

The Blackwell Encyclopedia of Sociology

Edited by
George Ritzer



THE BLACKWELL ENCYCLOPEDIA OF SOCIOLOGY

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Introduction

The origins of sociology are usually traced back to 1839 and the coining of the term by Auguste Comte, one of the important thinkers in the history of the discipline. However, others trace intellectual concern for sociological issues much further back, and it could be argued that scholars (and non scholars) have been thinking sociologically since the early history of human kind. However, it was not until about a half century after Comte's creation of the concept that sociology began to develop as a formal and clearly distinct discipline, primarily, at least at first, in Europe and the United States. It was another French thinker, Émile Durkheim, who in the late 1800s was responsible for distinguishing clearly the subject matter of sociology from neighboring fields. Sociology became institutionalized in France (thanks, importantly, to Durkheim's efforts), as well as in Germany, Great Britain, and the United States. While sociology in the United States did not take the early lead in the development of key ideas and theories, it did move strongly in the direction of institutionalization (as did sociology in other nations, especially Great Britain). Sociology has grown enormously in the one hundred plus years since the work of Durkheim and the early institutionalization of the field and is today a truly globe straddling discipline. The sociological literature is now huge and highly diverse, and is growing exponentially. Journals, and therefore journal articles, devoted to sociology and its many subfields have proliferated rapidly, as has the number of books devoted to sociological topics. This is part of a broader issue identified by another early leader in sociology, Georg Simmel, who was concerned with the increasing gap between our cultural products and our ability to comprehend them. Sociology is one of those cultural products and this encyclopedia is devoted to the goal of allowing interested readers to gain a better understanding of it.

FRAMING THE *ENCYCLOPEDIA OF SOCIOLOGY*

The magnitude and the diversity of the sociological literature represent a challenge to a wide range of people scholars and students in sociology and closely related disciplines (some of which were at one time part of sociology) such as criminology, social work, and urban studies; in all of the other social sciences; and in many other disciplines. More generally, many others, including secondary school students and interested laypeople, often need to gain a sense not only of the discipline in general, but also of a wide range of specific topics and issues in the domain of sociology. Journalists and documentary filmmakers are others who frequently seek out ideas and insights from sociology. This encyclopedia gathers together in one place state of the art information on, and analyses of, much of what constitutes contemporary sociology.

While plans are already in place to revise this project in various ways, we have sought to make it as complete as possible at this point. Several approaches have been used to ensure that it is as inclusive as possible in terms of coverage.

First, there is the sheer number of essays – 1,786 in all. We began with the intention of having approximately 1,200 entries, but it quickly became clear that that was a gross underestimate. Rather than artificially set a limit, the number was allowed to grow to its current level. Often the submission of one entry led to the realization of the need to add others that had been omitted initially. Often, advisory editors, staff members, and authors came forth with suggestions, many of which were readily accepted. There were certainly suggestions and topics that we chose not to include for one reason or another, but in the main we usually erred on the side of inclusion rather than exclusion.

Second, an effort was made to cast a very wide net in terms of areas to be included. In the end, we came up with 35 such areas. It turned out that a majority of the entries that were recruited for a given area also fit into one or more – in some cases four or five – other areas. In order to clarify and simplify matters for readers, the original list of 35 areas was reduced to the 22 general categories that now form the organizational base of the Lexicon to be found soon after this introduction. The Lexicon represents the best way to get a quick overview of both sociology today and the contents of the encyclopedia (more on the Lexicon below).

Third, a wide and global search was conducted to find advisory editors to be placed in charge of each of the predefined areas. These are all luminaries in their respective areas and well known scholars. An effort was also made to make this a truly international board of advisory editors. As a result, there is a strong representation of editors from ten countries – Australia, Germany, Israel, Italy, Mexico, The Netherlands, New Zealand, Singapore, the United Kingdom, and the United States. This, in turn, helped to ensure that the authors of the entries would be from many different parts of the world. The following are among the many countries from which authors have been drawn: Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, China, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Ireland, Israel, Italy, Japan, The Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Portugal, Singapore, South Korea, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, the United Kingdom, the United States, and Zambia.

Fourth, as a result of the international diversity of editors and authors, the entries themselves are extraordinarily diverse. All, or virtually all, of the expected topics and people are included in these pages, especially given the transcontinental collaboration of an American editor (and editorial team) and a British based publisher. But the entries go far beyond that to include topics and people that are not typically included in a work like this emanating from the West and the North. This is truly a work that represents *global sociology*. While a major effort was made to be sure that there was representation from all parts of the world, there are certain to be omissions and oversights. One of the goals of both the online version and the next

edition will be to do an even better job of inclusion of authors and topics from throughout the world.

Another useful reference source found in this encyclopedia is the timeline of sociology. While this cannot cover everything that every one would consider of particular significance, it is a listing of over 700 of the most influential events, figures, and publications to have made an impact on the field. As with the entries themselves, the timeline covers a lot of ground both temporally (stretching back over 2,500 years) and geographically (ranging from the Philippines to Argentina to Poland and many places in between).

Another kind of diversity is reflected in the fact that legendary figures in the field of sociology (S. N. Eisenstadt, Thomas J. Scheff), contemporary leaders (Karin Knorr Cetina, Saskia Sassen, Linda D. Molm, Karen S. Cook, Roland Robertson, Chandra Mukerji, Gary Alan Fine), young scholars (Karen Bettez Halnon, Wendy A. Wiedenhof, Lloyd Cox), and even some graduate students (Elena Fazio, Kevin D. Vryan) are represented as authors in these pages. This diversity of authorship helped guarantee that the entries in this volume would range all the way from the expected “old chestnuts” to those on hot, new, cutting edge topics.

I should point out that I personally read, and in many cases re read (sometimes several times), all of the entries in this volume. Many went through two, three, or more rewrites and I read them all (as, in many cases, did the relevant advisory editors). I say that not because I am by any means an expert in all of the areas and topics covered here, but to make the point that all of the contributions were seriously reviewed, and from a uniform perspective. I tried my best to be sure that all of these entries were accurate, up to date, and of high quality.

As pointed out above, the overall design of this ambitious project can be gleaned from the Lexicon. First, a glance at the 22 broad headings gives the reader a sense of the great sweep of sociology that includes such diverse subfields as crime and deviance, demography/population, education, family, gender, health and medicine, media, politics, popular culture, race/ethnicity, religion, science, sexuality,

social psychology, social stratification, sport, and urbanization. Second, a more detailed examination of the topics listed under each of the broad headings in the Lexicon yields a further sense not only of that sweep, but also of the enormous depth of work in sociology. Thus, the coverage of the field in these volumes is both wide and deep. To take just one example, the crime and deviance category includes not only a general entry on crime, but also entries on such specific topics as capital punishment, child abuse, cybercrime, gangs, hate crimes, homicide, police, prisons, rape, victimization, and many more. To take another example, entries on the economy range all the way from major events (Industrial Revolution and the rise of post industrial society), theories (rational choice), and people (Karl Marx) to a wide array of other topics including money, occupations, poverty, wealth, shopping, super markets, and credit cards. Similar and often even greater depth is reflected in the lists of terms under most of the other headings in the Lexicon.

Sociology is a highly dynamic discipline that is constantly undergoing changes of various types and magnitudes. This greatly complicates getting a sense of the expanse of sociology. This is traceable to changes both within the field and in the larger social world that it studies.

In terms of changes in sociology, the encyclopedia includes many traditional concepts, such as primary groups, dyad and triad, norms, values, culture, and so on, but supplements these with a broad assortment of more recently coined and/or popularized concepts, such as distanciation and disembedding, glocalization, simulation, implosion, postsocial, actants, and imagined communities. Similarly, some key figures in the history of the discipline (e.g., Herbert Spencer) have receded in importance, while others have taken on new or renewed significance. For example, feminist theory has led to a rise in interest in the work of Marianne Weber, postmodernism and poststructuralism have led to a revival in interest in Friedrich Nietzsche, and growing interest in spatial issues has led to more attention to the ideas of Henri Lefebvre.

More generally, changes in the relative importance of various subareas in the discipline lead to increases (and decreases) in attention to

them. Among the areas that seem to be attracting greater interest are globalization (see below) as well as the sociology of consumption and sport. A significant number of entries in the encyclopedia can be included under one (or more) of these headings.

The entries included in the encyclopedia also reflect recent changes in the larger social world. For example, the study of cybercrime above is a relatively recent addition to the area of crime because the cyberspace in which it occurs is itself relatively new. Furthermore, new ways of engaging in criminal behavior on the Internet are constantly being invented. For example, a new crime has emerged that involves the sending of emails to large numbers of people around the world claiming that help is needed in transferring money from one country to another. In return, the email recipient is offered a significant share of the money. Those who respond with a willingness to help are eventually lured into transferring considerable sums to the sender of the emails in order, they are told, to help with the transfer by, for example, bribing officials. People have lost tens and even hundreds of thousands of dollars in such scams. While the perpetrators are hard to find, victims (especially in the US) are not and are subject to prosecution for illegal activities on their part (e.g., deceiving others in order to get needed funds).

A more general recent social change that is profoundly affecting sociology is globalization. This is clearly an emerging and multifaceted process that is dramatically altering the landscape of the world. Sociology (and many other disciplines including political science, international relations, and economics) has been compelled to deal with the process and its various aspects in many different ways. Thus, we have seen the emergence of various theories and methods devoted to dealing with this topic. Furthermore, the many different aspects and dimensions of the process of globalization have attracted the notice of sociologists (and other scholars). Much consideration has been paid to the economic dimensions of globalization, but there are myriad other aspects – social, cultural, political, and the like – that are also drawing increasing attention from sociologists. Thus, in addition to a general entry on globalization, this encyclopedia includes a number of more

specific entries on such issues as world cities, the global justice movement, and the globalization of sport, sexuality, and so on. Further such topics and issues will emerge as globalization as a process continues to evolve and develop. Sociology will respond by devoting attention to them.

By its very nature, sociology is also highly topical and its focus is often drawn to the most recent and publicly visible developments, events, and people. There are, of course, far too many of these to cover completely in these volumes, and in any case the topics covered are constantly changing with current events. However, in order to give a sense of this topicality, some of the most important such issues are covered here. For example, changes in science are dealt with under entries on cloning, genetic engineering, the measurement of risk, and technological innovation. Topical issues in health and medicine include AIDS, aging and health policy, stress and health, and exercise and fitness. A flavor of the many new topics in culture of interest to sociologists is offered here in entries on popular culture icons and forms, post modern culture, surveillance, and xenophobia.

The dynamic character of sociology makes it extremely interesting, but also very difficult to grasp in some general sense. Thus, it is useful to offer a definition of sociology, although the fact is that the complexity and diversity of the discipline have led to many different definitions and wide disagreement over precisely how to define it. While I recognize that it is one among many definitions, the following is a variant on one that I have employed previously in various contexts and is consistent with the thrust of most definitions in the discipline: *Sociology is the study of individuals, groups, organizations, cultures, societies, and transnational relationships and of the various interrelationships among and between them.*

Unpacking this definition gives us yet another way of gaining an impression of the field of sociology. On the one hand, it is clear that sociology spans the workings of a number of levels of analysis all the way from individuals to groups, organizations, cultures, societies, and transnational processes. On the other, sociology is deeply concerned with the interrelationship among and between all of those levels of analysis. Thus, at the extremes, one might be

concerned with the relationship between individuals and the transnational relationships involved in globalization. While globalization is certainly affecting individuals (for example, outsourcing is leading to the loss of jobs in some areas of the world and to the creation of others elsewhere around the globe), it is also the case that globalization is the outcome of the actions of various people (business leaders, politicians, workers). Sociology is attuned to such extreme micro (individual) and macro (global) relationships as well as everything in between. A slightly different way of saying this is that sociology is concerned, at its extremes, with the relationship between individual *agents* and the *structures* (e.g., of global transnational relationships) within which they exist and which they construct and are constantly reconstructing.

USING THE *ENCYCLOPEDIA OF SOCIOLOGY*

One way of gaining an impression of the expanse of sociology is, of course, to read *every* entry in this encyclopedia. Since few (save the editor) are likely to undertake such an enormous task, a first approach would be to scan the entire Lexicon and then select headings and terms of special interest. The reader could then begin building from there to encompass areas and topics of less direct and immediate interest.

However, readers without time to work their way through the entire encyclopedia would be well advised to focus on several rather general Lexicon entries: *Key Concepts*, *Key Figures*, *Theory*, and *Methods*. Let us look at each of these in a bit more detail.

In a sense the vast majority of entries in this encyclopedia are key concepts in sociology, but a large number of the most important and widely used concepts in the discipline have been singled out for inclusion under the heading of *Key Concepts*. An understanding of this range of ideas, as well as of the content of each, will go a long way toward giving the reader an appreciation of the field. For example, one can begin at the level of the individual with the ideas of *mind* and *self*, and then move through such concepts as *agency*, *interaction*, *everyday life*, *groups* (*primary* and *secondary*),

organizations, institutions, society, and globalization. This would give the reader a sound grasp of the scope of sociology, at least in terms of the extent of its concerns, all the way from individuals and their thoughts and actions to global relationships and processes. Readers could then work their way through the key concepts in a wide range of other ways and directions, but in the end they would emerge with a pretty good conception of the discipline.

A second way to proceed is through the topics under the heading of *Key Figures*. This is, in some ways, a more accessible way of gaining a broad understanding of the discipline because it ties key ideas to specific people and their biographical and social contexts. One could begin with Auguste Comte and the invention of the concept of sociology. One could then move forward to the development of sociology in France (especially the work of Émile Durkheim and his key role in the institutionalization of sociology in that country). One could then shift to the development of the field in other parts of the world, including Germany (Karl Marx, Max Weber, and Georg Simmel; Weber and Simmel were central to the institutionalization of sociology in Germany), Great Britain (Herbert Spencer), Italy (Vilfredo Pareto), the United States (Thorstein Veblen, George Herbert Mead), and similar developments could be traced in East Asia, Latin America, the Muslim world, as well as other parts of the globe. Another way to go is to move back in time from Comte to even earlier figures such as Ibn Khaldun and then push forward to later key figures such as W. E. B. Du Bois, Talcott Parsons, and Robert Merton (US), Michel Foucault and Pierre Bourdieu (France), Max Horkheimer, Theodor Adorno, and Marianne Weber (Germany), Karl Mannheim and Norbert Elias (Great Britain), although both were born in Germany), and so on. While we have restricted coverage in this encyclopedia to deceased key figures, it is also possible to gain a sense of the contributions of living key sociologists, either through entries written by them for these volumes (e.g., Immanuel Wallerstein, Thomas Scheff) or through innumerable topical entries that inevitably deal with their ideas. For example, the entry on structuration theory deals with one of the major

contributions of Anthony Giddens (Great Britain), simulacra and simulation is at the heart of Jean Baudrillard's work (France), globalization is closely associated with the work of Roland Robertson (also Great Britain), while ethnomethodology was "invented" by Harold Garfinkel (US).

All of those mentioned in the previous paragraph are theorists, but there are many other key figures in or associated with the discipline as well. One can read entries on these people and gain an understanding of specific areas in sociology, including demography (Kingsley Davis), race relations (E. Franklin Frazier), feminism (Charlotte Perkins Gilman), sexuality (Magnus Hirschfeld, Alfred Kinsey), gender (Mirra Komarovsky), media (Marshall McLuhan), urbanization (Lewis Mumford), crime (Edwin H. Sutherland), and many more.

A distinctive quality of sociology is that it has sets of elaborated theories and methods. Even though there is no overall agreement on which theory or method to use, they provide the keys to understanding the discipline as a whole. We have already encountered a number of theorists, but the encyclopedia is also loaded with broad discussions of both general theories and specific theoretical ideas. Among the more classical theories that are covered are structural functionalism, system theory, structuralism, Marxism and neo Marxism, critical theory, conflict theory, feminism, phenomenology, symbolic interactionism, labeling theory, role theory, dramaturgy, ethnomethodology, existential sociology, semiotics, psychoanalysis, behaviorism, social exchange theory, and rational choice theories. In addition, much attention is given to newer theories such as recent feminist theories, actor network theory, chaos theory, queer theory, expectation states theory, as well as a variety of the "posts" – postpositivism, poststructuralism, postsocial, and a range of postmodern perspectives.

The methods entries have similarly diverse coverage, which can be divided roughly into qualitative and quantitative methods. All are of varying degrees of utility in studying virtually any topic of concern in sociology. Among the notable qualitative methods covered are ethnography, autoethnography, performance ethnography, feminist methodology, visual methods,

verstehen, and participant and non participant observation. More quantitative methods covered include a variety of demographic techniques, experiments, social network analysis, and survey research. Also covered under the heading of methods is a wide range of statistical techniques. Finally, a series of broad methodological issues is dealt with, such as validity, reliability, objectivity, rapport, triangulation, and many others.

All of the above can be brought to bear on the 22 categories in the Lexicon. Thus, for example, another area covered here is the economy, especially consumption, and of relevance to a study of the latter might be the classical work of the theorist Thorstein Veblen, the concept of simulation, postmodern theory, and the use of ethnographic techniques.

Of course, since sociology is constantly expanding, so too are its key concepts, figures, theories, and methods. For example, globalization is, as we have seen, a relatively new issue and sociological concept. It is leading to a reconceptualization of the work of classical theorists (such as Marx and Weber) and of the relevance of their ideas (imperialism, rationalization) to globalization, the generation of a wide range of new concepts (e.g., glocalization, empire, McDonaldisation, time space distanciation) needed to get a handle on it, and theories (transnationalism, network society) and methods (quantitative cross national studies as well as methods that rely on data not derived from the nation state) appropriate to the study of global issues and processes. We can expect that in the coming years other new topics will come to the fore, with corresponding implications for how we think about the work of classical theorists as well as leading to the generation of new or revised concepts, theories, and methods.

STATE OF THE ART

It is safe to say that the *Blackwell Encyclopedia of Sociology* represents the largest and most complete, diverse, global, and up to date repository of sociological knowledge in the history of the discipline. It stands as a resource for professional sociologists, scholars in other

fields, students, and interested laypeople. Given the point made above about the continuing growth and expansion of the field, the bound, 11 volume version in which this introduction appears is just the beginning.

Thus, there will be an online version (www.sociologyencyclopedia.com) of the material represented here. Not only will this constitute another way of accessing the text, it will also make it clear that this encyclopedia is not a sociological “museum” but a living and lively work that will grow and change in the ensuing years. Bound volumes, especially encyclopedias, are not easy to update, but online versions lend themselves readily to change. New substantive topics can be added, as can new biographical sketches. Furthermore, extant entries can be updated and errors, should they have occurred, can be corrected. Thus, the online version of this encyclopedia will begin to grow and change almost as soon as it comes into existence.

In fact, although we were extremely successful in getting virtually all of the entries we recruited into the bound volumes before the publication deadline, there is a handful that, for one reason or another, did not arrive in time. Work continues on them and they will be among the first to be included among the additional entries in the online version.

Another obvious and early set of additions will flow from the decision to include only deceased sociologists (as well as scholars in many cognate fields whose work is closely related to sociology) in the encyclopedia. (This decision was made on the basis of the editor’s past experience with his *Encyclopedia of Social Theory* [Sage, 2005], in which the decision to include living theorists created great difficulties since, without the benefit of some history and hindsight, it was sometimes problematic to draw the line between those to be included and excluded.) In the few weeks since the deadline for the bound volumes of this encyclopedia has passed, several notable figures have died (Betty Friedan, John Kenneth Galbraith, Jane Jacobs). Their biographies will appear in the online version, which will be updated in this way regularly since, life being as it is, we can expect other luminaries to pass.

However, the intention of the editor and the publisher is that this hardback version will also be a living document in that it, too, will be revised. That revision will encompass any new additions made to the online version in the interim, but it will also involve other additions based on a full scale review of the volumes and reactions, solicited and unsolicited, from experts and readers.

Thus this encyclopedia can be seen as both an effort to define the field of sociology as it stands on the cusp of 2007 and a platform

for continually refining and expanding that definition as we go forward. Sociology is a living discipline and it requires a living encyclopedia to do it justice.

George Ritzer
Editor, Encyclopedia of Sociology

Distinguished University Professor,
University of Maryland
June 2006

Timeline

J. Michael Ryan

This timeline provides a listing of over 700 of the most influential events, figures, and publications to have made an impact on the field of sociology.

- 551–479 BCE Confucius theorizes life and society. His work is primarily known through the *Analects of Confucius*, compiled by his disciples posthumously
- 469–399 BCE Socrates lays the foundation of western philosophy
- 384–322 BCE Aristotle makes further contributions to western science and philosophy
- 360 BCE Plato debates the nature of ethics and politics in *Republic*
- 973–1048 CE Al Biruni, Abu Rayhan Muhammad ibn Ahmad
- 1332–1406 Ibn Khaldun, Abdel Rahman
- 1377 Ibn Khaldun writes *Muqaddimah*, which many consider one of the first important works in sociology
- 1516 Thomas More's *Utopia*, in which the term “utopia” is coined
- 1588–1679 Hobbes, Thomas
- 1637 René Descartes pronounces “cogito, ergo sum” (I think, therefore I am) in his *Discourse on Method*
- 1651 Thomas Hobbes's *Leviathan* discusses the requirement of surrender of sovereignty to the state needed to prevent a “war of all against all”
- 1689–1755 Montesquieu, Baron de
- 1692–3 Edmund Halley publishes the first life table
- 1712–78 Rousseau, Jean Jacques
- 1713 James Waldegrave introduces an early form of game theory
- 1723–90 Smith, Adam
- 1724–1804 Kant, Immanuel
- 1739 David Hume publishes *Treatise on Human Nature* advocating the study of humanity through direct observation rather than abstract philosophy
- 1748 Baron de Montesquieu argues that society is the source of all laws in *The Spirit of the Laws*
- 1759–97 Wollstonecraft, Mary
- 1760–1825 Saint Simon, Claude Henri
- 1762 Jean Jacques Rousseau publishes *The Social Contract*, which prioritizes contracts between people and the social will over government control
- 1764 Reverend Thomas Bayes's *Essay Towards Solving a Problem in the Doctrine of Chances*, published posthumously, contains a statement of his Bayes theorem, the foundation of Bayesian statistics
- 1766–1834 Malthus, Thomas Robert
- 1767 Adam Ferguson asserts that conflict between nations leads to solidarity and paves the way for civil society in *Essay on the Origin of Civil Society*
- 1770–1831 Hegel, G. W. F.
- 1772–1823 Ricardo, David
- 1775 American Revolution begins
- 1776 Thomas Paine's pamphlet *Common Sense* presents a commonsense critique of British monarchical rule over America
- 1776 Adam Smith discusses the invisible hand of capitalism in *An Inquiry into the Nature and Causes of the Wealth of Nations*
- 1781 Kant argues against the radical empiricism of Hume in *Critique of Pure Reason*

- 1788 Kant argues for the essence of free will in *Critique of Practical Reason*
- 1789 Jeremy Bentham develops the greatest happiness principle in *Introduction to the Principles of Morals and Legislation*, introducing a theory of social morals
- 1789 Condorcet coins the term “social science”
- 1789 French Revolution begins
- 1790 First US Census taken
- 1792 Wollstonecraft’s *A Vindication of the Rights of Woman*, an early feminist classic
- 1798 Malthus theorizes demographics with his *Essay on the Principle of Population*
- 1798–1857 Comte, Auguste
- 1801 First British Census taken
- 1802–76 Martineau, Harriet
- 1804–72 Feuerbach, Ludwig
- 1805–59 Tocqueville, Alexis de
- 1805 The method of least squares presented by Adrien Marie Legendre in *Nouvelles méthodes pour la détermination des orbites des comètes* [*New Methods for Determining the Orbits of Comets*]
- 1806–73 Mill, John Stuart
- 1806–82 Le Play, Frédéric
- 1807 Hegel’s *Phenomenology of Mind*, a key source on Hegel’s idealism
- 1809–82 Darwin, Charles
- 1812–87 Mayhew, Henry
- 1817 Ricardo’s *The Principles of Political Economy and Taxation*, a classic in political economy laying out the advantages of free trade
- 1818–83 Marx, Karl
- 1820–95 Engels, Friedrich
- 1820–1903 Spencer, Herbert
- 1822–1911 Galton, Francis
- 1832–1917 Tylor, Sir Edward Burnett
- 1833–1911 Dilthey, William
- 1834 Statistical Society of London (later Royal Statistical Society) founded
- 1835–82 Jevons, William
- 1835–1909 Lombroso, Cesare
- 1835 Adolphe Quételet authors *Sur l’homme et le développement de ses facultés, ou Essai de physique sociale* [*On Man and the Development of his Faculties, an Essay on Social Physics*] outlining his ideas of “the average man,” a statistical denotation of the mean values of measured variables
- 1837 Hegel’s *Philosophy of History*, a dialectical analysis of the goal of human history
- 1837 Martineau’s *Society in America*, an early sociological classic based on the author’s travels through America
- 1838–1909 Gumplowicz, Ludwig
- 1839 Comte coins the term “sociology”
- 1839 American Statistical Association founded
- 1840 Tocqueville offers early insight into the United States in *Democracy in America*
- 1840–1902 Krafft Ebing, Richard von
- 1840–1910 Sumner, William Graham
- 1840–1916 Booth, Charles
- 1841–1913 Ward, Lester Frank
- 1842 Comte’s *Course in Positive Philosophy* lays out a positivistic approach
- 1842–1904 Ratzenhofer, Gustav
- 1842–1910 James, William
- 1843 Mill in *A System of Logic* says that science needs both inductive and deductive reasoning

- 1843–1904 Tarde, Gabriel
- 1844 Marx's early humanistic thinking is laid out in *Economic and Philosophic Manuscripts of 1844* (not published until 1932)
- 1844–1900 Nietzsche, Friedrich
- 1846 Marx authors *The German Ideology*, proposing a methodology of historical materialism
- 1848 Marx and Engels inspire the masses and call for revolution with the *Communist Manifesto*
- 1848 Mill debates the principles of socialism in his *Principles of Political Economy*
- 1848–1923 Pareto, Vilfredo
- 1849–1928 Howard, George Elliott
- 1850 Spencer introduces his ideas of social structure and change in *Social Statics*
- 1851 Feuerbach's *Lectures on the Essence of Religion*
- 1851 The Crystal Palace opens during first World's Fair in London
- 1854–1926 Small, Albion W.
- 1854–1932 Geddes, Sir Patrick
- 1854–1941 Frazer, Sir James
- 1855–1936 Tönnies, Ferdinand
- 1855 Le Play authors *Les Ouvriers européens*, a series of 36 monographs on the budgets of typical families selected from diverse industries
- 1856–1939 Freud, Sigmund
- 1857 In Britain, the Society of the Study of Social Problems is created
- 1857–1913 Saussure, Ferdinand de
- 1857–1929 Veblen, Thorstein
- 1857–61 Marx lays the groundwork for his later work on political economy and capitalism in *Grundrisse: Foundations of the Critique of Political Economy*
- 1857–84 The National Association for the Promotion of Social Science operates in Britain
- 1857–1936 Pearson, Karl
- 1858–1917 Durkheim, Émile
- 1858–1918 Simmel, Georg
- 1858–1922 Sarasvati, Pandita Ramabai
- 1858–1941 Mosca, Gaetano
- 1858–1942 Boas, Franz
- 1858–1943 Webb, Beatrice
- 1858–1916 Kidd, Benjamin
- 1859 Charles Darwin writes about evolution through natural selection in *The Origin of Species*
- 1859–1939 Ellis, Havelock
- 1859–1952 Dewey, John
- 1859–1938 Husserl, Edmund
- 1860–1935 Addams, Jane
- 1860–1935 Gilman, Charlotte Perkins
- 1861–96 Rizal, José
- 1863–1931 Mead, George Herbert
- 1863–1941 Sombart, Werner
- 1863–1945 Spearman, Charles Edward
- 1863–1947 Thomas, William I.
- 1864–1920 Weber, Max
- 1864–1929 Cooley, Charles Horton
- 1864–1929 Hobhouse, L. T.
- 1864–1944 Park, Robert E.
- 1866–1951 Ross, Edward Alsworth

- 1867 Marx publishes one of the greatest insights into capitalism with *Capital*, Vol. 1: *A Critique of Political Economy*
- 1868–1935 Hirschfeld, Magnus
- 1868–1963 Du Bois, W. E. B.
- 1869–1940 Goldman, Emma
- 1870–1954 Weber, Marianne
- 1870–1964 Pound, Roscoe
- 1871–1919 Luxemburg, Rosa
- 1871–1954 Rowntree, Benjamin Seebohm
- 1873 Spencer's *Study of Sociology* becomes the first book used as a text to teach sociology in the United States, although no formal sociology class yet exists
- 1875–1962 Yanagita, Kunio
- 1876–96 Spencer writes his three volume work on *Principles of Sociology*
- 1876–1924 Gökalp, Ziya
- 1876–1936 Michels, Robert
- 1876–1937 Gosset, William Sealy
- 1876–1958 Beard, Mary Ritter
- 1877–1945 Halbwachs, Maurice
- 1877 Galton introduces the statistical phenomenon of regression and uses this term, although he originally termed it “reversion”
- 1879–1963 Beveridge, William Henry
- 1881–1955 Radcliffe Brown, Alfred R.
- 1882–1958 Znaniecki, Florian
- 1882–1970 MacIver, Robert
- 1883–1950 Schumpeter, Joseph A.
- 1883–1972 Takata, Yasuma
- 1884 Engels argues that women are subordinated by society, not biology, in *The Origins of the Family, Private Property, and the State*
- 1884–1942 Malinowski, Bronislaw K.
- 1885–1971 Lukács, Georg
- 1886 Krafft Ebing publishes *Psychopathia Sexualis*, one of the first systematic studies of sexuality
- 1886 Sarasvati authors *The High Caste Hindu Woman*, raising public consciousness about the plight of Hindu women and marking the beginning of family and kinship studies in India
- 1886–1964 Polanyi, Karl
- 1886–1966 Burgess, Ernest W.
- 1887 Tönnies's *Gemeinschaft und Gesellschaft* introduces his concepts of the same name
- 1887 Rizal publishes his first novel, *Noli Me Tangere* [*Touch Me Not*], describing the problems of Filipino society and blaming Spanish colonial rule
- 1887–1949 Sarkar, Benoy Kumar
- 1889 Charles Booth publishes his pioneering study of London poverty as *Life and Labour of the People of London*
- 1889–1968 Sorokin, Pitirim A.
- 1889–1976 Heidegger, Martin
- 1890 William James's *Principles of Psychology* is an early scientific work in psychology noted for its emphasis on the self
- 1890 Tarde distinguishes between the imitative and inventive in *Laws of Imitation*
- 1890 The first course in sociology is taught at the University of Kansas in Lawrence
- 1890 Sir James Frazer authors *The Golden Bough*, a comparative study of mythology and religion
- 1890–1947 Lewin, Kurt

- 1890–1962 Fisher, Sir Ronald Aylmer
- 1891 The first department of sociology and history is founded at the University of Kansas in Lawrence
- 1891 Walter Francis Wilcox's *The Divorce Problem: A Study in Statistics*
- 1891–1937 Gramsci, Antonio
- 1892 Small founds first major Department of Sociology at the University of Chicago
- 1892–1940 Benjamin, Walter
- 1893 Durkheim discusses the transition from mechanical to organic solidarity in *The Division of Labor in Society*
- 1893 New Zealand becomes the first country in the world to grant women the right to vote
- 1893 The first journal of sociology, *Revue Internationale de Sociologie*, is edited by René Worms in Paris
- 1893 The first sociological society, the Institut International de Sociologie, is founded in France
- 1893 Pearson introduces the term “standard deviation”
- 1893–1947 Mannheim, Karl
- 1893–1950 Sutherland, Edwin H.
- 1893–1956 Johnson, Charles Spurgeon
- 1893–1981 Marshall, Thomas Humphrey
- 1894 Kidd publishes *Social Evolution*, setting forth his ideas about the constant strife between individual and public interest
- 1894–1956 Kinsey, Alfred
- 1894–1962 Frazier, E. Franklin
- 1894–1966 Suzuki, Eitaro
- 1895 Durkheim presents a methodological foundation for sociology in *Rules of the Sociological Method*
- 1895 The first large scale census of the German Empire is taken
- 1895 The first Department of Sociology in Europe is founded by Durkheim at the University of Bordeaux
- 1895 The Fabians found the London School of Economics (LSE)
- 1895 The *American Journal of Sociology* (*AJS*) is begun by Albion Small
- 1895 Nietzsche attacks sociology in *Twilight of the Idols*
- 1895–1973 Horkheimer, Max
- 1895–1988 Mendieta y Núñez, Lucio
- 1895–1990 Mumford, Lewis
- 1896–1988 Kurauchi, Kazuta
- 1897 Durkheim uses *Suicide* to demonstrate how even the most seemingly individual of acts still has a basis in the social
- 1897 *Rivista Italiana di Sociologia* appears in Italy
- 1897–1957 Reich, Wilhelm
- 1897–1962 Bataille, Georges
- 1897–1990 Elias, Norbert
- 1898 Durkheim founds the journal *L'Année Sociologique* (later *Annales de Sociologie*)
- 1898–1970 Warner, William Lloyd
- 1898–1979 Marcuse, Herbert
- 1899 Veblen develops his idea of conspicuous consumption in *The Theory of the Leisure Class*
- 1899 Du Bois's *The Philadelphia Negro: A Social Study* is one of the first urban ethnographies
- 1899–1959 Schütz, Alfred
- 1899–1960 Becker, Howard

- 1899–1977 Thomas, Dorothy Swain
- 1900 Freud introduces his early principles of psychoanalysis in *Interpretation of Dreams*
- 1900 Husserl lays the groundwork of phenomenology in *Logical Investigations*
- 1900 Simmel discusses the tragedy of culture in *The Philosophy of Money*
- 1900 Pearson introduces the chi squared test and the name for it in an article in the *London, Edinburgh, and Dublin Philosophical Magazine and Journal of Science*
- 1900–80 Fromm, Erich
- 1900–87 Blumer, Herbert
- 1901 E. A. Ross authors *Social Control*, in which he analyzes societal stability in terms of sympathy, sociability, and social justice
- 1901–74 Cox, Oliver Cromwell
- 1901–76 Lazarsfeld, Paul
- 1901–78 Mead, Margaret
- 1901–81 Lacan, Jacques
- 1901–91 Lefebvre, Henri
- 1902 Cooley's *Human Nature and Social Order* is an early classic that influenced symbolic interactionism, noted for its emphasis on the "looking glass self"
- 1902 Ebenezer Howard inspires urban reform with his *Garden Cities of To morrow*
- 1902 Durkheim becomes the first Professor of Sociology in Europe with his appointment to a position at the Sorbonne
- 1902 The United States Census Bureau is founded
- 1902–79 Parsons, Talcott
- 1902–85 Braudel, Fernand
- 1902–92 Imanishi, Kinji
- 1903 Du Bois introduces the concepts of the veil and double consciousness in *The Souls of Black Folk*
- 1903 The LSE houses the first British Department of Sociology
- 1903 Durkheim and his nephew Marcel Mauss's *Primitive Classification* shows the basis of classification in the social world rather than the mind
- 1903 Formation of the Sociological Society in London; operates on a UK wide basis
- 1903–69 Adorno, Theodor W.
- 1903–96 Bernard, Jessie
- 1904 Robert Park's *The Crowd and the Public* is an early contribution to the study of collective behavior
- 1904 Contingency tables introduced by Pearson in "On the Theory of Contingency and its Relation to Association and Normal Correlation," which appeared in *Drapers' Company Research Memoirs Biometric Series I*
- 1904 Spearman develops rank correlation
- 1904–33 *Archiv fur Sozialwissenschaft und Sozialpolitik* founded by Max Weber, Werner Sombart, and Edgar Jaffé; it was shut down when the Nazis took power
- 1904–80 Bateson, Gregory
- 1904–90 Skinner, Burrhus Frederic
- 1905 American Sociological Society (ASS) [later ASA] founded at a meeting held at Johns Hopkins University in Baltimore, Maryland
- 1905 Weber ties the rise of the capitalist spirit to Calvinism in *The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism*
- 1905–6 Lester Ward serves as the first President of the ASS
- 1905–80 Sartre, Jean Paul
- 1905–83 Aron, Raymond
- 1905–99 Komarovsky, Mirra
- 1906 First ASS meeting is held in Providence, Rhode Island
- 1906 Sombart's *Why Is There No Socialism in the United States?*

- 1906 Hobhouse publishes *Morals in Evolution: A Study in Comparative Ethics*
- 1906–75 Arendt, Hannah
- 1907 Hobhouse becomes the first Professor of Sociology at a British university, the LSE (although Edvard Westermarck had held the position part time a few weeks before Hobhouse)
- 1907 James’s *Pragmatism* helps set the stage for the rise of symbolic interactionism
- 1907 Eugenics Society founded in the UK
- 1908 Simmel publishes *Soziologie*, a wide ranging set of essays on various social phenomena
- 1908 *Sociological Review* founded
- 1908 William Sealy Gosset, who went by the pseudonym “student,” introduces the statistic z for testing hypotheses on the mean of the normal distribution in his paper “The Probable Error of a Mean” (*Biometrika*)
- 1908–86 Beauvoir, Simone de
- 1908–97 Davis, Kingsley
- 1908–2006 Galbraith, John Kenneth
- 1908– Lévi Strauss, Claude
- 1909 German Sociological Association founded with Tönnies serving as the first President
- 1909 Freud delivers first lectures on psychoanalysis in the US at Clark University
- 1909–2002 Riesman, David
- 1910 Addams’s *Twenty Years at Hull House* contains recollections and reflections of the social reformer and feminist
- 1910–89 Homans, George
- 1910–2003 Merton, Robert K.
- 1911 Frederick W. Taylor authors *The Principles of Scientific Management*, laying out his ideas of the same name
- 1911–63 Kuhn, Manford
- 1911–79 Germani, Gino
- 1911–80 McLuhan, Marshall
- 1911–2004 Riley, Matilda White
- 1912 Durkheim equates religion with the social in *The Elementary Forms of the Religious Life*
- 1912–96 Lemert, Edwin M.
- 1913 James Broadus Watson introduces the term “behaviorism”
- 1913 The first assembly line introduced in a Ford factory
- 1913–2003 Coser, Lewis
- 1914–18 World War I
- 1914–96 Maruyama, Masao
- 1914–2000 Whyte, William Foote
- 1915 Pareto’s *General Treatise on Sociology* is a major contribution to sociology by a thinker most associated with economics
- 1915 Sir Patrick Geddes authors *Cities in Evolution*, an essay on the growth of cities
- 1915–80 Barthes, Roland
- 1915–2005 Shanas, Ethel
- 1916 Saussure distinguishes between the signifier and the signified in *Course in General Linguistics*
- 1916–62 Mills, C. Wright
- 1916–72 Kent, Donald P.
- 1916–96 Strauss, Anselm
- 1916–2006 Jacobs, Jane
- 1917 Russian Revolution begins
- 1917 Sociology taught for the first time in India at Calcutta University

- 1917– Whyte, William H.
1918 Znaniecki and Thomas use multiple methods in *The Polish Peasant in Europe and America*
- 1918 Weber's lecture on "Science as Vocation"
1918 The first Chair in Sociology in Germany is established at the University of Frankfurt
- 1918 The phrase "analysis of variance" appears in Sir Ronald Aylmer Fisher's "The Causes of Human Variability" (*Eugenics Review*)
- 1918–22 Oswald Spengler's *Decline of the West* argues that the development of civilizations follows a recognizable series of repetitive rises and falls
- 1918–90 Althusser, Louis
1918–2002 Blau, Peter
1918– Tsurumi, Kazuko
- 1919 Sorokin's doctoral dissertation, *System of Sociology*, is published secretly after the Russian Revolution
- 1919 Hirschfeld opens the Institute for Sexual Research in Berlin
1919 The New School for Social Research is founded
1919 Takata Yasuma writes *Shakaigaku Genri* [*Treatise on Sociology*], in which he attempts a general sociological theory based on methodological individualism
- 1919 First Sociology Department in India formed at Bombay University
1919– Bell, Daniel
- 1920 Znaniecki becomes the first Chair in Sociology in Poland at the University of Poznan
- 1920–76 Braverman, Harry
1920–80 Gouldner, Alvin
1920–92 Bottomore, Thomas Burton
- 1921 Park and Burgess author *Introduction to the Science of Sociology*, the first major sociology textbook
- 1921–88 Williams, Raymond
1921–2002 Rawls, John
1921–2004 Duncan, Otis Dudley
1921–2006 Friedan, Betty
- 1922 Weber's *Economy and Society* is published in three volumes posthumously, introducing his comparative historical methodology
- 1922 Malinowski publishes *Argonauts of the Western Pacific*, in which he classifies ethnographic research into three parts based on complexity
- 1922 Social Science Research Council established in the US
- 1922–82 Goffman, Erving
1922–92 Rosenberg, Morris
1922–96 Kuhn, Thomas
1922–97 Castoriadis, Cornelius
1922– Casanova, Pablo González
- 1923 Lukács's *History and Class Consciousness* anticipates a more humanist interpretation of Marx; it is a key source on the concept of "reification"
- 1923 The Institute of Social Research, also known as the Frankfurt School, is founded
1923 Weber's *General Economic History* (published posthumously)
- 1923–2003 Kitsuse, John I.
1923– Eisenstadt, Shmuel N.
- 1924 Hisatoshi Tanabe founds Tokyo Shakaigaku Kenkyukai (Tokyo Society of Sociological Study)
- 1924 Sutherland presents the first systematic textbook study of crime in *Criminology*
1924 Hobhouse publishes *Social Development: Its Nature and Conditions*

- 1924–33 Elton Mayo conducts the Hawthorne Experiments on worker productivity and concludes that the very act of studying something can change it, a principle that has come to be known as the “Hawthorne effect”
- 1924–98 Lyotard, Jean François
- 1924– Berger, Joseph
- 1924– Pearlin, Leonard
- 1924– Stryker, Sheldon
- 1925 Mauss develops his theory of gift exchange in *The Gift*
- 1925 Halbwachs helps establish social memory studies with *The Social Frameworks of Memory*
- 1925 Park and Burgess invigorate urban sociology with *The City*
- 1925 Fisher’s *Statistical Methods for Research Workers* becomes a landmark text in the field of statistics
- 1925–61 Fanon, Franz
- 1925–82 Emerson, Richard M.
- 1925–86 Certeau, Michel de
- 1925–94 Liebow, Elliot
- 1925–95 Deleuze, Gilles
- 1925–95 Gellner, Ernst
- 1925– Bauman, Zygmunt
- 1925– Rex, John Arderne
- 1925– Touraine, Alain
- 1926–84 Foucault, Michel
- 1926–95 Coleman, James
- 1926–2002 Illich, Ivan
- 1926– Smith, Dorothy
- 1927 Heidegger’s *Being and Time* is an existentialist analysis of individuals’ relationship to modern society
- 1927 Znaniecki founds the Polish Sociological Institute
- 1927–40 Benjamin collects notes that later become *The Arcades Project*, an early classic on, among many other things, consumption sites
- 1927–98 Luhmann, Niklas
- 1927– Bellah, Robert
- 1927– Ichibangase, Yasuko
- 1927– Luckmann, Thomas
- 1928 William I. Thomas and Dorothy S. Thomas introduce the Thomas theorem – what humans perceive as real will be real in its consequences – in *The Child in America*
- 1928–2003 Hess, Beth
- 1928– Alatas, Syed Hussein
- 1928– Becker, Howard S.
- 1928– Chomsky, Noam
- 1928– Townsend, Peter Brereton
- 1929 Mannheim’s *Ideology and Utopia* elaborates his sociology of knowledge
- 1929 The Great Depression begins in the US and spreads to the rest of the world
- 1929 Robert S. Lynd and Helen M. Lynd conduct the Middletown studies
- 1929 k statistics are introduced by Sir Ronald Aylmer Fisher
- 1929–68 King, Jr., Martin Luther
- 1929– Baudrillard, Jean
- 1929– Berger, Peter
- 1929– Dahrendorf, Ralf
- 1929– Etzioni, Amitai
- 1929– Garfinkel, Harold

- 1929– Habermas, Jürgen
 1929– Scheff, Thomas Joel
 1929– Tilly, Charles
 1930 J. L. Moreno invents sociometry, the cornerstone of network analysis
 1930 Yanagita introduces his theory of *shukenron* (concentric area theory) in his book *Kagyuko [On Snails]*
 1930–89 Spence, Donald L.
 1930–92 Guattari, Félix
 1930–2002 Bourdieu, Pierre
 1930–2004 Derrida, Jacques
 1930– Wallerstein, Immanuel
 1931 The Sociology Department at Harvard is established by Sorokin
 1931 Population Association of America (PAA) founded
 1931 The term “factor analysis” introduced by Louis L. Thurstone in “Multiple Factor Analysis” (*Psychological Review*)
 1931–94 Debord, Guy
 1931– Cardozo, Fernando Henrique
 1931– Rorty, Richard
 1931– Tominaga, Ken’ichi
 1931– Yoshida, Tamito
 1932 Schütz’s *The Phenomenology of the Social World* introduces phenomenology into mainstream social theory
 1932– Hall, Stuart
 1932– Irigaray, Luce
 1932– Stavenhagen, Rodolfo
 1932– Virilio, Paul
 1933–77 Shariati, Ali
 1933–84 Milgram, Stanley
 1934 Mead develops ideas central to symbolic interactionism in *Mind, Self, and Society*
 1934 The term “confidence interval” coined by Jerzy Neyman in “On the Two Different Aspects of the Representative Method” (*Journal of the Royal Statistical Society*)
 1934 The F distribution tabulated by G. W. Snedecor in *Calculation and Interpretation of Analysis of Variance and Covariance*
 1934–92 Lorde, Audre
 1934– Gergen, Kenneth
 1934– Jameson, Fredric
 1935 Mannheim suggests a planned society in *Man and Society in an Age of Reconstruction*
 1935 *American Sociological Review (ASR)* begins with Frank Hankins as editor
 1935 The term “null hypothesis” is used by Fisher in *The Design of Experiments*
 1935–75 Sacks, Harvey
 1935–91 Bonfil Batalla, Guillermo
 1935–2002 Sainsaulieu, Renaud
 1935–2003 Faletto, Enzo
 1935–2003 Said, Edward W.
 1935– Wilson, William Julius
 1936 John Maynard Keynes introduces his economic theory in *General Theory of Employment, Interest, and Money*
 1936–79 Poulantzas, Nicos
 1937 Parsons helps bring European theory to the United States in *The Structure of Social Action*
 1937 Mass Observation research unit set up by Tom Harrison, Charles Madge, and Humphrey Jennings

- 1937– Lemert, Charles
- 1937– Mita, Munesuke
- 1937– Willer, David
- 1938 Skinner’s *The Behavior of Organisms* is a major contribution to psychological behaviorism
- 1938 *Journal of Marriage and the Family* founded
- 1938–2002 Nozick, Robert
- 1938– Giddens, Anthony
- 1938– Robertson, Roland
- 1939 Elias develops his figurational sociology in *The Civilizing Process*
- 1939–45 World War II
- 1939–2004 Lechner, Norbert
- 1939– Burke, Peter J.
- 1940–91 Fajnzylber, Fernando
- 1940– Ritzer, George
- 1940– Komai, Hiroshi
- 1941 Kinji Imanishi publishes *Seibutsu no Sekai* [*The World of Living Things*], which is a philosophical statement of his views on the origins and interactions of organisms with their environment and development of the biosphere
- 1941 William Lloyd Warner authors *The Social Life of a Modern Community*, the first volume in the “Yankee City” series
- 1941– Collins, Randall
- 1941– Kristeva, Julia
- 1942 Schumpeter’s *Capitalism, Socialism, and Democracy*, best known for the idea of “creative destruction” in capitalism
- 1942 William Henry Beveridge publishes *Social Insurance and Allied Services*, known as the Beveridge Report, establishing the foundations for the welfare state
- 1942–2004 Anzaldúa, Gloria
- 1942– Bartra, Roger
- 1942– Castells, Manuel
- 1942– Turner, Jonathan
- 1943 Sartre further develops existentialism in *Being and Nothingness*
- 1943 William Foote Whyte’s *Street Corner Society* is a classic ethnography on street corner life in Boston
- 1943 The statistical P value is discussed in *Statistical Adjustment of Data* by W. E. Deming
- 1943– Ahmed, Akbar S.
- 1943– Hartsock, Nancy
- 1944 Polanyi’s *The Great Transformation* discusses issues of socialism, free trade, and the Industrial Revolution
- 1944– Beck, Ulrich
- 1944– Brunner, José Joaquín
- 1944– Chodorow, Nancy
- 1944– Haraway, Donna
- 1944– Inagami, Takashi
- 1945 Kingsley Davis and Wilbert Moore lay the groundwork for stratification in “Some Principles of Stratification” (*ASR*)
- 1945 United Nations founded
- 1945– Turner, Bryan
- 1946 Parsons establishes the Department of Social Relations at Harvard
- 1946– Cook, Karen S.
- 1946– Huat, Chua Beng

- 1946– Plummer, Kenneth
 1946– Wuthnow, Robert
 1947 Kinsey Institute founded at Indiana University at Bloomington
 1947 Horkheimer and Adorno criticize the Enlightenment in *The Dialectic of Enlightenment*
 1947– Alexander, Jeffrey
 1947– Latour, Bruno
 1947– Wright, Erik Olin
 1948 Alfred Kinsey, Wardell Pomeroy, and Clyde Martin revolutionize the way many think about sexuality with *The Sexual Behavior of the Human Male*
 1948 E. Franklin Frazier is elected the first black President of the ASS
 1948 Oliver Cromwell Cox authors his famous analysis in *Caste, Class, and Race*
 1948–2002 Rosenfeld, Rachel
 1948– Collins, Patricia Hill
 1948– Molm, Linda
 1948– Shimazono, Susumu
 1948– Ueno, Chizuko
 1949 Lévi Strauss helps develop structuralist thinking with his *The Elementary Structures of Kinship*
 1949 Merton's *Social Theory and Social Structure* appears, the first edition of a classic collection of essays
 1949 Simone de Beauvoir challenges the traditional concept of “woman” in *The Second Sex*
 1949 International Sociological Association founded with Louis Wirth serving as the first President
 1949 Stouffer et al., *The American Soldier: Adjustment During Army Life*, Vol. 1, is a major empirical study of the American military
 1949– Bhabha, Homi
 1949– Žižek, Slavoj
 1950 David Reisman, Nathan Glazer, and Reuel Denney develop inner and other directedness in *The Lonely Crowd*
 1950– Fine, Gary Alan
 1951 C. Wright Mills offers an analysis of working life in the United States in *White Collar*
 1951 Parsons furthers his structural functional theory in *The Social System*
 1951 Parsons develops action theory in *Toward a General Theory of Action*
 1951 Society for the Study of Social Problems (SSSP) founded in the United States
 1951 SSSP begins publishing journal *Social Problems*
 1951 British Sociological Association is founded
 1951 Asch experiments are published demonstrating the power of group conformity
 1951 Arendt's *The Origins of Totalitarianism* is a classic work in political theory, especially totalitarianism
 1951 Indian Sociological Society founded at Bombay
 1951– DiMaggio, Paul
 1952 International Social Science Council established
 1952 *Current Sociology*, an official journal of the International Sociological Association, is launched
 1952 American Psychiatric Association publishes first edition of the *Diagnostic and Statistical Manual (DSM)*
 1952 Dorothy Swain Thomas is elected the first female President of the ASS
 1952 *Sociological Bulletin* first published at Bombay University
 1952– Bianchi, Suzanne

- 1953 Skinner's *Science and Human Behavior* is a further contribution to psychological behaviorism
- 1953 Ludwig Wittgenstein's ideas of language games are presented in his work *Philosophical Investigations*
- 1954 Abraham Maslow makes famous his hierarchy of needs in *Motivation and Personality*
- 1954 Manford Kuhn and Thomas McPartland lay the groundwork for structural symbolic interactionism in "An Empirical Investigation of Self Attitudes" (*ASR*)
- 1954 The United States Supreme Court decision in *Brown v. Board of Education of Topeka, Kansas* ends officially sanctioned segregation in that country
- 1955 L. J. Moreno's *Sociometry* is a major contribution to social psychology
- 1955 Gino Germani's *Estructura Social de la Argentina* [*The Social Structure of Argentina*] uses empirical data from the Argentinian national census of 1947 to analyze contemporary Argentina
- 1956 Mills argues that there has been a convergence of economic, political, and military power and that members of this elite largely share a common social background in *The Power Elite*
- 1956 Dahrendorf's *Class and Class Conflict in Industrial Society* becomes a central work in conflict theory
- 1956 Coser integrates a Simmelian approach with structural functionalism in the *Functions of Social Conflict*
- 1956– Butler, Judith
- 1956– Markovsky, Barry
- 1957 Barthes helps develop semiology in *Mythologies*
- 1957 Chomsky revolutionizes the field of linguistics and helps spark the cognitive revolution with *Syntactic Structures*
- 1957 Richard Hoggart's *The Uses of Literacy* is an early contribution and exemplification of the Birmingham School
- 1957 Maruyama Masao writes *Denken in Japan* [*Japanese Thought*], which still serves as a reference point for ongoing debates on the intellectual development of modern Japan
- 1957 Michael Young and Peter Willmott author *Family and Kinship in East London*, exploring changes in kinship networks and contacts of families in East London as they are affected by urban change
- 1958 Galbraith challenges the idea of consumer sovereignty in *The Affluent Society*
- 1958 Homans's article "Social Behavior as Exchange" (*AJS*) develops his notion of exchange theory
- 1958 Raymond Williams presents his first major analysis of culture in *Culture and Society*
- 1959 Karl Popper's *The Logic of Scientific Discovery* argues that scientific results can never be proven, merely falsified
- 1959 Mills critiques structural functionalism in *The Sociological Imagination*, also introducing his concept of the same name
- 1959 Goffman's early statement on dramaturgy is developed in *The Presentation of Self in Everyday Life*
- 1959 Thibaut and Kelley's *The Social Psychology of Groups* is an early psychological contribution to exchange theory
- 1959 ASS changes its name to the American Sociological Association (ASA)
- 1960 *Journal of Health and Social Behavior* (*JHSB*) founded
- 1960 Morris Janowitz's *The Professional Soldier: A Social and Political Portrait*
- 1960 Alvin Gouldner's "The Norm of Reciprocity: A Preliminary Statement" (*ASR*)
- 1960 Margarey Stacey authors her first major work, *Tradition and Change: A Study of Banbury*
- 1961 Homans further develops his exchange theory in *Social Behavior: Its Elementary Forms*

- 1961 Fanon's *The Wretched of the Earth* is a powerful influence on revolutionary movements
- 1961 Goffman introduces the idea of a total institution in *Asylums: Essays on the Social Situation of Mental Patients and Other Inmates*
- 1961 Jane Jacobs analyzes urban culture in *The Death and Life of Great American Cities*
- 1961 *International Journal of Comparative Sociology* founded
- 1962 Richard Emerson introduces his first major statement on exchange theory in "Power Dependence Relations" (*ASR*)
- 1962 Thomas Kuhn in *The Structure of Scientific Revolutions* offers a revolutionary rather than evolutionary theory of scientific change
- 1962 Habermas's *The Structural Transformation of the Public Sphere* is an important early contribution to current debate on civil society
- 1962 Herbert Gans's *Urban Villagers* is a classic in urban sociology
- 1963 Goffman publishes *Stigma*, one of the first major works in labeling theory
- 1963 Betty Friedan's *The Feminine Mystique* marks the beginning of the second wave of feminism for many
- 1963 Australian Sociological Association founded (originally known as the Sociological Association of Australia and New Zealand)
- 1963 Stanley Milgram's experiments are outlined in his article "Behavioral Study of Obedience" (*Journal of Abnormal and Social Psychology*)
- 1963 *Demography* journal founded by Donald Bogue
- 1963 S. N. Eisenstadt presents analytic tools helpful for cultural comparison in *The Political Systems of Empires*
- 1963 European Fertility Project begun by Ansley Coale
- 1963 First issue of *Sociology of Education* published
- 1963 Nathan Glazer and Daniel P. Moynihan's *Beyond the Melting Pot* is known for its focus on assimilation
- 1963 Martin Luther King, Jr. delivers his "I Have a Dream" speech in Washington, DC
- 1963 Becker's *Outsiders: Studies in the Sociology of Deviance* is a key document in the sociology of deviance, especially labeling theory
- 1964 Blau's major integrative statement in exchange theory is laid out in *Exchange and Power in Social Life*
- 1964 McLuhan discusses the global village in *Understanding Media: The Extensions of Man*
- 1964 Marcuse publishes *One Dimensional Man: Studies in the Ideology of Advances in Industrial Society*, outlining what he sees as society's destructive impact on individuals
- 1964 Center for Contemporary Cultural Studies founded under the leadership of Richard Hoggart at the University of Birmingham, UK
- 1964 Aaron V. Cicourel's *Method and Measurement in Sociology*
- 1965 Social Science Research Council established in the UK (name changed to Economic and Social Research Council in 1983)
- 1965 Foucault argues that the madman has taken the place of the leper in *Madness and Civilization*
- 1965 *Australian and New Zealand Journal of Sociology* founded (later changed to *Journal of Sociology* in 1998)
- 1966 William Masters and Virginia Johnson further research into human sexuality in *Human Sexual Response*
- 1966 Berger and Luckmann further develop social constructionism in *The Social Construction of Reality: A Treatise in the Sociology of Knowledge*
- 1966 Scheff's *Being Mentally Ill: A Sociological Theory* becomes a major work in studies of mental illness, social constructionism, and labeling theory

- 1966 George McCall and J. L. Simmons help popularize identity theory in *Identities and Interactions*
- 1967 Derrida's *On Grammatology* becomes a central text in the emerging area of poststructuralism
- 1967 Debord criticizes both the media and consumption in *Society of the Spectacle*
- 1967 Garfinkel's *Studies in Ethnomethodology* develops the field of the same name
- 1967 *Sociology*, the official journal of the British Sociological Association, is founded
- 1967 Barney Glaser and Anselm Strauss's *The Discovery of Grounded Theory: Strategies for Qualitative Research* introduces their theory of the same name
- 1967 Liebow's *Tally's Corner: A Study of Negro Streetcorner Men* is an important ethnographic study carried out in Washington, DC
- 1967 Gans's *The Levittowners* is another classic ethnography, this time in a paradigmatic suburban development
- 1967 Otis Dudley Duncan authors *The American Occupational Structure*, detailing how parents transmit their societal status to their children
- 1968 Student revolts begin in Paris and spread throughout Europe
- 1968 Paul Ehrlich's *The Population Bomb* issues an early, perhaps overheated, warning about the population explosion
- 1968 John Goldthorpe, David Lockwood, Frank Bechhofer, and Jennifer Platt, in *The Affluent Worker: Industrial Attitudes and Behavior*, argue that the growing affluence of sections of the working class in Britain does not entail the end of class division, but that class remains a central feature of British life even in a prosperous, consumer society
- 1968 *Chinese Sociology and Anthropology* founded
- 1969 Blumer gives one of the first systematic statements of symbolic interactionism in *Symbolic Interactionism: Perspectives and Methods*
- 1969 Althusser lays the groundwork of structural Marxism in *For Marx*
- 1969 Native Americans take over Alcatraz Island in California, launching their civil rights movement
- 1969 The gay rights movement is launched during the Stonewall Riots in New York City
- 1969 Faletto and Cardoso author *Dependencia y Desarrollo en América Latina* [*Dependency and Development in Latin America*], which attempts to systematize an interpretive model of economic development in Latin America
- 1970 Students protesting the American invasion of Cambodia are shot by National Guardsmen at Kent State University in Kent, Ohio, setting off a wave of student strikes across the United States
- 1970 Gouldner critiques trends in sociology, especially structural functionalism, in *The Coming Crisis of Western Sociology*
- 1970 Baudrillard's *Consumer Society: Myths and Structures* becomes a classic text in the study of consumption
- 1970 Thomas S. Szasz launches a critique of psychiatry in *The Manufacture of Madness: A Comparative Study of the Inquisition and the Mental Health Movement*
- 1970 The first Women's Studies Program in the United States opens at San Diego State College
- 1970 Phillip Slater's *The Pursuit of Loneliness* discusses individualism, isolation, loneliness, and hyperconsumption circa the 1960s
- 1970 Fajnzylber publishes his first important work, *Sistema Industrial y Exportación de Manufacturas: Análisis de la Experiencia Brasileña* [*The Industrial System and Manufactured Goods: An Analysis of the Brazilian Experience*]
- 1971 Habermas presents a prehistory of modern positivism with the intention of analyzing knowledge constitutive interests in control, understanding, and emancipation in *Knowledge and Human Interests*

- 1971 Antonio Gramsci's *Prison Notebooks* are published, making his ideas, including hegemony, better known
- 1971 Phillip Zimbardo conducts his famous prison experiments at Stanford
- 1971 Sociologists for Women in Society (SWS) founded
- 1971 William Ryan's *Blaming the Victim* appears; the title becomes a catchphrase to describe placing blame on victims rather than on perpetrators
- 1972 The First General Social Survey (GSS) is taken
- 1972 The destruction of the Pruitt Igoe housing complex in St. Louis marks the end of the modernist reign for some postmodernists
- 1972 *Journal on Armed Forces and Society* founded
- 1972 *Philippine Sociological Review* founded
- 1973 Baudrillard challenges Marx in *The Mirror of Production*
- 1973 Clifford Geertz introduces his notion of "thick descriptions" in *The Interpretation of Cultures*
- 1973 David Rosenhan questions taken for granted notions of sanity and insanity in "On Being Sane in Insane Places" (*Science*)
- 1973 The United States Supreme Court decision in *Roe v. Wade* gives women the right to choose in issues of abortion
- 1973 Mark Granovetter's "The Strength of Weak Ties" (*AJS*) introduces his concept of the same name
- 1973 Bell's *The Coming of Post Industrial Society* documents and anticipates dramatic social change
- 1974 Immanuel Wallerstein develops world systems theory in the first of his three volume work, *The Modern World System*
- 1974 First issue of *Theory and Society* published
- 1974 Goffman's *Frame Analysis: An Essay on the Organization of Experience* introduces the influential idea of frames
- 1974 Glen Elder, Jr.'s *Children of the Great Depression* sets the stage for the development of the life course perspective
- 1974 The National Commission for the Protection of Human Subjects of Biomedical and Behavioral Research is established
- 1974 Henri Lefebvre brings spatial concerns to the forefront of social analysis in *The Production of Space*
- 1975 George Ritzer's *Sociology: A Multiple Paradigm Science* outlines the paradigmatic status of sociology and constitutes a contribution to metatheory
- 1975 Randall Collins develops a micro perspective on conflict theory in *Conflict Sociology: Toward an Explanatory Science*
- 1975 E. O. Wilson's *Sociobiology: A New Synthesis* is a key statement in the development of sociobiology
- 1975 Foucault outlines the history and theory of the carceral system in *Discipline and Punish: The Birth of the Prison*
- 1975 Foucault employs his idea of an archeology of knowledge in *The Birth of the Clinic: An Archeology of Medical Perception*
- 1975 Castoriadis's *The Imaginary Institution of Society* presents an interdisciplinary critique of contemporary capitalist societies, in part by formulating an alternative to both foundationalist social science and poststructural relativism
- 1975 Peter Singer's *Animal Liberation* becomes an important text in the animal rights movement
- 1975 *Canadian Journal of Sociology* founded
- 1976 Baudrillard argues that we can no longer engage in symbolic exchange in his *Symbolic Exchange and Death*
- 1976 Elijah Anderson's *A Place on the Corner* becomes a cornerstone of classical ethnography

- 1977 Bourdieu introduces habitus, field, and his constructivist structuralism in *Outline of a Theory of Practice*
- 1977 Albert Bandura's *Social Learning Theory* introduces the perspective of the same name
- 1977 James House's "The Three Faces of Social Psychology" (*Sociometry*) provides perspective for the field
- 1977 Joseph Berger, M. Hamit Fisek, Robert Norman, and Morris Zelditch's *Status Characteristics and Social Interaction: An Expectation States Approach* introduces the theory of the same name
- 1977 Richard Sennett's *The Fall of Public Man* demonstrates the impoverishment of the social world
- 1977 R. W. Connell's *Ruling Class, Ruling Culture: Studies of Conflict, Power, and Hegemony in Australian Life* deals with Australian class relations and culture
- 1977 Norbert Lechner urges Latin Americans to use political reflection as a guide to theoretical analysis in *La Crisis del Estado en América Latina*
- 1978 The publication of Edward Said's *Orientalism* is a foundational historical moment in the rise of postcolonial studies
- 1978 Derrida's *Writing and Difference* is another key contribution to poststructuralism
- 1978 Nancy Chodorow expands on Freud in *The Reproduction of Mothering: Psychoanalysis and the Sociology of Gender*
- 1978 The Society for Applied Sociology founded
- 1979 Roy Bhaskar authors *The Possibility of Naturalism: A Philosophical Critique of the Contemporary Human Sciences*, a cornerstone of critical realism
- 1979 Arlie Hochschild introduces the idea of emotional labor in "Emotion Work, Feeling Rules, and Social Structure"
- 1979 Lyotard's *The Postmodern Condition* declares war on the modern grand narrative and totalizations
- 1979 Bruno Latour and Steve Woolgar's *Laboratory Life: The Social Construction of Scientific Facts* introduces actor network theory (ANT)
- 1979 Rorty argues for a pragmatic philosophy in *Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature*
- 1979 Theda Skocpol's *States and Social Revolutions* makes the case for the importance of the state in social revolutions
- 1979 Morris Rosenberg broadens understandings of the self concept in *Conceiving the Self*
- 1979 Chinese Sociological Association is founded
- 1980 Foucault publishes the first of his three volume *The History of Sexuality*, which becomes a classic in poststructuralist and queer theories
- 1980 Stuart Hall's "Encoding/Decoding" appears in *Culture, Media, Language* and argues that audiences interpret the same television material in different ways
- 1980 Adrienne Rich introduces the lesbian continuum in "Compulsory Heterosexuality and the Lesbian Existence"
- 1980 Sheldon Stryker develops structural identity theory in *Symbolic Interactionism: A Social Structural Version*
- 1980 Ali Shariati publishes *On the Sociology of Islam*
- 1980 The Institute of Sociology of the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences founded
- 1981 Gary Becker authors *A Treatise on the Family*, a key text in the sociology of the family
- 1981 Alain Touraine outlines the techniques of "sociological intervention" in *The Voice and the Eye*
- 1981 Leonard Pearlín's "The Stress Process" (*JHSB*) outlines the concept of the same name
- 1981 Willer and Anderson's *Networks, Exchange and Coercion*
- 1981 First AIDS case reported in the United States

- 1982 First issue of *Theory, Culture, and Society* is published
- 1982 Luhmann's early work on systems theory is presented in *The Differentiation of Society*
- 1982 Margaret Archer's "Morphogenesis versus Structuration: On Combining Structure and Action" (*BJS*) makes the case for systems theory vs. structuration theory
- 1982–3 Jeffrey Alexander updates functionalism in his four volume *Theoretical Logic in Sociology*
- 1983 Karen Cook, Richard Emerson, Mary Gillmore, and Toshio Yamagishi further develop exchange theory in "The Distribution of Power in Exchange Networks: Theory and Experimental Results" (*AJS*)
- 1983 Baudrillard's *Simulations* introduces his famous concept of the same name
- 1983 Nancy Hartsock authors "The Feminist Standpoint: Developing the Ground for a Specifically Feminist Historical Materialism," a key contribution to standpoint theory
- 1983 Hochschild analyzes the emotional labor of airline attendants and bill collectors in *The Managed Heart: Commercialization of Human Feeling*
- 1983 First issue of *Sociological Theory* published
- 1983 Barry Wellman's contribution to network analysis in "Network Analysis: Some Basic Principles" (*Sociological Theory*)
- 1983 Melvin Kohn and Carmi Schooler's *Work and Personality: An Inquiry into the Impact of Social Stratification* is a key work on the relationship between class and work
- 1983 Paul DiMaggio and Walter Powell's "The Iron Cage Revisited: Institutional Isomorphism and Collective Rationality in Organizational Fields" will achieve the most cumulative citations in *ASR* history
- 1984 Anthony Giddens's most developed statement on structuration theory appears in *The Constitution of Society: Outline of the Theory of Structuration*
- 1984 Habermas develops his ideas of communicative rationality in *The Theory of Communicative Action, Vol. 1: Reason and the Rationalization of Society*
- 1984 Certeau's *The Practice of Everyday Life* accords great power to the agent
- 1984 Bourdieu's *Homo Academicus* is a study of academia from the author's distinctive theoretical perspective
- 1984 Bourdieu's *Distinction: A Social Critique of the Judgment of Taste*
- 1984 Luhmann develops his systems theory in *Social Systems*
- 1985 Gayatri Spivak's "Can the Subaltern Speak? Speculations on Widow Sacrifice" (*Wedge* 7/8) becomes a classic in postcolonial studies
- 1985 Deleuze and Guattari's *Anti Oedipus: Capitalism and Schizophrenia* makes an important contribution to poststructural/postmodern theory
- 1985 Jeffrey Alexander and Paul Colomy's "Toward Neo Functionalism" (*Sociological Theory*) develops the short lived theory of the same name
- 1985 Ernesto Laclau and Chantal Mouffe's *Hegemony and Socialist Strategy: Towards a Radical Democratic Politics* marks an important shift in neo Marxian theory
- 1985 *European Sociological Review* founded
- 1986 Ulrich Beck develops the notion of risk in *Risk Society: Towards a New Modernity*
- 1986 Lacan revises Freudian psychoanalysis in the context of Saussurean linguistics in *Écrits*
- 1986 Paul Virilio's *Speed and Politics* introduces the idea of speed through his notion of dromology
- 1986 *International Sociology* founded
- 1987 Dorothy Smith presents a phenomenological feminist critique in *The Everyday World as Problematic: A Feminist Sociology*
- 1987 Gilles Lipovetsky develops a post postmodernism in *The Empire of Fashion: Dressing Modern Democracy*

- 1987 Candace West and Don Zimmerman differentiate sex, sex category, and gender in “Doing Gender” (*Gender and Society*)
- 1988 Noam Chomsky and Edward Herman argue that the mass media are a political tool of political propaganda in *Manufacturing Consent: The Political Economy of the Mass Media*
- 1988 Barry Markovsky, David Willer, and Travis Patton author “Power Relations in Exchange Networks” (*ASR*)
- 1988 Linda Molm emphasizes rewards in exchange theory in “The Structure and Use of Power: A Comparison of Reward and Punishment Power” (*Social Psychology Quarterly*)
- 1988 *Journal of Historical Sociology* founded
- 1989 Žižek develops his ideas of ideology critique and cultural analysis in *The Sublime Object of Ideology*
- 1989 Bauman’s *Modernity and the Holocaust* argues that the Holocaust was an instantiation of modernity and argues for a sociology of morality
- 1989 David Harvey further develops social geography and the idea of time space compression in *The Condition of Postmodernity: An Enquiry into the Origins of Cultural Change*
- 1989 Edward Soja brings spatial concerns to the forefront once again in *Postmodern Geographies: The Reassertion of Space in Critical Social Theory*
- 1989 Trinh Minh ha’s *Woman, Native, Other: Writing Postcoloniality and Feminism*
- 1989 Michael Moore’s first major documentary, *Roger & Me*, exposes the effects of plant closures on social life in Flint, Michigan
- 1989 Berlin Wall falls
- 1990 James S. Coleman develops rational choice theory in *Foundations of Social Theory*
- 1990 Judith Butler’s *Gender Trouble* challenges traditional ideas of sex, gender, and sexuality
- 1990 Giddens introduces his idea of the juggernaut in *The Consequences of Modernity*
- 1990 Donna Haraway contributes to postmodern feminism with “A Manifesto for Cyborgs: Science, Technology, and Socialist Feminism”
- 1990 Patricia Hill Collins develops intersectionality in *Black Feminist Thought: Knowledge, Consciousness, and Empowerment*
- 1990 Tamito Yoshida publishes *Jyoho to Jiko Soshiki sei no Riron* [*Theory of Information and Self Organizing Systems*], outlining his general systems theory
- 1990 *Sociétés Contemporaines* founded
- 1990–2 The National Comorbidity Survey administers structured psychiatric exams to respondents to assess levels of disorder
- 1991 Jameson’s *Postmodernism, or the Cultural Logic of Late Capitalism* integrates neo Marxian and postmodern ideas
- 1991 Kenneth Gergen brings postmodernity to bear on the self in *The Saturated Self: Dilemmas of Identity in Contemporary Life*
- 1991 Giddens’s *Modernity and Self Identity: Self and Society in the Late Modern Age* is a discussion of important microsociological issues
- 1991 Sharon Zukin links power to geography in *Landscapes of Power: From Detroit to Disney World*
- 1991 The term “new urbanism” is introduced at a meeting of urban reformers in California
- 1991 Steven Best and Douglas Kellner’s *Postmodern Theory: Critical Interrogations* is a useful overview of postmodern theory
- 1991 Saskia Sassen introduces the term “global city” in her book *The Global City: New York, London, Tokyo*
- 1991 *Berliner Journal fur Soziologie* founded in Berlin

- 1992 Francis Fukuyama argues in *The End of History and the Last Man* that the progression of human history as a struggle between ideologies is largely at an end, with liberal democracy coming out the winner
- 1992 Marc Auge's *Non Places: An Introduction to an Anthropology of Supermodernity* introduces the ideas of non place and supermodernity
- 1992 Roland Robertson develops the idea of glocalization in *Globalization: Social Theory and Global Culture*
- 1992 First European Conference of Sociology is held in Vienna
- 1992 Bourdieu and Wacquant's *An Invitation to Reflexive Sociology* presents an overview of Bourdieu's ideas
- 1992 Bauman's *Intimations of Postmodernity* contains contributions to postmodern theory by a modernist
- 1992 European Sociological Association founded
- 1992 Mitchell Duneier's *Slim's Table: Race, Respectability, and Masculinity* becomes a classic in ethnographic studies
- 1992 *International Journal of Japanese Sociology* founded
- 1993 Bruno Latour establishes actor network theory (ANT) in *We Have Never Been Modern*
- 1993 Ritzer's *The McDonaldization of Society: An Investigation into the Changing Character of Contemporary Social Life* brings Weber's thesis of rationalization to bear on contemporary society and consumption
- 1994 Homi Bhabha contributes to studies of both culture and postcolonialism with *The Location of Culture*
- 1994 Cornell West's *Race Matters* is an important contribution to multidisciplinary thinking on race
- 1994 Cairo hosts UN International Conference on Population and Development, which leads to major reforms in population planning
- 1994 Giddens's *Beyond Left and Right: The Future of Radical Politics* marks a shift in his work to more practical issues
- 1995 Benjamin Barber's *Jihad vs. McWorld* contrasts a homogenizing and heterogenizing approach to global politics
- 1995 Michel Maffesoli develops neotribalism in *The Time of Tribes*
- 1995 *Soziale Systeme* founded
- 1996 Castells argues the importance of information in *The Rise of the Network Society*
- 1996 Appadurai's *Modernity at Large: Cultural Dimensions of Globalization* introduces the idea of "scapes"
- 1996 Samuel Huntington argues the importance of cultural civilizations in *The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order*
- 1996 Asia Pacific Sociological Association founded
- 1997 Chomsky authors *Media Control: The Spectacular Achievements of Propaganda*, summarizing his views on the media as well as terrorism
- 1997 Peter Burke outlines his model of a cybernetic identity theory in "An Identity Model of Network Exchange" (*ASR*)
- 1997 Hochschild's *The Time Bind: When Work Becomes Home and Home Becomes Work* discusses the time bind placed on contemporary families, the importance of the "second shift," and even the "third shift"
- 1997 Kathryn Edin and Laura Lein demonstrate the inefficiencies of the welfare system in the United States in *Making Ends Meet: How Single Mothers Survive Welfare and Low Wage Work*
- 1998 *Interventions: International Journal of Postcolonial Studies* founded
- 1998 Arts and Humanities Research Board established in the UK (changed to Arts and Humanities Research Council in 2005)

- 1999 Barry Glassner publishes a critical insight into the role of fear in US culture in *The Culture of Fear: Why Americans are Afraid of the Wrong Things*
- 2000 Michael Hardt and Antonio Negri's *Empire* argues that imperialism is being replaced by an empire without a national base
- 2000 Robert Putnam's *Bowling Alone: The Collapse and Revival of American Community*
- 2000 Bauman's *Liquid Modernity* provides new imagery in a theory of the contemporary world
- 2001 Edward Lawler advocates the role of emotion in "An Affect Theory of Social Exchange" (*AJS*)
- 2001 September 11, 2001: terrorists hijack airplanes and destroy the World Trade Center in New York City
- 2001 Barbara Ehrenreich brings light to the difficulties of living on the minimum wage in *Nickled and Dimed: On Not Getting By in America*
- 2002 Leslie Sklair argues for alternatives to global capitalism in *Globalization: Capitalism and its Alternatives*
- 2003 Chandra Mohanty's *Feminism Without Borders: Decolonizing Theory, Practicing Solidarity*
- 2003 John Urry brings chaos theory to bear on globalization in *Global Complexity*
- 2003 Annette Lareau argues that class based childrearing practices perpetuate social inequality in *Unequal Childhoods: Race, Class, and Family Life*
- 2004 Michael Burawoy, President of the ASA, launches a major debate on public sociology with his presidential address
- 2004 Hardt and Negri release *Multitude: War and Democracy in the Age of Empire* as a follow up to their 2000 work on empire
- 2005 ASA holds Centennial meeting in San Francisco, California

Lexicon

CRIME AND DEVIANCE

Abolitionism
Accounts, Deviant
Addiction and Dependency
Age and Crime
Aggression
Alcohol and Crime
Alcoholism and Alcohol Abuse
Beccaria, Cesare
Body Modification
Body, Abominations of the
Capital Punishment
Child Abuse
Class and Crime
Collective Deviance
Collective Efficacy and Crime
Conflict Theory and Crime and Delinquency
Control Balance Theory
Corrections
Courts
Crime
Crime, Biosocial Theories of
Crime, Broken Windows Theory of
Crime, Corporate
Crime, Hot Spots
Crime, Life Course Theory of
Crime, Organized
Crime, Political
Crime, Psychological Theories of
Crime, Radical/Marxist Theories of
Crime, Schools and
Crime, Social Control Theory of
Crime, Social Learning Theory of
Crime, White Collar
Criminal Justice System
Criminology
Criminology: Research Methods
Cultural Criminology
Cybercrime
Death of the Sociology of Deviance?
Death Penalty as a Social Problem
Deinstitutionalization
Deterrence Theory
Deviance
Deviance, Absolutist Definitions of
Deviance, Academic
Deviance, Constructionist Perspectives
Deviance, Crime and
Deviance, Criminalization of
Deviance, Explanatory Theories of
Deviance, the Media and
Deviance, Medicalization of
Deviance, Moral Boundaries and
Deviance, Normative Definitions of
Deviance, Positivist Theories of
Deviance Processing Agencies
Deviance, Reactivist Definitions of
Deviance, Research Methods
Deviance, Sport and
Deviance, Theories of
Deviant Beliefs/Cognitive Deviance
Deviant Careers
Domestic Violence
Drug Use
Drugs, Drug Abuse, and Drug Policy
Drugs and the Law
Drugs/Substance Use in Sport
Environmental Criminology
Female Sex Work as Deviance
Feminist Criminology
Fetishism
Football Hooliganism
Gangs, Delinquent
Gender, Deviance and
Hate Crimes
Homicide
Homophobia
Identity, Deviant
Index Crime
Insecurity and Fear of Crime
Juvenile Delinquency
Kitsuse, John I.
Labeling
Labeling Theory
Law, Criminal
Lemert, Edwin
Lombroso, Cesare
Madness
Masculinities, Crime and
Measuring Crime
Mental Disorder

Moral Entrepreneur
Moral Panics
New Left Realism
Organizational Deviance
Peacemaking
Police
Positive Deviance
Poverty and Disrepute
Prisons
Property Crime
Public Order Crime
Race and Crime
Race and the Criminal Justice System
Rape/Sexual Assault as Crime
Rational Choice Theory: A Crime Related
 Perspective
Recidivism
Robbery
Routine Activity Theory
Self Control Theory
Sex and Crime
Sexual Deviance
Sexual Violence and Rape
Social Control
Social Disorganization Theory
Social Support and Crime
Sociocultural Relativism
Strain Theories
Subcultures, Deviant
Suicide
Sutherland, Edwin H.
Transcarceration
Transgression
Urban Crime and Violence
Victimization
Violence
Violent Crime
Zimbardo Prison Experiment

CULTURE, POPULAR CULTURE, MEDIA, AND SPORT

Acculturation
Advertising
Agency (and Intention)
Agenda Setting
Anthropology, Cultural and Social: Early
 History
Anthrozoology
Art Worlds
Audiences

Author/Auteur
Barthes, Roland
Bateson, Gregory
Birmingham School
Blasé/Neurasthenic Personalities
Body and Cultural Sociology
Bricolage
Celebrity and Celestoid
Celebrity Culture
Censorship
Certeau, Michel de
Civilizations
Civilizing Process
Cloning
Collective Action
Collective Memory
Collective Trauma
Community and Media
Consumption and the Internet
Consumption of Music
Consumption Rituals
Consumption of Sport
Consumption, Mass Consumption, and
 Consumer Culture
Consumption, Visual
Consumption, Youth Culture and
Cool
Corruption
Counterculture
Critical Theory/Frankfurt School
Cultural Capital
Cultural Criminology
Cultural Critique
Cultural Feminism
Cultural Imperialism
Cultural Relativism
Cultural Reproduction
Cultural Resistance
Cultural Studies
Cultural Studies, British
Cultural Tourism
Culture
Culture: Conceptual Clarifications
Culture Industries
Culture Jamming
Culture, Gender and
Culture, Nature and
Culture, Organizations and
Culture of Poverty
Culture, Production of
Culture, Social Movements and
Culture, the State and

Cyberculture
 Deconstruction
 Deviance, Moral Boundaries and
 Deviance, Sport and
 Deviance, the Media and
 Digital
 Disability Sport
 Discourse
 Disneyization
 Distinction
 Documentary
 Drugs/Substance Use in Sport
 Economy, Culture and
 Elite Culture
 Emotion: Cultural Aspects
 Encoding/Decoding
 Ethnocentrism
 Exercise and Fitness
 Fans and Fan Culture
 Fantasy City
 Female Genital Mutilation
 Figurational Sociology and the Sociology of
 Sport
 Film
 Football Hooliganism
 Frame
 Gambling and Sport
 Gender, Sport and
 Genre
 Globalization, Culture and
 Globalization, Sport and
 Halbwachs, Maurice
 Health and Culture
 Health and Sport
 Hegemony and the Media
 Hermeneutics
 High School Sports
 Highbrow/Lowbrow
 Identity, Sport and
 Ideological Hegemony
 Ideology, Sport and
 Idioculture
 Information Society
 Information Technology
 Infotainment
 Intellectual Property
 Internet
 Knowledge
 Leisure
 Leisure, Popular Culture and
 Lifestyle
 McLuhan, Marshall
 Marginal Art
 Mass Culture and Mass Society
 Mass Media and Socialization
 Material Culture
 Mead, Margaret
 Media
 Media and Consumer Culture
 Media and Diaspora
 Media and Globalization
 Media Literacy
 Media Monopoly
 Media and Nationalism
 Media, Network(s) and
 Media and the Public Sphere
 Media, Regulation of
 Media and Sport
 Mediation
 Moral Economy
 Multiculturalism
 Multimedia
 Museums
 Music
 Music and Media
 Mythogenesis
 Nationalism and Sport
 Nature
 Olympics
 Orality
 Organizations, Tradition and
 Photography
 Play
Playboy
 Political Economy and Sport
 Politics and Media
 Politics and Sport
 Popular Culture
 Popular Culture Forms
 Popular Culture Icons
 Postcolonialism and Sport
 Posthumanism
 Postmodern Culture
 Practice
 Print Media
 Propaganda
 Public Broadcasting
 Public Opinion
 Qualitative Methods
 Queer Theory
 Radio
 Ratings
 Reception Studies
 Representation

Reputation
Ritual
Science and Culture
Science across Cultures
Semiotics
Sexualities and Culture Wars
Sexuality and Sport
Simulacra and Simulation
Simulation and Virtuality
Smoking
Soccer
Social Theory and Sport
Socialization and Sport
Society and Biology
Sociocultural Relativism
Sport
Sport, Alternative
Sport, Amateur
Sport and the Body
Sport and Capitalism
Sport as Catharsis
Sport and the City
Sport, College
Sport and Culture
Sport Culture and Subcultures
Sport and the Environment
Sport and Ethnicity
Sport, Professional
Sport and Race
Sport and Religion
Sport and Social Capital
Sport and Social Class
Sport and Social Resistance
Sport as Spectacle
Sport and the State
Sport as Work
Sportization
Sports Heroes and Celebrities
Sports Industry
Sports Stadia
Stereotyping and Stereotypes
Subculture
Subcultures, Deviant
Surveillance
Symbolic Classification
Taste, Sociology of
Technology, Science, and Culture
Telephone
Televangelism
Television
Text/Hypertext
Tradition

Transgression
Urbanism/Urban Culture
Urbanism, Subcultural Theory of
Values
Values: Global
Video Games
Violence Among Athletes
Violence Among Fans
Virtual Sports
Williams, Raymond
Xenophobia
Youth Sport

DEMOGRAPHY AND ECOLOGY

Age, Period, and Cohort Effects
Aging, Demography of
Aging, Longitudinal Studies
Benefit and Victimized Zones
Biodemography
Consumption, Green/Sustainable
Daily Life Pollution
Davis, Kingsley
Demographic Data: Censuses, Registers,
Surveys
Demographic Techniques: Decomposition and
Standardization
Demographic Techniques: Event History
Methods
Demographic Techniques: Life Table
Methods
Demographic Techniques: Population
Projections and Estimates
Demographic Techniques: Population
Pyramids and Age/Sex Structure
Demographic Techniques: Time Use
Demographic Transition Theory
Demography
Demography: Historical
Differential Treatment of Children by Sex
Ecofeminism
Ecological Problems
Ecology
Ecology and Economy
Environment, Sociology of the
Environment and Urbanization
Environmental Criminology
Environmental Movements
Family Demography
Family Migration

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 Adorno, Theodor W.
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 Durkheim, Émile
 Elias, Norbert
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Mannheim, Karl
Marcuse, Herbert
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Marshall, Thomas Henry
Martineau, Harriet
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Mead, George Herbert
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Mendieta y Núñez, Lucio
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Michels, Robert
Milgram, Stanley (Experiments)
Mill, John Stuart
Mills, C. Wright
Mosca, Gaetano
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Nietzsche, Friedrich
Nozick, Robert
Pareto, Vilfredo
Park, Robert E. & Burgess, Ernest W.
Parsons, Talcott
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Poulantzas, Nicos
Pound, Roscoe
Radcliffe Brown, Alfred R.
Ratzenhofer, Gustav
Rawls, John
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Rosenfeld, Rachel
Sacks, Harvey
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Sainsaulieu, Renaud
Saraswati, Pandita Ramabai
Sarkar, Benoy Kumar
Sartre, Jean Paul
Saussure, Ferdinand de
Schumpeter, Joseph A.
Schütz, Alfred
Shariati, Ali
Simmel, Georg
Small, Albion W.
Smith, Adam
Sombart, Werner
Sorokin, Pitirim A.
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Sumner, William Graham
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 Suzuki, Eitaro
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 Thomas, William I.
 Tocqueville, Alexis de
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 Organizations
 Organizations as Coercive Institutions
 Organizations and Sexuality
 Organizations as Social Structures
 Organizations and the Theory of the Firm
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 Organizations, Tradition and
 Organizations, Voluntary
 Outsourcing
 Performance Measurement
 Postmodern Organizations
 Professions, Organized
 Rational Legal Authority
 Sainsaulieu, Renaud
Shadow Work (Ivan Illich)
 Social Accountability and Governance
 State Regulation and the Workplace
 Strategic Decisions
 Strategic Management (Organizations)
 Supply Chains
 Teamwork
 Technological Determinism
 Time
 Top Management Teams
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METHODS

Action Research

- Analytic Induction
 ANOVA (Analysis of Variance)
 Auditing
 Authenticity Criteria
 Autoethnography
 Bell Curve
 Biography
 Chance and Probability
 Computer Aided/Mediated Analysis
 Confidence Intervals
 Content Analysis
 Convenience Sample
 Conversation Analysis
 Correlation
 Criminology: Research Methods
 Critical Qualitative Research
 Demographic Data: Censuses, Registers, Surveys
 Demographic Techniques: Decomposition and Standardization
 Demographic Techniques: Event History Methods
 Demographic Techniques: Life Table Methods
 Demographic Techniques: Population Projections and Estimates
 Demographic Techniques: Population Pyramids and Age/Sex Structure
 Demographic Techniques: Time Use
 Descriptive Statistics
 Deviance, Research Methods
 Documentary Analysis
 Effect Sizes
 Emic/Etic
 Empiricism
 Epistemology
 Ethics, Fieldwork
 Ethics, Research
 Ethnography
 Evaluation
 Experiment
 Experimental Design
 Experimental Methods
 Factor Analysis
 Feminist Methodology
 Foucauldian Archeological Analyses
 General Linear Model
 Gini Coefficient
 Grounded Theory
 Hawthorne Effect
 Hermeneutics
 Hierarchical Linear Models
 Historical and Comparative Methods
 Hypotheses
 Institutional Review Boards and Sociological Research
 Intergenerational Mobility: Methods of Analysis
 Intersubjectivity
 Intervention Studies
 Interviewing, Structured, Unstructured, and Postmodern
 Investigative Poetry
 Journaling, Reflexive
 Key Informant
 Latent Growth Curve Models
 Lazarsfeld, Paul
 Life History
 Log Linear Models
 Measures of Centrality
 Measuring Crime
 Methods
 Methods, Arts Based
 Methods, Bootstrap
 Methods, Case Study
 Methods, Mixed
 Methods, Postcolonial
 Methods, Visual
 Multivariate Analysis
 Narrative
 Naturalistic Inquiry
 Negative Case Analysis
 Objectivity
 Observation, Participant and Non Participant
 Outliers
 Paradigms
 Path Analysis
 Peer Debriefing
 Performance Ethnography
 Performance Measurement
 Poetics, Social Science
 Postpositivism
 Qualitative Computing
 Qualitative Methods
 Quantitative Methods
 Random Sample
 Rapport
 Realism and Relativism: Truth and Objectivity
 Reception Studies
 Reconstructive Analyses
 Reflexivity
 Regression and Regression Analysis
 Reliability
 Reliability Generalization
 Replicability Analyses

Sampling, Qualitative (Purposive)
 Secondary Data Analysis
 Sexuality Research: Ethics
 Sexuality Research: Methods
 Social Change and Causal Analysis
 Social Epistemology
 Social Indicators
 Social Network Analysis
 Standardization
 Statistical Significance Testing
 Statistics
 Structural Equation Modeling
 Subjectivity
 Survey Research
 Theory and Methods
 Theory Construction
 Time Series
 Transcription
 Triangulation
 Trustworthiness
 Validity, Qualitative
 Validity, Quantitative
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 Variables, Control
 Variables, Dependent
 Variables, Independent
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Verstehen
 Writing as Method

POLITICS AND LAW

Aging and Social Policy
 Anarchism
 Arendt, Hannah
 Authoritarianism
 Authority and Legitimacy
Caudillismo
 Citizenship
 Civil Society
 Class and Voting
 Communism
 Conservatism
 Corruption
 Courts
 Crime, Political
 Criminal Justice System
 Culture, the State and
 Democracy
 Democracy and Organizations
 Development: Political Economy

Developmental State
 Drugs and the Law
 Empire
 Fascism
 Federalism
 Global Politics
 Gramsci, Antonio
 Identity Politics/Relational Politics
 Imagined Communities
 Imperialism
 Laborism
 Law, Civil
 Law, Criminal
 Law, Economy and
 Law, Sociology of
 Legal Profession
 Liberalism
 Marginalization, Outsiders
 Media and Nationalism
 Michels, Robert
 Military Research and Science and War
Moralpolitik (Confucian)
 Nation State
 Nation State and Nationalism
 Nationalism
 Neoconservatism
 Neoliberalism
 NGO/INGO
 Nozick, Robert
 Peace and Reconciliation Processes
 Personal is Political
 Pluralism, American
 Pluralism, British
 Political Economy
 Political Leadership
 Political Machine
 Political Opportunities
 Political Parties
 Political Sociology
 Politics
 Politics and Media
 Politics and Sport
 Populism
 Postnationalism
 Power Elite
 Privatization
 Public Sphere
 Race and Ethnic Politics
 Race and the Criminal Justice System
 Rational Legal Authority
 Rawls, John
 Recognition

Republicanism
 Revolutions
 Revolutions, Sociology of
 Sexual Citizenship
 Sexual Politics
 Sexuality and the Law
 Social Movements, Political Consequences of
 Social Policy, Welfare State
 Social Problems, Politics of
 Socialism
 Sovereignty
 Sport and the State
 State
 State and Economy
 State and Private Sector Employees
 Stratification, Politics and
 Structural Strains, Successive Transition of
 Terrorism
 Tocqueville, Alexis de
 Totalitarianism
 Utopia
 Violence
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 Welfare State
 Welfare State, Retrenchment of
 World Conflict

RACE AND ETHNICITY

Accommodation
 Acculturation
 Affirmative Action
 Affirmative Action for Majority Groups
 Affirmative Action (Race and Ethnic Quotas)
 Alliances (Racial/Ethnic)
American Dilemma, An (Gunnar Myrdal)
 Anglo Conformity
 Anti Semitism (Religion)
 Anti Semitism (Social Change)
 Apartheid and Nelson Mandela
 Assimilation
 Authoritarian Personality
 Balkanization
Bell Curve, The (Herrnstein and Murray)
 Bilingualism
 Biracialism
 Black Feminist Thought
 Black Urban Regime
 Bonfil Batalla, Guillermo
 Boundaries (Racial/Ethnic)
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Burundi and Rwanda (Hutu, Tutsi)
 Caste: Inequalities Past and Present
 Civil Rights Movement
 Colonialism (Neocolonialism)
 Color Line
 Conflict (Racial/Ethnic)
 Consumption, African Americans
 Creolization
 Decolonization
 Diaspora
 Discrimination
 Diversity
 Double Consciousness
 Du Bois: "Talented Tenth"
 Du Bois, W. E. B.
 Endogamy
 Ethnic Cleansing
 Ethnic Enclaves
 Ethnic Groups
 Ethnic/Informal Economy
 Ethnic and Racial Division of Labor
 Ethnic, Racial, and Nationalist Movements
 Ethnicity
 Ethnocentricism
 Ethnonationalism
 Eurocentrism
 Fanon, Franz
 Frazier, E. Franklin
 Ghetto
 Health and Race
 Holocaust
 Hypersegregation
 Immigration
 Immigration and Language
 Indigenous Movements
 Indigenous Peoples
 Interracial Unions
 Intersectionality
 Johnson, Charles Spurgeon
 King, Martin Luther
 Majorities
 Manifest Destiny
 Marginality
 Massive Resistance
 Media and Diaspora
 Melting Pot
 Middleman Minorities
 Migration, Ethnic Conflicts, and Racism
Minzoku
 Multiculturalism
 Multiracial Feminism
 Nation State

Nationalism
Nihonjinron
 One Drop Rule
 Orientalism
 Outsider Within
 Passing
 Paternalism
 Plural Society
 Pogroms
 Polyethnicity
 Prejudice
 Race
 Race (Racism)
 Race and Crime
 Race and the Criminal Justice System
 Race and Ethnic Consciousness
 Race and Ethnic Etiquette
 Race and Ethnic Politics
 Race and Schools
 Race/Ethnicity and Friendship
 Race/Ethnicity, Health, and Mortality
 Racial Hierarchy
 Racialized Gender
 Racism, Structural and Institutional
 Racist Movements
 Redlining
 Refugees
 Reparations
 Residential Segregation
 Scapegoating
 School Segregation, Desegregation
 Schools, Magnet
 Scientific Racism
 Segregation
 Self Determination
 Separatism
 Slavery
 Slurs (Racial/Ethnic)
 Solidarity
 Sport and Ethnicity
 Sport and Race
 Steering, Racial Real Estate
 Stratification, Race/Ethnicity and
 Third World and Postcolonial Feminisms/
 Subaltern
 Tolerance
 Transnationalism
 Tribalism
 Truth and Reconciliation Commissions
 Whiteness
 Womanism
 Xenophobia

RELIGION

Animism
 Anti Semitism (Religion)
 Anti Semitism (Social Change)
 Asceticism
 Atheism
 Belief
 Buddhism
 Catholicism
 Charisma
 Charismatic Movement
 Christianity
 Church
 Civil Religion
 Confucianism
 Consumption, Religion and
 Cults: Social Psychological Aspects
 Denomination
 Economy, Religion and
 Folk Hinduism
 Fundamentalism
 Globalization, Religion and
 Health and Religion
 Hinduism
 Islam
 Jehovah's Witnesses
 Judaism
 Laicism
 Magic
 Martyrdom
 Millenarianism
 Myth
 New Age
 New Religious Movements
 Orthodoxy
 Pietism
 Popular Religiosity
 Primitive Religion
 Protestantism
 Religion
 Religion, Sociology of
 Religions, African
 Religious Cults
 Rite/Ritual
 Ritual
 Sacred
 Sacred, Eclipse of the
 Sacred/Profane
 Sacrifice
 Satanism
 Schools, Religious

Science and Religion
Scientology
Sect
Secularization
Sexuality, Religion and
Shariati, Ali
Shintoism
Spirituality, Religion, and Aging
Sport and Religion
Taoism
Televangelism
Theology
Totemism
Women, Religion and

SCIENCE

Actor Network Theory
Actor Network Theory, Actants
Big Science and Collective Research
Chance and Probability
Citations and Scientific Indexing
Classification
Cloning
(Constructive) Technology Assessment
Controversy Studies
Ecology
Environment, Sociology of the
Eugenics
Evolution
Experiment
Expertise, "Scientification," and the Authority
of Science
Fact, Theory, and Hypothesis: Including the
History of the Scientific Fact
Falsification
Feminism and Science, Feminist
Epistemology
Finalization in Science
Genetic Engineering as a Social Problem
Human Genome and the Science of Life
Induction and Observation in Science
Kuhn, Thomas and Scientific Paradigms
Laboratory Studies and the World of the
Scientific Lab
Materiality and Scientific Practice
Math, Science, and Technology Education
Matthew Effect
Merton, Robert K.
Military Research and Science and War
Nobel Prizes and the Scientific Elite

Paradigms
Peer Review and Quality Control in Science
Political Economy of Science
Primates and Cyborgs
Realism and Relativism: Truth and Objectivity
Science
Science, Commercialization of
Science and Culture
Science across Cultures
Science, Ethnographic Studies of
Science and the Measurement of Risk
Science/Non Science and Boundary Work
Science and the Precautionary Principle
Science, Proof, and Law
Science and Public Participation: The
Democratization of Science
Science and Religion
Science, Social Construction of
Scientific Knowledge, Sociology of
Scientific Literacy and Public Understandings
of Science
Scientific Models and Simulations
Scientific Networks and Invisible Colleges
Scientific Norms/Counternorms
Scientific Productivity
Scientific Revolution
Scientometrics
Speaking Truth to Power: Science and Policy
Strong Program
Technological Innovation
Technology, Science, and Culture
Women in Science

SOCIAL CHANGE, SOCIAL MOVEMENTS, AND GLOBALIZATION

Accommodation
Alliances (Racial/Ethnic)
Animal Rights Movements
Anti Semitism (Social Change)
Anti War and Peace Movements
Braudel, Fernand
Capitalism
Chicago School
Chicago School: Social Change
Civil Rights Movement
Civil Society
Collective Action
Collective Identity
Collective Memory (Social Change)

Collective Trauma
Colonialism (Neocolonialism)
Consumer Culture, Children's
Consumer Movements
Consumption, Fashion and
Contention, Tactical Repertoires of
Counterculture
Creolization
Crowd Behavior
Cultural Imperialism
Cultural Tourism
Culture, Social Movements and
Decolonization
Deindustrialization
Demography: Historical
Denationalization
Dependency and World Systems Theories
Development: Political Economy
Developmental State
Direct Action
Disasters
Disneyization
Durkheim, Émile and Social Change
Ecofeminism
Economic Development
Elias, Norbert
Emergent Norm Theory
Emotions and Movements
Empire
Endogenous Development
Environmental Movements
Ethnic, Racial, and Nationalist Movements
Feminization of Poverty
Framing and Social Movements
Friendship, Social Inequality, and Social
Change
Gay and Lesbian Movement
Gender, Development and
Gender, Social Movements and
Generational Change
Global Economy
Global Justice as a Social Movement
Global Politics
Global/World Cities
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Globalization, Consumption and
Globalization, Culture and
Globalization, Education and
Globalization and Global Justice
Globalization, Religion and
Globalization, Sexuality and
Globalization, Sport and
Globalization, Values and
Glocalization
Globalization
Gurvitch, Georges: Social Change
Human Rights
Hybridity
Imagined Communities
Immigration
Immigration Policy
Imperialism
Income Inequality, Global
Indigenous Movements
Industrial Revolution
Industrialization
Information Society
Knowledge Societies
Kondratieff Cycles
Labor Movement
Local Residents' Movements
McDonaldization
Marianne Weber on Social Change
Media and Globalization
Migration: International
Migration and the Labor Force
Mobilization
Modernization
Moral Shocks and Self Recruitment
Music and Social Movements
Nation State
Nationalism
Neoliberalism
Network Society
New Left
New Social Movement Theory
NGO/INGO
Olympics
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Peace and Reconciliation Processes
Political Opportunities
Political Process Theory
Population and Development
Privatization
Pro Choice and Pro Life Movements
Progress, Idea of
Protest, Diffusion of
Racist Movements
Reflexive Modernization
Refugee Movements
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Resource Mobilization Theory
Revolutions
Revolutions, Sociology of

- Riesman, David
Riot Grrrls
Riots
Said, Edward W.
Sainsaulieu, Renaud
Scientific Revolution
Second Demographic Transition
Secularization
Sex Tourism
Sexual Cultures in Russia
Social Change
Social Change and Causal Analysis
Social Change: The Contributions of S. N. Eisenstadt
Social Change, Southeast Asia
Social Indicators
Social Movement Organizations
Social Movements
Social Movements, Biographical Consequences of
Social Movements, Leadership in
Social Movements, Networks and
Social Movements, Non Violent
Social Movements, Participatory Democracy in
Social Movements, Political Consequences of
Social Movements, Recruitment to
Social Movements, Relative Deprivation and
Social Movements, Repression of
Social Movements, Strain and Breakdown Theories of
Sorokin, Pitirim A.
Spencer, Herbert
Stratification in Transition Economies
Student Movements
Technological Determinism
Terrorism
Transition from Communism
Transition Economies
Transnational and Global Feminisms
Transnational Movements
Transnationals
Transparency and Global Change
Uneven Development
Urbanization
Values: Global
Women's Movements
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- SOCIAL PROBLEMS**
- Abolitionism
Abortion as a Social Problem
Agenda Setting
Alcoholism and Alcohol Abuse
Capital Punishment
Caste: Inequalities Past and Present
Child Labor
Children and Divorce
Class Conflict
Collective Efficacy and Crime
Collective Trauma
Crime
Crime, Hot Spots
Crime, Organized
Crime, Political
Crime, Schools and
Crime, White Collar
Criminal Justice System
Dangerousness
Death Penalty as a Social Problem
Deterrence Theory
Deviance, Academic
Deviant Careers
Disability as a Social Problem
Disciplinary Society
Discrimination
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Domestic Violence
Drug Use
Drugs, Drug Abuse, and Drug Policy
Drugs and the Law
Ecological Problems
Elder Abuse
Ethnic Cleansing
Eugenics
Families and Childhood Disabilities
Family Structure and Poverty
Feminist Disability Studies
Fertility: Low
Fertility: Nonmarital
Gambling as a Social Problem
Gangs, Delinquent
Gendered Aspects of War and International Violence
Genetic Engineering as a Social Problem
Genocide
Globalization and Global Justice
Governmentality and Control
Homelessness
Homicide
Homophobia
Homophobia and Heterosexism
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Infertility
Insecurity and Fear of Crime
Intergenerational Relationships and Exchanges
Juvenile Delinquency
Kitsuse, John I.
Lemert, Edwin M.
Liebow, Elliott
Luhmann, Niklas
Marginalization, Outsiders
Migration, Ethnic Conflicts, and Racism
Migration: Undocumented/Illegal
Prevention, Intervention
Queer Theory
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Race (Racism)
Refugee Movements
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Residential Segregation
Risk, Risk Society, Risk Behavior, and Social Problems
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Sex and Crime
Sexual Harassment
Sexual Violence and Rape
Smoking
Social Disorganization Theory
Social Integration and Inclusion
Social Pathology
Social Policy, Welfare State
Social Problems, Concept and Perspectives
Social Problems, Politics of
Social Services
Social Work: History and Institutions
Social Work: Theory and Methods
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Stress, Stress Theories
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Traffic in Women
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Unemployment as a Social Problem
Urban Movements
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SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY,
INTERACTION, GROUPS,
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Attribution Theory
Authority and Conformity
Awareness Contexts
Bateson, Gregory
Behaviorism
Blau, Peter
Blumer, Herbert George
Cognitive Balance Theory (Heider)
Cognitive Dissonance Theory (Festinger)
Coleman, James
Collective Action
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Cooley, Charles Horton
Crime, Social Learning Theory of
Cults: Social Psychological Aspects
Decision Making
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Definition of the Situation
Developmental Stages
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Doing Gender
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Dyad/Triad
Early Childhood
Education, Adult
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Emerson, Richard M.
Emotion: Cultural Aspects
Emotion: Social Psychological Aspects
Emotion Work
Emotions and Economy
Emotions and Social Movements
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Exchange Network Theory
Existential Sociology
Experimental Methods
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Friendship: Interpersonal Aspects
 Friendship: Structure and Context
 Game Stage
 Generalized Other
 Goffman, Erving
 Group Processes
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 Homans, George
 Human–Non Human Interaction
 Identity Control Theory
 Identity, Deviant
 Identity Politics/Relational Politics
 Identity: Social Psychological Aspects
 Identity, Sport and
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 Interpersonal Relationships
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 Intimacy
 James, William
 Language
 Learned Helplessness
 Leaving Home in the Transition to Adulthood
 Lewin, Kurt
 Life Course Perspective
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 Mass Media and Socialization
 Master Status
 Mead, George Herbert
 Mediated Interaction
 Mesostructure
 Microsociology
 Milgram, Stanley (Experiments)
 Mind
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 Power, Theories of
 Power Dependence Theory
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 Psychological Social Psychology
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 Role
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 Rosenberg, Morris
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 Significant Others
 Simmel, Georg
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 Stereotyping and Stereotypes
 Stigma
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 Stressful Life Events
 Symbolic Interaction
Tatamae/Honne
 Thomas, William I.
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 Bonfil Batalla, Guillermo
 Bottomore, T. B.
 Bourgeoisie and Proletariat
 Capital: Economic, Cultural, and Social
 Caste: Inequalities Past and Present
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 Class Consciousness
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 Class, Perceptions of
 Class, Status, and Power
 Class and Voting
 Connubium (Who Marries Whom?)
 Convivium (Who is Friends with Whom?)
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 Discrimination
 Distributive Justice
 Dual Earner Couples
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 Educational and Occupational Attainment
 Elite Culture
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Family Structure and Poverty
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 Inequalities in Marriage
 Inequality and the City
 Inequality, Wealth
 Inequality/Stratification, Gender
 Intelligence Tests
 Intergenerational Mobility: Core Model of Social Fluidity
 Intergenerational Mobility: Methods of Analysis
 Kindergarten
 Leisure Class
 Life Chances and Resources
 Lifestyle
 Marx, Karl
 Meritocracy
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 Mobility, Measuring the Effects of
 Mosca, Gaetano
 New Middle Classes in Asia
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 Pareto, Vilfredo
 Poverty
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 Power Elite
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 Socioeconomic Status, Health, and Mortality
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 Strategic Essentialism
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Stratification: Functional and Conflict Theories
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 Stratification and Inequality, Theories of
 Stratification: Partner Effects
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 Stratification, Race/Ethnicity and
 Stratification Systems: Openness
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THEORY

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 Affect Control Theory
 Aging and the Life Course, Theories of
 Althusser, Louis
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 Arendt, Hannah
 Aron, Raymond
 Attribution Theory
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 Autopoiesis
 Barthes, Roland
 Base and Superstructure
 Bataille, Georges
 Bateson, Gregory
 Beccaria, Cesare
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 Bifurcated Consciousness, Line of Fault
 Biosociological Theories
 Birmingham School
 Black Feminist Thought
 Blau, Peter
 Blumer, Herbert George
 Body and Cultural Sociology
 Bottomore, T. B.
 Bourdieu, Pierre
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Braverman, Harry
 Bricolage
 Castoriadis, Cornelius
 Certeau, Michel de
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 Cognitive Balance Theory (Heider)
 Cognitive Dissonance Theory (Festinger)
 Coleman, James
 Collective Conscience
 Commodities, Commodity Fetishism, and
 Commodification
 Complexity and Emergence
 Compositional Theory of Urbanism
 Computational Sociology
 Comte, Auguste
 Conflict Theory
 Conflict Theory and Crime and Delinquency
 Constructionism
 Consumption, Spectacles of
 Control Balance Theory
 Conversation Analysis
 Cooley, Charles Horton
 Crime, Biosocial Theories of
 Crime, Broken Windows Theory of
 Crime, Life Course Theory of
 Crime, Psychological Theories of
 Crime, Radical/Marxist Theories of
 Crime, Social Control Theory of
 Crime, Social Learning Theory of
 Critical Realism
 Critical Theory/Frankfurt School
 Cultural Critique
 Cultural Feminism
 Cultural Studies
 Cultural Studies, British
 Culture Industries
 Culture, Nature and
 Debord, Guy
 Deconstruction
 Deleuze, Gilles
 Demographic Transition Theory
 Denationalization
 Dependency and World Systems Theories
 Derrida, Jacques
 Deterrence Theory
 Deviance, Constructionist Perspectives
 Deviance, Explanatory Theories of
 Deviance, Positivist Theories of
 Deviance, Theories of

- Dewey, John
 Dialectic
 Dialectical Materialism
 Difference
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 Distanciation and Disembedding
 Distinction
 Distributive Justice
 Division of Labor
 Dramaturgy
 Du Bois, W. E. B.
 Durkheim, Émile
 Durkheim, Émile and Social Change
 Dyad/Triad
 Ecological Models of Urban Form: Concentric
 Zone Model, the Sector Model, and the
 Multiple Nuclei Model
 Ecological View of History
 Economic Determinism
 Economic Sociology: Classical Political
 Economic Perspectives
 Economic Sociology: Neoclassical Economic
 Perspective
 Elective Affinity
 Elementary Theory
 Elias, Norbert
 Emergent Norm Theory
 Emerson, Richard M.
 Engels, Friedrich
 Essentialism and Constructionism
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 Everyday Life
 Exchange Network Theory
 Exchange Value
 Existential Sociology
 Expectation States Theory
 Exploitation
 Facework
 False Consciousness
 Family, History of
 Family Theory
 Fanon, Franz
 Feminism and Science, Feminist
 Epistemology
 Feminism, First, Second, and Third Waves
 Feminist Pedagogy
 Feminist Standpoint Theory
 Feuerbach, Ludwig
 Foucauldian Archeological Analyses
 Foucault, Michel
 Frame
 Freud, Sigmund
 Fromm, Erich
 Function
 Functionalism/Neofunctionalism
 Game Stage
 Game Theory
 Gellner, Ernst
 Genealogy
 Generalized Other
 Gift
 Gift Relationships
 Gilman, Charlotte Perkins
 Glocalization
 Goffman, Erving
 Gökalp, Ziya
 Gramsci, Antonio
 Globalization
 Grounded Theory
 Guattari, Félix
 Gumpłowicz, Ludwig
 Habitus/Field
 Halbwachs, Maurice
 Hawthorne Effect
 Hegel, G. W. F.
 Hermeneutics
 Hobhouse, L. T.
 Homans, George
 Horkheimer, Max
 Humanism
 Hyperreality
 Ideal Type
 Identity Control Theory
 Identity Theory
 Imagined Communities
 Implosion
 Individualism
 Information and Resource Processing
 Paradigm
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 Intersectionality
 Intersubjectivity
 Intertextuality
 James, William
 Knowledge, Sociology of
 Kurauchi, Kazuta
 Labeling
 Labeling Theory
 Labor/Labor Power
 Labor Process
 Lacan, Jacques
 Langue and *Parole*
 Lazarsfeld, Paul

- Lefebvre, Henri
 Legitimacy
 Lesbian Feminism
 Liberal Feminism
 Lifeworld
 Logocentrism
 Lombroso, Cesare
 Looking Glass Self
 Luhmann, Niklas
 Lukács, Georg
 Luxemburg, Rosa
 McDonaldization
 McLuhan, Marshall
 Malinowski, Bronislaw K.
 Malthus, Thomas Robert
 Management Theory
 Mannheim, Karl
 Marcuse, Herbert
 Marianne Weber on Social Change
 Martineau, Harriet
 Marx, Karl
 Marxism and Sociology
 Materialist Feminisms
 Mathematical Sociology
 Matrix of Domination
 Mead, George Herbert
 Merton, Robert K.
 Mesostructure
 Meta Analysis
 Metatheory
 Michels, Robert
 Micro–Macro Links
 Microsociology
 Mills, C. Wright
 Mind
 Modernity
 Mosca, Gaetano
 Narrative
 Nature
 Neo Marxism
 Network Society
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A

abolitionism

René van Swaaningen

When social scientists use the word abolitionism they mostly refer to the criminological perspective that dismisses penal definitions and punitive responses to criminalized problems, and that proposes their replacement by dispute settlement, redress, and social justice. In more general, historical terms it refers to the abolition of state (supported) institutions that are no longer felt to be legitimate. There have been abolitionist movements against slavery, torture, prostitution, capital punishment, and prison.

The word abolitionism as we currently understand it in criminology is adopted from the North American anti prison movement of the early 1970s. Herein most notably Quakers take up their historical mission from the anti slavery movement. They see prison as an institution that today fulfills the same social functions as slavery did till the late nineteenth century: disciplining the (mostly black) under class. This American abolitionism is mainly grounded in religious inspiration, and less in considerations about the counter effectiveness of criminal justice, as is the case in Europe. The European abolitionist social movements of that era were prisoners' unions and more intellectual radical penal reform movements (Van Swaaningen 1997). Academic abolitionism has its roots in symbolic interactionism and social constructionism, with a strongly Foucauldian focus on discipline in a carceral society.

Unlike the literal meaning of the verbal phrase "to abolish," abolitionism cannot be conceived in absolute terms. Abolitionists do not argue that the police or courts should be

abolished. The point is that crime is not to be set apart from other social problems and that the social exclusion of culprits seldom solves any problems. The penal system itself is seen as a social problem, and penalty is rejected as a metaphor of justice. Abolitionists both question the ethical caliber of a state that intentionally and systematically inflicts pain upon other people, and point out that, because generally accepted goals of general and special prevention cannot be supported with empirical data, the credibility of the penal system is at stake.

Abolitionism knows a negative and a positive momentum. It implies a negative critique of the fundamental shortcomings of the penal system to realize social justice, and aims at the prevention and control of criminalized problems by social means. In this negative phase, depenalization (pushing back the punitive character of reactions) and decriminalization (against the labeling of social problems as crimes) are the central topics. Cohen (1988) characterizes abolitionism's deconstructing moves as decarceration, diversion (away from the institution), decategorization, delegalization (away from the state), and deprofessionalization (away from the expert). In the positive phase, a distinction is to be made between abolitionism as a way of thinking (an alternative way of understanding crime and punishment) and as a way of acting (a radical approach of penal reform). In the first sense, abolitionism is an example of a replacement discourse (Henry & Milovanovic 1996). In the second sense, it moves between Pepinsky and Quinney's (1991) "peacemaking criminology" and Braithwaite's (1989) theory of reintegrative shaming. It is more modest than the former – for it is oriented at mechanisms of social control rather than at rebuilding community spirit – and embedded in a more

radical, dismissive position toward the penal system than the latter.

Initially, abolitionists shot their arrows at the prison system. Around 1980, the attention shifted to (the pros and cons of) non custodial alternatives. Warnings against the net widening effects of such sanctions were contrasted with their potential value in the attrition of the penal system. In this respect, Mathiesen's (1974) penal action theory has been very influential. This Norwegian criminologist argues that alternatives to prison should remain "unfinished" in order not to be absorbed by a penal rationale. He distinguishes between positive reforms, which ultimately strengthen the penal system, and negative reforms, which are of an abolishing kind.

Other abolitionists have focused on the penal procedure. Dutch criminologist Herman Bianchi (1994) proposes an assensus model: a form of dispute settlement that should mandatorily replace penal intervention if the directly involved parties agree on a solution. Both the consensus model of criminal law and the dissensus embedded in conflict models imply a fight over the representation of the facts, whereas assensus is "just" focused on the follow up. With these contentions Bianchi rejects both functionalist and conflict sociology. Norwegian criminologist Nils Christie (1981) has also advocated a participatory model of justice.

The development of (counter)criteria for penal intervention is another theme for abolitionists. According to Dutch criminologist Louk Hulsman, we do not need to wait for radical political reform or structural analyses in order to start with decriminalization: coercion needs legitimation, giving up on coercion does not. This pragmatic approach makes Hulsman's perspective an interesting challenge for those intellectual skeptics who advocated radical penal reform but were paralyzed by all the structural configurations it implies – which leads them to the idea that nothing works. According to Hulsman, the main change lies in a transformation from a top down vision of reform within the limits of a penal rationale to an approach from below,

in which the language from the "lifeworld" is adopted (Bianchi & van Swaaningen 1986).

In today's academic debate, abolitionism is mainly discussed as one of the many critical criminologies of the twenty first century. Many of its visions have been adopted by and integrated into other criminological perspectives. Now, popular perspectives such as constitutive criminology (Henry & Milovanovic 1996) or restorative justice (Braithwaite 1989) are grounded in abolitionist thought. Abolitionism's major merit is that it offers us a fundamentally different vision of crime and justice. Its epistemology offers an excellent basis for creative empirical research into penal and social control.

SEE ALSO: Criminal Justice System; Deconstruction; Deviance, Constructionist Perspectives; Deviance, Crime and; Foucault, Michel

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abortion as a social problem

Michele Dillon and Diana Dumais

Abortion has been legal in the US and in almost all Western European countries since the early 1970s, and in Belgium and Ireland since the early 1990s. Although abortion was legal in the Soviet Union for several years prior to its collapse, abortion politics have subsequently come to the fore in some Eastern European countries (e.g., Poland) as a result of government attempts to restrict it. But abortion is most intensely debated in the US, where legal and congressional initiatives to amend the US Supreme Court's recognition (*Roe v. Wade*, 1973) of a woman's legal right to an abortion continue unabated. Abortion activism is pursued by several religious and secular organizations, and abortion politics dominate presidential and congressional elections and debates over judicial appointments. Grassroots efforts to restrict abortion have met with some success, as subsequent Supreme Court decisions have imposed various restrictions on what many observers as well as pro life activists see as America's comparatively permissive law on abortion. Most notably, the imposition of spousal and parental notification requirements seeks to redress the emphasis on abortion as solely being a woman's right to choose and has sought to recognize the relational context of women's lives while not imposing an undue burden on women's freedom. The issue of late term abortion is currently one of the most intensely debated aspects of abortion law (even though most abortions are performed in the first trimester of pregnancy).

Notwithstanding the intensity of pro choice and pro life activism, American public opinion on abortion has remained steadfastly consistent. Since 1975, approximately one fifth of Americans agree that abortion should be illegal in all circumstances, another one fifth believe that abortion should be legal in all circumstances, and a broad majority take the moderate position that abortion should be legal but restricted. Whereas large majorities

T(approximately 80–85 percent) agree that abortion should be legally available to women in the case of rape, or when the pregnancy poses a physical threat to the mother or fetus, significantly fewer (approximately 40 percent) believe that it should be available if the woman/family cannot economically afford to have the child, or for other elective reasons (NORC, General Social Survey, various years).

According to the Alan Guttmacher Institute (2005: 5–6), abortion is one of the most common surgical procedures performed in the US: 1.29 million abortions were performed in 2002, and each year 47 percent of all unintended pregnancies in the US end in abortion. The abortion rate has been in decline since its peak of 29.3 (per 1,000 women ages 15 to 44) in the early 1980s, to 20.9 currently, and there has been an especially noticeable drop in its incidence among 15 to 19 year old girls (from 43.5 in the mid to late 1980s to 24.0 currently). By contrast, the overall abortion rate in England and Wales is considerably lower, at 17.0 (for women aged 15–44).

Many Americans argue that the number of abortions alone constitutes a social problem, although other commentators suggest that the aging and declining prevalence of abortion providers is a social problem in ferment. The majority of obstetricians who perform abortion are age 50 or over, and the proportion of US counties without abortion providers increased from 77 percent in the late 1970s to 86 percent in the late 1990s (Finer & Henshaw 2003: 6). Although its incidence might suggest that abortion has become a primary method of birth control, a majority of women who face the dilemma of an unintended pregnancy report using contraception during the month they became pregnant (53 percent), though not always correctly (Finer et al. 2005). Clearly, there are many, frequently overlapping, reasons why women seek abortion, including inadequate finances, relationship problems, concerns over readiness for motherhood, and psychological and physical health problems. Nonetheless, 60 percent of those who get an abortion are already mothers, and 12 percent have previously had an abortion.

The incidence of abortion is greater not only among teenagers, but across all age

groups, among women who are single, poor, and non white (Hispanic, black, or other ethnic minority). Most abortions in the US are obtained by women who have never been married (67 percent); a similar trend is evident elsewhere (e.g., 63 percent in England and Wales). Similarly, white women in both the US (41 percent) and England and Wales (37 percent) are more likely than women from any other single racial or ethnic group to obtain an abortion.

Although women in all economic groups seek abortion, low income women represent the majority of abortion patients. In 2000, 57 percent of women who obtained an abortion were poor or low income (defined as living at less than twice the poverty level, or earning less than \$28,300 for a family of three). However, low income women are less likely to end a pregnancy by abortion; their over representation in the abortion statistics is due to the fact that the rate of unintended pregnancy for this group is higher overall than for women with higher incomes. The impoverished economic circumstances of these low income women are further strained by recent changes in American welfare policy, which prior to the 1996 Welfare Reform Act was already significantly less supportive of maternity, child, and family welfare than European social policy. With low income pregnant women less likely than others to choose abortion, this means that their living situation and that of their children will further deteriorate, and lead to the inevitable downward spiral of poverty and its associated constellation of social problems.

Given the socio demographic trends in abortion usage, pro choice supporters argue that it is not abortion per se that is a social problem but the social and economic circumstances of many women's lives. In particular, they highlight that women's lack of resources, including the absence of health insurance, the lack of access to and effective use of contraception, and the absence of school sexual education programs, contributes to unintended pregnancies. Abortion supporters also point out that restrictions on abortion, such as demanded by spousal and parental notification requirements, do not recognize the high incidence of spousal and family violence in society

and the well grounded fears that many women and teenagers may have in disclosing their pregnancies.

SEE ALSO: Culture of Poverty; Domestic Violence; Family Planning, Abortion, and Reproductive Health; Pro Choice and Pro Life Movements; Public Opinion; Welfare State

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absenteeism

Gary Johns

Absenteeism is failing to report for scheduled work. As such, it is the violation of a social obligation to be in a particular place at a particular time (Johns 1997; Harrison & Martocchio 1998). Traditionally, absenteeism was viewed as an indicator of poor individual performance and a breach of an implicit contract between employee and employer. Thus, it was seen as a management problem and framed in economic or quasi economic terms. Indeed, economists most frequently view absenteeism in labor supply terms. More recently, absenteeism has increasingly been viewed as an indicator of psychological, medical, or social adjustment to work.

The most prominent of the psychological models is the withdrawal model, which assumes that absenteeism represents individual withdrawal from dissatisfying working conditions.

This model finds empirical support in a negative association between absence and job satisfaction, especially satisfaction with regard to the content of the work itself. It also finds support in a “progression” of withdrawal from being late, to being absent, to quitting a job. Psychological approaches have also linked employee disposition to absenteeism. Hence, the conscientious, those high in positive affect, and those who score high on composite tests of integrity are disinclined to be absent. Dispositional explanations find some corroboration in the fact that individual absenteeism is fairly stable over time, even in the face of changed work situations.

Medical models find support in research that links absenteeism to smoking, problem drinking, low back pain, and migraine. However, absence ascribed to medical causes frequently exhibits motivational correlates that suggest voluntariness. The line between psychological and medical causation is surely blurry, as positive links between both work stress and depression and absenteeism illustrate. Although medical mediation is often implied in the stress-absence connection, this has not often been explicitly tested. Correspondingly, depressive tendencies might underpin much absence ascribed to poor physical health, as might the adoption of a culturally approved sick role. Thus, placing the adjective *sickness* before the word absence carries a burden of more proof than is usually offered.

Another stream of scholarship that speaks to the adjustive aspects of absence is decidedly more social in nature, and thus of particular interest to sociologists. Much evidence indicates that absence is generally viewed as mildly deviant workplace behavior. For example, people tend to hold negative stereotypes of absentees, underreport their own absenteeism, and view their own attendance record as superior to that of their peers. In turn, negative attributions about absence give rise to three important consequences: the behavior is open to considerable social control, sensitive to social context, and the potential source of considerable workplace conflict.

One of the most important findings of contemporary absence research is the extent to which the behavior is open to social influence.

This stands as a salient complement to explanations that portray absence as a component of individual employee performance, a personal response to job dissatisfaction, a reflection of disposition, or a consequence of medical misfortune. Absence is open to social influence for two reasons. First, the connotation of *mild* deviance makes people sensitive to but not absolutist concerning its occurrence. Second, it is far from clear what constitutes a fair and reasonable level of absence. Markedly different absence rates across social units (e.g., teams, departments, plants, nations) are suggestive of this ambiguity. For instance, absence rates have been shown to vary by as much as a ratio of 7:1 between developed nations.

It was this observation of distinctive absence levels and patterns across meaningful social groupings that gave rise to the notion of *absence cultures*, which (in their strong form) constitute shared agreement about the appropriate meaning and expression of absenteeism within a social unit. Shared views about the *legitimacy* of the behavior under various circumstances are crucial. Evidence in support of the absence culture concept has been cumulative. At its base is considerable research suggesting that individual absence is influenced by social (often work group) norms, with such norms having been operationalized in a wide variety of ways. Absenteeism is generally negatively related to work group cohesiveness. This said, some research shows cohesive units colluding to take days off. However, absenteeism seems to peak under conditions of very low social integration: when cohesiveness is low, discourse on the legitimacy of the behavior is missing, and deviant overtones lack salience. The most persuasive evidence for the existence of absence cultures derives from formal cross level studies. In this research, work group absenteeism and beliefs about the behavior (generally aggregated to the group level) have been shown to influence the absenteeism of individual group members.

Most recently, the absence culture concept has been extended to understand how absenteeism is viewed and enacted among various occupations, social classes, and national cultures. Much of this research can also be

described as cross level. In general, more prestigious occupations exhibit lower absence rates. However, the dominant social class of the community in which employees live has been shown to influence absenteeism over and above occupational norms per se (Virtanen et al. 2000). Although there may be differences in the perceived legitimacy of absence across national cultures, the basic connotation of deviance seems to hold. However, indigenous mechanisms can reconcile the tendency to be self serving about one's own attendance with the need to exhibit collective solidarity. For instance, Johns and Xie (1998) found that both Chinese and Canadians underreported their own actual absenteeism and viewed their own attendance records as superior to those of their work group peers. However, the more collective Chinese reconciled this self serving by viewing the attendance of their work groups as being much superior to that of the occupational norm.

Given its deviant connotations and economic consequences for employers, absenteeism has often been a source of conflict in organizations. For these same reasons, it has also been a result of conflict, a way to assert control in the workplace. Given their respective organizational roles, managers and workers often hold different expectations about employee attendance, with managers expecting less absence than do their subordinates. As a result of this, excessive absenteeism is one of the most common subjects of labor arbitration. However, contemporary work designs that stress highly interdependent team structures and self management have also prompted conflict among employees themselves concerning absenteeism, as it is often an impediment to smooth teamwork.

On the other hand, conflict can also prompt absenteeism. At the heart of this are matters of social exchange. Thus, there is substantial research by social and organizational psychologists showing elevated absenteeism when distributive justice (i.e., equity) and support from management are perceived to be low. Hence, the appropriation of valuable time is one way to achieve fairer balance in one's exchange with the organization, especially when paid sick days are available. Sociologists and industrial

relations scholars have been most interested in the more collective manifestations of such exchange problems, seeing absenteeism as a means of asserting control in the work setting and resisting abuse by management. However, absenteeism has most often been viewed as a relatively individualized and less organized form of resistance, at least compared to strikes. Nonetheless, clear cases of collusion in support of absence have been observed, and unionized employees have been repeatedly shown to exhibit higher levels of absenteeism compared to those without representation.

Longitudinal research and research that is sensitive to social context illustrate how the social construction of absenteeism can change over time. For instance, Tansey and Hyman (1992) illustrate how this otherwise innocuous workplace behavior was reframed by employers to be a treasonous menace during the World War II production drive. Turnbull and Sapsford (1992) illustrate how absenteeism on the British docks changed from tolerated self expression to an entrenched expression of industrial conflict as technology and labor laws changed. In recent years, the increase in dual career couples and elder care issues, and the consequent drive for "family friendly" work places, has challenged the deviant overtones of absenteeism among some employees and employers.

The foregoing suggests that absenteeism is work behavior with a variety of meanings (socially constructed or not) masquerading as a unitary phenomenon. Also, the behavior can be studied at levels of analysis ranging from individual to national. These factors offer both challenges and opportunities for researchers. Because absenteeism has such a wide variety of causes, it has attracted the attention of a variety of disciplines, including sociology, psychology, economics, management, industrial relations, medicine, rehabilitation, and law. Except for integrative literature reviews (Johns 1997; Harrison & Martocchio 1998), however, there have not been enough synergies among these disciplinary approaches to absence. On the other hand, in part due to this multidisciplinary interest and in part due to the difficulties inherent in studying an infrequent and mildly deviant behavior, absenteeism has

been subjected to a great range and variety of research methods, a phenomenon that is very rare in the organizational sciences (Johns 2003). This multimethod approach, much advocated but seldom applied, has led to great advances in understanding the subtlety of absenteeism among those willing to accept the full complexity of this apparently routine work behavior.

SEE ALSO: Conflict Theory; Deviance; Norms; Stress and Work; Work, Sociology of

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accommodation

Rutledge M. Dennis

Accommodation was one of the four features of Robert Park and Ernest Burgess's model of social interaction. Though the concept illustrated racial and ethnic social changes taking place in the United States and the rest of the world during the last half of the nineteenth century and the first two or three decades of the twentieth, and for this reason lacks a certain relevance today, there are still aspects of the term, as defined by Park and Burgess, which might provide insights into specific patterns of racial and ethnic interaction and aid in our understanding of the dynamics of social change. Utilizing Simmel's model of dominance and its pivotal role in superordinate and subordinate relations, Park and Burgess describe accommodation as a procedure which limits conflicts and cements relations, in that groups and individuals recognize dominant individuals and groups as well as their positions within these super and subordinate relations. On the surface, this logic appears to be one of "live and let live," and appears to be grounded in an idea similar to that of social and cultural pluralism.

In the United States, the term has been closely associated with the policies of Booker T. Washington, founder of the Tuskegee Institute and the most influential black leader in the US between the 1890s and 1915. Washington adopted a strategy of racial accommodation because he knew confrontational politics would have resulted in the mass slaughter of Southern blacks, with the national government standing on the sidelines. He thus began a program of literally pacifying and engaging in compromises with Northern and Southern whites, and cajoling Southern blacks, who had the most to lose from confrontational policies, into joining such a strategy. He wanted this strategy to protect blacks from physical harm, while guaranteeing them some role in the economy, albeit at the lower levels for the time being. For whites the accommodative strategy was designed to demonstrate that they had nothing to fear from black

Southerners, who wished only to advance themselves through habits of work, sobriety, morality, and so on.

The situations and circumstances that determine the types of accommodation engaged in by various, and conflicting, racial, ethnic, linguistic, and religious groups vary. Type One accommodation is an accommodation in which there is a great power imbalance between two or more groups, based on population, military and police powers, and the economic and legal controls exerted by dominant groups. Less powerful groups must adjust to this power imbalance. The position of blacks and Native Americans in the US and Indians throughout Latin America adheres to this type, but the accommodation by Indian populations was reached after prolonged warfare against European colonial powers and their representatives. Type One might also include the accommodation by Scotland and Wales to England after the military and/or political arrangements that resulted in their respective incorporation into Great Britain. However, as the contemporary ongoing process of “devolution” demonstrates, neither Scotland nor Wales was satisfied with the hegemonic accommodative arrangement, which they viewed as highly beneficial to England. A similar arrangement may characterize the accommodative relationship between French Canadians and English Canadians and between Catalans, the Basque region, and the rest of Spain, though a large percentage of those in the Basque region have opted for independence rather than remain a province within Spain.

Type Two accommodation represents an accommodation in which contending groups may be relatively equal in size. Issues may revolve around how and why the groups settled into a territory, and how political and economic division of labor was defined and distributed among groups. Into this class may be placed Guyana, with its division between East Indians and Black Guyanese. Since independence from England, the accommodative strategy had been one of Black Guyanese political power and East Indian economic power. The election of Cheddi Jagan in 1992 threw the country into crisis, overturning the long existing accommodation strategy and signaling the possibility that East Indians would now have political as

well as economic control. Another example of political accommodation, focusing on language, is offered by Belgium, with the dialectics of accommodation and conflict involving Flemish and Walloon. Trinidad and Tobago can also be placed in the Type Two accommodation category, where the accommodating groups are East Indians and Black Trinidadians, the former controlling the economy, the latter retaining political control. As in Guyana, a crisis erupted in the 1990s when an East Indian became prime minister. Lastly, Malaysia offers another perspective on accommodation, this time with a large Malayan population and a much smaller Chinese population. The pattern of accommodation here was that Malaysians would hold political power while the Chinese would retain economic control. The threat of the Chinese gaining political power erupted in the 1960s, resulting in the removal of Singapore (predominantly Chinese) from the Malaysian Federation.

The Type Two cases reflect accommodation between groups. The examples given demonstrate that accommodation may clearly constitute a strategy and a theory of how multi ethnic groups must construct programs and policies to ensure a degree of cooperation and peace and to discourage social disorder. But under strategies of accommodation, groups wage silent political, economic, and social warfare in order to achieve or retain an edge over another group. Whenever one of the groups finds that it has an advantage, it immediately seizes upon an opportunity to secure it. This is clearly seen in attempts by both Flemish and Walloon speakers to extend their language into each other's provinces. Thus accommodation may be a temporary strategy engaged in by groups and nations when they perceive themselves as weak, or when groups are of comparable size and one group cannot have a decisive victory over another group. Unlike the Park and Burgess model, accommodation may not lead to assimilation but may be a stage leading to another form of conflict. What this illustrates is that people and nations may view accommodation as a useful strategy during periods of group weakness; it does not mean that they have accepted accommodation as a final solution in their relationship with other groups.

Finally, to return to Washington, it is a matter of debate whether he saw his accommodationism as a temporary strategy to buy time for blacks, or whether he saw it as a long term goal. A careful reading of Washington suggests the latter. For all his insight, W. E. B. Du Bois was blinded by a certain ideology and failed to understand that Washington simply could not play the same role in the South that he, Du Bois, played in the North. He also failed to see that the wisest policy would have called for a Northern and a Southern strategy for racial and social justice, and a willingness to understand in reality what Du Bois knew in theory: that different historical situations and circumstances require different approaches and strategies. Those unduly critical of Washington tend to confuse theory and reality.

SEE ALSO: Assimilation; Bilingualism; Conflict (Racial/Ethnic); Double Consciousness; Du Bois: "Talented Tenth"; Du Bois, W. E. B.; Park, Robert E. and Burgess, Ernest W.

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accounts

Robert Zussman

An account, as the term is most commonly used in sociology, refers to statements that explain disruptions in the social and moral order. In this sense, accounts are linguistic devices by which actors attempt to reposition themselves as socially acceptable and morally reputable in the face of imputations of deviance or failure. Although the concept of

accounts has roots in C. Wright Mills's 1940 article on "Situated Actions and the Vocabularies of Motives," in Gresham Sykes and David Matza's 1957 article on "Techniques of Neutralization," and more generally in the work of Erving Goffman, the term itself was introduced in its distinctive sociological sense by Marvin Scott and Sanford Lyman in their 1968 article, entitled simply "Accounts."

Since roughly the middle 1980s, the concept of accounts has given ground to the closely related concept of narrative. In certain respects, accounts and narratives refer to similar phenomena. Both accounts and narratives are (primarily) forms of talk. Both accounts and narratives call attention to the importance to the social production of meanings in addition to (or, in some instances, instead of) behavior. Both accounts and narratives are key tools in the negotiation of social identities. While no hard and fast distinction can or should be drawn between accounts and narratives, the two terms have, however, typically been used in somewhat different ways. Narrative, with strong resonance in literary theory, is a more general term than accounts and one with a more complex and varied history. Sociologists almost always treat accounts as an object of analysis; narratives, in contrast, are treated both as an object of analysis and, in some formulations, as a mode of analysis. As the terms are used in sociology, accounts typically refer to statements produced in tightly bounded situations, while narrative more often refers to longer statements, to full blown stories, deployed across situations. Similarly, accounts refer to responses to disruptions of a particular social order and by calls to accounts by an identifiable other. In contrast, narrative more often refers to storytelling produced under a wide variety of circumstances, including putatively spontaneous efforts to find, create, or express meaning, even in the absence of an identifiable other demanding such storytelling. For this reason, the analysis of accounts is typically focused tightly on strategies of social interaction, particularly on efforts to avoid blame. The analysis of narrative more frequently focuses on the expressive aspects of culture or on the effects of such cultural forms as the structure of plots. Finally, accounts most often refer to

efforts to repair a moral order, while narratives are more often understood as involving resistance as well as restoration.

The analysis of accounts has generated a lively research tradition, but it is a research tradition of a very particular sort. With the exception of some research conducted by scholars affiliated more with communication studies than with sociology, the analysis of accounts has generated few testable propositions and little quantitative research. Rather, accounts have served as a sensitizing concept, alerting researchers to a type of analysis that can be applied across a wide variety of sociological subfields and substantive areas, including, most prominently, deviance but also law, marriage, therapeutic communities, welfare, illness, and employment. Although these applications of account analysis could be classified in any number of ways, two useful ways of thinking about them are (1) in terms of the circumstances that provoke accounts and (2) what accounts accomplish in social interaction.

Because rule breaking, virtually by definition, represents a breach of the moral order, instances of rule breaking (crime, delinquency, and less explicit varieties of deviance), when observed, almost invariably involve calls for accounts from putative rule breakers. The density of accounts will vary, however, depending on the power of those agents of control (including, among many others, police, judges, social service workers, and, in some instances, physicians) who demand accounts and on the degree of control exercised by those agents over resources, symbolic and material, desired by rule breakers. Similarly, the likelihood that a rule breaker's account is honored, in the sense of granting forgiveness, will depend on the rule breaker's ability to generate a credible account consonant with the expectations of the agents of control.

While rule breaking involves an offense to a social and moral order upheld by someone other than the rule breaker, other forms of disruption unsettle the social and moral order of actors themselves, even in the absence of sanctions by others. Probably the most frequent account producing situations of this sort involves disruptions of an expected life course, as is the case in divorce and in unexpected

illness. Other account producing occasions emerge not from changes in the actor's life, but from changes in an environment which generate changed expectations about unchanged behavior. Changes in the gender order or the economic order or changes across generations, each as they alter, in their concrete manifestations, the expectations of individual actors, also generate accounts. Unlike accounts generated by rule breaking, accounts generated by unanticipated individual and social changes often lack a specific audience and clear standards by which they are honored or dishonored, and are as often directed inward (to the actor) as outward.

A third class of account producing situations consists not so much of disruptions of routine but of routinely generated demands for accounts. Many organizations expect their members routinely to produce accounts of their activities, both retrospectively and prospectively. The employee self evaluation is perhaps the most familiar form of such accounts, but similar phenomena may be found in student self evaluations and in a wide variety of therapeutic settings. Similarly, various events marking stages in the life course – anniversaries, retirements, school and military reunions – all encourage account giving at highly predictable intervals. Accounts produced under such circumstances combine elements of the accounts produced by rule breaking and by disruptions of other sorts. Although routine accounts typically involve distinct audiences, they may be directed inward as well as outward and involve a great deal of ambiguity and variation as to the circumstances under which they will be honored.

Accounts may also be classified by what they accomplish, by their functions and consequences, both for individual actors and for the social and moral order.

First, accounts may restore breaches in the social order. Scott and Lyman (1968) proposed that restorative accounts could be classified as excuses or justifications. Excuses, including appeals to accident and the absence of intention, acknowledge that a breach has taken place, but deny responsibility for it. Justifications, in contrast, involve techniques of neutralization, including either a denial of injury or a claim that a victim of an act was

deserving of injury. Unlike excuses, justifications involve an acceptance of responsibility but a denial that an act is incongruent with established standards of behavior. Both excuses and justifications, then, entail an acceptance of agreed upon general standards of behavior, even while recasting interpretations of particular behaviors. In this sense, accounts may be what Stokes and Hewitt (1976) call aligning actions: statements that create a congruity between conduct and cultural expectations for conduct in the face of actions that appear to depart from those expectations. Because both excuses and justifications involve an acceptance of agreed upon standards, accounts are a central contributor to the maintenance of a consensual moral order.

Second, accounts, even taken narrowly as explanations of disruptions of an ongoing moral order, are deeply implicated in processes of social control. In some instances, however, accounts may be understood as forms of resistance to the inclusion of an individual (or collectivity) in a discredited category. In yet other instances, as McLaughlin et al. (1983) have shown, individuals may refuse to produce accounts, even when reproached directly, denying not only the grounds of the reproach but also the reproacher's right to evaluate. Taken more broadly, accounts, understood as stories, may contribute not only to resistance but also to social change. Here used in a sense closer to that of narratives, accounts of injustice and protest have proven particularly powerful tools for mobilization in, for example, both the civil rights and labor movements.

Third, and more generally, accounts are a form of making meaning. Whether, as some suggest, this meaning making emerges from a deep felt human urge or, as is more demonstrable, from specific social situations that challenge existing understandings, accounts provide interpretations of behavior and its motives. Understood narrowly, accounts are efforts to give socially acceptable meanings to particular and otherwise discredited behaviors. Understood more broadly, as plotted narratives, accounts are efforts to connect a series of events and behaviors into a coherent story, with a beginning, a middle, and an end, causally related and with a more or less explicit moral content.

Fourth, and more specifically, accounts create identities. Because accounts involve the imputation of motives, and the selective avowal and disavowal of behaviors as motivated, they also involve claims as to what is and is not a part of the self. When offered with deep felt belief on the part of the speaker, as is often the case in response to illness, divorce, or other disruptions of a previous routine, accounts contribute to the formation of both personal (internally held) and social (publicly enacted) identities. When offered cynically, as self conscious efforts to manipulate impressions, whether for the enhancement of status or to avoid sanctions, accounts may not contribute to the formation of personal identities but nonetheless still contribute to the formation of social identities.

SEE ALSO: Accounts, Deviant; Identity Theory; Mills, C. Wright; Narrative; Social Order

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accounts, deviant

Michael L. Benson

An account is a statement made by someone to explain unexpected or untoward behavior (Scott & Lyman 1968). For example, Scully and Marolla (1984) interviewed convicted rapists and found that they had a variety of explanations for their behavior. Some men blamed the victim by stating that she had seduced them. Others denied that the woman had not consented. They claimed that she really did want to have sex. Still others contended that the whole episode had been blown out of proportion and was not really very serious. All of these explanations are designed to put the offender in a less unfavorable light, which is the major purpose that accounts are intended to serve. Although accounts are usually developed in reference to a person's own behavior, the behavior in question can be someone else's. Accounts are a universal feature of ordinary interaction, used by most people on a regular basis. Deviant accounts are those developed specifically to account for acts that are widely regarded as deviant and unacceptable to members of a particular social and cultural setting as opposed to acts that are simply unusual or unexpected.

Deviant accounts often apply to specific instances of behavior, such as in the example of the rapists given above. However, they also can apply to broader aspects of a person's life, indeed to an entire lifestyle or to a physical characteristic, such as obesity, which is stigmatized within a particular cultural setting (Goode 2002). For example, a woman who works as a prostitute might seek to account for her lifestyle by claiming it is a reaction to sexual abuse she experienced as a child. Similarly, drug dealers sometimes account for their involvement in dealing by claiming that it enables them to support their children better and to spend more time with them (Adler 1993). Whether accounts are focused on discrete instances of behavior or on entire lifestyles, their purpose is always to remove or at least reduce the stigma and negative connotations that would ordinarily accompany the actor's deviant appearing behavior.

Typically, accounts are conceived as being given by and applying to the behavior of individuals. However, they can also be used by organizations to defend or restore organizational reputations. For example, consider a situation in which it comes to light that some members of a large organization have committed an illegal act while occupying their organizational positions. As an illustration, we can use individual brokers in a large stock brokerage firm who individually defraud their clients. Other members of the organization may respond by expelling the wrongdoers and publicly claiming that their behavior is not representative of the organization as a whole and was not endorsed by the organization's leaders. Compared to individuals, organizations have some advantages in accounting for deviance in that they can at times disassociate themselves from the behavior of some of their members. Organizational leaders also can claim or feign ignorance of the deviant activities of subordinates and thus maintain their own personal integrity as well as that of the organization as a whole. It is more difficult for individuals to disassociate themselves from their own behavior.

Accounts are part of the subject matter of the sociology of talk, which is based on the premise that talk is the fundamental material of human relations. Accounts also have been considered by philosophers of language who study speech acts (Searle 1969). Even though accounts are in a sense nothing more than talk, it is recognized that they play an important role in the maintenance of social relationships and ultimately of society as a whole. They are techniques by which actors can repair relationships that have been damaged or threatened by the actors' unacceptable or unexpected behavior. Accounts help maintain social order by reducing or preventing conflicts that may arise whenever one person's behavior does not meet the expectations of another. Thus, if a rapist, for example, can convince his friends and family that his accuser was the one who was really at fault, then his relationships are to some extent repaired and conflict reduced. More generally, accounts are part of the inventory of impression management techniques that people call upon to present themselves to others.

Accounts are closely related to a group of other linguistic devices called techniques of neutralization. Techniques of neutralization are reasons that actors use to free themselves from normative restraints that ordinarily would prevent them from engaging in particular deviant acts (Sykes & Matza 1957). If the normative restraints can be neutralized, then individuals can feel free to commit deviant acts. For example, a student may cheat on a test by thinking to herself before the exam that everyone else is going to cheat so I might as well do so, too. In this case, the student's reasoning that everyone else is breaking the rules frees her from responsibility to follow the rules against cheating. Accounts differ from neutralizations in several ways. In theory, neutralizations occur before a deviant act takes place and have a causal role in its occurrence. An account, on the other hand, comes after the act in question and serves to explain the behavior in question to someone else. Accounts do not play a causal role in behavior, though they may describe the reasons that the actor had in mind before committing the act.

How accounts are related to neutralizations is an open question. In some cases, accounts probably reflect neutralizations that occurred to the actor prior to the deviant act. In other cases, accounts may not be preceded by neutralizations. Rather, they may simply be made up by actors after their deviance has come to light.

Research on accounts has focused on classifying the different types. Two major types have been identified – excuses and justifications (Scott & Lyman 1968). In offering an excuse, an account giver admits the act in question was wrong or somehow inappropriate but denies having full responsibility for it. There are various ways of denying full responsibility, such as claiming that the act was an accident or claiming that the actor was not himself. For example, a rapist may attempt to excuse his actions by claiming that he was under the influence of alcohol or drugs at the time (Scully & Marolla 1984). A justification is an account in which the giver accepts responsibility for the act but then denies the negative quality associated with it.

As with excuses, there are a number of different ways in which actors can deny the pejorative content of their acts. For example, a teenage boy may justify assaulting another boy by claiming that the victim had insulted his sister and deserved to be beaten up.

In addition to developing typologies of accounts, researchers have also been concerned with how accounts are culturally situated. Culture influences the structure of accounts, because the account giver assumes that his or her audience shares certain background assumptions about how the world works. For example, in interviews with convicted white collar offenders, Benson (1985) found that they often justified their offenses by claiming that their actions were necessary in order for them to stay in business and make a profit. For a business person to justify rule breaking by saying that he or she needed to make a profit to stay in business makes a certain sense in capitalistic economies. It is a rationale that most members of such a society can at least understand, even though they may not agree with its application in any particular instance. However, the same rationale would make much less sense and probably would not serve as an adequate justification for rule breaking in a communist society, where the idea of individual profit is not recognized or accepted. Thus, accounts often are based in and derive their plausibility from a larger social and cultural context. As this context changes, accounts also change.

Other important questions concern the conditions under which accounts are successful. A successful account normalizes social relations, reduces conflict, and restores the integrity of the account giver's personal and social identity. Researchers have investigated whether and how the social and personal characteristics of individuals influence the types of accounts they develop and their success.

Over the past few decades, the study of accounts has changed in that researchers have turned away from a concern with the empirical validity of accounts and toward the view that accounts must be conceived as tools used by people to accomplish certain ends. Thus, what matters about an account is not so much its empirical validity as a description of reality

or what really happened (Goode 2002). Whether any given account accurately portrays what really happened is now seen as a less important question. The more important question is how accounts work. What makes an account successful? How are they generated by social and cultural contexts? To what extent do the personal and social characteristics of the account giver influence the type and success of accounts?

The study of accounts raises a number of methodological problems. Typically, studies have been conducted through the use of qualitative in depth interviews. Qualitative interviews require a great deal of skill from the investigator to be used successfully. This technique is necessary because accounts can be complex and multifaceted. Further, they must be understood from the account giver's perspective. Research subjects must be permitted to tell their own stories in their own words. Thus, research results in this area depend on the interviewing and interpretive skills of individual researchers and are difficult to replicate. Studies of accounts tend to be based on small samples of respondents and to be very time consuming for investigators. They also tend to generate large amounts of textual data, which can be difficult to organize systematically. Because the samples are small and because the data generated by in depth interviews are difficult to summarize, only the most rudimentary quantitative analyses are possible. Questions can be raised about the validity and generalizability of the present knowledge base about accounts. Recent advances in computer based qualitative data analysis software have made it easier for researchers to manage the large amount of textual data that interviews produce and to conduct analyses that can be replicated by others. Nevertheless, it is likely that the knowledge base in this area will grow slowly and not in a cumulative fashion.

SEE ALSO: Accounts; Crime; Crime, White Collar; Deviance; Deviance, Crime and; Deviance, Explanatory Theories of; Deviance, Theories of; Deviant Beliefs/Cognitive Deviance; Juvenile Delinquency

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acculturation

Kimya N. Dennis

Foster (1962) defines acculturation as the process of bringing previously separated and disconnected cultures into contact with one another. This contact must be substantial enough such that "cultural transmission" takes place (Herskovits 1950). Cultural transmission is a key concept that distinguishes acculturation from other terms that are used interchangeably, including assimilation, enculturation, and diffusion. Both Foster and Herskovits highlight the theme of cultural borrowing. The process through which cultural borrowing occurs is of central concern to sociologists and involves between group power differentials, cultural artifacts, and group norms and values.

Acculturation is not the absorption of different cultures as a result of a mere physical contact or superficial exposure. The processes of cultural transmission and cultural borrowing are the result of conscious decision making on the part of an individual or a group that is approaching a culturally distinct group. If no

force or coercion is involved, the individual or group must decide whether and to what extent the new culture will be accepted or rejected. There are instances where the new culture will be imposed upon an individual or a group through force or coercion. In such forced circumstances, the individual or group retains the ability to consciously accept or reject certain aspects of the new culture. An example of conscious decision making under forced circumstances is the refusal of blacks to accept their "inherent inferiority" during Jim Crow. This refusal to accept this aspect of the Jim Crow subculture translated to the struggles of blacks for economic and political inclusion in American society. This selective acceptance and rejection of the Jim Crow subculture, within the American culture, illustrates the distinction E. Franklin Frazier (1957) made between "material acculturation" and "ideational acculturation." Material acculturation involves the conveying of language and other cultural tools whereas ideational acculturation involves the conveying of morals and norms. Individuals and groups can consciously decide to accept the language and cultural tools of a new culture without accepting and internalizing the morals and norms of the new culture.

The process of acculturation is complex and is not a simple matter of the cultural majority forcing its culture upon the cultural minority. The experiences of racial and ethnic minorities and immigrant populations in the United States highlight this complex process of inclusion or exclusion (Myrdal 1944). The "melting pot" is inclusion as a result of a merging of cultures and assimilation. The "salad bowl," also known as cultural pluralism, is another metaphor to denote inclusion. The cultures within the "salad bowl" do not assimilate but instead maintain their cultural traits and group identities. Both "melting pot" and "salad bowl" are in contrast to cultural exclusion, which fosters segregation by race, ethnicity, and religion. Segregation under cultural exclusion has been rationalized by redefining cultural pluralism. Attempting to include racial, ethnic, and religious segregation under the umbrella of cultural pluralism ignores the antagonism of black-white and native born-immigrant relations. While cultural

transmission is reciprocal, it is most salient from white to black and from native born to immigrant. There has been a degree of acculturation in which white Americans have borrowed aspects of the cultural expression of blacks and immigrant populations. These cultural aspects include music, dance, art, dialect, sports, clothing, foods, and religion.

George Spindler (1963) created a typology of individual and group responses to the process of acculturation. This typology is Passive Withdrawal, Reactive, Compensatory, Adaptive, and Culture Revisionist and was designed to assess college student responses to change. Spindler's (1963) typology can be generalized to individuals and groups beyond the original research design because there are patterns of responses to change and the process of acculturation across contexts. These response patterns are illustrated in various historical accounts, including Frederick Douglass's (1845) acculturation experience as a former slave and other blacks' experiences with acculturation (Andrew 1988; David 1992), as chronicled by Du Bois (1903), Ralph Ellison (1964), and Booker T. Washington (1901). Thomas and Znaniecki's (1956) study of Polish peasants and studies of "new ethnics" by Santoli (1988), Dublin (1996), and Myers (2005) also highlight individual and group responses to acculturation.

Some individuals and groups respond favorably and with relative ease to the possibility of acculturation whereas others respond unfavorably and with unease. In the former, the incoming group views its acculturation in a positive light and in the latter the incoming group views its acculturation in a negative light. Therefore, how the individual or group perceives the process of acculturation and how the larger society perceives this process are both significant. If the larger society views the possibility of an incoming group's acculturation as favorable and with ease, there will be less hostility and discomfort throughout the process. If the acculturation of an incoming group is viewed unfavorably and with unease by the larger society, there will be greater hostility, discomfort, and the process will require more effort on the part of this incoming group. Examples of favorable responses to acculturation include European immigrants

such as Poles, Italians, and Germans. The process of acculturation was performed with relative ease and it transitioned into a process of assimilation. In contrast, the process of acculturation for Jewish Americans and blacks has been met with greater hostility and discomfort such that there is a difficult yet enduring process of acculturation and assimilation. Both blacks and Jewish Americans' efforts to acculturate were resisted by whites. However, this hostility and discomfort is not only on the part of the larger society. Jewish Americans, for example, consciously accepted and rejected aspects of the dominant culture in order to maintain a Jewish identity and distinct religious and cultural practices. Therefore, the processes of acculturation and assimilation are gradual and continual for blacks, Jewish Americans, and other old and new racial and ethnic groups.

Because there are patterns of individual and group responses to acculturation which have unique geographical nation state differences, the political and economic climate of Europe and the European Union is a final illustration of the acculturation process. The acculturation of immigrant populations has particularly been an issue with the Muslim population in France, the Turkish population in Germany, and Caribbean and Asian populations in England. These societies are religiously and ethnically different from the Muslim, Turkish, Caribbean, and Asian populations being introduced into those countries.

SEE ALSO: Accommodation; Assimilation; Culture; Du Bois, W. E. B.; Melting Pot; Racial Hierarchy; Separatism

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action research

Robert Louis Flood

Action research refers to participatory processes that are democratic in nature, in which action is undertaken in a social context that leads to improvements, having accommodated for the needs of all stakeholders, while, at the same time, the process facilitates social research about action for improvement through participation and aids social research in general.

The kinds of actions that constitute action research are unbounded. Action may focus on improving basic conditions in communities in developing countries, performance in a commercial organization, understanding and influencing the impact of humans on the environment, education systems for adults, conservation of diminishing natural resources such as fish stocks or oil, and so on *ad infinitum*. Wherever there is a social issue there is a need for action.

Research in action research is both formative (what might we do?) and summative (what have we learned?). Formative research involves stakeholders in defining key issues, identifying possible kinds of improvement, choosing what to improve and how to make the improvements, and developing ways of evaluating whether improvement has been achieved or not. Summative research involves consolidation of learning from the process of action yielding experiential knowledge about tools and methods employed, concepts and models generated, and indeed the methodology utilized or developed to drive the action process. This is reflective praxis. Summative research provides experiential knowledge that may be drawn upon by future action researchers as well as the research society at large. In most social contexts like organizations, action is ongoing and so are the formative and summative cycles. Figure 1 represents research in action research showing that formative and summative processes in principle constitute interwoven never ending learning cycles.

One of the main principles of action research is meaningful participation in both action for improvement and the research process involving all stakeholders, insofar as

that is reasonably achievable. Stakeholders here are defined as all those people involved in and affected by the process itself and the process outcomes, such as decisions on what constitutes improvement and thus what action to take. Action research thus may lay claim to democratizing social action and social research processes. Further, some action researchers promote their action research as a means to emancipatory social practices and emancipatory social research.

Knowledge acquisition in action research undertaken in social contexts is different from knowledge acquisition in the natural sciences. Natural scientists emphasize repeatability of results in experiments in the belief that the natural world is regular over time and that it is possible to reach a consensus about natural phenomena. However, action researchers emphasize the ever changing and subjective character of social reality and that intersubjective discourse is the only means by which we may facilitate knowledge acquisition.

“Valid social knowledge [in action research] is derived from practical reasoning engaged in through action” (Greenwood & Levin 1998). Validity of social knowledge generated through action research therefore refers to the




Figure 1 Formative and summative learning cycles in the process of action research.

context from which knowledge is derived. It is context dependent. Thus, while knowledge derived from an action research process may hold utility in other social contexts, knowledge is not perceived to be concrete so that it holds true for all social contexts.

Checkland and Holwell (1998) recognize that outcomes from action research are not repeatable in the manner of the natural sciences, but state that outcomes can be and should be recoverable by interested outsiders. Recoverability means that the formative process and summative outcomes of the process are made transparent and thus more robust. Accordingly, it is essential to state the set of ideas and the process in which they are used methodologically (the epistemology) by means of which action researchers will make sense of their work, and so define what counts for them as acquired knowledge. "This yields a 'truth claim' less strong than that of laboratory experimentation, but one much stronger than that of mere 'plausibility'" (Checkland & Holwell 1998). "Plausibility," Checkland and Holwell state, is all that action research can claim without a process of "recoverability" built into the methodology.

Methods and techniques that may be drawn upon in the process of action research are wide ranging. They include many kinds of qualitative and quantitative approaches drawn from all areas of the social sciences. It is not techniques employed in a process of improvement that define whether the process is action research or not, but the methodology by which the process is driven and the outcomes interpreted. The key driver in methodologies for action research is "dialogue" rather than mere "discussion." Discussion may be thought of as the presentation and defense of ideas where there are winners and losers. This does not sit well within action research. Dialogue requires action researchers to suspend their views and explore the mental models of other participants and stakeholders. Learning and understanding begins only when you start to "see through the eyes of others" (Churchman 1979) in a search for authentic understanding of a multitude of beliefs and values that pervade all social contexts. In this way, dialogue promotes meaningful participation, facilitates deeper mutual understanding between participants,

and generates outcomes such as improvements that accommodate the needs of all participants.

A healthy debate in action research surrounds the question of what constitutes suitable dialogical processes for improvement and learning in social contexts. Numerous methodological approaches have been advocated and the claims of a few of these are summarized below (see the section on "Practices" in Reason & Bradbury 2001).

- *Action inquiry* offers person, second person, and third person types of research that each of us can conduct in the midst of our own ongoing practices at home or at work (Torbert 2001).
- *Action science* is an approach to action research that attempts to bridge the gap between social research and social practice by building theories that explain social phenomena, inform practice, and adhere to the fundamental criteria of science (see the seminal publication by Argyris et al. 1985).
- *Appreciative inquiry* is a positive mode of action research that liberates the creative and constructive potential of organizations and human communities (Cooperrider & Srivastva 1987).
- *Clinical inquiry* leads researchers to base their inquiry on needs of the client system and work on developing a healthy relationship with that system in the belief that such a process will obtain deeper and more valid information (Schein 1987).
- *Community action research* offers an approach to cooperation based on an underlying theory of learning communities that integrate research, capacity building, and practice, and on shared understanding of why such integration is both important and difficult (Senge & Scharmer 2001).
- *Cooperative inquiry* is a way of doing cooperative research with people on matters of practical concern to them utilizing a well considered way of closing the gap between research and the way we live and work together (Heron & Reason 2001).
- *Participatory research* is a way of life, a philosophical or political choice that works in support of groups who are most often excluded or marginalized from dominant knowledge discourses (Hall 2001).

That there is a multitude of methodologies presented under the banner of action research is at least in part explained by the wide ranging origins and groundings that constitute action research. The origin of action research is often traced to the social research of Kurt Lewin in the 1940s (e.g., Lewin 1943, 1948). In the 1943 publication, Lewin reported on training of housewives in cooking and the effects on their daily cooking habits in their own families. The important step Lewin made was to research in a real life social setting as opposed to “laboratory science” that hitherto dominated the research process. Lewin’s approach involved a deliberate methodical effort to create participative change in organizations. Lewin’s work also influenced research on group dynamics and experiential learning about interpersonal interaction in personal development (Schein & Bennis 1965).

Progress in this tradition of social research continued through the Tavistock Institute of Human Relations that employed Lewin’s idea of research in real life social contexts. Psychoanalytic research coupled with an action orientation characterized their socio technical thinking. The most famous of the Tavistock studies was undertaken in the British coal mining industry (Trist & Bamforth 1951). This was not an action research study as such, but the first real socio technical study that paved the way for action research. The problem was that new technology did not lead to greater efficiency and the industry wanted to know why. Trist and Bamforth found that production technology and work organization are inextricably linked. Inefficiency arose because of incongruity between demands created by new technology and what is of assistance to miners as a group of interacting human beings. Progress of the industrial democracy movement was influenced by Trist and Bamforth’s findings that swayed research away from Tayloristic reductionist approaches that advocate specialization through bounded work groups, towards more holistic real life social research.

The subsequent rise of industrial democracy promoting semi autonomous work groups shaped production systems and work practices of many large organizations, including Volvo,

Saab Scania, and Alfa Laval (Greenwood & Levin 1998). Socio technical thinking soon surfaced in North America (Davis & Taylor 1972) and then in Japan in the quality management movement (Juran 1980; Deming 1983). By the 1980s the idea of holistic research in real life social settings had pervaded industrial practices across the globe.

Reason and Bradbury (2001) acknowledge that action research is indebted to the Lewin and Tavistock tradition, but also identify crucial intellectual developments that gave rise to a fundamental theoretical framework within which action research would find its grounding. They identify the critique of positivist science and scientism that gave rise to new epistemologies of practice. They recognize a Marxist dictum that the important thing is not to understand the world, but to change it for the better. In this regard, Reason and Bradbury cite for example the educational work of Freire (Shor & Freire 1987), the participatory research practice of people working for the liberation of oppressed and underprivileged people (Fals Borda 2001; Hall 2001), and practices like participatory rural appraisal (Chambers 1997).

Perhaps the most fundamental grounding of action research lies in its systemic, or holistic, awareness (Flood 1999, 2001). Action researchers appreciate that human thought is not capable of knowing the whole, but is capable of “knowing that we don’t know.” This is an important step forward in human understanding. Such awareness highlights the futility, let alone the hostility, of traditional forms of practice based on science’s prediction and control, which dominate today’s social organizational arrangements. Such approaches are futile because social dynamics always will remain beyond control. Such approaches are hostile because they attack people’s spiritual well being by isolating us and treating us as separate objects, rather than appreciating patterns of relationship that join us together in one dynamic. Systemic thinking broadens action and deepens research. That is, action research carried out with a systemic perspective in mind promises to construct meaning that resonates strongly with our experiences within a profoundly systemic world.

SEE ALSO: Epistemology; Methods; Praxis

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actor-network theory

Geoffrey Bowker

Actor network theory originated in the 1980s as a movement within the sociology of science, centered at the Paris School of Mines. Key developers were Bruno Latour (Latour 1987), Michel Callon, Antoine Hennion, and John Law. It was sharply critical of earlier historical and sociological analyses of science, which had drawn a clear divide between the "inside" of a science (to be analyzed in terms of its adherence or not to a unitary scientific method) and its "outside" (the field of its application).

Actor network theorists made three key moves. First, they argued for a semiotic, network reading of scientific practice. Human and non human actors (actants) were assumed to be subject to the same analytic categories, just as a ring or a prince could hold the same structural position in a fairy tale. They could be enrolled in a network or not, could hold or not hold certain moral positions, and so forth. This profound ontological position has been the least understood but the most generative aspect of the theory. Second, they argued that in producing their theories, scientists

weave together human and non human actors into relatively stable network nodes, or “black boxes.” Thus a given astronomer can tie together her telescope, some distant stars, and a funding agency into an impregnable fortress, and to challenge her results you would need to find your own telescope, stars, and funding sources. Practically, this entailed an agnostic position on the “truth” of science. Indeed, they argued for a principle of symmetry according to which the same set of explanatory factors should be used to account for failed and successful scientific theories. There is no ultimate arbiter of right and wrong. Third, they maintained that in the process of constructing these relatively stable network configurations, scientists produced contingent nature–society divides. Nature and society were not pre-given entities that could be used to explain anything else; they were the outcomes of the *work* of doing technoscience. Latour called this the “Janus face” of science. As it was being produced it was seen as contingent; once produced it was seen as always and already true.

Together, these three moves made the central analytical unit the work of the intermediary. There is no society out there to which scientists respond as they build their theories, nor is there a nature which constrains them to a single telling of their stories. Rather, the technoscientist stands between nature and society, politics and technology. She can act as a spokesperson for her array of actants (things in the world, people in her lab), and if successful can black box these to create the effect of truth.

The theory has given rise to a number of concepts which have proven useful in a wide range of technoscientific analyses. It has remained highly influential as a methodological tool for analyzing truth making in all its forms. The call to “follow the actors” – to see what they do rather than report on what they say they do – has been liberating for those engaged in studying scientists, who frequently hold their own truth and practice as if above the social and political fray. Their attention to the work of representation on paper led to the ideas of “immutable mobiles” and “centers of calculation,” which trace the power of technoscience to its ability to function as a centralizing networked bureaucracy. Indeed,

the anthropological eye of actor networked theorists – looking at work practices and not buying into actors’ categories – has led to a rich meeting between the sociology of work, the Chicago School of sociology, and actor network theory. Latour’s later work on the distribution of political and social values between the technical world and the social institution has opened up a powerful discourse about the political and moral force of technology.

The actor network theory itself has changed significantly in recent years, including Latour’s (1999) tongue in cheek denial of each of its central terms and the hyphen connecting them. This has been in response to a number of critiques that the theory privileged the powerful, Machiavellian technoscientist as world builder, without giving much opportunity for representing the invisible technicians within the networks and alternative voices from without (Star 1995).

SEE ALSO: Actor Network Theory, Actants; Science and Culture; Science, Social Construction of; Technology, Science, and Culture

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actor-network theory, actants

Steve Fuller

Actor network theory has been the dominant school of science and technology studies since shortly after the English publication of Latour

(1987). It reflects the combined efforts of Michel Callon, an engineer turned economist, and Bruno Latour, a philosopher turned anthropologist, both of whom have worked since 1980 at the Center for the Sociology of Innovation at L'École Nationale Supérieure des Mines in Paris. Together, they have provided, respectively, the "hard" and "soft," or "policy oriented" and "academically oriented," versions of their joint intellectual standpoint. Actor network theory has flourished in the context of the changing status of academic knowledge production in the European Union, where states influenced to varying degrees by neoliberalism have increasingly forced a traditionally protected higher education sector to justify itself by establishing ties with external "users and beneficiaries."

Its name notwithstanding, actor network theory is less a theory than a method for mapping the patterns of "technoscience" that emerge from this neoliberal regime. However, the UK sociologist John Law, the main proponent of actor network theory in the English speaking world, has worked hard to convert the "theory" into a postmodern metaphysics presaging a complete makeover of the social sciences, in which networks become the stuff out of which both individual identity and social organization are constructed. While networks have long been recognized as an intermediate level of social organization between, say, a face to face group and an institution, actor network theory at its most ambitious aims to redefine these multiple levels as networks of varying lengths, resiliency, and rates of growth. Unsurprisingly perhaps, this ambitious vision has found many followers in business schools, where "networking" is most naturally seen as constitutive of social reality.

The conceptual cornerstone of actor network theory is the "actant," a term borrowed from semiotics. In the work of Greimas and Genette, it referred to anything that acts in a narrative setting. The term was coined to suspend issues about whether the actor is real or fictional, human or non human, etc. What matters is simply the actant's role in an action context. Actor network theory converts this methodological point into an ontological principle. Its import is that agency – and specifically responsibility – is distributed equally across

entities, including a host of non human ones not normally seen as exercising agency at all. Consequently, actor network accounts can appear animistic. In any case, they tend to undermine attempts to find a prime mover in a complex technoscientific "assemblage."

Sociologically speaking, actor network theory is a classic beneficiary of others' miseries, in this case, a democratized and status degraded French science and engineering profession. The godfather of structuralism in the human sciences, the philosopher Gaston Bachelard, turns out to be an inspirational figure because of his explicit portrayal of scientists and engineers as akin to a theoretically exploited proletariat, from whose labors philosophers try to extract surplus value in the form of such metaphysical positions as realism and idealism. This subaltern view suited French scientists and engineers after 1968, when Charles De Gaulle responded to the academic challenge to his presidency by multiplying universities, which succeeded in dividing the ranks of a previously elite profession along roughly class lines.

Actor network theory was built on case studies of the success – and especially the failure – of technoscientific networks to translate their typically divergent interests into a workable product or course of action. Significant in the French science policy context were three failures: the electric car's failure to be marketable; the Minitel's failure to become integrated into global computer networks; and the failure of a computer driven customized rail system to attract Parisian commuters (Latour 1993). In each case, the failure was traceable to an exaggerated confidence in what top down management could accomplish without attending to the "interests" of those mediating entities – often but not always human – whose cooperation would have been necessary for the policy's implementation. Reflexively speaking, the actor network theorist's own power here lies in her ability to temper actors' expectations, which in turn helps to maintain a rhythm to the circulation of elites that is tolerable by the society as a whole.

In terms of normative orientation, actor network theory may be seen as turning Max Weber on his head. If, as Weber believed, the "modernity" of the state is marked by a

reliance on scientifically authorized modes of legitimation, then instead of indulging their masters in the belief that policy regimes can be rendered efficient, duly authorized social scientists like Callon and Latour can both prove their usefulness and run interference on state policy by highlighting unforeseen obstacles on the way to policy implementation. They are thus able to manufacture a sense of integrity and even value neutrality – along with a hint of radicalism – in a client driven world: she can stare down her master while reinforcing the master’s need for her services. A not inappropriate comparison is with the psychotherapist who strings along the patient for the material benefit of the former and the spiritual benefit of the latter. This opportunism, perhaps even cynicism, has been widely noted within science and technology studies without being decisively addressed.

SEE ALSO: Actor Network Theory; Network Society; Semiotics; Technology, Science, and Culture

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Addams, Jane (1860–1935)

Mary Jo Deegan

Feminist pragmatist, social settlement leader, and Nobel Laureate, Jane Addams was a charismatic world leader with an innovative intellectual legacy in sociology. She is one of

the most important female sociologists who ever lived. From 1890 to 1935, she led dozens of women in sociology, although after 1920 most of these women were forced out of sociology and into other fields such as social work, home economics, applied psychology, pedagogy, and college administration.

Jane Addams was born on September 6, 1860, in the Midwestern small town of Cedarville, Illinois. She was profoundly influenced by her father, John Addams, a Hicksite Quaker, state senator, and mill owner, but she did not know her mother, Sarah Weber, who died when Addams was 2 years old. In 1877 Addams entered Rockford Female Seminary, in Rockford, Illinois, a pioneering college for women. After she graduated in 1881, her father died in August, and she became confused and despairing. She entered the Women’s Medical College in Philadelphia in the fall, but she soon returned to Illinois. In poor health and surrounded by family problems, Addams drifted for a year. Finally taking some action, in 1883 she traveled to Europe, but she remained frustrated until she returned to Europe in 1887 and started new studies of society and culture. Accompanied by her college friend Ellen Gates Starr, Addams found a direction for her life after visiting the social settlement Toynbee Hall in London’s East End. This group served the exploited working classes and supported artisans who harmonized their interests in art, labor, and the community. Toynbee Hall provided a model in 1889 for Addams and Starr to co found their social settlement, Hull House, in Chicago.

Hull House became the institutional anchor for women’s gender segregated work in sociology and a liaison with the most important male sociological center during this era, the University of Chicago. Addams became a significant figure in an international social movement organized to bring together all classes, social groups, ages (especially the young and the elderly), and the oppressed to form a democratic community able to articulate and enact their ideals and needs. Addams led a worldwide network of activists, friends, and scholars. She powerfully described life there in *Twenty Years at Hull House* (1910) and *The Second Twenty Years at Hull House* (1930).

A groundbreaking sociological text, *Hull House Maps and Papers* was published by Hull House residents in 1895, predating and establishing the interests of the early Chicago male sociologists, including her friends and allies Albion W. Small, Charles R. Henderson, and George E. Vincent. She also helped establish the urban sociology and arts and crafts influence of the sociologist Charles Zueblin and his wife, Rho Fisk Zueblin. She profoundly influenced the work of George Herbert Mead, John Dewey, W. I. Thomas, and, to a lesser degree, Thorsten Veblen. She built a political and feminist epistemology parallel to their approach called symbolic interactionism or Chicago pragmatism. She was not acknowledged publicly as a colleague by Robert E. Park and Ernest W. Burgess, although her ideas and areas of specialization also influenced them.

Her combined thought and practice is called feminist pragmatism: an American theory uniting liberal values and a belief in a rational public with a cooperative, nurturing, and liberating model of the self, the other, and the community. Education and democracy are significant mechanisms to organize and improve society, to learn about one's community, participate in group decisions, and become a *citizen*. Feminist pragmatists study "social behavior" and believe each "individual" is born with rudimentary, flexible instincts or "impulses." Infants primarily learn by observing, imitating, and responding to the gestures of others, particularly their parents. They can abstract the meaning of "gestures," particularly "vocal gestures," and generalize about "the other, the group, the community, and institutions." This "process" allows the individual to develop a "mind, intelligence, a self, and the ability to take the role of the other." The self learns organized "attitudes" of "the community" towards "social situations." People sharing the same neighborhood and community develop "shared experience (which is the greatest of human goods)." The self emerges from others and is not in conflict with others unless it is taught to be in conflict.

Women who obey the rules governing the home and family follow "the family claim." When they work for others outside the home,

they follow "the social claim." Conflicts between these claims create an instability in society, whereby "women become a resource for social change." Women in public life can utilize their cooperative worldview to implement the goals of democracy. The female world is based on the unity of the female self, the home, the family, and face to face interactions with neighbors in a community. Women can extend this pattern to nurturing others outside the home as "bread givers engaged in bread labor." Expanding their model for the home and family to the larger social situation is called "civic housekeeping." Women can be leaders in a new "social consciousness," indicated in "newer ideals of peace." A sign of this awakening consciousness is "the integration of the objective with the subjective." This is organized through "social movements in labor, social science, and women." The modern city is a new location for these social changes.

Women learn "folk wisdom" and share a culture based on female myths such as the Corn Mother. This unity crosses racial/ethnic lines while it supports and respects differences, including variation by class, age, race, religion, education, sexual preference, and disability. Democracy emerges from different groups, and represents these distinct perspectives, histories, communities, and characteristic structures of the self. Social change must articulate and respond to these various groups' commonalities and differences. "Old women" also learn and pass on legends, cherish the good in others, develop "woman's Memory," and engage in "perfecting the past." Because women are not full members of the male world, they are in an ideal situation to "challenge war, disturb conventions, integrate industry, react to life, and transform the past." "Women's obligation" is to help create and distribute the world's food supply. The modern woman's family claim is built on a "consumer role" that should critique and change industry. These concepts were discussed in several major books, including *Democracy and Social Ethics* (1902), *Newer Ideals of Peace* (1907), *The Spirit of Youth and the City Streets* (1909), *A New Conscience and an Ancient Evil* (1912), *The Long Road of*

Woman's Memory (1916), and *Peace and Bread in Time of War* (1922).

Addams's views on women were little understood then or now. Having a popular image as a "saintly" woman who worked for the poor, Addams believed that female values of nonviolence, cooperation, and nurturance were superior to male ones supporting violence, conflict, and self centeredness and that a society built on feminine values would be more productive, peaceful, and just. Female culture was learned primarily and not biologically given. Thus, this is not an essentialist or biological argument, but one based on the assumptions of learned, symbolic behavior attained through socialization, especially public education. After the start of the Great War in Europe in 1914, Addams realized that she needed publicly to choose nonviolent values over any others, and this led to a different path than the one followed by her male sociological allies. This was an agonizing time for Addams. Committed to her values, based on female ideals, she maintained her pacifist position and was publicly shunned. The culmination of her politically untouchable status occurred in 1919, when she was targeted by the US government as the most dangerous person in America. Mead, Dewey, and Thomas separated from her from approximately 1916 until the war ended in 1918. Other male sociologists never healed the breach and her public role as a sociological leader was damaged severely. She was ostracized by succeeding generations of sociologists until recently.

In 1920, women were granted the franchise, and to Addams this was a major victory. Contrary to her expectation of a progressive and powerful women's vote, this decade led to an eclipse of the former power of women activists, including Addams. She gradually resumed her public leadership during the 1920s, but the devastating impact of the Great Depression called for new, radical social analysis and social change. Addams again became a distinguished world leader. Winner of the Nobel Peace Prize in 1931, she spoke for many of the values and policies adopted during the New Deal, especially in social security and other government programs which altered American capitalism. Dying in 1935, she was

mourned worldwide as a great leader and interpreter of American thought.

There is a vast literature on Addams, most of it emphasizing her biography, social work, and public role in American society. This scholarship spans several fields, especially in women's studies, that criticizes white, middle class women, early social workers, reformers, and philanthropists as conservative, exploitative, and oppressive. Addams is often the symbolic leader of these various groups and sometimes emerges as a contemporary symbol of the villainy of benevolent ignorance or intentional evil. Thus, some scholars stereotype her as a racist, assimilationist, essentialist, and atheoretical meddler. There is a serious lack of study of her intellectual apparatus: her theory of the arts, her lifelong commitment to political theory, and her vast influence in American race relations, especially between whites and people of color.

The general scholarship noted above contrasts with the early studies of Addams as a sociologist before 1920, when she was highly integrated into the sociological literature, frequently spoke before the American Sociological Society, and published in the *American Journal of Sociology*. Addams's stellar leadership in sociology was erased until the publication of Deegan (1988) and a series of related articles on the sociology of Addams and the cohort of women she inspired. The importance of rediscovering her role and influence in sociology is increasingly visible and understood within the profession. A comprehensive microfilm of the Jane Addams Papers, organized and collected by Mary Lynn McCree, provides expanded access to thousands of documents concerning Addams's life and contributions.

Addams's intellectual legacy as a feminist pragmatist has been obscured and sometimes distorted. She articulated radical changes in American life and politics, altering the possibilities for human growth and action for the poor, the working class, immigrants, people of color, youth, the aged, and women. Addams was a central figure in applied sociology between 1892 and 1920 and led a large and powerful cohort of women whom she profoundly influenced. Contemporary scholars often document and either praise or deplore

Addams's significant contributions to public life, but her intellectual stature is barely appreciated. Her profound influence on the course and development of sociology is only suggested in most sociological books and articles. A growing number of scholars are analyzing this great, alternative heritage and tradition in American sociology. They envision a new horizon for a more just and liberated society.

SEE ALSO: Chicago School; Dewey, John; Mead, George Herbert; Pragmatism

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addiction and dependency

Emma Wincup

Terms such as addiction and dependency are frequently used to describe patterns of illicit drug use. However, there are no universal definitions of these terms and they are frequently used inconsistently and interchangeably. As a result, it is difficult to estimate

the number of drug users who can be described as addicted or dependent. Addiction tends to refer to dependence on a particular drug or drugs, which has developed to the extent that it has a severe and harmful impact on an individual drug user. The term implies that the drug user is unable to give up drug use without incurring adverse effects.

Dependency can refer to physical and/or emotional dependency and drug users may experience one or both forms. Drug users can become physically dependent on drugs, thus continuing with their drug use in order to avoid the physical discomfort of withdrawal. They can also become emotionally dependent on drugs; for example, relying upon drug use to seek pleasure or to avoid pain. Drug scope (a UK based independent center for expertise on drugs) suggests the term addiction is inexplicably linked to society's reaction to drug users, and argues that there is an emerging consensus that the term dependency is preferable.

Sociologists have been influential in highlighting the importance of societal reaction to drug use. Drawing upon the insights of symbolic interactionism, Howard Becker's classic study *Outsiders: Studies in the Sociology of Deviance* (1963) drew attention to the processes by which individuals became drug users within a deviant subculture. Employing the notion of a career, he highlighted how the labeling of individuals as deviants by the public and agents of social control (including criminal justice agencies and medical professionals) helped to increase levels of drug use. He argued that by attaching a stigmatizing label to a drug user, the individual responds to this new identity. Other influential research, such as Jock Young's *The Drugtakers* he role of the media in amplifying drug use.

Sociological analysis of drug use has played a significant role in challenging the medicalization of so called deviant behavior. Sociologists have challenged the practice of referring to drug use as a disease with the implication that it can be cured through medical treatment. In particular, feminist sociologists have been highly critical of this approach, which fails to recognize the links between women's subordinate position in society and their use of illicit drugs.

SEE ALSO: Deviance, Medicalization of; Deviant Careers; Drug Use; Drugs, Drug Abuse, and Drug Policy; Labeling; Labeling Theory

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Adorno, Theodor W. (1903–69)

Markus S. Schulz

Theodor W. Adorno, a German Jewish social theorist and cultural critic, is best known as a central protagonist in the development of the Frankfurt School's Critical Theory.

Born on September 11, 1903 as Theodor Ludwig Wiesengrund, the only son of a wealthy, Protestant German Jewish wine merchant and an accomplished singer of Corsican German descent, he pursued for much of his life a dual career as composer and academic thinker. He studied philosophy, sociology, and psychology at the University of Frankfurt and took lessons in composition with Alban Berg and piano with Eduard Scheuermann in Vienna, where he also met Arnold Schoenberg. Early friendships with Siegfried Kracauer, Max Horkheimer, and Walter Benjamin shaped profoundly his intellectual trajectory. Adorno wrote his dissertation at the University of Frankfurt under the supervision of Hans

Cornelius on Husserl's phenomenology (1924) and his *Habilitationsschrift* under Paul Tillich on Kierkegaard (1931). The publication of his Kierkegaard book coincided with the Nazi rise to power. He was dismissed from his junior faculty position at the University of Frankfurt and went to England, where he became an advanced student at Merton College, Oxford.

Adorno immigrated in 1938 to the US upon Horkheimer's offer to become a permanent member at the *Institut fuer Sozialforschung*, which had moved from Frankfurt to a building provided by Columbia University in New York, and a job in the Princeton Radio Research Project, led by Paul Lazarsfeld. The work in Lazarsfeld's music project proved conflictive. Adorno had no intention in helping to collect data that he thought would end up serving commercial administrative purposes. His assessments of the cultural regression in the actual practices of listening to music on radio puzzled his colleagues in the project. The Rockefeller Foundation discontinued its funding for the music component of the project.

Adorno followed Horkheimer to Los Angeles, where they closely collaborated from 1941 to 1944 on a manuscript that was later published under the title *Dialectic of Enlightenment*. The authors traced the history of western rationality in a series of audacious chapters and excursions from ancient Greece to the present. The chapters on the *Odyssey* and the modern culture industry were mainly Adorno's contributions. It cast Homer's epos as enlightenment of the myth from which it was derived. Ulysses's ruse against the mythical sirens was interpreted as a first step of enlightenment's domination of nature and in the self constitution of subjectivity. The modern culture industry was seen as tantamount to enlightenment becoming myth again in a totalitarian world of domination. The German edition of the book was available for many years only in the form of pirated copies. Its reprint in 1972 and its first translation into English made it an international academic bestseller. An improved new English translation appeared in 2002.

During his years in California Adorno also wrote most of the manuscripts for *Philosophy of Modern Music* (1949), *Minima Moralia* (1951), and *Composing for the Films* (with

Hanns Eisler, 1949), and provided musical consultation for Thomas Mann's *Doctor Faustus*. The *Minima Moralia* is seen by some as his most important work, as many of his key ideas are gathered in this collection of *Reflections from Damaged Life*. His dark time diagnosis is captured in his verdict that there is "no beauty and no more consolation other than in the gaze that is directed at the horror, that withstands it, and that clings on to the possibility of the better in the unfettered consciousness of the negativity" (Adorno 1951: 26).

From 1944 on, Adorno worked also on the Berkeley Project on the Nature and Extent of Antisemitism. The resulting book, *The Authoritarian Personality* (with Frenkel Brunswick, Levinson, and Sanford), was published in 1950 as part of the multi volume *Studies in Prejudice* (edited by Horkheimer and Flowerman). This social psychological study was innovative in its integration of multiple empirical methods and theoretical approaches and pointed to a connection between internalized acceptance of authoritarianism and susceptibility to anti-Semitic prejudices.

Adorno returned to Germany in 1949 to become vice director (in 1958, director) of the reestablished *Institut fuer Sozialforschung* and assumed a professorship for philosophy (from 1953 also for sociology) at the University of Frankfurt. He took on increasing responsibilities in the Institute's empirical research projects, which included studies of political culture, communities, and workplace relations. His collection of essays published under the title *Prisms* (1955) made him known to a larger audience as a cultural critic and social theorist. His *Jargon of Authenticity* (1964) was a sharp critique of Heidegger, whose work had been fashionable since the Nazi period. Adorno ridiculed the abstractness of Heidegger's existentialist philosophy as it subdued the concrete being.

In the course of the 1960s Adorno became an increasingly prominent public intellectual in West Germany, where he wrote frequently for the press and was heard on the radio and occasionally also seen on television. He served as the president of the *Deutsche Gesellschaft fuer Soziologie* (German Society for Sociology) from 1963 to 1968.

Although Adorno had helped to reestablish empirical social research in Germany after World War II, he found himself increasingly warning against what he regarded as objectifying uses of quantitative methods. Adorno's methodological critique culminated in a hefty dispute (later known as the *Positivismusstreit*) with Karl Popper and others about the proper ways of doing sociology (see Adorno et al. 1972). Adorno postulated that sociology should not restrict itself to a mere description of social conditions, but it should produce a critique of these conditions. He warned that the fragmentation of sociology into separate fields would undermine the ability to grasp the social totality. He argued that quantitative methods were often mindlessly employed in studies that aspired to exact measurements of unimportant surface phenomena but forgot to consider what was relevant and failed to reflect on the context of research and on issues of power. Adorno's own social research methodology had been described as a "totality empiricism" (*Totalitaetsempirismus*) oriented at the "indices paradigm" (*Indizienparadigma*) (Bonss). In attempting to tackle the social totality, Adorno considered the complexity of social relations to be more graspable in multi method case studies rather than mere quantitative opinion polls. The legitimation for this research would come ultimately from its transformative capacity.

Adorno provided a philosophically grounded justification of his theoretical approach in his *Negative Dialectics* (1966). Considered by many as his most elaborated work, in which his epistemological, methodological, ontological, and sociological positions, parts of which he had begun writing as far back as 1937, intersected, it does not offer a systematic theory but rather an "ensemble of model analyses." Adorno developed his arguments dialectically by engaging with Kant, Hegel, Marx, Nietzsche, and Heidegger through the method of interpretive "immanent critiques." Adorno reversed Hegel by maintaining that the whole social totality is what is false, yet he defended interpretive thought against the Marxist claim of its inconsequentiality by pointing to the lack of a viable revolutionary liberation project. Adorno maintained against positivism that the contradictions of the

social totality make it impossible to present a non contradictory theory about it. Adorno even refused to define his key terms. Their meaning was rather meant to be developed “mimetically” in the dialectical course of the argument. He argued that the identification of a concept with what it stands for represses the “non identical” (*Nichtidentische*) and is essentially the same principle that reduces humanness to its exchange value, subdues the individual, and antagonizes society. The moments of hope for redemption that appear in the *Negative Dialectics* are in the negation of despair, in reference to the memory of fulfilled childhood days, and in high art.

Adorno’s posthumously published *Aesthetic Theory* (1970) sums up his interest in visual art, literature, and music. The modern work of art has for him a double character. It is at once autonomous and yet in its autonomousness a reflection of its social conditioning. Adorno considered art as a sphere of experience that was not subservient to cultural criticism but equal to it. Adorno’s work on music had earned him the title of a “father of the sociology of music,” although he was ridiculed for his misunderstanding of jazz and much criticized for his inability to appreciate cultural excellence in musical genres that did not fit the compositional assumptions that he was trained in.

Adorno had a major impact on sociology and all of the humanities in Germany. He helped foment after World War II a critical sociology that is not content with describing society as it is, but that sees the task of sociology above all as questioning the status quo and criticizing its shortcomings. Adorno’s impact went far beyond academia. He had become in the 1960s increasingly a public intellectual who intervened in the debates on broadcasts and in the press. The West German student movement of the late 1960s and early 1970s saw in him a key source of inspiration, but later turned against him when he, unlike Herbert Marcuse at Berkeley, refused to participate in what he considered blind actionism. His perceived arrogance and arbitrary snobbishness came under heavy criticism. The conflict escalated in 1969 when he called in the police to evict students from the

Institute, whom he had feared to be in the process of occupying the building. Adorno died from a heart attack on August 6, 1969 while on vacation in Switzerland and was buried at Frankfurt’s main cemetery.

Adorno’s writings continue to attract the attention of sociologists, philosophers, musicologists, and cultural studies scholars. There is a huge and growing literature on Adorno. Contemporary sociology’s growing interest in culture and postpositivist studies as well as in public sociology are likely to keep the interest in Adorno’s work alive. His transcribed seminar lectures on the *Introduction to Sociology* (1993) were published a quarter century after his death and, like others of his works, were only recently translated or published as corrected translations into English.

SEE ALSO: Authoritarian Personality; Critical Theory/Frankfurt School; Culture; Culture Industries; Horkheimer, Max; Metatheory; Music and Media; Theory; Theory and Methods

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advertising

Lauren Langman

Advertising is the attempt to bring attention to a product or service using paid announcements in mass media that encourage people to purchase those goods or services.

The average person is exposed to innumerable advertisements. In addition to all the normal advertisements selling pharmaceuticals,

cars, soft drinks, beer, and fast food, among many others, in an election year there will be many more ads “selling” candidates. Supporters argue that ads help consumers make informed decisions about all sorts of things, and indeed, advertising can provide people with a common basis for common goals, values, and a variety of gratifications. Opponents claim advertising leads to social fragmentation, alienation, hyperconsumption, and the resulting wanton destruction of the environment. All agree that ads are everywhere.

Since marketplaces first emerged, sellers have attempted to supply information to consumers to describe and promote their offerings. The in house pictorial advertisements of Pompeii’s brothels involve advertising particular services and their costs. For most of history, advertising consisted of the displays of wares closely tied to the place where sales or trades took place; what you saw was what you could get, whether fruits, vegetables, clothes, jewelry, pottery, prostitutes, or metal tools. By the Middle Ages, certain trades had distinct symbols of their products or services, the three balls in front of the pawn shop or striped barber’s pole probably being the best known examples.

As trade began to flourish, especially after the rise of printing based literacy and news papers, advertising and mass media soon became intertwined. In the eighteenth century, most such advertising consisted simply of announcements of product availability and descriptions. The first newspaper advertisement in the US appeared in 1702 offering an estate on Oyster Bay. About 40 years later, the *General Magazine*, founded by Benjamin Franklin, printed the first magazine advertisement. By the nineteenth century, advertising had become an important part of commerce. In 1841 the first ad agency opened in Philadelphia. By the Civil War, the sale of advertising space in newspapers and magazines had become a major business, pioneered in part by William Carlton, whose agency would eventually become known as J. Walter Thompson.

For the most part, early advertisements were often flowery product descriptions telling about quality, how well items were made and functioned, and/or the “trustworthiness” of the producer. With the spread of railroads

and rural mail delivery came the home delivered catalogues of Sears and Wards, who distributed their catalogues, and thus their goods, throughout the nation. The period toward the end of the century would see the growth of the department stores that soon became major advertisers in newspapers. The window displays themselves were advertisements of the “fantastic” life that could be purchased (Leach 1993). At this time there also occurred the growth of “branded” goods such as Campbell soup, Quaker Oats, Morton’s salt, and Ivory soap. Soon outdoor signs and billboards heralding various goods, services, or events were found on buildings and along roads and highways. The turn of the twentieth century was marked by branded consumer products such as the Kodak Brownie or Gillette razor. Oldsmobile was the first mass produced car and the Wright brothers flew the world’s first airplane. So, too, was another innovation in the works. Electricity was becoming widely available and soon there were electrical home appliances from vacuum cleaners to refrigerators to sell and advertise.

From the 1920s or so on, there were four major innovations that would forever impact advertising and, in turn, society.

- 1 The rapid growth of cities, often tied to industrialization, created vast factories with better paid workers and, in turn, markets for consumer goods and services workers could not produce for themselves. Advertising proliferated to “help” them make “informed” choices.
- 2 The rapid growth of radio, and the licensing of airwaves to private companies, led to the proliferation of radio programming that sold airtime to advertisers. Soon came an explosion of regular radio programs featuring various “stars” and, as a result, larger audiences for commercials encouraging consumption. The airwaves were soon flooded with jingles, songs and rhymes, testimonials, endorsements, and lofty promises.
- 3 Advertising began to change from textual descriptions to visual images and from selling the quality of the product to constructing and improving the nature of the consumer. Owning the product came to

have meanings for self enhancement, status, recognition, and so on. Image slowly displaced substance. Advertised products promised to make one healthier, happier, more beautiful, and more “alluring.” Otherwise said, advertising began to “colonize consciousness” and transform desire such that people believed purchasing certain things would provide self gratifications that would make them happy (Ewen 1976; Ewen & Ewen 1982).

- 4 As a result of what has been said, the 1920s marked an important point of transition in which the technologies of mass production joined with mass mediated entertainment. Consumerism spread from the elites to the masses. This new complex of production, mass mediated advertising, and consumption would constitute modern consumer society with its elite driven culture, extolled by advertising, in which the democratization of desire was realized.

While the proliferation of television was delayed by World War II, by the end of the 1950s most Americans owned a television set. By this time, advertising had largely completed the move from selling products per se to creating certain kinds of consumer based identities that would lead to certain kinds of purchases. What one wore, drove, ate, or paid money to see/hear expressed one’s group membership, who one was, and one’s “distinction.” Acquisition and consumption had become the means of achieving happiness (Leach 1993).

The post World War II years in America saw a rapid expansion of the economy and, in turn, major corporate growth, rising disposable income, and an explosion of consumerism. Between pent up demand and the new affluence, and a proliferation of government backed mortgages that supported vast tracts of suburban housing construction, there were demands for all sorts of things including furnishings, appliances, cars, and, as a result of the boom in the ownership of automobiles, a national Interstate highway system. More than half of the economy was now based on advertising inspired consumer demand for goods, services, and cultural consumption from records to foreign travel. By the 1950s, capitalism had

achieved a major turning point: consumer society had arrived.

For many social observers, consumer society and its cornucopia of goods, championed by advertising, was a new stage of social development and a new form of domination. The new era of unending “spectacles” and manufactured events manipulated consciousness and fostered mass compliance to the world of better living through consumption (Boorstin 1962; Debord 1967). One of the key ways to understand this consumer society and the advertising that is so central to it has been the study of meanings and identities, namely what academics call semiotics. Thus, for example, certain meanings such as luxury, adventure, romance, sophistication, and even transgression come to be associated with certain brands or items. The advertisements suggest that if people buy this or that, eat this or that, or travel here or there, they will be considered classy, erudite, or sexy. The logic of advertising often borders on the “magical” in which a particular toothpaste makes one “popular” or an SUV renders one powerful. Similarly, many restaurants, theme parks, casinos, and hotels sell “themed environments” laden with meanings (Gottdiener 2001). In this realm of symbolic meanings, advertisements often challenge other advertisements and engage in what has been called “sign wars” (Goldman & Papson 1996).

How does advertising foster purchases? What mediates between advertised image, purchase, and emotions? Mass mediated images impact not only consciousness, but unconsciousness as well. Advertising’s images seem to go directly from the external source to the person’s emotional realms, avoiding the cortical areas of reason and reflection. Thus if people hear the right words or songs, they feel that buying the suggested product will provide them with a positive feeling. Some critics of advertising suggest that many ads have subliminal messages and/or hidden sexual/aggressive imagery that encourage people to buy certain products, from popcorn during movie intermissions to clam dinners because of subliminal images of sex orgies. In any event, seeing or hearing ads, consciously or not, evokes certain feelings and desires. When shoppers see or seek out what is advertised,

they are disposed to reproduce that feeling – and quite often the purchase does indeed make them feel better, if only for a short period.

For many people, their narrative of self and identity is expressed in their styles of life, their clothes, home and its décor, cars (or other forms of transportation such as bicycles, motorcycles), food preferences, cultural tastes, and so on. Merchandisers today are less selling products than marketing “brands” that provide the consumer with certain lifestyle based self identities and memberships in the “imaginary communities” of, say, North Face adventurers, Ralph Lauren sophisticates, or Abercrombie and Fitch or Fubu’s subcultures of transgression (Klein 2000).

Market researchers have devoted billions of dollars to targeting particular clusters of consumers. While social class (education, income) plays a major role in what one can afford and the aesthetic tastes one appreciates, for many Americans who consider themselves “middle class” selfhood is more complex, nuanced, and articulated in patterns of consumption that provide them with “distinction” (Bourdieu 1984). Thus, for example, “young bohemians” (urbanites in occupations like advertising) might well prefer to dine in the latest storefront restaurant serving Mexican Mongolian fusion food, while “the pool and patio” older, upper middle class suburbanites prefer Olive Garden or Chilies. Most tastes and preferences are not based simply on income but how people choose to dispose of it. Aesthetic tastes reflect lifestyles and identities. Products for the exploding youth market promise that consumers will be “cool”; the “marketing of cool” is a major strategy of advertising (Frank 1997).

The latest expression of branded selfhood is “celebrity ware,” fashion lines “designed” and marketed by various media stars such as Jaclyn Smith, Jennifer Lopez, or Paris Hilton. Much like the magical thought called “imitative magic” among traditional peoples, the consumer imagines that if he or she dresses like a glamorous “star,” then he or she too will be glamorous. Moreover, he or she might also need to enroll in that star’s exercise program or diet plan and pick from recommended plastic surgeons.

There is little agreement on the consequences of advertising for individuals and society. Does consumption bring the personal happiness promised by the ads? Aristotle warned that since human wants are insatiable, wealth and possessions do not bring happiness. Tolstoy said much the same. Freud suggested that happiness came through love and work; indeed, the accumulation of goods was often a compensation for what was lacking within one's self or one's relationships. Yet advertising promises that consumption will provide idealized selfhood and the very happiness people seek, but when consumption does not gratify, people continue to buy things in the hope that the next purchase, the next "improved" version, will make them happy.

Whether or not advertising (and consumption) brings happiness, it has costs. One of the most enduring criticisms of advertising and the associated consumerism comes from various leftist critiques that see ad dominated mass culture as an essential aspect of domination that sustains ruling class interests, while the majority of people are not only exploited and alienated but also "dumbed down" and actively involved in reproducing their own subjugation. For Marx, religion served to keep people pacified and look forward to the next life. Today, consumerism serves many of the same functions. Consumerism not only provides most of the profits for the current economic system, it also secures political hegemony as it entraps people into the system.

As Marcuse (1964) argued, advertising produces "artificial needs" that are "gratified" in consumption that fosters an exaggerated concern with the self and personal pleasures. This self centeredness leads to indifference to social costs and consequences on the larger community. Moreover, advertising fosters "one dimensional" thought that erodes the power of critical reason and, in turn, encourages acceptance of domination rather than human freedom. Sut Jhally (1997) has argued that Americans, 6 percent of the world's people, consume 25 percent of its resources, leading to major environmental damage. We are approaching a point where our planet will see its ability to sustain humanity decline. Many experts have tied the intensity of recent

hurricanes to global warming due to fossil fuel emissions and industrial pollutants.

Schudson (1984) argued that the function of advertising is not simply to sell goods, but further, advertising promotes "American realism," a notion that "the American way of life" provides more material abundance than that of any other society in the world. Not only is it "superior," but its future will be even better.

One of the most serious issues is political advertising, "selling" of candidates much like soap or toothpaste. Media consultants now play a major role in shaping political campaigns. Much like selling other products, they use focus groups, surveys, and audience responses to hone political images and messages to produce various soundbites and soundbites. Similar techniques are used to discredit the opponent. These political advertisements, like most other ads, appeal to feelings and emotions and, in turn, serious political questions are not subject to genuine debates.

At the same time, advertising has been used to promote such "worthy" causes from anti slavery to suffrage to anti sweatshop movements. But so too has advertising led to alienation and social fragmentation as well as social indifference to collective adversity. Yet whatever the opinions of critics, advertising has become a major component of the contemporary landscape.

SEE ALSO: Alienation; Department Store; Distinction; Hyperconsumption/Overconsumption; Identity: The Management of Meaning; Mass Culture and Mass Society; Mass Media and Socialization; Media and Consumer Culture; Semiotics

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aesthetics

Sam Binkley

Attempts to reconcile the concerns of sociologists with those of art historians and aestheticians have been among the most contentious of recent interdisciplinary efforts. The tendency of sociologists to reduce social “epiphenomena” to their independent variables in social structure impinges on the core belief of artists and aesthetes in the power of art to transcend the mundane. In its most reductionistic version the aesthetic is collapsed into a mechanism for the reproduction of class hierarchies and for the securing of legitimacy for social elites – a thesis most aggressively advanced in Marx’s reduction of the cultural and ideological “superstructure” to a dependent relation to

the economic “base.” Such a deterministic view is taken up in the aesthetic theory of the Frankfurt School, most notably in the writings of Adorno. In a manner typical of mid century cultural Marxism, Adorno differentiated between aesthetic productions before and after the arrival of capitalism and the expansion of commercial culture industries. Where aesthetics in the pre capitalist period possessed moral and ethical value, the aesthetics of mass entertainment eroded the capacity for individual thought and action, reproducing conformity and docility in the population through the standardization of personal taste (Adorno 1991). Similar assaults on the autonomy of the aesthetic are recorded in Veblen’s (1899) account of “conspicuous consumption,” wherein objects of aesthetic value are read as expressions of “honorific waste,” symbolic trophies of the dominance of one group over another.

Without a doubt, however, it is Pierre Bourdieu who has done the most to expand contemporary sociological understandings of the aesthetic realm. Bourdieu’s sociology is suspicious of the reductionism of Veblen and Marx, but is also skeptical of the idealism implicit within aesthetic theory since Kant, and resonant within the Frankfurt approach. In *Distinction* (1984), his landmark inquiry into the social dynamics of taste, he discovers in the aesthetic realm logics of taste and aesthetic preference which correspond to and naturalize social hierarchies, without specifically being reducible to them. He arrives at this synthesis by viewing aesthetics as a contentious game of classification, in which taste is derived from acquired competencies (cultural capital) for the discerning of value in all objects of consumption, from art to food. Such competing modes of classification (tastes) are understood by Bourdieu to correspond to competing subordinate and dominant class fractions. For the middle classes, who enjoy a degree of distance from the brute demands of manual labor, taste follows a logic which celebrates a degree of removal from the obviousness or the directness of taste and aesthetic preference. Elite tastes prefer the thoughtful distance of high art to the sensory impact of popular entertainment. For the working classes, whose economic location

places them in direct relation to immediate tasks and needs for survival, tastes in aesthetic preferences tend to emphasize the unmediated and the direct. Popular tastes refuse the logic of distance and reflection, preferring instead the excitement and directness of high sensory impact. Thus, the linkage Bourdieu establishes between social structure and aesthetics is not deterministic, but contentious: each aesthetic style valorizes and naturalizes the social location from which it derives. In short, lifestyles are rich symbolic metaphors meant both to legitimate but also to contest underlying social groupings, or, as Bourdieu handily put it: "Taste classifies the classifier."

While Bourdieu's work has inspired a groundswell of interest in the sociology of aesthetic production, other studies predate Bourdieu's influential work. Becker's *Art Worlds* (1982), for example, is credited with originating a sociological approach to the commercial and cultural system of museums and galleries through which contemporary art is legitimated and circulated. Similarly, Wolf's *Aesthetics and the Sociology of Art* (1993) traced many of the problematics surrounding a sociological approach to aesthetics.

SEE ALSO: Adorno, Theodor W.; Art Worlds; Bourdieu, Pierre; Conspicuous Consumption; Cultural Capital; Distinction; Veblen, Thorstein

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affect control theory

Dawn T. Robinson

Affect control theory (ACT) is an empirically grounded, mathematical theory of social interaction. David R. Heise developed the theory in the early 1970s based on symbolic interactionist insights about the primary importance of language and of the symbolic labeling of situations. Inspired by the pragmatist philosophy of early symbolic interactionists, the theory begins with the premise that people reduce existential uncertainty by developing "working understandings" of their social worlds. The theory presumes that actors label elements of social situations using cultural symbols available to them. After creating this working definition, the theory further argues that actors are motivated to maintain it.

ACT assumes that our labeling of social situations evokes affective meanings. These are the meanings that we try to maintain during interaction. ACT makes use of three specific dimensions to measure the affective meanings associated with specific labels, a set of equations to describe how events change those meanings, and a mathematical function to show what actions will best maintain or restore original meanings. The theory is fundamentally contained in this three part formalization: the measurement structure, the event reaction equations, and the mathematical statement of the control process. The theory is embodied in its mathematical expressions (i.e., the mathematical model predicts patterns that can then be tested empirically).

SCOPE

Scope statements specify the conditions under which a theory applies. ACT describes culturally situated social interactions. Therefore, the domain of the theory is quite broad. There are, however, some specific conditions that limit its applicability:

- *There is a directed social behavior.* This requires an Actor who generates the behavior, a target (or Object) of the behavior,

and a Behavior that is directed toward the object person. The behavior need not be observable to all: I could admire someone without anyone else knowing about this directed behavior. In such a case, the theory's predictions would apply only to my own responses to the event.

- *There is at least one observer who is a member of an identified language culture.* The observer can be the Actor, the Object, or a third party. It is from the perspective of this observer, or labeler, that ACT makes predictions. Participants may operate under vastly differing definitions of the situation, but always make predictions from a particular definition.
- *The theory applies only to labeled aspects of social experiences.* This scope condition excludes behaviors that are not witnessed or interpreted by observers or participants. Picture a child pointing and laughing at a man who is unaware that he has been sitting in wet paint. The paint on the man's pants will not enter into the man's predicted response unless it becomes part of his awareness. Picture another child shuffling across the floor to kiss her mother good night. Predictions about the feelings of the mother generated by the event *Daughter Kisses Mother* are within the scope of the theory. Predictions about the startle response that the mother might feel as a result of an electrostatic shock caused by the kiss are outside the scope of the theory.

SENTIMENTS

ACT assumes that people respond affectively to every social event – the *affective reaction principle*. The theory describes these affective responses along three dimensions of meaning: evaluation, potency, and activity. These are universal dimensions identified by Osgood and colleagues (1975) as describing substantial variation in the affective meaning of lexicons in more than 20 national cultures. These three fundamental dimensions of meaning serve as cultural abbreviations, describing important social information about all elements of an

interaction – identities, behaviors, emotions, and settings.

- *Evaluation.* The evaluation dimension captures the amount of goodness or badness we associate with a concept. It is a bi polar dimension of meaning that ranges from *nice, warm, good* to *nasty, cold, bad*.
- *Potency.* The potency dimension captures the amount of strength or weakness we associate with a concept. It is a bi polar dimension of meaning that ranges from *big, strong, powerful* to *small, weak, powerless*.
- *Activity.* The activity dimension captures the amount of liveliness or quietness we associate with a concept. It is a bi polar dimension of meaning that ranges from *fast, noisy, lively* to *slow, quiet, inactive*.

All social concepts evoke goodness, powerfulness, and liveliness. These affective meanings are referred to as *sentiments* in the theory. Sentiments are trans situational, generalized affective responses to specific symbols that are widely shared in a culture or subculture. While the dimensions themselves are universal across cultures, symbol sentiments are products of a culture. Grandfathers come in a wide variety of shapes, sizes, colors, ages, and demeanors. Individuals within a culture may vary widely in attitudes toward and understandings about their *own* grandfathers. Nonetheless, members of mainstream US culture basically agree that the general meaning of the role identity *grand father* is good, powerful, and relatively quiet. In contrast, our culturally shared sentiments about accountants are more neutral on the first two dimensions, and our image of *rapist* is extremely negative on the evaluation dimension. It is our very agreement about the generalized meanings associated with specific symbols that allows us to communicate effectively with other members of our culture.

Sentiments vary cross culturally, however. Within each culture, average evaluation, potency, and activity ratings are compiled into cultural “dictionaries” that contain generalized meanings. ACT researchers have developed these cultural dictionaries for the US, Canada, Japan, Germany, China, and Northern Ireland. There are profiles for hundreds of identities,

behaviors, traits, emotions, and settings in each culture. These sentiment profiles locate these cultural symbols – potential elements of social events – in a three dimensional affective space. The most important feature of these evaluation, potency, and activity profiles is that they represent *all* of the elements of a social interaction using the same metric. This unifying metric enables ACT's mathematical specification of social interaction.

IMPRESSIONS

After we define a social situation using culturally meaningful labels, the affective meanings change as social interaction unfolds. Picture a police officer interacting with a priest on a public sidewalk. The affect generated by the labels – *Police Officer* and *Priest* – help us know what actions we expect the two people to take. Now picture the *Priest Shoving the Police Officer*. In response to this event, our feelings about that priest, that police officer, and perhaps even what it means to shove someone, are temporarily altered because of our observation of that event. These situated meanings are called *transient impressions*: contextualized affective meanings that arise from labeling of specific social interactions.

ACT uses a full set of *impression formation* equations to predict changes in the impressions of Actors, Behaviors, and Objects on evaluation, potency, and activity as a result of their combination in social events. Taken as a set, these impression change equations are empirical summaries of basic social and cultural processes. They capture important information about the ways in which social events temporarily transform the meanings of the symbolic labels that we use to define events. Along with the sentiment dictionaries, these equations provide the empirical basis for ACT's theoretical predictions. Currently, there are separate impression formation equations for the US, Canada, and Japan.

CONTROL PRINCIPLE

Sentiments are the culturally shared, fundamental meanings that we associate with social

labels. Impressions are the transient meanings that arise during social interaction. Discrepancies between sentiments and impressions inform us about how well current interactions are confirming cultural prescriptions.

Symbolic interactionism rests on the assumption that social actors try to maintain their working definitions of social situations. Inspired by Powers's (1973) work on perception control theory, Heise (1979) developed a control system theory to model this principle. ACT proposes that actors try to experience transient impressions consistent with their fundamental sentiments – the *affect control principle*. Fundamental sentiments act like a thermostat setting, a reference level for interpreting what happens in a situation. When impressions vary from that reference level (as the temperature might vary in a room), people act so as to bring the impressions back in line with cultural sentiments.

ACT defines *deflection* as the discrepancy between fundamental cultural sentiments and transient situated impressions in the three dimensional evaluation, potency, and activity space. Deflection is operationalized as the squared distance between the sentiments and impressions. This mathematical expression allows manipulation of the impression change equations to implement the affect control principle.

These transformed equations predict the behavior that optimally maintains initial cultural sentiments for the actors and objects. After an event disturbs meanings, solving for the behavior profile produces the creative response that an actor is expected to generate to repair the situation.

EMOTIONS AND TRAITS

The *impression change equations* specify how events change impressions. The *behavioral prediction equations* use the affect control principle to predict how actors are likely to behave for a given definition of the situation. *Labeling equations* tell us how actors or objects may be redefined as a result of observed interactions. In addition, there are *attribution equations* which solve for traits that, when added to an identity, can make sense of observed behaviors,

and there are *emotion equations* that make predictions about the emotions that actors and objects are likely to feel during social interaction. Among other things, these equations imply that positivity of emotion is predicted by the positivity of the transient impression, as well as the positivity of the deflection produced by that transient impression. In other words, pleasant events make us feel happy. Events that are even better than our identities will make us feel even better. When events are identity confirming, the pleasantness of an actor's emotion should reflect the goodness of his or her fundamental identity. Thus, the theory predicts that individuals operating in "nicer" identities will experience positive feelings more frequently than individuals operating in more stigmatized identities. The potency and activity equations reveal similar dynamics. When events push us higher in potency than our identities warrant, we experience more powerful emotions. Likewise, when events make us seem livelier than our identities warrant, we feel energized. In the case of perfectly confirming events, ACT predicts that the potency and activity of an actor's emotions will be roughly half of the potency and activity associated with that actor's fundamental identity.

THE INTERACT PROGRAM

Both the logic and the substance of ACT are contained in its mathematical specification. The empirically estimated equations contain crucial information about affective processing reflecting basic social and cultural processes of attribution, justice, balance, and response to deviance. The logic of the theory (for example, the affect control principle and the reconstruction principle) is implemented through mathematical manipulation of these equations. These mathematical manipulations produce predictions about behaviors, emotions, and labeling. A computer program, INTERACT, contains the equations and the dictionaries of culture specific sentiments. This software allows researchers to work through implications of the theory. Simulation results using INTERACT can be taken as predictions of the theory and subjected to testing through empirical research.

RESEARCH

There is a large and growing body of empirical work in the ACT tradition. A number of recent studies focus on comparing affective dynamics cross culturally. These studies find substantial similarity in the affective dynamics governing social interaction in various cultures. The differences, however, give us a way to characterize normative differences between cultures formally. Several empirical studies support predictions about the operation of the control process in social interaction. An extensive body of recent research supports the theory's predictions about the relationships between identity and emotions. Qualitative research in the ACT tradition reveals the way that bereavement and divorce support groups make use of the control process in the kinds of identity work they encourage and how gay and straight congregations invoke somewhat different rituals in order to optimally maintain meanings about key religious identities. For a recent review of this and other empirical research in the affect control tradition, see Robinson and Smith Lovin (2006).

SEE ALSO: Emotion: Cultural Aspects; Emotion: Social Psychological Aspects; Impression Formation; Pragmatism; Scientific Models and Simulations; Symbolic Interaction

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affirmative action

David B. Bills and Erin Kaufman

The term affirmative action encompasses a broad range of voluntary and mandated policies and procedures intended to provide equal access to educational and employment opportunities for members of historically excluded groups. Foremost among the bases for historical exclusion have been race, ethnicity, and sex, although consideration is sometimes extended to other groups (e.g., Vietnam veterans, the disabled). Both the concept of affirmative action and its application have undergone a series of transformations and interpretations. These shifts have contributed to considerable ambivalence in levels of public support for and opposition to affirmative action policies.

There is no single model of affirmative action. Affirmative action efforts may be either public or private. Definitions of protected groups range from very restricted to very broad. Enforcement mechanisms may be quite rigorous or virtually non-existent. Oppenheimer (1989) identified a simple typology of affirmative action efforts that ranged from quite restrictive quota systems on one end to considerably less binding organizational commitments not to discriminate on the other. Situated between these ideal typical extremes were a variety of preference systems, organizational self-examinations, and outreach plans.

Affirmative action is in many ways an outgrowth of the Civil Rights Movements. In particular, Title VII of the 1964 Civil Rights Act prohibited discrimination in any areas of employment that was based on race, color, creed, or sex. The year after the passage of the Civil Rights Act, President Lyndon Johnson signed Executive Order 11246, which prohibited discrimination against minorities by federal contractors. While American presidents had routinely been issuing similar Executive Orders for some time, EO 11246 was different in two important ways. First, it included sex rather than merely race as a protected category. Second, it established an enforcement mechanism, the Office of Federal Contract Compliance. While not a powerful

entity, the OFCC was an important step in institutionalizing affirmative action.

Affirmative action received a further boost with the passage of the 1972 Equal Employment Opportunity Act. The EEOA required federal agencies to adopt affirmative action. By 2000, this legislation covered about 3.5 million federal employees (Harper & Reskin 2005).

Affirmative action has had substantial effects in both the educational and employment realms. Its impact has to a great degree been determined by several important Supreme Court decisions, although lower courts too have been instrumental in the direction that affirmative action has taken.

Perhaps the first broadly felt effects of affirmative action in education pertained to busing. Fourteen years after the landmark 1954 Supreme Court decision *Brown v. Board of Education* declared that government-mandated "separate but equal" schooling was unconstitutional, the Court decided in *Green v. County School Board* that schools needed to take affirmative steps to end racial discrimination. This led to the implementation of busing plans in many urban areas as a means to end racial discrimination in schools. Many of these were quite ambitious, but by the early 1990s these plans had been essentially discontinued.

Largely because of the steadily increasing centrality of higher education as a means to socioeconomic mobility (Sullivan 1999), affirmative action has been of critical importance in the allocation of educational opportunity. *University of California Regents v. Bakke* (1978) was a pivotal case regarding affirmative action in higher education. The University of California at Davis Medical School had two admissions programs, one general and one special. The general admissions program required that students have a 2.5 grade point average on a 4.0 scale for consideration. In contrast, the special admissions program, open to applicants who claimed economic or educational disadvantage and membership in a minority group, had no such grade point requirement. Allan Bakke, a white male, applied to the Davis Medical School in both 1973 and 1974. Bakke was rejected both times. In both years, special applicants with significantly lower qualifications than Bakke received admittance to the

Medical School. Although the Court failed to reach a consensus on the case, Justice Powell's opinion came to serve that function. While Powell's opinion overturned the special admissions program on the grounds that it violated the Equal Protection Clause of the 14th Amendment, the decision did allow the use of race as a factor in future admissions decisions so long as racial classifications were just one of many factors used to attain a diverse student body.

Standing in contrast to the *Bakke* case was *Hopwood v. State of Texas* (1996). In order to accommodate the large number of applicants to the University of Texas School of Law, the admissions program based its initial decisions largely on the applicant's Texas Index (TI) number, consisting of undergraduate grade point average and Law School Aptitude Test (LSAT) score. The TI score allowed the sorting of candidates into three categories: presumptive admit, presumptive deny, and discretionary zone. In order to consider and to admit more African American and Latino students, the Law School considerably lowered its TI score ranges for them. Hopwood, a white resident of Texas, was considered a discretionary zone candidate, but did not receive admission. Plaintiffs sued, claiming that the Law School's admissions program subjected them to unconstitutional racial discrimination. Rejecting Powell's *Bakke* opinion, the Court ruled that the consideration of race and ethnicity for the purpose of attaining a diverse student body was not a compelling interest under the 14th Amendment. The Court further stated that the use of racial classifications to attain a diverse student body hinders rather than helps the attainment of equal education.

The most recent Supreme Court affirmative action rulings in higher education were *Gratz et al. v. Bollinger et al.* (2003) and *Grutter v. Bollinger* (2003), both concerning admissions policies at the University of Michigan. In the first case, petitioners Gratz and Hamacher applied to the University of Michigan's College of Literature, Science, and the Arts. Although the college determined Gratz to be well qualified and Hamacher to be within the qualified range, both were denied admission.

In order to ensure consistency, Michigan's undergraduate admissions policy used a point system that awarded points to applicants for a variety of factors, including race. The admissions policy automatically awarded 20 of the 100 points needed for admission to African American, Latino, and Native American candidates; it was undisputed that the university admitted virtually every qualified applicant from these groups. Gratz and Hamacher sued on the grounds that the admissions policy violated the Equal Protection Clause of the 14th Amendment, Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, and 42 USC §1981. Citing Powell's opinion from *Bakke*, the Court agreed, finding the policy unconstitutional on the grounds that it was not narrowly tailored to achieve a diverse student body.

The second decision reviewed the admissions policy at the University of Michigan Law School. In order to achieve a diverse student body in accordance with the requirements that the *Bakke* decision outlined, the Law School admitted students through a flexible, individualized admissions policy. The policy took into account factors such as undergraduate grade point average, score on the LSAT, letters of recommendation, the applicant's personal statement, and an essay describing how the applicant would contribute to the school's life and diversity. While the admissions policy defined diversity in a broad manner, it did reaffirm the school's commitment to including African American, Latino, and Native American students. Grutter, a white Michigan resident, filed suit, claiming that the policy violated the Equal Protection Clause of the 14th Amendment, Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, and 42 USC § 1981. The Court disagreed, finding that the policy's narrowly tailored use of race to foster a diverse student body did not violate the Equal Protection Clause, Title VI, or §1981.

Affirmative action is also deeply embedded in the American workplace. The Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) is the federal agency charged with ending employment discrimination. EEOC monitors compliance with and enforces civil rights legislation such as Title VII of the Civil Rights

Act of 1964; to do so, the agency can bring suit on behalf of alleged victims of employment discrimination. To prove employment discrimination, the EEOC must find one of the following: (1) disparate treatment, or an employer's intentional discrimination against an employee, or (2) disparate impact, which, while neutral in intent, shows that the policies of a particular employer have had a negative outcome for a particular employee or class of employees.

Griggs v. Duke Power Company (1971) was a major decision regarding racial discrimination in the workplace. Duke Power Company required most potential employees to have a high school diploma and to pass two aptitude tests. Current employees without a high school education could also qualify for transfer by passing two tests, neither of which measured the ability to learn to perform a particular category of jobs. Thirteen African American workers challenged Duke's practices on the grounds that they violated Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. The Court agreed, ruling that the Act prohibits employers from requiring a high school education or passing scores on an aptitude test as a condition of employment or transfer when (1) neither standard relates significantly to successful job performance, (2) both requirements serve to disqualify African Americans at a significantly higher rate than their white counterparts, and (3) the jobs in question had been filled solely by white employees due to longstanding practices of racial preference. Title VII prohibits artificial, arbitrary, and unnecessary barriers to employment when those barriers work to discriminate on the basis of racial or other impermissible classifications.

Another important case regarding affirmative action in the workplace was *United Steelworkers of America v. Weber* (1979). In 1974 United Steelworkers of America and Kaiser Aluminum & Chemical Corp. entered into a collective bargaining agreement. The agreement included an affirmative action, which reserved 50 percent of the in-house training program positions for African Americans. The plan was to remain in place until the percentage of African American craftworkers roughly

equaled the percentage of African Americans in the local labor force. During the plan's initial year, seven African American and six white trainees entered the program, with the most senior African American having less seniority than several white production workers whom the program had rejected. Weber, one of the rejected production workers, alleged that the affirmative action program violated Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 through discriminating against qualified white applicants. The Court held that Title VII's prohibition of racial discrimination does not forbid all private and voluntary affirmative action plans that account for race.

Whether applied to employment or to education, affirmative action has been a politically sensitive issue. Much of the contention has been grounded in differing understandings and interpretations of affirmative action. In part these differences have emerged from the great diversity of affirmative action programs that have been in effect at any given time. Perhaps as important have been efforts by both proponents and opponents of affirmative action to frame it in ways most congenial to their own preferred remedies for redressing unequal access to social participation. While most participants in the affirmative action debate agree on the social benefits of racially and culturally diverse workforces and student bodies, they differ sharply on how to achieve this. Opponents of affirmative action often emphasize the apparent contradictions between group-based remedies and the American commitment to individualism and meritocracy. Many maintain that affirmative action unfairly stigmatizes members of protected categories, who can never be certain that their success was due to their individual merit (Steele 1991). Advocates discuss the benefits of more exclusive hiring and admissions criteria and the need in a fair society to provide reparations for indisputable histories of disadvantage.

SEE ALSO: Affirmative Action for Majority Groups; Affirmative Action (Race and Ethnic Quotas); *Brown v. Board of Education*; Discrimination; Labor Markets; Occupational Segregation; School Segregation, Desegregation

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affirmative action for majority groups

Mako Yoshimura

Affirmative action is generally a policy to give preferential treatment to minority groups (such as women, ethnic minorities, indigenous people, and handicapped persons) who are socially vulnerable and face structural discrimination in a society through the use of measures such as quota systems to provide for equality in employment, education, and so forth. In some countries, however, such as Malaysia, South Africa, and Fiji, there is affirmative action for majority groups that are perceived as being disadvantaged.

Malaysia has a population of around 25 million people, made up in 2000 of Malays (66 percent), Chinese (25 percent), Indians (8 percent), and "others" (1 percent). The Constitution defines certain special privileges for the Malays, and the New Economic Policy gives people defined as Bumiputera (literally, "sons of the soil," comprising Malays, indigenous people such as the *orang asli*, and ethnic minorities in Sabah and Sarawak) advantages with respect to capital ownership, employment, education, grants, licenses, and so on. These privileges are considered "sensitive issues" in Malaysia, and public discussion is prohibited.

During the British colonial period, Chinese came to Malaya to work in tin mines while

Indians came to work as rubber tappers. Malays remained agricultural smallholders (planting rice, rubber, and coconuts) or fishermen in coastal areas, and argue that they were excluded from the country's economic development. When Malaya became independent in 1957, the major industries were dominated by western capital and there was a substantial economic imbalance between Malays and non Malays.

Ethnic riots on May 13, 1969 showed the severity of the ethnic divide between Malays and Chinese. A government white paper, *Toward National Harmony*, blamed the "economic factor" for the ethnic clash, and also called for prohibition of public debate (even in Parliament) on "sensitive issues" such as Malay privileges, the position of Malay as the country's national language, the status of the Sultans, citizenship for non Malays, and the use of non Malay languages.

The government announced the New Economic Policy (NEP) in 1970, saying "the aims were to eradicate poverty and to restructure society so as to correct social and economic imbalances." The NEP aimed to increase Bumiputera employment in modern sectors of the economy (i.e., in manufacturing and services), and to build Bumiputera corporate equity. Employment was to be restructured to reflect more closely the country's ethnic composition. With regard to equity ownership, the targets were Bumiputera 30 percent, other Malaysians 40 percent, and foreigners 30 percent, compared with 1970 figures for corporate equity of Bumiputera 2.4 percent, other Malaysians 32.3 percent, and foreigners 63.3 percent. Bumiputera received preferential treatment in permits, grants, real estate ownership, education, and so on. The NEP remained in effect from 1971 until 1990. It was succeeded by the National Development Policy (NDP) from 1991 until 2000, and then the National Vision Policy (NVP), covering 2001 until 2010.

Special privileges for the Malay population originated during the colonial period with an enactment reserving certain lands for Malay ownership (Federated Malay States Enactment of 1913 and FMS Enactment of 1933 – Cap. 142 of the consolidated legislative code). Article 89 of the current Federal Constitution makes provision for Malay reservations.

In the early twentieth century, rubber plantations were developed by western capital and the Enactment on Malay Reservation was aimed at protecting Malays by reserving their land.

The quota system for Malays is based on Article 153 of the Constitution, which defines the responsibility of the king (the Yang di Pertuan Agong) “to safeguard the special position of the Malays and natives of any of the States of Sabah and Sarawak” and “to ensure the reservation” for them of a reasonable proportion of “positions in the public service,” as well as “scholarships, exhibitions, and other similar educational or training privileges” offered by the federal government, along with permits or licenses to operate “any trade or business” by federal law.

The All Malaya Malay Youth Congress in 1955 and Bumiputera Economic Congresses in 1965 and 1968 demanded improvements in the economic status of Malays by providing special allotments and facilities for Malays. The recommendations of these three congresses seemed radical and unrealistic at the time, but the May 13 riot and the fear of ethnic instability created a political basis for acceptance. It was difficult for non beneficiaries to accept this political economic policy, and the political party system, which consists of an alliance or National Front made up of the United Malays National Organization (UMNO), the Malaysian Chinese Association (MCA), and the Malayan Indian Congress (MIC), was designed to absorb criticism and represent the interests of each ethnic group. At the same time, institutions of state power such as the Internal Security Act, Official Secrets Act, Printing Press Act, and Publications Act helped curtail public discussion. The prime minister between 1981 and 2002, Dr. Mahathir, wrote in his book *The Malay Dilemma* (1970) that Malays were genetically inferior, and he later used this argument as a basis for rationalizing affirmative action for the Malays.

There have been objections to the implementation of Malay privileges on grounds that they benefit only small groups of Malays. Other criticism suggests that Malays should try harder to improve their economic performance rather than relying on legislated special privileges. Even Mahathir has

complained that Malays take these privileges for granted.

The Republic of South Africa has a population of 44.83 million, comprising people defined as black (79 percent), white (9.6 percent), and colored (8.9 percent), along with a small Indian and Asian element (2.5 percent). The apartheid policy that discriminated against black Africans was abolished in 1991, and in 1994 an election in which all races participated put a black government into power, ending 350 years of white rule.

The history of discrimination and unequal treatment in politics, economy, education, and human rights created not only segregation but also huge imbalances in income and political participation. Poor people who live on less than US\$2.00 per day make up some 48 percent of the population, and most of them are black or colored. The acknowledged unemployment rate for this group is 38 percent, while the rate for whites is 4 percent, and the actual unemployment rate in black and colored residential areas is thought to be as high as 50–60 percent.

When the African National Congress (ANC) came to power in South Africa in 1994, it identified black economic empowerment as a major tool for addressing the economic injustices of apartheid. Besides the quota system of public servants, affirmative action policies for employment became standard for all larger companies under an Employment Equity Act put into effect in 2000. Under the Broad Based Black Economic Empowerment Act of 2003, “black people” is defined as a generic term that includes “Africans, Coloreds, and Indians.” According to the Act, “broad based black economic empowerment” – with an emphasis on “broad based” – refers to the economic empowerment of all black people including women, workers, youth, people with disabilities, and people living in rural areas.

Regarding ownership, the Black Economic Empowerment (BEE) Commission has recommended the following quotas for black people: 30 percent of productive land, 25 percent of the shares of companies listed on the Johannesburg Stock Exchange (JSE), 40 percent of non executive and executive directors of companies listed on the JSE, 50 percent of state owned enterprises and government procurement, 30 percent of the private sector, and 40 percent of

senior and executive management in private sector companies (with more than 50 employees).

Yet, progress in extending black administration level employment and black ownership, according to a government document entitled *Towards a Ten Year Review*, remains slow. While the government emphasizes the need to empower the black population still further by affirmative action, there has been criticism that the policies are not helping the poorest people, and the Congress of South African Trade Unions (COSATU) and other groups have highlighted problems arising from corruption and cronyism.

The third case is Fiji. Fiji has a population of 830,000, made up of Fijians (51 percent), Indians (44 percent), and others. The Constitution of Fiji and the country's Social Justice Act sanction affirmative action for indigenous Fijians in matters such as education, training, land and housing, participation in business, and employment in state services.

The original Fiji Constitution drafted in London reserved privileges for indigenous Fijians. The Alliance Party, widely supported by Fijians, was in power from 1970, when the country became independent, to 1987, when the National Federation Party supported by Indians and the Fiji Labour Party won power. Two coups d'état followed in 1987, and a new Constitution enacted in 1990 reserved certain privileges and positions for Fijians, including the post of prime minister. In 1997 this document was replaced by a new Constitution that moderated the Fijian privileges, among other things removing the restriction on who could become prime minister. Following the putsch of 2000, affirmative action policies were encapsulated in a draft 20 Year Development Plan that is to be introduced in Parliament.

Post 1987 affirmative action policies were based on practices in Malaysia, where the ruler had powers to safeguard the special position of the indigenous people. The 1990 Fiji Constitution preserved quotas for the public service, stipulating that not less than 50 percent of civil service posts should be reserved for indigenous Fijians. A *Nine Points Plan* introduced in 1988 and a *Ten Year Plan for Fijian Participation in Business* recommended ways for indigenous Fijians to make financial investments and build equity. The 1997 Constitution extended the

definition of the target group to "all groups or categories of persons who are disadvantaged."

In 2000, the *Blueprint and Government's Policy for the Enhancement of Indigenous Fijians/Rotumans Participation in Commerce and Business* (the *Blueprint*) aimed at economic reform for creating a "multi ethnic and multi cultural society," fulfilling the "aspirations of the Fijians and Rotumans," and respecting "the paramountcy of their interests." A *Twenty Year Development Plan (20 Y Plan)* further developed the *Blueprint's* proposals, setting as a goal a 50:50 division within the local economy between Fijians and other groups by the year 2020.

As in South Africa, Fiji viewed the Malaysian policy of affirmative action in support of a majority group as a sound model for economic development and political stability. Fiji began emulating the Malaysian affirmative action model as early as the 1980s, when the Fijian Holdings Company was conceived by the then prime minister, Ratu Sir Kamisese Mara, a close friend of the Malaysian prime minister, Mahathir Mohamad. Following the military coups in 1987, Fiji fervently embraced the Malaysian model (Ratuva 2002: 131). South Africa also had a close relation with Malaysia from 1994 and Mahathir was positive in support of South Africa under the South-South assistance.

When a country contemplates affirmative action for a majority group, it generally assumes that historical disadvantages the group has suffered have caused discrimination and an economic gap that cannot be overcome without special measures. Yet it is difficult for non-beneficiaries to consent to affirmative action for a majority element since they bear no responsibility for discrimination in the past, and the measures are imposed by a dominant group that holds political power. Moreover, such policies can give rise to reverse racism or reverse discrimination. Ratuva (2002) has pointed out that affirmative action of this sort can become a form of economic nationalism if it is driven by political forces and justified by political ideology aimed at consolidating the interests of a particular ethnic group.

Affirmative action is generally understood to be a program of contingent measures that will be abolished when the pattern of opportunity

and treatment in a society improves. Yet it is difficult to decide when a program has met its objectives and should be ended. It is critical to set clear goals and a timetable based on a practical system of evaluation. Also, to lift the income standards of people disadvantaged by an affirmative action program, it is vital to set up social security programs and a social safety net that will sustain the poorest households and disadvantaged people in a society on the basis of income and needs, and not according to ethnic or racial standards.

SEE ALSO: Affirmative Action; Apartheid and Nelson Mandela; Ethnic and Racial Division of Labor; Indigenous Peoples; Race; Race and Ethnic Politics; Race (Racism)

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affirmative action (race and ethnic quotas)

John Stone

Affirmative action is a term applied to policies designed to redress inequalities created by

historical legacies of racial, ethnic, and other types of group discrimination and disadvantage. Such policies have also been called affirmative discrimination, usually by those opposed to such measures, or positive discrimination, by proponents of these strategies. Like most social action aimed at redistributing resources and opportunities between groups, affirmative action is generally a controversial set of procedures and can lead to violent protests and opposition. The scope of affirmative action can be applied to a variety of different social institutions, but access to (higher) education, employment opportunities, and political quotas are the major arenas where affirmative action has been used. Differential group access to educational or employment positions is nothing new as powerful groups in most societies have tended to monopolize life chances, even when the society claims to be based on egalitarian principles. What makes affirmative action so prone to conflict is that it represents an attempt to mitigate or reverse such inequalities for the sake of disadvantaged and generally less powerful groups.

In modern times, affirmative action policies were introduced in India, under British colonial rule, to compensate for the exclusion of lower caste and dalit (outcaste) groups in employment and educational institutions in the 1890s. India has by far the longest experience of such measures in recent times and provides interesting illustrations of the strengths and weaknesses of these measures. Similar procedures were developed in the United States in the 1970s as a reaction to the perceived inadequacies of the Civil Rights legislation of the mid 1960s. Malaysia adopted affirmative action in the wake of the bloody ethnic riots between Malays and Chinese in 1969; Sri Lanka used the strategy during the Sinhalese-Tamil tensions following independence; and South Africa has employed the same approach to rectify some of the gross inequalities between whites and Africans after the end of apartheid in the early 1990s.

The main advocates of affirmative action argue that it is a necessary political initiative when group blind policies fail to produce significant results in rectifying past inequalities. Even when formal measures have been passed to enshrine equality in the constitution, and in

major areas of economic and social life, it is rare that theoretical equality can be rapidly transformed into a genuinely egalitarian society. This is because equality of opportunity is unlikely to lead to equality of outcomes – however approximately defined – after long periods of group domination, segregation, and discrimination. Large accumulations of human and social capital, wealth, knowledge, and influence may take generations to overcome. Situations of tense intergroup conflict, and delicate political and military balances of power, may lead to urgent calls for rapid and demonstrable changes in group resources, and affirmative action is often presented as a necessary, if not sufficient, strategy to bring about some tangible evidence of the success of such social engineering within a reasonable length of time.

The key debates are centered on a series of questions about whether affirmative action leads to effective results; helps to diminish, or actually enhances, group conflict; in practice merely substitutes one injustice for another; has unintended consequences that are more detrimental than the positive aspects of the policies; and raises complex questions of the morality of one generation paying the price for the sins of another. A number of comparative issues arise that appear to have relevance in most situations. Like other social policies, affirmative action has a mix of costs and benefits that are phased in a typical pattern: the former tend to be experienced immediately while the latter tend to be delivered at a much later date. This is particularly striking in cases, like the United States and India, where affirmative action is geared to redressing minority disadvantage rather than in societies where the beneficiaries are the disadvantaged majority, as in Malaysia or South Africa. In democratic political systems where the majority is prone to bear the “cost” of such policies, the electoral backlash against them, due to the timing problem, is a major obstacle.

Certain critics of affirmative action make the point that such policies tend to be cosmetic and do not address the fundamental problems generating inequality. Proposing targets or quotas in higher education or employment fails to rectify inequities in primary and secondary education, or in levels of technical skill and managerial expertise. Instead of fixing the basic problems, affirmative action policies divert attention away

from them and also may place underqualified individuals in a position where they can fail to meet minimum performance standards or complete academic courses. This sets in motion a self fulfilling prophecy and feeds the stereotypes of those opposed to greater assistance to the disadvantaged.

Affirmative action policies also raise potentially difficult moral questions concerning intergenerational accountability, and individual as opposed to collective responsibility. While most accept the need to take some state action to compensate for past categorical discrimination, when specific individuals are confronted with situations where they lose out to those whom they perceive as “less qualified” members of other ethnic and racial groups there is a tendency to interpret this as “reverse racism.” Pointing to the historical record, to the current legacy of unequal opportunities, or to the dubious nature of many “objective” indices of merit (SAT scores, IQ tests, etc.) provides little comfort to the individuals on the losing end of these decisions. In political systems where such individuals are part of the democratic majority, this invites a considerable political backlash.

Another issue that is frequently raised by both supporters and opponents of affirmative action is the skewed social class impact of many types of preferential policies. It can be argued that this is not a critical matter in the early stages of redistributive strategies as some inclusion of formerly disadvantaged elites is an essential first step in reducing ethnic violence and conflict. Apart from integrating these groups into the mainstream of society, they can also act as vital role models – Du Bois’s “Talented Tenth” – to inspire hope and emulation. However, when an increasing economic chasm opens up between the newly affluent and a dangerously alienated underclass, the time has come to reassess the targeting of affirmative action policies to ensure a greater focus on economic, as much as ethnic and racial, justice. William J. Wilson’s concern for the “truly disadvantaged” in America, and the Indian Supreme Court’s rulings in the 1990s, reflected this realignment.

Opinions differ widely on whether affirmative action is the cause of or solution to ethnic and racial conflicts. The extent to which such conflicts are fostered by resource imbalances is also a matter of debate, but in many cases

economic and social inequities are closely associated with such conflicts. Attempts to rectify these conditions are likely, as mentioned earlier, to stimulate immediate resistance, but in the longer term can help to reduce some of the causal factors underpinning racial and ethnic strife. Few would suggest that the degree of inequality is the only variable involved, just as few would maintain that affirmative action is the sole cause of racial and ethnic strife.

There may be some indirect and often unintended benefits, valuable side effects, from these policies. These include pressures to expand opportunities; increasing the pool of talent; improvements in efficiency; and the encouragement of positive political mobilization. In the Malay case, it has been argued that there has been an expansion of private education and eventually public education, as well as the beneficial exploitation of overseas educational opportunities. Such benefits can be seen as a result of the pressures created by the Malay Rights policies. On the other hand, critics maintain that attempts to radically alter economic management and ownership inevitably produces incentives for bribery and corruption. In order to meet ethnic targets, existing entrepreneurs appoint token directors and managers who simply add to costs and bring about little structural change. The so called "Ali Baba" corporations are a much cited example in which bumiputera ("sons of the soil," i.e., Malay) directors are appointed as the official owners of the business, but the actual organizations remain firmly in the hands of the Chinese or Indian minorities. While it is true that this often happens in the short run, it is necessary, however, to evaluate the longer term outcomes of such regulations. In South Africa, Anglo American and other major conglomerates struck deals with aspiring Nationalist (white Afrikaner) businessmen after 1948 which undoubtedly enhanced Afrikaner entrepreneurial success over the next few decades. After 1994, in the newly democratic society, a similar process developed with African entrepreneurs, like the former ANC politician Cyril Ramaphosa, moving into multiple business ventures as a consequence of affirmative action for the African majority.

Another line of argument suggests that public policy can be more effective in bringing

about greater ethnic equality by using non ethnic strategies. This is a parallel argument to the advocates of class based affirmative action, and stresses the beneficial outcomes of regional investment and location decisions that attack ethnic inequalities in a more indirect manner. Such an approach has the added advantage that it avoids the question of which groups should be eligible for preferential treatment. In the United States, opinions differ on whether affirmative action should be confined to African Americans and Native Americans, or whether Latinos, Asian Americans, and women should also be included. Moskos and Butler (1996), in their study of the American military, argue that blacks should be the only recipients of preferential policies; others disagree. The legitimate scope of affirmative action is clearly an important and complex question in post apartheid South Africa, with the claims of groups like the mixed race Coloureds and the Indians, who were also discriminated against under apartheid, but not perhaps as severely as the African majority, subject to varying interpretations.

A particularly vital factor, as most of the comparative evidence suggests, is the wider economic context in which these policies are pursued. Other things being equal, the faster the rate of economic growth of the total economy, the less disruptive will be the process of resource redistribution that lies at the heart of the affirmative action strategy. Much of the success of the Malaysian case, which at the outset – in the wake of the 1969 race riots – was hardly promising, can be attributed to the sustained and rapid expansion of the economy. By 2004 the policy, which is usually seen as a temporary measure to bring about rapid social change, was on the verge of being abolished. A major criticism of affirmative action policies is that they are introduced as temporary measures and then, once started, are politically impossible to end. The Indian case offers examples where this is supported, the Malaysia experiment suggests the reverse.

The politics of affirmative action in the United States reflects the continuing American Dilemma. Developed as a response to the lack of results flowing from the Civil Rights struggles of the 1960s, preferential policies were seen as a means to achieve greater equality

of outcomes among an increasingly diverse population. Like school busing, it has proved to be a controversial method toward the fulfillment of a generally approved social goal. Even if affirmative action goes the same way as busing, American society will still have to face the reality of the persistence of racial inequality.

SEE ALSO: Affirmative Action; Apartheid and Nelson Mandela; Assimilation; Conflict (Racial/Ethnic); Du Bois: "Talented Tenth"; Ethnic Groups

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age and crime

Peggy S. Plass

Of all the social characteristics associated with crime, age is perhaps the most powerful. Age has been found to be a strong predictor of involvement in crime for both victims and offenders. Crime is a phenomenon of the young

– risk for involvement drops precipitously with age. While the patterns for both victimization and offending are the same, the explanation for age's effect on each is distinct.

In the United States, arrest rates generally peak for all crime in the early 20s. Generally, a bit more than half of offenders arrested in any given year are under the age of 30, and nearly 80 percent are under the age of 40. The elderly commit very few crimes (usually less than 1 percent of arrestees are age 65 or older). While juveniles (people under the age of 18) do *not* comprise a majority of those arrested for crimes in the United States, they do account for a disproportionately high level of arrests. Not surprisingly, then, juveniles have received a great deal of attention from social scientists and policymakers. In fact, a majority of theories which were developed in the twentieth century to explain criminal offending focused on the bad behaviors of youth (a focus probably fueled as much by concern for these young offenders as it was by the volume of offenses that occurred in this group). Among the best known of these explanations of criminal behavior in the young are Albert Cohen's strain theory (in which delinquency is seen as a reaction to failure, specifically in school), Walter Miller's subcultural theory (in which delinquents are seen as adhering to a different set of values), Sykes and Matza's techniques of neutralization (in which the techniques of youth for rationalizing or making sense of bad behaviors are examined), Sutherland and Cressey's differential association theory (in which children are seen as learning bad behaviors from those with whom they associate), and Travis Hirschi's social bond theory (in which the level and type of connection that youths have with legitimate institutions, values, and ways of doing things are portrayed as insulating them from involvement in crime) (Cohen 1955; Miller 1958; Sykes and Matza 1957; Sutherland & Cressey 1978; Hirschi 1969). A belief in the uniqueness of the needs of juvenile offenders fueled the development of a separate system of justice for these criminals, the juvenile justice system.

The first juvenile court was opened in 1899 in Cook County, Illinois. Not long after that, separate systems of justice for children were found in every state in the US. The degree to which

young people should be held accountable for their criminal acts in the same way as are adults has, however, continued to be controversial in the United States. When rates of violent crime among juveniles began to rise in the 1980s, many states modified statutes, making it easier to try juveniles in the adult (criminal) courts. At the same time, there is also evidence that lawmakers continue to believe that children are different from adults. For example, in 2005 the US Supreme Court ruled that executions of those who were under the age of 18 when they committed their crimes are unconstitutional (*Roper v. Simmons*). Recent research regarding cognitive development in late adolescence has fueled debate as to whether or not teens are physically capable of the same criminal intent as are adults (ABA Juvenile Justice Center 2004). Undoubtedly, the issue of how these youngest offenders should be processed will continue to garner attention in the field.

Just as young people are more likely to commit crimes, they are also more likely to be victims. Since the early 1980s, the National Crime Victimization Surveys have found the highest rates of violent crime victimization to be among teenagers, with people in their early twenties having the next highest rates. Younger children are also at high risk for many types of criminal victimization (e.g., child abuse, family abduction, and the like), and recent evidence suggests that children of all ages comprise the majority of sexual assault victims in the US (Snyder 2000). Most explanations of the high rates of victimization among children focus on characteristics of the lifestyles of youngsters, who are generally more likely to engage in risky behaviors (e.g., Maxfield 1987). David Finkelhor, of the Crimes Against Children Research Center, also suggests that the high victimization rates of children can be explained by factors such as the level of dependence that children experience (e.g., children, unlike adults, are unable to choose where and with whom they live) and their smaller physical stature (Finkelhor & Hashima 2001).

SEE ALSO: Crime; Crime, Life Course Theory of; Criminal Justice System; Juvenile Delinquency; Race and Crime; Sex and Crime; Strain Theories

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age identity

Richard A. Settersten, Jr. and Lynn Gannon

Age is important for societies, groups, and individuals (Settersten 2003a). For example, age underlies the organization of family, educational, work, and leisure institutions and organizations. Many laws and policies structure rights, responsibilities, and entitlements on the basis of age. Members of a society may share informal ideas about age and the changes that occur between birth and death, and individuals use these ideas to organize their lives. Age also shapes everyday social interactions.

Age is also linked to many aspects of self and personality, including “age identity” – that is, how individuals feel and think about

themselves and others based on age. "Subjective age identification" was an especially lively tradition of research from the 1960s through the 1980s, but has only received scattered attention since (for an early review of this literature, see Barak & Stern 1986; for information on instruments and methods, see Cutler 1982; Settersten 1999). Several specific facets of age identity have been explored, including how old individuals feel, look, act (e.g., social roles and activities; interests and hobbies; functional capacities), and think (e.g., attitudes and values; intellectual functioning). Research in this tradition has also examined how individuals identify with or classify themselves into larger age groups, and how they compare themselves to age peers or stereotypes about people their age. It has also explored individuals' judgments about the "best," "optimal," and "desired" ages in life.

Research in this area has generally focused on late life, measured one or another of these types of age identity as single item dependent variables, and then examined correlates or predictors in three categories – physical, psychological, and social – though rarely in a single study. Most studies have included gender, chronological age, and at least crude measures of physical health, psychological well being, education, and income. A range of other factors has also been considered in isolated studies (such as marital status, employment status, transitions to widowhood or retirement, number and ages of children or grandchildren), though there is not enough evidence to reveal clear patterns.

Of the commonly included factors, the most consistent findings relate to self rated physical health, which has a strong negative relationship with subjective age (that is, better physical health is associated with younger age identity, and poorer physical health is associated with older age identity). Indicators of self rated psychological well being (especially life satisfaction, which has been examined most often) also show consistent negative relationships with subjective age identity. Of course, physical health and psychological well being are intimately connected (e.g., Freemont & Bird 2000), and these interrelationships have

often not been examined in research on subjective age identity.

Education and income also generally exhibit negative relationships with subjective age identity, though the evidence is not as strong or consistent as that for physical health and psychological well being. It is important to note, however, that both physical health and psychological well being are strongly connected to education, occupation, and income (e.g., Mirowsky et al. 2000), and these three dimensions of socioeconomic status may therefore have indirect rather than direct effects on subjective age identity via physical health and psychological well being (Barrett 2003). Race has rarely been included in analyses of subjective age identity, but when it has, it has generally not been significant – though race, like dimensions of socioeconomic status, may exert its influence through physical and psychological health, for which there are many strong racial disparities (e.g., Smaje 2000).

The evidence for gender differences in subjective age identity is, surprisingly, even less consistent than socioeconomic status. Early studies speculated that women might have younger age identities and more often value youthful ages than men, particularly because of stronger cultural norms related to physical attractiveness for women. Studies in the 1980s and 1990s, however, have not found regular evidence of this gender difference and, in fact, one recent study found exactly the opposite (Kaufman & Elder 2003).

Early studies also suggested that chronological age and subjective age identity were positively related (that is, the older one is, the older one feels). Recent studies have instead suggested that there may be tendencies to identify with age groups other than one's own, particularly in early and late life (e.g., Goldsmith & Heiens 1992; Montepare & Lachman 1989). That is, teenagers and young adults may hold age identities that are older than their actual ages; adults through midlife may hold age identities that are relatively close to their actual ages; and adults in late life may hold age identities that are younger than their actual ages. In advanced old age, however, these discrepancies may vanish or reverse with the onset of significant health problems.

These assertions demonstrate the importance of expanding inquiry to younger periods and to dynamics across the life course (see also Kaufman & Elder 2002). To understand changes in subjective age identity within individuals adequately, prospective longitudinal data are needed. But such changes can also be assessed retrospectively, as individuals derive a sense of age identity at any given point by making internal comparisons between their current and former selves (Sherman 1994).

Inquiry in this area might also be expanded to address individuals' understandings of how other people view them (which may be incorporated into self perceptions) and the views that individuals have of others. For example, studies of subjective age identity in late life suggest that respondents will classify others of the same chronological age as "old," but use younger terms to describe themselves (e.g., Connidis 1989). Younger adults tend to hold more negative views of aging than older adults, and many older adults who view the aging process as negative often do not apply this view to themselves. Generally, only those who are in poor health or isolated, or those who are very old, label themselves as old. This tendency may lead individuals to deny or insufficiently prepare for the hardships of aging.

Most research on subjective age identity has been conducted in the United States, and much remains to be learned about how these matters vary across cultures and nations. Not surprisingly, the few studies of subjective age identity in other countries have suggested that Americans have or strive for more youthful age identities (e.g., Uotinen 1998; Westerhof et al. 2003).

There is significant need to build multi-item measures of subjective age identity with sound psychometric properties, and to understand interconnections among the various types of subjective age outlined earlier. There is also great need to understand their differential correlates or predictors, as well as their differential outcomes. Measures of subjective age identity have rarely been viewed as independent variables, and are probably predictive of many physical, psychological, and social outcomes.

The last few decades have brought dramatic changes in the structure and content of the

life course (for illustrations, see Settersten 2003a). These changes warrant renewed attention to subjective age identity and other age-related phenomena in contemporary societies – including age norms, age-related images and stereotypes, and the boundaries and markers of different life periods.

SEE ALSO: Age Prejudice and Discrimination; Aging and the Life Course, Theories of; Aging, Sociology of; Identity: Social Psychological Aspects; Life Course Perspective; Self; Social Identity Theory

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age, period, and cohort effects

Norval D. Glenn

Age, period, and cohort effects must be considered as a package, because the three kinds of effects are so closely interrelated that it is impossible to deal empirically with one without also dealing with the others. Age effects are the consequences of growing older, either of human individuals or of other entities. Period effects are the consequences of influences that vary through time. And cohort effects are the consequences of being born (or coming into existence by some other means) at different times.

Assessing age effects is central to social gerontology, developmental psychology, and the sociological specialty of aging and the life course, in which fields hypotheses about the consequences of aging abound. For instance, it

is believed that participation in conventional crime diminishes due to declines in energy and risk taking propensities associated with aging out of adolescence and young adulthood, and it is believed that voting and other forms of political participation typically increase as, and because, young adults take on greater work and family responsibilities. Estimating age effects is not easy, however, because these effects may be confounded with period or cohort effects in any kind of data used for the task. For instance, in a simple comparison of persons who are at different ages at one point in time (cross sectional data), age effects may be confounded with cohort effects. For instance, older persons may be different from younger persons because they have always been different rather than because they have changed as they have grown older. In panel data, which result from the same persons being studied at different points in time, changes as the persons grow older may be age effects, or they may be period effects. For instance, changes in political attitudes from young adulthood to middle age may be the consequences of aging, or they may result from general changes in the political milieu throughout the society.

The confounding of age, period, and cohort effects is known as the age–period–cohort conundrum and is a special case of the “identification problem,” which exists whenever three or more independent variables may affect a dependent variable and each of the independent variables is a perfect linear function of the others. This is the most extreme version of collinearity, because the multiple correlation of each independent variable with the others is unity. When all but one of the interrelated variables are controlled, the variance of the remaining one is zero. The identification problem is common in social research, being present, for instance, when the difference between two variables, as well as those two variables themselves, may affect a dependent variable. The classic case of the identification problem is when age, period, and cohort may all affect a fourth variable.

The age–period–cohort conundrum can be illustrated by the use of a standard cohort table, in which multiple sets of cross sectional data relating age to a dependent variable are

Table 1 Percentage of women who were married, by age and year, United States

Age	Year			
	1968	1978	1988	1998
25-34	87.4	76.6	67.3	67.3
35-44	87.1	82.1	76.3	72.1
45-54	82.4	80.5	76.2	70.8
55-64	67.7	70.4	70.7	67.8
65-74	46.5	48.3	53.3	54.8

Source: Data are from the March Current Population Survey conducted by the US Census Bureau. The percentages are from, or are calculated from data in, US Census Bureau (1969, Table 37; 1979, Table 51; 1990, Table 49; and 1999, Table 63).

juxtaposed and in which the intervals between the periods for which there are data are equal in years to the range in each age category. For instance, in Table 1, in which the dependent variable is whether or not women were married, ten year intervals and ten year age categories are used. In such a table, the trend within a cohort can be traced by starting with any but the oldest age category in the left hand column and reading diagonally down and to the right. For instance, according to the data in Table 1, in the cohort of women who were 25–34 years old in 1968, the percentage married went from 87.4 in 1968 to 82.1 in 1978 to 76.2 in 1988 to 67.8 in 1998. This decline of almost 20 percentage points could have been an age effect, because the cohort grew 30 years older; it could have been a period effect, reflecting general changes in the society during the three decades covered; or, more likely in this case, it may have been a combination of age and period effects. In other words, in this or any other cohort diagonal, age and period effects may be confounded. Likewise, age and cohort effects may be confounded in each column, and period and cohort effects may be confounded in each row, of a standard cohort table.

It is obvious that a simple inspection of Table 1 cannot reveal the extent and nature of any age, period, and cohort effects reflected in the data. What has not been evident to many researchers interested in the age–period–cohort conundrum is that no routinely applied statistical analysis of the data can, by itself, be relied on

to provide accurate estimates of the effects. Although one cannot put all three variables measured in the same way into a regression or similar analysis (the program will not run), various transformations of variables, manipulations of measurement, and simplifying assumptions can be used to get the analysis program to yield estimates of the effects of all three variables. For instance, two of the variables can be entered in continuous form while the third is converted into a set of dummy variables. Or one year intervals between periods can be used while ten year age categories are used. However, the resulting estimates are almost never meaningful; the linear dependence of the variables on one another is broken in the statistical model, but it remains in the real world.

The reason that statistical modeling cannot be relied on to distinguish the effects is illustrated by the different combinations of effects that could produce the data in Table 2, which is a standard cohort table reporting hypothetical data. The simplest interpretation of the data is that they reflect pure linear age effects, whereby each additional ten years of age produces a five point increase in the dependent variable. For some dependent variables, this might be the only plausible interpretation, but as the alternative explanations at the bottom of the table indicate, it is not the only logically possible one. Rather, an infinite number of combinations of age, period, and cohort effects could produce the pattern of variation in the dependent variable shown in the table. When the pattern of variation in the dependent variable is not as simple as that in Table 2, which is usually the case, the combination of effects producing the data must be somewhat complex. It should be obvious that no mechanically applied statistical analysis can reveal which of the many possible complex combinations is the correct one.

Nevertheless, much time and effort has been devoted during the past 35 years to developing all purpose techniques of statistical modeling to distinguish age, period, and cohort effects (APC). The method introduced by Mason et al. (1973) has been widely used, and unpublished papers describing at least two new APC modeling methods are being circulated.

Of the several statistical APC techniques, only the Mason et al. method has been demonstrated by simulation experiments to

Table 2 Pattern of data showing pure linear age effects, offsetting period and cohort effects, or a combination of age effects and offsetting period and cohort effects. (Numbers in the cells are hypothetical values of a dependent variable)

<i>Age</i>	<i>Year</i>					
	1950	1960	1970	1980	1990	2000
20 29	50	50	50	50	50	50
30 39	55	55	55	55	55	55
40 49	60	60	60	60	60	60
50 59	65	65	65	65	65	65
60 69	70	70	70	70	70	70
70 79	75	75	75	75	75	75

Alternative explanations:

1 Each 10 years of aging produces a 5-point increase in the dependent variable.

2 There is a 5-point per 10 years positive period effect on the dependent variable and a 5-point per 10 years negative cohort effect.

3 There is some combination of age and offsetting period and cohort effects on the dependent variable. An infinite number of combinations of such effects could produce the pattern of variation in the dependent variable shown in the table.

be able to produce accurate estimates, and it works only under very limited conditions. The method in its simplest form consists of (1) converting age, period, and cohort each into a set of dummy variables; (2) dropping one dummy variable from each set, as must always be done; and (3) dropping an additional variable from one of the sets. The simplifying assumption (identifying restriction) in this case is that the two dummy variables dropped from the same set have equal effects. If this assumption is precisely correct, if only one of the APC variables has effects, and if the effects are non linear, then the method yields accurate estimates, but these conditions are very rarely met. If the simplifying assumption is even a moderate distortion of reality, the estimates will be grossly in error. And if there is any substantial linear component of the effects, the estimates are unlikely to be correct. How well the method works when there are non linear effects of two or three of the APC variables has not been demonstrated.

A major limitation of all major methods of APC modeling is that they are based on the

assumption that the effects are additive. In the real world, however, APC interactions are ubiquitous. There is a great deal of evidence, for instance, that young adults tend to respond more to stimuli for change than do older adults, so that period effects often vary by age and thus among cohorts of different ages. Furthermore, many kinds of age effects are likely to change through time and thus to vary among birth cohorts. Social expectations for behavior at various chronological ages have shifted considerably in recent decades, an example being an increased expectation for middle aged and older people to be sexually active. Even biological aging has changed moderately with advancements in medical care and nutrition.

When cohort data are complex, and especially when there are interactions among the variables, their meaningful interpretation always requires knowledge of the phenomena being studied from sources other than the cohort data, or what Converse (1976) has called "side information." Some of this information may come from the same data set as the cohort data, but it usually comes from other sources. The data in Table 1 illustrate both the kinds of interactions that are common in cohort data and how side information is required for meaningful interpretation of complex cohort data. There are several interactions in the data, and statistically modeling the effects reflected in them would be difficult even if the identification problem did not plague the effort. However, the data are not mysterious to family demographers familiar with the relevant side information, namely, changes in marriage, divorce, and longevity in the United States in recent decades. The trends producing the data are (1) a substantial increase in the typical age at first marriage from the late 1970s through the 1980s; (2) a steep increase in divorce from the mid 1960s to around 1980 that involved long term marriages only to a limited extent; (3) a decrease in the death rates of middle aged and older men that began in the 1980s; and (4) the maturing into the older age brackets of cohorts with very high lifetime rates of marriage. To anyone not familiar with these trends, no statistical manipulation of the data in Table 1 could lead to much insight into the complex pattern of the data.




Figure 1 Happiness index^a by age and sex, United States.

^a Percentage of respondents who said they were “very happy” minus the percentage who said they were “not too happy.”

Source: Pooled data from the 1972 through 2002 United States General Social Surveys.

The general meaning of simpler cohort data (but not the exact magnitude of effects reflected in them) may be evident once they are examined systematically. An example is data on reported personal happiness from the 1972 through 2002 American General Social Surveys. The relationship of reported happiness to age did not change systematically from 1972 to 2002, and thus pooled data from all of the surveys can be used to show that relationship, for males and females, respectively (see Fig. 1). For males, the relationship of happiness to age is positive and monotonic, but for females it is non monotonic, being higher for middle aged and early elderly persons than for either younger or older ones. The male–female difference relates to age in an almost perfectly linear fashion, with women reporting greater happiness than men in young adulthood and men reporting greater happiness than women beyond middle age. This cross sectional variation in reported happiness by age could of course reflect either age or cohort effects, or both (and to some small extent might result from differential mortality).

At this point, one needs to ask what the overall trend, and the trend among the youngest

adults, would be if the observed age pattern of reported happiness were the result of cohort succession, that is, the result of each successive cohort that matured into adulthood being different from the ones before it. In the absence of offsetting period effects, the mean happiness of males would have declined, absolutely and relative to the happiness of females. In fact, however, the trends were in the opposite direction. The indicated happiness of males increased and that of females decreased from 1972 to 2002, both among adults as a whole and among those under age 35, resulting in a substantial and statistically significant increase in the relative happiness of males. The offsetting period effects explanation should not be summarily dismissed, because occasionally there are reasons to think that period and cohort effects may be in opposite directions. However, there is no reason to think that the happiness trends deviate from the usual pattern, whereby period and cohort effects result from common period influences and thus are same signed components of change. (Here theory and side information are brought to bear in interpreting the data.) If the age pattern of happiness was the result of age effects, the

happiness of males within cohorts as they grew older should have increased, absolutely and relative to the happiness of females. That is precisely what the data (not shown) indicate. The indicated intracohort trends are more than great enough to create the cross sectional age pattern of reported happiness, probably because they reflect period effects as well as age effects and because intercohort trends reduced the cross sectional age differences. Therefore, the cross sectional data in Figure 1 apparently correctly indicate the direction of age effects on reported happiness, but they probably underestimate the magnitude of those effects.

Other cohort data require different analytic strategies, there being no formula or cookbook approach that works well in all cases. Rather, the analyst must use ingenuity and imagination to adapt the analysis to the problem at hand. Various statistics, ranging from simple to complex, may be useful, as long as the researcher is aware that the solution to the age-period-cohort conundrum cannot be solely a statistical one.

SEE ALSO: Aging, Demography of; Aging and the Life Course, Theories of; Aging, Longitudinal Studies; Aging, Mental Health, and Well Being; Aging, Sociology of; Gerontology; Life Course Perspective; Secondary Data Analysis

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age prejudice and discrimination

Bill Bytheway

Agism is often defined as prejudice and discrimination against older people on the basis of age. Women are disadvantaged and oppressed as a result of sexism. Black and minority ethnic groups are disadvantaged and oppressed by racism. In similar ways age is held against older people due to agism.

The dominant social order of many contemporary societies has been radically changed by campaigns against sexism and racism. Many countries have legislation intended to end such discrimination and to ensure equal opportunities regardless of gender or ethnicity. In contrast there is comparatively little legal constraint relating to age.

Age discrimination is when people are denied resources or opportunities as a result of being judged to be old. Age prejudice is when older people are viewed in stereotypical and negative ways. At the individual level these actions are triggered either by chronological age or by the visual appearance of the person: face, body, and dress. Collectively, agism may be evident in the way in which services are organized, located, or described.

In his classic definition of agism as “a process of systematic stereotyping of and discrimination against people because they are old,” Robert Butler (1975) did not see being old as problematic. However, as he goes on to observe: “Old people are categorized as senile, rigid in thought and manner, old fashioned in morality and skills” and, in part, this is because the word itself enables “us” to characterize “them” in non inclusive and homogenizing ways.

Increasingly, the word “older” is preferred to “old” or “elderly.” Many have difficulty with this, however, using “older” as a euphemism for “old,” or demanding a categorical definition based on chronological age. For those challenging agism this could be construed as evidence of success in that it is not so easy to stereotype and discriminate against such “ill defined” categories. The turn to “older,” however, also

reflects a broader view of agism: as a set of deterministic beliefs about how people change biologically over the course of their whole lives. This conceptualization still parallels theories relating to racism and sexism in that biological differences are seen to underpin prejudicial assumptions, but it differs in that people of all ages are oppressed by agist assumptions about the aging process. Moreover, these beliefs legitimate the use of chronological age in determining expectations relating to personal growth and physical capacity.

Infants and very frail older people are unable to live independently in the modern world and most people would accept that they should be given proper care. Similarly, just as children need education so, in a well ordered society, retired people are seen to need a pension. This and similar benefits and concessions are sometimes described as indications of positive agism. However, when chronological age is used to determine who is in need of care, education, or a pension, then legal status is transformed upon reaching certain birthdays and, regardless of whether such change is welcomed, these policies underpin demeaning attitudes and agist prejudice.

ORIGINS OF AGISM

Arguably, agism has existed in every society. Following anti sexist and anti racist action in the 1960s, however, it was perhaps inevitable that agism would be "discovered." At that time, social research was revealing the deplorable position of older people in so called civilized societies. For example, in the US, there was Jules Henry's *Culture Against Man* (1965) and, in the UK, Peter Townsend's *The Last Refuge* (1962) and Barbara Robb's *Sans Everything* (1967). It was in 1969 that the word agism was coined, when Robert Butler commented on a controversy over the allocation of his rise blocks to old black people. In the angry debates that followed he heard echoes of the infamous intergenerational battles the previous year between students and police and, in a newspaper interview, he described the reaction to the housing proposals as a function of agism rather than racism (Butler 1989).

Such prejudice underpins the allocation of resources. Americans for Generational Equity (AGE) was formed in the 1980s to question governmental policies that seemingly prioritized the old at the expense of the young. It drew upon the work of Daniel Callahan, whose *Setting Limits* (1987) advocated using chronological age to weigh the provision of health care resources against older people.

Agism is about rights as well as inequalities. The ultimate human right is to life and, as Simone de Beauvoir (1979) found in her review of ethnological evidence, many societies respect old people so long as they are competent, but abandon them when they become senile and infirm. At the beginning of the twentieth century, for example, the famous surgeon Sir William Osler backed Anthony Trollope's suggestion that men over 60 are useless and should be offered a peaceful departure through chloroform (Graebner 1980: 4-5). More recently, alarmed by forecasts of the impact of demographic change on the economy, various commentators have backed euthanasia for the aged. In 1984, for example, Governor Richard D. Lamm of Colorado argued that sick old people should "die and get out of the way."

The study of agism developed primarily in the US and, in the wider context, the policy agenda has focused on older workers and employment law. Many of those seeking to legislate against age discrimination have been patronizing towards "the old," and the historian Thomas Cole (1992) has argued that the attack on agism "originated in the same chorus of cultural values that gave rise to agism in the first place." In his view, agism is a conceptual tool that is "neither informed by broader social or psychological theory nor grounded in historical specificity" (pp. 228-9). The evidence of current sociology appears to support this claim: to date, sociological research into age has failed to match that which has focused on gender and ethnicity.

AGE PREJUDICE

Most of us have anxieties about the future and a fear of aging. Underpinning these are a number of beliefs: that the chances of illness and impairment will increase as we grow

older; that old people are ugly; that they have failing memories, etc. With age, we lose not only those we are closest to, but people with whom we can share past experiences. There is a particularly strong fear of “losing one’s faculties” and of becoming dependent on others for basic daily routines. These fears affect how we react to people of great age. Butler argued that agism allows younger people to see older people “as different from themselves” and as a result they “subtly cease to identify with their elders as human beings.” The same is said of infants, but the difference is that in time infants are expected to become “full” human beings.

Since the publication in 1972 of a newspaper article by Susan Sontag, it has become widely accepted that appearance is constrained by agist values. Particularly for women, the youthful fashion model presents an image of the idealized body that is oppressive for women of all ages (Woodward 1999; Calasanti & Slevin 2001). Some older women have vividly described the experience of being made to feel “invisible” in an agist world (Macdonald & Rich 1983). Nevertheless, images of older people abound. Kathleen Woodward (1991: 1), for example, offers a telling anecdote about an exhibition that included the portrait of a thin naked old man. For some, the portrait confirmed and consolidated their prejudices and they indulged in agist humor. Others, however, Woodward noted, were forced to address their reaction to this image of their own possible future. Uncompromising images of the aging body can easily shock those who would normally look away. People often express their feelings of disgust and pity.

Prejudice is also evident in the ways in which chronological age is used in creating a summary identity. Just as a single photograph can categorize an individual as “male, old and white,” for example, so the words “Applicant, 75, male” are sufficient to place the individual into an age and sex category and a stereotyped image comes to mind. In such ways chronological age and the image of the aging body combine to consolidate an age identity.

The above examples of prejudice feature an individual who is prejudged according to age. Agist prejudice can also apply to older people collectively. At a local level, housing can be

reserved for “the elderly” and, as Butler observed, this might evoke in the local community the image of large numbers of “senile old people” invading the local community. In such instances, it is neither chronological age nor the sight of an older person that triggers the response, it is the stigma that goes with the crowd and words such as “elderly” and “senile.”

AGE DISCRIMINATION

Whereas prejudice stigmatizes, discrimination divides and excludes. Exclusion implies a bar, something that is easier to demonstrate than stigma. Leaflets and advertisements often include age stipulations and clerks can point to these in explaining how we might be too old or too young to qualify. Typically, this kind of institutional discrimination depends upon chronological age. With each birthday, our status changes and regulatory doors open and close. Whether it is the cinema or the cardiology clinic, the temptation to lie about our age is always there.

There are many situations where chronological age is considered incidental. What really counts is appearance. In an agist society, older people are encouraged to pass as “youthful” and, in many settings, we only gain entry by conveying the right image. Gatekeepers in employment agencies, leisure centers, holiday camps, and night clubs have enormous discretion.

There are many sources of national statistics that can be used to illustrate the massive social and economic inequalities that result from such bureaucratic discrimination. For example, the UK Family Expenditure Survey demonstrates a strong association between age and household finance. There are striking differences between people aged 50 to 64 and people aged 75 or more. The older group has an average disposable income that is less than half that of the younger. The main sources of income of the younger group are wages and salaries, whereas for the older they are predominantly pensions. Of the two groups, the older spends proportionately more on household essentials. People aged 75 or more are less able to cope with unexpected bills. These differences are caused by legal and regulatory restrictions on employment and income generation and it is in this way

that institutional agism constrains the financial resources of older people. Many have less freedom to spend than they had previously and less than that enjoyed by younger generations.

METHODOLOGICAL ISSUES

As researchers, a key issue that we have to address is whether we see agism as a concept that helps explain inequality and discrimination, or as a political and cultural phenomenon. If the first, then we should consider carefully how we define and study it. We could conceptualize agism as something that includes "erroneous" beliefs about the "facts" of age and, following Palmore (1999), our aim would be to overcome agism through knowledge and education.

The second strategy, however, implies recognition that anyone and any organization can act against agism. As researchers we would not claim any authority in defining agism and how it should be challenged. We might encounter definitions that seem bizarre, based on an outdated vocabulary for example. Or, reflecting Cole's observation, we may encounter definitions of agism which, paradoxically, seem positively agist. Accepting that this is how discussion of agism is developing in the wider world, we would not seek to challenge this "mistaken" view of agism. Rather, we would attempt to account for its emergence and distinctive construction.

It is helpful to return to precedents relating to sexism and racism. In both, the lead has been taken by members of those groups that suffer the consequences. So campaigns against sexism have been led by women in a wide variety of contexts: ideological, academic, cultural, political, and economic. Men aligned to such campaigns have occasionally played a part, but it would be absurd to suggest that men have ever led, or should aspire to lead, such campaigns. Similarly, those who have led campaigns against racism have, with few exceptions, been members of oppressed racial groups. So the fight against agism defined as discrimination and prejudice against older people must be led by older people: people who have first hand experience of the consequences.

Where does this leave us as sociologists concerned to challenge age prejudice and discrimination? We may have relevant first hand experience of agism in the broader sense and we may encounter age prejudice within universities or similar institutions, but we are in a weak position to claim leadership in more broadly based campaigns against agism. It is only when we cease to be *employed* as sociologists and begin to share with others the experience of retirement and "being too old" that we can start to play an influential part in political action.

So the conclusion might be that sociologists have first hand experience of aging and the oppressive use of chronological age, rather than of prejudice and discrimination against older people. It is in this context that sociologists employed as researchers can play a leading role in the continuing struggle against agism. To this end, there are three directions that should be considered in planning future research (Bytheway 2002): moving away from a narrow focus on "the elderly" and "their needs," and towards aging in general and extreme age in particular; away from the planning and delivery of support services and towards the management of everyday life; and away from idealized models of the aging process and towards a focus on how people talk about and act upon their age.

SEE ALSO: Age Identity; Aging and the Life Course, Theories of; Aging and Social Policy; Aging, Mental Health, and Well Being; Aging, Sociology of; Beauvoir, Simone de; Body and Society; Discrimination; Elder Abuse; Gerontology; Prejudice; Retirement; Stereotyping and Stereotypes; Stigma

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agency (and intention)

Stephan Fuchs

Agency is a fundamental and foundational category and puzzle in virtually all social sciences and humanities. Debates over agency have emerged together with these fields, and continue unabated into the present time, with no resolution or consensus in sight. While many agree that agency, action, and actor are basic in some sense, controversies persist over the definition, range, and explanatory status of these concepts. In addition, agency is contested because it connects to core questions in metaphysics, philosophy, and ethics, such

as free will, moral responsibility, personhood, and subjective rights. Agency is tied to the legacy of liberal humanism that is part of the core of democratic citizenship.

In sociology, one result of these enduring conflicts has been a metatheoretical split into agency vs. structure, micro vs. macro, and individualism vs. holism. On the micro side of this divide are those who argue that, since only actors and their actions are real, all things social must ultimately be “reduced to,” or “explained in terms of,” agency. In contrast, those on the macro side defend the emergent and irreducible status of large scale social entities, such as organizations, states, and social structures.

Underneath these disagreements are some common themes. Agency is the faculty for action. This faculty may be uniquely human. Action differs from the (mere) behavior of non human organisms, which is driven by innate or conditioned reflexes and instincts. Non human organisms have no or little control over how they behave. They do not have a sense of self or, if they do, it is not reflexive. Their behavior is caused by forces they cannot comprehend or influence. Human actors are different because they are conscious and aware of the world, themselves, and other actors. To some extent, what they do, and who they are, is up to them. They are open to the world, and not stuck in the immediately pressing here and now of a local niche. Human identity is not fixed from the start, and so human beings have to make themselves into who they will become. This makes predictions of actions difficult, if not impossible. Action is contingent; behavior is necessary. An actor can act, but also not, and can also act in different ways. While actors may have reasons for their actions, such reasons do not determine actions in the same rigid way that natural forces cause behavior.

The faculty for agency is located in the human mind. The mind is the seat of reflexivity, deliberation, and intentionality. Before we act, we rehearse possibilities and alternatives. The mind also houses the sense of who we are as individual persons. Humans have minds and selves, and these together are the sources for action. Action is motivated, but not caused, by intentions. These intentions give actions their meaning. To understand

agency, action, and actors, sociology needs to understand and interpret the meanings and intentions that actions have for their actors. This is difficult, since intentions and meanings presumably are mental states inside the head, and so cannot be directly observed, unlike overt behavior. While each of us can introspect our own intentions, what happens in other minds may ultimately be inaccessible. In fact, for Freud, we do not even know, and chronically deceive ourselves, about what happens in our own minds.

RATIONAL CHOICE

Much depends on how this agentic core is developed. One possibility is rational choice and exchange theory. This holds person, intention, and action constant. In this tradition of scholarship, there is no genuine problem or difficulty with agency because it is settled by *fiat*. By axiom or definition, all actors are deemed rational. Rational actors always act out of a well defined interest in their own personal welfare. Rational actors are very informed and knowledgeable. They know what they want, and what they want most. They also know how to get what they want in the most effective and efficient way. To do this, they must compete against other rational actors who want the same things. If two actors want something the other has, an exchange might occur. Such exchanges occur in markets. All social action is rational market exchange. To the extent that an actor needs something from another very badly, and cannot get that resource from someone else, the second actor has power over the first. Power results from dependence.

SYMBOLIC INTERACTIONISM

Very different from this rationalist and utilitarian theory of agency is symbolic interactionism, which owes much to American pragmatism. In this tradition, agency is more contingent and open ended. It is not known or settled beforehand what action is and who the actors are. This is not for the external observer to decide, but emerges from the practice of social life itself. The self is not a homogeneous utility function, but a complex and

multidimensional accomplishment. The most prominent theory of the self, that of Mead, reckons with three components of the self, each in an internal conversation with the others. The faculty for agency is not ready made, but emerges through a process of social formation and reformation. Social interaction is negotiation over definitions of the situation. Reality is socially constructed. Actors develop a sense of self, and present a certain side of themselves to others. They take each other's roles to manage the problem of double contingency. They see themselves through the perceptions of those others with whom they interact, particularly "significant" others.

To understand agency, one needs to take the "actor's point of view" and see the actors' worlds from their own perspectives. Since all action is symbolically structured, most importantly through language and culture, the key to agency and action is interpretation, not explanation. Understanding agency is akin to interpreting texts. The central method for interpreting social action and interaction is, therefore, participant observation. Sociologists are not free to impose their concepts on those they study, but must connect their understanding to the self understanding of the actors they study.

ETHNOMETHODOLOGY

Symbolic interactionism works with a notion of agency that is similar to the idea of the subject in German idealism. The actor is a sovereign, in charge of who he or she is, and in control of the situation. The actor is a maker and author of the world. The world is the actor's will and representation. In contrast, the ethnomethodological notion of agency is indebted to continental phenomenology and existentialism (Husserl and Heidegger). Actors are not really in control of social life; rather, social life is in control of them. They are not subjects, but "members." Members of ordinary everyday society do not so much act as enact the social practices of common sense. There are very narrow limits on what actors can be consciously aware of and define or redefine. These practices continue and confirm themselves through members, much like

the “habitus” in Bourdieu, which is a collective unconscious. Members are not the authors of these practices but one outcome of them. Members are the means by which society reproduces itself. Social practices cannot be defined and redefined at will. They establish a sense of facticity and normalcy over an abyss of uncertainty, contingency, and anxiety.

The way to study these practices is to disrupt them, and then observe how a sense of facticity repairs itself. Any social order is a local accomplishment. But it is not an accomplishment of actors and agency. Rather, social order emerges and maintains itself, and it does so through its members.

CONSTRUCTIVIST AGENCY

One difficulty with making agency, action, and actor the foundational concepts of the social sciences is that there are very many actors, doing very many different things, for many different reasons. There are about 6 billion actors alive today. It is impossible to know all of them, what all of them are doing, and why. Reasons and intentions are presumably inside the head, which makes them difficult to retrieve. One might ask them for their reasons, but the stated reasons may not be the real ones. Even if all this were knowable, it is still uncertain how one would get from an action to, say, the modern world system. A society is not the result of any one’s doing. It cannot be “intended” as such or as a whole. Society does not really consist of persons or actors, in their full biographic totality. Even that which a single person does may have consequences that go far beyond any subjective meanings and plans.

One possible strategy to avoid such difficulties is a constructivist, rather than realist, notion of agency. Constructivism sees agency not as a faculty that is, in fact, had by actors but as a property that may, or may not, be ascribed to them. Agency then becomes an attribution, akin to the granting of a privilege that can also be withdrawn and withheld. Societies and cultures differ in how they distribute such privileges, and to what sorts of entities. Tribal societies with animistic cosmologies, for example, tend to grant agency

to spiritual forces of nature that modern science sees as inanimate objects governed by physical laws. Historical sociology shows that different societies ascribe agency, and hence responsibility and accountability, to different persons in different ways, resulting in variable distinctions between adults and children, for example. Likewise, we tend to grant agency to our pets, but not to the microorganisms in our bodies. We tend to attribute agency to all other human persons, but on occasion with draw this privilege, as happens to the insane or the comatose. Passionate conflicts rage over whether and when embryos have agency, and thus subjective rights that need to be protected. If all animals have agency and subjectivity, killing them for consumption might be murder.

This constructivist turn in the study of agency makes variation in attributions the key. Agency now becomes a second order construct, not a first order essence or natural kind. Allowing for variation might make it possible to render agency more amenable to empirical research, whereas up to now it has been bogged down in conceptual and semantic analysis.

SEE ALSO: Constructionism; Ethnomethodology; Micro–Macro Links; Rational Choice Theories; Structuration Theory; Structure and Agency; Symbolic Interaction

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agenda setting

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The concept of agenda setting has become a term of art in the sociology of social problems largely through research concerning the effects of mass media on public opinion. However, it has also been applied beyond this particular area of research to consider how topics arise as matters of public concern more generally. Thus research on agenda setting focuses on the whole range of forces that influence public opinion on any given issue and the various ways in which issues become topical among policymakers themselves.

Research on agenda setting is predicated on the fact that there is not always a very strong relationship between scientific accounts of the prevalence and/or seriousness of a given social problem and the success with which that problem is publicized and/or made the focus of public policy. Often, putative problems that are not very widespread or significant get very high levels of public attention, while problems that are quite serious are comparatively ignored. If problems do not get placed on the public agenda simply by virtue of the fact that, objectively speaking, they warrant public attention, then there is a need to study the real reasons why some problems find their way onto the public agenda and others do not. Research based on this insight is often called social constructionist, to highlight its insistence that our beliefs about social problems do not derive as much from the objective characteristics of those problems as from the ways in which images of them are socially constructed in the mass media and elsewhere. Typically, the questions raised in the agenda setting literature concern such issues as the social conditions under which a given problem arises as a matter of public concern, among whom it arises as a matter of concern, techniques used to get issues onto the public agenda, the resources with which this work is accomplished, the capacities of various audiences to attend to particular problems or problem sets, and the consequences (or the lack thereof) of various agenda setting efforts.

The earliest research on agenda setting noted that because most of our information

regarding what is happening in the community or the world at large derives not from first hand experience but from the mass media, these media play an important gatekeeping role in determining which issues come to our attention. Some research has suggested that the mass media do not necessarily dictate exactly what we should think about the most important issues facing the community, but that they heavily influence whether an issue comes to be seen as important in the first place. This is accomplished through story selection and through decisions as to whether to continue coverage on a story or let it die. Research looking at the social structural conditions under which the news media work suggests these conditions strongly encourage a convergence of the various individual media outlets on similar sets of stories. Other research suggests that the power of the mass media goes considerably beyond merely establishing the salience of a problem to establishing the specific "frames" in light of which particular issues ought to be seen. For example, mass media coverage of the problem of "drunk driving" not only places that issue on the public agenda but overwhelmingly tends to frame it as a problem concerning the personal habits of individual drivers. One might argue that this problem could just as easily be framed as a problem of inadequate road safety measures or public transportation provisions. Hence, researchers interested in agenda setting want to understand why one frame is promoted and/or adopted on a problem rather than another. Different media portrayals of a putative problem may suggest different causal explanations, levels of urgency, specifications of who is involved (as perpetrators, victims, or problem solvers), and possible remedies for the problem. Thus it is argued that the mass media can have an enormous influence not only on whether we regard a problem as important and worthy of public attention but also upon how we orient to that problem in all of its myriad dimensions.

In response to the argument that the mass media shape public opinion in this way, some have countered that the mass media merely reflect the interests and concerns of their consumers. Hence, one major debate in the agenda setting literature has focused on the question of whether the mass media shape public opinion or public opinion shapes the

content of the mass media. This formulation of the question has also been subject to the important criticism that neither the mass media nor public opinion are sufficiently uniform or consistent to speak of them in the singular. If we want to understand adequately whether public opinion has an influence on mass media content or vice versa, we must first specify which elements of "the public" we are speaking of and, likewise, which mass media. This point is equally true of research that would seek to explore the influence of the mass media on policymakers and vice versa. Contemporary research in this area acknowledges that these questions are seldom straight forward. Typically, various claims makers are actively involved in vigorous struggles with one another as to whether a given issue belongs on the public agenda or not, and, if so, how that issue should be framed. These various claims makers often have very different levels of access to the wide range of media outlets potentially available, different (and often very unequal) resources with which to promote their claims, and different levels of credibility among the various audiences they would hope to persuade. This more finely grained approach to research has also suggested that the very idea of a singular "public agenda" may need to be refined. If, in fact, the work of agenda setting is tailored to particular audiences that vary depending on the nature of the issues concerned, then it may be more appropriate to speak of many different public agendas, taking shape in many different practical arenas, rather than the singular and integrated public agenda of a given society.

SEE ALSO: Audiences; Awareness Contexts; Constructionism; Frame; Framing and Social Movements; Information Society; Media Literacy; Media Monopoly; Media and the Public Sphere; Mediation; Politics and Media; Propaganda; Public Opinion; Public Sphere; Reception Studies; Social Problems, Concept and Perspectives; Social Problems, Politics of

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aggression

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Aggression is any behavior that is directed toward injuring, harming, or inflicting pain on another living being or group of beings. Generally, the victim(s) of aggression must wish to avoid such behavior in order for it to be considered true aggression. Aggression is also categorized according to its ultimate intent. *Hostile aggression* is an aggressive act that results from anger, and is intended to inflict pain or injury because of that anger. *Instrumental aggression* is an aggressive act that is regarded as a means to an end other than pain or injury. For example, an enemy combatant may be subjected to torture in order to extract useful intelligence, though those inflicting the torture may have no real feelings of anger or animosity toward their subject.

The concept of aggression is very broad, and includes many categories of behavior (e.g., verbal aggression, street crime, child abuse, spouse abuse, group conflict, war, etc.). A number of theories and models of aggression have arisen to explain these diverse forms of behavior, and these theories/models tend to be categorized according to their specific focus. The most common system of categorization groups the various approaches to aggression into three separate areas, based upon the three key variables that are present whenever any aggressive act or set of acts is committed. The first variable is the *aggressor*

him/herself. The second is the *social situation or circumstance* in which the aggressive act(s) occur. The third variable is the *target or victim* of aggression.

Regarding theories and research on the *aggressor*, the fundamental focus is on the factors that lead an individual (or group) to commit aggressive acts. At the most basic level, some argue that aggressive urges and actions are the result of inborn, biological factors. Sigmund Freud (1930) proposed that all individuals are born with a *death instinct* that predisposes us to a variety of aggressive behaviors, including suicide (self directed aggression) and mental illness (possibly due to an unhealthy or unnatural suppression of aggressive urges). Other influential perspectives supporting a biological basis for aggression conclude that humans evolved with an abnormally low neural inhibition of aggressive impulses (in comparison to other species), and that humans possess a powerful instinct for property accumulation and territorialism. It is proposed that this instinct accounts for hostile behaviors ranging from minor street crime to world wars. Hormonal factors also appear to play a significant role in fostering aggressive tendencies. For example, the hormone testosterone has been shown to increase aggressive behaviors when injected into animals. Men and women convicted of violent crimes also possess significantly higher levels of testosterone than men and women convicted of non-violent crimes. Numerous studies comparing different age groups, racial/ethnic groups, and cultures also indicate that men, overall, are more likely to engage in a variety of aggressive behaviors (e.g., sexual assault, aggravated assault, etc.) than women. One explanation for higher levels of aggression in men is based on the assumption that, on average, men have higher levels of testosterone than women. However, amounts vary across individuals depending on a variety of factors in addition to sex.

In contrast to the biological perspective on aggressors, the social learning perspective proposes that aggressive behaviors/tendencies are instilled in individuals when they observe aggression performed by others. One significant factor in this process is modeling, which is the tendency of individuals to imitate the behaviors displayed by others. Many experiments have

shown that individuals are more likely to engage in aggression after witnessing acts of aggression (particularly portrayals of aggression that are shown in a positive light). It has also been shown that those who grow up in homes where domestic abuse has occurred are significantly more likely to engage in domestic abuse as adults. Researchers conclude that growing up in an abusive situation teaches some children that acts of physical aggression are appropriate. It may also serve to desensitize them at an early age to the outcomes of aggression.

Another component of social learning theory is that people may engage in aggressive acts because they can be rewarding. As individuals are socialized, behavioral patterns are established through a process known as "reinforcement." This means that we continue patterns of behavior that result in some type of reward, while we discontinue or decrease those behaviors that result in punishing or negative outcomes. Therefore, if one learns that aggression is more likely to result in a positive outcome (attention, approval, power, money, etc.) than a negative outcome, aggressive actions are more likely to be viewed as a viable means to a desired end.

A third explanation of aggressive behavior involves the phenomenon of psychopathology or sociopathology. These terms are frequently used interchangeably, since the conditions and symptoms are very similar in nature. The fundamental difference between the two is that psychopathology is thought to have a primarily biological basis, while sociopathology is thought to have a primarily social origin (such as childhood trauma). In either case, the individual experiencing this condition feels a kind of disconnection from the normative standards of the society around them. This disconnection is also generally accompanied by an inability to fully empathize with the experiences or feelings of others in their social environment. These combined factors may lead the individual to engage in patterns of behavior characterized by inappropriate and/or abnormal levels of verbal and physical aggression. Some propose that modern society is marked by such a high rate of significant life change, disruption, and social disconnection (e.g., frequent moves, divorce, the incidence of inadequate day care,

etc.) that children today are more likely to experience factors conducive to this condition.

Apart from these key factors, research has shown that a wide variety of other influences, such as drugs, alcohol, verbal and/or physical provocation, arousal, etc., may have significant (though varying) impacts on the occurrence of aggressive behavior. The phenomenon of aggression is broad and complex, and many factors affect those who engage in it.

With these characteristics of aggressors in mind, we turn to the second key variable in determining aggression: the *situation*. A major consideration involving the situation is the presence of frustration or stress. Frustration is generally defined as the blocking of goal directed behavior. In what came to be known as the *frustration-aggression hypothesis*, many early psychologists and social psychologists argued that frustration was a precursor to *all* acts of aggression. However, research on this issue proved that the presence of frustration does not necessarily result in aggressive acts. A complex interplay of factors determines whether the sensation of frustration ultimately translates into aggressive behavior. For example, if an individual perceives that an aggressive act will eliminate the cause of frustration, then the likelihood of that act being committed is increased. If aggression is not perceived as a possible remedy, the aggression is decreased.

Closely related to the phenomenon of frustration and aggression is the influence of environmental stressors. A prime example of the impact of stress on aggression is the relationship between high temperatures and various forms of violent crime. Research has shown that a variety of violent crimes (murder, assault, etc.) increase significantly during hot weather. Studies on the urban riots of the 1960s also show a clear correlation between high temperatures and the incidence of crowd violence. Laboratory experiments show that aggression is more likely to result from stressors such as heat and irritating noise, if the participant believes there is no escape from the stress. When participants perceive that they can modify or escape from the stressor, the occurrence of aggression decreases significantly. Other studies have shown a connection between a variety of environmental stressors (e.g., cigarette smoke, pollution, etc.) and the incidence of aggression.

The sociocultural perspective on aggression proposes that the fundamental situational determinant of aggression and violence is the nature and content of the popular culture in which one lives. It is hypothesized that factors such as the prevalence and availability of guns, governmental utilization of the death penalty, and the institutionalization of violence in sports (contact sports, in particular) foster a *culture of violence*. Another component of this culture is the frequency and portrayal of violence and aggression in the mass media. Numerous studies have documented the high frequency of such portrayals in various facets of the media. Most estimates show that the average American child has witnessed hundreds of thousands of violent acts, and tens of thousands of homicides, on television by the age of 18. Nearly every study on exposure to violence in the media shows a significant relationship with the tendency toward aggressive behavior (though direct causality remains difficult to prove). Thus, from a sociocultural perspective, the individual tendency toward aggression is largely a product of the norms people learn through social exposure.

The third key variable in aggression is the *target* or *victim* of the aggressive act. One aspect of this variable is the demographic characteristics of the target, namely, gender and race. These characteristics depend largely upon what type of aggression is being committed. For example, in examining the occurrence of crimes such as murder or assault, it is found that men are much more likely to be victims than women. However, if we focus more specifically on murder among spouses or cohabiting male/female couples, women are significantly more likely to be murdered than men. Regarding the issue of child abuse, it has been found that male and female children are abused in roughly equal rates. With regard to race and ethnicity, most aggression is intraracial, or directed within one's own racial/ethnic group. Most racial/ethnic minorities in the United States have higher rates of victimization than whites, though whites are more likely to be the victims of interracial aggression (such as murder, rape, and assault).

An important issue beyond the basic demographic dimension of aggression is the victim's capacity to retaliate against the aggressor.

Usually, if a victim has a significant ability to retaliate, the likelihood and severity of aggression is reduced. This dynamic is particularly relevant in cases of aggression that involve considerable thought and deliberation. In cases that involve strong emotion and/or the consumption of drugs or alcohol, rational considerations such as retaliatory capacity are less effective in reducing aggression. It is also thought that the low immediate retaliatory capacity of certain victims, such as abused children or rape victims, contributes to some degree in the occurrence of these crimes.

A final issue related to victims of aggression involves the psychological impact of aggression upon them, and the manner in which it may affect future behavioral patterns and coping strategies. One concept that exemplifies this concern is *learned helplessness*. Research on this phenomenon demonstrated that when animal subjects learned that aggression (such as electric shocks) was unavoidable, they quickly stopped trying to avoid it – even after escape became possible. The application of this concept to human behavior is mitigated by a variety of factors, but many believe that it holds relevance in explaining why some victims of aggression fail to free themselves from violent or abusive situations when the opportunity to do so is available. The primary problem encountered when examining the impact of aggression on victims in this manner is that it becomes easy to *blame the victim* for the aggression itself. However, by further understanding common responses to aggression, it also becomes possible to construct useful therapeutic programs and treatments for dealing with the phenomenon in a constructive way.

SEE ALSO: Learned Helplessness; Milgram, Stanley (Experiments); Rational Choice Theory: A Crime Related Perspective; Social Learning Theory

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aging, demography of

Charles F. Longino, Jr. and Janet Wilmoth

Demography is the scientific study of human populations. Its origins are as old as those of science. The demography of aging, on the other hand, did not begin to emerge as a distinct subfield until the second half of the twentieth century, when low fertility and mortality rates were creating dramatic shifts in the age structure of developed countries. In 1980, Jacob Siegel devoted his presidential address to the Population Association of America to the topic of demography of aging, which he declared “brings demographers to focus holistically on a population group, the elderly, and a demographic process, aging” (1980: 345).

At that point, researchers in this area were in the early stages of defining old age and aging, documenting changes in the age structure, identifying mortality trends, describing the health status of older adults, explaining the geographical distribution and mobility of older adults, understanding the life course and cohort flow, and exploring living arrangements, family support, and retirement trends (Siegel 1980). Since that time demographers have become increasingly concerned with population aging as it relates to social transfer programs, social institutions such as the economy and the family, and the overall quality of

life for different age groups (e.g., children, working aged adults, older adults) (Preston & Martin 1994). Both formal demographers and social demographers have contributed to the sociology of aging. Their work on population aging worldwide and in the United States is reviewed below.

Formal demographers are primarily concerned with documenting the changing size, age/sex structure, and geographical distribution of the population, which are influenced by fertility, mortality, and migration rates. The first contribution demography makes to the sociology of aging, therefore, is documenting worldwide trends in population aging. Demographic transition theory explains the shifting fertility and mortality rates that accompany economic development. This transition involves three distinct phases. The first is characterized by high, fluctuating mortality rates and high, stable fertility rates. The age structure of the population is young and life expectancy at birth is low. In the second phase, childhood mortality declines. Typically, drops in fertility lag behind reductions in mortality, causing population growth and a reduction in the average age of the population. The final stage of the demographic transition is characterized by additional improvements in mortality, particularly mortality related to human made and degenerative diseases that disproportionately affect older adults. Fertility fluctuates but remains low, often at below replacement levels. It is during this last stage that the population ages; specifically, the average age of the population increases as the proportion of the population that is older increases.

Historical evidence suggests this demographic transition occurred slowly in most developed countries. Consequently, developed countries, particularly in Western Europe and North America, experienced gradual population aging during the second half of the twentieth century. In contrast, developing countries are going through this demographic transition at a quicker pace, which means their populations are projected to age at a more rapid rate (United Nations 1999).

Another contribution demographers make to the sociology of aging is documenting national changes in mortality, morbidity, and

disability. Mortality rates are related to life expectancy. Improvements in life expectancy *at birth* have been slowing, as the gains due to improved standards of living and health care have been realized and mortality rates due to infectious disease have decreased. However, in many countries improvements in life expectancy *at age 65* continue as mortality rates among the oldest old decline. Life expectancy at age 65 tends to be highest in developed countries with more equitable wealth distributions, a higher percentage of gross domestic product that is allocated to old age benefits and health care expenditures, and lower rates of tobacco consumption (Munnell et al. 2004).

Increasing life expectancy, particularly at age 65, raises questions about the quality of life during these additional years lived. Are older adults living longer, healthier lives or are they living longer in poor health? Healthy life expectancy, which is the number of years lived, on average, without disease and/or functional limitations, increases when improvements in morbidity and disability keep pace with, or exceed, improvements in mortality. In this scenario, morbidity is compressed into a shorter period of the life span such that older adults, on average, live longer and in better health.

In addition, the causes of disability often change as morbidity is compressed. Disability due to infectious and parasitic diseases tends to drop; however, disability due to non communicable diseases like cancer, heart disease, and neuropsychiatric disorders usually increases. This shift is expected to be particularly noteworthy in developing countries that are experiencing rapid population aging (Murray & Lopez 1997).

Social demographers focus on the social causes and consequences of demographic trends. They have attempted to address a range of issues related to population aging with international data. Three commonly addressed topics related to international population aging include the potential demand placed on health care systems, the impact of changing family structure on care provision, and the economic implications of an aging population.

The growth of the older adult population will not only place demands on health care in terms of the absolute number of people who

need to be served, but it will also create shifts in the type of care that is required. The demand for treatment of non communicable diseases and chronic conditions is likely to increase (Murray & Lopez 1997). This type of care is typically more technologically intensive and occurs over a longer period of time, which increases costs.

In terms of changing family structure and care provision, older adults in the future will have fewer adult children due to fertility declines. The education of women and their growing participation in the labor force world wide, along with rising divorce rates in all developed countries, increase the complexity of family lives. The willingness and availability of adult children and extended family members to continue to provide the same level of support for their parents in the future is, therefore, called into question.

There is a common expectation that these population trends may come at a cost, particularly by slowing economic growth and raising demand for governmental support of older adults. For developing nations, rapid population aging in future decades may reverse hard earned advances in economic development. In developed countries, continued population aging raises troubling questions about the viability of the pension and social security systems. Potential solutions would be to increase the retirement age, raise taxes to improve public pension fund solvency, lower benefits, and encourage private pension savings.

Another contribution of demography to the sociology of aging is that it documents in detail the trends in population aging that occurred in the United States. The most obvious is the growth of the older population. The percentage of the population age 65 or older increased from 4.1 percent in 1990 to 12.4 percent in 2000 and will be over 20 percent by 2060 (Himes 2001). Furthermore, the fastest growing segment of the older adult population is among the oldest old, who are age 85 and over. The percentage of older Americans who are age 85 and older has increased from only 5 percent in 1900 to 12 percent in 2000, and is expected to increase to 23 percent by 2050.

Over the past 50 years in the United States there have been substantial decreases in

mortality, particularly in later life, and subsequent increases in life expectancy. Life expectancy at birth is now 74.3 years for men and 79.7 for women (National Vital Statistics 2004).

The leading causes of death in the United States continue to be due to degenerative diseases associated with aging, including heart disease, cancer, and stroke (Center for Disease Control 2003). The most common chronic conditions include arthritis, hypertension, hearing impairments, heart disease, and cataracts. Almost 45 percent of older adults are limited in activities because of a chronic condition (National Academy on an Aging Society 1999). Overall, however, demographic research on the health of older adults suggests Americans are living longer in better health.

A core concept in the sociology of aging is heterogeneity among the older adult population, which is substantiated by social demographic research on gender, racial, ethnic, and socioeconomic variation among older Americans.

In terms of gender, the ratio of men to women in later life is quite unbalanced and decreases dramatically with age. There are 70 males for every 100 females over the age of 65. Among those aged 85 and older, there are only 41 males for every 100 females (US Census Bureau 2000b). Consequently, many of the "problems of aging" are disproportionately experienced by women whose life course experiences shape their later life outcomes, including health conditions, economic status, and social relationships.

These outcomes also vary by race and ethnicity. The older US population is increasingly racially and ethnically diverse: 83 percent is currently non Hispanic white but only 64 percent will be so by 2050. Rates of growth are fastest among older Hispanic and Asian populations (Federal Interagency Forum on Aging Related Statistics 2000) due primarily to immigration trends, changing preferences for entry into the United States based on family status, and increases in the number of immigrants aged 60 or older.

Some of the differences in later life outcomes across racial and ethnic groups, of course, can be attributed to differences in socioeconomic status. Educational attainment

is an indicator of socioeconomic status, and it has increased since 1950 more rapidly for non-Hispanic whites. Given the close connection between education attainment and income, it is not surprising that non-Hispanic white older adults are less likely to be in poverty and have more wealth in later life than other race and ethnic groups (US Census Bureau 2002). Furthermore, at all income and educational levels, non-Hispanic white older adults are more likely than minority older adults to own a variety of assets, including high risk investments that can yield higher returns (Choudhury 2001). Perhaps more importantly, there is evidence that the economic disparities across racial and ethnic groups are increasing (Utendorf 2002).

Social demography also makes a contribution to the sociology of aging by systematically considering the consequences of population aging in the United States, particularly as it relates to labor force participation, retirement, and family ties.

Over the past 50 years, labor force participation among middle aged and older men has dropped, while for middle aged and older women labor force participation has increased (Federal Interagency Forum on Aging Related Statistics 2000). For both men and women the age at retirement has declined. Among men the average age at retirement decreased from over 67 years in 1950–5 to 62 years in 1995–2000. Among women that average decreased from almost 68 years to approximately 62 years over the same time period (Gendell 2001).

This trend toward early retirement, in combination with increasing life expectancy, has substantially increased the average number of years retirees collect benefits: for men the average life expectancy at the median age of retirement in the early 1950s was 12 years, but this figure had increased to 18 years by the late 1990s, and among women the average life expectancy at the median age of retirement increased from nearly 14 years to 22 years during the same time period (Gendell 2001). Demographers speculate that even if age at retirement were to remain stable or increase somewhat, the average length of retirement is likely to increase due to projected improvements in life expectancy (US Census Bureau 2000a).

In terms of family ties, family members are a primary source of support to older adults. The majority of older Americans are embedded in a web of family relationships despite the increasing propensity to live independently. Over the twentieth century, the percentage of older adults living with family declined dramatically. This trend toward independent living is often attributed to preferences for living alone that have been realized through the improved economic and health status of the older population as well as changes in norms concerning non-family living arrangements (Pampel 1983). The likelihood of living alone tends to be lower among older adults who are minority group members or immigrants, are in poorer health, have fewer financial resources, and have more children.

Even though older adults are not likely to live with children, they tend to be in frequent contact with and live in close proximity to at least some family members. Current cohorts of older adults had relatively high marriage and fertility rates and therefore have relatively large family networks from which to draw support (Himes 1992). However, the trend toward lower fertility, in combination with longer life expectancy, is substantially restructuring American families. Although average family size is decreasing, multigenerational families are more prevalent (Bengston et al. 1995).

The complexity of family structure has been compounded by rising divorce rates, falling remarriage rates, and increases in the proportion of the population who have never married. This retreat from marriage has created a range of blended, alternative, and stepfamily arrangements. The long term implications of the restructuring of the American family for family relationships and caregiving in later life have yet to be determined. However, some research suggests that divorce undermines affection and exchanges between parents and children, particularly between fathers and children (Amato & Booth 1996). Thus, future cohorts of older adults may not be able to rely as much on spouses and children for support.

In conclusion, the demography of aging primarily uses quantitative methods to document population aging worldwide and in the United States. In doing so, it provides a justification for studying older adults, identifies

the social causes of aging, and considers the various consequences of shifting population age structure.

SEE ALSO: Aging and the Life Course, Theories of; Aging and Social Support; Aging, Sociology of; Demographic Data: Censuses, Registers, Surveys; Demographic Techniques: Population Pyramids and Age/Sex Structure; Demographic Transition Theory; Gender, Health, and Mortality; Gerontology: Key Thinkers; Healthy Life Expectancy; Race/Ethnicity, Health, and Mortality

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aging and health policy

Jill Quadagno and Brandy D. Harris

In many nations, people 65 and older are the fastest growing segment of the population, with the most rapid growth occurring among the oldest old: individuals aged 85 and older. Illness and disability are not an inevitable component of advancing age. Many people remain in good health into very old age, and early diagnoses and treatment of conditions associated with aging combined with healthy lifestyle choices can mitigate the effects of age-related diseases and conditions. Nonetheless, population aging raises critical health policy issues because the elderly have more

hospitalizations and more chronic conditions than younger people and use more prescription drugs and medical services (Solomon 1999).

Demographic trends indicate that health care systems are likely to experience unprecedented demands in the near future because health policies have not kept up with these demographic changes (Victor 1991: 63). Until the twentieth century, the major causes of death for individuals of all ages was from an acute infectious disease, that is, an illness or condition with a sudden onset, sharp rise, and short courses, such as tuberculosis, diphtheria, gastrointestinal infections, and pneumonia. Death rates from these diseases dropped dramatically in developed countries between 1900 and 1970 due to antibiotics and immunizations and public health measures such as improved sanitation and purification of the water supply. As deaths from acute diseases declined, there occurred an increase in life expectancy along with a higher prevalence of chronic disease such as arthritis, heart disease, osteoporosis, Alzheimer's disease, emphysema, and diabetes. While some chronic diseases have an apparently sudden onset (e.g., heart attack), they may in fact have long latent periods before symptoms are manifested (Solomon 1999).

Many national health programs were enacted in the post World War II period. Services focused on acute medical care, reflecting the most pressing health care needs at that time. Yet population aging and the increase in chronic health conditions have altered the nature of service demands. Even when coverage for acute care is adequate, in many countries, chronic care for elderly people is poorly coordinated and inadequately provided because health care systems were not originally oriented to these problems. Yet chronic care service needs differ considerably from those required for treating acute disease. How well the chronic care needs of older people are met depends on many factors. The generosity of routinely provided medical benefits, particularly long term therapies and prescription drugs, as well as treatment patterns of health professionals, are part of the equation. Availability of a full range of health and social care services needed to support chronic care is another (Manton & Stallard 1996).

The US does not guarantee universal access to health care (Quadagno 2005). Most non poor children and working aged adults are covered by employment based private health insurance, but anywhere from 14–18 percent lack medical insurance altogether (Hacker 2002). Government programs only cover people who are “uninsurable” in the private health insurance market. Medicare is a federal program that pays for hospital care and physician services for the elderly and disabled. It pays for approximately 54 percent of older Americans' health care expenses. Medicaid is a joint federal–state health insurance program for the very poor, but also pays for a substantial amount of nursing home care for the chronically ill. Because gaps in Medicare coverage (deductibles, co payments, prescription drug costs, etc.) leave many acute health care needs unmet, two thirds of elderly Medicare beneficiaries purchase supplemental “medigap” policies from private insurance companies. However, many beneficiaries of color are not able to purchase private supplemental insurance because of cost. They either rely on Medicaid for additional coverage or shoulder the burden themselves (Williams 2004).

How the prevalence of chronic disease and need for care among elderly people will be expressed in the future is unknown. If improved health behaviors and medical advances succeed in limiting or minimizing chronic conditions, there could be a compression of morbidity, with people experiencing fewer years of chronic illness and living longer, healthier lives (Manton & Stallard 1996). Alternatively, increased future longevity could be accompanied by longer periods of disabling chronic disease processes occurring, or more sick elderly people with a high need for long term care services.

Research suggests that the compression of morbidity thesis is more accurate. People are living longer and experiencing fewer years of incapacitation. Results from the National Long Term Care Survey (NLTCS) reveal that from 1982 to 1999, disability rates among people over age 65 decreased about 2 percent per year (Fries 2003). The dilemma for health policy is that while a compression of morbidity may decrease the need for residential and

institutional care, it may also increase dependence on technological interventions and prescription drugs to help sustain aging individuals' capacity for self care. Between 1984 and 1999 the percentage of older Americans utilizing assistive devices for a disability increased from 13 percent to 26 percent (FIFARS 2004).

Further, overall trends mask significant differences in health care access and cost by race, income, and health status. Elderly people with more education and higher socioeconomic status are likely to experience a compression of morbidity, while low income elderly and racial minorities may experience greater incapacity and thus rely more heavily upon the health care programs (Fries 2000). Past experience suggests that this is the case. Among Medicare enrollees age 65 and older (for 1992 to 2001), the average cost of health care for non Hispanic blacks was higher than costs for either non Hispanic whites and Hispanics. Moreover, Medicare enrollees who reportedly had no chronic health conditions paid approximately \$11,900 less, on average, than those who reported five or more chronic conditions (CMS 2004).

Concerns about how governments will finance both the acute and chronic care costs of an aging population have been the central issue in most recent health policy debates. Many countries are struggling to integrate fragmented systems of treatment and community support to provide appropriate chronic care for their aging populations. Health care policymaking in the future is likely to involve some targeting of benefits to the older, poorer, more disabled population.

SEE ALSO: Aging and Social Policy; Aging and Social Support; Aging, Mental Health, and Well Being; Aging, Sociology of; Health Care Delivery Systems; Health Maintenance Organization; Leisure, Aging and

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aging and the life course, theories of

Angela M. O'Rand

The life course perspective provides an orienting framework for identifying the mechanisms that link lives and social structures in historical time. It focuses on the intersection between biography and history (Mills 1959). Accordingly, the conceptualization of time is a central concern. *Biographical time* is defined by the links between chronological age, psychophysical development and/or decline, and successive social statuses. *Biographies* are variable sequences of social statuses across the life span, with some statuses (but not all) highly correlated with chronological age. *Historical time* also has chronological and social components, with the latter tied to events or periods that exert differential influences on biographies.

Age, period, and cohort are core concepts in the life course perspective. Briefly defined, age refers to biographical time; period refers to historical time; and cohort refers to a group whose members experience a particular event at the same time in their lives. Persons born at the same time constitute a birth cohort. As they age they come to encounter historical events from a different social vantage point than other birth cohorts. So, for example, members of the US baby boom cohort, born between 1946 and 1964, face historical events such as the Vietnam War or the stock market bubble of the 1990s, and experience them differently from other birth cohorts because of their age and life course statuses during those events (Hughes & O'Rand 2004).

The life course framework is founded on three general principles. The first is the *age stratification principle* or the conceptualization that age is an independent social basis for differentiation and inequality across societies. First, age is a gauge of human development, marking some largely universal psychophysical transitions in the aging process from birth to death. Human development is a product of the coevolution of the brain and its cognitive capacity with a long life span, an extended period of juvenile dependence on parents/caretakers, and a complex familial organization for provisioning offspring until they reach adulthood (Kaplan et al. 2000). Hence, age has an underlying biological component that differentiates and stratifies developmental statuses. Second, age is also a social construction, defined by institutional arrangements that allocate individuals into social statuses, such as student, voter, and retiree, on the basis of age. Social allocation on the basis of age distributes resources and advantages unequally by defining rights and obligations.

The second principle may be termed the *heterogeneity principle*. This refers to processes of social differentiation as increasing functions of age. Birth cohorts may live through history together, but they do not experience that history similarly because of two sources of differentiation. First, birth cohorts are themselves heterogeneous in socially meaningful ways from the beginning. Gender, race, class, and geographical locations are among the initial differences within cohorts that anchor the

trajectories of lives and condition opportunities and actions over time. The baby boom cohort is not a homogeneous group, but one highly stratified by education, work history, race/ethnicity, and other meaningful social characteristics (Hughes & O'Rand 2004). Second, individual lives become increasingly differentiated within cohorts over time because later life statuses (such as wealth status or disability) are affected by social origins and by highly variable and interdependent transitions that intervene across several domains of life, including education, family, work and health, from birth to death. Levels of educational attainment, employment stability, marital stability, and health maintenance, along with personal responses to these life events across the life course, interact in complex ways to increase differentiation with age. These diverse life trajectories can also be deflected by historical events, which can have more severe consequences for some members of a cohort than for others. Glen Elder's extensive studies of the impacts of war, depression, and economic hardship repeatedly demonstrate the diversity of experiences with history within cohorts (e.g., Elder 1998; Conger & Elder 1995).

The *demographic principle* refers to changing aggregate patterns of lives that are responses to changing historical circumstances and stratified opportunities. These are the day to day behavioral responses of individuals to their life conditions that, in the aggregate, can exert forces for social change. For example, the baby boom was unexpected. Fertility behavior in the century before the baby boom and following it exhibited a long term trend of declining fertility. However, the post World War II economy and culture led to changes in fertility behavior including earlier and larger families. Since the post World War II period, even more demographic changes have occurred, including increased labor force participation among young mothers, delayed fertility until middle age, and rising divorce and serial marriage, all of which are challenging traditional institutions associated with the family and the market.

This principle challenges the age stratification process that has differentiated the life course along strict age criteria. Matilda White

Riley and her colleagues (e.g., Riley et al. 1994) proposed a theory of structural lag in the 1990s, which argued that changing demographic patterns associated with increased active life expectancy and the delayed onset of disability (among other factors) have made age based public policies associated with work and retirement obsolete and counterproductive for society. However, even more compelling was their argument that the life course is shifting in nearly every respect away from age differentiation to age integration. Figure 1 is an expanded version of the Riley age integration model of the new life course. It portrays the shift from an age differentiated conception of the life course, in which social statuses in youth, middle age, and old age are strictly separated, to an age integrated life course over which statuses and status transitions can recur and co occur across ages and domains of life. Work and parenthood can occur early in life; education may continue later in life; parenthood may also extend to later life and be accompanied by family roles associated with assisting elderly parents; remarriage and new family formation can continue well into older

ages. In addition, changes occurring in one domain of life at any time (e.g., divorce in middle age) can trigger changes in other domains of life (e.g., returning to school, entering the labor force, a decline in mental health). The figure captures the dynamics among the three principles of the life course perspective noted earlier: age stratification, heterogeneity, and demographic pressure.

FROM PERSPECTIVE TO THEORY

These basic elements of the life course perspective are products of the convergence of several sociological traditions over the last three decades. Since Ryder's classic essay (1965), social demography has steadily contributed to the life course perspective through the development of dynamic models of life transitions such as marriage, fertility, and employment and their interdependence across historical contexts (e.g., Oppenheimer et al. 1997). Status attainment theory has moved in the same direction by steadily elaborating the relationship between social origins and later life




Figure 1 Expanded age integration model of the life course.

achievements across cohorts (Bernhardt et al. 2001). Criminology has developed trajectories of criminal careers and their turning points in varying contexts (Sampson & Laub 2003). And social gerontology has steadily turned to estimating the influences of earlier life patterns, including childhood origins, on later life economic well being and health (O’Rand 2001).

This convergence has not generated a unifying theory *per se*. Rather, efforts to develop middle range theories within the life course perspective continue. Some of these are focused at the personological level. In this vein, Glen Elder and his colleagues have proposed several mechanisms of human development across the body of his work (e.g., Elder & Caspi 1990). The first two are borrowed from Ryder’s (1965) classic paper on cohorts and social change, the remaining from life course research that has emerged over four decades.

- *The life stage hypothesis*: Social change and historical events have enduring (imprinting) impact on the lives of those in vulnerable and/or transitional statuses at the times of these events. The transition to adulthood is especially fateful in its long term effects.
- *The situational imperative hypothesis*: The level of disruption and compelling severity of an event induces cohort variability. Exposures to wars, to large scale depressions and similar big events, and to highly disruptive proximate events such as family dissolution, job loss, or incarceration, have greater effects on the life course than less severe events.
- *The interdependent lives hypothesis*: Social ties serve to diffuse experiences within a cohort such that long term consequences are felt not only by individuals with direct experiences, but also by those associated with these individuals. Families share each other’s experiences.
- *The accentuation principle*: New situations increase the salience of prominent individual attributes and lead to their reinforcement and accentuation over the life course. Ascribed attributes, and attributes developed early in life (such as temperament, aspiration, sociability), are reinforced

and amplified over the life course, and especially in the face of adversity.

Other efforts are generating theories at a structural level. One of the more provocative theoretical developments in this regard addresses life course stratification within cohorts based on the cumulative dis/advantage hypothesis (O’Rand 2002), which predicts that cohort differentiation over the life course is increasingly stratified in the direction of initial inequality (following Merton’s “Matthew Effect”). Institutional processes preferentially reward early advantages and penalize early disadvantages over time in a cumulative fashion. These processes are embedded in normative schedules of achievement, organizational time clocks of advancement, and socioeconomic compounding and discounting regimes that cumulatively appreciate or depreciate earlier achievements. They are observable in patterns of economic inequality and health disparities in mid and late life in which socioeconomic origins and early educational achievements exert enduring independent effects on these later outcomes. These factors become embedded in historical contexts that can introduce obstacles to, or incentives for, cumulative effects.

In short, the life course perspective has been useful as an organizing framework for the study of lives over time with its focus on the intersection of biography with history. Its usefulness has spanned research on diverse domains of life, ranging from education to family, work, health, and even criminal careers. It has also spawned middle range hypotheses to account for the changing temporal organization of lives over time.

SEE ALSO: Age, Period, and Cohort Effects; Aging, Demography of; Aging, Longitudinal Studies; Aging, Sociology of; Gerontology, Key Thinkers; Life Course and Family; Life Course Perspective

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aging, longitudinal studies

Duane F. Alwin

Historically, the concept of aging refers to changes to individuals that occur over time resulting from some combination of biological, psychological, and social mechanisms. The life span developmental perspective is a somewhat broader framework, as it considers aging to begin at birth and conceptualizes human development as multidimensional and multidirectional processes of growth involving both gains and losses. From this perspective, human development and aging are embedded in multiple contexts and are conceived of in terms of dynamic processes in which the ontogeny of development interacts with the social environment, a set of interconnected social settings, embedded in a multi-layered social and cultural context. In addition, the uniqueness of individual biographies and the diversity of life patterns have encouraged a life course approach to human development within the social sciences. The study of the life course is primarily concerned with the social pathways defined by events and transitions experienced by individuals and the sequences of roles and experiences followed by individuals over particular phases of their lives. Influences of development, maturation, and aging are usually identified with changes within individuals linked to their getting older, becoming more mature due to having lived more of life, having experienced a variety of different life course events, or due to physical, cognitive, or other kinds of developmental change. For simplicity, we often refer to all of these types of "within person" change as the effects of (or consequences of) aging.

How do students of aging, life span development, and the life course study the causes and consequences of within person change? Several different approaches have been used by researchers interested in the causes and consequences of within person change with respect to outcomes of interest (outcomes typically related to health, disability, or cognitive functioning), but the emerging consensus

among students of aging is that research designs that collect measurements on the same persons over time are a particularly valuable approach to studying the causes and consequences of aging. Any research design that locates and measures events and processes in time is referred to as *longitudinal*. There are a variety of types of longitudinal designs, including everything from complicated life history calendars, which go to great lengths to date events, their timing and duration, on the one hand, to retrospective life histories presented in narrative form, on the other (see Scott & Alwin 1998).

Still, perhaps the most common approach in the study of aging is the one shot cross sectional study in which researchers simply compare age groups and from such comparisons draw inferences about aging. One of the critical problems with the one shot cross sectional studies is that they confuse the potential effects of aging with the influences of cohort factors (see Mason & Fienberg 1985). Persons of a particular age at a given point in time are also members of the same birth cohort (i.e., persons born during the same year). Members of a particular birth cohort share the experience of the life cycle; that is, they experience birth, infancy, and childhood, reach adolescence, grow into early adulthood, and mature into midlife and old age during the same historical time. In this sense, members of a birth cohort share a social history; that is, they experience the same historical events and the opportunities and constraints posed by society at a given time in history. A person's *cohort* membership may be thought to index the unique historical period in which a group's common experiences are embedded, and their behavior may have as much to do with their historical experiences as they do with their age.

It is important to realize that one shot cross sectional designs are *not* inherently limited, especially if they involve the replication of cross sections over time. The existence of *diachronic* cross sectional data for the same cohorts can be used as a legitimate basis for separating the effects of aging and cohort effects under certain circumstances (see Alwin et al. 2005). Another way to control for cohort differences is to study a single cohort over time. Eaton (2002) provides a strong rationale for studying a single

cohort from conception to death. In this type of single cohort study, age variation occurs over time rather than cross sectionally, and this permits an explicit focus on within person change. However, development and aging do not occur in a historical vacuum, and while studying a single cohort over time does hold many variables constant, it is difficult to generalize about processes of aging because of the confounding influences of aging and history.

Having information on the same persons across a range of birth cohorts – a multiple cohort longitudinal study design – opens up several possibilities for analyzing the effects of aging across cohorts. The value of this type of longitudinal design is borne out by the vast number of research projects over the past few decades that locate and measure events and processes *in time* (see Young et al. 1991). Indeed, we have reached a point where there are several longitudinal data sets that permit the study of patterns and processes of aging in different historical and cultural contexts. For example, in the US, the series of panel surveys known as the Health and Retirement Study (HRS) provides a series of replicated longitudinal studies of a sequence of birth cohorts currently and in the future. The first of these began in 1992 as a panel survey of persons from cohorts born in 1931 through 1941 and re interviewed biennially since then. The idea for the HRS derived from a growing awareness of the inadequacy of data available from the Retirement History Survey that began in 1969 and followed a set of cohorts of men and unmarried women born in 1906 through 1911 for ten years. Basing one's inferences about processes of aging, it was argued, on such a limited spectrum of historical cohorts had obvious limitations, given, for example, the growing participation of women in the labor force and related changes in the family. The collection of data on health and other antecedents of work and retirement decisions for more recent cohorts was viewed as essential to understanding experiences related to processes of aging in the more contemporary social context.

The assessment of change over time is fundamental to the quantitative study of aging, and longitudinal designs are vastly superior to cross sectional studies in their ability to reveal

causal influences in social processes because they can better pinpoint the temporal order of events, conditions, and experiences. Of course, even the best longitudinal data are unlikely to firmly resolve many substantive issues of this sort, in that there will still be relevant variables that are omitted from the design, limitations of sampling, measurement imperfections, and other impediments to drawing causal inferences. On the other hand, longitudinal data permit one to address far more interesting questions than is possible with cross sectional data. Longitudinal data are also essential for examining issues linked to life course theory, which focuses primarily on the developmental or age related patterns of change over the life span that are embedded in social institutions and subject to historical variation and change.

Generally, in research on aging and the life course virtually all the best designs for studying life course phenomena are *longitudinal* because they allow one to conceptualize more accurately the nature of the substantive phenomenon and locate lives in time. This requirement strongly implies the need for repeated longitudinal studies based on sequences of birth cohorts (see Alwin et al. 2005). Still, there are several major impediments to drawing inferences about change and its sources, even with longitudinal data. Perhaps the most fundamental of these is to be able to locate events and processes in time and specify their causal relation to consequences or outcome variables, while taking other causal factors into account.

Finally, longitudinal designs also fit well with the newer perspectives linking the demography of the life course to human development. If one takes a lifespan developmental perspective with respect to the study of processes of aging (including life cycle processes and life course events and transitions) and recognizes that human lives are embedded in social and historical contexts, it is clear that a range of ontogenic and sociogenic factors impinges on people's lives in ways that affect their well being. Capturing the interlocking trajectories or pathways across the life span that are marked by sequences of events or social transitions which impact upon individual lives and relating them to measures of health and functioning (among other things), as well as linking them to underlying social

processes, is an important focus of a great deal of research on aging, and these are the major theoretical concerns that drive the present discussion of longitudinal methods for the study of aging and human development.

SEE ALSO: Aging, Demography of; Aging and the Life Course, Theories of; Aging, Sociology of; Life Course; Life Course Perspective

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aging, mental health, and well-being

Linda K. George

Social factors are strongly implicated in mental health and well being throughout life, including old age. Sociologists argue that

mental health and subjective well being are powerful indicators of how well societies serve their members both individually and collectively. That is, effective societies not only meet the basic needs of their members, but also provide the conditions and opportunities that sustain emotional health and perceptions that life is good.

Three topics regarding aging, mental health, and well being are reviewed here: descriptive information about the distribution and dynamics of mental health and subjective well being in late life, evidence about the social antecedents of mental health and subjective well being in late life, and the role of social factors in the course and outcome of late life depression.

THE EPIDEMIOLOGY OF MENTAL HEALTH AND WELL BEING IN LATE LIFE

The vast majority of Americans are relatively free of psychiatric or emotional symptoms and are generally satisfied with their lives. This pattern is at least as strong for older adults as for young and middle aged adults. It is important to define the terms “mental health” and “subjective well being” in both conceptual and empirical terms. Subjective well being is the more straightforward of the two and is generally conceptualized as perceptions that life is satisfying and meaningful. Typical measurement strategies include a global self assessment of life satisfaction (e.g., as unsatisfying, somewhat satisfying, and very satisfying), multi item life satisfaction scales, and, more recently, multidimensional scales that tap several aspects of life quality (e.g., life satisfaction, purpose in life, self acceptance). Each measurement strategy has characteristic strengths and weaknesses. The global rating is easily and quickly administered, but generates limited variability. Life satisfaction scales generate more variability than global self ratings, but often include items that arguably measure the conditions that generate satisfaction with life in addition to subjective well being. The conceptual and empirical clarity of multidimensional scales is even more problematic. For

example, “high quality social relationships” is one of the subscales of the most commonly used multidimensional scale. Most sociologists, however, view social bonds as a predictor of subjective well being rather than an element of it.

Defining and measuring mental health is even more problematic. Although the label “mental health” is typically used, in fact investigators define and measure emotional distress and dysfunction rather than mental health. Two distinctions are sources of controversy among researchers. The first quandary is whether to measure overall psychological distress, regardless of the types of symptoms individuals experience, or whether to measure specific psychiatric syndromes such as depression and anxiety. At this point, both approaches are used, although the latter is more common. The second controversy is whether to use diagnostic measures of the presence or absence of mental illness or to use symptom scales that are used in continuous form. Again, there are countervailing advantages and disadvantages. Diagnostic measures have the advantage of identifying severe cases of mental illness, rendering findings of interest to clinicians and policymakers, as well as to sociologists. The disadvantage of diagnostic measures is that they have limited variability and ignore much of the significant distress caused by emotional symptoms that do not meet the criteria for a full blown psychiatric diagnosis. In contrast, the advantage of symptom scales is that they capture the full range of psychiatric symptoms in the population, but focus on a distribution in which most “symptomatic” individuals suffer few if any functional consequences from their symptoms. Although discussion of these issues is often heated, empirical evidence suggests that the relationships between social factors and diagnostic vs. symptom scales of a specific syndrome vs. psychological distress are highly similar (Kessler 2002; Mirowsky & Ross 1989).

Sociologists initially hypothesized that older adults would be disadvantaged in life satisfaction relative to their younger counterparts as a result of the social and physical losses characteristic of late life. Contrary to this hypothesis, older adults report significantly higher

satisfaction with life, on average, than young and middle aged adults, although the differences are substantively modest (Campbell et al. 1976). These age differences have been consistent for more than 30 years and do not result from older adults being more advantaged than young and middle aged adults in objective life conditions (Horley & Lavery 1995). Aspiration theory explains age differences in life satisfaction. According to this theory, individuals are satisfied with life when there is little discrepancy between their aspirations and their achievements and, conversely, are dissatisfied when there is a large discrepancy. Older adults' higher levels of subjective well being result from their lower aspirations, on average, than those of young and middle aged persons. It remains unclear whether these age differences result from cohort differences or the dynamics of aging.

One cannot understand age distributions of mental illness without taking into account the difference between organic and non organic psychiatric disorders. Organic disorders involve structural changes in the anatomy of the brain and include dementia. These disorders are typically and appropriately not included in sociological investigations. Non organic diagnoses include depressive disorders, anxiety disorders, psychotic disorders, and substance use disorders (alcohol, illegal drugs, abuse of prescribed medications). Most sociological studies focus on depression; thus, social epidemiology is primarily the study of the distribution of depression.

Depression in later life exhibits an epidemiologic paradox. Rates of depressive disorder (i.e., disorder meeting diagnostic standards) are lowest among older adults, highest among young adults, and intermediate among middle aged adults. But a different pattern is observed for depressive symptoms, where the oldest old report higher levels of symptoms than adults of other ages (Blazer et al. 1991; Mirowsky & Ross 1989). Definitive evidence about the cause of this paradox of low diagnoses and high symptoms is lacking, but most observers believe that criteria other than the pure number of symptoms (e.g., persistence over time) exclude some older adults from qualifying for a diagnosis of depression.

SOCIAL ANTECEDENTS OF MENTAL HEALTH AND SUBJECTIVE WELL BEING

A common, if not consensual, theory of the social precursors of depression in later life is emerging in the research literature (George 2004). Loosely speaking, it is a model of stratification or social disadvantage and stress. The general premise is that social disadvantage puts individuals on pathways that expose them to more proximate determinants of depression and distress. Although applications of the basic model utilize both cross sectional and longitudinal data, it is a stage model of increasingly proximate predictors of psychiatric disorders in general and depression or distress in particular. There are five stages in the model.

The first, most distal stage includes basic demographic variables (e.g., age, sex, race, or ethnicity) that represent fundamental aspects of social location and are in fact bases of stratification in society. The second stage includes measures of early events and achievements, most commonly educational attainment and childhood traumas (e.g., child abuse, sexual abuse, parental divorce). The third stage includes indicators of later achievements, primarily SES (occupation, income) and family characteristics (marital status, fertility history). As a group, the first three stages provide fairly extensive information about social status. The general hypothesis is that disadvantaged status increases the risk of depression and distress.

The fourth stage of the model includes indicators of social integration. The most commonly used indicators measure personal attachments to social structure, such as organizational and religious participation. More recently, investigators have examined the effects of characteristics of the residential environment, such as measures of disorganization and transience, poverty levels, and rates of criminal victimization. Personal attachments to social structure are expected to decrease the risk of depression and distress; residence in disorganized, poor, and unsafe neighborhoods is expected to increase risk. The fifth stage of the model includes the most proximate antecedents of depression and distress and

includes both vulnerability and protective factors. The major vulnerability or provoking factors investigated are chronic stressors and stressful life events. Two types of protective factors are typically examined. The first and most widely studied is social support: the tangible and intangible assistance that individuals receive from family and friends. Psychosocial resources such as self esteem, mastery, and sense of control are also often included in models of the precursors of depression and distress.

This model is rarely tested in its entirety. Nonetheless, there is strong evidence supporting it. All of the social factors in the model are significant predictors of depression and distress, both in late life and in adulthood more broadly (e.g., George 1992; Holahan & Moos 1991). One of the advantages of the model is its stages of increasingly proximate predictors. Substantial evidence indicates that many of the variables in earlier stages of the model have limited direct effects of depression and distress, but have large indirect effects via more proximate predictors. The effects of demographic variables and SES are mostly indirect, exerting their effects on depression by increasing levels of stress exposure, including ambient, environmental stressors, decreasing the resources and assistance available from social support networks, and decreasing individuals' levels of psychosocial resources (e.g., Turner & Lloyd 1999).

Comparison of research based on older samples with those from age heterogeneous samples reveals only a few rather subtle, but important differences. The most distinctive aspect of depression and distress in later life is the prominent role of physical illness and disability in increasing risk of depression. Many studies suggest that physical illness and/or disability is the strongest single predictor of depression and distress; in contrast, physical health is of negligible importance during young adulthood and middle age (George 1992). In contrast, demographic variables are weaker predictors of depression and distress in late life than earlier in adulthood. Racial or ethnic differences are minimally important during later life and even gender differences in depression, which are very large in young adulthood, narrow substantially by late life.

It is important to note that this model has proven useful in predicting both dichotomous diagnostic measures and continuous symptom scales. The strongest evidence of the power of social factors to predict depression comes from studies in which social factors are shown prospectively to predict the onset of depressive disorder among persons who are not depressed at baseline (i.e., in a true onset study). To date, there have been only a few studies of the onset of depressive disorder among older adults (George 1992; Green et al. 1992); their results strongly support this model of the social antecedents of depression.

The theoretical foundations of research on subjective well being in late life are less sophisticated than those for depression and distress and were best articulated by Campbell, Converse, and Rodgers 30 years ago. Campbell and colleagues argued that perceptions of well being are based on the objective conditions of life. Thus, they hypothesized that satisfaction with life would be a function of economic and social resources. They suggested that the major research questions of interest are whether the objective conditions relevant to self appraisals of well being differed across population subgroups and whether the levels of resources required for positive appraisals differed across population subgroups. Their research revealed that regardless of age, gender, education, and race or ethnicity, perceptions of well being rested on the same basic set of life conditions. Economic security, high quality social relationships, and health are, not surprisingly, the strongest predictors of subjective well being. Other life domains, including leisure, the residential environment, and job satisfaction are significant, but substantially weaker predictors. Population subgroups differed, however, in the amount of resources needed to produce high levels of life satisfaction. For the purposes at hand, the most relevant finding is that older adults, on average, require substantially lower levels of resources than young and middle aged adults to perceive their lives as satisfying (i.e., lower incomes, smaller social networks, less robust health). Note that these findings were based on cross sectional data.

After three decades, findings from pioneering studies of subjective well being have stood the test of time. Since then, research on

subjective well being in late life has been augmented in two primary ways. First, akin to the “positive psychology” movement, some sociologists suggest that if we want to study mental health, rather than mental illness, subjective well being is an appropriate outcome. Consequently, recent investigations have added many of the elements of the model of the social antecedents of depression and distress to the study of subjective well being, especially stressors (e.g., Krause 1986). Results of those studies indicate that high levels of stress dampen levels of life satisfaction modestly, but their effects are much weaker than those for basic social resources such as economic security and health. Second, some investigators have used longitudinal research to determine the extent to which social losses that frequently occur in later life (e.g., widowhood, retirement, illness onset) trigger corresponding declines in subjective well being. Results indicate that life satisfaction is relatively insensitive to these types of losses and transitions (Kunzmann et al. 2000). As a result, most investigators view subjective well being as a relatively stable assessment of life as a whole (i.e., across domains of experience and across biographical time).

SOCIAL FACTORS AND THE COURSE AND OUTCOME OF DEPRESSIVE DISORDER

The vast majority of research on social factors and depression in late life examines social factors as predictors of depressive symptoms disorder. The assumption in these studies is that social location, social disadvantage, and social stress increase the risk of depression. It also is possible, however, that social factors predict the course and outcome of depression (e.g., recovery, time till recovery, chronicity) among depressed older adults. Only a few studies have examined the role of social factors in recovery from depression – and although social scientists have conducted this research, most of it has been published in psychiatry journals. Evidence to date demonstrates that three social factors are strong predictors of recovery from depression. Social stress impedes recovery from depression,

lowering the odds of recovery and increasing time till recovery (McPherson et al. 1993). The effects of social support are even stronger and, of course, in the opposite direction. Perceptions of adequate social support increase the odds of recovery and predict shorter time until recovery (Bosworth et al. 2002; George et al. 1989). Religious participation also increases the odds of recovery and shortens the time till recovery (Koenig et al. 1998). In general, sociologists have paid insufficient attention to the role of social factors in facilitating or impeding recovery from both physical and mental illness, despite the fact that the limited evidence available suggests that this is a profitable area of inquiry.

SEE ALSO: Aging and Health Policy; Aging and Social Support; Aging, Sociology of; Elder Care; Medical Sociology; Mental Disorder; Stress and Health; Stress, Stress Theories; Stressful Life Events

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aging and social policy

Debra Street

All developed countries have social policies designed to meet income, health, and social needs of older citizens. Most less developed countries, too, have at least some public programs explicitly designed to serve elderly people. While the particulars of such policies

differ from place to place, social policies for aging populations have in common collective national efforts to improve health and income security for older people. The scope and breadth of such social policies is an important influence on the overall well being of each country's elderly citizens. From a sociological perspective, both country specific and comparative social policy research have focused on understanding how different configurations of social policies create outcomes that minimize, reinforce, or exacerbate late life inequalities arising from social class, race or ethnicity, and gender. Besides analyzing how these status categories influence inequality, sociologists also research and theorize how the interplay of institutionalized life courses and social policies contributes to age stratification.

HISTORICAL DEVELOPMENT OF AGE BASED SOCIAL POLICIES

Before the development of the modern welfare state, older people depended on mainly informal mechanisms when age or frailty dictated withdrawal from employment or impeded the capacity to undertake daily activities. Wealthy elderly people had sufficient resources to obtain whatever help they needed to remain independent. The vast majority of elderly people, however, turned to family and kin networks to help them survive in old age, particularly in pre industrial times. As industrialization progressed throughout Western Europe and North America, more elderly people were displaced from traditional family roles in farming communities as younger family members took advantage of opportunities to work in towns and cities. For lone elders or for elders whose families were unable or unwilling to offer assistance to them in old age, locally based institutions – including poorhouses, asylums, and almshouses – provided food and shelter to elders unable to maintain their independence, whether through poverty or frailty. Some communities provided subsidies to “deserving” elders to enable them to avoid institutionalization, although such local practices varied widely.

TWENTIETH CENTURY DEVELOPMENTS

By the beginning of the twentieth century, complex socioeconomic factors combined with political windows of opportunity, fostering initiatives throughout the industrialized world to address problems of modern industrial economies. Modern welfare states emerged, characterized by benefit programs designed to address the problems that rapid social change and industrialization imposed on individuals and their families. Public education, social assistance, unemployment and disability insurance, and health insurance were social policies devised to meet the needs of working aged families.

At the other end of the age spectrum, social policies designed to provide retirement income and health and long term care for elderly people emerged as integral components of national welfare states. Pension policies developed because, at the same time as modern improved public health measures and living conditions contributed to increased longevity, most individuals were confronted by an industrial workplace having scant use for older workers. Although some early twentieth century employers offered pensions for retiring workers, most did not. Business failures during the Great Depression created mass unemployment among people of all ages, but elderly workers who were displaced had even less chance than younger ones of finding any employment. Without secure pensions, elderly people who could no longer work due to frailty, ill health, or lack of employment opportunities risked destitution in old age. The practice of nearly universal *retirement* from paid work that became institutionalized in the latter half of the twentieth century required public pension systems that provided secure income in old age.

Thus, some modern social policies like pensions were designed to benefit elderly people directly. Public pension systems were developed to manage labor markets and to secure later life income for individuals (and their dependents) when they retired from paid work. Age was one criterion used to establish eligibility for public pension benefits. Many contemporary long term care programs require old age (sometimes in combination with

disability or low income) to meet eligibility requirements. Some social assistance programs also use age as a criterion for eligibility in combination with low income, such as Guaranteed Income Support in Canada, or Supplemental Security Income in the US. And when sociologists in the 1970s drew attention to the social exclusion many elderly individuals experienced in modern societies, many countries enacted additional policies to foster participation of elderly people in community life. For example, policies implemented under the Older Americans Act in the US sought to promote participation by providing inexpensive transportation for elderly clients, subsidizing activities and information centers, and supporting other socially integrative activities. Other countries enacted similar policies to promote social inclusion.

For other social policies, age is irrelevant as a basis for establishing eligibility, yet elderly people often benefit indirectly. For example, national health insurance is available to residents of all ages in most countries, although elderly people arguably benefit disproportionately from such policies because they use more health services than other age groups. Elderly people in retirement may also benefit indirectly through national tax structures that skew taxation more heavily towards earned employment income, rather than investment or pension income as in the US. Whether program eligibility and level of benefit distribution should most appropriately be based on age versus need is a longstanding debate in social policy circles in modern welfare state regimes.

Welfare state regimes are country specific combinations of social policies that shape the distribution and redistribution of income and wealth across and within age groups. Social policies composing national welfare states were developed during the first half of the twentieth century, in response to population wide problems (like ill health, unemployment, disability, and inadequate old age income) arising in modern industrial economies. Social welfare policies are most generous in social democratic welfare states, typified by Scandinavian countries, where eligibility is usually based on citizenship and programs and benefits are universal, comprehensive, and generous. In corporatist welfare states, typified by countries

like France or Germany, social policies support families and maintain workplace status hierarchies, but with relatively comprehensive universal entitlement to benefits. In contrast, liberal welfare states, such as Canada, Great Britain, and the US, are characterized by a predominance of targeted rather than universal social policies, designed to provide public subsistence benefits only to individual “labor market failures” with low incomes. Old age stands out most sharply as an influence on social policy when considering the quality and quantity of publicly provided income security, regardless of welfare state type. Even in liberal welfare states, where social benefits are usually low and means tested, elderly individuals have been treated as a historically “deserving” group entitled to relatively generous universal public pensions.

Social policies beyond pensions are also vital for the well being of elderly populations, particularly those addressing their health, long term care, and social needs. Except for the US, all developed countries provide universal health insurance for citizens regardless of age. Canada and Western European countries often have additional age based specialty programs, such as subsidies for obtaining prescription drugs or adaptive technologies like eyeglasses and hearing aids. In contrast to other countries, the US relies on a patchwork of employment based health insurance for working age families, Medicaid for the poor, and Medicare, the universal health insurance program for the elderly. The age based entitlement to public health insurance under Medicare marks the US as unique among all developed countries in terms of the relationship between age and access to health care.

Social policies shaping social services and long term care systems benefiting elderly people differ across nations. One truism is that, regardless of place, most elder care is provided privately, within families. Nonetheless, family provision alone cannot meet all the complex needs of aging populations. In places like Sweden, relatively comprehensive long term care policies take the form of purposefully designed, age integrated housing developments, where most services elders need are provided to them under one roof. Another approach provides public income subsidies

and pension credits for care providers (even care providing family members) to support in home supportive care when required, as in Germany. While all countries have some combination of public programs for frail elders, they are seldom well integrated. Most other countries’ elder social services and long term care provision is characterized by fragmentation of services and gaps in meeting service needs, as is the case in North America and Great Britain. Despite some social service programs that compensate for age related frailty or poor health through self care promotion, the extent of public provision is insufficient to meet need. Which types, how much, and where (whether in an individual’s home, a congregate day site, or a nursing home or residential care setting) supportive social and long term care services are publicly provided also varies substantially from country to country.

As important as such health and supportive long term care policies have been for elders’ well being, the undeniable centerpiece of age based social policies is the evolving system of national retirement income programs. National pension systems were initiated at different times, under different sociopolitical conditions, and with varying degrees of generosity and scope of coverage. Countries like New Zealand and the Scandinavian countries led the way in early development of comprehensive pension policies to address income adequacy for elderly citizens. In the aftermath of the Depression, the US implemented Social Security, a redistributive, earnings related, universal public pension. Canada and Great Britain implemented flat rate citizens’ pensions prior to World War II, adding an earnings related public pension tier only after the war. By the 1960s, most industrialized countries offered public pensions systems that offered an adequate floor of protection against destitution in old age; some offered generous public pensions. Other countries, like Great Britain and the US, relied heavily on private pensions to provide income adequacy in retirement. Parallel developments in private industrial pensions actually had a quasi public character, in that they were state regulated and subsidized in tax systems.

Throughout the twentieth century, public pension systems in industrialized countries

were reformed, adapting to new conditions in workplaces and trends in national economies. In the relatively affluent and optimistic decades following the end of World War II, virtually all western countries expanded public pension systems and improved benefits. During the same period, industrial workplaces, particularly unionized ones, featured employers offering parallel systems of increasingly generous private employment based pensions for long serving employees. By the mid 1970s, enhancements to public pensions throughout the developed countries and the tandem expansion of public and private pensions created an apparent “golden age” of pensions, guaranteeing individuals the right to “cease work before wearing out” (Myles 1989).

Despite the 1970s optimism surrounding the institutionalization of retirement with secure pension income, feminist and critical sociologists’ empirical studies demonstrated that the golden age of financially secure retirements was restricted, in most countries, to a pension elite having access to both public and private pensions. Race, ethnicity, gender, and characteristics of lifelong employment (employment sector, wage level, job tenure, etc.) meant that many elderly people, particularly women and racial or ethnic minorities, had incomes below the poverty line. By the 1980s the apparently limitless 1970s horizons of post war pension expansion narrowed in the aftermath of worldwide economic downturn and dawning transformations from industrial to service economies. Serious gaps in pension provision, particularly for categories of disadvantaged workers, became increasingly obvious. As more women entered paid employment, and family forms changed (through single parenthood and increased rates of divorce), public pension systems that granted most women pension incomes as dependents of employed men – norms predicated on the employed male bread winner/unpaid homemaker model – and which failed to take into account women’s unpaid care work became increasingly irrelevant in terms of meeting women’s future retirement income needs. Some public pension systems adapted policies to incorporate pension credits for periods of caregiving. Private pensions could not. Moreover, employers began replacing company administered, defined benefit private pensions,

which featured risk sharing and guaranteed benefits to individual retirement accounts known as defined contribution plans. Defined contribution plans promised portability and individual ownership, advantages for an increasingly mobile modern workforce, unlikely to experience lifetime employment at a single firm. But defined benefits also individualized risk, exposing individuals to the potential for low retirement income in the wake of poor investment choices, inadequate levels of participation and saving, or bad equities market luck. By the late twentieth century, policy makers and researchers had shifted their focus from explaining the development of age based social policies in modern welfare states to other concerns. These included understanding how pension systems could continue to adapt to new socioeconomic conditions, fill gaps in coverage, and provide equitable and adequate incomes to retired individuals, regardless of gender. At the same time, sociologists increasingly focused research on understanding the potential implications of the increased risk implied by individualized retirement accounts.

TWENTY FIRST CENTURY DEVELOPMENTS

The early twenty first century finds the connections between age and social policies in a state of flux, with tensions between collective provision and individual responsibility playing out in most national debates about the appropriate relationships among age, need, and social policy. Universal social insurance programs have been retrenched in most (although not all) developed countries and the impetus in social policy appears to be opposite to the trend towards increased collective provision throughout the twentieth century. To the extent that social policies for elderly people are adapting to the post industrial twenty first century global economy, most trends seem to point towards retrenchment, increased privatization, and increased targeting of remaining spending programs. Among the socio demographic realities influencing social policies are aging populations, burgeoning national budget deficits, slowed growth in national economies, and international uncertainty, all

factors contributing to fiscal austerity shaping social policy innovations.

Welfare states are not particularly nimble in the face of rapid social change, but lessons from the twentieth century inform sociologists that social policies will surely adapt to new realities of aging in the twenty first. Sociologists will make contributions to welfare state theory building and comparative research as the outlines of transformed age based social policies emerge. They will explore whether welfare state retrenchment reflects abandonment of collective provision or whether a more nuanced definition of retrenchment is warranted, one that acknowledges the need to marshal scarce resources until conditions improve. Innovations in targeting program resources efficiently to the neediest beneficiaries, a policy aspiration in most countries, implies that sociologists will need to develop better models to understand the complexities of the interplay between taxing and spending practices that create social policy outcomes. Such research may signal opportunities for policy learning across innovating states whose national policy mixes best meet the needs of aging populations. Because all policy innovations create new sets of policy “winners” and “losers,” sociologists will need to study how age and policy outcomes contribute to or undermine national political support for social policies. Finally, social policy innovations will provide research fodder for sociologists, who will continue pursuing their traditional core interest in inequalities, researching the implications of the relationships among age, social policy regimes, and social stratification, as current age based policies are transformed and new ones enacted.

SEE ALSO: Aging, Demography of; Aging and Health Policy; Aging and Social Support; Aging, Sociology of; Elder Care; Gender, Work, and Family; Life Course and Family; Retirement; Social Policy, Welfare State; Welfare State, Retrenchment of

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aging and social support

Pearl Dykstra

Social support is a powerful predictor of living a healthy and long life. Large, well controlled prospective studies show that social support has an impact on older adults' health independently of potentially confounded factors such as socioeconomic status, health risk behaviors, use of health services, and personality (Uchino 2004). This entry discusses social support and then considers how it is related to aging.

Social support refers to positive exchanges with network members that help people stay healthy or cope with adverse events. Researchers typically distinguish the following types of supportive behavior: instrumental aid, the expression of emotional caring or concern, and the provision of advice and guidance.

Epidemiologists introduced the concept of social support in the 1970s to explain why people who are embedded in social networks enjoy better mental and physical health. More recent research has revealed that support is not the only pathway by which social relationships affect well being (Berkman et al. 2000). Characteristic of social support is that it involves behavioral exchanges (giving and receiving) that are intended as helpful and

are perceived as such. Social support needs to be distinguished conceptually from the other ways through which people benefit from having close relationships. The first is that networks provide opportunities for companionship and social engagement. Shared leisure activities serve as a source of pleasure and stimulation, whereas the participation in meaningful community activities brings social recognition. Social control is a second mechanism responsible for the healthful effects of social relationships. Social control operates directly when network members consciously attempt to modify a person's health behavior, or indirectly when people internalize norms for healthful behavior. Third, relationships provide access to resources that transcend an individual's means. To have relationships is to have access to other people's connections, information, money, and time. The different functions of relationships (social support, companionship, social control, and access to resources) are related to each other, and not easily separated in everyday life.

Social support is basically positive. Of course, not all our interactions with others are pleasant and enjoyable. Personal relationships can function as a source of stress, conflict, and disappointment. For that reason it is important to distinguish positive social exchanges (support) from negative social exchanges (Rook 1997). Examples of the latter are encounters characterized by rejection and criticism, violation of privacy, or actions that undermine a person's pursuit of personal goals. Ineffective assistance or excessive helping are other forms of negative interactions.

From the start, a major focus of social support research has been the question of how and why social support has salubrious effects. In this line of research social support is the independent variable. Two theoretical models have been dominant in the literature. The direct effects model maintains that social support operates at all times. The support people receive helps them maintain an overall sense of stability and self worth and helps them in their efforts to improve their situation. According to the buffering effects model, social support operates when people are under stress. Social support helps people cope with setbacks and serves as a protective barrier against threats

to well being. Underlying mechanisms are physiological, in the sense of moderating levels of cardiovascular reactivity, and psychological, in the sense of restoring self esteem, mastery, and feelings of competence. The direct effects model and the buffering effects model are not competing theoretical frameworks. Each is couched in its own empirical tradition, and empirical support has been found for both (Cohen & Wills 1985). Tests of direct effects are generally based on data from the general population, whereas tests of buffering effects consider individuals undergoing stressful life events, such as a serious illness, marital problems, or the loss of a loved one.

Studies published in the 1980s showing that supportive behaviors at times have negative rather than positive consequences formed the impetus for new theoretical developments. One set of theoretical specifications pertains to the nature of support exchanges. For example, to better understand direct effects, researchers have suggested looking at the reciprocity of exchanges. Drawing upon equity theory, the idea is that receiving more support than one gives leads to distress and guilt. Over benefiting is not only a violation of the norm of reciprocity but may also lead to a state of dependency. Whereas reciprocity focuses on the balance between support giving and support receiving, the optimal matching hypothesis, which is a specification of the buffering effects model, focuses on the kind of support received (Cutrona & Russell 1990). This hypothesis suggests that support is most effective when it matches specific needs. If people do not receive the right kind of support, then strains will not be reduced. A second set of theoretical specifications pertains to the meanings assigned to support exchanges. It has been suggested, for example, that the effects of receiving support are moderated by self esteem. For some, receiving support has self threatening qualities because it implies failure and an inability to cope on one's own. For others, receiving support has self enhancing qualities such as evidence of love and caring. According to this perspective, people will react negatively to help if it causes damage to their self esteem. A complementary perspective is that the perceived motivation for support exchanges determines their impact

on well being. Exchanges perceived to be motivated by affection rather than obligation or reciprocity are presumably most beneficial to the recipient.

A line of research that has been more prominent in the social gerontological literature has focused on explaining differences in the availability of social support. Here social support is the dependent variable. Questions about the access to support are particularly relevant to the elderly given that the loss or disruption of relationships is common in later life. Coinciding declines in older adults' health and mobility, leading to an increase in the support required from others, further underscore the relevance of the issue of how older adults negotiate transitions in their relationships. The convoy model of social support (Kahn & Antonucci 1980) emphasizes that pools of available contacts and needs for resources from others are patterned by older adults' life histories.

Network composition is a dependable indicator of the sources, the quantity, the quality, and the types of support to which older adults have access (Dykstra 1993). Relationships tend to be specialized in their support provisions. Knowledge about the different types of relationships composing networks provides insight into available support. According to the task specificity model, different types of relationships best provide support that is consonant with their structures. Neighbors can best handle immediate emergencies because of their geographic proximity, kin can best perform tasks requiring long term commitment, and friends can best be relied on for issues particular to a generation or life course phase that assume similarity in interests and values. The marital dyad can function in all the previously described task areas, since that unit shares proximity with neighbors, long term commitment with kin and, frequently, similarity in interests and values with friends. In agreement with the task specific model, available evidence indicates that partners are the primary providers of support in old age. Kin and non kin generally differ in the support they provide. Family members are more likely than are friends to provide instrumental support such as help with transportation, shopping, and household chores. Family members are less

likely than are friends to provide emotional support such as exchanging confidences, advice, or comfort.

There is also considerable overlap between kin and non kin in the support they provide: family members can be major sources of emotional support and there are friends who provide long term instrumental support. This happens when the usual primary providers are not available (spouseless and/or childless elderly). A compensatory hierarchy of support providers exists. Ties lower in the support hierarchy are invoked when higher placed ties are not available. The position in the hierarchy follows socially shared views on who should provide help. The partner is generally the first to provide assistance when older adults are in need of help with the activities of daily living. In the absence of a partner or when the partner is impaired, adult children are likely to step in. In the absence of children or when they live too far away, support is likely to come from friends, siblings, or other family members, or neighbors. The hierarchical compensatory model has been criticized for not keeping up with demographic reality. It is based on a conventional view of the family and fails to address the complexities in commitments that arise with divorce and new partnerships.

Though friends, members of the extended family, and neighbors often step in when needed, instrumental support provided by these relationships has a fragile basis. Given the absence of culturally prescribed obligations to provide such help to older network members, commitment and support expectations tend to be individualized within the relationships, and are subject to continuous negotiation. Relationships with peers are more susceptible to dissolution if exchanges are unbalanced than are parent-child relationships. The availability of friends, relatives, and neighbors for intense support giving depends on the buildup of reciprocity over the course of their interactions with older network members (Wentowski 1981).

The hierarchical compensatory and task specificity models focus on types of relationships and the normative expectations to provide support associated with them. A drawback of the focus on relationship types is that the gendered nature of social life remains hidden.

Women are both expected to and do provide more support to aging family members. This is not to say that men do not undertake instrumental tasks. Though men and women do equal amounts of caregiving as spouses, men's participation in non spousal caregiving is conditioned by their relationships with women (Calasanti 2003). Men often function as back ups for their caregiving wives and sisters. Sons who act as primary caregivers are likely to be only children, to have no sister, or to have a sister living far away from the parent. Research shows a gender typed specialization of the kind of support giving tasks that are performed. Men are more likely to engage in activities such as odd jobs in and around the house, and paper work, bills, and finances, whereas women are more likely to perform household tasks and personal care.

Family members provide the majority of the care that frail older adults receive. A longstanding debate is whether the emergence of formal services erodes the provision of informal support (Attias Donfut & Wolff 2000). Empirical evidence favors the complementary hypothesis rather than the substitution hypothesis. Formal services increase the total level of support; they extend rather than replace informal support. With the introduction of formal care, informal support providers appear to redirect their efforts to previously neglected or partially unfulfilled areas of support, rather than reduce their overall effort. Research shows furthermore that formal help is called in as a last resort. Though informal networks respond to increasing incapacity by expanding the scope of their assistance, there is a point beyond which the needs of the older adult exceed the resources of the network. At that point supplementary support is sought in formal services.

The imbalanced focus in the gerontological literature on help provided by children creates the impression that all older people need help and downplays their role as helpers in old age. Within families, more support goes down generational lines than goes up. Parents provide money, gifts, affection, and advice to their offspring until very late in life. A role reversal occurs only when the older generation encounters difficulties functioning independently. That is when the direction of exchange

of assistance and services starts flowing predominantly from the bottom to the top.

Over the years there has been a methodological shift from relying on marital status, numbers of close friends and relatives, church membership, and other proxy variables to represent exposure to social support to more carefully examining the actual transactions in relationships. Nevertheless, a generally agreed upon measure of social support does not exist. This lack of consensus is not surprising given the wide range of disciplines in which social support is studied. Large epidemiological studies require brief measures. The crude nature of these measures leaves open what characteristics, structures, or processes of social interactions are most consequential for health. Psychologists tend to rely on measures of anticipated support: the belief that others will provide assistance in the future should a need arise. A criticism of these measures is that they might say more about the person than about the quality of his or her relationships. They are a way of measuring social support that makes it indistinguishable from a personality trait. In defense, one can argue that anticipated support is based on assistance that has actually been provided in the past. Sociologists (House et al. 1988) emphasize the necessity of distinguishing structural measures of support (existence or interconnections among social ties) and functional measures of support (actual exchanges of assistance and help). An issue that has yet to be resolved is whether to use global or relationship specific measures. Global measures, whereby respondents are requested to rate supportive exchanges with their friends, neighbors, and relatives taken together, have the advantage that they are relatively easy to administer. The disadvantage is that they provide little insight into the relative importance of various social network ties. Relationship specific measures, whereby an inventory is made of the supportive quality of selected relationships in the network, have the drawback that they are cumbersome to collect. Furthermore, their aggregation is not always straightforward (Van Tilburg 1990).

Social support researchers are faced with a constant tradeoff between breadth and depth of analysis. It is important to acknowledge that social support is amazingly complex. To

advance our understanding of how social support works we need first to pay careful attention to our relationship measures, distinguishing tangible support exchanges from embeddedness. Secondly, we need to assess simultaneously the mechanisms that produce the positive outcomes hypothesized for social support. In doing so, we should more often make use of reports from multiple actors in the social network. Enriching information collected from one person with information from others helps uncover biases. A discrepancy between persons regarding the content and significance of their relationship might highlight conflicts or differences in dependencies.

Apart from a microsocial focus on the pathways by which social support influences well-being, there is a need for macrosocial analysis of the determinants of levels and types of social support. People's support networks are shaped in part by the locations they occupy in a larger social structure stratified by age, sex, and socioeconomic status and organized in terms of residential communities, work organizations, and religious and voluntary associations. Demographic developments such as the extension of life, the drop in birth rates, the increases in divorce and remarriage, and migration set limits for the potential availability of family support. Welfare arrangements influence the resources potentially available for redistribution through families and formal services. There is ample room for sociologists to make their mark in the social support literature, which so far has been dominated by psychologists and epidemiologists.

SEE ALSO: Aging, Mental Health, and Well-Being; Caregiving; Elder Care; Family Structure; Health Behavior; Life Course and Family; Social Integration and Inclusion; Social Network Analysis; Social Support

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aging, sociology of

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The sociology of aging is both broad and deep. The breadth of the field can be highlighted in several ways. First, the sociology of aging encompasses investigations of aging as a process, of older adults as a group, and of old age as a distinctive stage of the life course. Second, aging research is performed at multiple levels of analysis, from macro level studies of age structure within and across societies, to meso level studies of labor force participation and family structure, to micro level investigations of health and well being. Third, aging research uses the full repertoire of methods that characterize the discipline, including life tables and other demographic methods, survey research, ethnographic methods, and observational studies. The depth of the field results from the accumulation of scientific studies that now span more than three quarters of a century.

Any attempt to summarize concisely the state of the science in the sociology of aging will inevitably do justice neither to the breadth nor the depth of the field. Here, four major themes in theory and research on aging are reviewed. Selection of these themes is based on a review of appropriate reference works (e.g., handbooks, encyclopedias) and perusal of major journals and textbooks.

AGE STRUCTURE AND ITS IMPLICATIONS

Although primarily the province of demographers, both scientific and public interest in aging partially rests on the aging populations characteristic of the modern world. Age

structure is based on the sizes of age groups in a given society. In turn, the sizes of age groups are a function of fertility and mortality rates. The *theory of the demographic transition* provides a portrait of the relationships between development (i.e., industrialization, urbanization, technological advances) and the age structures of societies (Bourgeois Pichat 1979). According to this theory, the demographic transition occurs in three stages. In the first, prior to and during the early years of modernization, both fertility and mortality rates are high. The result is an age structure that takes the form of a pyramid, with the largest age group consisting of children, and older adults comprising the smallest group. During the process of modernization (the second stage), mortality rates decline, but fertility rates remain high. The result is larger populations in total size and a young population. The dependency ratio, which is the proportion of the population in the labor market relative to the number of children and older adults not in the labor market, is high, but consists primarily of children. As societies achieve modernization (third stage), mortality rates continue to decline, but fertility declines as well. The theory of the demographic transition hypothesized that the third stage would lead to a steady state population size, in which fertility and mortality rates would be approximately equal and the age structure would take the form of a cylinder, with all age groups of approximately equal size, and the numerator of the dependency ratio including approximately equal numbers of children and older adults.

The first two stages of the theory of the demographic transition have been supported in empirical studies. Evidence for the hypothesized third stage is much weaker. Although both fertility and mortality rates have declined in modernized societies, fertility rates have declined faster than mortality rates, resulting in populations with disproportionately large numbers and percents of older adults. Two other demographic patterns have exacerbated the aging of the population in some societies. First, in the US and, to a lesser extent, in Western Europe and Australia, the end of World War II ushered in a decade or more of unusually high fertility, resulting in a baby boom, followed by the expected sizable declines

in fertility. These unusually large cohorts delayed the expected declines in fertility, but because of the small cohorts that followed them, escalated the aging of the population. Second, countries in South America, Asia, and Africa have achieved substantial modernization with substantially smaller declines in fertility than expected.

The importance of the theory of the demographic transition is not its accuracy, but rather its attention to the age structures of societies and the effects of social change (in the form of fertility and mortality rates) on those age structures. Regardless of the indicator used (e.g., proportion of older adults, median age of the population), the population is aging rapidly in the US and other western societies.

Although initially slow to comprehend the significance of an aging population, both scientific and policy communities are now well aware of the challenges posed by an aging society. "Young" populations also pose problems for societies, but solutions to those problems (e.g., child welfare, schooling) evolved gradually in modern societies and became institutionally embedded in custom and law. The aging of modern populations occurred more rapidly, resulting in significant structural lag (Riley & Riley 1994) in institutional responses to the needs of older adults.

Demographic research has expanded substantially beyond questions of age structure per se. Most of what is now known about the prevalence, incidence, and course of disability is based on demographic research. Among the contributions of this research are findings that rates of disability among older adults have been gradually declining for approximately 20 years, that the higher rates of disability among women than men results from their greater longevity rather than higher incidence of disability onset, and that, although it is less common than the onset of disability, a sizable proportion of older adults recover or improve in functional status. The distinction between life expectancy (expected years of survival) and active life expectancy (expected years of disability free survival) also is a high priority issue. Interest in active life expectancy stems from concern that the increased longevity characteristic of modern

societies has been achieved by prolonging life after the onset of frailty and disability. Evidence suggests that the length of disability prior to death has not increased over the past several decades; however, there also has not been a decrease in the interval between the onset of disability and death. As these topics illustrate, demographers now devote a significant proportion of their efforts to understanding heterogeneity in the older population.

A large proportion of sociological research on aging rests on the challenges posed by an aging society, although that impetus is not always explicit. Studies of public and private transfers of money, time, and in kind services rest in large part on their salience for sustaining an aging population. Studies of health, disability, and quality of life are important not only because they address threats to well being, but also because they shed light on the factors that keep older adults from excessive reliance on public programs. Even studies of the caregivers of impaired older adults rest not only on concern about the health risks of chronic stress, but also on the desire to enable families to bear as much of the cost of care as possible, thus relieving public programs. Thus, age structure and its social implications is a significant and far reaching arm of aging research.

AGING AS CONTEXT: THE SIGNIFICANCE OF COHORTS

Multiple forces, both social and non social, determine the process and experience of aging. Historically, there was a tendency to attribute the aging process and the experience of late life to inherent biological and developmental processes. Most of us are relatively ignorant of the extent to which the process and experience of aging vary across historical time, finding it difficult, for example, to imagine a time when there was no retirement or when the odds of dying were essentially the same during childhood, adulthood, and old age. And yet, retirement as a predictable life course transition and odds favoring survival to old age both emerged in the twentieth century. The concept of cohort allows us to distinguish conceptually and empirically between inherent components of

the aging process and patterns that result from social factors, especially social change and unique historical events or circumstances.

Although cohort membership can be based on any event, the term is typically used for birth cohorts (i.e., for persons born at the same or approximately the same time). Cohorts share more than the timing of their births; they also experience the same historical events and social structures throughout their lives. Cohorts share collective experiences that often differ from those shared by earlier and later cohorts. Thus, there often are sizable cohort differences in the process and experience of old age.

Cohort differences, often observed across cohorts born in relative proximity, can be generated by multiple conditions. First, cohorts can differ substantially in size and composition. Substantial evidence documents that unusually large and unusually small cohorts differ substantially, especially in economic opportunities, with the latter more plentiful in smaller cohorts. Cohort composition can be affected by many factors, including excess male mortality during wars, different birth rates across racial/ethnic groups, and changes in immigration policies.

Second, historical events can substantially alter the experiences of cohorts. When many cohorts experience the same historical event, effects differ depending on age at the time of the event (e.g., wars most strongly affect young men). Even in the absence of dramatic events or dislocations, historical developments imprint cohorts differently, creating persisting differences (e.g., racial identity among African Americans before and after the Civil Rights Movement). Substantial evidence suggests that historical events and social change generally affect adolescent and young adult cohorts more than they affect younger and older cohorts.

Third, social change creates cohort differences and the more rapidly social change occurs, the greater the differentiation across cohorts. Social change, of course, takes many forms, ranging from changes in public policies (e.g., Social Security and Medicare created large cohort differences in economic status during later life), changes in the norms governing social behavior (e.g., norms concerning the acceptability of fertility outside of marriage and cohabiting), and major structural changes

such as the shift from an industrial to a service economy. Technological change also generates cohort differences, with varying implications for the older population. For example, devices that save household labor or provide assistance in compensating for disabilities enhance the likelihood that older adults can live independently. Conversely, diffusion of general technological changes often takes longer to reach older adults, distancing them from younger cohorts (e.g., personal computers and related use of the Internet).

Fourth, older cohorts are inevitably affected by the composition of and changes occurring in younger cohorts. Responses to those changes can create related changes in older cohorts. For example, the prevalence of custodial grandparents, although still uncommon, increased dramatically over the past two or three decades. This change in older cohorts is a direct result of changes in fertility and childcare practices of younger cohorts.

Cohort comparisons comprise a substantial proportion of sociological research on aging. An issue that receives considerable attention is comparisons of the assets and liabilities that different cohorts bring to late life. To date, research findings paint a rosy picture of this form of cohort change. For at least half a century, successive cohorts have entered old age with higher levels of resources and fewer liabilities than the cohorts that preceded them. This pattern has been especially consistent for health, education, wealth, and the availability of social support, all of which are valuable assets in late life. As Uhlenberg and Minor (1996) note, there is no reason to believe that this pattern will continue indefinitely. Indeed, some scholars predict that baby boomers will enter old age more disadvantaged than their parents; other scholars predict that the pattern will not reverse until the children of the baby boomers reach old age – but most scholars expect the pattern of increasingly resource rich older cohorts to peak at some point during the next 50 years.

The large volume of cohort comparison studies is too large to detail here, but includes issues as diverse as political affiliation and voting behavior, family structure (primarily cohort differences in divorce, remarriage, and single parent mothers), cognitive abilities,

alcohol consumption, and rates of depression. Cohort comparisons also are important for policy planning and analysis. Comparison of cohorts before and after a major policy change, such as the enactment of Medicare, is one of the primary strategies used to evaluate the impact of broad scale public policies. Cohort comparison studies also remind us that public policies targeted at older adults are not the only policies that create differential advantage or disadvantage across cohorts. Policies that enhance educational attainment during adolescence and young adulthood have long term benefits, creating cohorts that are more advantaged as they enter old age than were older cohorts. The GI Bill, first made available to World War II veterans, for example, created dramatic increases in the educational attainment and economic resources with which those cohorts entered late life.

At the same time that cohort comparison studies have enjoyed success, a related body of research examines *intracohort variability*. Although there are often large differences across cohorts, cohorts are not homogeneous. Paralleling sociology more broadly, increased attention to heterogeneity has characterized aging research for the past quarter century. Intracohort variability has received both conceptual and empirical attention. Two bodies of research have contributed most to this research base.

First, the attention paid to social location, as indexed by basic ascribed and achieved statuses, has increased dramatically. Thirty years ago or so, gender differences, racial/ethnic differences, marital status differences, and socioeconomic (SES) differences typically were examined perfunctorily, if at all. It was not until the mid to late 1970s, for example, that women's retirement received empirical attention. There is now general consensus that age, race/ethnicity, gender, and SES represent basic social structural categories and are forms of social stratification. Investigation of these multiple forms of stratification has been incorporated into aging research and into the discipline more broadly.

Second, a compelling body of research demonstrates that historical events or conditions do not have uniform effects on cohort members. Some cohort subgroups are strongly

affected by historical events; others are largely untouched by them. Several important studies demonstrated that the Great Depression had the strongest contemporaneous and long term effects on late adolescents whose families experienced the greatest economic deprivation (Elder 1999); that relatively few young adults participated in the political activism of the 1960s, but that there were persisting differences in the life patterns of those who did and did not (McAdam 1989); and that veterans' emotional problems in middle and late life were largely a function of amount of combat exposure during World War II (Elder et al. 1997). Broad based cohort effects also have been observed for these and other historical events or conditions (e.g., the "children of the Great Depression" had greater concerns about financial security than earlier and later cohorts, regardless of the amount of deprivation experienced), but there is also great heterogeneity in the effects of historical events on cohort members.

Intercohort comparisons and studies of intracohort variability are arguably the core of sociological aging research. These studies demonstrate that aging is not solely – or even primarily – a biological process, but rather that the aging process and the experience of late life are shaped by social and historical context.

AGING AND WELL BEING

The vast majority of aging research falls under the general topic of aging and well being, with well being broadly defined to include any social asset (e.g., economic resources, life satisfaction). Social scientific interest in aging was spurred by concerns about the well being of older adults in both absolute and relative (to other age groups) terms. This is probably not surprising. The history of sociology in general has been driven by concerns about social disadvantage – its prevalence, antecedents, and consequences.

The types of well being examined in relation to aging are numerous. A partial list of the forms of well being frequently studied in late life include longevity, physical health, disability, mental health, subjective well being, economic status, and identity or sense of self.

Self perception during late life is an important and understudied topic relative to studies of physical and mental health and subjective well being. Two primary dimensions of self perception are especially important: a sense of self worth (typically measured as self esteem or self acceptance) and a sense of competence (usually measured as self efficacy, mastery, or sense of control). These self perceptions are important in their own right – most of us consider adequate self esteem and sufficient self efficacy essential components of well being. In addition, these self perceptions mediate many of the relationships between social factors and other forms of well being, including physical and mental health and subjective well being. For example, self esteem has been shown to mediate the effects of education on health (Murrell et al. 2003), of social support on subjective well being and self rated health (Bisconti & Bergeman 1999), and of social stress on functional status (Forthofer et al. 2001). Traditionally, sociologists tended to view self perceptions as the province of psychology. There is now plentiful evidence, however, that the antecedents of these self perceptions are primarily social and that their distributions are concordant with multiple stratification systems. Adequate sociological explanations of variability in well being will need to take these psychosocial processes into account.

Three major research strategies underlie most research on aging and well being. First, some studies examine the well being of older adults relative to that of younger age groups. Examples of this kind of research include age comparisons of rates of poverty, chronic physical illness, disability, and mental illness and levels of subjective well being, self esteem, and self efficacy across age groups at a single point in time. These studies are of limited use in understanding the aging process because it is unclear whether differences across age groups are due to age per se or to cohort differences. But comparisons across age groups can be useful for both providing basic descriptive information about the relative status of older adults and for identifying issues important to public policy (e.g., whether it makes sense to target income maintenance programs at specific age groups). That is, policymakers typically are more concerned about the unmet needs of

older adults than they are about disentangling age and cohort effects.

A second strategy for understanding the effects of aging on well being is to study adults longitudinally as they move from middle age to late life and from being young old to being old old. The advantage of this strategy, of course, is that age related changes in well being are directly observed. These studies focus on the status of the elderly relative to earlier points in their lives, rather than relative to younger age groups. The limitation of these studies is that findings may be cohort specific, rather than reflecting a consistent developmental pattern. In theory, if one samples a large number of cohorts and studies them over long periods of time, investigators can determine whether patterns of change and stability are similar across cohorts. Unfortunately, few, if any, data sets are of sufficient breadth in both the number of cohorts studied and number of measurements over time to permit conclusions about whether patterns of change and stability are generalizable or cohort specific.

Patterns of change and stability in the multiple forms of well being that have been studied to date cannot be detailed here. Importantly, however, there is no consistent pattern of age related decline across all forms of well being. Declines are the modal pattern for some forms of well being, such as income and the prevalence and onset of chronic illnesses. Stability or increases are the modal pattern for other types of well being, including self esteem and life satisfaction – at least until very late life (i.e., age 80 and older).

A third strategy is to focus on variability within the older population – to assess variability in well being among older adults and to identify the antecedents of that variability. Either cross sectional or longitudinal data can be used to study heterogeneity among older adults, but only longitudinal data permit investigators to establish temporal order between well being and its presumed antecedents. Note that age is not the independent variable in studies of this type; instead, the independent variables are the presumed causes of variability in well being.

Compared to studies of age structure and cohort comparisons, the theoretical underpinnings of studies of aging and well being are

typically richer and more complex. A broad range of theories is used in studies of well being in late life. Most of these theories are imported in whole or in part from other domains of sociology. For example, stratification theories are used to examine both income dynamics and health inequalities in later life, stress theory is used in studies of physical and mental illness, network theory is used to understand older adults' patterns of social support, and aspiration and equity theories are used in studies of subjective well being. In addition to importing theories from other domains of sociology, a substantial proportion of research on aging and well being rests on theories developed to highlight the distinctive conditions of later life. Examples include activity theory, which posits that multiple forms of well being are enhanced in late life by sustaining high levels of activity and engagement – and adding new forms of activity to compensate for losses that often accompany aging; the double jeopardy hypothesis, which predicts that the combined statuses of being old and a member of a racial/ethnic minority have more damaging effects on health and well being than their purely additive effects; and socioemotional selectivity theory (Carstensen 1995), which suggests that declines in social contacts in late life are a purposeful and effective strategy for sustaining high quality relationships. Clearly, the theories used to explain variations in well being among older adults are rich and varied.

The independent variables used in studies of well being during late life are typically measures of social status, social context, and social resources. Social context, as indexed by age, race, and gender, is related to economic well being, physical and mental health, and longevity. Only the more social psychological forms of well being, such as self esteem and life satisfaction, are either not significantly related or are weakly related to these basic demographic characteristics. As expected, traditional indicators of socioeconomic status are significant predictors of longevity, physical and mental health, self esteem and self efficacy, and subjective well being. Social resources, especially social integration (e.g., organizational and religious participation) and social support

also have positive effects on longevity, health, sense of self, and subjective well being. As this brief description illustrates, we know a lot about the factors that explain heterogeneity in well being in later life. These same social factors also explain much of the variability in well being among young and middle aged adults. As the body of research that compares predictors of well being across age groups documents, the distinctive feature of well being in late life is not the specific antecedents of well being, but rather the distribution of those antecedents across historical and biographical time.

AGING AS THE CULMINATION OF THE LIFE COURSE

During the past 20 years, the life course perspective has assumed increasing influence in sociological research, especially research on aging. The core of the life course perspective is the proposition that lives unfold over time and that events and conditions at earlier phases of the life course have persisting effects at later phases – either continuing direct effects or indirect effects via more temporally proximate events and conditions. Taking temporality seriously changes research questions and research methods in multiple ways (George 2003). Most importantly, perhaps, long term patterns of change and stability, often conceptualized as trajectories, are the primary focus of analysis. Investigators can study trajectories of independent variables (e.g., marital history), trajectories of dependent variables (e.g., patterns of recovery, remission, and chronicity in depressive symptoms), or both. In addition to the “shape” of trajectories, duration in states of interest also may be important (e.g., length of time till recovery from disability).

Methodologically, life course studies require either multiple measurements over long periods of time or retrospective data about earlier phases of the life course. Longitudinal data are more accurate than retrospective data, but most life course investigators are willing to use retrospective data if they are all that is available. The statistical techniques most frequently used in life course studies (e.g., latent

growth curve analysis) are newer and more complex than those used in cross sectional or short term longitudinal studies. Other methodological problems, ranging from substantial attrition in sample size to difficulties in selecting measurement tools that are applicable across adulthood, emerge when using longitudinal data covering long periods of time. Nonetheless, it is the way that research questions are conceptualized that is the hallmark of life course studies.

Life course studies provide important information about trajectories of vulnerability and resilience. At their best, they also incorporate the processes by which early events and conditions have persisting effects on outcomes of interest measured decades later. Work by Elder and colleagues on the long term effects of combat exposure provides a compelling illustration of the knowledge generated by life course studies (Elder et al. 1997). This research is based on the Terman men, a sample of unusually intelligent males tested on multiple occasions from childhood to early old age. Most of these men participated in World War II, although not all of them were exposed to combat – and among those who were in combat, the amount of exposure varied widely. Elder and colleagues demonstrate that combat exposure is a significant predictor of physical and (especially) mental health problems 40 years later, controlling on other known predictors of physical and mental health in later life. They also identified the life course achievements that allowed some of these combat veterans to avoid or minimize subsequent health problems. Men who achieved greater socioeconomic success, those who sustained contacts with other combat veterans, and especially those who had lasting, high quality marriages were able to avoid or minimize the health risks posed by combat exposure. This research demonstrates the benefits of life course research, documenting both the persisting effects of early trauma and the mechanisms that allowed some men to avoid those risks.

In aging research, the life course perspective has been used most frequently to understand the effects of life course patterns of socioeconomic status on multiple forms of well being in later life. The conceptual framework underpinning most of this research is the

theory of cumulative advantage/disadvantage. This theory was developed nearly a half century ago by Robert Merton (1957), as a framework for understanding occupational success among college and university professors. Merton observed that, at job entry, assistant professors looked very similar on standard measures of productivity and occupational success, regardless of the status of the institutions in which they were employed. Over time, however, variability increased dramatically in levels of productivity and occupational success among professors, with those employed at resource rich schools exhibiting patterns of increasing success and those at resource poorer schools exhibiting steady declines in productivity. Merton referred to the pattern of increasing success as cumulative advantage and the trajectory of declining productivity as cumulative disadvantage. In colloquial terms, the theory of cumulative advantage/disadvantage posits that “the rich get richer and the poor get poorer.”

In general, what Merton observed among professors is true for socioeconomic status (SES) over the adult life course. That is, SES differences are smallest during young adulthood and largest during late life (Crystal & Shea 1990). This is true for income and SES differences are even more dramatic for wealth. Thus, cumulative advantage/disadvantage generates increasing economic heterogeneity over the adult life course.

The life course perspective also has been valuable in accounting for health inequalities across the life course. As is true for income and wealth, SES differences in health are minimal during young adulthood. By middle age, however, there are large differences in health between the lowest and highest SES quartiles in the US. Evidence is less clear during old age, with some investigators reporting that SES differences in health continue to widen during late life (Ross & Wu 1996). Other researchers, however, report that SES differences in health are largest during middle age and narrow somewhat during old age, although they remain significant (House et al. 1994). At some point in late life, SES differences in health are likely to narrow as the result of selective mortality (i.e., the earlier deaths of many lower SES individuals).

Some of the mechanisms that account for SES differences in health also have been identified. The benefits of education, occupational status, income, and wealth are, of course, much of the basis of SES differences in health. Other mechanisms that mediate the effects of SES on health include health behaviors; stress, including life long accumulation of stressors; and psychological resources such as self esteem and mastery.

In addition to long term trajectories of assets and liabilities, the life course perspective also focuses attention on the persisting effects of early life events and conditions. For example, evidence demonstrates that parental SES predicts health during middle and late life, over and above the effects of individuals' own SES trajectories (Hayward & Gorman 2004). Indeed, limited evidence suggests that fetal growth *in utero* plays a substantial role in health during late life (Barker et al. 2000). In addition to economic resources, lack of emotional support from parents during early childhood increases the risk of both depression and chronic physical illnesses in late life (Shaw et al. 2004). Similarly, a variety of childhood traumas – including child abuse, sexual abuse, and parental divorce – are known to increase the risk of depression many decades later, even with other known risk factors taken into account (Kessler et al. 1997).

Although the volume of life course research that extends to late life has increased dramatically during the past two decades, many other topics could be profitably addressed in a life course framework. For example, although there is compelling evidence that social relationships are powerful predictors of health and well being in late life, little is known about the relative importance of life long patterns of social bonds as compared to the contemporaneous effects of social networks during late life. Similarly, religious participation has been demonstrated to be a strong predictor of mortality and morbidity in late life (Koenig et al. 1999). But this research is based on studies in which *current* religious involvement is measured. Virtually nothing is known about how length of exposure to religious participation affects health. In other words, we do not know how long individuals

must participate in religious activities before health benefits are observed.

The life course perspective also renders the usual distinction between social selection and social causation moot. Studying the life course is the equivalent of studying patterns of selection and causation as they unfold across personal biography. And, of course, the effects of social causation observed earlier in the life course become selection effects for outcomes observed later in life.

The life course perspective focuses on the complex links between social/historical change and personal biography. In addition, the life course perspective is ideally suited to linking macro and meso level social conditions to individual behaviors and well being, to tracing the effects of both structural opportunities and constraints of human agency (i.e., personal choices) over the long haul, and documenting the many ways that the past is indeed prologue to the future. Thus, life course research is an important and exciting part of the sociology of aging.

SEE ALSO: Age, Period, and Cohort Effects; Aging, Demography of; Aging and the Life Course, Theories of; Aging, Mental Health, and Well Being; Aging and Social Policy; Aging and Social Support; Chronic Illness and Disability; Cultural Diversity and Aging: Ethnicity, Minorities, and Subcultures; Demographic Transition Theory; Life Course; Life Course Perspective

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aging and technology

Stephen J. Cutler

Aging and technology stand in a reciprocal relationship to each other. On the one hand, technological change has numerous implications for older persons and for how they experience the process of aging. On the other hand, individual aging and population aging may be viewed as catalysts shaping the nature of technological development and change.

To illustrate, technological developments in the areas of health and medicine (including advances in birth control technology) have been among the factors contributing to increases in life expectancy and to population aging. Initially concentrated in western societies, population aging has now become a worldwide phenomenon as birth rates decline and life expectancy increases in nations across the globe. As environments (e.g., one's home or neighborhood) become more taxing, demanding, and challenging because of frailties and mobility limitations associated with aging, technology can redress such imbalances, reduce what Lawton and Nahemow (1973) refer to as environmental press, and enhance person-environment fit. Various types of assistive devices can compensate for sensory and mobility problems that are more prevalent at the older ages, lengthen the period of independence, and reduce reliance on informal and formal caregivers. The advent of personal computing and the emergence of the Internet can facilitate social interaction and social integration, place a wealth of information at the fingertips of older persons, and allow for new modes of social, political, and economic

participation. Online networks of social support are flexible, overcome barriers to participation in support groups created by time and distance, and have been shown to reduce strains and burdens associated with caregiving.

Technology is not without negative consequences. According to some modernization theorists (e.g., Cowgill 1974), population aging – a product of technological developments – led to increased competition between generations for jobs, provided a rationale for the institutionalization of retirement as a life stage, and contributed to a decline in the status of older persons. Rapid changes in health care technology have been accompanied by periods of normative indeterminacy in the appropriateness of using technology with older patients. Costs associated with the use of advanced medical technology in end of life care have led some to propose using age as a basis for rationing scarce, expensive health care.

Other dimensions of technological development are proving to be problematic for older persons. Suburbanization, for instance, was a process predicated in large measure on the availability of the automobile as a means of transportation. With the aging of suburbs and the “aging in place” of its residents, mobility can be a challenge to older persons in the absence of alternative means of transportation. This is an example of what Riley et al. (1994) refer to as structural lag: a situation where societal opportunity structures have not kept pace with changes in the circumstances and conditions of the older population. A variation of structural lag is what Lawton (1998) refers to as individual lag, which is when social structures and environments change more rapidly than people’s abilities (e.g., the challenges of keeping abreast of rapid changes in communications and information technology).

These several examples point to ways that technology acts as a causal agent in affecting the lives of elders and in influencing the nature of the aging process. Yet aging can also be viewed as a force influencing technological development. Most observers agree that technology generally tends to be developed by young persons and is aimed at a young market, but there are signs of growing interest in the development and application of technologies specifically for the elderly. Some of this

interest stems from a recognition of commercial and market implications of social and demographic trends such as the aging of baby boomers and a likely “graying” of the labor force. That the prevalence of functional limitations and related health problems increases with age points to continued growth in the market for assistive and other enabling technologies.

Numerous studies have documented that older persons have been slower to acquire and adopt some forms of technology than younger persons have. Notable examples are communications and information technologies. Might processes of cohort succession and cohort change diminish if not eradicate such age differences in the future, or will processes accompanying intra cohort aging lead to the persistence of age differences?

It is safe to conclude that some portion of observed age differences in technology use is due to the operation of cohort effects. In school and workplace settings, as well as at home, both the young and the middle aged have had much greater exposure to information technology than current cohorts of older persons. Familiarity with cell phones and automated systems such as ATMs among the young and middle aged likely means that these and related skills will be brought with them to their later years. Furthermore, adopting and using new technology is related to socioeconomic factors, especially education and income. That future cohorts of older persons will certainly have higher levels of educational attainment and perhaps greater levels of economic security also suggests that age differences may diminish in coming years.

On the other hand, if the types of cognitive, sensory, and motor changes that typically accompany aging persist, these may lead to the continuation of age gradients. For example, the additional features that are usually part of revised or new versions of technology often add to their complexity, and trends toward miniaturization may present visual and motor control challenges. Until the objectives embodied in transgenerational and universal design are realized, changes that accompany normal aging may work against adoption and use of tomorrow’s new and enhanced, but more complicated technologies.

Finally, fascination with technology must not cause us to overlook inequalities in access. The potential benefits of the technology embodied in “smart” houses are impressive, but more fundamental for many elders are basic housing issues of availability, affordability, and adequacy. Navigational systems, already available in high end automobiles, may make it easier to reach destinations safely and benefit some segments of the older population. For many others, however, the availability, accessibility, and cost of *any* form of transportation are more immediate issues. Thus, for persons living on limited, fixed incomes, the fruits of technological change may prove to be inaccessible, thereby creating and/or perpetuating a “technological divide” as a further form of social inequality within and between age groups.

SEE ALSO: Aging and Health Policy; Aging, Mental Health, and Well Being; Aging and Social Support; Aging, Sociology of; Information Technology; Technology, Science, and Culture

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aging and work performance

Melissa Hardy

In the US, work performance, narrowly defined, is measured by productivity; more broadly conceived, it denotes how well individual workers master requisite skills, complete tasks, execute instructions, interact with colleagues, and contribute to the success of the enterprise. Perhaps as a holdover from the earlier part of the twentieth century, older workers often are assumed to be less productive than their younger counterparts. When worker productivity was a function of the speed of repetitive tasks in physically demanding jobs, and the “innovations” of the shorter work week led to a faster pace on the production line, the age related declines in strength and endurance likely would have created age related reductions in productivity. In part, these changes involved a growing role of innovative technology in the workplace; however, it was not the technological change, per se, that made work more difficult for older workers. It was the speed at which the machines were operated.

The current research literature that deals with changes in productivity as workers age is inconclusive, and many of the studies refer to dated production technologies. Productivity can best be assessed in specific work contexts, not only because it is job specific productivity that is at issue, but also because expertise and experience – two factors that tend to increase with age – can be job or even task specific. Unfortunately, neither employers nor workers are particularly willing research subjects. Because reliable data that include contextual factors are not available, the relationship

between age and job performance is not well understood (Aviolo 1992; Czaja 1995, 2001). Even so, current assessments suggest that age accounts for a small fraction of the between individual variability in performance; productivity levels are highly variable among older workers; and experience appears to be a better predictor of job performance than age (Aviolo et al. 1990).

A growing literature documents age related decline in acuity in all five senses (vision, hearing, touch, taste, and smell), age related decline in motor abilities, and changes in cognition that can affect work performance. For example, rates of visual impairment increase with age, including a loss of static and dynamic visual acuity. Loss of contrast sensitivity, reduction in color sensitivity, greater sensitivity to problems of glare, and declines in dark adaptation are also age related. Many older adults experience age related hearing losses, including difficulty understanding speech and increased sensitivity to loudness. And, aging has been linked to slower response times, disruptions in coordination, loss of flexibility, and other declines in motor skills, such as reductions in strength, endurance, and dexterity (Rogers & Fisk 2000).

Decrements in intellectual functions such as working memory, attention, and perception may also decline with age. Memory, learning, thinking, and language use are cognitive functions that have received considerable attention from researchers. With aging, the sensoriperceptive system linked to the intake of information, the cognitive system that processes information, and the motor systems that translate thoughts into actions all appear to slow with aging, although not uniformly. Working memory, problem solving and reasoning, inference formation, encoding and retrieval in memory, and information processing have all been shown to decline with age (Park 1992). These changes in cognitive processing make it more difficult for older workers to shift their attention between displays, more difficult to multitask, and more difficult to maintain a rapid pace of information processing, but the evidence supporting these findings is largely experimental, performed in laboratory settings.

Changes in physical work capacity associated with aging include changes in the cardiovascular

and musculoskeletal systems, body structure, and sensory systems. Although there are large individual differences here as well, certain patterns of aggregate decline are apparent. For example, maximum oxygen consumption shows a clear, linear decline with age, although it is also responsive to regular exercise and can therefore be better maintained through adherence to a schedule of routine cardiorespiratory exercise.

Many of these declines can be attenuated, reversed, or compensated for by individual behavior, workplace modification, and job redesign. For example, even workers performing physically demanding work require positive physical exercise to maintain an average fitness level for their age. Regular physical exercise can keep physical capacity nearly unchanged between ages 45 and 65; however, failure to engage in regular exercise can make a 45 year old worker less fit than an active 65 year old (Ilmarinen 1992). Improved workplace lighting, larger characters, acoustical adjustments, and ergonomically designed work tools can make important differences to aging workers. In addition, workers develop strategies as they age, and their accumulated experience and knowledge can compensate for slower speeds; practice can also compensate for declines in working memory and declines in perception and attention (Salthouse 1997; Czaja 2001). In addition, cognitive functions such as processing complex problems in uncertain circumstances can actually improve with age. And the process of learning is not dependent on age, although the specific features of this process relative to brain structure may change with age, and the speed of learning may slow (Baltes & Smith 1990; Salthouse 1997).

To the extent that work performance is linked to speed, skill, and expertise, training that updates workers' skills is particularly important for an aging workforce. Negative stereotypes of older workers as inflexible, unable to use new technologies, incapable of learning new skills, and unable to provide sufficient returns for the training cost provide employers with an argument against investing in retraining older workers, who are underrepresented in employer provided training programs. Because workers learn differently

as they age (Hardy & Baird 2003), training programs should take these differences into account. By presenting material at a somewhat slower pace, using active learning strategies that apply concepts within specific work contexts, building on existing skills, and allowing workers some say in structuring their own training, the effectiveness of the training can be increased.

Unfortunately, the United States Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967 (ADEA) has not been able to prevent the frequent exclusion of older workers from these retraining programs. The US Department of Labor attempted to consolidate the nation's fragmented employment and training system into an integrated employment and job training service. These "one stop" centers allow workers and job seekers to locate an extensive range of information at a single site, including descriptions of employment opportunities, skill requirements for jobs, and education and training programs. The Workforce Investment Act of 1998 institutionalized and expanded the One Stop Career Center System.

As aging workers experience changes in physical and mental functioning, they also encounter changes in work techniques and the tools of the trade, work expectations and workloads, the introduction of new technologies and different methods of organizing the labor process (e.g., team approaches versus sequential, individually performed operations). Although the complex connections among work experience, work performance, and aging have not been fully developed, some research reports that older workers are as productive as younger workers, and that older workers and younger workers can be equally productive in both skill demanding and speed demanding jobs (Spiriduso 1995). Ilmarinen (1999) argues that many workers become physically weaker but mentally stronger as they age, and these changes should be reflected in work responsibilities that are less physically demanding but draw on the cognitive functions that improve with age. The concepts of *work ability* and *employability*, introduced by those at the Finnish Institute of Occupational Health (Ilmarinen 1992), address the connection between the capabilities of workers, the structure of job tasks, and the design of the work environment. The work ability index

can be a tool for human resource managers and serve as a guide for how employers can build in adjustment periods that permit the identification of sources of friction in the new regime. Then they can develop appropriate training and design ergonomically superior work settings that allow work to flow smoothly. Japan, for example, is providing federal support to companies that retool the workplace (*kaizen*) to accommodate aging workers, allowing innovative ergonomic design to minimize the effects of changes in functional ability.

As our workforce ages, we will need to better understand how features of work environment, physiology, and cognition account for variability in work performance and how the tools, workplaces, and tasks can be redesigned to enable rather than limit workers. Because of the range of systems involved, an interdisciplinary approach will be required, and employers and workers will have to become much more accepting of and accessible to research. Unlike Taylorism, which transformed production lines in the early part of the twentieth century by micro managing the labor process and severely restricting workers' discretion in determining how to perform their tasks, innovative approaches to employment practices in the beginning of the twenty first century can develop dynamic approaches to workplace design that will enhance workers' abilities and create flexibility in both the process and the structure of the work day.

SEE ALSO: Age Prejudice and Discrimination; Aging, Mental Health, and Well Being; Aging and Social Policy; Aging and Technology; Employment Status Changes; Labor-Management Relations; Labor Markets; Leisure, Aging and

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AIDS, sociology of

Susan Kippax and Heather Worth

AIDS or acquired immune deficiency syndrome is caused by a retrovirus identified in 1984, the human immunodeficiency virus (HIV). Twenty years later, it is estimated that over 20 million people have died of AIDS and 40 million people are living with HIV, with 95 percent living in developing countries. The world is facing a global pandemic: a pandemic marked by inequalities of class, gender, race, and sexual preference. The spread of HIV and AIDS is not evenly distributed and prevalence rates range from less than 1 percent of the adult population in much of the developed world to more than 30 percent in some southern African countries. Some countries in northwestern Europe and Australia have "local" epidemics mainly confined to gay men; some such as Botswana, Namibia, South Africa, and Zimbabwe are experiencing "generalized" epidemics where the entire sexually active population is affected; others such as Russia are experiencing an accelerating epidemic initially confined to transmission among injecting drug users but now becoming generalized; while still others such as the United States and some countries in South America are experiencing multiple epidemics – among people who inject drugs, among gay men, and increasingly among the poor. In Asia and the Pacific regions the patterning of the epidemic continues to emerge, but there are fears that some countries, such as India, will experience a generalized epidemic.

Globalization has played a central and unique role in both the spread of and the response to the AIDS pandemic, and presents both risks and opportunities for future action. As AIDS has become an intensely globalized problem, a number of pressing issues have come to the fore, not only economic but also

political, social, cultural, and security issues. By the mid 1990s serious concerns were being raised about the massive global debt being incurred by developing countries in their fight against HIV and AIDS. While widespread financial and donor support for HIV programs is now available, particularly through the Global Fund for TB, Malaria, and HIV and international donors, the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund were slow to recognize the severity of the economic toll AIDS would exact and thus slow to fund.

Structural adjustment policies, set up as a condition for receiving loans, required that countries adopt austerity programs – including major cuts in health spending. Critics have argued that this helped create the very social and economic conditions and forces that contributed to the spread of HIV infection in developing countries. There is no doubt that many nations will experience severe economic downturn because of AIDS. In Africa, there has already been a decline in agricultural output and a threat to food security. Ill health means: less time spent on growing crops and more time spent caring for the sick; a concomitant decline in household expenditure on education; a return to rural areas to die, thus adding to the problem of scarce village resources; a dramatic increase in health expenditure; and, as a consequence of parental deaths, a rapid increase in the number of children orphaned.

While pressure is being exerted by developing countries over their right to parallel import and produce their own anti retroviral AIDS drugs under the emergency conditions of the AIDS crisis, the World Trade Organization (WTO) TRIPS agreement concerning patent protection to pharmaceutical companies may substantially widen the gap in global access to such therapies. In November 2001 in Doha, the Ministerial Conference of the WTO declared that the TRIPS should be interpreted to support public health and allow for patents to be overridden if required to respond to emergencies such as the AIDS epidemic.

Massive global flows of population (forced and by choice) are an integral part of globalization and the spread of HIV is implicated in these transient flows of populations. The war in the region of the Horn of Africa in the

early 1980s as well as the 1994 war in Rwanda brought into sharp relief the connection between refugees and HIV. The worldwide number of refugees and internally displaced people has been estimated at over 22 million, with an HIV prevalence rate of up to 5 per cent in some countries. Migration for work also renders men and women vulnerable to HIV because of their living and working conditions – poverty, powerlessness, precarious family situations and separations, and inadequate access to health services.

AIDS is an issue of global governance involving various UN agencies, medical establishments, pharmaceutical companies, researchers, governments, non government and community based organizations. The global politics, policies, and practices of AIDS prevention and support radically affect nationally based health care systems and education programs, as well as local grassroots efforts.

HIV PREVENTION

As a blood borne virus, HIV is most commonly transmitted by sexual practice, particularly penetrative intercourse (vaginal and anal) with an HIV infected person. It is also transmitted by the sharing of HIV contaminated needles and syringes, from an HIV positive mother to her child during birth and breast feeding, and via the transfusion of infected blood and blood products. The population most affected by HIV is young men and women of reproductive age.

Although in 1996 treatments – in the form of anti retroviral therapy (ART) and fusion inhibitors that block HIV from entering the body's immune cells to effectively slow the progression from HIV to AIDS to death – were developed, there is at present no cure for AIDS or an effective prophylactic vaccine for HIV. Perinatal transmission (sometimes referred to as “mother to child” transmission) can be dramatically reduced by using anti retroviral therapy, while changes in sexual practice and injection drug use can almost completely prevent HIV transmission. These changes in practice include abstinence (from sex and from injecting drug use), the use of condoms for sex, and the use of clean needles and syringes for drug injection.

There is now indisputable evidence that countries which have established needle and syringe programs supplying clean needles and syringes to people who inject drugs have curbed injecting drug related HIV transmission. Embracing this “harm reduction” approach has proved far more effective than abstinence based and related drug supply reduction programs, such as the “war on drugs,” and there is little evidence to support the claim that needle and syringe programs promote illegal behaviors.

In countries and regions, for example, in much of Western Europe and in the United States, Australasia, Thailand, Cambodia, Senegal, and Uganda, where condom promotion has been successful, there has been a dramatic decline in HIV prevalence. In these countries, the adoption of condoms has proved more effective than abstinence or reliance on monogamy. In other words, “safe sex” (some times “safer sex”) rather than no sex has been effective. It is also clear that where there are or were barriers to condom uptake, HIV prevalence rates are high, with some countries exhibiting prevalence levels of 30 to 35 per cent among their sexually active populations.

HIV prevalence rates fall in countries where governments: acknowledge HIV is a virus that affects everyone; are committed to and fund prevention and health promotion including education programs; promote condom use and needle and syringe programs; support social movements by funding at risk communities to combat HIV transmission; and provide treatment, care, and support to all those living with HIV and AIDS. In the absence of these factors, prevention efforts falter.

Nonetheless, debate continues about the provision of needle and syringe programs and the content of sex and relationship education for the young, some arguing that young people have the right to sex education that recognizes the central role of condoms in halting HIV transmission, with others claiming that sex education should focus on promoting abstinence. Moral agendas in many countries thwart prevention efforts: some governments claim that sex education promotes sexual activity among the young; others, particularly those with religious affiliations, promote monogamy, which is now acknowledged to be a risk factor – at least for married women.

The conservative policies of some countries, including the United States, and the related advocacy of abstinence and monogamy, have had a profound and, many would claim, negative impact on HIV prevention and education programs.

AIDS AND HUMAN RIGHTS

The promotion and protection of human rights constitute an essential component in preventing transmission of HIV and reducing vulnerability to infection and to the impact of HIV/AIDS. Because HIV most affects stigmatized and marginalized populations, human rights issues have been central to the response to HIV. Denying the rights of people living with HIV and those most at risk imperils not only their well being, but also life itself. Human rights violations include sexual violence and coercion faced by women and girls, stigmatization of men who have sex with men, abuses against sex workers and injecting drug users, refugees, and migrants, lack of access to condoms and harm reduction measures in prisons, and violations of the right of young persons to information on HIV transmission. Human rights violations constitute a major barrier to both prevention efforts and access to treatments and care.

HIV exacerbates the differential power between men and women and the gendered patterns of social and economic dependency. Social structures and the beliefs, customs, and practices that define “masculine” and “feminine” attributes play a central role in who is vulnerable to infection, and who will receive care, support, or treatment. In the early years of the pandemic men accounted for the majority of those living with HIV. However, this is changing: to the end of 2004 in Sub Saharan Africa, 57 percent of all adults living with HIV were women.

For men and boys, institutions and structures that form societal expectations about gender create social pressure for men to take sexual risks, putting them at risk of HIV. In many countries, men’s labor takes them far from families, increasing their (and their partners’) vulnerability to HIV. The problems facing men are often overlooked because of

their apparent physical and emotional vulnerability. A disregard for their own health and that of their sexual partners puts men in danger. Young men have the greatest number of unprotected sexual acts, are most likely to inject drugs, are most likely to engage in male sex work, and to be the victims of male to male sexual violence. On the other hand, older men may seek very young women as partners and wives because they believe they are less likely to be HIV positive, thus placing young women at increased risk of becoming infected.

Women have less access than men to education and economic resources, which significantly reduces their capacity to fight HIV, but at the same time women are often positioned as vectors of HIV. In some societies, there is a belief that women and girls should be both ignorant about sex and passive during sex. Lack of knowledge of sexual matters is often viewed as a sign of purity and innocence, and prevents young women from seeking information about sex. On the other hand, girls are often pressured by boys to have sex as a proof of love. Data on HIV transmission indicate that in much of Africa and in countries such as India, most married women are infected as a consequence of normal marital sexual relations with their husbands. It is estimated that some 60 to 80 percent of African women in steady relationships who become infected with HIV have one sexual partner – their husband or regular partner.

Women's subordinate place and the emphasis on women's innocence make it difficult for them to discuss sex and safe sex openly with their partners. Women may also have little control over how, when, and where sex takes place, which considerably constrains their ability to insist on safe sex. Further, violence against girls and women, including rape, exacerbates their susceptibility to HIV, and this increases in times of conflict and war.

People living with HIV and AIDS are particularly subject to stigmatization and discrimination in society, including in the workplace and in access to government services. Fundamental human rights, such as the right to non discrimination, equal protection and equality before the law, privacy, liberty of movement, work, equal access to education, housing, health care, social security, assistance, and

welfare, are often violated based on known or presumed HIV/AIDS status. The Commission on Human Rights in 2001 and again in 2002 confirmed that access to AIDS medication is a key component of the right to the highest attainable standard of health, enshrined in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, the International Covenant on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights, and the Convention on the Rights of the Child.

On a political level, the response to the AIDS pandemic is hindered by countries which do not recognize freedoms of speech and association, nor the right to information and education by infected and affected groups and by civil society as a whole. Respect, protection, and fulfillment of human rights are central to the AIDS agenda, and equally, HIV/AIDS needs to be at the center of the global human rights agenda.

While some uncertainties remain as to why some countries have a higher prevalence than others, and why some countries have managed to reduce prevalence levels radically, it is evident that a successful response to HIV is dependent on a human rights approach that empowers civil society and ensures the communities have a secure place within the national dialogue. In general, in the developed world and also, in some instances, in the developing world, where a modern public health approach has been adopted, an approach in which communities encourage and support individuals, understood as rational agents, to reduce harm to themselves and others, and where people have access to prevention education and treatment, HIV transmission has been slowed. On the other hand, economic and social disadvantage and civil disruption, and associated marginalization and stigma, increase vulnerability to HIV.

HIV TREATMENTS

The issue of human rights is central to treatment access: all who are infected with HIV have the right to treatment. In the developed world where most people living with HIV have access to these therapies, there has been an 80 percent fall in deaths related to AIDS. In the developing world, however, only

approximately 5 percent of those who are infected are currently receiving the most effective therapy. Prospects for access to treatments continue to be thwarted by poverty and global inequalities despite the recent moves for treatment “access for all”: the Global Fund’s commitment to buy and distribute cheap generic drugs to poor countries; and the “3 by 5” initiative of the World Health Organization (WHO) to provide ART therapy to 3 million people by 2005. To the middle of 2004, only 400,000 of the 3 million had been treated with ART.

The “3 by 5” initiative, although welcomed by many, has placed an additional burden on much of the developing world – the burden to test their populations. There are estimates that between 180 million and 300 million people will need to be HIV tested at least once in order to reach the target of 3 million people on ART. People have been slow to come forward for testing, however, because of the stigma and discrimination often associated with an HIV positive diagnosis. As a result of the poor response, routine “opt out” testing is being adopted in countries with high prevalence rates. While some interpret this response as necessary, others are concerned that the pressure to test will undermine human rights and increase stigma and discrimination rather than reduce it.

An added incentive to treatment rollout is the possibility that if treatment uptake is extensive, then ART may also act in a preventive fashion. It is yet to be proven whether widespread testing and subsequent uptake of treatment among those who are HIV infected will reduce the population viral load and hence make HIV transmission less likely. In the developed world, high uptake of treatment has not led – at least not initially – to a reduction in HIV transmission. In some countries such as the United States and Australia, treatment uptake is related to a relaxation in “safe sex” and an apparent concomitant increase in HIV incidence.

The current push for routine testing and treatment carries with it the risk of downplaying prevention. In recognition of this problem, some are advocating prevention in the clinic – voluntary counseling and testing have become a site for prevention. While prevention in the

clinic may be a useful addendum to health promotion, it is unlikely to succeed alone. What is needed to sustain changes in sexual and drug injection practice is cultural and normative authority, and such authority is best achieved in the social realm. The clinic is by its very nature private, confidential, and individualistic and thus unlikely to provide the appropriate environment for sustained prevention. More importantly – perhaps most importantly – extending testing so as to make it a major prevention tool will give governments the excuse to draw back from HIV, the excuse not to have to deal with and face the complexities of talking about sex and drugs, the excuse not to train teachers and those in contact with the young, to raise issues in connection with HIV transmission. It will excise the public and collective voice.

The current conservative global climate appears to be producing a flight from “behavioral” prevention. While it is imperative that the quest continue for a cure to HIV and AIDS and for an effective prophylactic vaccine and other prevention technologies, it is equally vital that such endeavors do not undermine the gains already made. The challenge for modern public health is to address the social, cultural, and economic dimensions of health, to address issues of power between and within countries, and to attack discrimination and prejudice.

SEE ALSO: Drug Use; Gender, Development and; Globalization, Sexuality and; Health Risk Behavior; HIV/AIDS and Population; Human Rights; Prevention, Intervention; Safer Sex

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al-Biruni (973–1048)

Syed Farid Alatas

Abu Rayhan Muhammad ibn Ahmad al Biruni was born in the city of Khwarazm (modern Khiva) in what is today known as Uzbekistan, but during his youth was part of the Iranian Samanid Empire. He spent his early years under the patronage of various rulers until finally becoming part of the court of Mahmud Ghaznavi (979–1030), the ruler of an empire that included parts of what is now known as Afghanistan, Iran, and northern India. Al Biruni went to India with the troops of Mahmud and remained there for many years. During

this time, he studied Sanskrit, translated a number of Indian religious texts, and conducted research on Indian religions and their doctrines. Al Biruni was the first Muslim and probably the first scholar to provide a systematic account of the religions of India from a sociological point of view. Furthermore, his work is considered to be a vital source of knowledge of Indian history and society in the eleventh century, providing details of the religion, philosophy, literature, geography, chronology, astronomy, customs, laws, and astrology of India.

Typical of the great scholars of his period, al Biruni was multitalented, being well versed in physics, metaphysics, mathematics, geography, and history. He wrote a number of books and treatises. Apart from his *Kitab ma li al hind* (*The Book of What Constitutes India*), he also wrote *Al Qanun al Masudi* (on astronomy and trigonometry), *Al Athar al Baqia* (on ancient history and geography), *Kitab al Sai dana* (*Materia Medica*), and *Kitab al Jawahir* (*Book of Precious Stones*). His *Al Tafshim li Awa'il Sina'at al Tanjim* gives a summary of mathematics and astronomy. His important work sociologically speaking is his *Kitab ma li al hind*, in which he presents a study of Indian religions. Al Biruni died in 1048 CE at the age of 75.

The history of Central Asia during the tenth and eleventh centuries provides an important backdrop for the understanding of al Biruni's intellectual development. He was born in the environs (Persian, *birun*) of Kath, one of the two main cities of Khwarazm, the other being Jurjaniyya. The title of Khwarazmshah had been held for a long time by the ruler of Kath. But in 995 the ruler of Jurjaniyya killed his suzerain and appropriated the title for himself. During the civil war, al Biruni fled the area for a few years. Various dynasties that once flourished around Khwarazm, such as the Samanids to the southeast, the Buwayhids to the west, and the Ziyarid state in between, were gradually absorbed by the Ghaznavids under the leadership of Sultan Mahmud in central Afghanistan by 1020. During his flight and after, it is likely that al Biruni lived in places such as Rayy (near modern Tehran), Bukhara, and Gurgan. In Bukhara he met the famed physician and

philosopher ibn Sina (Avicenna). By 1022, Sultan Mahmud had conquered large parts of India including Waihand, Multan, Bhatinda, and the Ganges valley up to near Benares. It was during this time that al Biruni developed an interest in Indian society, living in an empire that conquered large areas of the Indian subcontinent and having the opportunity to travel and take up residence there (Kennedy 1970).

The work of al Biruni that can be considered as sociological is his study of India. His *Kitab ma li al hind* (*The Book of What Constitutes India*) aimed to provide a comprehensive account of what he called “the religions of India and their doctrines.” This included the religion, philosophy, literature, geography, science, customs, and laws of the Indians. Of special interest to sociology is al Biruni’s construction of the religions of India.

Al Biruni considered what we call “Hinduism” as a religion centuries before Europeans recognized Hinduism as not mere heathenism. In attempting a reconstruction of al Biruni’s construction of “Hinduism,” it is necessary to point out that it is inadequate to rely on Sachau’s English translation of the Arabic original. The translation, which was undertaken in the late nineteenth century, reads into Arabic terms nineteenth century European ideas about what Hinduism was. For example, in his preface in the Arabic original, al Biruni refers to “the religions of India and their doctrines” (*adyan al hind wa madha hibuhum*) (Al Biruni 1377/1958 [ca. 1030]: 4), while this is translated by Sachau as “the religions and doctrines of the Hindus” (Sachau 1910: 6). Throughout the translation Sachau uses the term “Hindu,” leading one to assume that al Biruni conceived of a single religion called Hinduism. For example, the second chapter of the *Tahqiq ma li al hind* was translated by Sachau as “On the Belief of the Hindus in God,” whereas the Arabic original has it as “On their Beliefs in God, Praise be to Him.” Moreover, the term Hindu does not appear in the Arabic text and the term “*hind*” did not have religious connotations.

The account of the creed of the Indians begins in chapter 2 with an exposition of their belief in God, by which al Biruni means the same God that is worshipped by Jews,

Christians, and Muslims. The exposition begins with an account of the nature of God, with reference to his speech, knowledge, and action (Sachau 1910: 27–30; al Biruni 1377/1958 [ca. 1030]: 20–2).

We are then told that this is an account of the belief in God among the elite. Here al Biruni is making a distinction between ideas associated with a high tradition and ideas held by the common people, as far as the conception of God is concerned (Sachau 1910: 31–2; al Biruni 1377/1958 [ca. 1030]: 23–4).

What we get so far is a picture of a monotheistic religion based on a determinate number of books, the *Patañjali*, *Veda*, and *Gita* (Sachau 1910: 27, 29; al Biruni 1377/1958 [ca. 1030]: 20–1). The *Veda* was “sent down” to Brahma (*anzalahu ‘ala brahma*) (Sachau 1910: 29; al Biruni 1377/1958 [ca. 1030]: 21). Sociologically speaking, a distinction has to be made between the abstract, metaphysical ideas of the high tradition and the literalist, anthropomorphic ideas of the common people.

From the chapter headings of the *Kitab ma li al hind*, it is obvious that by “the religions of India and their doctrines” al Biruni means something much broader than “religion” as understood in sociology today. He is clearly referring to the entire corpus of Indian beliefs and practices, including the various branches of knowledge that are not seen by modern sociology to be part of religion. These include theology, philosophy, literature, metrology, geography, astronomy, chronology, and the study of manners and customs.

RELEVANCE TO THE HISTORY OF CONTEMPORARY SOCIOLOGY

Al Biruni’s studies on Indian religions are important for three principal reasons. One is that he pioneered the comparative study of religion. Al Biruni was extremely versatile as a scholar. In his work in the exact sciences such as in his *Kitab al Jamahir* (*Book of Precious Stones*), he was an experimental scientist. But he was well aware that such methods were not suitable for the study of religion and, therefore, employed a comparative approach in his study of India. For example, when he makes the distinction between the abstract,

metaphysical ideas of the elite and the anthropomorphic ideas of the masses, he clarifies that this dichotomy is to be found among the ancient Greeks, Jews, Christians, and Muslims (Sachau 1910: 24, 111). In other words, the dichotomy is a universal tendency found in all religions.

Second, his work on India is an example of an early sociological study conscious of the necessity for objectivity. Al Biruni was an impartial observer of Indian society. This can be seen from the full title of his study: *Kitab al Biruni fi tahqiq ma li al hind min maqbulat fi al 'aql aw mardhulat*, that is, *The Book of What Constitutes India as derived from Discourse which is Logically Acceptable or Unacceptable*. Al Biruni's approach was to make assessments based on what was logically acceptable. He was fully aware of the need to refrain from making value judgments about Indian religions from an Islamic perspective. He attempted to present Indian civilization as understood by Indians themselves (Sachau 1910: 25; al Biruni 1377/1958 [ca. 1030]: 19). Al Biruni quotes extensively from Sanskrit texts which he had either read himself or which were communicated to him.

Third, al Biruni's work on India is important from a methods point of view because it contains ideas pertinent to social statistics, applied social research, and the issue of numerical evidence (Boruch 1984). These come under the categories of errors in information, data sharing, the limits of knowledge, and statistics. On errors in information, he was concerned with fixing limits to guesswork and the problems of translation as he relied greatly on Sanskrit sources (Boruch 1984: 826). He also raised the problem of response bias that arises from ethnocentrism, lying, corroboration, the question of the validity of information (Boruch 1984: 828–30), and the types of misrepresentations.

On data sharing, al Biruni was critical of those who resisted doing so, saying that the Indians “are by nature niggardly in communicating that which they know, and they take the greatest possible care to withhold it from men of another caste among their own people, still much more, of course from any foreigner” (Sachau 1910: 22, cited in Boruch 1984: 836). On the limits of knowledge, he listed various impediments such as knowledge

of languages, carelessness of scribes, a metrical system of writing, and religious insularity (Boruch 1984: 837). On statistical technique, Boruch notes that although al Biruni was obviously not familiar with concepts of relative frequency distribution, there is an attempt to articulate an embryonic notion of that when he discusses rare events (Boruch 1984: 838).

In cautioning us against the various types of lies and misrepresentations, al Biruni refers to the example of the critics of the Mu'tazila school of theology in Islam. He once called upon a scholar by the name of Abu Sahl 'Abd al Mun'im Ibn 'Ali Ibn Nuh al Tiflisi, who spoke of the misrepresentation of the Mu'tazila school. According to the Mu'tazila, God is omniscient and, therefore, has no knowledge (in the way that man has knowledge). The misrepresentation is that God is ignorant (Sachau 1910: 5)! It is the same scholar who urged al Biruni to write a work on the religions of India because of the misrepresentations of India that were found in contemporary works among Muslims (Sachau 1910: 6–7).

Also on methods, al Biruni makes an interesting case for hearsay as opposed to eyewitness. We are used to thinking of eyewitness accounts as more reliable than hearsay. Al Biruni concurs when he says that “the eye of the observer apprehends the substance of that which is observed, both in the time when and the place where it exists, whilst hearsay has its peculiar drawbacks” (Sachau 1910: 3). However, he notes that had it not been for the drawbacks, hearsay would be preferable to eyewitness. The reason for this is that “the object of eye witness can only be *actual* momentary existence, whilst hearsay comprehends alike the present, the past, and the future, so as to apply in a certain sense both to that which *is* and to that which *is not*” (Sachau 1910: 3). In this sense, al Biruni notes, written tradition is a type of hearsay and the most preferable, observing that if a report regarding an event were not contradicted by logic or physical laws, then its truth or falsity depends on the “character of the reporters, who are influenced by the divergence of interests and all kinds of animosities and antipathies between the various nations” (Sachau 1910: 3).

While it is true that his study was narrow in that his sources were mainly textual, what

is interesting from the sociological standpoint is the definition of *dm* (plural, *adyan*), the complexity of which is lost when translated into the modern “religion.” This then raises the question as to whether al Biruni imposed an Islamic conception of religion onto his Indian data or derived this broad conception from his Indian textual sources or informants. This issue has so far not been dealt with by scholars of al Biruni or of Hinduism.

It has been noted that al Biruni utilized Muslim categories in his study of Indian thought. As Lawrence suggests, the introductory chapters on theology and philosophy of the *Kitab ma li al hind* suggest an organizational principle and selection criteria based on the Islamic understanding of God (Lawrence 1978: 6). However, this cannot be seen as an imposition of Muslim categories as al Biruni did not read Islamic meanings into the religions of the Indians. It is interesting that al Biruni’s translator, Edward C. Sachau, observed that al Biruni’s method was not to speak himself “but to let the Hindus speak, giving extensive quotations from their classical authors” (Sachau 1910: xxiv), while Sachau himself does not always allow al Biruni to speak when he reads modern European meanings into al Biruni’s Arabic text.

Al Biruni had a universal conception of *dm*, which he applies to religions other than Islam, at a time when the Latin *religio* was only applied to Christianity. At the same time, al Biruni does not intellectually or culturally Islamize the religions of the Indians by reading into the Indian material an Islamic model or Islamic meanings.

SEE ALSO: Hinduism; Islam; Khaldun, Ibn; Religion; Religion, Sociology of

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alcohol and crime

Hung En Sung

Alcohol is the most widely abused psychoactive substance in the United States. It is the only legally available non prescription addictive drug that dangerously alters the mind and behavior. The term “alcohol related crime” refers to violations of laws regulating the sale or use of alcohol and also covers other criminal activities that involve alcohol.

Underage drinking and drunk driving are the most prevalent alcohol specific offenses in the US. In 2003, more than three fourths of students had consumed alcohol by the end of high school, and more than half of 12th graders had been drunk at least once in their lifetime (Johnston et al. 2004). Apart from being illegal, underage drinking – binge drinking in particular – has led to very high rates of drunk driving among adolescents. Youths between ages 16 and 20 are more than twice as likely to be involved in alcohol related car accidents. Young male drivers, people with drinking problems, those who begin drinking at younger ages, and drivers who do not wear safety belts are disproportionately likely to be involved in alcohol related fatal accidents.

There are more than 82 million incidents, but only 1.5 million arrests for drinking and driving each year (Hingson & Winter 2003). Law enforcement has not been effective in

detering drunk driving: at least two thirds of the fatal alcohol involved accidents are caused by repeat drink drivers. Effective measures for controlling drunk driving and alcohol related accidents include lowering legal blood alcohol concentrations, controlling liquor outlets, nighttime driving curfews for minors, educational treatment programs combined with license suspension for offenders, and court monitoring of high risk offenders.

Data demonstrate the close association between alcohol and violent crimes. Nationally, about 30 percent of violent crimes involved an offender who had been drinking according to victimization data (Bureau of Justice Statistics 2004). At the macro level, alcohol availability rates and alcohol consumption rates are associated with violent crime. Yet at the micro level, alcohol increases the risk of violent behavior only for certain individuals and under some social situations or cultural influences. For example, drinking is conducive to aggression when alcohol intoxication is celebrated as a display of masculinity and male togetherness or when certain situational cues, such as weapons or hostile peers, are present.

Although perpetrators are far more likely than victims to be intoxicated, the role of alcohol in violent victimization is largest among groups that, if not intoxicated, are normally less vulnerable to violence: whites, males, and persons of higher socioeconomic status. Difficult temperament, hyperactivity, hostile beliefs, history of family violence, poor school performance, delinquent peers, criminogenic beliefs about alcohol's effects, impulsivity, and antisocial personality disorder are risk factors that increase the likelihood of alcohol related violence and could appear in childhood and adolescence as its precursors.

Alcohol use typically co occurs with domestic violence. Two thirds of victims reported alcohol being a factor. Recent findings have also corroborated the role of alcohol in female to male and same sex partner violence. Although moderate drinkers are more frequently engaged in intimate violence than are light drinkers and abstainers, only heavy and/or binge drinkers are involved in the most chronic and serious forms of aggression. The odds, frequency, and severity of physical attacks are highest on days of alcohol use. Relationship stress, deficient

conflict/anger management skills, and a history of physical abuse heightens risks of violence due to alcohol abuse or dependence in an intimate relationship. Clinical data attest that violence decreases after behavioral marital alcoholism treatment.

The role of parental alcohol abuse in the perpetration of physical or sexual child abuse has not been conclusively established. However, some research indicates that parental alcohol abuse may increase a child's risk of experiencing physical or sexual abuse. Potential contributors to alcohol induced child abuse include low socioeconomic status, relationship stress between parents, and parental history of violence.

Alcohol is also a contributor to nuisance, loitering, panhandling, and disorderly conduct in open spaces. The prevalence of alcohol use is high among the homeless and street youths. The mere sight and smell of alcohol related incivilities instill a sense of insecurity in the citizenry. Policing alcohol related street disorder and enforcing compliance checks of alcohol dispensing businesses have proved promising in reducing citizens' fear of crime and preventing further deterioration of community safety.

A particular alcohol organized crime connection was seen after 1919 when the ratification of the 18th Amendment outlawed the production, sale, and transportation of alcoholic beverages across the US. The emergence of a national market for bootlegged liquor increased the visibility, influence, lethality, and wealth of criminal organizations and severely corrupted the enforcement apparatus (Miron 2004). Homicide rates grew dramatically in major urban areas during the 1920s. Public health gains of Prohibition were achieved at a public safety cost that the society was unwilling to tolerate. The 21st Amendment repealed the 18th in 1933.

The mere co occurrence of alcohol use and violence does not prove that alcohol use causes violence. In some cases, the desire or plan to use violence may actually trigger alcohol consumption (i.e., drinking to embolden oneself before attacking someone). Moreover, certain common factors may lead to both alcohol consumption and violence (i.e., some youth gangs encourage both heavy drinking and fighting). The *causal* pathways between alcohol and human violence in diverse contexts remain to be determined.

SEE ALSO: Alcoholism and Alcohol Abuse; Crime; Drug Use; Drugs, Drug Abuse, and Drug Policy; Drugs and the Law; Drugs/Substance Use in Sport; Juvenile Delinquency

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alcoholism and alcohol abuse

Paul Roman

Evidence of the presence of alcohol in human societies extends to the beginning of recorded history. Nearly all human societies have discovered and used some form of beverage alcohol (Heath 2000). Ethanol, the genre of alcohol consumed by humans, occurs as a natural product of the fermentation of common

foods. In decaying fruit, sugar converts to ethanol, and likewise with grain and potatoes, where decay and fermentation move from starch to sugar to ethanol. Thus ethanol's production and discovery of its psychoactive effects likely occurred accidentally when humans attempted to store food for later consumption. The discovery of the psychoactive effects of this substance likely led quite quickly to the deliberate production of alcoholic beverages.

The normative structures surrounding the use of alcohol have varied greatly over time and geography. Many settings have been observed by social scientists where drinking almost solely accompanies rituals of celebration and social solidarity (Bacon 1943). In many settings alcohol is consumed regularly as a part of normal diet. Some preparations, especially beers, have significant nutritional value, while consumption of diluted wine, via the purifying effects of alcohol, allows for safe use of otherwise marginal water supplies.

Together with evidence of positive social effects of alcohol use, there is a long historical record of events of drunkenness with varying consequences. The potential adverse effects of alcohol consumption are recognized in its prohibited use throughout Islamic and other religious groups. In an early biblical account, Noah is recorded as having shamed himself before his sons after a drinking bout that celebrated completing the construction of the Ark. Many historical records describe damage and destruction associated with excessive drinking, and there are occasional references to persons whose chronic excessive drinking prevented them from fulfilling expected social roles. In general, however, the historical record suggests many centuries' socially integrated use and relatively few problems in those cultures where alcohol was manufactured and used.

The emergence of concepts of alcohol related problems in the form of alcoholism and repeated patterns of alcohol abuse are social developments of the past 500 years. This transformation has raised complex questions for sociological analysis, for within most societies patterns of socially integrated alcohol use have been sustained in parallel to emerging social concerns and problems. From a broad perspective, the emergence of alcohol problems

and the definition of alcohol dependence accompany combinations of industrialization, urbanization, immigration, and population growth (Heath 2000).

Deviant uses of alcohol involve failures to perform expected roles and/or destructive or anti social behaviors. Sociologically, alcohol abuse is any use of alcohol that is contrary to social norms governing the circumstances where the drinking occurs (i.e., alcohol abuse is not an objective phenomenon, but is largely socially constructed) (Gusfield 1996). These behaviors can range from breaking the rules of small groups to committing murder in an intoxicated rage. The significance of alcohol abuse lies in the combination of (1) its relative prevalence within a certain population or subgroup of that population, (2) repeated and/or escalating patterns of abuse by individuals, (3) the extent to which the social and physical consequences of abuse touch upon moral codes or key values of communities or subcultures within them, and (4) the manner in which the local culture interprets the causal relationship between the presence of alcohol and adverse outcomes.

Alcoholism (or alcohol dependence) can be viewed as a subcategory of severe alcohol abuse, while others define alcoholism as a distinctive disease condition that is triggered by the interaction of alcohol with physiological characteristics that biological researchers are yet to agree upon (Jellinek 1960). The key feature of alcoholism is repeated events of alcohol consumption (typically alcohol abuse) despite notable physical, psychological, and social costs that accompany such consumption (Bacon 1973). That this behavior is seemingly irrational and beyond the individual's control is one of the bases used to define it as a disease condition.

Alcohol abuse and alcoholism are behavioral patterns that can be found today in nearly all societies that have moved into some phase of industrialization. This seeming universality is an artifact of the globalization of patterns of western social and economic organization. There is great variability across cultures and nations in drinking and problematic drinking patterns, and such variations are important topics for sociological analysis (Heath 2000). For example, it has been observed that

unanticipated drinking problems may emerge in industrializing nations where regular alcohol consumption has been normative for centuries. Problems emerge not from alcohol consumption per se, but from the adoption of new patterns of drinking, such as the consumption of distilled spirits when drinking customs had been centered for centuries on beer or wine, or through patterns of daily drinking in commercial bars following completion of work in settings when drinking had been traditionally restricted to festivals or other similar occasions of social celebration.

Sociological interest in ethnic differences in drinking patterns and problems has led to studies to understand why some ethnic groups have very low rates of abstinence from alcohol consumption accompanied by low rates of alcohol problems. Orthodox Jews are a particularly striking example of this phenomenon, and analyses have revealed unique patterns of social control that encourage alcohol use but respond sharply to incidents of intoxication or abuse (Glassner & Berg 1980). Research of this genre has also revealed that cultural groups with significant rates of abstinence are usually marked by significant alcohol problems, with abstinence norms being a signal for the relatively weak mechanisms of social control over deviant drinking behavior.

Since alcohol is a potent drug, it is not surprising that age is a social variable that generates substantial social control efforts in industrialized societies such as the US, with concerns about drinking among American college students and its consequences approximating a level of social panic in the late twentieth and early twenty first centuries (Wechsler & Wuethrich 2002). Drinking patterns are linked to gender. While in most societies alcohol use and abuse is concentrated among males, industrialization, women's employment, and movement toward social equality for women appear to lead to increasingly similar drinking patterns between men and women, although parity of drinking between men and women is essentially non-existent in any society (Wilsnack & Wilsnack 1997).

Sociologists have had a longstanding interest in the dynamics of family relationships associated with alcohol dependence. Research produced a model describing how family structures

adapted to the behavior of the alcoholic husband and father, focusing upon the changes in role expectations and role relationships that often kept families intact despite dramatically deviant behavior on the part of this adult male (Steinglass et al. 1987). Stemming from these studies has been the concept of "enabling" behaviors that has widely diffused into both technical and popular literatures.

Research by sociologists has also focused upon employed persons with drinking problems, approaching this issue from two distinct perspectives. One framework looks at the stressors built into jobs and organizations, and the manner in which heavy drinking is a response to these conditions, used in a manner that can be aptly called self medication (Martin et al. 1992). A second approach parallels the research literature on the family, looking at the group dynamics and power relationships in work settings that tend to "normalize" deviant drinking behaviors and reduce the likelihood of identification (Roman & Blum 2003). Several recent studies have examined the roles of labor unions in these dynamics. This research has helped formulate strategies for peer intervention that build upon workers' relationships that might otherwise impede the process of providing assistance to the problem drinker.

It is clear that control is a major theme in discussing the use of alcohol in human society. Thus, in multiple nations on multiple occasions, the prohibition of the manufacture and use of alcohol has been seen as the sweeping solution for the problems that drinking brings to different social institutions. The American experience of the emergence of a major temperance movement that ultimately led to national Prohibition has been well documented (Clark 1976). Reasons for the repeal of Prohibition are more complex than is implied by assertions that the social experiment was a failure. One of the dynamics that emerged along with Prohibition's repeal was the diffusion of the idea that certain drinkers were unable to control their drinking because they suffered from the "disease" of alcoholism (Jellinek 1960). Such a concept effectively undermined the need for Prohibition for the entire population and instead called for identification of treatment of the small minority which was unable to drink "normally."

Sociology has a long tradition of critical perspectives on the dominant definitions of alcohol related problems and accompanying social policies (Roman 1988). There is considerable skepticism about the disease model of alcohol dependence, largely because the successful treatments of such dependence are primarily centered on the personal "will" in the achievement of abstinence rather than through external medical interventions. Related studies have examined the dynamics of the processes surrounding alcohol dependence and recovery through intense conceptual and empirical examination of Alcoholics Anonymous (Denzin 1986).

Given its potentially harmful effects, its widespread use, and the legality of its use for most adults, it is clear that there is considerable ambivalence around the notions of appropriate and inappropriate uses of alcohol in most of the world today. The possibility of prohibition has been largely abandoned in most locations and thus appropriate controls become the central issue. Most current sociological research is oriented toward these practical considerations, focused on the design and evaluation of prevention and treatment strategies, with extensive recent attention to curbing the "binge drinking" of college students, drinking and driving, and methods to reduce or eliminate youthful alcohol consumption often associated with crime and delinquency.

SEE ALSO: Addiction and Dependency; Alcohol and Crime; Chronic Illness and Disability; Deviance, Medicalization of; Deviance, Theories of; Deviant Careers; Drugs, Drug Abuse, and Drug Policy; Health Risk Behavior; Labeling Theory; Marginalization, Outliers; Moral Entrepreneur; Sick Role; Social Epidemiology; Stigma

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alienation

Randy Hodson

Alienation is the social and psychological separation between oneself and one's life experiences. Alienation is a concept originally applied to work and work settings but today is

also used to characterize separation from the political sphere of society. To be alienated is to live in a society but not to feel that one is a part of its ongoing activities.

Theories of alienation start with the writings of Marx, who identified the capacity for self-directed *creative activity* as the core distinction between humans and animals. If people cannot express their *species being* (their creativity), they are reduced to the status of animals or machines. Marx argued that, under capitalism, workers lose control over their work and, as a consequence, are alienated in at least four ways. First, they are alienated from the *products* of their labor. They no longer determine what is to be made nor what use will be made of it. Work is reduced to being a means to an end – a means to acquire money to buy the material necessities of life. Second, workers are alienated from the *process* of work. Someone else controls the pace, pattern, tools, and techniques of their work. Third, because workers are separated from their activity, they become alienated from *themselves*. Non alienated work, in contrast, entails the same enthusiastic absorption and self realization as hobbies and leisure pursuits. Fourth, alienated labor is an isolated endeavor, not part of a collectively planned effort to meet a group need. Consequently, workers are alienated from *others* as well as from themselves. Marx argued that these four aspects of alienation reach their peak under industrial capitalism and that alienated work, which is inherently dissatisfying, would naturally produce in workers a desire to change the existing system. Alienation, in Marx's view, thus plays a crucial role in leading to social revolution to change society toward a non alienated future.

The study of alienation has probably inspired more writing and research in the social sciences than any other single topic. Today, the core of that research has moved away from the social philosophical approach of Marx, based on projecting a future that *could be*, and toward a more empirical study of the causes and consequences of alienation within the world of work as it *actually exists*. Although less sweeping than Marx's original vision, this approach has produced insights that are largely consistent with his views. The contemporary approach substitutes measures of job satisfaction for Marx's more expansive conception

of alienation. Related concepts include job commitment, effort bargaining, and, conversely, resistance. In the political sphere voting behavior and a sense of political efficacy have emerged as central empirical indicators of underlying alienation from society's power structures.

The intellectual movement from a social philosophy of alienation to a social science of alienation has produced a wealth of research on the causes of job satisfaction and related empirical measures of political and social disengagement. Autonomy to decide on the details of one's own work tasks and freedom from oppressive supervision have been identified as among the most important determinants of experiencing satisfaction and meaning in one's work. Other determinants of job satisfaction include both positive foundations for self realization, such as perceptions of justice at work and supportive co workers, and corrosive factors, such as large organizational size, bureaucracy, and control of local operations by remote corporate entities. The absence of work can also generate a sense of alienation because one has no useful role in society. High levels of unemployment have been empirically linked with increased depression, higher rates of illness, and even suicide. Globalization has contributed to job loss for many workers who are displaced by workers elsewhere in the world who either have access to better technology or are willing to accept lower pay.

In the political sphere alienation arises from a sense of estrangement from political power. Such estrangement arises because political institutions have become increasingly distant in large complex societies, but also, importantly, because effective channels of participation have been blocked for many people or simply do not exist. The role of individual and corporate wealth as determinants of political influence has led many people to a lack of confidence and trust that the political institutions of society either represent their interests or are open to their participation. Political alienation appears to be on the increase. In western nations, particularly in the United States, the proportion of people who bother to vote has fallen to a historic low. In the 1960s in the United States about three quarters of the population felt that the government

was run for the benefit of all. Today, this number has fallen to roughly one quarter.

Even for those who have good jobs and some opportunity to exercise political power, overwork and the experience of feeling chronically rushed and pulled in multiple directions have become increasingly common sources of disaffection. Such stresses can lead to feelings of alienation and separation from one's life. In spite of widespread overwork, however, surveys indicate that many people prefer work activities over family and leisure activities, further contributing to overwork even in the face of work that may be less than fulfilling. It appears that at least some work in modern society may compete well with alternative activities in the private spheres of life. If people prefer work to family and leisure, does this imply that alienation from work has ended? Or does it simply suggest that the roles of community and family are fading as these assume a smaller and smaller place in people's lives? These changes, if true, present a challenge to traditional alienation theory as it struggles to understand the increasingly diverse experience of life in modern society.

Theories of alienation, as scientific explorations of the causes of job satisfaction and political behavior, serve a pivotal function in moving us beyond workplace and societal practices that destroy human motivation and toward practices that liberate human involvement and creativity. Theories of alienation, as exercises in social philosophy, help to keep alive questions about the future of society by envisioning possible alternatives that do not yet exist. Such exercises are necessary if the social sciences are to retain a transformative potential beyond the tyranny of *what is* and toward *what could be*.

SEE ALSO: Anomie; Capitalism; Class Consciousness; Dialectic; Gramsci, Antonio; Industrial Relations; Labor Process; Marcuse, Herbert; Marx, Karl; Mass Culture and Mass Society; Political Sociology

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alliances

Siegfried P. Gudergan

The concept of alliance has been used widely in a variety of contexts with definitions generally being discipline bound. Theoretical and empirical research into alliances has had extensive interdisciplinary appeal. Research into alliances has been conducted in a multitude of disciplines, including sociology, psychology, economics, political science, law, strategic management, and organizational behavior. The word alliance has a set of meanings, including a confederation described as the act of forming an alliance; a formal agreement establishing an association or alliance between nations or other groups to achieve a particular aim; a coalition, being an organization of people, nations, or businesses involved in a pact or treaty; a bond, being a connection based on kinship or common interest; and a confederation as a state of being allied or confederated. We define alliances as a unified effort involving two or more organizations, groups, or individuals to achieve common goals with respect to a particular issue. This view of alliances is closely related to its sociological roots and suggests that an alliance has a number of defining features. First, an alliance brings together two or more individual parties – whether people or organizations. Second, an alliance requires these parties to be interconnected in some way with resource dependencies. Interconnectedness is a state of being connected reciprocally. Third, the alliance must share common goals, interests, or

values. Fourth, there is an assumption that the individual parties maintain at least some level of autonomy.

The functioning of alliances involving autonomous parties is based on shared norms and behavioral expectations (Macneil 1980). Drawing on sociological foundations, researchers such as Macaulay (1963) and Macneil (1978, 1980, 1981) have examined behavior in alliances being shaped by norms, obligations, and reciprocity. The work of Clegg and his co authors (2002) on alliance cultures and associated value systems supports this notion; so do Dyer and Singh (1998), Gudergan et al. (2002), and Ring and Van de Ven (1992, 1994). Common to a lot of work is that alliances can be characterized by social dilemmas where one party's interest can be in possible conflict with the common interest of the alliance.

Social relations that underlie alliances explain the nature of the connection between the parties to an alliance and possible tensions. These relations are characterized by different levels of chemistry, politics, and associated political and professional relations, dealings and communications. They are associated with human action and activity within groups and can be viewed as a union of political organization comprising social and political units. This suggests that an alliance is the state of being allied or confederated, reflecting unification and coalition. Associated bonds reflect the attachment representing a connection that fastens alliance activities. Group actions, or activities by the parties in alliances, are those taken by a group of individuals and/or organizations. While such actions are associated with transactions and communalism, they are also characterized by embedded conflict.

Social control plays a vital role in alliances and is defined as the control exerted actively or passively by group action. Such control in alliances is reflected in the power, management, and leadership occurring in alliances affecting duties, responsibilities, obligations, and accountabilities. Social and other institutional enforcement mechanisms applying to the alliance influence the extent of compliance with agreements.

Agreements entailing explicit and implicit understandings result from oral and written

alliance statements of an exchange of promises. Oral alliance contracts are agreements that are not in writing and are not signed by the parties, but are real, existing contracts that lack only the formal requirement of a memorandum to render them enforceable in litigation. Written agreements are legal documents summarizing the agreement between parties. Associated alliance communications, messages, and contents are subject to the parties' social interpretations. The resultant social contract is an implicit agreement among people within the alliance that results in the organization of alliance activities.

Mental processes of the alliance parties include interaction and internalization processes. Interpersonal chemistry – the way individuals relate to each other in the alliance – affects the nature of social relations and the extent to which mental processes result in implied alliance contracts. Implied contracts in alliances assume a meeting of minds and community of interests. Political relations – social relations involving authority and power – in turn influence compliance with implied alliance contracts. Legal relations – professional relations that are regulated by law and are based on the fiduciary system – influence how one alliance party justifiably places reliance on the other, whose contribution is sought in some manner. Reliance on alliance agreements is based on an understanding characterized by comprehension, discernment, and empathy. These social settings explain the process by which explicit and implicit agreements are formed and social or implied contracts evolve that affect compliance with alliance agreements.

The potential existence of ethnocentricity and individualistic and selfish action can be counterbalanced by procedures that secure a dialectical process toward increased tolerance and mutual understanding (Etzioni 1988). The interaction patterns developed through procedures of communicative activities are used as the basis on which alliance norms can be created. These norms give predictability in the specific setting of future alliance action, and managers responsible for the exchange serve as guarantors of norm fulfillment.

Although established alliance specific norms may result in well functioning alliances, the creation of such norms may demand substantial effort at the personal level, particularly when it involves parties from different macro cultures. Hence, personal relationships and reputations between boundary spanning alliance parties play an important role in facilitating and enhancing the functioning of the alliance. There is also risk involved in increased manager–organization dependency where the alliance is too closely connected to the specific individuals involved in the process.

The development of alliance norms is consistent with interactional psychology (Endler & Magnusson 1976) and social psychology (Kelman 1961). The interaction of parties and associated oral alliance contracts leads to a sense of obligation and *de facto* accountability that is based on social norms. In addition, the specification and acceptance of written alliance contracts result in parties forming an informal understanding of alliance prerogatives. Important to note here is that each party to the alliance might interpret a written contract differently because of ambiguity and differences in their macro culture. As such, the informal understanding about carrying out obligations may be viewed differently by the other party to the alliance. This understanding is mirrored in a sense of obligations and *de jure* accountability that is based on a fiduciary system. A party's sense of obligation and accountability – embedded in the implied alliance contract – increases with the bi directional communications in the alliance. While parties form a sense of obligation and accountability, they also form expectations about the other party's sense of obligation and accountability. This in turn influences the confidence in that party devoting appropriate inputs to the alliance.

In summary, alliances are socially embedded where this embeddedness determines processes that characterize the alliance. The specific understandings underlying the alliance functioning are socially constructed, resulting in the parties' sense of obligation and accountability that comprise the implied alliance contract.

SEE ALSO: Alliances (Racial/Ethnic); Management; Management Networks; Networks; Organizations as Social Structures; Social Control

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alliances (racial/ethnic)

Benjamin P. Bowser

An alliance is "a close association for a common objective" or "for mutual benefit," synonymous with the idea of a league, a confederacy, or a union (Friend & Guralnik 1960). One will find research on alliances between business organizations and between clients and therapists in psychotherapy. Here the focus is on alliances in social movements. Despite the importance of alliances in the success of any social movement, there is no tradition of focused research on the topic. For example, in social science research in the US, it is touched on in now classic social movement studies such as Ted Gurr's *Why Men Rebel* (1970), Anthony Oberschall's *Social Conflict and Social Movements* (1973), and Francis Piven and R. Cloward's *Poor People's Movements: Why They Succeed, How They Fail* (1977). Ralf Dahrendorf in *Class and Class Conflict in Industrial Society* (1954) explored the idea of alliances only briefly while explaining why conflict has not happened as Karl Marx predicted in the post World War II period. One central objective of this work is to present the underlying processes and principles by which social movements mobilize, are sustained, and then demobilize.

A variety of theoretical perspectives emerged out of efforts to follow up on these studies and present even clearer ideas of social movements which could also assist in our understanding of alliances. For example, social movement theorists have explored a number of issues and problems related to alliances: studies of levels of relative deprivation (Stouffer et al. 1949; Pettigrew 1964), of ethnic solidarity (Bonacich & Modell 1980), and of resources to mobilize (Tilly 1978). The shortcomings of these post war theories have led to a more theoretically diffuse approach which uses primarily ethnographies and case studies in order to derive new insights into social movements and alliances. This can be seen in chapters of Michael Jones Correa's edited volume, *Governing American Cities: Interethnic Coalitions, Competitions, and Conflict* (2001). In this collection

of case studies, what is clear is that appeals to color and minority status are no longer sufficient in the post civil rights era. Rather, authentic appeals to important issues and interests across groups are necessary for successful coalitions and to avoid the intense conflict that occurs whenever one or the other group is excluded. For this reason, biracial coalitions may not be enough; such coalitions must now be all inclusive. Memphis is another example to illustrate this point. Until 1991 Memphis was the only major US city with a majority black population that had not elected a black mayor. Infighting and competition among black city leaders and citizen aversion to candidates who attempted cross racial appeals were all explanations. A black finally was elected mayor and worked to overcome these obstacles, and was able to hold an interracial coalition together for two terms. Several popular theories of voting and election strategy in urban elections were examined – black threat theory, urban regime theory, and deracialization. The urban setting was found to be the most important factor, suggesting that each site is unique enough and that no one theory can describe the prospects for or against multiracial political alliances (Venderleeuw et al. 2004).

Others have pointed out that it is rare for racial commonalities to overcome interminority tensions, highlighting the limits of race based coalitions; institutional barriers such as competition for jobs and different media images are more than sufficient to push intergroup dynamics against alliances (Rogers 2004). Women seem better able to mobilize around institutional barriers. There is something about black women's multiple social identities that links multiracial blackness (African, Pakistani, and Caribbean) in Britain as a unified oppositional identity which can be invoked by black women activists in order to mobilize collective action (Sudbury 2001).

In looking at movements focused on economic inequality and for social justice between 1930 and 1990, data were analyzed on 2,644 "left" protest events that occurred on US college campuses. The availability of resources was important to the successful formation of within movement coalitions but not to the formation of cross movement coalitions. Local

threats inspire within movement coalition events, but it took larger threats such as the war in Vietnam and the draft to affect multiple constituencies and inspire cross movement coalition formation. This research demonstrated that political threats sometimes inspire protest and that organizational goals do influence strategic action (van Dyke 2003). There are also examples where alliances resulted in bringing the power of the state to protect minorities. The alliance of Canadian Jews and political liberals, following World War II, was very strategic. This alliance prompted politicians to adopt the view that racial prejudice was a social problem resulting from an individual's pathology, and led to laws being passed against it. In doing so, they managed to get discriminatory practices prohibited and set a standard of non discrimination for the law abiding population. This universalist philosophy has led to other minority groups which are now experiencing racial/ethnic discrimination to join the original coalition to continue legal reform (Walker 2002).

The potential for theoretically fruitful work on alliances will require investigators to go beyond the familiar black–white racial antagonism model. There are many more variations of ethnic antagonism, segregation, social identities, and even attitudes toward intermarriage that play into the potential for inter and intraracial alliances (Hirschman 1986). In addition, it is now a necessity for social movements to expand beyond national boundaries and move toward an international stance (Bowser 1995). For those who worry about the scope of western economic, political, and cultural structures and their worldwide domination, it can be assumed that these structures and domination can only be effectively influenced and challenged by counterinternational structures and alliances (Waterman 2005). Given the little that we know about alliances, there is an extraordinary challenge ahead for both social movements and those who study them.

SEE ALSO: Alliances; Biracialism; Black Urban Regime; Ethnic Groups; Ethnic, Racial, and Nationalist Movements; Majorities; Poly ethnicity; Race and Ethnic Politics; Separatism; Social Movements

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Althusser, Louis (1918–90)

Kenneth H. Tucker, Jr.

Louis Althusser was a French Marxist philosopher, best known for his structuralist reinterpretation of Marxism in the 1960s. He was

also important as a strong intellectual influence on many of the poststructuralist authors such as Michel Foucault, Jacques Lacan, and Jacques Derrida, who became central figures in social scientific and literary studies in Europe and the US in the 1970s.

In two of his major books, *Lire le Capital* (1965), translated as *Reading Capital*, and *Pour Marx* (1965), translated as *For Marx*, Althusser criticized the overly romantic versions of Marxism that became prominent in the 1960s. He was particularly disparaging of the “humanist” Marxism of thinkers such as Antonio Gramsci and the Frankfurt School, who viewed Marx as a theorist of alienation concerned with the quality of life under capitalism. For Althusser, this romantic Marxism undermined Marx as a scientist. In Althusser's view, Marx attempted to scientifically analyze the capitalist mode of production, as well as other forms of social organization. While Marx was concerned with issues such as alienation in his writings as a young man, including the *Paris Manuscripts of 1844*, this was a youthful folly which Marx abandoned after 1845. Althusser labels this intellectual change in Marx's writings an *epistemological break*, as Marx moved from romanticism to science, culminating in his masterwork *Capital*. Althusser argues that in *Capital* Marx examined the economic structure of the capitalist mode of production, developing a new type of science that not only analyzed capitalism but also explained its own conditions of development. Even Marx was limited in what he accomplished and what he could understand, however. Althusser believes that he supplies the missing dimensions of a Marxist science.

Althusser was dismissive of many Marxists' fascination with the ideas of the philosopher Hegel, such as the theory of the dialectical progression of history and the notion that the whole determines its parts. These abstract ideas Althusser thought to be scientifically useless. He also found Marxism's dichotomous pairing of economic base and cultural and ideological superstructure to be problematic. He replaced these terms with his ideas of *contradiction* and *overdetermination*. Althusser argues that capitalism is an inherently contradictory system, as workers struggle with capitalists, private interests conflict with public

goods, and the like. But Marxist analysis must move beyond concerns with economic analysis. In Althusser's language, every contradiction is overdetermined, as there are a number of different contradictions in politics, ideology, and economics which influence one another. Each of these realms is relatively autonomous, with its own internal dynamics. Yet they influence one another, so that what happens in the political realm can affect economic activities and decisions. For Althusser, there is no center to the mode of production. The ideological, economic, and political elements of the social structure cannot be explained solely by economic factors. While the economic level is indeed the determining factor in any mode of production, this is only in the last instance, which rarely occurs.

One of Althusser's major contributions to Marxism is his theory of ideology. For Althusser, ideology is not simply a misguided interpretation of social life; rather, ideology produces conscious awareness for individuals. It is no accident that Althusser seems much like Freud here, for he also argues that ideologies are unconscious, tied to the emotional dimensions of people's existence, such as their hopes and fears. Althusser also draws on the psychoanalyst Lacan's notion of the imaginary, which is a world of mirrors and illusions, organized around the images and fantasies that we have of ourselves and of others. We take this imaginary to be real, and relations between individuals are converted into imaginary relationships. Ideology operates in the realm of the imaginary. Much of ideology's content and power is based on unconscious assumptions, beliefs, and desires.

What Althusser calls "ideological state apparatuses," major institutions ranging from the family to governments, generate ideologies which individuals internalize. Ideologies convince us that we are individuals freely making choices. In Althusser's vocabulary, we are *interpellated* as individuals with free choice, as subjects. Ideology is dependent on the idea of a subject, indeed ideologies create us as subjects. We are addressed as subjects, named as subjects, so we think of ourselves as free individuals. We live ideology, as we engage in ideological practices such as rituals and

traditions which tie us to universal ideas such as God and the Nation, and the institutions which these ideas represent. But these beliefs, like the idea of the subject, are myths. Individuals are "bearers of structure," as structures influence individuals rather than vice versa. We are determined by material constraints beyond our consciousness, such as the division of labor and the movement of private property, but also by non material structures that we are not aware of, such as language and sexuality.

Althusser's analysis of ideology and his embrace of Freud helped guarantee that his influence extended beyond the confines of Marxism. He has been especially influential in the poststructuralist school of his student Foucault, and other figures such as Derrida, though these thinkers are not Marxists. They have adopted variants of his ideas that individuals are the creation rather than the creators of structures, and that language determines our existence. Like Althusser, they see society in terms of a "decentered totality," where economic, political, and ideological elements interpenetrate in every social formation with no one dimension having priority over the other. Foucault et al. also reject any teleological or progressive version of history, for no social formation gives birth to its successor.

While Althusser remained popular in the US throughout the 1970s and the early 1980s, his influence in France waned after the student revolts of 1968. Althusser sided with the French Communist Party against the students, for he did not see the demonstrations as indicators of a truly revolutionary movement. Students and intellectuals abandoned his thought as they turned against the Communist Party. His life took a very tragic turn when he murdered his wife in 1980. He was institutionalized until 1983, as he was believed unfit to stand trial. He lived a lonely life upon his release until his death in 1990.

SEE ALSO: Base and Superstructure; Critical Theory/Frankfurt School; Derrida, Jacques; Foucault, Michel; Freud, Sigmund; Gramsci, Antonio; Hegel, G. W. F.; Ideology; Lacan, Jacques; Marx, Karl; Poststructuralism; Structuralism

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ambivalence

Gad Yair

Ambivalence denotes contrasting commitments and orientations; it refers to simultaneous conflicting feelings toward a person or an object; and it is commonly used to describe and explain the hesitance and uncertainty caused by the juxtaposition between contradictory values, preferences, and expectations. Lay person use follows intuitive psychological explanations which refer to ambivalence interchangeably with personal hesitation, confusion, indeterminacy, and agitation. In contrast, sociological use suggests that although ambivalence is a bi polar, subjective experience, its causes are social and hence understandable and predictable. True, most sociological uses of the term maintain its conflictual denotations, but this volatile experience is treated as the result of contrasting social pressures exerted on actors.

The concept of sociological ambivalence has been strategically used to show that structural functional theory is not blind to conflicts and

contradictions in social structure. Specifically, Merton (1957) proposed the concept as part of his role set and role relations theory. He suggested that while societies have a functional need to enable most people most of the time to go about their business of social life, without encountering extreme conflict in their role sets, normative contradictions and contrasting expectations are nonetheless inherent in social structure. Ambivalence is therefore a normal part of social life, expected and even routinized. As Merton suggested, sociological ambivalence refers to incompatible normative expectations, attitudes, beliefs, and behavior assigned to a status or to a set of statuses. According to this role set approach, sociological ambivalence results from such incompatible normative expectations incorporated in a *single* role of a *single* social status. Hence, ambivalence is not a pathological situation because it normally results from the social definition of roles and statuses. Therefore, Merton advocated that in explaining inconsistent behaviors and feelings sociologists need to expose the latent and the manifest contradictions in social structure.

Merton's structural functional approach is general and ahistorical. It aims to explain contradictions, tensions, and inconsistency in all manners of social life, in all periods and societies. In contrast, Bauman (1991) historicizes the phenomenon, suggesting that the experience of ambivalence is a child of late modernity, of fluid modernity. While modernity aspired to order, control, and predictability, its most recent phases have harbored disorder, confusion, and even randomness. Bauman's take on ambivalence suggests that in late modernity ambivalence as incoherence became a *Zeitgeist* – “the spirit of the time” – a general cultural orientation that is loosely identified with postmodernity. Instead of Merton's social psychological approach, Bauman's approach is phenomenological. Where Merton pointed to normative micro level contradictions in social structure, Bauman focuses his attention on the blurring of cognitive categories and the mixing up of genres. He suggested that ambivalence – a structural condition – confounds calculation of events and confuses the accuracy and even the relevance of past action patterns (Beilharz 2001). He further argues that historically ambivalent times result from the inadequacy

of linguistic tools and from the blurring of social categories. Under these conditions, perceptions become hazy, inconsistent, and confused. Consequently, action turns mute, while thinking becomes numb.

Applications of the concept of ambivalence in empirical studies follow these traditions. Most studies measure the concept as a phenomenological experience denoting confusion, conflict, hesitancy, contradictory feelings, and behaviors. They frame it as a dependent variable of prior structural conditions: changing family configurations, restructuring of labor markets and organizations, and contrasting political commitments (Yair 2005). Their unique contribution – as Merton envisioned – is in tying together different units of conceptualization and analysis – actors and social structures. In doing so, they provide a meaningful explanation for seemingly paradoxical behaviors, attitudes, and feelings.

SEE ALSO: Merton, Robert K.; Modernity; Role; Structural Functional Theory

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American Dilemma, An (Gunnar Myrdal)

Peter Kivisto

In 1944 the Swedish economist Gunnar Myrdal published a monumental study on the social conditions of African Americans. Encyclopedic in its effort to cover all aspects of black life, *An*

American Dilemma was a volume of over 1,000 pages that included analyses of major demographic, political, economic, and cultural forces that shaped the black experience in the United States. Furthermore, it provided extended discussions of social inequality and social stratification and the persistent role of prejudice and discrimination. It examined the institutional structure of the black community, including an analysis of patterns of leadership and prospects for collective action aimed at redressing a long legacy of racial hostility and oppression. After presenting a vast body of data regarding the past and present circumstances of blacks, Myrdal provided tempered, but nonetheless generally optimistic, conclusions about the future.

The study was commissioned by the Carnegie Corporation, a philanthropic organization established by the estate of the industrialist Andrew Carnegie, which wanted to derive from the study its implications for the formulation of social policy. Although it was not entirely clear why the corporation hired a foreigner who had conducted no prior research on race relations in the United States or elsewhere, a primary reason appears to have been the desire to obtain a novel, outsider's perspective on the topic. Myrdal had substantial monetary support, ample office space in New York City's Chrysler Building, and the participation of many prominent American scholars, including several black activists and intellectuals.

The overarching thesis advanced in the study was noteworthy in several ways. Despite the range and complexity of the topics treated, Myrdal's conclusions about the future of race relations derived from a remarkably simple claim: the dilemma produced by the conflict between the American ideals of freedom and equality and the reality of black oppression would be resolved in favor of the realization of American values. Myrdal was an assimilationist who based his assessment of the future of race relations on the assumption that the nation had a unified culture with commonly shared core values. He referred to this as the American Creed, which involved generalized values rooted in the Christian tradition and the national ethos. A dilemma existed in the United States insofar as the American Creed was not realized in the everyday lived experience of

white Americans, which involved complex patterns of behavior and thought that led to the perpetuation of prejudice, discrimination, and racial subordination. The race problem was located in the white mind, which, as long as it harbored prejudicial attitudes that were translated into discriminatory actions, would ensure that the dilemma persisted. Thus, the solution to the race problem would occur when whites rooted out their own racism and treated blacks in a manner congruent with the core cultural values.

But Myrdal did not think that consciousness raising was all that was needed to cure the nation of white racism. On the contrary, he understood that the historical legacy of racial oppression had to be remedied. He called for the federal government to play a critical role in promoting policies intended to improve the social conditions of African Americans. A dedicated democratic socialist, he had played a pivotal role in the creation of Sweden's welfare state. He was an unapologetic proponent of social engineering. This position had not been a particularly prominent feature of American social science, but it was congruent with the expanded role of the state being advanced by advocates of the New Deal. It contrasted with the *laissez faire* views that Myrdal associated not only with William Graham Sumner, but also with virtually all important scholars of race relations, including Robert E. Park, W. I. Thomas, and W. Lloyd Warner. He thought that these scholars shared Sumner's contention that the mores cannot be legislated – or in other words, that laws do not change the way people think and feel. Such a position led to governmental acquiescence regarding the existing state of race relations. Myrdal's position starkly refuted this claim. In his opinion, government could and should involve itself in improving the living conditions and life chances of blacks, through expanded educational opportunities, job training, and the like. In the process, it could play a salutary role in changing white attitudes and behaviors such that they ended up being congruent with the American Creed.

Myrdal called for racial integration. He abandoned Booker T. Washington's approach, which had opted for promoting black socioeconomic development within the confines of

a racial caste society. Prior to Myrdal commencing his research, Roy Wilkins of the NAACP expressed concern that Myrdal might promote a renewed commitment to the Washingtonian position of development within the framework of a segregated world. Instead, Myrdal endorsed the quest most closely associated with the views of W. E. B. Du Bois for the dual objectives of advancement and integration.

Myrdal placed relatively little emphasis on black activism as a means for challenging their subordinate place in American society. For critics such as Ralph Ellison, this was part of a larger problem with the work, which was that it significantly downplayed the role of blacks as sociohistorical agents shaping their own lives and that of the society they inhabited. When Myrdal discussed the presence of protest organizations within the black community, especially the NAACP and the Urban League, he stressed the importance of their interracial character. He was sympathetic to such organizations and suggested that more organizations with somewhat different political orientations would be welcomed. Nonetheless, his general view was that due to their lack of power and experience, such organizations would necessarily play an essentially secondary role in the move to redefine the roles that blacks would play in the future. He did not appear to anticipate the profound significance of the Civil Rights Movement, which began to have a major impact on the existing racial formation within a decade of the publication of *An American Dilemma*. Despite this shortcoming, the book stands as a landmark of sociological analysis and a clarion call for government intervention on behalf of racial equality and harmony.

SEE ALSO: Assimilation; Civil Rights Movement; Consumption, African Americans; Discrimination; Du Bois, W. E. B.; Park, Robert E. and Burgess, Ernest W.; Prejudice; Race; Race (Racism)

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American Sociological Association

Michael R. Hill

The American Sociological Association (ASA) is currently the largest and most influential membership organization of professional sociologists in the US. The ASA began its organizational life in 1905 when a small group of self-selected scholars representing several existing scholarly organizations (including the American Economic Association, the American Historical Association, and the American Political Science Association) proposed a separate and independent American Sociological Society (ASS) (“Organization of the American Sociological Society” 1906). The first ASS annual meeting convened December 27–29, 1906, in Providence, Rhode Island, with 115 members and a full program of scholarly papers. In 1959 the organization’s name was formally changed from the American Sociological Society to the American Sociological Association. As of 2004, the ASA reported 13,715 paid members and an investment portfolio valued at \$7.1 million.

Corporately, the first ASS presidents comprised the major white, male, intellectual

architects of what became the American sociological tradition and included (with institutional affiliations and dates of ASS presidency): Lester Frank Ward (Brown University, 1906–7), William Graham Sumner (Yale University, 1908–9), Franklin Henry Giddings (Columbia University, 1910–11), Albion Woodbury Small (University of Chicago, 1912–13), Edward Alsworth Ross (University of Wisconsin, 1914–15), George Edgar Vincent (University of Minnesota, 1916), George Elliott Howard (University of Nebraska, 1917), and Charles Horton Cooley (University of Michigan, 1918). The pioneering work of the ASS and its ever growing membership is chronicled in the 23 volumes of the *Papers and Proceedings of the American Sociological Association* (1906–28) and in the pages of the *American Journal of Sociology* (*AJS*). The *AJS*, founded in 1895 by Albion W. Small and published by the University of Chicago Press, predated the ASS. The *AJS*, under Small’s editorship, became the voice of the ASS and reprinted many of the articles and official reports appearing in the *Papers and Proceedings* (Meroney 1930a).

From the beginning, ASS membership grew steadily from 115 in 1906 to 1,812 in 1930, with the largest proportion of members (41.7 percent and 41.5 percent, respectively) coming from the Middle West and the East. In the early years, to 1922, annual meetings focused single-mindedly on a topic chosen and organized by the Society’s president for that year, with an average of only 43 members participating on the program of any given meeting. These relatively small gatherings provided maximum opportunities for detailed discussions and face-to-face interaction between presenters, discussants, and the attendees as a whole. When Columbia’s Franklin H. Giddings presided at the 1911 meeting in Washington, DC, for example, the program roster included 14 participants, an all-time low. The introduction of separate sectional meetings (organized around special topics) within the ASS began in 1922, resulting in larger total numbers of program participants during annual meetings and, simultaneously, a trend away from extended discussions of the presentations toward the reading of large

numbers of formal papers per se (Meroney 1930b), a pattern that continues today. By 2004 there were 43 separately organized sections, representing such diverse fields as teaching and learning; medical sociology; Marxist sociology; sociology of emotions; mathematical sociology; history of sociology; animals and society, etc.

Despite the existence of numerous female sociologists during the first years of the twentieth century, the ASS was overwhelmingly a male club. When women were invited to participate on the annual programs it was typically as discussants rather than as major presenters (albeit the programs organized by Edward A. Ross (1914 and 1915) and William I. Thomas (1927) were more inclusive of women). Men dominated governance of the ASS during its first 25 years. Women rarely reached the inner sanctum of the ASS Executive Committee. The few who did were Emily Green Balch (1913–14), Julia Lathrop (1917–18), Grace Abbott (1920–23), Susan M. Kingsbury (1922–25), Lucile Eaves (1924–26), and Ethel Stugess Dummer (1927–30). Foreshadowing the end of what Deegan (1991) called the “dark era of patriarchal ascendancy” in American sociology, extending from 1920 to 1965, Dorothy Swaine Thomas became in 1952 the first woman elected to the ASS presidency. Since 1969, members of Sociologists for Women in Society (SWS) have lobbied for wider participation by women in governing the ASA. Subsequent female ASA presidents include Mirra Komarovsky (1973), Alice S. Rossi (1983), Matilda White Riley (1986), Joan Huber (1989), Maureen T. Hallinan (1996), Jill Quadagno (1998), and Barbara F. Reskin (2002). As of 2001, women comprised approximately 52 percent of the ASA membership.

African American sociologists also experienced variable inclusion within the ASA membership and governance structures. For example, W. E. B. Du Bois, America’s most noted and prolific African American sociologist, neither attended ASA meetings nor held any ASA office. Indeed, Du Bois was professionally ostracized due to the ideological opposition of Robert E. Park, an ASA president (1925) and an influential faculty member of the sociology department in the University of

Chicago. Park favored perspectives advocated by Booker T. Washington and this made room for limited African American participation within organized sociology. Partly in consequence, E. Franklin Frazier, with a doctorate from the University of Chicago, became – in 1948 – the first African American ASA president. Nonetheless, Frazier later recounted instances of racial discrimination at ASS meetings. Little changed during subsequent years. In 1968 the Black Caucus, led by Tillman Cothran, was organized to confront the continuing marginalization of African Americans within the ASA. As of 2001, African Americans comprised approximately 6 percent of the ASA membership. Two additional African Americans have been elected to the ASA presidency: William Julius Wilson (1990) and Troy Duster (2005). Compounding sexism with racism, no African American woman has ever been elected to the ASA presidency (Deegan 2005).

When the ASS was first proposed in 1905, Edward A. Ross, then a professor at the University of Nebraska, endorsed the idea but also wrote: “As the *American Journal of Sociology* will no doubt publish the best part of the proceedings, I see no reason for our group doing any publishing.” By 1935, however, a disgruntled faction within the ASS chafed at the editorial control exercised over the *AJS* by the University of Chicago, as well as the Chicago department’s unbroken administrative lock on the ASS office of secretary treasurer. By a two to one vote at the annual business meeting in December 1935, the ASS membership established a new journal, the *American Sociological Review (ASR)* – and it remains an official ASA journal today. Of those supporting this change, Frank H. Hankins (of Smith College) was made the first editor of *ASR*, Henry P. Fairchild (of New York University) was elected ASS president, and Harold Phelps (a non-Chicagoan from Pittsburgh) was elected secretary of the Society. It was a clean sweep for the rebels (Lengermann 1979). Nonetheless, the strong Chicago influence within the ASA continued. For example, of the 25 ASA presidents elected from 1946 to 1969, fully 12 (48 percent) had earned their doctorates at Chicago. Harvard University, the only significant challenger to Chicago’s enduring

dominance, trained six (24 percent) ASA presidents during this period and seven other schools trained but one ASA president each (Kubat 1971: 582).

The 1935 “rebellion” against Chicago exemplifies numerous quarrels characterizing sociology generally and the ASA specifically, among them internal departmental conflicts between powerful professors (e.g., Talcott Parsons vs. Pitirim Sorokin at Harvard; Philip Hauser vs. Donald Bogue at Chicago); elite departments competing with each other (e.g., Chicago vs. Harvard vs. Columbia, *ad infinitum*); academics from large schools vs. small schools; so called “pure” scientists vs. “applied” researchers; large vs. small ASA sections; radicals vs. liberals vs. conservatives, etc. The fight over Pitirim Sorokin’s nomination and election to the ASA presidency (1965) is an illuminating case study of organizational turmoil (Johnston 1987). More recently, the 1976 ASA president, Alfred McClung Lee, fought heatedly with the ASA Council and subsequently decamped to form the Society for the Study of Social Problems (SSSP), a more openly liberal, action oriented sociological organization (and when Lee discerned that the SSSP had in his view become too much like the ASA, he again bolted to co found the Association for Humanist Sociology). It is a curious fact that the status, prestige, and power struggles among sociologists are so little studied by a discipline in which such matters are otherwise standard inquiries.

Over the long century since the founding of the ASA, countless former sociologists have been lured away by cognate disciplinary organizations. This silent disciplinary migration includes many who are now identified as social workers, criminologists, urban planners, geographers, anthropologists, demographers, rural sociologists, prison administrators, gerontologists, statisticians, economists, political scientists, high school and community college social science teachers, and the like, who have clubbed together in their own independent groups. As a result, the ASA is neither as intellectually robust nor as professionally diverse as it might otherwise be. For the most part, the ASA today is largely an organization by and for tenured academic sociologists at large universities and elite colleges, not to

mention a modicum of researchers and administrators employed by well endowed private foundations and large government agencies. The ASA’s professional services, programs, awards, annual meetings, special conferences, and publications directly reflect the needs and interests of this bureaucratically sophisticated, well educated, upper middle class constituency.

The ASA publishes several academic serials and currently requires subscription to at least one major ASA journal as a condition of ASA membership. These serials include *American Sociological Review*, *Contemporary Sociology* (a journal of book reviews), *American Sociologist*, *Journal of Health and Social Behavior*, *Social Psychology Quarterly*, *Sociology of Education*, *Teaching Sociology*, *Sociological Theory*, *Contexts*, *City and Community*, and *Sociological Methodology*. The association’s professional newsletter, *Footnotes* (begun in 1973), is distributed to all members. Additional publishing projects include the *Rose Series in Sociology* (formerly the *Rose Monograph Series*), an annual *Guide to Graduate Departments*, a bi annual *Directory of Departments*, a monthly *Employment Bulletin*, a bi annual *Directory of Members*, the *Final Program* for each yearly ASA meeting, and a variety of miscellaneous publications on special topics.

Day to day operations of the association are administered by the ASA Executive Officer, who is selected and hired by the ASA Council (the Council is itself elected by the ASA membership from a slate of candidates selected by an elected Committee on Nominations; write in candidacies are possible, but rare; and ASA membership is essentially open to anyone willing to pay the annual dues). The first full time ASA Executive Officer, Gresham Sykes, was hired in 1963 with offices in Washington, DC. From that point forward, the ASA executive office, as a formal bureaucratic organization in its own right – with the vested interests inherent in all such organizations – grew in size, complexity, and influence. Sally T. Hillsman, who became the ASA Executive Officer in 2002, is the ninth full time appointee to hold the position. As of 2005, the ASA executive office included some 25 paid staff members. With the rise of the executive office, the ASA President has

become much less responsible for ordinary bureaucratic tasks and typically concentrates his or her energies on chairing the Program Committee and presiding at Council meetings. As an ongoing bureaucratic entity, the ASA executive office frequently represents the collective face of American sociology to legislators, government agencies, courts of law, private industry, media, research foundations, other non profit associations, and to practicing sociologists and would be sociologists. For good or ill, the ASA executive office has itself become a consequential force in shaping and promoting the public image of disciplinary sociology in the US.

It must be noted that the structure and constraints of the ASA, as an organization, are not congruent with the particular needs and goals of all sociologists as sociologists. A variety of independent organizations serve special interests and agendas not met by the ASA and include, for example, the Society for the Study of Social Problems, Society for the Study of Symbolic Interaction, Association for Humanist Sociology, Rural Sociological Association, Association of Black Sociologists, Sociologists for Women in Society, Association for the Sociology of Religion (formerly the American Catholic Sociological Society), the Harriet Martineau Sociological Society, and the Clinical Sociology Association, among many others. These organizations, some larger than others but all smaller relative to the size of the ASA, collectively represent a significant number of dedicated sociologists. Further, whereas the ASA is national in scope, several regional and state sociology organizations provide meetings and professional outlets on a more local level. Many sociologists participate in both the ASA and one (sometimes more) of the smaller sociological organizations or regional societies. Some of these organizations work in tandem, alongside the ASA, some in splendid isolation, and yet others largely within the ASA.

The history, politics, and activities of the American Sociological Association are the subject of numerous short studies and scholarly articles (see Centennial Bibliography Project Committee 2005). Two in house histories have been sponsored by the ASA itself (Rhoades 1981; Rosich 2005), but no independent

comprehensive studies have yet appeared. A new archival depository for ASA records has been arranged at Pennsylvania State University, but few official records prior to 1950 are extant (save reports published in the *Papers and Proceedings of the American Sociological Society* and materials surviving in the personal papers of various ASS members and officers).

SEE ALSO: British Sociological Association; Chicago School; Cooley, Charles Horton; Du Bois, W. E. B.; Komarovskiy, Mirra; Park, Robert E. and Burgess, Ernest W.; Parsons, Talcott; Patriarchy; Small, Albion W.; Sorokin, Pitirim A.; Sumner, William Graham; Ward, Lester Frank

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analytic induction

Norman K. Denzin

Originally associated with the work of Florian Znaniecki (1934), analytic induction is an interpretive strategy that seeks universal explanations of the phenomenon in question. Analytic induction involves a process of generating and then testing hypotheses against each successive case or instance of the phenomenon. Its decisive feature "is the analysis of the exceptional or negative case, the case which is deviant to the working hypothesis" (Buhler-Niederberger 1985). Negative case analysis may be regarded as a "process of revising hypotheses with hindsight" (Lincoln & Guba 1985). Analytic induction directs the investigator to formulate processual generalizations that apply to all instances of the problem. This differentiates analytic induction from other forms of causal analysis, including the multivariate method where concern is directed to generalizations that apply, not to all instances of the phenomenon at hand, but rather to most or some of them.

DESCRIPTION OF ANALYTIC INDUCTION

Strategically, analytic induction represents an approximation of the experimental model to the extent that explicit comparisons are made with groups not exposed to the causal factors under analysis. Conceptually, this represents the classic "before-after" experimental design, and when employed in the field method it calls for the investigator to search for empirical

instances that negate the causal hypothesis. This general strategy, which combines the method of agreement and the method of difference, involves the following steps (see Robinson 1951; Buhler-Niederberger 1985; Schwandt 2001; Silverman 1993; Flick 2002):

- 1 A rough definition of the phenomenon to be explained is formulated.
- 2 A hypothetical explanation of that phenomenon is formulated.
- 3 One case is studied in light of the hypothesis, with the object of determining whether or not the hypothesis fits the facts in that case.
- 4 If the hypothesis does not fit the facts, either the hypothesis is reformulated or the phenomenon to be explained is redefined so that the case is excluded.
- 5 Practical certainty can be attained after a small number of cases have been examined, but the discovery of negative cases disproves the explanation and requires a reformulation.
- 6 This procedure of examining cases, redefining the phenomenon, and reformulating the hypotheses is continued until a universal relationship is established, each negative case calling for a redefinition or a reformulation.

Alfred Lindesmith's (1947, 1968) research on opiate addiction provides an illustration of this method. The focus of his investigation was the development of a sociological theory of opiate addiction. He began with the tentatively formulated hypothesis that individuals who did not know what drug they were receiving would not become addicted. Conversely, it was predicted that individuals would become addicted when they knew what they were taking, and had taken it long enough to experience distress (withdrawal symptoms) when they stopped. This hypothesis was destroyed when one of the first addicts interviewed, a doctor, stated that he had once received morphine for several weeks, was fully aware of the fact, but had not become addicted at that time. This negative case forced Lindesmith (1947: 8) to reformulate his initial hypothesis: "Persons become addicts

when they recognize or perceive the significance of withdrawal distress which they are experiencing, and that if they do not recognize withdrawal distress they do not become addicts regardless of any other consideration.”

This formulation proved to be much more powerful, but again negating evidence forced its revision. In this case persons were observed who had withdrawal experiences and understood withdrawal distress, but not in the most severe form; these persons did not use the drug to alleviate the distress and never became addicts. Lindesmith's (1947: 8) final causal hypothesis involved a shift on his part from “the recognition of withdrawal distress, to the use of the drug after the insight had occurred for the purpose of alleviating the distress.” The final hypothesis had the advantage of attributing the cause of addiction to no single event, but rather to a complex chain of events. All the evidence unequivocally supported this theory, and Lindesmith (1947: 165) concluded: “This theory furnished a simple but effective explanation, not only of the manner in which addiction becomes established, but also of the essential features of addiction behavior, those features which are found in addiction in all parts of the world, and which are common to all cases.”

ADVANTAGES OF ANALYTIC INDUCTION

Before reaching the conclusion that his theory explained all cases of opiate addiction, Lindesmith explicitly searched for negative cases that would force revision or rejection of the theory or the definitions of central concepts. Analytic induction provides a method by which old theories can be revised and incorporated into new theories as negative evidence is taken into account. The method, with its emphasis on the importance of the negative case, forces a close articulation between fact, observation, concept, proposition, and theory. It leads to developmental or processual theories, and these are superior to static formulations which assume that variables operate in either an intervening or an antecedent fashion on the processes under study.

Still, as Turner (1953) has suggested, analytic induction is too frequently employed in a definitional rather than a causal fashion. For example, predictions concerning who would take a drug and who would not, or under what conditions withdrawal symptoms would be severe or not severe, are not contained in Lindesmith's theory. Instead, it is a predictive system that explains the behavior of persons who have taken opiates.

The goal of seeking interpretations that apply to all instances of a phenomenon is admirable, as is the use of negative cases to reach that goal. As a strategy for interpreting qualitative materials, analytic induction has a great deal in common with grounded theory analysis and the constant comparison method (Glaser & Strauss 1967; Lincoln & Guba 1985; Silverman 1993; Schwandt 2001).

SEE ALSO: Emic/Etic; Experimental Design; Experimental Methods; Hypotheses; Methods; Negative Case Analysis; Znaniecki, Florian

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anarchism

Chamsy El Ojeili

Anarchism signifies the condition of being without rule. Anarchism, then, has often been equated with chaos. This interpretation was lent weight by the period of anarchist “propaganda by deed” towards the end of the nineteenth century. For most anarchists, though, their political allegiances involve opposition to the intrusiveness, destructiveness, and artificiality of state authority, the rejection of all forms of domination and hierarchy, and the desire to construct a social order based on free association. Anarchism is, however, a heterogeneous political field, containing a host of variations – for instance, organization versus spontaneity, peaceful transition versus violence, individualist versus collectivist means and ends, romanticism versus science, and existential versus structural critique of domination.

Although anarchism has been traced back, say, to millenarian sects of the Middle Ages, anarchism is properly a nineteenth century ideology and movement, and anarchists are perhaps best remembered through Marx’s encounters with Max Stirner, Pierre Joseph Proudhon, and Mikhail Bakunin. Nevertheless, anarchism and communism were not clearly distinguished as varieties of socialism until the period after the Second International. From this time onwards, Marxists equated anarchism with extreme individualism, with opposition to any form of organization or authority, and with mistakenly taking the state (instead of capital) as primary in understanding exploitation and domination.

The equation of anarchism with individual rebellion has some justification in the case of thinkers like Max Stirner and Emma Goldman, and certainly in the case of the “anarcho capitalism” of Murray Rothbard and Robert Nozick. However, prominent anarchist thinkers such as Mikhail Bakunin, Peter Kropotkin, Rudolph Rocker, and Alexander Berkman were collectivist and socialist in orientation, did not reject political organization, and were deeply critical of capitalism. If this draws anarchists nearer to Marxists, anarchists after Bakunin were wary of the

possibility of a new dictatorship by Marxist intellectuals, seeing Marxian politics as statist, centralist, and “top down,” against their own “bottom up” and decentralist conception of transitional struggle and post revolutionary social organization (say, a federation of communes).

In the twentieth century, anarchism provided the underpinnings of larger movements and rebellions – for instance, revolutionary syndicalism (the trade unions as revolutionary weapons and models of a future social order) in strongholds such as France, Spain, and Italy; and the collectivization of land and factories during the Spanish Civil War. MIT linguist and political activist Noam Chomsky is probably the best known contemporary representative of this strand of anarchist thought.

Between 1914 and 1938, anarchism as an ideology and a movement went into serious decline. However, it was widely viewed as at least implicit in the counter cultural opposition of the 1960s and 1970s. From this period, Murray Bookchin developed a sophisticated anarchist theory containing a social ecology perspective that emphasized diversity and locality; and, more recently, “primitivist” anarchists connected modernity’s obsessions with science and progress with the domination of human beings and nature and with the loss of authenticity and spontaneity. For some, poststructuralism has strong anarchist resonances – underscoring difference against totalizing and scientific Marxian theory and politics, decentralist, and attentive to the micro operations of power. Finally, the anti globalization movement is sometimes said to represent a “new anarchism,” opposing neoliberal capitalism and statism, decentralist and localist in its aims, and characterized by openness and by “horizontal” organizational tendencies.

SEE ALSO: Capitalism; Communism; Direct Action; Goldman, Emma; Nozick, Robert; Socialism; Utopia

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Anglo-conformity

Toni Michelle C. Travis

As a nation founded by European immigrants, the United States had to grapple with the concept of what it means to be an American. In seeking to become American, many immigrants adopted one model of assimilation, Anglo conformity. This model promoted subordination of immigrant cultural values and customs to American holidays, civic rituals, and the English language which was stressed by the public school system. Even in colonial times multiple cultures were evident, although the dominant culture was British with the values of speaking English, governing based on common law, and practicing Protestant Christian beliefs. The goal was to emulate the cultural traits of white Anglo Saxon Protestants (WASPS).

Theories held that the process of assimilation would follow one of two routes, Anglo conformity or blending into American society as part of the "melting pot." Both routes led to fast track assimilation and Americanization.

Anglo conformity was an underlying premise of the Immigration Act of 1924, which reinforced the primacy of European immigration. It established national quotas, which favored immigrants from Northwestern Europe. Asian immigrants, however, were excluded from the US beginning with the Chinese Exclusion Act of 1882, followed by the Act of 1924 that barred Japanese entry by denying them a quota. Two groups already present in American society were not part of this assimilation process. Both Native Americans and

African Americans were excluded. Native Americans were confined to reservations, while African Americans faced segregation.

Since the Immigration Act of 1965 the Anglo conformity model of assimilation has been challenged by the rise of ethnic consciousness. Immigrants in the post 1965 wave came primarily from Africa, Asia, and Latin America. These immigrants caused a reexamination of what it means to be American. Was the criterion for becoming American merely to speak English or to conform to an antiquated image of American equaling white, a synonym for European looking? The new immigrants, often referred to as people of color, con-founded the notion that all Americans looked like the earlier European immigrants.

Anglo conformity is now just one of many ways of being American. In a multicultural society a growing number of Americans may not speak English as their primary language and prefer to retain the cultural traditions of their ancestors. The formation of American identity continues to be an evolving process.

SEE ALSO: Acculturation; Assimilation; Eurocentrism; Melting Pot; Multiculturalism; Pluralism, American; Race and Ethnic Consciousness

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animal rights movements

Robert Garner

Concern for the rights of animals dates back to at least the nineteenth century, but the modern animal rights movement emerged in the 1970s, initially in Britain. It can be distinguished from a more moderate concern for animal welfare, both in terms of objectives and strategy. Reasons for the rise of the animal rights movement include factors such as affluence, changes in the occupational structure, and the influence of gender that are only indirectly related to the public's concern for animals and what is done to them. More specific explanatory variables include the intellectual ballast provided by academic philosophers, and the greater awareness of what is done to animals and the ways in which they can suffer.

The first national law designed to protect animals was carried in Britain in 1822. The legislation itself was very moderate but established the principle that animals can be directly harmed and that the law could be used in certain circumstances to reduce their suffering. Since then, animal welfare in Britain and elsewhere has become an important political issue and most areas of animal use are subject to a complex legislative and bureaucratic framework (Garner 1998).

For the animal rights movement, however, the law does not go far enough. This was particularly evident in the abolitionist demands of the anti vivisectionist organizations that emerged in the nineteenth century. However, concern for animals in general declined at the beginning of the twentieth

century and did not reemerge until the 1960s and 1970s in Britain, and a decade later in the US. The revitalization of the animal protection movement can be measured in terms of a marked increase in the number of groups existing and the membership of new and existing groups, growing income, and the existence of an increasingly attentive public prepared to donate to groups and support their objectives.

This revitalization of the animal protection movement was characterized by a greater radicalism as traditional animal welfarism was challenged by an emphasis on animal rights. In Britain, the anti vivisectionist organizations were reinvigorated and new national animal rights groups were created (e.g., Animal Aid and Compassion in World Farming). In the US there were two streams to the development of the animal rights movement. One centered on New York and Henry Spira's well documented campaigns against laboratory animal exploitation, while the other centered on the creation of People for the Ethical Treatment of Animals (PETA), now by far the largest animal rights organization in the US.

The animal rights movement can be distinguished from animal welfarism by its objectives and strategy. It is characterized by its abolitionist objectives. In practice, this means the end of raising and killing animals for food, their use as experimental subjects, and as sources of clothing and entertainment. Animal welfare proponents, by contrast, can be characterized by a belief in eliminating the unnecessary suffering of animals. By implication, of course, this assumes that some suffering – that which provides significant human benefits – is necessary.

This ideological difference has resulted in conflict, sometimes severe, between the welfare and rights wings of the animal protection movement, the arena for this conflict in Britain often being the Royal Society for the Prevention of Cruelty to Animals (RSPCA). The animal rights movement is also characterized by its willingness to engage in grassroots campaigning. While the older welfare groups (such as the RSPCA and the Fund for the Replacement of Animals in Medical Research) tend to be more elitist, relying on the expertise of their full time staff, animal rights

groups encourage and facilitate grassroots activism. What has emerged is a network of activists only loosely connected to the national groups who try to provide leadership and direction. For example, recent British animal rights campaigns against the export of live agricultural animals and the Huntingdon Life Sciences contract research laboratory have involved locally formed groups with little formal structure and hierarchy. In America, similarly, the new radical groups have encouraged individual activists to participate in mass campaigns and civil disobedience. This was the fundamental characteristic of the Spira inspired campaigns which launched the modern animal rights movement in the US.

Because of the characteristics noted above, the animal rights movement may be an example of a new social movement, distinguished from an old social movement by its decentralization, disorganization, rejection of the old political divisions based on capital and labor, and stress on wider cultural changes as opposed to merely seeking piecemeal legislative change. This is a pretty accurate description of the animal rights movement, if not the animal protection movement in general. It should be noted though that some of the above characteristics imputed to new social movements are not particularly new – witness some of the animal protection campaigns in the nineteenth century. Some scholars (e.g., Jordan & Maloney 1997) doubt its explanatory utility.

Animal rights grassroots activism is a reflection both of the urgency to right what are perceived to be appalling wrongs and the animal rights movement's lack of "insider" status with government. A moral imperative is also behind the pursuit of direct action by a small number of animal rights activists. Direct action was particularly associated with the Animal Liberation Front, formed in a number of countries from the 1970s onwards. More recently, animal rights militants have been organized in specific campaigns against animal research establishments, most notably Huntingdon Life Sciences in the UK. Assessing the validity of direct action depends principally, of course, upon the type of action undertaken. Most argue that civil disobedience, such as sit ins, is a valuable part of

democratic culture. At the other end of the spectrum, violence or threats of violence directed at those who use animals is deemed by most within the animal rights movement as unacceptable, whatever the moral imperative that causes it. Very few activists, it should be said, have undertaken this kind of terrorist activity.

There is a role for social scientists in seeking to explain the emergence of the modern animal rights movement over the past few decades, although there has been a general paucity of scholarly works by political scientists and sociologists on the animal rights movement. Two US based studies are Nelkin and Jasper's *The Animal Rights Crusade* (1992) and Finsen and Finsen's *The Animal Rights Movement in America* (1994).

Jasper and Poulsen (1995) have sought to utilize the animal rights movement as a case study of social movement recruitment, mobilization, and maintenance. One of their principal arguments is that people are recruited into the animal rights movement through moral shocks, often provided by the movement's own literature. Images of animal exploitation have influenced people to participate in animal rights activism. This, they argue, contrasts markedly with other new social movements (e.g., the anti nuclear movement) where activists tend to be recruited through preexisting networks.

Arguments employed to explain the emergence of the animal rights movement are general or specific. In the former category is the explanation associated with Inglehart (1977), which sees the possession of post material values as the reason behind a growth in concern for non material quality of life issues such as the well being of animals. Inglehart explains the growth of post material values in terms of post war affluence. Certainly, this approach would seem to have considerable explanatory power as far as the animal protection movement is concerned, not least seeming to account for its historically uneven development – buoyant in times of prosperity, less so in times of economic depression.

Inglehart's explanation is not entirely convincing or, at least, comprehensive enough to account for the rise of the animal rights movement. In the first place, surveys suggest that

animal rights activists do not tend to be the most affluent members of society. Rather, given the preponderance in the animal rights movement of those in the non productive service sector – teachers, doctors, and so on – it may be, as Cotgrove and Duff (1980) have suggested, that the most important explanatory variable is occupation rather than affluence. Alternatively, a key explanatory variable could be gender, given that a preponderance of animal rights activists are women. Here, it might be argued that the culturally defined role of women, with its emphasis on nurturing and caring, and the greater consciousness women have of their political status, has led many to lend their weight to a cause with which they can identify (Donovan & Adams 1996).

Other explanations provide room for the independent explanatory validity of people's genuine concern for animals and what is done to them, as opposed to being byproducts of affluence, occupation, or gender. Surely of some importance, for instance, is the development of a radical philosophy for animals, which has given the movement academic respectability and has aided the recruitment of articulate people from academe and other professions.

The emergence and development of the animal rights movement have been accompanied and encouraged, then, by the work of academic philosophers and, more recently, by legal scholars. Especially important influences on the animal rights movement have been *Animal Liberation* (1975), written by the Australian philosopher Peter Singer, and *The Case for Animal Rights* (1984), by the American philosopher Tom Regan. Somewhat ironically, since he has been feted for providing the Bible of the animal rights movement, Singer is in fact a utilitarian thinker, eschewing the notion of rights, and has been criticized by Regan and others for failing to provide a cast iron basis for the abolition of animal exploitation. More recently, a second generation of animal ethicists – including Pluhar (1995), DeGrazia (1996), and Rowlands (1998) – has emerged, providing important contributions to the academic debate, although less influential in the development of the animal rights movement. Equally important has been the contribution

of legal scholars, principally Francione (1995) and Wise (2000), who have suggested that the objectives of the animal rights movement can not be achieved while animals remain, in law, as the property of humans.

Of course, ideas by themselves do not have an impact without a receptive social climate. This is where cultural, occupational, and gender explanations come in. Another factor is that far more now is known about the capabilities of animals. This has the effect of making the radical philosophical arguments more convincing. This greater knowledge goes beyond a simple recognition that animals can feel pain. The fact that at least some species have been shown to have considerable cognitive ability makes it much harder to justify many of the ways in which humans exploit animals.

Knowledge of animal capabilities leads in turn to a greater recognition that they are more like us than we had previously thought. The decline of theological separatism and the influence of Darwin's theory of evolution are crucial here (Rachels 1990). Moreover, that the public are now much more aware of both the capabilities of animals and what is actually done to them is primarily a product of the greater coverage of animal issues in the media. This is also partly a product of the movement's efforts to get the issues onto the political agenda.

SEE ALSO: Anthrozoology; Direct Action; Environmental Movements; Gender Oppression; Human–Non Human Interaction; Moral Shocks and Self Recruitment; New Social Movement Theory; Popular Culture Forms (Zoos); Social Movements

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animism

Gaetano Riccardo

Already used by Stahl in 1707 in his work *Theoria medica vera (True Medical Theory)* to denote, in the medical field, the theory that identifies the soul with the life principle, in anthropology animism refers to Tylor's concept of religion, which he expounded in *Primitive Culture* (1871). In anthropology the term animism has also been used not to indicate a theory of religion but, more usually, the beliefs concerning the existence of many spiritual beings. Finally, in psychology, animism is conceived by Piaget as a typical concept of the world corresponding to a precise step in children's cognitive development.

To remain in the anthropological realm, Tylor's opinion was that the idea of soul would have been the starting point for more complex religious beliefs. Animism would have arisen from reflection upon universal

experiences such as dreams and death. In particular, the fact that people remain motionless while dreams provide the sensation of acting, moving, and interacting with others, including the dead, would have suggested to primitive people the existence of something surviving death, a kind of "double" able to abandon the human body. This is exactly what happens when people sleep. There is a feeling of temporarily leaving the body, only to return to it later. This element is precisely the soul or vital force, which in time came to be regarded as belonging not only to human beings but also to inanimate objects and animals. Thus primitive humans in their dreams would have imagined that life does not stop with physical death but continues. This would have suggested the idea of the existence of a parallel world beyond the material one.

If these souls are at first conceived as being attached to material things, the idea that some of them, the spirits, are totally immaterial leads them into what will become for humans the religious sphere. At this stage it is possible to verify a progressive hierarchization and differentiation of such spiritual beings, on the basis of ways that, starting from animism, reach polytheism and finally monotheism. This is to give a purely intellectual explanation for religious beliefs. Religion would be a kind of primitive philosophy. From this point of view, Tylor's animism is not very different from other theories aiming to find the kind of belief underlying more sophisticated religious forms. Other authors identified it with fetishism (Comte), magic (Frazer), or totemism (Durkheim).

The fact that Tylor's view, in contrast with other theories, was built on reflections on universal and immediate experiences, like dreams and death, could explain its great success during an age in which evolutionistic images of cultural facts were fashionable. Most of these theories aimed to discover the most archaic form of religion. The opposing arguments put forward by others referred not only to this approach, but also to the choice of one or another belief as representative of the most archaic form of religion. The various theories were more similar than different and the arguments against them always followed the same course. So, in the case of animism too, one of

the first arguments against it consisted in stressing that it was not universal. It was noted that many cultures had no word equivalent to the western idea of the soul. Studies of other peoples showed that the notion of the soul presupposed other even simpler notions. So what Tylor considered original was derived.

One of the first authors to stress this kind of argument against animism was Marett (1909), who spoke of pre animism. His reflections were based on studies of the Melanesians conducted by Codrington (1891) regarding the notion of *mana*, an impersonal power contained in all things. Among the other arguments against animistic theory, a very special place is occupied by that formulated by Durkheim in *Les Formes élémentaires de la vie religieuse* (1912). He showed that many of Tylor's statements were based on presuppositions whose attribution to the primitive peoples was scarcely probable. But Durkheim also stresses the merits of Tylorian theory, such as that of submitting the soul notion to a historical analysis. With Tylor the notion of the soul ceased to be an immediate datum of the conscience, as it was in most philosophical arguments, becoming rather a subject investigated as a product of mythology and history.

In spite of this progress in the debate, Durkheim stressed how it was anti historical to assign to primitive peoples the idea of soul as something completely separate from the body, as is the case with the idea of the double. It was also scarcely probable for Durkheim that the notion of soul as double was originated by the experience of dreams, which would have suggested to primitive people the idea of the existence of a self parallel to the self dwelling in the body. Stressing the relation that often exists between dreams and actual experiences, Durkheim emphasizes that certain oneiric images are only possible on the condition of presupposing the existence of religious thought, and they cannot be conceived as a cause. Above all, echoing a remark made by Jevons (1896), Durkheim stresses how the belief in the double does not automatically imply the belief in its being sacral, destined to worship. Finally, to explain religion as starting from the experience of dreams would be, notes Durkheim, to trace it to a hallucinatory and not a real element. But it

is not evident why this hallucinatory element, and not a real one, connected with life in society, would be at the basis of the various religious systems.

Although Durkheim shares with Tylor the concern to find the most archaic form of religion, his consistent critique of animism yet implies the kind of reflections that, developed afterwards by functionalism, will eventually diminish the interest in every debate aiming to trace the presumed original form taken by religion, leading scholars' reflections to more properly sociological and pragmatic problems.

SEE ALSO: Anthropology, Cultural and Social; Comte, Auguste; Durkheim, Émile; Early History; Fetishism; Magic; Popular Religiosity; Religion; Sacred; Totemism

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Annales School

John R. Hall

The group of interdisciplinary historians that emerged in France in the first quarter of the twentieth century became known as a school named for the journal that Marc Bloch and Lucien Febvre started in 1929 – *Annales de l'histoire économique et sociale*, now called *Annales: Histoire, Sciences Sociales*. Annales historians have been eclectic in their methods

and topics. Their shared perspective (1) subordinates traditional narrative history centered on political, military, and religious elites (e.g., the “scientific history” of the nineteenth century German Leopold von Ranke) and (2) embraces wide ranging sources of data and social science methodologies and theories. The diverse results of their scholarship are a testament to the power of colleagues, mentors, and students encouraging one another in manifold interdisciplinary inquiries, even on topics sometimes alien to their own.

Scholars like Tocqueville, Marx, and Weber already had eclipsed Ranke with broader sociological visions of history. But the Annales School consolidated that tendency for history proper with their journal and their informal collegial network centered in the *École Pratique des Hautes Études*, which gained stronger institutionalization in the Boulevard Raspail’s *Maison des sciences de l’homme* – the Paris building finished in 1970 that houses a complex of research centers and institutes. Peter Burke describes three generations of the Annales: the founding one initiated by Bloch and Febvre; the generation led by Fernand Braudel; and a third generation, many of them appointed by Braudel when he took up leadership of the *VI^{ème} section* upon Febvre’s death in 1956, and later served as the first director of the *Maison des sciences de l’homme*.

The founding scholars wrote imposing studies that challenged core assumptions about the subject matter of history. Marc Bloch ranged widely, writing about a persisting superstition – the king’s supposed ability to heal by touch – and exploring feudalism, a social institution that endured for centuries. Similarly, Lucien Febvre studied topics from biography to geography. The classic Annales exemplar remains Fernand Braudel’s *The Mediterranean and the Mediterranean World in the Age of Philip II*, written in notebooks while he was a prisoner of war in Germany, and published in French in 1949. The book maps the Mediterranean region by its environmental and human ecology and enduring social formations, offering a conventional narrative history of Philip only at the end. In the 1960s, Braudel theorized three temporal “levels”: ecological history (*la longue durée*), institutional history, and the history of events.

To address the connection between levels, he invoked an orchestral metaphor: Multiple historical temporalities, he argued, compose a grand symphony of History to be charted on the grid of objective time (Hall 1989).

The Annales is better understood as a school than as a paradigm because it connects radically different approaches, e.g., geography, economics, sociology, and social and cultural anthropology. Despite the systemic features of Braudel’s model, Annales scholars avoid the term “system.” As Georg Iggers (1997: 53–5) observes, they have borrowed from French structuralism, specifically from Émile Durkheim and more broadly from anthropological and linguistic structuralisms. To be sure, theirs is a *historicist* structuralism that views structures as enduring arrangements *in* history. Ironically, though, an affinity with Ranke is thereby retained. Like Ranke, Annales scholars largely embrace the historicist view that shuns any formal theoretical “laws” of development or social process. They differ from Ranke more in scope than methodological assumptions. Thus, Fernand Braudel’s model incorporates a diverse range of social, institutional, and ecological events within a multi-scale yet realist framework of linear time. Like Braudel’s, much other work within the Annales tradition has been averse to any strong use of theory.

Nevertheless, the sociological character of Annales studies would be hard to miss in structural histories like Georges Duby’s investigation of medieval European rural economy. With achievements such as this, the Annales School became unrivaled in the detailed, almost archeological, delineation of social forms and practices. Yet the Annales program for correcting preoccupations with the history of events succeeded perhaps too well (Iggers 1997: 56). What Jack Hexter once suggested for Braudel’s *The Mediterranean* is more widely salient: Annales structural analyses tend to remain disconnected from interplay with the concrete lives of human beings. Cultural structures are dissociated from life.

From the 1960s onward, Annales scholars participated in an international (and increasingly poststructuralist) dialogue that shifted the agenda of cultural history in relation to social history, history “from below,” Foucault’s

archeology, and what Italian historians called *microhistoria*. They produced a rich vein of studies such as Le Roy Ladurie's fascinating cultural inventory of local Pyrenees village life in the late thirteenth and early fourteenth centuries – *Montaillou: The Promised Land of Error* (1979), and Roger Chartier's history of reading. However, cultural history was hardly new to the Annales. Marc Bloch published his study of the "royal touch" in the early 1930s, and Febvre's 1942 study of religious thought artfully turned the question of whether Rabelais was an atheist into a study of *mentalités* – about what collective meaning unbelief would hold in sixteenth century Europe.

The Annales School gained prominence in historical sociology in the 1970s when Immanuel Wallerstein invoked Braudel's *The Mediterranean* in formulating his world system theory. More widely, along with other exemplars, the Annales School inspired the emerging post 1960s generation of historical sociologists to embrace diverse new practices and topics. The Annales School is best known for the studies of its participants. However, the challenge it poses for historical sociology and for sociology more generally concerns how to conduct social *science* under (historicist) conditions in a world where enduring traditions and practices, and durable social institutions and structures of life, frame both everyday and "historic" events.

SEE ALSO: Braudel, Fernand; Historical and Comparative Methods; Marx, Karl; Weber, Max

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anomie

Mathieu Deflem

Anomie refers to the lack or ineffectiveness of normative regulation in society. The concept was first introduced in sociology by Émile Durkheim (1893) in his study on the social dimensions of the division of labor. Contrary to Marx, Durkheim argued that the division of labor is not problematic as long as it is sufficiently regulated. However, under exceptional circumstances, Durkheim maintained, the division of labor will take on an anomic form, either because there is a lack of regulation or because the level of regulation does not match the degree of development of the division of labor. Durkheim saw such anomic forms present during periods of industrial crises, in the conflict between labor and capital, and in the lack of unity and excessive degree of specialization in the sciences.

In his famous study on suicide, Durkheim (1897) extended the anomie perspective when, next to altruistic and egoistic suicide, he identified the anomic type of suicide. Durkheim argued that anomic suicide takes place when normative regulations are absent, such as in the world of trade and industry (chronic anomie), or when abrupt transitions in society lead to a loss in the effectiveness of norms to regulate behavior (acute anomie). The latter type explains the high suicide rate during fiscal crises and among divorced men.

Durkheim's anomie concept was not widely influential in sociology until it was adopted and expanded in Robert K. Merton's (1938, 1968) theory of deviant behavior and opportunity structures. Differentiating between society's culturally accepted goals and its institutionalized means to reach those goals, Merton argues that a state of anomie occurs

as a result of the unusually strong emphasis in US society on the cultural goals (individual success) without a corresponding emphasis on the legitimate norms (education, work). Anomie refers to the resulting demoralization or deinstitutionalization of a society's legitimate means, leading people in some social categories, depending on their socioeconomic conditions, to be more likely to adopt illegitimate and often illegal means to reach culturally approved goals.

Based on Merton's work, anomie became among the most discussed and applied concepts in American sociology during the 1950s and 1960s. Working broadly within the structural functionalist framework, various theoretical extensions and reformulations were introduced and applied in empirical research. Theoretically, anomie was perceived among non Marxists as a useful alternative to alienation. In matters of empirical research, an important development was the introduction of the concept of anomia. First introduced by Leo Srole (1956), anomia refers to the social psychological mental states of individuals who are confronted with social conditions of anomie. Throughout the 1960s, the concept of anomia was widely adopted in empirical research, in part because it was easily measurable on the basis of the anomia scale Srole had introduced. At the same time, applications of Merton's anomie theory were also popular, especially in the area of crime and deviance. Caught between the polarization of micro and macro perspectives, the relation between anomia and anomie at a theoretical level has never been adequately addressed.

During the 1970s and early 1980s there was a general decrease in the popularity of structural functionalism, and the concept of anomie was much less applied and discussed. Since the late 1980s, however, there has been a revival of the sociological use of the anomie concept in at least two areas of inquiry. First, Merton's perspective of anomie and social structure is now widely recognized as one of the most influential contributions in criminological sociology (Adler & Laufer 1995; Passas & Agnew 1997). Along with Merton's various theoretical reformulations since 1938 and its extensions by others, the theoretical approach has now been broadened as comprising an

anomie theory as well as a strain theory (Featherstone & Deflem 2003). Whereas Merton initially presented the two theoretical components as inextricably linked, that perspective is generally no longer accepted. Anomie refers to a state of social organization, whereas strain is a mechanism that induces deviant behavior. Strain can only occur under conditions of anomie, but the social condition of anomie can be accompanied by a variety of mechanisms that lead to deviance. In contemporary criminological sociology, strain theory is much more influential than anomie theory.

Second, less widespread but no less significant is the recent adoption of the anomie concept in research on societies undergoing rapid social and economic change. This perspective particularly grew out of sociological efforts to account for the drastic changes that have been taking place in many Eastern European countries since the collapse of communism. This notion of anomie largely relies on the work of Durkheim, who introduced the concept a century before to denote similar events of transition and upheaval. It remains to be seen if and how this renewed concept of anomie will integrate with the related literature on globalization and inequality that is traditionally rather hostile toward Durkheimian and functional structuralist theories. Perhaps a new integrated perspective can emerge that will transcend the prior dichotomies between anomie and rival concepts such as alienation.

SEE ALSO: Alienation; Durkheim, Émile; Merton, Robert K.; Norms; Strain Theories; Structural Functional Theory

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ANOVA (analysis of variance)

Paul T. Munroe and Neil J. Salkind

Analysis of variance (or ANOVA) is a statistical technique that tests the difference between more than two sample means. It is one of the simpler of the techniques that fall within the larger category "general linear model."

In the basic case, a sample is divided into groups based on their values on one independent variable, usually a discrete variable with a relatively small number of categories. Within each group, the means for a second variable, the dependent variable, are calculated. The difference in the means for the different groups is calculated and is then compared to the variation of the individual cases within each group around that group's mean. The larger the difference in the means (relative to the variation around each mean), the more likely it is that the means are significantly different – that is, the less likely that one would make a Type I (alpha) error by saying that the groups have different means in the population from which the sample is drawn.

To calculate ANOVA, an F test is performed. The F statistic comprises the ratio of the variance between groups and the variance within groups as follows:

$$F = \frac{\text{Variance Between Groups}}{\text{Variance Within Groups}}$$

When the source of variance between groups (reflecting the strength of the treatment) is larger than the source of the variance within groups (reflecting individual variability), then the F value increases and approaches statistical significance. If both sources of variance are equal, the resulting F value is equal to 1, which one would expect by chance.

The manual computation of F is too detailed for this presentation, but below is the output from a simple one way analysis of variance computed using the Data Toolpak from Excel.

SUMMARY

<i>Groups</i>	<i>Average</i>
Column 1	4.67
Column 2	3.24
Column 3	6.43

ANOVA

<i>Source of variation</i>	<i>SS</i>	<i>df</i>	<i>MS</i>	<i>F</i>	<i>F crit</i>
Between groups	107.27	2	53.63	43.71	3.15
Within groups	73.62	60	1.23		
Total	180.89	62			

The above output shows: the average for each of the three groups or levels of the one independent variable source of variance (between and within groups); Sums of Squares (SS) and Mean Squares (MS), both variance estimates and the degrees of freedom (df); F value, which is a ratio, as stated earlier; and critical F value or that needed for significance.

In this example, the F value is greater than the critical value (that would be expected by chance alone) and the difference between the three groups is statistically significant. Since the F test is a robust test (an overall test of the significance between three means), follow up tests (often called post hoc comparison) need to be conducted to learn where this difference lies. These tests compare all combinations of means.

As with all general linear model techniques, there are some assumptions that must be met before one can make reliable inferences about the population based on the sample. The most

important of these assumptions is random sampling. It is assumed that the sample was drawn randomly from the population. It is also assumed that the distribution of the dependent variable is not skewed in either direction around the mean(s), but is normally distributed.

More complicated techniques have been developed based on the reasoning of analysis of variance, including multivariate ANOVA (MANOVA), which allows one to test simultaneously for the effects of two or more discrete variables, and possible interaction effects among these variables, on the dependent variable; ANCOVA (analysis of covariance), which allows for simultaneously testing the effects of one or more categorical and one or more continuous variables on a continuous dependent variable; and repeated measures ANOVA, which allows one to look for differences in means when individuals can be in two groups at the same time, for example the changes in means for the same people over time.

SEE ALSO: General Linear Model; Quantitative Methods; Statistics

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anthropology, cultural and social: early history

Bernd Weiler

The traditional subject matter of anthropology (from the Greek *anthropos*, human being, and *log*, study of) has been the study of

non western, “exotic,” and “nonliterate” peoples. As in other social sciences and humanities, the beginnings of western anthropology go back to Greco Roman antiquity. It was in the wake of the Greek colonization of the Mediterranean world, commencing around 750 BCE, that questions arose regarding the history, the inhabitants, and the fauna and flora of the newly discovered lands. This intellectual interest reached its first peak in the works of Hecataeus of Miletus (ca. 550–490 BCE) and Herodotus of Halicarnassus (ca. 480–425 BCE), often considered the “fathers” of western ethnography, and eventually led to a well developed body of doctrines that constitutes the classical heritage of anthropology (Müller 1980; Lovejoy & Boas 1997).

As in antiquity, the rise of anthropological thinking in early modern times was intimately linked to the expansion of European powers, beginning with the Portuguese expeditions to West Africa in the mid fifteenth century, followed by the epochal “discovery” of the “New World” in 1492, and continuing with the voyages of the sixteenth century. The exploration and conquest of the Americas instigated numerous debates regarding the historical origin, the legal and theological status, the cultural achievements, and the psychobiological and “racial” makeup of its indigenous population. Because of its biblical implications the rivalry between monogenesis and polygenesis, a rivalry that may be viewed as a special variant of the “grand” controversy between universalism and relativism, assumed particular importance. Early modern comparative ethnological analyses are thus said to have emerged in the course of the sixteenth century, represented by thinkers such as de Vitoria, Las Casas, and de Acosta (Pagden 1999). Antedating, but apparently only loosely connected with, these developments were the famous accounts of inland travelers to Asia (e.g., Rubruck, Polo), as well as the insightful ethnological works of medieval Islamic scholars of the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries (e.g., Ibn Batuta, Ibn Khaldun).

In the sixteenth and early seventeenth centuries knowledge about the “other” – it might suffice to point to Montaigne and Campanella – was also increasingly employed in a strategic manner to support moral skepticism, to

criticize the values of one's own culture, and to foster utopian visions: a normative use of anthropological "facts" that has continued to the very present. Apart from utopian thought and cultural criticism, anthropological considerations were also central to the development of political philosophy and international law (e.g., Grotius, Hobbes), especially for theories concerning the state of nature and natural rights.

As in other intellectual fields, anthropological thinking flourished in the Age of Enlightenment. The worldwide expansion of trade, the activity of scientific minded missionaries (e.g., de Laitau), and the famous naval explorations (e.g., de Bougainville, Cook) contributed to a wealth of new ethnographic material that stimulated comprehensive comparative social analyses (e.g., Montesquieu). Though degenerationist and "primitivist" ideas figured prominently in various social theories and fictional accounts, by and large the anthropological discourse of the Enlightenment was embedded in a progressivist framework. By combining the belief in the universality of reason and in the "psychic unity of mankind" with the idea of perfectibility and of the orderliness of the world, the contemporary "savage" was conceptualized as a distant ancestor and representative of prehistoric times. "In the beginning," so John Locke claimed in his *Two Treatises of Government* (1690), "all the world was America." As cultural differences were interpreted as temporal differences, many eminent Enlightenment thinkers, such as Turgot, Millar, and Smith, tried to reconstruct the successive stages of humanity (e.g., hunting and gathering, pastoralism, agriculture, industry) and to rank the various peoples on this universal ladder of development (Meek 1976). A thorough critique of this progressivist orientation can be found in the so called Counter Enlightenment, for example in Herder's early historicist pamphlet *Another Philosophy of History* (1774), and in the Romantic movement. Partly in opposition to the claim that the rest of the world was lagging behind the *grand nation*, Herder argued that every nation had its "center of happiness within itself." Though still adhering to the doctrine of "human brotherhood," Herder rejected the

temporal interpretation of differences by emphasizing the plurality, relativity, and incommensurability of cultures, thus paving the way for the famous opposition of *Kultur* and *Zivilisation*.

The second half of the nineteenth century saw the founding of a number of important anthropological journals, professional organizations, international conferences, and ethnographic museums and may thus be regarded as the period when anthropology emerged as an autonomous academic discipline. Preceded by the widening of the temporal horizon through the science of geology, modern anthropology built upon and united four lines of research which had developed in the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries: namely, the field of comparative philology and linguistics (e.g., Jones, von Humboldt, Schlegel, Bopp), the anatomical study of human "races" (e.g., Linnaeus, Blumenbach), prehistoric archeology (e.g., Thomsen), and the ethnographic accounts of missionaries, travelers, and explorers. The prime concern of the anthropologists of this period, often referred to as "armchair anthropologists" because they drew upon material collected by others, was to describe and explain the social evolution of humanity and its various institutions such as marriage, law, and warfare from the "origins" to the present or at least to the times covered by ancient historians. These endeavors rested upon the assumption that social phenomena, like natural ones, were governed by uniform laws, and that within the natural and the social world one could witness a steady growth from, as Spencer famously put it, "incoherent homogeneity" to "coherent heterogeneity." That the social evolution from the "savage" to the "civilized" also implied a "moral uplift" was a truth held to be self evident by the majority of thinkers. Important works written at the beginning of this period and generally discussed under the heading of "social evolutionism" include Maine's *Ancient Law* (1861), Bachofen's *Das Mutterrecht Primitive Marriage* (1865), Lubbock's *The Origin of Civilisation and the Primitive Condition of Man* (1870), Tylor's *Primitive Culture* (1871), and Morgan's *Ancient Society* (1877). One of the last and maybe the best known work of "classical" social evolutionism was the voluminous *The Golden Bough* (1890–1936) by Frazer.

From an ideological viewpoint social evolutionist ideas often emphasized the need to elevate the “savage” from his or her miserable condition and were hence employed to justify imperialist endeavors, colonial policies, and a variety of allegedly “civilizational missions.”

At the end of the nineteenth and the beginning of the twentieth centuries anthropology experienced an “anti evolutionist” turn. Arguing that cultures could not be viewed as self contained entities in which a more or less invariant series of “independent inventions” took place and which developed according to *one* grand scheme, Boas and his school of cultural anthropology in North America (e.g., Kroeber, Lowie, Spier, Goldenweiser) emphasized the actual historical relationships and the diffusion between “primitive” cultures. These relationships that constantly crisscrossed the allegedly conjectural history of social evolutionism should be studied by tracing the distribution of traits in well circumscribed geographical territories, the so called culture areas, an idea that owes much to Ratzel’s anthropogeographical work. By rejecting social evolutionism as well as ideas of innate “racial” differences and by asserting that different histories accounted for cultural differences, Boas and his school, often subsumed under the heading “historical particularism,” contributed decisively to the contemporary relativistic and pluralistic concept of culture (Stocking 1982). At the same time, Boas stressed the need for prolonged fieldwork to gather sufficient and reliable data as well as to understand the “native’s point of view.” Diffusionist ideas were also at the heart of the German *Kulturkreislehre* or “Culture Circle Theory” (e.g., Graebner, Ankermann, Frobenius), the Viennese School of Ethnology (e.g., Schmidt, Koppers), and, though with a rather speculative bent, of the works of Rivers, Smith, and Perry in Britain.

Around 1900 the French sociologist Émile Durkheim had become increasingly interested in the study of “primitive” societies in order to better understand the fundamental nature of social cohesiveness or solidarity. Though they were innovative theorists, Durkheim himself and his early students (e.g., Mauss, Hertz) contributed little to ethnographic fieldwork. By shifting the focus, however, from the historical

reconstruction to the study of the functional interrelations that existed between society’s institutions and belief systems at a given time, the Durkheimian school anticipated the “synchronic and nomothetic revolution” in anthropology. In Britain this new orientation is intimately linked to the work of Malinowski and Radcliffe Brown, the “fathers” of British social anthropology and the most influential theorists of functionalism from the 1920s to the early 1950s. Among their most famous students, some of whom later diverted from their ideas, are Firth, Evans Pritchard, Fortes, Nadel, Gluckman, Schapera, Mair, and Richards. Whereas Malinowski, whose ethnography on the Trobriand Islanders is often regarded as the archetypal fieldwork, argued that culture essentially functioned as a response to individual basic needs, Radcliffe Brown was interested in the contribution of a recurrent activity or institution to the structural continuity of the society as a whole. In Germany, Thurnwald is commonly considered the main functionalist theorist of the interwar period. A trend toward a synchronic anthropological orientation, frequently fused with ideas from *Gestalt* psychology and Freudian ideas, is also noticeable among some of Boas’s students in the 1920s and 1930s, most famously in Benedict’s *Patterns of Culture* (1934). In contrast to the British functionalists, however, the North American so called “culture and personality” researchers, which, apart from Benedict, include Sapir, Kardiner, Linton, and Mead, adhered to an idiographic orientation by arguing that each culture was characterized by a unique configuration or pattern.

SEE ALSO: Biosociological Theories; Boas, Franz; Colonialism (Neocolonialism); Cultural Relativism; Culture; Durkheim, Émile; Ethnocentrism; Feminist Anthropology; Indigenous Peoples; Malinowski, Bronislaw K.; Mead, Margaret; Progress, Idea of; Radcliffe Brown, Alfred R.

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anthrozoology

Adrian Franklin

Anthrozoology is the study of human–animal relations. The field of human–animal relations is fast becoming one of the hot areas of debate

in the social sciences and is beginning to forge the sort of attention once held only by “the environment.” A mere glance at the recent literature shows that this new area is advancing on several fronts. These include, for example, the philosophy and sociology of animal rights; genetically modified animals and “laboratory life”; histories of human–animal relations; animal foods, diets, and risk; animals, nature, and gender; consumptive relations in hunting and fishing sports; pets (or companion species) and health; companion animals, domestication, and human co evolution and animals and human representation.

It is a relatively young interdisciplinary field dating back to the 1980s, and particularly to the founding of two dedicated anthrozoological journals, *Anthrozoos* (est. 1987) and *Society and Animals* (est. 1993). It draws on a very wide range of disciplines (including anthropology, sociology, geography, veterinary medicine, history, ethology, art and literature, cultural studies, human medicine, psychology, and human medicine) and anthrozoological writing is itself characterized by multidisciplinary or drawing on more than one discipline.

It originated in two separate but now overlapping sources. Its first wave derived from the groundswell of interest in animal rights and welfare which itself belongs to the broader series of postmaterialism and the extension of rights. The possibility of animals rights focused attention on how little we knew about our relations with animals. These important relationships were never studied before because they fell between the scientific study of the animal and the social scientific study of human relationships. The new debates were driven by extremely powerful, influential, and wealthy international organizations such as People for the Ethical Treatment of Animals, the World Wildlife Fund, the International Fund for Animal Welfare, and Greenpeace. While much of the ferment was new, it was long in the making and includes contributions from such diverse origins as Henry Salt and the formation of the Vegetarian Society in the 1890s, Walt Disney’s persistent pro animal works in film and television in the twentieth century, and Peter Singer’s hugely influential book, *Animal Liberation*,

of 1975. Although the changing nature of human–animal relations resulting from the animal rights movement is one of the leading dimensions to anthrozoology, the possibility of perfect consistency in the realm of human–animal relations is less likely than differentiations. Social anthropology teaches that humans have always used animals to shape human differentiation and that is no different today. That is, for any one culture, the “animal world” is never seen as one indivisible category but as a historically constituted, contingent, and morally loaded field of meanings that derive from the human habit of extending/imposing social logics, complexities, and conflicts onto the natural world and particularly onto animals other than ourselves. In modern nation states the possibilities for differentiations in meaning and practice in human–animal relations are multiplied by the social differentiations that stem from class, ethnicity, region, gender, and religion (amongst others). A sociology of human–animal relations also includes how animals are/have been appropriated socially into a range of modern human projects: the use of animals in establishing and manipulating national identity, politics, and citizenship; the use of animal categories as signifiers of taste, belonging, and distinction and the use made of animals and categories of animals in framing moral and ethical debates (e.g., in popular television documentaries and children’s books).

A second strand to anthrozoology, and certainly a key theoretical inspiration, stems from one of sociology’s leading subdisciplines, science and technology studies (STS). In the past 25 years the writers who cluster under this heading have consistently refused to continue *humanist* sociological investigations that assume humans and human society can be isolated and studied independently from non humans. While this *posthumanism* asserts the importance of the agency of all non humans, and this includes machines, texts, technologies, and objects of all kinds, it has of course considerably changed the ontological status of animals and encouraged studies that investigate the potency of their interaction with humans (see Haraway 1989, 1991). There are landmark studies of humans and microbes (Latour 1988), humans and scallops (Callon

1986), and humans and laboratory mice and dogs (Haraway 1991, 2003). This has raised the field of anthrozoology to new levels of ontological debate, and in addition to theorizations of change in human–animal relations (Franklin 1999) there is now investigation into the very nature of the relation between them: Baker (2000) and Lippit (2000), for example, discuss the implications of Deleuze and Guattari’s concept *becoming animal* for contemporary art, literature, and relations with the animal other.

In a related way, geographers and sociologists of the city have begun to describe urban spaces as neither human nor animal but both. From the writings of Mike Davis on Los Angeles (especially *Ecology of Fear*) to new animal geographies of the city (Sabloff’s work on Toronto; see Sabloff 2001), we are beginning to appreciate the extent to which we are entangled with animals on an everyday basis and the fact that this entanglement matters.

The scope for anthrozoology is thus established by the increasingly contentious and conflictual nature of human–animal relations across a number of sites in the twenty first century and ontological debates within sociology itself.

SEE ALSO: Actor Network Theory; Actor Network Theory, Actants; Animal Rights Movements; Human–Non Human Interaction; Nature; Science and Culture; Society and Biology

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anti-Semitism (religion)

John P. Bartkowski

Anti-Semitism (also antisemitism) consists of hostility or hatred directed at Jews. Anti-Semitism may be manifested as prejudicial attitudes or discriminatory actions toward Jews because of their racial, ethnic, and/or religious heritage, as well as perceptions about their economic standing or political power. History records many incidences of anti-Semitism, culminating in the attempted genocide perpetrated against Jews during the Holocaust prior to and throughout World War II.

From a sociological perspective, anti-Semitism is not reducible to individual prejudicial attitudes or discriminatory acts against a Jewish person. Although anti-Semitism may be perpetrated by a particular individual or may target a specific victim, the question of interest to sociologists is how anti-Semitic attitudes and actions are collectively facilitated, culturally supported, and institutionally legitimated. Thus, even if a particular person or small group of “extremists” within a society exhibits anti-Semitic beliefs or behaviors, a sociological approach to this phenomenon seeks to account for the broader group influences (e.g., definitions of race, norms of authoritarianism,

sources of religious conflict) that legitimate such ideas and actions.

The Holocaust is the most horrific outgrowth of anti-Semitism, given the aim of its architects to commit “judeocide” (that is, the genocide of all Jewish people living in Europe). However, the precise role and scope of anti-Semitism in the Holocaust has provoked a debate of sorts among historians and social scientists (e.g., Smith 1998; Brustein 2003). One theory, dubbed “intentionalism,” attributes the Holocaust to a clique of mad extremists not representative of German culture or society. Another theory, more functionalist in nature, traces the Holocaust and the rise of Nazi fascism after World War I to obstacles that inhibited Germany’s modernization and undermined the nation’s economic development. A third perspective charges that “eliminationist anti-Semitism,” a virulent hatred of Jews that aimed to achieve nothing short of genocide, was widespread among the German population. According to this perspective, then, only Germany and its unique political culture could have spawned the Holocaust. There is some evidence to support each of these theories.

William Brustein’s (2003) work on anti-Semitism, particularly as it relates to the Holocaust, is especially instructive. Brustein suggests that there are four different forms (or sources) of anti-Semitism: religious, racial, economic, and political anti-Semitism. Religious anti-Semitism is rooted in the unique elements of Judaism (the Jewish faith), while racial anti-Semitism is linked to socially defined perceptions about Jews’ distinctive physical appearance. Economic anti-Semitism is most common in moments of economic crisis and during periods when Jewish commerce was perceived to threaten the welfare of other groups. Finally, political anti-Semitism often results from perceptions about Jewish influence on or threats toward the realms of governance and law (e.g., charges of Jewish involvement in the Communist Party during the twentieth century). Each form of anti-Semitism has been manifested in Europe at periods prior to the Holocaust, though it is the combination of these four types of anti-Semitism – such as that in pre-Holocaust Germany – that provokes the most virulent

hatred of Jews. Thus, current cross national studies of anti-Semitism suggest that it is important to identify the type of anti-Semitism found in particular locales, and the precise determinants that foster anti-Jewish sentiments and practices in specific contexts (Brustein & King 2004).

Research demonstrates that anti-Semitism also has a long history in the United States, although support for the tenets of this ideology has declined markedly during the past several decades (Dinnerstein 1994, 2004; Blakeslee 2000; Weiner & King 2005). For example, in 1964, 48 percent of Americans believed that Jews have irritating faults and are more willing than others to engage in “shady” practices, while only about half this number support such views in the contemporary United States (Smith 1993). Moreover, whereas 29 percent of Americans were regarded as “hardcore anti-Semites” by the Anti-Defamation League in 1964, only 17 percent were considered to fit this profile in 2002, which is a slight increase from the low of 12 percent in 1998 (Dinnerstein 2004). Thus, while anti-Semitism is at historically low levels, some observers argue that survey evidence suggesting that nearly 20 percent of the American population is anti-Semitic points to alarmingly high levels of anti-Jewish sentiment (Simon 2003). It is worth noting that the Anti-Defamation League’s operationalization of an anti-Semite is based on an 11-point scale measuring agreement with various stereotypes of Jews (e.g., Jews “always like to be at the head of things,” “are more loyal to Israel than America,” “have too much power in the business world,” “don’t care what happens to anyone but [their] own kind,” “are just [not] as honest as other business people”). Based on the Anti-Defamation League definition, hardcore anti-Semites are those who answer in the affirmative to six or more of the items on this 11-point scale. Other scales of anti-Semitism commonly include a selection of these items.

Despite the decline in Americans’ hostility toward Jews during the past several decades, some groups within the United States are still more inclined to hold anti-Semitic views than others (Dinnerstein 2004; Weiner & King 2005). Gender differences in anti-Semitism have been observed, such that men exhibit

more hostility toward Jews than do women. Americans who are older, rural dwellers, and Southerners are generally more anti-Semitic than those who are young, urbanites, and those residing outside the South. Blue-collar workers are more inclined toward anti-Semitism than are white-collar professionals. Education is widely viewed as the key to diminished anti-Semitism among those in the professional class, because higher levels of education tend to erode support for anti-Semitism while bolstering a commitment to liberal viewpoints and tolerance for others. Anti-Semitic views generally increase in locales with a higher proportion of Jews and declining economic conditions (Weiner & King 2005), a pattern that is commonly observed for other minority groups as well. As minority groups grow in number, concerns typically increase about the “threats” they may pose to local politics, economic opportunities, and social life in general.

There are also racial and religious variations in anti-Semitic attitudes. Research reveals greater support for anti-Semitic views among black Americans than among their white counterparts. Sociologists generally interpret blacks’ stronger negative attitudes toward Jews as a function of African Americans’ blocked opportunities in American society, which contrast markedly with the high economic status that Jews in the US tend to enjoy. Where religion is concerned, some research traces American anti-Semitism to the pervasiveness of Christianity in the US, particularly the conservative (fundamentalist) brand of Protestantism that is so prominent in the South. Interestingly, conservative Christians, who are generally distinguished by their view of the Bible as the inerrant word of God, seem to be of two minds concerning Jews (Smith 1999). While conservative Christians tend to embrace the biblical depiction of Jews as a “chosen people” and strongly support the existence of a Jewish state, they also believe that Jews should be converted to Christianity and tend to believe that Jews are overly focused on monetary gain.

Within the United States, efforts to promote Holocaust education to reduce anti-Semitism seem to have met with mixed success (Simon 2003). Between 80 and 90 percent of Americans believe that valuable lessons can be learned by

studying the Nazis' efforts to eradicate the Jewish population in Europe during the Holocaust. However, these courses may be of limited value in reducing anti-Semitism because students who take such courses enter them already having low levels of anti-Semitism and high levels of political tolerance. Thus, while such courses can provide beneficial knowledge about the Holocaust, students who take them are not very anti-Semitic in the first place. Those who could most benefit from such courses are likely to avoid enrolling in them because of their prejudice against Jews.

Finally, given the heterogeneity of cultural practices and viewpoints among different types of Jews (Conservative, Orthodox, Reconstructionist, Reform, and secular), it is worth noting that religious variations have been observed in perceptions of and reactions to anti-Semitism among American Jews (Djupe & Sokhey 2003). In one study of Jewish rabbis, Orthodox rabbis and those linked to Jewish advocacy organizations perceived anti-Semitism to be a greater problem and more frequently express concerns about this problem in public speech than those affiliated with other branches of Judaism.

SEE ALSO: Anti-Semitism (Social Change); Discrimination; Ethnicity; Genocide; Hate Crimes; Holocaust; Judaism; Pogroms; Prejudice; Race; Race (Racism)

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anti-Semitism (social change)

William I. Brustein

To account for the rise of anti-Semitism in the West in the modern period we can turn to the evolution and popularization of its four principal roots. The four roots, religious, racial, economic, and political, contain within themselves four distinct anti-Semitic narratives, each of which entailed its own set of themes depicting Jewish malfeasance. Anti-Semitism in the years prior to 1870 was largely characterized by a dislike based primarily on religious differences and perceived Jewish economic practices. After 1870, both religious and economic anti-Semitism continued – albeit with new themes – to be joined by the rising racial and political strains.

Of the four roots of anti-Semitism, religious anti-Semitism has the longest history in western Christian societies. Religious anti-Semitism encompasses hostility derived from the Jewish people's refusal to abandon their religious beliefs and practices, and, specifically within Christian societies, from the accusation of Jewish collective responsibility for the death of Jesus Christ. By the eighteenth century, the religious root would expand to include the French Enlightenment's critique that Judaism was responsible for the anti-progressive and exclusionist characters of its followers.

Official Christian antipathy toward Judaism began to gather steam within one hundred years of the death of Christ. Christian bitterness may have stemmed largely from the new religion's competition with Judaism for a following. The competition between the two religions was unlike that between quite *dissimilar* religions, such as Buddhism and Christianity or Hinduism and Christianity, for Jesus Christ had been a Jew and Christianity saw itself replacing Judaism as the inheritor of God's covenant with Abraham.

Since the birth of the Christian faith, numerous deeds of malfeasance have been leveled against the Jews. For centuries, Jews were held responsible for the crucifixion of Christ; chastised for not accepting Christ as the messiah; accused of a series of acts and practices, including practicing a ritual of killing Christian children in order to use their blood to make matzoth during the Jewish holiday of Passover; causing the "Black Plague" of the Middle Ages by poisoning the wells of Europe; desecrating the host (stealing and destroying communion wafers after the eucharist ceremony); serving as agent of the Antichrist; and, at various times, being usurers, sorcerers, and vampires.

With the advent of the Enlightenment, religious anti-Semitism took on a new leitmotif emanating interestingly from the attacks leveled on the Jewish religion by such eminent secularists as Voltaire, Diderot, Montesquieu, von Dohm, and d'Holbach. In their critique of the roots of Christianity, they condemned Judaism for remaining a fossilized religion, persisting in a self image of its special "election," and upholding anti progressive beliefs. In this way, the Enlightenment may have contributed to modernizing and secularizing anti-Semitism. During the nineteenth century, many secularists felt betrayed by Jews, who, in their eyes, failed to abandon their distinctive beliefs and practices after having been emancipated and granted civil rights. Whereas traditional religious anti-Semitism appealed largely to a less educated public, the secularist critique attracted a more highly educated following.

Whether one drew upon the traditional religious prejudice against Jews or the secular argument, the common assumption held that

once Jews converted to Christianity or abandoned the Jewish faith, the "Jewish problem" would disappear. However, as the nineteenth century unfolded, a new form of anti-Semitism emerged that would not see conversion or rejection of the faith as a sufficient solution to the "Jewish problem." For among the followers of this new form of anti-Semitism, Jews constituted a separate and pernicious race, and only through enforced social isolation or physical removal could the problem of the place of Jews in society find a resolution.

During the latter half of the nineteenth century, Jews were increasingly depicted as members of a unique race rather than as members of a separate religious group. Spurred on by European colonialism, nationalistic fervor, and fear of immigration, the new science of race dug deep roots into European mass culture. Scientific racism, or race science, referred to the ideology that differences in human behavior derive from inherent group characteristics, and human differences can be demonstrated through anthropological, biological, and statistical proofs. In the nineteenth century, race science rose and gained respectability. Proponents of racial theory held a firm belief that there were inexorable natural laws beyond the control of humans governing individuals and cultures. Arguments that territorial national sovereignty should be based on a culturally identifiable nation and that the superior cultures of Europe had the right and duty to colonize non European areas of the world found justification in scientific racism. The impact of scientific racism on European Jewry would be profound, for racial science permitted anti Semites to attire their hatred of Jews in the disguise of science.

How is it then that anti-Semitism became increasingly interwoven with racial thinking? By themselves, the advent of European colonialism and the project of national unification could hardly constitute a fertile context in which racial anti-Semitism would flourish. Moreover, before 1881, the relatively small Jewish population of Western Europe seemed, in the minds of many Gentiles and Jews, to be on the road to assimilation. This was, however, about to change with the westward march of Russian and East European Jewish immigrants. The wave of East European and

Russian Jewish immigration fueled a firestorm of racial anti-Semitism.

In the contexts of a spreading European colonialism, rising nationalism, and Eastern European Jewish immigration combined with the emergence and popularization of the new science of race, racial anti-Semitism gained adherents throughout the nations of Europe. For many of those embracing racial anti-Semitism, Jews should no longer be considered simply as a minority with their own religious beliefs, rituals, and customs within the national territory of established nations. In the new thinking, Jews constituted a separate race and, as a race, the Jews were inferior to Aryans but also the most dangerous of the inferior races.

Over the centuries, Jews have been variously characterized as miserly, manipulators of money, ultra materialist, and possessors of extraordinary wealth. The pervasiveness of the link between Jews and unsavory economic practices can be seen in the not too distant past in the usage of such unflattering verbs as “to Jew” (to cheat or to overreach) and “to Jew down” (to drive down the price unfairly by bickering) in one of the definitions of the word “Jew” (i.e., “applied to a grasping or extortionate usurer”) found in the authoritative *Oxford Universal Dictionary*, at least until 1955.

The history of the economic root of anti-Semitism, while not quite as old as that of the religious root, dates back to the Christian medieval period in Europe. Warnings against middleman practices are found in the writings of early Christian fathers like John Chrysostom and Augustine. It wasn't until the Lateran Council of 1139 that the Catholic Church assigned a negative significance to usury. In the decisions reached at the Lateran Council, usury took the meaning of charging excessive or illegal interest on a loan. The Lateran Council asserted that those who practiced usury, or those who practiced it but failed to repent, would be refused a Christian burial.

European Jews increasingly found themselves the object of charges of usury as well as a host of other economic sins, including dishonest practices in petty commerce and secondhand trade, and the pursuit of parasitic

and non productive commercial activities. Why did this occur? There is no question that Jews were overrepresented as moneylenders, peddlers, and merchants in Christian Europe. Though it officially condemned usury, the Roman Catholic Church throughout the Middle Ages derived benefits from the existence of usury and from Jews as usurers. In the eyes of the Church, Jews, having cut themselves off from the saving grace of Jesus Christ, were a likely group to perform the necessary but sinful practice of moneylending. Moreover, the Crown, cognizant of the Christian Church's prohibition against usury for good Christians, encouraged Jewish moneylending in its pursuit of its own prosperity and revenues. In that the Crown considered Jews its own private property, it saw fit to compel Jews to serve the role of moneylenders.

Moneylending was only one of the professions open to Jews in Christian Europe. More and more Jews were restricted to those economic activities considered the least desirable, like moneylending, and to those which did not engender competition for Christian guilds. For instance, medieval merchant guilds successfully blocked Jews from selling their goods in shops or at the marketplace, while craft guilds prevented Jews from manufacturing goods. Consequently, Jews were left to peddle goods in the street or countryside and to buy and sell secondhand wares, particularly clothing. Prior to the Holocaust, much had been made of the fact that Jews rarely pursued the farming profession. The dearth of Jews in farming in Europe has a foundation in medieval European prohibitions against Jewish property ownership. Land constituted a principal source of power and status in the Middle Ages in Christian Europe, and he who owned land had power over the serfs and a say in the selection of local priests. The Christian Church also depended on the payment of a tithe and feared that Jewish landholders might refuse to pay the Church tithe. To that end, the Church strongly discouraged its faithful from selling land to Jews or offering land to Jews in exchange for their debts. While Jews confronted obstacles in owning land, they were permitted and frequently encouraged by the Crown or nobility to manage large estates. Especially in East Central Europe, Jews

became prominent as administrators of large noble estates. By standing as intermediaries between the nobility and the serfs, Jews served as convenient buffers and scapegoats in times of growing economic tension.

By virtue of their experience as moneylenders or estate agents, numbers of Jews found employment as royal usurers of the princes or "court Jews," largely responsible for managing the personal finances of the aristocracy throughout much of Europe. Illustrative of the famous "court Jews" was Joseph Süss Oppenheimer, who, in mid eighteenth century Germany, arose from court agent of Duke Karl Alexander of Württemberg to the high post of privy councilor. Oppenheimer would become the *Jud Süss* of later anti Semitic legends. Even more famous than Oppenheimer, Meyer Amschel Rothschild, the patriarch of the famous Rothschild banking family, began as a court agent in 1769 to William, Prince of Hessen Kassel.

Before the nineteenth century, popular economic anti-Semitism in Europe typically embodied accusations about alleged unethical business practices in secondhand trade, petty commerce, and moneylending conducted by Jews. As the nineteenth century unfolded, economic anti Semites would add the charge that Jews inordinately controlled the major means of production and, by virtue of this power, successfully manipulated both the domestic and foreign policies of states. Though a number of Jewish families in Europe had acquired sizable fortunes before the advent of the nineteenth century, principally as court agents of aristocratic families, the myth of Jewish economic dominance truly gained widespread currency as a result of several key factors, including Jewish emancipation and European industrialization. The emancipation of European Jewry opened to Jews previously blocked access to higher education and the professions. More equal access to education and the professions bred increased competition between Jews and Christians, leading often to resentment. Europe's industrialization opened new domestic and global investment opportunities for entrepreneurs. The removal of barriers to trade allowed capital to flow across borders, financing railways and mines in a fashion never before experienced.

The new investment opportunities led to the accumulation of phenomenal wealth for the fledgling banking industry. Jews were well represented in the banking industry, given their prior background as moneylenders and court agents, and many Jewish families benefited greatly from the new investment opportunities. This is certainly not to say that wealthy Gentile fortunes did not exist. But rather, it was the number of wealthy Jewish families in proportion to the overall Jewish population, and the concentration of Jewish wealth in a small number of arenas like banking, that likely cast Jewish economic dominance in a particular light. Take, for instance, the case of the state of Prussia in 1908, where it was reported that 55 of the 200 millionaires were of Jewish origin, of which 33 had made their money in finance and banking. The accumulation of extraordinary wealth, particularly through profits from investment, elicited vitriolic resentment within many quarters. That several prominent Jewish families became prime beneficiaries of this new wealth gave new legs to the myth of Jewish economic dominance. Yet the banking industry wasn't the only economic enterprise in which wealthy Jewish families appeared to dominate. Notable European Jewish families held substantial control over the department store industry, grains, real estate, and the cattle, fur, pearl, jewelry, diamond, and ready made clothing trade, and perhaps most importantly, the news medium.

Not only did trade become global after 1840, but local or national economic crises became, for the first time, worldwide. In the pre industrial economy, abrupt price fluctuations were typically caused by natural disasters like droughts or floods and tended to be local in nature, whereas in the new industrial economy, financial crises more often were linked to trade and became cyclical, more spatially diffused, and increasingly severe in their impact. It was during and after these periodic recessions or depressions that attention focused on the alleged negative role that the wealthy Jewish banking houses played in the creation of the economic crisis. In contrast to earlier epochs of economic crises, during the Industrial Age, with the existence of multinational financial houses managing the international flows of capital and buying and selling stocks,

the physical presence of Jews was no longer a necessary requisite for economic chaos in the minds of many anti Semites. The 1873 Depression unlocked a wave of resentment against the free market policies of the 1850s and 1860s – policies that had become associated with Jewish banking interests. The 1873 Depression also unleashed public displeasure by virtue of the series of accompanying stock market collapses and bank failures – in which several prominent Jews had played a role. The Great Depression of the 1930s evoked heightened economic antipathy toward Jews for a number of reasons. In a time of high unemployment, the immigration of thousands of Eastern European Jews constituted an economic threat to financially hard pressed Gentiles. For others open to the possibility of Jewish perfidy, the Jews were seen as both manipulators and beneficiaries of the worldwide economic collapse as foretold in the notorious but popular *Protocols of the Learned Elders of Zion*.

At various times throughout the modern period, the myth of a “Jewish world conspiracy” has attracted adherents. Jews have been accused of plotting to take over the world by undermining the existing social and political order. The myth of the “Jewish world conspiracy” springs from diverse sources. Before the emergence of revolutionary socialist parties in the last decades of the nineteenth century, subscribers to the myth that the Jews covertly planned to take control of the world believed they had proof in what they perceived was the inordinate Jewish presence as “court Jews” advising and financing rulers, and the role Jews allegedly played as leaders and members of the supposedly anti Church and liberal Freemasons. In more recent times, Jews were assumed to be the backers or originators of radical and subversive movements whose chief aim was allegedly to bring down the reigning national political order.

Political anti Semitism, defined as hostility toward Jews based on the belief that Jews seek to control national and/or world power, experienced a momentous upsurge after 1879 in Europe. The dramatic rise in political anti Semitism between 1879 and the Holocaust can largely be attributed to the emergence and

rapid development of an international socialist movement and, concomitantly, to the popularization of the notorious *Protocols of the Elders of Zion* in the aftermath of the Bolshevik Revolution. During the last half of the nineteenth century, a host of newly established political movements and parties marked the European political landscape. Many of these new political groups advocated radical programs aimed at redressing social and political inequalities. Among these new movements or parties were the socialist or Marxist groups, which steadily gained prominence in Europe after 1879. These parties were perceived to represent major threats to the interests of elite and middle class groups as well as to the Christian religious faithful.

Socialism was disliked by many people across the social spectrum because of its apparent antipathy toward religion, patriotism, and nationalism. Jews and socialism were inextricably tied in the eyes of anti Semites for numerous reasons. The link between socialism and Jews requires exploration. To begin with, it is worth repeating that the “red menace,” namely, the fear that a worldwide subversive communist movement sought to gain world power, had dominated western thinking until 1989. Belief in the “red menace” reached epidemic levels in the wake of socialism’s first major success, the Bolshevik Revolution of 1917, and again in the aftermath of communism’s success in Eastern Europe and China after World War II. That prominent Jews played key roles from the beginning in the socialist and communist movements provided the European anti Semitic crusade considerable nourishment and momentum.

After 1917, acknowledgment of the existence of a link between Jews and revolutionary socialism reached pandemic proportions. The seizure of power by the Russian Bolsheviks in 1917, followed by a series of left wing uprisings elsewhere in Europe in the aftermath of World War I, ushered in a wave of anti Marxist and anti Semitic hysteria. During the chaotic period following the termination of World War I, many political leaders and major newspapers portrayed the Bolshevik Revolution and the wave of left wing revolutionary attempts to seize power elsewhere as

part of the overall Jewish plan to take control of the world. Jews were shown to have dominated the leadership of the Russian Bolshevik Party and leftist revolutionary parties in other European states. The purported link between Jews and revolutionary socialism grew ironically to include rich Jewish financiers, such as the American shipping magnate Jacob Schiff and the German banker Max Warburg. In the opinion of many in the anti-Semitic camp, wealthy Jews were alleged to have engineered and funded the revolutionary movements in Russia in order to bring down the despised and intensely anti-Semitic Czarist regime. Much has been made of the position Jews held in the leadership of the Russian Bolshevik Party and the fact that these Jews employed pseudonyms. In time, Trotsky, Zinoviev, Kamenev, and Radek became household names throughout the West, and Jew and Bolshevik became synonymous. The fact that these Jewish revolutionaries employed aliases convinced many in the West that they were deceitfully trying to hide the Jewish nature of the Russian Revolution. The popular association between Jews and Bolshevism made inroads far beyond the masses of ardent anti-Semites and the uneducated.

During the peak of the revolutionary socialist upheaval in the years following the conclusion of World War I, political anti-Semitism received a substantial boost from the worldwide publication and translation of the infamous forgery, the *Protocols of the Elders of Zion*. (In 1919, the earliest German and Polish editions appeared, and in 1920, the first English edition was released in London and Boston.) The *Protocols* described an elaborate Jewish plan of world conquest through the creation of worldwide unrest, culminating in the ascent to world power of the Jewish House of David. In particular, the Russian Revolution, by ushering in a period of European wide revolutionary upheaval, civil war, and the birth of an international communist movement, transformed a relatively obscure pamphlet into a powerful vehicle, giving credibility to the myth of "Judeo Bolshevism" and linking anti-Semitism and anti-Bolshevism for decades. No other factor did more to galvanize political anti-Semitism after World War I

than the fear of revolutionary socialism. By advocating social and economic leveling, dismissing religion, and opting for internationalism over nationalism, revolutionary socialists spawned substantial resentment among many groups in society who failed to share their vision.

The western world's anti-Semitism contributed to the Holocaust. As we embark upon a new millennium, we may wonder if anti-Semitic prejudice could once again raise its ugly head to the extent that world Jewry would again be threatened with mass annihilation. Do recent European events including negative portrayals of Israeli policy in the Middle East and attacks on Jewish persons and property conjure up a revival of European anti-Semitism on the scale of the 1930s? The likelihood of history repeating itself vis à vis the Jews within the West is highly unlikely. Indeed, the recent upsurge in anti-Semitic acts in Europe has more to do with the Israeli-Palestinian dispute than with what some commentators refer to as the reawakening of Europe's ancient anti-Semitic demon. These attacks on Jews and Jewish property emanate almost exclusively from particular segments of Europe's Muslim population.

A more optimistic assessment of the future of Jewish-Gentile relations within Europe is not based solely upon beliefs in the value of learning, but largely because of the attenuation of the underlying foundations of the four roots of anti-Semitism within the West. Much has occurred in the Christian-Jewish relationship since 1945 to dampen Christian religious anti-Semitism. In particular, the *Nostra Aetate* declaration embraced by the Second Vatican Council in October 1965, withdrawing the blanket accusation of Jewish guilt for the murder of Christ, and the public pronouncements of Pope John Paul II, documenting the historical mistreatment of Jews by Christians, have eliminated official Christian support for anti-Semitism. The science of race, which had successfully dug deep roots into western society before World War II, has been convincingly debunked. Few serious scholars would today pay heed to such notions as a hierarchy of races and inferior and superior races. Clearly, the racial basis of anti-Semitism has

largely disappeared. With the collapse of the Soviet Union and the state socialist system in Eastern and Central Europe, the foundation for political anti-Semitism has been dealt a mortal blow. Revolutionary socialism provided anti-Semites a key weapon in their assault on Jews given the magnitude of the perceived threat from revolutionary socialism and the alleged association of Jews and the political left. Perhaps no other fact has done more to alleviate anti-Semitism than the collapse of communism.

The fate of economic anti-Semitism diverges from the other forms. Economic anti-Semitism, while somewhat abated, still appears to draw adherence. Economic anti-Semitism in the West today is more implied and subtle than before World War II. Murmurs about Jewish inordinate influence in banking, the media, and the arts are less common now, but still present. Recent events in Russia and the Ukraine point to the resiliency of resentment of large segments of the population toward the alleged economic power of Jews. Equally disturbing has been the tendency of some in the anti-globalization camp to blame Jews for the purported evils of globalization. However, these anti-Semitic voices have failed to resonate widely – a big difference from the pre-World War II period, when anti-Semitic attitudes were widely held by respected elites and the lower and middle classes.

If, on the one hand, popular anti-Semitism in Europe has lost considerable steam by virtue of the attenuation of the religious, racial, and political roots, it has, on the other hand, gained strength from popular resentment toward Israeli policies in the Middle East. Increasingly, the distinction between a dislike of Israeli policies and a dislike of Jews has become blurred in the minds of many people. Even more alarming is the explosive rise of anti-Semitism within the Islamic world. While Christian–Jewish relations have vastly improved since the Holocaust, Muslim–Jewish relations have fallen upon hard times. Fueled largely by the Israeli–Palestinian dispute, anti-Jewish antipathies wrapped in religious, racial, economic, and political narratives have entered the public discourse throughout the Muslim

world. The curtain of history has yet to drop on society's longest hatred.

SEE ALSO: Anti-Semitism (Religion); Conflict (Racial/Ethnic); Fascism; Holocaust; Judaism; Prejudice; Race (Racism); Racist Movements; Religion

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anti-war and peace movements

Kristina Wolff

Anti war and peace movements are social movements that concentrate on many issues related to war, armed conflict, and violence. Often, they focus on calling for an end to a specific conflict, the abolition of war, and the elimination of weaponry, as well as the creation of nonviolent mechanisms to solve conflicts. Historically, strategies for change have included violent acts such as assassination, self immolation, and/or the destruction of property. However, the vast majority of people participating in these movements utilize nonviolent tactics. These approaches include wide scale boycotts, protests and marches, sit ins, speeches, letter writing campaigns, education and outreach, and voting.

Motivations for resisting war and promoting peace vary and include concerns over the ideological reasons behind the war, the immorality of killing people, violations of human rights, and the destruction of lives, property, and/or the environment, as well as the financial costs. Individuals and groups organize in a variety of ways, including through local churches, schools, and organizations. Recently, many protesters have joined together for specific events such as the meeting of government officials who are conducting a war. With the emergence of the Internet and other advances in technology, coalition building has been expanded, as it is easier to reach people around the globe. There has been a significant increase in simultaneous protests happening around the world, as demonstrated by protests against trade practices and the World Trade Organization, and continual opposition and protests against the war in Iraq.

Researchers have noted that anti war and peace movements succeed in affecting public debate and the opinions and actions of government officials, but they rarely stop wars (Marullo & Meyer 2004). One example of this is the amount of opposition against the Vietnam War. While each war that the US has waged has had some level of public resistance, the anti war and peace movement of the 1960s and 1970s galvanized the nation and created enough pressure on government officials to change their actions concerning the war. Part of this success was the number of people within government and politics who were openly against the war and worked to end it as soon as possible. The progression of the scale of opposition increased with the length of time spent in Vietnam, the growing number of casualties, and the expense of the war. This is a common trend, which can also be seen in the growth of visible opposition to the war with Iraq.

SEE ALSO: Civil Rights Movement; Gay and Lesbian Movement; Peace and Reconciliation Processes; Social Movements; War; Women's Movements

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apartheid and Nelson Mandela

Kogila Moodley and Kanya Adam

Apartheid is a uniquely South African policy of racial engineering with which European colonizers tried to ensure their supremacy between 1948 and 1994. Invented by the Afrikaner section of the minority white population, it also aimed at advancing exclusive Afrikaner nationalism. Prior to the institutionalized racism, Anglo type informal segregation had achieved similar effects, although racial mixing and miscegenation was widespread in a rapidly industrializing society. The apartheid ideology, strongly influenced by evolutionist, hierarchical, and racial supremacist ideas, justified the formal separation between racialized groups in South Africa. The Afrikaner Nationalist Party, particularly under its leader Hendrik Verwoerd, systematized these practices into a coherent doctrine. Afrikaner newspapers, such as *Die Burger*, preachers, and intellectuals used the suppression of the Afrikaans language by the assimilationist United Party as a mobilizing tool, subsequently supplemented with a program of capital accumulation (“buy Afrikaans only”) for fledgling Afrikaner building societies and banks.

When the Nationalists unexpectedly came to power through a restricted franchise in 1948, Afrikaners formed 57 percent of the white population controlling 29 percent of total personal income, as against the English speaking whites who held 43 percent. Africans, although comprising 68 percent of the population, commanded only 20 percent of total personal income (Giliomee 2003: 489). The Nationalist “poor whites,” distinctly underprivileged vis à vis English speakers, also had to compete with African jobseekers, who were considered cheaper and more pliant by English dominated corporations. Faced with the threat of nationalization, a compromise was struck to guarantee poor whites job reservation and higher wages in mining enterprises (“civilized labor policy”) as well as preferential employment on the railways and in the post offices.

Racial legislation took the form of categorizing the population into four racial groups: whites, coloreds, Asians (Indians), and Africans. In 1949, the Prohibition of Mixed Marriages Act made it illegal to marry across the color line. Later this was followed by the Immorality Act, which declared it an offense to have any intimate contact across racial groups. The Population Registration Act required the carrying of identification documents; the Group Areas Act of the 1960s designated separate residential and commercial areas for each group; the Suppression of Communism Act, which gave extraordinary power to the state to ban organizations considered to be “communist,” and the Bantu Education Act controlled access to segregated education for each racial group.

Longstanding communities comprising people of all groups who had come to live together were destroyed by these measures. The residential segregation particularly affected the Indian and colored property owners more than it did Africans, who had already been excluded earlier under the Urban Areas Act preventing them from acquiring any land in the urban areas and “white” South Africa, comprising 83 percent of the total territory. The rationale offered for this was twofold; firstly, that whites had submitted petitions complaining about Indian and colored penetration into their areas with the consequent drop in their property values. Secondly, it was argued that groups would be more inclined to live harmoniously with one another when they reside among members of their own group. The same logic was to pervade the case for separate educational facilities, at first at the primary and secondary levels.

Unlike any other country, South Africa imposed group membership, regardless of individual association. Without self identification such labeling stigmatizes people, especially where differential privileges and forcible separation are concerned. This is all the more so where groups have lived in close proximity to one another and shared culture, language, and religion, as was the case with the 10 percent so called coloreds in the Cape. Often there were few discernible differences and degrading practices such as pencil tests – namely, to see if a pencil when inserted into hair would

fall out or be held by more curly African type hair – were used to decide if one was colored or white.

Through a process of ethnicization, black ethnic groups were separated from one another and disaggregated, while non blacks with diverse ethnic origins were homogenized through racialization into one group, as whites, for political advantage. Apartheid utilized different histories and cultures to divide the population through the program of separate development. Whites held the monopoly of political control over a disenfranchised “non white” majority. Economic power was initially concentrated in the hands of the people of English origin but later increasingly included Afrikaner capitalists through state patronage.

The franchise was the privilege of white South Africans only, as others were excluded from the political process. Instead Africans were to have circumscribed citizenship rights within the segregated enclaves designated for each group, known as Bantustans. Freedom of movement from these impoverished rural areas into urban centers was curtailed through influx control and pass laws.

European penetration of the African hinterland had destroyed most of the traditional African subsistence economy. Squeezed into ever more overcrowded reserves, its inhabitants increasingly relied on remittances of migrant workers in the cities. At the beginning of industrialization, Africans had to be forced into poorly paid work on the mines through head and hut taxes which British administrators first introduced in the Eastern Cape. Later it was sheer rural poverty that drove blacks into the city slums, dormitories, and compounds. Migrant labor not only destroyed the African peasantry but also undermined the traditional family. The competition among ethnically housed migrants in the insecure urban settings encouraged tribalism as a form of kinship solidarity and own group protection in a tough struggle for survival.

In 1910 the African National Congress (ANC) was founded. Among the first goals of the ANC was the battle for African unity against tribalism. Under the influence of supportive white and Indian liberals and communists, this priority was later extended to colorblind non racialism. A moderate black elite,

educated at Christian missionary schools, repeatedly pleaded with the government for recognition. A much celebrated Freedom Charter of 1955 claimed the right of all South Africans to the land of their birth. A Gandhian type civil disobedience campaign against new pass laws was tried in Natal, but failed when the government simply imprisoned the peaceful protesters. The National Party government responded with ever more repressive legislation. The 1960 Sharpeville massacre of some 60 protesters marked a turning point. The ANC and its rival, the more radical Pan African Congress (PAC), decided to go underground, revert to sabotage without hurting civilians, and establish an exile presence for the anti apartheid struggle after they were outlawed inside the country. After a few years in hiding, Nelson Mandela and his comrades were caught and sentenced to life imprisonment, to be freed only after 27 years on Robben Island in 1990.

In 1983 the National Party had split and shed its conservative wing. In 1989, the hard line president P. W. Botha was replaced with a new National Party leader, F. W. de Klerk, who had finally realized that apartheid was not sustainable. The costs outweighed the benefits. Influx control of blacks into the cities had failed; business needed ever more skilled employees who also had to be politically satisfied; a powerful union movement had taken over from the banned political organizations since the late 1970s; restless townships could not be stabilized, despite permanent states of emergencies; demographic ratios changed in favor of blacks, with more whites emigrating and draining the country of skills and investments; the costs of global sanctions, particularly loan refusals, and moral ostracism of the pariah state were felt. The collapse of communism and the end of the Cold War in 1989 provided the final straw for the normalization of South Africa. The National Party decided to negotiate a historic compromise from a position of relative strength while the whites were still ahead. With the loss of Eastern European support, the ANC also had to turn away from the armed struggle and seek a political solution. A perception of stalemate on both sides prepared the ground for a constitutionally mandated agreement to share power for five years. The first free democratic

elections in 1994, 1999, and 2004 provided the ANC with a two thirds majority.

NELSON ROLIHLAHLA MANDELA (B. 1918)

Nelson Mandela, perhaps the most generally admired political figure of our time, was born on July 18, 1918 into the Thembu royal family in Transkei. Groomed to become a chief, he attended Healdtown, a mission school of the Methodist Church, which provided a Christian and liberal arts education, and later the University College of Fort Hare, which was a beacon for African scholars from all over Southern, Central, and Eastern Africa. For young black South African leaders including Oliver Tambo and Robert Mugabe, Fort Hare became the center of early anti colonial sentiments and liberation strategies. At the end of his first year, Mandela became involved in a boycott of the Students Representative Council against the university's policies and was expelled. After moving to Johannesburg as an impoverished student, Mandela studied law at the University of the Witwatersrand, where he was the only African student in the law faculty, and, in partnership with Oliver Tambo, set up the first black law practice in Johannesburg in 1952.

As a young student, Mandela became increasingly involved in political opposition to the white minority government's denial of political, social, and economic rights to South Africa's black majority. Together with Walter Sisulu, Oliver Tambo, and others, Mandela was active in the ANC Youth League, of which he became national president in 1950. He helped organize the passive resistance campaign against the laws that forced blacks to carry passes and kept them in a position of permanent servility, calling for non violent protest for as long as it was effective. This led to his first arrest and suspended sentence under the Suppression of Communism Act. Despite his ban from political activity, Mandela succeeded in reorganizing the ANC branches into small cells for their expected underground functioning.

In 1956 Mandela was charged with high treason along with 156 political leaders

following the anti pass campaign and demonstrations against the Declaration of the Republic. Following the banning of the ANC and PAC in 1961, Mandela went underground and traveled to Addis Ababa, Algeria, and London where he attended conferences and held discussions with various political leaders.

A few weeks following his return to South Africa in July 1962, Mandela was arrested and charged with incitement and for leaving the country illegally. At the notorious Rivonia trial of 1964, he was sentenced to life imprisonment together with his fellow conspirators on June 12. His statement from the dock stirred the conscience of many:

During my lifetime I have dedicated myself to the struggle of the African people. I have fought against white domination, and I have fought against black domination. I have cherished the ideal of a democratic and free society in which all persons live together in harmony and equal opportunities. It is an ideal which I hope to live for and to achieve, but, if needs be, it is an ideal for which I am prepared to die.

The rallying cry "Free Nelson Mandela" became the slogan associated with opposition to apartheid for anti apartheid campaigners around the world in subsequent years.

On February 11, 1990, after nearly 27 years in prison, Mandela was finally released unconditionally following delicate negotiations, sustained ANC campaigning, and international pressure that led to both his freedom and the beginning of the end of apartheid. He had refused earlier offers of conditional release in return for renouncing the armed struggle. After more than two decades of imprisonment, Mandela quickly filled a vacuum in the heterogeneous ANC camp. His leadership unified the oldest and most popular liberation movement as he straddled the divide between a militant youth and older traditionalists, revolutionaries and pragmatists, African nationalists and liberal universalists, orthodox socialists and social democratic capitalists. He succeeded in rallying the ANC's skeptical constituency behind the new politics of negotiation, suspending the armed struggle, and allaying fears of nationalization and redistribution. Mandela's remarkable lack of bitterness and steady moderation were

also critical in convincing the white minority to share political power with a disenfranchised majority.

As the first ever democratically elected president of South Africa, he presided over the transition from minority rule and apartheid, from May 1994 to June 1999, winning international respect for his advocacy of national and international reconciliation. At the same time, Mandela was criticized for his support of Arafat's PLO, Libya's Gadhaffi, and Cuba's Castro, whom he referred to as his "comrades in arms." Some critics alleged that the world's most famous prisoner was in danger of becoming a symbol more powerful behind bars than in the world of *realpolitik*. Many were also disappointed with his government's ineffectiveness in dealing with a looming AIDS crisis. However, he subsequently engaged in a massive campaign to address the AIDS pandemic and in so doing admonished his successors for their silence on this question.

After his retirement as president in 1999 and handing over to his successor, Thabo Mbeki, Mandela went on to become an advocate for a variety of social and human rights organizations. On his 80th birthday he married Graca Machel, widow of the former Mozambican president, and travels the world to raise funds for major causes. He has been honored in countless countries with a host of prestigious awards. As a universally revered hero and global conscience, he speaks out against injustice on the world scene, from criticizing US unilateralism to peacemaking in Burundi. He spoke out against the Zimbabwean government for its human rights abuses while other African leaders maintained silence. Mandela almost assumed the role of informal opposition leader along with fellow Nobel laureate Desmond Tutu while simultaneously remaining a loyal member of the ANC.

For countless people around the world Nelson Mandela stands as an international hero whose lifelong struggle to end racial oppression in South Africa represents the triumph of dignity and hope over despair and hatred. His unprecedented moral authority and iconic status resemble the influence of Mahatma Gandhi nearly half a century earlier. Like Gandhi, an honorable Mandela remains faithful to his party's ideals of non racialism,

inclusiveness, and reconciliation for his beloved South Africa.

SEE ALSO: Burundi and Rwanda (Hutu, Tutsi); Color Line; Conflict (Racial/Ethnic); Racial Hierarchy; Race; Race (Racism); Truth and Reconciliation Commissions

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arcades

Keith Hayward

Originating in Paris in the 1820s, arcades were decorative passages or walkways through blocks of buildings. Typically glass roofed and supported by ornate ironwork columns, arcades served as a form of interior street; a site of conspicuous consumption for the wealthy, and a place of marvel and spectacle for the poor. Hemmed in by antique shops, concession stands, and an eclectic array of emporia, arcade shop fronts offered the observer a chaotic visual experience of illuminated shop signs, *objets d'art*, and a cornucopia of commodities and artifacts from around the world. In sociological terms, the importance of the Parisian arcades lies in their purported role as progenitor of modern consumerism and more tangentially as a prototype of the contemporary shopping mall.

The unearthing of the arcade as a site of sociological and philosophical importance is closely associated with the work of the German literary theorist Walter Benjamin. Benjamin

was fascinated by the “mythical” qualities of the arcades, viewing them as both “threatening” and “alluring” – places in which the emotions were stimulated and where the social constraints of public and private life were simultaneously blurred and challenged. In his fragmentary work *The Arcades Project (Das Passagen Werk)* he viewed the arcades as a metaphor that could help us understand the composition and dynamic form of high modern industrial capitalism. Benjamin described arcade shop fronts as “dream houses,” where everything desirable becomes a commodity (frequently on the first floor of the arcades, sexual pleasures could be bought and drinking and gambling were common). For Benjamin, the continual flow of goods, the “sensual immediacy” of the displays, the utopian forms of new technology, and the novelty and visual appeal of transitory fashions were all fragments of the “commodity fetish.” Yet, while newness itself becomes a fetish, the modern commodity has a built in obsolescence: the novel inevitably becomes the outmoded. This tension is apparent when one considers the fate of the arcades themselves. Following Baron George Haussmann’s “creative destruction” of Second Empire Paris in the 1860s, most of the arcades were destroyed to make way for the wide boulevards and imposing facades that characterize Paris today. Likewise, by the time of Benjamin’s research, the arcades had already been superseded by the more organized modern department store, which in turn served to further “democratize demand” and usher in the rationalized forms of mass urban consumption that we know today (Ritzer 2004, 2005). However, surviving examples of original arcades can still be found in Paris today.

SEE ALSO: Benjamin, Walter; Conspicuous Consumption; Consumption; Critical Theory/Frankfurt School; *Flânerie*; Marxism and Sociology; Shopping Malls

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Arendt, Hannah (1906–75)

Peter Murphy

PERSONAL HISTORY

Hannah Arendt was born in Hanover and grew up in an assimilated German Jewish social democratic household in Königsberg, then East Prussia, today Kaliningrad in Russia. She attended university (1924–8), completing a year at Marburg where her teacher, and briefly her lover, was Martin Heidegger; a semester at Freiburg with Edmund Husserl; and then on to Heidelberg to complete a doctoral dissertation under Karl Jaspers. Arendt had a gift for friendship. She remained close to Jaspers all her life. She even maintained a tense contact with Heidegger after the war, despite his embrace of Nazism. After university, Arendt lived in Berlin and married the leftist philosopher Günter Stern (pen name Anders) in 1929, fleeing Nazi Germany for France in 1933, divorcing Stern in 1937. She worked in Paris for Jewish relief organizations and became acquainted with the rising French intellectuals of the day (Aron, Sartre), as well as Jewish intellectual émigrés such as Walter Benjamin, whose manuscripts she carried from France and edited (in 1968) after Benjamin’s suicide. She met her second husband, the Berliner and communist Heinrich Blücher, in 1936. In 1940, Blücher and Arendt fled Nazi occupied France for the US, finally arriving in 1941 in New York, the city that would be her

home for the rest of her life. She became a US citizen in 1951.

In the US Arendt did political journalism (1941–5), directed research for Jewish cultural reconstruction organizations (1944–6, 1949–52), and was a chief editor at Schocken Books (1946–8) where, among other projects, she published a German edition of Franz Kafka's *Diaries*. After the success of *The Origins of Totalitarianism* in 1951, Arendt began a career of visiting professorships and lecture engagements at American universities. Skeptical of academic conformism, she resisted any permanent appointment until 1967. She taught peripatetically at Berkeley (1955), Princeton (1959), Columbia (1960), Northwestern (1961), Wesleyan University's Center of Advanced Studies (1961–2), the University of Chicago's Committee on Social Theory (1963–7), and at the New School for Social Research (1967–75). She presented Princeton University's Christian Gauss Seminar Lectures (1953), the Walgreen Lectures at the University of Chicago (1956), and the Scottish Universities' Gifford Lectures (1973).

INTELLECTUAL AND SOCIAL CONTEXT

Arendt progressed through some of the most important intellectual milieus in the twentieth century – from inter war German universities, to wartime Paris, to post war New York and Chicago. Possibly the most decisive of all of Arendt's intellectual environments was her childhood town of Königsberg – a place that was the seedbed of an astonishing intellectual progeny. On the far eastern side of the Baltic, this old port and university town not only produced Immanuel Kant but also Hermann Minkowski (the geometer who provided the mathematical basis for Einstein's theory of space time) and Theodor Kaluza (whose geometry laid the foundation for string theory in physics). Copernicus came from the nearby port town of Frombork.

Arendt rebelled against German high schooling. She organized teenaged study circles with her friends to read and translate Greek texts. Expelled from high school, she took refuge in University of Berlin classes, most notably those of Romano Guardini.

Later, in Berlin and Paris, she had extensive contact with Jewish intellectuals, including influential Zionist (Jewish homeland nationalist) advocates such as Kurt Blumenfeld and Salmon Schocken. Arendt, who likened herself to a self-conscious pariah, admired the Zionist critique of Jewish assimilation in Protestant and Catholic Europe, but remained to the end of her life an anti-nationalist and a federalist. Her ideal of Israel was a settler federation encompassing Jews, Arabs, and other nationalities. In the 1940s she criticized the appeasement of the Nazis by some Jewish leaders and repeated this charge, to great controversy, in her report *Eichmann in Jerusalem* (1963).

Though she followed events in Europe closely, her intellectual life after 1951 was an American one. She became a paradigmatic example of a New York intellectual of the 1950s and 1960s. Her many New Yorker friends included the poets Randall Jarrell and W. H. Auden. Her closest friend from that world was the Catholic American novelist Mary McCarthy, with whom she shared many judgments on modern "mass society."

SUBSTANTIVE CONTRIBUTIONS

Arendt's masterpieces are *The Human Condition* (1958) and *On Revolution* (1963). They are classics – elegant, timeless, and profound. Her other major works circulate like orbs around these twin suns. The essay collections *Between Past and Future* (1961) and *Crises of the Republic* (1972) underscore and amplify the themes of *On Revolution*. *The Life of the Mind* (1981) develops ideas originally sketched in *The Human Condition* into a multivolume work. Arendt's life's work has a marvelous unity throughout. Observations about twentieth century fascist and communist revolutions in *The Origins of Totalitarianism* (1951) were the starting point for her study of the eighteenth century French Revolution in *On Revolution*. The triptych structure of *The Human Condition* echoes the anti-Semitism–imperialism–racism structure (the "three pillars of hell") of the totalitarianism book, and is replayed in the tripartite meditation on thinking, willing, and judging in *The Life of the Mind*.

In *The Human Condition* Arendt divides human doing into three dimensions: labor, work, and action. Each dimension of this typology represents a confluence of social psychology, behavior, and institutions. Labor conjoins need psychology, survival behavior, and bureaucratic institutions. Human beings labor in order to consume – and consume in order to survive. Bureaucracies developed to coordinate labor on a large scale. History has seen many kinds of bureaucratic society, from early patrimonial to late imperial societies. Arendt observed how twentieth century totalitarian states like the Soviet Union and China also gravitated around the organization and ideology of labor. These were “body” politics in which a bureaucratic class that owed its existence to a political party orchestrated industrial and rural and prison slave labor on a vast and often irrational scale.

In Arendt’s eyes, labor had a number of defining characteristics, each of which were negated in work or action:

- Laboring is done with the human *body*. Its telltale sign is exhaustion.
- Labor’s products are *transient*. Whatever it produces is consumed more or less immediately. Labor is constantly needed to maintain and reproduce life. Some societies are dominated by laboring; in others, it shrinks to modest proportions. But no matter its social weight, the consumption goods it produces barely survive the act of being produced. Bread lasts a day. It is ephemeral – subject to swift decay. It leaves nothing behind.
- A labor centric society produces *nothing lasting*. It creates no durable artifices. Its building or its manufacture is notoriously shoddy. Its time horizons are short term. The fixation of the totalitarian party state on “five year plans” was typical of this.
- Labor is *repetitive*. Human beings labor to rest, and rest to labor. They consume in order to labor, and labor in order to consume. Labor has no beginning or end. It is unending toil. Its tasks are repeated day in and day out. The utopia of labor is abundance; a state where life’s necessities are easily come by, without back breaking toil.
- Labor is *private*. The products of labor are immediately incorporated and annihilated by the body’s life processes. Human beings hide from public attention the toil and sleep, pain and elation, consumption and defecation that dominate the life process. Labor fulfills needs that all human beings have, and yet these needs cannot be shared (my hunger can never be your hunger) and cannot even be fully communicated (how can I really describe my pain?).
- Labor is *urgent*. Human beings must eat and sleep. Labor serves the need to survive, but the desperation to survive also readily turns into its opposite: a lust for cruelty and death.

Class societies emerged when some individuals found ways of making peasants and slaves labor while others worked, traded, and ruled. Interestingly, though, Arendt did not regard labor centric societies as limited to patrimonial or totalitarian types. Even when labor in the field and factory shrank dramatically in modern automated societies, the ghostly imprint of labor remained when, as Arendt insisted, modern bureaucracies produced nothing of lasting significance, modern buyers were hooked on instant gratification, and modern industries produced goods that instantly wore out.

Permanence mattered to Arendt. Only through work are lasting things created. Work creates things or objects – artifices – that are durable. This is important because the human species makes its world out of these artifices. There is a crucial difference, Arendt insisted, between producing bread that lasts a day and building a temple that lasts centuries. The former appears and then disappears almost in the same instant; the latter endures through time. Just as the loaf of bread is ephemeral, so are human services and bureaucratic functions – even modern automated ones. Often, their only material effect is records. Information technologies and systems are one of the few ways human beings objectify intangible services and functions. Bureaucracy is only immortalized through its files. Arendt observed that even thinking (the activity of the philosopher) left nothing behind it. It took others (Plato, etc.) to make something of the

thoughts of Socrates – to create a work from the labor of thought.

On the whole, Arendt preferred work to labor, and action to work. Labor satisfied hungers. Work produced durable objects. Action created new beginnings. Action was the highest form of human behavior. This was because human beings, Arendt thought, have an impulse to be “unique.” They believe their identities (the symbolic representation of their selves) to be distinctive. It is action that allows a person to disclose to others “who I am” by beginning something new – something that is not a retread of what has come before. This happens on small and large scales. Yet action risks futility. Initiatives frequently fail either because they have no support or else because no one records them. A person can begin something new but fail to make it last. Unlike artifacts, actions have a will o’ the wisp quality if they cannot be objectivated in institutions and stories.

Action is like Socrates’ thoughts without Plato to record them. The human challenge is: how can my “I” last? In other words, how can “I” be remembered? How can “my” self be immortalized? One answer is that human beings perform acts that are sufficiently memorable that someone will tell a story about those acts. Storytelling turns acts into worldly artifices. To become worldly, human deeds and events and patterns of thought must be reified. They must be turned into things or objects – books, paintings, sculptures, monuments, or documents. Human beings witness deeds. They remember them. They reify the memory of those deeds. The fleeting moment is thus materialized. This materialization is a kind of workmanship. The worldliness of a material record (“what’s in the file”) provides reliability of recall that human memory cannot match. Everyone knows how unreliable human recollection is – notwithstanding the memory feats of oral societies. What makes the human world, including materialized memories, reliable is that things in the world that surround human beings are relatively permanent. These worldly things are more permanent than the actions they record, and more permanent than actors’ lives and deeds.

Human beings constantly tell stories about each other’s doings. The storytelling – and

ultimately the books – of the novelist or the playwright fix this for generations in the case of great heroes. But, mostly, human beings are not great heroes. Most stories told about them are not art but institutional narratives – from the Domesday book to corporate storytelling. Some narratives are stories of failure – the doomed initiative, the project that went awry. Some are stories of achievement. The latter tell us how individual actions are turned into worldly structures. Some of these stories are gripping. They show us how many of the greatest achievements in history were almost failures.

Arendt sought to explain that initiatives or “actions” succeed only when others pledge themselves to carry forward the initiative. That’s how power is created. A leader initiates and others commit themselves to abide by and expand the initiative. When initiative and commitment persist, a worldly structure like a city or state, institution or association comes into being. Few human beings are present in the heroic moment “right at the very beginning” of this process. There are few Solons or Henry Fords. But those who come later replicate the initiatives and commitments of the founder titans. Most people are remembered not for their heroism but for participating in an ongoing collective artifice or world making. Those who “participate in power” are remembered for their collective achievement. Stories are told about the making of great republics, commonwealths, towns, cities, and institutions. We do remember the Athenians and the Venetians. Their characters are distinctive. They do escape oblivion.

One of the most important things Arendt realized is that the story of great collective achievement applied with equal force to the New York and Chicago of her day as it had done to Paris in the nineteenth century or to Berlin in the early twentieth century. She understood without illusion that power had crossed the Atlantic from Europe to America. Mid twentieth century Europe had produced violence instead of power – on a daunting scale. The totalitarianism of the Nazis and Stalinists had substituted destruction for self sustaining action. With this in mind, Arendt set out in *On Revolution* to explain the different political trajectories of Europe and the US in the modern age.

In Europe, the idea of revolution arose out of the mental ideals of laboring. Jacobin and communist outpourings from the French Revolution seized on “bread” rather than freedom as the major objective of revolution. This explained the difference between the American and European conception of politics. The American beginning was prosperous, Arendt noted. Colonists had access to plenty of land and good wages. Poverty – “the social question” – did not affect America in its early days. Europe, in contrast, was bedeviled by poverty. Thinking they would end this scourge, Europeans encouraged the poor to enter the public realm. European modernity recognized “the rights of man.” Political entitlements were due to all human beings, including the dispossessed by reason of birth or nature. Arendt was skeptical of this. She wondered aloud whether “by birth or by nature” was not loaded dice. Arendt equated nature with life – with pre-political bodily processes. When the modern continental revolutions opened the public realm to the poor, they unwittingly opened the door to desperation. For “the rights of man” became the rights of the hungry. Churches, noblesse oblige, and civic charities outside the political realm had previously cared for the downtrodden. When the rights of man prevailed, the idea of revolution acquired the force of nature. It suddenly appeared in history as an implacable torrent like force – making the same insistent demands on a mass scale that the hungry and the desperate made on an individual or group scale. The French idea of revolution took up where the bodily processes of life and labor left off. Social movements that were raging frenzies drove it. When the poor entered the public realm en masse for the first time in human history, politics became the politics of neediness. It acquired an urgent, insistent, violent, crushing character. History became surrounded by an aura of inevitability. Freedom became a kind of necessity. Terror and mass murder were legitimated by this necessity. In this atmosphere, the political philosophies of Hegel and Marx were born.

Arendt contrasted three alternative models to the French Revolution. The first was the great historic city oligarchies ruled by citizen peers – from Aristotle’s Athens to

Machiavelli’s Florence. The second was Edmund Burke’s England, where the rights of man were resisted in favor of the historical rights of an “English person” embodied in an unwritten constitution. Arendt drew a certain tacit flavor from Burke: she was enduringly skeptical about the declarations and proclamations of human rights. She had been a stateless person, and understood the fragility of that condition. Rights not embodied in the law of the state were worthless. Humanity was an inherently stateless condition. She cautioned against woolly schemes to create a world state. Who wants to live under a world police, she reasoned?

The third model that Arendt contrasted to the French Revolution was the American Revolution. This was the model that Arendt most cherished. It represented a public order that (in Burke’s sense) was not universal but that nonetheless was capable of enlargement. Arendt loved America and the American Revolution because they promised new worlds and new beginnings, yet also ways of stabilizing what was new and making it permanent.

New beginnings were a kind of disclosure. In political action, actors disclose who they are by beginning something. The impetus of the American Revolution was to extend the “right to act” to all Americans – no matter whether they were old or young, rich or poor, high or low, wise or foolish, ignorant or learned. The Europeans, including the famous observer of America Alexis de Tocqueville, thought of this as “democracy.” The Americans in contrast thought of it as “republicanism.” The difference in terminology mattered. The American republic retained something of the spirit of the ancient and Renaissance city republics. This was echoed in the American passion for distinction. Distinction requires public life. The public realm is the place where actors can excel, and thereby distinguish themselves. At times Arendt hinted that the public realm and the republic were virtually identical. She never identified the American republic with its written constitution.

Arendt agreed that law was a restraint on despotism, and that classical republics always thought of themselves as the enemies of despotism. But she did not think of a republic just as a negation of tyranny. She thought of

it as a positive force that induced public happiness, not merely freedom from dictatorship. Public happiness was created by the wide spread participation of citizens – and resident aliens – in the public realm. The public sphere was the space where individuals could appear. It was the worldly artifact where citizens and others could reveal and display their initiative – their freedom to begin. The law of the constitution helped create the boundaries of the public space. But public happiness depended not on law but on participation in the public realm. Public happiness depended on human selves being lifted out of the obscurity of private life into the visibility of the public. Such a lift could be nerve wracking. Public speaking rates as most people's greatest fear. What Arendt reasoned, though, was that only in the public realm could individuals gain recognition for their distinctive abilities and characters. Human beings gained recognition when their initiatives drew the attention or support of their fellows. It was these initiatives that allowed individuals to distinguish themselves and to be remembered by their peers.

Only those who “act” will be remembered, because they will have stories told about them. Others will be forgotten. Notorious criminals and dictatorial mass murderers are cited by history. But they are remembered only for their failure to leave anything constructive behind them. They create mayhem but no power. They leave a trail of violence but no achievement. Creating worldly structures requires finding others to cooperate in initiatives. For this, a public realm is crucial. Why the American Revolution succeeded and the French Revolution failed was that the Americans found a way of replacing violence with power – through public action and promise making.

Privacy, Arendt believed, was for subjects, not citizens. In private, persons could be happy. She herself was a private person who enjoyed the company of her family and friends. She also knew that duty weighed heavily on great public figures. But she rejected the idea that private matters of welfare and property were the proper ends of government. Thus, she wondered aloud, whether the outcome of the American Revolution – two centuries on – had not been ambivalent. It could hardly

be denied that contemporary Americans judged government according to whether it delivered prosperity and welfare (“jobs and insurance”). This propensity, though, was not born of a history of poverty. Need did not become a factor in American life till the great immigrant waves of the nineteenth century. By that time, American political ideals were already in place. Arendt instead thought that a fatal passion for sudden riches haunted American public life. She couldn't quite make up her mind where this passion came from.

She acknowledged that a good republic needed to be liberated from poverty, otherwise necessity would rule politics. But she knew that liberation did not by itself produce a successful system of power. Liberation did not cause people to act in concert. Americans were good at acting in concert, but also – seemingly – were distracted from this by their passion for consumer wealth. Arendt's explanation of this was that the poor had their own vision of wealth, and that vision had inveigled its way into American life. The poor idealized material abundance and endless consumption. Arendt found herself in agreement with the “mass society” critics of the 1950s: America had developed a passion for consumption, the wealth of a laboring society. Its counter was a Doric interpretation of republicanism that said that freedom and luxury were incompatible, and that frugality was the mainstay of freedom. In short, prosperity, through the medium of luxury, threatened the public realm.

This argument could easily be stood on its head, though. It is equally plausible that wealth is a byproduct of “acting in concert,” and that American capitalism was bounteous because of – and not despite – its civic foundations. Arendt would not have agreed. For her, prosperity and necessity destroyed republics. Both turned human beings into private creatures. Prosperity encouraged the private life of consumption, while necessity justified the isolated life of violence. Both were inimical to the public realm.

Revolutions of the French type demonstrated the fateful relation between necessity and violence and privacy. Such revolutions substituted violence for power. Violence was the medium of those who stood alone. Power, in contrast, was a product of public life.

Power arose out of cooperation and interaction between persons. The thing that most distinguished the French type revolutions, as they spread around the world, was not the power of those who participated in them but their powerlessness. Notwithstanding their awesome effects, terror and destruction were impotent. They always ended in social demoralization and depression.

Arendt had a high opinion of power. She did not share the view of most twentieth century intellectuals that power corrupts. Equally, she rejected the idealization of impotence. Impotence always leads to rage and infatuation with violence. She was skeptical of the *enragés* who reveled in self pity, powerlessness, and humiliation, and who created movements and states that were violent but impotent. Impotence could be seen in the inability of such movements and states to leave anything worldly and lasting behind them. Constructive acts in the human domain require cooperation. Cooperation is a public medium. It emerges through interaction in public space. Public actors start things. Others perpetuate these beginnings through stories and commitments. Stories and commitments are public media. When the capacity to begin is combined with the capacity to tell stories and to make commitments to things that are ongoing, power is created. Successful societies endow their institutions with power. Societies that are impotent substitute violence and terror for power.

The ultimate failure of impotent revolutions is their inability to create and grow power. This, Arendt judged, was one of the reasons why the American Revolution had been so successful. It was a mistake then to equate America with “limited government.” Yes, its legislators and administrators are subject to the rule of law. Yes, it has a written constitution that regulates relations between the various branches and levels of government. But the point of all of this is not to limit government but to augment power.

The American system of power began in a simple public covenant, the Mayflower Compact, drawn up by the pilgrims as they crossed the Atlantic on their way to settle in America. In response to proposals, and through mutual promises, the pilgrims created a “civil body politic” and the instruments of government.

Power is precisely the union of initiative and commitment. It is different from strength, which is the capacity of individuals in isolation to resist pressure and violence. Power is also different from violence. Violence is born of isolation. The suspicious nature and paranoia of dictators tell us much about the isolative character of violence. Power comes into being when persons join together for purposes of action. By combination and mutual promise human beings create stable worldly structures to house their combined power of action. Americans created a lot of these worldly structures. They created towns, cities, counties, and states. But they didn’t just create worldly structures – they combined them. Out of multiple states, for example, they created a federal union of states – the United States.

Arendt thought Americans were sometimes neglectful. They missed opportunities to incorporate cities into the federal union and they often forgot about their revolutionary past. Yet they also had a genius for increasing or augmenting power. Part of that genius rested on respect for grassroots action. The origin of American power was “the people.” “The people” are a collective character – persons who come together in order to act. This image of popular action was immortalized by Tocqueville’s depiction of the American talent for voluntary association. But Americans created vast numbers of compulsory and collective bodies as well: states and cities. Just as crucially, they discovered an ingenious way of combining these powers through mechanisms of balance or equilibrium. They were inspired to do this by ancient political theories. Such arrangements enabled power to be stopped when it went astray, but to be preserved and increased at the same time. The Americans found a way of enlarging their republic without simply relying on expansion or conquest. The idea of a union of states laid the basis for a republic that had features akin to the classic city republics but which was of unprecedented size. Beyond its borders, the US achieved further enlargement of its power through alliances and treaties. Like the original promises that created America’s first institutions, treaties and alliances created durable worldly structures across the face of the earth. This allowed America to reach out on a global scale

without encountering the disadvantages that attend a world state.

Power does many things. It builds, it organizes, and it legislates. But how does it legitimize itself? Power invariably attracts critics. How do those with power justify their acts? They can appeal to the origin of power in “the people.” This justification often faces practical impediments, though. A “people” may pledge to create and maintain a legislature, but lawmakers can still make bad laws. Thus, holders of power have to justify their acts independent of “the people.” They do this in a number of ways: appealing to transcendental justifications for their acts, to self-evidence, and to beginnings. Arendt rejected transcendental justifications of action, such as the appeal to the higher law of God or the higher law of the Revolution that the Jacobins, Nazis, and Bolsheviks relied on. Transcendence equaled necessity, and thus confounded freedom. Arendt also rejected self-evidence as a satisfactory justification of power. She admired Jefferson, but took issue with his formula “We hold these truths to be self-evident.” Self-evidence is a kind of mathematical necessity, and Arendt was suspicious of any necessity in politics – even in the American Declaration of Independence. While geometric axioms might be self-evident, the principles of politics, Arendt thought, were not. If “we” freely agree, then “our” agreement should not be coerced by truth. Politics is properly a function of opinion not of truth.

This was one of the weaker aspects of Arendt’s theorizing. It is not clear that opinion is always an effective medium for lending initiatives support. Jefferson was right. Self-evidence plays a powerful role in mobilizing allegiance. Why Arendt missed this is pretty obvious. From storytelling to promising, all her media of politics are linguistic in nature. But self-evidence works through showing, not saying. Arguments and opinions can pressure and threaten. So can images that “send a message.” Self-evidence, though, relies not on delivering messages but on showing patterns that everyone already intuitively knows. Like much of ancient Greek thought, Plato’s republic rested on the tacit geometry of proportionality. Arendt was skeptical of Plato’s “public worker,” the demiurge, who she

thought created a political artifact like a carpenter builds a table – keeping a pattern in mind. This smacked of violent behavior (hammering) carried on in isolation (by the lonely artisan). But, in fact, the most complex types of voluntary cooperation (e.g., creating and maintaining a city) work because actions can be framed in terms of self-evident patterns that do not require articulation or verbal agreement. Unsurprisingly, then, many of the American founders were deists, including Jefferson. Arendt interpreted this as a residual attempt by them to justify actions by appeals to the rewards and punishments of heaven. But, given Jefferson’s Epicureanism, Arendt’s interpretation makes no sense.

American deism simply asserted that there were absolutes in nature: not commandments, but self-organizing pattern or order. Arendt, however, was skeptical of all appeals to nature. Nature equated with urgency. Urgency equated with violence. Thus, the authority of American power could not rest on self-evidence. Nonetheless, it was erected on an absolute. This absolute, Arendt argued, was not coercive. It was the absolute of beginnings. Not nature, but the natal condition legitimated power. Power existed to provide the worldly house of action. Action provided the justification of power. The initiative of the lawmaker or the policymaker was justified by the idea of inauguration or beginning (again). Here Arendt entered into difficult but productive terrain. At first glance her argument looks contradictory. When people act, they begin something new. Action is fragile. Its products can evaporate; its deeds can be forgotten. Power allows persons to perpetuate their acts. Power derives from agreements among people whose desire to act is such that they will bind themselves to their own creations. This suggests that durability trumps change and that permanence overwrites initiative. In fact, if they do not, the effort to initiate and create has been pointless: time will erode our deeds and turn our life from something meaningful into something meaningless. Arendt sought to escape the paradox of “the new and the lasting” in this way: the thing that is most lasting in a state is the act of foundation. The foundation is an act that lasts. All the best deeds in a state imitate this act that lasts.

The ultimate justification of law and policy is to initiate something that lasts.

Arendt thought that the Americans took the idea of the act that lasts from the Romans. Central to Roman religion was the notion of being bound back to the beginning of Rome. This piety provided authority for the city state. This authority was invested, most visibly, in the Roman Senate. The Roman “people” had power, and the Roman Senate exercised authority. The authority of the Senators stemmed from their origins in the citizen ruling class of early republican Rome that had overthrown kingship. The Americans relied on something analogous – and not simply because they ousted the English Crown. Take the case of the American Supreme Court. It is a power that checks the behavior of other powers in the Republic by interpreting and applying constitutional law. Its power, however, rests on authority. Its authority – what legitimates its power – derives from it being tied back to the original act of constitution making. The American Constitution was an act of the American people – an initiative agreed to in a popular vote. The authority of the Supreme Court derives from the unbroken line that ties the present day Constitution back to the original act of making the Constitution. Importantly, though, this continuity is also a procession of change. The US Constitution is a worldly legal artifice that is periodically revised, amended, and added to. It is an act that has lasted; it has lasted because it is subjected to periodic initiatives that alter it. The voting public accepts some initiatives and rejects others. Amendments augment the Constitution. Augmentation is the key to the authority or legitimacy of power, Arendt thought. Augmentation permits the old and the durable to be changed without being disposed of. This makes change an expression of stability, and innovation a manifestation of permanence. Thus, Arendt could conclude that the “absolute” lies in the beginning, because the beginning is conservative while conservation is achieved through alteration.

This dialectic of initiative and stability is neither prosaic nor procedural. Rather, it is a great drama and the stuff of brilliant stories. What *On Revolution* did was to tell America’s foundation story in philosophical terms.

Arendt’s model for this was Virgil’s story of the wanderings of Aeneas after the burning of Troy. As the story goes, Aeneas’ joining of Latins and Trojans prefigures Rome’s creation out of the merger of Latins and Sabines. But this act of foundation, though a new beginning, is replete with the myth history of earlier Greek heroes and gods. This myth history placates the arbitrariness implicit in any beginning. What is new can be intensely willful. It can start processes that have unintended and even dreadful consequences. To the extent that initiative relies on will, it is arbitrary. Its philosophical conundrum is: why this and not something else? The answer, Arendt thought, was to reinsert the act of foundation back into a temporal continuity that the will otherwise destroys. The idea of foundation as a refoundation – America as a new Rome – achieves exactly this.

Arendt stressed that refoundation was different from the Christian idea of the beginning of things as an act of creation that is entirely new. In Arendt’s Virgilian model, the act of foundation is a creation out of something, not a creation out of nothing. In this manner, Arendt attempts to answer the question of how we can civilize the arbitrariness inherent in all beginnings. If this civilizing does not happen, then new beginnings may simply license the human potential for crime. Every despot proclaims a new order. This new order always ends up being a horrible, chaotic, violent mess. It is a beginning that plunges society into violence and bestiality. It is a beginning that is devoured by its own effects. It is a beginning that ends in murder. One way of logically avoiding this is to say that the legitimate absolute is the new beginning that is not an absolute new beginning. Thus, Virgil’s mythical Rome was a creation that was in part a recreation of the fraternal compact of Aeneas’ Trojan expatriates. America was the creation that was in part a recreation of Rome. All birth, which naturally equips human beings to begin, is also a matter of lineage.

Arendt observed that America after the colonial and revolutionary eras broke with the classical past. It began down its own path of “absolute novelty.” Given its several beginnings (compacts, independence, revolution,

constitution) it no longer needed to cast itself as a recreation of the past. It now entered history as a *sui generis* actor. It had its own past filled with foundation acts. What saved these acts of beginning from their own arbitrariness is that each act of beginning carried its own principle within itself. Each act of beginning was an absolute. Each was an absolute because it inspired subsequent deeds that replicated the “first” beginning. Arendt imagines a circle of legitimation: what happens afterwards validates the inaugural act, while later acts are validated by first beginnings. This circle of American history was a pragmatic absolute. The absolute was absolute because it worked.

RELEVANCE TO SOCIOLOGY

Arendt casts light on many of the great problems of classical sociology, ranging from the nature of labor in Marx to the nature of the state in Weber. But, more crucially still, she adapts these themes, which had begun as European questions, to the horizon of the “new world.” By doing this, she creates an indispensable model for any future “sociology of the new world.” In this sociology, America rivals Europe for the production of themes. As the phrase indicates, the master theme of any “new world” sociology is the question of the creation of “new worlds” and all of the paradoxes such an idea invariably generates.

Arendt was a philosopher of social creation. Her principal European peer in this was Cornelius Castoriadis. His work has similar resonances for sociology. The most powerful thing that distinguishes Arendt’s work from Castoriadis’s is that Castoriadis’s rumination on creation was a reflection on the West and its fading energies – what he called its rising tide of insignificance. Arendt likewise knew in her bones that Europe had become impotent after the plague of totalitarianism. With her spiritual home in America, though, she was also in a position to see that the new world had what Europe had lost – escalating energies and power.

Thus, among her many contributions, perhaps her greatest achievement was to begin to chart ways of thinking about new world societies. Arendt was schooled in European social

thought, so there never could have been a question of her postulating an absolute hiatus between Europe and America. Not that there was one in any case. But nobody thought harder, more deeply, or more seriously about what it means to create a “new world” in the new world. For any future Weber of North American or Australasian sociology, the paradoxes that Arendt posed – the paradoxes of time and creation, change and permanence, arbitrariness and principle – will be forever the inescapable beginning of understanding the social constitution of the strange new worlds of the migrants who settled on distant shores and the Europeans who left Europe and its discontents behind them.

SEE ALSO: Communism; Fascism; Political Sociology; Revolutions; Totalitarianism

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Aron, Raymond (1905–83)

Dusko Sekulic

Raymond Aron was a French sociologist, philosopher, political actor, and commentator. Before World War II, he lectured at several

French universities, including Le Havre and Bordeaux. In 1930 he defended his doctoral thesis, *Introduction to the Philosophy of History*, which was published as a book and widely reviewed in Europe and the United States. After graduating, he spent the period 1930–3 in Germany and observed the rise to power of National Socialism. In 1935 he published *German Sociology*, in which he made the distinction between “systematic” and “historical” sociology. Systematic sociology was concerned with “fundamental social relations, types of social groups [and] the static structure of society,” while historical sociology focused on the “laws, or at least the theory, of the development of the bourgeois society” (Aron 1957 [1935]: 2).

Within systematic sociology he distinguished between formal sociology (Simmel and von Wiese), the sociology of society and community (Tönnies), phenomenological sociology (Vierkant), and universalistic sociology (Spann). Within historical sociology he classified Oppenheimer, the cultural sociology of Alfred Weber, and Mannheim’s sociology of knowledge. The greatest attention and praise, however, was paid to Max Weber, “without any doubt, the greatest of German sociologists” (Aron 1957 [1935]: 67). Weber’s influence is present in all of Aron’s work and Aron’s stature in modern sociology has been compared with that of Max Weber. When Aron was presented with the Goethe Prize in 1979, Dahrendorf declared: “Raymond Aron is the only social scientist of recent decades who . . . may be compared in terms of significance with Max Weber” (Dahrendorf 1989: 30).

The analogy with Max Weber can be extended to intellectual preoccupations. Like Weber, Aron “became a sociologist in a long and intense debate with the ghost of Karl Marx” (Albert Salomon in Gurvitch & Moore 1945: 596). Aron’s sociology is a constant debate with the heirs of Marx in their communist totalitarian form. This consistent theoretical criticism of Marxism earned Aron a certain isolation within French sociology, which was heavily influenced by Marxism. However, that did not diminish his influence on the general intellectual and political scene in France.

In 1940, Aron joined *Free French* in England and from 1940 to 1944 was editor of *La France Libre*. After the war he continued to write as a journalist (with *Figaro* from 1947), was a member of editorial boards of influential journals like *Combat* and *Les Temps modernes*, and held political positions such as *directeur de cabinet* in Malraux’s Ministry of Education. In 1955 he was appointed professor of sociology at the Sorbonne, and in 1970 he became professor of sociology at the Modern Civilization Collège de France. He was also co editor of the *European Journal of Sociology*.

As subtitles of Colquhoun’s (1986) biography indicate, before the war Aron was more preoccupied with the philosophical problems where (especially after his appointment to the Sorbonne) his writing went more in a “sociological direction.” Aron (1978) himself divided his contribution to sociology into four major areas: (1) the analysis of contemporary ideologies with *The Opium of the Intellectuals* (1955), the most comprehensive example of that problem; (2) the analysis of the concept of industrial society in *Eighteen Lectures on Industrial Society* (1963) and *The Industrial Society* (1966); (3) the analysis of international relations and warfare in *The Century of Total War* (1951), *Peace and War* (1961), *The Great Debate* (1963), *De Gaulle, Israel, and the Jews* (1968), *The Imperial Republic* (1973), and *Clausewitz* (1976); and (4) the analyses of modern political systems and movements in *Democracy and Totalitarianism* (1965), *An Essay on Freedom* (1965), *The Elusive Revolution* (1968), and *Progress and Disillusion* (1969).

At the beginning of the 1960s Aron wrote an influential introduction to sociological theory, *Main Currents in Sociological Thought* (first volume in 1960, the second in 1962). Beside treatments of Comte, Marx, Pareto, Weber, and Durkheim, there is an extensive discussion on Montesquieu with special emphasis on Alexis de Tocqueville. The idea for this book came to him as a consequence of attending the World Congress of Sociology at Stresa, in Northern Italy, in September 1959. Aron wondered whether there were commonalities between Marxist sociology, advocated by the sociologists from Eastern Europe, and empirical sociology, especially in its American tradition. The purpose of that book was a

“return to origin,” to show that sociology, Marxist or otherwise, has a common origin, and that Weber could not be understood without Marx, or Durkheim without Comte.

The inclusion of Tocqueville was unusual because he was not usually considered one of the “fathers” of sociology. But one sentence explains Aron’s affinity for Tocqueville: “Instead of giving priority either to industrial reality, as Comte did, or to the capitalist reality, as Marx did, he gave priority to the democratic reality” (Aron 1969: 183). For him, the political was always an autonomous dimension of social life. The mode of concentration or dispersion of political power and the relation of such concentration or dispersion to freedom and liberty were the key elements of his analysis. For him, political institutions and processes were not mere reflections of the industrial base or capitalist relations. They are independent spheres of human action and also a dimension for evaluation of different societal types.

Aron can be rightly called a great liberal of modern sociology. For him, liberty and reason were not abstract concepts, dogmas, or ideologies but the epitome of old republican virtues embedded in social institutions. Ideologies, the “opium of the intellectuals,” were the perversion of the spirit of reason and liberty, and they constituted the greatest threat to the institutions on which these great virtues are based. In that sense, Aron is one of the last great sociologists of the Enlightenment, although without the naïve belief in endless progress, as demonstrated in *Progress and Disillusion* (1968).

SEE ALSO: Communism; Ideology; Marxism and Sociology; Tocqueville, Alexis de; Totalitarianism; Weber, Max

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art worlds

Diana Crane

One of the most influential ideas in the sociology of art, the concept of an art world provides the basis for a sociological orientation for understanding the arts, in contrast to artist centered approaches favored in other disciplines. Art worlds have both social and cultural components. The concept of an art world implies that art is a collective activity, rather than the product of solitary genius. The cultural bases for cooperation among actors in art worlds are shared commitments to artistic conventions that define what is considered to be art in a specific period and how it should be produced.

The production and distribution of art in art worlds is characterized by an extensive division of labor. Many people who do not define themselves as artists provide some essential material or service that is required for the creation or dissemination of artworks. A partial list of occupations on which painters depend include manufacturers of painting equipment, art dealers, art collectors, museum curators, critics, aestheticians, state bureaucrats, members of the public, and other painters. Placing the artist in the context of an art world demystifies art and artistic genius because it reveals that the creative process is similar for major and minor artists. The process of creating an artwork is not confined to activities that take place in an artist’s studio

but involves a variety of opportunities and constraints that are shaped by the nature of the social organization of the art world to which the artist belongs.

This approach rejects the conventional analysis of meaning in artworks, based on an evaluation of their social or aesthetic significance. Artworks are not interpreted as reflecting or commenting on social life. Instead, the meanings of artworks are embodied in the conventions that are used to create them. The formulation of aesthetic judgments by sociologists of art is not acceptable. Aesthetic assessments are part of the collective activity of art worlds. Through their interactions with one another, artists develop shared agreements about the worth of the works they are creating.

The concept of an art world was defined and extensively analyzed by Howard Becker, using a wide range of materials drawn from many different types of art, both popular and elite. The publication of his book *Art Worlds* in 1982 marked the beginning of a renewed interest among American sociologists in the sociology of art. The concept is powerful because it can be applied to many different types of creative activities, ranging from the plastic arts, literature, music, photography, and fashion, to culture industries such as film, television, and popular music. Issues related to different aspects of art worlds that sociologists have explored and debated in the past two decades include the following.

Culture creators and support personnel. Becker identified four categories of artists, each of whom had a different relationship with contemporary art worlds: integrated professionals, mavericks, folk artists, and naïve artists. Artists who belong to art worlds are “integrated professionals.” They are confronted with similar types of constraints and opportunities, which affect their access to resources for making art. Artists who are not “integrated professionals” are relegated to the margins of the art world. Mavericks generally begin their careers in conventional art worlds but, because of their commitment to types of innovations that are too radical for members of those art worlds to accept, they withdraw from those social networks and lose the types of support they provide. By contrast, folk

artists are not members of conventional art worlds and do not think of themselves as artists producing artworks. Instead they generally belong to local communities of people engaged in the same type of activity. Becker uses the example of quilting as performed by housewives in farm communities. Finally, naïve artists have also had no contact with conventional art worlds and no artistic training but tend to work by themselves. Some of their works resemble certain types of conventional painting while others are virtually unique.

A number of studies have attempted to show how “outsider” artists working in non elite art worlds are similar to or different from “integrated professionals.” Finney (1997) suggests that, given the multiplicity of art worlds today, the terms “insider” and “outsider” are relative. For the individual, the definition of insider and outsider depends on her location in a particular art world. For those who take a larger perspective, the terms are inherently unstable, shifting over time in response to sociological, cultural, and aesthetic trends.

Conventions or shared understandings of what cultural works should be like. Becker approaches the meaning of artworks through an analysis of the conventions on which they are based. For example, he contrasts the artist’s conventions with those of the craftsman. The conventions embodied in art objects are lack of utility, absence of virtuosity, indifference to beauty, and uniqueness in the sense that the artist is constantly challenging and replacing conventions for specific forms of art and cherishes her autonomy in relation to collectors and dealers. The conventions of the craftsman are exactly the opposite: uniformity in the production of series of objects, demonstration of skill in the creation of useful or beautiful objects, and fidelity to the client’s demands. Failing to observe conventional procedures is a way for an artist to express her autonomy and freedom but it is likely to impede recognition. Breaking artistic conventions often disturbs an artist’s relationships with other actors in the art world and with the public. Familiarity with conventions is an important indicator of differences among art publics as well.

Organizations in which artworks are displayed, performed, or produced. Three types of

organizations that perform important roles in the production of artworks have been identified (Gilmore 1987). Small organizations embedded in social networks of artists provide settings for continuous feedback among creators and between creators, critics, and audiences. This seems to be especially conducive for the creation of works that are either aesthetically original or ideologically provocative or both. Small profit oriented businesses encourage artists to produce works that are pleasing and profitable. Non profit organizations tend to emphasize the preservation of existing artistic traditions rather than the creation of new ones. Funds from federal, state, and local governments that contributed to the support and expansion of the organizational infrastructure of avant garde art worlds have greatly diminished, with negative consequences for the continued production of this type of art (Pagani 2001).

Gatekeepers, who evaluate cultural works. To sell their work and extend their influence beyond the confines of their immediate social networks, creators must obtain a nucleus of supporters or a “constituency” in the art world or on its periphery. In the case of the artist, this is usually drawn from art galleries, museums, art journals, collectors, and corporations. Three models of the gatekeeping process have been proposed: objective appraisal in terms of existing aesthetic criteria, cultural persuasion based on the development of new aesthetic criteria, and social influence in which success is engineered through personal influence and the availability of material resources (Mulkay & Chaplin 1982). Studies of artistic careers indicate that the first model, which Becker calls “the conventional theory of reputation,” is least likely to explain artistic success (Finney 1997).

Audiences. Becker differentiates between serious and occasional audiences on the basis of how much they know about the nature of artistic conventions, about how they are being used, and about how they are changing at a particular time. People’s experience of art is strongly influenced by their awareness and understanding of the conventions on which it is based. The values they express in their judgments about art reflect their level of understanding of artistic conventions.

Characteristics of potential audiences are a major factor in determining what types of cultural works are displayed, performed, or sold in a particular urban setting. Artworks produced in different types of organizational contexts vary depending on the social class of the audiences that typically consume them (Crane 1992). Cultural products directed at audiences drawn primarily from the middle or upper class tend to be defined as “high culture,” while those aimed at minority or lower class groups tend to be defined as ethnic or popular culture.

Comparisons of art worlds. Many studies have examined how art worlds vary within cities, in large as compared to small cities, in different countries, and in elite and non elite art forms. Implicitly or explicitly, the avant garde art world in New York is generally used as the exemplar against which other types of creative activities are compared. For example, studies of non elite art worlds generally show that they include some but not all aspects of the components of elite art worlds.

Critiques and new directions. Becker’s analysis of how an art world operates is central to our understanding of the production of culture but it has been criticized for overemphasizing the social and organizational aspects of artistic creation, for reducing elite arts to the status of non elite arts, and for neglecting the impact of social and political institutions. Others claim that its treatment of aesthetic issues and meaning is superficial. In its original form, this approach emphasized consensus, cooperation, and coordination in art worlds rather than conflicts among artists and other actors who control material and symbolic resources. This orientation discouraged attention to artistic controversies, as well as ideological and political aspects of the arts.

For some observers, the weaknesses in Becker’s concept of an art world are the strengths of Bourdieu’s (1993) concept of a cultural field. While both concepts are designed to characterize the relationship between creators and their social environments, Bourdieu’s approach emphasizes the opposition between elite and non elite arts, their connections with social class, and their ideological and aesthetic foundations. Recent work is moving toward a synthesis of the two approaches, including a

conceptualization of the aesthetic and ideological foundations of the arts that overcomes the limitations of an approach based mainly on artistic conventions.

Methods. Studies of art worlds have generally been based on interviews and ethnographic research. Following Becker, researchers have tended to interpret their data by constructing typologies of different types of artists or of activities related to the production and dissemination of art. The focus of most studies has been on the activities of small groups of creators, small organizations involved in display, performance, or dissemination of art works in urban settings, and the publics for these works. The concept has been less useful for understanding cultural production in large organizations located in cultural industries, where creators are faced with different types of pressures and rewards.

SEE ALSO: Culture; Culture, Production of

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'asabiyya

Georg Stauth

'*Asabiyya* (of Beduin, pre Islamic, secular origin: from 'asaba, to bind, to fold, to wind, and 'asâba, the group of male relatives) is one of the most important concepts of the social history of the Arabs and of Islam. Meaning a basic form of social and material human relations, it is a concept which integrates biological, geographical, social, and cultural terms. It is central to Ibn Khaldun's (1332-1406) theory of civilization ('umran), as discussed in his famous *Muqaddima* (Ibn Khaldun 1967, I: 269-8, 313-27). '*Asabiyya* became one of the most daring sociological concepts. Today, it is of importance with respect to global issues and intracultural discourse between Islam and the West and about the "heritage" of political structures in Muslim societies.

Rosenthal's (1932) translation of the *Muqaddima* reads '*asabiyya* in mere terms of "group feeling." Diverse French and German translations use "esprit de corps," "idea of nationhood," "cohesiveness," or "solidarity" among segmentary tribal or nomadic groups. Schimmel (1951) would refrain from translating it at all. A complex reading associates '*asabiyya* not only with group solidarity but also with the striving for sovereignty within and among tribal or family groups. In this sense, '*asabiyya* also means strong societal effects of solidarity determining the vitality of dynastic or state institutions. In fact, '*asabiyya* could be referred to merely in terms of sociopolitical vitality, not only with respect to the condition of states (nomadism, urbanism), but also to the foundation and expansion of religious doctrine, and of knowledge, rationality, and science. In its most abstract and absolute sense '*asabiyya* seems to be identical with "power," including the reflection of the social sources of power formation (Simon 1959: 48 ff.).

Durkheim, with his concept of mechanical solidarity, seems to have considered the '*asabiyya* problematic. He departed from the classical view on societal formation and in contrast to Hobbes's self interest and the respective approaches on individualism, he

focused on "solidarity." He seems to have been influenced by Ibn Khaldun in this. A well debated French translation of Ibn Khaldun's *Muqaddima* by W. M. G. de Slane (Paris 1862–8) existed in Durkheim's lifetime. Taha Hussayn, the influential Egyptian nationalist philosopher, was a student of Durkheim's in Paris. He submitted his dissertation, however, as late as in 1917, the year when Durkheim died (Hussein 1917). 'Asabiyya is a theorem about the irreducibility of the social which resembles Durkheim's thesis of the community as the prior element of the social. Without any doubt, it is through Durkheim that the concept of 'asabiyya gained new importance both in Middle Eastern as well as in western sociology.

In Ibn Khaldun's "sociological studies" – "antedating modern European sociology by more than four centuries" (Grunebaum 1953: 339) – 'asabiyya is central to his cyclical model of civilizational construction. Modern sociologists depended on the metaphorical and structural translations of his formula, specifically with respect to the "Community–Society" (*Gemeinschaft–Gesellschaft*) divide in twentieth century social theory. "'Asabiyya is a sociopolitical structure which marks the transition from classless to a class society. The tribal aristocracy holds power only in so far as it is still integrated into egalitarian structures" (Lacoste 1984: 116).

'Asabiyya stands at the center of an empirical foundation of a general cyclical law inherent in processes of civilization. It includes a specific concept of social dynamism: tribal solidarity is the motor of renewing bloodless urban structures and institutions. Since nomads in general are people of desert lands and countryside, marginals in the real sense, sociology often understood 'asabiyya wrongly as a pure concept of social cohesion of tribal or local communities and similarly Islam as the religion of communal holism and static societies. Starting from this angle and neglecting the urban sources of Islam and the urban inclinations of 'asabiyya would mean giving little justice to Ibn Khaldun's civilizational theory and the fundamental position of 'asabiyya in it. Ibn Khaldun was the first to explain history and to take social development as the subject of theoretical consideration.

From there, 'asabiyya is involved in a type of rationality which in its reference to the broadest real institutional and visionary expansions remains tied to concerns of family and local group relations and their inherent genealogical sense; not preventing any type of functional technical rationality, however, but subsuming it to solidarity of (male) groups and the genealogy of blood ties and vitality.

'Asabiyya, in its conceptual generality, incorporates a variety of fields of social construction which renders it an ambiguous and paradoxical concept in the global field of sociology today. First, 'asabiyya appears as the very secular foundation of social dynamics between (tribal) egalitarianism and (dynastic) power construction. This denotes an ambiguous field of tension between solidarity and power. The concept is grounded in egalitarian kinship and brotherhood relationships, in which the extent of social cohesion becomes largely dependent on solidarity sentiments, "group feeling," and socio ecological conditions. The existence of the social group and its organization, 'asaba, is the material social condition of 'asabiyya. In this sense, 'asabiyya also appears as an abstracted idea of solidarity groupings within fragmented strata of urban civilization, as well as of military, political, and religious "chieftaincies whose composition varies greatly" (Lapidus 1990). On the other hand, Ibn Khaldun understands 'asabiyya in general as the moving force in social development; in a way, as an absolute turning point for gaining superiority of men, tribes, and nations over others, it moves towards kingship. Lack of 'asabiyya leads to loss of power. For Ibn Khaldun, the dialectics of "solidarity and kingship continue to be essential for the formation and sustenance of all political regimes" (Mahdi 1957: 198). More specifically, Ibn Khaldun distinguishes components of order and continuity and the effects of growing social differentiation. Kinship and group solidarity – whether real or imagined – support the sustenance of life. State power in its various forms depends largely on securing and reflecting immediate social ties of life sustenance. It is important to trace with 'asabiyya a kernel of a theory of "bio politics," state power moving from abstracted ideas of territorial control to genealogy, nutrition, and

strength of the population. In this sense, *'asabiyya* puts into the forefront of power construction a category which is at the center of the modern discourse of power: the sustenance, flourishing, and encapsulating of "naked life" (Agamben, Foucault) – here, of course, in the sense of a collective body.

In fact, *'asabiyya* relates to a sociopolitical concept of vitality of populations and their inherent institutional bondage. In this context, to describe *'asabiyya* and nomadism in terms of vitality of marginal "collective bodies" and their potential to create equivalents to organized "war machines" (Deleuze & Guattari 1992) is interesting and reminds us of Foucault's similar description of the mass movements of the Iranian Revolution.

Second, *'asabiyya*, although secular in its base, remains a concept which is strongly involved in religious constructions of the social: group solidarity needs to be underscored by religion. The dialectic of *'asabiyya* and religion unfolds its regime in that religion extends and intensifies the power of *'asabiyya* groups on the one hand while, on the other, there is no flourishing of religion without *'asabiyya*. Prophecy and Mahdism would not be possible without *'asabiyya* support. However, *'asabiyya* based tribal groups can only gain and maintain dynastic power with the support of religious propaganda (Ibn Khaldun 1967, I: 320).

When Ibn Khaldun speaks of religion and *'asabiyya*, what counts is the holistic sense of the theocracy of the state; individual or group piety or enhancement for the transcendental world are not the essential elements here. That is what makes his perspective so strange among medieval thinkers: he delivers an objective evaluation of the social significance of religion and religious law; in fact, a functionalist concept of both: religion and solidarity.

Third, there is the dimension of charisma in Ibn Khaldun's concept of *'asabiyya*. Social, political, and economic energy derive from blood relation and the genealogical foundation of the individual's status within the line of such relationships. This is the paradox: *'asabiyya* – despite its bondage to the social as such – also relates to individualist power constructions in the specific terms of kingship and prophetism. Here, obviously, we may

trace a very special characteristic of charisma, in that it roots in the (tribal) genealogy of blood ties as a "natural gift," but even more as a means of securing social support, while individual charisma appears to be only a function to this general social condition of charisma. Creative power and vitality depend on the group and its genealogy and the maintenance of its energy over generations with respect to social, political, and economic achievements. The blood relation and the genealogical formation of blood ties and thus the individual's status within such a line of relationships form a decisive foundational basis for any concept of charisma. In contrast to Weber's individualist explanation of charisma (depending on the "gifts" of the individual and personal extraordinariness), it is the "social fact" of the genealogy of the kin group that founds the formative aspect of all social movement.

'Asabiyya as a concept of dynamism differs from Weber's idea of charisma, for Weber's idea depends on an individualistic transcendental absolutism. He sees the inner strength of the individual, its drives, its extraordinary abilities and their routinization as a source and an essential condition for modern bureaucracy and professionalism. In contrast, *'asabiyya* represents a sort of communal totalism based on genealogy and descent. What is of a broader interest with respect to social theory is that *'asabiyya* as a source of charisma relates in a very ambiguous sense to immediacy, bondage to face to face relations, human solidarity instincts and their effects on power and state formation. This seems to contrast concepts like restraint and rationality, modulation of affects, civilization or general regulation and bureaucracy. In this anthropological perspective, the actively thriving human group tends to absorb the social sphere of regulating institutions, and everything melts within *'asabiyya* – not the other way around, as Gehlen and Luhmann would have it (if one takes their system–lifeworld dichotomy in this context).

Thus, *'asabiyya* can be discussed beyond the spirit of social cohesion, beyond the prevailing local family or group networks, in terms of a specific type of rationality; namely, causal rationality, which operates in a controlled social field in which cause and effect,

success and defeat remain visible. However, at the same time, the system of visible causal rationality seems to be not only coexistent within functionally differentiated systems, but also it tends to make use of it and to profit from it. In this condition, *'asabiyya* signifies that any input raising into the rational functional system would also lead to a test of its effectiveness in keeping up with local personalized networks. This would not lead to any strategic gain on both sides. The strategic gain of *'asabiyya* in this figure of thought would lie in immediate controlling of causes and effects. *'Asabiyya* is quite in agreement with ontological theories about the clash of systems of functional technical causality with prevailing family and mafia structures in Southern Italy that Luhmann (1995) described. Indeed, to view *'asabiyya* in terms of Luhmann's South-North dimension is helpful, as it would come close to imagining modern culture as a deterritorialized arena combining latent eastern and western structures based on discrete patterns of vitality without engaging in an open clash about fundamentals and value.

Fourth, and beyond the three paradoxes of *'asabiyya* in relation to egalitarianism/power, solidarity/religion, and individual charisma/group, genealogy, and causal rationality, there seems to be a further dimension of sociological concern with *'asabiyya* in the way in which it relates to knowledge and professional groups. In a strange turn of the sociological problematic of *Gemeinschaft* – similar to Machiavelli's *virtù* – there is a momentum which crystallizes in its intensity and situational expression as an “emotional component” in intersubjective relations and collective experience with respect to the construction of knowledge. *'Asabiyya* appears here as a multi-layered concept, including faithfulness to the community, will for defense, readiness for self-sacrifice, internal unity, common will for power, and national passion, but also religious fanaticism: “feeling of solidarity” as a source of knowledge and vice versa. In this sense, *'asabiyya* turns into an abstracted concept, which seems also ethically overcharged.

'Asabiyya here also turns into an idea of the solidarity of the “finer natures,” “two friends,” the “warm feeling of friendship,” solidarity among immediate social groups,

which also operate in modern social and professional life up to national and religious solidarity circles (Ritter 1948). Following this elitist transposition of the concept, *'asabiyya* could also relate to modern types of socially constituted solidarity, designating “a true irrational solidarity circle” within a modern universalist perspective. Although it is considered that *'asabiyya* could generate the negative effects of delimiting a general, universal value to the strict borderlines of a social group, the readiness of group members to help and sacrifice themselves without expecting any return, generating true altruism, should be stressed. However, restricted to group solidarity, help and sacrifice can ignore injustice and create double moral codes leading to separate internal and external application of rules (*ibid.*).

The positive emotional values and intensities of feeling within the solidarity circles could potentially lead to fanaticism and the loss of the objective value of things. Again, positive inner group feelings could lead to coolness, indifference, enmity, hatred, and moments of pitiless behavior toward outsiders. There is no external validity of morals and the solidarity circle has moral boundaries (*ibid.*).

'Asabiyya describes the friend-enemy, insider-outsider valuation that irrational solidarity groups apply to moral values, which on the other hand leads to dividing good from evil, just from unjust, in a way that may turn out to be a great obstacle for objective knowledge.

Solidarity presents itself in varying degrees of strength, which could turn into aggression, feud, and war. When Ritter (1948) points to the Arabs and Islam, to the leadership of Muhammad and Umar in organizing the Islamic conquests, he speaks of pure solidarity, not of irrational solidarity groups. However, he shows that solidarity, despite its legitimate function, often appears to be intermingled with less noble motives. “Interests” enter, where pure emotions are rare in real life.

In this sense, the feeling of solidarity comes about in practical life, through blood relationship, face to face social interaction and reciprocal testing and trying, through common occupations and neighborhoods. A higher *'asabiyya* points to the common education solidarities, or breakthrough solidarities tying

the founder generations together versus the superficial solidarities of later strands (maintaining good relations for selfish purposes) (ibid.). This “orientalist” transposition of *'asabiyya* into a universalist outlook, as the momentum of western “irrational solidarity groups” – mirrored within a framework of Islamic history as worked out by Ayad (1930) and Rosenthal (1932) and showing similarities with Machiavelli’s concept of *virtù* – is based on reflections on European history and disasters, specifically World War II.

In a very specific interpretation of *'asabiyya* and religion, the “Ibn Khaldunian mode” has recently received new attention with respect to interpreting Saudi Wahabism and Islamic movements. Lapidus’s (1990) warning, that conquest movements which “represented a fusion of clan, religious, and political identities rather than lineage *'asabiyya*” were the driving force in the Islamization of the Greater Middle East, seems to support such a perspective. This would lead to a reinterpretation of contemporary Muslim society in terms of varying expressions and combinations of *'asabiyya*, sectarian movements, and tribal utopianism. Gellner’s reading of *'asabiyya* as interacting with a learned urban elite, pedantic scripturalist and urban classes to be muted by desert utopianism and *'asabiyya* based tribal segments (Zubaida 1995) could be viewed as a first stage in this perspective. For Gellner (1981), it is the coincidence of tribal movements and urban Islamic spirituality that strengthens the position of civil society in Muslim countries. For Gellner, this relative strength of civil society founded on the merging of Islam and tribal solidarity patterns, together with the gradual transformation of oriental despotism and the growth of modern institutions, was to lay the ground for a strong and real pattern of modernity in Middle Eastern societies. This is Islamic utopia, which in this context puts Ibn Khaldun’s treatment of religion in a position of increasing importance. However, much of the debate on Islamic civil society, with its often essentialist concepts of civil or public religion, stands in contrast to Ibn Khaldun, for whom religion is instrumental to broadening the social effects of tribal (secular) solidarity and *'asabiyya*. For Ibn Khaldun, religion is secondary to power, it is

functional to power; however, it is dependent on power.

Recent theory exploits this Khaldunian split between *'asabiyya* and religion. Gellner defined the dynamism of Islamic society in terms of the decline of tribalism and therefore insisted that *'asabiyya* comes to be substituted by the religious ethos of urban educated classes challenging secular power. For Gellner, this forms the historical background to the current surge of Islamism in politics. Eisenstadt (2002) departs from a fundamental concept of “separation between the religious community and the ruler” in Islamic societies. He perceives *'asabiyya* as the case of tribal religious proto-fundamentalism in traditional Islam. In insisting on an inherent entwining between *'asabiyya* and religion, Eisenstadt believes that it is this tribal religious element which cyclically transforms society and creates new political regimes (Voll 1991).

This inner connection between tribal elements and Islamic religious political visions – presenting the “symbol of pristine Islam” – is seen here as the inherent model of Islamic societies where primordial Islamic utopia gives rise to patrimonial or imperial regimes, establishing anew the “old” Ibn Khaldun cycle” (Eisenstadt 2005). Thus, the antinomies of Ibn Khaldun’s theory of *'asabiyya* have been explained as an essential, undeniable, and authentic trait of the social dynamic in Islamic societies; where one sees some modernist elements implanted, however, all explanations of recent social unrest on a world scale related to Islam seem to have caught sight of an involuted “tradition” of cultural specificity in the “Khaldunian sense” of cyclical revolt (Ruthven 2002) and tribal utopianism (Eisenstadt 2002).

Indeed, Ibn Khaldun’s stand is ambiguous. On the one hand, he considers the solidarity of kin (*'asabiyya*) to be the basis for the spread of religion, and on the other hand, he sees the prophetic tradition of Islam as the real monotheistic religion, functioning to broaden solidarity among kin groups. In this, however, Ibn Khaldun provides for the clear distinction between *'asabiyya* and religion as two different fields of social contention.

A comparative analysis of modern societies would obviously have to deal with the more

general and enlightening global issues of *'asa biyya*, East and West, with respect to rationality, knowledge, and science as much as with its impact on relations between state and society, with respect to individualism, sovereignty, and "naked life" and their varying social and jurido political expressions.

SEE ALSO: Agency (and Intention); Body and Cultural Sociology; Civil Religion; Islam; Khaldun, Ibn; Religion

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asceticism

Giuseppe Giordan

The concept of asceticism shows the unity of efforts through which an individual desires to progress in his moral, religious, and spiritual life. The original meaning of the term refers to any exercise, physical, intellectual, or moral, practiced with method and rigor, in hopes of self improvement and progress. Notwithstanding the great flexibility that characterizes the application of asceticism, the concept always alludes to a search for perfection based on the submission of the body to the spirit, recalling the symbolic distinction between exterior and interior life.

Following the evolution of the concept of asceticism within different historical and social

contexts, it is possible to see its strategic importance within the social sciences, especially in regard to understanding the western world. Aside from the combination of physical and intellectual exercises, which have always had their own social relevance, asceticism refers to the complex relationship between nature and culture, as well as to the classic religious relationship between faith and reason; such aspects are the fruit of a continual and dynamic negotiation that develops within concrete social and cultural contexts.

THE HISTORICAL ASPECTS

A comprehensive look at the historical evolution of the concept of asceticism allows for a description of what one refers to when using the term. Etymologically, the term comes from Greek and it was Homer who used it only to describe artistic technique and production. Herodotus and Thucydides used the term in reference to physical exercises and effort undertaken by athletes and soldiers in order to keep their bodies fit. Coupled with this physical aspect of asceticism is the moral dimension, where a constant and prolonged effort is what leads intellect to wisdom and virtue. The methodical training of the spirit, which was celebrated by nearly all classical philosophers, involves the progressive liberation of the soul from the body, which was considered bad and deviant.

It is with the Pythagoreans that the concept of asceticism is used in a specifically religious sphere, referring to the perfecting exercises the soul undertakes in order to deserve the contemplation of God. Already in the classical world the concept had pieced together the physical with moral and religious dimensions: exercising the body, controlling the passions, mortification through abstinence and renunciation, and good works were considered subsequent stages that educated the virtuous man.

In early Christianity, all the above elements were interpreted and organized in a coherent manner. Especially within monastic life, almost as if to substitute the bloody sacrifices of the early martyrs, penance and asceticism become necessary to win the struggle against sin and to gain particular graces from God.

Perceived in this manner, Christian life becomes an austere struggle that combines suffering and renunciation in a continual effort to overcome temptations of the flesh. Just such control of the instincts, and sometimes even of the legitimate inclinations of desires, marks the particular relationship that the ascetic has with his own body. Besides poverty and obedience, in the first centuries of Christian life chastity was advised, which sometimes manifested itself in extreme forms of radical hostility toward sexuality. Aside from corporal mortification, especially within the Benedictine and Cistercian traditions, work, silence, and prayer together with fasting and vigils were characteristic elements of asceticism.

In the Middle Ages, ascetic practices left the monasteries to involve groups of laypeople, who, imitating the great religious orders such as the Dominicans or Franciscans, came together to give birth to the Third Orders. Asceticism in this period became further refined, developing new methods designed to perfect the exercises of the spiritual life. Among these a special place was devoted to mental prayers, which included the continual repetition of simple prayer formulas such as the rosary or brief invocations to the saints. Together with the repetition of oral formulas were repeated exterior acts of veneration, such as genuflection, often practiced with a deep penitential spirit, and the use of the hair shirt and other means of mortification.

ASCETICISM AND MYSTICISM

With the advent of the modern era, especially with the Reformation, a radical critique of asceticism as it was conceived in the Middle Ages can be found. However, Luther's doctrine of justification, which denied the worthiness of human efforts to obtain salvation, did not lead to ethical and moral indifference. The Reformation promoted a new understanding of asceticism, which changed from physical discipline and was manifested in the workplace, married life, respect for parents, and the undertaking of political responsibilities, obviously alongside prayer and meditation on the Bible. Max Weber (1958) discusses

Protestant ethics in terms of this worldly asceticism and considers modern capitalism as an expression of the Puritan Calvinist mentality.

Even Catholics realized the excessiveness and the risks of an indiscriminate application of asceticism. The Church warned against excesses, distancing itself from the most gruesome and inhumane practices. Even in the theological field a new sensitivity developed, which, notwithstanding the necessity of human effort, stressed the preeminence of God's actions. What was important was not human actions but passive human acceptance of the works of the Spirit. The excessive willingness of asceticism was replaced by a mystical attitude that valued physicality, affections, and the emotions of the person, thus overriding an openly dualistic and often Manichean vision. However, asceticism and mysticism were not to be considered as being opposed to one another, but as two aspects of the same spiritual journey. Especially from modern times on, this journey did not privilege mortification of the body and the passions but underlined the importance of the individual's harmonious development, in both physical and spiritual dimensions. Starting from renunciation for its own sake, there is a movement from a choice that is functional toward the fulfillment of a more harmonious and balanced personality.

THE SOCIOLOGICAL APPROACH

The founding fathers of sociology showed great interest in both asceticism and mysticism, above all particular forms of religious cohesion that developed from these two experiences throughout the centuries. Interest in these issues remains alive even in the contemporary world, and sociologists find it not only within new religious experiences but also in connection with different fields such as caring for the body or political activism.

Max Weber contrasts asceticism and mysticism, specifying that the former considers salvation as the result of human actions in the world, while the latter refers to a particular state of enlightenment, which is reached only by a few select people through contemplation. While asceticism calls people to actively

dedicate themselves in the world to incarnate the religious values in it, in the mystical perspective the world loses importance in order to give way to a union with God. The logic of mysticism is to run away from the world, while the logic of asceticism has a belligerent attitude toward the world full of sin. Weber points out how asceticism is a broad and, in certain aspects, ambiguous sociological category. On the one hand, it means the systematic and methodological effort to subordinate natural and worldly instincts to religious principles. On the other hand, it refers to the religious criticism of the often utilitarian and conventional relationships of social life. Therefore, it is possible to distinguish two different forms of asceticism. One is founded on a highly negative perception of the world. The second considers the world as God's creation. Even though the world is the place where humans can sin, it is also the concrete situation where the virtuous person fulfills his vocation with a rational method. According to the second definition of asceticism, the individual, in order to find confirmation of his own state of grace and privilege, lives his existence in the world as if he were an instrument chosen by God.

Asceticism, when it is put into concrete practice in the life of a religious group, as is the case with Calvinism or in the various Protestant sects, can become a forcefully dynamic element of social and cultural transformation, instigating reform or revolutionary movements. Starting from the distinction between asceticism and mysticism, Weber points out the difference between western and eastern religions. Even though it is not a strict contrast, eastern religions rely on mysticism, while western religions are centered on ascetic ideals and ethics. This does not mean that in western Christianity there are no mystical experiences, especially within the Catholic sphere, which determine ascetic practices that reinforce the authority of the hierarchical Church. Jean Séguy (1968) hypothesizes that in Catholicism, the sociological category of mysticism is often functional in order to affirm obedience as a virtue, and, therefore, intended as asceticism.

Reworking Weber's distinction between the Church and the various sects, Ernst Troeltsch

(1992) uses the concept of asceticism to verify the plausibility of each part. With such a goal in mind, he proposes a detailed analysis of all the forms of Christian asceticism according to different historical periods, economic and social contexts, and types of religious groups. First, there is the heroic asceticism of the early Christians. Based on Christ's ethics more than on hostility toward the world, it consists of a feeling of indifference toward what is bound to disappear. It then follows that the definition of asceticism, based on Augustine's pessimistic view of the world, devalues the material world in comparison to the interior world, making it necessary to stop and or discipline the impulses of the flesh. Medieval Christianity sought to establish a compromise with mundane reality; while monks practiced fleeing from the world, laypeople had to accept its dynamics. Lutheranism successively proposed a secular asceticism that considered the effort of transforming the world as an instrument of continuous conversion, while Calvinism considered work and professional achievement as signs of divine election. Finally, within the sects, asceticism mainly became a renunciation of the world, expressed in various ways from indifference to hostility and resignation. Asceticism in this particular light is not the repression of the senses but, rather, a denial of established power.

ASCETICISM IN THE CONTEMPORARY WORLD

Far from disappearing, asceticism is present in the contemporary world, and not only in the context of oriental religious experiences such as some practices of Hinduism and Buddhism. While in a strictly religious sphere new forms of asceticism could be tantric practices or yoga, Deborah Lupton (1996) relates asceticism to the issue of food and awareness of the body, and Enzo Pace (1983) puts it in the context of political activism.

According to Lupton, in western cultures food and diet are interpreted in a dialectic that puts asceticism and hedonistic consumption as the two extremes. Eating, together with the corporeal experience, demands the continual exercise of self discipline: such

ascetic practices of diet, besides having over the centuries a typically religious value, represent a means to build one's own subjectivity. Furthermore, as in religion ascetic renunciations are rewarded by God's grace, so self control and self denial with regard to food are rewarded by a healthy, slim, and fit body. Fitness, body building, and dieting would then be the ascetic practices of the contemporary era, where it is considered morally good to eliminate the need for bad or unhealthy food. Even today temptation of the flesh, considered as food and no longer as an entity opposed to the soul, must be energetically resisted through a rigorous dietetic asceticism.

Enzo Pace reflects on the relationship between religion and politics within the Italian context, with reference to the Democrazia Cristiana Party. He hypothesizes that the predominance of an ascetic attitude in the political arena, which characterized dissent in a few Catholic groups, was succeeded by a mysticism typical of charismatic movements, which separate their faith from any presence in society and politics to give space to the acts of the Spirit. Lay neo asceticism promoted subjective adhesion to one's faith rather than objective membership of a specific institution: such subjective tension rediscovered the ethical religious basis of one's own choice founded on personal contact with the Bible, and therefore not controlled by an ecclesiastical institution. This form of political asceticism underlines the importance of social and political dedication, experienced in terms of Christian vocation, starting with workers and those in marginalized situations and poverty openly criticizing the progressive secularization of the Church, which made political compromises with the state party, Democrazia Cristiana. The interesting point of this hypothesis, which goes beyond the concrete Italian context, is that it shows that the worldly asceticism of political dedication permits interpretation of one's own political actions as being connected to the evangelical message of equality, justice, and solidarity, even if such religious identity is no longer perceived as directly dependent upon a religious institution that guarantees it.

Analyzing the role of asceticism in the Protestant sphere, Jean Séguy (1972) highlights

that it is not necessarily connected to work ethics but can assume other modes of expression, such as giving up tobacco or alcohol, a particular way of dressing, the adornment of a place of worship, or decoration of one's home. Séguy's observations, integrating Weber's interpretive scheme, still leave open the inquiry on the role of asceticism in the modern world.

SEE ALSO: Body and Cultural Sociology; Buddhism; Christianity; Durkheim, Émile; Hinduism; Martyrdom; Popular Religiosity; Religion; Sexuality, Religion and; Weber, Max

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Asch experiments

William J. Kinney

Solomon Asch (1907–96) conducted pioneering social psychological experiments on conformity in group settings, and the processes by which we form impressions of other people. His conformity experiments are of particular importance, in that they displayed how the desire to conform to social pressures may be so great that it overrides our own perceptions. Asch emigrated from Poland to

the United States in 1920, completed a PhD at Columbia University in 1932, and worked for 19 years as a faculty member at Swarthmore College. In addition to his seminal research on conformity and person perception, he wrote the classic text *Social Psychology* (1952). This text had a profound impact on the early development of the field.

Asch is primarily known for his experiments on conformity in group settings. In these experiments, college students were told that they were participating in a study on visual perception. The students (in groups of varying sizes, but usually ranging from seven to nine) were seated around a table, and shown a succession of "stimulus cards" with a series of lines on them. They were informed that their task was to match the length of a single line on a card displayed on an easel with one of three lines (labeled A, B, and C) displayed on a separate card. The experiment was structured so that the lengths of the three comparison lines varied to the extent that there was an extremely low probability of error. Students gave their answers aloud and responded in the order they were seated around the table.

In truth, this experiment was not designed to measure the students' visual perception. It was intended to measure the extent to which they would conform to group norms and perceptions, even when those norms/perceptions conflicted with their own interpretation of reality. In the primary version of this experiment, all of the students except one in each test group were in fact confederates in the study. The individual participant in each group was seated last, so that all other members of the group would give their verbal responses before the participant. At specific intervals, the confederates in the experiment were instructed to intentionally give identical answers that were clearly wrong. The participants were thus faced with the dilemma of providing a response that was correct based on their own perception, or a response that they personally believed was incorrect but that matched with the apparent perception of the entire group, excluding themselves.

Asch expected that the participants involved in the study would display a high level of independence from the influence of the group. The results of the study therefore came as

somewhat of a surprise. About one third of the participants conformed to the group's incorrect answers in a majority of the trials, while about one fourth refused to conform in any of the trials. The rest of the participants conformed in some instances, though less than a majority. Of all the judgments made by all of the participants, approximately one third reflected conformity to the group (i.e., the answers were incorrect), while two thirds reflected independence from the group (i.e., the answers were correct). Though these findings do indeed indicate a higher incidence of independence than conformity, it must be kept in mind that the incidence of conformity constitutes a significant minority of the responses. This significance is enhanced when keeping in mind that the specific act of conformity resulting from this experiment involves denying one's own perception of reality. It is also noteworthy that, while the majority of the *individual responses* given in the experiment reflected independence from the group, three fourths of the *participants* conformed *at least once* during the course of the experiment. A clear majority of the participants therefore displayed a capacity to engage in this extreme form of conformity at least once during the course of the experiment.

Given these results, Asch sought to determine what factors and motivations may have played a role in the conforming behaviors of his experiment participants. Follow up interviews with the participants revealed three different responses to the group pressures they encountered. First, some of the participants appear to have experienced an altered or distorted *perception* as a result of the group influence. As the majority opinion became clear, they viewed this as the genuinely correct interpretation and failed to attribute their incorrect perception to group influence. Second, a large number of the participants experienced a distortion in *judgment*. For these people, the majority opinion indicated that their own perception of the situation must simply be incorrect. Their actions were therefore based on faith in the majority, and uncertainty regarding their own individual perspective. A majority of the participants fell into this category. And, third, some of the participants distorted their *actions* to comply

with the group pressure. These individuals continued to believe in their own perception, regardless of the group influence. However, they acted contrary to what they perceived in order to avoid negative consequences from the group (ridicule, embarrassment, etc.).

Another important facet of Asch's conformity experiment involved his exploration of the group dynamics and processes that may *decrease* the likelihood of conformity. More specifically, he sought to examine the impact of dissent and minority influences on group unanimity and conformity. In one variation of his experimental procedure, he instructed all but one of the confederates to give the wrong answer. One lone confederate was instructed to give the correct answer. In this circumstance, when the naïve participant in the experiment had just one corroborator from the rest of the group, the rate of conformity dropped dramatically (by approximately three fourths). In another variation, Asch examined the influence of a minority on the majority by instructing nine confederates in a group of 20 students to vote incorrectly (thus, 11 of the participants were naïve non confederates). In this case, none of the naïve participants complied with the minority (i.e., all of the participants gave the correct answer). However, their reaction to the confederate minority was respectful and considerate (in contrast to the ridicule and laughter encountered by lone confederate dissenters).

The impact of these experiments on the early development of the field of social psychology was enormous. They inspired a wide ranging body of studies and experiments on the phenomenon of conformity that continue to this day. A variety of studies have explored how personal or individual qualities (e.g., personality type, gender, nationality, status, etc.) may influence the likelihood of conformity. Other studies have examined the impact that various situational factors (e.g., group size, fear, ambiguity, etc.) may have on the phenomenon. In addition, the Asch conformity experiments served as an inspiration for other, future research (e.g., Stanley Milgram's experiments on obedience to authority, Phillip Zimbardo's mock prison study at Stanford University, etc.) that was to have equally profound consequences in the social sciences.

Though not as widely recognized as the conformity experiments, Asch also conducted a series of experiments on our perceptions of other people that had an equally profound impact on the early theoretical development of social psychology. In these experiments, a list of personality descriptors was read to participants. The participants in turn were asked to write a brief essay on their perception of the hypothetical person possessing these traits, as well as pick a variety of additional traits (from a predetermined list) that they felt would also describe this person based on the preliminary perception they had formed.

Asch found that, when certain key traits were changed between different experimental groups, it created radically different impressions in the participants' minds. For example, one test group was read a list that contained the traits: *cautious, determined, industrious, intelligent, practical, skillful, and warm*. Another group was read the same list, except *warm* was replaced with *cold*. In the test group that was read the trait *warm*, 91 percent of the participants responded that the person being described would also be *generous*. Only 9 percent of the group that was told the person was *cold* also felt he/she would be *generous*. The alteration of this one trait was so important that it ultimately changed the participants' perception of the hypothetical person on 12 out of 18 key personality traits.

Based on these findings, Asch concluded that certain perceived characteristics (such as *warm/cold*) are weighted more heavily in the minds of most people, and play a much greater role than other traits in determining our overall evaluations of others. He deemed such characteristics to be *central traits*. Characteristics that are less likely to alter our overall perception of others are *peripheral traits*. In addition, it was concluded that our perceptions of others are generally composed of structures of perceived traits, many of which are inferred. Complex expectations and impressions of others are thus formed based on the assumption that certain traits or sets of traits are associated with one another. This pioneering set of experiments formed the foundation of what came to be known as implicit personality theory, a crucial component of

modern social psychological theory on person perception.

Solomon Asch's body of work served as inspiration for the creation of the Solomon Asch Center at the University of Pennsylvania in 1998. The Center's mission is to advance the work of social scientists in understanding and resolving violent intergroup conflicts.

SEE ALSO: Authority and Conformity; Decision Making; Group Processes; Milgram, Stanley (Experiments); Social Psychology; Zimbardo Prison Experiment

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assimilation

Richard Alba and Victor Nee

Assimilation is reemerging as a core concept for comprehending the long run consequences of immigration, both for the immigrants and

their descendants and for the society that receives them.

This new phase could be described as a second life for a troubled concept. In its first life, assimilation was enthroned as the reigning idea in the study of ethnicity and race. In the United States, where the theoretical development of assimilation mainly took place, this period began with the studies of the Chicago School in the early twentieth century and ended not long after the canonical statement of assimilation theory, Milton Gordon's *Assimilation in American Life*, appeared in the mid 1960s. In this first phase, assimilation did double duty – on the one hand, as popular ideology for interpreting the American experience and, correlatively, an ideal expressing the direction in which ethnic and racial divisions were evolving in the US; and, on the other, as the foundational concept for the social scientific understanding of processes of change undergone by immigrants and, even more, the ensuing generations.

This dual role inevitably produced irreconcilable tensions that undermined the social scientific validity of assimilation. As a critical sociology arose in response to the Vietnam War and to the deeply embedded racism in the US revealed by the race riots of the late 1960s, assimilation came to be seen as the ideologically laden residue of an intellectually exhausted functionalism. The very word seemed to conjure up a bygone era, when the multiracial and multi ethnic nature of American and other western societies was not comprehended. By the early 1990s, Nathan Glazer (1993) could write an essay tellingly entitled, "Is Assimilation Dead?"

Yet, as social scientists and others attempt to understand the full ramifications of the new era of mass immigration, which began for the societies of North America and Western Europe in the two decades following the end of World War II, they are resurrecting the assimilation idea, but now in forms that take into account the critiques of the preceding decades. To be useful as social science, as a means of understanding contemporary social realities and their relationship to the past and future, this rehabilitation requires that the concept of assimilation be stripped of the normative encumbrances that it had acquired

in its prior existence. At the same time, it requires the recognition that the pattern of assimilation is not the only modality of incorporation evident in immigration societies, that pluralism and racial exclusion exist also as patterns by which individuals and groups come to be recognized as parts of these societies.

THE POST WORLD WAR II SYNTHESIS

As the paradigmatic concept for research on the incorporation of immigrants and their descendants, assimilation can be credited to the Chicago School of Sociology of the early twentieth century and especially to the work of Robert E. Park, W. I. Thomas, and their collaborators and students. Yet, by the middle of the twentieth century, when assimilation attained its zenith as an expression of American self understanding (a.k.a. the "Melting Pot"), its formulation in social science had not yet crystallized into a set of clear and consistent operational concepts that could be deployed in measurement. Part of the problem, as Milton Gordon demonstrated, was that assimilation is multidimensional; and the solution required disentangling distinct, if interrelated, phenomena, a task he set for himself in *Assimilation in American Life* (1964). It is with this book that a canonical account emerges, and it has proven so compelling that, despite several problematic aspects that have provided handholds for subsequent critics, it remains very influential.

Acculturation, Gordon argued, was the dimension that typically came first and was inevitable to a large degree. He defined acculturation in a very broad manner, as the minority group's adoption of the "cultural patterns" of the host society – patterns extending beyond the acquisition of the host language and such other obvious externals as dress to include aspects normally regarded as part of the inner, or private, self, such as characteristic emotional expression or key life goals. In the US, the specific cultural standard that represented the direction and eventual outcome of the acculturation process was the "middle class cultural patterns of, largely, white Protestant, Anglo Saxon origins," which Gordon also described as the "core culture."

In his view, acculturation was a largely one way process: the minority group adopted the core culture, which remained basically unchanged by acculturation. Only the area of institutional religion was exempt: he had no expectation that the fundamental religious identities – e.g., Catholic, Jewish – of different immigrant groups to the US would be given up as a result of acculturation.

Acculturation could occur in the absence of other types of assimilation, and the stage of “acculturation only” could last indefinitely, according to Gordon. His major hypothesis was that structural assimilation – i.e., integration into primary groups – is associated with, or stimulates, all other types of assimilation. In particular, this meant that prejudice and discrimination would decline, if not disappear, that intermarriage would be common, and that the minority’s separate identity would wane. All told, Gordon identified seven dimensions of assimilation – cultural, structural, marital, identity, prejudice, discrimination, and civic.

Yet seven proved not enough. As subsequent analysts attempted to apply an assimilation framework in empirical research, they spotted gaps in Gordon’s design and added other dimensions to fill them in, while still remaining faithful to the fundamental premises of the schema. One obvious omission was socioeconomic assimilation, and researchers quickly identified it as a distinct and critical dimension. Indeed, the view that cultural and socioeconomic assimilation are inevitably linked was a key premise in the classic literature on assimilation that predated Gordon’s synthesis – for example, W. Lloyd Warner and Leo Srole’s *The Social Systems of American Ethnic Groups* (1945). One drawback, however, was that socioeconomic assimilation was generally equated with attainment of average or above average socioeconomic standing, as measured by indicators such as education, occupation, and income. Since many immigrant groups, especially those coming from agricultural backgrounds such as the Irish, Italians, and Mexicans in the US, entered the social structure on its lowest rungs, this meaning of socioeconomic assimilation conflated it with social mobility. This conception has become problematic in the contemporary era of mass immigration because immigrant

groups no longer start inevitably at the bottom of the labor market: present day immigration includes numerous groups that bring financial capital, as well as substantial educational credentials, professional training, and other forms of human capital.

Another addition to the repertoire of assimilation dimensions involved residential mobility. Douglas Massey’s “spatial assimilation” model formalized the significance of residence for the assimilation paradigm (Massey 1985). Its basic tenet holds that as members of minority groups acculturate and establish themselves in labor markets, they attempt to leave behind less successful members of their groups and to convert socioeconomic and assimilation progress into residential gain, by “purchasing” residence in places with greater advantages and amenities. However, because good schools, clean streets, and other amenities are more common in the communities where the majority is concentrated, the search by ethnic minority families for better surroundings leads them toward greater contact with the majority. In the US, this has also meant their suburbanization, since the suburbs are where middle class majority families are found.

In the end, though, the post World War II synthesis suffered from other blind spots that were not easily remedied without changes to its foundations, and these became the basis for a series of withering criticisms of the entire assimilation corpus. One concerned the seeming inevitability of assimilation. Warner and Srole exemplify this premise – according to them, American ethnic groups are destined to be no more than temporary phenomena, doomed by the assimilatory power of the American context.

Interestingly, Gordon himself did not believe this: while he saw acculturation as mostly inevitable, he argued that ethnic groups still had a social structural role in providing for many non economic needs of individuals. Nevertheless, the inevitability of assimilation seemed to many scholars the default assumption, and it made assimilation into the natural endpoint of the process of incorporation into the receiving society. Even black Americans, blocked by the racism of US society from full pursuit of the assimilation goal, were presumed to be assimilating, albeit

at a glacial pace. Further, by equating assimilation with full or successful incorporation, assimilation scholars viewed racial minorities as, in effect, incompletely assimilated, rather than as incorporated into the society on some other basis. After the racial turmoil in the US of the 1960s, this view seemed untenable.

Another blind spot could be described as a profoundly ethnocentric bias. The post war synthesis in effect assumed that minority groups would change to become more like the ethnic majority, which, aside from absorbing the new groups, would remain unaffected. In cultural terms, it elevated the cultural model of the "core" ethnic group, in the US, middle class Protestant whites of British ancestry, to the normative standard by which other groups are to be assessed and toward which they should aspire. Assimilation then was a decidedly one directional process, as Gordon in fact proclaimed. What was lacking was a more differentiated and syncretic concept of mainstream culture, a recognition that it could be a mixture, an amalgam of diverse influences, that continues to evolve with the arrival of new groups.

A further implication of this ethnocentric bias was that the chances and rate of assimilation for any group varied in accordance with its phenotypic similarity to the core group. In the US, this was not just a problem for African Americans. Warner and Srole laid out in systematic fashion a hierarchy of racial and cultural acceptability, with English speaking Protestants in the top rank. For groups deviating from this ethnic prototype in any significant respect, assimilation would be prolonged, if not doubtful. Thus, the assimilation of "dark skinned" Mediterranean Catholics, such as the Italians, was expected to demand a "moderate" period, which Warner and Srole equated with six generations or more! Given such arguments, it was not difficult to criticize the assimilation perspective for uncritically reflecting the racism of the larger society.

NEW CONCEPTUALIZATIONS

The writings of the Chicago School offer another different starting point for the formulation of a new concept of assimilation, one

better suited than the post war synthesis for societies as diverse and fluid as the United States, especially under the impress of contemporary immigration. The founders of the Chicago School were responding to the transformative changes and social problems associated with the mass immigration of their time, which have some similarities with those of today. Their definition of assimilation envisioned a diverse mainstream in which people of different ethnic/racial origins and cultural heritages evolve a common culture that enables them to sustain a common national existence. This more flexible and open ended specification of assimilation largely receded into the background in Gordon's synthesis.

Contemporary scholars are taking up the challenge of refashioning the concept. Rogers Brubaker (2001), for example, defines assimilation as one group "becoming similar (in some respect)" to another group. For their definition, Richard Alba and Victor Nee (2003) start from the recognition of assimilation as a form of ethnic change. As the anthropologist Frederick Barth emphasized, ethnicity is a social boundary, a distinction that individuals make in their everyday lives and that shapes their actions and mental orientations toward others. This distinction is typically embedded in a variety of social and cultural differences between groups that give an ethnic boundary concrete significance. According to Alba and Nee, assimilation, as a form of ethnic change, can be defined as the decline of an ethnic distinction and its corollary cultural and social differences. "Decline" means in this context that a distinction attenuates in salience, that the occurrences for which it is relevant diminish in number and contract to fewer and fewer domains of social life. As ethnic boundaries become blurred or weakened, individuals' ethnic origins become less and less relevant in relation to the members of another ethnic group (typically, but not necessarily, the ethnic majority group); and individuals from both sides of the boundary mutually perceive themselves with less and less frequency in terms of ethnic categories and increasingly only under specific circumstances. Assimilation, moreover, is not a dichotomous outcome and does not require the disappearance of ethnicity; consequently,

the individuals and groups undergoing assimilation may still bear a number of ethnic markers. It can occur on a large scale to members of a group even as the group itself remains as a highly visible point of reference on the social landscape, embodied in an ethnic culture, neighborhoods, and institutional infrastructures.

Boundaries are obviously important for assimilation processes; this observation raises the possibility that features of social boundaries may make assimilation more or less likely and influence the specific forms that it takes. Aristide Zolberg and Long Litt Woon (1999) have introduced an extremely useful typology of boundary related changes that sheds light on different ways that assimilation can occur. Boundary crossing corresponds to the classic version of individual level assimilation: some one moves from one group to another, without any real change to the boundary itself (although if such boundary crossings happen on a large scale and in a consistent direction, then the social structure is being altered). Boundary blurring implies that the social profile of a boundary has become less distinct: the clarity of the social distinction involved has become clouded, and individuals' location with respect to the boundary may appear indeterminate. The final process, boundary shifting, involves the relocation of a boundary so that populations once situated on one side are now included on the other: former outsiders are thereby transformed into insiders.

Boundary blurring and shifting represent possibilities not adequately recognized in the older literature. Boundary shifting is the subject of the recent whiteness literature, which discusses how various disparaged immigrant groups, such as the Irish and Eastern European Jews, made themselves acceptable as "whites" in the US racial order: indicated is a radical shift in a group's position (Jacobson 1998). Boundary blurring may represent the most intriguing and underexplored possibility among the three: blurring entails the ambiguity of a boundary with respect to some set of individuals. This could mean that they are seen simultaneously as members of the groups on both sides of the boundary or that sometimes they appear to be members of one and at other times members of the other. Under these

circumstances, assimilation may be eased insofar as the individuals undergoing it do not sense a rupture between participation in mainstream institutions and familiar social and cultural practices and identities. Blurring could occur when the mainstream culture and identity are relatively porous and allow for the incorporation of cultural elements brought by immigrant groups, i.e., two sided cultural change.

Another innovation is the concept of "segmented" assimilation, formulated by Alejandro Portes and Min Zhou (1993). They argue that a critical question concerns the segment of a society into which individuals assimilate, and they envision that multiple trajectories are required for the answer. One trajectory leads to entry to the middle class mainstream. But, in the US, another leads to incorporation into the racialized population at the bottom of the society. This trajectory is followed by many in the second and third generations from the new immigrant groups, who are handicapped by their very humble initial locations in American society and barred from entry to the mainstream by their race. On this route of assimilation, they are guided by the cultural models of poor, native born African Americans and Latinos. Perceiving that they are likely to remain in their parents' status at the bottom of the occupational hierarchy and evaluating this prospect negatively because, unlike their parents, they have absorbed the standards of the American mainstream, they succumb to the temptation to drop out of school and join the inner city underclass.

CONCLUSION

One profound alteration to the social scientific apparatus for studying immigrant group incorporation is that it is no longer exclusively based on assimilation. Very abstractly, three patterns describe today how immigrants and their descendants become "incorporated into," that is, a recognized part of, an immigration society: the pattern of assimilation involves a progressive, typically multigenerational, process of socioeconomic, cultural, and social integration into the "mainstream," that part of the society where racial and ethnic origins have at most minor effects on the life chances

of individuals; a second pattern entails racial exclusion, absorption into a racial minority status, which implies persistent and substantial disadvantages vis à vis the members of the mainstream; a third pattern is that of a pluralism in which individuals and groups are able to draw social and economic advantages by keeping some aspects of their lives within the confines of an ethnic matrix (e.g., ethnic economic niches, ethnic communities). A huge literature has developed these ideas and applied them to the ethnic and generational groups arising from contemporary immigration.

In the US, all three patterns can be found in the record of the past, and all are likely to figure in the present and future, though not in ways identical to those of the past. The pattern of assimilation has been the master trend among Americans of European origin. The pattern of racial exclusion characterized the experiences of non European immigrant groups, such as the Chinese, who were confined to ghettos and deprived of basic civil rights because American law, up until the 1950s, defined them as "aliens ineligible for citizenship." The pattern of pluralism is evident in the minority of European Americans whose lives play out primarily in ethnic social worlds, which remain visible in the form of ethnic neighborhoods in such cities as New York and Chicago.

In contemplating contemporary immigration to the US, most observers readily concede the continued relevance of the patterns of racialization and pluralism. The first reappears in the new concept of segmented assimilation; and the second has been elaborated in old and new forms, in the guise of such concepts as "ethnic economic enclaves" and "ethnic niches." It is the pattern of assimilation whose continued significance has been doubted or rejected. But it is increasingly apparent that all three remain relevant. It may be unlikely that the assimilation pattern will achieve the hegemonic status that it did for the descendants of the prior era of mass immigration: in the long term, it applied even to many descendants of Asian immigrants, despite the racial exclusion from which the immigrants themselves initially suffered. But it is not outmoded, as a great deal of evidence about such matters as linguistic assimilation and

intermarriage demonstrates. Any reflection on the American future must take assimilation into account, and the same will undoubtedly prove true in other immigration societies.

SEE ALSO: Acculturation; Anglo Conformity; Boundaries (Racial/Ethnic); Immigration; Melting Pot; Whiteness

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atheism

Patrick Michel

An atheist is one who does not believe in the existence of God or who denies God's existence. The difficulty of defining atheism results from the whole range of nuances that

the concept appears to subsume. Whether it results from active denial or whether it derives from a real or supposed vacuum, whether it is therefore “positive” or “negative,” atheism is fundamentally conceived as unbelief. But this only renders the problem more complex: how can one devise a history or a sociology of the “negative”? If atheism, placed as it is under the sign of privacy, is nothing more than the other side of belief, only the latter can be a positive concept. Atheism is thus an integral part of a system organized around a central reference to a religion which exhausts the concept of belief. Ultimately, any sociology of atheism is a sociology of religion.

The difficulty of accounting for unbelief (or non belief) independently of what is supposed to provide its foundations explains why the concept of atheism has been studied by theologians and philosophers, psychologists and psychoanalysts, far more than by sociologists and historians. (This does not take into account the abundant literature – pertaining more to propaganda than to science – dedicated to this subject in the Soviet Union and its satellite countries.) There is no doubt that the phenomenon has a very long history: 2,500 years before our era, there were thinkers in India who claimed that the skies were empty. Lucretius and Epicure, Epictetus and Parmenides, Heraclitus and Xenophanon of Colophon held similar assumptions. More than 2,000 years before Nietzsche, Theodor the Atheist proclaimed the death of God. Moreover, from the atheism of antiquity to that of the Enlightenment and the “Masters of Suspicion” (Ricoeur’s expression for Marx, Nietzsche, and Freud), the history of non belief is also that of the deepening of the distinction between the sacred and profane, lay and religious.

However difficult it may be to reduce it to a unique definition, atheism as an indicator and an instrument of the secularization of societies occupies a pivotal position in this process of disenchantment which, mostly in Europe, constructed the individual as an autonomous category and as the central subject of history. In that sense, atheism, as invented by modernity, is a pure product of the Christian West, even if its occurrence is

well attested in other contexts. Strongly condemned and attacked by the churches, which saw it as the epitome and the culmination of all the errors of modern times, as this “absurd enterprise which is the construction of a world without God” denounced by Louis Veillot, this atheism derives simultaneously from materialism, rationalism, and more modern trends going from immanentism to phenomenology and from Marxism to existentialism. Some identify within it the expression of four tendencies: a scientific atheism (science does not need the hypothesis of God to explain the laws of nature); a moral atheism (there is a contradiction between God and evil: “The only excuse God has, therefore, is that He does not exist,” a formula Sartre borrows from Stendhal); a humanist atheism (from Bakunin to Nietzsche and from Proudhon to Lukács or to Merleau Ponty); and an ontological atheism (Nietzsche, once again, but also Hölderlin or Heidegger). And there is even a “methodological atheism,” which should be scrupulously respected in any scientific description of phenomena related to belief.

Atheism cannot possibly be grasped today in the same terms as those used by the seventeenth century Encyclopedists or, nearer to us, by Marxism or existentialism. Nor can it be grasped in the terms we use to approach these thinkers. If atheism remains in certain societies legally impossible or socially difficult, and thus an object of scandal, what everywhere else was once a marginal attitude has now become an established social fact, provided one interprets atheism not as the militant denial of God, who is relevant to only a small number of our contemporaries, but as a profound indifference which can take on many different forms. As pointed out by the Japanese Buddhist monk, theologian, and philosopher Hōseki Shinichi Hisamatsu (1996), “the fundamental characteristic of the modern era is atheism.”

This is not because a solution has been found to the question of the existence or non existence of God. It is that this question appears to have lost its organizing capacity. The radical individualization which characterizes our contemporary relation to meaning deprives religion of the centrality it claimed to

embody. Such an evolution, seen against the backdrop of a massive distancing from the institutionalization of belief, entails two major consequences: the ever increasing difficulty of sustaining the distinction between believer and non believer when there is no longer, except in theory, a “content” to belief which can be taken as an ultimate frame of reference; and therefore the loss of sociological relevance of a concept of atheism, the meaning of which demands that very frame of reference.

Theology itself has made use of these trends. Apart from the currents which, in the perspective opened up by Dietrich Bonhoeffer, try to define an a religious Christianity (especially in the English speaking world and under diverse forms), some have suggested that the term “unbeliever” should be replaced by “believer in a different way.” Others even go so far as to consider unbelief as a new paradigm for theological research, and even as a new model for the comprehension of faith.

In the field of sociology itself, the substantial developments observable within our societies suggest an end to the bias which consists in identifying belief with religion and the latter with institutionalized religion. Maintaining this approach implies that the only way of outlining the contours of contemporary belief is to use the analytical tools devised for the study of institutionalized religion. An approach through membership, based on the proximity or the distance from a specified content of belief, seems unable to account for the trends just mentioned. To take only one example, a very large majority of French people claim to be Catholic, but 40 percent of them simultaneously state that they “have no religious affiliation.” Along these same lines, approximately one third of the teenagers who identify themselves as Catholics assert that they “do not believe in God.”

The contemporary landscape, in which belief is governed by subjectivism, is made up entirely of fluid currents which remain highly resistant to any structuring reference to a form of stability, unless stability is perceived as strictly operational. The goal is not to reach a “religious identity,” seen as stable (and

indispensable to understand an “a religious” identity). What is now at stake is the relation to experience (and the priority of the latter over the content of belief); to authenticity (and the priority of the latter over truth); to a refusal of violence and to belief constituted as a “comfortable” space, kept at a distance from constraints and norms.

Of course, individualization is not a new process, nor is individuality a modern invention, nor individualism a contemporary discovery. This is not the question. The rather enigmatic status of religion today (should the term be used in the singular or the plural? Is religion on its way out or making a comeback? Is it ultimately reducible to politics or is it the converse?) does not proceed from an overriding individualization of the relation to meaning, but from the social legitimatization of the latter. Even the great names of sociology, from Durkheim to Weber and from Tocqueville to Marx, are of little help in understanding this phenomenon because it is – if not a radical or unexpected novelty – at least a brutal acceleration of the movements which stir our contemporary societies, and via globalization, even those beyond our western societies, which have been the cradle of the individualization of belief.

If the concept of atheism does not appear to make sense today as a sociological tool, it continues however to make sense as a political category. We are not thinking here specifically of the effort to eradicate religion pursued in the communist system, where the official policy of forced atheization was a necessary part of the construction and consolidation of the legitimacy of the regime. “Opium of the masses,” religion was construed as the prime indicator of social suffering. If its disappearance would have demonstrated the advent of the harmonious society sought for by the regime, its resilience proved how difficult it was to achieve such a program. Only one country, Albania, followed this logic inherent to the communist project to the bitter end, by declaring religion unconstitutional.

With the collapse of the Soviet Union and its empire, the reference to atheism has taken on a different political significance. If yesterday it was linked to communism, it now

testifies to the perversion and decadence of western society. This type of discourse, often associated with a radical interpretation of Islamism, presents the secularization of societies as an outgrowth of Christian civilization. In the last instance, it aims at stigmatizing "democracy" as the official institutionalization of pluralism and therefore of a presumed relativism. From the same perspective, it also denounces a domineering West imposing its own order on the rest of the world.

SEE ALSO: Civil Religion; Civilizations; Communism; Cultural Relativism; Deinstitutionalization; Globalization, Religion and; Humanism; Individualism; Modernity; Post modernism; Religion, Sociology of; Sacred, Eclipse of the; Sacred/Profane; Secularization; Values

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attitudes and behavior

Frances G. Pestello

Since the early days of the twentieth century, scholars have pondered the role of mental conceptions and evaluations in guiding social action. This has been an enduring question in social psychology and one that has implications for all of sociology. Most social scientists have conceptualized this as the relationship between attitudes and behavior. Two competing paradigms have emerged to explain this relationship. They diverge theoretically and methodologically. One approach to the study of attitudes and behavior is grounded in positivism and deductive theorizing. The competing paradigm is inductive and phenomenological, emphasizing process and construction. The central disputes, in these competing approaches, involve the importance placed upon social context and how attitudes are conceptualized.

These competing approaches to the study of attitudes emerged almost immediately in psychology and social psychology. Attitudes are identified by early writers as a foundational concept in social psychology. Herbert Spencer used the concept. Thomas and Znaniecki wrote about the scientific study of subjective dispositions, which they called "attitudes." They defined attitudes as the subjective component of situations and as a critical component of the social landscape. Situations undergird all behavior. Behavior is never separate and distinct from the situations in which it occurs. In *The Polish Peasant* (1918) they provide the foundation for a situational, processual approach to the understanding of behavior, in which there are three kinds of data a social actor considers in forming actions: the objective conditions, preexisting attitudes, and the definition of the situation. Faris (1928) too articulates the processual nature of attitudes, as a residue of past action as well as a precursor to future actions. Faris emphasizes the importance of imagination in the construction of action.

However, it was Gordon Allport in the mid 1930s who posited what proved to be

the seminal definition of attitudes as mental states which direct one's response to objects and situations. This definition put attitudes in a causal, directive relationship with behavior, and lay the groundwork for a deductive, scientific approach to the relationship between attitudes and behavior. From this perspective attitudes are intrapersonal, psychological tendencies expressed through the favorable or unfavorable evaluation of objects. Initially the core component of an attitude was affective. As the concept developed, some researchers articulated a tripartite model, including a cognitive or mental piece, a conative or directive or guiding component, and an affective or emotional aspect to attitudes.

The dominant contemporary model in the attitude-behavior literature was developed by Martin Fishbein and Icek Ajzen, who called it the theory of reasoned action. The theory of reasoned action is a four stage, recursive model, in which the immediate determinant of volitional behavior is intention. Intentions are dependent upon attitudes and subjective norms, which are one's perception of how relevant others would view the performance of the behavior in question. Attitudes and subjective norms, in turn, are determined by "beliefs." In short, if behavior is not coerced and one intends to do something, then behavior should follow, if nothing else intervenes. The line of research promulgated by the theory of reasoned action is probably the most visible and cited exemplar of this approach to work on attitudes. The core assumption of this approach to attitudes is consistency. Attitudes are conceptualized as generic, trans situational, psychological expressions that guide behavior across circumstances. Attitudes, if measured correctly, predict behavior. The social context in which the behavior is expressed is largely irrelevant.

Early on the invisibility of attitudes as an individual, mental construct created a measurement problem for researchers. The dilemma was how to get people to reveal their inner attitudes in a reliable and valid way. This led to the development of attitude scaling techniques, which generated reproducible results. These techniques have become the backbone of sociological data collection strategies. Likert, Thurstone, Guttman, and Osgood pioneered

the operationalization and measurement of attitudes. The common core of all these techniques is asking questions about how respondents evaluate target objects through survey or interview questions.

Considerably less attention has been paid to the conceptualization and measurement of behavior in attitude-behavior research. Given its visibility, behavior appears to be a more straightforward and obvious concept that is easily measured. Some, such as Fishbein, discourage the measurement of actual behavior and opt for the measurement of behavioral intention instead. Intentions, like attitudes, can be revealed through the answers to carefully worded questions. Researchers have therefore come to rely primarily upon survey instruments to measure behavior. Through a question format, respondents are asked to reveal what they intend or expect to do, or, through self reports, what they remember doing at some earlier time. Although a causal relationship is hypothesized, most researchers accept the simultaneous measurement of attitudes and behavior in their designs.

Sometimes attitudes were found to predict behavior. Other times, no relationship was found. Surprisingly, based on theoretical predictions, sometimes there was an inverse relationship between attitudes and the related behavior. In the mid 1960s, some researchers, like Albrecht, began to focus on intervening variables that might interfere with or enhance the relationship between one's attitudes and subsequent behavior. It was believed that such a focus might help explain the inconsistent findings in the attitude-behavior literature. The thrust of this research is that some conditions, largely attributable to the social context, may impact the relationship between attitudes and behavior. The relationship would be more clearly understood if researchers looked not simply at whether attitudes and behaviors are related, but under what conditions they were related. Social constraint, opportunity, reference group, and the public or private nature of the situation are some of the variables considered in these analyses.

The primary critique of the scientific approach to the study of attitudes rejects the notion of consistency. Both attitudes and behaviors are believed to be interpersonal.

In this approach to the problem the role of social context is prominent. Richard LaPiere challenged the core assumption of the positivist approach in an early article entitled "Attitudes vs. Action." He discovered in a field study that the way in which respondents' thought and talked about a despised minority did not always match their actions. He demonstrated this anomaly by traveling around the Western United States with a Chinese couple, members of a group that was experiencing high levels of prejudice and discrimination at the time. As they traveled, he observed how his Chinese companions were treated in actual service situations. The Chinese couple was refused service only once. In addition, the service they received was reasonably good throughout their travels.

He followed up these observations by sending a questionnaire to all the establishments the Chinese couple had visited with him throughout their travels. The surveys indicated that the Chinese couple would not receive service at almost every establishment they had visited, a sharp contradiction with actual experience. His conclusion was that prejudicial attitudes toward the Chinese did not predict their treatment in actual situations. By using a qualitative and inductive approach to the attitude-behavior relationship, LaPiere established the basis for an entirely different approach to the study of attitudes and behavior. Merton produced similar findings in a study on African Americans. This approach assumes that attitudes are complex and situational.

LaPiere anticipated the work of Herbert Blumer, who challenges the very idea of a bivariate, objective, intrapersonal conceptualization of either attitude or behavior. Blumer was unwilling to see attitudes as input and behavior as output. For him the key to understanding the relationship between mental conceptualizations and actions is embedded in the actor's definition of the situation. Actors are continually interpreting and reinterpreting the situations in which they find themselves, in order to create and coordinate their line of action with others. This approach, perhaps because of the more laborious methodology and the non deterministic assumptions upon which it is based, has failed to generate

anywhere near the volume of research the theory of reasoned action has.

Irwin Deutscher begins with the conundrum posed by the work of LaPiere and draws on Blumer in his 1973 review and critique of the current state of theoretical and methodological thinking on the relationship between attitudes and behavior. Deutscher struggles with the generic problem of how words and deeds are connected. He concludes with an advocacy of a situational approach to the study of attitudes and behavior, in which social actors construct their behavior and give it meaning in specific social situations. Deutscher emphasizes that "it's what's in between attitude and behavior" that counts in understanding the relationship. In a 1993 sequel to *What We Say/What We Do*, Deutscher and his colleagues find a great deal of evidence that merits the continued use of the phenomenological approach in the study of attitudes and behavior. From their perspective, situations are open, indefinite, and subject to continuous interpretation, reinterpretation, and modification by the social actors embedded in them. People imbue situations with meaning, then act on the basis of that meaning. Behavior is constructed in concert with others, not solely by individuals. Social action is almost always in collaboration with others.

The concept of attitude has been used to explain behavior in a variety of contexts. Attitude change has also been used as a means of hypothesizing and explaining behavioral change. Relevant studies appear in almost every field of sociology, including law, criminology, family, and substance use. Given the affective and motivational nature of attitude conceptualization, work in the sociology of emotions, motive, and language has relevance for understanding the complexity of this relationship and resolving some of these intellectual disputes in understanding the relationship between thoughts and actions.

SEE ALSO: Accounts; Blumer, Herbert George; Definition of the Situation; Emotion: Social Psychological Aspects; Interaction; Language; Psychological Social Psychology; Social Cognition; Symbolic Interaction; Thomas, William I; Znaniecki, Florian

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attraction

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Attraction is a positive attitude one holds for another person. Attraction also refers to the positive behaviors an individual displays in response to another person over a prolonged period of time. Positive behaviors can include the experience of positive emotions or feelings in conjunction with the other, enhancing the welfare of the other, and trying to maintain close proximity to the other. Little work has been done to expand on the theoretical construct of attraction. Rather, the literature has tended to address the question of why people are attracted to each other and why people find some people more attractive than others.

From this body of literature, several principles of attraction have emerged: familiarity, proximity, reciprocity, similarity, and physical attractiveness. Empirical support for all of these conditions has been found by experimental studies and naturalistic studies. In other words, empirical support for these conditions has been established in studies among relative strangers and among actual relationships (either friendship or intimate).

Familiarity is the principle that individuals tend to like people who are familiar to them. The more exposure effect is the consistent research finding that people, under most conditions, tend to like familiar people and objects more than people and objects they have not seen before. The more individuals are exposed to a given person, the more attracted they are to that person.

Proximity is the second principle of attraction. Proximity refers to the location of individuals – either physical or functional distance. The closer individuals are physically, the more likely attraction will occur. Proximity is influential in the development of attraction because it allows opportunity for

individuals to interact. Attraction cannot occur without interaction. In other words, interaction is a necessary condition in order for attraction between individuals to occur. Proximity is related to familiarity in that individuals who are geographically close are more likely to be familiar than those individuals who are geographically distant. The closer individuals are, the more likely they are to interact with one another. As the number of interactions between individuals increases, they become more familiar to one another. While being physically close to another person increases the likelihood of interaction, being functionally close to another person has a greater impact on whether or not a relationship develops. In the classic study by Festinger et al. (1950), the authors investigated the impact of the physical layout of an apartment complex on the development of friendships among married couples. They found that couples were more likely to form friendships with their next door neighbors compared to neighbors who lived two doors away. The further any two couples lived, the less likely they were to develop a friendship. But, they found that functional distance was a stronger predictor than physical distance as to whether or not relationships developed. Couples who lived by the mailboxes or stairways tended to develop more friendships than couples who did not live near the mailboxes or stairways. Proximity is influenced by institutional structures (i.e., school tracking) and preferences (i.e., similar interests cause individuals to end up at the same place at the same time).

Reciprocity is another principle of attraction. People tend to like people who like them. Balance theory (Heider 1953) asserts individuals are motivated to maintain a cognitive balance among a set of sentiments. Sentiment refers to the way an individual feels (or evaluates) another individual or object. Balance theory argues that relationships tend toward a balanced state, in which there is no stress. If a person, A, believes that another person, B, likes A, A will start to like B. Relationships are supposed to be reciprocated. When a relationship is not reciprocated, the relationship ceases to exist.

Similarity is the fourth principle of attraction. People tend to like others who hold similar

attitudes. Balance theory offers an explanation as to why people like others who hold similar attitudes. Balance theory's principle of consistency argues that individuals strive to maintain relationships that are consistent (congruent) with one another, rather than relationships that are inconsistent (incongruent). If inconsistency does arise between cognitive elements, individuals are motivated to restore harmony between elements. Inconsistency is presumed to be unpleasant and stressful; this is why individuals are motivated to minimize stress. Another explanation for similarity is social comparison. People compare their beliefs to the beliefs of others. When attitudes and beliefs are similar, people's beliefs and attitudes are validated.

Not only do people tend to like others with similar attitudes, they also tend to like others who are similar to them in terms of demographic characteristics. This tendency is captured in the principle of homophily. *Homophily* refers to the principle that individuals are more likely to interact with those who are similar to them, rather than with those who are dissimilar to them (McPherson et al. 2001). It is a well documented research finding that individuals tend to both initiate and maintain relationships with similar others. This does not necessarily mean that individuals choose to interact with those who are similar to them rather than those who are dissimilar to them. Furthermore, the more individuals interact, the more similar they become over time. Common characteristics in which individuals tend toward similar others are sex, race, ethnicity, age, class background, and educational attainment. Studies looking at naturally occurring relationships have consistently found that individuals are more likely to be friends with those who are similar to them than those who are dissimilar.

Homogamy is the research finding that in addition to being attracted to similar others, individuals tend to marry similar others. Marriage partners tend to share similar characteristics, including education and race.

Physical attractiveness is the final principle of attraction. People tend to like individuals who are physically attractive more than those who are less physically attractive. The primary explanation for this principle can be

summarized with the stereotype, “what is beautiful is good.” What one considers to be physically attractive is culturally dependent and changes over time, both within and across cultures. The matching hypothesis asserts that individuals tend to be attracted to individuals of similar levels of attractiveness.

Some researchers argue that there is an evolutionary component as to what traits are considered to be physically attractive. Buss (1989) argues there are sex differences in biology that give rise to psychological differences in attraction between men and women. In a study of 37 cultures, he found that women tend to value economic stability, ambition/drive, social status, and older age. He found that men tend to value youth and physical attractiveness. Physical attractiveness signals fertility (reproductive value). The two traits that are key in physical attractiveness are clear skin and symmetric features. Work by Eagly and Wood (1999) contradicts the work by Buss. They find that individuals choose their mates within the constraints of the role structure – that people choose good exemplars for their culture’s definition of a good mate (either wife or husband). They reanalyzed Buss’s 37 culture study. Specifically, they looked at the variability in the amount of sex differences in cultures. They asserted that if it is truly biology that causes the gender differences in mate selection preference, there should not be variation across cultures. However, they found that gender differences in mate selection are not found in societies in which there is gender equality. Specifically, the more similar the gender roles are for women and men in a given society, the greater the tendency to choose a mate like oneself. Rather than biology impacting mate selection, according to their social structural theory, gender roles impact mate selection.

The majority of research within the area of interpersonal attraction has focused on the conditions under which attraction occurs. The exception to this has been the development of theories of love, for example Sternberg’s (1986) triangular theory of love. The triangular theory of love asserts that there are three basic components of love: intimacy, passion, and decision/commitment. Intimacy is the feeling of a close emotional bond with a person. Passion refers

to the physical and sexual component of love. Decision/commitment is the conscious choice to love a person in the short term and the declaration of a longer term promise. Each of these three components is combined in different ways to yield eight types of love.

A growing area in current research focuses on the intersections of class, race, and ethnicity on attraction. Specifically, research has started to focus on whether or not there are differences across class and racial and ethnic groups in the factors that influence attraction. Also, research has started to focus more on relationships (friendship or intimate) in which people differ. Specifically, there has been an increase within the literature on interracial friendships and intimate relationships (see, e.g., Hallinan & Williams 1989).

SEE ALSO: Cognitive Balance Theory (Heider); Friendship: Interpersonal Aspects; Friendship: Structure and Context; Networks; Social Exchange Theory; Social Network Analysis; Social Network Theory; Sociometry

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attribution theory

Abdallah M. Badahdah

As interest in consistency theories waned in the 1960s, new approaches to cognitive research emerged. In the 1970s, and to a lesser extent in the 1980s, attribution research became a dominant force in the field of social psychology. There is no one theory of attribution; rather, several perspectives are collectively referred to as attribution theory. Attribution theory explains how perceivers explain human behaviors by inferring the causes of those behaviors.

Fritz Heider (1958) provided social psychologists with the building blocks for developing attribution research. Heider argued that people strive to understand, predict, and control events in their everyday lives. Laypeople have their own theories about the reasons why certain events occur. Heider encouraged social psychologists to learn from the commonsense, causal reasoning that was presumed to guide their behaviors. Among his important contributions to attribution research was his proposal that in their search for causal structures of events, people attribute causality either to elements within the environment (external attribution) or to elements within the person (internal attribution). Moreover, Heider noted that people have a tendency to overestimate the power of internal causes, such as needs and attitudes, when explaining others' behavior. Another insight was his distinction between intentional and unintentional behaviors and his assumption that people tend to make an internal attribution of causes if they view an action as intentionally caused. However, Heider did not articulate and develop a systematic theory of his attribution principles.

Jones and Davis (1965) were the first to decipher some of Heider's principles and translate them into testable hypotheses. Correspondence inference theory identifies the conditions under which an observed behavior can be said to correspond to a particular disposition or quality within the actor. In other words, "correspondence inference" refers to the perceiver's decision about whether the actor's behavior matches or corresponds to

particular personal traits. The process of correspondence inference works backward and is divided into two stages: the attribution of intention and the attribution of dispositions. First, to determine whether the actor had intended to produce the observed effects, the observer's responsibility is to find out whether the actor knew about the act's observed effects and had the ability and freedom to produce those effects. Second, the observer seeks to conclude that the act was caused by internal or dispositional factors by comparing the effects of chosen and non chosen actions. Cultural desirability plays a role at this stage. If an act's given effect is expected and considered culturally desirable (in role), then it is less informative and plays a lesser role in correspondence inference. However, if the effects contradict generally held expectations, then more information can be gained and an attribution to personal dispositions is made. Sometimes chosen and non chosen acts produce similar results, which complicates the attribution process. The principle of non common (unique) effects of the intended act is helpful in this case. When a given act has fewer non common or unique consequences, the observer's confidence in his or her attribution increases.

Correspondence inference is also influenced by two factors related to the observers: hedonic relevance and personalism. The consequences of an act are said to be hedonically relevant to the observers if they benefited from or were harmed by the act. The more hedonically relevant the consequences of an act are to the observers, the more likely that inferences will be correspondent. Personalism influences correspondence inference if observers perceive that they are the act's intended target. The more strongly the observers believe that they are the act's intended target, the more likely they will attribute the act to personal dispositions.

Kelley's (1967) theory of covariation analysis is concerned with the accuracy of attributing causes to effects. His theory hinges on the principle of covariation between possible causes and effects. The causes can be persons, entities, or times. Three types of information are used to make causal attribution: consensus, distinctiveness, and consistency. Consensus

refers to whether all people act the same way toward the same stimulus or only the observed person. Distinctiveness concerns whether the observed person behaves in the same way to different stimuli. Consistency refers to whether the observed person behaves in the same way toward the same stimulus over time and in different situations. One can score high or low on these three qualities. The attribution to personal or environmental factors depends on the combination of these qualities. For example, an attribution is most likely to be made to a personal quality within the actor if consensus and distinctiveness are low and consistency is high. However, if consensus, consistency, and distinctiveness are high, then the attribution is more likely made to external factors.

Kelley acknowledged, however, that observers might have limited information, or lack the motivation or time needed to sort through multiple observations. In such cases, observers use their past experiences and theories about the relationships between causes and effects, which he called “causal schemata,” to make attributions. Two principles are associated with these causal schemata. The discounting principle states that the role of a particular cause in producing a given outcome is minimized if other plausible causes are present. The augmentation principle argues that observers are more likely to attribute a given effect to the actors if the effect is produced under inhibitory conditions, such as risk or cost. Thus, if a given effect is produced despite the risk and cost involved, then perceivers are more likely to attribute the cause to the actors.

Kelley and Michela (1980) called the above theories, which focus on the antecedents–attribution link, “attribution theories.” Bernard Weiner’s (1986) theory of achievement and emotion, which focuses on the emotional and behavioral consequences of the attribution process, is labeled attributional theory. Weiner’s theory suggests three dimensions of perceived causality: the locus of the cause (within the person versus outside the person), the stability of the cause (stable versus unstable), and the controllability over the cause (controllable versus uncontrollable). Individuals will pay attention to and search for a causal attribution if the outcome is negative, unexpected, and/or important. The resultant

emotions depend on the type of attribution that observers make. Weiner distinguished between two groups of affective consequences of causal attribution. First, “outcome dependent” affects, such as feeling happy for succeeding in a task or sad for failing a task, are experienced because of the attainment or non attainment of the outcome, and not by the cause of that outcome. The second group, “attribution linked” affects, are the product of appraisal and the assignment of a cause. For example, successful outcomes that are attributed to one’s internal quality, such as effort, are more likely to engender high self esteem than success that is attributed to external factors, such as good luck. Similarly, attributing one’s failure to an internal quality may cause lower self esteem than failure that one attributes to external factors.

In the process of making attributions, people make errors by either overestimating or underestimating the impact of situational or personal factors when explaining their behaviors or the behaviors of others. These errors are termed biases in attribution. One prominent bias is the correspondence bias, which refers to observers’ tendency to exaggerate or overestimate the influence of dispositional factors when explaining people’s behavior. This bias is so ubiquitous that in the social psychology literature, it is known as the fundamental attribution error. Even though there is no one preferred or accepted explanation for this bias, several have been suggested. One explanation of correspondence bias is that in explaining an individual’s behavior, observers are more likely to focus on the actor rather than situational cues. Another explanation suggests that when people attempt to explain others’ behaviors, they proceed through two steps. In the first step, the observers make dispositional inferences, which is relatively easy and effortless. In the second step, the observers revisit their inferences to correct or adjust them after scrutinizing the situation. Revisiting the first step for the purpose of correction might be difficult or impossible if the observers are busy or distracted. Another type of error is the actor–observer difference, in which actors tend to attribute the cause of their behaviors to external factors, while observers of the same behaviors tend to attribute causality to stable, dispositional factors

within the actors. One explanation for this bias is the amount of information available to actors and observers. Actors have more intimate information about themselves and their present and past behaviors than observers. Self-serving bias is the third type of bias, and it refers to a situation in which people attribute their own successes to dispositional factors, but attribute their failures to external factors. One reason for engaging in self-serving bias is to increase or maintain self-esteem; another is to enhance one's self presentation.

Attribution research has been criticized for being individualistic and for paying little attention to social context. Studies at the interpersonal level have focused on issues related to marriage, such as the relationship between attribution and marital satisfaction (Bradbury & Fincham 1990). For example, it was found that spouses in happy relationships tend to use more relationship enhancing attributions (e.g., attributing negative behaviors to external factors), whereas spouses in unhappy relationships tend to use more distress maintaining attributions (e.g., the negative behaviors are attributed to internal, stable traits). At the intergroup level, attribution theories provide insights into the field of intergroup relations. For example, attribution theories explain the tendency for in group members to attribute positive outcomes to causes that are internal to the group, while negative outcomes are attributed to environmental factors. This tendency is known as the ultimate attribution error. At the societal level, attribution is seen as an ingredient of social representations. That is, members of a given society share beliefs about the causes of societal problems, such as homelessness and unemployment (Hewstone 1989).

Attribution research also has examined several of its basic assumptions in cross cultural studies. While many social psychologists view attribution biases as a cultural universal, cross cultural research has indicated that this is not the case. Research has indicated that attribution biases are prominent in western cultures, which stress individuality and view the self as independent and autonomous. In these cultures, individuals are encouraged to ascribe behavior to dispositional factors and underestimate external ones. In Asian cultures, however,

socialization stresses the importance of group membership and conformity. Individuals in these collectivistic cultures are aware that their behaviors are largely governed and intended to please their in group. Hence, when they make attributions, they are more attentive to the role of situational factors. Undoubtedly, individuals in collectivistic cultures do make personal attributions, but they tend to be more sensitive to external forces.

Attribution theories have much to contribute to the study of many sociological phenomena, such as labeling, accounts, impression management, and stratification (Grittenden 1983; Howard & Levinson 1985). Recently, Weiner's attributional theory has focused on the dimension of controllability in the study of stigma, providing an interesting insight that might complement sociologists' work on this topic.

SEE ALSO: Accounts; Labeling Theory; Marriage; Self Esteem, Theories of; Stigma

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audiences

Pertti Alasuutari

The audience is a central concept in media research. Typically, the audience refers to a large, loosely connected mass on the receiving end of the media, and in most cases it is used in association with electronic media, such as radio or television. The concept's centrality in media research stems from the fact that as a notion it provides a link between academic theory, industry practice, and media policy. In public service broadcasting politics, the audience is the public whose freedom of speech and whose access to the public sphere are at stake, for whom high quality and educational programs are made, and in whose name laws controlling and regulating the media are passed. For commercial broadcasting, the audience ratings and the demographic features of a program's audience are of crucial economic importance. For academic research, the concept of audience is important in addressing these questions: the audience is the arena in which the effects of mass communications are played out, or the place where the meanings and pleasures of media use are ultimately realized. More recently, media research and theory have questioned the self-evident character of the notion of the audience. The audiences are not natural things; they are constructed by audience rating techniques and by various notions of the audience. Different notions of audiences are part of the working of the media in contemporary societies. Developments in information and communication technology have also made the notion of audience in its traditional sense problematic and made media researchers question when it is sensible to speak of communication technology users as audiences.

The English word *audience*, denoting the assembled spectators or listeners at an event, first appeared in the fourteenth century, but it was not until the mid-nineteenth century that the word took on a more modern meaning by denoting the readers of a particular author or publication. With the advent of electronic media in the early twentieth century the word was adapted to include the far-flung listeners of radio and television. As a theoretical concept, the idea of a mass audience crystallized in the 1930s.

Paul Lazarsfeld started a brand of communication research in the 1930s commonly known as the Lazarsfeld tradition or the mass communication research (MCR) tradition, which significantly influenced the way academics and media practitioners came to see audiences and audience research. In this approach, the audience was conceived as a rather heterogeneous collection of people who were mostly unknown to each other, to be captured with the help of statistical research and revealed by quantifying selected attributes of individual audience members and aggregating the results. The idea in Lazarsfeld's studies was to try and explain how people make choices between available alternatives. In addition, the mass communication tradition was concerned with studying the effects of mass communication. It addressed public concerns about the effects of the media; for instance, how moving pictures affect the young or how the media is used for propagandistic purposes. The theme of the effects of mass communication was also behind marketing research dealing with radio and later television audiences: commercial broadcasting companies wanted to study how effective these media are for advertising.

The MCR tradition conceives of mass communication in terms of a transmission model. Developed by Shannon and Weaver (1949), the elements of the model are succinctly expressed in Lasswell's (1948) well-known verbal version: "Who says what in which channel to whom with what effect?" The model is simple, generalizable, and quantifiable and it fits within a commonsensical conception of communication as transportation of information.

However, there are shortcomings in this mechanistic model of communication, which the MCR tradition tried to overcome by modifying and developing it. Human communication is poorly described as sending packages of information to a receiver, because interpretation of the contents by the receivers is an essential element, which is a condition for the effects that communication may have. Because there was no theory of language in the original model, the effects of mass communication were a mystic black box. Accordingly, from the viewpoint of the effects, the transmission model was commonly labelled as the "magic bullet" or "hypodermic needle" theory, and later became known as the stimulus response theory. Empirical research showed that there are several intervening factors that modify the response to messages. Recipients of mass communication are not isolated individuals, but are influenced by family members, friends, and work colleagues. Drawing on these findings, Katz and Lazarsfeld developed the two step flow theory of mass communication, which asserts that information from the media flows in two stages. First, certain people who are heavy or regular users of the mass media receive the information. Second, these people, called opinion leaders, pass the information along to others who are less exposed to the media, through informal, interpersonal communication. Later, it has been noted that there are different sets of opinion leaders for different issues. Also, research that is more recent has shown that the spreading of ideas is not a simple two step process. A multiple step model is now more generally accepted (Rogers 1962).

Despite modifications, in the transmission model of communication the audiences have a passive role as recipients of information. Either directly or indirectly, through opinion leaders, audience members are pictured as individuals influenced by mass communication.

Unlike the mass communication research tradition's main strand, the uses and gratifications (U&G) tradition conceives of audiences as active agents and approaches the mass media from the other end of the chain of communication. Instead of asking "what media do to people" it is concerned with "what people do with media." U&G researchers are interested

in the various functions that mass communication has for individuals.

U&G arose originally in the 1940s as part of the MCR tradition. The first studies were based on qualitative interviews, from which the researchers inferred and named the different functions that the media served for respondents. Later, from the late 1950s onward, U&G became part of the dominant survey research paradigm. Instead of using open ended questions, researchers used ready made lists of functions such as social information, entertainment, and passing time. Respondents were asked to assess how well these functions characterize their media use, and researchers analyzed how different functions correlated with different programs and segments of the population. After an interval the tradition underwent a revival in the 1970s and 1980s. It presents the use of media in terms of the gratification of social or psychological needs of the individual. For instance, in 1974 Bulmer and Katz suggested that individuals might choose and use a program for diversion, personal relationships, personal identity, surveillance, and information. According to U&G researchers, the mass media compete with other sources of gratification, but gratifications can be obtained from a medium's content, from familiarity with a genre, from general exposure to the medium, and from the social context in which it is used. U&G theorists argue that people's needs and personality types influence how they use and respond to a medium. Within the U&G tradition, the lists of different uses and gratifications have been extended, particularly as new media forms have come along.

James Lull's (1980a,b) ethnographic study about the social uses of television can be seen as a return to the origins of the U&G tradition. Based on participant observation in households, Lull's study suggests that television has several uses. It can be a companion for accomplishing household chores and routines and used for background noise as an environmental resource. Second, television can be used as a "behavioral regulator," by which Lull means that activities such as mealtimes and chore times are punctuated by television. These are both "structural" uses, in addition to which Lull identifies "relational" uses.

They relate to the ways in which audience members use television to create practical social arrangements. "Communication facilitation" means that family members can use television in order to help them to talk about difficult or sensitive issues. By "affiliation/avoidance" Lull refers to television as a facilitator of physical or verbal contact or neglect. An example of this would be a moment of intimacy with a couple while watching television, or at least with the television switched on. "Social learning" refers to uses of television making decisions, modeling behavior, solving problems, disseminating information, and transmitting values. Finally, "competence/dominance" includes role enactment, which is reinforced by the parent regulating the watching of television programs as a gatekeeper.

The emergence of reception theory can be dated to an article by Stuart Hall (1973). It was important in inspiring reception research in media studies, in accordance with the cultural studies approach of the Birmingham Centre for Contemporary Cultural Studies. Like the older communication models, the reception model approaches (mass) communication as a process where certain messages are sent and then received with certain effects. However, the reception paradigm meant a shift from a technical to a semiotic approach to messages. A message was no longer understood as some kind of a package or a ball that the sender throws to the receiver. Instead, the idea that a message is encoded by a program producer and then decoded (and made sense of) by the receivers means that the sent and received messages are not necessarily identical, and different audiences may also decode a program differently. The model does not dismiss the assumption that a message may have an effect, but the semiotic framework introduced means that one moves away from a behavioristic stimulus response model to an interpretive framework, where all effects depend on an interpretation of media messages. With this linguistic or semiotic turn the arguments about effects are sort of swallowed up or at least made dependent upon people's interpretations or thought processes.

The reception theory has inspired empirical studies about the reception of television programs by different audiences, the first

one of which was David Morley's *The "Nationwide" Audience* (1980). By selecting different groups of people and showing them the *Nationwide* public affairs television program, Morley could more or less confirm and develop Hall's ideas about different codes audiences use for decoding media messages. Morley's seminal study was soon followed by studies about the reception of (especially) romantic serials and literature (e.g., Radway 1984; Ang 1985). What became known as qualitative audience reception studies typically meant that one analyzes a program, film, or book and studies its reception among a particular audience group by conducting "in depth" interviews of its viewers or readers.

The turn from a causal to a semiotic framework of communication meant that the active role of the receiver became emphasized. John Fiske's optimism in the face of television viewers' possibilities to actively produce their readings and interpretations is often considered as an extreme example. Fiske (1987) even talks about television's "semiotic democracy," by which he refers to the delegation of production of meaning to viewers. On the other hand, Fiske does recognize the imbalance of cultural power. Although the semiotic or cultural power of the dominant is sharply limited by the semiotic guerrilla tactics of the powerless, there is an inequality in people's ability to circulate their meanings simply because there is inequality of access to the media.

In reception research there has been a gradual shift from studying the reception of a particular program within an audience group to studying the role of different media in the everyday life of people (e.g., Morley 1986). These studies concentrate on the politics of gender, on the discourses within which gender is dealt with in the programs and how women viewers interpret and make use of the offered readings against the background of their everyday lives and experiences. Feminist scholarship has had an important role in this change. At the expense of a diminishing interest in program contents, in what became known as audience ethnography, more emphasis is laid on the functions of the medium, for instance how television use reflects and reproduces (gendered) relations of power in family life. Within audience ethnography researchers also started to look at reception from the

audience's end of the chain. One does not try to explain a reception of a program by probing into an "interpretive." Instead, one studies the everyday life of a group, and relates the use of (a reception of) a program or a medium to it. One studies the role of the media in everyday life, not the impact of the everyday life on the reception of a program.

From the late 1980s onward there was a new turn in the field of audience research when a number of writers began to question and discuss the premises of audience ethnography. For instance, Allor (1988), Grossberg (1988), and Radway (1988) emphasized that there really is no such thing as the "audience" out there. Instead, *audience* is, most of all, a discursive construct produced by a particular analytic gaze. This constructionist turn broadened the frame within which one conceives of the media and media use. One does not necessarily abandon ethnographic case studies of audiences or analyses of individual programs, but the main focus is not restricted to finding out about the reception or "reading" of a program by a particular audience. Rather, the objective is to grasp our contemporary "media culture," particularly as it can be seen in the role of the media in everyday life, both as a topic and as an activity structured by and structuring the discourses within which it is discussed. One is interested in the discourses within which people conceive of their roles as the public and the audience, and how notions of programs with an audience or messages with an audience are inscribed in both media messages and in assessments about news events and about what is going on in the world. This means resumed interest in the programs and programming, but not as texts studied in isolation from their usage as an element of everyday life. Furthermore, the constructionist turn adds a layer of reflexivity to the research on the reception of media messages by addressing the audiences' notions of themselves as the audience.

Related to the constructionist turn, there has been an increased interest in analyzing how notions of the audience are related to media policy and politics (Ang 1991, 1996). It has been pointed out that different notions of audiences also provide the discourses by which to legitimate different program policies

(Hellman 1999). For instance, the problematization of the distinction between "high" and "low" brow in media research reflects, perhaps also contributes to, the international and especially European deregulation of media policy. Similarly, the celebration of the active audience and the emancipatory potential of different programs and genres can be seen as a discourse useful in justifying or opposing media policies and politics.

A further challenge to the notion of the audience and audience research has emerged from the development of information and communication technology, which has meant that electronic mass media such as radio, television, film, and video are amalgamated with interactive media such as telephones and the Internet. Since many researchers who used to do media audience research have now moved to researching people's use of information and communication technology (e.g., Silverstone et al. 1991), it is inadequate to call it audience research. For instance, using the Internet may at times entail "audiencing," when an individual reads, views, or hears texts, programs, films, or music, but at other times or simultaneously it may mean that he or she is engaged in two way communication or in gaming. Additionally, the local context in which this takes place may include other people who play an active part in using the Internet resources. In this way audience research is intertwined with what is called user research of information and communication technology.

SEE ALSO: Birmingham School; Encoding/Decoding; Lazarsfeld, Paul; Media; Media Literacy; Public Opinion; Radio; Ratings; Semiotics; Television

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auditing

Thomas A. Schwandt

The notion of auditing is associated with social science methodology and with social theory. Generally defined, auditing is a procedure whereby an independent third party systematically examines the evidence of adherence of some practice to a set of norms or standards for that practice and issues a professional opinion. Thus, for example, financial auditors examine a corporation's financial statements against a set of standards for generally accepted accounting practices and issue a professional opinion (called an attestation) as to the dependability, integrity, and veracity of those statements. This general idea has been borrowed from the discipline of accounting and adopted in discussions of social science method. An auditing procedure has been suggested as a means to verify the dependability (cf. reliability) and confirmability (cf. warrantability) of claims made in a qualitative study (Lincoln & Guba 1985; Schwandt & Halpern 1989). The researcher is advised to maintain an audit trail (a systematically organized documentation system) of evidence including the data, processes, and product (claims, findings) of the inquiry. A third party inquirer then examines that audit trail to attest to the appropriateness, integrity, and dependability of the inquiry process and the extent to which claims made are reasonably grounded in the data.

In the field of social program evaluation, the general idea of auditing has influenced practice in two ways. First, program and performance auditing that is routinely performed at state and national levels. As defined by the Comptroller General of the United States (US GAO 1994), a performance audit is "an objective and systematic examination of evidence . . . of the performance of a government organization, program, activity, or function in order to provide information to improve public accountability and facilitate decision making." A program audit is a subcategory of performance auditing in which a key objective is to determine whether program results or benefits established by the legislature or

other authorizing bodies are being achieved. Second, metaevaluation – a third party evaluator examines the quality of a completed evaluation against some set of standards for evaluation. These standards are, more or less, guidelines for the conduct of evaluation and are promoted by various national and international evaluation agencies and organizations (e.g., the American Evaluation Association, the Canadian Evaluation Association, the African Evaluation Association, the European Commission, OECD).

The significance of auditing to social theory arises as program and performance auditing practices have proliferated (e.g., in hospitals, schools, universities, etc.) in contemporary society. An auditing mentality is closely associated with neoliberal theories of governance and the ideology of New Public Management (NPM). NPM emphasizes a programmatic restructuring of organizational life and a rationality based on performance standards, accountability, and monitoring. By being submitted to formal audit procedures the work of organizations is held to be more transparent and accountable. A variety of criticisms based in empirical and conceptual investigations are directed at the audit society, audit culture, or the culture of accountability as the latest manifestation of the infiltration of technological, means end, and instrumental rationality into the forms of everyday life. Auditing is viewed as an example of what Lyotard called the performativity that is characteristic of modernity – that is, the drive for efficiency, perfection, completion, and measurement that strongly shapes conceptions of knowledge, politics, and ethics. Some scholars argue that auditing (and associated practices such as total quality management, performance indicators, league tables, results oriented management, and monitoring systems) is not simply a set of techniques but a system of values and goals that becomes inscribed in social practices, thereby influencing the self understanding of a practice and its role in society. To be audited, an organization (or practice like teaching or providing mental health care) must transform itself into an auditable commodity. Auditing thus reshapes in its own image those organizations and practices which are monitored for performance (Power 1997). Others argue that audit

culture or society promotes the normative ideal that monitoring systems and accountability ought to replace the complex social political processes entailed in the design and delivery of social and educational services and the inevitably messy give and take of human interactions. Still others contend that the growing influence of an audit culture contributes to the disappearance of the idea of *publicness* as traditional public service norms of citizenship, representation, equality, accountability, impartiality, openness, responsiveness, and justice are being marginalized or replaced by business norms like competitiveness, efficiency, productivity, profitability, and consumer satisfaction.

SEE ALSO: Authenticity Criteria; Norms; Reliability

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authenticity criteria

Yvonna S. Lincoln

Authenticity criteria are criteria for determining the goodness, reliability, validity, and rigor of qualitative research. They may be contrasted with trustworthiness criteria on foundational grounds. Trustworthiness criteria were developed in response to conventional quantitative and statistical concerns for rigor, including internal validity, external validity (or generalizability), reliability (or replicability), and objectivity. Each of the four dimensions

of trustworthiness parallels each of the four rigor dimensions of quantitative methods. Trustworthiness criteria, therefore, may be said to be foundational because they respond to the foundations of conventional scientific research.

Authenticity criteria emerged in response to the call for criteria which were responsive not to conventional quantitative research, but rather to the reformulated philosophical premises of phenomenological, constructivist, or interpretivist inquiry. Such criteria were neither proposed nor self evident. Attempts to tease out such criteria resulted in five proposals for judging the fidelity of phenomenological or interpretivist qualitative research to its underlying philosophical principles or axioms. Those five proposals included fairness and balance, ontological authenticity, educative authenticity, catalytic authenticity, and tactical authenticity.

FAIRNESS AND BALANCE

The mandate that interpretivist (or constructivist) research collect the constructions of all stakeholders or research participants implies that these participants will be actively sought out and solicited for their views on the research problem at hand. This does not imply that “anything goes,” or that standards will not be brought to bear when weighing the information and sophistication level of the accounts; merely that all accounts will be sought, and judged later. Community derived standards, with the input of the researcher, can be developed for testing the various accounts or constructions against some tests for information accuracy, misinformation, biases, stereotypes, or lack of information. But such testing of accounts is conducted after accounts from all participant or respondent groups have been invited and elicited.

Balance is the characteristic of case studies or ethnographies (the usual product of qualitative research methods) which demonstrates, within the text, that accounts have been sought, and that all viewpoints, whether consensual or competing, are being fairly represented. Balance requires, first, that those viewpoints be expressed, although the researcher may not

agree with them, and second, that discussions of methodology explain the efforts of researchers to seek out and obtain those constructions. Occasionally, some stakeholding or participant groups will elect not to provide their constructions of the phenomenon being researched. Efforts to persuade them otherwise may fail, but researchers must explain and describe their efforts fully in the case study or ethnography.

ONTOLOGICAL AUTHENTICITY

In qualitative research, it is frequently the case that interviewees and research respondents will be asked questions which they have never formulated for themselves. Occasionally, when that happens, respondents will find themselves expressing ideas or thoughts which never consciously occurred to them previously. The experience of coming to know how an individual feels about some issue – when she or he never thought about the issue before – is an encounter with one’s own personal consciousness, which is termed ontological authenticity. This self understanding or self knowledge is one of the intended outcomes of the process of phenomenologically oriented inquiry, and is therefore a criterion for judging the fidelity of the process of such inquiry. It is not necessary for each and every respondent to discover something new about her own thinking on some matter, but if no respondents make such discoveries, then the inquiry could fairly be called superficial.

EDUCATIVE AUTHENTICITY

A second criterion for judging interpretive and qualitative research is the extent to which all members of stakeholding groups come to understand the constructions of all the others, and indeed, members of different stakeholding groups (e.g., parents and teachers and school administrators) understand the value positions and/or constructions of other groups. This suggests that researchers need to plan for anonymous reporting venues which make all stakeholding groups aware of the sensemaking of other groups, whether through formal

reporting venues, or more informal periodic portrayals of group data.

This widespread sharing of constructions (although never individual respondents' names or other identifiers) runs counter to conventional inquiry, where in certain kinds of inquiries, particularly evaluations, data are shared only between researcher and managers and/or funders. The purpose, however, of interpretive inquiry is to ensure that all participants come away from the inquiry with richer, more textured, more informed, and more highly sophisticated understandings. In this manner, when decisions must be made by a community, each participant is operating with high levels of accurate information, and sound understanding of the viewpoints, constructions, and value positions of other community members.

CATALYTIC AUTHENTICITY

Catalytic authenticity refers to the possibility that research or evaluation study participants may wish to take action of some sort on their own behalf. For instance, as a result of some piece of research, parents may decide that their children need more formal instruction on ways to prevent sexually transmitted diseases. The research has acted as a catalyst to prompt greater concern on the part of parents for sexually active teenagers, and they may decide to address the school board on requested changes in the high school health and safety curriculum. Or research participants who are recipients of various community services may come to understand that social workers want to be responsive to their clients' needs, but struggle under enormous caseloads, and therefore attend to what appear to be the most desperate or dire circumstances. Research participants who are the targets of some social policy may desire to petition a state for more case workers in an agency to meet the needs of a growing community. In this instance, the understanding of overworked and overloaded case workers prompts the request for additional lines to serve the agency's and targets' need in this community.

Catalytic authenticity indexes a study's intent to address genuine or compelling social

problems, likely those identified by some community of stakeholders, and to find meaningful possibilities for addressing the problems which can be understood and acted upon by those for whom it is a problem. Catalytic research frames research problems in ways which enhance the likelihood that problems will be understood by all stakeholders, creates a language and a discourse which can be shared by all involved in studying the problem, but especially participants, and poses meaningful strategies (in cooperation with stakeholders) for addressing the issues. Catalytic authenticity ensures that community questions are a part of the activities of researchers, and that real world solutions can be acted upon.

TACTICAL AUTHENTICITY

Sometimes, stakeholders understand the issues all too well, but do not fully understand how to address the issues, or to whom potential solutions might be posed. When this occurs, researchers and evaluators – most of whom understand quite well how to “speak truth to power” or to get themselves on public agency agendas – may be called upon to train research or evaluation participants appropriate means and modes for getting their concerns addressed. Far from being “activist,” as such researchers who work with participants are often labeled, they are doing little more than simply leveling the playing field so that participants and stakeholders with less power and voice may actively participate in the kinds of dialogue and processes to which any middle class family has access. This is a form not only of authenticity to the democratic and participatory aspects of naturalistic and phenomenological inquiry, it is a kind of *balance*, in that it rebalances power relations within a community via community and adult education in democratic process (Guba & Lincoln 1989).

Authenticity criteria are not the only metric for assessing the reliability, trustworthiness, validity, or fidelity to some real life context for a study. Authenticity criteria address the quality of process in a phenomenological study, and additional quality criteria have been extrapolated from a variety of writers

and theoreticians reflecting on their own work (Lincoln 1995). Those quality criteria include the communitarian nature of the inquiry, that is, whether the inquiry process supports community building or whether it is anti communal; whether a text has achieved polyvocality, or whether it remains “the voice from nowhere, and the voice from every where”; whether a text demonstrates critical subjectivity, reciprocity, and sacredness; and whether there is any sharing of the benefits of research from those who provided the answers to the inquirer’s questions.

Clearly, many criteria remain to be explored. Equally clearly, the rather spartan set of criteria which characterizes positivist, or experimental, inquiry is insufficient for a paradigm of inquiry which seeks community and participatory forms of knowing.

SEE ALSO: Auditing; Naturalistic Inquiry; Paradigms; Trustworthiness

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author/auteur

Laurence Simmons

The concept of authorship seemed uncomplicated, or was at least unexplored, until the second half of the twentieth century, since when it has become the site of much theoretical discussion. Modern literary criticism has not simply underwritten the authority of authors. The American New Critics of the 1930s and 1940s, Cleanth Brooks and Robert Penn Warren in their *Understanding Poetry* (1938), ruled out the study of biographical materials as a substitute for study of the literary text itself. They raised the issue of

whether the reconstruction of an author’s intention from the text was at all possible, and, if possible, whether it is even relevant. Soon after, in a famous essay entitled “The Intentional Fallacy” (1954), the American critics William Wimsatt and Monroe Beardsley forbade critics to refer to authorial intentions in the analysis of literature, arguing that the literary work itself contained all the information necessary for its understanding, and that appeals to authorial intention or biography (disparaged as “Shakespeare’s laundry list”) were at best irrelevant, at worst downright misleading.

In 1968, the year of student and worker unrest in Paris, French literary critic Roland Barthes published a short article, “The Death of the Author,” in which he argued that the traditional notion of an author is a product of rationalist thought that ascribes central importance to the individual human being. This idea of the author, Barthes went on to suggest, is tyrannical in that it encloses the text within a single meaning tied to the author as expressive origin. Barthes’s view of the author is intimately tied up with his notion of *écriture*, which translates, rather unsatisfactorily, into “writing” in English. For Barthes (1977: 42), writing “is that neutral, composite, oblique space where our subject slips away, the negative where all identity is lost, starting with the very identity of the body writing.” Texts are not produced by authors but by other texts, and here Barthes presages the ideas of later poststructuralists such as Julia Kristeva’s “intertextuality.” The text is irreducibly plural, a weave of voices or codes which can not be tied to a single point of expressive origin in the author. It is language which “speaks,” not the author. For Barthes, the classic texts of modernism, such as the poetry of Stéphane Mallarmé or the prose of Marcel Proust, reach such a point where language can be said to be “speaking itself.”

Shortly after Barthes’s intervention, in 1969 before members and guests of the *Société française de philosophie*, Michel Foucault delivered a paper entitled “What is an Author?” Beginning with a quotation from Samuel Beckett (“What does it matter who is speaking”), Foucault explored his indifference to the concept of the author as the motivation and

fundamental ethical principle in contemporary writing. What is in question in writing, he suggested, is not so much the expression of a subject as the opening up of a space in which the subject who writes can only but disappear: “the mark of the writer is reduced to nothing more than the singularity of his absence” (Foucault 2000: 207). The quotation from Beckett, as Foucault realized, contained a contradiction, and it was contradiction that remained the hidden theme and motor of his seminar. “‘What does it matter who is speaking,’ someone said, ‘what does it matter who is speaking.’” Even though he or she might be anonymous and without face, there is someone who has offered up this enunciation, someone without whom this thesis, which negates the importance of who speaks, could not have been formulated. That is, the same gesture that refutes any relevance of the identity of the author nevertheless affirms its irreducible necessity. The author who Barthes had wanted to kill off comes back as a ghost.

At this point Foucault was able to clarify the direction of his understanding of the problem. This was founded upon the distinction between two notions that are often confused: the author as “real” person (who must remain outside the field) and the “author function” who will be the subject of Foucault’s essay. The name of the author was not simply a proper name like others, neither on the descriptive level nor on the level of designation. According to Foucault: “As a result, we could say in a civilization like our own there are a certain number of discourses endowed with the ‘author function’ while others are deprived of it. . . The author function is therefore characteristic of the mode of existence, circulation and functioning of certain discourses” (Foucault 2000: 211). The various features of the author function derive from this: a regime that attributes rights to an author and at the same time allows for the possibility that he or she might be persecuted and punished for what is written; the possibility of distinguishing between literary texts and scientific texts; the possibility of authenticating texts by placing them in a canon; the possibility of constructing a transdiscursive function which constitutes the author beyond the limits of his or her own text as the

instigator of a discourse (thus now the name Marx represents much more than the author of *Das Kapital*).

Two years later Foucault was to deliver this paper again at the University of Buffalo in a modified form in which he opposed even more rigorously the author as real individual with the “author function.” “The author is not,” he declared on that occasion, “an indefinite source of significations that fill a work; the author does not precede the works; he [*sic*] is a certain functional principle by which, in our culture, one limits, excludes, and chooses; in short, by which one impedes the free circulation, the free manipulation, the free composition, decomposition, and recomposition of fiction” (Foucault 2000: 221). This radical separation of the author subject from the apparatus that governs its function within society was read by many hostile critics as a profound indifference on Foucault’s part to the flesh and blood subject in general and it led to a charge that he was simply “aesthetizing” the living subject. But Foucault was perfectly conscious of this dilemma and this aporia. For him, the subject as living individual is always present if only through the objective processes of subjectification which construct it, and the apparatus which writes it and captures it within mechanisms of power. As Foucault never tired of repeating, “the trace of the writer lies only in the singularity of his absence.” The author is not dead, but to present oneself as an author is to occupy the place of the dead. An author subject exists, but he or she exists through the traces of absence.

In 1976 Jacques Derrida was to publish a small book on the French experimental poet Francis Ponge entitled *Signéponge/Signsponge* (1984). The title of this book punned on the *sponge* like nature of Ponge’s poetry, which sucked up watery *signs* and was, it could be said, “signed by the sponge.” In this challenging text, among other things Derrida looked at the different ways an author signs a text and how an author’s signature is a textual element as well as being a mark of the author – he calls these “signature effects.” Derrida specified three distinct senses of the word signature. First of all, the literal sense of the signature: the name of the author that is

articulated and readable (a director's name on the credits at the beginning of a film, a painter's signature on a painting, an author's name on the cover of a book). At first sight this may seem simple and straightforward and its use is rather like the way in which we sign our own names on checks or documents countless times each day. But, as Derrida points out, there are plenty of dud checks in circulation. That is, the signature may be a forgery, or it may not directly indicate ownership, as in the case of the Orson Welles's film *A Touch of Evil* (which Welles himself was to disown due to his exclusion by the studio from the final editing), or it may divert one's attention from the real author, as in the use of pseudonyms (where, for example, George Eliot gives the "wrong" indication about the author's gender). In Derrida's second sense, the signature is the set of marks or motifs left in the work, the style peculiar to one author or painter or film director. (Jackson Pollock's particular use of splattered paint is his signature in this context; the narratively inexplicable shots of driving rain that appear in most of Andrei Tarkovsky's films function in a similar way.) Third, there is what Derrida calls "the signature of the signature": those moments in a text when it points to the processes of representation and its own construction. These are metatextual moments of a sort of self reflexive pointing in a text to the text itself, a pointing to the act of production of that text. Derrida's meditations on the "signature effect," where the author is an active element at work within the text, provided a useful corrective to the extreme negation of Barthes's "death of the author."

In film studies there has been an equally complex debate around the concept of the author (generally taken to be the film director). In fact we can go as far back to Germany in 1913 to find the term "author's film" (*Autorenfilm*), meaning then, however, that a film was to be judged the work of its literary author or screenwriter rather than the person responsible for directing it. In the 1950s a group of French film critics and future film directors associated with the magazine *Cahiers du cinéma* initiated a debate on the *politique des auteurs* arguing the opposite, that despite its

collective or industrial production the director was the sole author of the finished product of the film, and that to fully understand any film we must focus on the figure of the director, in contrast to, say, its scriptwriter. So while they still recognized that filmmaking was an industrial process, the film criticism of the *Cahiers* critics stressed the *mise en scène* (the elements a director might manipulate in front of and with the camera), and the director's mastery of the codes of cinema that gave his or her films an individual touch (Derrida's "signature as style"). *Politique* here might be translated as "policy" (as much as "politics"), since it involved a conscious decision to look at films in a certain way and to value them in a certain way. During the German occupation of France in World War II, American films had been banned, but in the immediate aftermath of the war hundreds of heretofore unseen films flooded in. As they avidly consumed these films, the *Cahiers* critics bestowed auteur status and artistic respectability on directors such as Alfred Hitchcock, Howard Hawks, John Ford, and Samuel Fuller, most of whose films had only been awarded scant recognition in their countries of origin up until this point.

In the early 1960s Andrew Sarris, a film critic writing for the *Village Voice*, but also the English editor of *Cahiers du cinéma*, began to use the French "auteur theory" to reexamine Hollywood films, thus replacing the star or the producer or studio as the criterion of critical value with that of the director. Not only did Sarris assert that a creative artist could work within the constraints of Hollywood, but also that what had been considered commercial products up until this point could be thought of as works of art. Like his French counterparts, Sarris was the first to argue that these Hollywood films were worthy of serious critical attention and that popular directors like Alfred Hitchcock, Howard Hawks, Vincente Minnelli, and Nicholas Ray merited critical attention. In Sarris's hands auteurism also became an argument for the superiority of American cinema over that of the rest of the world and, indeed, the individualizing and formalist emphasis of auteur theory persists in popular journalism and general film culture in the US today. Back in Europe the debate

around auteurism was picked up in the light of the impact of structuralism, which had shifted attention to the codes employed and the structures of a text rather than a hidden or intentional (authorial) meaning. So in British film theory of the 1970s (associated with the magazine *Screen*) there was a shift from the notion of the author or director as a creative source of a work to the idea of a film as a set of structural relationships which *interact* to produce the author's worldview, rather than merely reflect or implement it. With this structuralist approach two notions are brought together that seem contradictory: on the one hand, the individual as director, a singular voice; on the other, the individual as director enmeshed in a number of social, aesthetic, linguistic structures that affect the organization of meaning in a text. For example, the films of John Ford were read through sets of binary oppositions that played out across them: European/Indian, settler/nomad, civilized/savage, book/gun, East/West. The master antinomy was taken to be that between nature and culture borrowed from the structural anthropologist Claude Lévi Strauss. Auteur structuralism shifted the emphasis from *mise en scène* to narrative structures and also displaced the auteur from the center of the work to become but one structure among several others making up the filmtext.

At first sight, the auteur frame would not appear to translate easily to the study of television and other media or popular culture texts. The names of television directors, with the exception of quality drama programs like *Twin Peaks* (which involved the film director David Lynch), are not well known to the general public, whereas those of actors often are. In the study of television the critical frame most employed is that of genre, which is often referred to as the other side of the auteurist coin. Nevertheless, the notion of the author/auteur, if only as a site of reaction, has an important place in media sociology and sociological theory, which may be credited with the latest theoretical twist and turn of the author/auteur. This is actor network theory, most prominently associated with the French sociologists of science Bruno Latour and Michel Callon. The theory's aim is to

describe a society of humans and nonhumans as equal actors tied together into networks built and maintained in order to achieve a particular goal, for example the development of a product. Latour recognized that semiotically both human actors and nonhuman participants (whether artifacts or naturalized constructs like bacteria) were equally "actants" (the term is borrowed from narrative semiotics): they were defined by how they acted and were acted on in the networks of practices. The important fact here is not that humans and nonhumans are treated symmetrically but that they are defined relationally as functions in the network, and not otherwise. An actor network, then, is the act linked together with all of its influencing factors (which again are linked), producing a network. The similarities and resonances with Barthes's demise of the subject, Foucault's "author function," and Derrida's "signature effect" will be obvious. Actor network theory opens up a new approach to cultural production, which is no longer to be understood in any individualistic way (the author as subject), but is rather shaped by the social and material organization of work, the means of communication, and the spatial arrangements of institutions. It is also important that, for Latour, actor network theory attempts to overcome the major shortfalls of modernism. The epistemology of modernism divided nature and society into two incommensurable poles. Nature was only observed, never man made; whereas society was only made by humans. The two poles were indirectly connected by language which allowed us to make stable references to either one of them. It is Latour's goal to show that the separation introduced by modernism is artificial. Because (technological) reality is simultaneously real, like nature, narrated, like discourse, and collective, like society, it does not follow the clean divisions envisioned by modernism, and Latour has claimed that *We Have Never Been Modern* (1993).

A number of people have contributed to this encyclopedia, but, it might be argued, all under the direction of George Ritzer. This could imply that this is *his* encyclopedia and that he is therefore the *author*, but as most of the words are not his own, it is fairly clear

that he could not be regarded as the author. If this was a film, and George Ritzer was the director, we might argue as to whether his direction of the process was so complete as to overpower any input from his collaborators, or whether it is in fact difficult, perhaps impossible, to assert his authorship because of the overwhelming nature of the collaborative process: the roles of advisers, consulting editors, famous experts in their fields, etc. A second issue to consider is one of organizational control: if this encyclopedia is a product of Blackwell Publishing, any claim George Ritzer might have to be its creator, or director of operations, might be nullified, in the same way that a studio system might influence the input of any director to their finished film. So perhaps the best theory might be that George Ritzer is simply some actor in a network of practices. Whatever the solution, even here at the opening of the twenty first century, it is clear that the claims and complexities of the arguments around the notion of author/auteur will not go away.

SEE ALSO: Actor Network Theory; Actor Network Theory, Actants; Barthes, Roland; Cultural Reproduction; Derrida, Jacques; Foucault, Michel; Poststructuralism; Structuralism

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authoritarian personality

Thomas F. Pettigrew

The authoritarian personality is a psychological syndrome of traits that correlates highly with outgroup prejudice. Three personality traits in particular characterize the syndrome: deference to authorities, aggression toward outgroups, and rigid adherence to cultural conventions. Thus, authoritarians hold a rigidly hierarchical view of the world.

Nazi Germany inspired the first conceptualizations. The Frankfurt School, combining Marxism, psychoanalysis, and sociology, introduced the syndrome to explain Hitler's popularity among working class Germans. An early formulation appeared in Erich Fromm's (1941) *Escape from Freedom*. American social psychologists soon demonstrated the syndrome in the United States. In 1950, the major publication, *The Authoritarian Personality*, appeared. The product of two German refugees (Theodor Adorno and Else Frankel Brunswik) and two American social psychologists (Daniel Levinson and Nevitt Sanford) at the Berkeley campus of the University of California, this publication firmly established the concept in social science. The volume offered both clinical and questionnaire evidence. But it was the easily administered F (for fascism) Scale that led to an explosion of more than 2,000 published research papers.

Critics immediately disparaged the work on political, methodological, and theoretical grounds. Right wing detractors questioned the finding that political conservatives averaged higher scores on the F Scale. They argued that there was widespread authoritarianism on the left as well. To be sure, the Berkeley investigators were politically liberal, and the syndrome exists on the left. But research repeatedly shows that the syndrome is preponderantly found among those on the political right. Indeed, a modern measure is simply called the Right Wing Authoritarianism Scale.

Methodological critics unearthed a host of problems. For example, the clinical evaluators were not blind to the F Scale scores of their interviewees. Consequently, their assessments

were not independently derived. No probability samples of respondents were tested – only samples of convenience (usually college students). The F Scale itself has problems. All the items are worded positively, so that agreement indicates authoritarian tendencies. This allows response sets to invalidate some scores, because some respondents agree or disagree regardless of the item content.

The Authoritarian Personality also provoked theoretical criticism. Its Freudian foundation is difficult to test directly. Many objected to its nominalist approach – the use of extreme categories based on the highest fourth of F Scale scores labeled “authoritarians” and the lowest fourth labeled “equalitarians.” The Berkeley co authors virtually ignored the middle half of their subject distribution. The most important theoretical objection concerned the 1950 study’s neglect of the social context. Authoritarianism rises in times of societal threat, and recedes in times of calm. Crises invoke authoritarian leadership and encourage equalitarians to accept such leadership. Moreover, the syndrome’s link to behavior is strongly related to the situational context in which authoritarians find themselves.

Many of these criticisms have merit. Nonetheless, research throughout the world with various F Scales shows that authoritarians reveal similar susceptibilities. In particular, high scorers are more likely than others to favor extreme right wing politics and exhibit prejudice against outgroups. Three key questions arise: Just what is authoritarianism? What are its origins? And why does it universally predict prejudice against a variety of outgroups?

This remarkable global consistency of results, despite the problems involved, suggests that the authoritarian personality is a general personality syndrome with early origins in childhood that center on universal issues of authority. A plethora of theories attempt to define the personality type and its origins. The original Berkeley study viewed it as a personality type with particular characteristics. Relying on psychoanalytic theory, it stressed the effects of a stern father in early life. Later formulations emphasize the syndrome’s focus on strength and weakness, its intense orientation to the ingroup, and the

importance of modeling of authoritarian behavior by parents. The most recent work on the syndrome’s origins connects authoritarianism with attachment theory. Rejection by an early caregiver, often the mother, leads to an avoidance attachment style that closely resembles the authoritarian personality. Recent survey data with a probability sample of German adults reveal a strong relationship between the syndrome and a strong desire to avoid interpersonal closeness.

These German surveys also suggest why authoritarianism is universally related to outgroup prejudice. Developed early in life, authoritarianism later leads to conditions and behaviors that in turn generate intergroup prejudice. For example, authoritarians more often feel politically powerless (“political inefficacy”) and that modern life is too complex and bewildering (“anomia”) – both predictors of prejudice. Situational factors are also involved. Authoritarians tend to associate with others who are prejudiced. And they tend to avoid contact with outgroup members – a major means for reducing prejudice.

Thus, the authoritarian personality concept is an important tool for social science to understand a range of important social phenomena. For all its problems, it has stood the test of time and an abundance of research. But it operates at the individual level of analysis. Writers often erroneously employ it to explain societal phenomena – a compositional fallacy that assumes societal processes are mere composites of individual behavior. However, when authoritarianism is combined with situational and societal perspectives, it gains explanatory power in accounting for such phenomena as extreme right wing politics and intergroup prejudice.

SEE ALSO: Adorno, Theodor W.; Critical Theory/Frankfurt School; Fromm, Erich; Holocaust; Race; Race (Racism); Scapegoating; Slurs (Racial/Ethnic)

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authoritarianism

Esperanza Palma

The concept of authoritarianism has been used mainly to refer to a type of authority whose power is exercised within diffuse legal, institutional, or de facto boundaries that easily leads to arbitrary acts against groups and individuals. Those who are in power are not accountable to constituencies and public policy does not derive from social consent.

Within sociology and political science, particularly within comparative politics, authoritarianism has been understood as a modern type of political regime. Therefore, the concept focuses on the way of accessing, exercising, and organizing power, on the nature of the belief system, and the role of citizens in the political process. This notion has had an important conceptual development since the 1970s, which clarified some ambiguities within political analyses that tended to mix up this type of regime with fascism and other forms of totalitarianism. The concept of authoritarianism has included a range of regimes, from personal dictatorships such as Franco's in Spain in the 1930s, hegemonic party regimes like the Mexican regime founded after the

1910 Revolution, and the military governments of South America established during the 1960s and 1970s. The context in which this type of regime was founded was generally a protracted situation of instability such as a revolution (Mexico), a civil war (Spain), a democratic crisis (Chile), and deterioration of the economy and political polarization (Argentina). Most countries where an authoritarian regime was founded had neither a liberal democratic rule nor an opportunity to develop a state of law, and the construction of the nation was mediated not primarily by the concept of the citizen but rather by the notion of "the people."

As part of non democratic politics, authoritarianism does not fulfill the two theoretical dimensions of polyarchy defined by Robert Dahl (1971), public contestation and inclusiveness, which translate into eight requirements: freedom to form and join organizations, freedom of expression, right to vote, eligibility for public office, right of political leaders to compete for support, alternative sources of information, free and fair elections, and institutions for making government policies depend on votes and other expressions of preference.

Authoritarianism does not allow either public contestation (organization of opposition) or participation of all citizens (extension of the suffrage). Even though these dimensions can develop to some extent, they are always restricted because the political monopoly of the group in power cannot be placed at risk. Elections might be held under some authoritarian regimes, as was the case in Mexico where universal suffrage was guaranteed, and yet their function is not to allow citizens to decide who will govern but rather to corroborate the permanence of a group in power, and to allow recycling of the members of the same political elite. In some other cases like South Africa under apartheid, contestation was effective but a racial group was excluded from participation.

Although it has been clear that all forms of non democratic regimes do not fulfill the requirements of polyarchy, it has been less clear what the differences are between authoritarianism and totalitarianism. In academic debate, there have been key authors and works that, based on comparative analyses, have

developed a theory of authoritarianism and that have specified its method of functioning. These authors are, among others, Juan Linz, who first studied the case of Spain under Franco, and Guillermo O'Donnell, who made a crucial contribution to the understanding of some Latin American cases by analyzing the regimes that followed military coups of the 1960s and 1970s in Argentina, Brazil, Uruguay, and Chile. From these analyses he developed the concept of "bureaucratic authoritarianism."

In a seminal article, Linz (1964) proposed a typology of political regimes which clearly distinguished among totalitarianism, authoritarianism, and democracy. The main contribution of this work is that it poses the view that authoritarianism is not a form of transitional regime but, rather, a stable institutional arrangement which resolves in a particular manner the obtaining of obedience, legitimacy, social control, relation to social groups, and recruitment of the political elite, among others. As Linz (1975) points out in an essay in which he treats thoroughly the differences between authoritarianism and totalitarianism, the borderline between non democratic and democratic regimes is a rigid one that cannot be crossed by slow and imperceptible evolution but almost always requires a violent break. The definition of authoritarianism excludes totalitarian regimes, traditional legitimate regimes or oligarchies, and nineteenth century semi constitutional monarchies. It also excludes earlier stages of modern democracies where suffrage was restricted to some layers of the male population.

Authoritarianisms are political systems with limited, not responsible, political pluralism; without elaborate ideology, but with distinctive mentalities; without extensive or intensive political mobilization, except at some points in their development; and in which a leader or occasionally a small group exercises power within formally ill defined, but actually quite predictable, limits (Linz 1975: 255). Totalitarian regimes, by contrast, have an ideology, a single mass party, and other mobilizational organizations, and concentrate power in an individual and his collaborators.

In contrast to the unlimited pluralism of democracies, the *limited pluralism* under authoritarian regimes does establish legal or

de facto limits to political and/or interest groups. Yet, there might be some institutionalization of political participation of a limited number of independent groups that might lead to complex patterns of semi opposition. Limited pluralism could have its expression in a number of organizations or in the composition of a political elite that can have diverse origins and viewpoints; however, in some cases it is neither illegitimate nor legitimate – in the sense that citizens can organize and freely express their preferences – but rather tolerated by the authoritarian rulers.

Authoritarian elites hold a *mentality* rather than an ideology, which is a system of thought more or less intellectually elaborated and organized, often in written form, by intellectuals. Mentalities are ways of thinking and feeling, more emotional than rational, that provide non codified ways of reacting to different situations. Ideologies have a strong utopian element and capacity for mass mobilization whereas mentalities are more difficult to diffuse among the masses. The founding group or leader of the regime has few ideological commitments except some vague ideas about defending order, uniting the country, modernizing the nation, overthrowing a corrupt regime, or rejecting foreign influences. *Vis à vis* limited pluralism and the absence of an ideology, the distinction between state and society is not fully obliterated.

Generally speaking, the absence of an ideological commitment translates into *low political mobilization*. Yet, some types of authoritarian regimes needed mobilization at the time of their founding. The historical and social context of the establishment of the regime favors or demands such a mobilization through a single party and its mass organizations. Struggle for national independence from a colonial power or the defeat of a highly mobilized opponent led to the emergence of mobilizational authoritarian regimes of a nationalist, populist variety, like the case of Mexico, whose regime was preceded by a revolution. However, once established, the political elite promotes demobilization and apathy.

Power is concentrated in a group and there cannot be rotation in power, although it does not have to be concentrated in a party. Given limited pluralism and the absence of an

ideology, the political elite is not so exclusive. There might be some semi opposition that is willing to participate in power without challenging the regime.

From this general framework of analysis some subtypes of authoritarian regimes are derived. Linz takes two main variables for distinguishing among cases: (1) limited pluralism, taking into account which groups and institutions are allowed to participate and which ones are excluded, and (2) the nature of the limited mobilization. These two dimensions give several subtypes (Linz 1975: 278): bureaucratic authoritarian regimes, organic statism, mobilizational authoritarian regimes, post independence mobilizational authoritarian regimes, racial and ethnic "democracies," pre totalitarian political situations, and post totalitarian authoritarian regimes.

If we take the dimension of limited pluralism, political power is controlled by certain social forces and channeled through different organizational structures. On that account authoritarian regimes range from those dominated by a military technocratic elite to those in which there is a single dominant party. If we turn to the other dimension, we find that in a bureaucratic military regime there are few, if any, channels for participation. There are also regimes that attempt to mobilize the citizens to participate through a single or dominant party. The circumstances under which mobilizational authoritarian regimes have appeared, such as an independent movement from foreign domination, must be taken into account.

Bureaucratic military authoritarian regimes, which have developed neither a more complex institutionalization of limited pluralism in the form of organic statism nor a single party contributing to the recruitment of the top level elite serving as an instrument of control and as a channel for participation of citizens, are the paradigmatic authoritarian regimes. The most important analyses of bureaucratic military authoritarian regimes have been developed by O'Donnell and one of the most important debates has been aired in the book compiled by David Collier, *The New Authoritarianism in Latin America* (1979), which presents crucial works and a collective debate held by Guillermo O'Donnell, Fernando Enrique

Cardoso, Albert Hirschman, and Robert Kaufman, among others.

The military coups of the 1960s and 1970s put into question the central assumption of modernization theory that democracy was associated with industrialization. Contrary to this theory, Brazil (1964) and Argentina (1966 and 1976) showed high levels of industrialization at the time of their coups. Uruguay and Chile (1973) used to have institutionalized, strong democracies. These cases posed the need to rethink and analyze the new authoritarianism that was becoming institutionalized. Thus, after the resurgence of authoritarianism in the 1960s and 1970s, some Latin American countries were facing a paradox: they were becoming more modern and at the same time more authoritarian (Cardoso 1979: 39).

Also a central characteristic of the debate on Latin American authoritarianism during the 1970s was the need for a new concept for understanding this regime in order to distinguish it from previous experiences of authoritarian forms of exercising power in the region. *Caudillismo* as a form of authoritarian leadership has always been present in Latin America, and yet what was new in the 1960s and 1970s was that the military as an institution took power in order to restructure the society and the state under a national security doctrine. Hence, the concept of bureaucratic authoritarianism. The concept was useful to characterize cases where a military intervention took place. To the extent that situations preceding military coups were economic crisis, hyperinflation, and political polarization, military governments envisioned their task and justified their actions as the need to restore order and normalize the economy (O'Donnell 1997a: 98).

Some of the distinctive characteristics of bureaucratic authoritarianism are that, unlike European fascism, it aimed to promote political apathy among the population, annihilated political parties, and the state did not take a corporatist form (Cardoso 1979: 290). Political domination was supported by the high bourgeoisie, and it was a system based upon exclusion of a previously active popular sector and the suppression of the citizenry. Expertise of coercion played a decisive role

within government, which implemented a supposedly neutral technical rationale for saving capitalism and eliminating groups that were responsible for "social diseases" by taking highly repressive measures (O'Donnell 1997b).

Most authoritarian regimes in Southern Europe and Latin America, as well as Eastern European regimes, were swept away by the third wave of democratization (Huntington 1991) during the 1970s and 1980s as the result of complex processes of legitimacy crisis, the spread of democratic values, international pressure, growth of opposition movements, and divisions within authoritarian elites. Democratizing processes inaugurated new lines of political and sociological research. One of them was the debate on the characteristics of authoritarianism and to what extent these characteristics and differences among cases determined a diversity of paths of transitions to democracy. For instance, it was an issue whether a more institutionalized authoritarian regime like that in Mexico made a more lengthy transition than a regime that depended to a great extent on a dictator, as in Spain. Another important trend that transitions to democracy brought into academic debate was the process of democratization itself and what could be learned about political and regime change in general from the third wave (O'Donnell & Schmitter 1989). A current research area is the concern for the conditions under which democracies would be stable and become consolidated (Mainwaring et al. 1992). Some cases in Latin America from the beginning of the twenty first century, where democracy seems to be at stake, bring attention to further empirical research within political science on the conditions that prevent democratic breakdowns which in the past facilitated the emergence of authoritarian solutions. Some of this empirical research focuses on institutional design and arrangements, such as form of government, presidential or parliamentary democracy, electoral and party systems, and types of opposition (Mainwaring & Schugart 1997).

SEE ALSO: Apartheid and Nelson Mandela; Authority and Legitimacy; *Caudillismo*; Democracy; Fascism; Modernization; Political Sociology; Totalitarianism

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authority and conformity

Mark Konty

A common phenomenon in social groups (some would say a requirement) is the existence of authority: the right or power to give orders and enforce standards. Authority is only meaningful if people comply with those rules and orders. Conformity, compliance with orders and standards, is the corollary to authority.

Early sociological views of authority and conformity examined their role in meeting the rational or functional requirements of a society (e.g., the maintenance of social order). Weber's (1968) discussion of legitimate authority is a good example of this line of thinking. Among other things, Weber wanted to explain how authority induces conformity in a society. On the one hand, coercion can ensure compliance with authority. People in a group will conform to the dictates of authority if they are threatened with physical or economic harm. On the other hand, Weber believed that societies could not rely totally on coercion. Instead, he argued, the people in a society had to view the authority as legitimate so that conformity to the orders and standards is voluntary and not coerced.

Weber outlined three types of legitimate authority. *Rational legal* authority ensures conformity by creating a system of rules and procedures by which everyone is bound. Conformity is given voluntarily because the greatest benefit is obtained within the system. *Traditional* authority produces conformity because people view the position and succession of authority as a product of the past and thus as an arrangement that should continue to exist. There is no rational calculation of benefits, simply the recognition that all is as it should be. *Charismatic* authority encourages conformity by convincing group members that the person in the position of authority possesses some unique qualities and the authority should thus be obeyed. Authority of this type exists only as long as the charismatic person exists and with that person's demise the authority simply disappears or may transform into traditional authority passed through a line of successors. By any of these three mechanisms a society's members conform to the authority of the leader without the threat of coercion because they believe the authority is legitimate and thus the demands are legitimate.

MICRO LEVEL PERSPECTIVES

After World War II many German citizens and soldiers charged with war crimes responded with the claim that they were not

responsible for their actions because they were simply "following orders." Responsibility for war crimes was mitigated by the position that conformity to authority is natural and thus the individual could not be held responsible for the consequences of obedience. This claim led to a new line of inquiry examining the micro level relationship between authority and conformity. American social scientists questioned the argument that people conform to authority as a matter of course. They argued that any rational individual would recognize the heinous consequences of his actions and resist the call of authority to commit atrocities.

Asch (1955) began this line of inquiry with a series of conformity studies. Asch believed that people would not conform to group consensus if their senses told them that the group was wrong. Asch's subjects came into a room with a number of other subjects who were actually confederates of the experimenter. The group was presented with three lines of different lengths and asked which line is similar in length to a comparison line. At first all of the participants seated at the table selected the correct line. After a few trials, however, the confederates begin to choose the obviously wrong line. When the confederates chose the correct line the subjects had less than a 1 percent error rate. When the confederates chose the incorrect line the subjects' error rate increased to almost 40 percent.

All of the subjects reported that they knew the correct line to choose, but they began to question their own judgment in the face of group consensus and decided to conform to the group rather than break consensus. Interestingly, if only one other person in the room confirmed the subjects' choice, the error rate fell below 10 percent. Confirmation by one other person was enough to break conformity to an obviously wrong choice. Asch discovered that people will defy their own senses to conform to the group, but can dissent with the support of others.

Milgram (1974) designed an experiment intended to show that people could resist authority if the demands of that authority are repugnant to the individual. The experiments required naïve subjects to administer increasingly more severe punishments to another person engaged in a learning experiment.

The person receiving the shocks was a confederate of the experimenter and no real punishment was administered, but the subject believed the punishment was real. Most subjects followed instructions and administered a level of shock listed as “extreme intensity” and a large majority willingly administered a level of shock above “danger,” listed as “XXX” on the voltage dial. All of the subjects expressed some level of unease with administering such obviously painful punishment, but verbal prodding by the experimenter is all that was required to raise the level of punishment.

Milgram thus demonstrated the opposite of what he predicted: people are willing to conform to authority even if that conformity requires the commission of a harmful act. Milgram concluded that the university setting, the researcher in a lab coat, and the seriousness of the actions undertaken by the subject all combined to give the subject the impression that the experimenter had the authority to demand conformity, which is precisely what the subjects did. Both Asch and Milgram found that people will set aside their own senses and beliefs to conform to the group or individual authority.

Zimbardo (1972) took the authority and conformity paradigm a step further to see if authority and conformity emerged from individual traits or characteristics of the situation. Zimbardo believed that the situation signals to the individual the types of behavior that are expected. Individuals then act on those expectations; they conform to the expectations of the situation. To test this hypothesis Zimbardo and his colleagues created a mock prison and randomly assigned experimental subjects to play a role as either a guard or a prisoner within this setting. Even though the situation was contrived, the subjects conformed to the expectations of their roles as if they were in a real prison setting. Guards began to abuse prisoners and prisoners began to rebel against the oppression. Zimbardo had to stop the experiment after only a few days because the guards had become too abusive and the prisoners began to show signs of mental strain.

The prison experiment demonstrated that authority is a property of a social position, not individuals, and that conformity is not

an individual trait but rather a common motivation that manifests in even the most contrived situations. These findings shed some light on Asch and Milgram’s observations. Asch’s study demonstrated the power of conformity to overcome even an obvious definition of reality. Milgram’s study demonstrated that authority comes from social positions and that this authority can induce conformity even when it violates the individual’s own values and beliefs. As Milgram (1974: 139) himself states: “The power of an authority stems not from personal characteristics but from his perceived position in a social structure.” The force of the situation can overcome whatever individual traits are brought to the setting.

These results on conformity raise an interesting question: when do people resist authority and not conform? As Asch discovered, the presence of allies increases resistance to authority. This was also confirmed in some of Milgram’s studies. Another way to approach this question is to look at the mechanisms influencing conformity. Within a situation people are influenced by the extant social structure. Milgram argued that if people believe that the higher status person has “legitimate” authority then conformity is more likely. Milgram (1974: 133) viewed responses to legitimate authority as an “agentic state . . . the condition a person is in when he sees himself as an agent for carrying out another person’s wishes.” The basic mechanism is that the lower status individual believes that responsibility for any subsequent act rests with the legitimate authority. The lower status person is absolved of any responsibility for committing heinous acts in the name of the legitimate authority.

Another set of studies using Milgram’s obedience paradigm, the Utrecht studies, specifically tested for this mechanism (Meeus & Raaijmakers 1995). When the low status person is under “legal liability” for his actions the rate of obedience is significantly lowered. That is, when the low status person becomes solely responsible for her actions, she is less likely to obey. The converse is also demonstrated in these studies: when the low status person is given “legal cover” the rate of obedience returns to baseline levels. These results are consistent with some other studies

showing that low status persons will not obey if the act directly harms them (for reviews of this and other variations on the Milgram obedience paradigm, see Miller et al. 1995; Blass 2000).

These lines of research all point to the power of the situation to influence people. Researchers posit many kinds of “authority” (Blass 2000), but all influence to conformity has a common characteristic: it is social in nature. A broader theoretical paradigm examining authority and conformity is “social influence.” While there are many theoretical veins in this paradigm, the basic premise is that the authority of the social group influences the behavior of group members (Zanna et al. 1987). *Ceteris paribus*, group members are inclined to conform to the expectations of their social group. Social identity theory (Abrams & Hogg 1999) is one theory of social influence that is integrated into sociological social psychology (Stets & Burke 2000). Theories of social influence will likely direct future micro level explanations for the construction of authority and its influence on conformity.

CURRENT MACRO PERSPECTIVES

With the emergence of globalization and related social problems like global terrorism, sociologists have new reason to examine the macro level implications of authority and conformity. The massive international corporate structures that both create and sustain globalization represent a type of authority with tremendous influence. The authority of these organizations is not vested in a single individual, but rather within the structure of the organization itself. Conformity takes the form of workers complying with corporate dictates, as well as the effect the corporations have in homogenizing culture.

The McDonald’s corporation, to take one example, not only introduces a structure for doing business to which all its subsidiaries and franchises around the world conform, but in each locale where a McDonald’s is located a little bit of the local culture is homogenized with the “global” culture that McDonald’s

brings (Ritzer 2000). This attempt to produce conformity on a global scale is often met with stiff resistance from other macro level sources of authority such as religion and clan ties. These two forces, corporate authority and religious authority, induce conformity in seemingly opposite directions and often produce a high level of conflict between the competing worldviews (Barber 1995).

The US’s “war on terror” produced its own startling example of macro level authority and conformity. In late 2003 the world became aware that US military forces were engaged in interrogation techniques that many defined as torture. Some of the soldiers’ actions were visually recorded and the images created a political scandal over who was responsible for the acts; that is, on whose authority the acts were carried out. In a hierarchical structure like the US military it is assumed that all authority is top down. The political administration, however, denied giving orders to carry out these actions. No evidence of authority ordering these acts was ever found. However, there is substantial evidence that the political leaders at the time created an organizational mandate to effectively press the war on terror by almost any means necessary, including “outrages against personal dignity.” Many of the soldiers charged with abusing prisoners claimed that they were simply conforming to the expectations of the military and political command and that it was the organization itself that fostered the belief that this kind of activity was promoted from the highest levels of authority (Hooks & Mosher 2005).

Globalization continues to expand the reach of all kinds of authority, from corporate and media influences to religious evangelism. The demands of group membership and hierarchical structures continue to produce heinous acts around the world. As new and old sources of authority influence conformity, theory and research into these phenomena maintain an important role in understanding local and global transformation.

SEE ALSO: Asch Experiments; Deviance; Group Processes; Milgram, Stanley (Experiments); Social Control; Social Influence; Weber, Max; Zimbardo Prison Experiment

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authority and legitimacy

Stephen Turner

Authority is often defined as legitimate power, and contrasted to pure power. In the case of legitimate authority, compliance is voluntary and based on a belief in the right of the authority to demand compliance. In the case of pure power, compliance to the demands of the powerful is based on fear of consequences or self interest. But beyond this, there is considerable disagreement and variation of usage.

Because legitimacy is a concept from monarchic rule, deriving from the right of the legitimately born heir to rule as monarch, authors as diverse as Hannah Arendt and Carl Schmitt have argued that it is not applicable to modern politics. But it is nevertheless commonly applied, even in ordinary political discussion, to many situations, such as voluntary compliance to taxation, that go far beyond the original meaning.

Both “legitimate” and “authority” are terms which appear in sociology as a neutralized or value free form of a concept that is normative or valuative in ordinary usage and in political theory. In its normative form, it distinguishes mere power from authority that is genuinely justified. One approach to sociologizing the term builds on these theories. Normally these are theories of representation, in which a person holding authority merely does so as a representative or delegate of the originating power.

The relations of representation that figure in governing ideologies have, historically, been very diverse. In the western political tradition, for example, kings were held to have “two bodies,” one being their body as representative of the nation, which legitimately exercised authority, the other their personal body, which did not (Kantorowicz 1957). In modern western political thought, parliaments and presidents are supposed to represent the will of the people. In Islamic political thought, God is the final basis of political authority, and the people are his caliphs or representatives, themselves subservient to Divine Law. Some sociological approaches to legitimacy, such as Habermas’s (1975), are attempts to consider the social conditions of genuine deliberative democracy, and treat these as representing genuine legitimacy and their absence as explanations for “crises” of legitimacy.

The most influential approach to the transformation of legitimacy into a sociological, descriptive concept was performed by Max Weber, who provided a famous classification of forms of legitimate authority in terms of the defining type of legitimating belief. Weber (1978: 36–8) identifies four distinct “bases” of legitimacy, three of which are directly associated with forms of authority. The fourth – value rational faith – legitimates authority

indirectly by providing a standard of justice to which particular earthly authorities might claim to correspond. The forms of authority are charismatic, traditional, and rational legal. Each of these forms can serve on its own as the core of a system of domination. Traditional authority is based on unwritten rules; rational legal authority on written rules. Unwritten rules may be justified by the belief that they have held true since time immemorial, while written rules are more typically justified by the belief that they have been properly enacted in accordance with other laws. Charismatic authority is command which is not based on rules. The charismatic leader says "it is written, but I say unto you," as Jesus said. What the charismatic leader says overrides and replaces any written rule. Charismatic authority originates in the extraordinary qualities of the person holding this authority, not in another source, such as the will of the people (pp. 212–54).

Weber also points to a variety of practical motives for adherence to a legal order that are not "legitimizing" but which may make a powerful causal contribution to the acceptance of the order. These may include the pragmatic value of adherence and the fear of punishment. The element of legitimizing belief necessary to sustain a legal order, consequently, may in many circumstances not need to be particularly large, as long as the regime assures compliance or acceptance in other ways. Weber largely ignored, and has been criticized for ignoring (Beetham 1974: 264–9), the idea of democratic legitimacy, because he considered democracy in its pure form to be possible only in small communities, and suggested that modern democracies typically involved a complex mixture of beliefs in which procedural rationality or "rational legal" authority was central, but which also involved charismatic authority, for example in the context of elections and leadership.

The concept of legitimate authority has many extended uses. Legitimacy is often viewed in modern political sociology as similar to trust, as a resource that regimes have and can employ to gain acceptance of policies. One can distinguish "input" or procedural sources of legitimacy from output sources, such as effectiveness, for example, and see both as

alternative sources of trust (Scharpf 1999). In the case of expertise, for example, cognitive authority might be said to derive from the procedural fact of peer review or from the successful application of expertise.

SEE ALSO: Authority and Conformity; Belief; Democracy; Expertise, "Scientification," and the Authority of Science; Legitimacy; Norms; Power Elite; Representation; Ruling Relations; Weber, Max

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autoethnography

Stacy Holman Jones

Autoethnography is a theoretical, methodological, and (primarily) textual approach that seeks to experience, reflect on, and represent

through evocation the relationship among self and culture, individual and collective experience, and identity politics and appeals for social justice. In investigating these relationships, autoethnography fuses personal narrative and sociocultural exploration. Autoethnographic inquiry and writing has long been practiced by journalists and novelists, historians and biographers, travelers and journal writers. However, development of the theoretical, methodological, and textual concerns and conventions of autoethnography among researchers and scholars in the human disciplines is more recent.

Autoethnography, as the term suggests, is closely aligned with ethnography, which in turn is most notably associated with anthropological explorations of cultural practices beginning in the twentieth century (though ethnographic writing dates to the sixteenth century and perhaps earlier). Such explorations focused on cultures as whole systems, subsuming individual and personal experience within larger, often monolithic structures of kinship and interaction. As practitioners of ethnography began to question the possibility and politics of western writers and scholars' claims to objectively and authoritatively investigate and represent exotic "others," ethnographic research and writing moved toward more partial, partisan, local, and personal accounts of culture. Beginning in the 1970s and intensifying in the 1980s, concerns about what any research team or single author can know, verify, and responsibly present as cultural "truth" came to be known as the crises of legitimation, representation, and praxis. These crises prompted a rethinking of the form and purpose of sociocultural investigation and description. Researchers called for accounts that foregrounded dialogue, incompleteness, the impossibility of separating or collapsing life from/into texts, and an ethical responsibility to the "subjects" of ethnography. Such accounts reflect the experience of a postmodern world in which the authority, autonomy, and independence of social, cultural, and personal institutions and practices is shifting and decentered. These accounts also evidence the development of poststructural theory interested in explaining, critiquing, and refiguring relationships among

identity, language, and systems of discourse and power. With these shifts, then, ethnographers recognized the need to explore, understand, evoke, and critique the relationship among not only individuals and cultures but also the subjects, authors, and readers of ethnographic representations.

Renewed interest in individual experience as it is situated in larger cultural systems led ethnographers to reconsider the power and import of personal narrative. In particular, autoethnographic texts feature concrete action, are reflexive and self critical, and strive to create an emotionally and intellectually charged *engagement* of selves, bodies, texts, and contexts. To create such texts, autoethnographers adopt the conventions of literary writing, calling upon the power of personal narrative and storytelling to conjure how selves are constructed, disclosed, silenced, implicated, and changed in the acts of telling and reading. Autoethnographic texts also self consciously stage an encounter of subjects, authors, and readers who are often classified as *other* by virtue of their race, class, gender, sexual preferences, religious affiliations, physical abilities, and other mutually implicated identity categories. Such encounters are opportunities to testify to and witness how selves are differently situated, understood, experienced, and changed within and outside such categories. These encounters are also occasions for debating and exchanging ideas about how to create more satisfying, creative, and just ways of being in the world. In this way, autoethnographic texts strive to be *performative* – to demonstrate how selves in cultures and cultures in selves are not constituted outside of or beyond discourse, language, and history, but are instead created and recreated in the moments of their telling. The performative autoethnographic text evokes how life stories are implicated in the social, cultural, and political contexts in which they are told, as well as how texts – as sites of dialogue and debate – are *themselves* spaces that are questioned and struggled over. In addition, autoethnographic texts are increasingly created *as performances* and thus literally stage encounters among authors, readers, performers, and subjects toward such contested and potentially productive ends.

Given the intellectual, social, and cultural contexts in which autoethnography emerged and the resulting concerns of autoethnographic practices and writing, establishing stable, all encompassing, and mutually agreed upon criteria for what constitutes an effective autoethnographic text is a difficult (and perhaps unwelcome) task. However, there are some intersections among the criteria offered for effective autoethnography. Such work should strive to create a visceral lifeworld and a charged emotional and intellectual atmosphere; a relationship of mutual responsibility among subjects, authors, and readers; aesthetic and analytical strategies that generate opportunities for dialogue (rather than an exhibition of mastery); a felt obligation to explain and critique existing systems and discourses of power; and an embodied commitment to act through and on the knowledges of the text. These criteria constitute current challenges facing autoethnographers and act as points of departure for staging more evocative, ambitious, and charged texts.

SEE ALSO: Critical Qualitative Research; Ethnography; Performance Ethnography; Representation; Writing as Method

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autopoiesis

Jens Zinn

The neurobiologists Humberto R. Maturana and Francisco J. Varela introduced the term *autopoiesis* in the 1970s in order to describe how living systems (e.g., human, plant, cell, or microbe) produce and reproduce themselves. Combining the idea of autonomy and production, autopoiesis means in short the continual self production of living systems. The components of an autopoietic system reproduce themselves and the relations between them by these components and relations (Maturana et al. 1974; Maturana & Varela 1987). It is therefore operationally closed: the system determines the rules of reproduction relatively independently of its specific environment.

Since an autopoietic system is determined by its internal organization of reproduction, it cannot be changed directly from the outside – that would destroy it. It can only be “perturbed.” The outside can affect it, but the state of a system itself determines what and how such perturbations will affect it. As a result of ongoing non destructive perturbations, autopoietic systems become structurally coupled to their environment or to other systems. That does not mean that they blend with a specific environment, but they are loosely coupled. They have only to fit insofar as it allows them to maintain their autopoietic reproduction. (Human beings can live in a wide range of environments from the North Pole to the equator as long as they can nourish themselves on the environment.) From this

perspective, social phenomena appear as a result of structurally coupled systems which mutually perturb one another over a period of time.

The concept of autopoiesis supports constructivist ideas of reality. Behaviour is not what a system is doing, but it is ascribed by an *observer*. The observer's observations are at the same time determined by his or her own autopoiesis.

The concept was very influential in several disciplines. In sociology, Luhmann (1989, 1995) took up the concept of autopoietic organization and transferred it into systems theory. Functional systems conceptualized as autopoietic systems cannot influence each other directly. They only notice information that can be transformed into something that is relevant for the respective reproduction of a system. For example, truth as the core element of science is only recognized by the economic system insofar as it can be transformed into money. Such systems are autonomous, but they might become structurally coupled when they mutually constitute relevant environments. Many scientific innovations are obviously very relevant for economic success, while the money provided by the economic system supports scientific research.

Maturana and Varela (1987) were very reluctant to see their concept transformed into the framework of social systems theory. Instead, they prefer to see the concept as strictly bound to biological systems.

SEE ALSO: Constructionism; Luhmann, Niklas; System Theories

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awareness contexts

Stefan Timmermans

In their 1965 landmark study *Awareness of Dying*, Barney Glaser and Anselm Strauss introduced awareness context as "what *each* interacting person knows of the patient's defined status, along with his recognition of the others' awareness of his own definition... *awareness context*... is the context within which these people interact while taking cognizance of it." Studying the process of dying in six San Francisco Bay area hospitals, Glaser and Strauss were struck by how little information patients possessed about their impending death, even though the staff were often aware that the patient might be dying. They analyzed the organizational structural conditions for secrecy, its resulting interactions, changes in awareness, and consequences of the interactions for the participants and the setting. Drawing from the symbolic interactionist tradition, Glaser and Strauss intended to capture the work of managing and negotiating social change within the structural context of the hospital.

Glaser and Strauss distinguished four awareness contexts: *closed awareness*, *suspicion awareness*, *mutual pretense awareness*, and *open awareness*. In a closed awareness context the patient is unaware of pending death while the staff know. Glaser and Strauss found that most patients in the early 1960s died in closed awareness (Glaser & Strauss 1968). Closed awareness reflects a patronizing approach in medicine in which authorities determine what is good for others to know. Ultimately, because it depends on staff and relatives keeping the secret from an unsuspecting patient, closed awareness is an unstable condition that can change into other awareness when the united front breaks down. In a context of suspicion awareness the patients suspect with varying degrees of certainty that the staff consider them dying. Staff and relatives might unwittingly flash clues or even drop hints and patients might search out diagnostic information. Closed and suspicion awareness contexts put much strain on the interactions between nursing staff, relatives, and patients. The most

isolating context, however, is the mutual pretense awareness context when patients and staff know that the patients are dying but pretend otherwise. Both parties might send tentative signs about death which are met with non response in the daily bustling of the hospital. Finally, when both parties know that the patient is dying, the context changes to open awareness. This context is the prerequisite for Elizabeth Kubler Ross's psychodynamic stage theory of coping with death (Kubler Ross 1969). While in open awareness patients know they are dying, uncertainty about the time and manner of dying might still persist with staff and patient managing prognostic knowledge and expectations about appropriate dying styles. Still, in an open awareness context a patient has the opportunity to say farewell to loved ones and take care of estate planning.

Glaser and Strauss's awareness contexts theory was significant as the first comprehensive sociological exploration of the process of dying and helped foster a US social movement of death and dying activism in the early 1970s. Reflecting on Glaser and Strauss's observation that dying patients were often ignored in North American hospitals and the work of Elizabeth Kubler Ross and Cicely Saunders (Saunders 1978), death activists challenged the patronizing approach to terminal illness and death in institutions. Glaser and Strauss's study in particular gave rise to a subdiscipline of communicating bad news in clinical encounters. Physicians in training increasingly received pointers on how to break bad news. As a consequence, the incidence of the closed, suspicion, and mutual pretense awareness contexts gradually declined in American and some other western hospitals (Cassileth, Zupkis, et al. 1980). These changes have been explained by an ethos of individualism and a climate of doubt about the beneficence of medical experts. Other countries, notably Japan and Italy, have maintained dying in closed awareness (Gordon 1990; Kai, Ohi, et al. 1993).

Glaser and Strauss framed the interaction around the deathbed in terms of knowledge about pending death. Yet, researchers noted that even when patients and their relatives were increasingly informed, they absorbed the information differently. One person's open awareness was the other's closed awareness:

some people seemed to persist in denial even when they were informed. Based on introspective ethnographies of their own encounters with dying relatives, Stefan Timmermans and Laura Mamo suggested modifications to the open awareness context (Timmermans 1994; Mamo 1999). Timmermans argued that open awareness could be suspended when patients and relatives block out the information provided about the terminal condition. In addition, the information, often provided with qualifiers, might be questioned for accuracy in an attempt to maintain hope. Glaser and Strauss's open awareness context could be subdivided into *suspended open awareness*, *uncertain open awareness*, and *active open awareness*. Mamo argued for a stronger link between the emotional and cognitive aspects of managing, negotiating, and acting upon information about a terminal condition.

In addition to setting a sociological agenda for the study of the dying process, the theory of awareness context has been relevant as an illustration of *grounded theory*, a qualitative data analysis method based on coding schemes and memo writing aimed at generating theory (Glaser and Strauss 1967). *Awareness of Dying* demonstrated grounded theory's emphasis on inductive conceptualization in a systematic manner to understand a range of interactions. The authors' data gathering in different hospitals was guided by the developing conceptual framework, a strategy they would refer to as *theoretical sampling*, and ongoing comparisons with alternative settings.

Glaser and Strauss intended their theory not only as a substantive theory of death and dying but also as a flexible theory of managing secrets and interpreting suspicious signs in larger and more intimate settings. Their theory has been applied in a study of the early stages of Alzheimer's disease when patients, their relatives, and caregivers learn to distinguish signs of disease from the normal forgetfulness and confusion that comes with old age. In this situation, no party has firm knowledge about Alzheimer's but everyone has to try to reconcile possible with probable Alzheimer's disease and then incorporate this information in personal and group identities (Hutchinson, Leger Krall, et al. 1997). The theory has also been used to shed light on the disclosure of

adoption to adoptive children and people outside the nuclear family (Hoffman Riem 1989), and the disclosure of single women's pregnancy in Ireland (Hyde 1998).

SEE ALSO: Death and Dying; Grounded Theory

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B

ba

Takami Kuwayama

In Japanese, *ba* means “place” or “field.” It has, however, so many other meanings that it is difficult to find a single English word for it. Furthermore, it is associated with the Japanese belief that a person’s behavior is induced or actually caused by the place in which that person is situated. Thus, *ba* not only indicates a physical space, but also illuminates the Japanese notion of accountability. When applied in the analysis of social relationships, *ba* explains how Japanese groups are organized.

Nihon Kokugo Daijiten (Comprehensive Dictionary of Japanese, 2nd edn, 2001) defines *ba* under ten categories. Among the most relevant are: (1) site; whereabouts; place; garden; seat; (2) place where an event takes place; place where a meeting is held; venue; seat in a meeting or its atmosphere; (3) situation or circumstances at each moment; plight; occasion; time; (4) scene in a play or a movie; portion of a theatrical performance that is complete in itself with no change occurring in the background scene; (5) mental state or emotional condition; stage or level of a skill; (6) term used in psychology to refer to the environment or condition that affects a person’s behavior or response; and (7) area where a given physical quantity has a value according to each point set in a space (e.g., electric field; magnetic field; gravitational field; stress field; nuclear field; power field). These definitions show that the term *ba* is used primarily to designate “place” in the widest sense of the word, but, by extension or by implication, it also means the power of a place to induce a particular state of the mind or actual behavior among the people who, purposely or by accident, have gathered in that

place. Furthermore, in some situations, *ba* has a temporal dimension.

Clinical psychologist Hiroshi Yamane regards *ba* as comparable to the Greek idea of *topos*. He explains that the term *basho*, written in two characters, one meaning “*ba*” and the other meaning “site,” mainly indicates a physical space, whereas *ba* is more inclusive because it also signifies the atmosphere prevailing in a particular place. According to Yamane, *basho* is transformed into *ba* by some recognizable factors. Among them are the ways a given place is used in everyday life, the social meanings attached to that place, and the personalities of the people who gather in that place. *Ba* is, therefore, not simply a physical concept, but a social one as well, whose meaning is dependent on the relationship of the people present at a particular place. Yamane further contends that *ba* is spontaneously created, instead of being manipulated for specific purposes, which makes it difficult to control. In other words, *ba* has a structure of its own, which is often invisible even to the people involved, and exerts its influence independently. In clinical settings, *ba* helps mentally suffering people recover by allowing them to interact spontaneously with other patients and therapists. On the other hand, *ba* may suppress the patients’ autonomy by creating a hostile atmosphere, experienced as a collective pressure for conformity, from which they find it difficult to escape.

We may say that *ba* has a logical structure that makes a given place, rather than the individual who is there, accountable for his or her thought and action. As such, it exemplifies the widely shared Japanese belief that the self is acted upon by an external entity, whether animate or inanimate, rather than acting upon that entity. This belief contrasts with the modern western conception of the self, which places the individual at the center of the universe,

regarding him or her as the ultimate source of action. Clifford Geertz (1983) best explained this perspective when he described the western self as “a bounded, unique, more or less integrated motivational and cognitive universe, a dynamic center of awareness, emotion, judgment, and action organized into a distinctive whole and set contrastively both against other such wholes and against its social and natural background.”

The Japanese concept of *ba* is related to the so called “situationalism” or “particularism” of the Japanese people. A classic study of this subject is found in Ruth Benedict’s *The Chrysanthemum and the Sword* (1946). During World War II, Benedict was astonished to find that Japanese soldiers, known for their loyalty to the emperor, had suddenly changed their attitudes after being captured and became very cooperative with their enemies, disclosing many of Japan’s military secrets. Interviews with these soldiers revealed that they had considered themselves socially dead and behaved according to the new circumstances in which they were placed. Put another way, the dramatic change in the prisoners of war’s attitudes had been demanded by the complete change in their situation. Similar changes were repeatedly observed after Japan’s surrender, when, for example, the wartime slogan of “fighting to death with bamboo spears” was replaced overnight with a warm welcoming of the occupation forces. Benedict thus called Japanese ethics “situational” and “circumstantial.” This ethics is parallel to the idea of *ba*, which requires behavior appropriate to a particular place. Instead of consistency across situations, it encourages “malleability,” holding the place accountable for a person’s emotion, thought, and action.

In sociology and anthropology, Chie Nakane presented a most powerful theory of *ba*. Nakane, author of *Japanese Society* (1970), one of the most influential books in the study of Japan, translated *ba* as “frame” and explained that it could be “a locality, an institution or a particular relationship which binds a set of individuals into one group.” Thus, she extended the meaning of *ba* to indicate human relationships that develop in a particular social setting. In Nakane’s work, *ba* or frame is

contrasted with “*shikaku*” or “attribute,” which includes both ascribed and achieved characteristics. Being a member of X Company, for example, refers to frame, while working there as an office clerk refers to an attribute. The former concerns the individual’s group membership, whether president or a clerk, while the latter points to that individual’s specific capacity. According to Nakane, these two criteria overlap in actual contexts, but frame is far more important than attribute in the organization of Japanese groups.

Nakane maintained that the frame blurs the distinction between people with different attributes. In her mind, Japan’s traditional family called “*ie*” is the best example of this blurring. In the *ie*, often translated as “household,” the most important factor in deciding membership is common residence for the purpose of satisfying needs and maintaining the household line, rather than the blood relationship. Thus, the household head’s brother, for example, who has married and established his own household, is an outsider (i.e., non member), whereas his adopted son is an insider (i.e., member), even if they are genealogically unrelated. In this example, the household refers to frame, and kinship to attribute. To support her thesis, Nakane cited the Japanese saying, “The sibling is the beginning of a stranger.”

Regarding the *ie* as the basic unit of Japanese society, Nakane contended that larger groups, including the corporation and even the entire nation, are structural extensions of the *ie*. Because the Japanese group is, in Nakane’s analysis, organized by the principle of frame, which emphasizes common membership, individuals tend to be totally involved in group activities. From this emerges the so called “group consciousness” of the Japanese, namely, the feeling of being one unit within the frame. This feeling, in turn, generates a strong attachment to the group. Nakane explained the success of post war Japanese corporations in terms of this strong group identity of the Japanese people.

Cross culturally speaking, the idea that one is acted upon by an external entity, rather than acting upon that entity, is not peculiar to Japan. Nor is the conception of self as part of a larger whole, whether of the human group or the

place surrounding it, exclusively found among the Japanese. Indeed, in the anthropological literature, the non western self has frequently been described as “situational,” “relational,” “undifferentiated,” “sociocentric,” and so forth. Particularly interesting is Edward Hall’s report that, among Spanish Americans, mental illness is a foreign idea because they tend to think that the individual will act peculiarly when he or she is put in a certain set of circumstances. Thus, according to Hall, they try to keep the individual away from situations that are not good for him or her, while denying that he or she is mentally ill (Hall 1976). Although not identical, this notion is similar to that of *ba*. Comparative research utilizing *ba* as a frame of reference may reveal unexpected cross cultural similarities in the relationship between human beings and the place, or, more generally, the environment.

SEE ALSO: *En*; *Ie*; *Nihonjinron*; *Seken*; *Self*; *Tatemaie/Honne*

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balkanization

Polly S. Rizova

The term “balkanization” has come to mean a process of dividing an area, a country, or a region into several small hostile units. It was first coined by the *New York Times* in the aftermath of World War I to denote the

disbanding of the Habsburg Empire into small, antagonistic states. The name is derived from the region that comprises the southeastern part of Europe, the Balkan Peninsula. Because of its geographical location and historical situation on the boundary between the Ottoman and Habsburg empires, the various states in this area have been subjected to constant conquest and political manipulation by outside powers. The Balkans comprise the states of Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Bulgaria, Croatia, Greece, Republic of Macedonia, Romania, Serbia and Montenegro. Sometimes Slovenia and the European part of Turkey are also included.

The diversity of the region’s population, the ever changing political boundaries, and a history of severe ethnic, national, and religious conflicts make up the characteristics that give the term its special meaning. In the twentieth century, the region was at the center of the two major European conflicts: Archduke Franz Ferdinand of Austria was assassinated in Sarajevo in 1914, an event that triggered the start of World War I. The region was also heavily involved in the conflict between the Western Allies and the Soviet Union against Nazi Germany during World War II. At the end of the first conflict, the Ottoman and Habsburg empires were destroyed and Yugoslavia, together with a series of other independent states, was created. With the exception of Greece and Turkey, all of these fell under the sphere of influence of the Soviet Union between 1945 and 1989. After the collapse of the Soviet Union, more ethnic violence erupted as the component parts of the former Yugoslavia struggled to realign themselves in the new political vacuum. The massacre in Srebrenica, the siege of Sarajevo, the conflicts in Kosovo, and the appearance of Slobodan Milosević at the War Crimes Tribunal in the Hague, all helped to reestablish the image of the region as one of deep seated ethnic and religious divisions and long standing historical animosities.

In reality, the types of processes often subsumed under the term balkanization are as old as human conflicts. They are often found in imperial settings where the colonial powers have used the tactic of “divide and rule” to

divert the attention of the colonized from the primary source of their exploitation. The system of indirect rule, employed by the British in many of their colonies, illustrates a carefully calculated policy to prevent the emergence of a united opposition to foreign rule. This took many forms, such as: playing one ethnic or religious group off against another; favoring one region at the expense of another; importing laborers from other colonies of different religious or linguistic backgrounds to work in specific economic niches; or making sure that the local military or police forces were only recruited from a single minority or tribal background. Such tactics were commonplace throughout the British Empire and, while they clearly served a useful function for the colonizers, they created a dangerous legacy of ethnic strife and conflict in the postcolonial era. In fact, it could be argued that much of independent Africa's instability in the post war period is a direct result of, or at least strongly nurtured by, colonial policies to fragment and balkanize the continent. It has also been argued that similar tactics have been used in the postcolonial period and particularly as a result of the Cold War competition between the West and the Soviet Union that encouraged rivalries to undermine their opponent's allies and support their friends on the continent.

Subdividing states on ethnic, national, or religious grounds does not necessarily produce violence and conflict, and in some cases may be used as a means of conflict resolution in an effort to protect minority rights or safeguard regional, linguistic, or religious autonomy. Federal constitutions have often successfully managed to preserve the integrity of multinational states, as the classic example of Switzerland's canton structure illustrates. In this case, German, Italian, and French speaking units have held together for centuries and even Hitler and Mussolini, at the height of their expansionist powers, did not choose to annex the German or Italian speaking parts of the Swiss Federation. While the Swiss case is clearly unusual, there are other examples where subdividing an already divided state has been used to diffuse conflict in the aftermath of a civil war. At the end of the unsuccessful secessionist war by the southeastern region (Biafra) of the newly

independent Nigeria in the 1960s, a series of constitutional measures was enacted to increase the number of political units from the three basic regions, each dominated by a single ethnic group, to 12 states in 1967 and to 19 in 1976. In this way, it was intended that the rivalries between the three major ethnic groups – Ibo, Yoruba, and Hausa Fulani – would be diffused in the many subunits of the new federal state. As Horowitz has argued, creating multiple states can result in several outcomes that may help to reduce the destructive power of ethnic conflicts. The new arrangements help to transfer some of the conflict from the center to the local levels; the new more numerous states foster arenas where intra ethnic conflicts may develop; more opportunities are created for interethnic cooperation and alliances; as the new states strive to promote their own interests non ethnic issues start to emerge; and, finally, separate state bureaucracies open up employment opportunities for groups previously excluded from the federal civil services. While hardly definitive, the Nigerian experiments in different types of federalism suggest that a form of benign balkanization can be employed to counterbalance and diffuse the tensions created by the legacy of a colonial history of divide and rule.

SEE ALSO: Conflict (Racial/Ethnic); Ethnic Cleansing; Ethnonationalism; Self Determination; Tribalism

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bankruptcy

Claudia W. Scholz and Juanita M. Firestone

Bankruptcy or insolvency is a legal status in which a debtor is deemed unable to meet obligations to creditors. Bankruptcy usually involves some combination of debtor asset liquidation, payment rescheduling, and the discharge of remaining debts. Legal frameworks governing bankruptcy around the world vary in the degree to which they seek to serve the interests of creditors, debtors, or society at large.

Legal systems that favor the creditor tend to regard excessive debt in moral terms or as a form of deviant behavior. In many Latin American countries bankruptcy law is not clearly separated from criminal law, which strongly discourages many from pursuing bankruptcy status. Canadian bankruptcy law emphasizes credit counseling as a means of "reforming" the debtor. In contrast, some legal systems view bankruptcy as a fresh start for debtors, emphasizing debt discharge over the rescheduling of payment. For example, in the US over a million individuals filed for debt liquidation (Chapter 7) in 2004, while less than half that number filed for debt reorganization (Chapter 13). Under US debt liquidation provisions a considerable proportion of a debtor's assets, usually including his or her home, is exempt. Under Chapter 7 debtors are protected from further action by creditors even if monies generated from the sale of the debtor's assets do not fulfill all existing obligations. Some have argued that US bankruptcy protection takes the place of a social safety net, serving as a last resort for families faced with economic hardship.

While considerable variation remains, bankruptcy laws around the world seem to be converging. With the passage of the Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and Consumer Protection Act of 2005, the US began to shift away from a debtor centric bankruptcy framework. In contrast, many European countries with little history of consumer bankruptcy law are adopting US style debtor friendly laws as higher proportions of their populations fall into

credit card debt. In addition, the United Nations Commission on International Trade Law (UNCITRAL) has been coordinating efforts to provide an international legal framework to deal with bankruptcies involving transnational corporations.

Sociological studies of consumer bankruptcy filings in the US indicate that debtors span all socioeconomic and demographic categories. Nevertheless, many bankruptcy filers may be classified as middle class based on educational attainment and other characteristics. Most bankruptcy filings are precipitated by transformative life events such as job loss, illness, or family disruption (divorce or death of spouse). In the US certain debt burdens, including federal educational loans and child support payments, cannot be discharged through standard bankruptcy proceedings. Personal bankruptcy remains on a debtor's credit report for 10 years, resulting in significant negative consequences for access to credit, services and, in some cases, employment.

Chapter 11 is the most common US bankruptcy protection status for businesses. Bankruptcy allows a firm to reorganize and restructure its debt obligations, including certain leases and contracts. Typically, a business may continue to operate while in Chapter 11, although it does so under the supervision of the Bankruptcy Court. In recent years several high profile bankruptcy decisions have resulted in widespread layoffs and the transfer of a number of large pension programs to the federal government's overburdened Pension Benefit Guarantee Corporation.

SEE ALSO: Consumption; Credit Cards; Inequality, Wealth; Money; Wealth

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Barthes, Roland (1915–80)

Nick Perry

Roland Barthes is best known as a literary critic and essayist and as a member of that generation of internationally distinguished French intellectuals (*maîtres à penser*) that includes the philosopher/historian Michel Foucault, the psychoanalyst Jacques Lacan, and the anthropologist Claude Lévi Strauss. His relevance for sociology derives above all from the way his writings (1) served to construct linkages between semiology (the study of sign systems), ideological processes, and social structures; (2) made plain just how the possible objects of inquiry of such a “social semiology” might be massively extended; and (3) contributed to the interpretation of readership as social practice.

In his consciously quirky and playful exercise in autobiography, Barthes’s own laconic summary of his life was “studies, diseases, appointments” (Barthes 1977a: 184). As a student at the Sorbonne his initial academic interest was in classics and French literature. An ongoing struggle with pulmonary tuberculosis, however, a struggle that would last until his early thirties, prevented him from sitting the examination that was the path to, and prerequisite for, an orthodox academic career. In 1947, unable to find work in Paris, he accepted a post as librarian and subsequently as a teacher in L’Institut français in Bucharest, Romania. When the institute’s staff were expelled by the Romanian government in 1949, Barthes succeeded in being appointed to a position at the University of Alexandria in Egypt. It was here that he was first introduced to contemporary

linguistics by the semiologist A. J. Greimas. Both men would eventually go on to join the faculty of the École des Hautes Études in Paris. In Barthes’s case, his initial appointment – to a postgraduate only institution that was also his first French academic post – was not until 1960. By then he was in his mid forties and had published three books and numerous articles, worked briefly in publishing, and held scholarships in lexicology, and subsequently sociology, at the CNRS (Centre national de la recherche scientifique). He was granted tenure at the École in 1962, and appointed as *directeur d’études* in “the sociology of signs, symbols, and representations.” By the time of his election in 1976 to France’s most prestigious academic institution, the Collège de France, Barthes had become the country’s most famous literary critic. The title he chose for his chair was Professor of Literary Semiology. It was a post that he would hold until his death following injury in a traffic accident in 1980.

Although Barthes is most renowned for his contributions to literary theory and criticism, the influence of his more than 20 books and collections of essays reaches across a number of disciplines in the humanities and the social sciences. His writings also traverse and interrogate a variety of theoretical approaches, ranging from an early enthusiasm for existentialism, through structuralism and poststructuralism, to the phenomenological singularities of his last works. *Mythologies*, his third book and the work which above all served to secure him a place within Anglo American media sociology and the analysis of popular culture, was seen as an exemplar of structuralism. Published in France in 1957, it consisted of short essays that had first appeared as a series of magazine articles (literally, “Mythologies of the Month”) that were retrospectively integrated by a lengthier, concluding theoretical essay. The short essays were eclectic, ranging widely across, and engaging with, an emergent consumer culture and featuring such topics as all in wrestling, soap powder advertising, *Elle* magazine, Einstein’s brain, electoral photographs, wine, and French toys.

The publication of *Mythologies* in English in 1972 broadly coincided with the emergence of British cultural studies. The combination of belated translation and the peculiarities of

(especially) English culture both served to skew the terms of its reception and allowed it to exert a liberating impact upon those working in, or drawn to, this field (cf., e.g., Hebdige 1979; Masterman 1984). Practitioners of cultural studies were predisposed to read Barthes's book *against* the prevailing literary derived and narrowly academic definitions of Englishness. Hence what they read it *for* was its matter of fact selection of everyday objects of inquiry; its perceived even handedness as between high and popular culture; its recognition of the political and ideological import of signifying practices; its methodological promise – as well as for the sheer exuberance and wit of the writing. The overall effect was to facilitate the assimilation of the themes of Barthes's collection to a more explicitly empirical idiom and to a more nearly sociological methodology.

Mythologies was thus interpreted as having provided a methodological model that could be generalized so as to reveal how all manner of everyday objects and images are invested with ideological meanings. There is an irony about this consolidation of novelty into orthodoxy. For what most of the subsequent commentators on Barthes have sought to show is that what he particularly valued and was especially alert to was the repudiation of conventional models and methods of writing.

The approach that he developed in *Mythologies* was derived from, but decisively extended, Saussure's notion of the sign. In Saussure's account, a sign was understood to be the relation between two elements. These two elements were not, however, a thing and a name, but rather a concept or idea (the signified) that is materialized by a vocal or graphic mark, such as a photograph or print on a page (the signifier). The distinction between signifier and signified is an analytic one; they are united by the sign and hence they always arrive together. The relation between them is, however, in no way natural, but rather an arbitrary or conventional one that is given by the culture in which they circulate.

What Barthes added to Saussure's model was the notion that the signs (i.e., signifier + signified) of this first order system acted as the signifiers for a second order system of signs (again, signifier + signified) that operate on the level of myth. As such, the signs in this

second order system are perforce associated with *new* concepts (or signifieds). These second order signs function ideologically to "establish blissful clarity," capitalizing upon the apparent naturalness of the first order so as present themselves as if they were facts of nature. Barthes famously illustrates the operation of this process with an example drawn from a photograph on the cover of *Paris Match* nial boy soldier in French military uniform giving a disciplined salute, "his eyes uplifted, probably fixed on a fold of the tricolour." At the first level it is simply a colonial boy soldier in uniform. But at the second level of myth, what it signifies, says Barthes (1972: 116), is "that France is a great empire, that all her sons, without any colour discrimination, serve faithfully under her flag." Yet myth and its attendant ideology always has access to the alibi which the first order provides – in this case, that "it's just a picture."

In this early work, Barthes's structuralist informed objective was to demythologize the mythmaking process; to tell just how showing can become a form of telling; to say just what "it goes without saying" is being made to say; to expose how the purportedly natural is thoroughly conventional and how it thereby acts to sustain a particular social formation and the interests that it serves. What he subsequently argued, however, from a more clearly post-structuralist perspective (in an essay whose initial publication in French had actually predated *Mythologies'* appearance in English) was that, insofar as such unmaskings had become routine, then they were effectively complicit with mythology (Barthes 1977b: 165–9). Rather than the more or less transparent ideology of myth, the proper object of critique was the sign itself, with its investigation sustained by a full recognition of the density, ambiguities, and fissures of language. As he would phrase it some years later:

Whether in science, in economics, in linguistics, in sociology, the present task is less to be sure of the main principles than to be able to describe imbrications, relays, returns, additions, exceptions, paradoxes, ruses: a task which very quickly becomes a combative one, since it comes to grips with a henceforth reactionary force: *reduction*. (Barthes 1985: 102, italics in original)

For Barthes, those forms of critical inquiry which aspired to recover what a given author *really* meant were instances of just such a reduction. Inasmuch as they were predicated upon the revelation of clear and stable meaning, purportedly anchored and sustained by the notion of authorial intent, then they were supportive of a social order that seeks to regulate or suppress the very notion of difference which language and writing serve to make available. Thus what Barthes proposed was a shift of attention away from the closed singularity of “the work” and toward the contested plurality of “the text” (Barthes 1977b: 155–64); away from “the author” and toward “the reader” (Barthes 1977b: 142–8).

There are affinities between such themes and the contributions of other writers associated with poststructuralism such as Derrida, Foucault, and Kristeva. The influence upon sociology of this aspect of Barthes’s writing is linked to this larger movement and the “linguistic turn” with which it is associated. Its impact thus appears as altogether more diffuse and indirect than that of *Mythologies*. Certainly with respect to the sociology of pre Internet media, it is *Mythologies* that has proved to be his most consequential contribution. It is noteworthy, for example, that it is routinely incorporated into analyses of television (cf., e.g., Fiske & Hartley 1978; Perry 1994) – notwithstanding that the essays effectively predate the medium’s general availability and hence do not engage with its characteristic flow of images. But then it may be that, as Barthes – always the writer – once observed, the image always has the last word.

SEE ALSO: Author/Auteur; Ideology; Photography; Poststructuralism; Semiotics; Structuralism

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base and superstructure

Rob Beamish

The base and superstructure metaphor did not originate with Karl Marx – Scottish Enlightenment thinkers Adam Ferguson, Adam Smith, and others conceptualized different modes of subsistence, with particular structural characteristics, as foundational to societies – but Marx (1904, 1980) wrote the classic statement. Humankind distinguishes itself from nature and animals when it produces its means of subsistence – indirectly producing its actual material life. Production is substantial and eternal to human life; its form is historical. In the same year Darwin’s *Origin of the Species* appeared, Marx (1980: 99) sketched the “guiding thread” to his work: humankind enters determinate, necessary social relations of production appropriate to a determinate developmental stage of the material forces of production. These two relations – comprised of real individuals, their activity, and the material conditions in which they live – constitute the “economic structure,” the real basis of the legal and political superstructure and determinate forms of social consciousness. Consciousness does not determine social being, being determines consciousness.

Rejecting claims that new ideas or changes in the superstructure were fundamental to social transformation, Marx argued the material infrastructure was the real locus of, and for, change. The social relations of production – or property

relations – initially facilitate but later fetter development in the material forces of production, leading to social transformation. With the ensuing changes “in the economic foundation, the whole immense superstructure sooner or later revolutionizes itself” (Marx 1980: 100). This formulation suggested to some the infrastructure’s direct determination of the superstructure.

After Marx’s death, Engels rejected simple, deterministic interpretations of Marx’s Preface, arguing the base was determinate “only in the last instance.” But Engels’s scientific socialism and the Marx/Darwin parallels he had drawn supported those espousing a narrow, mono causal, deterministic Marxism. Bernstein (1961) was among the first to reject claims that socialism would emerge from a purely objective, evolutionary process – capitalism’s economic breakdown through the falling rate of profit, over production/under consumption. Karl Kautsky, Heinrich Cunow, Michael Tugan Baranowsky, Louis Boudin, Rosa Luxemburg, Henryk Grossmann, and others defended the inevitability of the “breakdown theory” or mildly qualified its determinism. In contrast, Karl Korsch emphasized the subject/object dialectic and praxis.

Interpreting Marx’s statement that “*der materiellen naturwissenschaftlich treu zu konstatierenden Umwälzung*” as “the material transformation, determined with the precision of science” (e.g., see Stone’s interpretation, Marx 1904: 12) rather than “the material, scientifically diagnosable, transformation in the economic conditions of production” (Marx 1980: 101) and separating that from the ideological forms – implicitly not scientifically diagnosable – in which humankind becomes conscious of the conflict, the determinists argued the economic base is the focus of historical materialism. Changes in the superstructure would follow axiomatically.

Careful attention to Marx’s Preface, let alone his other works, demonstrates that the Second International’s economic determinism was misguided. The dynamic relation Marx sketched was changes within the material forces of production (consisting of the means of production – raw materials, machinery, technology, production facilities, and geographic spaces – and human labor power). Contrary to dialectically

materialist, technological, or economic determinist claims, the subject, as labor power, the social relations of production, including workers’ aggregation in increasingly larger factories, and class consciousness were all within the internal dynamic fueling pressure for change. Praxis was always within Marx’s guiding thread.

One must also read the scientific diagnosis of the “material transformation in the economic conditions of production” in context. The Preface introduced Marx’s first, long awaited (almost 15 years), published critique of political economy. He almost had to justify why a socialist revolutionary must wade through the ensuing dry economic analysis. The compressed sketch proclaimed that political economy’s diagnostic precision could reveal capitalist production’s fundamental contradictions. Properly grasped, practical action focused on those fissure points could create a revolutionary transformation of capitalism’s basic infrastructure.

Marx (1980: 101) recognized it was in “the legal, political, religious, artistic or philosophical, in short, ideological forms” that humankind became “conscious of this conflict,” but emphasized that it was the social relations of production that required fundamental transformation:

A social formation does not collapse before all the forces of production, of which it is capable, are developed and new, superior relations of production do not take their place before the material conditions of existence have matured in the womb of the old society itself. Therefore humankind always sets for itself only the tasks that it can solve, since closer examination shows that the task itself only arises where the material conditions for its solution are already at hand or at least in the process of being grasped. (Marx 1980: 101)

In 1969, Louis Althusser argued that capitalist reproduction is key to the base/superstructure metaphor. He maintained that ideology (contrasted to ideologies), endowed with a structure and function, is an omni historical reality, operating through ideological state apparatuses (ISAs). Ideology provides an “imaginary relation” to the relations of production that functionally reproduces those relations rather than exposing the relations of production themselves. Interpellating subjects into an

(ideological) subject, the ISAs repress real understanding and reproduce the relations of production, leaving the base determinate in the last instance. By replacing conscious, historical subjects with a system of structures, Althusser misinterprets Marx's guiding thread in a different way than those in the Second International.

SEE ALSO: Althusser, Louis; Capitalism; Capitalism, Social Institutions of; Labor/Labor Power; Marx, Karl; Materialism

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Bataille, Georges (1897–1962)

Michael Presdee

Georges Bataille was born in Billon, Puy de Dôme, in central France and converted to Catholicism on the eve of World War I, serving in the army from 1916 to 1917. Later he joined the seminary at Saint Fleur and spent a period with the Benedictine congregation at Quarron

the Isle of Wight in Britain. In 1922, Bataille became the deputy keeper at the Bibliothèque Nationale in Paris, a position he held until 1944, later becoming a librarian in Carpentras in Provence in 1949 and then in Orléans in 1951. Through his editorship of *Critique*, he gave space to new intellectuals such as Foucault, Barthes, Derrida, and Deleuze.

Intellectually, Bataille was an uneasy member of the Surrealist movement during the 1920s, calling himself “the enemy within,” and through the work of Nietzsche became preoccupied with the notion of eroticism, horror, and obscenity, writing on topics such as transgression, excess, evil, sacrifice, de Sade, and desire. Bataille always involved himself in intellectual edge work, having a “thirst for excess and violence” and the “unacceptable.” From Nietzsche he learned that “the secret for harvesting from existence the greatest fruitfulness and the greatest enjoyment is . . . to live dangerously” (Nietzsche 1974: 228).

Bataille's work on transgression was his most important intellectual legacy to modern sociology and criminology. It showed that he had an intimate understanding of the effects of the march of rationalization on a controlled and constrained society, where carnival, the fête, and collective celebration have become necessary for the formation of individual identity. Transgression, crime, antisocial behavior all became for him essential characteristics of advanced capitalism, and he concluded that “there is no prohibition that cannot be transgressed . . . the nature of the taboo . . . makes a world of calm reason possible but is itself basically a shudder appealing not to reason but to feeling, just as violence is” (Bataille 2001: 63–4). Here is the beginning of the modern debate about the fascination yet fear of doing social edge work, of the sublime feeling that comes from doing crime and transgressing. “Men are swayed by two simultaneous emotions: they are driven away by terror and drawn by an awed fascination. Taboo and transgression reflect these two contradictory urges. The taboo would forbid the transgression but the fascination compels it” (Bataille 2001: 68). This “delightful terror” achieved through transgression Bataille saw as emanating from violence and eroticism, with the realization that the darkness of social life is a place where we live out our

lives, that there is nothing else. “Cruelty and eroticism are conscious intentions in a mind which has resolved to trespass into a forbidden field of behaviour . . . Cruelty may veer towards eroticism” (Bataille 2001: 80). It is here in violence and eroticism where we acquire the energy for social life and creativity.

SEE ALSO: Criminology; Cultural Criminology; Deviance; Deviance, Criminalization of; Foucault, Michel; Nietzsche, Friedrich; Pornography and Erotica; Sadomasochism; Transgression; Violence

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Bateson, Gregory (1904–80)

William K. Rawlins

Gregory Bateson was a Cambridge educated anthropologist whose life’s work spanned and influenced many academic fields, including anthropology, communication, education, psychotherapy, and sociology. Using cybernetic concepts to theorize human–environmental interaction in holistic and recursive ways, Bateson developed sophisticated and continually evolving accounts of reflexive relationships among culture, consciousness, communication,

levels of messages, social and biological contexts, epistemology, and learning.

Bateson’s early fieldwork with the Iatmul in New Guinea resulted in *Naven* (1936), a book that presaged three enduring concerns of his scholarship. First, he endeavored to describe and analyze the culture holistically, involving inextricable interconnections among all aspects of their life (e.g. food production and consumption, emotional expression, cosmology and religious beliefs, performances of gender, social organization, etc.). Second, he introduced the concept schismogenesis, which formulated cultural activities as dynamic patterns of interaction occurring across time. Two such patterns of progressive differentiation were termed *symmetrical* – the exchange of similar behaviors, like boasting, commercial rivalry, threats, or warlike posturing and arms development, which can escalate until the interacting system breaks down; and *complementary* – the exchange of different behaviors, like assertiveness and submissiveness, exhibitionism and admiration, each behavior tending to promote its complement, which can distort the respective parties’ comportment and their treatment of each other until the system breaks down. Importantly, Bateson did not view these patterns as linear occurrences with one party their undisputed originator; rather, all participants’ behaviors were considered reactions to reactions. Attributing causes for behaviors derives from one’s point of view. Third, Bateson reflected in depth on the value and validity of his own interpenetrated activities of participating in and thinking and writing about the Iatmul’s culture, thereby anticipating contemporary concerns in social studies with the politics of representation. Bateson pursued further fieldwork in New Guinea with his wife Margaret Mead, and they co authored *Balinese Character: A Photographic Analysis* (1942), the pioneering use of extensive photography in anthropological study.

Bateson participated actively after World War II in the Macy Conferences on cybernetics, ideas that captivated his intellectual imagination and further informed his tendencies to think about human interaction in terms of self regulating patterns between persons as well as social groupings and their environments. His work researching alcoholism with psychiatrist

Jurgen Ruesch resulted in *Communication: The Social Matrix of Psychiatry* (1951), a landmark volume explicitly formulating psychiatry as communicative activity. The book presents groundbreaking discussions of several staples of contemporary communication theory. First, it explores hierarchical levels of communication and metacommunication, that is, communication about communication, which comprises all the nonverbal cues and verbal propositions exchanged between communicators concerning how their actions and words will be interpreted, as well as the nature of their relationship. In addition, three types of codification are introduced: *digital* codification involves input (e.g., the word “sadness”) that is significantly different from the external events it stands for; *analogic* codification involves processing recognizable models of external events (e.g., dejected posture modeling sadness); and *gestalt* codification allows people to summarize experience and recognize similarities in events despite differences in their particulars (e.g., identifying both a funeral and someone’s loss of a job as sad occurrences). The book also discusses interrelationships among codification, social action, and values; all meaning making simultaneously combines selective interpretation and behavioral performance as it necessarily instantiates and reinforces cultural values.

In characterizing the multiple levels of abstraction shaping human interaction, Bateson developed the concept of framing. He conceived frames (or contexts) as communicated premises for delimiting a set of meaningful actions. For example, a play frame stipulates that another’s shoves or aggressive remarks are not to be taken seriously. Frames are negotiated through exchanging metacommunicative messages that classify and evaluate behaviors and messages occurring within the frame (or context). The fluidity of frames derives from the reflexive nature of the messages that simultaneously constitute and label them. Consider: when is a shove too hard or a remark too hurtful to maintain a perception of the interaction as play? Bateson suggested that other messages or cues at a higher level of abstraction function metacommunicatively to preserve the play frame, but he also observed that every message or cue has the metacommunicative potential to constitute or define a frame. The

reflexive quandary rendering human communication so vulnerable to misinterpretation is how communicators distinguish between the framing metacommunicative messages and those that are framed. Bateson believed that paradox was prevalent in human communication because of this self reflexivity as the simultaneous vehicle for and referent of classifying messages. Context persisted as a critical watchword for Bateson’s theorizing, and his conceptual nuances of framing inspired Erving Goffman’s important book, *Frame Analysis* (1974).

Arguably Bateson’s most prominent theoretical contribution to social theory, the double bind theory of schizophrenia, emerged from his funded research with Don Jackson, Jay Haley, and John Weakland in further investigating “the paradoxes of abstraction in communication.” A double bind situation involves two or more persons with repeated experiences of their communicative relationship. In this ongoing relationship threats are made by a powerful person on a primary level (often verbally) that are contradicted by messages (e.g., “Do not view this as a threat”) occurring at another level of abstraction (often nonverbally). All this interaction transpires in a situation from which the person being threatened cannot escape or comment upon. When persons have learned to perceive their social world in this conflicted and incapacitating way, experiencing any feature of the double bind interaction is likely to create considerable anxiety, anger, and/or a confused inability to understand how others are framing their messages (e.g., as playful, sarcastic, loving, or threatening).

This theoretical work with its emphasis on troubling social contexts interactively created through stifling and incongruent communicative practices significantly undermined reductive explanations analytically isolating psychopathologies within individual persons. It inspired and informed R. D. Laing and other proponents of the anti psychiatry movement and provided considerable theoretical impetus for establishing the discipline of family therapy. The term double bind appears frequently in popular parlance and has been invoked heuristically in multiple ways, for example, to describe perceptions of political impotence among broad social constituencies in contemporary life. Although the theory

has been largely discredited as a causal explanation for schizophrenia, it remains a compelling description of conditions surrounding disturbed communication practices and corrupted potential for mutually beneficial dialogue.

Bateson viewed all communicators as embedded in a ceaseless stream of contexts of learning about the premises of communication emerging from and regulating their interaction. For Bateson, learning transpires on multiple levels. In Learning I, persons learn to adapt their behaviors to pertinent cues within a specific context; for example, acquiring basic ways to greet other persons. But persons also must learn how to distinguish among contexts; for example, greeting family members on a typical morning, versus greeting strangers, or family members who have long been absent or are angry about something. This latter knowledge, termed Learning II or learning to learn, allows people to revise their set of behavioral choices depending upon the appropriate recognition of context. For Bateson, character refers to a person's resulting habits of punctuating interactional sequences (i.e., demarcating their beginning and end) and identifying contexts. This learned basis for recognizing how interactive situations are evolving and the proper behaviors called for by self was considered self validating by Bateson. It is therefore difficult for individuals to change significantly their basic worldviews as they tend to seek out and define contexts in ways that justify their behaviors, and they will behave in ways that interactively create sensible contexts for their actions. While Learning III conceivably involves changing one's self validating habits for discriminating among contextual possibilities, Bateson deemed it rare and necessitating a profound reorganization of character. A comprehensive effort to systematize Bateson's conceptions of communication theory underpinned Watzlavick, Beavin, and Jackson's *Pragmatics of Human Communication* (1967), which attracted worldwide attention to Bateson's ideas.

Bateson was concerned about the nature and limits of linear thinking and simplistic notions of individuals' intentions. He distrusted the conscious purposes of human beings in trying to exert unilateral control over the co evolution of human and natural ecologies. First, he considered persons' conscious control over

interaction limited because persons are only conscious of the products of their perceptual activities. They remain unaware of the culturally patterned processes (e.g., conventional understandings of reality and linguistic structures) through which perception occurs. Second, persons conceive means–end relationships in narrow and self serving ways. They typically do not understand how the arcs of their conscious activities are embedded in, affect, and in turn are affected by enveloping circuits of message pathways and consequences for living ecological systems. Bateson was deeply troubled by what he viewed as the toxic potentials of reductionistic explanations separating mind and body, conscious and unconscious purposes, reasons of the heart and reasons of the mind, art and science, selves and societies, organisms and their environments, ideas and their contexts. His masterwork, *Steps to an Ecology of Mind* (1972, reissued 2000), is an indispensable resource assembling his published essays addressing all of his diverse interests up to 1972.

Convinced that our ways of understanding and describing the world have practical, aesthetic, and moral consequences, Bateson devoted much of his later life to developing an epistemology suitable for understanding co evolving living systems. He emphasized that we are part of the contexts we study and that arbitrarily separating the knower from the known is an epistemological error. How and what we know about our human and natural environments will influence how we interact as part of those environments, which in turn will alter them and recursively present constraints and possibilities for further knowledge creation and understanding. Harries Jones (1995: 8) terms this Bateson's "ecological epistemology," which involves a compelling pronouncement: "Our own survival depends on understanding that not only are we coupled to our own conceptualization of ecosystems and ecological order, but also to embodiments of our own ways of thinking about them and acting on them." If we cannot recognize the errors in our own ways of thinking about and living as parts of interconnected human and biological orders, we may create the conditions for our own demise. Bateson urged holistic ways of thinking to grapple responsively and responsibly with the

predicaments of our own making. He recommended both rigor and imagination in confronting living questions, as well as humility and respect for the larger circuits of causation pat- terning our possibilities.

SEE ALSO: Goffman, Erving; Human–Non Human Interaction; Interaction; Pragmatism

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Beard, Mary Ritter (1876–1958)

John P. Bartkowski

Mary Ritter Beard was a historian, social critic, and first wave feminist. She was also a propo- nent of women's suffrage in the US during the early decades of the twentieth century. Beard's

work highlighted women's contributions to American society and cultures across the world. She was also a social reformer who fought for women's rights and organized working women in early twentieth century America.

Mary Beard was born and raised in Indiana. She and Charles Beard (a noted historian) met at DePauw University in the 1890s and married in 1900, fittingly a date that many consider to be the dawn of the Progressive Era to which the Beards notably contributed. Mary Beard's own work, both social reform and scholarship, was beholden to a critical intellectual orientation. During the second decade of the twentieth century, Mary Beard promoted women's suf- frage and the empowerment of women work- ers. Following the passage of women's right to vote, the suffragist movement broke into com- peting factions. Beard allied herself with suffra- gists who, while supporting women's political enfranchisement, were opposed to the Equal Rights Amendment. Beard and her compatriots feared that the Equal Rights Amendment would be used to undermine protective legisla- tion for women, including union sponsored laws that regulated women's wages, work hours, and work conditions.

Beard is considered by many to be one of the founders of women's studies. She strongly pro- moted women's access to education and was among the first to propose university courses about women. She created the World Center for Women's Archives, which collected docu- ments related to women's historical contribu- tions. Beard's vision for this archive placed a particular emphasis on representing women's diversity by race and class, a focus that was unusual for the time during which she lived. In *Woman as Force in History* (1946), widely considered her most important and influential work, Beard argued against conventional fem- inist thinking of the time, later popularized in Simone de Beauvoir's *The Second Sex*. Femi- nist convention during that period held that women were a wholly subjugated group or "second class" sex. Beard called the idea of women's complete historical subjection to men a "fantastic myth." If women's subju- gation had been complete, she contended, then there would be no compelling reason for his- torians – most of whom were men – to take seriously women's impact on history. Arguing

that women's influence was ignored by historians rather than empirically absent from history, Beard urged historians to refocus their analytical range of vision to account for women's critical social contributions. Her later work focused on women in Japan, a highly patriarchal society.

Beard viewed women's most vital social role as that of civilizing men and society at large. In her view, the life of men initially resembled that of "beasts," and women "lifted" men out of their uncivilized existence. Civilization itself, Beard surmised, was largely the accomplishment of women, and historians' shortsightedness and patriarchal bias led them to neglect this fact. Her work can be read as an effort to correct for this gender bias. Early in her career, Beard took to task the *Encyclopedia Britannica* for its failure to recount women's influence in American history, including their civilizing role on the frontier and their facilitation of urban social reform.

Beard's brand of feminist historical analysis would seem to imply that women were morally different from – and even superior to – men. This idea remains popular among some "difference feminists" today, who emphasize the distinctiveness of women's moral reasoning. However, claims about women's civilizing influence are also quite controversial because they render what some charge is an essentialist, homogenizing portrayal of "uncivilized" men counterposed to "civilizing" women. However, a careful reading of Beard's work reveals that it does not essentialize women but instead highlights women's diversity.

Although one of the primary motifs in Beard's work focused on women's civilizing influence in history, there were also many subplots winding through her historiographies. Years before feminist scholars began theorizing women's resistance against patriarchy, Beard was examining such oppositional tactics in fine grained detail. She called attention to the ways in which economically disadvantaged women's subjection was influenced by a combination of their social class position and gender. Consequently, Beard's historiographies examined intersecting inequalities such as race, class, and gender many decades before this approach was to become common practice in

women's studies, gender studies, history, and the social sciences.

SEE ALSO: Feminism; Feminism, First, Second, and Third Waves

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Beauvoir, Simone de (1908–86)

Vicky M. MacLean and Patricia Parker

The French existentialist philosopher, writer, and social essayist Simone de Beauvoir is most widely known for her pioneering work *Le Deuxième Sexe* (1949), published in English as *The Second Sex* (1953). Her exposé of woman as "Other" and her calling attention to the feminine condition of oppression as historically linked to motherhood are considered her major contributions to modern feminist thought. While not generally acknowledged as a sociologist, Beauvoir nevertheless contributed to sociology in *The Second Sex*, *The Coming of Age* (*La Vieillesse*, 1970), a study of old age, and, to a lesser extent, her writings on the media (Deegan 1991) and death and dying (Marks 1973). Simone de Beauvoir is also internationally read and widely known for her novels, autobiographies, and travelogues. In

1954 her novel *Les Mandarins* was awarded the Prix Goncourt, clearly placing Beauvoir among the most highly acclaimed French literary writers of her time. Beauvoir's theorizing corrects androcentric biases found in earlier gender neutral theoretical frameworks, particularly in her use of social categories to inform individually oriented philosophical theories of self determination and freedom (Walsh 2000). She systematically examined the historically situated or lived experiences of women relative to men. Deeply influenced by the existential philosophy of her lifelong companion Jean Paul Sartre, Simone de Beauvoir extended Sartrean existential philosophy to encompass social and cultural determinants of the human condition. She used existential philosophy, as a guide for understanding herself as a woman and as a framework for understanding the condition of women more generally.

The first of two daughters, Simone de Beauvoir was born in Paris January 9, 1908 to a devout, aristocratic, middle class Catholic family. Her father, a lawyer and amateur actor, having no money for a sufficient dowry, urged Simone to pursue higher education. As early as age 11, the young Beauvoir disavowed marriage and motherhood and shortly thereafter, she disavowed her belief in God. Unlike most women of the time, Beauvoir began a lifelong pursuit of educational advancement, excelling in various disciplines. In 1924, she earned her first baccalaureate in Latin and literature. She earned a second degree one year later in mathematics and philosophy. In the course of earning two baccalaureates in 1925, she attended the Institut Sainte Marie to take courses in Latin and literature, the Institut Catholique for courses in mathematics, and the Sorbonne for philosophy and literature. In 1926, she passed her exams for certificates in Latin, literature, and mathematics, and in the following year she earned her certificate in philosophy. In 1928, Beauvoir became friends with fellow teaching trainees Maurice Merleau Ponty and Claude Lévi Strauss, and in 1929 she began her lifelong relationship with Sartre. The two met while preparing for major examinations in philosophy, in which Beauvoir, the youngest of the group, was placed second. Sartre was placed first, but only after having failed his first

attempt the previous year. Some of the reviewers of the exam argued for a reversal of the rankings, however, thus suggesting a gender bias in the final placement (Bieber 1979; Brosman 1991).

In 1929, Beauvoir began her teaching career, holding various positions in the French lycée system at Marseilles (1929–33), Rouen (1933–7), and Paris (until 1944). Beauvoir moved around for a number of years while Sartre served in the military. In 1931, the two discussed the prospect of marriage, since married couples were generally assigned to teach at the same universities (Bieber 1979; Brosman 1991). However, Beauvoir declined Sartre's offer, refusing to sacrifice their autonomy to the bourgeois convention of marriage. In 1933, Sartre met Olga Kosakiewicz, a student of Beauvoir's, and for a time the couple expanded to become an ill fated trio, an experience reflected in Beauvoir's first novel, *She Came to Stay* (1943). Through the years, both Sartre and Beauvoir took on various lovers, while maintaining their own unique relationship. In 1944, Beauvoir was suspended from her teaching position at the Lycée Victor Duruy after a parent complained of Beauvoir's undue influence on her daughter (Brosman 1991). Although Beauvoir's position was subsequently reinstated, she nonetheless resigned from the university, retiring from teaching to travel and to pursue her career as a writer. Beauvoir met Nelson Algren, another of her prominent lovers, while visiting the United States in 1947. Beauvoir's now internationally renowned essay on existential morality, *The Ethics of Ambiguity*, was published in that year, followed by her publication *America Day by Day*, a travelogue providing a view of American culture and social life. In 1949, after three years of research and writing, Beauvoir released the highly controversial *Second Sex*. Twenty thousand copies were sold in France in its first week of distribution and the 700 page book was later translated into 26 languages (Bair 1989).

True to her existentialist philosophy, Beauvoir's writings avoid any attempt to discover a single universal "truth" as prescriptive for intellectual or personal freedom for all women. Her efforts to understand women's historical oppression, contemporary situation, and future

prospects drew from fiction and literary criticism, as well as from biology, historical anthropology, political economy, and psychoanalysis. However, Beauvoir found extant writings either erroneous or incomplete and developed her own distinctively sociological argument, noting that “one is not born, but rather becomes, a woman” (1953 [1949]: 267). Consistent with existentialist philosophy, Beauvoir saw the human condition as defined foremost by the freedom to choose, as humans are born with no fixed essence or nature. Despite this freedom, however, it is *external social forces* that undeniably shape transcendent possibilities for self creation. Thus for a woman to be defined as Other is to be defined as second to man, less than man, and for man’s pleasure. Beauvoir explored this idea further, addressing the condition of lesbian women who choose other women as sexual partners as a means of transcending societal restrictions on women. Critiquing the ambiguities of psychoanalysts who accepted socially defined categories of masculine and feminine, she stated that labeling women as “masculine” for choosing to be themselves is to deny women authenticity.

To define the “masculine” lesbian by her will to “imitate the male” is to stamp her as inauthentic. . . . The truth is that man today represents the positive and the neutral that is to say, the male and the human being whereas woman is only the negative, the female. Whenever she behaves as a human being, she is declared to be identifying herself with the male. . . . Her activities in sports, politics, and intellectual matters, her sexual desire for other women, are all interpreted as “masculine protest”; the common refusal to take account of the values toward which she aims, or transcends herself, evidently leads to the conclusion that she is, as subject, making an inauthentic choice. (p. 408)

Beauvoir’s theorizing took a distinctively sociological dimension in *The Second Sex*, contributing to the social basis for the study of gender. Similarly, the scope of her research methodology contributed to revisionist history, as she theorized from sources and documentation from women themselves, including letters, diaries, autobiographies, case histories, political and social essays, and novels (Bair 1990).

In *The Second Sex* Beauvoir began by asking “what is woman?” evaluating societal institutions and their influences and definitions of women and femininity. She dispelled the idea that womanhood is a natural existing phenomenon and maintained that the concept of Other is a duality that has existed as long as consciousness itself. Always present in religion and mythology, Otherness is a concept upon which humans base their realities. For example, we have day and night, good and evil, and, at the heart of *The Second Sex*, male and female. In the context of the sexes, male, historically defined as the sovereign of the sexes, is the Self by which we judge, and female is the Other, the alter and opposite of male. Throughout history, women’s value as procreator has been viewed as secondary to men’s more prominent contribution to society as warrior (p. 64). Beauvoir’s analysis further demolished historical myths and images of women and she identified moments throughout history when women made significant progress toward emancipation. In particular, Beauvoir believed that socialism, to the extent that it removes sole responsibility for the family and childrearing from women, is necessary for women’s liberation. Although Beauvoir placed most of the blame for women’s oppression on the actions of men, she did not exonerate women for their complacencies. She noted that declining to be the “Other” would require women to forsake the benefits they received from their alliances with men (p. xxvii). Ultimately conceding that women will never fully achieve a complete independence from men as in a socialist class revolution, Simone de Beauvoir advocated solidarity between women and men in the struggle for freedom.

In *The Coming of Age* and *The Second Sex*, Beauvoir used a similar approach, drawing from history and literary criticism as well as from first hand observation to address the indignities suffered by the aged in contemporary societies. Boldly, Beauvoir proclaimed her intent to “break the conspiracy of silence” that hides from public view and discussion the material and social impoverishment forced upon older persons. Beauvoir systematically reviewed the historical circumstances of the aged in various times and cultures. She called

to task the failure of society to admit to its own impending old age by pointing out that we deny ourselves by refusing to see ourselves in the faces of the old (pp. 13–14). In comparing conditions of older persons in primitive societies with those in modern technocratic societies, she drew attention to housing, employment, retirement earnings, and hospital and institutional settings. All were examined and found lacking. She also addressed the subjective understandings and experiences of older individuals: loss of occupation, of privacy, of sexual relations, of health, of personal relationships, and even of death. Prior to the development of the field of gerontology, Beauvoir told us what it means to grow old in contemporary society. She beseeched her readers to break the conspiracy of silence reflecting the failure of modern civilization to admit what the state of the aged really is and, when understood, to call for radical systemic changes.

In yet another sociological dimension of her work, Beauvoir examined images of women's sexuality as portrayed by the media. Her sympathetic portrait *Brigitte Bardot and the Lolita Syndrome* (1959) can be viewed as a liberated or transcendent expression of woman's sexuality. In the French actress Bardot, Beauvoir found the image of a "sex kitten" embodying the ambiguities of seductress with childhood innocence, the desired with the forbidden, and the accessible with the inaccessible (Deegan 1991). Examining pictures of Bardot from media snapshots, Beauvoir argued that Bardot reflected a "spontaneous dignity" in her ability to turn up her nose at artificial jewels, perfumes, and glamorous clothing, while tempting even the most virtuous saint with her lascivious walk and dance. Beauvoir's early analysis represents a genre of media research that would later surface in numerous sociological and popular culture studies.

Throughout Beauvoir's writings, particularly her autobiographies and novels, there is a central preoccupation with death (Marks 1973; Bieber 1979). In *Memoirs of a Dutiful Daughter*, realization of her own mortality as a girl, and as a young woman she describes the loss experienced upon the death of her childhood friend "Zaza." One whole volume, *A Very Easy Death* (1964), was written on the topic of death after her mother became ill and died of cancer. The

book deals with the profound personal impact of her mother's death, as well as the more general conditions of dying, euthanasia, and the functional preparation for one's own death, through the "dress rehearsals" of burying loved ones. In *Adieux: A Farewell to Sartre* (1981), Beauvoir said her public goodbye to the man who was her lasting companion, reflecting on her years with him and on the connections between death and aloneness, and admitting no regrets. There is significant discussion among Beauvoir's critics and supporters surrounding the nature of her relationship with Sartre and his influence on her work. The two were companions and scholarly critics of each other's writings from the time of their first acquaintance in 1929 until Sartre's death in 1980. Although Sartre's existentialist framework significantly shaped Beauvoir's work, her writings contributed unique theory and gave voice to both existential and feminist thought, particularly in her defense of the victims of prejudice and social injustice. Indeed, the originality and merits of her many writings are indisputable. Through fiction and non fiction she identified dilemmas of the human condition, particularly those embodied in situational and societal restrictions on freedom (Deegan 1991).

Though Beauvoir regarded herself as a writer and novelist first and foremost (Bair 1990), her contributions to the field of sociology are significant. Her emphases on the social construction of femininity and of woman as Other, a similar emphasis on the social construction of old age by institutions that deny the humanity of the older person, her attention to the role of the media in portraying images of women, and her profound honesty in creating a greater social awareness of death and dying are notable examples of her contributions. As a social philosopher, Beauvoir was not only a scholar but also an activist. She traveled extensively, taking more than 200 trips abroad including visits to Italy, Germany, Austria, Czechoslovakia, Morocco, Spain, Soviet Russia, Cuba, the United States, Sweden, Norway, Turkey, Greece, Japan, China, Egypt, Israel, and northern Africa. She supported independence for both Algeria and North Vietnam. In addition, she actively supported social and political causes, participating in marches and vigils for

abortion on demand, workers' emancipation, students' rights, the impoverished, and for women's liberation (Bieber 1979; Brosman 1991).

SEE ALSO: Aging and the Life Course, Theories of; Cultural Feminism; Culture, Gender and; Existential Sociology; Gender, Aging and; Inequality/Stratification, Gender; Sex and Gender

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Beccaria, Cesare (1738–94)

Marilyn D. McShane and Frank P. Williams III

Cesare Beccaria was born Cesare Bonesana, Marchese di Beccaria, in 1738 in Milan, Italy. His writings became associated with the classical school of thought on crime and punishment. Many of his ideas laid the ground work for the reform of courts and laws throughout the world as well as the enactment of constitutions and proclamations of individual freedoms in emerging nations like the United States.

The eighteenth century was a time of massive social change. The industrial revolution, the rise of the middle class, colonization, and urbanization around the world brought new cultural ideas and shifts in conceptions of government responsibility. The courts of this era were often said to be barbarous and cruel. Accusations were made in secret and torture was inflicted particularly on the poor. There were comparatively few written laws and judges ruled politically to suppress anyone who threatened the aristocracy or the Church.

The son of noble parents, Beccaria studied at a Jesuit school in Parma and then at the University of Pavia, earning a doctorate in law, before returning home to marry the daughter of a military officer. With a background in law, math, and economics the young scholar spent a great deal of time conversing with his colleagues about the applications of utilitarian theory to public policy. His discussion group, led by the brothers Alessandro and Pietro Verri, published a journal, *Il Caffè*, where topics such as taxes and tariffs, supply and demand, and labor force issues were argued. Emphasizing the logical, rational thought that was popular during this period of enlightenment, Beccaria penned *Dei Delitti e Delle Pene* (On Crimes and Punishment) outlining his thoughts on a model penal system. Fear of recrimination, however, forced him to publish the work anonymously in 1764 and it was not until the work received popular acclaim that he stepped forward in 1768 to acknowledge authorship. That same year he took the chair in political economy and

commerce at the Palatine School in Milan, but he left the position within two years. In 1771, he received an appointment to the Supreme Economic Council of Milan and remained a public official for the rest of his life.

In his treatise, Beccaria covered many aspects of the criminal justice system – from the construction of laws through the processing of the suspect and the punishment of the convicted. He posited that vague or obscure laws would be corrupted and that defendants must be given time and the means to prepare a defense, one of the cornerstones of our due process tradition. He argued that torture should never be used and that capital punishment was an indefensible act. To him, the evil of punishment should be only a slight bit greater than the benefits of the crime it seeks to prevent. As a rational being, man would choose the least painful path, and the principle of deterrence would prevail.

Like other philosophers of this time, Beccaria espoused the idea that free will was the basis of our behavior and that, under the terms of the social contract, each person gave up hedonistic liberty for the benefit of the greater needs of society. He acknowledged that it was incumbent upon society to devise and enforce just laws but, having seen first hand how such laws could be corrupted, he cautioned the citizenry to watch over the process to ensure that justice was available to all regardless of birth right or means.

Although there was much demand for him to make public appearances and to travel for speaking engagements, he was so shy that his first such invitation, to Paris, ended in his flight home and afterward he declined all invitations and retired quietly. While some critics argue that Beccaria's ideas were neither unique nor groundbreaking, and some have even said that Pietro Verri was responsible for them, most will agree his succinct treatise summarizes the ideas that were popular at this time. Moreover, it clearly outlines the judicial reforms many believed were necessary in an evolving civilized society.

Even today, thousands of college students each year are assigned his work to read. His writing endures no doubt because it is very readable and direct. For example, when

considering courtroom procedures he argues that: "Every judge can be my witness that no oath ever made any criminal tell the truth." His focus on preventing crime still rings true today: "[S]ee to it that the laws are clear and simple and that the entire force of a nation is united in their defense, and that no part of it is employed to destroy them. See to it that the laws favor not so much classes of men, as men themselves. See to it that men fear the laws and fear nothing else."

Beccaria worked most of his life as a lecturer and as a public official. Beset with a number of family and health problems in later life, he died in November of 1794.

SEE ALSO: Crime; Criminal Justice System; Deterrence Theory

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behaviorism

Evans Mandes

Behaviorism was a dominant school of American psychological thought from the 1930s through the 1960s. Its principal founder, John B. Watson, clearly defined behaviorism as

follows: "Psychology, as the behaviorist views it, is a purely objective branch of natural science. Its theoretical goal is the prediction and control of behavior. The behaviorist recognizes no dividing line between man and brute" (Watson 1914: 158). Other behaviorists following in Watson's footsteps included Clark Hull (drive reduction theory), Edward Chace Tolman (purposive behaviorism), and B. F. Skinner (radical behaviorism). The most successful of these was Skinner, who developed the dominant theory of behaviorism for 30 years, working on a more or less non theoretical basis, using only objective measures of behavior. He was squarely on the nurture side of the nature–nurture controversy and on the deterministic side of the free will–determinism issue. He disavowed favorite psychological constructs such as consciousness, freedom, indwelling agents, dignity, and creativity. In each case Skinner argued that these examples either represent constructs from one's own biological/environmental histories or are behaviors in which the antecedents (controlling agents) are not clearly understood (Skinner 1971).

Unlike classical sociological theory, which is often defined by the work of major sociologists of the times (e.g., Du Bois, Weber), classical psychological theory is often defined by schools of thought (e.g., Gestalt, functionalism, structuralism) championed by several individuals who espouse variations on the acceptable truth. Skinner worked through the 1940s, 1950s, and 1960s, when other important behaviorists challenged the acceptable orthodoxy in interesting ways. Hull, for instance, argued that the dominant *cause célèbre* for behaviorism was drive reduction. Any action associated with the satisfaction of a biological or social drive state became learned, and learning could only happen under drive reduction states. Hull then quantified this process in a theory he called mathematico reductive, his attempt to provide post hoc curve fitting equations to specific drive reduction states (Hull 1943). Although influential, his work diminished in importance as other types of learning where the clear drive reduction antecedents were not known came into vogue. These included social modeling, latent learning, and exposure learning.

A leader in this latter form of behaviorism, called purposive behaviorism, was Tolman (1959). His research was aimed at isolating learning situations where the clear drive reduction antecedents could not be easily specified and where certain mentalistic concepts – anathema to radical behaviorism – were used to help explain latent learning phenomena. Tolman's favorite term, "cognitive map," was an example. He used this term to clarify how animals and humans are influenced by latent cues in their everyday lives, cues which may not be observable in a behavioral sense, but which still operate in a coercive and deterministic stimulus response fashion as determiner of behavior. Tolman, with seeming prescience, predicted the coming of the cognitive revolution in the 1970s, which surpassed behaviorism as a major theory. The cognitive revolution allowed the return of mentalistic concepts such as mind and consciousness into the vocabulary of cognitive behaviorism and ushered in a new look for theoretical psychology.

Although Skinner's radical behaviorism is no longer a major player in psychological theory, the applications that his research fostered are very much a part of the contemporary scene. These applications span many areas in contemporary psychology, including clinical psychology and therapy. He gave us a strong hint of his application of learning called operant conditioning in his one and only novel, *Walden Two*, a book first published in 1948 and still in print. The novel represented Skinner's attempt to engineer a utopian society based upon Skinnerian operant principles. Sometimes called social engineering, Skinner's novel was his solution to the horrors of World War II. He hoped to engineer out of the human repertoire all negative emotions, leaving only the positive ones. This is an example of behavioral modification, and many of its elements (positive reinforcement, successive approximations, gradual change in behavior through desensitization) have been incorporated successfully in therapy today. The removal of unwanted behaviors such as phobias, tics, etc. can be successfully treated using behavior modification techniques; these are accomplished through the non reinforcement of unwanted behaviors. Behavior modification techniques, which are part of a

larger classification of therapies called behavior therapy, have been successful in reducing the amount of self destructive behaviors among children suffering from infantile autism.

The principal set of events that led to the demise of behaviorism as a compelling theory was the growth of connectionism and the cognitive revolution of the 1970s, which was theoretically friendlier to the biological causes of behavior. More specifically, the Chomsky (1971)–Skinner (1957) debates of the 1960s concerning the origins and development of native languages sealed the fate of radical behaviorism, since Skinner was never able to deal with the irrepressible novelty of human speech. Young children usually speak grammatically and in novel form with each new utterance, a fact that is anathema to any learning paradigm of language acquisition.

The legacy of behaviorism for modern psychology was its insistence upon measurable behavior, thus transforming psychology from its introspective and subjective past into the world of scientific inquiry. This process allowed psychology to embrace new disciplines such as statistics and measurement theory in attempts to add legitimacy to its new endeavors at the expense of more humanistic approaches to psychology.

SEE ALSO: Social Learning Theory; Theory

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belief

Carlo Prandi

Popular dictionaries define the term belief in the following general terms: (1) a feeling of certainty that something exists or is good; (2) an opinion about which one feels sure. While the concept of belief is not, therefore, immediately associated with a religious context, it does not exclude it. When the “certainty that something exists” refers to a transcendent entity, then it is close to the idea of faith understood as a religious belief in a particular God. The semantic dichotomy between faith and belief originates and is developed especially in the historical context of western Christianity, when, beginning with the “confession of faith” established by the Council of Chalcedon (451 CE), the concept of faith assumes an undoubtedly confessional character.

From the time of the Protestant Reformation, the conflict between Luther and the church in Rome derived, among other things, from the claim that each possessed the “true faith.” The traditions of the Roman Church were, for Luther, *traditiones humanae*, beliefs that were not legitimated by the revealed writings. For the founder of the Reformation, what did not come from God, through the Revelation, came from the Devil. As a consequence the reformers abrogated traditions which, for the Roman Church, were an integral part of the Catholic faith: some of the sacraments, purgatory, the cult of both the Madonna and the saints, religious holidays, fasting, and monastic vows.

The faith–belief duality is very important within the churches, as it is the basis for their theological and institutional identity. From the standpoint of sociological research, however, a clear distinction between faith and belief does not exist except in the sense that the former has an essentially religious content. In fact, while there may be a difference in extension and depth between the two terms, from a sociological point of view the common substantial nucleus of both is constituted by the adhesion of a subject or group to realities that, by their nature, are not verifiable from an empirical or scientific standpoint.

The definitions proposed above do not cover the whole spectrum of human beliefs. There are some behaviors which, although making no reference to unverifiable reality, confirm Durkheim's thesis that opinion is an eminently social fact and, as such, is a source of authority (Durkheim 1965 [1912]). Religious belief, according to Durkheim, is the fruit of social pressure that produces a constellation of symbolic figures in which society represents its own values by identifying them with divine figures. Durkheim's scheme is also useful for interpreting the type of manipulation practiced by an authoritarian political power over the masses in order to reach determined objectives. This is the case of the cult of personality, a belief shared by a group in the charismatic qualities of a leader who is recognized as having the ability not only to interpret the present world, together with its history, but also to elaborate revolutionary projects.

Belief is, therefore, a cognitive approach to reality that ignores, without necessarily excluding, the experimental method that western culture, from Galileo on, has set as an essential condition of scientific knowledge. Both Enlightenment thinking and positivism have traced a structure of human thought that refers to a world of reason, logic, and positive science, in which the demands of the mythical conscience (which is founded to a large extent on belief) find no place. In reality, in belief one can see the persistence of that primitive structure of the human mind that Lévy Bruhl described as "participation." For him, the advent of conceptual representation and of scientific explanation did not necessarily lead to the cancelation of that mystical and mythical residue that is at the root of belief. Even if it had succeeded in eliminating the mystical and mythical residue, which was the great conceptual effort undertaken by positivism and Marxism (in turn creating new mythologies), the fact remains that the concept does not constitute the only form of thought even where the scientific method presides over the great transformations of the modern world. Belief is located in that sphere of human thought where the emotional, extra logical, and non critically filtered aspects persist. Beliefs do not constitute simple extraneous fragments, erratic masses, or past residues but are a functional part of that

complex relationship with reality that does not exhaust the structure, historically achieved in modern western society, of scientific laws and conceptual abstraction.

The Weberian definition of charisma, considered an extraordinary quality endowed with strengths and supernatural or superhuman characteristics (Weber 1968 [1922]), has the structure of belief. In fact, Weber writes that decisions are made through the spontaneous recognition of charisma by those who are dominated, and this is granted through proof that begins to grow from faith in the revelation, from veneration of the hero, and from trust in the leader. Charisma, therefore, relies on a collective belief that reduces, or annuls, any distance between the subject (the community that lives the charismatic experience) and the object (the charismatic leader). The subject does not follow the route that is offered to him or her by modern rationality, but lives the situation and directly participates in it without critical mediation.

Charismatic leadership, of which the great ideologies of the nineteenth century have provided abundant examples, is realized, therefore, by activating collective representations (beliefs) that testify to both an intensely lived participation (often multidirected) and the persistence of extra logical elements in the cultural, political, and religious life of a society. In the symbolic elements of belief, rational and "irrational" (better: extra rational) blend together and constitute, as Lévy Bruhl writes, a "participating" form of thought. It is a question, to some degree, of a constant of human culture, including that which is a protagonist of modern scientific technical development. The frontiers between the two different formalities of human thought are not canceled even in a regime of advanced modernity, but they maintain a relative mobility.

Among the complex forms of belief, there is also the collective perception of "difference" and the reactions that it provokes. The social construction of this process is evident: individuals have a tendency to follow the models of behavior suggested by the culture to which they belong. This is due to the fact that a culture strengthens cohesion and facilitates communication among its members, while the adherence of these individuals to the socially shared

cultural scheme allows them to collectively identify themselves as “us,” in opposition to “others.” The product of the process by which identity is constructed is that particular and inevitable belief we call “ethnocentrism.” This, in specific sociohistorical conditions, is defined as the negative perception of human groups that are socially, culturally, and religiously different from our own. Ethnocentrism and prejudice are tightly connected sources of belief, and can manifest themselves in different fields: racial, social, religious, generational, and ethnic.

At the origin of more or less dogmatic certainties or dogmatically approved beliefs are motivations that can be traced to support or defend both personal and group affairs. The serenity that originates from the certainty of acting correctly whenever we behave in accordance with the culture to which we belong may be considered as the social construction of beliefs that appear to be convenient. In this case the picture of beliefs approaches that of ideology; worldviews tend to be reduced to a dualistic scheme in which what is “usual” for a determined social group appears normal, correct, and valid, in opposition to what is “different,” which appears anxiety provoking, risky, unfair, negative, and thus an object of beliefs that are only partially controllable. A typical case is represented by the “blood charge,” the expression used for around a millennium to designate the legend that Jews used the blood of Christians as an ingredient in food and drinks prescribed for Easter holidays. An ancestral fear of the unknown, sometimes connected to a specific desire for power, can lead to feelings of deep threat from “others,” against which defensive positions are assumed that are legitimated by beliefs made up of a collective elaboration of fear, and the desire to marginalize, if not eliminate completely, that which is “different.” These mechanisms of construction of socially shared beliefs are manifested in the following instances: (1) when the social structure is heterogeneous, or when it is losing its original homogeneity: the individuals that compose it differ in skin color, language, ways of living and dress, and in religious faith; (2) when rapid social and cultural change is in progress in a society: feelings of rivalry and hostility develop among heterogeneous groups, with the consequent construction of uncontrolled

beliefs; (3) when a minority group tends to increase in size and is perceived as a threat to the majority; (4) when exploitation of a minority group favors the community: in the United States, blacks were long thought to be intellectually and morally inferior, and Genesis 9:20–7 was often cited to justify beliefs regarding blacks’ racial inferiority; (5) when a society exalts ethnocentrism, and racial and cultural assimilation is not favored. Among the factors that promote prejudice and the social production of uncontrolled beliefs are habit, a tendency to conform, uncritical attachment to one’s own original culture, and blind acceptance of current ideas in the in group.

Ernest Renan, historian of both ancient civilizations and Christianity and an intellectual educated in rational and positive thinking, was convinced that the inferior races of the earth were represented by the blacks of Africa, Australian Aborigines, and Native Americans. He maintained that at the origin of humankind the whole earth was populated by members of these races, which were progressively eliminated by other races. According to Renan, wherever the Aryans and Semites established themselves in a country and found uncivilized races, they proceeded to exterminate them. The inferior races were not merely primitive and uncivilized, in Renan’s view, they were incapable of being civilized. He talks of their “absolute inability to achieve organization and progress,” of the “eternal infancy of these non perfectible races,” of “people vowed to immobility.” Obviously, faith in reason and beliefs without scientific basis can coexist even in those individuals who are considered to be among the protagonists of the rationalist turning point of the contemporary age.

Modernity, together with the advent of scientific technical rationality and the “disenchantment of the world” (Weber), has cleared the field of many beliefs whose groundlessness became evident: the scientific method has its own internal logic founded upon the inductive method, the repetition of the experiment, and the aid of the mathematical tool. Science, already conceptualized by Francis Bacon as free of various “idola,” i.e., beliefs with no rational base, has abandoned the ground of uncontrolled individual ingenuity, chance, the arbitrary, and hasty synthesis. Instead, science

proceeds methodically, according to experimentation built not *ex analogia homini* (from the variability of human feelings) but *ex analogia universi* (on the constancy of universal laws) and is founded upon an awareness of the instrumental nature of cognitive faculties.

Modern thought has learned from the scientific method to avoid magic, emotional and religious elements connected with a social symbolism that is not strictly functional and rational. Yet modernity appears as the producer of new beliefs, as well as intent upon preserving ancient and "pre logical" beliefs. To give just one example, astrology has spread through the most technologically advanced societies, while maintaining its ancient traditions, which attributed personal or divine intelligence to the stars and believed in a direct relationship between the action of the stars and natural events, and, above all, human life. It was believed possible to establish, using criteria elaborated by ancient civilizations, a more or less close relationship between the celestial and human orders. Astrology believes in a universe that is alive, made up of hidden but real correspondences (even if not scientifically proven), in which astral combinations influence and regulate the destiny of every human, from the moment of conception or birth.

The examination of certain forms of belief which technologically advanced societies have not been able to expel sets up the problem of the *operation* of the collective mentality. Different questions arise. Has modernity totally eliminated mythological production, or is it the producer of its own myths (and therefore beliefs)? Does there exist between primitive thought (participant and mythical, emotional and symbolic) and modern thought (trained to use rational and scientific categories) an unbridgeable separation and a radical heterogeneity, or is there instead a sort of gangway that allows a continuous transit from one to the other? Is primitive thought extraneous to the mentality of modern humans or is it, within certain limits and in specified forms, able to find a place in humanism, which has matured over centuries of reason and science? Modern humans are not without myths, nor devoid of values, archetypes, norms, and models that can be globally termed beliefs.

It is possible that mythical activity is a necessary and spontaneous function of the intelligence, an activity elicited in the human mind by the emotions that accompany intelligent deductions. It is congenital and common to all humans, it belongs not only to all peoples, but also to every person, at any age, and it belongs to all cultures and to any level of awareness reached by a society. Cassirer evoked the Mesopotamian myth of Marduk who kills the monster Tiamat, and with the quartered parts of his body gives form and order to the world up to the creation of humanity. According to Cassirer, the world of human culture can be described in the words of the Babylonian legend. It could not have originated until the obscurity of the myth had been fought and defeated. But the mythical monsters were not entirely destroyed. They were used in the creation of a new universe and even today they survive in it. The strengths of the myth were being opposed and subjugated by superior strengths. While these intellectual, ethical, and artistic strengths are in full vigor, the myth is tamed and subdued, but as soon as they start to lose their vigor, chaos returns. Then mythical thought starts reaffirming itself and pervades the entire human cultural and social life (Cassirer 1983 [1946]). The fear and distrust that Cassirer shows toward the mythical monsters are partly justified: the twentieth century has given ample demonstration of the devastation produced in the web of civilization by the myths of the hero, race, state, political party, war, and blood.

Both technology and science are powerful bulwarks against the return of beliefs and old fashioned myths, but they leave open the mystery of existence, the problem of the meaning of life, birth, and death. Science and technology have freed humans from the ancient seduction of mythology and magic and have established the regime of critical conscience; however, the eternal quest for meaning is insistent and goes beyond positive science, which is research into second causes. The data of the mythical conscience, the producer of beliefs, thus have a radical ambivalence: irrelevant and negative if observed from the perspective of scientific thought, they can be positive when they are not polluted by tendencies that are rigidly ethnocentric. Modern humans can be

subject to two possible alienations: the alienation of myth, of uncontrolled belief, which is entirely subject to emotion and prejudice, and the alienation of abstract rationality. Both result in two forms of unfaithfulness to the human condition. GUSDORF (1953), with the intention of recovering the existential value of religion, utopia, feeling, fable, and legend, maintains that scientific knowledge interprets nature according to its own measure, which nevertheless is shown to be insufficient when an existential thematic arises that requires a different type of category. His conviction is that those who claim to eliminate myth (and therefore every form of belief) are covertly forced to reintroduce it when they want to deal with problems of the meaning of existence.

To recognize the meaning and function of myths and legends, understood as socially shared beliefs, is not the same as admitting that critical conscience loses its supremacy over mythical conscience. The world composed of emotional and imaginative connections that Cassirer called "mythical thought" and Lévy-Bruhl called "participation" seems to be, therefore, an anthropological structure that logic cannot dethrone. Between the two there is no competition: each answers a different purpose. The two factors are undoubtedly able to react to each other, but it is impossible for them to eliminate each other. A structural analysis of the different ways to interpret the world replaces the evolutionary scheme, so dear to positivists, of two successive ages of the human conscience. Logic and myth, rationality and belief, are two superimposed layers and not two mutually replaceable types of interpretation placed at the same level, such that logic and scientific rationality are necessarily destined to replace myth and belief.

If it is true, therefore, that the birth of the sciences of nature and sociology expels myth as conclusive *Weltanschauung* and desecrates the universe by introducing the category of the "profane," it is also true that the technical and profane dominion of nature leaves behind it an emptiness and nostalgia, a kind of demand for sacredness remaining as a potential state surviving from the Weberian "disenchantment." Ancient and new beliefs are where modernity does not resolve, but, on the contrary, reopens, the questions of meaning.

SEE ALSO: Anti-Semitism (Religion); Atheism; Charisma; Civil Religion; Culture; Eurocentrism; Fundamentalism; Ideology; Magic; Millenarianism; Myth; Orientalism; Popular Religiosity; Sacred; Sacred/Profane; Satanism; Televangelism

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bell curve

Alex Bierman

The bell curve, also known as the normal distribution, provides a foundation for the majority of statistical procedures currently used in sociology. It can be thought of as a histogram of a continuous variable, but with such fine distinctions between outcomes that it is not possible to differentiate individual bars, so that the

histogram appears to be a smooth line in the shape of a bell. Beneath this line is 100 percent of the possible outcomes, with the x axis describing the range of possible outcomes and the y axis describing the proportion or probability for each outcome.

The shape of the distribution is symmetrical, so that if it is divided in two, one half is the mirror image of the other. It is also unimodal, meaning that there is only one mode (most frequent value in the distribution). Because the bell curve is unimodal and symmetrical, the distribution's mean, median, and mode are identical and in the exact center of the distribution. Additionally, the "tails" of the curve extend indefinitely, without ever actually reaching the x axis.

The bell curve has a specific distribution of scores. One standard deviation from the mean will always take up 34.13 percent of the area under the curve, or 34.13 percent of scores for the variable. Two standard deviations from the mean will always take up 47.72 percent of the area under the curve. Three standard deviations will always take up 49.87 percent of the area under the curve. Since the distribution is symmetrical, the distance from the mean will be the same regardless of whether the standard deviations are above or below the mean. Each additional standard deviation from the mean adds progressively less area under the curve because scores are less likely the farther they are from the mean.

The bell curve is especially useful for hypothesis testing because of the central limit theorem. This theorem states that, *even when individual scores are not normally distributed*, in random samples of a sufficient size, the distribution of sample means will be approximately normally distributed around the population mean. This facilitates hypothesis testing by allowing a sociologist to examine the probability of producing a specific sample mean, based on a hypothesized population mean. If this sample mean is unlikely to occur simply through chance, the sociologist can reject the hypothesized population mean. Similarly, relationships between variables can be tested by measuring their relationship in a sample, and studying how likely it would be to find this relationship if there was no relationship in the population.

SEE ALSO: Confidence Intervals; Hypotheses; Measures of Centrality; Random Sample; Standardization; Variables; Variance

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Bell Curve, The (Herrnstein and Murray)

Stephen K. Sanderson

Herrnstein and Murray's *The Bell Curve* (1994) is one of the most controversial and widely debated works of social science in the second half of the twentieth century. Almost instantly upon publication, the book set off a firestorm that took years to die down. What were the authors saying that was so incendiary? Their main arguments can be summarized approximately as follows. The US has increasingly evolved into a society stratified along the lines of intelligence. At the top of this stratification system is a cognitive elite of highly educated professionals, business managers, government officials, and the like who are increasingly set off from the rest of the population by their very high levels of intelligence. The cognitive elite has become increasingly separated from the rest of society by their attendance at elite universities, where they meet other highly intelligent individuals and intermarry, thus producing highly intelligent children who are likely to remain members of the elite intergenerationally. These consequences have resulted substantially from the fact that intelligence is highly genetically heritable, on the order of 40–80 percent. Intelligence is of great social

importance. High intelligence is necessary for high levels of educational attainment, social status, and income. By contrast, low intelligence is associated with low levels of these outcomes, and also with a variety of social pathologies, such as higher rates of illegitimacy, poverty, welfare dependency, and crime. There are significant differences among racial and ethnic groups in intelligence, and these differences are largely genetic in origin. Such differences go far in explaining why blacks are overrepresented in the categories of social pathology mentioned above. The situation seems to be worsening, and thus the gap between the cognitive elite and the underclass growing, because of the tendency of poorer individuals of lower intelligence to out reproduce the more wealthy and more highly intelligent. Moreover, “Unchecked, these trends will lead the US toward something resembling a caste system, with the underclass mired ever more firmly at the bottom and the cognitive elite ever more firmly anchored at the top” (p. 509).

Although *The Bell Curve* is not primarily about race, most of the controversy focused on the chapters that claimed that racial and ethnic differences in IQ scores have a large genetic component. Data presented by the authors show that the group that scores the highest on IQ tests is Jews, especially Ashkenazi Jews of Eastern European origin, and almost all American Jews are so descended. The authors report that Ashkenazi Jews score, on average, about a half to a full standard deviation above the mean for whites, which translates into roughly 7–15 IQ points. Next in line are East Asians and Americans of East Asian descent, who tend to score an overall average of about 106 (with about 110 on the spatial mathematical component and 97 on the verbal component). American whites and Western European whites average about 100. American blacks average about 85, or a full standard deviation below whites. Actually, Herrnstein and Murray compile the results from 156 studies to show that the average black–white difference is 1.08 standard deviations, or about 16 IQ points.

Although a standard objection to IQ tests is that they are culturally biased, the authors show that on those test items deemed the most

culturally biased, blacks actually score higher than on the so called culturally neutral items. The other major standard objection to such findings is that IQ is highly correlated with social environment, especially socioeconomic level. Indeed, this is so, and both whites and blacks of higher socioeconomic status have higher reported IQ scores. However, the black–white gap does not diminish when socioeconomic status is controlled. Indeed, it widens.

Herrnstein and Murray show that cognitive test scores are excellent predictors of economic success, and, moreover, that the gap in earnings between American whites and blacks virtually disappears when cognitive test scores are controlled. When these scores are factored out of the equation, black income is 98 percent of white income. This finding leads the authors to conclude that the black–white income gap has very little to do with racism or racial discrimination and mostly to do with differences in cognitive abilities.

In the years immediately following the publication of *The Bell Curve* there appeared a “mountain of essays and books purporting to refute that work and its conclusions” (Chabris 1998). As of 1998 at least five major critical books had appeared. Two of these are works by serious social scientists: Devlin et al. (1997) and Fischer et al. (1996). Devlin et al. (1997) contend that the heritability of IQ is much lower than the .40–.80 claimed by Herrnstein and Murray. They also point to adoption studies that they claim show that IQ is largely determined by environment. Fischer et al. (1996) contend that intelligence is a poor explanation of social inequalities because the abilities of individuals are much more complex and changeable than can be captured by old fashioned notions of intelligence. Social inequalities, they claim, are determined more by patterns of education, jobs, and taxation. As for race differences, they claim that ethnic minorities score low on intelligence tests because they are of low status, not that they are of low status because they score low on intelligence tests.

In defense of *The Bell Curve*, Bouchard (1995) claimed that, in fact, the evidence shows that low IQ is an important risk factor for poor social and economic outcomes and that high IQ is an important protective factor. The effect of

IQ is much greater than parental socioeconomic status. Moreover, because of the enormous controversy the book engendered, the American Psychological Association created a task force on intelligence, which gave its report in 1996 (Nessier et al. 1996). The task force concluded that the size of the black–white IQ difference is indeed approximately one standard deviation; that cultural biases in IQ tests cannot explain this difference; and that IQ tests are equally predictive of social, economic, and educational outcomes for both blacks and whites (cf. Murray, 2005).

In terms of policy recommendations, Herrnstein and Murray oppose Affirmative Action and other compensatory programs on the grounds that they either have not worked, or have actually worsened the situation for minorities. The authors favor a society in which everyone has a valued place commensurate with their abilities. They do not favor wholesale income redistribution, but they do favor augmenting the incomes of the poorest segments of the population so that an income floor is established. They also favor policies that would strengthen marriage, since single parenting is a serious risk factor for low social outcomes.

SEE ALSO: Class and Crime; Educational Inequality; Income Inequality and Income Mobility; Intelligence Tests; Race; Race (Racism); Stratification, Race/Ethnicity and

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benefit and victimized zones

Harutoshi Funabashi

The concept of a benefit zone refers to a social zone or space in which residents in the zone possess a unique opportunity to consume and enjoy various goods that are refused to those living outside of the zone. In direct contrast, in the victimized zone those inside are deprived of opportunities to satisfy their needs. In other words, a victimized zone is defined by the imposition of various external negatives (e.g., pollution and industrial diseases). Whereas the entry to a benefit zone has a barrier to keep others from getting in, a victimized zone is surrounded by a barrier to prevent victims from getting out. In this way, “the handicapped” become “the deprived” when they are refused entry to a benefit zone or they cannot escape from a victimized zone.

Empirical studies that use this theoretical perspective comprise one of the origins of Japanese environmental sociology. According to the group that developed these concepts, the theory of benefit and victimized zones belongs, in Merton’s sense, to the “sociological theory of the middle range.” This methodological orientation has contributed to the creation of these new concepts through case studies in contemporary Japanese society.

The concept of benefit and victimized zones provides a useful theoretical framework for analyzing characteristics of various social problems, the process of social conflict, and the possibility and difficulty of social consensus. By adding supplementary viewpoints we can distinguish various types of benefit zones, victimized zones, and combinations of the two.

Firstly, the size and shape of these zones vary. There is a pinpoint zone, a linear zone, a circle zone, and a plane zone. On the one hand,

there are widespread and large zones, on the other, dense and narrow zones. Some zones have a clear cut border, whereas others have vague, indistinct boundaries.

Secondly, the relation between benefit zones and victimized zones that are produced by the same factor or activity is very important. The two basic types of interrelation between the zones are the overlapping type and the separate type. The overlapping type refers to cases where the benefit zone and the victimized zone overlap completely. By contrast, with the separate type the two zones are entirely separate from each other. Between these two basic types there is an intermediate type, namely, a differently overlapping type, which refers to an overlapping type relationship in which there is a different degree of benefit and victim within a zone.

These concepts enable us to analyze why social consensus is so difficult today and to discern the type of structural injustices that occur in various regional conflicts, especially those involving environmental issues. The most prominent feature of many regional conflicts today is the separation of the benefit zone and the victimized zone. For example, those that benefit from the construction of a bullet train are a totally separate group of people from those that suffer from the environmental destruction caused by such a construction (Funabashi et al. 1985). Separation of the two zones occurs not only in the context of space but also in time. For example, the generations that have created the greenhouse effects caused by CO₂ or radioactive waste might not suffer from their long term effects. Generally speaking, it is more difficult to find social consensus in conflicts that result in spatially or temporally separate zones than it is in conflicts that involve overlapping zones.

Similarly, the localization of a victimized zone into a narrow sphere and the wide reach of a benefit zone reduce the chances of achieving social consensus. For example, the noise pollution and the vibrations caused by the bullet train affect victims in a linear and relatively narrow zone along the railway. They are minorities that possess little political power, whereas the beneficiaries of this high speed form of transportation are the majority in Japanese society and therefore have far greater political power.

Using this theoretical perspective we can analyze the changing meaning of the idea of

“public interest” in contemporary society. Why has the notion of public interest lost the power to create social consensus in many conflicts today? Benefit and victimized zones theory can provide a clear answer to this question. When the benefit zone and victimized zone are completely separate, the idea of public interest is not persuasive.

The notion of benefit and victimized zones has led to the creation of other theoretical concepts that enable us to analyze environmental problems in terms of more macroscopic social structures. The notion of the external imposition of the environmental burden was developed by generalizing the concepts of the benefit zone and the victimized zone and by clarifying the relation between the two. This indicates that some social units do not bear the environmental burdens they create. Rather, these burdens are imposed on others.

Geographically, the external imposition of the environmental burden occurs frequently between the center and the periphery within various spatial scales: in a town, in a prefecture, in a country, and in the world. The external imposition of the environmental burden is today an essential tool in the measurement of environmental degradation. Frequently, the flow of the environmental burden from the center, the benefit zone, to the periphery, the victimized zone, is followed by enormous sums of money. Such money flows produce overwhelming political power and a domination structure. For example, in Japan, all kinds of radioactive wastes are imposed on a peripheral village (Rokkasho) in a peripheral prefecture (Aomori) and this is followed by an enormous flow of money in the name of compensation. The periphery, in this case the village and prefecture, is obliged to accept the external environmental burden because it is politically weak and economically poor.

Another way of developing the concept of the benefit and victimized zones is to combine them with the theory of social dilemmas. The prototype of the social dilemma model for analyzing environmental problems is the “tragedy of the commons” as presented by Hardin (1968). Theoretically, a social dilemma is a paradox of rationality concerning collective goods. It is defined as follows: an individual actor’s rational actions pursued in his

short term private interests have the long term, cumulative effect of destroying the environment, the collective good, and injuring the actor as well as others. Combining the idea of social dilemma with the theory of the benefit and victimized zones, Funabashi (1992) presented different types of social dilemmas, namely the self harming type and the others harming type. Hardin's tragedy of the commons model considers only the self harming type, in which the benefit and victimized zones overlap completely. However, the social dilemma of the others harming type occurs when the benefit and the victimized zones are separate, as is often the case in contemporary environmental disputes. Resolving the others harming type of social dilemma is more difficult than the self harming type.

The concept of benefit and victimized zones enables us to be sensitive to environmental justice, to highlight an unjust situation in various social contexts. At the same time, these concepts stimulate the quest for normative principles and a valid general policy orientation. Representative normative principles based on these concepts can be summed as follows.

Firstly, when a victimized zone is produced by a project, in order to bring about social justice, it is necessary to cut off the benefit in the benefit zone and to compensate the suffering in the victimized zone by transferring the cut off benefit. Secondly, promoters of any project must respect the voice of the victimized zone in order to achieve social consensus. And thirdly, in order to attain social consensus more easily, the separation of the benefit and victimized zones should be avoided. Similarly, in order to resolve today's environmental problems, an overlapping of the benefit and the victimized zones should be an essential precondition of any proposed project.

One theoretical task is to enlarge the range and relevance of this theoretical perspective by developing supplementary concepts based on various case studies and combining them with the notion of the benefit and victimized zones. For example, faced with various risk problems, we need supplementary concepts such as "latent" and "explicit" victimized zones to describe complicated situations more precisely.

Another theoretical issue to be further discussed concerns the method of identifying the

benefit and the victimized zones. As to social conflicts raised by risk problems, subjective factors inevitably intervene in the definition of the benefit and the victimized zones. How is it possible to identify objectively the benefit and the victimized zones? Or is the definition of these zones always subjective and a result of social construction?

These questions may not be easily resolved. However, if we try to enrich such supplementary concepts and viewpoints through empirical research of various social problems, sociological studies using the concept of benefit and victimized zones can continue to produce fruitful insights in both descriptive research and in the normative sphere.

SEE ALSO: Distributive Justice; Environmental Movements; High Speed Transportation Pollution; Pollution Zones, Linear and Planar; Social Justice, Theories of; Social Structure of Victims

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Benjamin, Walter (1892–1940)

Margaret E. Farrar

German literary critic and philosopher Walter Benjamin was born into an upper middle class Jewish family in Berlin. In 1912 he began attending the University of Freiburg and

graduated *summa cum laude*. However, his Habilitation, *The Origin of German Tragic Drama*, was ultimately rejected by the University of Frankfurt in 1925, and thereafter Benjamin was unable to secure steady academic employment. (*The Origin of German Tragic Drama* would later be regarded as a classic of twentieth century literary criticism.) In 1917 Benjamin married Dora Pollak, and a year later had a son, Stefan. For many years, Benjamin supported himself and his family through his work as a critic for *Frankfurter Zeitung* and *Literarische Welt*.

Over his lifetime Benjamin developed and maintained deep, intellectual friendships that profoundly influenced his writing. In 1915 Benjamin met Gershom Scholem, a scholar of Kabbalah and the first Professor of Jewish Mysticism at Hebrew University. Scholem and Benjamin corresponded for years, and Benjamin often considered moving to Jerusalem to join his friend there. In the 1920s Benjamin met both Theodore Adorno and Bertolt Brecht, and became intensely interested in dialectical materialism and the role of the proletariat in shaping history. This interest was strengthened by his affair with Asja Lacin, a Latvian actress and journalist who lived in Moscow.

In 1930 Benjamin divorced Dora. Benjamin's financial and personal situation worsened with the ascendance of fascism in Germany; in 1933, he was forced to emigrate to Paris, where he became affiliated with the Institute for Social Research. When the Institute moved from Paris to New York, Benjamin made an attempt to leave Paris as well. Persuaded by Adorno and with a visa negotiated by Max Horkheimer, Benjamin planned to leave Paris for the US via Spain in 1940. Upon trying to cross the Franco Spanish border on September 25, however, a local official refused his group entry and threatened to turn them over to the French authorities. Rather than face the Gestapo, Benjamin took his own life that night. The next day, the rest of his party was permitted to cross the border. Benjamin is buried in Port Bou, Spain.

WORK AND INFLUENCE

In the introduction to a volume of Walter Benjamin's collected writings, Hannah Arendt

describes Benjamin as one of "the unclassifiable ones." His work, she writes, "neither fits the existing order nor introduces a new genre that lends itself to future classification" (Benjamin 1968: 3). Benjamin is indeed "unclassifiable." His work blends historical materialism, Jewish mysticism, and poetic nostalgia to chronicle the experience and contradictions of modernity.

In large part because of its idiosyncrasies, Benjamin's work received scant attention in the decades immediately following his death. In 1968 came the first publication of his work in book form with Arendt's edited *Illuminations*; since that time there has been tremendous interest in his oeuvre, especially in the fields of art criticism, literary studies, and philosophy. Benjamin's most important works include the essays "Goethe's Elective Affinities," "One Way Street," "The Work of Art in the Age of Mechanical Reproduction," and "Berlin Childhood in 1900." Reflecting his diverse intellectual influences, mysticism and Marxism are intertwined in Benjamin's writing, where both incisive critique and messianic hope can be found in equal measure.

Perhaps Benjamin's most famous essay, "The Work of Art in the Age of Mechanical Reproduction," has become a standard text for scholars trying to make sense of the political implications of the technological developments in art under modern capitalism. In it, Benjamin argues that our ability to reproduce art inaugurates a new moment in history where the realm of authenticity is made increasingly meaningless through art's reproducibility; the "aura" of a work of art, he states, "wITHERS in an age of mechanical reproduction" (Benjamin 1968: 221). Film in particular irrevocably transforms the masses' sensual and intellectual experiences of art, rendering contemplation and judgment impossible in the face of a constant stream of moving images. When politics becomes aestheticized, Benjamin concludes, the results are fascism and war.

The second aspect of Benjamin's work that is especially relevant for sociologists is the figure of the flâneur. Found in his essay "Paris, Capital of the Nineteenth Century," and developed in reference to Benjamin's study of poet Charles Baudelaire, the flâneur represents a particularly modern sensibility: a detached observer of urban life who is connected to and

yet not part of the bourgeoisie. The flâneur moves through the city's crowded streets and its arcades, simultaneously part of and yet not an active participant in urban life.

Benjamin's other writings on cities employ a similar method: reflection, recollection, and a kind of self-conscious urban archeology: "[One] must not be afraid to return again and again to the same matter," Benjamin (1978: 26) writes, "to scatter it as one scatters earth, to turn it over as one turns over soil." While this approach might be seen by some as a search for fixed objects or a static past, Benjamin's writings problematize this interpretation, because the objects he uncovers are never constant or found in a pure, unchanged state. In "Berlin Chronicle," a piece written as he is about to be exiled from the city by the Nazis, Benjamin painstakingly details elements of a city that no longer exists, or a city on the verge of disappearing. Benjamin's text drifts (as a flâneur might stroll through the streets of a town) to the cafés and parks, avenues and back alleys that constitute the topography of his past. Thus the Berlin encountered in the "Chronicle" is not Berlin at the time of Benjamin's writing, nor is it precisely Berlin in 1900; instead, it is what Benjamin (1968: 5) calls "lived Berlin"; it is a Berlin thoroughly imbued with and mapped by memory. In this and his other city essays (for example, "Moscow," "Marseilles," and "Naples") Benjamin artfully weaves together strands of time, place, and loss.

Apart from *The Origin of German Tragic Drama*, Benjamin never completed a book-length work. In 1927, however, he began work on a newspaper article on the Parisian arcades, which he considered the most significant architectural forms of the nineteenth century. The arcades, for Benjamin, represented both the infrastructure and the ruins of capitalism, a rich archeological site littered with literary, psychological, economic, and technological fragments to be excavated and examined.

This newspaper article became the foundation for *Das Passagenarbeit*, an exhaustive study of the arcades that would become Benjamin's life work. For 13 years he took extensive notes on countless aspects of the arcades, trying to recreate the dreamscape, or in his words "phantasmagoria," of modern urban life.

Eventually, he organized these fragments into 36 sections, or "Convolutés," on topics that included fashion, iron construction, advertising, photography, and prostitution. Each convolute includes juxtaposed observations, quotations, aphorisms, and references; together, they comprise a multi-layered picture of bourgeois Parisian life that Susan Buck-Morss famously described as Benjamin's "dialectics of seeing." As such, the Arcades Project is perhaps the best example of Benjamin's methodology: a cultural history that resists and subverts historical narrative, replacing it with a montage of images that could be combined to form constellations of ideas.

Das Passagenarbeit remained a work in progress until Benjamin's death in 1940. Benjamin never completed the book, and burned his copy of the manuscript before he committed suicide at the Spanish border. A copy of the work survived, however; it was published in German in 1982 as *Das Passagen Werk*, and was translated into English in 1999.

SEE ALSO: Adorno, Theodor W.; Arcades; Commodities, Commodity Fetishism, and Commodification; Consumption, Mass Consumption, and Consumer Culture; Critical Theory/Frankfurt School; Film; Flânerie; Mass Culture and Mass Society; Media and Consumer Culture

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Bernard, Jessie (1903–96)

Joyce E. Williams and Vicky M. MacLean

Dubbed the “reasonable rebel” by many of her supporters, Jessie Bernard is internationally recognized for her contributions to sociology and to feminist thought (Lipman Blumen 1988). She was one of the most productive of female sociologists although her career developed during a time considered by many as hostile to women in the profession (Deegan 1991). She authored over a dozen books, and co authored almost that many, as well as over a hundred articles, book chapters, encyclopedia entries, and essays. Her impact on sociology spans more than six decades and includes the areas of marriage and family, gender and sex roles, community studies, the history of the discipline, sociology of knowledge, and social problems and public policy. Her greatest legacy emerged in the last 30 years of her life as reflected in the contributions made to the development of feminist thought and gender scholarship. Trained as a traditional sociologist, Bernard’s intellectual journey progressed through social positivism, functionalism, and finally to feminism (Lipman Blumen 1979). Over time Bernard became a strong critic of the discipline, its dominant paradigms and masculine biases, and of broader public policies and practices. Bernard helped to found the Society for the Study of Social Problems (SSSP) in 1951, an act of rebellion against the American Sociological Association (ASA) and its timidity in leadership in such issues as poverty, inequality, racism, sexism, McCarthyism, and academic freedom (Bernard 1973). She served as president of SSSP in 1963. Her professional associations, activities, awards, and honors are many. The Jessie Bernard Award for outstanding scholarship in gender studies was established in 1976 and is presented at

the annual ASA meetings. It is a living reminder of the debt the field owes to Bernard (Cantor 1988).

Jessie Sarah (later changed to Shirley) Ravitch was born in Minneapolis to Eastern European immigrant parents Rebecca (Bessie) Kantar and David Revici, the father’s name later anglicized to Ravitch and finally to Ravage (Bannister 1991: 18). The name changes were not unusual for that day, often to accommodate Anglo pronunciations and sometimes to obscure a foreign identity. Jessie was the third of four children and by the time of her birth her father had risen from a Transylvania candle maker to become a real estate broker. Her parents settled in a middle class Jewish community, largely of Romanian origin, on the South Side of Minneapolis, but soon after Jessie was born they moved to the suburbs where they were the only Jewish family. There are varying and conflicting accounts (some from Bernard herself) as to how much her Jewish heritage influenced her life. On the one hand, she reported being “only vaguely conscious of myself as a Jew.” On the other hand, she remembered her grandmother as setting “the Jewish stamp on our home.” Her biographer represented her childhood as one of “ever present tension between Jewish and Gentile culture” (Bannister 1991: 26). Some of Bernard’s professional writings are about Jews as a minority group in the United States (1925, 1942a, 1942b) and also about the tensions within the Jewish community in social class and religious differences (Bannister 1991). She expressed these contradictions in two early writings on Jewish culture, one published anonymously, and the other, largely autobiographical, describing the biculturalism of Jews as “social schizophrenia” (Graeber & Britt 1942: 243–93).

In 1920, at age 16, Jessie entered the University of Minnesota where she earned both bachelors and masters degrees in sociology. There she met sociology professor and well published author Luther L. Bernard (LLB), a Chicago PhD (1910), who became her mentor and collaborator. In 1925, although 21 years her senior, and non Jewish, Luther married Jessie and, in the custom of the day, she took his name. Marriage to LLB, a well known but contentious sociologist who in 1932 served as

president of the ASA, in many ways defined Jessie's life and work. The two moved frequently and along the way Jessie took graduate work at Chicago, at Tulane, and at Washington University (St. Louis) where she remained long enough to secure her doctorate in 1935 and later to teach at nearby Lindenwood College (1940–7). She was profoundly influenced by Chicago and her graduate study with Ellsworth Faris, Robert Park, and George Herbert Mead.

According to Jessie's biographer, the marriage was conflictual as LLB was controlling and dogmatic in both personal and professional matters (Bannister 1991). Between completion of work on her doctorate and the Lindenwood job, Jessie lived apart from LLB and worked for the Bureau of Labor Statistics in Washington, DC. In those years she also did research for what was to become a major, definitive history of sociology, *Origins of American Sociology* (1943). During her Washington years, Jessie actually filed for divorce but the two reconciled, apparently with LLB finally agreeing to her having children. Three children were subsequently born to the Bernards: Dorothy (1941), Claude (1945), and David (1950), born shortly before LLB died in 1951.

The Bernards left Washington University in 1947 for Pennsylvania State University. This time it was Jessie who secured the job and LLB moved with her. She was hired as an assistant professor and he as a lecturer. Jessie remained at Pennsylvania until 1964 when she gave up full time teaching and university affiliation for life in Washington, DC, writing and, from time to time, accepting visiting professorships and research appointments. Her location in Washington gave her access to governmental projects, with varying results. For example, she was one of several well known social scientists who participated in Project Camelot sponsored by the Department of Defense, ostensibly to develop a general social systems model to predict social change in developing countries. The project was canceled, however, when it became known that the Defense Department had a covert agenda for the governance of Chile (Horowitz 1967). From her Washington vantage point, Bernard also had opportunity to influence social policy and public opinion, particularly with regard to the family and roles

of women. *Marriage and Family Among Negroes* (1966) grew out of work with the Children's Bureau and efforts to address the issue of unwed mothers. Her book *Women and the Public Interest* (1971) began as a position paper for the Democratic campaign of 1968, laying out an agenda and conceptual framework for addressing issues relating women to public policy.

Bernard's work is not easily classified as it is among the most eclectic of any sociologist of comparable reputation. One explanation is provided by Bernard herself as she defined her life's work as reflecting "four revolutions" (1973) in the discipline of sociology: the quantification of sociology in the 1920s; the expansion of sociology from the defining influence of the Chicago School in the 1930s, a change in which her husband played an important role; her participation in the founding of SSSP as an alternative to ASA in the 1950s; and, finally, the feminist revolution of the 1960s. According to Bannister, Bernard's work on the historical development of American sociology was to have been her doctoral thesis, but, influenced by the quantification revolution in sociology, she opted instead to present a more empirical study on patterns of neighborhood settlement (Bannister 1991: 57). Her early effort to comply with the push for quantification in sociology is particularly evident in her efforts to quantify "success" in marriage in some of her earliest publications.

While her involvement in SSSP followed the death of her husband who had served as an early president of ASA, it was in many ways reflective of his influence as he had led an internal revolution at ASA in the early 1930s, helping to remove it from the influence of the University of Chicago, a move that she supported even though her own experience with the University of Chicago had been a positive one.

The final phase of Bernard's "life calendar" reflects her "conversion" to feminism, beginning with her involvement in Sociologists for Women in Society, which grew out of the Women's Caucus of the ASA (1973). Bernard, considered an "expert" on marriage and the family, came to feminism late in life and lent her name and support to the cause. Her feminist transformation is clearly traceable in

her works on women: *Academic Women* (1964), *The Sex Game* (1968), *Women and the Public Interest* (1971), *The Future of Marriage* (1972, 1982), *Women, Wives, and Mothers* (1975), *The Female World* (1981), and *The Female World from a Global Perspective* (1987). The first of these books, *Academic Women*, addresses the careers of women in academe and undoubtedly reflects an important intellectual and personal turning point for Bernard, even though she said the book was met with “a great big yawn” among her peers (Lipman Blumen 1988: 272). In it she raised the question as to why women were less productive than men given that women in the academy were a select group with higher intelligence and abilities than the average man. She concluded that much of the work done in the academy took place in a single sex, male privileged arena (the “stag effect”), giving men greater positional advantage in the communication system. *The Sex Game* is a somewhat humorous survival guide to help women negotiate their roles in the midst of rapid social change, much of which they were responsible for unleashing. In *Women and the Public Interest*, Bernard set forth what is essentially a position paper on the changing roles of women with a focus on the necessity of maximizing these roles for the public good. It is written primarily as an explanation of the “movement women” of the 1960s and early 1970s. *The Future of Marriage* won critical acclaim for Bernard even though it began as simply a review of the body of knowledge relevant to marriage in order to provide some predictions for the future. The work evolved as a reconceptualization of marriage as “his marriage” and “her marriage,” substantively and qualitatively different because of the “structural strain” built into the wife’s marriage. All data pointed to the fact that marriage was a more positive experience for the husband than for the wife. According to Bernard, she did not begin this work with the idea that marriage was bad for wives. Indeed, she acknowledged that the facts had been known for a long time, and that she had reported many of them herself. This time, however, she saw them differently, no doubt from a more feminist perspective. In *Women, Wives, and Mothers* Bernard provides an important synthesis and critique of the state of research on sex differences and the misuse of this body of

knowledge to promote a gender ideology that perpetuates sex inequality. In this work Bernard comes into her own in her explicit development of feminist consciousness through her examination of women’s socialization and motherhood over the life course.

Bernard wrote two final books that took her feminist theorizing to a new level. *The Female World* (1981), considered by most as her best work, is a conceptualization of the female world as existing *sui generis* and parallel to the presumptive, normative world of males. She characterized this female world structurally as *gemeinschaft* and culturally as an ethos of love and/or duty. The title of Bernard’s final book, *The Female World from a Global Perspective* (1987), suggests that it is only a modification of the earlier title. However, it is far more. Her discussion of “feminist enlightenment” warns that in the context of an increasingly global world, and particularly against the backdrop of the third world, feminist scholarship could descend into another form of colonialism. Bernard returned to philosophy of science issues that concerned her early in her career when her work was paradigmatically functionalist, assuming the universality of western science. She had written intermittently about such issues (1949, 1950, 1960) and in this final work came back to questions about scholarship and scientific values with warnings that feminist scholarship should not slide into romantic idealism or angry polemics.

Most of Bernard’s books were written after she retired from full time teaching but while she was still the single parent of three children. In addition to the above, her contributions to sociology include works on the community, on methodology, on game theory, on the sociology of conflict, and on philosophy of science and the development of sociology. In her autobiographical history of sociology, “My Four Revolutions,” Bernard concluded that “practically all sociology to date has been a sociology of the male world” (1973: 782). Indeed, she knew the history of sociology to be a male history for she, along with husband Luther, had helped to write it. Their massive, 860 page volume *Origins of American Sociology* (1943) is still the definitive history of the discipline, but it is one lacking in female contributions. Using inductive methodology, exhaustive publications

on American social thought, and the vast resources of the Library of Congress, the Bernards traced the development of American sociology from its European influences. They construct, more conceptually than empirically, a Social Science Movement with roots in English and French social thought, social reform, and Comtean positivism. Despite the emergence of American sociology from social reform and social problems, there is no mention of women such as Jane Addams whose settlement house activities played such a vital role in early descriptive and empirical sociology. Some 30 women are indexed in the book but most as authors of pre sociological, historical works. The only woman to receive multiple citations is Harriet Martineau and she is cited only in relation to her translation of Auguste Comte. While her husband was the first author on this publication, Jessie subsequently acknowledged having done all of the research for the volume and in a footnote more than 30 years later stated that she contributed 33 chapters to the work and Luther 27 (1978: 341). He at the time was, of course, a well known and well published sociologist. Some of Bernard's work for the book was published as a chapter in a volume on *Trends in American Sociology* (Lundberg et al. 1929: 1–71).

Despite Bernard's early efforts to become a quantitative sociologist, she tended to favor an inductive form of writing, and most of her work is qualitative. Whether writing on the family, the community, or marriage, she tended toward exhaustive and critical literature reviews as well as analysis of relevant theoretical frameworks. She always looked at where we have been and where we are going. Her strength was in synthesizing, and in reconceptualizing a body of empirical work. Above all, she ferreted out fresh ideas from the works of others and inspired new areas of scholarship for those who followed. On October 6, 1996, at age 93, when she considered her feminist revolution still a work in progress, Jessie Bernard died in a nursing home in Washington, DC.

SEE ALSO: American Sociological Association; Family Conflict; Gender, Work, and Family; Inequality/Stratification, Gender; Marriage; Sex and Gender

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bifurcated consciousness, line of fault

Marjorie L. DeVault

Dorothy Smith's influential feminist essay, "A Sociology for Women," begins by calling attention to a "line of fault": "a point of rupture in my/our experience as woman/women within the social forms of consciousness – the culture or ideology of our society – in relation to the world known otherwise, the world directly felt, sensed, responded to, prior to its social expression" (1987: 49). Insisting on the anchorage of consciousness in located bodily experience, Smith was pointing to the shift away from embodied experience into a governing conceptual, ideological mode of consciousness associated with the "ruling relations" of industrial capitalism (1999). She saw in most women's lives in that period a distinctive subjectivity, a "bifurcated consciousness" organized by women's household or reproductive labor and the supporting and applied tasks assigned to them, historically, in the occupational division of labor. As mothers, wives, community volunteers, nurses, secretaries, and so on, Smith argued, women engage with people where and as they actually live, "working up" individuals so as to fit them to the more abstract frameworks that organize institutional activity. Located thus, at the juncture of embodied specificity and ideological abstraction, women in such positions hold in their consciousness both ways of seeing and thinking. Typically, their movement from one to the other framework is achieved without conscious thought as an expert practice of everyday action. However, when attention is directed to this dual formation, the disjuncture can be seen as a "line of fault" which opens this organization of social life to analytic scrutiny, as an earthquake opens the earth's crust.

Smith's early sociological work dealt with the sociology of mental illness, family and class, and the social organization of knowledge. She was an immigrant from Britain to the US and then Canada, a single mother, and an activist.

The new scholarly networks and constituencies that grew out of the women's movement of the 1970s provided a context in which she developed her influential approach to investigating the social world, which she views as neither method nor theory but "an alternative sociology." She first wrote of women's bifurcated consciousness in the early 1970s (Smith 1974). Like other feminist thinkers of that time, she was considering how to conceptualize a state of consciousness women were discovering in the feminist activity of consciousness raising – a distinctive but only indistinctly articulated sense of alienation from dominant modes of subjectivity. In addition to its sources in feminism, Smith's account drew from the materialist method of Marx, the social psychology of George Herbert Mead, and the phenomenology of Alfred Schutz. In later writings, she and her students developed an "institutional ethnography" (IE) approach (Campbell & Manicom 1995; Campbell & Gregor 2002), which sketches out methods designed to explore the disjunctures of life within textually mediated societies.

The injunction to "begin with women's experience," which is central to Smith's feminist writing, parallels in various ways the writings of other socialist feminists of the time, such as Sheila Rowbotham, Sandra Harding, and Donna Haraway, as well as Patricia Hill Collins's account of a "black feminist thought" tied to a position as "outsider within." Smith is often categorized, with Harding, Haraway, and Collins, as a "standpoint feminist." Smith has resisted the label and its flattening of differences among these feminist thinkers (Smith 2005). For Smith, the notion of a "standpoint" is not a specific perspective whose content can be defined or achieved, but only a pointer toward the disjunctures that may serve as productive starting points for social inquiry; it produces a "subject position" or "site for the knower" who is committed to an inquiry that retains the sensual, embodied experience of particular places. One might also see parallels with formulations developed around other kinds of oppression, such as the idea of home and school languages of working class children, W. E. B. Du Bois's account of African

Americans' "double consciousness," or Franz Fanon's writing of the "masks" worn by the colonized, and Smith was likely influenced by these kinds of writing. However, she would want to insist on the specificities of consciousness associated with distinctive positions in social formations, and the ways in which subjugated and dominant consciousnesses are fostered, nurtured, and inhibited in each situation; therefore, her theoretical and epistemological writing should be read alongside her historically grounded accounts of trans formations in the relations of ruling (Smith 1985; Smith 1999: ch. 5; Griffith & Smith 2005: ch. 1).

SEE ALSO: Black Feminist Thought; Consciousness Raising; Double Consciousness; Feminism and Science, Feminist Epistemology; Feminist Methodology; Feminist Standpoint Theory; Matrix of Domination; Strong Objectivity

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Big Science and collective research

Brian Woods

Although Big Science is a rather nebulous term, most commentators have used it to describe an array of perceived changes in science and scientific practice during and after World War II. Following Alvin Weinberg's *Reflections on Big Science*, the term has often been associated with the rise of a military industrial government academic complex, the use/production of huge machines, the investment of massive resources, and the growth of large techno scientific organizations. As such, Big Science is often compared against a pre war Little Science, usually characterized by lone or heroic scientists (typically, a Thomas Edison or Albert Einstein type figure) working in their makeshift laboratory. Yet large scale science is not a twentieth century phenomenon. Astronomy, for example, modeled itself on the factory system during the nineteenth century, with an increase in the hierarchical division of labor and a focus on large scale, mission oriented projects. These developments coincided with increased funding (mainly philanthropic) and the construction of ever larger telescopes, upon which the field of inquiry came to depend.

Nonetheless, the Manhattan Project, which brought together resources and labor power on an unprecedented scale to produce the first atomic bomb, often serves as the symbol for the beginnings of Big Science. Because of this, many commentators have seen technology as the driving force behind Big Science. The use of big machines, huge scientific instruments, and/or complicated technological systems have necessitated large systems of organization and control, which in turn have required industrial scale inputs of labor and capital: a pattern that led some observers to claim Big Science as the industrialization of research, or what Paul Zilsel called the emergence of "think factories." In *Scientific Knowledge and Its Social Problems* (1972), Jerome Ravetz argued that

the industrialization of science has meant that pure science now involved increasing capitalization, which necessitated a structural division of labor between scientists and their industrial managers.

Because of the huge resources needed to fund it and because of its size, many commentators have viewed Big Science as an inherently political activity (as opposed to a supposedly apolitical Little Science), which is embroiled in bureaucratic and national politics. The growth and growing influence of government laboratories (particularly after the Manhattan Project) on science development, the creation of the idea of science as a “public good,” and the coming together of government and private capital to serve sociopolitical ambitions and goals of national importance led many to question the autonomy of Big Science. Like Ravetz, Weinberg had witnessed the rise of the science administrator with some trepidation and argued that Big Science’s requirement for both state and industrial support was skewing science away from the “quest for truth” towards a market conscious, product oriented, capital intensive activity that has taken on the impersonal nature of industrial enterprise. From this perspective, the trend towards technological goals rather than scientific understanding is a corruption of science by government and corporate interests.

The entanglement of science and politics, while evident in all industrialized countries, was especially so in the old Soviet Union. Soviet science was distributed into what Graham (1992) termed three gigantic pyramids: the university system, the academy of sciences system, and the industrial and defense ministry system. After the 1917 revolution the Soviets organized science into large centralized institutes, with the Academy of Sciences as the leading center of basic/fundamental research. While the State Planning Commission of the Council of Ministers determined the budgets for each of the three pyramids, they all had relative autonomy, though very powerful leaders dominated each. After World War II, Big Science took on a whole different character when the Soviet Union began construction of large “science cities” that housed thousands of scientists and researchers all working in close proximity on large state oriented projects, such as space and nuclear weapons.

The most renowned analysis on Big Science is probably Derek de Solla Price’s *Little Science, Big Science* (1963). Price was less concerned with the condition of science than he was with charting its historical growth. Using statistical data on increasing numbers of scientists and scientific papers, Price demonstrated the “first law” of scientific growth: that science had maintained a general exponential growth for 300 years, doubling in size every 15 years. For Price, Big Science was a stage in the historical development of science: a point between Little Science and the start of an epoch of New Science. Although Price did not define the detailed nature of this change, he did state that the exponential growth of science could not continue indefinitely, that it must reach saturation. With saturation and an exhausting of resources came the onset of new conditions, where centuries of tradition would break down, giving rise to new escalations, redefinitions of basic terms, and beginning to operate with new ground rules. According to Price, Big Science showed “all the familiar syndromes of saturation.”

Other observers have noted that the ever increasing dimensions of science have brought with it new sets of problems. Scientific credibility becomes harder to earn, not because scientists today are any less competent, but simply because there are more of them. Research under Little Science (so the argument goes) was more open to critical scrutiny because of a smaller audience, but under Big Science it is more likely that the research will go unread once it enters the deluge of information overload. Coupled with this is the problem that fewer people are eligible to dispute a given knowledge claim (both because of specialization and because of the high expense of reproducing experiments), while simultaneously these claims are playing a greater role in legitimating policies, actions, and events. In addition, the increased government reliance on science to underwrite its activities is also leading to the long term tendency for Big Science to become a more acute instrument of political power as its sphere of accountability diminishes.

SEE ALSO: Citations and Scientific Indexing; Military Research and Science and War; Science and Public Participation: The Democratization

of Science; Scientific Literacy and Public Understandings of Science; State; State and Economy; War

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bilingual, multicultural education

Amy Lutz

The term bilingual education is used to refer to a variety of different language programs in schools with different goals and methods. These programs range from those that transition minority language students to the majority language as quickly as possible, to programs that build or maintain high level proficiency in a second language through teaching content area in that language. One of the ways of distinguishing different types of bilingual education programs by their goals and methods is to classify them as strong or weak forms of bilingual education (for more on forms of bilingual education, see Baker 1996). Weak forms of bilingual education are programs where the goal is monolingualism or limited bilingualism, whereas strong forms of bilingual education are programs where the goal is bilingualism and biliteracy. Weak forms of bilingual education include submersion or structured immersion programs in the majority language, programs that transition students into the majority language, mainstream education programs with foreign language teaching, and segregationist language programs. Strong forms of bilingual education – those programs emphasizing fluency in two languages – include immersion in a

minority language, maintenance/heritage language programs, two way/dual language programs, and bilingual education in two majority languages in populations with two majority languages. Some bilingual education programs include or are a part of multicultural education. Multicultural education acknowledges the ethnic and cultural differences of a diverse student population and seeks to provide equal access to education for all students. While some have equated multiculturalism to cultural pluralism, the former differs in that it not only recognizes differences among groups, but also aims to provide equal access to institutions for all groups (for more on multiculturalism, see Goldberg 1994; Hollinger 1995; Mahajan 2002).

In the US, weak forms of bilingual education, such as programs emphasizing a transition to English rather than augmenting the language skills in the mother tongue with English language skills, have generally been utilized in educational systems, although forms of bilingual education have varied over time and by state (for more on bilingual education in the US, see Fishman & García 2002). From the eighteenth century to World War I, there was an atmosphere of general tolerance with regard to the use of languages other than English in public and even as the medium for instruction in schools (Baker 1996). During the two world wars, public suspicion of foreign languages extended to their use in the classroom. Classes were generally taught in English and the use of other languages in schools was forbidden in some places. However, by the 1960s and 1970s, bilingual education became part of a wider multicultural education movement that emerged from civil rights and desegregation efforts with the goal of making the educational system more equitable for ethnic minorities. For linguistic minorities, the provision of equal access to education may include some form of bilingual education. The Bilingual Education Act of 1968 provided federal funding to schools in support of coursework taught in the students' native language and was the first federal legislation in the US focused on enhancing educational opportunities for Mexican, Puerto Rican, and Native American students (Ricento & Burnaby 1998). In 1974, in the case of *Lau v. Nichols*, the US Supreme Court ruled that, in accordance with the Civil Rights Act, language

minority students have the right to receive education in their mother tongue. In order to comply with the 1974 Supreme Court ruling, the Office of Civil Rights developed a set of procedures, programs, and regulations on the provision of bilingual education, often referred to as the Lau Remedies (Ricento & Burnaby 1998).

The demand for programs to address the educational needs of language minority students has created conflicts in the school systems in three general areas: the cost of the programs, the shortage of bilingual teachers (particularly in certain subject areas), and the capacity of the language programs to integrate students into the general student bodies in schools (Cervantes Rodríguez & Lutz 2003; see also Johnson et al. 1997). In the 1980s and 1990s, the "English Only" movement sought to limit the use of languages other than English in US public institutions, including as a medium of instruction in schools. The early 1980s marked a shift away from the Lau Remedies due to decreases in funding of strong bilingual education programs, legislative efforts that limited enforcement of the Lau Remedies, and policies that allowed states and districts to determine whether their policies and programs complied with the Civil Rights Act (Ricento & Burnaby 1998). Some states, such as California, have since passed ballot initiatives to eliminate bilingual education from the states' public school systems. Passed in 2002, the No Child Left Behind Act continues the trend away from strong forms of bilingual education; it sets a 3 year limit on instruction in children's mother tongues and directs federal funds toward programs that promote a transition to English rather than bilingualism.

Much of the past research on bilingual education in the US has focused on the acquisition of English and educational outcomes of students with limited English abilities (for more recent sociological research on bilingual education, see Roscigno et al. 2001). More recent sociological research has focused on the educational outcomes associated with proficiency in an immigrant mother tongue in addition to English (e.g., Fernandez & Nielson 1986). Authors in the segmented assimilation perspective, in particular, have argued that maintenance of an ethnic mother tongue is associated with enhanced educational outcomes (Portes &

Schauffler 1994; Zhou & Bankston 1998; Portes & Rumbaut 2001).

In Latin America, indigenous languages have become part of bilingual/bicultural education in some countries and school curricula throughout the region are increasingly including a variety of programs to promote English language skills. Bilingual education has been ongoing in Mexico since about the 1930s, but was implemented more widely in the 1970s, often as a means to transition indigenous students to Spanish (Mar Molinero 2000). By the 1980s the use of indigenous mother tongues in school curricula was more accepted, but Mexico's participation in NAFTA with the US and Canada led to increased pressures to focus on English language acquisition by the 1990s. Support for bilingual education in Peru also increased in the 1970s after Quechua gained status as an official language. The Puno bilingual education project in Peru, which used the students' mother tongue (either Aymara or Quechua) as the main medium of instruction and Spanish as a second language, has been influential throughout Latin America (Mar Molinero 2000; for more on the Puno project, see Hornberger 1988). Despite the program's success in enhancing students' knowledge of academic content, the experimental bilingual education program in Puno was discontinued in 1990, although efforts at similar programs have emerged since that time (Hornberger and López 1998). Bolivia's educational reform efforts in the 1990s entailed a program to include indigenous languages as both a subject and a means of instruction (Mar Molinero 2000). Unlike bilingual education programs in much of Latin America (and much of the rest of the world), the Bolivian program is aimed at promoting proficiency in indigenous languages (in addition to Spanish) for *both* majority and minority language speakers (for more on bilingual education programs in Mexico, Bolivia, and Peru, see Mar Molinero 2000).

Bilingual education in Canada includes heritage language programs intended to promote and maintain fluency in immigrant languages and French immersion programs. Heritage language bilingual education is available in some provinces, meaning that children receive academic instruction in an immigrant mother tongue or ancestral language for about half the

school day (Baker 1996). In other provinces, heritage language classes are offered to teach children a heritage language outside of the school day. In the 1960s, Canada began experimental programs in French language immersion. These programs were innovative in that they used the target language as the medium rather than the subject of academic instruction (Genesee 1998). The Canadian immersion programs provide an educational experience in which majority English language speakers are immersed in French at school, thereby allowing them to have proficiency in both of Canada's official languages (Genesee 1998).

The success and popularity of the French immersion programs in Canada has led to the creation of similar programs in Australia, Spain, the UK, Finland, and Switzerland (Baker 1996). Other bilingual education programs throughout the world offer bilingual education in two majority languages. These programs utilize two (or more) majority languages as the medium of instruction of content area. Often, they feature a national and international language, with the goal that students become fluent in both. Such programs can be found in Luxembourg, Taiwan, Singapore, Germany, and Nigeria (Baker 1996). In Luxembourg, for example, the language that is used as a medium of instruction shifts from Luxembourgish, to German, and then French as the students progress through the school system; students also learn additional foreign languages such as English and Latin as a subject in the secondary level, with the option of additional languages if they select the language stream in the curriculum (Hoffmann 1998). Private international schools (such as those found in Asia and the Middle East) often utilize bilingual education programs in two majority languages or teach content predominantly in English or another European language with the goal of bilingualism and preparation for continuing study in European or US university systems (Baker 1996).

In the European Union, decisions related to linguistic rights, bilingual planning, and educational programs are generally left to national governments. A variety of bilingual education programs and philosophies exist and programs are targeted at building bilingual proficiency among regional and immigrant language

minority children, as well as programs targeted at bi or multilingualism among majority language speakers. Member states are encouraged to promote fluency in at least two "foreign" languages, one of which should be an official language of a European Union member state (Extra & Yağmur 2004). Exchange programs for teachers and students such as LINGUA, ERASMUS, and SOCRATES are also aimed at building bilingual skills in the various languages that exist throughout the member countries. The European Union indirectly promotes bilingual education for language minorities through directives and recommendations on language minority rights such as the 1977 directive recommending that children of immigrants be taught in their own mother tongue, and more recent charters on rights of regional language minorities and through funding for research, publications, and conferences on issues related to regional language minorities. However, support for bilingualism tends to focus more on the promotion and preservation of the European Union's official languages and European minority languages than on the preservation of mother tongue skills among immigrant minorities (Extra & Yağmur 2004).

In this sense, there is a distinction between the bilingual programs for regional language minorities and immigrant minorities. Regional languages lost institutional support and speakers through processes of consolidation of European nation states in the nineteenth century that included the selection of official languages for communication, business, and educational purposes within nation states. In recent years, many bilingual education programs have had a goal of rebuilding skills in European regional languages and promoting cultural diversity within nation states. For example, in Spain the democratic transition following the end of the Franco regime created an opening for greater use of regional minority languages (prohibited during much of the Franco era), including as a medium of instruction in schools. In areas where there is strong support for and use of a regional language some academic subjects are taught in local languages such as Galician or Basque, while other academic subjects are taught in Castilian (Cenoz 1998; Mar Molinero 2000). In Cataluña, Catalan is now the principal language of the school system.

In addition to regional language minorities created by nation building processes in the nineteenth century, changes in national borders as a result of the world wars and the fall of the Soviet Union have also resulted in language minorities, particularly in Central and Eastern Europe (in both EU and non EU European countries). In some cases language minority students take a substantial part of their course work in their mother tongue. For example, Hungarian ethnic students in Slovakia and Romania receive content area instruction in both the majority language and Hungarian (Fitzgerald Gersten 2001). Guestworker programs and immigration have also resulted in non European language minorities (with Turkish and Arabic being the largest such language groups) as well as European language minorities (such as Finns in Sweden). There are also important refugee populations residing in European countries from Latin America, Africa, Asia, and the Middle East. There is not a standard bilingual education curriculum or program for children of immigrants, refugees, and guestworkers in the European Union. Germany, for example, with the largest immigrant population in Europe, has a variety of different types of bilingual education programs both within and across cities with large immigrant populations. Language programs for children of immigrants, guestworkers, and refugees range from weak bilingual education programs that focus on the primary acquisition of majority language skills, to strong bilingual language programs that intend to promote fluency in both the language of the country of origin as well as the majority language, to segregationist programs that utilize the curricula and language of the country of origin (Skutnabb Kangas 1984; Romaine 1995; Extra & Yağmur 2004).

Internationally, sociological research on bilingual and multicultural education addresses the often overlapping issues of language minority rights (such as speakers of indigenous languages in Latin America, guestworkers and immigrants in Europe, and Spanish speakers in the US), issues related to colonial and post colonial language policies and linguistic practices (particularly with respect to curricula in India, Latin America, Africa, and the Middle East), language maintenance and shift, and the impact of bilingual and multilingual skills on

academic outcomes. Methodologically, the greatest obstacle to sociological research on the impact of language on educational outcomes is a lack of national and international survey data that include measures of proficiency in majority and minority languages as well as specific demographic and educational data.

SEE ALSO: Acculturation; Bilingualism; Culture; Diversity; Ethnic Groups; Ethnicity; Globalization, Culture and; Globalization, Education and; Immigrant Families; Immigration; Immigration and Language; Language; Migration, Ethnic Conflicts, and Racism; Multiculturalism; Race and Schools

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bilingualism

Lilia I. Bartolomé

Bilingualism is succinctly defined by Uriel Weinreich in his book *Languages in Contact* (1953) as the ability to alternatively use two languages. He defined the person involved in using two languages as bilingual. Bilingualism is common throughout the world and results from various language contact situations including: (1) colonization – colonizer imposition of a language different from the native language; (2) residing in officially bilingual countries (e.g., Canada, where English and French are official languages, and Finland, where Finnish and Swedish are official languages); (3) growing up in a bilingual household where caretakers use two different languages; and (4) migrating to a new society where immigrants often continue to use their native language at home while learning the host country's dominant language and using it in official institutions. Bilingualism can occur at either the individual or societal level and can be examined using a variety of disciplinary lenses. For example, individual bilingualism is examined via disciplines such as neuropsychology, cognitive psychology, developmental psychology, and psycholinguistics. Societal bilingualism is studied by researchers representing various disciplines such as sociology, the sociology of language, sociolinguistics, and anthropology.

At the individual level, how learners acquire a second language and become bilingual is the focus of study. A speaker can, at various ages and developmental stages, acquire two languages in diverse learning contexts such as the home, school, or work. Factors that influence second language acquisition include learner (1) age, (2) ability or intelligence, (3) previous school and literacy experiences, (4) attitudes, and (5) personality. In addition, since second language acquisition represents an acculturation process, access to second language speakers and culture determines, to some degree, successful second language acquisition. Second language acquisition can be adversely affected when learners experience social distance (lack of opportunity to authentically interact with native

speakers) or feel psychological distance from the second language speakers and their culture (Schumann 1978). The process by which learners acquire a second language also varies. For example, learners can acquire two languages concurrently or sequentially: the former begins at the inception of language acquisition and the latter begins at approximately age 5, when the essential elements of the first language have been acquired (McLaughlin 1984).

Few bilinguals are balanced bilinguals, that is, equally proficient in both languages, since each language is typically used in different contexts for differing purposes and functions. In addition, individuals' language use and skill do not necessarily remain constant over time. Furthermore, the term *bilingualism* is somewhat ambiguous in that it does not specify a level of proficiency required for a speaker to be labeled "bilingual." Levels of proficiency range from fully, balanced bilingual to "semilingual," a pejorative term used to signal the lack of native like proficiency in either language. The notion of "semilingualism" is regarded as linguistically inaccurate since notions of language proficiency typically reflect social biases and preferences for standard academic language registers as used by dominant culture speakers. (For an example of this literature, see Bartolomé 1998.) Moreover, a comprehensive view of proficiency exceeds the mere ability to understand and speak and also includes reading and writing abilities as well as mastery of phonology, lexicon, syntax, and semantics across the four language modes. In sum, there are numerous linguistic dimensions along which the learner's language skill can vary from complete fluency to minimal command.

Bilingualism is also used to describe the use of two languages at a societal level. Sociolinguistics is one major discipline that has studied societal bilingualism. This disciplinary perspective points out the inadequacy of utilizing solely physiological and psychological perspectives to understand the phenomenon of bilingualism and emphasizes the importance of studying the interaction between language use and social organization. Although a recent field of study, developing only since the beginning of the 1960s, sociolinguistics specifically examines phenomena such as bilingualism, ethnic/

linguistic conflict, language planning efforts, and language standardization movements.

In any society, it is highly improbable that two languages are used for identical functions; a language community is more likely to use each language in certain contexts and for specific purposes. Charles Ferguson (1959) initially coined the term *diglossia* to describe a specific type of societal bilingualism where two varieties of the same language exist side by side. In this linguistic situation, a "low" or colloquial variety is used for everyday affairs in informal institutions (e.g., family) and the "high" or "classical" form is used for formal affairs in official institutions (e.g., church). One example of diglossia is in Arab nations where there is a clear separation in the use of classical and colloquial Arabic. Later, Joshua Fishman (1972) extended the meaning of the term *diglossia* to refer to the use of two separate languages in one society. Societal bilingualism can be either stable or unstable. In stable bilingual societies, languages tend to be reserved for different domains with clearly differentiated functions and uses. In transitory or unstable bilingual societies, the domain-language separations are not as clear cut and, ultimately, allow for the use of the two languages across various domains and functions.

Another dimension of bilingualism has to do with the social status of speakers. For example, there is a distinction between "elite" bilingualism and "folk" bilingualism (Fishman et al. 1966). The former refers to high status groups who speak the society's dominant language and who further enhance their status by learning a second socially prestigious language. The latter, "folk" bilingualism, refers to languages spoken by groups such as immigrants and linguistic minority groups who reside in a society where the dominant language is not their own and where they occupy sociopolitical and economic positions of low status.

The concepts of "additive" and "subtractive" bilingualism also reflect speaker social status issues (Lambert 1975). An additive bilingual situation is where the addition of a second language and culture does not require that students lose their first language and culture. In fact, in an additive bilingual context, the first language and culture are maintained

and supported. In a subtractive bilingual situation, the opposite is true – the second language and culture are expected to replace the learners' first language and culture. Typically, learners from groups that are considered low status (e.g., Mexican Americans in the US) are schooled under subtractive conditions while high status learners (English speakers in Canada) are expected to maintain their first language while acquiring French as a second language.

Where linguistic minorities possess significant political power, they are often able to require state provided bilingual education. Bilingual education programs vary widely in orientation, purpose, implementation, and results and reflect either additive or subtractive philosophies. Some programs strive to teach learners a second language while maintaining their first (e.g., maintenance and two way bilingual programs), while others focus on teaching the second language and only utilize the students' first language as a way of accessing the second (e.g., transitional bilingual education). (For examples of bilingual education programs and the orientations that inform them, see Crawford 2004.)

Currently, critical sociolinguists urge greater recognition of the political and ideological dimensions of bilingualism in order to develop more comprehensive linguistic theories that explore the complex relationship between language, ideology, and social organization and their implications for solving urgent educational problems of linguistic minorities and oppressed groups of people. (For an example of this literature, see Macedo et al. 2004.) They propose that bilingualism cannot be understood fully outside a power relations framework that can shed light on the constant tensions and contradictions between linguistic hegemonic tendencies (i.e., the present attack on bilingual education in the United States where laws are being promulgated to prohibit instruction in languages other than English) and the increasing cultural and ethnic self affirmation of linguistic minority groups that look at the native language as a point of reference for identity formation.

SEE ALSO: Bilingual, Multicultural Education; Biracialism; Immigration and Language; Language; Literacy/Illiteracy; Multiculturalism

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biodemography

James R. Carey

Although still a modest subfield within demography, biodemography is arguably the fastest growing part of demography and one of the most innovative and stimulating. The two main branches today involve: (1) biological demographic research directly related to human health, with emphasis on health surveys, a field of research that might be called biomedical demography (or "epidemiography" because it is a cross between demography and epidemiology), and (2) research at the intersection of

demography and biology (as opposed to biomedicine), an endeavor that will be referred to as biological demography. The first branch is characterized by demographers engaging in collaborative research with epidemiologists. This is very important, for both fields and for deeper understanding of human health. Researchers in the second branch face an even bigger challenge. Demographic and epidemiological concepts and methods are fairly similar, whereas the underlying paradigms of demography and biology are less related.

Both of the two main branches of biodemography have many smaller branches. As in any innovative, rapidly growing interdisciplinary field, these smaller branches form tangles and thickets. Consequently, it is difficult to present a coherent structure for the evolving research in biodemography. One way to proceed is to make use of the hierarchical ordering of knowledge within biology. This provides a basis for ordering the research subdivisions that range from the molecular and cellular to the ecological and evolutionary. This ordering of biodemography by levels is useful because, as the eminent physiologist George Bartholomew noted over four decades ago, the significance of every level of biological organization can be found above and explanations of the mechanism in the level below. For example, the results of studies on different APOE gene alleles shed important light on molecular mechanisms for different risks of ischemic heart disease, Alzheimer's disease, and other chronic conditions, thus providing information on a person's individual risk of these chronic diseases and, in turn, informing the design of population surveys and model construction for epidemiological forecasting.

BIOLOGICAL DEMOGRAPHY

Biological demography is an emerging interdisciplinary science concerned with identifying a universal set of population principles, integrating biological concepts into demographic approaches, and bringing demographic methods to bear on population problems in different biological disciplines. Whereas biomedical demography brings survey techniques, biomedical information, modeling strategies, and

statistical methods to bear on questions about the health of different *human populations*, biological demography brings experimental paradigms, model systems, evolutionary perspectives, and comparative techniques to bear on questions about the demographic characteristics of different *species*. Biomedical demographers might ask questions about the shape of the trajectory of human mortality at advanced ages. In contrast, biological demographers will ask the more general question of whether the slowing of mortality at advanced ages is a universal life table characteristic of species as diverse as nematodes, fruit flies, mice, and humans. Biological demography not only situates the population traits of humans within the broader demographic characteristics of all living organisms, but it also provides a scientific framework for asking basic questions that differ from, but are complementary to, conventional demography.

Because of the range of the subdisciplines within biology and of the subspecialties within demography, the term "biological demography" does not fully reflect the diversity of its main intellectual lineages including gerontology, population biology, and demography, the complexity of its deep historical roots, or the scope of the questions that are commonly addressed by biological demographers themselves. Although biological demographic researchers use mathematical and statistical modeling techniques similar to those used in classical demography, they also use experimental methods to address questions about the nature of mortality and fertility, development, and aging in such model organisms as fruit flies and rodents. Thus, unlike most research in classical demography, biological demographic research exploits the hierarchical ordering of knowledge that unites and drives the biological sciences.

Biological demography embraces all the research at the intersection of demography and biology. It hence includes studies of fertility, migration, and mortality. To date, however, the main emphasis has been on studies of survival and longevity, with some emerging research on fertility and on the links between fertility and mortality. Whereas the traditional paradigm around which biological gerontology is framed is concerned with questions at

molecular, cellular, and/or physiological levels, the biological demographic paradigm of aging integrates research at the organismal level – the quintessence of biological relevance because all discoveries at lower levels of biological organization concerning aging must ultimately be tested at the level of the whole organism. And unlike traditional research in both classical demography and the biology of aging, biological demography draws from population biology and thus emphasizes evolutionary and ecological concepts, life history theory, and comparative methods. This multidisciplinary synthesis represents a unique research paradigm that is concerned with both proximate questions (e.g., those concerned with the *mechanisms* of aging) and ultimate ones (e.g., those concerned with the evolutionary and ecological *function* of a particular life span). Thus biological demographic research embraces many questions about both aging and life span that do not fall within the bounds of either traditional demography or gerontology.

AN EMERGING BIOLOGICAL DEMOGRAPHIC PARADIGM

The view of many demographers toward biology is similar to the view of many sociologists who believe that “biology” and the “social” are locked in an explanatory zero sum game in which any ground ceded to the former diminishes the value of the latter. But even if sociologists (and, by extension, demographers) did banish “biological” explanations of social behavior from their own forums, swelling interest in the topic would still exist elsewhere in the academy, as would a flourishing of curiosity among the general public. What separates biological perspectives in sociology (sociobiology) and demography (biodemography) from their more conventional alternatives is not whether biological perspectives on sociological or demographic questions are correct, but how useful specifically biologically minded thinking and experimental methods are for understanding human demography.

In the perennial struggle of all disciplines, including demography, to define and renew themselves and to ensure their relevance in an ever changing world, each discipline is always

faced with decisions regarding whether to move in new directions. Demography, like other social sciences, is slowly coming to terms with important truths that the biological sciences have proved beyond doubt – that both the human mind and human behaviors are as much products of biological evolution as is the human body. Human beings may be unique in their degree of behavioral plasticity and in their possession of language and self awareness, but all of the known human systems – biological and social – taken together form only a small subset of those displayed by the thousands of living species.

Inasmuch as demography is concerned with whole animal phenomena (birth, death), model systems (e.g., nematode worms, fruit flies, laboratory rodents) can be brought to bear on fundamental questions concerning the nature of fertility and mortality. However, a stumbling block in mainstream demography for the serious use of these model systems in studying aging has been the mistaken belief that, because causes of death in humans are unrelated to causes of death in non human species (particularly in invertebrates such as nematodes and fruit flies), little can be learned from detailed knowledge of age specific mortality in these model species. This perspective is based on a theory familiar to most demographers – the “theory of the underlying cause” in public health and medicine which states that if the starting point of a train of events leading to death is known (e.g., cancer), death can be averted by preventing the initiating cause from operating. For aging research the problem with this perspective is that death is seen as a single force – the skeleton with the scythe. A more apt characterization that applies to deaths in all species is where deaths are viewed as the outcome of a crowd of “little devils”: individual potential or probabilistic causes of death, sometimes hunting in packs and reinforcing each other’s efforts, at other times independent. Inasmuch as underlying causes of death are frequently context specific, difficult to distinguish from immediate causes, and their post mortem identification in humans is often arbitrary (in invertebrates virtually impossible), studying the causes of death often provides little insight into the nature of aging. If aging is considered as a varying pattern of vulnerability to genetic

and environmental insults, then the most important use of model species in both teaching and research on the demography of aging is to interpret their age patterns of mortality as proxy indicators of frailty. That is, different model systems can be used to address questions at different levels of demographic generality.

The demographic profiles of humans have characteristics typical of a wide variety of organisms due to similarity in evolutionary selection pressures. For example, the characteristic of higher male than female mortality during prime reproductive ages is typical in sexually reproducing animals of a large number of vertebrate and invertebrate species. The pattern is an evolutionary result of sexual selection on males and, as such, is a *general characteristic* of a large number of species. Other observed general characteristics include the variable rate of change in mortality with age (rates that decline after earliest stage and then increase with age) and a slowing of mortality at the most advanced ages. Given such generalities, there are also characteristics of mortality profiles that pertain more specifically to a particular species (or other taxonomic group). Such species level characteristics are imposed on some general pattern.

The mortality experience for humans can thus be considered at two levels. The *general level* exhibits a decline after infancy, increases through the reproductive life span (the overall U shaped trajectory), and a sex differential. The *specific level* pertains to details of the mortality experience unique to humans including the actual probabilities of death by age, inflection points of age specific mortality, the cause specific probabilities of death, and the age specific pattern of the sex differential. The observed mortality pattern is a combination of the evolutionary components of the trajectory (which will be common to a large number of species with overlapping life history characteristics) and the proximate age and sex specific factors contributing to mortality under certain conditions. For example, under contemporary conditions male reproductive competition selects for riskier behavior and results in deaths due to accidents and homicides during early adulthood. The general and specific components of any population's mortality schedule

can only be determined through studies using model systems; that is, the use of experimental demography and comparative biology.

BIOMEDICAL DEMOGRAPHY

Demographers over the past half century have increasingly become involved with the design of surveys and the analysis of survey data, especially pertaining to fertility or morbidity and mortality. Recently various kinds of physical measurements (such as height and weight), physiological measurements (of blood pressure, cholesterol levels, etc.), nutritional status (assessed by analysis of blood or urine and other methods), physical performance (e.g., hand grip strength or ability to pick a coin up from the floor), and genetic makeup (as determined by analysis of DNA) have been added to surveys. Such biological measurements can be used as covariates in demographic analyses in much the same way that social and economic information is used: developing such analysis is an important activity of biomedical demographers.

In particular, there has been rapid growth of interest in using genetic information in medical demographic research. Particularly exciting is the use of information from DNA about specific genes. Information from DNA about genetic polymorphisms (i.e., mutations) can be used to determine the genetic structure of a population and to make inferences about the influence of migration and inbreeding on the population. A central goal of such "molecular demography" is to identify genetic polymorphisms that affect mortality, morbidity, functioning, fecundity, and other sources of demographic change. Much of this research to date has focused on finding genetic variants that influence longevity. This relationship can be studied by analyzing changes with age in the proportion of survivors who have some specific allele (i.e., version of a gene). If in a given cohort the allele becomes more frequent with age, that allele may be associated with lower mortality.

It should not be forgotten, however, that much can be learned about genetics even if DNA is unavailable. The genetic and common environment components of these variations – in life spans, fertility, and other demographic

characteristics – can be analyzed in humans using demographic data on twins, siblings, cousins, and other relatives of various degree. These data are available in genealogies and in twin, household, parish, and other population's registries. What is necessary is to have information about the proportion of genes shared by two individuals and about shared non genetic influences. Analysis of variance methods, correlated frailty approaches, and nested event history models have been applied by demographers.

In sum, both the biomedical demography branch of biodemography and the biological demography branch are vibrant areas of demographic research that are rapidly growing and that have great potential to enrich and enlarge the domain of demography in particular, and sociology in general.

SEE ALSO: Aging, Demography of; Aging and the Life Course, Theories of; Demographic Techniques: Epidemiology; Life Table Methods; Ecological Problems; Gender, Aging and; Healthy Life Expectancy; Mortality: Social Epidemiology; Transitions and Measures

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biography

Janet Hoskins and Gelya Frank

The use of biography in the social sciences has come to new prominence in recent decades because of disciplinary shifts towards narrative analysis, reflexivity, phenomenology and hermeneutics, psychoanalysis, and postmodernism, as well as the persistence of Marxist and feminist thought. The longer history of biography goes back to humanistic portraits of “great men” enshrined in literary biographies and historical studies. Still earlier models in the Christian West embrace the lives of saints and religious exemplars.

Around 1900, social scientists began to modify that heritage by focusing on the lives of persons in places and social classes unrepresented, or represented inaccurately, in the mainstream. Like journalists, novelists, and missionaries of the same era, they began to describe the lives of individuals in non literate

societies, ethnic and racial minorities, rural poor and urban working classes, in gendered roles under patriarchy, and situations of cultural dissidence. The social scientist's unique contribution was twofold: (1) employing analytic schemata to dig beneath the surface of easy assumptions or stereotypes; and (2) including narratives or at least a paraphrase of the subject's self expressed perspectives. Most biographies in the social sciences since then have "studied down" by focusing on disadvantaged people at the margins of society. Massive adoption of qualitative methods by scholars in practice disciplines once ancillary to the social sciences, however, has produced an avalanche of biographical studies recently in fields such as education, social work, counseling, psychology, occupational therapy, nursing, and even medicine to identify and comprehend treatable problems among mainstream and elite populations. As a result, almost no category, group, or class of people in the US and Europe today escapes social science representation through biographical methods.

Biography has long been a part of the social sciences, having been introduced in different disciplines as "case histories" (psychiatry), "life histories" (anthropology), "personal documents" (sociology, psychology) and, more recently, "life stories" (linguistics, oral history), each focused on understanding individuals as the unit of analysis. Recent years have seen more interdisciplinary dialogue seeking to refine the importance of individual lives to broader social and cultural phenomena. Anthropology, which made the recording of individual lives in an interview setting a cornerstone of ethnographic methodology, is but one of many disciplinary sources for narrative and biographical approaches in the social sciences today. But it remains a pivotal and innovative site for working through issues of representation through the modernist period and the period of postmodernist critique (Kluckhohn 1945; Langness & Frank 1981; Frank 2000). Most of the pioneering research focused on American Indians in an effort to salvage evidence of cultures undergoing rapid and destructive colonization. A more sophisticated reading of such documents was outlined by Ruth Benedict (1959), who defined the unique value of life histories as showing "the repercussions

the experiences of a man's life – either shared or idiosyncratic – have upon him as a human being molded in that environment." She stressed the value of subjectivity and an insider's perspective, not just cultural inventories; she also saw the usefulness of these documents for studying individual variation within a larger social whole. Benedict's turn to the humanities, and particularly philosophy and literary criticism, sought more adequate models for interpreting human lives than was then usual for the social sciences, in an early and perhaps prescient articulation of what would later be called the "interpretive turn."

Benedict's humanistic impulse was carried out most fully by Oscar Lewis, who in 1961 published *The Children of Sanchez*, a novelistic compilation about urban slum dwellers which reached a wide audience with stories that emphasized a shared humanity and emotional identification. Lewis's work was severely criticized, however, for suggesting that the urban working classes were mired in a "culture of poverty," an analytic lens that softened a more sweeping political and economic analysis of oppression by the ruling classes in Mexico by focusing microscopically on beliefs and behaviors of the oppressed. Sidney Mintz's (1960) life of a Puerto Rican peasant was received more favorably for maintaining a materialist analysis of worker oppression. Generally, sociologists have made immigration and labor history their focus, from Znaniecki and Thomas's *The Polish Peasant* (1927) to Willis's *Learning to Labour* (1977).

Anthropology in the late twentieth century through the present has focused explicitly on what formerly were background issues in the study of culture: diasporic identities, communities at the margins of nation states, contested beliefs and practices, hybridity and borders. Alfred Gell (1998) has argued that the biographical approach is particularly suited to anthropology, since the view it takes of social agents tends to replicate the time perspective of these agents themselves. (In contrast, the temporal scope of history or sociology could be described as "supra biographical" and that of social and cognitive psychology as "infra biographical.") Because anthropology tends to concentrate on social action in the context of particular lives – or a particular stage of these

lives it is necessarily preoccupied with the life cycle and the individual agent. The specifically biographical depth of focus defines a methodology that works best in the spaces traversed by agents in the course of their biographies. Many of these spaces are now transnational and multicultural; some are even transgendered. At the same time, we have also experienced what has been called the narrative turn, in which scholars have attempted to distinguish self narrated life stories from scholarly authored biographies, cutting loose from naturalistic, materialistic moorings.

Inspired by European philosophical traditions of phenomenology and hermeneutics, Bertaux (1981), a sociologist, argued that biographical self reports should not try to create the illusion of a naturalistic unfolding of an individual's development, but should instead be treated as "life stories." By this he refers to discrete speech acts elicited under particular circumstances and illuminating particular needs of the subject's lived experience. He highlighted the methodological issues of the sociology of knowledge, in which biographic statements can be used to understand the lived experience of others and analyze how these experiences are constructed textually into personal narratives. Life story approaches have been greatly accelerated with innovative methodological and substantive contributions by linguists (Linde 1993), sociologists (Denzin 1989), psychologists (Rosenwald & Ochberg 1992), feminist social critics (Personal Narratives Group 1989), and many others. Seen also in anthropology, this life story impulse turns away from totalizing life histories constructed to correspond to a specific research agenda and toward the incorporation of partial self narratives or life stories within more open texts (Ginsburg 1989; Kondo 1990). Crapanzano's *Tuhami* (1980) followed the model of a psychoanalytic case history to include the dreams, fantasies, and imagined encounters of a tailor involved in a spirit possession movement, looking at his own private psychological world and not only the factual events of his life. More attention has also been paid to reflecting on the elicitation frame or context, including analyses of the power relations between the biographer and the biography subject, with the goal of producing not only texts but also analyses in a more collaborative way than before.

When the subject of a biography is alive, then there is clearly a process of exchange in which certain documents and confidences are offered in response to certain questions, and the accounts of the biographical subject and the writer come to construct each other. These new "collaborative biographies" mark a shift away from viewing the observer/observed relationship as "a scaffolding separate from content, to the view that the relationship is inseparable from content" (Freeman 1989: 432). Rather than referring to "informants," persons seen as a means to an end, "informing" on their culture, Freeman speaks of "narrators" who construct new selves in dialogue with an investigator, thus co creating the data that will later be analyzed. As part of the process of experimenting with the genre of ethnographic writing more generally, there is a new playfulness in the writing of biographical accounts that often involves co authorship and analysis of the shaping factors of the anthropologist's relevant life concerns, described as the "biography in the shadow" (Frank 1979, 2000; Behar 1993). The increasing popularity of mass market autobiographies and memoirs, often written as testimonies to the newly crafted identities of members of ethno racial minorities, GLBT communities, or grassroots political activists, has brought a new vitality and particularity to anthropological writings as well.

Abu Lughod (1993) argued that biographies of ordinary Bedouin women can be used to "write against culture," resisting and destabilizing anthropological generalizations about the structural features of certain types of society (in this case, Arab or Middle Eastern societies), which she fears have a tendency to congeal into too reified an idea of "cultures" as self contained entities. Chapter headings that stand for classic anthropological categories of analysis (patrilineality, polygyny, honor and shame) label collections of stories that serve to unsettle assumptions about those categories. The question that concerns her is: What is it like to *live* those institutions, those ideologies? The particularities of individual experiences and family disputes conveyed in the narratives serve to qualify, or even dissolve, the notion of "Bedouin culture"; they shed a more nuanced and sensitive light on women's opinions, and their efforts to achieve their own goals and maintain their

own honor within the constraints of the structures within which they must operate.

In this way, Abu Lughod turns around the central problem about life narratives from the point of view of the anthropologist, sociologist, or historian, which has been the question of representativeness. What in the way of insights into generalities can be extracted from their uniqueness? The issue of subjectivity has been endlessly debated in the social sciences. The recent interpretive turn emphasizes the fact that life stories are consciously staged and directed, as both narrator and investigator look for moral lessons and a sense of coherence. The “self” that is presented will vary on both an individual and a cultural level, but its representativeness rests not so much in what materially happens to people as in what people imagine or know might happen, and also how they interpret what does happen, how they make sense of it. Biographical narratives allow researchers to capture the point of view of the subject, and to explain how in spite of particular idiosyncrasies, each person is also a product of his or her culture, place, and time.

The intersection of history with personal experience and the individual life with the collective heritage makes biography a particularly significant locus for the analysis of historical memory. The microcosm of one person’s biography does not disqualify each unique narrative from any hope of generalization, but can be seen precisely as part of its value. Each narrative enlarges our sense of human possibilities, and enriches our understandings of what it has meant to live in a particular society and culture.

More than that, giving a cultural dimension to the study of biography develops the possibility of a knowledge that is itself more fully intersubjective. The investigator who tries to capture a narrator’s particular ways of telling a story, the idiom and emotional tone of speech, constructs a self for the subject of each biographical study. Preserving traces of that dialogical encounter allows readers to glimpse the dynamics of that collaborative process, and to participate in the translation of culture that occurs as each life is narrated. Ethnographic research has expanded beyond the study of small societies to larger global contexts and connections, but the emphasis on the individual agent and stages of the life cycle remains

important, and is perhaps a trademark of even multi sited fieldwork. The agitative turn which has become prominent in various forms of practice theory requires attention to biographical frames of meaning and individual relations established through things with other persons.

There have also been moves to innovate by developing new genres, including cultural biographies (Frank 2000), biographies of things (Appadurai & Kopytoff 1986; Hoskins 1998), biographies of popular movements (Passerini & Erdberg 1996), and biographies of scientific objects (Dalton 2000). For example, the notion of biography has provided new perspectives on the study of material culture, and prompted new questions about how people are involved with the things they make and consume (Appadurai & Kopytoff 1986; Hoskins 1998). To what extent is our notion of biography culturally bounded? Do other cultures operate with a notion of the life cycle that extends beyond the grave to include reincarnation or the continued involvement of the ancestors in the lives of their descendants? The extension of the term “biography” to entities other than persons is often linked to the idea of a life cycle of birth, youth, maturity and old age which can be applied to groups, institutions, and concepts.

In summary, three key “moments” can be observed in the use of biography in the social sciences. First, a period when life histories were “collected” as data which would then be subjected to criteria of cultural typicality or, in other disciplines than anthropology, analyzed through schemata designed to destabilize conventional biographical assumptions while establishing diverse disciplinary imperatives. Second, a period when concerns of representing the humanity of the oppressed or the exotic took center stage, in what has retrospectively come to be seen as a kind of “tactical humanism.” Third, what could be called the narrative turn, in which the primary concern has been how lived worlds have been constructed by language and made to mask certain unspoken relations of power, often articulated as part of a Foucauldian linkage of knowledge and power.

SEE ALSO: Autoethnography; Ethnography; Life History; Methods; Phenomenology; Psychoanalysis

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biosociological theories

Richard Machalek

Biosociological theories integrate biology into sociological explanations of human social behavior. They do so by incorporating theoretical ideas and empirical discoveries from various branches of biology including evolutionary biology (especially *sociobiology* and *behavioral ecology*), ecology, ethology, neurobiology, endocrinology, and population genetics. In sociology, most biosociological theories are emerging in a new specialty area known as *evolutionary sociology*.

Not to be confused with the pseudoscience of "Social Darwinism," the new evolutionary sociology is grounded in and guided by well established explanatory principles, models, research methods, and rules of evidence developed and used by contemporary biologists. Increasingly, the traditional disciplinary boundaries that once clearly separated biologists from social and behavioral scientists, and social and

behavioral scientists among themselves, are being eroded by those working within the framework of *neo Darwinian* evolutionary theory – the integration of Darwinian evolutionary theory with Mendelian genetics.

The emergence of the new evolutionary sociology was made possible by several important theoretical developments in twentieth century evolutionary theory. In 1964, W. D. Hamilton introduced the ideas of *kin selection* and *inclusive fitness*, concepts now central to biological explanations of social behavior, in his seminal theoretical formulation on the genetic basis of social behavior. Kin selection is a form of natural selection by which individuals influence the survival and reproductive success of genetic relatives other than offspring. Inclusive fitness is defined as the sum of an individual's reproductive success plus that individual's influence on the reproductive success of its genetic relatives, other than direct descendants. These two ideas are important in biosociological theory because they help explain how cooperative social behavior can favor the replication and transmission of genes, the driving force of organic evolution. Shortly thereafter, G. C. Williams in his classic book *Adaptation and Natural Selection* (1966) clarified and sharpened the concept of *adaptation*: a heritable morphological, physiological, or behavioral trait that increases an individual's chances of survival and reproductive success. This led to a better understanding of social behavior as a product of natural selection.

Before long, R. L. Trivers formulated the theoretical notion of *reciprocal altruism* to explain the evolution of cooperation among individuals lacking common genetic interests (1971). In 1975, E. O. Wilson synthesized these and other theoretical and empirical developments in his landmark book, *Sociobiology: The New Synthesis*, thereby laying the foundation for the emergence of *neo Darwinian* social theory.

The controversy surrounding sociobiology and its applicability to human social behavior gradually subsided. During this time, systematic research and theory building by an expanding community of scholars and scientists led to the rise of *neo Darwinian* enterprises such as Darwinian anthropology, evolutionary psychology, evolutionary economics, and most recently, evolutionary sociology. *Neo Darwinian* social

theory is unified by shared, fundamental concepts and theoretical principles derived from contemporary evolutionary biology, especially sociobiology and behavioral ecology. Among the most important of such ideas is the *maximization principle*, which states that organisms tend to behave in a manner that maximizes their inclusive fitness, i.e., their overall influence on the perpetuation of their genes in subsequent generations (Lopreato & Crippen 1999).

Biosociological theorists view social behavior as the product of two types of causes: *proximate* causes, such as neural or hormonal activity or environmental stimuli that trigger physiological activity, and *ultimate* causes, which refer to evolved adaptations that generate behaviors. If behaviors feature a heritable component, then they are subject to natural selection and can become established in a phylogenetic line. For example, the chain of proximate causes that influences a female's preference for one male over another as a potential mate may include an unconscious perception of and preference for bilateral (left/right) symmetry in males. The adaptive value of this perception and preference in mate choice appears to be based in the fact that bilateral symmetry often signifies developmental stability in heritable traits, such as a robust immune system, a quality from which offspring would benefit significantly. Thus, behaviors pertaining to mate choice entail both proximate and ultimate causation. Evolutionary theorists often say that proximate causes account for *how* a behavior is produced (its generative mechanisms), and ultimate causes explain *why* the behavior occurs (its adaptive benefits).

Although a few biosociological theorists attempt to explain social behaviors at both proximate and ultimate levels, it is more common for them to focus on either one or the other. Consequently, most biosociological theories can be grouped loosely into three categories: those that focus primarily on (1) proximate physiological or morphological causes of behavior, (2) proximate ecological causes of behavior, or (3) evolved adaptations as ultimate causes of behavior.

Recently, biosociologists have theorized about patterns of hormonal activity as proximate causes of phenomena such as gender differences in behavior, variation in emotional states, or variation in the development of patterns of

aggression and violence. Similarly, biosociological theorists also have attempted to explain the origins of human sociality as the product of a complex history of neurological, hormonal, social organizational, and environmental interactions, the roots of which extend far back into primate evolutionary history.

Other biosociological theorists focus on ecological factors as proximate causes of patterns of human social behavior. At the micro level of social analysis, for example, some theorists use *evolutionary game theory* to explain how the strategy ecology within which individuals interact influences the development of patterns of cooperation or conflict among actors. At the macro level of analysis, other theorists use evolutionary and ecological principles to analyze entire social systems and changes therein. Occasionally, biosociologists use organic evolutionary theory as a source of analogies for describing and analyzing processes of social organization and change. For example, analogues to genetic processes such as mutation, recombination, or genetic drift are said to be found in cultural processes such as innovation, invention, or diffusion. Sometimes called "stage theories of evolution," these theories typically characterize societies as complex systems of behavioral adaptations by which populations cope with the material conditions and demands of human life. It is common for such theories to feature taxonomic schemes developed for comparative and historical analysis of human societies. For example, such theories often distinguish among major societal types such as foraging (or hunting gathering), horticultural, agrarian, industrial, and post industrial societies, each of which is understood as a distinct complex of adaptations to those societies' environments. Some theories posit close parallels between organic and socio cultural evolution, while others reject such parallels and describe societies as complex systems of organization that develop (versus evolve) in response to ecological challenges such as extracting resources from environments and reducing mortality rates in human populations. However, all such theories, both evolutionary and ecological, place primary explanatory emphasis on proximate causes of human social behavior, such as material, demographic, technological, or social organizational factors.

Recently, biosociological theorists have begun to express increasing dissatisfaction with the *tabula rasa* ("blank slate") view of human nature. Many have abandoned the longstanding view of the human brain as a general, all purpose learning machine lacking specific, innate algorithms that give rise to the development of complex social behaviors. Instead, like neo Darwinians in general, biosociologists increasingly subscribe to a new understanding of the human brain as densely populated by a rich and extensive array of *cognitive algorithms*, or innate mental mechanisms, that help generate complex patterns of social behavior. These mechanisms are believed to have evolved in the ancestral human environment commonly called the *environment of evolutionary adaptedness*, or *EEA*. Also described as *behavioral predispositions*, these mechanisms are conceptualized as species typical, domain specific adaptations which, in archaic human environments, enabled ancestral humans to cope with specific survival and/or reproductive challenges such as threat detection, foraging, mating, coalition formation, and parenting. The manner and extent to which such mechanisms may continue to be adaptive in *contemporary* societies, however, remains a point of debate among biosociologists and other neo Darwinian social scientists.

One example of a highly influential bio social theory that attributes patterns of complex social behavior in contemporary societies to evolved adaptations for group life is a theory of homicide (Daly & Wilson 1988). Guided by Hamilton's analysis of cooperation based on kin selection, evolutionary reasoning suggests that the intensity of conflict among individuals, such as family members, will be mediated by the degree of biological kinship among them. Family members are much less likely to be killed by consanguine kin (with whom they share common descent) than they are by affines (those to whom they are related only by marriage). As predicted by the principles of *kin selection* and *inclusive fitness*, genetic relatedness appears to suppress the expression of lethal violence among individuals engaged in conflicts of interest. Many evolutionary theorists interpret these differences as evidence of evolved, fitness enhancing psychological adaptations that operate in both ancestral and contemporary social environments.

It is common among biosociological theorists to devote considerable attention to the evolutionary origins of male–female behavioral differences, many of which are attributed to *sexual selection*. This theoretical interest derives from evolutionary biology’s explanation that, in sexually reproducing species like humans, the genetic interests of reproductive partners overlap but do not coincide. Accordingly, a strategy adopted by males for maximizing their reproductive output may not maximize the reproductive success of their female reproductive partners, and vice versa. Consequently, a surprising degree of conflict between males and females can be expected even when they are reproductive partners. According to Trivers (1972), mates compete for *parental investment*, the limiting resource in reproductive effort. As a result, significant male–female conflict, even among humans, may be expected when one reproductive partner attempts to secure maximal parental investment at the other’s expense. Following this and related lines of biological reasoning, biosociological theorists have explored gender relations among humans with regard to behaviors such as marriage, divorce, remarriage, parental care, the household division of labor, sexual coercion, and gender stratification (Lopreato & Crippen 1999).

Another topic that has been subjected to biosociological theorizing using the concept of *kin selection* is how cooperation evolves among members of groups consisting of genetically unrelated individuals (non kin). For example, ethnic group membership extends to large populations of individuals, often dispersed globally, who are not close kin. Yet, members of such groups often share a strong sense of collective identity and exhibit stable patterns of cooperation and even altruism toward each other, despite the fact that they are no more related to each other than they are to other members of their societies’ populations. Biosociologists explain the development of strong social ties among members of these groups as based on kin selected psychological adaptations acquired by ancestral humans in the EEA. Ethnic identity, for example, is explained as a human trait built upon a platform of evolved mechanisms such as *kin recognition*. Similarly, some biosociologists regard the intense social ties that unite members of some contemporary

religious groups as manifestations of the same evolved psychological architecture that generated high levels of solidarity and cohesion among members of small groups of ancestral humans who were unified by the dual forces of kin selection and reciprocity.

Another topic engaging the energies of biosociologists is *gene–culture coevolution*, a phenomenon identified by Wilson (1975) and other sociobiologists. Evolutionary theorists view genes, cognition, and culture as aspects of the natural world that are conjoined in complex systems of interaction and mutual causal influence. They regard culture as the product of human cognition and learning, which themselves are the indirect products of genes and direct products of the brains they construct. Central to the theory of gene–culture coevolution is what psychologists call *prepared* (also called *biased* or *directed*) *learning*. The phenomenon of prepared learning demonstrates that, as in many other species, humans possess innate mental algorithms that predispose them to learn and retain some types of behavior more easily than others. One such socially relevant learning bias for which experimental evidence has been adduced is a “cheating detection mechanism” that appears to enable individuals to recognize with considerable ease the incidence of non reciprocity in a social contract.

In gene–culture coevolution theory, culture is conceptualized not only as a product of natural selection, but as a selection force as well. As an information system that organizes and regulates patterns of social organization, if culture influences the expression of behaviors that have heritable components, it can alter gene frequencies across generations, thereby affecting the course of organic as well as sociocultural evolution.

SEE ALSO: Biodemography; Complexity and Emergence; Game Theory; Social Exchange Theory

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biracialism

Alison Roberts

Biracialism is used to indicate a racial ancestry comprised of two “races.” The term generally refers to first generation persons of “mixed race” heritage, i.e., individuals who have parents of *socially defined*, distinct racial groups. Biracialism is sometimes used interchangeably with multiraciality or “mixed race.” Social scientists are concerned with the myriad meanings of biracialism in private and public spheres. Micro level analyses delve into the process of racial identity development and how biracial persons construct their racial identities in social interaction. Macro level analyses examine how race is measured and its role in demographic statistics, government policies, and state politics.

“Mixed race” ancestry, steeped in the legacy of colonialism and slavery, is not a new social phenomenon, but biracialism is a relatively young concept. The emergence of “biracialism” reflects a growing acceptance – or at least,

recognition – of “mixed race” populations, and illustrates the successful lobbying of biracial persons and interracial families to dismiss single race classification schemes as inadequate for identifying or categorizing people of “mixed race” heritage. An increasingly diverse global society is characterized by growing rates of immigration and interracial unions. Coupled with shifting racial boundaries, a new cultural space has opened up for biracial individuals to define themselves and claim racial identities previously unavailable to them – insofar as these identity options exist within the social structure.

Ifekwunigwe’s (2004) organization of “mixed race” scholarship into three distinct stages provides a useful conceptual framework for understanding the development of biracialism: pathology, celebration, and critique. Pseudo-science was the reigning influence of the “age of pathology,” resulting in the stratification of socially defined racial categories. This racial hierarchy positioned the “white” race at the top; the dominating myth of white racial purity defined miscegenation as a threat to white supremacy and a pollutant of the white race. Offspring of interracial unions were considered genetically inferior to those of the white race. Sound science prevailed eventually, demanding a departure from treating race as biologically determined.

With academic roots in counseling and developmental psychology, early studies on biracialism relied primarily on psychoanalytic perspectives of identity formation as a theoretical framework. These studies advanced our knowledge by proposing different models of biracial identity development, but also drew heavily from clinical samples – contributing in part to the continued stigmatization of biracialism. The groundbreaking anthology of both popular and scholarly writing, *Racially Mixed People in America* (Root 1992), was important because many of the authors were themselves biracial, and they treated biracial people as an independent population rather than as a subset or subculture of a racial minority parent group. The “age of celebration” was ushered in with personal memoirs of biracialism and theoretical exploration of “mixed race” identity, and was distinguished by a “mixed race” centric perspective. Studies remained small in scope,

however, and relied more on theory than on empirical data.

With this foundation in place, the field of biracialism and “mixed race” theory flourished throughout the 1990s, became increasingly interdisciplinary, and invited more critical approaches. The current “age of critique” is marked by unresolved matters including the development of a comprehensive model for understanding biracial identity in all its forms; reconciliation of personal identity with racial categorization; and the limitations of a “multi racial movement” within the larger struggle for racial justice. Sociological analyses of biracialism have pushed the field forward with empirical research focusing on the personal and political aspects of multiraciality.

Sociologists have contributed by employing symbolic interaction as a theoretical framework. Rockquemore and Brunson’s (2002) pioneering study showed that biracial individuals develop their racial identities from a constellation of interacting factors including phenotypic appearance, socialization via family and school, age and life course stage, neighborhood community, social networks, and geographical location. Building on earlier conceptions of biracial identity, their research yielded four typologies to characterize biracialism: border identity (based on neither single race but an integration of the two); singular identity (based exclusively on one race); protean identity (based on situational context); and transcendent identity (based on the absence of race as a factor). Although their national, representative sample was limited to black and white biracial Americans, the results illustrated that there is no single, universal conception of biracial identity – a biracial individual’s racial identity can be dynamic, changing according to time, place, and circumstance.

The meaning of race is also fluid, and racial designations are inevitably associated with economic, political, and social struggles. Racial identity is a paramount construction, with racial classification closely linked to government prescribed policies and programs. The politics of biracialism are part of a broader discourse on racial justice. Important issues include the likely consequences of a multiracial designation in racial democracies; conservatives’ co option of the “multiracial movement” to

advocate for a color blind society (in which racial inequalities are ignored); and how biracialism is situated in the global society – currently within a white/non white dichotomy and potentially within a black/non black paradigm in the future – and what that means for biracial people and other racial minorities.

Conducting research on biracialism merits special attention to methodological challenges. Perhaps the most obvious and shared concern is finding an honest way to write about race without reifying it. Studying biracialism involves an inevitable confrontation with the limitations of word usage and its underlying connotation – that race does have a biological or genetic reality. Identifying and recruiting biracial people can be taxing for a number of reasons: the population is small, complicated to define, and difficult to locate. Self identification remains the most clear cut approach for identifying a particular biracial population, but the presumption of a static identity is limiting. Researchers are still in the midst of determining the best methodological practices for defining a biracial population and ensuring representative sampling.

As researchers continue to be more critical in their approach, future directions must incorporate a diasporic approach to theoretical frameworks; just as states and nations have different racial structures, so too do they have different conceptualizations of biracialism and “mixed race.” Scholars must extend their expertise beyond the polarizing black/white paradigm that dominates North American and European literature. Theoretical approaches and empirical studies should be developed to examine the diversity within “mixed race” populations, inclusive of all permutations of “mixed race” – especially those which do not include “white” as part of the equation. The question of how class intersects biracial identity remains largely unanswered, as does the role of gender in the experiences of biracial individuals. The study of biracialism, multiraciality, and “mixed race” theory will be ever evolving so long as “race” continues to be a powerful force in shaping people’s life chances and experiences.

SEE ALSO: Color Line; Hybridity; Interracial Unions; Polyethnicity; Race; Race (Racism); Racial Hierarchy

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Birmingham School

Chris Barker

Birmingham School refers to the work of the Centre for Contemporary Cultural Studies (CCCS), which operated as a research center at the University of Birmingham (UK) between 1964 and 1988. The Birmingham School represents a decisive moment in the creation of the intellectual and institutional project of cultural studies, as well as a "cultural turn" in sociology. The substantive focus of the Birmingham School was popular culture as explored through the concepts of ideology and hegemony. Indeed, the work of CCCS contributed to the legitimization of popular culture as a field of academic inquiry. Among the substantive topics of research undertaken by CCCS were the mass media, youth subcultures, education, gender, race, and the authoritarian state. The media were of special significance insofar as the texts of popular culture in the contemporary world are forged within their framework.

CCCS was founded in 1964 as a postgraduate center by Richard Hoggart and developed further under the leadership of Stuart Hall. It is during the period of Hall's directorship (1968–79) that one can first speak of the formation of an identifiable and distinct domain called cultural studies. A West Indian born British thinker initially associated with the New Left of the late 1960s, Hall was interested in the regeneration of western Marxism while critical of its reductionist tendencies. Sociology (along with English literature, psychoanalysis, feminism, and continental philosophy) was one of a number of intellectual influences on the thinkers of the Birmingham School. However, cultural studies can now be considered as an academic domain in its own right, so that neither CCCS nor cultural studies is best described as a subcategory of the discipline of sociology per se. Rather, sociology and cultural studies are cousins with "family resemblances."

CULTURAL STUDIES AS A POLITICAL PROJECT

Within the English literary tradition that formed a backdrop to the early work of CCCS, popular culture was commonly regarded as inferior to the elevated cultures of "high" art. However, CCCS sought to challenge the criteria used to police the boundaries of "good works," arguing that they are not universal but rather are derived from an institutionalized and class based hierarchy of cultural tastes. More importantly still, the Birmingham School understood popular culture to be the decisive arena in which consent and resistance to the ascendant meanings of a social formation were won and lost. This is a political conception of popular culture as a site where cultural hegemony is secured or challenged. For CCCS, then, evaluations of popular culture were not made on the basis of cultural or aesthetic value per se, but are concerned with issues of power, politics, and ideology.

In that context, members of the Birmingham School generally regarded their work as a political project of an intellectual character rather than as an abstract academic discipline. Indeed, cultural studies writers of this period had aspirations to forge links with political movements outside of the academy. In particular, the

Birmingham School's Gramscian thinking located cultural analysis and ideological struggle at the heart of western politics. It placed a special premium on "organic" intellectuals and their relations with other participants in social struggle. Organic intellectuals are thinkers who form a constitutive part of working class (and later feminist, postcolonial, African American, etc.) struggle, acting as the theorists and organizers of the counter hegemonic class and its allies.

Thus, the Birmingham School conceived of cultural studies as an intellectual project that aimed to provide wider social and political forces with intellectual resources in the "ideological struggle." CCCS intellectuals sought to play a "demystifying role" by pointing to the constructed character of cultural texts. They aimed to highlight the myths and ideologies embedded in texts in the hope of producing political opposition to subordination. However, it is open to doubt whether cultural studies has been connected with political movements in any "organic" way. Rather, as Hall (1992) has wryly commented, cultural studies intellectuals acted "as if" they were organic intellectuals or in the hope that one day they could be.

BIRMINGHAM'S THEORETICAL PERSPECTIVES

Culturalism and Structuralism

The initial focus of CCCS was on "lived" class culture, a focus that chimed with the work of Richard Hoggart and Raymond Williams. This has been described by Hall (1992) as the moment of "culturalism" and is associated with the adoption of a broadly anthropological definition of culture that takes it to be an everyday lived process. Culturalism stressed the "ordinariness" of culture and the active, creative capacity of people to construct shared meaningful practices. Methodologically, culturalism has favored concrete empirical research and ethnography. Paul Willis in particular was a proponent of ethnographic research into culture as sensual lived experience. In his most famous work, *Learning to Labour* (1977), Willis describes his ethnographic study of a group of

working class boys and the way that they reproduced their subordinate class position.

However, culturalism was surpassed within CCCS by the influence of structuralism, particularly as it was articulated with Marxism. Structuralism is concerned with social and cultural structures or predictable regularities, so that a structuralist understanding of culture is concerned with the "systems of relations" of an underlying structure (usually language) and the grammar that makes meaning possible. Structuralism extends its reach from "words" to the language of cultural signs in general, so that human relations, material objects, and images are all analyzed through the structures of signs making culture analogous to (or structured like) a language. Thus, members of CCCS began to explore culture with the tools of semiotics (or the study of signs).

Dick Hebdige's *Subculture: The Meaning of Style* (1979) illustrates the structuralist influence within the Birmingham School. Hebdige explores subcultures in terms of the autonomous play of signifiers and in doing so asserts the specificity of the semiotic and cultural. For Hebdige, style is a signifying practice of spectacular subcultures that displays obviously fabricated codes of meaning. Through the signification of difference, style constitutes a group identity that is achieved by transforming the signs of commodities into a bricolage that acts as a form of semiotic resistance to the hegemonic order. British Punk of the late 1970s, an especially dislocated, self aware, and ironic mode of signification, was Hebdige's favored exemplar.

Neo Gramscian Marxism

Despite the influence of structuralism, it was arguably Marxism that formed the most important theoretical paradigm within the Birmingham School. At the height of its activities CCCS sought to fuse aspects of Marxism, with its stress on history, materialism, capitalism, and class, with the more synchronic approach of structuralism.

In developing its particular version of a structuralist Marxism oriented to the study of culture, the Birmingham School mined the intellectual resources of Barthes, Althusser,

and (most crucially) Gramsci. The key conceptual tools were those of text, ideology, and hegemony as explored through the notion of popular culture as a site of both social control and resistance.

The significance of both Althusser and Gramsci to the Birmingham School was that they offered a way to explore culture on its own terms while remaining within a Marxist problematic. Classic Marxism had argued that the cultural “superstructure” is shaped by the economic “base” or mode of production. By contrast, Althusser proposed a model in which ideology, politics, and the economy were grasped as discrete levels or practices of a social formation that worked relatively autonomously from each other. Gramsci’s work stressed the importance of meaning, common sense, and ideology in the cultural domain. Althusser and Gramsci helped the Birmingham School move away from the economic reductionism of the base and superstructure model. They argued that although the analysis of economic determinants may be necessary to any understanding of culture, it is not – and cannot be – self sufficient because cultural phenomena work within their own rules and logics (as structuralism argued).

For the Birmingham School, the concept of ideology referred to discourses that “bind” social groups and “justify” their actions. Ideologies, while purporting to be universal truths, are understood by Marxism to be historically specific understandings that obscure and maintain the power of social groups (e.g., class, gender, race). The concept of hegemony was developed largely from the work of Gramsci, for whom it describes a situation where a “historical bloc” of ruling class factions exercises social authority and leadership over the subordinate classes through a combination of force and, more importantly, consent. Hegemony involves a temporary closure of meaning supportive of the powerful and describes the process of making, maintaining, and reproducing the governing sets of meanings of a given culture.

One of the seminal texts of cultural studies, *Resistance through Rituals* (1976) edited by Hall and Jefferson, encapsulates the Gramscian thrust of the Birmingham School in its title. Here, British youth subcultures are explored as

stylized forms of resistance to the hegemonic culture. It was argued that, in reaction to the decline of traditional working class values, spaces, and places, youth subcultures sought to reinvent through stylization the lost community and values of the working class. For example, skinheads were held to be recapturing in an imaginary way the tradition of working class male “hardness” through their cropped hair, boots, jeans, and braces.

Gramscian themes of ideology, hegemony, resistance, and containment are also apparent in Hall and colleagues’ *Policing the Crisis* (1978), a book that explores the 1970s moral panic in the British press surrounding street robbery. The authors explore the articulation of mugging with race and the alleged black threat to law, order, and the British way of life. Specifically, the text sets out to give an account of the political, economic, ideological, and racial crisis of Britain that formed the context of the moral panic about mugging and to dispute its association with a black British presence. In doing so, Hall and his colleagues sought to demonstrate the ideological work done by the media in constructing mugging and connecting it with concerns about racial disorder. In particular, *Policing the Crisis* explores the popularization of hegemonic ideology through the professional working practices of the media.

Texts and Audiences

The Gramscian influence within the Birmingham School was also evident in a series of textual analyses that explored the operations of ideology in news and current affairs, soap opera, advertising, and popular film. Here the concept of a text is a metaphor for the construction of meaning through the organization of signs into representations. A text is constituted not simply by the written word, but includes all forms of signification so that dress, television programs, advertising images, sporting events, pop stars, etc. can all be read as texts. Textual analysis for the Birmingham School usually involved deconstructing the practices of cultural coding to show us how the apparent transparency of meaning is an outcome of cultural habituation.

The power of textual representation lies in its enabling of some kinds of knowledge to exist while excluding others in what may be called a “politics of representation.” For example, members of the Birmingham School developed a hegemonic model of news production in which the ideological character of news is understood to be an outcome of the routine attitudes and working practices of staff. News journalists are said to learn the conventions and codes of “how things should be done,” thereby reproducing ideology as common sense. In particular, their reliance on “authoritative sources” leads the media to reproduce primary definers’ (e.g., politicians, judges, industrialists, the police, and other official agencies) accounts of the news.

Similarly, CCCS’s analysis of advertising stressed the selling not just of commodities but also of ways of looking at the world. Acquiring a brand is not simply about purchasing a product, but rather is concerned with buying into lifestyles and values. Thus, objects in advertisements are signifiers of meaning that we decode in the context of known cultural systems associating products in adverts with other cultural “goods.” While an image of a particular product may denote only beans or a car, it is made to connote “nature” or “family.” In buying commodities we emotionally invest in the associated image and so contribute to the construction of our identities through consumption.

However, while textual analysis founded on semiotic theory and framed by the problematic of ideology and hegemony was a core concern of the Birmingham School, key participants also explored the relationship of audiences to texts. In particular, they moved away from the idea that texts fixed the meanings for readers in order to investigate the way that audiences produced a variety of meanings. This was theorized by Hall through his “encoding/decoding” model and researched empirically by David Morley.

Hall conceived of the process of encoding/decoding as an articulation of the linked but distinct moments of production, circulation, distribution, and reproduction, each of which has its specific practices which are necessary to the circuit but which do not guarantee the next moment. In particular, the production of

meaning does not ensure consumption of that meaning as the encoders might have intended because television texts are polysemic and can be interpreted in different ways. That is not to say that all the meanings are equal among themselves; rather, the text will be *structured in dominance* leading to a *preferred meaning*.

Hall proposed a model of three hypothetical decoding positions: (1) the dominant hegemonic decoding which accepts the preferred meanings of the text; (2) a negotiated code which acknowledges the legitimacy of the preferred meanings in the abstract but makes its own rules and adaptations under particular circumstances; and (3) an oppositional code where people understand the preferred encoding but reject it and decode in contrary ways. David Morley’s research into the audience for a British news “magazine” program, *The Nationwide Audience* (1980), was based on Hall’s encoding/decoding model and gave empirical backing to it. It was argued that dominant, negotiated, and oppositional decodings had been made by different groups of viewers according to their social class.

RACE AND GENDER: THE POLITICS OF DIFFERENCE

At its inception a good deal of the work of the CCCS was focused on class as the central dimension of cultural power and struggle. Yet the Birmingham School was formed at a moment in British history when race was a significant issue in the political arena. There could be few British cities that exemplified this more than Birmingham, with its large Caribbean, Indian, and Pakistani diaspora populations. The Handsworth region of Birmingham is the largest “black” residential area in Europe. And yet a key figure within CCCS, Paul Gilroy, argued that the legacy of Raymond Williams had endowed cultural studies with too nationalistic an orientation to culture that had sidelined important issues of race and migration within Britain. The 1984 CCCS collective book *The Empire Strikes Back* and Gilroy’s book *There Ain’t No Black in the Union Jack* (1987) set out to address these issues. Further, as has been noted, *Policing the Crisis* was concerned with law and order, the media,

and race in Britain, while a sub theme of Hebdige's work on subculture was the engagement of white youth cultures with the post war black presence in Britain.

Just as Gilroy argued that race was being sidelined within CCCS, so a number of women writers began to argue that the Birmingham School was reproducing male hegemony in its work. For example, the early discussions of subcultures appeared to be centered on boys and men to the detriment of girls and women. However, the emergence of feminism within CCCS began to challenge this gendered perspective. Indeed, Hall once famously described feminism at CCCS as a "thief in the night": feminism broke into the cosy male world of CCCS and shook it up. For example, Angela McRobbie began to explore girls' magazine and female subcultures with a feminist eye allied to the overall project of CCCS. Although feminism had to shout to be heard, it does share with the Birmingham School a desire to produce "knowledges" of and by "marginalized" and oppressed groups with the avowed intention of making a political intervention. Certainly, feminism has emerged as a major strand of subsequent work within cultural studies.

ENDGAME

In 1988 CCCS ceased being a postgraduate research center and become a university department that included undergraduate teaching before it too was closed in the 1990s. Indeed, one might see the Birmingham School as a distinct institutional and intellectual project as coming to an end in the mid 1980s, after the departure of Stuart Hall a few years earlier. However, cultural studies as a project continued to grow. For example, one CCCS graduate, Lawrence Grossberg, was influential in the growth of cultural studies in the US. Today, cultural studies as an intellectual project has practitioners across the world, while poststructuralism has arguably eclipsed both structuralism and neo Gramscian Marxism as the decisive theoretical paradigm. It would thus be wrong to equate the Birmingham School with cultural studies as a whole. However, it would be equally mistaken to displace the decisive influence of the Birmingham moment in its formation.

SEE ALSO: Althusser, Louis; Cultural Critique; Cultural Studies; Cultural Studies, British; Encoding/Decoding; Gramsci, Antonio; Hegemony and the Media; Ideological Hegemony; Ideology; Marxism and Sociology; Popular Culture; Structuralism; Subculture

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bisexuality

Christian Klesse

Definitions of bisexuality are manifold and heterogeneous. There are at least four seemingly contradictory meanings associated with the term. Firstly, in early sexology bisexuality was conceived of as a primordial state of hermaphroditism prior to sexual differentiation. Secondly, bisexuality has been invoked to describe the co presence of "feminine" and "masculine" psychological traits in a human being. The idea of androgyny has impinged to

a certain degree on popular ideas about bisexuality. Thirdly, bisexuality has provided the concept to account for people's propensity to be sexually attracted to both men and women. This is currently the most common understanding of bisexuality. Fourthly, bisexuality is frequently seen as a pervasive "middle ground" (of merged gender, sex, or sexuality). This representation of bisexuality includes the notion that "we're all bisexual, really," which may imply either an essential androgyny or a universal "latent bisexuality" in the sense of an abstracted potential to love people of both genders (or irrespective of gender) (Hemmings 2002).

Bisexuality plays a rather paradoxical role in the history of sexuality. Although it has been integral, if not central, to most modern theories of sexuality, it has rarely been acknowledged or taken seriously in or for itself. Thus, Angelides (2000) shows that bisexuality has been a central concept in the establishment of an *economy of (hetero) sexuality* in the spreading discourses of (evolutionary) biology and medical sexology in the second half of the nineteenth century. The Russian embryologist Aleksandr Kovalevsky was the first to use the category of bisexuality in his 1866 discussion of hermaphroditic ascidians. Charles Darwin appropriated these findings in *The Descent of Man* (1871) in order to bolster up his theory of evolution. He declared primordial hermaphroditism to be the missing link in his theory of the descent of man from invertebrate organisms. This theory was linked with an insight from within comparative anatomy, according to which the sexual organs of even higher vertebrates went through stages of hermaphroditism in their early development. Darwin drew upon both theories when he speculated about the possibility that "some remote progenitor of the whole vertebrate kingdom appears to have been hermaphrodite or androgynous" (Darwin, quoted by Angelides 2000: 32). This model further rested on Ernst Haeckel's extremely influential recapitulation theory, according to which "ontogeny recapitulates phylogeny." This principle established the conviction that in the development from fetus to adulthood each human would recapitulate the complete life history of the entire species. Recapitulation theory proved a powerful tool to back up the sexist and racist claims so pervasive in nineteenth century scientific thought that

black people and women would be closer to the state of primitive hermaphroditism. It attests to the thoroughly racialized character of western conceptualizations of sexuality. Bisexuality both marked the original intersexed character of the human embryo and an ambiguous sexual character of uncivilized and primitive systems of sexual social organization (Storr 1997). Evolutionist theories of primordial bisexuality further provided key theoretical elements to the shift in the understanding of homosexuality from a theory of sex role inversion to one of object choice at the turn of the century. Richard Krafft Ebing saw homosexuality as an archaic residue of primordial bisexuality and Havelock Ellis conceptualized it as "a psychic and somatic development on the basis of latent bisexuality" or better as a result of its unsuccessful repudiation.

Freudian psychoanalysis, too, the most significant (non biological) theory on sexuality at the beginning of the twentieth century, located a theory of essential bisexuality at the core of its explanation of sexual orientation via the resolution of the Oedipus complex. However, due to the linear narrative structure of this theory and its perception as a standard route to an unequivocal adult sexual orientation, Freud did at the same time face inevitable difficulties to account for modes of desire that did not repudiate one or the other gendered object choice. Post Freudian developments of psychoanalytic theory were frequently even more reluctant to consider the validity of bisexual object choices (Angelides 2000). A counter tendency may consist in Cixous's (1981) critique of Freudian and Lacanian accounts of bisexuality. Although the notion of bisexuality has been epistemologically instrumental and necessary for most modern conceptualizations of homosexuality and heterosexuality, bisexuality has generally been written "out of the present" in theories that evolve around a hetero/homo dichotomy (Angelides 2000).

Alfred Kinsey and his colleagues challenged the dominant dichotic or binary understanding of sexuality that divides the human population into heterosexuals (the majority) and homosexuals (a few deviants) in their influential sex surveys *Human Sexual Behavior in the Male* (1948) and *Human Sexual Behavior in the Female* (1952). These controversial publications

revealed that the majority of the respondents recollected both sexual activities with men and with women as part of the lifetime sexual experience. Rather than clearly belonging to one camp or the other, the authors suggested, most people would consequently fall somewhere in the middle ground of a continuum ranging from exclusively heterosexual to exclusively homosexual. In order to define individual sexual orientation they invented a heterosexual-homosexual rating scale. The so-called Kinsey scale encourages people to place themselves on a 7-point scale ranging from 0 (exclusively heterosexual) to 6 (exclusively homosexual). Points 1 to 5 stand for varying combinations of homosexual and heterosexual experience. A range of researchers have since modified the Kinsey scale, adding further dimensions such as sexual or romantic feelings, fantasy, relationship history, etc. The best known of the models is probably the Klein Sexual Orientation Grid (KSOG) which tries to provide a "dynamic and multi-variable framework" for understanding sexual orientation. The KSOG evolves around the variables sexual attraction, sexual behavior, sexual fantasies, emotional preference, social preference, self-identification, and lifestyle. It further adds a time dimension by asking people to reflect about each of these issues regarding their past, present, and anticipated (wished for) experiences (Klein and Wolf 1985; Rodríguez 2000). Despite this concern for complexity and contingency, such attempts at refined measurement appear futile in the face of the inherent ambiguity of (bi)sexual desire.

In sociology the interest has nowadays largely shifted from "sexual orientation" to the more flexible concept of "sexual identity." The consideration of bisexuality has contributed novel insights to the understanding of sexual identity development. Research has suggested that for most bisexuals identity formation is not a linear process with a fixed outcome, but an ongoing process of self-location and renegotiation (Firestein 1996). The specificities of bisexual identification (such as a comparatively late coming out process and frequent identity changes) are often read to signify a lack of authenticity. In contradiction, Rust (1996) has argued that bisexual identification processes reveal the insufficiency of linear coming out models. Rust suggests

replacing the linear model with a social constructionist perspective that conceives of "identity as a description of the location of the self in relation to other individuals, groups, and institutions." According to this perspective, sexual identities appear as "landmarks on a sexual landscape" which is historical, socially constructed, and shaped by multiple power relations. In order to understand identity change we consequently would have to consider changes in the social context and the language available for self-description, too. The focus consequently moves away from "coming out" to broader questions of identity formation and maintenance. The study of lesbian and gay coming out narratives has shown that individuals tend to rewrite their past and construct a certain future in order to legitimate their current sexual identities (and lifestyles) as a consequence of their deep personality structures. Although it is questionable that the temporality at the heart of "traditional" coming out narratives can fully represent experiences of bisexual desire, most coming out stories of self-identified bisexuals are also structured around the logic of a "before" and "after" (Hemmings 2002).

The emergence of self-conscious and assertive bisexual social movement networks and organizations in many countries since the late 1970s has resulted in the consolidation of a bisexual identity. Bisexuals have been active in a range of social movements around gender and sexuality since their inception, in particular the feminist, lesbian and gay, S/M, polyamory, and queer movements. The marginalization of bisexuality in many political environments has led many self-identified bisexuals to campaign around this aspect of their identity. Historically, it has been in particular the contestation of bisexuality in the gay male and (even more so) the lesbian feminist movements that has fed into the motivation to set up an autonomous social movement (Rust 1995). The emergence of affirmative bisexual identity politics has led many bisexual activists and theorists to clearly define bisexual identities in sharp distinction to other sexualities. Some have used the term "monosexual" to refer to both heterosexuals and homosexuals as a set of people who would only desire one gender and take for granted the sexual dualism of the hetero/homo binary. Within the juxtaposition of bisexuality and

monosexuality, bisexual identity thus is accented an enlightened reflexivity and a progressive transformative potential.

However, some writers have cautioned that it is in particular the attempt to create a closed and clear cut definition of bisexual identity that would undermine the potential of bisexuality to exceed the constrictive binary logic of western models of sexuality (Rodríguez 2000). Drawing on the theory of monosexuality, bisexual oppression has been framed as an effect of "monosexism" (i.e., the normative belief that one should only be attracted to one gender). This model can be said to lack specificity in that it fails to explore the differences in the ways bisexuals tend to be stigmatized in heterosexual, lesbian, or gay spaces and does not pay attention to the unequal power relations between distinctly positioned groups (Hemmings 2002). The concept biphobia has proven to be more flexible in explaining the specific forms of discrimination faced by bisexuals in different social contexts. Biphobia entails prejudiced behavior, stereotypical representation, and strategies of discrimination and marginalization. Biphobia entails a range of stereotypes, such as the beliefs that bisexuals would be shallow, narcissistic, untrustworthy, morally bankrupt, promiscuous, incapable of monogamy, HIV carriers, fence sitters, etc. Biphobic representation intersects with other discriminatory discourses, in particular the ones around sexism, racism, and classism. It is marked by a certain overlap with homophobia or heteronormativity, but cannot be fully subsumed by either of these concepts.

Bisexual movement politics have transformed bisexual identities and given rise to specific bisexual theories. They have also provided the basis for the growth of literature that directly addresses bisexuality. Apart from a handful of publications in the second half of the 1970s there had been an absolute silence in the anglophone scientific literature on bisexuality after the publication of the Kinsey studies. Only since the late 1980s, when bisexual organizing gained momentum, has a range of books concerned with social and political activism been edited (Tucker et al. 1995; Off Pink Collective 1996; BiAcademic Intervention 1997). Bisexual feminists started to explore the interrelation between feminism and bisexuality (Weise 1992;

George 1993; Rust 1995). Until the 1990s most of these publications assumed the form of first person narratives and committed themselves to a bisexual visibility politics. Academic research was still scarce and remained limited to very specific topics, such as mixed orientation marriages. Only worries about the HIV/AIDS epidemic triggered some largely epidemiological research into (behavioral) bisexuality. From the 1990s onwards it is possible, according to Hemmings (2002), to identify a shift within the writing on bisexuality. Many authors abandoned their concern with positive images and started to explore issues regarding epistemology. This work is primarily concerned with the potential gains and losses of discourses around bisexuality (Hall & Pramaggiore 1996; Angelides 2000; cf. Storr 1999). Debates within this kind of (post)bisexual theory have centered on the questions why queer theory has been reluctant to engage actively with bisexuality and what the effects of a bisexual perspective could be for a deconstructive theory of sexuality. At the same time, historians have embarked on the task of writing a critical genealogy of (bi)sexuality in order to uncover the largely hidden role of bisexuality in modern discourses on sexuality. This work suggests that social scientific research into sexuality and gender needs to draw on an integrated focus on "bisexuality" in order to comprehend fully the complex web of meanings around sexuality. This is the more urgent, because most aspects of bisexuality (whether as identity, behavior, desire, or discourse) are still vastly under researched.

SEE ALSO: Coming Out/Closets; Feminist Activism in Latin America; Gay and Lesbian Movement; Heterosexuality; Homophobia and Heterosexism; Homosexuality; Lesbianism; Psychoanalysis; Queer Theory; Sexuality Research: History

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black feminist thought

April L. Few

Black feminist thought is a collection of ideas, writings, and art that articulates a standpoint of and for black women of the African Diaspora. Black feminist thought describes black women as a unique group that exists in a “place” in US

social relations where intersectional processes of race, ethnicity, gender, class, and sexual orientation shape black women’s individual and collective consciousness, self definitions, and actions (Collins 1991, 1998). As a standpoint theory, black feminist thought conceptualizes identities as organic, fluid, interdependent, multiple, and dynamic socially constructed “locations” within historical context (hooks 1984; Collins 1998; Smith 1998; James & Sharply Whiting 2000). Black feminist thought is grounded in black women’s historical experience with enslavement, anti lynching movements, segregation, Civil Rights and Black Power movements, sexual politics, capitalism, and patriarchy.

DEFINING BLACK FEMINIST FRAMEWORKS

Distinctive tenets of contemporary black feminist thought include: (1) the belief that self authorship and the legitimization of partial, subjugated knowledges represents a unique and diverse standpoint of and by black women; (2) black women’s experiences with multiple oppressions result in needs, expectations, ideologies, and problems that are different than those of black men and white women; and (3) black feminist consciousness is an ever evolving process of self conscious struggle (i.e., emancipatory historiography) for the liberation of black women, black men, and black communities through activism. In the landmark book *Black Feminist Thought* (1991), Patricia Hill Collins delineated a similar list to describe elements of black feminist thought. For instance, Collins posited that black feminists (1) acknowledged black women’s historical struggle against multiple oppressions; (2) examined how black women and their families negotiate the intersections of race, ethnicity, gender, sexual orientation, and class; (3) eradicated malignant images of black womanhood; and (4) incorporated an activist perspective into their research through the co creation of knowledge with informants, consciousness raising, and empowerment within the context of black women’s lives.

The cornerstone of black feminist thought is the significance of black women defining and

validating their own relationships to self and others while eradicating and replacing deleterious images of black womanhood. Black feminist thought is standpoint theory about black women's radical subjectivity. bell hooks described radical subjectivity as a process that emerges as a person comes to understand how interlocking structures of domination influence choices made in her life. This awareness incites emancipatory historiography and resistance against grand narratives of being and social relationality. Black radical subjectivity is created using fluid terms, parameters, and locations specified, validated, and lived by black women and the communities of which they are a part. In *Yearning* (1990), bell hooks discussed the importance of language in defining self. She saw language as a place of struggle and resistance for black women. Language is the conduit to define identity and validate experience. In *Learning from the Outsider Within: The Sociological Significance of Black Feminist Thought* (1991), Collins argued that black women's insistence on self definition, self valuation, and black female centered analysis was significant for two reasons. First, valuing one's own self defined standpoint is a means of resisting racist and sexist ideologies and other dehumanizing processes endemic to systems of domination. Second, black female self definition allows black women to reject internalized, psychological oppression. Alice Walker's *The Color Purple* (1982) and Ntozake Shange's *For Colored Girls Who Have Considered Suicide/When the Rainbow is Enuf* (1976) are two literary examples of the necessity for black female self definition.

Attention to the interlocking nature of race, ethnicity, gender, class, and sexual orientation over the course of time, generation, and geography is a recurrent theme in the writings of black feminists (Beale 1970; Davis 1981; Lorde 1984; Walker 1984; King 1988; Collins 1991; Guy Sheftall 1995; Springer 2002). Black feminists assert that all black women have the common experience of negotiating oppression(s) despite occupying different social locations and possessing variable privileges. The strategies through which black women claim, reframe, and politicize their specific situatedness in respect of unjust hierarchical social relationality is the politics of location. Black women

"do" identity politics out of necessity for survival and exist in the politics of location by default as a result of imposed marginalization. Identity politics is in effect an individual and a group process of consciously and subconsciously negotiating intersectionality. In *Yearning*, hooks argued that even in the margins of discourse one can actively and consciously engage the politics of location on an individual or group basis in liberating ways. Black feminists recognize that although black women and black men are tied inextricably by the experience of racism and classism, sexism is a domain that remains to be contended in private and public relationships. The complexity of black and white women's relationship has been shaped by historical sexual politics, first in the private domain during the period of enslavement in the United States, and second in the public domain in workplace relations, activism (e.g., exclusion by white feminists/activists in the suffrage and birth control movements and women's political organizations), and in academia (e.g., women's studies programs and in the articulation of feminist and critical theory).

BLACK FEMINISM AND ACTIVIST ROOTS

Black feminist thought has been expressed historically through collective social and political activism. Linking thought with action is a defining characteristic of black feminist consciousness. The contributions and deliberate acts of nineteenth century and early twentieth century black women and activists such as Anna Julia Cooper, Harriet Tubman, Sojourner Truth, Harriet Jacobs, Mary Church Terrell, Amy Jacques Garvey, Pauli Murray, and Ida B. Wells Barnett could be described as the first steps in the development of black feminist thought. Although none of these women would describe themselves as purveyors of black feminist thought, their visionary activism and commitment to social justice reflect a keen awareness of the impact of multiple oppressions on the physical, economic, and psychological well being of black women, black families, and black communities. Black women leaders

sought to redefine the images of black womanhood and address racism through organizing national black women's clubs and organizations. For instance, Mary Church Terrell founded the National Association of Colored Women (NACW) in 1896. The NACW became the intellectual and political umbrella organization for black women's clubs in the country. Black women's clubs focused on disseminating positive images and models of respectable black womanhood for public consumption. Ida B. Wells Barnett was a founder of the National Association for the Advancement of Colored People (NAACP) and is remembered best for her eloquent analysis of the intersections of race, gender, and sexuality in her anti lynching work. She documented over 700 lynchings occurring in the late 1800s. She confronted racism and sexism by highlighting the incessant sexual assaults on black women by unpunished white men and the simultaneous racist and erroneous projection of white male lascivious behavior onto black men as rapists of white women. Mary McLeod Bethune was the founder of both the Bethune Cookman Institute and National Council of Negro Women (NCNW) and president of the NACW. In 1936, she was appointed director of the Division of Negro Affairs in the National Youth Administration. At this post, Bethune arranged a historic meeting between Eleanor Roosevelt and a group of black female activists to discuss progressive policies for social change. A fervent civil rights activist, attorney, and poet, Pauli Murray provided her legal thesis to be used as foundational material to try the *Topeka Board of Education* case. Among her many accomplishments, Murray was a co founder of the National Organization of Women (NOW) and co wrote the mission statement of NOW. She also became the first black female Episcopalian priest in the United States. Frances Beale, founder and leader of the Student Non Violent Coordinating Committee (SNCC) Black Liberation Committee, argued in her groundbreaking article "Double Jeopardy: To Be Black and Female" (1970) that black women experienced racism and sexism simultaneously and that there were opportunities available to black women beyond reproduction. At the time, some black nationalists believed that black women could best help the struggle for racial

liberation by remaining home and having babies. Beale wanted to broaden the political and economic roles of black women by making motherhood compatible with employment and political activism.

In the 1970s, black feminist activists would birth two explicitly black feminist activist organizations – the National Black Feminist Organization and the Combahee River Collective. In 1973, Margaret Sloan, Eleanor Holmes Norton, and Florence Kennedy founded the National Black Feminist Organization (NBFO), the first explicitly black feminist organization in the United States. The NBFO resulted from black women's frustration with racism experienced in the women's movement and a grassroots desire to raise the consciousness of all black women and to connect to black women from all social stations in life. The first NBFO regional conference was held in New York City in 1973 with the promise of continuing much of the liberatory, self defining work started by earlier black women's organizations. The Boston Chapter of the NBFO became the Combahee River Collective, an anti capitalist, socialist revolutionary organization of intellectuals and grassroots activists. Barbara Smith, Beverly Smith, and Demita Frazier wrote the seminal "A Black Feminist Statement" (1977) on behalf of the Combahee River Collective. In this statement, the authors delineated the genesis of contemporary black feminism and their understanding of the impact of multiple oppressions; identified the legacy and divisiveness of sexual politics in black communities; rejected black lesbian separatism in the black feminist movement; documented problems in organizing black feminists; and indicated black feminist issues and future policies. In addition, the statement revealed criticisms against the black liberation and mainstream white women's liberation movements for their blatant inattention to the ways in which various aspects of identity – race, class, gender, and sexuality – are inseparable for black women. The black liberation movement of the 1970s was largely conceived as a black male movement. Michelle Wallace's *Black Macho and the Myth of the Superwoman* (1978) was a stinging analysis of black male sexism and misogyny in the black liberation movement.

BLACK FEMINISTS' BREAK FROM MAINSTREAM FEMINISM

Given that black feminists broke with mainstream feminism in the 1970s, black feminist thought reflects a provocative, sophisticated critique of the mainstream white women's movement and theorizations. In her classic work, Frances Beale (1970) argued that the praxis of white feminist groups was grounded in a privileged, middle class experience and was not cognizant of an anti racist, anti capitalist ideology. Beale, and later Michelle Wallace in *A Black Feminist's Search for Sisterhood* (1975), contended that black and white women could not unite around common grievances or discuss these issues in a serious manner if white feminist groups failed to acknowledge their complicity in and the impact of racism and capitalism on black women's lives. In *Age, Race, Class, and Sex: Women Redefining Difference* (1995), black lesbian feminist Audre Lorde explained the processes in which black women are "Othered" by white feminists. Paula Giddings (1984) argued that the alliances between black and white women were strained because white feminist organizations did not address the issues of poor and working class black women. Black feminists documented several ways in which black and white women experienced sexism differently. For instance, historically, stereo types of black and white womanhood differ and traditional housewife models of womanhood are not applicable to most black women (hooks 1984). In addition, historically, black women have been more likely to be heads of household than white women and their labor contribution to the marketplace has always exceeded that of white women (Guy Sheftall 1995). It should be noted that black feminist writings do not advocate wholly a separatist movement from mainstream feminism but do call for a recognition and the deliberate inclusion of the diversity of all women's experiences in scientific inquiry.

BLACK FEMINIST LITERATURE

The actions of black female activists paved the way for an inspiring plethora of black feminist

creative writing and scholarship in the 1970s to the present day. Toni Cade Bambara's *The Black Woman: An Anthology* (1970) was a groundbreaking anthology of poetry, essays, and short stories by and of black women. This anthology includes works by novelist Alice Walker, poets Audre Lorde and Nikki Giovanni, writer Paule Marshall, activists Grace Lee Boggs and Frances Beale, and musician Abbey Lincoln. In their own way, the authors candidly discuss how issues of race, gender, sexuality, body image, the economy, politics, and labor impact the lives of black women. In "The Dialectics of Black Womanhood" (1979), Bonnie T. Dill explored the contradictions of being a member of a group (e.g., based on racial identity) yet simultaneously being set apart from it by virtue of another identity or consciousness (e.g., gender). Barbara Smith's essay "Toward a Black Feminist Criticism" (1977) is often cited as a major catalyst in opening the field of black women's literature. This essay also presented the first serious discussion of black lesbian writing. In the 1970s, the literature of black feminists concentrated on examining primarily the relationship of race, gender, sexuality, and class.

The 1980s saw black women scholars building a bridge of theory and practice between the ivory tower and the community. Scholars wrote about their pedagogical experiences in such works as Gloria Hull, Patricia Bell Scott, and Barbara Smith's *All the Women are White, All the Men are Black, But Some of Us are Brave: Black Women's Studies* (1982) and bell hooks's *Talking Back: Thinking Feminist, Talking Black* (1989). Black feminist scholars continued to explore the daily negotiation of multiple identities or intersectionality. For instance, radical black feminist warrior/poet Audre Lorde penned the incomparable *Sister Outsider* (1984), a collection of personal reflections on facing cancer, being part of an interracial lesbian couple raising a son, sex, poetry, rage, and restraint. Other examples include Kimberle Crenshaw's "Demarginalizing the Interaction of Race and Sex: A Black Feminist Critique of Antidiscrimination Doctrine, Feminist Theory, and Anti Racist Politics" (1983) and Deborah King's "Multiple Jeopardy, Multiple Consciousnesses: The Context of a Black Feminist Ideology" (1988). In the 1980s, black

feminist literature illuminated the historical and courageous contributions of black women in American civil rights and women's movements. Paula Giddings's *When and Where I Enter: The Impact of Black Women on Race and Sex in America* (1984) and Angela Davis's *Women, Race, and Class* (1981) are seminal works that carefully contextualized black women's agency in American social movements. In addition, black women scholars critiqued their place in mainstream feminism and pushed themselves to define feminisms (see hooks 1984).

In the 1990s and early twenty first century, black women scholars focused efforts to articulate the tenets or characteristics of black feminist thought, an Afrocentric standpoint theoretical framework. Patricia Hill Collins published her landmark manifesto, *Black Feminist Thought: Knowledge, Consciousness, and the Politics of Empowerment* (1991), and addressed critiques of this work in *Fighting Words: Black Women and the Search for Justice* (1998). Authors such as Henry Louis Gates, Stanlie James and Abena Busia, Beverly Guy Sheftall, and Joy James and T. Denean Sharpley Whitling compiled significant anthologies to capture the dynamic, multifaceted pulse of black feminist thought. During this time, black feminists also spotlighted black women's experiences of intimate violence and resistance to center concerns of sexism over racism in the context of violence. Melba Wilson wrote about black women healing and surviving incest. Nellie McKay examined the high profile sexual harassment case of Anita Hill and Clarence Thomas, and the works of Beth Richie, Traci West, and Carolyn West brought sophisticated theory into a multifaceted analysis of the interlocking roles of racism, classism, and sexism, not only in abusive intimate relationships but also in how those "isms" are perpetrated against abused black women in institutions such as the criminal justice system.

CONTEMPORARY BLACK FEMINISM AND RESEARCH

Black feminist scholars and activists who are currently in their twenties and thirties some times are referred to as third wave black

feminists. As Generation X and millennials, third wave feminists may tap into popular culture (e.g., hip hop, neo soul) and art (e.g., performance, photography, dance) to conduct their analyses of black women's lives, activism, and the development of black female radical subjectivity. There are, however, black feminists such as Kimberly Springer who reject the label of "waver" on the basis that "wave ideology" or models may perpetuate the exclusion of multi ethnic feminists' contributions to the women's movement history and feminist theorizing. In 1995, Kristal Brent Zook published a highly important article that questioned the existence of black feminist activism at the organizational level. Zook chastised black women of the previous generation for failing to organize on behalf of black women and for surrendering leadership roles to serve black male oriented causes such as the Million Man March. In 2000 Barbara Ransby critiqued Zook, stating that she failed to recognize the positive effects of grassroots, decentralized black feminist organizations on black women and communities.

Methodologically, black feminist thought frameworks are conducive to qualitative, quantitative, or mixed method designs. Black feminists incorporate traditional data (e.g., interviews, narratives, case studies, oral histories) and non traditional and non literal data (e.g., poetry, storytelling, diaries, photographs, creative art) to document the personal experiences of participants. Methodological critiques of the utility of black feminist thought in scientific inquiry have included the difficulty of operationalizing black feminist concepts and the lack of predictive power in regard to behavioral outcomes. Black feminist scholars have attempted to address these critiques in their empirical research. Using survey data from the 1994 National Black Politics Study, political scientists Simien and Clawson conducted a confirmatory factor analysis to examine the structure of black feminist consciousness and its relationship to race consciousness and policy attitudes. Family scholars Few, Stephens, and Rouse Arnett shared their own experiences incorporating black feminist frameworks into their research designs, data collection methods, and representation choices for the resulting metanarratives. Future research directions should include additional attempts to

demonstrate the utility of black feminist thought in empirical research and to explore generational change and direction among identified second and third wave black feminists.

SEE ALSO: Feminism; Feminism, First, Second, and Third Waves; Feminist Standpoint Theory; Multiracial Feminism; Outsider Within; Third World and Postcolonial Feminisms/Subaltern; Transnational and Global Feminisms; Womanism

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black urban regime

John Arena

Black urban regime refers to large, majority or near majority black cities in the United States governed by black mayors. The first examples of a black urban regime were Carl Stokes's and Richard Hatcher's election in Cleveland and Gary, respectively, in the late 1960s. The majority of black urban regimes arose in the 1970s and later. In the late 1980s, 13 US cities were defined as black urban regimes, while in 2001 the number had risen to 19 (Bositis 2002: 11, 26; Reed 1999: 254).

Black urban regime theory addresses the origins, structural constraints, and sociopolitical conflicts faced by black urban regimes. Three key questions guide research on the black urban regime: Why does the regime leadership pursue policies that hurt the material interests of its predominantly black poor and working class electoral base? How does the regime gain the consent of the black community to a pro corporate development model? How would a progressive, pro working class regime arise in the context of a majority black city?

Analyzing the historical origins of black urban regimes is important for understanding the pro corporate character they have taken. Although many post war US cities faced employment losses due to deindustrialization, exodus of affluent, mostly white, residents, and

a decimated tax base, majority black cities tend to be the hardest hit by these trends (Horan 2002: 28). In fact, these negative trends are what, in many ways, allow for the ascension of a predominantly black political leadership at the municipal level. Furthermore, by the late 1970s, as several black mayors were coming to power, the federal government began to drastically reduce funding to cities. Thus, there were – and are – strong structural factors that encourage black urban political leaders to pursue a business oriented “pro growth” development model. A pro corporate urban economic development model appears as the only viable strategy to lure investment and jobs back to cities.

Although the structural constraints are important, they are not sufficient to explain the pro corporate character of the black political leadership. Reed (1988) points to the social origins of the black political class to explain the regressive development model they support. Black political leaders – even those with a civil rights background – have tended to come from a professional managerial stratum. Furthermore, many were groomed for political office in federal government and private foundation funded poverty programs (Reed 1999: 88–9). Thus, their class background, past political formation, and attendant ideological worldview predisposed them to a pro business agenda.

Further solidifying black middle class support for the pro corporate model are the material benefits that accrue. The opening of high level positions in the public sector, and the awarding of public contracts to African Americans that had previously been limited to whites, has tended to benefit the black middle class. Thus, similar to urban regime theory as developed by Stone (1989), black urban regime theory identifies a dominant *governing coalition*, composed of a black led public sector and a white dominated corporate sector. This alliance represents the power structure in majority black cities. Its members cooperate to carry out urban economic regeneration projects.

The governing elite alliance is not without conflict. A major point of contention has been over affirmative action programs in the awarding of contracts. Nonetheless, there tends to be agreement on the overall pro corporate orientation of the regime.

The focus of *urban regime theory* is to analyze the process of cooperation and conflict between the public and private sector segments of the governing elite. To examine the content of this relationship the major, pro growth corporate organization is normally studied. For example, in his classic urban regime theory informed study Stone (1989) analyzed the Central Atlanta Progress (CAP), which was that southern city’s most powerful corporate planning organization. In contrast to this research agenda, a distinguishing feature of *black urban regime theory* informed studies is their focus on the impact of the pro corporate agenda on black working class communities and how regime elites legitimate inequality. For example, Oden (1999) found that Oakland’s black urban regime delivered only symbolic, rather than substantive, redistributive benefits to poor and black working class communities. Reed (1987) pointed to the discursive powers of black mayors – in this case, Atlanta’s Maynard Jackson – as key to obfuscating the material, class based distributive stakes embedded in the pro growth agenda.

There are several theoretical, methodological, and political issues that must be addressed to extend and develop this research agenda. Theoretically, future studies need to draw connections between the meso, or middle range, level that black urban regime theory operates within and the macro, extra local level changes and forces. Lauria (1997) recommends employing regulation theory as one way to make the macro–micro connection. Methodologically, researchers must refine their data gathering techniques to highlight the key unit of analysis of black urban regime theory informed studies – the class relationship between the governing elite and the overwhelming black working class popular base of the regime. To obtain rich data, researchers must develop meaningful relationships of trust with black working class communities.

The methodological challenges are tied to implementing the political agenda of black urban regime theory. Like all theories, black urban regime theory has a normative or political component. The political goal is to use theory and research to strengthen the capacity of working class communities to challenge the regressive pro corporate agenda of the

governing elite. Researchers face three challenges to realizing this normative agenda. The first is to allow black working class communities to define issues that need to be studied. The second is to include workers as participants in research. The third is to develop ways for workers to draw on research findings to improve the political practice of the working class movement. Arena (2006, forthcoming) has drawn from the political action research model to articulate and implement the embedded political goals of black urban regime theory.

SEE ALSO: Inequality and the City; Metropolis; Race; Social Exclusion; Urban Policy; Urban Renewal and Redevelopment; Urbanization

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blasé/neurasthenic personalities

Chris Rojek

The concept of blasé/neurasthenic personalities was coined by the German sociologist Georg Simmel to refer to distinctive psychological responses to modern, metropolitan life. In his masterpiece, *The Philosophy of Money* (1907), Simmel analyzed modern, metropolitan existence in relation to a variety of ubiquitous social effects. Among the most prominent are the fragmentation of relations; the increasing preponderance of technology in everyday life; the leveling effect of monetary exchange transactions; the separation of subjectivity from culture; and the recession of tradition. In these circumstances, Simmel argued, there are strong tendencies for men and women to adopt blasé or neurasthenic characteristics in their personality and interpersonal behavior. The blasé personality is punch drunk by the ephemerality and instability of modern conditions. They become indifferent to suffering and in justice. They retreat into a cocoon of purely subjective considerations and initiatives. The neurasthenic personality is wired by the impermanence and prolific possibilities offered by modernity. Their behavior is characterized by ceaseless anxiety and nervousness, which prevents them from fully committing to transcendent goals.

Simmel's analysis of the psychology of modernity influenced David Riesman and Christopher Lasch in the 1950s and 1970s, but it only became prominent in sociology and cultural studies during postmodernism and the so-called collapse of grand narratives. Simmel's categories of psychological types captured the romantic uncertainty of living without guarantees and with globalization and disembodiedness. However, as with much in Simmel's work, it offered no politics of social reconstruction.

SEE ALSO: Alienation; Metropolis; Modernity; Simmel, Georg

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Blau, Peter (1918–2002)

Omar Lizardo

Peter Blau is one of the most influential figures in post war American sociology. His long career and range of substantive interests span the range from small groups and social exchange theory to organizational theory, the analysis of status attainment, and finally general sociological theory. One significant legacy is his macrostructural theory, or as he referred to it in his landmark book *Inequality and Heterogeneity* (1977), his “primitive theory of social structure.”

Blau began his sociological training with a Parsonian interest in broad theoretical systems. However, his orientation toward theory was significantly transformed during the course of his training at Columbia University under the tutelage of Paul Lazarsfeld and Robert Merton. From Merton and Lazarsfeld he developed a concern with the measurement of abstract concepts and their connection to theory. Blau is sometimes considered the last great “grand theorist” of twentieth century American sociology. His notion of grand theoretical sociology as primarily a general, explanatory, and empirical form of doing science continues to form the core of mainstream sociological theory and research into the twenty first century.

In spite of its apparent “heterogeneity,” it can be argued that a single strand runs through Blau’s diverse body of work. For Blau, the

study of the structural limits posed by large scale distributions of actors, positions, and resources on the opportunities and choices of individuals constituted the central subject matter of sociology. Nevertheless Blau made seminal contributions to many sociological fields. His life’s work can be divided into four major components: status attainment, his work on organizations, his exchange theory, and his macrostructural theory.

STATUS ATTAINMENT AND MOBILITY

Blau and Duncan’s classic monograph *The American Occupational Structure* (1967) introduced to a sociological audience multiple regression and path analysis, which is today the bread and butter of quantitative sociology. Blau himself seems to have considered this focus to be only a peripheral afterthought in the context of his other work. In a later recollection he noted that he was urged to undertake a large scale study of mobility in the American occupational structure since in 1950 none yet existed. He enlisted the help of the legendary Otis Dudley Duncan because he considered his own experience with quantitative analysis inadequate. The book remains a landmark mainly because of its quantitative innovations. Most of its admittedly overly optimistic substantive conclusions regarding a future of increasing mobility and decline of ascription have since then come under criticism.

ORGANIZATIONAL THEORY

Blau’s first major contributions to sociology were in the field of organizations. His first major publication – an elaboration of his dissertation research – was *Dynamics of Bureaucracy* (1955), which at the time formed part of a rising post Weberian wave of organizational studies. This research consisted in exploring how far the received image of the Weberian bureaucracy as an efficient, mechanical system of roles, positions, and duties held up under close scrutiny in the empirical study of social interaction within organizations. Blau (1955) contributed to this strand of research

by highlighting the ways in which the real life of the organization was structured along informal channels of interaction and socio emotional exchange, and how the incipient status systems formed through these back channels were as important to the continued functioning of these organizations as the formal status structure. Thus, Blau was primarily concerned with the interplay between formal structure, informal practices, and bureaucratic pressures and how these processes affect organizational change.

Blau's second major contribution to organizational analysis centered on the study of the determinants of the "bureaucratic components" of organizations. He collected data on 53 Employment Security Agencies in the US and 1,201 local offices. The major outcome of this work was Blau's (1970) general theory of differentiation in organizations. This article had an immediate impact in the field of organizations in particular and in American sociology in general. It featured for the first time what would become Blau's characteristic style of deductive theorizing. Blau derived several useful generalizations, the most important of which are (1) increasing size results in an increase in the number of distinct positions (differentiation) in an organization at a decreasing rate, and (2) as size increases the administrative component (personnel not directly engaged in production but in coordination) decreases. This article generated a flurry of research attempts to further formalize, test, and qualify the theory. Most of these studies (primarily by Bruce Mayhew and his students) supported Blau's generalizations.

Because organizational theory in sociology moved away from nomothetic generalizations about determinants of intra organizational structure and to the study of organizational environments, Blau's article only had a brief influence on organizational research. However, as an exemplar of how to do research and how to build theory, and as a way of showing that general and fruitful deductive theory was possible in sociology, Blau's article (and his later macrostructural theory) deeply influenced a generation of researchers. Because Blau's formal style of theorizing was naturally compatible with attempts at mathematical formalization (and both his organizational and later his macrostructural theory were indeed formalized

by mathematical sociologists such as Norman Hummon, Thomas Fararo, and John Skvoretz), it can be said that Blau's work at this stage constituted an important impetus for the development of mathematical sociology as a coherent and productive subfield in American sociology.

EXCHANGE THEORY AND SMALL GROUP BEHAVIOR

From his original study of social activity in bureaucracies, Blau developed a "microstructural" theory of exchange and social integration in small groups (Blau 1960b). His work on this type of non economic exchange and its interaction with the status and power structure of the group (flows of advice, esteem, and reputation) would later become important in the influential formalization of exchange theory in the hands of Richard Emerson. To this day Blau is seen in social psychology (along with George Homans) as one of the intellectual progenitors of modern exchange theory in structural social psychology.

While this strand of Blau's work may appear anomalous from the point of view of his later focus on macrostructure, it is important not to be misled by the issue of scale (micro versus macro). Even at this early stage Blau showed a predilection for a distinctive style of Durkheimian explanation, in which individual level outcomes in small groups (competitiveness, cooperativeness, orientation toward peers and clients, etc.) were seen as at least partly derivable from "structural effects" (Blau 1960a) associated with the overall distribution of these qualities in the group, and with the position of the individual in the network of relations of the group.

MACROSTRUCTURAL THEORY

For Blau (1977), social structure consisted of the networks of social relations that organize patterns of interaction across different social positions. This view of social structure was faithful to Radcliffe Brown's definition of social structure as the network of actually existing relations that connects human beings in a society. Blau broke with Radcliffe Brown on

how he conceptualized the components of social structure. For Blau, the basic components of social structure were not natural persons, but instead social positions. Thus, the “parts” of social structure are classes of people like men and women, rich and poor, etc. The relations between these components are none other than the actual network connections that may (or may not) obtain between members of different positions.

Blau thought that the genesis of social structure can be found whenever an undifferentiated group begins to array itself along some socially relevant distinction. In Blau’s view, to speak of social structure is to speak of differentiation among people. By a socially relevant distinction, Blau means a social distinction along some distinguishable social characteristic (age, race, sex, religion, ethnicity, etc.) which comes to determine who interacts with whom. Blau used the term parameter of social structure to refer to socially relevant positions along which people could be classified. For Blau, a particular criterion of classification was not a parameter if it did not actually affect the real social relations of individuals “on the ground.”

In Blau’s (1974) view, two major classes of parameters could be distinguished: graduated and nominal. Modern society was characterized, following an insight of Simmel’s, by the fact that they were composed of (1) a multiplicity of socially relevant positions and (2) that these positions were connected to one another in complex and sometimes mutually contradictory ways, resulting in cross cutting social circles. Two positions are connected in a mutually contradictory manner if increasing interaction along one distinction leads to decreasing interaction on another. Positions may also be connected in a mutually reinforcing way, whenever interaction along one distinction increases the chances of connecting along some other distinction.

For Blau, one important consequence for rates of intergroup interaction follows from the distribution of people across social positions. The heterogeneity theorem states that increasing heterogeneity across any given dimension of association (more even distribution of people along the “slots” that define a given parameter, such as years of education) increases the probability of intergroup relations.

Thus, in a hypothetical society in which 90 percent of the population has 20 years of education and the other 10 percent has 6 years of education, we should expect less intergroup relations along the education dimension in a society in which people are evenly distributed across this dimension even when holding constant the individual preferences to associate with people of the same educational level. Thus, the lower or higher levels of intergroup contact caused by the distribution of people across positions is a “structural effect” (Blau 1960a) separable from individual level attributes.

The theory was put to empirical test by Blau and Schwartz (1984), where many of the propositions of the theory found verification with data on rates of intermarriage among different groups in SMSAs in the US. The theory was refined and restated one last time by Blau (1994). At the later stages of his career, Blau attempted partially to reformulate some of the areas of research that he had touched on earlier (such as social exchange, mobility, and organization processes) in terms of his later macrostructural framework. This effort, however, remained partial at best, and met with some empirical disconfirmation. Therefore, a complete macrostructural theory remained outside Blau’s grasp.

However, Blau’s legacy lives on: his idea of social structure as the distribution of individuals along a multidimensional space (Blau 1977; Blau & Schwartz 1984) has become the central element of McPherson’s “structural ecological” general theory of affiliation, where this multidimensional social space has been rebaptized as Blau Space in his honor. Fararo and Skvoretz have been able to formalize Blau’s ideas regarding different interaction probabilities given different distributions of people across social positions and different levels of in group and out group preferences, showing it to be formally compatible with Granovetter’s strength of weak ties principle. In this and many other ways, Blau’s foundational ideas continue to be the impetus for theoretical development and innovation in contemporary social science.

SEE ALSO: Exchange Network Theory; Merton, Robert K.; Organization Theory; Organizations as Social Structures; Simmel, Georg; Social Exchange Theory; Social Structure

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blockbusting

W. Edward Orser

Real estate blockbusting, pervasive in many American cities in the post World War II period, is the intentional action of a real estate broker to place an African American resident in a previously all white neighborhood for the express purpose of the excessive profit to be made by panicking whites into selling low, then in turn charging marked up prices to incoming minority residents (Helper 1969). The Civil Rights Act (Fair Housing Act) of 1968 declared it an illegal practice “for profit, to induce or attempt to induce” sales and rentals “by representations regarding the entry or prospective entry into the neighborhood of [a] person or persons of a particular race, color, religion, etc.” (Section 804 [e]). The 1968 Act, which declared discrimination in residential sales,

rentals, or loans illegal, specifically outlawed blockbusting and indirectly barred other discriminatory real estate practices, including steering and redlining.

Rigid adherence to residential segregation designed to maintain a racially separated (dual) housing market paradoxically enabled blockbusting to flourish under certain circumstances. Typically, blockbusters preyed upon the racial prejudices and fears of white residents in segregated neighborhoods by selling or renting to African Americans – or even by spreading rumors of black settlement – to panic property owners unwilling to accept residential integration. Such actions, sometimes referred to as “panic selling” or “panic peddling,” severely depressed housing values, enabling the operators to purchase houses well below prior market value. As whites succumbed to blockbusters’ tactics, “white flight” often ensued, further depressing the prices they were willing to accept. In turn, blockbusters sold the properties to African American home seekers, previously denied such residential options within the rigid confines of housing segregation, at markups considerably in excess of normal business margins. The profit from such transactions, which could be considerable, was sometimes referred to as “the color tax” or “black tax,” the price African Americans had to pay to gain new housing opportunity. Since prospective African American home buyers often lacked access to conventional financing due to discrimination from mainstream financial organizations, blockbusters also often profited from loan arrangements, including second mortgages and land contracts, which protected their investment but left purchasers exposed to considerable risk.

In the first decades of the twentieth century the growth of African American populations in urban centers as part of the First Great Migration led to early variations by real estate agents dubbed “white blockbusters.” Focusing their activities on the margins of formative urban ghettos, these operators recognized the profit to be made in tenement districts like New York’s Harlem or Chicago’s South Side, where housing values were depressed, of introducing African American tenants, who had little choice historically but to pay substantially higher rents than whites (Osofsky 1963; Philpott 1978).

Blockbusting reached its peak in the United States in the post World War decades of the 1950s and 1960s, however. During the first half of the twentieth century, the formal and informal mechanisms undergirding residential segregation had hardened, even as African American populations in urban areas increased substantially. Early efforts to assure housing segregation by discriminatory zoning failed court tests, but restrictive covenants on the basis of race or religion were introduced widely into single family housing neighborhoods and subject to enforcement by community improvement associations. Not until 1948 in *Shelley v. Kramer* did the US Supreme Court rule that restrictive covenants were unenforceable. Federal mortgage loan programs, introduced in the 1930s as part of the New Deal effort to stimulate the housing industry and encourage homeownership, not only sanctioned but also encouraged residential segregation. Policies intended to protect the risk of lenders “red lined” neighborhoods where racial mixing occurred, considering them likely to become unstable and therefore poor investments, and prevented African Americans from gaining access to conventional financing in such areas (Jackson 1985; Massey & Denton 1993). The mainstream real estate industry, members of the National Association of Real Estate Brokers (claiming the title “Realtors”), was equally committed to preserving residential segregation. Its “Code of Ethics,” adopted in 1924 and continued in much the same form into the 1950s, contained a section which committed its members to an anti blockbusting standard, but left a backdoor opportunity to small firms, white and black, which did not – or could not – belong to the organization and therefore were not bound by such guidelines. Finally, violence and the threat of violence often played a role in preventing African American settlement in white neighborhoods.

The mechanisms of segregation held remarkably firm in cities across the nation, even as African American urban populations swelled during and after World War II in the era of the Second Great Migration. Equally remarkable, however, was how rapidly they crumbled during the post war decades. While blockbusting likely accelerated rather than caused the episodes of rapid racial transition that ultimately

led to an expanded but still racially segregated ghetto, it played a critical role in a process which unfolded with extraordinary similarity in city after city – New York, Chicago, Cleveland, Detroit, Boston, Baltimore, St. Louis, Kansas City, Dallas Ft. Worth. With the mainstream real estate and finance industry focused on new suburban housing, underwritten by favorable federal policies and generally available only to whites, blockbusters and real estate speculators reaped profits from the exceptional convergence of white prejudice and African American need. Especially vulnerable to blockbuster tactics were single family neighborhoods adjacent to the traditional ghetto; however, blockbusting triggered racial change at such a rapid rate in some instances that areas well beyond the earlier informal boundaries soon experienced its effects. While African Americans gained improved housing opportunities, neighborhood amenities, and living space, the instability of neighborhood turnover, the cost of inflated prices and risky financing, and the commercial disinvestment which often accompanied racial change frequently produced resegregation and subsequent socioeconomic decline.

Localities sometimes attempted to curb or prevent blockbusting practices, adopting ordinances intended to quell panic by limiting “for sale” signs or various forms of solicitation. African American real estate agents and others sometimes challenged local restrictions as unreasonable restraints on their legitimate business and the interests of their clients. In some cities, firms accused of blockbusting were sued for unethical business practices and exploitative transactions. Fair housing organizations in localities like Cleveland and Chicago sought to combat real estate practices which adversely affected prospects for residential segregation, including blockbusting, with affirmative programs aimed at achieving stable levels of racial diversity.

Following adoption of the Fair Housing Act, flagrant instances of blockbusting have declined, though steering continues to be more pervasive. The anti blockbusting provisions of the law were upheld by federal court decisions in 1971 (*United States v. Mitchell* and *United States v. Bob Lawrence Realty*) and again in 1975 (*Zuch v. Hussey*) (Metcalfe 1988). The

weak enforcement mechanisms of the original law were strengthened by the 1988 Fair Housing Act.

SEE ALSO: Race (Racism); Redlining; Restrictive Covenants; Steering, Racial Real Estate; Urban Policy; Urbanization

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Blumer, Herbert George (1900–87)

Thomas J. Morriene

Herbert George Blumer, tutored by his parents to be keenly observant of society, was early on a serious scholar of history and philosophy. He emerged from rural Missouri to study at Chicago under George Herbert Mead already enamored of the prospects for examining and explaining the interactions among human beings and the world. He was fortunate as an undergraduate at the University of Missouri to be able to work with Charles Ellwood, a sociologist, and Max Meyer, a psychologist, both of whom nurtured his progress toward Phi Beta Kappa recognition.

Blumer was always grounded in the real world of labor and economics. He had to drop

out of high school to help in his father's wood working shop and worked summers as a roustabout to pay for his college education at the University of Missouri (BA 1921, MA 1922). He later taught part time and played professional football (1925–33) with the Chicago Cardinals while he worked toward his PhD at Chicago. He then taught at Chicago from 1928 until 1951 when he was appointed the first chair of the Department of Sociology at the University of California at Berkeley, a post he held until he retired in 1967. With Emeritus Professor status until 1986, he remained actively engaged in writing and research until shortly before his death. Throughout his long career Blumer combined research and theory with practical involvements in the public and private sectors: with the Department of State's Office of War Information (1943–5), as a charter member of the US Board of Arbitration, and as chair of the Board of Arbitration for the US Steel Corporation and the United Steel Workers of America (1945–7). He headed various professional organizations including the American Sociological Association (1956), UC Berkeley's Institute of Social Sciences (1959–65), and the Pacific Sociological Association (1971–2) and was regularly recognized for his achievements, including the Career of Distinguished Scholarship Award from the American Sociological Association in 1983. In each role, he strived to foster and focus scholarly debates on topics that combined theoretical relevance with practical significance (see Morriene 1999 and Blumer 2004 for additional biographical information).

Blumer's (1969) preeminent contribution to sociology and social psychology is his formulation of a distinctive theoretical and methodological perspective known as "symbolic interactionism." Based on the philosophy and social psychology of both George Herbert Mead and John Dewey, it is firmly grounded in pragmatists' assumptions about human action and the nature of the self. The theory underlies his lifelong critique of mainstream, deductively formulated, positivistic, and structural functional sociology.

In building this theoretical perspective and its associated methodological position, Blumer (2004) drew heavily from the work of Mead to present social action and social structure as

ongoing processes of individual and collective action predicated on the uniquely human capacity for self indication. Symbolic interactionism articulates Blumer's rationale for rejecting theoretical stances not based on close examination of individual and collective human experience. He particularly disdained theories that ignore or belittle the role individuals play in creating, sustaining, and changing the social world through the ubiquitous processes of self indication, interpretation, and action. His wide ranging macro and micro oriented research emphasized the empirical focus of symbolic interactionism (Prus 1996), its anti positivist, anti behaviorist perspective, and its utility as an all encompassing theory of human action (Maines 1988; Morrione 1988).

Blumer (1969) sets out the perspective's three basic premises in *Symbolic Interactionism: Perspective and Method*: (1) people act individually and collectively on the basis of the meanings of "objects" in their world; (2) the meanings of these material (an automobile, a pencil, a statue), abstract (justice, truth, love), or social (a friend, soldiers, a parent) objects are constructed in encounters people have with one another; and (3) during interaction people use interpretive processes to change these meanings. He then discusses the "root images" of the perspective: human group life, interactions, objects, actors, actions, and interconnections among individual and group acts or lines of action.

Blumer always sees human group life, including social structures, in terms of action that occurs as people endeavor to manage situations. As individuals construct acts they define the situations they confront and create definitions of reality to guide action. When the meaning of a gesture is shared between or among people it becomes, as Mead says, "significant," enabling communication, concerted action, and ultimately, the formation of social organization.

For Blumer, like Mead and Dewey, neither action nor interactions are, as behaviorists may argue, mere responses to stimuli; they are outcomes of processes of indication and interpretation that mediate between stimulus and response. These processes result in the creation of symbols or stimuli to which meanings are attached. All Blumer's sociology rests on this pivotal detail. The fact that people point out or indicate things to themselves, attach meanings

to them, and thereby create objects, would be of little significance without the understanding that people act on the basis of the meanings of the objects in their life experience. Without self indication and symbolic interaction, there would be no social world.

Methodologically, the indication–definition–action link is key because it means that in order to understand why individuals or groups do whatever they do, one has to grasp the meaning of the objects in their world, as they define them and as they bring them to bear on action. For Blumer, this means that careful examination of processes of collective definition is central to any work that investigates macro structural phenomena, including social change, industrialization, social problems, or social movements.

The idea that one must strive to see the world from the point of view of those experiencing it lies at the heart of contemporary ethnographic research and attends to Robert E. Park's warning about problems created by substituting the views of the researcher for the views of the participants. Blumer similarly valued Charles H. Cooley and W. I. Thomas's understanding of action related interpretive and definitional processes, and crafted a pragmatist's version of Cooley's "sympathetic introspection." Blumer's view defines social reality as more than a mental phenomenon and serves as a basic element in ethnographic research.

Blumer contends that action is formed and guided through processes of role taking based on indication, self interaction, and object and situation definition. To create or "build up" an act an actor must, wittingly or not, point things out to him/herself and anticipate what the other(s) might do in turn as they regard the projected act. Being able to be an object to oneself, possessing a self, allows this to occur. Acts are, according to Blumer, formed through a process of ongoing definition and interpretation and have infinitely variable careers. Some acts are linked together as people "fit" their lines of action together. These "joint acts," as he calls them, are the essence of social organization and social structures such as marriage, a corporate board meeting, a Senate hearing, a protest march, or a multinational disaster relief effort. Joint acts, made up of acts predicated on

individual and collective definitions, also present “obdurate” realities that exist in their own right, apart from the ways people confronting them may wish to see them.

Blumer espouses a distinctly non reified definition of social structures as processes involving action and a recursive model of society conceived of as a “network of interaction.” He depicts society, not as a system with innate needs striving to maintain equilibrium as functionalists do, but rather as a dynamic “framework” comprised of “acting units” (individuals, interest groups, organizations, communities) “interlinked” through symbolic interaction and “joint activity” meeting and handling a never ending stream of situations within which individual and collective acts of all sizes and durations occur. This view facilitates analyses of macro social phenomena (Lyman 1988). Although Blumer (1969: 57) argues that sociology should concern itself with “molar parts or aspects” of society like “institutions, stratification arrangements, class systems, divisions of labor, [and] large scale corporate units” lodged within it, he employs these conventional terms in an unconventional way, rejecting the notion that they are abstract forces or variables capable of *causing* individual or collective acts.

Blumer believed that the self, through interpreting and defining whatever is encountered in situations, allows people to *construct* action and that all structures, including culture, norms, or biological and psychological conditions, affect, but do not determine, action. In *Industrialization as an Agent of Social Change* (1990), he says that industrialization plays a “neutral role” in shaping human behavior; it does not determine it. Industrialization impacts society as people who confront its aspects imagine the potential impact and assess the consequences according to their own world of meaning.

Using this fundamental premise Blumer crafted major and often discipline defining analyses of a host of subjects that included collective behavior, social movements, fashion, race relations, industrial and labor relations, social problems, morale, public opinion, social attitudes, social change, public sector social science research, and social psychology. Consistent with his perspective, he assigned social interaction the central role in creating, maintaining, and changing social reality. Blumer’s

(1939) analysis of collective behavior and social movements, for instance, foreshadows major themes in “resource mobilization” and “new movement” theory while directing inquiry into processes of individual and social definition and group conflicts revolving around cultural, ethnic, and economic bases of power, any of which might spur individuals and groups to contest the status quo.

Race relations was a hot topic at the University of Chicago; Robert Park, Louis Wirth, Robert Redfield, Everett C. Hughes, as well as Blumer, studied it. He saw race prejudice as motivated by a “sense of group position” and reflected in a “color line” embodying socially constructed images of group dominance and subordination. These images, Blumer (1958) observed, emerge from a collective process of definition and comparison, framing acts that eventuate in social structural arrangements supporting racism. His analysis challenges psychological and psychoanalytic models of race prejudice that locate its origins in psychological phenomena such as personality traits or attitudes. Blumer, instead, emphasized the value of a macro structural (Lyman 1984) historical sociological perspective sensitive to processes of social interaction and individual and collective definition.

Although symbolic interactionism seems likely to continue to draw criticism from positivists, structuralists, and others who espouse methodologies that are more removed from the actualities of human activity, reflection, and interaction, its assumptions and central concepts inform a wide range of empirically grounded ethnographic depictions of “structure as action” as well as specific considerations of the self, human activity, and interchanges as meaningful, adjustable processes.

Building on the conceptual and methodological emphases in Herbert Blumer’s work, Patricia and Peter Adler, Howard S. Becker, Gary Allen Fine, John Lofland, Lyn H. Lofland, Stanford M. Lyman, David R. Maines, Thomas J. Morriane, Robert Prus, Clinton Sanders, Tamotsu Shibutani, Anselm Strauss, and Jacqueline Wiseman, among others, have contributed notably to the interactionist perspective. Readers may refer to their works for a fuller sense of what has become known as Blumerian or Chicago style symbolic interaction.

Attending to individual and collective action, regardless of the subject matters or interactional features at hand, Herbert Blumer not only emphasizes the importance of comprehending and examining social reality as it is developed within the emergent flow of situations experienced and adjustively handled by people in ever shifting arenas in which they find themselves, but he also stresses the need for developing a set of trans situational or generic social processes each of which is to be informed by examining human group life in the instances in which it takes place.

SEE ALSO: Cooley, Charles Horton; Dewey, John; Mead, George Herbert; Park, Robert E. and Burgess, Ernest W.; Pragmatism; Symbolic Interaction

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Boas, Franz (1858–1942)

Bernd Weiler

Franz Boas, born in Minden, Westphalia, is commonly regarded as the most influential figure of American anthropology in the first third of the twentieth century. Raised in an assimilated Jewish family, which had strong sympathies for the liberal ideals of the revolution of 1848, Boas studied natural sciences and mathematics at the universities of Heidelberg, Bonn, and Kiel, graduating in 1881. In a complex intellectual “odyssey” he abandoned his materialistic *Weltanschauung* and, under the influence of neo Kantianism, shifted his attention from the field of physics to Fechnerian psychophysics to Ratzel's anthropogeography, and finally, several years after graduating from university, to ethnology (Stocking 1982: 133–60). In 1883–4 he spent a year among the Inuit of Baffinland to examine the influence of the natural environment on the life of the people. Upon his return to Germany Boas published the results of his first fieldwork, obtained the docentship for geography at the University of Berlin, intensified his relationship with the leading German physical anthropologist, pathologist, and liberal politician R. Virchow, and worked as an assistant of A. Bastian at the *Royal Ethnographical Museum* at Berlin. Fascinated by the museum's collection of North Pacific Coast culture, Boas went to do fieldwork in British Columbia in 1886. The culture of the Native Americans of the Northwest Coast was to remain at the center of Boas's ethnographic research throughout his life. Returning to New York in 1887, Boas accepted the position as an assistant editor of the journal *Science* and, for political, professional, and personal reasons, decided to settle in the New World. From 1889 to 1892 he taught anthropology at Clark University, supervising the first American PhD in anthropology. From 1892 to 1894 he worked as an anthropologist at the *World's Columbian Exposition* at Chicago. While serving as a curator of the American Museum of Natural History (1896–1905) Boas organized the famous Jesup North Pacific Expedition, which set out to study the historical relationships between Asian and North American

peoples. In 1896 he became a lecturer of physical anthropology and in 1899 was appointed the first full professor of anthropology at Columbia University, a post he held until his retirement in 1936–7.

As a key figure in the professionalization of anthropology Boas helped to establish the American Anthropological Association as well as other anthropological organizations, founded and edited various anthropological journals, helped to organize the International School of American Archaeology and Ethnology in Mexico, and taught the first generations of academic anthropologists in the US, many of whom went on to establish and hold posts at prestigious anthropological departments and institutions. Apart from his numerous scientific writings, Boas was also a well known public intellectual who spoke and wrote on a variety of socially contested issues such as racism, nationalism, and immigration. His name has remained closely associated with the doctrine of cultural determinism and the anti racist movement.

Though few would deny the importance of Boas's role in the history of anthropology, opinions diverge when it comes to judging his scientific accomplishments. Those viewing his legacy in a positive light argue that his rigorous criticism of social evolutionism (the dominant paradigm in anthropology around 1900), his rejection of racial explanations of cultural differences, his emphasis on the fundamental sameness of the human mind the world over, his idea that race, language, and culture were distinct categories which had to be studied independently of each other, and the prominence given to diffusion and to the historicity of so called "primitive" societies contributed decisively to the modern relativistic and pluralistic concept of culture (Stocking 1982). Because of his insistence on grasping the Native's point of view and uncovering the subconscious categories underlying the Native's language, Boas is also credited with laying the foundations for the hermeneutic method in anthropology. As a physical anthropologist Boas is said to have proven the instability of the human type in general and of the cephalic index in particular. Finally, it is argued that by his continuous warning against "premature" theories and by calling for extensive fieldwork

and "painstaking" data collection, Boas set new standards of proof, put an end to "armchair anthropology," and became a leader of the scientific revolution in anthropology in the early twentieth century.

Critics of the Boasian tradition argue that as an ethnographer Boas was unable to synthesize his vast collection of data and to present a coherent picture of the cultures he studied (White 1963). Furthermore, his overall idiosyncratic orientation, his deep seated belief that facts will eventually speak for themselves, and his tendency to take one negative instance to discard established theories are said to have hampered theory building in anthropology. In recent years doubts have also been raised about the accuracy of Boas's data in his famous study on the changes of immigrants' head shapes. These doubts have reinforced the criticism that Boas's cultural determinist stance, which was most fully developed by his students Benedict and Mead, suffers from a severe ideological bias, namely from the neglect of biology and the strong preference of nurture over nature.

SEE ALSO: Anthropology, Cultural and Social: Early History; Biosociological Theories; Cultural Relativism; Culture; Mead, Margaret; Race; Race (Racism); Scientific Racism

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body, abominations of the

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Erving Goffman (1963) describes three types of “stigma,” or attributes that are socially discrediting: violations of accepted behavior or belief, membership in a despised national, religious, or racial group, and abominations of the body. The final category involves physical characteristics that compromise bodily appearance or functioning. Whether voluntarily or involuntarily acquired, abominations of the body can be regarded as a form of deviance. Like the other types of stigma, undesirable physical characteristics isolate some individuals, disqualifying them from “full social acceptance” (p. 1). Everything about the stigmatized person is interpreted in light of the negative trait, so that interaction with the non stigmatized is often awkward and uncertain. Tension is manifest in people’s tendency to avoid eye contact, make guarded references to the stigma, or avoid everyday words that suddenly become taboo; it leads both parties to consider avoiding or withdrawing from encounters.

Two main types of bodily abomination are *violations of aesthetic norms* and *physical disability*. Aesthetic norms are standards for appearance, including height, weight, and the absence of disfigurement. Individuals whose body deviates from the norms of their society are often treated as less than fully human. Examples include uncircumcised females in many African countries and hermaphrodites (who are born with both male and female sexual characteristics) in the West. Conversely, societies reward persons who conform to aesthetic standards. The tendency to link physical attractiveness with positive characteristics and life outcomes

has been documented since the 1970s (Dion et al. 1972). In particular, physical attractiveness increases perceived sociability and popularity (Eagley et al. 1991). There are concrete benefits as well; attractive people earn higher salaries (Frieze et al. 1991) and report having more sexual partners (Berscheid & Walster 1974).

The second category of bodily stigma, physical disability, refers to the difficulties that impaired persons face in engaging with their environment and their exclusion from full social participation (Oliver 1996). Whether impairment becomes disability depends largely on societal context – not only structural and environmental factors, but also imagery and attitudes about impairment. In some countries, injury and illness prevention campaigns may actually foster the notion that physical impairment is intolerable (Wang 1992). In addition, research indicates that “able bodied” Americans prefer to avoid impaired people, as evidenced by their stated preference to work with, live next door to, and socialize with other “able bodied” individuals (Katz 1981).

Some bodily abominations are more discrediting than others. For example, paralysis may be more stigmatizing than shortness due to its greater visibility, obtrusiveness, and perceived consequences for functioning. Beliefs about the bearer’s culpability – be they accurate or not – also influence reactions to stigma. Obesity is often attributed to self indulgence and laziness, even though researchers are unsure about what makes some people fatter than others (Grogan 1999). At the same time, the stigmatized are not always held responsible for bodily abominations that are the unintended consequences of voluntary acts. The amputated limb of a professional mountaineer, for instance, is readily seen as evidence of courage and competitive spirit. Ultimately, whether one attaches blame to stigma is largely a matter of cultural context.

Individuals respond differently to the social consequences of their bodily abomination. Some internalize the negative attitudes of others, believing that they deserve to be stigmatized. Many obese people, for instance, develop feelings of self loathing. Like the majority, they too come to see themselves as slothful and undisciplined (Cahnman 1968). Other individuals respond by forming collectivities or

engaging in political action. In recent decades, racial minorities, homosexuals, and the disabled have all fought for equal access to material and cultural resources, claiming that their perceived stigma is an illegitimate basis for social exclusion. Finally, some groups consciously adopt stigmatizing physical markers as a form of political protest. The tattooing, facial piercing, and Native American “Mohawk” hairstyles worn by 1970s British “punks,” for example, have been described as expressions of social disaffection and rebellion (Hebdige 1979). Similarly, some contemporary body modifiers use “tribal style” scarification, branding, tongue splitting, and genital piercing to convey solidarity with indigenous peoples and establish membership in a subcultural community (Pitts 2003). Such activities are becoming increasingly mainstream, however, and questions have been raised about their efficacy as a form of political resistance (Kleese 1999). Nonetheless, given that many body modifiers understand their abominations as a means of valorizing physical difference and conveying cultural dissent, the significance of these practices remains open to interpretation, at least for the time being.

SEE ALSO: Body and Cultural Sociology; Body Modification; Body and Society; Deviance; Goffman, Erving; Identity, Deviant; Labeling; Stigma

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body and cultural sociology

Bryan S. Turner

Diverse theoretical traditions have been influential in the development of the contemporary sociology of the body, such as philosophical anthropology, Marxist humanism, and phenomenology. However, Michel Foucault (1926–84) has been a dominant influence in late twentieth century historical and sociological approaches. His research on sexuality, medicine, and discipline gave rise to a general theory of the government of the body. The distinction between the discipline of the individual body (“the anatomo politics of the body”) and regulatory controls (“a bio politics of the population”) in *The History of Sexuality* (1978) stimulated a general sociological investigation of “governmentality” (Burchell et al. 1991). Systematic sociological interest in the body began in the 1980s with *The Body and Society* (Turner 1984) and *Five Bodies* (O’Neill 1985). The journal *Body and Society* was launched in 1995 to cater for this expanding academic market.

Taking a wider perspective, there has been a persistent but erratic and uncertain interest from symbolic interactionism in body, identity, self, and interaction. Erving Goffman in *The Presentation of Self in Everyday Life* (1959) demonstrated the importance of the body for identity in disruptions to interaction. Recognition of the need to manage bodily functions to avoid embarrassment was an important consequence of Goffman's approach. While the body began to appear in the study of micro interactions, it also had major implications for the historical sociology of the norms of civilized behavior undertaken by Norbert Elias in *The Civilizing Process* (1978). The training of the body, especially in relation to martial arts, dance, and general comportment, was studied by Elias in the transformation of court society. Domestic utensils, such as the fork or spittoon, were important features of the regulation of manners through the training of the body. By the 1990s, the history of the body had become a major academic development in research on sexuality, culture, and the representation of the human body.

Academic interest in the body was a response to significant changes in post war society, namely, the rise of consumerism and the growth of leisure industries. In the nineteenth century, the body was an implicit problem of economic theory in relation to labor as a factor of production. The issue was to make the body productive by increasing its efficiency through training, regulation, and management. Diet was a government of the body, and the efficiency of the human body was increased by correct rationing, exercise, and dietary control (Turner 1992). Taylorism in the management of labor in factory conditions would be another example, and domestic science for girls in schools was recognized as a method of making the working class body more healthy and efficient. In the 1920s, the eugenic management of the body became an important part of government policy in societies such as Turkey, Sweden, and Germany. Fascism in Italy also sponsored mass sport and gymnastics as a method of disciplining populations and of incorporating the working class into fascist aesthetics.

In the late twentieth century, there was increasing social and economic emphasis on

leisure and consumption rather than production. The growth of a new hedonistic culture was identified by Daniel Bell in *The Cultural Contradictions of Capitalism* (1976). Bell described new contradictions in a society that still required a disciplined labor force, but also encouraged and promoted hedonism through advertising, credit, and consumerism. In a neglected article on the "expressive revolution," Talcott Parsons (1974) noted a shift away from the cognitive rational components of culture to the affective expressive elements. He suggested that countercultural religious movements would articulate the new quest for self enjoyment, gratification, glorification of the self, and "pure love." Leisure industries, mass consumption, and extended credit have developed in tandem with the emphasis on youthfulness, activism, and the body beautiful. The body became a major conduit for the commodification of the everyday world and a symbol of the youth cultures of post war society. In addition, aging, disease, and death no longer appear to be immutable facts about the human condition but contingent possibilities that are constantly transformed by medical science. Cosmetic surgery has become a growth industry in western societies through which the body can be constructed. These cosmetic practices have become the target of the ironic surgical drama of the French artist Orlan, whose facial reconstruction is filmed as an artistic performance.

The post war baby boomers became the social carriers of a popular culture that focused on the athletic, groomed, and sexual body as an icon of liberalism and the do it yourself culture that followed the Events of 1968. There are two salient social phenomena that illustrate these developments in consumerism – the global growth of mass sport, especially international football, and popular dance. Football stars, such as David Beckham, are the new celebrities whose bodies are an essential marketing device for major football teams. The creation of dance fashions from disco to "storm rave" and the transformation of venues from the dance halls of the 1950s to the club experience of the 1990s created social spaces for the expressive and erotic body. Popular dance forms have become a global "dancescape" in which the body is

sexually charged as part of the gay scene. Finally, the playful body, the body as a personal project of self development, the eroticism of bodily experience, and the erosion of a sharp division between straight and gay bodies have been associated with the postmodernization of society. The postmodern body is one that can be endlessly recreated and reshaped.

FOUR PERSPECTIVES ON THE BODY: CONSTRUCTION, REPRESENTATION, EXPERIENCE, AND BODY TECHNIQUES

We can usefully identify four theoretical perspectives in the sociology of the body. The first shows that the body is not a natural phenomenon but is socially constructed. The second considers how the body is a representation of social relations of power. The third examines the phenomenology of the lived body, or the experience of embodiment in the everyday world. The final perspective, which has been significantly influenced by anthropology, looks at the body as a collection of practices or techniques.

Firstly, feminist theory in particular examined the social construction of the body. For example, Simone de Beauvoir in *The Second Sex* (1972) argued that women are not born but become women through social and psychological processes that construct them as essentially female. Her work inaugurated a research tradition concentrating on the social production of differences in gender and sexuality. The basic contribution of feminist theories of the body has been to social constructionism, that is, the differences between male and female bodies that we take for granted as if they were facts of nature are socially produced. Feminism in the 1970s was important in establishing the difference between biologically determined sex and the social construction of gender roles and sexual identities. Empirical research has subsequently explored how the social and political subordination of women is expressed in psychological depression and physical illness. Creative research examined anorexia nervosa, obesity, and eating disorders such as Susan Bordo's *Unbearable Weight* (1993). There have also been important historical studies of anorexia, but the popular literature was influenced

by Susan Orbach's *Fat is a Feminist Issue* (1985). Research on the body in popular culture has explored how women's bodies are literally constructed as consumer objects. For example, Lolo Ferrari had her breasts enlarged by silicon implants and appeared as a comical character on Channel 4's "Eurotrash" show. With her massive breasts, Lolo had herself become, partly ironically and partly tragically, consumer trash. Although feminism has been critical of the commercialization of the female body, postmodern irony often makes the classification of the body as a consumer object problematic and uncertain. Madonna is simultaneously religious icon, social critic, and consumer success.

Secondly, the body is often discussed as a cultural representation of social organization. For example, the head is employed as a metaphor of government and the word "corporation" to describe the modern company has its etymological origins in bodily metaphors. In the anthropological tradition, the divisions of the body are used to make moral distinctions between good and bad. For example, left handedness represents things that are sinister. Research on tattooing shows how the skin is both a physical and cultural boundary in which tattoos are markers of inclusion and exclusion. Sociologists have studied how the body enters into political discourse as a representation of power, and how power is exercised over the body. Following Foucault, historical research has shown how representations of the body are the result of relations of power, particularly between men and women. One classic illustration is the historical argument that anatomical maps of the human body vary between societies in terms of the dominant discourse of gender.

Thirdly, the concept of the "lived body" was developed by the French philosopher Maurice Merleau-Ponty in his *Phenomenology of Perception* (1982). In developing the phenomenology of the everyday world, he was concerned to understand human consciousness, perception, and intentionality. His work was original in applying Edmund Husserl's phenomenology to intentional consciousness but from the perspective of corporeal existence. He wanted to describe the lived world without the use of the conventional dualism between subject and object. Hence, Merleau-Ponty was critical of

the legacy of René Descartes's *cogito ergo sum* ("I think, therefore I am") that became the foundation of the dualism between mind and body. Merleau Ponty developed the idea of the "body subject" that is always situated in a social reality. Rejecting behavioral and mechanistic approaches, he argued that the body is central to our being in the world. Perception cannot be treated as a disembodied consciousness. Research inspired by this idea of the lived body and lived experience has been important in demonstrating the intimate connections between body, experience, and identity. Studies of traumatic experiences relating to disease or accident have shown how damage to the body transforms the self and how sharing narratives can be important in sustaining an adequate sense of self worth.

Finally, we can also examine how human beings are embodied and how people learn corporeal practices that are necessary for walking, dancing, shaking hands, and so forth. Social anthropologists have been influenced in particular by Marcel Mauss (1979), who invented the concept of "body techniques" to describe how people learn to manage their bodies according to social norms. Children, for instance, have to learn how to sit properly at table and boys learn how to throw in ways that differentiate them from girls. This anthropological legacy suggests that we think about the body as an ensemble of performances. These assumptions have been developed by Pierre Bourdieu in terms of two influential concepts. "Hexis" refers to deportment (gait, gesture, or posture) by which people carry themselves. "Habitus" refers to the dispositions through which taste is expressed. It is the habitual way of doing things. Bourdieu has employed these terms to study the everyday habitus of social classes in *Distinction: A Social Critique of the Judgment of Taste* (1984). The body is invested with symbolic capital whereby it is a corporeal expression of the hierarchies of social power. The body is permanently cultivated and represented by the aesthetic preferences of different social classes whereby, in French culture, mountaineering and tennis require the flexible, slim, and pliant bodies of the middle and upper classes, whereas the working class sports of wrestling produce an entirely different body and habitus. Bourdieu's work has been

influential in studies of habitus in a range of human activities from boxing to classical ballet.

We can simplify these complex theoretical traditions by suggesting that research on the body is confronted by two distinctive options. There is either the cultural decoding of the body as a system of meaning that has a definite structure existing separately from the intentions and conceptions of individuals, or there is the phenomenological study of embodiment that attempts to understand human practices that are organized around the life course (of birth, maturation, reproduction, and death). The work of Bourdieu offers a possible solution to this persistent tension between meaning and experience or between representation and practice. Bourdieu's development of the notions of habitus and practice in *Outline of a Theory of Practice* (1977) provides research strategies for looking simultaneously at how status difference is inscribed on the body and how we experience the world through our bodies, which are ranked in terms of their cultural capital. This reconciliation of these traditions can be assisted by distinguishing between the idea of the body as representation and embodiment as practice and experience.

BODY, EMBODIMENT, AND PERFORMANCE

In considering the future of the sociology of the body, two issues are important. There is a general view that, while there has been an extensive theoretical debate about the body, there is an insufficient and inadequate empirical research tradition. In this respect, the ethnographic work of anthropologists has been a useful corrective. Secondly, there is a growing research interest in embodied performance, which may also offer further empirical grounding for the study of the body. For example, to study ballet as performance rather than as representation, sociologists need to pay attention to the performing body. Richard Shusterman in *Performing Live* (2000), drawing on the work of Bourdieu and developing a pragmatist aesthetics, has argued that an aesthetic understanding of performance such as hip hop can not neglect the embodied features of artistic activity. The need for an understanding of

embodiment and lived experience is crucial in understanding performing arts, but also for the study of the body in sport. While choreography is in one sense the text of the dance, performance takes place outside the strict directions of the choreographic work. Dance has an immediacy, which cannot be captured by discourse analysis. It is important to recapture the intellectual contribution of the phenomenology of human embodiment in order to avoid the reduction of bodies to cultural texts.

Over the last two decades, a variety of perspectives on the body have emerged. It is unlikely and possibly undesirable that any single theoretical synthesis will finally emerge. The creative tension between seeing the body as cultural representation and experience will continue to produce innovative and creative research. There are, of course, new issues on the horizon which sociologists will need to examine: the posthuman body, cybernetics, genetic modification, and the genetic mapping of the body are obvious issues. The wealth and quality of this research suggest that the sociology of the body is not a passing fashion but an aspect of mainstream sociology.

SEE ALSO: Beauvoir, Simone de; Body Modification; Body and Sexuality; Body and Society; Civilizing Process; Consumption and the Body; Elias, Norbert; Emotion Work; Foucault, Michel; Gender, Consumption and; Posthumanism; Sport and the Body

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body modification

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Body modification practices have proved fertile ground for sociologists interested in deviance, social control, and the social construction of problematic behavior. Most of this literature fits within the symbolic interactionist tradition, focusing specifically on the ways that people negotiate definitions of body art such that it becomes scary or beautiful, dangerous or alluring, rebellious or inclusive, and so on. The vast majority of this work is framed in discussions of labeling and differential association orientations which explain social definitions and the processes through which body modifiers learn how to be successful in changing the ways their bodies look to themselves and those with whom they come in contact.

Considering the fact that humans have practiced body modification of one form or another (the most common permanent practices of which are tattooing, cicatrization [a.k.a. scarification], and infibulation [a.k.a. piercing]) in virtually every civilization, it is interesting that so many find these practices disturbing. Tattooing, especially, has a long and not so illustrious connection with seedier elements in society, most saliently with outlaw bikers, convicts and gang members in prison, enlisted members of the military carousing on leave, prostitutes, and other “deviants.” While these affiliations are longstanding and still quite common, the social meanings that make them what they are have begun to change as more affluent and less threatening people have become increasingly visibly tattooed, pierced, scarred, and/or branded. Many of these changes have developed in homologous fashion with the “tattoo renaissance.”

In the late 1960s and early 1970s a two pronged “renaissance” began in tattooing. Spearheading the cultural facet of the renaissance, San Francisco tattooist Lyle Tuttle tattooed Janis Joplin and other popular music stars who made tattoos visible to their middle class fans. Spearheading the artistic movement, San Francisco tattoo artist Don Ed Hardy and Chicago tattoo artist Cliff Raven combined formal training in art with Japanese full body aesthetics and American popular iconography to introduce “fine art tattooing” in America. Soon, middle class Americans realized that tattoos could be aesthetically sophisticated and their popularity and visibility began spreading across class, gender, and racial lines. It would not be unreasonable to claim that, since it has become so widely accepted and practiced among such diverse segments of the population, tattooing is no longer deviant when practiced with restraint.

As greater diversity and availability have come to characterize tattooing practices, people’s decisions to become tattooed have become more subtle and more complex. People no longer have merely to consider whether they should get a tattoo; they now have to consider which kind of tattoo best suits them, and whether it should be visible. Among those who get tattoos, some are quite explicitly oriented toward artistic merit, creativity, and

uniqueness of design, while others tend to focus more directly on getting “classic Americana” designs (e.g., panthers, roses, vow tattoos, unicorns, and the like).

The ascendancy of tattoo oriented magazines has made tattooing more visible as an artistic expression to a greater segment of the population. With this greater exposure, the tattoo world has become divided among different *taste publics*, each of which tends to emphasize different kinds of tattoos and different purposes for collecting and/or applying them. Gang members tend to value the autobiographical functions of their iconography; bikers tend to value a tattoo’s relative value in “showing class” (i.e., frightening “citizens” with outlandish behavior); soldiers and sailors tend to value classic military designs that connect them with a broader historical tradition; artistic collectors tend to value custom designs, worked out especially for them. Within each of these taste publics, different kinds of tattoos will garner different degrees of status, as will the extent of coverage. In artistic circles, for example, the full back tattoo, or “backpiece,” garners significant status, whereas it is not visible enough to frighten “citizens” and therefore is less important among bikers; among navy personnel, bluebirds at the collar (a tattoo signifying the sailor’s trip across the equator while on duty) will earn respect that those unfamiliar with navy iconography will not acknowledge; “classic” tattoo designs garner higher status among Americana collectors, especially as they age, whereas those less intimately connected to the tattoo world may consider them ugly. However, some of these aesthetic orientations are more likely than others to be accepted outside of the taste public under consideration. Current evidence seems to suggest, for example, that middle class parents are less concerned by their offspring’s choices to get tattooed as long as the designs are aesthetically pleasing and easily concealed.

While artistic merit is clearly an important factor in the relative shock value of any tattoo, its placement may be even more important. Tattoos on “public skin” (i.e., hands, neck, face, and/or head) tend to have greater shock value, almost irrespective of the nature of the design, which is one reason that tattoo artists are often reluctant to tattoo public skin

on anyone other than a known and committed tattoo collector. The aversion to tattoos on public skin is most likely a byproduct of the tattooer's apparent unwillingness to conceal what many consider a mark of stigma. Facial tattoos have not always held this status, however.

Tattooing came to the West by way of Captain Cook, who brought the practice back to the British aristocracy. While early western exposure to tattooing tended to take the form of exhibitions of tattooed "natives" brought back from the South Sea Isles, women in the aristocracy soon began requesting and receiving cosmetic tattoos that took the form of permanent eyeliner, rouge, and lipstick. British Prime Minister Winston Churchill's mother was among those adorned with permanent makeup.

As tattoos became more visible and more acceptable, punks and "modern primitives" began looking for other permanent forms of body modification that would express their alienation from contemporary, developed western culture. The more common of these practices is piercing. While tongue and eyebrow piercing are certainly less shocking than they once were, more "radical" forms of piercing such as genital piercing, stretching earlobes, and piercings located in other uncommon sites on the body (usually measured by quantity as much as quality) are still unsettling to many. Piercing, more than other forms of permanent body modification, is often associated directly with intense sensation and "body play" which make it widely practiced among B&D/S&M (bondage and discipline/sadomasochism) cultures and other segments of the population interested in exploring the connections between pain and pleasure.

Most sociological analysis of body modification practices has been ethnographic with fairly explicit connections to symbolic interactionist discussions of the social construction of art, culture, deviance, and/or reality more broadly construed. Current interest among those practicing postmodernist and/or poststructuralist cultural text analysis of the body has also yielded a sizeable literature. Within this latter tradition, *metatheorists* tend to view the body as a site for inscription of cultural meanings, thereby *queering* not only their bodies but also the nature of the interactions they are likely to have with other people. In queering their

bodies and interactions, they regain control over their bodies in an age when body image is dominated by mediated constructions of beauty that have little to do with realistic and/or lived corporal experience of reality.

SEE ALSO: Body, Abominations of; Body and Cultural Sociology; Culture; Deviance; Labeling; Subculture

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body and sexuality

Beverley Chaplin

All cultures have mechanisms which serve to organize and regulate sexuality. This is affected through a range of social institutions with the (gendered) body integral to this organization. In terms of social sanction, the variety of human sexual practices comprise a hierarchy which runs in a continuum from those

conforming to the dominant heterosexual model to practices which constitute areas of contestation. Sociological analysis of the body and sexuality thus constitutes something of a materialist–discursive divide, with the former focusing on the physical, innate aspects of the body and sexuality, while discursive or representational analysis focuses on the cultural and communicative aspects of the body, a body as an “object” constructed within cultural discourses and practices. Feminist and poststructuralist challenges to materialist explanations point to the (particularly female) body as a “sign” or “symbol” within discourse. Consequently, materialist/discursive explanations of the body and sexuality roughly equate to a “masculinist”/“feminist” divide. There has, however, been little research conducted into the *experience* of embodiment per se – the body as “vehicle in being” (Merleau Ponty) and the relation of this to sexuality.

“Naturalistic” accounts of the body and sexuality view the biological body as fundamental to society and social relations and the creator of social meanings. Until the eighteenth century the male body was viewed as a superior “norm,” with the female body conceived as simply an inverted, inferior version: Lacqueur’s “one sex/one flesh,” genderless model. Eighteenth century scientific inquiry saw the elaboration of gender onto the body, which affected the conception of men and women as possessing “oppositional” bodies. The embellishment of gender derived from Enlightenment egalitarian ideals at odds with the material reality of female subjugation to men. Thus, the emphasis on *difference* became socially inscribed. Together with the development of the view of sexuality as integral to individual self identity, “naturalistic” accounts of the body provided the biological legitimation of the supposed “inferiority” of female corporeality, and thus female subordination: the public/private divide. This gendered view of the body was further elaborated upon by the increasing medicalization of the female body in the nineteenth century, when women’s bodies were viewed as rooted within their reproductive capabilities and their behavior deemed as governed by reproductive “pathologies”: the nature/culture divide. In addition, as late as the 1970s, sociobiological explanations attempted

both to explain and to justify social inequalities and difference which, it was claimed, could be located within the structure of genes. Such explanations were not confined merely to gender inequalities however, but encompassed homosexuality, which was defined as deriving from the presence of a “homosexual gene.” The assignment of sex difference to sex hormones in turn led to a questioning of the legitimacy of both feminist and homosexual demands for equality and the conception of both women and homosexuals as the “Other.”

The sexologist Richard von Krafft Ebbing’s conception of homosexuality as “primitive” and degenerate in *Psychopathia Sexualis* (1965) was challenged to an extent by the publication of Havelock Ellis’s *Sexual Inversion* in 1908, wherein he posited that cultural factors, as well as a congenital predisposition to same sex love, contributed to the incidence of homosexuality. Ellis also argued that women’s increasing liberation and education in the early twentieth century was responsible for the “masculinization” of middle class women, resulting in lesbian “sexual inversion,” a view which has been celebrated by those women who choose to “perform” what Judith Halberstam terms “female masculinity.” Magnus Hirschfeld, who, in 1928, became the founder of the World League for Sexual Reform, challenged the notion of sexual polarity, calling for cultural and legal sexual reform, wherein homosexuals could embrace and celebrate their homosexuality and wherein women should be treated fairly and without discrimination. Edward Carpenter’s *The Intermediate Sex* (1908) suggested that homosexuals were, in some senses, superior to their heterosexual counterparts with regard to their finer sensitivity, and, in the case of female homosexuals, their “masculine” strength and independence. Nevertheless, the idea of lesbians as “masculine” women simply contributed further to prevailing conceptions of the supposed superiority of the male intellect and the male body as the privileged body and heterosexuality as the dominant (and thus socially acceptable) sexuality. The empirical findings of the Kinsey Report in 1948 and 1953 pointed to the widespread occurrence and regularity of homosexual sex, and thus in some senses facilitated the subsequent legalization of homosexuality in the West. Nevertheless, homosexuality

remains illegal in some countries, often due to religious beliefs, and heterosexuality remains the dominant sexual practice. Queer theory itself often defies definition, with some arguing that it refers not merely to lesbian and gay sex, but to any sexual practices which are outside of dominant “normative” practices.

Some “naturalist” feminists, notably during the late 1970s, but also within later ecofeminist theorizing, have celebrated women’s biological difference to men, arguing that women’s bodies and in particular their reproductive abilities should be regarded as a particular source of knowledge and thus recognized as having social parity with male knowledge and experience. Contemporary naturalistic accounts of reproduction tend to stress the appropriation of offspring by fathers, via marriage and fatherhood, resulting from men’s separateness from women’s experience of, and access to, creative continuity. Thus, it is argued that this deprivation forms the basis of male control over social institutions and the separation of public from private spheres of social life. Others criticize this stance, concerned that the conception of a specific female “essence” does little to combat oppressive cultural ideologies.

Naturalistic/materialist views of the body and sexuality have therefore been regarded by many sociologists as reductionist in the sense that their reliance upon biological *difference* results in a too simplistic analysis which fails to account for social change and cultural disparity, and a stress upon the *natural* basis of social inequality.

Discursive approaches to the body and sexuality emphasize the manner in which the individual “becomes” a particular being, examining how the body and sexuality are socially *constructed* and the power relations inherent to that construction. There is then, within social constructionist theories, a basic distinction which is formulated between the material body and its social and cultural representations. However, beneath the broad umbrella of “social constructionist” views there exists a number of disparate and often contradictory explanations of the relationship between bodies, sexualities, and the social. Foucault’s genealogical approach demonstrates how bodies increasingly became constituted as the objects of discourses

which have had profound effects on the social construction of sexuality and the body, so that sex becomes a “regulatory ideal.” This is constitutive of a shift during the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries from a religious concern with the *subject’s* sexual “body as flesh,” to an emphasis on the body as *object*, achieved via a shift from the regulation of individual bodies to a panoptic concern with the social body. This in turn affected the construction of normative heterosexuality and the classification of variations from this “norm” as “deviant.” Therefore, there occurred a shift from overt sexual repression to the incitement of desire, resulting in more widespread discriminatory forms of control and systems of representation. Foucault’s analysis of sexuality, in particular his conception of the “hysterization” of the female body has, in turn, facilitated the questioning by feminists of naturalistic conceptions of gendered social inequalities predicated upon biology towards a recognition that these conceptions are themselves socially constructed (Shilling 2003). The effect upon the female body of what Foucault terms the disciplining and surveillance of the body within modern society has, many feminists argue, resulted in the pathologizing of women’s reproductive capabilities.

The relation of the social construction of gender to the female body and sexuality has been explored by feminists and has (certainly, in the early years of second wave feminism) taken the form of a denunciation of “naturalistic” conceptions of the female body as reducible to its biology. Thus, the goal of much feminist thought has been to liberate female sexuality from its reproductive confines. The conception of women as sexually passive and the female body as the (unwilling) receptor of male sexual advances has historically rendered women as conceptualized by uninterest in sex. The key feminist text in the 1970s was Simone de Beauvoir’s *The Second Sex* (1947), in which she depicted the female body as a tabula rasa upon which is inscribed “masculinist” sexual ideologies pertaining to female sexual expression. Feminists have tackled the issues of rape and pornography, arguing that rape is a direct result of the unequal relations between men and women within the sexual domain, an inequity

which sees men as the dominant partner and women as the submissive "other." Feminists disagree, however, on the issue of pornography, with some, such as MacKinnon (1987), arguing that it is a major site of female oppression, constitutive of male power and control, and reflective of women as the object of male heterosexual desire and conquest. Others argue that the anti porn stance is to deny women access to their own brand of erotica, which serves to deflect attention from other important sources of female oppression.

Feminists have also argued that the specificity of female biology and the association of child birth and childrearing, which sees women relegated to the private sphere, must be overcome if women are to attain embodied equality with men. Within such conceptions, motherhood is therefore regarded as the site of patriarchal rule. However, the psychoanalytic feminist Julia Kristeva argues for a discourse on pregnancy which empowers women. Similarly, Donna Haraway in her *Simians, Cyborgs and Women: The Reinvention of Nature* (1991), asserts that modern technologies of surveillance have diminished the power of the pregnant woman to the extent that this has altered her relationship with her unborn fetus and, indeed, with her own body (Brook 1999).

Gayle Rubin's argument that the cultural fusion of gender with sexuality has resulted in the feminist essentializing of the relation of sexual intercourse to sexuality provides evidence of the disparities which exist within feminist thought regarding the relation of female sexuality to the female body. The work of Judith Butler utilizes the discursive approach of Foucault and posits gender as a continuing performance wherein bodies become embroiled within a heteronormative discourse, such that the performance itself becomes "normalized" and "natural." Her later work poses the problem that if gender is the social elaboration of sex within a given culture, the body simply becomes its regulatory social meanings. If, however, these regulatory norms require reiteration, this implies that bodies do not ever quite conform to the materiality of sex.

Mary Douglas's anthropological approach in *Purity and Danger: An Analysis of Pollution and Taboo* (1966) considers that, since blood and

other body fluids are "naturally" contained, female menstruation is viewed as a *liminal* state of being. This culminates in the conception of the female body as a site of abjection. Julia Kristeva questions why menstrual blood is viewed as "polluting" in the same manner as excrement, for example, arguing that the female body as the site of abjection can be positively utilized by women, particularly as it transforms during pregnancy, as this change signifies the total "otherness" of the female body. Essentially, both theorists argue that the emission of essentially "female" body fluids effects the rendering of the female body as a site of pollution, although they differ in their ideas of the usefulness or otherwise of the concept of abjection. Conceptions of the "purity" of sexual exchange have also been examined in the context of AIDS/HIV by Grosz (1994), wherein she cites contemporary AIDS discourse as specifically aimed at women, who are ironically held to be socially responsible for the containment of the spread of this "polluting" virus. The panic surrounding AIDS/HIV is also part of a wider "risk discourse" in late modernity, which is, as Williams and Bendelow claim in *The Lived Body* (1998), reinforcing of a "moralizing discourse" separating the "good" body from the "bad." In addition, there appears to be some incongruence between the growth of such a discourse and the representation of sexualized bodies within the media and within consumer culture. In terms of gender, the media representation of the sexualized and thus objectified female body is one which reinforces it as "other," despite the fact that there has occurred an increase within consumer culture of representations of the sexualized male body. Representations within advertisements, film, and literature, along with the institutional structuring of sexuality, give rise to gendered patterns of male and female sexual behavior, in a type of scripted role play. Thus, much feminist thought attempts to counter or challenge such gendered stereotypes. The potential *disembodiment* which may be experienced within cybersex has been variously theorized as enabling the development of a "second self," wherein an individual is freed from the embodied boundaries of gender or race, as in the work of Turkle (1984) or as

reflective of the continued existence of gendered boundaries, particularly in terms of the discursive construction of science and technology as masculine and rational (Sophia 1992).

Feminists in particular have examined the relation to women's self identity of the heterosexual "male gaze," citing the representation of women's bodies as the site of male sexual desire as a causal factor in women's often problematic relationship with size and body image. However, the increasing objectification of and representation within advertising media of both male and female bodies has led to an increase in eating disorders and in the use by both sexes of cosmetic surgery. Alongside the more traditional types of female surgery, such as breast implants and the newer trend for vaginal "tightening," men too are now attempting to enhance their sexual attractiveness via the use of pectoral and chest implants and penis enlargement. Thus, in late modernity, the (sexualized) body becomes a *disciplined* body, a body subject to *self surveillance*, itself reflective of prevailing concepts of smallness in women and largeness in men, concepts themselves metaphorically related to inequities of power relations and, some argue, to capitalist relations themselves.

There does appear to be a lack of a more phenomenological approach to the body and sexuality, an approach which views the body as a "lived" body, with all its attendant secretions, messiness, and corporeality. Plummer (2003) refers to this as a "stunning omission (such that) the living and breathing, sweating and pumping, sensuous and feeling world of the emotional, fleshy body is hardly to be found" within the literature on the body and sexualities. Exceptions to this are to be found in the work of Deborah Lupton. Such theorizing may be all the more important in late modernity as sexuality becomes, according to Giddens, the property of the individual, freed from the bonds of reproduction and intimately bound up with the project of "self." This, he argues, points to a "decentered" form of sex within "late" modernity and the conception of a type of "plastic sexuality," a kind of "pure relationship," which refers to the development of relationships which are contingent, rather than bound within institutionalized forms. Nevertheless, despite legal increases in the

rights of minority groups to define and practice their own particular brand of sexuality, there continues to be a New Right political backlash against these advancements which is currently manifest within varying issues centering on the body and sexuality. Such indictments are accompanied by the propounding of a return to more traditional values via the retention of virginity among young people and the reinstatement of traditional institutions such as marriage and "compulsory" heterosexuality.

SEE ALSO: *Body and Society*; Ellis, Havelock; *Gender, the Body and*; Hirschfeld, Magnus; Kinsey, Alfred; Krafft Ebing, Richard von; *New Reproductive Technologies*; *Pornography and Erotica*; *Sexual Citizenship*; *Sexual Politics*; *Transgender, Transvestism, and Transsexualism*

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body and society

Bryan S. Turner

Over the last two decades there has been growing interest in the sociology of the body, as illustrated by the publication of *The Body* (Featherstone et al. 1991), *The Woman in the Body* (Martin 1989), *Five Bodies* (O'Neill 1985), *The Body and Social Theory* (Shilling 1993), and *The Body and Society* (Turner 1984). Three philosophical works were particularly important in initially stimulating sociological analysis of the human body. First, *The Absent Body* (Leder 1990) was critical of Cartesian dualism that separates mind and body. Employing a phenomenological perspective, Leder studied the absence of the "lived body" in everyday life, and showed how disruptions of illness bring the body into focus. Second, *The Body in Pain* (Scarry 1985) explored the problem of physical pain in torture and war, and demonstrated the centrality of the body to contemporary moral issues. Third, Michel Foucault's historical studies of medicine in *The Birth of the Clinic* (1973) and sexuality in *The History of Sexuality* (1978) generated interest in the interaction between the body, medical practice, and systems of belief. Foucault opened up new ways of thinking about how bodies are imagined, constructed, and represented. Georges Canguilhem's important work on *The Normal and the Pathological* (1994) influenced Foucault's approach to the history of systems of thought, including our knowledge of the human body. Foucault has remained central to research on power and the body as a representation of society. For example, Thomas Laqueur's *Making Sex* (1990) demonstrated major historical changes in the anatomical representation of the sexual organs, reflecting different theories of gender. This general interest in the sociology of the body has seeped into medical sociology by suggesting innovative theoretical frameworks and new topics of empirical inquiry (Turner 2004).

TWO THEORIES OF THE BODY

The sociology of the body has been divided analytically into two distinctive, often

contradictory, approaches. These two traditions represent alternative answers to the question: is the human body socially constructed? In social constructionist approaches, the body is treated as a system of cultural representations. In the phenomenological tradition, the "lived body" is studied in the everyday world of social interaction.

The body is often studied as a cultural representation of social life. For example, in medieval art, there was considerable fascination, especially in the fifteenth century, with the spiritual significance of the bare breasted Virgin Mary and the child Jesus. In the theological tradition of the *virgo lactans*, the Virgin was a figure of spiritual salvation whose milk acquired a status similar to Christ's blood. The female breast is a representation of divine care. In this sociological and anthropological tradition, research considers the ways in which the body enters into political discourse as a representation of power, and how power is exercised over the body. This approach to the body, which has been dominated by the legacy of Foucault, is concerned with questions of representation and control in which diet is for example a regulation or government of the body. The Foucauldian perspective is not concerned to understand our experiences of embodiment; it does not aim to grasp the lived experience of the body from a phenomenology of the body.

The principal starting point for an analysis of the lived body has been the research of the French philosopher Maurice Merleau-Ponty. In the *Phenomenology of Perception* (1982) he examined how perception of reality occurs from the specific location of our body, and hence he showed how cognition is always an embodied perception of the world. Phenomenology is a critique of the dualism of the mind and body, in which body is seen to be passive and inert. Research inspired by the phenomenological tradition has been important in showing the intimate connections between body, experience, and identity. For example, traumatic experiences of disease have a major impact on self-perception and identity, and hence loss of a body part can have devastating consequences for self-identity. This division between the body as representation and as experience has dominated the sociological debate about the

body, and there have been many attempts to reconcile this difference.

While there is therefore a sociological and anthropological tradition which examines the body as a symbolic system, we can also examine how human beings are embodied and how human beings learn a variety of cultural practices that are necessary for walking, sitting, dancing, and so forth. The study of embodiment has been the particular concern of anthropologists who have been influenced by the concept of "body techniques" (Mauss 1973). These anthropological assumptions have in turn been developed by Pierre Bourdieu through the concepts of *hexis* and *habitus* in which our dispositions and tastes are organized. For example, within the *habitus* of social classes, Bourdieu showed in *Distinction* (1984) that the body is invested with symbolic capital in which the body is a living expression of the hierarchies of social power. The body is permanently cultivated and represented by the aesthetic preferences of different social classes. The different sports that are supported by different social classes illustrate this form of distinction. Weight lifting is part of the *habitus* of the working class; mountaineering, of upper social strata.

If the body is understood exclusively as a system of cultural representation, it becomes very difficult to develop an adequate sociology of the body as lived experience. Sociologists have therefore become interested in bodily performances, which cannot be grasped simply as static representations. Richard Shusterman in *Pragmatist Aesthetics* (1992), drawing on the work of Bourdieu, has argued that an aesthetic understanding of performance cannot neglect the embodied features of artistic activity. The need for an understanding of embodiment and lived experience is crucial in understanding performing arts, but also for the study of the body in sport. Research on the body from the perspective of Bourdieu creates innovative approaches for understanding the relationship between injury, careers, identity, and embodiment. The study of injury and accident in ballet performances provides general sociological insights into the relationships between trauma, embodiment, and identity.

The work of Bourdieu offers one possible solution to this division between the meaning

and experience of embodiment or the cultural representation of the body. Bourdieu's development of the notions of *habitus* and practice in *Logic of Practice* (1990) creates research strategies for examining how, for example, status differences are inscribed on the body and how we experience the social world through our bodies that are ranked in terms of their cultural capital. This analytical reconciliation can be supported by clearly distinguishing between the idea of the body as cultural representation and embodiment as practice and experience.

FEMINISM, GENDER, AND THE STARVING BODY

The contemporary anthropology and sociology of the body has been continuously influenced by feminist social theory. Simone de Beauvoir's *The Second Sex* (1972) was a major contribution to the study of the patriarchal regulation of the female body. She argued that women are not born but become women through social and psychological processes that construct them as essentially female. Her work inaugurated a tradition of research on the social production of differences in gender and sexuality. Feminist theories of the body have employed social constructionism to show how the differences between male and female bodies, that we take for granted as if they were facts of nature, are socially produced. Germaine Greer's *The Female Eunuch* (1970) and Kate Millet's *Sexual Politics* (1969) were important in establishing the difference between biologically determined sex and the social construction of gender roles and sexual identities. More recently, there has been increasing interest in the question of men's bodies, health, and masculinity in, for example, R. W. Connell's *Masculinities* (1995).

The underlying theory of gender inequalities was the idea of patriarchy and much empirical research in sociology has subsequently explored how the social and political subordination of women is expressed somatically in psychological depression and physical illness. Creative scholarship went into historical research on body image, diet, obesity, and eating disorders. The sociological analysis of anorexia nervosa

and bulimia has occupied a critical place in the evolution of feminist theories of the body. Anorexia charts the contradiction between increasing body weight and the aesthetic ideal of the slim body.

AGING, DISABILITY, AND IMPAIRMENT

The sociological analysis of the body has played an important role in the development of the “social model” in disability studies, especially in establishing a distinction between disability, impairment, and handicap. By focusing on the notion that the human body is socially constructed, activists rejected the medical model of disability, arguing that the disability label results in a loss of social rights. While “the disabled body” is socially constructed, researchers have also emphasized the importance of examining the lived experience of impairment. Empirical work has contributed significantly to our understanding of the complex connections between rehabilitation, embodiment, and self.

Phenomenological studies of impairment and disability question the legacy of mind/body dualism, and promote analysis of the embodied self and the disruptions of everyday life. Chronic illness and impairment pose interesting questions about the continuity of the self and the discontinuity of embodiment. Disability, while socially produced by systems of classification and professional labels, has profound significance for the self, because our identity is necessarily constituted by our embodiment. Since our biographical narratives are embodied, disability is an existential challenge in terms of its contested meaning for the self. The problems of mobility and autonomy are fundamental to the life world of the elderly, the chronically sick, and the disabled. These traumatic experiences shape selfhood by transforming the relationships between the self, body image, and social world.

Research on the aging body has also been associated with new perspectives on gerontology as a system of social regulation and representation of senile bodies. Other studies emphasize the lived experience of aging.

CONCLUSION: MICHEL FOUCAULT AND BIO POLITICS

The human body, or more specifically its genetic code, is now central to economic growth in a wide range of biotech industries. In a paradoxical manner, the pathology of the human body is itself a productive factor in the new economy. Body parts have become essential commodities within a consumer society and with globalization the exchange of organs has become an aspect of international trade. Disease is no longer regarded as simply a constraint on the productivity of labor, but as an actual factor of production. The body is increasingly regarded as a code or system of information from which economic profits can be extracted through patents rather than merely a natural organism, and the body as a topic of medical science is being radically transformed by the Human Genome Project. In terms of media debate, the new reproductive technologies, cloning, and genetic screening are important illustrations of public concern about the social consequences of the new genetics. Improvements in scientific understanding of genetics have already had major consequences for the circumstances under which people reproduce, and genetic surveillance and forensic genetics may also transform criminal investigation and the policing of societies. The human body lies at the center of legal concerns about human rights, especially the rights of ownership of the body and its code. The major political question of modern times concerns the possibility of what Francis Fukuyama (2002) has called *Our Post human Future*. The cultural dominance of the body in late modernity is not difficult to document, but its very complexity has raised intractable analytical and political problems about how to understand and how to manage the body.

These changes in biomedicine illustrate the distinction made by Foucault (1978: 139) between the study of the individual body and the study of populations. In the “anatomopolitics of the human body,” Foucault examined how various forms of discipline of the body have regulated individuals. In the “biopolitics of the population,” he studied the regulatory controls over populations. Anatomopolitics is concerned with the micropolitics of identity

and concentrated on the sexuality, reproduction, and life histories of individuals. The clinical examination of individuals is part of the anatomo politics of society. The bio politics of populations used demography, epidemiology, and public health sciences to examine and manage whole populations. Foucault's study of the body was thus organized around the notions of discipline and regulatory controls. The new genetics have created enhanced opportunities for governmentality as a strategy of political surveillance and economic production (Foucault 1991). The government of the body as a consequence remains a critical issue in the management and regulation of individuals and populations in contemporary society.

In conclusion, the sociology of the body has been important for medical sociology because it has propelled the analysis of medical institutions into the mainstream of modern sociological research. Whereas the study of medicine as well as health and illness was strangely absent from classical sociology, in contemporary social theory the medicalized body has become part of the core concern of theoretical sociology, because the body is now recognized as central to the debate about agency and structure. The cutting edge of sociological research is now concentrated on questions relating to the possibility of the social as nature is being radically transformed. Medicine and the body raise questions that are critical for the future of human society, and these questions are reformulating sociological theory.

SEE ALSO: Beauvoir, Simone de; Body and Cultural Sociology; Body Modification; Body and Sexuality; Bourdieu, Pierre; Disability as a Social Problem; Foucault, Michel; Gender, Aging and; Illness Experience; Sex and Gender

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Bonfil Batalla, Guillermo (1935–91)

Luis Méndez y Berrueta

Guillermo Bonfil Batalla was a Mexican ethnologist who studied at the National School of Anthropology and History (*Escuela Nacional de Antropología e Historia*, ENAH) and received his doctorate in anthropology at Mexico's National Autonomous University (*Universidad Nacional Autónoma de México*, UNAM). He is one of the most important representatives of the new generation of Mexican anthropologists who began to dominate the academic panorama after 1968. This generation was characterized by its strong criticism of the state's official *indigenismo*, which is understood as the set of state policies, institutions, and laws in relation to indigenous people. In light of both his theoretical reflections and his political work, Guillermo Bonfil Batalla is frequently considered one of the precursors in Latin America of the theoretical and ideological emergence of the autonomies of autochthonous peoples and of academic reflections on the consolidation of pluricultural states.

Throughout his life, Bonfil Batalla held various political positions, such as director of the National Institute of Anthropology and History (*Instituto Nacional de Antropología e Historia*, INAH) in 1972, director of INAH's Center for Research and Higher Studies (*Centro de Investigaciones y Estudios Superiores del INAH*, CISINAH) in 1976, and director of the National Museum of Popular Cultures (*Museo Nacional de Culturas Populares*) in 1981. From 1989 to 1991, the year of his death, he was first Director of Popular Cultures, and then in charge of the Cultural Studies Seminar of the National Council for Culture and the Arts (*Consejo Nacional para la Cultura y las Artes*, CONACULTA). He was also president of the Latin American Association of Anthropology (*Asociación Latinoamericana de Antropología*) and was named a National Researcher, having received the *Presea Manuel Gamio al Mérito Indigenista* award in 1988. He also participated actively in the First (1971) and Second (1979) Declarations of Barbados.

Guillermo Bonfil Batalla's anthropological works, spanning three important decades in Mexico's history (from the early 1960s until 1991), can be read as a theoretical synthesis of a twofold political crisis: on one hand, the crisis of the institutional *indigenista* model, consolidated during the General Lázaro Cárdenas government (1936–40), soon after the Mexican Revolution, and, on the other, the crisis within Mexican anthropology. The latter crisis was historically and ideologically dependent on the *indigenista* model, while at the same time being affected by the reality in Latin America, which pointed toward a forced entry into modernity on unequal terms but which also translated into resistance to that path, opting for the socialist model(s), revolution, and guerrillas.

As a student at ENAH, an institution which was at that time dedicated to educating professionals for official *indigenismo*, Bonfil Batalla generated his work in a context which was increasingly replete with diverse, contradictory theoretical and political positions and which had begun to criticize that model. Mexican official *indigenismo* had been the result of a long process of legitimization of revolutionary values. One of those fundamental values was the construction of a national identity in which, at least ideologically, it was imperative to recuperate the indigenous past of this colonized country. At the same time, it was equally important to generate a political praxis for integrating the *historic* native Mexican with the *real* native Mexican, and to develop a certain coherence between them. In other words, in the homogenizing framework of a national culture that brandished its indigenous past as only one of the values of *mestizaje*, the presence of a *real* indigenous population was acknowledged for the first time. This was viewed as important not only because of the indigenous population's statistical density or the extent to which it was marginalized, but also – and perhaps above all – because of its *difference*. In order to carry out programs in favor of native Mexicans, it was necessary to know who they were. Manuel Gamio and Alfonso Caso ideologically created this *indigenismo*, which attempted to articulate the concept of national culture and indigenous culture through the word “integration,” which, at least as understood by Gamio, consisted of exchanging values between the indigenous

community and the national community. In short, the indigenous population should not assimilate into the *mestizo* culture but should, rather, integrate itself into an exchange of values.

Nevertheless, that term assumed other nuances when, in the hands of Caso, the need to establish an *indigenista* policy was confronted. Caso was to provide *indigenista* institutions, specifically the *Instituto Nacional Indigenista* (INI), founded in 1948, with the bureaucratic structure and ideological guidelines that it retained until its recent closure. This policy was understood fundamentally as a government decision designed to protect indigenous communities and integrate them into the nation's economic, social, and political life. It was explained above all by the right of those communities to equality, in the unequal framework of poverty and marginalization in which they lived. Thus official *indigenismo* ended up as a policy defined as integrationist and protection oriented.

Meanwhile, academic work in this area was shifting toward the idea of applied anthropology, which aimed to find solutions to communities' concrete problems. Nevertheless, it was Gonzalo Aguirre Beltrán who had offered a theoretical explanation of *indigenismo*. This theoretical defense of integrationist policies was guided by two key points: a theory of the acculturation process, and the notion of regions for taking refuge (these were areas of the country where it was possible to preserve the structure inherited from the colonial period and an archaic pre industrial culture, to protect people from the onslaught of civilization). Integration was thus viewed as part of a process of acculturation. Consequently, from 1940 to 1964, extending after the Cardenist period, indigenous policy shifted from the notion of the dissolution of the Mexican native to that of regional development, more in line with Aguirre Beltrán's theory. The goals of INI during this period identified literacy as their central concern, as an element that would promote changes in the region. By the 1960s, however, and especially within the academic community, dissident voices began to express their disagreement with this model.

In 1962, Bonfil Batalla published one of his first articles, "Diagnóstico del hambre en Sudzal, Yucatán: un ensayo de antropología

aplicada" (Diagnostic assessment of hunger in Sudzal, Yucatán: an attempt at applied anthropology), in which he criticized the notion of applied anthropology within official *indigenismo*. He saw it as subjectivism based on psychologism, as a product of the metaphysical denial of the social structure, while anthropology ignored the genuine cultural structure of communities and attempted to change subjective elements that were erroneously considered to be the reasons behind the communities' negative situation. At the end of the 1960s, the controversy within academic circles in relation to official *indigenismo* had repercussions in Mexican anthropology in 1968–70. Specifically, the severe criticism of colonialism and imperialism in economic and cultural terms had a strong influence on social science in general, and on social anthropology in particular, in direct relation to anthropological practice, consequently interpreted as cultural penetration. The triumph of the Cuban Revolution and of the decolonization process in Africa, the emergence of the theory of the third world, struggles for liberation, the proliferation of guerrillas and social movements, the Vietnam War, and particularly the Mexican student movement of 1968 all left their mark, above all in the formulation of an emerging debate on the social role of the scientist. This debate led to an interpretation of the anthropologist as an active agent of imperialism. A number of students and professors at ENAH were actively involved in the student movement of 1968. In 1969, Bonfil Batalla's contract was canceled and he left the school, together with a number of other professors, who resigned in protest.

By 1970, the diversity of currents of thought within ENAH was already considerable (at that time ENAH was the primary center for dissemination of anthropology and for educating professionals in the field). In addition to official *indigenismo*, there were also Marxist positions and a critical tendency, represented by Bonfil Batalla and other members of his generation (Margarita Nolasco, Arturo Warman, Salomón Nahmad, Mercedes Olivera, Enrique Valencia, Rodolfo Stavenhagen), who in the same year published *De eso que llaman antropología mexicana* (*On What is Referred to as Mexican Anthropology*). From that time on, Bonfil Batalla became one of the main representatives of a new form of *indigenismo* which,

in Latin America, anticipated future reflections on the autonomy of indigenous communities and on the vital nature of the ethnic issue. Bonfil Batalla's contribution to that book (Bonfil Batalla 1970) could be described as a review of the theoretical political position that he would maintain during the rest of his life, and which would reach its definitive form in the work entitled *México profundo*, published a decade later.

Bonfil Batalla's first proposal was that Mexican *indigenismo* had originated in the ideals of the Mexican Revolution, and in what he called the need to confront those ideals with the nation's cultural reality. In his terms, official *indigenismo* had proposed the disappearance of Mexican natives as its goal, even though the "conservation of values" was used in its discourse. Anthropologists criticized the notion of the integration of native Mexicans, which, according to this set of ideas, did not imply the establishment of relations between native Mexicans and the nation (which already existed, for good or ill), but rather the complete assimilation of what was indigenous, resulting from their total loss of identity. They were also critical of the concept of a national culture, in which social and cultural differences were diluted into a *mestizo* sector ideologically constructed and declared official, leading to the erroneous conclusion that there was something that could be referred to as a common culture for all Mexicans.

These ideas were theoretically within the current of thought that had been inaugurated by the French anthropology of 1968 (by Jaulin, Debray, Perrot, and Condominas, among others) and which, as a result of anthropological projects in Vietnam and the Camelot project in Latin America, had begun to criticize the political role played by anthropological practice. Bonfil Batalla owed a particular theoretical debt to Jaulin, who was one of the first authors to define the notion of ethnic diversity as opposed to the notion of integration. He identified the latter as a form of ethnocide, understood as the cultural extermination of ethnic groups through integration as a process promoted by any form of capitalist domination. Similarly, Bonfil Batalla analyzed the "native Mexican" voice, which essentially referred to the colonized status of a group of subjects, in direct

opposition to a fact that, no matter how fundamental, was ignored: Mexico's ethnic and cultural plurality. This coincided with the need to reformulate anthropological practice as "science with commitment," reducing the anthropologist's field of action to serving as an adviser and promoter of the needs of the communities under study. It is important to add that this idea was not exclusive to Bonfil Batalla's work, but was common among anthropologists with a Marxist leaning. Together they called for support of anthropology that was committed to the causes for which the people and ethnic minorities were struggling.

This position of so called "anthropology with commitment" was immediately criticized by official *indigenismo*, fundamentally through Aguirre Beltrán, and also by Marxist anthropologists in academic circles. The criticism intensified in 1972 when Bonfil Batalla accepted the position of director of INAH. This criticism can be read as the development of a crisis, clearly theoretical in nature, at the very heart of the country's *indigenistas* policies. Just as the academic sector had become polarized into political factions, and official *indigenismo* was obliged to defend itself against increasingly harsh criticism (such as the accusation that it attacked national sovereignty by allowing the work of the Summer Linguistic Institute, whose aims were clearly religious, and that it had facilitated the work of US linguists and anthropologists in the Camelot project), the two primary institutions charged with addressing the indigenous problem in Mexico during the government of Luis Echeverría Álvarez (1970–6) were headed by two adversaries (Bonfil Batalla and Aguirre Beltrán, respectively). In short, the crisis had become institutionalized.

In the theoretical arena, Aguirre Beltrán's primary criticism of Bonfil Batalla consisted of an absolute rejection of what he referred to as the constitution of "native Mexican power." He argued that this would end up becoming consolidated, as in the United States, in a "reservation economy" that would lead to an ethnic consciousness, not a class consciousness, necessary for the development of communities, thus eliminating the possibility of a class struggle and transforming the conflict between national society and indigenous communities into a

conflict of castes. Thus, unlike Bonfil Batalla, who focused the problem of *indigenismo* on the difficulties surrounding the nation's cultural diversity and on the problem of the cultural and political autonomy of indigenous communities, Aguirre Beltrán viewed it as fundamentally important to accelerate the transformation from a caste consciousness (inherited from Mexico's colonial past) to a class consciousness. His theoretical position on this point was very similar to the positions maintained by Marxist anthropologists, who viewed the indigenous as part of the social class of peasants and whose intention was to "integrate" native Mexicans into the social revolutionary class. There were, however, more critical positions in this regard, such as that of Ángel Palerm, who, in contrast to Aguirre Beltrán, proposed that the state and the nation were different phenomena and that, at least in theory, a nation state might accept cultural plurality without jeopardizing its internal structure. This implied that the *indigenistas* policy of a nation state would not necessarily have to be one of assimilation and destruction of identity.

In 1971, one year before Bonfil Batalla assumed the directorship of INAH, he participated, along with a group of distinguished Latin American anthropologists (including Darcy Ribeiro and Stefano Varese), in the Declaration of Barbados. The anthropological proposal from the 1970s was synthesized in this declaration, and it outlined the ideological tendency of indigenous movements in Latin America that can still be observed today. The Declaration of Barbados analyzed the role of the state, religious organizations, and anthropologists in relation to autochthonous peoples. The state, according to this Declaration, should guarantee that indigenous peoples maintain rights over their territory as a collectively owned, extensive, and inalienable property, based on the assumption that the rights of indigenous societies come before those of the national society. The problem of autonomy was once again addressed, emphasizing the need for the state to recognize the right of indigenous peoples to organize and govern themselves according to their own specific cultural characteristics. It was suggested that religious missions should discontinue all types of activities,

and that the purpose and responsibility of anthropologists consisted in contributing knowledge to communities and serving as intermediaries between these communities and society.

From that time on, Bonfil Batalla's theoretical works turned toward responding to the question of whether autochthonous cultures could be understood as "class cultures"; in other words, he focused on the role of indigenous cultures within the state and in the nation's cultural reality. This in turn made it necessary to first define the nation's cultural reality. His arguments, developed in his earlier works, are synthesized in *México profundo*, in which he maintained that Mexican society was composed of a multiplicity of subcultures that had never been harmonious; in fact, they existed amidst constant tension and were contradictory, antagonistic, and encompassed a complex set of class cultures. The traditional anthropological concept of culture highlighted the homogeneous, harmonious aspects of the cultures studied. The concept of class cultures, referring to the culture of oppressed groups within a larger dominant system, was introduced with the objective of eliminating asymmetrical relationships, and thus leading to the possibility of constructing a pluricultural state.

In the political arena, Bonfil Batalla's central idea was to contribute toward consolidating an indigenous movement and anthropological reflections emerging from the point of view of autochthonous peoples themselves. This effort led to partial results in the Second Barbados meeting of 1977. Unlike the first meeting, the entire body of the declaration was elaborated by indigenous representatives from native Mexican movements and organizations. According to Bonfil Batalla, this was because, during 1975, the Mexican government began to sponsor the formation of indigenous organizations, in parallel to the historic events taking place at that time, specifically the international rise in ethnic movements, with Vietnam's triumph and the advances in China as particularly representative of this tendency. In this panorama, Bonfil Batalla pointed to notable differences in indigenous discourses, with some "rationalizing" official *indigenismo* in their own terms, others maintaining self management and

autonomy oriented discourses, and yet others advocating millennium inspired ideas with utopian tendencies. At the institutional level, by 1979 Bonfil Batalla had managed to develop a training program for ethnolinguists, with the idea of educating members of the communities to serve as anthropological professionals who would then initiate direct dialogue with anthropologists and even with institutions.

This turbulent period of contradictions around the role of the native Mexican in the Mexican nation exploded a decade later. Mexico's neoliberal adventure and its forced insertion in the globalized world rendered futile any proposal on official indigenous policy. It is not by accident that, by 2004, the INI was closed down, after an accelerated process of dismantling. Nor is it surprising that INAH changed its traditional orientation toward the indigenous world, focusing instead on other global projects more oriented toward tourist consumption. In short, the struggle of the 1960s and 1970s between different positions on the ethnicity issue continues unresolved. The integrationist position defended by Aguirre Beltrán still exists, although outside the framework of the exhausted nationalist revolutionary order. The pluriculturalist position defended by Bonfil Batalla, as well as by many other anthropologists, is now outside the institutional context, although it has not disappeared and has instead taken on the form of social movements that resist the globalized world.

SEE ALSO: Culture; Ethnic Groups; Ethnicity; Indigenous Movements; Indigenous Peoples; Multiculturalism; Revolutions

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Bottomore, T. B. (1920–92)

William Outhwaite

Tom Bottomore brought to British sociology a concern with social theory, especially (but by no means entirely) Marxist theory, with social movements, and with what came to be called the third world. He was one of the leading members of the generation of British sociologists who passed through the London School of Economics just after World War II. After a year's research in Paris on Marx and on the French civil service, he returned to LSE, where he taught from 1952 to 1965. Following two years at Simon Fraser University in Vancouver he took up a Chair at the University of Sussex, which he held until his retirement in 1985. He put into practice his thoroughly international approach in many years of patient work developing the International Sociological Association, of which he was president from 1974 to 1978; he was also president of the British Sociological Association from 1969 to 1971.

Bottomore's publishing career began with an edited collection of Marx's writings, and he continued to write and edit books on Marx and Marxism (including Austro Marxism and the Frankfurt School) throughout his life. He also began a translation of Georg Simmel's *Philosophy of Money*, completed by David Frisby, and retranslated Rudolf Hilferding's *Finanzkapita* (1991) and Karl Löwith's essay of 1932 on *Max Weber and Karl Marx*. He also wrote substantially on classes and elites, on political sociology, and increasingly on economic sociology. At the time of his death he was working on two books, one on the concept of planning and another on socialist democracy. A six month trip to India meant that his magisterial textbook *Sociology* (1962) was substantially oriented to that country, as well as displaying a sensitivity to issues of global development otherwise rare in British sociology at the time. His many books remain a major reference point for contemporary work across a wide range of fields.

Bottomore was anything but an orthodox Marxist; he had no time, for example, for the

concept of dialectic. For him, Marxism was a sociological theory *and* a political project, but the efficacy of each was to be judged on the ground, in practice. Most unorthodox, perhaps, though anticipated in the neo Kantian Marxism of the Austro Marxists, was his insistence on the fact/value distinction. He was in many ways an honorary Austro Marxist, attracted by their combination of economic rigor, political sensitivity, and theoretical openness and flexibility.

But the diffusion and revival of Marxist social theory, which was perhaps Bottomore's principal achievement in Britain, was part of a broader impulse to deprovincialize British sociology in both its theoretical resources and its substantive concerns. He was probably happiest working outside Britain, and his intellectual and practical internationalism and wanderlust gave him a strategic place along with the great immigrants who substantially shaped British sociology in the second half of the twentieth century – such figures as Norbert Elias, Ralf Dahrendorf, Ernst Gellner, John Rex, Ilya Neustadt, Stuart Hall, and Zygmunt Bauman.

He did not predict the sudden collapse of the European state socialist regimes, though he noted their serious economic and political problems and the possible restoration of capitalism. He envisaged and hoped for a more moderate transformation, involving political democratization and the decentralization of economic decision making. As he had noted earlier, the possibility of the restoration of capitalism undermines the original Marxist notion of a one way irreversible movement to socialism. "But ... Marx's ... analysis still needs to be pursued in new conditions" (Bottomore 1991: 98).

SEE ALSO: Capitalism; Class; Communism; Critical Theory/Frankfurt School; Marx, Karl; Marxism and Sociology; Neo Marxism; Socialism; Theory

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boundaries (racial/ethnic)

Andreas Wimmer

The study of ethnic and racial boundaries is intimately connected to the constructivist view on race and ethnicity. Rather than individual ethnic or racial “groups,” their history, culture, and social organization, the boundaries between such groups and the mechanisms of their production and transformation move to the foreground. This implies a shift away from concerns with the given culture, identity, and social cohesion of ethnic groups toward strategies of boundary *creation* and transformation as they relate to the strategies of other individuals and groups. Perceived cultural or racial similarity or historical continuity thus are now seen as *consequences* rather than *causes* of the making of ethnic and racial boundaries. Such boundaries form a central dimension of the social organization of complex societies and their stratification systems.

The literature goes back to Frederik Barth’s introduction to an edited volume (Barth 1969) in which he laid out the constructivist agenda for coming decades of research. Studying ethnic boundaries has since then become a major preoccupation of mainstream anthropology and of the sociology of race and ethnicity. Special

attention has been given to the mechanisms of boundary *maintenance*, for example through selection of diacritical elements, linguistic markers, enforcement of endogamy, or more broadly the policing of sexual boundaries.

The constructivist perspective later spilled over into the field of nationalism studies. It has become a commonplace – with the notable exception of Anthony Smith (1986) – to see the boundaries of a national community as resulting from a reversible political process of inclusion and exclusion rather than as a consequence of cultural homogeneity and historical continuity (Wimmer 2002: ch. 3). Spinning off from this nationalism literature, the territorial aspect of the boundary making process has received some attention. A growing literature subsumed under the banner of “border studies” has emerged from this.

In the study of race relations the constructivist stance has also gained ground over the past two decades. While earlier scholarship, especially in the US, took the existence of racial groups for granted, a newer strand has looked at the role of the state in *creating* and sustaining racial boundaries through strategies of “racialization” (Miles 1993). The focus on boundary making has greatly been enhanced by the emergence of a literature that compares different countries from a macro (e.g., Marx et al. 1999) or a micro perspective (e.g., Lamont 2000) because it helped to denaturalize racial distinctions and highlight the varying nature and salience of racial boundaries in different contexts. Historical research has uncovered that the characteristics of racial divides may change considerably over time and that individuals and entire ethnic groups may have crossed the racial lines over the past generations, thus supporting a broadly constructivist perspective.

Three major limitations of the Barthian paradigm have been discussed over the past decades. First, the importance of power relationships in the making and unmaking of ethnic and racial boundaries was greatly underestimated in the original formulation. Recent scholarship emphasizes the role of the powerful apparatus of the modern state in drawing and enforcing ethnic and racial boundaries through policies of nation building, assimilation, “minority” incorporation, and so on. Others, especially those studying individual ethnic political

movements, have emphasized “resistance” of individuals or groups against such policies or the everyday “making” of ethnic boundaries in social networking and moral discourses. The exact relationship between dominant and subordinate strategies of boundary making remains to be determined by future research.

A second problem associated with the earlier literature is the lack of attention given to individual variability. Most fully fledged analyses of boundary making have developed from a “groupist” perspective, to cite Jenkins’s (1997) term, which takes ethnic groups as actors with a unified purpose and strategy, assumed to be one of boundary maintenance and policing rather than of dissolution and assimilation. This does not fit well with the ethnographic record, which shows that various, sometimes contradicting, claims to groupness are put forward by persons that share an ethnic background (Brubaker 2004). However, an equally diverse sample of examples could be cited as support for the *opposite* proposition: that ethnic boundaries are drawn unambiguously and are agreed upon by a vast majority of individuals. We know that ethnic conflict and violence tend to enhance such unity and produce clear cut boundaries. Beyond such rather general observations, no systematic literature has yet developed which would try to explain the variation in the degree of variability.

The last and most widely discussed problematic refers to the limits to the malleability, transformability, and strategic adaptability of ethnic boundaries. Recently, a number of insightful critiques against the more exaggeratedly constructivist interpretations of Barth’s essay have appeared. This new literature acknowledges that it is a matter of *degree*, not of *principle*, whether or not ethnic boundaries can be reconstructed and reorganized, following Katherine Verdery’s advice to “situate the situationalisms” of Barth (Verdery 1994). A number of mechanisms have been identified that lead to a “hardening” of ethnic boundaries, less strategic malleability, and thus more stability over time.

Contrary to Barth’s famed assertion that it is the boundary that matters in ethnic relations, not the “cultural stuff” they enclose, a number of authors have emphasized that this stuff may indeed make a difference. In the continuous

landscape of cultural variations we may find discontinuities or ruptures, such as brought about by migration or conquest, along which ethnic boundaries will follow with a high likelihood. Various authors have used different language to make this point.

Bentley and Wimmer have used Bourdieu’s habitus theory (Bentley 1987). Cornell (1996) distinguishes between ethnic groups that are held together by shared culture or shared interest, the latter being more prone to boundary manipulation and change. Hale (2004) takes a cognitive perspective and argues that communication barriers or embodied, visible differences will make it more likely that an ethnic or racial boundary emerges and stabilizes. Finally, the precise way boundaries are constructed may have consequences regarding their stability and manipulability through strategic action. Systematic comparative research will have to establish the validity of these various new approaches in a more precise and empirically solid way.

SEE ALSO: Assimilation; Ethnic Groups; Ethnic and Racial Division of Labor; Ethnicity; Race; Race (Racism); Racial Hierarchy; Separatism; Stratification, Race/Ethnicity and

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Bourdieu, Pierre (1930–2002)

Christine A. Monnier

Pierre Bourdieu was born in rural southern France and pursued an educational career that led to his enrolment at the École Normale Supérieure as a philosophy major. He spent his military service in Algeria, at the time a French colony, and engaged in anthropological work on Kabylia. There he examined for the first time the effects of power and stratification in the context of colonialism as it interacted with native cultural practices. From then on, his sociological work on the nature and dimensions of power in culture made him one of the most influential contemporary sociologists. For Bourdieu, *culture* is a symbolic order that provides the components of social domination and unconscious mechanisms of reproduction of such domination between social classes. Bourdieu was also a sociologist of practices, that is, how symbolic structures are incarnated in the actions of social agents. Whatever topics he engaged – education, cultural practices, or artistic productions – Bourdieu always considered how both culture and practices sustain forms of social domination. This approach was designed to resolve the traditional dilemmas of sociology: objectivism versus subjectivism, structure versus agency, determination versus freedom. For Bourdieu, those dilemmas could only be transcended by taking into account the existence of invisible objective structures and agents' subjective interpretations of their circumstances.

Drawing from structuralism, Bourdieu conceptualized social and institutional settings as fields or markets. A field is a structured space of positions, a hierarchy (dominant/dominated) based on the unequal distributions in the domains of economics (wealth), social relationships, symbols (prestige), or culture (educational credentials). The amounts and types of capital with which agents are endowed determine their relative positions in the field. In the educational field, upper class students are endowed with different forms of capital that place them in a more valued position than lower class students. As a result, fields are characterized by struggles to improve one's position and to define what counts as legitimate production. For instance, in the artistic field, avant garde artists may struggle to challenge the definition of what is considered "art" against what may be defined as commercialization. Fields also compete with one another for dominance. Religious and political actors may want to influence what counts as legitimate art. According to Bourdieu, any sociological analysis should start by examining the field under study to determine the different positions, what kind of capital is most valued, how legitimacy is defined and by whom, and the struggles and strategies actors engage in. Such structural analysis provides the structural framework of social action.

For Bourdieu, the major determinant of practices is *habitus*: the set of dispositions actors acquire in their social milieu that generate and organize practices and representations. Habitus is the source of many types of ordinary behaviors, shaping artistic tastes (*distinction*), table manners, speech patterns (*language and symbolic power*), body language (*masculine domination*), writing styles, food and drink preferences, educational success (*reproduction in education, the state nobility*), etc. In all these practices are embodied a social hierarchy. For instance, not all artistic tastes are equally valued in the field of cultural production, and not just any writing style is valued in the educational field. To prefer Hollywood blockbusters to avant garde cinema is to display a lower class habitus; to be at ease in select restaurants and know how to choose the right wine reveals a high class habitus. In all cultural practices and fields, habitus is what distinguishes and

divides social classes and determines dominant and dominated positions. In this sense, an agent's subjectivity is itself structured through the inculcation of habitus and reveals the social conditions in which it was acquired as well as the capital (or lack thereof) with which the agent was endowed.

If field and capital are what determine action from the outside, habitus is what determines action from the inside. Therefore, any complete sociological analysis should include agents' representations and attitudes as they shape their experience in any given field. By combining analysis of both field and habitus, Bourdieu is able to transcend the structure/agency dilemma by integrating them (Swartz 1997: 141).

For Bourdieu, if habitus, capital, and field determine practice, then the academic world and the sociologist herself should not be exempt from sociological analysis. All sociology should involve reflexivity: the sociological analysis of the conditions of production of sociological work. After all, the academic world is a field of power, as any other field, and the sociologist is an agent vying for recognition (capital). How sociologists study the social world, the topics and methodologies they select, etc., therefore should be analyzed as products of a specific field and strategies to improve their producer's position. Also, agents operating in the academic world develop an academic habitus, a topic that Bourdieu studied in *Homo Academicus*.

In the last part of his life, Bourdieu entered the public sphere to engage major political issues, something he had always been reluctant to do as he was wary of being co-opted by social movements. However, he saw economic, political, social, and cultural developments as justifying his intervention in the public debate. Nevertheless, Bourdieu's position remained uncompromising and reflexive. He believed that entering the public debate should be done carefully, and intellectuals thus risking manipulation by political organizations or by the media should offer not merely signatures on petitions, but also their expertise in building an informed political agenda. For his part, Bourdieu used his carefully developed concepts and research to illuminate social issues.

In his work on television, Bourdieu examined the impact and influence of the logic of the market on the journalistic field. This influence

generates a tension between "pure" and commercial poles. At the pure pole, the journalistic field is organized autonomously according to its own internal ethical codes and principles. At the commercial pole, demand imposed on actors in the field mostly comes from external constraints, advertising revenues, polls, and ratings. Bourdieu's concern is that the commercial pole is becoming dominant and this implies consequences not only for the journalistic field but for other fields as well, as the journalistic field, heteronomous by definition, has the capacity to influence other fields – culture, science, academia, and so on.

One important consequence of the domination of the market over the journalistic field is the depoliticization of news through a focus on anecdotes, human interest stories, and scandals at the expense of socially and politically significant news. At the same time, journalists may themselves be turned into celebrities, their power deriving from popularity rather than from credibility based on their field's standards. This is significant because journalists are dominated agents among the dominants; they are subjected to the authority of network/newspaper owners (mostly corporate groups), editors, and the logic of market revenues in general. As a result, they might develop a self-censoring habitus, drifting toward the commercial pole of the field without being directly coerced to do so. Correlatively, the media become a place of choice for actors from other fields, where they may have been failures, but now can find celebrity and fame in the media field. This is particularly visible in science where failed scientific agents – those who failed according to the mechanisms of the scientific field, such as professional research and publications – may find new credibility and power, their lack of professional credibility ignored if they fit the journalistic field.

As a result of such depoliticization, news worthy items – especially from non-western countries – tend to be downplayed unless they provide some temporary sensational stories. Many US 24-hour news cable channels tend to summarize foreign news through segments with such titles as "The World in 60 Seconds." When such networks do address the news, it is usually depoliticized and uncritical, using simplistic dichotomies (democrats versus

republican, pro versus con) which mask complex issues.

In his final writing, Bourdieu takes on the social uses of the concept of “globalization” that has become an obligatory reference in all sociopolitical and economic debates. He argues that globalization is both a descriptive concept that refers to the worldwide expansion of financial speculation and market capitalism and a normative concept conveying the idea that global capitalism and the dominance of the market are *faits accomplis*, an inescapable reality to which societies and social agents must adapt. Globalization is thus presented as a new utopia: the “natural” next evolutionary stage in socioeconomic structure. For Bourdieu, this view is a carefully constructed myth whose “naturalistic” touch hides its social production mechanisms and power relations.

For Bourdieu, in the social reality masked by the myth of globalization, representatives of the states are liquidating the progressive welfare systems established in western democracies. State agents are thereby eliminating one of the most important roles of the nation state: the social protection of its citizens. Under the new doxa (neoliberal ideology), or dominant discourse, such protection has to be eliminated in the name of flexibility, budgetary constraints imposed from outside, and global competition. This decline in power of the nation state correlates with the rise in power of global institutions, such as the World Bank, the International Monetary Fund, and the World Trade Organization, all of which lack accountability.

This structural reconfiguration of institutions, misleadingly presented as necessitated by the times, is actually the product of social and ideological strategies by actors in the economic field to increase their symbolic capital. One such strategy has been the successful imposition of the new neoliberal doxa that presents globalization as an economic necessity. Bourdieu demonstrates that the creation and imposition of this new doxa is actually a deliberate social product.

The idea of globalization as the next step in the evolution of economic systems was promoted by think tank economists as part of a large scale lobbying effort to promote this new doxa. Economic issues were addressed in the media as an objective domain in their own

right, completely independent from political and social considerations and to be dealt with by economic experts. This economic discourse was then presented as objective, scientific, and rational, disqualifying it from critique by its rivals which ostensibly lacked such qualities. Additionally, globalization of market mechanisms, as part of the new doxa, becomes the new revolution toward progress and democracy. Therefore, any opponent could be labeled as anti democratic, archaic, or selfishly reactionary. Finally, to paraphrase Bourdieu, the new doxa tends to universalize the particular, i.e., to impose worldwide a mode of thinking and an economic system specific to the United States while presenting them as natural universals.

The result of this strategy was to increase the symbolic and social capital of economists as globalization experts in the academic and media fields. Such an increase in capital was also accomplished by turning economics into an entirely abstract and mathematical discipline, churning out models by which economic reality and policies were to be measured. In cases of disjunctions between models and reality, the models can never be wrong and the blame would be placed on politicians or citizens, too ignorant or undisciplined to make the right economic choices. The difficult reality that results from neoliberal policies would be left to other social scientists with less symbolic capital to examine.

For Bourdieu, to substitute abstract mathematical models for economic and social reality produces two types of effects. First, it amounts to mistaking the things of logic for the logic of things. In other words, the model always prevails and reality becomes irrelevant. Second, mathematical skills become a new tool of social selection and reproduction in the educational and academic fields.

The real consequences of such policies were explored at length in empirical work by Bourdieu and his team in *The Weight of the World*. For Bourdieu, these consequences are disastrous for democracy as they include depoliticization, that is, a growing political apathy and crisis of legitimacy of the political class. This depoliticization is directly the result of the takeover of economic matters by global institutions with no accountability to any constituencies. As a result, social agents

understand that no matter which group of politicians they elect, the economic policies will not change. Another social consequence hidden by the new doxa is the destruction of everything collective – unions, collective contracts, and wage scales. The social agent is left to fend for herself in an individualized labor market, whose main characteristic is the casualization of work, insecurity, and flexibility.

SEE ALSO: Capital: Economic, Cultural, and Social; Habitus/Field; Poststructuralism; Structuralism; Structure and Agency

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bourgeoisie and proletariat

Wout Ultee

Engels and Marx are regarded as the founders of a theoretical tradition in sociology called historical materialism. This perspective takes

economic power as the prime dimension of social stratification and holds that the history of all hitherto existing societies is the history of class struggles. The main classes in the societies Engels and Marx studied most intensively were the bourgeoisie and the proletariat. More particularly, classical historical materialism postulated several trends supposedly characteristic of any society with private ownership of the means of production, such as machines and factories (capital goods) and free markets for capital, labor, and consumption goods. According to the “general law of capitalist accumulation,” the longer the capitalist mode of production prevails, the more capital will have accumulated, leading to both higher profits for capital owners (the bourgeoisie) and to worsening living conditions for the people who live by their labor (the proletariat). Although recognizing in the early phases of the capitalist mode of production the presence of small and large proprietors as well as skilled and unskilled workers, the persistence of the capitalist mode of production would lead to a disappearance of the middle classes. Small proprietors would become less common, as they lose out in the fierce competition from large proprietors. Workers skilled in using their hand tools would also become less common as proprietors replace them with cheaper unskilled workers operating machines. In addition, since the persistence of the capitalist mode of production is accompanied by ever deeper economic downturns, wages tend to fall while the percentage of unemployed workers rises.

Engels charted the condition of the working class in England in the early 1840s by adducing personal observations and authentic sources. He also pointed towards proletarian violence during economic downturns, and maintained that each new economic crisis would be accompanied by more violence. Two decades later Marx sought to “illustrate” the general law of capitalist accumulation by way of governmental statistics for the UK. Production of coal and iron had increased, more railway tracks were in use, and exports had boomed. At the same time profits grew, and the numbers on the official lists of paupers increased. Of course, the proletariat never violently overthrew the bourgeoisie.

Around 1900, Eduard Bernstein, of the revisionist wing of historical materialism, pointed

out that wages had increased. He invoked the rise of better paid skilled labor, necessary for the operation and construction of machines. He also predicted that labor unionism, the introduction of general suffrage, and the increasing vote for social democratic parties would lead to a gradual reform of capitalism. After World War II the revisionist prediction was that rising standards of living would result in the embourgeoisement of the working class.

Within orthodox historical materialism the old hypothesis that under capitalism the bourgeoisie gets richer and the proletariat poorer cropped up in different guises. Before World War I, Rosa Luxemburg held that the rise of wages in the mother countries of colonial empires was offset by a decline in the living conditions of colonial workers. In the 1970s, after the political independence of most colonies, Immanuel Wallerstein's world system theory postulated a trend towards more absolute poverty in the periphery of the world economy (the old colonies) as a consequence of the increasing power of multinational companies (with their head offices in the old imperial centers) extracting raw materials in the periphery to be processed in the center. Of late, in connection with the elimination of import barriers in rich countries against manufactured goods from poorer countries, it has been argued that globalization fosters unhealthy working conditions and child labor in the periphery of the world economy.

These orthodox hypotheses have led to systematic quantitative research, and the results suggest that they contain at least some truth. In addition, the issue of whether income inequalities and extreme poverty are rising on a world scale is hotly debated and frequently researched in contemporary sociology. Also, although mass unemployment during the 1930s gave way to several decades of almost full employment after World War II, double digit unemployment levels in several Western European countries beginning in the 1980s have brought old questions about the developmental tendencies of market economies to the fore again.

SEE ALSO: Capitalism; Class Consciousness; Employment Status Changes; Engels, Friedrich; Income Inequality, Global; Marx, Karl; Marxism and Sociology

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brand culture

Jonathan E. Schroeder

Brand culture places brands firmly within culture to look at the complex underpinnings of branding processes. Much brand research emerged from the allied fields of management, marketing, and strategy, which generally hewed toward positivistic models of brand "effects" driven by quantitative analysis. Recently, sociologists, anthropologists, and cultural studies researchers have looked at brands from historical, critical, and ideological perspectives, acknowledging the growing importance of brands in society (Koehn 2001; Lury 2004). An emphasis on brand culture forms part of a larger call for inclusion of sociological issues within the management and marketing research canon, joining in the contention that culture and history can provide a necessary contextualizing counterpoint to managerial and information processing views of branding's interaction with consumers and society.

Brand culture refers to the cultural influences and implications of brands in two ways. First, we live in a branded world: brands infuse culture with meaning, and brand management exerts a profound influence on contemporary society. Second, brand culture constitutes a third dimension for brand research – in conjunction with traditional research areas of *brand identity* and *brand image*, brand culture provides

the necessary cultural, historical, and political grounding to understand brands in context. The brand culture concept occupies the rhetorical space between strategic concepts of brand identity and consumer interpretations of brand image, shedding light on the gap often seen between managerial intention and market response.

Recent research has shown that brands are interpreted or read in multiple ways, prompting an important and illuminating reconsideration of how branding “works,” and shifting attention from brand producers toward *consumer response* to understand how branding creates meaning (Holt 2004; Schroeder & Salzer Mörling 2005). Cultural codes, ideological discourse, consumers’ background knowledge, and rhetorical processes have been cited as influences in branding and consumers’ relationships to advertising, brands, and mass media. Consumers are seen to construct and perform identities and self concepts, trying out new roles and creating their identity within and in collaboration with brand culture.

If brands exist as cultural, ideological, and sociological objects, then brand researchers require tools developed to understand culture, ideology, and society, in conjunction with more typical branding concepts such as *brand equity*, *strategy*, and *value*. Thus, brand culture implies an awareness of basic cultural processes that affect contemporary brands, including historical context, ethical concerns, and consumer response. In other words, neither managers nor consumers completely control branding processes – cultural codes constrain how brands work to produce meaning. In this way, research on brands and branding has opened up to include cultural, sociological, and philosophical inquiry that both complements and complicates economic and managerial analysis (Lury 2004; Arvidsson 2005).

How do brands interact with culture? From a cultural perspective, brands can be understood as communicative objects. The brand manager wants consumers to buy into a symbolic universe as defined by, in part, the brand identity. In theory, brand management is about communicating a message interpreted in line with the brand owner’s intention (Kapferer 2004). This

perspective fails to take into account consumers’ active negotiation of brand meaning, contextual effects such as time, space, and personal history, and cultural processes such as the No Logo and anti globalization movements. At one level, consumer choice is critical to understand why certain brands become more successful than others. However, the meanings consumers ascribe to brands are not only the result of a projected brand identity – a process of negotiation also takes place in and between a marketing environment, a cultural environment, and a social environment. Managing brands successfully mandates managing the brand’s meaning in the marketplace – the brand image. Yet the brand meaning is not wholly derived from the market. Culture, aesthetics, and history interact to inject brands into the global flow of images.

Brands are not only strong mediators of cultural meaning – brands themselves have become strong ideological referents that shape cultural rituals, economic activities, and social norms among consumers and producers. In this way, brands and branding can be seen as a central historical and cultural force with profound impacts on the perception of the marketplace and of the consumer. Furthermore, brands may preempt cultural spheres which used to be the privilege of religion or politics. Brands promote an ideology closely related to theological and political models that equate consumption with happiness – a classic advertising proposition. Strong brands constantly develop prescriptive models for the way we talk, the way we think, and the way we behave.

Brands have become a contested managerial, academic, and cultural arena. Many of the world’s biggest companies – and most highly valued brands – are seen as *corporate brands* rather than corporate entities – such as McDonald’s, Nike, BMW, and Coca Cola – each valued more for their intangible brand attributes than for any other assets (Interbrand 2005). These corporate brands are an increasingly important, powerful, and visible part of culture and demand distinctive research approaches. Scholars from different disciplines squabble over who owns the brand literature, with marketing, management, corporate identity,

and advertising academics squaring off for dominance.

The cultural landscape has been profoundly transformed into a commercial brandscape in which the production and consumption of brands rival the production and consumption of physical products (Baudrillard 1981). This shift has been called an attention economy, an experience economy, an information society, and an image economy. Future research questions include: What does this transformation imply for branding and consumer culture? How do brands command so much value? What roles do brands play in cultural and social institutions, rituals, and trends?

SEE ALSO: Branding and Organizational Identity; Brands and Branding; Consumption, Spectacles of; Consumption, Visual; Mass Media and Socialization; Media and Consumer Culture

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branding and organizational identity

Matthew Higgins

Branding and organizational identity refer to a process through which a pattern or a structure is ascribed to a group of individuals and recognized as unique, autonomous, and relatively stable in space and time. There are two components to this: the organizational identity, which is a concern with *what and who* the organization is, and branding, which is primarily concerned with how the organization is represented to key stakeholders. In part, the development of the body of work relating to branding and organizational identity can be summarized as the story of how writers and practitioners have sought to clarify the relationship between these components and increasingly of late to see how branding and identity can be treated holistically through multidisciplinary perspectives.

Organizational identity is conventionally concerned with how an organization's members conceptualize who "we" are and what "we" stand for. A relatively recent field of study, it is largely informed by social identity theory, examining how identity is formed through social interaction and how individuals identify with the organization. Within the literature, organizational identity is often contrasted with corporate identity, the latter being a concern with how the organization expresses itself, or brands itself. Issues of branding and organizational identity have traditionally straddled the business disciplines and have received increasing attention since World War II. Scholars in strategy, organizational studies, accounting, and marketing have adopted approaches to the subject that reflect the primary interests and motivations of their respective disciplines. This is evidenced with the myriad of differing terms through which to explore branding and organizational identity. Thus, we see contributions on corporate image, corporate reputation, corporate branding, corporate communication, corporate personality, and corporate identity.

Each of these terms draws from a particular intellectual and cultural background and provides a distinct focus on the subject. The term of preference is largely at the whim of fashion, each term's popularity ebbing and flowing as preferences change.

Each perspective usually privileges certain aspects of branding and organizational identity, whether it be examining who the organization is and what the organization stands for, or how, what, and to whom the organization communicates. For example, strategists employ the term organizational identity to refer to a concern with an organization's competitive position and reputation within the marketplace. This provokes a perspective that incorporates representations of the internal and external environment, with a focus upon what the organization is and how it is presently positioned and how it would ideally be positioned. The audience for the output of this examination is primarily internal (e.g., managers within the organization). These themes are developed with a marketing perspective that is often focused on the interconnections between image and product propositions, stretching this idea to emphasize the need for coherence in the image between the producer and the produced. Accordingly, strategic marketers have offered a view of organizational identity that is seen as both an analytical tool for examining strategic positioning within the environment, while also being a means of defining parameters of the organization and establishing distinctiveness within a competitive marketplace. This is often complemented by marketing communication that is concerned with the manner through which the organization communicates to the external stakeholders and the content and design of that message. In contrast, accountants have sought to measure the financial value accrued through the organization's identity by examining the strength of the identity across key stakeholders, appreciating the distinctive qualities of that identity within a given context, and using this information to attach a financial value to the organization's brand – more commonly referred to as brand equity. The significance of a financial value being attached to the strength of brand identity has encouraged many organizations to strengthen their image and to move away from representing themselves as

simply “producers” to organizations with a sense of “being” or personality. Thus, accountants are primarily concerned with how the organization is presented to an external audience and how that presentation is perceived.

These externally focused perspectives have often received the label *corporate identity*, while studies that looked inward at the way in which identity was formed have employed the term *organizational identity*. This latter term is often the preferred expression for scholars in organizational studies, who explore perspectives on organizational structure, and examine the interaction between culture, the self, identity, and image within an organization. Within organizational studies, organizational identity is a field of study that traces its origins to Albert and Whetten's (1985) influential article on the organization's central character, distinctiveness, and temporal continuity aspects. This approach argues that an organization may possess multiple personalities and that these may be at both the individual level and the level of the organization. Of particular interest is the temporal and evolving nature of identity, with issues of identity having particular congruence at particular stages of the organization's development. Albert and Whetten's ideas have been subject to critique for their proposition that an organization's identity is enduring. Writers in the last decade have sought to question how enduring an organization's identity is, viewing organizational identity as dynamic and suggesting that identity is increasingly fluid and transient to enable it to respond to environmental change.

The central role of communication in the processes of identity formation is also relevant to this discussion. Burke's (1966) “rhetoric of identification” links identity with issues of persuasion and processes of organizing. Burke argues that identification is a necessity due to the estrangement experienced by the individual through the division of labor. The individual responds to the division by acting to identify with others, seeking personal meaning through corporate identities. These identities may be manifested through labels and names, enhancing the self through status and prestige. For example, by identifying with a particular group within an organization, any praise directed at the unit is also directly or indirectly praise for the individual. While Burke's identification is

usually associated with the individual act of identifying, the organization can provide assistance in this process through symbolic processes that associate and disassociate the individual with specified groups. Within organization communications the use of “we” and “they” is important to induce cooperation. The managers within an organization may seek to encourage the individual employee that they and the organization are like them, that they share similar values and beliefs, or that the individual shares with the manager and the organization a common enemy against which the parties should unite.

However, these differing perspectives to the body of thought have highlighted the multifaceted nature of branding within the organizational context. In the process they have offered new ways of conceptualizing organizations, with a particular focus on the presentation of the identity within and of the organization. Increasingly, the differing perspectives from organizational studies, marketing, accountancy, and human resource management are being drawn together. The outwards directed communications and identity presentation has been supplemented with identity formation and internal communications to employees, shareholders, suppliers, and distributors. The idea of what constitutes the corporate image has also broadened. The corporate brand has moved away from a monologue through advertising and press releases, to an interactive “experience” (Schmitt 1999). Increasingly, organizational branding is seen as a means for the specialist functions of an organization (e.g., marketing, accounting, and human resource management) to work together in support of a cohesive entity. Issues of distinctiveness encompass not merely the differentiation from other organizations, but also the ability of the organization to demonstrate who they are and what they stand for. This is epitomized by Schultz et al. (2000), who bring together the differing perspectives to suggest that a holistic approach to organizational branding is necessary.

This extension of branding to organizations has been driven by a number of factors, most notably deregulation of industries, mergers, acquisitions, and the internationalization of business. The growth of the service sector and the development of electronic exchanges have

required organizations to rely increasingly upon the development of familiar visual cues and symbols to attract and reassure the customers in the absence of more tangible evidence. With the renewal of debates surrounding corporate social responsibility in the 1990s, the need for an organization to demonstrate what it stands for has seen a focus upon activities that enhance the organization’s reputation and realize its responsibility as a “corporate citizen.” In a period of shortened product life cycles and difficulty in recruiting and retaining quality staff, a strong corporate identity can provide a degree of protection from competitors. In the building of an identity, particular attention is paid to the structures, actions, communications, products, and services associated with the organization.

Perhaps significantly, the push to develop a coherent identity for the organization coexists with the problematization of the boundaries of the organization. The processes within a value chain are often spread across organizations, requiring the cooperation of a number of organizations in the fulfillment of the desired outcome. Strategic alliances, secondment, the outsourcing of supply, and subcontracting of production thus provide examples of where divisions between organizations become blurred. The distinction between the customer and selling organization is also problematized. The means by which organizations communicate is transforming this relationship as digital media enable an increasing number of communication channels and promote an approach to relations that emphasizes the need for interactivity.

Due to the relative youth of the area, researchers approach organizational identity through a multitude of differing perspectives and there has been a concentration on conceptual issues rather than methodological approaches. Methods used to research organizational identity and branding include functionalist approaches which view corporate identity as a social fact. This is exemplified by market research attitude surveys, and psychometric tests that seek to establish the feelings and perceptions of individuals (e.g., customers and other key external stakeholders to the brand) are frequently used tools. In contrast, more interpretive perspectives are beginning to draw linkages between identity, image, and

culture, examining how symbols, rites, and infrastructure are used to construct meaning. Such approaches have also problematized the identity of the stakeholders and defining whether stakeholders are external or internal to the organization. A more relational approach is being adopted that seeks to undertake a more longitudinal perspective on how an individual relates to the organization. Discourse analysis offers a particularly intriguing method for exploring how myths and stories help to formulate the organization's identity. Such an approach also exposes the probability of there being a number of storytelling narratives that are not necessarily coherent and quite likely to be contradictory. The manner in which the employee is constructed within such narratives and how the employee seeks to live up to the story being told becomes an area of interest. This moves us into the way in which the employee uses branding to exhibit a particular form of self to the organization that is enterprising and simulates the values expressed through the organization. With the convergence of perspectives and the emphasis on developing a multidisciplinary perspective on organizational identity and branding, a number of research tools that seek to fulfill this approach are being promoted. Of particular recent managerial interest is the AC²ID Test developed by Balmer and Greyser (2002). The authors are seeking to develop a holistic perspective on organizational identity and branding, drawing from functionalist and interpretive perspectives. Rather than assume a monolithic organizational identity, Balmer and Greyser propose that any organization comprises a number of identities and these identities are pertinent to different groups both within and beyond the organization. The AC²ID Test provides a framework within which these identities can be explored, the aim being to manage these identities and to ensure alignment.

Over the last decade, the sociopolitical aspects of branding and organizational identity have been explored and work in this area has enjoyed a broad audience. Popular texts have employed the ideas of branding and organizational identity to illuminate broader social problems. Texts such as Naomi Klein's *No Logo* (2000), Douglas Coupland's *MicroSerfs* (1995), and Morgan Spurlock's documentary film

Supersize Me (2004) have made significant contributions to the debate. These, and similar texts, position branding and organizational identity as an integral aspect of what could be referred to as marketing culture. This is the acknowledgment that the consumer sign based structure of society is incorporated within the discourse of civil society and is integral to the structuring of social relations. The distinction between consumption and production is blunted as the act of working itself becomes an act of consumption, employment becoming an integral part of identity formation. Who you work for and the way in which you work are increasingly as important as the clothes worn, places seen, and the labels displayed in the presentation of the self. With the convergence of the shopper and the worker, the debates on organizational identity and branding are central to discussions of the construction of the individual within contemporary society.

SEE ALSO: Brands and Branding; Consumption, Spectacles of; Consumption, Mass Consumption, and Consumer Culture; Globalization, Consumption and; Identity Theory; Management Consultants; Organizations and the Theory of the Firm

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brands and branding

Albert M. Muñiz, Jr.

According to the American Marketing Association, a brand is any name, sign, or symbol designed to identify and differentiate the goods or services of one producer from those of competing producers. Brands can be distinguished from the more generic constructs of products and services, which can be defined as anything offered for sale to a market to satisfy a need or a want. At a deeper level, a brand is the total constellation of meanings, feelings, perceptions, beliefs, and goodwill attributed to any market offering displaying a particular sign. Unbranded products and services are commodities (flour, soap, beer). Brands allow for the differentiation of generic products and services by associating them with particular meanings and qualities. Branding refers to the advertising, marketing, and managerial practices designed to develop, build, and sustain the characteristics, properties, relationships, and signifiers of a particular brand.

Brands and branding have greatly facilitated competitive market economies by allowing producers a way to differentiate similar offerings. Hence, market capitalism is intimately linked with the concepts of brands and branding. Brands have also changed the ways in which consumers make consumption decisions, relate to the market, define themselves, and interact with others. By virtue of their pervasiveness and the sophistication with which they are produced and managed, brands can now be considered one of the chief sources of meaning in modern consumer culture. Brands and branding have become much accepted hallmarks of contemporary society and consumer culture by both their proponents and their critics (Schudson 1984; Twitchell 1999).

Today, brands are applied to everything including political parties, universities, and

religions. Even water and dirt are branded. Despite its current prevalence, the practice of branding is a relatively recent development. While there are precedents that go back much further (stonemasons and other artisans have marked the goods they produced with water marks and other symbols in order to identify their source for centuries [Hine 1995]), what we would recognize today as true branding did not begin until the second half of the nineteenth century. As recently as 1875, most products were still sold as unmarked and unbranded commodities. Producers sold their goods to distributors and retailers who then dispensed them in a largely generic fashion. Consumers simply purchased what was available. Soap was sold by weight from an unbranded cake, flour was dispensed from unmarked sacks, and beer was drawn from an unnamed keg. These practices changed as the first national manufacturers' brands emerged in the latter decades of the nineteenth century.

Several convergent forces made the emergence of brands possible. Advances in manufacturing and packaging fostered the efficient production and standardization necessary for successful product differentiation, while improvements in transportation made national distribution possible. Changes in trademark and patent laws allowed manufacturers the ability to protect their brands, trademarks, and innovations. A growing and increasingly literate population created consumers that could read and understand the claims different brands were making, while the emergence of national media enabled these claims to be easily disseminated to a national audience (Keller 1998). However, the most important precursor to the emergence of brands was the rise of the modern advertising industry. Modern advertising, using national media, allowed marketers an increasingly sophisticated way to reach the population in order to create, elaborate, and project their brands onto the national consciousness (Fox 1984; Marchand 1985).

The first products to be branded were patent medicines and tobacco. During the 1850s tobacco producers first began to engage in truly modern branding efforts, including creating colorful brand names and distinctive packaging. Advertising and branding quickly caught on and the practice spread rapidly, particularly

among packaged goods manufacturers. By the early twentieth century, national mass marketed brands began to dominate and then replace unmarked (and often local) commodities sold from bulk containers. Brands soon became prominent and respected.

During the twentieth century, branding evolved considerably. Following the development of the first national brands, the practice of branding became far more specialized and scientific. Experts emerged in the many different aspects of branding, such as trademark design, marketing research, and advertising. The role of advertising in promoting brands also increased as advertising agencies developed more professional copy and slogans. Shortly before World War II, packaged goods manufacturer Procter and Gamble introduced the brand management system (Low & Fullerton 1994). Rather than leaving responsibility for a brand spread among experts in several different functional areas, the brand management system assigned a single manager to be responsible for the performance of that brand. This fostered greater consistency in the strategy and tactics applied to these brands and served to make them even more powerful.

The brand management system became standard practice during the national brand and economic boom following World War II. As this approach became more sophisticated, marketing and branding efforts began to focus on segmenting, targeting, and positioning, creating increasingly specific meanings that were aimed at increasingly smaller and better defined markets. In the 1980s, branding became focused on the concept of brand equity, the value (particularly financial) added to a functional product or service by associating it with a brand name. The emphasis on brand equity focused attention on defining, measuring, valuing, and controlling strong brands. This was when the concepts of family branding and brand extension became particularly powerful, resulting in a multiplicity of brand variations, such as the several varieties of Coke now available: Coke Classic, Coke II, Coca Cola C2, Cherry Coke, Vanilla Coke, Diet Coke, Caffeine Free Coke, and Caffeine Free Diet Coke. New challenges include the rapid proliferation of brands and products, the fragmentation and saturation of media and markets, threats to intellectual brand

property and logos, and an increasingly vocal anti branding movement.

Brands have greatly impacted the practice of business. Branding allows marketers to charge a premium for their offerings. Manufacturers are able to impart different, additional, and particular meaning to their generic commodities, resulting in far fewer acceptable substitutes at a given price. This increases profits and provides protection against price competition. Brands provide the manufacturer with leverage in distribution channels. Distributors and retailers prefer strong brands because they are less risky. This results in wider distribution and ample and prominent shelf space. Brands also lower marketing and advertising costs by making consumer awareness and loyalty more efficient to maintain.

Brands have also changed the lives of consumers. Brands simplify purchase decision making by fostering predictability and accountability. Consumers who have tried a particular brand understand what that brand offers and believe that they can expect the same experience every time they consume it. Consumers also know who they can hold responsible if a branded product does not live up to its expectations. Brands are a powerful source of meaning. Some have suggested that the meaning of a brand is its most important characteristic (O'Guinn & Muñiz 2005). Others have gone further and argued that brands (and the advertising and marketing efforts on which they are predicated) are the chief vessels of meaning in contemporary consumer culture and are important cultural resources for individual identity projects (Holt 2002). By consuming different brands, consumers are able to construct a social self and communicate their identity to others.

Just as the practice of branding has evolved, so too has the way in which brands are understood and researched. For decades, brands were approached almost exclusively from psychological and economic perspectives which stressed individual, passive, and rational consumers. Brands were treated as a set of weighted attributes, which were conveyed to consumers who largely accepted them in toto. Though broadening in focus and complexity, these models have kept their focus on the passive, rational individual. Recently, the fields of marketing and consumer behavior have begun to embrace

sociological and anthropological perspectives, focusing attention on what consumers do with brands rather than what brands do to consumers (Brown et al. 2003; Thompson 2004). These perspectives treat brands as social creations and view consumers and their various social aggregations as active interpreters and co creators of brands (Firat & Venkatesh 1995; Fournier 1998; Kates 2004).

The Internet and the World Wide Web allow consumers an unprecedented ability to talk to like minded others about their brand beliefs and experiences and have created new opportunities and challenges for branding. These media allow marketers a chance to observe consumer conversations in order to learn what consumers really think about their brands. They have provided an opportunity for marketers to affect these conversations via peer to peer, grassroots, and viral branding efforts. These media have also created challenges by fostering consumer interaction and aggregation that is beyond the control of marketers. Consumers can now share their thoughts and feelings in online forums and consumption communities.

One particularly relevant form of consumption community, and one becoming increasingly pervasive due to the Internet and World Wide Web, is the brand community (Muñiz & O'Guinn 2001). Brand communities are specialized, non geographically bound communities that form among users of brands. They share characteristics with more traditional conceptualizations of community, being marked by a shared consciousness, rituals, and traditions and a sense of moral responsibility, though these qualities have a particular expression owing to the commercial and mass mediated ethos of brands. Brand communities are important participants in the brand's larger social construction and play a vital role in the brand's ultimate legacy. They have also been the site of transformative and emancipatory consumer experiences, allowing consumers to transcend and resist the market (Muñiz & Schau 2005). By sometimes accepting and amplifying marketer actions while other times rejecting them, brand communities make the brand a contested space between the marketer and the consumer. Given the brand's prominent place in modern capitalism and the assumed complicity of

modernity in the loss of community, brand communities represent an intriguing and ironic adaptation of a fundamental form of human aggregation.

Large brands, particularly global, multinational brands, have become the target of a great deal of criticism and opposition, often seen as being emblematic of and responsible for the contemporary consumer society and its impact on global and local cultures, media, the environment, and human rights. Books such as Naomi Klein's *No Logo: Taking Aim at the Brand Bullies* (1999), Kalle Lasn's *Culture Jam: The Uncooling of America* (1999), or Alissa Quart's *Branded: The Buying and Selling of Teenagers* (2003) have fostered a growing anti branding movement that is reflected in the guerilla anti marketing actions of groups like AdBusters, the Billboard Liberation Front, and the Church of Stop Shopping. By some accounts, this opposition to brands is becoming larger and more organized. Others suggest opposition is easily co opted by corporate brand strategy (Frank 1997).

Brands are not just names and signs. They are increasingly important cultural resources and centers of social organization. Future research on brands should continue to examine the role of consumers and their collectives in the creation of the brand experience, particularly with regard to resisting markets and marketers. More research should examine the role of the brand as a cultural resource. An emerging perspective on brands suggests that brands will be unable to continue to draw from other cultural texts (such as movies, music, celebrities, and art) as a source of brand content. Instead, this perspective asserts that brands will have to develop their own contribution as a cultural resource by providing original and relevant cultural materials with which consumers can construct their identity (Holt 2002). Future research can examine if this transformation takes place and how it impacts consumers in their personal identity projects.

SEE ALSO: Advertising; Brand Culture; Branding and Organizational Identity; Conspicuous Consumption; Consumption and the Internet; Consumption, Mass Consumption, and Consumer Culture; Culture Jamming

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Braudel, Fernand (1902–85)

Immanuel Wallerstein

Fernand Braudel was the leading figure of the so called second generation of the Annales School of historiographic tradition, a tradition that distinguished itself from the outset by its emphasis on what it called “total history.” Within this tradition, Braudel’s work is noted for four major emphases: (1) concern with the unit of analysis, and in particular with a construct he called a “world economy” (*économie monde*); (2) analysis of social temporalities, which he asserted to be multiple, and in particular that of the *longue durée*; (3) his insistence on interscience, which refers to his concern with breaking down the barriers between history and the other social sciences (sociology, geography, political science, and economics); and (4) an interpretation of economic life that drew a sharp and unusual distinction between the market and capitalism.

Braudel was a prolific author. He is known especially for three major works, each multi volume: *The Mediterranean and the Mediterranean World in the Age of Philip II* (1972; in French 1966); *Capitalism and Civilization, 15th–18th Centuries* (1981–4; in French 1979); and the unfinished *Identity of France* (1988–90; in French 1986). The exposition of his epistemological views is, however, primarily to be found in his essays, which exist in various collected versions.

His concept of a world economy (*économie monde*) is different in crucial ways from the standard economist’s term of world economy (*économie mondiale*). A world economy (hyphenated in English to make the distinction, which is easier to make clear in French) is not “the economy of the world” (seen as a collection of nation states) but “an economy that is a world,” that is, an integrated economic structure, involving a division of labor. Hence a world economy can be, and usually has been, a geographical entity smaller than the globe. Braudel himself sought to demonstrate this idea in his work on the sixteenth century

Mediterranean. By shifting the focus to a world economy as opposed to the various political units that are located within it, Braudel was analyzing what he considered to be the effective social unit within which economic life was lived and social institutions were constructed. It was a radical shift of standpoint from which to do social science, and it has proved to be very fruitful.

In the same book on the Mediterranean in which he elaborated and used the concept of the world economy, Braudel also introduced his notion of the multiple social temporalities. He organized the book in three parts, each viewing the Mediterranean from a different temporal standpoint, what he called in French *structure*, *conjoncture*, *événement*, or structure, cycle (not conjuncture in English), and event. Structures existed, he said, in the *longue durée*. They persisted over long periods of time and formed the frameworks within which social action occurred. In his famous epistemological manifesto, "Histoire et la longue durée" (*Annales E.S.C.*, 1958), he specifically distinguished the *longue durée* from the *très longue durée* (or eternal time), which, he said, "if it exists, must be the time of the sages." The latter is the time he associated with nomothetic social science. Structural time, by contrast, is longlasting and constraining, but it is not at all eternal (or universal, in some language conventions). Rather, it is specific to particular historical entities.

The cyclical processes which he described (*conjonctures*) were cycles *within* structures, middle term in length. Braudel thus was not endorsing the ancient and familiar idea that history is nothing but a series of cyclical processes (e.g., Vico, Toynbee, Sorokin). Rather, he was arguing that the life of historical structures was made up of continuous fluctuations or cycles (such as expansions and contractions of economic processes or demographic movements). Therefore, he insisted, in order to understand the sociopolitical happenings of a particular period within the life of a historical structure, one had to ascertain within which swing of a cycle the structure was located at that specific point of time.

And finally, of course, there were innumerable events, which were short term and

idiographic. Constructing the sequence of events had traditionally been the principal grist of most historians' writings. But for Braudel, in a famous quip that he meant to be taken quite seriously, "events are dust." If we concentrate upon them, they will tell us very little because we would have missed the structures and cycles that embody the meaningful historical narrative. Events are dust in two senses: they are ephemeral (dust is easily blown away), and they distract us from the real story (dust in our eyes).

It follows from his rejection of the *very* long term (the eternal) on the one hand, and of the ephemeral short term (events) on the other, that we are pushed to being both historical (the *longue durée* but not the *très longue durée*) and systemic (structures and cycles) at the same time. This is the heart of the idea of inter science. The distinction between history on the one hand and the other social sciences on the other was, for Braudel, not only false but also deadly. It keeps us from practicing the necessary skills of combining the historic and the systematic into a single exercise. This was of course an intellectual position, and Braudel was well aware of the organizational obstacles to its realization. This is why he tried to create a Faculty of Social Sciences at the Sorbonne, in which historians as well as other social scientists would be located. This is why he constructed the faculty of the VI^e Section of the École Pratique des Hautes Études out of a combination of those historians, anthropologists, sociologists, and economists who would be ready to work together. And this was the central objective of the program of the Maison des Sciences de l'Homme, of which he was the administrator.

The work, however, that has had the most impact on the world of social science was *Capitalism and Civilization*. As he organized *The Mediterranean* in three parts around three social times, he organized *Capitalism and Civilization* around the metaphor of three stories in a house. The bottom story was that of material, every day life, the life everyone leads in all historical systems – what we eat, where we live, our kin systems, our religious practices, our modes of working and of entertaining ourselves. Above this bottom floor stands the market – a

persistent, natural effort of exchanges, small and large, that enable us to maximize the consumptions of everyday life. Markets, he said, were so natural that, whenever anyone tried to suppress them, they reemerged covertly, even clandestinely, but always vigorously.

The top floor was capitalism, a floor that, unlike the market, was not inevitable and in point of fact had not always been in existence. Far from capitalism being those structures in which a (free) market existed, he insisted that capitalism was quite the opposite – the anti market. Capitalism was the effort to monopolize economic life in order to maximize profit. Capitalism functioned by constraining the markets for the benefit of those who controlled capitalist institutions. In many ways, he saw much of history as a contest between the forces of the market and the forces of capitalism, which he envisaged as a contest between libertarian and oppressive structures.

His conception of capitalism was an upside down one, contrasting sharply with the prevailing views of Adam Smith (and his successors) and Karl Marx (and his successors), both of whom saw competitive capitalism for the most part as the modal form of modern life, from which monopolistic tendencies were a deviation and represented either an anachronism or a distortion. Braudel, on the contrary, saw monopolistic tendencies as the defining central feature of capitalism, living on the top floor of the economic world and oppressing both the market and everyday life beneath it.

Braudel was a very active academic organizer. He succeeded Lucien Febvre as the president of the VI^e Section of the École Pratique des Hautes Études in Paris, which became the principal locus of work in social science in France, and has been since renamed the École des Hautes Études en Sciences Sociales. He was the editor for almost two decades of *Annales E. S.C.* He was the founding administrator of the Maison des Sciences de l'Homme (MSH) in Paris from its beginning to his death. The MSH is a structure that combines affiliated research centers, a major social science library, and programs of international collaboration among and across the social sciences. He was the co founder of the International Association of Economic History, and its president

(1962–5). He served for some 15 years as president of the scientific committee of the very influential *Settimana di Studi di Storia Economica*, an international structure located in Prato, Italy. He taught at the Collège de France, and he was a member of the Académie Française. In the 1960s, he sought, valiantly but unsuccessfully, to establish a faculty of social science (separate from that of Letters) at the Sorbonne.

The combination of his intellectual production (translated into over 20 languages) and his organizational work meant that his influence rippled outward throughout his life and afterwards in two senses: from France and the French speaking intellectual world to all of Europe and the Americas, and latterly to Asia; and from the narrow disciplinary niche of economic history to other kinds of history, and to the other social sciences – sociology, anthropology, and geography in particular.

His initial links with sociology were in his long and continuous dialogue (private and public) with Georges Gurvitch. But it was with the rise of historical sociology as a major subdiscipline, particularly in the United States and Great Britain, that Braudel began to be read and appreciated extensively among sociologists. Furthermore, the last 15 years of his life coincided with both the publication of *Capitalism and Civilization* and the onset of a Kondratiev B phase, or major cyclical downturn, in the world economy. Suddenly, both the media and political economists began to notice the relevance of Braudel's approach to the understanding of capitalism and current happenings in the world system. He began to be extensively interviewed by journalists about the post 1970 world. He became a living exemplar of what he had been preaching – the breaking down of the barriers between the archival work that historians traditionally have done and the work on the contemporary world of sociologists and political scientists, and latterly anthropologists as well.

Braudel felt misunderstood and disavowed, even betrayed, by his students. He often wondered about how lasting was his influence, how long his works would be read. But, like most important thinkers, it is less in the number of citations of his work by future authors that

his influence is being felt than in the slow anchoring of his mode of analysis and his epistemological assumptions in the assumptions of future historical social scientists. The details of historical research are quite regularly superseded by later work. The mode with which we do our work and the spirit in which we analyze is seldom spelled out by the authors of scholarly works. It is in the tacit acceptance by many of his key concepts – the world economy as the unit of analysis, the importance of the *longue durée*, the dubiousness of the traditional boundaries that created walls between the social sciences, and the centrality of monopoly to the analysis of capitalism – that we can measure his lasting contribution. These concepts are not yet the consensus views of the historical social sciences. But they are all on the table, and for that we must thank Braudel.

SEE ALSO: Capitalism; Gurvitch, Georges: Social Change; Kondratieff Cycles; Marx, Karl; Smith, Adam; Sorokin, Pitirim A.

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Braverman, Harry (1922–76)

Stephen Wood

Harry Braverman, journalist, publisher, and a director of Monthly Review Press (1967–76), is best known for his book *Labor and Monopoly Capital*, published in 1974. This helped to continue the Marxist tradition within class theory at a time when it was being debated out of sociology by a mixture of alternative theories and empirical analysis centered on the rise of the middle class and the increasingly diamond shaped nature of the class structure, as well as by the emerging emphasis on subjectivity in sociology. It also refueled a Marxian current that had never been very strong in work sociology, which C. Wright Mills (in the late 1940s) had famously termed “cow sociology” for its instrumental, managerial emphasis on ways of improving employee performance.

The core of *Labor and Monopoly Capital* is a Marxist theory of the capitalist labor process. Marx had outlined how the development of the labor process was a key defining feature of capitalism. It was geared to profitable production, through generating more value from workers than is returned in the form of wages. The factory system had brought the worker and the labor process under the direct control of the capitalist and facilitated an ever more rapid accumulation of capital, through harnessing the detailed division of labor and the systematic, scientific study of work. This entailed a deskilling of both jobs and individuals.

In the twentieth century, assembly line work, as pioneered by Henry Ford, came to represent the paradigm case of deskilled jobs, with very short job cycles (often well under a minute) and training times. Deskilling had thus long been recognized, but with the advent of new forms

of more advanced technologies (e.g., in process industries) and the increasing size of employment in service jobs (e.g., in finance and health), a belief began to emerge in the 1950s and 1960s that the number of deskilled jobs would decline. Research by Blauner in the United States (published in 1964), for example, suggested that, at higher levels of automation, higher levels of skills would be demanded. Also jobs in the expanding service sector were widely thought to require higher levels of skills and education than the average factory job.

Within this context Braverman sought to reinstate the primacy of Marx's theory of the labor process. First, he stressed the centrality of Taylor's scientific management to the development of the United States in the twentieth century. Technology is of secondary importance, as Taylorism is concerned with the control of labor at any level of technological development. Taylorism is central because it represents the rationality of capitalism: it is "the explicit verbalization of the capitalist mode of production." Second, he reinforced the connections between Taylorism, deskilling, and the demise of the craft worker. Thus he interpreted Taylor's dictat that the conception of tasks should be divorced from their execution, and management should have sole responsibility for conception, as meaning that workers would be deskilled and have no control over their work. Third, he viewed the new computerized technologies (e.g., computer numerically controlled machines) that were emerging in the 1970s as being designed to embody Taylorist principles, and hence as building the control of the worker into the machine and eliminating any remaining skills that Taylorism had failed to remove through organizational means. Fourth, he highlighted how Taylorism was being applied in the service sector and to white collar and even administrative managerial work.

The main implication that Braverman drew out from his account of "the degradation of work in the twentieth century" (the subtitle of his book) is that deskilling remains inherent to capitalism. It has guaranteed the capitalist's control over the labor process and wage rates that maximize profits, and has meant that the working class has become homogeneous and the class structure polarized. Consequently, discussion and measures of class based on

occupational categories are wrong and accept "tailored appearances as a substitute for reality" (p. 426). In addition, attempts to supersede Taylorism, founded for example on the human relations movement's emphasis on participative management through group processes, or psychology's job redesign aimed at increasing workers' discretion, did not reverse the central tendency of capitalism. Rather than reversing Taylorism they reinforced it, as they provided the tools for managers to maintain "the human machinery" of production and habituate the worker to the dictates of capitalism.

It is hard to reconcile Braverman's thesis of a long term trend for the degradation of the worker with the changing overall skill levels of workers over the past century and a half, not least because the majority of workers in the nineteenth century lacked basic skills such as literacy which are now (perhaps mistakenly) taken for granted. In the twentieth century the numbers of craft type workers did not, in fact, decline to the extent implied by Braverman, and the main consequence of mass production was a whole new set of semi skilled occupations, not the substitution of craftwork by routinized labor. Variations in the nature and extent of Taylorism between different countries highlighted by historical and comparative empirical studies also show how deskilling is not a consistent trend. For example, the relatively high skill levels in a country such as Germany may enable capitalists to develop high quality products or services that they could not produce in other countries.

The most fundamental criticism that has been made of the deskilling thesis is that control of labor need not become an end in itself for management and the achievement of its prime objective – profitability – may not always be furthered by deskilling work. For example, the number of workers may be reduced by increasing the discretion of a smaller core workforce; and the more refined is the division of labor and the more limited the range of aptitudes possessed by individual workers, the greater are the coordination costs and problems for the organization of adjusting to fluctuating product market conditions and new technological opportunities.

Nevertheless, a key legacy of Braverman was to ensure that scientific management and its

effects on workers were not increasingly treated as simply a benchmark of the first era of mass production. Much work in the twenty first century, as in the twentieth century, remains low skilled: there have been clear cases where technology has reduced the skill level required in particular jobs and the discretion given to individuals, e.g., in engineering; and many of the jobs created in the past 20 years with the great growth in the service sector are low skilled, e.g., work in fast food chains, though not necessarily routinized. Hochschild's conception of emotional labor also implies that the capitalist's quest for control can extend to regulating the interpersonal relations at the heart of many transactions in the service sector. Current concern for deskilled jobs particularly has focused on call centers, which are often presented, with some justification, as modern sweatshops where customer service representatives have calls automatically fed to them, deal with customers through menu driven instructions and pre set scripted replies, and have little or no discretion over working arrangements.

SEE ALSO: Capitalism; Class, Status, and Power; Division of Labor; Emotion Work; Fordism/Post Fordism; Labor–Management Relations; Labor Process; Marx, Karl; Mass Production; Taylorism; Work, Sociology of

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bricolage

Andrew Milner

Bricolage is a French word, with no direct equivalent in British, North American, or Australasian English. In everyday usage, it describes the work done by a bricoleur – very roughly, but not quite, a cross between an odd job man and a handyman. In the 1950s and 1960s, though less so today, its meaning carried the sense of proceeding in an apparently disorganized and non rational fashion, but nonetheless producing effective results. It connoted the process of finding out how to make things work, not from first principles but from messing around with whatever materials were to hand. The term was introduced into the social sciences by the distinguished French anthropologist Claude Lévi Strauss to explain the “science of the concrete” developed in neolithic times and still present in some tribal cultures. It was taken up by the philosopher Jacques Derrida, who argued that all discourse is bricolage, and by the sociologist Michel de Certeau, who saw everyday reading as a form of bricolage. In each case, it actually functions as an analogy rather than a concept. More recently, postmodern cultural studies has tended toward the view that there is something distinctively contemporary and distinctively valuable about bricolage as method.

Lévi Strauss's *La Pensée sauvage*, first published in 1962 and later translated into English as *The Savage Mind*, is one of the classic works of structuralist anthropology. It sought to explain how “primitive” mythical thought was able to produce an impressive body of reliable knowledge about matters such as pottery, weaving, agriculture, and the domestication of animals. Lévi Strauss insisted that this “science of the concrete” was very different from modern science, but nonetheless no less scientific in its procedures and results. Explicitly likening it to the work of the modern bricoleur, he argued that, whereas modern science uses “concepts,” which aim to be wholly transparent vis à vis reality, bricolage and myth use “signs,” which require the interposition of culture into that reality. The science of the modern engineer therefore aims in principle to go beyond the

constraints imposed by culture, whilst bricolage and myth remain confined within them (Lévi Strauss 1966: 16–20). The characteristic feature of myth and bricolage is thus that they build up structured sets “not directly with other structured sets but by using the remains and debris of events” (p. 22). Art, Lévi Strauss continued, lies midway between modern science and myth/bricolage, for if the scientist creates events by means of structures, and the bricoleur creates structures by means of events, then the artist unifies events by revealing a common structure within them (pp. 22–6).

Derrida’s famous essay “Structure, Sign and Play in the Discourse of the Human Sciences” was first published in English in 1966, but included the following year in *L’Écriture et la différence* and later in its English translation, *Writing and Difference*. He sought to deconstruct Lévi Strauss’s binary opposition between engineer and bricoleur by arguing that all discourse borrows concepts from the “text of a heritage.” The notion that the engineer breaks with bricolage is thus “theological,” he concluded. But if scientists and engineers are themselves also bricoleurs, then, as Derrida recognizes, “the idea of bricolage is menaced and the difference in which it took on its meaning breaks down” (Derrida 1978: 285). This characteristically poststructuralist move reduces Lévi Strauss’s own sense of “neolithic” difference to sameness, paradoxically enough in the name of difference. Moreover, not only is engineering bricolage, but so too, according to Derrida, is Lévi Strauss’s own method (p. 286). Here, the philosopher is on firmer ground, since Lévi Strauss had indeed noted the “mythopoetical” nature of bricolage and would indeed later argue that his own studies of myth were themselves a kind of myth (Lévi Strauss 1966: 17; Lévi Strauss 1969: 6). This is an early example of what would later become the postmodern valorization of bricolage as method.

In the first volume of *L’Invention du quotidien*, first published in 1980 and subsequently translated into English as *The Practice of Everyday Life*, de Certeau also borrowed analogically from the art of the bricoleur. He did so at two levels. Firstly, he distinguishes between the strategies and tactics of everyday consumption in general, arguing that, whilst strategy

proceeds in terms of rational means–ends relations, tactics often work by way of bricolage: combining heterogeneous elements in the manner of a decision where an opportunity is seized, as distinct from that of a rational discourse (de Certeau 1984: xviii–xix). Secondly, and more specifically, he argues that reading can be considered a form of bricolage, in which the reader “poaches” from writing. Readers are travelers, he writes: “they move across lands belonging to someone else, like nomads poaching their way across fields they did not write” (p. 174). This notion has been further explored, with special reference to television audiences, in Henry Jenkins’s *Textual Poachers* (1992).

SEE ALSO: Certeau, Michel de; Deconstruction; Poststructuralism; Structuralism

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British Sociological Association

Jennifer Platt

The British Sociological Association (BSA), founded in 1951, is the national learned society for sociology, affiliated as such with the International Sociological Association. Starting

when sociology was hardly a distinct discipline, or institutionalized within British universities, it expanded rapidly as sociology expanded, and has developed a wide range of functions. (These do not, however, as in some professional associations, include the certification of sociologists or their qualifications.) It both organizes activities for sociologists and represents them in the wider society (see the BSA website, www.britisoc.co.uk).

Initially based at, and subsidized by, the London School of Economics, then home of the only university sociology department, it now has an independent administrative office in Durham, and is funded by subscriptions and the profits from publications and conferences. Subscription rates have been related to income, reflecting egalitarian principles also shown in the strong influence of the women's movement on many aspects of its organization. Membership is open to all sociologists, and to other interested individuals in academia and elsewhere, though most members are higher education staff or students. Levels fluctuate as a proportion of Britain's academic sociologists; since 1999, total membership, including some overseas members, has been around 2,200.

The BSA's earliest activities included running study groups on specialist fields, such as sociology of education, and holding conferences; there are now over 30 study groups and an annual conference, where several hundred participants attend papers given in many parallel sessions. Its first journal, *Sociology*, started in 1967; this was followed by *Work, Employment, and Society* in 1987, and in 1996 the electronic journal *Sociological Research OnLine*; these are all intellectually and financially successful. Edited volumes of papers from most annual conferences have also been published. Since 2000, Sociology Press, supported by the BSA, publishes at low prices research monographs and edited collections chosen on academic rather than commercial grounds. A members' newsletter has appeared three times a year from 1975.

Codes of practice, on subjects such as the ethics of research practice, guidelines on non-sexist language, and postgraduate research supervision, have also been promulgated. Other activities have arisen from the felt need to respond to external situations. Initially, data

were collected on employment for sociology graduates. During the growth in degree courses of the late 1960s, advice was given on syllabuses and teaching was discussed; a summer school for graduate students, especially helpful for smaller departments and part time students, has run since 1965. When many sociology students were active in student unrest, the BSA attempted to resolve conflicts and maintain a favorable public image for sociology. When in the 1980s university funding was heavily cut, and sociology was out of favor with the government, it fought against cuts and, with other learned societies, opposed attempts to close the Social Science Research Council, the major governmental research funding body (later the Economic and Social Research Council). Over its history the BSA has liaised with that body, attempted to influence its policy, and made nominations for its committees, as it has also for other national policy initiatives such as the University Research Assessment Exercises held since 1992.

SEE ALSO: American Sociological Association; Professions, Organized

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Brown v. Board of Education

David B. Bills and Erin Kaufman

The 1954 *Brown v. Board of Education of Topeka, Kansas* stands as the most significant Supreme Court decision in the history of American education, as well as one of the most important statements on racial equality and the relationship between various levels of American government. A half century later, the impacts and implications of *Brown* are still emerging.

Prior to *Brown*, American education followed the edict of “separate but equal,” first established in the 1896 Supreme Court decision *Plessy v. Ferguson*. According to the Court’s ruling, the denial of access to public railway accommodations did not violate the plaintiff’s rights, as long as “separate but equal” accommodations were available. The Supreme Court subsequently affirmed the “separate but equal” doctrine for postsecondary education in *Berea College v. Kentucky* (1908). This ruling upheld the criminal conviction of officials of Berea (a private college) for allowing African American students to be educated with white students. Two decades later the Supreme Court extended the “separate but equal” doctrine to K 12 education in *Gong Lum v. Rice* (1927). This ruling permitted a Mississippi school to exclude a student of Chinese descent from a white school.

In the mid 1950s the practice of Jim Crow was firmly established in the Southern US. Under Jim Crow (a term believed to have originated in 1830s minstrel shows, in which whites performed racially demeaning impersonations of blacks), virtually all public spaces were rigidly and legally segregated across racial lines. The practice of Jim Crow was stringently enforced through both legal and extra legal means, no less in public schools than in transportation, hotel accommodations, eating and drinking establishments, and the voting booth.

In the decades prior to the *Brown* decision in 1954, the National Association for the Advancement of Colored People (NAACP) supported the filing of three claims involving issues of equality in higher education. Importantly, these Supreme Court decisions served as precedent for dismantling the system of “separate but equal” that shaped the American public school system. First, *Missouri ex rel. Gaines v. Canada* (1938) required that states either establish separate graduate schools for African Americans or integrate them into existing ones. Lloyd Gaines, an African American man, was refused admission to the Law School at the University of Missouri. Instead of admission, the state offered to pay Gaines’s tuition for law school in a neighboring state; this offer complied with Missouri state law. Gaines brought action on the grounds that the denial violated the equal protection clause of the 14th

Amendment. The Court agreed, claiming that the state’s system of legal education provided white students with a privilege denied to their African American counterparts.

Second, *McLaurin v. Oklahoma State Regents* (1950) challenged the provision of “separate but equal” accommodations in higher education. McLaurin, an African American resident of Oklahoma, was admitted to the Graduate School of the University of Oklahoma as a doctoral candidate in education. In light of a state law requiring segregation at institutions of higher education, the University assigned McLaurin to a seat in a row designated for African American students, restricted him to a special table at the library, and, although allowed to eat in the cafeteria at the same time as other students, limited him to a special table there. The Court ruled that such conditions violated the equal protection clause of the 14th Amendment. The Court noted that the segregated conditions set McLaurin apart from his colleagues, inhibited his ability to study, and generally impaired his pursuit of a graduate degree.

Finally, *Sweatt v. Painter* (1950) involved equality in both the formal and the more informal elements of equality in graduate education. Petitioner Sweatt was denied admission to the University of Texas Law School, solely because the state law prohibited the admission of African Americans to the law school. Sweatt was instead offered admission to a law school that the state had established for African Americans. Sweatt filed suit on grounds that the policy violated the Equal Protection Clause of the 14th Amendment. The Court agreed, citing disparities between the two schools in terms of course offerings, opportunities for specialization, student body size, library holdings, and the availability of law review and other activities. The Court also recognized disparities in the more informal elements of legal education such as faculty reputation, the experience of the administration, influential alumni, community standings, tradition, and prestige.

Brown v. Board of Education was not the first legal challenge to racially segregated public schools in the US, a distinction that goes back to the 1849 case *Roberts v. City of Boston, Massachusetts*. It was rather the culmination of a long and concerted history of judicial challenges

(Kluger 1976). The case itself was initiated and organized by the NAACP under the leadership of Charles Hamilton Houston and later by future Supreme Court Justice Thurgood Marshall. The NAACP recruited African American parents in Topeka, Kansas for a class action suit against the local school board. African American children in Topeka were only allowed to attend designated public schools, which were strictly based on race. The case is named for plaintiff Oliver L. Brown, the father of Topeka student Linda Brown.

The Supreme Court's unanimous decision in *Brown v. Board of Education* overturned the "separate but equal" doctrine that had previously structured public schooling throughout the country. Chief Justice Earl Warren showed significant consensus building skills through his ability to ensure a unanimous decision from the Court; this unanimity in turn reinforced the importance of the Court's decision. Consolidating claims from Delaware, Kansas, South Carolina, Virginia, and Washington, DC, *Brown* ruled that, even though physical facilities and other tangible elements in public schools might be equal, laws permitting or requiring racial segregation in public schools violate the equal protection clause of the 14th Amendment. According to the Court, the segregation of children in public schools on the basis of race deprives minority students of equal educational opportunities. The Court also cited the work of social scientists Kenneth and Mamie Clark as evidence that segregation on the basis of race generates in minority students an enduring feeling of inferiority about their social status. In the "doll test," for example, the Clarks used four dolls, identical except for color, to determine self perception and racial preference among 3 to 7 year olds. When asked which doll they preferred, the majority of the minority children chose the white doll, and they assigned positive characteristics to it. The Clarks interpreted these findings to mean that "prejudice, discrimination, and segregation" caused children to develop a sense of inferiority. Based on these findings, the Court ruled that the doctrine of "separate but equal" has no place in public education and that separate facilities are by definition unequal.

Although ordering the positive step of integration lay beyond the jurisdiction of the

Court, the Court could provide direction for dismantling the system of segregation it had prohibited. *Brown v. Board of Education* (1955), known as *Brown II*, provided these guidelines. Stopping short of mandating a specific implementation timeline, *Brown II* ordered that communities desegregate schools "with all deliberate speed." The Court placed the primary responsibility for this process on school authorities, and it called on the lower courts to assess whether schools were making good faith efforts to desegregate.

Legal challenges to racial segregation in public schooling did not end with *Brown*, but rather continued consistently in the years following the 1954 decision (Russo 2004). In *Griffin v. County School Board of Prince Edward County* (1964) the Supreme Court prohibited the state of Virginia from undermining desegregation initiatives by establishing a "freedom of choice" program. Furthering this reasoning, *Green v. County School Board of New Kent County* (1968) provided "Green" factors for determining successful desegregation efforts, including the desegregation of facilities, faculty, and staff, extra curricular activities, and transportation. In 1971 the influential *Swann v. Charlotte Mecklenburg Board of Education* ruled that schools could use numerical ratios and quotas as starting points in their efforts to desegregate. Notably, Swann brought the issue of busing into the desegregation debate, and the decision was the last unanimous Court ruling in a major school desegregation case. In *Keyes v. School District No. 1, Denver, Colorado* (1973), the Court extended its focus from de jure to de facto segregation, claiming as unconstitutional not only legal segregation, but also any school board action that resulted in segregating schools.

The Court's 1974 decision in *Milliken v. Bradley (Milliken I)* contrasted its earlier, more proactive desegregation rulings. In this case, the Court ruled unconstitutional a multi district desegregation plan in Detroit, Michigan on the grounds that it compromised the autonomy of local districts. Since this decision, the Court has shown relatively little interest in continuing to pursue cases of educational desegregation, and federal presence from local remedies has fallen considerably from its 1970s levels.

Despite waning judicial interest in an active desegregation agenda, the legacy of *Brown v. Board of Education* shaped later civil rights legislation (as was intended by the NAACP in bringing the case). The *Brown* decision was a critical event in the Civil Rights Movement that eventually led to the 1964 Civil Rights Act, a landmark piece of legislation that made discrimination on the basis of race, religion, sex, and other categories illegal in the US. Further, *Brown* was instrumental in laying the foundation for the 1965 Voting Rights Act, which granted African Americans the right to vote. More recently, the elimination of the “separate but equal” doctrine established by *Brown* has been important in the extension of educational opportunity to students in special education programs and to Hispanic students.

While it is difficult to overestimate the significance of *Brown*, its implementation has often been slow and uncertain. In the years after the Court handed down its decision, many opponents of desegregation responded with both open and subtle tactics of resistance. Elected politicians at all levels – congressional, gubernatorial, and mayoral – often openly defied the *Brown* decision under the doctrine of “states’ rights.” Resistance to the *Brown* decision was especially severe in such Southern cities as Little Rock, Arkansas, and Farmville, Virginia, although busing efforts in Northern cities, notably Boston, also met with opposition.

Along with resistance to the *Brown* decision and the Court’s position on desegregation have come challenges associated with de facto segregation, which results from segregated neighborhoods and racialized housing patterns. Although some neighborhoods have become less segregated over the past decade, concentrations of African American and Latino students in metro areas help to account for the continued existence of highly segregated public schools. For example, the country’s 27 largest urban school districts have lost the majority of their white students and now serve one fourth of the country’s African American and Latino students. Although white students are the most segregated group of students in the country, attending on average schools that are at least 80 percent white, Latino students are the most segregated minority group in terms of both race and poverty; many times, linguistic

segregation exacerbates this latter situation. De facto segregation also helps to explain the development of what Frankenberg et al. (2003) call apartheid schools, which enroll almost all minority students and often deal with problems of widespread poverty and limited resources.

SEE ALSO: Civil Rights Movement; Race; Race (Racism); Race and Schools; School Segregation, Desegregation; Segregation

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Buddhism

Massimiliano A. Polichetti

Buddhism is a neologism, created in Europe in the middle of the nineteenth century CE, from the Sanskrit word buddha, literally the awakened one. It is derived from an epithet attributed to Siddharta Gautama, born in Northern India – one of the dates accepted by scholars for his life being 563–483 – once gained the bodhi, or awakening. Far from designating a man or preexisting godhead, the term buddha defines all those beings who, starting from the same conditions of common beings, succeed through their own spiritual merits in being released from worldly pains to gain eternal bliss and omniscience.

During its history, which spans at least 25 centuries, *Buddhadharma* – the spiritual law of the Buddha, a term which is certainly to be preferred to the western term *Buddhism* – has differentiated into schools which western scholars used to call the Southern school, because of its enduring presence today in Sri Lanka and Southeast Asia, and the Northern school, more widespread in the Himalayan regions, Tibet, China, Mongolia, Korea, Japan, and in other parts of Asia. More appropriate denotations of these two traditions, to use Northern school terminology, are *mahayana* and *hinayana*, i.e., the great vehicle and the lesser vehicle. The word vehicle is very apt in expressing the idea of a method – religion – which becomes unnecessary once the goal of awakening is attained, but which until that moment is an indispensable tool in transcending *samsara*, the world of rebirths. The school which *mahayana* defines, in derogatory fashion, as *hinayana* uses other terms to describe itself, such as *theravada*, the followers of the elders. For the *mahayana* school, the ideal of holiness is embodied in the figure of the *bodhisattva* – the hero of awakening motivated by the ideal of *bodhicitta*, the altruistic thought of awakening – who continues to be reincarnated until all other beings have been saved. The *theravada* school urges its followers to emulate and devote themselves to the ideal of the *arhat* – the venerable destroyer of the enemy – who strives to attain awakening by progressively annulling the dissonant emotions (*klesha*) which force beings to be reborn without any possibility of choice.

Even though this is not the place to undertake an in depth analysis of the difficult issue of the relationship between western and eastern philosophical terminologies, it should be at least pointed out that, while Buddhist philosophy in the East and Christian philosophy in the West both place the doctrine that seeks to define causes as the main foundation of their gnoseological methods, the outcomes of these pursuits differ. Christian philosophy requires an uncaused cause – a concept which originated with Greek philosophers and was given a final formalization by Aristotelian Thomism. Buddhist thought does not attempt to define a beginning in the endless chain of causes. Causes are thus considered as being generated in turn by other causes since a time with no

beginning. The effects generated by any cause subsequently become causes of further effects. If it were admissible to slot Buddhist thought into the categories of the history of western philosophy, it would be classified as one of the immanentistic solutions to the gnoseological problem. In its cosmological outlook this all feeds into the consideration that no one phenomenon or event in the existential order is *absolutum*, independent, or self generated, and that all are composed and produced, and thus depend on causes, parts, and conditions; in a word, they are interdependent. Furthermore, in most cases – with few exceptions, such as space – they are subject to becoming and are thus impermanent. When applied to the ought to be of human beings, this vision means that every behavior matters greatly: every act and every thought is destined to last forever because of the law of cause and effect (*karma*) and will be reproduced on an exponential scale. *Karma* is increased by the frequency and the regularity with which a given action is performed. Once a *karmic* imprint is fixed within the mental continuum (*santana*) of an individual, it is difficult to mitigate its results. The Buddhist goal, *nirvana*, is the ceasing of the uncontrolled and compelled embodiment of the mental principles. A life, this life, is just a link in the chain of *samsara*. Far from being a sweet hope of eternal life, *samsara* is the context which needs to be transcended since it holds no place for freedom, simply because of the compulsion it involves to continue to take on new forms of life as a result of the *karma* produced on the basis of disturbing mental factors. The reason given to explain the need to avoid rebirth is extremely straightforward and well reflects the eminently pragmatic method of *Buddhadharma*: even the higher types of rebirth – including humans and worldly divinities – involve discomfort. The Buddhist spiritual path has never developed a justification of a moral type for pain: it is only an alarming symptom of the perils of relying on limited concepts and realities.

In presenting himself as a model, the Buddha provides the disciple with all the indications needed to emulate him completely. This is something which occurs more through the seduction of conviction than through a process of persuasion based solely on his inscrutable

superiority. The community of the emulator disciples is called sangha, and together with the Buddha and his dharma forms, the so called triple gem (triratna) are the foremost elements of this tradition.

Anyone who seriously undertakes to travel the path leading to nirvana realizes from the very first steps that no one else can travel this demanding path in his or her stead. All of the Buddha's teaching hinges on this premise and, as a result, the emphasis returns time and time again to the central position of individual responsibility; for the Buddha is first and foremost the master (guru) who expounds the theoretical and practical means that can be used to achieve liberation. He does not assert he is able to take upon himself the burden of the negative actions of beings, he does not take upon himself the weight of the imperfections of the world. The Buddha only points the way to be traveled by those individuals who are capable of fathoming the depths of such an acceptance of responsibility. Buddhist salvation – to be understood, it should be recalled, as emancipation from samsara – is mainly expressed and achieved through the teaching and the application of the Buddhadharmas. The substance of the Buddha's sermon, delivered at the Deer Park in Sarnath near Varanasi in Northern India to his first five disciples, concerned the four noble truths (chatvari arya satya) which mark the real beginning of his formal preaching. These truths are defined as noble (arya) both because they were taught by the Buddha, who is noble and superior to common beings, and because they are capable of making those beings who are currently subjected to the contingencies of a conditioned existence noble and superior themselves.

The first of these truths is that of true sufferings, which are the physical and mental aggregates which arise as the result of actions defiled by disturbing mental afflictions. True suffering also includes all the activities of the mind, the speech, and the body of each ordinary being, except for the actions generated through pure spiritual aspiration and meditations. They can also be considered in positive terms as the effective understanding of the fact that all physical and mental phenomena are subject to change, birth, old age, and death and that all conditions of worldly life are

unstable and devoid of the causes of lasting bliss.

The second truth is that of true origin. Origin stands for the source of suffering located in mental afflictions and the compulsive actions they cause. This truth expresses the understanding that suffering is first and foremost a condition of the mind, which unceasingly creates expectations and cravings that are regularly disappointed by the actual reality of the world. In addition, physical discomfort and pain do not correspond to the full dimension of suffering for our suffering minds, which produce all the unstable existential conditions – which as such are incapable of quenching the boundless thirst for bliss inside all beings – and which cause future opportunities for experiencing pain.

The third truth is that of true ceasing, which teaches that two previous truths – suffering and, especially, the cause of suffering – can be eliminated. This is achieved essentially by understanding that suffering begins in the mind and then returns to the mind.

The fourth truth is that of true path or the means whereby the truth of ceasing can be attained. These means are the practice of virtue by conducting one's life intelligently and bravely, taking great care not to damage other beings, and being able to have insight into how the importance of each present moment can be usefully seized.

It is worth here considering the first of the practical effects of the Buddhist philosophical construction on human morality. The first path comprises right understanding, which translates into a realistic assessment of suffering, its origin, and the path leading to its elimination; the understanding of what is to be pursued and what is to be abandoned; the understanding of the lack of a permanent self in the person; the understanding of the mechanisms leading to rebirth, and so on. This is followed by right intentions: being able to turn the mind to positive content, such as benevolence and kindness, and to draw it away from grasping, preconceived, and mistaken opinions. Right speech: shunning lies, slander, and harsh or meaningless speech. Right conduct: refraining from taking lives, stealing, and improper sexual behavior. Right livelihood: ensuring the right standard of living for oneself and one's loved

ones, without damaging others directly or indirectly. Right effort: committing oneself to being aware and detached in all circumstances. Right mindfulness: remembering to be mindful of everything done in thought, speech, and act. Right concentration: freeing oneself from all the conditions which interfere with the naturally clear state of the mind, attaining the various levels of meditational absorption, and thus achieving higher levels of knowledge such as clairvoyance.

Not only is the analysis of the link existing between form and mind the first step toward every gnoseological definition of reality as an ontological unity, but also the possibility of this analysis in itself indicates that when human beings produce works of art they are substantially shaping the subtle matter forming the plane sustaining the universal field of interaction, hence the opportunity here for some thoughts on Buddhist art. Buddhist sacred art, through whatever physical medium it is expressed, refers back to a main determining reason. The paintings, sculptures, illuminations, and many specific elements of the architecture – mainly the stupa, an impenetrable monument around which the devotee practices a circumambulating clockwise interaction – are conceived in order to be utilized as perceptible supports for a practice informed, in relation with the body–mind compound, by a non dualistic spiritual attitude, whose complex symbolic codes, in the absence of a specific initiation to those liturgies, remain difficult to access and understand. The specific function of a Buddhist painting or sculpture is thus the one favoring concentration of mind of a contemplator on the image of a divinity, at least during the initial stages of meditation. Gradually the devotee progresses toward various levels of awareness at the end of which the necessity of considerable material support is surpassed. Buddhist sacred art thus expresses the attempt to impress in the image a vigorous mystical valency, evoked by a practitioner for effective transmission – with minimum possible variants – to another practitioner, using complex symbologies, iconogrammetric structures, and iconological codes, giving ground to the representation of extremely complex concepts. For example, the bhavachakra, the cosmological chart illustrating the six worlds of

rebirth (hell, famished spirits, animals, men, titans, worldly divinities), and the mandala, the psychocosmogram – to use the, by now, classic definition formulated by Tucci – that illustrates the subtle relations between the individual microcosmos and the universal macrocosmos.

Some fundamental ideas regarding, in different cultural environments, the transformation of something – a food, a metal – into something else draw their symbolic meaning from the process of transmutation of a human into a divinity (theosis). It would be useful in using terms like theosis to understand the description of some inner processes made by the vajrayana (the diamond vehicle, i.e., the esoteric aspect of Buddhadharma) schools, but only when it is made clear that these terms are rooted in traditions formally, historically, and theoretically external to the esoteric aspect of Buddhadharma, a lore in which the ontological gap between a god creator and the creatures simply does not exist. In the Buddhist Indo Tibetan tradition, the mahayana–vajrayana lineages preserve till today some systems – called tantra – promising shortcuts toward awakening with an altruistic aim. In some rites related to those systems, the performers, in order to assure the correct execution of the rite itself, are requested to divinize themselves from the beginning of the liturgy. The human body in this context is considered akin to the chrysalis from which one day the angelic butterfly will be released. This is certainly not a marginal idea within the culture it has occurred in over the course of time, but rather an instrumental notion, a thirst for improvement to be made use of on the path of transformation which humans travel over time in order to attain the full achievement of their natural potential. This can be done by actualizing the so called divine pride (*deva mana*), in the periodic training of remembering the divinity (*devanusmrtianupurvaprayoga*) admitted by the formal practice (*sadhana*) of the esoteric resultant vehicle (*phalayana*), or *tantrayana*, opposed to the exoteric causal vehicle (*hetuyana*), also called vehicle of perfections (*paramitayana*) or *sutrayana*. In the Indo Tibetan vajrayana the various psychic essences constitute indeed a sort of synopsis between the physiological and visible part of the person and the intellectual, invisible one. These essences

are described according to different functional valences. Also the fluids and the tissues, like blood, are not only simple objects to be mentally analyzed but sacramental substances. The concept of the transformation of blood into the nectar of immortality (Sanskrit: *amṛta*; Greek: *ambrotos*) draws its symbolic validity from the process of transmutation of a human into a divinity. Eventually, this process will lead to the actual divinization of the practitioner (*sadhaka*) himself. The transformation of the ordinary human being into a blissful and omniscient divinity is an idea not divisible by the Semitic theological frame shared by Jews, Christians, and Muslims. Also if some particular details inside the Abrahamic revelations seem to point toward the divinization of creatures – *diis estis* (you'll be gods) in the Old Testament – these aspects remain nevertheless mainly marginal by referring to the most orthodox connotation. The ritual transformation of the time and space context is widely used in Indo Tibetan vajrayana, the structure of which thought hinges both on sympathetic compassion (*karuna*) and on intuitive understanding (*prajna*) of the ultimate mode of existing (*shunyata*). *Karuna* and *prajna* enable the adept to make full use of the workings of the liberated mind, so as to be able to overcome the cycle of unconscious rebirths and become an awakened one, a buddha released from any conditioning, free from failing to identify himself with the unmeasurable order of consciousness, and thus finally able to effectively do the welfare of all transmigrating beings. It is always useful to interpret these psycho experimental systems in light of the dual focus of sympathetic compassion and vision of the truth, in considering the effect of tantric systems both on metaphysics and on morality.

Since its historical beginning, the Buddhaharma has been a doctrine that assumes a life style characterized by challenging social renunciations. But the need to spread the practice of virtue to everyone led to the definition of a lay path, which does not require the integral renunciation of social activities. Furthermore, in the vajrayana some daily ceremonies are recommended or compulsory for everyone, not only for monks. These ceremonies or rites are today taught also in western countries. On one hand, the greed for tangible goods pushed

modern contemporary western humanity to strive hard for the satisfaction of material needs. On the other hand, the reminiscence of a blissful homeland, set in some afterlife, persists as a background sound in urbanized reality. The novelty is that the Christian churches, even in the areas where they are deep rooted, are not considered any longer as holders of all paths to wisdom. The adaptation and rooting of Buddhist esoteric lore in the western cultural milieu are still in progress, thus their practical results are still unforeseeable.

SEE ALSO: Religion; Religion, Sociology of

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built environment

Joel A. Devine

At its most basic level, the built environment refers to all elements of the human made physical environment, i.e., it is defined in contrast to the natural environment. Dunlap and Catton's (1983) distinction between the "built," the "modified," and the "natural" environments is heuristically useful inasmuch as it

more readily acknowledges the intermediate, mediative, and continuous possibilities of interaction and reciprocal relations between and among these divisions. Given its essentially contrast dependent definition, it is not surprising that the term has become increasingly in vogue in the era of environmental consciousness.

Usage varies widely and not always consistently across disciplines depending on the concreteness (pun intended) of the application, chosen placement along a micro–macro continuum, and over time. Within the engineering professions the phrase typically references infrastructural elements, components, support activities, technology, and/or systems as in, for example, the vast network of roads, rails, bridges, depots, and support facilities that enable the circulation of persons and/or things, i.e., the transportation infrastructure. Similarly, the “built environment” is used to capture the complex of activities, technologies, practices, and structures implicated in the generation, transmission, and delivery of energy and other utilities (e.g., water, sewerage, sanitation, communication, and information).

Among the building trade professions and many applied architects and designers, usage also is often somewhat narrowly focused on site planning, design, and materials as well as the properties, mix, and juxtapositions thereof. Aesthetic and functional considerations are salient as well. Alternatively, numerous architects, planners, urban designers, and developers, as well as members of allied professions, employ the phrase with a more inclusive, extensive, and often more macro orientation. While not necessarily eschewing the aforementioned foci, this usage necessarily entails a somewhat larger, more aggregate, and decidedly urban perspective and is necessarily relational inasmuch as it includes consideration of how the intended development of structures, utilities, services, functions, space (in its undeveloped, partially developed, and/or wholly developed forms), and the attendant ambience and aesthetics interface with either extant design and usage or among a plurality of objects. In practice, this contextualization may range from a single site and its immediate environment to far larger aggregations such as a housing tract, industrial park, mixed development, neighborhood, city, region, or even national policy. Inasmuch as this

is a developmental process, temporal as well as spatial considerations may figure prominently.

The above mentioned sensibilities continue to be highly relevant and have been institutionalized in the United Kingdom in the Centre for Education in the Built Environment (CEBE), one of 24 subject centers forming the Higher Education Academy, and the Commission for Architecture and Built Environment (CABE). At the same time, the term “built environment” has also evolved in a more expansive, holistic, integrative direction that extends well beyond the traditional applications and disciplinary boundaries. The latter arguably owes to an increasing appreciation of the complexities, interactions, and interdependencies characterizing urbanism amidst the backdrop of globalism, but also has resulted from extensive cross fertilization with the social sciences (including the so called “new geography”). Over the past 20 years, much of this newer sensibility has been recast by the discourse of postmodernism.

While ultimately interconnected and often explicitly recognized as such, two broad sets of analytically distinguishable themes are especially prominent within this emergent multidisciplinary sensibility. The first may be thought of as the environmental imperative. It concerns issues of urban development, livability, and sustainability and addresses effects and consequences of the built environment (*qua* urbanization) on the natural environment (or aspects thereof). Within this genre, substantial literatures focus on the implications of a variety of developmental practices on the health of the natural environment writ large as well as the consequences for particular flora and fauna (e.g., sprawl vis à vis habitat destruction; auto emissions and climate change; population density and air, water, and ground contamination; green space and quality of life).

The second thematic set concerns the influence of the built environment in shaping human behavior and vice versa. Hence, it is not surprising that it is in this realm that the linkage between sociology and the built environment is manifest most dramatically. Lynch’s pioneering work on mapping and meaning in 1960 represents a critical early watershed in this emerging behavioral orientation, one subsequently superseded by an

increasingly subtle and dynamic sensitivity regarding the behavioral, cognitive, and social relational aspects of the built environment. Within this broad framework, the built environment and the attendant concepts of space and spatial practices have shifted from (epiphenomenal) status as marker of location to one of central theoretical concern now understood as both a reflection (consequence) and conditioner (determinant) of social relations.

Often exhibiting substantial interdisciplinarity as well as formidable diversity with respect to theoretical orientation and methodological practices, a considerable array of subgenres flourish under this broad rubric. Among these, a focus on the built environment as: interactional constraint and enabler; as place, heritage, historical and cultural identifier; as non verbal (semiotic) communications; and as a source and resource of contention and conflict.

SEE ALSO: City Planning/Urban Design; Environment and Urbanization; Lefebvre, Henri; Urban Political Economy; Urban Space

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bureaucracy and public sector governmentality

Stewart Clegg

While bureaucracy stretches back into antiquity, especially the Confucian bureaucracy of the Han dynasty, the modern rational legal conception of bureaucracy emerged in France in the eighteenth century. Indeed, the word is French in origin: it compounds the French word for an office – *bureau* – with the Greek word for rule. In the nineteenth century, Germany provided the clearest examples of its success because of the development of a disciplined bureaucracy and standing army, inventions that became the envy of Europe.

Bureaucratic organization depends above all on the application of "rational" means for the achievement of specific ends. Techniques would be most rational where they were designed purely from the point of view of fitness for purpose. Max Weber, the famous German sociologist, defined bureaucracy in terms of 15 major characteristics: (1) power belongs to an office and not the office holder; (2) authority is specified by the rules of the organization; (3) organizational action is impersonal, involving the execution of official policies; (4) disciplinary systems of knowledge frame organizational action; (5) rules are formally codified; (6) precedent and abstract rule serve as standards for organizational action; (7) there is a tendency toward specialization; (8) a sharp boundary between bureaucratic and particularistic action defines the limits of legitimacy; (9) the functional separation of tasks is accompanied by a formal authority structure; (10) powers are precisely delegated in a hierarchy; (11) the delegation of powers is expressed in terms of duties, rights,

obligations, and responsibilities specified in contracts; (12) qualities required for organization positions are increasingly measured in terms of formal credentials; (13) there is a career structure with promotion either by seniority or merit; (14) different positions in the hierarchy are differentially paid and otherwise stratified; (15) communication, coordination, and control are centralized in the organization.

Weber identified authority, based on rational legal precepts, as the heart of bureaucratic organizations. Members of rational bureaucracies obey the rules as general principles that can be applied to particular cases, and which apply to those exercising authority as much as to those who must obey the rules. People obey not the person but the office holder.

Weber saw modern bureaucratic organizations as resting on a number of "rational" foundations. These include the existence of a "formally free" labor force; the appropriation and concentration of the physical means of production as disposable private property; the representation of share rights in organizations and property ownership; and the "rationalization" of various institutional areas such as the market, technology, and the law. The outcome of processes of rationalization was the production of a new type of person: the specialist or technical expert. Such experts master reality by means of increasingly precise and abstract concepts. Statistics, for example, began in the nineteenth century as a form of expert codified knowledge of everyday life and death, which could inform public policy. The statistician became a paradigm of the new kind of expert, dealing with everyday things but in a way that was far removed from everyday understandings. Weber sometimes referred to the results of this process as disenchantment, meaning the process whereby all forms of magical, mystical, traditional explanation are stripped from the world, open and amenable to the calculations of technical reason.

Bureaucracy is an organizational form consisting of differentiated knowledge and many different forms of expertise, with their rules and disciplines arranged not only hierarchically in regard to each other, but also in parallel. If you moved through one track, in theory, you need not know anything about how things were

done in the other tracks. Whether the bureaucracy was a public or private sector organization would be largely immaterial. Private ownership might enable you to control the revenue stream, but day to day control would be done through the intermediation of experts. And expertise is always fragmented. This enables the bureaucracy to be captured by expert administrators, however democratic its mandate might be, as Michels's studies of trade union bureaucracy established. Bureaucracy in the nineteenth century was largely identified with public sector management, yet as private enterprises grew in size they adopted the classical traits of bureaucracy as well as innovating some new elements.

Weber constituted an idea of bureaucracy conceived in terms of liberal ideals of governance. Hence, the characterization of bureaucracy as rule without regard for persons premised on a democratic ideal against blandishments of power and privilege was both a moral and abstractedly ideal empirical description, which, for much of the twentieth century, stood as a proximate model of what public sector responsibility was founded upon. Nonetheless, criticisms of bureaucracy have been legion, perhaps best captured in the exquisite command of the rules of the bureaucratic game shown by the participants in the British television comedy series *Yes, Prime Minister*.

The criticisms of bureaucracy suggested that it was not so much rational as incremental; it enabled exploitation of uncertainty for sectional benefit; it generated both individual and organizational pathology; and it suffered from segmentalism, where many employees in strictly formal bureaucracies displayed a relative disinterest in the broader conduct of organizational life. The process of reform of bureaucracy seeks to ascribe new norms of authority in the governmental relation between members in the hierarchy. Chief among its methods has been the application of new design principles to the classical bureaucracies whose qualities Weber captured in his model; they have been reengineered to achieve greater efficiencies. A major mechanism is the removal of a bureaucratic ethos and its replacement with a cost cutting mentality – in the guise of efficiency – which elevates one dimension of public sector management above all other considerations. Outputs

increasingly come to be defined and measured and performance based orientations developed toward them. These changes are often associated with the widespread development of contracting out in the public sector, as market testing principles are introduced: what was previously internal work organized according to hierarchy increasingly has to be contracted out to the cheapest provider. The main contemporary mechanisms for reforming public sector bureaucracy have been privatization of government owned assets and the outsourcing of specific activities. The specialist skills brought by the outsourcing service provider take elements of government's back office into the front office of the service provider. By moving some elements from intraorganizational to contractual control, increased efficiency occurs. The modern tendency is for markets increasingly to replace bureaucratic hierarchies. These "new organizational forms" are attracting considerable contemporary attention as changed paradigms for management.

As the designs of bureaucracy were changing, so too were the mentalities of those who occupied them. If the Weberian bureaucrat valued ethos, character, and vocation, the contemporary bureaucrat is expected to be enterprising. To capture the sense of new forms of government and mentality, the French theorist Michel Foucault came up with a neologism, governmentality, based on the semantic merger of government with "mentality." He was pointing to a fusion of new *technologies* of government with a new political *rationality*. "Governmentality" refers both to the new institutions of governance in bureaucracies and to their effects. These effects are to make problematic whole areas of government that used to be accomplished through the public sector, seamlessly regulated by bureaucratic rules; now they are moved into calculations surrounding markets. Foucault defines government as a specific combination of governing techniques and rationalities, typical of the modern, neoliberal period. Bureaucracies, rather than regulating conduct, now enable individuals in civil society to act freely through markets to get things done, in normatively institutionalized ways governed increasingly by standards, charters, and other codes, and public administrators to recreate themselves as entrepreneurial actors.

SEE ALSO: Bureaucratic Personality; Governmentality and Control; Rational Legal Authority; Weber, Max

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bureaucratic personality

Christopher W. Allinson

An important factor in the development of human personality during adulthood is the influence of the work organization. A long standing concern among social scientists in this respect has been the impact of bureaucracy. Max Weber, in his classic description of bureaucracy, observed that the individual may become little more than a cog in the bureaucratic machinery, a process explained by Karl Mannheim in terms of *functional rationalization*: the idea that a sequence of actions is organized in such a way that it leads to a previously determined goal with every action in the sequence receiving a functional role. This has important outcomes for the individual, as it eventually induces *self rationalization* or training to a specific psychological disposition. In extreme cases, this may amount to cognitive restructuring.

The seminal account of this process was that of Robert Merton. He suggested that the values and attitudes necessary for the bureaucratic official to make a useful contribution are embraced to such a degree that the needs of the organization become secondary to the workings of the bureaucracy itself. This is explained to some extent by Veblen's concept of *trained incapacity*: actions based on skills that have proved effective previously continue to be applied even though they lead to unsuitable

responses in altered circumstances. This is similar to Dewey's idea of *occupational psychosis*: as a result of the demands of the organization of their occupational roles, people develop particular predilections, biases, and priorities that may hamper the effective execution of their work. Merton contended that attention switches from the goals of the organization to the details of the control system. Rules become ends in themselves rather than means to ends, and are applied in a ritualistic manner regardless of circumstances. Rigid compliance with formal procedures, and a punctilious insistence on observing regulations, may cause the bureaucrat to lose sight of what really needs to be done. Behavior becomes so rule oriented that it is impossible to satisfy clients, thus giving rise to the pejorative connotations of impersonality and petty officialdom so commonly associated with bureaucracy. Although Victor Thompson denied that this kind of behavior (which he described as *bureaupathic*) is associated with any one type of person, Merton, like Mannheim, saw the bureaucrat as having internalized an externally rationalized order that yields a relatively stable pattern of stimulus-response connections. This pattern is widely regarded as constituting personality.

Merton observed that the sentiments associated with the bureaucratic personality emanate from several sources. One is the bureaucrat's career structure. Rewards resulting from conformity, such as regular salary increases and pension benefits, cause the individual to overreact to formal requirements. Moreover, fixed progression keeps competition between colleagues to a minimum, and encourages an esprit de corps that often takes on a higher priority than work objectives. Another is the tendency for bureaucratic procedures to become "sanctified," the official performing them in an impersonal manner according to the demands of the training manual rather than the requirements of individual cases. Additionally, administrators are so mindful of their organizational status that they often fail to discard it when dealing with clients, thus giving the impression of a domineering attitude.

It is frequently argued that the behavior associated with the bureaucratic personality derives from personal insecurity. Several sources of insecurity in the work context have

been identified in the literature. An important factor is fear of superiors. Afraid of being blamed for violation of rules, bureaucrats often apply them to the letter, even when discretion is needed. Similarly, there may be fear of specialists. They have to be trusted to employ their skills properly, and the anxieties emerging from possible mistrust may lead to an inflated tendency on the part of the bureaucrat to control and ritualize. There may also be fear of inadequacy. This can be ameliorated by the ritual performance of quite simple activities, with officials finding comfort in familiar routines. A further problem is fear of uncertainty. A typical response is conformity to the demands of the system by following rules, and documenting that they have been followed, and offloading ambiguous responsibilities. Finally, there is fear of failure. Doubt over whether or not one is destined for career success may lead to exaggerated attempts to appear conscientious and conformist.

The traditional stereotype is that the bureaucratic personality is most prevalent among those employed in government agencies and other public sector organizations. This may be due to a perception that higher accountability and goal ambiguity in the public sector prompt more formal, rule based controls than are necessary in private organizations. Empirical evidence, however, suggests otherwise. Several recent studies found that private sector managers (mostly in business firms) expressed greater commitment to rules and procedures than did their public sector counterparts. A possible explanation for this may be that private companies more closely resemble the structured, decentralized bureaucracies characteristic of Weber's classic description than do those in the public sector.

SEE ALSO: Bureaucracy and Public Sector Governmentality; Mannheim, Karl; Merton, Robert K.; Rational Choice Theories; Weber, Max

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Burundi and Rwanda (Hutu, Tutsi)

René Lemarchand

There is more to Rwanda and Burundi than the arcane histories of two overpopulated (7 million each), poverty stricken micro states in the heart of the African continent: their minute size belies the magnitude of the tragedies they have suffered. The first will go down in history as the site of one of the biggest genocides of the last century, resulting in the systematic killing of an estimated 800,000 people, mostly Tutsi, in a hundred days from April to July 1994. The second lives on in the collective memory of the survivors as a forgotten genocide: who today remembers that in 1972, between 200,000 and 300,000 Hutu were massacred at the hands of a predominantly Tutsi army?

Behind these horror stories lies a sociological puzzle: although Rwanda and Burundi have more in common than any other two states in the continent, in terms of size, traditional institutions, ethnic maps, language, and culture, they have followed radically different trajectories, one (Rwanda) ending up as a republic under Hutu control at the time of independence (1962), the other (Burundi) as a constitutional monarchy under Tutsi rule. Not until 1965 did the army abolish the monarchy. And while both experienced genocide, the victims in each state belonged to different communities – predominantly Tutsi in Rwanda and overwhelmingly Hutu in Burundi. Today Rwanda has emerged as a thinly disguised Tutsi dictatorship, while Burundi is painstakingly charting a new course toward a multiparty democracy.

The key to the puzzle lies in history. Some times referred to as “the false twins” of the continent, traditional Burundi was far from being a carbon copy of Rwanda. In neither state is ethnic conflict reducible to age old enmities, yet the Hutu–Tutsi split was far more pronounced and therefore potentially menacing in Rwanda than in Burundi. In contrast with the rigid pattern of stratification found in Rwanda, where the “premise of inequality” formed the axis around which Hutu–Tutsi relations revolved, Burundi society was more complicated and hence more flexible. The monarchy was conspicuously weak compared to its Rwanda counterpart, and real holders of power were the princes of the blood (*ganwa*) rather than centrally appointed chiefs and subchiefs. Although both states crossed the threshold of independence at the same time (July 1962), they did so under very different circumstances: while Rwanda had already gone through the throes of a violent Hutu led, Belgian abetted revolution (1959–62), Burundi was relatively free of ethnic tension. The focus of conflict had little to do with Hutu and Tutsi, involving instead political rivalries between the two principal *ganwa* led factions, *Bezi* and *Batare*.

The years immediately following independence saw a drastic transformation of the parameters of conflict, where the Rwanda model took on the quality of a self fulfilling prophecy in Burundi. As many Hutu elites in Burundi increasingly came to look to Rwanda as the exemplary polity, growing fears spread among the Tutsi population of an impending Rwanda like revolution. Unless Hutu claims to power were resisted, they would share the fate of their Rwandan kinsmen. This meant a more or less systematic exclusion of Hutu elements from positions of authority. Exclusion led to insurrection, and insurrection to repression. The first act of insurrection came in 1965, shortly after Hutu candidates were denied the fruit of their electoral victory. An abortive Hutu led coup by gendarmerie officers led to the arrest and execution of scores of Hutu leaders, and the flight to Europe of the panic stricken king *Mwambutsa*, leaving the throne vacant. Another major purge of Hutu leaders occurred in 1969, after rumors spread of an impending Hutu plot against the government. The crunch came in April 1972 in the wake of a localized

Hutu insurrection. The government responded by the wholesale slaughter of all educated Hutu elites, and potential elites, including secondary school children. An estimated 200,000 Hutu – some Tutsi analysts claim 300,000 – died in the course of what must be seen as the first recorded genocide in independent Africa. From 1972 to 1993, when the first multiparty legislative and presidential elections were held since independence, the state and the army remained firmly in Tutsi hands.

There are obvious differences between the Rwanda genocide and the Burundi bloodbath, in terms of scale, target group, and circumstances. The killings in Rwanda came about in the wake of a long and bitter civil war (1990–4), triggered by the invasion of Tutsi exiles from Uganda on October 1, 1990. There was nothing in Burundi comparable to the virulent anti-Tutsi media campaign organized by Hutu extremists, and the central role played by Hutu youth groups, the infamous *interahamwe*, in planning and organizing the killings. Most importantly, in Rwanda the killers were eventually defeated by the Tutsi dominated Rwandan Patriotic Front (FPR); in Burundi, by contrast, they came out on top, in full control of the army and the government. Yet there are parallels as well, in that both were retributive genocides, occurring in response to perceived threats; in each case the army and the *jeunesses* were the driving force behind the killings; and in Rwanda as in Burundi the post-genocide state emerged stronger than before, and ethnically homogeneous.

A critical turning point in post-genocide Burundi came with the 1993 elections, and the short-lived tenure in office of Melchior Ndayizeye, the first popularly elected Hutu president of Burundi. His assassination by a group of army officers on October 21, 1993, unleashed a violent civil war, from which the country is only barely recovering. An estimated 300,000 people died in the course of what some referred to as a genocide in slow motion. The power-sharing agreement negotiated at the Arusha conference (1998–2000) did not bring an end to ethnic and factional violence – to this day, a small, militant Hutu dominated faction, the Forces Nationales de Libération (FNL), continues to engage in sporadic attacks against civilians – but it did pave the way for a major

political turnaround, by substantially reducing the scale of violence, putting in place a three-year transitional government consisting of an equal number of Hutu and Tutsi, and by taking the constitutional, legislative, and administrative steps required for holding multiparty legislative and presidential elections in April 2005. Not the least significant of such measures is the allocation to Hutu and Tutsi candidates of respectively 60 and 40 percent of the seats in the legislature and the government to Hutu candidates, and the restructuring of the army on a 50/50 share of officers' positions.

The contrast with post-genocide Rwanda could not be more striking. The recognition of ethnic identities is central to an understanding of the pluralistic character of the emergent Burundi polity; in Rwanda, the elimination of such identities by decree is no less important to appreciate the extent of the transformations enforced by the Kagame regime. There are no Hutu or Tutsi in today's Rwanda, only Rwandans, or Banyarwanda. Yet at no time in its violent history has Rwanda been more thoroughly dominated by Tutsi elements, or, more specifically, Tutsi from Uganda. Tutsi survivors, the so-called *rescapés*, are systematically excluded from positions of authority. The Hutu are at the bottom of the heap, not just politically but socially and economically. The depth of inequality between Hutu and Tutsi is without precedent in colonial or precolonial history. To hold the regime responsible for ethnic discrimination makes no sense, however, since Hutu and Tutsi no longer exist, officially at least, as separate ethnic categories.

By the criteria normally used by political scientists to define a regime as totalitarian (an official ideology, a single political party, a centrally directed economy, governmental control of mass communications, party control of the military, and a secret police), Rwanda qualifies as one of the few totalitarian states in existence in Africa, and the only one in which an ethnic minority representing 15 percent of the population holds unfettered control over the state, the media, the economy, and the armed forces. It is also one of the largest recipients of foreign assistance per capita, and thanks to the generosity of the international community it boasts one of the largest armies in the continent (approximately 75,000 men). Last but not least,

it is the only country on the continent that has invaded a neighboring state – the Congo – on three different occasions, looted its mineral wealth, and used its influence to manipulate client factions – all of the above without incurring effective sanctions from the international community.

Rwanda's claim that its security is threatened by the presence in the Congo of former *génocidaires*, though not unfounded, is greatly exaggerated. But it serves as a convenient pretext to carve out a major sphere of influence in a vitally important swath of territory in its neighbor to the west. In the past the histories of Rwanda and Burundi were closely interconnected. Today, the destinies of the three states that once formed Belgian Africa are more closely intertwined than at any time in history, past or present.

SEE ALSO: Ethnic Cleansing; Genocide; Holocaust; Tribalism; Truth and Reconciliation Commissions

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C

capital: economic, cultural, and social

Paul M. de Graaf

The distinction between economic, cultural, and social capital has proven to be useful to explain the way in which parents pass their status on to their children, and to explain why there is individual variation in the status attainment process. One of the core questions in the sociology of social stratification is how status is attained within a given society, and how the determinants of status attainment vary over historical periods and over societies. An important part of the status attainment model, as developed by Blau and Duncan (1967), consists of the effects the family of origin have on offspring status. The key notion of the working of the different types of capital is that educational attainment, occupational achievement, and income attainment are affected by the resources an individual has at his or her disposal. Note that many sociologists in the field of social stratification do not use the word *capital*, but refer to economic, cultural, and social *resources*. Whereas the distinction between economic, cultural, and social resources has been developed to explain the effects of the family of origin on educational and occupational attainment, it has proven to be fruitful in other realms of the status attainment process as well.

Economic resources refer to an individual's income and wealth. In the status attainment process an individual can take advantage of the economic resources of his or her parents. An individual's financial or material position is important both with respect to intergenerational transfers and with respect to career

advancement. In the first place, economic resources play an important role in the process of educational attainment, especially when the cost of education is high. Second, the intergenerational transmission of occupational status can be directly governed by a family's economic resources, especially by the transmission of the ownership of a business and by financial support. Third, intragenerational (career) mobility can be facilitated by the economic resources to which an individual has access.

The term cultural capital comes from Bourdieu (1973). Cultural capital, or cultural resources, refers to cultural distinctions between status groups, which are based on differences in education, occupation, and wealth. Children of the higher status groups have access to cultural capital, which consists of appropriate manners, good taste, proper use of language, and respect for formal culture. Through family socialization the values of the formal culture and receptivity to the beaux arts (classical music, theater, painting, sculpture, and literature) are inculcated. This receptivity is taken for granted in the higher forms of secondary education and in tertiary education (DiMaggio 1982). Bourdieu's theory of cultural reproduction was formulated to explain the relationship between parents' social position and their offspring's educational attainment. The theory of cultural reproduction argues that pupils who are familiar with formal culture are favored and profit more from education than other children. It is possible to elaborate on the value of cultural capital by arguing that it does not only affect educational careers, but is also productive in the labor market, especially to be selected in high prestige professions.

Social capital refers to the resources one has access to through one's network: family members, neighbors, friends, acquaintances, and

colleagues (Lin 1982). It is important to note that the size of the network itself is not decisive. Social capital is dependent on (1) the amount of resources available in the network, and (2) the willingness of the network member to share these resources. In other words, social capital is a combination of the number of people who can be expected to provide support and the resources those people have at their disposal. The resources available through the network consist of the members' economic, cultural, and social resources. The mechanism behind the impact of social capital is in the fact that an individual's social network can lead to direct support and access to information. Social capital has proven to be a major predictor in educational and (especially) occupational careers. Social capital can be received from one's parents, but most of it is built up during one's career and by the association with other people, such as in voluntary organizations or in one's neighborhood, or via friends and acquaintances.

The value of economic, cultural, and social capital may vary between societies and over historical periods. Bourdieu's main hypothesis is that cultural capital has replaced economic capital as the main type of parental resource which explains the intergenerational transmission of educational opportunities (Bourdieu 1973; de Graaf 1986). There are several reasons why parental financial resources do not matter much in modern society. First, the direct costs of education have decreased considerably, especially in the European welfare states. Compulsory education is almost free of cost, and tertiary education is inexpensive. Second, the indirect (opportunity) costs of education, like forgone income and extended financial dependency on parents, have decreased as well, especially because the rising returns of education have made the investment worthwhile. Third, due the great increase in affluence during the second half of the twentieth century, the costs of education have become much easier to bear. Fourth, decreasing fertility adds to the declining importance of financial resources in the parental home. Functionalist approaches to social inequality argue that talent has become the main determinant of educational attainment, and that a system of meritocracy has become prevalent. Since talent (intelligence)

is partly hereditary, some reproduction of inequality from one generation to the next is unavoidable. However, conflict sociology (Collins 1971; Bourdieu 1973) argues that privileged parents have found a new way to secure their offspring's social position by using their cultural capital. The basic mechanism behind this is that the children of parents with high levels of cultural capital do not object to extending their educational careers, whereas children of lower classes prefer to leave education at younger ages. It is important to note however that this strategy has not been overall a successful one, given that empirical evidence has shown that the association between social origins and educational attainment has decreased in western society. Apparently, the total impact of all parental resources combined has decreased.

SEE ALSO: Bourdieu, Pierre; Cultural Capital; Cultural Capital in Schools; Distinction; Educational and Occupational Attainment; Life Chances and Resources; Stratification, Distinction and; Stratification: Functional and Conflict Theories

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capital punishment

Ray Paternoster

The first recorded execution on American soil was of Captain George Kendall, put to death in 1608 by firing squad. Since that time, there have been more than 15,000 known executions. About one third of executions in the United States have occurred since 1930. Figure 1 shows the number of executions that have taken place in the US from 1930 until the end of 2003. One important thing to note in this figure is that the frequency with which the death penalty has been used has varied substantially over time. There were between 150 and 200 executions per year in the US during the 1930s, but then there occurred a long term decline. There were no executions at all during the ten year period from 1967 to 1977 because state and federal courts were deciding whether the death penalty was constitutional. After 1976 there was a fairly consistent but slow increase in the number of executions up to a peak of 98 executions in 1999. There are two points to keep in mind about this, however. First, although the frequency of the death penalty has increased since 1976, the number of executions is nowhere near what it had been from the 1930s to the 1950s. Second, although the frequency of the use of the death penalty had begun an upward trend in 1976, the peak of this increase occurred in 1999. From 1999 to 2003 there has been another decline in the frequency of executions, with only 65 occurring in 2003.

Another important characteristic of the death penalty is the fact that it has always been a relatively rare criminal sanction. No matter what time period is chosen, the number of executions is a relatively small proportion of the total number of potentially capital crimes. As only one example, in the year 2000 there were approximately 15,000 murders committed in the United States and only 85 executions.

Although not every state has executed some one over the time period 1930–2003, most states did have the death penalty on their books. However, the different states have used capital punishment with varying degrees of regularity. Figure 2 shows the percentage of executions in four regions of the United States during two different time periods. This figure clearly illustrates that the vast majority of executions in the United States have taken place in Southern states. This is true during the period 1930–67, when approximately 60 percent of all executions occurred in Southern states, but is even more true today, when over 80 percent of the executions since 1977 have taken place in Southern states.

One of the things we have learned thus far about the death penalty is that it could have been used far more frequently than it has. Another indication of our complicated attitude about the death penalty is that historically we have tried to impose it in the least painful manner. Before 1930, the most frequent method of carrying out the death penalty was by hanging. Death by hanging was supposed to be a quick and painless death. Unfortunately, hanging someone was not technically easy to do and there were many “botched” executions




Figure 1 Number of executions in the United States, 1930–2003




Figure 2 Percentage of executions by region of the United States

where the condemned were slowly choked to death. The frequency of botched hangings encouraged the search for more humane ways to impose the death penalty. Late in the 1800s, New York State devised the electric chair, which promised a quick and painless death through the application of a massive dose of electricity. For most of the period 1930–67 the majority of the executions in the US were carried out by electrocution, while a few states continued with hanging, and others experimented with lethal gas and death by firing squad. Death by electrocution never seemed to fulfill its promise of providing a painless way to put someone to death. In many cases the first surge of electricity did not cause either death or a loss of consciousness and the condemned seemed to experience a great deal of suffering. In other instances flames broke out on the condemned's body during the course of the electrocution. In the late 1970s there was a movement among death penalty states to devise alternatives to the electric chair and the gas chamber. In 1977, Oklahoma became the first state to adopt the use of lethal injection as its method of imposing the death penalty. Other states soon followed and since that time about 80 percent of all executions have been carried out by lethal injection.

There is one final and controversial feature about the death penalty in the United States to be addressed. From the very beginning the claim has been made by critics of the death

penalty that capital punishment has been imposed in a racially discriminatory manner. During the period 1930–67 about 90 percent of the executions for rape involved a black offender and the vast majority of these offenses had a white victim. Since then there have been numerous empirical studies of the imposition of the death penalty and the majority of these seem to suggest that non white offenders who kill white victims are at a substantially higher risk of being sentenced to death. This issue was raised before the United States Supreme Court in the case of *McCleskey v. Kemp* in 1987. In that case the Court held that the statistical evidence did not support the conclusion that the state of Georgia acted with intentional discrimination in its administration of the death penalty. It left open the possibility, however, that evidence of racial discrimination could more successfully be presented before state legislatures. What is clear is that the death penalty will continue to be around for many years in the United States and that there will always be controversies surrounding it.

THE DEATH PENALTY IN OTHER COUNTRIES

The United States is, of course, not the only country in the world that uses capital punishment, but it is in odd company. Figure 3 shows




Figure 3 Number of countries that have abolished the death penalty in some form or have retained it (2005). *Source:* Amnesty International, www.amnesty.org.

the number of countries in the world that have abolished the death penalty for all crimes (abolitionist strict), those that have abandoned it for ordinary crimes but not for a few strictly specified extraordinary crimes such as treason (abolitionist ordinary), those that have abolished the death penalty in practice in that, although they continue to maintain the death penalty by law, they have not executed

an offender in ten years or more (abolitionist practice), and those countries that retain the death penalty (retention). There are approximately as many strictly abolitionist countries (86) as there are retentionist (76), but far more countries have abolished the death penalty in some form than have retained it for ordinary criminal offenses like murder. Moreover, not all countries that have retained the death




Figure 4 Number of countries that have abolished the death penalty by law or in practice. *Source:* Death Penalty Information Center, www.deathpenaltyinfo.org.

penalty impose it with the same frequency. Amnesty International has estimated that there were approximately 4,000 executions worldwide in 2004, occurring in 25 different countries (www.amnesty.org). About 97 percent of those 4,000 executions took place in only four countries (China, Iran, Vietnam, and the United States), with about 85 percent occurring in China alone (some 3,400 executions).

It is probably not true that the world has abandoned the death penalty. It is, however, fair to say that western democratic countries have turned away from capital punishment and that there is likely a worldwide trend away from it. The list of strictly abolitionist countries includes Belgium, Denmark, France, Germany, Ireland, Italy, the Netherlands, Norway, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, and the United Kingdom, countries that the United States would likely consider its democratic "peers." In addition to the number of countries that have abolished the death penalty, therefore, it is also important to look at which countries have rejected it, and which continue to use it. As mentioned, abolitionist countries include the most advanced industrialized countries with democratic governments and excellent records on protecting human rights. Retentionist countries are more likely to include non democratic countries with a history of human rights abuses.

Evidence that the world community as a whole may be moving away from the death penalty can be seen in Figure 4, which indicates that the number of abolitionist countries has increased steadily over the past 20 years, and in fact has nearly doubled.

SEE ALSO: Criminal Justice System; Law, Criminal; Race and the Criminal Justice System

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capital, secondary circuit of

Ray Hutchison

For Marx, the second circuit of capital is the sphere of unproductive labor, where commodities are sold and money capital is created. David Harvey used the second circuit of capital to explain urban growth under capitalism, while Henri Lefebvre used the same ideas to study the production of space in capitalist society.

Marx's political economy describes two spheres of social activity: a substructure of productive activity where commodities are created for sale, and a superstructure of circulation for the buying and selling of monies and credits and of commodities themselves. The circulation of capital is specified as $M - C \dots P \dots C' - M'$ where M is money and credit, C is commodities, C' is the increased amount of commodities created by the productivity of labor (P), and M' is the increased monetary value from the sale of the output. In the first $M - C$ phase money capital is used to purchase commodities that will be consumed productively (to create surplus value) or consumed unproductively; in the second $C' - M'$ phase profits from the sale of commodities are transformed into money capital. The two phases in the circulation of capital are independent of one another and are distinct from the production process itself.

The circulation of capital is a continuous process in which money is exchanged to purchase commodities (labor power, raw materials, machinery) that are used to produce a new commodity that is sold to produce a profit (surplus value). Profits may be reinvested (to purchase additional labor power, materials, and machinery) to create even greater surplus value. This is the first circuit of capital. But surplus profit and surplus labor must be absorbed, and this process takes place in the second circuit of capital. Marx described the second circuit of capital as investment in the various infrastructures required for production: factory buildings and housing for workers, transportation for raw materials and finished products, and the like. There is a fundamental opposition between the two: while the first circuit of capital is productive (it is capable of producing surplus value), the second circuit of capital is not

productive (it does not generate surplus value). Marx understood that as the mode of production and the process of capital accumulation changed over time, the content and form of these relations would also change.

The second circuit of capital has influenced recent social theory in significant ways. The circulation of capital requires the reproduction of labor power. This process, referred to as social reproduction, occurs in schools, hospitals, and individual households, all of which are situated in the second circuit of capital. Similarly, capital must also have access to raw materials found in nature, and as ecosystems have been depleted, the reproduction of nature becomes necessary for the continued expansion of capital.

In Lefebvre's work on *La Revolution urbaine* (1970), the second circuit of capital refers to land and the advanced capitalist relations of production (involving finance, construction, government) that govern the production of land: "Real estate, as they call it, plays the role of a second sector of a parallel circuit to that of industrial production." The construction of housing, the development of space, speculation in land, the formation of capital markets, and the like constitute a fundamental force of social development. In a significant break with orthodox Marxism, Lefebvre notes that real estate speculation may become a source of capital formation and an independent source of surplus value. Capitalism imposes its form of abstract space everywhere, resulting in a built environment within which everyday life is lived – an environment that has been organized to facilitate the production of surplus capital. Lefebvre's account of capital accumulation and the production of urban space through the second circuit of capital was influential in the development of the new urban sociology in Europe in the 1980s, and continues to influence work in the new urban sociology in the US at present.

The second circuit of capital occupies a critical space in David Harvey's model of urban growth under capitalism. The continued expansion of capitalism requires that surplus capital and surplus labor generated in the first circuit of capital must be channeled into other uses. A portion of this surplus flows into the second circuit, including investments in (and the labor power required to produce) housing, transportation, and the built environment more

generally. These investments represent a new form of fixed capital (they require large, lumpy investments that are subject to some degree of risk, particularly as capital flows from the first circuit may result in the overproduction of housing, retail space, and the like) and they require a tertiary circuit of education, finance, government, science, and technology to manage and control the activities of the second circuit and to increase surplus value in the first sector. The result is a dynamic model that links investment cycles to housing markets, commercial and retail construction, and the like, to the production, appropriation, and concentration of economic surplus: the flow of capital into the second circuit of capital creates urban forms that facilitate capital accumulation.

The second circuit of capital has had a marked influence on the development of social theory and, in particular, urban sociological theory. The analysis of space has moved beyond the spatiality of geography to important encounters with Lefebvre's notions of abstract space, formal space, representational space, etc. Harvey's work renewed interest in the Marxist analysis of urban society. New applications of the second circuit of capital will need to take into account changes in the circulation of capital resulting from the restructuring of capitalism in the new global economy: as Marx foresaw, investments in science and technology have annihilated space and time, moving investment out of the second circuit of capital (where urban infrastructures, land based transportation, etc. are increasingly less relevant for the reproduction of capital) into new and as yet unexplored circuits of capital.

SEE ALSO: Capitalism; Lefebvre, Henri; Marx, Karl; Space; Urban Space

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capitalism

Jacques Delacroix

Capital is anything of value, such as money, put to work to produce revenue. Capitalism is the organizing principle of any society that relies on market forces and private parties, as opposed to tradition or to government action, to put wealth to work on a systematic basis (rather than incidentally or intermittently).

The discipline of sociology began largely as a critical commentary on capitalism. The emergence of modern, society wide capitalism in Western Europe in the late eighteenth century was accompanied by deep social transformations, including a dramatic rise in urban, and therefore highly visible, poverty. (The rise of capitalism is inseparable from the Industrial Revolution.) These upheavals triggered a general intellectual malaise and generated both the social and intellectual movement of socialism and the academic discipline of sociology. Perhaps because of the circumstances of its birth, sociology has always cast a pessimistic look at capitalism (Feagin 2001). Accordingly, sociologists tend to ignore Adam Smith, the moral philosopher (1723–90) who first laid out the links between capitalism and prosperity.

The founders of sociology, including Georg Simmel (1858–1918) and Émile Durkheim (1858–1917), generally viewed capitalism as a central object of their inquiry. Two nineteenth century thinkers in particular exercised a lasting influence on American sociology's study of capitalism: Karl Marx (1818–83), a German philosopher and socialist revolutionary working mostly in Great Britain, whose main book is even entitled *Capital*, and the German economic historian and sociologist Max Weber (1864–1920).

THE CRITICAL MARXIST LOOK AT CAPITALISM

Scholars favorable to capitalism rarely use the word "capitalism," preferring to refer to the "market" and "market forces." Consequently, the influence of Marx and of his followers, critics, and opponents of capitalism may well

dominate the literate public's understanding of the phenomenon.

The social thought of Marxism has influenced sociology both indirectly and directly. It is possible to speculate that the pressure of the Marxist critique of capitalism has prompted sociologists (including many not identified with Marxism) to pay close attention to social and economic inequalities. Stratification research has been very productive over the years, providing many innovative causal descriptions of important features of contemporary capitalist societies (see, e.g., Renzulli et al. 2000).

More directly, Marxist thought has prompted a large number of cross national studies of economic development, under the headings of "dependency theory" and "world system theory," seamlessly followed by "globalization studies." This sociological research track is based partly on the paradoxical argument that the expansion of capitalism worldwide, from its historical center in Europe and North America (correctly predicted by Marx and Engels in 1848), impedes or somehow distorts the development of poor countries (see Firebaugh 1996).

In fact, international statistics demonstrate that between 1980 and 2001 conventionally defined economic growth in the less developed countries occurred more slowly (+3.22 percent per year, on average) than in the United States (+3.44), but considerably faster than in the European Union (+2.6). Tangible indicators of human welfare also show that social improvement accompanies the expansion of capitalism in most of the less developed world. Thus, the following poor countries increased by more than ten percentage points their population with access to clean water between 1990 and 2000: Ecuador, El Salvador, Guatemala, Paraguay, Nepal, the Central African Republic, Ghana, Kenya, Mali, Tanzania (by 30 points). India, Pakistan, and Vietnam together brought clean water to an additional 200 million people during the decade. The life expectancy of the average Costa Rican in 2003 was 10 percent higher than the life expectancy of the average European in 1955–8 (all data for this paragraph from the World Bank's *World Development Indicators 2003*; Kuznets' 1964 *Postwar Economic Growth*). A 2002 World Bank study concludes that the poor countries with the slowest economic growth between 1980 and 2000 were

those *least* touched by globalization, that is, those least affected by the latest expansion of capitalism.

Sociologists of economic development also commonly concern themselves with inequality between and within countries. Unfortunately, they seldom specify whether they refer to the poor becoming poorer or to a situation where some become richer faster than others. (The latter is a logical inevitability in the presence of any growth because there is no likelihood that all sociologically recognizable entities will benefit at exactly the same rate.) However, this imprecision may not matter because the same 2002 World Bank study indicates that “globalization” (greater integration in capitalist networks of trade and investment) does *not* increase inequality between countries *or* within countries.

CAPITALISM, COMMUNISM, AND SOCIALISM

Slippery terminology obscures our understanding of capitalism and of its possible alternatives. Since the end of the nineteenth century, and even more since World War II, many political parties and some countries have called themselves “socialist” or “communist” while some communist countries called themselves something else. In addition, several “socialist” countries exhibited no trace of socialism, in any form. In all cases, these terms signal hostility toward capitalism. At any time, a “communist country” was simply a country under the political control of a communist party. The United Nations used to designate such countries by the neutral and more accurate term “centrally planned economies.” This designation indicates a massive attempt to replace market forces with government planning of the economy and the control of capital by a self-perpetuating political elite. Those countries also restricted private ownership of productive property to varying degrees.

From the end of World War II to the early 1990s, the Soviet Union (accompanied by its reluctant satellite states in Eastern Europe) and China, both under the control of communist parties, positioned themselves as political and military rivals to the United States and to the western European countries. As a part of this

rivalry, those countries’ elites announced that they were, each in their own way, building new societies not relying on market forces. They proclaimed that their economic growth would soon outpace that of capitalist countries and, ultimately, “bury” capitalism. For brief periods, their economies did grow faster than capitalist economies. The race ended abruptly in the early 1990s with the collapse of the Soviet Union and the rejection of communist parties in the satellites.

The Communist Party of China (later followed by that of Vietnam) had earlier begun to abandon anti-market policies while retaining a monopoly on political power. In the early 2000s, communist Vietnam had become a favorite of multinational firms. In 2004, the communist economic alternative to capitalism was represented only by impoverished Cuba and by North Korea, a country raked by frequent famines.

THE WEBERIAN TRADITION

The strong influence of Max Weber on American sociology is somewhat surprising because it stems mostly from one short book, *The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism*, published in 1905, which constitutes a minor and peripheral part of his monumental production. The first part of Weber’s endeavor consisted in precisely defining various historical forms of capitalism and in outlining social conditions that constrained earlier and geographically diverse manifestations of capitalism. In particular, Weber joined Marx and Engels in stating that there cannot be real capitalism unless much of the workforce is legally free. However, some academics have argued against this viewpoint (Steinberg 2003), or offered empirical demonstrations to the contrary, including showing that American southern slavery was quite compatible with capitalism (Fogel & Engerman 1974). In spite of any historical restrictions, there have always been instances of capitalist enterprise because someone always purchases goods to sell them for higher prices in other places or at another time.

Weber’s work reminds us that money, or any other form of income, is not invariably put to work, or “invested.” When it is invested, it is not always by private parties because government

appropriates much income in the form of taxes. Historically, money was rarely invested, for several reasons. First, many societies existed barely above the subsistence level and therefore had little to invest. Second, when and where subsistence levels have been exceeded, people, from the Pacific Northwest Kwiakiutl Indians to Beverly Hill stars, have often expanded income to acquire prestige, or power, or both: Louis XIV of France built a sumptuous palace where he gave lavish parties in order to domesticate his sometimes rebellious aristocracy as well as to awe his neighbor kings. Money can also be used directly to buy friends in high and low places.

Thirdly, money can be kept for a rainy day, under the mattress, buried beneath the apple tree, or even dangling as jewelry from women's ears, as has been the case in India for hundreds of years. Such practices used to be encouraged until recently by general insecurity and by the scarcity of opportunities for ordinary people to invest.

In *The Protestant Ethic* Weber also constructed a historical argument implying that the Protestant Reformation – a specifically European phenomenon – laid the attitudinal groundwork for the genesis of the modern, western capitalism he had previously defined. A short article, “The Protestant Sects and the Spirit of Capitalism” (1946), additionally sketched the role of trust in entrepreneurship. Many other Weber writings tangentially relevant to his study of capitalism are periodically collected in English and published under different titles.

Taught in more or less distorted form in innumerable college sociology and business classes, the idea that capitalism requires a particular collective attitudinal predisposition has captured the American popular imagination. It is frequently mentioned as historical fact throughout the American mass media. However, empirical verifications of arguments derived from Weber's thesis and conducted according to ordinary, contemporary sociological methods have been scarce. Following Samuelsson (1993 [1957]), Delacroix and Nielsen (2001) submitted one common interpretation of the Protestant ethic thesis to several simple empirical historical tests. They concluded that it was unlikely that the putative linkage between Protestantism, on the one hand, and early industrial

capitalism, on the other, ever existed. Nevertheless, the scholarly exegesis of Weber's work on capitalism has produced an abundant American sociological literature imbued with lasting passion as well as interesting sociohistorical studies.

VARIANTS OF CAPITALISM

The wealthiest countries are unmistakably capitalist countries, except for a handful of small petroleum rich states. Since all wealthy capitalist countries possess representative institutions, control over their governments tends to switch back and forth. In many of these, at various times, political parties that persist in calling themselves “socialist” are in power. All such parties have abandoned the project of ever replacing capitalism with some other socioeconomic arrangement. However, the label still matters a little because socialist parties often implement distinctive policies. To complicate matters further, parties that don't call themselves socialist may implement similar policies.

As a rough approximation, socialist party administrations favor government imposed income redistribution, some in the form of generous welfare benefits, the providing of social services by government rather than by the market or by other private initiative, strong and pervasive rather than light handed government regulation of economic activities, and a great deal of job security. Last but not least, the extension of leisure time at most levels of society often follows the accession of socialist parties to power. Not surprisingly, these features that together define “welfare capitalism” require high taxes. As another approximation, since World War II, the US and Japan have kept closer to pure market policies while the European countries and, to a lesser extent, Canada and Australia tended toward welfare capitalism.

Socialist parties' policy distinctiveness is a matter of degree rather than categorical. In 2001, government expenditures amounted to about 57 percent of GDP in Sweden, a country known for its lavish social programs; they were 42 percent in Canada, and still 35 percent in the US (*OECD Observer 2003*). The government's share of the economy is growing everywhere. The socioeconomic policies of wealthy

capitalist countries are thus composed from the same menu, with different emphases, irrespective of what party or coalition is in power. Formerly, a fair degree of government ownership of large business enterprises and of those considered strategically situated, such as banks and public utilities companies, was also associated with socialist party rule. However, the movement toward privatization is very advanced and appears irreversible. Significantly, in the spring of 2004, one of the last holdouts, the French Socialist Party (then out of power), gave its passive assent to a financial maneuver that privatized Air France, the very visible and highly symbolic national airline.

CAPITALISM, GROWTH, AND FLEXIBILITY

Different fiscal and social policies have thus proven compatible with the maintenance of capitalism although they are not equally conducive to economic growth. The American economy, denounced by many European critics as too capitalistic, has, for the past 20 years, grown considerably faster than its European counterparts, which were often guided by socialist parties. In 2001, Puerto Rico's real per capita income reached the same level as that of European Union member Portugal. In 2004, the GDP per capita of a poor southern American state such as Arkansas was just about on par with that of Germany. It may be that the immobilization of capital in government structures and services, as well as leisure time, are more difficult to transform into investment and growth than is consumption of goods by private parties.

Welfare capitalism also appears to lack flexibility. For the period 1998–2001 (determined by data availability), unemployment of more than one year affected four German workers in one hundred but fewer than two American workers in *one thousand*. Moreover, socialist governments are more likely to limit competition, deliberately or inadvertently through invasive regulations. (In France, retailers are allowed to hold discount sales only twice a year, on dates decreed by the central government in Paris.) In addition, the remaining government-controlled business entities may compete less

vigorously than their wholly private counterparts. Competition stimulates technical and organizational innovation (Kogut & Zander 2000) while weeding out poor performers at a fast clip. Both innovation and the elimination of inferior performers improve productivity and, therefore, economic growth. Yet, Japan, a rich capitalist country with a weak socialist party, saw its economy stagnate for the better part of the 1990s. Yet, the western European countries, with their strong welfare proclivities, have forged ahead with the construction of the European Union, an entity rooted in two basic tenets of capitalism: that free trade and freedom of investment promote economic growth.

CAPITALISM AS IT REALLY IS

The actual workings of capitalism at the beginning of the twenty first century reflect closely the object neither of Marx's nor of Weber's inquiry, nor again that of many of their followers within the sociological discipline. Capitalism is both more hemmed in by government regulation and encompasses many more active participants than the former anticipated and, it seems, than the latter still expect.

In wealthy societies, private economic actors operate within a largely government managed financial context. Government entities (central banks) determine the availability of credit with or without legal mandate because they have become by far the largest economic players thanks to their power of taxation. The value of the main national currencies is partly decided by frequent negotiations between the governments of the richest countries. In addition, the full coercive power of the nation state is brought to bear without cease on private economic players. Governments of capitalist countries implement numerous regulations the violation of which results in outright punishment, including fines and prison terms. In the European Union, as in the US, permanent regulatory commissions (such as the US Federal Trade Commission) wield quasi judicial influence over business conduct. Elsewhere, as in Japan, cultural norms allow government bureaucracies to exercise significant and often arbitrary power over whole industries.

CAPITALISM, THE WORKING CLASS, AND STOCK OWNERSHIP

Although real stock exchanges have been in existence at least since the late eighteenth century, neither Marx nor Weber seems to have grasped fully the importance of these institutions. Contemporary sociologists have also not given them the attention they deserve.

Stock companies have proved effective to put ordinary people's money to work, for three reasons. First, stocks can usually be purchased in small units: a 21 year old American saving his beer money for six months can acquire a significant portfolio through a mutual fund company. Second, stocks allow small investors to distribute their risk prudently: even a personal investment of as little as \$1,000 (less than 1/30 of American GDP per capita in 2004) can be apportioned between as many as ten different companies in ten different industries, possibly even in ten different countries. Third, the modern corporate form, existing in all advanced capitalist countries, insures that the small investor cannot legally lose more money than he has invested in a particular company. The minimization of risk inherent in wide investment spread and in limited liability nevertheless allows for large gains: \$1,000 of Intel stock in 1978 (the price of a small moped then) would have grown to \$350,000 (the price of a good house in the American Midwest) in 2004.

The implementation of modern communication technology in stock exchange and other financial operations, allowing simultaneously large numbers of anonymous transactions, has given major flexibility to this approach to putting money to work. It's not clear whether these developments will mostly serve the interests of small investors directly, or through non-profit organizations such as pension funds (some of which boast of assets larger than the national incomes of many countries). Alternatively, technological progress may favor anew large corporations effectively controlled by professional managers rather than by their shareholders, an issue of considerable sociological importance.

Marx (with Engels in 1848, and again in *Capital*) expected, and some of the sociologists his work inspired still anticipate, capitalism's self destruction. The corresponding scenario

involves two mutually reinforcing processes. First, the industrial working class, with no ownership stake in productive property, would increase massively in number by absorbing other social groups while sinking into deeper and deeper poverty (Burawoy et al. 2004; Robinson 2004). Second, the ownership of productive property would become concentrated in ever fewer hands.

In reality, the blue collar class has *shrunk* to about 20 percent of the labor force in rich countries. Counting generously, it was only 22 percent of the American workforce in 2002, that is, probably more than in 1848, but significantly less than in 1980 (28 percent). This shrinkage occurred while the value of manufacturing production in the same countries kept rising year by year, increasing by 50 percent in real dollars in the US in the last decade of the twentieth century. Nearly everyone in capitalist countries, including the industrial working class, has many more possessions, of much better quality, than his or her parents, as well as more leisure time; most attend school longer. People also live longer: American life expectancy increased by a mean 6.5 years between 1970 and 2001, with black women benefiting the most. (All figures in this paragraph from the *Statistical Abstract of the United States 2002 and 2003*.)

In the meantime, the ownership of the means of production has become very *dispersed* rather than concentrated: more than half of American families held stocks in the early 2000s. However, this very multiplication of the number of shareholders, added to their geographical dispersion, and to the fast transfer of stocks from owner to owner, has forced a deep separation between the actual management of capitalist enterprises and their legal ownership. This, in turn, poses recurrent problems with respect to honest governance and social responsibility, problems offering fertile ground for future sociological research.

SEE ALSO: Base and Superstructure; Bourgeoisie and Proletariat; Capitalism, Social Institutions of; Class Consciousness; Communism; Durkheim, Émile; Engels, Friedrich; Industrial Revolution; Marx, Karl; Marxism and Sociology; Simmel, Georg; Smith, Adam; Socialism; Weber, Max

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capitalism, social institutions of

Pursev P. M. A. R. Heugens

The concept of capitalism refers to the idea that societies should allow economic actors to

rationally organize the social and financial capital at their disposal in pursuit of perpetually renewed profits (Weber 1989: 17ff). The particular organizational forms with which actors have chosen to organize economic transactions vary considerably, but an oft used classification distinguishes between formal organizations, markets for the exchange of commodities and capital goods, and organization–market “hybrids” like interorganizational networks and alliances. As these organizational forms represent the core engines of production and exchange of consumer and capital goods in capitalist societies, these three discrete structural alternatives are typically referred to as the economic institutions of capitalism (Williamson 1985).

But though economic institutions are necessary ingredients of capitalist societies, they are not in and of themselves sufficient conditions to support the maintenance of a capitalist system of production. The success of economic institutions is wholly contingent on the presence of a number of fundamental background conditions, notably (1) some form of social peace, (2) individual freedom, (3) transferable property rights, and (4) enforceable contracts. These four characteristics are upheld by a separately distinguishable set of institutions: the social institutions of capitalism (Heugens et al. 2004). The latter may be defined as a set of public or private arrangements for the regulation and enforcement of exchange transactions between two or more autonomous capitalist actors.

Before a given capitalist actor can produce products or deliver services, it must be put in a context in which some form of social peace has been achieved (Roe 2003). Although the pursuit of profit by force and coercion – piracy, banditry – has never been eradicated from human societies, these types of activities are governed by their own laws and should not be put in the same analytical category as activities oriented towards the extraction of profit from peaceful exchange (Weber 1989). In fact, such parasitic ways of rent extraction are largely detrimental to the capitalist enterprise because they negatively affect its value generating potential. Firms and factories that fail to deliver services or produce products because of internal strife or external struggle are simply less valuable than those running smoothly (Roe 2003). In

fact, if capitalist actors anticipate too much trouble to begin with, new economic institutions of capitalism may not come into being in the first place. Hence, all wealthy capitalist societies are characterized by efficacious social institutions that, regardless of their shape or form, have succeeded in diminishing potential conflict and promoting the conditions that support cooperation.

Furthermore, any economic system built on the voluntary exchange of goods and services must also provide social institutions guaranteeing at least some actors the individual freedom to engage in exchange agreements and co-dictate their terms. Needless to say, capitalist societies have a far from perfect track record with respect to promoting the freedom of all individuals. Present day capitalist states like the UK, the US, France, Portugal, and the Netherlands were once able to juxtapose capitalist enterprise and a system of slave labor. Moreover, critical management scholars also see contemporary labor–management relations between capitalist employers and nominally free workers as colored by domination, and organizations as coercive institutions. Nevertheless, for the capitalist system to work, at least some classes of actors – usually managers or entrepreneurs – must enjoy the institutionally guaranteed freedom to engage in economic exchanges.

To facilitate the conclusion of transactions in the marketplace, it is moreover necessary that bundles of property rights be attached to physical commodities or services, and that these rights may be exchanged without much friction in the form of transaction costs (Demsetz 1967). Property rights are societal instruments, which help internalize externalities such as the harms and benefits associated with capitalist production. They also help make capitalist exchange processes more predictable. The owner of a bundle of property rights may rightfully expect fellow capitalist actors not to interfere with these prespecified rights and allow them to be exercised in certain mutually agreed upon ways. Capitalist societies thus have a profound need for social institutions that install private property rights and facilitate their frictionless transfer.

Finally, from a capitalist exchange perspective it is necessary that there are instruments

available in the form of contracts that facilitate the making of mutual promises about future exchanges, and that these instruments are enforceable such that the promises they record are usually kept (Macneil 1980). The nature of the capitalist production process means that the future cannot always be foreseen, that reciprocity in economic exchange transactions is not always direct, and that private information about the competence and effort levels of exchange partners is not always symmetrical. To accommodate the myriad problems associated with these conditions, intended exchange transactions must be recorded in instruments that are designed for that specific purpose, and appropriate social institutions must be in place to uphold these instruments in the face of potential deception and defection (van Oosterhout et al. 2006).

Whether any of the social institutions of capitalism referenced above should be classified as public or private depends on their position vis à vis the relationships they govern, as well as on the nature of the sanctions they rely on to regulate and enforce capitalist exchange (Elster 1989a). Private institutions typically arise within long lasting exchange relationships between two or more capitalist actors, and serve to make those relationships self-enforcing and self-policing. The sanctions that private institutions employ ultimately derive their disciplining potential from the threat of terminating the relationship or expelling a member from the larger group, thus keeping the sanctioned party from the future benefits that would have accrued to it if it had remained in the relationship. Public institutions, on the other hand, are positioned external to the exchange relationship. They typically exist in the form of a separate entity with some form of authority to police and enforce the exchange relationships over which it presides. Because of their independent status, they are also often called third party enforcement mechanisms. The sanctions they employ range from relatively subtle measures like taxes and reprimands to largely coercive measures like fines and imprisonment. Capitalist actors tend to rely on private institutions whenever possible, because they are faster in terms of execution than public institutions, cheaper to operate, and considerably less “transaction rupturing” (Williamson 1979).

Nevertheless, not all four of the background conditions necessary to operate and maintain a capitalist system of production can always be provided by such intrinsically more efficient private institutions. Social peace and individual freedom have a strong public goods character. Everyone benefits when these conditions are in place, but no single actor can produce them by individual means or even has the incentive to contribute to their advancement. Under such conditions, the rational pursuit of private objectives by self interested individuals may produce collectively disastrous outcomes (Elster 1989b). Individuals have every incentive to exploit the social peace by making an easy living as brigands and highwaymen. The condition of individual freedom is also easily eroded when certain individuals use organized force to subject others and exploit them as serfs or slaves. The classical way out of the dilemma of the provision of public goods is the abdication of individual authority to some form of Hobbesian Leviathan – a public institution. This is the terrain of classical social contract theory (Heugens et al. 2004). This body of work suggests that individuals may jointly agree on certain collective limitations to their natural rights and freedoms, in return for long run stability (social peace) and greater security and actually getting to enjoy the rights they do retain (e.g., certain forms of individual freedom). In all modern capitalist societies these collective limitations have taken the form of the state. This quintessential social institution of capitalism represents a Pareto optimal solution in that all its citizens benefit from the collective behavioral constraints – laws, covenants, social norms – it provides to overcome problems of collective action.

The state is a versatile creature in that it not only provides for social peace and individual freedom, but also creates and delivers transferable property rights and enforceable contracts. But states are public institutions, and as such are often criticized for being slow, inefficient, and breeding the bureaucratic personality. Fortunately, whereas state bureaucracy and public sector governmentality probably represent the only feasible solutions to the problem of providing social peace and individual freedom, private institutional alternatives are available for the provision of transferable

property rights and enforceable contracts. These institutions include (but are certainly not limited to) kinship ties, clans, and more intangible enforcement mechanisms like trust and reputation.

All of these institutions are private in the sense that they are either synonymous with long term relationships between formally independent actors (the former two) or clearly derive from them (the latter two). Since property rights are essentially social conventions pertaining to (1) which individuals are entitled to certain goods and commodities and (2) what they get to do with these, extended families and clans are perfectly capable of providing equivalent solutions to legally recognized property rights. By erecting and policing clear social norms pertaining to the distribution of wealth over kin and clan members, these private institutions effectively circumvent any resort to public institutions and may even fill the voids in case the latter are absent or deficient in a given setting (Khanna & Palepu 2000). One important boundary constraint in this respect is of course that these norms often cannot be used to govern transactions between kin and clan members on the one hand and outsiders on the other.

Private social institutions of capitalism also exist for the enforcement of contracts. In addition to the kin and clan related mechanisms discussed above, trust and reputation represent two additional institutions that can secure this necessary background condition for capitalist exchange. The added benefit of the latter two mechanisms is that they can also emerge in long term exchange relationships between two or more parties that are not affiliated by clan or kinship ties. The sanctions on which these two mechanisms draw can be divided into dyadic and third party sanctions. The former derive their disciplining potential from the fear of a potential contract breaker to forgo the future benefits associated with continuing the dyadic relationship, including the utility this party derives from being trusted or enjoying a good reputation. The latter derive their power from the potential offender's fear of being excluded from the benefits of present and future transactions with third parties that could potentially observe the breach of a contract, which again include not only the economic value of those relationships but also the trust and esteem

contained in them (Brennan & Pettit 2004). The private character of the social institutions of capitalism discussed here not only guarantees their relative differential efficiency as compared with public institutions, but also the speed with which they may be applied and their relationship leading to salvaging rather than rupturing effects.

SEE ALSO: Bureaucracy and Public Sector Governmentality; Bureaucratic Personality; Capitalism; Labor–Management Relations; Organizations as Coercive Institutions

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captive mind

Syed Farid Alatas

The concept of the captive mind was originated by the Malaysian sociologist Syed Hussein Alatas and was developed to conceptualize the nature of scholarship in the developing world, particularly in relation to western dominance in the social sciences and humanities. The captive mind is defined as an “uncritical and imitative mind dominated by an external source, whose thinking is deflected from an independent perspective” (Alatas 1974: 692). The external source is western social science and humanities and the uncritical imitation that influences all the constituents of scientific activity such as problem selection, conceptualization, analysis, generalization, description, explanation, and interpretation (Alatas 1972: 11). Among the characteristics of the captive mind are the inability to be creative and raise original problems, the inability to devise original analytical methods, and alienation from the main issues of indigenous society. The captive mind is trained almost entirely in the western sciences, reads the works of western authors, and is taught predominantly by western teachers, whether in the West itself or through their works available in local centers of education. Mental captivity is also found in the suggestion of solutions and policies. Furthermore, it reveals itself at the levels of theoretical as well as empirical work.

Alatas elaborated the concept in two papers published in the early 1970s (Alatas 1972, 1974) but had raised the problem in the 1950s referring to the “wholesale importation of ideas from the Western world to eastern societies” without due consideration of their sociohistorical context, as a fundamental problem of colonialism (Alatas 1956). He had also suggested that the mode of thinking of colonized peoples paralleled political and economic imperialism. Hence the expression academic imperialism (Alatas 1969, 2000), the context within which the captive mind appears.

While the phenomenon of the captive mind is important, discourse on the concept as developed by Alatas has been limited to citations in works of scholars sympathetic to the type of

critique undertaken by him. There have been no systematic expositions or rebuttals of the concept and it seems to be largely ignored, particularly in western social science establishments (interview with Syed Hussein Alatas, August 29, 2004).

Since the latter part of the nineteenth century, scholars in the non western areas such as India, Southeast Asia, and the Middle East, noting that the humanities and social sciences originate in the West, raised the issue of the relevance of these fields of knowledge to the needs and problems of their own societies. From the 1950s onwards there was a strong recognition of the academic dependence of the third world on the West as far as the social sciences were concerned. This dependence was seen in terms of both the structures of academic dependency and the ideas derived from alien settings and whose relevance is in question. The former can be gauged from the relative availability of first world funding for research, the prestige attached to publishing in American and British journals, the high premium placed on a western university education, the design of curricula and adoption of text books in non western universities, as well as several other indicators (Altbach 1977; Weeks 1990; S. F. Alatas 2003). The latter problem of dependence on ideas can be illustrated by a survey of concepts and theories that are in vogue across a range of disciplines in the developing world. The captive mind exists within this context of dependency.

The discourse on the captive mind belongs to that genre of social science literature that consciously addresses various problems relating to the state of the social sciences in the third world. These problems can be subsumed under concepts and movements such as the critique of colonialism, academic imperialism, decolonization (of knowledge), critical pedagogy, deschooling, academic dependency, Orientalism, Eurocentrism, and the captive mind.

Alatas begins his conceptualization of the captive mind with a parallel idea, the demonstration effect, developed by James Duesenberry in connection with consumer behavior. According to the idea of the demonstration effect, rising income would result in higher levels of consumption as consumers attempt to match the consumption patterns of those whose

lifestyles they wish to imitate (Duesenberry 1949). Alatas suggests that the thinking of third world social scientists can be understood in terms of the demonstration effect. According to this interpretation, the consumption of social science knowledge from the West arises from the belief in the superiority of such knowledge. Among the traits of this consumption that parallel the economic demonstration effect are: (1) the frequency of contact with western knowledge; (2) the weakening or erosion of local or indigenous knowledge; (3) the prestige attached to imported knowledge; and (4) that such consumption is not necessarily rational and utilitarian (Alatas 1972: 10–11).

Alatas provides illustrations of the workings of the captive mind from development studies. The dangerous consequences of the captive mind lie in the weaknesses of the thought pattern in, for example, development studies in the West which are being imitated elsewhere. These cover various areas of scientific activity such as abstraction, generalization, conceptualization, problem setting, explanation, and the understanding and mastery of data (Alatas 1972: 12). For instance, in the area of abstraction and generalization, Alatas discusses the work of Tinbergen (1967) on development planning as being marred by general and abstract propositions that are redundant (Alatas 1972: 12–13). In another illustration, this time from the work of Kuznets, Alatas criticizes some of the propositions for being so general that they lack any utility for meaningful analysis. This problem could have been avoided had the work attempted to derive propositions and conclusions directly from historical and comparative data (Alatas 1972: 14). Another problem in development studies discussed by Alatas is that of erroneous judgment as a result of unfamiliarity with data or ignorance of the context. The example given is Hagen's view that digging with the Southeast Asian hoe is an "awkward process," but the spade, which is a better instrument, can only be of limited use in low income societies to the extent that shoes are not widely used (Hagen 1962: 31–2, cited in Alatas 1972: 15). Alatas suggests that Hagen did not comprehend the function of the hoe in its proper context. In the Southeast Asian context, the hoe is actually the more efficient instrument because of terrace cultivation on

mountain slopes. Hagen's failure to judge the efficiency and utility of the hoe by reference to its context is a violation of an important anthropological principle (Alatas 1972: 15).

It is problems such as these in development studies as well as the social sciences in general that are imitated and assimilated by the captive mind and result in ill conceived development plans. Dominated by western thought in a mimetic and uncritical way, the captive mind lacks creativity and the ability to raise original problems, is characterized by a fragmented outlook, is alienated from both major societal issues and its own national tradition, and is a consequence of western dominance over the rest of the world (Alatas 1974: 691). The problem of the captive mind is unique to the non western world. While uncreative, imitative, fragmented, and alienated minds are to be found in the West as well, the context in which these occur is not the same. Alatas argues that the counterpart of the captive mind does not exist in the West because in the West we do not find people who are trained in non western sciences, in non western universities, trained by non western professors, and assigned works of non western scholars in non western languages (Alatas 1974: 692). The captive mind is a phenomenon peculiar to the developing world in that the uncritical and imitative thought exists in the context of the domination by an external civilization, the West (Alatas 1976).

The logical consequence of the awareness of the problem of the captive mind is the development of an autonomous social science tradition that would function to eliminate or restrict the intellectual demonstration effect or the captive mind (Alatas 1972: 20). An autonomous social science tradition is defined as one which independently raises problems, creates concepts, and creatively applies methodologies without being intellectually dominated by another tradition (Alatas 2002: 151). This does not mean that there are no influences from other traditions or that there is no learning involved from other traditions. Translating the notion of autonomous social science into practice involves the following aspects (Alatas 1972: 20-1): (1) restricting the development of the captive mind by encouraging a process of selective and independent assimilation of knowledge from the West; (2) setting higher

scientific and intellectual standards by comparing local and regional social sciences with their counterparts in developed countries; (3) encouraging interest in comparative studies in the training of social scientists; (4) creating awareness in government and among the elite in the development of an autonomous social science tradition; (5) obtaining the support of those foreign scholars sympathetic to the idea; (6) attacking faulty development planning and the abuse of social science thought that arises from the workings of the captive mind with reference to concrete local targets; and (7) awakening the consciousness of social scientists regarding their intellectual servitude.

SEE ALSO: Colonialism (Neocolonialism); Decolonization; Dependency and World Systems Theories; Eurocentrism; Uneven Development

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caregiving

Patricia Drentea

Caregiving is the act of providing unpaid assistance and support to family members or acquaintances who have physical, psychological, or developmental needs. Caring for others generally takes on three forms: instrumental, emotional, and informational caring. Instrumental help includes activities such as shopping for someone who is disabled or cleaning for an elderly parent. Caregiving also involves a great deal of emotional support, which may include listening, counseling, and companionship. Finally, part of caring for others may be informational in nature, such as learning how to alter the living environment of someone in the first stages of dementia.

Sociologists generally limit their discussion of caregiving to unpaid workers. Caregivers are typically family members, friends, and neighbors. Sometimes caregiving is done by those affiliated with religious institutions. While caregiving of all types is also done by paid workers such as nurses, social workers, and counselors, this is paid work, and thus is not in the same category. Caregiving rarely refers to the daily

care that parents provide for their children, because this is classified as parenting; however, caring for an adult disabled daughter would be considered caregiving because it is outside of the norm of expectations for older adults.

Recently, sociologists have begun to use the term carework rather than caregiving. Care work is considered more accurate to describe a relationship that is not always voluntary and freely given. The word caregiving stems from gerontological work, where a service ethic is presumed to motivate the caregiver. Sociologists have chosen the word carework to highlight the inequality in who generally cares for others. They note that families, and particularly women within families, provide care. Additionally, with few affordable market based options in carework, those with more money have better options to decline caregiving, thus further showing the inequality of who cares for whom. Finally, the social supports issued by welfare states are not always stable and dependent, resulting in contextual or geopolitical differences in who "chooses" to caregive (Harrington et al. 2000).

Caregiving is measured by ascertaining what type of care is provided and how many hours are spent caring for others over a typical day, week, month, or year. The constellation of factors important to consider in caregiving research is the relationship with the care recipient, and the levels of care needed and provided. The personal demands on the caregiver are also typically measured, such as family and work status, and physical impairment of the caregiver (Pavalko & Woodbury 2000). The amount of social support available to the caregiver is important, as are the contexts in which the caregiver and care recipient live. Socioeconomic status, sex, race and ethnicity, and age of both caregiver and care recipient are integral to understanding the level of stress created by the caregiving relationship (Aneshensel et al. 1995). It is often wise to study caregiving within a certain disease cluster or category, such as caring for the elderly with several functional limitations, or caring for someone with HIV/AIDS, since each cluster will bring about specific issues surrounding the context of the problem.

Much research focuses on caregiver burden, which examines the level of stress and burnout

associated with caregiving. Other research, however, highlights positive aspects of caregiving, in which caregivers have reported the meaning and fulfillment that caring for someone has brought to their lives. Researchers also try to assess the context in which the caregiving relationship takes place, and many have designed interventions to support the caregivers. Respite care, often provided by for-profit businesses, allows caregivers to have a break and take care of their own needs while someone else cares for their loved one on a short-term basis.

Most caregiving is done informally by family members. This informal, unpaid service saves the government billions of dollars each year (Arno et al. 1999); however, it may cost employers in lost days of work when caregivers must handle emergencies. It also results in lost wages for employees who must provide care rather than engage in paid work.

Caregiving is one of the most studied areas in social gerontology (George 1990). Additional research, however, will be increasingly useful as the population ages. First of all, we must continue to monitor the amount of care provided by others, as we expect it to increase while the baby boom ages. Second, we must continue to assess the effect caregiving has on the economy, in terms of lost wages, lost employee hours, and saving the government/welfare state from providing the care. The context of caregiving should continually be studied to assess under which conditions caring for others is most stressful versus most enjoyable. Interventions and more respite care should follow for the most stressful of situations (with studies of *when* caregivers are willing to use respite care). Monitoring what delays nursing home placement is important to scholars and policymakers. We know little about those receiving care: when possible, interviewing care recipients would greatly increase our understanding of this complex, often emotional relationship. More research could also be done on racial and ethnic variations in caregiving, and when men provide care. Finally, social scientists should strive to get their work on caregiving into the hands of policymakers, as this is one of the most common “second careers” of most adults at some point in their lives.

SEE ALSO: Aging and Health Policy; Aging and Social Policy; Carework; Elder Care; Emotion Work; Ethic of Care; Gender, Aging and; Gender, Work, and Family; Healthy Life Expectancy; Social Support; Stress and Health

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carework

Joya Misra

Carework refers, simply, to the work of caring for others, including unpaid care for family members and friends, as well as paid care for others. Caring work includes taking care of children, the elderly, the sick, and the disabled, as well as doing domestic work such as cleaning and cooking. As reproductive labor, carework is necessary to the continuation of every society. By deploying the term “carework,” scholars and advocates emphasize the importance of recognizing that care is not simply a natural and uncomplicated response to those in need, but actually hard physical, mental, and emotional work, which is often unequally distributed through society (Meyer 2000). Because care tends to be economically devalued, many scholars who study carework emphasize the skill required for care, and the importance of valuing care.

The scholarship on carework addresses several key issues. Understanding the balance in care provision among families, states, and markets is a central concern. There are significant issues about the relationship between family provision of care and market provision of care (paid versus unpaid care). The state plays its own role, in terms of providing care, supporting care, and encouraging care. Many carework scholars call for the state to play a larger role in care provision, both to eliminate gendered expectations for care provision within families and to subsidize provision due to the expense of and demand for high quality care. These issues of family, state, and market have played out within the feminist welfare state literature for decades, and have become more integrated with carework scholarship that focuses more specifically on the experiences of the provision of care (Meyer 2000; Daly 2001).

Scholarship on carework also highlights the tensions between paid versus unpaid care. The commodification of care is viewed with significant suspicion, in part due to concerns that paid care provides less emotional nurturing. Indeed, the rationalization of carework can lead to a greater respect and reward by making visible the skills and hard work involved in carework. Yet the emotional and nurturing aspects of carework are important both to the care recipient and to paid and unpaid careworkers (Foner 1994). For paid carework, a focus on efficiency and billable hours may have extremely detrimental effects. This tension simply exists because society devalues the worth of nurturance and love. Although the commodification of care changes the nature of care, the result need not be a loss in quality. While unpaid family care may be of very high quality, elder abuse and child abuse happen within families as well as in paid care settings, and professionals can at times provide better care, particularly for the disabled and sick. Paid care should also not be seen as replacing unpaid care; unpaid care often continues alongside paid care. Paid and unpaid caregivers may work together, and may need to negotiate successful strategies for sharing care (Abel & Nelson 1990; Ungerson 1997).

Another tension exists between care quality and costs for care. Care improves significantly

with lower ratios of careworkers to recipients. For example, a person caring for two parents with dementia may face greater stress than a person caring for only one parent. Similarly, a nursing home center with a 3:1 ratio of nurses to care recipients will allow higher quality care than one with a 10:1 ratio of nurses to care recipients. Yet, costs increase when care is provided in this manner. As a result, lower quality of care is often necessary, which may create higher levels of burnout for careworkers as well as poor outcomes for care recipients. Yet, most families simply do not have the time or money to provide what may be the highest quality care, and must make difficult choices.

Care may also be experienced by unpaid careworkers as both a burden and a right. Unpaid carework takes place in a larger context, which includes enduring ideologies about the gendered nature of carework, unstable social support for care, and limited market based options for care (Meyer 2000; Daly 2001). Many unpaid careworkers, due to a lack of options, must juggle work, care, and other responsibilities, and may feel pushed into providing care. Yet, the provision of care can also be seen as a right. Those with the least resources and autonomy (e.g., lesbian or gay partners, immigrant domestic workers, or women under US welfare reform) do not have the same ability to *choose* care; when their family members need care, they may be relatively powerless to help. The social context plays an important role in structuring and limiting choices about care. Care is a profound and central experience in many people's lives; it is critical to analyze the experience of care with more subtlety, recognizing that care may be empowering as well as oppressive – and may be both at the same time.

Finally, as all of these points suggest, in equalities provide a key approach for analyzing carework. Carework clearly reinforces gender inequality, but also inequalities of race, ethnicity, class, sexuality, ability, and nation. For example, in the United States, race and gender systems have historically devalued the care racial and ethnic minority women provide for their own families, while appropriating this care for white families. At its most basic, research on carework investigates differences in

carework based on social location, and seeks to show how different social locations are linked through care provision.

SEE ALSO: Caregiving; Elder Care; Emotion Work; Ethic of Care; Inequality/Stratification, Gender; International Gender Division of Labor; Welfare State

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caste: inequalities past and present

Rita Jalali

Societies all over the world are socially stratified but they vary in the ways in which inequality is structured. To categorize different forms of stratification systems sociologists most frequently examine the way resources such as wealth, power, and prestige are acquired in society. In some societies, such valued resources are acquired on the basis of achievement or merit. In others, these resources are accorded to individuals on the basis of ascribed, not achieved, characteristics. One is born into them or inherits them, regardless of individual abilities or skills. A person's position is unalterable during his or her lifetime. The idea of

ascribed and achieved status is used to contrast caste systems with class systems. In class systems one's opportunities in life, at least in the ordinary, are determined by one's actions, allowing a degree of individual mobility that is not possible in caste systems. In caste systems a person's social position is determined by birth, and social intercourse outside one's caste is prohibited.

Caste systems are to be found among the Hindus in India. Examples of caste like systems, where groups are ranked and closed, and where one's position is fixed for life, can also be found in other non Hindu societies such as Japan, during the Tokugawa period, and South Africa, during the era of apartheid.

The term "caste" itself is often used to denote large scale kinship groups that are hierarchically organized within a rigid system of stratification. Early Hindu literary classics describe a society divided into four *varnas*: *Brahman* (poet priest), *Kshatriya* (warrior chief), *Vaishya* (trader), and *Shudra* (menial, servant). The *varnas* formed ranked categories characterized by differential access to spiritual and material privileges. They excluded the Untouchables, who were despised because they engaged in occupations that were considered unclean and polluting.

This hierarchical system persisted throughout the Hindu subcontinent for millennia. The basis of caste ranking was the sacred concept of purity and pollution. Brahmins were considered ritually pure because they were engaged in priestly duties. Untouchables were regarded as impure since they were employed in manual labor and with ritually polluting objects. Usually those who had high ritual status also had economic and political power. Relations between castes were generally regulated by beliefs about pollution. Thus, intermarriage between castes was not allowed; there were strict rules about the kind of food and drink one could accept and from what castes; and there were restrictions on approaching and visiting members of another caste. Violations of these rules entailed purification rites and sometimes expulsion from the caste.

How did such a stratification system achieve legitimacy? Traditional Hindu religious beliefs about *samsara* (reincarnation) and *karma* (quality of actions) provided the justification

for the operation of this hierarchical society. A person's actions in previous lives determined his or her social ranking in this life. Those who were born in a Brahman family must have performed good deeds in their earlier lives. Being born a Shudra or an Untouchable was punishment for the sinful acts committed in previous lives. The *varna* scheme refers only to broad categories of society, for in reality the small endogamous group or subcaste (*jati*) forms the unit of social organization. In each linguistic area there are about 2,000 such subcastes. The status of the subcaste, its cultural traditions, and its numerical strength vary from one region to another, often from village to village. Some *jat*is contain millions of persons and others a few hundred.

Field studies of local caste structures in India revealed that there was some mobility within the caste system. Castes were often able to change their ritual position after they had acquired economic and political power. Upward mobility occurred for an entire caste, not for an individual or a family. However, those at the top and bottom of the hierarchy – the Brahmans and the Untouchables – maintained their high and low status.

The Indian social structure was profoundly affected by British colonialism. Western ideas, the legal system, English educational institutions, and new economic activities brought greater mobility and new opportunities to even the low castes, but those that derived the most benefits were the upper castes, the Brahmans. After the country became independent in 1947, the Indian leaders enacted legislative and legal measures to create a more egalitarian society. A new constitution was adopted, which abolished untouchability and prohibited discrimination in public places. In addition, special benefits were provided for those who had suffered most from the caste system. Places were reserved for Untouchables in higher educational institutions, government services, and in the lower houses of the central and state legislatures.

What progress has the country made toward improving the lives of the Untouchables, who now form 16 percent of the population? Has the traditional caste system disintegrated? The movement from a traditional to a modern economy, together with India's democratic electoral

system, has had a significant impact on the institution of caste. An urban middle class has formed whose members are drawn from various caste groups. Divisions based on income, education, and occupation have become more important than caste cleavages for social and economic purposes. In rural areas, the dominant castes are no longer from the higher castes but belong to the middle and lower peasant castes.

The structural and cultural changes are most prominent among the upper socioeconomic strata in urban areas whose members share a common lifestyle. For those who live in rural areas (nearly 72 percent) caste factors are an integral part of their daily lives. In many parts of the country *Dalits* (the term means oppressed and is preferred by the members of the Untouchable community rather than the government assigned label, Scheduled Castes) are not allowed inside temples and cannot use village water wells. In rural and urban areas, marriages are generally arranged between persons of the same caste. With the support of government scholarships and reservation benefits, a small proportion of *Dalits* has managed to gain entry into the middle class – as school teachers, clerks, bank tellers, typists, and government officials. Reservation of seats in the legislature has made the political arena somewhat more accessible. The recent rise of a *Dalit* political party, the Bahujan Samaj Party, is evidence that *Dalits* are finally gaining some political power. They are particularly strong in the northern regions of the country. In the 2004 national elections, they captured 19 seats (and 5.33 percent of the votes) in the parliament. The majority of *Dalits*, however, remain landless agricultural laborers, powerless, desperately poor, and illiterate. Poverty rates among them remain much higher than for other castes. As in the past, rural and urban areas in India will continue to witness inter caste conflicts. Yet, what is significant is that, like ethnic conflicts elsewhere between groups, these conflicts have more to do with control over political and economic resources and less over caste beliefs and values.

SEE ALSO: Affirmative Action; Conflict (Racial/Ethnic); Racial Hierarchy; Stratification, Race/Ethnicity and

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Castoriadis, Cornelius (1922–97)

Phillip Ablett

Cornelius Castoriadis was a Greco-French philosopher, economist, psychoanalyst, social theorist, and post-Marxist revolutionary. Born in Constantinople (Istanbul) in 1922, Castoriadis grew up in Greece amid dictatorship, invasions, and civil war. Educated in philosophy, law, and politics at the University of Athens, Castoriadis fought the Nazis as part of the communist, and later Trotskyist, resistance. In 1945 Castoriadis went to study in Paris, where in 1948 he co-founded the libertarian socialist group and journal *Socialisme ou Barbarie* (1949–67), many of whose ideas influenced the 1968 worker-student uprising. He was unable to obtain French citizenship until 1970 and led a revolutionary's double life by working professionally as a senior OECD economist. As the journal's preeminent theoretician, Castoriadis initiated a series of thoroughgoing internal critiques of the Marxist tradition. Against statist definitions

of socialism as nationalization, Castoriadis advocated workers' self-management, which he expanded into a project of human autonomy. After 1970, Castoriadis retrained as a psychoanalyst and became director of studies at the Écoles des Hautes Études.

Castoriadis's mature work, exemplified in *The Imaginary Institution of Society* (1975) and numerous essays, presents an original, interdisciplinary critique of contemporary capitalist societies, in the course of which he formulates an alternative to both foundationalist social science and poststructural relativism. The interdisciplinary and "extra-academic" character of most of Castoriadis's writing has contributed to its slow reception in sociology, despite sympathetic appraisals from Habermas, Heller, and Bauman. His work, however, has much to offer sociology's interpretive, action perspectives and publicly engaged critical theory. Like the latter, Castoriadis sees theory as a necessary but partial moment in our sociohistorical *doing*. Accordingly, his sociological ideas are inextricably tied to rethinking ways in which social action might institute human freedom and justice.

Philosophically, Castoriadis builds his social theory upon ontology. Against the dominant traditions of western thought, he posits a basic indeterminacy in social and natural reality. This challenges the exhaustive knowledge claims of objectivist determinism (what Castoriadis calls "identitarian ensemblistic" or "ensidic" logic): the idea that reality consists solely of a rationally or empirically bounded set of determinate objects. For Castoriadis, objects related through chains of inevitable cause and effect represent just one determinate layer of being. There remains an indeterminate layer, which in the social world is revealed in the human capacity for creative imagination, both at the personal (*radical imaginary*) and collective (*social imaginary*) levels.

Imagination is not simply the illusory, but rather the capacity to see things otherwise, "provide new responses to the 'same' situations or create new situations" (Castoriadis 1987 [1975]: 44). Consequently, Castoriadis conceives of social institutions as the creations of the social imaginary in action. The social imaginary for Castoriadis is an unstable "*magma*" of cultural meanings (transcending reason or empirical reality) that give a society its broadest

self definition. Society (the sociohistorical) is, therefore, an open ended dialectic between the already created array of symbolically mediated institutions and the creating of new ones; it is “the union *and* the tension of instituting society and of instituted society, of history made and of history in the making” (Castoriadis 1987 [1975]: 108). In this light, institutions cannot be “explained” by reference to causes and functions but require an elucidation of the significations that animate and transform them.

Society as an imaginary creation does not represent in itself a reflexive or democratic accomplishment for Castoriadis. Since the rise of “civilization” in ancient Mesopotamia, most societies have been characterized by heteronomy (i.e., “rule of the other”), in which the imaginary of the dominant group is instituted as natural or divinely sanctioned. Autonomy or self determination, however, remains historically possible for both the individual and society.

Social autonomy means a society being able to self consciously institute and revise its own laws with the maximum participation of all of its members. It begins whenever a subordinate group starts to question the dominant imaginary that construes its subordination as inevitable and seeks equal participation. Castoriadis characterizes as revolutionary praxis this exceptional form of deliberate social self creation, which simultaneously recognizes the autonomy of the other. His examples include the ancient Greek democracies, medieval Italian communes, the English Civil War, the American and French Revolutions, workers’ councils, and contemporary social movements where direct democracy is sought against elite rule. Castoriadis counterposes these instances of praxis to the currently dominant imaginary of neoliberalism, where people surrender their agency to “representative” democracy (which he calls “liberal oligarchy”) and market despotism. He does this not to prove that democracy is inevitable but to remind us that societies have imagined and can pursue such paths.

By attesting to the power of imagination in social life, Castoriadis’s work is a robust reproach to pronouncements that history ended with the triumph of global capitalism. It is also an invitation to imagine something new and better.

SEE ALSO: Action Research; Critical Theory/ Frankfurt School; Democracy; Marxism and Sociology; Neoliberalism; Praxis; Revolutions

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Catholicism

Émile Poulat

Catholicism, along with Orthodoxy and Protestantism, is one of Christianity’s three principal branches and statistically the most important. Today’s use of the term is a recent, secularized means of referring to the Catholic Church, whose head is the pope and whose headquarters are in the Vatican City in Rome.

The word Catholicism is a latecomer in the long history of the church, a word whose history has yet to be written. It is scarcely more than four centuries old in the French language, where it seems to have been born amid the sixteenth century wars of religion as a counterpart to the Protestantism of the Calvinists. The schism between German Lutherans (the Church of the Augsburg Confession) and

Catholics – only recently healed after lengthy ecumenical dialogue – has no exact parallel in the relations between the Catholic and Orthodox Churches: the orthodoxy Constantinople claims for itself is not opposed to any putative Roman heresy, but to the iconoclasts over whom it triumphed in the ninth century.

Relations between confessions are inflected with language difficulties about which no unanimity exists and which are open to multiple interpretations. “Church” is a theological concept that each confession develops in its own way. Doctrinal differences have led to the establishment of separate churches whose ecclesiological peculiarities limit and undermine ecumenical dialogue. In contemporary Catholic usage the word Church is regarded as the result of contamination or degradation and reflects vacillation and uncertainty. Formerly, “Holy Church” referred to the only true Church, mother of all and universal teacher. Today, reference to the Roman Catholic Church or the Anglican Church, for example, indicates the existence or absence of a linkage to the See of Peter (*cathedra Petri*), a nuance current in the Anglican tradition and more generally in the English speaking world.

By invoking its divine institution the universal Catholic Church affirms itself to be independent of any earthly power and sovereign in its own order. This exceptional prerogative of which it is the sole beneficiary is recognized at the international level. The Catholic Church is a society with no national frontiers but with a place among the nations, possessing a territorial base of its own (Vatican City) and legally embodied by its supreme organ of governance, the Holy See (called such by the UN), where ambassadors are accredited from around 164 nations with whom it has diplomatic relations. Thus, while Catholicism is a religion in the modern sense of the word, it is also more than that, making it of great sociological interest.

Statistics about the demography and membership of religions need to be interpreted cautiously. The last research dates from 1982, with forward projections to the year 2000 (Barrett 1982). For Catholicism, however, such statistics can be updated by means of the *Annuario pontificio* and the *Annuaire statistique de l'Église*. The number of adherents is thus estimated

at about a thousand million, distributed among close to 3,000 major territories, of which 2,700 are dioceses with the full exercise of episcopal authority, and some 400,000 parishes. This framework is supported by 4,500 bishops, assisted by 265,000 diocesan priests (called secular clergy), 2,000,000 religious priests (of which 125,000 are priests called “regular” because they live under a rule, *regimen*), 80,000 nuns, 26,000 permanent deacons, 80,000 lay missionaries, and 2,500,000 catechists.

Two subsets can be distinguished from this vast collectivity. The first were once called mission territories, entrusted to vicariates or apostolic prefects working with missionary orders and congregations and foreign resources. These once had considerable territorial significance. The second were once very local: the churches of the oriental rites that were united to Rome, whose special autonomy has always been recognized by virtue of their non derivative origins. Decolonization has accelerated somewhat the establishment of such fully operative churches, and while missionary activity has not ceased, it has undergone profound transformation. Migration has also led to the multiplication of dioceses of the oriental rites in western countries (e.g., 75 percent of Arabs living in the US are Christian), while the Latin Christians of the East have declined to the point of atrophy.

As one would expect, such a culturally diverse communion is not only spiritual in nature, but also a consciously hierarchical and strongly centralized organization that rests on extensive legal, administrative, and financial resources. Over the centuries the Catholic Church has been closely associated with the political life of Europe, as well as Latin America. For millennia, religion was a public matter and its laws were also those of society. The two orders of temporal and spiritual authority possessed respectively civil and ecclesiastical power, but their exact relationship and the question of which had authority over the other – the pope or the sovereign – was debated endlessly and often bitterly. Today, confessional states are now the exception rather than the rule. The separation of church and state and the principle of secular government have more or less succeeded the principle of Catholicity.

It is no longer religion that is public, but each person's *freedom* of religion (i.e., freedom of conscience and worship). Religion itself, it is held, is a private matter. However, the privatization of the church is not an inevitable outcome of freedom of conscience and the religious neutrality of the state. The church does not cease its active presence in public life, nor does the nature of that presence cease to be transformed or to take new directions.

The history of the Catholic Church from the end of the nineteenth century is the history of its difficult and necessary conversion to this new order of society, which provides the conditions for its very existence. The singularity of the Catholic Church – its strength and its weakness – is really its deep dislike of *any* regime and for the modern invention of the separation of church and state. What the church teaches and what it does always refer to an ideal of *integration*, although the words necessary for expressing this ideal are freighted with the old opposition between the church and the world.

The “conversation” this entails between church and state is supervised on the church’s side by the papacy. The papacy consists of the current pope himself, plus the historical institution for which he assumes responsibility and the continuity of which he represents. The Holy See is at one and the same time the Roman pontiff, the central government of the universal church (over which he exercises “the supreme and full power of jurisdiction”), and the legal personification of the Catholic communion. The activity of the Holy See is exercised above all by a traditional but periodically reformed organization, the Roman curia. Since 1967 it has had at its head a secretary of state who serves as the leader of the government and who directs the policy of the church in its relations with states. He oversees the work of 9 congregations, which constitute as many ministries but whose heads remain directly responsible to the pope. Their names clearly indicate the tasks for which they are responsible:

1 Doctrine of the Faith (the old Holy Office, successor to the Inquisition), under which is an International Theological Commission and a Biblical Commission

- 2 Oriental Churches
- 3 Divine Liturgy and Discipline of the Sacraments
- 4 Causes of Saints (procedures for beatification and canonization)
- 5 Bishops
- 6 Missions (previously called the Congregation for the Propagation of the Faith and today called the Congregation for the Evangelization of Peoples)
- 7 Clergy
- 8 Institutes of Consecrated Life (vowed religious)
- 9 Catholic Education (seminaries and Catholic schools and universities)

In addition to these congregations, three tribunals exist under archaic names: (1) the Apostolic Signature, which judges appeals and administrative disputes; (2) the Roman Rota, for cases of marriage litigation; and (3) the Sacred Penitentiary, for matters of conscience that are private or reserved to the pope. Then there are offices or bureaus, among them the Prefecture of Economic Affairs (accounts office) and the Administration of the Patrimony of the Holy See.

Among various permanent commissions, there are pontifical councils established after the Second Vatican Council in 1962–5 (Unity of Christians, Interreligious Dialogue, for the Laity, for Culture, Pastoral Council of Migrants, Family, Health, Charitable Works, etc.). To these entities of government are added institutions responsible for administering the cultural patrimony of the Holy See and making it accessible to the public: the Vatican Library, the Vatican Archives, and the Vatican Museum. Only 3,500 active permanent staff (with a thousand retired) are employed in this administration – not many, given the task and the size of the budget, the balancing of which has become a problem.

“The Vatican” is partly mythic (a kind of shorthand), but also a reality of international law, defined by the Lateran Accords (1929) between the Holy See and Italy. It is a miniature state of 44 hectares: testimony to a distant historical past (the Papal States) and endowed with a system and government of its own (bureaus of work and places of service), but

above all a territorial basis for the independence of the Holy See.

The papacy is often considered one of the last absolute monarchies, but this is inappropriate. If the power of the pope is supreme and complete, it is neither absolute nor solitary, but vicarious and collegial. This relativization did not prevent its growth from the end of the nineteenth century, nor block the reestablishment of episcopal collegiality at the Second Vatican Council. This takes effect at several levels: in a unique way on the occasion of a council; periodically by the holding of synods (11 from 1967 to 2005, to which are added an extraordinary session and 8 special sessions); and regularly in national or regional episcopal conferences. Compared to these, the particular council of the pope that the Sacred College of Cardinals comprises (120 below the age of 80 years) seems a lighter and more mobile structure. Its major responsibility is to elect a successor at the death of the pope.

The Holy See is not supranational: it is not a state among states while participating in their organizations as an “observer,” and the Vatican citizenship that its officers enjoy is in addition to that of their national origin. The Catholic Church thinks of itself as being transnational: state boundaries are accommodated and respected, but without thereby discriminating among the faithful. As for the latter, they voluntarily give an international form to their national activities. Thus, since 1951, there has been a Conference of International Catholic Organizations (OIC) comprising 36 member organizations, 4 associated ones, and 4 invited, most of which have NGO consultative status at the UN and its specialized agencies, such as UNESCO.

If the diocese and the parish have been the ordinary structures of the church for a thousand years, the importance of other structures should not be neglected: the ancient, strongly controlled network of orders, congregations, and other institutes of religious life; the teaching sector (seminaries and Catholic schools and universities); the periodical and book publishing sector; hospital care and charities, complemented by missionary cooperation and economic development; and the immense movement of the lay apostolate, long identified – narrowly – as Catholic Action, but the forms

and orientations of which vary considerably by country and era.

Tensions can arise between the two aspects of these intertwining activities: an internal aspect turned toward spirituality and some times tempted to ignore “the world,” and an external aspect turned toward the apostolate and evangelization, engaged in the world to the point of losing its Christian identity – hence, it is possible to go from “dechristianization” to “deconfessionalization.” This was the great adventure of the Catholic Social Movement, born in Western Europe around 1870, from which arose Christian labor unions and political parties of Christian inspiration. If these were not or are no longer specifically Catholic, a study of Catholic organization can not pass over them in silence, for they speak to the church’s capacity to maintain a presence.

Globally, the Catholic Church is an immense mosaic of cultures, traversing all the social classes, speaking all the languages. At the center of this Catholicity there exists a relatively small bureaucracy which no official of any country would judge sufficiently large. Political scientists would do well to examine this phenomenon more closely. They would discover that the principle of episcopal collegiality involves decentralization and subsidiarity, associating strict control at all levels with features of voluntary association. In itself this fundamental principle cannot guarantee functionality – historians and sociologists have known that for a long time. Nevertheless, despite all the difficulties it experiences and the struggles it encounters, the Catholic Church continues.

SEE ALSO: Christianity; Church; Religion; Religion, Sociology of

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caudillismo

Sergio Tamayo

Etymologically, *caudillo* comes from the latino term *capitellus* or *caput*, which means head. A political system or political regime based on *caudillaje* is named *caudillismo* and is under the mandate of a *caudillo* (political leader). *Caudillo* means the boss or leader of an army at war. However, political and military leaders who lead emancipation or popular movements are also designated with the same word. Different authors have analyzed *caudillismo* from two main orientations: as a social movement or institutional regime, and as a reflection of the action of a leader or *caudillo*. It has been a phenomenon associated mainly with Latin American politics. Nevertheless, various movements or regimes have been recognized by the name of their *caudillo* (e.g., Peronism in Argentina, Cardenism in Mexico, Cesarism in Rome, Bonapartism in France, Bismarckism in Germany, Franquism in Spain, *Duce* to Mussolini, *Fuhrer* to Hitler, etc.).

The main issue in this characterization is not the fact that the *caudillo* or leader maintain a rightist or leftist ideology, nor that they consider themselves, at the same time, fascist, nationalist, populist, democratic, revolutionary, or authoritarian. The personal characteristics of leadership and the social historical context are transcendental. There are also other social types that have been associated with the notion of *caudillo*, such as the social bandit, *cacique*, the mafias, the revolutionary *caudillo*, the charismatic leader of masses, and the political boss.

Caudillismo is related to historical periods, movements, and political regimes. These movements are characterized by being political transitions led by charismatic leaders. It is important to stress in these phenomena the structural similarities as well as the reproduced figure of the *caudillo*.

The term *caudillismo* has been established mainly in Latin America to identify the period of independence (1810–25) and the post independence stage that continued with the making of nation states in the nineteenth century. Though not all the Latin American countries went through similar transitions, it is possible to observe historical components that permitted the presence of *caudillismo*. A significant aspect is the change in economic model when Spain left its American colonies. In the case of Argentina and Chile, the decline of the colonial system implied the flourishing of an exporting oligarchy linked to English capitalism. The development of the economy was based on exportation, which provoked the fragmentation of the artisan industry still linked to colonial forms of organization: a clash between exporting sectors and groups of artisans and of incipient manufacturers. The confrontation was between the rural provinces and centralism in the cities. In Mexico, Peru, and Bolivia the economic crisis registered a sharp reduction in fiscal income. The dispersion of power benefited the formation of weak and disaggregated national governments. In both cases *caudillismo* appeared due to the power vacuum generated by the disintegration of the colonial system and the need to reunite the population around a national project.

Sarmiento's novel *Facundo* shows us these political conditions in Argentina. The right of

property was agrarian: large estates or haciendas in the case of Mexico, the landscape of the pampa, the rudimentary exploitation of work, and violence as a way of life. He describes the farmland in its dogmatic, isolationist, Catholic tradition. The *gaucho* was both a social subject and a *caudillo*. The *caudillo* was shown as a tyrant leader. The antagonism was mirrored against the city, the center of rationalism, order, and democracy.

Although in appearance the emergence of the *caudillo* can express these contradictions between the country and the city, *caudillismo* according to Frank (1970) represents the existence of antagonistic groups that seek to position themselves in the same capitalist system. In Argentina, for example, the allies of the English interests that supported the politics of exportation were placed against the nationalists who represented the interests of the provinces, the artisan production in traditional manufacturing. The *caudillo* was a result of these tensions. He was capable of canalizing social conflicts. The *caudillo* became a hinge that articulated the old colonial model with the new capitalist market.

The study of *caudillismo* in Latin America has looked for generalities and parallelisms with other times. The work of Krauze (1997, 1999a, 1999b) is particularly relevant because of his characterization of the Mexican *caudillos*. The nineteenth century *caudillo* was made by the independent and liberal leaders who built the Mexican nation. The biographies of power dominated the period of the 1910 Mexican Revolution. The revolt can be explained by the function of charismatic leaders, who were viewed by their followers as secular saints. Brading (1980) also refers to the origin of the Mexican Revolution as a struggle between regional *caciques* worried only about their own interests and dominance over their people. In the case of Mexico, the *caciques* were different in the North and in the South of the country. Those in the North received financing from the local governments that opposed the dictatorship of Porfirio Díaz. Those in the South were helped by popular uprisings. The process continued a transformation from the local *caciques* to regional *caudillos*, from a local vision to one supported by the popular movement. These

changes ended in a new national synthesis: presidentialism. The role of the *caudillo* permitted a type of institutionalization of national power.

Caudillismo, especially that which was seen in the first decades of the nineteenth century in Latin America, is connected to the Bonapartism experienced in France after the *coup d'état* of Louis Bonaparte in December 1851. Bonapartism was possible partly due to the fact that it permitted equilibrium between the contending parties in an unresolved struggle. The charismatic and despotic political leader embodied the government with the objective of bringing discipline and order. With this strategy, the head of state was placed above the conflict, limiting the contenders in any political participation. The measures of industrialization made the workers as well as the bourgeoisie benefit from the intervention of the state. The leader professed himself savior of the working class when parliament was abolished. And the bourgeoisie permitted it because in its place order and stability were imposed. With heroic national wars Bonaparte put a stop to the interests of the working class. The internal struggle became static. Bonaparte moderated the conflicts and repressed social explosion. That is why the state moved towards its automatization. Bonapartism is a phenomenon that can always appear when society is shaken by destructive conflicts with no way out. It is the inevitable outcome of situations of anarchy and chaos.

Bonapartism has also been associated with Cesarism. Cesarism reveals elements similar to those in the political leadership in Latin America. Originally, Cesarism was defined as that regime established in ancient Rome by Cayo Julius Cesar. It represented a solid power that came from the interests of the groups in battle, supported by strong ties to the army. The term Cesarism has also been used to define the French governments that arose from both Bonapartes. Gramsci (1975) refers to Cesarism as a situation in which a strong leader is present. The Cesarist, he says, arises from a setting in which conflicting social forces are more or less equal. If they continue in this manner the struggle leads to mutual destruction. Cesarism as well as Bonapartism expresses arbitrated

solutions, conferred by a great personality, the political leader. The Cesarist is the heroic figure of the charismatic boss. In this sense, Cesarism and Bonapartism have also been associated with phenomena such as fascism and Bismarckism.

This kind of political leadership operates in transitions toward the making of industrial, urban, and modern societies. In such a mutation, political forces do not find themselves sufficiently developed. The reinforcement of the state is necessary by means of a charismatic figure who protects the interests of the nation and exercises a mediating function between different antagonisms.

Other regimes or movements of the masses in which the role of the political or charismatic leader is relevant are recognized as populism and neopopulism. Latin American populism is sustained by a broad social mobilization under the precept of the integration of the popular classes. Populism refuses class struggle. The government emphasizes industrialization pushed by an interventionist state, a mixed economy, a nationalist ideology, and a strongly personalized driving force. In this way there is supremacy of the Will of the People and a direct relationship between the people and the charismatic leadership. The leader interprets the spirit of the people. In the same manner, populism emerges not only because of tensions between subdeveloped countries and colonizing countries, but also between subdeveloped regions and the fairly industrialized centers within the same countries. To many authors, this is a constant source of tension between metropolis and province. In any case, a society in crisis is presented as a division between the "traditional" and the "modern" sectors. In such conflictive and social tension situations, the masses are subordinated to the charismatic leader. The leader represents the state that, at the same time, is the expression of the people and of national history.

Juan Dominguez Perón has turned into the prototype of the charismatic leader, with a government at the same time populist and personalized. He was a leader driven by a broad popular movement. Other populisms have been identified with the chiefs of Latin American states (e.g., Lazaro Cárdenas in Mexico and

Belaúnde Terry in Peru). Political parties have identified themselves as populists when they boost social political movements of nationalist inspiration, such as the Peruvian APRA (*Alianza Popular Revolucionaria Americana*) and the Mexican PRI (*Partido de la Revolución Institucional*). In the case of Mexico, the PRI led the influence and the orientations of the *caciques* and rearticulated political patronage. New post revolutionary *caciques* were formed, but they were based on different political loyalties. This association between populism, political leadership, and Bonapartism has led some authors to claim that the Mexican regime is strongly presidential and therefore Bonapartist. Recently, a few scholars have defined certain Latin American regimes as variants of populism and neopopulism. Chávez in Venezuela and Fujimori in Peru are the best examples for conceptualizing neopopulism. Salinas of Mexico and Menem from Argentina are also included. Neopopulism is defined as a regime that promotes social and economic modernization along with the exercise of authoritarian and personalized power (sometimes dictatorial). Neopopulism is characterized by strong executives and the fragility of institutions, which promotes hyper presidentialism.

In some cases political leadership is sustained by marginal classes, as in the case of Fujimori, without forgetting the interests of enterprises and industries. In other cases, like that of Chávez, neopopulism confronts elites and generates certain benefits for marginal sectors, but at the same time it leads to growing political polarization. In all such situations the system of political parties and legislative institutions is weak and the opposition loses its credibility.

The political movements and regimes that have been identified with a strong leadership are various, but they all share two historical characteristics: (1) a weakness of the social forces in conflict during transitional periods, in a process of modernization or the formation of a nation state; (2) the emergence of a charismatic leader who puts himself above the conflict and solves it. These situations are inserted into the context of civil wars or national independence processes in which the strong leadership can reflect different realms and scales: in local, regional, or national events; in gangs,

movements, or regimes. Depending on these realms and scales, we can refer to manifestations such as social bandits, leaders, mafias, *caudillos*, mass leaders, or political bosses. Nevertheless, the constant characteristic of the *caudillo* is charisma.

Charisma, according to Weber, is a particular form of power because of its link to a certain type of domination. The authority of the *caudillo* leader is based on a natural talent involving the capacity to fascinate, which they possess to an exceptional degree. It is not enough to have the power of attraction: the gift must serve to announce or realize a mission that can be religious, political, military, or social. The charismatic leader is not an isolated character but needs followers – those who recognize the gift of the leader and recognize themselves in him. The legitimacy of the actions of the *caudillo* rests upon the recognition of his particular *don*, which reaches such a degree of acceptance that it justifies the obedience of his followers. The charismatic person achieves his power because he is converted into a spokesperson for their security, hope, and salvation. In Christianity a charismatic leader is one who possesses an extraordinary faculty to make miracles happen or to formulate prophecies that become real. He is a leader who can emerge victorious in conditions of extreme inferiority. Charisma can be expressed in revolutionary, conservative, or resistance movements.

Thus the *caudillo*, the boss, the social bandit, the Cesarist, the Bonapartist, or the populist are all charismatic leaders. There are many examples of the social bandit or *bandolero* (e.g., Robin Hood). Hobsbawm (1965) regards the social bandit as a man who is not considered to be a criminal. He believes in the justice of his actions, which are directed mainly against the rich and based on the customs and traditions of the local community. The bandit is righteous to the people and criminal to the state. The case of the bandit Heraclio Bernal in Mexico illustrates the charisma superimposed by his followers and the defects incorporated by his detractors. According to his followers, Heraclio was tall and attractive, intelligent, friendly, chivalrous, generous, dashing, and without fear. They claimed that he challenged the authorities because he was imprisoned for crimes he did not commit. His accusers claimed that he was

lawless, socially worthless, ignorant, deviant, cruel, and uncivilized; they described him as scrawny and small. The relationship between bandit followers is based on loyalty, prestige, and the authority of the bandit, characteristic of a political leadership. Admiration for the bandit is reproduced in his vision of the future and of justice for the suffering.

The *cacique* is a local boss, only worried about his own interests. He maintains power over his towns and regions. But the *cacique* can be the first step in the conversion into a *caudillo* because he has used coercion on those close to him to obtain loyalty; he also rewards them with privileges to maintain unity. The interest of the *cacique* is to subdue a limited territory to his influence and to establish alliances with the central power to maintain his dominance. The *cacique* turns into a *caudillo* when his worries and interests go beyond the regional and he adheres to a social cause, such as a political movement or a social or revolutionary struggle.

Guzmán (1995) points out the characteristics of *caudillos* in different periods. In discussing Mexican President Porfirio Díaz (1876–1910) he emphasizes his physical qualities: a leader who shone with embroideries and medals; virile and potent because of his slim and robust height, wide shoulders, and severe figure. Krauze summarizes the charisma of the Independence *caudillos* Miguel Hidalgo and José María Morelos y Pavón. The first was a priest influenced by Creole patriotism, a professional gambler of a spendthrift and disorderly disposition. The mass of his followers were also disorganized, unreliable, and amorphous. Although he did not have an alternative political project, Hidalgo could be bloody with his enemies. Morelos was also a priest, more dedicated to spiritual service and helping the helpless. He organized, trained, and uniformed his followers. He was unrelenting, but not bloody; he was moved by political and military objectives. The ideal of equality was given more importance by Morelos, as well as the task of building an independent nation.

During the Mexican Revolution the *caudillo* Emiliano Zapata was followed by thousands of farmers without land. The elite considered him a bandit and a leader of thieves. To his supporters, Zapata was a charismatic leader. The *caudillo* is synonymous with *leader*. The leader

is the fundamental element in the treatment of social movements. Smelser (1995) discusses the characteristics of leaders of collective action and highlights their charismatic qualities. They unify the mobilization and express the feelings of the people. They use myths to motivate action and to create awareness in their followers. They lead the movement and can lead rebellions, but the character of the leader is permeated by democratic or authoritarian practices. A leader with authoritarian practices – frequently seen in the social urban movements in Latin America – can be considered a “local leader,” as claimed by Nuñez (1990), who points out that neighborhood leaders are those who organize people. They also become the intermediaries between society and government. The leader or urban *cacique* imposes himself on a territorial group. The population accepts him through a mixture of fear, prestige, and necessity. The power of the leader is created by the access he has to certain resources, added to his charismatic qualities, forms of expression, and giving of orders; it is reinforced by the violence used by his most loyal supporters against dissidents within the movement. He also works as a community leader. He holds a great deal of autonomy with respect to the masses and the authorities.

For Stewart et al. (1989), a leader makes decisions and acts as the image of the movement. He must have three attributes: charisma, prophecy, and pragmatism. His authority and power are therefore based on the consistency of his character (charisma). He possesses the truth that only he can reveal (prophecy) and he is a practical man in his decisions to reach the goals and obtain the wishes of the group (pragmatism). The leader becomes a *caudillo* of the masses.

SEE ALSO: Charisma; Leadership; Populism

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celebrity and celetoid

Chris Rojek

Celebrity is the assignment of honorific or sensational status to an individual through the agency of mass communication. An important distinction in the field is between *ascribed* and *achieved* forms of celebrity. The former refers to the assignment of status on the basis of genealogy. For example, in Britain Prince William and Prince Harry possess ascribed celebrity on the basis of their bloodline. In the US the children of presidents, such as Chelsea Clinton and Jenna and Barbara Bush, fall into the same category. Ascribed celebrities tend to predominate in the power hierarchy of traditional societies in which rule is organized around monarchical or charismatic leaders. Achieved celebrity refers to the attribution of honorific or scandalous status by virtue of the accomplishments of an individual. This type of celebrity is common in modern societies attached to legal rational forms of legitimacy. Within celebrity culture there are institutionalized categories of sports stars, pop idols, artists, film stars, and politicians into which achieved celebrities can

be positioned. Generally speaking, the transition from traditional to modern society involves the eclipse of ascribed celebrity and its replacement by the achieved form.

There have been a variety of attempts to explain the rise of celebrity culture. Subjectivist accounts focus on the unique, God-given talents of individuals and the expansion of the global mass media in accelerating and broadening data exchange. This position concentrates on the singularity of the celebrity. For example, it holds that no one can rival Jennifer Lopez as the ideal of contemporary female beauty, Tom Cruise as the all-round action hero, or Picasso as the greatest twentieth-century artist. Subjectivist accounts rest upon strong interpretations and for this reason are often controversial. Because they prioritize the irreplaceable singularity of the celebrity they marginalize the role of cultural intermediaries (managers, promoters, publicists, impression management personnel) in creating the public face of the celebrity for mass consumption. In societies based around fully developed mass communications, celebrities are typically socially constructed rather than naturally produced. Today, few achieved celebrities wake up to find themselves famous overnight as Lord Byron allegedly did after the publication of *Childe Harold* in 1812. Rather, they require their image to be fashioned and mediated to mass consumers.

Structuralist accounts of celebrity place more emphasis on the role of cultural intermediaries and manipulation in the construction of celebrities. Generally, the main purpose behind constructing the public face of achieved celebrity is pecuniary gain. One of the strongest examples of the structuralist approach is Adorno and Horkheimer's culture industry thesis, which presents popular culture as the calculated expression on multinationals based in the entertainment industry. Marcuse's later theory of one-dimensional society follows the same line of argument. Structuralist accounts prioritize relations of production over relations of consumption. While audiences and fans can bend and inflect the constructions of the culture industry, they are ultimately depicted as secondary actors. The primary player is the culture industry, which orchestrates consumer demand

for the consumption of achieved celebrity through its control of advertising, marketing, and other branches of mass persuasion.

The structuralist approach is subject to three main criticisms. First, it tends to neutralize the accomplishments of the celebrity in favor of an explanation which focuses on the pronouncement and manipulation of celebrity. As a result, issues of talent and skill are oddly ignored. Second, it undervalues the power of audiences and fans to counteract the pronouncements and manipulations of the culture industry. In consumer culture the relationship between production and consumption is more one of hegemony than domination. Third, structuralist accounts tend to be too glib about the function of celebrity. Achieved celebrity certainly makes use of techniques of manipulation as a means of persuasion, but it does not follow that this practice necessarily eventuates in the subordination and enslavement of the consumer. Achieved celebrities can perform an emancipatory function in raising consciousness, building a sense of belonging, and expediting distributive justice.

Poststructuralist approaches to celebrity employ the motif of intertextuality to explain the appeal of celebrity and the rise of celebrity culture. Intertextuality proceeds on the basis that meaning is always an effect of the interplay between agents and texts. The method developed in poststructuralist philosophy as a way of destabilizing phonocentric or logocentric readings of meaning which assume the notion of transcendental presence. For example, Richard Dyer explores celebrity as the constant interplay and negotiation between cultural intermediaries, achieved celebrities, and audiences. Unlike structuralist approaches that tend to assume a prime mover in the construction of celebrity (usually, the culture industry), poststructuralist approaches emphasize shifting power alliances and a continuous process of exchange and negotiation.

However, in privileging the role of textuality and discourse in the construction of celebrity, poststructuralist approaches produce a curiously disembodied account of celebrity. The glamor and sensuality of celebrity are missing. Similarly, these accounts are usually based upon weak comparative and historical perspectives, which means that they have difficulties in

explaining or predicting change in genres of celebrity.

Without doubt the expansion of mass communications has been the principal factor in the enlargement of celebrity culture. Globalization and the disembedding of populations have created a new role of cultural adhesion for celebrities. Their presence in everyday life may be largely at the level of virtual reality. Nonetheless, one can argue that they anchor exchange and interaction by providing foci of continuity, glamor, and sensuality. As organized religion has declined, the culture of achieved celebrity has emerged to offer new narratives of belonging and recognition. The lifestyles of the rich and famous may even perform the function of late modern parables in which audiences gain insights and support into lifestyle management issues. By the same token, the proliferation of celebrity culture has created divisions and sectarianism. Celebrities are certainly often efficient in manipulating public opinion and for this reason the employment of celebrities in the advertising industry has become a more prominent feature of commodity culture.

A *celetoid* is an individual who achieves concentrated media attention for an intense but brief time span and then fades from collective memory. The concept arose from the analysis of celebrity and the emergence of achieved celebrity culture. Celetoids are the product of the age of the mass media and especially check book journalism. One recent example that is familiar globally is Monica Lewinsky, who was at the center of sexual allegations involving President Bill Clinton in his second term of office. For a relatively short time, Lewinsky was the focal point of mass media attention, featuring in newspaper stories, TV documentaries, and talk shows. Her involvement with Clinton produced a lucrative book deal and other media spin offs. However, as media interest subsided, collective interest in and memory of Lewinsky receded. Other examples of celetoids are one hit wonders, have a go heroes, reality TV contestants, and medical phenomena such as octuplets, Siamese twins, and so on.

In the age of electronic mass communications the celetoid can be regarded as embodying the carnivalesque tradition identified by

Mikhail Bakhtin in which the categories – especially the hierarchy of formal order – are subject to parody, ridicule, or more restrained forms of contest. However, the celetoid is also a powerful weapon in the ratings wars in which agents of the media exaggerate or create scandals and sensationalism in pursuit of high sales.

SEE ALSO: Celebrity Culture; Consumption; Culture Industries; Media Literacy; Music and Media; Popular Culture; Popular Culture Icons

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celebrity culture

Ellis Cashmore

Celebrity culture is characterized by a pervasive preoccupation with famous persons and an extravagant value attached to the lives of public figures whose actual accomplishments may be limited, but whose visibility is extensive. It became a feature of social life, especially in the developed world, during the late 1980s/early 1990s and extended into the twenty first century, assisted by a global media which promoted, lauded, sometimes abominated, and occasionally annihilated figures, principally from entertainment and sports.

Celebrity culture defined thought and conduct, style and manner. It affected and was affected by not just fans but entire populations whose lives had been shaped by the shift from manufacturing to service societies and the corresponding shift from consumer to aspirational consumer.

While some have argued that there have been acclaimed and illustrious characters of

considerable renown since the days of the Macedonian king Alexander the Great in the third century BCE, and perhaps before, the distinguishing features of contemporary celebrity culture are: the prodigious number of famous individuals whose fame is predicated less on achievement and more on the attention of the media; the ubiquity of their representation; and the immoderate esteem afforded them by a wide constituency of consumers.

A further distinguishing peculiarity of celebrity culture was the shift of emphasis from achievement based fame to media driven renown. This was captured in the contrived verb *to celebrity*, which, while never formally defined, might be interpreted to mean “to exalt; praise widely; make famous; invest common or inferior person or thing with great importance.”

In his *Illusions of Immortality*, David Giles (2000: 25) submits that: “The ultimate modern celebrity is the member of the public who becomes famous solely through media involvement.” While the “ultimate” celebrity’s rise might be attributable “solely” to the media, celebrities typically performed some deed, however modest, to attract initial attention. That deed might involve an appearance on a reality television show, a criminal action, or an inept showing at a major sports event. In other words, conduct that would hardly be regarded as commendable and deserving of recognition in earlier eras, perhaps as recently as the 1980s.

During the late 1980s and early 1990s, however, conceptions of merit were rendered indeterminate and figures who traditionally earned distinction and drew praise for their efforts vied with more prosaic characters whose achievements were often uncertain. This heralded what we might call the Age of the Celebrity, in which idolatrous followings accrued to what seemed literally worthless individuals. In fact, they were not worthless, worth being an equivalent value of merit conferred on someone or something by a population. Whether the neophyte celebs actually deserved reverence is a less interesting question to a sociologist than the reasons why so many believed they deserved it. A participant in a reality television show, a contestant in a quiz show, a hitherto unknown bank clerk featured in an advertising

campaign: these were the types of characters who ascended from obscurity to public visibility and, in some cases, veneration. They became estimable without seeming to do anything.

What they *did* do was appear; their images were relayed to millions via television and Internet sites; newspapers recorded their exploits; magazines recounted their thoughts. “Media involvement,” to repeat Giles’s term, was the key to their deeds: they involved themselves with the media.

Various accounts purported to explain the zeal with which consumers pursued celebrities, who, by the late 1990s, were assigned an unofficial alphanumeric rating, members of the A list afforded most prestige. Most arguments suggested that being a fan – and that probably included anyone who was aware of celebrities, i.e., all but recluses, hermits, and ascetics – sought and discovered a sense of empowerment. Though rarely interrogated, empowerment (at least in the context of celebrity culture) meant a fortification of confidence, especially in controlling one’s own life, and perhaps claiming one’s rights.

THE LEADERSHIP VACUUM AND THE GLOBALIZED MEDIA

While it appeared to pop out of a vacuum at the end of the 1980s, there were three conditions under which celebrity culture came into being. The first is a widespread loss of faith and confidence in established forms of leadership. In times of national crisis, we are forced to place our faith in traditional leaders. Engaged in war or under siege, people look to their politicians, generals, and church leaders. These were active people, who based their reputations on what they said and did.

In the absence of crises, our commitment became less secure and we had no need to trust them anymore. In his *Big League, Big Time*, Len Sherman (1998) argues that, while celebrities might not have been obvious replacements, they were functional equivalents of leaders: people who represented, influenced, perhaps inspired and commanded our attention, if not

respect. In addition, they possessed a kind of exemplary authority. As such, they became what Sherman describes as “the most watched, admired, privileged, and imitated people.”

The next condition was the time space compression. The globalization of the media introduced the capacity to transmit large volumes of information – news, entertainment, and advertising – around the world, not just quickly, but instantly. Satellites, or transponders, were the instruments of the media’s global expansion. By wrapping the world in an invisible network of communications, satellite broadcasters were able to bounce information off satellites and send them literally anywhere. Satellite television companies recognized no national boundaries. This effectively meant that virtually everyone on earth was part of one huge market.

Rupert Murdoch, perhaps more than any other media figure, exploited the opportunities offered by the satellite technology pioneered in the 1960s, and the deregulation and privatization of the television industry in the 1980s and early 1990s. In February 1989, Murdoch’s European satellite started beaming programs via satellite through his Sky network. By the end of the 1990s, his various channels reached 66 percent of the world’s population.

The problem with having so many channels is content: what do you fill them with? MTV supplied a clue. To keep so much of the world glued to the screen, television networks needed a formula. Televised programming detached itself from fixed content and began firing off in the direction of entertainment, for which we should read *amusement* – something that occupies us agreeably, diverting our minds from matters that might prompt introspection, analysis, or reflection. This is not to suggest that drama that provokes contemplation and critical examination cannot be entertaining too, nor even that the narratives of soaps or cartoons are not open to critical reading. And it certainly does not underestimate the viewers’ speedy acquisition of skills for screening and skimming information. But, for the most part, entertainment does not prompt us to modify ourselves in any way.

Light entertainment, to use a more indicative term, became a staple of a formula that demanded only a modest level of attention from

viewers. Music+movies+sport. Asked to respond to this in the 1990s, an informed person might have said: people will soon get sick of it; they will feel bombarded, under siege, overwhelmed by too much entertainment. This did not prove to be the case.

Of course, the communications revolution did not end with television and the proliferation of multimedia brought a further layer of information conduits, notably the Internet.

THE NEW TRANSPARENCY

The third condition concerned the relationship between performers and the newly emergent media. Even before it was called showbusiness, the entertainment industry furnished individual artists who drew acclaim and were used as selling points. From nineteenth century minstrel shows, through ragtime, the British music halls, silent film, radio, and, of course, theater, popular entertainment forms invariably provided a showcase for figures who distinguished themselves from their contemporaries. The Hollywood star system, beginning in the 1940s, was able to exploit this as no other industry ever had, operating a smooth functioning, factory like production line in which “stars” were treated much as commodities. Their use value was in generating box office sales.

While the concept of producing stars rather than waiting for them to emerge stayed largely intact until the mid 1980s, the newly abundant media both offered different opportunities and demanded a different kind of engagement with artists. Madonna, perhaps more than any other entertainer, realized this.

After the success of her fourth album, *Like a Prayer*, in 1989, Madonna appears to have seen the future: the days when people got to be famous and stayed that way through just making movies, hit records, or writing bestsellers were approaching an end. The most important feature of the coming age was visibility: doing was less important than just being in the public gaze. With so many channels of communication being filled up with all manner of entertainment, there was bound to be an overflow of entertainers, most of whom would make little impression on the public consciousness. The

ones who did were those who would not just make themselves visible but transparent – there was no contradiction.

Madonna not only epitomized this, she also helped it materialize. She seems to have struck a bargain with the media. It was something like: “I will tell you more, show you more about me than any other rock or movie star in history; I will disclose my personal secrets, share my fears, joys, sorrows, what makes me happy or sad, angry or gratified; I will be more candid and unrestricted in my interviews than any other entertainer. In other words, I’ll be completely see through. In return, I want coverage like no other: I want to be omnipresent, ubiquitous, and pervasive – I want to be everywhere, all the time.” It was an intriguing quid pro quo; almost as if new rules of engagement with the media had been formulated. The age of celebrity began.

As the 1980s turned to the 1990s, Madonna was, as she wanted to be, everywhere. This was surely the meaning of *Blonde Ambition*, the title of her 1991 tour. The following year, she bared herself in her book *Sex*, accompanied by the album *Erotica*. Being famous was no longer sufficient: it was necessary to make consumers privy to as many aspects of a celebrity’s life as permissible.

The beauty of the age of celebrity, though, was that the consumers were not hapless chumps: they were educated in the arts of celeb production by the very channels that presented them. Put another way, they didn’t just look at the pictures: they were able readers. They did most of the work. This is the thesis of Joshua Gamson’s study *Claims to Fame*, which portrays fans as knowing and savvy participants in the celebrity production process: “The position audiences embrace includes the roles of simultaneous voyeurs of and performers in commercial culture” (1994: 137).

All the celebs did was make themselves available. Madonna was the first celebrity to render her manufacture completely transparent. Unabashed about revealing to her fandom evidence of the elaborate and monstrously expensive publicity and marketing that went into her videos, CDs, stage acts, and, indeed, herself, Madonna laid open her promotional props, at the same time exposing her utterly contrived persona changes.

CONSUMPTION AND COMMODIFICATION

Writers such as Graeme Turner (2004) and Helga Dittmar et al. (1995) have pointed out the ways in which celebrities, perhaps inadvertently, promote aspirational consumption by becoming ambulant advertisements. In this sense, celebrity culture is perfectly consonant with commodification – the process whereby everything, including public figures, can be converted into an article of trade to be exchanged in the marketplace.

Consumer culture was originally built on the avarice, envy, and possessiveness that flourished in the post war years. Robert K. Merton’s classic study “Social Structure and Anomie” had concluded that desire drives us toward appropriation: we want to possess the things we see dangled in front of us by advertising. The advertising industry had sensed that people didn’t buy products just because they needed them: the needs had to be encouraged. Desire worked much better. If someone desires something, the second they procured it, the desire is gone. So, the trick was to keep pumping up new desires: as soon as consumers upgraded the fridge, they needed to start thinking about a new car. As soon as they got the car, they started thinking about a new house. “The accelerator of consumer demand,” as Zygmunt Bauman calls it, is pressed hard down as new offers keep appearing on the road ahead.

In his article “Consuming Life,” Bauman (2001: 16) argues that one of the triumphs of the consumer culture is in liberating the pleasure principle from the perimeter fence beyond which pleasure seekers once could venture only at their peril. “Consumer society has achieved a previously unimaginable feat: it reconciled the reality and pleasure principles by putting, so to speak, the thief in charge of the treasure box,” he concludes.

In other words: consumers still want to possess commodity goods, but they allow themselves the indulgence of whimsically wishing for things that they know are out of reach. However, that does not stop consumers wishing to be like any number of other celebrities who actually possess not only the coveted goods but also a congruent lifestyle. Consumers do not just want the attainable: they wish for the

unattainable. What once seemed totally irrational now appears completely logical. Human desire has been transformed.

Shopping is now considered glamorous, not utilitarian. The consumer is encouraged to declare her worth by spending money on items that will help her look like, play like, or in some other way be like someone else. That someone else is the celebrity, or more likely, celebrities with whom she feels or wants to feel an attachment. In this sense, the consumer's enterprise is as much to express a sense of bonding or even identity with the celebrity as acquiring new possessions.

Celebrity culture is a phenomenon that is simultaneously well known and recondite. Many are fascinated by celebrities without actually understanding why they are fascinated. Everyone is aware of celebrity culture while remaining ignorant of when, where, and why it came into being. Maintaining this paradox is arguably the greatest triumph of celebrity culture.

SEE ALSO: Celebrity and Celestoid; Fans and Fan Culture; Popular Culture; Popular Culture Icons

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censorship

Matt Hills

Censorship has generally been of interest to social theorists when considered as a matter of state control over "free speech" and/or mass mediated content. This governmental censorship has tended to focus on notions of protecting "vulnerable" (young/lower class/female) audiences from representations of sex, violence, and criminality which, it is assumed, may deprave, corrupt, or desensitize them (Dewe Mathews 1994).

Media sociological work on censorship (e.g., Barker & Petley 2001) argues that it has worked to support the ideological power of hegemonic blocs, tending to repress expression which does not fall into normative cultural categories, as well as especially restricting popular rather than "literary" culture. "Educated," middle class audiences for elite culture are not as likely to be represented as "vulnerable" as audiences for popular film and television. In the US, the cinema Production Code of 1930 infamously detailed exactly what could not be shown in classical Hollywood film: sexual relations between heterosexual characters were elided; morally bad characters were depicted as never triumphing thanks to their crimes; and homo sexual relationships could not be shown nor even strongly implied (Jacobs 1991; Berenstein 1996).

As well as restricting popular culture through codes of conduct for producers or industry self regulation, censorship can also be said to act productively (Kuhn 1988). Though it has historically produced gaps and absences in pop culture, it has also shaped moral texts and genres, especially by favoring moral messages such as "crime will be punished."

Censorship debates have been recurrently linked to moral panics surrounding new media technologies. One of these was the UK's "video nasties" panic in the 1980s (Critcher 2003), when the new media technology of video recording was felt to have undermined media regulation by making "adult" horror texts depicting violence and gore available to "children." More recently, the Internet has occasioned similar outcries, with the availability

of online pornography supposedly threatening state and industry regulation of such imagery.

Despite the focus on state and media industry censorship, the term can be addressed sociologically in a variety of other ways. For example, Hill (1997) analyzes subjective “self censorship,” whereby media audiences, as social agents, reflexively monitor their own media consumption, seeking to avoid specific types of imagery. Hills (2005) argues that censorship practices underpin certain fan cultural distinctions, as genre fans construct their communal self identity against both governmental censors and “mainstream” audiences.

SEE ALSO: Fans and Fan Culture; Film; Genre; Media, Regulation of; Moral Panics

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central business district

Michael Indergaard

The central business district (CBD) is the downtown of the American city, which in the early twentieth century possessed two sorts of centrality: first, it was usually at or near the city’s geographical center and, second, it hosted its most important economic functions. The term

emerged as business districts were developing in outlying areas, but downtowns, with their skyscrapers, mammoth department stores, and movie palaces, remained dominant. However, after downtowns peaked in importance in the 1920s, policy debates and sociological discussions increasingly focused on (1) problems related to their decline and (2) organized attempts to bolster or reestablish their centrality.

Like the term downtown, the idea of a CBD was uniquely American, reflecting a sharp separation between place of work and place of residence that distinguished US cities from those in Europe. In the 1920s CBDs were dense concentrations of businesses that were largely depopulated, but visited on a daily basis by a majority of the city’s residents who came to work, shop, or seek amusement. It was commonly thought that their standing was confirmed, rather than challenged, by the decentralization of population and business. This notion was theoretically affirmed by Ernest Burgess, one of the founders of the Chicago School of Sociology, who proposed that as the city grew it expanded radially from the CBD in a series of concentric zones or rings. Fusing notions from human ecology and neoclassical economics, Burgess depicted the CBD as a crucible of competition that improved efficiencies in land use across the city; only intensive users that could exploit its central location (e.g., department stores, banks, central offices) could afford to pay its high prices while others were dispatched to search out the places that best fit their respective needs and abilities to pay. Thus, he concluded that the CBD naturally remained the center of economic, political, and cultural life.

The concentric zone thesis inspired several decades of research, but by the 1930s downtowns were beset with falling property values and tax revenues, decaying residential areas, and unrelenting traffic congestion. Subsequently, real estate interests and their allies repeatedly mobilized to revitalize CBDs. Their argument that the central city needed to be made more attractive so as to draw capital and middle class residents back spawned notions such as urban redevelopment and urban renewal, and influenced federal policies for over three decades. These efforts disrupted many minority neighborhoods, but had limited success in revitalizing CBDs, which were

buffeted by the extension of freeways, suburbanization, racial tension, and industrial decline. In the 1970s, the federal government left cities on their own, while market thinkers proposed that their fortunes depended on their ability to compete for capital; some suggested that it was natural that CBDs were declining in importance. Against the naturalism of market thinkers (and human ecology) a critical approach (urban political economy) emerged, stressing that the city was a built environment shaped by economic and political power. Critical scholars linked the changing fortunes of CBDs to investment cycles and showed that centrality was accompanied by social exclusion and hierarchy. In the 1980s, they focused on growth coalitions wherein city officials and various interests joined to boost property values and how gentrification fed off of, and reinforced, the centrality of downtowns.

In the 1990s, scholars drew attention to new forms of centrality in CBDs related to the growing economic importance of globalization and culture. Global city theorists proposed that the diverse resource base of some major cities, along with their positioning vis à vis communication networks and corporate headquarters, allowed them to assume several central functions in the global economy: to exercise command and control over decentralized production systems and to serve as sites for new dominant sectors, namely, finance and producer services, and for related innovations and markets. Their centrality involves their standing vis à vis global networks: their CBDs are less connected to, and provide few benefits for, other areas and social segments within their own region. Another body of work focused on issues related to the roles cities play in the symbolic economy: a new focus on organizing consumption, including publicly subsidized construction of large entertainment projects (e.g., professional sports stadiums, festival malls) that aim to bring the middle class to the CBD as visitors; the role of artists in altering property images and values; and the rising importance of creative workers – a less conventional middle class segment drawn to the city's distinctive lifestyles and employment opportunities.

Identifying the boundaries and essential features of CBDs has become ever more problematic as the production of centrality is

increasingly wedded to flows of images and finance capital. During the 1990s, areas on the margins of CBDs gained instant centrality through linking up with Internet infrastructures, startups, and financing networks. It is unclear how resilient this sort of centrality will prove to be. Concentrations of creative firms can exploit advantages of face to face interaction to make new applications of digital technology. But technology also facilitates further decentralization – an option made newly attractive by the threat that terrorism poses to symbols of global centrality.

SEE ALSO: Chicago School; Ecological Models of Urban Form: Concentric Zone Model, the Sector Model, and the Multiple Nuclei Model; Global/World Cities; Megalopolis; Metropolis; Metropolitan Statistical Area; Park, Robert E. and Burgess, Ernest W.; Urban; Urban Renewal and Redevelopment; Urbanization

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Certeau, Michel de (1925–86)

Ian Buchanan

Born in 1925 in Chambéry, France, Michel de Certeau obtained degrees in classics and philosophy at the universities of Grenoble,

Lyon, and Paris. Joining the Society of Jesus in 1950, he was ordained in 1956. He completed a doctorate on the mystical writings of Jean Joseph Surin at the Sorbonne in 1960 and taught in Paris and San Diego. He died of stomach cancer in 1986.

Certeau's career can be divided into three stages. The first was largely concerned with traditional religious history; then, after "the Events of May" (1968), his work took a very different turn, becoming both contemporary and sociocultural; then, after a highly productive decade writing about contemporary issues, Certeau's thoughts returned to the history of religion and he produced what would be his last book, a two volume history of seventeenth century mysticism in Europe.

The first stage of Certeau's career culminated in a profound retheorization of history, the fruit of which is to be seen in *L'écriture de l'histoire* (*The Writing of History*), first published in 1975. Greatly influenced by Lacanian psychoanalysis, Certeau argued that history is a machine for calming the anxiety most westerners feel in the face of death. It works by raising the specter of death within a memorial framework that gives the appearance that we will live forever after all. Ultimately, Certeau's project was an attempt to understand "the historiographic operation" itself, which he described as a threefold relation between a *place*, an analytic *procedure*, and the construction of a *text*.

The second stage of Certeau's career began abruptly in May 1968 when the streets of Paris erupted in a paroxysm of student and blue collar protest. The essays written on the run in these heady days (*The Capture of Speech*) are of lasting interest to social theorists for the way they begin to theorize everyday forms of resistance. Certeau was given an opportunity to expand on these preliminary investigations in the early 1970s when he was given a large research grant to study French culture on a broad scale. Pierre Mayol and Luce Giard were brought on board to assist, contributing two ethnographic studies on "living" (Mayol) and "cooking" (Giard). The legacy of this work is the two volumes of *The Practice of Everyday Life* (a third was planned, but never completed). Certeau completed a project on migrants (*Culture in the Plural*), also government

funded (the OECD). In terms of their uptake in sociology, Certeau's most important and influential concepts come from this period: strategy and tactics, place and space.

Both strategy and tactics are determined as *calculations*. In his early thinking on the subject, Certeau toyed with the idea of connecting the notions of strategy and tactics to modal logic and game theory, but this was never brought to fruition. The essential difference between strategy and tactics is the way they relate to the variables that everyday life inevitably throws at us all. Strategy works to limit the sheer number of variables that can effect it by creating some kind of protected zone, a place, in which the environment can be rendered predictable if not properly tame. Tactics, by contrast, is the approach one takes to everyday life when one is unable to take measures against its variables. Tactics refers to the set of practices that strategy has not been able to domesticate. They are not in themselves subversive, but they function symbolically as daily proof of the partiality of strategic control.

The transition point between the second and third stage of his career is Certeau's unfinished project on the anthropology of belief. He started it while working at the University of California San Diego, a position he held from 1978 to 1984, but set it aside after completing only three essays to work on what turned out to be his last work, *The Mystic Fable*. These essays concern the way the forerunners to modern anthropology – Montaigne (*Heterologies*), Léry (*The Writing of History*), and Lafitau ("Writing vs. Time") – encountered the manifold differences of the New World as alterity and turned that alterity into a means of authorizing their own discourse about the Old World. Certeau described this discourse as heterological, which strictly speaking means discourse of the other. But since he died before formulating either a specific thesis or a particular method, we can only speculate on what he actually intended by the term. It is clear, however, that he meant "other" to be understood as a complex interweaving of its theological and psychoanalytic trajectories.

Certeau began to work in earnest on his mysticism project, which culminates the third and final stage of his career, when he returned to France after nearly a decade in California. This project revisits the topic with which

Certeau's career began, but as with his critique of historiography, its aim was not merely to add yet another catalogue of curiosities to an already well stocked cabinet. Rather, he wanted to understand the logic of mysticism, to try to understand it for itself as its own peculiar kind of discourse. In this respect, as he explains in the opening pages of the first volume of *The Mystic Fable*, his aim can best be grasped as the attempt to revive (literally, make live again) the lost discourse known as mystics, which, like physics, metaphysics, ethics, and so on, was once a discipline in its own right. But since in contrast to these other discourses mystics has in fact vanished, Certeau also had to account for its subsequent disappearance. He argued that mystics exhausted itself because its project of trying to resurrect the word of God in an era that no longer knew its God simply could not be sustained. Mystics could, through its bold linguistic experiments, occasionally evoke the essential mystery of God, but it could not convert that into an enduring presence.

SEE ALSO: Everyday Life; Lefebvre, Henri; Practice

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chance and probability

Stephen Turner

Chance is an informal concept, sometimes meaning probability, sometimes meaning randomness. Probability is a formal mathematical concept expressed in its most simple form as dependent probability, which is a number between 0 and 1 that represents the likelihood that, for example, a person with one property will have another property. Thus, the probability of a live birth being female is a dependent probability in which the two properties are live birth and female. Probabilities may also be assigned to beliefs. In this case, known as subjective probability, the number represents the strength with which we believe another belief to be true. This is the kind of probability that one employs in making a bet with a friend about whether or not something is true.

It is commonly asserted that social processes are probabilistic and that causal relations in social sciences are probabilistic. This usually means that the causal relationships or processes in question are not deterministic. It is something of a paradox that despite this widespread belief, there are few theories and only a few models that employ formal notions of probability. However, only very infrequently can numerical dependent probabilities be assigned to non deterministic processes or causal relations. Typically, the relations are not only non deterministic, but are subject to a large number of additional causal influences which are themselves non deterministic.

Why is this the case? The problem, as John Stuart Mill saw 150 years ago, is complexity

and entanglement. The social processes we are interested in are typically influenced by a large number of variables and cannot be isolated from these influences and identified and estimated. Consequently, we also cannot estimate their interactions. Thus, it is impossible to obtain precise knowledge of the causal relationships that interest us, and which we believe to be fundamentally probabilistic. Moreover, constructing theories or models with multiple probabilities is mathematically difficult. Thus, probabilities generally play very little formal role in sociological theories. Because actually identifying probabilities and deriving predictions from them is so difficult, alternative methods are used.

Our normal substitute for knowledge of the actual mechanisms is the causal model. Causal models are not based on probabilistic relations between inputs and outputs, but instead use a particular kind of simplification, which uses non probabilistic linear relations, which are known or assumed to be false as representations of the unknown underlying processes, but which are easy to formulate mathematically. These are treated as representing actual causal processes with a determinable degree of "error." Error here is understood as the difference between the outcomes that would be predicted if the simplifications were true and the actual outcomes. Some philosophers and statisticians, such as Clark Glymour, have argued that this is the only kind of causal knowledge available to the social scientist, and that consequently the usual way of formulating the theoretical aspirations of social science, by comparing it to physics (which does use probabilities to represent basic causal processes), is misguided.

The terms used in standard statistical discussion, notably "error," despite the fact that they are enshrined in statistical usage, are confusing and potentially misleading in this context. The term error is correctly applied to such cases as errors of observation (e.g., in the distribution or curve of errors that multiple observers make when they are identifying the position of a star through a telescope). The application to the social sciences is confusing because the numerical phenomena to which it is typically applied in social sciences are not errors of observation, but rather the distribution of observed values

that result from actual non deterministic, entangled, causal processes, and would appear whether or not there was any error of observation at all.

The source of the usage is historical. The standard method of modeling causal relations in the social sciences originated with Karl Pearson, who invented correlation and regression analysis. The method involved measuring the degree to which knowledge of the value of one variable enabled the value of the second variable to be predicted. This was done by identifying the (deterministic, linear) equation, graphically represented as a line, which had the least error as a representation of the relationship. A close relationship with relatively little variation or "error" around this line produced a high correlation, while a relationship in which there was more variation produced a low correlation. This notion of variation used the mathematics of error and calculated variation in terms of least squared deviations from regression lines.

Although this error based notion of probability as variation is the basis of standard causal models of the kind used in sociology, there are alternatives. Some forms of modeling employ the notion of dependent probability and attempt to measure the goodness of fit of such models with data. Subjective probabilities, or probabilities of belief, are employed in Bayesian statistics in which new data are understood to improve probabilistic estimates or estimates of variation.

SEE ALSO: Fact, Theory, and Hypothesis: Including the History of the Scientific Fact; Statistics

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change management

Patrick Damson

A key aim of change management is to manage processes towards a future that, even when anticipated and planned for, can never be fully foreseen. It is a paradox that continues to generate considerable debate and conceptual and definitional confusion.

DEFINING CHANGE MANAGEMENT

There are many different definitions of change management. Simple definitions tend to stress the process of planning, controlling, and managing company change, whereas the more elaborate definitions detail the various cultural and structural elements of change as well as the need to overcome forces of resistance. The term is commonly used to refer to the process of managing a shift from some current state of operation toward some future state. This movement may be either in the form of a proactive strategy or in response to unforeseen changes in internal operations or external business market conditions. Change management is therefore about managing the process of *changing*. Whether this process involves extensive planning or is an unplanned response to unexpected forces will influence how the process is managed. Some commentators, for example, seek to identify best practice guidelines on how best to manage planned change through drawing on company experience and building on research findings. Improving our abilities to manage change is a reasonable aim, yet the large majority of major change efforts still fail to achieve their stated objectives. It is the unpredictability of change, the complex and messy processes of changing, that makes this a fascinating area and one in which there will never be any sure fire guidelines on how to make change succeed.

So how should we define change management? Change management is the control and coordination of processes in the transition to new forms of working arrangements and ways of operating. In managing change there is an intention to orchestrate or steer these processes toward some preferred or predefined outcome.

MAIN ELEMENTS AND TYPES OF CHANGE MANAGEMENT

Change management centers around planning and directing, monitoring and evaluating, and correcting and adapting change processes. The degree of manageability of these three elements of direction, appraisal, and regulation will be influenced by the scale and type of change. Change may take the form of fine tuning operating practices through small developmental activities or it may involve a major reconfiguration of structures. Change may be in response to an unanticipated change in business market conditions or as part of a planned proactive strategy to reconceptualize business. If we combine the scale of change with whether change is in response to the unexpected or part of a planned strategy, then we can differentiate four ideal types. First, *reactive small scale change* initiatives that seek to accommodate and adapt to unforeseen changes in, for example, local business market conditions. Second, *developmental proactive change* programs that seek to gradually improve on current ways of doing things over a planned period of time. Third, *proactive large scale change* initiatives that seek to reinvent and renew company business. Fourth, *reactive large scale change*; for example, the unanticipated need to respond to a change in business or world events that necessitates a major repositioning of a company.

As well as the dimensions of the scale and depth of change, and whether change is reactive or proactive, we can also consider a number of other elements: for example, the essential nature and content of the change (whether new technology or management technique), time frames of change (whether change is to occur quickly or over a protracted period of time), the triggers to change (whether internal or external), and the effects of change on employee attitudes and perceptions. Internal drivers for change include structural and administrative elements, changes in the nature of products and the delivery of services, technology, and initiatives aimed at the human side of enterprise, whereas external drivers include changes in business market activity, world events, legislation, trade regulations, and advances in technology.

HUMAN RESPONSES TO CHANGE MANAGEMENT

If people perceive change as being required in order to ensure business survival and maintain jobs then they are more likely to support change. However, if change is seen by employees as an attempt by management simply to tighten workplace controls in their search for greater levels of productivity in order to raise company profits or their own career profiles, then people are likely to resist change.

Human responses to change vary according to individual and group perceptions and the context within which change is taking place. For some people, change may form a routine part of their daily business activities. For example, they may be working in a highly dynamic business context where change is constant and as such forms part of the culture of the work place. Within this context, employees may expect certain patterns of change and concerns may be raised over failure to sustain change (change is the norm rather than the exception). Alternatively, people working in an established large public organization may view change less as an ongoing driving dynamic and more as a disruption to daily activities and established ways of working. In this context, change occurs on an irregular basis and is not part of the culture of the organization. Today, the pervasiveness of company change has resulted in a myriad of change initiatives, often in the form of multiple and overlapping programs rather than single change projects, in which employees may become cynical of repeated announcements of the need to change. A lowering of status, disruption to social arrangements, change in job tasks, the threat of unemployment, and change fatigue can all cause people to resist company change initiatives. Their response to a minor change in work tasks to accommodate an ICT systems upgrade will differ to their response to a fundamental shift in the way things are done and organized. It is the manageability of large scale transitions and transformational change initiatives (also referred to as “first order change”) that has drawn the greatest attention among academic researchers, the media, and the business community, as it is these changes that generally involve large investments in time and

money, are highly disruptive to employees, are often viewed as critical to business survival, and may raise issues of job security and employment.

THE CHANGING WORLD OF WORK: OLD WINE IN NEW BOTTLES

Interest in change is nothing new, as economic, social, legislative, technological, political, and business market forces continue to trigger processes of change in organizations. With the emergence of a new form of factory organization following the industrial revolution, the rise and fall of the textile industry, the mass manufacture of automobiles in the twentieth century, and the shifting fortunes of electronic and telecommunications companies in the twenty first century, change management remains a central activity for companies that wish to remain in business. Early concerns centered on how to structure an efficient form of organization. For example, in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, principles and concepts of organizations and their functioning were developed independently by a number of organization theorists: Henri Fayol, normally associated with administrative theory (an old term, which in the past has been used to refer to the principles of management); Max Weber, who focused his analysis on the emergence of the bureaucratic phenomenon; and Frederick Taylor, who formulated his principles of scientific management.

DIVISION OF LABOR UNDER NEW FACTORY REGIMES

Frederick Taylor advocated the close scrutiny of the way workers worked in order to identify the most efficient way of performing tasks. His time and motion studies were used to collect detailed data on the physical movements and characteristics of employees, the type of material and tools used in their work, and the time taken for them to complete tasks. From the scientific study of work he argued that it would be possible to redesign work processes to improve output while simultaneously ensuring that workers worked to their full capacity. For Taylor, the “variability” of labor is a recurrent

managerial problem that needs to be tackled in the redesign of work that enables greater predictability and control in the transformation of a worker's capacity to work into actual work. His theory of change management is based on the assumption that there is one best way to structure an organization (a formalized structure to achieve specific goals) and that people are economic beings (workers are primarily motivated by monetary rewards).

WORK AS A COMPLEX SOCIAL SYSTEM: PEOPLE AND CHANGE

The human and social side to industry was highlighted in the famous set of studies carried out at the Western Electric Company, Hawthorne Works in Chicago. Their studies found how continuous improvements in employee performance could not simply be accounted for by more favorable conditions of work, but involved the effects of human associations on individual and group feelings of self worth. Three major findings from these studies were that employees' physical capacities are generally less important than workgroup norms; employee decision making typically reflects workgroup norms; and informal workgroup leaders have a key role in the motivation of staff and the maintenance of group objectives. By drawing attention to the social organization of work, these studies stimulated interest in the potential development and implementation of "ways of working" that would increase the motivation and efficiency of employees.

MECHANIZATION AND SOCIO TECHNICAL SYSTEMS THEORY

In Britain, the Tavistock Institute of Human Relations was established in London in the late 1940s and was concerned with discovering ways of simultaneously improving worker satisfaction and employee productivity. Research on the mechanization of coal mining (assembly line cutting, known as the longwall method) demonstrated the importance of social and community relations (rather than simply the psychology of individual needs). They concluded that there is a need to reconcile human

needs with technical efficiency, and in this case, they proposed a composite method that supported semi autonomous workgroups. Socio technical systems (STS) theory thereby evolved, maintaining that change initiatives that focus on either the purely technical or social aspects of work are likely to have limited "success," in producing a situation where the whole is sub optimized for developments in one dimension.

STRATEGIES AND STRUCTURES: CONTINGENCIES OF CHANGE

Up until the 1960s the focus had mainly been on the internal characteristics of organizations and their operation, rather than on business context. Researchers were aware of the importance of external factors (noted in both the Hawthorne studies and the Durham coal mining studies), but it was the emergence of contingency theory that brought this to the fore. Their basic theoretical tenet is that, while there is no one best way of organizing, it is possible to identify the most appropriate organizational form to fit the context in which a business has to operate. The factors that are deemed to be of primary significance include either single variables, such as technology or the environment, or a range of variables, such as in the ambitious study by the Aston group that examined the relationship between contextual factors and structural variables. Essentially, contingency theorists reject the search for a universal model (a one best way approach) and set out to develop useful generalizations about appropriate strategies and structures under different typical conditions.

NEW MANAGEMENT TECHNIQUES AND THE RISE OF THE ELECTRONIC ORGANIZATION

In the 1980s and 1990s, with the success of Japanese industry, attention turned to new methods of organizing and working, particularly within the engine of economic growth for the twentieth century, the automotive industry. Western manufacturing supremacy was being called into question by Japan, which had embraced the importance of quality management and employed new manufacturing

methods such as Just In Time (JIT) management. Throughout the 1990s, organizations embarked on a plethora of change initiatives through a whole range of new production and service concepts that were often combined with developments in new technology. Since the turn of the century, attention continues to focus on developments in communication and information technologies and how these are “revolutionizing” our home and work lives. Debates on the effects of new forms of electronic business, jobs, and employment patterns in the so called “e age” combine with issues of globalization, cultural and political change, and the implications of the emergence of new industrial economies such as China.

COMPETING PERSPECTIVES AND THE IDEOLOGY OF CHANGE MANAGEMENT

There are a number of competing perspectives on change management and these often reflect the ideological positioning of the protagonists and/or their methodological preferences for conducting research. The positivistic tradition of contingency theorists, for example, has resulted in the design of certain types of studies to identify best strategies for managing change given certain prevailing circumstances. These snapshot studies (typically, quantitative) contrast with the more longitudinal qualitative studies that seek to study change over time. Ideologically, debates over whether change management is ultimately tied up with controlling and exploiting labor in the pursuit of company profits, or whether change management is essentially about improving the lot of workers and employees’ experience of work, remain at the hub of many contemporary studies. Two worth reviewing here are the planned organizational development (OD) approach and the processual perspective.

ORGANIZATIONAL DEVELOPMENT: PLANNING FOR CHANGE

The three general steps identified by Kurt Lewin for successful change comprise *unfreezing*, *changing*, and *refreezing*. Unfreezing is the stage in which there is a recognized need for

change and action is taken to unfreeze existing attitudes and behavior. This preparatory stage is deemed essential to the generation of employee support and the minimization of employee resistance. Lewin found that in order to minimize worker resistance, employees should be actively encouraged to participate in the process of planning proposed change programs. Managing change through reducing the forces that prevent change, rather than through increasing the forces which are pushing for change, is central to Lewin’s approach and his technique of force field analysis. He maintained that within any social system there are driving and restraining forces which serve to maintain the status quo, and that organizations generally exist in a temporary state of balance (quasi stationary equilibrium) which is not conducive to change. Consequently, to bring about change you need either to increase the strength of the driving forces or decrease the strength of the resisting forces.

For OD specialists, change management centers on providing data to unfreeze the system through reducing the restraining forces rather than increasing the driving forces. Once an imbalance has been created then the system can be altered and a new set of driving and restraining forces put into place. A planned change program is implemented and only when the desired state has been achieved will the change agent set about “refreezing” the organization. The new state of balance is then appraised and where appropriate methods of positive reinforcement are used to ensure employees “internalize” attitudes and behaviors consistent with new work regimes. The values underpinning this approach are that individuals should be treated with respect and dignity, that hierarchical control mechanisms are not effective, that problems and conflicts should be confronted and reconciled, and that people affected by change should be involved in its implementation.

PROCESSUALISTS AND LONGITUDINAL RESEARCH ON CHANGE MANAGEMENT

Apart from these two perspectives, a more pluralist political process view has been

promoted by a group of researchers known as processualists. Andrew Pettigrew's book *The Awakening Giant: Continuity and Change in ICI* (1985) powerfully demonstrates the limitations of theories that view change either as a single event or as a discrete series of episodes that can be decontextualized. In a comparative analysis of five cases of strategic change, the study illustrates how change as a continuous incremental process (evolutionary) can be interspersed with radical periods of change (revolutionary).

This foundational work of Pettigrew has been widely referenced in the change management literature and the processual perspective is further developed in the work of Patrick Dawson. The three main factors that are seen to shape change processes comprise the politics, the context, and the substance of change. This perspective is concerned with the voices of employees at all levels within an organization, and with the political arenas in which decisions are made, histories re-created, and strategies rationalized. In this approach, change management is not simply about how managers manage change, but about how individuals and groups seek to make sense of their change experience. It is also concerned with understanding change through taking into account the enabling and constraining characteristics of change, as well as the scale and type of change (substance); and the conditions under which change is taking place in relation to external elements (e.g., business market environment) and internal elements (including the history and culture of an organization).

ONGOING DEBATES, FUTURE CONCERNS, AND EMERGING ISSUES

For those who view conflict and political process as an essential element of organizations in which a range of different individuals and groups compete, power is central and yet the divisions are not characterized as a dichotomy between management and workers (a criticism leveled at early labor process theories). Although many labor process theorists do take a far more sophisticated position than the one

characterized here, the essential element of the need to control workers under capitalist modes of production remains a central tenet. For those in the organizational development camp, conflicts are to be reconciled with democracy being key through a process of employee participation. Between these three characterizations lies a host of other positions and frameworks (for example, we could contrast a technical bureaucratic with a cultural perspective, or a postmodern approach with a modernist position), and increasingly (if somewhat ironically) the sociological analysis of change management innovations is being more widely researched within business schools than sociology departments.

Current sociological thinking is moving towards a concern with a world of dualities in which the complexity and dynamics of process are recognized. The dualities of change and continuity, innovation and convention, centralization and decentralization, and organizing and strategizing question neat sequential models or simple continua that contrast and compare two dimensions. In the search for a division between dual factors, past studies have focused on definitional and conceptual issues in drawing boundaries to clarify the domain in question. In the case of change management, the possibility of managing change to improve industrial democracy and enhance employees' experience of work has been contrasted with studies that view change management as ultimately caught up with the exploitation of labor in the capitalist pursuit of ever greater profits. Increasingly, many of these simple divisions are being called into question, highlighting the need for more detailed sociological studies of change management that are able to critique and inform such debates.

SEE ALSO: Knowledge Management; Organizational Learning; Strategic Decisions

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chaos

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Chaos theory emerged over the past several decades in the physical sciences as an explanatory framework for processes that appeared disorderedly, such as turbulence or weather patterns, but which had complex mathematical models behind their seeming randomness. Complexity theory developed as an offshoot of chaos theory. It seeks to explain, among other things, the diversification of biological systems using a parsimonious set of predictors.

Social science has a history of applying the theoretical findings from the physical sciences. However, theories which are highly predictive for disciplines such as chemistry or physics fall short of explanation for the diverse phenomena and larger standard error margins of human behavior. The apparent promise of chaos or complexity theories for sociology is their tolerance for ambiguity, uncertainty, or unpredictability, and their assertion that apparent disorder in human behavior may in fact be orderly at a higher level than we are measuring (Lee 2002).

However intriguing the theoretical or methodological possibilities may appear, at the time of this writing few sociological studies have been published that successfully apply chaos or complexity mathematics to empirical research results. Journal articles more frequently use concepts and models of chaos or complexity as metaphors, and they may fail to distinguish between the two theories. One example would be Weigel and Murray's (2000) article on stability and change in relationships. They suggest that the more dynamic and flexible modeling potential of chaos theory might provide additional explanatory power for studies of intimacy.

A few books and edited collections were published in the middle to late 1990s to explore the potential applications of chaos and complexity theories to the study of human behavior (Eve et al. 1997; Kiel & Elliott 1997; Byrne 1998) and to elucidate some of their methodological implications (Brown 1995).

Promising sociological research directions may also be found in the incorporation of fuzzy

set theory to social science research methods (Ragin 2000; Ragin & Pennings 2005; Smithson 2005). "Fuzzification," according to its originator Lotfi Zadeh (1965, 1973, 1975), is a methodology used to generalize a specific theory from a crisp (discrete) to a continuous (fuzzy) form. Individual members of a fuzzy set may or may not have full membership in the discrete sense, but may be assigned a value indicating their degree of possible membership. For an empirical research example, readers might examine recent work on social movements (Amenta et al. 2005).

SEE ALSO: Knowledge, Sociology of; Kuhn, Thomas and Scientific Paradigms; Mathematical Sociology; Science and Culture; Science, Social Construction of; Scientific Knowledge, Sociology of

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charisma

Stephen Hunt

The term “charisma” is one of the most enduring conceptions in the annals of sociology. Its origin, meaning “gift,” as derived from the Greek, is close to Max Weber’s understanding of the term which has subsequently passed into common vocabularies. The notion of charisma can be seen as one of Weber’s core typologies, one related to the underlying basis of authority. Weber, in such works as *The Religion of China* (1951), speaks of charismatic leadership not only in terms of group cohesion but also in terms of education (pp. 30, 190), virtue of dynasty (pp. 198f., 119f., 135) – the belief in the transfer of extraordinary endowments of religious, political, or military descendants – and as hereditary (pp. 140, 141, 164). Weber also uses the term “gentile charisma” with reference to such families (pp. 35, 167, 264). In a sociological sense, charisma refers to the qualities of those who possess, or are believed to possess, powers of leadership either as a virtue of exceptional personality or derived from some unusual inspiration such as a magical, divine, or diabolical source, powers not possessed by the ordinary person (Weber 1947). Since Weber’s notion of charisma is closely related to the sacred, it has parallels in Durkheim’s *mana* – a dynamic which may be socially disruptive and seems to be inherent in certain objects or persons in tribal societies, as evidenced in the *orenda* among some North American tribes and *maga* in ancient Persia.

In his section on religion in *Economy and Society* (1978), translated and published separately as the *Sociology of Religion* (1965), Weber

begins his analysis by examining what he considers to be the most elementary forms of religious belief and behavior. In tribal collectives, he observes, religious orientation is largely motivated by the desire to survive the immediate problems of everyday life through magical and manipulative means. Magic begins to develop into religion when charisma is attributed less to the objects themselves than to something behind the object which determines power – in other words, to a spirit, soul demon, or some similar conception. Once charisma is located outside the material world, the way is open for ethical demands of God(s).

Weber believed that all the great oriental religions were largely the product of intellectual speculation on the part of relatively privileged strata. Even more significant, however, have been intellectuals derived from relatively less privileged groups, especially those who, for one reason or another, stood outside the traditional class structure. The latter have tended to establish highly ethical and radical religious conceptions which Weber saw as marking a profound impact upon the development of the societies in which they emerged, in contrast to the rather conservative and elitist religious intellectualism of privileged strata. To one degree or another, these individuals also displayed charismatic qualities.

Charisma issues an evocation, and those who respond do so with conviction. Thus every charismatic leader invariably subscribes to the proposition, “It is written . . . but I say unto you . . .!” Charisma is thus unusual, spontaneous, and creative in a fundamental sociological sense. It may be inherent or acquired. When acquired by a human being, it is usually the result of undergoing some extraordinary experience or involvement in practices which are extraordinary. It may, for example, be acquired through rigorous ascetic practices or time spent in mystical contemplation or through altered states of mind typified by trance or possession by spirits. Since charisma represents the extraordinary, the non routine aspects of life and reality, it is something which can transcend established ideas and established order. It thus tends to be radical and revolutionary and opposed to tradition.

Charisma is a source of instability and innovation and therefore constitutes a dynamic

element in social change. The concept of a cultural breakthrough was essential to Weber's understanding of the process of social transformation. At each "turning point" in a society's development, he argued, there are two possible directions in which it could advance. If it were to proceed in one direction, the society would undergo profound transformation in the established order, but, if it were to take the other, the existing order would be reinforced. The breakthrough juncture in social change is associated with the idea of charisma and prophets representing the prototypes of leaders with such qualities. Charismatic leadership is, in Weber's account, the source which precipitates it. Thus pure charisma is alien to the established institutions of society and prevailing economic arrangements in particular.

Three points have to be considered in association with the concept of charisma in relation to social change. The first is the role of the individual who initially conceives and initiates the breakthrough and challenges the legitimacy of the established system. Secondly, a good deal of emotional fervor surrounds charismatic leadership which, according to Weber, may border on the pathological. Thirdly, charisma is *relative* and restricted to time and place. The charismatic leader will only succeed if the level of commitment to the new ideas enjoys a level of social receptivity. In other words, a charismatic leader can emerge only if the total situation is one that is conducive to change. Visionaries may be present all the time, but they will be only remote voices on the margins of society unless conditions within a given society are such that people will respond emotionally in support of their ideas.

The charismatic prophet was, for Weber, one of the most important figures in religious history. The prophet is the agent of religious change and of the development of new and more complete solutions to the problem of salvation. His or her message is one which is accepted out of regard for the personal qualities and gifts of the charismatic leader. Prophecy is fundamentally founded not upon reason or intellectual analysis but upon insight and revelation. In contrast to the prophet, the priest stands for tradition, established authority, and conservatism. The latter is a full time professional attached to a cult and its ceremonies and

often administering divine grace as part of an established religious tradition.

Charismatic authority is considered legitimate because it is based on the magnetic, compelling personal style of leadership. By contrast, bureaucratic authority is considered legitimate because it is founded on abstract rules. Traditional authority is rendered legitimate since it rests on precedence. Charismatic leadership and legal rational systems of domination stand at opposite poles. Of all these forms of authority, charismatic leadership is the least stable. Such leaders are unpredictable, their lifestyles chaotic, their moods labile, and their commands often unfathomable. Moreover, the authority of charismatic leaders depends entirely on the support of their followers. If the followers lose faith, the leader is left with no power of command. For this reason the charismatic leader's position is precarious.

Charisma, as Wilson notes, is perhaps the most extreme claim to legitimacy, but it relies on faith and total trust. The image of the charismatic leader depends on a mythology of origins; on the incidents of portents and signs; on exceptional experiences; on his having had the opportunity to assimilate past wisdom; on hearsay stories of stamina, energy, untutored insight, and untrained exceptional abilities. Above all, he must be above normal human failings and beyond the need of such therapeutic or miraculous powers as he is supposed to possess and which he applies to others. With such an image, the charismatic leader is always at risk. He may not suffer ill health, nor yet, in any ordinary way, indulge in the pleasures of the senses (Wilson 1990: 234).

In principle, followers have a duty to acknowledge the leader's charismatic quality, so if they are hesitant or doubtful it is a failing on their part, and one the leader may come to resent (Bendix & Roth 1971: 175). Lacking the shelter of a bureaucratic office or the sanctity of tradition, the charismatic leader must be ready to perform miracles to satisfy the followers' craving for proof of his charismatic endowment, and to keep them motivated in the face of persecution by the authorities and mockery by unbelievers. It is therefore a misconception to think that charismatic leaders simply issue commands which followers automatically obey. Leaders may initially meet

resistance or may face demands that they are unable or unwilling to satisfy.

Despite apparent freedom, the charismatic leader lacks institutional support: if the followers lose faith, his authority simply evaporates. The possibility of defection and betrayal is therefore inherent in charismatically led movements. Paradoxically, a charismatic leader can come to feel trapped by his or her own followers, who may demand miracles or this worldly success which the leader simply cannot deliver or regard as irrelevant to the mission. As Wilson observes, a charismatic leader may capitalize on the claims made for him: he need never explain himself, indeed, there is some advantage in his inexplicability and unpredictability. His followers will rationalize his idiosyncrasies and aberrations. Nonetheless, outsiders may seize on just these vulnerabilities to discredit charismatic claims (Wilson 1990: 234).

Wilson also refers to “charismatic deflation,” by which he means that at some time the sect or comparable constituency will experience a pattern of scrutiny of their claims and the charismatic claims of their founders or early leaders: leaders are cut down to human size, and their weaknesses and ambition, their *amour propre*, are regularly exposed. And this not only by rivals and outsiders: there may occur reinterpretations among some brought up in the faith, and religious movements in which past leadership has been charismatically legitimated are thus likely to be undergoing particular strain. Movements which trace their origins to seekers or collective leadership have less trouble on this score. For others, once equivoication occurs, what was once a source of strength becomes an embarrassing handicap. The greater the past reliance, moreover, the greater the present disabilities (Wilson 1990: 115).

For Weber, charismatic leadership tends to become routinized. The first phase of a religious movement passes fairly quickly. Charismatic phenomena are unstable and temporary and can prolong their existence only by becoming routinized – that is, by transformation into institutionalized structure. After this event, the followers must make a new adjustment if the group is to be maintained. The life of a charismatic band of disciples is arduous. Typically, the followers wish to continue the original religious experience under new conditions,

and this means that eventually they must experience a crisis of succession.

If the authority of charismatic leaders is precarious during their own lifetime, the survival of the charismatic movement after the leader dies is a crisis since something of his charisma dies too. Weber suggests that the way the crisis is met is of crucial importance, for the authority relations that are established at that historical moment will shape the nature of the religious institutions that will follow. In particular, the question of succession is problematic since it cannot be filled by traditional or legal bureaucratic authority and can unleash a succession crisis. Other means must be deployed for succession and they are typically ritualized and rich in symbolism, involving such elements as consulting oracles, praying for divine guidance, and commencing initiation ceremonies.

Weber distinguished three ways in which charisma can be passed on. Firstly, the transmission of charisma can be based on symbolically charged criteria which guarantee the outcome. Secondly, the leader may designate his or her successor, sometimes making an unpredictable choice. Thirdly, the leader’s close disciples may designate the successor. Whatever the method of selection, the duty of the faithful is to acclaim a new leader, who governs by right. Generally, an authoritative institution is built up to fill the place of the founder after his death. Typically, this phase of the religion’s life cycle transforms the movement from an extraordinary, tradition breaking experience to an organized, socially acceptable institution that fits in comfortably with the established order. This developmental process has three different aspects. Firstly, the cult, or patterns of worship, becomes ritualized. Secondly, the ideas and beliefs become more rational. Thirdly, the religious community becomes rationally organized, with well defined roles and responsibilities.

Routinization is frequently associated with the development of the priestly role – mediators between man and God(s). By incorporating authority in established offices the clergy protect their position from what are considered inauthentic charismatic outpourings. This means, in effect, that what has come to be called the “routinization of charisma” actually involves the *containment* of charisma. Thus, a

movement that begins as a dramatic break with tradition becomes in time an established orthodoxy, neatly meshing and compromising with other social institutions. Routinization for Weber meant that charisma could become part of everyday life. Nonetheless, as Wallis (1984: 86–118) notes, routinization may be countered by an attempt to restore the charisma which set the movement off in the first place. It may thus remain latent as a resource on which revivalists can draw. For instance, the claim of charismatic renewal within mainstream Christian denominations is to restore to the faithful the gifts of the Holy Spirit (the *charismata*) that were given to the apostles at the first Pentecost.

Sectarian developments have provided fertile ground for a study of charisma. Wilson observes that by no means all Christian sects begin under charismatic leadership, but a good number have, or have had, powerful inspirational leadership to warrant a comparative exercise respecting the implications of charisma for the development of religious sects (1990: 110–12). Charismatic leadership has also been a major theme in the exploration of new religious movements. In movements with such a leadership, great effort is devoted to what Barker (1995) calls “charismatization”: socializing people to recognize and orientate toward charismatic authority. As with the Unification Church, charismatization is achieved through the accumulation of elements, many of them apparently minor but many tending in the same direction, to render charismatic claims plausible.

The all pervading charismatic authority has frequently proved to be a license for exemption from external moral restraint allowing the charismatic leader to indulge in sexual, financial, or violent excess (Anthony & Robbins 1997). Indeed, Barker (1984: 137) sees the charismatic leader’s claim to divine authority and monopoly of decision making as potentially threatening signs to the well being of members of new religious movements. At other times leaders may actively seek to enhance their charisma when, as in the case of sociology, outside persecution threatens the movement (Wallis 1984). By contrast, such movements may bring a democratization of charisma, as with the Christian charismatic movement in relation to the “gifts of the spirit” (Poloma 1989).

Charisma is particularly precarious in the modern world. Wilson points out that at least since the time of Hobbes, the idea has been widely held that no man stands much above another, however forcefully his image may be projected. As information and communication have improved, following widespread literacy, rational empirical argumentation, and scientific method, the claims to exceptional charisma have become more difficult to sustain and a less acceptable legitimation of leadership. The modern mind is cynical, seeking rationally based explanations for individual differences and solutions for social problems. Democracy, too, formally assumes that one person is the equal of another, and this democratic current even affects charisma itself (Wilson 1990: 110–11). Moreover, as Fenn (2003: 466–7) establishes, it is difficult to sustain charisma in terms of the secular religious groupings as a source of inspiration and authority in the context of the nation state, which claims a greater authority and loyalty and has itself a form of charismatic endowment. This may be exemplified by the violent confrontations between the authoritarian theocratic organization of the Mormon Church under the leadership of a charismatic prophet and its clash with secular powers and the spirit of modern democracy.

Wilson (1990: 234) regards the public’s readiness to see charisma deflated as the simple counterpoise of unbelief to the commitment of a movement’s votaries. This readiness has undoubtedly grown in modern society, in which charismatic manifestations are increasingly confined to the fringes, in which there is dependence on systems and not on persons, in which objectively tested routine procedures and forward planning are relied upon rather than the exceptional competences of individuals. The charismatic becomes the bizarre: few individuals believe that social problems can be solved even by the collective will, let alone by the supposed extraordinary willpower of one gifted and divinely inspired individual. The charismatic leader thus easily becomes the object of ridicule.

SEE ALSO: Buddhism; Bureaucratic Personality; Charisma, Routinization of; Charismatic Movement; Christianity; Durkheim, Émile and Social Change; Islam; New Religious

Movements; Religion, Sociology of; Sect; Weber, Max

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charisma, routinization of

Ray Gordon

Weber (1978: 241) notes that those attributed charismatic authority are considered “extraordinary and endowed with supernatural, superhuman, or at least specifically exceptional

powers or qualities . . . regarded as divine in origin or as exemplary, and on the basis of them [qualities] the individual concerned is treated as a leader.” In this sense, the social relationships directly involved with charismatic authority are strictly personal and irrational in character. Weber points out, however, that if these relationships are not to remain a transitory phenomenon, they and the charismatic authority they are involved with “cannot remain stable; they will become either traditionalized or rationalized, or a combination of both” (p. 246). What Weber means is that, over time, either a bureaucracy vested with rational legal authority will supersede the charismatic leader or institutionalized structures will incorporate the charismatic impetus. This rationalization or institutionalization process is what Weber refers to as the routinization of charisma.

Weber discusses a number of social forces that contribute to the routinization of charisma. He argues that it is only in the initial stages of a charismatic leader’s reign that members of his or her community will live on the basis of “faith and enthusiasm, on gifts, booty, or sporadic acquisition” (p. 249). In contrast to the irrational and sporadic nature of charisma, the community’s members have interests in continuing their lives in a way that offers them security and stability on an everyday basis. To highlight his point, Weber refers to the problem of appointing a successor to the charismatic leader once he or she disappears. How this succession problem is met has direct impact on the character of the subsequent leader–subordinate relationships involved. The original basis of recruitment may be charisma; however, the appointed leader will also need to satisfy established norms. These norms may include training and tests of eligibility and/or heredity. Weber adds that the anti economic character of charisma will also be altered because the leader must have some form of fiscal organization to provide for the needs of his or her community; this fiscal organization “becomes transformed into one of the everyday authorities, the patrimonial form, especially in the estate types or bureaucratic variant” (p. 251). In short, the fiscal organization acquires a differential power imbued with its own traditions, norms, and interests, which the

charismatic leader will need to be both materially and ideally satisfied.

Weber's routinization of charisma is an illustration of how social structures constrain the agentic capacity of individuals. Since Weber's work, numerous writers have discussed the interplay between agency and structure. Parsons (1937) and Goffman (1961), albeit from different perspectives, researched the effect of social institutions on the behavior of specific social groups. Later, building on Berger and Luckmann's (1966) social constructionist perspective, institutional theorists such as Meyer and Rowan (1977) as well as DiMaggio and Powell (1983) argued that modern societies consist of institutional rules that, over time, become rationalized myths that are widely believed but never tested: they originate and are sustained through public opinion, the education system, laws, and other institutional forms (see Clegg et al. 2005: 53). From a more abstract perspective, Giddens (1984) argued that structures are not something external to social actors but are rules and resources produced and reproduced by actors in their practices. In more recent times, theorists such as Clegg (1989), Haugaard (1997) and Flyvbjerg (1998, 2002), drawing on the work of Weber, Foucault, and others, use a theory of power to illustrate how the relationship between agency and structure is more fluid and discursive in nature; they show how the practices of individuals are both constrained and enabled by the understanding these individuals have of the knowledge that underpins their social system: knowledge that has been constituted by the disciplined adherence to rules, norms, and hidden sociocultural codes of order.

Returning to Weber's link between charisma and leadership, charismatic leadership resurfaced during the 1980s and 1990s under the guise of the "transformational leadership" thesis. The thesis attracted significant interest and still constitutes much of the work being done in the field today. However, apart from an indirect approach adopted by those writers who address transactional leadership (Bass & Avolio 1990), little if any of the transformational leadership literature addresses what Weber had to say about the routinization of charisma. Rather than seeing charismatic leadership as an irrational phenomenon, the vast

majority of transformational leadership theorists appear to adopt a normative approach that assumes rationality on behalf of the leader: irrationality and the routinization process are simply not considered because they do not fit the theoretical framework. With Weber's work in mind, one can argue that the routinization of charisma and its effects on transformational leadership is one area that requires further scrutiny.

SEE ALSO: Authority and Conformity; Charisma; Charismatic Movement; Institutionalism; Structure and Agency; Weber, Max

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charismatic movement

Paul Freston

Movements usually referred to as “charismatic” developed within Protestant and Catholic Christianity from the mid twentieth century, and especially the 1960s. Protestant versions are sometimes called “neo Pentecostalism” and the Catholic movement was initially styled “Catholic Pentecostal,” highlighting connections with the broader Pentecostal movement. Charismatic Christianity is usually considered to include: (1) renewal movements within established denominations; (2) independent charismatic churches and new denominations; and (3) charismatic parachurch organizations. The number of charismatics has steadily risen world wide, and in 2000 probably represented some 10 percent of the world’s Christian population.

While there is diversity among charismatics, all stress the importance and current availability of various “charismata” or “gifts of the Holy Spirit” mentioned in the New Testament, especially glossolalia (“speaking in tongues”), prophecy, healing, and other “supernatural” gifts. Often this is framed in terms of a definite experience known as “baptism in the Holy Spirit,” as well as a desire to renew ecclesiastical institutions by recapturing the vibrancy of the early church.

The charismatic movement is related phenomenologically to the Pentecostal movement of early twentieth century Protestantism. There are, however, important differences. While classical Pentecostalism was typically of the poor and dispossessed, charismatic Christianity began and largely continues within middle class and professional circles. Related to this are its more restrained tone and concern with therapy and self fulfillment; charismatics tend to be more world affirming and distant from Pentecostalism’s world denying “holiness” roots. Other differences are theological (charismatics put less stress on glossolalia as a sign of Spirit baptism) and ecclesiastical (they do not join classical Pentecostal denominations but remain in mainline churches or form independent groups). As the phenomenon has spread world wide, the extreme social inequality in many countries has created a yawning cultural gap

between Pentecostals and charismatics. Nevertheless, within Protestant circles the latter have often influenced the former in recent decades.

The origins of the charismatic renewal, traditionally dated to the 1960s, are often explained in terms of the developed West: as a reaction to the bureaucratization of church life and the numerical decline of the churches; as an experiential affirmation of Christian spirituality in the face of secularization and rationalization; as a search for community in the impersonality of urban late modernity marked by social and geographical mobility. It has thus been characterized as simultaneously anti modern (in its “fundamentalistic” biblical literalism and moral traditionalism), modern (in its grass roots ecumenism in the face of religion’s marginalization), and postmodern (in its hedonistic individualism, buttressing of economic goals by “spiritual” reinforcements, and use of metonymy).

But other authors have stressed that charismatic Christianity is a global culture characterized not by unilateral diffusion from the West but by parallel developments and complex flows. It is global because experiential and iconic, predominantly urban and heavily involved in high tech media use; its informal networks transcend national and cultural boundaries. It is everywhere recognizable by its expressive worship and its cultivation of the immanence of God and the contemporaneity of the miraculous. Many (but not all) of the “waves” through which it has gone (driven by the desire for fresh experiences) have also been diffused widely. But these waves (together with the tendency to controversial authoritarian forms of church government) have only accentuated the divisiveness of the movement, aided by the inherent instability of its experiential theology.

Large swathes of the charismatic world have adopted a dualistic form of “spiritual warfare” doctrine, in which the reality and ubiquity of evil spiritual forces are confronted by prayer. The public behavior of many charismatics has been influenced by belief in “territorial spirits,” which hold demonic control of geographical regions or sectors of social life. Also controversial is the “health and wealth” gospel especially popular in North America, much of Africa, and parts of Asia (but less so in Europe). Teaching that Christ’s atonement

includes the removal not just of sin but also of sickness and poverty, the power of God is viewed as a force that can be tapped by "faith." Of North American provenance, its global diffusion is, however, complex and "glocalized."

The myth of origins of the Protestant charismatic movement locates the beginnings in the US Episcopal Church in 1960; an Episcopal priest's experience of "baptism in the Spirit" reached major news magazines. But this version is parochial and says more about the ability to publicize developments than about global reality. Charismatic movements had existed before (e.g., among black Anglicans in South Africa from the 1940s; in the Reformed Church in France; among Brazilian Baptists in the 1950s). While American influence was undoubtedly great (especially through popular books), the global charismatic movement is not an American "product."

In the developed anglophone world, the pattern of development was, firstly, of attempts to influence the mainline Protestant denominations and form ecumenical charismatic networks. By the late 1970s, this was eclipsed by new independent ministries, often influenced by "Restorationist" teaching that the "new wine" of charismatic experience required the "new wineskins" of New Testament patterns of church organization, centered around "apostolic" leadership and authoritarian "shepherding" relationships. This would herald a final revival before the return of Christ. What were effectively new denominations emerged (such as New Frontiers and Ichthus in the United Kingdom). But as Restorationism aged, it moderated its tone and began to have an enduring cultural impact on other sectors of the church.

Perhaps the greatest impact in the 1980s was from John Wimber's Vineyard movement. Starting in California, it emphasized "power evangelism," linking proclamation of the gospel to manifestation of spiritual gifts. This involved "mapping" the spiritual terrain and "power encounters" with the supernatural. This self-styled "third wave" (after the original Pentecostal and charismatic "waves") had great impact also on classical Pentecostal and conservative evangelical circles. One result was the "Marches for Jesus," popular in many countries from the late 1980s, inspired by the idea of "territorial spirits" as a theory both of

evangelism and of charismatics' role in society. The "discerning" of territorial spirits often follows a politically conservative line, but in some Brazilian and African cases has been adapted to "third worldist" concerns.

It was also in the 1980s that the "Word of Faith" or prosperity gospel became popular, especially in the United States, Africa, and parts of Latin America and Asia. Leading global exponents included the American Kenneth Hagin, the Korean Yonggi Cho, the Nigerian Benson Idahosa, and the Argentinian Héctor Giménez.

With the growth of charismatic mega churches, an emphasis on small groups known as "cells" developed, as a way both of maintaining cohesion and community and of gaining the supposed advantages of small and socially homogeneous groups in attracting converts. This trend is often interpreted as a recognition that religion is increasingly deinstitutionalized, and as an absorption of consumerist strategies of predictability and control.

Another major influence of the 1990s was the "Toronto Blessing." This phenomenon involved outbursts of uncontrollable laughter or convulsive body movements and animal utterances. Interpreted as being "slain in the Spirit," the phenomenon dominated the life of many charismatic churches for several years and was understood as preparation for revival. It provoked mass pilgrimages to the Toronto church which publicized it globally, but other charismatics rejected it. In fact, similar phenomena had occurred elsewhere beforehand (especially in Argentina) but without the capacity to globalize them.

The late 1990s saw the growing popularity of Alpha, an introductory course in Christianity aimed at bridging the ever widening gulf with secular culture. Based on a premise of hidden religiosity in individualistic forms which the church needs to tap into, it quickly spread to some 75 countries and transcended the charismatic milieu.

By 2000, charismatic Protestantism in the developed West was often regarded as one of the few sectors of church growth. But much of this comes from recycling Christians rather than conversion of the unchurched. The charismatic movement represents largely a redirection of western Christianity in terms of style, emphases, and organizational forms.

In some parts of the world, however, the movement flourishes in a context of general church growth. A major focus has been West Africa; since the 1980s, large churches in Ghana and Nigeria have become a focus for younger, educated urbanites, and their leaders are significant players on the global charismatic stage. In South Africa, white charismatic leaders started influential multiracial (but mainly white led) churches in the 1980s, matched since the end of apartheid by similar black churches influenced by West African models.

In Brazil, which has the world's second largest community of practicing Protestants, all the historical Protestant denominations suffered charismatic splits by the 1970s, but recent Protestant expansion in the middle class has been mainly due to new charismatic "communities." Considerable female leadership is characteristic, as is the integration of pastoral and entrepreneurial activities. Rather than the "Toronto Blessing," Brazil has had its own equivalents (such as gold teeth fillings in believers' mouths).

Some Latin American charismatics have been very influential worldwide, especially Argentinian evangelists as well as the Colombian church leader César Castellanos, responsible for the "G 12" adaptation of the "cell" method, a major charismatic influence since the late 1990s. In Guatemala, two (controversial) charismatic Protestants have become president.

Charismaticism represents a new stage in the inculturation of Protestantism in Latin America. The penetration of the youth culture, the assimilation of musical rhythms, the adoption of secular communication styles, the reinterpretation of spiritual warfare in terms of local religious rivalries, the acceptance of social categories and symbols of prestige once placed under taboo – all point to charismatic Christianity in the third world as both a global culture, with multiple foreign influences, and a creative local adaptation.

The charismatic movement has also been extremely important within Catholicism. Its "myth of origins" talks of an American university location in 1967 (and of a basically university ambience for its first years), and of Protestant charismatic influence on the originators. It also claims to be a child of the Second

Vatican Council. Certainly, without Vatican II the absorption of such a "Protestant" phenomenon would have been unlikely, and the Council also prepared the way by its liturgical changes and greater emphasis on the Bible and lay initiative.

Known initially as "Catholic Pentecostalism," the Catholic Charismatic Renewal (CCR) had become international by the mid 1970s, with the patronage of Cardinal Suenens of Belgium and the blessing of Pope Paul VI. By 1990 it had become effectively global with the encouragement of Pope John Paul II, who appreciated its politics, its activism for traditional sexual mores, and its contribution to parish renewal.

By the year 2000 the CCR had declined in the US but had expanded worldwide, involving (to some degree) about 10 percent of all Catholics. Latin America was the hub, and secondarily the third world in general. The CCR now has a bureaucratic organization. Having started as a lay movement, it still has considerable lay leadership, but clerical influence has strengthened. Since 1993, the central organ, the International Catholic Charismatic Renewal Services, has had papal recognition. Below it, the CCR is organized at the continental, country, diocesan, and parochial levels.

Unlike the Protestant movement, the CCR adapts the "baptism in the Holy Spirit" to Catholic sacramental theology and emphasizes the eucharist and (increasingly) the Virgin Mary. But there is some variety within the CCR globally (in clerical roles, in the relative emphasis on particular gifts, etc.). In part, this is because the CCR spread not only through missionary priests but also through separate local initiatives which later became incorporated into the CCR. An example of the latter is the controversial Archbishop Milingo of Zambia, whose version was strongly oriented to an African understanding of healing.

One of the largest movements within the CCR is El Shaddai in the Philippines, led by a layman and said to have 7 million members. Another large CCR is Brazil's. Started in 1969 by American Jesuits and initially very middle class, the movement achieved (somewhat reluctant) episcopal recognition in the 1990s as a way to combat Pentecostalism. Since then, it has become very visible in the media and

politics (largely in a fairly conservative direction). The hierarchy has warned against exorcism and a “magical” mindset in general, and has demanded loyalty to papal teaching and Marian devotion (the clearest distinguishing mark from Protestant charismatics). In the late 1990s, the CCR gained extra visibility through the “singing priest” Marcelo Rossi, whose “aerobics of the Lord” attracted multitudes to his masses.

In the context of growing religious pluralism in Brazil, the CCR extended its reach amongst the lower classes and by 2000 involved some 8 million people, although it remained disproportionately strong amongst middle class women, many of whom found an outlet for leadership. The CCR has embraced bureaucratic organization and advanced technology. It consolidates a “Catholicism of choice” in the new competitive religious field, rather than a “Catholicism of birth.” In addition, it is often interpreted in Brazil as a strategy to limit the influence of liberation theology. However, other studies point to the internal diversity of the movement and the anti institutional and oppositional potential in its direct contact with the sacred and its legitimation of lay (and female) leadership.

With regard to the future of charismatic Christianity (Protestant and Catholic), some authors see it as condemned to incessant splintering and on the verge of becoming a spent force. Neither in its size nor in its nature does it contain anything that might significantly challenge trends to secularization. Notwithstanding its supernaturalism, it fits in well with the secular world of late capitalism and merely rearranges the percentages within a declining Christian world. Other authors see it as one of the forms of religion likely to do best in the twenty first century, with its combination of subjectivism and community discipline. In between, while avoiding the (oft repeated) predictions of decline (especially when viewed from a global perspective), one can also recognize its sociological limitations (e.g., to reverse secularization in the West, or to prevent the erosion of Catholic allegiance in Latin America).

SEE ALSO: Charisma; New Religious Movements; Religious Cults

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Chicago School

Ray Hutchison

The Chicago School of Urban Sociology refers to work of faculty and graduate students at the University of Chicago during the period 1915–35. This small group of scholars (the full time faculty in the department of sociology never numbered more than 6 persons) developed a new sociological theory and research methodology in a conscious effort to create a science of society using the city of Chicago as a social laboratory. The Chicago School continues to define the contours of urban sociology, most clearly in the contributions of urban ecology and applied research within the urban environment.

The University of Chicago was founded in 1890 as a research university modeled after Johns Hopkins University and Clark University. The Chicago School of the period discussed here is represented by three generations of faculty. The first group included Albion Small (founder of the department), W. I. Thomas, Charles R. Henderson, Graham Taylor, and George E. Vincent. The second

generation included Small, Thomas, Ernest Burgess, Ellsworth Faris, and Robert Park. It was this group that trained the graduate students responsible for the classic studies of the Chicago School. The third generation included Park, Burgess, Louis Wirth, and William Ogburn. This group of faculty would remain intact until the time Park retired from the university in 1934.

While it is common to date the origin of urban sociology at Chicago with Park's arrival in 1914 and his subsequent work with Burgess, the idea of the city as a laboratory for social research came much earlier. Henderson applied for funds for a systematic study of the city in the first decade, and Thomas began his research on *The Polish Peasant in Europe and the United States* in 1908. An early (1902) description of the graduate program in the *American Journal of Sociology* stated:

The city of Chicago is one of the most complete social laboratories in the world. While the elements of sociology may be studied in smaller communities . . . the most serious problems of modern society are presented by the great cities, and must be studied as they are encountered in concrete form in large populations. No city in the world presents a wider variety of typical social problems than Chicago.

The sociology faculty pioneered empirical research using a variety of qualitative and quantitative methods in an effort to develop a science of sociology. Park formulated a new theoretical model based upon his observation that the city was more than a geographic phenomenon; the basic concepts of human ecology were borrowed from the natural sciences. Competition and segregation led to formation of *natural areas*, each with a separate and distinct *moral order*. The city was "a mosaic of little worlds that touch but do not interpenetrate." Burgess's model for the growth of the city showed a central business district surrounded by the zone in transition, the zone of workingmen's homes, the residential zone, and the commuter zone (see Fig. 1). Roderick McKenzie expanded the basic model of human ecology in his later study of the metropolitan community.

The research and publication program of the Chicago School was carried out under the auspices of a Local Community Research

Committee, an interdisciplinary group comprised of faculty and graduate students from sociology, political science (Charles Merriam), and anthropology (Robert Redfield). Support came from the Laura Spellman Rockefeller Memorial (more than \$600,000 from 1924 to 1934). Graduate students under the guidance of Park and Burgess mapped local community areas and studied the spatial organization of juvenile delinquency, family disorganization, and cultural life in the city. The research program produced a diverse array of studies broadly organized around the themes of urban institutions (the hotel, taxi dance hall), social disorganization (juvenile delinquency, the homeless man), and natural areas themselves. Among the notable Chicago School studies are Frederick Thrasher, *The Gang* (1926); Louis Wirth, *The Ghetto* (1928); Harvey W. Zorbaugh, *The Gold Coast and the Slum* (1929); Clifford S. Shaw, *The Jackroller* (1930); E. Franklin Frazier, *The Negro Family in Chicago* (1932); Paul G. Cressey, *The Taxi Dance Hall* (1932); Walter C. Reckless, *Vice in Chicago* (1933); and E. Franklin Frazier, *The Negro Family in Chicago* (1932).

The Chicago School dominated urban sociology and sociology more generally in the first half of the twentieth century. By 1950 some 200 students had completed graduate study at Chicago. Many were instrumental in establishing graduate programs in sociology across the country, and more than half of the presidents of the American Sociological Association were faculty or students at Chicago. The *American Journal of Sociology*, started by Small in 1895, was the official journal of the American Sociological Association from 1906 to 1935. The dominance of the Chicago School also generated antagonism, and a "minor rebellion" at the annual conference in 1935 would result in the founding of a new journal, the *American Sociological Review*, and marks the decline of influence of the Chicago department.

There were early critiques of the Chicago School, including Missa Alihan's 1938 critique of the determinism inherent in Park's human ecology (Park wrote that "on the whole" the criticisms were correct). Maurice Davie (in 1938) reanalyzed data from Clifford Shaw's *Delinquency Areas* (1929) and showed that




Figure 1 Burgess's model of urban growth

delinquency was associated with areas of physical deterioration and high immigrant populations and not in the concentric zone model used in the Chicago studies. Burgess's concentric zones were soon replaced by a variety of models showing multiple nuclei and eventually the decentralized, poly centered city. Still, urban ecology remains the dominant model and method among urban sociologists at present.

Recent attention has focused on the role of women in the development of the Chicago School. Deegan (1986) argued that the contribution of women was marginalized by Park and

other male faculty. Jane Addams's Hull House had conducted early community studies. Edith Abbott was a part time instructor in the department, and Addams had been offered a part time position. Many of the Chicago faculty were involved with Hull House and other social reform movements; Graham Taylor was one of the early members of the department. Burgess would later note that systematic urban research at Chicago started with the Hull House studies begun by Abbot and Sophonsia Breckenridge in 1908. Although many of the graduate students would use the settlement houses to assist

their research, efforts to distinguish themselves from social reform and the emerging field of social work may explain a reluctance to connect the Chicago School with these earlier studies.

The influence of the early work of the Chicago School may be seen in some later studies, notably St. Clair Drake and Horace Cayton's *Black Metropolis* (1945) and in several community studies directed by Morris Janowitz in the 1970s. William Julius Wilson's work on poverty neighborhoods in 1980–95 once again made use of the city as a social laboratory, including a sustained program of training for graduate students, but Wilson would leave for Harvard before this research agenda was completed. The Chicago School of Urban Sociology has not had lasting influence in the work of the department.

In addition to urban sociology, there are claims to various other Chicago Schools in ethnic studies, crime and delinquency, symbolic interaction, and other fields. The Chicago School of Urban Sociology does not usually include G. H. Mead or W. Lloyd Warner, both of whom were important figures in the department in the 1930s (Mead) and 1940s (Warner). Louis Wirth noted that the Chicago School included many different theoretical models and perspectives and included methodologies ranging from personal documents and ethnography to quantitative analysis. Park felt that Thomas's work formed the foundation for the department, but wrote that he was not aware that he was creating a "school" or a "doctrine." The Chicago School label developed in large measure from critiques by scholars from other universities. Recent work in urban geography has argued that while Chicago was the model for urban theory of the twentieth century, Los Angeles is the model for urban theory of the future. It should be noted that the Los Angeles School (a title coined by the authors themselves, in contrast to the Chicago School) is more appropriately urban studies, rather than urban sociology.

SEE ALSO: Addams, Jane; American Sociological Association; Park, Robert E. and Burgess, Ernest W.; Robert E. Park, Ernest W. Burgess, and Urban Social Research

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Chicago School: social change

Andrew Abbott

Like most schools of thought, the Chicago School was not a unified and single minded orthodoxy. Although the idea of social change was essential to virtually all the Chicago writers, they defined it in various ways and then used those resulting concepts in quite varying places in their work. It was only William Fielding Ogburn who foregrounded the phrase itself in his writings. But for W. I. Thomas on the one hand and Robert Park and Ernest Burgess on the other, change was, if possible, even more central

than it was for Ogburn. Yet, in the long run, both sociologists and popular literature have chosen to accept Ogburn's sense of social change as society wide upheaval and transformation (indeed, this is now the lay sense of the phrase). But that current meaning should not lead us to read the Chicago works teleologically. (For the standard account of the Chicago School in English, see Bulmer 1984; for more recent revisionist accounts with relatively current bibliographies, see Abbott 1999; Chapoulie 2001.)

The Chicago writers all worked within traditions for which the notion of perpetual change was axiomatic. Historicism came with department founder Albion Small. Pragmatism was embodied in faculty colleagues John Dewey and George Herbert Mead. The department's reformists – Charles Henderson, George Vincent, and W. I. Thomas, as well as Small (and Mead, who was in the philosophy department) – were all tied to Hull House and other Chicago institutions interested in changing society for the better. It is then little surprising that nearly all the writers of the classical era of the Chicago School (i.e., these men and their students, writing through the period 1915–35) took for granted the notion that social life is first and foremost a free process rather than a regular motion within a fixed structure. This notion of the social as processual, along with its correlate that all social facts have particular locations, was indeed the philosophical foundation of the Chicago School.

But these ideas expressed themselves differently in different writers. There were three basic versions of social change in the writings of the Chicagoans. The most familiar is William Fielding Ogburn's conception of social change as the sum total of societal wide trends. Ogburn's most far reaching statement is found in the two volume 1933 report on *Recent Social Trends*. The social survey tradition reached its apogee in this "survey" of the whole nation, done by a Hoover appointed committee of which Ogburn was both a member and director of research. The volumes begin with a summary, followed by 29 chapters by experts discussing topics ranging from population and natural resources to education, attitudes, labor, consumption, arts, religion, and taxation. The report's introduction sets out a view of social change that Ogburn was to repeat and elaborate

throughout his career. Society consisted of a number of divided areas of social organization (Ogburn was never clear about whether these were institutions or functions or simply complexes of social organization). But not all parts of our organization are changing at the same speed or at the same time. Some are rapidly moving forward and others are lagging (note the implicit assumption of progress). Although he argued that the order of these changes could vary – sometimes social developments might precede mechanical developments, and some times vice versa – in general, Ogburn argued that scientific and mechanical inventions led the process. These led to changes in those parts of economic and social organization close to technology – factories, labor, and so on – and then onward to changes in the family, government, schools, and so on. At the end came changes in values and norms. This was the argument that became enshrined as "cultural lag."

Ogburn's conception of social change was thus one that aggregated across the social world. Trends and time graphs of trends pervade his work. Because of this level of aggregation, the focus on particularity and location characteristic of the other Chicagoans disappeared. Also, Ogburn's strong positivism led him to pay more attention to things that were easier to measure. It is thus hardly surprising that inventions (already "measured" by patents) would come first in his account of aggregate change and that beliefs and values – notoriously difficult to measure and ultimately capturable only in the aggregate change of summed survey responses over time – would come last. All the same, Ogburn's work was almost obsessively processualist. Indeed, his insistence on the pervasiveness of broad social change led him to downplay great events and great men, rather as did his contemporaries of the Annales School in France. The table of contents of the *Recent Social Trends* volumes indeed makes no mention of the tumultuous events of 1929 to 1933, although of course they are discussed in the individual articles.

For Robert Park, Ernest Burgess, and the ecologists, on the other hand, social change was not a term of art. Like Ogburn, they too were processualists – social theorists whose fundamental axioms rested not on structure and organization but on story and trajectory.

But unlike him, they chose their underlying metaphor from plant ecology, with its passive cycle of contact, interaction, invasion, conflict, accommodation, and assimilation. In human ecologies, this might be punctuated by collective behavior (runaway events) and tamed by social control (which referred mostly to what we would today call symbolic or cultural systems). Theories of and examples of these processes took up the vast majority of the 1921 Park and Burgess textbook of sociology, *Introduction to the Science of Sociology*. But whereas progress was the most important implicit model of change in Ogburn, neither progress nor indeed directed change of any sort was important in the Park and Burgess view. Process was simply process.

In addition, unlike Ogburn with his division of the social world into abstract complexes of social organization or institutions, Park, Burgess, and their students tended to divide the world into types of people (racial, ethnic, religious, occupational, and age groups) doing types of activities (suicide, divorce, ganging, striking, whoring, delinquency, movie going, etc.) in particular places (central business district vs. outlying zones, on ecological boundaries vs. in the core of natural areas, in “belts” that crossed zonal boundaries, etc.). Where Ogburn had many charts of trends, they had many maps of activities. Whereas social change lost in them the direction Ogburn had given it, it gained a location (social and geographic) that he ignored.

For Park himself the core change concept was the natural history. By this, Park meant something like typical sequence of events. Most of his students undertook natural histories of their topics: of gangs (Thrasher), of revolutions (Edwards), of churches (Kincheloe), of taxi dance halls (Cressey), and so on. At the individual level, this concept of a typical sequence of events was often called the life cycle. It is illustrated in Cressey’s 1932 “life cycle of the taxi dancer,” Mowrer’s 1927 “behavior sequences in family disorganization,” and in many individual life histories—Shaw’s two book length biographies of delinquents, Mowrer’s “Diary of Miriam Donaven,” and so on. These concepts of typical sequence were never theorized by the Chicago School, but they certainly pervaded its writing.

This notion of patterns of change across the life course came less from Park and Burgess than from the monumental example of Thomas and Znaniecki in the *Polish Peasant* (1918–21) and from Thomas’s continuing production of individual, social psychological studies. One of the five original *Polish Peasant* volumes was a single life history. Moreover, the theoretical scheme sketched in the famous “Methodological Note” with which the series opens is based on the notion of a life pattern organized by attitudes.

Thomas’s is thus the third major conception of social change in the Chicago School proper (chronologically it was the first; it is taken third here because it is the least familiar today). Although Thomas’s theorizing could be obscure, he had a firm sense that change and dynamism—not stability—were the natural state of society. (His collaborator Znaniecki would make this explicit in responding to Herbert Blumer’s critique of *The Polish Peasant* in 1938.) Thomas’s three concepts for theorizing this constant flux were social organization, social disorganization, and social reorganization. These received careful but not always consistent definition in the “Methodological Note.” They all involved the mutual adjustment of individual attitudes with social values, an adjustment occurring within a context where large social forces were threatening and transforming the social foundations of social values even while the steady flow of events across the life course presented challenges to the personal organization of attitudes. Social organization (along with its correlative, individual organization) denoted the situation in which the social values and personal attitudes mutually determined a dynamically stable accommodation of individual and society. Social (and correlatively individual) disorganization denoted the situation in which they did not. Social reorganization referred to the reestablishment of the individual/society accommodation, a reestablishment which Thomas sometimes attributed to the leadership of individuals and sometimes to changes in social values.

The triad of organization, disorganization, and reorganization appears throughout the writings of the Chicago PhDs of the 1920s and 1930s, chiefly in studies of suicide, divorce, crime, delinquency, ganging, and other “social problems.” In these writings (and particularly

in later readings of them), the subtleties of Thomas's conceptualizations were usually lost. The three terms simply became a list describing the perpetual and mutually disturbing fluctuation of group values and individual attitudes so familiar in the reformist literature. Although for Thomas the terms had lacked normative content, their deployment in the context of social problems and reformism led by a kind of contagion to a much more normative understanding of "organization." This gradual redefinition destroyed the original utility of the triad of terms as a processual and nonnormative alternative to the clearly normative term "social structure" favored by the rising structural functionalists of the late 1930s.

The Chicago School was thus completely organized around the notion of social change. Indeed, they took change as the natural state of social life. Their analysis of change ranged from the trends of Ogburn to the typical sequences and patterns of Park and Burgess and the organization and reorganization of Thomas. Only the Ogburn view would survive the eclipse of Chicago thinking by the structural functional school. Parsons's teleological evolutionism could only admit the kind of directed, progressive change that was implicit in Ogburn's thinking. The perpetual flux of Thomas as well as the located but often random contact and competition processes of Park and Burgess would become an esoteric subtext in American sociology until the concept of conflictual change took center stage again in the 1970s.

SEE ALSO: Chicago School; Mead, George Herbert; Park, Robert and Burgess, Ernest W.; Parsons, Talcott; Pragmatism; Social Change; Structural Functional Theory; Znaniecki, Florian

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child abuse

Karen Polonko

Throughout the world, literally hundreds of millions of children are victims of abuse, neglect, and exploitation. Restricting our focus to the US, over 3 million children are reported to official agencies for severe maltreatment in any given year (English 1998). While approximately 15 percent of children have been reported to agencies for maltreatment, surveys indicate that this figure grossly underestimates the true extent of the problem, as over a third of adults in the US report having experienced physical, sexual, emotional abuse and/or neglect as a child.

How child abuse is defined has enormous implications for the safety and well being of children and reflects existing cultural, political, and structural inequalities. Narrowly defining child maltreatment, as we do in the US, as only the extremes of abuse with demonstrable injuries, not only results in artificially low estimates of child maltreatment, but also limits the government's ability to intervene on behalf of children, affords abusing parents the greatest protection, and places children in the greatest danger.

As summarized by the World Health Organization (2002: 59), "Child abuse or maltreatment constitutes all forms of physical and/or emotional ill treatment, sexual abuse, neglect or negligent treatment or commercial or other exploitation, resulting in actual or potential harm to the child's health, survival, development, or dignity in the context of a relationship of responsibility, trust, or power."

Child physical abuse involves a parent or caretaker intentionally inflicting physical pain

on the child and can range, for example, from shaking, dragging, or spanking a child to the extremes of kicking, punching, or beating. Child sexual abuse involves a caretaker using a child for sexual gratification and can range from noncontact abuse (proposition, exhibition) to the extremes of actual penetration, to commercial sexual exploitation. Child emotional abuse involves inflicting psychological pain on the child. This includes, for example, yelling at, ridiculing, degrading, or humiliating a child; communicating that the child is flawed or unlovable; threatening a child or a child's loved one; exposure to domestic violence.

Child neglect involves a caretaker's failure to provide for the child's basic needs. This includes physical neglect (adequate shelter, food, clothing), medical neglect (adequate health care), cognitive or educational neglect (intellectual stimulation, involvement in child's schooling), supervision neglect (monitoring the child's whereabouts, involvement in child's activities), and emotional neglect (providing emotional responsiveness, support, and affection). Prenatal neglect and abuse (failure to obtain proper care and/or substance abuse during pregnancy) constitutes yet another category of maltreatment.

CONSEQUENCES OF CHILD ABUSE AND NEGLECT

The consequences of child maltreatment are considerable, not only for the child, but also for society. Some consequences for the child are greater for one type of maltreatment than another. For example, child neglect is most strongly associated with the child having a lower IQ and lower educational achievement; child physical abuse with the child engaging in violence as a teen and adult; and, child emotional abuse with subsequent psycho pathology. However, all forms of maltreatment are associated with adverse effects for children and the adults they become. Child physical and emotional abuse and neglect all increase the likelihood that the child will subsequently:

- Be cognitively impaired (e.g., lower IQ and cognitive development; lower grades and educational achievement).

- Have impaired moral reasoning (e.g., less empathy, less compliance, and less developed conscience).
- Engage in violence and crime (e.g., more likely to engage in juvenile delinquency, nonviolent crime, and violent criminal behavior as a teenager and adult).
- Be violent in relationships (e.g., more likely to assault their siblings and other children, and later to abuse their spouse, child, and elderly parents).

In addition, all types of child maltreatment, physical and emotional abuse and neglect, and sexual abuse increase the likelihood that the child will subsequently:

- Have mental health problems as a child, teenager, and adult (e.g., higher rates of depression, anxiety, anger, anti social personality disorder, eating disorder, etc.).
- Become a substance abuser of both legal and illegal substances as a teenager and adult.
- Become pregnant as a teenager and engage in risky sexual behavior (e.g., engage in earlier first intercourse, higher rates of STDs, more partners, and teenage pregnancy).
- Have poor health when older (e.g., higher rates of cancer, heart disease, chronic lung disease, irritable bowel syndrome, liver diseases, etc.).

Aside from the obvious, reasons why the effects of child abuse and neglect are so profound and long lasting include the neurological changes in the child's brain that result from maltreatment; the modeling effects of seriously inadequate parenting; the adoption of a belief system about self, others, and the world as malevolent; and the defense mechanisms that maltreated children must develop to cope with their terror, despair, and hopelessness.

CAUSES OF CHILD ABUSE AND NEGLECT: CHARACTERISTICS OF PARENTS

Many of the parents who abuse and neglect their children were themselves maltreated as children. In addition, having been maltreated

as a child also increases the likelihood that one will suffer other outcomes such as lower IQ and educational attainment, more mental health problems, substance abuse, and teen pregnancy – each of which, in turn, independently increases the risk of maltreating one's child. In other words, many of the consequences of having been abused and neglected as a child are also the causes of growing up to maltreat one's own child, laying the foundation for a cycle of abuse and neglect across generations. For example, parents who abuse or neglect their children are more likely to:

- Have been maltreated as a child.
- Have mental health problems, including parent depression.
- Have a violent marriage.
- Be a substance abuser.
- Be a teenage mother.
- Have lower levels of education and to be chronically poor.

In addition to the above, parents who abuse or neglect their children are also more likely to:

- Have serious parenting deficits (e.g., have unrealistic expectations for their children).
- Use harsh and aggressive parenting with their children (i.e., high levels of emotional abuse).
- Have low levels of parental involvement and supervision, give their children low levels of attention and affection (i.e., high levels of physical and emotional neglect).
- Frequently use corporal punishment on their children (i.e., high levels of physical abuse).
- Have less play materials or any cognitively stimulating materials in the home for their children (i.e., high levels of neglect).

The first set of factors points to the cycle of child abuse and neglect. The second set of factors indicates that engaging in low or “culturally acceptable” levels of harsh parenting, corporal punishment, and neglect significantly increases the likelihood that parents will proceed to more severely abuse and/or neglect their children. Moreover, at least in the area of physical violence, more frequent corporal punishment has the *same* adverse consequences

as physical abuse, from lower IQ to more violent behavior, mental health problems, and risky sexual behavior, except to lesser degrees.

CHILD ABUSE AND THE LARGER COMMUNITY AND SOCIETY

Child maltreatment is associated with substantial costs to society. The World Health Organization (2002: 70) estimated that the total financial cost of child maltreatment in the US was \$12.4 billion, which includes, for example, the costs of services to families of maltreated children, the loss of the contributions of victims, and related costs of the criminal justice and health care system. In addition, it is important to acknowledge the ways in which the larger community and society fail children, neglecting them (e.g., high levels of child poverty, poor quality schools, lack of neighborhood monitoring of children) and abusing them (exposure to high levels of violence and crime, legal support for children as property).

Intervention and prevention must address the larger context of child abuse, including for example:

- The degree to which the government and corporations support policies that benefit children (e.g., providing quality childcare for every child).
- The degree to which children are economically provided for by encouraging gender equality in the labor force, enforcing fathers' child support payments, and having a strong social welfare system which provides for all children.
- The provision of sex education, on site availability of contraceptives, and parenting classes in high school designed to help teens, and ultimately all parents, postpone childbearing until they are mentally and financially able to raise a child without maltreatment.
- The level of help provided to maltreated children and survivors.
- The extent of protection for children provided by the law, agencies, and the criminal justice system.
- The degree to which children are viewed as the property of parents as opposed to the responsibility of the entire community.

- The level of support for extending human rights to children.

In these and other ways, a society can move toward protecting rather than forsaking its children.

SEE ALSO: Childhood; Rape/Sexual Assault as Crime; Victimization; Violent Crime

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child custody and child support

Janet Walker

Since the 1960s, growing proportions of children worldwide have been experiencing their parents' separation at an increasingly early age. Parental separation entails a series of transitions and family reorganizations, including changes in parenting arrangements, residence, family relationships, and standard of living, that influence children's development and adjustment over time. All pose risks for children.

When parents separate, a number of important decisions have to be taken. These relate to:

- where children will live and with whom – usually referred to as child custody, child physical custody, or child residence;
- who will make decisions about the children's day to day care and their overall upbringing in areas like education, religious affiliation, and health – sometimes referred to as child legal custody;
- what arrangements will be made for the non custodial or non resident parent to stay involved in the children's lives – known as child contact, access, or visitation;
- how property and assets will be divided;
- whether financial transfers between the ex spouses will continue – called spousal support/maintenance;

- how sufficient financial provision will be ensured for the proper maintenance and care of the children – usually called child support.

These decisions are critical factors in promoting healthy child development and reducing the risk of difficulties enduring into adulthood. Changing approaches to child custody and child support reflect a mix of tradition, prevailing cultural values about childrearing, expectations about family life, and sensitivities surrounding state intervention in intensely private family matters.

There is a growing tendency to encourage parents to make decisions and agree arrangements for their children informally between themselves, often called “private ordering,” rather than rely on legal remedies and the courts. But reaching agreement can be fraught with difficulty given the emotional, relational, and practical issues surrounding parental separation and parenting across two households. When parents cannot agree, they normally turn to the courts to resolve their disputes, and so the search for less adversarial, more conciliatory approaches to decision making, which minimize tensions and conflicts for parents and children alike, has intensified. Concerns have been expressed not only about the increasing number of children experiencing family breakup, but also about the potentially detrimental consequences for their well being and development. Research indicates that increased mental health problems for children are related to stresses such as parental instability, interparental conflict, loss of time with parents, and economic decline (Amato 2000). Governments in countries with high divorce rates, such as the US, Canada, Australia, and the UK, struggle to find the correct balance between respecting the privacy of family life and protecting vulnerable children who grow up in increasingly complex and shifting family structures.

Such dilemmas are comparatively new. Until the mid nineteenth century, when parents separated fathers had an absolute right of control over their children and the mother had access only at the father’s discretion. Attitudes began to change when awareness of the importance of maternal love and care began to

emerge. In 1839, the Child Custody Act in England made it possible for the court to transfer legal custody of children under the age of 7 to the mother and made provision for visitation rights, in the belief that children should be brought up enjoying the affection of both parents. This “tender years” doctrine continued to influence the determination of child custody throughout most of the twentieth century. Mothers were usually regarded as the best parent to provide psychological, emotional, and physical care. Moreover, the classical economic model of the western household, involving a breadwinner husband and a homemaker wife, reinforced the belief that mothers should be granted custody of children after divorce and that fathers should provide the necessary financial support and play a role in the upbringing of their children through regular access.

Since the 1960s, this traditional gendered division of responsibilities has been steadily eroded. Mothers have gained much greater financial independence through increased participation in the workforce and fathers have devoted more time to childcare activities. The appropriate determination of both child custody and child support has been thrown into question and simple gendered solutions no longer appear appropriate. Although the ultimate test is that the child’s best interests have primacy when parents separate, keeping both parents involved, emotionally and financially, in their children’s lives has become a policy imperative. Either the mother or the father having sole custody of the children is increasingly viewed as the least desirable option. The focus is on encouraging joint parental responsibility so that children spend time with both parents, although the links between parenting time and shared parental responsibility are likely to be complex and, as yet, are not well understood.

In some countries, terminology has changed to reflect this shift. The 1989 Children Act in England and Wales, a landmark piece of legislation, emphasized that the primary responsibility for the care and upbringing of children rests with both parents. The notion of one parent having “custody” of a child was abandoned because it implied a kind of ownership which could exclude the other parent. Instead parents are referred to as the resident parent (with whom the child lives most of the time)

and the non resident parent (who has contact with the child but does not provide the primary residence). Residence orders, determining where a child should live, do not assign custodial status to either parent. In 1995, Australia adopted similar terminology, and in 2004 New Zealand also followed this trend. Whatever terms are used, however, arrangements for children continue to arouse strong emotions in and conflict between parents.

When courts have to be the final arbiter of arrangements for children, judges often turn to mental health professionals and social workers to help them make better informed and more effective decisions about what would be in a child's best interests. In the US, child custody evaluations have become a burgeoning field of practice, and concerns have been expressed about overreliance on the recommendations they contain. Tippins and Wittman (2005) have argued that custody evaluations can have a profound impact on the direction a child's life will take after judicial disposition and that the best interest standard is a legal and sociomoral concept rather than one capable of scientific assessment. Given that many custody recommendations lack an adequate empirical foundation and tend to be influenced by current trends, Tippins and Wittman suggest that they hold significant potential to harm rather than protect a child.

In Canada, by 2000 joint physical custody was awarded for 37 percent of children whose custody was part of the final divorce decree (Juby et al. 2005). While there is some evidence that children living in shared care/joint custody arrangements seem to be better adjusted than those in sole custody situations (Bauserman 2002), the parents who manage to share care may well differ in important ways such as having higher levels of education and financial resources. Nevertheless, disentangling the emotional ties associated with the marital relationship while reformulating parental ties represents a hugely demanding and difficult transition for parents, and making joint parental responsibility a reality is no easy task (Walker et al. 2004). Sole custody is a more straightforward option to implement, although it typically results in significant dissatisfaction among non custodial parents who experience their parental role as episodic rather than

continuous. Mothers may well regard it as a fairer reflection of the allocation of parenting tasks prior to separation, however, since in the majority of households it is they who undertake most of the childcare. Certainly, parents who agree their own arrangements tend to continue previous allocations of responsibility. It is still the norm for children to live mainly with mothers despite growing demands by fathers' groups for legal presumptions of equal parenting time. Research into the benefits for children of equal parenting time or dual residence is extremely limited, however, and in France it is ruled out as being against the best interests of children. More longitudinal research is needed to establish what kinds of parenting arrangements may be in each child's best interests, in view of the complexities and changes associated with post separation family relationships and obligations. Nevertheless, existing research indicates that the factors having the greatest impact on children after parental separation are quality of family relationships, notably those between children and each parent, continuity of parental care, and financial stability (Amato & Gilbreth 1999). How to ensure that fathers stay committed and involved when they are not the resident parent remains a key challenge. Requiring them to pay child support is one mechanism.

Lone parent families have always been the most economically vulnerable, and for over 100 years attempts have been made to recover money from fathers who no longer live with their children. Collecting payments has presented huge challenges and large numbers of mothers become dependent on social welfare assistance. Many of the current policies have grown out of concerns not only about the lower living standards of lone parents, but also about the numbers of parents dependent on welfare, the low amounts of child support paid by non custodial parents, and the difficulties of enforcing payments through the courts. Child support policy straddles many technical domains, including estimating the costs of bringing up children, which are undoubtedly higher in separated households, the interaction between income support and taxation policy, and the complexities associated with dividing assets between parents and making post separation financial settlements. These calculations are

complicated further by varying perceptions of what mothers and fathers regard as fair and just. Residence and contact arrangements are highly variable and liable to change as children grow up and when stepfamilies are formed, making it hard for policies relating to child support to stay simple, transparent, and appropriate.

Governments have attempted to enforce parental responsibility through a variety of child support regimes, which seek to be fair in light of the complex personal circumstances of most separated families, to advance the well being of children, to ensure cooperation and compliance, and to reduce the cost of lone parenting to the public purse. Achieving these diverse agendas is problematic and there have been some serious failures. Child support policy has become the locus for negotiating the limits of public and private responsibility for children. Whereas governments in England, Canada, and Australia have developed and imposed arm's length, formulaic determinations rarely regarded as fair by fathers or mothers, the trend in continental Europe has been toward creating enabling structures and procedures which encourage parental cooperation in working out realistic child support arrangements, which may ensure higher compliance rates.

Although courts have long maintained that child support and child contact are independent obligations, they are inevitably closely associated in the minds of parents (Bradshaw & Skinner 2000). Most of the evidence suggests a generally positive relationship between paying child support and having contact with children. Proposals to link the amount of child support paid to the amount of parenting time are contentious, however. Fathers rarely question their parental obligation to contribute financially to the care of their children, but calculations relating to child support and modes of collecting and enforcing payments need to be facilitated through an increased understanding of the emotional turmoil that accompanies parental separation, and the inevitably changed and changing nature of the relationship non residential parents have with their children. Facilitating contact and involvement between non resident/non custodial parents and their children when it is in children's best interests to do so may be critical in ensuring that financial support is forthcoming. Child support is not just about

money, and more research is needed to understand non compliance and the complex inter relationships between child residence, contact, perceptions of fairness, and financial transfers.

Child support and child contact remain two of the most complex and controversial aspects of family policy because they require delicate balances to be struck between the competing needs of children, resident parents, non resident parents, and the state (Smyth & Weston 2005). Moreover, they are primarily adult issues, but hearing the voice of the child is an increasingly important aspect of decision making relating to arrangements which involve children. Young people are very concerned with issues of fairness and an enduring sense of family despite the breakdown of their parents' relationship. Although shared parenting may better meet the needs of children and young people than traditional custodial arrangements, and more closely reflect their perceptions of what is fair in terms of contact and child support (Parkinson et al. 2005), achieving it remains a major challenge.

SEE ALSO: Children and Divorce; Divorce; Family Demography; Family Structure; Life Course and Family; Lone Parent Families; Non Resident Parents; Stepfamilies

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child labor

Virginia Morrow

Child labor refers to a form of child work. Child labor was first conceptualized as a social problem during industrialization in nineteenth century Britain, and the reasons were related to the need for cheap unskilled factory labor, and new moral concerns about childhood (Cunningham 1996). It is usually assumed that children in contemporary industrialized or post industrial societies do not work, and that child labor is a "problem" in developing or majority world countries, but many children are "economically active" in some way, and accordingly there are many definitions of child labor. Economists Rodgers and Standing (1981) produced a typology of child activities and differentiate between the following categories of child work: domestic work; non domestic, non monetary work; tied or bonded labor; wage labor; and marginal economic activities.

Definitions of the terms "child" and "labor" and "child labor" are contested, and the topic is hotly debated. The category "child" (following the UN Convention on the Rights of the Child) includes "all those under the age of 18," but in many societies and cultures the

distinction between childhood and adulthood is not made according to age, but according to stage in the life course. Western ideas about "work" and "labor" equate "work" with paid employment in the formal labor market, but social anthropologists have argued that work has many meanings, and can be broadly understood as the performance of necessary tasks and the production of necessary values (Wallman 1979). The International Labor Organization, a UN organization that promotes "decent work," combining workers' (represented by Trades Unions), employers', and governmental organizations, has over the years defined child labor as:

- Labor performed by a child who is under the minimum age specified in national legislation for that kind of work; and
- Labor that jeopardizes the physical, mental, or moral well being of a child, known as hazardous work (Minimum Age Convention, No. 138, 1973); and
- Unconditional "worst" forms of child labor, internationally defined as slavery, trafficking, debt bondage and other forms of forced labor, forced recruitment for use in armed conflict, prostitution and pornography, and illicit activities (Worst Forms of Child Labor Convention No. 182 (1999) (ILO 2004).

Convention 182 reiterates the forms of work that are already prohibited for both children and adults in human rights treaties, and unconditionally prohibits all work for children under the age of 12.

In most countries, national legislation restricts the formal employment of children, but it is not effective in many circumstances, and needs to be seen in the context of poverty and underdevelopment, and the provision of acceptable alternative activities for children, especially high quality education services which do not exist in most countries, and tend to be limited to "elementary education" for 5 years only.

Child labor is generally not well researched, and numbers of child laborers are usually estimated or are broad guesstimates. The extent of official data on labor force participation of

children is very limited even in developed countries, where it is often based indirectly on recorded violations of child labor legislation, or (rarely and not officially) on health and safety data of accidents at work, rather than direct national statistics about the nature and extent of child employment. Many forms of child labor are not reported, or are under reported, and governments are under no obligation and have no incentives to collect such data.

Approaches to the study of child labor evolved during the twentieth century, and four dominant overlapping perspectives have been identified (Myers 2001; Ennew et al. 2005). The labor market perspective initially dominated European interventions and arose through concern from trade unions, employer associations, government departments, and philanthropic organizations during the early part of the twentieth century. It involved the construction of child labor as a “problem,” not least competing with adult employment, requiring abolition through the extension of compulsory education and enforcement of labor legislation. This approach expanded gradually internationally and remains the dominant model.

The human capital perspective views child labor resulting from economic underdevelopment, and childhood as preparation for adulthood, seeing children as potential economic producers, thus requiring skills and literacy to be developed through intensive education. This approach emphasizes the benefits of “investing in children.”

The social responsibility perspective sees child labor as arising from social inequalities, and defines children’s work as exploitative, alienating, or oppressive work that excludes children from protection, and depicts child labor as a collective moral responsibility. This approach has generated innovative non formal education programs in developing countries, such as street education and work–school arrangements.

The children centered perspective takes into account the effects of labor on children’s well being and individual/social development and also balances these with the advantages of work from children’s perspectives. Recently, this view has become linked with notions of

children’s rights and the UN Convention on the Rights of the Child (1989), which set standards for freedom from exploitation at work (Article 32), but also for participation (Article 12), which guarantees children’s rights to participate in decisions concerning them. This view sees children as active social agents who have capabilities and responsibilities, rather than as passive victims or blank slates upon whom culture is inscribed.

Within European sociology there is growing awareness among researchers that children’s perspectives on why they work give a different, more complex picture (Liebel 2004) and in some developing countries groups of working children have organized themselves and emphasize the right to decent work for children. However, the views of these groups are generally excluded from the debates at policy level about child labor, in which powerful vested interests continue to operate.

SEE ALSO: Child Abuse; Childhood; Human Rights; Industrial Revolution; Marx, Karl

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childcare

Julia Brannen

Childcare is a term which typically is applied to adults taking responsibility for younger children and looking after them on a daily basis in the private sphere of families and the home. In societies where women and men are employed outside the home, their under school age children may be cared for by kin or their care may be commodified, in which case care is provided through private markets, through quasi markets (childminding), or by the state. In the latter case, in western societies which have strong welfare states, childcare is provided in the public sphere for all children as a right as part of the social rights of citizenship (Leira 2002). In residual welfare states, the state and institutions step in only when children are deemed to be at risk or vulnerable because of abuse, neglect, or loss of both parents.

DEVELOPMENTS IN THE CONCEPT OF CARE

No contribution to this topic is complete without a brief exploration of the concept of care. Care is a multifaceted concept which over 20 years has undergone a number of theoretical developments. Until the 1970s care was theoretically subsumed within discussions of the "natural" role of mothers. In the 1970s, feminists argued that care such as childcare constitutes work and is a burden upon those who do an inordinate amount of it (traditionally women). Care has since been elaborated as a concept which has a relational ontology and belongs to the moral realm in which the self can only exist with and through others, and vice versa (Gilligan 1988; Tronto 1993; Sevenhuijsen 1998). In this conceptualization, care is not an automatic obligation associated with a particular role but a situated practice in which all people must interpret questions concerning an "ethic of care" – what is "the right thing to do," when to care, and how much care in relation to a variety of conditions (Finch & Mason 1993). To give care is thus not a top down moral obligation but negotiated with others

and with the self, involving both receivers and givers of care. Care is also a disposition: it involves values of attentiveness, responsibility, competence, and responsiveness. It is a social process with a number of associated phases: caring about; caring for; taking care of; and being responsive to care.

CHILDCARE IN THE PRIVATE SPHERE

Children's care in the private sphere has received a good deal of attention over the past 30 years as women's position in society has changed and gender equality has increased. Until the 1970s, childrearing, as it was then conceptualized, was predominantly the province of psychology and was assumed to take place exclusively within the family. Childcare was bracketed with motherhood; mothers were assumed to be the only carers of importance for children.

By the end of the 1970s, Bronfenbrenner (1979) had located the "individual developing child" within a hierarchy of social settings. Childcare as a concept began to be further elaborated in feminists' theoretical challenges to the dominant psychological paradigm of the "developing individual." The care of children, they argued, in falling disproportionately upon women was a cornerstone of their oppression and precluded women from positions of power in the public sphere. However, children's care also offered women a sense of power and gave meaning to their lives, albeit this was often turned against women's interests. Its significance was moreover underpinned by fantasies connected with women's own childhoods (Chodorow & Contratto 1982), while women's practices were normalized by the discourses of experts (e.g., Urwin 1985 with respect to young children).

Not surprisingly, fathers have remained very much as background figures in childcare, especially in the care of young children. How far their invisibility results from the concept of childcare is worthy of some consideration, in respect of both researchers' and informants' interpretations. For what fathers do with and for their children is likely to be shaped not only by what passes for care in a particular historical and social milieu but also by hegemonic notions of masculinity.

Much of the childcare research has been conducted on mothers with younger children so that childcare has been narrowly interpreted in relation to fulfilling the needs of small children relating to their material, social, and emotional requirements and their health and well being (Ribbens 1994). How far the concept stretches to encompass many of the other aspects of parenting as children enter school and remain materially dependent for longer as education is extended is doubtful. Indeed, much of what may be conceptualized as childcare in terms of looking after children's interests sits unsatisfactorily within the concept, namely, the considerable amount of consumption involved in bringing up children and the support that parents give children – with homework, preparing them for the world of work, and myriad other activities. Parents are pivotal figures mediating the household and the public world. However, this activity is often captured in other concepts such as health care and home-school relations.

CHILDCARE IN THE PRIVATE/PUBLIC SPHERE

Childcare is increasingly conceptualized at the interface between the public and private spheres. Work-family studies are a growing field of research which examine how mothers (and fathers) negotiate this interface with implications for the childcare they use and the childcare they do themselves. Studies show how childcare choices are shaped, for example, by labor and childcare markets, social class, ethnicity, lone parenthood, and time. In relation to time, Hochschild (1997) shows how mothers are increasingly driven by the "Taylorization" of family life and a consequent lack of time while, in the workplace, they are subject to work intensification and feelings of job insecurity, making it difficult for mothers to take up family friendly policies. Thus in these studies, childcare *per se* becomes less central as the focus shifts to the work-family strategies of parents, employers, and public policy.

Childcare is commodified in a variety of contexts. For example, in Britain public policy concerning childcare provision has been a backwater. Before the increase in the employment of mothers of young children that began in the late

1980s, the term "childcare" suggested rather uninspiring and unpromising connotations (Riley 1983, cited in Brennan 1998: 3). The British concept – spelt "childcare" and also "child care" – has no direct reciprocal meaning in other public policy contexts (Moss 2003).

There are two major policy areas concerning childcare. The first policy meaning (usually signified by two words) concerns the role of the state when it intervenes to protect children or when children are defined as being "in need." Here childcare is often underpinned by assumptions of maternalism as being the "best" form of care for children and is (increasingly in the UK) carried out by foster carers and (less often in the UK) in institutional settings.

Childcare (one word) refers to the way children are looked after when parents are in paid work. In the US and the UK, the care of young children has historically been a sphere in which public policy has not intervened to any great extent compared with many European countries. In the former countries, it has typically been dominated by ideas of maternalism (Brannen & Moss 2003). Care by family members and child minding (family day care) have been commonplace and continue to be so. The childcare workforce is typically low qualified and low paid.

Childcare, in both policy senses, takes on a different meaning in other countries, notably Scandinavia and some other European countries, where it refers to the fields of theory and practice concerning children. Here the educational content of childcare is more prominent and the concept of "pedagogy" is used to refer to the whole child (body, mind, and feelings). Pedagogy also involves an ethic of care (see above) that develops between pedagogues and children in their "care." Thus relationships between carers and children take on forms different from mother-child relationships and are less governed by neoliberal economics (many childcare providers in the UK and the US are businesses) and by concerns of risk aversion (keeping children safe as being the central priority for children's care).

The commodification of childcare also occurs in the context of globalization. In the US, home based childcare workers are increasingly recruited from poor developing countries, leading to a drain on the resources of the source countries (Hochschild 2000). Moreover, the

women concerned often employ other women in their countries of origin to care for their children in their absence. This practice highlights the issue of power between those who delegate care to others and those who work in the growing childcare workforce. Thus care relationships may not only contribute to love, responsibility, and attentiveness but also bring about inequalities and exploitation.

In this conceptual frame of childcare as relational, it is important to suggest that children are not just recipients of childcare. This is a crucial issue for future research in the field to explore. For children need to be seen as active partners in their care. Similarly, there is a need to examine childcare services as spaces in which children participate together and with adult carers, creating milieux that are qualitatively different from the home and which offer children many challenges and opportunities.

SEE ALSO: Caregiving; Carework; Child Custody and Child Support; Childhood; Divisions of Household Labor; Divorce; Ethic of Care; Fatherhood; Motherhood

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childhood

Sally McNamee

What is now known as the “new paradigm” of the sociology of childhood grew out of a rejection of traditional sociological and psychological theories of childhood. Children in earlier sociological accounts were subsumed into accounts of the family or the school – in other words, into the major sites of socialization. Children were, therefore, most visible when they were being socialized. Socialization, which is sociology’s explanation for how children become members of society, parallels developmental psychology, in that children progress from incompetent to competent adulthood through the process of acculturation or socialization. In both socialization theory and developmental psychology there was no view of children as active social agents; rather, children were seen (if they were seen at all) as passive recipients of socialization. In addition, both socialization theory and developmental psychology fail to see the child as existing in the present – instead, the focus is on what children *become*.

ialization theory ignores children's role in socializing both themselves and others. In fact, it fails to take account of the child as a competent social actor. What was missing from sociology, then, was an account of the socially constructed nature of childhood which focused on children as social actors rather than passive "becomings."

The historian Philippe Ariès noted that childhood as a concept has not always existed in the same way. In *Centuries of Childhood* (1962 [1960]) Ariès discusses the development of the *idea* of childhood through reference to diaries, paintings, and other such historical documents and traces the changes in attitudes to children from those based, for example, on indifference, to coddling (the child as a plaything), to the seventeenth century development of psychological interest and "moral solicitude." Ariès's work shows us the child as part of society in medieval times. Childhood at that time did not exist as a separate concept.

The childhoods described by Ariès are very different from the modern, particularly western, conception of childhood to which we subscribe. In the western view, childhood is a time of innocence and children are in need of protection from adult society, not expected to join it. In order to see some of the anomalies around childhood in contemporary western society, we have only to think of the ages by which children are – and are not – allowed to do certain things. For example, in the UK, children can work (in certain jobs) at the age of 14. They attain the legal age of responsibility at 10 years old, but cannot vote until the age of 18.

Of course, as well as differing over time, or historically, what "childhood" is also differs across cultures – a modern western childhood looks very different from that experienced by children in other cultures. For example, the work of Samantha Punch shows that children in rural Bolivia are, from the age of 5 years old, expected to work. This work might be collecting firewood or bringing water, or milking animals. Punch shows us the ways in which children contribute to family life and feel a sense of pride in so doing. A cross cultural view of childhood allows us to see one of the central tenets of the "new paradigm" very clearly – that of children as competent social actors. Many children in the developing world

(and some children in the West) work and/or care for families – and in some cases combine these activities with attending school. If "childhood" was indeed a time of innocence and if children were all in need of protection, then how is it that children in other cultures lead such competent (one might almost say "adult") lives? Of course, many commentators would see this as being an intrinsically bad thing – and this is not arguing against that view, merely pointing out that age is no barrier to living a competent social life.

Those working within the "new paradigm" began the task of de- and re-constructing childhood in the 1980s. Of particular note in the UK is the work of Allison James, Chris Jenks, and Alan Prout. Collectively and separately, they have authored many texts which have stimulated and led the debate around childhood. In Europe, the work of Qvortrup and others working on the "childhood as a social phenomenon" project contributed to the debate (see Qvortrup et al. 1994), and in the US Sharon Stephens's (1995) work has also been of importance. James, Jenks, and Prout's (1998) work provides the social study of childhood with a paradigm which is able to draw together different disciplines and which can locate a conceptual space for theories of childhood. The new social study of childhood, then, moves away from a conception of childhood as an age bound developmental process and from a view of children as passive recipients of socialization toward seeing childhood as a time of competence and agency. The central tenets of the "new paradigm" as set out by James and Prout (1997) are as follows:

- Childhood is to be understood as a social construction.
- Childhood as a variable of social analysis cannot be separated from other variables such as class, gender, or ethnicity.
- Childhood, and children's social relationships, are worthy of study in their own right.
- Ethnography is a methodology which has a particular role to play in the new sociology of childhood.
- Childhood sociology engages in and responds to the process of reconstructing childhood in society.

Under the rubric of the “new paradigm” many aspects of children’s everyday social lives have been studied over the last 10 to 20 years. These include, but are not restricted to, the study of children and time, children and schooling, children and leisure, children and health, street children, working children, and so on. In fact, children in almost every social setting have been studied by those working in the new social study of childhood. Childhood is now theorized, not as a universal concept, but as being fragmented by variables such as gender, disability, and class.

There have in the past been concerns that research with children and young people is problematic in terms of the difficulties involved in gathering meanings from children, a result of an expressed fear that children are unable to clearly articulate their own social worlds. This concern has largely been dispelled by the volume of good social research which has been successfully carried out with children. Good research with children is important not only to understand and document their social lives but also in terms of the development of social policy. Children’s voices from research are now beginning to be incorporated in policy for children. In the main, the majority of studies using the “children as social actors” approach discussed here have used the ethnographic technique, as called for by James and Prout (1997). However, within the broadly qualitative methods used to study children and childhood, a variety of tools have been used, and this reflects the interdisciplinary background of childhood studies: although called the “new sociology” of childhood, it is actually an interdisciplinary field of study. Researchers working within this area include geographers, psychologists, historians, sociologists, and anthropologists. Geographers, for instance, may use mapping and photography as methods, while historians would use documents. Some researchers currently use more quantitative methods, such as questionnaire surveys, which can elicit data that can be just as valid as ethnographic material. As with any research, the methods chosen to investigate reflect the standpoint of the researcher, the questions asked, and the tools used. It is possible to trace a movement over the last 20 years from research “on” children, which saw children as objects, to research “with”

children, which sees them more as subjects. More recently, there is a movement which has children as researchers, designing and carrying out their own research.

Childhood as a concept has been examined and children’s social lives made visible from many angles. In order to do this, children were metaphorically removed from the home and the school where previously they were hidden – and yet, paradoxically, at the same time were more truly present than in any other site. Future directions for the social study of childhood may involve returning the child to the home, the family, and the school. In the same way that early feminism had to deconstruct gender in order to make the oppression of women in patriarchal society visible, childhood sociologists have liberated childhood from the oppression of adult society. Now that there appears to be an acceptance of the child as a competent social actor in mainstream social science disciplines, perhaps now is the time to retheorize childhood as part of society rather than removed from it.

SEE ALSO: Childcare; Childhood Sexuality; Developmental Stages; Ethnography; Socialization; Youth/Adolescence

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childhood sexuality

Karen Corteen

Children and sexuality are in their own right particularly sensitive areas. Bringing the two together is to end a dominant and ideological taboo (Jackson 1982). Consequently, within America and the UK the area of childhood sexuality is research arid, and the established literature is predominantly undertheorized and uncritical (Plummer 1991; Weis 2005). Childhood sexuality is a sensitive and controversial area and this is particularly the case when the issue of children's sexuality challenges heterosexual norms and highlights the rights of all children to make informed choices about their own bodies, sexual desires, practices, and identity (Levine 2002; Corteen 2003a). Evidently, it deals with issues that are both personal and private as well as public and political. The issue of childhood sexuality when approached holistically is concerned with children's lives and experiences, their physical health and their emotional well being. Thus, it is more than a theoretical and analytical endeavor. Discussions around and constructions of childhood sexualities, whether they are underpinned by a scientific developmental approach or a sociological approach, can result in the validation or invalidation, the sanctioning or condemnation of sexual desires, practices, and identities. The subject is socially, politically, ideologically, and academically awash with commonsensical ideologies regarding children, childhood, sexuality, and childhood sexuality.

Despite the obsession with adolescent (hetero)sexual behavior and fears concerning pedophilia and child sexual abuse within American and British cultures (Plummer 1991; Levine 2002), research concerned with childhood sexuality is sparse. Such scarcity derives from a reluctance to undertake research in this area, together with practical and ethical methodological considerations and societal

ideologies and taboos which restrict investigation. Researching the area of childhood sexualities is empirically problematic and this situation is produced and compounded by ideologies concerned with the protection of "childhood innocence" and prohibitive conventions which prevail in relation to "childhood eroticism, and childhood sexual expression and learning" (Weis 2005: 1). Traditionally and contemporarily in America and the UK the limited literature and research focused on childhood sexuality have been viewed through the lens of childhood development. Yet, while Freud's theory of psychosexual stages has been a major influence in many quarters in various parts of the world, his discussion of the sexual character of children's development has not been embraced. Plummer (1991) notes that the Freudian stance has been used to justify both the repression and the liberation of child sexuality, including childhood sexuality. Notwithstanding, the framework of development presumes that a child's capacity to make sense of and to make appropriate decisions regarding sex and sexuality via adult guidance is predicated on biological development. The child's "sexual development passes through a series of stages of competence on the way to a 'maturity' in adult life" (Plummer 1991: 244). Due to the theoretical framework being employed, the conceptualization of these stages will vary. Nonetheless, developmental theories have and continue to have significant influence regarding the way in which childhood sexualities are imagined and responded to. For example, there are "academic models of development which are established which can serve to homogenize and standardize children's sexuality" (*ibid.*). However, contemporary approaches within social science have problematized this presumption through a contextualization of childhood sexualities in relation to external individual and structural influences.

The issue of childhood sexualities is inextricably connected to the construction of "childhood," "childhood innocence," sexuality, protection, the separateness of children, and the adult-child relation. Although the immaturity of children is a biological fact, there are variations across time and space in the manner in which such immaturity is understood and managed (Hendrick 1997).

Definitions of childhood and conceptions of childhood sexuality are primarily the product of the society from which they emerge (Plummer 1991; Corteen 2003a).

In addition, while sexual desire, practice, and identity are connected to biological and physiological influences, they are not determined by them (Jackson 1982; Plummer 1991). They are not biological givens, but are socially constructed and mediated by society. This can be evidenced in cross cultural studies and research findings regarding the onset, types, and frequency of predominantly heterosexual activity, rates of underage and premarital conceptions, and use of contraception. The development of children's "sexual script" is a complex process of constant negotiation and "the child cannot *not* do it" (Plummer 1991: 238). "Such scripting is highly variable and context bound" (ibid.); however, cross culturally both historically and contemporarily heterosexuality is rarely acknowledged as a sexual practice, category, or identity. Yet, in the discursive production of sexuality, heterosexuality is constructed and represented as the normal, natural, and desirable sexuality. Sexual minorities are subsequently produced as unnatural, abnormal, and undesirable. In debates surrounding childhood sexuality, minority sexualities such as bisexuals, intersexuals, transvestites, transgendered, and transsexual individuals are predominantly excluded, while lesbians and gay men are marginalized and disqualified. This process also operates through formal and informal rules and expectations regarding sexual behavior and gender representation.

The laws, conventions, and ideologies which govern sexuality are learnt. Official and popular discourses underpin the conceptualization of "children," "childhood innocence," "sex," and sexuality. In so doing they inform the reproduction of childhood (hetero)sexuality. Children learn to assess the costs and benefits of particular sexual behaviors and sexualities through the law, the family and other state institutions, and through civil society. The production and management of childhood sexualities entail a complex interrelationship between individuals and institutions. Adults and children internalize, police, regulate, and punish themselves and others with regard to sexual desire, practice, and identity. Children are not

just acted upon; they are agentic subjects and to some extent they engage in these processes. This can be evidenced in children's own gender and sexual performances and name calling and bullying related to gender and sexual representations. Regarding childhood sexualities, in order to "fit in" and to avoid violence and punishment, children must attempt to engage in compulsory and repetitive gender performances which demonstrate their heterosexuality while simultaneously distancing themselves from "non heterosexualities." This is particularly detrimental to the emotional and physical well being of young minority sexualities.

A "progress model" of "childhood" is rooted in an idealist conceptualization of history (Goldson 1997) which perceives the construction of childhood and institutional intervention into the lives of children, including concerns regarding their sexual development, as being in the best interest of the child. In so doing, state surveillance, regulation, and management of children are considered to be predicated on benevolent, philanthropic, and altruistic social reformism, humanitarianism, and enlightenment. Such intervention is legitimated through welfarist and protectionist discourses.

However, a more critical approach contextualizes such interventions and concerns within the determining contexts of age, adultism, the imperatives of social control, and the capitalist patriarchal ordering of society. Critical theorists recognize the historical and cross cultural differences in the meanings and experiences of childhood, together with the identification of childhood as a social institution (Holt, in Archard 1993) which is neither natural nor universal (Jackson 1982). While there remains a continual renegotiation and revision of definitions of childhood, childhood is a structural concept and a determining context. In the naturalization of "childhood" and "childhood innocence" the structural dimensions of the adult-child relation and the construction of childhood are absent.

The conceptualization of childhood and childhood sexuality, academically, politically and popularly, continues to be informed and facilitated by a biologically deterministic conceptualization of naturalness. Subsequently, historically and contemporarily children are conceptualized as on a biologically determined

path of development, the final stage being that of adulthood. The period of physical and emotional development is herein constructed around dependency, innocence, and protection.

Prior to the fifteenth century, childhood was not a distinct phase in a person's life. In the west from the fifteenth century onwards childhood began to emerge as a distinct phase of life and the gradual removal of children from the everyday life of adults can be evidenced. This was facilitated by the conceptualization of children as special and in need of protection. The construction of children as different to adults and subsequent concerns regarding children and childhood innocence gathered strength during the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries. Within western society in particular, the universalization of childhood and the "concern over and surveillance of the sexual, emotional, social and physiological immaturity and lack of autonomy of those defined within childhood" increased during the development and consolidation of capitalism (Evans 1994: 3). Historically, the concern with and the production of the "modern child," "childhood innocence," and child sexuality can be traced to the beginning of the nineteenth century (Hendrick 1997). Pivotal to the construction of the "modern child" was the development of compulsory education for all children. Compulsory schooling "demanded a state of innocence" (ibid.). In America and in the UK ignorance was (and continues to be) equated with innocence (Goldman & Goldman 1982; Jackson 1982; Levine 2002; Corteen 2003a). "Childhood innocence" together with children's assumed natural and normal heterosexuality required protection from external and internal influences "en route to adulthood" (Evans 1994).

According to Weeks (1989), the "conceptualization of the separateness of children went hand in hand with the socially felt need to protect their purity and innocence." This can be evidenced in the changing attitudes towards and the treatment of children with regard to sex and sexual matters. Jackson (1982: 27) asserts "the anxiety and controversy surrounding the issue of children and sex must be seen in the context of the 'prolongation of childhood.'"

Foucault (1979: 105) maintained that the discursive deployment of the "pedagogization of sex" during this time, due to concerns and

campaigns regarding the health of the nation, entailed the sexualization and subsequently the problematization of children. During this period infantile masturbation in particular became a "subject of obsessive concern" with the masturbator situated as perpetrator, "the archetypal image of the sexual deviant" (Weeks 1989: 4). Subsequently, children became pivotal to the anxieties embedded in medico legal discourse, which underpinned health interventions against "dangerous sexualities" (Mort 1987). Middle class values were imposed on the "morally degenerate" and "vice ridden" poor as child protection was directed downwards and administered by those in authority.

Child (hetero)sexuality was constructed as "precious, active . . . ever present" (Foucault 1979: 28) and therefore had to be managed. This was especially the case regarding adolescents, as adolescence was (and still is) affiliated with biological and physiological growth during puberty. External pubescent physical changes were demarcated as signifiers of children's awareness of, and capacity to understand, sexual matters. The management of child (hetero)sexuality was and continues to be established as the preserve of adults (Plummer 1991; Levine 2002; Weis 2005). Armed with the remit of surveying, analyzing, and classifying children and their sexual desires and practice, various "experts" were established. Children were paradoxically constructed as asexual and yet saturated with (hetero)sexual potential; they were preliminary (hetero)sexual beings, yet imbued with (hetero)sexual potential. Children were innocent, yet capable of being corrupted and corrupting others (Gittins 1998; Wies 2005). They were seen as in danger from their own emerging desires and/or at risk of corruption by others. In the containment of child sexuality the heterosexual presumption can be evidenced. For example, in many societies this can be seen in the architectural and physical organization of schools designed to separate boys and girls through the layout of desks, changing rooms, and in boarding school dormitories and rules for monitoring bedtime. Indeed, it has been documented that the first experience of heterosexual penetrative intercourse demarcates sexual maturity (Corteen 2003b).

The taboo of children and sex (Jackson 1982) impacted on childrearing practices. Children

were denied independent access to knowledge regarding sex and sexual matters. Subsequently, standards of modesty and decency and rules governing sexual matters were taught to children. Regulation, management, and control of children's sexuality operated on a number of levels. It entailed the incitement of discourses as well as discursive silences. Thus, it comprised both repression and production (Foucault 1979). The "restrictive economy" resulted in the disappearance of the longstanding "freedom" and openness of language between children and adults concerning sex. There was a gradual stifling of "the boisterous laughter that had accompanied the precocious sexuality of children for so long – and in all social classes" (ibid.: 27). Simultaneously, there was also a proliferation of discourses centering on sex and in particular on children and sex. Thus, children's sexualities are not so much repressed as produced (Plummer 1991).

The western ideology of "childhood innocence" forged during the development and consolidation of capitalism remains powerful and pervasive. "Childhood innocence" continues to be a major signifier regarding the distinction of children from adults. Indeed "innocence" still constitutes the "defining characteristic of the 'child'" (Gittins 1998: 7). In America and in the UK the taboo of children and sex remains firmly entrenched and sexual matters and sex itself persist literally, as well as socially, politically, and legally, "for adults only." Various rules, conventions, and laws are in place to position sex as the preserve of adults. Sexuality, and children and sex in particular, continue to be controversial, evocative, and provocative subjects. Whenever such issues arise they are met with public scandal and moral crusades; battle lines are drawn between conservative and liberal camps.

Socially, politically, and legislatively, protectionist and welfarist discourses prevail concerning the protection of pre(hetero)sexual children and childhood innocence together with the natural trajectory of heterosexuality. Contemporary research has demonstrated that children are presumed to be heterosexual unless there are explicit signifiers to suggest otherwise. Therefore, although heterosexuality is contested and changing, and while it is not experienced or occupied in a homogeneous manner, it has not

relinquished its hold. Childhood (hetero)sexuality is to be protected and nurtured. In particular children are to be guarded against and steered away from sexual desires, practices, and identities which deviate from the heterosexual norm. This is also the case regarding age and intergenerational sexualities (Plummer 1991). In the West, increased tolerance of sexual minorities such as lesbians and gay men can be discerned, but tolerance is far short of full acceptance. Subsequently, with regard to children there is no positive advocacy of "homosexuality" and lesbianism or other sexual minorities with regard to the dissemination of knowledge.

In western representations of childhood, children are protected by adults and it is the responsibility of adults (primarily parents and carers) to act in the best interests of the child and to attend to their needs (Goldson 1997). This welfarist and protectionist understanding and representation of childhood and the adult-child relation underpins commonsense thinking. However, this conceptualization is lacking. It lacks an understanding of childhood as a surveyed, regulated, and disciplined period of life. So while there clearly are important considerations regarding child protection generally and child protection specifically regarding sex and sexuality, it is fundamental to recognize and acknowledge that the emphasis on welfare and protection can result in marginalization, exclusion, and oppression on the grounds of age. Children are "objects of both care and control" and therefore it is important to distinguish between "what society does *to* them" and "what society does *for* them" (Goldson 1997: 27). This is particularly the case regarding childhood sexualities. The "sexual politics of fear" which results in censoring information about sexual matters from children is not protection but is indeed "harmful to children" (Levine 2002: xxi). What is potentially harmful to children is unplanned conceptions, sexually transmitted infections, and damaging sexual experiences, including sexual violence. The "means of [children's] self defense" against the perils of sex are "knowledge and courage as well as rights and respect, political and sexual citizenship" (ibid.: 238).

Children are very aware of sex and sexuality and can understand and express sexual feelings

and emotions prior to puberty (Goldman & Goldman 1982; Plummer 1991; Levine 2002). However, adults consistently underestimate children's awareness and understanding regarding sexual matters. Children are also surrounded by confused and confusing messages regarding their own sexuality and sex and sexuality generally. Further, some children will have been subjected to sexual abuse. In a vacuum of limited, partial, and distorted knowledge, children have to come to terms with and negotiate their sexual development, physically and emotionally. This constitutes a "politics of denial" wherein children are "systematically and institutionally . . . denied access to information and knowledge concerning their physical and sexual development and its broader social and cultural context" (Goldman & Goldman 1982: 77). Contemporary research illustrates that the information children in America and the UK receive regarding childhood sexualities, sex, and sexualities generally is limited and partial and does not reflect their material realities. In the UK the official knowledge they receive concerning sexuality is driven by a health oriented "damage limitation" model (Corteen 2003a) and in America "the embrace of abstinence appears nearly unanimous" (Levine 2002: 92). This is particularly evident in the official schooling of sexualities which is underpinned by welfare protectionism and authoritarian surveillance, regulation, and discipline (Corteen 2003a). The information children receive is not primarily concerned with the needs, concerns, rights, and lives of children, but the needs and concerns of states and particular sexual, economic, and political social orders. In the institutionalized dissemination of knowledge regarding sexual matters children are not taught about pleasure or the complexities and matrix of sex, sexualities, and relationships. Further, the "language of sexual intimacy, the fluidity of sexuality, and the creativity of human sexual responses" (Sears 1992: 13) are demonized and rendered out of bounds. Arguably, there is a failure to equip both heterosexual children and sexual minority children with an appropriate knowledge and understanding of sexualities which reflect their lives. Put on a continuum the result is that at the softer end children may be ill informed, misinformed, and confused. At the sharp end

children are marginalized, disqualified, and discriminated against. Such prejudice has the potential to do real damage, up to and including self harm and suicide (Corteen 2003a). Research shows that this is especially the case for young lesbians and gay men. Arguably, ignorance does not equate with innocence; ignorance potentially makes all children vulnerable and unequipped to deal with sexual matters (Levine 2002; Corteen 2003a).

When approaching childhood sexualities the controversial and sensitive nature of the issue must be understood. Further, it is important to acknowledge the predominant liberal, domesticating hegemonic approaches to childhood sexualities and the need to counter this with a more radical and democratic approach derived in commitment to children's rights (Corteen 2003a). Resistance to dominant conceptualizations and constructions of childhood (hetero)sexuality must also be acknowledged, as there are oppositional desires, practices, and identities, including among children themselves.

SEE ALSO: Childhood; Compulsory Heterosexuality; Pedophilia; Sex Education; Sexual Politics; Sexuality

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children and divorce

Mark A. Fine

The issue of how children are affected by parental divorce has arguably evoked as much controversy as has any other topic in the social sciences. The controversy reflects the importance and timeliness of the topic – in the beginning of the twenty first century, Census Bureau data indicate that at least 50 to 60 percent of children in the United States will spend some period of time before they reach 18 in a home in which divorce has occurred (Harvey & Fine 2004). One third or more of the children in the United States will live in a stepfamily by the time they reach 18 (Coleman et al. 2000). Similar rates have been found in other western countries (Barber & Demo 2006). Further, when children experience the divorce of their parents, they become approximately twice as likely to divorce themselves as adults (Amato 2000).

This debate has recently extended into the popular press, with the publication of two books by prominent scholars: Wallerstein et al. (2000) and Hetherington and Kelly (2002). These two sets of researchers reached quite different conclusions regarding the effects of divorce on children. Wallerstein and her colleagues concluded that as many as 50 percent of the young people in their sample became worried, underachieving, self deprecating, and sometimes angry because of their parents' divorces. By contrast, Hetherington and colleagues found that there was initial turmoil in the lives of children of divorce, but that there were few meaningful long term differences between these children and their peers from first marriage families. These differences in findings and interpretations are substantive and show that scholars often reach conflicting conclusions regarding the extent to which divorce negatively affects children (Fine & Demo 2000).

MAJOR DIMENSIONS OF THE TOPIC

A synthesis of the literature by Emery (1999) is helpful in making sense of these seemingly contradictory conclusions regarding the effects of divorce on children. Emery suggested that there are five "facts" related to children and divorce: (1) divorce is very stressful for children; (2) divorce increases the risk of psychological problems; (3) despite the increased risk, most children whose parents divorce function as well as do children from first marriage families; (4) children whose parents divorce report considerable pain, unhappy memories, and continued distress; and (5) children's post divorce adjustment is strongly influenced by post divorce family life, particularly the quality of the child's relationships with the parents, the nature and extent of interparental conflict, and the family's socioeconomic status.

According to Emery, some researchers, particularly Wallerstein, tend to emphasize the fourth point (i.e., that children experience pain following divorce) without adequately considering the others, whereas others tend to minimize the distress and pain experienced by these children and young adults and, instead, emphasize the other facts. Emery's synthesis is

particularly helpful because it acknowledges that there is some “truth” to each of the varying sets of conclusions. Below, each of Emery’s divorce related “facts” is briefly reviewed.

Divorce is stressful for children. As noted by Emery (2004), divorce brings a wide variety of changes into the lives of most children, including transitions in residence and school, a decrease in economic well being, and changes in the quality and closeness of parent–child relationships. Virtually all children of divorce experience some of these changes, and change, even if positive in nature, is inherently stressful.

Divorce increases the risk of psychological problems. Divorce has been identified as being related to children’s and adolescents’ social, emotional, behavioral, and academic problems. For example, compared to children from first marriage families, children whose parents divorce are twice as likely to see a mental health professional, up to twice as likely to have behavior problems, twice as likely to drop out of high school before graduation, and are 25–50 percent more likely to be clinically depressed (Emery 2004). Meta analyses have consistently reported that, on average, parental divorce has a small, but statistically significant, negative impact on the well being of children in the United States (Amato 2000). Rodgers and Pryor’s (1998) review of research conducted in the United Kingdom, Australia, and New Zealand supported this conclusion.

These negative effects are most common around the period of the divorce and many children and families recover from the initial distress and resume normal functioning within a few years (Emery 1999; Hetherington & Kelly 2002). However, many adolescents whose parents divorce remain disadvantaged years after the divorce relative to their peers in first marriage families (Simons & Associates 1996; Hetherington & Kelly 2002).

Most children of divorce function as well as children from first marriage families. The data discussed earlier with respect to risk also speak to the resilience of children of divorce. Even if 20 percent of children whose parents divorced exhibit clinically significant behavior problems, 80 percent do not. Even though this risk is greater than among children from first marriage families (10 percent), the fact remains that the vast majority of children whose parents

divorce function within clinically normal limits, just as is the case for children from first marriage families.

Divorce is painful. Wallerstein and Lewis (1998) reported on a 25 year longitudinal study of a non randomly selected sample of 131 children and adolescents from 80 California families that had experienced separation and divorce. Their participants’ earliest memories of their parents’ divorces were abandonment, terror, and loneliness. Adolescence was marked by early sexual activity and experimentation with drugs or alcohol. The respondents’ early adulthood also was marked by fewer resources for college funding, fears of intimacy, and strained relationships with their parents, particularly their fathers.

Wallerstein et al.’s (2000) analysis revealed considerable flux in their participants’ relationship lives after their parents divorced. These individuals spent much of their early adulthood negotiating relationships. Many were not married, nor interested in becoming married. Many did not want children. Wallerstein and colleagues reported that many of their respondents were very afraid of being abandoned.

Reflecting a recent trend toward asking individuals to tell stories about their experiences, Harvey and Fine (2004) described the narrative accounts that college students constructed about how divorce had impacted them. Harvey and Fine found considerable variability in both the tone of the stories and the reactions to divorce; however, a consistent theme was that many of the individuals, when describing the divorce, reported considerable pain, unhappy memories, and distress, supporting Wallerstein and colleagues’ conclusions about the post divorce pain and sadness.

Children’s post divorce adjustment is influenced by post divorce (and even pre divorce) family life. The quality of children’s adjustment following divorce can be predicted as strongly (or more strongly) by family processes occurring after (and before) the divorce than by the actual divorce itself (Fine 2000). For example, research has suggested that children’s adjustment is facilitated to the extent that their parents engage in relatively little conflict with each other, that they do not experience a loss in financial well being, that their parents are psychologically adjusted, and that they are

adequately parented by the parental figures in their lives (Barber & Demo 2006).

Another line of evidence that supports the importance of family processes on child adjustment comes from Amato and Booth's (1997) longitudinal research on families that have not yet experienced divorce. They found that poor marriages (defined by the participants as involving consistently high levels of conflict and distancing) harmed children in multiple ways, including problematic relations with parents; greater difficulty in dating (fewer dates, more problems); lower marital quality among those who later married; and relatively high rates of dissolution of close relationships. Children from divorced families showed similar patterns, although the effects were not as strong as those related to parents' low marital quality. Amato and Booth's study suggests the possibility that family processes (in this case, marital quality) may be more salient for children's development than is the actual change in family structure (e.g., from a first marriage to a divorced family).

CHANGES OVER TIME IN THE TOPIC AND ITS TREATMENT

A change in how divorce among children has been studied is that there has been an increase in the amount of qualitative research that has been conducted. Qualitative research examines, often through intensive interviews of a relatively small sample of individuals, the meanings that participants attach to their divorce related experiences and can identify issues, patterns, and trends that may go undiscovered with the more traditional quantitative type of research. The Harvey and Fine (2004) collection of college students' narratives regarding their experience with their parents' divorce is an example of this research trend.

A second change is the manner in which societal institutions have attempted to help children cope more effectively with their parents' divorce. The most popular intervention in this area has become parenting education courses for divorcing parents (Blaisure & Geasler 2006). These courses attempt to help children by educating their parents about how to sensitively guide their children through the divorce process

and by teaching them how not to put their children in the middle of their ongoing disputes. This type of intervention has become mandated for divorcing parents in many jurisdictions in the United States and in some other western countries. The increasing popularity of parent education for divorcing parents has occurred primarily because this approach has considerable intuitive appeal and because most participants report being satisfied with the intervention; there are few studies that have directly supported their effectiveness.

CURRENT EMPHASES IN RESEARCH AND THEORY

In terms of research, current emphases include: (1) more longitudinal work that tracks changes in family processes and child adjustment over time; (2) more "within family" studies, meaning that investigators examine variation within divorced families rather than only comparing them to children and families from first marriage families; (3) more attention to family processes, such as ex spouse conflict and parenting styles, rather than solely focusing on family structure (i.e., divorced vs. intact); and (4) more focus on family processes that occurred before the divorce as possible contributors to children's adjustment.

Theoretically, a number of new orientations have been utilized in recent years to study divorce and its consequences for children. First and foremost, there have been efforts to identify conceptual sets of variables that might mediate the small, but reliable, effects of divorce on children. These sets of variables can roughly be categorized as pertaining to the child (e.g., the child's temperament, with children having "easier" temperaments reacting more positively to divorce), the parent (e.g., parents who are less depressed have children with fewer divorce related problems), the parent-child dyad (e.g., parents who have higher quality relationships with their children before the divorce and who place appropriate limits on their children's behavior have children with fewer behavior problems), the interparental relationship (e.g., parents who are able to resolve their conflicts successfully tend to have better adjusted children), and the family as a unit (e.g., post divorce families with more

consistent routines have better adjusted children). These developments reflect attempts to explain theoretically *why* divorce has effects on children and, in a broader context, to explore how individual, dyadic, and family *processes* work in conjunction with changes in children's family *structure* to contribute to children's development.

A second theoretical development is that there has been more attention to genetic and biological contributions to divorce. For example, some individuals may have a biological predisposition to have certain characteristics (e.g., neuroticism) that make them prone to divorce (Booth et al. 2000). If there is such a biological predisposition to divorce, it may be genetically transmitted to offspring, explaining why offspring of divorce are themselves more likely to divorce. With respect to children, recent efforts to examine how children's behavior is at least partially biologically determined have important implications for understanding the consequences of divorce on children. It seems logical that children's temperament, which is thought to be genetically determined, influences how they react to major stressors, such as divorce. Most conceptualizations of children's adjustment to divorce have understandably focused on environmental factors, but more attention needs to be given to possible genetic and biological factors.

METHODOLOGICAL ISSUES

There are several methodological issues that pose challenges for researchers of children and divorce. First, the research designs that we are ethically and practically able to use make it very difficult to draw causal inferences that divorce causes certain deficits in child outcomes. When differences are found between children from divorced and first marriage (or any other family types) families, it is not possible to determine if divorce caused the differences noted, or if there were some other, unmeasured differences between the groups that caused the observed differences. The lack of random assignment to groups poses a challenge to the internal validity of the research designs. For example, children from divorced families have been found to be more likely to drop out before graduating from high school than are children in first marriage

families. However, we cannot determine if divorce is responsible for this group difference, or if other variables are responsible (e.g., lower socioeconomic status, less parental supervision and monitoring).

Second, it is difficult to acquire representative samples that allow us to draw conclusions regarding the effects that divorce has on children in the general population. It is quite difficult to obtain a sample that is randomly chosen from the population of children and families who have experienced divorce. Most studies have used small scale samples of those in mental health treatment (clinical samples) or non random samples of people who volunteer to participate in the study. Even with the use of such techniques as obtaining names from divorce court records or random digit dialing, it is challenging to find samples that allow generalization to the population of interest. The few large scale studies that have utilized random samples thus take on even more importance because they allow us to draw inferences about children in general and how they react to divorce.

A third methodological challenge is to disentangle the effects of pre divorce factors from post divorce ones. Evidence is mounting that some of the child problems observed following the divorce actually began before the divorce (see Cherlin et al. 1991; Amato & Booth 1997). Children, couples, and families are not randomly assigned to divorce versus continually married conditions, and it appears that couples and families that function less positively are more inclined to experience a parental divorce than are well functioning families. Thus, some of the child adjustment difficulties that have been attributed to divorce may be more accurately attributed to these pre divorce (and/or biological) factors. The methodological challenge inherent in identifying pre divorce factors is that longitudinal studies with large samples must be conducted, which are time consuming and expensive.

FUTURE DIRECTIONS IN RESEARCH, THEORY, AND METHODOLOGY

Researchers will likely continue the trend of studying children's development before, during, and after they experience stressors like

divorce. There may be less direct attention to *divorce* per se and more attention to how child, parent, parent-child, interparental, and family factors act individually and in combination to determine how well children cope with major changes in their life.

The increased focus on the multitude of factors that affect children as they develop calls for both qualitative and quantitative research advances. Qualitatively, more investigators will use such methods as in depth interviewing, participant observation, and narrative account making to gain a richer description of how divorce is experienced. Most of these studies will include only those children who have experienced divorce. Quantitatively, there will be more nationally representative longitudinal studies of children and their families that will allow us to track child development over time, as well as how their development is affected by such stressors as divorce. Many of these studies will fruitfully compare children from a variety of different types of families (e.g., divorced vs. first marriage).

SEE ALSO: Child Custody and Child Support; Divorce; Family Diversity; Lone Parent Families; Non Resident Parents; Stepfamilies

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chonaikai

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Chonaikai refers to the neighborhood associations in modern Japanese cities. Although the name varies from city to city, with some called "self governing" associations, *chonaikai* seems

to be the most common name. A *chonaikai* is principally composed of *all* households in a neighborhood, with sizes varying from about ten to more than a thousand households. They perform comprehensive functions including anti crime activities, traffic safety campaigns, fire and disaster prevention, sanitation, promoting mutual friendships, culture and leisure activities, mutual aid, transmitting information from city hall, and representing neighborhoods to local governments.

The origins of *chonaikai* also vary from neighborhood to neighborhood. Some date back to feudal villages and the neighborhood units of feudal cities from before the Meiji Restoration of 1868. After the national government enacted the new law governing the cities, towns, and villages in 1888, some of the older villages and neighborhood units of the feudal ward systems became administrative wards supervised by local governments (Akimoto 1990; Nakata 1993). Yet they were not exactly the same as the *chonaikai* defined above, because their membership was limited to wealthy land lords. Others were organized spontaneously in the first wave of urbanization beginning in the 1920s. The rise of self employed merchants and factory owners and the influx of migrants from rural areas prompted the organization of *chonaikai* and similar associations in urban neighborhoods (Nakamura 1990; Tanaka 1990; Tamano 1993). In 1940, the Interior Ministry issued Ordinance No. 17, ordering all such organizations to standardize as *chonaikai* and *burakukai* – the rural counterpart of the neighborhood association – in order to mobilize all of the nation's people for World War II. Thus, the *chonaikai* were reorganized legally as local units of the totalitarian regime. After the war, the General Headquarters of the occupying Allied Forces identified the *chonaikai* as organizations for cooperating with militarism and abolished them in 1947. The *chonaikai* nevertheless persisted eventually as “voluntary” associations. Almost all of the earlier *chonaikai* had been rebuilt by 1952, when the occupation ended. Local governments acknowledged their existence, at least in practice, often appointing their leaders as part time officials. Since then, the *chonaikai* have developed an ambiguous character. They are private,

non juridical associations of residents, on the one hand, and de facto representatives of their neighborhoods on the other. Most urban residents in Japan are organized in *chonaikai* or similar neighborhood associations. In the second wave of urbanization in the 1960s, they flourished in the newly developing urban and suburban areas. There were more than 270,000 such associations in 1980 (Iwasaki 1989: 7). Even in the central districts of Tokyo, *chonaikai* persist and play many significant roles.

Sociological accounts of the *chonaikai* in Japan differ in their characterizations. Some identify the *chonaikai* as a distinctive Japanese “cultural pattern.” Others characterize them as the local agents of public administrations. Still others emphasize that they are self governing neighborhood organizations.

The “cultural pattern” thesis arose in discussions about the prospects of modernization and urbanization in Japanese society. Modernization theorists expected functionally undifferentiated local groups such as *chonaikai* to be replaced by special interest groups, but the *chonaikai*, as mentioned, were reestablished in the 1950s. As urbanization accelerated, some sociologists questioned whether “urbanism as a way of life” would develop in Japan or not (Ohmi 1958). Although massification seemed to be the dominant trend, the persistence of *chonaikai* as local groups appeared to be a significant exception. While most sociologists considered them to be remnants of feudal society and therefore expected them to disappear, the culturalists countered that they would not disappear because they were rooted in Japan's cultural pattern. Although they indeed persist, it is doubtful that the culturalist “explanation” provides a sufficient answer to the question of why they persist. Are they still the same as the local groups of feudal society? Is the organization of associations based on neighborhoods an invariable pattern across Japan? Is it unique to Japan? The principle of organizing *all* of the households in a neighborhood did not appear before the 1920s, which indicates that it is a “modern” principle that only appeared in the early stages of urbanization (Nakamura 1990; Tamano 1993). Furthermore, some analysts reported the existence of similar associations in the Philippines (Ohtsubo

& Masatoshi 1986), Indonesia (Yoshihara 2000), Thailand (Kaewmanotham et al. 2000), South Korea (Torigoe 1994; Noh 2000), Hong Kong (Yoshihara 2000), and the People's Republic of China (Kuroda 2000). Some of these associations may have been transplanted from Japan during the period of military occupation in the 1940s, such as the RT/RW in Indonesia (Yoshihara 2000), the Kaifong association in Hong Kong (Yoshihara 2000), and Bansanghoi in South Korea (Torigoe 1994; Noh 2000), but others seem to be indigenous. One should not forget again that these associations were reorganized, or newly organized, in the process of modernization. These are not exactly the same as *chonaikai*, but it is easy to see that characteristics such as the membership policy for organizing all households and the comprehensive functions they perform are very similar to the *chonaikai* in Japan.

Those who claimed that *chonaikai* is a local agent of the public administration emphasized that the functions performed by *chonaikai* complemented those of the fire department, the police office, and other bureaus of the municipality. More important, however, is the historical fact that the *chonaikai*'s predecessors were founded when the national government reorganized the old villages as administrative wards in 1888, and that they were reorganized again under the militarist regime in 1940 (Akimoto 1990). Together with the functions they perform, these facts imply that the *chonaikai* is principally a local agent of the state bureaucracy. Its leaders were initially recruited from the ranks of the honored landlords of the late nineteenth century towns, and they gradually gave way to small merchants and factory owners, or the "old middle class," at the turn of the century. Even today, this group typically comprises the more active membership of the *chonaikai* and tends to use it as a base for the conservative political machine (Okuda 1964; Akimoto 1990; Tamano 1993; see also Bestor 1989). From the local agent perspective, the *chonaikai* are bodies of grassroots conservatism, whether characterized as "premodern" or not. From this perspective, as the new middle class residents took part in local communities, the dominance and effectiveness of the *chonaikai* would decline. Yet some critics reported that

in some housing developments the new middle class suburbanites involved themselves in *chonaikai*, so they assumed a more liberal character (Nakamura 1965). Another critic suggested that there is tension between the politically conservative *chonaikai* and municipal administration (Bestor 1989).

Finally, some scholars argue that *chonaikai* are not simply local groups but self governing associations of residents. They are thus some thing like a municipality of the neighborhood (Yasuda 1977), or an association for the collective management of the area (Nakata 1993). As territorial associations, the membership policy and comprehensive functions performed, including cooperation with the local government, are easy to understand. They might thus be rooted in the self governing tradition of Japanese community, but have not been properly treated by the government. Some scholars view this tradition as democratic (Iwasaki 1989); others see it as a historical development from the dominance of the honored landlords to the collective management of all the residents of the local area (Nakata 1993). Whether these interpretations are correct or not, the *chonaikai* have often contributed to improving local life and have effectively derived policy interventions from local governments (Iwasaki 1989). Many case studies since the 1970s have reported that some *chonaikai* have been involved in urban planning for community based redevelopments in inner industrial areas; others have succeeded in preserving the residential environment of middle class suburbs. Nevertheless, what kind of and whose interest the *chonaikai* represents should be carefully investigated in each case.

In sum, it seems clear that the *chonaikai* has characteristics of both a self governing association and a local agent of public administration. It is also clear that this form of neighborhood association in Japan has a distinct history. Yet, similar associations are also found in other East and Southeast Asian countries. Such associations were organized in the contexts of military mobilization, the local administration of the development dictatorship, or the empowerment and development devices for slum dwellers. Comparative analyses are required to develop an understanding of the nature of the various organizational forms of neighborhood associations

in different contexts. Such analyses may reveal the same complexities as those surrounding the *chonaikai* in Japan. However, the fundamental issue in all cases seems to be how to answer two questions: how the ruling structure of the state bureaucracy incorporates the neighborhood associations in order to foster support for administrative power and to monitor the local area and the residents effectively; and how people work their way into the administrative structure so as to empower themselves by taking part in the self governing activities. The neighborhood associations of Japan provide a good example for studying dialectics of social power based on localities.

SEE ALSO: Culture, Organizations and; Culture, the State and; Local Residents' Movements; Organizations, Voluntary; Urban Community Studies; Urbanism/Urban Culture; Urbanization

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Christianity

Lluís Oviedo

As a basic description, Christianity is the religious faith grounded on the life and teachings of Jesus of Nazareth. Beyond this point, the scholarly understanding of that concept has been the object of much discussion in modern times, particularly in the realm of the social sciences. In an attempt to put some order into the social, religious, historical, and ideological reality that corresponds to the term "Christianity," a synthetic account may be offered, covering its history and the main dimensions.

Christianity was, at its inception, a religious movement of messianic apocalyptic character, born from the preaching and destiny of Jesus, deemed by his disciples to be "the Christ" (Messiah or Redeemer), in the context of the anxieties and expectations of the Jewish religious milieu of the first century. The experiences of his followers after the death of their master and, particularly, their purported encounter with him as a resurrected person triggered the first expansion of this movement, which was perceived at the time as just another apocalyptic sect within Judaism.

Gradually, the Christian teaching reached ever more people outside the Jewish boundaries. It finally appeared as a new religious faith

oriented to a broader public inside the Roman Empire, and achieved stability as a more institutional and salvific religion. The new faith expanded despite the persecutions suffered throughout the first three centuries of its existence, and finally acquired the status of the official religion of the empire. During that time, the new religion struggled to better define its own beliefs, among many contrasting interpretations, in order to organize its aggregations at all levels, and to discipline its followers.

All of this endeavor in pursuit of order was unable to prevent successive splits among different groups and ideological orientations, the most remarkable being the schism between the eastern and western branches of the church during the Middle Ages, followed by the various Reformations of the sixteenth century.

Over the centuries, Christianity has shown a particular ability to adapt to the changing social and cultural conditions within which it finds itself. It was nurtured by the waning classical paradigm of Greco Roman society, later adapted to the new structures of feudalism in the traumatic early medieval period, and flowered during the High Middle Ages, when the faith, supported by the church, was a central element of the social and cultural configuration of society. Modern times have raised new challenges for Christianity, now impelled to search for a new balance within highly pluralistic societies and (in the western world) a less religious cultural milieu. Christianity, however, has always suffered from considerable stress caused by a polarization between two tendencies, one centripetal, seeking the establishment of a common realm, a unity that is not only religious but also cultural and political, and the other centrifugal, as some historians have shown, which is the ability of a religion to render self conscious and empower the identity of different peoples and social entities, nourishing their own self affirmation and providing the space for a more pluralistic society (Brown 1996).

At the present, Christianity is acknowledged as a "global faith" that numbers, according to the latest estimates, around 2 billion nominal members, spread through nearly the entire world, which assumes a multiplicity of confessional forms, Catholicism being the largest (around 1 billion members).

SOCIOLOGICAL DIMENSIONS OF CHRISTIANITY

Christianity is basically a faith, canonically established and regulated through a system of "dogmas" or "mandatory beliefs" concerning the understanding of God and the way he saves or benefits humans. A significant feature of this faith has been its ability to engage with reason since its first appearance within Greco Roman classical culture. Indeed, for some authors, the cognitive form of the Christian religion is the synthesis between a positive, revealed religion of Semitic origin and the rational framework provided by ancient Greek philosophy. However, this synthetic encounter has not always been peaceful and is far from simple, and some times contrasts blatantly with the dogmatic – i. e., not open to rational enquiry – nature of its principles. It would seem that this cognitive framework is rather based on a permanent tension and dialectic between faith and reason, a tension that continually arises in the ongoing struggle to cope with new standards of rationality in the long history of Christianity. The permanent struggle with reason has been deemed a sign of vitality for a religion called to actualize permanently its core beliefs through innovation and dialogue. Furthermore, a symptom of the "rational incompleteness" of Christian faith is the irresolvable dialectic of its apophatic and cataphatic aspects – mysterious/mystic and affirmative/rational. As a result, the Christian faith experiences a polarization of cognitive expressions, along the dualistic schema, which distinguishes faith as an experience of the mystery or the limits of human intelligence and faith as a way of understanding and deepening human knowledge. Even if the first seems to give rise to a "religion of mystics" and the second to a "religion of intellectuals," Christianity has kept both ways as legitimate expressions of the same faith.

Christianity has a plurality of religious practices along its confessional lines. The tension arises this time between a more sacramental communitarian trend and a more introspective personal one. Most mainline Christian communities express their faith through a double ritual schema: the public reading and comment (preaching) of the canonical scriptures (the Bible) and the celebration of sacraments or

rituals of mediation of divine force (grace). The second way of religious expression is through personal prayer, which has multiple expressions. A good deal of Christianity looks for a complementarity and balance of both dimensions, the ritual and the spiritual, but the achievement of balance varies among different Christian confessions and even within the same confession, allowing for different spiritual traditions.

Since its first days, Christian faith has been seen as a religion presided over by a quite strict moral code, struggling with an environment of more lax standards. However, Christianity has adapted its moral code to several different cultures, and has shown a certain degree of flexibility in the process. In this respect, a moral tension has been kept alive, among successive apocalyptic waves, reform movements, and the permanence of groups of “religious virtuosos,” more prone to strictness and to stress the difference between Christian fellowship and a worldly way of life. Christian morality has tended to be more communitarian, emphasizing engagement for others or “love of neighbor.” These ethics of mutual dependence and responsibility, however, are grounded on a strong call to self awareness and the personal divine call to mission. It seems that only with this sense of individuality and personal freedom before God and his norms is it able to provide for a moral schema of social responsibility.

Christianity has been from its very beginning organized in communities of hierarchical structure, which constitute the “church.” The term is applied to all Christian people – at least those belonging to the same confession – and, in a more limited fashion, to any community of believers led by a pastor or priest that gathers periodically for ritual, instruction, and exchange, and offers different services to the community at large. The communitarian emphasis is not taken for granted in any part of this large religious spectrum. Indeed, some forms of Christianity have adopted a more individualistic stance. Conversely, church activity has evolved in many areas into a kind of “agency” providing rituals and other services to a broad public, changing significantly its meaning and becoming less personal. A second organizational trait concerns the balance between “church” – as institution – and

“sect.” Christianity has lived the normal process, typified by every religious movement, of evolution from a more sectarian reality to a more institutional, open form: the “church.” It is not easy to know how long the process lasted, even if it appears that quite early Christianity took on an institutional, less apocalyptically oriented, form. Thus, a dual schema has persisted within the Christian organization, predominantly as an institutional church but leaving room for sectarian expressions, which historically harbored minorities of greater religious intensity. At the moment Christianity has a multiplicity of organizational forms, ranging between both extremes of the spectrum: church, denominations, cults, and sects.

Also in this case a plural panorama is noted, as Christianity has developed many models of relationship with its social environment. Many scholars, from inside and outside the Christian field, have tried to objectify this plurality, which ranges from the extreme of total integration and cooperation to the opposite, of distinction and sharp contrast. This configuration has given rise to several political systems as well (Niebuhr 1951). Even if historically Christian churches have tried to “Christianize” their respective societies, raising moral standards, promoting their own agenda, or implementing “Christian policies,” more frequently they have looked for accommodation within the social conditions of their context, adapting to successive changes. This, however, does not exclude moments of confrontation and resistance, or of unrest and social criticism, very often nourished by apocalyptic expectations. Yet, almost always, these tendencies have been those of the minority, and have represented only factions of a particular intensity, searching for social change or inspired by radical interpretations of biblical texts. Mainline Christianity has adopted a more “realistic stance” in its relationship with constituted powers, often serving even as a legitimizing agency, and has reacted only when the conditions for its survival have been threatened. In this respect, it is difficult to conclude whether Christian faith favors any kind of political or social agenda, as some authors have suggested. A kind of flexibility presides over its influence, which perhaps is to be seen at a different level: that of providing

moral commitment and ideological empowerment to any cause deemed worthy of fighting for.

CHRISTIANITY AS A SOCIOLOGICAL QUESTION

The sociological understanding of Christianity has dealt with several problems, which some times have challenged, and still do, the scientific enterprise. A very short list would include: the historic question on the origins and rise of Christian faith, the paradoxical relationship between Christian religion and modernity, and the enigma of secularization or the possible end of religion.

(1) From a sociological point of view, Christian origins seem to offer a “case study” on the “probability of the improbable,” to use Luhmann’s expression. The rational reasons which might explain the success of a religious movement fail in this respect. Almost everything conspired for the failure of this project: the disastrous end of its founder, the persecutions suffered from the beginning by his followers, the hostile environment encountered among Jews and pagans. Modern times have seen several attempts to rationalize the rise of Christianity and to supply an answer to the question of its unexpected success. Liberal understandings of biblical criticism have pointed to the eschatological strength of the new religion, able to convey the anxieties of a segment of the population at that time. Marxism has shown the ability of that faith to inspire an expectation of fulfillment for masses living in the midst of miserable conditions. Nietzsche has denounced the Christian maneuver of inverting values in order to satisfy the resentment of the weakest. The list may be enriched with many other kinds of arguments. Recently, more sophisticated sociological analysis has endeavored to decipher some of the clues of Christianity’s success, in a close alliance with insights offered by modern biblical scholarship. It seems, according to this point of view, that the growth rate, through conversion, in early Christianity is not much higher than that observed in other processes of religious conversion (Stark 1996). Class, gender, and social structure are some of

the factors contributing to the positive trend, and engagement with the needy, especially in times of crisis, convinced ever greater numbers of people of the advantages – rationally speaking – inherent in such a religion. It must be said, however, that aside from the fruitful engagement of biblical studies with sociology, the explanations provided by a more rational stance do not exclude, or, for that matter, require the presence of what can be called the “religious factor” or some measure of “religious capital.”

(2) The problematic relationship between Christianity and modern society has been shown, perhaps better than anybody else, by Max Weber. In *The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism* (1906) and later works, the German sociologist struggled with the foundational role of this faith as a necessary element for the configuration of the modern western world, social differentiation, and the development of science. Weber was concerned with the historical data which showed the lack of modern forms outside of the Christian matrix, and researched the positive role played by Protestant ethics and subsequent strictness in the development of capitalist societies, even if the causal relationship was minimized as a mere “elective affinity.” The relationship could be broadened, as Christianity is discovered as a factor of greater rationalization in diverse fields, theoretical and practical, anticipating a modern trend. Furthermore, Christianity is perceived as a key driver in the rationalization process, either in the theoretical or in the practical dimension, and as contributing to modern development. For Weber, the dialectics between Christianity and modernity are, nevertheless, more complex. Modernity may be seen as a result of mature Christian expression, but at the same time as a factor resulting in religious crisis. Indeed, the faith that helped give birth to the modern world later suffers the pressure of modern differentiation and disenchantment (*Entzauberung*), which deprives it of its ideological and practical basis. In a further step, Weber has conjoined religious crisis and personal disruptions brought on by the lack of a framework where certain values and sensitivities find their support. Other sociologists have tried to better understand this complex

relationship, which very often appears as paradoxical: it seems that modern society can go on neither with nor without Christian faith. Functional analysis has demonstrated the needed contribution of this religion for social processes in advanced societies. That “function” may be construed in many ways, from the classically attributed or acknowledged capacity of social integration and moral enforcement to the more abstract views of Luhmann: the “management of contingency,” the “semantic openness that allows evolution,” and the “blocking of reflexivity” needed to avoid an unmanageable number of paradoxes (Luhmann 1977, 2000). At the same time, sociologists may be concerned with the negative effects that may unleash an “excess of religious faith,” undermining the proper functioning of a society intended as a system. There is currently a lack of empirical proof regarding the possibility of a modern society without – at least some measure of – Christian religious presence.

(3) The last observations point to the third question: “secularization” as a dynamic affecting the essence of Christian faith, threatening its existence and giving rise to dark expectations. Even if the discussion around the so called “secularization thesis” remains active, some agreement has been reached on the study pertaining to the Christian origins of the secularization process, intended as a byproduct of modernization. Many see the secularization question as a “Christian question,” i.e., as a problem arising from the constituency of the Christian faith, which has conceded great autonomy in many spheres of action and long acknowledged the special dignity of rational inquiry. In that sense Christianity creates the conditions for the possibility of its own historical demise, as social differentiation makes that faith more dispensable and scientific progress seems to make it more irrelevant. In other words, it would seem that the Christian faith may be more vulnerable to practical dissolution than others, being too prone to accommodation to social realities, which in the end leave no space for religious affirmation. The question refers to the Weberian perception of a kind of “social incompleteness” which requires in some ways the presence of the religious element that helped to implement such a society. Thus, the more a society becomes secularized, the more it

needs a Christian reference. The situation is perceived as very problematic, from both a theoretical and empirical point of view: first, because, as Löwith (1949) has demonstrated, many ideas and values of modernity are the outcome of a secularized process of Christian ideas and values, and no one knows if these values can survive completely outside of a religious matrix; second, because the survival of a society without religion is still an open question, and a greater question is posed as to whether “modern social configuration” might find a firmer foundation by means of other secular or religious forms once the “Christian capital” has been exhausted.

CHRISTIAN FAITH AND SOCIOLOGY: AN OPEN QUESTION

At a deeper level, Christianity may be seen as a kind of “competing instance” with social science, and sociology as a renewed attempt to accomplish the enlightened tendency to “religion’s *Aufhebung*,” or its suppression and replacement by rational means. Since August Comte, sociological endeavor has been suspected of presupposing the dissolution of religion, and the sociological understanding of society has been perceived as being incompatible with the religious one. This applies particularly to western Christianity, because it has kept its own “theory of society,” its own view of the goals, limits, and means of social action, which have been challenged by a more enlightened or rational program (Hervieu Léger 1986). Recent theological approaches have radicalized the perceived tension and denounced the aporetic character of the attempt to provide a secular program for social development, because of the violent and nihilistic basis of such a voluntaristic enterprise (Milbank 1990). The relationship between sociology and Christianity has been marked by conflict and signed by warfare until very recently. As any other social science, sociology has been suspected of applying a “reductive stance” to Christian realities, hiding any element which could not be completely rationalized. The suspicion has at times reached empirical sociology, deemed as unable to “observe” what is, by definition, an inside and mysterious unobservable reality.

This, however, is only a part of the story. There is yet a tradition of collaboration between Christian faith and social studies. Surely there is no other religion so able to integrate and to make good use of sociological research, as this faith has, more often than not, accepted the challenge of rational inquiry, even when applied to itself. Furthermore, it is important to consider the fact of the existence of sociologists working often for church agencies and, more interestingly, recent trends in sociological research which have stressed a less reductive approach and a disposition to acknowledge a place, even a "rational weight," to the "religious factor," though they may apply an economic method for better understanding it (Iannaccone 1998; Stark & Finke 2000).

SEE ALSO: Belief; Catholicism; Church; Denomination; Luhmann, Niklas; Protestantism; Religion; Religion, Sociology of; Sect; Secularization; Televangelism; Theology; Weber, Max

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chronic illness and disability

Kathy Charmaz

Chronic illness lasts. A chronic illness has a lengthy duration, uncertain outcome, and unpredictable episodes, often with intrusive symptoms and intermittent or progressive disability. Having a chronic illness poses life problems such as following a medical regimen, managing ordinary responsibilities, and experiencing stigma and discrimination. A disease, in contrast, may remain silent for years without eliciting a diagnosis or causing noticeable symptoms and life disruptions. Experiencing chronic illness makes disease real. Sociological definitions of chronic illness start with the experience of disruption and impairment. Social definitions of disability start from the lack of societal accommodation to certain individuals' needs, thereby disadvantaging them and discriminating against them. Such definitions of disability tend to presuppose that the people involved have static, visible conditions with predictable and sustained needs.

Chronic illness and disability emerged as fields of sociological inquiry in early ethnographic studies such as Julius Roth's *Timetables: Structuring the Passage of Time in Hospital Treatment and Other Careers* (1963), Erving Goffman's *Stigma: Notes on the Management of Spoiled Identity* (1963), and Fred Davis's *Passage Through Crisis: Polio Victims and Their Families* (1963). These sociologists' depiction of patients' actions and interactions with professionals contrasted with Talcott Parsons's (1953) theoretical concept of the sick role. Parsons's concept assumed recovery from illness; impartial, active physicians; direct medical intervention; and reciprocal roles with passive patients whose temporary exemption from normal adult responsibilities allowed them to follow their physicians' advice and to concentrate on recovery.

Parsons's concept of the sick role fit neither the treatment goals for chronic illness and disability nor their corresponding treatment roles. Illness continues, disability persists. Hence, physicians treat symptoms rather than causes,

attempt to minimize complications, and rely on patients and their caregivers for information, but monitoring and managing occur at home. Studies of chronic illness and disability further reveal the limits of the sick role and its accompanying acute care model because individuals intermittently need a range of auxiliary health services as well as continuing social and community services.

Patients' conditions become part of their lives rather than a time out apart from them. Despite institutional, interactional, and physical or mental constraints, studies of chronic illness show that actors have agency. Roth's *Timetables* (1963) and Goffman's *Asylums* (1961) depict patients as active, creative individuals who adapt to their situations but, more over, adapt these situations, when possible.

Researchers began to study illness and disability as problematic in their own right instead of solely as a health indicator or status variable. From that point, sociologists have taken the experience of illness and disability as research topics to understand their consequences for self, identity, and social life. Their studies start from the perspective of adults and account for their experiences in sociological terms without the implied judgments of psychological interpretations.

The fields of chronic illness and disability share certain origins, although disability studies also has structural roots. The early attention to the organization and goals of rehabilitation to understand disability has continued. The emergence of the disability rights movement strengthened the structural roots of disabilities studies. Researchers and disability rights activists joined to produce a strong emphasis on social justice and activism in disabilities studies. As an exemplar of early activism, the 1960s Independent Living Movement made autonomy a major goal and won rights for people with severe disabilities to leave institutions and to live unsupervised in their communities. The Independent Living Movement relied, however, on the individual responsibility of persons with disabilities to organize and manage their care; the movement did not address how larger structural barriers impeded their efforts. Since then, disability studies adopted an explicit social model based on assumptions that *society*

disables people with defined impairments by failing to accommodate to them.

The fields of chronic illness and disability provide an important corrective to the extensive literature in medical sociology that focuses on doctor–patient relationships. For people with chronic illnesses and disabilities, the doctor–patient relationship represents a small – albeit consequential – part of their illness experience. Ordinarily, they are people, not patients.

Studies about managing chronic illness assumed the significance of maintaining personal control and demonstrated ways that people achieved and maintained it. They reorganize their homes, schedules, activities, and relationships and manage actual and potential stigma. These studies also show how people normalized the adaptations they made to live with an illness. Yet the onset of illness and many disabilities in adult life constitutes a “biographical disruption” (Bury 1982) that raises existential questions and spurs a reconstruction of self, as well as a reorganization of daily life. Charmaz (1991) furthers studying reconstruction of self and experienced time. From having long stretches of empty time to needing extraordinary amounts of time to handle ordinary tasks, existential meanings shift and change during a chronic illness. Health and social crises that puncture routine existence become long remembered turning points. Experiencing chronic illness magnifies turning points in adult life and often minimizes the time between them. For committed partners, the meanings and consequences of these biographical processes become shared and result in collaborative work to manage illness and disability.

Studies of chronic illness reveal the empirical significance of the body and thus encourage theorizing to begin at this basic level, rather than from texts and extant theories. These studies have also spawned a nascent sociology of suffering. When people define illness as disrupting their lives, they reveal taken for granted assumptions that their expectations have gone awry. Boundaries have been broken and trust in their bodies has been shattered. Questions of “why me?” follow. Under these conditions, experiencing chronic illness calls for a search for explanation and understanding. The turmoil and troubles of lifelong poverty

may, however, lead to accepting and normalizing chronic distress and impairment.

Disabilities studies moved its discourse from stigma, personal tragedy, and victimization to societal structures that separated people with disabilities and discriminated against them. From this perspective, assuming that impairment causes disability erroneously grants fundamental significance to medical definitions and interventions and thus obscures other forms of oppression, such as those inherent in power arrangements with their concrete expression in environmental barriers. Therefore, disability studies also challenge the concept of medicalization because it overstates the significance of physicians and understates that of global economic and power structures.

The place of personal narratives as scholarship remains debated. Do they provide insight into reconstructing coherence or proclaim self-indulgence? Several personal narratives by social scientists have exerted considerable influence. Irving K. Zola's *Missing Pieces: A Chronicle of Living with a Disability* (1982) found a ready audience among people in the disabled community because he learned to integrate his disability into his life after years of trying to overcome it. Arthur Frank's *At the Will of the Body* (1991) describes how having cancer and enduring pain separated him from ordinary worlds and from those closest to him. His story conveys the experience of suffering, recounts tales of loss and transcendence, inspires hope, and challenges commodification and dehumanization in medical care. Robert Murphy's *The Body Silent* (1987) chronicles his progressive paralysis as a benign tumor in his spinal column made him quadriplegic. Murphy saw himself as damaged, dependent, and deficient: defective. Like many people with chronic illnesses and disabilities, he believed his disability symbolized atonement for some prior wrong. Some members of the disabled community revere the book for its honesty, while others revile its reaffirmation of demeaning images of disability. Although Murphy's book records a dark descent, such books reveal the quest to make sense of an existential journey and of the self that emerges from it.

The fields of chronic illness and disability have become more distinct over time.

Sociological studies of people with chronic illness primarily remained social psychological, while disability studies grew more structural and interdisciplinary with foundational contributions by historians and political scientists. Structural disability theorists soon asked how ideological views, power politics, and economic practices shaped how societies constructed definitions of disability and impairment.

A constructionist perspective has informed both fields, but their usual starting points differ. Studies of chronic illness document how features of society influence individuals' experience and how they respond to the difficulties they face. David Locker's (1983) interview study of people with arthritis bridges chronic illness and disability. He observes that people's resources and strategies for managing life alter their definitions of impairment, disability, and disadvantage, which render constructions of disability less static than ordinarily presumed. Given their explicit commitment to social justice, however, some disability theorists and researchers disdain social psychological studies of chronic illness with their inductive methods, analytic emphases, and focus on individuals. Disability scholars have engaged the politics of welfare and subsequent meanings of dependency, disadvantage, and difference to a greater extent than researchers in chronic illness. These theorists apply current structural approaches in novel, although deterministic, ways; however, they have not generated new theories.

In contrast, major empirical studies of chronic illness have advanced theoretical conceptions in interpretive sociologies, including symbolic interactionism and narrative analysis. These studies move the theoretical discourse beyond roles – whether treated as patient roles, impaired roles, or rehabilitation roles – and into fresh analyses of situated actions, negotiated meanings, reconstruction of self, identity goals, definitions of duration, temporal benchmarks, time perspective, and narrative reconstruction.

Despite the theoretical directions suggested by major studies, however, most empirical studies of chronic illness do not advance theory but do further understanding of specific research problems, of research participants and their worlds, and of studied interactions and processes. Critical discussions of the theoretical

implications of studies in this field have, however, produced cutting edge analyses of the limits of positivism, postmodernism, and structuralism and subsequently altered views of the impaired body and biomedicine.

After some years of becoming distinctive areas, important areas of convergence between chronic illness and disability are evident. These areas include (1) inevitable disabilities among aging populations, (2) the later life incidence of chronic illness in people with lifelong disabilities, (3) the subsequent narrowing or collapsing of stable plateaus among people with disabilities, (4) the growing recognition of invisible disabilities and contested, disabling illnesses, (5) the disabling effects of medical and surgical treatment of illness, (6) structural inequities that differentially affect people with chronic illnesses or disabilities, and (7) critical efforts to situate theorizing illness and impaired bodies within their structural realities. These points of convergence may raise anew issues of suffering, loss, stigma, uncertainty, and reconstruction of self and identity at the individual level and economic divisions, power prerogatives, and the institutionalization of disadvantage and discrimination at the societal level.

A strong tradition of qualitative research has continued in studies of chronic illness, whereas disability studies draws on a wide range of methods. Throughout qualitative studies of chronic illness and disability, researchers have relied more on what people say during interviews and less on what they do and say in their own settings. Researchers tend to reify their participants' stories as though they reproduce reality without considering the taken for granted assumptions and practices on which those stories rest. We have given insufficient attention to silences and their meanings, although many people's struggles with chronic illness and disability occur in silence. Silences are crucial for learning what lies between statements and taken for granted actions. Understanding how people become silenced and when suffering leads to silence would deepen our knowledge of chronic illness and disability. Suffering fills silent spaces and may remain unacknowledged – in research participants' stories and in researchers' narratives. Yet new imperatives to bring the body into research and

theorizing necessitate gaining a more nuanced understanding of suffering.

The future of disability studies portends continuing its interdisciplinary traditions, critical stance, and activist agenda with critiques of developments in social policy and medical care. Disability activists and scholars challenge current practices and potential trends that reduce disabled populations, such as using prenatal diagnosis of genetic diseases for abortion decisions and legalizing assisted suicide. They raise theoretical and ethical questions about biological determinism, the value of life, and whose lives have value. Gary Albrecht's (1992) book suggests many potential directions for disability studies that remain untapped. For example, he notes that work in health clubs and sports medicine sells prevention and maintenance. With the commodification of fitness and function among older populations, disability studies may also move toward critical analyses of health promotion and maintenance.

In both fields, the effects of capitalism on technical advances, availability and distribution of supplies and services, and personal and professional relationships will outline individual experiences and fuel research on structure and experience and the connections between them. Future insights and arguments in these fields about visibility, temporality, identity, responsibility, and reciprocity portend illuminating what it means to be human and what it takes to create a caring society.

SEE ALSO: Body and Society; Disability as a Social Problem; Illness Experience; Medical Sociology; Sick Role; Symbolic Interaction

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church

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Sociology, especially in its classic works, provides analytic perspectives for understanding specific ecclesiastic religious phenomena (i.e., churches and church oriented religions). But long before the birth of sociology – in its contemporary empirical version – modern philosophy, both Continental and Atlantic, was deeply engaged with the ecclesiological question (Olivetti 1992). This philosophical attention attributed special theoretical relevance to observation of certain socio religious phenomena. This was particularly true in the classical era of the philosophy of religion – in the specifically modern meaning of the term – especially from Hume and Kant through Hegel. This emerged in the attempt to consider and

represent the tension between philosophical ecclesiology and theory of society (a tension that implies themes such as secularization, the relationship between church and state, the relationship between religion and morality, and the process of social differentiation and its limits). Thus the ecclesiological question, as a close relationship between the empirical and the theoretical sphere, plays a crucial role for that aspect of the crisis of ontotheological metaphysics known as philosophy of religion, regardless of the various solutions proposed by individual scholars. An exemplary case is *Religion* as the epilogue to Kant's transcendental program. Kant deals with the need to think and represent the church, but also with the contradiction of the more general assumptions this line of thought leads to. Another example is the classical (especially romantic and idealistic) theme of the opposition of *invisible* and *visible* church.

This theoretical and cultural context was an important part of the terrain where contemporary sociology started to appear in the mid nineteenth century, first as sociology of religion. This implied that the new discipline would pay special attention to the definition of “church” and remain devoted to this specific question. This turned out to be only partly true, and even then only sporadically.

CLASSIC AUTHORS

Weber (1963) and Troeltsch (1960) first defined church as a specific kind of religious organization which enforces its decisions by means of psychic coercion realized through managing religious benefits. As opposed to a sect, a church has a more hierarchical and more bureaucratic organizational structure, is larger, offers a way of belonging which is generally universal and therefore exploits territorial boundaries, has a generally lower level of intensity of participation, has a culture, a degree and a form of differentiation which is less radically opposed to those of the social context in which it operates, and suffers from greater inertia and resistance to change and innovation (Wilson 1997; Wuthnow 1988). This comparison shows how the concept of church, as opposed to that of sect, is multidimensional. There is a

plurality of roots (theological, sociological, etc.) to that opposition, but also a potential instability, with a risk of explosion when social forces (especially social differentiation) reduce the correlation among these dimensions. This orientation, right from the start, thus conceived of a church in terms of its greater complexity and articulation compared to a sect (Guizzardi & Pace 1987). Careful bibliographical analysis by Beckford (1973, 1984) shows that even today the prevailing sociological conceptions of church can be traced to the positions outlined in the works of Weber and Troeltsch. Even in the past two decades, attempts to define church more carefully in conceptual terms have usually been oriented towards this tradition. This is true for the new paradigm of rational choice theory applied to the analysis of socioreligious phenomena: church and sect are assumed to be theoretically distinct kinds of religious organization. The new theory is used to express the two concepts and their formal and operational opposition (Iannaccone 1988: 242; Stark & Bainbridge 1996: 124).

Over time, the sociological idea of church as a specific kind of religious organization has encountered problems and limits. At the general level, a first critical trend was identified by Kaufmann (1974): empirical studies began to focus on topics related to individual religious experience or behavior, or related to basic and therefore small sized religious groups, but ignored broader religious organizations. Whether this is the cause or effect (or both) of the guiding characteristics of this first analytic perspective is now less important than the growing risk that – on this basis – the sociology of religion will lose its ability to examine more complex religious phenomena.

Among these limits, there were the effects of the various disciplinary contributions in defining the church/sect opposition, or at least its *vulgata* (Swatos 1975, 1976). In other cases, the difficulties in applying the church/sect conceptual scheme could be attributed to the specific socioreligious context in relation to which that opposition was elaborated. It was much less complex than later socioreligious contexts. In any case, there is no reason to suppose that the church vs. sect scheme was more appealing for its useful simplicity than for any real

analytic power at the time of its first and classic elaboration.

Even the best analytic systems cannot predict how social situations will change. This does not mean, however, that eventual conceptual redefinitions forced by social changes cannot refer back to previous analytical systems and start from there (Swatos 1976: 142; Guizzardi & Pace 1987). During the twentieth century, Niebuhr (1975), with his work on the social roots of the process of denominationalization of American Christianity, provided one of the best known examples of overcoming and integrating the church/sect scheme as a means of accounting for the dramatic transformations which had taken place in religious organizations and institutions. Niebuhr, in presenting the reasons for his research and in describing its first results, interprets these social transformations in terms of degrees and forms of social differentiation, and in terms of degrees and forms of “internal” religious complexity (Niebuhr 1975: 283). And these are nothing but the exact same questions already noted at the onset of theoretical and cultural debate over the ecclesiological issue.

Later, the influence of the work of Luckmann (1967) – especially a very simplified interpretation of his ideas, in agreement with the orthodoxy of secularist ideology – may have helped to spread the opinion that the crisis of this approach to the analysis of religious organizations, especially those that were larger and/or more ecclesiastical, was actually proof of the incompatibility between modern organizational principles and spiritual or religious phenomena and experiences. Beckford himself, although he proposed a moratorium on using the church/sect conceptual couplet, justified his proposal for very different reasons. Beckford (1984) argued as follows: the growing difficulty in understanding large institutionalized religions such as churches is strongly and primarily related to the challenge in understanding the great transformations (above all, differentiations) inside religious realities, and between these realities and the social context. For example, it is no longer possible to assume, a priori, that churches rather than sects are capable of greater adaptation to today’s social contexts (see Wuthnow 1988: 495).

It appears that Kaufmann's (1974) appeal had not been sufficiently accepted. Nonetheless, although it is increasingly difficult to understand ecclesiastical realities simply as particular forms of religious organization, important contributions to the sociology of religion can still emerge from organizational studies and from the sophisticated tools of this discipline (Di Maggio 1998). This has been shown particularly in the case of Catholicism (and therefore of a church), where it is increasingly clear that a vast number of organizations are working, both generalist and specialist. In sum, could a church of such internal complexity, operating in such a differentiated context as advanced modern society, still be studied as an organization, and, as if that were not enough, as a *single* organization?

It is precisely this situation that allows for the possibility of a radically different analytic perspective. This change lies in a sort of break in the requested moratorium. The proposal radicalizes, rather than abandons, the organizational approach to all collective religious phenomena, historical churches included. The possibility is considered by several scholars, using very different conceptual and theoretical means. For the most part, these texts share a double refusal: a refusal to reduce sociology of religion to a sociology of individual religiosity (whether "diffused," "implicit," or other) and a refusal to assume large scale religious realities as a starting point for doing research.

These options are shared by many scholars, even when they share little else. They are very clear, for example, in the work by Chaves, who takes the Weberian idea of religious organization as one of his starting points and traces its consequences (which, in many empirical and theoretical works, have been shown to be quite interesting). Thus, the heart of his analysis is the minimum religious organization, the congregation in the American case, as the reality where two structures meet: the religious authority structure and religious agencies. What is important here is that this analytic strategy radically eliminates any concept of church. From this point of view "church sociology" would appear to be nothing but a trap (Chaves 1993).

This conclusion clearly reveals one of the possibilities for managing the difficulties created

by the great internal and external complexity inherent in sociological analysis of such religious realities as churches. It is worth underscoring a couple of corollaries to this. First, the sociology of religion could benefit from distancing itself not just from the concept of church, but also from those of religion and secularization. This would allow for a more detailed view of phenomena previously considered to fall into these categories. Second, a corollary which is perhaps an axiom: here once again there is a recognition of the need to concentrate on the phenomena of social differentiation, and above all to "de Parsonsify its current theory (Chaves 1994).

Right from the start of sociology there has been at least one other way to understand the church conceptually, although it has not been as widespread as the one above. Durkheim (1965) defines church as a community whose fellows are connected to each other through shared representations of the sacred and of its relationships and distinctions with the profane, and resulting in identical practices expressing these shared representations. This means that "church" must cover not only institutional phenomena, but also organizational phenomena. Once again, even if in a different way, there is the necessity of coping with complexity and social differentiation implied by the church question: complexity of social phenomena, organizations and institutions, and beliefs and behaviors, from religion to social environments. Durkheim considered differentiation as a positive phenomenon up to a certain point, after which it becomes dangerous. Further, he assigns religion (more precisely, church) a key role in managing and containing the process through which social differentiation increases social complexity.

Durkheim inspired sociological thought and imagination, while the attempt to operationalize his concepts and formalize his theories has met with difficulty and has not always succeeded. This was also the case for his sociology of religion and his concept of church. However, there are echoes or at least apparent analogies with that sociological concept of church in later sociological research. Talcott Parsons (1951), for example, treats churches as the greatest expression of the institutionalization of beliefs, thereby ensuring them a significant active role

within and for the social system (Moberg 1984). It is easy to imagine how the ongoing social differentiation of both social functions and social “levels” (Luhmann 1985b) created problems for trust in the empirical usefulness of such a concept of church.

CONTEMPORARY SOCIOLOGY

The ecclesiological question appears as both a theoretical and an empirical question. It is characterized by the need to account for (and the difficulty of so doing) very high degrees of complexity and for the equally high degrees and multiple forms of differentiation. It entails the double requirement of not ignoring the organizational dimension and not reducing church to that dimension. In addition, the ecclesiological question as addressed from a sociological perspective is made more difficult by the requirement for empirically operative concepts.

As seen by Chaves and others, a solution to such difficulties can be found that excludes, among other things, the usefulness itself of any concept of church. Yet it is also possible to find the opposite approach in the sociological literature: conceptual proposals concerning church elaborated within an analytic paradigm that accounts for the level of complexity and the level and forms of differentiation characteristic of advanced modern societies.

Few proposals satisfy these criteria, and they differ greatly. One, however, stands out: that offered by Luhmann (1977, 1985a, 2000) and already used by other scholars (even if Luhmann’s disciples are not always aware of this). The paradigm proposed by Luhmann on the basis of system theory is noteworthy for the radical way in which it focuses attention on questions of social complexity, contingency, and functional differentiation, especially that phase in which the main characteristic is the differentiation of society by functions (the phase coinciding with advanced modernization). In the domain of social systems, in reciprocal system/environment relationships with personal systems (both processes independently reducing either internal or external complexity), Luhmannian categories distinguish between three types of social systems: interaction, organization, and society (the last one by means of an increasing

functional differentiation tends to become global society: *Weltgesellschaft*). These social systems consist of communicative events. The very high level of social complexity, as well as the extreme contingency of each communicative event, depends on the degree reached, and on the form taken, by the social differentiation processes. The growth in differentiation between functions leads to a noticeable increase – tendentially radicalizing – of the differentiation between interactions, organizations, and society, with all three in a system/environment relationship with the others. With regard to Chaves’s suggestion, Luhmann does not include a transcendental catalog of social functions or functional societal subsystems; this reveals just how far his theory of social differentiation is from that of Parsons.

The assumptions and solutions offered by Luhmann obviously have to be discussed, but they clearly provide a sociological paradigm that addresses the theoretical background of the ecclesiological question. The fact that Luhmann identifies a possibility for religion in such a social scenario is particularly relevant here. In fact, the process of social constitution of the meaning and the phenomenon of communication implies two problems in particular (Luhmann 1985a). The first is the reduction of indeterminate or indeterminable complexity to determined or determinable complexity. The second and connected problem is that of the deparadoxalization of the social system’s self-reference. These problems have hitherto been resolved by social performances ensured by religious traditions. There is no reason to believe, however, that this means that religions are not constantly exposed to competition concerning this social function from potential functional equivalents – competition where the outcome is always unpredictable.

Luhmann’s (1977: 56) analysis of religion elaborates and uses a concept of church. Church is religiously specialized communication. Church is more or less analogous to money in the economic subsystem, law in the political subsystem, scientific truth in the scientific subsystem, etc. In the course of the process of functional social differentiation, each subsystem (politics, economy, religion, science, etc.) manages three types of relations: with other subsystems (*Leistungen*), with the society system (*Funktion*), and with itself (*Reflexion*).

Religious communication, or church, is the *Funktion* of the religious subsystem. From the religious subsystem, as from any other functionally specialized societal subsystem, one can observe the differentiation of functions within society. "Secularization" is then the religious mode for understanding the phenomenon of functional differentiation: understanding a relative reduction in influence and – simultaneously – a relative increase in the independence of the religious subsystem from other functional subsystems. This mode has an equivalent in each of the other functional subsystems.

The nexus between the ecclesiological question and that of social differentiation is once again apparent; in this case, however, it takes the form of a potentially direct and not inverse correlation. In fact, the more society is functionally differentiated, the better the conditions become for a clear manifestation of religious phenomena with specifically ecclesial traits. Obviously, religious traditions may or may not exploit these social conditions.

The concept of church (or religious communication) also appears to have a characteristic which distinguishes it from some forms of specialized social communication, even as it links it to others. Religious communication is governed by a code (transcendence/immanence), but does not have its own medium (Luhmann 1977: 72; 2000 187). In short, Luhmann's sociological perspective allows for a concept of church more or less comparable to those of specialized communication through law, money, scientific truth, or other media.

We have to consider two objections to Luhmann's idea of church, in order to clarify some aspects of the question. Especially in a global society, and with religion as its equally global specialized subsystem, the use of the term "church," derived from a particular religious tradition, can raise suspicions that such a general phenomenon (religious communication) is not encompassed by the term (church). This objection obviously cannot be addressed with extra sociological responses, such as those offered by a certain Christian theology through demonstration of ecclesiology with an important ecumenical and interreligious dimension, or by historical research stressing the decisive role played by the Christian tradition in the development of a global religious system (Beyer

1998). On the contrary, it may be useful to turn back to an empirically useful distinction, such as that between money and currencies, according to which it is possible therefore to use the term "church" in this case as both analogy and in more precise terms. This leads us to address a second group of critics.

If the process of functional differentiation tends to radicalize the differentiation between social "levels" or types of social systems (interaction, organization, society), it is also clear how church (societal religious communication) is not a type of religious organization (a great difference appears between this concept of church and that of religion at a societal level used by authors like Karel Dobbelaere, who adopt completely different paradigms such as those distinguishing between micro, meso and macrosocial levels). Nonetheless, once the contents of the concept of church are delimited, it would be a serious cognitive oversight not to prepare conceptual instruments that allow us to identify and distinguish ecclesiastical and non-ecclesiastical religious organizations, as well as individual "church oriented religiosity" and other kinds of religiosity.

Luhmann's proposal is particularly useful because it allows for the rather analytical consideration of the relationship between organizations and society. The more society and its subsystems become unorganizable through advanced modernization, the more organizations have achieved a previously unthinkable importance. Organizations, in fact, can influence societal communication (and vice versa). This naturally holds true for religion (Luhmann 1977: 272; 2000: 226), starting with the phenomenon of governance of communicative codes – through "religious dogmatics" (Luhmann 1977: 72). This is the ground for distinguishing between organization as more or less able to influence the governing of religious communication, and therefore between church (*Kirche*) and ecclesiastical organization (*Amtskirche*) with such an ability.

Returning to the first objection (why call societal religious communication "church"?), the way in which the term "church" is used can be appreciated, both to give a name to the concept of specialized religious communication in general (according to an analogy) and a name to those phenomena of religious

communication where the main influence in codification is that of organizations active within the Christian religious tradition (where “church” is a religious currency or just a kind of money). One can also imagine a religious communication regulated according to Christian schemas which influence (or fail to influence) religious organizations, religious interactions, and forms of religiosity, inside or outside Christian religious tradition. For example, the study of Christian liturgy lends itself to a delineation of the advantages of such a set of distinctions and concepts. The study of Christian theology and the scope of its influence can also be mentioned in this regard.

PERSPECTIVES

Luhmann’s concept of church (or religious communication) has begun to be used implicitly and explicitly and produced results. First of all, this understanding of the degrees of differentiation between functions and between types of social systems provides the basis for that concept of church, and can help to reduce the occasionally paralyzing emphasis placed on intuitions such as the well known “believing without belonging” (Beckford 1984; Davie 1990). In broader Luhmannian sociological theory, this (like the unorganizability of the church) is one of the effects of the religious variant of the differentiation between organizations and society, and therefore between religious organizations and societal religion (as well as between religion and religiosity). This does not exclude and actually stresses the current potentialities of ecclesiastical organizations in terms of recruitment and participation. The realization of participative potentialities related to ecclesiastical (and non ecclesiastical) religious organizations in an advanced modern society cannot be measured and assessed through a comparison with situations marked by lower degrees of social differentiation. A similar benefit in utilizing the Luhmannian approach to church and religion is its answer to the proposal to abandon the concept of secularization (Chaves 1994) because of the presumed lack of analogy between religion and other sub systems in terms of managing and representing functional differentiation. Beyer (1994) has

fully demonstrated the advantages of using this conceptual approach for the recognition and the study of the process of religious globalization and the formation of the global religious system.

It has also been shown how in this perspective it is possible to find analytic indications useful for overcoming the “puzzle” emerging in the debate between the new and the old paradigm, such as that in the Italian case (Diotallevi 2001, 2002). If, as the new paradigm suggests, there are insufficient reasons to assume a necessary correlation between social modernization and decline of organized religion, it is difficult to explain the case of Italy, an apparently efficient religious monopoly (and yet a “church religion” monopoly working within a social context of advanced modernization, and therefore contrary also to the old paradigm’s predictions). Yet, thanks to the use of Luhmann’s perspective, it is possible to capture the degree of internal diversification of religious supply that certain church politics and policies have allowed to develop. This understanding, however, is possible once it is clear that within a single ecclesiastical religious tradition many religious firms may operate: once it is clear that a church is not necessarily a religious organization, through the recognition that this church may “have” many religious organizations.

SEE ALSO: Catholicism; Denomination; Durkheim, Émile; Organizations, Tradition and; Organizations, Voluntary; Orthodoxy; Protestantism; Religion; Sect; Secularization; Social Movement Organizations; Strategic Management (Organizations); Weber, Max

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citations and scientific indexing

Yuri Jack Gómez Morales

A classic analytical distinction between a citation and a reference reads: "if paper R contains a bibliographic footnote using and describing paper C, then R contains a reference to C, and C has a citation from R." According to this, citation and referencing are relations among published texts. But whereas referencing is an intratextual relation between a written word, statement, description, or even an entire argument and a bibliographic reference, citation is an extratextual relation between a complete piece of scientific literature, namely a book or a journal article (just to mention classic forms), and many other pieces of literature of a latter publication date. A reader can easily see a reference by inspecting a text; after all, referencing is a technical standard for editing publishable texts. But a reader cannot see citation directly. Whereas referencing, when it happens, takes place within a singular piece of edited and published material, citation, when it happens, is something that takes place across a section of published literature and it becomes visible for a reader, so to speak, as long as some kind of bibliographic control of that literature can be exerted. This is the purpose that a citation index accomplishes. A citation index is a form to organize and display a body of bibliographical references. These references are collected

from reference lists of journal articles, books, and so on, and then organized alphabetically by author. Once this list is ready, under each of the entries one finds the record of published works that have cited them at some point.

A citation index is one of several tools developed throughout centuries of printing for controlling the literature bibliographically. In fact, among the first textual devices functioning as indexes, the Roman Catholic *Index Librorum Prohibitorum* (Rome, 1559) constitutes a good example of the double sided nature of this textual technology that is at once social and textual. Journals, too, since their very inception in seventeenth century Europe were used as bibliographical control tools for a growing mass of published material until a whole range of secondary serials (abstracting and indexing services) was launched toward the end of the nineteenth century. However, the bibliographical control of scientific literature through citation indexing was a twentieth century achievement in which developments in both journal editorial standards (Bazerman 1984) and computing technology concurred in the making of scientific indexing through citation an empirical possibility (Garfield 1955). In contrast with the Roman *Index*, which served the purpose of catching what the Catholic Church considered as heretical texts, authors, and distribution networks during an age of religious turmoil, an index to scientific literature serves to identify significant scientific contributions, significant scientific authors, and relevant sociocognitive and sociotechnical networks. And it is because of this that when a citation index for science became a technical reality and a prosperous commercial enterprise in the realm of information retrieval by 1964 (Garfield 1979), further implications were immediately sought for the sociology of science and for science policymaking and management, where the notion of citation and its associated technical procedure of indexing have been consequential.

As an information retrieval tool, citation indexing of scientific literature has empowered scientists by providing them with means and search criteria for taking hold over an increasingly growing mass of scientific literature, and thus has become instrumental for scientific

research. As a methodological operationalization within sociology it contributed substantially to the advancement of the empirical investigations on the normative structure of science. And yet, further considerations on the notion of referencing as a rhetorical resource (Gilbert 1977; Latour & Fabbri 1977; Woolgar 1988), on the one hand, and citation as part of the credibility cycle in science (Latour & Woolgar 1979), on the other, opened up new theoretical avenues for exploring sciences as social phenomena. As for science policy and management concerns, citation indexing of scientific literature, used as an evaluative tool often leading to research resource allocation, has proved to be a widespread practice and certainly an effective mechanism of social control, whether one likes it or not. This revolutionary technique for indexing scientific literature pushed forward quantitatively oriented studies on the history of science as well. Indeed, in conjunction with several other notions such as scientific productivity and scientific growth, citation (and co-citation) analysis allowed the construction of the scientific literature itself as a knowledge object deserving systematic investigation by scientometrics.

For the main purposes concerning us here, some sociologists used citation and scientific indexing at first as a means for developing analytic methods, based on observable patterns traceable in the literature, for studying the actual operation of norms and values responsible for the emergence of science as a social institution in modern societies, and therefore deserving of sociological examination. The interpretation of citation as an expression of an institutionalized pattern of conduct (acknowledging the sources on which one's work has been built) in science was set down by Merton and Zuckerman in a classic paper on the issue (Zuckerman & Merton 1973) and presented in context later in Merton's episodic memoirs (Merton 1977). When a scientific author references someone else's work in his or her own paper, this author is at least acknowledging authorship (a property right) to someone else. As is immediately obvious, in order to be granted with intellectual property rights over a piece of literature, a scientist must become an author in the first place; science is

published knowledge. Thus, Zuckerman and Merton conceived of publication in science as an ingenious procedure for socially granting intellectual property in science, and at the same time contributing to advancing certified knowledge by making it public. If publication grants a basis for claiming intellectual right, it is through citation that this right is socially enjoyed, though not being cited is like being the owner of a useless result from a cognitive point of view. The idea that the more a paper or book is cited, the more impact it has had within a field of studies, and the greater its influence in the community, led some sociologists to conclude that social standing and mobility within the scientific community depend, to a great extent, on the quality of a scientist's work, as this quality can be ascertained objectively through citation counting. On this ground, the use of citation counting as an evaluative tool among science policymakers and science managers became widespread. However, it is important to notice that normative sociologists' interest in scientific quality was related to a more far reaching research agenda on the institutionalization of science. Functionalist used citation measurements not for the sake of measuring and ranking people, institutions, and countries but as empirical evidence supporting an explanation of social stratification in science as a result of an operating structure of institutionalized norms and internalized values.

The idea of citation counting as an objective measurement of scientific quality as well as the attempts at writing a "scientific history" of science, or drawing maps of knowledge using citation and co citation analysis, has been as controversial as it has been fruitful (Edge 1977). The citation debate opened new avenues for studying science in which emphasis is placed on the mirror image of citation: referencing. Normative uses of citations assume that cognitive and technical standards for research performance and for evaluating scientific results are shared by participants. However, when focusing on scientific practice as it actually takes place in laboratory settings, some sociologists found that those standards were outcomes of social negotiation among participants and therefore context dependent (Mulkey

1991 [1976]). In this light, semiotic minded analyses of scientific texts were undertaken to substantiate the view according to which scientists' claims of objectivity with regard to the facts presented in their published papers are actually constructed in the text, and referencing is one among several other "stylistic" resources for doing so (Woolgar 1988). The study of scientific writing showed that the use of references might be understood as a rhetorical resource used in scientific papers whose aim is to persuade readers on different matters. These studies have shown a consistent "style" in scientific writing that starts by portraying a reported result as a genuine novelty. This is often achieved by reviewing the current state of the art in the introductory section of a paper where referencing is used profusely. In the material and methods section of the paper, referencing serves also the purpose of stating that adequate and authoritative techniques were employed. Very often, too, scientific authors typically show, usually in a concluding section, how their findings illuminate or solve problems reported in current literature, also referenced in the paper, as a means to substantiate the importance of the new published result (Woolgar 1988). A paper's reference list, then, provides rhetorical force for its arguments by appealing to a persuasive community made out of references that partially set the context of reading for the audience. Thus, by using references, scientists manage to assemble a network which is at once social and technical, a network that may be adequately deployed to support the facticity of a particular statement, or to deny or undermine the facticity of someone else's statement. Thus the intended audience of a paper is made up of those who are collectively of the opinion that the referenced papers on the list deserve a citation (Gilbert 1977), and those who have been persuaded of this or who find it useful for the advancement of their particular claims (Latour & Woolgar 1979). The more citations a paper receives over time has nothing to do with its objective quality. Citation counting provides only secondary evidence of the success of a particular scientist, research team, or laboratory in advancing their interests which, in the last analysis, can be reduced to remaining well positioned within a continuous cycle

of credibility gaining as a means for actually being able to do more science and starting the cycle once more.

Almost without exception, studies concerned with one of the several varieties of citation analysis have been of an empirical nature and based on the counting of the number of citations. However, despite the several warnings that the citation debate arose on the inadvisability of employing citation data without a sound theoretical underpinning, little progress has been made toward the formulation of a "theory of citation." Lately, though (Leydesdorff 1998), a reflexive view on citation states that the quest for a theory of citation presumes that citations themselves should be explained. The moment one starts to count citations to a published work, one is assuming that this tally tells us something about the cited text, about its position in a host of networks: semantic networks, networks of journals, institutional networks (Wouters 1998). If citation analysis is just a tool for explaining, for example, the growth of science, a "theory of citation" cannot be more than a methodological reflection designed to improve the accuracy of this measurement, merely a technical issue (Woolgar 1991). But when one raises questions such as whether citations indicate "impact," "influence," or "quality," one is in need of a clear definition of these concepts with reference to units of analysis. The reflexive lesson to be learned from the citation debate is that the functions of citations are expected to be different when different contexts or different levels of aggregation are studied, as suggested in the above competing sociological interpretations of citation. Citation analysis is based on a theoretical reflection of scientific practices that have been shaped historically, but the historical, philosophical, and/or sociological positions taken by citation analysts, however, have usually remained implicit. Understanding citation in terms of interacting networks of authors and texts over time enables the possibility of a new theory of citation as a "dynamic operation that allows for reduction of complexity in various contexts at the same time. The dynamic perspective of selections operating upon selections in other networks accounts for the character of citations as statistical indicators, for their

specificity and for their multi contextuality" (Leydesdorff 1998).

SEE ALSO: Matthew Effect; Scientific Norms/Counter norms; Scientific Productivity; Scientometrics

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cities in Europe

Patrick Le Galès

The European city concept derives from Max Weber and historians of the Middle Ages. In “The City,” Weber characterizes the medieval western city – in modern language, western European city – as having the following features: a fortification, a market, and a specifically urban economy of consumption, exchange, and production; a court of law and the ability to ordain a set of rules and laws; rules relating to landed property (since cities were not subject to the taxes and constraints of feudalism); and a structure based on associations (of guilds) and – at least partial – political autonomy, expressed in particular through the existence of an administrative body and the participation of the burghers in local government. This combination of political autonomy, religious culture, specifically urban economy, and differentiated social structure, all surrounded by a wall, made the western city an original sociological category and a structuring element in the Europe of the Middle Ages between 1000 and 1500. This golden age of urban Europe reached its high point at the end of the Middle Ages, when feudal structures were gradually fading, but before the states had established their domination everywhere (Tilly 1990).

The “western city” model elaborated by Weber defines an original set of analytical perspectives to analyze cities from a sociological perspective. Firstly, the “western city” is characterized as an ideal type by contrast to the Oriental city in particular. There is no general theory of urbanization and convergence of cities here, but rather the analysis of differences and

complex causal mechanisms. Comparison over time and between regions of the world allows Weber to characterize a particular social structure and its evolution over time.

Secondly, the European city is analyzed as a political actor. Weber analyzes the mechanisms of aggregation and representation of interest and culture that bring together local social groups, associations, organized interests, private firms, and urban governments and also the competition between different powers such as bishops, lords, burghers, and sometimes the state, between the great families, or between cities themselves, i.e., in political and institutional terms. Indeed, the power of the burghers led to the creation of the communes. A commune was characterized by its own political rights, by autonomous courts and economic policy, and less frequently by international policy and a military force.

Thirdly, the western European city is analyzed as an original social structure dominated by a new social class, the burghers. The city is conceived as an integrated local society and as a complex social formation, sometimes a local society. Bagnasco stresses the fact that Weber analyzed cities as a group, equipped with an administrative apparatus and with a leader, regulating the economy. The creation of the city as collective actor came about through the formation of confederacies of burghers – a bourgeoisie as collective actor, which can take different forms.

The Europe of cities was not just the Europe of early capitalism and of merchants but also that of intellectuals, universities, and culture that launched the Renaissance. The medieval European city was the crucible of European societies, in which new cultural and political models developed by contrast and opposition to the principles of feudal societies. The city gave rise to new social relations and cultural and organizational innovations, which were furthered by interactions between the various populations living within it. The conditions of the city promoted mechanisms for learning a collective way of life, for innovation and spreading innovation, rapid accumulation, transformation of behaviors, interplay of competition and cooperation, and processes of social differentiation engendered by proximity. But medieval

European cities were progressively integrated within nation states. The founding fathers of sociology were taken by the strength of the Industrial Revolution and the making of modern national societies. European cities were no longer original social structures but were absorbed in the making of national societies. Therefore, urban sociologists, Georg Simmel and his analysis of the metropolis, sociologists at the University of Chicago, or later writers in the Marxist political economy tradition did not follow that line of analysis. Instead they concentrated on both the rapid rise of industrial cities and the modern metropolis defined by contrast to the western city ideal type.

CITIES IN EUROPE: A DISTINCTIVE FEATURE OF EUROPEAN SOCIETIES

Cities in Europe include industrial cities of the nineteenth century, a small number of large metropolises, and a stable bulk of medium sized cities.

Over the twentieth century, the issue of the city in Europe was not an important one. Analysis of European societies, including cities, was exclusively focused upon the nation state framework. Differences of language, social structure, and culture were reinforced by the strengthening of the nation state and wars. This increased both differentiation between European societies and integration within each national society, i.e., the dual movement in which borders are strengthened and the inside is differentiated from the outside, while an internal order is organized and a national society gradually homogenizes despite international relations. Social relations, classes, and politics were defined not in urban terms but in national terms. These elements of national societies have been more or less in place since the late nineteenth century in most European countries. Cities were therefore analyzed within national categories as, for example, Swedish, Italian, or Dutch cities.

Urban sociologists were interested in the convergence of cities as industrial cities, or as modern metropolises with differentiated neighborhood and ever expanding suburbs. In the nineteenth century, the city became the site of

capitalist industrial development. Concentration in great metropolises and large industrial areas lent a different dynamic to cities, changing them both socially and physically (Hohenberg & Hollen Lees 1985). Outside Great Britain, the greatest impact of industrialization was in creating the industrial cities of the German Ruhr, Wallonia, and Upper Silesia in Prussia, with a lesser effect on the ports and industrial areas of Scandinavia, Holland, and France. The impact of the Industrial Revolution was much more limited in Southern Europe (with the exception of Bilbao and the Asturias), and it was not until the end of the century that the impact of industrialization was seen in the northwest triangle of Italy (Turin, Genoa, Milan) and in Barcelona, Bilbao, Oporto, and Lisbon. As industrialization developed, it benefited the major cities that already existed.

By contrast, the rise in the nineteenth century of the modern metropolises of London, Berlin, Paris, and Vienna was associated with the making of nation states and their empires. Capital cities benefited from the consolidation of states, the shift of political life onto the national level, and their capacity for control, as well as from industrial development and colonization. They absorbed a large part of the flow of migration, thus providing sizable reserves of labor. They were the first beneficiaries of the transport revolution, from tramways to road and rail networks. As university cities and cultural centers, they were the focus of unrest and the sites of the political and social revolts that punctuated the nineteenth century. The great metropolis became the site of consumption, of department stores and wide avenues, of hyperstimulation that changed the urban cultural experience. This led also to physical transformation with the ever increasing diffusion of urbanization around those large metropolises, hence the rise of suburbs, either working class suburbs such as the red belt in Paris, or bourgeois suburbs where the middle classes abandoned the center of English cities. The rise of the large metropolis then became an American phenomenon: New York and Chicago, and later Los Angeles, gradually replaced European cities in the urban imagination of the modernist metropolis.

EUROPEAN CITIES IN THE EUROPEAN UNION

The issue of cities of Europe and of European cities experienced a resurgence in the 1980s, for two reasons. Firstly, the growing field of comparative empirical urban research stressed the growth and dynamism of middle size cities all over Europe. They were even booming in some cases, such as in France or Scandinavia. Secondly, it was related to the question of European societies that emerged because of the acceleration of the political project of European integration and increased interdependence between national societies, the rise of globalization, and the tensions within national societies. Searching for common ground to define European societies in comparison with the US or Japan, scholars such as Therborn (1985) identified European cities as a major distinctive feature of European societies. Following Therborn's insights and building upon the work of historians, Bagnasco and Le Galès (2000; Le Galès 2002) developed the Weberian perspective to portray European cities as a particular type of social structure within the urban world. By contrast, a great deal of the urban sociological research of the 1990s was once again examining convergence patterns between cities throughout the world, either the rise of "global cities" or the complete urbanization of the world following the Los Angeles model. However, empirical research in Europe showed different results.

Contemporary European cities are characterized by the following features. They are part of an old urban system, constituted in the Middle Ages, which has remained more or less stable – meta stability – over time. The industrial period appeared as a parenthesis in the making of urban Europe; it had a massive impact only in Britain and Germany. This long term stability is also visible: most cities are organized around the center, main squares, monuments, and buildings of power; in part the physical form of the center has kept its organization and symbolic meaning over time. Setting aside London, Paris, the Randstad, and the Rhine/Ruhr region, Western Europe is made up mainly of medium sized cities with populations between 200,000 and 2 million. Even if one takes into account the larger metropolitan area,

most European metropolitan areas are medium sized by contrast to the US and Japan, where large metropolises dominate the urban map. The form of the city, the existence of public spaces, and the mix of social groups all suggest the idea of a continuing sense of "urbanity" characterizing European cities (Zijderveld 1998). Despite sprawl, the resistance of the old city centers epitomizes their peculiarity. One can take the example of public collective transport together with pedestrian areas and cycle paths to demonstrate the strength of the idea of the European city.

Beyond this long term stability, and by sharp contrast to the literature on the urban crisis in the US and the UK or the rise of global cities, medium sized European cities have enjoyed considerable economic and often demographic growth and dynamism since the early 1980s (but not everywhere; growth has been less in Southern Europe in particular).

In order to explain this dynamism of medium sized European cities – with the notable exception of the UK – several points need to be noted. Firstly, European cities are characterized by a mix of public services and private firms, including a robust body of middle class and lower middle class public sector workers (about a third of the jobs on average), who constitute a firm pillar of the social structure. They are organized in trade unions and political parties, and support public investment in cities.

A second point worth mentioning is the fact that European cities, although they are gaining more autonomy, are still structured and organized within European states – in particular, welfare states. According to OECD figures, Western European state taxes represent over 45 percent of annual GDP, in contrast to 32 percent in the US. This huge gap then translates into jobs in social services, education, and so on, which are crucially concentrated in cities. The social structure of medium sized European cities is therefore a major element of continuous political support for investment in urban amenities, services, and utilities. Moreover, because of the ongoing decentralization trend in most European countries, except in the UK, an average of about 60 percent of public investment is now controlled by local authorities in Europe and more importantly in cities, hence there is a constant flow of

investment in collective services in the cities, in particular in schools, hospitals, social services, housing, planning, transport, culture, and so on.

Thirdly, European cities are becoming more European, in the sense that the institutionalization of the European Union (EU) is creating rules, norms, procedures, repertoires, and public policies that have an impact on most, if not all, cities. The EU also is a powerful agent of legitimation. By designing urban public policies and agreeing (under the influence of city interests) to mention the idea of “a Europe of cities” as one of the components of the EU, it is giving a boost to cities to act and behave as actors within EU governance. Now part of an increasing number of transnational networks, European cities are being recognized as such.

Fourthly, the economy is becoming more urban and, beyond global cities, medium sized regional capitals – usually well equipped in research centers, universities, and diversified economic sectors – have benefited in terms of job growth. Last but not least, the continuing representation of the city as a whole, as well as the increased legitimacy of political elites in sustaining and reinventing the idea of European cities, has helped the making of modes of governance of European cities.

EUROPEAN CITIES AS INCOMPLETE LOCAL SOCIETIES AND POLITICAL ACTORS?

Beyond the relevance of the category “European cities” (for a debate see Kazepov 2004), the updated Weberian perspective on studying cities suggests going beyond the fluidity of day to day interactions and encounters on the one hand and determinist globalization trends on the other (Marcuse & Van Kempen 2000). Cities may be more or less structured in their economic and cultural exchanges and their different actors may be related to each other in the same local context with long term strategies, investing their resources in a coordinated way and adding to the riches of the social capital. In this case, the urban society appears as well structured and visible, and one can detect forms of (relative) integration. If not, the city reveals itself as less structured and as such no

longer a significant subject for study: some where where decisions are made externally by separate actors. This analysis suggests looking at the interplay and conflicts of social groups, interests, and institutions, and the way in which regulations have been put in place through conflicts and the logics of integration. Cities do not develop solely according to interactions and contingencies: groups, actors, and organizations oppose one another, enter into conflict, coordinate, produce representations in order to institutionalize collective forms of action, implement policies, structure inequalities, and defend their interests. This perspective on cities highlights the informal economy, the dynamism of localized family relations, the interplay of associations, reciprocity, culture and ways of life, the density of localized horizontal relations, and local social formations (Kazepov 2004).

European cities are not immune to common pressures in terms of immigration, rising inequalities, suburban sprawl, or network fragmentation. However, European cities remain strong within metropolitan areas in the making, governance issues are now more visible within European cities, as are the interdependence and interrelation between different actors and organizations – all things that used to be represented and made visible on the national and European scene. This new found visibility of interdependence gives opportunities to social and political actors to be involved in modes of urban governance or, by contrast, to increase the fragmentation and dislocation of European cities. European cities have not (yet?) been dislocated and they have considerable resources on which to draw in adapting to or resisting the new frame of constraints and opportunities.

SEE ALSO: Consumption, Urban/City as Consumerspace; Global/World Cities; Metropolitan; Urbanization; Weber, Max

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citizenship

Jack Barbalet

Citizenship refers to membership in a political community organized as a territorial or national state. The nature and content of citizenship varies with the form of state. Citizenship in the classic Greek *polis*, for instance, provided membership to a political elite, whereas modern liberal democratic citizenship provides opportunity to vote once every 3 or 4 years in a political election cycle. Sociological theories, however, recognize that citizenship has more than a mere political dimension.

Types of citizenship can be characterized in terms of two distinct axes or dimensions, one being *access* to citizenship status and the other being the *quality* of the rights and duties that attach to citizenship. Rules of access to citizenship separate citizens from non citizens. Two alternative legal possibilities include *jus sanguinis* or citizenship by descent and *jus soli* or citizenship by birthplace. Which of these operates can have large consequences for persons

who have moved across national boundaries either through the internationalization of economic activity and labor markets or the transformation of political units, both of which have relocated significant numbers of people transnationally over the last century.

Under conditions of *jus sanguinis* it is not sufficient to be born in a country to have access to its citizenship. To be a German or a Japanese citizen, for instance, it is not sufficient to be born in Germany or Japan. In these cases citizenship is based on descent or appropriate ethnic cultural qualities and birth in its territory has no bearing on access to citizenship, even for second and third generation settlers. The range of possibilities under *jus soli* arrangements, on the other hand, is broader. American and Australian citizenship, for instance, can be acquired by virtue of being born in those countries. French citizenship, on the other hand, is attributed to a person born in France if at least one parent was also born in France (or a French colony or territory prior to independence). The legal requirements of acquisition of citizenship by naturalization are also quite variable between nation states.

The second axis of citizenship, which is that of quality, refers to what is provided by formal membership of a political community once it is attained. The quality of citizenship comprises the rights and duties that are available to persons as citizens. The rights and duties of citizenship include not only those of political participation but also those that relate to legal and social capacities. Marshall (1950), for instance, distinguishes civil, political, and social citizenship.

The civil component of citizenship, according to Marshall, consists of those rights and duties that derive from legal institutions and especially courts of law. Civil rights include equal treatment before the law, rights of contract and property, and freedom from constraint by the state. Political rights are typically understood as rights of participation in the nation's political processes and especially the right to vote and stand for election. The social rights of citizenship are described by Marshall as rights to a basic level of material well being through state provision independently of a person's market capacities. Other writers have added to these three sets of rights,

as when Janoski (1998), for instance, includes participation rights along with civil, political, and social rights. Accounts of the quality of citizenship have also been supplemented by reflection on recent social movements, which lead to consideration of rights associated with gender, ethnic, and green citizenship, to which we shall return.

The analytic distinction between different rights of citizenship in Marshall's account is also a historical narrative of the development of citizenship and, within that development, of the relationship between citizenship and social class. Also, this historic developmental account of citizenship says something important about its institutional basis. Marshall's distinction between civil, political, and social rights operates in the context of an account of the incremental development of citizenship in England from the eighteenth century. At this time legal innovations functioned to oppose and undermine the remnants of feudal privilege that had persisted in English law. In that sense the advent of civil rights of citizenship was progressive. At the same time, civil rights encouraged market relations that gained strength during the eighteenth century, and they therefore harmonized economic and social inequalities characteristic of the class system. By the mid nineteenth century the industrialization that grew out of the market economy produced a working class movement that, among other things, laid claim to political membership in the states within which they lived and worked. The resulting parliamentary reform led to political rights becoming rights of citizenship rather than an adjunct to the privilege of property ownership. Here arises an element of antagonism between citizenship and the class system because, through political citizenship, organized electors without economic power can potentially influence market forces through the political process. This antagonism became more pronounced in the twentieth century, according to Marshall, because through social citizenship, won by working class voters, there arises participation as a right in a material culture that was previously the preserve of those who enjoyed class advantage.

Unlike a number of philosophical accounts of rights and citizenship that operate in terms of moral or ethical categories, Marshall's

sociological account underscores rights institutionally. This therefore avoids the problem of inappropriate historical judgments that are based on the values the writer takes to the situation they treat rather than those that emerge out of it directly. Marshall understands citizenship rights to exist in terms of the institutions that are pertinent to them. Civil rights are based on the courts of law, political rights on representative institutions, and social rights on the social services of the welfare state, including public education. Without the appropriate institutions, the corresponding rights have no basis. This approach does not deny aspirations for particular rights. In fact, such aspirations to as yet unachieved or denied rights in reality have the practical task of institution building to secure and sustain those rights. The virtue of this approach, then, is that it encourages an understanding of the history and practice of citizenship through a grasp of the development and role of institutions.

Citizenship is generally treated in terms of the rights that are available to citizens and denied to non citizens, but there are also duties of citizenship and the relationship between rights and duties in citizenship has drawn interest from sociological writers (Janowitz 1980; Janoski 1998). Citizenship duties or obligations arguably have a role in the maintenance of social order and integration, but for most writers this aspect of citizenship remains secondary to the importance of citizenship in providing otherwise unobtainable capacities to persons through the rights of citizenship. One difficulty with the notion of obligation is that it is not co terminous with the concept and practice of rights: it is erroneous to assume that to each right there is a corresponding obligation. This is because, as we have seen, citizenship rights are institutionally bounded and the relevant institutions require an organizational form; obligations or duties, on the other hand, operate as imperatives for citizens and as exhortations for compliance are morally, politically, and ideologically bounded. The disarticulation of rights and obligations is further evident in the fact that many obligations exacted by the nation state are not confined to citizens but also embrace non citizens, including the obligations of taxation, conformity to the law, exercise of social tolerance, and so on.

Marshall's influential account of citizenship has a social, political, and intellectual context that no longer obtains, and the changes that have occurred since the time his account was written lead to necessary modifications in the understanding of citizenship it provided. The full employment policies of the immediate post World War II period in all western societies meant that social citizenship could be fiscally supported by a large and growing work force. Structural economic and demographic changes since that time have meant that the financial basis of the social services required for social citizenship are no longer as secure as they were. When unemployment was typically "frictional" – associated with moving from one job to another – then high levels of unemployment benefits did not impose a strain on state financial support for social citizenship. When unemployment becomes "structural" and long term, and the non working sector of the population is extended further through increasing numbers of aged persons coupled with a declining birth rate, then the social services can draw on only a diminishing tax base and funding for social rights of citizenship can no longer be taken for granted.

Marshall's assumption of a full employment economy is coupled with another, namely that the basic social unit is the family, comprising a male breadwinner and a dependent female spouse and children. This, too, can no longer be assumed, which also has consequences for consideration of citizenship. Since the 1970s in all western economies erosion of the share of real national income going to wage and salary earners has been so severe that earnings of male breadwinners are insufficient to maintain a traditional family. At the same time there has been a massive increase in the workforce of women with dependent children. The economic decomposition of the traditional family means that the individual and not the family is the basic social unit. Marshall's citizen was sexually neutral because uniformly male. The labor force significance of economically independent females means that the citizen is now undeniably sexed. Sexually distinct perspectives on citizenship rights are now unavoidable.

There are a number of issues of "green" citizenship that Marshall and his generation did

not face, associated with a now unacceptable assumption of unlimited resources. Once it is accepted that natural resources are inherently limited two tenets of green citizenship arise. First, in a world of non renewable resources the community of citizens must include an inter generational membership such that the rights of as yet unborn citizens feature in present calculations of distributive well being. Second, as some writers have argued (Turner 1986), an ecological perspective on citizenship means that natural objects such as land, trees, and animals must be accorded citizenship rights. Given the difficulties of claiming and enforcing such rights this concern might be translated to issues concerning new duties or responsibilities of citizenship. In any event it has to be acknowledged that the environment upon which national well being depends is not confined to national boundaries. The radioactivity released by the Chernobyl disaster in 1986 spread across Western Europe. Green citizenship raises questions of transnational citizenship.

A further development that has affected issues of citizenship is the changing composition of national communities, through migration, from culturally homogeneous populations to mosaics of national, ethnic, religious, and racial diversity. These changes pose problems of integration and social segmentation. From the migrant's point of view this is the issue of access to the rights of citizenship, a problem classically treated by Parsons (1969) in his discussion of the citizenship consequences of internal migration and racial diversity in the US. Today, the question of access to rights by outsiders is associated with the broader questions of the increasing internationalization of national economies and displacement of persons through war and national decomposition and the consequent movement of large numbers of people across national boundaries. This raises questions concerning the impact of international organizations on national citizenship rights. Indeed, in Western Europe today there are in effect different levels of citizenship participation insofar as non national residents may have civil and social rights and even certain political rights by virtue of the laws of their host countries that operate in terms of EU sponsored human rights protocols and other transnational directives.

SEE ALSO: Capitalism; Democracy; Markets; Migration and the Labor Force; Sexual Citizenship; Welfare State

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city

Alan Bairner

Cities were a feature of all the great ancient civilizations. Relatively small by modern standards, they nevertheless facilitated a far more diverse range of activities than was possible in other forms of human settlement. The city and the urban way of life that accompanies it, however, inasmuch as they have interested sociologists, are of more recent origin and are closely linked to the rise of industrialism.

In the nineteenth century the city and urbanism began to exert a powerful fascination upon social theorists and sociologists. Marx and Engels saw the rise of the city as an integral part of human development and they recognized, as did Weber, that differing cultural and historical conditions lead to different types of cities. In addition, however, they argued that

the human condition experienced in cities is the product of economic structure. Engels went so far as to examine the human condition of the working class in nineteenth century Manchester in what has come to be seen as a pioneering exercise in social inquiry.

Tönnies drew an unfavorable contrast between the social bonds that are experienced in rural societies (*Gemeinschaft*) with the much weaker ties that are common to towns and cities (*Gesellschaft*). This pessimistic view of life in the city was shared by Simmel, who regarded the unique characteristic of the modern city as the intensification of nervous stimuli contrasting with the slower, more habitual and even quality of rural existence. Durkheim, on the other hand, while acknowledging that city life brings with it impersonality, alienation, and the potential for conflict, also believed that the organic solidarity that emerges in the city can be the basis of a deeper form of social cohesion than that of mechanical solidarity found in pre-urban societies.

The industrial age made urban centers increasingly attractive to immigrants: both internal, from the rural hinterland, and external, from other parts of the world. As a consequence, all modern industrial societies became heavily urbanized and since the second half of the twentieth century the global process has also become an increasing element in the social transformation of developing countries.

In this period, cities have become the centers of economic, industrial, and political power. But how have they impacted on social life? Opinions vary today just as they did among the classical sociological thinkers of the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. For some, cities are dynamic, full of creative energy and offering a previously unknown range of diverse opportunities. For others though, they are infernal places, characterized by violence, crime, corruption, and ill health. More realistically, they are a blend of the attributes that are indicated at both ends of this spectrum of opinion. What is undeniable, however, is that they are unequal and divided social spaces that have continued throughout the twentieth and into the twenty first centuries to be the objects of sociological analysis and research.

The study of cities has involved focusing on the built environment, on the social life or

urban people, and on the relationship between the two. A hugely significant work in this respect was *The Death and Life of Great American Cities* written in 1961 by Jane Jacobs. However, the origins of urban sociology can be traced to the work of the Chicago School in the 1920s and 1930s and in particular to Robert E. Park, Ernest Burgess, and Louis Wirth. Park was the founder of an ecological approach which likened cities to biological organisms. Many subsequent studies of cities have been influenced by this approach despite the fact that its emphasis on the natural development of the city ignores the importance of economic and political decisions about planning.

Wirth was responsible for introducing the idea of urbanism as a way of life. Extending the concerns of earlier social thinkers, he argued that in cities people may live in close proximity but they do not truly know each other. Weak social bonds, a more frenetic pace of life, and the centrality of competition rather than cooperation characterize their lives. Wirth's views on the impersonal nature of modern urban life were highly influential. It has often been suggested, however, that both he and Park were overly influenced by their experiences of North American cities. Indeed, even in the US at the time they were writing, although arguably less so today, it was possible to find close knit communities resembling villages which helped to preserve ethnic difference even in huge ethnically diverse cities such as Chicago itself and New York.

There is no doubt, however, that the idea of life in the city as being a distinctive form of human existence has continued to figure in sociological debate. Indeed, this concern has intensified with the emergence of what is generally known as the post industrial city. Since it was previously thought that the modern city and industrialism are inextricably linked, the idea of a city with very little industrial activity has proved difficult to understand.

More recent major contributors to the sociological understanding of the city include Henri Lefebvre, David Harvey, and Manuel Castells. Like Simmel, Lefebvre was interested in the relationship between the social space of the city and the mental life of its citizens. In addition, he sought to demonstrate the extent to which urbanization in and of itself has come to replace

industrialization as the key determinant of capitalist accumulation. For Harvey and Castells, however, the city remains a product of industrial capitalism rather than its major driving force. More specifically, according to Harvey, industrial capitalism continually restructures space and, for that reason, urbanism has been an important product – arguably the most visible product – of industrialization. For Castells, the spatial form of the city is bound up with the overall mechanism of its development. That is to say, unlike the Chicago School, he does not regard the city solely as a distinct location, but also as an integral part of the entire process of collective consumption. In such ways has the sociological debate moved from seeing cities as natural spatial processes to socially and physically constructed features of the social and economic systems of power. In so doing, however, this intensely theoretical contemporary debate has tended to inspire far less empirical research than was generated by the Chicago School.

That said, theoretical considerations alone have undeniably underpinned numerous emerging concerns within the overall study of the city. These include suburbanization, inner city decay, urban conflict, urban renewal (including gentrification and civic boosterism), and spatially identifiable inequalities. Sharon Zukin, for example, has powerfully demonstrated the ways in which access to “public” spaces in modern cities is increasingly controlled. Studies have also taken into account the relationship between globalization and the city, including the emergence of what are described as global cities, the rapid growth of cities in the developing world, and the city as the agent of consumer capitalism.

SEE ALSO: Arcades; Built Environment; Chicago School; Cities in Europe; City Planning/Urban Design; Gentrification; Lefebvre, Henri; Park, Robert E. and Burgess, Ernest W.; Simmel, Georg; Urbanism/Urban Culture

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city planning/urban design

Regina M. Bures

City planning encompasses the policies and processes that influence the development of towns, cities, and regions. While planning occurred in early cities, it was not until the early twentieth century that city (urban) planning emerged as a distinct discipline. In response to the rapid growth of cities that accompanied industrialization, early urban sociologists sought to address the social issues that emerged. Early planning initiatives were related to the conservation movement and sought to address the physical and social ills that had arisen in the industrial cities. By the late twentieth century, most city governments housed a planning board or agency.

Social structures and processes shape the spatial form of the city. Because city planning can shape the spatial form of cities, it also has an impact on the social life of cities. A number of dimensions of this reciprocal relationship between planning and the social environment are of interest to sociologists. These include: the relationship between the physical nature of the city and social relations in the city; the

influence of cultural and social divisions on the planning process; the effect of planning on the distribution of groups and resources in cities; and the role of planning in creating and maintaining social divisions.

Addressing the impact of the physical nature of the city on social relations was the goal of the early planning movement. Plans for utopian communities, such as Robert Owen's New Harmony, sought solutions to the social problems of the industrial cities. In his seminal book *Garden Cities of Tomorrow* (1902), Ebenezer Howard's self-contained, decentralized garden cities with their surrounding greenbelts were the antithesis to the industrial towns of the time. More recently, the focus has been on creating green space in existing cities.

The desire for aesthetically appealing cities fueled the popularity of the City Beautiful Movement. This trend emerged following the Chicago Columbian World Expedition of 1893 with its neoclassically designed White City. The City Beautiful Movement, which had a strong influence on the design of public buildings and spaces in the United States, however overlooked the issue of housing and did little to improve the immediate environs for poorer city residents.

This disconnect reflects the extent to which different cultural and social groups may influence the planning process. While groups with more resources may favor large scale planning, residents with fewer resources may desire better housing or city services. In a market economy, individuals with more resources will pay more for better housing and services. Developers will offer better housing, shopping, and other amenities if they are able to make a profit. The strength of a city's culture or sense of place will affect the impact of capital on development and planning.

The potential for conflicting interests between social groups in the planning process can be illustrated by looking at the social consequences of using gentrification as a redevelopment tool. Gentrification can be an important element of urban redevelopment plans by helping communities maintain coherent identities and architectural integrity. Yet gentrification may also lead to the displacement of existing communities. Minorities and less

affluent residents may be displaced by rising rents and property values.

The causes and consequences of city planning fall under two sociological perspectives: the ecological perspective, which overlaps significantly with neoclassical economic theory, describes the effects of planning and development in terms of housing supply and the preferences of specific groups.

Development within cities is shaped by the combination of social, political, and economic factors that are unique to that city. Sociologists are also concerned with the effect of planning on the distribution of groups and resources in cities. The perspective most often associated with this is human ecology (Chicago School), which emphasizes the spatial distribution of groups within cities and draws heavily from neoclassical economics. On the other hand, the political economy perspective sees development as a process shaped primarily by political and economic forces. As an applied political economy perspective, the Los Angeles School of urban sociology uses the fragmented social and spatial landscape of Los Angeles to illustrate the characteristics of the new postmodern city (see Dear 2002).

Both of these perspectives are useful for understanding the consequences of urban planning and development processes. But to fully understand these consequences, one must consider the interplay between the physical and social environment of the city. As plans are enacted and development occurs, changes in the physical environment will affect the social environment as well.

The impacts of urban planning on the social environment evolve over time. Two key issues in urban redevelopment debates, neighborhood succession and involuntary dislocation, follow from the ecological and political economy perspectives. The changing ecology of communities leads to neighborhood succession, while changes in the political economy of an area may result in the dislocation of residents.

Planning often plays a role in creating and maintaining social divisions. Planning determines the land use and transportation patterns that shape the community life of cities. There is a distinct spatial dimension here. Social divisions manifest themselves in space as

segregation, the physical separation of members of one racial, ethnic, social, or economic group from members of another group.

In the United States, local governments control zoning which can restrict access to and the use of land; however, individuals and market forces shape the development of new land. The type and density of housing in a neighborhood will predispose it to specific social groups. Neighborhoods organize life chances in the same sense as do the more familiar dimensions of class and caste.

Also of interest to sociologists are cross national and historical comparisons of urban policies and planning strategies. Such studies examine changes over time in planning and planning outcomes. Often these offer examples of different types of governmental interactions. For example, in the United States much more emphasis is placed on private development. On the other hand, government control over land and use of public transportation are greater in European cities.

Current emphasis in sociological research and theory on urban planning builds on these themes in a number of ways. These include solutions to housing inequality, urban sprawl, and the impact of the created environment on social relations. Each of these topics incorporates an explicit awareness of the spatial dimension, reflecting a common theme of the relationship between the planned and social environments.

Housing costs and neighborhood status are closely related. At the same time, many city residents with lower incomes have a difficult time finding affordable housing. A number of factors come into play: market factors, institutional factors, and individual preferences.

Market factors such as accessibility, rents, and "best use" determine urban land use and structure. When the concern is maintaining property values, institutional mechanisms such as zoning and homeowners' associations seek to maintain homogeneity within neighborhoods.

To address the issues of density and urban sprawl, there is a focus on planning strategies to contain sprawl. Planning strategies for minimizing sprawl include smart growth policies, growth boundaries, and New Urbanist communities. Smart growth policies seek to shape city growth

in a manner that limits sprawl. As an example of smart growth policies, growth boundaries set limits to development, often specifying conservation buffers to protect open land.

A second strategy for addressing sprawl was pioneered by the architects Andres Duany and Elizabeth Peter Zyberk. Their “New Urbanism” principles were grounded in the belief that the spatial design of a neighborhood can influence the development of community: communities built using the principles of the New Urbanism that communities should be walkable and include both residential and commercial elements. New Urbanist communities are more like small towns than suburban developments. The limitation of this planning style is that it assumes that physical features of neighborhoods that are associated with traditional neighborhoods, such as front porches, will increase street level activity and interaction among residents.

A number of recent studies have examined the relationship between the social and the created environment, focusing specifically on the diversity of the created environment. In the absence of a historical culture or sense of place, planning offers a market oriented model of community. Analysis of the social consequences of development and redevelopment processes can illustrate the limitations of such created environments.

The planning process shapes the city, but the city’s physical, political, and economic environments shape the planning process. As sociologists study the urban environment they often focus on the social and historical components, and the spatial components are often overlooked. The nature of the give and take relationship between the social environment of the city and the urban planning process means that there are abundant opportunities to study the impact of planning processes and policies on the social environment of our cities.

Modern computing technology and the increased interest in using mapping techniques to complement other social science methods have made it much easier for urban scholars to study the consequences of planning decisions at both the neighborhood and city levels. Understanding urban processes at multiple levels is important with the awareness that social processes at the individual level cannot

be accurately inferred from aggregate data and individual level processes (ecological fallacy). While qualitative approaches often unpack the meaning and social significance of places, quantitative studies are used to better understand the social context in which planning decisions are made as well as their social implications.

To understand the developmental patterns within a city, it is useful to examine its historical patterns of land use and the degree to which these patterns have changed. The social environment is both time and context dependent. Thus, an approach to urban development that includes both socially and spatially conscious methods is most appropriate. Current efforts in sociology include the integration of spatial perspectives into theory and methodology into the discipline.

Perhaps the biggest limitation of planning is that the planning process is so often divorced from the social environments that it will affect. Groups with little economic or political power are often overlooked in the planning process. While change is an important part of the urban environment, we need to consider more innovative approaches to maintaining community and social environment while preserving the physical environment. As we learn more about the relationship between maintaining communities and restoring communities, urban sociologists and planners should seek to balance the social, political, and economic dimensions of cities.

SEE ALSO: Chicago School; Gentrification; Growth Machine; Levittown; Mumford, Lewis; New Urbanism; Park, Robert E. and Burgess, Ernest W.; Urban Ecology; Urban Renewal and Redevelopment

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civil minimum

Yasushi Suzuki

According to Japanese political scientist Keiichi Matsushita, “civil minimum” is a minimum standard for living in urban society that should be assured by municipalities. It comprises social security, social overhead capital, and public health. Civil minimum is based on the right to life, and should be considered as the postulate of urban policies, decided through democratic procedures including citizen participation, and indicated by numerical goals. It may vary from municipality to municipality, but it should exceed the “national minimum.”

The civil minimum was initially proposed in the late 1960s. The rapid economic growth of the time brought about massive immigration from rural to urban areas, and the national and local governments were required to develop urban infrastructures as soon as possible. However, the governments prioritized economic growth, preferentially investing in industrial infrastructures rather than public facilities and services for urban residents. As a result, problems such as air and water pollution, fetid odors, traffic congestion, and the deficiency of urban facilities such as fire stations, parks, schools, sanitation systems, hospitals, welfare institutions, and others became major issues of urban politics. In the early 1970s, coalitions of reformists including the Social Democratic and the Communist parties raised these issues and won elections for mayors and governors in some major cities and prefectures. The new reformist administrations set agendas based on the idea of a civil minimum. For example, the Tokyo Metropolitan Government, where economist Ryokichi Minobe was elected governor in 1967, formulated a mid term plan for achieving the civil minimum quickly (1968), then developed social indicators for Tokyo (1973a), and published a long term *Plan for Tokyo Metropolis with Plaza and Blue Sky* (1973b), in which “Plaza” signaled the principle of citizens’ involvement and “Blue Sky” symbolized an ideal urban environment. The series of plans adopted by the Minobe administration embodied the idea of civil minimum. Although the minimum standards

for various areas were not easy to determine (Tokyo Metropolitan Government 1972), the idea of a civil minimum was adopted by about one third of Japanese municipalities by the mid 1970s. Its impact on the local administrative structures was profound, since Japanese local governments have been supervised, and effectively ruled, by the national government for a long time.

Although the reformist administrations suffered from fiscal crises during the economic depression following the oil crises and were politically defeated in the late 1970s, the “civil minimum” standards were largely satisfied during the asset inflated “bubble” economy in the late 1980s. Recently, in connection with the national reform of the local administration system in 2000, the civil minimum has been reinterpreted as criteria for local governments to provide public services under the principle of “subsidiarity” applied to the relationships between local and national governments, and social indicators have been considered as benchmarks that measure the specific goals and performances of public services (Matsushita 2003).

Thus, the term “civil minimum” has become well established in Japanese political and administrative language. It signifies a seminal idea on the principles of municipal policies and has contributed to facilitating the decentralization of the local administration system in Japan.

SEE ALSO: Environment and Urbanization; Human Rights; Local Residents’ Movements; *Seikatsu/Seikatsusha*; Social Policy, Welfare State; Urban Policy

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civil religion

David Yamane

Civil religion refers to the cultural beliefs, practices, and symbols that relate a nation to the ultimate conditions of its existence. The idea of civil religion can be traced to the French philosopher Jean Jacques Rousseau's *On the Social Contract* (1762). Writing in the wake of the Protestant-Catholic religious wars, Rousseau maintained the need for "social sentiments" outside of organized religion "without which a man cannot be a good citizen or faithful subject." The broader question motivating Rousseau concerned political legitimation without religious establishment.

Although he does not use the term, Durkheim's work in *The Elementary Forms of Religious Life* (1912) was clearly influenced by his countryman's concern for shared symbols and the obligations they articulate. Recognizing that "the former gods are growing old or dying," Durkheim sought a more modern basis for the renewal of the collective sentiments societies need if they are to stay together. He found that basis in the "hours of creative effervescence during which new ideals will once again spring forth and new formulas emerge to guide humanity for a time." Civil religious ideals arise from national civil religious rituals.

Robert Bellah's 1967 *Daedalus* essay "Civil Religion in America" brought the concept and its Rousseauian Durkheimian concern into contemporary sociology. Bellah argued that civil religion exists alongside and is (crucially) distinct from church religion. It is actually a religious "dimension" of society, characteristic of the American republic since its founding.

Civil religion is "an understanding of the American experience in the light of ultimate and universal reality," and can be found in presidential inaugural addresses from Washington to Kennedy, sacred texts (the Declaration of Independence) and places (Gettysburg), and community rituals (Memorial Day parades). It is especially evident in times of trial for the nation like the Revolution and Civil War.

Like Rousseau and Durkheim, Bellah saw legitimation as a problem faced by every nation, and civil religion as one solution – under the right social conditions. Bellah argued in *Varieties of Civil Religion* (1980) that in premodern societies the solution consisted either in a fusion of the religious and political realms (in the archaic period) or a differentiation but not separation (in the historic and early modern periods). Civil religion proper comes into existence only in the modern period when church and state are separated as well as structurally differentiated. That is, a civil religion that is differentiated from both church and state is only possible in a modern society.

Its structural position relative to both church and state allows civil religion to act not only as a source of legitimation, but also of prophetic judgment. "Without an awareness that our nation stands under higher judgment," Bellah wrote in 1967, "the tradition of the civil religion would be dangerous indeed." By 1975, Bellah declared in *The Broken Covenant* that American civil religion was "an empty and broken shell" because it had failed to inspire citizens and lost its critical edge. Much of this nuance was lost on critics of Bellah and of the concept of civil religion, who often accused him of promoting idolatrous worship of the state, so much so that Bellah himself did not use the term in *Habits of the Heart* (1985) or thereafter, despite the substantive continuity from his earlier to his later work.

Although Bellah's concern was primarily normative, his essay stimulated considerable definitional and historical debates about American civil religion, as well as some empirical research. Systematizing and operationalizing civil religion in a way that Bellah's original essay did not, Wimberly (1976) found evidence for the existence of civil religion as a dimension of American society distinct from politics and

organized religion. Some research also tested the concept of civil religion cross nationally, finding unique constellations of legitimating myths and symbols in Israel, Italy, Japan, Mexico, Poland, and Sri Lanka.

Before a consensus could emerge on the meaning and reality of civil religion, however, the concept lost favor among sociologists. By 1989, James Mathisen was asking “Whatever happened to civil religion?” In fact, in Mathisen’s (1989) account, interest in civil religion peaked just a decade after Bellah’s essay was published. Part of what happened was the emergence of religious nationalism and fundamentalism worldwide. This highlighted the divisive aspects of religious politics and politicized religion over and against the potentially integrative effect of civil religion. Examining the American situation after the rise of the New Christian Right, Wuthnow (1988) found not a single civil religion, but two civil religions – one conservative, one liberal – in dispute and therefore incapable of creating a unifying collective consciousness. Shortly thereafter, Hunter dramatically captured this situation in the title of his 1991 book, *Culture Wars*.

By the 1990s, other concepts began to compete in the arena once dominated by civil religion, most notably “public religion” and concern with the role of religion in civil society. Where civil religion was principally treated as a cultural phenomenon, this recent work has been much more focused on institutions (e.g., Jose Casanova’s 1994 *Public Religions in the Modern World*) and social movements (e.g., Richard Wood’s 2002 *Faith in Action*). Even Bellah and his colleagues in *The Good Society* (1991) turned their attention to the institutional dimension of “the public church.”

Whether or not future research and reflection is conducted in the name of “civil religion,” the fundamental religious political problem of legitimation remains. Sociologists in the future, therefore, will continue to grapple with the question to which civil religion is one answer, hopefully standing on the shoulders of Rousseau, Durkheim, and Bellah as they do so.

SEE ALSO: Durkheim, Émile; Religion; Religion, Sociology of

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Civil Rights Movement

Aldon Morris

Just 50 years ago African Americans were a severely oppressed group. They did not enjoy many of the basic citizenship rights guaranteed by the US Constitution. This was especially true of the American South, where large numbers of black Americans resided. In fact, state laws explicitly denied many of these rights and prevailing social customs disregarded them altogether.

In the South black people were controlled by an oppressive social system known as the Jim Crow regime. Under Jim Crow, blacks were denied the franchise, barred from interacting with whites in public spaces, and were trapped at the bottom of the economic order, where they were relegated to the poorest paying and least desirable jobs. This inequality was buttressed by the ideology that blacks were genetically and culturally inferior and thus deserved their wretched place in the social order. This racial inequality and ideology was thoroughly entrenched in the fabric of American society because it had reigned supreme for two and a half centuries of slavery and the Jim Crow era that was established after the brief Reconstruction period that ended in the late nineteenth century. This oppressive system was backed by

state laws and white violence utilized by white supremacist groups such as the Ku Klux Klan. It was condoned by the US Supreme Court, which declared in the 1896 *Plessey v. Ferguson* ruling that racial segregation did not violate the Constitution so long as separate facilities for blacks were equal to those of whites. Yet the most cursory examination of race relations made it glaringly clear that this premise was false.

As a result, there could be no denying that blacks were legally and socially stripped of the basic rights promised in a society that represented itself as the world's leading democracy. By the 1950s, blacks faced the dilemma that had dogged them for centuries: how could they wage a successful struggle to overthrow their oppression without being fatally crushed by a superior enemy? This question is the basic one that all oppressed people have had to address in their quest to attain freedom and justice.

The social movement is the vehicle available to oppressed people to overthrow oppression. A social movement is an organized collective effort by large numbers of people for the purpose of generating the social power required to initiate social change. The hallmark of the social movement is the use of unruly tactics and strategies to generate the power needed to usher in change despite resistance. The social disruption created by movements is essential to change precisely because conventional methods – lobbying, voting, legal action, and the like – are either unavailable or ineffective for oppressed people who are not constituents of established polities. While conventional methods are often used by social movements, they must be coupled with disruptive tactics to be effective. In short, effective social movements specialize in disruptive tactics because they undermine social order. Social disruption enables social movement leaders to demand change in exchange for the cessation of unruly protest, thus making it possible for social order to be reestablished.

THE RISE OF THE MODERN CIVIL RIGHTS MOVEMENT

The modern Civil Rights Movement that became a major social force in the mid 1950s was the means by which African Americans and

their supporters overthrew the Jim Crow regime. It is erroneous to assume that African Americans did not begin to fight for the overthrow of racial inequality until the 1950s. Indeed, the historic black freedom struggle began on the slave ships in the seventeenth century and continued throughout the slave and Jim Crow periods. This struggle intensified especially during and following World War II. This period gave rise to mass marches and protest rallies that demanded full equality for blacks in the military and the larger society. The labor and civil rights leader A. Philip Randolph explicitly called for nonviolent mass action by blacks modeled after the Gandhi movement to overthrow British rule. Powerful social movements that generate change have long histories usually rooted in prior struggles, protest organizations, leaders and politically conscious members of the oppressed masses who have participated in or been influenced by previous struggles. Thus, like other major movements, the Civil Rights Movement did not spring from thin air, but was rooted in a long history of struggle.

The modern Civil Rights Movement came of age in 1955 during the year long Montgomery bus boycott organized by local black leaders and led by Martin Luther King, Jr., who would become the charismatic leader of the national Civil Rights Movement. In Montgomery, as in cities throughout the South, the black community was a victim of the racially segregated Jim Crow regime. All aspects of race relations in Montgomery were circumscribed by racial segregation, including the local buses, where blacks had to ride in the Jim Crow section located in the rear of the bus. On December 1, Rosa Parks was arrested for refusing to relinquish her seat to a white rider, thus violating Alabama segregation laws. Local black leaders organized a boycott of the buses that resulted in victory after an entire year of protest. This struggle became the model for the Civil Rights Movement that would occupy the world stage for over a decade.

The Montgomery bus boycott became an exemplary model for the larger Civil Rights Movement for several reasons. First, it was highly visible because it lasted a year and resulted in victory when the Supreme Court ruled that bus segregation in Montgomery

was unconstitutional. Second, it championed nonviolent direct action as the unruly method of protest that could be effective because such peaceful and legal protest could not easily be crushed by white violence and resistance. Third, it revealed that an entire black community could be organized into a disciplined struggle. Prior to this movement, there were divisions and conflicts in Montgomery's black community. The boycott community solved this problem by forming a new protest organization – Montgomery Improvement Association – that combined all the political and voluntary organizations into one “organization of organizations” that mobilized and sustained the movement. Fourth, it demonstrated that the black church could be utilized as the movement's institutional and cultural framework to produce mobilization and solidarity through frequent mass meetings. Fifth, it proved that blacks themselves were capable of raising the bulk of the funds needed to finance the movement. Sixth, the Montgomery struggle catapulted Martin Luther King, Jr. into the charismatic leadership of the movement. His eloquent oratory and dedication attracted media attention, thus providing national and international visibility to the struggles by African Americans to overthrow the Jim Crow regime.

Similar protest movements in other Southern cities were organized within months of the Montgomery bus boycott. They embraced the same organizational, cultural, and tactical characteristics as the Montgomery movement. Within a short time, Dr. King, Ella Baker, Bayard Rustin, and other leaders of the local movements organized the Southern Christian Leadership Conference (SCLC), the purpose of which was to organize and coordinate protest movements throughout the South to overthrow racial inequality. The National Association for the Advancement of Colored People (NAACP) (which had been formed in 1910 with similar goals) became active in the emerging movement. Because the NAACP championed the legal method, it addressed many of the legal issues and court challenges associated with protest. The Congress of Racial Equality (CORE), organized in 1942 to initiate nonviolent protest against racial segregation, also became active in the Civil Rights Movement by initiating protest. Despite tensions and rivalries, these

national organizations and the plethora of new local protest organizations constituted the infrastructure of the modern Civil Rights Movement. From this base, the new movement launched its attack on the Jim Crow regime.

The Civil Rights Movement encountered serious opposition from the Jim Crow regime and the white privileges it protected had no intention of passing into history without a fight. The white opposition responded to protest with mass arrests, racially motivated laws to stall the movement, economic reprisals, and strategic white violence designed to frighten participants into submission. In fact, the white opposition organized counter movements designed to undermine civil rights protests and to bolster the racial status quo. Thus, the protest activities and the opposition it spun set the stage for dramatic confrontations that became the hallmark of the modern Civil Rights Movement. This tug of war between these two forces alerted the nation and the world to the magnitude of racism existing in the bosom of American democracy.

By 1960 the modern movement involved significant numbers of young blacks, but it was an adult driven phenomenon. This changed significantly in the spring of 1960s when black college students began organizing sit ins at racially segregated lunch counters. These sit ins spread so rapidly across the South that they became known as the student sit in movement. These student led protests drew thousands of young people into the Civil Rights Movement and it mobilized thousands of adults who rallied to their support. Many of the sit ins successfully desegregated lunch counters.

The leaders of the sit ins, supported by Ella Baker of SCLC, decided they needed to become an organized and independent wing of the Civil Rights Movement. Following the sit ins they organized a new protest organization, the Student Nonviolent Coordinating Committee (SNCC). The SNCC represented a dynamic force in the movement, for it involved young people full of idealism, relative freedom from economic pressures, and the absence of rigid time constraints. Thus, the SNCC joined the SCLC and CORE as the activist wing of the movement. In their efforts they were supported by the NAACP and the National Urban League. The young people of the SNCC inspired and ignited another force – white

students largely of elite backgrounds from the North – who joined with them to overthrow Jim Crow and seek the realization of a robust democracy. Significant numbers of these students joined the sit in movement and subsequent protests, adding to the strength of the Civil Rights Movements.

The Civil Rights Movement matured into a major social force during the 1960s. Its tactical repertoire of social disruption expanded and was increasingly deployed with razor like precision to generate the political leverage needed to convince the economic and political rulers of the Jim Crow regime that it was in their interests to dismantle legally enforced racial segregation. Boycotts, mass marches, mass arrests, sit ins, freedom rides, attempts to register at all white schools, lawsuits, and other unruly tactics created economic and political chaos. The opposition used bombings, billy clubs, high pressure water hoses, and attack dogs to try to put out the political fire created by the movement. These vicious attacks on peaceful demonstrators occurred as television cameras and satellites recorded the carnage for the world to witness. The brutal confrontations in the streets also put pressure on the federal government and courts to support the goals of the movement because of their unwillingness to appear to support open tyranny against black citizens while the world watched and examined how the leading democracy would respond to injustice while being gripped by a Cold War with the Soviet Union to determine which nation would emerge as the reigning superpower.

ACCOMPLISHMENTS

In a decade (1955–65) the formal Jim Crow regime was overthrown. In 1964 the federal government issued the 1964 Civil Rights Act, which barred discrimination based on race, sex, religion, or national identity. This Act snatched crucial power from the regime because in effect it reversed the 1896 *Plessey v. Ferguson* ruling by declaring that racial segregation had no place in America. This historic Act was a direct response to the 1963 Birmingham confrontation led by King and the thousands of protests it generated throughout the nation. Yet the dying regime still had life because the 1964 Civil

Rights Act did not seize the franchise for millions of Southern blacks. It was the 1965 Selma, Alabama protest and its march to Montgomery which served as both the symbolic capital of the Confederacy and the birthplace of the modern Civil Rights Movement that led to the franchise for Southern African Americans. These protests were massive and so was the brutal opposition, who responded by murdering several protesters while beating and tear gassing hundreds more. As a result, President Lyndon Johnson worked for a federal Act that would land the vote in the hands of the descendants of slaves. In 1965 Johnson signed the Voting Rights Bill, thus making the franchise available to all eligible American citizens.

EXTERNAL OPPORTUNITIES

Movements are fought by those seeking change. Without such heroic struggles, oppression and injustice would be far more prevalent than it is today. Yet certain realities outside the protest group can affect the mobilization and the outcomes of social movements. This was true for the Civil Rights Movement. By the 1950s record numbers of blacks had migrated from the rural South to the urban cities of the North and South. Urban black communities developed stronger institutions, leaders, and economic resources than had been possible in the South. Thus, because of this urban migration, blacks possessed the economic and institutional resources that could sustain a protracted struggle. Additionally, by the late 1950s televisions and satellites made it possible for protest groups to dramatize their grievances to national and international audiences, thereby garnering their sympathy and support. Finally, the Civil Rights Movement gained additional strength because of the Cold War environment following World War II. It was a period in which the Soviet Union and the US struggled for world supremacy and each courted the colored nations of Africa and Asia who were attaining independence from European colonialism. The dramatic and brutal confrontations in American streets caused by protest severely hampered America's foreign policy aimed at attracting the support of the world's colored people. As a result, the executive branch of

the government as well as the federal courts shifted toward supporting civil rights for blacks so that America could realize its global aspirations. The marriage of protest and these external developments combined to make the Civil Rights Movement a powerful social force.

POLITICAL AND SCHOLARLY OUTCOMES

The Civil Rights Movement became a national and international model for social change. It did so because of its exemplary organization, pioneering innovative tactics, cultural creativity, and success. This movement succeeded in revealing that oppressed people can play a crucial role in determining their fate. It taught that social movements are capable of generating the political leverage required for oppressed people to confront power holders and demand change and to do so effectively. In America it was not long before students, women, environmentalists, anti war activists, gays and lesbians, farm workers, the disabled, and many other groups launched their own movements by drawing on the model, inspiration, and lessons learned from the Civil Rights Movement. This was also true in other parts of the world. For example, the anti apartheid movement of South Africa, China's Pro Democracy movement, Poland's Solidarity movement, and many others in Europe also drew lessons and inspiration from the American Civil Rights Movement. Its anthem "We Shall Overcome" has been adopted by numerous movements globally. The political impact of the Civil Rights Movement continues to be felt around the world.

The Civil Rights Movement has had a scholarly impact as well. Prior to this movement the dominant view among scholars was that movements were spontaneous, unorganized, non rational, and highly emotional. They were viewed as exotic phenomena, usually disappearing before accomplishing significant goals. This scholarly consensus did not fit the basic characteristics and outcomes of the Civil Rights Movement. Rather than being spontaneous, that movement was anchored in longstanding institutions and cultural traditions of the black community. Indeed, organizational activity lay

at the core of the movement. Because this movement resulted from a high degree of organizing, it could not be conceptualized as an unorganized enterprise. It was characterized by careful planning and strategic thinking and therefore could not be accurately described as driven by emotion. Because of its duration and the real goals it achieved, the movement evolved as an explicit political development that pursued unconventional avenues to achieve its goals. Partly as a response to this groundbreaking movement, scholars have fashioned a new view of social movements where organization, strategic thinking, cultural traditions, and political encounters figure heavily as explanatory factors in their analyses.

It is clear that racial inequality still exists in America and this is especially true from an economic standpoint. Thus, the Civil Rights Movement did not accomplish all of its goals, despite the fact that it changed American race relations substantially by overthrowing formal Jim Crow. Worldwide inequality is still a stark reality. The Civil Rights Movement proved that such inequalities can be attacked through social movements. Such movements are the vehicles by which the voice of the oppressed can make a difference.

SEE ALSO: Accommodation; *Brown v. Board of Education*; Charismatic Movement; Collective Action; Color Line; Direct Action; Labor Movement; Social Movements; Social Movements, Political Consequences of

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civil society

Larry Ray

Civil society is often understood as a defense against excessive state power and atomized individualism, which otherwise threatens to create conditions for authoritarianism. The term can be traced to Roman juridical concepts (*ius civile*), but its contemporary use to describe contractual relations, the rise of public opinion, representative government, civic freedoms, plurality, and “civility” first appeared in seveneenth and eighteenth century political philosophy. Thomas Hobbes’s theory of the sovereign state (Leviathan) was premised on the existence of two branches of society – political and civil – tied by a “social contract” between subjects and the state. Surrender of sovereignty to the state protected society from the war of all against all. Although the political system was the dominant part, the civil and political were mutually sustaining systems, in which private activity, while governed by sovereign laws, was otherwise bound only by conscience and the rules of civic association. Disputing Hobbes’s negative

views of human nature, John Locke further enhanced the status of civil society as a space of association, contract, and property regulated by the law. When, for Locke, subjects entered a commonwealth of property they contracted authority to the state for their self protection, but they did so conditionally, and political rule is answerable to law derived from natural rights that inhere in civil society.

In subsequent theories civil society became an autonomous sphere separate from and possibly opposed to the state. Based on limited networks of aristocratic men and an emerging public–private dichotomy, the model of free association and debate was often that of the coffee house in which public activity actually took place in small and exclusive social circles. Civil society theories were concerned to defend the idea of a space for public debate and private association at a time when such liberal principles were not widely shared. For Adam Ferguson (1966), the development of civil society reflected the progress of humanity from simple, clan based militaristic societies to complex commercial ones. However, this process of social differentiation and loss of community threatened increased conflict and weakened the social fabric. Civil society has the potential to establish a new order requiring dispersal of power and office, the rule of law, and liberal (i.e., tolerant) sentiments, which secure people and property “without requiring obligation to friends and cabals.” An important implication here is that civil society does not refer to just *any* kind of informal or private social relations, which exist in all societies, but to morally guided relations that make possible anonymous social exchanges and thereby facilitate social integration.

The classical tradition of civil society theory formulated a concept closely associated with liberal market values and community involvement. This idea links the Scottish moralists (e.g., Ferguson), Tocqueville, Durkheim, and contemporary writers such as Robert Putnam (1993). Active, voluntary, and informal groups and networks make for more stable democracy and protect against incursion by the state. Civil society thus has a recursive property – it protects against state incursion while strengthening the (liberal democratic) state. Conversely, the

absence of civil society is both an explanation and reinforcement of authoritarianism.

However, an implicit tension between conflicts in commercial society and the demands of social peace was highlighted by Hegel, for whom civil society was divided between ethical life (*Sittlichkeit*) and egotistical self interest. Objective Spirit achieves self knowledge through differentiation into discrete spheres, which form a totality of the family (socialization towards moral autonomy), civil society (production, distribution, and consumption), and the state. Hegel's view of civil society anticipated Marx's critique of class polarization as "the conflict between vast wealth and vast poverty . . . turns into the utmost dismemberment of will, inner rebellion and hatred" (Hegel 1967: 151). This will be overcome if the constitutional legal state (*Rechtsstaat*) synthesizes ethical life with the public domain of civil society. But Marx dismissed civil society simply as the equivalent of bourgeois society, an arena of conflict, class oppression, and illusory emancipation. The proletarian victory would substitute for the old civil society a classless association in which there would be neither political power nor the antagonisms of civil society (Marx 1978).

Gramsci reintroduced the concept into Marxism in the 1920s when – attempting to combat economic reductionism – he defined civil society as a sphere of cultural struggle against bourgeois hegemony. This formulation was influential among Eurocommunist parties in the 1970s and 1980s, although ironically a significant revival of the concept came in the anti communist revolutions of 1989. Here a central idea was to identify diverse social spaces for public discussion, local initiatives, and voluntary citizens' associations that were neither narrowly merged with the market nor adjuncts of the state. Arato (1991) described the revolutions of 1989 as "self limiting," in that they eschewed central control of power and utopian visions of the future. Active citizens would replace communist power with self managed civil societies and permanently open democracy. In the event many commentators view post communist civil societies with disappointment, in the face of cultures of distrust, the habit of informal dealings, and the

strengthening of particularistic visions and elements (Misztal 2000).

Alongside and possibly supplanting national state–civil society relations, some suggest that there is a global civil society made up of international non governmental organizations, transnational social movements, and digitally mediated social networks (Norris 2001). Although this idea has been influential, there is a conflict between the goal of creating transnational cosmopolitan values and the unregulated growth of world markets brought by global neoliberalism that has resulted in heightened levels of social inequality, which neither states nor international organizations have the capacity to address. Global political and corporate institutions are not (yet?) embedded within constraining networks of a global civil society and there is a risk here of an excessively elastic and insufficiently complex concept.

SEE ALSO: Democracy; Gramsci, Antonio; Individualism; Marx, Karl; Public Sphere; Transnational Movements

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civilization and economy

Roberta Garner and Larry Garner

“The economy” is a social institution that is constructed and reproduced through human action, as human beings collectively produce their conditions of survival and well being. In sociological perspective, “the economy” is not reified as a thing or mechanism apart from human actions, interaction, and relationships.

This definition of the economy guides sociological analysis of relationships between economic institutions and civilization – culture, ideology, art, law, religion, and prevailing forms of thought, feeling, and discourse.

THE INTEGRATION OF ECONOMY AND CULTURE

One sociological distinction is that between non market societies and market societies as two broad categories of civilization. In the former, economic activities are embedded in cultural, social, and political institutions and limited by them. In market societies, the economy is clearly differentiated from such cultural, social, and political institutions, while at the same time it has powerful effects on them, creating a distinct form of civilization.

In *non market societies*, market institutions are secondary or absent, and production and distribution are primarily embedded in kinship and/or hierarchical power relationships among status groups. Economic activities are limited or “hedged in” by norms of institutions in which they are embedded.

In early human societies, and still today in smaller societies, economic activities are inextricably linked with kinship, and roles associated with economic activities are kinship and gender roles (as suggested by the derivation of “economy” from Greek *oikos*, “household”).

Societies of surplus extraction and redistribution emerged from kinship based economies in the regions that produced “civilizations” in the traditional sense of the term – stratified, state level societies. As subsistence activities became more productive and a surplus became available, ruling groups appropriated this

surplus and used it not only to enrich themselves but also to build armies, organize large projects, and construct elite cultural and religious institutions. Kinship based economic activities persisted at the local, micro level, but at the macro level civilizations became stratified. Slavery, tribute collection, and feudal serfdom are examples of stratification systems associated with surplus appropriation. These types of articulation can be seen, for instance, in classical antiquity, ancient China and India, MesoAmerican civilizations, African kingdoms, and European and Japanese feudalism. In these civilizations, production and distribution were closely tied to differential power between groups such as lords and serfs, slaveowners and slaves, tribute collectors and tribute bearers. In many instances, stratified groups (clans, castes, and distinct ethnic groups) were defined by ascribed characteristics, stable membership, and differentiated honor as well as power differences. These unequal groups were status groups, quite different from economically defined classes in market society. While many of these civilizations included market exchanges, the market remained a secondary or supplementary form of organizing distribution and had only a limited impact on production decisions; it was highly circumscribed by traditional rules, roles, and obligations.

Another type of society is comprised of *market societies* in which “the economy” is clearly differentiated from other social institutions. In market societies, decisions about production and distribution are linked to exchanges between buyers and sellers of products and services. These commodified, market relationships have a strong impact on non economic institutions, relationships, norms, and culture. They shape a civilization organized around profit and commodification, as well as constant, rapid flux in social relationships, technology, and the human impact on the natural environment.

The modern era, after the European Middle Ages, saw the rise of market or capitalist societies in which markets became the major institutional form of economic activity. Production was increasingly for markets, not for household use nor for powerholders capable of extracting and redistributing goods. Market exchange for profit became the driving force of economic activity and accrued to private firms and

individuals that owned productive property. Labor power was not organized through coercion as in slavery, *corvée*, and tribute collection, nor was it mobilized by traditional obligations; instead, it became a commodity traded in labor markets. Market institutions were closely linked with rational calculation and monetized or commodified relationships among individuals and groups. Status groups and traditional forms of authority declined in importance. Class inequality based on economic standing and market position replaced status group distinctions as the dominant form of social differentiation. Legal systems shifted toward juridical equality of individuals, at the same time that individuals' economic positions were highly unequal.

In the twentieth century there were attempts, most notably in the Soviet Union and China, to establish command or planned economies in which political institutions and decision making in a centralized state organized production and distribution in lieu of market mechanisms. These forms of society not only are structurally different, but also constitute different civilizations, distinct in their culture and the values, discourses, ideas, and consciousness shared by their members. In the words of sociologist C. Wright Mills (1959), there are differences in the "varieties of men and women that prevail in this society." In this respect, one can identify a general link between economy and civilization.

CLASSICAL THEORY: ANALYZING THE EMERGENCE OF CAPITALIST CIVILIZATION

The systematic analysis of the relationship between "economy" and "civilization" began with the Enlightenment and the rise of modern nation states interested in increasing their wealth and power by specific economic policies. The merits of mercantile and *laissez faire* models of development intrigued theorists of this period, culminating in Adam Smith's thesis that self-regulating markets were the best way to enhance the wealth of nations. But even Smith warned of the deleterious social effects of the division of labor and specialization of skill: monotonous labor routines dull the

workers' senses and alienate workers from their work.

Almost 75 years later, Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels (1948 [1848]) provided a detailed, comprehensive, and critical look at the historical sequence of modes of production, each characterized by distinct economic activities, technical knowledge, and class relationships. Technology and economy are not conceptualized as reified "determining forces" but are themselves created in the context of interactions among human beings. In all historical societies, these interactions are patterned as class relationships. Corresponding to each mode of production are compatible political and ideological institutions that function to reproduce the class relationships associated with production. Each type of society constituted by a mode of production plus political and ideological institutions is a distinct social formation.

For Marx and Engels, there was an evolutionary sequence of social formations from primitive communism (no classes, no state, no literate culture), to slave societies and despotic kingdoms, and then, in some regions such as Western Europe and Japan, to feudal societies based on serfdom. Capitalism emerged from class struggles within feudal society. The capitalist ruling class, the bourgeoisie, oversaw an organization of social and economic life in which "the cash nexus" dominated all forms of social interaction. Marx and Engels envisioned the overthrow of capitalism by its exploited masses and the creation of a future society in which social relations and activities would no longer be driven by the logic of commercialization. In communist societies, class inequalities and the state would disappear, and thanks to a very high level of economic production and technical knowledge, human beings would be liberated from the division of labor and fixed economic roles. These fixed roles would be replaced by pleasurable activities in fluid accord with individual talents and changing dispositions (1970 [1845–6]).

Each social formation is characterized by ideas, values, discourses, art forms, ways of thinking, and ways of interacting – in short, a compact civilization – which mesh with the economic base. In the case of capitalism, we find commodification of human relationships, rapid social change, emergence of global

culture, disintegration of traditional forms of authority, and an ideology of freedom and individualism.

The complex Marxist model, with its evolutionary sequence, dialectic of agency and structure, and emphasis on the strong but never reified role of the mode of production in shaping the civilization as a whole, has left an indelible mark on subsequent analysis of the relationships between economy and culture. Later theorists were often in “a debate with Marx’s ghost” (Zeitlin 1997).

Three great classical sociologists of the beginning of the twentieth century – Max Weber, Georg Simmel, and Émile Durkheim – also focused on the role of economic activity in society. Like Marx and Engels, they show a deep ambivalence about the effects of capitalism on civilization, decrying its oppressive monetization of human relationships, yet recognizing that it swept away superstition, magical beliefs, caste like status inequalities, and feudal oppression.

For Durkheim, even more than for Marx and Engels, “the economy” is not a separate reified structure but inextricably linked with the overall social order. He emphasized, for example, that capitalism’s exchange relationships, in which each party at all times seeks to maximize gain, would be altogether socially unstable without a non contractual base of contracts – the shared norm or value of the inviolability of contract. Like Marx and Engels, Durkheim was interested in the changing forms of the division of labor; he linked them to changing forms of social control and social cohesion, noting that as the division of labor became more complex, the normative order and collective conscience became less harsh, punitive, and undifferentiated. An advanced, complex division of labor, itself arising due to the material force of greater social density, can create a higher type of social cohesion. In advanced market societies, organic solidarity based on differentiation of functions and mutual dependency can replace mechanical solidarity, based on similarity and conformity. The resulting civilization is potentially a higher, more complex form in which diversity, individuation, and moral autonomy are more respected and highly developed, but in this evolution, there is always the risk of anomie,

a pathological loosening of normative regulation, as well as the disintegration of social bonds (Durkheim 1964 [1893]).

Georg Simmel, deeply influenced by Friedrich Nietzsche’s attack on modern civilization, offered a critique of the money economy. Like Marx and Engels, he saw capitalism engendering a civilization in which money takes on a life of its own, infusing all aspects of social, cultural, and psychological life, and accentuating the individual’s alienation from self and others. He concurred with Durkheim that capitalist civilization is characterized by feelings of limitlessness, especially limitless wants. In the money economy, social relationships are subordinated to exchange value and the impersonal calculation of monetary gain. Capitalist civilization produces social types that reflect the abstractness of money, its detachment from use value and specific experience. Among these types are the miser and the spendthrift, who appear to be opposites yet are linked in their exclusive focus on the potentiality of money. Simmel also pointed out that when individuals leave rural communities and enter the urban money economy, they experience a kind of liberation: they enjoy greater personal autonomy (concomitant with the anonymity afforded by the city) and the stimulating, enlightening effect of living in an ever changing milieu (1971 [1903]; 1978 [1907]).

Max Weber, influenced by both Marx and Engels and Nietzsche, brought a new perspective to analysis of economy and civilization. Without rejecting the Marxist interest in effects of the mode of production on culture, he also gave weight to economic consequences of non economic beliefs and activities. In *The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism* (1958 [1904–5]), he asserts that Protestant beliefs and values were preconditions of capitalist accumulation. It was the culture and beliefs of the Protestant Reformation – the sense of calling, asceticism, and predestinarian faith – that unintentionally encouraged the behaviors underlying capitalist accumulation in Western Europe. This analysis is part of an even larger perspective on economy and civilization: his argument that the moral demands articulated by the Hebrew prophets set in motion a cultural transformation in the West toward a disenchanting understanding of the world, suppression

of magical belief, and insistence on self aware action. This transformation makes possible both modern capitalism and the modern ascendancy of instrumental reason – the rationality of means that accompanies both capitalism and bureaucracy. The conception of the omnipotent God of the Hebrew Bible, emphasized anew in the Protestant Reformation, actually creates an ever growing space of rational action. In western belief, the multitude of weak, immanent, spirit beings that are tolerant of human transgressions and can be compelled by magic gave way to a single, intolerant, transcendent, and demanding God who holds people morally accountable and forces them into constant monitoring of their own actions (Weber 1952; Zeitlin 1997).

To summarize, the classical theorists had highly ambivalent views of capitalism and rationalization, seeing in it both the development of culture beyond magical and mystical views of the world, and the source of intense alienation and new forms of exploitation, now legitimated in the name of reason, accumulation, and efficiency.

TWENTIETH CENTURY THOUGHT: CAPITALISM AND CIVILIZATION

A series of twentieth century social theorists returned to these themes, adding new elements and reinterpreting theories in light of changes in the global economy itself.

Karl Polanyi's contribution was to insist that over the course of history the market was not the primary economic institution in most societies and that not all societies are market societies. Reciprocity and redistribution, rather than exchange, are the basic relationships of production and distribution in many societies. The extreme marketization and monetization of life in capitalist societies is a recent phenomenon in human history. It has a corrosive effect on the social fabric and reduces human beings to a "factor of production." Polanyi (2001) developed these influential views on market and non market societies in an analysis of the transition of western European societies into market societies in the early modern period.

The world systems school is interested not only in the transition from precapitalist to

capitalist civilization in the West, but also in the expansion of capitalism into the rest of the globe. Influenced both directly by Marxist thought and by the French Annales School of historiography (emphasizing the material basis of culture and the analysis of change over long periods), Immanuel Wallerstein (1974) develops a broad historical perspective on the emergence of a global capitalist social formation. The capitalist world system emerged during European expansion after 1450, with devastating consequences for all other cultures and civilizations. The global capitalist system is composed of three levels, a core of industrialized, developed capitalist nations (basically Western Europe, North America, and Japan), a semi periphery of partially industrialized nations (Eastern Europe, the Southern Cone of Latin America, parts of East Asia), and a periphery of underdeveloped nations and (in the past) colonized regions. As capitalist culture penetrates the periphery and semi periphery, local cultures and traditions are transformed by commodity relations and globalized media. Nationalist and fundamentalist movements in the periphery are responses to the disintegrative effects of western capitalism on traditional civilizations (Wallerstein 2003).

While both Polanyi and world systems theory examined the relationship between non market and market civilizations, other theorists provided insights into key characteristics of capitalism as a civilization with a distinctive culture. In the period between the world wars, the Frankfurt School pioneered the analysis of the relationship between capitalism, which the scholars tended to analyze in Marxist terms, and culture, art, and individual social psychological characteristics, to which they brought Freudian, Hegelian, and even surrealist concepts. Walter Benjamin (1996 [1968]) suggests that the work of art loses its "aura," its unique and sacred quality, under conditions of capitalist commodity production and mechanical reproduction in industries such as film, music recording, and photography. Commodified, fragmented, subjected to industrial assembly processes, and disseminated to the masses, the work of art ceases to be a cultural treasure. For Benjamin, this is not a loss but a dramatic delegitimation of icons of bourgeois culture, a radical undermining of authority that has revolutionary potential.

Other Frankfurt School theorists, most notably Theodor Adorno (2001), were less optimistic about cultural forms under capitalism, seeing them all – even jazz, for instance – as instruments of domination. This theme has reappeared in contemporary work on capitalism and culture, for example in Thomas Frank's *The Conquest of Cool* (1997), an essay about the enormous recuperative power of capitalist culture which is able to capture, incorporate, commodify, and thus nullify every effort at rebellion.

THE CIVILIZATION OF CAPITALISM IN THE INFORMATION AGE

In the last decades of the twentieth century, the hegemonic expansion of capitalist civilization accelerated as the global political economy shifted under the impact of neoliberal policies and structural adjustment programs. Globalization, with speeded up transnational flows of capital, media, and migrants, weakened local and national cultural institutions and broadened cultural horizons. With globalization came extension of values and behaviors that had previously been found in developed market societies, such as standardization, commodification, the discourse of efficiency, rapid technological change, and the triumph of the “bottom line” and instrumental reason. Marx and Engels's phrase, “all that is solid melts into air,” presciently sums up this rapid penetration of globalized, commodified culture into regions and communities where non market relationships had persisted into the twentieth century.

Manuel Castells (1996), in a massive work on informational capitalism, emphasizes the links between new technologies of production, specifically information technologies, on the one hand, and new global forms of culture in the network society, including the formation of oppositional identities and collective actions against corporate globalization, on the other. Informationalism is a major change within the framework of globalized capitalism that can be seen as constituting a civilization distinctly different from industrial capitalism.

Other theorists emphasized the growing reign of instrumental reason and its penetration into all areas of life. This view of the civilization

of our era was already expressed by Jürgen Habermas (1984) and Herbert Marcuse (1992) during the decades of transition from industrial capitalism to globalized, information era capitalism. The triumph of instrumental reason was analyzed more recently and accessibly in George Ritzer's (2000) *McDonaldization* thesis, which argues that the giant fast food corporation is now the paradigm of culture and social relationships, governed by efficiency, calculability, predictability, and technological control.

Fredric Jameson (1992) suggests that there are some genuinely new forms of culture – postmodern culture – associated with advanced capitalism. He proposes a concept, “the cultural dominant,” to express the impersonal mechanism whereby the economic forms of our age shape culture through an invisible and unintentional process, not through conscious molding by the bourgeoisie but through unconscious penetration of all culture by the logic of advanced capitalism – architecture, visual arts, “style” and design in fashion and consumer products, writing, movies, and so on. High and low culture, mass culture and elite culture – all are produced as commodities in the market. Cultural products take on the logic of advanced capitalism: its ephemeral quality; the devaluation of the past which is reduced to “nostalgia” or “retro”; the mediated and shallow nature of experience which is expressed through shifting surface intensities. In order to illustrate this shift within capitalist culture, Jameson contrasts Van Gogh's painting of peasant shoes that express struggle, labor, and class inequality to Andy Warhol's shiny, empty, decontextualized *Diamond Dust Shoes*. Advanced capitalism as a civilization replicates the central features of the market economy – commodification, rapid change, evanescence – but in new, heightened forms that seem difficult to challenge by older types of class struggle.

Richard Sennett (1998) develops a similar theme with respect to social character, the forms of relationships and worldviews that emerge with flexible capitalism. He argues that character has been corroded by extreme flexibility in economic production, accompanied by globalization, new technologies, and concentration of economic power. The “varieties of men and women” generated in the culture of flexible capitalism experience their world as

fragmented, dislocated, unpredictable, and disconnected from both the individual and the collective past.

SEE ALSO: Capitalism; Commodities, Commodity Fetishism, and Commodification; Consumption, Mass Consumption, and Consumer Culture; Culture, Economy and; Culture Industries; Globalization, Culture and; Ideology, Economy and; McDonaldization; Markets; Social Embeddedness of Economic Action

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civilizations

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The approach to the civilizational dimension in sociological analysis presented here is based on a shift in the comparative analysis of institutions which took place in the early 1970s. This was essentially a move from a strong emphasis on structural differentiation, as well as to some extent on ecological factors as the major criteria according to which societies have to be compared – an emphasis to be found in many of the evolutionary approaches of the 1950s and 1960s – to a perspective which stresses the interweaving of structural aspects of social life with its regulatory and interpretive context. The central analytical core of the concept of civilization as presented here – in contrast to such social formations as political regimes, different forms of political economy or collectivities like “tribes,” ethnic groups, or nations, and from religion or cultural traditions – is the combination of ontological or cosmological visions, of visions of transmundane and mundane reality, with the definition, construction, and regulation of the major arenas of social life and interaction.

The central core of civilizations is the symbolic and institutional interrelation between the formulation, promulgation, articulation, and continuous reinterpretation of the basic ontological visions prevalent in a society, its basic ideological premises and core symbols on the one hand, and on the other the definition, structuration, and regulation of the major arenas of institutional life, of the political arena, of authority and its accountability, of

the economy, of family life, social stratification, and of the construction of collective identities.

The impact of such ontological visions and premises on institutional formation is effected through various processes of social interaction and control that develop in a society. Such processes of control – and the opposition to them – are not limited to the exercise of power in the “narrow” political sense; as even sophisticated Marxists have stressed, they involve not only class relations or “modes of production.” Rather, they are activated by major elites and influentials in a society.

The structure of such elite groups is closely related, on the one hand, to the basic cultural orientations prevalent in a society; that is, different types of elite groups bear different types of orientation or visions. On the other hand, and in connection with the types of cultural orientations and their respective transformation into basic premises of the social order, these elite groups tend to exercise different modes of control over the allocation of basic resources in the society.

The very implementation or institutionalization of such premises and the concomitant formation of institutional patterns through processes of control, symbolic and organizational alike, also generate tendencies to protest, conflict, and change effectively the activities of secondary elite groups who attempt to mobilize various groups and resources to change aspects of the social order as it was shaped by coalitions of ruling elite groups. Although potentialities for conflict and change are inherent in all human societies, their concrete development – their intensity and the concrete directions of change and transformation they engender – vary greatly among different societies and civilizations according to the specific constellations within them of the factors analyzed earlier.

In most societies in the long history of humankind such combinations of ontological visions and of definition, structuration, and regulation of institutional areas were embedded in the concrete institutional organizations and collectivities without being the object of specific institutional formations or bearers thereof, and with but very weak – if any – distinct collective identity or consciousness. A full development of the distinct ideological and institutional civilizational dimensions – and of

some awareness of their distinctiveness – occurred only in some very specific historical settings, namely, the so called axial civilizations – even if some very important steps in that direction can be identified in some archaic civilizations such as the ancient Egyptian, Assyrian, or Mesoamerican ones, and especially in what may be called proto axial ones, such as in the Iranian Zoroastrian one (Eisenstadt 1982a, 1986; Breuer 1994).

AXIAL AGE CIVILIZATIONS

By axial age civilizations (to use Karl Jaspers’s nomenclature) we mean those civilizations that crystallized during the half millennium from 500 BCE to the first century of the Christian era, within which new types of ontological visions, conceptions of a basic tension between the transcendental and mundane orders, emerged and were institutionalized in many parts of the world. Examples of this process of crystallization include ancient Israel, followed by Second Commonwealth Judaism and Christianity; Ancient Greece; possibly Zoroastrianism in Iran; early imperial China; Hinduism and Buddhism; and, beyond the axial age proper, Islam. It was through the emergence of the axial civilizations that civilizations crystallized as distinct entities and an explicit consciousness thereof developed (Schluchter 1985, 1989; Weber 1970–1).

The crystallization of these civilizations constitutes a series of some of the greatest revolutionary breakthroughs in human history, which have shaped the contours of human history in the last two to three millennia. The central aspect of these revolutionary breakthroughs was the emergence and institutionalization of new basic ontological metaphysical conceptions of a chasm between the transcendental and mundane orders. The development and institutionalization of these ontological conceptions entailed the perception of the given mundane order as incomplete, inferior – often as evil or polluted – and as in need of reconstruction to be effected according to the basic transcendental ontological conceptions prevalent in these societies (i.e., in line with the conception of bridging the chasm between the transcendental and the mundane orders, according to the precepts of a

higher ethical or metaphysical order or vision). In all these civilizations it gave rise to attempts to reconstruct the mundane world, from the human personality to the sociopolitical and economic order, according to the appropriate “higher” transcendental vision.

One of the most important manifestations of such attempts was a strong tendency – manifest in all these civilizations – to construct a societal center or centers to serve as the major autonomous and symbolically distinct embodiments of respective ontological visions, and therefore as the major loci of the charismatic dimension of human existence. But at the same time the “givenness” of the center (or centers) could not necessarily be taken for granted. The construction and characteristics of the center tended to become central issues under the gaze of the increasing reflexivity that was developing in these civilizations. The political dimension of such reflexivity was rooted in the transformed conceptions of the political arena and of the accountability of rulers. The political order as one of the central loci of the “lower” mundane order had to be reconstituted according to the precepts of the transcendental visions. It was the rulers who were usually held responsible and accountable for organizing the political order according to such precepts.

At the same time the nature of the rulers became greatly transformed. The king god, the embodiment of the cosmic and earthly order alike, disappeared, and a secular ruler appeared (even if he often retained strong sacral attributes). He was in principle accountable to some higher order. Thus, there emerged a new conception of the accountability of rulers and community to a higher authority: God, Divine Law, and the like. Accordingly, the possibility of calling a ruler to judgment appeared. A striking case of such developments occurred in ancient Israel, with elaborations of the ancient Israeli Judaic religion. More secular versions of such accountability, with a stronger emphasis on the community and its laws, appeared on the northern shores of the eastern Mediterranean, in ancient Greece, and in the Chinese conception of the Mandate of Heaven. In varying forms the idea of accountability appeared in all axial age civilizations.

Of special importance from the point of view of this analysis is the fact that one of the major

manifestations of the attempts to reconstitute the social order in these civilizations was the development of a strong tendency to define certain collectivities and institutional arenas as most appropriate for the implementation of their respective transcendental visions. The most important development of this sort was the construction of “cultural” or “religious” – indeed, of civilizational – collectivities as distinct from “ethnic” or “political” ones. A crucial component of the construction of such civilizational collectivities was the development of specific collective “civilizational” consciousness or identity as distinct from purely religious, political, or “ethnic” ones. Such civilizational collectivities or frameworks usually comprised many different political and ethnic groups, while at the same time continually impinging on and interacting with these units, which became subcurrents within the broader civilization frameworks, but which could also cut across such different frameworks.

AUTONOMOUS ELITES AS BEARERS OF CIVILIZATIONAL VISIONS

In the axial age civilizations, the development and institutionalization of this new ontological conception was closely connected with the emergence of a new social element, of a new type of elite, of carriers of models of cultural and social order. These were often autonomous intellectuals, such as the ancient Israelite prophets and priests and later on the Jewish sages, the Greek philosophers and sophists, the Chinese literati, the Hindu Brahmins, the Buddhist Sangha, and the Islamic Ulema, which were of crucial importance in the constitution of the new “civilizational” collectivities and the concomitant patterns of collective identity.

The new type of elites that arose with the processes of institutionalization of such transcendental visions differed greatly from the ritual, magical, and sacral specialist in the pre axial age civilizations. They were recruited and legitimized according to autonomous criteria, and were organized in autonomous settings distinct from those of the basic ascriptive political units of the society. They acquired a conscious, potentially countrywide and also

trans country status of their own. They also tended to become potentially independent of other categories of elites, social groups, and sectors.

At the same time there took place a far reaching transformation of other elites, such as political elites, or the articulators of the solidarity of different collectivities. All these elites tended to develop claims to an autonomous place in the construction of the cultural and social order. Moreover, each of these elites was more or less heterogeneous, and within each of them as well as within the broader sectors of the society there developed a multiplicity of secondary elites and influentials, often carrying different conceptions of the cultural and social order – and frequently competing strongly with each other, especially over the production and control of symbols and media of communication. These new groups became transformed into relatively autonomous partners in the major ruling coalitions. They also constituted the most active elements in the movements of protest and processes of change that developed in these societies and which evinced some very distinct characteristics at both the symbolic and organizational levels (Eisenstadt 1982b).

First, there was a growing symbolic articulation and ideologization of the perennial themes of protest which are to be found in any human society, such as rebellion against the constraints of division of labor, authority, and hierarchy, and of the structuring of the time dimension, the quest for solidarity and equality, and for overcoming human mortality.

Second, utopian orientations were incorporated into the rituals of rebellion and the double image of society. It was this incorporation that generated alternative conceptions of social order and new ways of bridging the distance between the existing and the “true” resolution of the transcendental tension.

Third, new types of protest movements appeared. The most important were intellectual heterodoxies, sects, or movements which upheld different conceptions of the resolution of the tension between the transcendental and the mundane order, and of the proper way to institutionalize such conceptions. Since then, continuous confrontation between orthodoxy on the one hand, and schism and heterodoxy on

the other, and the accompanying development of strong antinomian tendencies, has been a crucial component in the history of humankind.

Concomitantly, there developed the possibility of the development of autonomous political movements and ideologies – with their own symbolisms – usually oriented against existing political and sometimes also religious centers. Protest movements made important organizational changes in their confrontation – especially the growing possibility of structural and ideological links between different protest movements and foci of conflict. These links could be effected by different coalitions of different secondary elites, above all by coalition. The new dynamics of civilization transformed group conflicts into potential class and ideological conflicts, cult conflicts into struggles between the orthodox and the heterodox. Conflicts between tribes and societies could become missionary crusades. The zeal for reorganization, informed by the distinctive transcendental vision of each civilization, made the entire world at least potentially subject to cultural political reconstruction.

EXPANSION OF AXIAL CIVILIZATIONS

With the institutionalization of axial civilizations, a new type of intersocietal and intercivilizational world history or histories emerged. Within all these civilizations there developed, in close connection with the tendencies to reconstruct the world, a certain propensity to expansion, in which ideological, religious impulses were combined with political and to some extent economic ones. To be sure, political and economic interconnections have existed between different societies throughout human history. Some conceptions of a universal or world kingdom emerged in many post axial civilizations, as in the case of Genghis Khan, and many cultural interconnections developed between them, but only with the institutionalization of axial civilizations did a more distinctive ideological and reflexive mode of expansion with potentially strong semi missionary orientations develop. Such expansion could be geographically concomitant with that of religion, but these two processes were not necessarily identical. This mode of expansion also gave rise to greater awareness

of civilizational frameworks or collectivities encompassing many different societies, and of collective consciousness and identities, which usually encompassed different political or ethnic groups.

The expansion of axial civilizations entailed their continuous encounter with non axial or pre axial ones. In the encounter of axial with non axial it was usually the axial side that emerged victorious, without however necessarily obliterating many of the symbolic and institutional features of the latter. These were often incorporated in the former, transforming them and often leading to their attenuation. Japan has been the most important continuous case of an encounter of non axial with axial civilization, in which the former absorbed the latter and led to the de axialization of many of its components (Eisenstadt 1995).

MULTIPLICITY OF AXIAL CIVILIZATIONS AND WORLD HISTORIES

The general tendency to reconstruct the world, with all its symbolic ideological and institutional repercussions, and to continual expansion, was common to all the post axial age civilizations. But their concrete implementation, of course, varied greatly. No one homogeneous world history emerged, nor were the different types of civilizations similar or convergent. Rather, there emerged a multiplicity of different, divergent, yet continuously mutually impinging world civilizations, each attempting to reconstruct the world in its own mode, according to its basic premises, and either to absorb the others or consciously to segregate itself from them.

Two sets of conditions were of special importance in shaping the different modes of institutional creativity and of expansion of these civilizations. One such set consists of variations or differences in the basic cultural orientations prevalent in them. The other is the concrete structure of the social arenas in which these institutional tendencies can be played out.

Among the different cultural orientations the most important have been differences in the very definition of the tension between the transcendental and mundane orders and the modes of

resolving this tension. There is the distinction between the definition of this tension in relatively secular terms (as in Confucianism and classical Chinese belief systems and, in a somewhat different way, in the Greek and Roman worlds) and those cases in which the tension was conceived in terms of a religious hiatus (as in the great monotheistic religions and Hinduism and Buddhism).

A second distinction, within the latter context, is that between the monotheistic religions in which there was a concept of God standing outside the Universe and potentially guiding it, and those systems, like Hinduism and Buddhism, in which the transcendental, cosmic system was conceived as impersonal and in a state of continuous existential tension with the mundane system.

A third major distinction refers to the focus of the resolution of the transcendental tensions, or in Weberian – basically Christian – terms, of salvation. Here the distinction is between purely this worldly, purely other worldly, and mixed this and other worldly conceptions of salvation.

A second set of cultural orientations which influenced the expansion of the various axial civilizations had to do with access to their centers and major manifestations of the sacred, and the extent to which this was open to all members of the community or was mediated by specific institutions. Further differences related to the way in which relations between cosmic and social order, the civilizational collectivities, and the major primordial ascriptive collectivities were conceived – there may be a total disjunction between these levels, or they may be mutually relevant and each can serve as a referent of the other without being totally embedded in it.

The concrete working out of all such tendencies depends on the second set of conditions – the arenas for the concretization of these broad institutional tendencies. These conditions included, first, the respective concrete economic political ecological settings, whether they were small or great societies, or whether they were societies with continuous compact boundaries or with cross cutting and flexible ones. Second was the specific historical experience of these civilizations, including encounters with other societies, especially in terms of

mutual penetration, conquest, or colonization. It is the interplay between the different constellations of the cultural orientations analyzed above, their carriers, and their respective visions of restructuring of the world and the concrete arenas and historical conditions in which such visions could be concretized, that has shaped the institutional contours and dynamics of the different axial age civilizations, and the subsequent courses of world histories.

INTERNAL TRANSFORMATION OF THE AXIAL CIVILIZATION

One of the most important aspects of the dynamics of axial civilizations was the development of an internal transformative capacity which sometimes culminated in secondary breakthroughs. Examples include Second Temple Judaism and Christianity, later followed by Islam, but also Bhuddism and to a lesser extent Neo Confucianism, all of which developed out of heterodox potentialities inherent in the respective “original” axial civilization.

The most dramatic transformation from within one of the axial civilizations has probably been the emergence of modernity as a distinct new civilization, which promulgated a distinct cultural and institutional program, a distinct mode of interpretation of the world, of a social *imaginaire* (Castoriadis 1987), which first crystallized in Western Europe and then expanded to most other parts of the world, giving continual rise to the development of multiple, continually changing modernities.

The cultural and political program of modernity as it crystallized in Europe constituted in many ways a sectarian and heterodox breakthrough in the West and Central European Christian axial civilization. Strong sectarian heterodox visions had been a permanent component in the dynamics of these civilizations, but with some partial exceptions, especially among some Islamic sects, they did not give rise to radical transformation of the political arena, its premises, and symbols. Such transformation took place in the realm of European Christian civilizations through the transformation of these sectarian visions through the Reformation and later the Great Revolutions, in which there developed a very strong empha-

sis on the bringing together of the City of God and the City of Man (Eisenstadt 1999). It was in these revolutions that such sectarian activities were taken out from marginal or segregated sectors of society and became interwoven not only with rebellions, popular uprisings, and movements of protest, but also with the political struggle at the center and were transposed into general political movements with aspirations to control the center. Themes and symbols of protest became a basic component of the core social and political symbolism.

The religious (more specifically, sectarian) roots of modernity, and especially of the tensions between totalistic Jacobin and pluralistic orientations which developed initially in Europe, could – in the course of European expansion – find a very strong resonance in the utopian sectarian traditions of other axial civilizations. The religious roots of the modern political program also help to explain the specific modern characteristics of what have often been portrayed as the most anti modern type of contemporary movements: the various fundamentalist movements. Contrary to the view which sees them as traditionalistic, they constitute a new type of modern Jacobin movements, which reconstruct tradition as a modern, totalistic ideology (Eisenstadt 1999).

CULTURAL AND POLITICAL PROGRAM OF MODERNITY

The cultural and political program of modernity, as it crystallized first in Western Europe from around the seventeenth century, was rooted in the distinctive premises of the European civilization and European historical experience and bore their imprints, but at the same time it was presented and was perceived as being of universal validity and relevance. This program of modernity entailed a major shift in the conception of human agency and of its autonomy, and of its place in the flow of time. It entailed a very strong component of reflexivity and uncertainty about the basic ontological and cosmological premises, as well as about the bases of social and political order of authority prevalent in society – far beyond the reflexivity that developed in the axial civilizations – a reflexivity which was shared even

by the most radical critics of this program, who in principle denied the legitimacy of such reflexivity. The reflexivity that developed in the modern cultural program came to question the very givenness of such visions and of the institutional patterns related to them. It gave rise to the awareness of the existence of a multiplicity of such visions and patterns and of the possibility that such visions and conceptions can indeed be contested, thus creating a situation in which specific patterns of legitimation lost their markers of certainty (Lefort 1988). Closely related was the development of a conception of the future as open to various possibilities which can be realized by autonomous human agency, or by the inexorable march of history. This program entailed a very strong emphasis on autonomous participation of members of society in the constitution of social and political order and its constitution; on autonomous access of the major social sectors; indeed, of all members of the society to these orders and their centers.

Central to this cultural program was the emphasis on the growing autonomy of man and woman, but in the first foundations of the program, certainly of the emancipation from the fetters of traditional political and cultural authority and the continuous expansion of the realm of personal and institutional freedom and activity, such autonomy entailed other dimensions: first, reflexivity and exploration; second, active construction, mastery of nature, possibly including human nature and of society.

Out of the conjunctions of these different conceptions there developed, within this modern cultural program, the belief in the possibility of active formation, by conscious human activity rooted in critical reflection, of central aspects of social, cultural, and natural orders.

In connection with these orientations there took place far reaching transformations of symbolism and structure of modern political centers as compared with their predecessors in Europe or with the centers of other civilizations. The crux of this transformation was first the charismatization of the political centers as the bearers of the transcendental vision promulgated by the cultural program of modernity; second was the development of continual tendencies to permeation of the peripheries by the centers and of the impingement of the

peripheries on the centers, of the concomitant blurring of the distinctions between center and periphery; and third was the combination of such charismatization with the incorporation of themes and symbols of protest which were central components of the modern transcendental visions as basic and legitimate components of the premises of these centers. It was indeed the incorporation of themes of protest into the center which heralded the radical transformation of various sectarian utopian visions into central components of the political and cultural program.

This program entailed also a very distinctive mode of the construction of the boundaries of collectivities and collective identities. Such identities were continually constructed and continually problematized in a reflexive way and it constituted a focus of continual struggles.

CRYSTALLIZATION AND EXPANSIONS OF MODERNITY

The new and distinctive civilization of modernity crystallized out of the conjunction of these cultural orientations with the development of capitalism through its successive market, commercial, and industrial phases, as well as the formation of a new political order and state system, together with the military and imperialist expansion inherent in the whole pattern.

The crystallization of early and later modernities and their expansion were not peaceful developments. Contrary to optimistic visions of progress, they were closely interwoven with wars and genocides; repression and exclusion were permanent components of modern social structures. Wars and genocide were not, of course, new in the history of humankind. But they were radically transformed through their interweaving with the basic cultural program of modernity; with its initial institutionalization in the nation states, which became the main frame of reference for citizenship and collective identity. This interaction was of course intensified by the technologies of communication and of war, constituting a continual component of the crystallization of the modern European state system and of European expansion beyond Europe.

Military, political, and economic expansion were not of course new in the history of human kind, especially not in the history of the “great” civilizations. What was new was first that the great technological advances and the dynamics of modern economic and political forces made this expansion, the changes and developments triggered by it, and their impact on the societies to which it expanded, much more intensive. The result was a tendency – new and practically unique in the history of humankind – towards the development of universal, worldwide institutional, cultural, and ideological frameworks and systems. All of these frameworks were multi centered and heterogeneous, each generating its own dynamics and undergoing continual changes in constant relations to the others. The interrelations among them have never been “static” or unchanging, and the dynamics of these international frameworks or settings gave rise to continuous changes in these societies. The dynamics of these frameworks and systems – and the different countries within them – were closely interwoven with the specific cultural programs of modernity as it crystallized first in Europe.

At the same time, the crystallization of the first modernity and its later developments were continually interwoven with internal conflicts and confrontations, rooted in the contradictions attendant on the development of the capitalist systems and, in the political arena, with the growing demands for democratization. These conflicts accelerated with the continual overall and colonial expansion of modernity, an expansion which has also greatly contributed to the self conception of European and western civilizations as superior to others.

Of special importance in this context was the relative place of the non western societies in the various economic, political, and ideological international systems. Non western constellations differ greatly from western ones and not only because western societies were the “originators” of this new civilization. More importantly, the expansion of the world systems, especially insofar as it took place through colonization and imperialist expansion – gave western powers a hegemonic place within them. But it was in the nature of these international systems that they generated a dynamics which gave rise both to political and ideological

challenges to existing hegemonies, as well as to continual shifts in the loci of hegemony within Europe, from Europe to the US, then also to Japan and East Asia.

But it was not only the economic, military political, and ideological expansion of the civilization of modernity from the West throughout the world that was important in this process. Of no lesser – possibly even of greater – importance was the fact that this expansion has given rise to continual confrontation between the cultural and institutional premises of western modernity, and those of other civilizations – those of other axial civilizations as well as non axial ones, the most important of which has of course been Japan. True enough, many of the basic premises and symbols of western modernity and its institutions – representative, legal, and administrative – seem to have been accepted within these civilizations, but at the same time far reaching transformations and challenges have taken place and new problems have arisen.

It was out of the continual interaction between the development of these economic, technological, political, and cultural processes and the attempt to institutionalize the cultural and political program of modernity with its tensions and contradictions that the concrete institutional and cultural patterns of different modern societies crystallized.

CONTINUALLY CHANGING MULTIPLE MODERNITIES

The concrete contours of the different cultural and institutional patterns of modernity, and of the distinct programs of modernity as they crystallized in different societies, were continually changing. They were continually changing first of all because of the internal dynamics of the technological, economic, political, and cultural arenas as they developed in different societies and expanded beyond them. Second, they were changing because of the continual confrontations between premises enunciated or promulgated by respective centers and the elites and the concrete developments, conflicts, and displacements attendant on the institutionalization of these premises. Third, they were continually changing through the political

struggles and confrontation between different states, between different centers of political and economic power that played a constitutive role in the formation of European modernity, and later through the conflict ridden expansion of European, American, and Japanese modernity. Such confrontations had already developed within Europe with the crystallization of the modern European state system and became further intensified with the crystallization of “world systems” from the sixteenth or seventeenth centuries on.

Fourth, they were continually changing because of the shifting hegemonies in the major international systems that developed in the wake of ongoing changes in the economic, political, technological, and cultural arenas, and in the centers thereof. Fifth, the institutional and cultural contours of modernities were continually changing due to the very contradictions and antinomies inherent in the cultural program of modernity and to the potentialities inherent in its openness and reflexivity, and due to the continual promulgation by different social actors (especially social movements) of varying interpretations of the major themes of this program and of the basic premises, narratives, and myths of the civilizational visions.

Accordingly, new questionings and reinterpretations of different dimensions of modernity develop continuously within modern societies – and competing cultural agendas have emerged in all of them. All these attested to the growing diversification of the visions and understandings of modernity, of the basic cultural orientations of different sectors of modern societies, far beyond the homogeneous and hegemonic paradigms of modernity that were prevalent in the 1950s. The fundamentalist and the new communal national movements are one of the most recent episodes in the unfolding of the potentialities and antinomies of modernity.

Thus, while the spread or expansion of modernity has indeed taken place throughout most of the world, it did not give rise to just one civilization, one pattern of ideological and institutional response, but to at least several basic versions which in turn are subject to further variations.

Multiple modernities, made up of all the components mentioned above, developed around the basic antinomies and tensions of the modern

civilizational program from the very beginning of the institutionalization of modern regimes in Europe. With the expansion of modern civilizations beyond the West, in some ways already as a result of the European conquest of the Americas, and with the dynamics of the continually developing international frameworks or settings, several new crucial elements have become central in the constitution of modern societies.

The preceding considerations about the multiple programs of modernity do not of course negate the obvious fact that in many central aspects of their institutional structure – be it in occupational and industrial structure, in the structure of education or of cities, in political institutions – very strong convergences have developed in different modern societies. These convergences have indeed generated common problems, but the modes of coping with these problems (i.e., the institutional dynamics attendant on the development of these problems) differed greatly between these civilizations.

Such developments may indeed give rise also to highly confrontational stances – especially with regard to the West, but the positions in question are formulated in continually changing modern idioms, and they may entail an ongoing transformation of these indications and of the cultural programs of modernity. While this diversity has certainly undermined the old hegemonies, it was at the same time closely and often paradoxically connected with the development of new multiple common reference points and networks, and with the globalization of cultural networks and channels of communication far beyond what existed before.

AGENCY, STRUCTURE, AND CULTURE FROM A CIVILIZATIONAL PERSPECTIVE

Civilizational analysis, as presented above, has some bearing on central problems of sociological analysis, above all the problems of agency and social structure, as well as culture and social structure (Eisenstadt 1995). Here we can only outline a few themes and issues to be explored.

Theories which treat social structure and agency as distinct, ontological realities cannot

explain certain crucial aspects of human activity, social interaction, and cultural creativity. In particular, many aspects of institutional formations and dynamics, such as the structure of the centers or the construction of boundaries of collectivities and modes of political protest, cannot be explained entirely in terms of the “natural,” autonomous tendencies of these spheres of activity in terms of some inherent cultural belief or traditions, in terms of the rational, ability oriented consideration of the actors and not in terms of some inherent cultural belief, predisposition, or tradition. As against these approaches the civilizational perspective highlights interconnections among the three levels (i.e., between human activity, social interaction, and human creativity). Civilizational theory is not committed to extreme cultural explanations. But it argues that central dimensions of “culture” are of great importance in shaping institutional formations and patterns of behavior, even if they always operate through specific social processes and institutional frameworks. The crystallization of such central aspects of social interaction, institutional formations, and cultural creativity is best understood in terms of the processes through which symbolic and organizational aspects or dimensions of human activity are interwoven. Such social processes do not shape directly the concrete behavior of different individuals. Rather, they shape the frameworks within which such behavior is undertaken, the institutional ground rules – the “rules of the game” – within which the rational, utilitarian considerations (although not only they) may play an important role. Thus, culture and social structure are best analyzed as components of social action and interaction and of human creativity, as constitutive of each other and of the social and cultural orders.

These considerations bear also on the explanation of social change. Such changes are not caused naturally by the basic ontologies of any civilization, or by structural forces or patterns of social interaction in themselves, but rather by the continuous interaction between them – an interaction in which contingency plays a very important role. Historical changes and the constructions of new institutional formations presuppose processes of learning and accommodation, as well as different types of

decision making by individuals placed in appropriate arenas of action, responding to a great variety of historical events and drawing on a range of interpretive frameworks. Similar contingent forces, however, can have different impacts in different civilizations – even civilizations sharing many concrete institutional or political ecological settings – because of the differences in their premises.

Thus, any concrete pattern of change is to be understood as the combination of historical contingency, structure, and culture understood as compiling the basic premises of social interaction and the reservoir of models, themes, and tropes that are prevalent in a particular society. At the same time, the rise of new forms of social organization and activity entails new interpretations of the basic tenets of cosmological visions and institutional premises, which greatly transform many of a civilization’s antecedent tenets and institutions. The most dramatic of such changes are relatively rare in history; as argued above, the two outstanding cases are the emergence of axial civilizations and the transition to modernity.

It is appropriate to conclude with a brief comment on the problem succinctly posed in Marx’s famous statement: “Men make their own history, but they do not make it under circumstances chosen by themselves, but under circumstances directly encountered, given, and transmitted from the past.” While we may expect that this basic problem will never be fully resolved and will continue to pose a challenge to social and historical analysis, the preceding discussion may help to advance our understanding of some aspects. The structures and frameworks of activity and interaction are created by human action and interaction, but no human action or interaction can become actualized except through such frameworks and structures.

The civilizational perspective adds three main points to this very general thesis. First, the radical indeterminacy of all these frameworks – the absence of any natural or rational, evolutionary or revolutionary, foundation for uniform development – provides an opening for cultural and institutional variety. Second, the most fundamental and far reaching cultural patterns which develop within such broad frameworks co determine the various dimensions

of social life, and the long term combinations of cultural and structural formations give rise to distinctive civilizational complexes. Third, the creative indeterminacy that is at the root of civilizational pluralism may reappear within a given civilizational framework and find expression in dissent, heterodoxy, and critical questioning, as well as in innovative patterns of cultural and institutional production. A comparative approach to the study of civilizational dynamics will need to take all these aspects into account.

SEE ALSO: Culture; Division of Labor; Empire; Modernity; Political Sociology; Religion; Religion, Sociology of; Revolutions, Sociology of; Social Change: The Contributions of S. N. Eisenstadt; Weber, Max

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civilizing process

Robert van Krieken

The concept of the civilizing process arises from a particular approach to the idea of "civilization," a word which first appeared in French and English in the eighteenth century, although there were earlier precursors. The understanding of "civilization" on which the conception of it being a *process* rests needs to be distinguished from other possible approaches. "Civilization" can be used in the *plural* to refer to particular assemblies of social, cultural, moral, political, institutional, and economic forms, to the historical emergence of civilizations and the interrelationships between them. Febvre referred to this as the ethnographic sense of the word, verging on being interchangeable with "culture," but with an added material and institutional dimension.

"Civilization" can also be used as a singular noun, referring to anchoring of social power and authority in rational and impersonal rules and structures, and to the existence of processes of rational cultivation, refinement, education, or formation of otherwise unreasonable human beings as a crucial element of a peaceful and productive civil society. This is generally what is meant when "civilization" is opposed to "barbarism," although at other times it is opposed to "culture," which is seen as representing the realm of values, norms, intellectual creativity, and spirituality. This meaning has also frequently been allied with Christianity, colonialism, and progress, as well as (since the end of World War II) the forms of social, political, cultural, and economic life found in the US (Beard & Beard 1962).

Underpinning the idea of the civilizing process, however, is a conception of "civilization" as a verb, aiming at an understanding of those social and political conditions, practices, strategies, and figurations which have produced

changing conceptions and experiences of civility. In this approach there is a concern to link the analysis of social, cultural, political and economic structures, processes and lines of development to the analysis of changing forms of habitus, of subjective and intersubjective forms and relationships. The concept is used most precisely and in the greatest depth by the German sociologist Norbert Elias and his followers, but it also usefully captures a cluster of developments examined by a variety of other social theorists who have observed and analyzed the emergence of a specifically modern disciplined character, mode of conduct, or habitus along similar lines. Foucault and Weber, for example, agree that one can trace a developmental trend towards increasing self discipline, a regularization and routinization of the psyche, so that one's inner "economy of the soul" coordinates with the outer economy of an increasingly bureaucratized, rationalized, and individualized social world. Their work converges on the notion that there has been "socialization of the self," a transition in European history from a social order based on external constraint to one increasingly dependent on the internalization of constraint (van Krieken 1990a, 1990b).

Elias's particular approach to the civilizing process aimed to counter the understanding of civilization as a "state," which was somehow a stable and natural characteristic of a particular people or nation, by showing (1) that what is experienced as "civilization" is founded on a particular psychic structure or habitus which had changed over time, and (2) that it can only be understood in connection with changes in the structure and form of broader social relationships. His account of "the civilizing process" can be understood as an "archeology" of the modes and norms of conduct that are today simply assumed to be natural and self evident, revealing their history and their intimate linkages with broader social, political, and economic developments.

In *The Civilizing Process*, first published in 1939, Elias (2000) examined successive editions of a variety of etiquette manuals, showing that the standards applied to violence, sexual behavior, bodily functions, eating habits, table manners, and forms of speech became gradually more sophisticated, with an increasing

threshold of shame, embarrassment, and repugnance. Gradually, more and more aspects of human behavior become regarded as "distasteful" and "removed behind the scenes of social life," including the infliction of physical violence and pain on other human beings. The institutional nucleus of this development was the emergence of "court society," the organization of the lives of the European upper classes around courts and their associated, ever changing codes of conduct.

The social process of "courtization" which underpinned the transformation of feudal society subjected first knights and warriors, and then ever expanding circles of the population, to an increasing demand that expressions of violence be regulated, that emotions and impulses be subjected to ever increasing self reflection and surveillance, and placed ever more firmly in the service of the long term requirements of complex networks of social interaction imposing increasingly ambivalent expectations. In court society we see the beginnings of a form of mutual and self observation which Elias referred to as a "psychological" form of perception, and which is now analyzed in terms of reflexive self awareness.

The restraint imposed by such differentiated, complex networks of social relations became increasingly internalized, and less dependent on its maintenance by external social institutions, underpinning the development of what Freud recognized as the super ego. Freud (1930) had earlier argued for the idea of a historical "process of cultural development" or "civilization," and stressed the importance of an accurate understanding of how human dispositions were subjected to cultural transformation. These transformations are to be understood in the context of developments in the structuring of social relations, including the development of a money economy and urbanization, but for Elias the two most important ones were (1) the process of state formation with its monopolization of the means of violence, and (2) the gradual differentiation of society, the increasing range, diversity, and interdependence of competing social positions and functions composing European societies.

The increasing monopolization of the means of violence associated with state formation created a pressure towards other means of

exercising power in competitive social relations, so that social success and distinction is increasingly dependent on “continuous reflection, foresight, and calculation, self control, precise and articulate regulation of one’s own affects, knowledge of the whole terrain, human and non human, in which one acts” (Elias 2000: 398). The increasing density of European societies, produced by a combination of population growth and urbanization, and the ever larger circles of people that any single individual would be interdependent with, no matter how fleetingly, also facilitated the “rationalization” of human conduct, its placement at the service of long term goals, and the increasing internalization of social constraint, eventually making a highly regulated mode of conduct effectively “second nature.”

Important as driving forces behind the civilizing process are *competition* and the opportunities for advantage offered by being *distinctive* in the realm of manners and morals. Continuing competition between various social groups has generated both the willingness to submit to the demands of etiquette and the increasing subjection of people’s bodies, emotions, and desires to stringent controls and ever more demanding forms of self discipline. Competition has also driven the spread of the civilizing process, first to the higher bourgeois strata, in their attempts to enter court society, and then in turn to the strata below them.

An important development in the understanding of the civilizing process, which arose from Elias’s (1996) more specific engagement with a sociological understanding of the Holocaust, as well as evolving from the critical debates around the earlier accounts of the civilizing process, has been the emergence of more detailed explorations of the extent to which it can be regarded as unilinear, the ways in which it can reverse its direction under particular circumstances, and how it can also be accompanied simultaneously by processes of *decivilization* (Fletcher 1997). There is also increasing examination of the issue of contradictions and conflicts within civilizing processes, and the question of “civilized barbarism,” whether the infliction of violence should be seen simply as having been “reduced,” or as changed in form, such as from physical to symbolic violence. The monopolization of physical force by the state,

through the military and the police, cuts in two directions and has, as Elias (1996) put it, a “Janus faced character,” because such monopolies of force can then be all the more effectively wielded by powerful groups within any given nation state, such as under the Nazi regime. The formation of any inclusive social bonds is at the same time unavoidably exclusionary in relation to those seen as lying outside the community, village, nation, state, or “people,” or lower down the social scale, and more recently this idea has informed analyses of genocide and other types of “civilized barbarism.”

The concept is an important element of research and theory in a number of social scientific fields. Social and historical studies of the self, identity, emotions, and the body draw on the idea of the civilizing process to help explain the emergence of socially and historically specific psychological dispositions, modes of conduct, and moral orientations. The sociology of sport looks at the role of sport in the civilizing process, as an arena of “controlled decontrolling” of interpersonal violence and strong emotions, substituting sporting matches for war. Social histories of crime and punishment show both that the incidence of violent crime has decreased over the centuries, and that tolerance for the “spectacle of suffering” also gradually declined, although there is also debate around an apparent decivilizing trend towards greater levels of incarceration and greater intensity of punishment. Studies of genocide and the conduct of war refer to the debates around the civilizing process to explain both how mass killings take place and how the practices of professional soldiers continue to change over time. Sociological studies of organizations are making increasing use of the concept to analyze the ways in which organizational forms have developed over time and to understand key elements of organizational subjectivity. Discussions of international relations and globalization also make use of Elias’s account of the underlying mechanisms of state formation and the monopolization of violence to explain current developments in relations between nation states and the global movements of people as migrants and refugees.

The methodological and theoretical problems associated with the idea of the civilizing process include whether there has been too

much emphasis placed on it as a largely unplanned process, and not enough attention paid to it as the aim and outcome of the consciously planned projects of particular social groups and agencies, as a civilizing *mission* or *offensive*. This is of particular relevance to the role of the concept of civilization in colonialism. Elias's own account of the civilizing process in Western Europe paid only slight attention to religion and religious institutions, and his focus was primarily on the intrastate civilizing process, leaving open the analysis of interstate civilizing processes.

There are also a cluster of concerns which together can be called the "anthropological critique." Anthropologists (Goody 2002) have raised doubts about the extent to which the behavior of people both in earlier historical periods and in other cultural contexts differed from people in western societies today, drawing attention to those features of human relations in all cultural and historical contexts which produce roughly similar forms of behavior. Medieval villagers and members of tribal societies were and are subjected to considerably more restraint than inhabitants of a modern industrial city, and that what is interpreted as the result of a lesser degree of internalized self constraint can equally be understood as *produced* by particular social and cultural expectations. Very similar regimes of managing emotions and impulses in the service of longer term ends can arise in the absence of the centralization of political power in the state, which is at the core of Elias's explanation of the European civilizing process.

Although Elias set out to analyze the social conditions underpinning European's perception of themselves as being civilized, much of the research working with the concept of the civilizing process can be seen to take on that self perception as its own, slipping back into the normative understanding of civilization as equated with progress and improvement. At this point the opposition of civilization to culture reemerges, along with the power dynamics built into the civilizing process, highlighting the ways in which it can be experienced as an essentially colonizing process.

The themes which will dominate future discussion of the civilizing process include extending the analysis of civilizing processes beyond the advanced industrial societies, understanding

decivilizing processes and contradictions within the civilizing process, particularly in relation to genocide and other continuing forms of organized violence, the nature of contemporary civilizing processes and the emotional and moral dimensions of current social change, and the regulation of crime and organizational corruption, as well as the analysis of legal institutions and legal change more broadly, the application of the concept to international relations between states, especially in arenas such as human rights and cosmopolitanism in world politics, as well as to the broader analysis of globalization.

SEE ALSO: Body and Cultural Sociology; Civil Society; Civilizations; Disciplinary Society; Distinction; Elias, Norbert; Figurational Sociology and the Sociology of Sport; Foucault, Michel; Freud, Sigmund; Genocide; Habitus/Field; Holocaust; Weber, Max

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class

Lois A. Vitt

Class refers to a stratification system that divides a society into a hierarchy of social positions. It is also a particular social position within a class stratification system: lower class, working class, middle class, upper class, or other such class designations. It is a method of social ranking that involves money, power, culture, taste, identity, access, and exclusion. Conceptualizations of class belong not only to sociology, but also to the popular press, the marketplace, the political process, and to those who perceive themselves as being located within a particular class position. People who do perceive class distinctions are "class conscious" and may feel the impact of class in powerful ways. Others barely notice it or refuse to concede its existence despite living with its effects. To some people, class connotes differing economic circumstances, lifestyles, and tastes; to others it is about social status, esteem, and respect.

New students of sociology will quickly encounter the concept of class. They will become familiar with the writings of Marx and Weber and other prominent social theorists who have contrasted, debated, explained, and elaborated the works of these foundational figures over the past century. They will be introduced to the research methods and applications that have alternatively advanced and

constrained class studies, especially in the US. They will also find that the topic of class is both ideologically and emotionally charged, and that its usage in academic as well as interpersonal settings can be fraught with controversy and strong sentiment.

During and after the years of the "Red scare" following World War I and the era of McCarthyism in the 1950s, fear of communism and anything "Marxian" contributed greatly to individual and academic tension over the topics of class and class conflict in the US. American anxiety stemming from these periods served to strengthen the widespread creed that America is a "classless society," a land of opportunity for everyone who is willing to work hard and strive for economic and material achievement through personal effort. With emphasis on enterprise and the freedom to succeed, the stage was set early on for an American style social stratification system that differed from those that had evolved over time in the Old World. Henry Chistman, a missionary touring the colonies in the nineteenth century, wrote: "American[s] can never flourish on leased lands. They have too much enterprise to work for others or remain tenants."

Divergent class perspectives in the literature capture differences in the historical development of class systems in Europe and the US. Egalitarianism, in its American meaning, pertains to equality of opportunity and respect, not of result or condition, and reflects the absence of inherited feudal structures, monarchies, and aristocracies. It indicates an achievement oriented system and a history of political democracy prior to industrialization that remains unreceptive to European style class consciousness. While European social theory was concerned with the role of economic classes (and class conflict) in industrial society, most American sociologists concentrated instead on studies of social mobility, analyses of the occupational structure, and subjective perceptions about occupational prestige. To soften the Marxist model of class, social class was transformed into a continuous gradation of social class positions based on prestige rankings through which individuals could evolve as a consequence of personal effort. The new class model, adapted from Weber's "status" theories, was extended and elaborated by sociologists

seeking to understand the “American form” of social stratification.

Formal definitions of objective social class and subjective social class appear in the sociological literature. *Objective* social class is defined by Hout (1974) as “social class in terms of objective criteria decided upon by the sociologist, for example, income, occupation, and education. The criteria chosen by the sociologist are usually based on observations and studies of how the people in the community view the system of stratification.” Hout defines *subjective* “Social class in terms of how people place themselves within the society. People may be asked what social classes exist in their community and then asked to place themselves within one of these classes, or they may be asked to rate themselves within a system of classes presented by the investigator.”

In both European and American settings today, class is used in a wide range of descriptive and explanatory contexts. Depending upon context, various concepts of class are employed as well. Together with other authors in *Approaches to Class Analysis*, Wright (2005) portrays class concepts through a variety of theoretical prisms for the purpose of clarifying alternative traditions. Definitions, concepts, and elaborations of class, however, are fundamentally shaped by the questions they seek to answer.

A primary task has been to seek answers about (or to try to prevent) the social cleavages and conflicts that can impact and change the course of history. Others use class to locate and explore the objective or subjective identity and lived experiences of individuals and families in contemporary society. Questions within these research traditions may be related, such as when class location is used to reveal and explain the culture, interests, or antagonisms of different classes. Sociologists also use class distinctions to measure social mobility from one generation to another and within and between societies, or to explain variances on any number of lifestyle, preference, voting, and other social and economic measures.

All class research approaches, whether designed to probe for conflicting class interests, to measure social mobility, or to test for variances, are descended from overarching theoretical class frameworks. They are rooted in the

writings of Marx, followed by refinements and rebuttals in the works of Weber and numerous other social thinkers across many disciplines. Although many use the term social class after Plato, concepts of class (and social class) received little attention until Marx made it central to his theory of social conflict and to the role that classes play in social movements and social change.

For Marx, class division and conflict between classes exist in all societies. Industrial society consists mainly of two conflicting classes: the bourgeoisie, owners of the means of production (the resources – land, factories, capital, and equipment – needed for the production and distribution of material goods); and the proletariat, who work for the owners of productive property. The owning class controls key economic, political, and ideological institutions, placing it inevitably in opposition to non owners as it seeks to protect its power and economic interests. “Class struggle” is the contest between opposing classes and it is through the dynamic forces that result from class awareness of conflicting interests that societal change is generated.

Marx himself seems never to have attempted to state in any precise and definitive way just what he meant by class, although four classes that are characteristic of a capitalist society have emerged from Marxist literature: (1) the capitalist class (the bourgeoisie); (2) a class of professionals, merchants, and independent craftsmen (the petty bourgeois); (3) the working class (the proletariat); and (4) a class whose members for a variety of reasons cannot work (the lumpenproletariat). In well developed capitalist economies the working class constitutes the majority of the population. The capitalist class owns most of society’s assets and holds most of the economic and political power. In between capitalists and workers is a class that consists of professionals, merchants, shopkeepers, craftsmen, and other independent proprietors. Like capitalists, they own their own means of production and hire workers to assist them. They often contribute much of the labor required for creating or selling their goods and/or services and therefore can be their own “workers.” Sometimes members of this class identify their interests with capitalists, while on other occasions their interests are in line with those of the working class.

Marx believed that all productive (capitalist) systems must eventually give way to more advanced social systems wherein workers will control the means of production and in which there will be no classes. His analysis was concerned primarily with the structure and dynamics of capitalist industrial societies against which he predicted workers would eventually revolt. Revolution did occur in Eastern Europe (although the resulting communist system ultimately failed), but a workers' revolution did not materialize in the West. Marx did not foresee that as industrial capitalism thrived in the West, the fundamental objective of workers became a larger share of the economic pie, not a change in the system itself. Further problems with Marxian theory occurred in the changing class structure itself. While Marx called for a growing contraposition of the two major opposing classes, the polarization of owners and workers did not occur. Instead, the middle class grew and both the working and middle classes accommodated to, even embraced, the capitalist system. Although not accurate in some predictions, the Marxian view of society is nevertheless valuable to understanding class, class antagonisms, conflicting interests, and social stratification in human societies.

Weber's concepts and contributions to stratification theory expanded and refined Marxian understandings of advanced industrial society. Like Marx, Weber believed that economic stratification produces social classes: "We may speak of a class when (1) a number of people have in common a specific causal component of their life chances, insofar as (2) this component is represented exclusively by economic interests in the possession of goods and opportunities for income, and (3) is represented under the conditions of the commodity or labor markets." But Weber suggested that classes could form in any market situation, and he argued that other forms of social stratification could occur independently of economics. Weber's was a three dimensional model of stratification consisting of (1) *social classes* that are objectively formed social groupings having an economic base; (2) *parties* which are associations that arise through actions oriented toward the acquisition of social power; and (3) *status* groups delineated in terms of social estimations of honor or esteem.

For Weber, classes are aggregates of individuals who share similar "life chances" in their education and work and in their ability to purchase material goods and services. Life chances experienced within social classes are based upon the degree of *control* exercised over particular markets: money and credit, property, manufacturing, and various learned skills that earn income in the workforce. Dominant classes achieve a tight monopoly on some lucrative markets; less dominant classes get only partial market participation (Collins 1985).

In Weberian terms a class is more than a population segment that shares a particular economic position relative to the means of production. Classes reflect "communities of interest" and social prestige as well as economic position. Class members share lifestyles, preferences, and outlooks as a consequence of socialization, educational credentials, and the prestige of occupational and other power positions they hold, which also serve to cloak the economic class interests that lie beneath. This status ideology eases the way for class members to monopolize and maintain the prestige, power, and financial gain of higher socioeconomic positions, as only persons who seem like "the right kind" are allowed into preferred positions (Collins 1985).

The social class structures of several American communities (and cities) were identified in classic studies from the late 1930s through the late 1960s. In 1941 W. Lloyd Warner and his associates, on the basis of his research in a New England community, conceptualized classes as groups of people, judged as superior or inferior in prestige and acceptability to the classes below or above them. Coleman and Neugarten, for their 1950s study of social class in Kansas City, built on this research, but converted class to status groupings in order to test the symbols of social status such as neighborhood, social clubs, homes, churches, educational attainment, and occupations. Weber's dimensions of class were disaggregated into "socioeconomic variables" that included income, education, and occupation. Attention was shifted away from purely economic interests to include subjective differences among individuals and families in neighborhoods and communities. The results of these studies were in line with Weber's conception of status groups delineated

in terms of social estimations of subjective status. They also showed a highly developed awareness of social ranking based upon status symbols – homes, neighborhoods, social clubs – and the relative social status of the individuals and families who owned or otherwise enjoyed them.

Community studies “demonstrated” that a continuum exists among occupations ranked primarily by prestige. The top and bottom status groups were seen as small in size and were defined in extreme terms as the richest and the poorest people. This description left the rest as one large middle class, a perception similar to class images that persist in the US today. Is the US a “classless society?” In such a society, social classes are ill defined, blurred, and overlapping. There is little or no consciousness of class divisions and there are no subcultures based on social class. Some policy makers, journalists, and others use concepts or dimensions of status, alone or in some combination, to describe the categories of a basically classless system. The resulting social separations that consign most Americans to the “middle” are frequently either blurred or arbitrarily drawn. Vanneman and Cannon (1987) describe this all too common practice: “Class sorts out positions in society along a many rungged ladder of economic success and social prestige; in this continuous image, classes are merely relative rankings along the ladder: upper class, lower class, upper middle class, ‘the Toyota set,’ ‘the BMW set,’ ‘Brahmins,’ and the dregs ‘from the other side of the tracks.’”

By contrast, a true class society is characterized by population segments having distinctive attitudes, values, and other cultural qualities and forming subcultures within the larger societal culture as a whole. The perception that one belongs to a given social class – whether higher or lower in relative ranking – involves familiarity with certain manners and customs, similar lifestyles, access to (or exclusion from) sources of privilege, knowledge, income, wealth, and feelings of community with other members of the same class. Personal interests may or may not depend upon the position and attainments of the social class as a whole, since relations between and among social classes are complicated by race, gender, age, and ethnicity,

and changing workplace and regulatory issues as well.

A theoretical case in point concerns the emergence of a much more complex work environment in the twenty first century, simultaneously calling for broad (and deeper) sociological understanding of the impact of global enterprise on human collectivities at home and abroad, and a rethinking of the effects of financial interests that are more diffusely held, more complex, and more competitively focused than in the past. To address the new workplace complexity, Wright (2005) recognizes (1) that class analyses of actual societies today require identifying ways in which different class relations may be combined, and (2) that simple, one dimensional property rights are no longer valid, but instead are actually complex bundles of rights and powers subject to government restrictions, union representation on boards of directors, employee stock ownership, and delegations of power to managers, and other rights and powers that are being “decomposed and redistributed.” Such redistribution of rights and powers moves class relations away from simple, abstract forms of polarized relations.

Recent studies, the popular press, and public discourse argue that the US is not a classless society and that class is a powerful force in American life. Class differences and the obvious movement of families up and down the economic ladder present a contradictory but compelling picture of stagnating mobility, emerging elites, and the lived experience of social class cultures, particularly those involving the intersections of race and gender. Despite controversy and disagreement among some social scientists that the era of class is over, it appears that interest in the concept of class, far from being over, is actually on the rise.

Ironically, the operation of class in the US is becoming more apparent as globalization serves to illuminate increasingly unequal distribution of income, wealth, and personal power at home. Responsibility for job and income security, health insurance and health care, education, and retirement security has been shifting steadily for some time from government and business interests to working Americans. Over the last two decades the income gap between wealthy Americans (who own investments and enjoy federal tax breaks) and those at the middle and

bottom of the pay scale has widened. Wages are stagnant, the middle class is shouldering a larger tax burden, and prices for health care, housing, tuition, gasoline, and food have soared.

In US popular culture and political conversation, class is often referred to as the “haves and have nots.” What is really meant is “rich” and “poor,” but class is about more than money. The emotional and practical difficulties of transcending class boundaries have been well documented by sociologists and others in both classic and recent literature. America still celebrates the idea that there is opportunity to move up from humble beginnings to achieve greatness, and for some fortunate Americans this scenario may still be true. For those who follow social policy trends, however, there are ominous signs that all but a privileged few may be losing hard won economic gains and that a permanent underclass may be hardening.

At a time when retirement income is on the horizon for pre retirees, employers are trimming or cutting entirely previously promised pension and health care benefits. At a time when a college degree matters more than ever, success in obtaining an education is being linked to class position and to the finances required to make up for previous public support of higher education. At a time of extraordinary advances in medicine, class differences in health and lifespan are wide and appear to be widening (Scott & Leonhardt 2005). There is far less actual upward mobility than once believed and far more downward sliding than is being acknowledged. Most problematic of all may be the prospective loss of the pervasive ideology that social class boundaries in America merely exist to be overcome. The stage seems set for renewed serious interest by sociologists in the realities of social class in America today.

SEE ALSO: Class Conflict; Class Consciousness; Class, Status, and Power; Marx, Karl; Stratification and Inequality, Theories of; Weber, Max

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class conflict

Stephen Hunt

Marx famously stated “the history of all societies up to the present is the history of the class struggle.” In his interpretation, the term class is used to refer to the main strata in all stratified society as constituted by a social group whose members share the same relationship to the forces of production. This was evident, according to Marx, in western societies which developed through the epochs of primitive communism, ancient society, feudal society, and industrial capitalism. Primitive communism, based on a communal mode of production and distribution, typified by a subsistence economy, represents the only example of a classless society. From then on, all societies

are divided into essentially two major classes that are in an antagonistic relationship: masters and slaves in ancient society, lords and serfs under feudalism, and bourgeoisie and proletariat under the capitalist order. During each historical epoch the labor power required for production was supplied by the majority subject class. While, for Marx, class conflict arises in the exploitative situation evoked by the relationship to the forces of production, it is also evident through the development of such forces by an emerging class. The superiority of the capitalist forces of production, by way of illustration, led to a rapid transformation of the social structure, but only after the revolutionary triumph of the emergent class over the feudal order.

In terms of class conflict, or potential class conflict, Marx distinguished between a "class in itself" and a "class for itself." The former comprises a social grouping whose constituents share the same relationship to the forces of production. However, for Marx, a social grouping only fully becomes a class when it forms a "class for itself." At this stage, its members have achieved class consciousness and solidarity – a full awareness of their true situation of exploitation and oppression. Members of a class subsequently develop a common identity, recognize their shared interest, and unite, so creating class cohesion and ultimately taking recourse to revolutionary violence.

Much of Marx's work was concerned with class conflict in capitalist industrial society. Class antagonisms could not be resolved within its structure. Thus, the contradictions inherent in capitalism and its accompanying sociopolitical structures would bring class conflict to its ultimate realization. As capitalism develops, the workforce is concentrated in large factories where production becomes a social enterprise and thus illuminates the exploitation of the proletariat and its shared grievances. The increasing use of machinery would result in a homogeneous class since such technology brings a leveling process of deskilling, enhancing a sense of common experience and engendering an increasing sense of alienation.

Marx believed that the class struggle that would overthrow the capitalist order would ensure that private property would be replaced by communally owned property, though industrial manufacture would remain as the basic

modus operandi of production in the new society, communally owned but at a higher level of technological development. Since history is one of the class struggle, history would eventually come to an end. The socialist society that would replace capitalism would contain no dialectical contradictions, while, in effect, the working class would abolish itself.

Among those who systematically addressed Marx's theory of class conflict was Max Weber. Weber agreed with many of the fundamental aspects of Marxian thought, particularly in viewing the economy as the crucial source of stratification. In contrast to Marx, however, Weber added to the economic dimension of stratification two other dimensions: prestige and power. Property differences generated "classes"; prestige differences forged "status groupings"; and power differences brought factions or political blocs ("parties"). Whereas Marx assumed that members of any one economic class could develop class consciousness and become united in a shared interest and purpose, Weber regarded this as unlikely. Rather, class consciousness would evolve only when it is obvious to all constituents that the interests of antagonistic groups are incompatible and that conflict would ensue. In fact, Weber says quite explicitly that economic classes do not normally constitute communities, whereas status groups – united on the subjective basis of common degrees of social prestige – are more likely to do so. Moreover, there may be a discrepancy between one's status and one's class. Weber also identified an intimate relationship between classes, status groups, and parties. He held that parties may form on the basis of similar "class" interests or similar "status" or both, yet this was rare and class conflict in the form of revolutionary process was improbable (Gerth & Mills 1958: 194).

Since Weber, critics of Marx's theory of class conflict have focused on various aspects of his work. Two examples may be cited here. Dahrendorf (1959) argued that, contrary to Marx's prediction, the manual working class was becoming increasingly heterogeneous. Dahrendorf saw this as resulting from changes in industrial technology leading to differences in skill, economic and status rewards, and interests within the ranks of the manual workers that undermined collective class consciousness

and hence negated class conflict. Another approach was to question Marx's thesis that the proletariat was a particularly revolutionary class. In her key work, Skocpol (1979) identifies, instead, the peasant class as *the* ingredient for successful social revolutions. This she concludes from her comparative study of the revolutionary outcomes in feudal France, Russia, and China. Skocpol also identifies the state as a determinant in whether class conflict ultimately results in a revolution process. As a relatively autonomous system of institutions, the state must be weakened by external pressures in the global order and internally by the loss of coercive structures before the revolutionary process can be brought to fruition.

SEE ALSO: Bourgeoisie and Proletariat; Class Consciousness; Class, Perceptions of; Conflict Theory; False Consciousness; Marx, Karl; Weber, Max

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class consciousness

Wendy Bottero

Deriving from Marxist class analysis, “class consciousness” refers to a developing process in which those sharing common objective economic relations (a “class in itself”) become aware of their shared class interests and work together to achieve common class aims, acting as a self-conscious social grouping (a “class for itself”). In the classic Marxist formulation,

class position leads to class consciousness, which in turn leads to class action. Karl Marx identified within society an underlying economic “base” which determines the social and political “superstructure,” arguing that the revolutionary class consciousness of the working class will emerge as the result of economic developments that make the conditions of class inequality increasingly clear and transparent.

Marx did not think that it was simply shared class interests that generated a self-conscious social class. He argued, for example, that small holding peasants formed a collective class only in the sense that “potatoes in a sack form a sack of potatoes” because, despite sharing similar conditions of existence, the peasant mode of production isolated peasants from one another rather than forging social relations between them; so to the extent that “the identity of their interests begets no community, no national bond and no political organization among them, they do not form a class” (Marx & Engels 1969: 478–9). It is only under specific conditions that a “class in itself” transforms into a “class for itself,” with a series of economic transformations helping members to become aware of their shared interests and to act in a concerted way to achieve common goals.

In Marx's model, working class consciousness will result from the intensely competitive nature of capitalism, which simplifies the class structure, resulting in society “splitting up into two great hostile camps, into two great classes, directly facing each other: Bourgeoisie and Proletariat” (Marx & Engels 1998 [1848]: 3). The capitalist pursuit of profit eliminates skill divisions amongst the working class, with all workers reduced to unskilled labor. The proletariat are homogenized, and concentrated together in larger and larger working units. A polarized gap develops between an increasingly large working class, trapped in shared conditions of miserable poverty, working alongside each other in large factories, and a tiny group of capitalists, running a handful of enormous monopolistic enterprises. Intense competition between capitalists, and the “boom and bust” economy that results, force down wages and make the livelihood of the working class increasingly insecure. All these factors combine to make the working class a solidaristic, self-aware, class for itself.

One key problem with Marx's model is that class polarization and pauperization have not occurred in capitalist societies as he predicted, with rising affluence and the expansion of middle order groups complicating, not simplifying, the class structure. Similarly, class consciousness when it has emerged has done so in a limited, intermittent, and generally non revolutionary fashion (more often described as "trade union consciousness"). This has led to revisions of the original Marxist model, with suggestions that the working class are characterized by *false consciousness*: the notion that ideological beliefs act as a smokescreen, obscuring the exploitative conditions of the working class and blurring their commonality, thus preventing them from realizing and acting upon their shared class interests.

A more radical set of criticisms sees the empirical failure of revolutionary class consciousness as a symptom of a more serious theoretical weakness within Marxist class analysis, in particular casting doubt on Marx's *economic* account of the formation of social consciousness and social groupings. It is pointed out that Marx's acknowledgment that class solidarity does not inevitably arise out of shared class interests raises the serious question of just how class consciousness and solidarity *do* emerge, and what processes operate to sustain them. The apparent lack of a straightforward connection between class location and class consciousness has been characterized as the "weakest link in the chain" of Marxist class theory (Lockwood 1988).

In an alternative formulation of the class consciousness question, by Max Weber, classes are not communities but only "possible, and frequent, bases for social action" (1978 [1910]: 927). Unlike Marx's model (in which class position *will* lead to class consciousness and action, given certain tendencies in economic relations), Weber (1978 [1910]: 302–3) argued that there is no necessary logic by which economic class categories with distinct life chances will result in classes as social groupings or lead to class struggle or revolution. For Weber, economic location (and its associated life chances) is only one factor amongst many affecting our social consciousness and identity. So we cannot predict that *class* consciousness (or action) will emerge from a common class situation, as this

is only one possible contingency. This is partly because Weber believed social classes were internally differentiated (by skill and property differences) and so were always a potentially unstable basis of commonality, but also because he believed there were other bases of social consciousness – status and party affiliations – which cross cut economic interests and potentially undermine the formation of "class" consciousness. Much subsequent class analysis has adopted a neo Weberian stance, rejecting the idea that political action follows directly from class position, and instead arguing that class position creates only "potential interests," as just one source of influence sitting alongside – and competing with – many other structural influences on identity and action (Goldthorpe & Marshall 1992: 383–4).

In neo Weberian terms, the task of class analysis is to investigate the *degree* to which objective class situation influences subjective consciousness, social identities, and political action. This is a considerable retrenchment from earlier accounts, which made stronger theoretical claims about the links between economic and social behavior, and this retrenchment has itself been taken by some critics as a sign of the theoretical exhaustion of class theory (Pahl 1993). Moreover, Savage, reviewing the evidence of the relation between class position and social attitudes and beliefs, concludes that most studies have found severe limits to class consciousness. Although people can, and do, identify in class terms, this identification is often fleeting and does not seem to be a major source of group belonging. Savage concludes that people's social attitudes are "too ambivalent to be seen as part of a consistent class related world view," with class location shaping only some of their views in "highly mediated and complex ways" (2000: 40).

In recent times, the issue of class consciousness has been reformulated as the problem of class identities. It is no longer the absence of revolutionary consciousness that is addressed, but rather the apparent failure of class to explain variation in social attitudes, beliefs, and identities. For critics alleging the "death of class," the absence of class consciousness – in the form of clear cut class identities – has been taken as evidence of the declining significance of class in late modern or postmodern societies.

Pakulski and Waters (1996: 90) claim that “class” was most salient when it occurred in close knit communities based on single industries (such as mining or steel towns), where the domination of one class by another was highly visible and shared class interests could be easily recognized. However, with the rise of service economies and more flexible and fragmented labor markets, such communities have disappeared. With affluence and highly differentiated consumption patterns, it is argued that societies have become individualized and fragmented, and so the prospects for material inequality giving rise to class communities, solidarity, consciousness, or political action have receded. Beck (1992: 131), for example, argues that people in the same class now exhibit quite different lifestyles, so that knowing an individual’s class position is no longer a useful guide to that person’s outlook, social and political ideas, family life, or personal identity.

Whilst this claim is contested, conventional neo Weberian class analysis has become increasingly cautious about the extent to which class relations generate class identities (Goldthorpe & Marshall 1992; Hout et al. 1996). The neo Weberian emphasis has been on how class continues to shape *objective life chances*, which, it has been argued, has tended to neglect the issue of *subjective beliefs* and *identities*. Critics argue that neo Weberian class analysis has marginalized the cultural and subjective aspects of class at the same time that cultural identity has become of ever greater importance in the social sciences more generally (Savage 2000: 1).

A later generation of class theorists, influenced by Pierre Bourdieu (1984), do focus on issues of cultural identity but argue that the starting point for class analysis should be the *weakness* of class consciousness (Savage 2000: 34). The focus of “culturalist” class analysis is on how specific cultural practices are bound up with the reproduction of hierarchy. Such accounts draw inspiration from Bourdieu’s research on how “class” inequalities are reproduced through the hierarchically differentiated nature of tastes and dispositions. In Bourdieu’s account, everyday tastes in things ranging from the types of food and clothing we like to our preferences in music, art, decoration, gardening, or sports, and even our intellectual attitudes, act as both a reflection and reinforcement of

“class” differences, but “class” is interpreted very broadly in terms of location within an economic and cultural space. “Taste,” for Bourdieu, reflects internalized class dispositions which are shaped by the people and social conditions around us. However, Bourdieu argues that these class dispositions and tastes are largely *unconscious* and *pre reflective* since, he suggests, the impact of social location on social perception and behavior typically occurs in implicit, taken for granted ways. The emphasis here is not on the development (or not) of class consciousness, but rather on the classed nature of particular social and cultural practices. People do not have to explicitly recognize class issues, or identify with discrete class groupings, for class processes to operate. Class cultures are viewed as modes of differentiation rather than as types of collectivity, and “class” processes operate through individualized distinction rather than in social groupings.

For a later generation of class theorists this helps tackle the paradox that class remains structurally important in shaping people’s lives but that this does not translate into consciously “claimed” cultural identities. Work on class “dispositions” suggests much more implicit and unself conscious “class identities,” but still argues that “class” continues to shape people’s social identity; so that even if collective class consciousness dies out, class remains important as a “social filter” for socially “placing” ourselves and others (Reay 1997: 226). Such models explicitly downgrade the importance of reflexive or self aware forms of class consciousness, and reflect the considerable shift in thinking that has occurred in class analysis since Marx’s time. Rather than the classic Marxist model of “class in itself” giving rise to “class for itself” in which inequality triggered consciousness and action, this new model sets out a reverse process, in which explicit class identification and awareness may dissolve, but class dispositions remain implicitly encoded as a form of identity through (largely unconscious) class differentiated tastes and practices.

SEE ALSO: Bourgeoisie and Proletariat; Bourdieu, Pierre; Capitalism; Class, Perceptions of; Class Conflict; Class, Status, and Power; Distinction; False Consciousness; Marx, Karl; Weber, Max

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class and crime

Roland Chilton and Ruth Triplett

There is a longstanding controversy over the importance of social class in the production of criminal conduct. Some argue that there is a strong relationship between social class and crime while others say there is little or no relationship. This controversy is often an argument over the definition and measurement of crime, and the meaning of class.

Although official definitions of crime are legislative, in practice crime is defined by administrative policies and enforcement practices. Those who study crime and delinquency

also define crime. The definition of crime was greatly expanded when criminologists began asking people to report their own illegal or improper behavior. In some of the early self-report studies, so much behavior was defined as delinquent that almost any child could be said to have committed a delinquent act. At the other extreme, some criminologists have suggested that conduct such as economic exploitation and racial discrimination are criminal even when the conduct does not violate existing law.

Researchers differ as well on how they measure crime. Some measures of crime are based on official counts of crime – reports of offenses or offenders produced by police, court, or correctional agencies. These efforts create information on offenses, victims, and offenders. Official data cover activities that are illegal and considered serious enough to warrant recognition by the criminal justice system. A different set of crime measures is created when interviews or questionnaires are used to ask people about crimes they have committed. The measures of crime used in such studies vary widely. The acts presented range from very minor offenses, or offenses that are illegal only for children, to very serious offenses.

In addition to issues of the definition and measurement of crime, disagreements about the meaning and measurement of social class make it difficult to conclude whether class is linked to crime. We can say in a general way that those who own a great deal of property and have high incomes are rich or upper class; those who own little or nothing and have low incomes are poor or lower class. Beyond this general notion the issue is quickly complicated. No commonly accepted set of classes exists.

RESEARCH ON CLASS AND CRIME

For the first half of the twentieth century, the question of the link between class and crime was examined in three basic ways. First, investigators looked at the impact of economic conditions on crime rates, asking if crime increases with economic downturns. A basic assumption in this approach was that poor economic conditions are harder on the poor than the middle class and that this produces increased crime.

A second approach examined the social class of prisoners or others formally identified as offenders. Generally, convicts were and are poor. In a third approach, crime rates for specific geographical areas were compared with a set of social and economic characteristics of the areas. These studies asked if areas with indications of high poverty rates and low social class were also areas with high crime rates. In general the answers to these questions were yes. All three of these approaches probably influenced the development of theories either attempting to explain the reasons for the class–crime relationship or assuming such a relationship.

However, in the 1940s and 1950s there was a shift in focus in criminology. The first aspect of the shift came when Edwin Sutherland introduced the notion of “white collar crime” to call attention to offenses committed by high status people in conjunction with their occupations. A second shift in focus came about when some criminologists fixed their attention on young people and on middle class delinquency. Researchers concluded that there was a great deal of unreported criminal and delinquent conduct committed by middle class teenagers. And that, with some exceptions, the relationship between class and crime was weak or non-existent.

In trying to reconcile the conflicting results of a number of individual level confessional studies with those comparing area characteristics with area crime rates, some questioned the accuracy, representativeness, and scope of the surveys. Others played down or ignored the problems presented by the survey approach and concluded that the impact of social class on crime was a myth (Tittle et al. 1978).

In 1979, John Braithwaite published a careful review of a large number of area and confessional studies and a balanced discussion of the advantages and limitations of each. After reviewing studies carried out through the mid 1970s, he concluded that lower class children and adults commit the types of crime handled by the police at higher rates than middle class children and adults. On the “myth” of the class–crime relationship, he warns us to “be wary of reviews that pretend to be exhaustive but are in fact selective” (p. 63).

Studies since the 1970s have continued to focus both on the geographical distribution of

crime and the relationship of an individual’s class membership to crime. They have also continued to differ in their findings. Studies of the geographical distribution of crime generally continued to reinforce earlier findings that official delinquency rates for small urban areas were linked to indicators of poverty and disadvantage (Chilton 1964). In 1991 Patterson reviewed 22 studies of poverty and crime published from 1976 to 1986 and found that, although some of the studies did not find a relationship between class and crime, most of the studies showed positive effects of poverty on crime.

Analyses of the relationship between class and crime at the individual level, however, were less supportive of a relationship. Some researchers using reports of individuals suggested that while social origin might play a minor role in explaining juvenile criminality, the effect of the individual’s own social position is important for adult criminality (Thornberry & Farnworth 1982). Others suggested that the correlations between self reported delinquency and social class are weak and should be weak in part because of the offenses used and in part because traits associated with high and low social class scores are related to different kinds of crime.

Responding to the general absence of studies on the impact of social class on adult crime, Dunaway and his colleagues used three different measures of social class to analyze the responses of an adult sample for a single city – an “underclass” measure, a gradational measure of class based on income and education, and respondents’ business ownership and position as employers or employees. In addition, they used two measures of crime, the total number of offenses reported when respondents were asked to check one or more offenses from a list of 50 that they might have committed over the preceding year and a violent crime scale.

They found that what one could conclude about class and crime depended on the measures of class and crime used. For example, when the full set of offenses was used to measure crime, only income was inversely related to crime. Using the violence subset as a measure of crime, they reported an inverse relationship between crime and some of their social class measures.

What measure of crime and class is used may well explain, in part, why studies of geographical areas find a stronger relationship of class to crime than do individual studies. Another possible explanation of the conflicting results is the distinctly different locations of the people and situations studied. Studies of geographical location are usually carried out for urban areas, Metropolitan Statistical Areas, urban counties, cities, or census tracts. Individual studies have frequently been carried out in small towns and areas with very small minority populations. These studies have often been unable to tap both the high and the low ends of the social class distribution. Nowhere is this clearer than in the way the two approaches deal with race. One classic self report study dropped all black respondents from the analysis. The area studies include minority populations in the crime counts and in the population counts.

The relationship of race to crime is important in any understanding of the class-crime relationship. US public health statistics on homicide as a cause of death indicate that this is a leading cause of death for black males. In addition, the Federal Bureau of Investigation's Supplementary Homicide Reports (SHR) suggest that black offenders are responsible for most homicides with black victims. More importantly, black males have been over represented in both the victimization figures and the offender figures for over 35 years.

The traditional response to this situation is to say that high homicide offending rates for black males are a function of social class. Peterson and Krivo (1993) analyzed homicide victimization rates for 125 US cities and found that black homicides were linked to racial segregation. Parker and McCall's city level analysis of interracial and intraracial homicide provides another indication of the probable utility of race specific data. Using race specific independent variables for about 100 US cities, they conclude that economic deprivation affects the intraracial homicide rates for whites and blacks. In addition, in a study that used arrest counts to create race specific offense rates, Ousey (1999) reported a large gap between black and white homicide rates. The black rates were five times as high as the white rates. Although he found that measures of poverty and deprivation had an impact on both black

and white homicide rates, he found that the effects of these variables were stronger for whites than for blacks. He suggests that extensive and long term disadvantage may have produced cultural and normative adaptations that have created this gap in the rates. The patterns of homicide rates by race suggest that the rates are probably linked to exclusion and segregation – economic, racial, and ethnic – but especially to the separation and isolation of large segments of the urban population based on income and assets. This separation is frequently based on race or ethnicity but it is increasingly linked to a combination of racial separatism and poverty.

As John Hagan (1992) has suggested, the relationship between class and crime may be class and crime specific. It is also probably race and gender specific. He is probably also right in his assertion that not only does class have an impact on crime, but also some kinds of crime, or at least some responses to crime, have an impact on the social class of some offenders. This is why he is right in his assessment that "the simple omission of class from the study of crime would impoverish criminology."

SEE ALSO: Criminology; Criminology: Research Methods; Measuring Crime; Race and Crime; Sex and Crime

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class, perceptions of

Wendy Bottero

How people perceive class inequality is not just a question of class consciousness but also entails the issue of consciousness of class (and inequality), of class as social description and social identity (Cannadine 1998: 23). When people describe their unequal worlds, they are often engaged in making claims about the relative worth of different groups and the fairness (or otherwise) of social arrangements. All accounts of hierarchy contain “images of inequality,” social pictures which classify and grade the members of society. These are politically loaded descriptions, and the images individuals draw partly depend on their social location and the agendas that they are pursuing.

Historians of social imagery argue that the language of social description is fluid and ambiguous, with frequent mixing of models. Ossowski (1963) sees “class” imagery as metaphorical, enabling people to draw on shared understandings, but with a very wide range of possible meanings. The ambiguity of such terms gives them their appeal – rather than identifying an objective social structure or precise social group, the language(s) of “class,” “us and them,” and so on reflect the shifting politics for which they are used. Images of inequality are not a reflection of reality but an “intervention” within it (Crossick 1991: 152).

Subjective perceptions of inequality have been used to construct “maps” of the objective social hierarchy. One early example (Warner 1949) used community rankings. Noticing that people in a community continually referred to the reputation of their neighbors, Warner aggregated these perceptions into “social class” rankings of the entire community. This method (aggregating subjective evaluations of rank) rests on the assumption that perceptions of status straightforwardly reflect the stratification structure. Yet Warner’s own research found that such perceptions vary systematically by status.

A related approach is used to construct prestige scales, mapping the stratification structure by looking at the general reputation of occupational categories. A sample of individuals ranks or rates a list of occupations, and the results are aggregated into a status scale. In support of this it is claimed that there is considerable consensus over such rankings, with rich and poor, educated and uneducated, young and old, all – it is argued – having the same perceptions of the prestige hierarchy, with little variation in their relative ratings (Treiman 1994: 209). This similarity is taken as evidence of a consensus about the worth of occupations, supporting functionalist claims of shared values about social rewards. Such conclusions are contested, however. Critics argue that considerable popular disagreement over occupational rankings is minimized by the methods of prestige studies (Pawson 1989). There is also controversy about what prestige scales measure. For critics, prestige ratings simply assess the various objective attributes (skill, income, etc.) that make jobs more or less advantaged. If so, then differential rankings of occupations are statements of fact rather than any indication of moral approval for varying rewards. But if prestige ratings are simply “error prone estimates” (Featherman & Hauser 1976) of the objective socioeconomic characteristics of jobs, it may make more sense to measure socioeconomic position directly (Goldthorpe & Hope 1972).

Critics also argue that attempts to map stratification through the subjective perceptions of the population rest on a false assumption “that a single structure pervades the social consciousness” (Coxon & Davies 1986: 13). Unlike sociologists, “people on the street” are less

interested in, or aware of, the “big picture” of an overall status continuum, because they instead focus on the relative rankings of the people and social roles that immediately concern them (Coxon & Davies 1986: 40). Whilst individuals may be concerned with distinctions and differences in the occupations that they encounter on a daily basis (at work, through friends and family), the differences between occupations that they rarely encounter, or simply hear about in the abstract, may not mean much to them. Prestige rankings may be an artifact of the sociological exercise rather than a deep seated feature of the social consciousness.

Many commentators suggest that perceptions of inequality depend on social location *within* a structure of inequality. The classic statement, by Lockwood, argues that people’s perceptions of the “larger society” vary according to how they experience inequality in the “smaller societies in which they live out their daily lives” (1975: 16). However, subsequent research reveals that people’s images of inequality are not so clear cut, with different views “wheeled on” in different situations (Savage 2000: 27). Cannadine (1998) argues that different models are often used to describe the same social structures by the same speaker, with slippage occurring within accounts. The model used partly depends on what point the speaker is trying to make.

Just as images of inequality are never simple descriptions of social structure, so we cannot just “read off” an individual’s social imagery from his or her social position. In a six nation study of subjective class identification, Kelley and Evans (1995: 166) found that a “middling” self image was held by those at all levels of the objective stratification hierarchy. Their conclusion was, in almost all societies, very few people identify with the top or bottom classes, with most people subjectively identifying with the middle classes. Despite big differences in people’s social position, most people located themselves as “average” or “middling” in the social order. This does not mean that hierarchical social location has no effect on images of the social order, however. Kelley and Evans argue that claims to being “middling” are related to the hierarchical nature of general social networks, because “reference group forces” constrain people’s subjective perceptions to a restricted range

of the class hierarchy. “Reference group forces” refers to the way in which people assess their own class position in relation to the education, occupations, authority, and income of the people who immediately surround them. Because such social relations are themselves hierarchically sorted, this leads to a distorted perception of the class hierarchy, as “even very high status people see many others above themselves, and very low status people see others even lower” (Evans et al. 1992: 465).

Because we tend to see our own social milieu as “typical” and “middling,” high status people tend to exaggerate the size of the higher classes and minimize the size of the lower classes, resulting in a relatively egalitarian image of society, whilst low status people exaggerate the size of the lower classes, resulting in a more elitist image (Evans et al. 1992: 477). This means that public debates over issues of equality and the politicization of images of society are likely to emerge from, and affect, unequally located groups differently.

SEE ALSO: Class; Class Consciousness; Class, Status, and Power; Stratification and Inequality, Theories of

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class, status, and power

Wout Ultee

Class, Status, and Power is the title of an edited collection by Reinhard Bendix and Seymour Martin Lipset. The first edition was published in 1953, and after several reprints a thoroughly revised edition appeared in 1966. "Class, status, and power" is also an apt name for the research program that dominated the sociology of stratification in the first decades after World War II. This program denied the existence, in all times and in every society, of one fundamental dimension of stratification and viewed societal stratification as three dimensional, with the task of sociological research being to determine in concrete cases the interplay of class, status, and power and its consequences for the extent to which societies change or are stable.

Taking the lead from a statement by Weber (1968 [1922]), the program of class, status, and power wished to overcome unproductive oppositions between various theoretical paradigms. This hope seemed to be dashed around the mid 1960s by an upsurge in Marxist and neo-Marxist theorizing in sociology, but since the 1980s a neo-Weberian approach has had the upper hand. The aim of the program of class, status, and power was to move beyond detailed descriptions of particular contemporary societies, especially the United States, to historical and comparative studies of various aspects of stratification. In this respect the program was

successful. The study of stratification flourishes in all nations with research universities, and comparisons of aspects of stratification in a large number of societies are the order of the day. However, the program of class, status, and power suffered from theoretical incoherences. One was admitted by Bendix and Lipset in a footnote to the 1966 introduction: classes and status groups are themselves aggregations of power. By the term power they in effect referred to political power. Indeed, Weber had maintained that classes, status groups, and parties are phenomena of the power relationships within a society.

Ultimately, the yield of the program of class, status, and (political) power remained limited because it did not specify strong hypotheses about how the three pinpointed dimensions of stratification interact in various types of societies and how this affects societal stability or change. Dahrendorf (1979) admitted as much in a correction of Dahrendorf (1957). His old propositions like "the radicalness of structure change co-varies with the intensity of class conflict" do not say enough about either the substance of conflict or the direction of change. He added that the notion of life chances goes some way toward remedying this deficiency, indicating what a more fruitful program of research looks like.

Perhaps the oldest theories of societal stratification are those of scholars like Plato and Machiavelli, but also of twentieth century thinkers like Pareto and Mosca. These theories have as a starting point a quite visible phenomenon within most societies: their population consists of a small number of official rulers and numerous persons who are being ruled. To the extent that rulers are wise, cunning, or whatever, societies are stable. Some theories of political power assert an inevitable decline in these respects among the persons ruling a society; other theories of political power maintain that the circulation of elites fails to result in important societal changes. According to the program of class, status, and power, this view of society is limited: political power is but one of three dimensions of stratification.

According to another unidimensional theory of societal stratification, the fundamental dimension of this phenomenon is the relationship between the members of a society and its

means of subsistence. Whatever the rulers of a society do, they rarely procure their own food and the inhabitants of a society in some way or another make a living. According to Scottish moral philosophers of the eighteenth century such as Ferguson, Millar, and Smith, hunting was one mode of subsistence, herding another, cultivating the earth a third, and division of labor and commerce others. Each had particular rules of ownership with respect to territories for hunting, pastures for grazing herds, fields for cultivating grain, and tools for producing tradable goods. In the nineteenth century, Marx (cf. Jordan 1971) proposed that the history of human societies was that of a struggle between classes, be they freemen and slaves in ancient societies, lords and serfs under medieval feudalism, or capital owners and wage laborers in contemporary societies with private ownership and free markets for capital and labor. Unemployment was the scourge of laborers, and the next economic downturn would be accompanied by more unemployment than the previous one.

The starting point of a third unidimensional theory of social stratification is that every society contains notions about the degree to which individual activities are valuable to society at large, and about the standard of living appropriate for persons differing in occupation, as well as the respect due to them. Widespread in each society too are ideas about how persons ought to be recruited to these more and less valuable positions. These hypotheses most clearly were stated by Durkheim (1960 [1897]). Since the shared ideas refer to the esteem bestowed on persons of a certain category, these groupings have been called status groups. Durkheim added that ideas about legitimate rewards are not immutable, and that they change with the general level of living and with the moral ideas current within a society. Ideas about legitimate recruitment change too; at one time the title a person received at birth was the almost exclusive principle of recruitment, but in Durkheim's France only inequalities resulting from the inheritance of wealth, merit, and innate capacities were considered just.

The program of class, status, and power attempted to unite these unidimensional theories into one general theory. It did so by

recognizing that the dimensions cannot always be reduced to one and the same dimension. As to political power, it was held that the power of the persons commanding a society's state does not rest only upon violence, threats to life, and weapons. These persons seek to establish themselves more or less successfully as legitimate rulers, turning their rule of might into a rule of right. Although a society's laws protect the economically dominant classes and a society's courts are run by persons connected to them, in a state with laws and courts, decisions by judges do not always favor the participant who is economically dominant. The economically dominant class comprises more persons than the participant in court, and it is in their interest that laws, precisely because they are slanted toward them, are upheld – even though in some cases decisions go against the economically dominant participant appearing in court. Also, since ideas have a logic of their own, the ruling ideas of a society are never fully the ideas of its ruling class.

According to the program of class, status, and power, in pre industrial societies persons who attain political power often afterwards amass economic power, and in this way prolong their rule. This tells against an idea of the theory that class is the fundamental dimension of stratification: according to this notion, political power would follow economic power. Political parties in industrial societies do not always seek to improve the living conditions of one specific economic class. In some countries parties mainly aim to conquer the state and to dispense its spoils – jobs, tax receipts, and all kinds of legal privileges – to its leaders and followers, making them brokerage parties. Also, some parties are ideological. They proclaim a worldview, often part of some religion but sometimes too of a secular system of thought, and reject any governmental policy that does not square with this.

As to the unidimensional theory that notions about legitimate status are fundamental to societal stratification, it should be said that according to Durkheim in France during the nineteenth century, guilds had been abolished and church and state separated, with the state leaving the economy to the free interplay of labor and capital. Under such conditions, so

the hypothesis runs, notions about what is just *de jure* simply are not realized *de facto*. Also, it will be clear that by allowing for changes in notions about legitimate reward and recruitment, Durkheim to some extent did away with the assumption of shared ideas. Changes in the collective conscience cannot be so hard and fast that from one day to another a particular general agreement is replaced by a vastly different consensus. In contrast, theories taking class as the prime dimension of stratification hold that consensus rarely is present, and to the extent that it is, consensus is imposed by the economically dominant class. How this class did so was unclear, and Marxist theories of religion remained underdeveloped. Expanding the notion that religions promise the oppressed salvation in life after death, Weber held that persons privileged in property, honor, and political power have a need to assure themselves that these actual privileges are legitimate, and that some religions cater to this need.

Although the program of class, status, and power pointed toward various findings that are difficult to square with this or that unidimensional theory of societal stratification, it did not provide much guidance for making progress. It offered case studies, but whether they turned into exemplars is another matter. According to a study by Wolfgang Eberhard adduced in the first edition of *Class, Status, and Power*, inherently unstable notions about what is valuable to society become more widespread by an intertwining of political and economic power, making this society more stable. This happened in agrarian China through the strategies of families with a branch of bureaucrats and another one of landlords. If such meshing does not obtain, struggles will be more violent.

Lenski (1954) surmised that persons with inconsistent positions on various dimensions of stratification are more likely to get involved in movements aimed at societal change. Lenski regarded these inconsistencies, say high in education but low in occupation, as a horizontal dimension of stratification, in contrast to the vertical ones of class, status, political power, or whatever. Evidence for persons with inconsistent positions on various dimensions of stratification for countries like the United States pointed toward a stronger support for political

parties in favor of state interventions that redistribute income from the rich to the poor. However, it also was found that persons with inconsistent positions were more likely to be disinterested in politics and to stay at home during polling days. Non voting was held to add to political stability.

Lipset and Bendix (1959) followed Weber, not so much by giving more flesh to the program of class, status, and power as by raising questions about the degree to which a society's system of stratification is rigid or even closed. They posited that in countries with a strong feudal tradition like those of Europe, social mobility would be less widespread than in countries like the US, where the opposition between capitalists and wage earners was not preceded by that between lords and serfs. Lipset and Bendix came to reject this hypothesis after assembling data for a dozen industrial countries in the 1950s on father-son mobility across the manual/non manual line. They buttressed this conclusion by bringing in data showing that patterns of intermarriage were pretty much the same in industrial societies too. Since the mid 1960s hypotheses have been proposed and tested about the extent to which parties of the left, either communist or social democratic, increase mobility and decrease income disparities. The mobility data adduced by Lipset and Bendix and other scholars for some time remained limited to men and their fathers. The occupation of men was held to indicate the class of every household member, and the occupation of the father was considered a good gauge of parental influence. In the 1970s, with the onset of a new research program on life chances and resources, the question of women and stratification became a topic in stratification research.

Using election surveys for various industrial countries with universal suffrage, Lipset established that persons from the lower classes were more likely to vote for a left wing party than persons from the higher classes. Having found that voting depends upon class, the follow up thesis became that with rising standards of living, class differentials in voting become smaller and the pressure for political change weaker (Lipset 1981 [1960]). However, although differences between the manual and non manual

classes in their support for parties of the right and the old left decreased, new parties emerged in several advanced industrial societies. The Greens cater not to material interests but to post material ones, like a clean environment and the preservation of animals and plants, and some theories pinpoint highly educated persons working outside the private sector as the prime recruiting ground of these parties (Inglehart 1977). With the emergence of anti immigrant parties in several European countries, the question arose whether persons with higher chances of unemployment are more likely to vote for the new right.

As indicated, the research program of class, status, and power that dominated the sociology of stratification in the first decades after World War II was somewhat incoherent. The enumeration should have read classes, status groups, and parties, with all three types of groupings amounting to instances of power relations within a society. The program also misleadingly tended to equate class with income. Class is about economic power and means of production. It therefore is about wealth, from which persons of course derive income. The program did recognize that persons who do not own means of production and live from their labor differ in productive skills. It therefore was multidimensional when it came to economic power alone. As has been remarked too, the program of class, status, and power was less than explicit about the effects of economic resources. Perhaps it was taken as a matter of fact that if productive skills are in demand and supply is limited, wages are higher. As conventional wisdom holds, in societies where labor is legally free, unskilled jobs have the lowest wages and the highest unemployment rates, since anybody can perform them. Also, if inventions in the means of production make certain skills obsolete, the chances of unemployment for persons with these skills rise, while their wages drop. Since the consequences of economic resources involve wages and unemployment, multidimensional research is in order here too.

The question of race and stratification has a long standing in US research. However, one exemplar within the program of class, status, and power gave off a wrong signal for answering it (Lipset & Bendix 1959). It is true that the

US is a society without a feudal tradition. Yet according to the theory that class is the fundamental dimension of stratification, capitalism was preceded by feudalism and feudalism by slavery. Although slavery had been abolished in 1865 in the US, a century later the legacy of slavery was still visible in the exclusion of African Americans from the polling booth in the areas where most of them lived. According to Wiley (1967), it also showed up in labor market outcomes like lower wages and higher percentages of unemployment, and in market processes for goods and services, such as European American landlords refusing to rent to African Americans, and white owned restaurants refusing to serve blacks. These European American practices regarding African Americans were liabilities for the latter in the society's distribution processes. For this reason, the late contribution to the program that stratification is multidimensional was also an early contribution to the new program on life chances and resources.

The idea that classes, status groups, and parties are phenomena of the power relationships within a society was called Weberian. Since the end of the 1960s, two other concepts, those of resources and life chances, have become current and have been termed "neo Weberian." However, the prime contribution of neo Weberianism is the proposition that the aggregation of the resources of a society's inhabitants into an overall distribution of power determines inequalities in a society's distribution of life chances. Individual resources can be economic, symbolic, and political, with classes, status groups, and parties being aggregate phenomena of the power relationships within a society. Among others, unemployment, wages, and secondary benefits like health insurance are taken as aspects of life chances. In the 1980s, the program of class, status, and power was superseded by that of life chances and resources.

SEE ALSO: Class; Elites; Life Chances and Resources; Mobility, Horizontal and Vertical; Mobility, Intergenerational and Intragenerational; Stratification, Gender and; Stratification and Inequality, Theories of; Stratification, Race/Ethnicity and; Stratification: Technology and Ideology

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class and voting

Geoffrey Evans

Class voting refers to the tendency for citizens in a particular social class to vote for a given political party or candidate rather than an alternative option when compared with voters in other classes. Though apparently simple, this notion has generated considerable intricacy and ambiguity. The definition of social class has been much debated, as have measures of class position and attempts to summarize statistically the class–vote association. Explanations of patterns of class voting are little in evidence and of uncertain generality. Nevertheless, despite these unresolved disputes concerning measurement and theory, there has at least been a substantial body of research into whether or

not levels of class voting have weakened as western democracies have moved from being industrial to post industrial societies.

Interest in class voting emerged in response in part to the failed agenda of Marxism, for whom electoral politics was an expression of the democratic class struggle that supposedly preceded the expected class based revolution. This tended to result in a focus on class voting as a dispute between just two classes, the working class and the middle class, and their political representatives, parties of the left and right. Early research also relied on data obtained at the level of electoral constituencies, with the consequent need to make strong assumptions about how voters in different classes actually voted. More recently, studies of class voting have focused on large scale surveys of voters which have created a vast body of evidence on individual level class voting.

Possibly the most influential work on the topic is Robert Alford's (1967) analysis of trends in class voting in four Anglo American democracies (Australia, Britain, Canada, and the US) between 1936 and 1962 using a manual versus nonmanual measure of class position. He also introduced the most commonly used, cited (and criticized) measure of the level of class voting: the "Alford index." The Alford index is the difference between the percentage of manual workers that voted for left wing parties on the one hand and the percentage of nonmanual workers that voted for these parties on the other. This became the standard instrument in studies that followed, most of which appeared to show that class voting was in decline. As a result, by the 1990s many commentators agreed that class voting in modern industrial societies had all but disappeared. Class was thought to have lost its importance as a determinant of life chances and political interests because either the working class had become richer, white collar workers had been "proletarianized," or social mobility between classes had increased. At the same time, post industrial cleavages such as gender, race, ethnicity, public versus private sector, and various identity groups had emerged and replaced class based conflict, while new post material values had supposedly led to the "new left" drawing its support from the middle classes, thus weakening the class basis of left–right divisions. Moreover, rising levels

of education had ostensibly produced voters who were calculating and “issue oriented” rather than being driven by collective identities such as class.

All of these accounts assumed that there had indeed been a widespread, secular decline in class voting. However, during the 1980s a movement emerged that questioned the validity of this assumption and argued instead that problems of measurement and analysis seriously undermined the work that had followed Alford’s approach. In particular, it was argued that the use of a crude manual/nonmanual distinction obscures variations in the composition of the manual and nonmanual classes (Heath et al. 1985). For example, if skilled manual workers are more right wing than unskilled workers and the number of skilled workers increases, the Alford estimate of difference between manual and nonmanual workers will decline even if the relative political positions of skilled, unskilled, and nonmanual workers remain the same. With this and similar indices the measurement of the class–vote association is thus open to confounding by changes in the shape of the class structure. In other words, this type of index confuses differences in the marginal distributions of the variables with differences in the association it is supposed to measure – a problem also found with the OLS regression techniques used in, among others, Franklin et al.’s (1992) 16 nation study that represents the culmination of this tradition.

In recent years, therefore, the manual/non manual representation of class voting has been to a large degree superseded. The most influential class schema used currently was developed by John Goldthorpe and his colleagues (Erikson & Goldthorpe 1992). The main classes identified in this schema are the “petty bourgeoisie” (small employers and self employed), the “service class” or “salaried” (professional and managerial groups), the “routine nonmanual class” (typically lower grade clerical “white collar workers”), and the “working class” (foremen and technicians, skilled, semi, and unskilled manual workers). The principal distinction underlying the distinction among the employee classes in the schema is between a *service contract* in which employees receive not only salaried rewards but also prospective elements – salary increments,

job security and pension rights, and, most importantly, well defined career opportunities – and a *labor contract*, in which employees supply discrete amounts of labor, under supervision, in return for wages which are calculated on a “piece” or time basis. As the employment relationship of the service class is relatively advantageous in terms of employment and payment conditions, occupational security, and promotion prospects, its members have a stake in preserving the status quo. In contrast, the disadvantages of the labor contract can explain why the working class provides a basis of support for the redistributive programs of the left.

This shift to greater complexity in the measurement of class has been accompanied by a similar move away from the measurement of political choice as a dichotomy of left versus right (or left versus non left) to a fuller representation of the voters’ spectrum of choice at the ballot box. Apart from its simplicity, the main reason for the use of a dichotomy to represent voter choice seems to have been a desire to make systematic cross national and over time comparisons. Unfortunately, the selective nature of what is being compared undermines any true comparability. The problem is analogous to that faced in the analysis of class position. Changes in the composition of composite categories such as “left” or “non left” may lead to spurious changes in estimates of class voting. The use of dichotomies to represent vote choices and social classes also precludes from observation any processes of class–party realignment. The concept of class realignment in voting implies a change in the pattern of association between class and vote without any change in the overall strength of this association (i.e., without class dealignment or, of course, increase in alignment). But this cannot be discerned if the distinction between realignment and dealignment is obscured by restricting the numbers of parties and classes to two.

The other major innovation of the last two decades is in the statistical measurement of the class–vote association. There has been a move from Alford type indices to logistic modeling techniques which measure the strength of the relationship between class and vote independently of the general popularity of political parties or changes in the sizes of classes. These

techniques also enable the statistical estimation of more complex class and party relationships, thus facilitating greater sophistication in the representation of both class position and party choice.

Research using these advances comes to rather different conclusions than those in the two class, two party tradition (for examples, see Evans 1999; Hout et al. 1995). While there is evidence of a linear decline in left versus non left class voting (most notably in Nieuw beerta 1995), it is not typical. When examined over the longest available time series, levels of class voting in Britain were found to have *increased* during the 1940s and 1950s before falling back in the 1960s. Similarly, the US, a nation of traditionally low levels of class polarization, may well have seen the growth of new class-vote cleavages – such as between those who vote and those who do not (Hout et al. 1995). And in at least some of the new post communist democracies the 1990s saw increased levels of class voting as these societies underwent the rigors of marketization (Evans & Whitefield 2006). Only in certain Scandinavian countries is there robust evidence of a decline from an unusually high degree of class voting to levels similar to those in other western democracies.

Despite these methodological and evidential advances, the debate about the decline of class voting remains active, with many authors continuing to claim evidence for a decline (e.g., Oskarsson 2005). By comparison with this extensive literature examining descriptive questions, signs of empirically tested theoretical development are far less noticeable. Most scholars have assumed a sociological, relatively deterministic account of the transition to industrial and post industrial politics, but there are those who have rejected these in favor of more voluntaristic models. Kitschelt (1994), for example, argues that the electoral fortunes of European social democratic parties are largely determined by their strategic appeals, rather than by secular trends in the class structure – a line of reasoning that echoes Sartori's (1969) influential emphasis on the importance of organization, and especially parties, in the creation of class constituencies. This would suggest that even in post industrial societies class voting might increase as well as decrease. It also implies that class relevant policy programs should result in

increase in the class basis of party support. Evidence for this in Britain has indeed been provided by Evans et al. (1999), who show a close relationship over a 20 year period between left-right polarization in parties' manifestos and the extent of class voting. Later work by Oskarsson (2005) indicates that this pattern is also found elsewhere in Europe. This is not to say that sociological changes have no impact. Changes in the relative *sizes* of classes have been thought to have implications for party strategy: most importantly, in a change to a "catch all" strategy by parties on the left in response to the shrinking class basis of support for those parties (Przeworski & Sprague 1986). In some political systems such moves leave open the space for left parties to attract support from marginalized working class groups; in others, such as first past the post systems, we might expect the start up costs for electorally viable left parties to be too great. Unfortunately, many of these arguments still await rigorous tests using survey analysis. Research that tries to unravel *why* voters in different classes vote differently is in short supply, though Weakliem and Heath (1994) provide evidence of the role of rational choice and inherited preferences, while Evans (1999) provides evidence that promotion prospects can under certain conditions account for class differences in left wing versus right wing party support. A more explicit link between models of class voting and their dependence on advances in theories of voting behavior more generally is an area where further development might still usefully occur.

SEE ALSO: Class; Class Consciousness; Class, Perceptions of; Class, Status, and Power

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classification

Roger Burrows

Classification – the process of assigning objects (elements, cases, units, items, and so on) to classes or categories – is fundamental to cognition,

language, and the construction of social structures. As such it has long been an important topic for sociological inquiry (Durkheim & Mauss 1963; Bowker & Star 1999; Olsen 2002). At the same time, more formal processes of classification – taxonomies, typologies, the construction of ideal types, and so on – are at the analytic heart of much of the sociological enterprise (Foucault 1970; van Mechelen et al. 1993) and, as such, they are also a central resource for the sociological imagination. Indeed, this distinction between classifications as both a substantive topic of investigation and, simultaneously, as an analytic resource for such investigations, forms the foundation for debates about what has come to be viewed as the issue of the “double hermeneutic” (Giddens 1976) in the discipline. This refers to a central conundrum in sociology in which the concepts and categories drawn upon by lay actors in their everyday practices are “explained” by sets of concepts and categories developed by sociologists that may (or, more likely, may not) be recognized by lay actors themselves. On occasion these sociological concepts and categories are reappropriated by lay actors into everyday language and life (one thinks of “social class” and more recently “social capital,” “social networks,” “social exclusion,” and so on). But on other occasions the challenge is to demonstrate how and why the categories and classifications developed by sociologists are (in any sense) “superior” to those used by lay actors to explain their social actions. Which set of understandings possesses the greatest legitimacy – those provided by social actors in terms of their own lay “vocabularies of motive” or those provided by sociologists in terms of systematically constructed typologies of social action?

This tension between classificatory regimes that are “self directed” and those that are “externally suggested” or even “externally imposed” is, of course, ubiquitous. It is not just a small band of sociologists who are keen to classify us in ways with which we might not concur. Indeed, some would view the advent of the age of informational capitalism as one in which both the means and the desire to classify populations have undergone a step change. New and evermore sophisticated systems of social classification underpin a whole assemblage of new technologies of surveillance that

involve the creation of what some commentators have termed a “phenetic fix” (Lyon 2002; Phillips & Curry 2002) on society; technologies that capture personal data activated by people as they go about their everyday activities and which then utilize this data in order to construct abstractions to classify people in new social categories (of income, attributes, preferences, offenses, and so on) with the aim of influencing, managing, or even controlling them in one way or another.

Of course, such technologies of classification have long been an endemic feature of modernity, but under conditions of informational capitalism this urge to classify has accelerated (Gandy 1998; Haggerty & Ericson 2000; Staples 2000; Lyon 2002, 2003). Widespread processes of sorting, clustering, and typifying have come to form a central feature of what some would view as *post panoptic society* (Boyne 2000). Agents of surveillance no longer need to observe concrete individuals. More likely now is the “creation of categories of interest and classes of conduct thought worthy of attention” (Lyon 2002: 3), the data capture necessary for the creation of which is increasingly embedded within many of the mundane social spaces of everyday life (shops, emails, web browsing, post/zipcodes, transportation systems, banks, etc.).

The ability to understand how classification systems are formed, built, implemented, and acted upon is thus likely to become fundamental for understanding how contemporary societies work (Bowker & Star 1999). Classifications, especially those which become “standards,” soon sink from sociological view unless we remain alert to their functioning. In particular we are now surrounded – immersed even – by systems of classification, standards, protocols, and so on that we have come to term “software.” For Thrift and French (2002) this means that the actual “stuff” that constitutes what we have traditionally thought of as the “social” has “changed decisively”; for them, software now increasingly functions in order to provide what they term a “new and complex form of automated spatiality” which has altered the “world’s phenomenality.” For Bowker and Star (1999), in their programmatic call for a revitalized sociology of classification, unless we routinely inspect the social construction of the classifications that

have come to dominate our social world we will systematically miss some of the most important elements of the contemporary functioning of power – what Bourdieu (1991) terms the “symbolic power of naming” that (inevitably?) emerges from the quest to classify populations, whether that naming be done by marketing organizations, the criminal justice system, the health care system, or even sociologists.

SEE ALSO: Epistemology; Knowledge; Knowledge, Sociology of; Social Fact

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cloning

Matthew David

Claude Lévi Strauss's *Myth and Meaning* (1978) discusses the cultural significance attached to twins in non literate societies. Twins are invested with ambivalent feelings, embodying abundance and loss, security and threat, natural and unnatural, good and evil. Twins also challenge the "identity" of being one thing or the other. The spliced lipped, incipient twin, hare, as messenger/transgressor between binary opposites, is also the mythical carrier of order and mishap. Being born feet first, wanting to move too fast, to get ahead of oneself or one's twin at the expense of mother and nature, is also invested with moral significance.

Mythic thinking is about projecting the desire for social order onto nature. Yesterday's twins are today's clones. Advocates of cloning, and in particular human cloning, are united in the claim that their critics engage in scientifically illiterate mythic thinking, but, as Lévi Strauss concluded, belief in the inevitability and moral superiority of change, progress, and history also represents a form of "mythic thinking" in modern "scientific" cultures. This entry highlights the mythic constructions of all sides of the cloning debate. It suggests the socially based nature of beliefs in general.

The Collins English Dictionary defines a clone as "a group of organisms or cells of the same genetic constitution that are descended from a common ancestor by asexual reproduction." The Philip's Compact Encyclopaedia extends the definition of asexual reproduction to the use of "artificial means." The wider of these two definitions suggests two forms of cloning, "natural" asexual forms of self replication and "artificial" replication of a single

genetic original by either plant propagation or animal tissue manipulation (i.e., the transfer of the genetic material of one cell into a genetically emptied out egg cell such as was the case in the creation of Dolly the sheep). While plants and many animal species can reproduce asexually, this was not the case in mammals before the advent of scientific cloning techniques.

However, many advocates of scientific cloning research and application argue that the inability of humans (and mammals in general) to reproduce asexually by natural means does not mean that mammalian clones have not always existed. Rather than defining a clone in terms of its being genetically identical to a single parent, such advocates redefine a clone as being any organism that is genetically identical to another organism. By so doing, the definition of a clone can be extended to identical twins, and so it is possible to render the human clone an established part of the natural world.

Whether the difference between being genetically identical to the single individual from whom one's DNA was extracted and being genetically identical to another individual in drawing the same genes at the same time from two genetically distinct individuals is a difference that really makes a difference, marks out a key site in controversy over the social meaning and relations of cloning. In debates over cloning (in mammals generally, but particularly in humans), debates triggered by advances in artificial cloning techniques, the use of the narrower definition leads to the view that mammalian cloning (by nucleic transfer techniques) is an "unnatural" means to an "unnatural" end. Taking the second definition, it could be concluded that such a practice was an "unnatural" means to a "natural" outcome. While critical of the claim that the "unnatural" is necessarily morally inferior to the "natural," advocates of mammalian/human cloning almost invariably also claim the "naturalness" of cloning as part of their justification by including identical twins in their definition. Definitional slippage, the ability to have your cake and eat it, is common practice on all sides of the debate over cloning.

It should also be recalled, as the first definition above notes, that the definition of cloning does not necessarily only refer to reproduction

of genetically identical organisms, but may also be extended to include the production of lines of cells with the same DNA as a specific organism. The production of such cell lines in laboratory conditions draws upon embryonic developmental processes to produce cells rather than whole organisms for therapeutic purposes. Some wish to refer to such procedures as cloning, while others prefer to use the phrase "cell nuclear replacement technique" precisely to avoid negative associations with the idea of cloning as the attempt to reproduce identical living organisms (Klotzko 2004: 72). Critics of such therapeutic techniques emphasize the "clone" tag precisely to make this connection. The use or avoidance of such resonant or neutralizing language has become a recurrent theme in public discourse on controversial biotechnology (Turney 1998).

Linguistic slippage occurs also around the boundary between therapeutic and reproductive human cloning. Critics of therapeutic "cloning" can claim that a clone embryo produced artificially for the purpose of harvesting its cells is not different from one produced for reproductive purposes. Critics then seek to show that at no singular moment in the embryonic developmental process can it be said that the embryo objectively ceases to be "just" living and becomes "a life." Many critics conclude that "cloning" human embryos to destroy them for cell harvesting, even at an early stage in their development, is morally wrong. Most critics would also conclude that not destroying these embryos and allowing the birth of a human cloned baby would be equally wrong (Peters 1997; Evans 2002; Habermas 2003).

Advocates of therapeutic cloning seek to diffuse criticism of embryo research by distinguishing an embryonic cluster of cells from an individual organism. If an early set of embryonic cells is divided into two this leads to identical twins, but if these cell clusters are recombined, in time a single organism develops. Can a unique "life" be said to exist through such divisions and recombinations, does "life" begin at the point after which such manipulation ceases to be possible, or is such a line in the sand between living tissue and a living organism a social convention? The establishment of a point after which living cells

become taken, in the eyes of the law, as "a life" worthy of some moral status is certainly the product of the balance of social interests and beliefs rather than objective fact (Mulkay 1997).

Critics point out that the techniques enabling therapeutic human cloning are identical to those that would be required to clone a fully formed human. As such, research into the one can only increase the likelihood of the other, even if it does not make it inevitable. Defenders of therapeutic human "cloning" research have suggested that such a "slippery slope" argument is mistaken, as all the necessary data required by a "rogue" scientist bent on producing a cloned human baby are already available from animal research. This defense raises numerous questions. Firstly, if true, why does so much additional human embryonic research need to be done? Secondly, does such a line of argument not further justify the slippery slope view of science? Yesterday's animal cloning research is now said to have made human reproductive cloning possible, and so, given the passage of time, is likely. Is this not the slippery slope writ larger still? Thirdly, if scientists at the time of Dolly's birth assured the public that human reproductive cloning was never their intention, what comfort can we take from similar pronouncements today? Despite reassurances, and irrespective of the inner motivations of Nobel prize winners (Wilmot et al. 2002), we are now told that one outcome of animal cloning research is an increased likelihood of human reproductive cloning. Who should the public believe, trust, and/or follow the advice of? (For accounts of media/public constructions of cloning, expertise, and trust, see Allan 2002; Petersen; 2002; Pilnick 2002.) It may be that unintended consequences make cutting edge scientists no better futurologists than more skeptical but less scientifically literate citizens. Specific expertise is no guarantee of general authority, either in prediction or in persuasion.

Conceptual slippage and the social relations that play upon ambiguous language are manifested also in debates over whether cloning a human individual by nucleic transfer would be immoral in any case. The inclusion of identical twins within the category of clones has the effect of naturalizing the outcome for some,

while critics question the value of such an equation. How does sibling identity relate to parental identity? While religious and many other critics seek to uphold traditional conceptions of family, sexuality, and sexual relations against the threat posed by cloning to such institutions, advocates of human reproductive cloning can claim that such institutions are no less artificial and potentially oppressive as would be the life of a cloned human. Meanwhile, critics of “designer babies” (Ettorre 2002) suggest that reproductive liberty may also be just as oppressive in an age of market led eugenic pressure.

Advocates of human reproductive cloning can argue that a person genetically identical to their (most likely) socially defined parent is no less an individual than anyone else, except in as far as society might treat them differently. Parents routinely violate a strict reading (or misreading) of Kantian principles regarding the treatment of another as an end in themselves, rather than as a means to an end, so, in this sense, a clone would not be any different. Critics respond in two ways. One is to point out that the desire to have a child cloned from another person already suggests a heightened degree of expectation about the new individual’s identity and role. This may impose unacceptable constraints upon the new individual’s capacity to develop as an autonomous person (Peters 1997). A second line of criticism would be to suggest that the very defense of a clone’s unique individuality, as a moral argument for allowing it, undercuts the practical value of such a technique and vice versa. Any claim that a clone would be valuable to others because of his or her genetic foundation begins to encroach upon their moral status as an individual, but to deny such a benefit would be to make cloning pointless.

Regarding the ethical suspicion surrounding the desire to clone, advocates of human reproductive cloning suggest that clones will not be the mindless zombies of science fiction films such as *Star Wars: Attack of the Clones* (2002) or the *Stepford Wives* (1975, 2004), and so would not offer scope for domination and malign gratification to evil dictators and/or lazy patriarchal men. Advocates suggest such a fear is the result of an irrational splicing of ideas about cloning and genetic modification in the

minds of the scientifically illiterate. Yet, critics point out that it is just such a splicing of cloning techniques and those for genetic modification that has driven genetic research with plants and animals for a generation. The agricultural and pharmaceutical returns and effects of such a fusion far outweigh even the box office potential of science fiction targeted to the socially over anxious. If all the significant information needed to allow “rogue” human cloning is already available in the animal data, what is this research currently aiming to tell us, if not how to fuse cloning with genetic modification? While capacity is not necessity it is not intrinsically irrational to be concerned (Nerlich et al. 1999). For better or worse, cloning challenges the boundary between humans and other species.

Just as some critics of human cloning suggest it is the logical extension of a slippery slope that starts by reducing natural human reproduction to forms of instrumental, mechanistic, and exploitative technique (Rifkin 1998), through such things as contraception, abortion, and *in vitro* fertilization, so some advocates of human reproductive cloning argue that all the above techniques are positive advances in human life for precisely the same reasons. Taking control of reproduction and being able to make choices about the timing and the genetic makeup of one’s offspring is seen by such advocates as a logical extension of the liberal principle of reproductive liberty, the right of individuals to make their own reproductive choices, free from the need for permission from any authority that might claim to know better as to how, or when, or with whom they ought to reproduce (Harris 2004). Critics point out the potential eugenic consequences of allowing reproductive cloning, especially if it is combined with forms of genetic modification, while advocates point to the eugenic potential of any attempt to restrict it. Both sides invoke a logical inevitability whereby what might seem innocuous in itself is seen as just the thin edge of a eugenic wedge. Both extremes, and all points in between, can read their own argument into the available evidence, and, mirroring each other’s arguments, logic alone cannot determine whether a person should read the world in one way or in another. The supposedly logical “If X, then Y” is still just a rhetorical device in as far as the content of such categories and the

relationships between them are always open to reinterpretation.

Cloning (in its many contested aspects) represents a site of conflict between social practices, interests, and beliefs that are irreducible to evidence or logic. Such combinations of practice, interest, and belief are ways of life. The willingness to believe something is always, in part at least, the product of the way of life in which one lives. This is as true for scientists as it is for non scientists. The meaning of cloning cannot escape from “mythical thinking.”

SEE ALSO: Body and Society; Genetic Engineering as a Social Problem; Human Genome and the Science of Life; Medical Sociology and Genetics; Myth; Posthumanism

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cognitive balance theory (Heider)

Paul T. Munroe

Balance theory explains how people tend to maintain consistency in patterns of their liking and disliking of one another and of inanimate objects. When patterns of liking and disliking are balanced, structures are stable. When they are imbalanced, structures are unstable and there is pressure to change in the direction that makes them balanced.

It was the social psychologist Fritz Heider who, in 1946, founded the now widely studied theoretical research program known as balance theory. In balance theory's early statements, for example in “Attitudes and Cognitive Organization” (1946), Heider was interested in the perceptions of a person, *p*, with respect to another person, *o*, and an object of mutual interest, *x*, which could also be a third person. Heider noted that the patterns of perceived relationships among the three entities could be in one of two states: balanced or imbalanced. Imbalanced states produce tension which may be resolved by changing the relations or by distancing oneself from the situation.

Consider three entities: *p* (person), *o* (other), and *x* (an object of interest). Heider identifies three possible relationships among them, L (likes), ~L (dislikes), and U (forms a unit relationship with; i.e., is associated with, owns, or possesses). Accordingly, “*p* L *o*” means “*p* likes *o*”; “*o* ~L *x*” means “*o* dislikes *x*”; and “*p* U *x*” means “*p* forms a unit relationship with *x*,” for example, “*p* owns *x*” or “*p* made *x*.” Both L and U are positive relations, while ~L and ~U are negative ones. When considering three entities, a balanced situation exists if there are all




Figure 1 Balanced and imbalanced graphs (Heider's examples using the graph theoretic notation of Cartwright and Harary).

positive relations (e.g., $p \text{ U } x$, $p \text{ L } o$, and $o \text{ L } x$) or when two relations are negative and one positive (e.g., $p \sim \text{L } o$, $o \text{ U } x$, and $p \sim \text{L } x$). When there is one negative relation and two positive (e.g., $p \text{ L } x$, $p \sim \text{L } o$, and $o \text{ U } x$), or when all three relations are negative (e.g., $p \sim \text{L } x$, $p \sim \text{L } o$, and $o \sim \text{L } x$), the situation is imbalanced. Heider's main point was that balanced cognitive structures are stable, while imbalanced structures produce tension, discomfort, and a pressure to change.

The theory was advanced importantly by Dorwin Cartwright and Frank Harary in 1958. They added a graph theoretic nomenclature that allowed for the simultaneous examination of many individuals at once. As a result of this mathematical graph theory, some very interesting theorems were examined, the predictions from which are both powerful and not intuitively obvious.

To understand the graph theory, several definitions are necessary. A "point" represents an individual, such as p , o , or q , or an inanimate object, x . A "line" represents a liking, disliking, or unit relation between two points. A directed line or arrow indicates the direction of a relationship, e.g., $p \xrightarrow{+} o$ means " p likes o ." A line with no direction indicates a mutual liking or disliking relationship, e.g., " $p \text{ --- } + \text{ --- } o$ " means " p and o like each other." A "path" is a series of lines connecting two or more points, and a "cycle" is a non intersecting path that begins and ends at the same point. The sign of a path or cycle is the product of the signs of all of the lines in that path or cycle. Consistently with Heider's theory, a graph is balanced if the signs of all of its cycles are positive.

The graphs in Figure 1 show Heider's original balanced and imbalanced structures using the graph theoretic notation of Cartwright and Harary. Graphs (a) through (d) are balanced (all of their cycles are positive), while graphs (e) through (h) are all imbalanced. The graph theoretic version introduces several advantages: it is more efficient because there are fewer statements needed to convey the liking and disliking relationships, there are no limits as to how many entities can be included in a graph, and several properties of mathematics can be used to make predictions about the results of balanced and imbalanced graphs.

When a situation involves imbalance, there is pressure within the system to change the relationships. Several balancing operations have been identified. The simplest to understand, though often the most difficult to enact, is to change one or more of the relationships from disliking to liking, or from liking to disliking. In Figure 1(e), p can make overtures to o to change the nature of their relationship. If p and o come to like each other, then the graph will be balanced and equivalent to the graph in (a).

Although one person in the situation can control only his or her own feelings, members of the group may attempt to influence one another. In graph (f), p may entice o and q to like each other. Intriguingly, one such influence attempt uses a principle of reciprocity to induce a positive relationship. Since reciprocated relationships are balanced while non reciprocated relationships are imbalanced, any non reciprocated relationship will produce tension. This tension could be resolved by changing to a

mutual liking relationship. If p says, "Did you notice the nice thing q did for you, o ?" q must have positive feelings for you," this may induce just such an asymmetry. Of course, this works two ways; in (e), p may try to convince q to dislike o , and may use the same tactic, as in "Did you hear the nasty thing o said about you, q , last night?"

Other operations may be used to balance a group structure. In graphs (e) through (g), one person may exit the situation, leaving the other two individuals in a balanced structure. Technically, if any of the three individuals leave, the remaining two will be left in a balanced situation. However, as Jordan has shown, people have a preference for positive relationships, so it is more likely that the one who leaves is one who is in a disliking relationship, leaving two persons who like each other behind.

Another balancing operation is known as "partitioning." In this case, one or more group members spend time separately with others who do not like each other. As Johnston and Campbell have shown, joint custody situations are an example of this. With partitioning, only those members who like each other spend time together. However, it is a risk in this situation that the absent other comes up as a topic of conversation (an " x "), reproducing the original imbalanced structure and producing tension in the subsystem.

If no balancing operation is possible (actors cannot leave, and difficult relationships are not repaired), there are ways that actors can restore balance cognitively and reduce their stress. One such operation is to reduce cognitive and/or emotional investment in the situation. Actors may "tune out," decide that the situation is not all that important, and withdraw emotionally. Another stress reducing operation is to distort reality. Several options are available in our common lexicon for this. Consider p in Figure 1(f). p may convince him/herself that "I think o and q really like each other, they just have a funny way of showing it," or "If they revealed their 'true' selves to one another, they couldn't help but like each other." Parents of embattled siblings can often be heard to say: "They really love each other underneath it all, they are just going through a phase right now." This may ultimately prove true or not true, but at the time only the parent perceives the situation this

way. It seems likely that there is some distortion of the current reality.

Cartwright and Harary presented a version of balance theory that used the mathematical theory of linear graphs. As a result, they proposed several theorems that have predictive value for group structure; among them are the completeness theorem and the structure theorem. The completeness theorem claims that previously unacquainted individuals will form relationships that complete a structure in the direction that will achieve balance. People may differentially attend to information about the other person that is consistent with their knowledge of how that person relates to known others. Elliott Aronson and Vernon Cope (1968) have tested this theorem. When people form relationships that are congruent with these predictions, the resulting graphs are balanced.

The structure theorem is also particularly interesting. The theorem states that all balanced structures may be broken down into two subsets, one of which may be empty. Within each subset there are only positive relationships, while between subsets there are only negative ones. This theorem allows one to predict that over time, groups that contain at least one disliking relationship will tend to devolve into two "cliques." Within the cliques, people tend to have positive relationships, but between them, animosity is likely to grow.

Heider's original ideas have proven very fruitful. Many theories of social networks, for example, have their roots in Cartwright and Harary's graph theoretic version of the theory. Festinger's cognitive dissonance theory is another direction focusing mainly on the p , o , x relations, as well as more simple p , x relationships in which there are paths with mixed valences. Heise's affect control theory uses a cognitive consistency argument that builds on Heider's and Festinger's earlier work.

Balance theory predictions and implications are often simple and clear, so much of the research testing balance theory tends to rely on controlled experiments and/or vignette studies. In addition, several applications of balance theory to family and work situations have made important contributions to a number of fields.

SEE ALSO: Affect Control Theory; Attribution Theory; Cognitive Dissonance Theory (Festinger)

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cognitive dissonance theory (Festinger)

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Cognitive dissonance theory posits that individuals seek to maintain consistency among multiple cognitions (e.g., thoughts, behaviors, attitudes, values, or beliefs). Inconsistent cognitions produce unpleasant arousal that leads individuals to change one of the cognitions to bring it into line with other cognitions.

The theory has its roots in Heider's (1946) balance theory, which states that people strive for balanced relationships between individuals and objects in their environment. Because unstable beliefs are difficult to maintain, people make adjustments in order to regain consistency

and rationality. Festinger (1957) extended balance theory, which focused on perceptions of the external world, to include consistency in self-perception, or one's internal world. Festinger theorized that the driving force behind the need for balance was the aversive arousal caused by inconsistent cognitions. People feel tension if they experience irrational cognitions and will therefore change cognitions to ease the tension and restore balance.

Aronson (1969) later introduced a "self concept" theory, which posits that an individual is motivated by a threat to the self concept caused by inconsistent cognitions. When a person has conflicting cognitions such as "I love my wife" and "I was rude to my wife yesterday," he experiences feelings of discomfort that threaten his self concept. He then takes steps to change or weaken the negative cognition in order to reduce dissonance. For instance, he buys his wife flowers, which bolsters the cognition that he likes his wife and minimizes the dissonant cognition of being rude. This act reduces the threat to self concept caused by dissonance.

Bem (1965) offered a non-motivational explanation for attitudinal change. His "self-perception theory" stated that people's attitudes are not predetermined, but instead are established by reflecting on one's behavior and then deducing underlying attitudes based on consistency with that behavior. For instance, attitudes are formed or changed when a person thinks "I acted in a certain way, thus my attitudes must be concordant with that behavior." Thus, a change in behavior leads to a change in attitude. This behaviorist explanation assumes that attitudes are formed through a non-motivational assessment of a situation.

Zanna and Cooper (1974) helped bring dissonance theory back to its motivational roots. In an experiment participants wrote counter-attitudinal essays after taking a placebo pill. The authors manipulated having either a high or low choice in writing the essay, as well as telling the participants that the pill made them feel tense, relaxed, or had no side effects (control condition). This research demonstrated that taking a pill allowed participants to blame arousal on the pill, thus reducing the motivation to change the dissonant cognitions. Researchers concluded that arousal caused by

internal imbalance (i.e., dissonant cognitions) motivates attitude change, while arousal that is perceived to be caused by external factors (i.e., a pill) will not lead to attitude change.

Another approach was introduced by Steele and Liu (1983), who suggested that attitude change resulting from dissonance is caused by a need for a positive self image rather than a need for cognitive consistency. Individuals can relieve dissonance induced arousal simply by reaffirming a valued aspect of the self, even if the aspect is unrelated to the cognitions. For example, if a person who dislikes cherry pie finds herself telling the chef how good the pie is, she experiences dissonance. The dissonance threatens the self image, leading to arousal. However, the discomfort is relieved when she gives a homeless man money on her way home. This act of self affirmation relieves dissonance induced arousal, even though it is unrelated to the cognitions that caused the arousal. Although the dissonant cognitions (i.e., not liking the pie, and saying she liked it) still exist, the arousal has dissipated because she has reaffirmed that she is a caring person by giving the homeless man money. Thus, self affirmation reduces the need to change one's cognitions in order to restore consistency.

Another perspective, called the "New Look" alternative (Cooper & Fazio 1984), suggests that dissonance occurs when one violates a societal norm. The resulting arousal motivates one to justify this discrepancy through reinterpretation of the outcome (e.g., attitude change) in a more positive direction. Unlike many other dissonance theories, this approach claims that the self and self esteem are irrelevant.

Through the years, dissonance has been theorized to be caused by inconsistent cognitions, a threatened self concept, a need to protect one's self image, and violation of social norms. Thus, it is not surprising that there is some disagreement about the true cause of dissonance produced attitude change. Some researchers claim that each of these theoretical causes can lead to dissonance in different situations. Additionally, it is difficult to determine which cause leads to dissonance because study results can often be explained by multiple theories. As a result, researchers remain divided in their beliefs about the underlying mechanism that drives dissonance.

Traditional dissonance studies have employed a "forced compliance" paradigm to arouse dissonance. This technique involves convincing participants to do something that they would not usually do, while simultaneously leading the participant to believe that they had freely chosen to complete the behavior. For example, a student is induced to write an essay supporting graduation requirements including a senior thesis. If this behavior is counter to the participant's attitudes, it will create dissonance between the action of writing the essay and the participant's own beliefs.

An alternative dissonance technique called "hypocrisy" gained popularity in the 1990s. Stone and colleagues (1994) theorized that dissonance would result when one gives advice to others but later realize one's own failure to follow the advice. To test this hypothesis, they asked participants in the "hypocrisy" condition to create a speech to be included in a video ostensibly for the purpose of creating an AIDS education video for high school students. Then they asked the participants to list times in their pasts when they had failed to use condoms. Public advocacy of condom use coupled with the realization that they personally had failed to follow their own advice led participants to reduce dissonance by purchasing condoms.

Although forced compliance and hypocrisy studies are among the most noted dissonance studies, other studies have used a variety of techniques to demonstrate the effects of dissonance on decision making, behavior, attitudes, morals, and learning. For instance, post decisional dissonance occurs when a person has chosen between two equal choices. To bolster the belief that one has made the right choice, the person will see the chosen alternative more positively than the one not chosen.

Other studies demonstrate that strong commitment to a belief that is later invalidated can lead an individual to attempt to persuade others to support the incorrect belief. Obtaining social consensus then relieves dissonance because the belief and the social support of the belief will be consistent.

Initiation studies demonstrate that individuals report enjoying group membership more if they endure a difficult or painful initiation to join the group. Their liking of the group justifies the high price they paid to be in the

group. Similarly, deterrence studies demonstrate that children who obeyed a weak order to avoid playing with a toy reported liking the toy less than children who obeyed a strong order. Because it is reasonable to obey a strong order, but not a weak order, the children rationalized their behavior by thinking they must have avoided the toy because they do not really like it that much.

Just as there is a variety of ways that dissonance is induced, there is also a variety of ways to alleviate dissonance. Festinger suggested that dissonance could be relieved by (1) changing one or more of the cognitions so that all the cognitions would be in agreement; (2) adopting cognitions or behaviors that strengthen the “desirable” cognition and therefore make the “undesirable” cognition less salient; or (3) reducing the importance assigned to the inconsistency. Traditional forced compliance studies typically involve the first method; they measure attitude change in participants who have acted in a counterattitudinal way. Subsequently, participants adjust their attitudes to be more in favor of the counterattitudinal position, adjusting their attitude to be more in line with their behavior.

Hypocrisy studies go a step farther and require participants to actually change discrepant behaviors in order to relieve dissonance. Stone and colleagues (1994) found that participants experiencing “hypocrisy” reduced dissonance by purchasing condoms and by stating intentions to use condoms. These behaviors strengthen the desirable cognition (“I practice safe sex”) and take the focus off the undesirable cognition (“I have failed to practice safe sex”).

The third option for reducing dissonance involves reducing the *importance* of the inconsistency, rather than reducing the inconsistency itself. Such trivialization is likely to occur in circumstances where attitudes are very salient or central to the individual’s self concept and are therefore very resistant to change.

The “hydraulic model” of dissonance reduction suggests that, when several modes of dissonance reduction exist, the easiest mode will be used. Therefore, if changing a central attitude or behavior is difficult, an easier mode of dissonance reduction, such as trivialization, is likely to occur. Dissonance can also be relieved

by other methods such as misattributing the arousal to external elements, creating a positive self evaluation, receiving ego enhancing information, reducing the arousal chemically, or by focusing on other valued aspects of the self.

In addition to studying theoretical aspects of how dissonance is aroused and relieved, researchers have also applied dissonance theory to many real world settings. For instance, recent research has shown that people in some cultures are less likely to experience dissonance. Studies have also demonstrated that people with high self esteem experience greater dissonance arousal than people with low self esteem. The social aspects of cognitive dissonance have also been investigated. For instance, researchers have found that social support can reduce dissonance and that people change their attitudes when they witness someone in their group experiencing dissonance.

Researchers in the fields of health and prevention have applied the theory to a variety of behaviors that people carry out even though they know the behavior has negative consequences for their health. For example, recognizing one’s dissonant cognitions regarding smoking or body image can lead to a reduction in smoking or bulimic behaviors. In addition, cognitive dissonance theory has been used to study patients suffering from anxiety disorders and depression who experience dissonance as a result of their disorders. Despite extensive evolution, dissonance theory has proved to be a resilient theory useful in many contexts.

Dissonance theory is not without its controversies, however. Early dissonance theory did not offer clearly defined terms, methods, or operational rules. As a result, individual studies confirming the theory were criticized as lucky methodological guesses. Skeptical researchers also questioned whether attitude change (e.g., in the forced compliance paradigm) was a result of dissonance or merely due to the reinforcement effects of the activity. Dissonance theory also challenged established behavioral theories by suggesting that animals had cognitions that could affect learning and behaviors. Finally, methodological techniques, especially deception, gave rise to ethical criticisms. The theory withstood these controversies and has since gained a general acceptance through decades of experiments, which have largely confirmed its

basic propositions. Thus, dissonance studies testing the theory itself have declined recently, although researchers continue to test the theory using new operationalizations and new contexts.

SEE ALSO: Attitudes and Behavior; Cognitive Balance Theory (Heider)

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cohabitation

Sharon L. Sessler

The past few decades have brought dramatic changes in the residential arrangements of romantically involved unmarried adults. Indeed, as sexual activity has become uncoupled from marriage, growing numbers of young couples have begun sharing a home and a bed without the legal sanction of marriage. Cohabitation, as

this type of living arrangement is commonly known, has become a normative part of the adult life course.

Determining the prevalence of cohabitation is a challenging task. Given the nature of today's dating and mating patterns, measuring trends in cohabitation is a highly subjective undertaking. Legal marriages are officially recorded via state licenses; no such formality is imposed on cohabiting couples. The process of entering into cohabiting unions can be rather indeterminate. Some couples may first spend a night or two together, but then find themselves staying overnight several times a week before ultimately acknowledging that they "live together." During this process, individuals may retain their separate addresses, even if they rarely sleep there, yet remain unwilling to tell family and friends that they cohabit. Other romantic couples proceed quickly and quite consciously into coresidential relationships, but without specific plans to marry. For others, cohabitation is a stepping stone to marriage – a way to test for compatibility or cement their relationship.

The indeterminacy of this process is reflected in how surveys attempt to capture the cohabiting population; there is no consistent definition of what cohabitation entails. Whereas some studies ask if a partner sleeps there most of the time, others rely on a more subjective measure and allow respondents to determine if they are cohabiting. Still other surveys rely on information from a household roster and include partners only if they are there at least half the time or more. The US Census Bureau enabled the identification of household members as "unmarried partner" in the 1990 and 2000 Census. Measures of cohabitation may therefore include those who share a home, along with those who reside together part time, or who are together every night but maintain separate residences. Conflating these definitions is most problematic for minority populations, who are most likely to be part time cohabitators. The imprecise nature of how cohabitation is defined may therefore exaggerate or understate its prevalence as a living arrangement, or hide variations across groups.

While living together without being married is far from being a new phenomenon, it first

drew serious attention in the 1970s and has since been a topic of great interest. It has become increasingly prevalent over the past three decades. In the US, initial estimates from the Current Population Survey (CPS) of 1980 revealed that approximately 1.6 million unmarried couples were cohabiting, more than triple the number that did so in 1970. By 1990 the number of cohabiting couples had grown by another 80 percent, to almost 2.9 million couples. A total of 4.9 million households consisted of heterosexual cohabiting couples in 2000. Despite the dramatic increase in cohabiting couples, at any one point in time the proportion of all co-residential couples who are unmarried is rather small. Cohabitors accounted for only 8.4 percent of all couple households in the 2000 census. Other western countries have also seen rapid growth in the numbers of people cohabiting.

Although cohabitors account for only a small fraction of all households, experience with living together outside of marriage is far more prevalent and has increased dramatically. In fact, cohabitation has become a normative experience. In the late 1980s one third of all women between the ages of 19 and 44 in the US had ever cohabited in their lives; by 1995, 45 percent of similarly aged women had done so. By 2002 well over half of all women ages 19 to 44 (57 percent) affirmed that they had lived with a romantic partner. Cohabitation remains most common among those in their mid twenties to mid thirties. Almost half of all American women aged 30 to 34 (49 percent) in 1995 had lived at some point with a romantic partner without being married, and by 2002 this figure had risen to 62 percent. Living together has also become the modal pathway preceding marriage. Again relying on information from the 1995 NSFG, Raley (2000) found that over half of all women born between 1965 and 1969 (55 percent) had lived with their partner prior to marriage. Marriage records in Great Britain and other European countries also indicate that the large majority of people now cohabit prior to marrying. Furthermore, considerable numbers of adults have cohabited without subsequently marrying their partner.

Despite its increased popularity, cohabitation is still more commonplace among particular subgroups. Living together historically served

as the “poor man’s” marriage; even today, the least educated continue to lead the growth in cohabitation. In the US over half of women with less than 12 years of schooling had ever lived with a romantic partner as of 1995, compared to about 37 percent among women with at least a Bachelor’s degree. Nonetheless, cohabitation has become common even among college graduates. By 2002, 47 percent of women who were college graduates had lived with a partner at some point, compared with 62 percent for women aged 19 to 44 who were high school graduates and 68 percent for those with less than 12 years of schooling. Racial differences in living together have narrowed far more than have educational disparities. Whereas cohabitation used to be more widespread among African Americans, recent increases in the proportion of people cohabiting have been greater among non-Hispanic whites. Both groups were more likely to cohabit than Hispanic women of similar ages in 1995. Nonetheless, given distinctive differences in marriage rates across these racial groups in the US, these results suggest that the role served by cohabitation may increasingly differ by race. Marriage rates are considerably lower among African Americans than for either whites or Hispanics. For blacks, then, living together may serve as a marriage alternative, whereas for whites it is still more likely to be a precursor to marriage. Living together has also been more prevalent among the previously married than the never married. In fact, it is increasingly replacing remarriage, even among those with children.

Cohabitation differs rather dramatically in its prevalence, as well as its role in childbearing, in Canada and Western Europe. In countries that have the highest proportions of cohabiting unions – Sweden, Finland, Denmark, and France – family law often views married and cohabiting couples similarly. In these countries, most non-marital births are to cohabiting couples, in contrast to the US where greater shares of such births are to women living without a partner. But there is considerable variation in the prevalence of cohabitation in Europe, as demonstrated in the research of Kiernan (2004a,b) and Heuveline and Timberlake (2004). Countries such as the UK, Netherlands, Germany, Austria, and Belgium have intermediate levels of cohabitation, and the shares

cohabiting in most Catholic countries (Italy, Spain, and Ireland), while substantial, are even lower. The extent to which children are born into cohabiting unions or live with cohabiting parents also fluctuates widely, though in most of the Northern and Western European countries the shares of cohabiting couples living with children are similar to those in the US.

Most cohabiting unions are of relatively short duration, lasting on average only a year or two. A small fraction continue to cohabit indefinitely or represent an alternative to marriage. In the US roughly half of all cohabiting unions end within the first year. In contrast, only about 1 in 10 lasts 5 or more years. Because cohabiting appears to be such a transitory arrangement, many argue that it is not usually an alternative to or a substitute for marriage. Yet the purpose of cohabitation appears to be changing over time. As living together has become more prevalent it has become less likely to serve as a staging ground for marriage. Among those who entered cohabiting unions in the early 1980s, about 60 percent eventually married. The share of those entering cohabiting unions in the 1990s that subsequently married declined to about 53 percent (Bumpass & Lu 2000). Using more recent data from the NLSY for young women for the years 1979 through 2000, Lichter et al. (2006) found that cohabiting unions were more likely to end in dissolution than in marriage.

One possible explanation for this change comes from new evidence that young adults often do not have explicit plans to marry at the time they decide to cohabit. Sassler (2004), in a qualitative study of New York cohabitators, reported that marriage was not discussed seriously prior to entering into shared living arrangements, and in fact was generally not raised in any serious fashion until after a considerable length of time. This finding is being replicated in other qualitative studies conducted on a wider array of social classes in various locations in the US. A growing body of research is reporting that rather than an explicit testing ground for marriage, many cohabitators live together for financial reasons or because it is more convenient. As cohabitation becomes normative, it increasingly appears to serve as an alternative to being single.

Despite common beliefs that living together is a good way to assess compatibility for

marriage, couples that lived together prior to marriage have elevated rates of marital dissolution. Cohabitation therefore does not appear to reduce subsequent divorce by winnowing out the least stable couples from marriage. However, the association between cohabitation and relationship disruption has not been firmly established. Using data from the 1987 National Survey of Families and Households, Schoen and Owens (1991) reported finding no connection between premarital cohabitation and subsequent divorce among women born in the early 1960s, though cohabitators from earlier birth cohorts did have a higher likelihood of experiencing a divorce. It remains unclear whether the relationship between cohabitation and divorce has weakened or strengthened among more recent cohorts of cohabiting women. The relation between repeat cohabitation and subsequent union dissolution is more clear cut. Those who have lived with multiple partners in informal living arrangements do experience increased relationship instability.

As mentioned above, those who choose to live together tend to be different from adults who marry without first cohabiting, in that they tend to have lower levels of education, more unstable employment histories, and less traditional orientations towards the family. Another way in which cohabiting couples differ from those who are married is in their divergent backgrounds. For example, cohabiting couples are more likely to consist of partners from different racial backgrounds than are married couples, suggesting that living together is more acceptable than is marriage for interracial partnerships. Cohabitation is also less selective than is marriage with respect to education (Blackwell & Lichter 2000). Finally, several factors increase the likelihood of cohabiting instead of entering into marriage, further differentiating the two groups. Recent work by Qian and colleagues (2005) finds that women who experience non-marital births, for example, are substantially more likely to enter into cohabiting situations than marriage. Less is known about men who enter into cohabiting unions, and how they differ from those who marry, though recent research using data from the Fragile Families study shows that men who have fathered children with multiple partners, and who therefore may have child support obligations that extend

across several families, are less likely to wed their current partner with whom they share a child. In general, cohabiting partners tend to differ more than married couples on a range of dimensions; further research is required to determine the effect that such differences may have on the quality of their match.

Evidence on the domestic labor performed by cohabitators indicates that their patterns are in many ways similar to married couples. Cohabiting men do about as much domestic labor as do married men. While cohabiting women spend far less time on domestic labor than married women, they continue to do more than cohabiting men do (Shelton & John 1993). Furthermore, in a study of transitions in the domestic labor of single adults, Gupta (1999) reports that single women who move into cohabiting unions increase the amount of domestic labor they perform, while cohabiting men do not. These results suggest that cohabiting couples “do gender” in ways that are quite similar to married couples.

A substantial proportion of cohabiting couples reside with children. Some of these children are the result of previous marriages or relationships. But cohabitators are increasingly bearing children without marrying. In the early 1980s in the US, for example, an estimated 29 percent of all births to single mothers were to cohabiting women; by the early 1990s, 39 percent of all non marital births were to cohabiting women, and estimates from the final years of the twentieth century suggest that births to cohabiting couples accounted for close to half of all births to single women in cities of over 200,000 persons (Bumpass & Lu 2000; Sigle Rushton & McLanahan 2002). In Britain, some 60 percent of all unmarried mothers are cohabiting at the time of their child’s birth. Living together has largely replaced what used to be referred to as “shotgun” weddings, as single women who become pregnant are now just as likely to move in with their partners as they are to marry (Manning 1993; Raley 2001). These developments provide additional fuel to those worried about the effects that the increasing prevalence of cohabitation is having on marital unions.

While an increasing proportion of children are born into cohabiting families, a substantial number of children will spend time in

cohabiting families following the divorce or breakup of their parents’ relationships. As a result, a rising proportion of cohabitators are residing with children under the age of 15, both biological children and those that might be considered “stepchildren.” The proportions have increased from over a quarter of all cohabitators in 1980 to over 40 percent by 2000 (Fields & Casper 2001). Furthermore, children’s likelihood of living with a cohabiting parent is even greater. Although estimates vary somewhat, Graefe and Lichter (1999) report, using data from the NLSY, that over a quarter (26 percent) of children born prior to 1992 could expect to live with a cohabiting mother some time by age 14, while Heuveline and Timberlake (2004) found that about one third of American children can expect to live with a cohabiting parent.

Since cohabiting unions are less stable than marriages, a growing body of evidence has sought to document how children fare if they spend time with a cohabiting parent (or parents). While we still do not conclusively know whether spending time in a cohabiting family rather than with married parents or an unmarried parent is more or less beneficial to children, cohabiting families do break up more often than do married ones. The preliminary evidence suggests that spending time in cohabiting families can have detrimental effects for children, often because of the transient nature of the relationship. In other words, children who spend time with a cohabiting parent may fare worse developmentally than children raised in stable two parent families, and even children raised by single parents who do not cohabit, largely because cohabiting parents tend to experience multiple transitions in and out of relationships. It is these multiple transitions that are detrimental to children (Brown 2004).

The dramatic increase in cohabitation has stimulated a great deal of research exploring who cohabitators are, suggesting what role cohabitation serves in the union formation process, and assessing the impact of cohabitation for the well being of adults and children. Religious leaders and policymakers are increasingly questioning the impact that living together has on marriage and parenting. The growing acceptance of cohabitation among the general population, in conjunction with its increasing

prevalence as a staging ground for parenting, presents new challenges to those concerned about growing inequality across family types. Yet the role cohabitation will play in patterns of family formation in the US and other western countries in the future is still unknown, and will require further study of its impact on individuals and families in differing circumstances and life course stages, how its meaning changes over time, and the impact that living together has on the institution of marriage.

SEE ALSO: Divorce; Family Diversity; Family Structure; Family Structure and Child Outcomes; Family Structure and Poverty; Intimate Union Formation and Dissolution; Love and Commitment; Marriage

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Coleman, James (1926–95)

Peter V. Marsden

James S. Coleman ranks among the most influential sociologists of the twentieth century. Coleman's scholarship pursued several linked lines of inquiry in parallel, but centered on understanding and improving the performance of social systems. He led a study of inequality in educational opportunity (Coleman, Campbell

et al. 1966) that had a major impact on US educational policy and served as a model for much subsequent policy research in social science. *Foundations of Social Theory* (1990), his principal theoretical work, outlined an approach to understanding social phenomena resting on interdependent purposive actions. He viewed the rising prominence and power of large organizations (“corporate actors”) as the most distinctive feature of contemporary society, and contended that social science and social theory should help to develop new forms of social organization that are more attentive to the interests and welfare of natural persons. Coleman’s work has enduring influence on social theory, educational research, organizational analysis, mathematical sociology, and policy research, among other fields.

A native of the Midwestern and Southern United States, Coleman’s undergraduate degree was in chemical engineering. He subsequently became interested in the social sciences, earning a doctorate in sociology from Columbia University in 1955. He held academic appointments at Johns Hopkins University (1959–73) and the University of Chicago (1956–9 and 1973–96). He was a member of the US National Academy of Sciences and served as president of the American Sociological Association in 1991–2.

Coleman practiced “middle range sociology” characteristic of the post World War II Columbia School (Swedberg 1996), stressing insight into substantive questions about social organization, informed by a close interplay between theory and empirical inquiry. His scholarship reflected the diverse influences of his graduate mentors. He drew theoretical inspiration from Robert K. Merton and an emphasis on macro social questions from Seymour Martin Lipset. His studies with Paul F. Lazarsfeld and his background in the sciences oriented Coleman to mathematical models of social processes. His interest in rational choice analysis grew beginning in the 1960s, much influenced by economic analysis and positive political theory.

Coleman’s early career works illustrate the breadth of his substantive concerns. He had a penchant for “community” studies focused on structural features and system level questions (Coleman 1986). He took a quantitative approach to studying social organization that

avoided atomization and abstraction away from social context.

Coleman assigned sustained high priority to increasing the responsiveness of social organization. He co authored *Union Democracy*, which examined political processes within the International Typographical Union (Lipset et al. 1956). The presence of a stable two party system there avoided the power concentration predicted by Robert Michels’s iron law of oligarchy, an outcome attributed to historical and social factors including local autonomy, occupational community among printers, and secret societies providing independent power bases. Legitimate competition among political factions promoted correspondence between union activities and member concerns, mitigating agency problems found in otherwise similar membership organizations dominated by a permanent leadership group. Coleman viewed pluralistic arrangements – legitimate competition among multiple centers of power – as important devices helping to align actions of social organizations with interests of their constituencies.

The Adolescent Society (1961), Coleman’s first study to address educational questions, focused on how the social organization of high schools – especially student status hierarchies and value systems – affected their performance. Set against ongoing social changes – increasing specialization, the declining capacity of families to prepare children for economic life, and rising segregation of adults and children – Coleman argued that both formal and informal structures in schools tended to discourage high academic performance. Adolescent cultures prized athletic success and popularity rather than scholastic achievement, and students responded accordingly. Coleman advocated restructuring that would engage students actively and collectively in educational pursuits.

While an associate at the Bureau of Applied Social Research at Columbia, Coleman conducted research on the processes through which physicians came to adopt a new drug. Later published as *Medical Innovation* (Coleman et al. 1966), the study found that both formal communication media and personal contacts (social and professional) influenced adoption decisions. Integration into local social networks alerted physicians to the new drug, but more




Figure 1 Examples of transition processes.

importantly offered legitimation by resolving uncertainties about its benefits and drawbacks.

Coleman viewed mathematics not as a methodological tool, but instead as a vehicle and formal language for expressing and refining sociological theory. He stressed dynamic modeling of social processes, rather than applications of statistics or static representations of social structure. *Introduction to Mathematical Sociology (IMS)*; Coleman 1964) outlined an intellectual agenda for mathematical sociology and remains a foundational work in this field.

IMS emphasizes continuous time, discrete state stochastic process models, centering attention on transitions from one condition to another. Such transitions can be one way, e.g., the rate at which physicians move from not prescribing to prescribing a new drug (Fig. 1a) or two way, e.g., the rates at which adolescent evaluations of the “leading crowd” at school change between favorable and unfavorable (Fig. 1b). Explanatory factors such as network integration or membership in the leading crowd could amplify or dampen transition rates for individuals. Coleman highlighted the equilibrium assumptions required by cross sectional analyses of such dynamic phenomena, stimulating interest in over time observation plans. The imagery of distribution of units into states governed by an underlying regime of transition rates subsequently became widespread in sociology, particularly in event history models for longitudinal data analysis.

Beginning in the mid 1960s, Coleman conducted major large scale research projects that addressed US educational policy issues. The first and best known of these was *Equality of Educational Opportunity (EEO)*; Coleman, Campbell et al. 1966), a study mandated by

the 1964 Civil Rights Act. Examining rural/urban, regional, and race/ethnic inequalities, *EEO* found only modest differences in “input” school resources such as facilities, textbooks, or teacher salaries – the then conventional standards for gauging equality of opportunity. An important innovation was *EEO*’s attention to disparities in the outcomes of schooling, where substantial race/ethnic differences were evident. The study traced achievement inequalities largely to family background and both peer and teacher characteristics, attributing few to variations in school resources. Results of *EEO* were widely invoked in support of school desegregation policies.

Public and academic debate alike surrounded Coleman’s educational policy studies (Ravitch 1993), none more so than a 1970s project that found that court ordered mandatory school desegregation plans tended to accelerate white residential movement out of central cities. A subsequent study showing that parochial and private school students had higher achievement levels than public school students (Coleman & Hoffer 1987) generated controversy because it implied that policies creating school competition, such as school choice or voucher plans, might improve the performance of public schools. Catholic schools had particularly low dropout rates, and notably high rates of achievement growth among less advantaged students. In accounting for differences across sectors, the public/private school project stressed features of school social organization such as disciplinary climate and the presence of “functional communities” encouraging contact among parents, teachers, and students.

Coleman regarded research projects like *EEO* as a novel genre of social science that provides information about current or prospective policy initiatives, contrasting them with exposés of social problems and basic disciplinary research. He observed that sponsors establish the agenda for policy research projects, and expressed concern that they would exercise undue control over research designs and the dissemination of findings. He advocated a pluralistic framework for the governance of policy research that would engage multiple interested parties in the conception of projects and review of results.




Figure 2 Micro-level translation of macro-level proposition.

Coleman viewed questions about the functioning of social systems as both most difficult and most important for sociology. He advocated multilevel theories that account for systemic phenomena as outcomes of interactions among interdependent micro level actors (Coleman 1986). An informative theoretical account for relationships between macro level phenomena would entail linking them to micro level actions (Fig. 2). To understand a macro–macro (Type 4) proposition, one would show how (1) system level conditions shape micro level conditions, (2) micro level conditions translate into micro level actions, and (3) micro level actions combine to produce systemic outcomes. Coleman pointed to micro–macro (Type 3) transitions as the greatest challenge for social science analysis.

Coleman’s *Foundations of Social Theory* (FST; 1990) develops a rational choice basis for such explanations. Operating within a broadly conceived methodological individualist framework, FST aspires toward a transdisciplinary theory of the functioning and performance of social systems. Coleman assumes an economic concept of rational action – use of scarce resources in pursuit of interests – as a model for Type 2 transitions. Economic analysis and the model of the optimizing rational agent appealed to him by offering an approach to making micro–macro transitions, and allowing anticipation of the results of social interventions. He was, however, careful to disavow the assumptions of independent action embodied in many economic models; though interests pursued by actors were often selfish, they could also be influenced by structural features including interdependencies, networks, authority structures, norms, and organizations.



Figure 3 Relations between basic elements of Coleman’s social system.

Elementary units in Coleman’s framework are actors and resources (also termed events). Actors control resources, which in turn are of interest to actors (Fig. 3). Interdependence exists within this minimal situation by virtue of the interests of actors in resources that others control. Seeking to realize their interests, actors may allocate resources via such means as direct use, compensated transfer, or unilateral transfer. FST fashions explanations for dyadic relationships of authority and trust, as well as meso level structures including exchange, authority, and norms. It develops a mathematical formulation of the exchange model with a structure paralleling that of an open market. This makes micro–macro transitions, showing the implications of distributions of interest and control for power differentials among actors and value variations across resources. Coleman applied this model to understanding collective decisions as well as labor market exchange.

Committed to the view that actions are responsive to the incentives present in social situations, Coleman insisted on explaining rather than assuming the norms that were a staple of mid twentieth century sociological analysis. FST argued that norms reflected a consensus that “beneficiary” actors legitimately hold rights of control over specified “target” actions of others. Beneficiaries were apt to demand such control when their interests were affected by the actions in question. Effective norms would arise when beneficiaries could not gain control of the target actions via compensated exchanges, and when social organization was sufficient to produce and apply a system of sanctions supporting conformity with a normative prescription.

One of Coleman’s most influential works conceptualized social capital as aspects of social structure that facilitate action (Coleman 1988). The term encompasses numerous structural phenomena covered in FST, including systems of trust and obligations, networks of information flow, norms backed by sanctioning systems, and centralized structures of authority

relations. Social relations often constitute social capital by facilitating the development of trust or serving as a foundation for effective sanctioning systems. Network closure often provides social capital; Coleman's public/private school project attributed some achievement differences to community structures having high student–parent, parent–teacher, and parent–parent contact. These were said to supply sanctions and monitoring that encouraged both continuation in school and academic achievement.

Coleman observed that social capital has a restricted scope of applicability, however; it is a less general (“fungible”) resource than economic capital. Features of social structure could result in harmful as well as beneficial consequences. Moreover, a rational choice perspective highlights a public goods dilemma in the production of social capital: benefits of social capital often accrue to actors other than those who produce it, and hence it will typically be underproduced. One important source of social capital is social organization created to pursue one purpose, but subsequently appropriated for another use. Coleman believed that the social capital available to advance the interests of children was in especially short supply, and advocated policy steps to increase incentives for its creation.

Much of *FST* is devoted to “new corporate actors,” the feature of contemporary society that Coleman saw as most distinctive. Part of a “Great Transformation” from primordial social organization resting on families as the basic social units to “constructed social organization” in which corporate actors – deliberately designed, special purpose social structures having a legal standing independent of natural persons – were central features (Coleman 1992).

At base, corporate actors are built on simple authority relations, which arise when one actor grants control over some set of actions to another in exchange for compensation (disjoint authority) or in anticipation of shared benefit (conjoint authority). Their capacity for action and potential complexity grows vastly with the development of complex authority relations, in which a superordinate may delegate the exercise of authority to an agent, and role based social organization involving relationships among abstract positions rather than persons.

Such innovations expand the range of potentially viable authority configurations, permitting forms in which only a participant's net relationship with the corporate actor, rather than dyadic relationships with each and every other participant, need be profitable. Coleman calls attention to social inventions including the concept of “juristic persons” and limited liability, which offered new means through which individual persons could combine resources in pursuit of interests. Corporate actors could have far greater size, complexity, and longevity than primordial organizational forms; importantly, responsibility for their actions could not be settled on any individual person.

Rational choice analysis sensitized Coleman to principal–agent problems within corporate actors. When possible, self interested subordinates will pursue their own ends rather than those of the intended beneficiaries of the corporate actor. Likewise, superiors may attempt to expand their control over a subordinate's actions beyond the scope of the latter's grant. Both of these common defects in authority relations lead to suboptimal performance. Coleman suggests that the effectiveness of corporate actors could be enhanced by organizational structures and incentive systems involving short feedback cycles and exchanges among agents in proximate positions, rather than the lengthy loops associated with centralized command control schemes and extensive oversight on the part of superiors.

The increasing concentration of social power in corporate actors rather than natural persons was of much greater concern to Coleman, however. He was struck by the pervasiveness of corporate actors in contemporary society, and their capacity to pursue specialized purposes relentlessly. Specialization contributed to their efficiency in attaining their ends, but often also predisposed them toward a narrowness of purpose, lack of responsibility due to neglecting collateral effects of their actions, and an unreceptiveness to the interests of natural persons.

Such consequences are especially severe to the extent that the purposes of corporate actors and natural persons diverge. Coleman's major value premise in *FST* is that corporate actors should be judged on the basis of their effects on the interests of persons. Observing that individual welfare is increasingly dependent on

affiliations with powerful corporate actors, he raised concern about the fate of unorganized interests and provisions for persons, notably children, who lack such linkages.

Coleman viewed the decline of primordial social organization in favor of constructed social organization as irreversible, and therefore regarded the social control of corporate actors as a prominent item on the agenda for sociology and social policy alike, recommending steps to better align the actions of corporate actors with the interests of persons. He suggested some interventions which would manipulate the environments in which corporate actors operate: changes in tax laws, creation or maintenance of competition within organizational fields (e.g., school choice), the creation of countervailing corporate actors, or audits by external parties. Other steps would alter the internal structures of corporate actors by changing governance structures to increase the influence of affected parties on performance, increasing the incentives for agents to act responsibly, or assigning greater liability for harmful actions to agents.

Skeptical about the capacity of states, themselves large corporate actors, to develop effective remedies, *FST* closed with Coleman's call for a "new social science" oriented to improving the design and performance of organizations and institutions, a process he called the "rational reconstruction of society." Such an enterprise would bridge disciplinary boundaries, resting on basic theory and research, but also entailing major programs of applied social policy research.

SEE ALSO: Educational Inequality; Mathematical Sociology; Merton, Robert K.; Micro-Macro Links; Oligarchy and Organization; Rational Choice Theory (and Economic Sociology); Social Capital and Education

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collective action

Doug McAdam

The term "collective action" is hopelessly broad. Taken at face value, it could plausibly refer to *all* forms of human social action involving two or more people. Suffice to say,

consideration of such a broadly inclusive category would be well beyond the scope of this entry. But there is a far narrower subset of human action to which the term has been applied and which will be the focus here. For our purposes, *collective action* refers to *emergent and minimally coordinated action by two or more people that is motivated by a desire to change some aspect of social life or to resist changes proposed by others*. By “emergent” is meant innovative lines of action that depart from taken for granted normative routines. “Coordinated” simply means that the various parties to the emerging conflict are attuned to one another and acting in awareness of this fact. Finally, the emphasis on change and/or resistance to change is designed to capture the adversarial or potentially conflictual nature of “collective action.”

While considerably narrower than the inclusive definition imagined above, even this delimited category of action has been the object of a great deal of scholarship. In recent years, much of the relevant work has been done by “social movement” scholars, principally in sociology and political science. But there is also a long standing interest in the dynamics of “collective action” among some economists and political scientists intent on understanding the conditions under which people will engage in emergent action of this sort. Finally, there is a wealth of historical scholarship on various instances of collective action, carried out by historians, or historically oriented social scientists. While not claiming to be equally conversant with these very different and vast literatures, this survey takes them as its point of departure.

The following three broad animating questions are examined:

- When? Under what conditions can we expect collective action to develop?
- Who? What individual level factors appear to predict participation in collective action?
- Impact? What do we know about the outcomes of collective action and the factors that may help account for variation in its effects?

WHEN?

In the long history of research and theory on the topic, no question has received more

attention than that concerning the origins of emergent collective action. What factors make for such action in the first place? It is a perplexing question. Typically, people’s day to day behaviors are governed by predictable, institutionalized routines. Indeed, most of us are quite dependent on those routines. So the interesting question is, under what conditions will people willingly abandon these routines in favor of emergent action? There may be no simple answer. But in the literature one can discern three main perspectives on the topic.

Strain Theories

The first perspective is not so much a specific theory as a class of explanations that share the important assumption that collective action is typically a response to some form of severe *strain* in society. A distinction should be made, however, between *classic* and more *contemporary* strain arguments. Classic strain theories suggest that whatever the underlying structural strain, the real motive force behind collective action comes from some identifiable shared *psychological state* or condition. So, for example, for *mass society* theorists, the structural condition that puts a society at “risk” of collective action is the absence of intermediate groups (political parties, religious institutions, etc.) by which citizens are functionally integrated into society. But the immediate motivation to action stems from the feelings of *anomie* produced by living in a “mass society.” For classic strain theorists, then, social movements function principally at a psychological, rather than a political, level.

This is not true of more contemporary strain perspectives, such as competition theory or traditional Marxist accounts of revolutionary collective action. The former explains racial or ethnic conflict as a byproduct of demographic, economic, and/or political processes that are perceived as pitting two or more groups against each other in the search for economic or political power (Olzak 1992). For their part, Marxist scholars continue to attribute revolutionary collective action to economic dislocations produced by the contradictions inherent in capitalism (Paige 1975). Gone are the mediating psychological states that play such a central causal role in the classic strain accounts, replaced by

a straightforward link between grievances and action, created by the underlying structural dislocations identified in the theory.

Resource Mobilization

As formulated by McCarthy and Zald (1973), resource mobilization was conceived as an explicit alternative to the then dominant strain perspective. There is always sufficient “strain” or “grievances” in society, they argue, to provide the motivation for emergent collective action. You cannot therefore rely on strain, which is more or less ever present, to account for collective action, which is far more variable. What *does* vary, they argue, is not the motivation to engage in collective action, but the organizational capacity and resources required to do so. So it is not strain per se that produces collective action, but a significant increase in organizational capacity and resources. What produces such an increase? Proponents of the approach have offered two answers to this question. An increase in general societal prosperity is seen as allowing for more collective action, as the “slack resources” needed to support such activity increase as well. The other possibility is for a specific movement to benefit from a significant infusion of funds from one or more external “sponsors.”

Political Process Theory

The distinctive contribution of political process theorists has been to reassert the fundamental *political* character and origin of most instances of emergent collective action (Tilly 1978; Tarrow 1998; McAdam 1999). In this conception, society is seen as an elaborate system of power relations that grants some groups routine access to power while denying it to others. In times of political stability, the power disparity between “members” (those who enjoy routine access) and “challengers” (those who don’t) is likely to be so great as to virtually preclude the possibility of effective political action by the latter. But no political system, even the most coercive and centralized, is spared periods of instability. It is during such periods that emergent collective action is expected to develop. The main emphasis has been to stress the

catalytic impact of events or processes that weakened established regimes, thereby creating new “opportunities” for successful collective action by challenging groups. Recently, however, proponents of the approach have also sought to incorporate “threat” as well as “opportunity” into the argument (McAdam 1999; Goldstone & Tilly 2001). That is, destabilizing events that come to be perceived as posing serious threats to group interests may also set in motion emergent collective action.

WHO?

If the “when” of collective action has generated the lion’s share of research and theory on the topic, the “who” of the matter has not lagged far behind. That is, a great deal of scholarship has been devoted to the question of “differential recruitment.” Why does one person come to take part in an episode of collective action while another does not? Answers to this question have tended to fall into two general categories: *individual* and *social structural* accounts of participation.

Individual Explanations

There is a very basic appeal – especially in the West, and the US most of all – to individual accounts of behavior: the idea that to explain behavior one need look no further than the individual. This assumption has given rise to a number of individualistic accounts of participation in collective action, or “activism,” to employ the shorthand term. These explanations can be further grouped into three basic types: those that attribute participation to certain psychological characteristics; those that stress rational calculus as the basis for individual activism; and those that see participation as a reflection of a certain attitudinal affinity with the aims of the “movement.”

The oldest accounts of activism identify a particular *psychological state or characteristic* as the root cause of participation. The emphasis is on character traits or states of mind that presumably impel, or at least dispose, an individual to activism. What varies are the specific characteristics or qualities identified as significant in this regard. Even a cursory accounting

of the variants of this approach is beyond the scope of this entry. A few examples will have to suffice.

Mass society theory was, for a number of years, an especially influential account of participation in collective action. Proponents of the approach argued that emergent movements serve as “substitute communities” for those alienated, poorly integrated members of society who are disproportionately drawn to activism. An even older psychological tradition – reflected in the work of Adorno and colleagues – identified participation in non democratic movements with “authoritarian” personality traits. In 1969, Lewis Feuer published an influential account of the student protest movement, arguing that those who were drawn to the movement were apt to be those students, especially males, who saw in it a chance to express unresolved emotional conflicts with their parents. The essence of the approach should be clear: collective action participation stems presumably from the motive force of some characteristic psychological trait or process.

Running very much counter to psychological theories is an important *rationalist* tradition in the study of collective action. Rather than individuals being compelled to participate as a result of specified psychological traits, states of mind, or “needs,” activism is held to reflect the same kind of rational cost–benefit calculations that decision theorists assume inform all choice processes. However, the key touchstone text that inspired this important line of work was actually centrally concerned with the seeming irrationality of collective action.

In his classic 1965 book *The Logic of Collective Action*, Mancur Olson posed what he saw as the stark “free rider problem” that confronted any who would seek to mobilize collective action geared to the provision of a public good. Why, asked Olson, would anyone take part in such an effort when they would receive whatever benefits the group achieved whether they participated or not? From this perspective, individual activism appeared irrational. But Olson was not blind to the fact that, while not normative, there was also no shortage of emergent collective action in the real world. How does one explain this seeming paradox? One option might have been to embrace the then dominant psychological perspective and simply

argue that collective action represented a departure from the “normal” rational choice processes thought to structure routine social life.

This was not, however, the tack that Olson took. Instead he went on to explicate two general conditions under which he felt we could expect to see collective action develop. These conditions involve (1) the provision of *selective incentives* to increase the rewards of those engaging in collective action, and (2) the creation of monitoring and sanctioning systems that would effectively deny benefits to those who failed to participate. Since then scholars in this tradition have sought to extend, modify, or refine Olson’s rationalist take on individual activism.

The central claim of this third perspective is simple enough: activism grows out of strong *attitudinal support* for the values and goals of the movement in question. This account was especially popular as applied to student activism in the US in the late 1960s and early 1970s. According to the research of Flacks (1971) and others, the actions of student radicals were motivated by values learned from their parents.

To their credit, advocates of this approach rejected the somewhat mechanistic psychological models of participation sketched above in favor of a straightforward behavioral link between a person’s values and political attitudes and participation in collective action. Unfortunately, this conceptual advance has not produced any better fit between theory and data. Based on his analysis of 215 studies of the relationship between individual attitudes and riot participation, McPhail (1971) concluded that “individual predispositions are, at best, insufficient to account” for participation in collective action.

Does this mean that attitudes are irrelevant to the study of individual activism? Albeit their importance appears to have been overstated in many accounts of participation, attitudes remain important insofar as they serve as a kind of minimum requirement for involvement in a given instance of collective action. In this sense, a certain attitudinal affinity with the aims of a movement is probably a necessary – but hardly sufficient – condition to account for participation. The question becomes: if attitudes dispose someone to take part in collective action, what additional factors encourage them to act on these dispositions?

Social Structural/Network Explanations

Because of the apparent lack of empirical support for the psychological and attitudinal accounts of participation, attention has turned in recent years to explanations based on an individual's social structural proximity to a given instance of collective action. The argument is that people participate not simply because they are psychologically or attitudinally compelled to, but because their structural/network location in the world puts them "at risk" for participation. But what are the specific structural or network factors that predict variation in individual activism? Twenty five years of sustained work on this topic have yielded consistent empirical support for two main factors: prior ties to participants and membership in organizations.

The factor that has been shown to bear the strongest relationship to activism is *prior contact with another movement participant*. Several representative studies will help make the point. In a study of all applicants to the 1964 Mississippi Freedom Summer Project, McAdam (1988) found twice as many participants to have "strong ties" to other volunteers than did accepted applicants who withdrew in advance of the campaign. These findings are very much in accord with those reported by Snow et al. (1980) in their groundbreaking survey of the empirical literature on movement recruitment. Of the nine studies reviewed in the article, all but one identified prior interpersonal ties as the most common source of movement recruits.

This consistent empirical finding, however, hardly tells us all we would want to know about the role of prior social ties in recruitment to collective action. First, the finding conveniently skirts the important question of origins. That is, to say that people enter into collective action because they know others who are involved ignores the obvious problem that on the eve of the movement, there are no salient alters already involved to pull ego into participation. Second, this structural account fails to acknowledge conceptually or address empirically the fact that potential recruits invariably possess a multitude of "prior social ties" that are likely to expose them to conflicting behavioral pressures. Here we confront the hoary problem of sampling on the dependent variable.

Overwhelmingly, the studies of recruitment start by surveying activists after their entrance into the action in question. But showing that these activists were linked to the movement by some prior social tie does not prove the causal potency of that tie.

The final lacuna in regard to this issue is theoretical. As Passy (2003: 22) notes: "we are now aware that social ties are important for collective action, but we still need to theorize . . . the actual role of networks." Fortunately, scholars of social movements and collective action have begun to move beyond the simple structural relationship between prior ties and participation to theorize and empirically explore the more dynamic social and social psychological processes that appear to account for the effect. The specifics of these efforts are, once again, beyond the scope of this entry. But an article by Gould (2003) illustrates some of the directions in which this work is developing.

The other consistent structural "fact" about the origins of collective action is that the overwhelming majority of emergent movements develop within *established organizations, institutions, or networks*. What this means at the individual level is that, not only are most activists drawn into mature movements through prior ties to other activists, but also that in the early days of a movement, participation tends to overlap substantially with the membership of certain key "mobilizing structures." Either way, the message is the same: throughout the life of a movement, structural connections to other activists or activist organizations appear to shape the chances of participation far more than individual psychological or attitudinal factors.

But, as with the notion of "prior tie," the concept of the "mobilizing structure" has too often been treated as an objective structural facilitator of collective action, rather than a contested site of interaction that can support various lines of action. The point is, existing groups or networks are as apt to constrain as to facilitate collective action. For these settings to become sites of emergent mobilization, they must be culturally conceived and defined as such by a significant subset of the group's members. This process has been termed *social appropriation* by its proponents (McAdam 1999; McAdam et al. 2001).

IMPACT?

If the general topic of collective action is unwieldy, much harder is the assessment of its impact. Nonetheless, since much collective action is motivated by a desire to change aspects of social and political life, understanding something about the effectiveness of such efforts is necessarily an important goal. The most coherent and focused academic take on the issue has come from social movement scholars who, in recent years, have devoted considerable attention to the topic. This attention is in marked contrast to the generalized neglect of the topic evident in earlier periods.

Given the view of social movements that prevailed in sociology and political science well into the 1970s, the failure to consider the issue of impact or consequences is entirely understandable. Both disciplines saw movements as ineffectual. For their part, sociologists grouped social movements together with other unusual/aberrant social phenomena – crazes, fads, panics, crowds – into a field of study known as “collective behavior.” All these forms of behavior were seen as collective responses to rapid social change. They were not, however, *effective* responses to change. They functioned instead at a psychological level as an outlet for the feelings of anxiety and fear which rapid social change inevitably produced. To the extent that movements served any political function whatsoever, it was only in alerting rational policymakers to the strains triggering collective action.

Political scientists paid no more attention to movement outcomes than sociologists, but for a different reason. In considering electoral and policy outcomes, political scientists stressed – indeed, continue to stress – the strategic preference of elected policymakers for broad centrist policies that can attract broad majority support. Down’s 1957 work on the “median voter” was both emblematic and influential in this regard.

The turbulence of the 1960s and 1970s undermined the prevailing views of social movements, especially in sociology. Not only did movements appear to be far more political (and consequential) than the collective behavior perspective allowed, but the era also brought scores of younger scholars into sociology who

had themselves been active in those movements and disposed to reshape the field in line with their own experiences. Accordingly, the separate field of social movement studies that emerged in the late 1970s and early 1980s was animated by a very different assumption than the traditional collective behavior perspective. Far from assuming the political/policy irrelevance of social movements, the new generation of sociologists asserted the consequential impact of movements without, however, typically subjecting this assumption to systematic empirical test.

In recent years this has changed, and a discernible literature on “movement outcomes” has emerged in sociology and, to a lesser extent, political science. The earliest works in this area were admittedly quite elementary, seeking simply to assess the impact of this or that movement on some aspect of political or social life. Most of these studies focus specifically on the success of movements in relation to particular policy outcomes (cf. Andrews 1977; Gamson 1990). Others take up the broader and, in some cases, unintended consequences of social movements (McAdam 1988; Katzenstein 1998).

Taken together, then, these studies provide impressive evidence of the potential of social movements to serve, under certain circumstances, as important vehicles of social and political change. That said, researchers are only now turning to the “how” of the question. Having found that movements are capable of producing significant change effects, the more important goal is to identify those factors or processes that account for these outcomes.

To date, three mechanisms have been proposed as keys to the variable impact of movements. These are disruptive protest, signaling, and public opinion shift.

A recurrent debate in the literature concerns the tactical effectiveness of *disruptive protest* versus more moderate forms of collective action. Starting with Lipsky’s classic work on “protest as a resource,” many analysts have endorsed the general idea that movement success depends on the ability of challenging groups to create “negative inducements” to elite bargaining through the disruption of public order and the threat such disruption poses to the realization of elite interests (Piven & Cloward 1979; McAdam 1999).

Though limited, some empirical evidence can also be cited in support of this particular mechanism (Gamson 1990; McAdam & Su 2002).

Lohmann (1993: 319, emphasis added) proposes a “*signaling* model of information and manipulative political action” in which elected officials use mass political activity to better understand the policy preferences of the electorate. For her, public protest can serve as a kind of mobilized public opinion, providing lawmakers with timely and meaningful information regarding the distribution of policy positions within the general public. The question is, under what conditions will this information prompt lawmakers to shift their own policy behaviors? Lohmann stresses two conditions in particular. The first is the size of the protest. All things equal, lawmakers can be expected to attend to only the largest of movement gatherings. They are also, according to Lohmann, likely to “discount the observed turnout for extremist political action and shift policy [only] if the estimated number of activist moderates exceeds a critical threshold” (p. 319). So, to summarize, movements that are able to organize large, ideologically moderate, public demonstrations are likely to have a demonstrable effect on public policy.

The link between public opinion and policy outcomes has interested political scientists (and, to a lesser extent, economists) for years (Page & Shapiro 1983). Viewing elected officials as rational actors intent on staying in office, these scholars have hypothesized that politicians will generally modify their policy preferences to fit *shifting public opinion* in an effort to retain electoral support. Theory aside, survey articles summarizing the mass of work on the topic find a reasonably strong link between opinion shift and policy change.

All of this suggests another, less direct, link between movement activity, public opinion, and policy change than the one imagined by Lohmann. Here protest does not work directly – as a signal – to change the policy preferences of policymakers, but rather does so only indirectly by first shifting public opinion in the direction of movement goals. Once opinion has shifted in this way, it then acts, in the manner consistent with the aforementioned research, to alter the policy preferences of those public officials who are subject to electoral pressures.

SEE ALSO: Civil Rights Movement; Culture, Social Movements and; Mobilization; Political Opportunities; Political Process Theory; Resource Mobilization Theory; Revolutions; Social Change; Social Movement Organizations; Social Movements; Social Movements, Networks and; Social Movements, Strain and Breakdown Theories of

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collective consciousness

Susan Wortmann

Two components of Durkheim's project are to establish sociology as a discipline in its own right, distinct from psychology, and to understand and demonstrate the dependence of human beings upon their societies. These come together in Durkheim's *âme collective* (collective mind). This concept, commonly referred to by sociologists as the "collective consciousness" or "conscience collective," exemplifies the crucial role that the social plays in human behavior. While theorists disagree about the ultimate role of the collective consciousness in Durkheim's overall work, the idea of such an entity still provokes discussion, critique, theoretical application, and empirical testing.

Durkheim (1933: 38, 39) defines the collective consciousness as "the totality of beliefs and sentiments common to average members of the same society . . . it is an entirely different thing from particular consciences, although it can only be realized through them." Durkheim finds the collective consciousness important enough to be included in his major texts,

The Division of Labor in Society (1933), *Suicide* (1951), *Elementary Forms of Religious Life* (1954), and *The Rules of Sociological Method* (1964). To understand how the collective consciousness functions, one must first understand Durkheim's distinction between what he deems mechanical and organic societies, the people produced in each, and the types of law that govern them.

Durkheim (1933) illustrates the different mechanisms of social order through two societal types. The first type, the *mechanical* society, is a traditional, simpler society composed of economically self-sustaining members who, living in close proximity, are more alike than different. For instance, they live in families or clans, performing similar agrarian tasks. They are unified by language, religious beliefs, values, rituals, and activities common to all and respected by all. Together, these representations comprise the collective consciousness: a real, external, and coercive societal entity that preexists, outlives, is found in, and acts upon all people in the same manner.

In mechanical solidarity the collective consciousness places real and nearly complete force on humans. That is, in a mechanical society, the function of the collective consciousness is to enforce social similarity and to discourage individual variation, which, in such a society, could undermine collective unity. Deviation is likely to be felt strongly by the collectivity, which seeks to prevent it and punish it severely if it occurs. Mechanical solidarity is thus also characterized by repressive law, designed to punish the person who deviates or engages in criminal activity (which is whatever the collective deems offensive to the collective conscience). Durkheim (1972) associates this law with the heart of society, the "center of the common consciousness." Here, violations result in a collective response and swift punishment extending to the person and perhaps to those immediately associated with them, such as spouses, children, and neighbors. This is because, as Durkheim (1933) points out, violation has ultimately been committed against the society itself. Agreement and speed of punishment, therefore, ensure reinforcement of collective rules, continued social unity, integration, and strict control of most, if not all. Indeed, Durkheim (1972) states that repressive law "attaches the particular individual to the

conscience collective directly and without media tion; that is the individual to society.”

As populations grow, dynamic density in creases and people interact more and more inten sely. They are also more and more divided by a struggle over scarce resources. Thus, the need for a social division of labor becomes pronounced, leading to a change in societal structure (Harms 1981). This new societal arrangement is marked by the connection of previously separate commu nities, and by urbanization, industrialization, increased resources, transportation, and commu nication. Significantly, it is also marked by an increase in occupational specialization: the divi sion of labor. The changed and differentiated division of labor has a paradoxical effect: it creates interdependent individuality. That is, individuals increasingly perform heterogeneous tasks, thus increasing their interdependence on each other and society, but they also perform increasingly specialized tasks, thus increasing their indivi duality. Their individual consciousnesses are increasingly developed and distinctive from the conscience collective. Durkheim deems such a societal arrangement *organic*. Here, the preeminent law of the land is no longer repressive but resti tutive – civil law that, emphasizing individual rights, attempts not to punish or disgrace indivi duals or their associates, but instead to return a situation to its previous state. Durkheim (1972) describes the collective consciousness in organic solidarity as “feeble” or “nonexistent,” saying that it originates not in the heart, like repressive law, but rather “in very marginal regions.”

Debated is just what role and content Durkheim leaves to the collective consciousness in organic society. For instance, Talcott Parsons, in *The Structure of Social Action* (1937), argues that Durkheim’s own conception of the collec tive consciousness in organic society is unclear. Parsons believes that Durkheim either discards the notion of the collective consciousness or relegates it to the normative sphere of shared common values (Giddens 1972). Pope (1973), however, critiques Parsons’s normative read ing of Durkheim, arguing that Parsons sought to promote his own theoretical understand ings through Durkheim’s foundational work. Giddens (1972) interprets Durkheim as continu ing to see the collective consciousness as opera tional, but changed. For Giddens, Durkheim’s

collective consciousness, now generated by the interdependence brought on by the specialized division of labor, is embodied in the state. Whereas the collective consciousness in mecha nical society enforced what was necessary for society, in organic solidarity the state, informed by workers’ guilds, consciously deliberates and collectively enacts what is best for society.

Durkheim’s collective consciousness con tinues to provoke debate and application. For instance, Lehmann (1994) critiques Durkheim’s collective consciousness because it fails to address the social integration or regulation of women. Illustrating that Durkheim’s project is influenced by his own sexism, classism, and racism, she points out that Durkheim’s “indi viduals” are men. Women are largely absent from his entire project, relegated to the asocial realm, to home and to reproduction. Thus, to Lehmann, Durkheim’s collective consciousness allows for, and explains only, the collective consciousness of men.

Contemporary research applications are diverse. Examples include Greenburg’s (1980) test of a collective consciousness as an entity capable of controlling crime rates in Poland; Schindler’s (1999) study of the perception of angels as non judgmental divine forces in the American collective consciousness; Lawson’s (1999) exploration of the generative role of religious language among Catholic Charis matics in collective consciousness formation; and Turner and Wainright’s (2003) exploration of the collective’s power to mediate injury among professional ballet dancers.

The idea of a collective consciousness also seems to appeal to non academics. The term appears frequently in contemporary public dis course without reference to Durkheim. In this usage it often is associated with what the indi vidual author or speaker perceives to be a nor mative societal agreement between groups. It has also been used to discuss the existence of a powerful, invisible social force that socially connects and influences individuals. Indeed, it is ironic that the publication *What is Enlighten ment?* (2004) contained an article on the collec tive consciousness that reaches the conclusion, much like Durkheim himself did nearly a cen tury ago in *The Elementary Forms of Religious Life*: beneficial social advance can result from

the recognition (and scientific study) of invisible collective forces that co-reside in society and the individual.

SEE ALSO: Anomie; Division of Labor; Durkheim, Émile; Durkheim, Émile and Social Change; Social Change; Social Control; Solidarity, Mechanical and Organic

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collective deviance

Erich Goode

In *Stigma*, Erving Goffman wrote of the “tribal stigma of race, nation, and religion,” these being imputed blemishes of identity that are “transmitted through lineages” which “equally contaminate all members of a family” (1963: 4). For Goffman, tribal stigma makes up one of three major types, the other two being “abominations of the body,” namely, “the various physical deformities” such as extreme ugliness and physical disability, and “blemishes of individual character,” such as mental disorder, homosexuality, alcoholism, radical political behavior, and dishonesty. With all stigmatized persons, “we” – meaning “normals,” persons who do not bear the stigmatizing trait – “exercise varieties of discrimination,” we “construct a stigma theory, an ideology to explain” their inferiority, and we “tend to impute a wide range of imperfections on the basis of the original one” (1963: 5). With tribal stigma, the members of some tribal categories stigmatize all the members of another simply on the basis of that membership alone.

Tribal stigma can be referred to as *collective deviance*. Collective deviance is a form of categorical thinking, acting, and reacting that constitutes a typification of *any and all* persons to whom the tribal label applies. Here, deviance is a quality possessed not by an individual but by an entire collectivity. A person is regarded as a deviant because, in certain social circles or categories of humanity, it is stigmatizing to belong to a particular tribal category. One is *tainted* by one's categorical membership and this taint translates into stigmatizing treatment by members of one or more other tribal categories: hostility, censure, condemnation, discrimination, stereotyping, ridicule, scorn, social isolation, and/or punishment.

The term “racism” has been applied to describe collective deviance, but racism is a narrower concept than collective deviance. As it is currently used, racism implies a distinct power differential, a substantial measure of hegemony, and a focus on a category of humanity with genetic, or presumed genetic, characteristics. In contrast, tribal stigma does not necessitate a

power dominance of one category over another, does not imply that one category's definitions of reality prevail over the other's, and encompasses race, ethnicity, national background, as well as religious membership (as analytically distinct from religious beliefs per se). It must be emphasized that collective deviance is not a one-sided affair. Indeed, within a particular tribal – that is, racial, ethnic, national, or religious – category, possession of the very trait regarded as normal and acceptable is, outside that category, stigmatizing, and vice versa. This divergent and situationally specific definition of acceptable tribal characteristics implies *mutual deviantization* (Aho 1994: 64), in which members of opposing tribal categories regard members of the other one as deviant.

Hence, among militant Muslims and Arabs, especially militant Palestinians, it is anathema to be an Israeli; among militant Israelis, it is anathema to be a Muslim and an Arab. Among militant, nationalist Indian Hindus, Muslims are considered undesirables; among militant Indian (and Kashmiri) Muslims, Hindus are considered undesirables. Similarly, during periods of violent conflict, in Northern Ireland, Catholics and Protestants; in Rwanda, Hutus and Tutsis; in Bosnia, Catholic Serbs and Muslims, have demonized one another. Collective deviance – and its frequent accompaniment, mutual deviantization – have been significant facts of life in many regions of the world during a major swathe of human history.

Of course, many instances of collective deviance take place in a setting in which the dominant category holds so much power that mutual deviantization cannot take place. For instance, the Jews in Nazi Germany and, during World War II, in most of Europe were stigmatized, demonized, verminized, persecuted, and murdered. But the reverse did not take place; Jews did not persecute non-Jewish Germans. The same applies to African American slaves versus whites prior to the Civil War, and North American Indians versus whites prior to the twentieth century. In these cases, deviantization was entirely, or almost entirely, one-sided. Mutual deviantization takes place only when competing tribal categories are capable of marshaling political, economic, and cultural capital against one another. When such disparities are so lopsided that the less powerful

category cannot inhabit or control deviance-defining contexts, mutual deviantization cannot effectively take place.

Throughout recorded history, members of one racial, ethnic, national, and religious category have stigmatized, deviantized, and demonized members of another category because of the category to which they belonged. To the person applying this evaluation, every person in the collective belongs to an inferiorized category and, hence, deserves to be treated as less than human. Any full and complete exploration of deviance must consider Goffman's "tribal stigma of race, nation, and religion" – in short, *collective deviance*. "Collective" means that one is automatically discredited as a consequence of belonging to a racial, ethnic, national, or religious category of humanity. With respect to the dynamics of stigma, deviance, condemnation, and inferiorization, collective deviance plays as central a role as individual behavior, which has been the almost exclusive focus of research on deviance.

SEE ALSO: Body, Abominations of the; Deviance; Deviance, Constructionist Perspectives; Goffman, Erving; Labeling; Labeling Theory; Race; Race (Racism); Sociocultural Relativism; Stigma

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collective efficacy and crime

Ruth Triplett

As described by Sampson et al. in 1997, collective efficacy describes a neighborhood level process that is important to understanding variation in crime rates across neighborhoods.

Collective efficacy involves both the willingness of individuals in a neighborhood to work together toward a common goal, such as crime control, and mutual trust. Since the discussion of collective efficacy in the initial publication in 1997, collective efficacy has been an important new addition to criminology's understanding of the causes of crime across neighborhoods.

Interest in neighborhoods and crime comes from the long recognized fact that there is substantial variation in crime rates across cities and neighborhoods within cities. Explaining this fact was key to the work of early theorists in the Chicago School, in particular Shaw and McKay. Examining crime rates in the city of Chicago, Shaw and McKay found two facts: crime rates vary substantially across areas of the city, and over time crime rates remain stable in areas. Building on the work of Park and Burgess, Shaw and McKay argued that social disorganization is the cause of the variation in neighborhood crime rates. Though not clearly defined by Shaw and McKay, social disorganization was defined by later theorists as revolving around the inability of individuals in a neighborhood to agree upon and work toward a common goal. Social disorganization was theorized to result from neighborhood structural characteristics such as poverty, racial/ethnic heterogeneity, and high rates of mobility. Shaw and McKay then used the idea of cultural transmission to explain the stability of crime rates. Their belief was that the gangs that developed in certain neighborhoods passed down their culture, assuring stability in crime rates.

Until the 1960s, the theory of social disorganization was a dominant one in criminology. Interest waned, however, as theoretical difficulties emerged and tests of the theory became problematic. It was not until the 1980s that new attention to neighborhoods and crime reemerged in a number of works. One particularly important aspect of these new works was the interest in explaining just what it was that led many neighborhoods characterized by poverty, racial/ethnic heterogeneity, and high mobility to have high crime rates.

Perhaps the most innovative of these new works was Sampson et al.'s (1997) ideas on collective efficacy. With collective efficacy, they focused attention on what makes neighborhoods

effective at social control. Sampson and his colleagues ask us to consider three sets of factors important in explaining variation in levels of collective efficacy. The first is the effect of a highly mobile population. As with early social disorganization theorists, Sampson and his colleagues recognize the harm to social ties that occurs when people move in and out of neighborhoods at a rapid rate. A second factor they identify is the pattern of racial and economic segregation by neighborhood that stills persists in the US. Finally, Sampson et al. see as key to understanding levels of collective efficacy the results of this economic and racial segregation, which they identify as alienation, powerlessness, and dependency. The result of all three of these factors is to lower the level of collective efficacy – the trust neighbors have in one another and their willingness to work together as a neighborhood. This has the direct effect of increasing levels of crime.

Since the publication by Sampson et al. in 1997, research on collective efficacy has found support for its importance in understanding neighborhood violent crime rates. In their initial article, Sampson and his colleagues found support for their predictions that neighborhood structural characteristics such as poverty, racial/ethnic makeup, and mobility decrease collective efficacy, and that collective efficacy significantly affects neighborhood crime rates. Others have found a significant relationship between collective efficacy and intimate violence (Browning 2002) and perceptions of collective efficacy and crime.

SEE ALSO: Collective Action; Crime; Criminology; Social Disorganization Theory

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collective identity

Owen Whooley

Within social movement theory, collective identity refers to the shared definition of a group that derives from its members' common interests, experiences, and solidarities. It is the social movement's answer to who we are, locating the movement within a field of political actors. Collective identity is neither fixed nor innate, but rather emerges through struggle as different political actors, including the movement, interact and react to each other. The salience of any given collective identity affects the mobilization, trajectory, and even impacts of social movements. Consequently, collective identity has become a central concept in the study of social movements.

The concept of collective identity emerged in the 1980s in Europe within new social movement (NSM) theory. Most locate its origin in the work of Alberto Melucci (1995). After the 1960s, Europe witnessed an increase in movements espousing post-materialist programs. These "new social movements" focused on questions of identity, originated largely from the middle class, politicized everyday life, and carried out their struggle through cultural and symbolic means. Scholars of new social movements felt that the dominant European paradigms, based on models drawn from materialist movements, offered little conceptual insight into these "new" movements and reoriented the field toward more cultural issues. Believing these differences to be fundamental, European scholars embedded their analysis within a macrohistorical framework that viewed the

"new" movements as the paradigmatic movements of the epoch.

While the historical claim of NSM is controversial, it has made an important contribution to social movement theory by opening up new venues of research. The concepts like collective identity derived from NSM now permeate throughout the field of social movement research. Researchers, dissatisfied by what they believed to be the overly structural depiction of social movements offered by the dominant resource mobilization and political process theories, adopted concepts from new social movement theory, like collective identity, to bring the cultural back into the study of social movements. As a concept, collective identity is now widely accepted within social movement research and is used by researchers from a variety of theoretical backgrounds. Researchers acknowledge the relevance of collective identity not only for "new" social movements, but also for a variety of movements, both "old" and "new."

Collective identity is not predetermined. Political actors do not share a *de facto* identity as a result of their common structural position. Rather, identity emerges through various processes in which movement actors instill it with significance, relevance, and form. The three major processes through which movements construct an identity are (1) the establishment of boundaries, (2) negotiation, and (3) the development of consciousness. In boundary making, social movements create new group values and structures that delineate who they are in relation to other political actors. In negotiation, movements engage with other political actors, continually enacting their shared identity and working to influence symbolic meanings. Finally, the development of consciousness imbues the collective identity with a larger purpose by embedding it within an ideological framework that assigns blame for the injustice against which the movement is mobilized.

Collective identity, therefore, becomes manifest in the day to day activities of the social movement. Movements not only have a collective identity, they also act in accordance with that identity. The line between "being" and "doing" is blurred. The various activities in which a movement engages mold and form its collective identity through the enacting of that

identity. Identity practices include the making of demands, framing/ideology, culture, leadership, organizational structure, and support resources. A movement's demands reflect its shared identity, for these demands address the grievances of the group as a group. For example, the American Indian Movement made demands in the name of the Native American constituency that it represented. In framing an issue, a social movement defines an injustice, attributes this injustice to its opponents, and defines its collective response to this injustice, establishing the field of relevant actors in a given struggle. A movement's culture also reflects its identity in that activists create a cultural space that resonates with the more general identity of its constituents. The Civil Rights Movement developed an internal movement culture that drew heavily from the black church in order to provide a familiar space for its members. Similarly, a movement chooses its leaders and organizational structures, allocating power and decision making capacities within the movement in accordance with its collective identity. Finally, the outside resources that the movement solicits give an implicit message as to whom the struggle is for and who its allies are.

Social movement scholars have appealed to the concept of collective identity to bring insight into some of the persistently puzzling issues in social movement theory. A movement's collective identity plays a significant role throughout the course of the movement and, in turn, allows social movement theorists to appeal to it for a variety of explanatory purposes. In explaining the emergence of a movement, identity unites disparate individuals into a cohesive unit by providing a common framework and fostering group solidarity. During recruitment, a strong, salient identity can overcome the free rider problem by compelling individuals to join the movement even if they could receive its benefits without participating. Identity also informs the choice of tactics, adding more sophistication to the rational choice theoretical models by acknowledging an influence on strategic choices beyond merely pragmatic concerns. Finally, the success or failure of a movement in achieving recognition of identity as legitimate adds further insight into the more general impact of a movement.

The work on collective identity is not without its problems and internal conflicts. Because of its relative novelty, there has been some inconsistency within social movement research as to how the concept of collective identity has been employed. Scholars with a more structural orientation tend to apply it as an add on to their models, defining it narrowly and relegating it to the periphery of the analysis. Researchers with a more cultural, constructionist orientation define identity widely, attributing nearly every aspect of a movement to its identity. In addition to the different theoretical weight attributed to collective identity, there is also a division between scholars who define identity as constructed, fluid, and dynamic and those who define it in a more reifying and static way. Currently, researchers are attempting to solve these inconsistencies by looking at the relationship between collective identity and other dominant concepts in social movement theory, like opportunities. The most promising direction appears to be finding a middle ground between these various extremes, acknowledging the importance of collective identity without overstating it and recognizing its simultaneously constructed and structurally rooted origins.

Collective identity also faces an empirical challenge from movements that approach the issue of identity in complex and creative ways. While scholars of collective identity have tended to ascribe a single identity to a single movement, many movements face a conflicting set of identities among their members and must attempt to build solidarity *across* these multiple identities. Negotiating these conflicting identities can be a complicated, conflict ridden process, as exclusion and fracture inevitably are involved in the construction of identity across multiple systems of domination. In addressing these cases, researchers are beginning to draw upon the concept of intersectionality from the ories on race. Intersectionality recognizes that various systems of oppression cannot simply be added onto one another, but rather interact in complicated ways. In addition to the complexity of movements with multiple identities, collective identity scholars also need to develop the theoretical sophistication to account for movements that seek to deconstruct identity. There seems to be an implicit assumption within collective identity research that a strong

identity has a positive effect on movements by encouraging solidarity. However, some social movements, like the lesbian, gay, bisexual, and transgender (LGBT) movement, attempt to deconstruct oppressive identities and recognize the problematic and often oppressive nature of identities. A dilemma exists within these movements of whether to embrace an identity that has been historically oppressive but could form the basis of cohesion or to deconstruct this identity, possibly risking the mobilizing capacity it brings. Collective identity theory must develop the sophistication to address this issue.

The trend in research on collective identity seems to be moving in three related directions to overcome some of these problems. First, there has been a move to incorporate insights from within social movement theory, such as political opportunity structure and collective action frames, and from outside the field, such as the concept of intersectionality. Bringing together these disparate concepts adds a degree of sophistication to the models of collective identity and possibly synthesis within the field in general. Secondly, social movement scholars are beginning to address the paucity of social movement research that examines the relationship between the individual and the collective. Presently, there are few individual level analyses of social movements. Collective identity offers a potentially rich solution to this problem by illuminating how individual members come to fuse their identities with that of the collective. Finally, collective identity will increasingly face challenges from movements like LGBT that adopt a creative approach to identity. Researchers must revise their understanding of collective identity to meet the challenges presented by these movements.

SEE ALSO: Culture, Social Movements and; Framing and Social Movements; Identity Politics/Relational Politics; Intersectionality; New Social Movement Theory; Social Movements

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collective memory

Barry Schwartz

Collective memory refers to the distribution throughout society of beliefs, feelings, moral judgments, and knowledge about the past. Only individuals possess the capacity to contemplate the past, but this does not mean that beliefs originate in the individual alone or can be explained on the basis of his or her unique experience. Individuals do not know the past singly; they know it with and against other individuals situated in conflicting groups, in the context of alienation, and through the knowledge that predecessors and contemporaries transmit to them.

History and commemoration are the vehicles of collective memory. At the formal level, history includes research monographs and text books; at the popular level, magazines, newspapers, television, and film; at the informal level, conversations, letters, and diaries.

Commemoration consists of monuments, shrines, relics, statues, paintings, prints, photographs, ritual observances and hagiography (eulogy and ritual oratory). Since historical and commemorative objects are transmissible, cumulative, and interpreted differently from one group to another, they exert influence in ways difficult to understand solely in terms of their producers' convictions and characteristics.

Historians and commemorative agents perform different functions. Historians seek to enlighten by revealing causes and consequences of chronologically ordered events. Commemorative agents seek to define moral significance by marking events and actors that embody collective ideals. Historians describe events in all their complexity and ambiguity; commemorative agents simplify events as they convert them into objects of moral instruction. On the other hand, history and commemoration are interdependent: just as history reflects the values and sentiments that commemoration sustains, commemoration is rooted in historical knowledge.

At the turn of the twentieth century, many scholars wrote about the social context of history and commemoration, but Maurice Halbwachs's pioneering work made it a separate research field. That Halbwachs worked on collective memory while Karl Mannheim wrote his classic essays on the sociology of knowledge is no coincidence. The sociology of memory, like the sociology of knowledge, arose during the era of post World War I disillusionment and flourishes in societies where cultural values no longer unify, where people have already become alienated from common values, and separate communities regard one another distrustfully. The sociology of memory, like the sociology of knowledge, represents the erosion of dominant symbols.

Between 1945, the year of his execution by the SS, and the early 1980s, sociologists ignored Halbwachs's work. After 1980, however, Halbwachs was cited time and again, even though his two major books, *The Social Frames of Memory* (1925) and *The Legendary Topography of the Gospels in the Holy Land* (1941), had not been translated from their original French. Halbwachs's discoveries did not cause the current wave of collective memory research; they were rather swept into it.

Since the 1980s, collective memory scholars have worked on and debated six sets of basic issues: *history and commemoration* (how historical events furnish the stuff of commemoration and how commemorative symbolism, in turn, defines historical significance); *enterprise and reception* (who produces commemorative symbolism and why their products are sometimes accepted, sometimes rejected); *consensus and conflict* (which beliefs about the past are shared; which beliefs, polarizing); *retrieval and construction* (how historical documentation limits the range of historical constructions); *mirroring and modeling* (the degree to which collective memory shapes and reflects reality); *continuity and change* (how collective memory's malleability is superimposed upon its durable structures). As many scholars addressed these issues in terms of power relations and hegemony, collective memory's traditional articulations of virtue, honor, and heroism began to appear as elite "mystification." Newly favored topics included the commemoration of victims, diversity, unpopular wars, and ignoble events. Holocaust and slavery topics abounded. This pattern accompanied two late twentieth century trends: multiculturalism, which recognized minorities' dignity and entitlements, and postmodernism, which documented the erosion of tradition and the individual's declining identification with the past. Multicultural and postmodern influence is evident in the continuing debunking of history and a growing body of research on ritual apologies, the "politics of regret," negative commemoration (e.g., museums and monuments for the victims of oppression and atrocity), and discrediting of the great legends and myths that once linked men and women to the dominant symbols of their cultural tradition.

Despite multicultural and postmodern influence, collective memory has remained centered, at the popular level, on traditional (heroic) contents. Also, new perspectives emerged in the late 1990s and early 2000s: (1) appreciation of objective properties that limit what can be done with the past interpretively; (2) a keener sense of the past as a lost source of moral direction, inspiration, and consolation; (3) individual beliefs, once inferred from historical and commemorative materials, are assessed directly within the sociology of cognition, psychology,

and, most prominently, through sample survey methods; and (4) models of collective memory are formulated in an increasingly active voice, depicting individuals dialogically reinforcing and modifying the historical texts and commemorative symbols they consume.

The units, trends, and issues of collective memory that show up so clearly in the analyses of communities and nations appear also in the fields of family, organizations, institutions, and communities. Within each field, however, recent claims of collective memory scholarship begin to ring hollow. "Demystifying" the past is a vital program as long as there is something to be mystified, some injustice or atrocity to be concealed. In every culture and in every age we see exclusion and bias, but as the work of civil rights, multiculturalism, and inclusion continues, it becomes more difficult to squeeze out insights from their analysis. How new realities will affect collective memory's program remains for the next generation of scholars to determine.

SEE ALSO: Collective Memory (Social Change); Culture; Halbwachs, Maurice; Knowledge, Sociology of; Tradition

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collective memory (social change)

Bridget Fowler

A group's or nation's collective memory is constituted by its images, concepts, and evaluations of the past. Although memory is only possessed and transmitted by individuals, it is shaped by group relationships. Individuals share their recollections with members of their group and rationally reorganize their stories of the past in accordance with others' understandings of events (Coser 1992: 43).

Collective memory is important because the removal of a group from authority means eradicating its remembered significance within a nation's past activities, not least that nation's most serious or sacred acts (Connerton 1989). Great political dangers lie in such organized forgetting. If the systematic rewriting of history is still largely a dystopian Orwellian future, the active obscuring from historical view of groups such as Tutsis or gypsies has been common place. Given privileged access to contemporary media, dominant classes possess unparalleled capacities to marginalize the Other and to redescribe the character of their past.

A familiar dichotomy attributes collective memory to preliterate and traditional societies, while modern societies possess "history." It is certainly true that certain diasporic groups such as the Jews – "the people of memory" – relied almost entirely on oral collective memory to transmit their ethics and their past (Nora 1996–8 I: 3). Yet subordinate classes in capitalist modernity have also possessed their own distinctive collective memory, as in the case of the crafts in the Glasgow Trades Hall. Here, nineteenth century frescoes portray each collective craft group, while on gold inscribed walls are recorded successive craft officials, from the medieval city to the present.

Yet if collective memory is the possession of all adults, in modernity it takes a progressively fragmented and weakened form. It is increasingly relegated to those institutional places that Nora has entitled "the realms of memory." In turn, history, the specialized intellectual and

critical production of historians, has now become more widespread and more authoritative.

Recent social theory has stressed the importance of consecrated or canonized cultural works and of the active social processes by which a person is attributed with a "name," thus preserving their works for the future. This is another important form of collective memory. Indeed, Bourdieu (1984) has pointed out that the fruits of such social or cultural distinction are not simply symbolic rewards, but that they allow some to have a different relationship to death. The remembrance of the Great through statues, monuments, anthologies, and portraits offers "eternal life." Those who make a mark on posterity have produced the works which sustain collective memory in the future. Cultural memory commonly passes through secular rituals, such as the doctoral induction or the award of state honors. By such means, individuals are selected by an institution, even one which they may themselves reject. Their singular world vision ceases to appear iconoclastic and becomes part of the communal, sanctified discourse of that society, thus cheating death.

The major architects of the theory of collective memory are Maurice Halbwachs and Walter Benjamin. Halbwachs's interwar writings take up some elements of Bergson's theories, not least his dynamic notion of memory, which functions like an electric circuit or telephone exchange. Bergson, however, still postulated purely individual representations, including memory images. It was Halbwachs who developed the Durkheimian concept of collective representations for the terrain of memory. In Durkheim's conception, collective representations were distinguished by their obligatory nature, their multiple images of the Great, and by being learnt off by heart. Yet it is important to note that such collective consciousness for Durkheim did not preclude rational representations, including those developed by modern scientific institutions. Halbwachs in this respect did not differ. However, his key point was that we need the social frameworks of time, space, and number for remembering. The absence of such group supplied frameworks explains the reasons why we do not recall our dreams, for the latter deal with our purely individual needs.

Halbwachs argued that memory is reactivated through encounters with places – hence his interest in the sacred topography that emerged in the Holy Land after Jesus's death, in the form of sites of pilgrimage. In the modern metropolis, too, memory sites are crucial, so that a city like London can be crisscrossed by different groups, each having a past commemorated through different buildings or statues. Here, occupational groups such as painters, novelists, and architects have their own collective memories, directing their gaze through a landscape of monuments. Occupational groups' memories are not, however, restricted to places: they develop their own distinct memory via other techniques, such as musical notation and specialized conversation (Halbwachs 1997: 29). The collective memory of the right performance is also learnt by the body; indeed, the body becomes for Halbwachs – and for Bourdieu – a *pense bête*, or memory pad.

Halbwachs elaborated on these ideas in relation to various forms of the social, from family traditions, to churches and social classes. He was particularly interested in the regulating processes that created unity within the group, including religious groups' use of dogma to create definitive assessments of the past and the nobility's presupposition that its particular history was identical with the national past. Nor did Halbwachs neglect the division between the dominants and the dominated – as a child he had been given quite different memories of the Paris Commune from his parents and the family servants. Later, he was to write of one other current of the dominated's memory: the collective memory of the cooperative movement, a distinctive invention of the modern working class.

Halbwachs saw memory as dynamic and constantly reconstructed, its peculiar selection of materials being developed in relation to the practical needs of each contemporary group. Yet this theoretical conception has been subsequently disputed, as has his view that history and collective memory are radically differentiated. It is collective memory that carries us "midstream," he argued, while history occurs on "the banks of the river," as the more precise and rigorous assessment of empirical data. This conception of history has been attacked

as positivist, while his conception of collective memory has been stigmatized as Romantic and organicist (Osiel 1997).

It is fruitful to consider Walter Benjamin in this light as well. There are three main reasons why he should be understood in this way. First, like Halbwachs, he places major weight on the role of narrative in collective memory, as the preeminent way of recalling to mind the ancestors and defining moments of the group. Unlike Halbwachs, he focuses on the antithesis between the stories told by traditional village tellers of tales and the stories told in newspapers or novels in the capitalist metropolis, which lacked any authentic connection with their readers' perspectives. The ancient, story-telling form of collective memory had, in his view, survived neither the shock of World War I's mass slaughter nor the subsequent loss of money values with the Europe-wide inflation.

For Benjamin, secondly, addressing the "phantasmagoric" consumer cultures of European capitals, such as Berlin or Paris, could attain access to urban collective memory. This requires a practiced technique of social archeology to excavate and reveal the cities' transformations of social relationships. Such archeological methods could highlight the distinctive character of modern society, including the social relations like fashion in which the commodity had been embedded and the charging of commodities themselves with the weight possessed by religious symbols in an earlier period.

Thirdly, Benjamin considers the canon of cultural works – the "bourgeois literary apparatus" – as one form of contemporary collective memory. He is persuasive in identifying the new "magic" of the individual artist's signature and the role of museum curators or critics in the crucial decisions about museum selections and classic editions. Yet he is also attentive to the dangerous narrowness of such a bourgeois canon, not least its dismissal of popular culture, the celebration only of works that were "affirmative," as in Germany after 1933, and the marginalization of anonymous works, such as Chinese pottery.

There are profoundly problematic elements in the theory of collective memory, particularly in the debate around Halbwachs's thought.

For, at the end of his *Social Frameworks of Memory*, Halbwachs noted the increasing anomie of memory within capitalism, a theme which he elaborated in *The Collective Memory* as rival "currents of thought." From the dove-tailed and reinforced collective memories of traditional societies, memories have now become more differentiated and more conflict-ridden.

Halbwachs's notion of collective memory as infinitely malleable in relation to present group needs – his "presentism" – has been challenged by studies of American leaders (Schwartz 1990). Even given changing "structures of feeling," Schwartz has shown that not everything is alterable. To take an example, Abraham Lincoln had initially provoked a stereotype of being a "homely man of the people," being characterized at his assassination in 1865 as weak and indecisive. Yet by 1908, divested of this weakness, he had become the visionary leader who fitted the new ethos of a democratic America. Some continuity remained: in 1908, as in 1922, the Lincoln cult honored the collective remembrance that he came from the people, but now subtly omitted the earlier critical censure.

Halbwachs has been accused of retaining a concept of collective memory too close to the dominant class. This is not ultimately persuasive, given his description of the dominated's memory of the Commune, already cited. Nevertheless, following the practices of Foucault and oral historians, it is necessary to differentiate analytically between the dominants' memory, popular memory, and counter-memory. Moreover, in some regions, ideas of the past have been so dangerous and confusing that social memory as a whole has become stunted: "We did not find a common collective memory [about the 1930s famine] in the [Russian] Kuban" concludes one study (Khubova et al. 1992). Contemporary Russia may turn out to be unique, the degree zero of collective memory. Nevertheless, Nora (1996–8) has also pointed to a further form of "alienated memory": the bewildering array of collective memories and histories in the West. He graphically entitles this "era of commemoration" one of "commemorative bulimia."

The main controversy over Halbwachs is whether he was a Burkean or Romantic thinker:

he has been claimed to have a conception of memory that revealed an affinity for organicism or even the regressive reconstructions of a patriarchal *Gemeinschaft*. One such critic, Osiel, arguably fails to sustain his charge. For not only does Halbwachs's notion of collective memory stress the rationality of revising individuals' recollections in the light of others, but Halbwachs himself recognized the increasing differentiation of modern collective memory and hence the diminution of its unifying elements.

Osiel's own contribution to the study of collective memory, building on Halbwachs, is nevertheless outstanding. Using historical studies of "liberal show trials" he critiques those western relativists who deny both the value of witnessing (remembering under oath) and the legal procedures for resolving contests over memory. In post conflict situations like the trial of Vichy collaborators or the trial of the Generals after the Argentinian dirty war, it is socially unacceptable, Osiel has argued, "to let a thousand ideological flowers bloom." While accepting that there will still be the need for a "Brechtian resolution" of different *private* truths, such trials create a *public consensus* about which witnesses have been more plausible. Collective memory has thus been reestablished, placed on a firmer and more rational foundation.

It is perhaps no coincidence that the phenomenologist Paul Ricoeur has also turned to the Halbwachian/Bourdieuian conception of collective memory in this context. He, too, sees important limits to nihilistic pessimism as to the variability of constructions of the past (Ricoeur 2004). Ricoeur applies the notion of ideology to the vulnerability of collective memory. Thus he suggests that the equivalent of individual blocked memory or manipulated memory is, on the political plane, "memory abusively summoned." In other words, power elites, with interests in mystification, corrosively distort memory of the past. This can result in the forgetting of a whole dimension of a society's life, such as the institutionalized anti-Semitism and anti feminism of the Vichy regime in France or the crimes of apartheid in South Africa. Subsequently, history, the alternative to liberal show trials, may regain a crucial role in correcting, disabusing, and extending collective memory within such societies.

SEE ALSO: Art Worlds; Benjamin, Walter; Collective Memory; Collective Trauma; Habitus/Field; Halbwachs, Maurice

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collective trauma

Piotr Sztompka

Social change may have adverse effects, bring shocks and wounds to the social and cultural tissue. This is true even if the changes are beneficial, expected, and defined as a victory by the people. The forerunner of this idea was Durkheim, who coined the famous notion of the "anomie of success."

Traumatogenic change exhibits four traits. First, it is sudden, occurring within a span of time that is relatively short for a given kind

of process. For example, a revolution is rapid relative to historical time (even when it takes weeks or months) and a collapse of the market is sudden relative to long range economic change.

Second, traumatogenic change is usually comprehensive, either in the sense that it touches many aspects of social life or that it affects many actors and many actions. Revolution is a good example of traumatogenic social change because it usually embraces not only the political domain, but also the law, economy, morality, culture, art, even language, and it affects the fate of many groups, if not all the population.

Third, traumatogenic change is marked by specific content, either in the sense that it is radical, deep, and fundamental (i.e., it touches the core aspects of social life or personal fate) or that it affects universal experiences, whether public or private. For example, a shift in dominant values, a transfer of power, or an overturning of prestige hierarchies changes the very constitution of society, whereas a rise in crime, corruption, or pollution degrades the context of everyday life and threatens the immediate lifeworld of every societal member.

Fourth, traumatogenic change is faced with disbelief, as it is unexpected, surprising, shocking. A devaluation of a currency, a collapse of a market, and a *coup d'état* are good examples.

It is important to distinguish mass traumas from truly collective (social) traumas. Mass events produce consequences for a number of people simultaneously – a hurricane leaving thousands homeless, an epidemic affecting large segments of a population, an economic crisis resulting in massive unemployment. When such disasters hit, the victims face them alone at first, as a multitude of private disasters. The trauma is not yet shared; it is suffered side by side with others, but not yet *together* with others.

Truly collective traumas, as distinct from massive traumas, appear only when people start to be aware of a common plight, perceive the similarity of their situation with that of others, and define it as shared. They start to talk about it, exchange observations and experiences, gossip and rumors, formulate diagnoses and myths, identify causes or villains, look for conspiracies, decide to do something about it, envisage

copied methods. They debate and perhaps even quarrel and fight among themselves about all this. Such debates reach the public arena, are taken up by the media, and are expressed in literature, arts, the movies, etc. The whole “meaning industry” is full of rich narratives focusing on giving sense to common and shared occurrences. It is then that the expression of trauma may go beyond the subjective, symbolic, or ideal level and acquire more tangible social forms: intense interaction, outbursts of protest, forming of groups, collective mobilization, and creating social movements, associations, organizations, and political parties. Traumatogenic changes become “societal facts *sui generis*” in the sense given to this term by Durkheim.

There are various domains that can be touched by traumatogenic change. One is the biological substratum of a society, the population. The extreme consequence of a traumatogenic change may be the extermination of societal members. Wars, famines, and epidemics provide numerous tragic examples. Slightly less extreme is a decay of the biological fitness of the population, marked by such indicators as the level of childbirth, death, life expectancy, suicide rates, frequency of diseases, mental disorders, etc. An early example of such a perspective is Pitirim Sorokin's *Sociology of Revolution* (1928), which analyzed in detail the disastrous impact of the Bolshevik revolution on the biological capacity of Russian people.

We reach a truly sociological level of analysis when we turn to structural traumas, affecting social organization: social networks, configurations of groups, associations, and formal organizations, the hierarchies of stratification, class divisions, etc. A forerunner to such a perspective was Ferdinand Toennies's analysis of decaying *Gemeinschaft* (community) and emerging *Gesellschaft* (modern society), followed by rich research on the collapse of communities under the impact of industrialization and urbanization. Another line of research focused on the atomization and individualization of social life, grasped best by David Riesman's memorable term, the “lonely crowd.” There is a rich tradition of studies which show the impact of technological inventions on the organization of labor. Recently, much attention has been paid to the destructive effects of autocratic regimes on the organization of civil society.

There is one more domain that can be affected by traumatogenic change. This is culture: the axionormative and symbolic belief systems of a society. The shock of change may reverberate in the area of affirmed values and norms, patterns and rules, expectations and roles, accepted ideas and beliefs, narrative forms and symbolic meanings, definitions of situations, and frames of discourse. The forerunner of this perspective was again Durkheim, with his notion of anomie or normative chaos, rephrased fruitfully by Merton (1996a). Thomas and Znaniecki's (1974) monumental study documented the plight of emigrants who found themselves in a cultural environment entirely at odds with their earlier lifeworld, opposed to deeply ingrained and accustomed habits of thinking and doing.

In the twentieth and twenty first centuries a large pool of changes has become potentially traumatogenic (i.e., sudden, comprehensive, fundamental, and unexpected). One source of cultural trauma is intensifying intercultural contact and confrontation of diverse cultures, often resulting in tensions and conflict. The most traumatizing situations occur when the imposition and domination of one culture is secured by force. Imperial conquest, colonialism, and religious proselytizing provide prime examples. But even when the spreading of an alien culture is more peaceful (by virtue of economic strength, technological superiority or the psychological attractiveness of cultural products flowing from the core toward the periphery), the result often disrupts the cultural stability, continuity, and identity of indigenous groups. Another source of cultural trauma is the intensifying spatial mobility of people, who as emigrants and refugees, but also as business travelers and tourists, find themselves in an alien culture.

The third source of cultural trauma is a change of fundamental institutions or regimes (e.g., basic political and economic reforms carried out in societies lacking the requisite cultural background, the ingrained competence to deal with new institutions, or even more gravely when new cultural imperatives fitting the reformed institutions run counter to established cultural habits and traditions). Similar effects may be produced by new technological inventions, which require specific skills, care,

and discipline from users, and when all these are absent. Another case is the transformation from rural to urban and a lack of preparedness for the new lifeworld. In all these cases cultural trauma results from the processes of modernization or its components: industrialization, democratization, technological progress, urbanization, new risks, etc. The traumatizing effect is strongest when modernization is imposed, rather than originating from within as an indigenous development. But even when a change of regime originates from below and realizes the aspirations of the people, it inevitably engenders some form of cultural trauma, as it clashes with deeply embedded, thoroughly internalized earlier "habits of the heart" (to use Alexis de Tocqueville's phrase), which create, at least temporarily, "civilizational incompetence" (Sztompka 1993) to follow the cultural imperatives of the new system.

The fourth source of traumatogenic change is located at the level of beliefs, creeds, doctrines, and ideologies. Changes of ideas may take various forms. One is the acquisition of new knowledge, which may shatter established convictions and stereotypes. Thus, news about the Holocaust which emerged fully at the end of World War II produced a traumatic shock accompanied by guilt feelings among anti-Semitic groups in the US (Alexander et al. 2004). Another instance is the revision of established historical accounts, destroying cherished myths about the past. For example, new perspectives on the French Revolution show it to be much less heroic and much more bloody; the discovery of America is seen as simultaneous with the extermination of its native peoples; the whole history of the USSR is rewritten, revealing terror and extermination rather than a workers' paradise. Still another case is the appearance of new ideas which may raise the sensitiveness or modify perceptions of otherwise well known facts. For example, the birth of ecological awareness, feminist consciousness, and the concept of universal human rights makes everybody view the conquest of nature, gender oppression, and other inequalities and injustices in a completely new light. In all these cases the clash of old and new beliefs produces at the cultural level a phenomenon akin to cognitive dissonance – the emotional disturbance caused by the incongruence

of recently acquired information with deeply held convictions.

Cultural disorganization and accompanying disorientation are necessary but not sufficient conditions for a full fledged trauma to emerge. At most, they create a raised sensitiveness among people to all adverse experiences or information, facilitating a climate of anxiety and uncertainty. Against this background there must also appear a set of conditions or situations, perceived as pernicious, dangerous, or threatening. It is these that serve as the triggering, precipitating factors for the emergence of trauma. Most often, these conditions or situations are brought about by the same major change that caused cultural disorganization. They may be a direct result of certain policies or reforms undertaken by the government in the aftermath of revolutionary upheaval, for example. Or they may derive from some more general, global tendencies in the wider environment of a society. Some of them are more universal, affecting everybody (e.g., inflation, crime), others are more particular, affecting only some segments of the population (e.g., unemployment, status degradation). Against the background of cultural disorientation – a condition that makes people more sensitive and anxious – such events or situations may engender a traumatic syndrome. But before they do, there is a stage of cultural labeling, framing and redefining.

Trauma, like many other social conditions, is at the same time objective and subjective: it is usually based in actual phenomena, but it does not exist as long as they are not made visible and defined in a particular way. Such defining, framing, and interpretive efforts do not occur in a vacuum: there is always a preexisting pool of available meanings encoded in the shared culture of a given community or society. Individual people do not invent meanings, but rather draw selectively from their surrounding culture and apply them to potentially traumatizing events. Hence, traumatizing conditions or situations are always cultural constructions. There may be traumas which are not rooted in any real traumatizing conditions or situations, but only in the widespread imagining of such events. Moral panics (Thompson 1998) ensue when threats, dangers, or traumas are defined in a highly exaggerated manner. But

the opposite is also possible: events or situations with objectively strong traumatizing potential may not lead to actual trauma because they are explained away, rationalized, or reinterpreted in ways which make them invisible, innocuous, or even benign or beneficial.

Cultural traumas generated by major social change and triggered by traumatizing conditions and situations interpreted as threatening, unjust, or improper are expressed as complex social moods, characterized by a number of collective emotions, orientations, and attitudes. First, there is a general climate of anxiety, insecurity, and uncertainty (Wilkinson 2001). Second, there is a prevailing syndrome of distrust, both toward people and institutions (Sztompka 1999). Third, there is disorientation concerning collective identity. Fourth, there is widespread apathy, passivism, and helplessness. Fifth, there is pessimism concerning the future, matched with nostalgic images of the past. Of course, not all these symptoms accompany every case of trauma, and not all these symptoms are equally manifested by various groups or subgroups within a society. For every traumatogenic change there are some core groups which may experience and perceive it strongly, and peripheral groups for whom it is irrelevant or marginal. Some groups, due to their structural and cultural location, are more insulated and some are more susceptible to the impact of traumatogenic change. One may theorize about the factors responsible for the differences among various groups in their susceptibility to trauma. Crucial variables may include access to various resources – cultural, social, economic, and political capital – helpful in perceiving, defining, and actively facing traumas. On the cultural side, the key factor seems to be education. On the one hand, the higher their level of education, the more perceptive and more sensitive to cultural traumas people become. On the other hand, they are better equipped to express and fight trauma. No wonder that some more subtle and hidden traumas have been perceived, diagnosed, and opposed firstly by intellectuals, philosophers, and social scientists, who have provided ready made definitions and symbolic frames for other people to pick up. Usually, more educated groups also have better skills for actively coping with cultural trauma. But other

kinds of cultural capital, apart from education, may also play a part. For those kinds of trauma that originate in a cultural clash or multiculturalism, a tolerant, relativistic, cosmopolitan orientation – as opposed to ethnocentrism or dogmatism – will allow people to cope better.

In the realm of social capital there is the factor known as social rootedness, or extensive personal contacts. To illustrate, in studies of post communist societies it was observed that those who have rich social networks of acquaintances, numerous friends, and strong family support are much better prepared to cope with the traumatic reorientation to capitalist entrepreneurship, free markets, and individualistic responsibility. For many kinds of trauma, capital in the literal sense – wealth or power – may provide important cushioning resources, insulating against trauma or providing efficient means to deal with trauma.

Cultural traumas evoke various reactions from people. One may use a typology developed with reference to the classical treatment of anomie and social adaptations to anomic conditions proposed by Merton (1996a). Merton describes four typical adaptations to anomie: innovation, rebellion, ritualism, and retreatism. The first two are active, constructive adaptations; the second two are passive adaptations. This typology may be applied to cultural traumas. Innovation may target culture directly and through socialization or indoctrination redefine a cultural dissonance as less grave, or only temporary; or it may use the opposite strategy by articulating cultural dualism as radical and irreconcilable, idealizing new cultural ways and totally denouncing the old. Such “cultural propaganda,” which may be spontaneous or purposefully directed, aims at alleviating the incongruence within a culture brought about by traumatogenic change. Another form of innovation targets the resources needed to insulate people against cultural trauma. Efforts at enriching cultural capital (e.g., by obtaining education), social capital (e.g., by entering a network of voluntary associations), or financial capital (e.g., entrepreneurial activities) allow one to locate oneself more securely in a new cultural reality. Rebellion would indicate a more radical effort aimed at the total transformation of culture in order to replace the traumatic

condition with a completely new cultural setup. Counter cultural movements, anarchic political groups, and some religious sects provide the best illustrations of this adaptation. A passive, ritualistic reaction would mean returning to established traditions and routines and cultivating them as safe hideouts to deflect cultural trauma. Finally, retreatism in this connection would mean ignoring trauma, repressing it, and acting as if it did not exist. This can provide a kind of subjective insulation from the traumatic condition.

Within the incessant flow of social change a cultural trauma may appear in a double capacity: as the consequence or side effect of some other changes (traumatogenic in character), but also as an instigator of another stream of changes effected by coping actions. Trauma may appear not only as a cost of change, but also as a stimulating and mobilizing factor for human agency. Cultural trauma – in spite of its immediate negative, painful consequences – may show its positive, functional potential as a force of social becoming (Sztompka 1991).

SEE ALSO: Anomie; Civil Society; Collective Memory; Collective Memory (Social Change); Durkheim, Émile; Durkheim, Émile and Social Change; Sorokin, Pitirim A.

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collectivism

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Collectivism is a cultural pattern that emphasizes the importance of in group goals, conformity, loyalty, social harmony, and preserving in group integrity. The concepts of collectivism and individualism have a long history in the social sciences. For example, Ferdinand Tönnies suggested that in a *Gemeinschaft* (community) people have strong personal connections, common values and goals, and a sense of unity and loyalty. In a *Gesellschaft* (society), in contrast, people focus more on their personal interests and gains and less on their sense of belonging. Also, Emile Durkheim contrasted traditional societies with modern ones. In traditional societies, individuals have similar values, conform to the collective's rules and standards, and exhibit little personal uniqueness. In modern societies, conformity to the collective rules and standards is viewed as disadvantageous and personal uniqueness is promoted and expected.

The concepts of collectivism and individualism are widely used by contemporary social scientists, largely as a result of Hofstede's book *Culture's Consequences* (1980). While Hofstede identified four dimensions in his book – power distance, uncertainty avoidance, individualism, and masculinity – individualism and collectivism are the most frequently utilized concepts in studies of cross cultural differences.

These concepts have been studied at both the cultural and individual levels. At the cultural level, cultures (countries) are used as the unit of analysis, whereas at the individual level, individuals are used as the unit of analysis. The constructs that correspond to individualism and collectivism at the individual level are

idiocentrism and allocentrism, respectively. Hofstede's ratings of countries, priming techniques, and the direct assessment of individualism and collectivism are the three commonly used approaches to studying individualism and collectivism. Collectivism has been used to explain differences between cultures, mainly European American and East Asian ones.

Studies have shown that the collectivistic self is an interdependent, flexible, relational, and multiple self that emphasizes the importance of connectedness and maintaining harmonious relationships. Accommodating and adjusting to different situations and taking the roles of others are expected and encouraged, and the resultant inconsistency between attitudes and behavior is tolerated. Collectivistic individuals are good at expressing and experiencing emotions that are other focused (e.g., shame). Collectivists are sensitive to others' appraisals, susceptible to embarrassment, and concerned about "saving face" and protecting others from embarrassment. Although collectivists consider both internal and external factors when making attributions, they are more perceptive than individualists of social and situational contexts. They use an indirect communication style and prefer to resolve conflicts using means that preserve relationships.

SEE ALSO: Authority and Conformity; Culture; Durkheim, Émile; Individualism; In Groups and Out Groups; Self; Tönnies, Ferdinand

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colleges and universities

Steven Brint

The distant predecessors of colleges and universities go back in the West to the Greek academies of the fourth and fifth centuries BCE. In these academies, young men from the governing classes studied rhetoric and philosophy (and “lesser” subjects) as training for public life (Marrou 1982). In the East, the roots of higher education go back to the training of future government bureaucrats at the feet of masters of Confucian philosophy, poetry, and calligraphy. In both East and West, a tight relationship existed between social class, literate culture, and preparation for public life.

Modern higher education institutions trace a more direct lineage from the medieval *studium generale*. In the first European universities of the twelfth and early thirteenth centuries (notably, Salerno, Bologna, and Paris), students and masters came together to pore over the new knowledge discovered in ancient texts and developed by Arab scholars of Spain. These gatherings of students and teachers were a product of the revival of scholarly inquiry in what has been called the twelfth century Renaissance. The term university does not, as many believe, refer to the universe of all fields of knowledge. Originally, it meant simply “an aggregate of persons.”

The medieval universities have a recognizable similarity to modern higher education in that they were permanent institutions of learning with at least a rudimentary formal organization. Courses of study were formally organized, lectures and examinations were given at scheduled times, administrative officials presided, graduation ceremonies were held, and students lived in lodgings near the university buildings. The *studium generale* were recognized as such because they housed at least one of the “higher faculties” in law, medicine, and theology in addition to faculties of the arts. Courses in the arts, typically with an emphasis on logic and philosophy, were common preparation for study in the three learned professions. Thus, from the beginning, a certain vocational emphasis is evident in the university; degrees awarded on the completion of

professional studies certified accomplishments worthy of entry into professional life. However, the spirit of inquiry was equally important; these were places renowned for famous teachers, such as Abelard in Paris and Irnerius in Bologna (Rashdall 1936).

In the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries the fortunes of colleges and universities waned. The causes for decline are numerous. They include the attractiveness of commercial over scholarly careers, the interference (in some places) of religious and political authorities, and the insularity of faculty who jealously guarded their guild privileges but resisted new currents of thought. During this period, colleges and universities became places interested in the transmission of ancient texts, rather than the further advance of knowledge. They were often criticized as little more than pleasant retreats for wealthy students. Professional training moved out of the universities: into Inns of Court, medical colleges, and seminaries. New elites interested in technical and scientific progress established entirely new institutions rather than allying with existing colleges and universities. Napoleon, for example, founded elite professional training institutions, the *grandes écoles*, and the early investigators in the natural sciences created separate societies, such as the British Royal Society, to encourage research and discussion.

The revival of the university is the product of nineteenth century European reform movements led in the beginning by intellectually oriented aristocrats and eminent philosophers and theologians. The University of Berlin, founded in 1810, was the first reformed university and others shortly followed in its wake. The new university was founded on the “Humboldtian principles” of the unity of teaching and research (meaning that both activities were performed by the professoriate) and the freedom to teach and to learn without fear of outside interference. The development of new academic structures such as the research seminar and the specialized lecture created an environment out of which pathbreaking researchers (e.g., Leopold Ranke in history and Justus von Liebig in chemistry) emerged (McClelland 1980). The German research universities had become by mid century a model for reformers throughout Europe and from as far away as the

US and Japan. The first research university in the US, Johns Hopkins University, was founded in 1876, explicitly on the model of the German research university.

Higher education's emphasis on training for a wide range of applied fields has been equally important as a source of its current centrality. Here, the US, rather than Germany, has been the decisive innovator. In the US the passage of the Morrill Acts (1862 and 1890) provided land grants to states to establish public universities. These institutions were designed to provide both general education and practical training in agricultural and mechanical arts for all qualified applicants. They encouraged both the democratization of American higher education and a closer connection between universities and emerging markets for educated labor.

The American university's role in society was further enhanced by its willingness to work collaboratively with government, professional associations, and (somewhat later) also with business and community organizations. The Wisconsin Idea encouraged close connection between university experts and government officials during the period before World War I. Universities also cooperated closely with professional associations to raise educational training standards. Connections between university and state were extended, particularly in the sciences, during World War II and the Cold War, when government grants for university based scientific research became a very large source of support.

These developments encouraged a new view of higher education. In the 1960s, Clark Kerr coined the term *multiversity* to describe institutions like his own University of California as service based enterprises specializing in training, research, and advice for all major sectors of society (Kerr 1963). Junior colleges, founded just after the turn of the century, were by the 1960s even more systematically tied than universities to local and regional markets for semi-professional and technical labor. In terms of growth, these two year colleges are the great success story of twentieth century higher education and their influence is now evident even in four year institutions. The utilitarian approach of American educators was resisted for some time in Europe and Asia, where access to

higher education was strictly limited to those students who passed rigorous examinations and where higher degrees had long served as important badges of social status linked to cultural refinement. However, by the last quarter of the twentieth century, the utilitarian approach to higher education had become the dominant model throughout the developed world.

Institutions of higher education rarely shed their earlier identities completely; instead, they incorporate new emphases through reorganization and by adding new units and new role expectations. Much of the nomenclature, hierarchy, and ritual of the medieval university remains and is in full display at graduation ceremonies. Although many new fields have become incorporated into the curriculum, the liberal arts emphasis of the ancient academies remains central in the first two years of undergraduate study (the lower division), at least in countries influenced by the American model. The nineteenth century emphasis on specialization is evident in the second two years of undergraduate study (the upper division) and in the graduate and professional programs. The nineteenth century emphasis on research remains an absorbing occupation of faculty and graduate students. The twentieth century emphases on ancillary training, service, and entertainment activities are typically buffered from the core of teaching and learning (as in the case of university extension, agricultural experiment stations, university based hospitals, and intercollegiate sports teams).

ACADEMIC ORGANIZATION

Modern institutions of higher education are far from *collegia* in their authority structure, but they also do not fit an ideal type corporate model of centralized, top down control. Instead, decision making structures are based on divided spheres of power and ongoing consultation between two authority structures: one based in knowledge and the other in the allocation of resources. The dual hierarchy of professors and administrators is a structural feature of academic organization with particularly important consequences.

The authority structure of knowledge is constituted by the departments and, within the departments, by the professorial ranks. Advancement in the professorial hierarchy is based in principle on the quality of a faculty member's professional accomplishment (typically involving assessments of research, teaching, and service). Differences in rank are associated with higher levels of professional deference and income. This hierarchy moves from the temporary ranks of lecturer and instructor to the regular ranks of assistant, associate, and full professor. Highly visible full professors may be appointed to named chairs that provide both additional symbolic recognition and a separate budget for research and travel.

The top level of the administrative hierarchy is composed of a president or chancellor, who is responsible for fundraising and interaction with important resource providers as well as overall supervision; a provost or executive vice chancellor, who is responsible for internal academic matters; and the deans of the colleges and schools. Top administrators are usually drawn from members of the faculty, though an increasing number of lower tier institutions now hire professional managers at the presidential level. Top administrators make the ultimate decisions about budget allocations, hiring and promotion, and planning for the future. However, the professorate, through its representatives in an academic senate, typically retain a decisive say in all decisions involving curricular organization and instruction. They also retain the predominant say in hiring and promotion decisions, expecting only very rare overrule by administrators.

Universities depend for prestige and resources on the accomplishments of their faculty and, as a general rule, the less distinguished the faculty the more powerful the administration. Professors in non elite institutions have consequently sometimes chosen to organize in collective bargaining units to control administrative discretion through contractual means. The institution of tenure greatly enhances the influence of faculty. After a 6 year probationary period, assistant professors come up for a decision on promotion to tenure and accompanying advancement in rank. Promotion to tenure, a conventional rather than a legal status,

guarantees lifetime employment for those who continue to meet their classes and act within broad bounds of moral acceptability. Together, dual authority and tenure guarantee opposition to any administrative efforts to abandon existing programs or to reduce the work conditions and privileges of the faculty.

SOURCES AND CONSEQUENCES OF GROWTH

Theorists of post industrial society have suggested that the growth of the knowledge sector in the economy is behind this expansion of higher education (Bell 1973). Estimates vary on the rate of growth of the knowledge sector, depending on the definition used. Industries employing high proportions of professionals are growing faster, by and large, than other industries, but some estimates show the rate of growth slowing over time. No estimate has shown that knowledge industries contribute a dominant share of the national product in the advanced societies, or even the majority of the most dynamic export industries.

While the growth of the knowledge sector may be an important factor in the expansion of graduate and professional education, its importance at the undergraduate level is doubtful. At least three other sources of growth must be given proper emphasis. One is the interest of states in expanding educational opportunities for their citizens. Another is the interest of students, given these opportunities, to differentiate themselves in the labor market. As secondary school completion approaches universality and higher education attendance becomes more feasible, more students have a motive to differentiate themselves by pursuing higher degrees. Finally, and perhaps most important, is the increasing role played by educational credentials as a means of access to desirable jobs in the economy. Credentials are not simply (or in many cases primarily) a guarantee of technical skills. They also signal that their holders are likely to have cultural and personality characteristics sought by employers. These characteristics include middle class manners, a competitive outlook, literacy and

communication skills, and persistence. Colleges both reward and socialize these qualities.

Since the 1960s the trend in the industrialized world has been in the direction of the American model, with an increasing proportion of students entering higher education, but with stratification among institutions and major subjects also increasing. Two quite separate market situations tend to develop: one for largely well to do students who can afford an expensive 4 year residential experience and another for largely moderate to lower income students who desire convenience and flexibility as they juggle school, family, and work. In most countries of Europe, for example, access to higher education is now possible from all secondary school tracks (including vocational tracks) and once rigorous secondary school leaving examinations have been relaxed to allow a larger flow of students into higher education. In addition, 3 year degrees have also become normative in many European countries. For these reasons, higher proportions of the age cohort now attend colleges and universities in countries like Australia and Korea than in the US. Over the last quarter century the age of mass higher education has arrived throughout the developed world.

SEE ALSO: Community College; Education and Economy; Educational Attainment; Educational and Occupational Attainment; Institution; Schools, Public; Sport, College; Stratification and Inequality, Theories of

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colonialism (neocolonialism)

Julian Go

Colonialism refers to the direct political control of a society and its people by a foreign ruling state. Essentially it is a political phenomenon. The ruling state monopolizes political power and keeps the subordinated society and its people in a legally inferior position. But colonialism has had significant cultural, social, and economic correlates and ramifications. Neocolonialism is the continued exercise of political or economic influence over a society in the absence of formal political control.

Traditionally, the concept of colonialism has been associated with "colonization," which refers to the transplantation or settlement of peoples from one territory to another. The word colonization is derived from the Latin *colonia*, meaning the settlement of people from home. But popular and scholarly uses of the term later shifted the meaning. Colonialism came to refer to political control with or without settlement. The concept also took on a more explicit ethnic, racial, and geographical component. It increasingly came to refer to the establishment of political control by European or western powers over Asia, Latin America, and Africa. It also signified political control by one "race" over another "race," where the latter is deemed inferior to the former.

Analytically, colonialism is related to but also distinguishable from imperialism. While imperialism also refers to control by one society over another, it does not have to take the form of direct political control. It can also occur through informal political means (such as temporary military occupation), the exercise of economic power (control over finance or imposition of embargoes), or cultural influence (the spread of Hollywood movies around the world). Colonialism, by contrast, is a more specific variant of imperialism, referring to a situation whereby control is exerted directly and for a sustained duration of time. The ruling power officially declares political control over another territory and its people and institutionalizes the control through declarations of law. The

colonized country is then a part of the mother country but subordinate to it. In this sense, colonialism can be seen as one particular form of imperialism among others.

Colonialism itself can take various forms and have a number of different correlates. It can involve settlement and the governance of settlers, such as British colonization of the United States, Canada, or Australia. It might also involve economic plunder or the destruction of native inhabitants, as with Spanish colonialism in South America. Colonialism might also involve the establishment of extensive bureaucratic systems designed to control territories by extracting tribute. Furthermore, colonialism can also involve a temporary state of transition from inferior political status to equal political status, whereby the colony becomes fully integrated into the mother country, such as French colonialism in some parts of Africa.

Sociological thought has had varied intellectual relationships with colonialism. On the one hand, Herbert Spencer's social evolutionary theory was sometimes used, implicitly or explicitly, to justify European colonialism in Asia and Africa in the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. In the United States at the turn of the twentieth century, sociologists such as Franklin Giddens advocated US colonial rule in the Philippines and elsewhere. On the other hand, Karl Marx (1906) criticized colonialism as an economic phenomenon that served the narrow economic needs of the ruling society. In Marx's view, colonialism facilitated the "primitive accumulation" of capital. Marx and Engels (1972) suggested that colonialism further facilitated the spread of capitalist social relations around the world. Other early works tried to specify the particular character of colonial societies. Furnivall's concept, "plural societies," conceived of colonial societies as unique social forms in which people of different cultures, races, and ethnicities mingled.

Later scholarship on colonialism has gone in multiple directions. Some expanded upon Marx's views on colonialism. John Hobson argued that British colonial expansion served as a necessary outlet for overaccumulation; Lenin later expanded this view to theorize colonial expansion as arising from a particular stage of capitalist development, specifically its finance and monopoly stage. A. G. Frank (1969) drew

upon Marx in the 1960s to examine the economic effects of colonialism upon colonized societies. Criticizing modernization theory, Frank argued that Latin American underdevelopment and the economic development of Europe had both been enabled by colonialism. Through colonialism, western powers extracted raw materials and profits from colonial societies to fuel their own industrialization, but that process simultaneously prevented colonial societies from developing.

Other scholarship took the study of colonialism in different directions. Beginning in the 1950s and 1960s, Franz Fanon (1969) and Albert Memmi (1967) examined the forms of racial domination involved in colonialism and their cultural and psychological impact in Africa. In the late 1960s, Robert Blauner (1969) expanded the idea of colonialism to include "internal colonialism" and thereby theorize the difference between the experiences of white immigrants in the United States and those of African Americans and Hispanic immigrants. Later, Edward Said (1979) proposed the concept of "Orientalism" to capture the conceptual and ideological bases of colonialism. In Said, colonialism and associated forms of imperialism depend upon binary concepts revolving around "East" and "West," "Self" and "Other."

The term neocolonialism refers to relations of unequal power between countries despite the formal independence of those countries. The term suggests that, even after colonized societies attain independence, they are kept in a position of political and economic inferiority that reproduces the position they had had when they were formal colonies. In this view, formerly colonized nations remain subject to unequal exchange with western countries, become dependent upon them for capital and technology necessary for their own industrialization, and serve as places for labor exploitation and continued resource extraction by foreign firms. Politically, formerly colonized nations remain subject to various mechanisms of outside control by western powers, either through debt bondage and international institutions like the World Bank or through political pressure or direct military intervention. Consciousness of neocolonialism among formerly colonized peoples was formally declared at the 1955 Bandung

conference, when representatives from Asian and African countries met to forge cross national alliances and express opposition to colonial rule.

SEE ALSO: Decolonization; Dependency and World Systems Theories; Methods, Postcolonial; Postcolonialism and Sport; Orientalism; Plural Society; Third World and Postcolonial Feminisms/Subaltern

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color line

Earl Wright

In 1903, William Edward Burghardt Du Bois penned the phrase: "The problem of the twentieth century is the problem of the color line – the relation of the darker to the lighter races of men in Asia and Africa, in America and the islands of the sea" (Du Bois 1994 [1903]: 9). This thunderous statement, appearing in his classic text *The Souls of Black Folk*, served as Du Bois's clarion call for the nation, grappling with tense and volatile relations between blacks and whites, to engage in objective and thorough research on black Americans. Research and

propaganda on the color line would be Du Bois's life's work. Some of his book length treatments of the color line include his Harvard dissertation, *Suppression of the African Slave Trade to the United States of America, 1638–1870*, *The Philadelphia Negro*, and *The Souls of Black Folk*. While each of these books, in addition to the many articles he wrote on the subject, are considered classic works in the area of race, arguably, Du Bois's most impressive and influential research on the color line consists of the investigations he spearheaded as the director of research at Atlanta University between 1897 and 1914.

In 1897, W. E. B. Du Bois was chosen to lead the Atlanta Sociological Laboratory, the term used to describe those engaged in sociological activity at Atlanta University between 1896 and 1924, by Atlanta University President Horace Bumstead. Several years prior to Du Bois's appointment, the university institutionalized a program of research into the social, economic, and physical condition of black Americans. Upon completing research for *The Philadelphia Negro*, Du Bois, who quickly became a sought after scholar, was providentially offered the position of director of research at Atlanta University. President Bumstead's offer to lead the Atlanta Sociological Laboratory coalesced with Du Bois's desire to develop a program of research on the color line. According to Du Bois, "After I finished [*The Philadelphia Negro*], or before I finished it, the question with me was how this kind of study could be carried on and applied to the whole Negro problem in the US" (1961: 3). Du Bois ardently believed, at this point in his life, that the existing racial problems between blacks and whites resulted primarily from a lack of education and knowledge of basic facts concerning the other. Once people were educated and provided with accurate data concerning those on the opposite side of the color line, he believed that relations between blacks and whites would improve. In a 1961 interview, Du Bois discussed his desire to begin a large scale study of black Americans that would be housed at the member institutions whom we now refer to as the Ivy League. "What we needed was an academic study of the American Negro. I wanted the universities of Pennsylvania, and Harvard

and Yale and so forth to go into a sort of partnership by which this kind of study could be forwarded. But of course they didn't do anything at all. But Atlanta University, which was a Negro institution down in Atlanta, Georgia asked me to come down there and teach and take charge of some such study" (1961: 3).

When Du Bois arrived at Atlanta University two studies had already been conducted and a third planned. Of the 20 monographs published by the Atlanta Sociological Laboratory between 1896 and 1917, Du Bois spearheaded the preparation of 16. Notwithstanding his accomplishment prior to and after his tenure at Atlanta University, it can be argued that his most impressive sociological contributions to research on the color line were accomplished during this period. Three of the more significant studies led by Du Bois are highlighted below.

The 1900 study, "The College Bred Negro," focused on black college graduates. This study is an important examination of the color line given the ideological sparring over the education of black Americans that was taking place between Booker T. Washington and Du Bois. Notwithstanding a more elaborate analysis of the divisions between these giant scholars, Washington believed that black American independence should begin with an entrepreneurial foundation grounded in the vocational and technical, while Du Bois believed it should begin with holistic or liberal arts education. Washington also suggested that it would be very difficult for black college graduates in early twentieth century America to find gainful employment. Du Bois's main conclusions in this investigation were that black American college graduates were gainfully employed and that there was a demand for college educated blacks.

The 1906 study, "The Health and Physique of the Negro American," addressed the physical condition of black Americans vis à vis whites. During this era it was believed that there were physical and intellectual differences between blacks and whites and that blacks were inferior to whites in both areas. Through a collaborative effort with several black American medical professionals and 1,000 Hampton Institute undergraduate students, the major finding

of this study debunked the widely held belief that there were physical differences between blacks and whites.

Last, the 1911 study, "The Common School and the Negro American," focused on the condition of black public schools. Du Bois discovered that black schools were not receiving their fair share of state and federal funding. For example, one county in Georgia educated 3,165 black students and 1,044 white students. However, the level of state funding for each group was \$4,509 and \$10,678, respectively. In addition to uncovering disparities in school funding, Du Bois's venture into the color line in education revealed that black teachers were being paid half as much as white teachers.

In summary, while much is known about Du Bois's book length treatments of the color line, such as the texts mentioned above, few are aware of the dense body of work he conducted on the color line at Atlanta University between 1896 and 1914. An examination of that body of work provides the earliest and most detailed information on the color line in the early twentieth century on topics including education, religion, crime, health, and business.

SEE ALSO: American Sociological Association; Black Feminist Thought; Double Consciousness; Du Bois: "Talented Tenth"; Du Bois, W. E. B.; Park, Robert E. and Burgess, Ernest W.; Race and Ethnic Consciousness

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coming out/closets

Chet Meeks

The closet and coming out are key concepts in the sociology of sexualities and in lesbian and gay studies. The closet refers to the systematic

repression of homosexuality. The closet exists when the state, science, the media, the criminal justice system, and other social institutions (school, family, etc.) work concertedly to construct homosexuality as a pathological social threat, and to institutionalize heterosexuality as the only “normal” and legitimate sexuality. Coming out refers to the individual and/or collective disclosure of homosexual identity as a way of combating the closet and its effects.

The concept of the closet has become ubiquitous in post Stonewall gay and lesbian culture. Memoirs and biographies of lesbian and gay people, for example, almost uniformly tell of the evolution of a life from darkness, secrecy, and isolation, to being “out of the closet” (Monette 1992). The American lesbian and gay community has a holiday, National Coming Out Day, to encourage visibility and openness about sexual identity. The closet has been singled out by conservative, liberal, and radical gay activists alike as a penultimate obstacle. Many academics who study sexuality rely on the concept of the closet to discuss all forms – historical and contemporary – of sexual invisibility and disclosure. Sedgwick (1990) argues that western cultures are characterized by a heterosexual/homosexual binary that operates as a master social logic, meaning that this binary informs not only the way sexuality works in our societies, but also the way *all* social institutions operate. This binary works, in part, by organizing all human desires in terms of disclosure or invisibility. The closet, in this view, is not merely a condition that applies to homosexuals as a “sexual minority,” but is rather a general social condition that organizes all of social life.

Sociologically, the closet means something very specific, and much attention has been given in recent years to clarifying its meaning. Many have argued recently that prior to the mid twentieth century, the closet was not an organizing feature of gay life, that especially in America’s cities there were high levels of gay and lesbian visibility, and a relative degree of integration of gay life into immigrant and working class urban culture (Chauncey 1992). It was only during the mid twentieth century that the social conditions associated with the closet

came into being. It was during this time that homosexuals came to be thought of as moral monsters. The US Congress targeted communists and homosexuals as threats to the integrity and strength of the nation. Police squads in cities across America harassed gay men, lesbians, and transgender people, raiding bars and meeting places, and arresting individuals for sodomy or for not wearing appropriately gendered clothing. Social scientific and psychological knowledge was used to construct homosexuality as a social and personal pathology. The closet, then, refers to a situation in which a sharp cultural distinction is made between homosexuality and heterosexuality, with the former being associated with pollution, suspicion, and danger. All social institutions – the state, the criminal justice system, education, the media, etc. – participate in the making and maintenance of the closet.

The term coming out originally made its debut in gay liberationist discourses as a response to these oppressive mid century conditions. “Out of the closets and into the streets” was the rallying cry of a social movement against the closet (Jay & Young 1972). It is important to note that, for gay liberationists, coming out meant more than the personal disclosure of one’s homosexuality; additionally, it meant taking a collective, political stance against the institutionalized nature of homosexual oppression, as well as the oppression of working class people, people of the third world, black Americans, and women. Coming out meant coming out *against* “straight” society, announcing allegiance to a collective political movement, and not merely coming out as an individual with homosexual desires.

As symbolic expressions, the closet and coming out have enabled the building of lesbian and gay solidarity and identity because they describe a common, widely shared experience of silence, shame, and isolation. The closet organizes the wide variety of experiences lesbians and gay men have into a single, communally shared narrative (Plummer 1995). Coming out has operated as an extremely efficient mobilizing tool in lesbian and gay politics because it connects political struggle to individual action. Coming out, at least as it was originally articulated, links

individual disclosure with broad scale political action and change.

In recent years, some have suggested that the conditions associated with the closet are weakening. Beginning in the 1990s, European and American societies witnessed an explosion of gay visibility in popular culture. In America, Democratic politicians frequently court the “gay vote.” Most recently, the American Supreme Court declared all sodomy laws unconstitutional, perhaps signifying a retreat of the state from the active repression of homosexuality. Although the trend is uneven and incomplete, many lesbians and gay men today do not report feeling a sense of dread or shame attached to homosexuality (Seidman et al. 1999). Many, in fact, report disclosing their sexual identity on a regular basis, making homosexuality a regular, normal feature of their daily lives. If these trends continue, we may indeed be approaching the end of the closet (Seidman 2002). Making sense of how sexuality is regulated and lived in such a world will surely provide social scientists with ripe opportunities for new research.

SEE ALSO: Compulsory Heterosexuality; Gay and Lesbian Movement; Homophobia and Heterosexism; Homosexuality; Identity Politics/Relational Politics; Patriarchy; Sexual Politics

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commodities, commodity fetishism, and commodification

Nicholas Sammond

Commodities are things that are useful, or that satisfy human needs. The requirements to which commodities are applied may be fundamental – such as food or shelter – or they may be more ephemeral, such as the desire to appear attractive or successful. The term “commodity” dates back to the late Middle Ages and once carried a variety of meanings, including advantage, convenience, ease, or, in Elizabethan slang, a woman or her genitals. As it is understood today, however, a commodity is a product that is bought and sold. This narrowing of the term came about with the rise of capitalism as the central organizing principle of Euro American economic and social life.

The pioneering critique of capitalism by the economist and philosopher Karl Marx (1976 [1867]) in the mid nineteenth century, at the moment when sociology was taking form as a social science, brought the commodity to the fore as a unit of analysis in the study of capitalist social relations. In that work, Marx refined the meaning of the term, suggesting that commodities were not simply objects that fulfilled needs, but that their seeming simple utility served to mask the social and material relations that brought them into existence – particularly the human labor necessary to produce them. For Marx, commodities had a “dual nature,” which was comprised of their utility (or use value) and their value in the market (or exchange value). Although a commodity was useful to the person who bought it because it satisfied some need, it was also useful to the person who sold it because its sale yielded value in excess of the cost of the labor and materials necessary to produce it, either in the form of other commodities or in money.

Marx’s refinement of the term was in response to the work of economists such as Adam Smith and David Ricardo, who treated commodities as if their value were strictly

determined by their utility. This was a fiction, he argued, that caused the social labor that went into the production of commodities to disappear. In particular, it masked the social negotiation of labor in which a producer of a given commodity sold his or her labor to a capitalist, who then sold that commodity at a profit. Another person (another producer of labor) purchasing that commodity would not see that negotiation as a component in the price of the object, but would see its value only as determined by the market. The struggle of a laborer to be paid as much as possible for his or her labor, and of an employer to pay him or her as little as possible, though present in the value of the object, disappeared in the description of commodity value as the result of invisible market forces. The price of food, clothing, or fuel, for example, was seen as set by forces of supply and demand, into which the very social struggle over the price of labor did not figure. Locked in their own struggle to earn a living, and surrounded by the commodities necessary to live, individual laborers were blinded to the social relations they had in common with other workers, seeing commodities as simple objects of utility and not as repositories of those relations.

Marx referred to this epistemological process, by which the designation of commodities as mere objects of utility veiled the other meanings they contained, as *commodity fetishism*. This derisive and sarcastic term was meant to point out that the description of commodities as containing their own value by classical economists, though purporting to be scientific, was actually fantastical and wrong headed. In using the term “fetishism,” Marx was drawing upon emerging anthropological theory, which described primitive religious practices in European colonies in Africa and East Asia as “fetishistic” because adherents of those religions ostensibly believed that their gods or ancestors dwelt in the statues or idols they worshipped. Economists who treated commodities as if they had value in and of themselves – that so much coal was worth so much cloth by virtue merely of what it was, and of its relative availability – were no better than primitive shamans, or worse, hucksters who peddled a demonstrably false religion to unsuspecting followers. Just as the study of the archaic religious practices of their colonial and slave trade

subjects was revealing to Europeans of the nineteenth century the workings of primitive societies beyond which they had long since evolved, Marx’s parodic description of the commodity relation as equally fetishistic was meant to shed scientific light on that relation as not the working of the (super)natural world, but a social process amenable to alteration.

The notion of fetishism as a central element in the organization of primitive societies played an important role in discussions of human social life in the nineteenth century. In making an argument for positive philosophy, Auguste Comte (1855), often considered the founder of modern sociology, argued that fetish worship lay at the root of human social organization. Fetishism, he claimed, marked the beginning of an abstract relationship to the natural world which would eventually evolve into the more highly rational and complexly organized thought and social organization of the modern world in which he and his contemporaries dwelt. This notion was just as widely contested as it was accepted, giving rise to competing theories of primitive social and religious organization, including *animism* (Edward Tylor), *totemism* (John McLennan), and *mana* (Marcel Mauss). At the end of the nineteenth and beginning of the twentieth centuries, even as fetishism was increasingly contested in the rapidly stabilizing disciplines of sociology and anthropology, it gained popularity in studies of psychology and sexuality, most famously by Havelock Ellis and by Sigmund Freud. In this work, the fetish referred to an object of displaced erotic desire – such as a body part or article of clothing – that stood in for the whole person, the desire of whom was, for some cultural or pathological reason, forbidden. For Freud in particular, this definition of the fetish entailed the clear delineation between a natural world in which all objects and creatures obeyed immutable laws, and a cultural world in which the (mis)interpretation of those laws in daily life gave rise to pathological behavior.

The evolution of the concept of fetishism is important to understanding commodity relations, not only because early arguments about fetishism informed Marx’s formulation of the commodity fetish, but also because subsequent debate about the fetish’s role in mediating between the natural and social worlds would

further facilitate the introduction of the notion of commodity fetishism into social theory. At the end of the nineteenth century, even as the role of fetishism in the evolution of human social life was called into question, the centrality of capitalism and commodity exchange in the social organization of the Americas and Europe captured the attention of an emerging sociological discipline. The rapid rise and rationalization of industrial development framed Max Weber's discussion of the relationship of (Christian) religious orientation and capitalist accumulation, and the attendant availability of a wider range of consumer goods informed Thorstein Veblen's analysis of the role of the commodity in bourgeois status hierarchies. What had been for Marx a sarcastic metaphor for the misapprehension of social relations as natural became increasingly a sincere heuristic for examining the role of commodities in the organization of daily social life: like its archaic precursor, the commodity fetish mediated between abstract economic forces and the actions of individuals.

A signal difference between Marx's formulation and those at the turn of the twentieth century was one of intent. Marx's analysis of commodity fetishism was meant to rip away the veil of mystification that kept members of the working class from seeing their common oppression and the common usurpation of their labor power hidden in the notion of the autonomous value of commodities. The ultimate goal of this analysis was to be a revolution by the proletariat and the seizure of the means of production, such as that which ostensibly happened in Russia in 1917. The analysis of social theorists such as Weber and Veblen, however, was at most reformist, suggesting to a largely middle class audience a means of understanding the alienation and anxiety deriving from rapid changes in its social life, and paving the way for social reforms designed to stave off workers' revolts elsewhere in Europe and in North America.

As industrialization accelerated at the turn of the century, with it came a series of rapid changes in the organization of daily life. Populations shifted from rural to urban settings, and cities grew exponentially. Subsistence production in the home – of clothing, food, toys, furniture, etc. – was replaced by the purchasing

of those commodities. First in the middle class and later in the laboring classes, children gradually left the labor market, either in the home or in factories, and attended schools. The advent of movies, radio, and mass publications meant that entertainment, once the province of home or community, became increasingly a mass consumer activity. Toward the middle of the twentieth century, labor movements for a living wage argued for men (as husbands) as the sole wage earners in families, and for the removal of women from the labor market. Both in theory and in practice, this positioned women as the managers of household consumption, a role well established in the middle class and gradually extended to the working class. With these shifts, men and children in particular were seen as either the victims or beneficiaries of commodities, the concrete result of women's purchasing decisions. Commodities were seen as more than simply the bearers of *practical* use value; they also carried in them *social* values, in that they encouraged their users to be passive, consuming members of society rather than active and productive citizens. For example, where families may once have made their own clothing and canned their own foods, by the early twentieth century those activities (which were almost exclusively the province of women) were being replaced by the purchase of readymade clothing and pre-packaged foods. Or, if children had once made their own toys from materials at hand, such as sticks, stones, discarded scraps of clothing if they were poor, or had them made by crafts people if wealthier, they were more likely to have mass produced toys created by anonymous factories and identical to those held by other children. In popular social theory and criticism, this shift to consumption signaled a loss of productive independence and a more passive relationship to one's environment.

This transition has come to be called the "commodification of everyday life," or the rise of "consumer culture." In the strictest sense, *commodification* refers to the insertion of a product of human labor into a system of exchange such as capitalism. Commodification, then, refers to the removal of an object (or person) from a (theoretical) realm outside the social relations of production and its seemingly for-cible incorporation into market relations. Used

in the broader sense of the commodification of everyday life, or the commodification of social relations, it suggests the loss of personal and civic autonomy, and is often synonymous with “commercialization.” Although this concept of commodification is often deployed as a means of arguing for social life independent of the realm of commerce, in doing so it departs from Marx’s observation that imagining an existence independent of commodity relations, or a civil sphere of existence, serves to veil the very notion of commodities as inherently social objects. These two distinct meanings of the term “commodification” derive from different theoretical understandings. The purpose of the Marxist analysis of commodification is to demonstrate to workers their alienation from the products of their labor, to demonstrate the role of political and civic systems in supporting a capitalist system that creates that alienation, and ultimately to end capitalism. A more reformist analysis of commodification has traditionally targeted an audience of consumers in both the middle and working classes, and its purpose has been to alienate them from commodity relations in the service of bolstering the political and civic spheres of social life, rather than to create the intellectual support for revolution.

Much of the impetus for this more moderate approach to the analysis of commodity relations derives from the work of the Frankfurt School of social analysis and its descendants. Although Marxist in its origins and orientation, the analysis of capitalist cultural and social life by theorists such as Max Horkheimer and Theodor Adorno sought to demonstrate how the commodification of daily life in democratic capitalist society naturalized consumption as a form of civic activity, thus weakening a robust and critical civic engagement on the part of its citizens. Similarly, Louis Althusser and György Lukács outlined the means by which commodity relations structured thought and its application in social interaction in capitalist democracies, suggesting (albeit in different ways) that alienation from the social relations of production inherent in the commodity relation extended to the exchange of ideas. In this model, ideology was not external to language but integral to it, and the common discourse of daily interaction was deeply interwoven

with the ideological processes that supported commodification as a natural function of social life. These approaches suggested the possibility of the amendment or gradual epistemological overthrow of consumption and commodity relations as the central organizing principles of social life – primarily through a return to a vigorous analysis of use value and its relationship to exchange value. Arguing against this, however, poststructuralist theorists of political economy such as Jean Baudrillard maintained that the commodity relation was so fundamental to consciousness in a capitalist society that there was no prospect of redemption through alienation. The only possibility for undermining the pervasive presence of consumption in daily life was by undermining the very notion of value itself, whether use or exchange value, a move which would challenge the fundamental structures of social, political, and economic life.

THE STUDY OF THE COMMODITY IN CULTURE

In cultural anthropology, however, there has long been a concern about applying such overly reductive models of value to the complex organization of life in different historical, social, and cultural circumstances. Mauss’s preference for the term *mana* over the fetish, for instance, was in part driven by a critique of the projection of European cultural models onto non western social and cultural groups. These approaches often have proceeded from the assumption that, regardless of cultural context, all objects involved in exchange relations are commodities, and as such embody the social relations of production and consumption for a given culture. This assumption that, in exchange relations in significantly different cultures, things are always *necessarily* commodities may overlay a historically and culturally specific economic model onto a wide range of social interactions. For example, Arjun Appadurai (1986) has argued that anthropologists must model the “social life of things,” placing an emphasis not on the *thing* exchanged but on the social processes in a given culture that frame and give meaning to that exchange. In this model, not all exchanges necessarily involve the commodity

relation, the value which inheres in an object depends upon the specific social rules through which it is exchanged, and the same object may be a commodity in one set of social circumstances and something else – such as a gift or religious token – in another. Approaches such as Appadurai's permit modeling social and cultural relations such that the commodity relation is only one in a range of possible modes of social interaction in a given culture, and they have called into question the primacy of the commodity as the sole determinant in exchange relations.

Although this suggests a limitation to the heuristic utility of the commodity in anthropology, it has not fundamentally altered the robust critical discussion about the centrality of commodity relations in (primarily) Euro American social life put forward by the cultural studies school of social analysis, in works by Stuart Hall, John Fiske, Susan Willis, Sut Jhally, Valerie Walkerdine, and others. The rubric of cultural studies is quite broad, encompassing criticism opposed to consumption as a fundamental principle of daily life as well as that which sees consumer society as less clearly inimical to positive social activity. Yet it may broadly be understood as supporting the analysis and critique of consumption as an integral part of social life. This work has included an analysis of how groups subordinated by formations of race, gender, class, or sexuality have found in commodities and their consumption tools for resisting dominant or totalizing ideologies. At the same time, however, arguments for treating the excesses of consumption – such as conspicuous consumption, eating disorders, or addictive reconstructive surgery – not as aberrations in a healthy society but as symptomatic of the alienation inherent in the commodity relation are closer to those of the Frankfurt School.

This very breadth of analytical approaches has laid this school of research open to questions of methodological rigor, and the variety of approaches residing under its aegis to what properly constitute the limits of the approach. Likewise, the emphasis by some practitioners of cultural studies on the empowerment of social groups and individuals has engendered criticism of its analytical detachment. In spite of

these hesitations, the insistence by its adherents for an analysis of the use of commodities as tools in the social, economic, and political activities of subordinate groups has gained wide acceptance. With the rise of models of social relations that throw into question nation based versions of civil society and its relationship to subjectivity, dominant/subordinate cultural relations, and ideology, these approaches have also provided a means for the study of the globalization of social and cultural relations – especially given the expanded global reach of capitalist epistemology in the past 30 years – alternately allowing researchers to model cultural domination and local systems of appropriation and resistance.

If one views the commodity as the embodiment of the social relations of labor, and the acceptance of its autonomy in the marketplace as the mystification of those relations, then the study of commodity relations is more likely one that entails revealing those disappearing social relations of labor. In this sense, “commodity fetishism” – often colloquially understood to mean the elevation of the commodity to the status of a near deity – is redundant: every commodity is a fetish, and every commodification a fetishistic act. If, however, one sees the commodity as open to unexpected appropriation for use in the distinct symbolic economies resistant to those of the dominant groups, then the commodity may demystify even as it mystifies, and (re)commodification may have the unintended consequence of destabilizing social and material relations between dominant and subordinate groups at a microsocial level, even as it continues to mystify social relations of labor at the macrosocial level. This contradiction between the social and the economic, the danger of the collapse of apparently distinct systems of value into a seamless market based ethos, make the commodity and its regulation the site of intense scrutiny and debate.

SEE ALSO: Comte, Auguste; Conspicuous Consumption; Consumption, Mass Consumption, and Consumer Culture; Consumption Rituals; Cultural Studies; Gender, Consumption and; Hyperconsumption/Overconsumption; Marx, Karl; Weber, Max

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communism

David W. Lovell

Communism will be examined in its two major guises: first, as a principle of social organization that has been advocated since at least the time of ancient Greece; and second, as a political movement and system of government that held power over a substantial part of the earth's surface during the twentieth century. Though communism may nowadays be most readily associated with the works of Marx and his disciples, Marx grafted a historically specific project of socialism onto an idea of great antiquity. The core proposition of communism is that the private ownership of property must cease because it is the major cause of social evils, including egoism, excess, and conflict. The ideal of a communist society substantially overlaps with utopia. However, the relationship between the communist ideal and the reality of communist states, by way of socialism, is not at all straightforward.

Communism was first systematically examined and advocated in Plato's Socratic dialogue about the good society – *The Republic* – written nearly 2,500 years ago. For Socrates, however, the communal sharing of goods and women was to be restricted to only one of the three classes of his ideal society, the Guardians, so that they would advance the common interest and not their own. Some ancient communities have, for certain periods, held their goods in common. This was the case, for example, in some of the early Christian communities, awaiting what they believed was the imminent return of Christ and the creation of the kingdom of heaven on earth; later, some monasteries required their clerics to take a vow of poverty so that they would not be diverted from their service to God. The idea of communism has appeared episodically in print across history, including in works such as Thomas More's *Utopia* (1516) and Morelly's *Code of Nature* (1755), but seems to have been a more persistent undercurrent in popular discontent against the wealthy. More believed that communal ownership would abolish the foundations of pride, envy and greed: "wherever you have private

property, and money is the measure of all things, it is hardly ever possible for a commonwealth to be governed justly or happily . . . I am wholly convinced that unless private property is entirely abolished, there can be no fair or just distribution of goods, nor can mankind be happily governed” (More 1989: 38–9). Morely’s agrarian communism envisaged that people would not differ even in dress, so concerned was he about the evil and divisive effects of inequality.

Communism is only one approach to the question of justice and social unity, and has attracted a chorus of critics almost from the beginning. Aristotle, for example, was an early critic of Plato’s ideal of communal property and the community of women. As he argued in *The Politics*, “that which is common to the greatest number has the least care bestowed upon it” (Aristotle 1988: 23). Indeed, men who have private property “will make more progress, because everyone will be attending to his own business” (p. 26). Aristotle may have detested “the love of self in excess,” but he argued that people would be united and made into a community by education, not by the abolition of private property.

It is probably true to say that most political thinkers have been exercised by the social disorders that are created by the gulf between rich and poor. For most, however, communism is not the solution; indeed, it is seen by them as creating its own set of social problems. Like Aristotle, Jean Bodin (1530–96) argued that social disorder springs not from inequality as such, but from *excessive* wealth and *excessive* poverty. Bodin added that an equality of possessions would not succeed in producing social harmony, for “there is no hatred so bitter, or enmity so deadly as that between equals. Jealousy of equals one of another is the source of unrest, disorder, and civil war” (Bodin 1967: 159). Aristotle, too, had made a similar point: “there is much more quarreling among those who have all things in common” (Aristotle 1988: 27). Many of these critics have also pointed to the practical difficulties raised by equalizing conditions between humans, since it will be immediately upset by human actions, and thus will need constant intervention and even coercion – perhaps by an all powerful state – to maintain.

Not surprisingly, many discussions of property by social and political thinkers have focused on what gives someone the right to use property to the benefit of one’s self and to the exclusion of others. Suffice it to say that these justifications tend to turn either on convention (or possession, with its supporter, legality) or labor (in John Locke’s words, property is something a man “hath mixed his *Labour* with”) (Locke 1960: 288). Such arguments are met with stiff resistance in the form of accusations that property is theft, or – in Rousseau’s celebrated account – that the recognition of property is a type of confidence trick, backed up by the state’s laws. As Rousseau put it, “The first man who, having enclosed a piece of ground, bethought himself of saying ‘This is mine,’ and found people simple enough to believe him, was the real founder of civil society” (Rousseau 1966: 192) with all its crimes, horrors, and misfortunes. The primary modern justification for private ownership, however, is instrumental: that it is conducive to greater exertion in one’s own interest and consequently to the greater public benefit (by some mechanism such as Adam Smith’s “invisible hand”). Communists, however, continue to insist not just that property has adverse social effects, but also that there is no proper moral foundation for private ownership.

The chief inspiration for the prohibition of private property in communist works is moral: the abandonment of private ownership of goods and property will heighten the sense of community and produce social harmony, as people cease putting their private interest above the collective good. Communist proposals have consequently appeared in many different types of productive system, from simple agrarian and slave owning societies, through feudal societies, to modern, industrial societies. These proposals have relied not so much on hopes of abundance to satisfy the community, but on the voluntary curbing of appetites and wants to distribute equally what is available.

These moral ideas have sometimes found more practical expression. In addition to the early Christians, a small group of Diggers in seventeenth century England advocated agrarian communism on the grounds that God had given the earth to humankind in common, but

once they tried to cultivate unenclosed common land in 1649 they were crushed by the authorities. More than a century later, however, the French Revolution of 1789–99 ushered in the modern era and, with it, a profound change in approach to political ideas. As the culmination of the Enlightenment, the revolution gave encouragement to the measuring of existing political and social arrangements against ideals. It thereby gave a fillip to many older ideas, including communism, though there was a growing recognition that industry – with its potential to create vast amounts of new wealth – signaled the dawn of a new age. Nevertheless, communism of the traditional variety appeared during the revolution in the form of Gracchus Babeuf and the Society of Equals (1794–7), conspirators who wanted a revolutionary overthrow of authority and the establishment of a community based on equality. Babeuf declared in his *Manifesto of the Equals* (1796) that ownership and inequality were the source of all evil. He advocated that all should work, but that consumption should be modest. The conspiracy was discovered and suppressed by the French authorities, but Babeuf's ideas were passed on to the socialism that emerged in the 1820s and 1830s through the work of a surviving co-conspirator, Filippo Buonarroti.

Socialism and communism are different concepts, but they have overlapped during the last 170 years. Their core differences may be summed up by saying that the abolition of private ownership to produce equal distribution was the central prescription of pre-nineteenth century communism, while conscious and rational organization of economic activity as a basis for abundance is the major prescription of socialism. Durkheim explained the distinction between socialism and communism with great clarity, arguing that communism had appeared throughout recorded history as a moral critique of private consumption, while socialism “was able to appear only at a very advanced moment in social evolution” related to the emergence of industry (Durkheim 1962: 76). Communism therefore is about communal consumption; socialism is an attempt by society to direct its productive activities to the benefit of all. In an important respect, socialism – by assuming the creation of abundance – transcends the key

questions of distribution to which communism was a response.

Diverse systems of socialism emerged in nineteenth century England, France, and Germany, but they were all concerned with overcoming the disorder and human misery of modern, industrializing, market societies. Socialism was unified not in its prescriptions, but in its concerns. Pierre Leroux put his finger on it when in 1835 he contrasted socialism and individualism. Socialists put *society* at the center of their field of vision and concern. They rebelled against the growing acceptance of economic activity freed from its more limited and instrumental role in managing the household, and becoming an end in itself.

There is a clear affinity between the egalitarian and communitarian themes within pre-socialist communism, and the critique of unrestrained individualism devised by the socialists. But socialism and communism interacted in unexpected ways, more influenced by historical accident than theoretical logic. Socialists were of course keen to claim historical precursors, but the fact that Marx chose to entitle the 1848 *Communist Manifesto* as “communist” rather than “socialist” indicates that he saw it as more radical and more worker oriented than the schemes of his socialist competitors. Communism thus emerged as the revolutionary and proletarian wing of the socialist movement. Marx's theoretical achievement was to harness modern communism to the emerging industrial working class in a historical story of class struggle that described the growing tensions and inevitable clashes between proletarians and capitalists. As Marx famously declared in the *Communist Manifesto*: “The history of all hitherto existing society is the history of class struggles” (Marx & Engels 1969a: 108). The modern class struggle and the victory of the proletariat, however, would be succeeded by the triumph of the universal human interest, of which the proletariat was the bearer: “The proletarian movement is the self-conscious, independent movement of the immense majority, in the interests of the immense majority” (p. 118).

For Marx, the greatest of the socialist thinkers, the key problem of capitalism was scarcity and its social effects, which he summed up in

the concept of alienation. Humans were alienated from their products, from their human essence, from other humans, and from their own society. Communism was about creating a genuinely human society, the details of which were always sketchy and sometimes conflicting, but the precondition of which was material abundance. Humans would move, as Marx put it, from the current realm of necessity to the realm of freedom. According to Marx, the highest development of the productive forces “is an absolutely necessary practical premise [of communism] because without it *want* is merely made general, and with *destitution* the struggle for necessities and all the old filthy business would necessarily be reproduced” (Marx & Engels 1969b: 37). But the principle of distribution in Marx’s communism, the end point of this entire process, would not be egalitarian, but rather: “From each according to his ability, to each according to his needs!” (Marx 1970: 19).

Marx’s disciple V. I. Lenin adopted the title “communist” – and his Russian Social Democratic Labor Party (Bolshevik) changed its name to the Russian Communist Party in 1918 – to indicate adherence to “genuine” Marxism and revolutionary social change. The term “communist” was, once again, employed to indicate a divide within the socialist movement. Lenin’s communism was distinguished by its stress on leadership of the working class, a commitment to revolution as the forceful overthrow of the bourgeois state, and the creation of a “dictatorship of the proletariat.” After the Russian Revolution of November 1917, which ultimately removed Russia from the blood bath of World War I, communist parties were confirmed as the revolutionary wing of the socialist movement. Communists were fortified by the swingeing attack on war mongering as the necessary consequence of capitalist monopoly that Lenin launched in his 1917 pamphlet *Imperialism, The Highest Stage of Capitalism*: “The more capitalism is developed, the more strongly the shortage of raw materials is felt, the more intense the competition and the hunt for sources of raw materials throughout the whole world, the more desperate the struggle for the acquisition of colonies” (Lenin 1975: 695) The destruction of capitalism had become vital to the survival of humanity. The

transition to communism, however, was complicated by threats from external enemies and by the discipline required by its major phases, the “dictatorship of the proletariat” and “socialism.” Talk of “phases” in the development of communism rightly signaled that the transformation in human relations envisaged by communists would not occur overnight, but it also provided communist leaders with a store of convenient excuses for much of the conflict, misery, and disappointment their citizens had to endure.

Communism held sway in a number of “fraternal” (but ultimately mutually hostile) states during the twentieth century: in the Soviet Union from 1917 to 1991; in Eastern Europe from 1949 to 1989; in China from 1949 onwards; and in some Asian and African states and Cuba from the 1950s. This system was eventually established in at least 14 countries, encompassing perhaps one third of the world’s population at its height. Communists aimed to build a new type of human society, based on solidarity and the fulfilment of people’s needs, but most of these states collapsed near the end of the twentieth century under the combined weight of elite disillusionment and popular discontent. The general shape of the communist system was similar across these states, but it owed far more to the practical exigencies of the first communist state, the Russian traditions it inherited, and Lenin’s unshakeable belief in the Bolsheviks’ duty to take and keep power, than to any theoretical blueprint. The key feature of this system is the directing role of the communist party, and the consequent subordination of all constitutional forms, and all social and economic activity, to the party’s rule. Rival parties were not tolerated. National variations modified this tenet only slightly. There were strong links between the party leader’s personal style and the behavior and policies of communist governments. Decision making was conducted chiefly within the party, out of public gaze or control. Rule was maintained by a combination of manufactured “consent” based on ideology and outright coercion. This model of top down party control meant the centralized control of all key appointments within party and state, strict party discipline, and party supremacy over state institutions.

For all its theoretical stress on the role of vast historical forces, especially social classes, modern communism has been extraordinarily leader centric. Leaders have been crucial in organizing and maintaining communist parties, in part because of their political skills, and in part because of their (sometimes overstated) theoretical abilities. Leaders' actions have proved decisive in the success or failure of attempts at revolution. And the intellectual, political, and personal styles of their leaders have given a distinctive tone to each of the communist states. Lenin is the acknowledged model of a communist leader, though few others have shared his abilities. Yet even after the shortcomings and crimes of Joseph Stalin were conceded by his successors, emerging leaders such as Mao Zedong, Fidel Castro, and Che Guevara were able in the 1950s and 1960s to give communism a new lease on life by their anti imperialist rhetoric and their dashing image. Just as Mao in his quest to take power in China had made a revolutionary place for the peasantry in communist theory, so Castro and Guevara gave a fillip to anti imperialism by promoting the role of guerrilla warfare. In his 1961 manual on *Guerrilla Warfare*, Guevara identified three lessons from the Cuban Revolution: "(1) Popular forces can win a war against the army. (2) It is not necessary to wait until all conditions for making revolution exist; the insurrection can create them. (3) In underdeveloped America the countryside is the basic area for armed fighting" (Guevara 1985: 47). Guevara's death in Bolivia on a guerrilla mission has sustained a romantic view of his life that is no longer enjoyed by either his comrade in arms, the aged dictator Castro, or the deeply flawed Mao.

Fundamental to modern communism is state ownership of at least the major means of production, distribution, and exchange, on the grounds that this would end the exploitation that marred previous human affairs, and would produce the abundance which Marx anticipated. Decisions about what to produce, how much, and when, are made politically and administratively, and not by information supplied by a market. This type of economy, which communists attempted to plan, has given rise to numerous problems. As the communist system was established largely in underdeveloped countries, state control

was an effective device for industrialization (despite its human costs). Yet the growing complexity of an industrialized economy diminished the ability of planning to control it, and it ultimately proved much less productive and more wasteful than the market.

The communist experiment in state power and central economic planning was disappointing. Despite the enthusiasm with which it began, communism turned out to mean a privileged ruling elite and a subject population; it achieved neither liberty nor equality; and it was unable to innovate or change easily. Many of the achievements of Soviet communism were nevertheless undeniable, including its role in the defeat of Hitler and its rapid rebuilding into a "super power" after the devastation of World War II.

Not surprisingly, there has been great debate about how far the communist states ever approximated the communist – or socialist – ideal. Those who are disheartened at the inequality, waste, and alienation of capitalist societies have few positive resources from the communist experiment on which to rely for solutions. Leninist communism now has few adherents; but more importantly for this essay, it undermined the belief that common ownership would remove the sources of tyranny and exploitation. And it revealed how difficult it is to replace individual motivation for betterment with a communal motivation.

Socialism introduced the hope that production could be organized in such a way as to deliver abundance, and thus that the issues of distribution that have bedeviled human societies would be overcome. If material abundance could, in fact, be achieved, would this end all the divisions within society? Such an outcome seems implausible. As concern over the conquest of material scarcity declines, demand for socially scarce goods, wherein satisfaction is derived from relative position, increases (Hirsch 1977). Competition does not end, its locus merely shifts. But seriously to anticipate material abundance itself is heroic. It seems much more likely that humans will continue to be confronted by scarcity, as their wants inexorably outstrip the ability to satisfy them, and so questions of distribution will not disappear. Conflicts over the allocation of scarce resources, over the values by which we orient our lives, and over our identities will continue. Politics is one

way of acknowledging and managing conflicts in a civilized way. Yet communism has no developed political theory, because the harmony it envisages leaves little room for politics.

The twentieth century communist movement was distinguished by its stress on revolutionary methods, its reliance on a disciplined revolutionary party and centralized economic planning, its lack of political freedom, and ultimately by its lack of economic success. It is unlikely to make a major resurgence. What will survive, however, is the moral critique of individualism that is at the heart of the communist ideal. If it is ever to be a serious political program, communists must begin to explore the institutional and other consequences of dealing with evil and error in human affairs, not simply expecting that they will disappear with the abolition of private property. But perhaps communism is destined to endure not as a serious model for an alternative social and political system, but as a moral beacon for those frustrated by rampant individualism and disgusted by the increasing commodification of life in market societies.

SEE ALSO: Bourgeoisie and Proletariat; Capitalism; Individualism; Marx, Karl; Socialism

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community

Graham Crow

“Community” is concerned with people having something in common, although there is much debate about precisely what that thing is. The most conventional approach relates to people sharing a geographical area (typically a neighborhood), an idea captured in references to *local* communities. Place is central to such an understanding because of the assumption that people are necessarily brought together by the fact of living in close proximity. This view is contested by those who argue that shared place does not always promote social connections between people. It is an established axiom of urban sociology that modern city spaces can be characterized as anonymous and impersonal, devoid of the collective connectedness associated with the idea of “community.” Indeed, the theme of urbanization and increased geographical mobility leading to a loss of traditional patterns of community has been a very powerful one in sociological thought from the very beginning of the discipline. Against this background, the search for the basis of community has led other writers to highlight the importance of people being brought together by common interests or by common identities, neither of which requires co presence. Occupational communities such as the academic community provide one example of groups of people whose common interests derived from work based attachments may hold them together despite their being geographically dispersed, while religious communities illustrate the parallel point that a community of identity does not necessitate members being together in

the same place. In this vein, Benedict Anderson has described nations as “imagined communities” whose members cannot possibly all have close, face to face connections.

Whether the basis of a community is common residence, common interest, common identity, or some combination of these factors, it is necessarily the case that the relationships that are involved will be exclusive to some degree. Put another way, communities operate by distinguishing those who belong (“insiders”) from those who do not (“outsiders”). Community is an important dimension of social divisions as well as togetherness because inclusion in community relationships promises benefits (such as access to material resources, social support, or raised social status) that set members apart from others. A strong sense of this difference from non members, of “us” and “them,” is a characteristic of some of the most tightly bonded communities. Conversely, communities to which access is more open are correspondingly looser entities whose members do not have such a marked group identity, loyalty, and solidarity. People’s sense of belonging to communities thus varies considerably in its intensity. The same point about variation applies to the degree of commitment that communities require of their members. The contrast between communities that bind members together tightly through similarity and those that have more points of connection with outside groups is captured in the distinction between the two types of social capital, respectively “bonding” and “bridging,” that Robert Putnam develops in *Bowling Alone* (2000).

A fourth dimension of communities alongside common residence, interests, and identity is common synchronization of activities, that is, coming together in time. There are several respects in which communities are dynamic phenomena that are marked by variation in people’s ability to synchronize their involvement. To begin with, communities are characterized by what Albert Hirschman (1985) calls “shifting involvements.” This is most obvious in groups that see the degree of engagement of individual members change as they struggle to combine involvement in that community with their rival commitments to work, to family, and to other communities of which they may also be

a part. Individuals’ degrees of involvement vary considerably, both in the short term and over the life course. It is true more generally that communities are engaged in a constant process of recruitment of new participants to replace those who leave. These recruits may need to pass through a period of probation and a ritual of acceptance before they are treated as full members. Ritual events are also an important part of communities’ calendars, serving to bring members together both physically and emotionally. The ordinariness of community relationships in people’s everyday lives needs to be reinforced periodically by extraordinary gatherings such as carnivals and conferences that celebrate the purpose, achievements, and memory of the community and thereby strengthen members’ attachments to the collectivity. Such occasions may also be used to underpin the legitimacy of community leaders, and where necessary to sanction the transfer of power from one cohort of leaders to the next.

The political dimension of community has received a good deal of attention from researchers. Community leaders are not necessarily typical of the constituencies that they claim to represent, notably in terms of social class, age, gender, ethnicity, and disability. Formal political processes are skewed toward favoring those with more resources at their disposal, and in consequence the realm of community politics is typified by contestation over who has most authority to speak for communities. The sphere of community politics also brings to the fore disagreements about strategy concerning the relative merits of following established political procedures compared to community based direct action. Studies of community involvement in the redevelopment of rundown urban areas that are home to heterogeneous populations highlight the difficulties of seeking to give equal voice to the various groups that have a stake in the process, such as long established working class populations, middle class gentrifiers, ethnic minority in migrants, and commercial developers. Janet Foster’s *Docklands* (1999) is one such study showing that in such settings “community” potentially has more of the character of an arena of conflict than of a body of people with shared interests and identities, although it is the latter perspective of

common goals that is emphasized in the rhetoric of community development.

The ideal of community cohesion is one of several powerful forces working toward the creation and reproduction of spatially segregated homogeneous residential communities. The early twentieth century studies in the Chicago School tradition of research revealed the tendency for migrants to cities to congregate in ethnic enclaves, and segregation along ethnic lines in encapsulated communities remains a marked characteristic of urban settlement patterns. "White flight" from urban centers to suburbia and to rural areas is another manifestation of this phenomenon. Spatial polarization of populations is also the product of economic forces, with many neighborhoods having distinctive social class profiles. People's wish to live among others like themselves also reflects further dimensions of social difference such as age, as occurs in retirement communities. Gated communities are an increasingly common expression of the cultural ideal of community homogeneity and the exclusion of outsiders, although arguably they are better seen as the product of particular planning regimes and property developers' marketing strategies than as the product of spontaneous preferences. In other historical and political contexts urban planners and developers have sought to create "mixed communities" (the British New Towns of the mid twentieth century are a good example), as part of a deliberate policy of challenging spatial expressions of social divisions.

The pursuit by policymakers of community as an ideal extends far beyond the realm of housing development. A number of policy initiatives in fields as diverse as architecture, the arts, education, health, policing, and the delivery of care services have all been designated types of community work. Such initiatives are underpinned by the assumption of consensus concerning the desirability of promoting "community." This assumption has been challenged by those who see state sponsored community work as an unwelcome means of extending control over communities that threatens to undermine their autonomy, diversity, and authenticity. An alternative critique highlights the use of community initiatives as a way of

reducing welfare state responsibilities for the provision of services, as a result of which community members are required to be more reliant on their own resources. Both of these rival critiques bring into question the view that "community" is always regarded positively. That said, the traditional association of the absence of community with social problems and social exclusion remains a powerful one, as does the idea that the promotion of community can help to solve those problems. Recent debates have sometimes operated with the notions of "civil society" and "social capital" as alternative conceptualizations of "community," but the same points apply whatever terminology is used.

The study of community presents researchers with a number of methodological challenges. The exclusive nature of communities makes it difficult for outsiders to gain ready access, and the processes of negotiating entry and gaining trust can be lengthy. This is one of the reasons why several classic community studies have involved years (and in certain cases decades) of fieldwork. Another reason for community research requiring extensive periods of fieldwork is the ambitiousness of aspiring to research all of the various aspects of "community" and their interconnections. Classic studies such as Robert and Helen Lynd's *Midtown* (1929) have typically sought to report on community members' patterns of work, family relationships and life course transitions, education, leisure activities, religious practices, and political organization; these dimensions of community relationships constitute a substantial research agenda. A further set of difficulties relates to the question of how to compare the findings of different community studies, given that every community is to some extent unique. These are not insuperable problems, however, and community researchers have proved themselves adept at overcoming methodological obstacles. It is possible, for example, for researchers to study communities of which they are already members, or to undertake research as part of a team (although each of these solutions throws up its own problems). It is also possible for rigorous comparative work to be undertaken using the same research instruments in different communities,

while re studies of the same community can also be undertaken to rebut criticism of this type of research as being of limited value in capturing social change.

Arguably the most enduring challenge facing community researchers relates to the definition and operationalization of the concept of “community.” The corruption of Ferdinand Tönnies’s distinction between *Gemeinschaft* and *Gesellschaft* (translated as “community” and “association”) into the idea that a continuum could be identified between strong rural communities and urban social patterns that lacked depth and durability has rightly been criticized for its geographical determinism: people’s “community” relationships are not the simple product of their spatial location. It is quite another thing to acknowledge that local context matters to how people live their everyday lives, and ethnography is a favored tool among researchers who seek to capture the nuances of particular community settings. Immersion in a community allows ethnographers to capture the distinctiveness of its culture and to appreciate how belonging to that community is understood by its members. Other approaches focus less on the symbolic meaning of community and more on the mechanics of its operation. Social network analysis has proved particularly illuminating regarding the nature, purpose, and extent of people’s connections to others, and it is more open than ethnography is to quantification. Barry Wellman has used this approach to argue convincingly that technological developments in communications (including the development of Internet communities) have freed individuals from dependence on others in their vicinity. Nevertheless, network analysis also reveals that many people’s community ties continue to have a strong local component, especially if family and kin members are included in that calculation. Overall, research findings point to the continuing importance of communities of all types, both place based and others. These findings cast doubt on those general theories of social change that anticipate the demise of community.

SEE ALSO: Chicago School; Civil Society; Community and Economy; Family and Community; Imagined Communities; Networks; New

Urbanism; Place; Social Network Theory; Retirement Communities; Social Capital; Solidarity; Tönnies, Ferdinand; Urban Community Studies

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community college

Regina Deil Amen, Tenisha Tevis, and Jinchun Yu

Although American community colleges (formerly known as junior colleges) have existed since the late nineteenth century, little sociological attention has been paid to these institutions until recently. The conceptual frameworks that do exist highlight the juxtaposition of the community college’s function of expanding access to higher education while also limiting opportunity for many students.

In the first two decades of the twentieth century, as secondary school enrollments increased rapidly and the demand for college access grew, university leaders and local school district officials advocated four different models of junior colleges: the junior college, that is, the lower division of a college of liberal arts or a university; normal schools accredited for two years of college work; public high schools extended to include the lower division of college work; and small private colleges limited to

two year college work (Levinson 2005: 51). Presidents of many leading universities tried to emulate the German elite university model that focused on highly specialized professional training and research and to reduce the number of their freshmen and sophomores. They saw the two year junior college idea both as an upward extension of the high school and as a primary means of responding to the demand from working class parents and local communities for access to elite higher education. They believed the creation of the junior college system could function as a buffer zone to protect the university by diverting those clamoring for access, leaving the university free to pursue its tasks of research and advanced professional training (Brint & Karabel 1989).

Previously enrolling only about 10 percent of all undergraduates, the community college experienced unprecedented growth in the three decades following World War II. Between 1944 and 1947 community college enrollment doubled as more than 250,000 new students registered for classes. Community colleges grew exponentially in the 1960s and 1970s (Dougherty 1994). Since the 1980s the number of community colleges has stabilized at over 1,100, or over one fourth of all higher education institutions in the US. This level of enrollment accounts for 45 percent of first time college students and 37 percent of all undergraduates in US colleges and universities.

As a great invention of US higher education in the twentieth century, the community college has made college accessible to those people who may otherwise not be able to attend any college, especially to the working class and minority populations who were traditionally under represented in four year colleges. Because of its open door admissions policy, low tuition cost, diversity of course offerings, and flexible course schedule, community college is actually accessible to every applicant who may even not finish high school and is touted by its proponents as “democracy’s college” or “people’s college.”

Despite the fact that the low tuition and very low or open admissions policies of community colleges make these institutions a major entry way into college for poor students, racial minorities, lower achieving, part time, commuting,

and adult students, surprisingly few sociologists have focused on these institutions and their students. However, several key researchers have illuminated our understanding of the stratifying role that community colleges have played in the expansion of higher education and college access. Lower class and minority students are still disadvantaged in community colleges in terms of persistence rates and transfer rates. In particular, community colleges are criticized for systematically “cooling out” many of their students’ bachelor degree aspirations by channeling them into terminal vocational programs (Clark 1960). The term cooling out is used to describe the process by which community colleges urge students to recognize their academic deficiencies and lower their aspirations (Clark 1960; Karabel 1977). Students are persuaded to lower their original plans for a BA degree and to aim for a one or two year degree in a vocational or applied program. Colleges accomplish this cooling out by a combination of pre entrance testing, counseling, orientation classes, notices of unsatisfactory work, further counseling referrals, and probation.

Inspired by Clark’s classic idea that community colleges perform the function of cooling out students’ bachelor’s degree aspirations, Brint and Karabel (1989) challenged the view of community colleges as institutions that democratized higher education by allowing access to those formerly excluded from postsecondary education. The original mission behind the creation of the first community colleges was to offer high school graduates the first two year college work and then transfer them to four year colleges for upper division of college work. Most community colleges in the early years were thus transfer oriented liberal arts institutions from where students could transfer credits to a four year college to complete their baccalaureate degree. Although community college advocates in the early years also emphasized vocational education as an essential part of the two year college curriculum and some early community colleges did offer vocational programs, such semiprofessional training programs were resisted by most students as “dead end” ones and seldom attracted over one third of the total enrollments in any institution.

Brint and Karabel (1989) posit an institutionally based argument in which early community college leaders pushed for the vocationalization of the curriculum in an effort to ensure the legitimacy and survival of an institution that was structurally located at the bottom of the higher education hierarchy and therefore could not compete with the higher status four year colleges and universities. As a result, community colleges diverted would be four year college students toward two year degrees intended to prepare them for technical and semi professional occupations rather than transfer to a four year college.

Dougherty (1994) expands this institutional framework by analyzing the interests and actions of state and government officials in occupationalizing community colleges at the expense of students pursuing transfer goals, who, given their often weak academic preparation, suffer from obstacles that persist due to the institution's inability to perform its contradictory and often competing functions successfully.

Sociologists tend to discuss these dynamics in the context of research that reveals that two year colleges are associated with a lower educational attainment. A study by Lee and Frank (1990) showed that, four years after graduating from high school, only a quarter of those who enrolled in a community college had transferred to a four year college, suggesting that attending a community college decreases a student's chances of completing a four year degree. Dougherty (1994) reports findings from several studies that reveal a sizable gap of 11–19 percent in baccalaureate attainment between community college entrants and comparable four year college students. Only a handful of sociologists have attempted to identify the institutional mechanisms that lie at the root of this discrepancy. Dougherty suggests that community colleges present an institutional hindrance to those with bachelor's degree aspirations for several reasons, including fewer opportunities for social integration, difficulties obtaining financial aid, and loss of credits for those who do manage to transfer to four year institutions. He draws upon the research of Weis (1985) and others to suggest that the peer cultures in community colleges discourage academic work, and community college faculty's

low expectations and tendency to concentrate on a few promising students while largely giving up on the rest may be partially responsible as well.

The extent to which the institutional disadvantages of community college attendance result from pre or post transfer processes has barely been studied at all by sociologists. Some suggest that the minority of community college students who do manage to transfer are no less likely to complete a baccalaureate degree than are "native" students who began at a four year college. This finding, coupled with the reality of very low community college transfer rates, suggests that the disadvantage does stem from the community college experience. On the other hand, Rosenbaum (2001) explains that part of the reason why some students are not finishing college is that high school counselors view community colleges as providing a second chance for all students, regardless of past effort and achievement. They therefore operate according to a "college for all" norm that encourages nearly all students to attend college despite their level of effort, achievement, and preparation. However, this leads to unrealistic educational plans for students who are unprepared for college. In partial contradiction to the community college studies noted above, Deil Amen and Rosenbaum (2002) find this college for all philosophy continuing into the community college setting, where remedial students are encouraged toward their bachelor's degree goals, yet remain uninformed of the gravity of their lack of academic preparation and unaware of their low likelihood of completion. Rather than a diversion toward a lower alternative – a two year degree in a more vocationally oriented major – most of these students leave college with no degree at all.

Deil Amen and Rosenbaum (2003) also analyze the differences between community colleges and for profit and non profit occupationally oriented colleges and suggest that the minimized bureaucratic hurdles, focused organizational priorities, structured programs, proactive and extensive financial aid counseling, academic advising, and job placement assistance at the occupational colleges can serve as a useful model to enhance retention among similar low income students at community colleges.

Other recent studies employ a policy oriented perspective and note community colleges' increased focus on workforce preparation, particularly in the form of short term certificate and contract training programs (Dougherty & Bakia 2000). Shaw and Rab (2003) question this shift and the additional pressures for accountability that face today's community colleges. Their insightful comparative case study reveals the barriers to college access among low income populations that are created when federal policies encourage community colleges to respond to the needs of the business community as their primary "customer." Others analyze the ways in which ideologies and welfare reform policies have decreased college access and enrollment among recipients of public aid.

Although there is domestic controversy over the future of the US community college, most countries in Europe and Asia have supported the creation of two year colleges similar to American community colleges. In addition to transfer and vocational education, continuing and developmental education, and community education are also critical components of the comprehensive community college curriculum in the US. A new measure taken by community colleges in the 1970s was that "contract" or "customized" training programs tailored to the needs of particular employers were added to community college vocational offerings. Additionally, since the late 1980s, the clear separation between academic and vocational programs has disappeared, and vocational students are now as likely as academic students to transfer to four year colleges.

SEE ALSO: Colleges and Universities; Educational Attainment; Schooling and Economic Success

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community and economy

Amitai Etzioni

Community and economy are two distinct realms of social life. In communities, we largely deal with one another as persons. We value people not only in their own right, but also as neighbors, friends, and those with whom we share a concern for the common good. In the economy, we largely deal with one another as buyers and sellers, as consumers and marketers, and as management and labor. In this realm we often seek to maximize our self interest. In Martin Buber's (1971) terms, the community is the realm of the I Thou, the economy that of the I It. The opposition is not complete. Some people will seek advantage in the realm of community; for example, they may seek to form business connections in the country club. Other people do develop relationships of friendship and loyalty at work. Still, there are basic differences between the two social realms that exist along the lines previously mentioned.

Societies differ according to the relative importance and scope that they accord to community and economy. In earlier historical periods, most if not all societies were more community minded and less economically minded. The terms modernization and industrialization, or the rise of capitalism, are used as markers to indicate when the economy rose in importance and the community declined in importance. In recent decades, societies such as China and India have begun moving in the same direction as other societies did before them. Even today, societies differ significantly in the value that they place on economic achievement versus nurturing various communal goals.

The US is widely regarded as the society most concerned with productivity, profit, efficiency, and other such economic goals. Americans work longer hours (Anderson 2003) and have fewer vacation days (Valenti 2003) than those who live in other industrialized countries.

There are two profoundly different ways of thinking about the relationship between the realm of community and that of the economy.

One treats the economy (sometimes referred to as the market) as self sustaining and self regulating. People in the economy are said to seek to increase their well being. They realize that they can best serve this goal by a division of labor in which each participant specializes in making some product or service and selling it. The division of labor in turn leads to a natural coming together of interests and hence the "market" requires no regulation from outsiders. On the contrary, "interventions" in the market tend to "distort" the market, and make it less efficient. People who subscribe to libertarian and *laissez faire* conservative social philosophies, as well as many mainstream economists, hold this view.

In contrast, others view the economy as a subsystem of the society; that is, the economy is embedded in society. The society provides a capsule of sorts, which contains the economy, sets goals for it, and guides it through values and political instruments. (This is the main point of an influential book by Parsons and Smelser, 1956.) Government regulations, for instance, limit what the market can do in order to protect workers, children, consumers, and the environment, among other social assets. The government also seeks to affect the economy through its various tax, budgetary, and federal banking policies. The purpose of this is to stimulate the economy to grow faster, to prevent it from overheating (driving prices too high), to smooth out the business cycle, and to increase savings and many other socioeconomic goals. From the second viewpoint the issue is not whether an economy can and should be guided or interfered with, but rather what is the extent to which such interventions are needed and what are the proper interventions. Many liberals, social democrats, and social scientists hold this viewpoint.

The first viewpoint, that of treating the economy as free standing and not as an integral part of society (and community), tends implicitly to assume that the actors are small and hence powerless vis à vis the market. It views the economy as composed of many hundreds of thousands of shop keepers, small businesses, and workers. None of them can control the market and the market guides their behavior. Thus if a corporation would set prices above what the market "tolerates," then it is said that

such a corporation would be unable to sell its products, and if it set them too low, it would be unable to cover its costs. In either case, those who do not abide by the market will soon be out of business. In contrast, the second view sees the markets as being subject to manipulation by larger corporations that control large segments of the economy. Various antitrust policies have been used over the years to break up such power over the market, although most of these attempts have not been very effective.

To illustrate, George J. Stigler (1968), a Nobel Laureate in economics, argued that the farmers have no say on the price of their products, as each competes with many thousands of others. However, Stigler ignored the rise of agribusiness and larger farming corporations: Oxfam estimates that in the US, 50 percent of all agricultural products come from 2 percent of the farms, 98 percent of poultry comes from large corporations, 80 percent of beef comes from just four firms, and 60 percent of pork comes from four firms (McCauley 2002). Stigler also ignored the fact that farmers use their political power – which they exercise “outside” the economy, in the society – to set prices and improve their returns. This is done through gaining subsidies, obtaining credit below market terms, and limiting entry into their markets (via import quotas).

SOCIOECONOMIC BEHAVIORS

Individuals are, simultaneously, under the influence of two major sets of factors: their pleasure and their moral duty (Etzioni 1988). There are important differences in the extent to which each of these goals drives economic behavior, and which sets of factors are different under different historical and social conditions, and within different personalities under the same conditions. Hence, a study of the dynamics of the forces that shape both kinds of factors and their relative strengths is an essential foundation for a valid theory of behavior and society, including economic behavior (a key subject for the science of socioeconomics).

The independent effects of social values versus prices can be highlighted by the findings of

the combined role of information and values in a four year field experiment with the time of day pricing of residential electricity in Wisconsin (Stern & Aronson 1984). Individuals were experimentally assigned to a variety of electricity rate structures. Those individuals who believed that lowered demand in peak periods would be good for the community (e.g., by allowing utilities to shut down inefficient and polluting power plants) and who also believed that households as a group could make a big difference in peak demand, felt a moral obligation to lower electricity use in peak periods (Black n.d.). People who felt an obligation to change their behavior had lower electricity bills than people who felt no moral obligation, but who were charged the same electricity rates.

Another study correlates both income and social/moral attitudes with tax compliance (as measured by the propensity to evade paying taxes that are due). It found that income correlated somewhat more strongly with compliance than did moral attitudes, but only after the study broke rejection of the governing regime, policies, or values into six factors. Even given this procedure, the correlation of compliance with income level was 0.3560, while that with general alienation was 0.3024, followed by a correlation with distrust of 0.2955, with suspicion (“others cheat”) of 0.2788, and so on (Song & Yarbrough 1978). Disregarding the question of relative strength, clearly both economic and moral attitudes are at work. Both seem to account for significant chunks of the variance in behavior.

HAPPINESS

There is a considerable deal of social science evidence that shows that human contentment ceases to increase as income grows beyond a fairly modest level. To cite but a few studies of a large body of findings, Andrews and Withey (1976) found that the level of one’s socioeconomic status had a limited effect on one’s “sense of well being” and no significant effect on a person’s “satisfaction with life as a whole.” Freedman (1978) discovered that levels of reported happiness did not vary greatly among the members of different economic classes,

with the exception of the very poor, who tended to be less happy than others. Myers and Diener (1995) report that while per capita disposable (after tax) income in inflation adjusted dollars almost exactly doubled between 1960 and 1990, 32 percent of Americans reported that they were “very happy” in 1993, almost the same proportion as did in 1957 (35 percent). Myers and Diener also show that although economic growth slowed between the mid 1970s and the early 1990s, Americans’ reported happiness was remarkably stable (nearly always between 30 and 35 percent) across both high growth and low growth periods. Easterlin’s (2001) work found that happiness remains generally constant throughout life cycles. Typically, income and general economic circumstances improve throughout one’s life until retirement, but happiness does not experience a comparable level of growth; nor is the leveling off of income during retirement accompanied by a decrease in happiness. In other words, once basic needs are satisfied, the high production/consumption project adds little if anything to human contentment.

SEE ALSO: Community; Economy (Sociological Approach); Management Theory

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community and media

Simon Cross

“Community” and “media” are independent sociological terms that when combined in the notion of “community media” refer to adaptations of media technology for self directed use by a given community. They typically involve small scale media platforms serving the communication and information exchange needs of people who share a bounded geographical location such as a neighborhood, village, town, or even a city. However, since people no longer interpret their community allegiance solely by reference to the geographical place in which they live, this definition can be broadened to include computer based “communities of interest” where geographically dispersed individuals commune on topics of common interest, although they may never actually meet physically.

Community media practices are grounded in the core principles of public service media – to educate, inform, and entertain – but they also contain a fourth dimension: that of extending citizens’ access to and participation in the public sphere. The foregrounding of ordinary people in this way stems from the advocacy by community activists that media should be used

to reflect and respond to the lives of the people living in the areas that they serve. It is argued that this can only be achieved when media are used as an expression *of* community rather than *for* the community.

What this means in practice is that media non professionals participate in both front stage and back stage community media activities. In front stage terms, it means, for example, that community members themselves might present a live radio show dealing with locally relevant topics or personal interests. In back stage terms it might mean that they are directly involved in planning the stations' future programming possibilities. This helps reinforce accountability for what has been produced within the community.

The normative ideal is that the relevant community based media resources are owned or managed autonomously from state systems and eschew commercial imperatives. However, some communities receive corporate sponsorship in order to meet expensive startup and training costs. Where the costs of maintaining technology and training lie beyond the financial reach of a community (a special problem in developing countries), media resources are often managed in partnership with non governmental organizations and community focused international bodies such as UNESCO.

Community media practice is predicated on a perceived failure by commercial and public service media sectors to ensure pluralism, diversity, and provision of local content. The charge is that mainstream media, usually thought of as homogeneous in form and one directional in distribution, have muted freedom of expression by failing to provide communities with media content that reflects everyday lives as they are lived in communities. No longer viewed as a fringe cultural activity, the sheer weight of output internationally means that it is now plausible to speak of community media as an important "third sector" of media production.

Because the communicative ethos of community media coheres around people's right to be media producers, i.e., to send as well as to receive, it is often described as a radical form. However, the community media sector *per se* should not be thought of as necessarily concerned to confront the media establishment, but rather as trying to create a *useful* forum

for extending non exclusive dialogue in local communities.

The notion of citizens "communing" through participatory forms of media expression suggests that it might simply be used to communicate closeness or mutuality ("this is who we are") and which, by definition, calibrates distance from others. It is important to note, however, that community media content nevertheless tends to be outward looking and connected to wider social concerns and issues.

Community media have differing histories according to different national and political contexts. For example, in Latin American countries community radio can be traced back to the 1940s. Political repression led stigmatized, disadvantaged, and repressed communities to participate in community radio broadcasts as a way of maintaining their cultural identity. Since the early 1970s community based media have also played a key role in social development in Africa and across the Indian subcontinent.

In Europe and North America, the sociopolitical origin of community media is rooted in the 1960s, a time of political upheaval and the emergence of a counterculture. This latter was associated with objections to the societal trend toward large scale, vertically structured, anonymous institutions. In this context, for example, activists pioneered community television, sustained by the belief that small production units could be more democratically controlled and equipped with less complicated, less expensive equipment for use in local program making. In the United States alone, it has led to more than 1,000 community access television channels.

In the last two decades, community media initiatives have been closely linked with social development goals. In many of the world's poorest regions, community media not only protect communication and cultural and information rights of indigenous peoples but also facilitate communal forms of decision making. This is achieved via a range of formats including street theater, video and film production, alternative newspapers, comic books and cartooning, and Internet access. It is, however, radio that continues to flourish as the most important community media platform because of high illiteracy rates and the medium's emphasis on spoken voice.

In deregulated media markets, the release of spectrum and digitalization of communication have created new spaces for ethnic and other minority voices to be heard. Moreover, when we consider that a station serving a small community can potentially reach a national, international, or even a global audience, this serves to dramatize how the conceptual contours of digitized community radio may now be stretched.

The conceptual boundaries of community media have recently been further extended by the notion of virtual “communities of interest” made up of geographically dispersed people with varying degrees of attachment and a complex set of relations to the new geography of cyberspace. The use of computerized media, and ease of access to the Internet and the World Wide Web, have created “virtual communities” extended in time and space and altering geographically bounded conceptions of community media.

The significance of networked communities (“telecommunities”) lies in their potential for forging new kinds of links and interconnections between people, and between people and centers of power. This is due to computer mediated communities being based upon two way (horizontal) flows of information. Thus, while traditional forms of solidarity are said to be fragmenting and breaking up, it has been claimed that virtual environments offer a way of rebuilding communities (we should add that a growing “digital divide” renders this optimistic prospect neither certain nor universal).

The role of media in building communities is by no means new, however. In Benedict Anderson’s (1991) classic definition, the nation state is an “imagined community,” in which a population that could never meet together is bound by a shared language and culture. Anderson argues that the development of what he terms “print capitalism” from the late seventeenth century, based on the spread of literacy and the growing market for publications printed in shared vernacular languages such as English, reinforced demand for reading material by the newly literate. Printers met demand by launching newspapers, which became one of the “mass simultaneous ceremonies” constitutive of nationhood. Thus, the daily ritual of reading the newspaper bound millions of readers together

as participants in the construction of a homogeneous national community.

Anderson’s concept of a print based imagined community could be extended to the sphere of broadcasting. In Great Britain, for example, the monarch has, since 1930, used radio first, and subsequently television, to make an annual Christmas message. The broadcast was soon extended to include the 30 or so countries that made up the British Empire (later termed the Commonwealth). The originator of the broadcast, John (later Lord) Reith, the founder of the British Broadcasting Corporation, was in no doubt that radio was a key platform for helping the masses to recognize themselves as members of a cohesive (inter) national community.

Anderson’s influential account of imagined community reminds us that there is a fundamental sense in which all communities are fictional creations. In this context, it is important to note that electronic communities do not make either the interaction or the social context less real than communities based on notions of affiliation, ethnicity, and nation. Nevertheless, the formation of virtual communities has given rise to a developing research agenda that coheres around “revival of community” and networked democratic participation, i.e., to investigate whether virtual communities are able to foster long term responsibility and mutuality as well as participation.

Studies of community media in physical communities currently highlight four areas of research: organization, product, users, and environment. These areas overlap and hence their investigation requires multimethod research designs. Recent studies have developed this multidimensional approach and have also extended empirical lines of enquiry by integrating theoretical perspectives and concepts borrowed from democratic theory (especially Jürgen Habermas’s influential concept of the “public sphere”), theories of identity, postmodernism, diaspora studies, community studies, communications policy, human rights, citizenship studies, and communication rights.

The eclectic metatheoretical character of “community media studies” is poised to deliver an abundance of insights about community media activism vis à vis the conventional communication role of mainstream media. However,

it is also likely that future studies will encounter the thorny problem that the relationship between community media use and participation in a community is not linear but curvilinear. The methodological significance of this point lies in the fact that researchers have yet to develop a theory that accounts for how these two *separate* processes may be related over time; future empirical tests of this relationship will also need to develop longitudinal research designs that will open out this research issue for scrutiny.

The future of community media is likely to be cross media and multiplatform. It will bring together facilities for sound, video, and multimedia production alongside access to broadband communications, FM and digital radio broadcasting, and digital TV systems. Researchers seeking to understand this multiplatform environment will have to work with and develop a wide range of quantitative and qualitative methods inspired by the multiple disciplines within the social sciences and humanities.

Future studies can be expected to focus on individual community media initiatives that can be used for the comparative analysis of community media resources and ventures. One way around the anecdotal quality of the singular study might be by exploring not an individual community media organization but the umbrella association or network to which most community groups are affiliated. This has the advantage of examining how community media organizations help shape communications policy in relation to their access and participation practices.

Given the seductive appeal associated with the notion of a multimedia future, it is important to avoid romanticizing the transformative possibilities of new kinds of electronic networking. It is by no means certain that every community would wish to replace a bulletin board situated in a local community center with an electronic version. Communities endure because members make their own informed decisions on what are appropriate or relevant media to communicate their sense of belonging and identification.

SEE ALSO: Community; Cyberculture; Diaspora; Digital; Media and Diaspora; Media and

Nationalism; Media, Network(s) and; Media and the Public Sphere

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complementary and alternative medicine

Hans A. Baer

Various terms have been bandied around over the past several decades for a wide array of heterodox medical systems, ranging from professionalized to folk medical systems. Within the US context, the term that has become

commonplace in various circles is *complementary and alternative medicine*, whereas, for example, in Australia it is simply *complementary medicine*. At any rate, historically, medical sociologists have tended to focus on various aspects of biomedicine, including medical dominance and professionalism, and have tended to ignore alternative medical systems. Exceptions include the work of Walter Wardwell, Lesley Biggs, David Coulter, Ian Coulter, and Evan Willis on chiropractic in the United States, Canada, and Australia. Conversely, medical anthropologists have conducted studies of shamanism and other indigenous and folk medical systems as well as the phenomenon of medical pluralism in complex societies. In modern industrial or post industrial societies, in addition to biomedicine, the dominant medical subsystem, one finds other medical subsystems, such as homeopathy, osteopathy, chiropractic, naturopathy, religious healing systems, and popular and folk medical systems. Patterns of medical pluralism tend to reflect hierarchical relations in the larger society, including ones based upon class, caste, racial, ethnic, regional, religious, and gender divisions. The medical system of a complex society consists of the totality of medical subsystems that coexist in a generally competitive, but sometimes collaborative or even cooptative, relationship with one another.

Although only a few sociologists, such as Cant and Sharma (1999), have employed the concept of medical pluralism, the growing interest on the part of particularly upper and upper middle class people in alternative medicine in western societies appears to have prompted a growing number of medical sociologists to examine issues such as the sociopolitical relationship between biomedicine and alternative therapies, the holistic health movement, and patient utilization of alternative therapies.

What has come to be termed complementary and alternative medicine (CAM) is an amorphous category that encompasses many medical systems and therapies in various national contexts, but particularly anglophone countries such as the United States, Canada, United Kingdom, Australia, and New Zealand. Whereas alternative practitioners and laypeople have tended to speak of holistic health, CAM

and integrative medicine are in large part biomedical constructions.

What started out as the popular holistic health movement in the early 1970s in large part has evolved into the professionalized entity generally referred to as CAM or *integrative medicine*. Alternative medicine generally refers to all medical systems or therapies lying outside the purview of biomedicine that are used in its stead. Complementary medicine refers to medical systems or therapies that are used alongside or as adjuncts to biomedicine. Finally, integrative medicine refers to the effort on the part of conventional physicians to blend biomedical and CAM therapies or to the collaborative efforts between biomedical and CAM practitioners in addressing health care needs of specific patients.

Scholars have proposed various typologies of CAM therapies. Most typologies of CAM tend to privilege western and Asian therapies over indigenous, folk, and religious therapies. In contrast to most schemes that exclude biomedicine, Nienstedt (1998) presents a "model of complementary medicine and practice" which includes it. Her typology delineates four categories or quadrants: (1) biomedicine which includes MDs, osteopathic physicians, dentists, optometrists, podiatrists, psychologists, pharmacists, nurses, physician assistants, medical technologists, physical therapists, and so on; (2) body healing alternatives (e.g., chiropractors, homeopaths, medical herbalists, naturopaths, massage therapists, reflexologists); (3) mind/spirit alternatives (e.g., Christian Scientists, faith healers, psychic healers, transcendental meditation); and (4) cross cultural alternatives (e.g., shamanism, folk medicine, Ayurveda, Chinese medicine, Reiki therapists). Although Nienstedt's scheme includes biomedicine, it does not make any reference to the power difference that exists between it and other therapeutic systems.

The notion of a dominative medical system attempts to recognize the fact that both biomedicine and a wide array of CAM systems coexist within a hierarchical social arrangement. Medical pluralism in the modern world is characterized by a pattern in which biomedicine exerts dominance over alternative medical systems, whether they are professionalized or not. With European expansion, allopathic medicine

or what eventually became biomedicine came to supersede in prestige and influence both professionalized indigenous medical systems, such as Ayurveda and Unani in India and Chinese medicine, and a wide array of folk medical systems. The US dominative medical system consists of several levels that tend to reflect class, racial, ethnic, and gender relations in the larger society (Baer 2001). In rank order of prestige, these include (1) biomedicine; (2) osteopathic medicine as a parallel medical system focusing on primary care and incorporative spinal manipulation as an adjunct; (3) professionalized heterodox medical systems (namely, chiropractic, naturopathy, and acupuncture); (4) partially professionalized or lay heterodox medical systems (e.g., homeopathy, herbalism, bodywork, and midwifery); (5) Anglo American religious healing systems (e.g., Spiritualism, Christian Science, Pentecostalism, and Scientology); and (6) folk medical systems (e.g., Southern Appalachian herbal medicine, African American folk medicine, *curanderismo* among Mexican Americans, and Native American healing systems). With some modification, the model of the dominative medical system can be applied to other modern societies. For the most part, the therapeutic systems that fall under the rubric of CAM tend to be situated under the categories of professionalized, partially professionalized, and lay heterodox medical systems. Within this framework, for example, whereas MDs tend to be white upper and upper middle class males, folk healers tend to be working class women of color. Alternative medical systems often exhibit counter hegemonic elements that resist, often in subtle forms, the elitist, hierarchical, and bureaucratic patterns of biomedicine. Conversely, corporate and governmental elites around the world have come to express growing interest in CAM therapies as cost cutting measures in an era of rising health care costs.

New medical systems or synthetic ensembles of therapies, such as the hygiene movement in the nineteenth century or the holistic health movement in the late twentieth century, emerge as popular health movements that often undergo a process of professionalization and may in time even be absorbed by biomedicine. The holistic health movement began to emerge on the US West Coast, especially the San

Francisco Bay Area, in the early 1970s. It quickly spread to other parts of the United States and also to other, especially Anglophone, countries (Canada, Britain, Australia, and New Zealand), as well as to western European countries such as Germany, the Netherlands, and Denmark. It began as a popular movement or medical revitalization movement that in various ways challenged the bureaucratic, high tech, and iatrogenic aspects of biomedicine. The holistic health movement was by no means a monolithic phenomenon and varied considerably from society to society where it had emerged. It encompassed numerous alternative medical systems, such as homeopathy, herbals, naturopathy, and bodywork, with divergent philosophical premises. Although it appeared to have its strongest expression in western societies, it also drew heavily from various eastern healing systems, such as Chinese medicine and Ayurveda. To a large extent, the holistic health movement overlapped with the New Age movement that also became very popular particularly in western societies. Like the holistic health movement, New Ageism focuses upon a balance in the interaction of mind, body, and spirit in its attempts to achieve experiential health and well being. New Ageism also incorporates many therapeutic techniques and practices, including meditation, guided visualization, channeling, psychic healing, and neoshamanism.

By the late 1970s, an increasing number of biomedical and osteopathic physicians as well as nurses, particularly in the US and UK, began to recognize the limitations of their conventional approach to illness and that they were losing many of their more affluent patients to alternative or heterodox practitioners. A group of MDs and DOs established the American Holistic Medical Association in 1978. Nurses in particular, given their person orientation, expressed interest in holistic health and formed the American Holistic Nurses' Association in 1981. In time, more and more biomedical schools began to offer courses on alternative medicine – something that is still in process – as it became apparent that the bread and butter patients of biomedicine, those with disposable incomes, could afford to pay for alternative therapies out of their own pockets. Although some MDs subscribe to the philosophical

underpinnings of various alternative therapies, including their vitalist perspectives, others adopt these techniques without wholeheartedly subscribing to their ideologies or reinterpret them in terms of biomedical concepts or evidence based medicine.

Ironically, holistic health as a popular movement has by and large been tamed and evolved into a professionalized entity referred to as CAM or integrative medicine. Over the past decade or so, numerous biomedical practitioners have written overviews of CAM and have called for an evidence based approach (Micozzi 2001). In 1999 the National Institutes of Health's Office of Alternative Medicine (established in 1992 as a result of a Congressional mandate) was renamed the National Center for Complementary and Alternative Medicine. Furthermore, health insurance companies, health maintenance organizations, and hospitals have become increasingly interested in CAM therapies as a way of satisfying patients' demands and curtailing costs. While CAM or integrative medicine often continues to adhere to some notion of holism, in reality it appears to function as a style of health care in which biomedicine treats alternative therapists as subordinates and alternative therapies as adjunct.

Sociologists and anthropologists have addressed a number of issues regarding CAM, including overviews of the holistic health movement (Lyng 1990), social profiles of patients utilizing CAM and their reasons for doing so, social profiles of CAM practitioners or conventional physicians who have incorporated CAM therapies into their practices, the drive for professionalization on the part of specific CAM therapists (including osteopaths in the UK and Australia, chiropractors in the US, Canada, UK, and Australia, naturopaths in the US and Canada, acupuncturists in the US), the transformation of some conventional physicians into holistic healers (Davis Floyd & St. John 1998), and integrative medical centers (Lowenberg 1989). In part emulating the success stories of chiropractors, naturopaths, and acupuncturists in places such as the US, Canada, and Australia, various other CAM therapists, including homeopaths, bodyworkers, herbalists, and direct entry midwives, have begun to seek legitimation by creating

professional associations, training institutions, and self regulation as well as lobbying for licensing or certification.

The social scientific study of CAM remains in its infancy. Whereas some scholars posit the existence of a CAM social movement, others point to the growing commercialization of CAM therapies and the emergence of a lucrative CAM industry. One important question that has arisen within this context is whether CAM is a counter hegemonic force, a hegemonic force, or a bit of both. Some have even argued that biomedicine in various national contexts is being coopted by biomedical institutions, including centers of integrative medicine in which MDs serve as directors, biomedical schools and hospitals, and NIH's National Center for Complementary and Alternative Medicine, which funds efficacy studies of CAM therapies based upon randomized, double blind methodology (Saks 2003; Baer 2004).

While sociological and anthropological studies of a wide array of alternative medical systems in modern societies have been elucidating much about CAM, most of this research has relied upon archival sources and survey research. What is desperately needed are in depth studies of CAM practitioners, their educational institutions, associations, conferences, and clinical practices, and the vitalist subcultures within which they and their patients or clients function as well as the increasing number of settings in which biomedical and CAM practitioners interact with one another.

SEE ALSO: Health Care Delivery Systems; Health Maintenance Organization; Medicine, Sociology of; New Age; Professional Dominance in Medicine

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complexity and emergence

R. Keith Sawyer

Complex phenomena reside between simplicity and randomness. When the laws governing a system are relatively simple, the system's behavior is easy to understand, explain, and predict. At the other extreme, some systems seem to behave randomly. There may be laws governing their behavior, but the system is highly non linear, such that small variations in the state of the system at one time could result in very large changes to later states of the system. Such systems are often said to be *chaotic*. Complex systems are somewhere in between these two extremes: the system is not easy to explain, but it is not so chaotic that understanding is completely impossible.

An interest in complexity is often accompanied by an interest in *emergence* – the processes

whereby the global behavior of a system results from the actions and interactions of agents. There is no central controller or plan. Higher level order emerges from the interaction of the individual components. Such systems are self organizing, with control distributed throughout the system. Emergent systems are often complex in that they manifest order at the global system level that is difficult to explain by analyzing the individual components of the system in isolation.

Complex systems that manifest emergence tend to have a large number of units, with each unit connected to a moderate number of other units, and frequent, repeated interactions among the connected units, which occur simultaneously throughout the system. Whereas complex physical systems tend to have simple rules for these interactions, the units in complex social systems are individuals who communicate using the full richness of natural language.

Societies have often been compared to complex systems. Inspired by the rise of science and technology, in the eighteenth century societies were compared to complex artificial mechanisms like clocks. Just after World War II, Talcott Parsons's influential structural functional theory was inspired by cybernetics, a field centrally concerned with developing models of the computational and communication technologies that were emerging in the post war period. In the 1960s and 1970s, general systems theory continued in this interdisciplinary fashion. It was grounded in the premise that complex systems at all levels of analysis – from the smallest unicellular organisms up to modern industrial societies – could be understood using the same set of theories and methodologies.

Common to all of these metaphors is the basic insight that societies gain their effectiveness and functions from a complex configuration of many people, engaged in overlapping and interlocking patterns of relationship with one another. Some key questions raised by these society as system metaphors are: What do these relations and configurations look like? Which systems are most effective, and which are stable and long lasting? How could a stable complex system ever change and evolve, as societies often do? What is the role of the

individual in the system? Such questions have long been central in sociology.

Complexity theory has the potential to provide several new insights into these central sociological questions. Beginning in the mid 1990s, several scientific developments converged to create a qualitatively more advanced approach to complex systems, and complexity theory began to influence a wide range of disciplines, from biology to economics. This influential new approach has begun to filter into sociology. The study of complex dynamical systems can provide new perspectives on important unresolved issues facing the social sciences – the relations between individuals and groups, the emergence of unintended effects from collective action, and the relation between the disciplines of economics and sociology.

Parsons's structural functional theory represented the first wave of systems theories in sociology, drawing on systems concepts from cybernetics to describe human societies as complex self maintaining systems. The general systems theories of the 1960s and 1970s represented a second wave. General systems theories were always more successful at explaining natural systems than social systems. In spite of the universalist ambitions of such theorists, social scientists generally ignored them. In contrast, the latest work in complexity theory – the *third wave* of systems theory – is particularly well suited to sociological explanation. Third wave sociological systems theory grew out of developments in computer technology. In the 1990s, computer power advanced to the point where societies could be simulated using a distinct computational agent for every individual in the society, using a computational technique known as *multi agent systems*. A multi agent system contains hundreds or thousands of agents, each engaged in communication with at least some of the others. The researcher can use these simulations to create *artificial societies*. The researcher defines and implements a model of the individual agent, creates a communication language for them to interact, and then observes the overall macro behavior of the system that emerges over time.

This new methodology has led complexity theorists in sociology to become increasingly concerned with *emergence*. Examples include traffic jams, the colonies of social insects, and

bird flocks. To illustrate, the “V” shape of the bird flock does not result from one bird being selected as the leader, and the other birds lining up behind the leader. Instead, each bird's behavior is based on its position relative to nearby birds. The “V” shape is not planned or centrally determined in “top down” fashion. Rather, it emerges out of simple pair interaction rules, i.e., from the “bottom up.” The bird flock demonstrates one of the most striking features of emergent phenomena: higher level regularities are often the result of quite simple rules and local interactions at the lower level.

In the social sciences, a comparable example of an emergent phenomenon is language shift. Historians of language have documented that languages have changed frequently throughout history, with vocabulary and even grammar changing over the centuries. Yet until the rise of the modern nation state, such changes were not consciously selected by any official body, nor were they imposed by force on a population. Rather, language shift is an emergent phenomenon, arising out of the nearly infinite number of everyday conversations in small groups scattered throughout the society. In this social system, successive conversations among speakers result in the emergence over time of a collective social fact: language as a property of a social group. The study of social emergence requires a focus on multiple levels of analysis – individuals, interactions, and groups – and a dynamic focus on how social group phenomena emerge from communication processes among individual members.

Whether or not a global system property is emergent, and what this means both theoretically and methodologically, has been defined in many different ways. For example, in some accounts, system properties are said to be emergent when they are *unpredictable* even given a complete knowledge of the lower level description of the system – a complete knowledge of the state of each component and of their interactions. In other accounts, system properties are said to be emergent when they are *irreducible*, in any lawful and regular fashion, to properties of the system components. In yet other accounts, system properties are said to be emergent when they are *novel*, when they are not held by any of the components of the system.

Philosophers of science began debating such properties early in the twentieth century. Social scientists have applied widely different definitions of emergence, resulting in some conceptual confusion.

Complex systems researchers have found that the emergent higher level may have autonomous laws and properties that cannot be easily reduced to lower level, more basic sciences. Thus the paradigm of complexity is often opposed to the paradigm of reductionism. For example, cognitive scientists generally agree that mental properties may not be easily reduced to neurobiological properties, due to the complex dynamical nature of the brain. In an analogous fashion, several sociological theorists have used complexity theory to argue against attempts to explain societies in terms of individuals, a reductionist approach known as *methodological individualism*. Because many socially emergent phenomena are difficult to explain in terms of the system's components and their interactions, these theorists have claimed that emergentist thinking supports sociological collectivism and realism, and that individualist approaches will have limited success as a potential explanation for many social phenomena.

For example, due to complexity and emergence, there may be potential limitations of individualist methodologies such as neoclassical microeconomics and evolutionary psychology. Complexity theory suggests that both psychology and microeconomics are likely to be severely limited in their ability to explain human behavior in groups. As currently conceived, psychology is the study of system independent properties of individuals (e.g., variables, traits, mental models, cognitive capacities). Microeconomics is the study of how collective phenomena emerge from aggregations of individual preferences and actions. Both are individualist in that they reject explanations that propose that group properties could lawfully influence individual action. Many contemporary paradigms are based on such reductionist assumptions – evolutionary psychology, cognitive neuroscience, behavioral genetics, and social cognition. Yet an emergentist perspective suggests that many social systems may not be explainable in terms of individuals, and that neither psychology nor microeconomics can

fully explain the socially contextualized nature of human behavior.

Because societies are complex systems, individualists cannot assume that a given social system will be reducible to explanations in terms of individuals. However, anti individualists cannot assume that a given social system will not be so reducible. Whether or not a social system can be understood solely in terms of its component individuals and their interactions is an empirical question, to be resolved anew with respect to each social system. Theories of emergence from complexity science show why some social properties cannot be explained in terms of individuals. Thus one cannot assume that methodological individualism can exhaustively explain human behavior in social groups. However, not all social systems are irreducibly complex, and some social properties can be explained by identifying their processes of emergence from individuals in interaction. Complexity approaches can help to determine which approach will be most appropriate for which social system.

Studies of social groups must be fundamentally interdisciplinary, because a focus on emergence requires a simultaneous consideration of multiple levels of analysis: the individual, the communication language, and the group. A complete explanation of the most complex social systems may require interdisciplinary teams composed of psychologists, sociologists, communication scholars, and economists.

SEE ALSO: Collective Action; Computational Sociology; Micro–Macro Links; Parsons, Talcott; Structural Functional Theory; System Theories

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compositional theory of urbanism

Jennifer Schwartz

Compositional theories of urbanism assert that urban unconventionality and urban–rural differences are due mainly to the social characteristics (i.e., class, race/ethnicity, age) of city dwellers. The density and heterogeneity that define the urban environment do not affect how people relate to one another or cause people to deviate. In other words, there are no independent effects of city life on people’s behaviors.

Compositional theory developed in the 1960s largely in reaction to determinist models of urbanism that assumed cities had harmful effects on people’s well being. The prevailing ideology of Louis Wirth (1938) and other determinists was that large, dense environments with a mix of different types of people create conditions harmful to people’s social and psychological well being and contribute to the development of social problems, like crime, illegitimacy, and so on. The high concentration of people in an area was thought to overload one’s senses, leading urban dwellers to retreat into social isolation as a means of adapting to incessant stimuli (Simmel 1964 [1902]). Further, density or crowding might cause greater friction among people, leading to interpersonal violence, greater withdrawal, and “urban malaise” (i.e., loneliness, depression, and anxiety) (Hall 1966; Galle et al. 1972). The diversity of cities and greater division of labor (i.e., heterogeneity) was believed to heighten competition among interest groups, make moral consensus and a sense of community difficult

to achieve, and weaken interpersonal ties and social controls. So, the traditional determinist view was that social conditions of the city undermine social relationships, leading to the adoption of non traditional values and deviant behaviors.

Proponents of the compositional theory of urbanism, however, argued that even in large, dense, heterogeneous areas, people find their own social worlds that insulate them from the effects of the urban environment. For example, Herbert Gans (1962b: 65–6) suggests that “[the city] population consists mainly of relatively homogeneous groups, with social and cultural moorings that shield it fairly effectively from the suggested consequences of number, density, and heterogeneity.” That is, people can achieve a sense of community within their neighborhoods whether they live in large cities or small towns. City dwellers, like others, create and sustain personal networks that lend emotional and social support and provide stakes in conformity. These intimate social circles may be based on kinship, ethnicity, neighborhood, occupation, or lifestyle, but basic group dynamics and the quality and extent of social relationships are unaffected by the urban environment.

Compositional theorists critiqued determinists for failing to recognize the “mosaic of social worlds” that exist in the city and, instead, concentrating on the social problems located in certain segments of the city. By selectively examining highly transient, impoverished (inner city) areas, determinists mistakenly attributed anemic social bonds among people, higher levels of mental health issues, and social problems to city life when these outcomes are more likely attributable to high population turnover – a feature in some communities that made it difficult to build and sustain social relationships. Transience was responsible for anonymity and detachment from mainstream society and social relationships. In other areas of the city not characterized by such high population mobility, social life was taking place in relatively small groups (e.g., families, neighborhoods) just as in smaller communities across the country.

Early qualitative evidence supports compositionalist claims of the endurance and vitality of social ties in urban settings. In *The Urban*

Villagers, Gans (1962a) presents a picture of organized, cohesive ethnic communities in Boston. In her work *The Urban Neighborhood*, Keller (1968) concludes that urban neighboring exists, but the strength of neighborhood ties varies by the composition of the neighborhood, for example by social class or family structure. Others also demonstrate across various urban contexts that people in cities are not lonely or isolated and have strong family, peer, and neighborhood networks (Suttles 1968; Howell 1973; Fischer et al. 1977). More recent quantitative work has gone beyond documenting the existence of social ties in urban settings and focuses on empirically assessing how the extent/size, type, and use of social networks differ across settings as well as among city dwellers (e.g., by race/ethnicity, life cycle). Further, compositionalist work has provided a basis for the development of more nuanced theoretical approaches to studying social networks in urban (and non urban) settings, such as Claude Fischer's subcultural theory of urbanism.

Compositional theorists do not deny that there are aggregate level behavioral differences along the urban-rural continuum. However, they attribute these differences primarily to the different kinds of people found in urban areas compared to suburban and rural areas rather than to effects of urbanism itself. People's characteristics – social class, age/life cycle, family status, race/ethnicity – largely shape their behaviors and define their ways of life. The concentration in urban settings of individuals with certain traits accounts for the greater unconventionality of cities. For example, the effect of being married on the likelihood of engaging in crime is the same in an urban context as in a suburban or rural context. If there is more crime in the city, it is, in good part, due to more crime prone, unmarried people living in the city than in other types of areas. Further, the city selectively attracts certain kinds of people who are more amenable to non traditional lifestyles – the young, the deviant, the unmarried – accounting for urban-rural differences. Compositional theorists explain lifestyle differences between urban dwellers and others as being due to demographic differences, not social breakdown. So, they would expect that once demographic

differences are taken into account, urban/non urban differences should disappear.

Urban populations do tend to be younger, less often married, and more heterogeneous in terms of race/ethnicity, religion, and social class. Some studies show that much of the relationship between population density (a measure of how urban a place is) and pathology (e.g., delinquency, welfare, hospitalization for mental illness) disappears once demographic factors are taken into account. For example, higher urban crime rates may be due to greater poverty levels in urban areas: social class affects both living arrangements (i.e., density) and the likelihood of engaging in crime. However, though the relationship is lessened considerably, most empirical research shows that urban/non urban differences in unconventionality and rates of social problems remain, even after taking into account demographic features of place. It would be an overstatement to conclude that living in an urban environment has *no* effect on people, but compositionists are likely correct that much of the effects of the urban environment operate through social networks and vary according to social characteristics of residents.

Compositional theorists recognize that demographic characteristics *associated* with urban-rural differences do not *explain* these differences. They emphasize that demographic characteristics shape roles, opportunities, and behavioral expectations, so attention should be directed toward the social, economic, and political forces that shape expectations, opportunities, and roles available to various groups. For example, compositionists would point to the need to examine how job availability attracts certain kinds of workers to a given place or how housing market practices (including discrimination, but also pricing and lending practices) shape residential "choice" such that certain kinds of people are attracted to certain kinds of neighborhoods. They also emphasize the need to examine the larger social systems in which cities are embedded. Urban economies are shaped by national and international forces; the economic demands placed on cities influence the kind of workers drawn to an area. For example, city economies based on the production of technology (e.g., Silicon Valley) may attract a relatively educated workforce; a

labor market rich in construction jobs may attract a greater than average share of men.

At the heart of urban sociology is the question: what are the consequences of urban life? According to compositional theorists, there are no negative consequences of living in dense, urban environments. Social networks are alive and well in cities, if you know where to look. These social networks insulate people from the stress and strains of daily urban living. Compositionalists attribute urban/non urban differences to the social characteristics of people who live in urban settings, not to the urban environment itself. Though this premise is only partially accurate, compositionalist theory represents one of the first serious statements that ran counter to the popular turn of the century premise that cities were divisive and alienating. The major tenets of the theory have contributed to the development of more sophisticated analytic models that take into account demographic differences across place and self selection factors. Compositionalist theory has also provided a firm grounding for more current theoretical approaches to understanding urban dynamics and differences across urban and non urban settings.

SEE ALSO: Urban Ecology; Urban Political Economy; Urban Poverty; Urbanism, Subcultural Theory of

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compulsory heterosexuality

Eric Anderson

Popularized by Rich (1981), compulsory heterosexuality is the cultural assumption that both males and females are biologically predisposed to heterosexuality. The assumption that biology excludes a naturalized explanation of homosexuality limits humans to only heterosexual attraction. Therefore, the operation of compulsory heterosexuality usually involves the hegemonic manner in which heterosexuality is reified and naturalized, while homosexuality is considered the product of either psychological dysfunction or personal deviant choice. From this understanding homosexuality is deviant because it is thought to go against supposed natural inclinations. Hegemonic understandings of heterosexuality have often been supported by the misconception that other animals are also exclusively heterosexual, even though Bagemihl (1999) has shown homosexuality, as temporary sexual behavior and as a form of long term relationship coupling, exists widely throughout the animal kingdom.

One result of the naturalization of heterosexuality and stigmatization of homosexuality, bisexuality, and transgenderism manifests itself in cultural and institutional inequality for non heterosexuals. The institutionalization of heterosexuality can be found at all levels of

western societies, in which power and privilege are usually dispersed unevenly in the benefit of heterosexuals. Restricting civil marriage to heterosexuals, for example, provides that group of people with significant insurance, taxation, and many other economic and social privileges that are denied to gay and lesbian couples.

Rich goes on to argue that validation of heterosexuals at the expense of non heterosexuals influences the reproduction of male privilege in a patriarchal society by both political means and social violence. She contends that in a society in which men control most aspects of women's institutional lives, including their right to birth control, abortion, and occupational equality, women are essentially bound to a binary system of oppression. Should they choose not to participate in heterosexual family structure, they are stigmatized and further denied social and institutional support. Rich asserts that the naturalization of heterosexuality is so hegemonic that even feminists have failed to account for the overwhelming effects it has on oppressing women. She even suggests that compulsory heterosexuality promotes a political institution of domestic violence. For example, the naturalization of heterosexuality is thought to excuse men's violence against women because "that's just the way it (biologically) is" (Rich 1981: 154). In some respects, this boys will be boys attitude suggests that men may actually be victims themselves (i.e., victimized by their own biological destiny).

Much of the fervor over Rich's thesis has diminished over the years, which is perhaps attributable to the widespread institutional and cultural gains that gays and lesbians have made since 1981 (Widmer et al. 1998). Whether it is a result of people and societies increasingly viewing homosexuality as the process of natural outcomes or not, gays and lesbians have made substantial progress in securing institutional equality. Consequently, much of the discussion of compulsory heterosexuality has shifted to the examination of heterosexism, which assumes that heterosexuality is and ought to remain culturally and institutionally privileged. Although heterosexism is thought to operate with less overt homophobia than compulsory heterosexuality as well as with more covert mechanisms, Clausell and Fiske (2005) and others have shown that prejudice toward those

other than heterosexuals increasingly reflects ambivalence: a combination of both positive and negative attitudes and behaviors. Ambivalence, of course, normally does little to change the status quo, thereby slowing the progress that gays and lesbians make toward full civil and cultural equality.

SEE ALSO: Bisexuality; Heterosexual Imaginary; Heterosexuality; Homophobia; Homophobia and Heterosexism; Homosexuality

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computational sociology

William Sims Bainbridge

A new sociological approach employs computer simulation and artificial intelligence in the development of theories and in empirical research. Much of the early work was carried out in the areas of social exchange and social networks. The initial methodology – variously called *artificial social intelligence*, *agent based modeling*, or *multi agent systems* – employs the ordinary based computer models of human interaction. Computer and information scientists have recently developed similar techniques for analyzing empirical data, with names like *machine learning*, *recommender systems*, and *latent semantic analysis*. There is good reason to believe that computational sociology will spread beyond the specialized subfields that first adopted it and

become a major approach in all areas of social research.

THEORY CONSTRUCTION

In *The Nature of Social Science* (1967) and *Social Behavior* (1974), George Homans argued sociological theories should be formalized, much in the manner of classical Greek logic and geometry, as hierarchical structures of propositions beginning with axioms and precise definitions of terms. From these, chains of other propositions should be derived by logical inference, down to hypotheses that could be operationalized in rigorous empirical studies. Unfortunately, traditional sociology did not have rigorous methods for carrying out deductions from axioms, or precise definitions of concepts.

This is where computer simulations came in. A computer program is a structure of algorithms, which are formal procedures for achieving particular goals. Typically, an algorithm sets forth a series of unambiguous steps the machine must go through, from an initial set of conditions to the desired result. A mathematical proof is also an algorithm, and computers have begun to play a useful role in sections of mathematical proofs that may be too complex for a human mathematician to handle in a reasonable period of time. Most famously, after a century of effort by human mathematicians, a computer was essential in completing the proof that areas on any flat map can be colored in with only four colors, without there being the same color on both sides of any boundary.

Probably the first example was the computer program Logic Theorist, completed in 1956 by Allen Newell, Herbert Simon, and J. C. Shaw (Crevier 1993). Historians consider it the very first successful artificial intelligence program, and it was able to prove 38 theorems from the influential treatise *Principia Mathematica* by Bertrand Russell and Alfred North Whitehead. Logic Theorist employed simple transformation rules to work from initial axioms to theorems, in the manner of classical deductive logic. Computational sociologists have generally found this particular method too limited, and they have looked for a way to model interaction among human beings more directly. In a review article

on computational sociology, Macy and Willer (2002) argue that agent based modeling is the most promising approach.

An *agent* is a computational entity that can act, somewhat in the manner of an animal or human being, sensing external events and doing things that affect the environment. Autonomous software agents can be either simple or complex, but even the simplest can produce complex effects when many of them interact in a multi agent system. Agents can be heterogeneous, either following different rules of behavior or possessing different resources and memories that cause them to act in different ways even when following a shared set of rules. As in the real world, interaction in many such programs is a decentralized or distributed process that occurs locally around individuals and small groups, and that builds from the local level to create large scale social phenomena.

Perhaps the most influential simulation for sociologists was actually carried out by a political scientist, Robert Axelrod, who explored the conditions under which self interest could bring people to cooperate with each other. Sociologists in some schools of thought had long argued that shared values, religion, or stable cultural institutions are essential to bring people to act cooperatively in their dealings with each other. Axelrod's simulation intentionally left out all these factors, to see if they were really necessary. He challenged social and computer scientists to write algorithms that would compete for resources in a simulated tournament, each representing a strategy that one or more agents would follow in exchanges where each promised to give the other some benefit. One successful algorithm was Tit for Tat. It had two simple rules: (1) on the first turn interacting with another agent, cooperate; (2) after the first turn, do whatever the other agent did the previous time. In a population of agents following various rules, Tit for Tat outperformed other strategies in terms of allowing the agent to benefit from mutually profitable exchanges, without being exploited frequently by deceitful agents. Axelrod's study does not prove that human cooperation results from entirely self interested behavior based on a simple strategy, but it does prove that other factors are not logically necessary.

STUDIES IN COMPUTATIONAL SOCIOLOGY

Axelrod's research assumed that individuals have the opportunity to interact repeatedly, and thus to learn how their potential exchange partners habitually behave. Macy and Skvoretz (1998) explored the emergence of cooperation in a population of strangers who interact at random but with three behavioral options: (1) cooperate – give in hopes of a profitable return; (2) cheat – take what the other person offers but give nothing in return; or (3) exit – refuse to give or take. The computer simulated agents also had the equivalent of visible emotions that might signal their intentions, and some ability to perceive the emotions of others. The study also experimented with how local or distant the exchanges were, effectively dividing relations into neighbors and strangers. The first finding was that the more costly it was to exit exchange relationships, the more likely it was that the agents would cooperate, especially with neighbors. Perhaps most significantly, cooperation between strangers was fragile but could evolve, and the study explores the conditions that permit this to happen. It also illustrates the significance of local groups as the breeding ground for culture, such as implicit norms of trust.

In another research project, Macy (1995) combined computer simulations directly with laboratory experimentation involving real human beings. He was interested in a strategy different from Tit for Tat that can also produce cooperation in multi agent simulations. The PAVLOV algorithm – named for the early twentieth century Russian psychologist who studied how the behavior of dogs can be conditioned by rewards – has the same first rule as Tit for Tat, but its second rule differs: After the first turn, if the previous turn was rewarding repeat that behavior, otherwise switch to the opposite behavior from last turn. After using multi agent simulations to develop hypotheses about PAVLOV, Macy ran experiments in which a series of volunteer research subjects thought they were playing computer based exchange games with other people, but those alleged other people were actually a multi agent simulation.

Many simulations explore factors other than strategies for trading with exchange partners,

notably allowing the agents to gain information from their environments. Takahashi (2000) explored the evolution of general exchange among a group of people, in which individuals would give to other people to the extent they perceived that the other individual behaved fairly in exchanges with others, quite apart from their personal experience of having been rewarded by that individual. Bainbridge (1995a, 1995b) has explored the emergence of both religious faith and ethnic prejudice in societies composed of agents intentionally designed to have limited ability to process information, on the theory that the limitations of the human mind are responsible for some of the key features of culture. Carley (1991) has argued that social organizations can be viewed as mechanisms for processing information. Inspired by Carley's theory, Mark (1998) has used computer simulations of communication interactions to explore how social groups of various sizes become differentiated, on the basis of information shared within subgroups.

Markovsky (1992) has explored the limits of predictability in the behavior of social exchange networks where individual agents may have slightly different structural power. When the networks are small, results tend to be highly regular and predictable. But Markovsky found that larger networks often become highly sensitive to very minor differences in the power of one of the positions. Results can become unpredictable. Thus, complex computer simulations are often chaotic, leading to unexpected outcomes. Markovsky suggests that the behavior of social networks in the real world may be predictable only if they are small and operate for a short period of time. Large scale social behavior, however, may be chaotic, sometimes fitting into neat patterns, and at other times diverging to quite unanticipated consequences. Carley and Svoboda (1996) have simulated the adaptation of formal organizations such as corporations, finding that the relationship between organizational design and performance is chaotic, with tiny initial differences between organizations sometimes leading to very substantial differences in outcomes.

Similarly, Bainbridge (1997) explored chaotic behavior in the competition between religious movements. Conventional theory holds that religious movements succeed either because

they have unusually charismatic leaders or because they serve the status needs of deprived social classes and disadvantaged minorities. Bainbridge experimented with a set of agent based computer simulations that ignored these factors and simply modeled the spread of competing movements in a social network, following three rules: (1) an individual will convert to a movement if a plurality of his associates already belong to it; (2) an individual will tend to break ties to neighbors who belong to different movements from his own; (3) members of one especially aggressive movement will tend to establish bonds with neighbors regardless of their affiliations, in what sociologists of religion call *outreach*. The first two rules alone produce a quick stalemate, in which a few people are converted before each movement becomes socially isolated and all action halts. The third rule allows a small movement to grow through outreach in an environment consisting of several other denominations, with difficulty but inexorably, if many of its members are initially concentrated in the same neighborhood and therefore can achieve a concentration of forces that gives it a local majority from which it can expand. If the simulation begins with random distribution of movement membership across the social network, the outcome depends very sensitively on whether a critical mass of members of a movement practicing outreach happens to concentrate in one neighborhood.

CHAOS, INDETERMINACY, AND THE LIMITS OF REDUCTIONISM

The frequent appearance of chaotic effects in sociological computer simulations reminds us that chaotic effects have been observed in physical sciences, notably cosmology. No one was watching, perhaps 15 billion years ago, when our current cosmos emerged from an infinitesimal point in the proverbial Big Bang. Both the details and some fundamental principles remain obscure, but the standard cosmological model envisions an expanding mass of subatomic particles, in which the most important for future human life were the free protons and electrons that combined to form hydrogen atoms as the universe cooled. Tiny, random heterogeneities allowed matter to collect

gravitationally into galaxies, stars, and planets. The nuclear reactions inside stars synthesized heavier elements, notably carbon that forms sufficiently complex molecules with itself and with other elements to be the basis of life. Stars of a particular size range exploded and hurled these elements into space where they could collect into planets. On a small fraction of planets – those just the right size at the right distance from a star in a stable solar system – life evolved from inorganic matter, and over time life diversified, including the evolution of very complex life forms. On at least one planet, but probably on only a vanishingly small fraction of all planets, intelligent social life emerged and founded a science of sociology to study the laws governing its own interactions. From this perspective, the universe is a complex, chaotic system that contains adaptive subsystems, such as biological evolution and human learning.

As George Homans frequently remarked, social process may be either convergent or divergent. In a *convergent* process, random effects are damped out by large numbers of social interactions, so the phenomena are rather lawful and therefore predictable. In a *divergent* process, small changes at one point in time escalate to produce big differences later in time. Divergence is chaotic, but it can lead to situations that stabilize, at least for long periods of time, and thus establish a new, if ultimately temporary, set of sociological laws. For example, the accidental death by disease of Alexander the Great, on June 13, 323 BCE at the age of 32, before he could consolidate his empire, made it possible for Rome to defeat Macedonia a century later, setting the stage for the Roman Empire and such vast cultural developments as the rise of Christianity.

Thus, the chaos arising from the behaviors of individuals in interaction with each other, illustrated by agent based computer simulations, has an unmeasured but probably great effect on the development of societies and the entire world, at the very least setting some of the cultural characteristics. Some events may set major conditions for future events. In the language of chaos theory, human history is *path dependent*, and the route actually taken to reach the current year constrains what may happen next, even as today's random events may take us on a new course. These observations suggest

that sociology and related social sciences must examine the concrete sociocultural conditions that prevail and chart changes as they occur, recognizing that some apparently small but qualitatively different changes may cascade over time to have decisive impacts.

INDUCTIVE THEORY

Since the 1960s, sociologists have been using computers to test theories empirically, chiefly through statistical analysis of quantitative data. In the ideal situation, the theoretical literature provides one or more theories from which the researcher derives one or more testable hypotheses whose key concepts can be operationalized in more or less rigorously measured variables. The researcher then either collects new data or finds an existing data set that contains the appropriate variables. The statistical analysis determines whether the hypotheses are supported by the data, taking account of such things as statistical significance and interactions among independent or intervening variables.

This tradition of computer assisted research has tended to emphasize theory testing rather than scientific discovery, and as computer technology and information resources have improved over the years, this bias has led to an increasing number of lost opportunities. In the 1960s, computers were primarily suited to the testing of well defined theories, but the Internet based computational infrastructure of the early years of the twenty first century is far better suited to discovery, not only of hypotheses that can be tested in subsequent studies following the traditional approach, but also of complex models that transcend twentieth century notions of what sociological theory fundamentally is.

Data mining is the use of sophisticated statistical and machine learning techniques to discover meaningful patterns in data. It is often associated with *data fusion* and *information integration*, sets of methods for bringing data together from multiple, distributed sources and combining different kinds of information, including multi modal sources and texts in multiple languages. For decades, sociologists have employed statistical methods like exploratory factor analysis, cluster analysis,

and multi dimensional scaling to find patterns in raw data, but they have not been especially enterprising in adopting new methods coming out of computer science, notably machine learning techniques in which autonomous software agents hunt for meaningful information.

The World Wide Web has arguably become the chief societal institution that not only transmits but also organizes human culture, and its influence can only grow in the future as most forms of information and culture migrate to it. Like the Roman bureaucracy before it, the Internet provides highways over which long distance communication takes place, plus the rules that shape the meanings communicated. Consider the *recommender and reputation systems* employed by influential commercial web sites like Amazon.com and eBay. The pages on Amazon.com for books by one of the most influential sociologists says: "Customers who bought titles by Max Weber also bought titles by these authors: Émile Durkheim, George Herbert Mead, Erving Goffman, Peter L. Berger." One may then look up each of these other authors, and trace a network of similarities outward until one has a chart of the network of affinities between authors that comprise the cultural territory of sociology. Based on the actual buying behavior of customers, such systems automatically categorize the books, music recordings, and objects sold. Thus, they simultaneously create the cultural ontologies of the future, on the basis of the behavior of the millions of people using the systems, and offer valuable tools for the sociologist who wants to study these phenomena.

New and effective linguistic tools such as Latent Semantic Analysis exist for comparing written texts online, such as political statements or Web home pages. Such methods constitute *computational ethnology*, rigorous techniques for mapping cultures and their processes of change, employing autonomous artificial intelligence agents. For example, one may use the Vivísimo clustering engine to chart relations among websites located by the Lycos search engine, on the basis of the frequencies of words shared by the sites. Searching for "God," in a demonstration limited to fewer than 200 sites, turns up 198 sites that Vivísimo places in ten categories, which it automatically labels: Church (26 sites), Life (17), Ministry (14), Loved (12),

Religious (12), God Exist (9), Children (7), Answers (9), Art (11), and Music (7). Without requiring any judgment by a human researcher, the system has identified ten chief themes surrounding God in our society, which we may further group as follows: religious institutions (Church, Ministry, Religious), personal needs and emotions (Life, Loved, Children), intellectual (God Exist, Answers), and aesthetic (Art, Music).

Websites may also be mapped in terms of the hyperlink connections between them. On June 10, 2004, the Alta Vista search engine was able to find a total of 4,964 websites that had links to the home page of the American Sociological Association. In contrast, it found fully 27,355 websites that linked to the American Psychological Association home page. Such data not only allow one to compare the Web based popularities of organizations, discovering here that psychology is far more central to American society than sociology, but they can also show connections to specific institutions of society. Only 7.5 percent of the links to the ASA home page are from websites in the .COM domain, compared with 36.4 percent of the sites linking to the APA – strong evidence that psychology is more connected to the commercial sector.

Some of the sociological approaches that made the least use of old style statistical “number crunching” – symbolic interactionism, ethnomethodology, and comparative historical analysis – are likely to benefit most from these new forms of computing. What these approaches have in common is a focus on socially constructed realities that cannot easily be captured in discrete variables but consist of a tangle of contested meanings and negotiated roles. With the vast torrent of meaning communicated over the Internet, it is possible to take *grounded theory* (Glaser & Strauss 1967) to an entirely new level of sophistication, allowing us to study the aggregate results of chaotic social processes and thereby discover new theoretical concepts grounded in the socially constructed definitions currently dominant in the society.

This empirical computational sociology can become the input to multi agent simulations designed to develop formal theoretical systems based on a combination of general laws

of interaction with the specific chaos generated social facts of the current social world. A recent development in computer science is the marriage of realtime empirical research and simulation in dynamic data driven systems, an approach that apparently has yet to be employed in the social sciences but is being used already in meteorology. Many years of effort will be required to fulfill the vision of computational sociology, as talented sociologists in collaboration with computer and information scientists develop new methods and evangelize for them across the subfields of the discipline.

SEE ALSO: Complexity and Emergence; Computer Aided/Mediated Analysis; Qualitative Computing; Theory and Methods; Theory Construction

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computer-aided/ mediated analysis

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One of the key features of qualitative – non numerical – data is that they are messy and usually voluminous. We wind up with huge piles of texts: transcripts, field notes, documents, questionnaires, pictures, audio, video, and so on, and have to sort our way through them. Add to this the need to find a rigorous approach to the analysis of these large quantities of data, and the researcher faces a daunting task. Researchers from different disciplines and different methodological perspectives will take different approaches to this task, but in most cases, computers can help.

Whether we are looking for what we think are identifiable phenomena that we can cluster together into categories or themes, or some more emergent, holistic sense of the data, we need to be able to organize the data in some way. We need to be able to find our way through it, whether by chronology, narrative structure, topic, case type, theme, or by some other kind of relationship between one piece of text and another. We may need to be able to

pull together all the pieces of text that have to do with a topic. We may need to be able to see each utterance in its original context to know what it means. Or we may need to be able to find support for a proposition or find the data that contradict it. When working with the often enormous piles of text generated in qualitative research, being careful, diligent, and thorough can be a tremendous challenge, both because of the volume of the data and the complexity of the thought required to analyze it. For all of these tasks, computers can be a big help (Weitzman & Miles 1995b; Weitzman 1999, 2003, 2004).

Software for qualitative data analysis (QDA) allows the analyst systematically to index and organize the data and then to retrieve the data reliably and flexibly in many different ways. For example, it can facilitate finding all the data *the analyst has previously identified* as indicating a particular theme or conceptual category, and it can facilitate parsing these data into subgroups based on demographic or other categorical or quantitative variables. It can also find all the cases where a theme was not present, or where combinations of themes are present, and so on. With the use of Boolean operators the analyst can construct queries of arbitrary complexity and execute them nearly instantly. The speed and consistency with which QDA software can carry out such operations already make it far more feasible to regularly carry out the kinds of analyses referred to above (Weitzman 2004).

However, it is critical to remember that software can provide tools to help you analyze qualitative data, but it cannot do the analysis for you – not in the same sense in which a statistical package like SPSS, SAS, or STATA can do, say, multiple regression. Many researchers have had the hope – for others, it is a fear – that the computer could somehow read the text and decide what it all means. That is, generally speaking, not the case. Thus it is particularly important to emphasize that using software cannot be a substitute for learning data analysis methods. The researcher must know what needs to be done and must do it. The software provides some tools to do it with.

An interesting series of empirical studies of research practice by Fielding, Lee, and Mangabeira (Fielding & Lee 1998; Mangabeira et al. 2004) has suggested that QDA software

use may not always result in projects being more quickly completed. One important observation is that the work of initial coding of data is not much faster on screen than on paper. Further, on the first attempt at using QDA software, a significant investment of learning time may be required, which may slow things down, particularly at the outset. However, for users who are able to gain proficiency at software use after the initial learning period, the picture may soon change. Considering the sorts of operations described in the paragraph above, and in the discussion of particular types of software below, it is hard to imagine the researcher who can carry out those same functions as quickly by hand. This creates the opportunity for either more rapid production of results by the same methods that would have been employed by hand, or for the use of methods which would be too time consuming without the assistance of software. For a more detailed discussion of hopes and fears, and the limits of what software can do, see Weitzman (2003).

TYPES AND FUNCTIONS OF SOFTWARE FOR QDA

This is a rough sorting of available software into types. There is naturally quite a bit of overlap among categories, with individual programs having functions that would seem to belong to more than one type. However, it is possible to focus on the “heart and soul” of a program: what it mainly is intended for. This categorization scheme was first presented in Weitzman and Miles (1995b). Since then, the landscape has changed somewhat, both in terms of what programs do and in terms of what kinds of programs qualitative researchers are using. Some of the categories, like “code and retrieve” software, are virtually empty at this point. Others, like “textbase managers,” appear to be rarely used by qualitative researchers. Most of the interest, and virtually all of the recent literature on the use of these programs, has focused on one category, “code based theory builders.” Nonetheless, qualitative researchers often find themselves faced with unique challenges – unusual data sets, novel analytic needs – and a knowledge of the range of

options remains useful. The categories are illustrated with examples of programs that fit them at the time of this writing.

Text Retrievers

Text retrievers specialize in finding all the instances of words and phrases in text, in one or several files. They typically also allow you to search for places where two or more words or phrases coincide within a specified distance (a number of words, sentences, pages, etc.) and allow you to sort the resulting passages into different output files and reports. Free, easy to use search programs available on the World Wide Web (e.g., X1 and Google Desktop) do these basic things very well. Many of the programs qualitative researchers typically turn to, on the other hand, may do other things as well, such as content analysis functions like counting, displaying keywords in context, or creating concordances (organized lists of all words and phrases in their contexts), or they may allow you to attach annotations or even variable values (for things like demographics or source information) to points in the text. Examples of text retrievers are Sonar Professional, ZyIN DEX, and a variety of free (but hard to use) GREP tools available on the World Wide Web.

Textbase Managers

Textbase managers are database programs specialized for storing text in more or less organized fashion. They are good at holding text, together with information about it, and allowing you to organize quickly and sort your data in a variety of ways, and retrieve it according to different criteria. Some are better suited to highly structured data that can be organized into “records” (that is, specific cases) and “fields” (variables – information that appears for each case), while others easily manage “free form” text. They may allow you to define fields in the fixed manner of a traditional database such as Microsoft Access or FileMaker Pro, or they may allow significantly more flexibility (e.g., allowing different records to have different field structures). Their search operations may be as good as (or sometimes even better than) those of some text retrievers.

Examples of textbase managers are askSam, InfoTree, and TEXTBASE ALPHA.

Code and Retrieve

Code and retrieve is the dominant paradigm for qualitative analysis software, but at this point most programs with code and retrieve capability have evolved to the more sophisticated code based theory builder category discussed next. These programs are often developed by qualitative researchers specifically for the purpose of qualitative data analysis. As a baseline, the programs in this category have specialized in allowing the researcher to apply category tags (codes) to passages of text, and later retrieve and display the text according to the researcher's coding. These programs have at least some search capacity, allowing you to search either for codes or words and phrases in the text. They may have a capacity to store memos. Even the weakest of these programs represented a quantum leap forward from the old scissors and paper approach, being more systematic, more thorough, less likely to miss things, more flexible, and much, much faster. Examples of code and retrieve programs were the earlier versions of The Ethnograph, HyperQual2, Kwalitan, QUALPRO, Martin, and The Data Collector.

Code Based Theory Builders

Code based theory builders today appear to attract most of the qualitative researchers who employ software for their analyses. Most of these programs are also based on a code and retrieve model, but they go beyond the functions of code and retrieve programs. They do not, nor would you want them to, build theory for you. Rather, they have special features or routines that go beyond those of code and retrieve programs in supporting your theory building efforts. For example, they may allow you to represent relations among codes, build higher order classifications and categories, or formulate and test theoretical propositions about the data. For the most part, these programs allow you to create hierarchical trees of codes, but some (notably Atlas/ti and HyperRESEARCH) allow for non hierarchical networks as well. They may have more powerful

memoing features (allowing you, for example, to categorize or code your memos) or more sophisticated search and retrieval functions than had the earlier code and retrieve programs. They may have extended and sophisticated hyperlinking features, allowing you to link segments of text together, or to create links among segments of text, graphics, photos, video, audio, websites, and more. They may also offer capabilities for "system closure," allowing you to feed results of your analyses (such as search results or memos) back into the system as data. One program, QUALRUS, uses artificial intelligence techniques to suggest coding.

Increasingly, code based theory builders support the integration of quantitative and qualitative data. It is important to distinguish here between "numbers in" capabilities and "numbers out" capabilities. With regard to numbers in approaches, some programs have strong facilities for applying quantitative or categorical variables to qualitative data sets, allowing the analyst to associate demographics, test scores, or survey results, for example, with the cases in their qualitative data. In the best implementations you can easily import whole spreadsheets of such variables into the qualitative analysis package and flexibly and easily examine subsets of cases based on combinations of these variables. For example, you might want to compare the occurrence of some qualitative theme you have identified in different demographic categories. Numbers out capabilities, on the other hand, allow the analyst to generate quantitative data based on their qualitative work and export it for further analysis in spreadsheets or statistical packages. The best implementations here allow you not only to generate numbers based on frequency of coding, but also to use coding for developing scores, flexibly generate frequencies of co-occurrence of codes either on text passages or within documents, and give you good control over the parameters of the matrices of numbers generated.

Finally, code based theory builders are supporting teamwork with increasing flexibility. Many programs will now at least allow you to lump together coding work done on different copies of a data set (perhaps by different coders) into one new data set. More sophisticated merge

functions allow you to track team members' work: who wrote which memo, who used which code on which passage of text, and so on, allowing not only more control over the merge, but also facilitating collaboration, and particularly discussions of differences in coding. Some programs will allow the generation of statistics assessing consistency of coding, or inter coder reliability, and it is important to pay attention to the fact that different programs use quite different statistical models for this.

Multimedia capabilities have become for many researchers a significant issue in software choice. There are now several programs in the code based theory builder category that allow you to use audio and video, as well as text, as data: AFTER, ATLAS/ti, C I SAID, HyperRESEARCH, InterClipper, TAMS Analyzer, and Transana all allow you to code and annotate audio and/or video files and search and retrieve from them, in ways quite similar to the ways they let you manipulate text. In these programs you can play a media file (audio or video), mark the beginning and ending points of segments, and then treat those segments much like segments of text.

Examples of code based theory builders are AFTER, AnSWR, AQUAD, ATLAS/ti, C I SAID, HyperRESEARCH, MAXqda, NUD•IST, NVivo, QCA, fs/QCA, QUALRUS, and The Ethnograph. Three of these programs – AQUAD, QCA, and fs/QCA – support cross case configurational analysis, QCA being dedicated wholly to this method and not having any text coding capabilities, and fs/QCA supporting Ragin's fuzzy set extension of this methodology (Ragin 2000).

Conceptual Network Builders

These programs emphasize the creation and analysis of network displays. Some of them are focused on allowing you to create network drawings: graphic representations of the relationships among concepts. Examples of these are Inspiration and Visio. Others are focused on the analysis of cognitive or semantic networks (e.g., the program MECA). Still others offer some combination of the two approaches (e.g., SemNet and Decision Explorer). Finally, ATLAS/ti, a program also listed under code based theory

builders, also has a fine graphical network builder connected to the analytic work you do with your text and codes, while others, like NVivo, offer an integrated drawing module which does not manipulate underlying relationships.

Summary

In concluding this discussion of the five main software family types, it is important to emphasize that functions often cross type boundaries. For example, askSAM can be used to code and retrieve and has an excellent text search facility. ATLAS/ti, NUD•IST, NVivo, The Ethnograph, and MAXqda graphically represent the relationships among codes, although among these only ATLAS/ti allows you to work with and manipulate the drawing. The first release of NVivo lets you draw diagrams, but any connections you draw are only represented in the diagram – they are not representations of the defined relationships among codes and other objects, as in ATLAS/ti. You see the actual relationships among codes in a hierarchical “explorer” with expandable and collapsible branches, as in NUD•IST, The Ethnograph, and MAXqda. The Ethnograph and MAXqda each have a system for attaching variable values (text, date, numeric, etc.) to text files and/or cases. Sphinx Survey allows you to work with survey data consisting of a mix of qualitative and quantitative data. The implication: do not decide too early which family you want to choose from. Instead, stay focused on the functions you need.

CHOOSING QDA SOFTWARE

There is no one best software program for analyzing qualitative data. Furthermore, there is no one best program for a particular type of research or analytic method. Researchers will sometimes ask “what's the best program for a study of health services?” or “what's the best program for doing grounded theory?” or “what's the best program for analyzing focus groups?” None of these questions has a good answer. Instead, choice needs to be approached

based on the structure of the data, the specific things the analyst will want to do as part of the analysis, and the needs of the researcher around issues like ease of use, cost, time available, collaboration, and so on.

Four broad questions, along with two cut across issues, can be asked that should guide the researcher to such a choice (Weitzman & Miles 1995a, 1995b; Weitzman 2003). These guidelines for choice have seen wide use in practice since their original formulation and have proven to be effective for guiding researchers to appropriate choices. They are presented here only in outline. For fuller discussions of these choice issues, see Weitzman (1999) or Weitzman (2003).

Specifically, there are four key questions to ask and answer as you move toward choosing one or more software packages, and some sub points to the third and fourth are included here:

- 1 What kind of computer user am I?
- 2 Am I choosing for one project or the next few years?
- 3 What kind of project(s) and database(s) will I be working on?
 - Single vs. multiple cases
 - Data sources per case: single vs. multiple
 - Data types (e.g., text, graphics, audio, video)
 - Structured vs. open (e.g., fixed response vs. free text)
 - Uniform vs. diverse entries (e.g., all interviews, or a mix of data types)
 - Size of DATABASE
- 4 What kinds of analyses am I planning to do?
 - Exploratory vs. confirmatory
 - Coding scheme firm at start vs. evolving
 - Multiple vs. single coding of passages
 - Iterative vs. one pass
 - Interest in context of data
 - Intentions for displays
 - Qualitative only, or numbers included (and numbers in vs. numbers out)
 - Collaboration

In addition to these four key questions, there are two cut across issues to bear in mind: How important is it to you to maintain a sense of "closeness" to your data? What are your financial constraints when buying software and the hardware it needs to run on?

With these basic issues clear (reference to a fuller version of these questions may be necessary), you will be able to look at specific programs in a more active, deliberate way, seeing what does or does not meet your needs. (You may find it helpful to organize your answers to these questions on a worksheet, such as the one proposed in Weitzman (1999), which has rows for each of the questions, and columns for answers, implications/notes, and candidate programs.) For example, if you are working on a complex evaluation study, with a combination of structured interviews, focus groups, and case studies, you will need strong tools for tracking cases through different documents. You might find good support for this in a program's code structures, or through the use of speaker identifiers that track individuals throughout the database.

CONCLUSION

Qualitative data analysis software is not an analysis methodology and it will not automatically analyze data. It provides tools which, in the hands of a competent researcher, can make possible analyses of great depth and rigor. It can facilitate the analyses of data sets of sizes that would not be feasible by hand. (A cautionary note is in order here: there has been an increasing number of projects in recent years in which researchers, believing that software will make it all possible, collect data sets of sizes that make meaningful analyses back breaking, even with software.) There is a wide range of different software packages of different types available. Investigate what is available at the time you prepare your project. Do not constrain yourself to what the person down the hall or the person you met at the conference raved about (though having colleagues who use what you use can be a boon). QDA software, appropriately matched to a project's needs and thoughtfully applied, can greatly enhance the qualitative research enterprise.

SEE ALSO: Computational Sociology; Content Analysis; Conversation Analysis; Critical Qualitative Research; Documentary Analysis; Ethnography; Qualitative Computing; Text/Hypertext; Validity, Qualitative

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Comte, Auguste (1798–1857)

David Michael Orenstein

Auguste Comte named sociology and established the French *realist* approach to the subject. He was born Isidore Auguste Marie François Xavier Comte on January 19, 1798 in the French Mediterranean city of Montpellier during the aftermath of the great French Revolution. In his early teens he rejected the conservative Roman Catholic monarchist views of his parents and declared himself a republican and a free thinker. A prodigy in mathematics, at 15 he passed the nationally competitive entrance exams for the prestigious

École Polytechnique, but had to wait a year until he met the minimum age of admission. A charismatic student leader, in April 1816 Comte was expelled from that school and Paris when a student demonstration was used as an excuse to purge anti-monarchist students. Dropping his first name, he returned to Paris as Auguste Comte in July.

Comte supported himself as a private tutor and attended public lectures on an array of scientific topics. At one of these he met the philosopher Henri de Saint Simon and soon accepted a position as Saint Simon's secretary and editorial assistant. Their relationship terminated in a bitter falling out in 1824. That year Comte also married Caroline Massine, a former Parisian prostitute. In 1826 Comte initiated work on a series of lectures intended to organize all scientific knowledge into a coherent single system. In the course of writing he suffered a nervous breakdown and was institutionalized. Released as uncured into the care of his wife, he attempted suicide, before completing his lectures. Those lectures provided the foundation for Comte's multivolumed *The Positive Philosophy*.

The Positive Philosophy included Comte's arguments for a science of society detailing its areas of focus, methodological approach, and applied use. In early remarks he called that science *social physics*, but then switched to *sociology*, a term he had previously used in private correspondence. He modified and expanded on his conception of sociology in numerous later writings, the most important of which is the *System of Positive Polity*.

In 1844 Comte met Clotilde de Vaux. He credited her with revealing to him the necessity of altruistic love as a foundation for social harmony. After her death two years later he promoted her to sainthood in the Religion of Humanity that he had founded, surrounded himself with disciples, and rejected those who wanted to develop sociology without embracing his religion. Comte died on September 5, 1857.

SOCIOLOGY, POSITIVISM, AND THE HIERARCHY OF THE SCIENCES

Comte's sociology reflects a rejection of Cartesian rationalism. Social relationships are

not to be comprehended by a process of introspective doubt and reflection. Rather, sociology is to be based on empirical observation in order to discover determinate social laws and how these laws can be used to improve social harmony. For Comte, the discovery of such laws constitutes *pure* sociology; discovery of how to use those laws in order to engineer a better society constitutes *applied* sociology.

Sociology is conceived by Comte as part of a larger system of knowledge – *the positive philosophy*. This system assumes a series of increasingly complex levels of reality. Each level of reality is governed by a distinct set of determinant laws that cannot be reduced to (i.e., logically deduced from) those of another level. Each level thus requires a separate science to discover its particular laws. These sciences themselves are presented as social evolutionary developments that emerge from pre scientific explanation. Knowledge originates as *theological*, becomes *metaphysical*, and culminates as *positive* (or scientific). Theological explanations ascribe events to actions of supernatural agencies. Metaphysical explanation assumes that outcomes reflect underlying essences. And positive explanation, according to Comte, relies solely on the objective observation of relationships.

Comte argues that the simpler the subject matter of a science, the sooner it will reach the positive level. In that social reality depends on preexisting physical, chemical, and biological realities, it is the most complex. Therefore, sociology is the last science to emerge. In Comte's hierarchical arrangement of the sciences, sociology's complexity places it first, followed by biology and so on. There is no science of psychology. The basic unit of the social is not the individual but the family. Individuals obtain their identity in the family and larger social entities evolutionarily emerge from the family.

As the highest and final science to emerge, sociology signifies the completion of transformation from pre scientific to scientific knowledge and allows the reorganization of all of social life on scientific principles. This exalted role of providing the foundation for both permanent intellectual and social harmony earns it the title of *the Queen Science*.

SOCIAL STATICS AND SOCIAL DYNAMICS

Comte takes a *realist* approach to society. Society is not a mere construct or simply the aggregation of individual activities. It is a real entity that develops over time. For the purposes of study, Comte makes an analytical distinction between *social dynamics* (the study of change) and *social statics* (the study of order). Comte's social dynamics mostly reflects the Enlightenment inspired evolutionism of the Marquis de Condorcet. Social statics is built primarily on the conservative anti Enlightenment philosophy of Joseph de Maistre. In Comte's sociology there is a persistent tension between Enlightenment and anti Enlightenment sources. An Enlightenment emphasis on progress, independent reason, and scientific questioning of dogma coexists with a desire for a return to medieval harmony, religious faith, obligatory moral codes, and traditional gender roles.

Statically, society is presented as an organic system of interdependent parts. Social harmony is dependent on beliefs, values, moral bonds, and altruistic sentiments that obligate individuals to fulfill duties toward one another and the collective good. The greatest danger to social order comes from self interested *egoism*. Women, who are presumed more socially oriented than men, are essential for reminding men of their social obligations, thereby curbing their tendency toward *egoism*. Dynamically, society is governed by Comte's famous *law of three stages*. According to this law, society (like each science) evolves from a theological to a metaphysical then to a positive stage. These stages are conceived of mentalistically: that is, all the features of a society are shaped by how the events of the world are understood and explained.

The Theological and Metaphysical Stages

In the *theological stage* events are accounted for by the actions of supernatural agencies. In the earliest period of this stage, *fetishism*, human like motivations are attributed to non human entities – the wind, rivers, and animal spirits all have motivations that shape their actions. In

that the world is seen as explicable in terms of human like motivations, fetishism generates little abstract thought to comprehend it and no authoritative priesthood to intercede with greater forces. Accordingly, social progress is slow, technology remains simple, and social organization is marginal with limited coordination of collective undertakings. *Polytheism* replaces fetishism. It personifies the supernatural into deities who control the objects and events of the earth. Contemplation of the deities and the rise of a priesthood with specialized knowledge of how to placate them leads to social advance in intellect and the coordination of collective projects. The evolution of the conception of these deities from simply having differing spheres of control to a hierarchical arrangement ultimately leads to the most advanced form of the theological stage – *monotheism*. If supernatural powers existing within a single entity. Using exclusively medieval European examples, Comte presents monotheistic society as a stable society in which secular and spiritual powers are divided between national rulers and an international church. The spiritual authority functions to constrain and direct the use of secular power for collective purposes. Although stable and harmonious, monotheism exhausts the evolutionary potential of theological reasoning. Monotheism (and the theological stage as a whole) thus begins a decline that undermines the feudal familial, economic, and political institutions that depend on it.

Metaphysical society is both negative and progressive: negative because it provides no foundation for long term social harmony, progressive because it paves the way for the *positivism* to follow. Destruction and false starts in creating the new assure it a comparatively short existence full of intellectual discord and violent conflict. The first part of the stage, *Protestantism*, involves a breakup of monotheism's international spiritual and moral unity leading to intellectual and civil conflict. The second part of the stage, *Deism*, is one of failed attempts to recreate social order based on false principles. For example, the metaphysical doctrine of natural rights is seen as leading to egoistic self aggrandizement and a loss of a sense of obligatory subordination to a greater collective good. Comte views any government and social

order intellectually conceived of as a contract based on such supposed rights as a preordained failure.

The Positive Stage and the Religion of Humanity

The *positive stage* requires sociology's emergence so that society can be reorganized on a scientific basis. A republican, but not a democrat, Comte conceives positive society as run on the basis of scientific principles discovered by a meritocratically selected elite. Due to assumed innate gender differences (males having greater rational ability, women having a greater affective role in the maintenance of social harmony by encouraging altruistic behavior), the elite is to be exclusively male. Comte rejects absolute property rights as metaphysical dogma, but he also rejects communism. He envisions privately held but highly regulated industry. Comte began to lose many of his early followers not only when he said that positive society would need a new secular religion to guide it, but when he additionally began to develop that religion, declaring himself its high priest. Positive society in Comte's final works resembles de Maistre's idealized image of medieval society – an organic whole in which all people know their role obligations both to all others and to the societal whole as they live under the watchful eye of a knowledgeable and beneficent international spiritual authority.

Comte's self anointing as the High Priest of Humanity allowed later generations of sociologists to dismiss him as a mentally unbalanced non sociologist easily relegated to the field's prehistory. But it is a mistake to understand the Religion of Humanity in purely personal and extra sociological terms, thereby ignoring its sociohistorical and social theoretical contexts. Comte undeniably had idiosyncrasies, but his use of religion – even an atheological one – to establish a sociomoral order modified an existing approach in French social thought (e.g., Robespierre's Religion of Reason). Moreover, a new religion makes sense in terms of Comte's theory. In Comte's sociology, the theological content justifying subordination to the social was evolutionarily outdated, but not

the use of religious symbolism and organization. A positive society did not imply advanced scientific thinking amongst all its members. For the common individual sentiment dominated intellect. Social harmony required collective symbols and rituals to create a sense of obligation and subordination to the collective good. As a transnational entity, the Positivist Church was intended to provide world unity. And as an entity independent of secular political authority, it was also to provide a check on the abuse of political power.

SOCIOLOGICAL METHODOLOGY

Despite an emphasis on empirical observation, Comte insists that systematic theory must precede and guide research: without theory, research would produce inapplicable ungraded information. Methodologically, Comte maintains that each science resembles most closely those nearest to it on the hierarchy of the sciences. Sociology therefore resembles biology with its emphasis of classification through comparison. Comte's *comparative method* includes three forms of comparison: comparison of human to non human societies (e.g., insect societies), comparison of societies at the same level of development, and comparison of societies at different levels of development. This third approach forms Comte's *historical method*. Following Condorcet, it is based on treating data from different societies around the world and differing historical periods as if they represent data derived from a single society. The historical method is justified by Comte's social dynamics. Society is actually evolving toward a single worldwide positive society. From this inevitable future perspective all humanity is joined together in social evolution.

Unlike later positivists, Comte rejects the use of mathematical formulae, statistical analysis, and causal reasoning in social analysis. Mathematical formulae are deemed appropriate only for sciences lower on the scientific hierarchy. They are insufficient for the complexities of biology and sociology. Statistical probabilistic reasoning is declared incompatible with sociology's focus on discovering definite deterministic lawful relationships. It implies for Comte an uncertainty incompatible with the degree of

accuracy necessary for applied ameliorative use of sociological knowledge. And, causal analysis is rejected in terms of Comte's reading of Aristotle, Immanuel Kant, and David Hume.

Aristotle argued that causality implies the existence of some ultimate or first cause. Comte sees this as positing some underlying metaphysical essence extrinsic to scientific observation. Kant locates causes not in reality itself but in the human perception of reality. For Comte, this means a cause describes an intermediary representation and not a feature of social reality itself. And Hume presents a cause as always inferred. It is never the product of empirical observation. Comte thus believes that to say "A" causes "B" involves a metaphysical non empirical approach that looks at intermediary perceptual phenomena. He proposes instead only to state objective concomitant or sequential relationships (e.g., "A" exists when "B" exists or "A" exists prior to "B"). For Comte, doing so explains social reality without the distortions of metaphysical suppositions.

Comte presents sociological explanation as both absolute and finite: absolute in that it is unmediated, but finite because it is limited by the practical constraints of human observation. A simple example of scientific limitation is found in Comte's discussion of chemistry. Comte assumes that stars are composed of the same chemical compounds found on earth. But their distance from the earth precludes the possibility of ever traveling to the stars to determine their exact makeup. Rather than such limitations humbling Comte, they embolden him. Comte believes that limits to knowledge mean that sociologists can gain almost all the knowledge available to human observation in a relatively short period of time and then quickly move to applying sociological knowledge to usher in the positive stage. Engineers need not know the composition of the stars to design a structurally sound bridge; similarly, sociologists need only finite empirically available knowledge to engineer a structurally sound society.

PROBLEMATIC ELEMENTS IN COMTE'S REASONING

Comte's methodological approach has numerous problems. The acceptance of Condorcet's

use of data from diverse societies as if they represented data from a single society at various stages of development is tautological – only if his dynamic theory is correct is using data from non western societies to describe features of early periods of European ones justified. Comte's exclusive reliance on European illustrations and period names for substages of the metaphysical stage leaves unclear which features of Protestantism and Deism are to be considered universal and which are peculiar to European experience. And Comte's presentation of the features of the final stage are purely speculative. It cannot be grounded in empirical observation in that no fully positivistic societies have ever existed.

Comte attempts to simultaneously declare the coming into existence of sociology and that sociology is sufficiently advanced to prescribe necessary reforms. He can do this only because his theory does not meet the scientific criteria he insists upon! Rather, it is built on what he otherwise describes as pre scientific metaphysical reasoning. He assumes a necessary and innate universal nature that destines societies to develop in only one particular direction. He then deduces that direction and specifies what the future will and should be.

Comte's *static sociology* is also flawed. It relies not on actual historical analysis of the relationship of institutions but on de Maistre's polemical romanticized representation of medieval Europe as a perfectly harmonious society. It is no more empirical than the image of the noble savage in the writings of Rousseau that Comte detested. Comte never empirically investigates the historical limits of social integration, but instead uses an analogy to biological functioning to assert both past and future near perfect harmony.

Finally, Comte's stated faith in the ability of sociology to achieve pure objective knowledge of the social shows naïveté even for the period in which he is writing. His attempt to get around Kantian relativity of knowledge by avoiding the use of causation is mere semantics. His motto, *prévoir pour pouvoir* (prevision to allow control) implies causal predictive power, even if Comte banishes the terms cause and causality from sociology's vocabulary.

COMTE'S INFLUENCE ON LATER SOCIOLOGY

While Comte was still living, a split developed between those dedicated to the totality of his thought (i.e., who wished to spread his religion) and those solely focused on advancing sociology. Positivistic churches spread to cities in Europe and the Americas. Within sociology, Comte's realist approach soon had both followers and opponents. In his native France, the realists came to be represented by Émile Durkheim and his students. The foremost opponent was Gabriel Tarde. Durkheim, despite other significant influences, always considered Comte to be sociology's founder. Like Comte, Durkheim posited a series of increasingly complex emergent realities, each with its own laws. Though Durkheim did accept the existence of both a psychological reality and the legitimacy of a science of psychology, he argued that the social constituted a reality whose laws and facts could not be reduced to the psychological. The reductionist Tarde rejected this realist image and attempted to construct sociology based on psychological processes of imitation. Durkheim's position at the Sorbonne gave an academic home to his realist view, which also found support from the secular educational liberal ministry of the Third Republic. But French sociology suffered from two world wars. Many Durkheimians perished in the first (including Durkheim's son André), and others (like Maurice Halbwachs) were killed during the Holocaust and the second. Certainly, Comtean realist sociological ideas persisted in later French social thought. But Comte's most persistent influence on sociology is to be found in the reactions against his work in Germany and Italy and in the selective appropriation of his ideas in the English speaking world.

Reaction to Comte's ideas from German historicists like Wilhelm Dilthey was generally one of hostility. Comte was seen as having gone too far in the wholesale application of natural science reasoning to historical and cultural phenomena. Kantian moral autonomy, individual volition, unique national features, and the impact of genius in shaping the *spirit* of a society were lost in Comte's comparative deterministic

focus on universal laws of order and change. But if Comte had exceeded the permissible degree of comparison and generalization in social study, it remained unclear what degree of lawful generalizing was possible in social science. A great late nineteenth century German discussion ensued. That discussion created the academic environment in which Georg Simmel and Max Weber developed their sociologies. Both Simmel and Weber can each be viewed as defining a middle ground between Comte's positivistic and Dilthey's approach to the social.

Along with Spencer, Comte also serves as a foil used by the neo Machiavellian Vilfredo Pareto in the development of his sociology. Pareto views Comte's progressive evolutionism as confounding moral wishes with social scientific analysis. Pareto's stark image of the social as non rational and non progressive with self interested elites in the endless pursuit of power for its own sake often reads like a demonic inversion of Comtean sociology. For Pareto, knowledge of social laws has no ameliorative applicability and human irrationality, conflict, and suffering persist unabated forever.

In the English speaking world the spread of Comte's ideas was greatly assisted by Harriet Martineau's 1853 condensed translation of *The Positive Philosophy*. Praised by Comte himself, its clarity, flow, and focus on core ideas surpassed the original, making Comte's ideas more apprehensible in English than in French. Comte was at first seen as a true social science innovator in British intellectual circles, as evidenced by the early part of his long correspondence with J. S. Mill. For a variety of reasons, though, that correspondence degraded into animosity with Mill rejecting Comte as a social scientist. Herbert Spencer later sought to develop sociology on non Comtean grounds. Yet Spencer, influenced by Marian Evans (pen named George Eliot), incorporated the Comtean concept of *altruism* as a necessary mechanism of social solidarity in advanced societies.

In the pre 1920 institutionalizing period of American sociology, Comte was generally accepted as the discipline's founder. Citations to his work were exceeded only by those to Spencer's. Comte was the main influence on Lester Ward, the first president of what is

now called the American Sociological Association. Durkheim in this same period was generally dismissed as having a collective image of society incompatible with American views of social action. But in American sociology since World War II Comte is infrequently cited and, when discussed, usually presented only as an anticipator of the field. As Comte's reputation declined, Durkheim's increased, and he is now regarded with Weber (and sometimes Karl Marx) as a true founder of the field. But certain arguments and approaches to sociology still reflect Comtean realism and are remnants of his early influence, or come filtered through the later (albeit selective) appropriation of Durkheimian thought by American sociology. Among these are: the distinction between pure and applied sociology; the analytical separation of the study of developmental social change from the study of social integration and functioning (Comte's statics and dynamics); the view of change as a natural process and not a product of individual genius or rationally conceived social contract; the focus on sociology as a holistic field integrating the findings of sub fields; the view of social bonds as a product of socialized learning and not rational choice; the emphasis on an empirical research; the insistence that sociology is an independent field and not just the collective subfield of psychology; the widespread use of physical science like determinism in social explanation; and a focus on the family and religious values as central to social order.

Perhaps, though, Comte's greatest influence is to be found not in the particulars of his theory but in the creation of a model of what constitutes theory in sociology. Unlike political science, in which theory denotes the body of work by a particular individual (e.g., Hobbesian, Lockean, or Machiavellian theory), or economics, in which theory often denotes a set of predictive equations, in sociology a theory tends to be a logical deductive system of propositions that includes a model of social structure order and change, a conception of how the individual is related to and internalizes the social, and a related methodology statement on how the social is to be studied. Comte provided that model.

Finally, as we move toward a postmodern future, how terms like postmodern and post modernity themselves are used may reflect sociology's persistent, but generally unacknowledged, Comtean heritage. Comte, like Durkheim after him, focused on the present as a period of total social transition to an emergent modern social consciousness. To the extent that the postmodern is looked at as a natural world wide social evolutionary emergent shared social consciousness that impacts on the totality of human thought and action, the term's use appears very Comtean indeed. The view that this transition starts in the West but spreads to all of humanity is also Comtean. And as sociologists construct theories of postmodernity to prevision the direction of that social evolutionary change, guide empirical research, and develop applied programs to improve social harmony, sociology's agenda appears still linked to Comte's image of the academic discipline that he named.

SEE ALSO: Durkheim, Émile; Halbwachs, Maurice; Martineau, Harriet; Positivism; Simmel, Georg; Spencer, Herbert; Theory; Weber, Max

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confidence intervals

Geoff Cumming

A confidence interval (CI) is an *interval estimate* of a population parameter. It is a range of values, calculated from data, that is likely to include the true value of the population parameter. When a newspaper reports "support for the government is 43 percent, in a poll with an error margin of 3 percent," the 43 percent is a *point estimate* of the true level of support in the whole population. The CI is 43 ± 3 percent, or (40, 46 percent). The 3 percent is half the width of the CI, and is called the *margin of error*. The endpoints of the CI are the *lower* and *upper limits* or *bounds*.

The *level of confidence*, C , is expressed as a percentage. Most commonly, $C = 95$ is chosen, to give 95 percent CIs, although 99 percent CIs, 90 percent CIs, or CIs with other levels of confidence may be used. Understanding level of confidence is the key to understanding CIs, and will be discussed in the context of an example that also illustrates calculation of a CI in a simple case.

To estimate μ , the mean level of community mindedness, we administer a measure to a random sample of $n = 30$ people from the population, and calculate mean $M = 59.52$ and standard deviation $s = 32.4$. The margin of error is $w = t_C \times s/\sqrt{n} = 12.11$, where $t_C = 2.045$ is the critical value of t , with $(n - 1) = 29$ degrees of freedom, for confidence level $C = 95$. The 95 percent CI for μ is thus 59.52 ± 12.11 , or (47.41, 71.63). There is a link with null hypothesis significance testing (NHST), in that any value outside a 95 percent CI would, given the data, be rejected as a null hypothesis at the .05 level of significance, and any value inside the CI would not be rejected.

Figure 1 shows a simulation of 20 independent random samples of size 30 from a normal population with $\mu = 53$ and standard deviation $\sigma = 30$. The leftmost sample has M and s as stated above. Such a sequence of samples will, in the long run, give CIs that capture μ on C percent of occasions, and this is the correct way to understand level of confidence.




Figure 1 Means and 95 percent confidence intervals (CIs) for 20 independent samples from a population with mean $\mu = 53$, showing sample-to-sample variation. The intervals vary in width because each is based on the standard deviation of that sample. In the long run, 95 percent of CIs are expected to include μ . Here, two CIs (open circles) do not include μ . More generally, C percent of CIs will in the long run include μ , where C is the level of confidence. Note that μ is more often captured by the central region of a CI than by regions near the upper or lower limits of an interval. In practice, μ is not known and only one sample is taken.

We can say “we are 95 percent confident that our interval (47.41, 71.63) includes μ ,” but it is misleading to say “the probability is .95 that our interval includes μ ” because that suggests μ varies, whereas μ is fixed but unknown. The CI for our sample is just one in an indefinitely long sequence, and we never know whether it does or does not include μ . We know only that 95 percent of all possible CIs will include μ , the population parameter we are estimating.

Each CI in Figure 1 is symmetric about the mean, but CIs for correlations and proportions, for example, are typically asymmetric (Altman et al. 2000). CIs can be difficult to calculate: CIs for some standardized measures of effect size, for example, require use of non-central distributions and an iterative computer

procedure (Cumming & Finch 2001; Smithson 2002).

CIs were introduced by Jerzy Neyman in 1934. They are a key component in *statistical estimation*, part of *statistical inference*. Both CIs and NHST are part of the frequentist approach to probability and statistics. In a quite different approach, Bayesian statistics, an analogous role is played by *credible intervals*, which do permit statements like “the probability is .95 that μ lies in this interval,” where the interval has been calculated from the data, after assuming some prior probability distribution for the parameter. Although CIs and credible intervals have entirely different theoretical foundations, in some simple situations, with reasonable assumptions, the 95 percent CI and




Figure 2 Means and 95 percent CIs for two groups of respondents, each tested on four occasions. Group is a between-subjects factor, and the CIs shown may be used to assess a between-groups comparison, such as Group 1 vs. Group 2, at time T1. Time of testing, however, is a repeated measure, and the CIs may *not* be used to assess a comparison across time, for example T1 vs. T2 for Group 1, because the CIs do not account for the correlation between the measures. In the figure, means at each testing time are slightly offset so CIs can be seen clearly.

the 95 percent credible interval are numerically identical.

During the mid twentieth century, NHST swept to dominance across the social sciences, although cogent criticisms of it were published. Statistical reformers advocated, among other things, wider use of CIs in addition to or in place of NHST. During the 1980s, medicine largely embraced reform, and it became routine to report CIs. In the social sciences, NHST still dominates, although in psychology reformers have had some success. The influential *Publication Manual* of the American Psychological Association now recommends use of CIs.

Four advantages of CIs are (1) they give point and interval estimates in units that are meaningful in the research context; (2) they help combine evidence over experiments, and thus encourage meta analysis and meta analytic thinking; (3) CI width gives information about precision, which may be more useful than a calculation of statistical power; and (4) there is a link with familiar NHST and p values (Cumming & Finch 2001).

However, there is evidence of a widely held misconception about CIs, as there is about NHST. Also, the graphic representing a CI in Figure 1 is ambiguous: it is used also for standard error (SE) bars, which depict an interval

\pm SE about a mean that is typically about half the total width of the 95 percent CI for the same data. It is unfortunate that the same graphic is used with two such different meanings, and every figure showing error bars must state clearly what they represent.

In Figure 2 the two 95 percent CIs at T1 overlap by about one quarter the length of either interval. For independent means, like them, this amount of overlap corresponds to about $p = .05$ and so the difference between the two means is about at the border of .05 statistical significance (Cumming & Finch 2005). However, for two correlated means, the CIs on the means are *irrelevant* for an assessment of the difference, because the CIs do not reflect the correlation. Therefore, the CIs in Figure 2 may *not* be used to assess comparisons involving a repeated measure, such as T1 with T2 for Group 1. It is a problem that conventional graphics, as in Figure 2, do not distinguish repeated measure variables from between subjects variables. CIs have much to offer, but better guidelines are needed for their interpretation, and better graphical conventions that avoid ambiguity and make clear what inferences are justified.

SEE ALSO: Effect Sizes; Experimental Design; Random Sample; Statistical Significance Testing; Variables, Independent

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conflict (racial/ethnic)

John Stone and Polly Rizova

Conflict is a basic process in social life and can be both destructive and cohesive. In some situations, it can be destructive for some groups and act as a cohesive force for others. Racial and ethnic groups may be the source and the result of the two faces of social conflict, acting as a boundary marker between groups that see themselves as distinctive in their interests and values from other such groups. Over the past 50 years, sociologists have grappled with a variety of perspectives on conflict that have emphasized various aspects of the destructive and the integrative nature of the process. Functional theorists have tended to downplay the purely negative forces while conflict theorists have tried to establish the central role of conflict as a means to challenge the status quo and bring about fundamental social change. Several attempts have also been made to refine and integrate the two approaches: pointing to the functions of social conflict or to elements of consensus and equilibrium found in both models.

Much of classical sociological theory analyzed conflict against the backdrop of the industrial and political revolutions of the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries in Europe and focused on class, status, and party groups as the principal bases of group struggle. Divisions arising out of racial or ethnic membership tended to be assigned to a peripheral position in the analysis, despite the overwhelming significance of war, colonialism, nationalism, and genocide that formed an equally central part of the historical experience. Some social thinkers did attribute greater importance to race and nation, but these individuals, such as Gobineau or Fitzhugh, were either fully fledged racial theorists or apologists for slavery. W. E. B. Du Bois, whose pioneering

sociological studies of race relations at the turn of the century were a notable exception, found his works largely ignored during his lifetime. It was only in the second half of the twentieth century that the catastrophic results of fascism and the expansion of studies of racism, apartheid, and colonialism brought racial and ethnic conflict to the center of sociological analysis.

In the United States, the struggles of the Civil Rights Movement in the 1960s, urban riots, and the violent nature of the confrontation between the forces defending segregation and those demanding racial justice began to make Parsonian theory, the dominant paradigm in the 1950s, look like an increasingly inadequate model to understand current developments. Together with the polarizing force of the Vietnam War, the idea of society viewed as an integrated system of self-regulating subunits became increasingly implausible; somehow, conflict needed to be brought back into the sociological analysis. However, Marxist notions of a bipolar division between bourgeoisie and proletariat, while stressing conflict as a central theme, nevertheless also appeared to ignore, or at best gloss over, the powerful reality of racial, ethnic, and national conflicts. Reformulations of the Marxist tradition, particularly trying to incorporate race and ethnic conflicts into a global – world systems – approach, seemed to be a better synthesis of class and race.

In South Africa, the implementation of apartheid after 1948 provided a stark example of a society based on racial oppression and naked force exercised by one racially defined group over others. One of the insightful early sociological studies of apartheid was aptly titled *South Africa: A Study in Conflict* (1965), written by a student from Parsons's sociology department at Harvard. Clearly, the reality of racial and ethnic conflict in apartheid South Africa made van den Berghe apply a radically different approach from that advocated by the author of *The Social System*. The decline and fall of apartheid some 30 years later, however, failed to support van den Berghe's conflict laden predictions of the 1960s, and an understanding of why this relatively peaceful outcome occurred provided some useful lessons in the complex interplay between racial and ethnic divisions. A revolution of rising expecta-

tions, a powerful explanation for fundamental conflicts since its original formulation by Alexis de Tocqueville to interpret the French Revolution, did not escalate into a race war under South African conditions. Whether this was a result of the closely integrated nature of the South African economy, the moderation and wisdom of the ANC leadership, miscalculations by the white elite, or the geopolitical changes produced by the end of the Cold War remain questions that will be the subject of debate for years to come.

Another example of ethnic conflict, but this time one that developed in a much more violent and destructive manner than in South Africa, was the collapse of Yugoslavia in the aftermath of the breakup of the Soviet Union. Unlike South Africa, Yugoslavia appeared to have many favorable preconditions that might have been expected to ameliorate conflict in the runup to the dissolution of the Soviet Empire. Tito's state had been more open to western democratic influences than many of its eastern European neighbors, was more economically advanced, and had a relatively decentralized federal system allowing significant autonomy to its diverse multi-ethnic, territorial units. Of all the satellites of the Soviet Union, this state seemed best positioned to handle the transition from communist rule to democracy without widespread ethnic violence. In reality, the state degenerated rapidly into civil war with a series of secessionist movements that led to the worst examples of ethnic cleansing and genocidal massacres in Europe since the end of World War II. What were the factors that caused this surprising outcome? Most analysts point to the role of geopolitical changes in undermining the legitimacy and rationale of the Yugoslav state. The divergent interests between the Serbian elites and Croatian, Slovenian, and Bosnian leadership produced a new context in which mobilization on an ethnic basis brought about the destruction of the previous federation. Former communist leaders quickly reframed their appeal on nationalist themes and the power vacuum created by the collapse of the Soviet bloc released these forces in a deadly struggle for ethnic autonomy and hegemony.

The examples of South Africa and Yugoslavia via suggest the complex dynamics of ethnic and

racial conflict in the modern world. Much of the research on ethnicity and racial divisions has shifted toward trying to understand the processes of ethnogenesis, the construction and perpetuation of ethnic boundaries, and the impact of forces like globalization and transnationalism on racial and ethnic conflict. While traditional patterns of international migration continue to play an important role in the generation of racial and ethnic diversity, they have been modified and changed by political and economic factors in complex and unpredictable ways. In the United States, large numbers of Mexican migrants, both legal and unauthorized, have continued the growth of the Latino population into the largest single minority group. In Europe, the relations between immigrants and ethnic minorities – not least the increasing number of Muslim migrants from Turkey and North Africa – will be a major element in determining the conflict and stability of the emerging political structure, no matter whether the European Union becomes a superstate or remains a looser federation.

A central focus of concern among social scientists has been to provide a better understanding of the dynamics of ethnic conflict and racial violence. Inadequate assumptions about the nature of modernization and modernity have been revealed by the increasing salience of such conflicts under capitalism, socialism, and in the developing world. The expectation that modernity would result in a smooth transition from *gemeinschaft* to *gesellschaft*, from community to association, accompanied by the gradual dissolution of ethnic affiliations and racial identities, has proved to be entirely inaccurate. The continuation of persistent racial inequality in the United States, and the stubborn tenacity of ethnic warfare and genocide in societies as diverse and remote from each other as Bosnia and Burundi, suggest that these forms of division have not lost their power to mobilize human groups and to undermine such “rational” considerations as economic profits and losses. Ironically, failure to appreciate the strength of ethnic ties under Marxist regimes was repeated by the advocates of hegemonic global capitalism until the events of September 11, 2001 forced a dramatic reappraisal of the diverse and complex sources of contemporary

identity. Those social scientists who have long argued against a narrow focus on material factors and stressed the fundamental nature of the ethnic bond in explaining the stubborn resilience of nations and nationalism seem to be receiving increasing empirical support from recent developments.

Several different theoretical perspectives can be found supporting contemporary studies of ethnic and racial conflict. Some, like rational choice theory, are methodologically individualistic and apply a cost–benefit formula to account for ethnic preferences and to explain the dynamics of racial and ethnic group formation. These have been criticized on the grounds that they fail to appreciate the collective dynamics of much ethnic behavior and underestimate the irrational side of racial violence. Other common perspectives see ethnicity and racial divisions as a type of social stratification: theories employing neo Marxist categories stress the economic components underlying much ethnic conflict, while those following in the tradition of scholars like Weber and Furtwängler provide a more pluralistic interpretation of the differences in ethnic and racial power. In general, these differences originate from the forces of conquest and migration, and are then perpetuated by the processes of group monopolization once an ethnic or racial boundary has been created. In this way, a hierarchical ordering of racial and ethnic groups is created which will eventually generate conflict as circumstances start to change and disadvantaged groups challenge the status quo. Other theories point to social psychological factors, like prejudice and ethnocentrism, as important explanations for the persistence of ethnic divisions and the ubiquity of racial conflict.

Two highly controversial arguments center on genetic imperatives, which it is claimed operate through the mechanism of kin selection and form part of the application of socio biological thinking to ethnic and race relations. Neoconservative theories concentrate on cultural factors, which, it is asserted, are disproportionately distributed among certain ethnic and racial groups. Such theories have been vigorously challenged because of their deterministic, if not racist, implications. The heat of the debate reinforces the conclusion that

no single theory provides a generally accepted and comprehensive explanation for the complexity of ethnic group formation or the persistence of racial conflict in contemporary society.

As a result of this analytical discord, it is hardly surprising that the proposed solutions to racial and ethnic conflict are equally diverse. Some see these divisions as fundamental to social life and that the search for a final solution to such conflicts is a never ending task that can be as potentially dangerous as the problem itself. Others propose that it is better to channel and institutionalize diversity in ways that make it less destructive and thereby reduce its enormous potential for violence and bloodshed. Creating cross cutting cleavages, blurring the boundaries of race and class, decentralizing political power in different forms of federal structures that protect the interest of specific ethnic and racial groups, and trying to ensure that majority rule also respects minority rights are just some of the techniques of social engineering that have been deployed to take the sting out of multi ethnic political units. Still others claim that the celebration of ethnicity and racial identity will bring about changes in attitudes and behavior that mitigate the dangerous polarization of groups along these types of boundaries. The persistence of ethnic and racial conflicts suggests that the diversity of theoretical interpretations is matched by the range of policy strategies, and that the continuation of ethnic and racial conflicts is likely to be an enduring feature of most societies for the foreseeable future.

SEE ALSO: Burundi and Rwanda (Hutu, Tutsi); Ethnic Cleansing; Genocide; Race; Race (Racism); Racial Hierarchy; Truth and Reconciliation Commissions

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conflict theory

Stephen K. Sanderson

The term “conflict theory” came into wide use in sociology during the 1960s, when it was seen as an alternative to and rival of functionalism. Initially, the term seemed merely to identify a more politically neutral Marxian perspective, but for some it meant something much broader. The strongest contemporary advocate of conflict theory is Randall Collins. For him, conflict theory includes not only Marx and the Marxists, but also Weber and a number of other social theorists extending back to earlier times. He sees as early forerunners of modern conflict theory such thinkers as Machiavelli and Pareto. Collins (1974, 1975) has done more than any sociologist to develop a synthesized conflict theory that owes more to Weber than to any other sociologist. Sociologists have often regarded Lewis Coser’s *The Functions of Social Conflict* (1956) as a version of conflict theory, but it is more a functionalist analysis of the role of conflict in social life than a use of conflict propositions to explain various social phenomena.

Conflict theory presupposes the following: (1) conflict or struggle between individuals and groups who have opposing interests or who are competing for scarce resources is the essence of social life; (2) competition and conflict occur over many types of resources in many settings, but power and economic resources are the principal sources of conflict and competition; (3) conflict and struggle typically result in some individuals and groups dominating and controlling others, and patterns of domination and subordination tend to be self-perpetuating; (4) dominant social groups have a disproportionate influence on the allocation of resources and on the structure of society.

Marxian conflict theory is the more prominent of two major lines of work. For Marxists,

social class is the source of conflict in all societies above the level of primitive egalitarian communities. Class conflict – between masters and slaves or landlords and peasants, for example – pervades history and is the engine of historical change. Marxists have focused most of their attention, though, on the class structure of modern capitalist society. The most prominent feature of capitalist society is the class struggle between capitalists and workers. Marx assumed, and nearly all later Marxists have assumed as well, that to understand the structure, functioning, and evolution of capitalist society you had to start from the fact that capitalists have as their main objective maximizing profits and accumulating capital. They do this by exploiting the working class, i.e., by paying them wages that are less than the full value of the goods they produce. Workers are motivated to resist capitalist exploitation as much as they can, and thus there is an inherent antagonism between capitalists and workers. This class struggle is the foundation of capitalism and the root cause of all other forms of struggle or conflict within capitalism.

In the 1970s some sociologists began to rethink the traditional interpretation of Weber handed down by Talcott Parsons, viewing Weber as offering a kind of conflict theory that was similar to Marxian theory in certain ways, but different in crucial respects (Cohen et al. 1975; Collins 1975, 1986). Collins developed this idea most thoroughly. He argued that Weber was a complex and multidimensional thinker who later in life evolved into a conflict theorist. Like Marx, Weber emphasized the role of conflict, struggle, and discord in social life, viewing them as pervasive features of society and the keys to understanding it.

There are certain crucial differences in the conflict theories of Marx and Weber, and in the conflict theories of their various followers. Four crucial differences can be emphasized:

- *Class and other struggles.* For Marxian theory, class struggle is most fundamental and underlies all other forms. Political, ethnic, religious, and ideological conflicts not only manifest the predominant form of class conflict and the nature of the dominant class, but also in essence would not exist at all were class conflict to be eradicated.

Weberians view this position as excessively “class reductionist.” They view class struggle as important in many societies, but often not as the most important form of struggle or as the basis for other forms of struggle. For contemporary Weberian conflict theorists, political, ethnic, and religious struggles are often most important and thus cannot be explained simply by relating them to class struggle. The neo Weberian theorist Frank Parkin (1979), for example, regards racial conflict as the most crucial type in South African society.

- *Inevitability of conflict, domination, and inequality.* Marxists have held that the capitalist class struggle can be eradicated and, along with it, the other major forms of social conflict that flow from it. Weberians, on the other hand, tend to view at least some degree of conflict as permanent and ineradicable. Attempts to eliminate certain types of conflict are likely to be only partially successful. If more fully successful, then they may very well intensify or create other forms of conflict. Weber, for example, famously argued that attempts to replace capitalism with socialism would intensify the power of the state, and thus would increase the conflict between the state and the citizenry. Weber was a kind of cynical realist (Collins 1986) who saw social life as a continual process of individuals maneuvering for power and control over situations and over each other.
- *Nature and role of the state.* Marx himself, and the majority of Marxists, have tended to view the state as the political agent of the ruling class, although more recently some Marxists have conceded a certain autonomy to state action. Weberians tend to see this type of class reductionism as a great oversimplification. The state is often tied to the ruling class and may do its bidding, but the state has its own interests to pursue, such as maintaining order, enhancing its status, and competing with other states (Collins 1975; Parkin 1979; Skocpol 1979). The autonomous role of states, and the importance of the international states system and geopolitics, are major emphases in Weberian conflict theory but receive little in Marxism.

- *Bureaucratic and organizational power struggles.* Bureaucratic organization was a major focus in Weber's work but almost totally absent from Marx's. For Weber, the alienating consequences of the modern division of labor were produced more by bureaucratic forms of organization than by who owned the means of production. Not only did these forms of organization play a major role in shaping modern social life, but they were also themselves the sites of major power struggles.

Marx's view of the state was that it was "the executive committee of the ruling class." In capitalist society, the main role of the state is to protect the position of the capitalist class and help it to achieve its economic objectives. In the view of such modern Marxists as Miliband (1977) and Szymanski (1978), the modern state in capitalist societies is a *capitalist state*. The state may "govern," but the capitalist class "rules." The state does three primary things to assist the capitalist class. It plays a legitimization role, by which it attempts to promote among the population a consensus regarding the basic moral soundness and appropriateness of capitalism as an economic system. It also engages in repression by preventing people from taking actions that would be harmful to the capitalist class. Finally, it has an accumulation function whereby it enacts and promotes numerous policies, laws, and strategies to aid the capitalist class in its quest for maximizing profits and accumulating capital.

Marxists have also formulated theories of racial antagonism. The so called orthodox Marxian theory of racial antagonism views it as an attempt to placate the working class and reduce the price of their labor (Reich 1977). Capitalists can take advantage of racial diversity by promoting racial tension among members of the working class, preventing it from achieving its full organizational potential and thus its ability to push for higher wages. Edna Bonacich (1972) has developed an alternative Marxian theory called the *split labor market theory*. This is a more complex and subtle theory that views racial antagonism emerging from a conflict between three groups: capitalists, higher paid labor, and cheaper labor. When there is a split in the labor market between higher paid and

cheaper labor, capitalists will try to replace the former with the latter as much as possible. If the split in the labor market corresponds to racial divisions, then capitalists may in essence be trying to replace one racial group with another. Higher paid labor will try to neutralize the threat from cheaper labor by excluding it through racial considerations.

Frank Parkin (1979) has developed a neo Weberian approach to stratification in modern societies that contrasts sharply with Marxist theory. Parkin accepts the reality of class domination, but adds to it other important forms in his *theory of social closure*. Social closure exists in all societies and involves efforts of individuals to monopolize various resources in order to achieve or maintain a privileged social position. Attempts at closure occur along many lines, including class, gender, race and ethnicity, religion, and educational credentials, and these are to a large extent independent of one another. Closure based on ownership of the means of production is simply one form of closure among several. Parkin's argument is that there are numerous forms of inequality that have little or nothing to do with ownership, and thus they cannot be explained in Marxian terms. In addition to the non class forms of inequality mentioned above, these include the high incomes and status positions of learned professionals, and the persisting inequalities in the old Soviet Union despite the eradication of all major forms of private property.

Theda Skocpol's (1979, 1994) Weberian work on social revolutions illustrates one of the major differences between Marxian and Weberian conflict theory. She has criticized Marxian theories of revolution for emphasizing class dynamics at the expense of the state, a classical Weberian theme. She asserts that revolutions are not made by revolutionaries, class based or otherwise, but result from what is happening at the level of the state. All social revolutions have occurred in societies in which the peasantry is the largest social class; however, in her view peasants are almost always discontented and potentially rebellious. Peasant discontent therefore cannot explain why, when, or where revolutions occur. Skocpol argues that revolutions occur when the state is vulnerable to a revolutionary overthrow. Most of the time the state is strong enough to put down

revolutionary action, but in certain circumstances it is unable to do so. In the case of the French Revolution, for example, it was a state fiscal crisis, brought on by the draining effects of war, that led to the demise of the old regime. In the case of more recent revolutions, such as the Iranian Revolution of 1979, it was the existence of a regime so brutally repressive of major social groups that it led to a level of popular resistance to the Shah's regime that was strong enough to overcome it.

Conflict theory is alive and well in modern sociology and many sociologists work within that framework, broadly conceived (Lord & Sanderson 1999). It has contributed much to sociological understanding and is being extended in new ways through linkage with perspectives normally thought far removed from it, such as sociobiology (Sanderson 2001) and Durkheimian social theory (Collins 2004).

SEE ALSO: Class Conflict; Conflict Theory and Crime and Delinquency; Critical Theory/ Frankfurt School; Dependency and World Systems Theories; Marx, Karl; Stratification: Functional and Conflict Theories; Stratification and Inequality, Theories of; Weber, Max

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conflict theory and crime and delinquency

Christopher R. Williams and Bruce A. Arrigo

Much of the sociological and criminological mainstream assumes that society is organized around and characterized by consensus; however, conflict theorists place the process of discord at the center of cultural, institutional, and organizational dynamics. While a number of theoretical variations have emerged from within the general conflict tradition, they share a few basic assumptions. First, conflict theorists assume that in more complex, industrialized societies, values and interests diverge at certain points of social difference. Second, conflict theorists recognize that power and resources are differentially distributed. Consequently, some social groups are in a better position than others to have their own values and interests adopted in a formal capacity and subsequently embedded in the policies and practices of social institutions. Thus, matters of social and cultural significance are points of division and deep struggle rather than points of agreement and commonly shared interest.

Within criminology, the adoption of conflict theory's basic assumptions has led to alternative ways by which to comprehend criminality, lawmaking, and law enforcement. Conflict theorists explain the presence of crime and the enactment of laws in much the same way as they account for other aspects of social life. In

short, conflict theorists draw attention to those individuals, groups, or collectives that accumulate the most power and resources sufficient to shape lawmaking and criminal justice policy, consistent with the values and interests of the dominant segment in a given society. Moreover, conflict criminologists assess how these entities influence organizational and institutional dynamics as linked to crime, law, and justice. Finally, conflict criminologists point out these organizations and institutions (including their members) benefit from those who control and shape the agenda when it comes to matters of crime, law, and justice.

Precisely because official definitions of crime are a product of the values and interests of a dominant segment as specified in legal codes and criminal justice practices, individuals or groups with less power, standing, or resources are more likely to have their behavior defined as criminal. In addition, these subordinate groups are subsequently more likely to be labeled and processed as deviant or criminal. Overall, contemporary conflict criminologists are more interested in this process of lawmaking and the dynamics of enforcement than they are in the characteristics or behaviors of individuals who violate the legal order.

For organizational purposes, conflict theories are sometimes grouped under two broad headings: pluralist conflict theories and radical conflict perspectives. Pluralist theories share a concern for the accumulation of social power, arguing that social issues are metaphoric “batlegrounds” within which competing interest groups attempt to exert control and gain ground. Significantly, a plurality of such segments are said to exist for any given issue, including those collectives organized around socioeconomic status, age, gender, race, religion, politics, and many others. As such, there are several competing groups invested in those decisions and actions taken by power brokers in relation to the particular issue under consideration. Consequently, each segment will attempt to exercise influence over those decisions and actions with whatever resources are available to that group. Central to each of these struggles, then, is power or the control of resources that provide a marked advantage in the conflict to achieve greater power, money, or status for the competing collectives.

The intellectual roots of both pluralist and radical conflict perspectives lie with Hegel, Marx, Weber, Simmel, and other classical theorists concerned with various forms of social conflict. Early pluralist conflict criminologists such as Thorstein Sellin and George Vold borrowed liberally from the social theory of both Weber and Simmel, especially when describing theories of crime, law, and justice to which cultural and group based conflict were central. For example, in one of the earliest efforts to connect criminological concerns with the broader notion of social conflict, Sellin (1938) suggested that there existed a number of “conduct norms” or informal rules of behavior that encouraged people to act in certain ways in particular situations. He argued that these norms were learned through socialization. Moreover, since socialization was subject to cultural and subcultural differences, he noted that people who belonged to different cultural collectives were likely to subscribe to different values and principles of human social interaction. As such, they would behave in accordance with the characteristics of the culture and/or subculture to which they claimed allegiance.

Sellin observed that in less complex, more homogeneous societies there appeared to be consensus surrounding these conduct norms; however, as society became more complex and heterogeneous, the norms were characterized by a plurality of cultural and subcultural groups, each with their own standards for interaction. When the norms of different social segments contradicted one another, conflict ensued. Sellin argued that, given the presence of incompatible norms, the emergence of conflict occurred in one of two ways: when two different cultures were pitted against each other, or when a single culture divided into subcultures. It is no surprise, then, that what is customary within one culture or subculture may be thoroughly deviant from the perspective of another culture. Law and its enforcement represent domains where these conflicts get considerable attention. Specifically, definitions of normalcy and deviance are recognized by and codified into law and public policy (representing the interests of the dominant group), and are simultaneously legitimized and enforced by formal mechanisms of social control.

Twenty years after Sellin's treatise on culture conflict, George Vold articulated the fundamental precepts for what is generally known as group conflict theory. In his work *Theoretical Criminology* (1958), Vold argued that human beings were by nature group involved, and that our lives were in many ways part and product of these involvements. Vold observed that groups initially form around common needs and interests, serving as "action units." These units more effectively further the segment's shared aspirations. Because groups are many and varied, they inevitably come into conflict with one another, engendering competition or struggle in order to maintain or improve their lot within the greater society. As segments come into conflict with one another, they often solicit the assistance of the state to protect or further their power or resource ambitions. As Vold (1958: 208–9) noted, lawmaking, law breaking, and legal enforcement reflect struggles between competing interest groups to control the police power of the state, with "those who produce legislative majorities win[ning] control over police power and dominat[ing] policies that decide who is likely to be involved in violation of law."

Vold's formulation of group conflict theory was a significant departure from Sellin's for two reasons. First, Vold recognized that interest groups and, consequently, conflict arose not only from cultural and subcultural differences but from other collective needs as well. These other group needs included economic, political, and religious concerns, as well as interests associated with race, gender, and class social divisions. Second, conflict theory was beginning to pose a significant challenge to traditional consensus models of societal analysis. Included among them was functionalist lawmaking. This approach argued that legal provisions developed from societal consensus and, as such, furthered the common interests of the society as a whole. Early work in the pluralist conflict tradition recognized the existence of conflict in these endeavors. Moreover, critical arguments were presented acknowledging that law, policy, and state practices emerged from and were protected by the interests of those dominant segments exercising social, economic, and political power rather than the will of the majority or the isolated needs of cultural collectives.

While the earlier works of Sellin and Vold were among the first to apply the insights of the conflict tradition to criminology, the social and political upheaval of the 1960s and 1970s helped to spawn alternative ways of thinking about the conflict–crime–law relationship. The widespread unrest that characterized the United States during these troubled decades suggested for many that the conventional functionalist consensus paradigm, with its emphasis on harmony and stasis, was wholly inadequate and misguided.

Given these concerns, a more radically inspired conflict criminology emerged. Unlike their predecessors who were rooted largely in the broader social theories of Weber and Simmel, radical conflict theorists such as Chambliss and Seidman (1982) were much more sensitive to the Marxian tradition. As a matter of intellectual history in criminology, part of the radical path pursued by conflict criminologists had already commenced, especially in the work of Richard Quinney (1970). Merging aspects of labeling theory with pluralist conflict insights, Quinney examined the role of societal reaction in the definitions of crime, the enforcement of laws, and the treatment of criminal offenders. At the same time, an increasing "radicalization" of academia was taking place whereby sociologists and criminologists, especially in the United Kingdom and the United States, more generally demonstrated a revived interest in the Marxian tradition of sociology with its emphasis on social class and political economy. Thus, during the decades of the 1970s and the early 1980s, the emergence and development of radical conflict theory reflected a conceptual amalgam of earlier pluralist conflict notions, labeling theory, and the radical insights of Marx and the Marxian sociological tradition.

Radical conflict perspectives are themselves many and varied, though central to most are issues of social class, economic conditions, and the political economy as both the source and product of conflict. Radical criminologists differ from their pluralistic counterparts on the specific causes of struggle and, correspondingly, the nature of crime. Generally speaking, pluralist theories do not identify with great precision the locus of power; instead, they note that different groups possess and exercise different amounts of power and that individuals can

voluntarily align themselves with different segments. While radical conflict theorists are sympathetic to this position, they expressly identify structural forces of power and their accumulation as the defining source. For instance, Chambliss and Seidman (1982) argued that the law represents the interests of certain social groups rather than the public at large (a position shared within pluralist models of conflict), and that the groups most likely to have their interests embraced by the legal order are those with higher economic (and, thus, political) standing within society. The greater the economic and political status of an identified group, the more likely it is for that segment to have its interests adopted in an official capacity.

More recent variations of radical conflict theory retain their focus on the political economy and on social class. However, they also incorporate the correlates of race, gender, ethnicity, age, sexual orientation, language, and other features of inequality into a more critical and seamless analysis of lawmaking, criminal behavior, and institutional responses to both. Radical conflict theorists argue that these social divisions are key determinants of social power.

Efforts to develop an integrated conflict theory in criminology also are discernible. Examples of these include Bernard's integrated model, Arrigo's integration of critical criminological theory, and Barak's critical hyperintegration theory. These efforts at conceptual synthesis examine various strains of conflict theory, identifying noteworthy points of theoretical convergence and divergence. The intent here is to develop a more unified theory that explains the presence of conflict in society and then to apply the model to the problems posed by crime and delinquency.

SEE ALSO: Class Conflict; Conflict Theory; Crime; Criminal Justice System; Criminology; Law, Criminal; Marx, Karl; Simmel, Georg; Stratification: Functional and Conflict Theories; Victimization

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Confucianism

Tan Chee Beng

It is widely acknowledged that Confucianism has a dominant influence in Chinese culture. But what is religion in the Chinese context? Chinese scholars writing in Chinese generally see Confucianism (*ru*xue or *ru*jia thinking) as a school of Chinese philosophy, and the question of whether Confucianism is a religion or not does not arise. Western scholars on religion, however, often regard Confucianism as a religion. Indeed, Weber's famous work on Chinese religion is entitled *The Religion of China: Confucianism and Taoism* (Weber 1951). It is worth noting that, historically, Chinese do not make a clear distinction between moral teaching and the western concept of religious teaching, these being referred to as *jiao* or "teaching." Thus,

sanjiao, referring to Confucianism, Taoism, and Buddhism, is better translated as “three teachings” rather than as “three religions,” for in the Chinese understanding of *jiao*, it is not an important issue whether Confucianism is a religion or not.

Chinese popular religion and its complex of pantheon, rituals, and temples is easily understood as religion. So is Taoist religion (*daojiao*). Once the indigenous institutional religion of China, today its deities and rites can be seen as part of Chinese popular religion. However, anthropologists and sociologists do not see religion as merely an institution that deals with the supernatural, and they seek a more pluralistic definition that can include all religious phenomena. Indeed, it is insufficient to understand the religious life of the Chinese from the perspective of Chinese popular religion only, for their transcendental views of life are guided by the transcendental teaching in Taoism and especially Confucianism. This is particularly obvious in the context of religious dialogue. A dialogue with Muslims about “perfect man” (*al insân al kâmil*) will require the Chinese to talk about the Confucian view of *junzi* (“superior man”) and relevant ethics, and/or the Taoist view of *zhenren* (“perfect man”). Similarly, the Chinese can invoke the Confucian moral system of the unity of human and heaven when relating to the Muslim and Christian view of the human and God.

Confucianism was developed from the teachings of Confucius (551–479 BCE) and Mencius (371–289? BCE). The most famous Confucian texts are collectively known as *Sishu*, or Four Books: *Daxue* (Great Learning), *Zhongyong* (Doctrine of the Mean), *Lunyu* (Analects), and *Mengzi* (Book of Mencius). Central to Confucian teaching is the idea of *ren*, which Wing-tsit Chan translates as “humanity.” Asked about this, Confucius said, “It is to love men” (Chan 1963: 40), and the Confucian moral world involves this transcendental thinking. Through self cultivation by practicing values that bring about the ultimate value of *ren*, one becomes a Confucian superior person. Of crucial importance is the value of *shu*, or “reciprocity.” The most famous teaching about this is: “Do not do to others what you do not want them to do to you” (Chan 1963: 39). This teaching is well known not only to the Chinese but also to the

other East Asian societies that have Confucian influence: Korea, Japan, and Vietnam. But the practice of Confucian love and ultimately *ren* really begins with *xiao* (usually translated as filial piety), a value that emphasizes respect and honor to parents, elders, and ancestors. Mencius said, “To have filial affection for parents is humanity, and to respect elders is righteousness” (Chan 1963: 80). So dominant is this value that, to this day, Chinese generally are guided by the value in their relations with parents and elders, even though its expression changes with time and parents and children may have different standards and expectations.

In fact, *xiao* in Confucian thinking is spiritual. By extending *xiao* beyond the family, one is able to love a wider circle of people. As Mencius said, “In regard to people generally, he (superior person) is humane to them but not affectionate. He is affectionate to his parents and humane to all people. He is humane to all people and feels love for all” (Chan 1963: 81). A related famous saying of Mencius is: “Treat with respect the elders in my family, and then extend that respect to include the elders in other families. Treat with tenderness the young in my own family, and then extend that tenderness to include the young in other families” (Chan 1963: 61). Practicing *xiao* is really the first step in the spiritual journey to attaining humanity (*ren*).

Confucianism developed throughout the centuries, culminating in the neo Confucianism (*lixue*) of the Song and Ming dynasties. By then, Confucian thinkers had incorporated aspects of Taoist and Buddhist thought into their Confucian teachings. The most famous Confucianist of this period was Zhu Xi (1130–1200), who synthesized various important Confucian ideas, including those of the neo Confucianists of the Song dynasty. His discussion of the Supreme Ultimate (*taiji*) – the all embracing ultimate standard in the universe – is so transcendental that it is as religious as it can be.

Since the early twentieth century, especially after the May Fourth Movement of 1919, Confucianism was attacked as upholding feudalism and blamed for China’s backwardness. At the same time, Confucian thinkers who were exposed to the West tried to relate it to modern China, giving rise to the modern Confucianism called *xin ruxue* or “New Confucianism.”

A well known founder of this new school was Liang Shumin (1893–1988). Reflection on Confucianism in relation to Christianity and western thought is evident in his writing. He insisted that Confucianism is not religion, which he saw as characterized by superstition. He argued that, in China, moral teaching had taken the place of religion. This of course involves the definition of religion, and it is common to find Chinese intellectuals seeing religion as dealing with the supernatural and with myths. The well known Chinese philosophy professor Lao Siguang holds this view, too, and considers Confucianism not a religion. However, he points out that Confucianism has religious functions (Lao 1998: 192). A notable exception is Ren Jiyu, who considered Zhu Xi's thought as belonging to the realm of religion although he considered it as not practical. A "third generation" New Confucianism thinker who is well known in the West is Tu Wei ming, the Harvard academic who has been active in introducing Confucianism in the West and relating it to modern challenges. He has also been active in participating in interreligious dialogues, speaking about Confucianism.

Overall, Confucianism is important for understanding Chinese religious life, which is much more than just worshipping deities and ancestors, as can be commonly seen being practiced by ordinary Chinese in mainland China, Hong Kong, Macao, Taiwan, Southeast Asia, and elsewhere in the Chinese diaspora among Chinese who still observe indigenous Chinese religious beliefs and practices. Just as not all Christians and Muslims follow the teachings of their religions in daily life, not all Chinese practice Confucian teachings, and few actually read Confucian texts. But Confucianism remains important as a Chinese ideal of spiritual life, and aspects of it, including different expressions of *xiao*, are practiced by ordinary Chinese. Confucius founded a moral and spiritual system that provided the ideal for one to be religious through self cultivation to be a moral human. Although Confucius and Mencius did not promote belief in the supernatural, the ancient Chinese idea of heaven remained important as the moral absolute, as can be seen in the saying of Mencius: "He who exerts his mind to the utmost knows his nature. He who knows his nature knows Heaven" (Chan 1963: 78).

Confucianism provides the ethical base of Chinese popular religion and various Chinese religious organizations. For example, the *Sanyi Jiao* (Three in One Doctrine), *Zhengkong Jiao* (Teaching of True Void), which are "syncretic" Chinese religious organizations based on "three teachings," and *Dejiao*, which is based on "five teachings" incorporating Jesus and the Prophet Mohammed in this "syncretic" Chinese religious organization, have Confucian teaching as an important part of their religious teaching, even though the rites may be more Buddhist or Taoist. As a member of the pantheon of Chinese popular religion, Confucius is a god that blesses educational achievement. Some Chinese parents (such as in Malaysia and Taiwan) still bring children who are entering school for the first time to a temple to worship Confucius, in the hope that they will be blessed to succeed in education. As a member of the Chinese pantheon, Confucius is a minor god among many. As a sage, Confucius is honored by the Chinese in general, and memorial rites are performed in Confucian temples in mainland China and Taiwan and in Confucian associations in Southeast Asia, especially on his birthday anniversary.

There is the rise of "New Confucianism" in the modern Chinese encounter with the West. Toward the end of the Qing dynasty there was also an attempt to make Confucianism the state religion of China, comparable to Christianity in the West. The most prominent leader of this movement in China was Kang Youwei (1858–1927). This Confucian revival movement failed, partly due to the close association of Confucianism with the imperial system, which the Chinese overthrew in 1911. Here it is important to point out that the mandarins in imperial China throughout the centuries had promoted an official Confucianism that served the state and its bureaucracy. This official Confucianism should be distinguished from Confucianism, the ethical and spiritual system.

Nevertheless, the establishment of *Kongjiao Hui*, or Confucian associations, succeeded in promoting the worship of Confucius, especially in Malaya (now Malaysia and Singapore) and Indonesia. In Indonesia, Tiong Hoa Hwee Koan, established in 1900, was the first Chinese association to seriously promote Confucianism. The establishment of Khong Kaw Hwee

(i.e., Kongjiao Hui) in Indonesia – the first one was founded in Solo in 1918 (Coppel 1981: 180) – further promoted Confucianism. The formation of a federation of Confucian associations in Jakarta in 1955, the Khong Kauw T'jung Hwee consolidated the promotion of Confucianism and contributed to the formation of an institutional religion that may be called “Confucian Religion” in present day Indonesia. The growth of Confucianism as an institutional religion was also helped by the official recognition of Confucianism as one of the “six religions” in Indonesia in 1965, alongside Islam, Protestantism, Catholicism, Hindu Bali, and Buddhism.

Today, the development of Confucianism has been under the organization of MATAKIN (Majelis Tinggi Agama Khonghucu Indonesia – the Supreme Council for the Confucian Religion in Indonesia). Confucian Religion may be considered a new Chinese organization that grew out of the Confucian revival movement. That Confucianism succeeded in forming an institutional Chinese religion in Indonesia is due to the promotion and the politics of religion and identity in Indonesia. The lack of Chinese intelligentsia well versed in Confucianism helped, too, unlike in China, where scholars could not view Confucianism as a religion. The presence and influence of Islam and Christianity were also important. Indeed, the Confucian Religion holds Sunday services, and the Confucian *Four Books* are treated as Holy Scripture. Confucius is referred to as *nabi* (Indonesian for prophet), and *Tian* or Heaven becomes Almighty God.

What is the sociological relevance of Confucianism today? As explained, Chinese religious life cannot be understood without reference to Confucianism or its influence on Chinese life. In fact, Confucianism is not just philosophy articulated by scholars; it is also diffused into Chinese social life. In a way, it resembles a “civil religion” – “a collection of beliefs, symbols, and rituals with respect to sacred things and institutionalized in a collectivity” (Bellah 1967) – of the Chinese. The well educated (in Chinese) can articulate Confucian ideas sophisticatedly, whereas the ordinary masses express Confucianism in their memorial rites and in their rhetoric about filial piety, harmony, and views of life, although often not necessarily conscious of their Confucian origin.

The economic success in East Asia since the 1980s has encouraged scholars to write about Confucianism and modernity. Although Confucianism appears as a common factor in these societies, it is simplistic to attribute economic success and modernity to a religion or an ideological system. Nevertheless, Confucianism is sociologically relevant in its influence on attitudes of life and on social relations. An example of Confucian influence on the Chinese view of life is the idea of fate, which allows humans a dynamic part in determining it (cf. Yang 1970 [1961]: 273). Chan (1963: 79) describes this Confucian doctrine of fate thus: “man should exert his utmost in moral endeavor and leave whatever is beyond our control to fate.” This attitude of fate, perhaps more obvious in coping with life than with practicing morality, is commonly held by Chinese in China and in diaspora. It has served them well in striving for higher achievement (such as educational and economic achievement) and coping with difficult life in general. It provides hope for success and a better life.

In social relations, including respect for the elders, the Confucian emphasis continues to be important to the Chinese. Even in mainland China, where Confucianism was condemned during the Maoist period, Confucian ideas of social relations are evident and generally upheld among both the less and better educated Chinese, in relations between parents and children, between teachers and students, between elders and younger people, and between officials and ordinary people. An often debated issue about Chinese society is that of the individual versus the group, and many times a western observer often still assumes that, in Chinese society, individuals are subjected to group interest. In fact, Fei Xiaotong, in his famous small book *Xiangtu Zhongguo* (Earthbound China) (1947), pointed out that Chinese social relationships cannot be described as group centered or individualistic; they are self centered or egoistic in a web of relationships (Fei 1992: 65). Indeed, de Bary (2003), discussing this issue in relation to Confucianism, points out that Confucianism does not emphasize the group or community at the expense of the individual. An understanding of Confucian traditions is still important for the sociological understanding of Chinese culture and society as well as Chinese worldview.

Despite western influences, Confucianism remains important for the Chinese and, in fact, for the Japanese and Koreans. For Chinese outside mainland China, Confucian traditions are meaningful to their cultural identity, and Confucius is worshipped as a deity in the popular religion. Because of globalization and the increasing need of interreligious dialogue, the need to turn to Confucianism as an important source of Chinese spiritual traditions will be even more keenly felt. Since 1978, China has been pursuing economic modernization. The collapse of communism as an ideology, and in fact religion, seems to have left a major spiritual vacuum, although giving more room to Chinese popular religion, Buddhism, Christianity, Islam, and other faiths, even new religious experiments such as Falun Gong. Despite all these developments, and although there have been various campaigns against Confucianism since the beginning of the twentieth century, Confucianism is always embraced when the Chinese need to turn to their own spiritual traditions. But what is embraced is not the feudal Official Confucianism that served the imperial regimes but the Spiritual Confucianism that is relevant not only to the Chinese but also to the world community. Globalization and the meeting of civilizations will make this form of Confucianism relevant to China and the Chinese in diaspora. Whatever the development, Confucianism will continue to influence Chinese cultural life, notably in attitudes to life and in social relations. After all, how Chinese can Chinese cultures be without Confucianism?

SEE ALSO: Civil Religion; Family and Community; Globalization, Religion and; Religion; Religion, Sociology of; Taoism

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conjugal roles and social networks

Robert M. Milardo

Social networks, or the kin, friends, and other close associates of primary partners (e.g., spouses), can have important influences on the internal character of a marriage or family. Elizabeth Bott (1971) was among the first to recognize this connection in a study conducted in the early 1950s that involved extensive interviews with 20 London families. In a now classic hypothesis, she argued that: "The degree of segregation in the role relationship of husband and wife varies directly with the connectedness of the family's social network" (p. 60). Spouses with separate networks, where members knew one another (i.e., highly interconnected or dense networks), were thought to have relatively separate conjugal roles, to perform household labor separately, and to engage in

separate leisure activities. In contrast, spouses with low density networks were thought to have relatively joint conjugal roles and leisure activities.

Bott proposed two causal pathways linking network structure with marital outcomes. In the first model, Bott hypothesized that highly interconnected networks would be more apt to share similar values and beliefs regarding conjugal roles relative to loosely connected networks. Consistent norms develop when members of local communities know and interact with one another and are therefore capable of sharing beliefs, conformity, and sanctions. Bott hypothesized a direct path, with network structure determining the strength of normative influence. The specific norm of interest concerned the segregation of conjugal roles. Highly interconnected networks should adopt a consistent gender based ideology, with husbands and wives having very separate responsibilities for decision making, household labor, and child care, as well as separate personal associates and leisure interests. Loosely connected networks are less predictable. Without the coordinated influence of network members, spouses are freer to adopt their own arrangement of roles and responsibilities and accordingly they may adopt separate or joint conjugal roles.

The strength of this first model rests on the recognition that relationship outcomes (e.g., the interactions between spouses and the outcomes of those interactions) are affected by the ties linking network members (i.e., conditions existing apart from spouses' relationship to one another), with the vehicle of influence being a system of normative beliefs. This is an important contribution because it represents the first concrete attempt to define social structure and normative influence in terms of the patterned interconnection of people, and subsequently to quantify the degree of structure in relational terms. It contrasts sharply with traditional conceptualizations of social structure based on categorical memberships like sex, race, or class, conceptualizations from which structure can be only inferred. On the other hand, a sharp limitation of the model is a failure to explain why a network would subscribe to one belief, such as role segregation or patriarchal norms, rather than any other. The underlying model can be usefully restated by simply treating the specific

beliefs, norms, and their attendant sanctions as variable. Whether a particular network shares patriarchal views or egalitarian views is critical to the outcome, but not the structural condition giving rise to the outcome. Greater structural interdependence (e.g., high density) gives rise to more homogeneous attitudes and beliefs on the part of network members, and the potential for coordinated influence. Highly structured networks where members know and interact with one another have greater influence, as Bott initially argued.

Yet another way in which Bott suggested conjugal roles are linked to social networks concerns the exchange of mutual support, including both instrumental supports (e.g., money, direct aid) and symbolic supports (e.g., love, positive regard). Members of dense networks will provide considerable aid to one another, a system of mutual exchange that is possible only to the extent that members know and interact with one another. In dense networks mutual assistance among members is presumed to be high, and as a consequence spouses will have less need for one another's practical aid and companionship, and segregated marital roles emerge. In contrast, in more loosely structured networks, members are less likely to know one another and the network's ability to coordinate mutual aid is limited, so spouses must rely more fully on one another, creating the conditions for joint conjugal roles to emerge.

The Bott hypotheses have engendered considerable research interest, particularly because they offered non intuitive explanations of marital action located in a social context. A recent review uncovered 14 studies that attempted to examine the link between network structure and the organization of conjugal roles (Milardo & Allan 2000). The original hypothesis has not been widely supported, although no study to date has directly tested the causal models underlying Bott's original hypothesis, and nearly all of these empirical tests have stumbled upon the inherent difficulty in defining a network, identifying its constituency, and quantifying its structure.

Nonetheless, Bott's work influenced several generations of network theory that included refinements in the way networks are defined and measured (Milardo 1992). Substantial advances have also been made in the

conceptualization of particular properties of network structure all of which center on the organization of ties linking members to one another. They share the common attribute of describing links between network members apart from their ties to spouses and, as a result, benefit from two distinct advantages. Attributes of network structure are essentially highly refined, quantifiable indices of local social structure that are relationally based. They permit a means to examine the pathways by which basic processes like normative influence and social sanctions, social support, and social interference develop and exert their influence. In the coming decade research will likely explore in greater detail representations of personal networks and their structural features, the potential causal pathways linking network structure with relationship outcomes, and the precise influence of kin, friends, co workers, and other acquaintances on primary partnerships.

SEE ALSO: Divisions of Household Labor; Kinship; Marriage; Networks

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connubium (who marries whom?)

Fabrizio Bernardi

The question "Who marries whom?" refers to patterns of partner choice. The tendency to marry (or enter a long term relationship such as cohabitation) a person who belongs to the same social group or who is similar with regard to certain characteristics is also known as homogamy. Since Weber argued that connubium (i.e., marriage) is one of the indicators of status group closure, homogamy has become a key object of study in order to highlight properties of the social structure. Sociologists have traditionally been interested in three individual characteristics that can be important in the choice of a partner: race/ethnicity, religion, and socioeconomic resources. Studying patterns of partner choice is important because it allows us to evaluate the degree of openness of the boundaries of different ethnic, religious, and socioeconomic groups. The more frequent marriage between subjects who differ with respect to the characteristics of the group, the more open the group is said to be. Substantively, the likelihood of ethnic intermarriages has been interpreted as an indicator of the level of integration and social cohesion between different ethnic groups. Religious intermarriages reflect the strength of different religions in conditioning individual life choices. Finally, socioeconomic homogamy is related to the openness of the system of social stratification and affects the overall level of social inequality. In fact, in a society with the maximum level of socioeconomic homogamy, all men with a high educational level and occupational class would marry women with a high educational level and occupational class. Conversely, in a society with a minimum level of socioeconomic homogamy, men with a high educational level and occupational class would marry women with a low educational level and occupational class, and the other way around. If one assumes that the social position of a couple results from the combination of both of their resources, then inequality among couples will be highest in the society with a maximum level

of homogamy, and lowest in the society with a minimum level.

Theories that aim to explain patterns of partner choice focus on three factors: individual preferences, control over partner choice by third parties (in particular, parents and relatives), and the structural availability of partners with given characteristics. According to modernization theory, for instance, the transformation from agrarian to industrial society also implies a change in the institution of marriage. It is argued that, with the advent of industrial society, the family loses its traditional economic functions and becomes fundamentally an emotional unit that cares for the integration and socialization of new members of the society. The shift to industrial society has also brought about a generalized improvement in standards of living and has been paralleled by the development of a welfare state that protects citizens against health, old age, and income loss risks. Therefore, the parents' need to control their offspring's marriage in order to safeguard the family economic assets and their own well being when elderly has decreased. Parallel to the transformation in the institution of the family and marriage, other changes such as the diffusion of mass media, the process of urbanization, and geographical and social mobility increase the opportunities for subjects of various social groups and with different socioeconomic resources to come into contact. In sum, modernization theory suggests that control over marriage by third parties (i.e., parents) has diminished, while the opportunities to meet people with characteristics different from one's own have increased. Thus, socioeconomic homogamy should decline over time.

In opposition to this hypothesis drawn from modernization theory, the theory of the educational system as a marriage market argues that increased participation in education segments the marriage market and favors educational homogamy for two reasons. First, by remaining in the education system for a longer time, subjects spend a larger part of their life course in a homogeneous environment with regard to education. Second, a longer amount of time spent in education also implies postponing marriage until school/university is completed. If marriage takes place just after leaving

the educational system, it is likely to occur with a partner one met at school/university and, thus, with the same level of education and a similar occupation. In sum, participation in the educational system segments the network of actual and potential acquaintances and limits the opportunities to meet potential partners with different levels of socioeconomic resources.

Other theories have focused on the mechanism underlying the formation of individual preferences for a partner with given characteristics. For instance, it has been argued that the tendency to marry someone from the same ethnic or religious group or with the same level of economic resources reflects individual preferences for cultural similarity. According to this theory, people prefer a partner who shares the same values, opinions, and tastes because this increases the possibility of mutual understanding, reinforces one's worldview, and augments the possibility of spending leisure time together. On the other hand, recent theories about social mobility and educational inequality suggest that in their mobility strategies, with choice of a partner being one of them, individuals aim to avoid downward social mobility. With the increase in the number of dual earner couples, both partners' social positions have become increasingly important for defining the couple's well being and social position. Thus, in the search for a partner, people would aim to marry someone who has at least the same level of social resources as they do.

The comparative analysis of ethnic, religious, and socioeconomic homogamy and of its changes over time involves several methodological complications. This is because, independent of individual preferences, the level of homogamy is affected by the marginal distributions of the characteristics under analysis in the populations of potential partners. First of all, the level of homogamy is negatively correlated with the degree of heterogeneity of a population with respect to the characteristic under analysis. For instance, if one considers two religious groups, the number of homogamous couples will tend to be lower in a society where each of the two religions accounts for 50 percent of the population than in a society where a religious group accounts for 90 percent of the population. Moreover, a second difficulty has

to do with differences in the distributions of potential partners with respect to the characteristics under analysis. The larger the imbalance in the two distributions, the lower the level of homogamy. For example, educational homogamy will tend to be lower in a society where 30 percent of the women and 10 percent of the men have a university education than in a society where 20 percent of both men and women have a university education. In order to deal with this type of problem associated with the marginal distributions of the characteristics under investigation, empirical research on homogamy has largely borrowed both conceptual distinctions and statistical methods from social mobility studies.

In addition, empirical research on homogamy has traditionally focused only on married couples and has excluded singles from the analysis. In recent years, changes in living arrangements have made this approach increasingly inadequate. There is, therefore, a manifest need to develop more comprehensive theoretical frameworks and analytical models in order to account for the overall process of searching for a partner, which might include the option of remaining single as one of its outcomes. Accordingly, the unit of analysis has shifted from the couple to the individual. Attempts have been made to investigate how individual preferences, third party control, and structural availability of partners with certain characteristics affect an individual's outcome in the marriage market. One should note, however, that by focusing on individuals one gets a one sided view of the process of partner choice, since it obviously takes two to form a couple. Ideally, one should simultaneously consider the parallel process of searching for a partner in both groups of potential partners.

Although it has long been recognized that patterns of partner choice offer key sociological insights, the mentioned methodological problems have made it difficult to get conclusive results on trends in patterns of partner choice over time and among countries. Still, one might predict that, given the substantive interest in the consequences of ethnic and religious homogamy for social cohesion and of socioeconomic homogamy for income inequality, the question "Who marries whom?" will remain at the core

of the research agenda on social structure in the coming years.

SEE ALSO: Intergenerational Mobility: Methods of Analysis; Marriage; Stratification Systems: Openness

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consciousness raising

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Consciousness raising (CR) was a cornerstone of radical feminist organizing in the late 1960s and early 1970s. Many of the women involved in the anti war, New Left, and Civil Rights Movements were disillusioned by the end of the 1960s as they found themselves relegated to the role of providing services (including sex) to men, the official leaders of these movements (Evans 1980). In the Civil Rights Movement and in the New Left, many women became unwilling to assume a back seat to men. Instead, they began small consciousness raising

groups to understand what had happened to them in male defined social movements, and how they could organize on the basis of sex (gender) to form their own movement for women's equality. They spoke of themselves as members of the women's liberation movement, rather than a women's rights movement (Echols 1989).

The term consciousness raising can be traced to other movements for social change, including the New Left where it was called criticism or self criticism, and earlier as it was practiced in China when Mao sent facilitators into rural villages to raise awareness of the teachings of communism after the 1948 revolution. Mao was particularly interested in raising the consciousness of women to their new role in society under communism – a role of active productivity in the fields and workforce.

The women involved in CR in the US constituted one segment of the contemporary women's movement that can be classified as the small group sector (Ryan 1992), the younger branch (Freeman 1975), or the radical feminist sector (Firestone 1970). As an initial step in their organizing, they met in small groups of 8–15 women and talked about their lives. The recognition that other women were experiencing the same frustrations and blockages in both their professional and personal lives was enlightening and often resulted in a call for action.

Many of these women went on to write classical articles on feminism and, as activists for social change, to use direct action tactics. For instance, Shulamith Firestone and Pam Allen founded New York Radical Women, moving from CR to street theater, civil disobedience, and “zap” strategies that gained media attention. Radical Women are remembered from a statement of principles beginning: “We take the woman's side in everything” (New York Radical Women 1970: 520).

New York Radical Women later splintered into three groups, one of which was Redstockings, co founded in 1969 by Firestone and Ellen Willis, itself dissolving in 1970. The name Redstockings was taken from two sources: Bluestockings, a term used to describe nineteenth century feminist writers (revealing regard for historical feminist activism), and Red for revolution. Going further than its origin group,

a Redstockings manifesto stated: “We identify the agents of our oppression as men” (Redstockings 1970: 534).

Identifying themselves as radical feminists, they began a discourse that would later spill over to the larger more generalized movement and society itself. Some of the terminology they placed in popular usage came from the New Left, but most was clearly related to a new emerging lexicon of feminist language that defined meaning and framed debates. Patriarchy, misogyny, oppression, exploitation, traffic in women, hegemony, the personal is political, gender, sexual harassment, and many more movement terms came into vogue during this time. An oft repeated message coming from this sector was one of hostility to the praxis of progressive movements that spoke for specific sectors of society (e.g., the working class, African Americans, anti war/anti draft) but still ignored the constituency of women.

The high energy and “true believer” spirit of the small group sector led to strident encounters both with outside forces and within the groups themselves. Thus, there was increasing disengagement as internal attacks, known as trashing, began to take a toll. Writing under the nomenclature Joreen, Jo Freeman, a founder and activist in the Chicago Women's Liberation Union, details the paralyzing effect of being dismissed from the group you felt provided you with the first understanding you had experienced in your movement activist days (Joreen 1976).

The vitriolic nature of the divisions that arose within this sector of the movement reveals the danger of ideological purity so commonly found in dedicated proponents of social change. The effect was toxic and led to the dissolution of much of the small group sector by the mid 1970s. Other factors contributed to the breakdown of these groups, including those that would lead to serious movement divisions based on race, class, ethnicity, sexual orientation, sexuality, age, and ability. In particular, lesbian and African American women challenged the movement – large and small sectors – to become inclusive of all women or to stop talking about sisterhood (Lorde 1984).

Betty Friedan, a founder of the National Organization for Women (NOW), dismissively

called CR navel gazing; but in fact, a CR session is a social process that allows hidden dimensions of women's lives to become transparent. It was the recognition of group subordination that came to be called "the personal is political." Later, this recognition was formulated as the "feminist click" where everyday events, language, and behavior were seen in a new light. The click represented awareness and connectedness for women. Thinking sociologically, rather than psychologically, the spread of feminist thought was the result of interaction. A fruitful analysis of this process is found in the sociological framework of symbolic interactionism (SI), which reveals the interactive process as the foundation of interpretation and meaning (Goffman 1959).

Consciousness raising as a method of "becoming aware" or as an organizing tool no longer played the same role in the women's movement after the 1980s. It became clear that, unless CR groups were representative of all women, the consciousness that was being raised was of the women in that particular group, and most groups that did CR were white middle class women. In the 1990s international and transnational feminism also called for a widening circle of feminist awareness and increased concern for the differences among women.

Whether the terminology used is consciousness raising, something else, or nothing at all, the process of expanding conceptions to both explore the particular in women's lives as well as to reach out to those women who have been excluded, inclusiveness, transnationalism, and global feminisms are the goals of the women's movement in the twenty first century.

SEE ALSO: Civil Rights Movement; Feminism; Feminism, First, Second, and Third Waves; Personal is Political; Radical Feminism; Women's Empowerment; Women's Movements

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conservatism

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Conservatism has been one of the principal ideologies of the modern era. It was first articulated in its contemporary form in opposition to liberalism and specifically to the cataclysm of the French Revolution, which challenged the principles and values of the old order, and the authority of monarchs and priests. The deep seated crisis of the European *ancien régime*, and the sudden appearance of revolutionaries prepared to act out utopian fantasies and inaugurate an entirely new kind of society, prompted a profound intellectual and political response, and laid the foundation for the modern conservative outlook.

Conservatism was part of the more general intellectual movement of the Counter Enlightenment which challenged many of the ideas of liberalism, in particular its abstract individualism, its universalism, and its demands for equality. Conservatives stressed the importance of history and tradition, the particular and the local. First used as a party label in England in the 1830s, conservatism gradually spread

elsewhere, but conservatives tended to regard it not as an overarching doctrine or transnational movement, but as composed of several distinct national traditions. Reflecting this, conservative thinkers have been highly diverse, ranging from Edmund Burke to Joseph de Maistre, and from Michael Oakeshott to Leo Strauss. Because conservatives are so averse to rationalism and to universalism, conservatism has not usually been presented as a universal doctrine in the grand manner of liberalism or socialism, organized around a distinct set of values and principles. It takes the form of a number of separate national traditions, each with its own peculiarities because of its unique national history and the statecraft that is deemed appropriate to conserve it.

Despite frequent attempts to present conservatism as a set of unique national experiences, there are nevertheless – as in all ideologies – common features and common principles. Together, these make up the conservative outlook. Conservatism is a fundamentally defensive doctrine, concerned with the preservation of existing institutions and interests, and with resisting the pressures for reform and change when these are seen to threaten them. Arising from this is a profound skepticism about human reason, human goodness, human knowledge, and human capacity. Conservatives are generally pessimistic about the state of the world and human society, and believe that most schemes of improvement are at best well meaning and at worst malicious attempts to change society which will end up making it worse. The conservative instinct is always to hang on to what is familiar and known, rather than to risk what is unknown and untried. This attitude towards change is a fundamental human attribute, found in all organizations and all individuals.

Conservatism since its inception has been a long rearguard action against the modern world. As the pace of change has accelerated so a conservative disposition has been increasingly hard to maintain but, its exponents argue, all the more necessary. Most of the original causes which rallied conservatives have all been lost – absolute monarchies, the political power of landed aristocracies, the political authority of the church, slavery, serfdom, the subordination of women. Conservatives have had to accept human rights, democracy, secularism,

property taxes, and much more. But this has not invalidated the relevance of the conservative message or the conservative attitude, although it sometimes makes it hard to grasp what it is that conservatives are seeking to conserve.

Conservatism is not just a doctrine about resisting change. It also has its own vision of society and human nature. Conservatives have been strongly critical of individualism and the doctrine of individual rights, because for them society exists before individuals, and the individual is a construction of society, fashioned by its customs, values, and traditions. Individuals do not exist outside society or prior to society, and therefore cannot for conservatives be treated as the yardstick for evaluating politics.

As a political doctrine conservatism is concerned with order, authority, tradition, precedent, and hierarchy. It holds that a secure and stable social order requires that authority be recognized and respected at all levels of the society, from the highest officials of the state, the holders of positions of responsibility in the professions, in companies and public bodies, to the heads of households. Conservatives seek to defend traditions, precedents, and hierarchies because these are the forms which give rise to authority and allow it to be exercised and accepted, the way things have always been done. Most conservatives were extremely hostile to democracy since it promised such a radical change in traditional governing arrangements, substituting the abstract notion of popular sovereignty for the historical sovereignty of the monarch.

As an economic doctrine conservatism has always emphasized property rights, but not as universal individual rights. Instead, property relationships are understood as deeply embedded in the history of particular societies, involving duties as well as rights. During the nineteenth century conservatives were often strong critics of *laissez faire* economic individualism, believing that the widening gap between rich and poor, the encouragement of speculation and competition, the growth of cities and the depopulation of the countryside, the loss of national self sufficiency, the spread of cosmopolitan and anti national values and traditions, and the leveling down and dumbing down associated with capitalism all represented

a huge assault upon the society they sought to conserve. Conservative political economy was highly pragmatic, often directed to protecting and subsidizing particular interests, such as farmers, and the national economy itself. Conservatives therefore often backed protectionist measures, particularly where these were linked to the strengthening of the national capacity for defense. Although conservatives have always tended to be against high levels of taxation, particularly taxes on property, they have not favored a minimal state on the doctrinal grounds professed by liberals, and in certain circumstances conservatives have been enthusiastic supporters of extending the powers of the state to tax and spend. Defense and welfare have both been regarded by conservatives as legitimate areas of state spending. All this has led liberals and some conservatives to question whether conservatism and capitalism are ultimately compatible.

As a cultural doctrine conservatism has been concerned with maintaining the authority of cultural traditions, with resisting the lowering of cultural standards, and bemoaning the decline of moral behavior in the West. This has also been a central concern of conservatives in the Islamic world, fearing the spread of western styles of behavior as well as western attitudes. In the West the spread of permissiveness, the undermining of individual responsibility, the emphasis upon rights rather than duties, the wave of social legislation allowing abortion and divorce, decriminalizing homosexuality, ending capital and corporal punishment have all caused enormous anxiety to conservatives. So too has the decline of education standards and the growth of new media, such as television and the Internet, which threaten traditional cultural standards and achievements. Some of these concerns are new, but cultural conservatism has deep roots, being connected to the desire to protect particular cultural heritages, whether western, Islamic, or Chinese, and the national expressions of those heritages.

Aside from its doctrinal elements conservatism also operates as statecraft. There is not one conservative statecraft, but rather as many statecrafts as there are states. A conservative statecraft is about choosing the best means to conserve the institutions of a particular state

and defend its essential interests. How that is done involves a basic strategic choice: governing by incorporating opposition, making such concessions to them as becomes necessary, or governing in such a way as to make such concessions unnecessary. The latter was the preferred path of Metternich and supporters of the *ancien régime* in Europe, the former being the statecraft of the English Whigs who were to become an essential part of the conservative coalition. Statecraft professed no permanent doctrines or principles, using them as tools in the gaining and holding of power. The substance of this conservatism lay in the institutions of the state which it was seeking to defend, and success was judged by how well that state survived. In the last decades of the Soviet Union the rulers of the Kremlin pursued a thoroughly conservative statecraft. Ultimately, that statecraft failed and the state was dissolved. In England by contrast the conservative statecraft preserved many aspects of the premodern English state throughout the twentieth century, including a monarchy with prerogative powers, a second chamber selected partly on a hereditary basis, and feudal titles and rituals.

Conservatism – whether as statecraft or doctrine – has been forced to adapt because of the huge changes which the modern era has unleashed. It might seek to delay change, but in the end could not resist it. The *ancien régimes* of Europe lasted through the nineteenth century, but most of them perished in the great conflagration of World War I. For conservatives like the Marquess of Salisbury, ensuring “shelter in our time” was as much as conservatives could aspire to. In the twentieth century the upheaval of two world wars and the pace of industrialization and urbanization forced many adjustments. Conservative parties were obliged to compete in the new mass democracies, to organize mass parties, and seek to appeal to a mass electorate. They generally did so by identifying themselves as the party of the nation, rallying national support against foreign enemies and immigrants and all who threatened the national way of life. They were also obliged to come to terms with capitalism and become the defender of capitalist institutions against the threat of Bolshevism.

The twentieth century saw the gradual emergence of conservative capitalism in many states, where conservative rather than liberal parties became the main protectors and defenders of capitalist institutions. This trend accelerated during the Cold War, when the security needs of states brought conservative understanding of national interests to the fore, and made it possible for them to forge coalitions to defend the nation and defend the free market and democracy against threats real or perceived from the left. The identification of the Soviet Union and international communism as the ideological enemy of the West provided a clarity to conservatism by crystallizing the values and the way of life which it was defending. At the same time conservatives found new enemies within, particularly after the emergence of the 1960s counter culture which rejected cultural and political authority across a broad front, and the tide of social liberalism which questioned traditional values and behavior in respect of sexual orientation, gender roles, and multiculturalism.

Conservatism at the beginning of the 1990s was at war on many fronts, but fairly clear who its enemies were and what it stood for. All this changed with the ending of the Cold War and the disappearance of the Soviet Union – the main rationale for conservative politics in the previous half century. After the Cold War, conservatism struggled to find a clear purpose and a new external enemy, and lost ground in many countries to social democratic and left coalitions. The spread of neoliberal and cosmopolitan ideas was not very conducive to conservative politics, and the proclamations of a new era of peace, prosperity, and steady progress in eliminating social problems seemed to leave little role for a robust conservatism. This particular phase was however abruptly terminated by the security crisis of 9/11, which allowed conservatives in many countries to define a new external enemy and declare a global war on terror. Many of the conservatives active in identifying the need for a new policy initiative to combat global terrorism were dubbed neoconservatives, a label they happily adopted.

Conservatism as a doctrine is wide enough to embrace the tough minded realism of neoconservatism with the ameliorative and concessionary

politics of the Middle Way. In recent decades it has also increasingly converged with certain types of liberalism. The resulting amalgam – liberal conservatism, or free market conservatism – has become one of the dominant ideological patterns in the western world. It has moved away from certain features of earlier twentieth century conservatism, particularly the emphasis upon welfare and the extended state and protectionism, and has embraced the market and capitalism, while still remaining confident about the value of the state and the need to use state power in defense of key institutions and interests.

SEE ALSO: Liberalism; Nation State and Nationalism; Neoconservatism; Tradition

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conspicuous consumption

Juliet B. Schor

The term conspicuous consumption entered the sociological lexicon via Thorstein Veblen's biting analysis of the spending patterns of the rich and *nouveau riches* in the late nineteenth century. *The Theory of the Leisure Class* (1899) is an account of how these groups spent enormous energy and money constructing an ostentatious style of life. They built and decorated ornate homes, adorned their persons with clothing and jewelry, designed elaborate carriages, and employed large numbers of servants dressed in expensive uniforms. Throughout,

the principles of waste, luxury, and ornamentation ruled the choices they made. The motive that animated their efforts was the desire for social esteem, which itself was dependent on the possession of wealth. But having money was not enough. It must be put “in evidence,” or become conspicuous. Because these are ongoing features of wealth based status systems, the concept of conspicuousness continues to be important long after the Veblenian era has passed.

THEORY OF CONSPICUOUS CONSUMPTION

The theory of conspicuous consumption is the centerpiece of Veblen’s larger analysis of class society and its relation to styles of life and work. Relying on a stylized history of “savage,” “barbarian,” and “civilized” societies, Veblen argued that the emergence of classes in the barbarian era (roughly synonymous with feudal Europe and Asia) led to the use of wealth as the primary basis of males’ social esteem, in contrast to military prowess. Wealth originally reflected booty gained in war, but over time came to be valued for its own sake, even to the extent that inherited wealth was more valued than wealth gained through personal accomplishments. Veblen believed that the desire to attain status, or social esteem, eventually became the dominant motive in individuals’ decisions about work and consumption, even eclipsing biological or physical pressures to consume. His account is thus thoroughly sociological.

In a status system based on wealth, the credibility and verifiability of individuals’ claims to status become a significant issue. Particularly before the era of paper money, wealth was not easily transportable, and ensuring its safety also militated against public display of money itself. Therefore, proxy measures of wealth holding developed, chief among them the ability to forego productive labor, and the ability to consume luxuriously, or what Veblen termed *conspicuous leisure* and *conspicuous consumption*. While status accrues in the first instance to the male head of household, wives and servants engaged in vicarious leisure and consumption.

Their idleness and adornment with expensive jewels, furs, and livery are powerful testaments to the pecuniary position of their husbands and masters.

Originally, the ability to forego productive labor was the basis of status. Veblen (1994) argued that labor came to be socially disreputable and associated with inferior groups. Elites’ desire to appear “at leisure” led to widespread idleness (e.g., among European nobility), to non working wives as a symbol of prestige, and even to the employment of servants who did no work. However, the conflict between the prestige value of idleness and what Veblen called the “instinct of workmanship” meant that over time conspicuous consumption, the purchase and display of expensive and luxurious goods, became the dominant status marker. In the modern era, Veblen argued, an affirmative desire to engage in what he called “invidious comparison,” or to trump others by amassing more than they have, became less important than a self protective attempt to keep up. Thus, Veblen believed that consuming conspicuously was as much a defensive as an offensive behavior.

For both leisure and consumption, public visibility is central. In Veblen’s day, when the rich gave elaborate dinner parties, they had their menus published in the newspapers. Today, expensive homes are pictured in popular magazines or television shows. This argument explains why furnaces are far less important as status goods than watches, and why some people pay as much for a handbag as a mattress. The need to put spending “in evidence” is because public display solves the informational problems associated with wealth based status competitions. To operate efficiently such a system needs a method for conveying accurate information about each participant’s wealth. Merely telling is not a viable system because of the problem of what social scientists have termed “moral hazard” – the incentive to lie or behave unethically, in this case the possibility of exaggerating one’s wealth. Therefore, status claims are verified by the requirement of committing real resources to the game. And a set of complex, unwritten rules for gaining social status have developed (eg., boasting is counter productive, nonchalance is preferred).

This weeds out pretenders and allows the system to operate in a slightly more oblique and therefore more powerful way. Thus, the role of public visibility, or what Veblen calls conspicuousness, becomes central to the operation of the system.

There are a number of noteworthy features of Veblen's theory of conspicuous consumption, particularly in relation to the contemporary literature on theories of consumption. First, agents are deeply intentional in their spending decisions, making choices for the purpose of maximizing their social status. They are fully informed, in command of their desires, and operate in a well organized social environment of shared assumptions and values. Consumption is neither personally expressive, nor impulsive. This is similar to conventional economic theories of the rational consumer. In contrast to the dominant economic accounts, however, Veblen's consumer has a pure social orientation. Consumption is valued for what others make of it, rather than for intrinsic product benefits or functions. In this, his approach is similar to anthropological accounts that stress the role of consumption in the construction and reproduction of culture, as for example in Mary Douglas and Baron Isherwood's classic discussion in *The World of Goods* (1979), or sociological accounts that emphasize the importance of symbols and meanings, such as the writings of Jean Baudrillard. Like some of these culturalist accounts, the theory of conspicuous consumption relies on a widely recognized valuation ranking in which all participants covet a set of consensual status symbols.

However, in contrast to standard accounts of consumption as a functional and satisfying cultural expression, in Veblen's account there is a frustrating aspect to spending, because all status is positional and the goal of the game is to *waste*. The dynamic part of his theory involves the "trickle down" of status goods through the layers of the social hierarchy. The rich are the first adopters of new and expensive products. As incomes rise, groups farther down the social hierarchy mimic the spending patterns of those above them. Luxuries turn into necessities with lower status, because everyone owns them, and the rich move on to the next new or more expensive thing. Absolute increases in spending

only yield social value when they improve relative position; when increases in standard of living are general, they are like being on a treadmill, merely keeping people from falling behind. (In economics, this approach is called "relative income," following James Duesenberry's appropriation of Veblen's model.) Another classic trickle down model is found in Georg Simmel's "On Fashion" (*American Sociological Review*, 1957). Simmel argued that fashion trends begin with the wealthy and diffuse throughout the population, and that as styles generalize, the rich abandon them in search of something novel. Thus, fashionability requires novelty.

The theory of conspicuous consumption also explains the pattern of consumer spending. It predicts that people will tend to spend more heavily on socially visible goods, in contrast to products that are used in private. Appearance goods such as dress, footwear, and jewelry have traditionally been central to status competitions. So too have vehicles, from carriages to SUVs and BMWs. The third item in the trio of status display is the home, where ornamentation, size, and materials all figure centrally in the social value of a dwelling. This theory of consumption patterning has been used to predict that people will pay higher status premiums for products that are more socially visible. For example, Angela Chao and Juliet Schor, writing in *the Journal of Economic Psychology* in 1998, showed that women pay higher prices, relative to product quality, for branded lipsticks, which they frequently use in public, than they do for facial cremes, which are used exclusively in the home. A 2004 Princeton doctoral dissertation by economist Ori Heffetz found that the wealthy spend a higher fraction of their income on visible items than do lower income households. The theory of conspicuous consumption is also central to accounts of branding, and predicts that products that are used in public view will attract more branding resources from advertisers. Similarly, if products follow a trajectory from relatively private to relatively public usage and display, they are likely to become more heavily advertised. Recent examples of newly branded goods which were purely private but are now displayed publicly include undergarments, water, and kitchen appliances.

VEBLEN AND THE SOCIOLOGICAL LITERATURE ON CONSUMPTION

The theory of conspicuous consumption and the broader account of a class based status driven consumer system was for decades the dominant approach to consumption in American sociology, and *The Theory of the Leisure Class* was the seminal work. For example, the research of Stuart Chapin, carried out through the 1920s and 1930s, painstakingly recorded the consumption items displayed in the living rooms of households of different social classes and tested subjects' ability to identify the backgrounds of the inhabitants. Classic sociological research such as that carried out by Andrew Warner and the Lynds found that people used consumer goods to signal and solidify status within their communities. The role of visible consumption display was thought to be more important in the US than in Europe because birth based status claims were weaker and upward mobility based on new money was more accepted. After World War II this approach continued to dominate the field, as considerable empirical research was aimed at describing differences in consumption patterns by social class. The theory of conspicuous consumption got a further boost in the 1950s with the critique of affluence and advertising found in hugely influential books such as John Kenneth Galbraith's *The Affluent Society* and Vance Packard's *The Status Seekers* and *The Hidden Persuaders*. Furthermore, despite some obvious differences, the Frankfurt School critique of mass culture and the 1960s rejection of consumerism in works such as Marcuse's *One Dimensional Man* also buoyed Veblen's influence. The Frankfurt School and Marcuse took the view that the power of corporations and marketing efforts were primarily responsible for people's consumer behaviors; they saw people as passive, almost powerless victims of a system that required mass consumption, passive leisure, and an uncritical attitude toward capitalism. In Veblen's story people are more active, but there are similarities. People become victims of strong structural forces in both accounts, although not to the same degree. In addition, both approaches take the view that consumer goods are important mainly for their social meanings rather than utilitarian benefits. And perhaps most importantly, both share a deeply

critical attitude toward consumption, which differentiates them from mainstream liberal theory as well as postmodernism.

BACKLASH AGAINST VEBLEN

In keeping with the materialist orientation of postwar empirical social science, most of the research in the Veblenian tradition looked at *what* people were purchasing, and ignored direct measures of consumers' intentions as well as how they interpreted consumer goods. The literature called these concepts the "coding" and "decoding" of consumption symbols. In the 1970s, this weakness in the literature was exposed. Two influential articles by Marcus Felson in 1976 and 1978 (published in *Social Indicators Research* and *Public Opinion Quarterly*, respectively) cast doubt on the entire approach on the grounds that consumers did not actually know which goods were more expensive, and in any case, the proliferation of consumer goods had eroded the homogeneity of the status system. While there were weaknesses in Felson's methodology and conclusions, it hardly mattered. The pendulum began to swing away from Veblen. It is not surprising, as his influence had been so profound and had lasted for so many decades, that researchers apparently found it suffocating. Beginning in the 1980s, sociological accounts of consumption contained a ritual denunciation of Veblen and his pernicious influence. While some market researchers did studies in this vein through the 1980s, sociologists and others in the emerging interdisciplinary field of "consumption studies" pursued very different ideas. In his widely cited 1987 *The Romantic Ethic and the Spirit of Modern Consumerism* and elsewhere, Colin Campbell attacked Veblen's theory on the grounds that it was not empirically supported, and failed to sufficiently account for the importance of novelty in "modern" consumer societies. Campbell argued that consumers were driven by an endless cycle of daydreaming–purchase–disappointment. Cultural studies accounts of media consumption emphasized an active viewer making her own meanings, undaunted by the symbolic meanings intended by producers. More generally, research in both sociology and other fields

shifted from a critical to an interpretive framework which relied far more on consumers' own interpretations of their actions and what consumption means to them. By contrast, in status driven systems consumers are not always fully conscious of or willing to admit motives. Evidence of status seeking is largely behavioral.

Postmodern theory also rejected Veblen. Although social differentiation was an essential principle of the consumer system for foundational postmodern consumer theorists such as Baudrillard, as the characterization of postmodernity as an era of fragmentation, pastiche, recombination, and bricolage developed, it became less compatible with the single minded, consistent, purposive Veblenian status seeker. The "postmodern" consumer is a playful, ironic, novelty seeking, adventurous individual, putting on and taking off roles like costumes from her eclectic closet. She shuns conventional upscale status aspiration. As Douglas Holt, one proponent of the postmodern markets thesis, has argued, the "good life" is no longer a matter of acquiring a well defined set of consensual status symbols, but needs to be understood as a project of self creation. Studies of subcultures also rejected the trickle down model on the basis of a growing tendency for consumer innovation to come from the social margins. Analysts noted that trends in fashion, music, art, and even language were starting among inner city youths, rather than wealthy suburbanites.

In the midst of this ferment, Bourdieu's magisterial study *Distinction* was published in French in 1979 and in English in 1984. *Distinction* affirmed the principle of class patterning of consumption, but expanded on the theory of conspicuous consumption by arguing that both "economic capital" (i.e., wealth or purchasing power) and "cultural capital" yield status. Cultural capital is knowledge of elite taste, manners, and habits, and is transmitted through family upbringing and elite educational institutions. Bourdieu's account is far more complex and developed than Veblen's, but *Distinction* has unmistakable Veblenian roots. This may account for some of the negative reception the book received in the American context. An interesting, although limited debate ensued, in which key tenets of the class/consumption approach were explored, such as whether taste

and consumer choice follow class patterns in the US or whether consensual status symbols still exist. The dominant view continues to be that this is an outmoded theory of limited usefulness in explaining consumer behavior. Perhaps not surprisingly, two books in the Veblenian tradition which were published in the late 1990s, Juliet Schor's *The Overspent American* and Robert Frank's *Luxury Fever*, were written by economists rather than sociologists.

CONSPICUOUS CONSUMPTION: OUTMODED OR RELEVANT?

Curiously, as the academy was presiding over the death of conspicuous consumption, consumers embarked on an era of unprecedented luxury spending, much of it patently conspicuous. The dramatic increases in the concentration of income and wealth which began in the 1980s led to booming markets for high end items, beginning with watches, jewelry, designer clothing, automobiles, and yachts. During the 1990s the competition spread to expensive hotel suites, weddings and other private parties, elaborate mansions, and private airplanes. Analysts also studied the emergence of a "new servant class" of immigrant women, mainly, but also of European style butlers, with an unmistakable Veblenian cast. These developments were duly reported on in national newspapers and magazines, as they had been a century earlier. As the corporate financial scandals of the early twenty first century came to light, so too did the consumption excesses associated with this public looting. It was highly reminiscent of the Gilded Age of the 1890s which had prompted Veblen to write *The Theory of the Leisure Class*. Then, as now, conspicuous consumption was fueled by worsening distributions of income and wealth, a trend which shows no signs of abating, as globalization and conservative policies continue.

What scholarship will eventually make of these developments is hard to say. After 25 years, perhaps it is time for the pendulum to swing back in the direction of the theory of conspicuous consumption, particularly in the wake of a growing grassroots anti consumerism and "voluntary simplicity" movement. However, that reversal is by no means certain.

Within the academy, consumption continues to be celebrated, and moral or other critiques of consumption remain suspect.

SEE ALSO: Bourdieu, Pierre; Brands and Branding; Consumption; Cultural Capital; Hyperconsumption/Overconsumption; Veblen, Thorstein

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constructionism

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Preeminently the result of Berger and Luckmann's book *The Social Construction of Reality* (1966), constructionist theory claims that what human beings at any moment hold to be "real" in social experience is itself a social creation, and in that moment is simultaneously a social product and production. Drawing particularly upon the work of Mead and Schütz, they posit a three moment dialectic using the concepts

of *externalization*, *objectivation*, and *internalization*. Society is a human product. Society is objectively real. "The human" is a social product. These three simple sentences provide a theoretical structure for understanding both in and through time how people relate not only to their external social world, but also to their own identities. Constructionist theory simultaneously incorporates and supersedes role theory inasmuch as it extends beyond roles to both reality and identity. That is, both where I am and who I am socially become both the effect and cause of where I am and who I am socially in and through an unending process of interaction sequences that constitute not merely social experience but also human being itself.

Subtitled "A Treatise in the Sociology of Knowledge," *The Social Construction of Reality* is intended to present a sociological account of how it is that, both collectively and individually, humans "know" the world around them and their place in it. Constructionist theory is empirical in the sense that it begins from an understanding of "society" as a product of human activity. Society does not come into existence apart from the interaction of human beings. Hence, at any point in time, society is being produced by its participants. In the absence of living human beings, there is no society. Yet, as a result of human beings existing through time, society comes to have an objective character (or "facticity") that makes it appear to exist not only potentially over against any specific human being, but also as an object of potentially coercive character against all the human beings who participate in it. What may sometimes be termed the "social system" exists *as if* it is objectively real. And because it is externalized as if it is objectively real, it becomes objectively real to its participants, in the sense that it is both formally and informally transmitted as real both to outsiders and to newborns, hence internalized by them to the extent that they wish to participate in the system. At the same time, however, because humans exist in both natural and technical environments as well as in interaction with multiple social environments, the social world can never be a closed system that reproduces itself unchanged across an extended period of time. Especially with increasing globalization in late

modernity, alternative “realities” (or constructions of reality) intersect and force reevaluation of the putatively objective character of the socially constructed reality of any specific situation, giving an ironic postmodern credibility to the Marxist dictum that “all that is solid melts into air,” as the “reality” is challenged by a multiplicity of competing realities across cultures.

SEE ALSO: Knowledge, Sociology of; Mead, George Herbert; Role Theory; Schütz, Alfred

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(constructive) technology assessment

Ragna Zeiss

Technology assessment (TA) refers to the study and evaluation of new technologies. The need for technology assessment was first articulated in the late 1960s when growing numbers of people became concerned about the consequences of new technologies and new large technological projects. In this period of environmental, anti nuclear, and democratization movements, societal problems were regarded as complex and interrelated and could not be solved by simple policy measures. Technology assessment was seen as a way to assess and analyze (adverse) social, economic, legal, political, cultural, and ecological effects of a given technology on society and to give society time to reflect upon these impacts and take appropriate measures.

Societal actors became interested in technology assessment for a variety of reasons. Some were attracted to technology assessment because the combination of scientific analysis and societal involvement seemed to do justice to the complexity of the problems that were faced at the time. The stress on the integration of natural and social sciences and the inter- or multidisciplinary of teams of independent scientists was popular for similar reasons: these teams might be able to provide society with a complete analysis of the likely consequences of a technology and bring together all facets of the problem. Yet others regarded technology assessment as a way to change anti technological attitudes; the negative consequences of large technological systems (and their breakdowns) and ideas formulated by influential thinkers such as those from the Frankfurt School will have influenced negative attitudes toward technological developments. The Frankfurt School posed a pessimistic view of technology as a destructive force that was out of control. Companies could use technology assessment to demonstrate to the public that social responsibility was taken seriously. Social movements like the environmental movement saw technology assessment as a legitimate way to ask attention for its requirements and to make them part of the regular policy preparation and decision making process (see Smits & Leijten 1991).

Despite the fact that societal groups became interested in technology assessment for various reasons, TA remained the generic name for the activity of describing, analyzing, and forecasting the likely effects of technology on all spheres of society. Two aspects are common to the perception of technology assessment by different actors. First, it is a means to analyze the societal consequences of technological developments. Second, technology assessment is considered as a tool to evaluate (technological) developments for policy purposes. The way in which technology assessment is considered and used in specific (national) contexts depends on the political institutions, the political climate, innovation and social policy context, the contemporary pressing issues, and the actors (and their ideas) involved in the process. These issues have also influenced the relation between technology assessment and social studies of technology (or technology studies).

INSTITUTIONALIZATION AND DIVERSIFICATION OF TECHNOLOGY ASSESSMENT

The examples discussed here can be seen as three different prototypes of technology assessment as it originated and became established in three different social, cultural, and political contexts. The first example is the development of technology assessment in the US. The second and third examples focus on, respectively, Denmark and the Netherlands.

The US and the OTA

The US Office of Technology Assessment (OTA) in the United States has long been *the* example of technology assessment. With the establishment of the OTA in 1972, technology assessment was first institutionalized. Apart from seeming an appropriate method for dealing with the (technological) issues raised by social movements, the institutionalization of technology assessment in the OTA was also seen as a way to strengthen the position of the Congress. The OTA was an office of Congress and therefore closely linked to the legislative branch. Its goal was to obtain objective information about the (secondary) effects of technology at an early stage of the technological development. With the help of this information, it could then independently assess the virtues of technological developments and correct the imbalance between legislature and executive. The OTA technology assessment can thus be considered as an "early warning system" that would help decision makers to avoid unwanted side effects of new technologies. The OTA only became successful after a number of years when the assessment products were extensively reviewed internally and externally and the reports could be regarded as of high scientific quality. It was then that the OTA became seen as an organization providing neutral and objective information. The OTA is sometimes regarded as a prototype of the classic technology assessment model. In the classic model, technology assessment studies the secondary impact of technology and provides decision makers with objective information on those

impacts. The OTA can then be characterized by its expert orientation and the indirect involvement of interest groups. Others have defined a specific "OTA model" that has developed since its early years (see Eijndhoven 1997). In later years many (societal) actors became disappointed since the high expectations they held of technology assessment had not come true. Technology assessment had not become a major contribution to society; it was realized that the impacts of technology could not be foreseen in their totality; technology assessment had not been the early warning system people had expected it to be (it had been more focused on the short term than on the long term); technology assessment did not provide neutral and objective information; and policymakers and the public had not accepted the results of technology assessment at face value. Technology assessment was then changed from an early warning system to a way to develop policy alternatives. The OTA is here characterized as an organization with much in-house expertise that provided thorough assessments of high scientific quality (through advisory panels, workshops, etc.) that provide options for policy development. In 1995 the OTA was closed. This does not mean that technology assessment no longer exists in the US; people are still concerned about understanding and controlling technical change. Technology assessment has been institutionalized in different places than in the OTA and some see opportunities for different forms of technology assessment, perhaps more similar to those in some European countries (see La Porte 1997).

Europe

The development of technology assessment started in Europe more than a decade later (in the 1980s) and took different forms than the technology assessment that was practiced in the United States. These differences can be explained by a number of things, such as the different political systems, the more limited capacity of especially smaller countries (and thus less in-house expertise), different concerns, and the role of social studies of technology. The early 1980s saw political debates around (new) technologies (nuclear power,

microelectronics, biotechnology) and their social, ethical, and economic consequences. It was also a period of economic stagnation during which technological innovation could be seen as a means to overcome crisis. Technology assessment started therefore with (slightly) different assumptions in Europe. There was less attention to the negative consequences of technological developments; one was often more interested in technological developments that could be seen as desirable. The assumptions that technology assessment could turn policy making into a scientific practice and that the scientific community would be able to predict all possible consequences of technological development, as was thought in the early years of the OTA, were no longer seen as realistic, and the focus turned toward controlling and forming future technological developments. These different assumptions on which some of the technology assessment projects were based were also influenced by the development of social studies of technology.

In many of the smaller countries (Denmark, Finland, Belgium, the Netherlands) social studies of technology are triggered by policy needs and the need to examine the social and environmental consequences of new technologies. This is also true for some larger countries like Germany, although social studies of technology do not have a clear link to technology assessment in Great Britain and France (see Cronberg & Sørensen 1995). Over time, social studies of technology also started to influence technology assessment. New approaches to technology assessment have been created on the basis of insights developed in social studies of technology. These studies emerged partly as a result of a critique on “technological determinism.” Technological determinism assumes that technology develops (almost) autonomously; society is not able to change technological developments and their impacts. Social scientists had, in accordance with this determinism, mainly focused on the effects of technology. New perspectives have criticized the line that was drawn between technology on the one hand and the effects of technology on the other. The detailed empirical studies that were carried out by technology studies scholars stressed the mutual shaping of

technology and society. Technology and innovation processes were now understood as integrated in the social, cultural, and political development of society. Rather than focusing on the external effects of technology and on choices between technological options, scholars started concentrating on the internal development of technology. Since technical developments were now understood as being influenced by society, design related issues and social discussions of the technology and options of technological development were needed. These new insights into the nature of technological change have influenced further development of technology assessment. Technology assessment changed from isolated analyses of social impacts and an early warning system to a constant monitoring of research and development processes. The users and consumers of technologies were no longer regarded as passive; instead they have become very important since what users do results in the consequences of a technology. Technology assessment has thus changed from the way in which it had first been developed in the United States (this is not to say that these changes may not, in their turn, have influenced technology assessment practices in the United States). Yet, there are still differences between technology assessment practices and the ways in which they are institutionalized and carried out in different European countries. Two examples are given below.

Denmark and the Danish Technology Board

In Denmark technology assessment started to become institutionalized in the early 1980s. The Danish Technology Board can be regarded as a prototype of the participatory model or of public technology assessment. Technology assessment in Denmark concentrates on mediating social discussion and fostering public debate about technological developments and their consequences. Whereas in house expertise was important for the OTA, in Denmark public participation and the involvement of different societal groups in the debate are seen as essential. The Danish Technology Board has developed a standard procedure to achieve debate on

the implications of technology in the form of consensus conferences (see below). At the end of the consensus conference a panel of lay people write a consensus document; this document is regarded as an important input for policy.

The Netherlands and the Rathenau Institute: Constructive Technology Assessment

In 1986 the Netherlands Organization for Technology Assessment (NOTA) was established. Since a policy memorandum of 1984, Dutch technology assessment was linked to both decision making and broader political and societal articulation of opinions on science and technology. The NOTA, which became the Rathenau Institute in 1994, drew on both the model of the Danish consensus conferences to stimulate social debates and a newly emerging form of technology assessment called "constructive technology assessment" (CTA). Consensus conferences in the Netherlands do not have the same importance for policy as they do in Denmark and are therefore often called "public debates." Constructive technology assessment is based on different ideas than consensus conferences. It provided an answer to the critique of technology assessment that its early warning function and ideas about future impacts of technology were elaborated only after the technology had already been developed. It focuses on broadening the design, development, and implementation processes of technologies in all phases of technical change rather than on assessing the impacts of (new) technologies. This is not to say that constructive technology assessment does not attempt to anticipate effects or impacts of new technologies at all. However, where in traditional technology assessment the technology or projects with strong technological components are seen as given, as static, constructive technology assessment concentrates on the dynamics of processes, where the impacts of technologies are building up during the development of the technology. Choices are constantly being made about the form, function, and use of particular technologies and thus the development of these technologies can be steered to a certain extent. Early interaction with (relevant)

actors is therefore seen as a core activity. Constructive technology assessment has thus brought traditional technology assessment, the anticipation and accommodation of social impacts, back to the actual construction of technology. Constructive technology assessment therefore consists of tools and strategies to bring technology assessment activities into the actual construction of technology. It can thus be regarded as a third prototype of technology assessment.

These ideas were influenced and supported by social studies of technology that saw technological development as a function of a complex set of social, economic, technical, and political factors rather than as an autonomous force with its own inner logic. The Rathenau Institute and the social studies of technology scholars mutually supported each other. The Rathenau Institute had an effect on technology studies in terms of funds, and technology studies informed the Rathenau Institute about new analytical techniques and new approaches regarding the development of new technologies.

The task of the Rathenau Institute is still mainly to organize and coordinate large scale TA studies and to foster public debate. Naturally, other Dutch institutes have also taken up (constructive) technology assessment. Outside the Netherlands many activities take place that can be labeled constructive technology assessment as well, although these activities are often given different names. The core of these activities is always to broaden the design of new technologies, but they may be carried out in different ways to emphasize different aspects and to fit the context in which constructive technology assessment is practiced.

METHODS OF (CONSTRUCTIVE) TECHNOLOGY ASSESSMENT

The above has shown that technology assessment analyzes the possible (long term and unintended) consequences of particular technologies (often for purposes of policymaking) by means of an interdisciplinary approach. Yet, a number of more specific methods can be and have been identified and used in order to undertake

(constructive) technology assessment. These consist of methods such as interviews, brain storming, literature research, document analysis, expert consultation, case studies, cost benefit analysis, computer simulations, and scenario development. There are also methods more specific to technology assessment and involvement of the public such as dialogue workshops, social experiments, public debates, consensus conferences, technology forcing programs and platforms, and strategic niche management. Which methods are used for (constructive) technology assessment depends on the type of technology assessment that is practiced and on the wider context in which this form originated and is now used. A distinction can, for instance, be made between project induced technology assessment (analysis of the possible consequences of one particular project, e.g., highway construction), technology induced technology assessment (analysis of the impact of a specific technology on society and natural environment), and problem induced technology assessment (identification of different possible solutions to an existing or future social problem). Another distinction is that between participatory methods based on stakeholder involvement (working groups, scenarios, hearings) and participatory methods that involve the general public (voting conferences, development space, consensus conference). One method more specific to technology assessment is further discussed below.

The consensus conference was developed by the Danish Board of Technology (DBT) to be used in participatory technology assessment. The term "consensus conference" and method were already used in the 1970s by the US health sector where health professionals obtained information from experts and discussed health related issues. However, the DBT was the first to involve members of the public in decision making processes; this has been called "the Danish model." Each year one or two consensus conferences are held by the DBT and the method is now used in many other countries as well. A consensus conference often takes place over a number of days during which a dialogue between experts and lay people is established. The conference is open to the public. The experts inform lay people about the

technology and its implications and lay people then have the chance to express their (economic, social, legal, and ethical) hopes and concerns about this technology, and their knowledge and experience will be included in the process. An attempt is then made to reach consensus on the issue. In this way, experts and politicians become aware of the attitudes and thoughts of the public about the issue, lay people are actively involved with decisions about technologies, the knowledge and experience of experts and lay people are integrated, and the process adheres to the democratic principle. In cases where the public may be affected by the (new) technology (biotechnology, transport, genetically modified food), the public can be seen as a stakeholder and needs to be involved to act as peer reviewers (see Ravetz & Funtowicz 1996; Fixdal 1997). This method is especially suited for topics that presuppose contributions from experts, are societally relevant, can be limited in scope, and address issues that need clarification of attitudes. The method is used slightly differently in different countries. In the US consensus conferences are, for example, often used to create knowledge rather than to inform the political system and requirements about transparency and accountability therefore differ (see Joss & Durant 1995; Andersen & Jæger 1999).

USE OF (CONSTRUCTIVE) TECHNOLOGY ASSESSMENT IN SPECIFIC FIELDS

(Constructive) technology assessment has been used to analyze technological developments in different areas. Biotechnology, energy technology, information technology, nanotechnology, nuclear power technology, and telecommunications are just a few examples. For some areas a specific form of technology assessment that concentrates on just one of these areas has been developed. One can think about environment technology assessment, information technology assessment, and the most substantive and institutionalized of these, health technology assessment (HTA), also called medical technology assessment. HTA is occupied with, for example,

coverage decisions, prices for pharmaceuticals, and numbers of services needed in an area. It helps to make policy decisions about priorities and the choice of health interventions by evaluating actual or potential health interventions. By examining short and long term consequences of the application of a health technology (or set of technologies) like drugs, devices, and procedures, it aims to help decision making in policy and practice. Many countries now have health technology assessment offices and centers and also the European Commission supports the forming of national and international networks for health technology assessment. HTA is not new; it started in the 1970s. The Health Program of the US OTA was the first of its kind and was established in 1975. Most European national programs regarding health technology assessment, like other forms of technology assessment, started in the mid 1980s, although earlier projects had already been established in the early 1970s. As with other forms of technology assessment, HTA differs among different countries. Some countries have a public agency for assessment of health technology (Sweden, Spain, France), whereas others make use of health technology assessment with regard to payment for health care through sickness funds and insurance companies (the Netherlands, Switzerland). Yet others have made health technology assessment part of the Department of Health and attempt to bring it into all administrative and clinical decisions (United Kingdom). Likewise, the methods used by different countries also differ.

SEE ALSO: Critical Theory/Frankfurt School; Risk, Risk Society, Risk Behavior, and Social Problems; Science and Public Participation: The Democratization of Science; Science, Social Construction of; Social Movements; Technological Determinism; Technological Innovation; Technology, Science, and Culture

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consumer culture, children's

Daniel Thomas Cook

Children's consumer culture refers to the institutional, material, and symbolic arrangements which organize a young person's involvement in, and movement through, the early life course in terms of commercial interests and values. Children are both subject to and arise as subjects in consumer contexts. The meanings which adhere to commercial goods are at once imposed upon children, childhood, and their social worlds and are taken up by children as resources with which they create selves, identities, and relationships.

Due to longstanding beliefs about childhood "innocence" (Higonnet 1998) and related concerns about children's susceptibility to influence, their involvement in the economic sphere has never been unfettered or come without adult reservations. Moral tensions and considerations comprise the environment of children's consumption because they revolve around determining the kind of social being or "person" a child is. Many observers question the timing of and extent to which children become knowing, reflective beings who have the wherewithal to make informed choices. The evident malleability of children's desires, interests, and pleasures only strengthens the case that a child does not conform to the economist's notion of a rational economic actor. The fear that children's apparent susceptibility to influence invites exploitation on the part of marketers and advertisers is reinforced by a deep seated cultural uneasiness that arises whenever children and markets commingle (Zelizer 1985; Langer 2002).

Moral concerns undergird children's consumer consumption in another way: children are

not involved directly in the material, symbolic, and ideological production of their culture to any great extent. In fact, they are born into it. Children's consumer culture is never merely confined to products made for children's use or to their own use of them, as the term "children's" might imply. It also invariably involves those who produce the goods and make them available – i.e., the manufacturers, designers, advertisers, retailers, and marketers – as well as the regulators of children's consumption – i.e., parents, public advocacy groups, and government – who often make determinations about appropriate or inappropriate goods and activities for children.

EARLY HISTORY

A commercial culture of childhood existed as a social form well before scholars recognized it as something noteworthy to study. Prior to the twentieth century in the US, there were markets for children's books (Kline 1993), toys (Cross 2000), clothing (Cook 2004), and nursery ware which were generally low in volume and sales, had few competitors, and were widely variable in terms of geographical location and concentration. There were, in other words, few goods designated specifically for children's use being manufactured by companies and sold to families. What was available was often sold in local dry goods stores and through mail order catalogues like those published by the Sears company of Chicago.

With the advent of the urban department store in the late 1800s and its rise to prominence in American cities during the first third of the twentieth century, children gained an increasingly visible presence in retail settings. Some stores offered the upper and middle class female clientele services in which they could "check" their children at supervised play areas where items available for purchase were also on display. In some cases, the stores offered child oriented services like barbershops to make the store amenable to both mother and child. As early as 1902, the Marshall Field's store in Chicago sponsored a Children's Day, and by the 1920s the association between children,

Christmas, Santa Claus, and toys was firmly solidified in many people's minds. The now traditional Thanksgiving Day Parade, where the highlight is the appearance of Santa Claus at the end, was inaugurated by George H. Macy to draw shoppers to his New York City store during a normally slow buying season (Leach 1993).

The seasonal attention paid to children at Christmas did not and could not in itself sustain a culture of consumption. More substantively, children began to gain a literal and cultural "space" in retail settings like the department store largely because they began to be seen as having the social right and where withal to be desirous of goods and to have their desires attended to by parents and retailers. Sales clerks and store managers in the 1910s and 1920s began to note that mothers increasingly were deferring to young children's requests for toys and to their likes and dislikes regarding clothing.

The institutional response, which took several decades to become widespread, was to begin to create retail spaces specifically designed for children and to merchandise goods with their perspective, not the mother's, foremost in mind. Toys initially had their own shelf, then separate aisle, then entire department. Separate departments for infants' and children's clothing did not exist until the 1910s, but by the late 1930s multiple departments for variously aged children or entire floors for youth clothing from infants through the teen years came into existence. In these departments, age appropriate iconography on the walls and carpets (such as ducks and bunnies for toddler aged children), along with child height mirrors and fixtures gave children the message that the space was theirs, oriented to their perspective. In the 1940s and 1950s, for instance, clothing stores for teen and pre-teen girls had Coca Cola dispensing machines, piped in popular music, and staged fashion shows often featuring the local schoolgirl clientele who served as models (Cook 2004).

Child orientation expanded beyond retail spaces into the realm of specifically child directed entertainment and media. It made marketing to children and what now is called brand merchandising possible. In the 1920s,

radio shows or segments for children began to be aired which were sponsored by cereal companies. By the 1930s, radio shows and their underwriters had developed the concept of the sponsored children's club. As members, children would receive merchandise or would be cajoled into active participation in a radio program by being made privy to a secret code or inside information. Film stars such as Jackie Coogan and, most famously, Shirley Temple appealed to both adults and children alike. Temple had her own lines of clothing in her own name and image, a doll in her likeness, and gave her name to other merchandise. Mickey Mouse made his debut in the late 1920s and by the mid 1930s was adorning children's wrist watches, drinking cups, and more. These tactics involved children with the company or property by offering them a sense of cultural ownership, of being recognized as legitimate participants in their own world of celebrity and goods.

Until the 1960s, there was no direct marketing per se aimed at children. Much of the understanding of children's perspective, wants, and desires derived from retailers' and manufacturers' own observations and cultural understandings of the nature of children. In the 1930s, some psychological studies of children began to be discussed in advertising and retailing trade journals which addressed, for instance, how differently aged children responded to such things as colors, premiums, and packaging. In the 1950s, Eugene Gilbert became prominent for his approach to the "youth market," focusing mainly on teenage and young adults in their twenties. By the mid 1960s, research on grade school aged children came into its own as market researchers and marketing professors began to design instruments to elicit consumer related preferences directly from children (Cook 2000). The significance of this research is not so much in the findings as in the acknowledgment that children can and should be treated as knowing, able consumers.

From the 1960s to the 1970s, a number of noteworthy developments in children's culture made lasting marks. The rise and spread of television increasingly allowed broadcast networks to offer child directed programs and hence

provided advertisers with an increasingly age circumscribed audience, i.e., target markets. By the early 1960s, the Saturday morning time slot was reserved mainly for children's programming and advertising. A group of concerned mothers formed the political action group Action for Children's Television (ACT) in the latter part of the decade. Spearheaded by Peggy Charren, ACT questioned the social benefits of exposing children to unregulated advertising which, they contended, promoted materialistic values. An early victory for the group was the pressure it brought to bear to eliminate so called "30 minute commercials" – children's television shows the sole function of which was to spotlight and promote a particular product like Hot Wheels.

CHILDREN'S CONSUMPTION SINCE THE 1980s

Throughout the 1980s and beyond, children's consumer culture has proceeded apace, expanding in market size and in the depth and breadth of its reach. The changing political economy of the household and the increasing centrality of children's voices therein, together with marketers' intensifying efforts to appeal ever more directly to children, contributed to the increasing specificity of the children's market. In the process, childhood itself, in many ways, has become redefined by and equated with market categories and meanings.

Changes in household composition and dynamics helped to facilitate the entrenchment of the kids' market in the everyday lives of families. Mothers entered the paid workforce in greater numbers than in previous decades and, by the late 1990s, a second (i.e., women's) source of income was seen as a necessity by many (Schor 1998). A steady, high rate of divorce and remarriage made *blended families* a common experience for many children. In addition, two prolonged periods of general, relative economic prosperity in the 1980s and 1990s, which were punctuated by only a brief downturn, made conditions favorable for children to become recognized as an economic influence and force by marketers and economists.

Together, these sets of factors also helped chip away at the lingering moral hesitations about the extent to which children could be addressed and targeted as direct consumers aside from the traditional Christmas season and gift giving occasions such as birthdays. Many observers point to women's absence from the home to work in the labor force as a source of guilt for mothers, who often "compensate" by acquiescing to children's requests for things more than they might have otherwise. Mothers' relative absence has also made for a market of convenience foods which can be easily prepared by the mother or by the children or father. Dining out or ordering food for take out or delivery have increased dramatically for similar reasons. Marketers began to realize that children consequently were gaining a stronger voice in family purchasing decisions, not only in the area of their own food, toys, and clothes as might be expected, but also in having a say in the choice of such big ticket items as the family car, vacation destination, large appliances, and even the location of the new home (McNeal 1992, 1999; Guber & Berry 1993).

The landscape of children's media and its relation to consumer markets also changed dramatically during this time. Tom Englehardt (1986) coined the term "Shortcake Strategy" to describe the emerging cross promotion of children's goods that interlaced a number of products with licensed characters and their "back stories." The doll Strawberry Shortcake began as a greeting card and eventually became a cartoon character and image adorning many kinds of merchandise. Marketers and merchandisers have followed suit and many characters for children are now conceived and planned as the entry point into an entire array of merchandise, promotions, and co branding efforts with other properties.

The rise and expansion of cable television has produced a number of networks, notably Nickelodeon, Disney, and the Cartoon Channel, that create their own characters and enter into cross merchandising agreements with clothing manufacturers, makers of Halloween costumes and candies, foods, backpacks, and video games, to name a few. Each major children's product and/or media character undoubtedly has a

website where children can “interact” with the characters, play branded games, or communicate with other children via the Internet through the medium of the specific commodity image and form (Kinder 1998).

An increasing ghettoization of children into their own specified worlds, goods, social relations, and media constitutes a strong trajectory of western childhood as it has been elaborated in and through commercial culture over the course of the twentieth and early twenty first centuries. Media – from cellular communication technology, to web interfaces, to televisual modes of entertainment, to video and digital games – are the keys to children's consumer culture because they act as multinodal portals into a ready made world of commercial meanings and relationships. This is a culture not initiated by children and not produced by them. It “empowers” them, as marketers like to believe and exhort, by giving children a voice and cultural ownership – a sense of propriety – over the goods and their meanings, but it is a voice articulated in the idiom and vocabulary of corporate owned and produced branded and licensed characters and products.

Researchers are beginning to address the problems of social inequality that arise in children's lives, such as in school, when some – due to difficult financial circumstances and racial inequities and differences – do not have access to the goods and images which increasingly define a children's culture (Chin 2001; Pugh 2004). Emergent research also delves into how the dynamics of children's engagement with and in commercial, consumer realms becomes articulated through the local understandings of non western, non US cultures (Langer 2004; Tobin 2004; Huberman 2005; Peterson 2005). To what extent is the globalization of capitalism enhanced or restrained by the globalization of children's culture? How do family traditionalist relationships react when confronted with technologies and meaning systems derived from notions of empowered, knowing, and desiring children? What images of childhood, of consumption, and of social life are encoded in the narratives of film, video games, and computer technology? In what way will children come to signify social order? These are some of the questions now being investigated

by researchers who realize that the hand of the market is visible in creating the means through which children come to know themselves as children and that market considerations cannot be separated from the experience of childhood.

SEE ALSO: Childhood; Consumption, Girls' Culture and; Consumption, Provisioning and; Consumption, Youth Culture and; Globalization, Consumption and; Media and Consumer Culture

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consumer movements

Robert N. Mayer

Consumer movements are the organized actions of individuals in pursuit of greater equality in the relationship between buyers and sellers. While consumer movements rarely resort to revolutionary violence or even civil disobedience in pursuit of their goals, these movements are engaged in life and death issues, like the safety of food, drugs, and automobiles. Consumer movements, once confined to affluent countries like the US and Sweden, are now found in rapidly modernizing countries like China and India, formerly socialist nations like Poland and Russia, and less developed countries like Nigeria and Bangladesh.

The history of consumer movements extends back to the end of the nineteenth century, when middle class and upper class women in the US formed local "consumers leagues" to press for better working conditions and greater food safety. In 1899 these leagues coalesced into the National Consumers League, which exists today as the world's oldest consumer organization. After a lull associated with World War I, consumer activism

in the US grew more forceful in the 1920s and 1930s. This era of activism culminated in the creation of Consumers Union, the publisher of *Consumer Reports* magazine and arguably the world's most powerful consumer organization.

Despite more than a half century of activity, consumer movements were largely unknown by members of the general public until the appearance of Ralph Nader in the mid 1960s. Nader became the first consumer celebrity, garnering ample media coverage for his crusading campaigns and quirky habits. When General Motors was caught illegally spying on Nader, he used the hefty proceeds from an out of court settlement to found a network of consumer organizations, most of which persist to this day. Consumer movements began to appear outside the US after World War II, notably in Western Europe; and in 1960, the International Organization of Consumers Unions (later renamed Consumers International) was established to assist consumer organizations around the world.

The earliest scholarship on consumer movements was produced by movement participants. Maud Nathan, the president of the National Consumers League, wrote *The History of an Epoch Making Movement* in 1926, and Persia Campbell, an economist who later became the consumer counselor to New York Governor Averell Harriman, published *Consumer Representation in the New Deal* in 1940. Scholarship from outside the US consumer movement did not appear until about 1970 (Herrmann 1971; Nadel 1971). Beginning a pattern that has persisted to the present, academic scholarship on consumer movements has been dominated by historians and political scientists, not sociologists (with Robert Mayer (1989) being the main exception).

As research on consumer movements expanded during the later 1970s and 1980s, sociological theory, if not sociologists themselves, began to inform the analysis of consumer movements. The most influential sociological perspective was the resource mobilization approach to social movements. Most closely associated with John D. McCarthy and Mayer N. Zald, this approach is designed to be a counterpoint to more social psychological explanations of collective behavior, with their

emphasis on deprivation and widely held beliefs about the need for social change. Resource mobilization theory draws heavily from political science and economics, emphasizing the role of “political entrepreneurs” in summoning the human and financial resources necessary to establish and sustain social movement organizations.

In the study of consumer movements, resource mobilization theory provides an answer to the challenge posed by Mancur Olson, Jr. in his 1965 book, *The Logic of Collective Action*: How can rational individuals be expected to voluntarily bear the costs of a social movement whose benefits go to all citizens? The core of the answer provided by resource mobilization theory is that modern day social movement leaders benefit in the form of long term careers as the heads of organizations staffed by additional full time professionals. These leaders raise funds by selling publications, receiving foundation support and government grants, winning lawsuits, and exploiting other sources of support beyond soliciting dues from consumers.

A number of scholars outside of sociology have drawn on resource mobilization theory to illuminate the dynamics of consumer movements. Legal scholar Joel Handler, in *Social Movements and the Legal System* (1978), was the first to apply the resource mobilization framework to the US consumer movement, focusing on the role of litigation in prompting action from legislators and regulators. Business scholars Paul Bloom and Stephen Greyser were attracted to the obvious business allusions in resource mobilization theory: social movement leaders as *entrepreneurs*, organizations as *competitors* in a social movement *industry*, organizational goals as *products*, adherence to organizations as *demand*, and *advertising* and celebrity *endorsements* as means of appealing to potential constituents. In a 1981 *Harvard Business Review* article, Bloom and Greyser took these allusions literally and divided the US consumer movement into competing *brands*, including “nationals” (reformist organizations that engage in a variety of lobbying and education activities), “corporates” (politically cautious organizations that advise and work with corporations), and “anti industrialists”

(radicals who are highly distrustful of businesses, government, and technology). Another business scholar, Hayagreeva Rao (1998), used resource mobilization to explain the early history of the product testing, “consumer watchdog” organization, Consumers Union. (Rao’s article is the only piece on consumer movements to appear in a top tier sociology journal, the *American Journal of Sociology*.)

The spread of consumer movements from the US and Western Europe to other nations demonstrates the diverse ways in which the social impulse to establish consumer rights is expressed. The Japanese consumer movement, for example, is far less professionalized than that of the US. It relies for its strength on local women’s organizations and buying cooperatives (Maclachlan 2002). In contrast, the consumer movement in the People’s Republic of China consists of a single, large, government supported organization – the China Consumers’ Association – that focuses primarily on processing hundreds of thousands of consumer complaints rather than on lobbying or litigation. India’s consumer movement could not be more different than that of China. India’s movement consists of dozens of privately funded regional organizations that reflect the country’s tremendous ethnic, religious, and linguistic diversity. As a result, India has more members of Consumers International, the world’s umbrella organization for consumer groups, than any other country, including the US.

Consumer movements have appeared in unlikely places. Even before the dissolution of the Soviet Union, Poland and, later, Russia had non governmental consumer organizations. Today, virtually every country in Central and Eastern Europe has at least one self sustaining consumer organization (MacGeorge 2000). Consumer movements are also well rooted in countries as diverse as Malaysia, Brazil, and Mali. Regardless of the initial level of economic development, consumer movements appear to flourish wherever economic growth and democratic institutions combine. The many commonalities and differences in the world’s consumer movements provide an opportunity for sociologists to test and deepen theories of globalization and development (Buttel & Gould 2004).

Finally, the sociological study of consumer movements dovetails with two closely related areas of research. One of these areas is the study of other modern social movements, especially the environmental movement (Shaiko 1999). Comparison of consumer movements with other social movements highlights the roles of movement structure, leadership, strategy, and ideology in the success of contemporary social movements. A second area of sociological study that relates to consumer movements is consumer culture. Consumer culture is a variegated field that examines both markets for culture products and the broader process by which the expansion of consumption is expressed in a society's beliefs and values (Cohen 2003). Sociological interest in consumer culture has resulted in the establishment of new journals (e.g., *Journal of Consumer Culture*) and a proposal for a formal section within the American Sociological Association.

SEE ALSO: Advertising; Consumption; Consumption, Green/Sustainable; Consumption, Mass Consumption, and Consumer Culture; Credit Cards; Culture, Social Movements and; Social Movements

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consumers, flawed

Allison Pugh

Flawed consumers is a term coined by the theorist Zygmunt Bauman to signify prevailing social discourse about poor consumers, or those who, by virtue of their limited means, cannot participate fully in the consumer culture of the contemporary West. While not in extensive usage, the term captures what other scholars have also set out to do: portray and explain how low income people are pathologized and marginalized as consumer society expands.

Bauman developed this concept in his monograph *Work, Consumerism, and the New Poor* (1998). In the production economies of yore, social acceptance and status rested upon participation and success in the labor force, and the poor were marginalized by claims that they lacked a work ethic. Under this rubric, however, the poor were still nominally useful as a reserve army of labor. But in the elaborated consumer economies of the late twentieth century, the level of production became less dependent on a large labor force in the developed world. Unable to participate fully in contests of consumption with standards set by others far away from poor communities, the poor were now castigated as flawed consumers, with neither social position nor, given the fixity of their predicament, even redeeming potential as some sort of reserve army of consumers to be. Bauman argued that social prestige came to be conferred upon the rich, not merely the industrious. The concept of "flawed

consumer” depended on the definition of “consumer,” emphasizing the relational quality of such notions as “poverty.”

The implications of the concept extend to the arenas of family and politics. While the work of quantitative scholars suggests that low income caregivers spend proportionately more on their children than do the more affluent, this is not necessarily evidence that the notion of “flawed consumers” does not hold sway, but rather implies that the concept influences the buying practices of low income caregivers. Researchers have found that low income consumers engage in a sort of “shielding consumption” to ensure their children can participate in peer culture, and to mute the effect of their own poverty on their children’s experiences; through consumption, they seek to deflect characterizations of being “flawed consumers” (Pugh 2004a). Low income caregivers have long been condemned for being unable to provide for their families appropriately. In a context in which consumption forms the bedrock of economic, social, and political activity, low income people become not just flawed consumers but flawed mothers. Elaine Power’s welfare reliant informants asserted that one of their highest priorities was to ensure their children fit in with their peers, even if they had to sacrifice buying household items, food, or personal items for themselves in order to do so (Power 2003). The low income women in Edin and Lein’s landmark study *Making Ends Meet* also said they felt compelled to spend what it took to make their kids feel normal. At the same time, this priority conflicts with the reality of available resources in many low income households in the West, not least in the United States, where, according to the US Census, more than 17 percent of children lived in “food insecure homes” in 2001.

In the political sphere, the flawed consumer concept also reverberates. Bauman explored the consequences of this new framing of the poor for social support for the welfare state. Formerly justified as a way to maintain this reserve army of laborers upon whom the economy sometimes depended, welfare benefits which provide (however nominally) for “flawed consumers” can no longer depend on economic

arguments for their rationale. In addition, other scholars have noted the contradictory implications of consumer culture for social patterning. In the American case, the paradox of the consumer culture’s promise of a newly egalitarian American society is juxtaposed with its divisive practices of segregating consumers by purchasing power and accentuating what distinguishes them. Those who are economic outcasts by virtue of their inability to consume risk being “flawed citizens” as well, constraining their claim to social personhood (Cross 2000; Cohen 2003).

Aspects of the concept “flawed consumer” remain unsettled. Bauman’s definition relied on a fairly narrow definition of consumption as strictly buying, or acquisition; indeed, he also referred to the poor as non consumers who were unable to buy the goods and services the market offers. Yet as we have seen above, caregivers do stretch budgets to ensure their child has at least some of the commodities of childhood that peer culture deems worthy. In addition, participation in consumer society can also include such practices as fantasy, playing, shopping, talking about products, even scavenging dumpsters, as Chin put it in *Purchasing Power* (2001). This wider net catches the poorest members of society within its reach, suggesting that it is not that the poor do not consume that makes them subject to the discourse of “flawed consumers,” it is that they cannot consume enough, or that they do not consume regularly (Pugh 2004b), or that they do not consume the right things (Nightingale 1993; Bourgois 1995; Schor 1998).

Bauman relies on broad brush characterizations of the producer and consumer eras to make his point, but the discourse of “flawed consumers” taps into a scholarly project that transcends his work. Awaiting future research are issues such as the implications of pathologizing low income consumers for other arenas of social life, such as work, education, and art; the disciplinary effect of this sort of discourse on consumers of greater means; and how such discourse is deployed and experienced in daily life.

SEE ALSO: Consumer Culture, Children’s; Consumption, Mass Consumption, and Consumer

Culture; Consumption, Provisioning and; Hyper consumption/Overconsumption; Poverty

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consumption

Michael T. Ryan

Consumption has been defined by economists in utilitarian terms as individuals taking care of their needs and maximizing their utilities in market exchanges, with the act of consumption taking place for the most part in private life. Even Marx saw it this way when he conceptualized the production process in four moments:

production, distribution, exchange, and consumption. He saw the first three moments as a socialized process determined by the social relations of property and production. While the shares of consumption for individuals were determined by property and production relations, the moment of consumption was a matter for individuals in their private lives. Veblen and Mauss were the first social theorists to detect and conceptualize a social logic of emulation and competition for prestige and power in consumer practices. Competition for prestige was not invented in market economies and societies; it could be found in the gift giving rituals that Mauss analyzed in tribal cultures. It could also be found in the idle pursuits of nobles in agrarian societies when useful work was considered ignoble and when indolence, warfare, sports, sacred activities, governing, and academic pursuits or devotion to the beaux arts were deemed appropriate because they were thought to have no practical significance, even if they actually did have social significance. So while acts of consumption are the acts of individuals, they also are organized through a social logic of emulation and competition for prestige and power.

In the nineteenth century, capitalist development and the industrial revolution were primarily focused on the capital goods sector and industrial infrastructure (i.e., mining, steel, oil, transportation networks, communications networks, industrial cities, financial centers, etc.). Obviously, agricultural commodities, essential consumer goods, and commercial activities also developed, but not to the same extent as these other sectors. Members of the working class worked for low wages for long hours – as much as 16 hours per day 6 days per week. That did not leave much time or money for consumer activities. Further, capital goods and infrastructure were quite durable and took a long time to be used up. Henry Ford and other enlightened captains of industry understood that mass production presupposed mass consumption. After observing the assembly lines in the meat packing industry, Frederick Winslow Taylor brought his theory of scientific management to the organization of the assembly line in other industries; this unleashed incredible productivity and reduced the costs of all commodities

produced on assembly lines. Workers needed higher pay and shorter hours at work to buy and consume the commodities that were produced, while scientific management allowed capitalists to pay higher wages and still raise their profit margins. Ford instituted the first 8 hour work day, 40 hour work week and paid a premium wage of \$5 a day during World War I. Consumer goods had a shorter “life expectancy” than producer goods; further, planned obsolescence made for commodities that would disintegrate within a predictable span of time and/or use (e.g., so many miles for a car tire, so many washes for a shirt, so many years for a living room ensemble, etc.). The fashion cycle also accelerated the depreciation of commodities even before they were physically used up. Buying on installment plans or on store credit in the new department stores made it possible to stretch out payments for the more expensive items. Initially, the advertising form informed potential buyers of the qualities and availability of new commodities without manipulating their needs or desires. The consumer society was up and running by World War I, but collapsed after the stock market crash of 1929 and the Great Depression that followed. During the latter era the corporations that had adopted this Fordist strategy returned to lower wages and longer hours. Yet the American labor movement in collaboration with corporations in the core of the American economy reestablished the conditions for this Fordist strategy after 1938, and the consumer society emerged from the ashes of World War II in the US, although it would become a global phenomenon after the reconstruction of Western Europe and Japan.

As Ritzer (1998) pointed out, the profession of sociology in the US has been slow to recognize this social phenomenon as an important topic to which sessions of sociological meetings should be addressed. Lefebvre and his colleagues, Baudrillard and Debord, were the first social theorists in France to take up a critical analysis of these changes in industrial society. Although Weber was not interested in the social logic of consumption per se, he did see status groups as having distinctive styles of life and providing an alternative form of difference to class differences for analyzing power

struggles and social change. Sumptuary laws in medieval societies prescribed distinctive forms of dress for the members of different estates. Institutional economist John K. Galbraith (1969) provided his analysis of these changes in the US. Vance Packard gave the public a more popular account of this new situation in several books (*The Status Seekers*, *The Waste Maker*, *The Hidden Persuaders*). The topic has been addressed by diverse writers in the “cultural studies” areas; conferences bring together philosophers, linguists, historians, anthropologists, sociologists, economists, and English professors beyond their disciplinary boundaries – an amazing outcome given their traditional animosities and turf wars.

Consumption has two levels or forms: individual consumption with its logic of emulation and competition for prestige and power, and collective consumption that corresponds to social needs. The consumer society is a social system that “delivers the goods” according to Herbert Marcuse. This is especially evident in Japan and the nations of Northern and Western Europe, the social democracies, where absolute poverty has been all but eliminated. As Galbraith pointed out in the 1950s, we can still observe “pockets of poverty” in the US, although much of it is relative poverty. Lefebvre notes that modernity is efficient at taking care of individual needs for material products and goods. But there are social needs that are poorly recognized and met: health care, education, childcare, care for the elderly, public spaces for recreation and leisure, love, and community, with community an important foundation for self actualization. Social goods are different from individual goods; they are not necessarily used up in the same way as a beer or a pair of slacks are used up in individual acts of consumption. Millions of citizens have made use of Central Park in New York City, but they have yet to use it up.

Baudrillard’s analysis of consumption begins with a critical analysis of Marx’s critique of political economy, especially his analysis of the commodity form as the cellular form of modern society. Marx distinguished the use value of the commodity from its exchange value. Commodity logic reduced everything and everyone to exchange value with the assumption that the

exchange values of the commodities exchanged were always equivalent, but the ideology of fair exchange distorted and made opaque the unequal exchange actually taking place between the working class and the capitalist class when the working class sold its only commodity, its labor power, to the capitalist class. Labor power is a unique commodity because the use of labor power in the labor process produced more value than was returned to the worker in the form of the wage. The working class performed surplus labor for which it was not compensated, and the surplus values produced were appropriated by the capitalist class as profits and were the source of capital formation. Capital is neither a thing nor a person, but a social relation of production that *appears* as the social relation between things. Commodity exchange integrated the members of different classes of modern society, but in a process that produced and reproduced the domination of capital. On the other hand, Marx saw the use value of commodities as corresponding to needs that were not equivalent and “natural” while recognizing how needs changed over time as well as the ways to satisfy them (e.g., horses, trains, cars, and planes are different modes of transportation corresponding to the human need for transportation). Baudrillard argues that needs are in no way natural and that in our consumer society needs are produced just like the commodities and are just as abstract and equivalent as exchange values. Over the course of the twentieth century we see the creation of a system of needs that completes the system of production. Marx’s formula for communism “to each according to his needs” is a formula for the reproduction of the capitalist mode of production, not the way out. In the consumer society, the political economy of the sign has created a new dimension in the commodity form: sign exchange value. Political economy includes the sign form as well as the commodity form. The sign form has a triadic structure: the signified, or meaning; the signifier, or the visual or acoustic image; and the referent, the object. Signifiers tend to become detached from their meanings and referents and exchange or play with each other in similar fashion to the detachment of exchange values from social labor and their use values. The code of consumption through the medium of the

advertising form attaches sign exchange value to all of the commodities. Consumption in its deepest meaning involves the consumption of these differential values which reproduces the code and the mode of production. Consumers are not conscious of this deeper logic, in similar fashion to their lack of consciousness of being exploited in the labor process in the nineteenth century. While workers in modernity are often conscious of being exploited at work, Baudrillard sees this as a more profound form of alienation, since consumers take pleasure or at least satisfaction from their consumer activities.

Lefebvre’s analysis of the bureaucratic society of controlled consumption is close to Baudrillard’s analysis, but differs in some important respects. Along with Debord, Lefebvre sees class strategy shifting in neo capitalism to the colonization, or commodification, of everyday life as well as the production, or commodification, of social space. Lefebvre conceptualizes consumption as a total social phenomenon, Mauss’s concept, through the sequence: need, work, satisfaction. Everyday life is a residuum, a moment of history; what is left over after working activities are extracted; humble acts that are repeated daily and taken for granted; the positive moment and power of daily life. Everyday life is also the product of modernity, of bureaucratic organization and the programming of private life, “everydayness” as an alienated moment of daily life. Everyday life is a contradictory amalgam of these positive and negative moments. For Lefebvre, everyday life is *the* social structure of modernity, a mediator between particulars and the social totality, a level of the social totality. Further, everyday life is another instance of uneven development, an impoverished sector that had yet to be developed with the available wealth and technologies to the same extent as other sectors like capital goods and the military. As long as people can live their everyday lives, modern society will continue to be reproduced in its present forms and structure. When people can no longer live their everyday lives, the possibilities for change in the forms and social relations become open, concrete. In a more optimistic fashion than Baudrillard, he interrogates modernity to analyze the possible movements

of the concept and the totality, from the programmed everyday to lived experience, self production and generalized self management as the revolution in everyday life, self development as a work of art. But he does entertain the possibility of Terricide, the destruction of the Earth. The consumer society is to some extent an American invention, but increasingly it has become a global dream. Will the carrying capacity of the Earth support a global consumer society? Both China and India are rapidly industrializing. Malls are now appearing in China as well as the production of cars; competition for a declining supply of oil is heating up international relations as well as the environment. While the mullahs in Iran have attempted to protect their traditional Islamic culture, dissident youth have appropriated hip hop music, drugs, and other western fashions as signs of protest against the mullahs' theocracy.

Both Lefebvre and Baudrillard go beyond the mere description of consumer patterns of different social strata which we can see in the work of many American researchers. They connect the logic of consumption in everyday life to the production and reproduction of modern society as a totality.

Michel de Certeau under the influence of Lefebvre and other researchers has looked at how consumers use commodities and the meanings attached to them through the media and the advertising form. Do consumers submit to the "terrorism of the code" as Baudrillard seems to assume? Certeau's research suggests otherwise, and a good deal of research in the cultural studies area has similar conclusions. Gottdiener (2001) finds a struggle over meaning between producers and users of consumer goods. Youth in the 1960s appropriated working class clothing like blue jeans and modified them in various ways as a sign of protest and a sign of proletarianization in the consumer society. Producers responded and reestablished the sign exchange value of their goods with various modifications: stitching, rips, pre faded forms, etc. To use a more contemporary example, the hip hop subculture appropriated the business casual forms of attire of Tommy Hilfiger as a sign of their innovative pursuit, in Merton's terms, of the American dream.

Tommy Hilfiger responded with displeasure to reestablish the prestige value of his line of fashion. Gottdiener has also demonstrated how consumer enterprises like fast food restaurants, casinos, amusement parks, airports, and malls compete on the basis of themed environments. This is a response to the realization problem which has displaced the valorization problem in the accumulation of capital. Producers have solved the problem of producing value through scientific management and Fordist strategies, but increasingly they now face the problem of realizing the values produced through sale of the commodities in extremely competitive and saturated markets.

Ritzer (2004) in his research on McDonaldisation has demonstrated how Taylor's principles of scientific management and Weber's ideal type of bureaucracy have been extended from the labor process to the process of consumption, spreading from McDonald's to the newspaper *USA Today*, to stand alone emergency rooms, etc. Like Baudrillard, Lefebvre, and Gottdiener, he links this process to society as a totality, although from a different conceptual basis.

Lefebvre has criticized his former colleague Baudrillard for constructing a social system that appears to be closed with no further developmental possibilities. Lefebvre sees it as a class strategy, not an accomplished system. If it were a system, how would anyone become conscious of its problematic features? He concedes that the consumer society takes care of individual needs, but it does a poor job of recognizing and taking care of social needs. This helps us understand why the US, the wealthiest nation within the bureaucratic society of controlled consumption, has failed to produce universal health care, day care for working families, public spaces for recreation and leisure, and a public life. Lefebvre also argues that the consumer society delivers satisfaction, but what about pleasure and joy? Consumers are attracted to malls and festival market places for communion as well as satisfactions, but these are highly commercialized social environments, pale simulations of the festivals of agrarian societies or the potlatch ritual celebrations of tribal cultures. Researchers in the cultural studies area criticize Baudrillard for failing to appreciate consumption from the

perspective of the users. His analysis is too academic; he needs to get out of his ivory tower and talk to actual consumers. Ritzer finds too much "commotion" in Baudrillard's theory; he brings together too many different concepts from diametrically opposed schools of thought. But the dialectical method of analysis as practiced by Hegel, Marx, and Lefebvre does attempt to bring together what a lot of theorists separate in their analytical and disciplinary fashions. It is unlikely that anyone can theorize modernity, or postmodern society, from a single theoretical approach. Modernity is a complex totality that requires an equally complex analysis.

Baudrillard's work is also problematic in terms of his solutions for our modern predicament. He suggests that we return to symbolic exchange, but he has little to say about concrete agents of change. He recognizes resistance in the "silent majorities." In contrast, Lefebvre sees some possibilities in an urban revolution, in the struggles for urban rights by differential groups, groups marginalized in modernity: youth, immigrant groups, racial and ethnic minorities, women, intellectuals, and the elderly. He also sees a possibility for the resurgence of the working class in the right economic conjuncture. This class has been somewhat integrated in the consumer society, but they may become conscious of their structural power as the producers of wealth when they experience declining standards of living and when they understand how production and property relations are barriers to the production of social goods and services. Lefebvre anticipates that this process could take hundreds of years, but so did the creation of industrial society.

Lefebvre's work is problematic where he remains attached to the revolutionary movements in Russia and China. He put far more credence in the Chinese cultural revolution than his colleagues in Debord's Situationist International, and he argued that the only barrier to the commodification of space was the strategy of the Soviet bloc. Whatever possibilities that the Russian and Chinese revolutions held out in the past have vanished.

SEE ALSO: Conspicuous Consumption; Consumer Culture, Children's; Consumption and the

Body; Consumption, Landscapes of; Consumption, Masculinities and; Consumption, Mass Consumption, and Consumer Culture; Culture; Economy, Culture and; Lefebvre, Henri; Mass Culture and Mass Society; Popular Culture; Veblen, Thorstein

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consumption, African Americans

Elizabeth Chin

The topic of African Americans and consumption is fundamentally engaged with slavery, US racial politics, social inequality, and Civil Rights activism. Central questions include the consumption *of* African Americans, and consumption *by* African Americans. Because much theory on consumption implicitly assumes a normative consumer who is white and middle class, consideration of African Americans and consumption has made important challenges to theories claiming to broadly account for all Americans or all consumers. Understood in the context of the structural inequalities of American society, African American consumption is not in and of itself different from normative (white, middle class) consumption. Rather, it is enacted within constraints, pressures, limits, and opportunities that give that consumption particular form and content. Put another way, it is only partly true that, for instance, a Barbie is a Barbie. The Barbie consumed by the poor African American girl in urban Detroit must be understood differently from that same Barbie, consumed by a well to do middle aged male Caucasian collector in Santa Barbara. The larger social and political context makes consumption and consumers intelligible and meaningful. This point is applicable to all consumption. However, the importance of social, political, and historical context in relation to consumption is powerfully evident in the case of African Americans and consumption.

Under slavery, African Americans were themselves commodities, a history making African American consumption uniquely complex. The material consumption of African American persons during slavery was buttressed by laws and traditions constraining the ability of bondsmen to freely consume time, labor, food, and clothing. Following emancipation, laws aimed at circumscribing African American civil freedoms often focused on restricting access to property – and consumption – of all types. The institutionalization of African Americans as unequal consumers long denied them open

access to essential wealth building commodities, most critically, homes and real estate. It has been argued that one element in the enduring poverty of African Americans can be traced to these policies. In particular the use of restrictive covenants – prohibitions on selling property to people of color – and redlining, the practice of steering African American home buyers to “appropriate” (non white) neighborhoods, is understood to have shaped African American communities and consumption in enduring ways. The more openly public forms of restricted consumption whose images endure most powerfully – touchstone images such as “whites only” drinking fountains – are reminders of the restrictions African Americans have faced in even the most mundane forms of consumption.

Consumption is a powerful arena through which the rights of African Americans have been abridged. But with key actions such as the Montgomery bus boycott of 1955–6, the Civil Rights Movement asserted that consumption was an arena through which basic civil rights must be granted. It is no accident that taking a seat at a lunch counter *as a paying customer* was one of the most powerful forms of political action taken by Civil Rights activists in the 1950s. African Americans continue to be especially active in mobilizing their buying power for political causes. A 1990s boycott of Texaco, sparked when executives referred to African Americans as “black jelly beans,” resulted in massive corporate change in that company; similar boycotts against Denny’s, Mitsubishi, and other corporations forced them to proactively pursue diversity within their ranks as well as their customer base.

The morality of the poor – and the moral implications of their consumption – is a strong theme in the case of African Americans. This topic gained prominence in the 1960s with Caplovitz’s examination of the so called “ghetto marketplace.” This work underscored that the poor, and especially African Americans, are a captive market being exploited *because of* their poverty, not despite it. Embedded here was a larger critique of American society whose tolerance for continued inequality, particularly inequality of race coupled with class, belied dominant images of the American dream. Caplovitz also coined the influential term

“compensatory consumption” to describe a dynamic through which disenfranchised people buy status items in order to make claims to social equality. He noted that the poor disproportionately consume alcohol, tobacco, or drugs in order to deaden their disappointment and disaffection, a situation exacerbated by aggressive advertising of these items in poverty-stricken neighborhoods. As the term passed into wider usage, it has been used not in the contextual way intended by Caplovitz but rather as a blunt moral criticism, portraying the poor as irrational and impulsive.

By 1990 African Americans had a buying power estimated at over 300 billion dollars. Thanks largely to a rapid expansion of the black middle class, in 2000 that buying power had increased an estimated 86 percent. African Americans were now viewed as an important market segment to be courted rather than problematic populations to be contained, gaining a new consumer legitimacy, but one hardly transcendent of the fundamental dilemmas of race and racism. The 1980s and 1990s also brought the drug wars, film depictions of African American drug lords, and the advent of the \$100 sneaker. African American consumption and consumers were nearly always portrayed as both out of control and immoral, a theme with an enduring history rooted in Calvinist doctrine that views material wealth as evidence of God’s grace and poverty as evidence of immorality. By this logic, the poor are to blame for their condition, needing discipline and rehabilitation in order to rise up. These notions were actively debated in the 1980s, but whether the intent was to expose the tribulations of poverty or to decry the depravity of the undisciplined poor, consumption gone amok often figured prominently.

Several key works emphasize that the exigencies of poverty are not anti American but an inevitable outcome of our nation’s history and policies. Carl Husemoller Nightingale’s melding of history and ethnography in looking at poor African American children in Philadelphia and Kotlowitz’s *There are No Children Here* provided influential depictions of the material deprivations of growing up poor while surrounded by images of wealth. Despite the rise of the African American middle class, the continuing dominant image of the African

American consumer was as a poor slum dweller. Such images are politically charged. In an analysis of events surrounding the civil uprising in 1992 Los Angeles, John Fiske argued that looting was better understood as “radical shopping,” which he interpreted as a form of “loud speech” resorted to in the wake of severe disenfranchisement and oppression. This point of view rejects dominant portrayals of the poor as irrational and insists on recognizing consumption itself as politically powerful.

Images of African Americans produced for mass consumption by dominant interests have illuminated the larger cultural politics of race, advertising, and consumption. Aunt Jemima’s transformation from a jolly, round faced mammy to a professional looking woman with button earrings and processed hair traces social changes in the images acceptable for use in marketing. (One might wonder, however, why Rasmus, the happy cook on the Cream of Wheat box, or Uncle Ben, clearly a servant, have not undergone similar makeovers.) Manning points out in *Slave in a Box* (1988) that depictions of servile/servant African Americans appeal to those for whom the sight of menial African Americans holds a nostalgic warmth. Such images are unlikely to appeal to African American consumers whose nostalgia for doing the serving and the smiling is at best limited. In a testament to the complexity of consumer engagement, rather than seeking to suppress such images, many African Americans work actively to preserve them. Gaining force in the 1980s, collections of racist memorabilia were undertaken by numerous African American institutions and individuals, collections whose purposes are equally political and curatorial. Bringing together items ranging from lawn jockeys, Golliwog dolls, and mammy salt and pepper shakers, such collections explicitly challenge viewers, collectors, and sellers to confront the politics of race and racism, and the seemingly innocuous, everyday items that can be harnessed to its purposes.

The continuing use of such images in the consumer sphere has everything to do with African Americans’ lack of power in the market, which translates into a lack of image control in that market. There is an old joke that, in the movies, the black guy always dies first. The critique embedded in this joke is that the black

guy only dies first in movies made by and for dominant audiences. African American film makers have directly addressed the linkages between consumption of material goods and consumption of images: US filmmaker Spike Lee's production company is named "40 Acres and a Mule," invoking the failed promise to ensure all African Americans property – and livelihood – after emancipation. Owning property has long ensured rights, including the right to vote, and with the growing power of media and fashion as property realms, African American participation has remained as political and problematic as ever. In the music and fashion industries, "urban" (read African American) style has come to be increasingly powerful as both market force and cultural image. Here, culture and its influence appear not to flow from the dominant to the subordinate but in reverse. While the normative image of the rapper and rap consumer is of the poor, urban black teenager, the largest group buying rap and hip hop music is middle class whites. It's not only hip, but big business to be urban and cool (and black). Coolhunters stalk the streets of key urban communities, trying to catch the ever changing waves of fashion, manufacturing and selling them in malls throughout the country and the world.

To challenge and/or sidestep the dominant marketplace, African American businesses have long attempted to create an alternative consumer sphere where the needs and desires of African Americans are intimately understood, respected, and catered to; in return, a loyalty to companies by and for African Americans is encouraged. African American entrepreneurs use consumer venues for political and capital forays: the FUBU company, whose acronym stands for For Us By Us, or the toymaker Olmec, whose name refers to Afrocentric theories and worldview. This dynamic keeps money "in the community," and black businesses and black consumers often view their interrelationship in overtly social and political terms. Many of the early successful black owned businesses sold products for skin and hair, and cosmetics that addressed the intimate needs of African Americans in ways most outsiders could hardly understand or anticipate. Madam C. J. Walker (1867–1919) is perhaps the most well known entrepreneur in this

mold, becoming the country's first African American woman millionaire with her line of hair care and cosmetic products which were formulated and marketed specifically for African Americans. More recently, toymakers have made inroads by creating and marketing "ethnically correct" dolls for children of color. Much has long been assumed about the ways in which the African American market has historically been constructed by marketers. Recent works rigorously exploring the development of radio advertising to African Americans, for example, are beginning to add nuanced accounts of what for too long has only been a murkily understood aspect of consumer life in the US.

Much work on consumption fails to account for the consumption experiences of persons of color, assuming that because mall and store spaces are themselves increasingly homogeneous, consumption itself is likewise undifferentiated. In recent years, important works that meld personal experience and scholarship have challenged these assumptions, pointing out that African American consumers have long faced inferior service, barriers to shopping where they "don't belong," or outright refusal of entry into stores. These informally practiced slights differ from the formal segregation of Jim Crow, but it is worth noting that consumption remains the battlefield and the encounters remain as damaging and dehumanizing as ever. African American entry into the middle class has provided the foundation for accounts of these personal experiences to be disseminated in mainstream channels. Attainment of positions such as reporter for the *New York Times*, Gist has allowed African Americans to describe the complexities of race, class, and consumption while examining the broader implications not only for themselves, but also for the nation.

Many aspects of African Americans and consumption remain poorly documented. Particularly needed is careful empirical work, since so much regarding African Americans and consumption has been based on speculation, conjecture, or opinion. Historical work, newly reinvigorated, promises much regarding African Americans and consumption, from considerations of property and possessions under slavery to the everyday consumer practices throughout the span of the African American past. The

middle and upper classes have been especially neglected. The work of Mary Patillo and Monique Taylor breaks new ground by addressing these groups, pointing the way, perhaps, toward more nuanced and embedded understandings of problems which are, undeniably, profoundly – and at times uniquely – American.

SEE ALSO: Brand Culture; Consumption; Consumption, Religion and; Double Consciousness; Race; Taste, Sociology of

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consumption and the body

Faye Linda Wachs

The relationship between the body and material culture in the post industrial world is defined through consumption. How one

experiences the body, manages corporeal identity, participates in social rituals as an embodied subject is, to a great extent, commodified. Changes in perspectives on the body are intertwined with the advent of consumer culture and the concomitant development of mass media and advertising. The growth of production during the industrial era necessitated a corollary growth in consumption. Markets for the expanding array of goods and services being produced were constructed through the attachment of meaning to consumer goods. The growth of markets driven by advertising profits resulted. The appropriation of meanings for advertising promotes what is termed the “floating signifier” effect (Baudrillard 1975) or the shift in the use value attached to objects such that any meaning or quality can be associated with any object. The body acts as both a carrier of these multiple and shifting meanings and a means for expression as the body becomes what Featherstone (1991) refers to as the “visible carrier of the self.”

No longer subject to the dangers of sin so prevalent in nineteenth century Victorian imagery, the body in twentieth century consumer culture becomes central to the project of the self as the main focus shifts from the soul to the surface of the body. Burgeoning consumer culture removed ideologies of self abnegation and replaced them with display imperatives through which social power was demonstrated through consumption, and in particular consumption of recreation and leisure (Veblen 1899). In such forms of display, Victorian preoccupations with health and fitness were retained and commodified. The weight of moral injunction shifts from “health” to the appearance of a healthy body, though what constitutes this appearance reflects current fashion rather than objective standards (Hepworth & Featherstone 1982). While morality had previously been displayed through bodily adornment (appropriate clothing, etc.), the new morality of “body maintenance” demanded that one display an appropriate investment in one’s body and, consequently, served to also fetishize the flesh itself. The proliferation of public, visual culture (movies, photographs, and so forth) increased individuals’ awareness of and self consciousness about external appearance and bodily presentation. For example, the burgeoning film

industry legitimated and normalized public bodily display and leisure/bodywork activity participation (i.e., sunbathing, weightlifting).

As Featherstone (1982) notes, within consumer culture the “outer” (appearance, movement, and control) and “inner” (functioning, maintenance, and repair) of the body are conjoined. The goal of maintaining the inner body focuses on the improved appearance of the outer body. Hence, the vicissitudes of age came to symbolize moral laxity. The consumer is expected to assume responsibility for appearance, i.e., to engage in bodywork where failing to do so becomes a sign of a host of failures. The proliferation of idealized icons, such as movie stars, provided examples and instruction on how to engage in the “right” kind of (commodified) bodywork. Body maintenance rituals then come to take on the role of virtuous leisuretime activities. Engagement is not only a moral imperative, it also holds out the promise of the rewards that come with enhanced appearance. The appearance of bodily neglect, however, is viewed as an indication of internal failings.

ADVERTISING AND THE MASS MEDIA

Framed as being good to oneself, bodywork has become integral to self identity and social status. The growth of the mass media provided a way to “educate” consumers about their needs and desires. Throughout the twentieth century advertising increasingly came to act as the guardian of the new consumptive morality, promoting both individualism and expression of the individual self through “conspicuous consumption” (Marchand 1985). Individuals have been taught to self survey, to eternally turn a critical eye toward their body and bodily displays, rather than toward their soul or moral fiber. Hence, the image the body projects, rather than the body itself, emerges as central to identity (Baudrillard 1975). Moreover, consumption becomes a part of every aspect of social life. A buying imperative comes to dominate how one experiences body, self, and leisure. This imperative is undergirded by institutions such as medical science and discourses that play upon cultural symbols of success and potency.

THE BODY AND THE SOCIAL DISPLAY OF IDENTITY

Scholars like Pierre Bourdieu problematize the interplay between consumption, the body, and social displays of identity. Bourdieu (1984) notes that the body is not simply a surface to be read, but is a three dimensional expression of social relations that take the form of corporeal or mental schema, referred to as habitus. Through the process of routine symbolic consumption, identity is constructed and embodied. Bourdieu notes through daily practice taste is inscribed upon the body, and therefore taste denotes class status. One’s taste serves as a marker of social status and creates a shared experience of class identity. The literal embodiment of class manifests in size, shape, weight, posture, demeanor, tastes, preference, and movement through social space. Other authors have applied similar principles to studying other facets of identity such as gender and/or race. Building on the work of Bourdieu, these scholars note that the politics of cultural legitimation and the cultural capital conferred by one’s taste reveal relations of power and privilege. How one’s physical abilities, tastes, and proclivities are read and valued by the larger society structures opportunities. Those in dominant groups are much more effective at having their own bodies defined as “superior,” “legitimate,” “healthy,” and/or “normal.” Some theorists argue that as culture globalizes, however, global consumer culture and the circulation of “lifestyle” commodities undermine the stability of embodied signifiers. Consumers who occupy different social locations may appropriate the symbols of other groups and thereby use such signifiers as a route to mobility (Featherstone 1991). This debate highlights key trends in body and consumption scholarship.

TRENDS IN BODY AND CONSUMPTION SCHOLARSHIP

Scholarship on bodies and identity is diverse and varied. Two important trends appear as to how the body is viewed in consumer culture: (1) the dominated body and (2) the expressive body. In the first case, many theories have focused on the tyranny of the marketplace and

its objectification and alienation of bodies. In the second case, opportunities for bodies to use consumer culture for expressive purposes provide a context for resistance and social change. Finally, many theorists blend approaches.

First, the body is viewed as subject to domination through commodification. Drawing on Marxist perspectives, the fetishization of bodies ultimately leads to the reproduction of socially unequal bodies. The bodies of the privileged are legitimated and idealized through participation in rituals of consumption. "Non dominant" or "othered bodies" are rendered invisible, undesirable, and affixed with markers of stigma. The underrepresentation of and limited roles given to people of color in the mass media demonstrate invisibility, while the common conflation of gay and AIDS provides an example of stigma (Dworkin & Wachs 1998). The individual is then subject to the tyranny of the market regardless of relative position. Through goods, services, and rituals of display, one's body is part of an endless tyranny of marketplace definition. The consumer begins to see his or her body as an alien object that must be constantly managed to preserve position and identity. He or she is not tyrannized by an outsider, but becomes engaged in endless rituals of self surveillance guided by idealized marketplace images conveyed through the mass media (Bordo 1993). Media forces, in particular advertising, conspire to simultaneously create a culture of lack and an endless array of products to assuage the lack, or at least the stigma of it (Kilbourne 1999). Some theorists note, however, that how one mitigates lack provides an opportunity for expression (Featherstone 1991).

Critiques of the dominated body approach focus on the cultural manufacture of meanings and identities. Baudrillard (1975) notes that individual desires are disguised expressions of social differences in a system of cultural meanings that is produced through commodities. The codes produced by fashion systems are infinitely variable (historically produced) differences attained through consumption. For Baudrillard, the commodified body still acts as a marker of social distinction, but not a permanent one. Altering the physical body can operate to alter one's position in the social order. Of course, one must recognize the limits, and that

some bodies are better able to reposition themselves than others.

This leads to the second way in which bodies are understood as sites of contestable meaning. The expressive body has the ability to participate in what Giddens (1991) terms "reflexive self fashioning." Through participation in consumer culture, awareness that identity can be self consciously constructed is generated. Consumers can enact resistance to the tyranny of the marketplace, and market forces can be manipulated to facilitate progressive social change. In this view, the "floating signifier effect" enables consumers to reappropriate symbols to be used in unanticipated ways. The problem is, as gender scholars have pointed out, this reappropriation is not equally accessible to all, and some meanings are more likely to be appropriated for some people than others. In this view, though the signifier may float, it does not float as easily to some meanings as others depending on the visible body possessed.

THE EXAMPLE OF GENDER

Work on gender, consumption, and the body reveals these tendencies, and the ability to consider both positions simultaneously. Scholars such as Lury (1996) note that gender structures one's ability to negotiate embodied identity. Indeed, women often lack the resources necessary to claim ownership of identity, to even be part of an "identity project." Moreover, women's "reflexive project of the self" will reflect historic gendered power relations that impose a specific form of feminine expression that is subordinate. Within feminist studies on bodies and consumption, the aforementioned tendencies emerge in the understanding of women's relationship to consumption. First, women are viewed as essentially passive objects of consumption; and second, women are viewed as active subjects of consumption (Jagger 2002).

In the first case, how consumer culture sexualizes and commodifies women is problematized. Particularly troubling is the normalization of a limited idealized range of images unattainable to most. The few who approach the ideal are subject to a litany of practices designed to stave off inevitable failure (Bartky

1988). Recent research demonstrates that male consumers are also now subject to increasing objectification (Pope et al. 2000). Those who view women as active subjects of consumption argue that this process offers a variety of resources for the construction of the self. The process has both positive and negative implications. While the first group focuses on the tyranny of perfection engendered by idealized images, the second explores how women have become active agents in the construction of self, even if from a limited (but expanding) array of images. This self construction is viewed as largely democratic and as creating a shared experience of gender in the culture, something that brings women together (Peiss 1999). Further, beauty industries have provided avenues to entrepreneurship for women, especially working class women and women of color (Peiss 1999).

However, as Lury (1996) notes, the cultural resources available for the construction of the modern self are not equitably distributed. Women's experience of subjecthood through the construction of woman as object engenders a host of conundrums. This type of analysis is now being applied to other facets of identity. Finally, recent research examines the consuming body in the global context. While feminist scholars demonstrate the expansion of women's resources, rights, and opportunities in western culture as demonstrated in consumer imagery (Just Do It), it would be remiss to fail to point out that this expanded access to consumer goods rests on the backs of a global workforce that has little to no access to consumer goods.

SEE ALSO: Advertising; Body and Cultural Sociology; Conspicuous Consumption; Consumption Rituals; Gender, Consumption and Globalization, Consumption and

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consumption, cathedrals of

J. Michael Ryan

George Ritzer has critiqued and built upon Marx's definition of the means of consumption to develop his own definition as "the settings or

structures that enable us to consume all sorts of things” (2005: 6). These “new means of consumption” (a term used interchangeably with “cathedrals of consumption” by Ritzer) are more generally related to a wider field of goods and services and tied to production, distribution, advertising, marketing, sales, individual taste, style, and fashion. They are concerned not just with shopping but also relate to the consumer’s relationship with entertainment and consumption oriented settings such as theme parks, casinos, and cruise lines, and other settings including athletic stadiums, universities, hospitals, and museums, the latter of which are surprisingly coming to resemble the more obvious new means of consumption. Examples include shopping centers such as West Edmont Mall or the Mall of America, themed restaurants such as the Rainforest Café, and “brandscares” such as Chicago’s Nike Town. Such settings are considered important not just for their changing role as consumption settings, but also for the ways in which they are altering consumption more generally and the role many of them play as powerful American icons in the world (Ritzer & Ryan 2004).

Although Ritzer (2005) is the theorist most responsible for popularizing the phrase “cathedrals of consumption,” it has been used at least since Kowinski, who stated that “malls are sometimes called cathedrals of consumption, meaning that they are the monuments of a new faith, the consumer religion, which has largely replaced the old” (1985: 218). These geographies are self contained consumption settings that utilize postmodern techniques such as implosion, the compression of time and space, and simulation to create spectacular locales designed to attract consumers. They can be considered cathedrals because, much like their religious counterparts, they “are seen as fulfilling people’s need to connect with each other and with nature, as well as their need to participate in festivals. [They] provide the kind of centeredness traditionally provided by religious temples, and they are constructed to have similar balance, symmetry, and order” (Ritzer 2005: 8). Thus, they are the empyrean form of a consumption setting. Kowinski (1985: 218) also favors this implication that consumption has

replaced religion as the dominant distraction of the masses.

In an ironic reversal, the idea of cathedrals of consumption is reflected in the growing number of religious cathedrals which are turning to consumption in order to maintain a congregation. While some of these churches are locating themselves directly inside consumption settings, others, such as one megachurch in Houston, are working in direct consultation with consumption experts like Disney, and still others are integrating shopping locales such as McDonald’s, book stores, food courts, and religious kitsch shops directly into their churches. Many of these churches and megachurches are, according to Leong (2001), “realizing what other institutions – museums, hospitals, airports, schools – are also waking up to: simply, that shopping has penetrated our subconscious to the degree that our participation in it is as natural and effortless as breathing.”

SEE ALSO: Consumption, Landscapes of; Consumption, Mass Consumption, and Consumer Culture; Consumption, Spectacles of; Shopping; Shopping Malls

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consumption and the Chicago tradition

Marc M. Sanford

For the sociologists of the Chicago School, or those formed in that tradition, consumption of goods and services provides a degree of contextuality that locates actors in social and physical space and time. These places and spaces are contextualized through culture, consumption, land values, and myriad other social forces. Consumption adds character to the individual, but also creates external effects in the local neighborhood. For Chicago School sociologists, consumption essentially operates in two ways. First, the location of businesses drives land values that cause a shift in the local population composition. Second, consumption of goods, products, and services characterizes populations according to urban versus rural status, ethnicity, neighborhood, gender, and age. Later theorists in the Chicago mold duly noted the reflexive nature of social networks and local ecology on consumption patterns and identity construction.

CHICAGO SCHOOL OF SOCIOLOGY: A BRIEF VIEW OF A CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK

The Chicago School of sociology refers to authors at or affiliated with the University of Chicago sociology department from approximately post World War I through perhaps the early 1940s. The research conducted at Chicago during this time was largely oriented toward several major themes: urban expansion, community and neighborhood studies, the science of sociology, and symbolic interactionism. The setting for much of the research that came out of Chicago was the city itself.

The major faculty members and PhD recipients at Chicago during this period were Robert Park, Ernest Burgess, W. I. Thomas, Louis Wirth, Morris Janowitz, Harvey Zorbaugh, Nels Anderson, George H. Mead, and others too numerous to list. Their ideas served to create an analytical framework for the study of life within the city. Consumption from

the Chicago perspective must be located within this analytical and research oriented framework.

The core tenets of research from Chicago sociologists emerge from exploratory analysis, a feel for on the ground research, social process, and the unique construction of space, both symbolic and physical, in the growth of the city. The concern over space stems from a focus on neighborhoods, communities, and social actors. Community boundaries exist as situational barriers that affect the people, place, and culture therein. Social actors are often the central “unit of analysis” and situated in a unique physical and temporal setting. In this framework, actors become active participants in constructing both their physical and symbolic surroundings. In short, Chicago scholars argue that social actors and social facts have a degree of contextuality within time and space (both physical and symbolic space) (Abbott 1997).

This exploratory analysis of the city fed into the then developing fields of urban, neighborhood, and community research, and nascent pursuits in criminology and social psychology. Although it was not the intent of the original Chicago School theorists to study consumption as a central factor of urban expansion, their detailed, one might say intimate, analysis of local neighborhoods in the city of Chicago led them to document a rich array of consumption behaviors as tied to issues of culture, class, race, and neighborhood and community concerns.

CONSUMPTION AND THE CHARACTER OF CITY LIFE

Park and Burgess recognize that the processes of consumption play a significant role in the distribution of populations and cultural groups across the city. Central to their theory of urban expansion, the competition for space by businesses helps to sort population groups into “natural areas.” The concentration and location of businesses not only drive land values, but high business concentrations become community centers dominated by spaces of consumption. These spaces of consumption are occupied by various retail businesses including banks, restaurants, and “large and magnificent palaces of amusement.” Even as these city centers

become dominated by consumption, it is those same goods that allow one to escape local boundaries. Goods such as newspapers, motion pictures, automobiles, and radio "release" the resident from the confines of his or her neighborhood.

Despite this escapism, goods primarily characterize and add concreteness to local community, ethnicity, perceived class status, and other social and symbolic boundaries. Harvey Zorbaugh, Robert Park, and Ernest Burgess suggest that land values tied to retail and other businesses contribute to the solidification of community boundaries. For Gerald Suttles, writing about 1950s and 1960s Chicago, ethnic groups have distinct patterns of consumption of clothing, fashion, food, and entertainment that mark their membership to a particular group and lifestyle and to a particular neighborhood. For example, clothing styles vary according to ethnically derived appearance norms and ethnic identity. Suttles suggests that Italian women wear different styles on the weekdays versus the weekend and that their dress is delineated by age. Almost counter to current trends, Suttles claimed that the males tend to show more differentiation in dress and fashion. For example, the Italian boys occupy a more "avant garde" fashion, the older African Americans wear more of the standard suits, and the younger African Americans stand out with tight pants, expensive hats, and unique blazers, shirts, and shoes. The Puerto Ricans and Mexicans occupy a more intermediary style position in comparison to other ethnic groups of the time and local area. These clothing styles and other personal belongings clearly mark the person's neighborhood of origin and whether or not he or she belongs in a particular neighborhood at a particular time.

Suttles also shows how the local social ecology impacts neighborhood and community businesses. Ethnically dependent patterns of consumption dominate and determine the makeup of local business and services. For example, Italian barbershops specialize in techniques and styles unique to the Italians and display media publications that contain news and information for people of Italian descent. Local stores carry goods that cater to the local, and often relatively ethnically homogeneous, populations.

Sites of consumption are often intimately tied to the private and networked lives of local residents. Residents of ethnic communities purchase goods in stores where they know the owner and where gossip is traded freely. In this sense, personal networks (often ethnocentric in nature) constrain consumption activities. A rare exception, the food and jukeboxes in the local Italian shops attracted not only Italians, but also younger members of other ethnic groups that bordered the neighborhood. "Ideal" commercial relations existed when ethnic groups conducted their business entirely within ethnocentric stores. Inasmuch as businesses were ethnocentric, they also became gendered consumption spaces. For example, local residents saw local taverns as unfit for a "respectable girl." Often, the success of a business depended on its physical location within the ethnic and symbolic landscape.

In addition to ethnic and geographical demarcation, what one consumes is often critical to forming a sense of identity, belonging, and separation between social and status groups. For example, Elijah Anderson's "Wineheads" consume cheap wine and occupy a lower social status because of what they consume (e.g., Boone's Farm Apple Wine) and where they consume it (on the street). The "Regulars" buy and drink "the expensive good stuff" such as Old Forester, Jim Beam, or Jack Daniels. They also consume "the good stuff" indoors and not in the public view. Park, Burgess, Anderson, and other Chicago theorists recognize the effect that lifestyle, as tied to social status, has in sorting population groups across the urban landscape.

Consumption of goods and services also differentiates the urban versus rural residents. Louis Wirth examines the rate of mass media consumption, the percent of income that goes toward consuming rent, and the amount of time and money the urban dweller spends consuming recreational services and food. According to Wirth, people in cities engage in a different consumptive mode of life. Urban dwellers consume culture, press, radio, theater, hospitals, transportation, and many other services and goods at rates different from their rural counterparts.

The Chicago School of sociology's stance on consumption is certainly not unified due to the

fact that consumption was never studied as a phenomenon in and of itself. However, the authors of the Chicago School modality viewed consumption within the framework of urban expansion and embedded in local neighborhood and community contextual factors. Patterns of consumption were constrained by local networks, local culture, race and ethnicity, and urban expansion. At the same time, consumption patterns help to define ethnic and racial boundaries, symbolic boundaries, and neighborhood and community borders.

SEE ALSO: Chicago School; Consumption, Urban/City as Consumerspace; Mead, George Herbert; Park, Robert E. and Burgess, Ernest W.; Urban Ecology

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consumption, experiential

Pasi Falk

“Experiential consumption” refers to consumption patterns and practices in which the experiential aspect gains a central role, thus rendering the utilitarian and economic aspects a less significant status as the motivational factors of consumer behavior. The centralization of the experiential aspect implies an emergence of a consumer mentality which is oriented toward the realm of representations rather than mere need satisfaction. Consequently, the rise of experiential consumption is closely linked to the following three historical trends at work in the coming of the (western) consumer society, roughly from mid nineteenth century onwards.

- 1 *The expansion of the realms of media publicity, mass culture, and entertainment*. This trend gains strength especially from the late nineteenth century onwards, creating markets for the mass production of (textual and audio visual tactile) representations which are consumed primarily in an experiential mode (news papers, magazines, novels, music halls, spectator sports, cinema, radio, television, amusement parks, theme parks, tourism, and so on). These make up the category of actual experiential goods which are comparable to other “consumables” (versus “durables”; Hirschman 1982) like food where the item is “used up,” usually in a single act of consumption. Then again, the actual experiential goods lack the oral materiality of food (which surely can have a high experiential value in addition to its nutritional function): these goods are “incorporated” rather through eyes and ears and “digested” as mental images, evoking a variety of feelings, affects, and emotions.
- 2 *The rise of modern advertising*. This dimension is entwined with the former and its main effect is the turning of goods into representations to be consumed, first in the mind, and then – as the marketing

people expect – realized in the purchase and consumption of the represented (and branded) product, be it a material or immaterial, consumable or durable item. Modern advertising is born with one foot in the world of goods and the other in mass culture. Mass culture transformed experiences into marketable products and advertising turned marketable products into representations. Accordingly, the *consumption of experience* and the *experience of consumption* become more and more indistinguishable (Falk 1994).

- 3 *The transformation and growth of urban shopping sites.* The evolution of shopping sites proceeds from scattered shops and stores to shopping streets, arcades, and department stores from the late nineteenth century onwards, leading up to the contemporary supermarkets and shopping malls. Contemporary shopping sites – especially the shopping malls – turn the practice of shopping itself into a realm of experience which may or may not involve the actual purchasing of goods. This novel experiential characteristic of shopping is aptly expressed in the double sense of the term: as shopping *for* in distinction to shopping *around*. The former refers primarily to daily or weekly trips to local stores or supermarkets for food and other “necessities” (Bowly 2000), while the latter has a flavor of entertainment and “spending time” downtown – or more precisely, in the department stores (Leach 1993) and shopping malls (Shields 1992) – without an obligation to spend money, at least in the sense of purchasing necessities.

The centralization of the experiential aspect in consumer behavior, and especially in the practices of shopping, should be recognized as an essential dimension which complements and corrects the one sidedness of the presentation of self construction as a process of identity adoption that is guided by the principle of free choice and the aim of social distinction (cf. Bourdieu 1984). The experiential aspect implies a dimension of self relatedness which locates the experiential (bodily) self and the reflective (cognitive) self on one and the same continuum.

Such a perspective helps in the realization that, in shopping, the interaction with material goods ranges from a variety of sensory experiences to acts of imagination in which the self is mirrored in the potential object of acquisition, with questions that are rarely formulated and hardly ever articulated, such as, “Is that for me?”; “Am I like that?”; “Could that be (part of) me?”; “Could I be like that?”; “Would I like to be like that?” An endless series of questions that are acts of self formation in themselves, regardless of whether they eventually lead to the realizing phase of purchase or not.

On the other hand, shopping malls bring all the dimensions of experiential consumption into a synthesis. In a larger scale, they are much more than shopping sites: they are, rather, multifunctional hybrids incorporating cinemas, restaurants, art galleries, and even chapels. Actually, they are slightly downscale city centers located downtown or transferred to the outskirts, as artificial copies of originals.

From the commercial point of view of the retailers, all the experiential freeware offered (including the advertisements) should promote the sale of both the experiential goods available to be consumed on the spot and all the goods people buy and carry away. However, another process parallels this promotional pursuit: these places also gain autonomy – in relation to their economic role – as experiential realms in themselves, as places for meeting friends, for walking around and just spending time rather than money. And this is a tendency which is not in any simple way subsumable under the promotional aims: the spatial practices or the “walking rhetorics” (Certeau 1984) of the urbanites – *qua flâneurs* *qua* shoppers – are largely self determined, implying a variety of ways in which these places are made “one’s own” which ignore, or even oppose, marketing interests (Falk & Campbell 1997).

SEE ALSO: Advertising; Consumption, Urban/City as Consumerspace; *Flânerie*; Life style Consumption; Shopping Malls

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consumption, fashion and

Susan B. Kaiser

Fashion can be understood sociologically as ongoing, processual changes in the “strong norms” (Crane 2000) associated with matters of taste, sensibility, and what it means to be “in the moment.” Social institutions ranging from science, media, and cultural politics to products and practices – all of which tap shifts in cultural moods – are susceptible to fashion’s processes. Among the most intimate of normative changes, however, are those in which consumers engage as they fashion their bodies in everyday life. One of the most compelling theoreti- cal and empirical questions surrounding fashion is its relation to shifting cultural moods, as well as to just who shapes, and is affected by, these shifts and the strong norms that eventually accompany them in a deeply personal and embodied way. What propels the need for changes in personal appearance styles on an ongoing basis? And how is fashion negotiated socially? That is, how do new ideas about how to look become strong norms within or across social groups? From a sociological point of view, fashion is about more than the latest runway styles presented by celebrity designers; it has to do, instead, with collective ways of

making connections with others and, at the same time, marking differences. This nuanced blend of identification and differentiation is the hallmark of fashion. Fashion requires collective consumer acceptance and, simultaneously, marks differences among consumers.

EARLY SOCIOLOGICAL APPROACHES

Fashion historians point to status competition as an important element in fashion’s identity–difference interplay, with some of the initial stirrings of such competition occurring in the proto capitalist Italian city states of the Renaissance. These stirrings contributed to a speeding up of style change. During the fifteenth century, the context of Burgundian court life further promoted intense status competition through clothes and accessories.

In general, the growth of fashion has been linked inextricably with western modernity and the associated exigencies of capitalism. Marx’s critique of capitalism drew theoretical attention to industrial capitalism and the production of fashionable objects in terms of commodity fetishism. Given Marx’s focus on social class as a function of control over the means of production, most sociological explanations of fashion in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries centered around class structure and production.

Veblen began to shift the focus toward consumption in *The Theory of the Leisure Class* (1899). He highlighted the interplay among conspicuous leisure, conspicuous consumption, and conspicuous waste in his critique of fashion’s hypocrisy and artificiality. He described how fashion functioned to display bourgeois consumer status by revealing the lack of a need to engage in physical labor. He also noted that bourgeois men accomplished this display indirectly – vicariously – through their wives. Since the “masculine renunciation of fashion” associated with the rise of the bourgeois class, over the 100 years previous to Veblen’s analysis, men’s appearances had become increasingly staid or “unmarked.” Gone were the flounces, the laces, the curls, the tights, and the high heels worn by aristocratic men in the seventeenth century. As the spirit of industrial capitalism played out in the restrictive masculine

sartorial codes (e.g., the conservative black trouser suit) that represented the managerial class, the corresponding role of bourgeois women was to shop and to throw their energies into the worlds of fashion and beauty. Hence, the consuming fashion subject was gendered (feminized), as Veblen, Simmel, and other sociologists observed at the turn of the century.

Whereas Veblen focused specifically on the leisure (bourgeois) class, Simmel's analysis addressed the consumer motivation for social mobility across the classes. In what has been called the "trickle down" theory, Simmel explained how the elite are the first to adopt new styles, only to be imitated by those at the next lower class level (in less expensive materials, etc.). Processes of industrialization tended to encourage a simplification (a modern "streamlining") of clothing styles, making such imitation more feasible. In order to maintain their fashion status, as the theory explains, the elite then distance themselves from the lower classes by adopting new styles. And hence, as Simmel (1904) put it, "the game goes merrily on" through a dialectical process of imitation (identification) and differentiation. Although best known for the trickle down theory, Simmel's contributions to fashion theory are much deeper, broader, and richer, including important work on aesthetics, modern urban life, and the social fabric in general. Further, whereas he focused primarily on social class in his explanation of the dialectical interplay at work in fashion's processes, the fundamental nature of this interplay between imitation (identification) and differentiation has been found to be useful by subsequent fashion scholars in the study of gender and age identity expressions through style – i.e., other identity negotiations that are embedded in power relations (Cook & Kaiser 2004).

NEW CONTEXTS, NEW APPROACHES

Since the 1960s there has been increasing attention to fashion's role in identity politics. The commodification of youth culture and style, coupled with the large baby boom generation, highlighted the importance of age as an identity variable in fashion consumption in the 1960s. The idea of being or looking youthful seemed

to be more important than looking rich. Blumer (1969) critiqued Simmel's analysis and argued that fashion should be understood as a process of "collective selection" rather than as a vehicle for class differentiation. Collective selection is the social, negotiated process of working through changing sensibilities and marking what it means to be contemporary, or "in the moment."

Analyses of working class youth subcultures, especially in the United Kingdom, further fostered a new way of thinking about style innovation and diffusion (Hebdige 1979). Rather than styles "trickling down," it became evident that new looks could emerge from the streets (from youth, minorities, and various subcultural groups – e.g., punk, Rastafarian). Further, the modern western assumption that the consuming fashion subject was white, bourgeois, heterosexual, and female was called into question by the array of stylistic expressions that were in part political, emerging from social movements such as those in the United States: second wave feminism (initially espousing a rejection of fashion to the extent that it reinforced traditional femininity) and civil rights (for example, the theme of "black is beautiful" and the popularity of Afro hair styles, dashikis, kente cloth). It became evident, however, that styles emerging from grassroots movements could be readily appropriated by the mainstream fashion and beauty industries. Hence, feminist style was appropriated and sold back to women as a "natural" look in makeup and designer jeans (which also alluded to working class male culture as well as lesbian style). And African American style influenced mainstream fashion, as did gay male culture (e.g., long hair, disco style) and punk style. By the 1970s, interdisciplinary fashion and cultural studies scholars were theorizing style and fashion in ways that asserted the importance of consumer agency and innovation.

At the same time, feminist and poststructuralist theories led to a questioning of some of the major assumptions (e.g., linear progress) and ways of knowing (e.g., binary frameworks) underlying modern western thought. Wilson (1985) argued that ambivalence was a fundamental theme underlying fashion and its relation to capitalism. That is, consumers are likely to both love and hate fashion, just as they both

love and hate capitalism. The feminist relationship with fashion could now be seen as one of ambivalence – a more productive (both/and) concept than one of disavowal, because the dichotomous (either/or) choice between being in the fashion system and rejecting it was a false one.

Davis (1992) and others have also used the theme of ambivalence in their fashion theories. Davis described how culturally coded “identity ambivalences” fuel fashion change. Especially prone to an ongoing, ambivalent interplay, he argued, are the “master statuses” of gender, status, and sexuality. Davis made an important distinction, although he noted the “useful confusion” between ambivalence (mixed emotions) and ambiguity (mixed messages).

To the extent that advanced (global) capitalism promotes the use of separates that consumers need to mix and match, identity experimentation through appearance style becomes a key theme in postmodernist explanations of fashion change (e.g., Kaiser et al. 1991). Such experimentation makes the daily connection between ambivalence and ambiguity real and embodied. It points to the fact that identities are not singular, or even binary; rather, they are multiple, partial, complex, and overlapping. In the context of fashion, there is no longer a single “fashionable” look each season; with an increased awareness of what it means to be a multicultural society and global economy, there are multiple looks that can represent “shifting strong norms” within specific groups simultaneously. With a more eclectic array of influences and an ever increasing frenetic pace of change, coupled with a growing “disconnect” between the production and consumption of fashion (i.e., between the increasingly invisible global assembly line and the hyperbolic visibility of branded fashion in the context of media culture), Blumer’s “collective selection” can be reinterpreted and revised in terms of the negotiation of group, rather than societal, norms.

Inevitably, the sociology of fashion (consumption) continues to tap into a range of larger debates that also engage fields ranging from textiles and clothing to cultural studies. Has the fashion system indeed changed from an elitist to a more populist paradigm? Are the days of “modern fashion” really over (i.e., what

is new about “postmodern” fashion production and consumption)? Can fashion only be described as a modern western phenomenon, especially in the context of a global economy? How can the “disconnect” between production and consumption be bridged in the context of global capitalism?

The interplay between identification and differentiation continues to be a major theme in contemporary fashion and fashion theory, but there is a heightened emphasis on the intersectionalities among identity variables (i.e., social class, gender, age, sexuality). A reconstruction of masculinity in the last 20 years appears to be blurring, and perhaps broadening, perceptions of how men can look. The commodification of style and the mix and match paradigm have undoubtedly been major factors in this reconstruction, as evident in the early twenty first century television show, “Queer Eye for the Straight Guy.”

Fashion seems to articulate visually that which cannot be readily put into verbal cultural discourse. Perhaps it anticipates shifts in cultural moods, but it does so in a way that inextricably links consumers’ everyday looks with social processes of negotiation and change. The sociology of consumption ultimately needs to grapple with the role of visual as well as commodity culture if it is to understand collective selection. Inasmuch as visual culture is intersectional, it sheds light on complex intersections among consumer identities that move beyond binary constructions. Fashion’s job is to mix visual metaphors, to tap cultural moods, and to produce and use materials enabling consumers to experiment with identities. In the context of global capitalism, fashion’s norms may be a bit looser and more commodified, and it is consumers themselves who are left to their own, subjective and intersubjective, devices to “connect the dots” among goods in the marketplace, media (including celebrity) imagery, innovative and normative appearance styles in everyday life, and (most problematically) the conditions of workers who produce the goods they wear.

SEE ALSO: Blumer, Herbert George; Celebrity Culture; Commodities, Commodity Fetishism, and Commodification; Conspicuous Consumption; Consumption and the Body; Consumption,

Youth Culture and; Globalization, Consumption and; Postmodern Consumption; Simmel, Georg; Veblen, Thorstein

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consumption, food and cultural

Grant Blank

Everybody eats to live, but food is more than nutrition. It is a basis for personal identity, a vehicle through which social structure influences individuals, an object that manifests long term cultural and social trends, and a foundation for social theory. Food is a powerful carrier of cultural meaning.

Food was neglected among most sociological classics. Friedrich Engels describes the awful details of working class diets in *The Condition of the Working Class in England*, but for his collaborator Karl Marx a “diet” is a German political convention. When Engels and other early sociologists mention food they use it as an illustration of an important social issue, like inequality or stratification, rather than as something to be explained in its own right. Émile Durkheim is the first to give food sustained theoretical attention in his *Elementary Forms of the Religious Life*, where he investigates the question of why in every society certain available and nutritious foods are declared taboo. Thorstein Veblen describes how copious eaters can flaunt high social status via conspicuous consumption.

During the heyday of structuralism in the 1960s and 1970s, food took center stage in the theories of Claude Lévi Strauss and Mary Douglas. Inspired by structural theories of language, these theories attempted to uncover the underlying rules or “grammar” that governed how people use food. A sufficiently detailed set of rules would derive all the characteristics of a specific culinary system. Lévi Strauss’s famous culinary triangle comparing cooked, raw, and rotten food is the best known structure. Unlike Lévi Strauss, Mary Douglas did not seek a universal language encoded in food. Her influential 1972 essay “Deciphering a meal” uses her own experiences and her family’s food preferences to describe the rules governing the meaning of meals ranging from Christmas dinner through Sunday dinner to everyday snacks. Structuralist theories declined as their weaknesses became apparent: their lack of historical perspective and their inability to handle change.

Recent theories draw inspiration from Norbert Elias’s book *The Civilizing Process* (1994), which argues that there has been a centuries long trend toward more civilized behavior (though not without reversals). “Civilized” means that a broad range of cultural, political, economic, and social changes have had the effect of reducing the importance of external controls on behavior and increasing reliance on self control and self restraint. These theories draw on two primary mechanisms to explain historical change: (1) status seeking, especially

when lower level groups emulate elites, and (2) social arenas where people are thrown into contests for social prestige. The most notable work is by Mennell (1996), who compares France and England to explain the relationship of food and culture since medieval times. Medieval food supplies were unpredictable and often scanty. Elites showed their power and status by feasting in gargantuan excess. Since only wealthy elites could eat enough to gain weight, plump was prestigious. The formation of nation states, greater internal security, increased trade, and improved transportation all helped to make food supplies increasingly secure, reliable, regular, and varied. Large scale famines ended by the early eighteenth century. The medieval pattern of elite feasts broke up first in Italian Renaissance city courts and then in the French court in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. In court circles, status competition led to the rapid elaboration of manners and etiquette. By then, large quantities of food were available to most people, so court cuisine distinguished itself from ordinary food by emphasizing quality over quantity. As food became more plentiful and reliable, a hefty physique no longer signaled social prestige. Elites began to distinguish themselves by their slenderness linked to self restraint in eating; obesity came to be associated with lower class indulgence. The restraint required to remain slender fit well with the self control essential for elaborate manners. The contemporary value placed on self control over appetite, thinness, health, beauty, and related sex appeal can be traced to these historical patterns of elites.

These theories explain the development of *haute cuisine* as an outgrowth of competitive processes. Within courts, elaboration of cuisine is one form of status competition. Goody (1982) documents virtually identical patterns cross culturally in court societies in China, India, and the Middle East. Courts are not the only arena where competition leads to elaboration. In nineteenth century Parisian restaurants competition for status and prestige drove the development of French cuisine. In India, as the ethnic identity of the urban middle class blurs, it is developing a trans ethnic, pan Indian national cuisine (Appadurai 1988). Although the Indian urban middle classes do not compete in a single arena, they are

connected via popular cookbooks. Written recipes and extensive commentary about cuisine are vital for the elaboration of high cuisine (Goody 1982). Gastronomic commentary codifies the etiquette of consumption and food service, clarifying and justifying rising standards. In addition, the discourse validates the rising status of cuisine by demonstrating its links to other high status fields.

The shift to a slim ideal body image has created special problems for women. This is signaled by the rise of eating disorders like anorexia nervosa and bulimia nervosa, which affect men too but have been particularly prevalent among women. Feminist research shows that women's deep involvement with food creates multiple cross pressures (e.g., Charles & Kerr 1986; Bordo 1998). Women are generally responsible for providing healthy, nutritious meals for their partners and children. Women are the primary nurturers and food is an important component of nurturing. Food is a reward and a comfort in times of stress. Women who have been sexually or physically abused frequently turn to food for comfort. However, social competition stresses that women must remain slender in order to be beautiful and sexually attractive. This competitive pressure seems to be increasing. There is evidence that ideal body shapes have become thinner over the past generation. These contradictory demands create a complex relationship between women and food. For women, food is a symbol that is readily available and resonates with many other symbols, enhancing its power. Research shows that as many as 80–90 percent of women monitor their food intake. From this perspective anorexia and bulimia are only extreme manifestations of the tensions that almost all women feel.

In families, food preparation tends to reflect the gendered division of labor. Women usually do the routine day to day cooking. Men tend to cook on special occasions or with special tools. A frequent division of responsibilities leaves men cooking only outside on the barbecue, or cooking only special meals.

Food is everywhere much more than the ingestion of nutrients. The study of the cultural meaning of food is becoming more central to sociology. One sign is the fact that food is increasingly seen as a channel used to illustrate

theoretical arguments. Bourdieu's (1984) *Distinction* is the preeminent example. His broad argument is that class reproduction is governed in part by the consumption signals that people send, including tastes in food as well as clothing, music, décor, theater, and a host of other areas. Food is linked to class, status, and institutions, and to social reproduction. Unfortunately, Bourdieu's emphasis on reproduction of existing classes gives his work many of the same weaknesses as the structuralist theories: there is little sense of history and mechanisms for change are weak.

The institutional settings where food is served include not only high and low cuisine, but all levels in between, including fast food. There is disagreement about what eating in restaurants means to diners. Finkelstein (1989) attempts to unpack the meanings of restaurant dining. She suggests that public dining is a social act that is strongly influenced by its setting. The ambience, décor, lighting, tableware, personnel, and service in a restaurant create different emotional responses. Pleasurable emotions include a sense of participating in a special occasion as well as a display of the diners' sophisticated taste and wealth. In a restaurant, diners buy entertainment in the form of emotional responses. Finkelstein argues that this indicates how far modern restaurants go to make emotions a commodity that can be bought in a market. Ritzer (2004) restricts his analysis to fast food, and mostly to the production side. Fast food is produced in an environment where service and production are very carefully controlled and rationalized. The goal of what he calls "McDonaldization" is to produce an absolutely uniform experience in every restaurant. Ritzer sees McDonaldization as an extreme form of rationality that controls the diner as well by offering few choices and supporting a narrow range of behaviors. Because of widespread efforts to lower costs and raise profits, Ritzer argues that McDonaldization is characteristic of many areas of modern life.

The ethnographic researchers in Watson's (1997) study argue that the meaning of McDonald's is very different in other cultures. For example, in East Asia, McDonald's has been an impetus for further elaboration of manners and commercial service. It introduced clean

bathrooms and much higher standards of service, as well as clean, well lit dining rooms. The alcohol free, child friendly environment is a setting where single, unaccompanied women can interact in public. Watson argues that Asians have localized the meaning of eating at McDonald's. Local owner operators have introduced localized menu items like the mutton based Maharaja Mac in India. Instead of being places where diners move in and out quickly, many McDonald's have become places where people linger, more like coffee houses in the US. Diners come to McDonald's for the experience not the product, and they have gradually shaped it so that it is their own experience.

Watson is part of a broader turn away from studies of production toward studies of consumption. One of the lessons of globalization is that producers have little control over the meanings that consumers assign to their products, especially as they are moved far from their origin. Here food is striking. As globalization moves around the world the food available to consumers has become much more diverse. Since many foodstuffs – particularly fruits and vegetables – can be bought year round, they no longer have a season. Since food can be cheaply transported across the globe, formerly regional foods are available everywhere. As Laudan (2001) points out, this rich environment fosters new social constructions of food. Focusing research on local meanings of food as they are modified by institutional contexts and history is a promising approach for future work.

All people, not just women, have an ambivalent relationship to food. Food is a source of life but also a source of anxiety, whether the anxiety is about obesity, mad cow disease, pesticides, or red meat. Wuthnow points out that people most actively construct culture when they are unsettled. For many people, food is a source of permanent unrest. Their unease leads them energetically to look for and construct the meanings for their food. Food is a rich source of culture, and will richly repay further work.

SEE ALSO: Bourdieu, Pierre; Civilizing Process; Conspicuous Consumption; Consumption and the Body; Distinction; Elias, Norbert; Globalization, Consumption and; McDonaldization

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consumption, girls' culture and

Amy L. Best

Modern girlhood can hardly be understood without attention to the influence of commodities and practices of consumption over modern constructions of self. For a large number of

girls in modern America, participating in the consumer realm is a defining feature of life as a girl. Yet, the meaning of girls' consumption has changed considerably over time. The explosion of the Internet, the emergence of segmented marketing as an alternative to mass marketing, the arrival of an organized feminist movement, and demands for external regulation by consumer advocacy groups all come to bear upon the distinct historical relationship between girls and consumption.

The role of the consumer market in girls' lives has sparked much popular debate, often reflecting anxieties about the changing roles of girls in American society. Debates over the perils of excess consumption by girls are hardly new. Girls' participation in the realm of consumption in the last century has generated concern about their appropriate place in society, their sexuality, their self esteem, and even their likelihood toward delinquency, though rarely calling into question their roles in supporting consumer capitalism itself.

Early studies of youth culture and consumption among sociologists and others failed to examine the distinct relationship between girls and consumption, reflecting an unwillingness to recognize the social significance of girls as cultural consumers and cultural producers. This is hardly the case today. A rich body of scholarship has emerged demonstrating the complex and contradictory connections between girls and consumption. While little mention was made of the ways girls participated in consumer culture or fashioned identities as consumers, feminist cultural scholars, writing since the mid 1980s, have made girls' practices of consumption a primary focus of inquiry, not only investigating the market's bewildering hold over them but also making visible the varied ways girls themselves have engaged in and challenged a consumer culture. Largely interdisciplinary in focus, feminist scholarship has argued that to understand the formation of modern girlhood is to also investigate the emergence and expansion of a commodity culture. Scholars have traced the historical emergence of a consumer culture and girls' relationship to it. Shedding light on the interstices of race, class, and age, cultural scholars have shown how commodity culture operates as a site wherein social inequalities meaningful to girls' lives are both reproduced and confronted.

Marketers have aggressively pursued girls for more than a century, transforming their activities, identities, and social relations. Though a burgeoning market awareness of girls (and boys) as consumers can be traced to the early 1870s, as the popularity of trading cards spread among an emerging middle class, most scholars agree that juvenile markets exploded within the context of post World War II America, a period of increasing economic prosperity and a dramatic expansion of the middle classes. The growing affluence of families in post World War II America, combined with a shift in parenting styles toward a more permissive set of practices, handed girls (and boys) of all ages greater economic power than experienced in decades before (Palladino 1996). Increasingly, girls had money of their own to spend and marketers were quick to capitalize on the changing economic and social reality of childhood and adolescence. The market swiftly transformed the leisure activities of girls, the spaces they occupied, and the activities in which they engaged. Advertisers actively courted girls, utilizing a breadth of strategies intended to establish brand loyalty. The now ubiquitous training bra, first marketed by Maidenform in the 1950s, is an exemplary case of marketers' rueful attempts to gain lifelong allegiance among these fledgling consumers (Brumberg 1997). Advertisers actively tapped into and exploited girls' concerns about popularity and appearance, drawing them into a world celebrating a conventional femininity centered on heterosexual romance, beauty, and the body. Entire markets developed around the idea of distinct commodities for the teenage girl; makeup, clothes, music were promised to ensure a particular kind of teen experience for girls, one marked by success in school, in love, and in life. By the late 1940s, girls' lives were largely experienced within the trenches of a commodity culture.

A confluence of forces conspired to cement girls' ties to a consumer market. Girls have long played important consumer roles in families. A century ago as the consumer market was gaining momentum, girls were already tied to work. While many adolescent girls were expected to work with most of their earnings going to household needs, girls also exercised influence over family spending patterns and in this way

first gained the attention of a new suitor – the market (Mitchell 1995).

The growing freedom and independence of girls from family life that followed urban and industrial expansion, increasing school attendance, and entrance into the labor force among youth together played a role in shaping a band of consumer girls. Babysitting, increasingly common in the 1940s, provided older girls with greater disposable income (Innes 1998). Child allowances, a practice that gained in popularity among middle class parents in the 1920s, provided young girls, not yet eligible for work, the means to consume. Today, the average 16 year old girl in the US earns \$103 weekly from allowance and part time work according to a Youth Rand Poll.

Youth markets have grown considerably over the last century. Few spaces occupied by girls today have escaped the sway of a consumer market. Even schools have failed to avoid the influence of a commodity culture as public resources for education recede and multinational corporations like Burger King, Coca Cola, and Nike provide funding to schools at an accelerating rate. Drawn into the folds of an ever expanding culture of consumption shaped by the unassailable pursuit of profit by consumer corporations, girls today are immersed in a dizzying world of beepers and cellular phones, cars and clothes, lip gloss, CDs, DVDs, and more at every turn.

Under consumer capitalism, girls' bodies have become significant commodities of visual display. Today's girls spend upwards of \$45 a month on makeup and other beauty aids alone, representing an estimated \$9 billion of the cosmetic market. They spend \$21.8 billion in clothing and accessories also according to the Youth Rand Poll. One consumer event for teen girls of particular importance is the high school prom (Best 2000). While proms epitomize the expansion of a distinct youth consumer culture and the spending power of youth, much of this market focus on proms is geared toward girls. Popular girls' beauty magazines like *Seventeen* and *Young and Modern* exploit the promise of self transformation at the prom, securing girls' consent to prevailing feminine forms that concentrate their energies on appearance work, all the while gaining sizable profits. The achievement of femininity for the prom depends on an

endless consumption of products: makeup, clothing, hair accessories, shoes, lingerie, hand bags, and jewelry, all products readily available in a commodity market and heavily marketed as tools for feminine display and self reinvention at the prom.

But the teen girl is not alone in this consumer world. As childhood scholars have demonstrated, the pre adolescent girl is also assailed by a veritable windfall of messages intended to promote consumption of an endless array of consumer goods from bubble gum to Beanie Babies, McDonald's Happy Meals to Groovy Girls (Steinberg & Kincheloe 1997). Barbie, primarily marketed to younger girls and reigning as one of the most popular toys worldwide, has been the subject of much scholarly investigation. Tracing Barbie's cultural importance, feminist scholars have shown how Barbie operates under a veil of whiteness, promotes a narrow construction of the feminine body, and actively normalizes hyperconsumption.

The success of advertising to girls stems from its ability to align consumption with particular social meanings that resonate with girls. Many scholars have demonstrated how marketers have linked consumption with personal empowerment and liberation, even as they promote and uphold rigid and narrow gender prescriptions. This is best illustrated in the much touted though nebulous turn of phrase "girl power," which originated with the London based pop music group the Spice Girls, intended to inspire groups of girls to exercise their right to consume. Hardly a call to action, "girl power" celebrates a tenuous feminist individualism entirely compatible with consumption. Yet paradoxically, girls have gained power through their participation in the commercial world. The arrival of mass produced clothing in the 1920s enabled girls to move out from under the yolk of maternal control since mothers no longer made their dresses (Brumberg 1997).

Early scholarship on girls and consumption, emphasizing the pleasures of mass consumption, often overlooked girls' agentic possibilities in the consumer realm. Fueled by a moral protectionism that rested on the enduring notion that girls were especially vulnerable to outside influence, early scholarship cast girls as passive consumers. However, girls' struggles for freedom and independence often take shape within

a consumer realm. Recognizing this, scholarship over the last decade has made visible the new areas of expertise and cultural authority girls have gained as consumers (McRobbie 1991).

Recent scholarship also has highlighted the importance of understanding the material contexts of consumption, arguing that girls' investment in cultural forms is profoundly situational (Roman & Christian Smith 1988; Harris 2004). Tweens worship hypersexualized pop icon Britney Spears not simply because she embodies an idealized feminine construct but instead because she represents a type of power and autonomy few girls between 8 and 12 experience in their everyday lives. Thus, while girls are consummate consumers of various media, spending countless hours watching television on the WB and UPN and music videos on MTV, listening to CDs of rappers Missy "Missy Demeanor" Elliot and Lil' Kim, reading maga zines like *Cosmo Girl*, *Seventeen*, and *Sassy* and the popular adolescent book series *Sweet Valley High*, it is the social meanings they generate as they consume that are important to understand. Girls use the objects offered by a consumer market toward their own ends: to construct identities, to express in group solidarity, to define themselves apart from parents and others. Girls' use of resources provided by a consumer market as they struggle to find their place in a culture that denigrates and dismisses, objectifies and sexualizes girls, sometimes has radical outcomes. Musical and (maga)zine based movements, most notably Riot Grrrls, have served as important conduits for girls to resist commodification, forge an alternative gender and sexual order, and to articulate a feminist political agenda.

More recently, the attention of scholars has turned to the globalizing forces shaping girls' increasingly complex relationships to consumption in a transnational context, revealing the vast gulf between girls whose sweatshop labor produces these products and those girls, often worlds away, who consume them. A broad range of possible research directions remains open as scholars trace these changes in global and consumer capitalism and the corresponding changes in girlhood.

With this in mind, future research directions are likely to be informed by extended definitions of consumption, greater attention to girls' changing relationship to public life in an

ever changing world economy, and girls' complex and paradoxical engagements with feminism in the consumer realm.

SEE ALSO: Childhood; Consumer Culture, Children's; Consumption and the Body; Consumption, Globalization and; Consumption, Youth Culture and; Culture, Gender and; Gender, Consumption and; Media and Consumer Culture; Riot Grrrls; Socialization, Gender; Youth/Adolescence

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consumption, green/sustainable

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Green/sustainable consumption refers to various disciplines, discourses, policy initiatives, and practices concerning the design, implementation,

and popularization of consumption practices and production innovations that seek to curtail any of the negative environmental and social effects of human economic activity. Moreover, whereas some have linked it to better physical and mental health and an enhanced quality of life, green/sustainable consumption also involves distinctively social psychological aspects (Myers 2003).

Proponents of green/sustainable consumption attempt to raise consumer awareness of oft latent connections between consumption and production as well as the obscured costs of pursuing a consumer lifestyle. For the former, green/sustainable consumption proponents seek to demystify those upstream and downstream consequences of consumption that have become "distanced" (Princen 2002) for people immersed in consumer society ("upstream" consequences refer to pre consumption factors involving resource extraction, production, and distribution, while "downstream" consequences involve post consumption waste and pollution issues). Following the prevailing wisdom of the larger scientific community, the concept of green/sustainable consumption implies that current patterns of resource extraction and usage are unsustainable and, according to more alarmist accounts, will lead to a host of environmental and social crises (Merchant 1989; McKibben 1999). Green/sustainable consumption's guiding global rationale holds that each individual consumer can act to reduce the adverse effects of population pressures and overconsumption on the environment. This may be achieved by consuming goods made using more sustainable production methods, by consuming less, or by engaging in practices such as recycling, conservation, and participation in locally based consumption cooperatives.

ECONOMY AND ECOLOGY

There is considerably less agreement as to what the goals of green/sustainable consumption should be and how public policy should be used to achieve them (Robins & Roberts 1998). Among more hardline "green" advocates, the objective is to identify and promote those consumption practices that can best sustain existing ecosystems while curtailing those practices that are

potentially most harmful. Others have oriented themselves toward the more modest goal of maintaining existing systems of consumption and production. Still others wish to implement consumption practices and develop productive technologies that serve the more radical goal of restoring the earth's ecosystems (e.g., Hawken 1993), thereby providing redress to longstanding patterns of environmental degradation.

For ecological economists and environmental scientists operating in the arena of public policy, green/sustainable consumption has become the purview of those concerned with "sustainable development" (World Commission on Environment and Development 1987). These analysts seek to identify ways in which quests for modernization and improved economic standing by developing nations can be achieved in ways that minimize harm to the environment while enhancing life quality. For developed nations, the policy driven approach of sustainable development aims to (1) provide tax incentives for the development of more efficient and environmentally sound technologies for the production and distribution of consumer goods; and (2) encourage more environmentally friendly consumption practices through a combination of regulatory incentives and "social marketing" campaigns to stimulate consumer awareness of the negative environmental and social consequences of global consumption and production systems (e.g., global warming/greenhouse effect, deforestation, pollution, waste, ozone depletion, abusive labor conditions, poverty, inequality, etc.) (Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development 1997).

SUSTAINABLE POLICY AND CONSUMER LIFESTYLES

The sustainable development approach has prompted disputes over the role played by institutions and policymakers in regulating consumer demand and encouraging the adoption of sustainable production technologies. Its policy driven approach has been criticized as a technocratic project based on unrealistic expectations concerning the malleability of presumably passive consumer behaviors through

regulation. The gap between policy and practice is exacerbated by the fact that the unhindered right of individual consumers to pursue comfort and pleasure through free market consumption is considered to be a cornerstone of basic democratic principles. Given this individualistic orientation, those trying to promote green/sustainable consumption and change consumer perceptions have found consumers to be recalcitrant to incentives and awareness campaigns designed to alter their lifestyle practices (e.g., the current popularity of SUVs among outdoor enthusiasts and other lifestyle groups).

In seeking to remedy gaps between formal policy directives and widespread public acceptance of green/sustainable consumption practices, the "ecological modernization" approach of some European environmental sociologists similarly holds that economic growth and resolutions to ecological problems need not be mutually exclusive (Lash, Szerszynski, & Wynne 1996; Spaargaren & van Vliet 2000). Their break with sustainable development adherents hinges on a reconsideration of the view of "the consumer." Whereas, in the sustainable development view, consumers are thought of as passive actors, ecological modernization proponents understand consumers in terms of active – albeit highly rational – choosers. Ecological modernization endeavors to influence consumer choices through a variety of consciousness raising educational avenues designed to promote green/sustainable consumption as a rational, ethical, and proper way to rein in the aggregate environmental and social damage wrought by consumer lifestyles (Spaargaren & van Vliet 2000; Paavola 2001).

Critics contend that this approach still fails to adequately deal with consumer objections to altering their lifestyle practices to serve needs for environmental sustainability (Hobson 2002). Like sustainable development, ecological modernization has been hard pressed to remedy the inherent difficulties posed by the need to couch green/sustainable consumption in individualistic terms as a "cultural politics" rather than as a movement connected to larger social and environmental justice issues. Accordingly, perhaps the most crucial issue facing green/sustainable consumption advocates involves how best to

market and promote socially and/or environmentally beneficial consumption practices to consumers.

UNDERSTANDING GREEN/ SUSTAINABLE CONSUMPTION

Despite the obstacles posed by the individualistic orientation of consumerism, evidence of participation in green/sustainable consumption comes from an assortment of movements at the margins of consumer societies, including downshifters, voluntary simplifiers, anti globalization groups, local producer cooperatives, consumer banks, “enviropreneurs,” and indigenous groups seeking a more direct voice in the governance and control of nearby natural resources. At present there exists a need for more – and more systematic – studies of such movements and the social conditions and personal motivations that give rise to them.

In general, whether the purview of economists, environmental scientists, sociologists, or marketers, there is clearly a lack of applied studies concerning ways to develop, assess, gauge, and modify policies designed to encourage green/sustainable consumption practices. In the future, the need to identify and better understand ways in which such practices can best be implemented is one that must be addressed in greater detail from a variety of disciplinary and empirical angles.

SEE ALSO: Consumer Movements; Ecology and Economy; Economy, Culture and; Environmental Movements; Hyperconsumption/Overconsumption; Lifestyle Consumption; New Urbanism; Waste, Excess, and Second Hand Consumption

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consumption and intellectual property

Kembrew McLeod

The rise of capitalism, the invention of the printing press, and the commodification of literary and artistic domains helped lay the economic, technological, and legal philosophical groundwork that led to the development of intellectual property laws. There are three major categories of intellectual property law – copyright, trademark, and patent law – though it was copyright law that was the first piece of legislation to arise from the collision of those above mentioned concepts. In 1710, Britain passed the Statute of Anne, which was akin to modern copyright law, and in 1790 the US

Congress passed a copyright law similar to this British statute.

Copyright law secures protection for all types of original expression, including art, literature, music, songs, choreography, flow charts, software, photography, movies, video games, and videos. Copyright only protects original expression fixed in a medium, and not the underlying concepts and ideas comprising that expression (i.e., you cannot copyright an idea). The differentiation between an idea and the protected *expression* of that idea highlights the way Enlightenment and Romantic notions of originality and authorship are deeply embedded in contemporary copyright law. Trademark law developed from a body of common law that was concerned with protecting commercial marks from being misused and misrepresented by competing companies. Lastly, patent law protects from unauthorized commercial use certain types of inventions.

Intellectual property owners are quite powerful and have at times flexed significant lobbying muscle. For instance, until 1998 the period of copyright protection lasted for the life of the author plus 50 years – unless the creator was a business, in which case the period of protection lasted for 75 years. But, to use one well known example, many of Disney's copyrights that protected its most lucrative characters were due to lapse near the turn of the century, with Mickey Mouse passing into the public domain in 2003, and Pluto, Goofy, and Donald Duck following in 2009. Disney, along with the Motion Picture Association of America (MPAA) and other content owners, heavily lobbied Congress to pass legislation to extend copyright coverage for an extra 20 years, which Congress did. Named after the late singer congressman, this piece of legislation was titled the Sonny Bono Copyright Term Extension Act, and it had the effect of preventing any new works from entering the public domain for 20 years after the bill was signed into law.

The intellectual properties sold by lifestyle companies contribute significantly to western economies and consumer culture. By their very nature, these properties – and the copyright, trademark, and patent laws that govern them – exert a powerful influence over social interactions in a consumer society. For instance, Nike is less a shoe company than a conceptual house

of cards built around the strength of its trade marks. It is a remarkably sturdy house of cards that is supported by the policing powers of the state. The corporation's marketing philosophy makes it clear that the company is not in the business of manufacturing shoes but in the business of branding – connecting lifestyles to cheap pieces of plastic, leather, and rubber. The growing centrality of corporate identity and corporate "image" requires Nike and others to invest a large percentage of capital on advertising and promotion in order to keep the brand at the center of the popular cultural imagination.

The massive profits generated by Nike and other companies stem not only from outsourcing its factory labor, argues legal and cultural studies scholar Rosemary Coombe, but also from its ability to successfully herd the migration of its trademarked brands into everyday life. Coombe argued in *The Cultural Life of Intellectual Properties* (1998) that companies need to have it both ways, because if they are to remain profitable and relevant, they need to saturate consumers with their logos, brands, and services. Naomi Klein, author of *No Logo* (2000), notes that logos have become the lingua franca of the global village, and these trademarked properties are often used by anti globalization activists as a site for their protests. Because public spaces, public squares, are disappearing – being replaced by branded environments – activists have come to see logos as a new kind of public square they can occupy.

Popular culture provides social actors with a kind of verbal shorthand. Appropriating words and phrases from mass media, consumer citizens can convey a wide range of meanings and emotions, sometimes with only one monosyllabic utterance. Religious rites and iconography, many argue, once provided a common reference point for big and little questions, but today mediated, privatized images and meanings have embedded themselves into everyday talk. The average American college student is more likely to recognize a line from the television cartoon *The Simpsons*, for instance, than an allusion to a story from the Old Testament. Referencing pop culture helps shape and define the identity and cultural preferences of social actors, providing a kind of grammar and syntax that structures everyday talk. In face to face

interactions many ordinary people can still legally refer to these intellectual properties, and we will continue to do so without inhibition. Increasingly, however, personal expression carried out over the World Wide Web, as scholars Siva Vaidhyanathan and Lawrence Lessig have argued, has come under the surveillance and regulation of intellectual property laws which are being enforced by owners through such means as cease and desist emails.

In 1999, trademark owning corporations won a major lobbying victory when the US Congress passed the Anti Cyber Squatting Consumer Protection Act. Since then, companies have aggressively pursued legal action against those who incorporate their trademarks into domain names. The Act imposes stiff criminal penalties against offenders, though companies can also use an arbitration process to control a domain name they don't like. When so much of culture and language is privately owned, it becomes all the more difficult to play with language, even in non confrontational ways. For instance, Mike Rowe, a 17 year old Canadian high school student, discovered the new legalities of personal expression when he registered the domain name MikeRoweSoft.com and soon found himself in legal troubles with Microsoft. Using a now common tactic, the software company offered \$10 in order to provoke the teen into a higher counterbid, which then allowed Microsoft to claim that Rowe had filed a "bad faith" registration (i.e., registering a name only for the sake of getting companies to pay him for the rights), and started proceedings to strip him of the domain name. Microsoft backed off its suit slightly after much bad PR, but it still insisted on controlling the domain name.

Regarded by many as vapid and a form of escapism, popular culture does impact the consciousness of consumer citizens powerfully, which is why it is necessary for social actors to manipulate and transform the language of popular culture that surrounds them. But in recent years, it has been difficult and/or impossible to do so because federal law protects trademarks from being portrayed in an "unwholesome or unsavory context." This provision allows courts to suppress unauthorized uses of famous cultural icons, even when there is no reasonable possibility of confusion in the marketplace. In many ways, the problem is as much with the

way trademark law is interpreted by "brand bullies" as it is with the way it is written.

The interpretation of the law by corporate lawyers requires that these companies go after any and all unauthorized uses, even if they are obviously meant to be "parodic" social commentary – a longstanding exception to the use of copyrighted material. The law is written in such a way that companies are required to zealously police the public, unauthorized uses of their trademark. Failing to do so may result in a "dilution" of the trademark and thus their exclusive right to it. In an era where brand images and icons are virtually equated with a company and its products, it would be almost negligent not to protect the value already invested. This is why lawyers for the Xerox Corporation constantly remind newspapers that its branded name isn't a generic term for photocopying. When a trademarked good loses its specific meaning, its economic value dies, suffering from what is called, fittingly, "genericide."

Another area of culture where intellectual property law and consumption are deeply interconnected is in the practice of product placement in movies, television shows, and more recently video games. Because society is saturated with commodities, advertisers argue, product placements in movies and television shows add "realism" to the production, despite the fact that there's nothing realistic about the way directors place products in the frame or the way products are spoken about in the context of the dramatic narrative.

Video games occupy the imagination of millions of teens and twenty somethings. These games are important because they seamlessly integrate leisure activity, consumption, every day life, and branded intellectual properties. Unlike most movies, people play video games multiple times and, by definition, they require the close attention of the viewer. The trademarked and copyrighted goods that appear in the media world typically do so with the explicit permission (and often payment) of the intellectual property owners. This works to shape both the consciousness of social actors and the rules by which they can communicate and interact with each other in media that are regulated by intellectual property laws.

Increasingly, these highly regulated media are becoming the primary ways many people

communicate – something that quite literally, under the law, positions branded cultural texts as objects that can only be consumed, not (re) produced or redefined or critiqued. Interestingly, the kind of aggressive tactics employed by intellectual property owners have succeeded in generating a backlash movement against what have been called the “cultural land grabs” of “brand bullies,” to use a phrase deployed by author David Bollier. Law professor James Boyle refers to the recent changes in intellectual property law as “the second enclosure movement,” referring to the increasing erosion of the “cultural commons” and the privatization of cultural resources.

These laws and the favorable litigious climate they have spawned, together with some high profile and aggressively pursued suits against alleged violators, threaten to preclude public expression. Few companies or organizations, and fewer individuals, can afford to withstand the kind of legal onslaught that, for instance, Disney can unleash. The sum effect has been a concentration of ownership of public expression, and thus a potential deadening effect on playfulness and creativity at the very moment when new technologies and new modes of communication offer the promise of new horizons.

SEE ALSO: Brands and Branding; Consumption and the Internet; Consumption, Spectacles of; Consumption, Visual; Culture Jamming; Intellectual Property

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consumption and the Internet

Sonia Livingstone

The study of consumption within the social sciences has a history stretching over a century or more, and has only recently been extended to the study of consumption of and on the Internet. The arrival of the Internet as a mass market technology in the early to mid 1990s throughout western countries and beyond has posed new questions for the multidisciplinary study of consumption and consumer culture, particularly as the Internet seems to facilitate the shift from mass consumption to increasingly specialized, flexible, and geographically dispersed forms of consumption.

Some familiar intellectual debates are now being replayed in this new arena between social researchers who question the power relations inherent in consumption (and its relation to production) and market researchers who approach the study of consumption uncritically as a means of increasing its presence in every day life. The study of consumption and the Internet has sought to critique the way in which online consumers (and therefore processes of online consumption) are researched within business and marketing schools, whether focusing narrowly on e commerce or more broadly on the circulation of information in a liberalized market. Studies of consumption and the Internet are particularly concerned to

critique accounts of consumer “needs” and “preferences,” the decoupling of consumption from production, and economic agendas that neglect the social and cultural meanings and practices that not merely accompany but also shape consumption.

Specific questions being asked about the Internet and consumption are multiple. First, taking “the Internet” as a “black box,” a technology diffusing through the marketplace and into workplaces, homes, schools, and communities, research has asked how the Internet itself is being consumed. Can the spread of the Internet be understood like the spread of any other consumer good – i.e., does it “trickle down” from the wealthy to the masses, and is there a widening or lessening “digital divide” akin to other social inequalities in material goods? Second, opening up the “black box,” research is beginning to ask about consumption processes in relation to the many and diverse goods and services increasingly made available through the Internet, where consumption is here understood both narrowly and more broadly. For instance, does e-commerce from business to consumers work in similar ways to high street shopping, or are the conditions of money, trust, pleasure, and practicalities significantly different? Is a consumption perspective helpful in exploring the emerging cultural and social practices by which online content is co-created and co-consumed by its participants, with implications for identity, expression, communicative norms, and social ties?

The better the Internet and its consumers (or “users”) are understood, and the more the Internet becomes a complex and plural set of technologies which encompasses information, services, communication, entertainment, work, business, educational, and many other applications, the more these two traditions of early research are converging. Moreover, as “Internet studies” (itself still a contested label) is increasingly attracting the attention of many disciplines across the social sciences and humanities, the more consumption studies must negotiate their contribution to this new interdisciplinary research space. The fundamental intellectual divide between the critical scholars and the more administrative or pluralist scholars persists, while becoming curiously intertwined with the “optimistic”/“pessimistic”

divide that has shaped the early phases of “Internet studies.”

Hence, researchers are asking whether the Internet affords new and emancipatory possibilities that can liberate people from well established and hierarchical practices of material and symbolic consumption “offline.” Attention has been focused on the “consumption” of information (as part of the potentially democratizing impact of the Internet, in turn a function of its flexible, heterarchical, even anarchic network structure), on the identity consequences of consumption online (in a domain where anonymity, expressiveness, experimentation, and tolerance supposedly shape the field of consumption), and on the creative potential of new consumption practices (playing with the artistic and innovative possibilities for new “products” – new forms of textual representation, original codes for communication and expressiveness, unexpected or collectively emergent forms of discourse).

More pessimistically, researchers are also asking whether the Internet affords new forms of commercial exploitation or social control, again extending and developing practices of production, distribution, and consumption offline to the online domain. Attention here has centered on the risks attendant on online consumption (risks associated with the commercial or state invasion of privacy, the involuntary collection and exploitation of personal data, the opportunities to monitor and target consumers in vastly greater detail and on a far greater scale than is generally possible offline), on the anxieties and fears of the public, resulting in barriers to online consumption as evident from the considerable reluctance toward e-commerce and other online transactions, and, occupying most research thus far, on the likelihood that this new domain for consumption (both of the technology and of its contents) is adding a further form of inequality (now in relation to digital information, online opportunities, e-learning, etc.), undermining attempts to reduce sources of social exclusion and economic disadvantage.

Research on consumption and the Internet is still in its early stages, the Internet itself only having been widely available since 1995, and even then only in wealthy parts of the world. The field has moved on from the early days of

speculative hyperbole toward a solid grounding in empirical research, even if this remains tentative in its preliminary conclusions. It has also moved on from the assumption of a separate domain called “cyberspace” or a clear virtual/real distinction, one that proved unsustainable both theoretically and in terms of everyday consumption practices. And, thirdly, it has moved increasingly away from any simple assertions of technological determinism (asking about the impacts or effects of the Internet on consumption) in favor of either a social determinism (stressing the importance of the offline context in shaping online consumption practices) or a “soft technological determinism” (seeking to understand in a more subtle and careful manner just whether and how consumption online differs from consumption offline, supplementing and diversifying the possibilities and practices of consumption in general).

Empirical studies are beginning to converge on the conclusion that, as is now routinely assumed in (offline) consumption studies, consumption online is integrated into daily life, and is not an activity apart. While the material and symbolic conditions of consumption on the Internet may differ, they are not of a different order from offline consumption and, most important, people move to and fro between these various spaces of, or opportunities for, consumption. Consequently, the social contexts of consumption (on and offline) represent an increasing focus of research. Online, researchers have been more successful in tracking the (re) emergence of familiar cultural norms, social conventions, and everyday anxieties than they have in documenting radical or alternative forms of consumption, communication, and community building, except perhaps among a highly motivated and generally elite minority of Internet enthusiasts. Online too, the signs are growing that the once free and anarchic or emancipatory potential of the Internet is subject to increasing attempts to privatize, commercialize, control, and profit from the activities of consumers online. Some of these are defended under a “neoliberal” freeing of the market, on as offline. Others are being hotly contested precisely as incursions into public freedoms, privacy, and rights. There are still many more questions than answers regarding consumption and the

Internet. But, it may be fairly suggested, some answers are beginning to emerge.

SEE ALSO: Consumption, Mass Consumption, and Consumer Culture; Cyberculture; Economy, Culture and; Internet; Shopping

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consumption, landscapes of

J. Michael Ryan

George Ritzer has built upon his notion of cathedrals of consumption to describe what he terms “landscapes of consumption,” or “geographic areas that encompass two, or more, cathedrals of consumption” (2005: 149). This definition can be extended to define landscapes of consumption as *locales that encompass two or more cathedrals of consumption that allow, encourage, and even compel people to consume*. The prototypical example of this would be the Las Vegas strip – an area where multiple cathedrals of consumption exist side by side in the same geographical setting and entice consumers not only through their individual appeal, but also

through the techniques made possible by their synergistic proximity.

Elsewhere, Ritzer et al. (2005) have extended the idea of landscapes of consumption with their case study of Easton Town Center in Columbus, Ohio. They argue that Easton serves as a prototype of a consumer setting that is becoming increasingly prevalent – one that seeks to simulate the look and feel of a nostalgic small town America. By encompassing two or more landscapes of consumption within one setting, Easton is able to expand the spectacle of landscape to a community level (Ryan 2005).

Sharon Zukin (1991) has also contributed much to the idea of landscape. She uses the term landscape to describe a configuration of material geographical surroundings and their related social and symbolic practices. She argues that landscape is the major cultural product of our time and that landscape and power are deeply and intricately connected. Through this, large scale, bureaucratic, economic structures attempt to impose a new order upon an existing geographical location. Although there is sometimes resistance to these attempts, ultimately capital wins out and landscapes are imposed. Zukin also argues that landscapes, contrary to the assertions of many postmodern social theorists, tend toward “repetition and singularity” and not toward ephemeral aestheticism.

SEE ALSO: Consumption; Consumption, Cathedrals of; Consumption, Mass Consumption, and Consumer Culture; Consumption, Spectacles of; Shopping; Shopping Malls

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consumption, masculinities and

Randal Doane

Masculinities and consumption refer to the gendered sense of self constituted through the use of goods and services in the leisure time and spaces of modern life in the West. In markets of goods, hobbies, and sexual practices, individual choice is delimited by the social structure of gender, and these markets provide the symbolic boundaries for the practical embodiment of different masculinities. Masculinities here is offered in the plural, to emphasize how a hegemonic masculinity (Connell 1995: 77) is secured as a temporary solution to problems within a patriarchal order. As a rule, the sexual division of consumption has been dehistoricized, but in the past 30 years, men have embraced a highly commodified, stylized, and androgynous masculinity.

Masculinity is linked with the positive attributes of power and virility, yet depends upon the denigration of femininity as its dialectical Other, and is constituted by antinomies of class, racialization, and sexuality. As a disposition, masculinity is conceptualized as homologous to the penis in a state of arousal: rigid, potent, and virile. This disposition entails a relentless retesting of unprovable ambition (Kimmel 1996: 333), in settings that embrace physical strength, competition, and even violence (Messner 1997). For straights and queers, men and women, to be masculine is to be in control. Representations of the masculine subject at work and play emphasize his concern for the objective results of performance, rather than the subjective yearning of gratification (Bordo 1999: ch. 1). The stoic sovereignty of the audiophile in the Maxell advertisement, for example, derives its meaning from the

dialectical implication of both the impotent bureaucrat in his grey flannel suit and the emotional female in the domestic sphere.

The historiography of masculine consumption was largely neglected in modern sociology (1848–1972), and accounts of the male self focused on his role as the laboring provider. Durkheim imagined “cultured men” in their occupations in the public sphere, and “natural women” to be at home in the domestic sphere. Particularly for the middle class, consumption was understood to be a feminine province, and in “Fashion” (1904), Simmel imagined that masculine men were free from such incidental concerns. Masculinity depended upon a circumscribed reflexivity, for to be too self-conscious was to be feminine. Here fashion reflected the articulations of masculinity to power and vigor, and femininity to fragility and docility. In *Theory of the Leisure Class*, Veblen argued that, even in its conspicuous form, men’s fashion showed relative constraint compared to the feminine “habitual uselessness” of the high heel, the skirt, and the corset. Men’s clothing was more objectively uniform, while women’s clothing provoked as it concealed, offering artifice and illusion.

In the mid 1970s, the decline of manual labor and the disappearance of jobs for life coincided with the feminist revolution, and gave rise to new models for masculine consumption and its sociological consideration. With the cultural turn in the social sciences, sociologists returned to conflict theory and symbolic interaction, to consider the determinacy of gender and, eventually, the complexity of masculinity. The two were not coincidental, as gender studies valorized women’s lives in ways that did not implicate masculine privilege.

The serious consideration of masculinity and consumption in sociology and cultural studies assumed three key subfields: first, the critical synthesis of Marx, Freud, and feminism in cultural studies; second, the Durkheimian legacy of the morality of consumption; and third, the historical studies of masculinity and consumption as key features of industrial modernity. First, research at the Birmingham Center for Cultural Studies on youth and resistance analyzed the intersections of masculinity and consumption, and the privilege of the pub(lic)

over the domestic sphere. Researchers drew on the Marxian legacy of culture as the bulwark against capital, and turned their willful optimism away from the union shop to the street corner, yet neglected to problematize masculinity effectively in initial studies. The “Screen School” of film studies adapted Freud for feminist ends, and focused on ideology and the masculinity of the filmic apparatus (Mulvey 1989).

Second, studies of consumer morality included Goffman’s *Gender Advertisements* (1979) and Bourdieu’s *Distinction* (1984), which mapped the classificatory schemes of consumption, and analyzed the masculine, whole mouth ways of eating and speaking. Nixon (1996) and Jackson et al. (2001) extended Goffman’s analysis of the commodification of the gendered body, and found a new reflexivity in contemporary variations of masculine consumption. They articulated how men’s magazines offer a “constructed certitude” to ease heterosexual men’s anxieties brought on by the new visibility of gay masculinities, the delay in marriage, and women’s upper hand in educational achievement.

Third, in addition to Kimmel’s treatment (1996) of masculinity in general, Ehrenreich (1983) explored hegemonic variations of masculine consumption, and Mort (1996) provided a sharp analysis of leisure and masculine sexuality in London in late modernity.

Sociological theory has had difficulty imagining the positive qualities of masculinity, and has yet to imagine how the emergence of capitalist markets in developing countries might transform traditional forms of masculinity. Likewise, scholarship in consumption has yet to interrogate the genealogy of gender in classic and late modern sociology. Witz and Marshall (2003: 341) offer a critical account of the masculine body as capable, and the feminine body as constrained, in the work of Durkheim and Simmel, respectively, and outline how contemporary sociology of the gendered body might be shaped for future developments in consumption theory.

SEE ALSO: Consumption and the Body; Gender, Consumption and; Femininities/Masculinities; Lifestyle Consumption; Sexuality, Masculinity and

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consumption, mass consumption, and consumer culture

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CONSUMPTION

Consumption, mass consumption, and consumer culture are a growing focus in contemporary life as well as in social science theory and research. Daniel Miller (1995) even suggests that consumption is replacing kinship as the central theme in anthropology. Consumption is the most basic of these concepts, but not the least contentious. From the Latin *consumere*, to take up, consumption means to

acquire. But other meanings include using up, burning, wasting, and decaying. In the first case consumption adds; in the others it subtracts. In current practice, the term may refer either to using an object or to both acquiring and using it. In the broader usage, consumption also includes such supporting activities as attending advertising, shopping retail displays, interacting with salespeople, engaging in word of mouth, and searching online for a good or service. This more common view holds that consumption consists of *activities potentially leading to and actually following from the acquisition of a good or service by those engaging in such activities*.

Tangible goods can be acquired and stored for future consumption, but most services, including surgery, stage plays, and haircuts, must be acquired and used simultaneously. The prototype of current consumption involves searching for, purchasing, and subsequently using a branded product. But we can also acquire goods and services by receiving them as gifts, borrowing or leasing them, creating them, finding them, stealing them, or, as with desks in a classroom, coming to feel they are ours through habitual use. Consumers are prototypically individuals, although they can also be couples, families, corporations, or other groups.

Consumption has come to entail more than is captured in the preceding definition. *When we consume an object we also consume its meanings*. Owning a Mercedes automobile may signify wealth, appreciating a piece of music may reflect one's taste, and wearing a certain style of jeans may signal sexuality to an intended audience. These meanings are jointly constructed by society, marketing and advertising, and other cultural meaning makers including designers, filmmakers, reviewers, newscasters, copywriters, artists, and musicians. As Charles Revson, the founder of Revlon, once observed, "In the factory we make cosmetics, in the store we sell hope." Meaning elaboration is such an integral part of the contemporary acquisition and use of objects that it is difficult to envision consumption without meanings. Although a dog might "consume" a bone according to the previous definition, something is missing that makes this an awkward construction. That something is the social meaning. A human

collector of bones (or postage stamps or Beanie Babies) will likely fit them into broader meaning systems understood by other collectors as well as employ collecting rules such as “no two alike,” “belonging to category X,” and “not for everyday use.” No matter how much a dog may like bones, it is unlikely to selectively acquire them with such meanings in mind.

One further definitional matter is deciding what, if any, activities are *not* consumption. Since consumption can include non market means of acquisition, are planting and nourishing a garden forms of consumption? Since we may also consume services, is going to a mosque to pray consumption? What about buying something in the market in order to give it as a gift? Are we consuming when we contribute to a charity? Does an employer consume the services of its employees? As parents, do we consume our children? Is breathing air consuming it? The answers to such questions are by no means fixed. One characteristic of consumer culture is its increasing commodification of the world so that more and more of it can be bought, sold, and consumed. We can now purchase and consume branded bottled water, human sperm, and coffee futures. However, two distinctions commonly limit such conceptual imperialism. One is that production is a separate activity from consumption. An artist painting a commissioned portrait is primarily a producer, even though the activity may involve the consumption of paints and brushes.

Secondly, there exists a shifting and contentious non commodified sphere of human life. The non commodity sphere has shrunk in highly marketized economies, but it has not disappeared. As children we are not consuming our parents’ services as much as engaging in intimate sharing. Children can, however, consume care from a commercial day care center. We may consume the services of a prostitute, but we share intimacy in our sexual relations with a love partner. There is a conceptual dividing line between, on the one hand, acquiring and consuming impersonal objects obtained in reciprocal exchange for something else and, on the other hand, giving and receiving personal mementos or services without explicit or implicit reciprocal provisos. A consumable commodity is normally fungible and we may do with it as we please. But an inherited family

heirloom has strings attached that link us to the donor. We cannot give it away or sell it with impunity. Viviana Zelizer (*Pricing the Priceless Child*, 1985) suggests that US child labor prohibitions were an attempt to decommodify the sacralized realm of childhood. Human organs, infants, and stem cells continue to resist commodification despite willing buyers. Those who resist allowing such commodification cling to a distinction between the more impersonal process of consuming and the more intimate process of being. However much we may come to believe that we are what we consume, we nevertheless continue to believe that there is something more to our existence than consumption.

MASS CONSUMPTION

Mass consumption is an evolutionary step from the necessary human act of consumption. Historically, mass consumption, *the consumption of the same objects by a large number of consumers*, emerged with mass production and was soon associated with mass communication, mass media, mass marketing, mass merchandizing, and mass culture. With mass consumption, millions of consumers potentially drive the same cars, eat the same foods from the same restaurant and supermarket chains, wear the same clothing from the same retail chains, watch the same films and television programs, listen to the same music, and fill their homes with the same mass produced furnishings. The specter of sameness in mass consumption is bothersome in individualistic societies. Even in the absence of strong individualism, massification threatens us with anonymity in an impersonal marketplace where we may as well be consuming machines as people. This is similar to the dehumanizing process that George Ritzer (2004) calls *The McDonaldization of Society*, except that Ritzer focuses more on rationalized massification in delivering services than on consuming them. At the same time that it threatens anonymity, mass consumption allows lower costs of production and results in greater material abundance and affordability for the consumer. Consumption is potentially democratized by having access to the same goods at uniform low prices instead of having to custom order

expensive tailor made consumer goods, as with the carriage trade of prior centuries.

One ironic champion of mass consumption was Andy Warhol. Warhol (1975), who called his supersized atelier The Factory and who lithographed prints of Campbell's soup cans, pop celebrities, and Brillo pads, lauded the identical goods of a mass consumption society. He suggested that the richest consumers buy the same common consumer goods as the poorest. No amount of money can provide a better Coca Cola than the one a poor person drinks, even if the purchaser is a movie star or the president.

Warhol also said he wanted to be a machine. He aspired to be not only Deleuze and Guattari's (1983) desiring and mass consuming machine, but a mass producing machine as well. Nevertheless, behind this populist democratic consumption façade, the gap between rich and poor is growing the world over and there remain many ways to signal one's place on the wealth continuum via consumption. The illusion that we can achieve distinction through mass consumption is sustained by the proliferation of branded consumption choices, market segmentation, and mass customization.

Brands add meaning to goods and services even when the object branded is virtually the same as others. Salt is salt, but Morton Salt with its slogan "When it rains it pours" and its logo of the young girl with the umbrella, spilling salt from a cylindrical blue Morton package, has more meaning than a bag of generic salt. Morton also segments its market, with separate offerings for those who want iodized salt, low sodium salt, sea salt, road salt, kosher salt, popcorn salt, and so forth. Furthermore, it packages an array of shapes, colors, and sizes from one serving sachets to picnic sized shakers to 50 pound industrial size bags.

Mass customization does not take place with salt, but jeans, automobiles, computers, and bicycles offer so many varieties, options, and components that they can virtually be customized for each individual. At Levi's flagship store in San Francisco, a customer can have his or her measurements input into a computer and subsequently order custom fit jeans in a variety of cuts, fabrics, colors, and styles. Digital songs can be selectively downloaded

from the Internet and mixed, matched, and sequenced in whatever way the consumer desires. In buying a BMW Mini Cooper automobile, the customer has a nearly infinite array of choices through the permutations of interiors, paint jobs, engines, wheels, tires, stereos, and many other available options. After ordering, consumers can watch online as their car is produced to order. Such mass customization has not done away with mass consumption, but for the consumer it does mitigate the specter of sameness.

Considered on a global scale, mass consumption and standardized business practices by multinational consumer goods companies introduce a reverse tendency toward non segmented and non customized consumption choices. The general assumptions are that what sells at home will sell abroad, that offering a variety of segmented products may be too risky, and that there are economies of scale to be gained by global advertising and merchandising. Although these assumptions are being challenged as Coca Cola, McDonald's, MTV, and others begin to tailor their offerings to the culture and local competition, Nike's Air Jordan shoes successfully sold in the same versions worldwide and that was part of their appeal. This is sometimes taken as evidence of cultural imperialism, westernization, or Americanization, but this fails to recognize local adaptations and interpretations of global brands and offerings (e.g., Tamar Liebes and Elihu Katz, *The Export of Meaning*, 1990). At the same time, a part of the meaning of such brands is the consumer's sense of participating in a shared global consumer culture by means of mass consumption.

Even without mass customization, there are ways in which the consumer can decommodify mass produced consumer goods. Our neighbor's canned beans are fungible and fully equivalent to our canned beans. But an ostensibly identical wedding ring purchased by a neighbor is not. Both by virtue of habituation (like the classroom desk) and by virtue of the symbolic meaning imparted through courtship and wedding rituals, this mass produced object has been singularized in the eyes of its owner and is no longer fungible. For most people, trading wedding rings would be as unthinkable as trading children.

CONSUMER CULTURE

If consumption involves the purchase of meanings, *consumer culture involves a quest for meaning in life primarily through consumption*. Consumer culture no longer merely refers to a type of emphatic consumption orientation that historically developed in the more affluent capitalist economies of the world. It has also come to mean that consumption and the things we consume *comprise* our culture. Culture has become commoditized to such a degree that we experience it as consumption, by consumption, and through consumption. We are never far away from an advertising message. Most of what we now read, see, and hear via mass media is a message, or a more subtle product placement, for something we can buy. We now speak of things we once actively chose to *do* as things to *consume*. Shopping has become one of our key leisure activities. Travel guides devote more attention to what we can buy in a locale than they do to its natural wonders. Our interpersonal relations are defined increasingly through the mediation of consumer commodities. Our key rituals are now consumption events staged by wedding planners, funeral directors, caterers, and entertainers. With our logo laden clothing and shopping bags, we are walking billboards for brands as we roam the shopping mall in search of an identity, in search of meaning in life.

Now that promotion has thoroughly colonized mass media, the Internet, email, postal mail, theaters, sports arenas, schools, roads, restrooms, buildings, buses, and busts, it seems that only old fashioned letter writing and personal conversations are free of commercial messages. But even these forms of intercourse are likely to be liberally sprinkled with mentions of consumption. Children may know only a few varieties of local plants and animals, but they know hundreds of brand names before they start school. What is more, they want to own key brands in order to come of age in a consumer culture. A child who does not know what is showing on television, what music is playing on the radio, and what brands are cool is a disenfranchised child who cannot communicate with peers (Ritson & Elliott 1999). We act no longer so much as citizens as consumers. Our politicians are sold to us in carefully crafted packages with

pre planned sound bites, slick advertising, and celebrity endorsers.

Historically, we came to the present state of global consumer culture through several key developments. Some already mentioned include mass production, mass media, mass consumption, and branding. Others include fashion and rapid innovation (so that there is always something new to want), rapid transportation and multinational corporations (so that we can simultaneously consume the same goods as distant others), affluence (so that we can afford these consumer goods), globalization (so that consumer culture is no longer confined to more affluent nations and more urban areas), and liberated consumption values (so that it is now more sinful, evil, or unpatriotic *not* to consume luxuries than it is to consume them). Although historically in the West the development of the department store, mail order selling, urbanization, industrialization, and the advertising industry was also instrumental in stimulating consumer culture, this is not the case everywhere, especially with the rise of Internet selling.

A good benchmark of global consumer culture is the proliferation, globalization, and commercialization of holidays. Christmas is the most spectacular and successful consumption dominated holiday. It is now widely celebrated even in such non Christian nations as China, India, Japan, Thailand, and Turkey. Other western holidays including Mother's Day, Valentine's Day, and Halloween are becoming global as well, just as non western holidays like Chinese New Year, Diwali, and Ramadan are becoming increasingly commercial and global. In countries where members of the prior generation did not know their dates of birth or who only celebrated name days in conjunction with saints' days, birthday cakes, cards, gifts, and parties are becoming the norm. The spread of these world holidays and the increasing portion of the calendar given over to them have been helped by the promotions of multinational manufacturers, retailers, and industries in such areas as foods, liquors, candies, perfumes, greeting cards, travel, decorations, books, clothing, and many other luxury consumer goods offered as essential for the holiday.

THEORETICAL PERSPECTIVES

Scholars before the 1950s considered only limited aspects of consumption phenomena. Karl Marx in *Capital* (1867) suggested the notion of commodity fetishism, but was more interested in the worker than the consumer. Thorstein Veblen's *The Theory of the Leisure Class* (1899), critiquing late nineteenth century American *nouveaux riches*, famously introduced the concepts of conspicuous consumption, conspicuous waste, and pecuniary emulation, but avoided emerging mass consumption issues. Werner Sombart (*Luxury and Capitalism*, 1902) critiqued luxury consumption, but also focused on the consumption of the elite rather than the masses. Georg Simmel (*The Philosophy of Money*, 1907) addressed issues involving money and spending, but he too stopped short of addressing the impact of mass consumption. Max Horkheimer and Theodor Adorno (2002 [1944]) as well as Walter Benjamin (1968 [1936]) worried about a debasing of taste and loss of the sacred "aura" of handmade works with the coming of mass reproduction. These were not so much attempts to examine mass consumption as reactions to it.

In the wake of post World War II American consumer affluence and spending, both critiques such as John Kenneth Galbraith's *The Affluent Society* (1958) and Vance Packard's *Hidden Persuaders* (1957) and defenses such as David Potter's *People of Plenty* (1954) and George Katona's *The Mass Consumption Society* whether rapidly increasing consumption was good for society and character. Galbraith and Packard worried that advertising and other marketing activities create new needs among consumers. In this view, the consumer is the passive victim of marketing.

This view was challenged in Jean Baudrillard's *The Consumer Society* (1970). In this early work, Baudrillard offers a more active view of consumers pursuing the sign value of consumer goods in an effort to communicate and differentiate themselves from others. But he also analyzed consumption as an obligatory moral system that fails to produce pleasure for the individual consumer. In seducing the consumer to want the latest thing, marketing caters to what Baudrillard called the "lowest common culture" by producing gadgets and kitsch

objects. This lowest common culture is consumer culture. A part of the seduction of the consumer occurs through the mystification and sacralization of the body, not merely as a site of eroticism but also as a site of fantasy and desire. Advertising, beauty magazines, and fashion models combine first to make us feel uncomfortable with our bodies, and then to offer to sell us signs that promise to make us thin, beautiful, and sexy. This is one of the ways Baudrillard sees advertisers, together with architects, designers, and others, taking on the role of therapists helping a reputedly sick society. Drawing on Daniel Boorstin's *The Image* (1963), Baudrillard saw consumption celebrities who are "known for their well knownness" replacing production heroes and offering to sell us back a way to be ourselves by dressing, acting, and talking like them. If consumer society has become the dominant discourse, Baudrillard, writing on the heels of the May 1968 French upheaval, also points to a counter discourse denouncing consumption and keeping it in balance in much the same way that beliefs in God and the Devil kept moral control in medieval society.

In *The World of Goods* (1979), Mary Douglas and Baron Isherwood, like Baudrillard, emphasize the symbolic value of goods. They go beyond the pursuit of consumer goods for the sake of individual differentiation, however, and suggest that these goods also help to separate groups of people by acting as "marker goods," signaling our group belonging. Goods help bind humans together through rituals such as gift giving, meals, and hospitality. They emphasize that just as one word from a poem has little meaning, one consumer good has little meaning by itself. It is rather the constellation of consumer goods we own that makes meaning in our lives. In their discussion of marker goods, Douglas and Isherwood echo some of the concerns of Pierre Bourdieu's *Distinction*, published (in French) the same year.

Bourdieu revived and extended social class theory by showing how French consumers use systems of taste in consumption, especially regarding their preferences in and knowledge of art, food, music, furnishings, and clothing, as *cultural capital* that establishes and perpetuates their status or *symbolic capital*. These systems of taste are acquired and transmitted

through the consumer's *habitus*. *Habitus* is the family, cultural, and institutional milieu in which we are raised and educated and which structures our ways of examining, thinking about, and acting toward events in the world. Having parents and friends with a certain level of education and certain occupations helps nurture and pass on a certain level of cultural capital. Cultural capital, in turn, may sometimes be converted into *social capital* or *economic capital*. Bourdieu's theory has been more popular in addressing consumption in Europe than in North America and several studies have questioned its relevance in the United States. Holt (2000) has recently demonstrated that by revamping Bourdieu's elements of cultural capital, they can be usefully applied in the US context as well.

If the preceding theories focus on the aggregate and shared meanings of consumption practices, another line of theorizing has focused on the more individual and particular meanings of consumption objects and practices. In *The Meaning of Things* (1981), Mihaly Csikszentmihalyi and Eugene Rochberg Halton studied the favorite possessions of three generations of Chicago families. They found that although the younger generation valued consumer goods that helped them do things and that elevated their status, the older generation in the same families valued possessions that represented their experiences and links to family and friends. They distinguished between negative terminal materialism, which values consumer goods as ends in themselves, and positive instrumental materialism, which values favorite possessions for what we can do with them. These themes are extended by Belk in "Materialism" (1985) and "Possessions and the Extended Self" (1988). The former paper finds that materialism, defined as the importance a consumer attaches to worldly possessions, is negatively related to feelings of happiness and well being. This finding, since replicated, suggests that materialistic beliefs that possessions can bring happiness may be misguided.

In *The Social Life of Things* (1986) edited by Arjun Appadurai, the lead chapter by Appadurai and the following chapter by Igor Kopytoff together offer a theory of consumer commodity value and meaning. They demystify the gift (partly drawing on Bourdieu) and

suggest that this symbolic form of exchange is *not* diametrically opposed to commodity exchange. At the same time, they mystify the commodity as being capable, in practice, of being decommo-ditized and singularized by the consumer. For example, when the consumer comes to regard a mass produced purchased commodity as a work of art or as part of a personal collection, it is no longer like the anonymous commodity it was when it was for sale to anyone in the market. The consumer recontextualizes the object in a way that lends it special, extraordinary, and unique meaning. As with the gift, the singular object is no longer fungible and freely exchangeable for another object of similar economic value. Although universal money and mass marketing produce a drive to commoditization and homogeneous value, culture and the individual institute a counter drive toward sacralization, singularization, and decommo-ditization. There is a link here to Émile Durkheim's (*The Elementary Forms of Religious Life*, 1915) notion of sacredness that is further developed by Belk et al. (1989). In *Hiding in the Light* (1988), Dick Hebdige discusses another type of sacralizing recontextualization in which British Mods re-gendered and transformed the meaning of the Italian motor scooter.

In 1987, Colin Campbell published *The Romantic Ethic and the Spirit of Modern Consumerism*. Its title plays off Max Weber's *The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism* (1905), but Campbell focuses on the engines of consumer culture rather than producer capitalism. He ties the origins of consumer culture to the Romantic Movement in late eighteenth and early nineteenth century Europe. Specifically, Campbell posits a longing for consumer goods that is bittersweet – a combination of painful longing for the object of our desires coupled with an excited state of anticipation. The consumer imagination is the key to this romantic day dream like state. This state of imagination has been termed the desire for desire and has been found to be underwritten by a hope for hope. Consumers pursuing this emotional state of desire are quite capable of auto arousing the focused wish for a consumer good through actively browsing shops, magazines, advertisements, and other sources of new things to want. Far from Galbraith's and Packard's

manipulation of consumer needs by marketing sorcerers, in this self stimulation of consumer desires the consumer acts as an eager sorcerer's apprentice.

In Grant McCracken's *Culture and Consumption* (1988), his concept of *displaced meaning* extends Campbell's arguments. McCracken argues that our hopes, ideals, and values in life are too fragile to stand up to scrutiny in every day life. In order to sustain our belief in these ideals, we displace them to another place or time. The projection may be either backward in time (e.g., the good old days of our youth) or forward (e.g., when I graduate, get married, retire). In a consumer culture, these displaced meanings often attach to longed for consumer goods. Consumers may sustain the belief that their ideal existence will emerge in Cinderella like fashion when they own their dream car, house, stereo, or other special consumption object. McCracken also demonstrates that consumer goods can be a force for either stability or change in our lives. Like the objects of longing to which we displace meanings, he suggests that consumer goods can act as ballast for our sense of identity, as well as allow the possibility or hope for change. This resonates with the arguments of Douglas and Isherwood as well as the findings of Csikszentmihalyi and Rochberg Halton. It also implicates the notion of continual experiments with and pursuit of life styles defined by consumption (Featherstone 1991).

HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVES ON CONSUMPTION AND CONSUMER CULTURE

Campbell and McCracken are also among a growing number of scholars who have addressed the issues of when, where, and how consumer culture first emerged in the world and how it has subsequently evolved. Fernand Braudel (*Capitalism and Material Life, 1400–1800*, 1973) led the way in focusing on every day material life. McKendrick et al. (1982) examined the origins of consumer culture in eighteenth century England and concluded that rather than a consumption revolution following from the Industrial Revolution, it may have been the other way around. They also traced

the role of clever merchandising by Josiah Wedgwood and others in stimulating the desire of consumers to have the latest thing. Rosalind Williams in *Dream Worlds* (1982) shows the seductive role of department stores in stimulating consumer culture in late nineteenth century France. The palatial enticements of the early department store are also explored in consumer culture fiction by Émile Zola (*Au Bonheur des Dames*) and Theodore Dreiser (*Sister Carrie*). Michael Miller's *The Bon Marché* (1981) considers the store that was the inspiration for Zola's tale. Gail Reekie (*Temptations: Sex, Selling, and the Department Store*, 1993) provides an analysis of the role of the department store in stimulating consumer culture in late nineteenth and early twentieth century Australia, but she develops a more gendered treatment of the "seduction" of female consumers by the patriarchal store management.

Consumer culture flourished in the United States during the late nineteenth century with the rise of branded packaging (Susan Strasser, *Satisfaction Guaranteed*, 1989), advertising (Roland Marchand, *Advertising and the American Dream*, 1985; Jackson Lears, *Fables of Abundance*, 1994), department stores (Susan Benson, *Counter Culture*, 1986; William Leach, *Land of Desire*, 1993), display (Simon Bronner's edited collection, *Consuming Visions*, 1989), and World's Fairs (Robert Rydell, *All the World's a Fair*, 1984). As Gary Cross (*An All Consuming Century*, 2000) documents, Puritan opposition, prohibitions, and anti consumption movements existed simultaneously. But during the twentieth century, consumer culture became the dominant ethos in the US. Religious and secular criticisms of consumption have by no means disappeared (e.g., Robert Wuthnow, *God and Mammon*, 1994; Juliet Schor, *The Overspent American*, 1998). But as Jackson Lears (1984) argues, self therapy through consumption has largely replaced salvation as the dominant national and personal goal.

Rather than eighteenth century England or nineteenth century France, Australia, or America, Chandra Mukerji (*From Graven Images*, 1983) suggests that fifteenth or sixteenth century England was the birthplace of consumer culture. She traces global flows of consumer goods such as calicoes, maps, and calendars as indices of developing consumption patterns.

In suggesting instead that the seventeenth century Dutch were the originators of consumer culture, Simon Schama (*The Embarrassment of Riches*, 1987) also follows global flows of goods from the boom in Dutch shipping and discoveries of objects of desire in the New World and Asia. Analysis of the global flows of consumption is continued in several of the chapters in *Consumption and the World of Goods* (1993), edited by John Brewer and Roy Porter. Rather than trying to fix a time and place that was the birthplace of consumer culture, McCracken considers each of these local “orgies of consumption” as an explosion of consumer culture, growing more and more sustained and wide spread between the fifteenth and twentieth centuries.

It will be evident from the preceding sources that there is a distinctly western bias in most treatments of the history of consumer culture. Although some recent work has begun to examine consumer culture in Japan (e.g., John Clammer, *Contemporary Urban Japan: A Sociology of Consumption*, 1997), China (e.g., Deborah Davis’s edited collection, *The Consumer Revolution in Urban China*, 2000), Russia (e.g., Christoph Neidhart, *Russia’s Carnival*, 2003), and India (e.g., William Mazarella, *Shoveling Smoke*, often been that the recent consumer culture in these nations is derivative from and imitative of developments in Europe and North America. There are only a few examinations of early consumer cultures elsewhere. For instance, Craig Clunas (*Superfluous Things*, 1991) examines consumer culture in late Ming China (sixteenth to seventeenth centuries), and Peter Stearns (*Consumerism in World History*, 2001) provides an outline of a global perspective on the history of consumer culture. Contrary to Don Slater’s assumptions in *Consumer Culture and Modernity* (1997), it appears that neither advanced capitalism nor widespread wealth is necessary for the development of consumer culture (Belk 1999).

EVALUATION AND DIRECTIONS FOR FUTURE RESEARCH

Consumer research and theory have changed considerably since the critical theory of the Frankfurt School and the elitist criticisms of pop culture by Adorno, Horkheimer, and

others. Despite the negative neo Marxist evaluation of consumer culture and globalism still held by many sociologists (e.g., George Ritzer, *The Globalization of Nothing*, 2004), others, including those in the cultural studies school associated with Birmingham University in the UK, have come to embrace, if not celebrate, consumer culture as liberating. James Twitchell (*Lead Us Into Temptation*, 1999) also has a more favorable evaluation of consumer culture and chides those who see it as evil. Others like Conrad Lodziak (*The Myth of Consumerism*, 2002) condemn such liberatory postmodern takes on consumer culture as failing to discern the compulsory nature of the contemporary consumption system and the relative powerlessness of consumers to transcend their dependencies on illusions promoted by marketers.

It seems clear that there are both pluses and minuses to the advance of mass consumption and consumer culture in much of the world over the past century. Mass production, mass communications, and mass merchandising have made more goods available to more people at more affordable prices. Somewhere between the subjective categories of necessities and luxuries there has arisen a class of goods judged to be decencies (Belk 2004). These standards are becoming global. Soap, clean running water, education, and electricity are now a part of the global “standard package” (David Riesman, *Abundance for What?*, 1964), but perhaps also are cars, cosmetics, sanitary napkins, television, travel, and health care. To the extent that access to these goods is democratized within mass consumption cultures, physical and psychological well being should increase. The desire to own these consumer goods may have positive motivational consequences as well.

But in a high level consumer culture there are also often negative consequences. As Lizabeth Cohen (2003) demonstrates in the US, the elderly, ethnic minorities, lower social classes, and women have often not only been left out of consumer culture, but also market segmentation has helped to further marginalize them. These observations are reinforced in work such as Victoria deGrazia’s *The Sex of Things* (1996) and Elizabeth Chin’s *Purchasing Power* (2001). McCracken revises Simmel’s trickle down theory by suggesting that rather than trickling

down the social class ladder, status goods trickle down the gender ladder from males to females, as illustrated by business dress practices. Penny Spark (*As Long As It's Pink*, 1995) argues that in culturally prescribing that design is a male province while aesthetic taste is a female province, women's material culture has been marginalized and trivialized.

The seemingly trivial pursuits of consumption can have profound effects. Too much materialism brings unhappiness. In extreme cases, consumption becomes an obsessive compulsive disorder and leads to unbearable debt and low self esteem. There are environmental damages from the pursuit of rampant consumerism. Coupled with the policies of the World Bank, the World Trade Organization, and the International Monetary Fund, the gap between rich and poor consumers in the world has grown dramatically since the end of the Cold War. This is true not only between nations but within nations as well. Arguments about the effects of globalism have tended to overlook those who have been left out and left behind in the spread of global consumer culture.

This discussion has only been able to identify some of the major aspects of mass consumption and consumer culture. In the future it should be more useful to think in terms of multiple consumer cultures rather than considering consumer culture to be a uniform phenomenon globally. More attention to consumer cultures in the less affluent world, including places like postcolonial Sub Saharan Africa, rapidly changing economies like China, India, and Eastern Europe, and among neglected aboriginal and ethnic groups within the more affluent world is clearly needed. Much remains to be discovered about the history of early consumer cultures in China, India, and other ancient civilizations. A great deal of attention has been devoted to advertising and market place exchange, but we need to know more about other avenues of consumption including gift giving, sharing, heirlooms, informal markets, self production, and barter communities. We need to know more about consumer boycotts, voluntary simplicity consumer lifestyles, and other strategies of resistance. We should consider relationships between religion and consumption, national and ethnic identity reflected in consumption, and virtual and

so called posthuman consumption. Although it is clear that consumption increasingly permeates nearly every aspect of our lives, we need to better understand the relationships between the existential states that Jean Paul Sartre (*Being and Nothingness*, 1943) labeled as having, doing, and being.

SEE ALSO: Brands and Branding; Commodities, Commodity Fetishism, and Commodification; Conspicuous Consumption; Consumer Culture, Children's; Consumption; Consumption Rituals; Department Store; Distinction; Globalization, Consumption and; Hyperconsumption/Overconsumption; Latinidad and Consumer Culture; Lifestyle Consumption; Mass Culture and Mass Society; Media and Consumer Culture; Shopping; Shopping Malls

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consumption of music

Tia DeNora

Music consumption has been a central topic in music sociology over the past three decades. Pursued through quantitative (Bourdieu 1984) and qualitative (DiMaggio 1982) methods, classic work in the area has highlighted music's role as a medium of status distinction. In more recent years, the links between taste and status have been shown to be, in the American context at least, more complex, the highbrow/lowbrow divide modulating into an omnivore-univore model (Peterson & Simkus 1992).

Work produced in the heyday of the Birmingham Cultural Studies tradition shifted the focus from taste and boundary maintenance to social identity construction and to a focus on style, subculture, and self. Most notably, this focus pointed scholarly attention from reception to consumption, from a focus on *what* meanings were found or attributed to musical works, to a focus on the process of meaning making and its role in the constitution of the

life world. In Willis's (1978) work, for example, the investigative lens examined actors themselves as they came to establish connections between music and forms of action and inter-action, the links they forged between preferred forms of music and forms of social life and social activity. In this sense, music provided, via its consumption, tools and repertoires for action. This shift has been marked by a series of key studies that trace the appropriation and reappropriation within music scholarship and popular culture of key composers and the meanings of their works (Gomart & Hennion 1999), following that process in terms of what, in a performative sense, can be "done" with music reception.

While debates concerning the provenance of meaning continue within some musicological circles, music sociology and the social psychology of music have long since left this concern behind in favor of music's social functions in natural, everyday life settings (Sloboda & O'Neill 2001). In recent years, the focus on consumption has turned to individual and group listening practices, and to the concept of aesthetic ecology. Gomart and Hennion (1999) and DeNora (2000) have depicted music's use as a technology of self construction and have explored the minute practices by which actors come to charge music with meaning and power. Gomart and Hennion refer to these practices as "techniques of preparation," procedures of framing music so as to self induce particular dispositions. They describe, for example, how their interviewees readied themselves for particular emotional responses that they knew, under the right conditions, music would elicit. In this sense, their research highlights the interactive character of music's emotional and social effects, how actors empower music to act "over" them in listening contexts. A related study by Bull (2000) describes how urban residents make use of the personal stereo to render their environments habitable, in particular modulating or cancelling the buffeting and strain of travel on public transport, and unwanted "noise" (including the music of other people, whether in the background, from a boombox, or escaping through headphones).

The history of music consumption has been re-examined in recent years by Maisonneuve (2001), who has considered the role of listening

and broadcast technology and its “configuration” of the listening subject. Like Bull, Maisonneuve has emphasized the vastly increased possibilities for private consumption afforded by recording technology since the early twentieth century. She has focused in particular on the intensification of personal modes of experiencing the “love for music.” Maisonneuve finds empirical purchase on these issues with the concept of the listening “set up” – the conglomerate of technological devices, the material cultural environment in which listening occurs – and the various material and textual artifacts that make up the instruments of listening – liner notes, music reviews, the phonograph or CD player, and so on. The listener is thus conceived as a node within a network of people and artifacts.

This work has highlighted music’s role as a resource in self regulatory strategies and, in turn, the connections between such strategies and institutional requirements, such as the need to engage in emotional work. DeNora (2000), for example, found that respondents described how they used music to relax after a hard day, or to “get in the mood” or “set the scene” for various social tasks and obligations, from attendance at evening meetings, to erotic encounters.

The concept of music consumption has been broadened to include more subtle or tacit features of “consumption” in an educational context where they are pursued ethnographically. There, acts of music performance, instrument choice, and the social distribution of musical activities can be seen to further sexual stereotyping, providing exemplars of what each sex is like or suited to. Music, in other words, can be seen to provide terms or analogues with which to think about the “differences” between boys and girls. In this way, music “gets into” conventional thought patterns; it provides a template against which to gauge thought and response and a map for the articulation of social and conceptual phenomena.

A further development has been a focus on what music may come to afford, in particular the non cognitive, embodied dimension of music as resource. This perspective has been investigated in quasi public contexts where music is seen to provide a parameter for the production of agency, albeit un or subconsciously imbibed, as

in the retail sector (North & Hargreaves 1997). It has also been investigated in music therapy, an area too often mistaken as distant from cultural sociological concerns. One area for further investigation in sociomusical study can be found at the nexus of music, bodily praxis, and bodily phenomena – music’s connection to blood pressure, heart rate, and pain perception is a classic theme in medical music therapy. Bringing this focus out into the study of social institutions and occasions has the potential to illuminate new micro mechanisms of the interaction order and, perhaps, enrich current debate within sociology on the mind–body issue by highlighting the material and temporal dimensions of action.

SEE ALSO: Consumption, Youth Culture and; Music; Music and Media; Taste, Sociology of

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consumption, provisioning and

Dale Southerton

Provisioning refers to the social and economic organization of the delivery and consumption of goods and services. Its conceptual application falls within three, not mutually exclusive, areas. First is the relationship between production and consumption, spheres of economic and social life often treated empirically and theoretically as separate from one another. Connections between production and consumption are acknowledged (supply and demand being examples), but their relationship tends to be approached from production or consumption led perspectives (Lury 1996). Second, by bringing together production and consumption, provisioning is a concept employed to address socioeconomic change. Third, it draws attention to modes other than economic markets through which goods and services reach consumers.

The concept has its origins in the “new urban sociology” of the 1970s. In *The Urban Question* (1977), Castells represented the city as a site of “collective consumption,” an alternative terrain to that of private consumption in commercial markets, highlighting the role of the state in providing for consumers as a public

collective (such as health care and urban infra structures). Debate emerged surrounding the impact on social relations of shifts between collective and private forms of consumption. Saunders (1986) argued that the principal social cleavage in the UK was no longer class but differential access to consumption – with those reliant on state provisioning (principally in the form of state housing) being distinguished from those with access (through their affluence) to the growing varieties of goods and services provisioned through markets. While not theoretically commensurate, some accounts of consumer society suggest similar divisions. Bauman (1988) distinguished between the “seduced” (into the consumer playground by the market) and the “repressed” (those dependent on the state and subject to its planning and management), while John Galbraith’s *The Culture of Contentment* (1992) presented a similar social division.

The “new urban sociology” and theoretical accounts of consumer society placed the term provisioning on the conceptual map, but it has been through its application in critiques of the relationship between production and consumption that it has found clarity. Two quite different approaches have emerged: “mode of provision” and “systems of provision.”

Mode of provision is most readily associated with the work of Warde (1992). It builds on Ray Pahl’s *Divisions of Labour* (1984), which highlighted the declining centrality of employment (only one form of work) in social and political consciousness, and emphasized the significance of household self provisioning (producing goods and services for the household often through the use of technologies such as the washing machine and video recorder) as a source of economic productivity and personal satisfaction. Table 1 outlines an ideal type model of cycles of production and consumption.

Table 1 Cycles of production and consumption

<i>Mode of provision</i>	<i>Access/social relations</i>	<i>Manner of delivery</i>	<i>Experiences of consumption</i>
Market	Price/exchange	Managerial	Customer/consumer
State	Need/right	Professional	Citizen/client
Household	Family/obligation	Family	Self/family/kinship
Communal	Network/reciprocity	Volunteer	Friend/neighbor/acquaintance

Source: Warde (1992).

The links between each mode of provision should be read as tendencies. At the simplest level, the model emphasizes the point that much consumption occurs outside of both market and state modes of provision. Food represents a good example. One might purchase a meal from a restaurant, prepare it oneself, have it provided through the state (such as state subsidized school meals), prepared by someone else in their household, or eat at the home of a friend. These are ways in which food can be provisioned within society. Each mode involves distinct social rules that govern distribution and access, present different circumstances of delivery, and are located within particular social relations that surround the experience of final consumption. Together, these represent the discrete elements which connect and configure production and consumption.

The systems of provision approach is associated with the work of Fine and Leopold (1993). Criticizing theories of consumption as “horizontal” (i.e., accounts that piece together explanations based on a selection of goods which are then generalized to the consumption of all material goods), they call for a “vertical” approach. First, explanations must be specific to particular commodities or groups of commodities. Second, each commodity must be analyzed according to the interaction between the factors that give rise to it – particularly production, distribution, retailing, consumption, and material culture. Finally, these factors form a differentiated chain of activities for each consumption good – an integral unit termed a system of provision. To illustrate, they provide a detailed analysis of the food and clothing systems of provision, where interconnection of elements across the supply chain (in the case of food, from agricultural regulation to changing relationships between manufacturers, distributors, and retailers, to cultural shifts toward healthier eating) act to configure the system as a whole. Consequently, horizontal explanations (such as consumers demanding variety or convenience) fail to capture the complexities of socioeconomic organization which differentiate between sets of commodities.

One of the difficulties (yet also a strength) of the modes of provision approach is that it fails to instruct where to draw boundaries between

different modes and their related cycles of production and consumption. People drive private cars on public roads. State modes of provision have, in many societies, become increasingly marketized (with internal markets in welfare services and public–private finance initiatives). Yet, the framework remains instructive precisely because shifting modes of provision highlight the changing social relations of production and consumption. Questions also emerge as to what constitutes different modes of provision. Can food cooked at home but purchased from a food retailer be regarded as provisioned through the market or the home? Ultimately, the answer would be the market. However, a more nuanced observation is made possible: the combination of mode of provision, access, and manner of delivery affects how that consumption is experienced. In this case, while food might be purchased through the market, it is provisioned through the work that is done in the domestic sphere as part of familial obligations and that transforms ingredients into a meal (DeVault 1991). Thus, consumers are also producers and production is not reduced simply to supply.

The systems of provision approach shares similar empirical and conceptual difficulties. Focusing on commodity chains again raises questions of where to locate the boundaries between sets of commodities. It is also difficult to decipher precisely what key factors influence each link in the system, not least because the harder one looks, the more factors one finds. Systems of provision can also be criticized for being either “linear,” with one link having a direct causal effect on the next, or tautological, because any system can only be analyzed within the terms of reference set out by the identification of the boundaries of that system.

Despite such criticisms, both approaches represent important theoretical frameworks for analyzing the changing social and economic relations and organization of production and consumption. They increasingly find salience within critiques of consumer culture and its emphasis on the apparent commodification of ever more aspects of daily life and, through their emphasis on connecting production and consumption, have been employed in debates ranging from environmental sustainability to the construction of “demand.”

SEE ALSO: Consumption, Experiential; Consumption, Mass Consumption, and Consumer Culture; Consumption, Urban/City as Consumerspace; Lifestyle Consumption; Markets; Supermarkets; Welfare State

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consumption, religion and

Kathleen M. O'Neil

The connection between religion and consumption has been investigated by a wide range of scholars. Topics examining this relationship include: the rise of capitalism and the nature of modern capitalism, competition among religious organizations for religious consumers, the

consumption of religious goods and services, as well as consumption as a secular religion.

In *The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism* (1958), Max Weber argued that Puritan religious beliefs, particularly Calvinist doctrine, were among the necessary conditions leading to the development of capitalism. Believing that salvation is predestined but not knowing for certain if they were chosen, Calvinists sought confidence in the fate of their souls through intense engagement in worldly activities. This ethic of hard work was coupled with a belief in the virtue of leading an austere life, including restricting the consumption of luxury goods. Consequently, profits were available for reinvestment in economic enterprise. Thus economic acquisition came to be seen as an end in itself, rather than exclusively as a means of satisfying needs and desires.

Contemporary scholars have questioned whether this process is found only in the West and if religious values identified by Weber are peculiar to Protestant Christianity. Broadening Weber's view, Collins (1997) noted that such beliefs were found in Zen Buddhism in late medieval Japan. Buddhist movements of the time rejected ceremonial religion. Instead, the activities of everyday life became regarded as opportunities for meditative practice. This focus on engagement with the world was also combined with a critique of lavish lifestyles. This combination of religious beliefs facilitated investment in commercial activities, enabling the transition to a market based economy. Collins also argued that in both the East and the West, religious organizations often contained the first entrepreneurs.

The extent to which the lifestyle of Calvinists and other Protestants involved limits on consumption has also been questioned. Wealthy Dutch Calvinists of the seventeenth century participated in a variety of forms of conspicuous consumption, but their style of consumption reflected an embarrassment with wealth stemming from their religious beliefs (Schama 1987). While the affluent of Italy and France had long preferred ostentatious building facades, Calvinists preferred less ornate exteriors. Interior display, on the other hand, frequently involved luxurious materials: dining tables inlaid with mother of pearl and floors constructed of marble were not uncommon.

Paintings became popular among the middle class. In dress Calvinists preferred somber colors, especially black and white, but the materials were first class: black satin or velvet adorned with white collars of linen or lace. Nevertheless, for some seventeenth century Calvinists income rose even faster than expenditure, and religion, while not limiting consumption, influenced style.

Scholars have also been concerned with the role of the Protestant work ethic in modern capitalism. Some suggest it has fallen away and been replaced by a consumer ethos. Others claim that a culture of hedonism has long existed along with the Protestant ethic. Bell argued that traditional American values of hard work, restraint, and delayed gratification have been replaced by a culture that emphasizes newness of experience and a demand for pleasure and leisure through consumption. Gradually work has become a means of increasing consumption, rather than being viewed as a valued end in itself.

Not denying Weber's claims, Campbell (1987) argued that a romantic ethic promoting a spirit of consumerism developed in parallel with the Protestant ethic and the spirit of capitalism. Arising out of Romanticism at the start of the nineteenth century, hedonism was an important ingredient in the development of consumerism. Pleasure and emotion became a defining feature of life; the search for pleasure led to a desire to consume novel things and an eagerness for new experiences. Campbell argued that consumption played a critical role in the Industrial Revolution and continues to influence the character of modern capitalism.

Sociologists of religion have examined consumption by investigating religion as a market place. One theoretical approach conceptualizes religious organizations as marketers of religious products competing with each other for religious consumers (church members). Others have focused empirically on the relationship between contemporary religious practices and consumption.

The theoretical approach of Finke and Stark (1992) was developed to examine the relationship between religious pluralism and religious participation. They argued that an open consumer marketplace for religion, as opposed to a state dominated monopoly, promotes

individual participation in religion. Their proposed mechanism is competition. Religious economies are expected to behave like commercial economies: the more religious organizations there are, the more competition there is for religious consumers. Consequently, the leaders of religious organizations are motivated to produce better religious products, which in turn attract more people to religion. This theoretical argument has been used to explain the relatively high level of religiosity in the United States as compared to most European countries. Competition among religious organizations is expected to be high in the United States, because unlike many European countries the United States lacks a state sponsored religion (or religious monopoly). A large number of empirical studies have investigated these claims, and the overall findings have been mixed. Many studies of particular times and places have not found that religious pluralism is positively correlated with religious participation (see Chaves & Gorski 2001 for a critical review of this literature).

Analyses of changes in the religious landscape suggest that religious practices have increasingly become connected to consumption. Wuthnow (1998) argued that in the 1950s a "spirituality of dwelling" predominated, where individuals sought the sacred within religious organizations, like churches and synagogues. By the 1960s, a "spirituality of seeking" had increased in popularity. A quest culture led people to look beyond established religious institutions for spiritual direction and insight. Most recently, a "spirituality of practice" has become prominent. Appealing to those uncomfortable within a single religious community but wanting more than endless spiritual seeking, this approach centers on various devotional practices used to connect everyday life to the divine. Both spiritual quests and practice based spirituality are intertwined with the consumption of particular goods and services.

While interest in spirituality is not new, in the late twentieth century forums for spiritual seekers proliferated. While some forums include less commercial groups like science fiction clubs and self help meetings, the emphasis on self understanding and spiritual seeking among the post World War II generations facilitated the emergence of new spiritual industries. Books,

videos, music, psychic services, natural food stores, and retreat centers have become outlets for those seeking a variety of spiritual resources. Suppliers of these goods and services are found both inside and outside of established religion. In particular there has been an increase in the printing and sale of books on spiritual matters. With sections devoted to Buddhism, Native American religion, New Age spirituality, self help, and religious fiction, bookstores have become the most important centers of spirituality apart from religious congregations. Publishers of print materials have successfully stirred customer interest and tapped into unfulfilled needs, leading some scholars to refer to book stores as the churches and synagogues of the current period.

Practice based spirituality often involves efforts to simplify and be more conscious regarding consumption. Ironically, new products and services have emerged to assist in the simplification endeavor: restaurants and stores that provide wholefoods, services such as yoga instruction and guided meditation, and wellness clinics providing holistic healing treatments. In addition, spiritual practices are increasingly structured around specialized niches, such as ecospirituality, feminist spirituality, or combining Christian beliefs and physical fitness. Spiritual entrepreneurs have helped to create those niches. Alternatives and complementary additions to traditional religion are increasingly found in the market.

Religious holidays are increasingly associated with consumption. It has been observed that shopping and gift exchange has replaced the Christian story of the birth of Jesus as the primary meaning associated with Christmas. The purchase of gifts to be exchanged during religious holidays is a major component of the economy of the United States. Many large retail stores conduct 25 percent or more of their business in the weeks preceding Christmas, and American consumers spend \$200 billion during the Christmas shopping season or an average of \$800 per family (Farrell 2003). In response to the dominance of Christmas and the shopping rituals associated with it, the winter holidays of other religions have been elevated in relative importance.

Examination of the devotion to consumption itself has also been a theme at least since the

writing of Thorstein Veblen. Recently, fast food restaurants, amusement parks, shopping malls, and similar settings have been conceptualized as cathedrals of consumption. Ritzer (2005) argues that such settings drive hyperconsumption. As consumers become disenchanted with rationalized consumption, including the uniformity of available services and products, newer and more magical settings are created to reenchant the experience of shopping. At the same time, the settings themselves are highly rationalized and are being replicated across the world. Shopping malls have become some of the largest and most popular public spaces in urban areas. Others have argued that participation in fashion and shopping involves meaning making acts. Part of the construction of the perfect self, consumption has been conceptualized as a secular ritual, in part through the efforts of advertising (Twitchell 1999).

SEE ALSO: Asceticism; Conspicuous Consumption; Consumption, Cathedrals of; Consumption, Mass Consumption, and Consumer Culture; Consumption Rituals; Hyperconsumption/Overconsumption; New Age; Religion, Sociology of; Shopping; Shopping Malls

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consumption rituals

Cele C. Otnes

Consumption rituals can be defined as holidays, special occasions, and other sacred events characterized by the intensive (and sometimes excessive) consumption of goods, services, and experiences. At such events, individuals engage in both consumption and other behaviors with actions that can be characterized as formal, serious, and intense (Rook 1985). Consumption rituals are distinct from other, more mundane types of consumption laden activities to the extent that they provide opportunities for individual and social transformations which may be temporary or permanent. For example, eating a family dinner might contain some elements of ritualistic behavior (e.g., saying grace at the beginning). In contrast, dinners occurring on Christmas or Thanksgiving are regarded as ritualistic because they commemorate important holidays in the culture, involve gatherings of people not present at "everyday" dinners, and feature special foods and beverages that are reserved and prepared for such occasions.

Consumption rituals also often feature the exchange of gifts. Such exchange can feature reciprocity that is either immediate or delayed. For example, the social norms governing Christmas gift giving require that a giver and recipient typically engage in simultaneous exchange. However, at other social events such as weddings, a giver expects reciprocity when he or she (or a close relative) is married. Because gift giving typically involves imperfect communication between the giver and recipient, researchers have explored the dynamics of this activity across the various gift giving

occasions in many cultures (e.g., Belk & Coon 1993; Ruth et al. 1999; Joy 2001).

Structural and functional elements of consumption rituals can reveal the potency of these occasions. Dennis Rook describes how consumption rituals can be understood in terms of structural elements such as ritual artifacts, ritual scripts, ritual performance roles, and ritual audience. *Ritual artifacts* at a Thanksgiving dinner might include special table decorations, china and silver that are typically kept separate from ordinary cutlery and dishes, and special foods such as a whole turkey which, while plentiful in the American food chain, has maintained a culturally sacred position as a food that should only really be consumed on holidays (Wallendorf & Arnould 1991). *Ritual scripts* are normative guidelines that instruct participants how to consume ritual artifacts. They range from the more formal scripts (e.g., having a Thanksgiving toast), to less formally articulated, but nevertheless influential, rules for behavior (e.g., men should watch football after Thanksgiving dinner while women clear the table).

Ritual performance roles are the sets of behaviors delineated as appropriate (or inappropriate) for each ritual participant. In the ritual script described above, women are assigned the roles of housecleaners, and men the roles of passive spectators. Yet recent shifts in gender roles have resulted in resentment on the part of women, who feel they are constrained by the rules of this ritual, and by many rituals in particular. Moreover, research indicates that "sociological ambivalence," or the mixed emotions that can arise because of role conflict between individuals, can be quite prevalent in ritualistic consumption contexts. For example, brides often wish to have more control over customizing their wedding planning than traditional bridal retailers have allowed (Otnes et al. 1997). As such, brides to be often find themselves caught between being grateful for professional assistance with planning such an elaborate and typically unfamiliar ritual and being angry and disappointed with restrictions on their choices regarding the purchase and consumption of artifacts.

Finally, the *ritual audience* involves those consumers who may not be directly involved in a ritual, but who may view it from near or

far. While some occasions such as Thanksgiving have few participants who stand on the sidelines, consider the size and composition of the ritual audience who “consumed” the wedding of Prince Charles and Lady Diana Spencer in 1981. While the spectators inside St. Paul’s Cathedral consisted of around 1,000 family, friends, politicians, and other wellwishers, the television audience for the wedding was estimated to be 750 million worldwide. Thus, it is quite possible that the audience for a consumption ritual can greatly exceed the number of more immediate participants.

Functionally, consumption rituals can provide us with what Tom Driver (1991) describes as the three “social gifts” of ritual – order, transformation, and “communitas.” Order refers to the ability of a ritual to provide structure to our lives and actions, and also to the fact that rituals often possess a fairly fixed sequence of activities within them (e.g., having a special breakfast on Christmas morning, then opening presents afterwards in a particular order within the family). Transformation refers to the ability of a consumption ritual to change the participant in either a slight or significant manner. One woman remarked that when her boyfriend presented her with an engagement ring, she could immediately “see the future, and that I’d have children someday” (Otnes & Pleck 2003). *Communitas*, a term borrowed from anthropologist Victor Turner, refers to the ability of a consumption ritual to strengthen social bonds with those in the participant’s immediate community, and perhaps with those in more peripheral social networks as well.

Research on consumption rituals has its roots in early anthropological studies of such activities as gift giving. Likewise, sociologists have published many studies on gift giving, but typically fewer on the celebration of holidays. Yet the impetus for much of the work on consumption rituals was Rook’s seminal article, “The Ritual Dimension of Consumer Behavior,” published in 1985. Since that time, scholars in anthropology, consumer behavior, and sociology alike have conducted detailed studies of many holidays and occasions (e.g., Miller 1993), as well as new variants of existing rituals (gift giving in the workplace; Ruth 2003) and even the emergence of new rituals (Sherry & Kozinets 2003). Because of the complex and

interdisciplinary nature of the topic, and because rituals are often protracted and involve many members of social networks, qualitative research methods are often employed to provide rich, insightful understandings of these consumption contexts. Future research directions in the area include exploring the ways rituals change meaning over time, the cross-cultural transference of consumption rituals, and the emergence of new rituals with heavy consumption components.

SEE ALSO: Conspicuous Consumption; Consumption, Mass Consumption, and Consumer Culture; Rite/Ritual; Ritual

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consumption, spectacles of

Sam Binkley

The use of the word “spectacle” in relation to practices of consumption has a specific intellectual genealogy that extends to the radical critiques of a group of French Marxists – the Situationists or the Situationist International – though the term has also come to denote a broader transformation of consumer culture into an expression of visual media. Deriving from Guy Debord’s use of the term in the title of his 1967 anti capitalist screed *The Society of the Spectacle*, to speak of spectacles of consumption is to invoke a critical reading of a fetishized relation to commodities that obscures real social relations, and passifies the spectator consumer in a synthetic world (Debord 1994). Spectacular consumption, in this sense, asks us to see only the appearance of commodities and not their deeper social character – a misrecognition which alienates us from our personal and social lives while presenting the world of goods as one possessing dynamism and liveliness. While the world of spectacle becomes increasingly vital, so the theory goes, one’s own life becomes increasingly empty and thing like. Yet, in a more modest sense, to speak of consumption as spectacular is to refer to the preponderance of visual symbols, images, and aestheticized surfaces in the design and marketing of goods and services, with no specific claim concerning its wider cultural and political impact (Featherstone 1991). In what follows, the spectacular nature of consumption is discussed with reference to these two distinct meanings: as a general expression of visual culture, and as a uniquely fetishized relation to social life.

VISUAL CULTURE

Commentators from a variety of fields have described the contemporary cultural condition in terms of the ascendancy of visual images and representations over other media and forms of social engagement. Whether under the rubric of postmodernity, late capitalism, or

post Fordism, everyday life is believed to be increasingly defined by new ways of looking and seeing that are historically unique to the conditions of advanced capitalist societies (Lash & Urry 1994; Mirzoeff 1999). Under such conditions, the eye is called upon to perform complex cognitive and interpretive tasks necessary for navigating richly symbolic environments and interactions and to take in staggering volumes of information. Through visual media, audiences are demanded to interpret meanings encoded in cryptic and nuanced messages and consider differently the manner in which representations correspond to the purportedly real worlds and social relations outside the image. Such developments, it is argued, impact as powerfully on individual subjectivity as on the character and content of interpersonal behavior and collective forms generally. These assumptions have informed a broad new field of scholarly inquiry loosely dubbed “visual culture,” an approach that combines the attention to popular cultural forms, everyday life practices and the micro politics of identity and cultural life typically identified with cultural studies, with a historically informed reflection on the changing nature of vision in contemporary society. Drawing from psychoanalysis and film theory, an expanded approach to the history of art and a nuanced sense of the interpretive agency of media audiences in their everyday practices, scholars in this interdisciplinary sub field derive a unique warrant for a study of culture and society organized around visual practices of looking, representation, surveillance, and identity formation (Foster 1988). Against the backdrop of a reading of society as spectacle understood as an interconnected set of practices of looking and imaging, a range of social phenomena from sexuality and identity to urban planning, policing, social difference, and cultural change can be read as expressions of changing visual practices. A specifically sociological version of this thesis is evident in the more modest form of a “visual sociology” approach which, while expressing a similar engagement with the visual, is largely limited to methodological assertions of the legitimacy of photography as a research tool (Prosser 1998; Schroeder 2002).

Yet underlying this assumption about the emergence of vision as an evermore hegemonic

force in culture and society is a wider account of the expansion of consumption and consumer culture, often read in a negative light. The commodification of social life is read as serving the individualizing ends of the capitalist consumer economy by replacing collective identities with highly individualistic consumer lifestyles, shaped not on concrete engagement with real social worlds, but on imaginary investments in the world of images (Ewen 1988). For scholars in communications and media studies traditions, such visual saturation is traceable to the growth of new media such as television, cinema, photographic reproduction, and more recently digital and electronic media. These developments together foster a unique social disengagement and collapse of civil society through the pacification and atomization of audiences for whom the interpretation of content is reduced to the unthinking reception of retinal, as opposed to discursive, stimuli. For sociologists, the visualization of culture is attributable to the overall weakening of traditional class distinctions and the status hierarchies that expressed them. Such conditions are brought on by the proliferation and inflationary overproduction of status bestowing commodities and lifestyles in a culture of accelerated consumption. With the democratization of conspicuous forms of consumption once reserved for cultural elites, a general aestheticization of daily life elevates the fleeting, impressionistic appearance over and against other more durable displays of status communication – a quality of social life that is particularly acute in urban contexts (Simmel 1971). For economists, the increasing emphasis on consumption and the maintenance of high levels of consumer demand has brought about an expansion of the visual realm through advertising and product design as the colonization of desire has become more and more the focus of economic growth. And for cultural historians, the expansion of the visual realm is identified with the growing sophistication and semiotic complexity of retail environments and themed spaces, particularly in new postmodern cities and their outlying regions (Leach 1993). While the views of these authors are hardly uniform, they share in common a sense of visual saturation as a cultural trend affecting a broader fragmentation of

personal identity and social life, resulting from the colonization of more and more realms of culture by the consumer market. Perhaps the earliest and most succinct reflection on this process is found in Marx's writings on commodity fetishism, whose assertion of the misrecognition of economic value in the appearance of the commodity form came to influence a century of writings on the spectacular nature of consumption as a more general instance of social misrecognition for political ends. This critique established the groundwork for a general suspicion of consumption based on the presumably dangerous properties of visual images.

FETISHISM OF COMMODITIES

"A commodity appears, at first sight, a very trivial thing," Marx famously wrote in his analysis of the "Fetishism of the Commodity," perhaps the most memorable passage of volume 1 of *Capital* (Marx 1976). But while the ostensible aim of this passage rested with a critique of contemporary nineteenth century political economy, this goal was far exceeded in a long tradition of twentieth century cultural Marxism that saw central elements of this analysis applied to fetishization in a broader cultural context. In its original form, Marx's critique was relatively straightforward: political economists, he contended, were flawed in their analysis of the origin of economic value through their narrow adherence to the already constituted objects of value – commodities – whose value was derived not from the kinds of collective efforts put into their manufacture, but from their relation to each other in the marketplace, expressed in their price. Such an approach, Marx wrote, betrayed a fetishistic relation to the commodity. It saw only the appearance of value reflected abstractly in its price, its "exchange value," and not the true origin of such value, which in reality derived from the labor invested in its production. More accurately, such a fetishized view ignored the specifically collective forms such labor took as modern industrial production, with all of its radical and transformative potential. Thus to perceive the commodity only for its "exchange

value” was to fall victim to its appearances, its visible manifestation or its spectacle, and to ignore the true social character embodied in what the commodity was in reality – a “use value,” whose origins and ultimate ends were not individual but collective. Capitalist relations of exchange, for Marx, reproduced precisely this fetishization, wherein the social character of economic activity was concealed or mystified behind a veil of illusion manifested in the simple appearance of commodities themselves, viewed not as the social and historical product of collective human endeavor, but as things artificially invested with a value they could not, as objects, realistically possess.

Fetishized commodities, in other words, exhibit relations between people as relations between things. Like religious fetishes, they embody falsely externalized powers, projections of power, meaning, and value whose real origins lie not truly in those things themselves, but with the relations that produced them, and with the agency and creativity of the ones who produce and consume them. And, as is well known, such misrecognition of a collective social whole in a falsely individualized fragment served the political instrument of the ruling capitalist class, whose survival and prosperity depended on the suppression of such totalizing apprehensions, and the channeling of all social needs into the market. To fetishize commodities, then, was to live in a state of ideological false consciousness, in which one fails to perceive the social realities concealed behind false appearances.

In the writings of twentieth century proponents of cultural Marxism, from Georg Lukács to the Frankfurt School theorists, the visual quality of commodities is implicated in the notion of commodity fetishism, expanded to include a far wider range of meanings and cultural values. The individual’s relation to herself is subjected to a form of ideological reversal or alienation, in which her own life as a social relation appears more thingish, while the commodity appears to have life – a process Lukács called reification. Spectacular consumption is, in this sense, alienating: because the images of consumption can possess such vitality and meaning, such meaning is drained from the real experiences we have of ourselves

in our social lives, which now appear sadly short of ideal perfection. Through the image, commodities become subjects, while the subjectivity of the viewer and the consumer increasingly appears as a foreign and alien object.

Indeed, consumption, viewed in such a fetishized form, becomes a stand in not just for community and collective membership, but for the more general experience of modernity itself – a predilection that is not uniformly negative even in the twentieth century Marxist tradition. Consumption as a metaphor for modernity is embodied optimistically in Walter Benjamin’s writings on the flâneur, the euphoric stroller of Parisian arcades and markets described by Baudelaire as emblematic of the ephemeral experience of capitalist modernity itself (Benjamin 1973). Indeed, the uniquely spectacular world unfolded by the commodity serves a potentially radical function for Benjamin as a dream world wherein alternative social horizons are dialectically hatched. But in the words of other critics, most notably Marcuse, Lukács, and the proponents of the Frankfurt School, but also in the French Marxist tradition that included Lefebvre, Barthes, and Debord, such fetishization produced a numbing effect on the individual, forcing an alienating and atomizing culture (Lefebvre 1971).

The linking of these expanded uses of Marx’s theory of commodity fetishism with the visual realm came with Debord’s *Society of the Spectacle*, which presently enjoys an almost cult status as an underground classic as proto postmodernist, pre punk critique. Debord’s view was one in which the spontaneity and vitality that constituted real social life was completely absorbed into the cultural fabric of a commodity form whose penetration into the warp and woof of daily experience and subjectivity had been radically enhanced by the arrival of visual media. In the society of the spectacle, not just commodities on display but all of life itself had become misrecognized as a commodity. The process of fetishism has completely encircled the individual as the perception of fabricated appearances has obscured the real social activity underneath, producing a condition of passivity and boredom. In the spirit of the French student movements of May 1968, Debord’s tract resonates with an

aesthetic vanguardism in its assessment of the possibilities for rupture and transgression.

CONSUMPTION SPECTACLES

The use of Marx's critique of commodity fetishism as a framework for understanding contemporary consumer culture as a visual process finds its most obvious target in the culture of advertising, where values and meanings that are ultimately historical and social in character are routinely transposed onto commodities. A notable application of this approach comes with Roland Barthes's inquiries into the semiotic ordering of culture, and the part played by advertising images in inducing viewers to make associations between ephemeral cultural values and concrete commodities. In *Mythologies* (1972), Barthes argued the ultimately arbitrary nature of the link connecting signifiers (material expressions of meaning) with signifieds (thoughts or ideas communicated by a given sign). For Barthes, the actual fashioning of meaning, the linking of signifiers and signifieds, was a cultural, historical, and deeply social process involving the creative activity of the reader of signs. Yet it was one whose social origins were often concealed, like the social character of Marx's commodities, behind an ideological form which made meanings appear naturally and timelessly to adhere to symbols and expressions. His memorable analysis of a Panzani Past ad in an essay titled "The Rhetoric of the Image" drove home the force with which this process is so effectively accomplished in visual media.

Barthes's semiotic approach to the critique of advertising has inspired volumes of scholarly studies of consumption as a spectacular event, whose net effect it is to engineer a transfer of meanings from a reservoir of cultural and historical sources into commodities themselves (Goldman & Papson 1996). Judith Williamson's *Decoding Advertisements* (1978) stands out as a memorable work in this tradition: combining a Marxist critique of commodity fetishism with Barthes's analysis of the power of images to establish meanings through connotative associations, Williamson studied the various ways advertising images, through a uniquely visual

vocabulary, absorb social meanings into commodity forms. Williamson's classic account of a perfume ad juxtaposes the image of Catherine Deneuve, a person, with a bottle of perfume, a thing, thus orchestrating a semiotic transfer of meaning in which the commodity emerges with a distinctly reified presence.

Such a semiotic critique of consumption as a spectacular process was ultimately taken as the basis for a radical assessment of contemporary culture as postmodern – a direction identified with Jean Baudrillard and his assessment of the collapse of signifying systems generally under the sheer weight of an accelerated visual culture. In the condition of simulacrum, Marx's thesis on commodity fetishism comes to a nihilistic end, as fetishized appearances foreclose any possibility of the social itself (Baudrillard 1981). Adding to Marx's dyad of use and exchange value, Baudrillard speaks of a third morphology of the commodity, into sign value, wherein commodities are valued for their function as signifiers within signifying chains, and all links with the social as a durable referent have been permanently severed. Under such conditions, it is no longer possible to speak of the obfuscation of the social or the alienation of the subject: the social itself has collapsed or imploded under the circulation of disembodied images, while subjectivity itself has become fragmented in an aesthetic hallucination of reality.

Such broad theories of the commodification of social life through spectacle have applications that extend far beyond the narrow culture of advertising and media, into realms such as public space, the body, retail environments, and the proliferation of personal electronic devices from cell phones to laptops – domains of purported social life that are transfigured into visually consumable spectacles. Perhaps most intriguing among these developments has been a growing concern among urban sociologists and historians with the patterns of urban renewal in the years following the crises of the 1970s. With the demise of the manufacturing base, urban centers are increasingly revitalizing themselves as leisure and recreation centers, driven by service and entertainment industries. The postmodern city is driven by a symbolic economy, staffed by cultural specialists and mediators of visual realms, from artists and designers

to architects and actors (Zukin 1991). Amid such transformations, historical textures are enhanced or invented altogether, so as to establish visually themed spaces whose allure, while amenable to the commercial interests of retailers, does little to promote public culture or advance genuine historical understanding.

Notable commentaries on the spectacularization of social space as an implicit obfuscation of the social have been provided by Frederic Jameson in his description of the qualities of the Westin Bonaventure Hotel in Los Angeles, whose disorientingly vertiginous architecture suggested a new experience of postmodern ephemera, and David Harvey's discussion of "time space compression" in post Fordist capitalism. George Ritzer has also disclosed the properties of spectacle as directly implicated in the rationalizing tendencies of market economies carried to new and giddy extremes in the current phase of consumer culture. Ritzer, in his uniquely Weberian nomenclature, has written of the "McDonaldization" or the "reenchantment" of environments colonized by the instrumental imperatives of the profit motive. In several cases, most notably several chapters of *Enchanting a Disenchanted World* (2005), Ritzer comments on a variety of sites, including Las Vegas, Mall of America, and TGI Fridays, for their use of spectacle to achieve the ends of profit, and along the way producing a new etherialization of social life. Variouslly employing Baudrillardian concepts of the implosion of the social, the de differentiation of institutions, and the compression of time and space, Ritzer uncovers new highly spectacular modes of consumption in the de differentiation of information and commerce evidenced by the Home Shopping Network, the compression of time and space apparent in the proliferation of historically themed entertainment complexes, and instances of the implosion of social space in Disneyland, which collapses the many traditional distinctions characteristic of modern societies, such as that between education, amusement, art, civil society, and commerce.

Other inquiries into the transformed character of the social under the regime of spectacle have taken on more micro level investigations into the spectacularization of the body through studies of tattooing and body modification, read

not as a simple process of commodification but of subversion and resistance; as well as inquiries into the changing relations of gender, as bodies themselves are called upon to perform more of the signifying functions of identity (Bordo 1999; Pitts 2003).

SEE ALSO: Commodities, Commodity Fetishism, and Commodification; Consumption, Mass Consumption, and Consumer Culture; Consumption, Visual; Debord, Guy; Postmodern Consumption; Situationists

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consumption of sport

Garry Crawford

In most advanced capitalist societies, sport is hard to avoid. Sport related media shows and channels, magazines, newspapers, Internet sites, films, fictional and non fictional books, advertising campaigns, video games, and even soap operas saturate our everyday lives. Sport is also a regular conversation topic for many families, friends, and work colleagues, and sport related goods (often demonstrating sporting allegiances) such as jerseys, scarves, hats, badges, jackets, ties, cups, mouse mats, pennants, etc., are commonplace in our towns, homes, and places of work.

As Coakley (1994) writes: "Throughout history sport has always been used as a form of entertainment. However, sports have never been so heavily packaged, promoted, presented, and played as commercial products as they are today." Giulianotti (2002) suggests that since the late 1980s, sport (and in particular he cites the example of association football) has witnessed a rapid commercialization and what he refers to as "hypercommodification." Giulianotti suggests this hypercommodification has been largely brought about by shifts within late capitalist society and in particular moves towards "disorganized capitalism" (Lash & Urry 1987), which have led to the contemporary dominance of consumer culture.

However, the question of whether sport audiences can be defined as consumers is a

difficult one. Followers of sport are most typically identified as fans, and it is notable that within much of the wider literature on fans (such as that on media fans) that there is a tendency to identify fans as quite distinct from consumers. This is particularly evident in the work of Jenkins (1992), who suggests that fans are different to "ordinary" readers in that fans "actively" engage with the texts they consume. A similar attitude is evident in many studies of sport fan culture, where for instance Wann et al. (2001) construct a series of dichotomies between fans and spectators, direct and indirect sport consumers, and lowly and highly identified sport fans. Though Wann et al. make no value judgments between these "types" of audiences, others, and most notably several key writers on football (soccer) culture such as Taylor (1971) and Redhead (1997), draw value laden distinctions between what they define as "traditional" fans (often white, male, and working class) and "new" (often middle class, "family" based) consumers.

However, both Williams (2000) and Crawford (2004) suggest that these categories are often based upon romanticized ideas of "authenticity," which see the celebration of one form of sport support (such as attending live sport events) and the rejection of all that is seen as new (such as following sport via the mass media). Moreover, Crawford (2004: 32) suggests that with regard to the literature on subcultures, "typologies of supporters tend to impose rigid distinctions between 'types' of supporters, which tend towards caricature and force diverse patterns of behavior into restrictive categories. Such typologies and dichotomies do not recognize the fluidity and often temporality of many supporter 'communities.'" It is important to recognize that not all fan activity directly involves acts of consumption. As Crawford (2004: 4) writes: "Much of what makes someone a *fan* is what is located within her or his personal identity, memories, thoughts and social interactions." However, most often these relate (either directly or indirectly) to acts of consumption. For instance, the memories, thoughts, and conversations of sport fans will often relate to events people have attended, games they have seen on television, consumer goods they have bought or seen, and similar acts of consumption.

Consequently, several other authors (e.g., Holt 1995; Sandvoss 2003) suggest that a profitable way forward is to locate discussions of sport fan culture within a wider consideration of consumption, recognizing that sport fans are first and foremost consumers. This approach allows links, both theoretically and empirically, to be formed with wider debates on audiences and consumption, which can inform the understanding and theorization of sport audiences. For instance, Sandvoss (2003) suggests that what constitutes the idea and image of a sport club to its fans is made up of numerous (often diverse) “texts” (such as the stadium, its various players and staff, its history, and various media texts and reading of these), making the club (to a degree) polysemic. That is to say, fans can (within certain boundaries) read into the object of their support a wide variety of different meanings. This (largely) blank canvas, Sandvoss suggests, allows fans to see in the club what they value in themselves. The sport club therefore becomes, like Narcissus’ pool, both a self reflection and the object of their affection. This theorization then provides a useful understanding of the nature of fan affiliations, the diversity of meanings attached to popular cultural texts (such as sport clubs), and, importantly, locates the consideration of sport audiences within wider debates on consumption.

SEE ALSO: Audiences; Consumption; Fans and Fan Culture; Media and Sport; Sport; Sport and Culture; Sport Culture and Subcultures

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consumption, tourism and

Jennie Germann Molz

Practices of tourism and consumption, and recent sociological interest in the relationship between them, have evolved as part of a broader shift within western societies from production centered capitalism, with its focus on work and the conditions of labor, to consumer capitalism, with its emphasis on leisure, image, taste, style, and consumption. In fact, many sociologists consider tourism to be emblematic of the contemporary consumer culture that has emerged over the past century in western post industrial societies.

The development of the seaside resort in early nineteenth century Britain reflects this shift. During the Industrial Revolution, the rationalization of the labor process resulted in a clear demarcation between work and leisure. For the first time, the working class had the time and the money to pursue leisure activities. At the same time, technological advances in transportation, such as the railway, made travel

cheaply and readily available to the masses. Whereas seaside resorts had previously been reserved for the wealthy, the increase in wages, the introduction of paid holidays, and the democratization of transportation meant that even the working classes could holiday at the seaside every year. The era of mass tourism was born.

During this same period, thanks to the increased availability of raw materials and advances in manufacturing technologies, consumer goods were also produced in unprecedented volumes and made available for mass consumption. As consumers enjoyed a greater choice of affordable goods, shopping and consumption took on a social value beyond the mere purchase and utility of commodities. Eventually, goods became valued not just for their usefulness, but rather for what they symbolized. For example, everyday items became associated with abstract qualities such as luxury, quality, youth, or beauty. Consumption practices shifted from an emphasis on use value or exchange value to an emphasis on sign value. Thus, recent studies of consumer culture are often focused on the cultural context of consumption, on the role of material goods as symbols rather than utilities, and on the consumption of intangible items such as services, experiences, images, and fantasies.

As Pierre Bourdieu argues in his influential work *Distinction* (1984), commodities act as symbols and so consumption practices are as much about establishing social hierarchies as they are about satisfying individual needs. In other words, consuming is a means of classification. Within this context, the tourist's choice of destination or style of travel communicates his or her social status. For example, mass tourism is usually associated with the working classes, whereas the middle and upper classes tend to pursue independent travel or luxury tourism that communicates a sense of adventure or exclusivity.

Over the decades, mass tourism and mass consumption have given way to what some sociologists refer to as postmodern or post-Fordist consumption, which is characterized by greater differentiation of products, niche marketing, and customized services. Different sociological approaches to the relationship between tourism and consumption are indicative

of these shifts from a focus on work to a focus on leisure, from an economy of utility and exchange to an economy of signs and symbols, and from mass to post-Fordist consumption.

One way in which theorists have approached the relationship between tourism and consumption is to consider tourism as a form of consumption. However, because tourism is both an industry and a cultural practice, it involves different forms of consumption. The travel and tourism industry is claimed to be the largest industry and one of the largest employers in the world. According to the World Travel and Tourism Council, the world travel industry accounts for over 7 percent of worldwide employment and is worth over 3.5 trillion US dollars. The number of people making international trips each year is equally enormous. The World Tourism Organization reports that the number of international trips grew from 567.3 million per year in 1995 to over 656.9 million in 1999, a number that is expected to reach 1.6 billion by the year 2020. This massive movement of people around the world involves the provision and consumption of material and service commodities such as food, drink, transportation, and accommodation. In this sense, the consumption of tourism can be quantified in terms of airplane trips, hotel beds, meals, and tickets.

Because the movement and accommodation of such vast numbers of tourists involves the consumption of scarce resources such as fuel, water, beachfront property, and local labor, many critics have expressed concern over the environmental impacts of jet travel, the unsustainable use of fresh water, the expansion of tourist resorts in sensitive ecological areas, and the uneven relationships between hosts and guests, especially in developing countries. To counter the damaging effects of mass tourism, various forms of ecotourism have emerged which emphasize sustainable consumption of local resources and even "non-consumptive" forms of tourism.

However, the consumption of material resources is often seen as incidental to the consumption of the intangible qualities and ephemeral experiences that tourists desire. In other words, tourism also operates as an economy of signs, sights, senses, and symbols. The visual appropriation of tourist sights and

destinations is a fundamental element of tourist consumption, as evidenced by the popularity of cameras and postcards for capturing and collecting tourist "signs." Starting with Dean MacCannell's analysis of sights and sightseeing in *The Tourist* (1976) and followed by John Urry's *The Tourist Gaze* (1990), the visual aspects of tourism became central to theories of tourist consumption. It is under the gaze of the tourist that cultural rituals and artifacts, local places, sights, and landmarks become packaged as consumable items.

One of the key features of post Fordist consumer society is that all aspects of social life become commodified, not least of all those aspects that appeal to tourists. In the late 1980s, anthropologists examining the impact of tourism on local communities found that local people objectified their own cultural traditions and artifacts as tourist commodities. In these cases, traditional rituals were performed not for their significance to local people, but rather as spectacles for tourists. Likewise, indigenous artifacts were reproduced as souvenirs with symbolic value for the tourists, but little use value to the local community. The effects of such cultural commodification are the subject of debate among researchers, with critics arguing that it results in the loss of cultural authenticity. MacCannell, for example, notes that local cultures construct "staged authenticity," a kind of commodified authenticity that inevitably thwarts the modern tourist's search for the authentic. On the other hand, some researchers argue that commodification brings money into impoverished communities and revives traditions that would otherwise die out.

In addition to consuming cultures, tourists also consume places by gazing at their landscapes, moving through them, and spending time in them. In turn, tourist destinations package, brand, and sell themselves to the tourist market. Some critics argue that tourist places become standardized and homogenized through touristic consumption. George Ritzer's (1993) notion of the McDonaldization of society, which identifies a move toward predictability, efficiency, calculability, and control across social institutions in general, manifests in tourist destinations as a form of McDisneyization that provides tourists with familiarity rather than difference. In contrast, other theorists

claim that places are not becoming homogenized, but rather are forced to differentiate themselves even more as they compete on a global stage for tourist interest and investment capital. For example, in order to attract tourists, some places brand themselves as heritage sites where tourists are able to consume the past by gazing upon sights and objects that represent the traditions and history of a specific culture.

In the late 1990s, critics began to challenge the correlation between tourism, consumption, and the gaze. For example, feminist scholars critiqued the disembodied nature of the tourist gaze and sought to reintroduce the body and other senses into analyses of tourism experiences. In addition, they have shown that tourism also often involves the consumption of other bodies, such as the laboring body of the local host or the prostitute's body in sex tourism. In response to such critiques, sociologists have turned to notions of performance to demonstrate the importance of other senses, such as smell, taste, and touch, and other embodied practices, such as walking, shopping, or bungee jumping, in tourism consumption. In these studies, researchers point out that tourists are producers as well as consumers of tourist places and experiences. For example, activities such as building a sandcastle, taking a photograph, or learning a handicraft are productive ways of consuming tourist experiences.

Just as tourism revolves more and more around consumption, consumption is increasingly becoming a form of tourism. Tourism has generally been associated with the purchase of souvenirs, which commemorate tourist experiences. However, the act of shopping itself has become increasingly central to those experiences. In other words, tourists now travel specifically to shop and shopping malls have become significant tourist destinations. The distinction between tourism and consumption becomes blurred in places like shopping malls. Theorists argue that the movement of commodities, the expansion of the global market, the deployment of global icons, and the globalization of products means that consumers do not actually need to travel around the world to consume tourist experiences. The urban consumer in the West can "travel" via the products and images on display in globalized retail outlets such as Benetton and the Body Shop.

Food also becomes a significant vehicle by means of which consumption serves as a form of tourism. Ingredients and recipes, not to mention immigrant restaurateurs, move around the world so the consumer does not have to. The consumer in the West can be a “culinary tourist” in a variety of ethnic restaurants or even in his or her own supermarket where fruits, vegetables, and other foods from other countries converge in a culinary pastiche. This convergence of foods and culinary styles is especially apparent in shopping mall food courts where kiosks plying Chinese stir fry, Italian pizza, French crepes, Greek souvlaki, and Japanese sushi serve up the world on a plate.

Whether sociologists approach tourism as a form of consumption or consumption as a form of tourism, it is clear that they consider tourism not as a set of self contained practices, but rather as deeply embedded in wider consumer society. Thus the shifting roles and practices of the tourist reflect the shifting societal conditions of production and consumption from a Fordist to a post Fordist economy. The mass tourism that emerged during the nineteenth century resulted from Fordist modes of aggregating consumers into mass markets and offering standardized products. In contrast, post Fordist production is highly differentiated, allowing consumers to choose from a variety of customized options. In terms of tourism, this means that tourists have the flexibility to choose different styles of travel, from eco tourism to backpacking, or from adventure travel to shopping tourism. The fragmentation of the tourist market and of the tourist product breaks down the distinction between tourism and other activities such as sport or shopping. This has led many researchers to argue that the conflation between tourism and consumption that occurs in places like shopping malls is emblematic of the breakdown between categories such as authentic and inauthentic, exotic and familiar, or home, work, and leisure that characterizes the current social condition in general.

For some social theorists, this breakdown of distinctions between tourism and other forms of daily life such as shopping and consuming signals the “end of tourism” (Urry 1995). This

does not mean that people will stop being tourists. On the contrary, it means that we are all already tourists all of the time. As mundane activities such as shopping become more like tourism and daily culture increasingly revolves around touristic features such as spectacle, aesthetics, leisure, and consumption, tourism ceases to provide an escape or counterpoint to the everyday. And yet, scholars find that tourists do continue to uphold the distinctions between the everyday and the extraordinary by performing and producing, as well as consuming, tourist places, senses, sights, and experience.

SEE ALSO: Consumption and the Body; Consumption, Food and Cultural; Consumption, Urban/City as Consumerspace; Cultural Tourism; Fordism/Post Fordism; McDonaldization; Sex Tourism; Shopping Malls; Status; Urban Tourism

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consumption, urban/city as consumerspace

Daniel Thomas Cook

The term urban consumption describes how the meanings of goods and commercially oriented experiences intermingle with space, place, and social identity in ways made possible by metropolitan life and are thereby specific to it. Urban consumption refers not just to purchases that occur within the confines of a city – as opposed to a suburb, or town or rural area. Rather, there is a character peculiar to the contexts of consumption which is both derived from, and is definitive of, urban culture. Urban life, to put it another way, is enmeshed with urban lifestyle.

MARKETS, PLACES, AND MARKETPLACES

Max Weber points out that cities are market places where inhabitants have been liberated from direct agricultural production and live primarily off commerce and trade. A certain amount of economic versatility distinguishes cities from towns. The relative permanence of residence of many inhabitants makes both cities and towns distinguishable from their predecessors, the bazaar or crossroads market, where merchants and buyers would meet at regular intervals to exchange goods.

As marketplaces, cities combine the specificities and permanence of *place* with the dynamic and generalizing tendencies of *markets*. The great cities of antiquity and modernity – Delhi, Constantinople, Lisbon, Venice, Hong Kong, New York, London, Paris, Tokyo – garnered their character and identity from the dynamism of social and economic intercourse which invites the constant flow and mixing together of peoples, ethnicities, and goods in the form of traders, merchants, laborers, customers, and tourists. Cities, in this way, are portals which acquire and generate their unique culture from an interaction with and integration of many others.

The commercial quality of urban life also figures in the shaping of personal temperament,

outlook, and attitude. Georg Simmel understood that the vibrancy of cities fueled what he called the “blasé attitude” of the metropolitan character, whereby urbanites would necessarily come to exhibit an indifference to the liveliness of the streets. In the city, according to Simmel, the dominance of the money economy in conjunction with the proximity of many strangers fosters an individualized kind of freedom which is borne out of the relatively anonymous existence one can lead in urban areas.

CONSUMPTION IN AND OF THE INDUSTRIAL CITY

Large, crowded, and lively cities grew from towns at exponential rates across North America throughout the 1800s. Propelled by the social changes wrought by industrialization and fed with surging immigrant populations from first Western then Eastern and Southern Europe over the 1880–1924 period, a historically unique public culture arose on the streets of the new industrial cities. Inexpensive, public amusements became increasingly available to a growing number of urban inhabitants. Spurred on by technological advances in lighting and electricity, evening performances on the Vau deville circuit, nickel movie houses known as Nickelodeons, amusement parks like those found at Coney Island in New York City, sports arenas, dance halls, and large, extravagant department stores became some of the most popular and visible of consumer entertainments.

With the increased efficiency and high productivity of mechanized factory production, large varieties and quantities of goods were made available at low prices. When Henry Ford, automobile manufacturer, uniformly raised the wages of his workers to \$5 a day and limited them to 8 hour work days in 1914, he was giving concrete recognition that his workers were also consumers who were in need of time and money to participate in the new world of commercial goods and leisure activities. Professional occupations needed to service and coordinate the new economy – secretaries, accountants, lawyers, copywriters, and editors, among others – arose at this time, thereby giving rise to a new middle class with a

growing disposable income. In general, increasing numbers of working people found more and more goods within their reach and these new goods were being made in an ever expanding array of styles and fashions.

The lavish display of many goods in department stores such as Marshall Field's store in Chicago or John Wanamaker's in Philadelphia recalled that of great palaces or cathedrals. They welcomed women to indulge in shopping as a personal pleasure rather than the mere exercise of domestic labor of shopping for the family. Many of the goods on display – silks, perfumes, jewelry – were, in previous times, available only to royalty and the well to do. Now they were within the physical, monetary, and social reach of the middle class woman shopper. Shopping in these stores and among the goods, being able to touch and handle them, evoked images and feelings of abundance and luxury and encouraged fantasy. Many working class and immigrant women were relegated to another kind of fantasy – window shopping – by viewing the goods separated by the new, large windows that faced the street (Leach 1993).

The new public, urban culture increasingly was experienced as a consumer culture of shopping places, entertainment, and amusements outside of the home. Often understood as having had a “democratizing” influence on social arrangements, the urban cultures of consumption and amusement offered places and activities whereby different people and different kinds of people could come into contact with one another. In these contexts, the varied ways of life brought from different national traditions could be on display for, and mix with, each other. On the other hand, the new forms of public, urban leisure and consumption gave expression to the many social cleavages and social distinctions – such as race, ethnicity, class, and gender – already existing in American life.

The public world of fun and amusement represented a different “culture” than what could be found in the immigrant neighborhoods of working people. In many neighborhoods, Old World sensibilities dominated, particularly regarding the proper arrangement between the sexes. For unmarried women of European descent, the home was often the site

of traditional authority where restrictive social and sexual mores were enforced by immigrant parents. The public world was heterosocial – mixing males and females – and, by its nature, most often took place outside of the surveillance of family and community. Moralists publicly decried the mixing of sexes in the dark movie theaters. The numerous dance halls, spurred by liquor industry interests, were places where “unescorted” women were welcome and where meeting an unknown man would not automatically call the women's “virtue” into question.

“Going out” meant physically and socially to leave one world behind and to enter a new one which was characterized by a sense of freedom. For many unmarried young women, conflicts with their parents were often over how much of their wages they could keep, and thus over their independence and privacy. A girl's dress was also often an issue. Evidence from diaries and subsequent testimonials indicates that some women would hide their “American” clothes somewhere outside their residences to be put on in secret for an evening out and, upon returning home, would don the everyday work clothes or ethnic garb. The “freedom” women experienced in the anonymity of the city and the public nature of amusements also allowed a gay, male world to exist in the interstices of straight culture. In New York in the 1920s and 1930s, for instance, commercialized leisure spaces such as ballrooms, saloons, and cafeterias existed where forms of dress, code words, and other coded signals marked out a discontinuous, half secret and half known geography of homosexual association.

Married or unmarried, men or women, gay or straight, those of the working classes spent what meager money they had outside of their small, often crowded rooms mixing with others on city streets. Weekend excursions to amusement places like New York's Coney Island in the early twentieth century gave single women another opportunity to be away from parents and to go on “dates.” The new commercial landscape also divided genders, classes, sexualities, and races even as it appeared to have united them. African Americans remained virtually absent from urban public culture, particularly in the industrial cities of the North. Saloons, the haven of working men, were not

welcoming to women. The well to do created their own exclusive sport clubs in the suburban areas of cities so as to ensure and promote race and class solidarity.

POST INDUSTRIAL CITIES: THE CITY AS CONSUMERSPACE

Consumption and amusement in the industrial city arose out of commercial and social arrangements that had been based foremost on the structures and cadences defined by the demands of labor. Urban consumption appeared to be derived from and in response to urban production. Commercialized leisure allowed workers to find some sense of self away from the overdeterritorialized environment of the factory, office, or behind the service counter. World's fairs, particularly those in New York City in 1939 and 1964, proffered images of future cities as clean, streamlined machines of efficiency which privileged work over leisure and consumption as the dominant ideal or mode of city life. In contrast, the opening of Disney World in southern California in 1955 offered a vision of community without obvious laborers or labor whereby all activity is centered around touring and consumption.

The transformation from industrial to post industrial society entails the decline of mass production in favor of flexible forms of production which respond to increasingly specific markets and market fragments. The predominance of part time labor and the rise of the service sector characterize the trajectory of North American and many western, capitalist economies beginning in the 1970s. The rapid suburbanization of the American landscape in the 1950s and 1960s spawned the growth of shopping centers and eventually shopping malls, which brought together a number of stores in one place under the auspices of a single organization. City populations, particularly that of white European Americans, continued to decline also in response to racial urban unrest in the 1960s in a migration pattern known as white flight. Consequently, by the end of the 1970s, many cities were facing high unemployment, unused factory and office space, and an unflattering image in public culture as places for crime and delinquency.

Urban planners, civic leaders, and real estate developers undertook a variety of efforts over the 1980s and 1990s to "revitalize" city centers by making them attractive places to visit. The key elements of revitalization centered around providing safe, some would say "sanitized," areas where visitors could walk, browse, eat, shop, and be entertained without much worry about personal safety. Disney's fantasy of Main Street USA in many ways has become the prototype for many urban areas and commercial zones in the post industrial period.

John Hannigan (1998) notes that the formula hit upon by planners and developers was one of a *festival marketplace*, which was distinguished from shopping malls in a number of ways. As opposed to standard shops "anchored" on either end by large retailers, festival marketplaces favored an eclectic mix of stores which emphasized eating and entertainment as much as shopping. Many of these marketplaces were built not in suburbs or outlying areas of the city, but often in downtown areas or old industrial areas of a city, often part of a larger plan at revitalization. Many observers point to Baltimore's Harbor project, San Francisco's Embarcadero, Boston's Faneuil Hall, and Chicago's Navy Pier as quintessential festival marketplaces.

These efforts were spurred by the interest of young urban professionals and artists who, in different ways, saw "inner city" areas as desirable places to live. In the 1970s and 1980s urban artists who were in search of inexpensive living spaces began renting or inhabiting lofts in abandoned or underused factories. Often white and from middle class, college educated backgrounds, the artists' presence slowly transformed pockets of poorer areas into spaces where shops and restaurants catered to their tastes and lifestyles. During the same period, many white professionals who grew up in suburban areas but who were employed in cities decided to forego the commuter lifestyle of their parents and live near their workplaces. Some of these *yuppies* were decidedly upper middle class in taste and lifestyle and they valued the architecture and design sensibilities of earlier periods. Drawn to older homes, many had a penchant for rehabilitating these structures to their original state.

Moving in or near blighted areas with the idea of rehabilitating housing stock is a key

component of contemporary *gentrification*. It is also a process fraught with racial and class tensions, in part due to the seemingly inevitable displacement of the often poorer, non white populations by the gentrifiers, many of whom see themselves as “pioneers” on the urban “frontier.” As housing stock improves and as the newcomers (who wield the kind of social and cultural capital necessary to make larger structures like housing authorities and zoning commissions pay attention to them) begin to enact their vision of the community, the area itself begins to transform (Anderson 1990). Restaurants with vegetarian offerings, European style coffee houses, yoga studios, and second hand stores which feature expensive or vintage clothing are among the kinds of businesses which mark the class identification of these neighborhoods (Zukin 1991). Eventually, chain retailers such as the Pottery Barn, Z Gallerie, and Whole Foods supermarkets strategically located themselves near their class clientele.

Revitalization and urban consumption have not proven to lift or assist those of racially or economically marginalized groups. As cities have again become places to shop, eat, and seek entertainment, and as more affluent, usually white, populations have come to habitate previously downtrodden areas, some non European “ethnic” businesses and areas have benefited. Chinatowns, Koreatowns, and Thai restaurants, as well as Mexican eateries and marketplaces, have to varying degrees of success found a niche in the consumer space of the city patronized by increasingly health conscious or novelty seeking consumers. Many critics point out that concentrating on upper income visitors and residents as targets for downtown revitalization ignores the majority of the middle and lower income populations who have been displaced to the outskirts of cities, “ethnic consumption” notwithstanding.

Sexually marginalized groups such as gay, lesbian, and transgendered people have found a measure of social enfranchisement through urban living and consumption. Stereotyped as affluent, urban, and cultured in taste, some cities have actively courted gay business owners and have provided social sanction in identifying certain neighborhoods as “gay” or gay dominated. Chicago’s North Halsted Street corridor is a prime example, where a 20 foot tall street

marker painted with the gay rainbow flag announce the area’s identity to all.

Urban consumption, in many ways, extends beyond the downtown of the department store or festival marketplace and has come to define the character and identities of populations and neighborhoods with a focus on the particularities of place and population. It is a symbolic activity of identification and social distinction for residents as well as visitors. Spectacular themed environments, stores, and restaurants (e.g., Niketown) have located in high density urban shopping districts. These combine shopping and entertainment organized around a brand identity and offer visitors an easily accessible set of meanings with which to associate.

The relocating or rebuilding of ballparks in or near city centers has also been part of urban revitalization efforts, particularly in the 1990s. Public-private partnerships between cities and teams position the park as an anchor or main attraction around which shopping, restaurants, new transit hubs, and entertainment districts can arise. The parks themselves have become sites of entertainment beyond that of providing seating to view a sports contest. Often featuring extravaganzas of spectacle and consumption, many of the newer ballparks paradoxically recall a fabled “enchanted” era of non commercialized sports through their hyper commercialism (Ritzer & Stillman 2001).

Post industrial leisure and consumption, much like the case with housing stock and gentrification, finds new markets in old ones. The transformation of former working spaces like the South Street Market in New York, as well as tours of former work spaces like factories, point to the transformation of cities being from primarily places based on production to festival marketplaces based on touring and consumption.

Future research will need to examine the extent to which a group or area will have to market itself as a destination for outsiders in order to maintain economic viability. As many city mayors are required to serve as their city’s “brand manager,” it will be important to investigate critically the extent to which self marketing changes the character and identity of cities and neighborhoods and to what extent leveraging small parts of a city as a “destination” harms or helps the large hinterland of

non visitable places where most urban inhabitants live.

SEE ALSO: Consumption, Spectacles of; *Flânerie*; Gender, Consumption and; Lifestyle Consumption; Shopping; Shopping Malls; Urban Tourism

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consumption, visual

Jonathan E. Schroeder

Visual consumption characterizes life in the information age. The computer, the Web, and the visual mass media structure twenty first century lives, commanding time and attention, providing a steady stream of images that appear to bring the world within. Encompassing not only visual oriented consumer behavior such as watching television, playing video games, bird watching, tourism, museum going, and window shopping, visual consumption also introduces a methodological framework to investigate the interstices of consumption, vision, and culture, including how visual images are handled by consumption studies. Visual consumption constitutes a key attribute of an experience economy organized around attention, in which strategic communication – including advertising, promotion, websites, retail environments, and mass media – incorporates visual images designed to capture attention, build brand names, create mindshare, produce attractive products and services, and persuade citizens, consumers, and voters.

Visual consumption represents an emerging branch of consumption studies, one that relies on interdisciplinary methods, based on a semiotically informed visual genealogy of contemporary images. Approaching visual representation via interpretive stances offers researchers a grounded method for understanding and contextualizing images, as well as the cultural centrality of vision. In connecting images to the external context of consumption, researchers gain a more thorough – yet never complete – understanding of how images function within contemporary society, embodying and expressing cultural values and contradictions.

Visual consumption begins with images, and finds allied approaches within visual

sociology and sociology of consumption research (Ekström & Brembeck 2004; Lash & Urry 1994; Schroeder 2002). Acknowledging that products, services, brands, politicians, and ideology are marketed via images, and that consumers consume products symbolically, implies rethinking basic notions of economy, competition, satisfaction, and consumer choice. Visual images exist within a distinctive socio legal environment – unlike textual or verbal statements, such as product claims or political promises, pictures cannot be held to be true or false. Images elude empirical verification. Thus, images are especially amenable to help strategists avoid being held accountable for false or misleading claims. For example, cigarette manufacturers have learned not to make text based claims about their products, relying instead on visual imagery such as the lone cowboy.

Researchers have focused on the image and its interpretation as foundational elements of consumption, bringing together theoretical concerns about image and representation to build a multidisciplinary approach to consumption within what has been called the sign economy, the image economy, and the attention economy (Goldman & Papsion 1996; Lash & Urry 1994). Images function within culture, and their interpretive meanings shift over time, across cultures, and between consumers. Visual consumption studies' aims are generally interpretive rather than positivistic – to show how images *can* mean, rather than demonstrate *what* they mean. Image interpretation remains elusive – never complete, closed, or contained, to be contested and debated.

Research on visual consumption has gone through several phases. In the first phase, researchers such as Erving Goffman and Howard Becker deployed photographs as data, evidence, and illustrations within research projects and scholarly reports documenting visual aspects of society. In the second phase, visual images came to both reveal and reflect broader sociological issues, such as alienation, anomie, identity, and exclusion, as researchers began to focus on the representational power of images via self portraits, subject generated images, and photo elicitation techniques. In the current phase, visual images themselves have assumed central importance, drawing from cultural studies and visual studies disciplines that emerged

to interrogate popular cultural forms, and later visual culture. Within this phase, a typical study might investigate how the television news channel CNN covers a war, emphasizing the visual technologies that structure information and ideology, or bring a sociological perspective to a website art piece, utilizing an interdisciplinary approach beyond the interests of aesthetics or art history.

Each phase contains several streams of research, including those that focus on image interpretation from various perspectives, such as psychoanalysis or semiotics (Hall 1997). Others emphasize image making as a social psychological act of representing and communicating, drawing on traditional anthropological and sociological theories and methods. Another approach utilizes photographs or other visual artifacts as stimuli for research, for *photo elicitation*, akin to projective measures within psychology that investigate deeper meanings and associations that people bring to images. An additional related practice concerns visual presentation of research, documentary films, and videos, as well as more filmic treatments of sociological topics such as rituals, subcultures, or tourism.

Visual consumption research rests on a set of assumptions about contemporary consumption in western industrialized societies. First, strategic marketing communication, including advertising, promotion, public relations, and corporate communication – and the mass media that it supports – has emerged as a primary societal institution. For marketing no longer merely communicates information about products, it is an engine of the economy, an important social institution, and a primary player in the political sphere. Marketing communications heavily depend upon photography, which includes still photography, film, and video.

Second, the world's photographability has become the condition under which it is constituted and perceived – every single instant of one's life is touched by the technological reproduction of images. From this perspective, there have been no significant events of the past century that have not been captured by the camera; indeed, photography and film help make things significant.

A third proposition focuses on the intertwined concepts of identity and photography,

in which individual and organizational identity remain inconceivable without photography. Personal as well as product identity (already inextricably linked via the market) are constructed largely via information technologies of photography and mass media. The visual aspects of culture have come to dominate our understanding of identity, as well as the institutionalization of identity by societal institutions. Yet photography does not represent the truth; it is not a simple record of some reality (Burgin 1996; Coleman 1998; Slater 1995). Visual consumption research has framed photography as a consumer *behavior* as well as a central information technology. Photography's technical ability to reproduce images makes it a central feature of visual culture.

Fourth, the image is primary for marketing products, services, politicians, and ideas. Products no longer merely reflect images; rather, the image often is created prior to the product, which is then developed to fit the image. Many products and services are designed to fit a specific target market; they conform to an image of consumer demand, exemplifying a seismic economic shift towards experience, towards images, towards attention.

These four propositions create an interdisciplinary matrix for analyzing the roles visual consumption plays in the economy. Specifically, they call attention to photography as an overlooked process within the cultural marketplace of ideas and images. This set of propositions directs our gaze to the cultural and historical framework of images, even as it questions the information that feeds those discourses.

Today's visual information technologies of television, film, and the Internet are directly connected to the visual past (Schroeder 2002). Research on information technology (IT) or information and communication technology (ICT) usually focuses on complex, sophisticated systems such as mass media, the Internet, telecommunications, or digital satellite transmission arrays. These constitute the basic building blocks of the information society, where information is a crucial corporate competitive advantage as well as a fundamental cultural force. The World Wide Web, among its many influences, has put a premium on understanding visual consumption. The Web

mandates visualizing almost every aspect of organizational communication, identity, operations, and strategy. From the consumer perspective, visual experiences dominate the Web, as they navigate through an artificial environment almost entirely dependent upon their sense of sight. Photography remains a key component of many information technologies – digital incorporation of scanned photographic images helped transform the Internet into what it is today. Photography, in turn, was heavily influenced by the older traditions of painting in its commercial and artistic production, reception, and recognition (Osbourne 2000; Slater 1995).

Associating visual consumption with the art historical world helps to position and understand photography as a global representational system. The visual approach to consumption has afforded new perspectives to investigate specific art historical references in contemporary images, such as the gaze, display, and representing identity. In addition, researchers can take advantage of useful tools developed in art history and cultural studies to investigate the poetics and politics of images as a representational system. Finally, art centered analyses often generate novel concepts and theories for research on issues such as patronage, museum practice, information technology, and marketing communication.

Constructing a visual genealogy of contemporary images helps illuminate how marketing communication works as the *face of capitalism*, harnessing the global flow of images and fueling the image economy. Marketing images often contradict Roland Barthes's influential notion that photography shows "what has been." As consumers, we should know that what is shown in ads has not really been; it is usually a staged construction designed to sell something. Yet, largely due to photography's realism, combined with technological and artistic expertise, marketing images produce realistic, pervasive simulations with persuasive power. Advertising conventions encourage use of a narrow set of expectations to decode and decipher imagery – positive expectations, generally, which promote promising conclusions about the advertised item. Contrary to museum going, for instance, looking at ads seems to require withholding one's cultural knowledge so that

ads become spectacles of visual consumption. Furthermore, information technology makes looking at many things possible, but it does not necessarily improve our capacity to *see*, to actively engage our senses in reflective analysis. For most consumers, the growing volume of images works against understanding how they function – they rarely take the time to thoroughly reflect on marketing imagery, its position as something that apparently comes between programs, articles, or websites makes it seem ephemeral or at least peripheral to serious consideration. However, images are vitally connected to the cultural worlds of high art, fashion, and photography on one hand, and media realms of news, entertainment, and celebrity on the other.

A central debate within visual consumption research concerns the polysemy of images. Some approaches suggest that images float in the “postmodern” world – signs disconnected from signifiers – leaving viewers free to generate novel, resistant, and idiosyncratic meaning. Certainly, consumers generate their own meaning, as they bring their own cognitive, social, and cultural lenses to whatever they see. However, researchers generally agree that this does not mean that the historical and political processes that also generate meaning are eliminated – images exist within cultural and historical frameworks that inform their production, reception, circulation, and interpretation.

Methodological issues within visual consumption stem from its interdisciplinary roots. Researchers have debated central concerns such as agency versus structure in image interpretation and influence, the role of the unconscious, and consumer response versus producer intention. One overlooked aspect concerns the role of fellow scholars, particularly those with visual expertise, in doing visual consumption research. Researchers consistently benefit from art historians, artists, and others with specific expertise, yet many scholars rarely make the effort to consult cross disciplinary colleagues about their visual materials.

Future research must acknowledge the image’s representational and rhetorical power both as cultural artifact and as an engaging and deceptive bearer of meaning, reflecting broad societal, cultural, and ideological codes. Research studies focused on the political, social,

and economic implications of images, coupled with an understanding of the historical conditions influencing their production and consumption, require cross disciplinary training and collaboration. To understand images more fully, researchers must investigate the cultural, historical, and representational conventions that limit both encoding and decoding interpretation processes. Greater awareness of the associations between the traditions and conventions of visual history and the production and consumption of images has led to a better understanding of how these representations constitute a discursive space within which a meaningful sense of identity and difference can be maintained. Research that extends previous work on visual representation into historical, ontological, and art historical realms may provide a necessary bridge between visual meaning residing within producer intention or wholly subsumed by individual response, and between aesthetics and ethics. Key questions remain about why certain images are celebrated, ignored, or vilified. Understanding the role that visual consumption plays in identity formation, visual history, and representation signals a step toward understanding how the market structures and subsumes basic sociological concerns of power, desire, and identity.

SEE ALSO: Advertising; Consumption, Spectacles of; Consumption, Tourism and; *Flânerie*; Goffman, Erving; Media and Consumer Culture; Museums; Semiotics; Video Games

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consumption, youth culture and

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Youth, especially teenagers, have been closely associated with certain forms of consumption linked to a distinctive youth culture that sets them off from both adults and younger children. This subculture centers on peer relationships – especially one's popularity or status – and the organization of these relationships into an array of cliques and crowds who use various lifestyle symbols to distinguish themselves from one another. Patterns of consumption often serve as key markers of both group identity and individual membership. August B. Hollingshead's *Elmtown's Youth* in the 1940s and James S. Coleman's *Adolescent Society* in the 1950s were among the first to identify the patterns and characteristics of youth subcultures.

Youth oriented forms of consumption have nineteenth century roots in the development of special products for children. Distinctive patterns for adolescents grew in intensity in the 1920s and 1930s. The press drew attention to this phenomenon in the early 1940s, when the term teenagers was popularized. Teenagers were portrayed as obsessed with the latest fashions in clothes, popular music, and "cool" automobiles. By the 1950s a youth culture, with its particular forms of consumption, was a taken for granted feature of adolescence.

A variety of consumer goods and services became common among teenagers, including personal television sets, cell phones, computers, videos, video games, elaborate proms and social events, and vacations to the beach or skiing, as well as more expensive clothes and cars.

Biological and psychological development plays a role in the behaviors characteristic of young people. Puberty involves significant neurological, hormonal, bodily, and psychological changes. These are associated with gaining greater autonomy from adults, coming to terms with sexuality, and developing a personal social identity. Dealing with these changes often brings increased levels of psychological and social stress. Such processes take place in all societies and historical periods and do not explain the distinctiveness, influence, and content of contemporary youth culture, which are rooted primarily in the economic, social, and cultural characteristics of advanced industrial societies.

The extended compulsory schooling of developed societies isolates adolescents from adult contact and responsibilities. This is accentuated by parents being employed away from the home and by the increasing time spent commuting by both parents and children. Personal cars and new forms of communication (e.g., mobile phones, email, text messaging, and electronic bulletin boards) increase the rates and frequency of interaction between adolescent peers. Links with parents and adults may be further reduced by new forms of entertainment such as television, videos, and video games, and by the specialized media content aimed specifically at young people.

A central feature of adolescent culture is a concern about status and popularity. This tendency has sometimes been exaggerated in the mass media, but there is little doubt that it is a significant matter for most teenagers. Processes related to psychological development may foster this, but the primary cause is the social and power structure within which adolescents must live. They may have spending money, but they have little economic or political power over the decisions that most shape their lives. They must be in school, cannot change the curriculum, cannot hire or fire the teachers. Teenagers do not choose who else will be in the school and often have little influence over where they live

or what school they attend. In contrast, people of this age in most historic societies were often married and treated more or less as adults. Modern teenagers do have the power to create their own status systems; adults cannot control whom teenagers admire, emulate, or denigrate. Accordingly, status is the main form of power and autonomy that is available to adolescents.

The key social formations are a type of what Max Weber called status groups. In contemporary US schools these are often referred to as crowds, each with its relatively distinctive life style expressed in clothing, music, argot, and attitudes toward adults. Some of the typical crowds in US schools include preps, jocks, punks, goths, brains, skaters, nerds or geeks, and hicks or cowboys. Crowds are usually subdivided into cliques, which constitute networks of friends who “hang out” together. A key source of status is whom you associate with; associating with higher status people improves one’s own status; associating with lower status people lowers one’s status. This is especially so for intimate, expressive relationships, as contrasted to instrumental relationships. The status of those one dates and eats with in the lunchroom affects one’s status much more than who sits next to whom in class or with whom one works on an assigned project. “Partying,” which often involves food and romantic or sexual liaisons, becomes a central social activity for many. There is a strong tendency to avoid intimate associations with those of lower status or those who have significantly different criteria of status, which tends to reduce associations with those from other crowds.

A second source of status is conformity to the norms of the group. This includes displaying distinctive lifestyle symbols through clothes, demeanor, language, etc. This is why teenagers are frequently very concerned to have the “in” or “cool” fashions. Those deemed to be of high status are likely to be emulated in their dress and actions. If you have high status, others are likely to copy what you do and wear. To stay “ahead,” high status people are motivated to constantly change the norms of what is cool. Fashion becomes very dynamic and even ephemeral. “That is so yesterday” is a phrase many contemporary youth use to distance themselves from what they see as outmoded and “not cool.” In schools where crowds have

a relatively clear cut ranking, lower status groups tend to copy the “popular crowd.” In more pluralistic schools where each crowd claims equality or superiority, comparison and emulation tends to be more within these groups.

On the one hand, the centrality of consumption to youth culture is indicated by teens’ behavior; for example, they hang out in shopping malls and seek part time employment to pay for the things they desire. On the other hand, its importance is indicated by the attention businesses have paid to this specialized market. In the early 2000s, it was estimated that US teenagers spent (or influenced their parents to spend) \$100–200 billion annually – more than the annual US expenditures on the Iraq War during these years. Since the mid twentieth century, businesses have created products aimed at the youth and teenage market. Companies invest large amounts in market research and advertising to promote these projects. Some marketing firms specialize in research on teenagers and preteens. Their methodologies range from large sample surveys to seeking out those who are defined as “cool” by their peers and video taping their dress and behavior. This knowledge is used to guide extensive marketing campaigns directed at young people. As teen status structures and styles have become more pluralistic, marketers have had to aim at particular subgroups or niches.

A number of television drama series portray the lives of teenagers and are aimed at marketing products to these groups. Advertisers pay about the same rate for some of these series as some of the most popular adult oriented programming. Popular music is heavily marketed to teenagers. MTV (Music Television) became a major network and a cultural phenomenon by focusing on videos of popular musicians, often including risqué lyrics and sexually suggestive dancing. Hundreds of radio stations (and their advertisers) see young people as their primary audience. Much of Internet based marketing is aimed at computer and Web savvy young people. Increasingly, music is sold and distributed over the Internet, and most customers are high school and college students. Publishers have created special teen editions of *Newsweek*, *People*, *Cosmopolitan*, and *Vogue* with advertising aimed at this age group.

Schools have become a site for marketing. Nationally franchised food outlets are available in some schools cafeterias. Schools sell exclusive rights to market particular brands of drinks and snacks, sometimes including the right to advertising on school premises. Some school systems sell advertising space in and on their school buses. Specialized marketing companies sign up school clubs or teams to peddle their products to friends and neighbors, with a percent going to the school or the student organization. Channel One, a national satellite network, provides schools with televisions and related equipment. In return, students are required to watch 12 minutes of Channel One's teen oriented news programming each day, including two minutes of advertising products that appeal to students. They are also encouraged to visit a related website that includes advertising aimed at teenagers. Another technique, "peer marketing," recruits students to wear or suggest the use of products to their friends without revealing that they are being rewarded with money or gifts.

Some marketing is directed at young people to indirectly shape parents' decisions about major purchases. Car companies, hotels, air lines, cruise lines, banks, credit card companies, insurance companies, and even investment firms advertise in media aimed at young people. In addition to influencing parents, marketers hope to create brand loyalty during adolescence that will shape buying habits well into adulthood.

Younger and older groups have adopted many of the behaviors characteristic of teenagers. Some elementary school girls model themselves after cheerleaders and other popular teenagers, including the use of makeup and clothing that simulates sexuality. Middle school students are often concerned about romance, sexuality, and fashion, and there are specialized media and marketing aimed at this audience. The audiences of television series about teenagers are composed largely of preteen girls. While the intensity of concern about peer popularity declines for post high school young people, teenage styles influence older age groups. As the age for marriage has increased, the singles' scene draws heavily on the cultural forms of adolescents emphasizing fashion, partying, and casual romance. Accordingly, the forms of consumption resemble teenage life

more than those of the young family of earlier generations. Youth, beauty, and sexuality became key values and status symbols. As the ironic novelist Tom Wolfe remarked: "In the year 2000, [people] prayed, 'Please, God, don't let me look old.' Sexiness was equated with youth, and youth ruled . . . The social ideal was to look 23 and dress 13."

These developments have made teenage status structures, youth cultures, and the related consumption patterns increasingly important to prosperous societies and their economies. As affluence increases, a higher proportion of consumption is based on acquiring status symbols rather than on technological or physiological requirements. Fashion became relevant not only to an elite, but to most of the population. It is a central source of the consumer demand so crucial to an advanced industrial society. Appropriately, these societies are often referred to as consumer societies. Of course, not all young people are obsessed with their popularity or having the latest cool stuff. In the US, however, teenage status systems play a key role in making a concern with fashion and consumption a taken for granted feature of contemporary society.

An extensive sociological literature has developed on both adolescence and consumption, but little on the link and interaction between the two, though several journalistic and cultural studies have appeared. More attention has been paid to children who are seen as more innocent and vulnerable to manipulation. Additional research is needed in many areas. How does the attention to fashion and consumption differ across crowds, schools, and societies and what are the sources of any variations? What are the long term effects of being preoccupied with these concerns on individuals and collectivities? Does the mass media primarily shape or reflect youth culture? As with consumption in general, scholarly and public opinion remains divided about whether the development of a youth based culture of consumption is a new form of creativity and freedom, or a new form of manipulation and alienation.

SEE ALSO: Advertising; Age Identity; Childhood; Consumer Culture, Children's; Consumption, Girls' Culture and; School Climate; Socialization, Agents of; Youth/Adolescence

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content analysis

Kristina Wolff

Content analysis is a method of observation and analysis that examines cultural artifacts. One of the most common and frequently cited definitions describes this type of research method as “any technique for making inferences by systematically and objectively identifying specified characteristics of messages” (Holsti 1969: 26). This method emerged in the early twentieth century when researchers began studying the texts of speeches, political tracts, and newspapers. It quickly evolved into investigating the wide array of texts in society, including photographs, movies, diaries and journals, music, television, film, letters, law cases, manifestos, and advertisements. Primarily, anything that is in or can be converted to printed form can be examined using content analysis. This method has a long history in sociology as well as many other disciplines, including political science, history, law, and policy studies, as well as feminist studies.

Content analysis examines materials using both quantitative and qualitative techniques as a means to understand messages within texts as well as to understand the message's content, producer, and/or audience. The benefits of this type of analysis are that it is unobtrusive and transparent and the material examined provides an accurate representation of society and various aspects of society, since it is created without the intent of being a subject of a study. Content analysis is a complement to other forms of analyses of texts and messages, which include frame analysis, textual analysis, and discourse analysis.

Briefly, *frame analysis* may utilize similar techniques of content analysis, but its approach varies in that it focuses on examining how individuals make sense of the world through studying the ways that people operate within social structures as well as how events are framed by these structures. *Textual analysis* originated in the fields of linguistics and semiotics. Like content analysis, this method looks for patterns and shifts in rhetoric. One core difference is the relationship of the reader to the text. Meaning is produced when the text is read, not when it is written, a connection must be made for the text to be “alive,” whereas for both frame and content analysis, words, phrases, and documents are considered complete. Lastly, *discourse analysis* moves beyond these examinations of what primarily consists of a message that has been produced, focusing on the attributes of a specific document or collection of documents. Discourse analysis follows the language rather than the document itself. The analysis moves from site to site rather than focusing on where the discourse resides.

Before a researcher begins the process of conducting content analysis, they establish a specific set of criteria that is used as the frame work for examination. Quantitative approaches select material that relates to the hypothesis of the study. During this phase, items that do not apply are eliminated. For example, if someone were to explore the ways women are portrayed in newspaper photographs, then one aspect of the predetermined criteria would be to eliminate all photographs of people containing only men and boys. Qualitative approaches also utilize a set of criteria, but the rules often are less

narrowly defined and are likely to be limited according to something such as the size or dates of the text being examined. Research questions are still utilized, but nothing from the data is eliminated at this stage. A similar study of images of women would be conducted on the same group of photographs, but the researcher may decide to focus on specific days of the week or types of articles or photographs and then look to see how women are portrayed according to these groupings. While approaches and overall techniques vary, one common element is the need to establish a set of systematic rules for examination before the actual process of analysis begins.

The most essential part of creating the framework for analysis is to clearly determine the unit of analysis to be examined. These can range from focusing on specific words and phrases to large paragraphs, characters, entire works, themes, or concepts that exist in the text. This process of establishing the criteria for analysis, examining the documents, locating, marking, and tallying the unit of analysis is called *coding*. These steps transform the raw data into categories that have been created as part of the established criteria. For example, if a researcher was studying conversations focusing on public opinion about the most recent State of the Union Address by the US President, that were occurring in various blogs on the Internet, the pre set categories may consist of "positive," "negative," and "mixed." These classifications would then be the actual terms or phrases that appeared in the blogs. Words like "responsible" or "admire" would be counted as "positive," whereas other words such as "insincere" or "unbelievable" would be counted as "negative." These words are tallied and then examined according to frequency of occurrence.

Words or phrases that are obvious in their meaning are called *manifest content*. They are considered the best way to achieve objectivity and reliability due to their ease of identification. Historically, this approach was very time consuming. Gans (1979) utilized quantitative techniques in his content analysis of television news. While he found that he was able to observe recurring patterns in news reporting, he was only able to concentrate on a few themes due to the size of the study and time constraints involved in analyzing the material. The growth

of computer software programs designed to perform content analysis allows researchers to perform this type of analysis fairly rapidly. The use of computers also increases reliability and validity of the findings, as it eliminates human error that can occur when counting and categorizing the data. These programs enable researchers to use larger amounts of data and wider time spans, due to the increased efficiency and accuracy, which also provides enough data to analyze the results using quantitative techniques.

Latent content is considered to be words and phrases which are more subjective in their interpretation. This kind of communication consists of phrases, paragraphs, or items that have underlying meanings and/or consist of symbolic messages. If a researcher were looking at the same collection of blogs, they may widen their examination to studying paragraphs. These could then reveal that one posting may use the word "admire" in a sentence, yet the context of the paragraph as a whole reveals that the writer admired the part of the address that focused on health care policy but overall they were disappointed in the president's main message.

Debates about how to use content analysis do exist within sociology and other disciplines. For some, quantitative content analysis is often heralded as *the* preferred or "correct" way to perform this type of analysis. It is the more widely used approach. However, qualitative content analysis is also well established and this approach is often the preferred technique to use when examining latent content or material that requires an interpretive approach. One of the requirements of content analysis is that research is limited to messages that reside within the confines of the document that is being examined. For example, Daniels's (1977) research on documents produced by white supremacist groups was limited to their official publications. Daniels utilized qualitative content analysis techniques; her examination was confined to a predetermined set of publications that covered a specific time period. Anything falling before or after this range in time was not studied. This constraint can be viewed as a strength in that it offers a focused and detailed analysis of the material, but it is also a limit of the method, as one cannot move beyond the predetermined criteria, the list of words or

phrases to be used in the study, or the material itself.

Often, the results of content analysis consist primarily of descriptive information. Without looking for patterns that develop over time within the material or using techniques of *triangulation*, then the findings are not generalizable to a large population. Triangulation or “multiple methods” is simply the use of more than one means of data collection and analysis. The combination of qualitative and quantitative techniques or the addition of additional research such as conducting a case study or performing secondary data analysis can complement and clarify the results of the content analysis.

This form of analysis is also reliant on what has been recorded in the cultural artifacts being examined. Scholars using these techniques often focus on what is missing from the messages they are examining, as well as what exists in their documents. For example, if a researcher was studying the police blotter in newspapers, they may focus on counting the number of racial markers that exist in the reporting as a means of understanding how race is understood in that community. Upon reanalyzing the content, they may then look for the absence of racial characteristics to see if any patterns exist; such as by comparing the number of times the label “woman” appears as opposed to the label “black woman.”

Through the use of triangulation, a researcher may develop a better understanding about why certain facts, words, or phrases are omitted. Epstein’s (1996) examination of the early response to the AIDS epidemic in the US and Cohen’s (1999) study on AIDS in African American communities both utilized multiple methods in their research. Each used content analysis to examine their cultural artifacts, which primarily consisted of newspapers. Epstein also utilized discourse analysis and interviews. Cohen included interviews and participant observation and conducted a case study.

Feminist approaches to content analysis also utilize multiple methods. Feminist researchers broaden the depth of investigation to include marginalized groups, particularly women. Cultural artifacts about, produced by, and used by women are examined. Feminist critique of content analysis was one of the first to challenge

the claim of the strength of objectivity to this approach. Content analysis begins with pre-conceived ideas as to what words or phrases best reflect the hypothesis and these ideas are shaped by researchers’ biases. Feminist researchers are continually reflexive in their analysis, paying attention to their own biases throughout all phases of research. This is another way to reduce bias throughout the research process.

SEE ALSO: Computer Aided/Mediated Analysis; Conversation Analysis; Critical Qualitative Research; Documentary Analysis; Methods; Semiotics; Text/Hypertext; Triangulation; Validity, Qualitative

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contention, tactical repertoires of

Verta Taylor

Social movement scholars use the concept of tactical repertoires of contention to refer to the strategies used by collective actors to persuade or coerce authorities to support their claims. The tactical repertoires of social movements include conventional strategies of political persuasion such as lobbying, voting, and petitioning; confrontational tactics such as marches, strikes, and public demonstrations that disrupt day to day life; violent acts such as bombing, rioting, assassination, and looting that inflict material and economic damage and loss of life; and cultural forms of political expression such as ritual, music, art, theater, street performance, and practices of everyday life that inspire solidarity and oppositional consciousness. If there

is a single feature that distinguishes social movements from routine political actors, it is the strategic use of protest – or novel, dramatic, unorthodox, and non institutionalized forms of political expression. Because participants in social movements lack access to conventional channels of influence, they often disavow politics through proper channels.

The tactics used by social movements are increasingly examined in terms of their place in a larger repertoire of collective action. The notion of repertoires of contention grows out of the work of Charles Tilly (1978), who introduced the concept to explain historical variations in forms of political contention. Tilly contends that the distinctive forms of claims making associated with the modern social movement are part of a larger repertoire of contention associated with the growth of national electoral politics and the proliferation of associations as vehicles of collective action. The term “repertoire” implies that the way a set of collective actors makes and receives claims bearing on each other’s interests occurs in established and predictable ways. A social movement’s tactical repertoire is what a challenging group knows how to do, it is what the larger society expects from it as an aggrieved group, and it accentuates the fact that a group’s tactics and strategies are adapted from other challenging groups so that every social movement does not have to reinvent the wheel in each new conflict.

Theorists associated with the contentious politics approach use the repertoires of contention concept as part of a larger framework for analyzing collective claims making that involves the government as a claimant, target, or mediator. Scholars who adopt this perspective focus on public protest events and link social movements to other forms of contentious politics such as strike waves, revolutions, and nationalism. Critics have objected to the contentious politics approach on the grounds that it is narrowly focused on political action (Goodwin & Jasper 1999). This approach to defining social movements excludes religious and self help movements not directed at the state, as well as movements that target systems of authority within organizations and institutions, such as the military, medicine, education, and the workplace.

A common theme running through a segment of the literature is the insistence on a broad definition of social movements that recognizes the multiple targets and tactics of social movements. Taylor and her collaborators (Rupp & Taylor 2003; Taylor & Van Dyke 2004) offer a definition of tactical repertoires that encompasses the myriad of strategies used by social movements engaged in challenges to different systems of authority, as well as to the political status quo. They define tactical repertoires as interactive episodes that link social movement actors to each other as well as to opponents and authorities for the intended purpose of challenging or resisting change in identities, groups, organizations, or societies.

TYPES AND DIMENSIONS OF TACTICAL REPERTOIRES

Discussions of social movements invariably differentiate them on the basis of tactical repertoires. Early typologies defined social movements either as instrumental or expressive depending on whether their tactics were directed toward social or personal change. Recently, scholars have distinguished between strategy oriented and identity oriented movements on the basis of whether a group's tactics are geared toward policy change or the generation of collective agency and identity. Several scholars question the bifurcation of movements, arguing that most social movements combine both instrumental and expressive action (Bernstein 1997). As a result, current classifications have abandoned dualistic models and draw distinctions between non confrontational or *insider tactics* (boycotts, lawsuits, leafleting, letter writing, lobbying, petitions, Internet activism, and press conferences) and confrontational or *outsider tactics* (such as sit ins, demonstrations, vigils, marches, strikes, symbolic performances, blockades, bombings, assassinations, and other illegal actions). Tarrow introduces violent tactics and offers the following typology of protest: conventional, disruptive, and violent.

Knowledge of social movement tactics derives from "protest event" research, pioneered by Tilly and his colleagues. Protest event research refers to the content coding of newspaper accounts of protest events and other

contentious gatherings. This approach uses variation in the number and timing of protest events to assess the level of mobilization of social movements. Some scholars identify problems with using newspapers to collect information on collective action events. Newspaper accounts are biased toward public protest directed at the government. Tactical repertoires that target other institutions and challenge cultural codes in everyday life are best studied through in depth qualitative and historical methods.

Taylor and her collaborators identify three features of collective action events. First, tactical repertoires are sites of *contestation* in which bodies, symbols, identities, practices, and discourses are used to pursue or prevent changes in institutionalized power relations. The second component is *intentionality*, or the strategic use of collective action to promote or resist change in dominant relations of power. Third, a social movement's tactical repertoires generate oppositional consciousness and *collective identity*.

FACTORS THAT INFLUENCE TACTICAL REPERTOIRES

Tactical repertoires are influenced by external sociopolitical factors and internal movement processes. Theorists of contentious politics link collective action repertoires to modernization, specifically the creation of the nation state and centralized decision making, the development of capitalist markets, and the emergence of modern forms of communication. These changes brought shifts in the nature and geographical reach of political authority and gave rise to new forms of political contention expressed in the form of strikes, rallies, public demonstrations and meetings, petitions, marches, sit ins, boycotts, insurrections, and various forms of civil disobedience. These means of claims making replaced older direct, local, and patronage dependent forms of protest with forms that are national in character, autonomous from power holders, and modular in the sense that similar tactics and strategies can be used by different groups of activists pursuing different targets.

New social movement theory (Touraine 1981; Melucci 1989), a paradigm that competes with the contentious politics approach, links the tactical repertoires of contemporary social

movements to the shift from an industrial to a post industrial economy that brought new forms of social control as a result of the intervention of capitalism and the state into private areas of life, including the self and the body. In western societies, these macrohistorical changes brought about new forms of mainly middle class activism, such as women's, peace, gay and lesbian, environmental, animal rights, self help, anti racist, and other movements. The tactical repertoires of these so called new social movements are thought to be distinct from earlier forms of class based activism because activists are concerned with issues of identity and quality of life rather than economic redistribution. Although the new social movement approach has brought attention to cultural repertoires, evidence for the hypothesis that contemporary movements are a product of the post industrial society is questionable. Scholars also take issue with the notion of "newness," arguing that some presumably new movements, such as the women's movement, date to the nineteenth century.

Sidney Tarrow advances the notion of protest cycles to understand how macrohistorical factors influence social movement tactics. Protest tends to follow a recurrent cycle or wave in which collective mobilizations increase and decrease in frequency, intensity, and formation. The ebb and flow that characterize protest cycles influence the tactics adopted by different movements in the cycle. In the early stages, disruptive tactics predominate, and, as a protest wave develops, interaction between protestors and authorities stimulates the institutionalization of moderate tactical repertoires and the radicalization of others as routine tactics become less effective. Paul Almeida's research on protest waves in El Salvador between 1962 and 1981 illustrates the role that threat and state repression play in this process. He shows how, over time, protest shifted from reformist contention based on non violent strategies to a radicalized movement reliant on violent protest.

The preponderance of empirical research on the way internal characteristics of social movements influence social movement tactics has focused on the relationship between a movement's form of organization and its capacity to engage in disruptive and confrontational protest. William Gamson (1990) provides powerful evidence that social movement organizations

facilitate disruptive protest, although Frances Fox Piven and Richard Cloward (1979) take issue with this based on their study of US poor people's movements, which demonstrates that the involvement of social movement organizations channels energy away from mass defiance into institutional forms of action. Research on Islamic activism in the Arab world demonstrates that organizational form remains important for understanding tactical repertoires.

Frequently, collective actors adopt strategies and tactics not because they have been shown to be effective, but because they resonate with the cultural frames of meaning participants use to legitimate collective action. Finally, the structural position of protestors influences a group's tactical repertoires. Several studies, including research on the mobilization of contention to support Muslim causes, report that economically and socially marginal actors who lack access to political and economic power are more likely to engage in disruptive and even violent forms of protest. A body of research also finds that inequalities of gender, race and ethnicity, class, and sexuality influence tactical choices (McCammon et al. 2001).

THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN TACTICS AND MOVEMENT OUTCOMES

Tactical repertoires have implications for movement success. Researchers interested in whether and how social movements produce social and political change identify several characteristics of protest that relate to effectiveness. Novelty, or the use of innovative tactics, is more likely to lead to success because innovative protest catches authorities off guard and increases the likelihood that the protest event will be covered by the media (McAdam 1983). William Gamson presents convincing evidence that disruptive tactics are more successful than conventional strategies. Aldon Morris's (1993) study of the 1963 Birmingham, Alabama, campaign against racial segregation suggests that using a variety of tactics yields favorable results. Size, or the ability to mobilize large numbers of participants, is another ingredient in a campaign's success because large demonstrations capture media attention,

demonstrate public support, and increase disruptive potential. Cultural resonance – or public displays of protest that tap into prevailing beliefs and identities – also increases the likelihood of positive outcomes.

Repertoires and tactics of protest are the theoretical building blocks of all theories formulated to understand social movements. There is need for continuing research to address ongoing debates over the impact of sociopolitical factors and social movement organization on tactical repertoires and the relative effectiveness of militant versus non militant tactics. The question of how the unorthodox tactics used by social movements influence the cultural fabric of societies remains unexamined. Because social movements in western democracies have received most of the scholarly attention, it is also reasonable to wonder how thinking about social movement tactics might change by closer attention both to social movements in non democratic states and to transnational activism.

SEE ALSO: Collective Action; Collective Identity; Culture, Social Movements and; New Social Movement Theory; Political Process Theory; Political Sociology; Protest, Diffusion of; Social Change; Social Movement Organizations

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control balance theory

Charles R. Tittle

Control balance is a general, integrated theory to explain deviant behavior by individuals or organizations, although it explains conformity and submission as well. Deviant behavior consists of acts disapproved by the majority of a group or that typically bring about negative social reactions. Since criminal behavior is usually deviant, the theory also explains most crime.

Theoretically, the likelihood of deviance in some form is predictable from a control imbalance and a motivation producing provocation. A control imbalance exists when the control a social entity (individual or organization) can exercise over things, circumstances, or individuals is greater or less than the control to which the social entity is subject. Relative amounts of total control are registered as control ratios, which can show balance, deficits, or surpluses. With a given control imbalance and a motivating provocation, specific deviance is chosen from acts within a restricted range of control

balance desirability (CBD). Since the degree of CBD varies among acts, all misbehaviors can be arrayed over a continuum of CBD. The range of the CBD continuum from which an act is chosen is related to a person's control ratio, opportunity, possible counter control the act will likely attract, and the person's self control. Choosing a particular deviant act is called control balancing – weighing perceived gain in control from possible deviant behavior against the counter control that it may produce.

Being rooted in social statuses, personal characteristics, and organizational affiliations, control ratios are global and situational. All people are assumed to want to gain more control, no matter how much or little they have, and actors are assumed to rely principally on deviant behavior in trying to overcome control imbalances. However, preexisting desire to extend control does not produce deviance unless it is brought into awareness by situational circumstances and other conditions exist. Actors become motivated toward deviance when sharply reminded of their control imbalances, especially if reminders involve denigration or humiliation, and they perceive that deviance can help. Motivation may lead to deviance if the behavior is possible in the situation (opportunity) and potential counter controls do not outweigh (or are not perceived as outweighing) potential gain in control to be realized from misbehavior. Because opportunities for deviance of some kind are omnipresent and the chances of controlling reactions are highly variable, some kinds of deviance always provide favorable balances. As a result, the strength of motivation predicts the chances of deviance in some form. If researchers measure the chances of subjects' committing each of a large number of deviant acts, along with their control ratios and motivation, they should find those with control imbalances who are motivated to be much more likely to commit one or more of the acts than are those with balanced controls. The control ratio and motivation, however, are not sufficient to predict the exact act to be committed.

Because serious deviant acts have the greatest potential for increasing one's control, a motivated person first contemplates committing one or more of them. But serious acts also imply great potential counter control. Therefore, only those

with small control deficits or any degree of control surplus can realistically resort to serious misbehavior. As a result, deviantly motivated people cognitively slide over a continuum of CBD to find an "appropriate" deviant act. Those with balanced control ratios are more conformist because they are less likely to become motivated toward deviance and they face greater potential counter control. By contrast, overwhelming control deficits reduce the ability to imagine alternatives, leading to submission.

Those with control deficiencies are frequently motivated by reminders of their relative helplessness, while those with surpluses are often motivated by not receiving the deference they expect. The specific act of deviance resulting from a convergence of a control imbalance, provocation and motivation, opportunity, and control balancing reflects its CBD, which is composed of two elements: (1) the act's likely long range effectiveness in altering a control imbalance, and (2) the extent to which the act requires direct and personal involvement of the perpetrator with a victim or an object affected by the deviance. When the theory's theoretical causal variables converge for a given individual, that person chooses from among deviant acts with similar scores on the CBD continuum.

An actor with a control ratio between the second and third quartiles of a continuum from maximum deficit to maximum surplus (excluding the balanced zone) is liable for acts somewhere between the second and third quartiles of CBD, provided that the actor has sufficient self control to avoid "unrealistic" action, there is opportunity to do them, and the risk of counter control does not outweigh the gain from the deviant act. The choice of deviant act is also influenced by such things as moral commitments, intelligence, habits, and personality.

Thus, an unbalanced control ratio, in combination with deviant motivation, will lead to a choice of a specific deviant act within a restricted range of the CBD continuum. The zone from which the deviant act is chosen narrows with increasing inclusion of the theoretical variables. Taking all of the theoretical variables into account allows the range of likely deviant acts to be quite narrow, though it may still contain a large number of different acts with similar CBD. Thus, the theory cannot

predict choice of a specific deviant act, such as stealing an object or assaulting a spouse.

The validity of the theory currently rests mainly on argument. The original statement (Tittle 1995) was quickly recognized as worthy of attention, but only limited tests were conducted. The research that was conducted, though challenging some aspects of the theory, nevertheless suggests that control imbalances are important predictors of deviance. Those empirical challenges and logical critiques led to a major revision (Tittle 2004a). That refined version has not yet been tested, so whether the theory fulfills its theoretical promise remains to be seen.

SEE ALSO: Crime, Life Course Theory of; Crime, Social Control Theory of; Deviance; Deviance, Crime and; Deviance, Theories of; Identity, Deviant; Juvenile Delinquency; Organizational Deviance; Rational Choice Theory: A Crime Related Perspective; Self Control Theory

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controversy studies

Chandra Mukerji

Controversy studies have been an important part of the sociology of science since the late 1970s when Merton's more institutional approach to the field began to be displaced by the sociology of scientific knowledge (SSK). Inspired by Kuhn (1970), the new sociologists

of science were determined to show empirically what Kuhn had suggested conceptually: that knowledge making was a social process. Controversy studies were important to this project because they focused on moments of change between more stable regimes of knowledge. Kuhn had argued that researchers during most historical periods engaged in "normal science" based on a shared paradigm. This kind of collective practice was particularly productive of new knowledge because researchers worked with recognized techniques on puzzles of common interest. They could learn from and build on what others were doing and collaborate more easily because they shared many assumptions about their research. But paradigms had limits that became increasingly visible over time. In moments of revolutionary change, new paradigms were developed to make sense of these anomalies, displacing the old regime of normal practice. In the transition period, scientists engaged in controversies about elements of the paradigm.

Scholars in SSK became interested in controversies to understand the processes of scientific change. Kuhn was vague in his theory about the character of the conflict before and during a revolution. Shifts in scientific models and practices seemed to have complex, emergent properties that seemed better studied ethnographically. Once in the laboratory, sociologists of science found a rich social life among scientists that included collective struggles for authority over fields (Barnes 1977; Knorr Cetina 1981; Barnes & Bloor 1982; Latour 1988; Lynch 1990).

Contests of knowledge in moments of controversy, when studied empirically, turned out to be deeply social processes. The truth of ideas was tested less with logical analysis of a philosophical sort than with debates about validity that had sometimes modest, sometimes epic proportions. The scientists involved in controversies were hardly dispassionate. They looked for ways to advance their ideas, enroll allies in their movements, and promote their schools of thought. At the same time, their critics and competitors looked for fallacies in their arguments, flaws in their data, and reasons to doubt their approaches to problems. Opponents and advocates alike vetted the work. Criticisms appeared in many different venues: universities

during personnel decisions, journals when articles were reviewed, and conferences when new papers were presented. Communities of practitioners worked to make their perspectives powerful in their fields (Latour 1988; Epstein 1996).

These wars over the nature of things were in part wars of words. As most epistemologists assumed, these struggles entailed some assessments of truth statements. What sociologists pointed out was that this linguistic and logical vetting was the work of scientists, not philosophers. Scientists were not just bench practitioners and mathematicians, but also writers. Their verbal assertions were matters of professional attention. Ethnographers of science followed the linguistic practices of scientific knowledge making both in the laboratory and the literature to see the social patterns of epistemic work (Latour & Woolgar 1979; Knorr Cetina 1981).

Controversy studies in SSK were historically not simply a reaction to Mertonian sociology of science, but also part of a more general shift in sociology that occurred during the 1970s and 1980s as the hegemony of functionalism dwindled. Radical critiques by structuralists and constructivists alike started to reshape much of the field. On the micro side, ethnomethodologists argued against traditional ethnography that used analytic categories from sociology instead of research subjects' understandings of things. They argued that meaning making was a local and emergent practice of ordinary people, not something that needed to be or should be imposed from above. On the macro side, Marxists confined their analyses to the structural properties of historical change – exactly what ethnomethodologists denied or decried. Structuralists wanted to specify the contradictions in regimes that drove history, and argued that the meaning making studied by ethnographers was epiphenomenal and not necessary to sociological explanations.

In spite of their opposed theoretical commitments, both groups of sociologists studied revolutions and purified their research practices in ways that targeted and excluded functionalist sociology. Few sociologists of science admitted that science was important to study because of its hegemonic properties and role in the Cold War, since this required asking scientists about their relationship to the government, not their

epistemic practices (Mukerji 1977). Still, the Cold War helped give salience to SSK. A contest of knowledge systems of grand proportions was shaping history at that time and gave intuitive salience to this work.

The collective commitment in SSK to studying social epistemology using ethnographic methods kept scholars in science studies focused on knowledge in the making. Science was studied mainly through the lens of ethnomethodology as a local group accomplishment, disconnected from institutional constraints. Truth was a product of identifiable social interactions that fieldwork made visible and studies of language made understandable (Knorr Cetina 1981; Lynch 1990).

The “strong program” in SSK provided a research strategy for approaching scientific controversies: methodological symmetry. Barnes and Bloor (1982) argued that sociologists should treat accepted and rejected forms of knowledge symmetrically, not attempting to explain what was good about accepted science and bad about rejected knowledge. The point was not to privilege successful claims to truth and to naturalize the boundaries around “real” science. The effect was to privilege knowledge and internalist accounts of it in the sociology of science. Methodological symmetry technically made SSK agnostic about scientific knowledge and respectful of scientists' words and work. But by systematically denying the authority of scientific knowledge, methodological symmetry helped to foster antipathy toward this kind of sociology of science among both positivist sociologists and some scientists.

Nonetheless, the elegance of the strong program and methodological symmetry was appealing to many young scholars. They liked addressing philosophical issues with sociological tools and they made controversy studies in the SSK tradition the center of the new sociology of science. If the adjudication of controversies was social, then things like tests of fit, logic, and research methods were tools of social struggle. Determining the truth was less a matter of logic than a test of social strength (Latour 1988). Paradigms had allies and advocates. Ideas were associated with groups of people. And controversies pitted groups against one another for dominance of a field. Labs were described as centers of calculation through

which resources and knowledge flowed. The exercise of scientific skepticism was recharacterized as part of an agonistic system for allocating power and fame (Latour 1988; Epstein 1996). The ideas with the greatest numbers of powerful advocates were the ones accepted as established knowledge. According to Shapin and Schaffer (1985), the processes involved in the determination of scientific truths paralleled the ones governing public life. Solutions to problems of knowledge were necessarily also solutions to problems of politics – ways to gain social authority. The scientific experiment was an exercise in proper governance. It was a way to produce trust as well as knowledge by modeling the systematic and successful exercise of human will on the natural world.

Callon (1986) and Latour (1988) argued that the groups that were victorious in scientific controversies had to contain not only social actors (researchers), but also non human actants (experimental objects and quasi objects). Successful experiments were ways to make parts of the natural world testify on behalf of theoretical assertions. Things could *show* that scientists were right and make their ideas more than simply a matter of opinion and refined argumentation. Reproducible tests of scientific truths – played out in the actions of things – took some of the burden of proof off linguistic assertions or truth claims. Scientific knowledge was based on witnessing of events as well as language practices. Things helped to make people trustworthy (Latour 1988; Shapin & Schaffer 1985).

In labs, the connections between objects of scientific study and technical language were invented through “shop talk” (Knorr Cetina 1981; Lynch 1990) and promoted through “literary practices” (Shapin & Schaffer 1985). Inscription devices (Latour & Woolgar 1979) such as print outs or images made with laboratory instruments provided researchers with common objects of discussion. They could determine from them how to analyze or supplement the data, adding new layers of social cognition to the process. Printed journal articles also allowed those without direct access to laboratory tests virtual means for witnessing them (Shapin & Schaffer 1985). Experiments circulated through these inscription devices allowed scientists to share a common “experience” of natural phenomena even at a distance.

In the 1990s the interest in controversy studies declined in the sociology of science along with the authority of SSK. Studies of knowledge without attention to its power began to seem limited as a new generation of scholars came to the field after reading Foucault about power/knowledge. Controversy studies lost their Kuhnian significance, too, once fieldwork revealed that these struggles were part of the routine operation of normal science, and were rarely openings for fundamental change such as a paradigm shift. Conflict no longer had the caché of revolutionary potential, either. Sociologists were generally not so interested in revolution – even in historical sociology.

Sociologists drawn to science through post structuralism wanted to know how classification systems worked as political tools, shaping social life. Like ethnomethodologists and epistemologists, they were interested in language, but did not share the assumption that close technical readings of statements could capture meaning. Language was a tool for power, but one accessible to ordinary people and flexible in its uses. Meaning was a site of contest, not a route to a determined truth. These “cultural” scholars in science studies started to question the primacy of epistemological issues in SSK, wondering why philosophical debates were allowed to set research agendas for sociologists. Methodological symmetry still had appeal to postmodernists, feminists, and cultural analysts who were entering the field because the principle seemed useful for revealing the political aspects of drawing boundaries between science and nonscience. But many of these scholars eschewed the commitment to ethnography and relativism in SSK. They wanted to follow Foucault, using history to study the power of knowledge (Haraway 1989; Epstein 1996).

If knowledge defined the reality upon which political regimes founded their authority, it was not benign, but rather a means of gaining or stabilizing advantages. Epistemological issues were not technical questions, but rather tools for managing social forms of consciousness. SSK with its emphasis on knowledge practices could help scholars see the social foundations of truth claims, but it did not help analyze who was being advantaged or disadvantaged by the changing realities woven with scientific facts. The idea that solutions to problems of

knowledge were also solutions to problems of politics (Shapin & Schaffer 1985) linked power and knowledge, but not in the same way as Foucault. SSK was built on the assumption that there *could be* solutions to problems of knowledge. With Foucault, there was no such assurance or prospect of real stability. Knowledge, including social knowledge, was a means for exercising and justifying acts of domination. The controversies in SSK could be about nuclear weapons without the military significance of the work really requiring analytic attention. The new work in science studies had to consider how science and technology were used (Latour 2004).

Although the SSK version of controversy studies declined in intellectual importance, many elements of this early work continued into the 1990s. Scholars paid ongoing attention to instrumentation, for example (Clarke & Fujimura 1992). The techniques of research that Kuhn had described as fundamental to normal science and SSK researchers had noted as important to labs (Barnes 1977; Latour & Woolgar 1979; Knorr Cetina 1981) were now a free standing matters of research set between science and technology (Clarke & Fujimura 1992).

The patterns of trust that held allies together and helped to make regimes of truth both powerful and useful were also pursued in new ways. Porter (1995) looked at the role of mathematics in establishing bonds of trust both in social science and social policy circles. Controversy studies had been turned on their head. Now the question was explaining how cooperation and mutual understanding were possible within and across highly contested social worlds of science (Martin 1991; Epstein 1996).

The science/nonscience boundary was also approached in new ways by scholars interested in how scientific facts met ordinary life (Epstein 1996). Now sociologists of science wanted to consider expertise, how it was authorized, and in what ways it was used (Martin 1991; Porter 1995; Collins 2002; Latour 2004). Scientific controversies were now part of public debates about policy, law, and natural resources.

Most importantly, sociologists started to question the notion of closure in scientific debates. Oreskes (1999) showed that the complete rejection of continental drift as a theory of geology early in the twentieth century did not

prevent the revival of this theory after World War II. Similarly, Simon (2002) showed that research on cold fusion continued after this idea was discredited. Controversies seemed to be so common in science in part because some never did reach closure, and ideas that seemed beyond the pale could still find allies. Knorr Cetina (1999) even showed that different science had different epistemic cultures. There was no single test of truth that research findings could satisfy for all fields. What was called scientific was not monolithic.

Now many sociologists of science are interested in the role of science in political controversies (Latour 2004) and the contest of scientific ideas against other kinds of expert and lay knowledge. The interest in scientific controversies has been transformed. Sociologists are less concerned with the social processes determining what is legitimate science and more with the importance of science in the public sphere (Collins 2002). There has been a retreat from the relativism and methodological symmetry that were central to controversy studies in SSK. Some sociologists of science (Collins 2002) have become allies of scientists, championing their ways of knowing and arguing for its importance to social policy. In the face of the growing power of religion in public life, science has been redefined as a cornerstone of rationality that may be fallible and contested, but still remains vital as both a human collective activity and tool for shaping public life.

SEE ALSO: Epistemology; Ethnomethodology; Expertise, "Scientification," and the Authority of Science; Feminism and Science, Feminist Epistemology; Foucault, Michel; Knowledge, Sociology of; Kuhn, Thomas and Scientific Paradigms; Merton, Robert K.; Military Research and Science and War; Post structuralism; Technology, Science, and Culture; Trustworthiness

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convenience sample

Clifford E. Lunneborg

Convenience samples are best described as what they are not. They are non probability samples. That is, no attempt is made in their construction to sample randomly from any well defined population. Random sampling is almost always difficult and expensive, often prohibitively so. Convenience samples, as the name implies, are more easily obtained. They may be self selected respondents to a mail out survey. Or they may be readily to hand, patrons of a local gay bar who agree to be interviewed.

The non randomness of the convenience sample militates against straightforward inference from sample to population. The percentage of those who call in to a local talk show host and voice opposition to the proposed location of a halfway house for parolees cannot be taken as an unbiased estimate of the proportion opposed, for any population that a researcher might define. Berk and Freedman (2003) amply describe the mismatch between classical statistical inference and convenience sample data. In particular, they point to the difficult task of trying to link the social processes that lead to the convenience sample data and the assumptions underlying statistical inference.

Non randomness severely limits, but does not completely preclude, the possibility of gaining scientific knowledge from data contributed by a convenience sample. As a prime exhibit, the “gold standard” in medical research, the randomized clinical trial, almost always rests on a convenience sample, those patients who volunteer (or consent when asked) to participate. The key here is the randomization. The volunteer patients are randomly assigned either to a “standard treatment” group or to a “new treatment” group and their progress is studied following the administration of the corresponding treatment.

The randomization serves two important purposes. First, it serves to level the playing field; it is unlikely that the two treatment groups will differ on any characteristic that might influence their response to treatment, other than the actual differences in treatment. Second, the randomization creates two random

samples, albeit samples from a very limited, local population, the convenience sample itself. Nonetheless, the random samples facilitate statistical inference. We can draw inferences about the local population from the responses of the samples. And, owing to the randomization, those inferences have a causal implication, the differences in treatment causing the differences in response to treatment. The role of randomization in attributing causation is developed in Rubin (1991) and the use of randomization as a basis for statistical inference, originally proposed by Pitman (1937), is well described in Edgington (1995), Lunneborg (2000), and Ludbrook (2005).

Of course, the linkage of treatment and response, even a causal one, might be thought to be of little importance as it is established only for this convenience sample of patients. The importance of the linkage can be generalized, though, in either of two ways. First, the medical community may be in agreement that the patients in this local population are broadly like similarly diagnosed patients seen in other clinics. What was demonstrated here ought to hold true, they are willing to conclude, for other patients seen by other practitioners in other clinics. This form of generalization speaks to the distinction drawn by MacKay and Oldford (2001) between statistical inference directed at the population actually sampled and scientific inference (or generalization) directed at some larger target population. Having statistically established a (causal) linkage over the local population, we might propose to our scientific colleagues that the results generalize to a larger target population.

The second form of generalization is what Mook (2001) refers to as theoretical. If the linkage reliably established for the convenience sample via randomization and randomization based inference is grounded in a particular, explicit theory, then the results generalize the support for that theory. Or, of course, the convenience sample data could weaken the support for that theory if the results were to contradict theoretical predictions.

Random allocation among "treatments," though providing the strongest support for both causal and statistical inference from convenience sample studies, is not always possible. Rosenbaum and Rubin (1983) propose the use

of propensity scores as a surrogate for active randomization. Consider a convenience sample of active non monogamous male homosexuals, the members of which can be characterized as either "committed" or "uncommitted" to the use of condoms. The men were not randomized between the two orientations. Assume, though, that for the sample there is a relationship between the choice of condom behavior and certain characteristics of the men, e.g., their ages, years of education, employment stability, residential stability, length of "outage." This relationship can be used to assign to each man a propensity score, the modeled probability that he will be committed to the use of condoms. By restricting attention to those pairs of men, one committed and one not committed, who can be closely matched on their propensity scores, one can carry out as if randomized analyses. These provide a more reliable comparison of the behaviors of the two groups than would a raw between groups comparison. Rubin (1991) describes the conduct of one such study in great detail.

Convenience samples can be useful even where formal statistical inference would be inappropriate. They are suitable for pilot studies. Will respondents be able to understand the questions in this survey? Can we get volunteers for the proposed study who are of the target age? Further, it might be considered unwise to commit to a more critical (and expensive) study unless a postulated relationship were not first observed in a convenience sample.

Berk and Freedman (2003) stress the importance of replication and replicability in interpreting convenience sample studies. Is what we observe in this convenience sample consistent with what we have seen in other samples? Can we successfully predict from this sample what we will see in a second sample?

The convenience sample, intentionally neither random nor representative, may lack homogeneity as well. Our description of the sample data, then, may lack stability, as it may be strongly influenced by a small fraction of the sample. Berk and Freedman (2003) advocate the routine use of sensitivity analyses to guard against mistakenly describing the outcome of the convenience sample study. Lunneborg (2000) describes the use of subsamples of the non random sample to this end.

SEE ALSO: Chance and Probability; Random Sample; Replicability Analyses

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conversation

Dan E. Miller

A conversation is an exchange of thoughts and ideas between two or more people. An instance of focused interaction, a conversation occurs when people cooperate with each other in order to introduce and sustain a single focus of attention by taking turns talking with each other. Conversations are the most natural, most frequent, and most universal of all forms of

spoken language. Generally restricted to small groups, conversations involving larger groups tend to divide into several conversational groups. For example, even groups as small as four people tend to separate into two dyadic units.

The significance of conversations cannot be overstated. Much of day to day life is organized and carried out through conversations – from institutional conversations (as between supervisor and worker, physician and patient, or between representatives of labor and management) to more casual conversations (as between a couple getting to know each other or two friends being sociable over lunch). Conversely, when social relationships break down, conversations are the primary source of remediation. Through conversation conflicts are resolved, friendships are rekindled, and labor contracts negotiated.

The study of conversations has its roots in several academic subdisciplines. They are: symbolic interaction, sociolinguistics, ethnomethodology, and conversation analysis. Although concepts employed and methods of analysis vary, throughout each approach one finds an underlying concern for pragmatic questions – how conversations are constructed, how conversational openings and closings are accomplished, conversational difficulties between men and women, and how conversations can be repaired. By focusing their study on the microsocial worlds of naturally occurring conversations, analysts have uncovered a rich source of data pertaining to how the interaction and social order is constructed and maintained.

To become native speakers, children must learn words, pronunciation, and grammar. They also learn how to construct different forms of conversation. These include gossip, sociability, bargaining, negotiation, critical deliberation, playful repartee, argument, interviewing and interrogation, persuasion, reciprocal self disclosure, and coquetry. Each of these forms involves distinct interaction patterns and relationships between actors. For example, sociability is a form of interaction wherein the participants, as equals, move from one topic to the next, each expressing her views, demonstrating her knowledge, and introducing new topics as the conversation proceeds. On the

other hand, an interrogation is asymmetrical, wherein one participant controls the situation by asking questions, interrupting, forcing topics, making threats, and calling for accounts.

Also, conversations can range from the highly ordered to the seemingly chaotic. In some situations, conversations are constructed with orderly turn taking sequences wherein one speaks while the other listens. However, the politeness of this conversational form may not be present in other situations. Among family members or in groups of close friends a more raucous form of conversation may be constructed in which those involved are more passionate, employing interruptions, simultaneous talk, and friendly argumentative banter.

Conversations are not restricted to face to face situations; they may be conducted via telephones, two way radios, the Internet, or with the exchange of letters. The technological limitations of these media require a strict adherence to the polite turn taking rule – one speaks or writes while the other listens or waits. In these situations simultaneous talking or writing destroys the topical continuity and interaction reciprocity that form the basis of all conversation.

SEE ALSO: Conversation Analysis; Discourse; Ethnomethodology; Interaction; Sociolinguistics; Symbolic Interaction

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conversation analysis

Anssi Perakyla

Conversation analysis (CA) is a method for investigating the structure and process of social interaction between humans. It focuses primarily on talk, but integrates also the nonverbal aspects of interaction in its research design. As their data, CA studies use video or audio recordings made from naturally occurring interaction. As their results, CA studies yield descriptions of recurrent structures and practices of social interaction. Some of these, such as turn taking or sequence structure, are involved in all interaction, whereas others are more specific and have to do with particular actions, such as asking questions or delivering and receiving news, assessments, or complaints. CA studies can focus either on ordinary conversations taking place between acquaintances or family members, or on institutional encounters where the participants accomplish their institutional tasks through their interaction. CA elucidates basic aspects of human sociality that reside in talk, and it examines the ways in which specific social institutions are invoked in, and operate through, talk.

CA was started by Harvey Sacks and his co-workers – most importantly Emanuel Schegloff and Gail Jefferson – at the University of California in the 1960s. The initial formation of Sacks's ideas is documented in his lectures from 1964 to 1972 (Sacks 1992a, 1992b). CA was developed in an intellectual environment shaped by Goffman's work on the moral underpinnings of social interaction and Garfinkel's ethnomethodology focusing on the interpretive procedures underlying social action. Sacks started to study the real time sequential ordering of actions: the rules, patterns, and structures in the relations between actions. Thereby, he made a radical shift in the perspective of

social scientific inquiry into social interaction: instead of treating social interaction as a screen upon which other processes (moral, inferential, or others) were projected, Sacks started to study the very structures of the interaction itself (Schegloff 1992a: xviii).

MAJOR DIMENSIONS

There are perhaps three basic features shared by CA studies: (1) they focus on *action*, (2) the *structures* of which they seek to explicate, and thereby (3) they investigate the achievement of *intersubjective understanding*. As general research topics, these three would be shared by many “schools” of social science. The uniqueness of CA, however, is in the way in which it shows how “action,” “structure,” and “intersubjectivity” are practically achieved and managed in talk and interaction.

Action

Some CA studies have as their topics the organization of actions that are recognizable as distinct actions even from a vernacular point of view. These include, for example, openings and closings of conversations, assessments, story telling, and complaints. Many CA studies have as their topic actions that are typical in some institutional environment. Examples include questioning and answering practices in cross examinations, news interviews and press conferences, and diagnosis and advice in medical and pedagogical settings. Finally – but perhaps most importantly – many conversation analytical studies focus on fundamental aspects of conversational organization that make any action possible. These include turn taking, repair (i.e., the ways of dealing with problems of hearing, speaking, or understanding), the general ways in which sequences of action are built, and the ways in which the participants of interaction manage their relation to the utterances through gaze and body posture.

Structure

In the CA view, human social action is thoroughly structured and organized. In pursuing their goals, the actors have to orient themselves

to rules and structures that make their actions possible.

Sacks et al. (1974) outlined the rules of turn taking in conversation. A current speaker is initially entitled to one *turn constructional unit* (smallest amount of talk that in its sequential context counts as a turn). The participants in interaction orient to the completion of such a unit as a *transition relevance place* where the speaker change may occur. A current speaker may select the next; if she does not do that, any participant can self select at the transition relevance place; and if even that does not happen, the current speaker may (but need not) continue. The explication of these simple rules has massive consequences for the analysis of social interaction, because virtually all spoken actions are produced and received in the matrix provided by them. Many institutional settings involve specific applications of these rules (Drew & Heritage 1992).

Single acts are parts of larger, structurally organized entities. These entities can be called *sequences* (Schegloff 2006). The most basic and the most important sequence is called *adjacency pair* (Schegloff & Sacks 1973), consisting of two actions in which the first action (“first pair part”), performed by one interactant, invites a particular type of second action (“second pair part”), to be performed by another interactant. Typical examples of adjacency pairs include question answer, greeting greeting, request grant/refusal, and invitation acceptance/declination. The relation between the first and the second pair parts is strict and normative: if the second pair part does not come forth, the first speaker can for example repeat the first action, or seek explanations for the fact that the second is missing.

Adjacency pairs serve often as a core, around which even larger sequences are built (Schegloff 2006). So, a *pre expansion* can precede an adjacency pair; an *insert expansion* involves actions that occur between the first and the second pair parts and make possible the production of the latter; and in a *post expansion*, the speakers produce actions that follow from the basic adjacency pair.

Intersubjectivity

In CA studies, talk and interaction are examined as a site where intersubjective understanding

concerning the participants' intentions, their state of knowledge, their relation, and their stance towards the talked about objects is created, maintained, and negotiated (Heritage & Atkinson 1984: 11).

The most fundamental level of intersubjective understanding – one that constitutes the basis for any other type of intersubjective understanding – concerns the understanding of the preceding turn displayed by the current speaker. Just like any turn at talk is produced in the context shaped by the previous turn, it also displays its speaker's understanding of that previous turn (Sacks et al. 1974). Thus, in simple cases, producing a turn at talk that is hearable as an answer, the speaker also shows that she understood the preceding turn as a question. Especially in longer utterances, the recipient's understanding of, and stance towards, the co-participants' action can be displayed through vocal and nonvocal means during the production of that action, and this displayed understanding can inform the further unfolding of that action. In cases where the first speaker considers the understanding concerning his talk, displayed in the second speaker's utterance, as problematic, the first speaker has an opportunity for correcting this understanding in his or her subsequent talk (Schegloff 1992b).

An important aspect of intersubjective understanding concerns the *context* of the talk. This is particularly salient in institutional interaction where the participants' understanding of the institutional context of their talk is documented in their actions (Drew & Heritage 1992). If the "institutional context" is relevant for interaction, it can be observed in the details of the participants' actions; for example, in their ways of giving and receiving information and asking and answering questions.

Research Process

As their data, conversation analytical studies use video or audio recordings of naturally occurring social interaction. Video and audio recordings give the researcher direct access to the details of social action, and they make it possible to scrutinize the data over and over again. The focus on naturally occurring data entails that the researcher investigates specimens rather than

representations of the actual social action that he wants to understand. The video or audio recordings are transcribed using a detailed notation. The notation of audio data was developed by Gail Jefferson and it includes symbols for a wide variety of vocal and interactional phenomena. The transcription of visual data is less standardized, except for a widely used notation for gaze direction developed by Goodwin (1981). The transcript is not a substitute for the audio and video recordings: researchers recurrently return to the original recordings.

The analysis of the data proceeds from case by case examination of data, through creation of collections of phenomena that become objects of study, towards the explication of the structural features of the phenomena. In this process, a careful examination of *deviant cases* is of greatest importance.

Example

The conversation analytical transcription and some of its analytical concepts are exemplified in the following segment taken from Pomerantz (1980).

- 01 B: Hello::,
- 02 A: HI:::
- 03 B: Oh:hi:: 'ow are you Agne::s,
- 04 A: Fi:ne. Yer line's been busy.
- 05 B: Yeuh my fu (hh) .hh my father's wife called me.

CA notation used in this segment includes:

- . Period indicating falling intonation at the end of an utterance
- , Comma indicating flat intonation at the end of an utterance
- : Colon indicating prolongation of sound
- a Underlining indicating emphasis
- hh Row of h's indicating aspiration
- .hh Row of h's preceded by a dot indicating inhalation
- A Capital letters indicating louder volume than surrounding talk

As Schegloff (1986) has shown, the openings of telephone conversations, as the one above, usually consist of four short sequences: (1) Summons (telephone ringing, not shown in the transcript) and answer (line 1); (2) identification/recognition (accomplished in lines 1–3);

(3) greetings (lines 2–3); (4) and “howareyou” sequence (lines 3–4). In a very dense form, these sequences establish the setting for the interaction and reinvoke the social relation between the participants.

B’s answer to the “howareyou” is, in line 4, followed by her assertion that A’s line has been busy. The assertion is about an event that the co participant (A) has a privileged access to (as it was her line). Pomerantz shows how assertions of this kind serve as “fishing devices” which cast their recipient in a position where it becomes relevant for him or her to speak about the referred to event. However, fishing takes place without the subject directly asking for information: the recipient, if he or she will speak about the event, will *volunteer* the information. That is what B does in line 5, where she tells who she was talking with. Pomerantz identified and explicated a particular form of social action that is recurrently resorted to in ordinary conversation. Subsequent studies have shown how this generic sequence can be made use of in eliciting clients’ talk in institutional encounters in psychiatric and counseling settings.

CURRENT AREAS OF EXPANSION

Since the early 1990s the study of institutional interaction has proliferated. Medical interactions and interactions in the media are currently among the most intensively researched settings; the study of technological working environments (Heath & Luff 2000) has also been strongly influenced by the CA method. Another area of intensive study is the interface between grammar and social interaction (Ochs et al. 1996), focusing on questions such as the construction of turns and repair. Yet another area of expansion involves the exploration of the uses of prosody (Couper Kuhlen & Selting 1996) and gesture (Goodwin 2000) in social interaction. There is also an ongoing debate concerning the applicability of quantitative techniques, along with qualitative ones, in CA studies.

SEE ALSO: Conversation; Discourse; Ethno methodology; Goffman, Erving; Quantitative Methods; Sacks, Harvey; Sociolinguistics; Symbolic Interaction

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convivium (who is friends with whom?)

Beate Volker

The degree to which people from different social strands have relations with each other indicates social cohesion. Therefore, the question of who is friends with whom is nontrivial. Compared to marriage, friendship is a non-institutionalized relationship: there is no formal start of a friendship and one can break off or change a friendship without notifying any third parties.

A generally accepted principle is that people prefer being friends with others who are like themselves. Interactions with similar others are rewarding (Homans 1984: 158). Seminal research has been done by Lazarsfeld and Merton (1954), who discuss value and status homophily affecting the selection of friends. Yet explanatory mechanisms differ among theories: *demand* side theories focus on individual preferences, while *supply* side theories are directed to the distribution of meeting chances in society. Important demand side perspectives are balance theory (Heider 1946) and the theory of social capital (on a micro level, Flap 2004). Important supply side perspectives are (macro) structuralism (Blau 1977) and focus theory (Feld 1981). An integration of both perspectives is the choice constraint approach (Fischer et al. 1977).

With regard to demand side perspectives, balance theory states that a friendship between two actors depends on their relationship with a third party. If two actors have a positive relation to a third party, they are likely to also form a positive relationship with each other. Yet if one actor has a positive and the other a negative relationship to a third party, the positive relationship is less likely. The theory assumes that imbalance in relationships produces a strain, which people reduce by changing or breaking off relationships. Importantly, balance theory takes existing friendships into account when it comes to the decision to create a new one. Further, social capital theory states that people become friends if they face a common future, if they are in one or another way dependent on

each other, or if they have invested in the relationship formerly.

The most prominent supply side theory is Blau's (1977) structural approach, which abandons a pure micro level exchange perspective and takes macro structures into account. Patterns of homophily are dependent on relative group sizes in the population. Interestingly, if different individual attributes are not closely correlated, intergroup associations can result despite the preference for ingroup associations. Related to the importance of numerical distribution is the argument on geographical proximity. Proximity reduces costs of interaction and facilitates the emergence of mutual trust. Furthermore, focus theory generalizes from numbers and places and assumes that individuals who share foci of activity have higher chances for meeting, and therefore greater chances for becoming friends (Feld 1981).

Lastly, the choice constraint approach emphasizes that relationships are the result of individual choices made under social constraints (Fischer et al. 1977). People choose to construct and maintain social exchanges with some of those whom they encounter and they make this choice on the basis of weighing rewards and costs.

Like marriage, friendship is a relationship that occurs among those who are similar in relevant social dimensions, like age, education, class, ethnicity, and religion (Laumann 1973; Fischer et al. 1977). Yet, unlike marriages, cross sex friendships are a rare phenomenon. With regard to age, Fischer et al. (1977) found that 38 percent of respondents' close friends were within 2 years of their age. Friendships are class sensitive in general, yet similarity is highest within higher classes. With regard to ethnicity, friends are also remarkably similar in ethnicity. Esser (1989) found that even second generation immigrants in Germany had friendship networks that were largely in their own group. Cohen (1977) showed that Jewish and black people have the highest tendency for ingroup association and Scottish people the lowest. Further, Protestants are somewhat more ingroup oriented than Catholics. Little research has been done on the question of whether similarity in one social dimension is associated with similarity in another. An

exception is the study by Jackson (1977), which shows that friends who work in the same economic sector also have a higher chance to be similar in education, age, and ethnicity.

A number of studies focus on the question "who has friends" rather than on who is a friend to whom. Interesting findings have been provided, showing that structural characteristics strongly influence people's associations. For example, married people have fewer friends than unmarried people and higher educated and richer people have more friends. With increasing age, the number of friends first increases, but then decreases. Lastly, numbers of friends also differ between people from different countries.

Tests of balance theory largely corroborate the "friends of friends are friends" proposition. Yet the difference between cognitive balance (indicating a state of mind) versus structural balance (indicating the structure of personal networks) should be taken more seriously in research.

Research into friendship and social capital mainly studies what friends can do for each other in order to achieve important individual goals. It has been shown that strong ties are not important in attaining things like a job (Granovetter 1995). Weaker ties are more important for these kinds of achievements. Fischer (1982) showed, in addition, that friends are not important for monetary transactions or any other material exchanges. Furthermore, while friendships are important for all kinds of social activities, they are not that important for matters of serious advice.

Blau's macro structural theory has been tested by Blum (1985) for socializing relationships and with regard to ethnic and religious heterogeneity. Blum demonstrated that while there are preferences for ingroup association, structural conditions exert substantial constraints. Heterogeneous populations promote intergroup relationships. McPherson and Smith Lovin (1987) also provide a test of Blau's theory and find evidence for the higher importance of group composition compared to individual preferences.

Concerning the social settings from which friends are drawn, Feld (1981) found that 68 percent of the relationships of the respondents in his study were formed in a shared setting

with roughly a third in work or voluntary associations (see also Marsden 1990). Social settings differ in the degree to which they enhance friendship formation. Friends drawn from childhood are most similar in age, friends drawn from the work setting are most similar in occupational level, and friends drawn from a kin setting are above all similar in ethnicity (Jackson 1977). Furthermore, the importance of settings for recruiting friends differs between classes and life stages and also between countries.

Friends are remarkably similar to each other in various dimensions, and the tendency to associate with similar others differs according to age, education, class, ethnicity, and religion. The degree to which similarity in one dimension is associated with similarity in another is rarely investigated. Furthermore, friendships are drawn from different sources and the dimension on which friends are similar partially depends on the source from which the friends are recruited.

Both perspectives, demand as well as supply side, have been corroborated in research, and although there is some evidence that the supply side might be even more important, it is not clear what the relative importance of preferences and constraints in friendship choice would be. It is furthermore noteworthy that systematic empirical accounts on "convivium" are somewhat dated and restricted to the US. Future research has the task to overcome these shortcomings. In addition, the assumption that everybody needs and has friends might not be true. Lastly, most research concentrates on friendship dyads and not on networks, thereby disregarding the fact that friendship relationships are not exclusive relationships, but are embedded in social networks.

SEE ALSO: *Connubium (Who Marries Whom?)*; *Friendship: Structure and Context*; *Friendships of Children*; *Social Change*

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cool

Ellis Cashmore

Cool emerged in indifferent response to the great surge of optimism that followed World War II. It was driven by the rhythms of the bebop music of Miles Davis and Charlie Parker, a rebellious, musical counterpart to the abstract expressionism of De Kooning, Jackson Pollock, and Franz Kline.

Vincent (1995) approaches cool as a style, an attitude, and an approach to music (and, we might add, art in general) that reflected the temperament of groups of African Americans including John Coltrane, Miles Davis, and other musicians who identified with cool. They literally turned their back on audiences, as if to signify their defiance and intentions not to become entertainers, at least not entertainers in the way of the earlier minstrels, who pandered to whites' conceptions of blacks.

The cool ethic informed a self conscious turning away from playing or performing simply for the delectation of whites – which is what the minstrels had done. Cool jazz musicians did not want to extend this tradition: they played for themselves and for each other, and if whites were willing to pay to watch, so be it. There was no concession; there was no acting up to stereotypes. Being cool implied a rejection of the values that ensured the subjugation of blacks, politically and culturally. Cool conveyed a covert anger, which, if ever made overt, would draw retribution from white society. Instead, musicians detached themselves from their audiences and created a manner, a posture, a “look,” and even an argot, all recognizable to those who shared their orientation yet invisible and inaccessible to outsiders, known as squares.

Heroin became integral to the aura of cool. Its users included many jazz musicians who coalesced into a junkie subculture and so reinforced the sense of isolation from mainstream society, while promoting an in group of users and dealers. Sidran (1995) argues that the drug was well suited to cool musicians as it suppressed emotional excesses and allayed anxieties.

Charlie Parker had used heroin since he was 12 years old and was one of countless jazz

players and aficionados who became dependent on and were ultimately destroyed by the drug. “These musicians were less secular stars than quasi religious figures and their fans often referred to them with godly reverence,” wrote Nelson George in his *The Death of Rhythm and Blues* (1988: 25).

If artists wishing to break into the main stream were playing the whites’ game, cool musicians decided the game was not worth playing. They remained almost arrogantly outside the musical establishment, attracting little interest from record corporations.

Like most gestures of defiance that start life among a circle of like minded rebels, cool became appropriated by both blacks and whites who were fascinated perhaps not by the politics of cool so much as by the external appearance, its image. To look unflappable in the face of turmoil, to prefix and suffix sentences with “man” or “baby,” to talk with a hip sounding slur that made you sound as if you were on heroin, to wear apparel with a certain looseness, to walk with a distinct swagger: all these were features of cool that were soon seized by what Norman Mailer once called the “white Negro” and were eventually dissipated. Jack Kerouac and the beat generation of which he was part embraced many of the idioms and some of the values inherent in cool; a critical pulse of scornful, mocking contempt for orthodoxy ran through both.

Even today, we use the term without reflecting on its source in African American culture and on its eventual ramification. Sidran concludes that the disaffection behind the cool movement was much the same as that behind the much more overt expressions of the 1960s (e.g., race riots).

SEE ALSO: Cultural Resistance; Culture Industries; Identity, Deviant; Music and Media; Popular Culture Forms (Hip Hop; Jazz; Rock ‘n’ Roll); Popular Culture Icons (Hendrix, Jimi; Marley, Bob); Subculture

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Cooley, Charles Horton (1864–1929)

Hans Joachim Schubert

Charles Horton Cooley was a prominent member of the founding generation of American sociologists. Named a full professor of sociology at the University of Michigan in 1907, he was then elected president of the American Sociological Association in 1918. It was his aim and achievement to apply the ideas of pragmatism to the development of a sociological theory of social action, social order, and social change, which he ultimately accomplished with his trilogy (Cooley 1963, 1964, 1966).

Cooley achieved the transition from the philosophy of the mind to a pragmatistic theory of action and communication in the course of his criticism of Descartes’s proposition *cogito ergo sum*. For Descartes, only “a self absorbed philosopher” isolated from other people (Cooley 1963: 6) can discover through spiritual contemplation or introspection (*cogito*) the meaning of the objective, social or subjective world (*sum*). According to Cooley, this position is not self evident (*ergo*). Rather, the meaning or value of objects is defined by actors in situations of symbolic mediated interaction (Cooley 1966: 284). Cooley argued that Descartes should have said *cogitamus* rather than *cogito*. The prerequisite for the generalization of meaning or social order is that individuals be able to coordinate actions using significant or “standard symbols” (Cooley 1963: 63). For Cooley, “communication” is the deciding “mechanism through which human relations exist” (Cooley 1969a: 61). Due to the “plasticity” of human nature (Cooley 1964: 19), neither the identity of the self nor the social order of society is instinctive. Individuation can only take place through socialization (and vice versa) (i.e., in interaction

with the social environment; more specifically, through “mutual understanding”). Thus, the discussion on Darwinism regarding the mechanism that enables human beings to deal with environmental change played a central role in the foundation and historical development of sociology. In that debate, Cooley veered away from the philosophy of the mind, but without pursuing approaches such as instinct psychology (McDougall), psychology of crowds (Le Bon), imitation or suggestion theory (Tarde, Ross). Cooley recognized that social macro structures, as well as structures of communities and individuals, develop through communicative interaction. The central “thesis” – his “organic view” – that he conceptualized at the end of the 1900s and later completed in his trilogy, is that sociability and individual autonomy are two sides of the interaction and communication process. “Communication” was his “first real conquest” he has been “working out ever since” (Cooley 1969b: 8).

In the first part of his trilogy, *Human Nature and Social Order*, he examines the “distributive aspect” (Cooley 1964: 37) of intersubjective relationships from a social psychological perspective; namely, the development of the self through symbolically mediated interaction. Cooley reconstructed three progressive phases of the evolving self: (1) the “sense of appropriation,” which is the expression of a biologically manifested spontaneity and activity; (2) the “social self,” which is developed by taking in the attitude of others; and (3) the famous “looking glass self” (Cooley 1998: 155–75), which describes neither an “over socialized self” characterized by passive internalization of given habits and values, nor an “unencumbered self” freed from all social constraints. The metaphor “looking glass self,” as Cooley explicitly declared, means not a “mere mechanical reflection of ourselves,” but it represents an open and distinctive self image, created through the imagination and interpretation of the world we inhabit. A looking glass self, according to Cooley, has three “principal elements”: first, the imagination of our appearance to the other person; second, the imagination of his judgment of that appearance; and third, some sort of self feeling, such as “pride or mortification” (Cooley 1964: 184). Like William James and

James Mark Baldwin, Cooley considered the development of the self to be a process of interaction between the self and the surrounding world. But unlike James, who saw this process as an “appropriation” of the world, and unlike Baldwin, who held the methods of “ejection,” “accommodation,” and “imitation” responsible for the constitution of the self, Cooley described the mechanisms that mediate between self and society as “communication” and “understanding.” With this, he rejected utilitarian approaches on the one hand, which assume a given autonomy of the self without taking anthropological and societal preconditions into consideration, and on the other hand rejected culturalistic and structural deterministic approaches, which can only reconstruct subjectivity within the framework of social norms and cultural values.

In the second part of his trilogy, *Social Organization*, Cooley avoids the dualism of “utilitarianism” and “normativism” as well, when he defines the sociological or “collective aspects” of social action (primary group, public opinion, democracy, social classes and institutions). His term *primary group* contains the first response to the question of social order. Primary groups are “face to face associations” such as “the family, the play group of children, and the neighborhood or community group of elders.” They are “primary” because the “social nature” and the “ideals of the individual” develop in these interactive relationships. On the one hand, primary groups are “not independent of the larger society”; their normative rules are influenced through “special traditions” of the respective society, and on the other hand, primary groups are also marked by “universal” communicative structures (Cooley 1963: 27). Parent–child communicative relationships, for example, are beyond cultural differences because the adoption of social roles and the development of personality can only occur when children are able to participate in reciprocal forms of social action. The mechanism of learning is communication and understanding and not conditioning. The specific harmony of communities, customs, and traditions develops through the universal mechanism of “mutual understanding.” Cooley does not define the term “primary group” or “community”

(*Gemeinschaft*) as Tönnies does (whose concept Weber and Durkheim adopted), with the help of a normativistic or even ontological concept of human action (*Wesenwille*); much less does he identify society (*Gesellschaft*) with a purely rational concept of human action (*Kurwille*), since communal norms and traditions, as well as societal interests and institutions, are the result of communicative and creative human actions. Contrary to Tönnies, Cooley saw that individuals experience solidarity, equality, and freedom as characteristics of the communication process, directly in communities. With this reformulation of the premises of enlightenment, based on a theory of human action, Cooley wants to avoid reducing the establishment of values to Natural Law and procedural theory. Democracy is, therefore, for him, not only a form of government, but also a way of living that is grounded in primary group experiences. In primary groups, individuals acquire the social competence and normative ideals that are the prerequisites for societal democratization. Democracy is endangered if, in primary groups, democratic options are masked by undemocratic cultural traditions. A further “primary aspect” of social organization is the “mind of the group.” The development of a “social consciousness” leads Cooley neither mentalistically nor metaphysically back to transcendental structures of the mind, nor does he define the collective consciousness positivistically as a “social fact” (Durkheim). Cooley shows, in contrast, based on communications theory, that “public consciousness,” as with all forms of social order, comes about through “interaction” and “mutual influence,” if not expressly through “agreement” (Cooley 1963: 10–11). “Public impressions” emerge when actors formulate demands in the public sphere because they are affected by social problems. Cooley does speak of *public opinion*, but only when the negative consequences of actions are evaluated and dealt with in public discourse. Unlike proponents of utilitarianism, Cooley does not reduce democracy to a consensual balance between fractional interests, nor, like Rousseau, to a “common will” (*volonté générale*). Democracy consists of deliberations through which the identities of the participants, their social bonds, as well as the organizational and institutional structures of

the society, are constantly changing. An important “collective aspect” of democracy is that of *social classes*, which enable actors confronted with structural inequalities to generate consciousness and political power. In the confrontation between classes, the deliberations are not only about economic, but also about cultural capital, which the “leisure class” uses to secure its hegemony (Veblen, in Cooley 1963: 119). Social classes are part of democracy, which is only endangered when classes close socially and refuse public discussion. Classes, like all institutions, are “a definite and established phase of the public mind” or “a mature, specialized and comparatively rigid part of the social structure.” *Institutions* are, over time and space, expanded structures of action such as “enduring sentiments, beliefs, customs” and large organizations such as “the government, the church and laws,” but also microsocietal “apperceptive systems” and individual “habits of mind and of action.” Institutions unburden actions and cultivate the “permanent needs of human nature.” As “organized attitudes,” they provide important options for individuals and, simultaneously, they also limit their activities. “The individual,” according to Cooley, “is always cause as well as effect of the institution” (Cooley 1963: 313–19). Due to ongoing environmental changes, institutions must constantly be recreated. Social “disorganization” arises when actors cannot solve problems of action because institutional change is blocked.

Cooley set up his conception of social change as a creative search and experiment process in the third part of his trilogy, *Social Process*. In it, Cooley discusses terms such as intelligence, reconstruction, anticipation, and creativity. Because the theory of social change, in tandem with a critique of ontological and teleological theories of action, is at the core of pragmatism, these terms have central importance for all pragmatists. Individual actions have their origin, according to Cooley, in “suggestions” and “habits” of the social world. Nevertheless, generalized meanings never provide complete answers to specific situations and concrete action problems; they must therefore be reconstructed in experiments and tentative trial phases. Drawing on past experience, actors continuously create ideas and hypotheses they

can test as new habits. Most significant in the sequence of action (habit, conflict, experiment, and new habit) is the experimental phase of “imaginative reconstruction” (Cooley 1966: 358). According to Cooley, the rationality of human action is not based on the context of justification, but on the context of discovery, on the invention of new ideas through “creative synthesis” derived from experiences: the “test of intelligence is the power to act successfully in new situations” (Cooley 1966: 351–3). Tentative and creative action is not only the mechanism of social change, but also of social order. The pivotal point is that social order is guaranteed neither through the pressure of inner or outer nature (behaviorism and empiricism), nor through the internalization of social norms (normativism). Nor is it warranted through a metaphysical mind (idealism), nor reflected in a balance or aggregation of rational individual action (utilitarianism); rather, social order is a constant interpretation and reconstruction of generalized meaning (pragmatism). Social order or “life itself” is not a “state” but a “process.” Thus, we cannot “expect anything final,” but we can “discover in the movement itself sufficient matter for reason and faith” (Cooley 1966: 377). For Cooley, social action is not limited either to the rational pursuit of clear goals or to the execution of social norms. With his pragmatistic social theory Cooley avoids the *homo oeconomicus* and *homo sociologicus*, showing that neither subjective ends (individuum) nor generalized behavioral expectations (society) are a given; they are instead constituted and stabilized through creative action. Therefore, for him, open questions and conflicts are basic motivations for actions, not, as in utilitarianism, the maximization of given ends and also not, as in normativism, internalized social facts (Cooley 1966: 241–54). Social order is consequently not a state of balanced individual interests and not an autonomous normative structure determining the boundaries of action, but rather a process of permanent “imaginative reconstruction” of social, subjective, and objective meanings.

With his trilogy, Cooley established a general pragmatistic sociology, elaborating a theory of social action, social order, and social change. This integrated approach is unique, and was not achieved either by his contemporary

George Herbert Mead or by members of the Chicago School of sociology and symbolic interactionism who followed the Cooley–Mead approach.

SEE ALSO: Chicago School; Looking Glass Self; Mead, George Herbert; Pragmatism; Primary Groups; Social Order; Social Change; Symbolic Interaction

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corrections

Melvina Sumter

Corrections is the subsystem of the criminal justice system responsible for the care, custody, and control of juveniles and adults who have been accused of committing a criminal offense

and offenders who have been convicted of committing a crime. As such, the apparatus of corrections, through either institutional confinement or non institutional alternatives, consists of a variety of agencies, institutions, programs, and services necessary to manage accused suspects and convicted offenders who are remanded to their care.

HISTORY

Historically, offenders were punished through the use of various forms of torture, corporal punishment, capital punishment, banishment, or fines. In colonial America, prisons as we know them did not exist; instead, prisons were used as holding cells for the purpose of eliciting a confession. In order to extract a confession, oftentimes brutal torture was administered, which was then followed by the penalty of a fine, but more often capital punishment or banishment. During this period, there were few written laws or prescribed codes for law violations, very harsh and brutal torture and corporal punishment, and extensive use of public executions.

In response to these autocracies, a wing at the Walnut Street Jail in Philadelphia was expanded from a typical jail that held debtors and those awaiting punishment into a wing called the "penitentiary house" of 16 separate cells designed for solitary confinement (Friedman 1993). Inspired by the work of the Quakers who believed that offenders could be reformed if they were placed in solitary confinement, where they could reflect on their criminal wrongdoings and thereby repent, this system of prison discipline became the first penitentiary used exclusively for the correction of convicted offenders in the United States (Stinchcomb & Fox 1999). As such, the main element of this system called for the reform of the offenders through hard labor and solitary confinement at night to prevent external communication, limited low tone conversation prior to bedtime, and silence enforced in the shops and at meals (Inciardi 1987; Friedman 1993).

The Walnut Street Jail served as the model for what became known as the Auburn and Eastern penitentiary systems. Influenced by

many of the principles of the Walnut Street Jail, the Auburn Penitentiary was opened in New York in 1817 and erected a portion of the new facility on that model (Stinchcomb & Fox 1999). However, as a result of reports of high rates of insanity and suicides, the concept of complete solitary confinement proved to be a failure. This concept was therefore discontinued and replaced by a system that became known as the congregate system (Mays & Winfree 2002). The congregate system allowed offenders to work together in workshops during the day while forbidding any type of communication and imposing sleep in isolation at night. Later, in 1829, a complete system of solitary confinement was adopted at Eastern State Penitentiary in Philadelphia where the offenders were only removed from their cells when they were sick or released from prison; as such, they ate, slept, received moral instruction, and worked in their cells (Clear & Cole 2003).

RATIONALE FOR PUNISHMENT

Throughout the history of corrections four major justifications have dominated the field at different times, to explain why offenders are punished.

Retribution is the oldest justification for punishment. Dating back to biblical times, it refers to revenge or retaliation for a harm or wrong done to another individual where the wrongful act is repaid by a punishment that is as severe as the wrongful act (Newman 1985). The theoretical premise of retribution is that punishment is inflicted on a law violator who deserves to be punished as repayment in proportion to the severity of the offense or the extent to which others have been made to suffer (Clear & Cole 2003).

Deterrence is a penal philosophy which states that the aim of punishment is to prevent future offenses by example to both the offenders (specific deterrence) and individuals who may be contemplating committing an offense (general deterrence) (Newman 1985). The theoretical premise of deterrence is that if the threat of punishment is severe enough, people will be dissuaded from committing a criminal offense.

Rehabilitation is the penal philosophy which maintains that the aim of punishment is to bring about reform and change in offenders, thereby helping them attain or regain a proper concern for law and become law abiding productive citizens (Duff 1995). The theoretical premise of rehabilitation is that offenders can be reformed by providing vocational, educational, or treatment programs (Clear & Cole 2003).

Incapacitation is the penal philosophy which states that the purpose of punishment is to reduce the likelihood of crime by physically restricting an offender's ability to commit an offense. The theoretical premise underlying incapacitation is that if offenders are locked up, it will curtail their ability to commit additional crimes (Stinchcomb & Fox 1999).

COMPONENTS OF CORRECTIONS

While prisons and jails are the most visible components of corrections, a significant part of corrections is unrelated to the imprisonment of the offender. A vast part of corrections is carried out in the community setting (Stinchcomb & Fox 1999). As such, corrections is divided into custodial institutions which are used to incarcerate accused suspects and convicted offenders and non custodial, community based alternatives which are designed to carry out the sentence imposed by the court in the community. The custodial institutions include jails and prisons and the community based alternatives include probation, intermediate sanctions, and parole.

Jails are considered to be the gateway to the criminal justice system. They are typically administered by the county; however, in some localities, jails are administered by a regional, state, or federal law enforcement agency. The primary functions of jails are to hold suspects who are apprehended as well as suspects who are not released on bail (Stinchcomb & Fox 1999). Jails also house offenders who are convicted of crimes and sentenced to a year or less, who are sentenced to more than one year and are awaiting transfer to a federal or state prison, probation and parole violators, and bail absconders.

Probation is a conditional sentence imposed by the court in lieu of incarceration, which allows a convicted offender to serve the sanction in the community under the supervision of a

probation officer. As such, probation generally replaces a term in an institution and is a contract between the court and the offender in which the former agrees to a prison term if the terms of probation are not met. Since probation is a conditional sentence, offenders sentenced under this option are required to meet a number of conditions which can be revoked at any time should the provisions be violated. Probation revocation may occur if there is a new arrest or conviction or a technical violation in which the probationer fails to abide by the rules and conditions of probation. If the offender successfully completes the terms of probation, he or she is discharged at the expiration of the sentence.

Intermediate sanctions are a range of punishment options that fall on a continuum between traditional probation and incarceration, which vary in intrusiveness and control over the offender. These sanctions are imposed on offenders who are perceived to require more rigorous supervision than traditional probation services provide, but less restrictive supervision than imprisonment (Clear & Cole 2003). As such, intermediate sanctions include a wide variety of penalties that allow a judge to match the severity of the punishment with the severity of the offense, such as community service, electronic monitoring and house arrest, restitution and fines, day reporting centers, house arrest and electronic monitoring, halfway houses, drug courts, boot camps, and intensive supervision probation (ISP).

Prisons, also called correctional facilities or penitentiaries, house offenders with sentences that range from one year to life. These facilities are designed to receive, house, and care for offenders as well as provide the programs and services necessary to prevent escapes, maintain a secure and safe environment, and promote the efficient functioning of the overall institution (Stinchcomb & Fox 1999). In order to accomplish these goals, prisons operate at varying levels of security classification which are maximum, medium, and minimum depending on the offenders' perceived level of dangerousness, offense committed, sentence length, and escape risk.

Parole is the conditional release of an offender from prison before the expiration of the sentence, after a portion of the sentence has

been served, where the offender remains under the continued supervision of the state or federal government. Since parole is a form of conditional release, like probation, it can be revoked for failure to maintain the conditions upon which it was granted or if there is a new arrest or conviction.

CORRECTIONS TODAY

The apparatus of corrections changed drastically during the latter part of the twentieth century.

The United States moved from an emphasis on rehabilitation back to a form of retribution, known as "Just Deserts." As such, the current trend is to have tougher criminal justice legislation and provide more punitive penalties. These policies are designed to provide offenders with longer sentences and keep them in prison longer. For example, sentence enhancement statutes such as determinate sentencing, mandatory minimums, and three strikes authorize judges to impose longer sentences. Likewise, legislation such as truth in sentencing which usually requires that offenders serve at least 85 percent of the maximum sentence imposed by the court and the abolition of parole have contributed to their remaining in prison longer. In addition, there has been an influx of waiver transfer of juveniles to adult prisons and the expanded use of capital punishment. As such, since the 1970s there has been an unprecedented growth in individuals under some form of correctional supervision.

The rate of increase in the US prison population was not the only astounding feature of the imprisonment binge (Blomberg & Lucken 2000). The change in the composition of the prison population was equally dramatic. The current get tough legislation and changes in drug laws have resulted in an escalation in the number of African Americans, females, juveniles, geriatric, and mentally ill offenders (Blomberg & Lucken 2000). These populations are intricately tangled with social disadvantages, such as poverty, unemployment, low levels of education, and deficit cognitive skills (Currie 1998; Blomberg & Lucken 2000). They are mainly non violent, with incarceration for drug offenses constituting the largest component of the increase of offenders under some

form of correctional supervision (Currie 1998; Blomberg & Lucken 2000; Austin & Irwin 2001; Robinson 2002).

In addition to the diverse population, correctional administrators face several significant challenges to include an increase in probation and parole caseloads which makes it difficult to manage case files, offer the necessary services, and provide the required level of supervision. As well, correctional administrators are faced with prison and jail overcrowding which makes it difficult to manage and maintain a safe and secure correctional facility. It also increases the propensity for violence among offenders, therefore posing safety risks for the offenders and staff. Another challenge is the increased medical and health care costs due to the rise in the special needs population and offenders with HIV/AIDS. Although correctional budgets have increased dramatically, these funds are used primarily for operational expenses.

SEE ALSO: Crime; Criminal Justice System; Prisons

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correlation

Robin K. Henson

Correlation refers to the relationship between two or more variables. Many different forms of correlation exist, but they all reflect a quantitative, statistical means for describing relationships. There are many so called univariate (i.e., one variable) statistics which are useful for describing single distributions of scores, including the mean, median, variance, and standard deviation. In contrast, a correlation statistic, as a measure of relationship, is inherently at least *bivariate* (i.e., two variables) in nature.

The most common manifestation of bivariate correlation is the Pearson product moment correlation coefficient, which was named after the British scientist Karl Pearson (1857–1936), who popularized the statistic originally introduced by Sir Francis Galton (1822–1911). The statistic is more commonly known as Pearson r or just r . Pearson r represents a very important development in the field of statistics because a large section of statistical work can be traced to the simple correlation coefficient.

Statistical relationship for two variables, or correlation, speaks to whether or not the variables are systematically related in some predictable fashion. For example, assuming no irrigational intervention, annual rainfall is likely related to growth in agricultural crops, such that crops receiving more rain likely will be more productive. Of course, this relationship probably varies somewhat depending on the type of crop, amount of sunlight, and many other variables.

Similarly, the hypothetical data in Table 1 reflect a relationship between annual family income and the average number of times family members use public transportation in a week. Here, however, there is an inverse relationship, such that there tends to be increased utilization of public transportation as annual income decreases.

The relationship between the two variables in Table 1 can be graphically displayed in a *scatterplot*. Scatterplots are often used to display the relationship between variables, where each axis represents one of the variables and the entries reflect the paired data for each observation. Figure 1 is a scatterplot for the above data, and allows for a visual inspection of the inverse relationship.

It seems clear from Figure 1 that there is a tendency for public transportation use to decrease as familial income increases. Of course, it is also clear that this relationship is not perfect, because in a few cases families with more income used public transportation with greater frequency than families with lower income levels.

Correlation, then, is interpreted in terms of the strength and directionality of the relationship. The *correlation coefficient* is the statistical summary of the relationship under study. This coefficient normally ranges from +1 to -1, inclusive. Within this range, a coefficient of 0 would represent no relationship. At one extreme, a coefficient of +1 would represent a perfect, positive (i.e., direct) relationship. At the other extreme, a coefficient of -1 would represent a perfect, negative (i.e., indirect, inverse) relationship. Therefore, the absolute value of the coefficient speaks to the strength of the relationship, such that coefficients closer

Table 1 Annual family income and utilization of public transportation (average number of uses per week)

<i>Family</i>	<i>Income (\$)</i>	<i>Public transportation use</i>
Smith	80,000	0
Washington	30,000	6
Jones	90,500	2
Wilson	60,500	4
Allen	60,000	3
Roberts	20,500	7
Thompson	50,000	2




Figure 1 Scatterplot of hypothetical data for annual family income with public transportation utilization ($n = 7$).

to 0 reflect weaker relationships than coefficients nearer the extremes. The sign of the coefficient indicates the directionality of the relationship, either positive or negative.

As noted, there are many different types of correlation coefficients, and r is the most common. Pearson r can be used when both variables are continuous in nature, or intervally scaled, which indicates that the observations of measurement are based on meaningful differences between the scores (e.g., \$60,000 is twice as much income as \$30,000). For the Figure 1 example, the $r = -.86$, which indicates a relatively strong, inverse relationship between the two variables.

Not all variables are continuously scaled, and therefore r would not be the appropriate correlation coefficient in such cases. When at least one of the variables represents ranked data, such as places in a graduating class, then the Spearman's rho correlation would be appropriate. Spearman's rho is often symbolized with r_s or ρ . Kendall's tau (τ) also can be computed for ranked data, but tau is generally thought to better handle data sets where there are tied ranks (Huck 2004).

In some data situations one of the variables might represent a dichotomy, which indicates two mutually exclusive categories of observations. Gender is an example of a naturally occurring dichotomy (male and female) that

might be coded with 0's and 1's in a data set. In medicine, the presence or absence of a particular disease would also represent a dichotomy. In situations where one variable is a dichotomy and the other is continuous in nature, then the point biserial correlation (r_{pb}) could be computed.

In some cases, however, one of the variables might represent an artificial dichotomy, where some type of cut off is applied to a continuous variable to create two groups. The biserial correlation (r_{bis}) applies to the relationship between an artificial dichotomy and a continuous variable.

Finally, when both variables are dichotomous, the phi coefficient (ϕ) could be computed. If both variables are artificial dichotomies, a tetrachoric correlation would be appropriate. There are other correlation coefficients to deal with other types of data, but these are the most common.

Although correlations do statistically describe the relationship between two variables, it is very important to note that the presence of correlation does not necessarily imply that the variables are somehow causally related. The issues of cause and effect are much more complicated than the computation of a simple correlation coefficient, and they depend on other factors in a research study. It is true that the presence of correlation between two variables is a necessary

condition for establishing causality, but it is not a sufficient condition.

For example, the relationship between incidences of violent crime and the number of houses of worship across a variety of communities is positive and fairly strong. This indicates that communities with more houses of worship also tend to have more incidences of violent crime. This relationship is not causal, however, because a third variable, population density, actually influences both original variables and accounts for their relationship.

The correlation coefficient nevertheless is a key element to most classical statistical analyses, which belong to a family of analyses within the general linear model (GLM). Within the GLM, all classical analyses attempt to maximize shared variance, or relationship, between two or more variables. Because of this, all GLM techniques are correlational in nature and therefore yield r^2 type effect sizes. An r^2 effect size, also called the coefficient of determination, is simply the square of a Pearson r . This statistic informs the proportion of variance in one variable that can be explained by the variance of the second variable. For example, if $r = .50$ between X and Y, then $r^2 = .25$, and 25 percent of the variance in X can be explained by the variance in Y. This effect size is important because it informs the amount of variance that both variables share.

The bivariate correlation should be distinguished from other forms of correlation that involve more than two variables, such as part correlation, partial correlation, and multivariate correlation. At times, bivariate relationships are called zero order correlations so as to differentiate them from other more complex forms of statistical relationship.

SEE ALSO: Descriptive Statistics; Effect Sizes; General Linear Model; Quantitative Methods; Statistical Significance Testing

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corruption

Barry Hindess

The most general meaning of corruption is that of impurity, infection, or decay. Corruption can happen to anything – a piece of fruit, a sporting event, a religious community, or a university – but the term is now most commonly used to suggest that there is something rotten in the government of the state. Thus, as conceptions of the naturally sound condition of government change, so too does the focus of concern regarding its corruption. In the social thought of western classical antiquity and early modern Europe, for example, corruption was seen as a disease of the body politic. It was a destructive social condition whose effects included improper behavior on the part of many individuals. During the modern period, however, politics has come to be seen in individualistic and economic terms, with the result that corruption now tends to refer to the improper behavior itself, and especially to conduct which involves the use of public office for the purposes of illicit private gain. Some commentators (e.g., Euben 1989) deplore this change in usage, seeing it as reflecting the triumph of liberal individualism and a corresponding loss of concern with the public good.

In fact, it is far from clear that this more restricted usage of the term necessarily reflects any lessening of this concern. While they may

not appeal to the older meaning of corruption, for example, public choice theory in economics and political science, and the “classical” liberalism of Friedrich Hayek, are very much concerned with minimizing what would once have been called corruption of the body politic. Or again, the early arguments in favor of representative government clearly saw it as a means of keeping in check the corruption of government by factions drawing on the short term interests of the poor and poorly educated majority. Much of the subsequent history of western political thought can be seen as focusing on the new sources of corruption created by the institutions of representative government and the opportunities they provide for politicians, public servants, and business interests to pursue their own private advantage. The older usage of the term corruption may have been abandoned, but many of the earlier concerns with the health of the body politic have continued, albeit now pursued under rather different headings.

Following initiatives taken by the World Bank and international development agencies, empirical research on corruption has grown enormously since the late 1980s. It concentrates largely on the public sector, and especially on areas in which the improper conduct of public officials seems likely to have damaging economic effects. Development agencies are particularly concerned with the impact of corruption on economic growth. Thus, while recognizing that corruption poses problems in all societies, they tend to see these problems as being especially serious in the non western world. This developmental perspective on corruption is particularly concerned with what it sees as the limitations of non western cultures and ways of life, and especially with cases in which conduct that was once regarded as acceptable “no longer fits modern conditions” (Rose Ackerman 1999: 5). Not surprisingly, perhaps, this perspective also suggests that an important part of the corruption on which it focuses is likely to involve the conduct of western businesses operating in these societies.

In practice, the precise incidence of corruption is difficult to determine, in part because many of those involved in corrupt conduct have an interest in secrecy. Yet there will also be cases in which corrupt individuals prefer to

advertise the fact. Indeed, if corruption is an abuse of public office, then the flaunting of corruption might be seen as an affirmation of one’s power, of one’s ability to get away with such behavior. It might also be seen, somewhat more positively, as evidence of one’s capacity to get things done in spite of the obstacles which the law and the rules of proper procedure seem to put in the way. Even in such cases, however, while the fact of corruption will be only too clear, many of its details are likely to remain hidden. Public regulatory bodies have been established in many societies to deal with entrenched corruption in the public and private sectors, but their ability to deal with those who are powerful in the sense just noted is likely to require considerable support from their political masters. The findings of such bodies must therefore be interpreted with some caution. Even in the best of cases, they present us with the tip of an iceberg whose true dimensions always remain obscure.

It is partly because the incidence of corruption is so difficult to establish that indirect measures have proved so attractive to many observers. The most influential of these is the Corruption Perceptions Index (CPI) published annually by Transparency International, an international NGO devoted exclusively to combating corruption. The CPI purports to rank countries in terms of the perceived incidence of corruption by bringing together a number of polls and surveys carried out primarily among professional risk analysts and business people. Like many such indices, its methodological failings are widely acknowledged and equally widely ignored. Its rankings are routinely reported in the national and international media, and they can have a real political and economic impact. Nevertheless, because they reflect perceptions rather than actual behavior, these rankings must always be taken with a pinch of salt. They reflect the perceived impact of corruption on the investment decisions of private business, which is not necessarily the area of greatest popular concern. Indeed, Transparency International’s own Global Corruption Barometer shows that, in three countries out of four, the kind of corruption that people are most concerned about is that which occurs in political parties.

SEE ALSO: Authority and Legitimacy; Crime; Deviance; Transparency and Global Change

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counterculture

Sam Binkley

Similar in meaning to the more inclusive term “subculture,” counterculture designates a group whose norms, values, symbolic references, and styles of life deviate from those of the dominant culture. Indeed, sociological commentary on the counterculture of the 1960s is so deeply informed by the rubric of subculture as to render the terms inseparable in many respects. Initially applied to the study of youth cultures in the sociology of deviance, subculture research drew heavily on the contributions of the Chicago School sociologists Robert Park and later Howard Becker, but also on the Durkheimian sociology of Robert Merton, whose formulation of Durkheim’s concept of anomie provided the basis for delinquency and deviance. Subcultures were viewed as alternative moral formations in which the blocked status aspirations of disadvantaged working class youth were realized through appropriations and inversions of dominant moral codes. Whether criminal or retreatist, such groups were considered as aspirational, if innovative,

in their aims. This largely American analysis of subculture received a more political interpretation in the works of the British Birmingham School of Cultural Studies, where blocked avenues of class agitation were expressed through styles of life in which symbols were appropriated and modified in their meanings (Hebdige 1979).

Yet while subculture is the generic term typically applied to a range of such groups, from post war British youth cultures to inner city African American youth cultures, counterculture is typically invoked with specific reference to the youth movements that swept American and Western European societies in the late to mid 1970s. First introduced by Roszak (1968), the term came to refer to a diffuse movement of students, youth, and other marginalia whose mobilizing strategies rejected that of traditional social movements, and appealed to diffuse concepts of anti technological sentiment to achieve spontaneous and widespread reforms. The counterculture, in Roszak’s formulation, is a specific case of subculture. It had an alternative strategy of political agitation to that of other subcultures. The appeal was more to a presumed mentalist, spiritual, and lifestyle development which, members of the counterculture argued, would serve as a basis for overturning hierarchical structures implicit within advanced technological societies.

The counterculture of the 1960s is typically traced to early reactions to the conformity and mediocrity associated with the years of the post war economic expansion. Beatniks and others drew on African American expressive traditions to fashion a vanguard sensibility in music, drugs, philosophy, literature, and poetry. Amid accelerating popular opposition to the war in Vietnam and an emerging student left, together with the growth of hippie enclaves and the increasing thematization of drug experiences in music, film, and media, a distinctly oppositional culture formed around what was termed a new “consciousness.” Rejecting not only the values of the mainstream middle class from which it emerged, but also the class based political traditions of an older generation of leftist opposition, the counterculture advocated an immediate and practical approach to social reform, beginning with the individual reform of personal relationships and daily

habits, and the adoption of utopian egalitarianism in one's everyday style of life. Sociological inquiries into the counterculture examined its religious and mystical aspirations (Tipton 1982), its historical origins (Gitlin 1993), its ongoing dialogue with consumer culture (Frank 1997), and ultimately its incorporation into the mainstream of American society in the form of a distinct demographic, variously termed yuppies or Bobo's (Brooks 2000).

The phrase counterculture still circulates in popular and sociological discussions, though its use has largely been elided with that of its more inclusive and richly conceptualized parent term, subculture.

SEE ALSO: Birmingham School; Cultural Studies; Deviance; Lifestyle; Social Movements; Subculture

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couples living apart together

Mary Holmes

Living apart together (LAT) broadly refers to couples, heterosexual or homosexual, who have an ongoing self defined couple relationship without cohabiting. Some couples keep separate residences, even though they both live

within the same locale. Levin (2004) has suggested that the dual residence aspect of LAT couples distinguishes them from a *commuter marriage* where there is one main household and just a second apartment for when one partner is away. However, with many commuter couples it is difficult to say which might be the "main" household. Distance perhaps better demarcates LATs from commuter marriages. LAT couples may live near each other, or far apart. Typically, those in commuter couples have residences at some distance and spend time apart in order for both partners to pursue professional careers. Such arrangements now encompass not just heterosexual and married couples, and for that reason Holmes (2004) uses the term *distance relationship*. LAT can serve as an umbrella term for all couples with dual residences. What the terms LAT, commuter marriage, and distance relationship have in common is that they refer to situations in which the woman partner/s has some independent existence, in ways not seen in the past.

Historically, there have always been couples who have had to endure separation, mostly when the husband's work took them away from home regularly. Such separations continue, but the husband's periodic absences from the family home are usually spent in temporary and/or institutional accommodation, as with sailing, fishing, military service, or incarceration. LAT relationships differ in that partners visit each other, but each returns to their own residence. These new arrangements have emerged as a result of women's increasing entry into the work force, especially the professions, and the associated financial and social independence this allows. Yet the extent of living apart together is difficult to judge.

One major methodological problem with LAT couples is measuring their numbers. Many large data sets use households as the unit of measurement and therefore do not capture couples living apart. There have been recent efforts to correct this, but estimates vary depending on different definitions of the target population. Ermisch and Kiernan's respective analyses of the British Household Panel Survey and the European Family and Fertility Survey suggest that as many as one third of those in Europe not married or cohabiting

may be having a relationship with someone in another household (Holmes 2004: 187). It is not known, however, how many of these may realistically be defined as living apart together, nor how far apart such couples live. However, Levin (2004: 228–9) has collected some quantitative data for Norway and Sweden which suggests that 8–14 percent of those who are not married or cohabiting are in a LAT relationship. This probably constitutes up to 4 percent of those populations, but may be a conservative estimate given Levin's rather strict definition. She notes that French and German scholars suggest slightly higher figures in their own nations, but based on broader definitions. As regards distance relationships, the American psychologist Gregory Guldner, in his book *Long Distance Relationships: The Complete Guide* (2003), states that one quarter of non married people in the US live in a long distance relationship (LDR). But work in this area has so far been almost wholly qualitative.

Sociological attention to couples living apart in new ways emerged in the late 1970s in the context of investigating the rise of dual career couples. Farris reported the findings from her Masters thesis on commuting in the Rapoport's 1978 collection on *Working Couples*. Kirschner and Walum discussed "two location families" in the first volume of *Alternative Lifestyles* published the same year. The focus was on commuter marriage – perhaps because unmarried couples who lived apart would not have been visible at the time (Levin 2004). The key issues have been to compare the satisfaction of such lifestyles in relation to cohabitation (Bunker et al. 1992) and to assess living apart as an attempt to achieve some balance between work and family demands. The latter is central to the first comprehensive sociological study of commuting couples by Gerstel and Gross (1984), who merged the qualitative data from their independent studies in the 1970s to give them a sample of 121 respondents, half of which had children. They looked at the costs and benefits of commuter marriage and argued such marriages illustrated that the demand of the economic system for mobile workers does not fit well with traditional family patterns of shared residence. This challenges the usual functionalist and Marxist arguments that the nuclear

family suits capitalism's needs. There are a few superficial inquiries into commuting in the early 1990s that mostly confirm Gerstel and Gross's findings. It is not until the end of the century that a shift in focus within the sociology of family, intimacy, and relationships prompts new, more substantial work.

Although interest in work–family "balance" continues, a focus on changes in intimate life is now driving much theoretical and empirical work on couples who live apart. These changes are being discussed in terms of how they relate to processes of individualization and the supposed impacts on traditional family, community bonds, and relations of care. Theoretical musings on these issues by the likes of Bauman and Giddens have begun to be questioned with the aid of empirical information. The issue of *Current Sociology* in which Irene Levin's article appears is a useful example of contemporary work in this line. The examination of couples living apart together, in all their forms, plays a crucial part in providing information about to what extent traditional or "conventional" ways of relating have become less dominant in the face of new conditions of social life prevailing at the beginning of the twenty first century. In particular it is arguably becoming less taken for granted that cohabitation, or indeed proximity, is necessary for intimate relationships. There is still much to be done, however, in terms of exploring the complex relationships between individualization, geographical mobility, sexuality, and the ways in which people love and care for each other.

Individualization has not extended equally to all groups of people. As with other "non conventional" forms of relating, research on LATs can help assess the effects of a supposedly greater social focus on autonomy. However, research so far indicates that even relationships seemingly based on high levels of independence may involve inequalities and interdependence. In order to better illuminate these issues further research on distance relationships needs to pay more attention to work being done on migration and globalization. Who you can love, how and where, is likely to be heavily influenced by discourses and practices relating to "race"/ethnicity, religion, security, home, and care. In addition, the sociology of the body and

of emotions has a part to play in making sense of forms of “everyday migration” involved in maintaining relationships without frequent proximity. Physically and emotionally, long term pursuit of such relationships may be sometimes exhausting and sometimes exhilarating. What might contribute to tired bodies and frayed nerves, rather than well being, requires investigation. Access to economic resources, gendered practices, flexibility at work, and transport and communication networks are likely to be crucial. Other factors that might determine whether such arrangements will grow in popularity will include the numbers and status of women in the workforce, the operation of global and local labor markets, and changing ideas about intimacy, gender, sexuality, and relationships. Already sociologists exploring sexuality have made a considerable contribution to illustrating that (hetero)sexual cohabitational relationships are not the only, or indeed necessarily best, way to live love. It would be extremely useful to have more quantitative data on the extent of non cohabitational relationships in order to establish just how non conventional such arrangements are. This would help provide a context for further qualitative research which locates LATs not just in relation to “traditional” relationships, but within broad social and global processes which might offer new possibilities as well as new problems for loving.

SEE ALSO: Cohabitation; Households; Intimacy; Lesbian and Gay Families; Marriage

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courts

Yenli Yeh

Courts cover broad perspectives (Gifis 1998). First, the court is a part of the judicial branch of the government consisting of a judge or a few judges responsible for adjudging disputes under the laws. Second, the court represents a judge or judges on the judicial bench. Third, the court is a legislative assembly that interprets laws. Fourth, the court stands for a legal system or process.

There is variation and diversity in respect to courts globally. This entry focuses on the court system of the US, which has a dual court system which includes the federal and state courts. There was a major debate between anti-federalists and federalists after the American Revolution concerning whether it was necessary to have a federal court system separate from the state systems. As a result of compromise, the federalists finally were able to have the federal courts with a minimal supervision system along with the state court systems (Neubauer 1984). Rapid population growth and industrialization after the Civil War resulted in the increased volume of litigations on the local and state levels. Many states expanded their state and local courts, and this kind of expansion created a very complex American legal system.

In general, the federal courts have the authority to decide controversial cases related to the US Constitution, and disputes between citizens of different states as well as between a state and citizens of another state (Lectric Law Library 2002). The federal court system includes the US Supreme Court, Courts of Appeals, District Courts, and Magistrate's Courts. The US Supreme is the highest court, consisting of nine justices appointed for life by the president, with the approval of the Senate. The role of the Supreme Court is to maintain the order of the US Constitution, resolve disputes between states, and guarantee the uniform enforcement of all federal laws (Freund 1961). The Supreme Court hears appeals from US circuit courts and state supreme courts which involve questions of the Constitution

and violations of federal laws. A *writ of certiorari* will be processed to the Supreme Court. Then justices will determine whether the laws were applied appropriately. The US Supreme Court is the court of last resort.

The next level of the federal court system is US courts of appeals, also referred to as circuit courts. There are 12 courts of appeals consisting of 11 circuits and the District of Columbia. Generally, each circuit court includes three or more states. Judges of courts of appeals are also appointed for life by the president with the consent of the Senate. Courts of appeals have the jurisdiction to review the appeals from district courts. The US Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit was created by the merging of the US Court of Claims and the US Court of Customs as well as Patent Appeals in 1982 (Lectric Law Library 2002). Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit has the specialized jurisdiction over appeals from specific federal agencies, which includes the US Court of International Trade, the US Court of Veterans Appeals, the US Court of Federal Claims, the US Tax Court, the Patent and Trademark Office, the Board of Contract Appeals, and the US Courts of Military Appeals (Lectric Law Library 2002).

Historically, under the courts of appeals are district courts which are trial courts of the federal court system. Most federal criminal and civil cases are tried and adjudicated in the district courts. Each state at least has one district court, while New York, California, and Texas have the exceptions of four district courts each. Currently, there are 94 district courts in 50 states, the District of Columbia, the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico, the Territories of Guam, the US Virgin Island, and the Northern Mariana Islands. Judges of district courts are nominated by the president and confirmed by the Senate. Federal district courts have jurisdiction over civil cases involving more than \$10,000 and criminal cases dealing with federal agencies. Each district court has a bankruptcy court that hears bankruptcy petitions of individuals and business.

The purpose of magistrate judges is to assist district court judges. Magistrate judges are authorized to hear civil cases of less than \$10,000. Felony charges will only be heard by

district courts judges. However, magistrate judges deal with pretrial work in many district courts, such as bail and counsel appointment.

State courts handle the vast majority of cases and have a more complex structure than the federal courts. Some states, such as Texas and New York, have numerous levels of lower courts. Although no two state courts are alike, there are four basic levels of state courts: lower court, superior court, intermediate court of appeals, and supreme court. Lower court, also referred to as inferior court, is the first level of the state court system. It has limited jurisdiction. There are more than 13,500 lower courts and they constitute more than 75 percent of the judicial courts in the US (Neubauer 1984; Abadinsky 2003). Lower courts include various types of courts: city court, county court, justice of the peace court, magistrate court, municipal court, city magistrate, justice court, traffic court, and probate court. Generally, lower courts only handle traffic violations, misdemeanor criminal cases, and civil disputes under \$5,000. Due to the limited jurisdiction, lower courts are responsible for criminal preliminary hearings, such as arraignments, setting bail, and appointing public counsels. Lower courts are generally authorized to impose a maximum fine of \$1,000 and no more than one year in prison. Appeals from lower courts will be heard in state superior courts.

The next level of the state court system is the state superior court, sometimes referred to as trial court, district court, circuit court, and court of common pleas. Superior court is a major trial court with authorization to hear all types of criminal and civil cases. Typically, superior court handles civil cases and criminal cases at the felony level as well as criminal and civil appeals from lower courts. Some superior courts also hear misdemeanor cases if joint jurisdiction existed with lower courts. There are multi divisions existing in some superior courts, including criminal, civil, family, and juvenile cases.

Intermediate courts of appeals are also known as courts of appeals, district courts of appeals, or appeal courts. A few states separate courts of appeals for civil and criminal cases, such as Alabama, Oklahoma, Tennessee, and Texas. All cases are typically heard by panels of three judges in intermediate courts of

appeals. Although the lower and superior courts hear the largest volume of cases, intermediate courts of appeals also handle a large volume of cases. Some states, because of small populations, do not have courts of appeal. These states are Maine, New Hampshire, North and South Dakota, Vermont, and Wyoming.

The court of last resort in the state court structure is the state supreme court. The number of supreme court judges per state varies from five to nine. State supreme courts handle limited cases of appeals and cases involving interpretations of state constitutions as well as state laws. Capital punishment cases are automatically appealed to state supreme courts. *Briefs* or *petitions*, written documents with legal arguments, will be sent to state supreme courts. Then, *oral arguments* are held before the final written statements are produced. Only appeals from state supreme courts involving the US Constitution and violations of federal laws will go on to the US Supreme Court.

According to the nature of courts, courts generally can be divided into criminal court, civil court, and juvenile court. The rule of *nullum crimen sine lege*, no crime without a law, is applied in the criminal process. It means courts have no jurisdiction to hear criminal cases unless a law has been broken. A defendant is entitled to have a series of due process rights that are guaranteed by the US Constitution. These guarantees include right to remain silent, right to counsel, right to bail, right to speedy and public trial, right to confront witness, and double jeopardy prohibition. Most misdemeanor cases begin and end in the lower courts in a process of *rough justice* (Abadinsky 2003). Due process is not the major focus in the process of rough justice due to the very large volume of misdemeanor cases handled by lower courts. Most defendants quickly plead guilty to avoid trial or incarceration. The flow of felony cases in criminal trial courts is very complex. It includes initial appearance (counsel, charges, and bail are addressed), preliminary hearings (probable cause and bail are reviewed), arraignment (plea bargaining and bail are decided), trial (pretrial motions and hearing, open statements, cross examinations of evidence and witnesses, trial motions, and closing statements as

well as deliberations are included), and sentencing (Abadinsky 2003). Jury trial is indicated in the Sixth Amendment of the Constitution. However, only a small amount of criminal cases go through jury trial. Each state has its own standards and applications of a jury trial. The US Supreme Court ruled that jury trial is required in cases of capital crime. The burden of proving criminal conviction is *beyond a reasonable doubt*.

While the prosecutor charges the defendant in a state criminal court, an individual could file a civil action against another private party in a civil court. Civil court serves the purpose of adjudicating personal disputes. Cases handled by civil courts include disputes involving torts, personal properties, contracts, succession, family relations, and civil rights (Abadinsky 2003). A trial is not the major goal of civil courts. Most civil cases are settled in an informal setting when the plaintiffs are willing to accept settlements. The flow of a civil case includes filing a complaint from the plaintiff, filing a response by the defendant, pretrial activities (motions, discovery, and conferences are arranged), trial hearing (trial motions, opening statements, examinations of witnesses and evidence, and summations and deliberations are included), and judgment/verdict either for the plaintiff or the defendant (Abadinsky 2003). Small claim courts are designed to resolve civil cases that involve small amounts of money (less than \$5,000) in a quick and inexpensive process. Only a small fee is required when a private party files a complaint in small claim courts. In addition, there is no attorney practice in small claim courts. Most civil cases are determined by bench trial instead of jury trial, just as in the criminal courts. The burden of proving civil liability is *preponderance of evidence*.

The first juvenile court in the US was established in Cook County, Illinois in 1899. The purpose of Cook County Juvenile Courts was designed to assist juveniles instead of punishing them. The nature of juvenile court has not changed over the years. Although the definitions of juvenile and the juvenile court process are different from state to state, the juvenile courts basically handle cases of juvenile delinquency, status offense, child neglect and abuse, and dependency. For the purpose of preventing

labeling, juveniles enter the juvenile courts as the last resort after failing efforts from police, schools, families, and social agencies. The juvenile court process includes intake, petition, preliminary hearings (the waiver decision will be made if it is necessary to transfer delinquent juveniles to criminal courts), adjudication hearing and dispositional decision.

Currently, almost all states allow juveniles to be tried as adults in criminal courts. This means laws allow juveniles to be waived/transferred to criminal courts because of the severity of crimes committed by juveniles and prosecutorial discretion. Delinquent juveniles will more likely receive harsher punishment in criminal courts than by remaining in juvenile courts.

SEE ALSO: Corrections; Criminal Justice System; Juvenile Delinquency; Race and the Criminal Justice System

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credit cards

Lloyd Klein

Credit cards are a popularized economic instrument enabling the consumer acquisition of goods or services in exchange for assured merchant or provider payment through financial

institutions. The resulting transfer of funds was enabled through a change in the cultural view of thrift and systematic savings. Much of the pattern was driven by a transformation from ideological values associated with savings into a culture focused on consumer acquisition. Max Weber's view of social change stressed an intensified neutralization of the "Protestant Ethic" into a more vigorous consumer orientation. In Weber's analysis, credit was viewed as more culturally acceptable beginning early in the twentieth century. This trend gave way to the "democratization of credit" and the increasing acceptance of consumer credit in the form of credit cards and other financial mechanisms.

The utility of credit cards was enhanced as consumers shifted from the "future orientation" of saving for planned purchases into a "present orientation" of buying now and paying for the goods or services at a later point. According to at least one industry insider, the original credit cards began as paper cards authorizing the acquisition of restaurant meals and eventually evolved into plastic strips facilitating the purchase of virtually any good or service.

The term credit card became culturally and economically significant as financial credit became associated with the use of financial instruments or bank cards issued by businesses. Banks and other financial institutions joined with the Interbank Organization (Mastercard) and eventually Visa, American Express, and Discover in working with merchants and national businesses. The credit card companies would license their name to the specific bank or company in exchange for a fee charged in permitting the use of their product.

Over time, some credit cards were transformed into affinity cards. These affinity cards focused on organizations such as the American Sociological Association, major league sports teams, and other special interest groups. A percentage of the generated consumer or member charges would be returned to the original sponsoring organization as a direct payment.

Credit cards are much more than just financial instruments enabling economic transactions. The cultural ramifications of credit cards include changes in consumer behavior and a significant revision in the definition of

social class. The “present” orientation enabled by credit card purchasing was driven by consumer desire for commodity acquisition as much as changes in the business community. In the matter of consumers driving this important economic transformation, Thorstein Veblen discusses the idea of conspicuous consumption wherein individuals compete with each other for social status. The game of “keeping up with the Joneses” is further referred to by Veblen as invidious emulation. Credit cards facilitate consumer desire to spend funds one may not immediately possess for the purpose of maintaining appearances. The ultimate effect is a greater emphasis on acquiring material goods (e.g., appliances, automobiles, clothing, etc.) or products with symbolic capital (travel experiences, knowledge acquired in universities or educational programs such as the Learning Exchange wherein entrepreneurs and entertainers share their unique talents or skills).

The development of credit cards can be expressed as a juxtaposition between entertainment and lifestyle vehicles and more sophisticated “all purpose” plastic cards enabling the consumption of everyday wants or needs associated with everyday acquisition of necessary goods and services. The entertainment lifestyle associated with the Stork Club and an ability to charge expensive restaurant meals was transformed by the ascendancy of Master Charge and American Express. Master Charge became Mastercard and Visa entered the fray in challenges to American Express. The all purpose cards were embraced by businesses and service providers throughout the world. Travel, restaurant meals, college tuition, and even fast food were immediately attainable with the application with preapproved plastic cards linked with vast computerized authorization systems.

Department stores had much earlier entered into the business with issuance of their own credit cards. Bloomingdale’s, Macy’s, Nordstrom’s, and other retailers issue their own credit cards with higher rates than the already existent bank cards. The selling point for these cards was associated with an extra discount on merchandise purchased at the retail establishment with the given store credit instrument.

One must examine the marketing of consumer credit in order to understand the

full impact of these socioeconomic changes. Early advertising associated with credit cards emphasized the class status of women during the emerging women’s liberation movement. “Mastercard and Me – We Can Do It All” was targeted at professional women seeking recognition through the acquisition of suitable goods and services facilitating their emerging careers. Other Mastercard and Visa advertising formulated during the 1980s focused on the applicability of credit cards in arranging vacations and life changing moments (such as weddings). American Express jumped into the fray emphasizing the Amex card for protecting one’s vacation with specified travel services (replacing a lost card, covering emergency expenses while traveling, etc.). The Discover Card was launched during an early 1980s Super Bowl ad depicting everyday people marching into a better life and “discovering the potential” that can be obtained with consumer credit.

Not all these developments were smoothly navigated by the credit card companies and merchants. An overheated economy in 1977 led to President Jimmy Carter’s call to consumers to go easy on credit card spending. The banks, credit card companies, and retailers were busy promoting consumerism for the sake of consumer spending. However, the debt margin on credit cards kept rising and consumers found themselves hit with a downturn in the economy. Jobs were lost in a stagflation period featuring inflation and recessionary difficulties with economic growth. Credit card spending flagged somewhat during this time while the marketing of consumer credit and credit cards began stressing personal consumer responsibility in monitoring debt levels.

Collateralized credit cards became more acceptable during this time. Individuals with a poor credit history or young people seeking to establish credit were offered a card with set spending limits based on a bank deposit. This device gave individuals the convenience of credit card spending without worrying about the repercussions of future consumer debt. Looked at from another way, it allowed people to borrow their own money at high interest.

The pressures of the 1970s gave way to more pronounced credit card spending during the economic boom of the 1980s. The stock market

was up, employment was more plentiful, and consumer confidence in the economy built steadily upward. Credit cards were more socially acceptable as “Generation X” (the new group of young people) went out and embraced consumer spending. Credit card companies became emboldened and marketed their product to anyone and everyone. More merchants and companies affiliated themselves with the cards produced by American Express, Mastercard, and Visa. Merchants sought out the help of credit reporting companies in seeking lists of good credit risks. Unfortunately, the seeking out of qualified applicants for preapproved credit cards reached a frenzied level. As pointed out by Bankrate.com, merchants were grabbing at every name perceived as a viable consumer risk. Cats, dogs, and even children whose names were obtained from merchandise ordering lists were sent solicitations for credit cards. The resultant publicity led to more careful screening.

The connection between credit cards and bankruptcy is an important contemporary subject. A 2005 revamped bankruptcy law makes it harder for consumers to dissolve their debts through filing for systematic relief. The reason for this legislation, which was lobbied strongly by the financial community, was the rise in consumer bankruptcy filings. As Caplovitz pointed out many years ago, and a trend that continues today, consumers utilized credit cards and often found themselves in ever increasing debt. Curiously enough, credit card companies still persisted in sending their consumer credit products to individuals deeply in debt or those struggling with declared bankruptcy. The battle to secure spending overwhelmed common sense in screening out these questionable credit risks.

SEE ALSO: Bankruptcy; Consumer Movements; Consumption; Consumption, Mass Consumption, and Consumer Culture; Money; Money Management in Families

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creolization

Robin Cohen

The words Creole and creolization have been used in many different contexts and generally in an inconsistent way. “Creole” was possibly derived from the Latin *creara* (“created originally”). The most common historical use was the Spanish *criollo*, which described the children of Spanish colonizers born in the Caribbean. The French transformed the word to *créole*. However, the racially exclusive definition, which confined the term to whites in colonial societies, had already been challenged in the early eighteenth century and referred also to indigenous people and other immigrants who had acquired metropolitan manners, cultures, and sensibilities.

The major form of acculturation was to adapt the language of the superordinate group – principally the French, Spanish, English, Dutch, and Portuguese. Using a European acrolect and an African or indigenous basilect generated many Creole languages. These are different from pidgins (simple contact languages) in that they have an elaborated lexicon and become mother tongues. “Creole” has adjectivally been applied to music (especially jazz), dancing, cuisine, clothing, architecture, literature, and art; there are even creole fish, flowers, and pigs. More recently sociologists, anthropologists, and cultural studies theorists have seen that creolization can be used in a much richer sense, alluding to all kinds of cross fertilization that take place between different cultures when they interact. When creolizing, participants select particular elements from incoming or inherited cultures, endow these with meanings different from those they possessed in the original culture, and then

creatively merge these to create totally new varieties that supersede the prior forms.

Creolization can easily be distinguished from *indigenization*, where global threats reauthenticate local cultural forms, from *homogenization*, where dominant cultural forces flatten every thing in their path, and from *multiculturalism*, where the component cultural segments remain viable even if there is some dialogue between them. It is somewhat more complex to separate the contemporary understanding of creolization from cognate terms like hybridity, syncretism, cosmopolitanism, transnationalism, and interculturality. But creolization does have a distinctive emphasis on cultural creativity, sharing, transcendence, and invention.

Contemporary understandings of creolization have been signaled in the work of the Martinican writer and cultural theorist Edouard Glissant, who asks whether we should favor "An identity that would not be the projection of a unique and sectarian root, but of what we call a rhizome, a root with a multiplicity of extensions in all directions? Not killing what is around it, as a unique root would, but establishing communication and relation?" Equally important is the work of the Swedish social and cultural anthropologist Ulf Hannerz. In his work on the evolution of a "global ecumene," he suggests that the "world is in creolization." Hannerz continues: "Creolization also increasingly allows the periphery to talk back. As it creates a greater affinity between the cultures of the center and the periphery . . . some of its new cultural commodities become increasingly attractive on a global market."

Attention to the "creolizing world" has considerable social scientific potential as a suggestive, instructive, and subtle means of describing our complex world and the diverse societies in which we all now live.

SEE ALSO: Acculturation; Hybridity; Multiculturalism; Race; Race and Ethnic Consciousness; Race (Racism)

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crime

John T. Whitehead

Criminologists differ on how they define crime. One definition is a legal definition: crime is a violation of the criminal law. Criminologists Edwin Sutherland and Donald Cressey call this the conventional definition of crime because it is the commonly used definition. They add that it is typical to distinguish a crime from a tort. A crime is a violation against the state whereas a tort is a violation against an individual and the civil law. Hence in criminal law the charge reads *The State of v. John Doe* while in civil court it is *Mary Smith v. John Doe*. A dramatic example of crime versus tort occurred in one of the most well known crimes of the twentieth century, the O. J. Simpson matter. In criminal court he was acquitted of the crime of murder but he was found civilly liable for wrongful death in civil court. Two such trials do not violate the constitutional protection against double jeopardy (being tried twice for the same crime), because criminal and civil court are considered two completely distinct systems and civil court carries no stigma of a criminal conviction.

Within the framework of the legal definition of crime, crime is distinguished from delinquency by the age of the offender. In most states an offender has to be 18 to be arrested and prosecuted as a criminal. Under 18 the youth is processed as a delinquent in a separate juvenile or family court and legally there is not a criminal conviction. A few states set 16 or 17 as the age for the beginning of criminal court jurisdiction.

Some other points to note about this conventional definition of crime are that not everyone who violates the criminal law is apprehended and that crime can vary from jurisdiction to jurisdiction. For example, only

about 20 to 30 percent of burglaries and robberies are cleared or solved. Also, if state X defines felony shoplifting to be theft of merchandise valued at over \$25 and state Y defines the limit to be \$100, a theft could be a felony (a serious crime) in one state and only a misdemeanor (a less serious crime) in another state. A felon can go to prison and loses important rights such as the right to vote. A misdemeanant can only go to a county jail or prison for a sentence of less than one year and does not lose such important rights as the right to vote.

Sociologist Émile Durkheim argued that crime is normal. By this he meant that even a society of saints would have persons with faults that the society would judge and punish. In other words, each society has a collective conscience that notices and punishes faults so as to reinforce the common values that most members should be striving to emulate and show allegiance to. In fact, Durkheim notes, the absence of crime might be a problem. It might mean that a society is overly repressive and does not allow enough room for dissent and innovation. So no society should congratulate itself for completely eliminating crime.

Building on this notion of the societal reaction to crime, some criminologists argue that crime and other types of deviance do not have unique elements in themselves that define them but that the criminal or the deviant “is one to whom that label has successfully been applied; deviant behavior is behavior that people so label” (Becker 1963: 9). This labeling perspective does not have as much popularity as it once did but the perspective still reminds us that societal reaction is critical in any definition of crime.

On the other hand, noted criminologists Michael Gottfredson and Travis Hirschi define crimes as “acts of force or fraud undertaken in pursuit of self interest” (1990: 15). So contrary to Sutherland, they see much crime as ordinary and mundane. In fact, they see crime stemming from human nature which focuses on pursuing pleasure and avoiding pain. And they see commonalities in crime, deviance, sin, and accident rather than conceptualizing them as distinct phenomena. For example, they argue that sin and crime are often the same actions, such as stealing someone else’s property. The difference is that religion (a church) sanctions

sin while the government (a court) sanctions crime.

Herman and Julia Schwendinger suggest still another definition of crime. They defined crime as acts against human rights. If they were writing today instead of 40 years ago, they might well include either terrorism or unjust wars as part of what they defined as criminal. For example, using their definition, some could argue that various national leaders are criminals if they are violating human rights, even though as president or leader of their countries they are arguably acting under color of law.

A recent perspective, but one with an ancient history, the restorative justice perspective focuses on harms instead of “crimes.” Contrary to the legal definition of crime noted above, restorative justice proponents disagree that the “state” is the aggrieved party. Restorative justice proponents argue that this conceptualization of crime dates back to the end of the Dark Ages when crime was seen as a felony against the king. So restorative justice theorists and practitioners argue that they are going back to the true definition of crime as a harm, injury, or wrong done to another individual. The response of society should be first to acknowledge the hurt and injury that has occurred. Then there should be attention to the needs of the victim. And there also should be attention to the needs of the person who has inflicted the harm, the offender. Thus a crime is seen not simply as an occasion for the state to inflict punishment, but as an opportunity for the community to intervene and help both the victim and the offender. Even more idealistically than this, peacemaking criminologist Richard Quinney (going beyond the critical criminology he once espoused) argues that crime is an opportunity for all of us to work on “the transformation of our human being” (2000: 188) and create a good society. To achieve such goals, some restorative justice proponents argue that community groups or religious groups, not government agencies like probation, should operate restorative justice programs as the emphasis is on a forgiving justice process rather than a bureaucratic punishing process.

Perspectives such as that of the Schwendingers and the restorative justice perspective, which some call radical, see the usual emphasis

on crime and criminal justice as too narrow. Such criminologists think that the criminal justice system puts too much emphasis on street crime and not enough emphasis on the crimes of the powerful. These criminologists contend that corporations or even the government can and do perpetrate “crimes” or injuries. For example, Jeffrey Reiman argues that while the FBI focuses on homicide, many more Americans are dying from occupational hazards at work or from malpractice in the hospital operating room. But because our capitalist system protects both corporations and doctors, there is considerably less attention to and enforcement of statutes pertaining to workplace crime. The result is that “the rich get richer and the poor get prison” (the title of his book). In the words of criminologist Richard Quinney: “It is through a critical criminology that we can understand how American law preserves the existing social and economic order. Criminal law is used in the capitalist state to secure the survival of the capitalist system and its ruling class” (2000: 90).

Building on this type of thinking but tying it in with some of the most recent economic trends, John Hagan argues that the new globalized economy has resulted in disinvestment in many communities, which has made job prospects very bleak. In other words, many transnational companies are exporting jobs to countries such as China or India where wages are much lower. Blocked out of high paying factory jobs, residents in low income areas turn to crime, especially drug dealing, as a way to earn a living. Thus Hagan argues that social inequality and capital disinvestment cause such crime as drug dealing in poverty stricken areas. So crime “has become a short term adaptive form of recapitalization for youth” (1994: 87).

Hagan also emphasizes that crime and our conceptions of crime are changeable. One specific and clear example of the changeable aspect of crime is Prohibition. Approximately 80 years ago the United States defined the manufacture, distribution, and sale of alcohol as criminal. Today alcohol production and consumption is a vital part of our economy, as advertising demonstrates. Instead of pursuing bootleggers, contemporary police are pursuing drug dealers. So whereas ethnic group members in low income neighborhoods once supplied their

own neighborhoods with bootleg beer, today ethnic group members are selling drugs to neighborhood residents and to consumers from other areas in what contemporary social scientists call deviance service centers.

Despite the existence of varying emphases by criminologists, two common ways of measuring crime that follow the legal definition to varying degrees are arrest statistics typically reported in the FBI Uniform Crime Reports and victimization studies such as the National Crime Victimization Survey. The FBI Uniform Crime Reports frame the discussion of crime in the United States by reporting the numbers of offenses reported to the police and the numbers of arrests. The FBI Crime Index is composed of violent and property offenses. Murder, rape, robbery, and aggravated assault make up the Violent Crime Index. Larceny theft, burglary, and arson compose the Property Crime Index. In 2002 there were over 11.8 million offenses reported to the police for an Index Crime rate of 4,118.8 offenses per 100,000 residents in the United States. This rate was down 1.1 percent from 2001 and down almost 25 percent from 1993. Larceny theft crimes account for about 60 percent of Index crimes in the United States. Murder and robbery, two crimes that citizens fear and television crime shows emphasize, account for one tenth of 1 percent and 3.5 percent of Index offenses, respectively.

Criminologist Edwin Sutherland noted that both criminologists and ordinary citizens, in accord with the FBI emphasis on Index crimes, often overemphasize street crime and underemphasize white collar crime. Writing over 60 years ago yet bearing uncanny relevance to the current rash of corporate and executive wrongdoing, Sutherland noted that examples of white collar crime “are found in abundance in the business world” (in Jacoby 1979: 17).

Victimization studies such as the National Crime Victimization Survey (NCVS) read descriptions of personal and property crimes to survey respondents who answer whether they have been a victim of such incidents in the past 6 months. The interviewers and the questions frame the implicit definitions of criminal acts (based on legal definitions) but to some extent the respondent defines acts as victimizations or not. If a respondent actually experienced such a victimization but thinks it is

not a crime and does not tell it to the survey interviewer, then that action is not counted as a victimization. Or if a victimization was quite trivial and would not have ended in an arrest, the respondent may still report it as a victimization. Victimization studies have helped criminologists study crime because they allow for the analysis of crimes that do not get reported to the police, what some call the dark figure of crime. The NCVS also transcends state to state variation in the criminal law; the survey uses the same descriptions of victimizations in every state.

In 2002 US residents aged 12 or older experienced approximately 23 million violent and property victimizations. The overall violent victimization and property crime rates were the lowest recorded since the start of the NCVS in 1973. The rate of violent victimization decreased 21 percent from the period 1999–2000 to 2001–2. Concerning property crime, from 1993 through 2002, the household burglary rate fell 52 percent; the auto theft rate decreased 53 percent; and the rate of theft declined 49 percent.

Marcus Felson points out that there are many fallacies in the general understanding of crime in the United States even when we use the legal definition of crime. As noted in the discussion of the FBI Crime Index above, minor property offenses vastly outnumber murders, especially dramatized murders such as gangland killings and sniper attacks. Related to this, most crime goes unreported and does not result in an arrest. Further, contrary to what many think, most crime is not organized and prosperity may actually increase crime by making more goods available for theft.

As noted above, the FBI rate of Index Crime in 2002 was down 1.1 percent from 2001 and down almost 25 percent from 1993. News papers and others attributed this decline to less reporting of crime to the police, more effective use of policing, increased incarceration, changes in demand for illegal drugs, especially crack cocaine, decreased use or availability of guns, improvement in the economy, and changes in youth attitudes. Criminologist John Conklin has done a thorough analysis of the dramatic crime decline in the 1990s. He concludes that the increased use of imprisonment was the

major factor in the crime decline, followed by changes in the crack market and a switch to marijuana. Careful analyses such as this are important because politicians often make claims that are not based on evidence. In New York City, for example, politicians claimed that changes in policing produced the crime reductions when the evidence does not clearly support such a claim.

A related issue is the comparison of the extent of crime in the United States to the extent in other countries. Despite recent decreases in US crime rates, criminologists Steven Messner and Richard Rosenfeld argue that crime is more prevalent in the United States than in other advanced societies. To demonstrate the preeminence of the United States in crime, they note that in 1997 the US had a robbery rate of 186.1 robberies per 100,000 residents. The next closest country was France with a rate of under 140 robberies per 100,000 residents. The US rate was more than two and one half times above the average rate for the 15 other countries in the comparison group. Similarly, the US homicide rate for 1993–5 was 8.2 homicides per 100,000 population. This was about six and one half times higher than the average rate of the other countries in the sample. American culture may be one reason for this. Messner and Rosenfeld argue that the American Dream – our emphasis on monetary success via competition – helps many of us to reach our own success goals but that it also contributes to the high level of crime in the United States compared to other nations. Their suggestion for reducing crime in the United States is to focus more attention on goals other than monetary success and to put some restraints on the individual achievement of material success instead of family and community interests.

In summary, police, prosecutors, and correctional officials act on the assumption that the conventional definition of crime, any violation of the criminal law, is both generally accepted and valid. Criminologists often do the same. But there are other definitions of crime, especially the definitions proposed by critical criminologists and restorative justice theoreticians, that raise important questions about our understanding of crime and our reaction to it.

SEE ALSO: Age and Crime; Alcohol and Crime; Class and Crime; Collective Efficacy and Crime; Conflict Theory and Crime and Delinquency; Crime, Biosocial Theories of; Crime, Broken Windows Theory of; Crime, Corporate; Crime, Hot Spots; Crime, Life Course Theory of; Crime, Organized; Crime, Political; Crime, Psychological Theories of; Crime, Radical/Marxist Theories of; Crime, Schools and; Crime, Social Control Theory of; Crime, Social Learning Theories of; Crime, White Collar; Criminal Justice System; Criminology; Deviance, Crime and; Environmental Criminology; Index Crime; Juvenile Delinquency; Law, Criminal; Measuring Crime; Property Crime; Public Order Crime; Race and Crime; Sex and Crime; Social Support and Crime; Victimization; Violent Crime

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crime, biosocial theories of

Lee Ellis

Most sociologists do not believe that biological factors play a significant role in causing crime, instead attributing it almost entirely to social learning. Sociologists and criminologists generally share this strict environmental perspective, and thereby keep biology at arm's length. A recent survey of criminologists indicated that only about 15 percent believe biology is important for understanding criminality. They are known as *biosocial criminologists*.

It is interesting to note that when criminology began to form about a century and a half ago, it exhibited a fairly strong biological emphasis. At that time, a physician named Cesare Lombroso argued among other things that the most persistent and vicious criminals were *atavistic*. By this term, Lombroso meant that hardened criminals were "throwbacks" to more barbaric stages in human evolution. He went so far as to propose that one could even identify such individuals by their exhibiting a number of relatively "primitive" physical characteristics.

By the early twentieth century, most criminologists had largely dismissed Lombroso's ideas and turned their attention to strictly environmental explanations of criminal behavior based on various principles of social learning. However, beginning in the 1970s, several criminologists began to give renewed attention to biology as providing significant explanatory power. None of them denied that learning and social influences were involved, but they suggested that biological forces could also be at work in the sense of affecting people's propensities to be more readily influenced by some social learning factors more than others. For example, persons who were biologically predisposed toward being risk takers might be more easily drawn into various types of crime than those who rarely took risks.

The biosocial perspective in sociology and criminology has two distinguishable but complementary traditions. One focuses on identifying evolutionary forces that may underlie

criminal behavior. The other tradition is mainly interested in linking criminality to specific biological processes such as those involving hormones and brain functioning patterns. Examples from each of these two traditions are summarized below.

Since the 1980s, several evolutionary theories of criminal behavior have been published. Among the least technical of these proposals was one articulated by Linda Mealey (1995). She put forth a theory of why criminal behavior in all cultures is committed primarily by males, particularly during their early reproductive years.

Mealey's evolutionary reasoning went as follows. Because they do not gestate offspring, males have more options than females do regarding how they will allocate their "reproductive effort." As a result, males in many species have evolved a variety of "creative" ways to augment the minimal time they have to devote to reproduction. Along these lines, biologists have documented in quite a number of species what are called *alternative reproductive strategies*, all of which are found only in males. For example, in a common freshwater fish known as the *bluegill*, most adult males jealously defend a little territory near the bottom of the pond where they spend most of their time. In the midst of their territory, each male hollows out a "nest" in the sediment. If a receptive female swims by and finds the male's territory attractive, she descends for a closer inspection. Sometimes, her visit is followed by the couple performing a synchronous courtship dance. He then ushers her to his nest, nuzzles her belly, and prompts her to lay several dozen eggs. This is followed by the male depositing a cloud of sperm over the clutch of eggs in order to fertilize them.

The scenario just presented is often more complicated due to the fact that not all male bluegill reproduce in this way. A second type of male bluegill has evolved called a *sneaker*. Sneakers do not defend territories or build nests, and females never seem to choose them as mating partners. Even so, sneakers manage to pass their genes on generation after generation, thus maintaining a representation in bluegill populations. Here is how they do it. Sneakers stealthily wait in the vicinity of a courting couple, usually without detection. Then, after

the female deposits her eggs, a sneaker will dart between the courting couple and spew out his own sperm cloud over the freshly deposited eggs. This is done literally in the blink of an eye to avoid being bitten by the mating pair, and therefore the number of eggs a sneaker can fertilize is usually limited to about 20 percent. Bluegill sneakers are an illustration of an evolved alternative reproductive strategy.

Humans are obviously not bluegill, but Mealey argued that males of our species may have also evolved an alternative reproductive strategy. She suggested that males who are clinically known as *psychopaths* (i.e., those suffering from what psychologists and psychiatrists call the *antisocial personality syndrome*) often pass their genes on to future generations by engaging in unusually manipulative and deceptive behavior. They often misrepresent their intentions to prospective mates, as well as intimidate and assault rival males and steal property with which to attract as many potential mates as possible. Mealey proposed that true psychopaths are genetically prone to engage in their lawless acts throughout their reproductive careers, but she also suggested that an even larger proportion of males (and even some females) merely learn similarly deceptive reproductive strategies. These individuals, she believed, will adopt more socially acceptable strategies by the time they become full adults. Mealey's theory is one of several recent attempts to apply modern evolutionary concepts to the study of criminal behavior.

The second tradition among biosocial criminologists focuses on specific biological processes, especially those having to do with the brain. The theories that have emerged out of this tradition are known as *neurologically specific theories*.

One of the very first neurologically specific theories to be proposed is called *arousal theory* or *suboptimal arousal theory*, and it usually focuses on the *reticular formation*, a diffuse area of the brain located primarily at the top of the brain stem. The reticular formation essentially monitors the environment and helps to regulate attention and the sleep-wake cycle. According to proponents of arousal theory, some people have reticular formations that are unusually insensitive to incoming stimuli. As a result, these individuals often feel bored unless they

are in the midst of unusually intense and novel environmental stimuli. In childhood, they will frequently exhibit hyperactivity and inattention. By the time they reach adolescence, these suboptimally aroused individuals will gravitate toward all sorts of intense and novel activities, quite a few of which will be illegal. Theoretically, besides stealing and fighting, suboptimally aroused adolescents and adults should be attracted to mind altering drugs and irresponsible sexual activities.

Another neurologically specific theory concentrates on the two hemispheres of the neocortex, which is the outermost layer of the brain and is largely responsible for language ability and other forms of “higher thought.” Studies have shown that the two hemispheres of the neocortex tend to function differently. In general, the left hemisphere thinks in linguistic terms, which usually involves stringing ideas into logical sequences. The right hemisphere, in contrast, thinks more intuitively, often by organizing experiences and thoughts in three dimensional space, and then it envisions solutions to obstacles (Ellis 2005). Furthermore, studies have indicated that the left hemisphere tends to be more “social” and “friendly” than the right hemisphere (reviewed in Ellis 2005).

The above evidence has led to what is known as *hemispheric functioning theory*. This theory asserts that persons who are most likely to repeatedly engage in crime have a less dominant left hemisphere than do people in general, a phenomenon called a *rightward shift in neocortical functioning*. Among the predictions of the hemispheric functioning theory is that offenders will do poorly in school, at least when it comes to subject areas with strong language components, although they may excel in other areas such as mathematics. Many studies have provided support for this prediction (Ellis 2005).

A novel prediction of hemispheric functioning theory is that criminality will be more prevalent among left and mixed handers than right handers. This is because the right hemisphere tends to control the left side of the body, while the left hemisphere controls the right side. Evidence is fairly consistent with this prediction, although differences are not pronounced.

Ellis (2005) has suggested how the evolutionary and neurologically specific traditions in

biosocial criminology can be combined into a “synthesized theory” – called the *evolutionary neuroandrogenic (ENA) theory*. Central to this theory is the idea that testosterone (the main so called male hormone) has evolved ways of altering the brain so as to make males more competitive and victimizing toward others than are females. One consequence of this “hormonal wiring” of the brain is that males are more involved in most victimful crimes (as opposed to victimless crimes).

To explain why males have evolutionarily favored competitive/victimizing behavior, the theory contends that females generally prefer to mate with males who are reliable provisioners of resources rather than with males who are not. In order to become a reliable provisioner, a male must be overtly competitive, often to the point of injuring rivals and stealing or damaging property.

Regarding its neurologically specific features, ENA theory maintains that exposing the brain to testosterone, both prior to birth and following the onset of puberty, facilitates competitive/victimizing behavior. Among the brain regions most affected are the reticular formation and the neocortex. Regarding the first, exposing the brain to testosterone subdues the reticular formation’s responsiveness to incoming stimuli, thereby causing the brain to require more intense environmental stimulation than a brain exposed to little testosterone. In the case of the neocortex, testosterone appears to shift functioning away from the left hemisphere toward the right. This tends to increase spatial reasoning and retard language development.

The end result, according to ENA theory, is individuals who are willing to compete for resources with which to attract sex partners, even if doing so victimizes others. Sometimes, sex partners themselves can be the objects of victimization, such as in the case of rapes and spousal assaults.

ENA theory still envisions learning as playing an important causal role in criminality, although the nature of that role differs somewhat from more traditional criminological theories. According to ENA theory, people’s brains vary, and as a result they are inclined to learn some things more readily than other things even when it comes to various forms of criminality.

Many new and exciting ideas have been proposed by biosocial theorists in sociology, criminology, and other social sciences in the past couple of decades. Much of their work is being inspired by the advances still being made in understanding evolution, the brain, and other biological phenomena.

SEE ALSO: Biosociological Theories; Crime, Life Course Theory of; Evolution; Lombroso, Cesare; Neurosociology

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crime, broken windows theory of

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Social psychologists use the term broken windows to signify the characteristics of neighborhood deterioration. They argue that if a broken window in a building or in a car is left

untended, other signs of disorder will increase. Wilson and Kelling (1982) suggest that an unrepaired broken window is a signal that no one cares for the neighborhood. They argued further that if the window is left broken, it can lead to more serious crime problems.

Phillip Zimbardo (1969), a psychologist, tested the broken window theory with some experiments. He arranged that a car without a license plate be parked in a Bronx neighborhood and one comparable car be parked in Palo Alto, California. The car in the Bronx was destroyed within ten minutes, while the car in Palo Alto was left untouched for more than a week. After Zimbardo smashed the car in Palo Alto, passersby started to vandalize the car. In both cases, once the car was damaged and looked abandoned, destruction, vandalism, and even theft soon followed.

Signs of neighborhood deterioration or disorder, such as broken windows, can lead to the breakdown of social controls. In stable neighborhoods, residents tend to watch out and care more for their property, children, and public safety. Residents in these neighborhoods are more attached to their neighborhood and more likely to consider their neighborhood as their home. Thus, any broken windows or other signs of disorder in these stable neighborhoods will soon be addressed and fixed. In these stable neighborhoods, more informal social controls are exercised by residents, the result being that crime is less likely to invade such areas. On the other hand, when a neighborhood can no longer regulate signs of public disorder, such as broken windows, more deterioration and even serious crime can result (Wilson and Kelling 1982).

Former New York City Mayor Rudy Giuliani implemented zero tolerance policing across New York City (NYC). Zero tolerance policing, primarily based on the philosophy of broken windows theory, is an approach of rigid enforcement of minor offenses and disorderly behavior such as jaywalking, panhandling, public drunkenness, and graffiti. Zero tolerance policing claims that if little things such as broken windows or graffiti are left untended, it can encourage more disorderly behavior or more crime. Thus, it is argued that the enforcement of laws governing minor offenses, especially public order offenses, can further prevent more serious crime from occurring and ultimately

lead to a decline in crime rates. During the period of the implementation of zero tolerance policing in NYC, the violent crime rate was found to decline dramatically (Bratton 1997). However, whether the precipitous decline in violent crime in New York City in the 1990s can be attributed to the broken windows philosophy is still debated. Harcourt (2002) argues that the crackdown on quality of life offenses and disorderly behavior has little impact on the decline of crime rate. He further states that no one has ever shown a direct connection between neighborhood disorder and crime rate. Comparing crime rates in New York City with those of four other large American cities (Chicago, San Diego, Washington, DC, and Los Angeles), Brereton (1999) found that reductions in crime rates in the mid 1990s occurred in cities with very different policing approaches from those operating in New York. The corresponding decline in crime rates in other cities without New York's zero tolerance approach strongly suggests that other factors may be involved.

Kelling et al. (2001) used the precinct level arrests for misdemeanors in NYC as the measure of broken windows enforcement. They found that the increased misdemeanor arrests in NYC reduced the violent crime rates. However, since one of the main features of the broken windows theory is the presence of existing disorders in a given neighborhood, a measure of misdemeanor arrests does not fully capture the construct of broken windows, as the reduction in violent crime may be attributed to the increased police surveillance and police presence. Research with more sophisticated measurement is needed to disentangle whether there is a direct or indirect relationship between broken windows and crime rates in a given neighborhood. For example, the crime rate of neighborhoods with the features of public disorders can be compared to neighborhoods with renewal projects to further examine whether fixing broken windows can reduce the crime rates. Factors that may mediate the relationship between broken windows and crime – such as neighborhood characteristics and unemployment rate – should also be taken into consideration.

SEE ALSO: Crime; Social Disorganization Theory; Zimbardo Prison Experiment

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crime, corporate

Gilbert Geis

Corporate crime involves organizational wrongdoing, such as anti-trust violations, false earnings statements, and misleading advertising.

The doctrine of corporate crime permits the justice system to deal with an organization as if it were a real person, despite the fact that, unlike humanity itself, a corporation can have an indefinite life span and possesses no corporeal substance that can be hauled before a court. In the early 2000s, corporate lawbreaking captured media headlines when scandals erupted that involved Enron, Adelphia, WorldCom, Arthur Andersen, and a number of other Fortune 500 businesses, though the invasion of Iraq soon thereafter relegated these cases to a secondary status in public consciousness.

Punishing corporate bodies was not allowed in early British and American law. One difficulty in punishing corporate bodies is that the web of decision making within a large institution often makes it exceedingly difficult to pinpoint culpable individual miscreants. Gradually, however, the doctrine of corporate crime won jurisprudential favor, primarily as a means to control the damaging misdeeds of an ever increasing number of very powerful businesses. In addition, corporations possess deep pockets that can be made to disgorge monies to compensate those they have injured.

The doctrine of corporate criminal liability rests on a distinction that can confound logic. Why should a corporation be vulnerable to criminal prosecution when other organizational entities are exempt from such actions? If the father of the Oliver family, for example, burglarizes a neighbor's house, no criminal charge of *State v. The Olivers* follows. When war criminals are indicted by the victors (it is invariably the victors who are able to punish the loser's war criminals) it is individuals who are named, not nations. In the end, it was pragmatism that prevailed, however: corporations need to be and can be reined in, at least somewhat, though it would seem unfair to prosecute families and futile to try to criminalize the entire population of a nation.

Until recently, the assumption was that fines against corporations, however large, could be passed along to customers by raising prices or, if that was not possible because of competition, could be written off as a routine part of the expense of doing business. But the government's 2002 prosecution of the Arthur Andersen accounting firm, a large limited liability partnership, demonstrated that when an organization depends on the trust of its

customers, its revealed wrongdoing can force it out of business.

Corporate criminal liability finds support in philosophical observations that portray a corporate entity as something other than an accumulation of its component human parts. A group decision is said to represent an amalgam of inputs that often lead to actions that no individual in the group would have carried out alone. Others maintain that the doctrine anthropomorphizes corporations and that the law should have paused and created a separate set of rules for dealing with organizations rather than relying on preexisting statutes and judicial decisions that were tailored to handle criminal offenses by individuals.

Countries in Europe and Asia initially refused to follow the English and American path, insisting that criminal punishment could not be inflicted upon a corporation because it did not possess the requisite *mens rea*, the guilty mind essential to the assignment of responsibility for a criminal act. Increasingly, however, particularly in regard to environmental offenses, many of the world's countries are beginning to enact statutes that permit corporate bodies to be sanctioned criminally.

The major stamp of approval of the criminal culpability of corporations in the US was set forth in the 1908 ruling by the Supreme Court in *New York Central & Hudson Railroad Co. v. United States* regarding illegal rebates paid by the American Sugar Refining Company to preferred companies. The company primarily relied on the argument that its punishment fell upon innocent shareholders who were unable to defend themselves against the government's action. The Supreme Court, rejecting this argument, declared that if authorities could not punish the company there would be no effective way to deal with a harmful and illegal way of doing business.

For sociologists, the most provocative writing on the subject of corporate crime is found in an interchange between Donald Cressey and a pair of Australian scholars, John Braithwaite and Brent Fisse. Cressey maintained that it is impossible to formulate a social psychological theory of corporate crime. Braithwaite and Fisse insisted that sound scientific theories can be based on an analysis of corporate behavior and that some theories of individual

action can fruitfully be applied to corporate activities. Such work could be based, for example, on decisions by boards of directors and a review of the overarching corporate ethos.

SEE ALSO: Class and Crime; Crime, Social Learning Theory of; Crime, White Collar; Law, Economy and; Organizational Deviance; Sutherland, Edwin H.

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crime, hot spots

Lorraine Mazerolle

Hot spots of crime are defined as "small places in which the occurrence of crime is so frequent that it is highly predictable, at least over a one

year period" (Sherman 1995: 36). Hot spots are places like street corners, malls, apartment blocks, subway stations, and public parks that generate a large number of complaints to police. Research shows that about 3 percent of all places generate over half of all citizen complaints about crime and disorder to the police.

Researchers from a number of disciplines (including geography, architecture, environmental planning, sociology, social psychology, political science, and criminology) have studied hot spots of crime. The "crime and place" perspective that informs today's hot spots of crime research has a long history dating back to late nineteenth century researchers in France (e.g., Andre Michel Guerry and Adolphe Quetelet) and early twentieth century researchers in Chicago (e.g., Clifford Shaw and Henry McKay). Recent hot spots of crime research straddles a number of theoretical perspectives, such as ecology of crime, environmental criminology, routine activities theory, crime pattern theory, defensible space, crime prevention through environmental design, and situational crime prevention. All of these perspectives contribute to our understanding of why crime clusters into hot spots and argue that crime is not random, but rather the result of environmental factors. These environmental (and situational) factors create opportunities for crime in some places and prevent crime from occurring in other places.

Sherman (1995) proposes six primary dimensions that help to define and distinguish one hot spot of crime from another:

- 1 *Onset*: This dimension deals with the factors that make a place become "bad." Such factors might include some form of distinctive character (e.g., a bar or parking lot), a change in the routine activities of a neighborhood, or mere chance.
- 2 *Recurrence*: This dimension deals with the point at which a place is labeled a hot spot. As an example, when a place experiences 3 robberies during a 1 year period, that place has a 58 percent chance of recurrence. Recurrence encourages us to ask if that is the threshold of activity that would define a place as a hot spot.

- 3 *Frequency*: This dimension deals with the number of times per year crime occurs in a given space.
- 4 *Intermittency*: This dimension deals with two issues. The first is the amount of time *between* criminal events. The second is what explains intermittency. Such factors as (a) criminal habits of the occupants, (b) economic difficulties of place owners, and (c) changes in traffic flow that impacts the flow of targets and offenders have been considered.
- 5 *Career length and desistence*: The fifth dimension is concerned with the desistence of crime problems in a particular space. Places desist from having crime problems for five reasons: death (e.g., a hot spot bar is torn down); vigilante behavior (e.g., omnipresence patrol by police, patrol by citizens); incapacitation (e.g., civil remedies, boarding up buildings); blocking opportunities (e.g., re routing a bus); building insulators (e.g., community cohesion, problem solving).
- 6 *Crime types*: This dimension describes the fact that places tend to have crime specialization because the place characteristics limit the types of crimes possible (e.g., drug dealing).

Most research into hot spots of crime requires the use of sophisticated spatial analysis using geographic information systems to understand the distribution of crime and pinpoint the locations of crime hot spots. Many techniques have been used to empirically and conceptually describe the clustering of crime into hot spots and new, innovative techniques often developed in the physical sciences are used to understand the non random distributions of crime.

A recent line of inquiry in the crime and place tradition has been the application of trajectory research, traditionally used to describe individual offending patterns over the life course (Weisburd et al. 2004). The use of trajectory analysis enables researchers to view crime trends at places over long periods of time and use group based statistical techniques to uncover distinctive developmental trends and identify long term patterns of offending in crime hot spots.

The concentration of crime in hot spots suggests significant crime prevention potential for law enforcement strategies such as directed patrols and problem oriented policing (Braga 2001). These types of police strategies focus crime prevention resources at micro places with large numbers of crime events. Recent research agrees with this "hot spots policing" approach, but finds that police need to distinguish between short lived concentrations of crime in hot spots versus those hot spots that have long histories (Weisburd et al. 2004). Indeed, Weisburd and his colleagues suggest that if hot spots of crime shift rapidly from place to place it makes little sense to focus crime control resources at such locations. By contrast, the police would be most effective by identifying and targeting resources at those hot spots with long histories of crime.

SEE ALSO: Crime; Drugs, Drug Abuse, and Drug Policy; Experimental Design; Methods, Visual; Police; Public Order Crime; Routine Activity Theory

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crime, life course theory of

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The life course perspective emphasizes the importance of time, social context, and process in both theory and analysis by taking into account historical events and changes as well as individual lives. The two central concepts in the life course perspective are trajectories and transitions. Trajectories are the long term patterns and sequences in an individual's life. These are pathways such as marriage, parenthood, careers, and criminal or non criminal behaviors. Transitions, on the other hand, occur within trajectories and are single events that are often age graded, such as changes in societal roles or status. They can include graduation, divorce, retiring, an arrest, and so on. These specific life events can be so abrupt and influential that they transform life trajectories. Therefore, there is a sequence of life trajectories, transitions, and adaptations during the life course.

This interlocked nature of trajectories and transitions leads to the broadly accepted view point of the life course perspective that an individual's childhood is connected to adulthood experiences. The life course focus on the full life span, from birth to death, thus posits that transitions occurring early in life or childhood can have consequences and shape events later in life. In addition, the life course perspective examines the social meaning of age throughout the life span, how social patterns are transmitted from generation to generation, and the effects of social historical events such as wars and tragedies, structural locations, and personal life histories. In short, the essence of the life course perspective is its concern with the duration, timing, and ordering of transition events and their effects on long term development and trajectories. Nowhere has this perspective been so central to thinking than criminological theory in general, and explanations for the longitudinal patterning of criminal activity in particular.

THE LIFE COURSE AND CRIMINOLOGICAL THEORY

Over the past dozen years, criminological theory has paid close attention to the longitudinal patterning of criminal activity. Much of this focus can be attributed to the important criminal career studies carried out in the early 1970s, 1980s, and 1990s in the United States, Canada, Puerto Rico, England, Sweden, Finland, Denmark, China, and Australia/New Zealand, as well as the review of the criminal career literature published by the National Academy of Sciences (Blumstein et al. 1986). This literature, aided by important theoretical models developed to better understand criminal activity over the life course, has grown tremendously since the late 1980s (Piquero et al. 2003).

Four main components underlie the study of criminal careers, and also underlie several life course influenced criminological theories: participation, frequency, seriousness, and career length. *Participation* separates those who have a criminal career from those who do not; *frequency* indicates the rate of criminal activity among active offenders; *seriousness* describes the severity of the offenses committed by an individual; and *career length* describes the length of time between an individual's last and first crimes.

A number of criminological theories have made exclusive use of this line of research and directly speak to the longitudinal patterning of crime over the life course. From this an entire subfield of criminological theory, developmental criminology, has emerged. In particular, developmental criminology focuses on two areas: (1) the study of the development and dynamics of offending with age; and (2) the identification of causal factors that predate or co occur with the behavioral development and have an effect on its course.

As an exemplar, we focus on three of these theoretical models: Moffitt's (1993) developmental taxonomy, Loeber and Hay's (1994) multiple pathways model, and Sampson and Laub's (1993) age graded informal social control theory.

Moffitt's theory begins with the classic aggregate age-crime curve, which exhibits a

peak in late adolescence followed by a precipitous decline throughout early and middle adulthood, reaching virtually zero in later adulthood. Moffitt claims that the aggregate age-crime curve hides two distinct groups of offenders, one characterized by highly active, short term participation during the adolescent years, and another characterized by a very small subset of individuals who engage in criminal activity at fairly frequent rates throughout most of the life course. The former group of offenders, "adolescence limiteds," begin offending during the adolescent time period largely as a result of the peer social context that emerges in adolescence and the maturity gap, or the recognition that adolescents look and feel like adults but are not allowed access to adult like activities. As a result of this maturity gap, similarly situated adolescents seek the aid and comfort of one another and engage in acts that seek to relieve them of their situation, such as vandalism, alcohol and drug use, sexual activity, and minor theft. With adulthood they tend to leave their dabbling in antisocial activity and function as normal adults with careers, relationships, and so forth. Only among a small number of adolescence limiteds does criminal activity continue into adulthood. The causal forces underlying their persistence include snares that encapsulate individuals, such as a criminal record, teenage childbearing, and so on.

The second group of offenders, "life course persistents," begin their involvement in antisocial and criminal activity early in the life course, offending at fairly stable yet high rates throughout adolescence, and continue into adulthood. Unlike the situated maturity gap and peer social context which adolescence limiteds find themselves subjected to, life course persistent offending is a function of neuropsychological/cognitive problems that are formed early in the life course. Such problems typically go undetected and uncorrected, in part because children suffering from these problems often times are reared in disadvantaged familial and socioeconomic contexts. Also, unlike their adolescence limited counterparts, life course persistent offenders engage in all sorts of antisocial and criminal activity including theft, drug use, and violence. The prospects for desistance from crime in adulthood are bleak

for life course persistent offenders because the neuropsychological deficits influence all facets of their lives, including employment, relationships, and overall decision making patterns. Thus, while desistance for adolescence limiteds is the norm, persistence is the norm for life course persistent offenders (though see Sampson & Laub 2003).

Loeber and his colleagues formulated a three pathway model to delineate developmental sequences in three domains: overt behavior problems, covert behavior problems, and problems with authority figures. The overt pathway starts with minor aggression (bullying), followed by physical fighting, and then by violence (rape, strongarm). The covert pathway consists of a sequence of minor covert behaviors (shoplifting, lying), followed by property damage (vandalism), and moderate to serious forms of delinquency (fraud, burglary). The authority conflict pathway (prior to age 12) consists of a sequence of stubborn behavior, defiance, and authority avoidance (running away, truancy). According to this three pathway model, individuals begin at a lower order (less serious behavior) and then proceed through the hypothesized sequences. It is also possible that individuals' development can take place on more than one pathway, with some youths progressing on all three pathways. The most frequent offenders are overrepresented among individuals in multiple pathways, especially those displaying both overt and covert behavior problems.

Unlike the typological models presented by Moffitt and Loeber, Sampson and Laub (1993) propose a single pathway model (there is only one group of offenders) that takes both childhood and adulthood factors into account in understanding the longitudinal patterning of criminal activity. Specifically, these scholars develop an age graded theory of informal social control that has three distinct components: (1) the structural context mediated by informal family and school social controls explains delinquency in childhood and adolescence; (2) there is continuity in antisocial behavior from childhood through adulthood in a variety of life domains; and (3) informal social bonds in adulthood to employment and family explain changes in criminality over the life course despite early childhood factors. Thus, for

Sampson and Laub, there is both continuity and change.

WHAT DO WE KNOW?

Research on life course criminology has generated a number of important “facts,” many of which have been controversial (Farrington 2003). Some of these facts, directly emerging from the studies outlined above, include: (1) the prevalence of offending peaks between ages 15 and 19; (2) the peak age of onset of offending is between 8 and 14, while the peak age of desistance from offending is between 20 and 29; (3) an early age of onset predicts a relatively long criminal career duration and the commission of relatively many offenses; (4) there is marked continuity in offending and antisocial behavior from childhood to the teenage years and to adulthood; (5) a small fraction of the population (“chronic offenders”) commits a large fraction of all crimes; chronic offenders tend to have an early onset, a high individual offending frequency, and a long criminal career; (6) offending is versatile rather than specialized; violent offenders in particular appear to be indistinguishable from frequent offenders; (7) the types of acts defined as offenses are elements of a larger syndrome of antisocial behavior that include heavy drinking, reckless driving, and so forth; (8) most offenses up to the late teenage years are committed with others, whereas most offenses from age 20 onwards are committed alone; (9) the reasons given for offending up to the late teenage years are quite variable, including utilitarian ones, for excitement/enjoyment, out of boredom, and/or emotional ones; from age 20 onwards, utilitarian motives become increasingly dominant; and (10) different types of offenses tend to be first committed at distinctively different ages. This sort of progression is such that shoplifting tends to be committed before burglary, burglary before robbery, and so forth. In general, diversification increases up to age 20, but after age 20, diversification decreases and specialization increases.

WHAT DON'T WE KNOW?

Still, there exist some contentious life course criminology issues that have been ill studied

and/or have generated discrepant results. Seven issues in particular are identified here. (1) While it is clear that the prevalence of offending peaks in the late teenage years, it is less clear how the individual offending frequency varies with age. (2) It is not clear whether the seriousness of offending escalates up to a certain age and then de escalates, or whether it does not change with age. (3) It is clear that early onset of offending predicts a long career and many offenses, but it is far less clear whether early onset predicts a high individual offending frequency or a high average seriousness of offending. Nor is it clear whether early onset offenders differ in degree or in kind from later onset offenders, whether onset age relates to offense seriousness over time, or how much there are distinctly different behavioral trajectories. (4) Although chronic offenders commit more offenses than others, it is not clear whether their offenses are more serious on average or whether chronic offenders differ in degree or in kind from non chronic offenders. (5) While it is clear that certain offenses occur on average before other types and that onset sequences can be identified, it is not clear whether these onset sequences are merely age appropriate behavioral manifestations of some underlying theoretical construct or if the onset of one type of behavior facilitates or acts as a stepping stone toward the onset of another. (6) Although there appears to be some research indicating that offenders are more versatile than specialized, these findings have been produced largely by research using official records through age 18. Very little information has been provided about how specialization/versatility varies with age into adulthood, and even less attention has been paid to the extent to which specialization/versatility varies in official and/or self report records. (7) While there has been much attention paid to the topic of desistance, little attention has been paid to developing estimates of career length or duration as well as residual career length. Such information bears directly on policy issues regarding sentence lengths. Smaller residual careers would be indicative of shorter and not longer sentences.

SEE ALSO: Crime; Deviance, Crime and; Juvenile Delinquency; Life Course Perspective; Race and Crime; Social Psychology; Theory

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crime, organized

Sean Patrick Griffin

Though the study of organized crime is primarily a sociological pursuit, the phenomenon is a subject of study in numerous other

disciplines, including anthropology, economics, history, and political science. Despite, if not because of, this broad and varied inquiry into the topic, there is little consensus on what constitutes "organized crime."

Perhaps the broadest interpretation of organized crime is offered by sociologist Joseph Albin (1971). His analysis identified four types of organized crime: political social (e.g., Ku Klux Klan), mercenary (predatory/theft oriented), ingroup (gangs), and syndicated (offers goods and services, and infiltrates legitimate businesses). Many scholars, for reasons that have inspired considerable debate within this research area, have opted to narrowly focus on syndicated organized crime as described by Albin (1971).

Albin argued for identifying the common characteristics among syndicated groups. This approach has been replicated numerous times. Four characteristics are most frequently cited in the academic literature when defining syndicated organized crime: a continuing enterprise, using rational means, profiting through illegal activities utilizing the corruption of officials. Several other authors have argued that groups must also use (or threaten) violence, and be involved in multiple criminal enterprises, to merit inclusion in the organized crime discussion.

While these "defining characteristics" are commonly cited among scholars, this should not be interpreted as settling the issue. For instance, there is no consensus regarding what constitutes "continuity." Is it continuity of a group, of a conspiracy, or of a crime pattern? What duration of time constitutes continuity, regardless of which factor is chosen? Similarly, there are questions regarding "multiple enterprises." How many are required and how would this be operationally defined? For example, an organization may be grounded on narcotics trafficking while by necessity evading taxes and laundering money. Furthermore, it can be argued that violence and corruption are merely "management tools" and that criminal enterprises may indeed thrive without the necessity of these tools (e.g., if law enforcement is ignorant of the problem).

There are other ongoing debates in the study of organized crime, and three stand out. Researchers continue to discuss such issues as

the distinctions between organized crime and “white collar” crime, and between organized crime and gangs. The other dispute concerns the degree of organization or sophistication exhibited by syndicates.

White collar crime is most commonly defined as “crimes committed by persons of high social status and respectability in the course of his occupation” (Sutherland 1983 [1949]: 7). However, if one focuses on the activities as opposed to the individuals involved in the activities, numerous white collar conspiracies quite easily fit the criteria listed above (i.e., continuity, corruption, multiple enterprises). For instance, several studies have demonstrated that securities frauds are often enduring and complex, requiring the use of financial “fronts,” money laundering, and the artful skills of accountants, financiers, and lawyers, the corruption of public and regulatory officials, and/or violence and so on. These studies have thus demonstrated that without an emphasis on the economic and social standing of the offender, these offenses would be considered organized crimes.

Today, numerous gangs engage exclusively in narcotics trafficking. Some scholars thus argue such organizations do not meet widely held characteristics of organized crime (i.e., these groups do not engage in multiple enterprises). There is no consensus in the academic literature on this matter, however. Some gang researchers delineate between gangs and “drug gangs,” with the latter obviously focusing on the drug trade and monopolizing sales market territories instead of residential territories, among other differences. Other researchers argue some gangs have become so sophisticated they are in fact organized crime groups. One example is Chicago’s Gangsters Disciples (Decker et al. 1998).

The most fundamental and contentious issue concerns the extent to which organized crime is, in fact, organized. Early studies stressed bureaucracy, adherence to protocols and rules, and what was essentially a business model for illicit endeavors. Later studies emphasized more informal relationships that were often fleeting and predicated on patron–client networks. The distinction can be viewed through the prism of two different models of research, each identified by a variety of terms. The more bureaucratic

interpretation of organized crime was characterized as the governmental/law enforcement/traditional view, whereas the other perspective was considered the informal structural functional system/developmental association model. Earlier studies emphasizing bureaucracy eventually gave way to the latter subset of models that now dominate the literature. Though membership in an organized crime group provides access to networking channels and increases the predictability of illegal venture, economic conditions tend against rigid structure in the “under world.” As economist R. T. Naylor (1997) argues, there are three risks associated with the illegality of organized crime: underworld contracts are not legally enforceable; the entrepreneur might be arrested; and criminal assets might be seized. Thus, the key contradiction of organized crime is that there is a need to provide substantial information to prospective customers but this process places the conspiracy in jeopardy because of fears of detection (by authorities and competitors).

SEE ALSO: Crime, Corporate; Crime, White Collar; Drugs and the Law; Gangs, Delinquent

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crime, political

Kenneth D. Tunnell

Political crime is an illegal offense against the state with the intention of affecting its political or economic policies, or an illegal domestic or international offense by the state and its agents. Political crime is conceptualized as individual, occupational, and organizational. Individual political crimes benefit individuals. Occupational crimes, occurring within the context of agents' legitimate occupations, also benefit individuals. Organizational political crimes benefit the organization as a whole rather than specific individuals.

Offenses against the state are treated as oppositional crimes committed by single individuals or organized groups. A lone individual hacking into government computers or selling classified government documents is an example of the former; groups of domestic and international terrorists planting bombs are an example of the latter.

Offenses by the state and its agents include organizational crimes such as unlawful surveillance of its citizens or, on the international front, destabilizing democratically elected governments or assassinating foreign leaders. These operations are systemic and benefit the state and its preferred economic and political order. On the other hand, political crimes by the state can also be individually based when, for example, state agents, operating within the legitimate authority and power of their political occupations, engage in crime for their own personal gain or to prevent loss. Political corruption within the office of elected officials, extortion among police officers, and cover ups within the executive branch constitute individual political crime when each is intended to benefit the office holder rather than the state (Turk 1982).

As egregious as political crime typically is, it has received only scant coverage in most criminology and criminal justice textbooks. As a result, this important crime type is often omitted from survey classes, and students in the sociology of crime often have little exposure to the vagaries of political crime and its consequences. Nonetheless, there are a few

publications in the area of political crime that comprise the bulk of the body of knowledge.

Early writings on political crime most often were case studies. Some focused on individuals or groups committing oppositional crimes against the state (e.g., revolutionary actions intended to disrupt normal activities and effect change). Others focused on the state and its agents committing crimes against its citizens and peoples of other countries (e.g., the unlawful opening of mail, spying on citizens' groups, circumventing democratic elections and their outcomes) (Churchill & Vander Wall 1988; Davis 1992; Ermann & Lundman 2001).

Some early (and recent) writings encouraged a broader definition of crime by suggesting that all crime is politically constructed in the arenas of politics and public opinion. Rather than accepting the state's politicized definitions of crime (which conveniently exclude the state and its behaviors), they suggest using social harm as a definition of crime. After all, evidence suggests that across human history, the actions with the most egregious results – physically, economically, environmentally, and in terms of human rights violations – have been carried out by the state and its agents, who generally are free from the application of the rule of law. Thus, the state's unethical but currently legal behaviors, under a broader political definition, would be subject to the criminal label (Bohm 1993). More recently, the literature has encouraged using human rights violations as a starting point for defining crime and particularly for political crimes of the state, especially within a global context and a world economy (Barak 1993).

The state and its violations have received greater attention in recent years and to such an extent that the term state crime has emerged. This term better articulates state actions and better delineates it from other types of political crime (Ross 2000). Within this growing body of literature, the term state corporate crime has emerged. A concept that focuses especially on the political activities of the state in conjunction with industry or specific corporations, it has proven especially useful for teasing out details of harmful actions often concealed within public and private sector bureaucracies (Friedrichs 1996). Case studies, such as that of the explosion of the US space

shuttle *Challenger* in 1986 and the loss of its 7 crew members, reveal the politicized and organizational antecedents for such disasters (Vaughn 1996).

There is no widely accepted theoretical explanation for political crime, nor method for studying it. Rather, a wide variety of classical and contemporary sociological theories (both social and social psychological) have been applied to it. Research methods used to study political crime mainly have been those central to case studies (viz., interviews and document research). Researching political crime undoubtedly has been and remains difficult; the various agents involved in any given political crime are secretive and documents typically are unavailable to researchers. Given these impediments, most research relies on secondary rather than primary data. Theoretical specificity and research strategies that are more imaginative are perhaps those areas within the study of political crime that most need improvement and that scholars more than likely will address in coming years.

SEE ALSO: Collective Action; Crime; Crime, White Collar; Organizations; Political Leadership; Political Sociology; Politics; Praxis; Social Change; Social Movements; State

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crime, psychological theories of

J. C. Oleson

Psychological theories of crime suggest that some offenses may be caused by mental factors or conflicts. Like biological theories, psychological theories of crime deal with causes at the individual level, but instead of associating crime with observable phenomena like brain abnormalities, psychological theories associate crime with abstractions like mental illness, intelligence, or personality.

For centuries, psychology has been essential to understanding criminal responsibility. Under criminal law, defendants who do not possess the requisite criminal intent (*mens rea*) are not guilty of a crime, even if they committed the criminal act (*actus reus*). This is why, for example, some offenders are found not guilty by reason of insanity. Mental states also regularly help distinguish varying levels of criminal responsibility, such as deciding between murder and manslaughter, or between first and second degree murder. Yet while legal evaluations of mental states extend back to ancient law, the search for the psychological origins of crime is only 150 or 200 years old.

Nineteenth century researchers, like Philippe Pinel and Benjamin Rush, claimed that criminal behavior was closely linked to forms of insanity. Henry Maudsley went even further, claiming that crime and madness were equivalents: criminals would go mad if they did not offend, and they do not go mad because they are criminals. More contemporary efforts have focused upon several psychological explanations for crime: psychodynamic conflicts,

cognitive deficits, traits or personality, and various forms of mental illness.

The psychodynamic psychology developed by Sigmund Freud has been used to explain criminal behavior. In *Wayward Youth* (1935), August Aichorn applied psychoanalytic theory to the causes of crime and delinquency. He claimed that crime is caused by “latent delinquency” that is partly biological, and partly shaped by one’s early relationships. If the process of socialization goes astray, individuals become “dissocial.” They seek immediate gratification, consider their needs more important than dealing with others, and guiltlessly pursue their urges without weighing right and wrong.

Other psychoanalysts interested in psychodynamic conflict have explained crime by focusing on components of the personality. Freud believed that the personality consists of three parts: the id, the ego, and the superego. The id represents the primitive unconscious drives for food, sex, and other biological necessities. Following the “pleasure principle,” the irrational id seeks instant gratification and has no regard for other people. The ego, guided by the “reality principle,” seeks to satisfy the demands of the id while simultaneously adapting to social conventions and norms. The superego, consisting of the conscience and the ego ideal, incorporates the moral values that have been socialized in the individual. When one fails to live up to moral standards, the conscience induces feelings of guilt; when one satisfies these standards, the ego ideal creates feelings of pride. Psychoanalysts believe that criminals are id dominated individuals, with underdeveloped egos and superegos, who can not regulate their pleasure seeking drives. Criminals have failed to progress from the pleasure principle to the reality principle.

Researchers focusing on cognitive deficits have linked crime to moral reasoning, intelligence, and information processing. Lawrence Kohlberg suggests that crime may be related to the way people organize their thinking about moral decisions. He posits six stages of moral judgment, moving from concrete thinking in the lower stages to abstract reasoning in higher stages. Pre moral reasoning (stages one and two) defines right as obedience to authority and the avoidance of punishment, and as looking after one’s own needs and leaving others to

themselves. Conventional reasoning (stages three and four) defines right as having good motives and earning social approval, and as maintaining social order for its own sake. Post conventional reasoning (stages five and six) defines right as recognition of a social contract conferring individual rights, and as an understanding of universal ethical principles such as justice, equality, and the value of human life. Kohlberg (1969) suggests that criminals are more likely to engage in concrete, pre moral reasoning and that non criminals are more likely to engage in conventional or post conventional reasoning.

Some researchers who focus on cognitive deficits claim that crime is linked to low intelligence. In *The English Convict* (1913), Charles Goring concluded that it was not physical differences that distinguished British prisoners from non prisoners but their defective intelligence. Others have supported Goring’s claim. Psychologists Henry Herbert Goddard and Lewis Terman both argued that feeble mindedness and crime were inextricably linked. While early criminologists like Edwin Sutherland and Carl Murchison questioned the IQ–crime relationship, many criminologists currently accept low IQ as a robust correlate of delinquency and crime. In their review of the literature, Travis Hirschi and Michael Hindelang (1977) concluded that while the average IQ score is 100, offenders have average IQ scores of about 92, or half a standard deviation below the population average. In *Crime and Human Nature* (1985), James Q. Wilson and Richard Herrnstein confirmed the low IQ–crime relationship, but suggested a deficit of ten – not eight – points.

Other researchers interested in cognitive deficits claim that impaired information processing causes crime. While rational choice theorists believe that criminals conduct cost benefit analyses and offend because it is in their interest to do so, psychologists have demonstrated that individuals often fail to analyze information in an accurate or efficient manner. For example, Wilson and Herrnstein noted that because of time discounting, the immediate rewards associated with crime may seem especially attractive, even given the risk of punishment, simply because of the immediacy of the payoff. Some individuals are able to delay gratification and to

work for distant goals while others seem incapable of this, and are therefore more likely to commit crimes. In volume one of *The Criminal Personality* (1976), Yochelson and Samenow identified dozens of thinking patterns that underlie criminal behavior, including irresponsible decision making, lack of empathy, concrete thinking, and seeing themselves as victims. Other criminologists have emphasized the role of mental “scripts” in making interpersonal judgments. Criminals may use fewer informational cues than most people, thereby misperceiving the intentions of others as hostile or malicious, and thus resort to familiar scripts of violent or criminal behavior.

Some criminologists have linked crime to personality traits. Sheldon and Eleanor Glueck (1950) identified a number of traits associated with antisocial behavior in young people, including ambivalence, defiance, destructiveness, distrust of authority, extraversion, impulsiveness, inadequate social skills, mental instability, narcissism, sadism, self assertiveness, and suspicion. Traits of aggressiveness, hostility, and impulsivity have been particularly implicated in studies of personality and crime. In their general theory of crime, Michael Gottfredson and Travis Hirschi (1990) suggest that impulsivity is essential to understanding crime. In their view, people with low self control are impulsive risk takers, are non verbal, are physical rather than mental, lack empathy and shame, and are oriented to the here and now. They do not work toward distant goals, and lack discipline and persistence. Their careers and relationships are unstable, and they are more likely to engage in behaviors like smoking, drinking, speeding, and promiscuous sex. Those with low self control are also far more likely to commit crimes.

Hans Eysenck (1977) suggested that personality could be measured on three dimensions: psychoticism (P) (where high scores signify tough mindedness and disregard for others), extraversion (E) (where high scores indicate impulsivity and sensation seeking), and neuroticism (N) (where high scores signify anxiety and emotional volatility). Eysenck believed that high E and N scores impede social conditioning. People with high E and N scores are less likely to be effectively socialized, and are therefore more likely to become criminals.

Individuals who score high on all three dimensions are especially at risk, particularly for crimes involving the victimization of others.

In many ways, Eysenck’s measure of tough minded psychoticism resembles another frequently invoked explanation for crime: antisocial personality disorder. Antisocial personality disorder is also interchangeably called psychopathy or sociopathy. Whatever term is used, the individuals with this condition lack feelings of guilt, remorse, or anxiety, and persistently violate the rights of others. They are often intelligent and superficially charming individuals, wearing “masks of sanity” (Cleckley 1976), concealing fundamentally damaged personalities that prevent them from forming meaningful relationships and that repeatedly lead them into risky behavior, crime, substance abuse, and violence. Analyzing the 16 characteristics proposed by Hervey Cleckley, Robert Hare (1980) identified five factors that describe psychopaths: inability to develop empathic relationships, unstable lifestyle, inability to accept responsibility for their antisocial behavior, absence of other intellectual or psychiatric problems, and weak behavioral control. Antisocial personality disorder is strongly associated with crime, and with chronic offending. Although psychopaths constitute only 4 percent of the male population and less than 1 percent of the female population, they are responsible for half of the serious felonies committed annually.

Research linking other forms of mental disorder to crime is equivocal. Building on the nineteenth century theories that linked crime to madness, early research found a robust relationship between offending and mental illness. As diagnostic criteria have evolved and as research methodologies have improved, however, the relationship has grown less clear. While individuals who have been diagnosed mentally ill are arrested at disproportionate rates, research suggests that the mentally ill are more likely to harm themselves than to hurt others.

Research typically shows that rates of mental disorder in prison populations are higher than in the general population, especially for psychopathy, schizophrenia, and depression. These studies, however, do not prove that mental illness causes crime. Several explanations are possible: mentally ill offenders may be less

successful at committing crimes, and more easily detected; police may be more likely to arrest mentally ill offenders; guilty pleas may be easier to obtain from mentally ill offenders; or the deprivations of prison might *cause* the mental illness. Research indicates that rates of offending in psychiatric hospital populations are generally higher than in the general population. Again, this finding does not in itself prove that mental illness *causes* crime. Early research actually suggested that psychiatric populations committed crimes at the same rate as the general population; the more recent research indicating that rates of robbery (and possibly rape) are higher among psychiatric populations may say more about who is institutionalized in psychiatric facilities than about rates of crime. In the future, careful research design may disaggregate the concepts of mental illness, crime, and institutionalization, and allow scientists to separate cause from correlation, but the relationship between mental illness and crime currently remains equivocal.

The psychological causes of crime remain a rich area of investigation. Contemporary research is already exploring the neurological bases of psychological phenomena such as psychopathy, intelligence, and personality. As biological and psychological explanations converge, the mechanisms of the individual level causes of crime may become clear. Psychological criminologists also may bridge individual level and interpersonal explanations to explain, for example, how personality traits contribute to the social bonds that underlie social control theory or how intelligence contributes to the trajectory of a criminal life course.

SEE ALSO: Crime, Biosocial Theories of; Crime, Social Learning Theory of; Freud, Sigmund; Law, Criminal; Rational Choice Theory: A Crime Related Perspective; Self Control Theory; Sutherland, Edwin H.

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crime, radical/Marxist theories of

Barbara Sims

Marxist criminological theory asserts that crime is the result of structural inequalities that are inherently associated with capitalist economic systems. Although Marx himself wrote very little about crime, theorists have relied on his economic theory to provide a foundation for a *critical* theory of criminal behavior. Marx believed that throughout history, human societies have consisted of two classes: those who have the power to create the rules under which everyone must live, and those who have neither the resources nor the political clout to have a say in just what those rules will be. Examples of these economic or political systems are master versus slave, lord versus serf, and, under modern day capitalism, capitalist versus proletariat. The capitalists are those who own the means of production, and the proletariats are those who work for them.

Marx used a base structure metaphor to describe the role of social institutions, with the economic mode of production providing the base of that structure. For Marx, the mode of production determines the characteristics of other social institutions, e.g., the social, political, and spiritual institutions.

Marxist criminologists argue that a society where some people, because of their place in the capitalist system, are able to accrue a great deal of wealth and material goods, and some are

not, is setting itself up for criminal behavior. Such behavior results from a lack of attention by those in power to the growing tensions among the working classes, who see a great divide between what the culture teaches them they can, and should, achieve, and the actual opportunities that could assist them in such achievement.

Intellectually, critical theorists rely on Marx's notion of exploitation of the working class by the capitalists to further explain growing frustrations by the former and rebellion, some of which could be criminal in nature. The capitalist class is able to earn extraordinary rates of surplus value, the profit produced by the workers for the capitalists, made possible through the labor of the worker. The workers are paid a subsistence living wage, barely enough to feed, clothe, and shelter themselves and, when relevant, their families.

At the time Marx was writing, the Industrial Revolution was underway with untold accounts of workers being injured or killed in the factories because of unsafe working conditions. Further, men, women, and children were being worked long hours in the factories of the capitalists, and in some cases suffered the lash of their supervisors should their work be deemed not to be of sufficient quality. The growing working class was increasingly viewed by Marx as exploited and, arguably, a powder keg about to explode.

Modern day Marxist theorists argue that although much has changed in the world since Marx's writings, there is still room for improvement when it comes to the working class. Neo Marxists, for example, suggest that although a revolution and the overthrow of the capitalist economy is not an appropriate solution to the problem of worker exploitation and gross inequalities of opportunity, there is much that could be done to reduce the boiling tensions and frustrations of the have nots in society. The minimum wage could be increased to an amount established by leading economists, factoring in the costs of food, clothing, and shelter in today's economy. Job creation and training programs could be established in local communities hit hard by the outsourcing of manufacturing sector employment to foreign markets. Assistance to families could take many forms. For one, subsidized and quality day care for the children of the working class could alleviate the stress of

worrying about who will take care of the children while the parents are at work. Medical leave with pay for workers who become unable to work or who have a family member in need of assistance could reduce the stress of worrying about missed wages or losing one's job because of an unexpected turn of events. Government sponsored health care programs that provide quality health care to the working class could also relieve much of the stress associated with worries over how to take care of oneself or one's family should illnesses or injuries occur.

On another level, Marxist criminologists argue that the criminal justice system, the system through which people who break the law are processed, should become more equitable. There should be an expectation that all individuals who come in contact with the system will be treated justly and equitably, with the rich receiving the same treatment as the poor. A system where "the rich get richer and the poor get prison" (Reiman 2001) should be abolished once and for all. Corporate fraud, or suite crime, that bilks retirement funds from longtime and loyal employees should be punishable by hard prison time no less than crimes of the street. When differences exist between the haves and the have nots when it comes to the meting out of justice, it becomes clear that the system is, in fact, unjust. Increasingly, members of the lower class, sometimes referred to as the truly disadvantaged, view the system as broken, and act out in ways that are hurtful to society.

One area that has always interested Marxist criminologists is the relationship between economic inequality and crime. Beginning with Willem Bongers (1969), Marxist theorists have attempted to demonstrate the relationship between economic inequality and crime. For Bongers, egoism is the result of the inherent ruthlessness of capitalism and its underlying competitiveness to get ahead by any means necessary. Members of the working class are forced to live in sometimes brutal conditions, and, at the same time, have the ruling class inculcating the culture with images of materialistic success. In this type of environment, the good of the whole is not considered, and altruism that would lead to prosocial attitudes and behaviors cannot take root. Richard Quinney, while agreeing with Bongers that capitalism causes crime, also pointed attention toward the

crimes of the ruling class. Those crimes are price fixing, political corruption, police brutality, violation of citizens' civil rights, and so on. According to Quinney, the ruling class must engage in actions of this sort in order to maintain the existing system.

In the 1980s and the 1990s, critical theorists, relying heavily on Marxist notions, continued to look at the relationship between structural inequalities and crime, and continued to examine more closely the crimes of the powerful. In an effort to demonstrate the importance of structural variables on individual interactions within the existing culture, Colvin and Pauly created an integrated structural Marxist theory of delinquency. They argued, and were able to demonstrate through an empirical test of their theoretical model, that parents discipline their children along the same lines as they themselves are treated within the workplace by their employers. Those who are supervised by employers who use coercive methods to obtain conformity in their workers use coercive methods in the household, as opposed to egalitarian means, to obtain conformity in their children.

Sims (1997) has argued that a well received theoretical model developed by Messner and Rosenfeld (1997) does not go far enough in explaining the role that social institutions play in the production of violent crime in America. The sociological paradigm developed by Messner and Rosenfeld does include strain theory and social disorganization theory, with a discussion of how inequality in opportunity within social institutions that are in disarray creates a society ripe for crime. What is left out, however, is the inclusion of Marxist criminology that can explain how social institutions are formed and function within the capitalist society. Sims (1997) argues that the economic foundation sets the stage for both the cultural messages received by the populace and the environment in which social interaction takes place. Marxist concepts can be used to add the missing link to Messner and Rosenfeld's model of crime.

Since the early 1960s, Marxist theories of crime have spawned several new theories, each bringing forth new ideas about the problem of crime. Left realism addresses the increasingly repressive control of the state over individuals who engage in lawbreaking, and calls for a closer look at the toll that crime takes on

individuals and communities. Feminist theory asserts that women continue to take a backseat to males in a patriarchal system, calling for studies that consider gender constructs in research designs. This approach would be one that goes beyond simply adding the variable *gender* to studies of crime and deviance and that demonstrates a clear understanding of the role that culture and social conditions contribute to society's views of and attitudes toward women. Peacemaking criminology attacks the militaristic approach to crime control, agitating for a system that looks toward an end to the "war on crime" and/or the "war on drugs" and the ushering in of a system in which all sides can live in peaceful coexistence with one another.

At the core of all of these theoretical perspectives, however, are basic Marxist principles. In sum, the economic mode of production dictates how the other social institutions will function. Although they may shift and do have some degree of autonomy, the economic foundation does not allow for too great a deviation from the base structure. The economy, then, takes a front seat to such institutions as the family, schools, the polity, and the spiritual. Under capitalism, a two class system emerges with a heavy emphasis on materialism and extreme competitiveness. The ruling class, those who own the means of production, are able to exploit the working class, and those who are most likely to suffer under this type of system are the poor, minorities, women, and children. At the same time, the ruling class is able to focus society's attention on the crimes of the lower classes while engaging in behavior that is corrupt, but that allows them to stay in power.

While some suggest that Marxist theories are somewhat utopian, other theorists see the importance of the contribution of the concepts of Marx to a more comprehensive examination of crime and delinquency. They argue continually that to ignore the more proximate (e.g., macro or structural) variables in any theoretical model of crime, in light of the fact that it is the more distal variables (e.g., micro or individual) that seemingly explain more in a multivariate (predictive) statistical model, is to miss the point. It is the way society is structured that determines the form that the social institutions take and the culture that arises out of interactions with individuals within those institutions.

SEE ALSO: Capitalism; Feminist Criminology; Marx, Karl; New Left Realism; Peacemaking; Stratification and Inequality

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crime, schools and

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The majority of schools in America are safe places. A comparison of national data from 1995 and 2001 shows the percentage of students

who reported being victims of crime at school decreased by 4 percent (DeVoe et al. 2003). In 1999 the US Departments of Education and Justice reported that almost 90 percent of all in school student injuries that required medical treatment were accidental, rather than the result of intentional acts of physical violence. Schools see fewer homicides and non-fatal injuries than homes or neighborhoods. From 1992 to 2000, school aged youth were 70 times more likely to be murdered outside of school than in school (US Department of Education 2001). The violence that does occur in schools, however, has changed. Serious violent acts are now more common than in the past. In the 1940s, school discipline problems generally involved running in the halls, chewing gum, talking out of turn, and other unruly behavior. In the 1970s, discipline problems progressed to dress code violations; in the 1980s, fighting became a concern. By the 1990s, school problems were defined as weapons possession, drug and alcohol abuse, gang activity, truancy, and violent assaults against students and teachers.

In schools, violence occurs along an age graded continuum. With younger children, violence is manifest as aggressive behavior such as kicking, hitting, or name calling. As children grow older, however, violent behavior becomes more serious and is characterized by assaults against other students and teachers, sexual harassment, gang activity, or carrying a weapon.

Students are not the only victims of violence at school; teachers can be targets as well. Between 1997 and 2001, on average, 21 out of every 1,000 teachers were victims of violent school crime; however, only 2 out of 1,000 teachers were likely to be victims of serious violent offenses such as robbery, aggravated assault, or sexual assault. Teachers in urban schools were more likely to be victims of violent crime than teachers in suburban or rural districts (DeVoe et al. 2003).

To minimize violence at school, it is important to understand the risk factors for violent behavior, so that effective school based prevention and intervention programs can be implemented. This is no easy task, however, as risk factors are complex and multidimensional, and may change over time. In addition, factors

associated with the potential for violence in school occur at both the individual and group level, and effective prevention programs must include a consideration of an individual school's design and operation.

Although violence is a learned behavior, other factors can influence an individual's propensity to behave violently. Two such factors are prenatal risk and a child's temperament. For example, birth complications such as oxygen deprivation can result in brain dysfunction and neurological and learning deficits that predispose an individual to violent behavior. Impulsive children and children with difficult personalities are also at risk for aggressive and violent behavior. Low cognitive abilities, especially verbal skills, and lack of school achievement constitute another set of risk factors for violent and aggressive behavior. Aggressive and violent youths tend to interpret neutral cues in their environment as hostile, thereby increasing the likelihood that they will react aggressively to a particular situation; such misattribution may cause a student to escalate an accidental bump in the hallway into a more serious altercation.

Aggressive behavior tends to be a pattern that persists over time, especially for children who are "early starters." One consistent finding in the research literature is a link between aggressive and violent behavior in adolescence, and negative, aggressive behavior in kindergarten and first grade. The pattern is one of early conduct problems leading to poor academic achievement, dropping out of school, and rejection by peers, all of which are factors associated with delinquent behavior.

Any effective strategy for reducing and preventing school violence needs to include parents, children, school staff, media, police officers, community members, and community based organizations. The most effective programs go beyond a concentration on individual children and singular risk factors, and attempt to change the climate or culture of the entire school. It is clear that a change in individual behavior cannot be sustained unless the social environment is also changed. Ensuring that basic safety needs are met is an essential first step in providing a school environment that is conducive to learning and proper socialization. An effective school safety program is

essential to prevent the onset of school violence, including a protocol for responding to crises, acts of violence, and even minor conflicts. Popular elements of school safety programs include the use of metal detectors, a zero tolerance policy for weapons, and using police officers as security guards.

There is a trend toward treating violent incidents as criminal acts to be handled by law enforcement officials and the courts, and the creation of alternative schools or programs for youths deemed too unruly for the regular school setting. School safety, however, is not just about "hardening the target" – using security cameras or metal detectors to deter unusual activity. Less punitive approaches include conflict resolution programs to settle disputes peaceably, mentoring programs to provide at risk students with supportive adult role models, new curricula to build character and develop moral reasoning, special skill building programs, and partnerships between schools and social service and mental health agencies. Other program components include structured playgrounds, closely supervising student behavior, and rewarding positive conduct. Schools are also implementing proactive programs designed to prevent aggressive acts by students, and to refer students to appropriate intervention services in the event that violence does occur. Many of these programs strive to increase student social skills while also working to reduce aggressive behavior. Fostering positive relationships between students and staff also creates a more caring school climate.

Despite the increase in the intensity of school violence in recent years, there are some encouraging signs that it can be prevented or at least reduced. School personnel and community members need to work together to create a positive environment that promotes social skills and high performance expectations, as well as a safe and caring climate where students are free to devote their time and energy to learning and developing the skills necessary to become successful and productive members of the community. Safe school strategies should focus on targeting goals that sustain expectations for acceptable behavior, and provide a disincentive for negative behavior, such as bullying, threats, vandalism, fighting, and theft. Understanding the relationship between risk,

prevention, intervention, and policy is also essential in implementing safe school policies and procedures. The key is to implement programs that have been shown to be effective in preventing violence or intervening when violence occurs.

SEE ALSO: Age and Crime; Crime; Criminology; Juvenile Delinquency; Scapegoating; School Discipline; Victimization; Violence; Violent Crime

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crime, social control theory of

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The social control theory of crime is fundamentally a theory of conformity. Instead of theorizing about the motivations for criminal behavior, control theorists ask, "Why do people conform?" Their answers to this question stress the importance of strong group relationships, active institutional participation, and conventional moral values in constraining and regulating individual behavior. When these controlling influences are weak or rendered ineffective, people are freer to deviate from legal and moral norms. Thus, in explaining conformity, control theorists highlight the conditions under which crime and delinquency become possible, if not likely, outcomes. Following this lead, a large body of criminological research inspired by social control theory has focused on how variations in the strength of individuals' bonds to family, community, school, and other conventional groups and institutions relate to patterns of self-reported and officially recorded deviant behavior.

Social control theory has origins in the early works of the moral and utilitarian philosophers, the nineteenth century writings of Émile Durkheim, and the early twentieth century research of the Chicago School of sociology. It is now counted among the leading sociological

perspectives on crime and juvenile delinquency, largely because of the influence of Travis Hirschi's formulation and evaluation of control theory in his book *Causes of Delinquency* (1969). Hirschi not only contributed a systematic theoretical analysis of the social bonds that account for conformity to legal and moral standards. He also assessed the explanatory power of his theory with a well designed survey of self reported delinquency among male adolescents. Most of the subsequent research and critical debate in the social control tradition has been addressed specifically to Hirschi's theoretical framework, which is often referred to as social bonding theory.

Hirschi explicitly grounds his version of control theory on Durkheim's classic analysis of suicide. Durkheim (1951) proposed that a lack of social integration – “the relaxation of social bonds” between individuals and society – was a source of high rates of “egoistic suicide” in certain societies. Hirschi (1969: 16) begins his theoretical statement by quoting Durkheim's characterization of how weak or ruptured social bonds to the family, community, or other groups create a condition of excessive individualism in which individuals depend only on themselves and recognize “no other rules of conduct than what are founded on [their] private interests.” Hirschi goes on to identify four conceptually distinct “elements” of the social bond that, when strong and viable, work against individualizing tendencies and maintain conformity to conventional rules of conduct.

First, Hirschi's concept of attachment, the *emotional element* of the social bond, comes closest to Durkheim's conception of the integrative influences of strong family and group relationships. Clearly, when individuals lack close emotional ties with others and do not care about other people's feelings or opinions, they are freer to deviate. Second, the *rational element* of the social bond, commitment, is based on individuals' calculation of the cost of deviance: the potential risk to their investments in conventional lines of action such as educational or occupational careers, if they were to be caught in an act of crime. In short, individuals who lack a commitment to school or a career have less to lose by committing crime. Third, involvement constitutes a *temporal element* of the social bond. People who are heavily engaged

in conventional activities have less free time to deviate than do those individuals with lots of “time on their hands.” Fourth, Hirschi's concept of belief, a *moral element* of the social bond, assumes that there is a common set of moral values that is shared, more or less, by all members of modern societies. However, the strength of belief varies across individuals, and those who are more weakly bonded to conventional morality will feel freer to violate the laws and norms of this common value system.

Hirschi (1969) treats these four elements theoretically as an interrelated network of variables: “In general, the more closely a person is tied to conventional society in any of these ways, the more closely [he or she] is likely to be tied in the other ways” (p. 27). However, he appears to assign causal priority to the emotional element of attachment by focusing on how close family ties subsequently affect the development of educational and career commitments and conventional beliefs in the moral validity of rules. Thus, Hirschi, like many other control theorists, implies that failure of the family to provide a strong and enduring emotional bond to the conventional social order is a basic source of criminality and other forms of disorderly conduct. A more controversial implication of social bonding theory is that attachment to any primary group, including delinquent friends, will strengthen the individual's bond to conventional society. Here, Hirschi's formulation runs counter to a central proposition of differential association and social learning theories, as well as to a large body of empirical evidence showing a positive relationship between social ties to deviant companions and delinquent or criminal behavior. Indeed, in light of similar findings in his own research on self reported delinquency, Hirschi concludes that his theoretical statement underestimates the importance of delinquent friends as a cause of law violating behavior. In most other respects, Hirschi's research and the results of numerous other investigations of delinquency and crime provide at least modest support for the argument that strong bonds to the family, school, work, and other conventional institutions discourage deviant behavior.

Hirschi's *relational* focus on the strength of the social bond distinguishes his theory from previous versions of control theory that

employed a *dualistic* conception of internal or personal controls versus external or social controls. For instance, following in the footsteps of W. I. Thomas and Florian Znaniecki's early work on *The Polish Peasant in Europe and America*, sociologists at the University of Chicago during the 1920s portrayed crime and delinquency as a joint product of *social disorganization* – the weakening of community control over group and individual behavior – and *personal disorganization* that left some individuals more vulnerable than others to the demoralizing or unconventional influences of urban life. Later renditions of control theory by two sociologists trained at Chicago, Albert J. Reiss and Walter C. Reckless, provide particularly clear examples of the dualistic approach.

Reiss (1951) presented the first systematic statement and empirical assessment of control theory based on his dissertation research on recidivism of juvenile offenders. His broad conception of social controls in the adolescent's environment included *primary group controls* (e.g., family structure, parents' "moral ideals" and techniques of control) and *community and institutional controls* (e.g., neighborhood quality and delinquency rate, school attendance, and compliance with authority). However, his psychoanalytic view of personal controls, which included "ego strength" and "super ego controls," created a sharp conceptual separation between the external social world and the internal state of the adolescent's personality. As a result, Reiss gives license to the reductionistic argument that psychopathology – the failure or inadequacy of personal controls – may be a sufficient cause of delinquency irrespective of the strength of the individual's bonds to conventional groups and institutions.

A decade later, Reckless (1961) proposed his version of control theory, which he labeled containment theory. He explicitly characterized his theory as an explanation of conforming behavior as well as of a wide range of criminal and delinquent behaviors, with the exception of deviance that is attributable to personality disorders or criminal cultures (like the infamous "criminal tribes of India"). Similar to Reiss, he drew a clear conceptual boundary between the "internal control system" of the self and the "external control system" of the family and other conventional institutional supports in

the individual's immediate social environment. In his commentary and research on this dualistic notion of containment, Reckless placed special emphasis on the importance of a "good self concept" as an inner "buffer" or "insulator" against environmental "pulls" or "pressures" toward delinquency. This rather mechanistic approach, which tends to rest much of its explanatory force on vaguely conceptualized psychological factors, has been widely criticized and was largely superseded by Hirschi's social bonding theory in the late 1960s.

Whereas Reiss, Reckless, and other early theorists such as Ivan Nye and Jackson Toby conceptualized external and internal controls as relatively stable, deterministic constraints on behavior, some control theorists have treated the interplay of control and deviation as a stochastic situational process. For example, Briar and Piliavin (1965) argue that the probability that individuals will act on short run "situational inducements" to deviate is contingent on the current strength of their "commitment to conformity." In the same vein, David Matza's (1964) analysis of *Delinquency and Drift* portrays delinquent behavior as a situational choice – an act of "will" – that becomes possible when adolescents are temporarily freed from moral constraints and "drift between criminal and conventional action." The ideas of these processual theorists have been difficult to examine empirically, but these works underscore a key assumption of contemporary versions of social control theory: crime is better understood as an exercise of freedom from constraint than as a product of deviant motives, environmental pressures, and other deterministic forces.

Since Hirschi's (1969) statement of social bonding theory, theoretical work on the relationship between social control and crime has moved in three different directions that are generally beyond the scope of this entry. First, a number of sociologists and criminologists have offered various forms of "integrated theory," which blend concepts and propositions from control theory with other theoretical explanations of deviant behavior. Most often, integrated theories add motivational components such as differential association with deviant peers or cultural or psychological "strain" to Hirschi's framework, thereby altering its

distinctively agnostic stance regarding the motives for deviant behavior.

Second, as anticipated by Kornhauser's (1978) comprehensive discussion of the origins of control theory in early work on social disorganization, a large body of recent theory and research has focused on ecological variations in forms and patterns of social control and rates of crime in urban neighborhoods. By conceptualizing informal control as a systemic property of communities, new disorganization theorists have revitalized links between contemporary research on social control and its roots in the macro level analyses of Durkheim and the Chicago sociologists.

Third, Hirschi, in collaboration with Michael R. Gottfredson, has taken a sharp turn toward micro level analysis of individual differences in deviance and control in the influential work *A General Theory of Crime*. Gottfredson and Hirschi (1990) argue *low self control* is the basic source of crime, which they define as "acts of force or fraud undertaken in pursuit of self interest" (p. 15). In advancing this argument, they abandon the relational focus of Hirschi's previous theory of the social bond in favor of a psychological explanation that is more in line with Reiss and Reckless's notions of internal or personal control. Relationships to family, friends, and other external sources of control virtually vanish from the general theory once the individual's capacity for self control is fixed at a particular level during childhood socialization.

SEE ALSO: Anomie; Authority and conformity; Control Balance Theory; Durkheim, Émile; Self Control Theory; Social Control; Social Disorganization Theory

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crime, social learning theory of

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The social learning theory of crime basically argues that some people learn to commit crimes through the same process through which others learn to conform. The theory assumes that people are "blank slates" at birth, having neither a motivation to commit crime nor to conform. The theory then asks two questions. First, at the micro level, it asks why an individual commits crimes. The answer to this question stresses the process of learning, which involves the interaction between thought or cognition, behavior and environment. Second, at the macro level, social learning theory asks why some groups have higher crime rates than others. The answer to this question involves the concepts of culture conflict, differential social organization, and social structure.

Social learning theory is rooted in the work of the Chicago School theorists of the early twentieth century. At the individual level, social learning theory draws on the idea of symbolic interactionism found in the work of Chicago School theorist W. I. Thomas, Cooley, and Mead. Symbolic interactionism is a social psychological theory that is based on the idea that all human behavior can be understood in terms of the way that individuals communicate through social symbols. People communicate through symbols that are social in origins. These symbols give meaning to the world. Symbolic interactionism then sees human behavior as social in origin and as something that

can only be understood when we understand how the individual interprets the symbols. At the group or societal level, social learning theories are based on the ecological work of Park and Burgess, the ideas of social disorganization found in Shaw and McKay, and Sellin's idea of culture conflict.

Along with social control theory, social learning theory is now considered one of – if not *the* – dominant theory of crime and deviance today. Its dominance is largely due to the work of two theorists, Edwin Sutherland (1939, 1947) and Ronald Akers (1985, 1998). In 1939, Sutherland published the first version of his theory of social learning in his textbook *Principles of Criminology*, with the final version published first in 1947. With this theory, he presented criminology with a purely sociological theory of crime that addressed his concerns about the biological and psychological theories of crime that were dominant at the time. Akers (Burgess & Akers 1966; Akers 1985, 1998) later revised Sutherland's theory of differential association, rewriting it in the language of modern learning theory and expanding on it to make it more comprehensive. Besides his theoretical contributions, Akers has also been a leader in empirically testing social learning theory across a variety of groups and crimes.

Sutherland's (1939, 1947) social learning theory is called the theory of differential association. Differential association, which is the central concept in the theory, refers to the idea that people come into contact with different types of people with different ideas about the acceptability of crime. Written in nine basic propositions, the theory starts with the idea that criminal behavior is learned largely through a process of interaction in small groups. When individuals learn criminal behavior they learn both the techniques (the how) and the motivations (the why) for committing crimes. The motivations, which Sutherland refers to in terms of attitudes, drives, and definitions, are critical to the learning process. Sutherland argued that one becomes criminal, not through association with criminals, but when definitions favorable to the violation of the law outweigh definitions unfavorable to the violation of the law.

If individuals become criminal through a process of learning both the how and the why of committing a crime, why does one group have

higher crime rates than another? Compared to his ideas on why an individual commits crime, Sutherland addressed this question only briefly. In answering this question, he came to disagree with an idea that is closely identified with the work of Chicago School theorists Shaw and McKay. They theorized that variation in crime rates across neighborhoods was due to social disorganization, an inability of a group of people to agree upon and work toward a common goal such as crime control. Sutherland came to argue that high crime rate areas were not disorganized, but were organized differently. Building on the work of Sellin in culture conflict, Sutherland then referred to differential social organization across groups and areas. Some areas have higher crime rates than others, then, because they are organized around principles that differ from the principles of those that have been embodied in the law.

Despite the recognition of its importance and its continuing dominance as a theory of crime, Sutherland's theory of differential association was not without its critics. It was in large part as a response to one of the most important criticisms that Akers came to develop his social learning theory. Written prior to the development of modern learning theories, Sutherland said little in his theory of learning about the process through which individuals actually learn.

A number of theorists worked to demonstrate the usefulness of Sutherland's theory and to expand on it by linking it with a modern learning theory. Included among these theorists are DeFleur and Quinney (1966), who demonstrated how differential association is logical and capable of producing testable propositions. They rewrote the theory in axiomatic form. Another theorist, C. Ray Jeffrey (1965), was the first to actually link differential association with operant conditioning, a modern learning theory that proposes that individuals learn based on the consequences of their behavior. In 1966, Burgess and Akers rewrote differential association in the language of operant conditioning. In doing so they explained more fully than did Sutherland how people learn and developed what Akers considers a more general theory of human behavior. The work of Burgess and Akers is perhaps of most importance among these revisions and expansions, in large

part because of the continued efforts, both the theoretical and empirical, of Akers on the behalf of social learning theory.

Since his initial work with Burgess in 1966, Akers has continued to develop social learning theory both theoretically and through his empirical testing of the theory. Today, he has what he now calls his own social learning theory. Akers' theory currently centers around four major concepts: differential association, definitions, differential reinforcement, and imitation. *Differential association* refers, as it did for Sutherland, to the varying pattern of associations with which individuals may have contact. Like Sutherland, Akers recognizes that few people would have contact with exclusively criminal patterns or exclusively non criminal patterns of associations. Most individuals associate with a variety of people, some of whom will define criminal behavior as acceptable and some of whom will not. *Definitions* refer to the cognitive part of the process or the "why" someone would commit a crime. This includes all the items Sutherland mentioned, such as attitudes and drives, as well as rationalizations.

Both differential association and definitions are central concepts in Sutherland's as well as Akers' theories. It is with the concepts of differential reinforcement and imitation that Akers expands on Sutherland's ideas to explain more fully how it is that individuals learn. *Differential reinforcement* refers to "the balance of anticipated or actual rewards and punishments that follow or are consequences of behavior" (Akers 1998: 67). Akers recognizes that rewards and punishments can be both social and non social, but it is those rewards and punishments which are social that he stresses as most important. In fact, he argues that much of what may initially look like non social rewards are actually social. For example, money, which may be categorized by some as a non social reward for a crime, is argued by Akers to be in fact a social reward. This is because the meaning of money comes from the social. Money gets its importance to individuals as a reward because it can give us status and power, each of which is a particularly social reward. Akers then defines social rewards and punishments very broadly. Non social rewards are defined narrowly by Akers to include largely the psychological and physiological effects of

drugs. Finally, *imitation* refers to the existence of models for observation. Akers expands Sutherland's ideas then to include the idea that one need not be in "interaction" with others to learn from them.

Basically, Akers' social learning theory argues that criminal behavior is more likely when the effects of all four of these central concepts combine to strengthen criminal behavior over conformity. Thus, criminal behavior is more likely when someone has contact with patterns of association that support criminal behavior by defining it as favorable, provide rewards for it, and model it.

In his initial work with Burgess, the emphasis was on rewriting differential association; thus their work, as well as much of Akers' own work, has focused on the individual level. Akers has however had a long term interest in the question of why certain groups have higher crime rates than others. Akers (1998) outlined a theory linking social structure and social learning. His social structure social learning (SSSL) theory of crime argues that four social structural variables – social correlates, sociodemographic/socioeconomic, theoretically defined structural variables, and differential social location – affect group or area crime rates through the influence they have on the process of learning that individuals go through. With *social correlates*, Akers recognizes Sutherland's idea that societies, communities, and cultures, for example, are organized differently. *Sociodemographic/socioeconomic* refers to the location individuals have in the social structure because of characteristics such as class position, gender, race, and/or ethnicity. Akers argues social learning theory can be integrated with existing social structural theories. Thus included in *theoretically defined structural variables* are variables found in structural theories such as social disorganization, culture conflict, and anomie. Finally, *differential social location* refers to the place individuals have in relation to primary, secondary, and reference groups. This refers to the place of individuals in more intimate groups such as family and friendship networks.

SEE ALSO: Crime, Social Control Theory of; Criminology; Social Disorganization Theory; Social Support; Sutherland, Edwin H.; Symbolic Interaction

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crime, white-collar

Gilbert Geis

The term white collar crime is not found in any statute book. It was coined by Edwin H. Sutherland in his 1939 presidential address to the American Sociological Society. Sutherland stated that his focus was on crime in the upper or white collar class, composed of respectable or at least respected business and professional men. A decade later, in his book *White Collar Crime*, he declared that white collar crime may be defined approximately as a crime committed by a person of responsibility and high social status in the course of his occupation. Corporate executives who murdered a spouse were not to be regarded as white collar criminals, but those who traded on insider information would meet the definition. In the same vein, a striking employee who assaulted a member of the corporate management team would not be considered a white collar criminal by

Sutherland, but the vice president who maimed a striker would fall within the definition's embrace.

A major aim of Sutherland's formulation was to overthrow explanations of crime common at the time, such as feeble-mindedness, Oedipal complexes, and racial identification, traits which were not characteristic of the majority of upper world offenders. Sutherland maintained that all crime could be interpreted by a single theoretical postulate, which probably explains his indifference to a precise definition of white collar crime. Later, others would argue that particular forms of white collar crime, such as anti-trust violations, insider trading, and securities frauds, could be analyzed only by interpretive schemes tailored to ingredients of the offenses.

A white collar crime definition contrary to Sutherland's was advanced later by a Yale Law School research team that emphasized the nature of the offense rather than the position of the lawbreaker. Their study sample was derived from a survey of federal prosecutors concerning their understanding of what statutory violations might properly be regarded as white collar crimes. The Yale focus undercut Sutherland's spotlight on abuses of power, but paved the way for sophisticated analyses of persons who violated specified statutes. Critics noted that a not inconsiderable number of the Yale subjects were unemployed and had engaged in relatively tame lawbreaking, such as passing checks with insufficient funds behind them.

Legal scholars also have taken issue with Sutherland's formulation, declaring that it promiscuously labels as "criminal" persons who violated only administrative laws or were charged civilly. Some insisted that Sutherland fouled the legal nest by running riot over such sacred concepts as criminal intent and presumption of innocence. For his part, Sutherland responded that social scientists should not be bound by legal definitions of crime, which often are the product of partisan actions by powerful elites to protect and advance their own interests. He believed that white collar researchers should examine the details of each case and determine for themselves whether it ought to be classified as a white collar crime.

Many white collar offenders, Sutherland maintained, escape criminal convictions only because they come from the same social classes

as judges, have gone to the same schools, and live in the same neighborhoods. In addition, prosecutors often are disinclined to pursue an offender charged with violating a complex statute in which the sometimes elusive existence of criminal intent has to be proven beyond a reasonable doubt. White collar offenders also have the wherewithal to hire astute attorneys. Prosecutors further realize that they may have to face a jury that might be swayed by the social skills and respectable appearance of the alleged perpetrator.

Relying on the Yale group's definition of white collar crime, Michael Gottfredson and Travis Hirschi maintained that the phenomenon was the result of an absence of self control among perpetrators, but their position has been repudiated by a number of scholars who insist that, at least in regard to the offenders Sutherland was concerned with, white collar criminals rank high on any reasonable measure of self control, and that it usually was personal discipline that enabled them to obtain the power necessary for their lawbreaking.

White collar crime has always been something of an outlier in the sociological domain, in part because it tends to be resistant to quantification. Besides, an understanding of the dynamics of white collar crime often requires a working knowledge of economics, jurisprudence, and regulatory practice, among other matters. White collar offenders, unlike, say, juvenile gang members, also are not likely to be accessible for fieldwork research. At the same time, the extraordinary outbreak of high profile white collar crime cases at the beginning of the current century that involved executives at Enron, WorldCom, Tyco, Adelphia, and other corporations highlighted the behavior, though research support for the topic from federal agencies remains sparse. Part of that indifference to funding white collar research is believed to inhere in the vulnerability of political administrations to possible findings of wrongdoing by their supporters whose donations are essential to survival in elective office.

SEE ALSO: Class and Crime; Corruption; Crime, Corporate; Crime, Political; Crime, Psychological Theories of; Crime, Social Learning Theory of; Law, Economy and; Sutherland, Edwin H.

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criminal justice system

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The American criminal justice system is a network of government agencies and individuals whose purpose is to apprehend, prosecute, and punish criminal offenders, maintain societal order, prevent and control crime, and ensure public safety. Most criminal justice agencies and organizations that are responsible for these functions can be classified under three primary groups: law enforcement, courts, and corrections.

The term "system" implies that each group within the criminal justice network collaborates

with one another to achieve a common goal. Although this is true in many respects, the criminal justice system resembles more of a loosely connected chain of individual entities that have separate and, at times, competing roles. For example, one of the responsibilities of law enforcement is to apprehend and arrest offenders, a function that operates on the crime control, or reduction of crime, model. Courts in the criminal justice system, however, operate under the due process model, which emphasizes fair application of the law and protection of individual rights. Individual entities within the system also frequently make significant decisions without consideration of how their decisions will impact the larger system. An aggressive driving while intoxicated law enforcement strategy, for example, can result in a high number of arrests. This decision can significantly affect the resources and case management capability at both the court and corrections stages of the system. Finally, the structure and organization of the criminal justice system vary widely among federal, state, county, and local jurisdictions. Acts which are classified as criminal violations in some jurisdictions may not be violations in others. A city prosecutor may endorse particular criminal justice policies that are not equally supported by the county prosecutor. In short, given the lack of coordination and consistency among individual entities, the criminal justice system is often referred to as a *non system*.

A common thread woven throughout the criminal justice system is the use of discretion, or individual professional judgment, to guide decision making. Not all persons who commit a crime can be arrested and processed through each stage of the criminal justice system. Therefore, criminal justice personnel in all levels routinely use discretion to make decisions on whether or how criminal offenders should proceed through the system. Law enforcement officers use discretion in deciding whether to issue a verbal warning or a ticket for a speeding violation. Prosecutors make discretionary decisions as to what cases to file with the court. The decision to release an inmate to parole is up to the discretion of the parole board members. While there is the potential for abuse (i.e., cases are disproportionately filed against a segment of the community, arbitrary application of the

law), the system relies on discretion to operate efficiently.

LAW ENFORCEMENT

Law enforcement serves several functions in the criminal justice system: preventing, detecting, and investigating crime, enforcing the law, protecting the public and property, apprehending and arresting offenders, and community service. Media images often depict law enforcement personnel as crime fighters who are regularly involved in high speed police pursuits, make large numbers of arrests, and routinely handle crisis situations. Contrary to these images, however, law enforcement officers spend most of their time gathering information for investigations and reports, maintaining order, establishing ties with community members, and providing services. Nationwide there are approximately 18,000 federal, state, county, and municipal law enforcement organizations. This estimate includes specialized law enforcement agencies such as university and college police, port authority police, and railroad police. In light of the increase in private security forces, many of which have some form of law enforcement powers, it is difficult to determine the exact number of organizations. Adding to the problem is the fact that there is little consistency among law enforcement agencies in terms of roles and responsibilities. Agencies can vary from one another according to mission, geographical area, community size, and community expectations. For example, a state highway patrol agency that focuses on enforcing motor vehicle laws plays a much different role in law enforcement than a sheriff's department that is responsible for the county jail and local court security.

Entry into the criminal justice system begins when law enforcement officers make an arrest for a crime. Law enforcement officers rarely observe crimes in progress. Reports from victims, witnesses, or other citizens, or information from an investigation, are the main sources of crime reporting. Therefore, law enforcement officers rely heavily on their relationship with the public to perform their job. Law enforcement officers cannot arrest all citizens for all criminal violations, so they routinely use

discretion to decide the best outcome for each situation. This outcome may involve handling criminal violations informally (e.g., verbal warning) or exercising other options besides arrest (e.g., transporting a homeless person to a shelter rather than making an arrest for loitering). Given their authority to decide who enters the criminal justice system, law enforcement officers are often called *gatekeepers* of the system.

After a law enforcement officer makes an arrest the case is presented to the prosecutor, who decides to either file formal charges against the defendant or not file charges and release the defendant. This action marks the transition into the courts stage of the criminal justice system. Law enforcement officers may additionally be called upon to participate in this stage by gathering more evidence for the prosecution's case and/or testifying if the case goes to trial.

COURTS

Many of the most significant decisions in the criminal justice system are made in the criminal courts. After an offender is arrested, the courts assume the responsibility of bail issues and proceedings, preliminary hearings, arraignments, pre trial motions, and plea bargains. At the same time, court personnel (prosecutors, defense attorneys, judges) make determinations as to whether a case proceeds through the criminal justice system, is removed from the system, or is referred to services outside of the system (e.g., treatment). Later phases in the court process establish the guilt or innocence of the accused, and the type of punishment, if any, a convicted offender should receive.

Courts in the United States operate under a *dual court system*, which encompasses both federal and state courts. Federal courts hear cases that fall within the federal government's authority such as counterfeiting, money laundering, mail fraud, and kidnapping. In addition to one federal court structure, each state operates its own court system which differs by organization, procedural steps, rules, and constitution. In general, most states have three levels of courts in their judicial system: lower courts, trial courts, and appellate courts.

At the lowest level are courts of limited jurisdiction or *lower courts*. These courts typically hear cases on minor or misdemeanor offenses such as trespassing, theft, assault, and violation of city codes. Some jurisdictions have specific courts for traffic violations, family and probate issues (divorce, wills, child support), and small claims courts. Preliminary hearings for major civil suits and felony criminal cases may also be conducted in the lower courts. Cases generally move through the lower courts quickly and no detailed record of the proceedings is kept.

At the next highest level are the trial courts. Also called *courts of general jurisdiction*, criminal trial courts hear cases ranging from minor offenses to serious felonies. The purpose of the trial courts is to decide on matters of fact and evidence. Most courts of general jurisdiction also hear cases on appeal from the lower courts and have the authority to grant a *trial de novo*, or new trial. Under a trial de novo, the trial courts retry cases as if they have never been heard before. Although much of the media and public perception of what occurs in court proceedings is based on the trial court, most cases do not go to trial. Instead, the majority of cases are handled informally through bargaining between the primary court actors: the judge, prosecutor, and defense attorney.

The highest level of courts in each state is called the appellate court, supreme court, or *court of last resort*. Some states have intermediate courts of appeal which review cases to be sent to the state's supreme court. After a verdict has been reached in a trial court, either the defense or prosecution can appeal the case to the appellate courts. Unlike trial courts, however, appellate courts do not decide on facts and evidence. Rather, they review the written transcript from the trial courts to ensure the proceedings were fair and carried out in compliance with the state law. The highest federal appellate court is the US Supreme Court. Comprised of eight justices and a chief justice, the US Supreme Court hears a select number of cases on matters related to the federal statutes and the US Constitution.

Courts are also responsible for sentencing convicted offenders. Sentences can come in many forms including imprisonment, fines,

restitution, community service, probation, and, in some cases, death. Several factors are taken into account in the sentencing phase. The pre-sentence report (investigation conducted on an offender's background to aid in sentencing decisions), for example, may reveal both mitigating and aggravating circumstances which impact the severity of punishment. Mitigating circumstances, or factors that may help reduce the offender's degree of blame, can include a defendant's admission of guilt for the crime, a defendant's strong employment record, volunteer service to the community, and the willingness to compensate a victim. On the other hand, aggravating circumstances, or factors that increase the offender's blameworthiness, are generally a previous criminal record, use of a weapon to commit the crime, cruelty to the victim, heinousness of the crime, and lack of remorse. Many states have some form of structured sentencing, mandatory minimum sentencing laws, or sentencing guidelines in which the judges' discretion on how to sentence an offender varies. Sentences, like convictions, can be appealed to a higher court; most death sentences undergo an automatic review by the appellate courts.

Like many areas of the criminal justice system, the courts are overburdened. Consequently, given the high volume of cases presented to the system, courts are often unable to process cases in a timely manner. Suggestions to minimize the clogged courts consist of hiring more court administrators and personnel, scheduling night courts, alternative courts for specific offenses (i.e., gun courts, drug courts), and court ordered mediation, a form of alternative dispute resolution.

CORRECTIONS

The corrections component of the criminal justice system is responsible for managing both defendants in pre-trial detention and convicted offenders who have been sentenced by the courts. This includes maintaining secure facilities such as jails and prisons, as well as non-institutional community based corrections such as probation and intermediate sanctions. Finally, corrections personnel monitor inmates who are released from prisons out onto parole.

Incarceration

Jails and prisons are the most common forms of incarceration in the United States. They are predominantly used for detaining offenders temporarily before trial and for housing inmates convicted of serious crimes who present too great a risk to be placed on probation. Although both jails and prisons house offenders, they differ in several respects. Jails are operated locally by municipal or county governments, and lodge inmates who have received short-term sentences, generally a year or less, for misdemeanor offenses. Jails also serve as temporary holding facilities for inmates awaiting bond, trial, or transfer to prison. Community based corrections including day reporting and electronic monitoring may also operate from jail facilities. Prisons, on the other hand, are operated by state or federal governments and house inmates convicted of felonies. Offenders can serve prison sentences ranging from longer than a year to life. Depending on the seriousness of the offense and risk to public safety, prisoners will be sent to facilities ranging in security levels from minimum, medium, to maximum.

While the organization and structure of jail and prison systems vary among federal, state, and local levels, all share the problem of inmate overcrowding. Prison overcrowding can result in ineffective prison management, behavioral problems among inmates, limited resources, and a reduction in rehabilitative program opportunities. Constructing more prisons, releasing inmates early, diverting less serious cases to intensive supervision probation, and contracting with privately owned prisons have been suggested to alleviate overcrowding. In addition to the problems associated with overcrowding, there are other concerns about special populations housed within correctional facilities. Inmates with sexually transmitted diseases and HIV/AIDS, female prisoners, mentally ill, inmates with substance abuse issues, and the growing elderly population all create unique challenges to an already overloaded correctional system.

Probation

Most offenders convicted of less serious crimes are sentenced to some form of probation, which

is the supervised conditional release of offenders into the community. Under probation, offenders must follow specific court ordered regulations or conditions which can require them to complete a substance abuse treatment program, obey curfews, meet regularly with a probation officer, and not associate with particular people (e.g., convicted felons). Probation can be revoked if an offender violates any conditions specified by the courts, is arrested, or convicted of a new crime. This means that, depending on the violation, offenders may be subject to further restrictive probation conditions, or possibly incarceration, for the completion of their sentence. Probation as a form of community based corrections is a viable alternative to correctional confinement in jails and prisons. It emphasizes keeping offenders in their communities and with their families, without experiencing the emotional and physical costs of incarceration.

Intermediate sanctions, which extend beyond simple probation, can be ordered for more serious offenders and can consist of intensive supervision (strictly supervised probation), day reporting centers, home confinement, and electronic monitoring. Community service, boot camps, fines, and restitution are also commonly used intermediate sanctions.

Parole

The supervised early release of an inmate from incarceration is called parole. Most states have parole boards that hold discretionary power to grant parole to offenders who have not served their entire prison sentence. In some jurisdictions, parole boards also have the authority to define conditions of release and revoke parole if appropriate. Factors for consideration in granting parole may consist of an inmate's good behavior/disciplinary problems while incarcerated, seriousness of current offense, prior offenses, and acceptance of responsibility for actions.

Parole functions, in part, to transition inmates from an institutional environment back into society. Therefore, conditions of release may consist of working with a parole officer to find housing, enrolling in treatment centers, securing stable employment, and pursuing

educational opportunities. Offenders who violate the conditions of release may have their parole revoked and be returned to prison to serve the remainder of their sentence.

JUVENILE JUSTICE

Entry into the criminal justice system for both adult and juvenile offenders in many respects is very similar. An adult arrest or juvenile detainment initiates the system's attention. Once in the system, however, juveniles are handled distinctly differently from adults. Unlike the punitive (punishment) approach in the adult system, the attitude toward youth in the juvenile justice system is rehabilitation (treatment).

The primary concern in the juvenile justice system is the well being of a child. Juvenile courts operate under the philosophy of *parens patriae*, which gives the state the power to exercise authority as a parent on the behalf of a child who may need protection. Further, in a juvenile court proceeding, judges consider both legal (e.g., seriousness of offense) and extra legal factors such as the situation of a child's home life, school performance, potential mental health, and/or substance abuse issues in deciding the outcome of a case. Another contrast to the adult system is the prosecution of juveniles for *status offenses*, acts that are considered law violations only when committed by minors (juveniles). For example, truancy, curfew violations, running away from home, and disobeying parents are status offenses. Juvenile courts also hear cases on other matters specifically related to juveniles, such as neglect and abuse, adoption, and parental rights of children who are in the custody of the state.

A final distinction between the adult and juvenile system is the informal handling of most juvenile cases before reaching a formal adjudication (trial) hearing. At the intake or screening process in the juvenile courts, intake officers frequently refer youth to social service agencies or impose restitution, fines, or community service rather than move their cases to the court phase. Diversion, the redirection of juveniles from the court system to treatment and community services, is often implemented at this stage. The goal of diversion is to keep youths from entering juvenile court yet ensure

that they remain accountable for their actions. Generally used for first time offenders who have committed minor offenses, diversion programs utilize a variety of options tailored for individual youth. Substance abuse treatment, counseling, restitution, letters of apology, community service, life skill development classes, and school attendance requirements are popular diversion program requirements.

Juveniles who receive a disposition (sentence) by the court may be required to live in non secure facilities such as foster homes, group homes, and halfway houses, or be sent to secure facilities such as reform or training schools. Juvenile offenders can also be assigned to community based corrections such as in home placement with intensive supervision, residential treatment programs, and probation.

SEE ALSO: Corrections; Courts; Crime; Juvenile Delinquency; Law, Criminal; Police; Prisons

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criminology

Stephen E. Brown

Criminology is the study of crime and related phenomena. A common starting point in defining criminology is to cite Edwin Sutherland's (1883–1950) tripartite definition of it as an examination of the process of creating laws, violation of laws, and reacting to those violations. While this is a relatively broad definition, it is not all encompassing. Moreover, while Sutherland's status in the field of criminology was enormous, his definition of the bounds of criminology intentionally excluded a litany of perspectives. This controversy over the parameters of criminology has always plagued the discipline. To appreciate the challenge of defining criminology to the satisfaction of a highly diverse population of scholars of crime and related phenomena, it is essential to identify a multitude of issues that divide criminologists into various camps.

At the heart of divisiveness regarding the parameters of criminology lies ideological conflict. It is ideological identities that have created a vast range of criminological perspectives and even staunch disagreement regarding definition of the term itself. Ideology strongly influences definitions of crime, the subject matter of criminological scrutiny. Disagreement over the definition of crime is a reflection of its relativity, also deeply rooted in ideological predispositions. What the law criminalizes at any given location in time and space is a product of prevailing ideologies. Moreover, the question of whether or not criminology should seek to explain behaviors that are not criminalized at a given time and place has been debated. Thus, defining criminology is deeply embedded in the polemical concepts of ideology and the relativity of crime. Defining criminology devoid of an appreciation of these concepts inevitably excludes some criminological perspectives, while inherently favoring others. Therefore, objectively defining criminology to incorporate its full breadth requires acknowledgment of the ideological differences that underlie distinct paradigms.

The study of crime and related matters has not always been dubbed criminology. Likewise,

definitions of both crime and criminology have evolved, and sometimes been revolutionized, across time and space. Aristotle and Plato were debating the essence of justice long before any specific scholarly identity, criminology or otherwise, emerged for assessing obligations of humans to conform to the needs or desires of others. Much later, Enlightenment philosophers such as Voltaire, Montesquieu, and Rousseau were planting the ideological seeds of what came to be classical criminology. The so called classical school of criminology that is extended much attention in most basic criminology texts was actually a vast, ideologically driven humanitarian reform movement. Paradigmatic differences in the field notwithstanding, this movement is widely considered to be the beginning of modern day criminology.

A broad understanding of criminology necessitates a historical perspective to identify the social contexts of paradigm shifts and the penchant for history to repeat itself. Classical criminology, for example, was a political/ideological reaction to the cruel and arbitrary social controls in place during the European Holy Inquisition. Thus the movement focused not on the criminal, but rather on the reaction of the state and church to various behaviors construed as criminal.

The philosophical rationale, developed by philosopher reformers such as Cesare Beccaria and Jeremy Bentham, was that behaviors could be controlled via appropriate state reactions to rational, free willed, and hedonistic human beings. Given those underlying assumptions regarding human nature, it was argued that behaviors stand to be deterred by punishments characterized by sufficient certainty, severity, and celerity. Consequently, the classical school of criminology led to reforms in the late eighteenth century that provided the framework for modern criminal justice systems. These classical ideas reemerged in the rational choice paradigm that evolved in the closing decades of the twentieth century, although emanating from a different social context, and remain popular today.

Positivists were the first to actually use the label of criminology to denote the scholarly study of crime. Cesare Lombroso, in fact, is often called the “father of criminology,” based on the impact of *The Criminal Man*, published

in 1876. While he viewed himself as a criminal anthropologist, followers such as Raffaele Garofalo were among the first to call it the field of criminology. The intellectual shift from classicism to positivism represented a marked schism in the conceptualization of the crime problem, moving away from the search for appropriate punishments to deter potential offenders to a search for the origins of defects in criminals. The new paradigm redefined the field by focusing on the presumably defective criminal rather than the formal social controls thought necessary to regulate the behavior of naturally hedonistic people. Given that the new positivistic paradigm dominated scholarly examination of lawbreaking for roughly the next century, it is understandable how the prevailing definitions of criminology incorporated a distinct positivistic bias that carries over to a degree even today.

At the heart of positive criminology are two central theses, both antithetical to classical conceptions of crime. First is the assumption that criminal behavior is determined by forces not under the control of the offender. These deterministic forces or causes of criminal behavior were initially considered to be biological in origin, but later came to include psychological factors and finally were dominated by social factors for most of the twentieth century within the United States. The second essential component of positive criminology insists that criminals be studied by application of the scientific method. Empiricism supplanted the philosophical reasoning of the classicists. As positivism came to dominate twentieth century criminology, the archetypical definition of the field gravitated toward “the scientific study of the causes of crime.” Definitions along these lines continue to be the modal depiction of criminology, as is evident in a review of both lay dictionaries and basic criminology textbooks. While such a positivistic biased explication includes a broad array of biological, psychological, and social forces impinging upon offenders, they clearly exclude both classical criminology and perhaps much of its contemporary counterpart in the form of a rational choice paradigm.

Also at odds with the typical definition of criminology as the scientific study of the causes of crime are numerous paradigms or

perspectives that have emerged more recently. Labeling theory, for example, rooted in the works of symbolic interactionists such as George Herbert Mead and Charles Horton Cooley, came to the American criminological forefront in the 1960s and 1970s. This perspective incorporated the relativity of criminal law, asserting that there are ultimately no forms of conduct that are inherently deviant. Instead, deviant status is a function of the reactions of others to particular behaviors. Therefore, this perspective shifted focus away from both crime (the classical interest) and criminals (the positivistic concern) in favor of scrutinizing social reactions to persons or their behaviors. The essence of this perspective is that the relative reactions of others play a more significant role in shaping the self than do either positive forces or rational decision making. Consequently, the importance of studying prior influences on the offender or the dynamics of their choices is overshadowed by the need to examine the contribution of social reactions to their behavior. The centrality of social reactions takes two relatively distinct forms. First, hostile reactions to initial behavior may trap the offender in a downward social spiral of lowered self image, isolation from conforming others, increased associations with similarly labeled persons and production of a deviant identity, ultimately committing the actor to a career of secondary deviance. Secondly, an individual's deviant status may be literally created by affixing the deviant label to behaviors heretofore not categorized as deviant. In the latter case, the behavior is deviant only because reaction to it has changed.

Social reaction theories such as labeling are ideologically distinct from both classicism and positivism. Social reaction theories do not presume, as do classicism and positivism, that the laws enacted by the state serve the interests of all, but rather see any given set of laws as the outcome of conflict among competing groups. Therefore, they allow that the problem may not be so much in law violation as in the creation and enforcement of the law, thus shifting focus from crime and criminals to the social reactions of others. Labeling theory, in fact, depicts the law and criminal justice system as doing more harm than good. In sum, a third major paradigm requires a definition of criminology that

concentrates on matters neglected by the earlier dominant perspectives.

Critical criminology similarly rejects the assumption that there is agreement on the law, but many variations of critical thought also strongly critique the empirical methods of positivists. Marxism in particular, and many conflict theorists in general, are unreceptive to or skeptical of the scientific method as a path to accumulate knowledge. Many conflict theorists fault the scientific pursuit of value free knowledge as impossible and see science itself as biased in favor of the elite. Marxism proper calls for historical eclecticism as a means of analyzing the dominance of the bourgeoisie over the masses. Similarly, some variations of radical feminism envision empiricism as a male tool for interpreting and constructing the world to reflect the interest of males.

Postmodern thinking has also made its way into the bounds of criminology, rejecting the premise that rationalism and/or empiricism are essential to the accumulation of truth or knowledge. At the center of postmodernism is a rejection of the notion that truth itself can be objectively pursued, or that there even is any singular truth. Instead it is believed that many truths may exist simultaneously and that no one version of truth or method of arriving at that knowledge should be considered superior. Postmodernists view all "experts" with a suspicious eye, believing that their claims to special expertise extend them special privilege in the pursuit of knowledge and invalidate the experiences of those lacking that expertise. Thus the empirical skills of the social scientist or the legal knowledge of the lawyer, for example, are not viewed as providing more valid insight into crime than the experiences of anyone else. Of particular concern to postmodernists is the control that specialists or experts gain over the language of a given realm. Relating to the definition of criminology, the postmodern critique would be that the rational and scientific jargon of the trained criminologist excludes the experiences of many victims, offenders, community residents, and others from contributing to our understanding of crime and related phenomena. The solution is to engage in a discourse analysis that gives equal weight to all persons' stories about crime, whatever mode of expression they choose for communicating. However, since experts have

so dominated the accumulation of criminological knowledge, deconstruction of existing knowledge is advocated to return the pursuit of truth to a fair playing field. More conventional criminologists, of course, regard this as nihilistic.

Emergence of criminology as peacemaking over the last two decades is another branch of critical criminology that summons a far broader definition of criminology. Leaders on this front such as Richard Quinney and Harold Pepinsky have been frustrated by the level of dividends yielded by more conventional approaches to understanding crime. Their call is for a humanistic approach, with a faith that only compassion can ultimately relieve the suffering associated with crime. Peacemaking, then, also is a splinter group from within the criminological community that has grown skeptical of the traditional methods for studying crime and related phenomena.

Disagreement also thrives regarding the pragmatic role of criminology. While there is wide agreement that criminology should generate knowledge about crime and criminals, there is less accord regarding the purpose of pursuing that knowledge. Some argue that the primary purpose of accruing explanatory power lies in the application of that knowledge to alleviate the problems associated with crime and criminals. Others believe that we should pursue knowledge for its own sake rather than for practical value. Perhaps most criminologists take a middle road, seeing knowledge as worth while for a variety of reasons, including the enhancement of understanding ourselves, our larger social world, and deviance. Most probably see a variety of ways for criminology to contribute to improvement of the human condition, but do not limit the pragmatic value of criminology to the control of those designated as deviants.

That diversity characterizes the field of criminology should be quite evident.

Besides conflict over ideological differences, criminologists are often divided along lines of "parent disciplines." Edwin Sutherland, for example, was quite successful in bringing sociology to dominance in the mid twentieth century. Many of those who identify with a psychological perspective still feel alienated from the larger criminological community, as

often evidenced by their commentaries in introducing psychologically informed criminology texts. Similarly, biologically rooted criminology suffered from a long period of intellectual ostracism as a consequence of ideological clashes in the mid twentieth century. Finally, a lack of agreement regarding the practical implications of the field separates criminologists. At one extreme are the staunch conservatives who see criminology as a storehouse of information for control of defective persons or decisions. These criminologists feel comfortable pursuing a range of typically unpleasant control measures to impose on people. At the other extreme, advocating praxis, are criminologists who focus on advocacy of policies that would enhance the playing field for persons whose existence is more likely to be labeled deviant by the state. In short, these criminologists feel comfortable arguing that the world should be transformed into a more just place for the existence of those who are designated criminal.

With such a lack of consensus among professional criminologists, the question is how we can define criminology in an inclusive manner. If we fail to do so, we are at risk of excluding from its bounds the contributions of a portion of serious scholars who devote their careers to pursuit of knowledge about crime and related phenomena. On the other hand, an overly broad definition of criminology risks diluting the subject matter and methods of its study to a level that obfuscates the knowledge that the field ought to produce. With such a cautious balance in mind, it might be proposed that criminology is the study of crime, criminals, and related phenomena within the context of their cultural environment, seeking to contribute to a body of explanatory theory through application of a range of scholarly perspectives and methods of analysis.

This definition is considerably more detailed than those typically offered, as it seeks to find a place for most of the paradigms and perspectives reviewed above. It incorporates scrutiny of both crime and criminals, as well as related phenomena. Examples of the related phenomena would include criminological focus on victims, police, or correctional settings as primary forces in the criminal environment. Including the cultural environment allows for consideration of criminogenic factors such as gender,

race, or social stratification. This expanded definition also allows incorporation of ideologically opposed perspectives and diverse methods of study that lie at the heart of criminological diversity. What remains essential in delineating the bounds of criminology, however, is a body of theory derived from a scholarly approach to understanding crime, criminals, and related phenomena. Omitted from criminology owing to a lack of such explanatory theory would be bodies of knowledge or skills related solely to the processing of crime or criminals such as the practice of law, crime investigation, evidence examination, counseling of offenders, and the like. Similarly excluded as atheoretical would be the investigative efforts of reporters to describe crime and the activist efforts of social reformers insofar as those efforts are distinct from the development of theoretical explanations of crime related phenomena. While these non theoretical endeavors may inform or be informed by criminology, they are not oriented toward the essential goal of scholarly development of a body of theory to explain crime, criminals, and related phenomena.

Although the practice of criminal justice does not fall within the domain of criminology, the scholarly examination of criminal justice is closely related. Arguably, the development that has most impacted evolution of the parameters of criminology over the past three decades or so has been the emergence of criminal justice as a scholarly discipline. Even Sutherland's widely cited but more narrow mid twentieth century definition of criminology included what later emerged as the academic discipline of criminal justice by virtue of his reference to reactions to law violation. With the proliferation of doctoral studies in criminology and criminal justice in recent decades, the distinction between the two has grown even more narrow. Increasingly, American doctoral level studies of crime and criminals have shifted from sociological emphases to criminal justice, criminology, or some combination of the two. Consequently the training of criminologists has come to draw less distinction between criminology and criminal justice. In the context of the proposed broad definition of criminology, it is a matter of emphases, with one sector focusing on the criminal, while the other (criminal justice scholarship) tends to concentrate on crime or

related phenomena such as the roles of law enforcement and corrections in crime and criminality. A considerable portion of criminal justice study, however, primarily below the doctoral level, continues to fall outside the bounds of criminology by focusing on knowledge and skills relevant only to the processing of the accused and not on a body of theory to further understanding of crime and related phenomena.

Essential to conceptualizing criminology is balancing the need to include study of crime from a full range of ideological perspectives, while demanding rudimentary scholarly criteria. The former is necessary to capture the dynamic and relative nature of crime, while the latter is necessary for criminology to offer insight that can withstand critical scrutiny. Criminological perspectives have changed dramatically across time and will undoubtedly continue to do so. A vibrant criminology will continue to contribute to our understanding of the most critical cornerstone of all cultures, the control of fellow beings.

SEE ALSO: Beccaria, Cesare; Crime; Crime, Radical/Marxist Theories of; Criminology: Research Methods; Deviance, Positivist Theories of; Feminist Criminology; Labeling; Labeling Theory; Lombroso, Cesare; Peacemaking; Postmodernism; Rational Choice Theory; A Crime Related Perspective; Sutherland, Edwin H.

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criminology: research methods

John Wooldredge

Research methods are procedures for obtaining information on individual and/or aggregate phenomena for the purpose of (1) creating a general explanation or *theory* to explain a phenomenon; (2) testing the applicability of an existing theory to a subgroup of the population; or (3) testing the effectiveness of an existing social policy or program. Topics (1) and (2) are critical to the dialectic of scholarly knowledge in criminology and criminal justice. Somewhat unique to the field of criminal justice, however, is a heavier emphasis on (3) as a product of research. The phenomena of primary interest to criminologists include juvenile delinquency, adult criminality, and victimization, at both the individual and aggregate levels. The interests of criminal justice researchers appear more eclectic, only a few of which include police practices and effectiveness, the dynamics of criminal case processing, sentencing discrimination, inmate violence, and correctional program effectiveness.

The methods employed in criminological and criminal justice research are identical to those in the behavioral and social sciences in general. A critical assumption underlying the use of these procedures involves the belief in an objective reality, or a world that different people perceive in similar fashion. Related to this assumption is that such a reality can be studied objectively. The perspective that individual and social processes can be studied dispassionately or scientifically is referred to as positivism.

Not all criminologists share the positivist perspective. For example, any effort to derive a social psychological theory of criminality relies on the idea that social processes operate uniformly across most (if not all) individuals. One might argue, however, that such uniformity does not exist, due to individual differences in perceptions of these processes. Ethnomethodology involves the perspective that all “realities” are socially constructed. From this perspective, individuals perceive their world in terms of how it makes sense to

them, thus introducing different perceptions of reality that may not be reconcilable.

The pieces of information that are gathered and examined during the course of research are referred to as data, which may be either qualitative or quantitative in form. Both forms of information may be gathered through observations of the phenomena under study, and quantitative information may also be compiled through survey research or a review of archival data. Qualitative observations are recorded by researchers as verbal statements that describe particular processes and outcomes, whereas quantitative observations consist of pieces of information recorded in numerical form. Both qualitative and quantitative methods are useful for theory development and testing, although a heavier emphasis in criminology and criminal justice appears to be placed on qualitative research for theory development versus quantitative research for theory/hypothesis testing and program evaluation. Many investigators use both approaches in a single study, however, because findings from each serve as a check on the other.

Ethnography is used to refer to a qualitative study of a social group or (sub)culture in which a researcher compiles a detailed description of processes and outcomes related to the phenomenon of interest. An example of ethnography would be a study of prison inmate social systems and adaptation to incarceration in a particular prison (such as the classic studies conducted by Clemmer, Sykes, Carroll, Jacobs, and Irwin). A penologist might make observations about the types of inmates that exist in that prison and how they interact with each other in order to understand, for example, why some inmates adapt to incarceration more easily than others. This information could then be used to create a general theory of inmate behavior that extends beyond the specific prison to all similar inmate populations. Critical to the success of such an endeavor is the researcher’s objectivity in making and recording his or her observations regarding inmate behaviors.

In contrast to qualitative research, a quantitative study involves gathering information and attaching numerical values to each piece. Some types of information already have numbers attached to them (e.g., a person’s age in years),

whereas other types are assigned numerical values by the researcher (e.g., the sex of an individual, where every male in a sample is coded as “0” and every female in the sample is coded as “1”). When a researcher attaches his or her own numerical values, these values are determined by the researcher and must be defined for someone who is trying to understand the study. These scales or variables are then analyzed with statistics in order to make sense of the information for subsequent interpretation. Statistics, therefore, are also pieces of information, the difference being that the statistical information is a more general summary of the information gathered by a researcher. Numbers are assigned to pieces of information only when a researcher intends to apply statistics in order to produce new information that cannot be obtained through verbiage.

Unlike qualitative research, where a researcher remains “open” to new information, the types of information gathered from a quantitative study are determined before data collection begins. This is one reason why quantitative research is used primarily for theory/hypothesis testing, because such research involves collecting information that has already been described in a specifically worded hypothesis derived from a testable theory. Quantitative research can be used for theory development when the theory of interest focuses on the causal order of events and behaviors rather than the substance of those events/behaviors. Even then, however, the application is usually limited to reducing the number of possible orders rather than pinpointing the exact causal model.

More steps are typically involved in quantitative research designed to test a theory/hypothesis compared to qualitative exploratory research for the purpose of theory construction. The research design of such a quantitative study always falls into one of three broad types: experimental, quasi experimental, and non experimental or correlational. These groupings reflect differences in methodological rigor, or the ability of a study to establish the causal order of events (which is relatively rare in criminological and criminal justice research). The specific steps involved in this application of quantitative research include the following:

- 1 Begin with a theoretical model (paradigm) of interest, which, in criminology, often involves a general perspective of a social, political, and/or economic process. For example, a “conflict paradigm” involves the perspective that many social problems such as discrimination, poverty, environmental pollution, and crime in a capitalist society are consequences of economic (and thus power) “conflicts” between groups.
- 2 The theoretical paradigm selected at step 1 is applied to a particular aspect of society. For example, a conflict criminologist is only concerned with the part of the conflict perspective that explains crime in a capitalist society.
- 3 Theories involve theoretical, or abstract, concepts (e.g., “economic power” and “crime”). In order to test a theory, one must be able to transform the theoretical concepts into operational definitions that are directly observable and measurable (e.g., “economic power” may be operationalized as gross annual household income). These definitions are then placed into a hypothesis, or a proposition that describes the predicted (hypothesized) relationship between the variables (e.g., persons with lower household incomes are more likely to be arrested). Any test of a theory actually involves a test of a specific hypothesis stemming from a general theory, and so the specific nature of any hypothesis means that a theory can never be tested directly. It is always possible that the measures tested do not accurately reflect the “true” theoretical concept. This is why such measures are constantly being refined.
- 4 A researcher then plans the data collection that is required for the hypothesis test(s), involving the determination/selection of the (a) target population, or the population to which the results will be generalized, (b) units of analysis reflected in each hypothesis (individuals, organizations, cities, counties, etc.), (c) time dimension to be reflected in the data (e.g., one point in time versus two or more points in time), (d) research design (based on the hypothesis and the level of rigor desired, such as matched pairs, factorial, pretest posttest, time series, etc.), (e) sample that represents the target

population (using one of a number of probability sampling techniques such as simple random sampling, systematic random sampling, sampling proportionate to size, etc.), (f) data collection instrument for compiling and coding the information (such as with a survey questionnaire), and (g) procedures for gathering information (telephone, mail, face to face, reviewing archival data, etc.).

- 5 The data collection phase consists of completing/obtaining completed instruments for all cases in the sample.
- 6 With the data compiled, the information should be checked for accuracy during the recording procedures. Computers are used for the purpose of data cleaning.
- 7 The data are examined in order to test each research hypothesis. This step involves the computation of statistics that help to summarize large quantities of data in order to test the hypotheses of interest and to describe the empirical relationships involved. Like the data collected for a study, statistics are also pieces of information, although they are designed to help make sense out of the data collected. It is up to the investigators, however, to apply and to interpret these statistics correctly in order to derive accurate conclusions regarding their data.

The use of quantitative methods for criminological and criminal justice research has steadily increased since the 1940s, due in part to the growing number of techniques, the availability of technology which facilitates data collection and analysis, and the proliferation of graduate programs and methods courses in the field. Ethnography remains a more powerful tool for theory construction, however, and many scholars place a high priority on combining the qualitative and quantitative.

The growing popularity of quantitative research has been met with resistance on the part of some qualitative researchers. Some individuals believe that the inability to numerically measure and evaluate many of the key concepts and processes that are critical to the field will produce misleading information regarding the validity of these ideas. When faced with having to operationalize highly abstract theoretical concepts, researchers can only measure observable proxies for the concepts of interest.

These proxies may not capture the full essence of the original idea, as when researchers use structural attributes such as the poverty rate or the unemployment rate to proxy the more complex process of structurally induced strain. This problem is exaggerated when a researcher does not fully understand the theoretical concepts and/or the procedures and limitations of complicated statistical techniques used in order to examine the data. The current state of graduate education in criminology and criminal justice programs contributes further to concerns over knowledge destruction, since these programs are often void of courses in theory construction and offer a very limited number of courses in research methodologies.

Some of the more common problems in extant criminological research include a lack of objectivity in theory construction (e.g., "convict criminology"), model misspecification (often due to poor conceptualization of the relevant theories), poor operationalization of concepts (e.g., unidimensional measures of multidimensional concepts such as low self control or social capital), inappropriate units of analysis (e.g., testing neighborhood level theories with county or state level data), inappropriate samples for the target populations (e.g., testing routine activities theory with college freshmen enrolled in a criminology class), and misapplications of statistical techniques (such as meta analyses of quasi and non experimental findings, multi level analyses with insufficient samples, and over corrections for spatially correlated error).

SEE ALSO: Criminal Justice System; Criminology; Ethnography; Measuring Crime; Positivism

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critical pedagogy

Rachel A. Domty

Critical pedagogy challenges both students and teachers to channel their experiences of oppression into educating and empowering marginalized peoples. Critical pedagogues approach education as a process of social, cultural, political, and individual transformation, where social equity can be nourished or social inequity perpetuated. According to critical pedagogues, notions defining rational classification of people into categories that diminish their social affect and importance keep them oppressed. Oppressed peoples thus require not only awareness of inequities they suffer but also an understanding of ways that oppressive social mechanisms and beliefs endure, and of resistance strategies. Reflection on one's own experiences of oppression and the feelings of frustration, shame, guilt, and rage that accompany those experiences help shape practices of critical pedagogy. Critical pedagogues redirect these feelings that can incite violent acts, submission, and/or ongoing repression into dynamic dialogue that defines literacy in terms of participatory citizenship.

Methods of critical pedagogy are as diverse as the people who practice them. However, some common elements and general themes include reworking roles of student and teacher, questioning economic categories of worth and success, and ongoing engagement with the social, cultural, and political interactions that perpetuate disenfranchised and marginalized identities. In a traditional educational environment, students listen to a lecturing teacher,

who controls the flow of questions and answers. Part of the traditional student–teacher relationship is that students consume decontextualized knowledge produced by the teacher (and those who dictate what the teacher teaches). This arrangement, according to critical approaches to pedagogy, disenfranchises people by removing their control over experiential reflection, and by neglecting to address emotionally charged daily experiences through which cultural symbols gain greater meaning.

Critical pedagogy incites critique of social values based on economic measures of worth and identity. When economic value defines products and peoples who can or cannot afford them, participation in community governance pits those who have against those who have not, and freedoms may only be afforded by people with enough money to buy them. Critical pedagogues teach people how to effectively participate in community governance (voting, legislating, finding alternative resources), thereby empowering people who are in no position to challenge oppressive economic systems and values based on economic leverage. Many scholars attribute the beginning of critical pedagogy to Karl Marx's writings on commodity fetishism and the social stratification that accompanies economic classification of people and resources, and to John Dewey's writings on educational theory and progressive schooling. More frequently, however, the beginnings of critical pedagogy are traced back to a school of thought, referred to as the Frankfurt School, that applied Marx's writings and critiques of capitalism to academic inquiries.

THE FRANKFURT SCHOOL

The Frankfurt School identifies a school of thought originating at the Institute for Social Research (Institut für Sozialforschung) established at Frankfurt University in 1923. As such, its members, many Jewish radicals and all various Marxist scholars, observed first hand the German fascists' rise to power. Austrian economist and historian Carl Grünberg became the first director of the Institute. Under Grünberg's charge, the Institute's research followed an orthodox Marxist avenue to investigate the economic structures of bourgeois society and

problems with the European working class movement. Institute staff during its first six years included economist Henryk Grossman, who worked on crisis theory, and Orientalist Karl Wittfogel, then an active member of the German Communist Party (KPD).

After Grünberg suffered a stroke, Max Horkheimer became director in 1930. With this change of directorship came changes in the Institute's general approaches to studying capitalism and socialism. In addition to Horkheimer, some notable Frankfurt School figures from this period include Erich Fromm (psychologist and philosopher), Theodor W. Adorno (philosopher, sociologist, and musicologist), Herbert Marcuse (philosopher), and Walter Benjamin (essayist and literary critic). Changes in the way Institute members approached capitalism and socialism included distancing academic study from activism while nurturing inquiry into how cultural systems, Marx's historical materialism, and Freud's psychoanalysis help explain dynamics of working class political struggles. Later in the 1950s and 1960s, former Hitler Youth member Jürgen Habermas and others steered the Frankfurt School back toward left wing student activist stances, which required ongoing intellectual disagreement amongst Institute members.

By this time the Russian Revolution had transformed Marxism as a subject of intellectual inquiry into the state ideology of Marxism Leninism. This transformation, together with Adolf Hitler's accession to power in Germany in 1933, the abolition of the Austrian workers' movement in 1934, and Francisco Franco's seizure of power through the Spanish Civil War (1936–9), represented a decade of defeat for the ideals and freedom of inquiry sought by Institute members, who fled Germany in exile.

Because of these developments, the Institute began referring to its brand of Marxism as "critical theory," thereby distancing its work from overt ties to subversive ideals without abandoning them. In his 1937 paper "Philosophie und Kritische Theorie" (Traditional and Critical Theory), Horkheimer wrote: "The Marxist categories of class, exploitation, surplus value, profit, impoverishment, and collapse are moments of a conceptual whole whose meaning is to be sought, not in the reproduction

of the present society, but in its transformation to a correct society." Themes developed by different Institute members in Horkheimer and Adorno's *Dialectic of Enlightenment* (1944) include the mass culture industry, Enlightenment philosophy, postpositivism, rationality, anti-Semitism, fascism, authoritarianism, and psychoanalysis. Later, critical pedagogues developed these ideas into educational approaches for steering social transformations toward using more equitable categories.

CRITICAL THEORY, PEDAGOGY, AND CONSCIOUSNESS

After Frankfurt School exiles developed critical theory as their brand of Marxism, Paulo Freire spread his brand of Marxism as a form of empowering education during his exile from Brazil. Brazilian voting laws in the 1950s and 1960s dictated that only functionally literate people were allowed to vote. Because sharecroppers and peasants were not given access to educational opportunities, these laws maintained a hegemonic power structure that kept the lower economic classes from having a voice in their governance. Freire spearheaded successful educational programs for these Brazilians, teaching them not only to read and write, but also how their constructive reflection and discussion of their experiences could sow literacy and participation in morally and ethically responsible community decision making. After President Joao Belchior Goulart invited Freire to implement a literacy program that aimed to teach reading, writing, and political understanding to 5 million illiterate Brazilians in the first year, a coup d'état plunged Brazil into over 20 years of military rule under which Freire was arrested twice and spent two months in prison before beginning his 16 years in exile.

Freire traveled extensively during those 16 years, a time in the United States marked by student activism and challenging capitalistic values. He defined the term "praxis" as a continual and balanced process of reflection and action, emphasizing that action arises from critical perception of lived experiences that can challenge oppressive social arrangements, so long as reflection does not dominate action or vice versa. Praxis at both the individual

and collective level involves coming to what Freire described as a “critical consciousness,” engaging in an ongoing process (“conscientization”) of theoretical application, evaluation, reflection, and further theorizing. Freire and many others who furthered the concepts of praxis and critical consciousness helped not only to develop critical pedagogy but also to pave the road to studies of postcolonialism and postmodernism.

The Civil Rights Movement in the United States at that time significantly fueled the development of critical pedagogy. Septima Poinsette Clark, who taught both children and illiterate adults in South Carolina and Tennessee (with Myles Horton at the Highlander Folk School), related problems these people faced in everyday life to English, math, and political concepts. She founded “citizenship schools” on these principles, and worked with judges and community groups to get equal pay for black and white schoolteachers. As a young black woman in the Southern, rural United States, bell hooks identified with the marginalized peasants she read about in Freire’s work. Yet hooks challenged the language Freire used as one that marginalized women, and subsequently became a figure in the feminist movement, educating and writing on topics that encouraged people to use education as a means of practicing freedom.

Ivan Illich’s *Deschooling Society* (1970) described this in terms of how traditional school systems make all students powerless and directly model capitalist social arrangements that critical pedagogies aim to transform. Paul Willis presents his notable ethnographic work on how schools ensure that working class students get working class jobs in his book *Learning to Labor* (1977). Ira Shor, another leading proponent of critical pedagogy, joined forces with Freire and emphasized that traditional capitalist definitions of literacy and education not only oppress lower social classes, but also perpetuate inequality through middle and upper social class strata as well. Because social transformation arises from praxis at the collective level, critical pedagogues maintain that education for critical consciousness must take place at all levels of society and among all categories of people to instigate necessary social change.

The democratic school and free school movement grew from these and many others’ works. These schools focus on participatory democracy by allowing student teachers and teacher students the power to choose what they learn and teach, with minimal class or activity requirements. By so doing, participation in democratic school activities helps people question the mass culture industry that perpetuates inequalities. The mass culture industry modifies education just like any other good or service, but critical pedagogues aim to spread informed dissidence that breaches the boundaries set by capitalist categories of people and of knowledge.

When corporations superficially adopt principles of critical pedagogy to sell products, they introduce elements of confusion to those new to the concepts of critical pedagogy. For example, “praxis” became the name of a standardized test used to evaluate teachers in training. A main goal of critical pedagogy challenges people to think and act against forces of commodification and the stratified categories that perpetuate social injustices. Such categories inherently define most, if not all, standardized tests, and place pressure on critical pedagogues to conform instead of transform.

Henry Giroux, another noted critical pedagogue, chose to leave the more culturally credentialed Penn State University, after 10 years, for McMaster University in Canada, because he observed increased alliances among corporate values and interests in the United States’ university system. Giroux’s move exemplifies problems faced by critical pedagogues. On one hand, they draw emotional and material support for their ideas and their communities from people raised according to capitalistic values. On the other hand, the principles they live and learn by inherently reject capitalistic values and ways they find support (such as commodification of educational services and concepts). Concepts drawn from social constructivism address these issues through exploration of how people “socially construct” their society, culture, and realities through enactment of recurring stratified interactions.

SEE ALSO: Civil Rights Movement; Commodities, Commodity Fetishism, and Commodification; Critical Theory/Frankfurt School;

Feminist Pedagogy; Foucault, Michel; Knowledge, Sociology of; Postmodernism; Praxis

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critical qualitative research

Gaile S. Camella

In the first edition of *The Handbook of Qualitative Research* (Denzin & Lincoln 1994), Kincheloe and McLaren (1994) begin by describing research and theory that could be labeled criticalist. Such work assumes socially and historically embedded power relations, “facts” as ideologically inscripted, language as both constructing and limiting consciousness, oppressions as multiple and interconnected, and research as producing and reconstituting (however unintended) systems of power.

Further, criticalist research assumes the need for emancipatory actions that lead to increased social justice and social transformation.

These assumptions would, at first, appear to construct new “critical truths” for a postmodern age, and have done so when dominated by an unrelenting focus on the victimization of those who have been oppressed (whether socioeconomically, sexually, racially, or otherwise). This is certainly a focal point that is warranted within the confines of patriarchy and racist, economic imperialism. However, recognizing that the practice of research has often itself resulted in the production and reproduction of power for researchers, along with an increasing awareness of diverse forms of resistance, critical qualitative researchers attempt to challenge even the construction of critical truths. Therefore, various forms of critical qualitative research are embedded within a self-conscious criticism that requires that the researcher continually challenge her “will to conduct research” as well as the “will to define and impose equity and justice.” The researcher’s ideological and epistemological biases are referenced from the beginning, are politically self-conscious, and are open to revision. This critical self-consciousness even challenges “master narratives” that would “lead to emancipation” while at the same time maintaining as major purposes the elimination of oppression and the construction of an emancipatory social transformation that would be recognized as tentative and shifting.

These criticalist, self-conscious assumptions have led to reconceptualizations of research in ways that affirm diverse knowledges and ideologies. These reconceptualizations challenge truth-oriented belief structures that are not even considered questionable from within forms of science that function as if ahistorical and apolitical. Critical qualitative research even deconstructs and blurs the boundaries of traditional disciplines. The following are examples of critical research questions that can provide the reader with a feel for the range of possibilities for exploration, research, and critique from within and across disciplinary boundaries:

- How did the creation of the “Orient” benefit European cultural strength and identity?

- How have androcentric orientations influenced the selection of problems identified as important for human cultural research?
- Does/how does the culture of caring in secondary schools create privilege for some students and serve as a form of erasure and exclusion for others?
- What are contemporary ways of speaking/acting within academic communities that are used to discredit forms of research that are not positivist and/or experimental in nature?
- How have particular forms of knowledge (and resultant knowledge bases) used in educational practices privileged particular groups of people and disqualified others?

Although the term *critical* most often evokes thoughts of neo Marxist “critical theory,” critical qualitative research is actually a hybrid and emergent form of inquiry. Calls for a critical social science (Popkewitz 1990), a postimperialist science (Lather 1998), and indigenous research agendas (Tuhiwai Smith 2001) are attended to as research is constructed that would uncover the ways that social relations are shaped by ideology and such research explores how these relations can be altered. This type of research is embedded within the history of qualitative research that has resulted in a scholarly environment in which diverse voices and ways of living in the world have been heard and respected. Additionally, critical qualitative research draws from the range of theoretical perspectives that have challenged notions of universalist truth, have acknowledged the political and power orientations of human knowledge(s), and have fostered emergent, activist orientations.

THE LEGACY OF QUALITATIVE RESEARCH

Qualitative research, as conceptualized from within ontological and epistemological perspectives that acknowledge the connections between knower and known (e.g., naturalistic, phenomenological), is foundational to the construction and contemporary acceptance of critical qualitative research. While specific “qualitative” methods may be used by truth oriented

scholars, the field of qualitative research overall has fostered a paradigm dialogue that challenges deterministic notions like generalizability and validity, as well as deconstructed the “will to truth” found in dominant constructions of science. Qualitative research in general has created a scholarly environment in which diverse research questions and methodologies are encouraged and fostered with the recognition that change, emergence, and new constructions (even as related to research questions and data collection methods) are necessary. This intellectual environment is necessary for a critical science that would unveil societal power relations, while at the same time engaging in self conscious examination of assumptions and biases even within the specific research that is being conducted.

Further, the various strengths of qualitative research as the avenue for diverse paradigmatic perspectives is directly related to and applied in critical scholarship. First, objectivist approaches have been discredited as not humanly possible, a position that can result in disciplinary boundary crossing, the acknowledgment of ideological embeddedness, and increased contextual awareness. Second, the acceptance of human subjectivity within qualitative research practices ensures an advanced rigor that attempts to make assumptions and biases clear up front. The various forms of qualitative research have attempted to document “lived experience,” often as played out in the lives of those who have suffered societal injustices and those whose voices have not usually been heard, or even acknowledged. Third, some forms of qualitative research have been implicitly critical in nature as research purposes and collaborations have dealt directly with the imbalance of power in society. Examples include research that addresses women’s/gender issues, ethnic/linguistic minority issues, race, and various practices of marginalization (Lincoln & Cannella 2004).

HYBRID AND DYNAMIC THEORETICAL ORIENTATIONS

A range of theoretical positions has challenged modernist truth orientations while at the same time introducing diverse explanations for the

construction (and imposition) of power within social relations. These various theoretical and even anti theoretical lenses have been/are being combined and reconfigured as needed in the practice of critical qualitative research. Perspectives that are employed include critical theory, poststructuralism, a range of feminist forms of critique that challenge patriarchy and sexism, queer theory, cultural studies, and postcolonial critique. These hybrid combinations result in “unthought of” ways of understanding the world and vantage points from which to examine rhizomes, tentacles, and sites of power and oppression. These previously unthought interpretations and contingencies foster border understandings, unrecognized possibilities, and the celebration of diverse and shifting identities.

When the term *critical* is used regarding scholarship, most scholars immediately think of the work in critical theory conducted at the Frankfurt School in Germany. Certainly, the neo Marxist work of Horkheimer, Adorno, and Marcuse while living in the US generated a site from which power could be explored while at the same time creating avenues for resistance, hope, and democratic possibility. However, a range of scholars who represent various power oriented traditions influence critical qualitative research. Continental theorists like Foucault and Derrida, Latino scholars like Friere and Fals Borda, and feminists like Kristeva and Irigaray would be included. Work in cultural studies and the various forms of tricontinental scholarship most often labeled postcolonial critique also represent perspectives that recognize power while avoiding its construction as a new truth. Perhaps more importantly, no theoretical view is treated as pure; each is increasingly emergent and hybrid. Feminism has reconceptualized cultural studies – poststructuralism and feminism have reconceptualized critical theory – postcolonialism has reconceptualized poststructuralism, and on and on. Critical qualitative research uses these hybrid constructions and even combines and revises them as needed to address particular social questions and problems.

Critical qualitative research methods of data collection and analyses include the range of qualitative techniques such as ethnographic interviews, participant observation, focus group

discussions, and document analyses that can be structured or emergent as needed. However, power oriented theoretical perspectives have made possible an expanded group of methods that include archeology, genealogy, deconstruction, and juxtaposition. As researchers attempt to gather data that would address issues like the construction of dominant discourses/knowledges, regulations/rules regarding who is authorized to speak, and the ways that subjects are constructed and positioned, new methods are often needed, chosen, and even designed. For example, a researcher may find, upon attempting to determine the impact of welfare reform on individuals, that money has been redeployed away from welfare services to programs that attempt to promote heterosexual marriage for the poor; the study, although begun using predominantly ethnographic interviews, may be revised to collect quantitative data as to the location and use of allocated funds in various state government locations. Finally, even though critical qualitative research methods appear to privilege language and various forms of discourse analyses (in a broad sense), the methodologies are not considered bounded by such perspectives and are open to emergent designs and diverse data orientations.

Depending on the actual theory/practice used in the particular research, critical qualitative scholarship has faced a range of criticisms. As examples, work with poststructural leanings tends to appear rationalist and “stereotypically” masculine; scholarship that uses postcolonial critique is judged as reinscribing power within the academic community; as discussed previously, the research faces the same criticisms leveled at qualitative research in general as being without rigor or objectivity. However, if the underlying assumptions of critical qualitative research are consciously placed at the forefront – especially the recognition that research is conceptually a power oriented construct or that theories can be used to reconceptualize each other but do not create new truths – then the criticisms become strengths.

EMERGENT, ACTIVIST ORIENTATIONS

Criticalist research is not simply hybrid and emergent, but, perhaps most importantly,

strives for actions that would increase the possibilities for social justice oriented societal transformation. The research questions that are implied are especially useful contemporarily when qualitative paradigms that challenge dominant truth orientations are coming under fire. Further, the discourse of research is currently being used to reinforce dualistic thinking that legitimates power for some and discredits and labels others as immoral, evil, not patriotic, socialist, or incompetent. Words like *accountability*, *profits*, *experimental or clinical trials*, and *evidenced based* are being used. Critical qualitative research demonstrates that research is never apolitical, is always complex and even ambiguous, requiring a critique of the underlying assumptions. In this contemporary postmodern time, critical qualitative research generates questions such as:

- How are children being “used” to perpetuate specific political agendas? How are they helped and harmed through such discourses?
- What is hidden or ignored related to the implementation of research results (e.g., in the field of education) in the contemporary labeling of decades of scholarship as “poor quality”?

The most activist possibility for critical qualitative research is to contribute to a critical social science that constructs public imaginaries (and continuous discussions) that embrace the complexities and ambiguities of research, yet at the same time recognizes its usefulness. These public discourses would place resistance to research at the center even as research is conducted to address contemporary societal problems; construct research collaborations with the public while at the same time avoiding the denial of difference; explore ways to challenge our positions of privilege (including those of researchers); question “knowing” as the very purpose of research; challenge public discourses that privilege forms of legitimation that reinscribe oppressive power(s); reconceptualize forms of representation that avoid oppressive results and interpretations; construct a critical public research dialogue; and create nonimpositional forms of critical transformative actions.

SEE ALSO: Critical Pedagogy; Critical Realism; Critical Theory/Frankfurt School

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critical realism

Jamie Morgan

Critical realism in its contemporary usage emerged out of debates in the philosophy of science in the 1970s (e.g., Harré & Madden 1975; Bhaskar 1997). It focused on what could be argued from the relative success of laboratory experiment to create artificial closed systems where causal relationships could be isolated and explored. It was argued that such closed systems of regular causal relations were rare outside the laboratory and that non social reality consisted of complex and stratified structures in open or variable and changing systems. The purpose of natural science method was to explain the powers of these structures as tendencies to act in particular ways. Because, in the ordinary course of things, regular outcomes

were rare outside the laboratory it was then inferred that reality could be analytically distinguished into structures, the outcome of their complex interplay, and human experience, perception, or interpretation of those outcomes. It was then argued that this distinction could make sense of the difference between theory and the rest of reality in quite a different way than the philosophies of idealism or materialist empiricism (Morgan 2006). Idealism argues that reality is mind dependent, while materialist empiricism argues that reality consists of a series of external objects of sense perception that are the basis of causal laws. Critical realism argued that neither actually accounts for natural science method. Idealism could not account for how laboratory experiment, methods, and theories could also fail as well as succeed. Empiricism could not account for why laboratory experiment was necessary at all if reality could be reduced to sense perception of causal regularities. Accordingly, it was argued that reality was mind practice affected in a continuing interplay of theoretical research programs of *depth reality*. This approach, as part of a broader movement termed scientific naturalism, had major implications in the philosophy of science in terms of mediating between the important insights of different responses to the failure of logical empiricism and positivism, particularly by acknowledging Kuhn and Lakatos's focus on the sociological conditions of scientific method and theoretical development (Sayer 1992).

At first sight critical realism does not seem particularly relevant to social science. However, it has been a growing influence within social theory and sociology, especially in the UK and Scandinavia, but also in the US via the *Journal for the Theory of Social Behavior*, initially for two reasons. First, it provides a philosophical argument for why positivism may be inappropriate as an account and method within natural science and, as such, undermines the universal science project that underpins the application of positivism to social science, especially the mathematical aspects of economics and behavioristic sociology which rely heavily on statistical methods, prediction, and closed system modeling. Second, it provides an alternative to forms of strong relativism in some

kinds of constructivism and postmodernist social theory that also reject positivism in social theory. The basis of this alternative was to adapt the natural science depth realist argument to societies. The conceptual problem was that humans, unlike electrons, think. The complexity and variability of society could not therefore be of the same kind as the rest of reality because change clearly has a different significance for a critical language using entity than it does for a weather system. The methodological problem was that there is also no obvious analogue to the laboratory on which to base any argument. The critical realist solution that developed through the early 1980s (Bhaskar 1998) was to revive the agency structure debate. Others, particularly Anthony Giddens, W. G. Runciman, Charles Tilly, and Pierre Bourdieu, were also pursuing this line of inquiry.

Both Giddens and Bhaskar explore and reject theories of methodological individualism and structuralism. Methodological individualism is rejected on the basis that although human action is central to social reality there are problems with reducing that reality solely to the beliefs and actions of the individual because it then becomes impossible to account for where beliefs come from, how actions and their goals are constrained, enabled, and conditioned, how goals sometimes fail, and why there may be unintended consequences (for the actor and for society at large) from the action, or lack thereof. Structuralism is rejected on the basis that although it is plausible to argue that every action must have a condition, it is implausible to translate that condition into a strong sense of conditioning because if structure is deterministic there is no sense that things can be otherwise and the characteristics of a critical language using entity are lost. The solution favored was to argue for a kind of analytical dualism where agency and structure are distinct but mutually dependent. Put another way, structure is the ever present condition and continuous outcome of human activity and, though human activity is conditioned by structures, no individual's activity is simply the interplay of structural forces. Giddens refers to this as structuration and Bhaskar as the transformational model of social activity. For Bhaskar and for critical realists, structures are real, with

real causal powers. However, those powers are practically and conceptually dependent in a different way than is the case for the objects of natural science. Most importantly, they are powers in the sense that they provide a relational authority and rules for particular actions for individuals, which also set in motion consequences and outcomes for those individuals and others. A banking system exists only insofar as there is a concept of banking and a practice of banking within a society. The act of banking reproduces the banking system, the act relies on a relation and its characteristics (one's status as a customer with a given credit rating, etc.) but is personalized by individual goals (applying for a mortgage to buy a particular house), and is also depersonalized in terms of indiscriminate effects for the individual (changes in the recycling of the dollar by China can affect the availability and interest rates for mortgages in the US).

What critical realists generally take from the agency structure problem is that a form of depth realism does apply to society. Society is a relatively enduring set of structures in complex stratified relations that are continually reproduced, inadvertently changed, and sometimes consciously and critically appraised and transformed by the humans whose activity sustains them. The powers and characteristics of structures and agents provide the background to each interaction of agents and structures from which particular events arise that cannot be reduced solely to how the agent perceives or experiences that event or interaction. Methodologically, in the absence of any analogue to the laboratory, social science can investigate the characteristics of structures and the effects on the socialization of agents to explore tendencies in the possibilities of action. As such the sociologist might focus on the interpretations of the individuals and thus seek to understand their motives and goals in a personal way, but can also link this to broader themes of how they fit into tendencies to act and provide explanations of that in terms of relatively enduring structures. Critical realism therefore accepts that the traditional explaining–understanding distinction refers to different methods, but rejects that the former is applicable to nature and the latter to society (Sayer 1992). As such, critical realism is a form of philosophical naturalism.

By the mid 1990s critical realism had become a vibrant multidisciplinary research community in the social sciences. At least three main strands of debate have emerged as significant to sociology and social theory. First, concerning the degree to which sociology does or does not benefit from or even require basic philosophical argument about the metaphysics of social reality and its significance for social science (Callinicos 2004), arguments vary from discussions of the applicability of naturalism to social science to debates concerning the relative merits of different meta theories, such as pragmatism versus realism (Kivinen & Piironen 2004), Marxism and critical realism (Brown et al. 2002), and – particularly in terms of later systematic developments by Bhaskar (1993) – to debates concerning the degree to which one can make substantive philosophical claims about reality and what this means for the appropriate relationship between science and social theory and philosophy (Morgan 2004). Second, there is a broad debate between realists on what kinds of research methods are compatible with social science (Carter & New 2005). Since critical realism rejects theorizations of society that are based on closed system assumptions, it also rejects research approaches that model or seek to do no more than identify particular regular relations between variables as accounts of events (e.g., age and suicide). This raises the issue of what value there might be in particular tools or methods such as analytical statistics. Critical realists tend to be split over this issue (Olsen & Morgan 2005). Third, there is a continuing debate focused on the agency structure problem itself. Margaret Archer has been the prime mover within critical realism in developing a distinctive approach to the agency structure problem. Her particular contribution has been a close critique of Giddens, arguing that his form of dualism collapses agency and structure together and that it is more plausible to separate them out on the temporal basis that structure always precedes an act of agency (Archer 1995). If one does not maintain this distinction it not only becomes impossible to explore the way in which agency uses and elaborates upon structures, but it also becomes impossible to differentiate how the agent is more than simply a product of and reducible to structures (Archer 2000, 2003).

Stones (2005) has replied directly to this critique, defending structuration on the basis that it is compatible with the “objectivity” of structure.

Others have contributed different lines of development and critique of the concept of structure in particular. Porpora (1998) defends an account of structure as systems of human relations among social positions. The philosopher Rom Harré, an early progenitor of what has become critical realism, has developed a critique of causal powers inherent in structures on the basis that only agents have particular powers to act (Valera and Harré 1996). Lewis (2000), following Porpora, has responded by differentiating the concept along Aristotelian lines. Structures may be material causes in the sense that they are the materials from which events are brought about, but are not themselves the means by which, or efficient causes by which, events are brought about. Finally, the social philosopher Ruth Groff (2004) has developed this position in terms of the overall coherence of the metaphysics of critical realist argument. The work of all these academics points to the current diversity of opinion and positions within and regarding critical realism.

SEE ALSO: Agency (and Intention); Bourdieu, Pierre; Critical Qualitative Research; Paradigms; Positivism; Scientific Knowledge, Sociology of; Stratification Systems: Openness; Structuralism

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critical theory/Frankfurt School

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Critical theory, the legacy of the Institute for Social Research at the University of Frankfurt, is rooted in the philosophies of Kant and Hegel, and in Marx’s critique of capitalism which claimed that it exploited and alienated workers, while its ideologies of reason, freedom, and

democracy disguised its actual operations. "Critical theorists" integrated Weber's notions of rationality and Freud's theories of character and desire into a theory of capitalism and its culture. They looked at sociology, political science, philosophy, art, literature, and cultural studies, including film theory and popular culture, to fashion a multidisciplinary, multidimensional, dialectical social theory largely concerned with the alienation, domination, and commodification and dehumanization in modern societies (Kellner 1989). Critical theory thus embraced the notion of *totality*: society was an outcome of a number of not always harmonious parts and levels; contradictions and tensions are seen as inherent. It is *critical* in the sense of critique as explicating what is not empirically given but apprehended through critical reason. Thus, unlike most social theories, it is very concerned with epistemology. Nor does it attempt "objectivity" because this is assumed both to promote and to hide domination. Rather, as an *emancipatory theory*, it seeks to foster the freedom, equality, and fraternity promised by the Enlightenment thinkers, these qualities being incompatible with late capitalism and hence undercut by technological logic, consumerism, and mass culture. It promotes a society where people may create democratic communities and realize their creative, unique human potentials.

To comprehend the rise of critical theory we need to consider at least two factors: the then state of Marxist theory and the social conditions of Germany following World War I. Marxist theory, as embraced by the Communist International, had become an "official orthodoxy" of economically determined laws of history as the progression of class conflict. But many academics, loyal to Marx's visions, such as Korsch and Lukács, began to reexamine consciousness and ideology after capitalist societies had entered a new phase with major economic, social, and technological changes. Finance had become as important as manufacturing and sales, while the welfare state and Keynesian economics were embraced. Nationalism had become a major social force and consumerism was beginning to grow. New and unprecedented technologies of mass production, rapid transportation, electronic communication, and even

warfare had transformed the early twentieth century. Yet while they focused on culture and ideology, they maintained the Marxian notion of immanent critique of capitalism, its alienation and reification, its mode of producing value through exploitation, and ideologies that disguised its actual operations.

World War I was an industrial war in which modern weapons such as battleships, machine guns, tanks, and even planes led to millions of deaths. Empires had fallen. The progressive Weimar government of post war Germany was relatively weak and little able to both forge a new democratic society and at the same time pay huge reparations imposed by the Versailles Treaty. The mood of the times, its angst and ennui, was captured in the existential philosophy of Heidegger, the novels of Kafka and Mann, the art of Grosz, and the music of Schoenberg. But these same conditions fostered the rise of fascism.

It was in this context that a uniquely talented collection of scholars came together in the mid 1920s to establish the Institute for Social Research, loosely affiliated with the University of Frankfurt. The best known of these men, whose work is influential to this day, were the philosophers Horkheimer, Adorno, and Marcuse, and sociologist turned psychoanalyst Erich Fromm. The goal of the group was to retain Hegel's notion of the movement and promise of reason, to rethink the Marxian critique of capital and the categories of its analyses in view of the social and technological changes of the age, and to develop an interdisciplinary theory that would go beyond the boundaries of economics, philosophy, sociology, and even psychoanalysis.

Their first task was to revive the tradition of Kant's critiques of reason as actively engaging and constructing the world. But with Hegel, they agreed that reason was historically determined, yet that unfolding of history promised human freedom and joyous consciousness. Weber, however, argued that rationality, i.e., *instrumental reason*, led to capitalist prosperity and technologies of domination over nature. Yet that same logic dehumanized people and led to their entrapment into "iron cages."

Inspired by the discovery of Marx's writings on alienation and Lukács's analysis of the reification of consciousness, the critical theorists

looked at the consequences of various epistemologies. More specifically, the logic of the physical sciences, when applied to the human sciences, served the goals of domination by reducing people to objects or reified entities, much as did capitalism. The logic of scientific objectivity and rationality fostered passivity and sustained the domination of capital. When Erich Fromm introduced Freud to the group, depth psychology – specifically, the theory of the superego as internalized authority – became part of a larger critique of domination.

In Germany in the 1920s, given a worldwide depression and growing unemployment, there were frequent conflicts between the left and right, and often bloody fights in the streets. In 1933, aided by the votes of many workers, the Nazi Party gained political power. The world would soon face the most massive war and unprecedented genocide in its history. In this latter context, the Frankfurt School began to investigate how and why such atavistic barbarism could surface in what had been one of the most culturally advanced societies in the world. They soon began a large scale study of the patterns of authority found in the families of modern society. This research revealed how a certain character type – the sadomasochistic authoritarian – when beset by economic hardships and social uncertainty, was disposed to follow a powerful leader who would forge new kinds of communities, promise a restoration of a former greatness that would provide the people with pride and dignity. Meanwhile, there were scapegoats to blame for adversity. The Jews had long served that role. The appeal of fascism and reception to its propaganda depended on (1) the psychological gratifications it gave to the individual; (2) a reactionary ideology that provided meaning in an increasingly heartless world; and (3) rituals and social organizations that offered a sense of community. Moreover, the Nazis brilliantly refined and exploited the new mass media, film and radio, for the purposes of propaganda and mobilizing an entire population, and the ruling classes supported Hitler as the bulwark against Bolshevism.

Fearing Hitler, the Frankfurt scholars moved to France and eventually the United States. After the war, Horkheimer and Adorno returned while Marcuse and Fromm chose to

remain. By then Fromm had both drifted away and faced exclusion. Nevertheless, the basic insights of the earlier period were developed and refined, as in large scale studies of authoritarianism in the US (Adorno et al. 1950). Following the concern with fascist political propaganda, they noted how the “culture industry” – the producers of books, films, music, and television, including advertising the “good life” – served political functions by fostering deception and escapism, paving the way for celebrity politicians like Reagan or Schwarzenegger.

During the 1960s, between a protest movement against the war in Vietnam and a growing counterculture that comprised the vanguard of the sexual revolution, Marcuse became a folk hero to progressive youth involved in what was called the “movement.” Marcuse’s trenchant *One Dimensional Man* (1964) argued that “one dimensional, rational thought” sustained an “administered society” while the mass media inculcated “false needs” that were gratified in consumer behavior that integrated the person into the society, yet coopted his or her agency to erode the possibilities that critical thought and resistance would overcome the status quo. Although capitalism had once required “surplus repression” of desire, with affluence and consumerism, “repressive desublimation” (sexual freedom) made people feel free while being entrapped.

Critical theory diverged from orthodox Marxism by not regarding class conflict as the basis of social change. The working classes, coopted by bourgeois ideologies and enthralled by consumer goods, were no longer seen as the agents of progressive social change. Finally, socialist revolution was not seen as inevitable nor even desirable, given the despotism and gulags of the USSR. Theorists eventually became pessimistic about the possibilities of progressive social transformation. Many ultimately retreated to the high culture of the educated German bourgeoisie where they found freedom in aesthetics as a realm still free of commodification.

By the late 1960s, a new generation of critical theorists had emerged. Jürgen Habermas (1984) often is considered the most important philosopher of the late twentieth century. His critical social theory attempted to incorporate

Weberian rationality, Schutz's concern with life world, Parsons's structural functionalism, and Mead's symbolic interactionism. In his attempt to resurrect the "uncompleted project of modernity," Habermas was concerned with the nature of communication, about which Marx said little. He showed how the rise of print media enabled a bourgeois "public sphere" where people could debate and argue various truth claims to arrive at certain social understandings and eventually overthrow monarchies. But eventually, in view of media commercialization, the critical aspects of media would wane. In his work on epistemology, he clearly differentiated rational/technical interests in *controlling* the world, practical/hermeneutic interests in *understanding* the world and other people, and emancipatory/critical interests in *overcoming domination*. He would later argue that the colonization of the life world – the realm of practical interests taken over by rational technical interests – secured domination through both passivity and marginalizing alternative forms of the social as "unpractical." His work also examined the nature of crises, student protest in the 1960s, and so on. Much like his teachers, there was little interest in the worker, perhaps because workers had become part of the forces conserving and protecting the society.

In his best known and most debated work, Habermas (1984) argued that communication was not well analyzed by Marx. Building upon ordinary language philosophy (Searle, Austin) and the developmental theory of Piaget and Kohlberg, he argues that speech acts have a goal of mutual understanding. But for various reasons, with the evolution of modernity, instrumental rationality has come to dominate all spheres of life, leading to distorted communication. Rejecting the Freudian theories of character, desire, and repression, but following Freud's model of therapeutic interpretation and understanding, he has argued that capitalist markets, the modern state, and bureaucratic organizations embracing instrumental reason and technological thought colonize the life world and attenuate communicative competence. His more recent work has become concerned with questions of justice and constitutionalism.

Today we might note what has been considered a third generation of critical theorists. Scholars such as Douglas Kellner, Andrew

Feenberg, and Timothy Luke have been at the forefront of the critiques of technology as having both liberating and dominating moments. Kellner, attempting to incorporate certain aspects of postmodernism, has written a number of scathing critiques of media and popular culture/current events including the first Gulf War, the O. J. Simpson trial, the theft of the 2000 US presidential election, and the corruption of the Bush dynasty. We might also note the work of Axel Honneth, who has been concerned with the need for recognition often lacking today, and Nancy Fraser's critiques of the meanings of "needs."

Other critical theory scholars worth noting might include Moishe Postone, who has rekindled the concerns with Marx's value theory, Harry Dahms, who has been rethinking alienation and globalization, Robert Antonio, who has been interested in globalization, David Smith, who has noted relations of current authoritarianism and genocide, and Lauren Langman, for whom psychoanalysis still provides trenchant insights into such diverse realms as consumerism, nationalism, Islamic fundamentalism, aspects of popular culture, and the alternative globalization movements. Moreover, there has been a resurgence of interest in some of the other Frankfurt School scholars such as Benjamin and Bloch.

To illustrate the value of critical theory for today, recall the central question of why German workers were attracted to Hitler and fascism, which proved to be contrary not only to their class interests but also to their very lives. Moreover, how could they commit the barbarities of the camps and "willingly" execute Jews? Many contemporary critical theorists can remember when the US was fighting an imperialist war against communism in Vietnam. Incidents such as My Lai or Operation Phoenix sanctioned the torture and deaths of many peasants. The hatred and dehumanization of the Vietnamese enemy "Other," much like the Nazis toward the Jews, could easily sanction torture, rape, and murder on a large scale.

Many blue collar voters supported that war and voted for Nixon, who continued a failed policy. More recently, workers gave G. W. Bush their votes and early support for the premeditated invasion of Iraq. Why do people support the policies of such leaders? Critical

theory suggests at least two reasons. First, the ideologies that shape consciousness emanating from the “culture industry,” from Rambo movies in the 1980s to Fox News of today, much like the propaganda of the Nazis, present damning worldviews, values, and depictions of Others that are not subjected to critical reason and democratic debate. Moreover, the conservative Christian segments of society see geopolitics in terms of a good Us and evil Others. Second, there is a large number of authoritarian personalities with sadomasochistic tendencies who, in face of economic threats, seek a strong, powerful, tough “father figure” who will use violence to protect his frightened followers. Given the anxieties and uncertainties of job security in these days of globalization, automation, and outsourcing, such men, and now even women, support “tough guys” or “strong men.”

Critical theory can be considered a product of capitalist domination that inspires intellectual, social, and political critique. Critical theory, with its multidisciplinary, dialectical analysis and critique of advanced capitalist society, its shallow consumerism and its suppression of human freedom, is not, nor can it really be, one of the dominant schools of social thought. But at the same time, the power of its logic, its capacities to reveal and clarify what might otherwise be obscured, mean that it will remain an enduring part of social theory and retain an influence that extends far and wide, even to those who would question its premises and conclusions. As long as social systems breed alienation, oppression, and domination, critical theory will seek to understand and to alleviate these problems.

SEE ALSO: Adorno, Theodor W.; Advertising; Alienation; Capitalism; Commodities, Commodity Fetishism, and Commodification; Consumption, Mass Consumption, and Consumer Culture; Cultural Critique; Culture Industries; Freud, Sigmund; Fromm, Erich; Horkheimer, Max; Marcuse, Herbert; Marx, Karl; Psychoanalysis; Weber, Max

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cross-sex friendship

Michael Monsour

Friendships between males and females, here after referred to as cross sex friendships, are non romantic (but not necessarily non sexual), voluntary, non familial relationships in which both individuals label their association as a friendship. The distinguishing characteristic of a cross sex friendship is that the friends are of different biological sexes. Similar to other kinds of friendships, such as same sex friendships, interracial friendships, and friendships of sexual minorities, cross sex friendships are characterized by generic benefits in the form of mutual trust, loyalty, fun, enjoyment, and social support which manifests itself as aid, affect, and affirmation. From a symbolic interactionist perspective, however, cross sex friends also offer one another the unique benefit of providing an insider's perspective on how members of the other sex think, feel, and behave. The bestowing of insider perspectives between cross sex friends enables males and females of all ages to take the role of the other sex, thereby increasing their understanding of their friend and the gender their friend represents.

Cross sex friendships have a protean nature, meaning that their form and function change as they appear in different stages of the life cycle. Consequently, a thorough understanding of cross sex friendships requires taking a

life cycle approach to those relationships. A life cycle approach focuses on how cross sex friendship experiences in earlier stages of life influence cross sex friendship experiences in subsequent stages of life. Those experiences encompass everything from the micro level for formation of cross sex friendship schemas and communicative practices to macro level societal and group norms concerning the appropriateness of such relationships and how they should be initiated and maintained. The transition from one stage of life to another is often marked by dramatic events and processes such as puberty, getting married or staying single, divorce, having children, entering the work place, and retirement. These transitional events and processes have an impact on how cross sex friendships are initiated, maintained, and some times discontinued.

Friendship historians agree that cross sex friendships were exceedingly rare in the United States until the 1970s. Scholarly analysis of the friendships between men and women can be traced back to 1974, with the publication of the landmark article "Cross Sex Friendship" by Booth and Hess in the *Journal of Marriage and the Family*. There has been a steady increase in the number of published investigations of cross sex friendships since 1974, but the numbers pale in comparison to the research conducted on same sex friendships and other sex romantic relationships. Researchers investigating cross sex friendships use a fairly wide range of methodological tools and strategies. The most common of these methods are surveys, observational analysis (most often of children in day care centers, preschool, and elementary school), and qualitative interviewing. With a few exceptions in which investigators observe children over the course of three or four months, there has been very little longitudinal research (but see Griffin & Sparks 1990).

Investigations of cross sex friendships have uncovered important findings when viewed from a life cycle perspective. Two significant life cycle milestones to recognize and study are when individuals have their first opportunity to mingle with members of the other sex (typically a family member), though they do not realize they are doing so, and when they have their first opportunity to interact with members of

the other sex and know that they are doing so. Life cycle experts generally agree that children are able to differentiate between the sexes around the age of 2 or 3 years. At that point, developing gender schemas guide how they think and behave in reference to members of the other sex (Martin 1994). Research has established that some 1 year olds form cross sex friendships (Howes 1996), though a more typical developmental age for those friendships is 3 or 4 years when the word "friend" actually becomes part of their working vocabulary (Bukowski et al. 1996). Cross sex friendships between toddlers and preschoolers are not the same as cross sex friendships in middle school, where participants have entered puberty and are contending with sexual identity issues and societal messages about appropriate gender behavior. Adolescent friendships between heterosexual boys and girls are quite different than the ones formed in earlier life because puberty introduces romantic and sexual tensions. Those friendships are also invariably affected by social network factors such as clique and crowd formations. Friendships in young and middle adulthood are similarly beset by romantic and sexual challenges. If an individual gets married and has children, his or her cross sex friendships change in that married individuals tend to form couple friendships with other married individuals rather than pursuing individual friendships with members of the other sex. Cross sex friendships of older Americans are affected by factors not as salient as they were in earlier stages of the life cycle, e.g., mobility, health issues, and the death of a spouse (Adams & Blieszner 1989). Despite the differences in cross sex friendships in stages of the life cycle, there are also similarities in that in each stage of life, cross sex friends support one another and enjoy each other's company.

From a structural perspective, there are a number of social and structural facilitators and barriers to cross sex friendship. The most obvious structural barriers to cross sex friendships are sex segregation in schools and many work environments, social network structures in elementary and middle school such as crowd and clique affiliations, and mobility issues in old age. There are also, however, structural facilitators of cross sex friendship formation.

Just as the workplace and school settings can inhibit the formation of cross sex friendships, they can also encourage and even require cross sex interaction, which creates the potential for friendships to develop. Structural facilitators and barriers to cross sex friendships are interrelated and must be studied as such. Researchers need to examine as many structural characteristics as methodologically possible if they want to understand the structural inhibitors and accentuators of cross sex friendship.

In every stage of the life cycle, social barriers to the initiation and maintenance of cross sex friendships originate from third parties or the cross sex friends themselves. Most commonly, social barriers are obstacles created by individuals in a person's social network that discourage the formation of friendships between men and women and boys and girls. Parents may discourage their elementary age children from having sleepovers that involve members of the other sex, even at the innocent age of 5 or 6. A man's or woman's jealousy over the cross sex friendship of their spouse or lover jeopardizes many cross sex friendships. The friends themselves may also present social barriers to their friendship, for example if one friend has a hidden agenda and secretly wants the relationship to be romantic in nature. Social barriers to cross sex friendship also reflect normative relational constraints, which are societal norms that place constraints on where, when, and how cross sex friendships may be initiated, developed, and maintained.

The significance of cross sex friendships to society and the individuals who constitute that society is largely unexplored terrain. An essay of this length cannot begin to cover the complexities of friendships between females and males. Indeed, even entire books are woefully inadequate. Unfortunately, cross sex friendships have been marginalized in the sense that relationship scholars pay them relatively little attention, and heterosexual laypersons often believe that the paradigmatic or ideal relationship between a male and a female should be a romantic one. Research has established one thing, however; males and females of all ages can be friends, and the benefits of those friendships are often qualitatively different than the

friendships formed between members of the same sex and even romantic relationships.

SEE ALSO: Friendship During the Later Years; Friendship: Interpersonal Aspects; Friendship, Social Inequality, and Social Change; Friendship: Structure and Context; Friendships of Adolescence; Friendships of Children; Friendships of Gay, Lesbian, and Bisexual People; Gender, Friendship and; Race/Ethnicity and Friendship

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crowd behavior

Clark McPhail

Herbert Blumer was the most influential crowd sociologist of the twentieth century. To his credit, he recognized in mid career that "sociologists had done a rather miserable job in studying the crowd systematically because they had done little to assemble empirical accounts" (Blumer 1957). He attributed this to the lack of "a well thought out analytic scheme which would provide fruitful hypotheses and lead to more incisive observations." But systematic study of "the crowd" proves to be impossible precisely because that concept, despite considerable cachet, is not a useful tool for investigating the phenomenon to which it purportedly refers. "The crowd" implies a homogeneity of actors and motives and, consequently, continuous and mutually inclusive action. Scholars who have taken a slightly different tack have produced extensive empirical evidence that refutes both those implications and their consequences.

Over the past two decades sociologists working at different levels of analysis have adopted "the gathering" as a more neutral and useful concept for referring to a temporary collection of at least two persons in a common location in space and time without regard to their actions or motives. All temporary gatherings have a *life course* consisting of three phases. An assembling process forms the gathering by bringing two or more persons together in a common location. A dispersing process terminates the gathering by vacating that location. The gathering is a kaleidoscopic mix of elementary forms of collective action by two or more of its members alternating or concurrent with their various individual actions. These three phases of temporary gatherings are not independent, but do divide a hitherto complex phenomenon into more manageable pieces for research and lend themselves to different and appropriate research methods that have produced the evidence summarized here.

Temporary gatherings of human beings are ubiquitous. Multitudes, crowds, and mobs have preoccupied preachers, politicians, and police for centuries because of their concerns with

persuading, producing, or controlling the behavior of the members of such gatherings. Most scholarly concerns have been with political gatherings that challenge the status quo. Late nineteenth century and early twentieth century scholars were critical of those gatherings and the allegedly disreputable and irrational character of the actors and actions that composed them. Contemporary scholars have been more concerned with describing and explaining than with discrediting political gatherings. Many collective action scholars have systematically coded newspaper archives to create databases with which to plot the rise and fall in the frequency of protest events, campaigns, and waves as measures of the life course of social movements.

Other scholars have been more concerned with describing and explaining the actions that compose the political gatherings of which protest events, campaigns, and waves are composed (Wright 1978; McPhail & Wohlstein 1983). Some have extended those concerns to similarities and differences across prosaic, religious, sport, and political gatherings. While both description and explanation of these units of analysis are equally worthwhile, far more attention has been given to the latter than to the former. Consequently, explanations have often been advanced for phenomena that are rare if not apocryphal. It is useful to provide a broad description of the phenomena to be explained before briefly reviewing the relevance of existing explanations for collective phenomena.

Some temporary gatherings assemble periodically, ranging from national independence days and inaugurations to daily prosaic gatherings on street corners. Ad hoc gatherings are assembled non periodically but are announced and mobilized well in advance (e.g., sport events, political and religious rallies); still others assemble in impromptu fashion (e.g., at the scene of fires or auto accidents, or for upset victory celebrations). Extensive surveys of participants (and sometimes non participants) in political gatherings and riots, in religious rallies, periodic holiday celebrations, and sport victory celebrations establish three noteworthy facts. First, individual attributes and attitudes do not predict who will or will not participate. Second, participation is a function of (1) *solicitations*

from friends, family, or acquaintances with whom the solicited are connected in social networks (Oliver & Marwell 1992) and (2) the *availability* to assemble when and (3) *means of access* to where the gathering in question occurs (McPhail & Miller 1973). Third, most people assemble for most gatherings with one or more friends, family, or acquaintances, remain together, and eventually disperse with those companions. Thus, most gatherings are composed of some singles but predominantly of small groups of companions. Those companions act alone; they interact with one another; and they occasionally act together with other singles and small groups in more inclusive collective actions. This contributes to the dynamic mix of alternating and varied individual and collective actions across the duration of most temporary gatherings.

Efforts to characterize entire gatherings by one or another prevailing attribute (e.g., "active crowd" versus "expressive crowds") have not proved effective because entire gatherings are never exclusively one or the other. The emotional expressions of cheering and applauding in religious, sport, and political gatherings, or the weeping and wailing at religious funeral gatherings, are themselves expressive actions. But it is rare for any collective action (or expression) to include the entire gathering and when that occurs it is of brief duration.

McPhail (1991) defines collective action as any activity that two or more individuals take with or in relation to one another. He inductively generated a taxonomy of elementary forms of collective action from on site observation records of hundreds of prosaic, religious, sport, and political gatherings over a period of three decades. Schweingruber and McPhail (1999) reported that the most characteristic feature in a periodic political gathering was alternation between and variation in the proportion of people engaged in different elementary forms of collective action. McPhail et al. (2006) further documented that feature in a systematic quantitative description of the proportion of people participating in various "directions of facing," "body positions or movements," "types of voicing," and "types of manipulation" in a large religious gathering over the course of a 9 hour period. Their evidence further refuted the classic stereotype of

"the crowd's" continuous and uniform action throughout the rally phase of the gathering and provided new evidence on the distinctive "milling" phase that precedes (and often follows) religious, sport, and political rallies. This study also established several similarities in the elementary forms of collective action in this religious gathering (e.g., cheering and clapping) that have been reported in quantitative studies of sport and political gatherings.

It is not surprising that violence against person or property was not observed in this religious gathering, but it is important to note that violence is the exception rather than the rule in most gatherings. Extensive examination of videotape records of the 1990 Poll Tax Riot in London and the 1992 South Central Los Angeles riot indicates that there were far more onlookers than participants in violence, and the latter participated intermittently rather than continuously. This reflects at the micro level what is now well established in archival studies of thousands of political gatherings in Europe from 1830 to 1930 (Tilly et al. 1975) and in the US during the twentieth century Civil Rights Movement: violence against person or property occurred in less than 10 percent of those political gatherings.

Routine dispersals have rarely been investigated, although there are numerous opportunities to do so. Sport stadiums and arenas containing tens of thousands of spectators routinely empty in 10–15 minutes after the contests' conclusion. University lecture halls filled with hundreds of students are routinely vacated in 5 minutes after the scheduled end of the class period. Movie theaters offer another venue for investigation, as do periodic worship services of all faiths.

Coerced dispersals traditionally involved police or military agents of social control escalating the level of force necessary to compel gathering members to "cease, desist, and disperse." These actions stemmed from the agents' assumptions that "crowd" members were incapable of controlling themselves, derived in large measure from traditional sociological stereotypes of the crowd. More recently in democratic nations in Europe and North America, police agencies that routinely deal with political protest gatherings have gradually moved toward regulating dispersal by

negotiating in advance with protest organizers the time, place, and manner that political gatherings commence, continue, and conclude (Della Porta & Reiter 1998).

Emergency dispersal has been extensively investigated by students of disaster planning and management as well as by fire and safety engineers. The most consistent and important finding for students of temporary gatherings is that incapacitating fear and/or irrational actions (a.k.a. panic) are rare phenomena. Rather than losing control when faced with life threatening problems, most individuals are creative problem solvers. Research consistently establishes that individuals are more likely to act altruistically than egoistically to assess the welfare of their companions and to assist in their safe evacuation (e.g., Johnson et al. 1994).

The preceding describes some of the phenomena to be explained; viz., what people do collectively in the formation, development, and termination of temporary gatherings. Any general theory of collective action should address all three phases; the majority of extant collective action theories fail to do so. Transformation (a.k.a. contagion or deindividuation) theories offer no explanation for the formation of "the crowd." They claim that individuals within "the crowd" lose control of their cognitive processes, mindlessly comply with the suggestions of charismatic leaders, and unwittingly imitate the actions of those around them. One alleged consequence of this "deindividuation" is mutually inclusive collective behavior. The same irrational mindlessness allegedly produces "panic" in emergency dispersals. However, neither on site observation records nor ex post facto interviews of participants provides any support for either of those claims. There is no mutually inclusive behavior; there is no evidence of lost cognitive control. Further, Postmes and Spears's (1998) meta analysis of 60 experimental studies of the deindividuation phenomenon established no support for the claim of impaired cognitive processes. Finally, the absence of individual cognitive control postulated by these theories simply does not fit and cannot explain the dynamic alternation and variation in what individuals do alone and together over the course of most gatherings.

Predisposition (a.k.a. convergence) theories claim that crowds form because two or more

individuals with the same innate or acquired predispositions to behave – attitudes, personality types, and grievances – converge on the same location for the same reasons. The urban riots, civil rights, and anti war demonstrations of the 1960s provided repeated opportunities to empirically examine those claims and yielded virtually no support. The mutually inclusive behavior that should occur within a gathering after similarly predisposed persons have assembled does not occur. Finally, the theories based on similar predispositions cannot account for the alternating and varied individual and collective actions constituting the phenomena to be explained.

Emergent norm theories claim that mutually inclusive behavior is an illusion. Its adherents claim instead that crowds are composed of individuals with diverse predispositions that lead them to participate in different ways; this includes the interaction among individuals attempting to determine what they should do in ambiguous and uncertain situations. That interaction is said to yield an emergent norm that constrains most people to behave collectively consistent with that norm and that restrains others from behaving inconsistently. Some critics charge that emergent norm theories imply compromised or crippled cognitive processes under the conditions of ambiguity and uncertainty. Without question, interaction among companions in the situation is the source of some decisions about what to do with or in relation to one another; however, all collective action in all gatherings does not stem from such interaction. Some derives from repertoires shared by many if not most members of a gathering enabling them to independently generate collective action (e.g., cheering or applause) without consultation with companions or solicitation from a third party; and, other collective action (e.g., civil disobedience) is planned and rehearsed well in advance of the gathering in which it is launched.

Rational choice theories acknowledge diversity in the phenomena to be explained. They recognize the influence of interaction upon individuals while deciding the costs and benefits of alternative courses of collective action. Rational choice theories are a step in the right direction because they place individuals in control of their own behavior. However, they are

flawed in several ways: they do not explain how alternative courses of action are initially formulated; they offer but one criterion – the mini max calculus – in terms of which a course of action is selected; they fail to accommodate errors and unanticipated consequences and the necessary adjustments required in the face of such negative feedback; and, last but not least, they fail to embody the behavioral choice that was rationally made. In short, they do not connect cognition to action.

Complexity and control systems theories begin with the recognition that the phenomena to be explained are variable and dynamic. These theories argue that the varied and dynamic yet coordinated actions to be explained can only be understood by assuming that the individual actors who participate in those actions are autonomous, heuristic, interdependent, and adaptive agents. McPhail et al. (2006) use a negative feedback, control system model of such actors to make sense of the three most common ways in which collective action has been observed to develop in many gatherings. These purposive actors adjust their actions in order to realize their goals or to display their approval (or disapproval) of others or their own words and deeds that realize or are consistent with those goals. Collective action by two or more individuals requires similar goals; these can be established independently, interdependently, or by adopting them from a third party. Thus, some collective actions (e.g., *cheering* and *applause* and the alternation between *sitting* and *standing*) were independently generated by the actors without consulting their companions or third party solicitation. Other collective actions (e.g., *conversing within convergent facing clusters* and *milling pedestrian clusters* in the pre rally and post rally period) were interdependently generated within the small companion groups that assembled, remained, and dispersed together in this as in most temporary gatherings. Still other collective actions (e.g., the distinctive prayer prostrations and huddles during the religious rally) resulted from voluntary compliance with the solicitations of a third party. That compliance was not collectively mindless obedience to the suggestions of charismatic speakers as hypothesized by traditional explanations because the observed proportion complying never approached unanimity.

Thus, complexity explanations recognize that some collective actions result from autonomous, self directing actors who can independently generate and pursue similar goals and independently participate in collective evaluations of the outcomes. Most of these actors are also embedded in small groups of companions who can interdependently generate their own goals, interdependently pursue their own collective actions, and evaluate the outcomes. Intermittently, these same individuals, acting alone or in consultation with their companions, can adopt the goals proposed by third parties, resulting in still other forms of collective actions by larger proportions of the gathering. These three means of generating collective action can occur separately at different times or concurrently in different sections of large gatherings. This may explain why the kaleidoscopic collective actions that occur across the duration of temporary gatherings are purposive but are neither mutually inclusive nor continuous.

SEE ALSO: Blumer, Herbert George; Collective Action; Complexity and Emergence; Emergent Norm Theory; Identity Control Theory; Rational Choice Theories; Riots

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cults: social psychological aspects

Gary Shepherd

The term cult has become, since the latter part of the twentieth century, one of the most controversial concepts in the social sciences. The term was originally employed by scholars of religion to signify a system of activities centering on an object of worship, but the concept has been gradually changed by sociologists to identify a particular residual type of religious group that fell outside the boundaries of recognized religious organization. Subsequently, scholarly attempts to redefine or specify the dimensions and implications of cult groups have proliferated, while at the same time the term cult has been appropriated for polemical purposes by opponents of unconventional religious organizations who characterize such organizations under the cult label as dangerous to both individuals and the larger society. The mass media in modern nations have largely adopted and disseminated these morally charged, negative definitions, and thus pejorative notions of the term cult and of the many

groups to which it is uncritically attached have become virtually universal among the general public. Many scholars of contemporary religions, especially sociologists, have now chosen to drop the term cult as a descriptor of a type of religious group, concluding that it is a conceptually polluted concept, and replaced it with a morally neutral term, such as new religious movement or alternative religious group. Others have argued that the term cult has a scientifically useful conceptual function and should be retained even though there is not yet a social science consensus on its essential definitional characteristics.

Both Durkheim, in *The Elementary Forms of Religious Life* (1915), and Weber, in *The Sociology of Religion* (1922), employed a classical conception of cult as designating a ritual system of worship activities. Durkheim focused attention on what he saw as the essential function of cultic activity within a community, namely to periodically renew, through participation in sacred rites, a collective sense of social unity and moral force around a set of shared values that constitute the community itself. Weber emphasized the rationalizing tendencies of cultic organization over time, particularly through the emergence of priestly roles to articulate, elaborate, coordinate, officiate, defend, propagate, and otherwise administer the system of religious practices and doctrines centered on the worship of a god or gods or other supernatural entities.

The rationalizing tendencies of religious organization noted by Weber were further elaborated by Ernst Troeltsch's attempt to specify the characteristics of Weber's two types of religious community organization: the church (a socially inclusive, less restrictive membership group embracing and embraced by the larger society) and the sect (an exclusive, particularistic, and restrictive membership group that by its strict requirements sets itself apart from and at odds with both the parent religious body and the larger society). In *The Social Teachings of the Christian Churches* (1931) Troeltsch placed the categories of Christian sects and churches along a dynamic, cyclical continuum in which sects were seen as typically breaking away from established churches to reclaim a perceived lost purity of belief or practice, only to gradually accommodate worldly pressures in

order to flourish, thereby acquiring church like characteristics that in turn generate a new schismatic cycle. He recognized, however, that even within Christianity not all organized religious expressions fit comfortably within the church–sect continuum, notably religious associations that give priority emphasis to achieving personal, non rational experiences. Troeltsch assigned such expressions to a residual category called mysticism, which was conceptually only vaguely connected to the church–sect continuum.

Howard Becker, in *Systematic Sociology* (1932), exchanged the term cult for mysticism, resulting in an influential shift in the sociological designation of cult as a particular type of religious group rather than referring only to the structuring of worship activities within all religions. Becker's definition of a cult included the characteristics of loosely structured, non demanding, non exclusive, and transient associations between individuals in urban settings who share interest in a limited set of esoteric spiritual beliefs typically propounded by a charismatic but not necessarily authoritarian teacher leader. Variations on the defining characteristics of cults as a type of religious group have subsequently proliferated. The greatest stimulus to reconceptualization and study of groups identified as cults occurred in the mid 1960s through mid 1970s as a consequence of certain elements within the hippie oriented youth counterculture (e.g., the Jesus Movement, the New Age Movement, the Communitarian Movement, etc.) and especially the increasing visibility and proselytizing activities of foreign and non Christian religious groups within western nations generally and the US in particular (e.g., the Unification Church, or "Moonies," the Divine Light Mission, the International Society for Krishna Consciousness, or "Hare Krishnas," etc.).

Although some sociologists argued that these contemporary, radically different groups were best seen as extreme variations of religious sects, most concluded that it was useful to expand the cult concept in a way that would account for more dynamic, structured, innovative, and purposive new religious movements that seemed to be more than just dissenting splinter groups from an already established religious tradition. Both Geoffrey Nelson's

Sociological Review article on "The Concept of Cult" (1968) and Milton Yinger's *The Scientific Study of Religion* (1970) emphasized the radical break from established religious worldviews characteristic of cults and the potential for cult groups to grow, increase their organizational complexity, and elaborate their own coherent, innovative worldview. From such developments over time, new religious traditions are formed that may, depending on a complex of social and historical conditions (and parallel to the institutional path of some sects), even ascend to the status of institutionalized "church" in the Weberian sense.

This line of thinking on cults was most clearly extended and articulated by Rodney Stark and William Bainbridge in their article "Of Churches, Sects, and Cults: Preliminary Concepts for a Theory of Religious Movements" (1979) and in their more comprehensive book, *The Future of Religion: Secularization, Renewal, and Cult Formation* (1985). Stark and Bainbridge distinguish cults as religious novelties that are not the product of schism from the established religions within a particular host society. Cults may originate in one of two ways: either from borrowing or "importing" their essential elements from an alien cultural tradition (i.e., from outside of the host society), or through the religious innovations of charismatic leaders who assert a new order of belief and practice that is substantially independent of established religious traditions. An example of the former would be the International Society of Krishna Consciousness (the "Hare Krishnas") in America (but not in India, where ISKON would be a sect of Hinduism); an example of the latter would be primitive Christianity in ancient Judea and adjacent areas of the Roman Empire. A contemporary cult may be present itself as the kind of amorphous, esoteric, and low commitment social enterprise identified by Becker in either of the two forms. The first form, according to Stark and Bainbridge, is the audience cult – a mystical or spiritually centered set of topics and ideas that are promoted through various media means. Adherents or advocates of these ideas are fundamentally consumers of the occult rather than members of a concrete religious organization. The second form is the client cult, which revolves around a kind of patient–therapist relationship in which

adherents seek personal assistance, guidance, or reassurance (psychological, physical, or spiritual) directly from agents who claim access to various supernatural powers. Neither of these forms creates a strong social identity for participants, and both are seen as focused on magical manipulations of non empirical forces to achieve desired empirical ends. However, cults may also coalesce into much more distinct membership groups with strict requirements, organizational hierarchies, broadly conceived ideologies, and long term aspirations for growth and influence. Stark and Bainbridge refer to this development as a cult movement and see such movements, in rare cases, as having the potential eventually to become transformed into new religious traditions. Even though the vast majority of cult movements do not succeed in achieving this outcome, cult movements are still seen as significant religious responses within secularized segments of modern society in which the appeal of established faiths has considerably weakened.

Sociological understanding of cults, however, has had little impact on public perceptions. From the 1960s onwards, the apparent proliferation of non conventional or alien religious groups in western societies, which were primarily successful in recruiting young people coming from conventional backgrounds, was deeply disturbing to many parents, mainstream Christian clergy, and various secular groups. From this public consternation emerged new, pejorative, polemical, and non scholarly definitions of cults. For many in the Christian clergy, a cult essentially came to be understood as any religious group that deviates from what are defined as orthodox Christian beliefs and practices – a “fake” religion that tempts people away from “true” religion. Such faith based, ethnocentric definitions considerably widen the category of groups labeled as cults, prominently including such well known American born religious organizations as the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter Day Saints (the “Mormons”), the Church of Christ, Scientist (Christian Science), and the Jehovah’s Witnesses.

Secular opponents of various unconventional religious groups (including some academic sociologists but mostly clinical psychologists, a variety of different types of therapists,

entrepreneurial and self styled “cult experts,” and several different anti cult organizations), beginning in the early 1970s, emphasized the dangers that cult groups were presumed to pose for both individuals who were snared by them and to the larger society that harbored them. Lists of identifying cult characteristics included (and currently still do) notions of “brain washing” or mind control tactics employed as recruitment and retention devices; fraudulent motives and totalitarian methods of charismatic leaders; exploitation or abuse of duped or cowed members for the benefit of leaders; secrecy and isolation from the outside world; a potential if not an actual tendency toward the use of violence; and so on.

This understanding of cults as dangerous or destructive groups engaging in fraudulent or even illegal activities was (and remains) largely adopted and disseminated by the mass media. Several spectacular and tragic episodes involving unconventional religious groups since the late 1970s have garnered massive media attention (e.g., the People’s Temple slayings and mass suicide in Jonestown, Guyana; the Rajneeshpuram takeover of a small Oregon community; the prolonged siege and fiery deaths of the Branch Davidians in Waco, Texas; the subway poison gas attacks by Aum Shinrikyo in Japan; and the mass suicides among followers of the Solar Temple in Switzerland and Heaven’s Gate in California). Other highly publicized, controversial groups whose reported activities continue to reinforce the widespread perception of cults as dangerous threats that need to be exposed and suppressed include the Church of Scientology (throughout Europe particularly) and the Falun Gong/Dafa movement (in mainland China).

Anti cult organizations such as the Cult Awareness Network (now defunct) and the American Family Federation have long advanced the claim that cults “brainwash” their members to such an extent that individuals within the group are significantly impeded in exercising full free agency and are thus largely helpless to avoid the abuse to which they are presumably subjected. This claim was bolstered from non random interview samples of ex group members and became the basis for involuntary removal of members from groups labeled as destructive cults by hired “deprogrammers”

until the American Psychological Association officially declared “brainwashing” to be an unscientific concept in the late 1980s, and American courts began convicting deprogrammers on charges related to kidnapping.

In contrast, most sociologists of religion continue to advocate a more detached, objective, and analytical understanding of cults and their relationships to conditions in both mainstream religions and society generally. Of the hundreds of groups that can reliably be identified as cult movements, only a very small fraction have or are likely to have violent confrontations with outsiders. Sociologists who specialize in the study of cult movements through field research or direct observations typically find that most groups they investigate, while espousing beliefs or practices that may seem outlandish, restrictive, or otherwise unappealing to outsiders, generally develop a core of sincere and committed followers whose right of religious choice ought not be trammled by indiscriminate negative labeling. The term new religious movement (NRM) has been widely adopted as a substitute for cult by many sociologists in order to neutralize the negative connotations that have accumulated around the term cult and to emphasize the need to examine every group on its own observable merits rather than simply stigmatizing unconventional religious organizations on the basis of a pejorative stereotype. Nevertheless, controversy over the nature of cults, how cults ought to be studied, whether the term itself ought to be discarded, and what kinds of policies, if any, ought to be adopted toward religiously deviant groups by secular authorities, continues.

SEE ALSO: Charisma; New Religious Movements; Religious Cults; Sect; Social Psychology

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cultural capital

Elliot B. Weininger and Annette Lareau

The French sociologist Pierre Bourdieu, working with various colleagues, developed the concept of cultural capital in the early 1960s in order to help address a particular empirical problem – namely, the fact that “economic obstacles are not sufficient to explain” disparities in the educational attainment of children from different social classes (Bourdieu & Passeron 1979 [1964]: 8). Bourdieu argued that, above and beyond economic factors, “cultural habits and . . . dispositions inherited from” the family are fundamentally important to school success (Bourdieu & Passeron 1979 [1964]: 14). In doing so, he broke sharply with traditional sociological conceptions of culture, which tended to view it primarily as a source of shared norms and values, or as a vehicle of collective expression. Instead, Bourdieu maintained that culture shares many of the properties that are characteristic of economic capital. In particular, he asserted that cultural “habits and dispositions” comprise a *resource* capable of generating “profits” that are potentially subject to *monopolization* by individuals and groups; and, under appropriate conditions, that can be *transmitted* from one generation to the next (Lareau & Weininger 2003).

As the originator of the concept of cultural capital, Bourdieu was notoriously disinclined to

elaborate the meaning and significance of concepts outside of the concrete context offered by empirical research. At the most general level, however, he emphasized that any “competence” becomes a capital insofar as it facilitates appropriation of a society’s “cultural heritage” but is unequally distributed, thereby creating opportunities for “exclusive advantages.” In societies characterized by a highly differentiated social structure and a system of formal education, Bourdieu further asserted, these “advantages” largely stem from the institutionalization of “criteria of evaluation” in schools – that is, standards of assessment – which are favorable to children from a particular class or classes (Bourdieu 1977).

Bourdieu (1986) further argued that cultural capital exists in three distinct forms. In its “embodied” form, cultural capital is a “competence” or skill that cannot be separated from its “bearer” (i.e., the person who “holds” it). As such, the acquisition of cultural capital necessarily presupposes the investment of time devoted to learning and/or training. For example, a college student who studies art history has gained a competence which, because it is highly valued in some institutional settings, becomes an embodied form of cultural capital. Additionally, Bourdieu suggests that the objects themselves may function as a form of cultural capital, insofar as their use or consumption presupposes a certain amount of embodied cultural capital. For example, a philosophy text is an “objectified” form of cultural capital since it requires prior training in philosophy to understand. Finally, in societies with a system of formal education, cultural capital exists in an “institutionalized” form. This is to say that when the school certifies individuals’ competencies and skills by issuing credentials, their embodied cultural capital takes on an objective value. Thus, for example, since persons with the same credentials have a roughly equivalent worth on the labor market, educational degrees can be seen to be a distinct form of cultural capital. Because they render individuals interchangeable in this fashion, Bourdieu suggests that institutionalization performs a function for cultural capital analogous to that performed by money in the case of economic capital.

Nevertheless, despite the similarities between cultural and economic capital, Bourdieu also

recognized that they differ from one another in important respects. In particular, he noted that the legitimation of inequality in cultural capital occurs in a manner that is highly distinct from the legitimation of economic inequality. Despite the fact that cultural capital is acquired in the home and the school via exposure to a given set of cultural practices – and therefore has a social origin – it is liable to be perceived as inborn “talent,” and its holder “gifted,” as a result of the fact that it is embodied in particular individuals. Moreover, because the school system transforms “inherited” cultural capital into “scholastic” cultural capital, the latter is predisposed to appear as an individual “achievement.” For example, scholars have demonstrated that middle class parents typically talk more to infants and young children than do working class or poor parents. As a result, middle class children often have larger vocabularies when they enter school, and subsequently score more highly on standardized tests measuring verbal skills (Lareau 2003). Nevertheless, teachers, parents, and students themselves are likely to interpret the differences in test scores as a matter of natural talent or individual effort.

Bourdieu’s arguments concerning cultural capital were notable because they vociferously challenged the widespread view of modern schooling as a mobility engine that promotes or demotes people through the class structure simply on the basis of their talents and efforts. Indeed, from Bourdieu’s highly critical vantage point, modern systems of schooling are far more adept at validating and augmenting cultural capital inherited from the family than they are at instilling it in children who enter the institution with few or none of the requisite dispositions and skills. Consequently, he maintained, the educational systems of modern societies tend to channel individuals toward class destinations that largely (but not wholly) mirror their class origins. Moreover, they tend to elicit acceptance of this outcome (i.e., legitimation), both from those who are most privileged by it and from those who are disfavored by it (Bourdieu & Passeron 1977 [1970]).

The concept of cultural capital also had tremendous impact in sociology because it placed culture at the core of stratification research. Bourdieu’s subsequent work used the notion

of cultural capital to further reinforce the premise that culture is directly implicated in social inequality. This is especially apparent in the thoroughgoing reconceptualization of social class that he presented in *Distinction* (1984 [1979]; Weininger 2005). For Bourdieu, classes are differentiated from one another in terms of the overall *volume of capital* (economic plus cultural) controlled by individuals or families. Within classes, “class fractions” are differentiated from one another by the *composition* of the capital controlled – or in other words, by the ratio of economic capital to cultural capital. Using this reconceptualization, *Distinction* analyzed the aesthetic practices and preferences of classes and class fractions located across the French social structure, focusing, in particular, on the taste or distaste for “highbrow” art forms (painting, music, literature, drama, etc.). Bourdieu’s data indicated that each class (and class fraction) exhibited a relatively unique pattern of tastes, one consistent with its particular mix of cultural and economic capital. Thus, for example, professors and artistic producers – one fraction of the dominant class – utilized their superior endowment of cultural capital to appreciate the most avant garde forms of art. By contrast, employers, the fraction of the dominant class richest in economic capital, tended to prefer less intellectually demanding forms of art, and especially those which conformed to traditional conceptions of beauty, and which connoted a sense of luxury. These differences of taste, Bourdieu argued, should be viewed as claims for the prestige constitutive of status, in Weber’s sense of “social honor,” which Bourdieu termed “symbolic capital.” As such, these differences were said to play an integral role in the legitimation of class stratification.

Within English language sociology, the concept of cultural capital began to make its way into the literature starting in the late 1970s with the translation of *Reproduction* (Bourdieu & Passeron 1977 [1970]). Given its genesis in Bourdieu’s study of the French educational system, it has unsurprisingly been in the field of educational research that the notion of cultural capital has triggered the greatest amount of empirical research and theoretical reflection, and the greatest contention. However, the concept has proven fruitful in a number of other

research areas. For example, proceeding from Bourdieu’s interest in the way that different forms of capital are implicated in complex patterns of stratification, Eyal et al.’s (1998) examination of the class structure of post communist societies in Central Europe focuses on cultural capital. Contrary to many predictions, they argue, members of the bureaucratic *nomenklatura* did not successfully exploit their authority under communism to appropriate large amounts of state property during the privatization process that marked the transition to capitalism. Nor have the small scale entrepreneurs who were tolerated in the final decades of state socialism managed to leverage their “head start” and become a full blown capitalist class in the post 1989 period. Rather, in countries such as the Czech Republic, Hungary, and Poland, a stratification system has emerged which can be characterized as a type of “capitalism without capitalists.” In this system, cultural capital stands as the most important basis of power and privilege. Thus, the dominant class in these societies can be described as a “cultural bourgeoisie” rather than an economic bourgeoisie. This cultural bourgeoisie, which is a diverse group that includes former technocrats and dissident intellectuals, has largely monopolized the skills, know how, and credentials (i.e., cultural capital) that have become critical to occupational success. The authors demonstrate that possession of cultural capital makes possible access to leading positions in the economy and the state and, conversely, that lack of cultural capital is a substantial barrier.

The concept of cultural capital has also proven highly productive in the study of aesthetic tastes and preferences. In this context, sociologists have evaluated the association between social position and taste, concentrating on the upper class predilection for exclusively “highbrow” aesthetic forms at the heart of *Distinction*. The evidence for this proposition strongly indicates that in the contemporary United States, for example, the relation is different from that charted by Bourdieu. Thus, Peterson and colleagues (Peterson & Kern 1996; Peterson & Simkus 1992) report that in matters of cultural taste, “elites” in the US are more accurately characterized as “omnivores” than “snobs”: status claims now tend to hinge on familiarity with a wide variety of genres

within each cultural form (music, literature, film, etc.) – genres that range from the high brow (e.g., classical music and opera) to the middlebrow (e.g., Broadway show tunes) and the lowbrow (e.g., country music and rock). Those claiming status are expected to be able to distinguish laudable examples of each genre according to standards of judgment that are unique to it. Despite the fact that it differs substantially from the form of aesthetic competence delineated in Bourdieu's account of French lifestyles, this "cosmopolitan" orientation is clearly conditional upon indicators of social class such as education, and therefore prone to function as a form of cultural capital. Indeed, Bryson (1996) goes so far as to dub it "multi cultural capital."

At the same time that it has been incorporated into various areas of English language sociology, the concept of cultural capital has also been the object of considerable criticism. Giroux (1983) has argued, for example, that when culture is viewed primarily as a form of capital, it becomes impossible to acknowledge the role it plays in enabling those in subordinate positions to resist domination. Similarly, Lamont (1992) asserts that conceptualizing culture in this manner prevents sociologists from recognizing that it contains repertoires which actors use to evaluate the moral quality of their own experiences and those of others – repertoires that do not necessarily have the character of a resource implicated in stratification processes. These debates are sure to intensify as scholars continue to interrogate the relation between culture and inequality. Regardless of the shape that they take, Bourdieu's concept of cultural capital, with its distinctive focus on the social value of cultural habits, dispositions, and skills, is likely to be an important part of the discussions in theories of inequality, the sociology of culture, and the sociology of education in the future.

SEE ALSO: Bourdieu, Pierre; Capital: Economic, Cultural, and Social; Class, Perceptions of; Cultural Capital; Cultural Capital in Schools; Distinction; Life Chances and Resources; Stratification, Distinction and; Stratification and Inequality, Theories of; Symbolic Classification

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cultural capital in schools

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One of the central goals of sociological studies of education has been to understand the role of schools in society. Do schools promote equal opportunity? Do schools help to recreate social stratification? In American society, where the ideology of meritocracy has taken root, American social science researchers have been preoccupied with issues of mobility and status attainment. The concept of cultural capital offers an alternative to the classic view of schools as the "great equalizer" which assesses students based on their raw talent or merit. Instead, the concept of cultural capital suggests that students' performance in schools draws on students' cultural resources where the habits, dispositions, and skills that children learn in the home are unequally valued by educators. For example, in this perspective children who learn classical music or other highly valued cultural practices at home may have an advantage in the educational setting compared to children who learn hip hop music or other cultural practices that are accorded lower social value. The profit yielded by cultural capital is linked to the value accorded to particular skills, dispositions, and habits by educators and other people in positions of power in dominant institutions. The concept of cultural capital plays a large role in arguments concerning social reproduction, in which schools are posited to play a key role in channeling individuals toward class destinations that reflect their class origins, and in legitimating inequality.

The concept of cultural capital grew out of the work of the French social thinker Pierre Bourdieu and his broader theory of social life. As Lamont and Lareau (1988) note, Bourdieu offers differing definitions at various points in his numerous writings. Bourdieu's most influential discussions of cultural capital in

education can be found in an early co authored work (Bourdieu & Passeron 1977) and in an article (Bourdieu 1977). Bourdieu's (1986) article offers the most direct discussion of the topic.

As with many core sociological concepts, the notion of cultural capital has been subject to a profusion of definitions in the literature. There has also been a profusion of indicators used to measure it. DiMaggio (1982), in a highly influential article, focused on students' attitudes, activities, and information regarding art, music, and literature. The assumption made by DiMaggio (and those who have followed him) is that proficiency with highbrow aesthetic culture of this sort enables students to carry out "status displays" which teachers, in turn, are inclined to reward. Lamont and Lareau (1988) defined cultural capital as "institutionalized, i.e. widely shared, high status cultural signals (attitudes, preferences, formal knowledge, behaviors, goods, and credentials) used for social and cultural exclusion." In doing so, however, they argued that in order for a given set of attitudes or preferences to be declared "cultural capital," this institutionalization must first be empirically documented. This argument was widely ignored. Instead, in part as a result of the constraints of representative survey data, empirical research has largely followed the work of DiMaggio and settled for indicators of cultural capital that hinge on knowledge of or facility with "highbrow" aesthetics (e.g., attendance at art museums, theater, or plays). While some studies have established a relationship between this type of "high status cultural consumption" and educational experiences, others (De Graaf et al. 2000) have found that parents' language use in the home, particularly in the form of reading, is more influential.

Some scholars, such as Kingston (2001), have declared the concept and the literature it has spawned to be of little or no value. Lareau and Weininger (2003), in a comprehensive review, criticize the English language literature for unnecessarily narrowing the concept by focusing on "highbrow" aesthetic culture. They also object to the partitioning of effects attributable to cultural capital from those attributable to "human capital" or "technical ability." They call for a broader conception of cultural capital which stresses the micro interactional strategies

through which children and their parents gain advantages in schools. For educational research, they stress the value of Bourdieu's definition of cultural capital as "the educational norms of those social classes capable of imposing the . . . criteria of evaluation which are the most favorable to their children." Although abstract, this definition implies the need to look critically at the standards which determine success in school and at the strategies that families pursue in relation to these standards. For example, child rearing practices that emphasize language development or parent involvement in schooling offer cultural capital to family members (Lareau 2000).

In sum, while pursuing different empirical approaches, researchers using the concept of cultural capital generally challenge the view of schools as adhering to objective and socially neutral standards of success. Instead, the concept of cultural capital stresses the ways in which the standards for success are drenched in family cultural practices. Advantaged families transmit an advantage to their children because educators proclaim the cultural practices in these families to be more valuable. From this vantage point, the role of schools in society – despite the well intentioned beliefs of educators – too often offers an advantage to children from the dominant class as they approach school with a set of powerful, albeit largely invisible, cultural advantages which they draw on to comply with standards for school success.

SEE ALSO: Bourdieu, Pierre; Capital: Economic, Cultural, and Social; Cultural Capital; Educational Inequality; Educational and Occupational Attainment

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cultural criminology

Jeff Ferrell

Cultural criminology explores the many ways in which cultural dynamics intertwine with the practices of crime and crime control in contemporary society; put differently, cultural criminology emphasizes the centrality of meaning and representation in the construction of crime as momentary event, subcultural endeavor, and social issue. From this view, the appropriate subject matter of criminology transcends traditional notions of crime and crime causation to include images of illicit behavior and symbolic displays of law enforcement; popular culture constructions of crime and criminal action; and the shared emotions that animate criminal events, perceptions of criminal threat, and public efforts at crime control. This wider cultural focus, cultural criminologists argue, allows scholars and the public alike to better

understand crime as meaningful human activity, and to penetrate more deeply the contested politics of crime control.

At a fundamental level cultural criminology in this way integrates the insights of sociological criminology with the orientations toward image and style offered by the field of cultural studies. Within this broad confluence of the criminological and the cultural, though, cultural criminology has emerged from a rather more complex co evolution of sociology, criminology, and cultural analysis. A fundamental starting point in this emergence is the work of scholars associated with the Birmingham School of Cultural Studies, the National Deviancy Conference, and the “new criminology” in Great Britain during the 1970s. Reconceptualizing the nature of contemporary power, these scholars explored the cultural and ideological dimensions of social class, examined leisure worlds and illicit subcultures as sites of stylized resistance and alternative meaning, and investigated the mediated ideologies driving social and legal control. Around this same time, American sociology provided a second starting point for what was to become cultural criminology: the symbolic interactionist approach to crime and deviance. As conceptualized in labeling theory and embodied in the naturalistic case study, this interactionist model likewise highlighted the contested construction of meaning around issues of crime and deviance, and in this sense explored the situated politics of even the most common of crimes.

As these two orientations co evolved – with American interactionists and ethnographers providing phenomenological inspiration for British scholars, and British cultural theorists and “new criminologists” offering American scholars sophisticated critiques of legal and ideological control – the transatlantic foundations for today’s cultural criminology were laid. With the rapid growth of punitive criminal justice systems in the US and Great Britain during subsequent decades, and the concomitant ascendance of an administrative “criminal justice” in place of a critical sociological criminology, however, little was immediately built from these foundations. It was not until the mid 1990s that a distinct cultural criminology began to emerge (e.g., Ferrell and Sander’s *Cultural Criminology*). While drawing on earlier

British and American conceptualizations, cultural criminologists now began to integrate into their work the sensibilities of postmodernism and deconstruction as well; elaborating on the “symbolic” in symbolic interaction, they began to explore the looping circulation of images, the representational hall of mirrors, that increasingly define the reality of crime and justice. In an echo of earlier transatlantic conversations, contemporary cultural criminology by intention also emerged as an integration of scholarly work from Great Britain, the US, and beyond.

Cultural criminologists’ transatlantic analysis of contemporary urban graffiti exemplifies the depth and complexity of this approach. Hip hop graffiti, the most pervasive form of contemporary urban graffiti, emerged out of the US hip hop movement of the 1970s as a stylized medium for displaying artistic ability and negotiating subcultural status. The practice of this illegal street graffiti also embodied what its practitioners called the “adrenalin rush”: the vivid, intoxicating experience of executing alternative artistry in situations of extreme physical and legal risk. As an increasingly prominent form of illicit public display, hip hop graffiti quickly attracted the attention of legal authorities who saw it as violating their own aesthetics of legal control. In response, authorities launched high profile media campaigns designed to define such graffiti exclusively as vandalism and threat, and aggressively enforced new anti graffiti ordinances, all of which accelerated graffiti’s experiential adrenalin rush, pushed the graffiti underground from subculture to counterculture, and helped construct hip hop graffiti over the next two decades as a global phenomenon. As hip hop graffiti has continued to develop in the new millennium, cultural criminologists note, so has this ironic spiral of culture and crime. Hip hop graffiti artists now maintain their own websites, art galleries, and magazines, and surreptitiously hang their paintings in the Louvre, the Museum of Modern Art, and the Tate Museum. Legal and political authorities counter by continuing to orchestrate media campaigns meant, above all, to poison the public perception of urban graffiti. US shoe companies in turn sell “SuperStar Graffiti” sneakers, US fashion designers stage graffiti demonstrations and promote hip hop graffiti video games, British advertisers employ

graffiti artists to paint corporate logos in city streets and appropriate existing hip hop graffiti for CD covers and ad campaigns – and graffiti practitioners continue to be arrested and incarcerated on charges of graffiti vandalism and destruction of private property (Ferrell 1996; Alvelos 2004).

In the same way that cultural criminology's analytic approach to contemporary crime issues embodies these sorts of interlocking cultural, critical, and interactionist frames, its methods emerge from its roots in naturalistic case study. While cultural criminology incorporates a variety of methods – among them textual, semiotic, and visual analysis – some of the more prominent work in cultural criminology has been characterized by forms of extreme ethnography. Immersing themselves in illicit subcultures, attempting at times to “become the subject matter,” constructing at other times auto ethnographies of their own lives, cultural criminologists have embraced ethnographic method as an avenue into the situated meaning and subtle symbolism constructed within criminal subcultures and events. In part this approach has been underpinned by cultural criminology's conceptualization of illicit subcultures like that of hip hop graffiti as collectivities of shared meaning and perception, linked by elaborate symbolic codes as much as by calculated criminal endeavor. Yet it has also been founded in a particular etiology of crime that points, at least in part, to crime's origins inside the immediacy of the criminal event, and to the shared experiences and emotions that develop within moments of criminality and crime control (Katz 1988; Lyng 1990). For cultural criminologists, the primacy of criminal subcultures, criminal events, and the meanings and emotions they spawn confirms the importance of methods that can move criminologists inside them; in the same way this focus reconfirms the value of a Weberian, *verstehen* oriented criminology and sociology.

Such experiences and emotions have also come into focus as part of cultural criminology's emphasis on everyday existence as an essential arena of criminality and control. Cultural criminology highlights the currents of carnivalesque excitement, pleasure, and risk taking that animate everyday life, but equally so the many capillaries of daily control designed

to contain and commodify these experiential currents (Presdee 2000). In fact, cultural criminologists argue, it is this very tension that accounts for various contemporary confluences of crime and culture: the aggressive policing of alternative subcultures and their styles; the mediated consumption of crime as commodified titillation and entertainment; and the shifting and always contested boundaries between art and pornography, music and political provocation, entertainment and aggression, crime and resistance. In all of these cases, cultural criminologists attempt to account for the political economy of crime by locating it inside the dynamics of the everyday, amid the ambiguities of day to day transgression and control.

While exploring the everyday meanings of crime and control, cultural criminologists have in this way also endeavored to fix these situated meanings within larger historical patterns. In a contemporary world shaped by the endless circulation of images and symbols, for example, conventional dualities of the “real” and the “representational” seem to make less and less sense – and so cultural criminology emphasizes the permeability of images as they flow between the mass media, criminal subcultures, and crime control agencies, and likewise the essential role of image and ideology in constructing crime control policies and practices. Following this line of analysis, cultural criminology suggests that everyday criminal justice has now become in many ways a matter of orchestrated public display, and an ongoing policing of public perceptions regarding issues of crime and threat. Shifts such as this are in turn seen to reflect still other dimensions of contemporary life, among them the emergence of a globalized economy of image and consumption, the tension between late modern patterns of social inclusion and exclusion, and the uncertain dynamics of personal and cultural identity within these arrangements (Young 2003). In this context cultural criminologists highlight especially the importance of the global city to the understanding of crime and crime control. With its contested cultural spaces of consumption and display, its amalgam of illicit subcultural dynamics, and its spatial and symbolic practices of everyday policing, the city seems an essential embodiment of contemporary social and cultural trends.

Throughout this range of substantive and theoretical work, cultural criminologists have quite explicitly challenged the conventional practices of criminology and criminal justice on two fronts. A first challenge has been issued in the area of style. Turning their cultural critique to the practice of contemporary criminology and criminal justice, cultural criminologists have noted there a style of writing wanting in elegance and engagement, and a social science culture of detached obfuscation operating so as to maintain a facade of objective neutrality. In response, cultural criminologists have noted the slippery politics of such representational codes – codes that have functioned, in both the historical emergence of criminology and the contemporary ascendance of criminal justice, as cultural displays masking intellectual alliances with political and economic power. Relatedly, cultural criminologists have noted the role of this arid criminological culture in sanitizing what would otherwise seem among the most engaging of subject matters: crime, violence, guilt, and transgression. In this context, cultural criminologists have sought to revitalize the enterprise of criminology, and to restore something of its humanistic orientation, through styles of research and presentation designed for engagement and effect. Along with the texture and nuance offered by ethnographic research, these have included the development of biographical and autobiographical writing styles, the incorporation of evocative vignettes drawn from popular culture, and the inclusion of visual materials and visual analysis. While better communicating the everyday importance of crime and crime control, cultural criminologists argue, such styles also offer a more honest accounting of criminologists' involvement with the politics of crime and crime control.

Cultural criminology's second challenge has occurred in the realms of theory and method. Cultural criminologists argue that survey research methods and quantitative data analysis – dominant modes of research within the objectivist culture of criminology and criminal justice – remain dominant not because of their innate scholarly merit, but due in large part to their utility in generating the sort of distilled data necessary for the administration of the criminal justice system. In fact, cultural criminologists contend, such modes of research

remain useful in this context precisely because they are meaningless: that is, because they drain from crime its situated meaning and seductive symbolism, leaving behind only the residues of statistical analysis. Likewise, rational choice theory and similar criminological theories founded on assumptions of instrumental rationality miss, from the view of cultural criminology, the very essence of much everyday criminality: pleasure, excitement, anger, and risk. As with other reductionist approaches, such theories may buttress calls for individual responsibility and punitive justice, and in this sense may find a home within the current practice of criminal justice, but they can hardly account for the inherent sensuality, ambiguity, and irrationality of crime itself.

Emerging from the alternative and critical criminologies of the 1970s, cultural criminology in these ways provides, by practice and intention, a contemporary alternative criminology, and a cultural critique of contemporary crime control arrangements. With its interdisciplinary foundations and emphasis on meaning, mediated representation, and style, it may also hold out the possibility of significantly expanding the analytic range and substantive scope of future criminological scholarship.

SEE ALSO: Birmingham School; Conflict Theory and Crime and Delinquency; Cultural Studies, British; Culture; Deviance, the Media and; Labeling Theory; Subcultures, Deviant; Symbolic Interaction

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cultural critique

Douglas Kellner and Tyson E. Lewis

Cultural critique is a broad field of study that employs many different theoretical traditions to analyze and critique cultural formations. Because culture is always historically and contextually determined, each era has had to develop its own methods of cultural analysis in order to respond to new technological innovations, new modes of social organization, new economic formations, and novel forms of oppression, exploitation, and subjugation.

The modern European tradition of cultural critique can be traced back to Immanuel Kant's (1724–1804) seminal essay entitled "What is Enlightenment?" Here, Kant opposed theocratic and authoritarian forms of culture with a liberal, progressive, and humanist culture of science, reason, and critique. By organizing society under the guiding principles of critical reason, Kant believed that pre-Enlightenment superstition and ignorance would be replaced by both individual liberty and universal peace.

Friedrich Nietzsche (1844–1900) historicized Kant's version of critique through a technique called genealogy. Nietzsche argued that Kant's necessary universals are born from his torical struggles between competing interests.

Compared to Greek culture, Nietzsche saw contemporary Germany as degenerate. Prominent figures such as David Strauss and Friedrich Schiller represented "cultural philistines" who promoted cultural conformity to a massified, standardized, and superficial culture. Thus contemporary culture blocked the revitalization of a strong, creative, and vital society of healthy geniuses. Here Nietzsche rested his faith not in universal categories of reason but rather in the aristocratic will to power to combat the "herd mentality" of German mass culture.

Like Nietzsche, Karl Marx (1818–83) also rejected universal and necessary truths outside of history. Using historical materialism as his major critical tool, Marx argued that the dominant culture legitimated current exploitative economic relations. In short, the class that controls the economic base also controls the production of cultural and political ideas. Whereas Nietzsche traced central forms of mass culture back to the hidden source of power animating them, Marx traced cultural manifestations back to their economic determinates. Here culture is derived from antagonistic social relations conditioned by capitalism, which distorts both the content and the form of ideas. Thus for Marx, cultural critique is essentially ideological critique exposing the interests of the ruling class within its seemingly natural and universal norms.

Whereas Kant defined the proper uses of reason for the creation of a rational social order, Sigmund Freud (1856–1939) argued that the liberal humanist tradition failed to actualize its ideal because it did not take into account the eternal and unavoidable conflict between culture and the psychological unconscious. Freud argued that the complexity of current society has both positive and negative psychological implications. On the one hand, individuals have a certain degree of security and stability afforded to them by society. Yet at the same time, this society demands repression of aggressive instincts, which turn inward and direct themselves toward the ego. This internalization of aggression results in an overpowering super-ego and attending neurotic symptoms and pathologies. For Freud, such a conflict is not the result of economic determination (as we saw with Marx), but rather is a struggle

fundamental to the social contract and is increasingly exacerbated by the social demand for conformity, utility, and productivity.

With the Frankfurt School of social theory, cultural critique attempted to synthesize the most politically progressive and theoretically innovative strands of the former cultural theories. Max Horkheimer (1895–1971), Theodor Adorno (1903–69), and Herbert Marcuse (1898–1979) are three of the central members of the Frankfurt School who utilized a transdisciplinary method that incorporated elements of critical reason, genealogy, historical materialism, sociology, and psychoanalysis to analyze culture. While heavily rooted in Marxism, the members of the Frankfurt School increasingly distanced themselves from Marx's conception of the centrality of economic relations, focusing instead on cultural and political methods of social control produced through new media technologies and a burgeoning culture industry. In the classic text *Dialectic of Enlightenment* (1948), Horkheimer and Adorno demonstrate that Kant's reliance on reason has not resulted in universal peace but rather increasing oppression, culminating in fascism. Here reason becomes a new form of dogmatism, its own mythology predicated on both external domination of nature and internal domination of psychological drives. This dialectic of Enlightenment reason reveals itself in the rise of the American culture industry whose sole purpose is to produce docile, passive, and submissive workers. Marcuse argued along similar lines, proposing that the American "one dimensional" culture has effectively destroyed the capacity for critical and oppositional thinking. Thus many members of the Frankfurt School (Adorno in particular) adopted a highly pessimistic attitude toward "mass culture," and, like Nietzsche, took refuge in "high" culture.

While the Frankfurt School articulated cultural conditions in a stage of monopoly capitalism and fascist tendencies, British cultural studies emerged in the 1960s when, first, there was widespread global resistance to consumer capitalism and an upsurge of revolutionary movements. British cultural studies originally was developed by Richard Hoggart, Raymond Williams, and E. P. Thompson to preserve working class culture against colonization by the culture industry. Thus both British cultural

studies and the Frankfurt School recognized the central role of new consumer and media culture in the erosion of working class resistance to capitalist hegemony. Yet there are distinct differences between British cultural studies and proponents of Frankfurt School critical theory. Whereas the Frankfurt School turned toward the modernist avant garde as a form of resistance to instrumental reason and capitalist culture, British cultural studies turned toward the oppositional potentials within youth subcultures. As such, British cultural studies was able to recognize the ambiguity of media culture as a contested terrain rather than a monolithic and one dimensional product of the capitalist social relations of production.

Currently, cultural critique is attempting to respond to a new era of global capitalism, hybridized cultural forms, and increasing control of information by a handful of media conglomerates. As a response to these economic, social, and political trends, cultural critique has expanded its theoretical repertoire to include multicultural, postcolonial, and feminist critiques of culture. African American feminist theorist bell hooks is an exemplary representative of new cultural studies who analyzes the interconnected nature of gender, race, and class oppressions operating in imperialist, white supremacist, capitalist patriarchy. Scholars of color such as hooks and Cornell West critique not only ongoing forms of exclusion, marginalization, and fetishization of the "other" within media culture, but also the classical tools of cultural criticism. Through insights generated by these scholars, cultural criticism is reevaluating its own internal complicity with racism, sexism, colonialism, and homophobia and in the process gaining a new level of self reflexivity that enables it to become an increasingly powerful tool for social emancipation.

SEE ALSO: Cultural Studies, British; Critical Theory/Frankfurt School; Ideology, Economy and; Marxism and Sociology; Nietzsche, Friedrich; Psychoanalysis; Racialized Gender

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cultural diversity and aging: ethnicity, minorities, and subcultures

Peggye Dilworth Anderson and Gracie Boswell

Current US Census population projections (2004) clearly show a growing number of diverse racial, ethnic, and cultural groups in American society. Parallel to this increase in diversity, the number of older adults in America is increasing. Older adult members of society are increasing at a faster rate than any other subgroup in America, and among this aging population, the percentage of the population who are members of minority groups will grow, between 2000 and 2050, at an even faster rate than the white majority. In 2002 (US Census 2002), the older population numbered 35.6 million; this was an increase of 3.3 million or 10.2 percent since 1992. Minority populations are projected to represent 26.4 percent of the elderly population in 2030, up from 17.2 percent in 2002. Between 2000 and 2030, the white population 65 and older is projected to increase by 77 percent compared with 223 percent for older minorities, including Hispanics (342 percent), African Americans (164 percent), American Indians, Eskimos, and Aleuts (207 percent), and Asians and Pacific Islanders (302 percent). Accompanying this tremendous boom in population growth and ethnic makeup will be economic problems as well as promises of

diversity. These economic problems and promises will be directly associated with living arrangements and health care needs of increasingly frail members of the population as well as the satisfaction of the supply and demand requirements for diversified goods and services of a vibrantly aging population (Angel & Hogan 2004).

In light of the demographic changes noted above, the need to understand diversity beyond racial categories and changes in the numbers of group members is a major challenge for researchers and other scholars of the twenty first century. Of great importance is to understand the range of factors that represent cultural diversity in a society. Central to this understanding is how best to define cultural diversity to reflect the changing and emerging identities of diverse groups. The biggest challenge in this definition is rooted in the term culture. Half a century ago, one study identified 150 definitions of culture (Kroeber & Kluckhohn 1952). Goodenough's (1999) definition of culture is a set of shared symbols, beliefs, and customs that shape individual and group behavior. He also suggested that culture provides guidelines for speaking, doing, interpreting, and evaluating one's actions and reactions in life. Goodenough's (1981) concept of cultural frame provides further insight into how individual characteristics and experiences, such as gender and age, can influence cultural beliefs and values. He suggested that cultural frame allows us to understand how an individual's culture is developed through the incorporation of the totality of one's experiences, interactions, and thoughts with the norms and expectations one perceives as being held by other group members. Therefore, due to differences in individual cultural frames, people can simultaneously be cultural group members and hold cultural beliefs that are not shared by some members of the group (Goodenough 1981).

At the expense of compounding the complexity inherent in the term culture, an understanding of what diversity means in the twenty first century is also important. Today the term diversity represents a more inclusive concept than in the past. It is used to model current dialogue and ideologies about inequality and social structures that are used to help resolve problems of social and professional interactions

in a pluralistic society. Although it is under the rubric of multiculturalism that culture, ethnicity, and race have been the usual variables of research interest, diversity is a multilevel and multidimensional concept that addresses more than culture, ethnicity, and race.

Representing the concerns of many interest groups, many variables may be used to bracket a linkage with diversity. Here, age is pulled into the diversity equation along with culture, ethnicity, and race. The inclusion of age is of paramount importance in social, economic, and legal institutions. In order to better appreciate the *raison d'être* for including age as a factor in the dialogue on diversity, we must move beyond mere awareness of negative attitudes toward the elderly to the cold hard facts supported by the social demographics of aging.

The discourse on cultural diversity and aging in social science research speaks to examining the theoretical and conceptual frameworks and perspectives that allow for capturing the cultural-historical background (values, beliefs, identities, and meanings assigned to experiences) and sociopolitical conditions (economic status and access to goods and services) of diverse groups. When culturally relevant, these frameworks and perspectives should also allow for defining and giving meaning to certain concepts from a cultural frame of reference. However, since theories of aging evolved out of a traditional Eurocentric social and cultural milieu, they have not proven effective in explaining aging in a culturally diverse context. In *Multiculturalism and Intergroup Relations* (1989), Ujimoto posited that traditional theories of aging (i.e., disengagement and activity) were not adequate to theorize about the Japanese ethnic population in Canada, because of the history of discriminatory practices endured by this group in relation to the majority Caucasian population. Similarly, this assertion is supported for some racial or ethnic minority groups in America, who were once thought to merge into a "melting pot" with Americanism as the central identifying group characteristic. Contemporary perspectives on diversity are centered on multiculturalism and cultural competence that take into account larger societal values and beliefs, and diverse cultural beliefs as well.

Multiculturalism became the buzzword of the 1990s in order to address the cultural

pluralism caused by the interrelationships between many racial and ethnic groups in America. Acknowledging individual differences, multiculturalism seemed to imply a commitment to a greater good for the whole society. However, in order to make this claim, some thing must be at stake for the various racial or ethnic groups that make up the society. Therefore, the central premise underlying multiculturalism was to recognize and respect the cultural heritages of various minority groups, while not creating alienation of one from the other. Otherwise, the result would be nothing more than the old pre Brown "separate but equal" ideology which was a dismal failure for already marginal members of society. By moving beyond the "melting pot" perspective, multiculturalism was a concept that embodied tolerance and less ethnocentrism. However, cultural bias was already pervasive due to cultural pluralism.

In order to assure that the various institutions in society were equitable for all members of the various groups, a system had to be in place that encouraged and facilitated culturally sensitive interactions between various interest groups. This recognition, along with the reality of widespread inequities, has moved contemporary discourse forward to what is referred to as a need for more "cultural competence." At any rate, cultural competence is not believed to be a state of being; instead, it is thought to be "a process of becoming over time," as suggested by Campinha Bacote in *The Process of Cultural Competence in the Delivery of Health care Services* (2003). This has been especially true with regards to interactions between aging individuals in the health care setting. In the context of the health care setting, cultural competence was described in the Commonwealth Fund field report (Betancourt et al. 2002) as being able to provide care to patients with diverse values, beliefs, and behaviors. This includes tailoring delivery to meet patients' social, cultural, and linguistic needs. Cultural competence was also described as both a vehicle to increase access to quality care for all patient populations and a business strategy to attract new patients and market share.

Betancourt et al.'s definition of cultural competence is steeped in humanistic terminology as well as a political economy perspective,

whereby the idea of a moral economy is invoked by acknowledging that cultural factors impact social institutions and change along with political and economic processes. Building upon the concept of multiculturalism and moving toward the dynamism represented by cultural competence, there are orientations which members of various interest groups and races or ethnicities might adopt or at least come to terms with. The three orientations are what Martin (1997) describes as diversity orientations, based on the interactions of different cultures, ethnicities, and races. The cultural orientation assumes that individuals abandon their ethnocentrism and learn rules guiding the behaviors of people from other cultures. The ethnic orientation assumes that individuals of different ethnic identities deserve equal respect. The oppression orientation, with regards to race, assumes dignity and power are restored to the oppressed minority. With this power, healing should take place in the psychological, economic, and political domains regarding interrelationships of the members of society. There is no clear evidence in American society that shows that these assumptions of diversity orientations have been realized. For this reason, diversity is the unfinished business of the twenty first century for social scientists to ponder.

As we move forward to address issues surrounding culture, ethnicity, or race, other social constructs will be called into question in the search for greater tolerance for individual differences and the need to dispel social inequalities. Research questions with other social constructs (i.e., age, gender, sexual orientation, disability, social class, language barriers, and religious and spiritual orientations) require examining the multiple concerns of multiple interest groups. This level of investigation beyond culture, race, and ethnicity embodies the new discourse on diversity that specifically includes age.

Although growing old has been thought to have marginalizing influences, many other factors weigh in to create an even more complex set of circumstances and individual differences that are demanding attention. Overshadowing the new demands on social structures will be the various factions representing racial subgroups and interest groups, not only stratified by age and race or ethnicity, but also impacted by gender, sexual orientation, religious or

spiritual tradition as well as other unnamed constructs. These competing interests of subgroups, stratified by various constructs of interest, signify the non monolithic nature of diversifying variables (i.e., age and gender) and recapitulate the notion that diversity is a multilevel and multidimensional concept that addresses more than culture, ethnicity, and race. However, of the three constructs, cultural diversity in the context of an aging society is of more paramount concern. Mindful of a rapidly aging society, social interactions need to place high priority on social changes in a variety of institutions, including the workplace, the health care arena, faith based organizations, communication networks, educational as well as leisure pursuits, and many other unlisted institutions.

Although the research terminology is new, cultural diversity is an outgrowth of the racial inequality debates of the past 50 years. Due to these past unresolved issues and changes in demography, current research on aging is challenged by many new methodological concerns. Consequently, aging is just one of the many social structures that is so dynamic that it begs to be addressed in the context of cultural diversity. The differences between the health outcomes of elderly whites and blacks have been well documented over the past 30 odd years. In some cases this research has informed the need for new policies, but in other cases it has simply raised more questions about the role of structure and agency and debates about social causation or social selection in studies of life stress. Furthermore, Williams (2004) has pointed out that inherent in the use of race to study health differences between groups of individuals is a tendency to mask problems associated with racism. By merely controlling for race of individuals or even stratifying by age, the richness of social and cultural contexts may be lost (Dilworth Anderson et al. 2002). While research that merely emphasized racial differences in outcomes might have been the necessary foundation for current theorizing, it did not go far enough.

Taking the context of cultural diversity into consideration, many contemporary methodological challenges are disclosed in the social science of aging. One of the main areas of investigation for diversity research is "inclusion." The science of inclusion goes

beyond racial and ethnic differences to address gender and poverty as well as language barriers that impact health differentials. These may be just a few of the factors forming the building blocks of diversity, which have been dictated by policy and that now affect what Curry and Jackson (2003) refer to as a science of inclusion. Among the main challenges embedded in this science of inclusion are the means of recruiting and retaining individuals from diverse backgrounds in health research. The idea of cultural competency becomes an important consideration in these recruitment and retention efforts, as the need to establish credibility becomes so essential in minority communities (Curry & Jackson 2003; Levkoff & Sanchez 2003). Additionally, training of investigators for diverse groups and research topics must become a priority as the scientific community grapples with issues of aging and associated disabilities.

Other methodological concerns include addressing the appropriateness of measures (i.e., are CES D scales useful for blacks?). Cross disciplinary methods (i.e., combining sociology and medical anthropology) as well as mixed methodologies (i.e., using qualitative to inform quantitative) are also important tools to use in investigating older adults and understanding the cultural contexts where they are found. Simultaneously, there is a need to display the qualities necessary for recruitment and retention of participants among diverse older adult populations (Yeo 2003).

As we look toward the future of research on aging and cultural diversity, theories and methods that are appropriate for inclusive scientific research should be a priority. Those theories and methods must be appropriate for research questions that address cultural complexity (i.e., aging of the gay and lesbian community, cultural heterogeneity of Latino and Asian Americans, spirituality and religiosity in health care). In other words, racial and ethnic groups should not be investigated as if they were monolithic entities. They each have their complex sets of problems and circumstances that need to be recognized as unique. For example, there are no typical persons of color (i.e., all persons with Afrocentric genetics in America are not African Americans), Asian, or Latino etc.

It is also important to not study aging in a vacuum. Older adults have a history. This

history encourages the use of the life course perspective as a useful methodological tool in the future. However, there must be ways to safeguard individuals with specific genetic predispositions from culturally biased or ethnically insensitive research that drives health policy.

New approaches to studying death and dying need to be addressed for an aging and culturally complex society. In order to prepare for this, more effort needs to be made in order to understand the health beliefs and attitudes as well as spiritual and religious beliefs and orientations of diverse cultural groups of older adults.

Finally, research in our pluralistic society is appropriate for cross national investigation. Jackson (2002) posits that the cultural complexity of the United States provides excellent models for research on aging that advances the field beyond investigating separate national and cultural perspectives. This would further advance understanding aging and cultural diversity in a global societal context.

SEE ALSO: Aging, Demography of; Aging and Health Policy; Aging and Social Policy; Aging, Sociology of; Culture; Diversity; Race; Race (Racism); Social Integration and Inclusion; Subculture

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cultural feminism

Kristina Wolff

Cultural feminism seeks to understand women's social locations in society by concentrating on gender differences between women and men. This type of feminism focuses on the

liberation of women through individual change, the recognition and creation of "women centered" culture, and the redefinition of femininity and masculinity. Cultural feminism utilizes essentialist understandings of male and female differences as the foundation of women's subordination in society.

Early cultural feminists sought to reclaim and redefine definitions of femininity and masculinity through recognizing and celebrating women's unique characteristics. Cultural feminists believe that women are inherently nurturing, kind, gentle, egalitarian, and non-violent. These tenets can be traced back to the *first wave* of feminism. During this time, scholars such as Jane Addams and Charlotte Perkins Gilman stressed the superiority of women's values, particularly compassion and pacifism, believing that these would conquer masculine qualities of selfishness, violence, and lack of self control in relation to sexual behavior. This was also a means to challenge the dominant cultural discourse that women were inferior and subservient to men. Efforts at fighting women's subordination included working for women's suffrage, women's right to free expression, and women's culture as well as outreach to poor and working class women. The decline of this early stage of cultural feminism has been attributed to World War I and societal reaction to these early feminists' opposition to the war.

Cultural feminism returned during the *second wave* of feminism in the early 1970s, when it reemerged out of the radical feminist movement. *Radical feminism* directly challenges biological definitions of male and female while actively working toward eliminating women's oppression. One aspect of this type of feminism was the minimization of gender differences and advocacy of androgyny. Within the movement, lesbians seeking to achieve recognition for their efforts, as well as visibility, created another body of feminism, *lesbian feminism*. Lesbian feminism focuses on unique issues that homosexual women face within feminism and throughout society, as well as examining the ways in which sexuality is socially constructed. Included in both lesbian and cultural feminism is the practice of separatism, the creation of spaces, groups, and communities that are separate from men. Cultural feminists employed some of the practices of both radical and lesbian

feminism but diverged from them due to its central focus. Cultural feminism emphasizes a need to highlight women's uniqueness and feminine qualities as positive attributes rather than erasing the differences between men and women, as stressed in radical feminism. It also modified lesbian feminism to create a feminism that appealed to a wider audience, while retaining a women centered focus. Cultural feminism is bounded by the practice of concentrating on the differences between genders as its foundation, while placing "woman" at the center. While there is great variety within this body of feminism, the main areas of scholarship focus on individual change, the development of women's culture, the redefinition of femininity and masculinity, and examinations of sexuality.

Foundationally, cultural feminism is the reclaiming and redefinition of female identity. Women's liberation occurs through the rejection of society's conception of "woman" since this is based on a male model of understanding. During a time period when some other branches of feminism were rejecting traditional values of womanhood, challenging and/or erasing what was understood as inherently female, cultural feminists sought to revalidate the essence of what it means to be "female" by embracing and reappropriating female attributes. This practice focuses on honoring one's femaleness through challenging traditional definitions of "woman" as well as the expected gender roles as defined by men. At the same time, traits that are attributed to women, such as the natural ability to nurture, are viewed as positive attributes that should be honored.

The early process of redefining and reclaiming femaleness took shape in a variety of forms and largely concentrated on changing personal behavior and attitudes and on creating a cultural transformation. This included the recognition and development of women's culture to counter women's invisibility, subordination, and often isolation from one another. Women's experience is the foundation of a "sisterhood," based on the belief that all women share a commonality due to gender. Women sought to establish "safe" places, free from male dominance, where they could build community. Often these events or spaces did not allow men to participate, thus giving women freedom

from men and men's subordination. Some defined this process of creating strong relationships and women centered spaces as "female bonding." This label sought to capture the inherent essence in women, one that naturally ties them together. Its purpose is to demonstrate the importance of placing "woman" at the center of their lives. The term also clashes with lesbians, as cultural feminists primarily defined "female bonding" as a non sexual, emotional connection. The result was that lesbianism quickly became subsumed under the label and, once again, left on the margins. Culturally, there was a surge in women's scholarship, art, and literature which focused on issues specifically related to and about women. Throughout the United States, women centered events and spaces were established. This included, but was not limited to, music festivals, businesses and organizations, women's centers, domestic violence shelters and rape crisis centers, and numerous community groups. Additionally, Take Back the Night marches were established to draw attention to rape, domestic violence, and abuse of women.

Central to this cultural shift is the development of an alternative consciousness, one that rejects what is "male" and how society is defined through a male lens. Cultural feminists view essentialist definitions of female and the qualities attached to understandings of femininity as powerful assets for women. Socially conditioned aspects of femininity, which include characteristics such as passivity and submissiveness, are redefined and revalidated as exemplifying women's innate ability to be nurturing, loving, non violent, cooperative, and egalitarian in nature. Men and masculinity are viewed as inherently violent, aggressive, and competitive. Men are seen as the "enemy" by virtue of their biological maleness. Women are subordinated due to men's nature. Women are also secondary because contemporary western society and western thought do not value women's virtues. Instead, male thought and ideas of hierarchy, domination, and independence are held in the highest esteem. Cultural feminism challenges these male values, seeking to change society and methods of governing through emphasizing women's natural ability to solve conflict through cooperation, pacifism, and non violence.

These changes in viewpoint, in placing women at the center, created a shift and dramatic growth in feminist scholarship. Cultural institutions that were often viewed as secondary in importance in society, such as women's roles, primary modes of employment, and motherhood, were now examined through a female lens. For example, Adrienne Rich and Nancy Chodorow examined the richness of women's experiences and roles as mothers, and Carol Gilligan joined Chodorow in utilizing psychological theories to further understand gender differences, thus helping to establish *psychoanalytic feminism*. Deborah Tannen's scholarship explores gender differences in the way men and women communicate with one another. Mary Daly, who also is influential in radical feminism, critiques and creates new languages as well as a feminist theology, both of which place women as central to her development of these new meanings. Ingrained in all of these "new" forms of scholarship is the inherent belief that women have certain innate qualities that should finally be recognized and honored by society, rather than remaining invisible or denigrated.

Included in these critiques and new scholarship was the development of standpoint theory and feminist epistemology. Both recognize that women have a unique perspective based on their experiences as women and that this should be valued, explored, and learned from. Both directly challenge traditional approaches to knowledge and understanding, recognizing these as grounded in and stemming from elite males in society. *Standpoint theory* posits that women's understanding of the world is different from men's, even if it is shaped by men's definitions. This difference is based on women's experiences and knowledge, both formal and informal. Women's perspectives vary in ways that are visible and invisible and affect the ways in which people understand and also approach the social world. Sandra Harding's development of a *feminist epistemology* centers on critiquing society's understanding and creation of knowledge, thus shaping the ways in which science and the quest for knowledge occur. Harding analyzes traditional approaches to expanding knowledge in society from a woman's standpoint to illustrate how women's "ways of knowing" differ from men's. This

ever expanding scholarship assisted in providing a foundation for the establishment of women's studies as a discipline, as well as in the development of many other concentrations and changes in focus of numerous disciplines. In sociology, for example, it provides a foundation for the sociology of sex and gender, feminist sociology, and feminist methods within sociology.

Inherent in the focus on differences between genders is the issue of sexuality and sexual practices. Approaches to sexuality vary. Some cultural feminists embrace women's ability to reproduce and promote it as "the" source of female power. They believe that men are afraid and/or jealous of women and their ability to reproduce and thus they try to control reproduction through a variety of means, including policy and technology. One direct result of this belief was the development of women's resources for health care and reproduction, including the publication in 1970 of *Our Bodies, Ourselves* by the Boston Women's Health Book Collective, which was the first publication dedicated to women's health written by and for women. Other cultural feminists seek to reclaim the power of positive sexual practices and desires through exploring women's fantasies, desires around intimacy, and ability to be open to and want emotional experiences. Addressing the focus of sexual behavior on the pleasures of women links directly back into radical feminism, which sought to highlight the importance of women enjoying sex. This included a reformulation of heterosexual practices that sought to concentrate on women's satisfaction instead of men's.

Some also focus on men's sexual behavior as a specific practice of male domination over women. Female sexuality is believed to naturally concentrate on relationships and intimacy. The focus is on reciprocity and caring rather than solely engaged on physical ecstasy. Sexuality for men is believed to primarily be focused on the merger of power and orgasm. Men naturally concentrate on their own physical desire, seeking to maintain power over women. Men want to be intimate with women in order to satisfy their own needs. In this respect, men and women are viewed as complete opposites.

Some cultural feminists advocate that women embrace their femininity as well as their

sexuality by rejecting sexual activity with men, viewing male penetration as domination. Many of these early feminists were also part of the radical feminism movement. Some of these women also apply the term “female bonding” here to illustrate the conscious focus on surrounding oneself with other women and having them fulfill every need, including as sexual partners. This approach to sexuality led to the creation of the anti pornography movement and also created a split among cultural feminists, particularly those who do not view sexual behavior as a source of men’s domination.

One of the accomplishments of cultural feminism was the emergence of the anti pornography movement. This movement materialized out of the establishment of women’s groups and organizations, particularly those that focused on issues of domestic violence, abuse, and rape. One of the beliefs of the movement is that men are unable to control themselves, that their desire to dominate women is due to their biological makeup. Women are then responsible for curtailing and controlling their behavior. This approach is very similar to the first wave of feminism, including those women involved in the temperance movement. Pornography is believed to perpetuate our culture’s misogyny and also causes violence against women, often because it depicts women being subjected to acts of violence. Some claimed that rape was simply due to men’s male essence, and others proclaimed that “porn is the theory, rape is the practice” (see, e.g., Brownmiller 1975; Dworkin 1979). It is believed that pornography also affects women negatively, compelling them to accept the negative images of women. The movement has had a varied history of success, resulting in the creation of anti pornography legislation and increased regulation, particularly around issues of age of participants and the elimination of highly violent images. It also continues to critique the role of pornography in society and has developed another area of feminist scholarship surrounding law, media, and sexuality studies. While many communities adopted strict anti pornography laws, many of these have been overturned on constitutional grounds.

Cultural feminism continues to influence current feminisms as well as other disciplines, including sociology, in particular concerning

issues of women and work, mothering, sexuality, and women’s role as “caretaker.” Cultural feminism is one of the most successful and influential types of feminism. However, it is not without critics. One of the most common critiques concerns its reliance on applying biological definitions of “woman.” The use of essentialist conceptions of “woman” reifies the societal beliefs it seeks to redefine. This key premise tends to invoke a universal conception of what “woman” is, failing to offer a response to traditional patriarchal beliefs of women and men. By embracing socially constructed ideas of femininity and masculinity, there is an implication that women cannot escape their destinies as females. Also embedded within these biological assumptions is the premise that women’s duty is to control men because they cannot control themselves due to their inherent essence. By relying on women to change their behaviors and seek to control men, cultural feminism leaves unchallenged the overarching system of patriarchy, which shapes societal understandings and practices of gender. Some early cultural feminists such as Adrienne Rich, Andrea Dworkin, and Susan Brownmiller have also offered critiques, but these are largely based on the application of essentialist definitions of “woman” rather than the belief itself. For some, the application is not complete with out female scientists researching women’s natural traits from their own perspective, thus countering male biases.

By seeking to unite all women under a banner of a “global sisterhood,” many argue that differences based on race, class, nation, status, age, and other complexities in women’s lives are erased. In many ways, cultural feminists have broadened their focus and depth of analysis to include other elements of culture. This includes the unique history and practices of women of color in the United States as well as women’s experiences in other nations. However, the criticism remains that through maintaining a singular focus on “woman,” even with this expansion, these other factors remain in a secondary position. Additionally, many of the feminists who do utilize a wider definition of cultural feminism, one that includes race, class, age, and so on, resist using an essentialist foundation of gender and instead focus on the complexities of all of these differences.

Another strong critique of cultural feminism is that it resulted in establishing “rules” as to “who” could be a feminist. Women were expected to embrace the concept of being “woman centered” or “woman identified.” This often resulted in an expectation that women would decrease their involvement with and reliance on men. This practice did not last long, nor was it widely embraced by all cultural feminists. Additionally, men were discouraged from being part of this type of feminism no matter how “liberated” they might have been. Women were expected to change their ideas and behaviors in order to liberate themselves, yet many women felt judged as not being “feminist enough” or “women centered enough,” and that only true feminists were in a position to determine who or what “woman” meant. This created and encouraged an elitist attitude within cultural feminism. Additionally, by not challenging patriarchal systems that create and perpetuate the ideology that women are inferior to men, this type of feminism fails to address larger systemic issues and relies on meeting needs within the status quo rather than critiquing the status quo.

SEE ALSO: Addams, Jane; Femininities/Masculinities; Feminism; Feminism, First, Second, and Third Waves; Feminism and Science, Feminist Epistemology; Feminist Activism in Latin America; Feminist Methodology; Feminist Standpoint Theory; Gender Ideology and Gender Role Ideology; Lesbian Feminism; Liberal Feminism; Materialist Feminisms; Multiracial Feminism; Patriarchy; Postmodern Feminism; Psychoanalytic Feminism; Radical Feminism; Third World and Postcolonial Feminisms/Subaltern; Transnational and Global Feminisms

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cultural imperialism

Kristina Wolff

Cultural imperialism is the process and practice of promoting one culture over another. Often this occurs during colonization, where one nation overpowers another country, typically one that is economically disadvantaged and/or militarily weaker. The dominant country then forces its cultural beliefs and practices onto the conquered nation. This has happened since nations have been warring, beginning with the Greek and Roman empires to the French and British empires, the American Revolution and the rise of communist governments in China and the Soviet Union to present day changes in governments around the world.

Culture can be imposed in a variety of ways, such as through creating new laws and policies concerning what specific types of education, religion, art, and language are to be used. For example, when Native North American tribes were forced onto reservations, the United States government dictated that children attend

Christian based boarding schools, they were taught to read and write English, and the use of their native language was discouraged and/or forbidden.

As a result of this, people find alternative ways of maintaining their culture; sometimes groups are forced into exile and their cultural practices are outlawed. Language or music is adapted as a means to continue the culture. For example, stories can be hidden within song lyrics and rhythms from their traditional music are merged with the new dominant forms as a means of maintaining parts of their culture. As with the Native North Americans, other populations have also been forced to change their style of dress, religion, language, and customs. This is common through the suppression of religion and has happened in various countries including China, Cuba, Germany, the Soviet Union, and Afghanistan.

Cultural imperialism differs from cultural diffusion primarily due to the mechanisms used to change culture and the roles that power plays in the process. Cultural diffusion occurs “naturally” when people and groups from other cultures interact with each other. It does not result in the purposeful reduction or elimination of various cultural aspects.

Cultural imperialism also occurs through programs designed to assist other nations, particularly developing nations. This can range from the ways in which small groups from western nations help out communities and villages to the impact of large international organizations’ efforts at creating positive change. It is not uncommon for organizations such as the United Nations or World Bank to place conditions on loans or grants they provide to nations. Often monies are designated for specific projects such as building roads where these groups believe it is most beneficial for the nation, as well as constructing schools or health clinics. Complications arise through this process, such as when curricula are being developed for the schools. By teaching students English, in the belief they are being better prepared for opportunities outside of their native country, this practice, along with the ways in which students are being instructed, reinforces western ideals and behaviors, often to the detriment of their existing culture.

Globalization has created a new vehicle by which cultural imperialism can occur, often

with minimal resistance or acknowledgment that it is happening. Supporters of the expansion of “free markets” argue that cultures are fluid and therefore cultural imperialism is a “natural” part of the growth of trade. If western practices and ideas are the most successful, then it is believed that cultural practices associated with them are better than other cultures. Some of the main challenges to this thinking include investigating what exactly is being transferred or imposed onto other nations, what group benefits from the cultural shifts, and what cultural aspects become lost. Research focuses on examining changes in images and content of art, music, fashion and clothing, sports and recreational activities as well as changes in consumerism, due to the influences of globalization.

Critiques of the effects of globalization often concentrate on “what” is being imposed on other nations. For example, many argue the spread of McDonald’s, Kentucky Fried Chicken, and Wal Mart represents positive change as they bring jobs and relatively inexpensive goods to other nations. However, the rapid expansion of these types of restaurants or stores also reflects a specific kind of American culture that is shaped and dictated by corporations. Many ask whether these kinds of businesses reflect US culture or whether they are simply an expansion of US capitalism.

Those who are actively challenging and resisting the spread of western practices and the effects of globalization often reside in places where they are experiencing this “new” wave of cultural imperialism. Scholars are examining the impact of cultural imperialism and larger issues connected to colonialism as a means to retain culture that is in danger of disappearing as well as to develop deeper understandings of the impact of outside forces on their nation and to expose the effects of these practices. Many citizens are openly challenging the oppressive nature of western expansion, creating coalitions and organizations aimed at maintaining cultural traditions and practices. Some nations have created protectionist policies in an effort to slow down the pace of western nations purchasing their land and other natural resources.

SEE ALSO: Colonialism (Neocolonialism); Cultural Studies; Ethnocentrism; Globalization; Imperialism; McDonaldization

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cultural relativism

Bernd Weiler

Cultural relativism, a highly complex doctrine surrounded by various epistemological, political, and ethical controversies, can be broadly defined as the view that culture is the key

variable to explain human diversity and that an individual's behavior, thought, emotion, perception, and sensation are relative to and bound by the culture of the group he or she belongs to. Within this frame of thought, culture is usually conceptualized as a holistic, historically grown entity with distinctive features and clear cut boundaries. The period of enculturation during early childhood is regarded as crucial. The autonomy of the individual is seen as more or less negligible, intragroup differences are usually minimized, and intergroup differences maximized. In the history of ideas, the emphasis on the cultural diversity, the cultural relativity, and boundedness of human experience has often been linked to and, at times, conflated with normative relativism, holding that all cultures are of the same "worth" and that an individual's ethical behavior ought to be judged in terms of the values of his or her culture (cf. Spiro 1986). Cultural relativist arguments have also often been employed to support moral skepticism and to criticize the values of one's own culture. Michel de Montaigne's (1533–92) famous essay "Of Cannibals" might serve as a famous example of the argumentative intertwining of the descriptive and the moral aspect of cultural relativism.

The cultural relativist stance is opposed to the universalist position according to which the cultural context is irrelevant to the concepts of truth, beauty, goodness, justice, and so on. It is also opposed to other forms of relativism, such as biological or racial relativism, which holds that differences between groups are due to differences in innate endowments. Analytically, the various forms of cultural relativist arguments can be distinguished along the two dimensions of extent and intensity. In its broadest form, cultural relativism extends to all manifestations of human existence. In this context even truth is regarded as a local and culture bound phenomenon, a position known as epistemological or cognitive relativism. In its narrow form, cultural relativists argue that culture is relevant only to certain aspects of human life (e.g., aesthetics and ethics) and irrelevant to others (e.g., knowledge). With regard to the dimension of intensity, one can distinguish between those cultural relativists who argue that culture is the sole *explanans* versus those who hold that culture is a significant *explanans*

of human thought, emotion, volition, and so on. In its broadest and most intense version, radical cultural relativism, a position favored today by some postmodernist thinkers, can be seen as a form of group solipsism beset with the various methodological difficulties and inconsistencies associated by R. K. Merton with the doctrine of insiderism (cf. Merton 1972).

Cultural relativist patterns of argumentation have been a constant feature of social analysis and criticism in the intellectual history of the West since the days of the “founding fathers” of ethnography, Hecataeus of Miletus and Herodotus of Halicarnassus. Modern day cultural relativism, an intellectual twin of historicism, can be traced back to the eighteenth century critical appraisal and partial rejection of the Enlightenment’s over rationalistic and atomistic picture of the human being and its progressivist conception of history. Opposing the stage theories of civilizational development, the thinkers of the so called Counter Enlightenment, most notably Vico, Möser, and Herder, argued that every historical period and every culture has to be understood as an end in itself and as intrinsically valuable. The German American cultural anthropologist Franz Boas and his students (e.g., A. L. Kroeber, R. H. Lowie, E. Sapir, R. Benedict, M. Herskovits, and M. Mead), the scholars most often associated with the doctrine of cultural relativism in the twentieth century, can be seen as the heirs to this Counter Enlightenment’s emphasis on the uniqueness of each culture. By criticizing simultaneously unilineal theories of social evolutionism, racial relativist explanations of cultural differences, and the axiological relativism à la Lévy Bruhl’s prelogical mentality, Boas and his school contributed decisively to the contemporary relativistic and pluralistic concept of culture (cf. Stocking 1982 [1968]). The epistemological and moral issues associated with cultural relativism have been hotly debated within and without anthropology throughout the twentieth century. Identifying a number of human universals, critics argued that there existed a “common denominator of cultures” and that the diversity of cultural forms was limited by the psychophysical constitution of humans (e.g., B. Malinowski), the external environmental constraints (e.g., M. Harris), and/or the possible number of

functional relations and logical combinations of society’s subsystems (e.g., G. P. Murdock). With regard to the moral questions, it was above all the human rights movement, arising in the aftermath of World War II, that severely challenged and undermined cultural relativist thinking. If one contextualizes the cultural relativism of the early twentieth century, however, it is important to note that to the first generation of professional anthropologists cultural relativism was not so much a codified doctrine and an epistemological position as part of the attitudinal tool kit when working in the field. As such, it amounted to a liberal minded plea for tolerance, implying the postulate to rid oneself of one’s own cultural prejudices, to suspend moral judgments, and to approach “strange” cultural values as “objectively” as possible. This legacy still deserves attention as even today a certain dose of cultural relativism might be a good, if not the best, medicine against the universal disease of ethnocentrism.

SEE ALSO: Boas, Franz; Ethnocentrism; Eurocentrism; Progress, Idea of; Sumner, William G.

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cultural reproduction

Adrian Franklin

Cultural reproduction is frequently considered to describe how cultural forms (e.g., social inequality, privilege, elite status, ethnicity) and cultures themselves are transmitted intact, from one generation to another. This idea emanates strongly from original work by Pierre Bourdieu in the 1970s on the role of the education process in reproducing class inequality and from such ethnographic classics as Paul Willis's *Learning to Labour* (1977) that showed how inequality could be reproduced culturally despite the best efforts of a benevolent education system. However, subsequent work on the concept of culture suggests that a concentration on class reproduction implies a very restricted sense of the term "reproduction," and that more significant dimensions of reproduction inhere in the idea of culture itself (Jenks 1993). Indeed, Jenks shows how cultural reproduction lies at the heart of more traditions of sociology than Marxism and neo Marxism.

The word culture derives from the notion of growth and development and does not imply stasis or repetition. Williams (1981) shows how

by the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries the word had itself grown to mean not only husbandry but also human development, specifically the cultivation of aptitude and understanding or, in other words, cultural capital or *change*. Critically, it remained only a *verb* until the nineteenth century. Another way of looking at this is suggested by Jenks, who argues that the idea of culture emerged from the noun *process*, in the sense of nurture, growth, and bringing into being – in fact to cultivate in an agricultural or horticultural sense. "Culture as process is emergent, it is forthcoming, it is continuous in the way of reproducing and as in all social processes it provides the grounds and parallel context of social action itself" (Jenks 1993: 1).

Drawing on definitions of culture from anthropologists, Jenks suggests that culture embodies the idea of accumulated resources (material and immaterial) that a community might employ, *change*, and pass on. Essentially it is the socially learned behavior and the shared symbolism of a community: it reveals and structures, empowers and constrains. The problem with cultural reproduction as Jenks sees it also concerns a restricted sense of the term reproduction. The tendency within Marxist traditions of sociology has been to see reproduction phenotypically. In this, reproduction is restricted negatively to repetition, to the copy or, in a weaker sense, to "imitation" or "likeness." As replication it implies a metaphor of restraint or the restriction on choice, and here of course is where ideology, state apparatuses, and symbolic violence are deployed in Marxian terms.

However, reproduction also has the *genotypical* sense of excitement, positivity, and vibrancy – as is implied in the newness of sexual and biological reproduction. Here the image changes to one of generation rather than repetition, of change and new combinations, innovation and creativity.

Jenks argues that in several traditions of sociology there is an implicit sense of a more positive form of cultural reproduction. In Durkheim's work the challenge of cultural reproduction was "to search for the appropriate collective credo that will ensure the reproduction of solidarity in the face of change" (Jenks 1993: 8). In other words, for Durkheim, it is a

defining feature of cultures that forms of solidarity will be produced in changed circumstances. The churning nature of modernization undermined mechanical forms of solidarity based on traditional societies, but new organic forms appeared among the newly individualized cultures of the city. As Jenks argues, "the Durkheimian tradition views reproduction with an optimism, indeed a positivism; its metaphors are consensual rather than divisive and its motivation is integrative" (1993: 8).

Equally, for ethnomethodologists there is a strong sense of creative cultural reproduction emanating from ordinary conversation and interaction. According to this view an inarticulate consensus must exist between competent social actors in order for interaction to work at all. And it is within the contexts of conversations and interactions that the business of cultural reproduction, whether of restraint and replication or innovation, is carried out/negotiated.

Cultural reproduction as a process must therefore be tracked and watched over time in methodological terms, and Willis's ethnographic work on the working class "lads" in a Midlands school remains the archetype. In this study it was shown that the lads were not failed by an educational system geared solely to reproduce the privilege of the elite but by their own culture whose appeal proved stronger than the alien culture of education based social mobility. Willis shows how the cultural richness of working class culture competed with that offered by the school and how the lads embodied this culture and used it against the school and its teachers. However, this study took place in the context of a vibrant and secure labor market for blue collar workers. A later (1990s) study was completed when that labor market had all but evaporated (Mac an Ghaill 1994) and this showed how new circumstances engendered new forms of cultural response. Mac an Ghaill did find a group corresponding to the lads, but unlike the superconfident 1970s group, they were undergoing a crisis of masculinity as the economic base of their culture had disappeared. Meanwhile, the new circumstances had produced a more fragmented masculine culture at the school with far more reaching out for the cultural capital that the school could offer.

Blasko's work in Hungary also found that schools offering cultural capital had been used effectively by working class parents and children to achieve social mobility and by the upper classes to maintain their existing positions (Blasko 2003: 5).

SEE ALSO: Bourdieu, Pierre; Cultural Capital; Cultural Capital in Schools; Educational and Occupational Attainment; Ethnography; Habitus/Field; Inequality, Wealth; Occupations

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cultural resistance

Stephen Duncombe

Cultural resistance is the practice of using meanings and symbols, that is, culture, to contest and combat a dominant power, often constructing a different vision of the world in the process. The practice is as old as history. The Hebrew Scriptures, for example, were a cultural means with which to create Jewish identity and then hold on to that identity in the face of Roman oppression. The stories of Jesus and Mohammed served similar functions. The modern theory of cultural resistance, however,

was first articulated in the mid nineteenth century by Matthew Arnold.

Arnold wrote his famous essay *Culture and Anarchy* at a time when his England was undergoing massive change: industrialization, urbanization, and an extension of the franchise to the working classes. Whereas some considered this progress, Arnold saw only chaos. But culture, as “the best which has been thought and said” (1990 [1869]: 4), offered a solution. It was a way to resist and rise above the politics and commerce and machinery of the day, providing a universal standard upon which to base “a principle of authority, to counteract the tendency to anarchy which seems to be threatening us” (p. 82). Culture was a Platonic platform where “total perfection” could be cultivated, eventually returning to the messy material world – if at all – in the form of an ideal state to guide society.

Arnold may have been the first modern voice to articulate a strategy of cultural resistance, but it is an intellectual and activist on the opposite side of the political spectrum, the Italian communist Antonio Gramsci, who framed its contemporary use. Gramsci, writing from prison in the late 1920s and 1930s, reflected on why the revolutions he fought for in the West had so far failed. Part of the reason, he concluded, was a serious underestimation of culture and civil society. Power resides not only in institutions, but also in the ways people make sense of their world; hegemony is a political *and* cultural process. Armed with culture instead of guns, one fights a different type of battle. Whereas traditional battles were “wars of maneuver,” frontal assaults which seized the state, cultural battles were “wars of position,” flanking maneuvers, commando raids and infiltrations, staking out positions from which to attack and then reassemble civil society (1971: 229–39). Thus, part of the revolutionary project was to create counterhegemonic culture behind enemy lines. But if this culture was to have real power, and communist integrity, it could not, as Arnold believed, be imposed from above; it must come out of the experiences and consciousness of people. Thus, the revolutionary must discover the progressive potentialities that reside within popular consciousness and from this fashion a culture of resistance. Gramsci’s theories of cultural resistance can be glimpsed in the practice

of Mahatma Gandhi’s invocation of *satyagraha* and Indian tradition to resist British colonialism, and, more recently, in the culture heavy tactics of the rebel Zapatista army in Mexico and the magical realist communiqués of their Subcommandante Marcos.

In the academy, Gramsci’s ideas shaped the mission of the Center for Contemporary Cultural Studies (CCCS) at the University of Birmingham in the 1970s. The CCCS is best known for its subcultural studies, and it was within these mainly working class subcultures that researchers found an inchoate politics of resistance. Dick Hebdige, for example, writes about how punk rockers performed the decline of post war Britain with ripped up clothes, songs mocking the queen, and lyrics that warned: “We’re your future, no future.” Through culture young people contested and rearranged the ideological constructions – the systems of meaning – handed down to them by the powers that be. Cultural resistance, however, was recognized as a double edged sword by CCCS director Stuart Hall and his colleagues. Subcultures opened up spaces where dominant ideology was challenged and counterhegemonic culture created, but these contestations and symbolic victories often remained imprisoned in culture, never stepping outside to confront material power. These were “magical resolutions,” as Stanley Cohen explains, to real world problems.

Cultural studies continues to be concerned with cultural resistance. Readers “re read” romance novels against the grain, and music fans claim ownership of the bands they love through zine writing. Even shopping is championed by John Fiske as an act of resistance: “a sense of freedom, however irrational, from the work involved in working and loving under patriarchy” (1989: 42). But Gramsci’s question of how this cultural resistance translates into a revolutionary strategy, or even the less ambitious question of how these cultural practices translate into material changes, is less often posed. Given the left of center politics of many in the cultural studies camp, it is ironic that culture is often celebrated as an escape – cultural resistance as the conservative Matthew Arnold understood and appreciated it.

Critics have also questioned the efficacy of cultural resistance within a consumer capitalist

economy that needs constant innovation to survive. Within this context, the drive to create an oppositional culture merely serves to create a new market for new products. As Frankfurt School critic Theodor Adorno snidely remarked about the jazz music fan as far back as 1938: “He pictures himself as the individualist who whistles at the world. But what he whistles is its melody” (2002 [1938]: 298). (Adorno did, however, maintain that the patently unpopular tonal music of Schoenberg held out resistant possibilities.)

Today, there is a renewed understanding – by activists, if not yet all academics – that cultural resistance is a necessary, but not sufficient, means of resistance. Using culture as a political tool is absolutely critical in a media saturated society linked by a global communications network. But in a world where the image of Che Guevara sells Swatch watches, cultural resistance, by itself, is not enough.

SEE ALSO: Adorno, Theodor W.; Birmingham School; Cultural Studies; Culture Jamming; Culture, Social Movements and; Gramsci, Antonio; Subculture

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cultural studies

Elizabeth Long

Cultural studies is an interdisciplinary field that explores the linkages between society, politics, identity (or the person), and the full range of what is called “culture,” from high culture and the popular arts or mass entertainment, to beliefs, discourses, and communicative practices. Cultural studies has drawn on different national traditions of inquiry into these connections – from the Frankfurt School’s studies of the mass culture industry, and of the psychological processes that undercut democracy in liberal and affluent societies, to French structuralist and poststructuralist critiques of ideology, constraining categorical frames, and a monadic and unified concept of the self. The branch of cultural studies that early drew the most attention from sociologists was that articulated by the Birmingham Centre for Contemporary Cultural Studies, perhaps in part because Birmingham scholars were inspired by some aspects of American sociology, especially the Chicago School tradition, which gave their work a recognizably social dimension.

Taking Birmingham as an example is instructive in pointing out some characteristics of cultural studies as a field. Conventionalized intellectual genealogies often begin with the work of Raymond Williams (1958, 1961), Richard Hoggart (1957), and E. P. Thompson (1963). All three challenged dominant traditions in the humanities in post war England. Hoggart and Williams argued first that literary or “high” culture is just one expression of culture, in the more anthropological sense – the broad range of meanings and interactions that make up social life. Second, they argued that cultural expressions could only be understood in a broader social context of “institutions, power relations, and history” (Seidman 1997). This led Williams (1961) to analyze, for example, the rise of the novel in modern England as part of the gradual evolution of a broad based reading culture, and to discuss the shifting meanings and (sometimes ideological) images that clustered around “city” and “country” as agriculture, industry, and urbanization changed the landscape of England

(Williams 1973). In *The Uses of Literacy*, Hoggart examined the changing culture of the working class through analysis of neighborhoods, pubs, and family interaction as well as popular music and literature in a book that combined personal reflection with historical sociology (Hoggart 1957). E. P. Thompson's *The Making of the English Working Class*, addressing similar problems of historical change in the early nineteenth century, showed that both Marxist conceptions of class and the discipline of history could be fruitfully broadened if culture – whether Methodism or the literary minded corresponding societies developed by skilled craftsmen – were taken into account in analyzing working class English politics (Thompson 1963).

This first generation of British cultural studies scholars were all “men of the left,” confronting the failures of communism, the idiosyncrasies of English working class politics, and the peculiarities of democratization under the sign of commercial culture. All were, in other words, *critical* analysts of what they liked to call “lived experience,” that very term indicating how thoroughly this version of cultural studies integrated cultural expressions with social life. They also were all seriously involved with alternative sites of mainly working class education, whether Workers' Education Association classes or University Extension courses (Goodwin & Wolff 1997), a commitment that led to the rather unusual institutionalization of cultural studies at Birmingham. And for all three, the scholarly moves they made were from the humanities and its traditional categories of analysis and evaluation into a more fully articulated sense of cultural and social reality.

When cultural studies became institutionalized under Hoggart as one subgroup of literary studies at the University of Birmingham in 1964 as the Centre for Contemporary Cultural Studies (CCCS), it retained some distinctive features from its prehistory. For example, staff and student groups cooperated in administering the center, and a Centre General Meeting of administrative and intellectual groups formulated policy. Most innovative, perhaps, were the self governing “subgroups” of researchers (often students) and teachers. Richard Johnson (1997) mentions that in 1974, for example,

there were groups on Art and Politics, Cultural History, Media, Subcultures, Women's Studies, Cultures of Work, and two Marxist Reading Groups. These groups produced most CCCS books and journals, and the “collective book” remained typical of Birmingham scholarship into the 1990s. So, too, did a relatively interdisciplinary and activist approach to scholarly careers, which may have contributed to the precarious institutionalization of cultural studies in Britain and its common location in academic sites that were themselves interdisciplinary.

As a younger generation of scholars moved to the fore in British cultural studies, they brought with them concerns from the student movement (Johnson 1997), and also training in sociology. Seidman, for example, mentions Stuart Hall, David Morley, Dorothy Hobson, Paul Willis, Phil Cohen, Dick Hebdige, Ian Chambers, and Angela McRobbie in this regard (Seidman 1997; Hall 1980b). They turned from the earlier thinkers' humanism to take up insights from sociological studies of deviance, subcultures, and popular culture, and at the same time turned towards strands of European Marxism – notably Althusser and Gramsci – as a corrective to what they characterized as the earlier generation's a theoretical “Englishness.”

Concerned about the new ways social domination operated in a post war world that was, at least for many in Europe, both relatively affluent and at peace, these scholars investigated the culture/society connection as a promising location for understanding this process. Post war shifts in the social organization of cultural and communications media also gave popular forms of culture immense social power. This was particularly true of cultural forms and technologies developing in and exported from the US, which was becoming a global force because of television, Coca Cola, and rock and roll – and later, MTV, the shopping mall, music videos, and theme parks – as well as more traditional forms of economic and military power. This shift also required new ways of thinking that linked culture, as it was linked in people's lives, more closely to society and politics, especially in relation to critical questions about democracy and equality.

Birmingham scholars often used a processual view of Gramsci's ideas about hegemony and

resistance in their analyses of popular cultural forms and usages. Subcultures became a particularly interesting object of study because members of subcultures formed collective and often countercultural identities around styles they fashioned from cultural commodities (Willis 1977; McRobbie, 1984). Birmingham appropriations of both Gramsci and Althusser also emphasized the contingent nature of ideological formations and their relative autonomy – from class determinism, in particular. This foregrounded history and human activity, which Birmingham scholars often discussed as “practice,” as well as opening up consideration of other forms and sites of domination, such as gender, race, or region (Bennett et al. 1986; Hall 1980a, 1991).

The problematic that informed scholars at Birmingham also influenced research arising from different national traditions. So in France, for example, structuralist semioticians like Roland Barthes (1972) drew on a long French preoccupation with language and linguistic culture to investigate how language like cultural forms encoded social domination in popular cultural “mythologies.” Somewhat later, post structuralist thinkers like Michel Foucault (1977, 1978, 1980) moved beyond purely linguistic discourses to understand how power and knowledge shape subjectivity, and Pierre Bourdieu (1977, 1984, 1991), drawing on both anthropology and sociology, considered the way culture, and legitimate culture in particular, influenced both social stratification and personal “dispositions.”

At roughly the same time in Germany, Jürgen Habermas drew on the Frankfurt tradition of critical social thought to examine the failure of formal politics to address new configurations of social domination. His influential response turned toward an analysis of the public sphere – conceived as a “realm” outside of the marketplace and the state, yet not reducible to private life. His formulation was itself profoundly cultural, first, because of its insistence that communication was an aspect of social reality irreducible to economic interests. Second, he discussed the evolution of the public sphere in Europe historically, locating different sites (e.g., the coffee house) and media (the newspaper) of communication that enabled conversation based on reasoned arguments about

fundamental social and political assumptions to take place. In his view, this was a necessary precondition for democracy. Although his conviction that both state and market were eroding the public sphere made Habermas pessimistic about the prospects for genuine democracy in the present, he argued nonetheless for a basic human capacity to engage in the rational discussion it would require (Habermas 1971, 1979, 1984–7, 1989).

Habermas’s work remains at a high level of abstraction, and has filtered into American scholarship mainly as the point of departure for more concrete – and often historical – examinations of “the public sphere” and for critical appraisals of the concept itself (Fraser 1989; Calhoun 1992a, 1992b; Schudson 1998). This kind of interdisciplinary, international borrowing is quite typical of cultural studies, and may partially explain why cultural studies scholarship has been more easily integrated into multidisciplinary fields, subfields, or programs than into more rigidly bounded disciplines. Similarly, the fact that several strands of cultural studies work (as was the case in Birmingham) originated as critical reformulations of the humanities, and have maintained a close connection to interpretive methodologies and to culture itself (however broadly defined), may explain why US cultural studies has been largely institutionalized in humanities rather than in the social sciences, with the exception of anthropology, some culturally inflected areas of sociology, and some aspects of political theory.

Nonetheless, broad questions about how contemporary culture relates to an emerging geopolitical order featuring new constellations of technology and capital and new configurations of collective organization – from regional religious fundamentalisms to transnational corporations and political unions – have continued to bring many scholars into the interdisciplinary arena of cultural studies. Since the academy is itself experiencing the same kind of dislocations, dispersals, and reconcentrations of power that scholars are attempting to understand in the environing social world, the enterprise of cultural studies has generated a broad array of such theoretical and empirical lines of inquiry. For example, urbanists have noted (like Hoggart in the 1950s) that the communities that provided

roots for ethnic or class solidarity have been dispersed by urban renewal, deindustrialization, and other developments effacing an older sense of place in contemporary cities. But more recently, gentrification, global hip hop culture, planned communities, and theme parks have begun to provide other material for thinking through the connections between "community" and identity. So critical geographers have turned to work by Jameson (1991), Lyotard (1984), and other postmodernists to understand how these new urban forms might structure people's experiences and possibilities for collective action (Harvey 1989; Zukin 1991, 1992; Gregory 1994). At the same time, changes in the social organization of sexuality and medical science have led other scholars to take up thinking by Foucault (1978) that examines how discursive formations linking textual knowledge, technical capabilities, and institutional developments have worked to structure contemporary sexual subjectivities and their emergence as socially recognized "identities" (see Butler 1993; Weston 1998; Sedgwick 2003; Seidman 2003; Eribon 2004).

Some of this reinvention involves the disappearance of traditional grounds for disciplinary activity. For example, high cultural texts no longer have the privileged place they enjoyed in early twentieth century public education. This has led critical literary scholars to become self-conscious about the historical roots of national literary studies and the sociopolitical dimension of canonization. In turn, this has engendered an examination of the institutions (literary criticism, the discipline of English, the Book of the Month Club) that work to define what we call literature and to assign criteria of literary value (Radway 1997), as well as a broad ranging analysis of popular cultural "texts" and their uses in the social world. Similarly, small scale low technology societies are either vanishing or negotiating their induction into global networks of technology, labor, and consumption. These geopolitical developments have led anthropologists to rethink the relationship between ethnographer and subject, to search at home as well as among traditional Others for ethnographic opportunities, and to recognize affinities between their signature methodology and that of tourists, state department officials, and world music entrepreneurs (Marcus 1999).

Yet, similar opportunities for cultural studies scholarship appear as new disciplinary formations emerge in response to social change. Social studies of science, for instance, have grown up in tandem with the enormous growth of "big science" in the recent past, and their critical take on science comes as much from public questions about an endeavor that has brought us nuclear weapons and environmental devastation along side space flight and the Salk vaccine, as from purely academic developments. Other new areas of investigation that are attracting cultural studies scholars include visual studies, cybercultures and communities (this has also spawned Internet based research methodologies), new technologies of embodiment and possibilities for identity construction, and globalization, which has affected the whole range of what are sometimes called the human sciences.

While this scholarship has spurred some significant departmental or program level institutionalization in American universities, it is most obviously present as a major paradigm in existing interdisciplinary programs, such as American studies, ethnic and women's studies, urban studies, and science and technology studies, and is an important intellectual force in publishers' offerings and conferences both in the Anglophone world and beyond. It is also what one scholar calls an "accent" in more entrenched academic fields, perhaps more welcome in traditionally interpretive disciplines or traditions of inquiry than in those underwritten by positivist epistemology. For this reason, much of sociology has seen cultural studies as a threat rather than an opportunity, yet one can clearly see openings toward cultural studies in cultural sociology, sociology of religion, gender/sexuality, and race/ethnicity, urban sociology, qualitative sociology, and some branches of social theory.

SEE ALSO: Birmingham School; Critical Theory/Frankfurt School; Cultural Studies, British; Culture; Gramsci, Antonio; Popular Culture

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cultural studies, British

John Storey

British cultural studies works with an inclusive definition of culture. That is, it is a “democratic” project in the sense that rather than study only what Matthew Arnold called “the best which has been thought and said” (*Culture and Anarchy*, 1867), British cultural studies is committed to examining *all* that has been thought and said. To put it simply, culture is how we live nature (including our own biology); it is the shared meanings we make and encounter in our everyday lives. Culture is not something essential, embodied in particular “texts” (that is, any commodity, object, or event that can be made to signify); it is the practices and processes of making meanings with and from the texts we encounter in our everyday lives. In this way, then, cultures are made from the production, circulation, and consumption of meanings.

Cultures, therefore, do not so much consist of, say, books, but are the shifting networks of signification in which, say, books are *made* to exist as meaningful objects. For example, if I pass a business card to someone in China, the polite way to do it is with two hands. If I pass it with one hand I may cause offense. This is clearly a matter of culture. However, the “culture” is not so much in the gesture, it is in the “meaning” of the gesture. In other words, there is nothing essentially polite about using two hands; using two hands has been made to signify politeness. Nevertheless, signification has become embodied in a material practice, which can, in turn, produce material.

This is not to reduce everything “upwards” to culture as a signifying system, but it is to insist that culture defined in this way should be

understood “as essentially involved in *all* forms of social activity” (Williams 1981: 13). While there is more to life than signifying systems, it is nevertheless the case that “it would . . . be wrong to suppose that we can ever usefully discuss a social system without including, as a central part of its practice, its signifying systems, on which, as a system, it fundamentally depends” (p. 207).

According to British cultural studies, then, to share a culture is to interpret the world – make it meaningful and experience it – in recognizably similar ways. So called “culture shock” happens when we encounter a radically different network of meanings; when our “natural” or “common sense” is confronted by someone else’s “natural” or “common sense.” However, cultures are never simply shifting networks of shared meanings. On the contrary, cultures are always both shared and contested networks of meanings. That is, culture is where we share and contest meanings of ourselves, of each other, and of the social worlds in which we live.

British cultural studies draws two conclusions from this way of thinking about culture. First, although the world exists in all its enabling and constraining materiality outside culture, it is only in culture that the world can be *made to mean*. In other words, culture constructs the realities it appears only to describe. Second, because different meanings can be ascribed to the same “text” (anything that can be made to signify), meaning making (i.e., the making of culture) is always a potential site of struggle and negotiation. The making of meaning is always entangled in what Volosinov (1973) would call the politics of “multi accentuality.” Rather than being inscribed with a single meaning, a “text” can be articulated with different “accents.” That is, it can be *made to mean* different things; in different contexts, with different effects of power. A text is not the issuing source of meaning, but a site where the articulation of meaning – variable meaning(s) – can be produced in specific contexts. We implicitly recognize this when ever we refer to, for example, a feminist reading, a Marxist reading, a queer reading, a postcolonial reading. In each instance, the intertextuality of the text is confronted by the intertextuality of the reader. In this way, then, the symbolic work of “production in use” is never a simple

repetition of the semiotic certainties of the lecture theater or the seminar room. For example, masculinity has real material conditions of existence, but there are different ways of representing masculinity in culture and different ways of being “masculine.” Therefore, although masculinity seems to be fixed by its biological conditions of existence, what it *means*, and the struggle over what it means, always takes place *in* culture. This is not simply an issue of semantic difference, a simple question of interpreting the world differently; it is about relations of culture and power; about who can claim the power and authority to define social reality; to *make the world (and the things in it) mean* in particular ways.

Meanings (i.e., cultures) have a “material” existence in that they help organize practice; they help establish norms of behavior. My examples of different masculinities and the passing of business cards in China are both instances of where signification organizes practice. Those with power often seek to regulate the impact of meanings on practice. In other words, dominant ways of making the world meaningful, produced by those with the power to make their meanings circulate in the world, can generate “hegemonic truths,” which may come to assume an authority over the ways in which we see, think, communicate, and act in the world: that is, become the “common sense” which organizes our actions (Gramsci 1971). Culture and power, therefore, are the primary object of study in British cultural studies.

SEE ALSO: Audiences; Birmingham School; Cultural Studies; Culture; Culture, Gender and; Hegemony and the Media; Popular Culture

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cultural tourism

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“Cultural tourism” could be defined as tourism that focuses on cultural attractions and activities as a primary motivating factor for travel. Notwithstanding the broad definitions of culture that abound within postmodern and populist writings, parameters need to be drawn around what is defined as “culture” in this context. It is therefore useful to break the concept of cultural tourism down into a number of subsets. As argued by Smith (2003: 29), “cultural tourism can no longer be considered as a special interest or niche sector, but instead as an umbrella term for a range of tourism typologies and diverse activities which have a cultural focus.”

Richards (2001: 7) suggests that cultural tourism covers the consumption not just of “the cultural products of the past,” but also of contemporary culture or the “way of life” of a people or region. Hughes (1996, 2000) differentiates between “universal,” “wide,” “narrow,” and “sectorized” cultural tourism. These definitions correspond broadly to perceiving culture as a whole way of life; to engaging with specific ethnic or indigenous groups; to experiencing the “artistic and intellectual” activities of a society; to visiting specific heritage attractions or arts venues. Cultural tourism encompasses heritage (both tangible and intangible), the arts (including festivals and events), and contemporary culture insofar as it relates to the lifestyles and traditions of a people or place. Cultural tourism is not simply about the passive consumption of heritage attractions or attendance of festivals, it can also involve a high degree of interaction with local people, as well as the pursuit of creative activities

(e.g., painting, photography, dance). Indeed, Richards and Raymond (2000) suggest that creative tourism is becoming a growth sector within cultural tourism.

As the demand for tourism increases, so apparently does the demand for cultural tourism, which appears to have grown exponentially in recent years. For example, McKercher and Cros (2002) estimate that as many as 240 million international journeys annually involve some element of cultural tourism. This may have something to do with broadening definitions of culture, as well as the apparent diversification of tourist interests (Sigala & Leslie 2005). The cultural tourist could be described as a tourist who is better educated than average (Richards 1996), and generally concerned with knowledge seeking and self improvement, thus the inner journey is likely to be as important as the outer journey. Cultural tourists actively seek difference and authentic and spontaneous (rather than “staged” or contrived) interaction with local people and places (Smith 2003). Tourism may often be described as “travel” whereby the cultural tourist elevates him/herself to the level of an adventurer or explorer. This is particularly the case in the context of indigenous and ethnic tourism. For this reason, cultural tourism has become increasingly politicized, and has sometimes been accused of being imperialistic, Eurocentric, or voyeuristic (Smith & Robinson 2006). However, cultural tourists are by no means homogeneous, neither in terms of motivations nor profiles. For example, McKercher and Cros (2002) differentiate between tourists for whom culture is a primary motivating factor (“purposeful”) and those who are “serendipitous” or “incidental.”

Cultural tourism can be subdivided into a number of typologies for the sake of greater definitional clarity, the facilitation of research, and product development.

HERITAGE TOURISM

Heritage tourism focuses on tangible artifacts from the past, including historical monuments, archaeological sites, religious sites, and museums. This includes World Heritage Sites,

of which there are now over 750 (including the Taj Mahal in India and the Pyramids in Egypt). Intangible heritage is also an important resource (e.g., the traditions, lifestyles, arts and crafts of local people). The interpretation and representation of heritage can be complex and contentious (e.g., concentration camps such as Auschwitz in Poland; Robben Island in post apartheid South Africa). Many heritage sites suffer from over visitation (e.g., Stonehenge in the UK; Ephesus in Turkey), therefore conservation and visitor management issues are of primary concern for this form of cultural tourism.

ARTS TOURISM

Arts tourism focuses on the visual arts (e.g., galleries) as well as performance (e.g., theaters, concerts) and other experiential forms of activity (e.g., festivals and events). There are some concerns that tourism can dilute or “trivialize” the arts. Many ethnic and indigenous art forms (e.g., Caribbean carnivals, Asian Mela festivals, Aboriginal arts and crafts, Andalusian flamenco dancing) are becoming more popular on a global scale, so care needs to be taken to ensure that they are not overcommodified.

CREATIVE TOURISM

Creative tourism involves tourists undertaking creative activities such as painting, pottery making, glass blowing, weaving, photography, and wood carving, either under the guidance of or independently of local people (e.g., with a tour operator). In many cases, creative tourism may be a subsidiary activity rather than a primary motivating factor, although growing numbers of tour operators are now offering special interest tours focused on creative activities (e.g., salsa holidays in Cuba, watercolor painting in Provence, cookery in Tuscany).

URBAN CULTURAL TOURISM

Urban cultural tourism focuses on city activities, which may include certain forms of heritage or arts tourism. Historic cities (e.g.,

Venice, Prague, Oxford) attract large numbers of international tourists. However, increasingly, cultural tourists are being drawn to deindustrialized cities that are being regenerated (e.g., Glasgow, Bilbao, Rotterdam). They may experience cultural mega events (e.g., expos) or visit “flagship” museums (e.g., the Guggenheim in Bilbao) or whole new cultural quarters or waterfronts (e.g., Barcelona, Cardiff).

RURAL CULTURAL TOURISM

Rural cultural tourism may incorporate aspects of indigenous or ethnic tourism, or creative activities. In some cases attractions have been purpose built to help develop tourism (e.g., ecomuseums in France and Scandinavia; historic centers in Ireland, Greece, and Spain). In others, former industrial sites such as coal mines have been regenerated and turned into attractions. For example, Blaenavon in Wales, Ironbridge in the English Midlands, and the Wieliczka salt mines in Poland have all been designated World Heritage Sites. Spinoffs from agro or farm tourism include gastronomic tourism, arts and crafts tourism, not to mention wine tourism (e.g., in the Douro Valley in Portugal; Stellenbosch in South Africa).

INDIGENOUS CULTURAL TOURISM

In this type of tourism, tourists visit indigenous peoples in their own habitat, although in many cases land has been taken from such peoples and they are forced to live in reservations (e.g., North American Indians) or to integrate into mainstream society (e.g., Australian Aborigines, Canadian Inuits). Tourists are generally interested in the lifestyles and traditions of indigenous groups, and may stay with families in their village (e.g., in Indonesian jungles or the Tunisian desert). Trekking and staying with tribal groups is popular in countries like Thailand or the countries of Central and South America. The environmental and sociocultural impacts can be significant, although cultural tourism can also help to raise the profile of indigenous groups and contribute to the renewal of traditions and cultural pride.

POPULAR CULTURAL TOURISM

This form of tourism focuses on some of the more “populist” forms of culture, such as attending sporting events or pop concerts, and visiting shopping malls and theme parks. It may also include visits to film or television locations or studios. In many regenerated former industrial cities, such attractions are proliferating and are often combined with more traditional forms of cultural tourism (e.g., art galleries, architectural features, museums).

The boundaries of cultural tourism are clearly being pushed further and further toward more global and contemporary forms of culture. Although a recognition of definitional and conceptual boundaries is important, the postmodern dedifferentiation of tourism, culture, leisure, and lifestyles can render this a somewhat elusive task.

SEE ALSO: Consumption, Tourism and; Culture; Culture Industries; Leisure; Leisure, Popular Culture and; Museums; Postmodern Culture; Urban Tourism

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culture

Lyn Spillman

Although the idea of culture seems common place and indispensable for thinking about human groups and human action, the term has resonated for more than a century with a variety of sometimes dissonant connotations (Kroeber & Kluckhohn 1963; Williams 1976; Smelser 1992). In vernacular usage, it may refer either to all the symbols, meanings, and values shared by members of a group, by contrast to other groups; or else to a specialized realm of expressive activities and artifacts contrasted with other institutional realms, like politics or the economy. Cultural sociologists now encompass both commonsense meanings of the term by treating as “culture” all socially located forms and processes of human *meaning making*, in specialized institutions, and whether or not they are confined to one clearly bounded group.

Cultural sociology is an area of social inquiry into meaning making, defined by its analytic perspective, rather than a particular empirical topic or institutional domain. Cultural sociologists investigate how meaning making happens, why meanings vary, how meanings influence human action, and the ways meaning making is important in generating solidarity and conflict. This analytic perspective applies to a wide range of substantive topics and social domains, contributing to the understanding of key sociological topics such as stratification, political institutions, social movements, and economic action, as well as to specialized domains of cultural production such as the arts, media, science, and religion. As a perspective, cultural sociology contrasts with sociological perspectives which focus on analyzing social structures regardless of the meanings attached to them, and with investigations which, although they might include information about norms, attitudes, and values, do not examine the contingent processes of their formation and change.

Sociological research on culture demonstrated significant intellectual and institutional growth as a well recognized area of inquiry only in the last decades of the twentieth century. As a result, cultural sociologists work with and weave together theoretical perspectives,

concepts, and methodologies drawn not only from classical sociology and its subsequent twentieth century developments, but also from a wide range of other disciplinary sources in anthropology and the humanities. Many significant contributions to the field, as well as its productive issues and tensions, derive their importance and their productivity from new syntheses of a variety of scholarly approaches (Friedland & Mohr 2004; Jacobs & Hanrahan 2005).

The sense in which “culture” refers to a clearly bounded group, by contrast to other groups, emerged in comparative reflection about differences among human populations which was prompted by European exploration and conquest across the globe (Stocking 1968). In this view, the entire way of life of a bounded group is thought to be embedded in, and expressed by, its “culture,” and evident in anything from weapons to religious myths. This idea of culture was central to the formation of cultural anthropology as a discipline (Kuper 1999). In the nineteenth century different cultures were often understood as hierarchically arranged according to western ideas of progress, but these evaluative connotations were pluralized and relativized in the course of the twentieth century, from the work of Boas through to the influence of postmodern and postcolonial theorists more recently. By the mid twentieth century, anthropological approaches had influenced common beliefs about culture, especially (1) that human societies cannot be explained simply by natural environment or human biology; (2) that cultural possibilities are innumerable; (3) that cultures are diverse; (4) that different elements within a culture are patterned and interconnected; and (5) that elements of culture must be understood by placing them in their context, rather than by treating them in isolation. It is indicative of the central importance of anthropology in the development of the idea of culture that sociological dictionaries, textbooks, and encyclopedias referred mostly to anthropology for their explanations of the term until the 1980s. Since then, sociological and anthropological approaches to culture have diverged, with anthropological research influenced more by postmodernism and postcolonial theory than research on culture in sociology. Anthropologists

who were particularly influential in the formation of cultural sociology are Clifford Geertz, especially for the strong rationale he provided for interpretive methods, and Mary Douglas and Victor Turner, for their Durkheimian analyses of cultural categories and of ritual, respectively. Questions canvassed in debates about culture in anthropology in the first half of the twentieth century – such as whether culture should be treated as patterned and emergent or as a collection of discrete traits, how to specify the relation between social structure and culture, how to understand persistence and change in cultural patterns, and how much analytic emphasis to place on “carriers” of culture, such as networks or cultural producers – have reappeared in contemporary sociological work on the topic (Singer 1968).

The sense in which “culture” refers to a specialized realm of expressive activities and artifacts also emerged in the nineteenth century, but it marked an increasingly strong contrast *within* western societies between expressive activities and other realms of social life (Williams 1976; Eagleton 2000). In the social differentiation and conflict of the transition to capitalism, industrialization, urbanization, revolution, and democracy, art and morality were thought to express higher human capacities and ideals than could be seen in economic and political life – though, for the same reasons, they could also be dismissed as unimportant for understanding the core dynamics of modern societies. The classification and evaluation of particular ideas and activities as “cultural” made the realm of culture a basis for critical judgment, as, for instance, for the Romantic writers of the nineteenth century or for critics of mass media in the mid twentieth century. This sense of “culture” became the core of scholarship in the humanities, as in the study of literature or art. It is in this sense that scholars have contrasted “high,” “popular,” “mass,” and “folk” culture, echoing in different ways the implication that culture should be a purer realm of human activity than the mundane realms of economic and political action, though the specific moral valuation attached to each term has often been the focus of extended scholarly debate. Within sociology the study of the arts

and mass culture developed a long tradition, but until recently was mostly considered peripheral to the discipline’s concern with the core dynamics of modern societies. More recently, theoretical approaches and methodologies drawn from the humanities, such as semiotics and narrative theory, have been important in the development of cultural sociology, enabling sociologists to conceptualize and analyze culture as an independent object of inquiry in new ways.

Influential classical social theorists – especially Marx, Durkheim, Weber, Simmel, and Mead – were writing at a time when the multiple senses in which culture might be understood were in flux. Against the background of issues generated by changes in European societies, culture did not become a central concept in sociological theory in the way it did in anthropology (Kroeber & Parsons 1958). Nevertheless, important ideas of each classical theorist seeded the study of culture in subsequent sociological investigation, and continue to do so (Alexander 1990). Marx’s linking of culture and power in the theory of ideology, and his critique of idealist theories, were refined and developed in the work of important twentieth century theorists such as Gramsci, Adorno, and Williams and the related work of the Frankfurt School and the Birmingham School. Weber’s historicist and hermeneutic emphases on understanding the implications of particular sets of ideas – such as those of the Protestant Reformation – as well as his theorization of cultural stratification by status, and of rationalization in modernity, added, for sociologists, an important theory of the historical significance of meaning making processes which remained in productive dialogue with Marx’s theory of ideology. Durkheim’s work on collective conscience, collective representations, cognitive categories, and ritual theorizes cultural processes as essential and constitutive social forces, though this work only had strong impact in sociology towards the end of the twentieth century. Like the other classical theorists, Simmel analyzed in depth the cultural impact of increasing complexity in modern societies, with special attention to issues of the changing nature of individuality and to increasing dominance of “objective” cultural products over autonomously generated “subjective”

culture. In contrast to these European theorists, the work of Mead, and more generally the American pragmatist tradition, influenced later work on culture by providing a basis for examining meaning making processes at the micro sociological level, in interaction and in subcultures (Long 1997).

Nevertheless, “culture” remained a residual category in sociology, and cultural sociologists now find precedents for their studies of collective meaning making under many different labels – for instance, in mid twentieth studies of the arts and of mass culture, in ethnographic studies of mostly deviant or powerless subcultures, in constructivist studies of social problems, and in the sociology of knowledge. Important studies of meaning making were also generated in the mid twentieth century by two major but opposing theoretical approaches: critical theories of ideology and structural functionalist theories of attitudes, values, and norms. However, the productivity of these theories for studies of culture ultimately ran aground on a theoretical impasse (Spillman 1995). Both generated important insights, but they took contradictory positions on the relative significance of domination and solidarity, or conflict and consensus. Both also tended to over generalize about culture, seeing it as a “reflection” of society, oversimplifying internal complexity, active cultural production, and the independent effects of meaning making processes themselves. These issues became the central focus for later sociological research on culture, which drew new theoretical energy from the work of theorists such as Foucault and Bourdieu on cultural power.

From the 1970s there were increasingly frequent calls for new sociological approaches to culture which avoided over generalized assumptions about consensus or ideology, which avoided both idealism and reductionism, and which did not confine themselves either to the study of subcultures or to the study of expressive artifacts like art. Cultural theorists working from a variety of different starting points (Geertz 1973; Bourdieu 1977; Hall 1978; Peterson 1979; Archer 1985; Swidler 1986; Wuthnow & Witten 1988; Alexander 1990) all rejected the contrasting alternatives which had previously shaped sociological approaches to culture, and introduced a variety

of conceptual innovations which generated more particular accounts of meaning making processes. These developments loosened old assumptions and shifted old debates, encouraging an unprecedented growth in sociological analyses of meaning making processes and the institutionalization of cultural sociology (Crane 1994; Smith 1998; Spillman 2002).

Three mid range reconceptualizations of “culture” then emerged in cultural sociology, although different approaches were often productively combined. First, drawing on the sociology of organizations, and on the sociology of knowledge, some scholars argued for a focus on specific contexts of cultural production, an examination of the ways particular meanings, values, and artifacts are generated in particular organizations, institutions, and networks, and how those social contexts influence emergent meanings (Peterson 1976; Crane 1992; Peterson & Anand 2004). This approach challenged over generalizations about cultural “reflection” of societies as wholes, drawing on theoretical resources from the sociology of knowledge and the sociology of organizations. Although many “production of culture” studies focused on specialized realms of mass media, the arts, and sciences, attention to particular institutional circumstances and constraints affecting meaning making processes is also crucial for the study of more diffuse cultural phenomena such as national identity, social movements, collective memory, or religion.

Another mid range approach to culture, influenced sometimes by pragmatism and sometimes by practice theory, focused attention on how interactions and social practices are themselves meaning making processes, and on the context dependent ways in which individuals and groups endow actions with meanings (Certeau 1984; Becker & McCall 1990; Fine & Sandstrom 1993; Swidler 2001; Eliasoph & Lichterman 2003). Like production of culture approaches, this focus on meaning making in action and interaction challenged overly general reflection models of the relation between culture and society; it also relaxed the assumption that meanings and values are entirely shared, coherent, or consistent for a given group or even an individual, providing a better understanding of diverse interpretations of common norms, values, and cognitive frames

and analyzing how individuals and groups draw fluidly on different elements in symbolic repertoires (“toolkits”) according to context. Culture, here, is a contingent and variable element of the ways action is framed. Applicable to understanding any sites of action and interaction, this approach has been applied to such diverse topics as corporate culture, the formation of racial and class identities, audience interpretations of mass media and artistic forms, and everyday engagement with politics.

Third, other sociologists, building on Durkheimian insights, have emphasized the importance of the deep formal structure of discourses for meaning making. Analyses of culture structures have built on two distinct traditions. First, discourse analysts have drawn on theories and concepts of textual structure derived from work in the humanities to analyze meaning making (Alexander 1989; Wuthnow 1992; Mohr 1994; Jacobs & Smith 1997; Franzosi 1998; Alexander 2004). They investigate the deep internal structure of discourses in terms of their categories, codes, genre, and narrative, showing how signifiers derive meaning from their relations in systems of signs. Such analyses of culture as structured discourse introduce to sociology a previously neglected set of influences in processes of meaning making, which provide a basis for constituting culture as a distinct object of inquiry that is analytically independent of, and sometimes causally efficacious for, both institutional and interactional dimensions of meaning making. Second, other cultural sociologists explore links between meaning making and social psychological processes of cognition, especially categorization (Schwartz 1981; DiMaggio 1997; Zerubavel 1997; Cerulo 2002). Analysts of cultural structures in sociology have investigated such topics as political discourse, media texts, and gender, but this approach may be adopted whenever the *underlying* cultural forms which are contingently mobilized in organized cultural production and informal interaction are of interest.

Understanding institutionalized cultural production, practices, and interaction, and “culture structures” as analytically distinct dimensions of meaning making, each worthy of investigation in its own right, has helped cultural sociology specify earlier vague and

overarching assumptions about culture, and the ways it might “reflect” social structures and generate social action. These specifications have also meant that culture is no longer considered to be the “whole way of life” of a clearly bounded group, nor confined to a domain of expressive artifacts and activities distinct from politics or economics. Thus, cultural sociologists investigate specific dimensions of meaning making, but in a wide range of empirical sites. Of course, while many investigations focus primarily on one dimension of meaning making – cultural production, culture in interaction, or culture as text – a full understanding of any particular topic involves all three levels, and many studies touch on all three with different degrees of emphasis. So, for instance, a study of the codes and categories structuring a political ideology may also extend to related processes of institutional production, and a study of variant audience interpretations of television will also include analysis of important features of the textual structure of programming.

At the same time, fundamental disagreements and debates have also emerged between cultural sociologists prioritizing one approach to culture over others. Those who emphasize institutionalized cultural production would view an overemphasis on textual structure as idealist, detached from the political and organizational dynamics of the social contexts in which texts are embedded. Production of culture perspectives also suggest that analyzing meaning in practices and interaction misses the central significance of organized institutional processes for the possibilities available for meaning making in complex societies. Against this, those committed to the “thick description” of meaning making in practice argue that the production of culture perspective elides meaning in favor of organizational dynamics. Practice theorists of various types also suggest that focusing on “culture structures” or cognitive categories underestimates the importance of the many, varied ways in which people interpret cultural codes in different contexts. In the third camp, analysts of “culture structures” argue, like practice theorists, that the production of culture perspective elides the more hermeneutic analysis of meaning making. Against practice theorists, though, they suggest that

focusing on variant contextual uses of meanings, values, and symbols in particular practices inevitably misses the larger cultural framework which constrains and enables particular instances of meaning making.

Such disagreements about emphasizing institutions, emphasizing practices, or emphasizing textual or cognitive structure are fundamental faultlines in cultural sociology, and constitute points of view for mutual critique of particular studies of culture. Tensions between “culture structure” theories (whether textual or cognitive) and “practice” theories are particularly evident in contemporary cultural sociology, but other lines of tension outlined above also continue to regenerate debate. However, such disagreements also generate productive research programs, and some of the richest contributions to contemporary understandings of culture carefully combine analysis of production, interaction, and formal structure while preserving the analytical distinctions between the different cultural dynamics.

Distinctions between the different cultural dynamics have also created new approaches to long lasting tensions in sociology – tensions between interpretation and explanation, between microsocial and macrosocial analysis, between structure and agency, and between an emphasis on consensus and solidarity, on the one hand, and on conflict, domination, and resistance, on the other. Cultural sociology has made significant recent contributions to understanding these issues and bridging these divides. Analyzing meaning making processes along the three dimensions outlined above has encouraged sociologists writing on a wide range of topics to combine interpretive and explanatory strategies; to link micro settings with macro processes in their research designs; to show how the limits and possibilities of meaning making mediate the obduracy of social structures with their intermittent possibilities of agentic change; and to open to investigation the ways solidarity and conflict are empirically mixed.

Important topics which have engaged the sustained attention of cultural sociologists include the construction and reconstruction of class, gender, race, national, ethnic, sexual, and other axes of social identity, distinction, and dispute; the role of meaning making

processes in generating and sustaining political engagement in social movements and in civil society; the discourses and issues generated in political, legal, religious, scientific, and professional institutions; collective memory and historical amnesia; mass media production, texts, and audiences; and artistic products, practices, and institutions (Spillman 2002; Friedland & Mohr 2004; Jacobs & Hanrahan 2005; Jacobs & Spillman 2005).

Important sets of empirical questions receiving increasing attention concern meaning making processes which operate at transnational or global levels (e.g., among immigrants or social movements); meaning making in economic action and industries; how newer communications technologies influence social identities and interactions; and the relation between embodiment, materiality, and the discourses which constitute the significance of that materiality.

Some emerging theoretical and methodological issues in the sociological analysis of culture may change the terms in which the relations between cultural production, practices, and structures are understood. One question receiving renewed attention is the historical impact of specialized arenas of cultural production – such as art, literature, and science – on broader political and economic change. Another issue is the relation between generic psychological and biological capacities for cognition and emotion, and their particular expressions in socially situated meaning making process. Third, theories of meaning making as performance are offering new ways of analyzing links between production, text, and action at both macro historical and micro situational levels. Fourth, there is renewed attention to the ways in which meanings and values have specific causal consequences for social action and for institutional change.

Pressing questions contemporary cultural sociologists are raising or revisiting thus include: What is the best way of combining analyses of culture structures and of practices? When do specialized cultural products and meaning making processes influence broader social change? How should the relation between generic cognitive and emotional processes and meaning making be understood? How does culture link structure and action in moments of

performative contingency? How can the causal impact of meaning making processes be specified while preserving the central importance of interpretation?

The idea of culture has long been both capacious and ambiguous, due to its complex historical origins and intellectual development, and cultural analysis was not generally considered central to sociological inquiry for much of the twentieth century. However, sociologists now think of culture as human processes of meaning making generating artifacts, categories, norms, values, practices, rituals, symbols, worldviews, ideas, ideologies, and discourses. They currently identify and analyze three different types of influence on meaning making: institutional production, interactional process, and textual structure, emphasizing each dimension to different degrees according to empirical topic and theoretical perspective, and often debating their relative importance. These analytic tools have helped avoid over generalization about cultural processes – for instance, about consensus or conflict, about idealism or materialism, about macro or micro levels of analysis, or about structure and agency. In turn, this has encouraged an efflorescence of sociological studies of culture on such topics as identity and difference, group boundaries, political institutions and practices, and the mass media and arts and their audiences. Cultural perspectives are also frequently integrated into research on such standard sociological issues as stratification, religion, immigration, and social movements. Since new empirical topics and theoretical issues in the sociological study of meaning making continue to emerge rapidly, the likelihood is that culture will become much more central to sociological analysis.

SEE ALSO: Adorno, Theodor W.; Art Worlds; Bourdieu, Pierre; Critical Theory/Frankfurt School; Cultural Capital; Cultural Critique; Cultural Studies; Cultural Studies, British; Culture: Conceptual Clarifications; Culture Industries; Culture, Production of; Discourse; Distinction; Emotion: Cultural Aspects; Foucault, Michel; Gramsci, Antonio; Hermeneutics; Ideology; Narrative; Norms; Parsons, Talcott; Practice; Pragmatism; Semiotics; Structuralism; Symbolic Classification; Values; Williams, Raymond

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culture: conceptual clarifications

Chris Jenks

Raymond Williams (1976) informs us that “culture is one of the two or three most complicated words in the English language,” which is a good place to begin. Despite the contemporary upsurge of interest in the idea – what Chaney (1994) refers to as the “cultural turn” in the humanities and social sciences – culture is a concept with a history. One compelling account is that the idea of culture emerged in the late eighteenth century and on into the nineteenth century as part of (and largely as a reaction to) the massive changes that were occurring in the structure and quality of social life – what we might also refer to as the advance of modernity. These changes at the social, political, and personal levels were both confusing and disorienting, and at least controversial. Such changes, through industrialization and technology, were unprecedented in human experience: they were wildly expansionist, and horizons were simply consumed; they were grossly productive, for good and ill; and they were both understood and legitimated through an ideology of progress. The social structure was politically volatile, being increasingly and visibly divisive. This was a situation brought about through the new forms of social ranking and hierarchy that accompanied the proliferating division of labor, being combined with the density and proximity of populations, through urbanization, and the improved system of communications. In one sense the overall aesthetic quality of life, compared with the previously

supposed rural idyll, was threatened by the machine like excesses of industrial society. There was an increasing gap between the creative and the productive, formulated for materialism by Marx as “alienation,” and for the Romantic idealist tradition by Carlyle as a loss of the folk purity of a past era. The machine was viewed as consuming the natural character of humankind, a call to be later echoed in the work of the Frankfurt School, Benjamin’s “Age of Mechanical Reproduction,” even Marcuse’s sense of one dimensionality, and finally the *cri de coeur* of Baudrillard’s evocation of postmodernism with its horror of simulacra. Whereas we began with “culture” mediating between humankind and Nature, it can now be seen to mediate between humankind and Machine. This provides us with several available “meanings” of culture.

Another account looks back to classical society. *Civilization*, deriving from the Latin *civis*, is a term descriptive of a state of belonging to a collectivity that embodied certain qualities, albeit self appointed, which distinguished it from the “mass” or more lowly state of being typified as that of the “barbarian.” Such was the ancient Greek and Roman sense of identification with nation and state.

In this context the idea of culture is not so much descriptive as metaphoric, and derives philologically from the agricultural or horticultural processes of cultivating the soil and bringing fauna and flora into being through growth. Whereas the former concept, “civilization,” is descriptive of a kind of stasis, a membership, a belonging, indeed a status once achieved not to be relinquished, the latter, “culture,” is resonant with other ideas of emergence and change, perhaps even transformation. Thus we move to ideas of socialization as “cultivating” the person, education as “cultivating” the mind, and colonialization as “cultivating” the natives. All of these uses of culture, as process, imply not just a transition but also a goal in the form of “culture” itself; it is here that hierarchical notions begin to emerge, such as the “cultured person” or “cultivated groups or individuals” and even the idea of a “high culture,” all of which reduce the metaphoricity of process and begin to coalesce with the original notion of a descriptive state of being not essentially unlike the formative idea of civilization itself.

Just as in many forms of discourse *culture* and *civilization* are used interchangeably, so in others *culture*, *society*, and *social structure* are conflated, though not necessarily confused. The idea of culture as a theory of social structure has given rise to the major division between “social” and “cultural” anthropologies, the former stressing universality and constraint and the latter emphasizing relativism and difference between societies. In contemporary cultural studies some would argue that the concept of social structure has been abandoned altogether and that culture has become the sole source of causal explanation.

Social theories that are based on a materialist interpretation of reality, such as the variety of Marxisms, see culture as essentially an ideological set of understandings that arise from the sometimes calculated but more often simply distorted representations of the basic set of power and economic relationships at the heart of the society. Here we would include such thinkers as Marx himself, but also Gramsci, Althusser, Lukács, Goldmann, Benjamin, Adorno, Horkheimer, and Williams. Of course, this group remains varied and subtle in their range of explanations, but all argue essentially for the primacy of the material world and thus produce culture as an epiphenomenon. Contrasting with this body of thought are the interpretive social theorists whose ideas derive more from the philosophies of Kant and Hegel. Within such an idealist tradition culture is realized far more as an autonomous and self-sustaining realm of social experience: a repertoire and a fund of symbolic forms that although related to their time are nevertheless both generative and self-reproducing in a way that escapes the constraints of materiality. Here culture is liberating rather than constraining; here creativity exceeds replication as a causal force. In the context of interpretive theory we would be addressing the sociologies of Weber, Simmel, Schütz, Geertz, and even Parsons.

Sociologists and anthropologists have come to account for the concept of culture in a variety of ways. In its most general and pervasive sense it directs us to a consideration of all that which is symbolic: the learned, ideational aspects of human society. In an early sense culture was precisely the collective noun used to define that realm of human being which

marked off its ontology from the sphere of the merely natural. To speak of the cultural was to reaffirm a philosophical commitment to the difference, particularity, and supposed plasticity that is “humankind.” Human beings inevitably transform their world into, and by way of, a series of symbolic representations. The symbolic then satisfies and absorbs the projections of human beings into objects and states of affairs that are different, and it also acts as a mediator between these two provinces. We no longer confront the natural as if we were continuous with it. We now meet with the natural and, indeed, experience it as preformed, through our vocabulary of symbols which are primarily linguistic but increasingly elaborate out into other forms like custom, convention, habit, and even artifact. The symbolic representations that constitute human knowing are, in their various groupings, classifications, and manifestations, the *cultural*. The very idea of culture therefore generates a concept which, at one level, provides a principle of unification for the peoples of the world, including those who once have and also those who continue to populate the world through time and across space. We can see here the origins of structuralism espoused primarily by Lévi Strauss, but then by Piaget, Chomsky, and others with great impact across a range of social and human sciences.

Culture, for early anthropology, was the common domain of the human; it distinguished our behavior from that of other creatures and it provided a conceptual break with the dominant explanatory resource of biological and, latterly, genetic determinism. From this happy state of egalitarian oneness through the aegis of culture – the very inspiration for cultural anthropology – the story takes a different turn and we move into accounts of diffusion, stratification, hierarchy, and relativism, still clinging to the unrevised central concept of culture. The dominant European linguistic convention equates “culture” largely with the idea of “civilization”: they are regarded as synonymous. Both ideas may be used interchangeably with integrity in opposition to notions of that which is vulgar, backward, ignorant, or retrogressive. Within the German intellectual tradition, a different and particular sense of culture emerged that was to assume a dominant place in our

everyday understandings. This was the romantic, elitist view, that culture specified the pinnacle of human achievement. Culture, in this sense, came to specify that which is remarkable in human creative achievement. Rather than encapsulating all human symbolic representation, German *Kultur* pointed us exclusively to levels of excellence in fine art, literature, music, and individual personal perfection. The main body, or in this formulation the residue of what we have previously meant as culture, was to be understood in terms of the concept of *Zivilisation*. This distinction, by no means fine, in many ways reflected the dichotomy provided by Kantian philosophy between the realms of “value” and “fact,” and was generative of two different ways of understanding and relating to the world. This divide also informs the distinction between philosophical idealism and materialism and informs discussions over cultural stratification. We might here note that such distinctions also gave rise to the belief that the human spirit (perhaps the *Geist* itself) came under successive threat with the advent and advance of modernity and the inexorable process of material development which, it was supposed, gave rise to an increasingly anonymous and amorphous urban mass society. The impersonal, yet negative, forces of standardization, industrialization, and technologies of mass production became the analytic target for the romantic neo-Marxist criticism of the Frankfurt School within their theories of aesthetics, mass communication, and mass society, and also in the early sociology of culture propounded by Norbert Elias with his ideas of the “civilizing process.”

Within the confines of British and American social theory the concept of culture has been understood in a far more pluralist sense and applied, until relatively recently, on a far more sparing basis. Although culture is a familiar term within our tradition and can be employed to summon up holistic appraisals of the ways of life of a people and their beliefs, rituals, and customs, it is not most common. We social scientists are rather more accustomed to mobilizing such batteries of understanding into “action sets.” That is, we tend to use more specific concepts like, for example, “value systems” (even “central value systems”), “patterns of belief,” “value orientations,” or more

critical notions like “ideologies.” Culture to British and American social theorists tends to have been most usefully applied as a concept of differentiation within a collectivity rather than a way of gathering. That is to say that the concept has become artfully employed in, for example, the sociology of knowledge that Karl Mannheim recommended, and also in the spectrum of perspectives on the sociology of deviance – ranging from Parsonian theory through to symbolic interactionism – in the manner of “subculture.” A subculture is the way of defining and honoring the particular specification and demarcation of special or different interests of a group of people within a larger collectivity. So just as classical sociology in the form of Tönnies or Durkheim, or indeed Comte, had recognized that the composition of the overall collective life emerged through the advance of the division of labor – by dint of the fragile integration through interdependence of a whole series of smaller, internally cohesive, social units – so also does modern social theory by articulating the specific mores of these minor groups, albeit often as “non normative” or even “deviant.” This dispersion of subcultures is at the base of what we might mean by a “pluralist” view of culture; it is modern and democratic and shies away from all of the excesses of a grand systems theory with all of its incumbent conservative tendencies and its implicit “oversocialized conception of man” (Wrong 1961). Such thinking succumbs, however, to the problem of order. Without a coherent, overall theory of culture (which still, in many senses, eludes us) it is hard to conceive of how consensus is maintained within a modern society. In response to precisely this problem, contemporary Marxism has generated the “dominant ideology thesis” which supposes that varieties of hegemonic strategies of mass media and political propaganda create a distorted illusion of shared concerns in the face of the real and contentious divisions that exist between classes, genders, ethnic groups, geographical regions, and age groups. Such a thesis is by no means universally accepted within the social sciences and in many ways the more recent explosion of interest in and dedication to the schizophrenic prognosis of postmodernisms (and even complexity theory) positively accelerates the centrifugal tendencies of the cultural particles.

We can summarize some of the above accounts of the genesis of our concept “culture” through a four fold typology. First, culture is a cerebral, or certainly a cognitive, category. Culture becomes intelligible as a general state of mind. It carries with it the idea of perfection, a goal or an aspiration of individual human achievement or emancipation. At one level this might be a reflection of a highly individualist philosophy and at another level an instance of a philosophical commitment to the particularity and difference, even the “chosenness” or superiority, of humankind. This links into themes of redemption in later writings, from Marx’s false consciousness to the melancholy science of the Frankfurt School. In origin we will see it mostly in the work of the Romantic literary and cultural criticism of William Coleridge and Thomas Carlyle and latterly Matthew Arnold.

Second, culture is a more embodied and collective category. Culture invokes a state of intellectual and/or moral development in society. This is a position linking culture with the idea of civilization and one that is informed by the evolutionary theories of Darwin and informative of that group of social theorists now known as the early evolutionists who pioneered anthropology, with their competitive views on “degeneration” and “progress,” and linking the endeavor with nineteenth century imperialism. This notion nevertheless takes the idea of culture into the province of the collective life, rather than the individual consciousness.

Third, culture is a descriptive and concrete category: culture viewed as the collective body of arts and intellectual work within any one society. This is very much an everyday language usage of the term culture and carries along with it senses of particularity, exclusivity, elitism, specialist knowledge, and training or socialization. It includes a firmly established notion of culture as the realm of the produced and sedimented symbolic, albeit the esoteric symbolism of a society.

Fourth, culture is a social category: culture regarded as the whole way of life of a people. This is the pluralist and potentially democratic sense of the concept that has come to be the zone of concern within sociology and anthropology and latterly, within a more localized sense, cultural studies.

SEE ALSO: Benjamin, Walter; Cultural Critique; Cultural Reproduction; Culture; Gramsci, Antonio; Williams, Raymond

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culture, economy and

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In traditional academic discourse, culture and economy have long been regarded as separate

analytical spheres: on the one hand, the realm of shared cognitions, norms, and symbols, studied by anthropologists; on the other hand, the realm of self interest, where economists reign supreme. Though the two disciplines overlap occasionally (in economic anthropology mainly), radical differences in the conceptual and methodological routes each field followed during the twentieth century have prevented any sort of meaningful exchange.

By contrast, the interaction between culture and the economy has always been a central component of sociological analysis. All the founding fathers of sociology were, one way or another, interested in the relationship between people's economic conditions and their moral universe. In his famous presentation in the *Preface to a Contribution to the Critique of Political Economy*, for instance, Marx described "forms of social consciousness" essentially as an epiphenomenon of material relations. Later interpretations, however, have suggested that even for Marx and Engels the relationships between "material base" and "superstructure" were far from deterministic. The "western" Marxist traditions that developed in Europe after World War I proposed a somewhat more sophisticated analysis that emphasized the integration of culture into the apparatus of domination – either because the hegemony exerted by bourgeois culture induces the masses into implicitly consenting to their own economic oppression (Gramsci 1971), or because the incorporation of culture into the commercial nexus of capitalism leads to uniformity of spirit and behavior and the absence of critical thinking (Adorno & Horkheimer 2002). Still, in these formulations culture remains wedded to its material origins in capitalist relations of production.

Partly reacting against what they perceived to be a one sided understanding of the relationships between base and superstructure in Marxist writings, Weber and Durkheim both sought to demonstrate the greater autonomy of the cultural realm, albeit in quite different ways. Both insisted that people's behavior is always infused with a meaning that is not reducible to their material positions. Weber (2002), more than anyone else, demonstrated the influence of preexisting ideas and, in particular, religious worldviews on the economic conduct of individuals. For instance, even though their

actions may look rational from the outside, the behavior of early Protestant capitalists was quite illogical from the inside: anxiety about salvation, rather than self interest, motivated them to accumulate. In other words, their search for profit was not based on instrumental rationality, but it made psychological sense given the religious (cultural) universe in which they lived. In fact, Weber considered that all religions condition individual attitudes toward the world and therefore influence involvement in practical affairs – but, of course, they all do it differently, so that the “economic ethics” of individuals varies substantially across social contexts.

It is Durkheim, however, who best articulated the *collective* basis of our meaning making orientation: groups of individuals share certain understandings that they come to take for granted in their routine dealings with each other. Hence how people behave, including in economic settings, is not a priori reducible to a set of predetermined individual preferences and the interests they support. Rather, most of people’s actions are motivated by habit and routine; and preferences, as well as the institutions they support, are informed by cultural norms (Meyer & Rowan 1977). In each society, then, culture and institutions act in tandem to shape individual consciousness and thereby representations of what is understood to be “rational.” This is what DiMaggio (1994) calls the “constitutive effect” of culture. Because these mental maps are widely shared, they have much greater efficacy than others that would be out of place, or misunderstood, in the same context.

CULTURAL SHAPING OF ECONOMIC INSTITUTIONS

As a system of representations that exists separately and independently of individuals, culture may shape economic behavior in many different ways. It may be more or less institutionalized. Corporate cultures, for instance, are often highly formalized, even bureaucratized, but the rules that underlie bazaar interactions, though obviously codified, remain very informal (Geertz 2001). Second, the effect of culture may be more or less profound. Meyer and

Rowan (1977), for instance, have famously suggested that many organizational rules are adopted in a purely ceremonial way, but have little impact on actual practice – a claim that has been notably supported by research on educational institutions and hospitals. On the other hand, substantial evidence has come out of cross national studies of a deep patterning not only of economic values and norms (Hofstede 1980), but also of economic institutions and organizations (Dore 1973; Hamilton & Woolsey Biggart 1989). The critical question, then, is whether the two are related, and how.

One possible answer has been provided by Dobbin’s (1994) suggestion of the existence of an elective affinity between economic and political culture (see also Beckert 2004). In his comparative analysis of the development of the railway sector in the nineteenth century, Dobbin shows that public officials in three countries sought to achieve economic growth in very different ways, and were influenced in doing so by their cultural perceptions about the nature and sources of the political order in their own nation. In the US, they strove primarily to protect community self determination; in France they oriented themselves towards centralized planning by the state in an effort to avoid logistical chaos; and in the UK they were mainly concerned with protecting the individual sovereignty of firms. Ultimately, then, the economy of each country ended up “reflecting” the polity it originated from.

Some sociologists, however, would argue that there is no such inherent consistency to national cultures. Biernacki (1995), for instance, finds that the process of their formation is eminently fragile, almost serendipitous. In his comparative study of textile mills at the onset of the industrialization process, he finds that the concept of labor had a substantially different meaning in Britain and Germany, but that these differences originated in on the ground practices by workers and employers rather than in some preexisting mental categories. These practical conceptions, derived from the material context of industrialization in each country, tended then to crystallize into full fledged meaning making systems, which became eventually codified in writing by political economists and other intellectuals. Through this process

they acquired a great cultural depth, and ended up shaping a whole set of outcomes in the development pathways of the two countries, such as the wage calculation system, disciplinary techniques within factories, forms of workers' collective action, and even industrial architecture. Yet, even then, the systems remained vulnerable to a change in practices (which eventually took place in the early twentieth century).

EMERGENCE OF CULTURE WITHIN THE ECONOMY

Biernacki's study illustrates particularly well the fact that we should think about the role of culture primarily through its inscription in *practices*. Economic settings, therefore, do not simply display, or reflect, preexisting cultural understandings, but should be regarded as places where distinctive local cultures are formed and carried out. There are two main ways in which this point has been articulated in the sociological literature. The first emphasizes the social meanings people produce (whether voluntarily or involuntarily) through their use of economic settings and economic objects, and is best illustrated by consumption studies. The second suggests that some form of social order (i.e., regulating norms and practices) emerges out of the interpersonal interactions that take place within economic settings, particularly formal organizations and markets.

The first set of questions goes back to Veblen's (1994) and Simmel's analyses of consumption, and was most noticeably extended by Bourdieu (1984). The fundamental idea here is that consumption is not about individual parameters (preferences, income), but is profoundly *relational*. Consumption practices are the site of a competitive struggle whereby individuals seek to position themselves vis à vis other individuals in the social space. For Veblen (1994), it is essentially about vertical hierarchy – leisurely elites seek to demarcate themselves from those below them by wasting money and time on perfectly useless purchases and activities. For Bourdieu, the structure of the social "space" is more complex: education and socialization into high culture (or not) play as much a part as money in determining taste, and beyond,

consumption practices. What structures consumption practices (as all forms of action), then, is what Bourdieu calls *habitus* – a system of dispositions that is formed through the individual's trajectory in the social space (understood, again, in a relational manner vis à vis other individuals).

The study of consumption practices thus provides an extraordinarily rich terrain for analyzing how people relate to one another, both structurally and cognitively. In a creative variation on this theme, Zelizer (1985, 1994) has shown that these relational meanings are not only expressed through *what* people purchase, but often in *how* they pay for it – cash, gift certificates, checks, food stamps. People, in fact, constantly personalize, differentiate, and earmark money in ways that can be understood as metaphors about social relations and identity. (Whether the *how*, like the *what*, is also subject to the logic of habitus, remains to be studied systematically.)

The second question – the cultural universe produced within and by economic institutions – has also given rise to a diverse and extremely rich literature. We may illustrate this point with three examples: anti-trust law, financial markets, and the McDonald's corporation. Fligstein (1992), most prominently, has studied the way in which the legal environment shapes the formation of distinctive economic cultures. Corporate managers, he argues, act on the basis of "conceptions of control" – shared understandings about how a particular market works. These conceptions evolve in close connection with changes in the legal regulation of corporate competition, which tip the balance of power toward management groups with certain organizational cultures at the expense of others. In the course of the twentieth century, for instance, the American corporation was a contested and historically evolving cultural terrain, where conceptions of control shifted from production to sales and marketing, and finally finance and shareholder value. In this case, organizational culture fundamentally emerges out of a combination of institutional forces and power struggles.

Of course, such tacit understandings and patterned practices may emerge in a more decentralized way, out of interpersonal interactions in corporations, factories, workshops, and

markets, including the most “rational” ones. Sociologists, for instance, have revealed the existence of all kinds of rituals, beliefs, customs, and informal control structures that regulate social life in the financial markets – the very heart, supposedly, of instrumental action. In fact, the economic potential of culture has not been lost on corporations, many of which try actively to “engineer” predictable behaviors and commitments on the part of their employees through the use of quasi religious rituals and the enforcement of strict codes regulating social interactions.

The organizational innovations introduced by the McDonald’s corporation are probably among the most potent examples of the cultural effects of corporate logics. As Ritzer (2004) has shown, they had a dramatic effect on human experience and social organization well beyond the boundaries of the firm of origin, helping spread the values and practices of efficiency, calculability, predictability, and control to various organizations and social institutions (education, medicine, and the criminal justice system), both in the US and abroad. The sheer success of this model is thus a precious reminder that instrumental rationality – as Weber worried – is also a very powerful “culture” in and of itself.

THE ECONOMY AS THE CULTURE OF MODERNITY?

The example of McDonald’s suggests a broader point, then: the constitution of economic categories themselves is through and through a social process. Consequently, what gets incorporated (or not) into the sphere of the marketplace reveals much about how we understand ourselves, about our “culture.” As Polanyi (2001) argued long ago, the hallmark of post eighteenth century modernity was the emergence of a distinctive social order dominated by market relations. Following nineteenth century critics (among them Marx, Weber, and Simmel), Polanyi articulated the dehumanizing effect of modern capitalism and calculative rationality on personality and human relations, whereby individuals come to be seen as commodities and means to an end rather than as ends in themselves.

Empirically, however, there is quite a bit of debate about whether such effects really exist: recent economic experiments in small scale societies, for instance, have suggested that market integration is *positively* correlated with human cooperation (Henrich et al. 2004), thereby vindicating earlier commentaries about the civilizing (Hirschman 1977) and socially integrating effects of commerce. It is also unclear whether the penetration of markets has been as universal and far reaching as some skeptics believe. Modernity certainly does not mean that everything has been engulfed into the sphere of the marketplace; for instance, the study of the conditions under which boundary “objects” such as children, death, organs, or art are subject to economic exchange has revealed a quite varied landscape. Hence, as sources of economic benefit, children were *removed* from labor markets around the turn of the twentieth century in the US (and countries that continue to authorize such practices today face grave political and economic pressures). On the other hand, as sources of emotional and social benefit, they were *commodified* in ways that were not foreseen in the nineteenth century, mainly through the adoption, insurance, and consumption markets (Zelizer 1985).

The intellectual challenge, then, is twofold: to specify the distinctive nature of the moral order capitalism relies upon, and to understand how it is produced. Perhaps this challenge is nowhere as obvious as in the current emergence of a new vocabulary that seeks to overcome the conceptual divide between culture and economy, and focuses instead on the always inextricably moral dimensions of economic discourses and practices (Amin & Thrift 2004). Particularly noticeable is the work on logics of moral justification, which identifies the recent appearance of the discursive figure of “connectivity” as a new regime of justification conceived in and for the post industrial capitalist economy (Boltanski & Chiapello 2005). Dezalay and Garth (2002) explore another exciting avenue in their analysis of the mutually reinforcing, profoundly entangled discourses of economic and political individualism (e.g., human rights and the market) and their worldwide diffusion under US hegemony. Finally, Callon (1998) and others have investigated

the *performative* nature of the knowledge forms that sustain the development of capitalism, mainly economics and accounting. They have shown that through their language, techniques, and representations, these disciplines produce a world of “calculative agencies” and create a host of new institutions in which these agencies may exercise their calculative power – thereby formatting, little by little, our cultural selves onto the model fiction of *homo economicus*. This outburst of work seems to signal that sociology is finally ready for a new form of engagement with economics that will demystify it as a cultural form, as the discursive rationalization and active formatting, by capitalism, of itself and for itself – not merely the science of how the economy “works.”

SEE ALSO: Civilization and Economy; Culture; Economy (Sociological Approach); Moral Economy

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culture, gender and

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The reproduction of our society's sex gender system has been a continuing puzzle for sociologists of gender. The history of western writings on gender has long included ruminations

on the role of culture in constituting gender difference and privilege (Wollstonecraft 1978; Mill 2003; and especially de Beauvoir 1993). Yet during the last 40 years of the sociology of gender, material characteristics – in particular, women’s position as paid and unpaid laborers – have received more attention than cultural factors (Hartmann 1980; Blum 1991). These findings have revealed large differences in the paid and unpaid work lives of men and women in our society, and they have led to a number of political reform movements and initiatives – Title IX, the comparable worth movement, lawsuits demanding equal pay for equal work – that have resulted in somewhat more equality in the workplace.

There seem to be limits to these efforts toward workplace equality between the genders, both at the highest levels, where the prototypical “glass ceiling” seems to prevent women from achieving the same levels of leadership afforded to men, and at the lower levels, where women continually seem to function as a “reserve” labor force, dropping in and out of full time paid labor according to the demands of their families (Callaghan & Hartmann 1991). Even a cursory examination of the beliefs and plans of current American college student women indicates that they expect to spend varying degrees of time out of the paid labor force caring for their children (Douglas 2004), a plan which demonstrably contributes to their continuing inequality in the workplace. Hays (1996) documents that a large portion of so called “stay at home moms” actually plan to head back into the labor force as soon as they are able.

These limits have led to a cultural turn of sorts in the field of the sociology of gender. Second wave feminism, influenced by Marxist materialist theory, has challenged the necessity and desirability of gendered social arrangements in both family and workplace. Despite the social movements the second wave has inspired, which have challenged these arrangements, and despite the fact that there is some evidence that they may be slowly changing, their overall persistence is indisputable and is one of the paradoxes of modern social science. In fact, some argue that there is a backlash against feminism which is stronger and more persistent than was second wave feminism

itself. Sociologists of gender, long rooted in a materialist tradition that privileged phenomena related to occupational statuses and earning levels, have turned to culture to explain the persistence of gendered social arrangements in family and workplace.

This turn to culture is partly a result of the influence of new intellectual currents more generally in the social sciences. Poststructuralism, identified with the works of Derrida, Foucault, Lacan, and others, led many in the social sciences and humanities to reflect deeply on the impact of discourse and categories of thought on our analyses of social life. Feminism has been integrally engaged with poststructuralism at a theoretical level. As Barrett describes it:

Feminist theory has been able to take up a number of issues outside the classically “materialist” perspective . . . Poststructuralist theories, notably Derridian deconstructive readings, Lacanian psychoanalysis, and Foucault’s emphasis on the material body and the discourses of power have proved very important in this. Feminists have appropriated these theories rather than others for good reasons: these theories address the issues of sexuality, subjectivity and textuality that feminists have put at the top of the agenda. (Cited in Brooks 1997: 6)

Postmodernism has extended the critiques of poststructuralism to challenge some of our most fundamental notions, such as the individual self, linear time, and the concept of space. Feminism’s engagement with postmodernism has also been fundamental and complex. As Brooks notes, “the relationship between feminism, poststructuralism, and postmodernism has been both dynamic and productive for feminism and social theory more generally” (p. 6). Some note the conceptual equivalence between postmodern feminism and postfeminism (McLennan, cited in Brooks 1997: 6). While sociologists have often been slowest among social scientists in acknowledging the importance and influence of both the poststructuralist and postmodernist intellectual movements, it is often through the impact of feminist and cultural sociology, both of which are fundamentally interdisciplinary, that these traditions have entered the field and been accorded full consideration.

In light of these observations, what can the variable of culture offer to the study of gender

in sociology? First, like the term gender, the term culture carries with it a long, interdisciplinary, multi-perspectival heritage that transcends the limits of the field of sociology. In the discipline of anthropology the concept of culture has long been an organizing term that structures discussion of the object, as well as more recently the “medium,” of analysis for the field (Ortner 1999). In this sense, culture is very broadly conceived in Tylor’s famous definition as a “way of life” (Williams 1981) to be looked at through a series of academic practices that themselves constitute another way of life (Geertz 1973; Clifford 1986). Analysis in the field of anthropology has become extremely self-reflexive, while retaining its core interest in the analysis of culture generally as an object of study.

SOCIOLOGY OF GENDER AND THE CULTURAL TURN

Where the sociology of culture has been important in gender studies has been in its attempt to define the use of the concept of culture in sociology. Various and competing definitions have been proffered. Some of these display an affinity with anthropological definitions of culture, descending from Tylor (1958), wherein culture is defined as a set of practices and beliefs that characterize particular societies, subgroups, and groups of societies. Other definitions focus more on the analysis of cultural products, their production, meanings, and uses. Sociologists tend to move back and forth quite easily between these different senses of the term culture and so there is no easy way to characterize the sociological consensus on its use, even as the subfield of the sociology of culture has continued to develop and grow.

Sociology as a discipline began in the US by employing a culturalist definition of culture, adapted from the Tylorian definition of culture as a “complex whole” produced by people’s historical experience, including knowledge, belief, art, morals, law, and custom. This concept was challenged by Radcliffe Brown (1958) and his followers, who proposed in contrast a “structuralist” theory asserting the primary importance of social structure in determining the important facets of social life. After an

initial series of debates, American anthropology became primarily a culturalist discipline in which the Tylorian definition of culture has been prominent. Nevertheless in American sociology the notion that structural issues are of primary importance has of course been prominent. However, of late we have witnessed a cultural turn throughout the social sciences which has affected many of the primary subfields of sociology, including the sociology of gender. This has meant that the importance of culture has been widely recognized throughout the discipline.

Nowhere has this been more primary than with the rise of the sociology of culture, which has now risen to be one of the most popular affiliations elected by members of the ASA. In this group the definition of culture includes both those who use the term in its more amorphous, Tylorian sense to mean patterns of life and ways of living, and those who define the study of culture as focused on the artifacts of recorded culture such as books, media, music, museums, photographs, etc. At the same time, the concept of culture has gained relevance in many other areas of the discipline, including the sociology of gender. This can be seen in recent works by Adams et al. (2005), in addition to areas outside the field of sociology altogether, like the rapidly expanding interdisciplinary field of cultural studies (Grossberg et al. 1992).

When cultural categories are applied to thoughts about gender the concept of culture offers a way to conceptualize those dimensions of our gendered beliefs and practices that can not be reduced to social structural or biological features alone. With regard to the paradox of gender difference, culture has proved to be an important variable. Sociologists have turned to culture to explain a variety of findings about gender that persist even as consciousness about structural discrimination and inequality has been raised and discussed. Indeed, there appears to be a core aspect of gender which is culturally, rather than biologically or structurally, determined.

The issue of mothering serves as a key example of this explanatory dynamic wherein the concepts of gender and culture intertwine. While biological explanations account for the fact that women give birth, sociologists of

gender realized early on in the discipline that recourse to the mothering “instinct” was inadequate as an explanation of why women performed so much more of the labor involved in mothering than did fathers or male caretakers (Hartmann 1980; Rich 1986). Yet an initial turn by gender sociologists to labor market explanations left gaps as well: gender sociologists became adept at explaining what labors women performed in the paid labor force, ways they were inadequately compensated for this work, and how women performed the vast majority of unpaid labor in the home – mothering included. But such discussions fell far short of offering adequate explanations for how this state of affairs came about. That women perform unpaid labor does not explain how this situation came about, nor why it persists. It is to this explanatory level that cultural explanations of mothering are directed. They fall into different categories, depending on the approach to culture which is used.

“Women mother” begins one paradigmatic feminist work on mothering (Chodorow 1978). This book posed the question of why it is that women do the work of mothering virtually universally across cultures and throughout history. This question has been answered in many different ways by those who analyze the intersection of gender and culture in the institution of motherhood. Psychoanalysis has long provided a key set of terms used in cultural analysis, although of course psychoanalytic theory employs only one particular set of cultural tools. These focus on the penetration of culture into the reproduction of our personality processes. Chodorow draws on psychoanalytic categories as they are structured by our cultural arrangements. She argues that a nuclear family, in which it is almost exclusively women who do the work of mothering, reproduces the capacity to mother in daughters, but not in sons, who are treated more distantly because of their anatomical difference from the mother. The psychoanalytic theory Chodorow uses is itself dependent on a series of cultural arrangements and conditions for the truth of its insights. While her basic insights revolve around the psychoanalytic preoccupation with the reproduction of psychological relationships between people in the family, these relationships themselves are embedded in a series of culturally

determined patterns which structure the family and its interpersonal matrix.

Other gender sociologists have drawn from psychoanalysis as well to explain phenomena as disparate as gender identity in the military (Williams 1989), women’s relationships to their bodies (Martin 1987), and our culture’s patriarchal thrust more generally (Dinnerstein 1976). Newer works by Chodorow (1999) summarize the importance of psychoanalytic theory for gender and other areas of sociology.

While Chodorow and others turn to psychoanalytic categories, other sociologists turn to more explicitly historical and ideological – but equally cultural – reasons why women perform the role of mothering. Those examining American society often cite the role of American cultural traditions (Hays 1996) or American mass media culture (Douglas 2004) in maintaining and reproducing the “custom” of female labor in the family and home. These cultural explanations have been important because they fill in where other types of explanations fall short of explaining the persistence and ubiquity of gender inequality.

Cultural explanations account for not only why women consent to perform unpaid labor in the family, but also explain why women resist other types of explanations, and criticisms of their actions – such as those offered by the women’s movement or feminist academics, which label this extra labor as oppressive or exploitative. Women’s own explanations for their lives often reject such accounts, substituting instead the idea that they perform family labors out of love and devotion. Larger cultural factors like their belief in religious ideas about women’s familial role, or their adherence to certain secular notions about the importance of traditional family values, can be invoked to help make sense of why women consent to a gendered division of labor that analysts find oppressive.

Hays (1996) and Douglas (2004) interrogate the history and development of current cultural ideas and policies about motherhood in our society, each in turn exposing the different ways these ideas and policies disadvantage women as a social and cultural group. Douglas relies in part for her evidence of the development and reproduction of social attitudes on a variety of popular media like film and television

that indicate how our society makes, and has historically made, contradictory demands on mothers. For example, the vast majority of mothers work, and for an increasing number of hours, yet particularly over the last 10 years the growth of the ideology of “intensive mothering” has demanded that an increasing number of hours be devoted to the tasks of childrearing. Many pages of popular culture lore are devoted to increasing guilt among those mothers who work for their inability to meet the demands of this mothering “speed up.” Her book is a prime example of works which combine cultural analysis with other types of analysis and evidence. Together, these forms of analysis enable one to develop a critical perspective on an aspect of social activity in which women’s work plays the major role. It is an extremely politically informed commentary on many aspects of our “culture of motherhood” in the contemporary US. Douglas supplements her cultural history with a running account of all the policy decisions affecting mothers that have been made by the US government over the last four decades – what she has dubbed the backlash era against feminism. Douglas’s work stands as an interesting methodological example among books discussing the gendered aspects of our culture in that it addresses not only gender and culture, but the political issues and related policy debates that highlight their importance for our everyday lives.

Hays (1996) is similarly cultural in her level of explanation, yet is both more specific and even more historically framed. Hays interrogates our widespread cultural assumption that what she calls intensive mothering is necessary or even beneficial for children. Marshaling historical evidence, Hays examines the historical growth of this assumption and analyzes its relationship to our society’s varying use of women as a reserve labor force, as women are pulled in to work when needed and pushed out with cries of child neglect when they are not. The argument is cultural throughout in that it challenges those who assert that women’s biology accounts for their desire to mother according to the intensive style she describes. The cultural evidence Hays uses, then, is both historical and socioeconomic in nature.

Yet another cultural take on the study of mothering focuses on the representation of mothering as a gendered practice in a series of cultural artifacts like film, television, books, newspapers, etc. There has been much work on the intersection of gender and culture focused on the topic of mothering from this perspective. Kaplan (1992), for example, focuses on the representation of mothers in popular Hollywood film, identifying several prototypes typical of Hollywood’s images and classifying a plethora of Hollywood works according to these prototypes. Many others have commented on various aspects of motherhood’s filmic representation and its potential impact on women viewers, and on our cultural ideas about mothering generally (Geraghty 1991).

Press (1991) and Press and Cole (1999) and others discuss some aspects of the representation of mothering in television, and its impact on the viewers they researched. Press (1991) focuses generally on analyzing the representation of women and families in prime time television, and in particular discusses women’s reactions to and interpretations of these representations. Many women interviewed for the study mentioned their reactions to the mothers and families depicted in the television they had watched. Some even described their own mothering styles, current or planned, in relation to these images. Press and Cole (1999) again discuss issues surrounding motherhood with women, this time in the context of broader dialogues on and off television about abortion. Discussion took place in groups and preceded or followed viewing of various prime time television treatments of the issue. While mothering itself was not the actual focus of the discussions, the topic was central to the abortion opinions expressed by many of the women in the study.

Many works (e.g., Walters 2001) discuss multiple types of cultural artifacts more directly, including films, entertainment, television, books, and news media, all from the perspective of how motherhood is represented in different ways and with what impact on society. These works all support the importance of cultural representations of gender in contributing to the reproduction of our gendered system and the inequalities inherent in it.

CONCLUSION

This brief discussion illustrates that the study of gender is intertwined with cultural concepts and factors. The definition of culture itself is difficult to pin down, and ranges from an amorphous notion encompassing many aspects of social existence, to one more specifically based on cultural artifacts and products. The sociology of gender cannot be imagined without a strong notion of the importance of culture and the ubiquity of cultural factors.

As the interdisciplinary study of gender has developed in a distinctive way, it has in turn influenced the sociology of gender to move in a more cultural direction. The recent influx of studies focusing on the gendered aspects of culture is a good example of the impact this has had on the sociology of gender. Press (2000) details three axes for recent work in the field of communication focusing on gender issues: technology, the body, and the public sphere. All of these topics have been taken up in recent work on the sociology of gender. The increasing tendency of the field to assimilate influences from interdisciplinary studies which have transformed the very nature of the field itself is good evidence that the cultural bent in gendered sociology is here to stay.

SEE ALSO: Culture; Doing Gender; Gender Ideology and Gender Role Ideology; Hegemonic Masculinity; Psychoanalytic Feminism

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culture industries

Nicholas Garnham

Culture industries is a term which performs both a descriptive and conceptual function. It also has a history. Since the term was coined by Horkheimer and Adorno in their 1947 essay "The Culture Industry: Enlightenment as

Mass Deception," both what the term designates and its theoretical implications have undergone a number of shifts.

In its original Frankfurt School usage the term was a polemical intervention into the mass society/mass culture debate and a development of the Marxist theory of Ideology. On the one hand, the term culture referred to the superstructure – the social realm of meaning construction and circulation where symbolic forms of all types were produced and distributed – and to the German Idealist tradition of culture (or art) as a realm of freedom from material constraint and interests. Its linkage to the term industry (in the singular), on the other hand, was intended polemically to indicate the destruction of the relative autonomy of the superstructure and of the emancipatory possibilities of art by the economic dynamics of the base. The culture industry thus primarily referred to the industrialization and commodification of the process of symbolic production and circulation *in toto*. For Horkheimer and Adorno, the ideological domination of capitalism, and thus the suppression of revolutionary possibilities, was effected not by the overt content of cultural production, but by the deep structure of the cultural forms and the alienated relations between both producer (artist) and cultural work and between producers and audiences that the system of capitalist industrial cultural production produced. In this period this approach was counterposed to the wide spread sociopolitical concern with propaganda as a key element in the construction and maintenance of authoritarian regimes (fascism and Stalinism).

The use of the term industry referred (drawing on Marx) to the domination of the cultural realm by competitive and increasingly monopolistic corporations driven by the search for profit through the exchange of cultural commodities, thus necessarily alienating. It also referred (drawing on Weber) to a process of organizational rationalization, whereby cultural production and consumption were increasingly planned, thus suppressing cultural and political alternatives. Importantly, this approach placed the analysis of advertising and marketing at the center of a general process the purpose and effect of which was to hold the audience in thrall (the new opiate of the people).

This rationalization took place not just within the process of production, but within the cultural form. Cultural products were standardized and produced “pseudo individuality” in consumption.

Importantly, this vision and theoretical analysis were starkly opposed to Walter Benjamin’s (1970) view of media technologies as emancipatory advances which shifted the relation between audience and art work from one of worship (“aura”) to one of education and rational inquiry.

Through the 1950s and 1960s the term culture industry and its accompanying theoretical approach was largely forgotten in favor of a pluralist analysis of the mass media and their power (or lack of it). It was dismissed as the nostalgic and elitist response of exiled German intellectuals to US popular culture. The term reappeared, more usually in the form of cultural industries, in the late 1960s with the revival of theoretical Marxism and the New Left. It now drew on three developments: (1) the revival of a political economy of communications which returned to a serious analysis of the economics of the mass media in contrast to the ideological analysis of media content; (2) the turn to cultural studies, which shifted the emphasis in the wider analysis of and opposition to capitalist consumerist hegemony from economic to cultural structures and processes; (3) the revival of the Frankfurt School analysis of capitalism and its social and cultural effects in the form of a utopian, countercultural, anti-consumerist critique of capitalism as the society of the spectacle (deBord 1995) symbolized by the May 1968 events in France and by Marcuse’s role as a guru of the US New Left (Marcuse 1991).

Now the use of the term signaled a shift away from a focus on the mass media, understood as the print publishing and broadcasting industries, and the overwhelming focus on the direct political effects of those media, to a focus on popular entertainment and, in particular, linked to a heightened sociological interest in youth culture, to a concern with the music and film industries.

It is important to note that in this new usage the cultural industries were no longer assumed to be alienated and repressive. On the contrary, the term could now be used positively in a

critique of the elitist implications of established public policies for the support of art and media (Garnham 1990). It was thus associated with a widespread positive evaluation, both within economics and cultural studies, of consumerism, and the discovery of the “empowered” consumer and audience.

At the same time the use of the term signaled a refusal to follow the “cultural turn” in rejecting economic determination. Those analyzing the cultural industries now drew not only on Marxist economics, but on developments in mainstream industrial and information economics, to make much more detailed and nuanced analyses of the economic structure and dynamics of the cultural industries than that of the Frankfurt School. The cultural industries were now analyzed in terms of the special nature of their products and markets. Indeed, the term industries in the plural was now used to indicate the existence of important economic differences between these industries. Stress was now placed on the particular nature of symbolic or immaterial products and services and the difficulties in commodifying them. Rejecting Frankfurt School notions of rationalization and planning, this new analysis emphasized the exceptionally risky and irrational nature of the production and distribution process stemming from the need for constant product innovation and the inherent uncertainty of demand. This created a “hit and flop” economy where a few super profitable, but inherently unpredictable, hits paid for the high percentage of losers. A distinction was drawn between the high sunk costs of production (so called first copy costs and more akin to R&D in classical material goods producing industries) and the low costs of reproduction and distribution which resulted in increased returns to scale and thus a powerful drive towards audience maximization and both sectoral and cross sectoral concentration of ownership and control. The structure and dynamics of the cultural sector were explained as the response of management under conditions of intercapitalist competition to these problems of realization.

On this basis the French school (Miege 1989; Flichy 1991) distinguished subsectors of the cultural industries (*les industries de l’imaginaire*) nature of their products, their relations of production, their relation to their markets,

and their relation to the underlying technologies of distribution and appropriation. These subsectors were, first, *editorial* (of which book publishing and records were the classic cases) where control over a catalog of products – and thus the ability to spread the investment risk – was strategically crucial. Here, production of the cultural products remained artisanal, was outsourced, and the key workforce was managed and subordinated through contract and intellectual property rights. The second subsector regarded *flow* (i.e., broadcasting in its various forms) where customer loyalty to a constantly replenished service and series of channels required control over distribution and the centralized planning of content production – and thus also the employment of content producers as wage workers in large industrial organizations. Here the commodity being sold was audiences to advertisers and a major share of value added was extracted not by the content producers but by the producers of consumer electronics (e.g., TV and radio sets, video recorders, DVD players, etc).

The cultural industries approach now developed in three distinct although not necessarily incompatible directions, and in so doing largely lost its original link to Marxism. First, the focus on distribution and the industries' links with the consumer electronics sector led to a focus on the impact of developments in ICTs (information and communication technologies) and related policy issues. Here the central argument was over the extent to which developments in the communication and cultural sectors were technologically determined and whether technological development was or was not broadly emancipatory (de Sola Pool 1984).

Secondly, the focus on the industrial economics of information led to a merger with the broader post Fordist analysis of the development of the capitalist economy, which saw the economy in general satisfying immaterial (and therefore cultural), rather than material, needs (Lash & Urry 1994). Here the distinction between cultural industries and other economic sectors is increasingly brought into question. These two developments have led to the absorption of the cultural industries analysis into a broader information sector, information economy, information society analysis.

Thirdly, the term cultural industries has given way to a range of terms such as entertainment industry, information sector, knowledge industries and, in particular, creative industries. Here, linked to a more general analysis of the knowledge economy (Castells 1999), itself a development of the concepts of the post industrial and service economies, the center of analysis is immateriality, the percentage of value added attributable to “knowledge,” the dependency on intellectual property. In particular, the role and formation of “knowledge” or “creative” workers becomes a matter of central concern. This development is largely policy driven. On the one hand, it is based on an argument that the cultural sector is a key growth sector globally and thus, as a response to deindustrialization, nations need to foster their “creative industries” in order to get a share of this market and the profits and export earnings that flow from it. On the other hand, “knowledge” creation generally is a condition for success in the new information economy and thus comparative advantage stems from creating conditions – educational, legal, and fiscal – to foster this creativity.

Analysis of and debates surrounding the cultural industries relate to two other important topics: the public sphere and intellectuals. Habermas's original formulation of his public sphere thesis stems directly from Adorno's analysis of the culture industries. It is the creation of the culture industries that destroys the public sphere as an arena for free discussion and deliberation upon which democracy is founded. Thus an analysis of the structure and dynamics of these industries is central to an understanding of the history and future possibilities of the public sphere.

Central to the culture industries tradition has been a concern with the socioeconomic position and role of cultural workers and the extent to which, as intellectuals, they can continue to exercise an autonomous and critical role in the development of knowledge and culture. The shift to a focus on creative industries and the information society places this concern with the relations of cultural production center stage.

SEE ALSO: Adorno, Theodor W.; Benjamin, Walter; Commodities, Commodity Fetishism and Commodification; Critical Theory/Frankfurt

School; Culture, Production of; Ideology; Information Society; Mass Culture and Mass Society; Media Monopoly; Political Economy

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culture jamming

Jay M. Handelman and Robert V. Kozinets

Culture jamming refers to an organized, social activist effort that aims to counter the bombardment of consumption oriented messages in the mass media. For Habermas (1985), an ideal speech situation is one in which all participants within a public space are empowered to reach consensus on issues of mutual importance through engagement in symmetrical discourse. Culture jammers see contemporary public space as filled with distorted communications, and seek to right the situation. These activists see fair and accessible public discourse as eroded by a mass media controlled by corporations, whose sponsored advertising has become the primary propagandist supporting the social logic of consumption culture. Culture jamming, then, is consumer culture jamming. The activists seek to break through the wall of corporate

controlled, distorted, asymmetrical public discourse, awakening people from the hegemonic culture where the logic of consumption permeates all aspects of their lived experience (Rumbo 2002).

The rationale for culture jamming is found in the writings of Frankfurt School theorists, perhaps most powerfully espoused by Horkheimer and Adorno (1996). The Frankfurt School's conceptual framework critiques social structures constructed under the guise of a capitalist ideology that come to define a culture of consumption. Here, corporations act as "cultural engineers" (Holt 2002) that define a limited set of socially acceptable human activities and identities, inherently limiting human potential and freedom. By controlling and permeating virtually all public spaces, corporations and their capitalist ideology serve as the groundwork for a hegemonic cultural logic of consumption. Ontologically, while this culture of consumption is socially constructed, it becomes reified as a "natural" social order, appearing concrete, objective, and void of competing worldviews and any alternative possibility for human expression.

Consistent with the underlying philosophy of the Frankfurt School, culture jamming involves at least three steps in its effort to break through this oppressive framework of social meaning. First, culture jamming tries to identify the contradictions buried beneath the apparently seamless barrage of capitalist messages. Advertising, the communication carrier of the capitalist cultural code, naturalizes consumption by interweaving consumer goods and the very fabric of social life (Leiss et al. 1990). Through advertising, consumption of consumer goods appears as the sole route to solving life's problems and achieving individual happiness. Culture jamming's first step is to unveil the economic, social, and environmental misery that hides beneath this happy exterior.

The second step in culture jamming involves achieving a type of reflexive resistance whereby consumers (i.e., the general public) become aware of the hidden contradictions underlying the cultural ideology of consumption. By revealing these otherwise hidden contradictions, culture jamming empowers consumers by enabling them not only to see the discrepancies lurking beneath capitalism's glossy

and seductive messages, but also to examine critically how the dominant capitalist ideology imposes constraints on human freedom. In achieving this, culture jamming sets the stage for the third step, which is emancipation. Here, consumers are changed – which is the culture jammers' ultimate objective. They are able to envision and act upon other cultural logics and alternative possibilities for social expression and individual happiness.

Culture jamming's perspective of omnipotent consumer culture that can only be broken by organized activists who heroically emancipate consumers has come under considerable scrutiny. At the axiological level, the culture jamming project inherently assumes that consumers are cultural dupes who have been hoodwinked by clever capitalists and are in dire need of emancipation by enlightened activists. Cultural studies of consumers have found that individual consumers can, on their own, be well aware of the contradictions that permeate a culture of consumption. These consumers come to see the contradictions in culture jamming itself as an attempt by yet another set of cultural elitists (social activists) to control the social agenda (Kozinets & Handelman 2004).

Ontologically, postmodern researchers view the erosion of a culture of consumption as occurring not through top down activist attempts at culture jamming, but via fragmented and self produced consumption whereby individual consumers produce their own system of cultural meanings (Holt 2002). With this type of resistance, consumers come to form their own patterns of social interaction and cultural meaning, which are organically produced not through consumption of mass produced products but by alternative methods of exchange, such as gift giving and sacrificial practices (Kozinets 2002).

Empirical research in this area lends itself best to interpretive (qualitative) techniques. As the issue of culture jamming is intricately tied with issues of cultural meaning, social movements, ideology, and the like, examining culture jamming and other forms of consumer resistance is best achieved by studying these activities embedded in their cultural context. Ongoing research in the area of culture jamming will grapple with the alternative axiological and ontological perspectives mentioned

above. On the one hand is the idea of consumer resistance such as culture jamming as occurring in the form of an organized, top down social activist attempt to break consumers free from a hegemonic capitalist ideology that sustains materialism as a central cultural value. On the other hand is a postmodern conceptualization of consumer resistance that advocates self directed agency towards consumer sovereignty (Thompson 2004).

SEE ALSO: Advertising; Consumption; Cultural Resistance; Culture; Culture, Social Movements and; Ideology

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culture, nature and

Chandra Mukerji

There is a movement among sociologists and social critics to include the built environment and physical bodies in social analysis, and to think seriously about the ways that locations

and creatures (including people) matter to group life. Part of this comes from anthropological leanings in sociology, and the tradition of thick description that includes discussions of chickens and back streets as well as group life. Part of it is motivated by feminist theory, and the determination to keep bodies and gender cultures in social analysis. Not only the settings for social life but also the human form itself is a cultural artifact made from natural materials. Part of the interest in cultures of nature also comes from Foucault. It is clear that power founded in the built environment provides an almost unnoticed but consequential regulatory mechanism.

Sociologists have had a long term interest in describing the physical forms and social effects of cultural relations to the natural world. While relatively few ethnographic sociologists have paid serious attention to the physical settings for social life, those who have done community studies have sometimes illustrated the centrality of cultures of nature to collective life. Kai Erikson in *Everything in its Path* (1976) describes the social devastation of the Buffalo Creek flood, and how the mining industry, in disposing of its wastes, set up the conditions for the flood. He makes clear that the physical locations where social relations play out matter, and that these are shaped through human hands as well as by natural forces. The book by John Walton (2001) about Carmel, California, again looks at history, environment, and community, showing the enduring value of community studies that focus on cultures of nature and the forms of life they sustain.

Urban sociologists have also written about nature, too – the persistence of natural forces in artificial worlds. Sharon Zukin (1995) describes cities as quasi natures of living creatures and supposedly inanimate structures that nonetheless settle and move. The city may seem to be the opposite of nature, but it is better understood as a culture of nature that seeks its control. Patrick Joyce (2003) looks at the meaning and forms of material control in two British cities, showing how political liberalism developed in the context of highly regulated material life. The compact between liberal, self governing individuals and the regimes of power they inhabit is partly written on the ground in the places they inhabit.

Ecofeminists write quite differently about cultural relations to nature, bringing gender critique to the patterns of seeing and using the physical world. They argue that gender domination has been both symbolically and practically played out on the earth. Carolyn Merchant (1980) describes the masculine gaze in science. She argues that longstanding popular respect for female deities or Mother Nature was undermined by the promotion of objectivity in modern science. The power that was gained this way and through the culture of stewardship helped to erode the quality of human life in spite of the rhetoric of improvement. Donna Haraway (2002), in quite a different move, looks at the companion species that live with human beings, sometimes known as pets, to meditate on domination of nature and the possibility of friendships with non human beings. She asks whether cross species companionship can be a model for human relations to the natural world.

Sociologists of science, after focusing most of their attention for years on epistemological issues, are now asking about cultural formations of nature, their connections to science, and their implications for power. Chandra Mukerji (1997) looks at the role of territoriality in state formation in France, asking not simply about land claims but also about the territorial engineering used to define and defend them. Patrick Carroll (2001) writes about the role of “engine science” or engineering in the British control of Ireland. Like Patrick Joyce (2003), he identifies the exercise of power with control of the built environment. But Carroll sees Ireland as a laboratory for the British to experiment with tools of colonial control that were exported to other parts of the empire.

Prakash (1999) documents some of the results of these British efforts at material domination. In *Another Reason*, he follows the tools of engineering from Britain to India. There western science confronted local intellectual elites, who tried to find ways to engage it. Some picked up western intellectual styles, and saw the colonial railroad and other engineering projects as ways to modernize India. Others tried to find ways to build intellectual links between traditional forms of Indian culture and the imported ones. British colonial

government established its hegemony through the environment, and brought face to face a utilitarian western reason and an indigenous one more deeply rooted in the subcontinent.

What makes work in this subfield so engaging is that it still takes materialism seriously even in this period when Marxist materialism has shown its intellectual failings. Human life remains embedded in the earth, and the landscapes people shape and inhabit. They regulate their bodies through material means, controlling diet, health, and habitations. In this period of globalization, when there are massive efforts to restructure relations to the natural world, this kind of social analysis has continued practical salience. And with the need to define a new materialism for the social sciences, studying the meeting places of nature and culture is intellectually vital as well.

SEE ALSO: Body and Cultural Sociology; Built Environment; Collective Identity; Consumption, Food and Cultural; Culture, the State and; Ecofeminism; Ecology; Environment, Sociology of the; Environment and Urbanization; Foucault, Michel; Human–Non Human Interaction; Materialism; Nature; Technology, Science, and Culture

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culture, organizations and

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Culture in organizations refers to the values, norms, and patterns of action that characterize the social relationships within formal organizations. Jaques (1951) first described the changing culture of a factory, defining it as the customary or traditional ways of doing things, which are shared to a greater or lesser extent by all members of the organization and which new members must learn and at least partially accept in order to be accepted into the service of the firm.

Turner (1971) defines culture and its importance for organizing. According to Turner, part of the effectiveness of organizations lies in the way in which they are able to bring together large numbers of people and imbue them for a sufficient time with a sufficient similarity of approach, outlook, and priorities to enable them to achieve collective, sustained responses which would be impossible if a group of unorganized individuals were to face the same problem. However, this very property also brings with it the dangers of a collective blindness that some vital factors may be left outside the bounds of organizational perception. Culture is the source of blind spots because sharedness in values, norms, and perceptions results in a similarity of approach, shared expectations among members of the group to bring certain assumptions to the task of decision making within the organization, and to operate with similar views of rationality. Culture is therefore a double edged sword.

INTELLECTUAL AND SOCIAL CONTEXT

Culture was primarily a central concern for anthropologists and sociologists throughout the twentieth century. Only more recently, in the 1980s, did it catch the attention of the structural contingency school of organization theorists and economists, as a result of a number of popular texts that advocated an optimistic, even

democratic view of the capacities of ordinary employees: *In Search of Excellence* (1982), *The Art of Japanese Management* (1982), *Theory Z* (1982), *The Winning Streak* (1984), and *Corporate Cultures* (1988) are some examples. These popular books reiterated and consolidated the insights of the human relations approach of industrial relations. These books also preferred alternative management theories, ones that capitalized on culture as a precursor of more effective production and less hierarchical arrangements. Rediscovering culture seemed to be a way of responding to economic recessions at that time, and especially the challenges coming from Japanese companies. Organizational culture became seen as a variable in the firm's success equation and ultimate performance. As Chan and Clegg (2002) observe, one consequence of these enthusiasms has been to reduce the culture concept to an effect, constituted as a (metaphorical) object of inquiry. In the realm of organizational research, culture therefore very often only refers to "organizational culture" – a term that came to the fore in a series of British and American popular management texts of the 1980s. However, research did not stop with this popular consensus. Existing chasms between functionalist and pluralist paradigms, modern and postmodern approaches, and science and contra science were reiterated in much of the research on organizational culture. Authors argued differences openly in a number of publications. A major axis of difference centered upon the definition of the construct per se (ontology), and upon the paradigms and methodologies used to apprehend it and to generate knowledge about it (epistemology).

MAJOR DIMENSIONS OF CULTURE

One dimension of culture was depicted by organizational anthropologists who pointed out that the organizational literature hijacked culture and used familiar concepts related to it (i.e., rituals, myths, taboos, and symbols) in disconcertingly unrecognizable ways (Marcus 1998). The displacement or transfer of the terms from anthropology to organization studies was inadequate and far from satisfying. Anthropologically and sociologically informed researchers considered that culture was not as

pliable as practitioners and managers seemed to think it should be (Meek 1988). For the latter, culture, as broadly construed by the organization and management literature, embodied consultant driven reform initiatives for corporations, as well as managers' own attempts to gain control of their organizations through influencing the value premises on which organizational members' behavior was based. With this dimension of organization culture, clearly the least deeply conceived, widespread interest and enthusiasm extolled its perceived potency; culture assumed the character of a panacea, one that, potentially, could solve many organizational ailments. The business community had no qualms about the seductiveness of cultural management techniques as they infiltrated management circles. The panacea attributes of culture became widely identified with and internalized by the practitioner and managerial community throughout the 1980s and 1990s, even while more fundamental research continued. Willmott (1993) provided a comprehensive review of this "corporate culturalism" phenomenon over that decade.

METHODOLOGICAL ISSUES

Martin (2002) used the metaphor of "culture war games" to describe the paradigm dissensus and struggle for intellectual dominance within culture research communities throughout the 1980s and 1990s. From the outset, the culture movement represented a promising alternative and even a counter initiative to functionalist and quantitative approaches in organization studies. The interest in culture in the 1980s gathered momentum amid a general discontent with quantitative approaches and structural contingency theories of organization that had already evolved from the systematic critique of normal organization science developed in the 1970s.

Administrative studies of culture favored quantitative techniques to provide functionalist accounts that lent themselves to the development of empirically based generalizations. Chatman (1991) and O'Reilly et al. (1991) were good examples. On the other hand, more pluralistic researchers had good reason to employ qualitative methodology and other

multi paradigmatic methodologies in developing context specific explanations of culture. Qualitative research on culture allowed multi perspective ethnographic methodologies to acquire legitimacy, representing an opportunity to break with the constraints of dominant quantitative and positivistic approaches.

The underpinnings of the two broad camps may be classified using Martin's (2002) "differentiation" perspective and its opposite, the "integrationist" genre of culture research. Research following a differentiation perspective, according to Martin, acknowledges inconsistencies in attitude. It sees consensus as occurring only within subcultural boundaries. It acknowledges conflicts of interest, for example, between top management and other employees, and within the top management team. These studies describe the inconsistencies and subcultural differences they find, so that inconsistency, subcultural consensus, and subcultural clarity become seen as the characteristic hallmarks of differentiation research.

The integrationist perspective drew from the managerially oriented and popular culture writings. Many quantitative studies depicted culture as an internally consistent package that fostered organization wide consensus, usually around some set of shared values. Aspects of change and reform in organizations were seen as an embodiment of organization wide cultural transformation, whereby either an old unity could be replaced (it was hoped by a new one) or unity forged out of difference. Some of the major themes that directed work undertaken in the integrationist framework were concerned with the management of meaning and various practices and devices through which managers attempt to bring off acceptable definitions of organizational reality as a basis for collective action, such as, for example, specific adoption of language, ritual, myth, story, legend, and narrative, etc., that were organizationally approved.

On one hand, the integrationist genre sees pragmatism, certainty, rationality, homogeneity, harmony, and a unified culture as an order of things that are both to be striven for and are achievable. Research in the integrationist genre conceptualized culture as a benign panacea, with properties that lent themselves to being pliable, at will, by managers. By contrast, the

differentiation perspective criticized integrationist social engineering and value management treatments of culture. The differentiation perspective developed a critical assortment of theories of organizations that opposed a seemingly scientific, variable based cultural theory of organization.

The bifurcation of cultural research into differentiation and integrationist camps was a result of resistance to the dominant integrationist and positivist approaches to organization theory and culture. The differentiation perspective argued that the existence of dissent and ambiguities, conflicts, and confusion in organizations, and the nature of the workers' passionate engagement in work, are glossed and rendered mute by the mainstream integrationist literature.

FUTURE DIRECTIONS

Between 1990 and 2001 three major handbooks were published: *Organizational Climate and Culture* (1990), *Handbook of Organizational Culture and Climate* (2000), and the *International Handbook of Organizational Culture and Climate* (2001). Additionally, economists such as Hermalin (2001) provided a comprehensive review of the relationship between economics and corporate culture. Administrative study of culture continues to thrive, emphasizing employee and company culture fit. Culture audit and organizational culture diagnosis tools continue to be refined mainly in company organizational development and applied settings that make use of such survey tools. More classically, future research in the differentiation tradition is likely to develop in the broad direction of studies of the hermeneutics of sense making and exploration of process philosophy views of culture.

The first view considers that material aspects of organizations are made real only by being given meaning. We make sense of the realities of our everyday world by invoking and bringing to bear prior experience and assumptions. When we observe culture, whether in an organization or in society at large, we are observing an evolved form of social practice that has been influenced by many complex interactions between people, events, situations, actions, and

general circumstances. The hermeneutic perspective is based on culture being constructed and accounted for through meaning giving and sensemaking.

The process philosophical perspective treats culture not as entity like structures but as instances that give meanings to actions and behaviors (Chia 2002). Culture is treated as a process of reality construction enabling people to understand certain events, action, things, and situations in distinctive ways. The treatment of culture as a fixed, unitary, bounded entity gives way to a sense of fluidity and permeability. It requires also that explanation of cultural forms be situated in a larger environment and a wider arena of different forces.

Future research on culture is likely to become more fruitful by returning to analysis of the social interactive processes through which actors create their world, via interpretive schemes. Deterministic models of culture are likely to give way to a reconsideration of culture as an inference making process, except perhaps where culture is conceived of as the subject of managerial tools and techniques.

SEE ALSO: Culture; Labor–Management Relations; Organizational Contingencies; Organizations as Social Structures

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culture of poverty

Kristina Wolff

The phrase culture of poverty was coined by Oscar Lewis (1965) to describe the combination of factors that perpetuate patterns of inequality and poverty in society. By focusing on the experiences of Puerto Ricans, Lewis illustrated how difficult it was for people to escape poverty due to the influence of cultural beliefs that support behaviors that contribute to people remaining in poverty. He described how the poor feel alienated in society. Because of their frustrations with their inability to transcend poverty, a culture develops which supports behaviors providing short term gratification and other conditions of poverty as “normal.” This is largely due to the conviction that it is impossible to improve their lives. These beliefs and behaviors are then instilled from one generation to the next, which eventually develops into a culture of poverty.

This concept has been used as a rationale to both increase and decrease government support for the poor, ranging from individuals within the US to debates about developing nations and the amount of aid they “deserve” from industrialized nations. A liberal approach utilizes this theory as a means to examine the structural impediments that create barriers for people to move out of poverty. These include absence of jobs, poor transportation, and limited access to adequate education and health

care. Conservative interpretations of poverty use Lewis's concept as an illustration of the lack of motivation of individual poor people. Often drawing on stereotypes within popular culture, that people on welfare are "lazy," "hedonistic," or possessing questionable morals, a culture of poverty represents an individual's choice to remain dependent on the government instead of seeking gainful employment.

Sociologists have explored the relationships of ethnicity, race, and gender with various interpretations of the culture of poverty. By using this concept as a means to illustrate groups as having a "defective" culture, it becomes politically justifiable to limit support for the poor. For example, when the US restructured welfare programs in the 1990s, many argued in support of forced birth control or caps on the number of children women on public assistance could have and still receive government funds. Women and children constitute a large segment of the impoverished and proportionally more women of color are in poverty or are part of the working poor in US society. By focusing on individuals or specific populations as responsible for their impoverished state, social structures and practices that create barriers to success escape accountability.

SEE ALSO: Feminization of Poverty; Poverty; Poverty and Disrepute; Race; Race (Racism)

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culture, production of

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The production of culture perspective focuses on the ways in which the content of symbolic elements of culture are significantly shaped by the systems within which they are created, distributed, evaluated, taught, and preserved. The initial focus was on the production of expressive symbols such as art works, scientific research reports, popular culture, religious practices, legal judgments, journalism, and other parts of the culture industries. Now the perspective is also applied to many situations where the manipulation of symbols is a byproduct rather than the purpose of the collective activity (Peterson 1976; Crane 1992, Peterson & Anand 2004).

In the 1970s, when the production of culture emerged as a self-conscious perspective, it challenged the then dominant idea that culture values and social structure mirror each other, a view held by most Marxists and functionalists – among them Talcott Parsons. Breaking from the mirror view, the production perspective sees culture and social structure as elements in an ever-changing patchwork (Peterson 1979). Research in the perspective draws freely on theories and methods developed in other branches of sociology. It is, however, distinctive in focusing on the consequences of social activities for the symbolic elements of culture (DiMaggio 2000).

Cultural production systems change slowly, but occasionally there is rapid change altering the aesthetic expression of a cultural expression. Such change is illustrated by the study that helped inspire the production perspective in culture, Howard and Cynthia White's 1965 study *Canvases and Careers*. It showed the transformation of the nineteenth century French art world and the consequent emergence of Impressionist art. Six production factors are identified as making possible rapid cultural change. These include changes in law and regulation, technology, industrial structure, organizational structure, occupational careers, and the consumer market. The workings of these facets should be considered together as part of an interdependent production network (Peterson & Anand 2004).

Technology provides the tools with which people and institutions augment their abilities to communicate, while changes in communication technology profoundly destabilize and create new opportunities in art and culture. Technological innovations including radio, phonograph records, movies, television, and digitalized communication transformed art and popular culture in the twentieth century. At the micro level, the electronic manipulation of guitar sounds transformed pop music, and digital communication media have facilitated the rapid globalization of culture (Waksman 1999; Goodall 2000).

Law and regulation create the ground rules which shape the ways in which creative fields develop. Changes in copyright law have influenced the kinds of fiction that gets published, and restrictive notions of intellectual property continue to inhibit cultural expressions. Censorship of the culture industries has shaped what can be produced, and federal restrictions on multiple ownership of newspapers, and TV and radio deregulation, have led to less diversity in points of view being expressed.

Industrial fields and *organizational structures* in creative industries tend to be structured in one of three ways. There may be many small competing firms producing a diversity of products, a few vertically integrated oligarchical firms that mass produce a few standardized products, or a more open system of oligarches with niche market targeted divisions plus a large number of small specialty service and market development firms, where the former produce the most lucrative products, while the latter produce the most innovative (Negus 1999; Caves 2000).

Occupational careers develop in each cultural field. The distribution of creative, craft, functional, and entrepreneurial occupations is determined largely by a field's structure, which in turn helps determine the symbolic output. Careers tend to be chaotic and foster cultural innovation, as creative people build careers by starting from the margins of existing professions and conventions (Becker 1982; Grazian 2003).

Markets are constructed by producers to render the welter of consumer tastes comprehensible. Once consumer tastes are reified as a market, those in the field tailor their actions

to create cultural goods like those currently most popular as measured with tools devised by producers (Turow 1992; Caves 2000).

The production perspective has proved a useful model for organizing ideas and research in five areas where the production of culture is itself not consciously sought. First, it has spawned the *culture industries* model in academic management research and become the prime model of post bureaucratic organization. Second, studies of the *autoproduction* of culture show that people produce identities and life styles for themselves from elements of traditional and mass mediated symbols. Third, studies show that *cultural omnivorousness* is replacing highbrow snobbery as people show their high status by consuming not only the fine arts but also appreciating many, if not all, forms of popular culture. Fourth, studies focused on *resistance and appropriation* show how young people take the products tendered to them by the culture industries and recombine them in unique ways to show their resistance to the dominant culture and to give expression to their own identities. Fifth, much of what is taken to be subcultural resistance is actually *fabricated* by the *consumer industry*. The contrast between the artifice of manufacture and the fan's experience of authenticity is arguably the most important unresolved paradox of cultural sociology (Negus 1999; Peterson & Anand 2004).

SEE ALSO: Art Worlds; Culture; Culture Industries; Popular Culture

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culture, social movements and

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Culture is the symbolic and expressive dimensions of social life. This includes sets of symbols such as language, intangible, abstract “mental products” such as ideas, beliefs, values, and identity, and the meanings given to material objects such as clothing, decorations, art objects, buildings, and the like.

Social movements are sustained, more or less organized attempts at change. They may try to change individuals, group behaviors, government policies, or society’s cultural understandings. Social movements are generally thought to last longer and be more organized than a mob or a crowd, but are not as established or institutionalized as a political party or lobbying group.

Sociologists have studied culture and social movements with three basic sets of questions. First, many accounts of social movement emergence posit their basic causes as cultural. Second, when studying the processes and dynamics that allow social movements to function and maintain themselves, analysts have focused on cultural factors such as collective identity, ideological claims, emotions, and internal group norms, rituals, and practices. Third, scholars who study the impact that movements have on society have often focused on the cultural changes that are their goals for action (cf. Johnston & Klandermans 1995).

MOVEMENT EMERGENCE

Most of the sociological study of social movements since the end of World War II has sought to ascertain why social movements emerge. One way to categorize the answers is whether they put the basic cause of movement emergence in the social structural dimensions of society or in societal and group culture. Social structural causes include changing economic fortunes of particular classes, the formal political systems of society, or the resources (such as money, members, and organizations) that a group can mobilize in order to mount collective action. Cultural answers to the question of movement emergence have generally fallen within one of two categories: changes in the national or societal culture or changes in group subculture among those people involved in a social movement.

For example, both Gurr (1970) and Melucci (1989) basically claim that movements develop because large scale social and cultural changes result in a collective social psychological anomie or alienation among people experiencing these changes. Various types of cultural “strain” lead to breakdowns in normal routines and result in disruptive and innovative collective actions. European based “new social movements” of the 1970s and 1980s, such as the Greens, were theorized as the cultural response to late capitalism’s elevation of “lifestyle” concerns over redistributive economic politics (Scott 1990). Middle class cultural movements replaced labor as central collective actors. A more specific analysis of the role of group culture was Gusfield’s (1986) thesis that the US Prohibition Movement was led by people concerned about their declining social status. Their movement was a “symbolic crusade” to restore their cultural prestige.

At a more micro level perspective, scholars have focused on the language and “framing” work done by movement leaders. Analysts argue that many groups have the potential for collective action, but it takes the articulation of an ideology and a sense of collective identity for this potential to turn into an actual movement. Movements are thus “constructed” by the frames of movement leaders, who convince people to engage in collective action. Collective action frames interpret people’s life situations,

including such emotions as the anger and fear they may feel, by articulating them as grievances against an unjust system or enemy. Frames also tell people how they might change such situations, and try to convince them their own involvement will make a difference (see Benford & Snow 2000).

In all of these examples, it is something in culture – changes in the culture of a particular group, changes in the larger culture, or the use of cultural objects such as rhetoric, ideology, and identity – that is responsible for causing a social movement to emerge.

MOVEMENT DYNAMICS

Once a social movement has emerged, it needs to sustain collective action through mobilizing people repeatedly to action. This involves both cultural objects and processes that work cognitively, emotionally, and morally. Movement ideology is composed of language and non-textual symbols directed at both movement members and the society the movement is trying to persuade. Other dimensions of culture, such as collective identity, group practices, and shared emotions and narratives, help people who are mobilized stay committed to their movement and their cause.

Social movements use ideological claims and symbolic messages to make their case for social change (Williams 1996; Platt & Williams 2002). Sometimes ideology is a straightforward articulation of the ideas that motivate the movement and include the visions of how society might be different. For example, Students for a Democratic Society drafted the *Port Huron Statement* that gave their rationale for action; similarly, Marx and Engel's *Communist Manifesto* was the ideological base for the international communist movement's plans for social change.

Movements experience some limitations in the ideological claims they can make (Williams 1995). While activists are free to formulate any argument they choose, many claims will not be effective in particular contexts. There is a "cultural repertoire" that puts boundaries on what a given society or historical period will consider legitimate ideas. These repertoires develop through the interaction of challenger claims and the reigning hegemonic ideology (Steinberg

1995). Movements face the challenge of articulating innovative calls for change, while using ideological claims and symbolic messages that are largely within the boundaries of the legitimate.

Movements' ideological messages are often reduced to easily remembered slogans, such as "Make Love, Not War," "God is Pro Life," or "No Blood for Oil." These slogans are a short hand that is only effective when the movement's fuller ideology is well enough known that audiences can fill in the potential ambiguity in content (e.g., a San Francisco bumper sticker, "I own a dog and I vote," only makes sense if one understands current land use issues in the Bay Area).

Another method of communicating the content of movement claims is to reduce them further to pictures or non-textual figures. The pro choice movement consistently uses a drawing of a coat hanger with a line through it to symbolize the dangers of illegal abortions. Christian right organizations distribute bumper stickers with the word "vote" in which the "t" is elongated into a cross. Communist movements have used red stars historically, while white supremacist groups in the US and Europe resurrect the Nazi swastika. Non-textual symbols provide even less information about specific issues, and yet make even broader political and social claims. They are often ambiguous enough that multiple groups use them, as in the Vietnam War era in the US when counterculture protesters stitched American flags on to the backs of their blue jean jackets at the same time that pro war blue collar workers were putting American flag decals on their hard hats. In such cases, the ideological message was not readable directly from the symbol used, but could only be understood within the context of a general presentation of self.

Movements must create and sustain a collective identity (e.g., Polletta & Jasper 2001). That is, people must feel that they share important characteristics with others in the movement, and that this identity is important enough to promote or protect through action. So, while slogans and non-textual symbols articulate a social movement's ideas, the individuals and groups who display them are also making a statement about their personal and social identity. Symbolic displays mark those using them

as part of a particular movement, and encapsulate their basic attitudes and values.

The creation and nurturance of a shared collective identity produces a sense of “we-ness,” in such a way that it can become the basis for action. People may identify themselves as the victims of an injustice, experience anger or determination as a result of this, and organize to combat the injustice. Other times, the “we” becomes people who hold a certain set of values or interests (such as preserving wilderness areas) and feel both motivated and obligated to act. Sometimes the “we” seems obvious, as when it is built on a longstanding ethnic or religious identity.

Collective identity helps mobilize and sustain a movement (Fantasia 1988; Nepstad 2004). People must be willing to continue to contribute time and energy, and perhaps withstand risk, through both victories and setbacks. Spirits must be kept up, shared identities must be reaffirmed, and group solidarity must be cultivated. Songs, slogans, a particularized vocabulary, items of clothing or grooming, flags or pennants, all can contribute to this process – letting fellow movement members know who one is, and distinguishing movement “members” from others. Narratives and stories allow group members to frame a shared history and align their experiences, motives, emotions, and identities (Davis 2002).

Another dimension of movement culture is the discourse and practices used among movement members in the processes of internal debate, decision making, and interpersonal interaction. “Backstage” arguments among movement members are connected to the public ideology movements articulate, but they are often not identical (Kubal 1998). They may be dress rehearsals for later public positions, they may be quarrels among factions vying for control of the group’s message (Benford 1993), and they may be jokes, rationales, or beliefs purposely kept from public view. Movement members develop norms of etiquette (Polletta 2002) or styles of discourse (Hart 2001) that govern what types of arguments are allowed within group meetings, what types of relationships are considered the model for action, and what types of people movement members should want to try to be. These are cultural rules of action that help shape movement ideological

claims, group strategic decisions, and public collective identity.

MOVEMENT IMPACT

Almost all social movements have a variety of goals. Many want to change laws, or enact policy changes within institutions such as schools, churches, or hospitals. But many movements also seek changes in their wider societal culture (Epstein 1991; D’Anjou 1996). For example, the gay and lesbian liberation movement wants policy changes that will end discrimination against gays and lesbians, but it also wants to change the cultural values associated with homosexual orientations. Similarly, the women’s movement in the US and globally has worked at combating stereotypes about women (Naples & Desai 2002), while the vegetarian movement has tried to change people’s ideas (as well as habits) about food and non human animals (Maurer 2002). The Christian Right has sometimes been interested almost exclusively in symbolic change, as when it advocates putting the 10 Commandments in government buildings. Movement groups are often particularly interested in creating “activists”; that is, the change in which they are most interested is in the set of personal and collective identities found within groups of people (Lichterman 1996). Helping to transform individuals and groups into people who continue to agitate for sociocultural change is itself a form of cultural impact.

SEE ALSO: Collective Identity; Culture; Framing and Social Movements; Ideology; New Social Movement Theory; Social Change; Social Movements; Social Movements, Strain and Breakdown Theories of

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culture, the state and

Chandra Mukerji

Studies of culture and the state focus on a range of relationships between modern political regimes and patterns of symbolic and material life. They reveal the diverse ways that power works through culture, and provide means for a better understanding of how power is accumulated, organized, and deployed in or around state systems.

Much work in this subfield takes nationalism to be the fundamental culture of states, but most scholars working in this tradition do not make the mistake of treating national cultures as natural kinds. They try instead to understand how the processes involved in developing and shaping state power since the nineteenth century have generated distinctive national forms of political culture. Sociologists studying nationalism and its development have revealed the cultural techniques used in the creation of nationalist movements and identities. They have investigated the use of propaganda, the arts, gender relations, sexuality, storytelling, engineering, dress, and the media to establish taken for granted connections between populations and their governments.

Other scholars interested in culture and states have examined political processes like voting, policymaking, public advocacy, court procedures, and the use of violence, considering these activities as cultural performances or narrative devices, and following the complex rituals by which power is both exercised and legitimated. Among the students of American culture, there has also been broad interest in the moral dimensions of political participation and the practices of political activists. And Europeans have written with insight and precision about the cultures of bureaucracies, economic institutions, and educational systems that have helped to shape state based political life and national identities.

Studies of culture and the state in the US surprisingly had methodological roots in urban sociology, particularly work of the Chicago School with its fundamental interest in political culture. Fieldwork studies of urban political life and social movements made their cultural

forms evident. Scholars schooled in this tradition but caught up in the social activism and analytical Marxism of the 1960s and 1970s began to broaden the area of political concern, asking questions not only about cities but also about states and how they gain or lose authority. They were given tools for their analyses of politics by European sociologists such as members of the British School of Cultural Studies, and the French scholars working with Pierre Bourdieu. These analysts showed how seemingly innocent cultural practices, particularly education and popular culture, had effects on stratification and national identity. Unfortunately, scholars working in these schools generalized about "culture" from their own national traditions, as though there were no cultural differences or different uses of culture among states. This lack of attention to states and culture was criticized by Michele Lamont, and led to her work with Laurent Thevenot to compare class cultures in France and the US (Lamont & Thevenot 2000).

While techniques for analyzing political culture were developing among sociologists of culture in the mid twentieth century, theories of the state became a major area of sociological concern. This was motivated by some of the same historical conditions: the social activism of the 1960s and 1970s. By doing comparative research across countries and historical periods, students of the state hoped to see when and why political regimes failed or endured. Most of the work in the field was strictly structuralist, and explicitly so. Guided by the traditional Marxist theory of history, these scholars assumed that the political fates of regimes would be a consequence of structural processes, and dismissed culture and ideology as objects of analysis. Methodologically, they used the extant historical accounts of states and empires to compare their trajectories of power. Where they found states (as they often did) to be "semi autonomous," they could have asked questions about culture, but did not. Only in the last decade has there been a turn toward culture by theorists of the state. The results have been impressive, if different in method and implication. Tilly's (2003) elegant analysis of violence has revealed the unclear border between legitimate and illegitimate forms of collective violence. Charrad's (2001) award winning study

of the political cultures of gender in North African countries has shown how differently a common religion could be portrayed and used in political processes of state building.

Given the fundamental differences in theoretical orientation and methodology between macrosociology of state systems and microsociology of culture, it seemed unlikely between 1960 and 1990 that sociologists would have considered seriously cultural studies of states. But outside sociology, there were shifts in intellectual culture that pushed sociologists in this direction. One was strong interest in comparative cultural studies of states among anthropologists and historians who wrote influential pieces about the political cultures of these systems. Their empirical work made sense to sociologists working with similar methods and interested in comparable concerns. The other influence was more powerful and disconcerting to sociologists: the rapidly growing interdisciplinary interest in cultural studies and the writings of Foucault. Foucault argued that power did not primarily reside in institutions like the state, but rather in the processes of social classification that simultaneously organized knowledge and social relations.

Structural analyses like those developed by historical sociologists of the state, from this perspective, were fundamentally misguided. Even power (as legitimate violence) was not a monopoly of armies and police systems, but was a part of the discursive terrain that aligned power with knowledge. Cultural studies begged the question of whether there were any distinctive kinds of powers that states could wield to their advantage. It was a good question, so rather than destroying all efforts to study states, poststructuralism simply sent sociologists back to the historical record to see what could be learned about the cultural powers of states.

Foucault's early work on hospitals, clinics, and prisons had been easily folded into the sociology of deviance. But later poststructuralists' mantra like invocation of class, gender, and race and treatment of complex cultures as texts were more grating to sociologists. They seemed to provide humanists with pre-fabricated versions of social analysis, making even constructivist sociologists weary of this approach to culture. Some scholars in the field shared Foucault's interest in the politics of

language and labeling, but even these often remained advocates of fieldwork methods and more local ways of understanding stratification and power.

Studying culture, then, seemed more important than before, but the question was how to improve sociological analysis. Many sociologists simply did fieldwork to address questions raised by poststructuralists. But a substantial number of new works in historical sociology appeared, using subjects in political culture to address the workings of power itself. They rejected Foucault's aversion to traditional politics as an object of study, but embraced his project of seeking out neglected cultural practices of power. Michael Schudson (1992) and Barry Schwartz (2000) considered the powers of collective memory, while Joseph Gusfield (1981) and Robin Wagner Pacifici (1986) wrote on the performative aspects of political events. Meanwhile, Chandra Mukerji (1997) focused on material culture and the built environment, the ways that state power could be stabilized and materialized in maps, styles of dress, and places themselves.

In the 1990s, perhaps in response to the Reagan years in American politics, many new works on culture and the state appeared, focusing on nationalism, fascism, and the Holocaust. The question of why fascism gained power in the mid twentieth century had dominated critical theory and neo Marxism, bringing cultural issues to the heart of Marxist thought. Now the subject was being reexamined, using the tools of cultural sociology to explain the seductions of political imagery and identities that supported genocide (Berezin 1997; Falasca Zamponi 1997).

In the face of theoretical challenges from cultural studies and methodological ones from anthropology and history, sociologists interested in culture and the state have become better scholars. The push to produce a more richly nuanced cultural history of states has made it harder simply to skim off the secondary literature. At the same time, sociological understandings of states have matured, too. They are not automatically reduced to apparatuses (as structures) or nations (as a natural counterpart to states). They are analyzed as places of power, engineered to be politically identifiable

and materially managed territories, and sites of performances of power, linking people to places. States in the new sociology of culture are simultaneously imagined communities, narrowly organized sets of social relations, socially sanctioned ways of using the land, and elements in webs of violence and control. They exist as social institutions but exercise power not as some passive apparatus, but rather through politically nuanced and intentional practices of cultural domination through design.

SEE ALSO: Bourdieu, Pierre; Built Environment; Collective Memory; Critical Theory/ Frankfurt School; Cultural Reproduction; Cultural Studies; Cultural Studies, British; Diaspora; Foucault, Michel; Ideological Hegemony; Media and Nationalism

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cybercrime

Samuel Nunn

Cybercrime refers to the commission of criminal acts that target computers, use computers as an instrumentality to traditional crimes, or transmit illegal information using computer networks. One continuing form of cybercrime targets computers. So called hackers and crackers, through various means, gain access to closed computer networks in order to vandalize or otherwise damage databases or network software by introducing computer viruses or “denial of service” attacks. Denial of service refers to computer viruses or worms that create an overabundance of computer transactions, to the extent that entire systems will slow significantly or shut down completely.

Cybercrime comes in many guises. The objective of many early cybercrimes involving computer intrusions was to destroy data or interrupt the flow of computerized services. As the cybercrime concept evolved, it began to include similar break ins to protected computer networks, but instead of mischievous vandalism, theft and material gain were the motivation. Common cybercrimes now include the theft and subsequent sale or counterfeiting of debit and credit card numbers from the protected databases of private financial firms, as well as larceny involving intellectual property such as computer software, movies, digital videos, recorded music, or other items. The commission and camouflage of other traditional crimes such as child pornography are considered cybercrimes because of the widespread use of computer networks, digital photography, electronic mail, and encryption techniques to support the operation of globalized schemes. “Cyberstalking” involves the use of electronic communications to transmit threats of personal violence or kidnapping. The increasing creativity of terrorist attacks during the 1993–2004 period created the term “cyberterrorism” to describe criminal acts involving interference with the computer networks and automated operations of federally defined critical infrastructure such as banking, aviation, finance, power, gas, petroleum, transportation, and water networks.

As with other offenses, cybercrime involves the three traditional elements of crime: *actus reus*, *mens rea*, and concurrence. The *actus reus* usually involves the illegal entrance into protected computer systems and subsequent actions taken against or in pursuit of electronic properties. The *mens rea* of cybercrime is more complex. Destructive, larcenous, and other criminal acts using computerized resources are typically accompanied by varied motivations including power, greed, dominance, revenge, or satisfaction of prurient interest. Concurrence is also a complicated aspect of cybercrime. Many cybercrimes, such as computer break ins and intellectual property theft, might not be detected for long periods of time. Computer assisted identity theft might go on for months before victims become aware a crime has occurred.

The most common forms of cybercrime are credit or bank card fraud, child pornography, unauthorized access to a computer, identity theft, and cyberstalking. In the US, many cybercrimes are federal offenses because they involve use of computer networks that cross interstate boundaries. By 2004, the US criminal code included approximately two dozen chapters devoted to aspects of cybercrime. It is common for major law enforcement agencies to form computer forensics and other specialized squads to investigate cybercrime. Similar organizational strategies have been followed by international police agencies such as Interpol and Europol.

Criminal justice agencies face several challenges in their fight against cybercrime. Because computer networks are globalized, many cybercrimes raise questions regarding which jurisdictions have responsibility for investigation. Further, many cybercrimes are perpetrated by single individuals or small groups that nonetheless affect the computers or electronic property of hundreds or thousands of persons or organizations located in many different locales across the globe. For any single victim, the costs of these cybercrimes are often too low to warrant reporting formally, but taken in sum the costs of the crimes for all victims can be massive. Effective enforcement and adjudication of cybercrime law often requires interjurisdictional task forces, including cross national teams to conduct simultaneous investigations and arrests

in different countries across many different time zones.

SEE ALSO: Consumption and the Internet; Crime; Crime, White Collar; Criminal Justice System; Internet; Measuring Crime

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cyberculture

David Bell

A neologism derived from a neologism, cyberculture welds together the “cyber” from cyberspace with “culture.” It is important to understand what happens when cyber and culture are brought together, and in order to work toward that understanding we need to begin by saying a few words about cyberspace (and some related things). The term cyberspace was famously coined by cyberpunk novelist William Gibson in his 1984 novel *Neuromancer*, to describe the imaginary “datascape” which his characters entered by “jacking in” – connecting their consciousness directly to networked computers. The well known and often quoted formulation in *Neuromancer* runs like this:

Cyberspace. A consensual hallucination experienced daily by millions of legitimate operators. ... A graphic representation of data abstracted from the banks of every computer in the human system. Unthinkable complexity. Lines of light ranged in the nonspace of the mind, clusters and constellations of data. Like city lights, receding. (Gibson 1984: 67)

This vivid description offered a powerful fictional portent for the future, a future of unthinkable complexity and constellations of data. However, the computing science realities of what was then emerging as cyberspace were little known to Gibson; nevertheless, the term and the way cyberspace was depicted in *Neuromancer* have had a profound influence upon its development and its representation – an influence Gibson did not foresee when he cobbled the word together. As he put it:

Assembled word *cyberspace* from small and readily available components of language. Neologic spasm: the primal act of pop poetics. Preceded any concept whatever. Slick and hollow awaiting received meaning. All I did: folded words as taught. Now other words accrete in the interstices. (Gibson 1991: 27)

Other words have indeed accreted in the interstices of Gibson’s cyberspace – including cyberculture. Moreover, cyberspace came to be the preferred term for scholars writing about particular configurations of media and communications technologies, most especially the Internet (though others prefer an expanded definition that encompasses other realms of digital technology and digital culture; see Bell 2001). Cyberspace became a hot topic across a range of academic disciplines in the 1990s, as more and more researchers turned their attention to the many ways that the Internet was transforming ever greater parts of people’s lives. Through the course of the 1990s, research and writing on cyberspace began to branch and specialize, and there was something of a publishing boom. Aside from computer science research, a large body of work emerged which focused on the social and cultural aspects of cyberspace. These “cyberspace studies” have morphed over time, particularly as scholars have brought ideas and theories from other disciplines – psychology, sociology, cultural studies, or geography, for instance – into contact with the Internet and related technologies.

In terms of the subject area we might call “cyberculture studies,” David Silver (2000) has tracked the development of cyberculture as a field of study across the 1990s, identifying three distinct phases. His typology offers a useful way of introducing the trajectory of these diverse studies in this important decade,

during which the foundations of cyberculture studies were solidified. Silver names the first substantive phase “popular cyberculture,” characterized by journalistic writing, personal accounts of being online, popular history publications about the development of the Internet, and large numbers of “how to” books helping people make use of computers and networks. Accounts from this phase tend to be descriptive, often experiential, but are split in terms of how their authors view the impacts that the Internet is having on people’s lives. At the most extreme ends of this divide are what Silver calls techno-futurist writings, which tend to be overwhelmingly optimistic, even utopian, about the promises of online life. Journalists writing in new US magazines like *Wired* or *Mondo 2000* typify technofuturism for Silver, as do writers describing cyberspace as a new frontier ripe for pioneers to colonize (see, e.g., Rheingold 1993). Writing from a polar opposite, profoundly dystopian, perspective are the “Neo Luddites,” who see in cyberspace multiple threats to human existence (see, e.g., Sale 1995). Of course, most writing during this phase falls somewhere in between these “dystopian rants or utopian raves” (Silver 2000: 20). Nevertheless, this fundamental binary divide – is cyberspace good or bad? – continues to structure many scholars’ thinking; indeed, later periods in the development of cyberculture studies revisit this in their own terms, and rants and raves continue to appear from both sides. However, as the field of study has evolved, it has refined both the theoretical and methodological tools brought to analyze the Internet, as well as focusing in on more specific domains and effects of cyberspace.

The second phase of cyberculture scholarship is called by Silver simply “cyberculture studies,” in recognition of a shift away from populist accounts (though these continue to be published) toward a more scholarly approach to understanding the Internet. Crucially, two major focuses were brought center stage in this phase, both of which are concerned with the relationship between online and offline life: studies of community and studies of identity. Here we see one way in which cyber and culture are brought together: by exploring how some of the key concerns of cultural studies (such as identity or community) are transformed in cyberspace. Silver rightly identifies

the *ur texts* here as Rheingold’s *The Virtual Community* (1993) and Turkle’s *Life on the Screen* (1995) – these are the “twin pillars” of second phase cyberculture studies (Silver 2000: 23), hugely influential books whose impact can be felt to this day. Turkle’s book is an important illustration of the second way that cyber and culture are brought together in this phase: the use of cultural theory to think about cyberspace. In her exploration of online identity, Turkle draws heavily on psychoanalytic, poststructuralist, and postmodern theories of self identity, which help her to understand how online identities are fractured and multiple. Other scholars also began to bring their own favorite theories and theorists into cyberspace, leading to a productive period in which cyberculture studies diversified: sociologists brought social network approaches to understanding online communities, for example, while geographers brought theories of space and place into contact with cyberspace and feminist scholars introduced ideas of cyberfeminism (see, e.g., Plant 1997; Crang et al. 1999; Smith & Kollock 1999). At the same time, there was also a diversification in terms of research methods used to study cyberculture, as researchers brought their own methodological traditions and innovations into cyberspace: qualitative and quantitative methods, linguistic and textual techniques, and so on.

Silver notes that studies produced in this phase tend to be more positive and optimistic about cyberspace, seeing productive new possibilities for identity and community online. However, many accounts rest on a problematic separation of online and offline (sometimes called “real life” or “real world”) experiences – another dualism which continues to haunt many studies of cyberculture to this day. Nevertheless, this second phase marks a consolidation of academic cyberculture studies marked by diverse theories and methods, intersections with diverse disciplines, and a gathering momentum in terms of both volume and growing sophistication of published material. We could say that this phase marks the beginning of something of a discipline of cyberculture studies itself, in fact, as degree courses, conferences, and networks blossomed in academia.

In the latter part of the 1990s, a third phase is identified by Silver. This he labels “critical

cyberculture studies.” Marked by continuing growth and diversification, Silver tracks four themes which rose to dominance in this period (for an overview of the breadth of this phase, see Bell & Kennedy 2000). The first is in part a counter to the problematic online/offline split of phase two, and is concerned with contextualizing cyberspace and cyberculture, in terms of how economic, social, and cultural interactions occur simultaneously in cyberspace and in “real life.” Empirical work bridging online and offline field sites – such as Miller and Slater’s (2000) ethnographic study of Internet use in Trinidad – has been particularly important in bringing back together the two worlds split apart in earlier studies. Detailed empirical work has also performed a valuable hype busting function, replacing the rants and raves of earlier phases with more balanced, empirically grounded studies.

The second theme of critical cyberculture studies picked out by Silver focuses on discursive constructions of cyberspace – the stories we tell about it. This means unpacking the ways that cyberspace is imagined and represented across a wide range of cultural texts, from cyberpunk novels and movies to Internet service providers’ adverts or pop songs (see Bell 2001). It also involves exploring the dominant discourses via which the Internet is talked about, whether the frontier mythology mentioned earlier or the “gold rush” discourse that provoked and sustained the dot.com explosion. Thirdly, Silver notes an increasing emphasis on questions of access and inequality – another valuable dose of hype busting, since it replaces the discourse of information freedom and the Internet’s democratic “worldwideness” with studies highlighting patterns of uneven development, issues of marginalization, and barriers to access to technology at all levels, from the global to the individual. Access questions bring into focus the extent to which axes of social identity such as race, class, gender, and sexuality are either reproduced or challenged in cyberspace, with studies concluding both that cyberspace reinforces existing divides as well as bringing in new ones, and that it can provide space for new and productive kinds of identity work to take place (see, e.g., Nakamura 2002).

Finally, Silver notes an increase in studies exploring design and visual culture aspects of

cyberspace, particularly around the idea of the interface: how cyberspace is represented to us on the screens of our computers – a neat return to Gibson’s originary formulation. Work on interfaces has also returned to themes introduced in earlier phases, such as the role of web pages in expressing self identity, and the role of participatory design in facilitating online communities. Crucially for Silver, critical cyberculture studies finally acknowledges the messy commingling of online and offline life and experience: “cyberculture is best comprehended as a series of negotiations that take place both online and off. . . . In the new millennium, it is the task of cyberculture scholars to acknowledge, reveal and critique these negotiations to better understand what takes place within the wires” (Silver 2000: 30).

Having described Silver’s useful brief history of cyberculture studies, attention can now be turned to an essay which attempts to define a program for cultural studies of the Internet, Jonathan Sterne’s “Thinking the Internet: Cultural Studies versus the Millennium” (1999). This is an important article in that it attempts to lay out a specifically cultural studies approach to cyberspace, therefore productively exemplifying Silver’s critical cyberculture phase. It provides a road map of what cultural studies as a discipline uniquely brings to analysis of cyberspace, urging scholars to “move beyond the commonplaces and clichés of Internet scholarship and [to] reconceptualize it in intellectually challenging and politically vital terms” (Sterne 1999: 260). It is, perhaps, in the last part of that statement – about being politically vital – that Sterne’s essay is most insightful; he reminds scholars of the deep political commitment at the heart of the cultural studies project, arguing that if it is (or should be) about anything, then cultural studies is about culture and power. Any critical study of the Internet should therefore have at its heart an analysis of culture and power since, as Poster (2001: 2) suggests, “without a concept of culture, the study of new media incorporates by default the culture of the dominant institutions in society” – the state and the market.

To advance his argument, Sterne places emphasis on the need to understand and critically analyze the politics of knowledge production (asking what is at stake in studying the

Internet, and how new knowledge of cyber space can advance emancipatory politics), the need to be acutely aware of context (the manifold relationships between people, place, practices, and things), and the need to produce a theory of articulation (how things are connected together). Such a theory would have as its central concerns “(a) *what counts* in a cultural study of the Internet and (b) *how to think about* and represent the Internet” (Sterne 1999: 263, emphasis in original). Finally, and echoing points made earlier, Sterne reinforces the necessity of a commitment to theory as a way of finding new and more effective ways to describe and analyze cyberspace and cyberculture.

Making a point resonant with Silver’s discussion of critical cyberculture studies, Sterne calls for a move beyond the simplistic online/offline (or virtual/real) split which has for so long impaired analyses of cyberspace, toward a conceptualization that emphasizes understanding the place of the Internet in everyday life. Equally importantly, Sterne argues for the need to reconnect the Internet to other media, and to techniques of analyzing other media. This is particularly crucial in the current period, given the increasing convergence of new (and old) media. As new digital devices such as MP3 players and palm pilots become more and more ubiquitous, and as existing media are repurposed for the digital age (mobile phones, for example), so the idea of separating out the Internet as an object of study becomes redundant. At the same time, the uses to which we may now put our computers – from listening to the radio to editing home movies to shopping – calls for a broader rethinking of what it is we are studying when we are studying cyberculture.

This last point is worth exploring in a bit more detail. Some researchers have suggested that we need to track the myriad sites where we encounter digital culture beyond the narrow emphasis on the computer screen: cyberspace exists in all kinds of places, from CGI heavy movies to imaging technologies used in biomedicine (see Bell 2001). Moreover, the kinds of contact that we have with these new technologies is equally varied: we may be transformed into data and lodged in databases thanks to the manifold technologies of data collection that monitor our habits and routines (from our shopping practices to our workplace productivity);

equally, we may have particularly intimate relationships with devices that become part of our everyday lives, even part of our bodies – leading some scholars to theorize the body–technology interface by using ideas of the cyborg or the post human (see Gray 1995; Badmington 2000).

Cyberculture must be about critically analyzing all of these sites, and the discourses and representations that surround them. In part that means attending to the mundane interactions we have with technologies such as word processors or console games; but it also requires an awareness of the cutting edge of new and future technologies, such as nanotechnology, artificial life, and artificial intelligence. To fully encompass all that cyberculture means is no easy task, therefore. While some scholars have called for junking the term cyberculture studies in favor of newer, more inclusive terms like web studies or new media studies (or even new media cultures; see Marshall 2004), others continue to see valuable mileage in working with and through cyberculture as a “contested and evolving discourse [whose] discussants include activists, politicians, computer geeks, social scientists, science fiction writers, digital artists, etc., all of whom are involved in the creation of new concepts and ideas” (Bell et al. 2004: xiii). To that end, the concept is still very much alive, indeed teeming with life, and we need the open, even promiscuous, approach to theory and method, as well as the political commitment, of critical cyberculture studies to continue to engage creatively and critically with the past, present, and future of cyberculture.

SEE ALSO: Consumption and the Internet; Cybercrime; Cybersexualities and Virtual Sexuality; Digital; Information Technology; Internet; Simulation and Virtuality

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cybersexualities and virtual sexuality

Ken Plummer

Just as when photography and film were first introduced they generated the pornographic photograph and film, so as soon as the newer information technologies appeared, an erotic

world of cybersex and intimacy appeared alongside and embedded within it. New information technologies are used in ways that can facilitate new patterns of sexualities and intimacies. And this is no small world. Surfing the Internet gives access to a medium full of intimate words and images: from guidance pages on infertility (over a million sites on sperm banks), to sites engaged in bride mail ordering; from images of the most "extreme" sexual fetishes ("Extreme" is indeed the name given to one such site), to access to potentially endless partners on email. The sheer range, number, and intense flow of unregulated intimacy and erotica of all kinds that becomes available at the press of a button could never have happened before in history.

These new technologies have generated multiple new forms of intimacy: sex messaging, sex chat rooms, sex news groups and bulletin boards, email discussion groups, camcorder sex, new forms of porn, access to relationships of all kinds, new social movement campaigns around sexuality, even so-called cyborg sex, teledildonics, virtual sex, and new approaches to the body and emergent "techno identities" and "techno cultures." Along with this a new language has emerged that mirrors new forms of sexualities: cyberporn, cyberqueer, cyberstalking, cyberrape, cybervictim, cybersex. Although such new forms can result in people meeting in real space for "real sex," there is also a great deal of masturbatory sex being generated through these media, as well as virtual sex taking place in these virtual spaces.

What this means is that in recent years many new sexual practices have unfolded along with an array of new issues. Sociologists are starting to provide critical ethnographic materials on their day-to-day workings, and are developing innovative theorizations of the whole field, clarifying and criticizing links to postmodern social theory and connecting these globally. Thus, Dennis Waskul in *Self Games and Body Play: Personhood in Online Chat and Cybersex* (2003) applies the theoretical work of Erving Goffman on self-management and the presentation of self in sexual communications online. Aaron Ben-Ze'ev has examined *Love Online* (2004), providing detailed accounts of how people meet online. Others have documented some of the pitfalls of cybersex – how it can generate infidelity, the growth and routinization of

pornography, the development of sexual harassment online, and the growth of “sexual addiction” on the Internet (e.g., Maheu and Subotnik’s *Infidelity on the Internet*, 2001, and Patrick Carnes’s *In the Shadow of the Net*, 2001). On a wider level, sociologists have suggested that moral panics and hysteria gather around such sexualities. Most prominently, there is the concern with pedophilia on the net, and the ways in which young people can be misled, “groomed,” and ultimately seduced and abused (see Philip Jenkin’s *Beyond Tolerance: Child Porn Online*, 2001).

Cybersexualities, then, are becoming increasingly an important means of sexual communication in the twenty first century. And they have both positive and negative impacts. They reveal changing spaces and boundaries for new forms of sexualities and suggest key shifts in public/private dimensions. Through both webcams and the global nature of communications the old boundaries in sexual relations break down. The body starts to change its contours – no longer simply fixed and corporeal, but fluid, boundary less and “virtual” (as with ideas of changing gender identity online raised by transgender activist Sandy Stone, 1995). Some have suggested that much of this leads to “posthumanism,” a marker for the end of the human being as such and the discovery of tools for articulating the embodied human with intelligent machines (Hayles 1999; Hables Gray 2002). A new form of being – the cyborg – may be in the making. Yet we must be careful. Even though there are already new worlds of cybersex, the posthuman, and the cyborg, and even though these will probably grow and develop, talk of cyberworlds still makes little sense to large populations that do not yet even have access to basic water, medication, shelter, phone lines, or computers, let alone the Internet.

Cybersex opens up political and moral questions that are emerging around the control and regulation of such sites. Hamelink (2000)

suggests a wide array of ethical issues in web issues. For instance, how decent it is to post a picture of your ex partner on the web? How far is it infidelity to find partners on the web while concealing this from one’s “real” partner? Should children’s access to cyberspace be guarded? What dangers threaten your children when they surf the Internet? What should we do if we want free speech in cyberspace but also want to rid the Internet of child pornography and racism? Do we need a new morality for virtual reality?

Cybersex is a new phenomenon raising many new questions. At the start of the twenty first century, there are signs that sociologists are taking significant interest in it.

SEE ALSO: Body and Culture Sociology; Body and Sexuality; Consumption and the Internet; Internet; Posthumanism

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D

daily life pollution

Koichi Hasegawa

Daily life pollution refers to the type of environmental contamination caused by the everyday life activities of ordinary citizens and consumers. In contrast with main pollution caused by industrial production processes, daily life pollution includes detergent pollution in rivers, lakes, or the ocean caused by washing clothes and landfill and incineration pollution caused by excess household garbage. Although the individual impact each citizen has on the environment is negligible, cumulatively their behavior can create severe environmental and social problems.

The cumulative effect of about 70 million households (in the US) or about 40 million households (in Japan) resembles the old proverb, "Many drops make a flood." "The ecological footprint" data of each country show the respective ecological impact per capita. In many countries the ecological impact exceeds the available biologically productive area of the country (Chambers et al. 2001), clearly showing this agglomeration effect for one environment. Theoretically, the "tragedy of the commons" by Hardin (1968) and subsequent studies of the "social dilemma" neatly model this mechanism. The social dilemma is defined as a dilemma or conflict between collectively and individually rational action, where the action required for achieving the collectively best outcome or goal is in conflict with the action required for achieving the individually best outcome (Yamagishi 1995).

For instance, a well organized garbage collection system that separates various kinds of garbage can reduce the whole amount of daily garbage and the whole amount of the related

municipal expenditure (collective best outcome). However, citizens may feel that separating their garbage takes too much attention and too many minutes. To save time, some of them may violate the rules by merging organic waste and non organic waste (individual "best outcome"). Every citizen has a similar temptation. As a result, the separated garbage collection system may not work as planned. The malfunctioning of the separated collection system discourages other citizens from obeying the regulations, finally causing the collection system to disappear. Garbage may flood the streets and parks and citizens must pay more tax to collect it (collective worst outcome). Thus, the ordinary citizen can easily be both the perpetrator and the victim of this vicious cycle of pollution.

Spiked tire pollution is another good example. Spiked tires have metal studs embedded to prevent cars from slipping on icy roads. They are highly effective, and unlike chains do not require any effort to put on or take off. In the 1970s they rapidly came into wide use, especially in snowy northern Japan. But when used on dry roads, they tear up the road surface and create dust. Thus in the late 1970s and early 1980s, spiked tires brought serious air pollution in major cities such as Sendai and Sapporo. In Sendai, a broad movement to encourage voluntary restraint in the use of spiked tires developed, including cooperation between public authorities, the mass media, residents' groups, and the local lawyers' association. In 1985, Miyagi prefecture including Sendai as its prefectural capital first enacted restrictive ordinances at the prefectural level. Similar ordinances were subsequently enacted by Sapporo and other prefectures. This led to nationwide legislation in 1990 that prohibited the use of spiked tires altogether. In other cases, public administration officials have taken the lead,

working with residents' groups to sometimes promote or sometimes discourage the use of certain products, such as the movement that started in 1975 around Lake Biwa to abstain from using phosphorous synthetic detergents and instead use soap powder.

In these cases, the possibility of resolving the issue through the use of alternative technologies or alternative products was high, and the concerned industries were not antagonistic to these movements. From a relatively early stage the industries endeavored to develop and market alternative products (e.g., studless tires, four wheel drive vehicles, and non phosphorous synthetic detergents). In situations where the perpetrators are also the victims and the movement is not facing a powerful adversary, it is relatively easy to reach a social consensus (although not necessarily an adequate solution – for example, the introduction of non phosphorous detergents did not entirely resolve the problem of detergent pollution, merely the issue of phosphorous pollution). This relatively uncontested consensus making process makes it easier for politicians and public officials to take the initiative.

In many cases of daily life pollution, the effects appear directly and visibly for ordinary citizens in a relatively limited geographical range. But daily life pollution, such as in driving automobiles, also contributes to much more widespread problems as global warming. In its basic logic, the issue of global warming closely resembles the “tragedy of the commons” or social dilemma process of local daily life pollution. But in the global warming case, the effect goes to the global level and pushes the most severe effects of the degradation on to future generations. In addition, the consensus building process has to occur among sovereign states, not local groups, making it more difficult.

Although ordinary citizens and general consumers are responsible for daily life pollution, this does not discharge producers, industries, and administrators of their responsibilities. Especially in mass consumption society, big industries strongly influence the market and consumers through advertising, stimulating customers' needs or desires as a “dependent effect” (Galbraith 1958). In the purchasing decisions of ordinary citizens, the image or package stimulated by advertising can become

more important than the utility value of the goods.

The case of spiked tires shows that appropriate regulation can work effectively to solve the problems of daily life pollution. It may be the only way to overcome the “social dilemma.” That means the government is responsible for solving this kind of problem. The government should prohibit the use of harmful commodities by legislative policy or administrative regulation. European countries first prohibited the use of spiked tires in the late 1970s because they tore up and damaged roads. Tire producers, car industries, legislators, and government administrators in other regions could have prevented spiked tire pollution in their own countries by paying attention to these foreign examples. On this point they were responsible.

Daily life pollution varies by domestic class structure, ethnic and racial differences, and global differences in wealth and poverty. These factors create serious gaps in consumption levels producing daily life pollution as well as in exposure to the resulting hazards. For instance, environmental racism can lead to the placement of waste disposal facilities near minority communities (Bullard 1994). At all levels, from community to the globe, richer people and countries consume more and produce more ecological damage than poorer or minority people. When we think of solutions to daily life pollution that involve reducing consumption, we have to remember that the poor of the world often do not yet have enough to meet basic needs. Given these disparities, wealthy people and nations have to take the initiative to adopt more eco friendly consumption patterns that reduce daily life pollution while meeting needs. These new consumption models will then diffuse to the poorer populations.

SEE ALSO: Environment and Urbanization; High Speed Transportation Pollution; Life Environmentalism; Local Residents' Movements; Pollution Zones, Linear and Planar

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dangerousness

Christian Debuyst

The term dangerousness is a neologism, invented in the context of the Italian positivist school of criminology and especially attributed to Garofalo, who, in the framework of his bio-psychological approach to the criminal, considered taking into account the essential element of *temibilità*, or the constant and active perversity of the criminal and the extent to which one is afraid of him based on this characteristic (Garofalo 1905; see also Kinberg 1959: 44-5). Garofalo replaced this older term with the concept of *periculosità*, which means dangerousness, and reformulated its definition: the capacity of an individual to adapt, or to resist adapting, to social demands. In this definition the American criminologist F. A. Allen (1960) perceived the fundamental objective of Garofalo: the elimination from society of those who, because of a moral abnormality, are not capable of making social adjustments.

Another meaning of the concept of dangerousness is found in the definitions of the terms dangerous populations and dangerous mental state. The former term appeared first in European and Latin American discourses of the eighteenth century and concerned subjects whose style of living was considered dangerous: vagabonds, beggars, etc. The term dangerous classes appeared in discourses of the nineteenth century and referred to the poor and the working classes. Also falling into the category of those from whom society must be protected were persons with mental deficiencies, who

(especially around the year 1920) were considered to be incapable of resisting their genetically inscribed impulses. Sexual deviants have historically been viewed in a similar way and portrayed as sick people to be imprisoned and sometimes as psychopaths, from whom it is also important to protect society. A similar concept of dangerousness is used nowadays in the US in connection with recidivists and the so called "three strikes and you're out" laws, under which criminals who have been convicted of three felonies are sentenced to life terms in prison.

The Italian positivist school found its starting point in Darwin's theory of evolution. According to the positivists, some individuals by nature cannot adapt to the complex demands of society. In this context, and in opposition to the views of the classical school of criminology, crime is not defined in legal terms, but as an expression of personality which results in a direct threat to society. Whereas the classical school defended the notion of free decision making, the positivist school emphasized the biological, psychological, and social determinism of human actions. From the perspective of the classical school, it follows that punishment would be effective as a deterrent to criminal acts, whereas from the positivists' point of view punishment should be replaced by scientific treatment as a better way of protecting society.

One reason for the development of the positivist perspective, especially in Western Europe, was rising crime rates which could not be efficiently handled by penal policy based on the classical model. In the same manner, other scientific approaches to dealing with crime were developed when the International Union of Penal Law was founded in 1889 and integrated into its program the idea of "social defense." For the US, the situation seems to have been different; under pressure from the media and from what Becker (1997) called "moral entrepreneurs," certain categories of persons (recidivists, psychopaths, sexual delinquents) and specific scandalized events gave rise to a single and concentrated change in legislation.

The first problem concerning the application of the concept of dangerousness is that of diagnostics and prognosis. Such critiques have

always accompanied the ideas of the Italian positivists. However, there have been some efforts to systematize the concept. In 1935, for instance, Kinberg introduced the differentiated view of dangerousness as “habitual” and caused by “temporal circumstances” (see also Megargee 1969). Clinical diagnostics done by psychiatrists seem mostly to overestimate the dangerousness of individuals, and the use of prediction tables as a basis of decision (at least between 1925 and 1960) always produced a great volume of falsely positive and falsely negative results. As a consequence of this, decisions about dangerousness are mostly based on the type and nature of offenses committed in the past.

Another critique is aimed at the theoretical basis of dangerousness, especially the concept of “criminal personality.” Social psychological theory and empirical research emphasize that behavior is always a product of situational conditions and more stable factors of personality. Other critiques apply a more sociopolitical perspective by emphasizing that giving too much significance to personality leaves aside more important aspects of social problems which the actors are confronted with. The same can be said of the types of offenses commonly taken into consideration when talking about dangerousness; these notions always leave aside other offenses that can arguably cause more harm to society, like white collar crime, political crime, or delinquency connected to drug trafficking. These critiques underscore the fact that the concept of dangerousness is marked by differences in ideology (Debuyst & Tulkens 1981).

Many psychologists and sociologists have criticized the notion of determinism, but in two different directions. On the one hand, it is argued that the notion of determinism denies the idea of personal responsibility, which is the basis of both penal law and the classical school of criminology. On the other hand, there are some critiques that enlarge the concept of responsibility to include the idea of society and social reactions, emphasizing that violent offenses and individuals in society who are called dangerous reflect conditions of social exclusion in which acts of violence can seem to be a rational reaction (Crawford 2002).

SEE ALSO: Crime; Crime, Biosocial Theories of; Crime, Psychological Theories of; Criminal

Justice System; Criminology; Deviance, Positivist Theories of; Deviance, Theories of; Mental Disorder; Social Pathology; Violence

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Davis, Kingsley (1908–97)

Donald J. Hernandez

Kingsley Davis, one of the most influential and eminent sociologists of the twentieth century, made major contributions to sociology, anthropology, and demography. A pioneer of sociological theory as it emerged during the 1930s and 1940s, he published prominent papers on the social and normative foundations of legitimate and illicit sexual behavior, marriage and divorce in contemporary societies, intermarriage in caste societies, and the place of children in the family and the broader social structure. Concerned with issues central to the structure and functioning of society, and therefore ideologically, morally, and emotionally charged, Davis's analyses were illuminating, but often perforce subject to extensive debate and

controversy, sometimes the focus of challenge from conservatives and other times confounding liberals.

A grandnephew of Confederate President Jefferson Davis, and born in Tuxedo, Texas on August 20, 1908, Kingsley Davis earned a BA in English in 1930 from the University of Texas, where he edited the campus literary magazine, and where he continued with graduate study in philosophy, economics, and sociology, earning an MA in philosophy in 1932. He then enrolled at Harvard University, studying with Talcott Parsons, Pitrim Sorokin, W. Lloyd Warner, and Carle Zimmerman, and he taught at Smith College from 1934 to 1936. Davis also was central in the prominent discussion group led by Talcott Parsons, who was then writing *The Structure of Social Action* (published in 1937). After receiving his PhD in 1936 with a dissertation titled “A Structural Analysis of Kinship,” Davis taught at Clark University (1936–7) and then Pennsylvania State University (1937–44), while also pursuing studies in statistics, mathematics, and demography as a Social Science Research Council post doctoral fellow at the University of Chicago with Samuel Stouffer and at the US Census Bureau.

Beyond his contributions to family sociology during the 1940s, Davis published (with Wilbert Moore in 1945) the most systematic and fully developed functional theory of social stratification, explaining the inequality found across social positions in all societies as the necessary consequence of their diverse positive contributions to the survival of the larger social system. Fierce debate followed as some critics took the theory to be an attack on the value position that equality is a virtue. They chafed against the idea that social inequality is necessary for a society to survive, and argued that the theory ignored the potentially dysfunctional effects of too much inequality, overstated the amount of social mobility occurring in actual societies, and did not address the issue of social conflict. Thus, opponents highlighted limits of the theory, effectively widening its scope, but the original underlying paradigm for analyzing relationships that link social positions, their incumbents, and social institutions has remained central to sociology. Important subsequent contributions advancing theoretical

sociology were his lucid synthesis in *Human Society* (1949) of fundamental sociological concepts and principles using ethnographic data, and his controversial presidential address to the American Sociological Association (1959) arguing that sociological analysis cannot be distinguished from functional analysis.

Davis’s seminal theoretical and empirical contributions to social demography began in the 1930s, with a provocative article on “Reproductive Institutions and the Pressure for Population.” Moving to Princeton University (1942–8), where he founded the department of sociology and anthropology, he wrote an extremely influential article, “The World Demographic Transition,” in 1945, as well as his first empirical research on cities, *Urbanization in Latin America* (with Ana Casis in 1946). Davis’s prominence as a demographer grew at Columbia University (1949–55) with the publication of *The Population of India and Pakistan* (1951), which stands as the classic work on the topic for 1880–1940, but also an exemplar of social demography for how to analyze and interpret the fertility, mortality, migration, family, education, and religion of a nation, and with his penetrating critique (1955) of Malthus’s work as a scientific theory of fertility.

At the University of California at Berkeley (1955–77), Davis continued to lead the theoretical development of social demography, first by conceiving (with Judith Blake, his wife) the analytic framework for studying intermediate variables through which social structure can affect fertility (1956). His subsequent presidential address to the Population Association of America in 1963, “The Theory of Response and Change in Modern Demographic History,” offered an integrated understanding of the central role that individual motivations for social and economic success played in the multiphase response of populations in all developed countries, not only in reducing fertility in response to declining mortality, but also by changing marital behaviors, and fostering migration out of agriculture and beyond national borders.

With characteristic incisiveness, Davis ignited a long running controversy with the publication of a logical, theoretical, and empirical critique in *Science* (1967) of family planning programs as a policy for reducing rapid population growth in third world countries. The

article argued that a policy of simply making contraception available to women will not be successful because fertility will decline substantially only if there are fundamental changes in features of social organization that determine the motivation to bear children. The article was lauded by conservatives and berated by liberals, despite the explicitly stated corollary, and essentially feminist argument, that achieving the goal of sharply reduced fertility would better be achieved by policies making educational, occupational, and income opportunities for women equal to those of men. Davis continued to contribute to understanding changes in the family, economy, and women's roles at the University of Southern California (1977–92), most notably in “Wives and Work: The Sex Role Revolution and its Consequences” (1984).

Davis's early interest in cities and urbanization also was abiding. Prominent among his contributions were “The Origin and Growth of Urbanization in the World” (1955), “Colonial Expansion and Urban Diffusion in the Americas” (1960), “World Urbanization 1950–1970” (V. 1, 1969; V. 2, 1972), *Cities: Their Origin, Growth, and Human Impact* (1973), and “Asia's Cities: Problems and Options” (1975). In the final years of his career at the Hoover Institution (from 1981 until his death on February 27, 1997), Davis organized conferences and edited books addressing causes, consequences, and policies for below replacement fertility in industrial societies (1987) and the connections linking resources, environment, and population change (1991).

Davis's creativity and the breadth of his influence in academia, in the Washington policy community, and the discourse of the general public are reflected in the terms *demographic transition*, *population explosion*, and *zero population growth* which he coined, and in the honor bestowed upon him as the first sociologist to be elected to the US National Academy of Sciences. As one of the giants among twentieth century social scientists, Kingsley Davis's legacy to scholarly and public discourse will endure for generations to come.

SEE ALSO: Demographic Transition Theory; Economic Development; Family Planning, Abortion, and Reproductive Health; Fertility

and Public Policy; Function; Industrial Revolution; Malthus, Thomas Robert; Stratification and Inequality, Theories of; Structural Functional Theory; Urbanization

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death and dying

Deborah Carr

Sociology of death and dying is the study of the ways that values, beliefs, behavior, and institutional arrangements concerning death are structured by social environments and contexts. Although death is a universal human experience, societal responses to death vary according to cultural attitudes toward death, as well as contextual factors including the primary causes of death, and normative age at which death occurs.

Conceptualizations of and practices surrounding death in the United States have come full circle over the past two centuries. In the eighteenth century, death was public and visible. Death tended to occur at a relatively young age, at home, and due to infectious diseases that could not be “cured.” The loss of a loved one was expressed by dramatic displays of grief among survivors, and elaborate efforts to memorialize the deceased (Ariès 1981). Throughout the late nineteenth and most of the twentieth

centuries, death became “invisible” (Ariès 1981) and “bureaucratized” (Blauner 1966). Physicians and hospitals assumed control over dying, death and mourning became private, the handling of dead bodies and funeral rites were transferred from private homes to funeral parlors, and people were encouraged to deny death and believe in medical technologies (Blauner 1966). Treating dying persons in isolation was believed to help smooth the transition beyond death; reducing the social status of those who were about to die would minimize disruption of ongoing social and economic relationships.

The epidemiology of death also changed dramatically (Omran 1971). In the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries deaths occurred primarily due to infectious diseases, which were not stratified by social class or gender. Men and women, rich and poor, were equally likely to become ill and die, and death often occurred relatively quickly after the initial onset of symptoms. Death during the latter half of the twentieth and early twenty first centuries, in contrast, occurs overwhelmingly due to chronic diseases, including cancer and heart disease. These diseases tend to strike older rather than younger adults, men more so than women, and persons with fewer rather than richer economic resources. Death typically occurs at the end of a long, often debilitating, and painful illness where the dying patients’ final days are spent in a hospital or nursing home, and where life sustaining technologies are used.

In the late twentieth and early twenty first centuries, death is again becoming visible and managed by the dying and their families. Patients’ and care providers’ recognition that dying is often a socially isolated, physician controlled experience has triggered a number of political and social movements with the explicit goal of placing control of the dying process in the hands of patients and their families. The Patient Self Determination Act, passed by Congress in 1990, requires all government funded health providers to give patients the opportunity to complete an advance directive (or living will) when they are admitted to a hospital. The hospice movement, which began in the United States in the early 1970s to promote palliative care at the end of life, also has grown in popularity. Hospice care, whether in hospital or at home, provides an alternative

to the medical, scientific model of dying. Pain management, open communication among family, patient, and care providers, and a peaceful accepted death are core goals.

As the context of death and dying has changed, research foci also have shifted. In the 1950s and early 1960s, research and theory were guided by the assumption that the United States was a death denying society (Gorer 1955). Influential works included an examination of the problems associated with transferring death and funeral rites from private homes to professional funeral homes, and explorations of the ways that health care providers, dying patients, and their family members mutually ignore and shield one another from their knowledge that the patient is dying (Glaser & Straus 1965).

In the late 1960s and 1970s, the “death awareness” movement guided research and theory. Key scholarly works of this era offered important advancements in conceptualizing the dying process. Barney Glaser and Anselm Straus (1968) proposed that dying tends to follow one of three trajectories: lingering, expected quick, and unexpected quick. The latter was considered most distressing for both health care providers and surviving family members. Elizabeth Kubler Ross (1969) delineated the emotional and cognitive stages that dying persons pass through, before reaching the final stage of “acceptance.” The interdisciplinary field of death studies and the two leading scholarly journals of death and dying also were launched in the 1970s: *Omega: The Journal of Death and Dying* debuted in 1970, while *Death Studies* has been published since 1977.

In the late twentieth and early twenty first centuries, research on death and dying has flourished (for an excellent and comprehensive compendium, see Bryant 2003). Scholarly and public concern about death reflects two broad social patterns. First, increasingly large numbers of older adults are living longer than ever before, with most suffering from at least one chronic and terminal disease at the end of life. Second, technological innovations to extend life, including life support systems, organ transplants, and advances in cancer treatment, extend the life span, but also raise important questions about the meaning of life and death.

Despite dramatic growth in death related research, the claim by William Faunce and Robert Fulton (1958) that the sociology of death is “a neglected area” remains at least partially true. The development of broad and unifying theoretical perspectives on the sociology of death and dying has not occurred alongside the explosion of empirical work (Marshall 1980; George 2002). Rather, subdisciplines of sociology have each claimed distinct – and seldom overlapping – topics of study pertaining to death and dying.

For example, demographers study the timing and social patterning of mortality. Social gerontologists investigate a broad array of issues pertaining to death, dying, and end of life, but their analyses focus nearly exclusively on persons age 65 and older. Sociologists of culture examine the ways that death is depicted in humor, art, literature, and other forms of media, cross cultural differences in death rites and rituals, and public discourses about controversial issues related to death and dying, including euthanasia and the death penalty. Medical sociologists investigate interactions between patients, family members, and their physicians at the end of life, as well as ethical, social, and financial issues pertaining to life extending technologies and practices. Sociologists of law focus on legal definitions of death, and the implications and problems created by such definitions for heroic medical efforts, transplantation, inheritance, and insurance. Sociologists of religion focus on rites and rituals at the end of life, the impact of religion and spirituality on beliefs about life and death, and changes in religious attitudes and practices as individuals manage their own dying process and the deaths of family members. Sociologists of deviance investigate deaths that violate traditional norms, such as murder and suicide, as well as reactions to death that are considered deviant, such as anniversary suicides.

Despite the absence of an overarching theoretical framework, one broad theme that underlies much current research is the importance of personal control and agency, among both dying persons and their survivors. Two specific lines of inquiry which have developed over the past ten years are personal control over practical aspects of the dying process, and active

“meaning making” among the dying and bereaved.

Mounting research explores how dying persons and their families make decisions about the type, site, and duration of care they want to receive at the end of life. Sociologists’ key contributions have included identifying the cognitive, emotional, and structural factors that may enable or prevent individuals from receiving the type of care they hope to receive. Recent research reveals that patients and their family members seldom have sufficient information about their illness trajectory and future life span so that they can make informed decisions. Nicholas Christakis (1999) argues persuasively that physicians are extremely poor at prognosis, or projecting how much longer a dying patient has to live, and they often convey an unrealistically optimistic picture of their patient’s future.

A second area of inquiry that has attracted renewed scholarly attention is meaning making among both the dying and their loved ones following loss. This concept was first set forth in *Death and Identity*, where Fulton (1965) argued that “preserving rather than losing . . . personal identity” was a critical aspect of the dying process. Victor Marshall (1980) proposed that heightened awareness of one’s impending death triggers increased self reflection, reminiscence, and the conscious construction of a coherent personal history. More recently, Edwin Schneidman (1995) proposed that dying persons actively construct a “post self” or a lasting image of the self that will persist after their death.

The ways that bereaved survivors actively find meaning in death was articulated early on by Herman Feifel (1977: 9), who observed that the mourning period following loss provides a time for the bereaved to “redefine and integrate oneself into life.” Current research explores the ways that active meaning making among the newly bereaved helps to reestablish predictability and one’s sense of security. Other goals for the bereaved include personal growth, an adaptive broadening of philosophical perspectives, and an increased appreciation of other interpersonal relations.

Scholars of death and dying face several important methodological challenges. First, bereavement research focuses nearly exclusively

on the loss of a spouse, children, and parents; few studies investigate personal responses to the deaths of friends, siblings, or unmarried romantic partners, including gay and lesbian partners. A further limitation is that studies vary widely in their operationalization of "dying." Common measures include one's current illness diagnosis, combinations of diagnoses, symptom expression, and functional capacity (see George 2002 for a review). Although rich conceptual models of dying trajectories have been developed, formal operationalizations need further refinement. Finally, although most conceptual models of the dying process and bereavement are dynamic, such as the stage theory of dying (Kubler Ross 1969), most empirical studies still rely on single point in time evaluations that retrospectively recall the dying and bereavement process.

In the future, the research agenda may focus increasingly on positive aspects of dying, including psychological resilience in the face of loss, and the characteristics of and pathways to a "good death." Important research goals include pinpointing modifiable factors of social contexts and relationships that may help ensure a smooth transition to death and bereavement. Early theories of loss proposed that persons who were not depressed following the loss of a loved one were "pathological." Researchers now are documenting that the non depressed bereaved may experience "resilience" rather than pathological "absent grief" (Bonanno 2004).

Research on the "good death" also is accumulating. A good death is characterized as one where medical treatments minimize avoidable pain and match patients' and family members' preferences. A "good death" also encompasses important social, psychological, and philosophical elements, such as accepting one's impending death and not feeling like a burden to loved ones. However, as norms for the "good death" are solidified, a fruitful line of inquiry may be the consequences for bereaved family members and health care providers when a death occurs under conditions that fail to meet the widely accepted ideal. Failure to achieve the "good death" may reflect enduring social and structural obstacles. For example, family member (or caregiver) involvement is essential to a patient's participation in hospice; few studies have explored the extent to which unmarried or

childless people rely on hospice. Such inquiries may further reveal the ways that the experience of death reflects persistent social inequalities.

SEE ALSO: Aging, Sociology of; Disease, Social Causation; Euthanasia; Gender, Health, and Mortality; Healthy Life Expectancy; Medicine, Sociology of; Mortality: Transitions and Measures; Social Epidemiology; Suicide; Widowhood

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death penalty as a social problem

Evi Girling

The death penalty (also known as capital punishment) is the sentencing of offenders to death after conviction following due process of law. The practice of the death penalty has undergone two key transformations in modern times. The first one is an unremitting restriction on the kinds of crimes and categories of offender on whom the death penalty could be applied, leading to its eventual abolition in the majority of jurisdictions. The second shift is its transformation from brutal public displays of excess (famously depicted by Foucault in *Discipline and Punish*, 1977) to private, detached, and medicalized executions where pain and the body is elided, where execution is rendered a non event. Within the sociology of punishment these shifts have been mostly explained either by the cultural dynamic of the privatization of disturbing events or by the transformation in technologies of power from punishment as a public and violent spectacle inflicting pain on the body to the emergence of disciplinary power and the surveillance of the soul.

The death penalty can be traced to antiquity from the Lex Talionis of the Code of Hamurabi (1750 BCE) to the laws of Draco in ancient Greece (seventh century BCE) and its prescription by Roman Law (fifth century BCE). It also has established provenance in some of the world's major religions, such as Christianity, Judaism, and Islam, all of which have at times provided justification or condoned the practice. Its widespread use during the middle ages was defended during the Renaissance and Reformation by many Enlightenment thinkers such as Hobbes, Locke, and Rousseau. It was however during this same period that the first seeds of at least partial abolitionism began to emerge. The Italian criminologist Cesare Beccaria in his work *Dei Delitte, et delle Penne* (1764) argued for the abolition of the death penalty and became influential in the development of the modern abolitionist movement. Abolitionism grew in the nineteenth century through the work of the jurists Jeremy Bentham and Samuel Rommilly.

By the end of the 1920s several European countries had eradicated the death penalty for peace time offenses. This momentum was reversed with the rise of authoritarian regimes and the reinstatement and expansion of the practice in jurisdictions such as Italy and Germany.

The end of World War II proved a turning point in the development of international sensibilities and legal instruments to regulate punishment by death. A number of international and regional treaties that restricted or provided for the abolition of the death penalty were put in place. The transformation has been at its most dramatic in Europe, where from the 1960s onwards increasing numbers of states abolished the use of the death penalty. In 1986 Protocol No. 6 to the European Convention of Human Rights came into force, abolishing the death penalty in peacetime. Since 1998 a condition for entry to the European Union has been the abolition of the death penalty. Beyond Europe the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (1948) recognized each person's right to life and states that "No one shall be subjected to torture or to cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment or punishment." Opponents of the death penalty argue that the death penalty violates these rights both at the point of execution and in the length, conditions, and experience of prisoners in death row. Article 6 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (1989) proclaims the right to life, but precognizes capital punishment as a permissible exception. It also sets out procedural safeguards for its application and significantly prohibits the execution of juveniles and pregnant women. The Second Optional Protocol to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (1989) provides for the total abolition of the death penalty, but allows states to retain the death penalty for the most serious crimes if they make a reservation to that effect at the time of ratifying or acceding to the protocol. The International Criminal Court (1998) excluded the death penalty from the punishments which it is authorized to impose. A similar stance has been taken by the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia (1993) and the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (1994).

Yet the abolitionist movement cannot claim global success. According to Amnesty

International, by 2005 121 countries had abolished the death penalty either in law or in practice, 86 countries had abolished the death penalty for all crimes, 11 had retained the death penalty only for exceptional crimes, and 24 countries retain the death penalty in law but have not carried out executions for the last 10 years. According to the best estimates during 2004, at least 3,797 people were executed in 25 countries and at least 7,395 people were sentenced to death in 64 countries. A small number of countries are responsible for the vast majority of executions: 97 percent of all known executions took place in China, Iran, Vietnam, and the US (Amnesty International 2005). Within this group the People's Republic of China is estimated to have carried out 3,400 (9 out of 10 executions).

Support and opposition to the death penalty rest on the fine balancing between philosophical questions about its justice or morality and pragmatic questions about its usefulness, its possible discriminatory or capricious distribution among the guilty, and the inherent risk of executing the innocent.

Arguments in support of the death penalty usually evoke the principle of retribution or the principle of deterrence. Arguments against the death penalty challenge retribution and construct the death penalty as an extreme form of torture that violates the sanctity of life in particular and human rights in general. The deterrent justification is the one most often deployed by retentionist states and rests on the extent to which the death penalty stops other offenders from committing the same offense, thus saving innocent lives. Supporters of capital punishment argue that it has a deterrent effect on potentially violent offenders, especially where the threat of imprisonment is not a sufficient restraint, for example those already serving life imprisonment. Studies in the 1970s and 1980s (e.g., Ehrlich 1975) showed support for the deterrent effect of execution. Such studies have been subject to extensive methodological criticism and other studies using similar data refuted the deterrent effect of executions. Bowers and Pierce (1980) have found that rather than a deterrent effect, executions appear to contribute to an increase in the number of homicides. There is at the moment no conclusive and undisputed evidence that executing

offenders is more effective deterrence than life imprisonment.

In jurisdictions which take into account mitigating and aggravating factors in sentencing to death, capital punishment is only inflicted in a relatively small proportion of those legally eligible, raising questions of possible arbitrariness and discrimination. One of the most striking disparities is in the geographical distribution of capital sentences and executions both within and across individual states. In the 1970s the US Supreme Court suspended the use of the death penalty (*Furman v. Georgia* 1972), accepting the argument that the death penalty was applied in an arbitrary and capricious manner and that members of racial minorities were unfairly treated. After that decision many states introduced new laws structuring the use of discretion at the sentencing stage and the death penalty was reinstated in 1976 after the decision in *Gregg v. Georgia* (1976). Subsequent attempts to present to the Supreme Court social scientific evidence of discrimination in the application of the death penalty have failed. In *McCleskey v. Kemp* (1987) the Supreme Court agreed that evidence of discrimination in death penalty cases in general was disturbing, but it held that discretion was essential to the criminal justice process and the standard of proof for its abuse must be set high and the petitioner had to prove discriminatory intent in their particular case. This is a fine balancing between individualization and equality. Since the 1990s numerous studies have sought to establish whether the death penalty is applied in a discriminatory way according to race, sex, and wealth. For example, a study by Paternoster and Brame (2003) in Maryland found that discrimination permeates every stage of case handling in capital cases, echoing similar findings by researchers in other US states. One of the most consistent findings of such studies has been that offenders who kill white victims, especially if the offender is black, are significantly and substantially more likely to be charged with a capital crime than if both the victim and defendant are black.

In 1997 the American Bar Association responded to a growing concern about the reliability of the death penalty and the risk of executing innocent people by calling for a national moratorium on all executions, in part

to “minimize the risk that innocent persons may be executed.” In a study of every death penalty appeal from 1973 through 1995 it was found that of all the thousands of cases that had completed the appeals process, 68 percent were found to contain errors serious enough for a retrial or a new sentencing trial. The study highlighted the need to maintain what has been termed super due process in capital cases safeguarding the appeal process, which had come under attack in the 1990s for its cost and the delay. In the beginning of the twenty first century a series of miscarriages of justice led to a moratorium on executions in Illinois and many states have enacted legislation to allow evidence from DNA testing to be considered after the normal appeals in capital cases have concluded.

It could be argued that the risks of error, arbitrariness, and discrimination are endemic in even the most sophisticated legislation and for all kinds of sanctions. Capital punishment is not in that respect a special case, yet the risk of mistake in capital cases is often used to challenge the legitimacy of this sanction. Zimring (2003) argues that this may be because the punishment is irreversible, because its application is incompatible with substantial error, and because unlike imprisonment the usefulness of executions can be more readily challenged.

SEE ALSO: Abolitionism; Capital Punishment; Deterrence Theory; Discrimination; Elias, Norbert; Foucault, Michel; Human Rights; Race and the Criminal Justice System

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death of the sociology of deviance?

Erich Goode

Over the past decade or so, the claim that the sociology of deviance is “dead” has become increasingly vocal. Colin Sumner (1994), advocating an outspoken leftist agenda, dates the field’s “death” to 1975. Unfortunately for his argument, he offers aphorisms, plays on words, and polemical assertions about the field’s role in the political economy, but no empirical evidence to test his proposition.

Miller et al. (2001) demonstrate that works in the sociology of deviance published in the 1990s cite criminologists more often than recognized deviance specialists; and among the most frequently cited works of recognized deviance figures, only two were published after 1975. These findings, they argue, offer an “empirical test” of the “declining influence of scholarship in the sociology of deviance” (p. 43). In spite of the possible methodological limitations of the authors’ measurements, the tests of Miller et al. do suggest the field’s declining theoretical vitality, although they do not support Sumner’s “death” claim.

Hendershott (2002) agrees with Sumner that the sociology of deviance is “dead.” She argues

that “few sociologists want to teach” courses on deviance, that the subject is “being eliminated” from sociology’s curriculum. The field of deviance studies “died,” she claims, because of its relativistic stance; increasingly, she asserts, Americans are rejecting the field’s neutral, amoral, relativistic cloak because it justifies immoral behaviors that deserve to be stigmatized and vilified. It is time, she says, to return to “common sense” and “natural law.” In short, it is time to redefine deviance as behavior that is inherently, intrinsically, and objectively bad, wrong, harmful, disruptive, and subversive, rather than a mere social construction, as the sociologists of deviance have claimed. Her agenda, she says, is to engage in “remoralizing” America.

In a balanced argument, Joel Best (2004) traces the “trajectory” of sociological studies of deviance from the late 1950s into the 1990s. He argues that the field “has come to occupy an insecure, even precarious, place in sociology.” His conclusion is that the sociology of deviance “no longer plays as prominent a role in sociology’s thinking as it once did.” This is documented by a decline in the citation count of articles using the word “deviance” published in sociology’s three most prominent journals between the 1970s and the 1990s. As Best points out, the field of deviance may not be dead, “but neither does it seem to be thriving.”

Goode (2003) found that just under two thirds (16) of the sociology departments in the 25 leading US institutions of higher learning offer a deviance course. Enrollment figures for deviance courses in the 17 departments examined were found to be as robust today as they were in the 1970s. In short, Hendershott’s charges – not endorsed by Best – that no one wants to teach the course, and that it is being eliminated from sociology’s curriculum, are contradicted by the available evidence. While Best (2004) dismisses the notion that undergraduate enrollments and textbook sales indicate the field’s continued intellectual vitality, Goode (1997) disagrees by demonstrating that the major deviance textbooks generate a substantial number of citations from the field as a whole. This, according to Goode, indicates their continued intellectual utility. A tabulation of the more than 1,700 scholarly articles located by the Social Science Citation Index

(1957–2004) that bore “deviance” or “deviant” in their titles indicates that the 1980s was the field’s peak year for scholarly productivity, and that the 1990s was more productive than the 1970s; expressed as a yearly average, the 2000s (2000–3) were only slightly less productive than the 1990s. Hence, the field’s scholarly productivity seems to be as strong as it was during a decade (the 1970s) its critics claim was its peak productive era.

Not one of these claims or tests compares deviance with any other subfield of sociology; it is possible that other subfields are no different from deviance in this respect. Indeed, evidence indicates that the field of sociology, taken as a whole, is less conceptually and theoretically innovative than it was in the past. Still, nearly all indicators point to the fact that the productivity, conceptual and theoretical creativity, and influence of the sociology of deviance have declined somewhat since the 1980s. It is possible that the field’s split from criminology is responsible for this decline. However, to adequately test the hypothesis, the productivity and vitality of other fields – and sociology generally – would have to be compared with deviance to determine whether the latter is exceptional in this respect. By no measure, however, can the sociology of deviance be said to be “dead.” Evidence suggests that the charge is empirically false and, in all likelihood, politically motivated, energized, on both the political left and right, by a dread of the field’s foundational assumption: social and cultural relativism.

SEE ALSO: Deviance; Deviance, Absolutist Definitions of; Deviance, Theories of; Sociocultural Relativism

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Debord, Guy (1931–94)

David Redmon

The *Situationist Internationale* extended French avant garde social movements by identifying how the spectacle replaced the commodity as the dominating mode of social life. Guy Debord was perhaps the foremost thinker in this group of French intellectuals who were influenced by Dadaism, Surrealism, and the sociologist Henri Lefebvre. Debord was not an academic, yet citations of his works are included in numerous sociological texts. Debord never graduated from college, barely graduated high school, and lived the majority of his life as a drifter who roamed to and from different urban locations. He eventually settled down in a rural village where he committed suicide by shooting himself in the heart at the age of 62 (Merrifield 2005).

Debord is most famous for his polemic “Society of the Spectacle” – a montage of theoretical writings which analyzed the transformation from a society organized around production to one organized around the consumption of “an immense accumulation of spectacles.” According to Best and Kellner (1997: 81), Debord sought to update the Marxian emphasis on class struggle and factory work with a project focused on the transformation of the city and liberating subjectivity from the hegemonic integration of media and consumer culture which manufactures a spectacular society. Spectacular society, Debord explained, was an apparatus of fabricated social relations in which institutions socialized people through relationships with images; it is a reified world where consumers and producers are alienated from each other and can only experience their social world through the accumulation of spectacles. Debord (1994) writes: “The spectacle is

the moment when the commodity has attained the total occupation of social life. The relation to the commodity is not only visible, but one no longer sees anything but it: the world one sees is its world.” All that remains from the spectacle are representations of life.

In spectacular society represented life is reduced to a hegemonic network of consumer gadgets, leisure is reduced to shopping, and the logo or brand becomes the dominating category of status and prestige for people. The apparatus of surface appearances effectively controls people precisely because they unite into a coherent glossy image that renders the rational techniques that manufactured them invisible; all that remains is the desire to possess the signifier of the sign. Therefore, the spectacle does not socially control its subjects by force, but through the pacification of creativity and the consensus of collective desire. The spectacle extends its subtle forms of normalization and domination by constituting the desires of subjects to conform to the glossy images in magazines, advertisements, commercials, and movies. “The spectacle,” Debord notes, “is the moment when the commodity has attained the total occupation of social life” (Thesis 42). The spectacle is a chain of images that flattens and reduces landscapes into a vacuum of TGI Fridays, Applebees, GAP, Abercrombie and Finch, glistening billboards, and Starbucks located next to fast food restaurants and chain hotels.

Debord is adamant in pointing out, however, that spectacular society is socially constructed by an apparatus of modern men and women: advertisers, city council planners, international financial institutions, corporations, special economic zones, architects, fashion designers, and so on. Therefore, he claims, it is imperative to understand that the spectacle is vulnerable to disruption and eventual eradication. The concept he applies to this possible transformation is *détournement*. *Détournement* is a conceptual and physical tactic employed by opponents of the spectacle who desire to alter, destroy, and replace it with a more humane alternative, one that advances creativity and the ability to fully participate in the creation of their everyday lives. Examples of *détournement* include squatting in abandoned spaces; resignifying or inverting the intended meaning of advertisements through graffiti or street art; reclaiming

streets, parks, or abandoned gardens so that the public can participate in them through actions such as growing organic food, playing with children, creating music, or participating in games, chess, soccer, or carnivals. Pleasure, passion, and organic relationships based on difference and self creativity are the values upon which the Situationists attempted to transform everyday life.

These intentional revolts were meant to influence everyday people to create their own *détournement* actions. May 1968 provided the defining moment of Situationism in that the historical rupture could not be attributed directly to a crisis in the economy. Perhaps the most controversial organization that emerged in Paris out of May 1968, and influenced by the Situationists, was the Angry Brigade. The Angry Brigade was a marginal yet influential organization of anonymous activists who set off more than 20 bombings. None of the bombs, however, were designed to kill or maim anyone (and no one was ever killed or maimed). Instead, their bombing targets were identified for their symbolic value. Consider one statement from their communiqué: "Life is so boring, there's nothing to do except spend all our wages on the latest skirt or shirt. Brothers and sisters, what are your real desires?"

Contemporary examples of *détournement* include international social movements against global capitalism and neoliberalism: Critical Mass and Reclaim the Streets. The twentieth century birth of these contemporary movements is marked by the 1989 uprisings in Venezuela against the International Monetary Fund. The mainstream media visualized them on January 1, 1994, when the Zapatistas rose up against neoliberalism and for humanity. They erupted in Seattle, WA against the World Trade Organization on November 30, 1999 – exactly 5 years after Debord's suicide. Appropriately, masked anarchists were invited to join local activists and citizens to damage the spectacle. Targets included the spectacular images that Debord sought to eradicate, the pillars of the global spectacle themselves: McDonald's, Starbucks, Niketown, and banks were all vandalized, windows were smashed, and graffiti was painted, "Fuck the WTO," "Stop sweat shops," and perhaps most famously, "We are winning!"

Individuals who employ Black Bloc tactics are made up of decentralized affinity groups who employ a diversity of tactics in reclaiming streets, desires, and autonomy. In regard to the destruction of corporate property in Seattle during the World Trade Organization meetings, for example, groups who employed "Black Bloc tactics" circulated a communiqué influenced by the writings of Debord. In true Debordian style, these groups explained that they "took on an offensive role regarding the conscious destruction of capitalist private property. Here, affinity groups within the Bloc would facilitate the smashing of windows, spray painting of revolutionary messages and trashing of police and/or military vehicles. Of course, all such activity was clearly directed against capitalist targets . . . In short, the demonstration here begins to assume its own identity free of the social spectacle of the commodified consumer culture, and begins to move in a more fluid, self defining manner" (Green Mountain Anarchist Collective). The Black Bloc papers go on to provide a comprehensive critique of the "society of the spectacle" and the international financial institutions through a critical analysis in which Debord is quoted in several passages.

SEE ALSO: Anarchism; Capitalism; Consumption, Mass Consumption and Consumer Culture; Consumption, Spectacles of; Lefebvre, Henri; Media and Consumer Culture; Situationists

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decision-making

Lois A. Vitt

Decision making is the process by which individuals and groups identify, combine, and integrate information in order to choose one of

several possible courses of action. In social psychology, research traditions involve the cognition, affect, and behavior that drive both *individual* decision making (including attitudes, beliefs, values, and actions) and *group* decision making (including group formation, group preference, performance and influence, social decision schemes, straw poll, social comparison, and groupthink).

Although some social psychologists have taken up decision making as a focused research interest, social psychology generally is seen as informing the emerging interdisciplinary areas of the decision sciences. As a topic area within social psychology, decision making is not guided by a single theoretical framework that researchers use to organize and guide their work. Rather, a number of theories in which decision making is either explicit or implicit can be found within symbolic interactionism, exchange theory, rational choice, cognitive consistency theories, and other research on attitudes, beliefs, values, and behaviors. Dissonance theory, for instance, is a comprehensive framework that describes cognition and behavior before, during, and after people make decisions. It is based upon the general proposition that inconsistent cognitions arouse an unpleasant subjective state, which leads to behaviors designed to reduce dissonance and achieve consistency, a satisfactory subject state. People feel discomfort in virtually all unresolved decision situations – the more important the decision, the greater the dissonance.

Historically, the heading of “judgment and decision research” is broad and work has been conducted over many years using differing methods within and across disciplines. Since the 1940s and 1950s, such research generally has followed two lines of inquiry. One group of researchers set out to learn how people decide on a particular course of action. How do people choose what to do next? Are their decisions rational? If not, by what processes do they make choices? A second group of researchers was motivated by people’s perceptions. Do people integrate conflicting thoughts and ideas, arrive at an understanding of the situation they are facing, and then make a judgment? Does their judgment improve with experience? How does human judgment compare with actuarial prediction?

From the first set of inquiries a formal modeling approach evolved, which has most commonly been used in economics and organization management. It typically compares the cost or utility of alternatives, characterizes choice as the maximization of value, and assumes that rational, self interested persons make the correct, most efficient choice on the basis of available information. Rational decision making involves sufficiently reducing uncertainty so as to allow a reasonable choice to be made from among alternatives. This classical approach has contributed illuminating tools of thought and substance to the social sciences, but it also has been seen as both too strong and too weak: too strong because it sets impractical – if not impossible – standards and too weak because it fails to capture the subtleties of human concerns (Bacharach 1994). Sharir and his colleagues (1997), for example, have argued that rational models do not deal with significant aspects of actual deliberations, which are essentially subjective and can be experienced, and appear to others, as vague.

Evidence is accumulating in economics, particularly behavioral economics, and organization management that decision making requires persons, individually or in groups, to expend cognitive effort, and more often than not, feeling effort as well when identifying alternatives and choosing among them. Choice is a motivational condition that arouses both cognition and emotion and affects decision making behavior. Argyris (2001) argues that in order to be effective in group decision making, it is necessary to understand interpersonal factors during the decision process itself. According to Hayashi (2001), effective decision making involves having the ability to intuit, or “trust your gut.”

A second set of inquiries involving judgment can be found in the scholarship on history, politics, and the law, where quantitative modeling and cost analysis can be difficult or implausible to apply. Using a reason based approach to decision making, this perspective identifies reasons and arguments that influence decisions and explains choice in terms of the balance of for and against alternatives. One school within this perspective sees judgments and decisions reached by groups through sets of relatively simple rules known as “social decision schemes.”

Rules within social decision schemes relate the initial distribution of members' views or preferences to the group's final decisions. A *majority wins* rule suggests that a group will decide according to whatever position is initially supported by most of its members. Other social decision schemes involve the familiar *two thirds majority* rule in use by some juries and other decision making groups, and an alternative known as a *first shift* rule, in which groups tend to adopt a decision consistent with the direction of the first shift in opinion shown by any members. In contrast, a fourth alternative is the *truth wins* rule, which indicates that a decision will be reached by members' recognition of the "correctness" of a solution. The results of many studies indicate that these straightforward social decision schemes underlie, and are successful in predicting (up to 80 percent of), even complex group decisions.

Although some scholars have contributed to both choice and judgment areas of decision research, controversy over which approach is superior and efforts to integrate the two are still ongoing. For instance, one review of some 20 studies found that intuitive ("clinical") judgments are less accurate than a simple statistical combination of the same information available to the judge (Goldstein & Hogarth 1997). A third historical or meta approach called deciding how to decide is used to compare and explain the selection of one decision strategy over another, depending upon the conditions involved.

Recent developments in the field of judgment and decision making include the emergence of a formal interdisciplinary field of decision science, which seeks to understand and improve judgment and decision making of individuals, groups, and organizations. Theories that provide the core for decision science draw on insights from a diverse set of disciplines, including social psychology as well as cognitive psychology, economics, statistics, neurology, and philosophy. Applications of decision making research are being used to improve decision capabilities of fields as diverse as medicine, military science, law, organization management, and consumer finance.

At one end of the field, judgment and decision researchers now include higher order thought processes, thus blurring the line between decision research and cognitive

psychology. Researchers cite and conduct studies that involve memory, mood, and motivation, learning and language, attention and attitude, reasoning and representation, problem solving and perception, expertise and explanatory coherence. At the other end of the field, researchers are conducting intensive study of the social aspects of decision making, thereby blurring lines between parts of social psychology, sociology, economics, political science, and anthropology. These areas of judgment and decision research are moving forward rapidly. However, another discipline exists that has long incorporated an understanding of the subjective nature of decision making – the field of market research that supports commercial advertising and consumer decision making.

Among the tools of market researchers are concepts originally developed by social psychologists and sociologists. Some market researchers, for instance, hold that human values inform the processes of preference, choice, and purchase decisions. Targeted efforts often are designed to tap into what is known about consumer values in order to sell them products and services. The idea that individuals or groups of individuals prefer and choose among what they value most is not new to social psychology. Although discussions about values and how values function at personal levels have occurred over centuries and can be found in all fields of the social sciences (and in law, the physical sciences, education, philosophy, and religion), it was social psychologist Milton Rokeach who may be best known for his work on the nature of human values and value systems. Rokeach argued that values drove decisions and although difficult to accomplish, changes in human values have the power to change even entrenched behaviors.

Other behavioral and social scientists (and philosophers) have used the term values to refer to ideals in the world toward which people are oriented and to what is regarded as personally desirable. Individuals hold beliefs and attitudes about the way things are, make judgments about the way things should be, make tradeoffs among choices, then choose and take action according to what they value. Although the study of human values in sociology has more or less languished (perhaps for want of better measurement tools), in

Value Focused Thinking decision researcher Ralph Keeney (1996) argues that values drive the best decisions of both individuals and businesses. New theoretical frameworks are being introduced into the values and decision making research literature in order to reenergize thinking in that research area, and also to present explanations of consumers' financial and health care decision making behaviors (e.g., Vitt 2004).

Decision making based on values alone, however, is not without controversy. Not much is known, for example, about the links between consumers' stated values and their sometimes inconsistent decision behavior. A better understanding of values awaits further research in social psychology and the decision sciences. How and why these inconsistencies operate in health care, purchase behaviors, savings and investment behaviors, and environmental choices could improve understanding of both individual and group judgment and decision making in these and other areas in society.

In addition to links to human values in decision making, connections have been made to the attitude literature, exchange theory, literature on the self, role and identity, and many other social psychological conceptualizations. Meanings elaborated in decision making also have importance beyond the task of rendering decisions. Decision making and the activities that surround it have symbolic significance as well. Decision makers develop and communicate meaning not only about decisions, but also about what is happening in the world and why. They define morally important issues, create understandings, and impact events, actions, policies, and even cultures. They allocate resources that define who is powerful, who is smart, who is prosperous, and who is virtuous. Thus, the process of judgment and decision making affects individual, organizational, and societal esteem and standing. It helps to create and sustain a social order of relationships, trust and distrust. It builds bridges to disciplines of study, both basic and applied.

The reality is that individual and group decisions result in outcomes as significant as life and death, war and peace, prosperity and impoverishment, social justice, foreign relations and the domestic policies of nations. Organizations can succeed or fail as a consequence of the decision making skills, mindsets, and practices of

managers. The theories and research of social psychologists have contributed to the vast decision sciences and will undoubtedly continue to fit into and work within this growing network, helping to improve knowledge about judgment and decision making by individuals and groups.

SEE ALSO: Attitudes and Behavior; Cognitive Dissonance Theory (Festinger); Identity Theory; Rational Choice Theories; Role; Symbolic Interaction; Values

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decolonization

Julian Go

Decolonization typically refers to a shift in a society's political status from colony to autonomous state or independent nation. It can also

refer to a shift from colonial status to full incorporation into the dominant polity such that it is no longer subordinate to the latter. While decolonization has occurred in many different places and times, typical usage of the term in the modern period refers to the decolonization by western colonial powers of dependencies in Asia, Africa, or the Americas. It is strongly associated with the fall of modern empires and the spread of nationalism and the nation state around the world. Decolonization has also been used to refer to a cultural or psychological process that may or may not correlate with formal political decolonization.

The first major period of decolonization in the modern era occurred in the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries. In this period, colonies of England, France, Portugal, and Spain emerged as independent nations. The period began with the revolution of Britain's continental colonies and the formation of the United States and the emergence of independent Haiti, formerly the French colony of Saint Domingue. Thereafter, in the early nineteenth century, colonies of Spain and Portugal in Latin America obtained independence in the wake of the occupation of Spain by Napoleon in 1808. The second major era of decolonization occurred in the mid twentieth century. This period saw a far reaching, global spread of decolonization. Most colonies in the Indian subcontinent, the Pacific, Southeast Asia, Africa, the Caribbean, and the Middle East obtained independence. The process began after World War I but was accelerated after World War II. From 1945 to 1981, approximately 105 new nations emerged as a direct or indirect result of decolonization. Most of these nations then joined the United Nations, such that the number of members in the United Nations expanded from 56 members to 156 in this period.

The two periods of decolonization differ in several respects, in part due to the character of the colonies involved. In the first period, decolonization was led by revolts among creoles and settlers who sought independence from their former mother country. In the second period, decolonization was led by indigenous groups rather than settlers or creoles. Furthermore, decolonization in the Americas during the late eighteenth and nineteenth centuries was

localized in the western hemisphere. By contrast, decolonization in the second period was global in scope, covering nearly all colonies. While a handful of countries remained dependencies of western powers after World War II, decolonization in this period is typically associated with the end of the western empires and the concomitant diffusion of the nation state ideal around the globe. Finally, decolonization in the first period was typically initiated by anti colonial revolutions. In North America, Central and South America, and Haiti, independence was won through war (the exception is the independence of Brazil from Portugal). In contrast, decolonization in the twentieth century most often occurred without violence. Except for Algeria, Angola, Indonesia, and Vietnam, colonies won their independence after initial signs of discontent were expressed and as imperial powers decided to let them become independent.

There is little consensus on the causes of decolonization, but several classes of causation can be discerned. One includes factors internal to the colony, such as the emergence of nationalism among local populations and associated resistance to the metropolitan power. A second includes the relative capacity or willingness on the part of metropolitan powers. The third includes larger systemic factors in the global system of international politics, which might in turn shape the metropolitan powers' willingness to decolonize. Some theories suggest, for example, that when an imperial state is "hegemonic" in the world system, it prefers global free trade and therefore becomes more supportive of decolonization. A related factor is global political culture. After World War II, for example, colonial empires began to lose legitimacy and the ideal of the nation state became most pronounced, in part because the United States lent support to anti colonial sentiment.

The results of decolonization in the twentieth century have been complex. While decolonization was heralded by national elites as the first step toward modernization and economic growth, modeled after the development of their former imperial rulers, these developmental dreams proved difficult to realize even in the absence of direct political control by outside rulers. The effects of colonialism upon local socioeconomic structures were difficult to cast

off and neocolonialism or relations of dependency continued with western powers. Many decolonized countries saw an influx of foreign capital that, as some studies argued, slowed if not impeded economic growth. They also became subject to the policies of global institutions such as the World Bank or International Monetary Fund. Political legacies were also strong, as postcolonial nations created governments often modeled after the government of their former ruler. The global diffusion of western political forms such as constitutions can partly be attributed to decolonization.

One of the most significant consequences of decolonization, however, is the emergence of the nation state as the dominant form for organizing societies and the related realization of the modern interstate system around the world. After decolonization in the twentieth century, empires have become illegitimate in the eyes of the international community, and few territories have become recolonized. Decolonization has meant that empire, a major form for organizing peoples for centuries, has ended. Whether this legacy of decolonization will persist, or whether a new era of empires will emerge, remains to be seen.

SEE ALSO: Colonialism (Neocolonialism); Dependency and World Systems Theories; Manifest Destiny; Methods, Postcolonial; Nation State

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deconstruction

George Pavlich

At first blush, placing a term like deconstruction in a sociology encyclopedia seems entirely incongruous. The word *encyclopedia* derives from the Greek prefix *en* (in) and *kúklos* with *paideiā*, connoting education (Ayto 1990: 201). Together, the implication is this: encyclopedias encircle education by gathering general, but definitive, discussions on particular topics between the covers of one reference work. This activity undoubtedly runs contrary to the spirit of deconstructive practices that expressly involve undoing language where it gathers itself into closed circles – especially when it purports to reflect the necessary, essential, absolute, or fixed. By contrast, the prospect of reinventing encyclopedic traditions from within is certainly not counter to deconstructive thought. Without clinging to the *en*, one could, for instance, allude to the deconstructive potential of generally circling around educative meaning horizons.

Associated with the French writer Jacques Derrida, deconstruction appears alongside several neologisms he initially created to read, yet reach beyond, the Platonic auspices of western metaphysics. Key among those auspices are oppositions that distinguish between appearance and reality, matter and form, temporal manifestation and essential principle (Derrida 1976, 1979, 1981). As well, metaphysical writing privileges logical arguments (*logocentrism*), formulating them as the center and marginalizing all other aspects of the text (Derrida 1982). So, the real, formal, and essential is assumed to be apodictic; logic within language faithfully represents, names, or classifies what is already there. Heidegger, who cast himself as among the first post metaphysical thinkers, sought to undo such thinking, appealing at times to nostalgic strategies of remembrance that recall “authentic” forms of Being ignored by metaphysical languages. Although markedly influenced by Heidegger’s work, Derrida offers a rather different, non nostalgic tack.

His now famous adage suggests that language may be approached as constitutive in its own right, without assuming the external

existence of its referents: “*There is nothing outside the text*” (Derrida 1976: 158; emphasis in original). Contextually sanctioned arrangements of words compose not only the entities enunciated through language (e.g., subjects, objects, things, transcendental ideas), but also the very concept of existence. Consequently, metaphysics’ primordial suppositions about being as that which is present, or indeed its emphasis on such oppositions as appearance–reality, are the products of language usage in given locales. For Derrida, anything said to exist or deemed present always achieves that status by virtue of specific iterations of language use. For instance, Being is enunciated as presence because of the way signs are locally deployed in relation to one another, and its meaning emerges from particular patterns of deferral. Consider another example. If asked “what does the word air plane mean?” a language user must respond by deferring to other words, signs with which that word is internally related in a given context – “it is a machine that flies,” “it is not a ground vehicle,” and so on. Dictionaries and encyclopedias also provide good examples of the ways meaning arises through deferral. Derrida (1976, 1981) famously explored this “play of differences” and coined the term *différance* (which in French can connote both “to differ” and “to defer”) to indicate how meaning, presence, and referents are generated by deferment to other signs. Such deferrals are not inconsequential; they literally shape both identities and how these live.

Moreover, language systems are governed by historically situated rules and conventions whose authority is premised on absence, rupture, aporia, and paradox. Patterns of *différance* are therefore never stable, necessary, fixed, or closed; they always can be – by virtue of their contingent, aporetic structure – disrupted, dispersed, opened, and dissociated to make way for new deferral patterns, meaning horizons, and existences. Disruptions to language formations have potentially vast consequences for the everyday meanings subjects use to encompass being at any given point in history. If that reflects Derrida’s direct relevance to ethical questions of how to be with others, it also suggests how deconstructing given

organizations of *différance* is ultimately about incipient ways of existing.

But what precisely is deconstruction? Although this question is not unproblematic in context, one might say that deconstruction has to do with opening up given linguistic arrangements to the mostly silent, background suppositions and aporias that enable their particular patterns of deferral. Its opening gambit, “guardrail,” is to read a classic text closely (never abandoning it or rejecting it out of hand), surveying especially what it eclipses, ignores, rejects, expels, dismisses, marginalizes, renders supplemental, excludes, and eliminates. Deconstruction pores over these delegitimated elements of a text to make room for alternate interpretations that open up a reading to what is completely unforeseeable from the vantage of its meaning horizons. Through such openings, deconstruction seeks to reorganize a given language use by realigning conventional oppositions, creating space for unexpected linguistic possibilities and being. Like the host, perhaps, it offers an unconditional welcome to the arrival of what is strange, unfamiliar, and other (Derrida 1997b, 1999, 2001; Derrida & Dufourmantelle 2000).

From here, the waters get muddy for those in search of singular definitions that expect one to decide definitively about deconstruction. The very question “what is . . .?” poses a unique problem: while it appears to open discussion, the *is* commits respondents to the existence of the very thing placed in question. Yet, as Derrida (1995, 1997) repeatedly indicates, deconstruction is not a finite being (a presence) that can be defined universally, once and for all. Indeed, formulating an essential, fixed definition of deconstruction would replicate the very “metaphysics of presence” that he challenges. Instead, a different approach to language is required, and one that immediately faces a definitional intricacy: the word “deconstruction” cannot be defined once and for all, with any fixed unity, because any meaning or feature attributed to it is always, in its turn, deconstructable (see Derrida 1988: 4).

Several further things may be said about deconstructive analysis. Each such analysis is, as noted in the above quotation, subject to further deconstruction – the process is

unending and without final decision. There is never a point at which deconstruction ends, for every emergent meaning horizon is traced through deconstructible grammars. Moreover, attempts at deconstruction do not approximate a sustained method, methodology, procedure, or unified strategy. Rather, their emergence is as diverse as the contexts in which they are located, and in each case a close familiarity with the analyzed text is required. Its contingent path is, however, never determined or predictable. As Derrida insists: "Deconstruction is not a method or some tool that you apply to something from the outside. Deconstruction is something which happens and which happens inside" (Derrida 1997a: 9). It is not an intentional act that produces predictable results – it emerges by happening, if at all. And that happening is pleasurable, structurally desirable, and playful. Derrida (in Kearney 1984: 126) even suggests that deconstructing a text entails revealing how it "functions as desire," how the quest to render present, to secure a stable plenitude, is always deferred. The reader engages this "desire of language" through his or her own desire to appropriate in the text an absence, or something that is other to the self who reads.

In addition, since deconstruction is always located as somewhat of a "double gesture" that both reads and exceeds given texts, it never breaks fully with the past: "I do not believe in decisive ruptures, in an unequivocal 'epistemological break,' as it is called today. Breaks are always, and fatally, reinscribed in an old cloth that must continually, interminably be undone" (Derrida 1981: 24).

So, deconstruction takes place, or not as the case may be, through particular instances where attempts are made to open (dissociate) given arrangements of language to other possible arrangements. It attends closely to the unspoken elements that enable the central, or privileged, theses of a given meaning formation; it transpires by working with the lowly, unstable, contingent, and aporetic foundations upon which any open system of *différance* resides.

While the emphasis on language may appear to render deconstruction particularly well suited to literary and philosophical discourses, its effects have reverberated through many

discourses, including socio legal studies, women's studies, cultural studies, anthropology, religious studies, politics, criminology, and so on. Within the context of sociology, specifically, deconstruction's ethical pursuit of how to be with others is directly pertinent. But it also strikes a potentially rich chord in several other ways.

First, to the extent that deconstruction privileges dissociation over "gathering," opening over closure, it dovetails with inaugurating strands of sociological thought that viewed social formations as contingent, changeable, and amenable to historically situated openings. In later musings on the idea of deconstruction, Derrida (1997a: 13) tells us his focus has always been on "heterogeneity" and "dissociation" rather than practices that privilege "gathering" and unified formulations of concepts like "community" or even "society." He senses in such unities potentially dangerous closures that direct responsibility from members and fail to recognize basic ethical commitments to excluded others, the absences which render possible intimations of identity. Deconstruction is a way to keep open such unities and to prevent them from closing themselves off as necessary, inevitable, or the like.

If this concern with contingent, heterogeneous openings echoes elements of sociology, deconstruction assuredly does not endorse the latter's Eurocentric visions of social progress, or any quests to engineer absolute social or communal formations (see Pavlich 2001). At most, its call is to keep associative patterns interminably open, to spring into play precisely where discourses try to sign themselves off as necessary, unavoidable, unquestionably just, and so on.

Second, Derrida explicitly engages with seemingly canonical sociological texts, including his discussions of Rousseau and Marx (Derrida 1976, 1994, 2002b). His *Specters of Marx* recovers the significance of Marx by reading key texts deconstructively, making place for the idea that – despite talk to the contrary – we continue to be heirs to diverse Marxist legacies. Marx's multiple intellectual ghosts still haunt our times. One of these, often portrayed as his chief bequest, addresses the essential ontology (laws, processes, effects) of

capitalist societies. Yet Derrida argues that this somewhat anachronistic ontology is not Marx's most enduring legacy. The memory of Marx also continues to surface, for example, in the personal suffering, exploitation, and inequalities that persist on a global scale. Derrida deconstructively quarries the margins of texts like Marx and Engels's *Communist Manifesto*, or *The German Ideology*, to disclose still other specters. He surfaces with Marx's emphasis on radical, historically placed self critique that opens up to what is to come, and which strives for what cannot be known from within present possibilities. While Derrida (1994: 89) may worry about Marx's ontological formulations, he tells us he is not prepared to relinquish the critical, probing "spirit" of Marxism; but even more than this, he remains committed to the promise of emancipation and even to the "messianic" pledge to deliver new ways of being, new events that usher in new collective associations. Marx's legacy here is to have alluded to the experience of a "messianic affirmation," without a messianism, that welcomes unconditionally the promise of existence beyond current social relations.

Finally, much of sociological thinking has been undertaken in the name of various conceptions of social justice; similarly, Derrida (2002a: 243) insists that deconstruction is a language of justice, and even more forcefully proclaims that it *is* justice. For him, justice appears as a promise, beyond law, and is itself incalculable, infinite, and undeconstructable. This is not to say that deconstruction pursues the *telos* of a known justice; rather, he asserts that justice is radically unknowable, infinite, undetermined, and incalculable. Yet for all that, we are required to calculate justice, and we do so through finite calculations that find expression in law. He therefore locates deconstruction in the "interval" between law (which is deconstructible) and justice (which is not). By relentlessly opening the law (rule, grammar), refusing to allow any finite calculation to close itself off as necessary, deconstruction perpetually opens up to a limitless promise of justice that is always to come, that never fully arrives. And it is precisely in the name of that promise that both deconstruction and sociology, commendably, proceed.

SEE ALSO: Derrida, Jacques; Poststructuralism; Postmodern Social Theory; Postmodernism

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deference

Paul T. Munroe

Deference refers to the granting of influence, esteem, or simply the “right of way” from one person to another person, persons, or impersonal entities. When one defers, the interest is in the other with whom one is interacting. Deference is a necessary element of a status relation, and deference often characterizes a large portion of the interaction among close personal friends, intimates, and family members.

Deference is a pivotal concept in the status characteristics and expectation states research program initiated by Berger, Cohen, and Zelditch in the mid 1960s. Groups of people who are working collectively toward the best solution to a task behave in ways that, if viewed externally, look very much like a hierarchy. Some people talk more than others, are listened to more, and are more influential than others. However, viewed from within the group, people are often unaware of the inequality. Group members can be remarkably satisfied with their interactions and not unhappy about the inequality at all. Deference is a key factor here. People look to the group members whom they think have the best ideas and defer to them.

The trouble with this process is that often the reason for deferring has to do with status characteristics like age, sex, or race rather than actual ability. So the relations are often unfair and inefficient, regardless of the group members’ sense of ease within the group process.

Deference is the most frequent dependent variable measure in status characteristics research. The standardized experiment compares the proportion of times a subject chooses to stay with their own choice or to defer to a partner’s choice. The higher the status of the other person relative to oneself, the more likely one is to defer to that person.

For Kemper (2000), deference is what distinguishes status from power relations in interaction. In status relations, lower status persons defer to the higher status person(s). In power or coercive relations, the low power actor responds to the high power actor because they

have to do so. Scheff (1988) argues that conformity is prevalent in much of interaction, leading to a state of normative control, because people defer to the norms and expectations of others to avoid the feeling of shame.

Goffman’s “interaction rituals” often involve deference behaviors. Interactions among those who are familiar or wish to be so are made smooth and disruptions are minimized by a pattern of each person offering deference to the other. This comes in the form of interest in the point of view of the other, looking at the other while listening, nodding, “back channeling” (saying “mm hmm,” “ah yes,” and so on), and overt statements of agreement. All these examples of deference facilitate interaction.

Deference can only be shown by people, individually or in groups, but the *object* of the deference can be another person, an object, idea, or imagined entity. One can show deference to another person, the law, God, or symbols such as the flag of one’s country. Behavioral examples include removing one’s hat in a courtroom, kneeling before an altar, or observing a moment of silence in memory of some person or event. Deference, viewed in these terms, is the key process that leads to social solidarity.

SEE ALSO: Expectation States Theory; Norms; Power, Theories of; Social Influence; Status

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definition of the situation

J. I. (Hans) Bakker

The term “definition of the situation” has come to signify the “Thomas theorem,” the idea expressed by W. I. Thomas as follows: “If men define situations as real, they are real in their consequences” (Thomas & Thomas 1928: 571–2). That is, when the phrase is used, it usually carries with it the connotation of the whole theorem. However, the phrase “definition of the situation” predates Thomas’s famous theorem. The more general conceptualization seems to be closely related to the concept of norms and culture. The interpretation of collective norms is important for all social action. It is only in certain situations where the agent chooses to redefine the norms. Park and Burgess (1921: 763–9) cite a Carnegie study (1919) where the term is used to discuss the topic of assimilation to American society, especially in terms of “Americanization”: “common participation in common activities implies a common ‘definition of the situation.’ In fact, every single act, and eventually all moral life, is dependent upon the definition of the situation. A definition of the situation precedes and limits any possible action, and a redefinition of the situation changes the character of the action.” Clearly the theorem, as it is often interpreted, applies more to the “redefinition” of a situation than to the norms defined by the collectivity. There is confusion concerning the history of the idea. Park worked with Thomas on the Americanization Studies series sponsored by Carnegie, but Thomas’s name did not appear as the lead author of the book they wrote with Herbert Miller until 30 years later (Thomas et al. 1951 [1921]). Hence, the first clear and contemporaneously recognized use by Thomas of the phrase can be said to be chapter 2 of *The Unadjusted Girl* (Thomas 1923: 41–69): “Preliminary to any self determined act of behavior there is always a stage of examination and deliberation which we may call the *definition of the situation*. And actually not only concrete acts are dependent on the definition of the situation, but gradually a whole life policy and the personality of the individual himself would follow from a series of such definitions.” He

cites examples from the ethical code of the Russian *mir* as instances of the definition of the situation “by the community as a whole,” which indicates that it is not just individuals who do the defining. Merton (1995) examines the publishing history of the concept in detail and argues that the “Thomas theorem” was first articulated in Thomas and Thomas (1928: 571–2) but that Dorothy Swain Thomas apparently had relatively little to do with the theoretical idea since she mainly contributed to the statistical argument. Maines (2001: 244–6) argues that Thomas’s “definition of the situation” has been falsely perceived by many sociologists as “subjectivistic” in contrast to Merton’s (1948) notion of “self fulfilling prophecies” as pertaining to objective social structures. To bolster that claim, Maines cites Thomas (1937: 8–9), where Thomas discusses “definitions” giving rise to “patterns.” But the later usage seems to be scarcely distinguishable from cultural norms and values. Merton’s self fulfilling prophecy focuses on the false definition of the situation which evokes behavior that then makes the original false belief seem true, as in a teacher believing a student has a low IQ and therefore not helping that student learn. In that way, the self fulfilling prophecy is a subset of the definition of the situation, not the other way around, as is often held. The Thomas theorem is frequently viewed as specific to symbolic interactionism and irrelevant to other research paradigms, but it can also be interpreted as a contribution to general sociology. Thomas clearly did not mean that all human choice is limited to social constructions that may lack objectivity; there is an “obdurate” reality and many definitions are real due to group pressures as manifested, for example, in gossip. The beliefs of members of a collectivity can create a positive feedback loop (e.g., Black is Beautiful). The “Protestant ethic” may be a definition of the situation that put social action on a new track. A more refined statement of the Thomas theorem might be: if human beings, individually or collectively, define a situation or set of situations as real, such social constructs can sometimes be real in their consequences, for better or for worse. However, that statement would not have the same punch. The extent to which “situation” is limited to small groups and communities rather than nation states remains problematic.

Is a situation the same as a frame? But Thomas's contribution is valuable as a reminder that there are indeed times when the objective consequences of holding a false belief can be very real and yet not be exactly equivalent to a self-fulfilling prophecy. Moreover, his ideas are not restricted to symbolic interaction or even just interpretive approaches to interaction generally; his sociological and anthropological "social psychological" interest in cognition and motivation overlaps with other approaches in disciplines such as cognitive neuroscience, psychology, and psychoanalysis (e.g., Langman 1998).

SEE ALSO: Agency (and Intention); Community; Culture; Frame; Merton, Robert K.; Norms; Self Fulfilling Prophecy; Thomas, W. I.

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deindustrialization

Nicole Flynn

Deindustrialization is a general term used to describe the shift in production from manufacturing to services beginning in the United States in the mid- to late 1960s. Although the transformation of the economy in terms of output is primary, the collateral changes are nearly impossible to separate. Changes in skills required for work and changes in the location of work stemming from the shift in output are often included as part of the concept of deindustrialization. Deindustrialization, or more optimistically industrial restructuring, is an expected development of advanced capitalism and a globalized economy. The implications of it, for both workers and industry, are debated by social scientists and economists.

The expansion and investment of capital, combined with wartime needs, drove the development of the manufacturing sector. As early as the Civil War, when manufacturing provided a more robust economy for the North than the agrarian South, the building of goods was recognized as providing both jobs for workers and goods for market. Cities developed around centers of manufacturing, and the spatial concentration of capital, both human and financial, created diverse and thriving communities. Chicago and New York are early examples of manufacturing cities, along with Philadelphia, Detroit, and Pittsburgh.

Following World War II, the population of the United States expanded and shifted, notably with the growth of the middle class. With this expansion, the demand for goods and services increased. Technology developed that made automation possible and increased both the effectiveness of manufacturing and the potential of the service sector. Expanding

service sector industries included health and health care, education, social services, personal services, and more recently financial, insurance, and real estate services, and hospitality/tourism. The increased demand for goods was accompanied by a push for cheaper production, which was made possible through automation, lower rents or land costs, and less expensive labor. The increased demand for services occurred during a time of increases in educational attainment, increases in female labor force participation, and increases in civil rights.

Both land and labor were cheaper in more rural areas, so initially deindustrialization meant a move from traditional manufacturing centers in the Northeast and Midwest, also known as the Frostbelt, to the South or the Sunbelt. Geographically, land was also cheaper outside cities, so when manufacturing plants relocated, they did so in more rural areas. Because of urban growth and residential patterns, less skilled workers were generally concentrated in the older areas of cities and towns. More affluent families and skilled labor lived in the suburban fringe. In former manufacturing cities, when service industries did expand and enter into urban areas, they brought jobs that required skills urban residents lacked. Lower skilled services and the remaining manufacturing jobs relocated or developed in the suburbs. The result is often referred to as "spatial skills mismatch" (Kain 1968; Kasarda 1995).

The decline in unionization is also a consideration in deindustrialization. As labor became less powerful and capital more concentrated, there was less potential for resistance when manufacturing reduced jobs or relocated. Traditional blue collar jobs, with high levels of unionization, were slowly disappearing. The diverse service sector, dominated by white collar and pink collar jobs, has yet to develop strong union representation.

As manufacturing left for cheaper markets, the service sector expanded. Production of services had advantages not available to goods producing industries. First, horizontal space was less important. Skyscrapers provided an effective way for industry to grow in space without having to purchase large tracts of expensive land. Office buildings rose in the air, and large cities became centers of financial

and legal services, information processing, and hospitality/tourism.

Demand for skilled labor in the service sector was very different from traditional manufacturing jobs. While most management manufacturing jobs did not require extensive formal schooling, service sector expansion increased the demand for more highly educated labor and workers skilled in specific areas such as medicine, the law, and technology. It also provided a share of lower skilled and lower paid positions that were often supervised by the more educated workers.

The expansion of the service sector and the bifurcation of skills and rewards associated with employment in these industries contributed to a shift in the class structure. Many blue collar jobs that paid living wages were relocated and the remaining options for workers with less education were lower skilled and lower paid service positions. The expansion of higher skilled services also ensured employment for the increasing number of college graduates and persons with professional and postgraduate training. A related outcome was increases in low wage earners and an expanding upper wage class, with fewer workers earning middle income wages. This shift has implications for class, race, and gender inequality.

In general, white men and women are more likely to benefit from these industrial changes than other race and ethnic groups. Workers with more access to higher education were initially best served by deindustrialization. As the service sector expanded, more women, especially white women, also entered and completed college and professional schooling. Their rise in educational levels, later age at first marriage and childbearing, and increasing presence in the labor force all coincided with the increasing availability of jobs in areas that were long accustomed to hiring women. Black women, a group with a long history of labor force participation and increasing levels of education, also stood to benefit from expansion of educational opportunities. Black men and immigrants with less education, a group that relied on low skilled manufacturing jobs, were most disadvantaged. The decline in unions that occurred with deindustrialization was an important factor explaining the wage gap between black and white men.

Recent research critically examines globalization as it shapes the context of deindustrialization. The ability to communicate and move both capital and people around the world makes possible an economy situated in a global labor market. World systems theory describes the interdependencies of advanced capitalist countries, developing nations, and countries rich in either labor, raw materials, or both. Goods producing industries dependent on unskilled labor search the rest of the world for cheaper locations for labor and land. Increasingly, less skilled service jobs are also relocated to countries with a surplus of inexpensive workers. Policy that encourages multinational corporations through tax benefits and exemptions further stimulates this movement of capital outflow and inflow of foreign investment.

Some researchers argue that deindustrialization is merely a feature of advanced capitalist economies, and that eventually the expansion of services will increase the standard of living for all persons in these post industrial countries. Post industrialists, as they are sometimes called, link any increases in inequality with the transition process or with qualities of the population, not the labor market. Others view the shift as a more permanent imbalance in the economy, one that will eventually not only increase inequality but also result in reductions in competitiveness and a decline in quality of output. The work of Bluestone, Harrison, Wilson, and others points toward a permanent change in the class structure, into one more reminiscent of pre industrialization characterized by a large class of poor workers and a class of wealthy persons, with little variation in between. The long term consequences of deindustrialization are still being debated. However, the transition of the United States economy from manufacturing to service production is a major transformation that clearly affects relationships between groups and shifts the structure of social institutions.

SEE ALSO: Braverman, Harry; Capitalism; Dual Labor Markets; Economic Development; Economic Sociology: Neoclassical Economic Perspective; Economy (Sociological Approach); Global Economy; Markets; Occupations; Post Industrial Society; Women, Economy and

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deinstitutionalization

Raymond M. Weinstein

In 1955 there were 559,000 patients in public mental hospitals in the United States, the highest there had ever been. At that time, patients were largely committed involuntarily and had long hospital stays. For more than a century, the number of patients at state institutions, historically the primary facilities for the treatment of psychiatric disorders, had been rising steadily. By 1980, however, this number had declined to just over 132,000, despite the fact that the national population grew considerably.

In 2003, fewer than 53,000 remained. The 93 percent drop in the resident census of state hospitals was accompanied by the growth of outpatient clinics and community mental health centers as primary care facilities, the sharp reduction in patients' average length of hospitalization, and the shift to policies emphasizing more voluntary admissions.

These statistics, however, did not reflect a precipitous reduction in the number of seriously mentally ill persons. What took place, especially from 1965 to 1980, was a *transfer* of patients from state institutions to a range of institutional settings such as nursing homes, board and care facilities, halfway houses, and community treatment centers. This massive and unprecedented patient relocation from hospital to community, termed "deinstitutionalization" by both social scientists and the mass media, was supported by certain ideologies and political actions. Deinstitutionalization was the most important social movement in the second half of the twentieth century, one that affected the lives of millions of mental patients, their families, community residents, and health care workers.

Changes in the locus of patient care were part of a psychiatric revolution that swept the country. A number of forces extant in society have been identified as causes. First, the introduction of psychotropic drugs in the mid 1950s – remarkable in their ability to attenuate flagrant symptoms and reduce the frequency of psychotic episodes – permitted psychiatrists to treat patients in the community rather than simply institutionalize them for indefinite periods of time. Second, the growth of new forms of psychotherapy in the 1960s (dealing with alcoholism, drug addiction, developmental disorders, and sexual dysfunctions) greatly expanded the definition of mental illness and its treatment on an outpatient basis. A third force for change was the new legislation in 1963 that provided funds for the construction and operation of non hospital patient care facilities. The idea of community based care of the mentally ill was not new, but the decades old vision was not realized until John F. Kennedy (president of the United States 1961–3) made a historic initiative and there was strong political support for it. Fourth, the deinstitutionalization movement was hastened by the call for

patients' rights from both inside and outside the mental health professions. A series of court decisions in the late 1960s and 1970s affirmed a patient's right to refuse treatment and to due process in commitment proceedings. Finally, the rising cost of inpatient care to state governments in the 1970s and 1980s coupled with increased federal support for community care was a powerful incentive for states to shift their financial burden to Washington. The payment structure and matched funding allowances of Medicare and Medicaid, as well as the expansion of federal welfare disability programs, encouraged the transfer of elderly and poor chronically ill patients from state supported hospitals to privately run nursing homes.

The process of deinstitutionalization involved two other goals aside from the release of hospital patients. It likewise entailed the use of alternative facilities to treat those with first time psychiatric disorders. Before the policy and practice of deinstitutionalization, these persons would have simply been placed in mental hospitals without any clear treatment plans or discharge dates. In addition, an important objective, arguably the most difficult of the three to achieve, was the development of community based mental health and social support services to maintain a non hospital patient population.

Deinstitutionalization had a distinctive social philosophy. In the post World War II period, the idea that state hospitals were inhumane warehouses and anti therapeutic environments for the mentally ill was featured prominently in the mass media as well as in scientific literature. Former patients wrote personal accounts about the negative effects of institutionalization. Journalists, at times playing the role of pseudopatient, published scathing exposés. Social scientists, via participant observation, researched large mental hospitals and documented the widespread patient abuse, staff incompetence, deplorable living conditions, and poor treatment. The post war era was also dominated by optimism that positive action could change social conditions. The Civil Rights Movement of the 1950s and 1960s encouraged the notion that hospitalized patients were a disenfranchised class and doors should be opened for them as well. The deinstitutionalization movement, characterized by a strong conviction that

community based care was more cost effective than institutional treatment, wedded social reformers and fiscal conservatives.

Important political actions hastened the process of deinstitutionalization. In 1963, under the provision of what is now called Supplemental Security Income, the mentally ill living in the community became eligible for federal financial assistance. This enabled patients who otherwise would be in state hospitals to stay at home, in board and care facilities, or in apartment hotels. Entrepreneurs, not always skilled in the management of psychiatric disorders, converted old houses and buildings into residential facilities for former patients. The passage of the Community Mental Health Centers Act the same year provided large scale funding for community based programs to treat released hospital patients and those with first time psychiatric disorders. Both pieces of legislation and their amendments provided much of the financial underpinning for deinstitutionalization. Later changes in state commitment laws tightened the criteria for admission and retention and also furthered the shift from hospital to community treatment. Lastly, a 1975 landmark Supreme Court case, which ruled that non dangerous patients who were not receiving treatment should be released if they could survive outside the mental hospital, accelerated the move toward community care.

The era of deinstitutionalization succeeded in gaining the release of a substantial proportion of hospitalized patients and in significantly reducing psychiatric admissions. However, the development of a full array of community based mental health and social services sufficient to maintain a non hospital patient population is the one goal that has not been realized. Various problems related to service delivery account for this. To begin with, achieving continuity of care for chronic patients outside of hospitals was inherently problematic. Treatment programs often focused on patients' immediate needs with little or no attention given to future requirements. In the early years, many proponents of deinstitutionalization believed chronicity would be abated once the negative effects of institutional living were removed. Second, the treatment needs of the mentally ill living in the community could not always be met. Before deinstitutionalization,

most hospital patients stayed for long periods of time, the rest of their lives in many cases, and there was little variation in the treatments afforded them. Today, the non hospital population is fragmented; patients have varying degrees of chronicity, some are shuttled in and out of hospitals, many mentally disturbed are in jail, others become homeless. Few communities have been able to service the treatment needs of patients who varied greatly in diagnosis, symptomatology, functional level, and family support.

A third problem of service delivery was the difficulty of providing comprehensive care. In the hospital, psychiatric, medical, social, rehabilitative, and vocational services were offered within a single physical setting. In the community, the locus and authority for such human services were typically divided among different public and private agencies that seldom achieved effective coordination. Fourth, the most disturbed persons in the community were frequently least likely to receive psychiatric treatment. Deinstitutionalization clearly intended that the new mental health programs would serve those most severely ill. However, many agencies, both intentionally and unintentionally, selected patients for treatment who were less disturbed or disabled. Persons least likely to secure psychiatric services on their own were left to do just that. Finally, community based care was lacking in effective measures of program outcome. Mental health administrators and clinicians seldom had reliable information concerning patient populations to be served and the effectiveness of treatments actually delivered. The statistical analysis used for program evaluation was more often than not irrelevant for the disjointed system of care that prevailed in most communities.

Aside from the problems related to service delivery, an important question is *why* community based care or aftercare programs failed to meet the objectives of deinstitutionalization. One important reason pertains to public attitudes toward the mentally ill. Research has consistently shown that most people do not want to associate with former mental patients or the mentally ill and that these negative attitudes have changed little over the years. Opportunities for discharged patients to find satisfactory employment and housing in the

community are thus limited by the public's prejudices. Deinstitutionalization occurred as a result of ideological, political, and legal forces in society, not public pressure to reintegrate former patients into communities. The public has been more willing to accept deinstitutionalization as a means of social control than treatment or rehabilitation. Former patients in nursing homes, jails, or halfway houses and board and care facilities in marginal neighborhoods are tolerated more than next door or at work.

A second explanation for the failure of aftercare programs deals with organizational processes within the mental health system. Sociologists have discovered that human service organizations are confronted with operational problems and compromising choices related to the establishment of priorities, acquisition of resources, adjustment of expectations, development of interorganizational networks, and rationalization of activities. Thus, state mental hospitals, which faced reduced resources in the era of deinstitutionalization, gave priority to inpatient care rather than discharge planning, and became more concerned with the number of patients discharged than their later quality of life in the community. Community mental health centers, in order to control costs and justify their effectiveness, chose to devote more of their resources to the non chronically ill and to enroll only the best patients for their vocational rehabilitation and substance abuse programs. Chronic patients were mainly treated with medications, their need for more comprehensive services ignored. Public and private social service agencies saw the chronically ill as outside the scope of their mission and refused to treat them. The lack of continuity of care between hospitals and community agencies reflected the role adaptations professional staff workers made adjusting idealistic goals to realistic accomplishments.

The inadequacy of community based care for the mentally ill is likewise explained through a political economy perspective. Mental patients, especially those with long term disabilities, are part of the so called underclass in American society, a growing army of unemployed persons, unskilled laborers, drug addicts, alcoholics, welfare recipients, illegal aliens, poorly educated racial minorities, and other incompetent or disreputable groups. Members of the underclass

lack sufficient power or resources to change social conditions that affect their lives. Thus, mental patients in hospitals, nursing homes, jails, on the streets, or in community halfway houses and board and care homes are unlikely to effectively organize and lobby the government for changes in the mental health laws or policies. Mental patients were decidedly *not* involved in the deinstitutionalization movement that sought to help them. Community housing for the mentally ill flourished only when there was an economic incentive to provide such services to this downtrodden group.

Despite its problems and failures, deinstitutionalization has been an integral part of mental health policy in the United States for almost half a century. Its ideology of concern for the well being of mental patients combined with the pragmatism of its promise of cost savings have probably sustained the movement over the years, often in the face of harsh criticism. Today, even with the experience of some notable program deficiencies, it is still widely assumed that community based care for the mentally ill is intrinsically more humane and more therapeutic than hospital treatment. Support for deinstitutionalization, however, has not resulted in corresponding increases in public monies for community mental health programs. Economy minded state officials have been willing to close state hospitals but are less willing to put the money saved into community programs for the patients they released. Advocates of deinstitutionalization have argued that dumping patients into neighborhoods ill prepared to deal with their needs does not constitute community treatment, and that the movement has not had a fair chance to demonstrate its merits since adequate public funding and program planning were lacking from the start.

The early history of deinstitutionalization offered promise to patients with chronic disorders: freedom from the sometimes inhumane conditions of public mental hospitals, reintegration with family and friends, management of their illness in community facilities. There was also hope that the new treatment programs would cure existing disorders in less chronic patients and prevent the occurrence of future illnesses among those who experience first time psychiatric episodes. Caregivers and service

providers, however, often did not distinguish between those with severe or lifelong conditions and those with less serious or intermittent disorders. Service programs during the early years were mainly designed for the latter group whose needs could be met with brief therapy and crisis interventions. The deinstitutionalization that took place failed to attend to the needs of the most severely ill and efforts at prevention failed to reduce the incidence of the most serious mental disorders. The very patients whom the movement was supposed to help, those forced out of state and county hospitals, fell through the cracks of the inadequate community service system.

In the 1980s and 1990s, one of the most important unintended consequences of deinstitutionalization was the dramatic increase in the homeless population. Inexpensive housing in large cities was unavailable and many discharged mental patients simply had no place to go and ended up living on the streets, in alleyways, or in subway caverns with other homeless people. Unable to make decisions for themselves or follow a consistent program of treatment, these novice outpatients suffered badly from a well meaning but poorly implemented social policy. Some discharged patients no doubt benefited from community care, but others found themselves bereft of adequate food, clothing, shelter, medical care, and psychiatric treatment, the very necessities and services formerly provided to them by the hospital. As early as 1984, the American Psychiatric Association proclaimed that deinstitutionalization was a failure and a major social tragedy.

By the close of the twentieth century, more than 90 percent of the state psychiatric hospital beds that existed in 1960 were eliminated. Thanks to lawsuits by civil liberties attorneys, it is now virtually impossible to treat severely mentally ill individuals involuntarily in the hospital or the community until they commit some overt criminal act. Increasingly, state mental health officials have been abdicating their responsibility to care for disturbed persons, preferring instead to hand them over to for profit health maintenance organizations (HMOs), who in turn eschew paying the \$400 a month per patient it would take for the newest antipsychotic medications. The outcome has been predictable: a significant rise

in criminal homicide. Deinstitutionalization has turned deadly, as approximately 1,000 homicides are committed each year nationwide by untreated mentally disturbed persons.

In recent years, the philosophical bases of deinstitutionalization have been reassessed. It is now generally recognized that the initial ideology of reform for hospitalized mental patients and conviction that substantial cost savings could be realized with community based treatment were misguided. Although it is unlikely that states will ever go back to a system of care based almost totally on hospital treatment, it is apparent that state hospitals continue to perform important functions for society. Such institutions serve as backup facilities for patients who cannot be treated effectively in outpatient clinics or nursing homes. Because of their size, hospitals are able to offer specialized services unavailable in community based programs. Decades of experience with deinstitutionalization have demonstrated that it is just as costly to provide effective and comprehensive care to mental patients with long term disabilities in the community as in state hospitals, equally as dear for that care to be provided by public institutions as by contracts with private facilities or practitioners. Current advocates of the policy stress that humane concern for the mentally ill, not presupposed cost advantages, should motivate society in its allocation of per capita treatment expenditures.

Deinstitutionalization never realized its promise or potential because it was largely a political rather than a clinical solution to the problem of chronic mental illness. Research has shown that the lives of patients can be improved by transferring them from large institutional settings to various neighborhood residences, provided that appropriate treatment and service programs are available to them in the community. The question is whether twenty first century politicians will be willing to commit the necessary financial resources to clinics and outpatient facilities their twentieth century counterparts did not.

SEE ALSO: Health Care Delivery Systems; Health Maintenance Organization; Homelessness; Hospitals; Managed Care; Mental Disorder; Social Movements; Social Services; Social Support

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Deleuze, Gilles (1925–95)

Sam Binkley

Gilles Deleuze was a significant twentieth century philosopher whose critiques of essentialism and rationalism made important

contributions to theories of postmodernity and poststructuralism. The philosophical standpoint he elaborated was one which emphasized the immanent possibilities for change manifested in things themselves. Bodies, objects, ideas, and social formations all possessed potentials for difference and deviation inherent in themselves. This view contradicted that of his chief philosophical interlocutor, Hegel (and all those upholding a Hegelian dialectical tradition), in which change was viewed as the result of external encounters or “negations” imposed from without. Deleuze’s philosophical project followed that of Nietzsche in emphasizing the affirmative property of things, and linking the agent with the act itself, denying traditional philosophical concepts of causality, will, and intention. Indeed, his philosophical oeuvre is defined by interrogations of the philosophical canon ranging from Plato to Nietzsche, Spinoza, Bergson, and Hume for conceptions of the world that emphasized such immanent properties of becoming and change.

These themes were developed and applied more broadly to a range of political and social arenas through books co authored with his longtime writing partner Félix Guattari. Most notably it was through a two part investigation of the contemporary social, cultural, and psychological nexus he termed “capitalism and schizophrenia” that Deleuzian conceptions of immanent difference were thematized and exported to other fields (Deleuze & Guattari 1977, 1987). Here Deleuze developed an identifiable nomenclature and rhetorical style whose influence extended to fields such as sociology, cultural studies, media studies, and throughout the humanities and social sciences more broadly.

Defined by Michel Foucault in the book’s opening pages as an introduction to anti fascism (not the fascism of the political state but the fascism of the mind which we as members of capitalist societies carry within us), *Anti Oedipus* (Deleuze & Guattari 1977) provides a critique of capitalist political economy that weds post Freudian psychoanalysis with Deleuze’s thesis on the generative capacity of things. It offers an overview of desire not as a reactive (as dictated by the law of Oedipal desire) but as an active and productive capacity, capable of affirming new differences and

investing new objects. Deleuze and Guattari discuss capitalism's success in denying desire its creative and affirmative quality through its incorporation into flows and chains of production governed by abstract systems (money), divorced entirely from the contexts and bodies in which they are generated. Against these limitations the book prescribes different flows of desire and production whose pattern escapes the Oedipalizing effects of capital through non linear and schizoid lines of flight: heading off in multiple directions, refusing to remain the same, escaping capture by slipping between dominant categories which threaten to consign desire to specific territories and purposes. *Thousand Plateaus* (Deleuze & Guattari 1987) continues this interrogation, adding the phrase that has become the most widely associated with Deleuze's contribution: the *rhizome*, a root or branch that twists, knots, splits, and grows in unpredictable, non linear directions (like a ginger root, as opposed to the linear structure of a carrot), serving as a metaphor for paths of desire, for modes of production, and movements of populations.

While his turgid and eccentric philosophic prose has drawn criticism from many sociological readers, Deleuzian thought has been influential in several areas, including postmodern social theory, where non linear, non teleological processes are considered as alternatives to modernization narratives of progress, social differentiation, and change (Delanda 1997). They have also been significant in theories of globalization, virtuality and the Internet, and in alternative conceptions of resistance to those provided by traditional Marxism (Hardt & Negri 2000).

SEE ALSO: Guattari, Félix; Postmodernism; Poststructuralism

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democracy

Stephen K. Sanderson

It is only within the past two centuries – and mostly within the past century – that genuinely democratic governments have flourished. What is democracy? Rueschemeyer et al. (1992) identify four main characteristics of the most fully developed democracies:

- Parliamentary or congressional bodies with a power base independent of presidents or prime ministers.
- The regular, free, and fair election of government officials, with the entire adult population having the right to vote.
- Responsibility of other divisions of government to the parliament or legislature.
- Individual rights and freedoms pertaining to the entire population and their general honoring.

It is important to distinguish between *formal* democracies, in which the formal apparatus of democracy exists but democratic principles are usually not upheld in practice, and *substantive* democracies, which have not only the formal machinery of democratic government, but generally consistently implement this machinery. Another important distinction is that between *restricted* democracies, or those in which the right to vote is limited to certain segments of the adult population (such as men, property owners, or whites), and *unrestricted* democracies, or those in which the entire adult population has the right to vote.

Democracy is not an all or none process, but rather a matter of degree. The modern democracies of North America and Western Europe are today unrestricted and substantive democracies, but all started out as restricted and,

to some extent, formal democracies. The earliest modern democracies developed in the most developed societies of Western Europe and the settler colonies that hived off from Great Britain. The US was the first democracy, established in 1776. It was followed in order by Norway (1815), France (1815), Belgium (1831), the UK (1832), Germany (1848), Switzerland (1848), the Netherlands (1849), Denmark (1849), Italy (1861), Sweden (1866), and Japan (1889) (Flora 1983). Democracy has taken much longer to come to the less developed world, much of which is still today under the control of highly autocratic and often brutally repressive regimes. However, a major new wave of democratization swept through many third world countries beginning in the 1980s (Markoff 1996; Schaeffer 1997; Kurzman 1998; Green 1999; Doorenspleet 2000). Most third world democracies, however, are still not full substantive democracies, and it may be several more decades before that is achieved.

It has long been noted that democratic government and economic development are closely linked. In an early study, Lipset (1959) used a small sample of countries and found a strong relationship between a country's level of democratization and its levels of wealth, industrialization, education, and urbanization. Later, Cutright (1963), studying 77 countries, found high positive correlations between an index of democracy and indexes of levels of communication, urbanization, and education, and a high negative correlation between democracy and the percentage of the labor force working in agriculture.

Bollen and Jackman (1985), using a sample of 100 countries, looked at the effects of the level of economic development along with several other independent variables: the degree of ethnolinguistic pluralism, percentage of the population that was Protestant, British colonial experience, and a New Nation effect (independence obtained between 1958 and 1962). Regression results showed that all five independent variables explained 58 percent of the variance in the level of democracy, but that economic development alone explained 46 percent.

Lipset et al. (1993), using a large cross national sample, looked at the effects of several independent variables on the level of

democratization: per capita GNP, British versus French colonization, political mobilization (the annual sum of protests, riots, and strikes), regime coerciveness (the ratio of military expenditure to GNP), and trade dependence (the ratio of total trade to GNP). Results showed that economic development was clearly the best predictor.

Diamond (1992) found that economic development was closely related to democracy, whether measured by per capita GNP or by the World Bank's Human Development Index (an unweighted average of literacy, life expectancy, and per capita GNP). The HDI was a somewhat better predictor. Of 17 countries at the highest level of the HDI, all 17 had governments that Diamond classified as liberal democracies. Of 11 countries at the lowest level of the HDI, all 11 had what Diamond called closed state hegemonic regimes. Diamond also reported the results of earlier regression analyses conducted with Lipset and Seong. These showed that the most powerful predictive variable was the Physical Quality of Life Index, a composite of infant mortality, life expectancy at age 1, and adult literacy.

Why should greater economic development be closely associated with democracy? At least three lines of thinking can be discerned. Marxian scholars (e.g., Szymanski 1978) have argued that democracy has been promoted by rising capitalist classes because it is the form of government most suited to their economic interests. Capitalists want, above all else, freedom of economic action, and democracy is an ideal system for promoting such freedom. The problem with this argument, however, is that the historical evidence shows that capitalists have actually been quite hostile to democracy in the form of mass suffrage because they have feared the consequences of giving the working class the vote (Rueschemeyer et al. 1992). Capitalists have generally favored *parliamentary* government, especially because they or their representatives have constituted the most prominent members of parliaments. But parliamentary government alone is a far cry from true democracy.

A second line of thinking, endorsed by such thinkers as Lipset and Diamond, is a type of modernization theory. Education and literacy promote beliefs in the importance of

democratic norms. An ideology of “secular reformist gradualism,” highly favorable to the development of democracy, emerges, largely as the result of higher living standards. As lower social strata become better off and better educated, they are less likely to be receptive to extremist ideologies. Economic development leads to the formation of a sizable middle class, much of which tends to work to moderate political conflict.

A third strand of thought emphasizes the resource balance between political elites and the rest of the population. Bollen (1983) notes that economic development creates a more educated and literate population that can gain access to the mass media of communication, thus allowing for increasing understanding of the political processes of their society. This increased understanding tends to generate greater demands for political representation. By the same token, a workforce that is better educated can become better organized and mobilized. In Bollen’s mind the key issue is the general population’s acquisition of resources that can be used to pressure political elites to accede to their demands for democracy. Tilly (2000, 2004) has taken a similar view.

In an exceptionally detailed cross national study of democracy using 172 countries and covering the entire period from 1850 to the early 1990s, Vanhanen (1997) based his analysis on the kind of balance of resources argument discussed above. Vanhanen argues that democracy emerges when the large mass of the population acquires resources it can use to force autocratic states to open themselves up to mass suffrage and political rights. Vanhanen identifies six types of resources that contribute to democratization: size of the nonagricultural population, size of the urban population, the degree to which farms are owned by independent families, the literacy rate, the enrollment rate in higher education, and the deconcentration of nonagricultural economic resources. Vanhanen measured all of these variables for most decades between 1850 and the early 1990s, combined them into a comprehensive supervariable called the Index of Power Resources, and then correlated this index with an index of democracy. The average correlation of the Index of Power Resources

with the level of democracy for three different years (1991, 1992, and 1993) was $r = .786$. Correlations for earlier years were not as strong, but were still very high. Vanhanen assumed that the correlation is causal in the sense that the acquisition of power resources preceded and brought about changes in the level of democracy.

Vanhanen stopped with simple correlations, failing to control for any other variables. He also assumed that all of the six subvariables within his Index of Power Resources were of equal significance in producing democracy. Sanderson (2004) reanalyzed Vanhanen’s data by looking at his six subcomponents separately. He consistently found that the best predictor of the level of democratization was the literacy rate, with the deconcentration of nonagricultural resources an important secondary predictor. Size of the nonagricultural population and size of the urban population turned out to be essentially unproductive.

These last findings seem to contradict the conclusions of the best comparative historical (nonquantitative) study of democracy ever undertaken, that of Rueschemeyer et al. (1992). They found that the factor most critical to democracy was the level of industrialization and thus the size of the working class, which became an organized political force that struggled to establish democratic institutions, especially the right to vote. Democracy developed earliest and most fully in those societies with the largest working classes and latest and least in those societies with the smallest working classes. In these latter societies the landlord class was still powerful and the peasantry politically weak. Landlords were vehemently opposed to democracy because the key to their economic success was labor repressive agriculture, which democracy would obviously undermine. However, with industrialization, the role of the landlord class in society declined and the role of industrialists and workers increased, thus removing a major barrier to democratization. In the third world today, landlords still play a major economic role in many societies, which is perhaps the main reason that democracy has advanced only little in many of these societies.

Sanderson (2004) suggests that his findings are, in fact, not incompatible with those of

Rueschemeyer et al. (1992). Indeed, they are complementary; it is just that the latter authors have omitted a crucial variable. Industrialization and working class formation were crucial to democracy, Sanderson argues, but workers have to be made politically aware and ready to engage in political action. Literacy – itself largely a product of the development of mass primary education – provided the key. Literate workers could read newspapers and political pamphlets and could communicate with each other about what they read. This seemed to be critical to the working class's struggle for political incorporation.

In the most recent cross national study of democracy, which spanned the entire period between 1800 and 1999, Wejnert (2005) compared the relative roles of internal social and economic development and diffusionary effects coming from other societies. Regression results showed that diffusionary effects, especially the location of a country within a world region packed with democratic countries and the degree of participation of a country in economic and political networks containing largely democratic countries, were much greater than internal developmental forces. However, it is not clear what to make of these findings, since Wejnert's study is one of the first to take diffusionary effects into account and her findings have not yet been replicated. Moreover, her finding that literacy was unrelated to democracy is extremely curious in light of Sanderson's (2004) finding that it was the most important predictor of democratization.

What is clear is that democracy has historically been closely tied to economic development and that it has been steadily expanding on a global scale. Whether democracy is promoted more by a country's internal economic and social development or by its connections to other democratic countries (or some combination of the two), it seems reasonable to predict that democratization will be a continuing, if not continuous, trend.

SEE ALSO: Citizenship; Democracy and Organizations; Global Justice as a Social Movement; Globalization and Global Justice; Human Rights; Social Movements, Participatory Democracy in; Welfare Regimes

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democracy and organizations

David Courpasson

Still a controversial issue, the idea that the “civilian” world might be becoming more democratic is juxtaposed with an opposite trend with respect to the organizational world. As Rousseau and Rivero, among others, put it: “Although we are increasingly likely to be governed by democratic political systems, our workplaces are seldom democratic” (2003: 116). The increasingly dominant corporate power (Bernstein 2000), the persistence and refurbishment of hierarchy and bureaucratic systems (Courpasson & Reed 2004), the endless reproduction of corporate elite (Ocasio 1994; Courpasson 2004; Davis et al. 2003) are all trends highlighting the fact that the post-bureaucratic dream of decentralized power and of people’s participation in the political decisions within organizations might be gone.

The supposedly post-September 11 shift in the global power balance does not explain by itself the apparently legitimate use of strong central powers in the political structures of most western countries. In other words, the emergence of a “culture” of threat and terror is not exclusively the product of late modern patterns of civilization or of tragic and unprecedented events. Likewise, in the business world, the concentration of power is an old phenomenon (see, for instance, in Ocasio 1994) which is not exclusively related to the threatening and hectic movements of markets and the dynamics of capitalism. The wavering balance between democratic and oligarchic

tendencies is one of the most ancient political features of societies.

Addressing the complex issue of democracy in the context of organizations requires us to go beyond these partial accounts in order to make the connection between organizational models and the functioning of contemporary democratic societies. There are important questions relating to the elective affinities between the meaning of democracy and its diverse facets, and government as a complex and intermingled set of values and mechanisms.

THE MEANING AND MEANINGS OF DEMOCRACY

There are scores of available and relatively acceptable definitions of the concept of democracy. So numerous are they that the concept itself is in danger of becoming one of the most popular “buzzwords” of organization studies. As a means of clarifying this conceptual “hodgepodge,” we suggest adopting a twofold approach to understanding democracy: a political version and a competitive version.

Usually, democracy is defined as both a form of rule (the sovereignty of the people) and a symbolic framework within which this rule is exercised (such as individual liberty) (Mouffe 2000). This pertains to the well-known duality within studies on democracy: the *liberal tradition*, according to which what counts is the rule of law and the respect of individual freedom encompassed in democratic regimes, and the *democratic tradition*, which privileges the notion of equality and the identity between governors and the governed. These traditions, when confronted, unveil the unassailable tension between liberty and equality. Dahl reminds us that for Tocqueville, the major phenomenon threatening democracy is that equality will crush liberty, that political equality is likely to destroy liberty, “because equality facilitates majority despotism, it threatens liberty” (1985: 9).

Therefore, the *political* definition of democracy leads to envisaging democratic politics not as the search for an unreachable consensus, but as an “agonistic confrontation” (Mouffe 2000: 9), necessitating the creation of a pluralistic body of actors. According to Mouffe, the main question of democratic politics “becomes then

not how to eliminate power, but how to constitute forms of power which are compatible with democratic values" (2000: 22). In short, the political perspective on democracy argues that democracy is not the absence of domination and the mere diffusion of social powers in the (organizational) body, but the genuine attempt to establish institutions which can limit and eventually contest domination. Dahl (1971) proposes to analyze the concrete forms of democracy through the notion of "polyarchy." Polyarchy is an approximation of democracy, where a permanent activity of institutional design and "engineering" (Poggi 1972) helps contestation to take roots within the social body.

The political perspective of democracy also implies that equality is not automatically taken for granted. It cannot exist without inequality, without exclusion. As Mouffe puts it, democratic equality "requires the political moment of discrimination between 'us' and 'them'" (2000: 44). Obviously, this view of democracy rejects the idea of "deliberative democracy" which can be found extensively in the organizational literature, especially under the auspices of the "managerial revolution" or of "post bureaucratic" management. The underlying argument of this latter perspective is that politics is identified with the exchange of arguments "among reasonable persons guided by the principle of impartiality" (Mouffe 2000: 86), which obliterates the possibility of legitimate struggles and debates between "adversaries."

For the *competitive* approach to democracy, a key characteristic of democratic regimes is the existence of a permissible opposition. This regards public contestation and political contestation (Dahl 1971: 4) as natural features of the system. Democracy is therefore a competitive regime. Ultimately, Dahl and the whole Tocquevillean tradition of which he is a part conceptualize democracy as being constituted by at least two dimensions: public contestation and the right to participate, i.e. the "inclusiveness" of the political regime. In that perspective, Dahl (1971: 8) defines polyarchy as a "highly inclusive" and an "extensively open to public contestation" regime, the closest to the concrete expressions of democracy.

The contribution of the competitive explanation is to clearly separate the generation of democratic regimes at the national level with the

circumstances of the organizational level. As Dahl (1971: 13) puts it, "while polyarchies may be competitive at the national level, a great many of the subnational organizations, particularly private associations, are hegemonic or oligarchic."

Wilde (1978) completes this definition by adding a more "procedural" nuance to the competitive aspect of bureaucracies. Democracies are, according to him, largely defined by "those rules that allow (though they do not necessarily bring about) genuine competition for authoritative political roles. No effective political office should be excluded from such competition, nor should opposition be suppressed by force" (p. 29). The corollary of this view is that organizations could be considered as democracies insofar as they develop "infra democratic" systems (p. 33), i.e., structural ingredients (comprising the distribution of power, specific political institutions, and social structure) which render democracy practically possible. But they are also "experiential" systems, characterized by the commitment of people to these very rules of competition and consent. We are clearly close to the seminal view of Montesquieu, when in *The Spirit of the Laws* he defines a political regime through the expectations and perceptions of individuals toward the governors, and through the degree to which power is concentrated.

Behind the scenes of the competitive framework lurks the notion of equality. This derives from Tocqueville's analyses on the tendency of equality to contribute to the degenerative process of democracy: "In democracies, not only are servants equal among themselves; one can say that they are in a way the equals of their masters" (2000: 549). This is the result of the credible potential for anybody (including the servant) to become a master himself. Democracy as competition is therefore connected to a vision of the temporary character of social hierarchies. But simultaneously, it requires from governors to invest constantly in the social fabric of their legitimation. As Tocqueville puts it, "servants are not sure that they should not be the masters and they are disposed to consider whoever commands them as the unjust usurper of their right" (p. 553).

Tocqueville's concerns go to the heart of the debate between bureaucratic and post bureaucratic models. The design of the latter model

aims explicitly to shatter the bureaucratic image of the unassailable bureaucratic hierarchy (Heckscher 1994). But once again, Tocqueville's reminder is timely: this type of hierarchical relationship, generating rivalries and endless struggles, necessitates the design of a constraining administration stipulating to each "what he is, what he can do, or what he should do" (Tocqueville 2000: 553). A rejuvenated bureaucracy, freshly legitimized by the requirement to "close the debates," arises from the very functioning and core values of democracy.

At the same time, both the political and competitive definitions of democracy offer another alternative. By saying that, we put forward the idea that organizations could be theorized as fundamentally antagonistic places, where a plurality of values and interests is never solved through a rational consensus (a notion dear to liberal democratic theories of management; see, e.g., Osborne & Gaebler 1992), nor through a pure domination or hegemony. It might be thought of as a complex and hybrid oligarchy, permanently producing acts of power and constituting itself as a political community through these very acts of power. A complex oligarchy is a political order of organizations based on certain forms of precarious and contestable dominations, always vulnerable and striving relentlessly to solidify themselves. It is precisely because of this precariousness that organizations can be seen partly as (very imperfect) democracies, "competitive oligarchies" to take Dahl's expression.

THE DEMOCRATIC PROBLEM: OLIGARCHIC DRIFT AND THE PRODUCTION OF INTERMEDIATE BODIES

At least since Tocqueville, we know democracy faces two major problems. First, the development of despotic/oligarchic trends spawned by the "circular" nature of democracy. Second, the consecutive necessity for democratic regimes to develop an institutional design likely to keep government from transmogrifying into despotism.

No principle, no procedural requirements, nor "absolute rights can prevent tyranny from emerging" (Dahl 1985: 18). In other words, any

governing body, majority or minority, may use democratic processes to destroy democracy itself. Democratic regimes are prone to self destruction (Linz & Stepan 1978). As Poggi (1972: 49) puts it, despotism is a degeneration of the inertial tendencies of democracy and not an intentional and implicit goal of a governing elite. To Tocqueville, oligarchy reproduces itself through the processes of democratization, what Poggi calls the circularity of democracy. As individual concerns are increasingly "privatized," the leaders must take powerful decisions in order to move away from despotic tendencies. In other words, oligarchs sustain their power by developing democratic principles and peculiar intermediate groups of political actors. But it is the central power which determines and delineates the type of groups, their prerogative and who, within these groups, is likely to reach the "inner circles" (Useem 1984).

According to Tocqueville, the very dynamics of equality might turn democracy into a new species of tyranny, a "breeding ground for mass despotism" (in Dahl 1985: 31). The Tocquevillian perspective outlines three major dangers to which democracies are prone: the atomization of societies into isolated individuals; the emergence of authoritarian regimes; and the support by people of these centralized forms of administration. Democratic collapse arises from the sometimes amazingly overwhelming public support toward authoritarian regimes. Moreover, the ascent of dictatorial forms of government stems often more from the persistence of inequalities than from an excess of equality, fragmenting the citizenry into hostile camps and enhancing confidence for a dictatorship (Dahl 1985).

Mild despotism emerges therefore from two parallel mechanisms. First, the illusions generated by the consensual vision of deliberative governments. In other words, consensus might be the very expression of hegemony and "the crystallization of [asymmetric] power relations" (Mouffe 2000: 49). The reconciliatory move observable in the post bureaucratic school of thought (Heckscher 1994), by insisting on the necessary initialization of debates, on the importance of speech acts (Benhabib 1996: 9), on symmetry, equality, and consensus, obliterates the fact that democratic politics in organizations is mostly about the negotiation of

paradoxes and the articulation of precarious solutions to these paradoxes (Mouffe 1999). Consensus is necessary but it must be accompanied by dissent, otherwise hegemonic regimes are likely to appear. This possible drift is also due to the fact that the very competitive essence of democracy implies a high degree of insecurity for those in governing positions. As Lipset et al. (1956: 10) put it, “the more truly democratic the governing system, the greater the insecurity.” In other words, what Poggi (1972) terms “status insecurity” supposes that organizations need to be combined with oligarchic modes of selection. Oligarchic principles provide arguments to justify discrepancies between individuals, the “us and them” principle in Mouffe’s terms. For Tocqueville, any mass of equals and atomized individuals needs an oligarchy to avoid being permanently threatened by anarchy. Under a tutelary oligarchy, people feel the obligation to cooperate, at least because they share similar concerns, fears, and weaknesses. Dresner (1968: 6–7) adds his voice by arguing that democracies should be defined as limited egalitarian ideologies. This presupposes certain inequalities and authority–obedience relationships as “necessary inequalities within general equality.” Dresner, using the Tocquevillean framework, insists upon the influence of the emergence of a “politically disinterested individualism” arising from a democratic appeal to “material interests”; as a consequence, the danger of drifting toward despotic regimes comes not mostly from the “tyranny of the majority” but from the “apathy of the masses” (p. 42).

In sum, any concrete democratic structure must define whether the central government should be arbitrary or moderate, i.e., does it “oppose or allow the existence of nongovernmental centers of power” (Poggi 1972: 41). This leads us to our second point: the production of intermediate political bodies.

As Rousseau and Rivero (2003: 119) suggest, it might seem easier to promote democratic practices in organizations than in broader social bodies; consensus regarding tasks and purposes, socialization capacities, educational systems, and the focus on work provide cultural “cornerstones” in most organizations, whatever their size. Through recent corporate post-bureaucratic upheavals, new forces sustaining

democratic values and practices have appeared. These include the decentralization of organizing and information, the transformation of certain bases of power distribution, the broadening of the array of stakeholders, and the concomitant awareness of broader interdependencies and mutual impact of acts of power in “network organizations.” But democracy has also to struggle with the persistence of hierarchy. The egalitarian aspects of democracy are hampered by the overwhelming competition among individuals, and with the contradictory effects of mobility on the organizational cohesiveness necessary to collective decision making and deliberative systems (Dahl 1985; Rousseau & Rivero 2003).

From these contradictory forces arises the absolute necessity for organizations to invent certain forms of “institutional engineering” (Poggi 1972) likely to tip the balance in the democratic direction. The idea is to counter the effects of the emergence of a “consumerist view of politics” (p. 45), which is the major threat to democracy as it facilitates the political monopoly of a specific oligarchy. Institutional engineering implies the creation of intermediate groups that prevent the displacement of social ties by more transitory relationships. For Tocqueville, intermediate groupings aim to create local powers that act as a counterbalance to the political concentration at the top of organizations and societies. They also aim to intensify individual commitments and enhance the construction of strong, efficient, and reliable internal elites. This institutional differentiation in the political system rests upon a “constitutional design” creating a distinction between a relatively small set of stable laws and an extensive set of peripheral laws subject to contestation, modification, or abolition. What rules are to become steady is a crucial issue for democracies to perpetuate. It implies that going further into the distinction between governmental and administrative issues, the former will affect the interests of the organization as a whole, the latter will affect primarily locally individuals.

The interest for organizations in installing local intermediate powers is especially important in times of economic deprivation which affect large numbers of people. In the context of societies, we know that under difficult conditions, individuals can be subject to

the seductive appeals of politically cynical leaders, without the will to take a hand in governmental affairs (Poggi 1972). For bitterness, feelings of insecurity or injustice, they could renounce any ambition and commitment, or withdraw exclusively into the private sphere, which could shatter social ties and make the social body collapse. Intermediate bodies are also a means for leaders to shed light on the benefits and interests of the collective body in times when individuals could prefer to neglect shared values and common political and cultural frames to step into the chilling dynamics of despotism. In the context of organizations, the political indifference or apathy, and the resulting focus on self fulfillment that one can observe (which is largely a result of the threatening and competitive "spirit" of contemporary liberal organizations; see Courpasson 2005), could lead to this type of dynamic: brushing off the ethical side of leaders' legitimacies, people could prefer to depend politically on strong and efficient centers of power, distributing the fruits of economic success, whatever the means used. The possibility of a political professionalization of leadership, foreshadowed a long time ago by Michels, might therefore doom the political aspirations of the forthcoming generation of workers and executives. Tocqueville's prophesy would then prove to be right. The urgent necessity of establishing strong intermediate (professional) powers could prevent organizations from becoming slowly and unobtrusively apolitical entities where the democratic idea would be restricted to the upbeat discourses of utopian thinkers and scholars.

CORPORATE ELITE PRODUCTION AND THE DYNAMICS OF DEMOCRACY

We have adopted a political framework to make sense of the dynamics of organizational regimes: the structures of power, the organization of coercion, the formation of coalitions and the production of political elites provide, in this perspective, the most relevant guides to the explanation of these dynamics (Tilly 1973: 447).

More particularly, understanding the emergence and production of a political regime supposes to focus on "the incumbents and their actions, their formulation of the agenda for the regime, their way of defining problems and

their capacity to solve them, the ability of the pro regime forces to maintain sufficient cohesion to govern" (Linz & Stepan 1978: 40). We suggest now that this has important implications for understanding the stability of political structures of organizations. Such factors are likely to inform both the definitions of democracy and the accounts regarding the evolution of democratic regimes toward oligarchy.

As Lipset et al. (1956) remind us, the insecurity of leadership status is one of the corner stones of democracies. However, a broad range of literature suggests firmly that contemporary corporate elites are perpetuating themselves relatively smoothly. This poses an interesting counterfactual for the supposed "circulation of power" or "circulation of control" put forward by some authors (Ocasio 1994; Ocasio & Kim 1999).

Two major phenomena might help account for the apparently seamless reproduction of corporate elites. First, the social fabric of a "class wide" principle (Useem 1984), according to which a certain number of mechanisms, especially interlocking directorates (Mizruchi 1996), facilitate the production of both cohesiveness among elite members and educational ingredients helping the selection and the socialization of coopted individuals, according to the well known "small world" phenomenon (Davis et al. 2003). In that view, a corporate elite can be represented as a powerful network of powerful individuals sustaining strategies of "power entrenchment" through the very management of the interlocks and friendship ties (Ingram & Roberts 2000). Second, the permanence of an "upper class" principle (Useem 1984), according to which the major ingredient of elite stability is its embeddedness in a specific social milieu of established wealthy families, "sharing a distinct culture, occupying a common social status, and unified through intermarriage and common experience in exclusive settings" (p. 13). At the corporate level, the power of social closeness and similarity has been pinpointed as a strong determinant of CEO succession and appointment (Westphal & Zajac 1995). Other studies have suggested that intra organizational mechanisms were also likely to produce endogenously an elite body through selective education and socializing mechanisms, as well as through the production of specific internal professions (Courpasson 2004).

If we follow Allen (1974), we could easily argue that the conjunction of these external and internal mechanisms is downright anti democratic, as it generates an “increasingly pervasive and integrated structure of elite cooptation among major corporations” (p. 404), restraining per se the quality of the competition and the principle of elite insecurity which has been put forward as the pillar of democratic regimes.

We have argued that the relationship between democracy and organizations is extremely ambivalent. A certain number of contemporary forces are clearly promoting democracy in the workplace. Others are clearly hampering any possibility of implementing true participation, contestation, and inclusiveness within organizations. When related to democracy, organizations appear more and more as regimes, i.e., “political forms ordering symbolically and structurally a set of social relations” (Mouffe 2000), organizing human coexistence and managing inequality between people and their relations of subordination. In organizations, “the stability of any democracy depends not on imposing a single unitary loyalty and viewpoint but on maintaining conflicting loyalties and viewpoints in a state of tension” (Crossman 1956). According to this general political definition of organizations, three major lines of inquiry may be suggested to better understand the relationship between democracy and the organizational world.

First, the study of the paradoxical roles played by contemporary oligarchies in the shaping of future organizations should be developed. Under a theory of political pluralism, it becomes urgent to understand that, in contemporary organizations, democracy and oligarchy are not necessarily opposite models. Oligarchy can become the very ferment of the production of a fragmentation of the complex social body. This can enable people not only to be related to the larger organization, but also to be affiliated with or loyal to subgroups within the organization (Lipset et al. 1956: 15), and therefore, to keep a close hand on their own fates and decisions. Contemporary processes such as the (re)emergence of professions and collegial forms in organizations (Lazega 2000) suggest undoubtedly that organizations could be politically shaped in a “polycratic” fashion, to take Weber’s expression.

Second the study of democracy in/for organizations cannot neglect the determination of political regimes by the specific profiles of business leaders. For instance, does the development of global corporations serve to develop a “global corporate elite”? In contrast, do the stiff competition and the uncertainties deriving from the growing multiplicity of stakeholders necessitate the generation of a more “parochial elite” deeply committed to the interests of individual companies but not fulfilling the political dimensions of the “managerial class”? At any rate, studying leadership as a profession, as some seminal studies have shown (Selznick 1957), more than as a practice could help scholars to better understand the very reasons why, maybe, key stakeholders do not consider developing democracy is in their interest.

Third, it is obviously crucial for organizational scholars to keep on studying the dynamics of authority within organizations, especially to understand why, while most people consider organizations have too much power over their members, very few think the latter should exercise more power in the workplace (Rousseau & Rivero 2003: 130). In other words, is democracy “thin” or “weak” because of a shared vision of legitimate authority within organizations? If yes, business leaders would have achieved a political tour de force. If not, we should give more attention to why the apparent zone of indifference (Barnard 1938) might be larger than ever in the contemporary workplace.

Other issues are of great importance, such as the link between the rise of the knowledge economy and the increasingly differential treatment of knowledge workers. The greater individual employability of these workers requires a rethinking of assumptions of the latent power asymmetry between firms and employees, and to what extent this dynamic has the capacity to enhance democratic practices or whether it forecloses any possibility of the development of a durable commitment of workers in the political affairs of the organizations for whom they work and in which they live.

CONCLUSION

We have argued that the current political dynamics of organizations and of surrounding

societies bear the seeds of mild despotic regimes, as Tocqueville predicted two centuries ago. At the same time, we have suggested that the incumbent economic leaders cannot brush aside the effects of recent corporate scandals in the engineering of the power structures of organizations. Moreover, recent investigations suggest that some deeply rooted patterns of corporate elite production could have been shattered for at least two decades (Cappelli & Hamori 2004).

Without envisaging that democratic organizations could miraculously emerge out of the shadows of corporate scandals, we think the quest for accountability and responsibility could be one of the political touchstones of organizations of the twenty first century. The constitution of a notion of *political performance* (Eckstein 1969) applied to organizations could help to find a new equilibrium for the excessive dominance of economic variables in the contemporary notion of survival. A politically efficient government is not necessarily the most democratic, but that which is capable of sharing out what is produced by a collective endeavor.

Organization studies on democracy are influenced by the post war optimism about the durability of democracies, once established. They are mostly grappling with the eternal question of why organizations are not democratic. We think organizational scholars should leave this question to jump to two complementary questions: (1) How far is democracy necessary to the functioning of organizations? (2) What are the contemporary concrete hybrids which are shaping the political structures of tomorrow's organizations? It is by understanding the complexity and fragility of these political hybrids that organizational scholars will be able to help future business elites to avoid some mistakes of the past.

SEE ALSO: Alliances; Culture, Organizations and; Democracy; Industrial Relations; Organizations

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demographic data: censuses, registers, surveys

Mark Mather

Population censuses, registers, and surveys are the primary sources of demographic data, including information about the size, composition, and

characteristics of a population or population subgroups. A census is an enumeration of all households in a well defined territory at a given point in time. Population registers are systems of continuous registration, maintained by certain countries, to keep demographic records of individuals. Surveys are used to collect detailed data on a particular subject from a sample or subset of the population. All three sources of data – censuses, registers, and surveys – are often used to monitor changes in population size and composition.

CENSUSES

For hundreds of years, censuses have been used to collect demographic, social, and economic information about individuals and households. The first modern census was conducted in Quebec in 1666, but there are much earlier references to census taking in the Bible and in early civilizations in China, Egypt, India, and Rome. The first US census was conducted in 1790, followed by the United Kingdom and France in 1801.

After World War II, the United Nations encouraged all countries to conduct national censuses, and today, more than 90 percent of the world's population is covered by a census enumeration. Recent censuses conducted in China and India – arguably the most ambitious censuses ever taken – together counted more than 2 billion people. The rich data from population censuses are used not only to monitor demographic changes within countries, but also to keep track of global changes in the size and characteristics of the world's population. In the United States, data from the decennial census are used to apportion Congressional seats in the US House of Representatives, draw new boundaries for legislative districts, and allocate billions of dollars in federal funds to states and local areas. Census data are also widely used by researchers, business groups, and local planners, who use them to monitor population trends, the demand for goods and services, and social and economic inequalities between groups.

Conducting a high quality, nationwide census is a complex and expensive process – depending on the size, geographical distribution, and level of cooperation of the population – and often

requires years of planning. Census administrators need to develop an address list, prepare detailed maps, prepare for advertising or outreach efforts, develop questionnaires (often in multiple languages), conduct tests of questionnaire items, and recruit and train census enumerators. Once the demographic data have been collected, the census staff need to analyze the data and prepare data products and reports for public use.

Census data can be collected through mail out questionnaires, by telephone, or through personal interviews. In the US census, which is conducted every 10 years, a questionnaire is mailed to every household in the United States. Census enumerators follow up with households that do not return their forms by telephone or with personal interviews. In the United States and in many other countries, census response rates have declined in recent decades because of growing concerns about privacy and confidentiality. The Netherlands has not conducted a national census since 1971 because of growing concerns among Dutch citizens about privacy and rights violations. Today, the Netherlands relies on a combination of surveys and administrative registers (see “Registers,” below) to collect demographic data.

No census is wholly accurate. One source of error relates to the difficulty in counting every household and resident in a population. Residents who fear the government or outsiders, speak non native languages, or live in mobile or complex households are the most likely to be missed in a census. In the United States, past censuses have also overlooked a disproportionate share of children and minorities, resulting in an undercount of those groups. In developing countries, census counts tend to be less accurate for populations with low levels of literacy and poor transportation networks. Other errors in census data can result from respondents’ inability or unwillingness to provide correct information or errors made in data collection or processing. In a few countries, census figures have been manipulated to bolster the numbers of a specific ethnic group or region.

In order to test the accuracy of census results, the US Census Bureau conducted special post enumeration surveys (see “Surveys,” below) after the 1990 and 2000 Censuses. Census population counts were compared with

independent estimates from these surveys for different geographical areas and for subgroups of the population. Census counts were also compared with 2000 population estimates derived through analyses of birth, death, and migration records. These comparisons have been useful in evaluating census undercounts, particularly for minority groups.

Census questionnaires are typically completed by the household head or “reference” person and may include questions about age, gender, marital status, place of birth, relationship, educational level, occupation, religion, race/ethnicity, or other demographic characteristics. Information is collected for each member of the household. There are two methods used to conduct a census: in a “de facto” enumeration, people are counted at their actual place of residence at the time the census is conducted. In a “de jure” enumeration, residents are assigned to their “usual place of residence.” The United Kingdom counts people using the de facto method, while Canada, Mexico, and the United States use a de jure approach.

REGISTERS

Countries with national population registers keep records of individuals from the time of birth (or immigration) to death (or emigration) and update the record over time with life events. In general, population registers are used to record four basic demographic events: births, deaths, marriages, and migration. However, registers vary in the type of demographic data that are collected and how those data are used. The earliest registration systems were maintained by parishes and date back to the 1300s. National population registers were first established in Europe during the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries. Today, the most complete population registers can be found in Denmark, Finland, Japan, the Netherlands, Norway, and Sweden. What distinguishes these countries from most others is that they collect and store information about demographic events in a central government office, instead of using separate systems of birth, death, and marriage registration.

Bryan (2004) notes that these “universal” registers are less common than “partial”

registers that are set up for specific administrative purposes. For example, several US agencies, including the Social Security Administration, the Department of Homeland Security, and the Internal Revenue Service, maintain large administrative data files that can be considered partial registers.

Population registers are most often used for government administrative purposes, but can also be used to monitor changes in a country's population size and composition, keep track of trends in fertility and mortality, or select random samples of individuals from the population. Data from pre industrial registers in Europe have been used for historical demographic research on family structure, fertility, and mortality. Population registers can also be used as a substitute to conducting a national census. The main advantage of a national register is timeliness; demographic events are recorded on a continuous basis, rather than once every 5 or 10 years.

Population registers are expensive to maintain, however, and require a high level of cooperation in order to produce high quality data. Universal registers are probably not feasible in a country like the United States, where there is growing public concern about invasion of privacy and protecting confidentiality.

VITAL REGISTRATION SYSTEMS

Like population registers, vital registration systems collect data on a continuous basis, but are generally limited to information about births, deaths, marriages, and divorces. Data on vital events are drawn from birth certificates and other forms that are completed at the time the events occur. Most developed countries have fairly complete vital registration systems, while developing countries are more likely to rely on surveys to collect the information. Along with basic statistics about the number of vital events that occur in a given month or year, vital registration systems often collect more detailed information on age, racial and ethnic composition, marital status, and other characteristics.

In the United States, the National Center for Health Statistics (NCHS) compiles and disseminates information about vital events based on data received from state health departments.

NCHS data are often used in combination with census or survey data to produce demographic rates and ratios (e.g., fertility and mortality rates) and to monitor national, state, and local demographic trends.

SURVEYS

Unlike censuses and registers, which enumerate the entire population, a survey is conducted for a sample or subset of the population. Surveys are generally used to collect detailed information about a specific topic, such as labor force participation, health, economic status, religious affiliation, or life course events. Surveys can also be used as a primary or supplemental source of demographic data in countries without a regular, high quality national census, population register, or vital registration system. While most census data are collected by the government, surveys are collected by a variety of governmental and private organizations.

The quality of survey data is dependent on many of the same factors that affect census data quality – response rates, respondents' knowledge and level of cooperation, and errors made in data collection or processing – but survey data quality is also linked to the size and design of the sample. Surveys are often administered using a “probability” or random sample of the population, so that findings can be generalized to the population as a whole. Data based on a probability sample are subject to “sampling error,” which indicates the extent to which sample estimates might differ from actual population characteristics.

Modern surveys were first introduced in the Gallup Poll in the 1930s, and were focused on measuring public opinion. The US Current Population Survey (CPS) dates back to the mid 1940s and was the first survey to collect detailed social, demographic, and economic information about the US population. In the 1950s and 1960s many countries conducted “knowledge, attitudes, and practice” (KAP) surveys to measure contraceptive use. The World Fertility Survey (WFS) revolutionized demographic analysis during the 1970s and 1980s with detailed surveys of women's fertility and contraceptive use in over 60 countries.

Today, the Demographic and Health Survey (DHS), modeled after the WFS, asks detailed questions about fertility, family planning, infant mortality, and maternal and child health.

Surveys are generally divided into two types: cross sectional and longitudinal. Cross sectional surveys, like the CPS and DHS surveys, collect information from a cross section of the population at a given point in time. Cross sectional surveys provide a snapshot of the population and are best for descriptive analyses, while longitudinal surveys ask questions of people at two points in time and are more suitable for measuring causal relationships between variables.

Worldwide, one of the largest surveys is the US decennial census “long form.” While the census “short form” is mailed to every household in the United States, the long form questionnaire is mailed to approximately one out of every six households – about 5 million households nationwide. The long form includes detailed questions about social and economic characteristics of the population, while the census short form includes only a subset of questions on age, gender, race, ethnicity, and household tenure.

The United States is conducting a new survey called the American Community Survey (ACS), designed to replace the census long form in 2010. Instead of having to wait 10 years for long form data, the ACS will provide demographic estimates for the American population each year. The ACS is the first US survey to provide continuous data on social, economic, and demographic characteristics for states and local areas.

SEE ALSO: Age, Period, and Cohort Effects; Demographic Techniques: Population Projections and Estimates; Demography: Historical; Descriptive Statistics; Fertility: Transitions and Measures; Mortality: Transitions and Measures; Random Sample; Survey Research

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demographic techniques: decomposition and standardization

Prithwis Das Gupta

Demographers are often interested in comparing rates (e.g., birth rates, mortality rates) in populations cross nationally and/or over time. Interpreting difference between rates requires an understanding of the various factors that comprise that rate. Crude birth rates, for example, depend not just on the fertility of women of childbearing age, but also the proportion of the population that consists of such women. In such cases, in which the overall rate of a phenomenon for a population depends on a number of factors, a detailed comparison of two such rates from two different populations can be made in two distinctly different but closely related ways. One way is to see how the overall rates would change if one of the factors varied as it did in the two populations, while the other factors were kept at the same levels. The rates obtained in this way are called the standardized rates with respect to the unchanged factors, and the process is called *standardization*. The other way of comparing the two overall rates is to break the difference between these two rates into additive components constituting

the effects of the factors involved. The effects of the factors obtained in this way are called the decomposed effects and the process is called *decomposition*. These two processes of standardization and decomposition are closely linked because, if they are developed correctly, the difference between the two standardized rates from the two populations corresponding to the only factor that has changed should be equal to the effect of the same factor in the decomposition process. Authors who have contributed to this subject include Kitagawa (1955), Cho and Retherford (1973), Das Gupta (1978, 1991, 1993), and Kim and Strobino (1984)

AN EXAMPLE: THE RATE AS THE PRODUCT OF TWO FACTORS

This example illustrates the use of standardization and decomposition by examining the respective roles that two factors play in constituting a rate. The Crude Birth Rate (CBR) is defined as the number of live births per 1,000 members of the population. In 1981, Austria had a CBR of 12.512 and Chile had a CBR of 32.845. The difference between the two rates is a substantial 20.333.

However, the CBR can also be calculated by multiplying the General Fertility Rate (GFR: the number of births per 1,000 women aged 15–49), which is represented by α in this example, by the proportion of women aged 15–49 in the total population, represented by β , so that:

$$CBR = \alpha\beta.$$

In 1981, Austria had a GFR (α) of 51.767 and the proportion of women aged 15–49 in the population (β) was .24170. For Chile, the numbers were $\alpha = 84.905$ and $\beta = .38684$.

The CBRs for Austria and Chile can be standardized on the β factor (i.e., the proportion of the population that is made up of women aged 15–49). This is done by multiplying the average of the two countries' β s by the respective α . The β standardized rates for Austria and Chile are:

$$\begin{aligned} \beta \text{ standardized CBR (Austria)} &= .5 * (\beta(\text{Chile}) + \beta(\text{Austria})) * \alpha(\text{Austria}) \\ &= .5 * (.38684 + .24170) * 51.767 \\ &= 16.269 \end{aligned}$$

$$\begin{aligned} \beta \text{ standardized CBR (Chile)} &= .5 * (\beta(\text{Chile}) + \beta(\text{Austria})) * \alpha(\text{Chile}) \\ &= .5 * (.38684 + .24170) * 84.905 \\ &= 26.684 \end{aligned}$$

The α effect – the amount of the difference between CBRs that is attributable to differences in GFRs – is the difference between the two β standardized CBRs: $26.684 - 16.269 = 10.415$.

Similarly, the α standardized rates for Austria and Chile are, respectively,

$$\begin{aligned} \alpha \text{ standardized CBR (Austria)} &= .5 * (\alpha(\text{Chile}) + \alpha(\text{Austria})) * \beta(\text{Austria}) \\ &= 16.517 \end{aligned}$$

$$\begin{aligned} \alpha \text{ standardized CBR (Chile)} &= .5 * (\alpha(\text{Chile}) + \alpha(\text{Austria})) * \beta(\text{Chile}) \\ &= 26.435 \end{aligned}$$

$$\text{The } \beta \text{ effect} = 26.435 - 16.517 = 9.918$$

The α effect (10.415) is 51.2 percent of the total difference in CBRs (20.333), and the β effect (9.918) is 48.8 percent of the total. These standardized rates demonstrate that 51.2 percent of the difference between the CBRs of Austria and Chile for 1981 can be attributed to the difference in their general fertility rates and the remaining 48.8 percent can be attributed to the difference in their proportions of women aged 15–49 in the total population. Although Austria and Chile had quite different crude birth rates in 1981, standardizing the rates shows that almost half of this difference is due to the different age structures in the two countries.

This technique can similarly be extended to the *product* of three or more factors (Das Gupta 1991, 1993).

OTHER FORMS OF RATES

Standardization and decomposition can also be used to analyze rates that are *functions of two factors*. For example, the General Fertility Rate (GFR) per woman aged 15–44 can be thought of as a function of two factors, viz., the number of births per married woman aged 15–44 (α) and the ratio of single to married women in the age group 15–44 (β). In this case, the GFR can

be written not as a simple multiplication of two factors, but as a function

$$\text{GFR} = \alpha / (1 + \beta)$$

of the two factors. Still, the technique is similar to that used for standardized rates that are the product of two factors; for example, β standardized GFR is computed by averaging two GFRs using the same α and different β s. This technique can be extended to functions of more than two factors (Das Gupta 1991, 1993).

In many situations, a factor may be represented by several numbers. For example, in a crude birth rate, seven age specific fertility rates together may be considered one factor (α) and seven numbers of women in the age groups as proportions of the total population the other factor (β). Such factors may be called *vector factors* (as opposed to scalar factors). Standardization and decomposition techniques can be applied to vector factors. For example, β standardized crude birth rate is computed by the sum of the products of all the age specific fertility rates and the average proportions of the population in that age range for the two populations.

Most of the papers on standardization and decomposition published so far perform standardization and decomposition techniques on *cross classified data* involving one or more factors. Unlike the situations in the preceding examples, the decomposition in this case involves the effect of the differences in the cell specific rates, called the rate effect, in addition to the effects of the factors. This might be done to compare subgroups of the population. For example, standardizing the age structure of two groups of women – those with one child and those with four or more – allows a more meaningful comparison of expressed future fertility preferences. When this is done as a one factor cross classified case with a single factor effect and rate effect, it is very similar to the case of two vector factors. However, the treatment of cross classified data with two or more factors is very different, and is discussed in Das Gupta (1991, 1993).

CONCLUSION

The four broad categories of decomposition – product of two or more factors, function of two

or more factors, function of two or more vector factors, and rates from cross classified data – should cover virtually all cases of decomposition of the difference between two rates for any number of factors. In the absence of general methods of decomposition to be used under various circumstances, social scientists have devised in the past their own ad hoc methods to handle their respective problems. Although their approaches have produced meaningful results, sometimes they have been less than satisfactory in terms of mathematical rigor and elegance.

The problem of decomposition is different from the problem of regression analysis. In the decomposition problem with cross classified data, the rate effect may not always decrease (it may even increase) with the addition of a new factor, whereas in the regression analysis the addition of each independent variable to the equation increasingly explains the variation in the dependent variable. For example, it is very likely that, in a regression analysis, poverty status would be explained significantly by race, but that the difference in the race composition in two years would not be an important factor in explaining the difference in the poverty rates in those years.

The decomposition problem can also be handled using statistical modeling approaches such as log linear analysis and the purging method involving errors (Clogg & Eliason 1988; Liao 1989) instead of the above mathematical approaches of solving unknowns from algebraic equations. The modeling approach is handicapped by the fact that it is often too complicated to be of any practical use even for data involving only two factors. Also, this approach leads to several widely different sets of results depending on the type of purging used and it is not clear how to justify choosing one set over all others.

Unlike the statistical modeling approach, the method presented decomposes the difference between two rates into additive main effects and does not involve any interaction effects. This elegance is achieved not by ignoring the parts in the total difference that other models might label interactions, but by fully accounting for the total difference in terms of main effects, and thereby distributing the so called interactions among the main effects. This

distribution does not change the conclusions about the relative importance of the factors, it only simplifies the picture.

The effects of factors do not necessarily imply any causal relationships. They simply indicate the nature of the association of the factors with the phenomenon being measured. There might be some hidden forces behind the factors that are actually responsible for the numbers we allocate to different factors as effects, but identifying those forces is beyond the scope of the decomposition analysis.

When there are more than two populations to be compared, the decompositions can be carried out more than once by taking two populations at a time. However, this procedure may lead to internally inconsistent results. For example, the effects of the factor α in the comparison of populations 1 and 2, and of populations 2 and 3, may not add up to the α effect when populations 1 and 3 are compared. A unique way of achieving consistency in the effects based on the multiple populations being compared, without bringing in an exogenous population as standard, is provided in Das Gupta (1991, 1993).

SEE ALSO: Demographic Techniques: Population Projections and Estimates; Demographic Techniques: Population Pyramids and Age Sex Structure; Fertility: Transitions and Measures; Mortality: Transitions and Measures

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demographic techniques: event history methods

Steven Martin

Event history analysis is a term used in sociology for numerous statistical methods that use information about *whether* and *when* an individual experiences an event. Almost any social phenomenon can be thought of as an event that happens to an individual, whether that individual is (for example) a woman having a third child, a city experiencing a race riot, or a state legislature passing women's suffrage. It is not surprising, then, that as computer software has made event history techniques easier to use since the 1980s, researchers have found many imaginative applications for these techniques.

Sociologists use the term event history analysis to describe models for duration data, but similar models are used in other disciplines with different names and slightly different terminologies. For example, models for duration data are called survival analysis by health scientists, duration analysis by economists, and failure time analysis by engineers. Many of the original and ongoing developments in duration modeling come from the health sciences, and some of the terms used in event history analysis (such as *risk* and *hazard*) reflect this heritage.

EVENT HISTORY DATA

Event history data generally require three pieces of information. These are *whether* an

individual experienced an event, *when* an individual who experienced an event experienced that event, and *when* the last valid observation came for an individual who was “censored” – that is, for an individual who had not yet experienced the event when the last observation was made.

Data for event history analysis can be collected and assembled in a variety of ways. In survey research, event history data are usually obtained by asking respondents to remember when events occurred in their lives. Traditionally, such retrospective data come from standard lists of survey questions. Examples would be: “Have you ever been married?” and “What year did your first marriage begin?” Increasingly, however, survey researchers have found that respondents do better at recalling long past events or difficult to remember events using *event history calendars* that allow the respondents to map several timelines at once (cf. Belli et al. 2001). For example, a welfare history calendar could include timelines for landmark events, residence changes, changes in family structure, employment changes, and use of entitlement programs. The increased use of event history calendars in survey research is one indication of the growing range of social questions being addressed through event history analysis.

AN EVENT HISTORY MODEL

Once the event history data have been organized, there are a number of event history models to analyze the results in a familiar regression style framework. Commonly used models include proportional hazard models for continuous time data. In such models, the outcome variable is the *hazard* or *rate* of the event of interest. The hazard is defined as the conditional probability that an event occurs in a given time interval (given that it has not already occurred), divided by the length of the time interval. An example would be a rate (or “hazard”) of .03 per month hazard of returning to welfare for single mothers who have just left welfare.

For continuous time data, the conditional probability of an event in a given time interval is $P(t, t + \Delta t)$, where t is the start of a time

interval and $t + \Delta t$ is the end of the time interval. The time interval Δt is defined to be vanishingly small, and the hazard function takes the following form:

$$h(t) = \lim_{\Delta t \rightarrow 0} \frac{P(t, t + \Delta t)}{\Delta t}$$

Besides $h(t)$, other commonly used symbols for the hazard function include $r(t)$ and $\lambda(t)$.

The general form of the proportional hazard model is as follows:

$$h(t) = \exp(\gamma(t) + \beta_1 x_1 + K + \beta_k x_k),$$

where $\gamma(t)$ is some function that describes how the rate of the event changes over time (the “*duration dependence*”), x_i are a set of explanatory variables, and β_i are a set of coefficients to describe how the explanatory variables predict differences in the hazard rate.

A proportional hazard model differs from a standard regression model in three notable respects. The first difference is that the coefficients are all exponentiated, so the explanatory variables are defined to have multiplicative rather than additive effects on the hazard. Second is the inclusion of $\gamma(t)$ to allow the hazard to vary as a function of time. The notion that the hazard is a function of time forces the researcher (usually) to choose a functional form for the duration dependence based on theoretical criteria or simple observed patterns. The duration dependency also forces the researcher to define a starting time t_0 . In many hazard models t_0 is implicitly obvious, but in other hazard models t_0 can be quite arbitrary. The last notable difference between a standard regression model and a proportional hazard model is the lack of an error term in a proportional hazard model; hazard models are estimated by maximum likelihood procedures rather than least squares procedures.

Continuous time event history models bear a strong resemblance to logistic regression models, which examine *whether* an individual experiences an event. Because a hazard model adds information on *when* events occur, the explicit time dimension makes it possible to determine the order of changes in explanatory variables and changes in the outcome variable. Establishing the time order of events is

critical to building causal interpretations from observed social patterns. Another advantage of hazard models is the full use they make of the available data. Event history models allow one to distinguish between two events that happened at different durations. A final advantage of event history models over traditional logistic regression models is that event history models enable the researcher to draw some information from individuals who could only be observed for part of the time they were at risk of the event ("censored" cases).

Event history models also have unique weaknesses. One is the problem of unmeasured heterogeneity. Any control variables left out of an event history model will distort the baseline duration function $\gamma(t)$ and bias the coefficients for the key explanatory variables to some extent. Many researchers have developed complex estimation procedures to correct for problems of unmeasured heterogeneity, but the statistical fixes themselves often rest on tenuous assumptions. For a description of problems of unmeasured heterogeneity see Vaupel and Yashin (1985). Another problem is that of non-proportional hazards. The proportional hazard model assumes that covariates have the same effect on the outcome variable across all possible durations of exposure, and this is simply not the case for many social phenomena. The problem of non-proportional hazards can be remedied fairly easily by interacting the covariate of interest with the duration function.

AN EXAMPLE

One example of an application of event history analysis comes from demography. The subsequent fertility of teen mothers has been a topic of social interest due to concerns that early births may lead to rapid repeat births, a particular social concern when the teen mothers are not married. One can test for such a difference using data from the June 1995 Current Population Survey (CPS), with a sample of 2,952 US women born in the years 1965 to 1970. Standard life table procedures indicate that 23.5 percent of teen mothers in the sample had a second birth within 24 months of the first birth, compared to only 19 percent of mothers with a first birth at age 20 or older. An application of a proportional

hazard model can show whether this difference is statistically significant, and whether this difference is evident at all birth intervals or only at short birth intervals.

A popular variant of the proportional hazard model is the Cox regression model, in which the duration function $\gamma(t)$ is not estimated directly (Cox 1972). The Cox model implicitly controls for duration since the first birth, with rates of second births very low immediately after a first birth, rising rapidly to a peak rate at about 3 years postpartum, and declining thereafter. In Cox regression models, the researcher need not specify a baseline duration function. The model controls for race and ethnicity, and includes a dichotomous variable that identifies women with a teen first birth. Finally, to identify possible non-proportional effects of time, a series of interactions between a teen first birth and duration since first birth are also added in Model 2.

Results using the Stata statistical package are shown in Table 1. The first model shows coefficients for age at first birth, averaged across all durations since the first birth, plus controls for race/ethnicity. In the first model, the coefficient for a teen first birth is small (.08) and not statistically significant. This coefficient shows the *overall* effect of a teen first birth on the rate of a subsequent birth, but the effect may not be even (or proportional) across time (or duration) since the first birth. For non-proportional results, look to the second model. The "main effect" of a teen first birth is essentially zero (.00); this coefficient refers to the comparison durations of the third to sixth years postpartum. However, there is a statistically significant *non-proportional interaction* effect in the second year postpartum, indicating that the monthly hazard of a subsequent birth increases by a factor of $\exp(.28) = 1.32$ times in the second year after a first birth. This means that teen mothers' second birth rates are much higher in the second year postpartum than we would expect from teen mothers' second birth rates at longer durations. Note also the marginally statistically significant *negative interaction* for teen mothers in the seventh and later years postpartum, perhaps indicating very low second birth rates at long durations.

From this analysis one can infer that the overall rate of second births is similar for teen and

Table 1 Coefficients from Cox regression models predicting the monthly hazard of a second birth

<i>Variable</i>	<i>Model 1: Proportional effect of age at first birth</i>	<i>Model 2: Non proportional effects of age at first birth</i>
<i>Age at first birth</i>		
19 or younger	.08 (.05)	.00 (.07)
20 or older (comparison group)		
<i>Age at first birth* duration since first birth</i>		
19 or younger*1st year postpartum		.11 (.27)
19 or younger*2nd year postpartum		.28** (.10)
19 or younger*3rd 6th years postpartum (comparison duration)		
19 or younger*7th and later years postpartum		.47* (.23)
<i>Race/Ethnicity</i>		
Hispanic	.15* (.07)	.14* (.07)
Non-Hispanic black	.04 (.07)	.03 (.07)
Non-Hispanic white (comparison group)		
Other non-Hispanic	.30** (.11)	.30** (.11)

Source: June 1995 Current Population Survey (CPS).

Standard errors are in parentheses. *P*-values are shown by stars. ** $p < .01$ * $p < .05$

non teen mothers, but the exact timing of those second births might be much sooner for teen mothers than non teen mothers. Hence, the techniques of event history modeling provide some justification to social concerns about closely spaced second births among teen mothers.

OTHER EVENT HISTORY MODELS

There is a large and growing number of variants on event history models. The Cox proportional hazard model represents only one type of proportional hazard model; there are many other proportional hazard models that explicitly define the duration dependency $\gamma(t)$. Further more, the expanded use of event history models has led to increased use of models for repeated events, events with more than one possible outcome, and events with more than one possible origin. Such complicated event patterns often arise in analyses of political events (Box Steffensmeier & Zorn 2002) and life course studies (Wu 2003).

There are also types of event history models that are not based on the hazard function.

Whereas proportional hazard models use as an outcome the hazard of an event, *accelerated failure time* models use as an outcome the expected time to the event. A set of methods called *discrete time* methods are useful when event times are measured in large units such as years. The issue of long time intervals in event history data is important because commonly used surveys increasingly suppress information about the month and day of events to protect the privacy of survey respondents.

To learn more about the variety of event history models and their uses, the reader should refer to specialized texts on the subject. Useful treatments for social scientists can be found in Yamaguchi (1991) and Blossfeld and Rohwer (2002), and a more general treatment can be found in Kalbfleisch and Prentice (2002). Many readily available software packages have modules for estimating basic to moderately complicated event history models, including the Cox regression model. Allison (1995) describes in detail various techniques for event history analysis in SAS. Other popular programs include SPSS, Stata, and S Plus. Researchers have also developed a number of statistical

packages for estimation of non standard event history models of various sorts, including CTM (Yi et al. 1987), TDA (Blossfeld et al. 1989), and aML (Lillard & Panis 2000). As event history analysis continues to develop and evolve, researchers will no doubt continue to write new programs and expand the capabilities of the existing programs.

SEE ALSO: Demographic Data: Censuses, Registers, Surveys; Demographic Techniques: Life Table Methods; Fertility: Transitions and Measures; Life Course Perspective

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demographic techniques: life-table methods

Robert Schoen

A life table describes the survival of a hypothetical group of persons from birth, through successive ages, to the death of the last member. In doing so, it shows the implications of a set of mortality rates for the probability of surviving from one age to another, and provides useful summary measures such as the expectation of life at birth. Beyond its wide use in studies of mortality, the life table has been used in analyses of marriage, divorce, contraceptive use, and many other topics where it is valuable to examine how rates of decrement reduce the number of persons in a closed group.

The life table dates back to the seventeenth century. In 1662, John Graunt advanced the first, rather crude, table based on English experience. In 1694, Edmund Halley (of comet fame) constructed a life table for Breslau (now Wrocław, Poland), adding actuarial functions to facilitate the calculation of life annuities. Life tables are now available for nearly all countries, and are routinely produced by government statistical offices, insurance companies, and academic demographers. Life tables describe the mortality experience of a population, facilitate population projections, and are central to calculating the costs of life insurance and life annuities.

Mortality (death) rates are the basis of most life tables. Demographers typically use death rates of the form

$$M(x, n) = D(x, n)/P(x, n) \quad (1)$$

where age specific death rate $M(x, n)$ reflects mortality between ages x and $x + n$ (or more precisely from exact age x to the instant before the attainment of exact age $x + n$), $D(x, n)$ gives the number of deaths in the population between the ages of x and $x + n$, and $P(x, n)$ is the number of persons in the population between the ages of x and $x + n$. Rates in the form of equation (1) are known as occurrence exposure rates, because they relate the number of deaths (occurrences) to the number of

persons at risk of dying (i.e., the exposed population). Death rates are generally calculated separately by sex, as male and female mortality patterns differ. Complete life tables show age in single years up to some high age (100 or over), but most life tables are “abridged,” and show ages 0, 1, and every fifth year from 5 to at least 85. Age 1 is shown because mortality at age 0 is very different from mortality at ages 1 to 5. Given contemporary survivorship, many recent abridged life tables go to age 90 (or higher).

To start the life table, a “radix” value is chosen to establish the size of the life table cohort, where that cohort is the hypothetical group of persons, closed to migration, whose survivorship is described by the table. Denoting the number of persons in the life table cohort who survive to exact age x by $l(x)$, the radix value, represented by $l(0)$, is generally set at 100,000. Essentially that radix indicates that the data are considered reliable to about five significant digits. Life tables based on small datasets sometimes start with a radix of 1,000, while insurance company life tables, based on extensive and detailed data, have used radix values of 10,000,000.

The central problem in life table construction is to transform death rates into probabilities of dying, and thus generate the number of survivors to each age in the table. Let us define $d(x, n)$ as the number of deaths in the life table cohort between the ages of x and $x + n$. Because the life table cohort is a closed group, we have

$$l(x + n) = l(x) - d(x, n) \quad (2)$$

or that the number surviving to exact age $x + n$ is the number surviving to exact age x less the number of deaths between those ages. Using equation (2), we can write the probability of dying between ages x and $x + n$, $q(x, n)$, as:

$$q(x, n) = d(x, n)/l(x) \quad (3)$$

In terms of life table functions, the death rate in equation (1) can be written:

$$M(x, n) = d(x, n)/L(x, n) \quad (4)$$

where $L(x, n)$ is the number of person years lived by the life table cohort between the ages

of x and $x + n$. (A person year is one year lived by one person.) Finding death probabilities from rates is thus equivalent to finding the number of person years lived in an interval in terms of the number of survivors to different exact ages.

Many ways of transforming rates to probabilities have been used in life table construction. One simple approach is to assume that the survivorship function, $l(x)$, is linear between ages x and $x + n$. That yields the solution:

$$q(x, n) = nM(x, n)/[1 + (n/2)M(x, n)] \quad (5)$$

A second approach is to assume that the survivorship function is exponential within each age interval. In that case,

$$q(x, n) = 1 - e^{-nM(x, n)} \quad (6)$$

While the linear assumption in equation (5) is usually accurate for 5 year age intervals in a mortality only life table, the exponential assumption in equation (6) is not. However, the frequently used Reed–Merrell modification, that is:

$$q(x, 5) = 1 - \exp[-5M(x, 5) - \{M(x, 5)\}^2] \quad (7)$$

generally yields an acceptably accurate abridged life table.

Two other life table functions are commonly encountered. $T(x)$ is the total number of person years lived above exact age x , and is thus the sum of the L values from age x through the highest age in the table. The life expectancy at age x , $e(x)$, is given by:

$$e(x) = T(x)/l(x) \quad (8)$$

The average number of years a person age x will live is the total number of years lived above age x by the life table cohort divided by the number of persons in the cohort who survive to age x .

Given a method for relating rates and probabilities, survivorship [$l(x)$] values can be found for all ages from equations (2) and (3), and person year [$L(x, n)$] values can be found from equation (4). The $T(x)$ and $e(x)$ values follow

Table 1 Abridged life table: US females, 1996

<i>Age interval</i>	<i>Proportion dying</i>	<i>Of 100,000 born alive</i>		<i>Stationary population</i>		<i>Average remaining lifetime</i>
<i>Period of life between two exact ages stated in years</i>	<i>Proportion of persons alive at beginning of age interval dying during interval</i>	<i>Number living at beginning of age interval</i>	<i>Number dying during age interval</i>	<i>In the age interval</i>	<i>In this and all subsequent age intervals</i>	<i>Average number of years of life remaining at beginning of age interval</i>
<i>(1)</i> <i>x to x + n</i>	<i>(2)</i> <i>q(x, n)</i>	<i>(3)</i> <i>l(x)</i>	<i>(4)</i> <i>d(x, n)</i>	<i>(5)</i> <i>L(x, n)</i>	<i>(6)</i> <i>T(x)</i>	<i>(7)</i> <i>e(x)</i>
0 1.....	0.00659	100,000	659	99,435	7,907,507	79.1
1 5.....	0.00135	99,341	134	397,043	7,808,072	78.6
5 10.....	0.00083	99,207	82	495,812	7,411,029	74.7
10 15.....	0.00093	99,125	92	495,426	6,915,217	69.8
15 20.....	0.00220	99,033	218	494,654	6,419,791	64.8
20 25.....	0.00242	98,815	239	493,488	5,925,137	60.0
25 30.....	0.00311	98,576	307	492,128	5,431,649	55.1
30 35.....	0.00430	98,269	423	490,336	4,939,521	50.3
35 40.....	0.00608	97,846	595	487,848	4,449,185	45.5
40 45.....	0.00858	97,251	834	484,325	3,961,337	40.7
45 50.....	0.01269	96,417	1,224	479,247	3,477,012	36.1
50 55.....	0.02036	95,193	1,938	471,421	2,997,765	31.5
55 60.....	0.03150	93,255	2,938	459,363	2,526,344	27.1
60 65.....	0.05068	90,317	4,577	440,808	2,066,981	22.9
65 70.....	0.07484	85,740	6,417	413,497	1,626,173	19.0
70 75.....	0.11607	79,323	9,207	374,780	1,212,676	15.3
75 80.....	0.17495	70,116	12,267	321,360	837,896	12.0
80 85.....	0.27721	57,849	16,036	250,275	516,536	8.9
85 and over...	1.00000	41,813	41,813	266,261	266,261	6.4

Source: Adapted from US National Center for Health Statistics (1998).

from the $L(x, n)$ and from equation (8). Special procedures are needed at ages under 5 and to close out the table. Readers interested in making a life table are referred to the discussions in Preston et al. (2001) and Schoen (1988).

Table 1 shows a life table for US females, 1996. It is a period life table, in that it is based on rates observed during a single year (or period). Cohort life tables, which follow the experience of actual birth cohorts, have been calculated, but are much less common because they require data over a long time interval. The $M(x)$ column is not shown in the table, but the age specific life table death rates can readily be found using equation (4).

As is commonly the case, there are 100,000 persons in the life table cohort. Life expectancy at birth is 79.1 years. Since 659 persons die at age 0, the probability of dying before attaining age 1 is .00659. Some 90,317 persons survive to attain age 60 where, on average, they will live another 22.9 years. At age 85, only 41,813 persons remain alive. Their probability of dying is 1, but on average they will live another 6.4 years.

The mortality patterns shown in the table are rather typical of contemporary low mortality populations. Japanese females, the population that currently has the lowest known mortality, have an expectation of life at birth approaching 85 years, and some select subpopulations have

been found with even longer life expectancies. Longevity in low mortality populations has been steadily increasing in recent years, and no limiting life expectancy is in sight.

The life table can be seen as a population model that goes beyond the experience of a single birth cohort. Consider a long series of birth cohorts, each of $l(0)$ births uniformly distributed over the year, exposed to an unchanging regime of age specific death rates. After 120 or so years, a stationary population will result, one that is constant in both size and age composition. Each year there are $l(0)$ deaths in the stationary population, $d(x, n)$ of them between the ages of x and $x + n$. There are $l(x)$ persons attaining every age x , $L(x, n)$ person years lived between ages x and $x + n$ and, at any time, $L(x, n)$ persons between the ages of x and $x + n$. The $L(x, n)$ function thus has two distinct interpretations: the number of person years lived by each cohort between the ages of x and $x + n$, and the number of persons in that segment of the stationary population. The total number of persons in the stationary population is $T(0)$, and its crude death rate is always $l(0)/T(0)$ or $1/e(0)$. Each year, behavior in the stationary population reproduces the lifetime experience of one life table birth cohort.

The basic life table model has been generalized in a number of ways. The table need not follow a birth cohort – any closed group will do. For example, numerous analyses have been done examining attrition in a marriage cohort, where time is represented by duration of marriage rather than age.

A common extension is to recognize more than one cause of exit (or decrement) from the life table cohort. Multiple causes of death are probably the most common example. However, studies have also been made of birth cohorts subject to the risks of mortality and first marriage, marriage cohorts subject to mortality and divorce, and many other subjects. Multiple causes of decrement are easily recognized. The total life table decrement function, $d(x, n)$, is simply apportioned to the different causes in the same proportion as observed decrements. A cause of death life table can reflect the probability of ever dying from a specified cause.

A further extension is the “cause eliminated” or “associated single decrement” life table. This model considers the hypothetical question

of what survivorship would be if a particular cause of decrement were eliminated. The simplest way to calculate such tables is to assume that age-cause specific rates (not probabilities) of decrements remain unchanged, though caution is in order because hypothetical rather than actual behavior is being described. Age specific probabilities of death for the remaining cause(s) always increase, because the population at risk of decrement to those causes must increase. The most common application is to cause of death life tables, where one can estimate the addition to life expectancy that would follow the elimination of a particular cause of death. The model is also useful in a number of other instances, for example to eliminate the possibly distorting effects of mortality from nuptiality mortality double decrement life tables.

An important generalization recognizes more than one living state in the life table model, and follows persons as they move between model states. Such multistate or increment-decrement life tables have been applied to numerous situations, especially studies of marriage, divorce, and remarriage; migration between geographical regions; changes in parity (i.e., a woman's number of live births); health status; and labor force status. Numerous useful summary measures can be found from such models. For example, a marital status life table recognizing the four living states of “Never Married,” “Presently Married,” “Widowed,” and “Divorced” can yield the probability of ever marrying, the proportion of life lived married, the probability a marriage will end in divorce, and the average duration of a marriage.

Multistate life tables can be constructed from a set of age specific rates of decrement using techniques analogous to those used for the basic life table, though multiple equations (or matrices) are needed. Conceptually, multistate models introduce important new distinctions. In calculating probabilities, one must be clear whether the starting population consists of all persons of a given age or just persons in a specific state at that age. The same is true with respect to life expectancies. The number of years a man age 60 can expect to live widowed depends substantially on his marital status at age 60.

It is commonplace – and analytically useful – to talk about measures such as life expectancy that do not refer to actual people but to the

experience of a life table cohort. The life table model remains a basic tool in demography because it shows the cumulative implications of a set of behavioral rates, and thus summarizes long term (and possibly complex) behavior.

SEE ALSO: Demographic Data: Censuses, Registers, Surveys; Demographic Techniques: Population Projections and Estimates; Gender, Health, and Mortality; Healthy Life Expectancy; Infant, Child, and Maternal Health and Mortality; Mortality: Transitions and Measures; Race/Ethnicity, Health, and Mortality; Socioeconomic Status, Health, and Mortality

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demographic techniques: population projections and estimates

John F. Long

Population projections and estimates constitute a core focus of demographic techniques. Both activities calculate the size and often the demographic characteristics of a given population in the absence of complete data such as might be available from a population census. Population projections and estimates play an important role in analysis of societal trends and in planning and policy decisions.

Population projections and estimates are sometimes distinguished from each other by the statement that population estimates refer to current or past dates while population

projections refer to future dates. A better distinction would be based on the time period of the input data relative to the output data. Population projections take the data on trends in population size and/or in the components of population change (births, deaths, and migration) and use mathematical models to extrapolate these trends into a time period not covered by the data. Usually, but not always, projections are done for some point in the future that is not only beyond the last date of the input data but also beyond the date that the projection is actually prepared.

Population estimates relate to a past time period for which population counts are not available (such as the years after the most recent population census). In contrast to population projections, population estimates take advantage of actual measurements of indicator variables related to population size or to the components of population change.

COMPONENT BASED PROJECTIONS

Population projections use a wide variety of methods, but the methods that are most commonly used take advantage of knowledge of the ways populations change. These methods, known as component methods, use information on the size and demographic characteristics of the beginning population (often measured by a census) and then add measures, extrapolations, or assumptions about the components of population change – births, deaths, and migration. In the most general form, the component method reduces to a basic accounting equation for population change.

$$P_{i,t} = P_{i,0} + (B_i - D_i + I_i - O_i) \quad (1)$$

where $P_{i,t}$ = population of area i at time t , $P_{i,0}$ = population in area i at beginning of period, B_i = births in area i since beginning of period, D_i = deaths in area i since beginning of period, I_i = immigration to area i , and O_i = outmigration from area i during the period.

If we add to this basic formulation information about the size of the population in each age group and the age specific probabilities of giving birth, dying, or moving, the resulting methodology is known as the cohort component

method. This method is the basis for many population projections since it has the advantage of using data on a known population age composition from the last decennial census to determine the future momentum of the population. For instance, populations with younger age structures are more likely to have higher growth rates due to a larger number of births and fewer deaths, while populations with an older beginning population will show the opposite trends.

The art in population projections comes from the choices made to predict the changes in the age specific birth, death, and migration rates. Many methods have been used ranging from holding previous rates constant, building in a time trend either from simple extrapolation or time series models, setting ultimate assumptions and interpolating to get to those results, or predicting future change with multivariate models. Each of the components of population change requires decisions about a number of issues as future rates are constructed.

Fertility rates have varied markedly over time, with a long term decline occasionally interrupted by major deviations like the post World War II baby boom in North America and many European countries. More recently, the rapid decline of fertility toward replacement or below in the developing world and the dramatic fall of fertility to well below replacement levels in much of Europe has made forecasting fertility much more difficult. Early uses of birth expectations data to forecast the short term future of fertility behavior achieved mixed success as many women's actual experiences failed to match their initial expectations. Time series analysis of the distribution of age specific fertility rates, sometimes taking into account the number of children already born to a woman (parity), has proved useful where there is a well behaved change in fertility patterns. Often, the approach has been to use expert judgment to assume an ultimate level of fertility – often related to the level of fertility needed to replace the population (roughly 2.1 children per woman). The assumption of this replacement level fertility level has been highly debated and there seems to be no agreement that future fertility for a given society needs to be near replacement.

Future trends in death rates have gone through similar discussions. Fortunately, the

basic mechanics of population projections are closely related to the construction of a life table and age specific mortality rates can be cumulated into life expectancies. The difficulty here is assessing medical and public health improvements that offer the possibility of substantially improved life expectancies and estimating the speed at which progress to those higher life expectancies can be made. There is no agreement as to whether there is an ultimate limit to the life span and hence to the improvement in life expectancies. As with fertility, not all changes are monotonic and declines in life expectancies have been noted in several countries over specific periods of time (e.g., in Russia since the disintegration of the Soviet Union). Typically, time series and extrapolation models set ultimate assumptions based on levels reached by other societies that are further along in achieving higher life expectancies.

Dealing with migration brings its own set of problems. Unlike births or deaths, migration can be in two directions. Moreover, the probability models based on current population of an area that work for births and deaths might work for outmigration but the population at risk of immigrating is not the current population of an area. For these reasons migration is often handled as exogenous to the system with assumptions made about the level rather than the rate of immigration. Alternatively, migration can be handled in a multistate model where the populations of various areas are projected jointly and the outmigration flows from one area become the immigration flows for other areas. Again, one has the problem of projecting future rates and often the origin destination rates are held constant and the major dynamic in migration flows become the shifting size of the populations of origin.

COMPONENT BASED ESTIMATES

Although population estimates can be produced based only on trends in the growth of the population as a whole, the more sophisticated methods use component based techniques similar to those used for population projections. However, rather than developing methods to forecast these components into the future, the task of population estimation methods is to measure the size of each component since the

last census or – lacking a direct measure – to find an indicator that can be used to model the level of that component. An indicator variable can be any measured characteristic that varies regularly with the component being estimated.

Direct measurement is possible for some of the components of population change. Births and deaths are often well measured by a vital statistics registration system. International migration is something of a mixed picture, with administrative data measuring most of the legal immigration into the country but often providing little or no information on emigration or illegal immigration. Unmeasured migration across international borders requires the use of assumptions about the quantity and characteristics of the population flows missed and is a major cause of estimation error.

The other major aspect of migration, domestic or internal migration between subareas of a country, is the focus of much effort in population estimation procedures. There is seldom a direct measure of internal migration, so it must be estimated using an indicator variable based on an alternative data source devised for another purpose. One method for estimating the internal migration rate uses administrative data that provide addresses for individuals at two different points in time (usually a year apart). Such data provide approximate information on immigration, outmigration, and even area to area flows. While there are several potential sources of these administrative data – changes in postal addresses, drivers' license records, tax returns, and health insurance information – the problem is to find a source that provides representative coverage and consistency in reporting and tabulation.

The US Census Bureau uses an administrative records method that compares tax returns from the Internal Revenue Service (IRS) for changes in filing addresses between two consecutive annual tax filings. In the estimation process, tax returns from one year are matched with those from previous years by matching Social Security numbers of the filers. For persons with a new address, the new mailing address is coded to state, place, and county. If the state, place, or county is different from the previous year, the filer and all exemptions are classified as migrants. These data are then used to construct net migration rates for each county

and place as an input to the population estimation formula. An estimate of the rate of net migration is calculated by dividing the net flow of exemptions (the tax filer plus his or her dependents) moving into the area by the number of exemptions filed in the area.

$$\mu_i = \frac{\sum_j (T_{ji} - T_{ij})}{T_i} \quad (2)$$

where T_{ij} = flow of tax exemptions from area i to j and T_i = total number of matched tax exemptions living in area i at the beginning of the period. This net migration rate (μ_i) is then multiplied by the initial population to get the estimated net internal migration for the period.

A critical assumption in this method is that the population not covered by the administrative dataset moves similarly to the population covered or that the uncovered population is too small to affect the results markedly. Since this assumption is especially inappropriate for the population over 65 and for certain military and institutionalized populations, those populations are handled separately. Other potential problems include the difficulty of coding addresses to geography, changes in administrative coverage over time, and the elimination of administrative data sources as governmental programs change. Despite these limitations, the population estimates made using this indicator model have repeatedly proven better than extrapolations of trends in these components based on data from previous time periods.

MODELING UNCERTAINTY IN PROJECTIONS AND ESTIMATES

Population projections and estimates have substantial uncertainty due to the approximations to reality made in specifying a model and in the unexpected events that inevitably arise as we go further into the future. Unlike sampling theory, there is no set model or series of models that can be used to determine future forecast error. One approach often used is to develop several different series of population projections that might represent reasonable high and low future levels of each component and create a set of alternative assumptions based on each assumed level. More recently, there has been increased interest in a

more formalized procedure for producing stochastic forecasts. These forecasts begin not with a single trajectory for the rates of each component of change but with a distribution of future fertility levels based on statistical time series analysis of past trends. These distributions are then used to develop simulations of future growth paths in which each year's value for each of the age specific rates is randomly selected from the distribution and the resulting forecast trajectory is calculated. This process is repeated for a large number of simulations giving a resulting distribution of forecast values of each component and for each age for all years of the projection period. Population estimates also have a substantial level of uncertainty, although probably not as much as projections, given the shorter time frame and the fact that they are based on actual measures.

SEE ALSO: Demographic Data: Censuses, Registers, Surveys; Demographic Techniques: Life Table Methods; Demographic Techniques: Population Pyramids and Age/Sex Structure

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demographic techniques: population pyramids and age/sex structure

Joan R. Kahn

Age and sex are among the most fundamental demographic characteristics of individuals. Viewed in the aggregate, age/sex composition

forms the basic structure of human populations. It tells us the relative numbers of young and old as well as the balance of men and women at different ages. By characterizing the "raw materials" of human populations, the age/sex structure indicates the numbers of people "at risk" or "available" to engage in a wide range of behaviors that vary by age (e.g., going to school, getting a job, committing a crime, getting married, starting a family, buying a home, getting divorced, retiring, getting sick and dying). By itself, it does not tell us who will engage in any of these behaviors, yet it does help determine overall patterns and trends.

Population aging is one of the most universal demographic trends characterizing early twenty first century populations. The age of a population simply refers to the relative numbers of people in different age groups. Populations around the world vary from being quite youthful (e.g., Uganda, where 51 percent of the population is under age 15 as of 2004), to being much older on average (e.g., Germany, where only 15 percent of the population is under age 15). The trend toward increasingly older populations is directly linked to declines in both fertility and mortality. With fewer births, the proportion of children declines, thereby raising the proportions at older ages; similarly, declines in adult mortality imply greater longevity and hence a larger proportion surviving to older ages. Trends in population aging are most evident in the more industrialized countries of Europe, North America, and Japan, where the percentage of population over age 65 is projected to surpass 20 percent by 2030. However, a great many less developed countries can also anticipate rapid population aging in the near future as a result of their recent steep declines in both fertility and mortality.

As can be seen from the demographic causes of population aging, the age structure is dynamic and can change as a result of shifting demographic patterns. It is also a major determinant of the demographic patterns themselves. Because vital events do not occur equally to people of all ages and both sexes, the numbers of births, deaths, and moves also depend on the numbers of men and women at different ages (i.e., the age/sex structure). For example, if population size and fertility rates are held constant, a more youthful population (with

relatively large numbers of people in the child bearing ages) will produce more births than an older one. Thus, very young populations have built in potential for rapid population growth even after fertility rates start to decline. This phenomenon is often referred to as “population momentum.” Conversely, an older population will have relatively more deaths and disabled persons than a younger population of similar size. Hence, understanding the age/sex structure of a population is vital to explaining social trends and planning for the future.

The most common measure of the sex composition of a population is the sex ratio, which is simply the ratio of males to females (multiplied by 100). In a few countries, such as India, government agencies calculate the sex ratio as the number of females for every 100 males. It is often assumed that populations are fairly balanced between men and women, but in most countries women outnumber men overall, though not necessarily at all ages. The sex ratio often declines with age because of progressively higher male than female mortality rates at older ages. In the US, for example, the overall sex ratio is about 95 males for every 100 females; however, at birth, there are about 105 males for every 100 females, and by ages 85 and over, there are only about 40 males for every 100 females.

Of course, not all countries follow this pattern; in places characterized by high levels of gender inequality and higher female than male mortality (e.g., India, Afghanistan), it is not unusual to find an excess of males at every age. High sex ratios may also reflect underreporting of females, as with the large number of “missing daughters” in China, who are thought to have been given up for adoption and not reported as live births (Tien et al. 1992, cited in Rowland 2003). Similarly, the growing popularity and availability of sex selective abortion in countries with strong preferences for sons has driven up the sex ratio in countries such as India and China.

DEPENDENCY RATIOS

The dependency ratio is a summary measure of the age structure and is typically defined as the ratio of economically inactive to

economically active persons. Since the economically inactive tend to be the young and the old, the dependency ratio is simply measured as the ratio of age groups (i.e., (Children + Elderly) / Working Ages). The precise ages used depends on the population being studied as well as the availability of data broken down by specific ages. In the US for example, the dependency ratio is often measured as the ratio of “persons under age 15 and over age 65” to “persons of ages 15–64.” While it is recognized that many persons over age 15 are not yet economically active, and many persons over age 65 are still economically active, the dependency ratio approximates the number of inactive persons whom each active person must support. Given the different needs of children and elders, it is often useful to look separately at the child dependency ratio (Children / Working Ages) and the aged dependency ratio (Elderly / Working Ages).

Data on age/sex structure are typically presented graphically in the form of an age pyramid, also known as a population pyramid. The pyramid can be thought of as two histograms placed on their sides and facing back to back, showing the age distributions for males on the left and females on the right. The vertical axis is age, coded in single years, or in 5 year age categories, with the youngest at the bottom. Each bar of the pyramid shows either the number or proportion of the population who are males or females in a given age group. The size of each bar reflects past patterns of fertility, mortality, and migration. For example, the number of people in age group X reflects the survivors of the births that occurred X years earlier, plus or minus the migrants from the same birth cohort who entered or departed the population during the intervening years.

Since each bar is determined by past demographic patterns, it follows that the overall shape of the pyramid does as well. Rapidly growing populations, in which births far exceed deaths, are typically characterized by a wide base and a classic “pyramid like” shape (i.e., each new cohort is larger than the previous one). In contrast, a population which is neither growing nor declining has a more rectangular shape whereby each new cohort entering at the bottom is roughly the same size as the preceding cohort. A population which is

declining due to an excess of deaths over births would have an age pyramid which is narrower at the base than at older ages.

In addition to reflecting population growth patterns, the shape of an age pyramid can also serve as a kind of historical record of past events that may have affected fertility, mortality, or migration. For example, one of the most obvious demographic consequences of war is the large numbers of deaths to young adult males. However, there are also brief declines in the numbers of births, either because spouses are separated or because couples choose to postpone getting pregnant until the war is over. In either case, the demographic impact would be unusually narrow bars in the pyramid representing small cohorts of males in their twenties and also newborns of either sex. As these cohorts grow older, their narrow size remains with them as they move up the pyramid.

After wars end, there is often a surge in births as couples reunite and attempt to make up for lost time. The post World War II baby boom is perhaps the defining demographic event for the United States in the second half of the twentieth century. The surge in births between 1946 and 1964 (the cohorts aged 35–55 in 2000) was unprecedented and unexpected, especially given the low fertility of American women prior to World War II. Every US age pyramid after 1960 shows the progression of the unusually large baby boom cohorts (and the smaller baby bust cohorts which followed in the 1970s) as they move through the life course. The visual impact of an age pyramid showing the baby boomers approaching retirement ages starting in the year 2010 helped to stimulate the policy debate on the future of Social Security and Medicare.

SEE ALSO: Age, Period, and Cohort Effects; Demographic Techniques: Decomposition and Standardization; Demographic Techniques: Life Table Methods; Demographic Techniques: Population Projections and Estimates; Fertility: Transitions and Measures

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demographic techniques: time use

Sara Raley

Time is a scarce, some would say increasingly scarce, resource. However, unlike other resources, time is equally distributed because everyone faces the same 24 hour constraint as they make decisions about how to allocate their limited time to various and often competing commitments. Despite its apparent equality, time allocation is a major indicator of social differentiation and stratification. For example, people with high levels of human capital may be better able to afford to trade paid work time for leisure time as well as purchase time saving goods and services (such as prepared meals and house cleaning) than people with lower levels of human capital.

Further, the choices people make about their time use has important implications for their health, financial security, and general life satisfaction. In addition to people's personal preferences, myriad norms (and even laws) govern how people should use their time – how much time is appropriate to spend at work, how much time is needed to care for family, and even how much time one should spend brushing one's teeth each night. Thus, at the social level, people's time use patterns reflect how societies value categories such as work, family, and leisure.

MEASUREMENT

There are three primary ways to measure people's time use: (1) asking respondents to indicate on questionnaires how much time they spend in various activities; (2) observing people in their daily routines; and (3) prompting respondents to recount their day in a time diary. Of these three methods, the time diary has become the preferred methodology because

of its accuracy relative to estimates based on questionnaires and cost effectiveness relative to observational methods.

Estimating weekly hours spent in certain activities is difficult because people do not spend their time in clearly delineated time frames. A person may go to the office at 9 a.m. and return at 5 p.m., but it does not necessarily mean she worked an 8 hour day. She may have taken a 1 hour lunch break, left the office for an hour and a half for a doctor's appointment, and spent 30 minutes in the afternoon talking on the phone with a child. Once home, the respondent may engage in a series of activities simultaneously (e.g., put in two loads of laundry, start cooking dinner, and answer a work related telephone call), making it extremely difficult to add up the exact minutes of the day spent in each activity. Further, there are some activities, like childcare, that are deemed more socially desirable than others, like television viewing. Thus, when asked about their time use, people may be more inclined to overestimate their time with their children and underestimate time spent watching television.

One way of getting around the biases inherent in people's estimates of their time use is to follow them around and keep track of their activities for them. This is likely to produce more accurate measures of time use, is a method often used by anthropologists, but is extremely costly. The high cost associated with this methodology means that only a few cases can be observed, making it difficult to draw representative samples and make practical comparisons between groups. People may also be reluctant to have researchers follow them around, particularly when they engage in behaviors requiring privacy like changing clothes and engaging in sexual activity.

Time diary methodology gets around some of these issues by asking respondents to provide an account of one or more of their days, or even a week. Because respondents are constrained to a 24 hour period in each day and must recount their activities sequentially (i.e., in the order they occurred throughout the day), it is more difficult to exaggerate time expenditures. It is less mentally taxing than responding to survey questions that ask respondents to quickly add up time in various activities. Respondents go

through their day's activities, which prompts them to remember things more precisely than if they are asked to sum all time spent in a single activity, like market work, in a day. Time diaries also capture the complexity of time use. They indicate multitasking, or when people engage in more than one activity simultaneously, as well as the location and people present for each reported activity. At the same time, diaries are not perfect measures of time use as people may be reluctant to report socially deviant or embarrassing behaviors.

HISTORY OF TIME USE DATA COLLECTION

Although the history of time diary methodology extends back to the mid 1920s, the most comprehensive and well known time diary study is the 1965 Multinational Comparative Time Budget Research Project. In this study, 2,000 respondents from each of 12 different countries completed single day diaries. The sampling procedure, diary format, and data collection procedures of this landmark study set the standard for several subsequent international time diary collections. In addition, several of the countries in the original 1965 collection replicated their studies in later years. The Harmonized European Time Use Study was developed between 1996 and 1998 and captured time use data on 20 countries. To date, time diary studies have been administered in over 60 countries spanning North America, South America, Europe, Australia, Africa, and Asia.

In the US, a series of cross sectional time diary studies based out of the Universities of Michigan and Maryland have been conducted at roughly 10 year intervals since the 1960s. Whereas most of these studies focus on the time use of adult men and women, smaller scale studies of adolescents and children were administered in the 1980s and 1990s. In 1997, the Panel Study of Income Dynamics (PSID) survey added time diaries for 3,000 children aged 3 to 12 as part of the Child Development Supplement (CDS). These children were followed up and asked to complete another diary in 2003, making this one of the few longitudinal diary collections. The study is particularly innovative not only because it is longitudinal,

but also because the time diary data in the CDS can be linked to the respondent's detailed income histories in the PSID.

Time diary methodology has become so popular that in January 2003, the Bureau of Labor Statistics launched the American Time Use Survey, which is now the largest time use survey ever conducted in the world. This nationally representative data collection makes it possible to make more detailed comparisons of time use across groups by such indicators as age, race, employment status, gender, and income.

TRENDS IN WORK AND LEISURE TIME

The time harried American trying to squeeze in time for market work, household labor, exercise, a healthy diet, family, sleep, and, of course, leisure is a common image in the popular media. Particularly in light of technological advances like beepers, pagers, cell phones, email, and instant messaging, it seems that everyone is on the go. In the context of this fast paced lifestyle, changes in work and leisure time are of central concern, with the prevailing viewpoint being that work time has increased greatly and leisure time is on the decline.

This perspective was underscored and popularized by Juliet Schor, author of the *Overworked American: The Unexpected Decline of Leisure* and *The Overspent American: Upscaling, Downshifting, and the New Consumer*, who argues the nature of work and consumption have changed so dramatically in the US that people are working longer hours than ever before so they can earn enough money to buy and accumulate large numbers of consumer durables. Relying heavily on government survey data as well as newspaper articles, she made the astonishing assertion that between 1979 and 1987, working hours increased by the equivalent of a month, or 163 hours, a year. Her arguments were echoed by Arlie Hochschild (1997), who claims the increased commitment to market work has moved society to an age where work has become home and home has become work.

In stark contrast to those who argue work hours are rapidly encroaching on quality leisure time are scholars like John Robinson and Geoffrey Godbey (1999), whose analysis of

time diary data on Americans' time since the mid 1960s argues that leisure time, if anything, increased in recent decades. Their estimates showed gains in free time activities (all those outside of market work, non market work, and childcare) amounted to an additional month and a half of *vacation* between 1965 and 1985. Others also pointed out that the average work week has changed little over the last few decades (Rones et al. 1997). Hence, the dramatic decline in leisure may be more a perception than a reality.

Both sides bring to bear convincing evidence on this issue, so it seems impossible that *both* work and leisure time could be simultaneously increasing. Jacobs and Gerson (2001) suggest, however, that even though the two sides *seem* thoroughly at odds, they may not necessarily be mutually exclusive trends. First, if the unit of analysis is shifted from individuals to families, where the once normative male breadwinner, female homemaker household has been replaced by dual earner and single parent families, it becomes clear that the combined working hours of families have skyrocketed. With the increase in women, particularly married mothers, in the labor force, far fewer families have a member available to focus exclusively on non market work. Second, changes in the distribution in the population might make averages across the population seem misleading. For example, the universe of people who are of working age has shifted. People are entering the workforce later in their lives because of increased educational attainment and exiting the labor market earlier as retirement ages decline. Thus, it is possible that people may be working more when they are in the prime working ages, but working less over the life course as a whole.

FUTURE DIRECTIONS: SUBJECTIVE FEELINGS ABOUT TIME

Time use data capture the objective measures of people's time use: what they are doing, where they are doing it, who is accompanying them, and how long they are engaging in their various activities. However, the sense of pressure and anxiety associated with daily activities is not a major component of most time diary collections. Who feels responsibility for the

family caretaking and the added stress that comes along with this responsibility is not captured by time use data. Further, the extent to which people enjoy the activities they engage in regularly is not measured in most time use studies. For example, some people enjoy spending 40 hours a week at work while others may find 40 hours of market work stressful. Hence, the field is moving to incorporate methodologies that evaluate the subjective as well as the objective dimensions of time use.

In experiential sampling studies, or “beeper” studies, respondents are randomly “beeped” and asked to report not only what they are doing, but how they feel about their selected activity. A major strength of this approach is that it provides a broad set of information about how daily life is experienced by capturing both the quantity and quality of time use. Further, it avoids the problems associated with the intrusive observer, which is particularly useful for interviewing self-conscious adolescents reluctant to be followed by an outside observer. Like the diary method, it also avoids the pitfalls of recall bias because respondents report their feelings as they experience them. Procedures of this kind were used as far back as the 1940s, but did not gain popularity among researchers until the 1980s when the term “experiential sampling method” was coined.

Since that time, several projects utilizing this methodology have been conducted, focusing primarily on adolescents, children, and families. These studies shed light on how adolescents and families organize their time, what activities they find the most enjoyable, what activities they find the most stressful, and how adolescents and their parents experience their interactions. Future studies can be used to better understand how men, women, and children experience time expenditures differently as well as how families collectively experience phenomena like work–family conflict. This is particularly significant in light of rising concern popularized by Juliet Schor that the time pressed nature of modern society is increasingly putting people’s physical and mental health at risk.

SEE ALSO: Demographic Techniques: Event History Methods; Gender, Work, and Family; Time

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demographic transition theory

John R. Weeks

Although it dominated demographic thinking in the latter half of the twentieth century, demographic transition theory actually began as only a description of the demographic changes that had taken place over time in the advanced nations. In particular, it described the transition from high birth and death rates to low birth and death rates, with an interstitial spurt in growth rates leading to a larger population at the end of the transition than there had been at the start. The idea emerged in 1929, when Warren Thompson gathered data from “certain countries” for the period 1908–27 and showed that the countries fell into three main groups, according to their patterns of population growth: (1) Northern and Western Europe and the United States had gone from high rates of natural increase to very low rates of natural increase, and were on the verge of depopulating at that time; (2) Italy, Spain, and the “Slavic” peoples of Central Europe showed

some evidence of a decline in both birth rates and death rates but it seemed likely that the birth rates would remain higher than the death rates for some time to come; and (3) the rest of the world, where there was little evidence of control over either births or deaths. The populations of these latter countries, comprising about 75 percent of the world's population at the time, were living at subsistence levels and would likely increase in size if economic conditions improved enough for death rates to decline a bit.

In 1945, following the end of World War II, there was a growing concern about population growth. Frank Notestein (1945) picked up the threads of Thompson's thesis and provided labels for the three types of growth patterns. Notestein labeled the first "incipient decline," the second "transitional growth," and the third "high growth potential." By reversing Thompson's order, one could describe the transition from high birth and death rates to a transitional drop in death rates followed by a drop in birth rates, and finally to a stage where both are low. That same year, Kingsley Davis (1945) edited a volume of the *Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Sciences* titled *World Population in Transition*, and in the lead article (titled "The World Demographic Transition") he noted that the world's population had been analogous for a long time to a powder fuse burning slowly toward the charge, but now it was about to reach that charge and explode. The term population explosion, alluded to by Davis, refers to the phase that Notestein called transitional growth. Thus in 1945 was born the term *demographic transition*.

At this point in the 1940s, the demographic transition was merely a picture of demographic change, not a theory, but each new country studied fit into the picture, and it seemed as though some new universal law of population growth – an evolutionary scheme – was being developed. Between the mid 1940s and the late 1960s rapid population growth became a world wide concern, and demographers devoted a great deal of time to the demographic transition perspective. Explanations were developed for why and how countries pass through the transition. These explanations tended to be derived from the modernization theory, which is based on the idea that in premodern times human

society was generally governed by "tradition," and that the massive economic changes wrought by industrialization forced societies to alter traditional institutions. In traditional societies fertility and mortality rates are high, whereas in modern societies the birth and death rates are low. Spanning these two extremes is the demographic transition. In the process, behavior has changed and the world has been permanently transformed. It is a macro level theory that sees human actors as being buffeted by changing social institutions. Thus, individuals did not deliberately lower their risk of death to precipitate the modern decline in mortality. Rather, society wide increases in income and improved public health infrastructure brought about this change. Similarly, people did not just decide to move from the farm to town to take a job in a factory. Economic changes took place that created those higher wage urban jobs while eliminating many agricultural jobs. These same economic forces improved transportation and communication and made it possible for individuals to migrate in previously unheard of numbers.

Modernization theory provided the vehicle that allowed the demographic transition to move from a mere description of events to a demographic perspective. In its initial formulations this perspective was expressed by sentiments such as "take care of the people and population will take care of itself" or "development is the best contraceptive" (Teitelbaum 1975). The theory drew on the available data for most countries that had gone through the transition. Death rates declined as the standard of living improved, and birth rates almost always declined a few decades later, eventually dropping to low levels, although rarely as low as the death rate. It was argued that the decline in the birth rate typically lagged behind the decline in the death rate because it takes time for a population to adjust to the fact that mortality really is lower, and because the social and economic institutions that favored high fertility require time to adjust to new norms of lower fertility that are more consistent with the lower levels of mortality. Since most people value the prolongation of life, it is not hard to lower mortality, but the reduction of fertility is contrary to the established norms of societies that have required high birth rates to keep pace with

high death rates. Such norms are not easily changed, even in the face of poverty.

Birth rates eventually declined, it was argued, as the importance of family life was diminished by industrial and urban life, thus weakening the pressure for large families. Large families are presumed to have been desired because they provided parents with a built-in labor pool, and because children provided old age security for parents. The same economic development that lowered mortality is theorized to transform a society into an urban industrial state in which compulsory education lowers the value of children by removing them from the labor force, and people come to realize that lower infant mortality means that fewer children need to be born to achieve a certain number of surviving children. Finally, as a consequence of the many alterations in social institutions, people feel less pressure to have children and the idea of consciously controlling fertility begins to take hold.

Over time it has become obvious that the demographic transition is too complex to be explained by simple reference to the modernization theory. One of the most important social scientific endeavors to cast doubt on the classic explanation was the European Fertility Project, directed by Ansley Coale at Princeton University. In the 1960s, researchers at Princeton began looking at changes over time in marriage and fertility patterns in various European provinces. They quickly discovered that cultural factors such as language and religion were important predictors of fertility patterns, even when controlling for economic variables. Economic development emerges, then, as a sufficient cause of fertility decline, though not a necessary one. For example, many provinces of Europe experienced a rapid drop in the birth rate even though they were not very urban, infant mortality rates were high, and a low percentage of the population was in industrial occupations. The data suggest that one of the more common similarities in those areas that have undergone fertility declines is the rapid spread of secularization, which often spreads quickly, being diffused through social networks as people imitate the behavior of others to whom they look for clues to proper and appropriate conduct.

The work of the European Fertility Project focused on explaining regional differences in

fertility declines. This was a very important theoretical development, but not a comprehensive one because it only partially dealt with a central issue of the demographic transition: How (and under what conditions) can a mortality decline lead to a fertility decline? To answer that question, Kingsley Davis (1963) asked what happens to individuals when mortality declines. The answer, which came to be known as the *theory of demographic change and response*, is that more children survive through adulthood, putting greater pressure on family resources, and people have to reorganize their lives in an attempt to relieve that pressure; that is, people respond to the demographic change. But Davis argued that their response will be in terms of personal goals, not national goals. It rarely matters what a government wants. If individual members of a society do not stand to gain by behaving in a particular way, they probably will not behave that way. Davis believed that the response that individuals make to the population pressure created by more members joining their ranks is determined by the means available to them. A first response, non-demographic in nature, is to try to increase resources by working harder. If that is not sufficient or there are no such opportunities, then migration of some family members (typically, unmarried sons or daughters) is the easiest demographic response. But what will be the response of that second generation, the children who now have survived when previously they would not have, and who have thus put the pressure on resources? Davis argued that if there is in fact a chance for social or economic improvement, then people will try to take advantage of those opportunities by avoiding the large families that caused problems for their parents. Davis suggested that the most powerful motive for family limitation is not fear of poverty or avoidance of pain; rather, it is the prospect of rising prosperity that will most often motivate people to find the means to limit the number of children they have.

A shortcoming of all of the explanations of the demographic transition has been that they have focused largely on the causes of the mortality and fertility declines, without paying close attention to the other changes that are predictably put into motion as the rate of natural increase changes in a society. Interaction

between population change and societal change is, in fact, at the heart of the realization that the demographic transition is really a whole set of transitions, rather than simply being one big transition. These transitions include the mortality (also known as the epidemiological) transition, the fertility transition, the age transition, the migration transition, the urban transition, and the family and household transition.

Usually (although not always), the first transition to occur is the mortality transition – the shift from deaths at younger ages due to communicable disease to deaths at older ages due to degenerative diseases. This process is brought about by changes in society that improve the health of people and thus their ability to resist disease, and by scientific advances that prevent premature death. However, death rates do not decline evenly by age; rather, it is the very youngest and the very oldest – but especially the youngest – whose lives are most likely to be saved by improved life expectancy. Thus, the initial impact of the mortality transition is to increase the number of young people who are alive, ballooning the bottom end of the age structure in a manner that looks just like an increase in the birth rate. This typically sets all the other transitions in motion.

The fertility transition is the shift from natural (and high) to controlled (and low) fertility, typically in a delayed response to the mortality transition. Although it can begin without a decline in mortality (as happened in France), in nearly all places in the world it is the decline in mortality, leading to greater survival of children, that eventually motivates people to think about limiting the number of children they are having. Throughout most of human history the average woman had two children who survived to adulthood. The decline in mortality, however, obviously increases that number and thereby threatens the very foundation of the household economy. At the community or societal level, the increasing number of young people creates multiple pressures to change, often leading to peer pressure to conform to new standards of behavior, including the deliberate control of reproduction. Another extremely important change that occurs in the context of mortality transition is that the scope of life expands for women as they, too, live longer. They are increasingly empowered to delay

childbearing and to have fewer children because they begin to realize that most of their children will survive to adulthood and they themselves will survive beyond the reproductive ages, beyond their children's arrival into adulthood. This new demographic freedom offers the promise of vastly greater opportunities than ever before in human history to do something with their lives besides bearing and raising children. This realization may be a genuine tipping point in the fertility transition, leading to an almost irreversible decline.

The predictable changes in the age structure (the age transition) brought about by the mortality and fertility transitions produce social and economic reactions as societies adjust to constantly changing age distributions. The age transition is the “master” transition in that the changing number of people at each age that occurs with the decline in mortality and then the decline in fertility presents the most obvious demographic pressure for social change. When both mortality and fertility are high, the age structure is quite young, but the decline in mortality makes it even younger by disproportionately increasing the number of young people. Then, as fertility declines, the youngest ages are obviously again affected first, since births occur only at age 0, so a fertility decline shows up first as simply fewer young children than before. However, as the bulge of young people born prior to the fertility decline pushes into the older ages while fertility begins to decline, the age structure moves into a stage that can be very beneficial to economic development in a society – a large fraction of the population is composed of young adults of working age who are having fewer children as dependents at the same time that the older population has not yet increased in size enough to create problems of dependency in old age. This phase in the age transition is often associated with a golden age of advancement in the standard of living. That golden age can be transitory, however, if a society has not planned for the next phase of the age transition, when the older population begins to increase more rapidly than the younger population. The baby bulge created by the initial declines in mortality reaches old age at a time when fertility has likely declined, and so the age structure has a much greater number and a higher fraction of older people than ever before. We are only now

learning how societies will respond to this challenge of an increasingly older population.

The rapid growth of the population occasioned by the pattern of mortality declining sooner and more rapidly than fertility almost always leads to overpopulation of rural areas, producing the migration transition, especially toward urban areas, which in turn creates the urban transition. In rural areas, where most of the population lived for most of human history, the growth in the number of young people will lead to an oversupply of young people looking for jobs, which will encourage people to go elsewhere in search of economic opportunity, producing an inevitable flow of migrants out of rapidly growing rural areas.

With all good agricultural land being accounted for, migrants from the countryside in the world today have no place to go but to cities, and cities have historically tended to flourish by absorbing labor from rural areas. A majority of humans now live in cities, and the fraction is steadily increasing. The urban transition thus begins with migration from rural to urban areas, but then becomes the urban “evolution” as most humans wind up being born, living, and dying in cities. The complexity of human existence is played out in the cities, leading us to expect a constant dynamism of urban places for most of the rest of human history. Because urban places are historically associated with lower levels of fertility than rural areas, as the world’s population becomes increasingly urban we can anticipate that this will be a major factor in bringing and keeping fertility levels down all over the world.

The family and household transition is occasioned by the massive structural changes that accompany longer life, lower fertility, an older age structure, and urban instead of rural residence – all of which are part and parcel of the demographic transition. These changes occurred first in Europe, leading van de Kaa (1987) to talk about the “second demographic transition.” A demographic centerpiece of this change in the richer countries has been a fall in fertility to below replacement levels, but van de Kaa suggested that the change was less about just not having babies than it was about the personal freedom to do what one wanted, especially among women. So, rather than grow up, marry, and have children, this transition is

associated with a postponement of marriage, a rise in single living, cohabitation, and prolonged residence in the parental household. There has also been an increasing lack of permanence in family relationships, leading to higher divorce rates and instability in cohabiting relationships. Furthermore, when families do reconstitute, it is increasingly likely that it will involve cohabitation rather than remarriage. It is reasonable to think, however, that this transition in family and household structure is not so much a second transition as it is another set of transitions within the broader framework of the demographic transition. The family and household transition is influenced by all of the previously mentioned transitions. The mortality transition is pivotal because it gives women (and men, too, of course) the dramatically greater number of years to live in general, and more specifically the greater number of years that do not need to be devoted to children. Low mortality reduces the pressure for a woman to marry early and start bearing children while she is young enough for her body to handle that stress. Furthermore, when mortality was high, marriages had a high probability of ending in widowhood when one of the partners was still reasonably young, and families routinely were reconstituted as widows and widowers remarried. But low mortality leads to a much longer time that married couples will be alive together before one partner dies, and this alone is related to part of the increase in divorce rates.

The age transition plays a role at the societal level as well, because over time the increasingly similar number of people at all ages – as opposed to a majority of people being very young – means that any society is bound to be composed of a greater array of family and household arrangements. Diversity in families and households is also encouraged by migration (which breaks up and reconstitutes families) and by the urban transition, especially since urban places tend to be more tolerant of diversity than are smaller rural communities.

SEE ALSO: Davis, Kingsley; Demographic Techniques: Population Pyramids and Age/Sex Structure; Family Demography; Fertility: Low; Fertility: Transitions and Measures; Healthy Life Expectancy; Malthus, Thomas

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demography

Vanessa R. Wight

Demography is the scientific study of human population. The discipline uses empirical investigation to analyze populations and its processes. This includes the study of fertility, mortality, and migration and how these factors

change over time and affect population size, growth, structure, and composition.

The field of demography typically has been thought of in terms of two strands of scholarship. *Formal demography* focuses on the conceptualization and measurement of population processes. This area within the field emphasizes the methods by which to measure fertility, mortality, and migration, how these processes operate across different populations and within the same population over time, and mathematical modeling for estimating population growth and structure. Yet demography is also interested in the relationship between demographic behavior and the larger social context. Thus *social demography* not only measures and quantifies population processes, but it also seeks to understand more broadly the context within which demographic behavior takes place, how this context influences demographic patterns, and the relationship between this behavior and subsequent social, economic, and biological processes. Hence, family and labor force patterns that are related to key demographic events, such as union formation and dissolution, household transitions and living arrangements, intergenerational relationships and exchanges, and employment status, become important objects of consideration.

Finally, demography has long been interested in the effect of demographic processes on the natural environment. It is perhaps here where demography gained its popularity. Concern over runaway population growth or “population explosion” and subsequent increases in the level of consumption of scarce resources has historically fueled doomsday reports of the expiration of human society. However, despite the general indictment that population growth is one of the main culprits of environmental degradation, others would argue that it is the bedrock of technological innovation, economic expansion, and efficient markets – all of which are, for the most part, considered beneficial to social welfare.

POPULATION CHANGE AND DEMOGRAPHIC PROCESSES

Populations change under a limited number of conditions (Hinde 1998). That is, the change

observed in any given population over a period of time (e.g., from time t to $t + 1$) is a function of the difference in the number of births ($B_{(t)}$) and deaths ($D_{(t)}$) experienced by a population plus the difference in the number of people moving in to ($IM_{(t)}$) and out of ($OM_{(t)}$) the population. Thus, population change over time can be expressed in the following *basic demographic equation*:

$$P_{(t+1)} = P_{(t)} + B_{(t)} - D_{(t)} + IM_{(t)} - OM_{(t)}$$

The main demographic processes that account for population change are *fertility*, *mortality*, and *migration*. Fertility refers to actual reproduction (e.g., number of births), which is substantively different from fecundity or the capacity of an individual to bear children. Fertility can be measured by estimating a crude birth rate (CBR), which is the number of births per 1,000 people in the population. However, this rate includes people who cannot bear children, such as men, girls, and older women. Therefore, using a crude birth rate can result in an underestimation of fertility at a particular point in time. Thus, age specific fertility rates (ASFR) and the total fertility rate (TFR) are generally used to estimate fertility behavior. The ASFR is the number of births to women of a specific age per 1,000 women who are that age. The TFR is estimated using a life table, which is a method widely used by demographers to calculate variation in such vital events as births and deaths, as well as migration. Life table estimates are derived by subjecting a birth cohort to a set of fixed age specific rates. It is a mathematical exercise that allows demographers to make inferences about future demographic behavior in a given population (e.g., the probability that a childless woman at age 30 will have a child by age 35 or the number of years a child born in 2000 can expect to live). The total fertility rate, thus, is a measure of completed fertility and represents the average total number of births a woman can expect to have provided the age specific fertility rates remain constant over her reproductive lifespan. It is derived by summing the age specific fertility rates. The various fertility rates can be expressed as:

$$CBR = \frac{\# \text{ of births}}{\text{Total Pop}} \times 1,000$$

$$ASFR = \frac{\# \text{ of births } W_i}{\text{Total } W_i} \times 1,000$$

$$TFR = \sum ASFR$$

Mortality is the study of deaths within a population. Like fertility, the extent of mortality can be estimated using a crude death rate (i.e., the number of deaths per 1,000 people in a given population at a particular point in time). However, because the risk of death can vary by age, demographers typically use age specific death rates to estimate mortality. As discussed above, age specific rates provide the number of events, in this case deaths, to people of an exact age or age group per 1,000 people who are of the exact age or age group. A commonly used age specific death rate among demographers is the infant mortality rate (IMR). The IMR is an estimate of the number of deaths to children less than 1 year old per 1,000 live births at a particular point in time. It is expressed as:

$$IMR = \frac{\# \text{ of deaths to children under age 1 in a given year}}{\# \text{ of live births in the given year}} \times 1,000$$

Life expectancy is also commonly used to assess the degree of mortality within a particular population. Like the total fertility rate, life expectancy is estimated using a life table and the measure represents the average number of years, typically measured at birth, that a person can be expected to live, assuming that the rate of mortality at each age remains fixed.

Demographers who study *migration* focus on the movement of people. The effect of migration on societies (both senders and receivers) can be positive or negative. On the positive side, migration can act as a safety valve, alleviating social and economic pressures associated with overpopulation. People can also benefit from remittances received from family members who have migrated. Furthermore, migration can help some countries meet labor shortages that may be the result of declines in fertility. However, out migration can also lead to labor shortages. Furthermore, some of the

loss in labor can be among the most highly skilled (i.e., a brain drain). The challenges to studying migration are tremendous and most of this is related to the paucity of data available on the global movement of people. Thus, migration is typically estimated using an intercensal component method. That is, if the size of the population at two points in time is known, as well as the number of births and deaths occurring during this time period, then the amount of net migration can be estimated as the residual. Thus,

$$\begin{aligned} \text{if } P_{(t+1)} &= P_{(t)} + B_{(t)} - D_{(t)} + IM_{(t)} - OM_{(t)}; \\ \text{then Net Migration } (IM_{(t)} - OM_{(t)}) &= \\ P_{(t+1)} - P_{(t)} - B_{(t)} - D_{(t)} \end{aligned}$$

SOURCES OF DEMOGRAPHIC INFORMATION

In order to analyze a particular population, it is necessary to measure the number of people currently alive, the number of births and deaths, and how many people move in and out of the population. One source of basic demographic information is a population count or census. Population counts provide demographers with the number of people in a given area, such as the world, nation, or state, at a given period of time. Another source of demographic information is a vital register. The registration of vital events documents processes that most closely come to bear on population change, such as births, deaths, migration, marriages, and divorce. Sample surveys are another source of demographic information. They are good sources of data for two primary reasons. First, most surveys offer additional information beyond the enumeration of people and vital events that can be helpful in assessing the relationship between demographic behavior and broader social and economic change. Second, sample surveys can provide demographic information for estimating fertility, mortality, and migration in places where census counts or vital registration systems are poor or nonexistent. The Demographic and Health Surveys (DHS) are a good example of this. Originally known as the World Fertility Survey (WFS) and the Contraceptive Prevalence Surveys (CPS), DHS is a worldwide research project offering data on

population, health, and the nutritional status of women and children in developing countries. Over time, the DHS has been adopted and widely used as an important source for estimating demographic rates of change.

DEMOGRAPHIC PERSPECTIVES: THEORIES OF POPULATION CHANGE

The study of human population size and growth has captured the popular imagination of societies for centuries (see Weeks 2004 for discussion). The field of demography has enjoyed a long history of exchange and debate over the theories that seek to explain the causes of population change, the conditions under which vital events such as mortality and fertility change, and the consequences of these changes for society.

The Malthusian Perspective

Perhaps one of the most influential arguments on the dangers of population growth, and certainly one of the longest standing, is that proposed by Thomas Malthus. In his *Essay on the Principle of Population* (1798), Malthus argued that “population, when unchecked, increases in a geometrical ratio. Subsistence increases only in an arithmetical ratio” (p. 4). According to Malthus, the world was expected to expand at a rate that could not be supported by the environment – population growth was projected to outstrip the earth’s resources.

Continued growth on a global scale over the last two centuries without a complete depletion of the earth’s resources has led some critics to suggest that Malthus’s theory of population growth may have been flawed. Demographic evidence today indicates that the world has not experienced the geometric growth rate in the population that he originally proposed. Furthermore, global society has managed to make progress in producing food at a tempo far above that projected by Malthus (Weeks 2004). This is evidenced by the presence today of large agricultural conglomerates whose aim is to develop technology based food production enabling people to better process food crops as well as renewable sources of fuel – something Malthus did not foresee. In short, Malthus assumed that food would continue to

be produced in the same manner in which it was produced in his lifetime. He did not consider humans' capacity for innovation as a protective agent against dangers of rampant population growth.

Despite the shortcomings of his perspective, we still see evidence today of the Malthusian tension between population growth and resources. In 1968, Paul Ehrlich garnered popular support and critical attention with his book *The Population Bomb*. Characterized by some as a modern version of Thomas Malthus, Ehrlich predicted widespread famine and economic devastation as the result of overpopulation. However, unlike Malthus, Ehrlich also emphasized increasing environmental degradation. According to Ehrlich, food security could not be sustained indefinitely. Ultimately, unchecked population growth would outstrip the nutritional carrying capacity or "the maximum number of people that can be provided with adequate diets at any given time without undermining the planet's capacity to support people in the future" (Ehrlich et al. 1993). Ehrlich's solution, like Malthus's, was to limit population growth by moral restraint or, if this failed, by contraceptive use.

Classic Demographic Transition Theory

More than a century after Malthus the field of demography was the proving ground for yet another theory of population growth – that of the theory of demographic transition. The first formulation of the theory was a description of demographic processes that evolved into a typology of a group of countries that by today's standards would be considered developed (Thompson 1929). Additional expansion on the themes originally advanced by Thompson launched the inculcation of the demographic transition theory – a broad framework that has been a predominant influence on demographers and their preoccupation with the determinants of population change (Kirk 1996; Weeks 2004). The theory argued that societies typically moved through three stages of growth patterns. First, societies were characterized by levels of high mortality and high fertility and exhibited either stable or low rates of population growth. Under this demographic regime, high levels of

mortality were instrumental in promoting high levels of fertility. As economic organization in pretransitional societies was largely structured around the family, the survival of it was essential to the long term functioning of society (Coale 1973). Thus high levels of fertility were necessary to balance high rates of mortality.

During the second stage, mortality declined as the standard of living improved. Declines in fertility typically lagged behind declines in mortality and this was thought to be the case because fertility behavior was largely determined by social norms and values that supported higher levels of fertility in the presence of high levels of mortality. It also took people time to recognize that more children were living longer and that the need to hoard them for insurance against old age was no longer necessary. In short, it took a while for norms and values to recalibrate to a level more consistent with low mortality.

The third stage of the transition was marked by declines in fertility. Industrialization and urbanization were thought to change parents' conscious calculus about having children. For example, the value of children changed as education requirements removed children from families' labor supply. Decreases in infant mortality meant that fewer births were necessary in order to achieve a desired family size. Hence, fertility declines were the result of an increasing economic advantage to limiting family size (Coale 1973; Kirk 1996; Weeks 2004).

Reformulations of the Demographic Transition Theory

The subtle assumption of demographic transition theory was that economic development created the necessary preconditions for declines in mortality and subsequent declines in fertility. Findings from the European Fertility Project organized by Ansley Coale in 1963 challenged this theory. Reexamination of fertility and mortality declines in approximately 600 administrative divisions in Europe revealed a high level of regional variation in *when* fertility declined. As Coale (1973) stated, "the demographic transition correctly ... predicted that mortality would decline before fertility ... In neither instance does it specify ... the circumstances under

which the decline of fertility begins." In short, the demographic transition theory could not reliably identify a threshold at which fertility declined. The evidence suggested that economic development was important. However, given variation across regions in the timing of fertility declines, critics argued that economic development was not enough.

Thus began a series of reformulations aimed at explaining the conditions under which fertility fell in the wake of declines in mortality. The somewhat ethnocentric nature of theory, in that it was postulated entirely by and about people in developed countries, and its economic determinism spawned a series of reformulations in which cultural and social context were thought to moderate the economic factors that influence fertility.

For example, some critics argued that despite the increasing importance of material conditions in explaining fertility decline, ideational components that give meaning to the various costs and benefits of children are also important. In other words, the examination of fertility behavior should consider both the decision making process (the cost benefit framework) and the context within which fertility decisions are made (Lesthaeghe 1983; Lesthaeghe & Surkyn 1988). Similarly, Caldwell (1976) argued that what mattered was what people thought about children – both the economic and social value placed on having them.

Central to Caldwell's restatement of the demographic transition theory was the idea that fertility would not decline until the flow of wealth, which had typically been from children to parents, was reversed. In the process of modernization, large family networks collapsed and were replaced by smaller families that were both economically and emotionally independent and self sufficient. In the midst of familial and emotional nucleation, wealth flows from children to parents changed direction. As a result, ideas and attitudes about children changed. The economic value of children declined as they became the financial beneficiaries of family life – thereby increasing the cost to parents of having them. Therefore fertility declined as families decreased their family size to adjust to change in wealth flows. Yet, Caldwell argued the economically rational behavior

influencing fertility decisions was determined by non economic factors, such as social and cultural conditions that exist in societies. It is these conditions that influence the social value of children and prevent fertility in societies from falling below replacement level, even when this may be at odds with the economic benefits of remaining childfree (van de Kaa 1996).

In a further elaboration, and in response to demography's failure to foresee the high levels of fertility resulting in the baby boom birth cohort of the 1950s and early 1960s, Robert Easterlin argued that economic well being was an important factor in explaining fertility declines (Easterlin 1978; Weeks 2004). Specifically, Easterlin argued that the standard of living experienced as children becomes the foundation or "yardstick" by which current economic well being as adults is measured. Therefore, if individuals are able to achieve a level of economic well being similar to their parents', they will marry earlier and exhibit higher birth rates. If, however, economic prospects appear bleak and adults perceive it to be more difficult to achieve a standard of living similar to what they experienced as a child, they may delay marriage and childbearing.

According to Easterlin (1978), how the age structure of a population interacts with the economy influences the degree to which adults face economic prosperity. Thus, if the number and proportion of people entering working age are small in the presence of a burgeoning economy, their labor will most likely be in high demand and well compensated. If this compensation can afford individuals a lifestyle similar to what they experienced as children, this will exert an upward pressure on fertility. People will feel comfortable assuming the increased financial burden of having children. If, however, there is a glut in the number of young adults entering the labor force, regardless of the state of the economy, their overabundance will increase the competition for jobs and lower wage rates. This makes it more difficult for individuals to achieve the standard of living comparable to that of their parents at the same age and will thus exert a downward pressure on fertility. In short, people will be reluctant to have children, or at least a large number of them (Easterlin 1978; Weeks 2004).

The Second Demographic Transition

Many of the aforementioned theories on population change were preoccupied with either high fertility or the transition from high to low fertility. Recent trends, however, suggest that we are witnessing a deceleration in population growth on a global scale and most of this is due to widespread declines in fertility rates. So while the level of fertility still remains high in some areas of the world, the average number of children born to women has declined, resulting in a reduction in the overall rate of growth (see below). This has led many in the field to shift their focus from an overwhelming concern about high fertility to a concern about low fertility. Some have argued that these demographic changes since the 1960s warrant the label “second demographic transition” (Lesthaeghe 1995). Like the first, this transition was also described in three stages. The first stage, which took place between 1955 and 1970, was characterized by an acceleration in divorce rates, the end of the baby boom, and an increase in the age of marriage. During the second stage, around 1975–80, cohabitation and childbearing outside of marriage increased. In the third stage, which marks the mid 1980s and onwards, divorce rates flattened, remarriage was largely replaced with cohabitation, and delays in fertility characteristic at younger ages were recouped after age 30 (Lesthaeghe 1995). However, unlike the first, the motivations for the second demographic transition were notably different. While fertility declines in the first transition were linked to economic development and changes in the value of children with an increased focus on child quality, the second demographic transition was inspired by an increase in secularization or rising individualism and an increased focus on the quality of adult relationships. In short, fertility behavior, such as low or below replacement fertility, under the new demographic regime is linked to delays in marriage and increases in contraception and the motivation of this shift in behavior is thought to be more a function of increasing individual autonomy, a move toward gender symmetry, and a greater focus on the relationship between adult partners than had previously been the case.

Developed and Developing Countries Compared

Many of the theories originally aimed at explaining changes in fertility focused largely on developed countries. The fertility behavior and demographic transitions of developing countries, however, differed somewhat from their developed counterparts. While the timing of the transition from high to lower fertility was compatible with theories of economic development, the pace of transition was much faster than what had been observed in other countries, suggesting that other factors related to fertility behavior were at play (Watkins 1987). Some demographers argued that the importance of institutional change, such as the control and distribution over family planning funds and methods, as well as of ideational change was missing from theories seeking to explain fertility behavior. For example, diffusion such as the exchange of ideas about family size and family limiting practices was thought to be an important and powerful solvent of traditional fertility behavior – explaining the pace with which developing countries moved through the transition (Watkins 2000). Others went further to argue that *what* was being diffused was important. That is, the diffusion of westernized family values, which typically accompanied modernization, was thought to be one of the most important social exports to developing countries (Caldwell 1976). With its emphasis on smaller, emotionally nucleated families and increased attention and expenditures on children, the export and diffusion of westernized social values, according to Caldwell, eclipsed the role of economic modernization in explaining fertility change.

POPULATION PROFILE IN THE BEGINNING OF THE TWENTY FIRST CENTURY

Apart from the ebbs and flows in fertility and the theories that seek to explain population change, the profile of the world's population today is marked by a deceleration in growth. In 2002, the annual average growth rate of the world's population was approximately 1.2

percent, compared to 2.2 percent approximately 40 years before (US Census Bureau 2004). Considering the long history of fertility decline and the theories attempting to explain it, a decreasing growth rate may not be much of a surprise. Indeed, most of the deceleration in population growth can be traced to fertility decline. In 2002, women globally were averaging about one half more of a child than necessary to maintain levels of population replacement. In response to relatively high, albeit declining, global fertility combined with moderate levels of mortality, the largest share of the world's population are the very young under age 15. The distribution of women and men is approximately equal. China with a population of approximately 1.3 billion, India with 1.0 billion, and the United States with 298 million hold the top three spots as the most populous countries. However, in 2002 developing countries constituted the remainder of the top ten ranking (US Census Bureau 2004).

In 2002, the overall life expectancy at birth was 63.8 years. That is, assuming that the rate of mortality remained constant across each age group, a person born in 2002 was expected to survive an average of 63.8 years. There is considerable variation in life expectancy across countries. European and North American countries had the highest levels of life expectancy – upwards of 70 to 79 years – while Sub Saharan Africa had the lowest – ranging from approximately 50 years or less. This variation is due, in part, to the HIV/AIDS pandemic which has taken its largest toll on the African continent (US Census Bureau 2004). In 2002, the effect of migration flows on population change was not large. Approximately 3 million people were estimated to cross national boundaries. Mexico was the largest sender of people, followed by China and Tanzania. The top three receivers were the United States, followed by Afghanistan and Canada (US Census Bureau 2004).

It is important to note that the onset of HIV/AIDS has important implications for the study of demography, particularly demographic trends in developing countries that face the highest rates of infection and disease. The full demographic impact of the disease has yet to be realized. However, the nature of the disease, such as how it is transmitted (i.e., by horizontal

transmission from partner to partner or by vertical transmission from mother to child), as well as where mortality is concentrated in the population, can already be observed in the declines in life expectancy, declines in the growth rate, and the distortions in the age structure among the hardest hit regions of the world.

SEE ALSO: Age, Period, and Cohort Effects; Demographic Techniques: Decomposition and Standardization; Demographic Techniques: Event History Methods; Demographic Techniques: Life Table Methods; Demographic Techniques: Population Projections and Estimates; Demographic Techniques: Population Pyramids and Age/Sex Structure; Demographic Techniques: Time Use; Demographic Transition Theory; Demography: Historical; Fertility: Transitions and Measures; Malthus, Thomas Robert; Migration: Internal; Migration: International; Migration: Undocumented/Illegal; Mortality: Transitions and Measures; Population and the Environment; Second Demographic Transition

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demography: historical

Etienne van de Walle

The history of population has long been of interest to historians and demographers. Historical writings were used to estimate the population of the Roman Empire, of China, and of the world over time. Local historians used monthly numbers of burials and baptisms in parish records to ascertain the effect of epidemics or food crises. Starting in the mid 1950s, the work of the French demographer Louis Henry is generally credited for initiating a new discipline, historical demography, based this time not only on the careful accounting of

vital events at the aggregate level, but also on the nominal linking of records. This became an essential tool of historians, and the appellation “historical demography” is often reserved for that auxiliary branch of history that deals with the quantitative aspects of past populations, whereas “demographic history” deals with more substantive aspects.

Adopting a more inclusive definition, historical demography is the discipline that studies the structure and the evolution of populations of the past for which written sources exist, and the determinants and consequences of population trends over time, both at the individual and at the aggregate level. This definition is broad enough to encompass literary sources or historical accounts (e.g., on the history of contraception), or medical or epidemiological evidence (e.g., on the history of disease). “The past” as used in the definition will depend on the situation and the use of the data; historical demography commonly uses sources in ways for which these sources were not meant at the time they were collected (as in the nominal use of census records) or applies new techniques to old data sets (as in regression analysis of population registers).

The field has focused heavily on methodological procedures meant to avoid the biases inherent in the data. The geographical coverage of its sources is spotty and they privilege certain individuals (e.g., the more stable and rural families) and typically only part of their life (e.g., the time they were observed in village records). Moreover, the quantitative data include a limited number of variables. Qualitative data derived from contemporary accounts or from literary, medical, and judicial sources are normative in nature, may reflect a written tradition rather than actual behavior, and are socially biased toward the upper classes; they provide insight, but must be used critically.

Louis Henry (1970) perfected the method of family reconstitution, which consists in linking all the information concerning individual couples and their children found in the registers kept by local church or civil authorities. The technique was applied to parish records of villages, and served first to investigate the fertility of individual married couples in eighteenth century rural France. Other researchers have followed his lead to study parish records in

various European countries, most notably England, and in Canada. Similar techniques can be used with already reconstituted families, as accessible through genealogies or population registers. Such registers that provide information on both the population and its vital events have existed in Sweden since 1750, and in several European countries during the nineteenth century. Akira Hayami (1979) initiated the study of the Japanese population registers of the Tokugawa era (the religious faith investigation registers); population registers and genealogies from Taiwan and mainland China have also yielded information on non western populations.

Henry's initial interest was the decomposition of the biology of fertility. He was searching past records for examples of "natural fertility," i.e., the marital fertility that would prevail in the absence of family limitation. The family reconstitution method proved useful to investigate additional characteristics of the demography of the old regime, such as infant and child mortality. The focus here was microdemographic. Henry also laid down a plan to study a representative sample of rural French parishes using non nominal counts of vital events, to study such topics as their seasonality, illegitimacy, marriage patterns (age at marriage, permanent celibacy, widowhood), and even literacy (ability to sign a marriage certificate). He also pioneered the technique of population reconstruction, the macrodemographic analysis of parish records over time to establish the age and sex distribution of a population as well as its fertility, nuptiality, and mortality trends.

Historical demography was widely accepted by historians because the study of common village people fitted well in the "serial" history of the Annales School (as opposed to "evential" history that focused on major events and figures). It contributed to an understanding of underlying structures and trends over the long term. The demographic system of past societies became the trunk on which other studies of the socioeconomic structure could be grafted. The methodology was extended to larger units, e.g., cities, regions, whole countries, where social differences between individuals and groups were more marked than in rural parishes. It was applied to large samples where the results could be extrapolated to rural France (Séguy

2001), England (Wrigley & Schofield 1981), Germany (Knodel 1988), Canada (Charbonneau et al. 1993), and the pioneer trail to Utah (Bean et al. 1990).

Parallel developments in historical demography involved the use of censuses, either alone or in combination with vital registration. At the aggregate level, they are used to compute long series of fertility and mortality indices to shed light on major demographic changes at the secular level. The European fertility project (Coale & Watkins 1986) produced standardized measures of fertility and nuptiality for a comparative study of the demographic transition in Europe. At the individual level, nominal listings of inhabitants are used to investigate household structure in the past (Laslett & Wall 1972). In the United States, the study of historical censuses has been facilitated by the systematic conservation of census lists. The interest in microdata from censuses stems in part from the new availability of computers facilitating the manipulation of large stores of data and from the development of analytical methods that did not exist at the time the information was collected. These include information on the occupational and ethnic composition of the population and on infant and child mortality (Watkins 1994) at the time of a particular census. Equally important in the eyes of social historians is the creation of historical series of comparable structural data where the evolution of social phenomena can be followed though time.

From a sociologist's point of view, historical demography provides insights into individual behavior and the complex social life of communities. Data from the past have served as a store of comparative materials on which hypotheses on human behavior can be tested and models of demographic evolution can be derived and applied to populations of the developing world with inadequate statistics. Theories about the demographic past have been regrouped in a series of general explanatory frameworks or models, which remain controversial and serve as battlefields for dissenting researchers. The most important of these models relate to fertility, mortality and health, and marriage and household formation. The long term study of fertility change is subsumed in the model of the fertility transition. Fertility transition is

interpreted as a change from natural fertility to deliberate control of childbearing. In natural fertility regimes, the duration of birth intervals within marriage is the result of involuntary behavior determined by social norms (e.g., on abstinence or breastfeeding), by health, and by environmental variables. After the fertility transition, the deliberate action of the spouses to limit their births is a function of their desire for children. The model posits that there is a clear divide between demographic regimes where couples had no precise reproductive targets, and regimes where they attempted to stop childbearing upon reaching certain parity and to replace deceased children. This fundamental change in behavior has been variously explained as an adaptation to socioeconomic change or as the result of the diffusion of new ideas, norms, and techniques (e.g., birth control).

The dominant model accounting for the decline of mortality in the western world has received the name of epidemiologic transition. Historical demography produced estimates of steadily declining mortality from the middle of the eighteenth century onward (Schofield et al. 1991). The decline reflects the progressive transition from a stage dominated by food crises and infectious diseases to a situation where most people die in old age from chronic diseases. The main explanations of the change have ranged from exogenous (the effect of climatic or epidemiological factors, and later the diffusion of medical knowledge) to endogenous causes (the high mortality resulting from population pressure and low standards of living giving way, under the influence of economic development, to better nutrition and a better control of the environment).

A third important model relates to nuptiality and household formation. John Hajnal (1965) pointed out the singularity of the Western European pattern of marriage characterized by a late age at onset and extensive celibacy. He associated it with a pattern of household formation where men had to defer marriage until they could establish sufficient livelihood to support a family. The study of household structure in European census lists confirmed that the conjugal family unit had long constituted the basic residential pattern. Extended family households appear to have been rare in Western Europe for several centuries, whereas they dominate in

many other contexts. If economic circumstances allow or prevent the contracting of marriages and the establishment of households, a feedback mechanism will link fertility population increase to economic growth. British historians have demonstrated the effectiveness of nuptiality as a long term regulator of population growth, and have adopted a Malthusian paradigm.

From its beginnings in the study of the fertility and mortality of individuals, historical demography has evolved toward the consideration of demographic systems and their dynamics in the historical context of specific economy and societies. In the process, it has grown increasingly comparative. The opening up of new data sources with historical depth in Japan and China has allowed a comparative approach that has often challenged the generalizations derived from the study of western countries (Bengtsson et al. 2004). It has been argued, for example, that the Chinese demographic system was more preoccupied than the European one with lineage perpetuation, and resorted more to adoption and to infanticide to attain that goal (Lee & Wang 1999). An attraction of historical demography is the opportunity it provides to analyze other data sets, other cultures, and other social and epidemiological contexts.

SEE ALSO: Age, Period, and Cohort Effects; Annales School; Demographic Data: Censuses, Registers, Surveys; Demographic Techniques: Decomposition and Standardization; Demographic Techniques: Event History Methods; Demographic Techniques: Life Table Methods; Demographic Techniques: Population Projections and Estimates; Demographic Techniques: Population Pyramids and Age/Sex Structure; Demographic Techniques: Time Use; Demographic Transition Theory; Fertility: Transitions and Measures; Mortality: Transitions and Measures; Second Demographic Transition

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denationalization

Saskia Sassan

Denationalization is an emerging category for analysis that aims at capturing a specific set of components in today's major global transformations for which the typical terms in

use – globalization, postnationalism, and transnationalism – are inadequate. These three terms all point to locations for change that lie outside the nation state. The effort behind developing a fourth category – denationalization – arises out of an as yet small but growing body of research showing that critical components of today's major transformations actually take place inside the nation state. The actual processes that constitute the transformation in this case have the effect of denationalizing what has historically been constructed as national. These processes are partial, often highly specialized and obscure. Further, they frequently continue to be coded, represented, and experienced in the vocabulary of the national, and hence can remain unrecognized and undetected. Thus this new category for analysis opens up a vast research and theorization agenda connected to global trends but focused on the nation state. Sociology is particularly well situated to develop this agenda because its theories, methods, and data sets have to a large extent been shaped by the fact of nation states. But while this new agenda can use and benefit from sociology's existing resources, it will require new interpretive instruments and framings.

The ongoing development of categories for analysis is today shaped in good part by the fact of cross border processes such as economic, political, and cultural globalization and the resulting theoretical and methodological challenges they pose. Such challenges arise out of the fact that the global – whether an institution, a process, a discursive practice, or an imaginary – simultaneously transcends the exclusive framing of national states yet partly inhabits national territories and institutions. Seen this way, globalization is more than the common notion of growing interdependence of the world generally and the formation of global institutions. It also includes subnational locations.

When the term globalization is used, it tends to cover the presence and further formation of explicitly global institutions and processes, such as the World Trade Organization, global financial markets, the new cosmopolitanism, and the War Crimes Tribunals. The practices and organizational forms through which these dynamics operate constitute what is typically thought of as global. Although they are partly

enacted at the national scale, they are to a very large extent novel and self evident global formations.

But there are processes that do not necessarily scale at the global level as such, yet are part of large global changes. These processes take place deep inside territories and institutional domains that have largely been constructed in national terms in much, though by no means all, of the world. Although localized in national, indeed, subnational settings, these processes are part of globalization in that they involve trans boundary networks and entities connecting multiple local or “national” processes and actors. Among these are included, for instance, cross border networks of activists engaged in specific localized struggles with an explicit or implicit global agenda, as is the case with many human rights and environmental organizations; particular aspects of the work of states, e.g., certain monetary and fiscal policies being implemented in a growing number of countries, often with enormous pressure from the IMF and the US, because they are critical to the constitution of global financial markets; the fact that national courts are now using international instruments – whether human rights, international environmental standards, or WTO regulations – to address issues where before they would have used national instruments. It also includes more elusive emergent conditions, such as forms of politics and imaginaries which are focused on localized issues and struggles, yet are part of global lateral networks containing other similar issues and struggles, with all participants increasingly aware of this and connecting around their shared local issues; these can be thought of as non cosmopolitan forms of globality.

But if the global partly inhabits the national, it becomes evident that globalization in its many different forms directly engages two key assumptions in the social sciences generally, and in sociology in particular. The first is the explicit or implicit assumption about the nation state as the container of social process. The other is the implied correspondence of national territory with the national, i.e., if a process or condition is located in a national institution or in national territory, it must be national. Both assumptions describe conditions that have held, though never fully, throughout

much of the history of the modern state, especially since World War I, and to some extent continue to do so. What is different today is that these conditions are now partly but actively being unbundled. Different also is the scope of this unbundling.

Conceiving of globalization not simply in terms of interdependence and global institutions but also as inhabiting the national opens up a vast field for study that remains largely unaddressed within the globalization and related scholarships. The assumptions about the nation state as container of social process continue to work well for many of the subjects studied in the social sciences, and have indeed allowed social scientists to develop powerful methods of analysis and the requisite data sets. Further, these same assumptions are typically also present in much of the scholarship on globalization, transnationalism, and postnationalism, from where come definitions of globalization as growing interdependence and the global as exogenous to the national. But these assumptions are not helpful in elucidating questions about how today’s global, transnational, and postnational processes and formations are constituted partly inside the national, and are not merely exogenous forces that “attack” the national.

Theories based on the assumption that the nation state is a closed unit, that the state has exclusive authority over its territory, and hence that what takes place inside the nation state is national cannot fully accommodate the series of instances that the category “denationalization” seeks to capture. We might formulate this effort as follows. We need to recognize that the fact that a process or entity is located within the territory of a sovereign state does not necessarily mean it is a national process or entity; it might be a localization of the global. While most such entities and processes are likely to be national, there is a growing need for empirical research to establish this for what is in turn a growing range of localizations of the global. Much of what we continue to code as national today may well be precisely such a localization – whether endogenous to the national or an insertion from the outside.

Developing the theoretical and empirical specifications that allow us to accommodate such conditions is a difficult and collective effort.

However, some of the empirical knowledge on subnational processes and conditions – especially in sociology, anthropology, and political science – can be of use, as can the methods used to produce such knowledge. Including the national allows us to use many of the existing research techniques and data sets in sociology developed with national and subnational settings in mind. But we will still need to use and develop new conceptual frameworks for interpreting findings – frameworks that do not assume the national is a closed system and one that excludes the global. Surveys of factories that are part of global commodity chains, in depth interviews that decipher individual imaginaries about globality, and ethnographies of national financial centers all focus on national settings and thereby expand the analytic terrain for understanding global processes. Denationalization is an analytic category that provides a potentially much encompassing conceptual architecture for this type of work.

Using (and developing) the category denationalization for studying these processes means mapping an analytic terrain for the study of globalization that moves inside the national. It includes but also moves beyond understandings of globalization that focus on growing interdependence and self evident global institutions. Thus part of the research work entails detecting the presence of globalizing dynamics in thick social environments which mix national and non national elements. Structurations of the global inside the national produce a partial, typically highly specialized, and specific denationalization of particular components of the national.

If we conceive of it narrowly, the research literature on denationalization is still small but growing rapidly. In the 1980s, Zorn did some initial work on the subject, and in the 1990s Sassen (1996) began a serious effort to develop the term into a category for analysis. The work of Gereffi and Korzeniewicz (1994) contains critical elements for this effort. There have been other efforts, notably Bosniak (2000), but a careful reading shows that denationalization is there used as equivalent to postnationalism. Closer to the mark is the type of analysis found in Rubenstein and Adler (2000), Koh (1997), and Jacobson and Ruffer (2006). Ulrich Beck (e.g., 2006) has for years developed a critique of

methodological nationalism that is a key ingredient for an elaboration of the category denationalization. The most developed treatment, and perhaps the book that introduces the category formally, is Sassen (2006). This book also examines a large body of contemporary work in all the social sciences (e.g., on global cities, on translocal households, on the incorporation of human rights norms in national law, on the reorientation of state policy toward global agencies) that has done a type of research we might see as fitting but has done so without knowingly developing this particular category for analysis, and hence would not be right to cite here. The most developed of these bodies of scholarship is that on global cities (e.g., Taylor 2004). In the last few years we have seen a significant increase in the number and kinds of studies wherein the critical organizing variable is the subnational constitution of global processes. This research ranges from studies focused on markets for global trading that have only one location, such as the Gold Fix in London, to particular types of ghettos that are becoming part of cross border networks of ghettos, often through cultural practices, most notably rapping. Multi scalar analytics are one framing that is critical in this effort, especially as a heuristic (Jones 1998).

SEE ALSO: Global Economy; Global Justice as a Social Movement; Global Politics; Globalization; Globalization and Global Justice; Post nationalism; Transnationalism

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denomination

William H. Swatos, Jr.

The term denomination was innovated in the late seventeenth century by those groups of Christians in England who dissented from the established Church of England, but considered themselves loyal to the British state and recognized the monarch as having rights with respect to the Church of England. In 1702, specifically, Presbyterian, Baptist, and Congregationalist clergy formed “the body of the Dissenting Ministers of the Three Denominations in and about the City of London.” The term was introduced to counter the pejorative term sect, which in popular usage carried a sense not only of deviant or undesirable practices, but also, as sectaries, implied political radicalism. *Denomination* is now used in pluralist societies for those forms of organized religious expression that generally support the established social order and are mutually tolerant of each other’s practices.

TYPOLGY

The term denominationalism was significantly introduced into the literature of the sociology of religion by H. Richard Niebuhr in his book *The Social Sources of Denominationalism* (1929). The central thesis of this work is that new religious organizations (“sects”) begin among

the socially “disinherited” within a population, but in the US, as these groups attain to higher social status, their religious expressions become more “respectable” or socially accepted; thus, there is a movement across generations from sectarian to denominational religious life – or else the sectarian group dies out. This strongly evolutionary view of religious innovation and organizational development has been considerably modified today. A particularly important contribution to the study of denominationalism was David Martin’s seminal article “The Denomination” (1962), wherein he argued for a reconsideration of this structural form as a historically and culturally specific type of religious organization, rather than as a stage on a quasi evolutionary continuum.

A standard current definition of the denomination has been provided by Wilson (1959: 4–5), who writes that the denomination is “a voluntary association” that “accepts adherents without imposition of traditional prerequisites of entry,” such as belonging to a particular ethnic or national group, or sectarian testimonies of spiritual regeneration. “Breadth and tolerance are emphasized . . . Its self conception is unclear and its doctrinal position unstressed . . . One movement among many . . . it accepts the standards and values of the prevailing culture . . . Individual commitment is not very intense; the denomination accepts the values of the secular society and the state.”

Furthermore, and most significantly, individuals in a denomination coalesce around a notably open view of their religious purpose. The elusive goal of a denomination’s members is to build and maintain a particular identity as believers without losing sight of all that, at the roots, unites religious groups and their purposes in a free society.

The association between religious denominationalism and sociocultural pluralism is crucial to its organizational success. In pluralism one may belong to any denomination or none at all. Religion is pigeonholed and privatized. It is a voluntary activity undertaken or dismissed at the discretion of the individual. The denomination is thus marked most significantly by this voluntarism of support coupled to mutual respect and forbearance of all other competing religious groups. It is indeed this quality of *competition* that is the unique hallmark of the

pluralistic religious situation; acceptance of the “free market” of religious ideas is the critical operating principle of denominationalism as an ideology. Denominations are the organizational forms that dominant religious traditions assume in a pluralistic culture. The distinction between monopolistic and pluralistic societies in typological differentiation between the church and the denomination appears particularly in Swatos’s (1979, 1981) church sect model.

Although denominationalism is now characteristic of virtually all western societies, it reaches its quintessential expression in the US; that is, American denominationalism has been the model for religious pluralism throughout the world. (Andrew Greeley, for example, titled a text on American religious life *The Denominational Society*, 1972.) The particular effect this had on American religious development up to the 1950s is chronicled in Will Herberg’s benchmark volume *Protestant–Catholic–Jew* (1955). Although, strictly speaking, denominationalism is a Protestant dynamic, it has become fully accepted in principle by all major religious groups in the US; in fact, one could say that the denominationalizing process represents the *Americanizing* of a religious tradition, which is at the same time and in the same measure a *relativizing* process. Religious groups that too strongly resist this process are likely eventually to face run ins with the legal system. Since the 1940s, social scientists have been particularly interested in the relationship between denomination and both social stratification and sociopolitical variables; the term *class church* was first applied as an equivalent to denomination by J. Milton Yinger in the 1940s.

Although some religious groups have made specific efforts to eschew the term as a label, denomination nevertheless has been the most neutral and general term used to identify religious organizations in the US. Denominationalism is an institutional pattern that both governs relations among religious groups and organizes contact between them and the wider community. Such common phrases in sociological research as organized religion and religious affiliation anticipate denominationalism as the dominant religious expression in society. Religious belief and action “work together” with the sociocultural system to develop a legitimation system as a result of mutual interdependence.

Denominationalism is a structure that allowed Americans to resolve religious differences peacefully. A concomitant result was to create a context for both a deemphasis on and eventual discrediting of theology as a source for authoritative knowledge in American civil society.

DENOMINATIONS TODAY

Since the 1980s, and particularly with the publication of Robert Wuthnow’s *The Restructuring of American Religion* in 1988, there has been considerable debate within the sociology of religion over the current significance of denominationalism in American society. This debate was presaged by a distinction drawn by the church historian Martin Marty in *Righteous Empire* (1970) between two “parties” in American religion. According to Wuthnow’s elaboration of this view, each denomination is now divided between the two parties (roughly, liberals and conservatives) on critical sociopolitical issues, reflecting in turn the relative rise in importance of “the state” as a sociocultural actor since the 1940s, whereas prior to that time the state’s field was largely limited to the political economic sphere. The ecclesiastical “party” with which people identify as a part of their cultural lifestyle hence is more important to both their spiritual and their moral lives than is a particular denominational label, according to this theory.

This realignment involves two related changes in the structure of American religion. First, official denominationalism, even that of the broadest sort analyzed by Herberg, appears to some analysts to be waning. They claim less and less distinctive information is conveyed by denominational labels, while more and more these organizations have been reaping distrust and alienation from members. Second, in their place hosts of movements with narrower objectives have emerged, ordinarily ones that cluster loosely around items from either conservative or liberal political agendas.

Attention has thus turned away from interdenominational ecumenical activity, for example, not because the churches themselves deem it to be unimportant, but because there is no need to negotiate peace among noncombatants. “The primary axis defining religious and

cultural pluralism in American life has shifted. The important divisions are no longer ecclesiastical but rather ‘cosmological’” (Hunter 1988: 22). They no longer revolve around specific doctrinal issues or styles of religious practice and organization, but rather around fundamental assumptions about values, purpose, truth, freedom, and collective identity. (Thus the most heated controversies swirl around such issues as abortion and sexual orientation rather than whether people kneel or stand or sit to receive Holy Communion or have or have not been confirmed by a bishop in apostolic succession. The growth of “nondenominational” and “para church” organizations is seen as part of this process.)

Others argue that this view is historically shortsighted and needs modification. Swatos, for example, uses the local–cosmopolitan distinction elaborated specifically in the sociology of religion by Wade Clark Roof to argue that denominationalism in the context of American voluntarism is preeminently a *local* dynamic, providing people “place” in a specific setting, and that this dynamic operates as much as it ever did to the extent that cosmopolitan elaborations (e.g., denominational agency structures) can be discounted from analyses. Cosmopolitan denominational bureaucracies are not, according to this thesis, the crucial social dynamic of the typology, but a specific, transitory development. In addition, intradenominational debates have created more internally consistent denominational worldviews – conservatives now dominate the Southern Baptists, while liberals have won the day among Episcopalians and the United Church of Christ. James Davidson and colleagues have also shown that the various denominations continue to remain significantly disproportionately represented among elites in the US across the twentieth century, with corrections required only to accommodate specific immigration effects. Reform Jews, for example, are now also significantly over represented among elites, along with Episcopalians, Unitarians, and Presbyterians; Roman Catholics have achieved approximate parity with their share of the general population. On the other hand, conservative Protestants generally remain significantly under represented among American elites, which may explain their attempts to

achieve greater political visibility, hence to influence both economic and cultural policies.

An often overlooked historical dimension of American denominationalism is the role women played in maintaining the life of the different denominations and in the social ranking system that they may have implied – again, particularly at the local level. The decline of membership in some mainline denominations (e.g., Methodists, Presbyterians, Episcopalians, Congregationalists [United Church of Christ]) is at least partially due to the increased presence of women in the workforce, which has resulted in a corresponding absence of women to undertake volunteer activities. Women in these denominations are also more likely to be in the professional classes and thus to have job responsibilities that do not end with the workday. Denominations that have declined in membership directly correspond to those that have most endorsed gender equality, while those that have gained membership are more gender differentiated. They also tend to attract membership from the working stratum, where even women working outside the home are, relatively speaking, more likely to be able to devote more of their discretionary time to church activities and are less likely to experience role redefinition in the home.

Regardless of which side of the debate on the significance of denominationalism is ultimately vindicated, both perspectives emphasize the crucial role of the congregation as the place where religious ideology and the lived experience of the people who wear a particular denominational label meet. This points to a crucial dialectic in American religiosity between organization and action: denominationalism is not now nor has it ever been realized except through the life of specific local units or congregations.

CONGREGATIONALISM

Used in three interconnected senses, the term congregationalism emphasizes the role of lay persons (or the laity, as contrasted to ordained, set apart clergy) within a religious organization. While congregationalism is especially important to understanding religion in the US, it is characteristic of denominationalism globally. Congregational religiosity may be contrasted to

both historic state church monopolies and to shrine or pilgrimage religion where a group of resident devotees maintains a shrine to which the public comes either for festivals or for specific clientelistic needs (funerals, weddings, healing services, fortune telling, etc.). Religious congregations in the US form the largest and most significant community group that weaves through American society, but at the same time their diversity on crucial sociopolitical, socio-economic, and sociomoral issues diffuses their potential impact on the larger society, as outsiders tend to see these cleavages in central values as diluting confidence in the authority of the stance of any specific group.

One sense of the term is to refer to a specific denomination of Christians, once called the Congregational Church – since a 1950s merger with the Evangelical and Reformed Church now formally titled the United Church of Christ (UCC). This body is the inheritor of the established church of New England formed through a Pilgrim–Puritan alliance in the early seventeenth century, shortly after immigration from England. In England today, historically Congregational churches are now part of the United Reformed Church; in Canada, most Congregational churches merged into the United Church of Canada in the 1920s; one group of Congregational churches in the US that did not join the UCC merger is now known as Congregational Christian Churches. New England Congregationalism spawned a number of offshoots, including Unitarianism and virtually all Baptist churches.

The name Congregational Church is taken from the fact that this denomination vests authority in the local congregation; that is, it has a congregational polity, or organizational structure. Other forms of polity are presbyterian, where authority is vested in the regional clergy associations, and episcopal, where authority is vested in a singular regional head, known in Christian traditions as a bishop. These forms of polity historically have named the major streams of American Protestant Christianity. (The United Methodist Church, for example, was originally named the Methodist Episcopal Church, contrasting it with the Protestant Episcopal Church, now known simply as the Episcopal Church in the US, the Anglican Church in most

of the rest of the world.) Both the presbyterian and episcopal forms in actual practice in the US, however, are modified significantly by congregationalism. In strict usage, however, the core principle of congregationalism is that the local congregation *is* the church; that is, no other earthly institution can claim religious authority over the corporate worship of believers. It hires (“calls”) its own minister (and can fire him or her as well). It also decides acceptable forms of doctrinal profession, worship style, and so on, and decides on what forms of “fellowship” it will accept with other churches – for example, whether it will allow members who belong to a different congregation to receive various sacramental ministrations, particularly Holy Communion, and the terms on which it will allow individuals who have belonged to some other congregation to join its congregation. The congregation also normally corporately owns the property on which any facilities it uses are located (e.g., the worship building, education facilities, and offices).

As a form of polity, congregationalism descends from the Jewish synagogue tradition (synagogue is a Greek word for “gathering together”), where in Orthodox practice a synagogue is created whenever 10 men gather together for prayer. In its modern usage, however, congregationalism has come to symbolize a greater principle – namely, the religious *voluntarism* of denominationalism. The upshot of modern western political ideology is that religion is an entirely voluntary activity: one may not only go to whatever church one chooses, but one may also go or stay home whenever one chooses, and one does not have to go to or join any church at all. Furthermore, the church is largely seen as serving the needs of its congregation, rather than the reverse. The greater the extent to which, as in the US, support for the church is on an entirely voluntary basis as well, rather than through some tax scheme, the role of the congregation is correspondingly increasingly magnified. In this sense all churches in the US and other nations which lack either an explicit or covert system of government subsidization are congregationalist in a radical way: unless a church has been extremely well endowed by prior generations, if the congregation leaves, the church must be closed. This is very different,

for example, from some Scandinavian countries, where state support ensures that a regular program of activities will go on, even though only a tiny percentage of the population attends church. By the same token, persons from these traditions may find offensive the practice of passing and offering (collection) plate or basket during worship – perhaps the one common worship experience that cuts across virtually all religious traditions in the US.

Steeped deeply in the Pilgrim myth and Puritan culture, the worldview of the Protestant ethic, the voluntaristic principle that is inherent in congregationalism colors all religion in the US, not simply the Congregational Church or even Protestantism or even Judeo-Christianity. Buddhist, Islamic, Roman Catholic, and national Orthodox groups in the US all must adjust to aspects of this organizational norm in order to survive. Similarly, the missionary activity of European Protestants throughout much of the Southern hemisphere and Far East has made congregationalism normative at least as far as Christian congregations are concerned. There was also a Catholic version of congregationalism in the US (called trusteeism) in the early years of the American experiment, but it was officially discontinued in the nineteenth century. Several recent studies of American Catholics, however, have emphasized continued popular attachment to a local parish as distinct from a hierarchical structure. Indeed, although the observation is most often credited to G. K. Chesterton, more than one commentator has remarked that in America even the Catholics are Protestants!

Americans can and do worship as well as vote with their feet and their pocketbooks. A degree of accommodation to this aspect of the “American way of life” is structured into virtually all corporate religious practice. By the same token, Americans are more likely to see “religion,” whether they value it positively or negatively, as a congregational activity (“belonging to a church,” or sometimes “organized religion”), and in recent usage to distinguish this from personal religiosity by referring to the latter as spirituality. Denominationalism, expressed through congregational religious life, provides definition for a sociocultural space in societies as they create institutional subsystems

that attempt to differentiate public and private worlds. In historically monarchical societies religious and political lines were certainly blurred and possibly obliterated. To hold a religious opinion contrary to the official church was to be disloyal to state and society. The move toward a measure of separation between worlds of public obedience and private opinion began in the British Isles, but was almost immediately exported to the American colonies, where it grew far more rapidly and produced more abundantly.

GLOBALIZATION

From both American and British missionaries the public/private distinction lying behind denominationalism was widely exported and has become internationally recognized as a normative principle for political-religious relations and articulations of religious freedom. At the same time, however, specific denominational traditions in Anglo America have at times had to face up to global realities in ways they did not necessarily expect. While on the one hand denominations in the mother countries gradually came to support an end to “colonialism” both in practice and in the ideology that lay behind it, they often were surprised that the doctrinal seeds they sowed would bloom as profusely as they have. For example, the largest number of Anglicans now reside in sub-Saharan Africa, and from a number of those countries they are being taken to task by their coreligionists for what are perceived by those whom they evangelized as betrayals of the basic tenets of the Christian faith, particularly with respect to human sexuality. This is also true for the southern cone of South America and parts of Asia. A similar situation exists among African Methodists. Some denominations of specifically American origin, such as the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter day Saints (Mormons) and Seventh day Adventists, have also globalized so successfully that their majority constituencies lie outside the US. In short, the denominational principle has been exported as a political solution but not necessarily as an ecclesiastical value of compromise to a set of standards that is not characteristic of the

indigenous population's appropriation of the moral values of Christianity.

In Europe, by contrast, the denominational principle has been appropriated in terms of a gradual disestablishment of specific religious expressions, but not necessarily of state support. Thus, it remains the case that "denominational" churches that have had historical state church ties remain largely the province of small numbers of attendees, with clergy salaries and building maintenance underwritten from state or parastate agencies. Potentially the most interesting cases for the future of denominationalism are in the countries of the former Soviet Union, where religious monopolies (primarily either Orthodox Christian or Islamic) vie with challenges from religious groups of primarily western denominational origin (e.g., Baptists and Pentecostals, and to a lesser extent New Religious Movements). In Greece as well, the issue of European Union pluralism versus historic Orthodox primacy has arisen, primarily in respect to the inclusion of "religion" on passports and identity cards in contravention of EU standards, but also with regard to the treatment of adherents to such "marginal" denominations as Jehovah's Witnesses.

SEE ALSO: Church; Globalization, Religion and; Protestantism; Religion; Religion, Sociology of

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department store

Wendy A. Wiedenhoft

Department stores by definition offer a large variety of merchandise organized into specialty departments under one roof. The first department stores were unique not simply because of the variety of goods they offered, but also because their policies were "consumercentric." Department stores instituted fixed prices – often advertised in newspapers – so consumers would not have to engage in the time-consuming practice of haggling over the cost of the goods that they purchased. Catering to the whims of consumers, department stores established the "no questions asked" policy of merchandise exchanges and refunds, money back guarantees on purchased products, and free delivery. The first department stores offered cooking and knitting classes; some became "Saturday bankers," cashing checks when banks were closed. Other consumercentric policies included personal attention by sales clerks and clothing alterations. These policies engendered consumer loyalty and trust, as did the participation by department store owners in local civic life (Rosenberg 1985; Leach 1993).

Aristide Boucicaut opened the first department store, Bon Marché, in Paris in 1852. It did not take long for retail merchants in the United States to institutionalize the department store as a fixture of the urban landscape. Alexander Turney Stewart has been credited with opening the first department store in New York City in 1862. Named the Cast Iron Palace, it contained 19 departments from silks to toys. Other cast iron department stores were established near Stewart's store on lower Broadway between 8th and 23rd, popularly known as "Ladies' Mile," including Lord & Taylor, Siegel Cooper, Stern Brothers, LeBoutellier, James McCreery, and Simpson Crawford. John Wanamaker, the "Merchant Prince," opened the Grand Depot in Philadelphia in 1876. It became the largest single floor department store in the world with 129 concentric counters surrounding a central ballroom of female fashions. Marshall Field built the largest department store in the world on State Street in Chicago when he added a 20 story men's store in 1917 across the street from his existing 12 story structure erected in 1907. Macy's department store soon took over this title when it came to occupy an entire city block and stand 30 stories tall in 1924.

THE DEMOCRATIZATION OF DESIRE

Department stores created a "dream world" (Williams 1982) for consumers with extravagant displays and spectacular atriums that encouraged them to browse and fantasize about current and future purchases and identities. However, these dream worlds would have been impossible without technological and organizational advances in mass production and consumption and business management (Leach 1993). The sensational array of goods displayed at department stores depended upon the mass production of consumer goods, especially ready to wear clothing. Reliable distribution methods were necessary to continually stock merchandise. This was particularly important because many of the first department stores sold food products. Elevators and escalators were installed to provide comfort and convenience as well as to methodically navigate consumers through different departments. Pneumatic tube systems were used

to efficiently handle the high volume of cash transactions until credit. Installment payment plans were established to tempt consumers to immediately gratify their desires. Thus, a hidden, formally rationalized system supported the enchanting façade of the department store (Ritzer 2005).

Although department stores catered to an overwhelmingly bourgeois consumer base, they did not close their doors to working class consumers who wanted a glimpse of luxury. Members of all classes were encouraged to spend hours walking through these vast emporiums, wandering from department to department, fantasizing about the novel array of consumer goods on display – all without having to spend any money at all. Marshall Field even tried to tempt consumers from the city sidewalk, installing spectacular window displays to create desire. According to Leach (1993: 63), glass was used by department stores to democratize desire while "dedemocratizing access to goods." Displaying goods under the protection of glass allowed all consumers to gaze at luxurious products, even if they could not physically touch them or financially afford them. While department stores may have democratized consumer desire by inviting all individuals to enter their dream worlds, most stores were privy to the fact that working class consumers could not afford many of the goods they offered. To solve this dilemma some department stores created bargain basements with marked down goods and cheap imitations of products for sale on the upper levels (Leach 1993).

A PRIVILEGED SPACE FOR WOMEN

One may question the democratic nature of this desire because it was primarily directed at one group: women (Reekie 1993). Although men certainly consumed goods, they were viewed as too rational to be tempted into buying something they did not really need. Store managers did not think that most men had the time to waste spending hours wandering through a variety of departments; conventional wisdom held that most men would be uncomfortable walking through women's departments. Women, on the other hand, were stereotypically viewed as not only having the time to shop, but also possessing

an irrationality that could be managed through created desire. The department store became the female public sphere, replacing, in the words of Émile Zola, the church. According to Zola, the department store “marches to the religion of the cash desk, of beauty, of coquetry, and fashion. [Women] go there to pass the hours as they used to go to church” (cited in Miller 1981: 19). Like the church, the department store was a place where middle class women could legitimately be alone in the city. Their access to this part of the public sphere was a consequence of their domestic duty to take care of the private sphere. While women could fantasize about the latest fashions, much of their shopping revolved around purchasing items for their households.

Women, however, were not just shopping at the department store but were also working as sales clerks within them. Furthermore, men were not entirely absent from this female public sphere as they owned and managed most department stores (Benson 1986). Thus, a sexual division of labor and a class division of shopping existed as a concrete reality in these dream worlds. Young, unmarried female sales clerks were overworked and underpaid, yet they were still expected to look and act professional. Female shoppers were not ignorant of this exploitation. During the Progressive era middle and upper class female shoppers formed a consumers’ league to help ameliorate the working conditions of female sales clerks in New York City, publishing a “white list” of department stores that treated their female sales clerks fairly. Interestingly, the success of securing shorter working days for sales clerks came at the expense of working class women, who did not have the leisure to shop during what became regular department store hours.

THE DEPARTMENT STORE AND THE SHOPPING MALL

The rise of the enclosed, suburban shopping mall in the post war era marked both the success and the eventual downfall of the traditional department store. The original grand emporiums remained in the city center, but when department stores began creating national chains they lost much of their distinctiveness. Mall developers courted the large department

stores to anchor their shopping centers. Most mall developers provided either low or no rent from department stores because they knew that they brought in prized foot traffic. Early shopping malls mimicked a “dumb bell” architectural model with department stores as the anchors to force consumers to walk through the interior of the mall and hopefully be tempted to shop at smaller, specialty shops. However, smaller specialty shops began to rob the department store of its actual departments. Consumers could now shop at Victoria’s Secret for lingerie or Footlocker for athletic apparel instead of searching for these departments at Macy’s or Bloomingdale’s.

No longer rooted in a local city culture, chain department stores became increasingly rationalized or “McDonaldized” (Ritzer 2004). The physical architecture of the stores lost their enchantment. The homogeneous products they offered for sale did little to distinguish one department store chain from another. Prices remained low, but at the expense of personal service. Mergers have been one of the primary causes of this disenchantment. Mergers, of course, are not a recent development. The first significant department store mergers occurred in the 1920s, culminating in the creation of Federated Department Stores in 1929. In 2005 Federated Department Stores spent \$11 billion to acquire May Department Stores Company. This mega merger of about 950 department stores has resulted in many May department stores, such as Lazarus, Rich’s, Hecht’s, and Kaufman’s, being renamed Federated’s most popular chain, Macy’s.

THE DEATH OF THE DEPARTMENT STORE?

In recent years the department store has been in a state of decline with the rise of “big box” stores, such as Home Depot, Office Max, and Petsmart. Big box stores are free standing spaces that specialize in selling large quantities of a distinct category of merchandise at low prices. Dubbed “category killers” (Spector 2005), big box stores seek to monopolize the market of a specific category at the expense of both local retail stores and department stores. Essentially, big box stores have taken the

“departments” out of the department store. Charles Lazarus, the founder of Toys R Us, institutionalized the modern big box store. Department stores dominated the market for toys until this category killer was established. Department stores have steadily decreased their number of departments since the birth of the big box stores, including home furnishings, home goods, and electronics.

The initial success of big box stores was built upon discount prices, convenience, and self service. Unlike the department store, big box stores did not seek customer loyalty or offer personal services. Instead, they sought to attract the bargain hunter who was willing to sacrifice the dream world quality of the department store for low prices. Indeed, the mentality of these consumers rests upon the notion that self service in a warehouse like setting keeps prices low. Over the years big box stores have gone through a transformation from low maintenance warehouses to lifestyle centers. Interestingly, they have come to incorporate many of the elements that once made department stores so enchanting to consumers. Some provide resting areas, cafés, day care facilities, and lavish displays; customer service is improving at many of them. Many big box stores have attempted to enchant their disenchanting spaces through implosion (Ritzer 2005). Although most of these stores are popular because they appear differentiated, many implode distinct categories or departments under one roof. For example, Barnes and Noble is not simply a book store, it is also a music store, a video store, a gift store, and a coffee shop.

Big box stores have not been the only competition that the traditional department store has faced. Discount department stores, like Wal Mart and Target, have also taken over their share of the retail market. The creation of the “festival marketplace” (Hannigan 1998) has also hurt department stores. These open air, Main Street style marketplaces combine eating, entertainment, and shopping. Unlike the enclosed shopping mall, most do not need, or want, department stores as anchors. While the festival marketplace began in the city, many are opening in the suburbs and threatening the vitality of the enclosed shopping mall. Enclosed shopping mall owners are trying to

compete with the festival marketplaces by courting big box stores, like Old Navy, Target, and Costco, to become new anchors and by creating open air wings. In order to survive, some department stores have begun to imitate big box stores, building free standing stores and abandoning the traditional anchor spaces they used to occupy in the shopping mall. The question remains, however, whether the department store can be sustained in an artificial space independent of either the city or the shopping mall.

SEE ALSO: Arcades; Consumption, Cathedrals of; Consumption, Landscapes of; Consumption, Urban/City as Consumerspace; Gender, Consumption and; McDonaldization; Shopping; Shopping Malls

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dependency and world-systems theories

Christopher Chase Dunn

Dependency approaches emerged out of Latin America in the 1960s in reaction to modernization theories of development. *Dependentistas* attributed the difficulties of development in the global South to the legacies of the long history of colonialism as well as contemporary international power relations. This approach suggested that international inequalities were socially structured and that hierarchy is a central feature of the global system of societies.

The world systems perspective is a strategy for explaining social change that focuses on whole intersocietal systems rather than single societies. The main insight is that important interaction networks (trade, information flows, alliances, and fighting) have woven polities and cultures together since the beginning of human social evolution. Explanations of social change need to take intersocietal systems (world systems) as the units that evolve. However, intersocietal interaction networks were rather small when transportation was mainly a matter of hiking with a pack. Globalization, in the sense of the expansion and intensification of larger interaction networks, has been increasing for millennia, albeit unevenly and in waves.

The intellectual history of world systems theory has roots in classical sociology, Marxian political economy, and the thinking of the *dependentistas*. But in explicit form the world systems perspective emerged only in the 1970s when Samir Amin, André Gunder Frank, and Immanuel Wallerstein began to formulate the concepts and to narrate the analytic history of the modern world system.

The idea of the *whole system* ought to mean that all the human interaction networks, small and large, from the household to global trade, constitute the world system. It is not just a matter of "international relations" or global scale institutions such as the World Bank. Rather, at the present time, the world system is all the people of the earth and all their cultural, economic, and political institutions and the interactions and connections among

them. The world systems perspective looks at human institutions over long periods of time and employs the spatial scales that are required for comprehending these whole interaction systems.

The modern world system can be understood structurally as a stratification system composed of economically, culturally, and militarily dominant core societies (themselves in competition with one another), and dependent peripheral and semiperipheral regions. Some dependent regions have been successful in improving their positions in the larger core/periphery hierarchy, while most have simply maintained their peripheral and semiperipheral positions. This structural perspective on world history allows us to analyze the cyclical features of social change and the long term patterns of development in historical and comparative perspective. We can see the development of the modern world system as driven primarily by capitalist accumulation and geopolitics in which businesses and states compete with one another for power and wealth. Competition among states and capitals is conditioned by the dynamics of struggle among classes and by the resistance of peripheral and semiperipheral peoples to domination and exploitation from the core. In the modern world system, the semiperiphery is composed of large and powerful countries in the third world (e.g., Mexico, India, Brazil, China) as well as smaller countries that have intermediate levels of economic development (e.g., the newly industrializing countries of East Asia). It is not possible to understand the history of social change without taking into account both the strategies and technologies of the winners, and the strategies and forms of struggle of those who have resisted domination and exploitation.

It is also difficult to understand why and where innovative social change emerges with out a conceptualization of the world system as a whole. New organizational forms that transform institutions and that lead to upward mobility most often emerge from societies in semiperipheral locations. Thus all the countries that became dominant core states in the modern system had formerly been semiperipheral (the Dutch, the British, and the United States). This is a continuation of a long term pattern of social evolution that Chase Dunn and Hall

(1997) have called “semiperipheral development.” Semiperipheral marcher states and semi peripheral capitalist city states had acted as the main agents of empire formation and commercialization for millennia. This phenomenon arguably also includes organizational innovations in contemporary semiperipheral countries (e.g., Mexico, India, South Korea, Brazil) that may transform the now global system.

This approach requires that we think structurally. We must be able to abstract from the particularities of the game of musical chairs that constitutes uneven development in the system to see the structural continuities. The core/periphery hierarchy remains, though some countries have moved up or down. The interstate system remains, though the internationalization of capital has further constrained the abilities of states to structure national economies. States have always been subjected to larger geopolitical and economic forces in the world system, and as is still the case, some have been more successful at exploiting opportunities and protecting themselves from liabilities than others.

In this perspective many of the phenomena that have been called “globalization” correspond to recently expanded international trade, financial flows, and foreign investment by transnational corporations and banks. Much of the globalization discourse assumes that until recently there were separate national societies and economies, and that these have now been superseded by an expansion of international integration driven by information and transportation technologies. Rather than a wholly unique and new phenomenon, globalization is primarily international economic integration, and as such it is a feature of the world system that has been oscillating as well as increasing for centuries. Recent research comparing the nineteenth and twentieth centuries has shown that trade globalization is both a cycle and a trend.

The Great Chartered Companies of the seventeenth century were already playing an important role in shaping the development of world regions. Certainly, the transnational corporations of the present are much more important players, but the point is that “foreign investment” is not an institution that only became important since 1970 (nor since World War II). Arrighi (1994) has shown that finance

capital has been a central component of the commanding heights of the world system since the fourteenth century. The current floods and ebbs of world money are typical of the late phase of very long “systemic cycles of accumulation.”

Most world systems scholars contend that leaving out the core/periphery dimension or treating the periphery as inert are grave mistakes, not only for reasons of completeness, but also because the ability of core capitalists and their states to exploit peripheral resources and labor has been a major factor in deciding the winners of the competition among core contenders. And the resistance to exploitation and domination mounted by peripheral peoples has played a powerful role in shaping the historical development of world orders. Thus world history cannot be properly understood without attention to the core/periphery hierarchy.

McMichael (2000) has studied the “globalization project” – the abandoning of Keynesian models of national development and a new (or renewed) emphasis on deregulation and opening national commodity and financial markets to foreign trade and investment. This approach focuses on the political and ideological aspects of the recent wave of international integration. The term many prefer for this turn in global discourse is “neoliberalism,” but it has also been called “Reaganism/Thatcherism” and the “Washington Consensus.” The worldwide decline of the political left predated the revolutions of 1989 and the demise of the Soviet Union, but it was certainly also accelerated by these events. The structural basis of the rise of the globalization project is the new level of integration reached by the global capitalist class. The internationalization of capital has long been an important part of the trend toward economic globalization, and there have been many claims to represent the general interests of business before. Indeed, every modern dominant state has made this claim. But the real integration of the interests of capitalists all over the world has very likely reached a level greater than at the peak of the nineteenth century wave of globalization.

This is the part of the theory of a global stage of capitalism that must be taken most seriously, though it can certainly be overdone. The world system has now reached a point at which the old interstate system based on

separate national capitalist classes exists simultaneously with new institutions representing the global interests of capital, and both are powerful forces. In this light each country can be seen to have an important ruling class faction that is allied with the transnational capitalist class. The big question is whether or not this new level of transnational integration will be strong enough to prevent competition among states for world hegemony from turning into warfare, as it has always done in the past, during a period in which a dominant state (now the United States) is declining.

The insight that capitalist globalization has occurred in waves, and that these waves of integration are followed by periods of globalization backlash, has important implications for the future. Capitalist globalization increased both intranational and international inequalities in the nineteenth century and it has done the same thing in the late twentieth century (O'Rourke & Williamson 2000). Those countries and groups that are left out of the "beautiful époque" either mobilize to challenge the status of the powerful or they retreat into self reliance, or both.

Globalization protests emerged in the non core with the anti IMF riots of the 1980s. The several transnational social movements that participated in the 1999 protest in Seattle brought globalization protest to the attention of observers in the core, and this resistance to capitalist globalization has continued and grown despite the setback that occurred in response to the terrorist attacks on New York and Washington in 2001.

There is an apparent tension between, on the one hand, those who advocate deglobalization and delinking from the global capitalist economy and the building of stronger, more cooperative and self reliant social relations in the periphery and semiperiphery and, on the other hand, those who seek to mobilize support for new, or reformed, institutions of democratic global governance. Self reliance by itself, though an understandable reaction to exploitation, is not likely to solve the problems of humanity in the long run. The great challenge of the twenty first century will be the building of a democratic and collectively rational global commonwealth. World systems theory can be an important contributor to this effort.

SEE ALSO: Capitalism; Colonialism (Neocolonialism); Development: Political Economy; Empire; Global Economy; Global Justice as a Social Movement; Global Politics; International Gender Division of Labor; Kondratieff Cycles; Revolutions; Transnational Movements; World Conflict

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Derrida, Jacques (1930–2005)

Michael Lipscomb

Jacques Derrida was an Algerian born philosopher remembered for his development of deconstruction, an approach to thinking that seeks carefully to analyze signifying objects in terms of the differences that are constitutive of those objects. Typically, this deconstructive approach proceeds through a close analysis of the ambivalent and marginal terms that help secure the bounded understanding of a text,

concept, or phenomenon, but which cannot be reduced to a final, stable meaning intended by the author or by orthodox interpretation.

Derrida's writing has been attacked for both its difficulty and its supposedly nihilistic implications. Regarding the first charge, his work certainly reflects the density and complexity of the philosophical tradition from which it emerges, but there are numerous places in his later work and his published interviews that offer fairly straightforward summaries of his thinking. Regarding the second charge, Derrida worked hard to counter the common conception that deconstruction entails a kind of textual free play that inevitably leads to a moral and intellectual relativism. In fact, his work represents a scrupulous commitment to the practice of carefully reading any text (written or otherwise), which, above all, respects the probity of the text under consideration. Thus, though his work offers a general strategy for thinking about conditions of knowledge and representation, the power of that approach is derived from its attentiveness to how those conditions are manifested in specific contexts. Throughout his long and prolific career, Derrida brought this practice of close reading to bear on examinations of an impressive variety of subjects, ranging across considerations of major figures in the western philosophical canon (e.g., Plato, Kant, Hegel, Husserl, Heidegger, Nietzsche, and Freud), literary productions (including the works of Ponge, Genet, Joyce, and Mallarmé), and a wide array of social and political themes (education, internationalism, telecommunications, political economy, and the death penalty, to offer a partial list).

Throughout the breadth of this output, and despite repeated criticisms to the contrary, Derrida's efforts were not aimed against the possibility of coherent interpretations; instead, he sought to show how the possible coherence of any interpretation, the very possibility of communicative meaning, is derived within a specific semantic code and is thus premised upon the possibility of repeating that code, its "iterability." In the temporal and spatial movement of a repetition, there is always the possibility of slippage, and thus the recurring possibility of the new and the unforeseen, the possibility that any text might be grafted into new contexts that would begin to reshape its

meaning. For Derrida, this iterative inevitability suggests a certain continuity and stability, but it also points to the inherently open ended status of any text, phenomenon, or representation. On the one hand, Derrida decidedly does not seek to reduce all phenomena to a literary text; rather, his famous declaration that "there is nothing outside of the text" (Derrida 1974) points to the ways in which texts are unendingly opened by the very terms that mark the bounded field of meaning that makes any immediate understanding possible. On the other hand, Derrida's thinking does not seek to destroy the conceptual traditions from which it emerges (they are, in fact, its very condition of possibility); rather, it seeks to solicit them in a way that denaturalizes that which might otherwise seem natural and already decided.

Derrida's approach to reading, therefore, has both epistemological and ethical implications, linking an insistence on careful descriptive work with an always present normative orientation. Descriptively, this line of thinking has helped complicate working concepts within a broad range of intellectual disciplines, opening those concepts to an ongoing reconsideration and thus stressing a kind of scientific and intellectual practice that remains open to new perspectives and events. To take but one example, Derrida's work has provided tools for productively troubling liberal, Marxist, structuralist, feminist, and psychoanalytic understandings of the "human subject" and its relation to its social environment. Normatively, Derrida's general approach emphasizes a respect for the "other" that comes from outside of our previously consecrated and currently present understandings, resisting the tendency to reduce that which is different to the interpretive grids that we have inherited. Deconstruction, then, carries an ethical imperative that productively complicates our other regarding orientations, and it is in this sense that Derrida would insist that deconstruction is always, in the very movement of its critical posture, an affirmative gesture that is capable of saying "yes" to that which is yet to come.

SEE ALSO: Deconstruction; Foucault, Michel; Postmodern Feminism; Postmodernism; Poststructuralism; Semiotics

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descriptive statistics

Karen Lahm

Descriptive statistics, also known as univariate statistics, are most often used to describe the distribution of a variable or variables in a sample. A distribution of a variable can be thought of as all of the individual scores or categories of a variable contained in a sample or population. For example, if the variable being measured in a sample of 100 people is age, then the distribution for the age variable would be all of the 100 separate ages of the people contained in the sample.

The most common examples of descriptive statistics are the mean, median, mode, range, standard deviation, and variance. It is important to note that one can obtain descriptive statistics for a sample or a population. However, in the population these values would be referred to as parameters, not statistics. So, when the term descriptive statistics is used to describe a variable or variables, the researcher is referring to a sample, not a population.

When taken together, the mode, median, and mean are most often referred to as measures of central tendency. They are used to describe the

center of a distribution of a variable. The mode is the most frequently occurring category or score in the distribution of a variable. For example, if one had a sample of eight test scores – 80, 50, 72, 65, 80, 80, 99, and 90 – then the mode would be the score of 80 because it is the score that is repeated most often. Even though the mode is considered a measure of central tendency, the mode is not the exact center of the distribution. It is just the most frequently reported score or category.

The exact center of a distribution of a variable is the median. Half of the sample lies above the value of the median and half lies below. The median can also be described as a value or category that lies at the 50 percentile of the distribution. Using a sample of five test scores – 50, 60, 70, 80, and 90 – in order to obtain the median one would first have to order the scores from lowest to highest. Using the formula for the median $[(n + 1)/2]$ with n being sample size of five, the formula would give us the placeholder of the median. Thus, in this example, the placeholder of the median is the third score and that is 70. Thus, two scores lie above 70 and two below. No matter how many scores are in a distribution, or the values of those scores, the median is always the exact center score.

The final measure of central tendency is the mean. The mean is simply the average score in the distribution of a variable. Adding up all of the observed scores of a variable in a sample and then dividing that summed value by the sample size (n) will result in the mean of that variable. Thus, if one had five scores in a sample – 60, 75, 82, 88, and 90 – one would add up those five scores and divide by five to get the mean ($395/5 = 79$).

The mean acts like a teeter totter by balancing all of the values of the scores in the distribution of a variable. As a result, the mean may not be, and usually is not, the exact center of a distribution. One reason for this is because the mean is highly affected by extreme scores (i.e., outliers) in a sample of scores. Extreme scores can be either very high or low scores when compared to the other scores in the distribution. For example, if one had a sample of seven test scores – 15, 65, 70, 72, 85, 90, 96 – the outlier in this case may be the 15. More over, because the score of 15 is so low, the

mean is actually pulled toward it, thus deflating the actual center score. This gives an inaccurate picture of the real center of the distribution of scores. So, when one has a sample containing outliers, it is often called a skewed distribution. Extreme caution should be used when examining the mean in a skewed distribution because it is often not the best representation of the center of that distribution. Rather, the median should be used as the best measure of central tendency for any skewed distributions.

Three other very important descriptive statistics are the range, variance, and standard deviation. These descriptive statistics are often called measures of dispersion because they typically describe the variation of the observed scores of a variable around the mean. The range is simply the difference between the lowest (i.e., minimum) and highest score (i.e., maximum) in the distribution.

The variance is the average squared difference of scores from the mean. Since the variance is measured in squared units (e.g., years squared, dollars squared, etc.) it is commonly not discussed as much as other measures of dispersion. A more frequently examined measure of dispersion is the standard deviation. Mathematically, the standard deviation is found by taking the square root of the variance. Thus, standard deviation can be interpreted as the average difference of scores from the mean.

Some samples have a wide variety of scores (i.e., heterogeneous samples) and some have observed scores that are very similar or close to one another (i.e., homogeneous samples). For example, if a sample of 100 people were all the same age then the measures of dispersion would both be zero because there is no variation in the ages of the sample respondents. Moreover, heterogeneous samples (i.e., having a wide variety of scores) would have high values for the variance and standard deviation, while homogeneous samples (i.e., very little variation in the scores) would have lower values for the variance and standard deviation. There is no commonly accepted value indicating a high or low measure of dispersion because variables can be represented in a wide array of units. For example, a standard deviation of six can represent a high measure of dispersion for a variable, such as number of children. However, that same

standard deviation of six can also actually be a very small measure of dispersion for a variable such as income.

SEE ALSO: Measures of Centrality; Outliers; Statistics; Variance

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deterrence theory

Mark Stafford and Gini Deibert

Deterrence theory can be traced to such early utilitarians as Cesare Beccaria and Jeremy Bentham (Johnson & Wolfe 2003). The underlying idea is that people will commit crimes to the extent they are more pleasurable than painful. Certain, severe, and swift legal punishments increase the pain for crimes and, thereby, can deter people from committing them.

Neither Beccaria nor Bentham systematically defined *deterrence*. However, Gibbs's (1975) definition is conventional: deterrence is the omission or curtailment of a crime from fear of legal punishment. The terms "omission" and "curtailment" identify two possibilities: (1) people may refrain entirely from committing a crime from fear of legal punishment, or (2) they may only curtail or restrict their commission of it (e.g., a motorist may speed only occasionally in the belief that repetitive speeding eventually will result in a fine).

No single version of deterrence theory is accepted universally. However, any version

is likely to include something like this proposition:

Proposition 1: The greater the certainty, severity, and celerity of legal punishment for a type of crime, the less the rate of that crime.

Certainty refers to the likelihood (e.g., probability) of legal punishment; severity refers to the punishment's magnitude; and celerity refers to its swiftness. A high certainty of legal punishment has been considered a more effective deterrent than either high severity or high celerity, and consequently it has been the principal variable in deterrence theory and research (Gibbs 1975; Nagin 1998).

There are two ways to consider legal punishments. The first is to consider them as *objectively given*. For example, for a particular time and place, the objective certainty of imprisonment for a type of crime could be estimated by taking the number of persons imprisoned for that crime, divided by the number of such crimes; and the objective severity of imprisonment for the crime could be estimated by the average number of years in prison people actually served for it. The second way to consider legal punishments is *perceptually*. For example, people could be asked about their perceptions of the certainty and severity of imprisonment for a type of crime. The distinction between objective and perceived punishments is reflected in these three deterrence propositions:

Proposition 2: The greater the objective certainty, severity, and celerity of legal punishment for a type of crime (OP), the less the rate of that crime (CR).

Proposition 3: The greater the objective certainty, severity, and celerity of legal punishment for a type of crime (OP), the greater the perceived certainty, severity, and celerity of legal punishment for that crime (PP).

Proposition 4: The greater the perceived certainty, severity, and celerity of legal punishment for a type of crime (PP), the less the rate of that crime (CR).

Or, combining and expressing the three propositions diagrammatically:

OP \longrightarrow PP \longleftarrow CR

where \longrightarrow denotes a positive relation and \longleftarrow denotes a negative relation.

Prior to 1980, most deterrence research focused on Proposition 2. For example, Gibbs (1968) found a negative association among US states between the objective certainty and severity of imprisonment for homicide and the homicide rate.

Both Beccaria and Bentham posited a positive relationship between objective and perceived legal punishments, which is stated as Proposition 3, and policymakers agree in expecting to increase people's perceptions of punishment by increasing the levels of objective punishments (e.g., by increasing the objective certainty of arrest for crimes). Despite that expectation, most of the relevant findings have been contrary to it. For example, Erickson and Gibbs (1978) found only a moderately strong positive association among 10 types of crimes between the objective and perceived certainty of arrest. Moreover, they found no support for a central implication of Propositions 2–4 "that the objective certainty of punishment is related to crime rates *through* the perception of punishment" (p. 263).

Doubts about the relationship between objective and perceived legal punishments have led deterrence researchers more recently to focus on Proposition 4 that perceived punishments (e.g., perceptions of the certainty of punishment) for a type of crime are negatively related to the rate of that crime (Nagin 1998). That focus is justified because Proposition 4 comes closer than the others in capturing the element of fear that is integral to the definition of deterrence (see above). Scores of studies over the past several decades have found that "perceptions of ... [the certainty of] punishment have negative, deterrent like associations with ...offending" (Nagin 1998: 13). This is not the case with the perceptions of the severity of punishment, "but when individual assessments of the cost of ... sanctions are taken into account ... significant negative associations ... emerge" (ibid.).

Many "non deterrence" variables are related to rates of crime, which makes deterrence theory more complex than the foregoing propositions suggest. For example, while crime rates are related to perceived punishments (Proposition 4), they also are related to threats of *extralegal* punishments, such as stigma, divorce,

and loss of job. Extralegal punishments are relevant for deterrence theory in at least three ways. First, legal and extralegal punishments may have independent effects on crime rates. Second, legal punishments may prevent people from committing crimes *through* their effects on extralegal punishments (e.g., people may refrain from crime for fear of job loss if arrested). Finally, legal and extralegal punishments may have interactive effects on crime rates (e.g., people may be deterred by fear of legal punishment *only if* they believe they will suffer an extralegal punishment, such as divorce).

SEE ALSO: Beccaria, Cesare; Crime; Criminal Justice System; Crime, Psychological Theories of

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development: political economy

Manuela Boatcă

The emergence of the idea of development in western culture is closely linked to the evolutionary worldview that began to gain ground in Europe in the eighteenth century and has as such also been constitutive for sociology as a discipline. Like evolution, development has

taken on a variety of meanings, the common denominator of which can be seen in the idea of continuous, orderly social change usually proceeding in several, clearly demarcated stages and entailing an improvement of living conditions. However, as will be shown in the following, while most evolutionary theories implicitly are theories of development, the reverse does not apply.

In contrast to the relative social stability and the deterministic outlook characteristic of previous centuries, such major political upheavals of the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries as the French Revolution, the American Revolutionary War, and the South American Wars of Independence, along with the rise in social mobility that accompanied the spread of industrialization, gradually imposed the notion that social and political change, rather than being exceptional, was the norm. Modern society, and with it western civilization, were increasingly seen as the product of progress in which such constant change had resulted. Viewed in turn as static, undifferentiated, and lacking in complexity, traditional societies were relegated to an earlier stage in the course of human development. The theological explanation according to which the “savages” and “barbarians” of the non European world had hitherto been considered less than human was consequently replaced by a historicist interpretation that perceived them as (merely) less developed. An evolutionary perspective postulating the unidirectionality and inherent progressiveness of human history thus became central to both western sociology and anthropology, as disciplines whose institutionalization in the nineteenth century was intimately linked to the European project of civilizing the world. Their task therefore consisted of identifying the different stages of development and the corresponding laws of social evolution through which each society must pass in order to reach the western standard of civilization. Classical political economy, best illustrated within sociology by Marx’s theory of historical materialism, concurred in this view by conceiving of modes of production as chronologically structured and nationally determined. In this classical understanding, development thus represented the outcome of an immanent historical process to be traversed by individual social organisms on their

way to maturity – the equivalent of modern society.

Massive criticism directed at evolutionism in the first half of the twentieth century, ultimately leading to its temporary discrediting as an academic endeavor, prevented a resumption of the issue of development until the post war era. During the 1950s, development again became central to both social scientific concerns and policymaking. The bipolar geopolitical structure characterizing the aftermath of World War II, as well as the simultaneous process of decolonization of European empires in Asia, Africa, and Latin America that resulted in the emergence of an array of new nation states in the so called third world, accordingly led to a competition for potential economic and political spheres of influence between the US and the Soviet Union. In response to the need to discredit the communist model as a viable alternative for the new nations, the multidisciplinary US modernization school identified the problem of third world countries in their traditionalism and viewed the solution to it in modernization, understood as a stage by stage replication of the economic development of Western Europe and North America. Drawing on evolutionary as well as functionalist assumptions, modernization theory saw societies as becoming increasingly similar in the course of a slowly operating process of social change considered unidirectional, progressive, and irreversible. It thus revived basic premises of nineteenth century evolutionary theory, such as the stage theory of development and the clear cut distinction between traditional and modern societies. At the same time, it replaced the notion of development as a byproduct of an immanent historical process with the one of development strategy, deliberately triggered and controlled by political actors with the help of state led policies. In *The Stages of Economic Growth*, one of the most widely debated works of the modernization school, W. W. Rostow (1960) identified the lack of productive investment as the main problem of third world societies and was among the first to suggest that the obvious solution was to provide US aid to these countries – understood in terms of capital, technology, and expertise. It can thus be said that the models brought forth by the modernization school were neither evolutionary nor

functionalist large scale *theories of social change*, but *theories of development* of limited spatial and temporal scope. They were born out of an attempt to solve the issue of development of particular regions of the world with respect to other particular regions at a specific moment in history – although researchers often extrapolated both across time periods and geographical locations. In this modern variant, development therefore became coterminous with planned economic growth and political modernization, to be implemented with the help of development agencies and foreign aid projects especially created for the purpose.

Rejecting both the main theoretical assumptions and the policy implications of the modernization school with respect to development, the largely neo Marxist dependency theory focused instead on underdevelopment (and is therefore sometimes referred to as underdevelopment theory). Arising in Latin America in the early 1960s in reaction to the failure of the United Nations' economic program to promote development, and the modernization school's inability to explain the ensuing economic stagnation in the region, the dependency school claimed that modernization was an ideology used in order to justify US intervention in third world affairs. In the wake of Lenin's and J. A. Hobson's theories of "imperialism," dependency theorists characterized modern capitalism as a center-periphery (i.e., asymmetrical) relationship between the developed, industrialized West and the underdeveloped, agricultural third world. Rejecting the theoretical division between "traditional" and "modern" society, which modernization policies were meant to bridge, dependency theorists claimed that the modern world's center-periphery structure mirrored an underlying international division of labor, established during the European colonial expansion and still maintained in the present through mechanisms of economic domination. In this view, the economies of the colonized regions had been reorganized so as to meet the needs of the colonizer countries, and ended up producing raw materials that served the latter's interests. Hence, in sharp contrast to modernization theory, the dependency school did not view underdevelopment as a "stage" previous to development, but as a distinct historical process

that industrialized economies have not experienced. For dependency theorists, therefore, just as center and periphery are relational notions, existing only simultaneously, development and underdevelopment are only different aspects of the same phenomenon, not different stages in an evolutionary continuum. Moreover, in their view, underdevelopment is not the natural condition the modernization school liked to presuppose, but an artifact created by the long history of colonial domination in third world countries, and as such a process of “development of underdevelopment” (Frank 1967). Accordingly, studying individual societies, as modernization theories did, meant leaving all exogenous factors of change out of the analysis and thus could not lead to a valid explanation of social change. Since the development of the US and Western Europe had been based on the underdevelopment of the third world, foreign aid policies could only result in the latter falling further and further behind. Consequently, dependency theorists saw the only concrete solution to the termination of dependency situations in third world countries in severing the ties with the core and choosing a socialist path of autonomous development, on the model of China and Cuba. In response to mounting criticism pointing out the economic success of other former colonies such as South Korea or Taiwan, a modified version of the theory later combined the notions of dependency and development into “associated dependent development” (Cardoso 1973). This approach postulated that the industrial capital invested by multinational corporations in peripheral countries could induce some amount of development and as such constituted a viable alternative for the states that did not want to take the chance of a socialist revolution.

World systems analysis expanded on the basis of the criticism that the dependency school had directed at the methodology of modernization studies. It claimed that the developmentalist view of social change which modernization theorists shared had a flawed logic. In a world economy such as the one represented by the current capitalist world system, it was the world system as a whole, and not individual societies, that should constitute the basic unit of analysis. Reifying political cultural units (i.e., states) into autonomously evolving entities, as

most theories of social change commonly did, led to ahistorical models of social transformation, as in the “traditional” vs. “modern” distinction. For world systems analysis, as for dependency theory, underdevelopment was not an earlier stage in the transition to development, but the necessary result of the international division of labor underlying the capitalist world economy. Although the world systems model advanced by Immanuel Wallerstein included an additional structural position, the semiperiphery, as well as a historical account of the evolution of the entire structural hierarchy since the sixteenth century, upward mobility within the capitalist division of labor (e.g., a semiperiphery’s rise to core status) was not considered development (since it was achieved at the expense of other regions), but merely successful expropriation of world surplus. While the dependency school, unlike world systems analysis, did not advance a general evolutionary theory, but one of social change in the periphery, both approaches retained a notion of development in which progress was represented by the – however uncertain – transition to (world) socialism.

The long term result of the neo Marxist critiques of the notion of development espoused by modernization theories was growing skepticism toward classical development theory, as well as added attention being devoted to the issue of underdevelopment both by scholars and policymakers. By the end of the twentieth century, development as a theme of academic research was largely considered outdated and treatment of the political and economic factors affecting macrostructural social change increasingly occurred within the more neutral, but less specifically defined, theoretical framework of globalization. In conceptual terms, this translated into a shift in the process of development from nationally to globally managed economic growth (McMichael 2005). Especially after the demise of communism in Eastern Europe and the end of the Cold War, global tendencies toward a withering away of the state as an agent of development on the one hand and toward a strengthening of the self regulating global market on the other were accompanied on the political level by the advance of neoliberalism and a corresponding trend toward privatization and anti statism. At the same time, the

language of globalization, whether in terms of the liberalization of market economies, democratization, or transition from the second to the first world, revealed the same teleological understanding of world history on which nineteenth century evolutionary models were premised, while adhering to a similar progressivistic logic as the one inherent in the successive western models of “development” represented by Christianization, the civilizing mission, or modernization (Mignolo 2000). Questioning the extent to which the evolutionist outlook central to the self definition of the modern world is complicitous with a model of global economic growth responsible for excluding the great majority of the world’s population from the development process while depleting the world’s natural resources has, therefore, raised more than once the issue of available alternatives and their respective scope. The answers have, on the one hand, often entailed the search for alternative developments – whether an “ethnodevelopment” focusing on indigenous peoples and ethnic minorities, a “sustainable development” targeting the preservation of resources, or a feminist development economics centered on gender sensitive development policies. However, dissatisfaction with the inherent limitations of the development paradigm as such has on the other hand prompted increasing demands for alternatives to development (Escobar 1995) that would fundamentally question the principle of economic growth and the model of modernity that has been based on it.

SEE ALSO: Decolonization; Dependency and World Systems Theories; Developmental State; Modernization; Political Economy; Political Sociology; Social Change

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developmental stages

Cynthia Schellenbach

The developmental stage approach refers to the socially or developmentally defined, age related sequence of stages individuals experience from birth through death. The assumption underlying the stage theories is that each stage represents a qualitatively unique period of development, indicating that the type of development is completely different and not reducible to earlier forms. That is, the developmental process occurs in an invariant sequence. The stage theory assumes that development is cumulative in nature and that development is based on each preceding step. It is expected that development proceeds toward increasingly complex levels of functioning. From a traditional viewpoint, the process of development proceeds in an irreversible sequence. Theoretically, one cannot return to an earlier form of development. The sequence of development is universal in nature. Development proceeds toward predictable end states. These end states may be influenced by maturational factors or environmental factors.

FREUD

Psychoanalytic theory was based on the contention that personality develops from a series of

qualitatively different stages of development from infancy through adolescence. The mental structures consist of the id, ego, and the super ego. The id is the force that seeks pleasure and self satisfaction at any cost, and is the primary force of energy during the infancy stage. The ego functions as a mediator between the urgent needs of the id and the constraints of the real world. The superego is the psychic mechanism by which the individual begins to internalize standards for right and wrong. The psychic stages of personality development include the oral stage (0–1), the anal stage (ages 2–3), infantile genital (ages 3–4), latency (age 4 to puberty), and the mature genital stage (mid teens to adulthood). The oral stage is the time at which energy is derived from oral satisfaction (as in the hunger–feeding–satisfaction behavioral sequence). The anal period focuses psychic energy on the child’s emergent abilities to retain bowel control, or to feel satisfaction with the ability to retain a valued part of the self. The latency period finds the child emphasizing same sex relationships in an attempt to quell the disturbing thoughts and feelings of sexuality that emerged during the previous stage. The final stage emphasizes the mature emotional resolution of sexuality.

The contributions of the theory focus on the developmental approach, an emphasis on maturational processes, and an illustration that personality is sequential and cumulative. The theory is limited in that the concepts were never verified in empirical research, that the stages of personality development were narrowly conceptualized (to the exclusion of other domains of development), and that the role of culture and society was not emphasized sufficiently.

ERIKSON

Erikson developed a theory that emphasized a predetermined plan for healthy personality development. Erikson believed that several limitations needed to be addressed in Freud’s theory. First, Freud emphasized that the steps in personality development were predetermined but failed to acknowledge any influence of the cultural environment on the individual. Second, Freud believed that little development occurred following puberty. Third, Freud

overemphasized sexuality to the exclusion of other domains of development that may influence personality development.

Erikson developed a theory of psychosocial development that emphasized the simultaneous process of psychological change (inward) and social change (outward) that occurs during the process of personality development. He also suggested that developmental change occurs throughout the lifespan. Erikson posited developmental turning points at designated times of enhanced vulnerability and the potential for positive development at eight times during the lifespan. Each developmental stage highlights a specific crisis, which will strengthen personality when mastered but will leave a weakness if the crisis is not mastered successfully. For example, stage one underscores the conflict of trust versus mistrust in which the primary objective is to provide a sense of predictability for the infant from birth through age 1. The toddler stage from age 1 through 3 highlights the crisis of autonomy (or the development of will) versus a sense of doubt or shame about one’s abilities. During the preschool years of 3 to 5, children begin to take on increasing responsibility and initiative versus internalizing a sense of guilt. During the early elementary school years, children master skills and knowledge based on their personal sense of industry versus feeling inferior to peers.

The building block of the theory is the period of adolescence, when the young person develops a sense of identity based on how they see themselves and how society views them as individuals. Early adulthood highlights a developmental turning point that focuses on a sense of intimacy with another, but not at the expense of personal isolation. Adulthood, with responsibilities toward children, work roles, and society, focuses on generativity versus stagnation. The older years of adulthood are years when adults turn inward and internalize a sense of integrity or despair depending on the level of personal reward or satisfaction with past decisions and lives.

Erikson was the first to elaborate in detail the psychological change that extends into adulthood and old age. He also sharpened the use of techniques such as psychohistory as well as the use of sociological and anthropological techniques to enhance the importance of the

social environment in shaping personality development. Critiques suggest that elements of each crisis may exist at other age levels, not exclusively at the time of ascendance, as Erikson implies.

KOHLBERG

Kohlberg conceptualized moral development as a series of six qualitatively different stages of development. Each stage represents a specific mode of moral reasoning, ending with the highest and most complex level of moral development. The endpoint is a preservation of justice for the rights of individuals. The content of the values is not relevant to the type of reasoning within each stage. The progress of an individual is indicated by a gradual shift from an externally controlled sense of morality to an internally controlled sense of morality through the process of internalization.

Kohlberg suggests that there are three levels of moral reasoning: the preconventional level, the conventional level, and the postconventional level. Each level consists of two sublevels of reasoning. For example, at the preconventional stage, decision making is controlled by external rules (usually from parents). In stage one, the child's definition of good and bad is based totally on obedience to authority. In stage two, moral behavior is based on doing what is best because others will reward the behavior.

At the conventional level of reasoning, the individual defines moral behavior as conforming to the rules of the external society and maintaining order based on a set of external laws. In stage three, the person is motivated to gain the approval of others who are significant, and the motivation is now internal. In stage four, the individual typically believes that the social order should be maintained in order to support the legitimate rights and expectations of others.

The postconventional stage is the time at which moral decisions are governed by internal, shared principles. At this point, moral behavior is completely internalized. At stage five, moral behavior is defined in terms of contract, as opposed to the needs of the individual. Stage six is the morality of the principles of conscience, although individuals at this stage

are respectful of the authority of mutual respect and trust. The highest level of internalized authority, or the greatest good for the largest number, dictates behavior. Judgments of moral behavior at this stage may or may not be consistent with the laws of the country or the state.

Several critiques have been leveled at Kohlberg's theory as a result of more recent research. For example, although much research does support the notion of invariant sequence, recent evidence indicates that many adults (especially those who do not receive higher education) show no advancement in moral reasoning over time. Moreover, there is no clear evidence that stage six always follows stage five. Another criticism suggests that there is no evidence to suggest that moral reasoning will necessarily be transferred to behavior. Finally, many researchers suggest that Kohlberg's theory is based primarily on moral reasoning, or cognitive processing, with little attention to the influence of other variables such as gender or context. In fact, while Kohlberg's theory is based on the justice perspective, or a perspective that focuses on the rights of the individual, other theorists such as Carol Gilligan suggest an alternative care perspective. Gilligan suggests that the care perspective is a moral perspective that views individuals in light of connectedness with others. Moral decisions are based on the balance of justice and concern for others. Many females, as well as some males, make moral decisions based on the impact of their decision on the relationship rather than on the precise rights of the individual. In other words, males and females may utilize different strategies for moral decision making, as influenced by gender and culture.

FAMILY LIFE CYCLE

Carter and McGoldrick propose an alternative view of the stages in the life course. These researchers shift the unit of analysis from the individual to the family, tracing the developmental stages of the family from its inception to its dissolution. For example, the first stage involves leaving home and becoming a single adult, or launching from the family of origin. The launching period is complete when a young adult separates from the family of origin

and becomes fully independent. The mate selection and marriage stage is second, in which two individuals from separate families of origin join to form a new system. The third stage in the family life cycle is becoming a parent with children, and taking on the role of parent in addition to the roles of spouse and worker. The next stage is the family with adolescents, in which parents embark on the lengthy process (10–15 years) of supporting their children through the process of achieving independence. The fifth stage of the family life cycle involves completion of the process of launching children, caring for aging parents, and adapting to changes in mid life. The last stage of the family life cycle is the family in later life. The challenges in this stage involve taking on the role of grandparenting and either entering the retirement phase or making a change in career.

Although the family life cycle is recognized as a considerable contribution to sociology as a research paradigm, it is important to recognize that the framework is limited to cultures in which marriage precedes childbearing, and one in which marriages continue until the death of one partner. Demographic data indicate that there are many diverse family units other than married couples. Moreover, a large proportion of marriages will end by divorce before the last child is successfully launched into the world. With the addition of remarriage following divorce, new family life cycles must be recognized.

SEE ALSO: Aging and the Life Course, Theories of; Aging, Sociology of; Freud, Sigmund; Life Course; Life Course and Family; Psychoanalysis; Socialization

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developmental state

Brad Williams

The developmental state is one that strongly influences the direction and pace of economic development by directly intervening in the development process, rather than simply relying on market forces to allocate economic resources (Beeson 2003). American scholar Chalmers Johnson is widely credited with coining the term in his seminal work *MITI and the Japanese Miracle: The Growth of Industrial Policy, 1925–1975* (1982), although the notion of state intervention in the market to ensure growth was not necessarily new. Johnson's book subsequently triggered a boom in studies of the state's role in the economy.

Like many observers in the 1960s and 1970s, Johnson was puzzled by Japan's post war economic miracle. His response was to highlight the important role of a plan rational capitalist developmental state, which combined private ownership and state guidance, as the key to Japan's remarkable industrial transformation and growth. By doing so, Johnson created a third category of state classification that transcended the traditional liberal (free market)–Stalinist (command economy) dichotomy. In Asia, this pattern of state intervention in the market was initially and successfully emulated by Japan's former colonies South Korea and Taiwan, and then later with mixed success by the countries of Southeast Asia, as well as China. The economic success of the East Asian states, rightly or wrongly, led many observers to perceive the developmental state "as a causal argument linking interventionism with rapid economic growth" (Woo Cumings 1999) throughout the world. The East Asian development experience challenged the arguments of dependency and world systems theorists – influential at the time – who were skeptical about the ability of the peripheral regions of an interconnected global economy to escape exploitation by the advanced industrialized states of Western Europe and North America. The developmental state thesis emerged during a period in which Japan, in particular, achieved rising trade surpluses with the US. In a manifestation of Orientalist thinking, scholars from

the so called “revisionist” school saw this as the result of the mysterious Other’s unfair adoption of a deviant form of capitalism that threatened not only established western economic thinking, but also its way of life.

The developmental state can also be located within the contexts of late developments and the influences of social mobilization and economic nationalism (Woo Cumings 1999). Modern Japanese history has been characterized by the determined attempt to catch up with the West – first, following the stagnation of the isolationist Tokugawa period, and then after the destruction resulting from its disastrous wartime defeat. The Japanese state devised a system of political economy that would enable it to achieve this task and survive in a western dominated world. Nationalism emerged from the war and imperialism and was an important component of the East Asian development experience, serving as an ideological mobilizing force behind the sacrifices the populace were forced to endure in pursuit of reconstruction and growth objectives.

There is a divergence of views regarding the factors contributing to the developmental state’s success, which can be broadly linked to the agency–structure debate within the social sciences. Some observers are critical of the inward orientation of Johnson’s model, believing it overlooks important structural factors such as the superpower conflict. Johnson downplays (but does not dismiss) the influence of the Cold War, arguing that Japan would have grown anyway. However, it is difficult to deny that Japan benefited enormously from the US security guarantee, which allowed it to concentrate on economic growth without being burdened by excessive defense outlays, and unfettered access to the vast consumer market of its superpower patron facilitated by its status as a bulwark against communist expansion in East Asia.

At the heart of the developmental state and the key institution of social mobilization was the economic bureaucracy. In Japan this was the Ministry of International Trade and Industry, or MITI (now METI) – the analytical focus of Johnson’s study – and its institutional equivalents in South Korea and Taiwan, the Economic Planning Board and Council for Economic Planning, respectively. In true Weberian fashion, the

economic bureaucracy that administered the developmental state was extremely professional, meritocratic, and rational. In the case of Japan, elite state bureaucrats were recruited from the top ranks of the best law schools in the country and entry into this world of prestige and power was limited to those who passed legally binding and highly competitive national examinations (Johnson 1995). For Johnson, the locus of state power in Japan was found in elite economic bureaucrats who formulated industrial policy, identified the means for implementing it, and ensured highly regulated competition in designated strategic sectors.

This is not to say that the state completely dominated society. The developmental state’s relationship to society has been described variously as “embedded” (Evans), “governed interdependence” (Weiss), and “dependent development” (Gold). State and society, in the form of big business (in Japan the *zaibatsu* and its post war successor the *keiretsu*, and in Korea the *chaebol*), are in a mutually beneficial relationship, with the state providing, inter alia, access to low cost finance, as well as markets and business helping to achieve the state’s development goals. According to Woo Cumings (1999), the developmental state is diachronic: the cooperative relationship between the bureaucracy and business had been learned and perfected over time through a process of institutional adaptation that meets the demands of the time.

While instrumental in achieving rapid growth, the close relationship between the bureaucracy and big business in South Korea and Japan, in particular, also has a negative aspect manifested as severe structural corruption. Here, the money made available by the state for business often found its way into the pockets of politicians from the ruling government parties. The bureaucracies’ role in these illicit flows, used to protect vested interests, suggested a significant deviance from Weberian ideals.

In addition to protecting vested interests, the East Asian developmental state was often undemocratic and authoritarian. While there was no inevitable causal link between authoritarianism and developmentalism, Johnson did acknowledge that authoritarian states could be successful in mobilizing people to work and

sacrifice for developmental goals. There existed what Woo Cumings referred to as an “elective affinity” between these two components. Many western observers sought culturalist explanations for the developmental state’s ability to mobilize the populace, or its legitimacy, highlighting the importance of Asian political acquiescence and the notion of “Asian values” with their accordant emphasis on community before the individual. The truth is its legitimacy rested on both violent and non violent foundations.

The 1997 Asian financial crisis represented a watershed for the developmental state. The collapse of several of Asia’s economies and the international community’s intervention to help the ailing region led to claims that the developmental state was inefficient, obsolete, and unable to cope with the forces of globalization. Laudatory labels such as “Asian miracle” were replaced by more pejorative expressions such as “booty capitalism” and “crony capitalism” in western analyses of East Asian political economy.

While many observers were quick to point out the obsolescence of the developmental state in East Asia, others surveying events a few years beyond the economic malaise of the late 1990s instead saw resilience, which derived from its adaptive qualities. Articles by Pekkanen, Peng, and Wong featuring in a special issue of the *Journal of East Asian Studies* devoted to the developmental state highlight the various ways in which the Japanese and South Korean variants have adapted in order to cope with emerging demands in public policymaking, social welfare reform, post industrial structuring, and state–society–global relations. Wong (2004) notes that the East Asian developmental state is currently under going an empirical and theoretical transformation, having moved beyond its initial narrow objective of rapid economic growth. The future of the developmental state model to a large extent depends on this continued ability to adapt, and especially whether government and business are prepared to eschew the corrupt and collusive practices of the past, provide greater accountability and transparency, and address new social demands in the face of a declining capacity to exercise power and authority.

SEE ALSO: Bureaucracy and Public Sector Governmentality; Capitalism; Corruption; Democracy; Dependency and World Systems Theories; Development: Political Economy; Legitimacy; Nationalism; Orientalism; Structure and Agency

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deviance

Erich Goode

To the majority of sociologists, deviance is defined as the violation of a social norm which is likely to result in censure or punishment for the violator. Behind this seemingly simple and

clear cut definition, however, lurks a swarming host of controversies. A perusal of course curricula verifies that most sociologists who teach a course on deviance divide the field into two distinctly different perspectives: constructionist approaches and explanatory theories. The constructionist approach sees deviance as “subjectively problematic,” that is, “in the eye of the beholder,” and takes as its primary task an understanding of how judgments of deviance are put together, and with what consequences. Explanatory theories regard deviance as “objectively given,” that is, a syndrome like entity with more or less clear cut, identifiable properties whose causal etiology can be explicated by the social scientist. Each perspective has its own mission, agenda, enterprise, and methodology. And though these two approaches define deviance in superficially similar ways, their definitions point to sharply divergent universes of meaning. The enterprises in which these perspectives are engaged are in fact linked only by the objectively similar nature of their subject matter; conceptually and theoretically, they are worlds apart.

CONSTRUCTIONISM

The majority of sociologists of deviance are constructionists; that is, they argue that their mission is to understand how deviance is created or defined subjectivistically and culturally. They argue that what is important about deviance is the dynamics and consequences of its social construction rather than its objectivistic or essentialistic reality or its causal origin. Sometimes referred to as the western or the Chicago/California School (Ben Yehuda 1985: 3–4; Petrunik 1980), the proponents of constructionism tend to adopt symbolic interactionism as their theoretical inspiration, use participant observation as their principal methodology, and typically focus on “soft” or low consensus deviance – that is, acts that may or may not be crimes, but if they are, stand a low likelihood of arrest and incarceration, behavior that tends to be punished predominantly through the mechanism of informal social control. Constructionism seeks to shift the focus of deviance researchers away from the objective nature and causes of deviant behavior per se

to the processes by which phenomena and persons “come to be defined as deviant by others” (Kitsuse 1964).

The term deviance is used principally by sociologists rather than the lay public; to the extent that laypeople use the term, its meaning differs markedly from that used by the sociologists. To the constructionist, the concept is defined or *constituted* by particular reactions from observers or “audiences,” real or potential, *inferred* as a result of what persons *do* or *say* when they discuss or discover something they regard as reprehensible. In other words, it is a “definition in use.” According to this definition, deviance is implicit in all social interaction; one does not have to name it to see it in action. And the reactions that constitute deviance are universal, transhistorical, and transcultural; they are found everywhere humans congregate. The phenomena – the behavior, beliefs, or conditions – that have generated this reaction differ from one time and place to another, but identification and condemnation of the norm violator is a fixture in all societies and social groupings throughout history. Hence, the fact that laypeople do not use the term deviance says nothing about its sociological purchase. The fact is deviance is a fundamental sociological process, as essential to human existence as identity, social structure, status, and culture. All human collectivities establish and enforce norms; in all collectivities these norms are violated; as a consequence, the enforcement of norms (“social control”) constitutes the life blood of all social life.

The constructionist approach defines deviance (or “social deviance”) as a normative violation that is regarded among specified collectivities as reprehensible and, if made public, is likely to elicit negative reactions against the violator (such as censure, condemnation, punishment, scorn, stigma, and social isolation) from members of such collectivities. These collectivities are referred to as “audiences.” The issue of audiences addresses the question, “Deviance to whom?” The “to whom?” question indicates that definitions of what constitutes a normative violation vary from one collectivity to another. Audiences need not literally witness the violation in question; they may be told about it or they may be potential audiences whose reactions may be inferred

from their ongoing talk, that is, stated beliefs and attitudes. An even more radically constructionist definition of deviance is the *strict* constructionist or ethnomethodological definition, which argues that deviance *does not exist* in the absence of literal, concrete labeling or condemnation (Pollner 1974). No condemnation, no deviance. By the lights of this definition, “secret deviance” is an oxymoron, a contradiction in terms. Many sociologists believe that such a definition would paralyze the study of deviance, since the overwhelming majority of behavior, beliefs, and conditions that *would* generate disapproval in most collectivities are never detected or sanctioned. Moreover, it excludes behavior, beliefs, and conditions that the person enacting, holding, or possessing them *knows* would discredit him or her in the eyes of others, but are kept secret from them (Goffman 1963: 41). Very few sociologists adopt the “strict” constructionist or “hard” reactivist definition of deviance, hence it is not discussed here.

As indicated above, to the constructionist, persons violate norms not only by engaging in certain acts but also by holding unacceptable attitudes or beliefs and possessing undesirable characteristics; attitudes, behavior, and characteristics constitute the “ABCs” of deviance (Adler & Adler 2003: 8). In addition, in certain collectivities, the presence of a “tribal” outsider, that is, one who possesses what is considered in those circles an “unacceptable” or “inappropriate” racial, national background, or religious membership, will elicit hostile or other negative reactions (Goffman 1963: 4). Constructionist sociologists also study false accusations of deviance, since that generates condemnation, a defining element in their definition of deviance (Becker 1963: 20). The fact that the person who elicits negative reactions is not “at fault” or “to blame” is irrelevant to a sociological definition of deviance. The fact is, people can be, and are, punished for entirely involuntary – or nonexistent – normative violations over which they had no control or choice.

To the constructionist, “deviance” refers to the negative reactions, actual or potential, that are likely to follow the discovery of an act, belief, or trait that is regarded as reprehensible *in* a particular collectivity or *to* a particular audience. (That collectivity can include, but is not

coterminous with, the entire society.) A given person becomes *a* deviant to the extent that he or she is stigmatized within or by the members of a given collectivity or audience. In Becker’s well known formulation: “*social groups create deviance by making the rules whose infraction constitutes deviance*, and by applying those rules to particular people and labeling them as outsiders.” According to this definition, then, the deviance of a person, that is, whether he or she can be regarded as *a* deviant “is *not* [solely] a quality of the act the person commits, but rather a consequence of the application by others of rules and sanctions to an ‘offender.’ The deviant is one to whom that label has successfully been applied” (Becker 1963: 9).

Constructionists emphasize that the two defining building blocks of deviance mentioned above – the violation of a norm and the negative reactions to the normative violation – do not necessarily occur together, as Becker (1963: 19–22) has pointed out. In fact, the punishment or condemnation of the norm violator is influenced by contingencies, one of which is *who* engages in the violation. The ancillary characteristics of the rule violator can influence whether and to what extent others react negatively to the infraction; these include, among others, age, race, sex, socioeconomic status, and – perhaps most important – degree of intimacy between the violator and the person evaluating the supposed infraction. In addition, if there is a victim, just *who* is victimized by the act may determine whether and to what extent the actor is punished or condemned. Moreover, to repeat, false accusations represent a case in which some one did not violate a norm but attracts censure anyway. To the constructionist, an accusation of deviance that is successfully lodged against an innocent party represents a case of sociological deviance, whether baseless or justified. Here we have an instance of a deviant *person* who did not engage in deviant *behavior*. Whether or not such accusations are successful, the literal facticity of the charge is only one of the many reasons why it succeeds or fails.

It is axiomatic to the constructionist that deviance is a social convention, “relative” to time and place, and that an act, belief, or trait that is non normative in one collectivity or setting may be normative in another. Even more fundamental, independent of the issue of

normative valuation, the constructionist position argues that the very *categories* that constitute what is defined as deviant are constructed variously in different societies, indeed even within different collectivities in the same society. The same partners who are regarded as incestuous in society A are acceptable, even mandatory, marital partners in society B (Ford & Beach 1951), hence the very definition or conceptualization of what constitutes “incest” is a social construct, not an objective reality. In ritual contexts, same sex intercourse among the Sambia is not regarded as “homosexuality” at all, although it would be so regarded nearly everywhere else (Herdt 1987). In most quarters in the western world, the use of one mind altering substance (alcohol) is not conceptualized as “drug use,” but the use of another such substance (marijuana) is so regarded. Hence, to the constructionist, behavior and other phenomena that are outwardly and objectively “the same” are not sociologically the same; conceptually, they may belong to entirely different categories or universes of meaning. In short, social and cultural relativism, both in terms of conceptualizing categories of phenomena and in evaluating representatives of these categories, is the foundation stone of the constructionist approach to deviance.

Constructionists divide into more “radical” and more “moderate” camps. For the radical constructionists, the issue of the cause or “etiology” of deviance or its constituent components is entirely irrelevant, even illusory. Seeking the cause or causes of deviance and its constituent elements is a fool’s errand, most in this camp would say. If deviance is socially created, there is no objective or essential common thread independent of the label that ties it all together – in effect, there is no “there there” – and hence, any attempt to explain its causality is by its very nature futile. In contrast, the moderate constructionists argue that seeking an explanation for deviance is secondary to and to some degree separate from their mission; phenomena labeled “deviant” may or may not share an objective common thread, but their etiology is not the deviance specialist’s central mission. Interestingly, however, some sociologists who study the social construction of deviance also examine the etiological impact of one or more legal or social constructions on the

commission of deviant behavior. For instance, some conflict theorists (who are mainly interested in the role of power and social class in the construction of the law) are also interested in how power and class influence behavioral violations of the law (Messerschmidt 1993); some labeling theorists, who typically look at the social construction of deviance labeling, argue that labeling may influence further, and more serious, deviant behavior (Scheff 1966).

Constructionists distinguish between “social” deviance, which is the violation of the norms of the society at large, and “situational” deviance, which is the violation of the norms that apply within a particular context (Plummer 1979: 97–9). Hence, widespread agreement on the legitimacy of the norms in the society is not necessary to define situational deviance – although it is to define *societal* deviance – since the concept is always relative to specific contexts. In other words, a particular *audience* defines deviance; something is deviant *to* a particular audience *in* a particular context. If tattooing is normative among Hell’s Angels, it is not deviant *to them*; if it is non normative among fundamentalist Christians and Orthodox Jews, it *is* deviant to them. The fact that tattooing is or is not deviant in the society at large is irrelevant to the issue of its normativity *within specified social circles*. Hence, “deviance” does not exist as an abstraction; it takes on relevance only within specified collectivities and in specified social contexts. Of course, *one* of these collectivities may be the society at large, which is how “societal” deviance is defined.

To the advocates of the constructionist approach, *social control* is the core of any sociological understanding of deviance. Social control is defined as any and all efforts to ensure conformity to a norm. Humans are irrepressible; all of us have a tendency to violate some of the norms. To engage in normative violations is tempting both because they more surely than conformity secure for us what we value, and because many of the things we have been told we cannot have are intrinsically rewarding (Gottfredson & Hirschi 1990). Hence, efforts to ensure conformity to the norms may be found in all collectivities, both historically and trans societally. These include positive efforts such as rewards, and negative efforts such as punishment; formal efforts such as arrest, and

informal efforts such as an insult or a slap in the face; and internal efforts, through the process of socialization, as well as external ones, such as censuring someone for engaging in a non normative act. Hence, while the state plays a major role in social control, it is only one of a wide range of agents dedicated to ensuring conformity. The many faces of social control represent the flip side of deviance; social control is an effort to deal with and suppress normative violations, as well as encourage by rewarding normative conformity. And it is the many efforts of social control that *define* and *constitute* deviance.

Nearly all constructionist definitions of deviance and social control include the component of power. Collectivities that control more of society's resources tend to have relatively more power to influence deviance defining social institutions, including the law and its enforcement. Members of relatively low status collectivities are more likely to find their behavior, beliefs, and traits defined and reacted to as deviant than those who have higher status and more power. Collectivities that have more power tend to have more influence on, in addition to the law, the content of the media as well as the educational, religious, and political institutions, all of which, in turn, influence definitions of right and wrong and hence what is considered deviant. Power over subordinate collectivities does not, however, ensure their conformity or agreement among members of those collectivities that dominant definitions of right and wrong are just or righteous. As we saw, humans are rebellious and irrepressible; smaller, non mainstream collectivities everywhere construct their own rules of right and wrong, independent of those of the most powerful strata of society. In all societies, the dominant institutions, regardless of how hegemonic they may seem, are incapable of intruding into each and every aspect of the lives of all human collectivities and groups within their scope. Still, power is a factor in the social construction of norms – and hence, in defining what is deviant. This is especially the case for “societal” deviance. It is often the case that the powerless are subject to the norms of the powerful, whereas it is rarer that the powerful are subject to the norms of the powerless. This is more likely to be true, however, of formal

definitions of crime than of informal definitions of deviance.

EXPLANATORY THEORIES OF DEVIANCE

The second approach to deviance encompasses explanatory theories. Explanations of deviance attempt to account for *why* non normative behavior occurs. (Some explanatory formulations turn the equation around and ask why *normative* – but for them, the logic is the same.) Their driving question is: “Why do they do it?” (or, alternatively, “Why *don't* they do it?”). Explanatory theories always take crime or deviance as the dependent variable and the explanatory factor they focus on as the independent or causal variable. Not all explanatory theories seek explanations of deviance in general; in fact, most attempt to explain one or more of its constituent components, such as mental disorder, drug abuse or addiction, crime, juvenile delinquency, white collar crime, embezzlement, burglary, motor vehicle theft, and so on. For the most part, adopting an explanatory paradigm entails examining deviance through the natural science model, an approach that is commonly referred to as positivism or, sometimes, methodological (as opposed to substantive) positivism (Hirschi & Gottfredson 1994). Positivism is characterized by *empiricism*, that is, reliance on the data of the five senses; *abstraction*, that is, the tendency to generalize beyond specific cases; the tendency to seek *cause and effect explanations* of phenomena in the material world; and, most important for our purposes, *essentialism* or *objectivism*. The last of these is the tendency to regard phenomena as pre-given entities, those that are internally consistent, containing one or more “common threads” that may be found more or less everywhere, or at the very least within a given society. For instance, the explanatory approach is comfortable referring to and studying the “epidemiology” of deviance (Crews 2001) – that is, the distribution of “deviance” in the population – whereas constructionists are likely to reject the very basis of such an enterprise. Explanation *presupposes* objectivism, since explanations are predicated on the existence of one or more common threads shared by the phenomena being explained. In other words, to the approach that

seeks explanations, deviance and its constituent components are a specific *type of action* – in medical terms, a “syndrome” – and not *merely* a convention or a social construction. And *because* it is a type of action, possessing internal coherence, it is the mission of the sociologist to account for it – that is, render a causal explanation of its origin. (Gottfredson and Hirschi (1990: 49) discuss the contradiction between substantive positivism’s acceptance of the legalistic definition of crime and their adoption of the natural science model, which presupposes objectivism.) Sociologists who seek explanations for deviance usually study behavior (or psychic conditions that presumably cause behavior), only very rarely beliefs, and practically never physical traits. They take for granted, assume, or hold in abeyance the social construction of definitions of deviance. For them, social control is interesting only insofar as it influences or causes deviant and criminal behavior, which is what they aim to explain in the first place (Hirschi 1969; Gottfredson & Hirschi 1990).

Although most do not articulate it in this fashion, many explanatory theorists would argue that societies tend to criminalize or penalize actions that are most harmful and disruptive both on a micro and a macro level, that is, both interpersonally and with respect to the viability of the society as a whole. For example, Gottfredson and Hirschi (1990: 15) define crime as “force or fraud in pursuit of self interest.” Rejecting the central tenet of constructionism, sociologists who seek explanations argue that it is incorrect to argue that “deviance” is relative to time and place. Though explanatory theorists would admit that while many customs and conventions do indeed vary the world over and throughout history, certain behavioral syndromes have identifiable, universal properties. For instance, even though mental disorder and illness, crime and delinquency, and alcoholism may be *thought of*, and persons characterized by them *dealt with*, differently in different societies, nonetheless, each has a common thread and hence a common etiology (Nettler 1974). Clearly – as with the constructionists – explanatory theorists may be divided into more “radical” and more “moderate” camps. The radical explanatory theorist argues that deviant categories are universal everywhere and for all times, and hence a universal explanation of deviance can

be devised (Gottfredson and Hirschi 1990). The moderate explanatory theorist says that deviance is shaped by the societies in which it occurs, and hence explanations of deviance and its components may apply only within each society. But both camps look for cause and effect explanations of behavioral syndromes that share one or more common, internally consistent components or elements.

For instance, practitioners of one explanatory theory, “self control” theory, adopt a “non relativistic position on the causes of crime.” This is the case, they say, because their theory does not regard deviance, crime, and delinquency as the products of unique cultures, peoples, settings, historical periods, or even variable legal definitions. Instead, self control theory assumes that the causes of crime are the same everywhere and at all times. In short, they argue, the mission of the sociologist of deviance, crime, and delinquency is to explain these phenomena, and in order to accomplish this mission it is necessary to conceptualize them essentialistically and objectivistically, that is, as possessing common, universal elements or components. Gottfredson and Hirschi (1990), two major advocates of this theory, use the term deviance throughout their theoretical discussion of crime. Crime, they argue, “is only part of a much larger set of deviant acts” (p. xvi). And they insist that a common explanation can be found for the constituent elements of crime and deviance, such as violence, white collar crime, reckless behavior, illicit, impulsive sex, and drug abuse.

To repeat, all explanatory theorists are aware that definitions of right and wrong are relative from one society to another; all criminologists that seek explanations for crime are aware that laws criminalizing certain acts vary the world over. But accounting for that variation, they would say, is not the sociologist’s mission. Moreover, they would argue, in spite of this variation, there are common threads running through the most fundamental of society’s norms and laws. Societies outlaw certain actions for a reason, and that is because the acts societies outlaw tear at the social fabric. Even if sociologists were to confine their analysis to a single society, the same logic applies: certain behaviors demand an explanation because of their internal consistency, and one *aspect* of that consistency,

many argue, is the harm and disruption these behaviors cause to the social order. Explaining phenomena bearing an internal consistency, a common thread, underlies *all* efforts to explain or account for crime, delinquency, violence, mental disorder, drug abuse, alcoholism, suicide, and prostitution. Such behaviors (or psychic conditions) demand an explanation because they are “different” from law abiding or “normal” behaviors and conditions. And the *way* they are different, many explanatory theorists argue, is that these behaviors are disordered, pathological, harmful, and/or exploitative. This approach is even less concerned about the fact that the lay public may not use such terms, or, when they do, mean different things by them from what the social scientist intends. To the scientifically inclined theorist, it is what the scientist says that counts, not the lay public.

In the most radical of explanatory arguments, the term deviant refers to a person with one or more specific, essentialistic or indwelling conditions that *manifest themselves* in specific actions. Certain people enact seriously deviant and criminal behavior, behavior that harms and exploits others and tears at the fabric of the society, because they are “different” from the rest of us. For instance, in one formulation, the overlap between the social deviant and persons characterized by the psychiatric terms “psychopath,” “sociopath,” and “antisocial personality disorder” is considerable (DeLisi 2003). Even in less radical formulations, criminals and deviants are persons primed to act in a certain fashion because they are certain *kinds of persons*. Other factors *in addition to* their characteristics may influence their deviant behavior, but with this approach individual characteristics are crucial.

Most *sociological* theories that attempt to account for the enactment of deviant behavior argue that the essentialistic, indwelling factors that cause (or inhibit) crime are to be found in actors’ environments, not in their individual traits or preconditions. These factors include the degree of social disorganization in the neighborhood in which people live; anomie, or society’s cultural and social malintegration; bonding with conventional others; and differential association with others who espouse positive definitions of normative violations. Here, the explanatory factor producing a particular

and “different” kind of behavior is shifted from specific *kinds of persons* to specific *kinds of social arrangements* and the actor’s place in them.

Opportunity theories, including routine activity theory, dispense altogether with explaining the propensity or tendency of individuals to engage in deviant or criminal acts, as well as the sociocultural environments that may influence actors to commit deviant and criminal acts, and focus entirely on the *situation* or *context* within which certain types of acts are likely to take place. Crime is committed to the extent that a motivated offender is in juxtaposition with a suitable target in the absence of a capable guardian (Cohen & Felson 1979). In this sense, then, the factor determining the criminal act is the context or situation – the opportunity to commit the crime. What accounts for the untoward behavior – in this perspective, nearly always crime, and usually economic crime – is neither a particular kind of person nor a particular kind of social arrangement, but particular kinds of opportunities, those that maximize potential rewards and minimize cost, of which punishment is a major component.

Most forms of crime that explanatory theorists study may be referred to as “hard,” serious, or *high consensus* deviance. Positivistic sociologists who see their mission as explaining or accounting for the origins of crime tend to be criminologists. All sociologists of deviance discuss and refer to the work of criminologists, but very few criminologists identify any longer with the field of the sociology of deviance. (This is less true of the UK than the US. For instance, in *Understanding Deviance*, 2003, Downes and Rock make little distinction between “deviance” and “crime.”) Criminologists typically study deviance only by implication, that is, conceptually and theoretically, but not as members of an intellectual community. As an identifiable field, the explanatory study of crime is separate and distinct from the field that is referred to as the sociology of deviance – and has been for more than a generation. Much the same can be said of sociologists who attempt to explain the etiology of the behavioral components of deviance, such as mental disorder, drug abuse, and alcoholism: they are sociologists of behavior that is regarded as deviant, but most do not adopt a “deviance” perspective, and few belong to the intellectual community of

the sociology of deviance. This intellectual split between these two camps – the constructionist and the explanatory theorists – as well as the departure of criminologists from the field of the sociology of deviance, have resulted in a smaller, less influential, and possibly less theoretically innovative school of deviance studies. The long term impact of this split has yet to be determined.

SEE ALSO: Conflict Theory; Deviance, Constructionist Perspectives; Deviance, Crime and; Deviance, Explanatory Theories of; Deviance, Theories of; Identity, Deviant; Labeling; Labeling Theory; Social Control; Sociocultural Relativism; Symbolic Interaction

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deviance, absolutist definitions of

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Absolutist definitions of deviance distinguish conformity from nonconformity by reference to an invariant moral standard. Some external agent such as a religious, philosophical, scientific, or international authority may establish the moral standard. From an absolutist perspective, a given activity, like homosexual behavior, might be considered deviant because the majority in a society claim it violates a religious dictate or even because it appears to affront a declared conception of the natural order.

The sociologically relevant aspect of an absolutist position is that it places the basis for moral judgment on a behavior or practice beyond the social and cultural context of the society or social situation in which the behavior or practice takes place. Therefore, the definitional standard for proclaiming an activity deviant has nothing to do with the norms of the particular society or culture in which the activity occurs. Absolutist definitions of deviance assume that a given activity, according to the particular higher authority, is deviant for all time in all places.

In general, deviant behavior theorists and researchers do not subscribe to absolutist definitions of deviance. Rather, they more typically hold to definitional approaches that are normative or reactivist. The normative approach defines deviance according to the expressed or implied standards of the particular group in which the activity takes place. Thus, a behavior will be considered deviant if it violates the social group's formal rules (often articulated as laws) or typical norms and practices (customs, mores, rules of etiquette, and the like). According to the reactivist perspective, deviance need not even entail norm violation; it states that an activity or a condition, such as being physically handicapped, can be defined as deviant merely if the audience viewing it reacts negatively to it.

The divine expression of absolutist definitions of deviance is often associated with religious fundamentalism, where scripture is taken as the relevant external authority. From a philosophical perspective, Plato and Hegel both erected moral systems that defined deviance in relation to absolute standards. Many eighteenth and nineteenth century Europeans believed the world's cultures could be arrayed along an evolutionary continuum, with the cultural norms and practices of the West representing the highest stage of development. Thus, when Europeans made contact with non western cultures, the invaders frequently attempted to discourage or eradicate what they interpreted as these peoples' "backward," deviant activities, such as wearing immodest clothing or engaging in promiscuous sexual activity. Conquest itself was often justified in the name of imposing the absolute standards of Christianity on native peoples. By the nineteenth century, the social Darwinism of Herbert Spencer provided a

"scientific" rationale for the alleged absolute superiority of European cultural and behavior norms.

Sociological opposition to absolutist definitions of deviance finds its roots in early twentieth century cultural anthropology. Attacking nineteenth century absolutist and ethnocentric judgments concerning non western cultural practices, Franz Boas and his students, including Ruth Benedict, Melville Herskovits, and Margaret Mead, formulated the anthropological perspective of cultural relativism, stating that any society's customs and practices can only be understood and assessed in reference to the particular culture itself. For the strong relativist, there are no absolute standards for defining deviance, only culturally specific ones.

During most of the twentieth century, relativism was the dominant perspective of cultural anthropologists and sociological students of deviant behavior. In both disciplines, relativism entails an empathetic methodological approach in which the observer attempts to understand any given behavior or practice relative to the normative standards of the culture, or even subculture, in which it takes place. In recent years, however, relativism has been challenged by those who insist on the need for universalist standards of human conduct. The most commonly cited referent for the assertion of such standards is the 1948 United Nations Universal Declaration of Human Rights. Those opposed to a relativist standpoint argue that a practice like female genital mutilation, though culturally prescribed in a number of African societies, must be declared deviant and condemned because it violates one or more articles of the UN Declaration, taken to be the absolute definitional standard.

Any definition of deviance must confront the question: deviant according to what or whose standard? In a world rife with international contact and conflict, sociologists (and other social scientists) are likely to be debating the merits of alternative definitions of deviance – especially absolutist versus relativist approaches – well into the future.

SEE ALSO: Cultural Relativism; Deviance; Deviance, Explanatory Theories of; Deviance, Normative Definitions of; Deviance, Reactivist Definitions of; Deviance, Theories of

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deviance, academic

John W. Heeren

If we consider deviance as a breach of expectations, then any organization or occupation is likely to provide distinct opportunities for legal and/or ethical violations. College and university faculty members are professionals employed within the occupational context of higher education. Thus, the opportunities for deviance available to them derive from their roles in professional disciplines and in the occupational setting of the university. While some professors are more involved in teaching or governance at their home campus, others are more focused on research or other activities of nationwide professional associations. Both these "local" and "cosmopolitan" roles can produce deviant behavior.

Two dimensions of activities are helpful in delineating the nature of academic deviance (Heeren & Shichor 1993). First, one can distinguish between professional and occupational forms of deviance. The first of these refers to breaches of the ethics associated with professions, while the second points to the kind of normal crimes that people may commit in their usual line of work. This second dimension also has to do with deviance vis à vis property or persons. Though there is some overlap in these

categories, they do permit the differentiation of four basic classes of academic deviance (see Fig. 1).

Occupational deviance among academics shares many features in common with deviance in other occupations. Just as white collar workers or laborers pilfer property belonging to the organization which employs them, so also may professors. It seems that the more universities become entrepreneurial in obtaining outside funding, the more these kinds of opportunities will be available and exploited by faculty members. An academic example of misappropriation of resources occurred in 1995 when doctors working at a fertility clinic affiliated with the University of California at Irvine gave the eggs of some women/patients to others without the donors' knowledge or permission (Dodge & Geis 2003). Occupational deviance with interpersonal implications would include such behavior as sexual harassment of students, staff, or colleagues and exploitation of human participants in research.

Professional deviance reflects the distinctive features of university and disciplinary organizations, especially their reward and opportunity structures, constitutive roles, and systems of social control. Because academics are rarely strongly motivated to pursue a professional career for reasons of money or power, the attractions of occupational deviance found in material gain and personal domination seem less central to their efforts. However, professional deviance, centering on issues of intellectual capital, is inherently closer to the career goals of faculty. Hence, when such misbehavior is likened to property offenses, it takes the form of misappropriating intellectual property. Two well known and serious forms of this type of deviance are plagiarism and the fabrication or misrepresentation of research findings. These offenses are essentially acts of theft and fraud.

Where professional deviance is interpersonal, it entails evaluations of the work of others in the academic roles of scholar, teacher, and colleague. Such evaluations are evident in refereeing journal articles and grant proposals, grading student work, and evaluating faculty colleagues who are candidates for promotion or tenure. Deviance in these contexts involves breaches of the expected impartiality. For example, a reviewer may recognize the author of a

		Norms Violated	
		<i>Occupational</i>	<i>Professional</i>
Focus of Deviation	<i>Property</i>	Theft or misuse of resources	Plagiarism or falsification of data
	<i>Interpersonal</i>	Sexual harassment or exploitation	Biased evaluation as referee for grants, jobs, articles, etc.

Figure 1 Dimensions and examples of academic deviance.

manuscript and slant the review positively or negatively accordingly. Because of the ambiguity of evaluation criteria and the meager accountability of the review process, the biased offender is not likely to be caught. Peer reviews for tenure and promotion and letters of recommendation provide similar opportunities for partiality in evaluation.

The teaching situation also allows biased evaluation to occur, as in the overvaluing of student work in light of the student's physical attractiveness, litigious attitude, or importance to the university's athletic program. According to the norms of universalism, none of these particularistic criteria should enter into the assessment of student performance. A more general overvaluation of students is the widely reported practice of grade inflation (Arnold 2004). Among the reasons suggested for this trend are attracting or retaining students where budgets are enrollment driven or improving student evaluations of a faculty member coming up for promotion. Whatever its sources, this grade inflation is deviant in that standards are lowered for ulterior reasons.

Though academic social control is similar to other forms of professional social control, in key ways it is also very different. Much of the evaluation of peers and students is protected by layers of confidentiality, anonymity, collegiality, and claims of academic freedom. Consequently, professors are granted considerable trust in carrying out these responsibilities. At the same time, scholarly work has a collective side which can operate to ensure that, prior to publication, academic work is ethically and competently done. One aspect of this is the existence of Institutional and Human Subjects Review Boards, which aim to prevent exploitation before the launching of a research project. In addition, prior to publication, most articles

will be scrutinized through the peer review process. After publication, this skepticism is continued through the critical response of peers to weaknesses and gaps in the finished work. Contrary to other work settings where open criticism of peers is regarded as a breach of personal loyalty, academics are more likely to prize and reward that kind of "whistle blowing." Finally, in most cases, the immediate professional rewards of academic success and recognition are relatively minor. Instead, the most important rewards are associated with more lengthy and distinguished contributions to scholarship. A single instance of plagiarism or falsifying results is not likely to provide significant reward. If a discovery is so spectacular as to provide immediate recognition, it would be the subject of careful scholarly scrutiny and would increase the chances of having the offense discovered.

Some occupational offenses, such as sexual harassment, have been thoroughly researched (e.g., Elgart & Schanfield 1991). However, the extensive professional trust granted professors, along with the confidentiality and anonymity of much of their work, has made it difficult to do much systematic research on most forms of academic deviance. What is known is often anecdotal and, even when thoroughly studied, findings are simply qualitative case studies of "scandals." Whereas journalists have uncovered violations such as the extensive "ghost writing" of medical journal articles (Barnett 2003), our understanding of academic deviance would be significantly enhanced if disciplinary organizations would undertake more methodical investigations.

SEE ALSO: Colleges and Universities; Crime, White Collar; Medical Malpractice; Peer Review and Quality Control in Science

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deviance, constructionist perspectives

Stuart Henry

Constructionist perspectives are ways of viewing reality as a human cognitive or social production. The extent to which reality is seen as having an independent existence outside the human mind or social processes distinguishes different versions of constructionist theory, as does whether the construction occurs individually or socially. Individual or personal constructionism refers to how humans make cognitive meaning of their experiences of their environment. Social constructionism is about how people interactively make sense of their world by defining it and categorizing it, by representing it through language, symbols, maps, etc., and by acting toward the representations as though they were real.

Constructionists see deviance as the consequence of humans attempting to create a moral order by defining and classifying some behaviors, appearance, or statuses as normal, ethical, and acceptable, and creating rules that ban, censure, and/or sanction violators of normality.

Deviance is taken to be a variation from social norms that is perceived as different, judged as significant, and negatively evaluated as threatening. Social action or reaction by authorities or control agencies toward those so designated can result in a labeling effect or "self fulfilling prophecy" that amplifies the original deviant behavior or appearance, entrenches the incumbent in a deviant role, produces additional deviance as a result of attempting to maintain secrecy, and ultimately results in an identity transformation which, if not reversed, may produce "career deviance" as the rule violator becomes engulfed in attempts to cope with the associated stigma that comes with his or her transformed social identity. Social constructionist perspectives toward deviance have tended to focus on the practices of authoritative agents in creating moral panics through claims about the perceived threat posed by the activities of various types of deviance, real or imagined, and less on those who engage in such behavior.

SOCIAL AND INTELLECTUAL ROOTS

It is significant that much of the groundwork for the constructionist perspective on deviance emerged during the mid 1960s, at a time when significant elements of western society were challenging past traditions of social order, and embracing a social, sexual, and personal freedom. The Vietnam era protests against imperial state militarism, combined with political developments in civil rights and women's movements, created a social climate that was resonant with intellectual analyses that showed how social processes could be oppressive, and how taken for granted institutional forces could be transformed. Social constructionism offered a theoretical basis for personal and social empowerment and promised liberation from the preordered world. As psychologist Henderikus Stam (2001: 294) notes, "the emergence of social constructionism also coincides with the coming of age of a generation of scholars whose academic tutelage was colored by a political activism and the rapid growth of the post war universities followed by their recent and equally dramatic restructuring as branch plants of the corporate world." In sociology,

social constructionism was part of a critique of positivism and structuralism, represented on the conservative side by Parsonian and Mertonian functionalism that dominated the discipline during the 1950s, and on the radical side by Marxist conflict theory. Constructionism, initially through interactionism using interpretive rather than positivist methods, represented a third way of theorizing about the social world and one that brought human agency, meaning, and social process into the analysis.

While constructionism in general is rooted in the philosophy of Kant and Nietzsche, and has been traced back to eleventh century realist nominalist debates between Abelard and Anselm through the fourteenth century nominalist ideas of William Ockham (Ockham's razor), constructionist theory in deviance is intellectually rooted in five strands of the twentieth century hermeneutic (interpretive) tradition. The first of these is phenomenological sociology, beginning with Alfred Schütz's *Phenomenology of the Social World* (1932, 1967) and manifest in the work of Peter Berger and Thomas Luckmann's *The Social Construction of Reality* (1966) and branching into Harold Garfinkel's *Ethnomethodology* (1967). Second is symbolic interactionist theory, particularly Charles Horton Cooley's *Human Nature and the Social Order* (1902) and George Herbert Mead's *Mind, Self, and Society* (1934), that came to fruition in Herbert Blumer's *Symbolic Interactionism* (1969) and was evident in Charles Lemert's ideas on primary and secondary deviance, Howard Becker's *Outsiders* (1963), and Erving Goffman's *Stigma* (1963). A third strand of twentieth century intellectual thought that underlies constructionism is social problems theory in the tradition of Spector and Kitsuse's *Constructing Social Problems* (1977, 1987), and reflected in Joel Best's *Images of Issues* and Norman Ben Yehuda's *Moral Panics* (1994). Fourth is the poststructuralism of Anthony Giddens's structuration theory in his *Constitution of Society* (1984) and its integration with late Foucauldian postmodernism and Schützian sociological phenomenology in Henry and Milovanovic's *Constitutive Criminology* (1996). Finally, the fifth twentieth century influence stems from psychology and psychotherapy, originating in George Kelly's *Personal Construct Theory* (1955), through Kenneth Gergen's

narratives of the relational self in *Saturated Self* (1991) and *Realities and Relationships* (1994), Rom Harré's realist social constructionism, to the more recent postmodernist influenced narrative therapies, and meaning making for psychotherapists in Hugh Rosen and Kevin Kuehlein's *Constructing Realities* (1996).

More broadly, constructionism has become a transcendent social theory, appearing not only in sociology and psychology but also in feminism, queer theory, the history and philosophy of science, narrative philosophy, literary theory, and everything from housing studies to duck shooting. As Stam (2001) has noted, not only has social constructionism permeated many fields of study, it has also broken out into popular culture.

Since its inception, constructionist theory has itself been differentiated into different approaches. One distinction is that made by Gergen in *Realities and Relationships* between the psychological version rooted in Kelly's personal construct theory, which concerns itself with how individuals cognitively construct their world, making sense of their own experiences of their environment, and the other rooted in the sociological interactionist phenomenological tradition of the shared construction of meaning, shaped by situational and social context, culture, and history. It is this second social constructionist approach that has been adopted by those examining deviance.

Social Construction of Reality

Social theorist Alfred Schütz was concerned with how humans, in their everyday lives, create a social world that seems real to them, and how they act toward that world, taking for granted its reality. He explored the way humans, based on their past biographical experience, develop ideal typical constructions that serve as working models or representations of the world, which contain recipe knowledge designed to allow them to achieve projected goals and objectives. These constructions or "typifications" are shared intersubjectively and can result in multiple realities.

Building on the work of Schütz, Berger and Luckmann described a series of interconnected

social processes through which humans create institutionalized social phenomena that are seen as having an independent existence outside of the people who created them. In this process humans lose sight of their own authorship of the world, “reifying” it into an apparent objective reality that then acts back on its producers. Thus, like Schütz, Berger and Luckmann revealed the dialectical relationship between social phenomena, experienced as typifications (taken for granted patterns of behavior and social types) that appear to exist independently and objectively, while simultaneously being created from humans’ meaningful subjective experiences. Berger and Luckmann saw typifications stemming from three linked processes: externalization, objectification, and internalization.

Externalization occurs when humans interact and communicate their experiences with others. Through communication humans construct categories to define the events they experience. Over time these social groupings, categories, and shared concepts become objectified by becoming institutionalized, formalized, and codified. Through this process the experiences, now categories, are made to appear independent of the people who created them and who develop recipe knowledge about them and about how to routinely act in relation to them. Through related processes, humans provide justifications and explanations for the existence of such institutionalized typifications that serve to legitimate their independent existence. Finally, this knowledge is communicated back to other members of society who internalize it and take it for granted as part of their knowledge of social reality. The overall effect of these three ongoing processes is reification: humans lose sight of what they author or create and thereby lose sight of their ability to change the apparent objective reality that stands before them.

Core Elements of Social Constructionism

Scholars who have adopted social constructionist perspectives more or less subscribe to the following core elements. First, social constructionists argue that knowledge or truth about the social world should not be uncritically accepted as real or self evident; its taken for grantedness

as a reality should be questioned. Thus, social constructionism takes a relativist epistemology rather than a realist one. Second, while communities of people may seem to agree on their understanding of certain phenomena or events as “the same,” this should not be seen as evidence that there is an underlying reality, nor even that what they accept as the same is identical. Third, the use of terms to label and classify social phenomena need not reflect an underlying real object. Fourth, commonsensical assumptions and expert knowledge are historically and culturally bound to time and place. Fifth, neither commonsense nor expert knowledge has a privileged claim to reveal the truth. Sixth, all knowledge is a result of social processes based on interaction and shared (intersubjective) meaning that is subject to negotiation by the participants involved. Seventh, the social construction of meaning is an ongoing production, gaining significance from the specific occasions of its use or displayed through its performance. Eighth, scholars who study the social process of knowledge production are themselves subject to the same critique as all knowledge production, and as such their claims are no more privileged than others. Ninth, knowledge production is a political process, subject to being shaped by concentrations of interests with a view to producing social effects; in other words, knowledge is intertwined with power and social action. Tenth, knowledge and meaning are not fixed but multiple and variable, and therefore changeable through reconstructing the language and altering the discursive processes that generate it.

Varieties of Social Constructionist Theory

Differences in social constructionist theory (recognizing that making such distinctions is itself to engage in social construction) are based on epistemology – how far its advocates reject realism and how reflexive is the perspective in subjecting its own analysis to a constructionist critique. (This same distinction also applies in the individualist version of constructionism.) Two contrasting approaches in social constructionist theory serve to illustrate their differences. In the most extreme version, developed in relation to the study of the history of science, and referred to by Paul Gross and Norman

Levitt in *Higher Superstition* (1994) as “strong social constructionism,” everything is seen as socially constructed. “Reality” is the product of specialized interpretive communities and can only be interpreted and verified in relation to agreed assumptions made by the community that created the assumptions; in other words, it is self referential. Versions of strong constructionism, also called “strict,” “extreme,” or “radical,” take the view that there is no way to objectively verify the existence of reality, and that all we are doing is observing the world from different communities and making “truth claims” about constructions of that world. Instead of engaging in “claims making,” scholars such as Ibarra and Kitsuse (1993) argue that we should be studying the language of truth claims.

In contrast, those taking a “minimalist,” “moderate,” or “contextual” view of constructionism believe that some underlying reality exists, we can know what it is, and that by selecting from and classifying this basic reality, humans build social constructions having different appearances, depending upon the social and cultural context. The task of analysis, according to Best (1993), is to locate social constructions in real cultural structural contexts, avoid being exclusively reflexive, and to focus on the substance of issues, evaluating false claims, and even creating new claims. The view of the contextual constructionist is that we need to examine the generation and sustenance of social phenomena; describe how they are defined, defended, and reacted to, with a view to making changes for the better. Those taking this more moderate contextual position thus afford themselves the basis of making judgments about which approach is better able to discern the nature of the construction process, how far it distorts any underlying reality, the extent of the “discrepancies” between objective reality and subjective experience, how realities can appear to exist and be sustained, and how changes may be made in the process to produce less harmful constructions. Unlike the strict constructionist who claims that positivism (a belief in reality) and constructionism are contradictory, the moderate or contextual constructionists argue that positivism and constructionism are separate, independent, and complementary.

While this distinction is important for allowing contextualists to use empirical evidence to support their claims that others are making fallacious claims (thus privileging their method of claims making), some commentators have argued that there is neither one constructionism nor many but a cluster of core themes (as identified above) engaged in differently depending on the authors’ aims and intent. In other words, social constructionism is itself seen as a politically framed claims making process.

CONSTRUCTING DEVIANCE

From the constructionist perspective, deviant behavior is a joint human enterprise between actors and audiences. Deviance is created by human agents making distinctions, perceiving differences, engaging in behaviors, interpreting their effects, and passing judgments about the desirability or unacceptability of the behaviors or people identified as deviant, as though they possessed object like qualities. In considering deviant behavior, constructionists identify five aspects of the deviancy construction process: (1) why and how rules are made; (2) how people interpret rules and act in ways that others perceive as deviant; (3) how behavior taken as deviant comes to represent an actor’s identity; (4) how people reject, avoid, resist, manage, or accept the deviant labels conferred upon them by others; and (5) how human actors develop new lives, either incorporating or transcending that which others label them as being.

While some social constructionist approaches to deviance have considered each of these as part of the process of creating deviance (Pfuhl & Henry 1993; Adler & Adler 1997), most constructionist work focuses on the first – the use of authoritative positions in society to create what British criminologist Stanley Cohen defined as “moral panics” around the perceived fear of certain designated behaviors, whether or not these behaviors exist, and whether or not persons actually engage in them. Classic historical examples include the sixteenth century European witch hunts and the twentieth century anti-Semitism by the Nazis against those of Jewish religion or identity.

Moral Panics

According to Erich Goode and Norman Ben Yehuda (1994), moral panics are societal reactions to perceived threats that are characterized by several features. First is their volatility, seen in their sudden appearance and rapid spread among large sections of the population via mass media, followed by a rapid decline in further instances of the problem. Second is the growth of experts who are claimed authorities in discerning cases of the feared behavior. Third, there is an increased identification of cases of the behavior that build into a “wave.” Fourth, hostility and persecution are directed toward the accused, seen now as enemies of society. Fifth, measurement is made of society’s concern through attitude surveys. Sixth, consensus is established about the seriousness of the threat. Seventh, there is a disproportionate fear of the threat relative to evidence of actual harm. Eighth, a backlash occurs against the persecution. Finally, there is an exposure of the flaws in identifying the problem. An excellent illustration is found in Jeffrey Victor’s study of satanic ritualistic child abuse in his book *Satanic Panic* (1993). This explores the moral panic over the claimed existence of secret international organizations and/or family clans who abuse their own children or kidnap runaway youth, exposing them to ritual torture and sexual abuse, in order to brainwash them into the ideology of Satan worship. The members of such satanic cults are said to be immune from the law because Satanists have infiltrated society’s institutions and protect them. Victor explored the process of accusations and claims made by adult psychotherapy patients, therapists, social workers, police officers, and the clergy. Thus constructionist perspectives on deviance tend to examine the agencies involved in the claims making process that produces the panic, rather than those designated as deviant or their behavior.

Goode and Ben Yehuda (1994) explain the production of moral panics, and thereby the social construction of deviance, by one of three models – grassroots, elite domination, or interest group conflict – that are similar to those used by sociologists to explain law creation. The grassroots model suggests that displaced anxiety from societal stress among a population

results in a spontaneous moral panic that scapegoats new categories of deviants. Here control agencies reflect opinion rather than create it. The elite domination model holds those in positions of power, whether government, industry, or religious leaders, responsible for promoting moral panic as a diversion from problems whose solution would undermine their own positions of power. The interest group conflict model sees the creation of moral panics as the outcome of moral entrepreneurs seeking to gain greater influence over society by defining its moral domain, which in turn brings reaction from other interest groups vying for their own prominence.

Victor (1998) has pointed out that moral panics claiming crime or deviance need not be based in reality but in imaginary deviants whose existence gains credibility in the eyes of the public when authorities, and those who claim expert knowledge, particularly science or medicine, legitimize the accusations that may begin as contemporary or urban legends. In such panics, actual people need not even be identified, but a category of behavior may be created, vilified, and demonized, without any real people being accused. Indeed, the behavior that the supposed perpetrators practice need not even have taken place for a moral panic to ensue. Research shows that moral panics are particularly likely to occur when bureaucratic interest, such as competing agencies, are vying for jurisdiction of authority, when methods of detection result in errors, and as Victor says, when there is a symbolic resonance with a perceived threat identified in a prevailing demonology – which serves as a master cognitive frame that organizes problems, gives meaning to them, explains them, and offers solutions.

In addition to explaining how moral panics occur, social constructionists examine the process of claims making.

The Politics of Claims Making

Social constructionists of deviance and social problems share a concern to examine how interest groups, moral entrepreneurs, and social movements create claims rather than examine the behavior of those about whom claims are

made. Claims making not only occurs in particular historical moments but also involves a process of, first, assembling and diagnosing claims about behavior or conditions seen as morally problematic. Second, it involves presenting these claims as legitimate to significant audiences, not least the news media. Third, a key task in framing a moral problem involves the prognosis of how to address the problem to bring about a desired outcome by defining strategies, tactics, and policy. Fourth, claims making involves contesting counterclaims and mobilizing the support of key groups.

CRITICISMS AND EVALUATION

Perhaps not surprisingly, critics both from outside and from within constructionism have challenged one another's epistemological position by taking either a pro or anti realist position. Pro realists accuse constructionists of being nihilistic and unscientific; anti realists ridicule any attempt at science as just another truth claim using scientific ideology to claim legitimacy for its own political ends. For example, Woolgar and Pawluch (1985) accuse moderate or contextual social constructionists of "ontological gerrymandering." They argue that claiming to be able to observe and document the variability in claims about a condition assumes the objectivity (i.e., reality) of the condition, without reflexively subjecting their own analysis to the same questioning. This, they argue, is theoretically inconsistent, if not contradictory. Instead, Woolgar and Pawluch suggest the development of forms of discourse about the social world that transcend the objectivist/relativist debate. For their part, contextual constructionists reject Woolgar and Pawluch's critique, arguing that it, and the attempts by Ibarra and Kitsuse to return to a "strict" anti realist reading of the original statement, lead to dead end, "armchair" sociology (Best 1993: 138). Best says that it is an illusion to believe that focusing on language avoids the problem of assuming reality because language is embedded in society: "An analyst who ignores the social embeddedness of claims makers' rhetoric takes that embeddedness for granted; this is another form of ontological gerrymandering" (Best 1993: 141).

More broadly, pure or strict social constructionism has been criticized for implying that problems of crime and deviance are merely fabrications, which is protested by those suffering their consequences, even though constructionists argue that there are often real consequences of acting toward constructions as though they are real. The point of constructionism, and here there are parallels with post modernism, is that revealing how what is taken to be real can be deconstructed enables the possibility of its being reconstructed differently through replacement discourse. Social problems, deviance and crime, subject to a deconstructionist analysis, can be reframed in ways that enable their reproduction to be slowed and even reversed, such that they become differently and less harmfully constituted (Henry & Milovanovic 1996). The question, indeed, the challenge for constructionists is how to demonstrate the value of this kind of analysis in bringing about changes in objective conditions, while maintaining that these conditions are only as real as we allow them to be. The value of social constructionism is that it seeks not only to understand the way humans constitute their world and are constituted by it, but also to use that knowledge to help them transform it into a more comfortable place.

SEE ALSO: Accounts, Deviant; Blumer, Herbert George; Bourdieu, Pierre; Constructionism; Derrida, Jacques; Doing Gender; Essentialism and Constructionism; Foucault, Michel; Frame; Framing and Social Movements; Goffman, Erving; Identity, Deviant; Labeling Theory; Lacan, Jacques; Mead, George Herbert; Moral Panics; Narrative; Post modernism; Schütz, Alfred; Status Construction Theory; Symbolic Interaction

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deviance, crime and

Erich Goode and Alex Thio

The study of deviance is sometimes confused with criminology, or the study of crime. Sociologists define deviance as the violation of a norm which is likely to generate a negative reaction, such as censure, condemnation, punishment, hostility, or stigma. Stigmatized persons are socially disvalued and discredited by those who accept conventional norms. Norms apply to behavior (the way one acts), physical characteristics (the way one looks), beliefs (what one believes) – indeed, to any dimension along which people can and do evaluate one another. And norms are relevant to specific contexts, whether to the society at large or to specific groups, social circles, or units within the

society. Hence, a particular action may be condemned in one society but not another, one community but not another, one group but not another. Indeed, what is deviant in one collectivity may be regarded as praiseworthy in another. Sociologists always ask the question, “Deviant to *whom?*” Without reference to a specific collectivity, or *audience*, the concept of deviance is meaningless. Hence, deviance is by its very nature *relativistic*, not only with respect to cross cultural comparisons, but also when comparing one collectivity in the same society with another.

All contemporary nation states have developed a set of formally spelled out statutes enacted by a legislature, court precedent, or decree; in earlier times, a monarch decreed formal rules, or laws, and even spelled out the punishments for their violation. A violation of one or more such statutes is referred to as a crime. Sociologists define crime as a violation of a *formal* norm, that is, as spelled out in the criminal law. The criminal law calls for a state mandated punishment, ranging from a fine, through imprisonment, to execution. In principle, *universality* is one condition of the criminal law: all citizens in the same society or nation state are subject to the same laws. A crime in one collectivity or region of the country is a crime in another. This is the central idea behind “common law,” the innovation instituted by King Henry II (r. 1154–89), who sought to unify the many disparate customs, traditions, norms, rules, and laws in the many English shires throughout the kingdom through a system of case law or “judge made” law, law rendered in court that acquired precedent everywhere. Common law thus came to be a legal norm that applied throughout the kingdom, a law that everyone had “in common.” Hence, the first and most fundamental difference between deviance and crime is that deviance is *micro* relativistic, that is, it is variable from one group to another in the same society, whereas crime is *macro* relativistic, that is, in principle, it is non relativistic within a given society and varies only from one society or nation state to another. Indeed, some observers argue that the criminal law is not even variable across societies (Newman 1976; Gottfredson & Hirschi 1990).

The difference between deviance and crime can be captured in a definition in use, that is, by comparing what sociologists of deviance and criminologists study. A comparison of the articles published in the flagship journal of the sociology of deviance, *Deviant Behavior*, with those that appear in criminology's most prominent journal, *Criminology*, verifies that, though the subject matter of these fields is similar, it overlaps very imperfectly. A perusal of the chapters in the introductory textbooks of these two fields, again, conveys how different is the subject matter of the sociology of deviance and criminology. Even more significantly, the two fields differ strikingly with respect to their conceptual and theoretical approaches.

One complicating factor is that the difference between the two fields is sharper in the United States, where the sociology of deviance and criminology are more clearly demarcated, than in the United Kingdom, where they overlap much more heavily. In addition, criminology is a huge field while the sociology of deviance is tiny. In 2002, the circulation of *Deviant Behavior* was 632; that of *Criminology* was 4,181. There are roughly 100 textbooks in criminology and criminal justice; there are at most 10 or 12 in print texts and "text readers" in deviance. Introductory criminology enrolls perhaps a quarter of a million students, not including criminal justice; deviance, fewer than 100,000. In criminology and criminal justice programs, typically, a range of courses is offered beyond the introductory level; in deviance, typically, there are none (Goode 2002). This means, willy nilly, that the field of deviance studies inevitably borrows heavily from criminology, while the reverse is rarely true. As a result, the two fields cannot always be neatly and cleanly distinguished. And lastly, to make matters even more complicated, a number of prominent sociologists of deviance are also criminologists (Cullen 1983; Tittle 1995; Akers 1998).

There are distinct differences between the two fields, however. First as to subject matter. As we saw, a crime is the violation of a specific type of formal norm – the criminal law – which calls for a state sanctioned punishment, typically imprisonment. Any act that is likely to result in arrest, conviction, and punishment of

the perpetrator is by definition a crime. In contrast, deviance is not *necessarily* criminal. Many actions are deviant without being criminal, that is, they are condemned or punished entirely informally, interpersonally: nude dancing, binge drinking, joining a religious cult, and becoming emotionally disturbed at work. Hence, a great deal of behavior is deviant but not a crime.

However, the question of whether all criminal acts are by definition deviant is controversial. Many sociologists define deviance as the violation of *any and all* norms; hence, they consider crime as a *subtype* of deviance, since such violations encompass both formal and informal norms (Clinard & Meier 2004: 130–3). According to this definition, all crime is deviance but not all deviance is crime. In contrast, other sociologists refer to the violation of a *formal* norm as a crime and the violation of an *informal* norm as deviance (Quinney 1965; Robertson & Taylor 1973). According to this definition, no deviance is crime and no crime is deviance.

One problem with the definition that sees crime as the violation of a formal norm and deviance as the violation of an informal norm is that many criminal acts violate informal norms as well, that is, in addition to generating arrest, they are *also* interpersonally stigmatizing and discrediting. Being known in the community as a criminal, especially as an ex convict, is regarded by most audiences as deviant. Illicit drug use and sale are clearly criminal, but they are also regarded as a form of deviance.

Hence, the subject matter of deviance and crime, although distinct, overlaps heavily. But the topics of study of the two fields differ substantially. Most criminologists consider the study of the Federal Bureau of Investigation's Index crimes – that is, murder, rape, robbery, aggravated assault, burglary, motor vehicle theft, and larceny theft – as the foundational core of criminology. Indeed, chapters on these criminal acts constitute most of the chapters on types of crimes in criminology textbooks. These are "high consensus" crimes, that is, acts for which there is widespread public agreement that they *should be* illegal. In addition, some criminologists study white collar crime, for which consensus is lower, but are nonetheless very rarely studied by sociologists of

deviance. And lastly, criminologists investigate the criminal justice system – the police, the courts, and jails and prisons.

In contrast, again, with respect to subject matter, sociologists of deviance *tend to* study what are referred to, in criminology, as “public order” or “vice” crimes (prostitution, homosexuality, drug use, and gambling), which are lower consensus crimes and have a lower likelihood of resulting in arrest; and they study acts which are not criminal at all. But the Index crimes are much less likely to attract the attention of deviance specialists. In addition, while criminologists study *only* behavior, sociologists of deviance study anything and everything that generates condemnation, punishment, and stigma – including physical characteristics and beliefs, both of which can be regarded as deviant. Both physical characteristics (“abominations of the body”) and beliefs (“treacherous and rigid beliefs”) are included in Goffman’s types of stigma (1963: 4), as are “tribal stigma of race, nation, and religion,” which are extremely rarely studied as a form of deviance but, in principle and by definition, could be.

In addition to their subject matter, conceptually and theoretically, the sociology of deviance and criminology differ as well. Insofar as sociologists of deviance do examine high consensus crimes such as rape, white collar crime, or any of criminology’s classic topics, they look at them through a very different lens. Most criminologists are positivists; they regard crime as a phenomenon whose epidemiology, or distribution in the population, and etiology, or causes, can be studied quantitatively. They tend to study crime by means of survey methods or the use of official police records, such as the FBI’s *Uniform Crime Reports*. In contrast, most sociologists of deviance are symbolic interactionists and constructionists, and take as their primary subject matter the social organization of the condemnation of particular beliefs, physical characteristics, or forms of behavior, as well as the impact of said condemnation on the identity, social interaction, and career of persons subject to said condemnation. For instance, a popular topic among sociologists of deviance is the “stigma neutralization” of criminal behaviors, such as rape (Scully & Marolla 1984), child molestation (McCaghy 1967, 1968), stealing drugs (Dabney 1995),

and shoplifting (Cromwell & Thurman 2003). Clearly, the concept of stigma neutralization is also applicable to deviant but not criminal acts, such as student cheating (McCabe 1995) and topless dancing (Thompson et al. 2003), as well as (with varying degrees of success) to physical characteristics such as obesity (Gimlin 2002: 110–40). This distinction between criminologists and deviance specialists is far from clear cut, however; some deviance specialists, a minority, still test etiological models, while some criminologists conduct research on deviant identities and the social construction of crime and criminals.

Since the 1960s, criminology has evolved into a profession as well as a field of study. Dozens, perhaps hundreds, of academic programs in criminology and criminal justice have been established during the past two decades; they are regarded as a stepping stone to a career outside of academia. Many criminology and criminal justice departments were formed after breaking away from sociology departments; today, non sociologists form a substantial minority of criminologists, and a majority of criminal justice specialists. Unlike the sociology of deviance, criminology is a distinctly policy oriented discipline. Perhaps the most important distinction between the study of deviance and the study of crime is that the majority of criminologists – and even more emphatically, criminal justice specialists – adopt a “correctional” view, conceiving of their research as a means of combating the problem of crime, whereas very few deviance specialists view their work in this fashion. In fact, a substantial proportion of sociologists of deviance harbor a certain *appreciation* for their subject matter and the people they study (Matza 1969: 24ff.), a fact likely to generate stigma and condemnation for the field as well as its practitioners (Hendershott 2002).

SEE ALSO: Anomie; Crime; Crime, Social Learning Theory of; Criminal Justice System; Criminology; Death of the Sociology of Deviance?; Deviance; Deviance, Absolutist Definitions of; Deviance, Explanatory Theories of; Deviance, Theories of; Deviance Processing Agencies; Labeling; Labeling Theory; Moral Panics; Organizational Deviance; Public Order Crime; Social Control; Social Disorganization

Theory; Stigma; Strain Theories; Subcultures, Deviant; Transcarceration

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deviance, criminalization of

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Imputations of deviance occur whenever there is stigmatization, condemnation, segregation, retribution, or rehabilitation. Criminalization refers to the process of applying the criminal law to certain behaviors. Criminalization reinforces the dominant standards in a society through threatened criminal penalties, criminal prosecution, and punishment. Not all deviant behaviors are criminal. Many scholars study the processes through which, and conditions under which, the criminal sanction is applied to particular deviance categories.

To change the status of a deviant category to a crime requires collective action. Thus studies of the criminalization of deviance reveal the links between deviance, political action, and social change. The dominant approaches to studying criminalization are the deviance and social control viewpoint, which asks whether criminalization is a neutral process or if it serves the interests of the powerful, and the social problems viewpoint, which looks at the social meanings, or collective definitions of crime.

In his highly regarded book *The Politics of Deviance*, Edwin M. Schur offers a definitive statement about the social processes of characterizing behaviors and conditions as deviant: "When people engage in organized political activity on deviance issues they are, in fact,

intentionally trying to ensure that a particular balance of power will tip in their favor.” On this account, the criminalization of deviance involves not only groups who wield the power to impose or extend deviance definitions and see to it that others who deviate from favored moral stances are subjected to state administered punishment, but also a process of stigmatization that implies social standing or acceptability for these groups. Three propositions can be derived from these observations. First, what is officially designated as deviant is often a political decision. Second, official rules are tied to interest groups and power. Third, the criminalization of deviance is a form of social control.

Jenness (2004) presents an authoritative review and evaluation of criminalization scholarship. Organizing this massive literature both chronologically and thematically, she examines three lines of inquiry. The first is classic work examining criminal laws that emerge in response to demographic changes that upset the balance between powerful interest groups and those they control. Classic work demonstrates the roles of both instrumental and symbolic politics in deviance defining and the emergence of criminal law. The second, contemporary line of inquiry “unpacks” the relative influences of organizational, social movement, and state related factors involved in efforts to criminalize deviance. The focus is less on changes in structural conditions than on the specific strategies for producing criminal law. The third, more recent line of inquiry looks to connect local criminal law formation politics with broader processes of institutionalization, globalization, and modernization. This line of inquiry asks whether deviantization and criminalization at the local level (i.e., county, region, state, country, etc.) intersect with some larger social, political, or cultural system. For each of these three lines of inquiry, Jenness (2004) details the factors which influence the criminalization of deviance.

FACTORS INFLUENCING THE CRIMINALIZATION OF DEVIANCE

Generally, there are two approaches to examining the content of a specific criminal law. The

first approach entails merely deciphering what specific acts are criminal. The second approach, by contrast, ensues from conceptualizing law as a field of critical inquiry. To demonstrate the distinction, consider the Texas sodomy statute struck down by the US Supreme Court in the summer of 2003: “A person commits an offense if he engages in deviate sexual intercourse with another individual of the same sex.” Employing the first approach, lawyers, judges, and law students examine the definition of “deviate sexual intercourse” and find that it includes “any contact between any part of the genitals of one person and the mouth or anus of another person.” Typically, that ends the analysis. But to those who follow the second approach, the content of the anti sodomy law is not simply the definition of homosexual conduct, but the social processes by which criminal status has been assigned to sex acts between individuals of the same sex, and the reasons for it. The second approach thus expands the examination of law to the social context of the issue in question, and hence its political dimension. This is the approach taken by criminologists, sociolegal scholars, and others who concern themselves with the criminalization of deviance.

Demographic Changes, Social Control, and Criminalization

The criminalization literature is packed with empirically grounded case studies which indicate that the construction of deviant categories and outlawing of ensuing behaviors can be linked to changes in the size, density, or distribution of human populations. There are two accounts of this relationship. The first focuses on changes in economic relations between status groups. The second focuses on the struggle between these groups to secure deference through the control of symbols, including the law.

The classic example of the materialist account (pertaining to the economic institutions of society) is William Chambliss’s 1964 study of the English creation of vagrancy laws. When the bubonic plague spread into northern Europe in the fourteenth century, it decimated the labor force, causing wages to rise beyond what landowners were willing to pay. As landowners

sought to keep wages low, laborers sought to migrate, in search of better pay. In response, landowners invented vagrancy laws to force workers to remain and work cheaply. Chambliss interpreted these events as evidence that the criminalization of deviance is often a reaction to demographic changes which upset the balance of power that inheres in economic relationships. Supporting this claim, Chambliss observed that later in history, vagrancy laws were expanded to cover loitering, associating with reputed criminals, prostitution, and drunkenness, during periods when demographic changes made cheap labor more readily available. Following in this vein, even homelessness, Jenness (2004) observes, has been criminalized in the United States – in response to gentrification and redevelopment in principal cities.

The second approach to studying demographic changes and the criminalization of deviance focuses less on the material basis for social control than on the role of symbolic politics. Here the classic study is Joseph Gusfield's 1963 analysis of the 18th Amendment, which made it a crime in the United States to manufacture, sell, transport, import, or export intoxicating liquors. Here again the analysis begins with a population shift, namely the mass influx of Europeans to major US cities in the 1800s. The swelling numbers of Catholic immigrants challenged the traditional dominance and prestige of Protestantism in American life, the response to which was defining the distribution and sale of alcoholic beverages as criminal. In Gusfield's view, although law enforcement played a role in Prohibition, the criminalization of liquor was more symbolic, for it "established the victory of Protestant over Catholic, rural over urban, tradition over modernity, [and] the middle class over both the lower and upper strata" (Gusfield 1963: 7).

While Chambliss and Gusfield each highlight the role of changing populations in the criminalization of deviance, they emphasize different means of social control. The example of vagrancy laws focuses on instrumental legislation, which attempts to control the actual behavior of those classified as deviant. The example of the 18th Amendment, on the other hand, focuses on the symbolic nature of criminalization, which for Gusfield does not depend on law enforcement for its effect (Jenness 2004).

Hundreds of case studies in the criminalization literature demonstrate the emergence of both instrumental and symbolic criminal law. Typical to these studies are populations perceived as threatening and "in need of control" by those in a position to bring about legal change.

Of course, not all demands to criminalize deviant behaviors and conditions are successful – many are ignored; others are overshadowed by new demands. Contemporary research seeks to discover and model how legal change is stimulated, defined, and institutionalized.

Organizational, Social Movement, and State Related Factors Involved in Criminalization

In 1971, Herbert Blumer called for reconceptualizing social problems as "products of a process of collective definition" rather than "objective conditions and social arrangements" (Blumer 1971: 298). Although undertaken more than 20 years earlier, Edwin Sutherland's groundbreaking and now classic study of the origins and diffusion of sexual psychopath laws illustrates Blumer's point.

Sexual psychopath laws called for taking criminals who were diagnosed as sexual psychopaths and confining them indefinitely. Sutherland depicted these laws as "futile" – noting first that they were rarely enforced, and second that there was no discernible difference between trends in rates of sex crimes among states with them and neighboring states without them. He argued that state legislatures hastened to adopt sexual psychopath laws not because they were effective, but in response to public hysteria, media hype, the institutionalization of erroneous claims about the nature and threat of sex crimes, and the influence of experts on the legal process.

Specifically, Sutherland observed, once a few serious sex crimes had been committed in quick succession, the stories were picked up by press associations and spread by news outlets across the country. Two to four spectacular sex crimes in a few weeks were enough to evoke the phrase "sex crime wave." The public hysteria which ensued led to the creation of committees to study the problem. Psychiatrists played an important part on many of these committees, and they made up the primary interest group

backing sexual psychopath laws. Most psychiatrists favored the view that criminals should be treated as patients, and frequently their opinions went unquestioned by state lawmakers. These views included what Sutherland believed to be erroneous claims about the prevalence of serious sex crimes, as well as their etiology, diagnosis, and curability. These events corresponded with a social movement to treat criminals rather than punish them. The result was a diffusion of laws that Sutherland feared “may injure the society more than do the sex crimes which [they are] designed to correct” (Sutherland 1950: 142).

Sutherland’s study, and many others since, demonstrate Blumer’s observation that more significant than the objective conditions of a putative (i.e., reputed) social problem are the definitional activities of social actors who perceive and judge them as offensive and undesirable. Sutherland’s study also demonstrated the significance of the tactics, power, and motivations of those who seek to influence the law.

Jenness (2004) summarizes a second line of contemporary research that builds upon efforts to identify the political conditions and processes necessary for social actors to effect criminalization. An example is her research with Kendal Broad detailing the activities of grassroots activists to criminalize violence against gays and lesbians. These activities included documenting and publicizing anti gay and anti lesbian violence, providing victim assistance and crisis intervention programs, and launching educational campaigns. By these means, a sector of the larger gay and lesbian movement succeeded in getting people to notice violence against gays and lesbians, and to recognize it as a social problem in need of a political response. These and other actions gained the attention of the media and further facilitated the institutionalization of calls for legal reform. And as the movement gained legitimacy, activists succeeded in framing the response to bias motivated violence, and in drafting actual legislation.

Research in this vein also demonstrates how efforts to criminalize deviance are affected by timing and the presence or absence of organizational support. Lowney and Best (1995), for example, characterize the early failure and later success of efforts to criminalize what became known as “stalking.” They report that although

there had been past attempts, no state legislature passed a law making stalking a crime until “star stalking” became an issue of concern for the Screen Actors Guild and that caught the interest of the general public. Similarly, not until the issue became part of the larger response to domestic violence did anti stalking laws become widespread. Thus, success and failure were related to whether claims were supported by significant organizational resources and whether they resonated with larger cultural concerns (Jenness 2004).

Significant factors in criminalizing deviance also include professional groups and networks, as well as the state (Jenness 2004). For example, Wolfson’s (2001) study of the increasing social and legal control of tobacco use demonstrates how activists have been able to build upon the preexisting work of public health organizations, such as the American Lung Association and the American Cancer Society, and how the fight against big tobacco has spread on account of activities of people working within state, local, and federal agencies such as the Office of the Surgeon General and the National Cancer Institute.

METHODOLOGICAL ISSUES, CURRENT EMPHASES, FUTURE DIRECTIONS

The study of when and how deviant behaviors and statuses become defined as criminal has expanded in many directions since Sutherland wrote in 1950. The literature now reflects the work of criminologists, sociologists, political scientists, and sociolegal scholars. Areas of inquiry include demographic, organizational, political, structural, and institutional conditions. Theoretical accounts of criminalization have moved away from traditional consensus and conflict models and toward integrative models which point to multiple factors, including individual activists, interest groups, the media, and organized social movements; the tactics, power, and motivations of these social forces, entities, and actors; and the political opportunities and structural conditions that make the criminalization of deviance possible. Contemporary work includes more sophisticated analyses of combinations of these factors, as well as

how they operate across time. And very recent work is beginning to examine criminalization as a social process operating across geopolitical units. Thus empirical and theoretical accounts of the criminalization of deviance have progressed from the now classic studies of the relationship between demographic changes, social control, and criminalization to contemporary scholarship identifying and detailing the organizational, social movement, and state related factors which structure and mediate this relationship, and most recently to the larger processes of institutionalization, globalization, and modernization from which criminalization may arguably derive (Jenness 2004).

Methods for studying criminalization have progressed as well. Assessments of the field (e.g., Hagan 1980; McGarrell & Castellano 1993) argued that research on the emergence of criminal law suffered from a tendency to unconsciously vacillate between description and explanation, to focus on historically grounded case studies rather than general processes of criminalization, to substitute moral prejudices for empirical inquiry, and to bog down in the stale debate between consensus and conflict theories. In response to these critiques, scholars began to inject other areas of sociological inquiry, to examine multiple case studies, and to create general models of the criminal law formation process. In a recent evaluation of this work, Jenness (2004) stresses that only recently have researchers begun seeking to understand processes of criminalization across diverse geopolitical units. One example is empirical research on innovation and diffusion in state hate crime laws (Grattet et al. 1998), which the authors argue is "affected by a state's internal political culture and traditions as well as by its location within the larger interstate system" (Grattet et al. 1998: 286).

Most recently, scholars have begun to address the impact of globalization on the origins of criminal law. Two hypotheses dominate this research. The first postulates that when local factors are paramount, there will be significant variation and tailoring of national laws. Support for this hypothesis is contained in the finding that distinctions between sexual harassment policies in France and the United States are due to particularities in the opportunities and constraints that activists and lawmakers

faced in their respective contexts. By sharp contrast, research on prohibitions against female genital cutting (Boyle 2002) shows that despite local opposition and widespread practice, international pressure has succeeded in getting countries to pass such laws. This finding supports the hypothesis that when factors external to nation state politics are paramount, there will be little variation between national laws. More subtly, however, Boyle's second finding that local context plays a role in the content, timing, and implementation of newly adopted anti female genital cutting laws and policies suggests that there is support for a third hypothesis: that both local context and particularities and global norms and system pressures matter (Jenness 2004).

Jenness (2004) suggests a variety of future directions for research, theory, and methodology. These include comparing the origins and making of criminal law to other forms of social control, elucidating the distinctions, if any exist, between instrumental and symbolic law, and examining how processes of decriminalization compare to processes of criminalization. Analyses of these processes may be expanded to include the influences of organizational fields and institutional logics, preexisting policy domains, and the workings of culture. These goals may be accomplished by linking research on the criminalization of deviance to the policy studies literature – particularly studies of the development of policy domains, the social processes involved in the generation of policy, and the influences of these processes on implementation.

SEE ALSO: Crime; Criminology; Deviance; Deviance, Crime and; Law, Criminal; Social Control; Sutherland, Edwin H.

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deviance, explanatory theories of

Erich Goode

Sociologists define deviance as the violation of a norm that, if discovered, would typically result in punishment, scorn, or stigmatization of the offender. The normative violation can include acts, beliefs, and traits or characteristics, and it

can be a violation of both formal norms (laws) and informal norms (folkways and mores). This definition opens two radically different though complementary missions or lines of inquiry: those that attempt to explain the causes of normative violations, and those that explore the dynamics underlying the social construction, accompaniments, and consequences of the norms, including laws, and their enforcement. Criminologists and sociologists who attempt to explain deviance and crime nearly always study non normative *behavior*, while constructionists look at the full gamut of normative violations – behavior, beliefs, and physical characteristics.

Not all deviance is criminal, that is, is a violation of society's laws. Many actions that are likely to be punished informally are not against the law and entail no risk of arrest. Nonetheless, all the explanatory sociological theories that are discussed in deviance textbooks were originally formulated to account for both deviance and crime, and they play a prominent role in the field of criminology. During the past two decades or so, practitioners in the fields of criminology and the sociology of deviance have gone their separate ways. Today, criminology is mainly an empirical and explanatory field, while the sociology of deviance has become a field concerned mainly with detailed studies of deviant scenes, the social construction of deviance and conventionality, and the interaction between respectables and persons with discredited or deviant identities, as well as among deviant persons themselves. Hence, increasingly, theories that were originally devised to explain deviant behavior generally now apply more specifically to the field of criminology than to the field of the sociology of deviance.

EXPLANATORY THEORIES OF DEVIANCE AND CRIME

A theory is an explanation or cause and effect account of a general phenomenon. The epistemological foundation of the explanatory mission is usually referred to as *positivism* (or “methodological positivism”) and is made up of the following assumptions: *objectivism* (that is,

phenomena take on a reality independent of their social construction); *empiricism* (we can know the world through our five senses); and *determinism* (the phenomena of the material world, including the social world, are linked together in a cause and effect fashion). The goal of all explanatory theories is to explain or account for as wide a range of phenomena as possible. Hence, an explanation accounting for embezzlement in general is superior to an explanation only accounting for the illegal appropriation of money by bank tellers living in small cities; and an explanation for crime in general is superior to one accounting only for embezzlement specifically (Hirschi & Gottfredson 1994: 263).

Objectivism refers to the fact that any attempt to account for the occurrence of deviance and crime is predicated on the view that the violation of social and legal norms constitutes an objectively real, pregiven entity that contains a common thread that demands an explanation. If deviance, including crime, and its constituent elements did not contain a common thread – that is, if it were a social construction and nothing else – then no explanation attempting to account for it would be possible. *Empiricism* typically refers to the fact that the violations of social norms can be investigated by means of highly sophisticated, quantitative social research methodologies, such as surveys, which stress reliability and validity. And *determinism* refers to the fact that the central question in explanatory research is: “Why do they do it?” (Or, contrarily, “Why *don't* they do it?”) In the field of the sociology of deviance and crime, theorists assume that they can discover law like generalizations that account for normative violations. All explanatory theories of deviance and crime – whether they focus on the individual, the individual in a particular context or social structure, or the social structure itself – address their research to the same basic question. In all of them, the *dependent* variable is the normative violation, and the *independent* variable is the factor their theory posits as the causal factor.

The Positive School. The earliest attempt to explain criminal behavior objectively, empirically, and in a materialistic cause and effect fashion was undertaken by a school of criminologists who are referred to as positivists, of

whom Adolphe Quetelet (1796–1874) was perhaps the first. Positivism broke with a much earlier, more legalistic tradition that ignored the characteristics of the offender. The most well known of the early positivists were the proponents of what came to be referred to as “the Positive School,” associated with the work of Italian physician Cesare Lombroso (1835–1909), author of *L'Uomo Delinquente* (1876, and subsequent editions). The Positive School was characterized by the following postulates. First, that legalistic investigations into the nature of crime be set aside for a scientific study of the characteristics of the criminal. This postulate led to accepting the criminal law as a given, and its violation as a crime. Second, that the criminal engaged in violations of the law as a result of forces that were beyond his awareness and understanding. This postulate was based on the assumption that the criminal lacked a free will. And third, the early criminological positivists attributed the cause of criminal behavior principally to a biological factor: one or more physical defects (or “atavisms”) in the human organism. Atavisms were thought to be ape like “throwbacks,” primitive characteristics that appear in some modern humans. They included a small brain, a sloping forehead, a large jaw, and a stooped posture. These defects, the theory argued, induce some people to commit crime.

Lombroso's theory was a “kinds of people” explanation that looked no further than the individual, specifically, the biological characteristics of offenders. Over time, however, Lombroso modified his explanation; with each new edition of his book, he attributed a decreasing impact of biological factors and an increasing role to social and structural factors. Lombroso's influence on the study of crime is immense. His focus on biological factors fell out of favor during the 1920s, when psychological behaviorism came into vogue, but made a comeback during the 1960s, and remains an emphasis among a few criminological circles to this day. However, his insistence that criminal behavior be studied objectively and scientifically is the foundational assumption of explanatory criminology. In spite of his emphasis on biological factors as a cause of criminal behavior, Lombroso is regarded as the “father” of scientific criminology.

CONTEMPORARY EXPLANATORY THEORIES OF DEVIANCE AND CRIME: AN INTRODUCTION

For the most part, explanatory theorists of deviance and crime take the social construction of the norms and the laws for granted; they do not regard an explanation of the content of norms and laws or their enforcement as their mission. Indeed, how laws and norms come into being and what their consequences are for the violators is not an issue for the explanatory theorist. And, while agreeing that all behavior, including deviance, is caused, contemporary sociological explanatory theories of deviance and crime do not universally share the Positive School's assumption about the norm violator's lack of free will. All agree that potential norm violators make choices, but they do so within constrained circumstances.

The most influential contemporary sociological explanatory theories (or theories devised by sociologists) of deviant behavior include: social disorganization theory; anomie theory; learning theory and the theory of differential association; social control theory; self control theory; and routine activity theory. In addition, several of the most prominent constructionist theories – labeling theory, conflict theory, including Marxism and feminism – harbor a “minor” explanatory mode.

Social disorganization theory. During the 1920s, the sociology faculty and graduate students at the University of Chicago developed a perspective toward deviance, crime, and delinquency that has come to be called the “Chicago School,” or social disorganization theory. Using the city of Chicago as their laboratory, these researchers took as their explanatory or independent variable the instability of entire neighborhoods and communities. Regardless of their individual characteristics, people who live in such communities are more likely to engage in illegal and non normative behaviors than persons residing in more stable communities. What makes for unstable or disorganized communities is that they are characterized by low rents, which means that residents who live in them invest little financially or emotionally in their community of residence, and tend to be socially and geographically mobile. Hence, the residents of unstable communities tend not to

monitor or sanction the behavior of wrong doing in their midst. As a result, residents can commit infractions of the law and the social norms without consequence, and tend to do so with greater frequency than in communities in which co residents monitor and sanction one another's behavior. In socially disorganized communities, street crime, drug abuse, alcoholism, prostitution, juvenile delinquency, and mental disorder are common; a high proportion of law abiding residents tend to move out as soon as they can, contributing to further crime, deviance, delinquency, and social disorganization. By the 1940s, the Chicago School had become regarded as obsolete (in the 1960s, a school of deviance research came to be dubbed the “neo Chicagoans,” but they had a very different orientation). However, by the late 1980s, social disorganization theory experienced a rebirth of interest, and is now a major perspective in the study of crime, delinquency, and social problems (Stark 1987; Skogan 1990; Bursik & Grasmick 1993).

Anomie theory. Émile Durkheim's book *Suicide* was the inspiration for anomie theory. Durkheim regarded anomie as a disturbance in the traditional social order which caused one form of deviant behavior in particular – suicide. In 1938, Robert K. Merton refashioned the concept of anomie as a disjunction or “mal integration” between a society's culture, that is, what members learn to value, what they are motivated to want and seek – material success – and its social and economic structure, which places limits on some of its members' ability to succeed. This disjunction places strain on members of the society who fail to achieve what they have been taught to want and strive for, which, in turn, results in deviant “modes of adaptation,” or behavioral consequences of this failure to achieve.

In the mode of adaptation Merton referred to as “innovation,” people retain the cultural goal of success but seek to achieve it in an unconventional, illegitimate, or deviant manner. Examples include pimping, drug dealing, and engaging in white collar crime. “Ritualism,” another deviant mode of adaptation, results from abandoning or scaling down success goals but compulsively following to the letter the norms and routines of proper behavior. A petty bureaucrat who insists that all

regulations be adhered to in every detail but has forgotten what the rules are for exemplifies this mode of adaptation. "Retreatism" represents the failure to achieve society's success goals in the conventional manner and giving up on those goals as well as giving up on any and all manner of achieving them. The ritualist is a "double failure" who has adapted by withdrawing from society's rat race in every way; examples include alcoholics, drug addicts, psychotics, and the homeless. And the last of Merton's modes of adaptation is "rebellion," the attempt to deal with the malintegration of society's culture and social and economic structure by overthrowing its culturally defined goals (material success) and any and all legitimate means to achieve those goals and replacing them with an alternative social, political, and economic structure. Clearly, the revolutionary fits here.

Merton's anomie theory argued something quite different from all prior theories of deviance and crime: that the conventional norms and the institutionalized social structure exerted pressures on actors in a social structure to violate the norms and the laws. Ironically, it was conventionality that produced deviance. While Durkheim argued that deviance resulted from a *too weak* hold of society's norms, Merton asserted the opposite – that anomie was a consequence of a *too strong* hold of the norms, that is, resulted from actors *following* society's norms. Merton's theory presupposes that it is deviance (not conformity) that is intellectually problematic, that is, that demands an explanation, that actors need to be motivated to commit infractions of the norms and the laws. It is also based on a high degree of consensus regarding the legitimacy of the norms and the laws. The theory is not concerned with how the laws or norms come to be devised nor how they come to be enforced. Indeed, the laws and norms are taken for granted. In addition, the theory does not explain how, once a person feels strain, he or she comes to devise one or another deviant adaptation. Anomie theory was a, perhaps the, dominant explanation of deviance and crime in the 1950s and the early to mid 1960s – indeed, the article that spawned the theory, "Social Structure and Anomie" (Merton 1938), is the most often cited article written by a sociologist ever written – but by the late 1960s

it fell out of favor and in some quarters was considered "disconfirmed." Like social disorganization, however, anomie theory made a comeback and is currently one of the more influential theories in the field (Messner & Rosenfeld 1997).

Differential association theory. In the third edition of his criminology textbook, Edwin Sutherland (1939) spelled out the theory of differential association. It has become one of a small number of important perspectives in the field. The first and most fundamental proposition of Sutherland's theory is that criminal behavior – and, by extension, deviant behavior as well – is learned. Hardly anyone stumbles upon or dreams up ways of violating the law. This must be passed on from one person to another in a genuine, more or less straightforward, learning process. The norms or values – or, in Sutherland's terminology, the *definitions* – favorable to committing crime must be learned in face to face interaction between and among people who are close or intimate with one another. Criminal knowledge, skills, sentiments, values, traditions, and motives are all passed down as a result of interpersonal – not impersonal – means. And the earlier in one's life this process takes place, as well as the more intense the relationship one has with one's interacting parties, the more influential it is. Sutherland's theory argued that people who eventually embark on engaging in criminal acts *differentially associate* with persons who endorse violations of the law. A person becomes criminal or delinquent because of an excess of definitions favorable to the violation of the law over definitions unfavorable to the violation of the law. The key to this process is the *ratio* of definitions favorable to the violation of the law to those that are unfavorable. When favorable definitions exceed unfavorable ones, an individual will turn to crime. Notice that Sutherland insisted that persons must *learn* and *be motivated* to commit crime; it is not simply something that someone would do naturally, spontaneously, or in the absence of social conditioning. Both crime and conformity to the legal code need explaining, Sutherland argued. There is no such thing as an asocial or culturally bereft social actor: we do what we have learned is good to do, and that includes both crime and law abiding behavior. Learning to

violate the law is no different from learning to speak English or eat with a fork or brush one's teeth. What is different for the criminal is that he or she has associated, and continues to associate, with persons who have promulgated the positive value of committing crime. Sutherland's theory has remained popular in criminology and the study of juvenile delinquency and deviant behavior; it has spawned a host of theoretical offspring, including the theory of "culture transmission" (Miller 1958), or the view that lower class culture is criminogenic, and the social learning school of crime and deviance (Akers 1998), which incorporates principles of operant conditioning into the theory of differential association.

Social control theory. Control theorists turn the traditional question – "Why do they do it?" – around and ask, "Why *don't* they do it?" Deviance, they argue, is not intellectually problematic. If left to our own devices, most of us would deviate from the rules of society and cheat, lie, steal, get drunk or high, and engage in all manner of sexually gratifying behavior. This approach takes the allure of deviance, crime, and delinquency for granted. What needs to be explained, they say, is conventional, law abiding behavior. Why don't we all violate the law and society's norms? What causes deviant behavior, control theorists argue, is the *absence* of the social control that ensures conformity to the rules. Conformists do not engage in deviant, criminal, or delinquent acts because of their strong bonds with or ties to conventional others, conventional institutions, their adherence to conventional beliefs, and involvement in conventional activities (Hirschi 1969). To the extent that persons have a stake in conformity – jobs, an education, a house, a relationship, a family – they will tend to conform to the norms of the society and not risk losing that stake. To the extent that persons lack that stake in conformity, they are more willing to violate the law, since they have "nothing to lose."

Self control theory. In 1990, a book was published that proclaimed itself "a general theory of crime" (Gottfredson & Hirschi 1990). The authors define crime as "force or fraud in pursuit of self interest" and argue that their explanation applies to any and all forms of crime, including white collar and corporate crime,

drug use, street crime, or the forms of crime traditionally studied by criminologists, as well as acts that may not be technically illegal, such as illicit or risky sex, the abuse of alcohol, and smoking. Like social control theory, self control theory argues that what needs to be explained is not violations of the law but conformity to the law. Crime does not need to be learned or motivated, Gottfredson and Hirschi argue. It is what anyone would do in the absence of controls. What causes violations of the law? True to its name, self control theory argues that a lack of self control is the cause of crime, and what causes a lack of self control is inadequate, inconsistent, and ineffective parenting or caregiving. Parents who fail to monitor or control the wrongdoing of their children produce offspring who lack self control and engage in criminal, deviant, delinquent, and high risk behavior. All of these behaviors have one thing in common: they are impulsive, intended to seize short term gratification without concern for long run risk to the actor or harm to the victim. Criminal and other high risk behavior is especially attractive to people who lack self control because these people "tend to lack diligence, tenacity, or persistence in a course of action," and such acts provide immediate and easy or simple gratification of desires, are "exciting, risky, or thrilling," provide "few or meager long term benefits," require "little skill or planning," and often result in "pain or discomfort for the victim" (p. 89).

Their "general theory of crime," Gottfredson and Hirschi argue, both is consistent with the facts of criminal behavior and contradicts nearly all competing theories of crime. The authors are not modest about the reach of their theory; they say they intend to explain "all crime, at all times" (p. 117). Indeed, they say, their theory also explains many other forms of deviant behavior that are not criminal, including alcohol abuse, risky sex, and being accident prone. Nor are they modest about their theory's devastating implications for the other explanations of crime, specifically, anomie and learning theory, as well as the explanatory component of labeling, conflict, and feminist theories. The only other explanations of deviance and crime that are compatible with self control theory, Gottfredson and Hirschi argue, are

social disorganization theory (since, in failing to exercise social control, the community, like the criminal's parents, fails to monitor or control wrongdoing) and routine activity theory (since that perspective focuses on criminal opportunity, not the criminal offender). Self control theory is based on the idea that the appeal of crime does not have to be learned or motivated. Deviants do not learn the value of engaging in deviance or crime. One does not learn to engage in crime because no learning is required. Criminal acts are simple, commonsensical, concrete, and result in immediate gratification. What causes criminal behavior is not the presence of something but the absence of something, that is, self control. Crime is in fact *asocial* rather than social in nature. In this sense, then, self control theory is a non sociological theory of crime. Though criminal opportunities may be sociologically structured, criminality, or the propensity to commit criminal acts, is a sociological factor only by virtue of its absence of social influence.

Routine activity theory. Routine activity theory is a contemporary version of the perspective put forth by the late eighteenth century utilitarians such as Jeremy Bentham (1748–1832) and Cesare Beccaria (1738–94), who argued for the importance of free will and the individual's rational calculation of pleasure and pain. Routine activity theory has purchase only among criminologists; typically, it is not discussed by sociologists of deviance. It focuses on crime rather than deviance, and most often monetary crimes rather than crimes of violence. A type of opportunity and rational choice theory, routine activity theory argues that crime takes place when there is a conjunction of a *motivated offender*, a *suitable target*, and *the lack of a capable guardian* (Cohen & Felson 1979). Since the theory is not an explanation of *criminality*, that is, the *tendency* or propensity to commit crime, but a theory of *crime*, or the likelihood of the commission of criminal acts, the "motivated offender" is assumed rather than explained. Routine activity theory argues that it is the opportunity to commit crime that is the key explanatory variable rather than the presence or absence of criminally inclined individuals. There will always be enough motivated offenders eager to capitalize on a criminal opportunity; what varies systematically is

social structural opportunities that increase the likelihood of offending. Hence, nighttime minimizes the presence of capable guardians and, hence, maximizes the likelihood of criminal behavior. An increase in the number of women working after 1945 removed persons (capable guardians) from domiciles and, hence, increased the likelihood of household burglaries. The rise in affluence increased the existence of movable goods in post World War II America, increasing the number of suitable targets, and thus increased rates of theft. The increase in ATMs led to increases in ATM related crime. In each case, the relevant variables are the suitable targets and the absence (or presence) of capable guardians – not the number of motivated offenders. The theory also focuses on the issue of victimization: the likelihood of being victimized by a predatory crime is directly proportional to the likelihood of being physically in juxtaposition with routine offenders, for instance, often being present, at night, outside the home, interacting with members of categories of the population more likely than the average to engage in criminal behavior – young, unmarried, relatively poor, especially minority, males. Routine activity theory is based on the assumption that people are more or less rational and act out of a free will, minimizing cost (or risk, that is, the likelihood of apprehension) and maximizing reward. It argues that crime is not a unique form of behavior, distinctly different from law abiding behavior, but follows the principles of all behavior, criminal or law abiding. The costs of crime are somewhat different from those of obeying the law, but the same principles apply: people are motivated to minimize cost and maximize reward. In this sense, then, routine activity theory challenges the basic assumption of the Positive School, which argued that criminals lacked a free will and acted without understanding what they are doing.

Constructionist theory's explanatory mode. The perspective in the sociology of deviance that is referred to as "labeling theory" arose in the 1960s as a reaction against the dominant positivistic study of normative violations. Labeling theory's principal focus was mainly on how conceptions of wrongdoing are developed, how rules are enforced, and what the consequences of being labeled as a deviant are. In

other words, its approach was mainly in the constructionist vein. However, a “minor” mode of labeling theory argued that being stigmatized as a wrongdoer – being labeled as a “deviant” – often has the ironic consequence of solidifying a deviant identity and entrenching patterns of deviant behavior. In other words, one aspect of this approach is causal or positivistic in its orientation: *labeling causes deviance*.

In a like vein, conflict theory is focused mainly on inequality in power as the primary determinant of the social construction of the criminal law and its enforcement – an entirely constructionist endeavor. Nonetheless, conflict theorists also examine inequality as a major *cause* of criminal behavior. Members of the lower class are more likely to commit common street crimes, this perspective argues, because in a society based on social class their options for success and social mobility are extremely limited. In contrast, corporate crime – the ability of executives to commit and, usually, get away with crimes that are vastly more lucrative than street crimes – is a manifestation of the immense power wielded by the corporate elite. “What is the cause of crime?” conflict theorists ask. Their answer: inequality. Similarly, Marxists argue that capitalism is the primary cause of crime in capitalist society.

And feminists, who usually focus on how norms and laws tend to reinforce patriarchal institutions, also argue that the cause of crimes against women is patriarchy. In tracing abusive, criminal behavior such as rape, sexual harassment, wife battering, and the molestation of children to male privilege, feminists adopt an explanatory approach to the study of criminal behavior. “What causes crimes against women?” they ask. Their answer: patriarchy.

CONCLUSION

The coin of the sociological study of deviance has two halves – the explanatory and the constructionist. The explanatory half accounts for the causes of deviant behavior as one or more pregiven entities, behavioral syndromes with a coherent common thread whose etiology demands to be studied, located, and explicated. Even the constructionist half harbors a “minor” positivist mode. The explanatory

approach is the dominant perspective in criminology, while, today, most researchers who identify themselves as sociologists of deviance tend to adopt a more constructionist orientation. These missions are radically different. Although an explanation of deviant behavior and the social construction of deviance are not contradictory, to a major extent their respective practitioners are separate. These two camps no longer form a single coherent intellectual community whose members refer to and make extensive use of one another’s work.

SEE ALSO: Anomie; Beccaria, Cesare; Criminology; Deviance; Deviance, Constructionist Perspectives; Deviance, Normative Definitions of; Deviance, Positivist Theories of; Deviance, Theories of; Lombroso, Cesare; Merton, Robert K.; Positivism; Social Control; Social Disorganization Theory; Sutherland, Edwin H.; Theory

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deviance, the media and

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The mass media feature deviance as entertainment. It is as though deviance has become part of our popular culture and everyday lives. There are many reports about prostitution, pornography, gay rights – including marriage and having families – legalizing drugs such as marijuana, gang member initiation rites, and polygamy. Mass media reports about deviance and crime comprise a large portion of television and popular culture entertainment (Winick 1978). Most media messages rely on audience stereotypes about “weird behavior” and simply play back many of the moral messages in order to attract even larger audiences. Audiences learn to play with deviance by, on the one hand, sharing in stereotypes, being repulsed by certain conduct, and cheering on authorities who seek to eliminate deviance, while, on the other hand, celebrating deviance for its innovations and resistance to convention, and in many instances emulating deviant lifestyles. However, the mass media coverage of deviance, especially crime, has changed over the last 40 years.

Deviance and the mass media are closely joined as audiences and social control agencies (e.g., police departments) rely on, as well as promote, social meanings via the mass media. Deviance does not refer to some objective behavior, but is rather a concept that reflects socially constructed moral meanings attached to certain behavior (e.g., crime, suicide, mental illness, prostitution) that may run counter to the moral meanings of some groups (Pfuhl & Henry 1993: 33). Crime, a special segment of deviance, refers to behavior that violates the law and is therefore illegal. The mass media do not simply inform audiences about deviant behavior; rather, the mass media increasingly help shape definitions and perceptions about

deviance and social order. The relationship between what is deviant and what is illegal is somewhat complex since most of what certain audiences regard as deviant is not illegal; by the same token, however, some illegal behavior is not deviant, e.g., parental spanking and physical punishment of their own children. Moreover, widespread drug use, particularly of marijuana, is quite common even though it is illegal.

The mass media refer to information technologies that permit broadcasting and communication to a large audience. Traditionally, these media have included print (e.g., books, newspapers, magazines, billboards) and electronic media (e.g., cinema, radio, television) and, more recently, various computer communication formats, particularly the Internet. They also include personal communication devices (e.g., CD players, game players, music players – iPods), as well as pagers and cell telephones, especially when the latter are used for broadcasting messages to subscribers of paging and telephone services. The mass media are significant for our lives because they are both form and content of cultural categories and experience. As form, the mass media provide the criteria, shape, rhythm, and style of an expanding array of activities, many of which are outside of the communication process. As content, the new ideas, fashions, vocabularies, and a myriad of types of information (e.g., politics) are acquired through the mass media. Moreover, the advent of new media technologies also opens up new possibilities for deviance and crime (e.g., Internet fraud, identity theft, the use of digital camera phones for taking pictures surreptitiously of people in locker rooms).

The mass media and deviance illustrate a perspective about how perceptions of social reality are socially constructed. The key aspect is the way in which symbols become meaningful and familiar to people, who define situations as one thing rather than something else (Spector & Kitsuse 1977). From this perspective, social power is the ability to define situations. The mass media are important for defining situations and making them familiar to audiences. Numerous studies of deviance have documented the life cycle or career of public definitions of certain acts as deviant, e.g., illegal drugs (Becker 1973), alcohol (Gusfield 1986), child

abuse (Johnson 1978, 1995), and missing children (Fritz & Altheide 1987).

Contemporary life cannot be understood without acknowledging the role of various communication media in the temporal and spatial organization and coordination of everyday life. The important work of Harold Innis (Innis & Innis 1972) and Marshall McLuhan (McLuhan & Fiore 1967) not only directed attention to the contribution of the technology of media for any message, but further argued that it is the technology that is most important in altering information and social relationships. However, it has remained for others to examine their thesis and incorporate the surviving corpus within an awareness of culture and especially popular culture, commonly associated with mass production, including mass media programming and other information (Couch 1984; Couch et al. 1996). These media are important in understanding deviance for two reasons. First, the mass media have altered public perceptions about deviance, social problems, and especially crime by stressing the most violent attacks as typical of criminal behavior. Presentations about law enforcement and police behavior have influenced public views about the nature and effectiveness of criminal justice. Second, the deviance process is also affected by the mass media. This process involves how some behavior comes to be regarded as deviant, on the one hand, and how behavior that was once regarded as deviant becomes more acceptable, on the other hand.

A key aspect of mass media influence on deviance is due to the entertainment orientation of popular culture. As suggested by Snow's (1983) analysis of media culture, the entertainment format emphasizes: (1) an absence of the ordinary; (2) the openness of an adventure, outside the boundaries of routine behavior; (3) audience members' willingness to suspend disbelief. In addition, while the exact outcome may be in doubt, there is a clear and unambiguous point at which a scenario will be resolved. Packaging such emphases within formats that are visual, brief, action oriented, and dramatic produces an exciting and familiar tempo to audiences. Moreover, as audiences spend more time with these formats, the logic of advertising, entertainment, and popular culture becomes taken for granted as a normal form

of communication. For example, research suggests that corporate media seek to harvest audiences by promoting fear as entertainment throughout popular culture and news (Furedi 1997; Glassner 1999; Altheide 2002). Moreover, such emphasis cultivates audiences to support political campaigns and domestic policies on crime and control as well as foreign interventions.

Crime, as one aspect of deviance, illustrates some of these points. Crime news is so pervasive that most people believe that crime is constantly increasing and that our lives are increasingly in danger from wild, drug crazed criminals who, seemingly, choose victims at random; in other words, criminal assaults can happen to anybody, at anytime.

Criminals and victims are not the only parties featured in crime news. The police and SWAT teams also star in nightly news reports that typically feature a reporter talking with a police spokesperson about a crime that has occurred, against a backdrop of flashing red lights illuminating yellow police tape. The scenario is repeatedly played out in other television reality shows, interview programs, and numerous action movies featuring super sleuths, who solve crimes by acting as maverick investigators, often outside the boundaries of law enforcement organizations. The reality programs present scenarios and language that most viewers have heard, seen, or read about, so the tough dramatic action that is being presented seems quite plausible, especially when no nonsense crime fighters get physically abusive with "perps," browbeat reluctant witnesses who do not want to get involved, and demean judges, defense attorneys, and the criminal justice bureaucracy for "technical details" (e.g., procedures) and the rights of the accused (Fishman & Cavender 1998).

The development of television was largely built on celebrating the protectors of "normal, decent" life and people. Ranging from the western marshals, who wore white hats and enforced the law against nineteenth century desperadoes, to twenty first century superheroes and sleuths battling crime and deviance, there has been a structural relationship between the appearance, style, and behavior of law enforcement and the relentless battle against deviance and disorder. Surette (1998)

suggests that the metaphor of sheep and wolves is appropriate, with the sheep (citizens) being protected from predatory wolves (criminals – and deviants) by sheepdogs (police and law enforcement). Perhaps the prime example of the development of this entertaining genre of television was the show *Dragnet*, produced by and starring Jack Webb. *Dragnet's* depiction of the Los Angeles Police Department illustrates the relationship between entertainment and reality, and had tremendous influence on the planning, financing, recruitment, and perception of the LAPD, as well as deviance and social problems (Shaw 1992).

Television and other popular culture materials about crime do not cover all aspects of the criminal justice system (Surette 1998). Little attention is paid to corrections and prisons, on the one hand, while court and adjudication procedures receive scant attention, on the other. Indeed, except for the occasional nasty remark about the “leniency” of the courts, American audiences receive little information about how the courts actually operate. It is not surprising that opinion polls reveal that the majority of the American public agrees with President Reagan’s attorney general, Edwin Meese III: “You don’t have many suspects who are innocent of a crime. That’s contradictory. If a person is innocent of a crime, then he is not a suspect” (*US News and World Report*, October 14, 1985).

It is apparent that the mass media contribute to definitions and images about deviance and deviant actors. When there were fewer media outlets, such as in the 1950s, during the early days of television, social problems such as alcoholism, illegal drug use, prostitution, and some criminal behavior, but usually not white collar crime, were presented very simplistically as social pathology due to moral failings of weak and evil individuals. For example, the movie *Reefer Madness* presented stereotypical images of drug users and the consequences of drug use, and is now a cult film that audiences, including law enforcement officers, now regard as absurd. However, police officials were very important news sources or claims makers about illegal drugs and their personal and social consequences. While police remain important spokespersons for news reporters, the spread of the mass media has opened up greater channels

of communication, and therefore greater opportunities for minority group members as well as individuals and organizations involved in activities that are regarded as deviant and undesirable. Numerous organizations that focus on the promotion or the control of deviant activities are claims makers that rely on mass communication to promote their issues.

The entertainment oriented mass media, especially local television newscasts, tend to be interested in presenting enticing reports about deviance. However, this interest also provides an opportunity for organized spokespersons associated with deviant behavior to express themselves and offer counterclaims about their activities, their meanings, and, quite often, their humanity. For example, stereotypical images of drug users were challenged by persons supporting ballot propositions to legalize medical marijuana; elderly women pleading for public approval to use this drug to alleviate their dying husbands’ pain appear to have been quite successful in shifting public opinion to support the passage of medical marijuana legislation in several states.

One of the major contributions of the mass media to the study of deviance and crime is familiarizing audiences with very rare behavior and scenarios. For example, sex change operations are quite rare, but individuals who have had them are featured on numerous cable channels, and increasingly on the Internet as well (e.g., Jerry Springer, Oprah). As audience members, we become more familiar with the stories, scenarios, problems, and rationale for undergoing these rare treatments and surgeries. We can converse about them with friends and co workers, we can develop opinions, and even speculate on what we would do if we wanted to change, or if a son or daughter was faced with certain urges.

In sum, the mass media and deviant behavior are closely linked. Deviance, after all, is not a characteristic of the behavior per se, but rather is a result of human beings interpreting some act as deviant and undesirable. The mass media can contribute to this definition either by presenting very limiting stereotypical propaganda, or by providing more information to audiences. This entails turning to numerous claims makers, who can present accounts and experiences that may strike a responsive chord. In the

final analysis, then, the future of varieties of behavior defined as deviant will continue to be linked to the mass media.

SEE ALSO: Crime; Deviance, Crime and; Deviance, Explanatory Theories of; Deviance, Theories of; Drug Use; Mass Culture and Mass Society; Media; Popular Culture; Social Change; Social Control; Symbolic Interaction

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deviance, medicalization of

Pf McGann and Peter Conrad

Medicalization is the process whereby previously non medical aspects of life come to be seen in medical terms, usually as disorders or illnesses. A wide range of phenomena has been *medicalized*, including normal life events (birth, death), biological processes (aging, menstruation), common human problems (learning and sexual difficulties), and forms of deviance. The medicalization of deviance thus refers to the process whereby non normative or morally condemned appearance (obesity, unattractiveness, shortness), belief (mental disorder, racism), and conduct (drinking, gambling, sexual practices) come under medical jurisdiction. The tendency to see badness – whether immoral, sinful, or criminal – as illness is part of a broader historical trend from overtly punitive to ostensibly more humanitarian responses to deviance. Within this trend most scholars agree that medicalization has been on the increase. They disagree, though, as to why, to what degree, and with what consequences this is the case. It is clear, however, that medicalization processes are caught up in and complicate struggles to define and respond to deviance. Constructing deviance as illness confers a moral status different from crime or sin. As such, medicalization has implications for social control, power, knowledge, authority, and personal liberty.

Deviance has been medicalized when it is defined in medical terms, described using

medical language, or a medical framework has been adopted to understand deviance. Due to the centrality of definition in medicalization, most studies are presented in a social constructionist genre. Work on medicalization has been conducted in sociology, history, psychology, psychiatry, medicine, education, anthropology, social work, and sexology. Across these disciplines, most scholars bypass the question of whether a form of deviance is “really” a medical disorder or disease in favor of analyses of how things become medicalized.

Medicalization is a collective and political achievement that requires moral entrepreneurs who champion a medical framing of a problem. Individuals, groups, and institutions have various stakes in questions over the applicability, desirability, extent, and consequences of the medical frame. Advocacy and self help groups, social movements, clinicians, lay people, even deviants themselves have been players in medicalization dramas. Sometimes physicians support medicalization, as in premenstrual syndrome (PMS) and transsexualism. In others they actively resist it, as when medical identification of domestic violence was first introduced. Early scholarship noted the possibility of medical imperialism or colonization in cases of medicalization, typically because it serves physicians’ material, strategic, or symbolic interests. The “discovery” of child abuse, for example, has been analyzed as enhancing the prestige and legitimacy of pediatric radiologists.

Constituencies outside medicine have also been advocates for medicalization. With autoimmune deficiency syndrome (AIDS) and post traumatic stress disorder (PTSD), social movement and advocacy group pressure increased medicalization through patient–physician collaboration. Hyperactivity disorder illustrates how the prior existence of a medical treatment (Ritalin) helped consolidate a nascent medical understanding of deviant childhood behavior as illness. Recent use of human growth hormone to treat “shortness” in children with normally functioning pituitary glands illustrates how difficult it is to disentangle therapeutic, cultural, and economic interests. The Human Growth Foundation (HGF), the primary supporter for the use of synthetic human growth hormone in children, grounded its advocacy in the

difficulties that shorter than average children and adults face. However, pharmaceutical companies, e.g., Genentech, provided most of HGF’s funding.

New evidence suggests that the engines driving medicalization are changing. The role of physicians in the expansion and contraction of medicalization has been declining. The Food and Drug Administration Modernization Act of 1997 allows pharmaceutical companies to advertise directly to US patients/consumers, perhaps facilitating an increased demand for medical intervention. Newly aware of disorders and treatments alike, potential patients now increasingly self diagnose then approach doctors, oftentimes asking for drugs by name. Thus men concerned about meeting rising standards of heterosexual potency “ask [their] physicians if Viagra is right for” them; shy people may request Paxil; those burdened with sadness seek relief with Wellbutrin. The shift to managed care is another factor in changing medicalization dynamics. Managed care organizations are now central to deciding what kinds of problems will be covered by health insurance. Whether this development inhibits rather than increases medicalization is a question for more politically and economically attuned constructionist analyses.

Because medicalization is a process, different phenomena reveal different *levels* of medicalization. At the *conceptual* level, medical vocabulary or a medical model organizes the problem; neither actual medical treatment nor doctors need be involved. The construction of deviant drinking as alcoholism is the exemplar here. Alcoholics Anonymous uses a medical model of understanding but eschews medical intervention. At the *institutional* level, organizations adopt a medical response and the medical model predominates, although medical professionals may or may not be directly involved. With gambling addictions and eating disorders, for example, physicians legitimate the treatment organization’s approach but are not necessarily involved in direct care. In contrast, at the *interactional* level, physicians tend to be directly involved either through diagnosis or through the provision of treatment as part of the doctor–patient relationship. For example, patients may come to their physicians with

vague life problems, and be prescribed psychoactive drugs without any particular medical diagnosis.

The *degree* a problem is medicalized can vary from minimal (sexual addiction), to partial (obesity), through nearly complete (mental illness). Such differences in the degree of medicalization mean that competing definitions of a form of deviance may exist. Remnants of previous understandings further complicate the definitional struggle; is compulsive shopping an illness or immature failure to inhibit desire? In addition, a medical definition may be salient in one context but not another. PMS, for example, is widely understood to be a medical disorder. But whether an individual woman experiences her menstruation as illness is another matter. Similarly, behavior that many people think of as run of the mill sissiness or tomboyism is medicalized in *Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders, Fourth Edition* (DSM IV) as gender identity disorder. This dormant medical frame can be mobilized if the child's behavior or appearance comes to the attention of persons familiar with the diagnostic category; in such an instance, the "normal" tomboy or sissy is reframed as pathological.

With levels and degrees we see that medicalization is not an either/or phenomenon. Nor is medicalization a one way process. Just as deviance may become medical, the medical framing of deviance may be undone (in part or in full). As medical meaning is diluted or replaced, medical terminology and intervention are deemed inappropriate. Masturbation is the classic example of near total *demedicalization*; in the nineteenth century, masturbation was medicalized as "onanism," a disease in itself, as well as a gateway perversion that rendered those of weak constitutions more susceptible to other forms of sexual deviation. Another example is the removal of homosexuality from the third edition of the American Psychiatric Association's *Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders* (DSM III). But whereas earlier medical framing of masturbation now seems absurd to many, the reclassification of homosexuality illustrates *contested* demedicalization. Despite the 1973 decision by the American Psychiatric Association to remove homosexuality from the roster of mental disorders, a small

but vocal psychiatric minority provides reparative or conversion therapy, and a portion of the public still views homosexuality as deviance (but not necessarily as illness). Homosexuality thus also illustrates that demedicalization does not automatically mean a form of deviance has or will become conventional, only that the official medical framing has ended. Medicalization may also be contested between institutions with different jurisdictions. Deviant drinking and illicit drug use, for example, may be seen as medical, criminal, or both, setting the stage not only for "turf" battles, but also for vastly different deviant careers depending on how and by whom an individual's drinking or drugging is interpreted and responded to.

The consequences of medicalization may be positive or negative – oftentimes both. As noted, the therapeutic ethos of medicine changes the moral status of both deviance and deviant. Extension of the sick role to the deviant diminishes stigma and culpability, both of which may increase the likelihood that a pedophile, batterer, or addict for example might seek treatment. Medical explanations for inchoate or diffuse difficulties can provide coherence to symptoms, validate and legitimate troubles, and support their self management. In addition, medical recognition may facilitate insurance coverage of medical treatment, thereby transforming potential deviants into disease victims seen worthy of care and compassion. Chronic fatigue syndrome, PMS, post partum depression, and PTSD illustrate these positive effects. Moreover, as with child abuse, medicalization may increase the visibility of a form of deviance, which in turn may help transform a seemingly isolated individual trouble into a socially recognized public issue.

Despite these benefits, many analysts are wary of medicalization and its potential negative consequences. The sick role, for example, may provide a "medical excuse" for deviance; certainly, it diminishes individual responsibility. As the medical model becomes more attuned to physiological and genetic "causes" of behavior, blame shifts from the person to the body, further displacing responsibility. Medicalization allows for the use of powerful forms of social control, such as psychoactive drugs or surgical procedures. But the guise of medical scientific neutrality and/or a therapeutic

modality means medicalization may be an insidious expansion of social control. Tendencies to individualize and depoliticize social problems are also linked to medicalization. Both obscure insight that deviance may be a reflection of or adaptation to the social organization of a situation; focus on the individual symptoms of gender identity disorder or battery, for example, deflects attention from the hetero-normative gender order, gender inequality, and patriarchal values. Medicalization also enlarges medical jurisdiction. Medical expertise may then be privileged at the expense of lay or competing views. Some transsexuals, for example, decline – or cannot afford – surgical intervention for “gender dysphoria.” Others exhibit less than stereotypically conventional expressions of gender and/or refuse to pass as non-transsexuals. Because such people do not fit the prevailing medical framing of transsexualism, they may be subject to ridicule, censure, or denial of service by medical gatekeepers.

Medicalization appears to be on the increase, but how much depends in part on what is measured. One approach looks at the growing number of people diagnosed. Another considers the increasing number of diagnostic categories. In addition to the proliferation of categories, medicalization increases through expansion of extant categories. That is, diagnostic categories themselves may be stretched, encompassing more behavior within their bounds over time. Psychiatric categories, especially the functional disorders, seem especially prone to such expansion. The emergence of adult attention deficit hyperactivity disorder (ADHD), the extension of the uses of PTSD, and the widespread use of psychoactive medications like Prozac for unspecified psychological discomfort are examples of this.

The movement to medicalization has also normalized medical intervention in some forms of deviance, such as plastic surgery for unattractiveness, aging, and obesity. This proliferation of medical fixes may create an imperative to submit to medicalization such that failure to use medical enhancements or treatments itself becomes a form of deviance. Thus refusal to take antidepressants for unhappiness, or failure to surgically reconstruct racialized facial features, may be seen as deviant in some circles.

The turn toward genetic understandings of personality and social behavior also has implications for medicalization processes. But geneticization is not the same as medicalization, although interpretation is the key to both. Discovery of a genetic component of homosexuality, for example, may fuel medicalization if medical technology (genetic screening, abortion, genetic therapy) is used to decrease the homosexual “defect.” In this case, a genetic link may catalyze a *remedicalization* of homosexuality. Alternatively, a genetic cause may be viewed as evidence of the naturalness of homosexuality, perhaps facilitating further demedicalization.

Finally, genetics suggests that a further shift in medicalization processes may be under way, from external control of deviant bodies and behaviors toward manipulation of internal processes. Whether such *biomedicalization* is a change in medicalization strategy or a new beast altogether is an open question. Some argue that medicalization is a modernist phenomenon concerned with imposing and maintaining bodily homogeneity. In contrast, biomedicalization’s transformation of bodily processes produces customized bodies and identities, a dynamic characterized as postmodern. Either way, medicalization and biomedicalization processes coexist. Both are implicated in and are facilitating new patterns of physician–patient/consumer collaboration. And both are part of the trend toward increased levels of self surveillance in the pursuit of new norms of health and bodily perfection.

SEE ALSO: Deviance, Constructionist Perspectives; Medical Sociology and Genetics; Mental Disorder; Moral Entrepreneur; Sick Role; Social Control

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deviance, moral boundaries and

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Through a variety of social mechanisms, most human diversity is categorized as normal variation and a varying fraction as deviance. This area of research asks how the moral boundaries of these categories are drawn, i.e., normal versus deviant, and what determines the placement of specific actors and acts within the categories (Lauderdale 1976; Ben Yehuda 1985). The sociologist, therefore, can examine how certain actions are defined as deviant from specific social reactions and the creation of moral boundaries that separate the varying definitions of normal from deviant ones. The creation of the boundaries and the placement of individuals as either normal or deviant are viewed as basic processes of social definition that often are found to be outcomes of political variables.

Extending the seminal work of Émile Durkheim, this line of research is contrary to the conventional view of deviance as social pathology that must be normalized or eradicated. Durkheim suggested the relevance of the relationship between political power and deviance in his analysis of sanctioning, in which he posited that increases in the consolidation of

power in society will lead to proportional increases in the repressive sanctioning of people who are defined as the most deviant (i.e., criminal). Deviance is studied as a normal phenomenon, which under certain conditions can play a part in facilitating social change. Socrates in his time, for example, was seen as a serious deviant under the law of Athens. His offense, however, was his independent thought and his call to his students to think as independently as possible. Now, Socrates is viewed as having acted for a higher moral good, not only for his country but also for all people. Under the Fugitive Slave Laws of the 1850s, aiding and abetting escaped slaves was a crime. With the passage of the 14th Amendment less than a decade later, however, slavery itself was the crime. In 1800, the organization of a labor union was defined as a crime (conspiracy in restraint of trade), yet by 1940 labor unions were legal, and many employers were even required by law to engage in collective bargaining (Lauderdale 2003). Definitions of deviance not only presage actions that come to be accepted later but also reveal that some actions continue to be unacceptable.

A basic question, thus, concerns how the boundary between normal and deviant, or good and bad, is constructed, maintained, or changed. In his watershed book entitled *Wayward Puritans* (1966), Kai Erikson attempted to answer part of this question. His book focuses on a variety of central issues in politics and power, and who and what might account for the shift in the boundary between normal and deviant. His analysis of specific cases of deviance amplification or creation by the Puritans is critical because the Puritans encountered diversity and reacted to it as deviance. The people who were designated as deviants, i.e., the religious dissenters, the Quakers, and the witches, were caught in a set of larger crises. For example, the designation of Anne Hutchinson, a religious dissenter, as a deviant resulted more from the power struggle among the male religious leaders than any of her actions. Erikson (1966: 68) presents the conditions under which the boundary might shift, for example, by "a realignment of power within the group," or threats from outside the group. Moreover, the redefinition of many Japanese Americans from normal to deviant (often including imprisonment in "relocation" camps)

following the invasion of Pearl Harbor suggests similar conditions and processes. During times of crises such as “terrorist” attacks or war, external threats and realignments of power continue to be key concepts in this area of study.

Such changing social conditions also are particularly useful when we extend the ideas by also focusing upon an emerging group or larger forces in society, and the emergence of “modern” society. Mies notes in her research on the terrorizing of midwives as witches that the terror was directly related to changes in society and the state, including medical professionalization, the increasing view of medicine as a “natural science,” and the legitimization of science. Witch hunters used torture chambers as the “laboratories where the texture, the anatomy, the resistance of the human body – mainly the female body – was studied.” Mies suggests that modern medicine and hegemony in this area were established on the base of “millions of crushed, maimed, torn, disfigured and finally burnt, female bodies” (1986: 83).

At more specific levels of analysis, researchers have examined how the moral boundaries have changed via the actions of moral entrepreneurs, social movements, organizations, the state, and global institutions (Goode & Ben Yehuda 1994; Oliverio 1998; Lauderdale 2003). Moral entrepreneurs, for example, initiate public discourses on particular issues trying to persuade the public and the state of their view of the truth. Joseph McCarthy, a classic example, who was a senator from Wisconsin, called for the purge of suspected communists in the 1950s. Initially, he was lauded as a great leader as he helped shift the moral boundaries, but evidence later revealed that many of the suspects were simply exercising their freedom of speech or were misidentified. The sociological literature on the changes in status, i.e., from normal to deviant or vice versa, of moral entrepreneurs such as McCarthy can be extended to examine other entrepreneurs working on various crusades or projects. Such entrepreneurs include people such as Ralph Nader (his early work on consumer protection), Leonard Peltier (his concerns with American Indian issues), Bobby Seals (his actions on racialization and freedom), and Mother Teresa (her projects on charity and love).

Social movement research has included people protesting in numerous arenas, such as the diverse movements against the North American Free Trade Agreement and the World Trade Organization, where protestors demand free access to water, air, and public space. Other movements are those such as MADD (Mothers Against Drunk Driving), the anti abortion a.k.a. pro life movement, the pro gun or anti gun movement, anti pornography groups, and the anti smoking movement. Researchers also are exploring the factors that lead to the transformation of a social movement into a social organization, which is important because most social movements do not reach institutional levels.

Research on the role of social organizations in creating, maintaining, or transforming moral boundaries recently has concentrated narrowly on the media. This research agenda can be extended by examining organizational forces that influence the media. In addition, the historical overview of scholars such as Annamarie Oliverio (1998) suggests the importance of unraveling the deep connections between expanding organizations, law, trials, the state, and globalization.

SEE ALSO: Deviance; Durkheim, Émile; Power, Theories of; Social Movements; State

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deviance, normative definitions of

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Sociologists tend to define deviance in one of two ways: by the negative reactions an act, the expression of a belief, or a physical characteristic generates, or by the violation of the norms or the rules that prevail in a given society or group. Reactivist definitions come in two varieties: the "hard" or strict reactivist definition, which defines deviance as acts, beliefs, or conditions that have already attracted a negative reaction from one or more audiences, and the "soft" or moderate definition, which defines deviance as behavior, beliefs, or conditions that are likely to generate negative reactions from audiences. In contrast, the normative definition identifies deviance as a violation of a norm held in certain social circles or by a majority of the members of the society at large. A norm is a standard about "what human beings should or

should not think, say, or do under given circumstances" (Blake & Kingsley 1964). Put another way, a norm is a social expectation concerning thought or behavior in particular situations. Violations of norms tend to draw reactions or sanctions from their social audiences. These sanctions generate the pressure that most people feel to conform to social norms. However, even if the actor, the believer, or the possessor is not detected or chastised for a normative violation, the non-normative act, belief, or trait is deviant nonetheless. To the normative definition, what defines something as deviance is a formal violation of the rules.

Norms evaluate conduct; recognizing that some acts (including beliefs and the expression of beliefs) ought or ought not to occur, either in specific situations (e.g., no smoking in public elevators) or at any time or place (e.g., no armed robbery, ever). The use of proper etiquette reflects deliberate decisions to adhere to norms of respect and consideration for others (Post 2003). The norms that comprise etiquette are also situational, but are more likely to be codified than norms in many social situations.

The conception of norms as expectations highlights regularities of behavior based on habit or traditional customs. People expect a child, for example, to act a certain way in church, another way on the playground. This raises another dimension of norms: they are situationally bound. Running and yelling of children is appropriate for the playground, but not in church. Laughing is expected behavior in a comedy club, but not at a funeral.

Norms are not necessarily clear-cut rules; instead, they are social properties. They are shared group evaluations or guidelines, and many of them are learned implicitly in the more general process of socialization. Rules come from one or more authorities which formulate them individually and impose them on members of a particular society. This authority could be the state, which reserves the right to exercise coercive force over the citizenry, or a monarch or a despot. Norms are an absolutely essential component of the social order.

No one has attempted to count norms because the number is quite large, depending on the group. There is an enormous number of possible situations in which norms regulate behavior. There is, for example, a norm that

guides people's behavior in elevators: one is expected to face the door. Sometimes the rationale for norms is vague. In this example, every one facing the same direction avoids invading someone else's "personal space," the distance between two strangers that feels most comfortable. This distance varies from culture to culture. Italians are comfortable with less distance between them than are Americans.

People risk being labeled as a deviant by audiences when they express unacceptable beliefs (such as worshiping devils), violate behavioral norms (such as engaging in proscribed sexual acts), or possessing certain physical traits widely regarded as undesirable, which include physical handicaps (being confined to a wheelchair) and violations of appearance norms (e.g., obesity) (Clinard & Meier 2004). However, even if audiences do not witness or learn about the normative violation, it is deviant nonetheless. In other words, to the normative definition, "secret" deviance is not a contradiction in terms; it exists, and is an important variety of deviance. In fact, it is possible that most normative violations remain a secret and never generate negative reactions of any kind from disapproving audiences. The normative definition is based on a certain measure of predictability that normative violations are likely to attract negative reactions, even if they are never observed. The fact that in a particular context or instance, a given observed act, expressed belief, or physical characteristic did not generate negative sanctions for the actor, believer, or possessor is beside the point. The normative sociologist does not have to wait until condemnation takes place to know that something is deviant. It is the violation of what the norms of a society or group say about proper and improper behavior, beliefs, and characteristics that defines them as deviant. For instance, we know in advance that it is a violation of society's norms to walk down the street, nude (Gibbs 1972), and hence, that that act is deviant. In contrast, the "strict" reactivist definition denies the predictability that negative sanctions follow normative violations, and denies the existence of "secret" deviance, arguing that the concept is an oxymoron (Pollner 1974). Most sociologists of deviance adopt some version of a normative definition of the concept, arguing that the strict normative definition makes it

impossible to study most normative violations as deviance, hence, fatally restricting the sociologist's domain of investigation.

SEE ALSO: Deviance; Deviance, Reactivist Definitions of; Norms; Positive Deviance; Social Control

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deviance, positivist theories of

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Sociologists define deviance as the violation of a norm that, if discovered, typically results in punishment, scorn, or stigmatization of the offender. The normative violation can include acts, beliefs, and traits or characteristics. This definition opens two radically different though complementary missions or lines of inquiry: those that attempt to explain the causes and consequences of normative violations, and those that explore the dynamics underlying the social construction, accompaniments, and consequences of the norms, including laws and their enforcement. Sociologists of deviance – including criminologists – who adopt the first

of these missions are usually referred to as “positivists”; those who adopt the second are called “constructionists.” Positivist sociologists of deviance and crime nearly always study non normative behavior, while constructionists look at the full gamut of normative violations – behavior, beliefs, and physical characteristics.

In the social sciences, positivism is usually defined as the natural science approach to social life. This means that the methods by which scientists study the world of biology, chemistry, and physics can be applied – taking their different subject matter into account, of course – to the social, anthropological, economic, psychological, political, and even religious worlds. The positivist approach is made up of the following assumptions: objectivism (i.e., phenomena take on a reality independent of their social construction); empiricism (we can know the world through our five senses); and determinism (the phenomena of the material world, including the social world, are linked together in a cause and effect fashion).

Objectivism refers to the fact that the positivist approach to deviance would argue that the violation of social and legal norms constitutes an objectively real, pre given entity that contains a common thread that demands an explanation. If deviance, including crime, and its constituent elements did not contain a common thread – that is, if it were a social label and nothing else – then no explanation attempting to account for it would be possible. *Empiricism* typically refers to the fact that the violations of social norms can be investigated by means of highly sophisticated, quantitative social research methodologies, such as surveys, which stress reliability and validity. *Determinism* refers to the fact that the central question in positivist research is: “Why do they do it?” In the field of the sociology of deviance and crime, positivists assume that they can discover law like generalizations that account for normative violations. Positivist approaches are not confined to sociology, of course; the factor attempting to explain crime has included biological, psychological, and sociological variables. All positivist theories of deviance – whether they focus on the individual, the individual in a particular context or social structure, or the social structure itself – address their research to the same basic question. In all of them, the *dependent*

variable is the normative violation, and the *independent* variable is the factor their theory addresses.

THE EARLY POSITIVISTS

The first positivists of deviance and crime belonged to a group of social statisticians who studied the social, physical, and environmental conditions associated with normative and legal violations, the most well known of whom was Adolphe Quetelet (1796–1874). Quetelet identified the existence of law like regularities in officially recorded criminal behavior, suggesting to him that crime was subject to causal laws that could be revealed through an approach and a research methodology similar to those of the natural sciences. By implying that crime is a product of society, Quetelet opened the possibility of a sociological analysis of crime.

The early years of the positivist approach to deviance and crime are most closely associated with the Positive School founded by Italian physician Cesare Lombroso (1835–1909). The Positive School was an attempt to apply the methods of studying the physical world to the world of crime. Advocates of the Positive School believed that violations of the law could be accounted for by natural causes rather than by free will. In this sense, the Positive School was a rejection of the free will hedonism of the Classical School, associated with the writings of Cesare Beccaria (1738–94), Jeremy Bentham (1748–1832), and Adam Smith (1723–90). The approach of the Positive School was far more radically positivistic than that adopted by Quetelet, in that it identified the cause of criminal behavior principally as a biological factor: one or more physical defects (or “atavisms”) in the human organism. Atavisms are ape like “throw backs,” primitive characteristics that appear in some modern humans. They included a small brain, a sloping forehead, a large jaw, and a stooped posture. These defects, the theory argued, induce some people to commit crime. Lombroso’s early focus on biological factors has led some observers to dub his approach as the “born criminals” theory. Unlike Quetelet’s theory, which was structural and sociological, Lombroso’s was a “kinds of people” explanation that looked no further than the individual

characteristics of offenders. Over time, however, Lombroso modified his explanation; with each new edition of his book, *The Criminal Man*, he attributed a decreasing impact of biological factors and an increasing role for social factors. Lombroso's influence on the study of crime is immense, both in his insistence that criminal behavior be studied objectively and scientifically and in his focus on biological factors, an emphasis that remains in certain quarters of the field of criminology to this day. Lombroso argued that engaging in criminal behavior was the result of forces that diminish the role of free will or rational choice – again, a hallmark of contemporary positivistic approach to deviance and crime.

All positivists *assume but do not investigate* the social construction of the norms and the laws. Indeed, how laws and norms come into being and what their consequences are for the violators is not an issue for the positivist, who assumes that answers to the “Why do they do it?” question would be the same regardless of how they emerged and operate. In other words, the relativity of the social norms and the law is irrelevant; the same cause and effect mechanisms would produce more or less the same pattern of normative and legal violations, regardless of what society or historical time period we are discussing. Positivists are interested in the cause or causes of deviant and criminal behavior under any and all normative and legal circumstances.

POSITIVIST THEORIES OF CRIME AND DEVIANCE

Positivist theories of crime and deviance run the gamut from genetic and biochemical through psychological to sociological. The *sociological* theories that attempt to explain or account for normative or legal violations include: social disorganization theory; anomie theory; learning theory; social control theory; and self control theory. In addition, several of the most prominent constructionist theories harbor a “minor” or positivistic mode: labeling theory; control theory, including Marxism; and feminism.

Social disorganization theory. During the 1920s, the sociology faculty and graduate

students at the University of Chicago developed a perspective toward deviance, crime, and delinquency that has come to be called the Chicago School, or social disorganization theory. Using the city of Chicago as their laboratory, these researchers took as their explanatory variable the instability of entire neighborhoods and communities. Regardless of their individual characteristics, people who live in such communities are more likely to engage in illegal and non normative behaviors than persons residing in more stable communities. What makes for unstable or disorganized communities is that rents are inexpensive, the populations who live in them invest little financially or emotionally in living there, and they tend to be socially and geographically mobile. Hence, they tend not to monitor or sanction the behavior of wrongdoing in their midst. As a result, residents can commit infractions of the law and the social norms without consequence, and tend to do so with greater frequency than in communities in which their co residents monitor and sanction their behavior. In such communities, street crime, drug abuse, alcoholism, prostitution, juvenile delinquency, and mental disorder are common; law abiding residents tend to move as soon as they can, contributing to further crime, deviance, delinquency, and social disorganization. By the 1940s, the Chicago School had become regarded as obsolete (in the 1960s, a school of deviance research came to be dubbed the “neo Chicagoans,” but they had a very different orientation). But by the late 1980s, social disorganization theory experienced a rebirth of interest, and is now a major perspective in the study of crime, delinquency, and social problems.

Anomie theory. Closely associated with the early work of Robert Merton (1968), the anomie perspective was a structural theory of crime and delinquency. Modern societies, Merton reasoned, especially the United States, offered their residents substantial opportunities. But while status goals, like materialism and wealth, are stressed, access to these goals is limited. Important status goals remain inaccessible to many groups, including the poor, the lower class, and certain racial and ethnic groups who suffer discrimination, such as blacks and Chicanos. Anomie develops as a result of an acute disjuncture between culturally valued

goals and the legitimate means through which society allows certain groups to achieve those goals. So, while everyone learns to aspire to the “American Dream” of financial success, in reality the social structure can provide legitimate opportunities to only a few, leaving others frustrated in their search for success. As a result, some will turn to alternative means by which to reach their success goals. These will be mainly lower class minority males in urban areas whom the system fails to benefit. Anomie theory continues to be popular, as do variations of anomie theory that provide more detail about both societal pressure to succeed and adapting to those pressures.

Learning theory. There are a number of learning theories of deviance, but one of the most respected is criminologist Edwin Sutherland’s (1947) theory of differential association. Crime and other forms of deviance are the result not of biological or psychological defect but of learning criminal norms. Sutherland, like other learning theorists, believed that the most powerful learning takes place in small, intimate groups among people who know one another well, such as close friends. These groups are very important because the members have high credibility with one another. During social interaction, people can teach other people many things, including techniques and rationale for committing crimes. Sutherland called the content of most of this learning “definitions favorable to violation of law.” In other words, the content of the learning was a justification or motivation to commit a crime. Such definitions can, of course, be reinforced over time. There are other kinds of learning theories which identify the psychological processes involved in the learning, but all learning theories are consistent on a central point: crime is neither inherited nor inevitable. Rather, it is acquired from others in a process of communication and interaction.

Social control theory. Social control theory, or more conventionally just control theory, asserts that deviance is not so much learned or the result of societal pressure as it is simply not controlled (Hirschi 1969). Popularized in the late 1960s, control theory stresses not things that push people to crime (like criminal motivation) but things that keep a person restrained and in

conformity. Control theorists believe that crime results when a person is not restrained or controlled by society. The control of particular interest in control theory is the individual’s bond with society. The closer the bond, the less likely that person will commit a deviant act. There are several elements of the bond, including attachment, commitment, involvement, and belief. The more a person is attached to his or her group, the more that person is committed to the group and its goals, the more time the person spends in the group, and the more the person believes in the norms of the group, the less likely will that person deviate from the group’s norms. Control theory generated a good deal of research and was a leading positivist theory in the 1970s and 1980s.

Self control theory. Self control theory, developed by Michael Gottfredson and Travis Hirschi (1990), is a theory with both learning and control elements. Self control theory posits that through the general socialization process, some people fail to develop self control over their behavior. They are therefore more likely to engage in risky acts, including crime, drugs, alcohol, and other behavior that overlooks or neglects the long term consequences of continuing to engage in that behavior.

Constructionist theory’s positivistic mode. The perspective in the sociology of deviance that is referred to as “labeling theory” arose in the 1960s as a reaction against the dominant positivistic study of normative violations (Lemert 1951; Becker 1973). Labeling theory’s principal focus was on how conceptions of wrongdoing are developed, how rules are enforced, and what the consequences of being labeled as a deviant are. In other words, its approach was mainly in the constructionist vein. However, a “minor” mode of labeling theory argued that being stigmatized as a wrongdoer – a “deviant” – often has the ironic consequence of solidifying a deviant identity and entrenching patterns of deviant behavior. In other words, one aspect of this approach is causal or positivistic in its orientation: *labeling causes deviance*.

In a like vein, conflict theory is focused mainly on inequality in power as the primary determinant of the criminal law and its enforcement – an entirely constructionist endeavor. Nonetheless, conflict theorists also examine

inequality as a major *cause* of criminal behavior. Members of the lower class are more likely to commit common street crimes, this perspective argues, because in a society based on social class, their options for success and social mobility are extremely limited. In contrast, corporate crime – the ability of executives to commit and, usually, get away with crimes that are vastly more lucrative than street crimes – is a manifestation of the immense power wielded by the corporate elite. “What is the cause of crime?” conflict theorists ask. Their answer: inequality. Similarly, Marxists argue that capitalism is the primary cause of crime in capitalist society.

Feminists, who usually focus on how norms and laws tend to reinforce patriarchal institutions, also argue that the cause of crimes against women is patriarchy. In tracing abusive, criminal behavior such as rape, sexual harassment, wife battering, and the molestation of children to male privilege, some feminists adopt a positivist approach to the study of criminal behavior.

The coin of the sociological study of deviance has two halves – the positivist and the constructionist. The positivist half examines the causes of deviant behavior as one or more pre-given entities, behavioral syndromes with a coherent common thread whose etiology demands to be studied, located, and explained. Even the constructionist half harbors a “minor” positivist mode. Positivism is the dominant approach in criminology, while today most researchers who identify themselves as sociologists of deviance tend to adopt a more constructionist orientation. Although positivism and constructionism are not contradictory, to a major extent, their respective practitioners are to some degree separate; they no longer form an intellectual community who refer to one another’s work.

SEE ALSO: Anomie; Beccaria, Cesare; Conflict Theory; Criminology; Deviance, Constructionist Perspectives; Deviance, Crime and; Empiricism; Feminist Criminology; Labeling Theory; Lombroso, Cesare; Objectivity; Self Control Theory; Social Control; Social Disorganization Theory; Sutherland, Edwin H.

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deviance processing agencies

George S. Rigakos

Deviance processing agencies refers to a wide gamut of institutions and agencies both public and private involved in the identification, vetting, and dispensation of populations considered at risk, dangerous, or that presumably require monitoring and surveillance to mitigate potential harms. Deviance processing agencies have been considered in a more comprehensive manner since the 1960s and 1970s and constitute a central focus of inquiry for social theorists interested in governmentality risk and social control. During anti-war student protests and the radicalization of academia in the 1960s and 1970s, sociologists and criminologists employed critical approaches often born out of a Marxian orientation (e.g., Spitzer 1975) to critically analyze developments in police practices, punitive legal measures, and inhumane prison conditions. They offered explanations of repressive state practices (Cooper et al. 1975) against dissidents and socially constructed deviants within the context of managing crises of

capitalist legitimacy, the symbolic importance of the labeling process, and the inherently biased function of legal norms (Quinney 1974). By the 1980s, a rather substantial body of scholarly work tied to an evolving critical criminology movement analyzed and deconstructed the practices of criminal justice agencies, particularly in the context of rising crime rates, mass imprisonment, and punitive neoconservative crime control policies (Lowman et al. 1987).

While interest in a critical analysis of state agencies was piqued by the unrest of the 1960s and 1970s, perhaps the best known deconstruction of the internal classification practices of a deviance processing agency is Goffman's (1961) ethnographic analysis of the asylum. His approach exposed how both initial classification and subsequent personal bias and discretion on the part of institutional workers reinforced the interpretation of seemingly innocuous behaviors as constitutive of a pre diagnosed mental malady. Thus, central to an understanding of how deviance processing agencies operate is to come to terms with the logics by which such organizations identify deviancy in the first place and how this vetting process accomplishes institutional objectives. Another focal concern, of course, is how these targeted populations are managed (or treated).

Reflecting general political and meta theoretical changes in academic climate, contemporary analyses of deviance processing agencies have moved away from Marxian interpretations. The most influential work in this area is now by Foucault (1977), whom some later analysts have read as both a rejection of Marxist functionalist interpretations and as an impetus for the decentering of the state in sociological explanations. The utility of Foucauldian notions such as panoptics, governmentality, and surveillance has significantly altered the lexicon of analysis in this area (Garland 1997). This shift in thinking is comprised of two main attributes. First, a realization that a significant proportion of deviance processing is accomplished by state, quasi state, and private institutions or organizations outside the context of the criminal justice system. Contemporary analysts have, for example, turned their attention towards state welfare agencies, private policing, and the profound disciplinary powers of insurance companies. Second, that

in the historical development of the science of "knowing" populations an important qualitative shift has occurred with the mass availability and distribution of computers after World War II. Sociologists have offered both substantive empirical examinations and general theoretical explanations for this profound transformation. A central element of this conversion is the institutional reliance on statistical *deviation* from a prescribed norm as actually constituting *deviance*. Thus, increasingly, private agencies such as insurance companies rely on actuarial grids to assess risky populations that in the eyes of such institutional needs constitutes deviance – a potential harm to the corporation.

Of course, such techniques are also widespread in the criminal justice system, including important decision making on likelihood to reoffend, the classification of prisoners within levels of custodial security, and even the designation of dangerous offenders based on indicators such as the psychopathy checklist. In other words, deviance processing has become multifarious and ubiquitous as we consistently come into contact with institutional requirements that we provide identification and that our credentials (ranging from criminal history to credit standing) become known. This routine provision of personal data is alternately considered part of a system of dataveillance, the move to a superpanopticon (Poster 1990), and even the ushering in of a new risk society. Indeed, risk and probability thus become unavoidable components of the deviance processing system acting as not only methodological solutions but also the problems (i.e., a bottomless barrel of risks) (Beck 1992).

Some of the critiques of these schools of thought have to do with the perceived "newness" of such surveillance practices for deviance processing and to what extent the purpose and function of such processing is qualitatively different from the targeted populations previously identified under Marxian formulations; the extent to which these processes are largely an expansion of Weberian identified tendencies toward rationalization and bureaucratization; and a conceptual slippage between deviance, social control, risk, and regulation. Each of these three issues has significant theoretical implications for our understanding of not only deviance processing but also, by

implication, political and social theory and his toriography (Rigakos & Hadden 2001).

SEE ALSO: Courts; Criminal Justice System; Deviance, Criminalization of; Governmentality and Control; Risk, Risk Society, Risk Behavior, and Social Problems; Social Control; Surveillance

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deviance, reactivist definitions of

Henry N. Pontell

The sociology of deviance entails two major perspectives, both of which emphasize the relative nature of the phenomenon. The normative

perspective, which most sociologists adhere to, views deviance as being located in customs and rules; deviance is the formal violation of one or more norms. The reactivist perspective, which has been associated with the labeling theory of deviance, takes a more radical approach to the relative nature of deviance, and views the existence and characteristics of deviance in how real behaviors, beliefs, or conditions are actually judged by relevant audiences (Goode 2001). Labeling theory has been marked by controversy since it arrived on the sociological scene in the 1960s. Two of its major proponents (Kitsuse 1972; Becker 1973) do not consider it a theory at all, and reject the term labeling, in characterizing what they view as the interactionist perspective. This term derives from the sociological perspective of symbolic interactionism, which sees all acts emanating from meanings that persons attach to social phenomena, with these meanings growing and changing through a continual interpretive process involving interactions with others (Blumer 1969). In a major review of labeling theory, Goode (1975) concludes that it "isn't a theory at all," and further relates that it might not even be a "general perspective," but rather a way of considering specific aspects of deviance through the application of symbolic interactionism.

The reactivist perspective is commonly traced to the writings of historian Frank Tanenbaum (1938), who highlighted the nature of community reactions to juvenile delinquency as the "dramatization of evil," whereby the social definition of the behavior was attached instead to the people who behaved that way, making them more prone to take on a deviant (evil) role. A little over a decade later, sociologist Edwin M. Lemert (1951) greatly expanded upon this general idea, including broader conceptualizations that related symbolic interactionism to the study of deviance. His classic distinction between primary deviance (related to the original causes of deviant behavior, which he termed "polygenetic," or due to a wide range of causes) and secondary deviance (related to the effective causes, after labeling took place, and a person formed a deviant identity), and his insistence that reactions form the essential quality of the social reality of deviance, formed the basis for the reactivist definition of deviance.

“Strict” reactivists (Kitsuse 1962) claim that in order for deviance to exist, the act, condition, or belief must first be heard about or witnessed, and second, must be met with concrete social disapproval, condemnation, or punishment. If these conditions are not satisfied, according to strict reactivists, deviance does not socially exist. If acts, beliefs, or conditions are known about and not reacted to as deviant, or if they remain hidden, makes no difference to strict reactivists. Real responses by audiences to concrete phenomena are what matter, and not the act, belief, or condition. Strict reactivists deny that audiences react to phenomena “in the abstract,” that is, as *classes* of acts, beliefs, or conditions (Gibbs 1972). It is the real life expression of some disapproval or condemnation to a specific act that defines deviance, according to strict reactivists.

Although Lemert’s work was among the most influential in what became known as the labeling perspective, it is quite clear that he was not a “strict” reactivist. In his landmark work *Social Pathology* (1951), he acknowledges deviant acts that are “clandestine,” have “low visibility,” and “escape the public eye.” That is, deviant forms can exist without actual reactions of audiences. What he does draw major intellectual attention to, however, is that socially visible deviations can attract a wide range of expressions and attitudes from a conforming majority. This entails an important dynamic process between *doing* deviance (for whatever reasons) and *becoming* a deviant (forming a deviant identity) that comprises the heart of the reactivist definition of deviance and the labeling perspective. He wrote that “older sociology . . . tended to rest heavily upon the idea that deviance leads to social control. I have come to believe that the reverse idea, i.e., social control leads to deviance, is equally tenable and the potentially richer premise for studying deviance in modern society” (Lemert 1967: v).

While both Lemert and Tannenbaum highlighted the ironic consequences of condemning deviance, in that this could produce further rule breaking behavior, Lemert (1951) noted that sometimes a reduction or elimination of the behavior in question resulted as well; an idea that fell by the wayside as later labeling proponents, in an effort to distinguish their new perspective from older ones, emphasized

the notion that negative reactions lead to further deviance.

Goode (2001: 27–8) notes three major criticisms of strict reactivism. “First, it ignores secret behavior or conditions that would be reacted to as deviance, were they known to the community.” Gibbs (1972) and Polsky (1969), among others, claim that strict reactivism is self defeating, as it poses a theoretical dilemma that concerns the notion of “secret deviance,” or phenomena that would be condemned if they were viewed by the community or other relevant audience. Secret deviance does not exist according to the strict reactivist; it is a contradiction in terms. This dilemma makes it impossible to research behavior and conditions that have not been reacted to or punished as deviance. A professional thief, white collar criminal, terrorist, or drug dealer who had not been reacted to would not be a legitimate subject for the study of deviance according to a strict reactivist perspective. “Second, the strict reactivist definition ignores secret behavior and conditions that would be reacted to as deviant, even where the actor or possessor knows that it would be condemned by the community at large” (Goode 2001). Strict reactivism ignores the views of persons who would be considered deviant by others. Such persons know they are different, usually disagree that they are worthy of condemnation, and have beliefs about how they would be treated upon discovery by others. These “secret deviants” are different than conformists, even though they exist among them. Denying this through strict reactivism denies a good part of the social reality of deviance. “Third, the strict reactivist definition denies the possibility that there is predictability in the reactive process” (Goode 2001). Strict reactivism assumes that researchers cannot predict in advance what real acts or conditions will be responded to negatively. A more reasonable assumption would be that there is a general association between types of acts and types of reactions (Gibbs 1972), a position that is taken by “moderate” reactivists, who acknowledge and incorporate the normative aspects of deviance into their analyses.

The utility of a moderate reactivist definition of deviance is demonstrated in the seminal work of symbolic interactionist Erving Goffman

(1963) on the concept of stigma. Goffman distinguishes between discredited and discreditable individuals. The former have already been negatively labeled. The latter are in danger of being discredited if information about them becomes known. These “potential” deviants would stand a high probability of being condemned and stigmatized if their true status were revealed. By relating the fact that a person who holds such discrediting information is sociologically different from one who does not, Goffman shows that actual labeling by audiences is but one aspect of defining deviance, and not the sole criterion for making such a determination (Goode 2001).

Other theorists, most notably Howard Becker (1963, 1973) and Kai Erikson (1962, 1966) – the latter of whose work can also be placed within the functionalist school of thought – can be considered moderate reactivists. Unlike strict reactivists, they do not view deviance as simply residing in a concrete negative reaction to an actual behavior. Rather, moderate reactivists believe that the labeling process is crucial to understanding deviance as a social phenomenon and cannot be ignored scientifically. Their approach centers on the problems inherent in the origins and consequences of labeling, which behaviors are condemned at different times and in different places, selectivity issues, the role and consequences of stigmatization, and the differences between known and secret deviants. In other words, the “soft” or moderate reactivist argues that *categories* of deviance exist, even if *specific* actors, believers, and possessors of non-normative characteristics have not been *concretely* punished or labeled.

A critical defining variable used by both strict and moderate reactivists is the audience involved in the labeling process. Audiences vary from single individuals (even the perpetrators themselves), to small groups, intimates, communities, official agents of social control, societies, or all humanity (Schur 1971). The question that separates strict and moderate reactivists is whether or not audiences always have to directly respond to deviant acts in order for these acts to be considered deviant. Moderate reactivists (which include most labeling proponents) would assert that audiences do not always have to witness an act for it to be deviant. In many common instances the

reaction can be predicted. This also means that acts are not deviant in some absolute sense, but only as so judged by real or potential audiences.

Labeling proponents, whether they are strict or moderate reactivists, have been referred to as “neo Chicagoans” (Matza 1969) in that – unlike the Chicago School, which focused on social disorganization as a cause of deviance – they do not consider the etiology of deviant behavior other than that which may further emanate from the labeling process. However, labeling researchers follow in the Chicago tradition of applying anthropological ethnography to the study of deviance, including an up close examination of the deviant’s world, as well as the audiences who label them.

SEE ALSO: Deviance; Deviance, Absolutist Definitions of; Deviant Beliefs/Cognitive Deviance; Deviance; Normative Definitions of; Lemert, Edwin; Symbolic Interaction

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deviance, research methods

Scott Grills

It is in part through their methodologies that sociological studies of deviance are distinguished from other disciplinary interests (e.g., philosophical, legal) in troublesome or otherwise offensive aspects of human group life. Questions of method are fundamentally questions related to our theories of knowing: how we claim to know what we know, how we go about the work of supporting our knowledge claims, and how we construct the intersubjective realities we share. The process of doing research involves a critical assessment of our theories of the social world in light of the empirical world that we are claiming to represent.

Sociology is a discipline that is marked by internal controversies about the preferred ways to conceptualize the social world and to study it. Unlike many of the traditional disciplines within the natural sciences, sociology is not dominated by one theoretical tradition, but is best understood as a discipline that is home to multiple paradigms. Of the various understandings of deviance that are to be found in the extended literature, this author's commitments are best contextualized relative to interactionist

understandings of deviance. Deviance is understood therein as a negative quality that is attributed to any social act or social object by some audience. From these perspectives, deviance is not a quality of any thought, act, or object, but rather is a quality that is attributed by an audience. Understanding deviance as a social construction firmly distances these sociological interests from those of the moralists. By so doing the work and commitment of moral entrepreneurs (e.g., rule creators, promoters of definitions of social problems, those promoting particular campaigns and crusades) is distinguished from those whose interests are more fully grounded in the sociological traditions of empirical inquiry, conceptual development, and theoretically attentive analysis. The sociological life is of course also a form of commitment – a commitment to research practice, to theorizing, and to empirically grounded and referential research. This is not a value free enterprise, but is one that reflects a commitment to understanding the social world. As such, a sociological interest in deviance is meaningfully distinct from the agenda of the moral entrepreneur, whose position ultimately shares more with other promoters of definitions of good and evil than it does with the sociological method or the sociological imagination.

Additionally, an understanding of deviance that is attentive to the moral attributions of some audience thereby clearly distinguishes “deviance” from “difference.” While any aspect of social life may be attributed with negative definitions, simple statistical difference is never enough to establish some aspect of social life as deviant. Therefore, a sociological understanding of deviant behavior is necessarily attentive to the moral dramas that accompany the social production of deviance. As such, an air of disrespectability accompanies the work of deviance scholars.

As Prus and Grills (2003) have argued, the study of deviance is marked by the deviant mystique. That is, what people think of as deviant may be defined simultaneously as offensive, immoral or otherwise troubling, and intriguing, fascinating, and alluring. The interest that the inquirer and various audiences may bring to the study of deviance in no way absolves the researcher from the best practices that accompany good research. In fact, the

reverse is the case. In the context of studies that may see researchers experience stigma arising from their chosen areas of study, the requirement to sustain committed and articulated research practices for the problem at hand remains rather crucial. Students of deviance and deviant behavior face the professional imperative to resist the deviant mystique in order to bring the same rigorous commitment to this inquiry as is to be expected of the sociological tradition more generally. The methodological practice that sociologists bring to the studies of deviance are not, in their most fundamental forms, distinct. However, the real life obstacles to understanding deviance – research in settings that may be marked by disrespectability, participants who define themselves at risk, the problems of the distinction between the discredited and the discreditable, formal control and institutionalization, and subcultural dynamics – establish deviance research as particularly challenging professionally and personally.

The challenges that accompany the empirical study of deviant behavior are many and each strategy that researchers may employ brings with it a mixture of insight and blindness. Where some aspects of social life are highlighted, others are necessarily lost to the gaze of the researcher. While some have argued for multiple methods as a proposed solution to this problem (e.g., survey research and participant observation and experimental design as component parts of a single project), others are less than convinced that methodological eclecticism is a reasonable position for the theorist to adopt. The methods we employ reflect the interests of the researcher and are not in any way neutral, accompanied as they are with their own theories of knowing and assumptions about the fundamental qualities of human group life. For example, if one's intention is to collect data amenable to statistical analysis and one's analytical modeling is linear, then some very specific assumptions about population, sample, and the causation of human action are necessarily incorporated into one's analysis. Where the researcher is willing to argue for and defend these assumptions this is non-problematic relative to the diversity that is found within the discipline. However, should the same research simultaneously "triangulate"

by adopting methods which make divergent and contradictory assumptions about human group life and human action, one might reasonably ask upon which rock they are standing, for the contradictions in such a circumstance are irresolvable. Quite apart from the specific methodological practices that are utilized to engage the empirical world, it is essential that students of deviant behavior attend to the relative congruence of the methodological and the theoretical positions adopted in the study of deviant behavior.

At the risk of doing harm to the wonderful diversity which is to be found in the sociological study of deviant behavior, the distinction made by Rubington and Weinberg (1996) between those theorists of deviance who take deviance to be objectively given and those who understand deviance to be subjectively problematic remains a useful one. Prus and Grills (2003) argue that there is (or ought to be) a reciprocity between the methodological positions of theorists and where they place their work relative to this rather rough edged typology. Ultimately, it is the questions we ask that define our interests, reveal our theoretical commitments, and position us as inquirers. Given the various theoretical positions that scholars bring to the study of deviance, some methods are more appropriate for the questions that accompany their interests than others.

QUANTITATIVE RESEARCH METHODS: COUNTING DEVIANCE

For some researchers, questions pertaining to "offense" rates are particularly salient to their work. What proportion of the population is gay or lesbian? What is the age of first sexual intercourse and how has this changed over time? How do homicide rates vary between the cities of Seattle and Vancouver? Questions of this order are most appropriately addressed through quantitative measures. C. Wright Mills's grand question for the sociological imagination, "What are the major issues for publics and the key troubles of private individuals in our time?" requires an attentiveness to the characteristics of a given society and its historical social structures (Mills 1959: 11–22). The ability to frame deviance relative to unemployment, changing

religiosity, perceived quality of life, changing gender roles, and societal change rests, in part, on being able to secure reliable and valid data that appropriately pertain to the population under study.

Official data may be particularly helpful for those who are interested in learning more about the formal regulation of deviance – the quantity of targets who have come to the attention of control agents, the demographic characteristics of targets, treatments and punishments applied by control agents, official assessment of treatment program successes, and regional variations manifested in preceding indicators.

In the US the Uniform Crime Reports represent the most fully articulated source of official data of the Federal Bureau of Investigation index of crimes. As Grove et al. (1985) argue, these data reflect a valid measure of offenses that the public and the police jointly consider to be crimes that are a threat to order and community. Since 1961 Canada has also established a uniform crime reporting system. Official statistics pertaining to deviant behavior are collected and publicly disseminated by Statistics Canada and the Canadian Centre for Justice Statistics.

These data include relatively complete and thorough accountings of those who are incarcerated, as well as related recidivism rates. Of course, this aspect of the criminal justice system is but a small part of the production of deviance. A limited range of behavior considered deviant is represented in data collected by the state or state related agencies. As researchers move further from the corrections system, official data become less and less convincing. For example, at the risk of stating the obvious, data on convicted bank robbers is limited to those whose level of relative effectiveness as a bank robber or abilities to engage the justice system were inadequate to avoid conviction. Likewise, the system of plea bargaining produces a context where researchers would be naïve at best to assume the crime for which a conviction is registered is, in fact, the offense which brought the deviant actor to the attention of the criminal justice system.

Official quantitative data is necessarily socially constructed, as targets determine the appropriateness of informing agents of control, as policing and like agencies manage caseloads,

as pleas are bargained and judicial systems make determinations. The officially derived quantitative data that are employed to test theories, evaluate the efficacy of programs, and establish funding priorities reflect this constructive process.

Respondent Derived Quantitative Data

For students of deviant behavior, official data may be useful, but they are also inherently limited. The range of behavior considered deviant by some audience is more wide ranging and encompassing than behavior that is defined by the official crime reports. Additionally, those who are publicly and officially identified as having engaged in this or that deviant behavior are a subset of those who participate in such deviant activities. For example, those identified by control agents will include those who are wrongly accused and exclude those who participate in the deviant activity yet have not or will not come to the attention of control agents (Becker 1963). Official statistics are not measures of deviant behavior as much as measures of the formal control of deviance.

Researchers who are interested in describing and theorizing about deviance more generally have made a concerted effort to move beyond official data sources to self report surveys. Self report surveys allow researchers to resist the systemic bias in official data and to study aspects of deviance that are excluded from official data.

Short and Nye's (1958) seminal work has established the relative analytical value of asking those involved in deviant behavior to report on their own activities. Self report studies tend to suggest the following: that the rate of offense is higher than that attended to by official agencies, that offenses committed by those of lower classes are more likely to come to police attention than those committed by those with greater financial resources, and, importantly, that much informal (and some would argue less serious) deviance is excluded from the public gaze.

While respondents' ability/willingness to self disclose will vary relative to perceived risk levels and the extent to which respondents attend to and recall deviant involvements, self report surveys also continue to be challenged

by the extent to which respondents are willing and able to accurately portray or disclose their involvements. For example, a 2004 Canadian Community Health Survey conducted by Statistics Canada ($n = 83,729$; 2003 data) found that 1.7 percent of Canadians self identified as gay, lesbian, and bisexual. This rate of participation in homosexual and bisexual activities tends to be lower than the 5–10 percent participation rate suggested by advocacy groups or by those extrapolating from behaviorally based studies.

At the risk of being trite, self report surveys only tell researchers what respondents are willing to reveal to them. As the above example illustrates, there may be a rather important disjunction between what people say they do and what they do. While self report surveys may be shown to be internally consistent (e.g., Hindelang et al. 1981) they are far removed from the accomplishment of everyday life. As Couch (1995) has argued, for a discipline that claims to attend to the social, sociology has historically been exceptionally reliant on the individual as the primary unit of analysis. Survey research perpetuates this concern, as it is inherently individualizing. As it is often derived from one person's responses to a series of prescribed questions, it thereby establishes the individual as the primary unit of analysis.

ETHNOGRAPHIC RESEARCH TRADITION: PARTICIPANT OBSERVATION AND CASE STUDIES

Ethnographic research refers to the various research practices that scholars may use to study and represent the way of life of a group of people. The extended ethnographic tradition is grounded in the research practices of observation, participant observation, and in depth interviewing. While ethnographers may draw on a variety of other research strategies to support their work (e.g., unobtrusive measures, visual records, diaries, auto ethnography, textual analysis, content analysis), field based research is as central to this tradition as is the survey to more quantitatively oriented research. Given the nature of fieldwork, researchers are less likely to present their data quantitatively or to use the language of the natural sciences in

their analysis. Readers are cautioned against assuming, however, that this work is any less empirically grounded or any less appropriate for developing meaningful theories of deviant behavior. In fact, field research may be the only means by which empirically grounded knowledge of aspects of deviance can be achieved.

Given that deviant subcultures may be marked by illegal activity, secrecy, purposive misdirection, and skepticism, and may sustain an amplified suspicion awareness context, investigative field research (Douglas 1976) may be the only way to develop a scientific understanding of deviant subcultures. This argument is eloquently made by Adler (1985) in the context of her membership role with drug dealers and smugglers. She clearly demonstrates that the only way to get close enough to the activities of upper level drug dealers was to take up a membership role (in this specific case, a peripheral role) within the subculture. This general point is also most certainly true of the most complete study we have on outlaw motorcycle gangs (Wolf 1991). Wolf's participation in the Rebels offers a clarity of understanding of the social organization of the group, the marginality of its members, and accompanying gender roles that would simply be unavailable to the non member.

Membership status is not a prerequisite for the development of ethnographic understandings of deviant behavior. The case study is an example of a research posture that is not predicated on membership status. Case studies are a research strategy that may be employed to develop a rich understanding of a subculture, a person's life, an organization, or a community. The case study model is marked by the depth of data collected and is often derived from participant observation, in depth interviews, and the personal involvement of the researcher(s) in the field site for an extended period of time. While most certainly not exclusive to sociology (for example, field derived case studies have been employed by biologists to better understand primate behavior), foundational work employing the case study model marked the development of the Chicago School in the 1920s, 1930s, and 1940s. Early work such as Anderson's *The Hobo* (1923), Cressey's *The Taxi Dance Hall* (1932), Shaw's *The Jack Roller* (1930), and Thomas's *The Unadjusted*

Girl (1923) served to place deviance in a community context. It was framed in the context of the city and the tension between urban and rural life, of differing life chances, and life as it was lived.

The case study approach is particularly appropriate where researchers are interested in understanding the creation of local cultures and the social construction of multiple realities. An interest in the lives and perspectives of slum dwellers, the homeless, and juvenile delinquents is an important move away from the moral certainty that had accompanied the work of earlier social pathologists, who tended to view deviance as indicative of sick persons or sick societies or perhaps both. While case studies attempt to be “true” to the lived experiences of the people whose lives inform the research, the contributions to the sociological study of deviance extend well beyond the “thick description” (Geertz 1973). The import to sociological theory of the case study is significant. For example, our collective understanding of the social construction of gender and the management of disrespectability owes much to Garfinkel’s (1967) ability to move beyond the particular to the general, while grounding his account in the lived experiences of Agnes, an “intersexed” person.

IN SUM

Maines (2001: 225) suggests our theoretical commitments and our methodological inclinations are “not because any of them make a priori sense, but because we like these things and are reasonably good at them.” There is wisdom in this deceptively simple claim. Research methodologies are in part skills based. The quantitative skills required for inferential modeling are not for everyone; neither is the commitment required to sustain a meaningful field presence in the context of a deviant subculture. Likewise, our theoretical commitments are an extension of the perspectives we bring to our work and our life. In many respects, a variety of sociological theories distil human group life into a conceptual heuristic that is unknown to experience. As Cooley (1922) taught many years ago, the distinction between individual and society may be analytically

useful, but pragmatically it is much less so. Likewise, we do a significant violence to our research on deviance if we adopt a simple structural determinism that views social interaction as a neutral medium through which social factors merely pass, or if we become so enamored with “lived experience” that participants become isolated from their histories, their institutions, and the circumstances of their lives that are not of their own choosing.

The study of deviant behavior is in part a pragmatic exercise. The sociological study of deviance requires that researchers attend to a phenomenon that is situationally defined by some audience, a population that is rarely known, participants who may be reluctant to more openly associate with discreditable identities, careers of involvement that vary rather markedly over time, and the reality that deviance occurs within a community context that extends well beyond practitioners and their confederates. As Grills (1998) has argued, the work of doing research is productively understood as problem solving activity. The more that one is interested in how people come to view the world as they do, how relationships are created and sustained, how activities are accomplished, how people come to be involved in various subcultural affiliations, and how identities are managed, embraced, or resisted, the more it is imperative that researchers focus on naturally occurring events rather than self reported data or laboratory experiments. Likewise, the more one is attentive to issues of measuring the incidence of deviant behavior, attempting to measure the effectiveness of control agents or self report data based upon random sampling techniques, the more one’s research demands rigorous survey based quantitative analysis.

At the close of his essay entitled “The Methodological Position of Symbolic Interactionism,” Herbert Blumer (1969: 60) writes: “Respect the nature of the empirical world and organize a methodological stance to reflect that respect.” This is exceptionally fine advice for the student of deviant behavior, for to do so resists the deviant mystique and brings the same intellectual standards to the study of deviance as is to be demanded of other research endeavors. The study of deviance is marked by disrespectability – the disrespectability of topic,

of spoiled identities, of subculture, and the contagion that may be experienced by the scholar. Quite apart from the specific methodological positions that researchers may adopt, respecting the nature of deviance as a social phenomenon requires that we fully attend to deviance in a community context.

SEE ALSO: Criminology: Research Methods; Descriptive Statistics; Deviance, Theories of; Ethnography; Measuring Crime; Methods, Case Study; Observation, Participant and Non Participant

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deviance, sport and

Timothy Jon Curry

Sports may be defined as physical contests that are competitive, fair, and guided by rules, organization, and/or tradition. The roots of sport are ancient, and probably stem from hunting. Although modern sports have more symbolic quests than the choice cuts of meat available to the successful prehistoric hunter, the thrill of the chase is much the same (Carroll 2000). The rules and traditions of sport may or may not be codified, but they ensure that the ritualistic aspects of sport are respected. And the ritualistic aspects of sport, the before and after ceremonies and events, the coin toss that ensures a fair beginning, the awarding of trophies and medals, and so on, are every bit as important as the game itself.

Deviance refers to behavior that goes against widely accepted traditions, norms, values, ideology, rules, and laws of society, and that draws mild to severe sanctions. Deviance in sport has existed across time and space and throughout the world, and whether or not someone commits a deviant act depends upon the time and place and who does the judging. Determining what deviance is, in other words,

is a social process. The behavior itself is not enough; there must also be a reaction to it. For instance, when Art Modell moved his Cleveland Browns football team from Cleveland to Baltimore in 1995, he broke no criminal law. But his actions precipitated violent outbursts on the part of Cleveland fans, who believed he went against accepted norms that bind professional sports teams to the cities that support them.

Deviance in sport includes a wide assortment of behavior. Many types of people are involved, and the perpetrators of deviance in sport cut across gender, race, and class lines. An abbreviated list of transgressors includes owners of professional teams, athletes, coaches, sport agents, fans, professional gamblers, pharmacists, educational institutions, corporations that promote sport, cities, states, and international organizations that govern sport. In contemporary society, deviance in sport is seen as news worthy, and newspapers and television news channels routinely feature stories of deviant sports figures. Misdeeds that occur at educational institutions affiliated with religious organizations have special fascination. When a basketball player at Baylor University was shot and killed apparently by a teammate in 2003, newspapers were anxious to report every detail of the incident partly because it took place at the world's largest Baptist University.

Previous generations of reporters and writers thought of sport as a character building exercise, and they were reluctant to report on the misdeeds of sport heroes (Dinan 1998). As a result of the attention given to deviance in sport by media today, it seems that it is more prevalent than a generation ago, but this is more than likely due to the coverage given to the topic rather than the actual rate of deviant acts committed. Even so, empirical research has failed to support the idea that sport participation builds character. If anything, the longer one participates in sport, the more likely it is that moral constraints such as fair play and honesty give way to the desire to win (see Miracle & Rees 1994).

CLASSIC TOPICS

Some of the classic topics studied by those interested in deviance and sport are cheating,

drug abuse, gambling, and violence (particularly among athletes or between athletes and fans). These are classic or standard topics because they concern the fundamental social conditions defining sport. Any activity that destroys or vastly alters the physical challenges of sport or the fair competition between opponents poses a threat to the basic premises of sport, and a serious threat to its continuation. For instance, consider the following examples.

Cheating – the intentional violation of rules and norms for one's advantage – has long been associated with sport. The National Collegiate Athletic Association (NCAA) estimated that 14 percent of member schools engaged in serious cheating in the 1970s, an estimate that seemed too low at the time according to Curry and Jobu (1984). Today, without good data, it is impossible to tell whether the figure is the same or much higher or lower, but cheating is still an important concern for the NCAA and its member institutions. Cheating can take many forms, and is especially serious when it involves coaches and others responsible for the integrity of the sports program. When Georgia Tech coach George O'Leary successfully applied for the head coach position at Notre Dame, he falsified information on his résumé by claiming to have acquired a master's degree (which he never earned) and to have lettered at a college where he never played. When this was discovered, he was immediately fired from Notre Dame. As sociologist Stan Eitzen (2003) notes, coaches who cheat on their résumés can hardly qualify as role models for their athletes.

Drug abuse – particularly *additive* drugs that are meant to stimulate the body beyond normal capabilities – are not a recent discovery. Anabolic steroids were first marketed in 1958 under the name of Dianabol and they proved to be effective when combined with exercise to produce gains in muscle mass. Sport historian Allen Guttman (1988: 165) notes that this effectiveness has been a "curse" because steroids can cause serious negative side effects to the body. Even so, athletes continue to use them, and the records they set through the help of additive drugs only encourage others to violate rules. Even the most talented professional athletes, who seemingly could get along without using banned substances, use them. In 2004, the names of some of the most respected

and highest paid professional baseball players were linked to the use of steroids during testimony to a US federal grand jury investigating possible steroid distribution by the Bay Area Laboratory Cooperative in California.

Gambling – particularly gambling that involves athletes or others in a position to alter the outcome of a contest – has long been associated with sport. Perhaps the most famous incident of sports gambling is the Black Sox Scandal (Curry & Jobu 1984). In 1919 the Cincinnati Reds upset the Chicago White Sox – soon to be called “Black Sox” – to win the World Series. Rumors of a fix circulated, and a year later eight players who were on the White Sox World Series team were indicted and charged with complicity in a conspiracy with gamblers to throw the game. Two of the players confessed. The Commissioner of Baseball at the time was Judge Kenesaw Mountain Landis; he strove to make an example of the players by banning them for life, even though the accused players were later found innocent in a court of law. In spite of the harsh penalties, gambling continues to be a problem in baseball, most recently with controversy over Pete Rose, an accomplished player whose admittance to the Baseball Hall of Fame seemed assured until it was discovered he bet on baseball games in 1985, 1986, and 1987 while manager of the Cincinnati Reds. Other sports, including collegiate and professional football and basketball, have had serious problems with gambling; so have boxing and horseracing. The problem stems from the great popularity of gambling in society. Billions of dollars are wagered on sports events by millions of respectable people. The Internet has increased opportunities for gambling on all types of sports. Athletes are tempted to gamble, partly because they enjoy competition and winning and see gambling as another challenge. According to some sociologists, the sheer volume of dollars involved in betting on sport attracts people who will look for ways to fix a sporting event despite the harsh penalties invoked if they are caught.

Violence – defined as the use of excessive physical force intended to cause mental or physical pain to another person – has long been associated with sport. Particularly alarming is when excessive violence is used as part of the strategy of competition. In 1905 President

Theodore Roosevelt became so concerned about violence in college football he spearheaded a move to clean up the excessive violence through rule changes and modifications to equipment. Such formations as the “flying wedge” were eliminated, and players were required to wear more protective gear. Even so, football remains a violent game, and some players take advantage of the rules to injure or maim their opponents. Coaches frequently overlook borderline violence, and applaud brutal body contact. Sport sociologist Jay Coakley (2004) believes that acceptance of excessive physical force can be looked at as deviant *over conformity* to the norms of sport. Both male and female athletes are so focused on maintaining their identities as athletes and so caught up in the emotions and physicality of sport that they fail to consider the consequences of unquestioned normative conformity. Serious injury and shortened careers can result.

THEORY

There is no single theoretical approach that dominates research in deviance, and sport sociologists employ a number of theories drawn from mainstream sociology and criminology. Two of the most popular are differential association and strain theory. Differential association is based on the work of Edwin Sutherland, who emphasized that people learn conformity or deviance from the people with whom they associate. In the case of young athletes, teammates might prove to be especially important, since peers typically have strong influences on young people. Sutherland noted that like behavior in general, deviant behavior is learned through interaction with others, especially in small, intimate groups. Such learning of deviant behavior consists of acquiring techniques, motives, drives, and attitudes. An individual learns “definitions” (mindsets or attitudes) that are favorable or unfavorable to prevailing norms, and becomes deviant when he or she learns to accept more unfavorable definitions than favorable definitions. The frequency, length, and intensity of a person’s associations determine the impact of associations on the person. Infrequent contacts of limited duration will have less impact than frequent, intense

contact (Sutherland & Cressey 1978: 80–3). To illustrate, Curry (2000) studied the interactions of a group of athletes in an elite sport program who engaged in bar fights and inappropriate sexual behavior. He found that the athletes knew that this behavior would be considered deviant by others, but that the prevailing norms among their teammates encouraged an occasional visit to what they called the “dark side.”

Strain or anomie theory is less concerned with the interaction among team members, and more concerned with the structure of opportunity in society. According to Robert Merton, who first constructed the theory, structural strain develops when the culturally prescribed goals of the social system cannot be achieved through socially approved means. The strain may produce deviance, and Merton outlined five typical social responses or adaptations to such a situation.

Conformity, the only non deviant response, is the first adaptation. A *conformist* accepts the conventional goals of society and the conventional means to obtain them. For example, an athlete who desires to win an Olympic gold medal will spend many years practicing and improving his or her skills until able to perform and succeed at the highest levels. In contrast, an *innovator* accepts the goals, but rejects the socially approved means and thus opts for deviance to attain the goals. In the case of Olympic athletes who use banned substances such as steroids, they are still trying to win medals, but are doing so through innovative practices with performance enhancing drugs (Lüschen 2001).

Other athletes may decide to continue to go through the motions of competing for an Olympic medal, yet abandon the goal of actually winning one. They realize that the competition is too difficult and so become *ritualists*. Merton also recognized *retreatism* and *rebellion* as reactions to strain. The retreatist rejects both the means and the goals of society. In the case of sports, the competitive athlete who gives up the sport entirely has retreated from the scene rather than try to compete to win. The rebel, on the other hand, rejects the goals and means of society but replaces them with new goals and means. Athletes who rebel against the Olympic Games might substitute other games that allow for a greater chance of success. For instance,

Tom Waddell began the Gay Games competition in 1988, to provide a more accepting environment for homosexuals. The Gay Games have been held periodically ever since, and in 2002 included over 11,000 athletes competing in over 30 events.

The major strength of Merton’s approach is that it places the origins of deviance in the broader social setting. To the extent that those who control sport, particularly elite sport, narrowly define what constitutes success, they encourage deviance. In other words, many gifted athletes feel they must cheat in order to win because the opportunities for success are so limited (see Leonard 1998: 139–72).

While these classic topics and theoretical approaches have long dominated research on deviance in sport, several new topics and theories are emerging. For instance, persons closely associated with sport may become involved in sexual harassment and sexual assault cases, homophobia and attacks on gay men, hazing in high school and collegiate sport, celebratory violence, eating disorders, excessive drinking, and many other deviant activities. Sport sociologists researching these topics face the difficult methodological problem of tracing the influence sport participation may have had in creating social conditions that encourage such deviance, while at the same time recognizing that these deviant activities are engaged in by others outside of sport.

Masculinity issues in the study of crime and deviance have come to the forefront, and sport sociologists are becoming aware of how boys and men strive through risky behavior, including deviance, to establish masculinity (Messner & Sabo 1994). Off the field violence toward women is increasingly understood through the dynamics of gender (Benedict 1997, 1998). Pressures on young men and women athletes to perform at the highest levels may result in psychological disorders that lead to numerous problem behaviors.

In addition, corporate or organizational deviance in sport is now recognized as a serious problem (Coakley 2004). Since corporations control vast resources, they are able to influence the media and create symbolic representation of sport that makes it difficult for the public to recognize their actions as deviant. For instance, sport sociologist Helen Lenskyj

(2000) notes that those in charge of the International Olympic Committee have been very eager to control the image of the Olympic Games. The Olympic “industry,” as she calls it, has until recently been able to disguise much of its deviance as the occasional misbehavior of certain individuals rather than part of its corporate culture. She argues that inside the Olympic industry, bribery and scandals involving high ranking political figures are common.

As sport sociologists research more of the corporate and organizational cultures that govern professional and big time amateur sport, the more the topic of deviance and sport moves away from the individual athlete and coach. This is all to the good, because many of the forces perpetuating deviance in sport lie outside the individual. In the future, a better understanding of deviance and sport may be generated through analysis of the close ties between corporations, the media, and consumer culture (Blackshaw & Crabbe 2004). Researchers have come to understand that the image of the athlete as a superior being is only an image; elite sport is not conducive to the development of moral behavior. But such images can be used to sell vast amounts of consumer goods. This does not mean that the idea of physical tests or challenges and fair competition is itself flawed. Humans have long enjoyed physical challenges, and the idea of fair competition, while more recent, has broad appeal. As in other spheres of human endeavor, the devil is in the details.

SEE ALSO: Anomie; Drugs/Substance Use in Sport; Football Hooliganism; Gambling and Sport; Health and Sport; Sexuality and Sport; Socialization and Sport; Sport, College; Sport and Social Resistance; Sport and the State; Strain Theories; Violence Among Athletes; Violence Among Fans

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deviance, theories of

Paul Rock and David Downes

“Deviance” and its companion words, deviant and deviation, have their roots in Latin and point to a straying from the *via*, road or path. Some of its variants have a long history: the thirteenth century *Romance of the Rose*, for example, talks of “deviant” in the sense of

being out of the way; “deviation” appeared in publications in the sixteenth century; and Durkheim powerfully foreshadowed its sociological usage in *Les Règles de la méthode sociologique* (1895), where he took deviance (which he did not name as such but rather awkwardly referred to as crimes against religion, ceremony, etiquette, tradition, “and so on”) to be the pivotal concept for what turned out to be his founding theory of functional analysis. (Durkheim contrasted his own approach with a more limited notion of crime he somewhat misleadingly attributed to Garofalo’s *La Criminologie*, 1890.) But “deviance” itself is a neologism with multiple meanings. The *Oxford English Dictionary* traces its first appearance in English to a piece written in 1944 by the psychologist Gregory Bateson, who presented it as a corollary of “standardization” (and see Bateson 1972). The English sociologist Walter Sprott employed it ten years later to refer to departures from culturally expected rules of conduct (Sprott 1954). And the most celebrated, if not the most elusive, description was offered nine years later still in 1963 by Howard Becker. In a passage that avoided exact definition, but which would have the greatest impact, he insisted on the social character of deviance: deviance, he said, “is *not* a quality of the act the person commits, but rather a consequence of the application by others of rules and sanctions to an ‘offender.’ The deviant is one to whom that label has been successfully applied; deviant behavior is behavior that people so label” (Becker 1963: 9).

That etymology is important because “deviance” is a latecomer which does not appear to be part of the currency of everyday speech. It was imported into the sociology of the English speaking world in the early 1960s by a number of its sponsors precisely because it did not seem to be freighted with the unwelcome or extraneous meanings that its predecessors, such as social disorganization (Faris 1955), social pathology (Wootton 1959), sociopathic behavior, and social problems, were thought to have acquired. Neither was it marred by what many of its proponents saw as the abstracted empiricism, “correctionalism” (Matza 1969), excessive positivism, and atheoretical leanings of the criminology of the time. One may see the transition marked in the titles of academic works of the period. Edwin Lemert, for

instance, published *Social Pathology* in 1951 but, in 1967, he titled a collection of essays *Human Deviance, Social Problems, and Social Control*. On the very cusp of change in 1961, and listing three variations simultaneously, was Robert Merton and Robert Nisbet’s *Contemporary Social Problems: An Introduction to the Sociology of Deviant Behaviour and Social Disorganization*.

“Deviance” had for a while the semblance of a moderately neutral term which implied no adverse or unnecessary social, political, or moral judgment. (That confidence was probably short lived. If the 1953 edition of *Roget’s Thesaurus* did not contain the term, the 2002 *Collins Thesaurus* gives among its synonyms “perverted,” “sick,” “twisted,” “bent,” “abnormal,” “queer,” “warped,” “perverse,” “wayward,” “kinky,” “devious,” “freaky,” and “aberrant.”) But, because it was in effect thought to be a new term of art, a term that was employed principally to distinguish it from its discredited antecedents rather than being an accepted definition in its own right, it rendered itself open to multiple interpretations that encapsulated the larger systems of theorizing that framed it. It was used by the self taught social statistician and criminologist Leslie Wilkins (1964) to mean a statistically uncommon event with peculiar social consequences. Wilkins made much of the alleged correspondence between the outlying location on a normal statistical distribution curve of certain forms of conduct and the social position of the person or group exhibiting them. Almost all people lie, Wilkins said, but there are a few, furthest from the mean, who are pathological in the high or low frequency of their lying and they are deviants. Those who were the furthest were somehow held structurally to be the most remote from the commonality of people in a society. The idea was misconceived (after all, much deviance, like traffic infractions or sexual misconduct, is commonplace), but it did engender some interesting ideas about how feedback loops could distort information as it traveled over large social distances, affected people’s reactions to populations at the extremes, and so amplified deviant conduct (see Young 1971) and led to what were called moral panics (Cohen 1972). It also raised the prospect of studying the saintly as deviants, although it

was an invitation accepted almost alone by Cohen (1966) inside criminology, but with greater alacrity by the sociologists of new religious movements outside (Barker 1984).

Deviance could be represented by the functionalist Talcott Parsons (1951) as the temporary or longer lasting failure of individual or group adjustment in social systems undergoing change. It could be said by other functionalists to play the unintended role of acting as an illicit support to conventional institutions – prostitution supporting monogamy by providing an emotionally sanitized outlet for otherwise dangerous sexual liaisons, or the taint of an illegitimate birth preserving primogeniture. It could, by extension, present the dialectical contrasts by which the respectable, normal, and conventional would be recognized and strengthened. And there were those who argued in their turn that deviance is manufactured precisely to support the moral order (Erikson 1966), deviance and morality being symbolically interdependent twins. In structuralist anthropology and sociology it could be a property of classification systems where the deviant was a worrying anomalous phenomenon that did not fit neatly into existing categories, and so posed a threat to the project of collective sense making and social order (Scott 1972). Deviance was there both symbolic matter out of place and, potentially, new matter coming into being, an experiment with the new and a foretaste of future existential styles (Scott and Lyman 1970). It could mirror the symbolic workings of systems of social stratification, where some symmetry may be expected between authority, wealth, and moral esteem, and where deviants are typically to be found among the lowest and least valued strata (Duster 1970) or, indeed, outcast altogether (see Heymowski 1969). It could thereby refract the capacity of some effectively to assign others to a devalued social status, although such assignments could be, and were, frequently challenged (Haug & Sussman 1969). And it was that link with signifying processes that was perhaps most strongly to promote its elective affinity with the ideas of symbolic interactionism, phenomenology, and ethno methodology. The ensuing bundle of ideas was probably the most distinctive theory of deviance of all. What came to be called labeling theory (to the distaste of Edwin Lemert and

Howard Becker, its progenitors), methodically explored the symbolic work undertaken when attempts are made to affix the deviant “label” to some person or group of persons, event, process, or phenomenon, encouraging power, “signification” (Matza 1969), and moral passages to become central topics.

Deviance was held in those theories to be an attribute bestowed on behavior and people by a defining audience. John Kitsuse (1968: 19), for instance, declared that he proposed “to shift the focus of theory and research from the forms of deviant behavior to processes by which persons come to be defined as deviant by others.” And Kai Erikson (1964: 11) proposed that analysis should turn away from the actor and towards the audience of behavior because it is the audience that will ultimately determine significance. Vital to that conception was the distinction mapped by Edwin Lemert (1951) between “primary” and “secondary” deviation, the first a possibly uneventful instance of the abounding violation of rules which escape public notice, the second, consequent upon public response, which required the rule breaker not only to react to his or her own behavior, but also to others’ reactions to that behavior. Secondary deviation was a social phenomenon shaped by social processes. The idea invited consideration of the symbolic adjustments that might have to be made to others’ responses, and of the reorganization of identity that could well have less to do with the “innate” character of the violator or violation and more to do with the assumptions, stereotypes, and stigmas that were incorporated in public judgment and imposed in practical action.

In that formulation, deviance was held to be the object of defining procedures that are themselves contingent on audience, time, place, power, and occasion. What is deviant in one setting will not be so in another, what is deviant for one may not be so for another, and it is not always easy to cast in absolute or categorical terms the rules by which it may be identified. To the contrary: it was a precept of many of those who studied deviance that the phenomenon resisted neat or absolute definition. Bittner (1963), for example, argued that there is such an infinite regression of rules for judging when and where rules should be applied that it becomes quite impossible to establish

absolute categories. It followed that deviance was thought often to be marked by experiential confusion, contradiction, and absurdity, prompting David Matza (1969) to suggest that deviance ineluctably coexists with ambiguity and "shifting standards."

Subjectively problematic, multiform, contested, and uncertain, deviance had major attractions for the phenomenological sociologist. Often involving extended exchanges between definers and defined, it invited an examination of existential processes that unfolded not only in interaction between a putative deviant and those who ascribed his or her identity, but also reflexively within the deviant himself or herself as the moral meanings of acts and selves were tested and explored (Becker 1963). Deviance was characteristically presented not as a stable or fixed state but as an emergent *process* of becoming, a moral career (Goffman 1959), that might at times be more or less orderly but which also lacked certain or necessary outcomes.

As a site of contestation, where meanings were problematic and people were marginal, deviance was also especially appealing to those who sought to use the methods of participant observation to achieve an anthropological distance from the world of the taken for granted and commonplace. By looking at and through deviance, they argued, by adopting perspective through incongruity, they might see the familiar as new and strange and so discover what might otherwise have escaped attention (Hughes 1958). Many of the deviant worlds which have thus been analyzed were amenable to ethnographic inquiry, and they tended to overlap or adjoin the sociologist's own.

It must be emphasized that the term deviance is at once theoretically denotative and connotative. It points, on the one hand, to thinking about an ill assorted range of behavior with fuzzy boundaries and indeterminate definition, including homosexuals, the blind, the mad, stutterers, alcoholics, strippers, nudists, drug users, thieves, convicts, robbers, prostitutes, delinquents, and those whom Gouldner (1962) rather disparagingly dismissed as the inhabitants of "the world of hip . . . drug addicts, jazz musicians . . . drifters, grifters and skidders." It attends to the way in which the meaning of deviance is contingent on a

politics of power and authority. Where control becomes a variable, it has been argued, crime is but one of a number of possible outcomes. Control might just as readily lead to conduct being informally regulated, mitigated or condoned, or treated as a matter for medical, psychiatric, religious, or political intervention (Gusfield 1968).

Theories of deviance were thus potentially wider by far in their reach than criminology and they made the criminal law, criminalization, and the facts of crime newly and interestingly problematic. Indeed, Lemert (1967) and Ditton (1979) came to propose that attention should shift away from deviant acts and people towards the phenomena of control. And where control was the variable, rule making, policing (Reiss 1971), and regulation (Hawkins 1984) came newly into view, no longer to be taken for granted as the backdrop of criminology, but occupying center stage.

It was but a step to study what came to be known as crimes of the powerful. Presaged by Sutherland (1949) (himself rooted in symbolic interactionism), it looked at how crime and control were bound up in a politics of naming, shaming, accounting, and enforcement (Geis & Jesilow 1993). Those matters, involving the trading of critical definitions of the situation, were also to be at the heart of labeling theory. Much was to be made of how people portrayed their motives and actions to themselves and others, how their deviance and conformity were eased by the narratives that could be so told, and how those narratives might be challenged, corroborated, and negotiated as deviant careers unfolded (Mills 1940; Sykes & Matza 1957; Maruna 2001).

But theories of deviance were also importantly connotative. Institutionally anchored in the British National Deviancy Symposium and in the American Society for the Study of Social Problems and its journal *Social Problems*, they advertised for many that there had been a conceptual, indeed, for some, political, break with past work whose errors and omissions were sometimes caricatured for dramatic effect. They stood for the treatment of deviance as a social process to be described, not as a thing apart, but in the stock language of sociological analysis, and of interactionist sociology in particular.

By and large the new theories succeeded in their object. Criminology is more fully sociological than before. It is now more responsive to the argument that deviant phenomena are emergent, political, negotiated, contingent, and meaningful. And it has moved on. Theories of deviance are still being advanced, and the ethnographic mapping of deviance is still vigorous (Duneier 1992, 2001), but they no longer hold sway as in the past. They had their period of flowering – perhaps something of a false dawn – in which crime, mental illness, sexual deviance, political deviance, and the like were to be analyzed afresh and in a way that transcended the limitations of criminology. There was the era indicated by the dates of the publications cited in this entry and by three generations of encyclopedias: *The Encyclopedia of the Social Sciences*, published in 1931 (Seligman), made no mention of deviance or deviation; *The International Encyclopedia of the Social Sciences*, published in 1968 (Sills), had an extensive treatment of deviant behavior and deviance; and the *The International Encyclopedia of the Social and Behavioral Sciences*, published in 2001 (Smelser & Baltes), had none. It is now criminology that people again practice, but it is a criminology that has absorbed the theories of deviance (and many other, more recent theories) in its passage (Lea & Young 1984).

SEE ALSO: Criminology; Death of the Sociology of Deviance?; Deviance; Deviance, Constructionist Perspectives; Deviance, Explanatory Theories of; Deviance, Normative Definitions of; Deviance, Positivist Theories of; Deviance, Reactionist Definitions of; Deviance, Research Methods; Deviant Beliefs/Cognitive Deviance; Deviant Careers; Symbolic Interaction

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deviant beliefs/cognitive deviance

Robin D. Perrin

Sociological discussions of deviance typically focus on non normative *behaviors*. Cognitive deviance, on the other hand, refers to deviant *beliefs*. The study of cognitive deviance “reveals

that social rules apply not only to how one behaves but also to how and what one thinks” (Douglas & Waksler 1982: 366). Beliefs are deviant if they fall outside the norms of acceptability and are deemed wrong, irrational, eccentric, or dangerous in a given society or by the members of a particular collectivity within a given society. Deviant beliefs are important to study because they reveal basic social processes and affirm the belief structure on which the culture of a society is built. In addition, the study of deviant beliefs is important because deviance is often the first step toward social change. Today’s deviant idea may well be tomorrow’s norm.

History is filled with fascinating examples of attempts to control or eliminate beliefs that threaten those in power. During the Inquisition, for example, real and imagined beliefs were severely sanctioned. In the United States in the 1950s, people who supposedly held communist beliefs were ostracized, fired from jobs, and sometimes imprisoned. An examination of most of the world’s major religions reveals that early followers were despised and sometimes killed for their beliefs.

Goode (2000) maintains that deviant beliefs are not always, or necessarily, minority beliefs. In fact, many widespread beliefs are rejected by society’s dominant social institutions. He suggests that paranormal beliefs – those that science regards as contrary to the laws of nature – are deviant despite the fact that many are widely endorsed. Belief in the validity of such phenomena as extrasensory perception, astrology, lucky numbers, ghosts, and UFOs is deviant, he maintains, because it is derided in the educational system, the dominant media, and the medical profession. That is to say, the most powerful representatives of society’s dominant institutions regard these beliefs as deviant. Yet, the deviant status of a given belief is only secured when the person who holds that belief is ostracized and stigmatized. The person who has a lucky number is not stigmatized, despite the fact that his view is seen as empirically indefensible by the scientific mainstream. Ultimately, therefore, it is the powerful and stigmatizing reaction of others – mainstream culture, people in power, interest groups – that determines the deviate status of a belief.

To define a belief as deviant is not necessarily to suggest that it is wrong or misguided. Its empirical, objective, or scientific erroneousness is a separate issue. Nearly all scientists regard paranormal beliefs as scientifically wrong, but what makes these beliefs deviant is the negative reaction they evoke from the scientific community, not the presumed wrongness of the beliefs themselves. The non-judgmental approach of the sociologist is especially evident in matters of religious faith. Beliefs that challenge religious norms will likely be ridiculed by the religious mainstream, which may label the competing religion a "cult." The sociologist, however, uses the term "cult" without prejudice. "Cult" merely distinguishes "new" religion from more established churches and sects. A cult is a deviant religion not because it is evil, but because it violates the norms of conventional religion, and because others react negatively to it. It is worth noting that all religions, including culturally acceptable religions like Christianity, began as deviant/cult movements (Stark & Bainbridge 1985).

One of the most fascinating areas within cognitive deviance is studies which focus on the process by which presumably erroneous beliefs come to be accepted by many people. This area of research fits into the larger sociological literature on collective behavior (e.g., panics, rumors, moral crusades, social movements) and the social construction of social problems (see Spector & Kitsuse 1977). For example, during the 1980s and 1990s many people, including prominent clergy and mental health professionals, came to believe that a large and active satanic cult had infiltrated the highest level of government and business. The satanists allegedly committed many heinous crimes, including the sexual exploitation of women and children, and human sacrifices. The beliefs persisted despite the fact that law enforcement personnel charged with the task of investigating the crimes routinely dismissed the claims. The "satanism scare" is a fascinating example of how widespread belief in a threat can persist even in the absence of evidence that the threat is real (Victor 1993).

Sociologists maintain that beliefs are formed in interaction with others – they are *socially constructed* (Berger & Luckmann 1966). Even

commonly accepted "facts" are socially produced. Most people accept that the earth is round, but they did not reach this conclusion all by themselves. The social constructionist perspective is especially relevant in the production of cognitive deviance, which often focuses on supernatural or otherworldly beliefs that must be accepted as a matter of faith. People can be convinced to believe in something they cannot see if those around them are convinced that the claims are true. The commitment of others provides for us, in the words of Peter Berger, a "plausibility structure." Others will help convince us that the unbelievable is believable. We will be drawn to the convictions, commitment, sacrifice, and enthusiasm of others.

The study of deviant beliefs reveals to the sociologist the socially constructed nature of reality. What members of the society, or of specific social collectivities, take to be real and true has momentous consequences for the nature of the society. Beliefs that challenge these collective understandings may be reacted to negatively, and the punishment of alternate beliefs constitutes a major segment of the apparatus of social control. Since the costs can be significant, deviant beliefs are difficult to maintain. Occasionally, the fringe may become the mainstream, blasphemy the inspiration, or the nutcase the prophet. Yet more commonly they remain fringe and lunatic. Most deviant beliefs, in fact, come and go with hardly a notice.

SEE ALSO: Deviance, Absolutist Definitions of; Deviance, Constructionist Perspectives; Deviance, Reactivist Definitions of; Deviance, Theories of; Moral Entrepreneur; New Religious Movements; Religious Cults

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deviant careers

Axel Groenemeyer

The concept of career has its origin in the sociology of professions, where it has been used since the 1950s with different meanings. Corresponding to everyday meaning, career refers to certain occupations and professions of high status and stable upward mobility. In this context career means a highly institutionalized social and cultural pattern of social positions in an orderly sequence or a system of sequences of positions with growing prestige and earnings within a bureaucratic organization. This definition was first applied in functionalist perspectives and was linked to the question of the social function of this patterned organization of professions for the integration of modern societies (Wilensky 1960).

Besides this narrow meaning, career refers also to a structure of an occupational biography in general, as the sequence of occupations in the life of an individual or a group of individuals. In this meaning career is not linked to professions or to vertical mobility within an organization, but indicates any pattern of occupational change or – even more generally – individual movement through a sequence of roles and status, which does not necessarily have to be institutionalized or prescribed by a system of rules. This definition refers to questions on the social conditions and processes for changes of occupations, roles, and positions within the life course. Whether and how these patterns of mobility are in fact institutionalized are empirical questions. The research on life course development has shown that the idea of a standardized career pattern with institutionalized upward mobility always only concerned a minority of individuals. In high modern

societies life courses and career mobility are increasingly destandardized and individualized. As a consequence, in life course research the concept of career has lost meaning (Marshall et al. 2001) and very often is replaced by the concepts of trajectory or status passage (Heinz 1991).

In a third meaning career refers to processes of individual adaptations and socialization within roles and positions of an occupational biography. In this context career is defined as a series of adjustments made to institutions, formal organizations, and informal social relationships involved in the occupation. This definition partly is used also in research on social conditions of positional changes, but normally is linked to analyses of individual developments of social and personal identities that take place in the context of occupational mobility as individual adaptation to the organization and culture of an occupation (Strauss 1971). In this perspective career development has to be analyzed within an action frame of reference, and changes of positions are the result or the consequence of individual developments and decisions.

The metaphor of career thus in general stands for the link between social structures, biographical development, and individual action within the life course: “development as action in context” (Silbereisen et al. 1986). Career refers to the social structure of the individual’s movement through defined social positions, to the individual’s movement through these positions; it can also focus on the intersection of individual biography and social structures.

The common frame of the career concept is the construction of a related sequence of stages and positions that have to be passed through one after the other. Preceding stages and positions constitute specific preconditions for succeeding stages or positions. In this sense the sequences of a career form an inherent causal connection, but changes of positions as turning points or transitions between stages have to be explained by specific social conditions and processes. The career concept also allows analysis of individual changes of positions and roles as a process of active individual adaptations of orientations, competencies, and perspectives that take place before “turning points” in the

life course, as well as processes of socialization that are the consequence of taking a new position or status.

At the same time, careers also constitute a pattern of providing meaning; they are constructed in prospect and accounted for in retrospect. The construction of a structured and coherent career provides meaning and sense, not only for institutions that guide and control individual biographies, but also for the individuals themselves (Collin & Young 2000).

Individual developments in deviant behavior normally do not follow institutionalized or organized sequences. Nevertheless, in a retrospective view there can be constructed typical patterns and sequences of development, organized around the deviant behavior itself, by patterns of problematic social conditions seen as causes of the deviant behavior, or by a sequence of consecutive institutions that have reacted to the deviant behavior (Cicourel 1969). Also in this context the assumption of a continuity and coherence of the individual biography constitutes the guiding idea of constructing a career pattern.

Another meaning of the career concept is emphasized when specific forms of deviant behavior are interpreted as a profession to earn one's living. In fact, some types of deviant behavior could be described as occupation, like some forms of organized larceny, fraud, or economic crime, but also prostitution and drug dealing, where different social positions or a status hierarchy and processes of learning and role adaptations could be analyzed in analogy with positions in respectable occupations (Letkemann 1973).

The sociology of deviance first adopted a perspective of career implicitly within analyses of deviant biographies in the context of the Chicago School of sociology (Shaw 1931; Sutherland 1937) and in the perspective of the theory of differential association (Sutherland and Cressey 1939). Also, the multifactor approach of Eleanor and Sheldon Gluck used the concept of career, but only to order variables in a temporal sequence. Synonymous with the career concept, very often the term natural history has been employed.

It was the development of the labeling approach that promoted the concept of deviant career in the 1960s. As a critique of etiological

theories of deviant behavior with emphasis on personality defects, the labeling approach demands explicit analyses of the dynamic processes by which the labels of deviant behavior are constructed, applied to specific persons, and adopted by them. Classical works from this perspective include Becker's analyses of the learning processes of "Becoming a Marijuana Smoker" (1953), Erving Goffman's (1961) description of individual adaptations and processes of identity development in the context of the total institution, Scheff's (1966) theory of psychic disorders, Suchman's (1965) work on patient careers, and the analyses of drug careers by Rubington (1967). Since then the notion of deviant career has spread into everyday meaning in different connections, such as drug career, criminal careers, illness career, and poverty career.

The biographies of drug addicts very often have a typical sequence of drug use that can be reconstructed as a sequence from soft to hard drug or patterns of increasing usage. The typical sequences are constructed as a drug career and laid the groundwork for ideological versions of the stepping stone hypothesis: the assumption of a quasi naturally progressing involvement into drug addiction that ends in the total misery of addiction. Empirical research has shown that this hypothesis cannot find justification without taking into consideration the social and institutionalized reaction, as well as the social context of drug use, marked by stigmatization and criminalization. In a sociological career perspective the use of drugs could increase the statistical probability of using other drugs, which also means that most of the persons involved in the use do not go on to other drugs. The transition between different stages of drug use is marked by specific biographical and social conditions, so that the causes for starting smoking or drinking alcohol are quite different from those of smoking marijuana, which are different from taking hard drugs (Kandel 1980).

But in fact the use of the career concept in this context always is only a very rough simplification. Biographical research on drug use has shown that drug careers only very seldom follow a linear sequence. They are always marked by interruptions, by processes of reintegration into respectable social contexts, and subcultural integration. This also holds for processes for

giving up drug addiction, for processes of reintegration and maturing out of the drug using context (Biernacki 1986), and also for the effectiveness of intervention and treatment (Groenemeyer 1990). In this approach, the career perspective has to be integrated into a larger analysis of deviant life courses and biographies, marked by status passages, turning points, and transitions.

The idea of criminal careers refers either to crime as work or occupation (Letkemann 1973), to the consequences of interventions of social control (Cicourel 1969), or to the causes and consequences of crime and criminal offenses in the life course (Sampson & Laub 1993; Farrington 1994).

One starting point for the rediscovery of the careers metaphor in criminology has been the development of self report studies in the 1960s and 1970s, which showed that criminal offenses are quite common behaviors for certain age groups, but for most offenders this behavior must be interpreted as transitory and occurs only once or very seldom. In this perspective a concept of criminal careers does not make much sense when it is defined analogously to that of the drug career as a sequence of different offenses. In the Philadelphia birth cohort study, Wolfgang et al. (1972) came to the conclusion that about 70 percent of all serious offenses are committed by about 6 percent of offenders. With this result they identified a small group of "career criminals," variously characterized as dangerous, habitual, or chronic offenders, who commit serious offenses with high frequency over extended periods of time (Blumstein et al. 1986). In this context criminal careers are defined as the longitudinal sequence of offenses committed by an individual offender (Farrington 1994). This construction of the career criminal gave way to extended research activities on patterns of individual offending and constituted the scientific base for the development of "three strikes and you're out" policies in the US.

Whereas in this perspective the differentiation between offenders is the starting point, other perspectives using the career metaphor start from the multifactor approach of Glueck and Glueck (1943) in searching for specific conditions in the development of crime. The

results of this branch of empirical research are extremely varied (Farrington et al. 1986; Loeber & LeBlanc 1990). In this context the career concept is only used to give the choice of factors and variables a temporal order from birth (and even before) to adulthood, without much claim to developing theoretical generalizations.

SEE ALSO: Crime; Deviance; Drugs, Drug Abuse, and Drug Policy; Drugs and the Law; Labeling; Labeling Theory; Professions; Work, Sociology of

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Dewey, John (1859–1952)

Mark D. Jacobs

John Dewey, perhaps the most prominent US public philosopher in the first half of the twentieth century, has cast a large shadow over many fields of sociology: social psychology, urban sociology, the sociology of education, the sociology of culture, political sociology, and public sphere theory, among others. Above all, he helped infuse much of American sociology

with a spirit of pragmatism. In addition to his seminal contributions to the study of method and of ethics, his sociological works focus on the active nature of education, democracy as community, and art and experience – and their interrelations. His students and colleagues – George Herbert Mead, W. I. Thomas, Robert Park, and Jane Addams – helped spread his influence almost immediately over sociological research and practice; it is not accidental that the three universities to which he devoted the bulk of his faculty career – Michigan, Chicago, and Columbia – all nurtured elite departments of sociology, and that the New School for Social Research, which he helped found, has continually sharpened the critical normative edge of sociology.

Dewey led a team at Chicago in elaborating and systematizing the insights of William James, among other pragmatists, to produce what James himself recognized as the first “school” of American philosophy. Pragmatism is an approach to philosophy that dispenses with metaphysical assumptions and hierarchies, relying instead on practical experimentation – seeing what works – to arrive at provisional assessments of truth. The focus is on ameliorating problems that arise in experience. Reality is seen as uncertain – probabilistic and contingent. Meanings are relational and emergent, conditioned by particular contexts; moral judgments rest on evaluations of consequences. The method is reflexive, involving the exercise of cooperative and deliberative intelligence to choose among projected alternative paths of social action, while making value and other assumptions as explicit as possible, and continually adjusting plans to incorporate the lessons of experience. Reflexivity extends to the method itself: there is continual inquiry into the very process of inquiry, as well as into the very meanings of the core ideas.

Pragmatism dissolves metaphysical dualisms between subjects and objects, nature and culture, facts and values, the knower and the known, means and ends, self and society. Dewey himself preferred the label “instrumentalism” to “pragmatism,” although by instrumentalism he meant the very opposite of adherence to instrumental reason, since he considered ends and values themselves to require constant reevaluation.

It is impossible even to summarize the range of Dewey's scholarly interests, which encompassed all branches of philosophy, including psychological philosophy. But perhaps his overarching *sociological* research problem involves the simultaneous strengthening of individualism and community. The interrelations of his core sociological concepts describe an arc from micro analysis to macrostructure. *Habits* are not personal properties, but rather interpersonal adaptations to *institutional* arrangements, which are therefore amenable to improvement through the exercise of *deliberative intelligence* exercised by *communities*. The most important such institution is the school, which is therefore optimally organized as a community of active doers (students and teachers alike), integrated as fully as possible into the larger community. *Democracy* (an ideal far from realized in the US) is the process of participation in communities of deliberation. In addressing social problems, the *public* must rely on communities of social scientists for alternative policy formulations, continually evaluated (as the public is perfectly capable of doing) according to their consequences. A public exists as a community of shared interest, containing all those whose lives are touched by the consequences of conjoint action. Reconstructing communities and institutions is necessary to endow practical activity with the expressive quality of aesthetic experience, making normal life processes into living works of art.

Dewey's pragmatic methods and conceptions shaped in fundamental ways not only the Chicago School of Sociology, but the Second, postwar, Chicago School as well. Dewey's influence is explicit, for example, in Becker's (1992) classic argument that the very meaning of art is the cooperative product of art worlds. It is equally evident in the "logic of systemic analysis" and the core concept of "social control" that guides Morris Janowitz's magisterial survey of *The Last Half Century* (1978), as well as Janowitz's prescription for *Institution Building in Urban Education* (1969). But Dewey's influence reaches far beyond Chicago; for example, to Philip Selznick's masterly analysis of the naturalistic ethics, moral persons, moral institutions, and moral communities that make up *The Moral Commonwealth* (1992), and to Jürgen Habermas's *Theory of Communicative Action* (1984).

SEE ALSO: Addams, Jane; Art Worlds; Chicago School; Chicago School: Social Change; Critical Theory/Frankfurt School; Democracy; James, William; Mead, George Herbert; Pragmatism; Public Realm; Schools, Public; Self; Social Movements, Participatory Democracy in; Symbolic Interaction

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dialectic

Kevin B. Anderson and Peter Hudis

While its roots go back to the Socratic dialogues, dialectics as social theory begins with G. W. F. Hegel, and extends through Karl Marx to today. With Hegel, the dialectic takes the form of a double negation. Ideas or social forms face negativity from within. If the process deepens, the old idea or form is overthrown. However, such a first or bare negation remains a "formless abstraction" unless it develops some determinateness or specificity (Hegel 1969: 113). This requires going beyond "the first negation as negation in general," to "the second negation, the negation of the negation," which is "concrete, absolute negativity" (p. 116). This

absolute negativity creates a new idea or social form in place of the old. Then the process may resume, with negation growing again within what has been newly created. Some have erroneously described this process as one of thesis antithesis synthesis, an expression Hegel himself never used (Pinkard 2000).

As against such formulaic notions, Hegel's dialectic is deeply rooted in historical and social development, especially the period of the Enlightenment and the French Revolution. These form the backdrop to all of his major works. As against the earlier Socratic dialectic, conflict and dialogue take place between real social forces, as well as between ideas. In the *Phenomenology of Mind* (1807), Hegel traces the development of consciousness and knowledge, from the ancient world to his own time. Successive forms of consciousness are negations of previous ones. For example, in the much discussed dialectic of the master and the slave (literally, lordship and bondage), slaves in the Greco Roman world acquire a more developed form of self consciousness than their masters. This is because they have experienced "absolute negativity," as their personal world has been shattered through the wrenching experience of slavery. This form of consciousness, he writes, has had "that experience melted into its every fiber," leading to a negation of the self (Hegel 1967: 237). But the fact that the slave performs physical labor, while the master enjoys a life of leisure, points in the direction of a second or absolute negation: "Thus precisely in labor where there seemed to be merely some outsider's mind and ideas involved, the bondsman becomes aware, through this rediscovery of himself by himself, of having and being 'a mind of his own'" (p. 239). This leads in turn to a new form of consciousness, Stoicism, which Hegel portrays as an advance. Alluding to the fact that several prominent Stoics were manumitted slaves, however, Hegel also stresses the limitations placed upon human consciousness by a historical period he characterizes as "a time of universal fear and bondage" (p. 245).

Hegel develops a number of other dialectical categories, including identity, difference, and contradiction. He writes that although identity between two forms also includes of necessity some sort of difference, difference also has to

involve some identity, a common set of terms or a framework through which they can express that difference. This could include a common language, for example. The impasse is overcome in a third stage, that of contradiction. Expanding the notion of contradiction from the sphere of ideas to that of social life, Hegel concludes that "everything is inherently contradictory" and that "contradiction is the root of all movement and all vitality" (Hegel 1969: 439).

Hegel's negations and contradictions create ground for a radical form of subjectivity, and he enjoins us to grasp reality "not as substance but as subject as well" (Hegel 1967: 80). He sees a drive for freedom as the overarching theme of human history, although this involves contradiction, even sometimes retrogression. As humanity strives for the universal, for an absolute liberation, internal barriers to its realization repeatedly manifest themselves. Prominent among these are abstract universals, which lack particularity or concreteness. The French Revolution, especially its Jacobin phase, was marked by universals of "pure abstraction," which "lacked a filling and a content," thus lapsing into the "sheer horror of the negative that has nothing positive in it" (p. 608). However, Hegel's system ends not here, but with a series of absolutes in which freedom is concretized, ultimately as the idea "engenders and enjoys itself as absolute mind" (Hegel 1971: 315).

Marx attacks the conservative side of Hegel's social and political philosophy, for example in his 1843 critique of the anti democratic *Philosophy of Right*. At the same time, Marx takes over the dialectic. In his "Critique of the Hegelian Dialectic" in the unpublished *1844 Manuscripts*, he characterizes Hegel's "outstanding achievement" as "the dialectic of negativity as the moving and creative principle" (Marx, in Fromm 1961: 176). At the same time, Marx distances himself from some aspects of Hegel's idealism: "For Hegel, human life . . . is equivalent to self consciousness" (p. 179). Nonetheless, many core principles of Hegel's dialectic – negation of the negation, contradiction, the concrete universal, etc. – are retained in the Marxian dialectic. Nor is idealism rejected *in toto*. A year later, in the "Theses on Feuerbach," Marx writes that many forms

of materialism lack the subjective element, are too contemplative: “Hence, in contradistinction to materialism, the active side was set forth abstractly by idealism” (MECW 5: 3).

With Marx, the notion of contradiction migrates to the sphere of political economy, where social change is driven by class struggle, as he and Engels maintain in *The Communist Manifesto* (1848). Change also occurs when, due to social development, “the material productive forces of society come into contradiction with the existing production relationships,” as he wrote in the preface to the *Critique of Political Economy* in 1859 (Marx, in Fromm 1961: 218). Eight years later, in volume 1 of *Capital*, Marx confirms his debt to Hegel by writing of “the Hegelian ‘contradiction,’ which is the source of all dialectics” (Marx 1976: 744).

In the closing pages of *Capital* Marx uses the Hegelian negation of the negation to frame a discussion of the possible demise of capitalism. In the section on “primitive accumulation” he describes the expropriation of the English peasantry during the agricultural revolution as “the first negation of private property,” as the peasants lose their land. Driven into the cities, they become the working class. Capitalism eventually “begets its own negation,” however, the revolt of the working class, a class that it has called into existence. “This,” Marx concludes, “is the negation of the negation” (pp. 929–30). Elsewhere, for example in the 1873 preface to a new edition of *Capital*, he criticizes “the mystificatory side of the Hegelian dialectic,” and writes: “It must be inverted, in order to discover the rational kernel within the mystificatory shell.” Nonetheless, he avows himself “a pupil of that mighty thinker” (pp. 102–3). In a letter to Engels of January 16, 1858, Marx expresses the intention to publish an essay on what was “rational” in Hegel’s dialectic, this after he reviewed Hegel’s *Logic* while in the process of writing the *Grundrisse* (MECW 40: 249). He never did so.

In his *Ludwig Feuerbach and the End of Classical German Philosophy* (1886), Engels develops two schema, which are embraced to this day by more orthodox currents within Marxism. First, Engels writes that Hegel’s “system” is conservative, while his “dialectical method” was revolutionary. Second, he divides all of philosophy into “two great camps,” idealism and

materialism, with the latter the progressive and revolutionary one (MECW 26: 363, 366). It was in this spirit that Georgi Plekhanov coined the term “dialectical materialism” five years later. Engels also enunciated three “laws” of dialectics: (1) transformation of quantity into quality, (2) interpenetration of opposites, and (3) negation of the negation.

Until the publication of the *1844 Manuscripts* in German in 1932 (a Russian edition appeared in 1927), Marx’s concept of dialectic and its relation to that of Hegel was obscured. Some Marxists delved directly into Hegel, however. In his 1914–15 *Notebooks* on Hegel’s *Logic*, Lenin returns directly to Hegel’s writings, modifying some aspects of the dominant form of dialectical materialism. Concerning the Hegelian notion of consciousness, he writes: “cognition not only reflects the objective world, but creates it” (LCW 38: 212). Lenin also expresses reservations about Engels and Plekhanov, attempting to go beyond the rigid divide between idealism and materialism by attacking not only abstract idealism, but also “vulgar materialism” (LCW 38: 114). He kept these reflections on the dialectic mostly private, however, allowing the very “vulgar materialism” he had critiqued to reign relatively unchallenged in the Soviet Union.

In his *History and Class Consciousness* (1923), Georg Lukács independently recovers the Hegelian dialectic for Marxism. He accuses Engels of confusing “the scientific experiment” with “praxis in the dialectical, philosophical sense” (Lukács 1971: 132). Moreover, he attacks Engels for neglecting the element of subjectivity in his three laws of dialectic: “But he does not even mention the most vital interaction, namely the dialectical relation between subject and object in the historical process.” The mere recourse to “fluid” concepts does not solve this problem, Lukács holds (p. 3). He also develops a concept of concrete totality, which allows a move from the factory – “in concentrated form the whole of capitalist society” (p. 90) – to the concept of fetishism or reification. The first to point to commodity fetishism as the core of Marx’s critique of capital, Lukács also extended reification from the factory to the entire human condition under capitalism – to the white collar worker, or the scientist, for example. In doing so, he incorporated Weber’s

theory of rationalization. Later, Lucien Goldmann (1969) discussed Lukács in relation to sociological methodology.

Frankfurt School member Herbert Marcuse's *Reason and Revolution* (1941) was the first major study of dialectics that appeared after the publication of Marx's *1844 Manuscripts*. Marcuse again places negativity at the center of dialectical thought: "Hegel's philosophy is indeed what the subsequent reaction termed it, a negative philosophy. It is originally motivated by the conviction that the given facts that appear to common sense as the positive index of truth are in reality the negation of truth, so that truth can only be established by their destruction" (Marcuse 1941: 27). Commonsense reason also traps consciousness in the particular and the empirical, blocking it from grasping the universal, and therefore the possibilities for radical change. With dialectical reason, in contrast, "possibility belongs to the very character of reality" (p. 150). In this sense, universals such as human emancipation are actually part of social reality, whereas oppressive social forms are in an ultimate sense unreal and false. Theodor Adorno, also of the Frankfurt School, parts company with Hegel on absolute negativity, taking issue with the concept of totality as well. Adorno, who seeks to expunge the affirmative character from dialectics, goes so far as to link absolute negativity to the Holocaust, this in his *Negative Dialectics* (1966).

Dialectic also marks some of the major treatments of race and colonialism, whether in W. E. B. Du Bois's notion of "double consciousness" in *Souls of Black Folk* (1903), or in Frantz Fanon's dialectic of colonialism and resistance in *Wretched of the Earth* (1961). C. L. R. James in his *Notes on Dialectics* (1948) and especially Raya Dunayevskaya developed a concept of dialectic that eschews abstract universals, elaborating a multiple concept of subjectivity that includes not only the traditional working class, but also blacks, women, and youth. Writing later on as a Marxist humanist, Dunayevskaya makes absolute negativity her point of departure, arguing in *Philosophy and Revolution* (1973) that Hegel's absolutes are not closures, but imbued with absolute negativity. She holds that dialectical thought, if concretized, can impact radical social movements,

helping to give them form and direction: "Philosophy and revolution will then liberate the innate talents of men and women who will become whole" (p. 292). Hegel's dialectic also allows oppositional movements to navigate periods of retrogression as well as progressive ones: "Far from expressing a sequence of never ending progression, the Hegelian dialectic lets retrogression appear as translucent as progression" (Dunayevskaya 2002: 332).

Strong challenges to dialectics have come from scientific positivism, and more recently from poststructuralism. Among others, poststructuralists attack the dialectic as too affirmative, counterposing a Nietzschean notion of absolute difference. These critics have also argued that Hegel's universals swallow up particularity and difference in grand totalities or narratives. Nonetheless, dialectical thought persists, especially through the traditions of Marxism and critical theory.

SEE ALSO: Adorno, Theodor W.; Critical Theory/Frankfurt School; Dialectical Materialism; Engels, Friedrich; Hegel, G. W. F.; Horkheimer, Max; Lukács, Georg; Marcuse, Herbert; Marx, Karl

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dialectical materialism

Rob Beamish

The term “dialectical materialism” first appeared in Joseph Dietzgen’s 1887 essay “Excursions of a Socialist into the Domain of Epistemology,” but only became a central concept within Marxism following George Plekhanov’s 1891 essay commemorating the sixtieth anniversary of Hegel’s death and his ensuing efforts to establish a monist view of history. Dialectical materialism became the dominant philosophy of Marxism during the Second International (1889–1917) and the official, formulaic philosophy of communist parties controlled by the USSR during Joseph Stalin’s dictatorship (1929–53).

As the official philosophy of Soviet communism, dialectical materialism brought together a simplistic notion of Hegel’s dialectical method – one that presented change as the result of the internal struggle of opposites in which a thesis gives way to its antithesis and is then followed by a higher synthesis of the original opposites – with Marx and Engels’s materialism to constitute a single, allegedly coherent science that applied to all material, biological, historical, social, and political phenomena. Its supporters claimed that it represented the extension and culmination of “historical materialism” – a term Engels used to designate a formalized philosophy of history based on Marx’s 1859 sketch of his “materialist conception of history.” All change, according to dialectical materialists, resulted from the thesis–antithesis–synthesis dialectic inherent in historical, social, even natural phenomena.

Marx himself never used the terms historical or dialectical materialism and, despite a few expressions of interest, never wrote a

comprehensive philosophical or methodological statement. On the contrary, Marx resisted attempts to convert his materialist conception into a substantive theory of history or totalizing philosophy, although in reading *Anti Duhring* and not rejecting the extension of dialectics to nature he gave Engels’s ideas tacit support. Marx’s own materialism was limited to the labor process and the material conditions of production. As the social relations of production developed, Marx argued, they became, at a certain stage, fetters to the material forces of production, creating the conditions for revolutionary change. In grasping such events, Marx noted, one had to distinguish between the transformation of the material conditions of production and the ideological forms through which people became aware of the conflict and engaged in struggles for change. This guideline focused on the key factors involved in historical change but it was not a rigid or comprehensive theory of history. Marx’s own historical writings demonstrate his appreciation for nuance and detail rather than slavish conformity to a restrictive rubric.

From 1875 until his death, Engels sought to bring greater coherence to his and Marx’s work by developing a philosophy which incorporated Hegel’s dialectics into an eighteenth century inspired materialism. This thrust, contrary to Engels’s and Marx’s original conception that conscious human action, directed against particular social relations, created social change, began to reduce history to one aspect of a general, material, natural evolution, in which social history and nature were subject to the same laws. Engels sought to extend his dialectical conception of nature – itself a questionable theory – to the study of historical development in all branches of science.

Socialism Utopian and Scientific popularized Engels’s claim that one could unify socialist history, idealist philosophy, and mechanistic materialism into a “scientific socialism.” Plekhanov and Lenin gave added intellectual and political credence to the Engelsian inspired materialist philosophy and by 1938 Stalin, the General Secretary of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU), affirmed that dialectical materialism was the sole and correct philosophy of Marxism Leninism. Maintaining

that all material phenomena constitute an interconnected whole, the explanations for all historical change were based on “diamat’s” three laws: the transformation of quantity into quality (small quantitative changes lead to abrupt “leaps” of qualitative transformation), the unity of opposites (all phenomena are comprised of opposites which internally “struggle” with each other), and the negation of the negation (in the “struggle of opposites,” one negates the other but it is later negated, leading to a higher, more developed unity). The crude triad of thesis–antithesis–synthesis was diamat’s dialectical conception. As the philosophy of Marxism, dialectical materialism encompassed all aspects of thought, events, and the material world.

Diamat’s major significance was political rather than philosophical or scientific. By maintaining that nature and the material world were primary and thought was derivative, the Marxism of the CPSU rejected human reason and consciousness as key factors in social change and focused exclusively on the dialectics of material reality. Because one could only provide after the fact reconstructions of events through diamat’s three laws, the powerful CPSU became the official interpreter of social events and the guide to further social change.

The critique of dialectical materialism began with Karl Korsch’s *Marxism and Philosophy* and Georg Lukács’s *History and Class Consciousness*. Written independently, both rejected the reduction of history to a materialist dialectic, emphasized the importance of consciousness in history, and stimulated ensuing western Marxists to focus on questions of epistemology, method, and a renewed understanding of Marx’s critique of Hegel. Korsch and Lukács’s focus on the active, mediated engagement of humankind with the natural world through labor was buttressed by the 1932 publication of Marx’s 1844 manuscripts, which, along with the *Grundrisse*, undermined diamat as a credible legacy to Marx’s materialist conception of history.

SEE ALSO: Base and Superstructure; Communism; Dialectic; Economic Determinism; Engels, Friedrich; Marx, Karl; Marxism and Sociology

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diaspora

Larissa Remennick

The term “diaspora” originates from the Greek “dia” (over) and “speiro” (to sow). The Greeks understood diaspora as migration and colonization of new lands. In modern parlance the term diaspora usually refers to ethnic groups whose sizable parts have lived outside their country of origin for at least several generations, while maintaining some ties (even if purely symbolic or sentimental) to the historic homeland. The “classic” diasporas in terms of the ancient history of dispersion are Jewish, Armenian, and Greek; the more modern (and also more numerous) diasporas include the African (“Black American”) diaspora resulting from the forced migration of slaves to the Americas, and Irish, Italian, Polish, Chinese, and Indian diasporas resulting from voluntary migrations.

Today the word diaspora is applied to a broad range of migrant populations whose current or historic uprooting was politically or

economically motivated, including political refugees, voluntary migrants, guest workers, expatriates, stable ethnic minorities, and other dispersed groups. Modern political and social thinkers (Sheffer 1986; Safran 1991; Cohen 1997) put forward several criteria for defining ethnic communities as diasporas: a history of dispersal (often forced or motivated by harsh living conditions), myths and memories of a homeland, alienation in the host country, a desire for eventual return (which can be ambivalent, eschatological, or utopian), ongoing support of the homeland, and a collective identity (often including common linguistic and cultural practices). Thus, the German diaspora embraces many generations of *Aussiedler* in Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union (now making a mass return to a reunified Germany); the Turkish/Kurdish diasporas include at least two generations of guest workers in Germany; and the Filipino diaspora embraces two generations of women and men working in medical and personal services across the western world. New diasporas may appear on the global map as a result of seminal geopolitical events, such as the founding of the State of Israel in 1948, with the following War of Independence and the dispersion of thousands of Palestinian Arabs across the Middle East and western countries. Another recent example of diasporization of a seemingly monolith ethnic entity is an estimated 25 million Russians and other Slavs remaining in the former Soviet successor states as a result of the collapse of the unitary USSR. Another result of the post-communist transition is the emigration of about 1.7 million former Soviet Jews who resettled in Israel and in the West (mainly the US, Canada, and Germany), enlarging and invigorating the existing multi-ethnic global diaspora of Russian speakers (Remennick 2002).

Some communities that used to have strong diasporic consciousness during the initial two or three generations upon resettlement later assimilated in the receiving societies and lost active ties with their homelands – the examples include Irish and Italian immigrants in North America and Australia. Other diasporas continued to exist for centuries without actual homelands (e.g., 1,500 years of living in *galut* – dispersion – in the case of the Jews), or even without a tangible concept of a homeland, like

Gypsies, also known as Roma people, scattered across Europe and Asia. Indeed, the term diaspora has acquired metaphoric implications and is used as a generic description of displaced people who feel, maintain, invent, or revive a connection with a prior home, real or imagined (Safran 1991). Robin Cohen (1997) has proposed another typology of diasporas in relation to the circumstances of their formation, social contexts, mythologies, and grounds for solidarity. These include: victim diasporas (e.g., refugees from war-stricken regions), labor and imperial diasporas (Russians and other Slavs in the former Soviet Union), trade diasporas, cultural diasporas (e.g., today's secular Jews living outside Israel), and global deterritorialized diasporas such as the Roma.

In the late twentieth and early twenty-first centuries, the closely entwined processes of mass migration, globalization, and ethnic revival led to a fortification and thriving of transnational diasporas, i.e., global communities with common ethnic origins whose economic, political, and social networks cross the borders of nation states. Diaspora discourse reflects a sense of being part of an ongoing transnational network and includes dispersed people who retain a sense of their uniqueness and an interest in their ancestral homeland. From a sociological standpoint, a diaspora is a social construct founded on group identity, common history, cultural practices, narratives, and dreams, i.e., it includes many virtual elements that nevertheless play a central role in its sustainability. The diasporic mindset is characterized by a sense of living in one place while simultaneously belonging to another, or even to many others, as many contemporary diasporas have multiple centers (e.g., the Russian Jewish diaspora stretching between Israel, North America, and Europe). As a result of the cross-fertilization of different traditions, diasporic minorities often develop cultural hybrids between home and host styles of clothing, eating, socializing, and so on that often entail the invention and use of hybrid languages and new vocabularies (e.g., Turkish German, Israeli Russian).

The maintenance of close ties between diasporic centers has been strongly reinforced by new communication and transportation technologies that compress time and space (Castells 1996). Electronic media including television

channels transmitted via cable and satellite across diasporic communities, Internet, and email make the contemporary world increasingly interconnected. Relatively cheap phone calls and air travel make homeland and other branches of the ethnic diaspora easily accessible. Altogether, these vehicles of globalization have dramatically increased the amount and intensity of contacts between co ethnics scattered across the globe. Many members of diasporic communities (expatriates) hold dual citizenship, vote in elections (and sometimes sponsor political parties or activist groups) in both the home and host countries, and participate in their economic life via entrepreneurial activities, sending remittances to families, and so on (Portes et al. 1999).

It can be argued that the majority of today's immigrants display some elements of diasporic consciousness and lifestyle. These are often seen as a challenge to the dominance of the existing nation states, especially if immigrants show a reluctance to assimilate into the main stream and exhibit signs of cultural separatism. Nationalism and nativist sentiments of the hegemonic majority can lead to social and political exclusion of minority groups that are often seen as a threat to national unity and security. The issue of dual or multiple loyalties of diasporic immigrants is often heralded by the conservative and right wing political forces in order to limit their access to citizenship and political participation, and thus to reaffirm their marginal status (e.g., Turkish and Kurdish guest workers in Germany). Anti immigrant tendencies have been further stimulated by the recent upsurge in international terrorism and the ensuing fears of the western nations that feel under attack and in an enhanced need for self defense. Despite this backlash, contemporary global diasporas continue to question the binary mode of identity and loyalty to one nation state and make hyphenated or multitiered identities more common and gradually more acceptable.

SEE ALSO: Assimilation; Ethnic Enclaves; Ethnic Groups; Ethnicity; Ethnonationalism; Globalization, Culture and; Middleman Minorities; Migration: International; Refugees; Transnationalism

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difference

Hasmita Ramji

The concept of difference seeks to recognize social diversity. Its growing profile is underpinned by a refiguration of the discourses of "multi," "commonality," and "universalism" in a variety of arenas and forms. Spurred by the postmodern turn, difference has been a key way to problematize universal categories such as "women" and "men." An analysis of gender, race, and other categories of difference points to the multilayered and fractured construction of collective and individual identities. The current interest in difference has in part been because of a belief that as a concept it can illuminate social diversity, but also in part because of its importance in recent recognition claims. Debates here have highlighted the relational underpinnings of diversity. What has attracted attention is "what are significant markers of difference in society" and "how are they made so"? The creation of difference on the basis of race, gender, or class at social, economic, and political levels is crucial, not

as individual characteristics but insofar as they are primary organizing principles of a society which locates and positions groups within opportunity structures. They can unlock how social inequality is created.

The key importance of difference in social existence was highlighted by the deconstructionism of Derrida. Derrida's starting point was his rejection of a common model of knowledge and language, according to which understanding something requires acquaintance with its meaning – ideally a kind of acquaintance in which this meaning is directly present to consciousness. For him, this model involved the “myth of presence,” the supposition that we gain our best understanding of something when it – and it alone – is present to consciousness. He argued that understanding something requires a grasp of the ways in which it relates to other things, and a capacity to recognize it on other occasions and in different contexts – which can never be exhaustively predicted. He coined the term “différance” (*différance* in French, combining the meanings of difference and deferral) in 1968 in response to structuralist theories of language (such as Saussure's structuralist linguistics) to characterize these aspects of understanding, and proposed that *différance* is the phenomenon lying at the heart of language and thought, at work in all meaningful activities in a necessarily elusive and provisional way.

The deconstructionist account of difference argues that opposites are already united; they depend on each other integrally; thus, there is no black without white, etc. Reality is fragmented and saturated with difference, and language is a key way of understanding this fragmentation. Derrida quotes Saussure, who wrote: “in language there are only differences. Even more important: a difference generally implies positive terms between which the difference is set up; but in language there are only differences without positive terms.” Derrida reemphasizes the point that meaning is not in the signifier itself, but that it only exists in a network, in relation to other things. *Différance* comes before being. This throws the idea of “origin,” of true original meaning, into radical question. With the idea of origin in question, Derrida pushes further than Saussure did to claim that there is no absolute identity, nothing that “is itself” by virtue of its being. This can be related to the

current debate in multicultural societies about difference.

The key issue, for many, is not about “difference” per se, but about the question of who defines difference, how different categories of previously conceived universal categories (e.g., women) are represented within the discourses of “difference,” and whether “difference” differentiates laterally or hierarchically. How does difference designate the “other”? Who defines difference? What are the presumed norms from which a group is marked as being different? What is the nature of attributions that are claimed as characterizing a group as different? How are boundaries of difference constituted, maintained, or dissipated? How is difference interiorized in the landscapes of the psyche? How are various groups represented in different discourses of difference? Questions such as these raise a more general problematic about difference as an analytical category. Brah (1996) suggests four ways in which difference may be conceptualized: difference as experience, difference as social relations, difference as subjectivity, and difference as identity.

The concept of difference, then, refers to the variety of ways in which specific discourses of difference are constituted, contested, reproduced, or resignified. Some constructions of difference, such as racism, posit fixed and immutable boundaries between groups signified as inherently different. Other constructions may present difference as relational, contingent, and variable. In other words, difference is not always a marker of hierarchy and oppression. Therefore, it is a contextually contingent question whether difference pans out as inequity, exploitation, and oppression or as egalitarianism, diversity, and democratic forms of political agency. Sandra Harding expresses the shift best in her claim that “there are no gender relations per se, but only gender relations that are constructed by and between classes, races, and cultures” (in Zinn & Dill 1999: 104).

Charles Taylor's (1994) seminal essay discusses difference as a need for (individual) recognition. Increasing cultural diversity and the emergence of multiculturalism leads to potentially contradictory discourses on two levels. On the one hand, the politics of universalism means emphasizing the equal dignity of individuals through the equalization of rights and

entitlements. On the other hand, the modern notion of identity has given rise to a politics of difference, based on recognition of the unique identity of individuals or groups, and their distinctness from everyone else. The politics of universalism require norms of non discrimination which are blind to difference, while the politics of difference require special rights and treatment for certain groups.

The contradictory implications of the recognition of difference that Taylor's work highlights are apparent in recent feminist debates. Many feminists now contend that difference occupies a central stage as the project of women's studies today. If difference has helped revitalize academic feminisms, it has also "upset the apple cart" and introduced new conflicts into feminist studies. For example, in a widely discussed essay, Jane Rowland Martin argues that the current preoccupation with difference is leading feminism into dangerous traps. She fears that it is giving privileged status to a predetermined set of analytical categories (race, ethnicity, and class): "we affirm the existence of nothing but difference" (in Zinn & Dill 1999: 104). Despite the much heralded diversity trend within feminist studies, difference is often reduced to mere pluralism: a "live and let live" approach where principles of relativism generate a long list of diversities which begin with gender, class, and race and continue through a range of social structural as well as personal characteristics.

However, despite seeing the pitfalls in some strands of the difference project, it is still the case that it has prised open discursive closures which asserted the primacy of, say, class or gender over all other axes of differentiation, and it has interrogated the constructions of such privileged signifiers as unified autonomous cores. The political subject of black feminism, for example, decenters the unitary, masculinist subject of Eurocentric discourse, as well as masculinist rendering of "black" as a political color, while seriously disrupting any notion of "woman" as a unitary category.

Conceptualizing the postmodern category of difference, then, remains paramount. Breaking down the barriers of artificial (socially constructed) difference enables the cultural politics of genuine difference based on achieving the principles of justice, freedom, and equality for students occupying varying historical locations

to commence. Giroux organized his understanding of the concept of difference into the categories of conservative, liberal, and radical (Miron 1999). There is a clear relevance to contemporary multicultural politics in western societies. As Giroux observes, conservative ideological forces such as the New Right have invoked the notion of difference to justify social relations of racism, male dominance, and classism. Invoking the supposed natural laws of science and culture, New Right groups have justified these unequal power relations by equating the category of difference with the idea of deviance.

SEE ALSO: Deconstruction; Derrida, Jacques; Postmodern Social Theory; Postmodernism

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differential treatment of children by sex

Erin Trapp and Jane Menken

In nearly all populations, in the absence of special circumstances, the numbers of males and females are approximately equal; female

advantage in life expectancy balances the slightly higher birth rate of boys. Cultural practices such as infanticide, differential feeding, and provision of health care by sex have, in some populations in the past, led to an unequal ratio of boys to girls and higher mortality and morbidity for girls compared to boys. The last two decades of the twentieth century have, however, seen a rapid convergence in the treatment of children by sex, particularly in the developed world. Despite improvements in the treatment of girls and women, inequalities still exist, most notably in developing countries in Asia and Africa.

FUNDAMENTAL CAUSES AND SOCIAL CONTEXT

In the developed world, waning parental preference for sons has led to a corresponding decline in differential treatment of children by sex. In the past, sex preferences were thought to be the result of the differing value of children of each sex in many cultures, gender roles enforced by traditionally patriarchal societies, and the desire of both parents to have a child whose sex matches their own. The decline in sex preference is thought to be the result of increased gender equality and broad attitudinal shifts across economic and socioeconomic lines. Further, in industrialized countries, children are seen less as an economic asset, but rather an economic burden due to educational and maintenance costs associated with extended adolescence. Therefore, sex preference is a value only the very well off can afford.

Evidence of a decline in differential treatment of children by sex also is abundant in many parts of the developing world, but disparities remain. In parts of Asia, previously observed advantages in male life expectancy have disappeared, and more girls now have access to education. Sex preferences in traditionally patrilocal societies were thought to be immutably embedded in cultural, religious, and behavioral norms. Change has occurred, but only in the context of some combination of fertility decline, female empowerment, and/or economic development, which are necessary, if not sufficient, conditions for improvement in the status of women and girls. Additionally,

since high rates of fertility permit sex preferences to be satisfied easily, fertility transition also corresponds with declining sex preference.

In populations in which male life expectancy exceeds that of females, the differential usually is attributed to cultural practices that lead to discrimination against girls and women and to the low social standing of mothers and their lack of power within the household. Maternal education and well being generally are found to lead to more equal treatment of children, affecting their mortality and morbidity as well as life chances. The higher standing of these mothers in the household is believed to be responsible for these changes. However, some research finds that maternal education has a negligible effect on standing in the household. Further, while mortality rates have equalized in many countries, girls still may experience higher rates of morbidity, including malnutrition, wasting, and/or stunting.

These changes illustrate a shift in our understanding of differential treatment of children, and point to resource dependent causes of differential treatment of family members, including household economics, the cost and efficacy of fertility control, education, and family planning.

MAJOR DIMENSIONS OF REMAINING DISPARITIES IN DEVELOPING COUNTRIES

The existence and effects of differential treatment of children by sex in developing countries can be illustrated in three major areas: mortality, health, and education. Although mortality (expressed in higher than expected ratios of boys to girls, higher mortality rates for girls, and/or a male life expectancy advantage) is the most obvious outcome of differential treatment, human capital effects such as poor health and less education provide evidence of disparities in treatment short of death.

Higher rates of mortality in girls than boys or higher than expected sex ratios favoring males, the clearest demonstration of the preference for sons, are found in some countries in Africa and Asia (most notably China, discussed below). Little documentation of excess female mortality exists outside of these regions.

Further, discerning female disadvantage from mortality data can be difficult because biological factors favor girls, so that female disadvantage may actually be more severe than is immediately apparent.

In the 1970s and 1980s, the median sex ratio of infant mortality in 82 countries in Latin America, Asia, and Africa averaged 118 male deaths to 100 female deaths; the median ratio was much lower in countries in Northern Africa (111), Western Asia (111), and South Central Asia (108), suggesting regional concentrations of female disadvantage. Significant female disadvantage, particularly in infant mortality, also is reported in the Middle Eastern Crescent. Factors such as low income, lack of maternal education, inadequate health care use, and large family size are associated with higher mortality risks in South Asia and affect all children. However, girls' excess mortality risks transcend socioeconomic status, and more recent studies continue to find selective neglect of girls based on certain sex and birth order combinations. For example, those with an older surviving sister may fare less well than those without a sister. Research evaluating programs aimed at reducing child mortality has found that improved maternal education serves to decrease child mortality as well as to equalize child mortality by sex, but sex differentials still exist.

These differentials in mortality are troubling, but fail to capture the human capital consequences of female disadvantage adequately. According to the United Nations (1998), child health disparities, like mortality disparities, by sex are most evident in South Central Asia, and girls in Northern and Western Africa also experience poorer health than boys due to disparate treatment. Girls in three countries in South Central Asia (Bangladesh, northern India, and Pakistan) also are far less likely to receive necessary immunizations than boys, although differential rates of immunization are small in other parts of the world and do not favor either sex. Studies of morbidity typically use malnutrition, wasting, and/or stunting to pinpoint the existence and mechanisms of differential treatment. In Bangladesh, nutritional and educational differences that were previously reported have narrowed after two decades of fertility decline. In India family

composition rather than sex leads to poorer health; both boys and girls with two or more surviving siblings of the same sex are worse off in terms of severe stunting and incomplete immunization. By contrast, evidence exists of better nourishment among girls than boys in six African countries. Although trends are not the same everywhere, the status and treatment of girls is improving in Asia and Africa, but significant room for improvement still exists.

The well known benefits of education in developing countries include declining fertility, improved child mortality and morbidity rates, improved health and status of women, and more educational attainment for subsequent generations. Yet educational opportunities remain limited, and female enrollment in primary school is significantly lower than male enrollment in 39 out of 40 developing countries in one study, which leads to higher mortality risks for girls than boys in these countries. Education differences persist at nearly all levels of socioeconomic status. Adherence to traditional gender roles in many countries contributes to unequal rates of education, with girls benefiting less from educational opportunities in Ghana, for example, and at higher risk of dropping out of school. In Thailand, the belief prevails that schooling is more important for boys than for girls. Thus, while family planning and economic development programs have improved girls' educational prospects in the developing world and their education has increased, traditional attitudes and resource limitations continue to limit opportunities for formal schooling.

AN IN BETWEEN CASE: CHINA

China often is thought of as an "in between" case, straddling the developed and developing worlds. As such, the treatment of children in China provides a stark example of the changes in the treatment of children by sex over time. Cultural preferences for sons led to high rates of female infanticide as late as the 1950s, a practice that waned with the establishment of the People's Republic of China, and a strong government that enacted policies aimed at modifying this and other cultural norms. However, the interruption in excess female mortality during

this period was brief due to famines experienced during the Great Leap Forward, and high rates of “missing” girls have persisted since the establishment of the one child policy in 1979. In this later period, sex selective abortion and adopting out of females are thought to be the means used to create the unequal ratio of boys and girls. The Chinese government modified the one child policy in rural areas in the late 1990s, allowing families with a first born daughter to pay “social compensation fees” in order to have an additional child, partially in response to this demographic imbalance. Yet China still is experiencing a deficit of marriageable girls, which could in turn affect the norms favoring boys and actually increase the value of daughters, lead to practices such as infant betrothal and bride buying, and create a large glut of unmarried men (already underway).

CURRENT EMPHASES, METHODOLOGICAL ISSUES, PROBLEMS, AND FUTURE DIRECTIONS

It is important to note that a high ratio of boys to girls exists in Korea, illustrating the potential for cultural practices to persist even absent government policies like those in China. Therefore, the need to study the differential treatment of children by sex – a complex and expensive process – persists. In particular, data concerning household allocation of resources that illustrate intra household access to nutrition, education, health care, and other resources are time consuming and labor intensive to collect. Proxy measures such as weight and height for age and weight for height (body mass index) are useful for measuring child treatment, absent direct observation, but have their own limitations. Low weight for age is considered an indicator of recent morbidity or poor nutrition, while low height for age is used as a marker of long term or chronic malnutrition. Yet the lack of an international, developing world based set of standards by which to judge the health of children is particularly troubling. Although the World Health Organization has endorsed a nutritional standard for developing countries that classifies a child as malnourished if weight for age is more than two

standard deviations below the median in the standard population from the US, researchers recognize that a standard based on US children may be inappropriate in developing world contexts, particularly given the growing problem of obesity in American children. Further, the biologically different rates at which children of both sexes develop confounds our understanding of their treatment in the home.

Increasingly, we recognize the interdependence of resource and cultural theories of child preference and treatment. Resource dependent explanations in the past suggested that parents would only value daughters for the economic benefit they bring to the household. Yet if this were the case, the dividends accruing from increased budgets or smaller family sizes would merely be used to more aggressively discriminate against daughters. Conversely, declining sex preferences can be expected to occur only if the status of women and their relative importance to their parents increases. Improvements in female nutrition, education, and status provide potentially powerful insight into this hypothesis. They suggest that family planning, microcredit, and other programs aimed at women’s empowerment have a direct effect on incentives to invest in daughters. It is also possible, however, that declining gender inequality in child outcomes reflects not just the role of programs in subsidizing and encouraging investment in daughters, but an increasing awareness of an emerging equalization of sons’ and daughters’ roles in providing support in old age.

Given the success in changing cultural practices that favor boys, development programs that aim to improve the status of girls have taken many shapes. In South Asia, girls’ education has increased, in part through government scholarship programs aimed at girls. Microcredit programs such as those run by Grameen Bank and BRAC in Bangladesh focus specifically on empowering women to participate in market and monetary activities. Employment of women outside the home has become acceptable and opportunities for their employment now exist, especially in the cities.

Unequal treatment of children by sex continues, with particularly egregious examples of female disadvantage found in developing countries in Africa and South Asia. There is room

for optimism, however, as differential valuation and treatment of children by sex is largely disappearing in developed countries. Further, traditional cultural practices in developing countries that favor sons appear to be subject to economic forces and resource development, and programs aimed at family planning, educating women, and providing health care to families appear to reduce differentials by sex in mortality, morbidity, and education.

SEE ALSO: Family Demography; Family Structure and Child Outcomes; Fertility and Public Policy; Gender Bias; Gender, Health, and Mortality; Inequality/Stratification, Gender; Infant, Child, and Maternal Health and Mortality; Socialization, Gender

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digital

Luke Goode

To understand the significance of the term “digital,” we must place it alongside its “other” – the term “analogue.” The technical

distinction between these terms is relatively straightforward. Each signifies a different method by which data are captured, transported, processed, distributed, and represented, that is, the means by which they are *mediated*. Whilst analogue media “encode” data using “traces” – such as light burnt on to chemical film stock, or grooves cut into vinyl records – whose patterns have a physical connection to the source data, digital media translate source data into strings of binary computer code lacking that physical connection. Like the written word, digital code is an “arbitrary” signifier. Unlike the written word, however, it is a system comprising just two “symbols” (the “on” and “off” states of an electrical current), making it unreadable by human beings (it first has to be translated back into analogue forms such as light or sound waves) and robust enough to encode many different types of data simultaneously, including words, images, and sounds.

A commonly held assumption is that whilst we may still be in a transition phase, the future will be wholly digital. This is problematic on both technological and cultural grounds. Technologically, mediation is never *purely* digital: when “Cypher” in *The Matrix* (1999) performs the unthinkable feat of reading raw digital code – green cascades of zeros and ones – even he is separated from the data by two layers of representation: light waves represent a numeric system which, in turn, constitutes a cultural representation of the underlying molecular activity occurring within the machine. Culturally, moreover, the digitization of the media scape constitutes a process that contributes to a range of complex tensions and conflicts, rather than a gestalt switch pitting “old” against “new.” Digitization reconfigures some very old social and cultural issues. These include: access and democracy; authorship and intellectual property; and the social status of competing cultural forms. Other controversies linked with digitization may be more recent but also have pre digital genealogies. These include: the globalization of media; the significance of “interactivity”; and the ascendancy of “network” and “decentered” models of social agency within sociological discourse. Digitization, then, is best understood as a tension charged process which spans and provides a stage for various social controversies. As such,

we can avoid the twin pitfalls of *technological determinism*, which treats technological change as an independent cause of broader social changes, and *technological voluntarism*, which overlooks the role technology plays in shaping various choices faced by human societies by assuming that the significance of technology lies only in the uses to which human actors choose to put it.

CHARACTERISTICS OF DIGITAL MEDIA

It can be argued that computers have always functioned as communications media. From their inception, they have both enabled *and* shaped (i.e., mediated) various forms of communication between *humans* (as in computer generated data used in scientific discourse), and between *machines* (as in early military “cybernetics” research on computer guided missiles), as well as between humans *and* machines (as in early artificial intelligence experiments or chess playing computers). But the term “digital media” is usually associated with a cluster of more recent developments: the rise of the PC, multimedia applications, video games, and the popularization of the Internet, to name a few. These developments collectively brought the computer into the purview of everyday popular culture. And, as computers became conduits for images and sounds (and for “entertainment”), and not merely alphanumeric data, they became “media machines.” As digital technology was becoming more “mediatized,” extant media were becoming more digitized. Media industries began to explore new outreach opportunities, including the Internet and proprietary digital broadcasting and telecommunications networks.

Discussions of digital media have revolved especially around two keywords: “interactivity” and “convergence.” In the analogue era, interactivity was limited by various factors. Production and transmission facilities were costly. In the case of broadcast technologies, spectrum was scarce and had to be carefully managed. (Concerns about the power of radio and television as a propaganda tool were also drivers for political regulation of access to the airwaves.) In the digital age, the situation is radically

changed. Streams of digital code can be transmitted in close proximity without causing the interference that would occur with analogue data. They can also be compressed to eliminate redundant data. As such, digitization dramatically increases data flow capacity through channels such as copper telephone wires, radio waves, and fiber optic cables. In principle, the traditional “mass media” imbalance between “transmitters” and “receivers” could be radically reduced (a hope that predates the digital era as in the Brechtian vision of democratic radio and, later, public access television experiments). In reality, most digital broadcasting and broadband Internet networks are structured asymmetrically with greater “download” than “upload” capacity, countering this potential “democratizing” effect.

The singular term “interactivity” is problematic because it conflates diverse possibilities (Manovich 2000), including: forms of conversation, e.g., in chat rooms, via mobile phones or email; distributed or “networked” cultural production, e.g., collaborative “net art”; menu based interactivity and “bespoke” media, e.g., selecting the camera angle for an action replay during televised sport; multilinear navigation that has users determining a sequence of events or data, e.g., video games or hypertext literature; and experiments in reality TV and game shows where audiences can influence the narrative through remote controls or cell phones.

It is important to note that various forms of “interactivity” predate digitization. These include talk radio, TV channel “zapping,” and letters to the editor. Digitization has greatly expanded the scope for interactive practices *and* stimulated an unprecedented level of cultural fascination with “two way” media. John Durham Peters (1999) suggests that contemporary fascination with the interactive potentials of digital media reflects a largely unquestioned tendency in western culture (with ancient, Socratic roots), to treat one way communication as intrinsically inferior to conversation and dialogue.

Convergence is another digital keyword. The fact that all digital technology speaks the universal language of binary code has stimulated debate about the opportunities and dangers of media convergence. Digital data are, in principle, able to traverse and integrate different

sites and devices (such as PCs, handheld computers, mobile phones, digital cameras), whereas different media remained largely discrete in the analogue era. Certainly, there is an unprecedented degree of connectivity between media and communications devices (interacting with TV shows via mobile phones, for example). This is a source of concern for some analysts, conjuring up images of a seamless, seductive, and commercialized web of information and entertainment that leaves little room for independent thought or engagement with the “real world.” For others, it is a cause for optimism, promising not only convenience but also better communication flows: being able to switch between a television news report and a “primary source” it cites (such as a government document) may make us better informed, critical, and discerning citizens.

In reality, the “universal language” of digital code has been, and looks set to remain, beset by technological, cultural, and economic obstacles. Technologically, devices are actually programmed using various “higher level” languages rather than binary code. Unless protocols are developed carefully and cooperatively, large scale convergence remains a pipe dream. Corporations often prefer proprietary rather than common standards, in the hope of exerting greater control over markets and future innovations. Culturally, there are still question marks over the value of convergence. Despite unprecedented cross media connectivity, the genres, conventions, locations, and discourses of various media are still characterized by a remarkable degree of separation: common technical standards will not necessarily lead to a melting pot of the diverse media forms that have emerged in the modern era.

A significant tension within digital discourse exists between visions dominated by “high fidelity,” on the one hand, and “multiplication,” on the other. In the first vision, the radical increase in data capacity afforded by the digitization of media networks is understood primarily as the basis for technically improved “signals”: typically, these visions are populated by high definition and wide screen television sets, home theater systems with pristine 3D audio, stunning cinematic realism in video games, virtual reality environments, CGI (computer generated imagery) animations, and

digital special effects. The second vision emphasizes instead the enlarged scope for multiplication and differentiation of media texts: here, the focus tends to be on the dense communication flows of the Internet, digital compression formats such as MP3 audio, the multiplication of channels, interactive services, and customization facilities in digital television, and the proliferation of mobile and increasingly miniaturized media devices including Internet capable mobile phones and wireless handheld computers.

DIGITAL POLITICAL ECONOMY

A significant amount of sociological research and discourse has emerged as a reaction against the optimistic prognoses for the digital age offered by libertarian commentators in the early to mid 1990s. Influential analysts such as Nicholas Negroponte of the MIT Media Lab and his colleagues at *Wired* magazine, alongside various politicians from both the right and center left, argued that digital technology heralded a new economy in which entrepreneurial individuals would triumph over large corporations. The Internet would become an arena of vigorous economic competition, where overheads would be slashed and great advantages would accrue to small electronic “cottage industries” that were sufficiently flexible to adapt quickly to changing market conditions. “Middlemen” such as advertisers and retailers would be swept aside as companies would interact directly with customers through “smart” systems able to automate and personalize transactions. In this account, the “cyberspace” economy would also make geography irrelevant, meaning that developing countries would be able to compete on a level playing field.

Since these optimistic forecasts, we have witnessed the infamous “dot.com” crash of the late 1990s. Financial markets finally lost confidence in the new economy as e-commerce enterprises, propped up by “venture capital,” struggled to turn a profit. From the beginning, however, a strong vein of skeptical discourse challenged the claims of the optimistic libertarians. For example, research has highlighted the large vested interests that control the gateways to digital networks such as the Internet, and the

rise of “electronic sweatshops” in the developing world whereby corporations outsource database management, technical support, and other aspects of digital industry to low wage economies. Dan Schiller’s (1999) neo Marxist analysis of “digital capitalism” argues that networks such as the World Wide Web, digital broadcasting, and mobile telecommunications lend themselves to hyperlinked webs of mass consumption, advertising, and marketing, favoring corporate synergies and vested interests rather than independent or small scale producers. Much attention has also been directed toward the global “digital divide,” where unequal access to digital technology is patterned by class and gender, but also by factors such as age, language, culture, and geography. In order to participate in digital networks, both specific and transferable skills have to be acquired by older generations, whilst they are increasingly “second nature” for younger people socialized within technology rich environments. In terms of language and culture, American English is a virtual lingua franca in globalized digital environments; and in terms of geography, even affluent rural populations often have poorer access to digital networks than their urban counterparts.

With the libertarian discourse losing much of its potency, sociological discourses on digital political economy have begun to shift in emphasis, supplementing macro analysis of ownership, control, and the corporatization of digital networks with closer attention to particular sites of tension and contestation. In particular, issues of intellectual property and “digital rights management” have a major currency. The “open source” movement promotes the development and distribution of non copyright software “source code.” Although the movement is characterized by some internal tensions, for the most part it is motivated by something other than simple antipathy toward large corporations such as Microsoft. The movement is also imbued with ideals that can be traced back to the 1960s and 1970s “hacker” counterculture. Here, digital networks are considered to be a matter of public, and not merely private, interest. Society as a whole stands to benefit from new technology, in this account, and technologies develop most efficiently when anybody with the requisite expertise can

contribute to their development. Interestingly, echoes of the early hacker counterculture also resonate in the libertarian discourse mentioned above. *Wired* magazine, for example, has frequently promoted the values of “netizenship” and digital democracy, celebrating the potential role of digital networks as spaces for political debate, polling, and voting. Libertarian groups campaigning against government regulation and censorship of the Internet have drawn heavily on hacker idealism which argues that information must be “set free.”

By comparison with the open source movement, the development of file sharing networks in which copyrighted music, movies, and other media are freely circulated does not readily lend itself to analysis as a “movement.” Instrumental motives, guilty pleasures, and anti corporate values can all play their part in these complex, anonymous, and contradictory spaces. Another fertile area for analysis is the emergence of flexible digital copyright arrangements, such as the “Creative Commons” license, which, unlike the “all rights reserved” arrangements favored by large corporations, allows for compromise between authorial rights and the impulse, prevalent within digital culture, to treat borrowing, sampling, and remixing as an integral aspect of creativity.

Opportunities and constraints in digital creative industries constitute another important aspect of political economy. On the one hand, digitization has made many areas of cultural production more capital intensive, to the detriment of small scale and independent producers. Special effects budgets have tended to spiral upwards, for example, as sophisticated illusions and visual spectacles become increasingly de rigueur for popular films, television shows, and music videos. Some smaller scale digital ventures and creative industries in smaller countries have, though, benefited from the outsourcing of digital graphics and special effects by Hollywood studios and other large media corporations. On the other hand, “second tier” desktop technologies have tended to advance rapidly in terms of sophistication and to decline rapidly in cost. Technical capabilities in music, film, animation, and publishing that were only recently the sole preserve of the few are becoming much more widely accessible. To generalize, the paradox of digitization is that it has

opened the way for burgeoning sites of diverse, creative, and increasingly sophisticated independent cultural production, but opportunities for making a living by it or getting mainstream distribution are fewer and further between.

DIGITAL CREATIVITY

Although “digital culture” is generally associated with novel and rapidly changing practices, we are already witnessing the emergence and consolidation of various digital “disciplines,” each demanding specific skills and approaches, and each giving rise to particular styles, conventions, and genres. Some of the key disciplines include: digital imaging; digital video; animation; 3D graphic design; digital music and sound design; web and interface design. But despite the emergence of these distinct disciplines, many “digital creatives” (and employers) attach great importance to flexible and cross disciplinary skills.

Digital creative and aesthetic tactics are too diverse to summarize here. But we can at least point to some recurring themes that are best understood as a series of tensions rather than a coherent set of principles. The first of these is the tension between immersion and self referentialism. Whilst digital special effects and 3D animation are often geared toward the creation of believable, “hyperreal” fantasy worlds, into which audiences, players, and users can become immersed, temporarily suspending their awareness of their artificiality, many digital cultural forms (such as dance and hip hop music, and various styles of graphic design) actively emphasize their technological provenance through the appearance of phenomena such as dissonant juxtapositions, “noise” (e.g., deliberately “pixelated” images or warped sounds), or computer related tropes (computer related noises or icons, for example). Some digital forms, such as computer games, that switch between sequences of “cinematic realism” and complex “interface” shots featuring level indicators, maps, and so forth combine both perspectives. The importance of the “interface” is, itself, a strong theme in digital culture. The way we interact with digital texts (with a mouse and cursor, for example) can become so culturally familiar as to recede from view. But alongside the desire to

create self effacing and naturalistic interfaces, digital culture is also characterized by frequent experiments with novel types of interface designed to be interesting and stimulating in their own right, rather than simply a conduit for “content.” Examples include the still young discipline of DVD interface design, which often brings elements of gaming into the experience of filmic consumption, many computer games themselves, and experimental website interfaces.

A related tension within visual digital culture revolves around the status of two different elements of creativity: the “pixel” and the “vector.” A digital imaging tradition has emerged that places great store by compositing (merging multiple images in technically proficient, though frequently surrealistic, fashion), texture (shading, shadows, and grain), depth (building images out of multiple “layers”), blending (seamless as opposed to harsh juxtaposition), and visual “noise” (blurs, graininess, and washed out colors, for example). In other words, there is a strong “painterly” tradition in digital imaging. This tradition is caught between the desire to showcase the visual feats of digital technology and the desire to erase its cold, machinic characteristics in favor of something more organic (something mirrored in hip hop and other pop music forms, where scratches, hisses, and so forth are used to add depth or “authenticity”). But a very different tradition has also emerged, based on mathematical “vectors” rather than pixels. “Vector” images are comprised of lines and flat color fills, whereas “bitmap” images, such as digital photographs and complex textures, represent matrices of discrete pixels that each have their own hue, saturation, and brightness values. Because vector images contain fewer data and are scalable (they can be enlarged indefinitely without deteriorating in quality), they lend themselves to more efficient distribution over digital networks such as the Internet and to “repurposing,” that is, they can easily be transferred between different sites, from large billboards to miniature handheld devices. The vector tradition is populated by many different styles including a minimalist and geometric modernism, and brash, cartoonish styles evoking a range of aesthetic influences including pop art, trash culture South Park style, “Japanimation,” and Nintendo. Experiments in

combining the vector and bitmap traditions continue to grow.

Linearity is another important site of tension within digital aesthetics. Early fascination with hypertext literature where readers construct their own pathways through texts, with cyclical loops in digital video and dance music, and with split screen or “windowed” video and computer screens, contributed to a sense that digitization heralded the ascendancy of a non-linear and spatial (as opposed to temporal) media culture. The emergence of devices such as MP3 players or hard disk digital video recorders, which allow for previously linear forms to break down in favor of more archival, random access structures, gives even more credence to this view. This is complicated, however, by the growing popularity of time based digital forms, including filmic sequences in computer games, “Flash” animation on the World Wide Web, and the online phenomenon of “blogging.” At most, we can say that digital culture is increasingly “multilinear,” rather than “non-linear.”

As well as calling into question the concept of beginnings, middles, and ends, digital texts often call into question the idea of the center, traditionally premised on the figure of the “author,” “auteur,” or “artist” as “originator.” Whilst hypertexts have been heralded as exemplars of the poststructuralist “death of the author” thesis, many digital texts appear to take this theme even further in two senses: firstly, the prevalence of “sampling,” modifying and remixing, within audiovisual culture, where very basic digital tools allow for the multiplication of pristine and malleable copies of “original” texts, has aroused debates not only around ethics and copyright, but also around the value of originality in the digital age; secondly, digital texts that are designed to be reworked over and over by multiple “authors,” such as collaborative “net art” projects, call into question the stability of the text and the notion of origins, authors, and centers. But despite these postmodern characteristics, digital media such as desktop video production suites, “virtual” music studios, and blogging tools multiply the opportunities and sites for individuals to become “authors,” “artists,” and “auteurs” and, if anything, modern dreams of

authorship and publicity are being nourished rather than diminished in the digital age.

SEE ALSO: Author/Auteur; Hyperreality; Internet; McLuhan, Marshall; Media; Media and Globalization; Multimedia; Poststructuralism; Semiotics; Simulation and Virtuality; Technological Determinism; Technological Innovation; Technology, Science, and Culture; Text/Hypertext

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direct action

Kelly Moore

Direct action is a method and a theory of stopping objectionable practices or creating more favorable conditions using immediately available means to obstruct another agent or organization from performing some objectionable practice. It is direct in the sense that users seek an immediate remedy for perceived ills, as opposed to indirect tactics such as electing representatives who promise to provide remedy at some later date. Direct action is usually undertaken by individuals and groups for three reasons: the group believes that the urgency of the problem requires immediate intervention; they believe that any other form of action is

unlikely to solve the problem; they do not have rights to affect targets in any other way. Examples of direct action include vigils, blockades, wildcat strikes, demonstrations, the occupation of buildings and other spaces, the destruction of property, street parties and theater, encampments, and symbolic illegal activities, such as cutting one piece of wire from a fence surrounding a military base to protest war.

The use of strategies to invoke an immediate response to an injustice is not new. For thousands of years people have drawn attention to problems using immediate means, such as “rough music,” refusal to work, and attacks on property. The use of the term direct action did not emerge until the late nineteenth century during labor struggles and revolutionary activity in Western Europe, Russia, and the US.

There are two main political theories that have advocated and justified the use of direct action. The first is anarchism. Anarchism is a political philosophy that first emerged during the Enlightenment. It rejects the moral legitimacy and utility of the state, and advocates instead the organization of individuals into self governing groups and federations. It was not until the nineteenth century that writers such as Proudhon, Bakunin, Kropotkin, and Goodwin began fully to develop anarchism as a viable means of governing. In the 1870s Bakunin, a Russian born writer and active participant in the labor movement, first articulated the link between direct action and the achievement of an anarchist political system (Crowder 1991).

The second political theory of direct action is based on the ideas and practices of the Indian political leader, Mohandas K. Gandhi. In the early twentieth century he began to develop a new form of direct action. His method, called Satyagraha or “the way of truth,” greatly influenced many other users of direct action in the twentieth and twenty first centuries. Satyagraha was inspired by the writings of Tolstoy and Ruskin, and by Gandhi’s Hindu religious beliefs. The core principle of Satyagraha was the appeal to the moral goodness of opponents through the acceptance of the consequences of refusing to participate in unjust systems (Diwakar 1949). Users of Satyagraha were required to make sacrifices, such as fasting, and be prepared and willing to accept the

consequences of their actions, including incarceration or violence. Between 1906 and 1913 Gandhi worked for equal rights for Indians in South Africa using Satyagraha. Thousands of people went to jail for refusing to pay an annual tax levied on former indentured servants, among whom were Indians, and for refusing to carry identification papers that the government required of Indians. He later used this method to help unite Indians and help them gain independence from Great Britain in 1947.

Gandhi’s methods inspired religiously based peace and civil rights activists in the US during the 1940s, 1950s, and 1960s. Men who refused to fight in World War II for religious or other moral reasons were given conscientious objector status and assigned to work camps. Some of the members of the camps refused to engage in menial or degrading labor because they believed that they should be able to contribute to ending the war in more significant ways. Many were jailed as a result of their refusal to cooperate with camp authorities. At the end of the war some of those who were jailed and other religiously based peace activists used Satyagraha methods. Among them were the Moscow–San Francisco Peace March in 1961, sailing a boat into nuclear testing zones in the South Pacific, and refusal to cooperate with government mandated civil defense drills. Martin Luther King, Jr., the leader of the civil rights group Southern Christian Leadership Conference, used methods based on Satyagraha in a series of campaigns to end segregation in the Southern United States between 1954 and 1965. These methods included the use of sit ins, Freedom Rides, and mass arrest. In the 1960s and 1970s people involved in ending the war in Vietnam also used Gandhi’s methods, but evolved them into more confrontational forms such as destroying draft cards and the occupation of buildings.

The use of direct action took a more carnival like and celebratory form when it was used by anti Vietnam War activists and members of the counterculture in the late 1960s. Taking inspiration from the Bohemian art community in San Francisco, groups such as the Diggers, Yippies, and the San Francisco Mime Troupe used direct action that embodied principles of freedom, playfulness, and joy. Distributing free

food, engaging in street theater, and mocking traditional culture through new styles of dress and living, as well as parodying conventional life, were hallmarks of these groups.

In the late 1960s and early 1970s the use of violent direct action reemerged as the mass based political movements of the previous decade dissolved. Small, armed, underground, clandestine groups such as the Weather Underground and the German Red Army Faction used robbery and murder to try to start a revolution. During this same time a practice known as “monkeywrenching” was used by ecological activists in the Southwestern United States. Rejecting the legal strategy of environmentalists that had developed in the 1960s, ecological activists destroyed equipment used for logging and other activities that they believed were used to harm the environment.

In the contemporary period, anarchist inspired direct action, Satyagraha based passive resistance and moral witnessing, and celebratory direct action can be found in some of the more distinctive forms of earlier periods, and also in more blended forms. Among the most important recent developments is the use of celebratory activities with other kinds of more confrontational direct action. Global justice groups such as the Direct Action Network and People’s Global Action, for example, use festivity as well as more serious demonstrations to draw attention to their claims and to build solidarity among themselves. Two other developments that have attracted attention are the growing use of property destruction and violence, especially among radical environmental and animal rights groups, and the role of the police in suppressing direct action.

The earliest sociological study of the use of direct action tactics is Gamson’s (1975) study of the relationship between tactics and organizational characteristics and the likelihood that a group wins concessions from targets. Gamson showed that groups that used violence were likely to win new concessions. Gamson’s study treated tactics as a set of rationally chosen practices designed to elicit maximum results from opponents. McAdam (1982) and Morris (1986) are now classic studies of the use of direct action in the Civil Rights Movement that further developed Gamson’s perspective. Both writers argued that Southern blacks use

marches, demonstrations, sit ins, and Freedom Rides to end segregation because blacks had no other means of affecting the political system. In their view, direct action was primarily a rational tactic chosen for its ability to pressure opponents. Piven and Cloward’s *Poor People’s Movements* (1979) shared with earlier studies a focus on when direct action works. They argued that the poor were more likely to win new benefits when they used disruptive tactics such as mass demonstrations and the illegal occupation of their targets’ offices. Unlike Gamson, McAdam, and Morris, Piven and Cloward saw direct action as a result of high levels of frustration rather than rationally chosen strategies.

In the 1980s and 1990s the effectiveness of direct action continued to be a central focus of most sociological studies of the subject. In the 1990s writers began to examine several new questions, including how and why groups choose to use direct action techniques. Earlier research had focused on the strategic uses of direct action. New research began to examine the role of moral motivations and social identities in shaping choices to use direct action. One important area of research has been in religiously based direct action. In a study of direct action in the US between World War II and 1968, James Tracy (1996) shows that some peace activists were motivated to use civil disobedience because their religious beliefs compelled them to do so. The act of civil disobedience itself, not only its formal political practices, was considered a politically important act because it revealed the power of users’ beliefs. Other research has found a similar pattern in studies of secular groups’ choices about direct action, such as AIDS activists (Epstein 1991), women (Naples & Desai 2002), and anti nuclear activists (Gamson 1989).

A second important direction of new research on direct action is to explain how the use of specific tactics spreads from one group or place to another. Since the middle of the twentieth century and in the present, activists have used workshops, conferences, and other meetings to teach others how to use specific direct action techniques. They also spread when people who used a tactic in one setting or geographical area make use of it in other settings and areas. There is less evidence that reading about or seeing new tactics, in the absence of face to face interaction

between users and potential adopters, is a major method of diffusion.

The role of repression, in its direct and indirect forms, on the use of direct action is an important new area of research for students of social movements in general and of direct action in particular (Earl 2003). Repression can drive groups to become involved in clandestine and sometimes violent direct action, but it can also force groups to use more routinized or less dramatic direct action.

Direct action has been studied using a variety of research methods. Earlier studies often used survey techniques. Data on many instances in which direct action was used was collected to examine the factors that contributed to its success or failure. Gamson's study is exemplary of this tradition. This method is currently used to study diffusion processes. In this case, researchers count the number of times an action is used in one place or setting at one point in time, and then measure its presence at later times and other places. Another common method for studying direct action is the use of historical records, such as newspapers, personal correspondence, oral history, police reports, and organizational records, to recreate how and why groups chose to use direct action. Tracy's (1996) study is a good example of this method. More recently, researchers have begun to use field observation to gather information about how new tactics are created, and why and how they are used. In these cases, researchers spend time with social movement groups by participating in their meetings and sometimes engaging in direct action with them. This method has the advantage of providing researchers with richer understanding of what direct action means to users and how they decide to use it, but it is less useful for examining effectiveness.

One of the major new initiatives in the study of direct action is the analysis of terrorism. Terrorism is the collective use of violence, especially against people, to intimidate a group or government into granting political demands. Terrorism is not new. It has been used by political actors for many reasons, and usually targeted heads of states or other leaders. More recently, terrorists have used violence against civilians and bystanders and have killed large groups of people at a time. Terrorists are

often conventionally understood to be mentally unbalanced or religious fanatics. Current research on armed, underground, clandestine groups and other users of terror, by contrast, has focused on the conditions under which people become involved in terrorist networks (Zwerman et al. 2000), the role of ideology (including religious ideology), and the failure of governments to respond to the demands of citizens.

SEE ALSO: Civil Rights Movement; Collective Action; New Left; Social Movements, Non Violent

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disability as a social problem

Anne Waldschmidt

Common sense takes disability as a simple natural fact, but the sociology of disability emphasizes that disability has to be differentiated from impairment. Not every chronic health condition is acknowledged as disability. There are cultures in which the social fact of disability does not exist (Ingstad & Whyte 1995). Disability as a social problem has evolved as a product of the modern welfare state. With the beginning of modernity and, above all, during the period of industrialization, a line was drawn between “the disabled” and other poor and unemployed people. In the course of the twentieth century disability became a horizontal category of social stratification. Even today the ascription process is ambivalent: it includes rights and benefits as well as discrimination and segregation.

Despite many efforts, an internationally accepted definition of disability does not exist (Albrecht et al. 2001). Nonetheless, on the national level classifications that constitute disability as social fact are in operation. Pedagogical diagnostics defining special educational needs are of great significance for establishing individual positions not only in the school system but also in later life. Medical experts serve as gatekeepers to the rehabilitation system and have great influence on disability categories, while legislation and courts serve as agencies to control disability as social problem.

The World Health Organization (WHO) made special efforts to find a universal disability concept on an international level. In 1980 it published the Classification of Impairments, Disabilities, and Handicaps (ICIDH). It was based on a threefold model: “impairment” denoted a defect or disorder in the medical sense, “disability” meant functional limitations, and “handicap” indicated the individual inability to fulfill normal social roles. More than 20 years later, the WHO (2001) revised this classification scheme. The topical Classification of Functioning, Disability, and Health (ICF) uses a multidimensional approach. Its first part,

“functioning and disability,” differentiates between “body functions and structures” and “activities and participation.” The second part consists of “contextual factors” and contains “environmental” and “personal” factors. The use of the participation concept as well as the reference to environmental factors are important novelties in contrast to the ICIDH. Additionally, terminology was changed. The term disability now comprises medically defined impairments as well as activity limitations and participation restrictions. The term handicap was completely given up. Despite these innovations disability studies scholars criticize the ICF because the social model of disability was only half heartedly implemented.

The epidemiology of disability aims at answering these three basic questions: (1) How many people have a disability? (2) How is disability distributed within the population? (3) What are the major causes? However, these questions are not easily answered. The complexity, relativity, and multidimensionality of bodily, mental, and psychological phenomena make it difficult to establish a clear cut disability definition as a starting point and to agree on operational categories that meet the basic requirements of valid statistics, such as one dimensionality, exclusiveness, and completeness. With regard to methods, there are different possibilities when counting people with disabilities. First, studies focusing on regions, certain groups, subsystems, institutions or programs can be used as sources for estimating the overall number of a disability population. Second, population studies are undertaken, either as a complete recording of the entire population or as representative random surveys. A third means is to officially register all persons who have been certified as having a disability by an official authority. In disability statistics – the history of which can be traced to the early twentieth century – all three ways have been used. Owing to the great methodological problems of counting disabled people, international statistical findings vary to a great extent. The population quotas range from an estimated disability population of 0.2 percent in Qatar (1986) to 8.1 percent officially registered severely disabled people in Germany (2001) and 19.3 percent of the civilian non institutionalized North American population counted in the 2000

census. The main disability causes have changed over time. War injury and accidents at the workplace used to be prevalent, but in industrialized countries chronic diseases amount to over 80 percent of all causes nowadays. Congenital anomalies and perinatal conditions add up to only 4–6 percent. In all countries chronic health problems correlate with lower class, manual work, low level of education, low income, female sex, and old age, as well as ethnic background and migration status.

As with all social categories, disability has its own history which is closely linked to the development of the modern welfare state (Albrecht et al. 2001; Waldschmidt 2006). Until the early modern age the treatment of bodily differences and health conditions was characterized by religion and magic as well as exclusion and charity. The seventeenth century became the epoch of confinement (Foucault 1961). After the Thirty Years War, in the age of absolutism and mercantilism, legitimized by Protestant ethics, a system of workhouses was installed all over Europe. Even the great majority of war invalids did not get any pensions. During the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, in connection with the beginning of modern science, attempts were made to treat people with impairments. In eighteenth century Paris the first public institutions were founded to educate deaf and blind children. Psychiatry and orthopaedics were new medical disciplines that originated in the age of the Enlightenment.

As a consequence of the working and living conditions in early capitalist society, chronic diseases, impairments, and injuries were widespread in the nineteenth century. Poor health was one of the main causes of deprivation and pauperization. At the end of the century, social insurance systems were established with the consequence that victims of work accidents and invalidity pensioners were entitled to individual social security benefits. A distinction was installed between them and the mass of the poor still relying on private or communal welfare. The nineteenth century was also the period of institutionalization, in which asylums for people with impairments were built at great speed around Europe as well as the US. At the end of the century, against a setting of economic crisis and political restoration, Social Darwinism and degeneration theory gained

influence in public and scientific discourse and former educational institutions gradually changed into nursing and custody homes.

World War I served as a turning point in disability history as impairment suddenly became a mass experience and could no longer be ignored by society and the state. The years after the Great War witnessed the birth of modern rehabilitation policy. The old repressive policy of forcing people into work was now given up in favor of medical therapy, training programs, and legislation that aimed at offering paid employment as a means of social integration. The self help organizations not only of war invalids but also of the civilian disabled that sprang up at that time were important factors in the beginning of recognition of disability as a social problem. On the other hand, radical Social Darwinist attitudes met with more and more public acceptance, due to the financial crisis of the welfare state. The internationally successful eugenic movement led to sterilization policies in many countries. It is estimated that in Germany up to 400,000 people fell victim to compulsory sterilization during National Socialism. In the second phase of the racial hygiene program of Nazi Germany, roughly 275,000 inmates of psychiatric and nursing institutions were systematically murdered (Schmuhl 1992).

After World War II social policy again focused on the problem of war invalidity. Rehabilitation programs were installed during the 1950s and 1960s, which originally aimed at integrating disabled adults into the labor force. Later, they were extended to other groups of people with disabilities and to additional areas of life, such as early childhood, the family, and leisure time. Since the 1970s, the segregation approach has been substituted with the concepts of deinstitutionalization, normalization, and inclusion as a result of efforts by international social movements of disabled people that put ideas like independent living, participation, and civil rights on the disability agenda. Nowadays it is internationally accepted that disabled people form one of the largest minority groups and are entitled to social support.

Since the 1960s, Goffman's (1963) stigma theory has been dominant in the sociology of disability. This microsociological approach views disability as constituted in social interaction. If

a person has a highly visible bodily feature or behaves in a peculiar way and is therefore negatively valued by interaction partners, he or she becomes stigmatized. The stigma will result in social distance, but at the same time interaction rules demand “quasi normalcy” to be maintained. For this reason, “mixed” social situations are typically characterized by feelings of ambivalence and insecurity about how to act. Stigma theory makes it possible to analyze disability not as an inner personal characteristic, but as a product of social relations (Scott 1969).

The labeling approach plays a role in disability discourse as well. In contrast to stigma theory, it emphasizes social power relations and the influence of social control agencies that define norms and sanction individuals who commit violations of these norms. Accordingly, disability can be examined as deviant behavior in a society based on the norms of bodily fitness, functioning at the workplace, individual capacity to self care, and beautiful outer appearance. As secondary deviance, disability is the effect of diagnostics and special treatment. As a result, people marked as disabled find themselves permanently marginalized. The labeling approach is useful for understanding the interactions between the life course of the individual and the rehabilitation system.

From the view of structural functionalism founded by Talcott Parsons, the question is posed whether or not a “disability role” exists (Haber & Smith 1971). Disability is distinguished from both deviant behavior as conscious norm violation and illness as temporary, legitimate exemption from normal role obligations. In contrast, disability is regarded as a form of socially accepted adaptive behavior that allows persons not able to permanently fulfill normal roles to obtain legitimate role exemption. They also obtain opportunities to fulfill restricted social obligations. The “disability role” enables social control agencies to register and acknowledge health problems and to regulate them by offering caring and rehabilitative programs to those concerned. Structural functionalism perceives disability as a socially functional role pattern that makes it possible to integrate people into society who would otherwise have been excluded.

Besides these three main theories, poststructuralist discourse theory inspired by Foucault

(1961) understands disability as an effect of “power/knowledge.” Additionally, one can find neo Marxist perspectives (Oliver 1996) focusing on socioeconomic conditions. The social theory of Pierre Bourdieu is used to analyze disability as a combination of structure and agency.

SEE ALSO: Body and Society; Bourdieu, Pierre; Chronic Illness and Disability; Deinstitutionalization; Deviance; Disability Sport; Eugenics; Euthanasia; Families and Childhood Disabilities; Feminist Disability Studies; Foucault, Michel; Goffman, Erving; Health and Social Class; Interaction; Labeling Theory; Marxism and Sociology; Sick Role; Social Epidemiology; Social Exclusion; Social Integration and Inclusion; Social Policy, Welfare State; Social Problems, Concept and Perspectives; Sociology in Medicine; Stigma; Structural Functional Theory

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disability sport

Howard L. Nixon II

Disability sport refers to any form of organized physical competition intended specifically for people with disabilities and contrasts with able bodied or mainstream sport, which is organized for people without disabilities. The historical lack of mainstream sports opportunities for people with disabilities is one of the important rationales for the development of disability sport. People are considered disabled, e.g., regarding physical mobility, sight, hearing, or mental functioning, when they have biomedical conditions or impairments that limit their ability to use certain skills, carry out certain tasks, or participate in certain activities or roles. Although their overall sports participation rates remain relatively low, people with disabilities have become increasingly involved in the pursuit of sport at various levels over the past few decades.

Disability sport has arisen and grown in popularity in recent decades, as people with disabilities have enhanced their rights, status, and perceptions of opportunity in society. Disabled people were relatively invisible in the United States until the 1970s, when federal law mandated the public education of American children and youths with disabilities in appropriate settings. What was known about people with disabilities was typically based on myth and stigma, but increasing public education, advocacy, and research in recent decades has resulted in a more accurate understanding of people with disabilities.

The scholarly study of social and cultural aspects of disability sport is relatively new. The first comprehensive collection of scholarly work in this area, *Sport and Disabled Athletes*, was edited by Sherrill in 1986, and the first comprehensive text on disability sport, *Disability and Sport*, by DePauw and Gavron, was published

in 1995. Two major scholarly journals publishing studies of disability sport have been the *Adapted Physical Activity Quarterly* and *Sociology of Sport Journal*. The Disability in Sport Program of the Center for the Study of Sport in Society at Northeastern University is an important source of education, advocacy, and research concerning disability sport and athletes with disabilities.

Disability and mainstream sport opportunities for people with disabilities may vary along a number of structural dimensions, including inclusiveness of eligibility, the amount of segregation or integration of disabled athletes and able bodied athletes or of athletes with different types or degrees of disability within a sport, disability adaptation, disability classifications, level of competitive intensity, and whether or not there is direct competition between disabled and able bodied athletes. Disability sports are divided into different classifications, according to the functional ability or medical or vision status of the participants with disabilities. There are also cases of disability sport divisions within mainstream sports, such as the Boston Marathon, but they are relatively few.

Two prominent examples of disability sport are the Special Olympics and the Paralympics. The controlled competition philosophy of the Special Olympics is to treat everyone as a winner, and the Special Olympics is open to everyone with an intellectual disability who is 8 years old or older. The Special Olympics training and competition program involves over 1 million children and adult athletes from around the world, and it has provided international competitive experiences through its World Games since 1968. The International Paralympic Committee organizes elite sports events for athletes with a number of different types of impairments, including spinal cord injury, amputee, intellectual and visual impairment, cerebral palsy, and other motor impairments. The Paralympics developed from a modest start in 1948 in England, was first staged as an Olympic style competition in Rome in 1960, and has developed into one of the largest sports competitions in the world, drawing nearly 4,000 athletes with physical, visual, or mental disabilities from 140 countries in 19 events to the 2004 Games in Athens, Greece. The International Paralympic Committee (IPC) and International Olympic

Committee (IOC) signed an agreement in 2001 for their respective Games to appear alongside each other in the future. The 1996 Summer Paralympics were the first such Games to get mass media sponsorship. Paralympic sports range from archery to volleyball and winter sports such as Alpine and Nordic skiing.

Despite groundbreaking legislation, such as the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990, people with disabilities in the US and other countries continue to face barriers to equal rights and full participation in society. These challenges help explain at least part of the appeal of disability sport to people with disabilities and the value of disability sport in reshaping public attitudes and treatment of people with disabilities. Thus, a major focus of some recent studies of disability sport is the empowerment potential of sport to enable people with disabilities to overcome stereotypes, stigma, prejudice, and discrimination based on conceptions of disability as *inability*. That is, disability sport is seen as a means of enhancing a sense of social identity, status, and power as well as personal competence or self efficacy. A shift from a rehabilitative philosophy in physical activity to an emphasis on empowerment in disability sport over the past few decades reflects the increasing seriousness of disabled athletes. Although there have been problems operationalizing the empowerment idea, it has been listed as a priority research topic of the International Paralympic Sport Science Committee.

For many disability sport scholars, sport classification is a central issue. Its main purpose is to classify sports and assign participants in ways that make competition fair, so that the outcome of events depends on factors such as ability, skill, training, and motivation rather than the nature or extent of disability. It is intended to avoid, for example, pitting athletes with amputations against those with cerebral palsy or who are blind in the same event. Official classifiers, who have the responsibility of assessing the functional ability or medical status of athletes and assigning them to particular sports classes or events, are important agents of social control in disability sport, and a study of disability swimming showed that classifiers generally maintained the social order of the sport and kept competition fair.

The dominant theoretical perspective in the sociological study of disability sport, especially regarding sport socialization, has been structural functionalism, although its dominance has been challenged in recent years by various forms of critical and feminist theory and sociocultural discourses on the body. We get a sense of the variety of disability and sport topics addressed by sport sociologists from a 2001 special issue of the *Sociology of Sport Journal* on “the sociology of ability and disability in physical activity.” It focused on topics such as women’s management of their physical disabilities through sport and physical activity; media representations of disabled sport and athletes; the politics of inclusion in sport of university students with mobility impairments; disability, sport, and the body in China; and stereotypes of gender and disability in elite disability sport.

A number of recent critical media analyses have focused on social marginality, inequality, and bias in print and electronic media coverage of disability sport. Some studies have critically pointed to the common “supercrip” image portraying disabled athletes as heroic within the boundaries of the world of disability, which some disabled athletes have strenuously resisted in an effort to portray themselves as a part of the larger society. Critics of this media image also argue that it implies that people with disabilities are only worthy of respect in society if they have overcome seemingly insurmountable odds to “conquer” their disability. In addition, some have observed a “hierarchy of acceptability” in the mass media that has resulted in more attention for athletes with disabilities who looked more like able bodied or “normal” athletes or for athletes with disabilities that were acquired rather than congenital or seemed more “correctable.” A common finding in this type of research has been less attention to female than male disabled athletes.

With the rapid development of elite disability sport, topics concerning integration and inclusion have been among the most debated about disability sport. Major questions have focused on who should be eligible to compete, against whom, and in what sports. More specifically, some have argued in favor of having able bodied people participate in certain disability sports, as a means of increasing their sensitivity to the needs

of people with disabilities, but others have strenuously opposed such "reverse integration" because they believed it reflected an outdated view of disability sport as rehabilitation rather than competitive sport, would reduce competitive opportunities for people with disabilities, and was at odds with the preferences of disabled athletes, who opposed the inclusion of able-bodied athletes in their sports. A potentially useful concept in this context is appropriate integration, which involves matching the abilities and motivation of participants with the structural parameters of a sport. Today, many disability sport advocates and scholars are focusing attention on the recognition and support from mainstream sport organizers needed to be able to include more disability sport divisions in mainstream sports events, from the interscholastic level to the Olympics. Scholars need to learn more about the kinds of sports opportunities pursued by people with disabilities, how they are socialized into, in, and through sport, and how the nature of their integration or segregation in sport influences how they and others with disabilities are integrated into society.

Various methodological approaches have been used in sociological research on disability sport and athletes with disabilities. Relatively little systematic empirical research has been done on the sociology of disability sport. Most of the published studies have relied on qualitative or interpretive approaches, such as participant observation, semi structured or unstructured interviews, and content analysis. The number of participants in these studies have been small, with few having over 30 participants. Thus, a number of these studies could be viewed as exploratory.

With the sociological study of disability sport still in its relative infancy, it is not surprising to find a limited amount of empirical research on disability sport, small sample sizes, and few attempts to replicate studies of specific research topics in this area. Future studies of disability sport are likely to rely heavily on critical perspectives and qualitative methods to pursue new ways of looking at disability, the disabled body, and sport, but large scale surveys, guided by more structural perspectives, are also needed. There is much to learn about the culture, organization, governance, commercialization, and

stratification of disability sport; power relations in and affecting disability sport; disability sport socialization and the social identity, status, and experiences of disabled athletes; the impact of the mass media on disability sport, sports experiences of athletes with disabilities, and perceptions of people with disabilities in general; the integrating influence of sport for people with disabilities; and the relationship of disability sport to mainstream sport and the mainstream of society.

SEE ALSO: Disability as a Social Problem; Feminist Disability Studies; Gender, Sport and; Identity, Sport and; Media and Sport; Olympics; Sport, Alternative; Sport and the Body; Sport and Race; Stigma

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disasters

Hilary Silver

Disasters are sudden, unexpected, localized, rare, and acute events that disrupt the environment and social structure, and inflict substantial harm on individuals, groups, and property. They differ from accidents in the greater scale of their individual and collective impacts. Roughly speaking, such catastrophes entail over a hundred deaths in a short period of time.

The sociological study of disasters dates to the late 1940s, when governments sought to comprehend the damage of World War II and started planning for potential nuclear holocaust. First at the National Opinion Research Center (NORC) and later at the Disaster Research Center at Ohio State, sociologists drew upon experience from natural disasters. Over time, disaster scholars borrowed from other subfields in the discipline.

The number of disasters has increased, especially since 1990. Ulrich Beck argues that, unlike modern industrial society based upon the distribution of goods, contemporary risk society is founded upon the distribution of dangers. Science and industry are creating more and deadlier risks with impacts less limited in time and space. These physical risks are situated in social systems that aim to control them. However, many technically risky activities require society to depend upon and trust inaccessible, unaccountable, and unintelligible organizations and institutions. Scientific realism should be tempered with the viewpoints of ordinary citizens who may be affected by oversights in rational systems. This means modernization must become “reflexive.” These observations hold for most disasters, regardless of cause. For some purposes, however, sociologists classify disasters by type, often distinguishing between natural and technological disasters. Increasingly,

political disasters have become a third category of study.

Natural disasters are often viewed as “acts of God.” Yet numerous studies of the social impacts of floods, earthquakes, tornadoes, hurricanes, wildfires, eruptions, famines, plagues, and pandemics demonstrate the importance of social structure and cultural context in determining the incidence and outcomes of these events. For example, Mike Davis’s *Ecology of Fear* (1998) argues that profit driven, sprawling urban development in Southern California without regard to its fragile ecosystem causes any one natural disaster in the area to set off others. John Barry’s *Rising Tide* (1997) similarly finds that engineering ineptitude and greed of planters and bankers helped cause the great Mississippi flood of 1927. Similarly, Eric Klinenberg’s “social autopsy” of the 1995 Chicago *Heat Wave* (2003) demonstrates the contributions of selective government preparations, privatized service delivery, and biased coverage of the local media to the death of over 700 people.

Technological disasters are often attributed to human error or worse. Thus, some say, they produce more enduring and debilitating impacts – anger, fear, uncertainty, stress, and distrust – than natural ones. Sociologists have studied explosions, dam breaks, blackouts, oil and toxic spills, fires, genetic mishaps, mad cow disease, Y2K and computer viruses, and accidents at nuclear power plants, chemical plants, and NASA. Such studies refute the usual risk management response based upon “high reliability theory” which maintains that decentralized authority and built in redundancy enhance reliability and safety.

Vaughan’s study of organizational deviance in *The Challenger Launch Decision* (1996) identifies risk taking, ignored warnings, and deception trickling down from the top to the bottom of the space agency. In uncertain environments such as agency competition for scarce federal funds, formal organizations like NASA develop technical cultures and bureaucratic and political accountability systems that tolerate mistakes, misconduct, and risk taking for the sake of ultimate goals. Social constructions of reality unnecessarily produce disastrous accidents.

However, Charles Perrow, in *Normal Accidents* (1999), says social constructionist

explanations miss the power structure that devises such risky complex systems in the first place. “Normal accidents” are inevitable in complex (vs. linear) interaction systems with tightly coupled, interdependent components. In such systems, failures multiply and spread in unexpected ways, making rational planning impossible and high reliability approaches even more damaging. Yet such catastrophes, Perrow points out, are rare because they have no one cause. Disasters require a “negative synergy” of combined conditions, from lack of warning to concentrated population.

Webb (2002) notes that sociologists currently know far less about political disasters – riots, revolutions, and terrorism – than about natural and technological ones. Man made disasters are not accidental, but deliberate. Terrorist disasters are designed to inflict as much death and damage as possible on symbolic victims. The sheer arbitrariness of their targets diffuses fear among entire populations, thereby magnifying the disastrous effects. After the World Trade Center catastrophe, the study of urban disasters became a growth industry. Savitch (2001) identifies three factors – social breakdown; resource mobilization; and global target proneness (including international media centrality) – that are responsible for which cities around the world are more vulnerable to terrorist disasters. Nancy Foner’s collection *Wounded City* (2005) shows there was also variation in the impact of 9/11 among New York City communities. Vale and Campanella (2005) analyze the recovery of a wide range of cities throughout the world. They identify a dozen “axioms of resilience,” including narratives to interpret and remember the disaster and the importance of surviving property.

Whether natural or man made, disasters have many similar social consequences. The majority of property losses in urban disasters are due to housing damage. Disaster victims disproportionately consist of the aged, the isolated, and the destitute. African Americans and renters are also over represented.

Disasters tend to have a life cycle, says Drabek (1986), progressing through the stages of preparedness, response, recovery, and mitigation. Most scholarly attention has focused on the second. There are widespread myths that, in an emergency, the population will panic and loot, and first responders will abandon their

posts, requiring a paramilitary, command and control structure to impose order. In fact, during the immediate crisis, studies find that people become more cohesive and converge upon the disaster site, offering help. This “therapeutic community” reaction is more typical in the wake of disaster than conflict, or what Freudenberg (1997) calls “corrosive community.” Established, expanding, extending, and emergent organizations, Dynes (1970) argues, together provide flexible and diverse responses.

Once disasters recede into the past, the political incentives to prepare for future contingencies diminish. Mitigation usually entails tradeoffs between profit and safety, security and civil liberties. Private insurers may withdraw from communities hit by natural catastrophes, forcing the federal government to become the insurer of last resort. Policy continues to be disaster driven, offering short term compensation rather than long term prevention strategies.

During the recovery stage, there is an opportunity for social change, but it may not be seized. In some cases, community corrosion ensues, prolonged by endless litigation, uncertainty about long term health, organizational competition, and “recreancy” (perceived governmental failure). As Kai Erikson’s *Everything in Its Path* (1978), a classic study of the Buffalo Creek flood, concludes, the survivors of disasters suffer from both individual and collective trauma. Disasters disrupt the social bonds, networks of relations, and common patterns of life that would otherwise support people. Thus, sociologists are now studying disaster memorials and the social construction of collective memory. Commemorations cement social bonds after a common tragedy.

SEE ALSO: Dangerousness; Ecological Problems; Organizational Deviance; Organizational Failure; Organizational Learning; Risk, Risk Society, Risk Behavior, and Social Problems; Social Structure of Victims

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disciplinary society

Susanne Krasmann

Talk about the disciplinary society is frequently linked to the idea of a society of total surveillance and adjustment. However, in his seemingly most popular and at the same time highly complex book *Discipline and Punish*, Foucault (1977) describes the disciplinary society not as a social reality but as a *program* of disciplining individuals. Thus it was the “dream” of the old authoritarian police to establish a society organized along military lines, functioning like the cogs of a machine. This aspiration did indeed have historical configurations: in the “social disciplining” (Gerhard Oestreich) of an administrative and regulatory organization of society, already being instituted in early modern times, aimed at producing obedient individuals; and in an unprecedented process of rationalization of power, provoking Weber to speak of the “iron cage” of bureaucratic rulership in modern societies. Foucault’s intention, however, is not to point out historical continuities and general principles shaping society, like “capitalism,” “modernity,” or “rationalization.” Rather, the disciplinary society is the effect of micro mechanisms of power and has itself to be distinguished from a type of power that donated the name: *discipline* does not refer to an institution, but designates a technology of power. It is unacquainted with a ruling center as it unfolds beyond the state. It is a mechanism of power localized amid society: the “productivity of the norm” (Macherey 1991), operating in occidental

societies since the seventeenth century. It thus differs from the juridical sovereign power of the *ancien régime* legitimized by the implementation and enforcement of law.

The topic of *Discipline and Punish* is the self-conception of modern societies, referring to ideals like humanity, civilization, and progress. Foucault exemplifies his critique of this self-conception, focusing on the transition to a new practice of confinement. The “birth of the prison” marks the new self-conception of the modern constitutional state dissociating itself from cruel practices such as the exhibition of sovereign power through the spectacle of public punishment. However, modern societies cannot count as better societies, as they are not free from power and repression. They operate with different mechanisms of power. This is the central argument in *Discipline and Punish*. The repeatedly evoked process of humanization turns out to be a shift to a new regime of power, a new economy of power, making the prison appear not only as a practice of confinement, punishment, and treatment, but particularly as a more effective and economically useful practice compared to corporeal punishment.

Two kinds of shift are significant for the transition to the disciplinary society, which Foucault exemplifies in his focus on the figure of the delinquent: the mechanisms of power shift from the body to the “soul” and from law to the norm. The practice of the prison is in no way unphysical, as confinement also is a physically noticeable restriction of freedom. Yet, while the offender in the *ancien régime* is punished conspicuously, in order to restore the king’s law, his power, disciplinary power is interested in the individual. Thus, rather than the body of the offender, the “soul” of the delinquent; rather than the real, the possible act; rather than the behavior, the character of the person takes center stage. With the emergence of the prison the delinquent has been born as an individual to know. Psychologists and psychiatrists, and later on social workers, are concerned with the motives and the biography of this person in order to reform his or her personality. The delinquent becomes a category describable in generalized terms, and that allows for subsuming the discrete offender like a species. The prison makes possible the establishment of criminology as a science – and as a practice of surveillance and control.

This is what designates discipline: a regime of knowledge and practices of power crystallizing in prison, but not reducible to this institution. Rather, prison is exemplary for the architectural model of the Panopticon that renders the inmates observable at any time from the tower in the middle of the building. Devised by the English lawyer Jeremy Bentham in the eighteenth century, it stands for the program of producing compliant individuals controlling themselves in a state of permanent visibility. In the disciplinary society this mechanism of normalization prevails in the most varied sectors of society and institutions producing their respective "useful" individuals: school, family, psychiatry, and the military impose similar mechanisms to fabricate pupils, soldiers, and workers, with body and soul suitable for the conditions of production. Thus, discipline is effective precisely in that it is a program, rather than social reality; in that it does not come upon individuals already disciplined. Rather, technologies of education, healing, confinement, and correction have to be employed again and again finally to generate discipline. As a result, social norms are constantly being produced and reproduced, regulating the action and the way of life of individuals, their work, their nutrition, their sexuality, their relationships. In this respect Foucault identifies the regime of the welfare state as a prototype of the disciplinary society. Expertise cultures develop the most varied social fields driven by the idea that society can intentionally be created and controlled.

In a double sense disciplinary power is productive. It appears to reproduce itself independently, and, differently from sovereign power, it does not simply prohibit, impede, force, and repress, but constitutes domains of reality and thereby individuals as objects of control and surveillance. At the same time, disciplinary power in no way abstains from law, but it no longer asserts itself primarily by law, as the sovereign power does. The norm now is a principle that predominates over law. It enables and designates the law in modern societies; it operates like a motor and serves as an indication for the production of laws that regulate the functioning of the social system. Norms do not emerge from a sovereign will, but from social processes. Thus, rather than resulting from contracts or from a legislator, they form part of social

systems that they are at the same time establishing. Norms are inherently relational. They establish social relations by being designated in relation to the demands of an environment and, due to their generality, by implementing an anonymous principle of comparability (Ewald 1990): an individual might mark itself only in difference to others. Subjectivation is impossible without objectification. The individual therefore is an inherently social product, certainly without being determined socially. However, subjectivity cannot be conceived of without social experience, and the notion of an autonomous individual self determined by free acts of will therefore is invalid. Norms imply forms of judgment and of communication and they display mechanisms of reproduction and differentiation. Serving as a normative measure, they demand comparison, while the empirical comparison creates new standards. Prescriptive normalization, the alignment of the individual according to model like norms, and descriptive, statistically generated normalization that takes the empirical reality itself as a norm, work together hand in hand.

Disciplinary techniques do not seek to operate through violence. They concentrate on the human body in two ways. External practices on the one hand shape, for example, the body of the soldier in military drill, while normalization power on the other hand operates implicitly. Both forms of power conjoin, with the result that a disciplined attitude is at the same time also a manifestation of moral conduct. Disciplinary power nevertheless does not only act on already existing bodies, but it also constitutes these: the body of the sick person holding certain symptoms; the body of sexual desire inhabited by drives and articulating longings; or the female and the male body familiar with their respective sensitivities. This fabrication of bodies is always due to the access of knowledge based technologies of power, involving specific notions of the human being (Foucault 1972; Butler 1993).

If Foucault's analysis has been accused of having a problematic normative reservation (for example, by Nancy Fraser, Jürgen Habermas, Axel Honneth, Charles Taylor, and Michael Walzer), it is precisely here that it can be seen how appropriately such critics judged, in the best sense: Foucault scrutinizes the norm itself

on how it accomplishes, asserts itself, and produces forms of knowledge, perceptions, and worldviews. The norm does not form the prerequisite but the vanishing point of his critique, focusing on the ways of subjectivation of people and the adjustment of the individual as a part of society. Elaborating a normative foundation would mean to close one's mind to understanding and appreciating that changing regimes might result in forms of domination that only recently have worked as forms of resistance. How power is being composed and how it is functioning have to be found out.

In the disciplinary society, man and his body become the objects of knowledge and of economic utility. In this respect, disciplinary power discovers life as a resource, an embodiment of energy, whose productivity might be increased. The "power over life" initially concentrates on "disciplining the individual body," subsequently also on "regulating the population." One precondition for this is an abstract knowledge of society rendered possible by procedures going back to the cameralistics of the seventeenth century, the establishing sciences of political administration, and the social statistics of the nineteenth century. In view of statistics and probability calculation, disease, crime, and accidents no longer appear as individual pathologies, fate, or chance, but as "social facts" (Durkheim). Understanding their social regularity allows for dealing with them as issues of demographic policy and social hygiene, in order to develop the mechanisms of security accordingly. The delinquent thus appears as a danger to society and fighting crime becomes an issue of *social defense* (Pasquino 1991; Foucault 2004).

Sovereign power only knows the right "to kill and to let live" (killing the offender while not being interested further in the individual), whereas "to make live and to let die" becomes the emblem of a "bio power" (Foucault 1979), designated as much by the aspiration of fostering life as by the dread of killing publicly. This dread appears nowadays, for example, in discussions about euthanasia and in the practice of capital punishment, technically perfected to make it unspectacular and to avoid pain to the delinquent and render invisible the responsibility of executioners. However, such practices reveal that bio power is based on discretion

and reaches decisions not only about valuable life to be enhanced, but also about degraded, hostile life to be annihilated. Killing forms a disaccord with a power devoted to the productivity of life. This power does not exclude killing. In the name of bio power racism not only is a matter of ideological attitude, but also to be rationalized as population policy, for the protection of society.

Foucault implicitly conceived of the disciplinary society as situated within the borders of the (nation)state. Therefore, the noticeable transformation of the modern state (the neoliberal retreat of the welfare state and the "responsibilization" of individuals for the risks of their existence; the inter and transnationalization of politics; the armament of the state in the name of home security) cannot be problematized by the categories of *Discipline and Punish*. The disciplinary society, however, embodies precisely the type of power that has not lost its currency: discipline, as a positive technique of power, links domination with morality and freedom with subjection. It operates through the suggestion that it is more prudent to dominate oneself than to be dominated, more virtuous to work of one's own free will than to be forced to work, etc. The self control that modern societies demand from individuals implies this double sense already in the concept: the control of the self by the self *and* through determination by others (Valverde 1996). More freedom can thus be misleading and sometimes only indicates a *shift*: a policy of economic deregulation, for example, may be accompanied by bureaucratic modes of control; the performance of individuals released from regulated paternalism in order to conceive of themselves as entrepreneurs will still be subjected to permanent evaluation and thus control. The flexibilized individual is faced with a new regime.

The panoptic principle – paradigmatic for the disciplinary society – has diversified in the age of media, automatic techniques of control, and practices of optimization in working life. The disciplinary society, operating with prescriptive norms, dissolves with the contingency of norms oriented on average values and constantly creating variable possibilities; the techniques of (self) disciplining, however, do not disappear.

SEE ALSO: Crime; Criminal Justice System; Discourse; Foucault, Michel; Governmentality and Control; Neoliberalism; Social Control; Surveillance

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discourse

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The primary definition of discourse denotes a method of communication that conforms to particular structural and ethnographic norms and marks a particular social group by providing a means of solidarity for its members and a means of differentiating that group from other groups. It is, perhaps, more accurate and useful

to regard this concept in the plural, that is, as *discourses*, thus encompassing its capacity not only for marking boundaries for the group and against other groups (using linguistic borders philosopher Kenneth Burke called “terministic screens,” which are essentially the points at which one discourse becomes distinct from another), but also as a method in many disciplines.

Discourses come to be in different ways. One discourse may be chosen by the group to specifically designate its identity and membership (called a discourse community and often requiring a highly specialized lexicon and superstructure, perhaps professional training to gain membership, e.g., sociology). Another discourse also may be imposed or identified by others as a means of stratification or “othering” a group, such as a pidgin language or other “non standard language variety,” leading to the recent pejorative overtones in terms like dialect or vernacular. Yet other discourses develop more natively, determined by cultural, technological, or other factors (such as primary orality or computerese).

A second definition of discourse lies within the field of linguistics and underlies the metatheory discourse analysis, a term brought into use in 1952 through an article of the same name by linguist Zellig Harris. This definition, which to some degree defines and therefore precedes the others, holds that discourse describes extra grammatical linguistic units, variably described as speech acts, speech events, exchanges, utterances, conversations, adjacency pairs, or combinations of these and other language chunks. The basic distinction ascribed to this definition is its extra sentential status. Thus, to the linguist, discourse is often referred to as the study of language above the sentence. Each of the six methodological approaches to discourse analysis posits its own extra sentential point of departure; thus, determining a central minimal unit for discourse analysis as a discipline remains problematic.

Interestingly, discourse analysis as an academic discipline provides a well developed example of the concept of discourse. The major methodological stances of discourse analysis restate sociological, anthropological, linguistic, or other related disciplinary approaches and bring them under the aegis of discourse analysis,

which unifies the disparate specialties by reframing them within the terministic screen created by and for discourse analysis. An analysis of how this happens may serve to illustrate the ways in which discourse analysis is a discourse community.

An excellent example of how discourse analysis is a discourse in and of itself rests in the formulation of the discipline by Deborah Schiffrin in her influential 1994 textbook, *Approaches to Discourse*. The book defines and elaborates the terministic screen identifying discourse analysis as a discourse community. Schiffrin characterizes discourse analysis as a metatheory that creates a subdiscipline of linguistics (i.e., a discourse community) by unifying six methodological approaches toward the sociolinguistic uses of language. While these approaches do not always agree on what constitutes a minimal unit, with some of them regarding multiple configurations of linguistic data as valid, they do share a focus on the extra grammatical structures of language. That is, the vast majority of linguistic data in discourse analysis come in units larger than a sentence. Smaller elements are sometimes analyzed for their use in social behavior, but their grammatical status is usually regarded as secondary to their social function, which means that these units are being studied for extra grammatical reasons.

Schiffrin further characterizes discourse analysis as comprising two theoretical perspectives: formalist and functionalist. The formalist perspective views discourse in terms of its linguistic structures and sequences; the functionalist perspective views discourse in terms of the way language is used for social reasons. These two perspectives (elaborated in Table 1) extend

Noam Chomsky's concepts of grammatical (formalist) and communicative (functionalist) competence, thus placing discourse analysis in the discipline of linguistics. Of course, each paradigm contextualizes the other: functionalism needs structuralist data; formalism, for all its claims to be based on the code alone, ultimately serves extra formalist purposes. These two paradigms exhibit the foundational approach taken by discourse analysis: they are terms in the terministic screen.

The formalist and functionalist paradigms, then, provide a framework for the six methodological approaches to discourse analysis (see Table 2), defining them based on methodological principles and unifying them under the discipline of linguistics, which is not where most of the approaches originated. Table 2 abstracts the starting points, research questions, minimal units, and major theorist (in parentheses) for those six methodological approaches to discourse analysis.

The model of discourse analysis posited above illustrates the way in which discourse analysis constitutes a discourse. Each of the six methodologies under the metatheoretical banner of discourse analysis belongs to an already extant academic discipline such as philosophy or linguistics and is a discourse in its own right. However, all of the methodologies are brought together by the designation of functionalist or formalist approach, the assignment of a starting point for analysis, the identification of a central research question, and the suggestion of a minimal structural unit.

The description of discourse analysis as a methodology has been accomplished by using the concept as the subject of this illustration.

Table 1 Discourse: formalist/functionalist principles

<i>Formalist</i>	<i>Functionalist</i>
"Etic" analysis based on form	"Emic" analysis based on meaning
Code-centered	Use-centered
Analyze code first	Analyze use first
Referential function	Social function
Elements/structures are arbitrary and universal	Elements/structures are ethnographically appropriate
All languages equivalent	Languages and varieties not necessarily equivalent
One code	Code diversity
Fundamental concepts taken for granted	Fundamental concepts problematic and to be investigated

Source: Schiffrin (1994: 21).

Table 2 Approaches to discourse analysis

	<i>Starting point</i>	<i>Research question</i>	<i>Minimal unit</i>
<i>Formalist</i>			
Conversation analysis (H. Sacks)	Sequencing/ adjacency	Why that next?	Adjacency pair
Variation analysis (W. Labov)	Structural variable	Why that form?	Multiple possibilities
<i>Functionalist</i>			
Speech act theory (J. Austin; J. Searle)	Speaker intention	How to do things with words?	Speech act
Ethnography of communication (D. Hymes)	Speech events/ speech acts	How does discourse reflect culture?	Speech event
Interactional sociolinguistics (E. Goffman)	Interpersonal goals	What are they doing?	Interchange
Pragmatics (H. P. Grice)	Grice's maxims/ speech acts	What are the cultural norms for speech acts?	Multiple possibilities

Source: Schiffrin (1994).

More important, the description shows discourse analysis to be a method of communication that conforms to particular structural and ethnographic norms and marks a particular social group by providing a means of solidarity for its members and a means of differentiating that group from other groups. Further, while discourse analysis is a discourse, the six methodological perspectives within discourse analysis are themselves separate discourses with their own terministic screens maintaining parallel distinctions as fully realized varieties of discourse analysis, not unlike the distinction accorded to dialects of a language.

Therefore, discourse analysis exhibits characteristics of both definitions of discourse offered here, accounting for every element of those definitions. Clearly, the concept of discourse analysis conforms to the basic definition of discourse by both establishing and following the stylistic and disciplinary norms of the discipline it names. Those adopting the distinction of discourse analysis will situate themselves within the discourse community of discourse analysis, either rejecting or claiming simultaneous membership in a related discourse community. The member of the discourse community of discourse analysis will command the lexicon and training required of a discourse analyst and will recognize the boundaries coincident with the terministic screen that lexicon and training impose, thus adopting the identity of that group.

If the discourse analyst claims additional membership in discourse analysis and another discourse community, say, discursive psychology (which studies language use as social process) or critical discourse analysis (which merges literary, psychological, and other theoretical perspectives with the methods of discourse analysis to challenge political power by challenging the language used to advance it), the discursive psychologist or critical discourse analyst may question the discourse analyst's status as a member of that discourse community by identifying the claimant within the confines of the terministic screen of discourse analysis. In the same way, a discourse analyst may contend that the stances of the discursive psychologist or critical discourse analyst focus on purposes outside the form and function of language above the sentence, therefore excluding them from the discourse community of discourse analysis. Either way, discourse analysis, as defined here, is a discourse.

Current research trends show that discourse is a concept in the social science, natural science, business, engineering, and humanities fields. In addition to the applications of the term detailed here, the term discourse functions as a way of identifying an approach to a subject (as in the case of analyzing a discourse community or terministic screen), a way of identifying the methodology used to extract information (as in the case of therapeutic analysis), or a way of identifying a subject in itself (as in the case of specific

extra grammatical analyses of linguistic phenomena). Further, the number of graduate level discourse studies programs is growing in English speaking countries, promising an interest in the subject of discourse now and well into the future. The omnipresence of the term confirms its inherent interdisciplinary and cross disciplinary value. That said, the term may also be in danger of overuse. Appropriating the term to describe virtually any use of language diminishes its capacity to function as shown above. Interestingly, the very difficulty brought about by overuse of the term discourse is a discourse phenomenon. Thus, an important future project may entail either a firmer definition or redefinition of discourse itself.

SEE ALSO: Conversation; Conversation Analysis; Education; Emic/Etic; Ethnography; Facework; Frame; Globalization; Goffman, Erving; Interaction; Intersubjectivity; Intertextuality; Language; Lifeworld; Mass Culture and Mass Society; Mass Media and Socialization; Media; Media and Globalization; Media Literacy; Metatheory; Orality; Reference Groups; Sacks, Harvey; Semiotics; Social Movements; Sociolinguistics; Stratification, Distinction and; Symbolic Interaction

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discrimination

Ian Law

Discrimination refers to the differential, and often unequal, treatment of people who have been either formally or informally grouped into a particular class of persons. There are many forms of discrimination that are specified according to the ways in which particular groups are identified, including race, ethnicity, gender, marital status, class, age, disability, nationality, religion, or language. The United Nations Charter (1954) declared in article 55 that the UN will promote human rights and freedoms for all, "without distinction as to race, sex, language, and religion." Later in 1958, the Universal Declaration of Human Rights added eight further grounds for possible discrimination, which were color, political or other opinion, national or social origin, property, birth, or other status.

Social scientists need to consider all kinds of differential treatment, as this is a general feature of social life. As Banton (1994) notes, for example, the family, the ethnic group, and the state are all based on acts of discrimination. In families, different individuals have differing roles and obligations that require particular types of behavior, for example husband and wife and parent and child. Members of ethnic groups may differentiate in their association with or exclusion of other people depending on the identification of their ethnic origins. States frequently discriminate between citizens and non-citizens in conferring rights and responsibilities. Although discrimination is often an individual action, it is also a social pattern of aggregate behavior. So, structures of inequality may be reproduced over generations through repeated patterns of differential treatment. Here, individuals are denied opportunities and resources for reasons that are not related to their merits, capacities, or behavior but primarily because of their membership of an identifiable group.

Discrimination takes many forms. Marger (2000) identifies a "spectrum of discrimination," which includes wide variations in both its forms and severity. Broadly, three categories of discrimination are identified as comprising this spectrum. Firstly, the most severe acts of discrimination involve mass societal aggression such as the annihilation of native peoples in North America, South Africa, and Australia, the Nazi Holocaust, plantation slavery, or more recent massacres of ethnic groups in Rwanda and Bosnia. Violent racism and domestic violence are two further examples of widespread discriminatory aggression. Secondly, discrimination involves denial of access to societal opportunities and rewards, for example in employment, education, housing, health, and justice. Thirdly, use of derogatory, abusive verbal language that is felt to be offensive (e.g., "Paki," "nigger"), which, together with racist jokes, use of Nazi insignia, and unwitting stereotyping and pejorative phrases, may all constitute lesser forms of discrimination. Dualistic notions of degradation and desire, love and hate, purity and disease, and inferiority and superiority may be involved in discursive strategies through which forms of discrimination are expressed. Explanations for discrimination require complex accounts that are able to

embrace micro-psychological processes, individual and group experiences, competition and socialization, together with structural power relations and aspects of globalization.

Feminist perspectives on anti-discrimination law have challenged the fundamental assumptions underlying the treatment and analysis of comparators. This position involves a critique of liberal legalism and the invisible construction of white male norms, in law, public policy, and sociology, which provide the benchmarks for assessing the scale of discrimination (Hepple & Szyszczak 1992). Other than using the position of the white majority as a test of differential treatment of minorities, assessment of material position in comparison to indicators of human needs/rights provides an alternative method of sociological analysis (Law 1996).

Poststructuralist and postmodernist directions in contemporary sociological theory have nurtured an increasing focus on the complexity of interactions between different forms of discrimination. The critique of the conceptual inflation of racism, which warns against labeling institutional practices as racist as they may have exclusionary effects on other groups, further supports the building of sociological complexity into the study of how discrimination works. This shift is also apparent in the development of international and national protections and remedies. Here, development of human rights approaches that emphasize particularly freedom from discrimination and respect for the dignity of individuals and their ways of life and personal development seek to build a collective agenda that encompasses the needs and interests of all individuals and groups. The shift toward the creation of general equality commissions in the UK and in Europe and the dismantling of institutions concerned with separate forms of discrimination such as race or disability further exemplifies this process. In future research, focus on the interactions between different structures of discrimination is likely to be key.

The United Nations Third World Conference in Durban 2001 affirmed the paramount importance of implementing the International Convention on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination. It also concluded that the major obstacles to overcoming racial discrimination were lack of political will, weak legislation, and poor implementation of relevant strategies

by nation states. In moving forward, the key role played by non governmental organizations in campaigning for change and raising awareness of many forms of discrimination was acknowledged.

SEE ALSO: Affirmative Action; Apartheid and Nelson Mandela; Civil Rights Movement; Gender Bias; Homophobia; Race; Race (Racism); Racism, Structural and Institutional; Stereotyping and Stereotypes

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disease, social causation

Joseph T. Young

Social causation of disease is defined as the origin of illness that results from social conditions and social interactions. This definition assumes that human biological factors are not the sole cause of disease. The definition further assumes that social factors such as socioeconomic status (SES), religion, and social networks have an effect on the level and severity of illness and mortality. The idea that social interaction and culture play parts in the causation of disease has been present in social thought since John Gaunt's discussion of the interaction between politics and mortality in 1662.

Social causes of disease can be divided into fundamental causes (Link & Phelan 1995) and proximate (or lifestyle) causes. Proximate causes

of illness directly produce illness by affecting biological processes and are individually controlled. For example, diet, smoking, alcohol and drug use, seatbelt use, and exercise behaviors are lifestyle choices that directly affect disease prevalence.

Fundamental causes of disease can be defined as indirect causes of disease that act through specific proximate statuses and behaviors caused by variable access to resources (social capital) that may help people avoid disease, and the negative consequences of disease (Link & Phelan 1995: 81). Social capital is available to an individual through social networks, education, occupation, income and wealth, religious ties, and social power. The amount of social capital available to an individual, as well as other social factors, partially determines the severity and type of diseases the individual is afflicted with and may ultimately be more important as causes of disease than proximate causes (Link & Phelan 1995).

Why is the study of social causation of disease important? The obvious answer is that with adequate linkage between the causes of disease, society is able to achieve remedies for the disease states and reduce the negative effects of these causes of disease on the individual and society as a whole. Understanding causative factors for disease supports disease prevention, potentially improves health, longevity, and quality of life, informs health policy, improves access to care, and increases the level of health knowledge. Major social causes include occupation, income, gender, education, social networks, health care access availability, institutional causes (such as insurance), diet and nutrition, and stress (event related) and psychological factors.

Biological explanations of disease do not fully explain either the prevalence levels or the severity of disease. Disease is thus multicausal in origin and is manifest from multiple causal pathways. We have moved from attempting to eliminate the causal connection between lifestyle, proximate causes, and disease to looking at the reasons that people have such behaviors that negatively impact their health. Those reasons for negative behavior are uniformly social in nature.

Methods used to delineate social causes of disease must, of necessity, be complex because

of the complex nature of the topic and the many interactions between levels of inquiry and factors involved. The methods primarily used are quantitative in nature and involve multilevel regression models of various types. General linear models, hierarchical models, and structural equation models are becoming the norms of inquiry, because the data are layered from individual factors to neighborhood factors and social institutions. These interactions require sophisticated models for accurate description, which makes inquiry in the area of study quite intricate.

The difficulty in delineating social causes of disease (hereinafter fundamental causes, because we shall assume that fundamental causes are more important to disease causation) is thus equally methodologically and theoretically complex. The effects of fundamental causes on disease are often indirect, working through more proximate statuses and behaviors, and thus the magnitude of their effect may be difficult to delineate. Methodological problems are compounded by the bidirectional nature of disease causation and the difficulty in defining the social causes. In other words, a single disease may have multiple causes, acting in concert to produce the resultant disorder and its effects. Further, the causes of the disease may interact with the resultant disease to cause further disease. For example, persons who smoke may have sedentary lifestyles, lower educational status, poorer jobs, more stress, and poorer diets because of less income, which may affect the levels of heart, lung, and kidney disease. If one disease state is present, this may lead to other disease states that synergistically affect the overall health of the individual (such as hypertension leading to renal failure, leading to heart disease and stroke). Indirect and direct causes may combine in a complex of causative factors that may be difficult to untangle, both from a methodological and a theoretical standpoint. Further lost in this decidedly social discussion of disease is the obvious effect of genetics and biology that do play some part in disease causation.

The difficulty in measuring social factors (how do we define a social factor and how do we measure it? what is the direction of causation and its level of effect?) may affect the resultant influence of the social factor on disease causation. Factors such as social integration, stress, social support, social capital, and

life events must be defined uniformly and systematically in order for meaning to be ascribed to their effects. The measure used to show the effect of social factors on health and disease must be equally precise. For example, mortality as an outcome is relatively precise. We all die, and we all die of something, but that "something" may not be a single disease or have a single cause. If we use cure, or worse yet control, in chronic disease states as a measure of outcome, the standard of what is cure and what is control may vary with the research involved. Standards for outcomes are not present in the literature, in many cases, to guide research.

The old dichotomy of causation, direct and indirect causes, seems to be too imprecise to explain social causation of disease. Direct physical causes of disease occur in a social context. Smoking may have social causes. Direct physical harm from injury occurs in a social milieu (e.g., driving too fast without a seatbelt may be the result of low SES, cultural preference, and excess alcohol use because the stress of life is too much to directly confront). All of these factors comprise a complex interplay of causation grounded in the fundamental causes of disease, which are primarily social in nature. The work of McKeown and associates on public health and smoking, and of Dubos (1959) on environmental factors in health and disease, makes a strong case for multifactorial causation of disease. The effect of nutritional deficits due to poor economic status may affect lifelong immunity and susceptibility to disease. To complicate matters, Barker and associates hypothesized that diseases, thought to be chronic and afflicting the more aged of the population, are perhaps genetically programmed before birth through poor nutrition of the mother, to be later expressed by metabolic pathways (e.g., metabolic syndrome leading to heart, vascular, endocrine, and kidney disease) later in life. Fundamental and social causes of disease may therefore have direct and indirect effects as a result of large, and as yet not fully delineated, social contexts of wealth, power, social capital, and social control, which may partially determine the level and severity of disease in the individual.

The theoretical underpinnings of the social causation of illness are material, cultural, behavioral, psychosocial, sociopolitical, and longitudinal in nature. The common thread of all the

theories is that differences in social factors lead to differences in illness levels and the ability to maintain and regain healthy status (Bartley 2004).

The material or socioeconomic status theory (Kitigawa & Hauser 1973; Kawachi & Kennedy 1997) links levels of illness to income. Income determines behaviors, diet, and type of work done, and is linked to housing quality and environmental determinants of illness as well as stress levels and work related levels of self identity and worth.

The cultural/behavioral theory states that socialized values and norms determine behavior and social identity, which in turn control health behaviors and levels of disease. A subset of behavioral/cultural theory, psychosocial theory (Wilkinson 1996; Elstad 1998), suggests that social status levels, social networks, and biochemical processes in the body are linked to behavior and thus to levels of illness.

Political economy theory (Lynch 2000) suggests that health and illness differentials are caused by differentials in social power controlled by external political and institutional hierarchies. Finally, life course theory states that events before and after birth affect physical health, the ability to maintain and repair health, and the level of illness through biological and social/behavioral pathways that change with age and the evolution of social institutions. A unified theory of social causation of illness must contain material, socialization and network, longitudinal and biological, stress and psychological, and behavioral/cultural factors. As yet, all the theories ignore the global aspects of illness causation and the interactions between the various aspects of social causation (Young 2004).

The term "social causes of disease" has been supplanted, first by the term social determinants of disease, and now by a field of study termed "social epidemiology," which includes the social determinants of health and disease (Kawachi 2002). This subfield of public health, health sociology, and epidemiology has helped to define social policy related to neighborhood improvement, health services access, and socioeconomic improvements that have decreased disease prevalence and delineated the pathways of social causation of disease.

Future research will depend on the ability of researchers to meet the demands of large,

complex longitudinal databases and methodological issues required for adequate analysis of this topic. Certainly, topics extending the idea of the life course perspective will require longitudinal multilevel analysis (Hayward et al. 2000). Other areas of future research should include the relationship of direct causes of disease to social causes and social outcomes; the effects of social causation of disease on the developing world and development (Sen 1987); the development of biomarkers and their reliability in linking health to social variables; and GIS techniques for analysis of area effects. We have only scratched the surface of all the environmental effects on illness and health.

Social epidemiology provides an avenue for formal empirical and theoretical research into the multifactorial causes of disease so that social and medical scientists can work together to improve global health and well being.

SEE ALSO: Epidemiology; Illness Experience; Social Capital; Social Capital and Health; Social Epidemiology

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Disneyization

Alan Bryman

Disneyization refers to “the process by which the principles of the Disney theme parks are coming to dominate more and more sectors of American society as well as the rest of the world” (Bryman 2004: 1). The term was devised by Bryman (2004) to parallel George Ritzer’s (2004) notion of McDonaldization and the definition is a deliberate adaptation of that concept. Disneyization does not refer to the spread of theme parks, though that is certainly happening, but to principles that the Disney theme parks exemplify. As such, Disneyization refers to the ways in which modern consumption opportunities in institutions as diverse as hotels, restaurants, shopping malls, and shops are increasingly infused with Disneyization.

In portraying the principles that the Disney theme parks exemplify, four dimensions of Disneyization are distinguished:

- 1 *Theming*. This refers to the application of a narrative to an institution that is external to that institution. An example is the

deployment of a narrative of the cinema or the natural world to a restaurant. Theming can add allure to otherwise commonplace consumption opportunities.

- 2 *Hybrid consumption*. This is the bringing together of different forms of consumption in a single location or site, such as shops attached to restaurants, amusement park attractions attached to hotels or shopping malls, and fusions of hotels with casinos, as in Las Vegas. The rationale for hybrid consumption is that it keeps consumers at a site for longer and turns it into a destination.
- 3 *Merchandising*. This term refers to the sale of goods bearing or in the form of company images or logos. It includes such things as tee shirts, mugs, pens, and other paraphernalia which are used to extract additional revenue from popular images, such as movie and television series tie ins or company symbols. The idea is to extend people’s enjoyment of the underlying image and in the process mining further value from it.
- 4 *Performative labor*. Workers in consumption environments in service industries are increasingly encouraged to view their labor in ways that suggest a performance, similar to that which occurs in the theater. One of the chief forms of this trend is that service organizations increasingly encourage workers to engage in *emotional labor* (Hochschild 1983). This means that workers are enjoined to display positive emotions through smiling and other external signs.

Bryman (2004) draws a distinction between structural and transferred Disneyization, suggesting that two separate processes may be at work in the spread of Disneyization. The former refers to the essential changes exemplified by the Disney theme parks. Transferred Disneyization refers to the relocation of the principles associated with the Disney theme parks into other spheres, such as shopping malls and restaurants.

The process of Disneyization should be viewed as a platform for rendering goods and particularly services desirable and consequently more likely to be purchased. As such, it is very much a strategy that is at the heart of modern consumerism.

SEE ALSO: Consumption, Cathedrals of; Consumption, Mass Consumption, and Consumer Culture; Emotion Work; Hyperconsumption/Overconsumption; McDonaldization

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distanciation and disembedding

Christoph Henning

Modern society is based on a functional differentiation of different social systems. Therefore, face to face interactions lose their significance in everyday life, as modern media such as money or more recently the Internet step in between. The consequence for individuals is the process of distanciation. It has both a spatial and an emotional side: people who feel a sense of belonging can live far away from each other, and people sharing the same neighborhood may not even talk to one another. Social interdependence is ever more mediated and behavioral patterns often adapt towards a mutual ignorance. The consequence for societal subsystems is that they are increasingly disembedded. They follow their own logic only, without reflecting upon social concerns or society as a whole.

Though these two related processes are but two sides of the same coin of modernization, they have been described in rather different theoretical schools. The term distanciation comes from Nietzsche. It was taken up by authors like Georg Simmel, Helmuth Plessner, and Norbert Elias. The term disembedding was first used by Karl

Polanyi, though the idea was already elaborated a hundred years earlier by Marx. It was taken up by anthropologists and later on by economic sociology (Granoveter & Swedberg 2001) and also by Giddens. Following Polanyi, it is the disembedding of the market in particular that is typical for modern capitalistic society. The economy has become the central process of modern society, yet an economy is more than just the market. It also includes consumption and (most importantly) production. In traditional societies the economy used to be embedded in larger cultural frames. Ethics, politics, and religion had a great influence on economic behavior. In modern society the economy can only process what is inputted into the economic system as *economic* information; that is, as monetary calculation. In Marxian terms, economic thinking was transformed from a logic of use value to a logic of exchange value. This logic is blind towards qualitative differences and only cares for quantitative dimensions of how much something costs or pays. The effect on individuals is distanciation: a weakening of social bonds and an increased individuality.

The Marxian interpretation of this process of disembedding and distanciation was mostly negative: now there are no more limits to growth, even if growth turns out to be ecologically destructive. In other words, the price for disembedding is a much greater social risk. Also, there are no more qualitative criteria for deciding at which point economic progress comes at the price of social instability. Classical sociology stressed the ambivalence of this process, pointing especially to the good sides of this very process. The argument was not capitalism's greater economic efficiency, as used by liberal economists like Hayek and Friedman. The sociological argument was a cultural one. The modern individual can no longer rely on "natural" bonds and ties with neighbors and fellow citizens. Some (e.g., communitarians) judged this as a loss. But at the same time this allows for more freedom. Now that individuals are independent of what neighbours think and do, they are free to do whatever they like. Modern culture is only possible because of this loss. If the economy were not disembedded and individuals could not distance themselves from one another, there would be no culture of individualism, no pluralism, no independent art or a free press.

Simmel and Elias were interested in how modern culture and the modern individual managed to deal with this distancing and disembedding. “Distance” here refers to the increased “social space” between different individuals, especially those from different classes, ethnicities, religions, ages, or genders. The concept of social space was further elaborated by Bourdieu. Giddens also followed Simmel’s footsteps, claiming that it is especially money as a modern medium that allows for a growing disembedding of social interactions (“the ‘lifting out’ of forms of life, their recombination across time and space”) (Giddens & Pierson 1998: 98). Money allows for economic interactions across distances, both in terms of time (via credit) and space (via the banking system).

Recent economic sociology and research on international management have shown that the modern economy is not as distanced and disembedded as Polanyi thought, not even on the market. Even in the heart of economic transactions – be it inside a firm, between firms, or between a firm and its customers – there are many social and cultural bonds that embed economic actions and bring partners closer. The debate on “glocalization” and the cultural turn in many disciplines have shown that this is a fundamental necessity. So, together with growing distancing and disembedding, one can most likely find counteracting tendencies of reembedding and trust (Giddens 1990).

SEE ALSO: Globalization; Modernity; Money; Risk, Risk Society, Risk Behavior, and Social Problems; Social Embeddedness of Economic Action; Space

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distinction

Douglas B. Holt

Distinction references the social consequences of expressions of taste. When people consume – whether it be popular culture, leisure, fine arts, the home, vacations, or fashion – these actions, among other things, act to express tastes. And tastes are not innocuous. Rather, what and how people consume can act as a social reproduction mechanism. So expressions of taste are acts of distinction to the extent that they signal, and help to reproduce, differences in social class. Distinction can be distinguished from other important class reproduction mechanisms such as educational credentials, the accumulation of financial assets, and membership in clubs and associations.

The term distinction is often used as a synonym for related concepts concerning status display, especially Thorstein Veblen’s popular idea of conspicuous consumption. But distinction, as developed by Pierre Bourdieu in his seminal *Distinction: A Social Critique of the Judgment of Taste* (1984), is a more precise term. To understand the nuances of Bourdieu’s ideas, we need to compare *Distinction* to prior work. (Bourdieu was more interested in berating Parisian elites than in conversing with related social theory.) The most influential ideas prior to Bourdieu were Simmel’s trickle down theory of fashion and Veblen’s theory of the “honorific” consumption of the leisure class.

In Simmel’s model, society’s elites are in a continual race to distinguish their consumption from their social inferiors, who do their best to

imitate higher status tastes. The constant inflation due to copying creates a very dynamic fashion system. Simmel proposes what may be termed a consensus symbol model: what is consumed is irrelevant as long as elites decide collectively that it will be a class signal. The anthropologist Lloyd Warner worked with a similar model in his famous ethnographic studies of the American social class system.

Veblen, unlike Simmel, is concerned with claims to distinction that are not necessarily defined as such by their participants. Much like Bourdieu, he is a close observer of elite status signals that have become naturalized as simply “good taste.” But Veblen’s model differs from Bourdieu’s in that he defines elites by their wealth and then looks at how they convert their wealth into acts of consumption that are not easily imitated: they spend excessively on “was teful” indulgences, they use their wives as stage props, they define beauty in terms of expense, and so on.

By comparison, Bourdieu’s theory of distinction makes three major contributions. First, he carefully unpacks and details the independent contributions of economic capital and what he terms cultural capital. Economic capital allows one to express tastes for luxurious and scarce goods, much like Veblen describes. Cultural capital is different in that it consists of the socialized tastes that come from “good breeding”: growing up among educated parents and peers. Cultural elites express tastes that are conceptual, distanced, ironic, and idiosyncratic. So rather than a unidimensional social class hierarchy, Bourdieu is able to specify carefully how class fractions are composed (and often clash) due to differences in their relative amounts of economic and cultural capital.

Second, he specifies a materialist theory that explains why different class fractions tend toward particular tastes. He traces the causal linkages between social conditions and tastes; for example, the economic deprivations of the working class lead to the “taste for necessity.” Rather than a consensus model, with Bourdieu’s theory, one is able to predict the kinds of cultural products different class fractions will like and the ways in which they will consume them.

Third, what is most notable about Bourdieu’s book, and least commented upon, is his nuanced

eye for the subtle distinguishing practices that pervade everyday life. Much like Erving Goffman, Bourdieu is able to pick apart the micro details – how one dresses, how one vacations, the way in which one justifies aesthetic preferences – to reveal their broader sociological impact.

Bourdieu’s research has stimulated a variety of empirical studies that have sought to test the relationship between tastes and social reproduction. The results of these studies have been inconclusive. One of the inherent problems in such studies is that cultural practices that communicate distinction are often quite subtle. Many of these practices are not easily captured by conventional social science constructs, nor by survey measures, the primary method for follow up studies to date.

For this reason, some of the most telling treatments of distinction have been written by cultural critics who are acute observers of the social world around them and are more sensitive to the historical shifts in taste. While less systematic, books such as Tom Wolfe’s *Radical Chic and Mau Mauing the Flak Catchers* (1999), Paul Fussell’s *Class: A Guide through the American Status System* (1992), and David Brooks’s *Bobos in Paradise: The New Upper Class and How They Got There* (2001) capture better than any sociological study how American elites signaled distinction in the 1970s, 1980s, and 1990s, respectively. The challenge for future sociological research is to develop theories and methods that are sensitive to these nuances.

Bourdieu’s theory has also drawn considerable criticism, particularly for its overly structural and economist approach. Certainly, a primary weakness of Bourdieu’s theory is that he posits a nomothetic model that abstracts away from historical particulars in order to claim universal application. There is a fundamental tension between Bourdieu’s universalizing model and his nuanced description of tastes, many of which are particular to France. So, rather than “test” Bourdieu’s model in its nomothetic form, the most fruitful future work will be to treat Bourdieu’s framework as a skeleton and then specify the particular characteristics of distinction across different societies and historical periods. Mapping these particular formations of distinction

is a massive and important project that has only just begun.

SEE ALSO: Bourdieu, Pierre; Capital: Economic, Cultural, and Social; Cultural Capital; Simmel, Georg; Stratification, Distinction and; Taste, Sociology of; Veblen, Thorstein

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distributive justice

Guillermina Jasso

Every day, and in all walks of life, the sense of justice is at work. Humans form ideas about what is just; and they make judgments about the justice or injustice of the things they see around them. Both the ideas of justice and the assessments of injustice set in motion a train of individual and social processes, touching virtually every area of the human experience. Thus, in the quest to understand human behavior, understanding the operation of the sense of justice is basic. And justice is central across the subfields of sociology.

This entry summarizes the synthesis of the late twentieth century and the foundation for the coming synthesis of the twenty first century. The first synthesis looks inward, providing a parsimonious and coherent model for understanding and investigating every aspect of distributive justice. The coming second synthesis looks outward, forging the links between justice and the two other primordial sociobehavioral forces, status and power, and proposing a new unified theory.

JUSTICE ANALYSIS: THE SYNTHESIS OF THE LATE TWENTIETH CENTURY

Justice analysis begins with four central questions (Jasso & Wegener 1997):

- 1 What do individuals and societies think is just, and why?
- 2 How do ideas of justice shape determination of actual situations?
- 3 What is the magnitude of the perceived injustice associated with departures from perfect justice?
- 4 What are the behavioral and social consequences of perceived injustice?

Justice analysis addresses the four central questions by developing three elements – framework for justice analysis, theoretical justice analysis, and empirical justice analysis (Jasso 2004). Developing the framework entails analyzing each of the four questions, identifying the fundamental ingredients in justice phenomena, and formulating a set of fundamental building blocks – the fundamental actors, quantities, functions, distributions, matrices, and contexts. Theoretical justice analysis focuses on building theories, of both deductive and non deductive type, each theory addressing one of the central questions and using as a starting premise one of the building blocks provided by the framework. Empirical justice analysis spans testing the implications derived from deductive theories and the propositions suggested by non deductive theories, and also carrying out measurement of the justice quantities, estimation of the justice relations, and inductive exploration.

The aim is a purity of approach, in which there is a minimum of terms and all terms are related to each other in specified ways.

Framework for Justice Analysis

The first central question – the scientific version of the ancient question, “What is just?” – immediately highlights two fundamental actors, the observer and the rewardee, and one fundamental quantity, the observer’s idea of the just reward for the rewardee. Pioneering

contributions of the last quarter of the twentieth century include Hatfield's idea that "equity is in the eye of the beholder" (Walster et al. 1976: 4), Brickman's distinction between principles of microjustice and principles of macrojustice, and Berger et al.'s (1972) idea that the just reward is a function of rewardee characteristics. Together these led to (1) the just reward matrix, which collects all the ideas of the just reward for a set of rewardees among a set of observers; (2) the observer specific just reward function (JRF) and just reward distribution (JRD) and their tight links to the principles of microjustice (now seen to be parameters of the JRF) and the principles of macrojustice (now seen to be parameters of the JRD); and (3) a new approach for pinpointing the effects of observer and social characteristics on the principles of justice (Jasso & Wegener 1997).

The third central question – "What is the magnitude of the injustice associated with departures from perfect justice?" – highlights a new fundamental quantity, the justice evaluation, and a new fundamental function, the justice evaluation function. The justice evaluation is the observer's judgment that a rewardee is justly or unjustly rewarded, and if unjustly rewarded whether underrewarded or overrewarded, and to what degree; it is represented by the full realnumber line, with zero representing the point of perfect justice, negative numbers representing unjust underreward, and positive numbers representing unjust overreward. The justice evaluation function represents the process by which the observer compares the actual reward to the just reward, generating the justice evaluation. The justice evaluation variable has twin roots in Berger et al.'s (1972) theoretical three category variable and Jasso and Rossi's (1977) empirical nine category fairness rating, emerging as a fully continuous variable with Jasso's (1978) introduction of the justice evaluation function:

$$\text{justice evaluation} = \theta \ln \left(\frac{\text{actual reward}}{\text{just reward}} \right), \quad (1)$$

abbreviated:

$$\mathcal{J} = \theta \ln \left(\frac{A}{C} \right), \quad (2)$$

where \mathcal{J} denotes the justice evaluation, A denotes the actual reward, C denotes the just reward, and θ denotes the signature constant, which governs both framing and expressiveness. The log of the ratio of A to C is the experienced justice evaluation; θ transforms it into expressed \mathcal{J} .

The just reward and the justice evaluation may pertain to self (reflexive) or to others (non reflexive). Both are assembled in the just reward matrix and the justice evaluation matrix.

The justice evaluation function (JEF) has several appealing properties. The first three noticed were: (1) exact mapping from combinations of A and C to \mathcal{J} ; (2) integration of rival conceptions of \mathcal{J} as a ratio and as a difference (Berger et al. 1972); and (3) deficiency aversion, viz., deficiency is felt more keenly than comparable excess (and loss aversion, viz., losses are felt more keenly than gains). These properties were quickly discussed (e.g., Wagner & Berger 1985) and remain the most often cited (Turner 2005). But, as will be seen below, a new theory for which the justice evaluation function served as first postulate was yielding a large number of implications for a wide variety of behavioral domains, and a stronger foundation was needed. In the course of scrutinizing the JEF, two new properties emerged: (4) additivity, such that the effect of A on \mathcal{J} is independent of the level of C , and conversely; and (5) scale invariance. Six years later two other desirable properties were noticed: (6) symmetry, such that interchanging A and C changes only the sign of \mathcal{J} ; and (7) the fact that the log ratio form of the JEF is the limiting form of the difference between two power functions,

$$\lim_{k \rightarrow 0} \frac{A^k - C^k}{k} = \ln \left(\frac{A}{C} \right), \quad (3)$$

which both strengthens integration of the ratio and difference views and also integrates power function and logarithmic approaches. More recently, an eighth (almost magical) property has come to light, linking the JEF and the Golden Number, $(\sqrt{5} - 1)/2$ (Jasso 2005).

The logarithmic ratio form is the only functional form which satisfies both scale invariance and additivity.

The JEF connects the two great literatures in the study of justice, the literature on ideas of

justice and the literature on reactions to injustice. As well, it generates several useful links, via the justice index (the arithmetic mean of \mathcal{J}): (1) a link between justice and two measures of inequality, Atkinson's measure defined as one minus the ratio of the geometric mean to the arithmetic mean and Theil's MLD; (2) a link with ideology, via decomposition of the justice index into the amount of overall injustice due to reality and the amount due to ideology; and (3) a link with poverty and inequality, via another decomposition of the justice index into the amount of overall injustice due to poverty and the amount due to inequality (Jasso 1999).

The JEF is linked to emotions at several crucial junctures. Experienced \mathcal{J} releases emotion, variously imagined as an explosion when the logarithm of the A/C ratio is taken or when $\ln A$ confronts $\ln C$. Next, the signature constant shapes emotion display. Finally, change in \mathcal{J} releases a new round of emotion. Further, it is thought that distinct emotions emanate from particular constellations of reflexive and non reflexive justice evaluations (Turner 2005).

The framework for justice analysis provides a large set of tightly integrated tools for doing theoretical and empirical work. Beyond the foregoing, these include \mathcal{J} , for use when the specific type of injustice, underreward or over reward, does not matter, and five context subscripts, for studying the effects of the social milieu, the time period, etc.

Finally, the justice profile – the time series of \mathcal{J} – permits assessment of the relative importance in a person's life of goods, bads, groups, self, others, of justice itself, as well as enabling analysis of location, scale, extreme values, drop offs, etc.

Theoretical Justice Analysis

The JEF has proved fruitful in generating testable implications. The early question, "If we know the distribution of the actual reward, what does the distribution of \mathcal{J} look like?" was soon answered, and joined by new questions and new answers (Jasso 1980).

The problem of how to calculate \mathcal{J} when rewards are ordinal (for everyone understood that all quantitative characteristics can arouse

the sense of justice, not only cardinal things like money but also ordinal things like beauty and intelligence) led to a new rule, "Cardinal rewards are measured in their own units, ordinal things as relative ranks within a group," a rule which would have profound substantive consequences, including the prediction that the most beautiful person in a collectivity experiences less overreward than the wealthiest. The rule for ordinal things also now joined the case in which C arises from a parameter of a distribution (e.g., mean wealth) in securing within justice theory a place for qualitative characteristics, thereby providing yet another instance of the pervasive import of the distinction pioneered by Blau (1974).

The problem of how to represent C led to an identity – with roots in Merton and Rossi's (1950) work on reference groups – in which C is replaced by the product of average A and an idiosyncrasy parameter. Average A was in turn replaced by its constituent factors in the cardinal and ordinal cases, such as the total amount of a cardinal thing and the population size, again leading to profound substantive consequences.

Theoretical derivation is, of course, not automatic, especially if the goal is the "marvelous deductive unfolding" which not only yields a wealth of implications but also reaches novel predictions (Popper 1963: 221, see also pp. 117, 241–8). In this endeavor, mathematics is the power tool, enabling long deductive chains which take the theory "far afield from its original domain" (Danto 1967: 299–300). Purely verbal arguments tend to tether the deduced consequences to overt phenomena in the assumptions, constraining fruitfulness and destroying the possibility of novel predictions. Instantiation, for example, cannot produce novel predictions, for novel predictions are novel precisely because nothing superficially evident in the assumptions could lead to them.

Four main techniques of theoretical derivation have developed, called the micromodel, the macromodel, the mesomodel, and the matrix model. They have different starting points (e.g., \mathcal{J} , change in \mathcal{J} , distribution of \mathcal{J}) and use different mathematical approaches.

Examples of testable predictions derived include:

- 1 A thief's gain from theft is greater when stealing from a fellow group member than from an outsider, and this premium is greater in poor groups than in rich groups.
- 2 Parents of two or more non twin children will spend more of their toy budget at an annual gift giving occasion than at the children's birthday.
- 3 Blind persons are less at risk of eating disorders than are sighted persons.
- 4 In a materialistic society, social distance between subgroups always increases with inequality.
- 5 Veterans of wars fought away from home are more vulnerable to post traumatic stress disorder than veterans of wars fought on home soil.

As well, justice theory provides interpretation of rare events, such as the invention of mendicant institutions in the thirteenth century and of detective fiction in the nineteenth. And it also suggests the existence of fundamental constants, including a constant governing the switch between valuing cardinal and ordinal goods.

Empirical Justice Analysis

The justice framework and justice theory set in motion a vast array of empirical work – testing derived predictions, testing constructed propositions, and measurement and estimation of justice terms and relations. Testing predictions requires talents in the farflung domains to which the long hand of justice reaches (Turner 2005) and thus brings the synergies of distant ideas and subfields. Measurement and estimation sharpen understanding of the elements in the framework (Jasso & Wegener 1997; Whitmeyer 2004).

In general, measurement and estimation distinguish between justice for self, justice for others, and justice for all. Because, as noted above, A and C are arguments of the JEF, it is convenient to set up a three equation system, comprised of the JRF, the JEF, and the actual reward function (ARF):

$$\begin{aligned} \mathcal{J} &= \theta \ln\left(\frac{A}{C}\right), \\ A &= A(X, Y, \varepsilon) \\ C &= C(X, Q, \varepsilon). \end{aligned} \quad (4)$$

This basic system can be augmented by equations representing determination of the principles of justice (parameters of the JRF and JRD). Specification and estimation of this system yield new insights and new tools, three of which are briefly discussed.

The just reward in the JEF formulas (1), (2), and (4) generates the justice evaluation – it provides the crucial idea of justice against which the actual reward is compared – and hence has come to be called the “true just reward” (Jasso & Wegener 1997). It can be expressed:

$$C = A \exp(-\mathcal{J}/\theta). \quad (5)$$

A challenge is how to estimate it. Of course, respondents can be directly asked what they think is just, as in the International Social Science Project. The possibility remains, however, that the response – called the “disclosed just reward” – differs from the true just reward, incorporating such mechanisms as socialization, response sets, and the like (Jasso & Wegener 1997). Equation (4), together with Rossi's factorial survey method (Jasso & Rossi 1977; Rossi 1979), points the way to a new technique for estimating the true just reward: ask respondents to rate the justice or injustice of the actual rewards randomly attached to a large set of rewarddees, estimate the signature constant, and then use equation (5) to estimate C . This procedure yields the estimated true just reward, which substantively is free of disclosure mechanisms and statistically is biased but consistent. A second procedure, proposed by Evans (1989) for estimating the just reward for self and by Jasso and Webster for studying non reflexive just rewards, obtains ratings for several hypothetical actual rewards for each rewarddee. Developments in brain imaging techniques may suggest other approaches for estimating the true just reward.

The multiple rewards per rewarddee design has a further appealing property: enabling test

for whether the signature constant varies not only by observer but also by rewarder – i.e., enabling test for two new kinds of impartiality in the justice process, framing impartiality and expressiveness impartiality.

As a third example, consider the three equation system in (4). Because \mathcal{J} varies only with A and C , the old practice of assessing the “determinants” of \mathcal{J} can now be precisely understood and its results correctly interpreted. For example, if \mathcal{J} is regressed on schooling, the obtained coefficient equals the actual rate of return to schooling minus the just rate of return to schooling; however, the signs and magnitudes of each rate cannot be identified from the coefficient.

The accumulating empirical record indicates that the judgment that oneself is overrewarded is rare and that societies differ sharply in the proportions who see themselves as underrewarded. In the United States, the independence of mind proposed by Hatfield is dramatic, there being wide variation in the ideas of justice; and college and graduate students view the gender wage gap as unjust. Justice indexes for the formerly socialist countries of Eastern Europe, which in 1991 indicated that inequality was too low, by 1996 indicated that inequality was too high. Finally, initial estimates of impartiality, carried out with US undergraduates, indicate that 70 percent fail the impartiality test, their expressiveness varying across the workers whose earnings they judge.

JUSTICE IN THE UNIFIED THEORY OF SOCIOBEHAVIORAL PROCESSES: THE COMING SYNTHESIS OF THE TWENTY FIRST CENTURY

Still under the rule of parsimony, the proposed ideas for the new synthesis, to be analyzed and tested, add the spirit of Samuel Smiles: “A place for everything, and everything in its place.”

- 1 Fundamental forces. All observed phenomena are the product of the joint operation of several basic forces (Jasso 2003).
- 2 Middle range forces. The basic forces generate middle range forces, in the spirit of Merton’s theories of the middle range.

- 3 Primordial sociobehavioral outcomes, goods/bads, and groups/subgroups. The middle range forces produce primordial sociobehavioral outcomes (PSO) from personal quantitative characteristics. Qualitative characteristics provide the groups for calculating relative ranks and distributional parameters and generating subgroup structures.
- 4 Three rates of change and three PSOs. Because there are three possible rates of change, a useful starting point posits the existence of three middle range sociobehavioral forces.
- 5 Justice, status, and power. As Homans believed, justice, status, and power are the three prime candidates for middle range forces. Justice increases at a decreasing rate, status increases at an increasing rate (Goode 1978; Sørensen 1979). While the rate of change in power processes has not been directly addressed, the reasoning here suggests that power increases at a constant rate.
- 6 Identity. Each instantaneous combination of a PSO, a quantitative characteristic, and a qualitative characteristic is an identity, consistent with the tenets of identity theory (Stryker & Burke 2000; Tajfel & Turner 1986).
- 7 Persons. A person is a collection of identities. This classic idea in identity theory is also a generalization of the justice profile to all three PSOs.
- 8 Personality. Persons can be characterized by the configuration of quantitative characteristics, qualitative characteristics, and PSOs in their identities. Examples include status obsessed, race conscious, beauty fixated. The distinctive configuration constitutes the individual’s personality.
- 9 Groups. A group is a collection of persons. This is a classic idea in identity theory.
- 10 Culture. Groups can be characterized by the configuration of quantitative characteristics, qualitative characteristics, and PSOs in the identities of their members. Groups, too, may be dominated by one or another element. Examples include materialistic society, status society, jock culture, nerd group. The constellation constitutes the group’s culture.

- 11 Two types of subgroups, preexisting and emergent. Preexisting subgroups arise from the categories of personal qualitative characteristics (e.g., gender based or race based subgroups). Emergent subgroups arise from the operation of PSOs (e.g., the overrewarded, the fairly rewarded, and the underrewarded).
- 12 Theoretical derivation of predictions. The four techniques developed in justice theory – the micromodel, macromodel, mesomodel, and matrixmodel – are used to derive predictions for all three PSOs. Novel predictions include predictions concerning the competition among PSOs and the effects of the relative importance of PSOs in personality and culture. For example, an early prediction is that in a justice group, each person is closer to the neighbor above than to the neighbor below, while in a status group, each person is closer to the neighbor below than to the neighbor above, and in a power group, each person is equally close to the neighbors above and below – a consequence of the distinctive rates of change of the three PSOs.
- 13 Emotions. Emotion is released by the PSOs and by change in PSO. An early idea is that the valence of the emotion matches the valence of the PSO or the change in PSO. Justice always releases both positive and negative emotions. Status releases only positive emotions, though intensity may be very low. Change in PSO can, of course, be positive or negative.
- 14 Inequality – form and content. Inequality is distinguished along two dimensions, form and content.
 - 14.1 Inequality – two types of content. Inequalities of interest include both inequality in quantitative characteristics and inequality in PSOs. A new question immediately arises: is inequality greater in the good or in the PSO, for example, in wealth or in status?
 - 14.2 Inequality – two types of form. The forms of inequality are inequality between persons and inequality between subgroups. Inequality between persons is typically measured by the dispersion in the distribution of a quantitative characteristic; the Gini coefficient exemplifies this kind of inequality. Inequality between subgroups is typically measured by contrasting the location parameters in the subdistributions of a quantitative characteristic corresponding to two subgroups; examples include the gender gap in earnings and the race gap in wealth. A new question immediately arises: what is the exact relation between the two forms of inequality?
- 15 Happiness. Happiness is produced by the individual's PSO profile. New questions that can be posed and precisely answered include questions about the effects on happiness of changes in income inequality, changes in valued quantitative and qualitative characteristics, and changes in dominant PSO.

In the coming synthesis, justice will be more deeply understood, its operation contrasted with that of its sibling PSOs. Though only one of three PSOs, justice will be remembered as the first to yield its secrets to exact mathematical expression.

SEE ALSO: Class, Status, and Power; Identity Theory; Income Inequality and Income Mobility; Social Identity Theory; Social Justice, Theories of; Stratification and Inequality, Theories of

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diversity

Gillian Stevens and Heather Downs

In ecology, where the concept is most highly developed, the simplest description of "diversity" is the number of species living in a specific environment: the greater the number of species, the higher the level of diversity. When describing social phenomena, "diversity" generally refers to the distribution of units of analysis (e.g., people, students, families) in a specific social environment (e.g., workplace, classroom, state) along a dimension (e.g., race, social status, political orientation). When measured empirically through one or more of a variety of indexes (such as the index of diversity), the highest levels of diversity occur when the units of analysis (e.g., people) are distributed evenly across the social dimension (e.g., racial categories). However, it is also common for a political ideal to serve as the benchmark for the assessment of levels of diversity. An American work setting may be considered to be appropriately diverse, for example, if the proportions of workers who are African American or Asian are comparable to the proportions of people in the general (or local) population who are African American or Asian. More loosely, some observers consider a setting to be diverse when the proportions of people with a selected characteristic (e.g., membership in a minority group) are relatively high.

Diversity is an important concept along numerous social dimensions, such as ethnicity, race, gender, socioeconomic status, sexuality, age, physical ability, and language repertoires.

Racial and ethnic diversity is a particularly important issue in many societies because race and ethnicity are strongly related to issues of power. Levels of racial and ethnic diversity within a nation as a whole are often used to establish the ideal levels of diversity within a nation's major social institutions, such as its labor force, educational system, and political system. Low levels of diversity within particular social institutions that occur because members of a minority group are underrepresented often lead to studies of gender or racial discrimination including processes of exclusion, and the policies designed to redress these inequalities. Investigating levels of diversity within geographical areas (rather than social institutions) leads to studies of residential segregation. Phenomena such as interreligious marriages or interracial adoption highlight the presumption that the more intimate social domains are expected to be homogeneous, i.e., not diverse, along important dimensions such as race and religion. Studies of the family are increasingly recognizing, however, that these presumptions are too restrictive.

Levels of diversity can change over time through social or demographic processes. For example, levels of ethnic and racial diversity at the national level can change because of migration streams dominated by selected racial or ethnic groups, or by group specific variation in levels of fertility. Social demographic processes such as racial and ethnic intermarriage or transracial adoption are responsible for introducing diversity within narrower, more intimate spheres such as the family and household.

In smaller settings such as the family, variation in levels of diversity along the lines of age and gender are an underappreciated facet of household and family life cycle stages. Individuals' experiences of age specific and gender specific diversity in their immediate households vacillate as they pass through the life cycle stages from childhood to the older ages. For example, people commonly live the first half of their lives in a gender diverse household but after middle adulthood are increasingly likely to live in households with a higher proportion of women.

Levels of diversity in a specific social setting help determine the number of opportunities for

social interaction and the consequent formation of relationships between people of differing characteristics; levels of diversity are also associated with group specific levels of inequality. For example, high levels of occupational segregation (i.e., low levels of diversity within occupations) help maintain sex specific and race specific differentials in income. High (or increases in) levels of racial and ethnic diversity can lead to cultural misunderstandings, or at worst, intergroup conflict. Groups in power may view high levels of diversity as threatening. National immigration policies, such as Australia's "Whites only" policy or the United States' national origins quota system, sought to restrict the entry of selected races to avoid increasing racial diversity in the nation.

In general, though, high levels of diversity along most social dimensions have positive social connotations. Highly diverse settings have numerous opportunities for intergroup interactions and therefore numerous opportunities for the breaking down of misunderstandings and the dissolving of cultural barriers. In racially or ethnically diverse schools, for example, children are more likely to form interracial friendships. Levels of interracial marriage are higher in geographical areas that are racially diverse. The rationale for affirmative action policies in the United States includes the presumptive positive effects of diversity on intergroup relations as well as the issue of equity of opportunity for minority group members. Highly diverse settings, by virtue of including people with a wide variety of characteristics, can also result in a more equitable representation of opinions and sharing of resources.

SEE ALSO: Affirmative Action (Race and Ethnic Quotas); Family Diversity; Interracial Unions; Occupational Segregation; Residential Segregation

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division of labor

Michael T. Ryan

The concept of the division of labor is used both by structural functionalists (the students of Durkheim) and conflict theorists (the students of Marx), but the meaning of the concept differs. For Durkheim and his followers, it means the occupational structure, and it also includes a new form of social solidarity, organic solidarity, that integrates the members of industrial societies in contrast to the mechanical solidarity of traditional societies. Durkheim saw this as a weaker, more precarious form of solidarity that was still in the process of development in the early twentieth century. For Marx and his followers, it means a double division of labor, the technical division of labor in the enterprise and in a particular industry that broke down the production process into a sequence of tasks and the social division of labor among enterprises, industries, and social classes that was mediated through commodity exchange in market relations. While the social labor of the enterprise was rationally organized, Marx saw contradictions and class exploitation and domination in the social division of labor.

Despite the chronic warfare of agrarian societies, the social structures of these societies remained relatively stable over hundreds, if not thousands, of years, with most of the changes taking place at the top – a change of regimes. The transition to industrial forms of society involved a lot of dislocations, conflicts, social movements, and chronic technological revolutions that have made this society far more

unstable, with the changes reaching down and disrupting the everyday lives of many members of this society. Durkheim and Marx have some common intellectual roots which have been obscured over time by their interpreters. Both were materialists influenced by German critical philosophy, especially Ludwig Feuerbach. Durkheim has been seen as a conservative theorist whose central focus was on the problem of social order. Marx has been seen as a radical theorist whose central focus was on the problem of social change. As Anthony Giddens points out, this is a simplistic and reductionist interpretation, especially of Durkheim, who was just as concerned as Marx about social change, and while Durkheim saw communists as hopeless utopians, he was a socialist himself, although he saw no possibility for the “withering away of the state.” He – like most of the early founders of the discipline of sociology – tried to explain how one form of society was transformed into another form. Durkheim and his school, under the influence of Darwin, were interested in the evolution of societies. So was Marx, who actually sent a letter to Darwin asking him if it was all right with him if he dedicated the first volume of *Capital* to him. Darwin passed on this honor. Yet the violent conflicts, the dislocations, and the social problems that accompanied the early development of industrial societies gave sociology problems to analyze and a reason for being.

Both Durkheim and Marx saw the social order of industrial societies as problematic. Durkheim saw the problems in terms of both the tendency to anomie, or normlessness, and the “forced division of labor.” In traditional societies there was a deep consensus over norms, values, and behavioral expectations. This was because members of these societies shared a common religion, performed similar work, and took care of most of their needs in their immediate communities, occasionally trading excess craft products and food with adjoining tribes. These commonalities formed the basis for what Durkheim called mechanical solidarity. However, industrialization created a new form of society where this normative consensus broke down. In the wake of the industrial revolution, urbanization and immigration brought together people with different values

and norms, different religions and subcultures. Further, industrial work forced workers to specialize and to take up new occupations and professions. Specialization meant that the members of this new society became dependent upon each other for all of their needs, and now their needs were no longer taken care of in their immediate communities. This division of labor created a new form of solidarity which Durkheim called organic solidarity. But this division of labor produced a form of solidarity that was weaker and more fragile than the mechanical solidarity of traditional societies, hence the structural tendency to anomie. He thought that a new corporate order constituted by professional and occupational organizations would create norms and ethics, a new moral order, which would address this problem. These guild like organizations would mediate between the level of the state and the level of employers and workers.

The problem with the forced division of labor is that inherited wealth gave a distinct advantage to the children of the capitalist class to take up the most remunerative positions in the division of labor, in many cases regardless of their natural talent. Wealth gave them the money and social capital, or social connections, to go to the best colleges and universities, as well as allowing them to follow their parents into the family business or to launch new enterprises. He thought the abolition of inherited wealth would address this problem and allow those with natural talent to get the education they deserved, so that they could assume appropriate positions in the division of labor regardless of the social locations in which they were born. This would reduce the resentment of talented individuals who would no longer encounter class barriers in their quest for occupational and professional careers; the opportunity structure would be open to those with demonstrable talent, a meritocracy, and it also would mean that the ranks of professionals, managers, and entrepreneurs would be revitalized with new talent and new ideas.

On the other hand, Marx saw most of the problems in this new industrial society as rooted in alienated labor and the exploitation of living labor by “dead labor” (i.e., capital and class relations). One aspect of the problem of alienated

labor is in Marx’s analysis of the contradiction between mental and manual labor. The craft laborer in pre industrial societies produced works that were based on the unity of mental and manual labor and on immediate relations between producers and consumers. The craft worker came up with the idea for a work in relation to the specific demand of a client, planned out the immediate process of production on his own, and managed the creation of this work on his own without taking orders or directions from an entrepreneur or manager. Guilds established fair market prices for the works produced and regulated the relations among apprentices, journeymen, and master craftsmen. Whereas in industrial capitalism when the working class sells its labor power – its only commodity, to the capitalist class – it alienates control of the labor process to the entrepreneur. The unity of mental and manual labor is broken up according to class relations. Mental labor is the prerogative of the capital, or management; they do the thinking and planning. The industrial wage laborer is reduced to manual labor under the direction of capital or management; they do what they are told to do. Work is reduced to indifferent money making. Industrial workers rarely have immediate relations with consumers, the price of the commodity is determined by competitive market relations, and relations between capital and labor were initially unregulated except through class conflict.

As Frederick Winslow Taylor’s scientific management theory claims, whenever a worker does any thinking it is bad for the productivity of the organization. Through careful time and motion studies Taylorism reduced work to a series of bit parts that required very little thinking on the part of the worker, although Taylor was simply following the logic of the technical division of labor to its end, deskilling the worker in the process. However, this organization of work creates the possibility for the automation of work, or the “end of work” as we know it, through robots and computers; further, automation requires the return of workers who need to think at work in programming the smart machines as well as getting the machinery back up after the system crashes, thus reestablishing in part the unity of mental and manual labor. Wage workers who know how to use computers

potentially have the abilities to work in any industry, breaking the tendency to one sided development and the deskilling of the worker. This aspect of alienated labor resembles Durkheim's concept of the forced division of labor. There were a number of other ways in which wage workers were alienated. Wage workers were separated from the products and wealth that they produced; while labor was now social and the process of production was socialized, the profits and wealth were privately appropriated by the capitalist class. Capital confronted the workforce as an alien force, and the relation between capital and labor was also a relation of domination and subordination. In competition for jobs, workers were also alienated from each other. Marx also saw in wage labor the alienation of humans from their "species being" as producers of their material world.

Class exploitation of wage labor by capital is a related problem. The capitalist class takes advantage of the fact that the working class is propertyless and needs to exchange its labor power for a wage that will allow it to reproduce its labor power (and its dependents) in everyday life. Further, the capitalist class takes advantage of the fact that during the labor process the working class creates more value than is returned to it in the form of the wage; the use value of labor power produces surplus value beyond the exchange value of labor power and the value of materials and machinery used up in the process. The transformation of value is opaque to the members of the working class in contrast to the transparent process of exploitation and domination in production and property relations based on slavery, caste, or serfdom. In this process the workers transform their labor power, their ability to work, into a commodity which they exchange for wages; they enter the labor process and transform raw materials into finished products and services; the enterprise sells the products, transforming them into money which should have more value than the production costs that went into them if the enterprise is to be successful. This is where profits, capital formation, and luxury consumption for the capitalist class originate.

Marx saw class conflict and a social revolution led by a class conscious working class, the

proletariat, as the agent of societal transformation. The interests of the proletariat were identical to the interests of society as a whole, just as at an earlier stage of social development and class struggle the interests of the capitalist class were identical to the interests of society as a whole in their struggle to overthrow the feudal order. In socialism the working class would regain control over the labor process and the distribution of wealth through some form of self management; in communism the working class would abolish itself as a class, creating a classless society and the end of the different forms of alienated labor. However, the technical division of labor, the occupational structure, modified by automated technologies, would remain a lasting contribution of the capitalist class to a post capitalist mode of production and society. But work would no longer define the "species being" of humans, and we might see a return to *Homo Ludens* in an urban society organized around leisure and play.

SEE ALSO: Consumption; Divisions of Household Labor; Durkheim, Émile; Economy (Sociological Approach); Ethnic and Racial Division of Labor; Marx, Karl; Politics; Social Structure; Solidarity, Mechanical and Organic; Stratification and Inequality, Theories of; Theory

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divisions of household labor

Michele Adams

Prior to the Industrial Revolution, economic production was organized around the home, and households were relatively self sufficient. Households were multifunctional, acting, among other things, as eating establishment, educational institution, factory, and infirmary. Everyone belonging to the household, including family members, servants, and apprentices, did their part in the household's productive labor. The word "housework," first used in 1841 in England and in 1871 in the US, would have made little sense prior to that time, since *all* work was focused in and around the home.

Over the course of the nineteenth century, however, the Industrial Revolution severed the workplace from the place of residence. Coinciding with this process, the ideology of separate spheres emerged, reflecting an increasing tendency for men to seek work in urban factories while women stayed home to look after the family. This ideology defined not only separate spheres, but different personality characteristics and divergent family roles for men and women, as well. In doing so, it naturalized the notion that men, strong and unemotional, should occupy the status of family breadwinner. Conversely, women, frail, pure, and living under the spell of the "cult of true womanhood," should aspire to nothing more profound than being good wives, mothers, and home makers.

Thus, as men and single women ventured forth to work in the impersonal factories and workplaces of urban centers, married women, particularly those of the middle classes, stayed home to cook, clean, and raise the children. Production and productive activities moved out of these households into the industrializing workplace. Concurrently, the value and status of men's labor went up, while that of women's household labor went down. Previously an integral part of the home centered production process, middle class women found themselves with less "productive" work to do. As a result, their energies became more focused on reproductive

work, which included making sure that their husbands and children were clean, well fed, clothed, and nurtured. Although economic necessity continued to force working class wives and women of color to seek employment outside of the home, the pattern of separate spheres reflected an ideal that most families desired to emulate. Toward the end of the nineteenth century, as households were increasingly motivated to purchase industrially produced necessities, women also became the family household consumption experts. As such, they orchestrated the family's purchase of food, clothing, soap, candles, and other material necessities that they had once helped produce in the home.

In the US, the home economics movement emerged around the turn of the century, at least partly in an attempt to elevate the status of housework. Home economists provided instruction on the "science" of household labor, schooling women in the provision of a scientifically sound and hygienically pure home. As early twentieth century housewives found themselves at the mercy of these household labor "experts," standards of cleanliness began to rise. Meanwhile, newly developed electricity and indoor plumbing facilities encouraged the invention of household labor saving devices. Electric refrigerators replaced ice boxes and washing machines replaced wash tubs, scrub boards, and elbow grease. As the public sphere industrialized, so, too, did the household, albeit with certain important differences: in the home, the labor remained unpaid, workplaces were isolated, and the workers were generalists, good at all types of housework. Even with the industrialization of the home, however, the time non employed women spent doing housework remained stable from the late 1920s through the 1960s, as standards for cleanliness increased, and tasks such as canning and sewing gave way to increased time doing chores like laundry and shopping for prepared food and ready made clothing.

Before the 1970s few studies examined the division of household labor, since most people accepted as "natural" the separate spheres ideology making women the housework and childrearing experts. As the women's movement gained momentum, however, feminists began pointing out the disproportionate amount of time women spent doing housework, even as they labored alongside men in the paid

workforce. Moreover, feminists suggested, the fact that women did the majority of housework disadvantaged them in the workplace. These challenges prompted research examining the household division of labor, its relative distribution, and the relationship of housework contribution to women's status in the paid labor market. In 1965, researchers from the Survey Research Center of the University of Maryland found that women did roughly 92 percent of routine housework, while men did approximately 49 percent of occasional tasks such as lawn care, household repairs, and bill paying.

Changing patterns in the division of housework began to appear in research from the 1970s and 1980s, as women started to reduce their contributions, and men, somewhat less dramatically, began to increase theirs. Reasons for these changes included women's increasing presence in the paid labor market, as well as general trends toward egalitarian attitudes in the home. Nevertheless, even as women assumed more significant roles as family breadwinners, men continued to resist doing housework. By the mid to late 1980s, researchers found that women were still doing approximately three times the amount of routine housework that men were doing. This general pattern continued throughout the 1990s, with men's proportional contribution to routine housework increasing, primarily as the result of the cutbacks made by women. Researchers note that, although the gender gap in family work is reduced when accounting for total hours of paid and unpaid labor, nevertheless, women essentially put in one extra full day of family work per week, a phenomenon that has been referred to as the "second shift" (Hochschild 1989).

Today, in the US and much of the industrialized world, household labor continues to be performed mostly by women, with chores themselves also segregated by gender. Women are still doing the majority of "routine" tasks, including cooking and meal preparation, meal clean up and dish washing, laundry, house cleaning, and grocery shopping. Men, on the other hand, do the occasional chores such as lawn mowing, household repairs, car maintenance, and, less often, bill paying. Characteristically, routine chores tend to be more repetitious, time consuming, time sensitive, and boring than occasional chores, which are less tedious and can usually be completed when convenient. While studies of

household labor tend to separately analyze routine and occasional housework, they often omit childcare or, alternatively, include it as a separate category of family work. Nevertheless, the presence of children also substantially increases the amount of routine housework that needs to be done, so the amount of household labor that women perform tends to go up when children are born. Men, on the other hand, spend more time in paid labor when children arrive, but often reduce their household labor participation. Some studies suggest that when men do more childcare, they may also increase their contributions to housework.

Some researchers see shifts in the division of household labor over the latter part of the twentieth century as dramatic, while others characterize them as relatively modest. For instance, in the US, men's proportionate sharing more than doubled between 1965 and 1985. Nevertheless, the narrowing of the gender gap in housework performance has been driven more by women cutting back their hours than by men augmenting theirs. Moreover, time diary studies have shown that while reductions in women's housework performance continued throughout the 1990s, men's actual housework time has increased little since about 1985, creating what one sociologist has called a "stalled revolution" (Hochschild 1989). Thus, studies continue to show that women do at least two thirds of the family's routine household labor.

Besides continuing to do the bulk of routine chores, women are still considered to be the household managers. Whether they actually do the chores, delegate the work to other family members, or hire outside help, women are largely responsible for ensuring that the work gets done, as well as establishing the standards by which the completed work is judged. Men, even as they do more, tend to be seen (and to see themselves) as "helpers."

Although the amount of housework performed by unemployed women remained relatively stable over much of the twentieth century, in the US and other industrialized countries, women's participation in the paid labor force increased considerably. In 1890 only 4 percent of married women in the US reported having paid employment outside of the home. By the 1950s that figure jumped to about 22 percent, and by 2002 the labor force

participation rate of married women reached 61 percent. Married mothers with children under age 18 made particularly large strides in paid employment, and by 2002, 68 percent worked outside of the home. Importantly, the employment rate of married women with young children under age 6 has more than doubled since 1970 in the US, from 30 percent to 61 percent in 2002. By 2003, women comprised nearly half (47 percent) of the total US labor force. Similarly, the latter part of the twentieth century witnessed a significant increase in female labor force participation in countries such as Canada, Japan, and those of the European Union. Nevertheless, and in spite of the fact that many women worldwide now continue paid employment through their reproductive years, employed mothers report persistent unequal treatment in the workplace.

Although women's earnings remain substantially lower than those of men, the gender gap in wages has decreased in the US to the point that women earn approximately 76 percent of what men earn, based on full time, year round work. Thus, with married women sharing more of the family breadwinner duties, it has generally been expected that their husbands would share more of the housework. The absence of men's sustained movement in that direction has been, therefore, a source of some disappointment to advocates of gender equality. Moreover, these paid and unpaid labor patterns appear to extend well beyond the borders of the US.

International trends largely appear to reflect those occurring in the US. Women in most developed countries do the majority of the routine housework, although their contributions are declining while those of their male partners are increasing slightly. Japanese wives, for instance, continue to report doing a large majority of housework. On the other hand, wives in many formerly Soviet countries more often report that their husbands share housework equally than do women in the US. Still, women in most countries devote well over half of their work time to unpaid labor while men devote one third of their work time or less. The presence of young children increases women's unpaid labor time substantially more than that of men, while, in many countries, women whose education level exceeds that of their husbands do relatively less housework. Moreover, women worldwide are

balancing their unpaid family work with increased time spent in the paid labor force, and while men's economic activity rates have decreased in many areas, women's rates have generally increased.

Within the last several decades, the number of family and household types has grown. Studies have begun to examine how housework is shared between cohabitators (both same and opposite sex) and in remarried families. Findings show that in each of these family types, sharing between partners tends to be somewhat more egalitarian than it does between spouses. Children's participation in household labor has also been studied, although much less extensively. Data from one large national survey (the National Survey of Families and Households) showed that, in the late 1980s, all children in the household were doing slightly less than 6 hours total of housework per week. Moreover, children's housework is allocated based on age and sex, with teens delegated more tasks than younger children, and girls allocated more tasks than boys. As teens, in particular, girls are given more of the routine household tasks, while boys are expected to contribute to outdoor chores. In this way, children are socialized into gendered patterns of family work that often replicate those of their parents.

Studies have also started to examine racial and ethnic patterns of household labor sharing. In the US, most research shows that African American men do more housework than either white or Hispanic men, although they still do much less than that done by African American women. Whether Hispanic men do more or less household labor than white men continues to be at issue, although a more consistent finding is that Hispanic women do more housework than either black or white women. Thus, more housework is performed in Hispanic households, although African Americans tend to be more egalitarian in their patterns of sharing. Moreover, when household labor is bought in the marketplace, it tends to be African American or Hispanic women, often undocumented, doing the labor for more well heeled white women. In this way, gendered ideals about "rightful" domestic workers intersect with race/ethnicity to reproduce patterns of economic disadvantage and privilege.

Studies indicate that the most consistent predictors of men's housework participation are

related to women's employment. The more hours wives work outside of the home and, often, the greater their proportional share of family income, the more husbands tend to share in the housework. Gender ideology also has an effect, with women's belief in equal sharing predicting their partner's increased contribution. In some instances, men's egalitarian attitudes predict their increased sharing, although men's attitudes are somewhat less predictive of their own participation. Generally speaking, more highly educated women do less housework and purchase outside domestic help more frequently. On the other hand, men with more education tend to do more housework. Marital status is a consistent predictor, with women doing more housework when they marry, and men doing less. When children arrive, the need for routine household labor increases, and most of the demand is assumed by women. Men tend to increase their hours of employment when children are born, which may have to do with women decreasing their paid employment to care for children.

In spite of the unbalanced division of household labor, most men and women consider their share of housework to be fair. Traditional norms suggesting that men are entitled to women's labor in the home, and correspondingly, that women are obligated to perform it, can lead to this conclusion. Research shows that both men and women perceive housework distribution as fair when women are doing approximately two thirds of it. Reallocation of household labor, moreover, to create a more balanced division of labor typically does not happen spontaneously, instead requiring focused attention on change. While some may consider household chores to be a way to show love to family members, for the most part neither men nor women consider housework to be fun. Thus, wives may need to confront their husbands in order to get them to do more, thus causing marital conflict to increase. Since traditional norms tend to make women responsible for relationship harmony, wives may avoid "rocking the boat" to increase sharing. Accepting their unbalanced contributions as fair may be preferable for some women to creating disharmony in their marriage.

A number of theoretical perspectives have been proposed to account for the allocation of family labor. Three of the most often cited

perspectives include time availability, relative resources, and gender ideology. Theories invoking time availability imply that the person spending the least time in paid employment will be expected to do the most housework. Because men have historically been more visible in the workforce, working longer hours, women would thus be expected to do the housework. Relative resource theories suggest that the partner with the most resources, including income and education, should be able to avoid large contributions to household labor. Again, drawing on relative resource theory, women's disadvantage in terms of wages and, until recently, educational resources, has created expectations that they would do most of the household labor. Finally, theories implicating traditional notions about separate spheres point to housework as "women's work" and paid labor as "men's work." When spouses subscribe to this conservative gender ideology, it is seen as natural for women and men to do "their jobs," and women are therefore assumed to be the household labor experts. Other theories, such as economic dependency theory and the "new home economics" approach, also attempt to explain the persistence of disproportionate allocation of family work.

Family work includes both paid labor and unpaid household labor. While we are typically aware of the time family members spend in the paid workforce, we are generally less aware of the fact that nearly as much time is spent doing unpaid housework as is spent doing paid labor. We are also less aware of the ties between the two "spheres" and the fact that responsibility for unpaid housework takes away from time (and energy) that could be spent in the paid labor force. Because power accrues with work force participation, the person responsible for the unpaid household labor is less likely to be empowered, either in the household or when they do participate in paid employment. Moreover, since traditional norms presuppose unpaid housework as women's work, women have been historically disadvantaged by the assumption of these cultural norms as natural and unchangeable.

Nevertheless, family work, both paid and unpaid, is changing. Women today are spending less time doing unpaid domestic labor, either because of constraints surrounding paid

labor or diminishing expectations about how much time should be spent doing housework. Nothing suggests that women will spend less time at paid employment in the future. Men, on the other hand, appear to be doing some what more housework, particularly when that work is considered as a proportion of total household labor. This may reflect increasingly egalitarian attitudes in the home or it may point to more persistent demands by working wives that their husbands participate more equally at home. Whatever the reason, shifts that have occurred in the division of household labor over the course of the twentieth century are likely to continue into the twenty first.

SEE ALSO: Gender Ideology and Gender Role Ideology; Gender, Work, and Family; Inequalities in Marriage; Marital Power/Resource Theory; Marital Quality; Women's Empowerment

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divorce

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Sociologists who study divorce have focused on three major questions. First, some have taken a macro perspective and examined how and why divorce rates have changed over time. In this research, scholars have looked at broad social trends and how they are related to divorce rates. Second, there have been many studies of why individual couples decide to get a divorce. In this research, sociologists have examined the characteristics of individual couples and how they are associated with the risk of divorce. The third major thrust of research has been to explore the consequences of divorce. Major focuses of this research have been on how divorce affects economic well being, psychological well being, and physical health.

DIVORCE RATES

A major social trend during the past century has been a global increase in the divorce rate. During the second half of the twentieth century divorce rates increased in most industrialized countries. Divorce rates have been highest in the US, but there have been increases in many other countries as well. In the US the divorce rate was relatively stable between 1950 and 1965, increased dramatically between 1965 and 1980, and decreased slightly between 1980 and 2000. In the US it has been projected that about a half of all marriages will be terminated by divorce, and a half of all children will have spent some time in a single parent home by the time they reach age 18.

During the past 20 years there has been a gradual decrease in the US divorce rate. Small but consistent yearly decreases in the divorce rate have resulted in a significant reduction in

the divorce rate. From 1980 to 2000 the divorce rate per 1,000 married women decreased from 22.6 to 19.0, a decrease of 16.3 percent (US Census Bureau 2004). Recent evidence indicates that this decrease is not due to increased cohabitation or the aging of the population.

Sociologists have observed that the divorce rate is affected by rapid social change and social upheavals such as war and depression. For example, in the US the divorce rate increased after both world wars and during and after the Vietnam War. It decreased during the Great Depression, was relatively stable from 1950 to 1965, and decreased modestly from 1980 to 2000. Some of the social characteristics that appear to have contributed to the increase in the divorce rate are increased individualism, increasing marital expectations, the economic independence of women, and no fault divorce laws. These are trends that have been occurring globally during the past 50 years.

During the 1960s and 1970s there was social upheaval and change with much emphasis on rights and the questioning of traditional roles, responsibilities, and authority. The civil rights and feminist movements helped stimulate an emphasis on individualism. As a result, in contemporary western culture and across the globe, there has been increased emphasis on individualism, freedom, autonomy, and the pursuit of personal happiness, including individual marital happiness.

As individual happiness has been emphasized, the primary purpose of marriage has become the achievement of individual happiness. If love wanes and one does not achieve the expected happiness in marriage, a logical solution is to dissolve the relationship. In short, one consequence of individualism is a trend toward less commitment to marriage and greater acceptance of divorce, cohabitation, and alternatives to marriage (Waite & Gallagher 2000; Wilson 2002). Recent research illustrates how divorce has become much more common and acceptable during the past 50 years. Compared to the past, young married mothers are much more likely to state that divorce is the best solution to persistent marital problems, and social sanctions against divorce have decreased (Thornton & Young DeMarco 2001).

Another major social change during the past 50 years has been the increasing economic

independence of women. For example, in the US the proportion of bachelor degrees earned by women increased from 35 percent in 1960 to 57 percent in 2002. The percentage of married women employed in the labor force increased from 32 percent in 1960 to 61 percent in 2003. Among married women with children under age six, 60 percent were in the labor force in 2003 compared with only 30 percent in 1970 (US Census Bureau 2004). A woman who is employed may be more likely to leave an unhappy marriage than a woman who is not employed. Similarly, an unhappy man may be more likely to leave if he knows his wife is financially independent (Schoen et al. 2002).

The norms of the broader culture are reflected in the law and as divorce became more common and accepted, no fault divorce laws were passed. Law is influenced by cultural norms, but it also may help shape cultural norms. The law may teach, reinforce values, and be a model for appropriate behavior. A number of researchers reported that no fault divorce laws had no effect on the divorce rate. On the other hand, several others found that divorce rates did increase as a result of the passage of no fault divorce laws. Debate continues over whether or not no fault divorce laws influenced the divorce rate. In recent research it was estimated that divorce rates would have been 6 percent lower if no fault laws had not been enacted (Friedberg 1998). Since the increase in divorce rates began before no fault laws were passed, the passage of no fault laws appears to have been a reflection of a cultural change already in existence. In addition, however, the findings suggest that no fault laws had an independent impact which helped shape the cultural acceptance of divorce and increase divorce rates.

DIVORCE RISK FACTORS

Divorce is a complex process influenced by many social and individual characteristics. Factors that have been found to be associated with the risk of divorce include age at marriage, premarital cohabitation, parental divorce, infidelity, alcohol and drug abuse, poor financial management, and domestic violence (Blumel 1992; Amato & Rogers 1997; Sanchez & Gager

2000). However, the nature and strength of risk factors differ across groups. To illustrate, in the US, premarital cohabitation is associated with subsequent marital dissolution among non Hispanic white women but not among African American or Mexican American women (Phillips & Sweeney 2005).

A major social change during the past century has been the increase in paid labor force participation of women. There has been debate about the influence of women's employment on the risk of marital dissolution. Schoen et al. (2002) found that women's employment was associated with an increased risk of marital dissolution among unhappily married women but not among happily married women.

There has been considerable study of couple interaction patterns and how they are associated with subsequent divorce. Contrary to expert opinion, Gottman et al. (1998) found that the extent of active listening by couples was not related to subsequent dissolution, nor was the amount of anger expressed. Rather, the risk of divorce was influenced by how couples handled disagreement and anger. Couples who could disagree without contempt or withdrawal were more likely to remain married. The ability to accept the influence of the other, starting discussions softly, and humor were all associated with greater marital stability. On the other hand, contempt, belligerence, and defensiveness were associated with a greater risk of marital dissolution (Gottman et al. 1998; Hetherington 2003).

EFFECTS OF DIVORCE ON ADULTS

Numerous researchers have found that compared with married persons, divorced persons tend to have more economic hardship, higher levels of poverty, lower levels of psychological well being, less happiness, more health problems, and a greater risk of mortality (Hemström 1996; Amato 2000; Waite & Gallagher, 2000; McManus & DiPrete 2001). Cross national data have confirmed similar findings in 20 countries across the world (Mastekaasa 1994a; Amato 2000). One of the ongoing questions among social scientists is whether the differences between married and divorced individuals are due to selection or the stress of divorce. The

selection explanation suggests that poorly functioning individuals have a high risk of divorce. Thus, characteristics that existed before the divorce produce the low levels of well being rather than the divorce itself. If this explanation is correct, then differences between divorced and married persons could be explained by characteristics that existed prior to the divorce. An alternative explanation is that the stress of divorce lowers people's well being. If this explanation is correct, then divorce would produce significant reductions in well being net of pre divorce characteristics. Although selection can account for some of the differences between divorced and non divorced persons, recent research indicates that divorce appears to have a significant impact on well being that is not explained by selection (Mastekaasa 1994b; Hemström 1996; Amato 2000; Waite & Gallagher 2000).

Although divorce is a stressful event, its impacts vary greatly according to the circumstances and attitudes of the people involved. Some are stressed by divorce but recover over time, while others are devastated and never recover. Hetherington (2003) observed that the majority of the divorced persons she interviewed were able eventually to build reasonably normal and satisfying lives. She identified six different patterns of adjustment to divorce. At one end of the continuum were the *enhanced* who adjusted well to the divorce. They were successful at work, socially, as parents, and often in remarriages. Ten years after the divorce, 24 percent of the women and 13 percent of the men were in the *enhanced* category.

At the other end of the continuum were the *defeated*, who spiraled downward after divorce and were low in self esteem, had elevated scores on depression and anti social behaviors, and often had difficulties with alcoholism or drug abuse. One year after divorce, about one third of the divorced adults Hetherington studied were in the defeated group. Ten years after the divorce, only 10 percent of her sample remained in the defeated group and they were mired in despair, poverty, and depression.

A key question is what helps adults adjust successfully to divorce. Four key factors have been identified in research: (1) income, (2) a new intimate relationship, (3) age, and (4) social networks (Wang & Amato 2000; Hetherington

2003). First, those with adequate financial resources are more likely to adjust to the divorce. Second, those with a new intimate relationship (dating regularly, cohabiting, or remarried) are better adjusted. Third, divorce adjustment is more difficult for older than younger individuals. In most cases older persons have invested more time in the marriage and may have more difficulty finding another partner. Fourth, social networks provide encouragement, support, and other resources. Hetherington (2003) reported that social networks were important for many in her enhanced group.

FUTURE RESEARCH

There are several questions that need to be addressed in future research. First, there is a need for more extensive study of the process of divorce. When individuals divorce they go through a process in which they change their identity from a married person to a single individual. They make a variety of decisions regarding money, residence, and childrearing. Divorce impacts relations with friends and relatives and it involves processing legal documents. Even though there has been extensive study of the causes and consequences of divorce, there has been relatively little study of the process people go through to obtain a divorce.

Another important area for future research is to study different subcultures and cultures. Relatively little is known about divorce rates and trends in other countries. Related to this is the need to examine how various risk and protective factors operate in different countries.

Finally, it would be useful to study the dissolution of other types of intimate relationships. For example, Avellar and Smock (2005) examined the economic consequences of the dissolution of cohabiting unions. We need to know more about the risk factors, the dissolution process, and the economic and social consequences of the dissolution of cohabiting unions.

SEE ALSO: Children and Divorce; Cohabitation; Family Conflict; Family Demography; Inequalities in Marriage; Infidelity and Marital Affairs; Marital Quality; Marriage

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documentary

Annie Goldson

Documentary has existed as long as film itself. The one reel actualities produced by the Lumière brothers in 1895 and the more complex films that followed these early experiments – for example, *Nanook of the North* (Flaherty 1922) and *The Man with a Movie Camera* (Vertov 1929) – were distinguished by their sense of a “historical real,” the depiction of real people and events (Renov 1986). This apparent ability to capture “reality” has continued to distinguish documentary from fiction; indeed, the genre, with its intimate connection to the physical world, appeals because of its truth claims, whether these exist at the level of fact or image. Documentary stimulates what Bill Nichols calls “epistophilia” or a “desire to know,” conveying an “informing logic, a persuasive rhetoric, or a moving poetics that promises information and knowledge, insight and awareness” (Nichols 2001: 40). The filmmakers above, however, would hardly have known they were making “documentary” at the time they were in production, as the genre had hardly yet been conceived.

It is difficult to give a comprehensive history of documentary, given the variability and flexibility of the genre. Documentary continuously responds to a changing environment. Technological advances, cultural and political

shifts, the production of “break through” documentary texts, and new market opportunities and pressures all impact on the direction and shape of the genre.

It is John Grierson, founder and leader of the highly influential British Documentary Movement, who is most often credited with coining the term documentary, as well as providing us with the first definition of the genre in the 1930s (Grierson 1966: 13). Describing it as “the creative treatment of actuality,” Grierson tended not to dwell on any contradictions implicit within his definition, but the tension between “evidence” and “artifice,” as Corner (1996) suggests, has continued to reverberate. Grierson’s legacy, as Aitken (1998) suggests, is multi faceted – the producer wrote copiously on the art of documentary, dreamed of “putting the working class on film,” but also linked documentary to the pedagogical purposes of instruction and civic education. His “social issue” documentary, which follows a problem/solution scenario and remains a mainstay of the public broadcasting documentary strands today, established a series of documentary conventions, such as an anonymous narration, interviews that reinforce the “voice” of the documentary, and a rhetorical editing style.

During the interwar period, an influential strand of documentary that fused politically progressive or dissident attitudes, with formal innovation, flourished. This transnational movement included films from the Grierson stable – *Drifters* (1929), *Song of Ceylon* (1934) – as well as European classics such as *Land without Bread* (1933) and *The Spanish Earth* (1937), and American films such as *The Plow that Broke the Plains* (1936) and *The River* (1937). This wave of work was curtailed by the onset of World War II as documentary became harnessed to the war effort and, outside spectacular or poetic texts such as *Triumph of the Will* (Riefensthal 1934) or *Listen to Britain* (Jennings 1942), became predictable in structure and tone.

Ethnographic documentaries, heirs to Flaherty’s complex legacy, continued through this period also. These ranged from “travel” films filled with exotic “disappearing savages,” to more serious works of some ethnographic worth. Despite the value of some, much ethnographic film retained the “I–You” split of the

anthropological gaze, thus replicating the power relationship between colonial powers and colonized peoples. Some films, notably those of Jean Rouch – *Les Maîtres fous* (1955), and *La Chasse au lion à l'arc* (1957–65) – exhibited the strains of failing imperial powers, anticipating more radical anti colonial documentary practices to come. Rouch was to turn his cameras onto his own tribe (Parisian youth) in his groundbreaking film *Chronique d'un été* (1961), which deployed and defined the techniques of *cinéma vérité*.

Although a number of canonical documentaries – *Blood of the Beasts* (1949), *Night and Fog* (1955), and later *The Sorrow and the Pity* (1971) – continued an earlier more poetic, politicized tradition, the majority of documentaries produced in the immediate post war period were made by governmental film boards. Documentary was to aid reconstruction and extolled the efforts of governments in creating jobs and developing infrastructures. The films were forced to adhere to set formulae and agendas and, although some filmmakers attempted to push at the boundaries, the documentaries remained largely forgettable.

The experimental edge displayed by documentary since its origins was further eroded by the establishment of television, which became, and remains, the site for most documentary funding and distribution. Television delivered documentary to audiences who in turn delivered advertising revenue back to broadcasters. Hence, documentary was tightly bound into the commercial contract of broadcasting culture, transmuting in the US (again, with some exceptions such as the fly on the wall films of Direct Cinema) to more sensationalist magazine style programming. Documentary fared a little better in the UK and Commonwealth countries, where a Griersonian notion of public service continued, manifest in such series as *Panorama*.

Today, despite the cultural variations that exist and the volatility of the international broadcast sector, television documentary remains remarkably uniform. Works tend to be gathered into “strands” that run for “seasons.” Variations of these strands appear on public and state broadcasting systems, and commercial and the new specialist channels. Current affairs series and investigative programs, as well as nature, history, and science documentaries, remain

staples and “national interest” documentary strands mandated with shoring up cultural identity appear on state broadcasting systems. Much of television documentary cited above remains “unauthorized,” its form and content largely dictated by the genre and timeslot expectations of audiences and network commissioners alike, although again, there are exceptions – “high end” documentary strands, such as the BBC’s *Storyville* or HBO’s *Cinemax Reel Life* collect disparate and riskier “independent” documentaries, often produced by “auteurs” into a season.

Television documentary has also had to contend with, and itself has been influenced by, the rapid rise of “reality television” or popular factual programming. There are, by now, sub genres of popular factual – from the survivor, celebrity, and dating shows, to the observational programs shot in airports or on the police beat. The critical and filmmaking communities remain divided over reality TV. Some argue that it has revived documentary, encouraging broader audiences to be more receptive to non fiction programming. Others revile reality TV for destroying what they see as documentary’s educational and political mandate. Certainly, reality TV is shaped by an economic environment that emphasizes competition, entertainment, and the need to garner ratings, which is remote from the existing traditions of documentary.

Although broadcast television has remained the dominant force in funding and distributing documentary, alternative media movements have continued to coexist. Developing rapidly during the 1960s and 1970s, they drew on the new and relatively inexpensive medium of video. Political, leftist, and agitprop collectives such as Newsreel (US) produced Marxist, radical, and feminist documentaries, while anti colonial or Third Cinema films, such as the 1968 Argentinian film *La Hora de los Hornos*, were deeply influential in the developed world. Experimental film and video practices that eschewed the commercial and broadcast circuits flourished in metropolitan centers such as New York, Berlin, and London. With the demise of the organized left wing and Marxist political parties at the end of the Cold War, documentary began to engage with identity based movements: feminism, AIDS activism, and

ethnic liberation movements, as well as environmental struggles and anti globalization. The rise of digital platforms continues this trend and there is active exploration into “digidocs,” often placed within activist and educational websites.

This more political documentary history has influenced a recent phenomenon: the shift of documentary back onto the big screen. If the overt educational and political agendas have faded on broadcast television, they are reemerging in the cinemas. Although not all cinema documentaries are “political,” most engage with educational and cultural questions and issues. High profile works such as *The Thin Blue Line* (Morris 1987) and *Roger and Me* (Moore 1989), and Moore’s later films, *Bowling for Columbine* (2002) and *Fahrenheit 9/11* (2004), proved that documentaries can generate not only controversy and critical acclaim but also large profits. A slew of similarly political documentaries have followed, such as *The Corporation* (2003) and *Super Size Me* (2004), alongside softer, unlikely hits such as *Spellbound* (2002) and *Être et avoir* (2002).

Up until the late 1970s, writings on the documentary tended to be insider accounts that underlined the status of the documentary maker as something of a hero/outsider. With some notable exceptions, the wave of critical theory and film studies that emerged around this period had ignored documentary, focusing most attention on Hollywood classical cinema. However, as theory matured, documentary began to be subject to serious investigation. Its closer alignment to “reality” in fact threw “the problem of realism,” already thoroughly explored in relationship to dramatic film, into even sharper relief. The problem with recording reality was that it assumes that “there is a real ‘out there’ in the natural world that can be shown (or that will reveal itself) without the use of linguistic or cinematic signs” (Gaines 1999: 2). This “impossibility” was wedded, in the same theoretical stew, with the Althusserian notion that “reality” is a highly ideological move to begin with. Realist documentary, then, was seen as reinforcing hegemonic belief systems because it appeared to capture “raw truth” while it was really delivering “ideology.” As well as dominating the discussion of documentary, these critiques privileged certain styles of documentary – those

more interactive and self reflexive modes – that are seen to reveal their own “constructedness” and frame.

Documentary theorists took a range of approaches to the genre. Bill Nichols’s influential modal analysis, which provided a loose taxonomy, continues to prevail, while Brian Winston (1995) has taken a more historical than structural perspective, exploring the ambiguities and tensions within the Griersonian tradition. Michael Renov’s (2004) most recent work traces subjectivity in documentary, a genre historically associated with objectivity. Accompanying the publication of monographs is an increasing number of edited collections on the documentary, some of the most useful emerging out of the “roaming” annual Visible Evidence conference. An increasing number of scholars, too, are breaking with the more canonical focus that has prevailed, engaging more with concepts of reception, audience, and more populist variants of television documentary, such as reality TV, docudrama, and mockumentary (Roscoe & Hight 2000; Hill 2004).

Although they tend to “get on with the job,” makers are aware of their role of representing “reality.” Every step in the production process is mediated by a slew of factors and many ethical and political dilemmas are generated on a daily basis. Documentarians measure up their films, or their films, indeed, are measured up, according to some “truth” or “history” that exists out there. Although couched in different language than that of academic debate, many of the same issues generated by the “problem of realism” are grappled with. The controversy around Michael Moore’s “creative” use of timelines, the arguments about the truth or otherwise of reality TV, the rise of the “mockumentary,” and the debates around bias, show that the tension between “creative” and “actuality,” between “artifice” and “evidence,” continues to reverberate in the various documentary communities – makers, audiences, and academics alike.

SEE ALSO: Author/Auteur; Documentary Analysis; Ethnography; Genre; Identity Politics/Relational Politics; Media; Popular Culture Forms (Reality TV); Poststructuralism; Public Broadcasting; Ratings; Realism and Relativism: Truth and Objectivity

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documentary analysis

Lindsay Prior

To Max Weber, the written order formed an essential building block of that quintessential form of modern organizational life – bureaucracy. Many later sociologists also noted the importance of documents for structuring and facilitating human interaction. Despite this, documents in sociological studies tend to be somewhat taken for granted and more often than not used as a resource for research rather than as a topic in their own right. Indeed, in the frame of research methods, the use and manipulation of documents is often subsumed under the broader category of “unobtrusive” techniques. This is in strong contrast to the study and use of talk and of speech, which is often linked to tailor made styles of analysis such as conversation analysis.

There is no obvious way to account for the contrasting fortunes of speech and writing in social scientific research and only a few social scientists have remarked on such differences. Thus, the anthropologist Jack Goody has frequently referred to and illustrated how writing is a rich, yet neglected, field for research studies. In a similar manner, Walter Ong underlined the ways in which the influence of writing – as against “orality” – has been underestimated in western scholarship. Yet the subordinate role of writing to speech is far from deserved. Text and writing are not, of course, coterminous with documentation and not all documents involve written traces. Architectural drawings, photographs, tapestries, scientific images, X rays, body scans, and various kinds of physical artifacts can all function as documents in a sociological sense. However, a consideration of the written trace will serve as a useful paradigm for this entry.

As already suggested, when documents appear in sociological research they are usually approached in terms of what they contain. That is, the focus is principally on documents as a means of conveying information – as instruments or conduits of communication between, say, a writer and a reader. Documents do, of course, contain information, yet it is also quite clear that each and every document enters into human activity in a dual relation. First, documents enter the social field as a receptacle (of instructions, obligations, contracts, wishes, reports, etc.). Second, they enter the field as agents in their own right. Indeed, as agents, documents have effects long after their human creators are dead and buried (wills and testaments provide a readily available example of such effects). And as agents, documents are always open to manipulation by others: as allies, as resources for further action, as opponents to be destroyed or suppressed (we should not forget that people burn and ban documents as well as read them).

The text (and pictures, plans, and drawings) contained within any specific document can be analyzed using various techniques. These range from simple forms of content analysis to more complicated forms of discourse analysis. The former method, insofar as it focuses on, say, word and phrase counts and numerical measures of textual expression, can offer fundamental

insights into what people consider to be significant and insignificant in the world. In this mode it is possible to study how people represent such things as “disease” or “crime,” or even “self” and “other” in any given context. More sophisticated approaches to document analysis using strategies derived from the analysis of speech transcripts – such as the deployment of second order coding schemes – can also be applied to the written word. However, the most promising lines of inquiry are probably those developed on the basis of discourse analysis.

Discourse is a complicated concept, and it is not always clear what is meant by discourse analysis even in texts that are devoted to explaining what it might be. The best intellectual starting point for a sociologist, however, is in the work of Michel Foucault, who was essentially interested in the ways in which sets of ideas and concepts in science, medicine, and social science often cohered into determinate ways of seeing the world. More importantly, such “discursive formations,” as he called them, were crucially linked to specific forms of social practice. In short, he argued that what is written and said is inextricably locked into what is done. So he assumed an essential connection between documents (and their contents), practical action, and sites of action – all of which express aspects of a discursive formation. With this in mind we can consider three specific moments of documentation in social action. They are, respectively, moments of production, consumption (or use), and circulation.

The production of documents (e.g., statistical and other reports on crime, health, poverty, and the environment) has figured as an object of study in numerous areas of sociology. The standard sociological stance is to use such reports as a resource for further study – as, say, a source of data on crime or health. Following the work of the ethnomethodologists, however, it is quite clear that documents as reports on the world can also be usefully studied as “topic.” In the latter frame the key questions revolve around how reports and accounts of the world are actually assembled by social actors. What kinds of conceptual and technical operations become involved in their production and what range of assumptions are deployed so as to achieve the end result of a “report”? In the sociology of health and illness,

for example, studies have focused on the ways in which such things as death certificates for individuals or mortality reports – for towns, cities, regions, and nations – are produced. In the sociology of science, questions have been raised concerning the ways in which scientific findings and papers are produced. Indeed, in numerous studies of scientific controversy it is clear that demonstrating “facts” about the world depends very heavily on documentation – especially the manufacture of visible traces (via graphs, photographs, and tables) of invisible entities.

As to issues concerning the consumption of documents, these often turn on matters of use and function. In this frame, what is important is a study of the manner in which people use written (and non written) traces to facilitate or to manage features of social organization – whether it be transitory episodes of interaction or the ongoing functioning of a hospital, or a business, or a school. For example, in his renowned study of folders in a suicide prevention clinic, Harold Garfinkel demonstrated how people who drew on such folders often used them for purposes that were not always consonant with the ways in which the files were originally designed. Thus, Garfinkel noted that many items of routine data that should have been contained in the folders (such as the age and occupation of the patient) were frequently missing. In a similar way, reasons for the non acceptance of patients were missing in 20 percent of the folders, while the names of the staff members in charge of the intake conference were missing in just over 50 percent of cases. Clearly, these were “bad” records, and Garfinkel turned to asking why such incomplete records were, nevertheless, assiduously kept. Some of the reasons for poor record keeping were referred to as normal and natural troubles such as clinic personnel forgetting to enter data. More fundamentally, however, Garfinkel argued that clinic personnel often used the records aware of the possibility that the detail contained within them might be called on at some future stage to demonstrate that patients had always got the treatment they deserved. So clinic folders were, if you like, being constructed in a medico legal framework such that it could always be shown that the “right” things were done to the “right” person at the

“right” time. Such a contractual reading of folder contents explained why it was that basic items of data could be missing from the files on the one hand, while marginal notes and corrections and additions to the folder contents could appear on the other. In short, it accounted for why there were “good” organizational reasons for keeping bad records. Similar reasoning can and has been applied to the use of records in numerous other settings, such as school records, surgical records, and police and welfare agency records. Thus, in medical sociology, there have been numerous studies directed at showing the ways in which patient identities and diagnoses are often shored up through the use of written traces in medical “charts” and patient files.

The creation of identity through documentation is, of course, something that has figured prominently in the history of sociology. Thus, researchers in the so called Chicago tradition (or school) of sociology gave voice to many human actors through the construction of “life stories.” In the latter frame, “delinquents,” criminals, and various people seen as outsiders figured largely in such accounts. In parallel mode, anthropologists often sought out autobiographies of those who had played important traditional roles, such as tribal chiefs. These days it is recognized that the work of identity creation and life “storying” is a concern of almost all people in the advanced world. This may be solely through the construction of a curriculum vitae for employment purposes or through a narrative of personal troubles as conveyed to a counselor, or more likely an account at a security check of who one “is” and what one is doing. (Asserting identity is, in the latter case, almost totally dependent on documentation.) Such autobiographical strategies constitute elements of what Foucault had termed “technologies of self” and they form an important cornerstone of everyday life in the modern world.

As for the circulation or exchange of documents – whether these be of good will cards, Christmas cards, memos, or files – it is possible to see in the trace of exchange the development of social networks and the emergence of identifiable human groupings. For example, studies of citations in scientific papers have been used so as to identify styles of interaction between

groups of scientists. Similar work using web crawlers has been used by sociologists to identify emergent medico scientific networks in the field of genomics. It is conceivable that a sociological study of email contacts and text messaging contacts among the ordinary public may also serve to demonstrate how the exchange of text and documentation functions both to define and cement social groupings. In a related mode, advocates of what has come to be known as actor network theory (ANT) highlight the ways in which documents do not simply circulate but how they also often act back and structure their creators or users. In the latter sense some have spoken of the ways in which documents are invariably involved in the *performance* of social organization.

It is evident, then, that documents, and especially written documents, can be taken as a field of research in their own right. In particular, the study of the processes of production and consumption (or use) of written materials is often key to understanding how the social world and the things within it are constructed. Naturally, in the hurly burly of ordinary everyday activity, issues of production and consumption become entwined, and it is not always easy to distinguish clearly between the one process and the other. Nor should issues of document content be overlooked. Rather, it is the ways in which production, consumption, and content relate to each other that should form the basis of sociological investigation.

SEE ALSO: Actor Network Theory; Biography; Content Analysis; Discourse; Foucault, Michel; Transcription

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doing gender

Sarah Fenstermaker

Candace West and Don Zimmerman introduced the concept “doing gender” in an article of the same title in 1987. They were the first to articulate an *ethnomethodological* perspective on the creation and affirmation of gender inequality between males and females in western society. The purview of ethnomethodology includes the study of the socially managed accomplishments of all aspects of life that are treated as objective, unchanging, and transsituational. West and Zimmerman’s treatment of gender began by making problematic the prevailing cultural perspective: (1) female and male represent naturally defined categories of being that are derived from mutually exclusive (and easily distinguished) reproductive functions, and which result in distinctively different psychological and behavioral proclivities; (2) such divisions are rooted in that biological nature, which makes them both fundamental and enduring; (3) these essential differences between masculine and feminine are adequately reflected in the myriad differences observed between women and men and the social arrangements that solidify around them.

In clear contradiction to these notions, West and Zimmerman asserted that sex is founded on the socially agreed upon biological criteria for initial assignment to sex category, but that classification typically has little to do with the everyday and commonsense sex categorization engaged in by members of a social group. They argued that it is not a rigid set of criteria that is applied to establish confidence that someone is male *or* female, but a seamless application of an “if-can” test. If someone *can be seen* as a member of an appropriate category, then he or she *should* be categorized accordingly. Following this assertion, West and Zimmerman were obliged to describe the process by which sex

categorization is construed, created, and reaffirmed. They did this through the concept of “doing gender.”

This concept challenged the current thinking about gender as an attribute, an individual set of performative displays (largely separate from the ongoing affairs of social life), or a response to vaguely defined role expectations. They completed what Dorothy Smith (2002: x) deemed “a ruthless but invaluable surgery” by distinguishing among sex, sex category, and gender. Under this new formulation, gender could no longer be seen as a social “variable” or individual “characteristic” but as a socially situated accomplishment. West and Zimmerman argued that the implication of such ubiquity is that the design and interpretation of social conduct can at any time be made subject to concerns about sex category. Thus individuals and their behavior – *in virtually any course of action* – can be evaluated in relation to a womanly or manly nature and character. This dynamic, situated rendering of gender points to all aspects of social life – behavioral, emotional, discursive – that mark, note, remind, create, affirm, and reaffirm the social conviction that there is something *essentially* male or female that resides within and justifies sex categorization. The powerful gender *ideals* that abound in popular culture, advertising, and the media certainly serve as resources to guide normative understanding of doing gender, but the actual doing of gender requires much more than a regimented list of “appropriate” behaviors. As West and Zimmerman (1987: 135) explain, “Doing gender consists of managing such occasions so that, whatever the particulars, the outcome is seen and seeable in context as gender appropriate, or, as the case may be, gender inappropriate, that is, *accountable*.”

West and Zimmerman maintained that humans might be classified as males or females, but to be treated as competent group members they must learn to feel, behave as if they possessed, and thus *demonstrate*, their essential womanly and manly qualities. By this the authors do not imply necessarily *hypermasculine* or *deportment*, but myriad craftings – according to every conceivable characteristic and expectation of particular settings and situations – that communicate competence as a person *accountably* feminine or masculine.

Moreover, while they allow that it is individuals who “do” gender, “the idiom of accountability [derives] from those institutional arenas in which social relationships are enacted” (Fenstermaker et al. 1991: 294). Categorical attributions like gender (and later, it was argued, race and class) are granted meaning by particular social conditions and are given concrete expression by the specific social and historical context in which they are embedded.

The notion of gender as an accomplishment in response to the ubiquitous dictates of accountability leads away from the notion of static normative ideals, and necessarily focuses attention on gender’s *situated, fluid* character. *That* women and men believe themselves to be different by nature is a cultural constant; *how* and *in what ways* those differences are observed, granted social meaning, and rendered consequential varies by the situated particulars of social setting, time, and place. This is not to say that the accomplishment of gender need be confined to interpersonal, so called “micro” level interactions. Indeed, this conceptualization does not *narrow* gender’s purview only to individuals, but enlarges it to address the myriad dynamics of any social order, at whatever level they operate.

ELABORATIONS

Following the initial formulation in *Gender and Society*, Candace West and Sarah Fenstermaker clarified and extended the concept of “doing gender.” Their interest widened to focus on the implications of the concept for explicating practices of inequality and on the application of the concept to empirical work. The subsequent theoretical commentary of West and Fenstermaker focused primarily on the relevance of gender to various forms of interpersonal and institutional inequality and to the extension of the concept to include race and class (see below). They were motivated by an interest in the *social mechanisms* by which the various outcomes of social inequality (e.g., job discrimination, sexual harassment, violence against women, hate crime, differential treatment by gender in school, church, and government) are created and legitimated.

In that spirit, West and Fenstermaker asserted that the accomplishment of gender manifests itself at every level of social arrangement: discursive, interpersonal, organizational, and institutional. West and Fenstermaker argued that as representations of collective action, institutions are subject to gendering in the presentation of their “essential” characters, and are thus assessed (and behave *as if* they are assessable) in relation to gender. We need only look as far as the various recent peregrinations heard on “preserving family values,” the United States as a “world cop,” or the “immorality” of big corporations like Enron to get a sense of how institutions take on gendered characters that inform expectations of their actions. The broad sweep of the concept poses myriad possibilities for applications to the empirical world, particularly evident in the extension of “doing gender” to the concept of “doing difference.”

In their article “Doing Difference” (1995), West and Fenstermaker posed a theoretical problem that took them well beyond their earlier preoccupation with gender. At the time, feminist sociological theory was beginning to pose questions about the categorical “intersectionality” of social life. West and Fenstermaker observed that there was little in the existing literature on gender that provided for an understanding of how race, class, and gender could operate *simultaneously* to shape and ultimately determine the outcomes of inequality. If such “intersections” or “interlocking categories” could go beyond metaphor, what was needed was a conceptual mechanism that illuminated “the relations between individual and institutional practice and among forms of domination” (West & Fenstermaker 1995: 19).

To adapt the argument offered in “Doing Gender,” West and Fenstermaker asserted that while the *resulting manifestations* of sexism, class oppression, and racism are certainly different, the mechanism by which such inequalities unfold are the same. That is, “difference” is done (invidious distinctions justified on grounds of race, class, or gender) within individual and institutional domains to produce social inequalities. These practices are influenced by existing social structure, but also serve to reinscribe the rightness of such practices over time.

CRITICAL RESPONSE

The attempt to develop this unitary model of the workings of inequality garnered heated criticism (*Gender and Society* 1995) that captured some of the problematic features of the formulation as well as the ways an ethnomethodological focus on the production of inequality can be misconstrued. First, critics were wary of any formulation that seemed to conflate the distinctive features of class, race, and gender inequality. The implication for some was that this conflation *erased* the very real differences among class, gender, and racial inequalities. Second, critics worried that insofar as the approach rested on analysis of *face to face* interactions, it might be ahistorical as well as astructural, and thus neglectful of the workings of power. Finally, critics charged that in its focus on the constructedness of social life, both stable institutional inequality and the possibility of ongoing resistance to it might be missed.

In response, Fenstermaker and West reiterated that by requiring the locus of production of inequality to be *interaction* (broadly defined), one is directed to the center of the creation of raced, classed, and gendered social divisions. However situated, such divisions are hardly ephemeral; indeed, they bear the weight of history, past and ongoing institutional practices, and the day to day workings of social structure. Finally, they argue that this is also the way in which social change is made, where resistance has meaning and institutional power can be challenged.

The ethnomethodological insistence on placing interaction at the center of social life was seen by critics as problematic theoretically, but was greeted by empirical researchers as an invitation to productively recast the study of gender, race, and class. Since the 1987 publication of "Doing Gender," scores of empirical studies have demonstrated the empirical usefulness of a concept that directs researchers to the actual production of social life. Studies of the creation of class, race, and gender in high schools (Bettie 2003), the construction of culture and patriarchy among Asian Americans (Pike & Johnson 2002), Dana Britton's (2003) study of prison guards, and Barbara Perry's (2001) study of the construction of hate crime serve as only a few exemplars of the valuable work that begins

from an interest in the situated dynamics of inequality.

TOWARD AN INTEGRATED FRAMEWORK

The useful theoretical tensions that now surround the concept "doing gender" speak to the multiple directions of feminist theory in sociology. First, there remains a continued interest in articulating the *simultaneous* management of categorical identities, where for example accountability to gender, race, class, and sexuality are *together* understood as ever available for social evaluation and social consequence. *How* those operate together or vary in individual salience in any given moment of interaction is a question for empirical study. Second are the recent calls to integration where gender is recast as a *social structure* or an *institution*. Here, the accomplishment of gender, race, class, and sexuality is acknowledged to be multidimensional, sometimes interpersonal, and sometimes organizational in character, and consciously builds in the likelihood of social change. It remains to be seen whether such integration can sufficiently direct empirical focus to the actual workings of accountability at all levels of social life. Third, a fruitful area of new study resides in the "destabilization" of social categories (e.g., "trans" gender, "multi" racial) that forces a reordering of both categorical definition and expectations surrounding accountability to them.

SEE ALSO: Ethnomethodology; Femininities/Masculinities; Gender Ideology and Gender Role Ideology; Inequality/Stratification, Gender; Intersectionality; Racialized Gender; Sex and Gender; Socialization, Gender

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domestic violence

Dianne Cyr Carmody

Domestic violence is a pattern of coercive behavior designed to exert power and control over a person in an intimate relationship through the use of intimidating, threatening, harmful, or harassing behavior (Dutton 1995). This rather broad definition includes multiple forms of abuse: physical, sexual, and emotional or psychological. There is a lack of agreement about what should be included in the definition of domestic violence. Some argue for a broad definition that includes sexual and emotional harm, like the one above, while others limit their definition to actions that result in physical injury.

The debate over the definition of domestic violence complicates the already difficult

problem of measuring the actual incidence of domestic violence. Those who use a broad definition report much higher incidences of domestic violence than those using a narrow definition. In addition, most cases are not reported to police and many victims suffer in silence for years.

In spite of these methodological challenges, research on the incidence, causes, and consequences of domestic violence has progressed in recent decades. This research, much of it conducted in the last 25 years, reveals important patterns and concurrent social problems associated with domestic violence. The victims of domestic violence are primarily female; in 1998, women were victimized at a rate 5 times higher than men (Rennison & Welchans 2000). Women face a higher risk of violent attack from intimates than strangers. Bachman and Saltzman (1995) found that women are up to six times as likely to be assaulted by a partner or ex partner than by a stranger and they are more likely to suffer an injury when their assailant is an intimate (Bachman & Carmody 1994). Domestic violence is one of the leading causes of injury to women in the US (Tjaden & Thoennes 1998). Research has also revealed important patterns associated with race and ethnicity. African Americans experience the highest rate of domestic violence (Rennison & Welchans 2000). Domestic violence rates also vary by age and economic status, with highest victimization rates among the poor and females between the ages of 16 and 24 years (Rennison & Welchans 2000).

Domestic violence has also been linked to a variety of concurrent social problems. While victims may want to leave an abusive relationship, many remain out of fear or lack of resources or hope for change. Victims' fear is well founded: studies show that victims face the highest risk of serious or lethal injury at the point of separation (Tjaden & Thoennes 1998). In addition, each year, approximately one third of all female homicide victims are killed by intimates (Bachman & Saltzman 1995). While the victims of domestic violence face clear challenges, even those in nonviolent relationships pay some of the costs associated with domestic violence. A recent report from the National Center for Injury Prevention and Control (2003) estimates that domestic violence costs the nation US\$5–10 billion annually in medical expenses, police and

court costs, shelters, and employee absenteeism. Domestic violence has also been cited as a primary cause of homelessness (United States Conference of Mayors 1999).

While early researchers worked to document the magnitude of the domestic violence problem, more recent studies have focused on prevention and intervention in violent relationships. Some have assessed the impact of mandatory arrest laws (Sherman & Berk 1984; Carmody & Williams 1987; Hirschel & Buzawa 2002) and court ordered batterer treatment programs (Davis & Taylor 1999; Stephens & Siden 2000). Others have emphasized the link between domestic violence and other types of violence: child abuse (O'Leary 1988), dating violence (Makepeace 1981), sexual assault (Russell 1990), and violence among same sex couples (Renzetti 1992). With increased understanding of the dynamics and causes of domestic violence, more effective interventions and preventative measures should emerge. The result will benefit us all.

SEE ALSO: Child Abuse; Rape/Sexual Assault as Crime; Sexual Violence and Rape; Violence

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double consciousness

Rutledge M. Dennis

When W. E. B. Du Bois introduced the concept of "double consciousness" in his literary and autobiographical masterpiece, *The Souls of Black Folk* (1903), the idea of doubleness was already a major motif in the literary works of Dostoevsky, Stevenson, Melville, Conrad, Poe, and Goethe. Likewise, the term had been addressed in the psychological and philosophical writings of Nietzsche, Dewey, and James. For both groups, the merger of doubleness and consciousness often suggested an irrational force and the emergence of a dual and split personality entombed in one physical body. The dual and split nature of this consciousness

suggested that what was in play was the existence of a "true" and genuine self which could be contrasted to a self which was "false" and inauthentic. Du Bois's use of the term would incorporate many of the psychological and, by reference, sociological assumptions associated with the authors above.

A restatement of the salient features of Du Bois's views on double consciousness permits us to focus on both the origins and consequences of this doubleness; such a restatement will also serve as the basis for a reassessment of the clarity of the concept as explicated by Du Bois. In addition, a reassessment permits us to approach the concept from contemporary sociological perspectives in order to focus on its possible utility in the current era. The core of Du Bois's logic on double consciousness is as follows: (1) it denies an objective consciousness; (2) the "other" becomes the eye through which the world is viewed; (3) it creates an internal warfare between black and white values and norms; (4) ultimately, the black and white selves may merge into a more creative and unique self; and (5) the struggle to appease black and white strivings has greatly handicapped an already distraught and oppressed black population.

In his examination of double consciousness, Du Bois places his thoughts and ideas in a sociological *cul de sac*. For example, his assertion of the absence of "true" self consciousness assumes that the self consciousness of blacks emerging from family and community networks, from economic, cultural, and political institutions, and from the dominant society was less than real or true. It was certainly not the consciousness of a free people, but it was a consciousness reflective of their condition and status in the society. For blacks to have had the consciousness of the free, while unfree, would fly in the face of logic and be yet another example of what Marx called false consciousness. That freedom for blacks would have meant another type of consciousness is a foregone conclusion, but the issue raised here addresses the difference between what consciousness would have been in freedom and how the experience of "unfreedom" is a true experience with its own accompanying consciousness, though not the uncomplicated consciousness Du Bois desired.

Du Bois's statement of blacks only seeing themselves "through the revelation of the other world" is simply untrue, and flies in the face of his own empirical research. For example, we now have vivid accounts of blacks during slavery, the Reconstruction, and the beginning of the Jim Crow years. What we see is a picture of a people grounded in the politics of pragmatism and using any and all available resources, strategies, and skills to navigate a system stacked against them. The reality is that they fought against the very idea of "only" seeing themselves "through the revelation of the other." It may seem logical that a people, faced with overwhelming political, military, and cultural power, may have no choice, but that logic is much too simple and does not take into account the highly complex manner in which humans both survive and play a variety of charades and roles in order to retain a positive and normative image of themselves against all odds.

The will to resist negative emotional, psychological, and sociological intrusions from those who wish to destroy one's humanity may be stronger than many believe. But here, one must understand Du Bois's strategy: to alert others, especially those who indirectly oppress, one must paint a picture which captures the horrors of physical, sociological, and psychological oppression and suffering, and these must be sketched in stark and uncompromising ways so that there is no mistaking the awfulness of this existence. Yet there is always the danger of making sufferers cardboard figures devoid of life, fiber, and willfulness, in which they become mere objects, incapable and unwilling to act. The reality of the brutalization of life in slavery and much of the post slave era is now known through the words and voices of those who shared the horrid experiences. What emerges is a picture of victims who were seeing and defining the "other" who victimized them, while they themselves were simultaneously being victimized and defined by the "other." But the victims were also simultaneously defining themselves and placing a sociological and psychological marker between the "real" self group and the self group seen and defined by the other. Thus, the victim-victimizer dance is dialectical and there is a degree of "shadow boxing." Invariably, we must then conclude that the victims

are never completely as weak as victimizers assume, nor are the victimizers ever as powerful as they believe themselves to be.

The second problem with the concept of double consciousness as used by Du Bois and as commonly used by others involves an inversion of logic. For example, if there is double consciousness, there must exist a "single" consciousness, and if the double nature of consciousness suggests the intrusion of the white mind and white thoughts and the conflicts resulting from this psychological and sociological invasion of white into black, the single consciousness must conversely connote a separate black thought tied to singular black experiences. Thus, the single consciousness is the black consciousness rooted in the experiences of blacks and their inner world out of which emerges the norms and values, and culture, around which blacks have, according to Ralph Ellison, created a world for themselves "on the horns of the white man's dilemma." The black, single consciousness, therefore, reflects the real and objective life as lived. However, rather than introducing the double consciousness to reflect, as it seems logical to do, how blacks have gained keen insights into whites and their social, cultural, and emotional world, Du Bois stands logic on its head by inverting the double to mean, not an objective view of the white world and how blacks see and define their actual objective condition, but how blacks look at themselves "through the eyes of others." This inversion of logic has kept the focus on a view of blacks as incapable of constructing an objective view of themselves or their world and almost destined to look at themselves and their world through the eyes of their oppressors. Again, there is little evidence to support this view. What makes Du Bois's position of the double more problematic is that, taken to its logical conclusion, it must mean that blacks have placed themselves completely within the consciousness of whites and thus use this white consciousness to assess black life, values, and concerns.

Sociology would be methodologically enriched if it were to "socialize" the term double consciousness and link it analytically and logically to the social. By doing so, we could better understand consciousness as it relates to specific dimensions of social interaction and

social relations. In this way, Du Bois's inversion of consciousness, the collective seeing of one group through the eyes of another group, is avoided, placing Du Bois upright, as Marx did to Hegel. Such a new definition of doubleness will not be directed toward how the powerless have accepted the view of themselves as persecuted by the more powerful. Rather, it will entail a shift which focuses the doubleness more vividly on the dominant powerful community, its institutions and organizations. Perhaps more importantly, such an adjustment in the use of the concept will move us away from one of Du Bois's central themes: a concentration on what powerful groups may think of less powerful groups. What does matter is for powerless groups to have an accurate view of who they are and what must be done as they engage the dominant society, and the need to develop a more accurate and objective critique of the dominant society.

Du Bois's metaphor of the double as "two souls, two thoughts, two unreconciled strivings; two warring ideals in one dark body" has been taken by many to refer to the hopelessness of the task facing blacks. The reality was far different from the picture painted by Du Bois. There was nothing in the black body or mind which mitigated against freedom for itself, hence, Du Bois led us sociologically into a blind alley by explaining the issue primarily as an internal battle, an internal war in which the black body was warring against itself. In reality, the war was external to the black body and stitched into the fabric of the social structure. Metaphorically, we can say that there was one soul occupying the black body, but there was another soul occupying the white body, and that soul was in opposition to the black body and the black soul. But just as the white body lacked two souls, the same can be said for the black body. Could the white soul enter the black body? Did whites have a double consciousness born from oppression and domination? Could the black soul enter the white body? Did Du Bois create a false dichotomy?

As problematic as double consciousness might be, Du Bois, when one reads the social contexts in which the concept is used, situated it in a sociology of black life, though he did not draw the obvious conclusions when he used the term. What must be asserted, however, is

the reality that consciousness of whatever type must emerge from the lived experiences of the people. One part of Du Bois's logic is correct: consciousness must originate in the economic and social relations within the society. One of the difficulties of tracing double consciousness is that, like so many examples in Du Bois's sociology, he does not consistently utilize the same terms throughout his empirical and theoretical works. And he does not delineate or even hint at the concept elsewhere in *Souls of Black Folk* outside of chapters 1 and 10. Nor does he use the concept in his subsequent works. This may mean that he really did not consider the concept as a major definer of black life in America. The question must be raised as to the term's sociological relevance, theoretically and methodologically. Was the term merely of metaphorical value to Du Bois, and does it raise more questions than it answers or resolves? Though the concept is widely used today to refer to groups other than blacks – women, homosexuals, and other ethnic and racial groups – we might be faced with the reality that the Du Boisian idea of the double consciousness may best be observed and understood as a legacy developed out of literary works and the legacy of psychology as a discipline which analyzes the internal dynamics of the self. In this manner, the term can be closely allied to the concept of individual and group identity.

SEE ALSO: Acculturation; Class Consciousness; Color Line; Du Bois, W. E. B.; False Consciousness; Majorities; Marginality; Marginalization, Outsiders; Race and Ethnic Consciousness; Socialization; Solidarity

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drag queens and drag kings

Leila J. Rupp and Verta Taylor

Drag queens and drag kings are men, women, and transgendered people who perform femininity, masculinity, or something in between. Drag in various forms can be found in almost all parts of the world, and increasingly a transnational drag culture is evolving. Traditionally, drag queens have been gay men who cross dress and lip synch to recorded music in gay or tourist venues, but the world of drag has become much more complicated with the emergence of drag king troupes, ballroom in black and Latino communities in the United States, and the participation of transgender, transsexual, and even heterosexual people in drag performances. Much of the scholarship on drag has focused on the question of how much such performances reify or challenge femininity and masculinity. Drag king troupes, influenced by feminism and queer theory, tend very consciously to deconstruct masculinity and femininity in performances, including by “faux queens” – also called “bio queens” – women who perform femininity or femininity as performed by drag queens. But even traditional drag queens, a variety of scholars have argued, undermine the notion of a polarized gender system by displaying the performative nature of gender.

Not all men who dress as women or women who dress as men identify as drag queens or kings. Other categories include transvestites or cross dressers, generally straight men who wear women's clothing for erotic reasons; butch lesbians; preoperative transsexuals; and transgendered people who display and embrace a gender identity at odds with their biological sex. Some drag queens and drag kings also identify as transgendered or are in the process of sex change surgery. Others alter parts of their bodies, as do “tittie queens,” drag queens who acquire breasts through either hormones or implants but have no intention of changing their genitals. Ballroom, a cultural phenomenon with origins in New York over 50 years ago and made famous by the film *Paris is Burning*,

encompasses a variety of categories: “butch queens” (gay or bisexual men who are masculine, hypermasculine, or effeminate), “femme queens” (male to female transsexuals at various stages), “butch queens up in drags” (gay men in drag), “butches” (female to male transsexuals, butch lesbians, or any woman dressing as a man), “women,” and “men” (straight men).

Drag also encompasses a variety of styles of performance. Esther Newton (1972), in her classic study of US drag in the 1960s, distinguished between “stage impersonators,” talented performers who sang in their own voices, and “street impersonators,” more marginal drag queens who lip synched their numbers. “Female impersonators” generally do celebrity impersonation and keep the illusion of being women, in contrast to those who regularly break it by, for example, speaking in their male voices, referring to themselves as men, or discussing their tucked penises. In Germany, this difference is marked by distinct identities: “drag queens” are glamorous female impersonators, while “Tunten,” a reclaimed derogatory term for feminine men, are what in the United States would be called street queens or camp queens who dress in trashy and outrageous outfits and perform political theater. A similar distinction can be found in South Africa, where white “drag artists” who adopt a masculine persona offstage contrast with black or colored “common drag queens,” effeminate men whose performance extends into everyday life. Ballroom features performances judged by “realness,” for example, a gay man dressed as a straight businessman. Kinging involves a wide variety of performances, from impersonation of hypermasculine straight men to campy gay male numbers to enactments of serious political critiques of such issues as rape, hate crimes, and wartime violence.

The term “drag” in the sense of men wearing women’s clothing dates back to the mid- or late nineteenth century, when glamorous female impersonators first appeared on stage. But drag also had connections to the subculture of cross dressing men looking for male sex partners; even before the use of the term “drag” there were subcultures of men – known as “mollies” in England – who used feminine attire and mannerisms to express their same sex sexual desire. In the 1920s, throughout the

major cities of the western world, public drag balls and clubs featuring drag performers attracted mixed crowds. During World War II, in both Canada and the United States, male military personnel staged drag shows to entertain their buddies, although in Canada, as military women increasingly took over female roles, men in drag in theatrical productions aroused suspicion of homosexuality. Despite the conservatism of the post war era, drag shows survived, in part by catering to straight audiences. In San Francisco, where the tourist industry touted the city’s reputation for sexual license, gay men and lesbians mingled with heterosexual tourists at the drag shows at Mona’s, “where girls will be boys,” and Finocchio’s. The Jewel Box Revue, although born in a Miami gay bar in 1939, also aimed at a straight audience. Like the tuxedo clad Harlem performer Gladys Bentley, Storme DeLaverié, who emceed the Jewel Box Revue, was a predecessor of today’s drag kings.

As drag changed in dramatic and less dramatic ways up to the explosion of gay and lesbian activism in the 1970s, two things remained constant: drag both built community among gay and lesbian people and challenged, if more or less politely, the dominant gender divided and heterosexual order. José Sarria, who performed in drag at the Black Cat in San Francisco and ran for city supervisor in 1961 as part of the struggle against police harassment of the gay bars, formed the Imperial Court System in 1965, arguably the first drag queen movement organization. The Court System (now known as the International Court System, with chapters scattered over the western part of the country) raises money for the gay community (and other charitable purposes) through drag shows, but more importantly provides a “family” and respect for drag queens, the heart of the Court.

Drag as a way of creating family is central to ballroom as well. The ballroom community is organized into houses, family like structures that sponsor competitive ball events. Each house has a mother (mostly men, but also women or transwomen) and a father who take responsibility for their children. Such familial support is essential for black and Latino youth who have often been rejected by their biological families, communities of origin, and religious

institutions, the structures that generally sustain people of color in US society. Likewise, drag king troupes provide a nurturing environment for masculine and transgender women who face hostility and violence in the larger world. Drag king troupes and individual performers come together at an annual conference, the International Drag King Extravaganza, held in Columbus, Ohio, since 1999, where, in addition to attending academic sessions and performances, those interested can learn how to apply facial hair, bind their breasts, “pack” (wear a dildo or in some other way create a penis), and move like men.

If drag historically has created community, it has also always carried the possibility of challenge. Even the tourist shows at Finocchio’s or the Jewel Box Revue had a potentially political edge. Comic routines called attention to the illusion of femaleness, and even traditional female impersonation worked to arouse sexual desire in straight male audience members. The role of drag queens in the resistance that followed the 1969 raid on the Stonewall Inn in New York is well known. In the years that followed, groups such as Street Transvestites Action Revolutionaries (founded by Sylvia Rivera, a heroine of Stonewall) and Flaming Faggots, along with men who identified as “radical fairies” and “effeminists,” as well as butch women, challenged gender conformity within the movement. But such gender revolutionaries fought an uphill battle with gay liberationists and radical feminists who tended to dismiss drag as politically incorrect. Not until the 1980s, when groups such as the Sisters of Perpetual Indulgence and Church Ladies for Choice took up comic drag in a serious political struggle with the religious right, did transgender presentation again play a more central role in the movement.

Nevertheless, drag queen performances, especially the more “in your face” political variety in which there is no pretense at being women and a great deal of direct discussion of gay life, sexuality, and gender crossing, can be seen as an effective strategy of the gay, lesbian, bisexual, and transgender movement. Drag shows at the 801 Cabaret in Key West, Florida, for example, explicitly challenge audiences composed of heterosexual as well as gay, lesbian, and bisexual people to confront the

question of what makes a man a man and what makes a woman a woman, as well as to experience desires outside of their own sexual identities. Drag king performances tend to be very explicitly political, representing an enactment of feminist and queer theory critiques of masculinity, although some numbers are humorous and simply fun.

Drag also involves the performance of and movement across lines of class, race, and ethnicity. Impersonation of middle and upper class men by black and Latino working class youth is part of ballroom events, and in both drag queen and drag king shows, performers sometimes adopt a racial or ethnic identity at odds with the one they normally embrace. Performance studies scholar Jose Muñoz argues that drag performed by people of color has the potential to deconstruct whiteness, and other theorists agree that drag holds the potential to expose the performance of racialized codes of gender.

Drag at the turn of the twenty first century has taken on a wide variety of forms, but all of them are foreshadowed in drag history. There are talented artists who impersonate female or male icons or create their own personae; there are street queens who live a marginal life; there are professional and amateur drag queens who lip synch and adopt a range of styles, from female impersonation to campy drag to voguing; there are movement activists who adopt drag for explicitly political purposes; there are mainstream celebrities such as RuPaul and Lady Chablis, who began their careers like other drag queens but became famous. Perhaps nothing illustrates the rags to riches possibilities of drag so much as the fortunes of Wigstock, the Labor Day drag festival in New York that began in 1984 with an impromptu performance by tired drag queens leaving a club at the end of the night and grew over the years into an international extravaganza attracting tens of thousands of spectators and official recognition from the city.

The major scholarly critique of drag queens – that they are more gender conservatives than gender revolutionaries, or that they exercise male power in female form – has not extended to drag kings, although there are no doubt some who would see them as aping, as they criticize, traditional masculinity. Some in the gay, lesbian, bisexual, and transgendered communities are critical of both drag queens and drag kings

for calling attention to gender transgression and thus undermining the argument that gay people are just like heterosexuals in every way except choice of partners. Gender theorists have been very interested in cross dressing and transgender performances for what they reveal about the social construction and performativity of gender and sexuality. Recent empirical research on drag queens, drag kings, and ballroom in different national and local contexts is enriching our understanding not only of the complex gender, sexual, racial/ethnic, and class dimensions of drag performances, but also of what they reveal about the fluidity of gender and sexual identity.

SEE ALSO: Doing Gender; Gay and Lesbian Movement; Homosexuality; Sex and Gender; Transgender, Transvestism, and Transsexualism

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dramaturgy

Peter Kirby Manning

A dictionary definition of dramaturgy is "the art of theater, especially the writing of plays." Roget's *Thesaurus* lists it under drama (599.2) and gives the synonyms theatrics, histrionics, acting, play acting, melodramatics, stagecraft, *mise en scène*, and stage setting. This definition turns attention to the literal process of creating for others a scripted text for its presumed effects. In everyday life the metaphor has its limits and the world is not always a stage, or even dramatic. Most attempts at precise definition of dramaturgy fail because, while it is a powerful metaphor or way of seeing, the concept as employed surfaces differences in emphasis and style.

Dramaturgy points to a family of words associated with the idea of analyzing, or being sensitive to, selective performance to emphasize features of symbolic action, whether they be textual, prose or poetry, or behavior. In social science, dramaturgy is not an actor's perspective or a view with the actor's eyes but a meta perspective that makes sense of action, whether it is carried out by organizations, groups, or actors. Dramaturgy reflects the everyday work of actors, but the perspective does not assume an ironic pose, discount what is done or said, or begin with scientific concepts or theories. As seems apt, dramaturgy assumes neither that we know much more than what we see nor that we understand what lies behind the eyes of actors.

Given this perspective, what does dramaturgy connote about analysis of the social? What is achieved by use of the theatrical metaphor and a focus upon how performances are enacted and with what effect(s)? What has an effect must be intelligible to others. In this sense, it requires or assumes feedback and reciprocity from an audience, the process by which claims are validated (verbal or non verbal, written or electronic). Failure to produce feedback and reciprocity requires repair, apology, recreation.

Kenneth Burke, a leading writer on theater and drama, defines humans (as a logical category) thus: "Man is the symbol using animal" (Burke 1989: 56). Symbol use is an expression of emotion or sentiment; it could be called a quest for meaning or emotional grounding.

Emotion, it would appear, is what is being symbolized; symbols touch off meaning, response, and emotion or catharsis in an audience. To state that symbols are “used” by “man” means that they are selectively attended to. Of the many symbols present in an encounter, only some will be used or selected to produce a response in others. In situations, parts or elements of action are revealed, given, and given off, but how they might produce a sequence of actions cannot be known fully in advance. Dramaturgy does not honor any particular repertoire of symbols, symbolic actions, conversational moves, or a given poetics of human conduct. However, it is likely that the power and appeal of dramaturgy rest in its applicability to the increasing number of situations in massified society in which strangers must negotiate encounters in the absence of shared values, beliefs, kin, or ethnic ties.

In this context of high modernity, performances rely on trust, evidenced in ongoing sequences of interpretation, what Goffman, following the philosopher Austin, terms the “felicity condition.” Social interaction is a communicative dance based on trust and reciprocity. Thus mutuality and duality constitute the “promissory, evidential character” of social life. While trust, or acceptance of forthcoming outcomes, is necessary, it may be violated, new contingencies may arise, and a new line of action may unfold. People perform, respond, perform, respond, and thus they symbolize. It is a false and misleading assumption that trust is absent in modern life; it must be made present more in modern life where strangers have fewer cues to establish it in advance.

Goffman’s view is not a full picture of the constraints of social structure. In many respects, the weakness of dramaturgy has been that those who use it casually “overcode” the notion, and apply it widely without qualification, seeing the ordering of life as a kind of bad high school play, or applying it exclusively at the actor’s consciousness level rather than explicating the limits of the idea as metaphor to guide careful analysis.

Dramaturgy, or dramatism as Kenneth Burke called it, as a perspective in social science emerged at the University of Chicago. While Burke was an original scholar and an autodidact, other figures in the movement, Goffman, Gusfield, Edelman, and Duncan, were Chicago trained PhD scholars. They were influenced by

the ideas of George Herbert Mead, Herbert Blumer, and Charles Morris, who was himself a student of Mead’s. Morris was pioneering and refining an idea related to symbolic interactionism and dramaturgy, semiotics, the science of signs. Burke’s earliest works were subtle deconstructions of the singular Marxist materialist portrait of man particularly popular amongst intellectuals in the 1930s. In effect, asserting the partiality of any view of human conduct, Burke also questioned any full organic scheme such as the popular structural functionalism current until the 1970s.

To understand the contours of dramaturgy, one must consider further dramatists. As scholars, they begin with three assumptions. The first is that behavior is a vast, unfolding, deeply complex matter, for the meaning of which we are given cues by others. This is followed by a second assumption: that the human need for order and ordering is fundamental. This assumption suggests that humans are driven to perform for others in some fashion as a condition of sociality. People are civilized, as Durkheim writes, because they are tied to others. The third assumption is that through symbolic action, words, gestures, postures, and facial expressions, we seek to be understood. Symbolic action creates the possibility that sequences producing order will be sustained. While social scientists have seized on interaction as their materials, others have worked on texts, plays, plastic and visual arts, and the sequences of concern need not be face to face encounters.

Kenneth Burke and Hugh Dalziel Duncan were critics of written texts. Burke, like William Empson, was an insightful observer of that poignantly ambiguous symbolic action, poetry. Poetry is metaphor in the guise of metonymy. This concern with forms of speech and aesthetics aligns dramaturgy with classic rhetoric (Aristotle in particular), accounts, or vocabularies of motive, as well as any persuasive performance. “Motive” in dramaturgy is a rhetorical form: an account for an action choice when it is questioned. This is how motives are revealed. The underlying and unifying idea is that once tradition and continuity in human relationships are attenuated, meaning must be sought and pointed to again and again rather than assumed. Because complexity of action remains, what is seized

upon for analysis, if not in everyday life, is what is *said* about what was done, will be done, or might be done. All renditions of interactions, including responses and interpretations of them, are endlessly partial. This proposition, refined by C. Wright Mills, brings us to the matter of metaphor and other figures of speech, for they provide recipes used to gloss longer sequences and order requests and responses. Strings of words may be extended into stories, allegory, myth, or other narrative genres. All representations are re representations, and thus are paradoxical, partial, misleading, and open to interpretation and response. Thus, no metaphor, even dramaturgy, can capture the full richness of behavior *mis en scene*.

If we hold these points loosely in mind, several refinements set the scope of dramaturgy. These include the role of the self, of pragmatism, conversational analysis, and the role of the audience. These are critical distinctions, because they account for the tensions between symbolic interactionism, dramaturgy, and ethnomethodology. Dramaturgy does not require a self or selves as central meaning producing mechanisms. All responses are interpretations, but they need not pass through a master self like processor. It does not rest upon pragmatism or the social psychology of Mead, Blumer, James, or Peirce. Pragmatism presumes intentions and purposes of some sort which are revealed and refined over the course of interaction. Most attempts to clarify the perspective play on an assumed pragmatism: actors (writers, painters, poets, everyday citizens) seek to convince others (an audience) of what they claim to be by selective presentation of symbols. Life is not captured to be reshowed on a VCR or DVD and cannot be rerun, even though it may be understood after the fact. The modern tradition of linguistics, conversation analysis included, posits a range of possible meanings in an interaction, whilst not considering the state of affairs chaotic. Sequential interpretations unfold, but cannot easily be used to reveal intent, purpose, or perspective. Perspective suggests consistency of project that is characteristic over time. Audiences are alert to efforts by others to make claims and to respond. Gusfield's gloss on Burke (Burke 1989: 10) makes the persuasive function of such symbolic action a part of the conflict and reflection inimical to human conduct. Readings

of "conflict" and "order" are done by the theorist, not by those who are embedded in the sense making. Ethnomethodology and conversation analysis resemble dramaturgy, but differ in the role they attribute to the ordering of conversations according to tacit conventions, and in the degree to which order is problematic. In many ways, dramaturgy opts for a kind of surrealism or search for meaning, while ethnomethodology assumes order prevails.

Dramaturgy burst on the scene soon after the publication of Goffman's reworked, ethnographically based dissertation, *Presentation of Self in Everyday Life* (PSEL 1959). It was first published in 1956 as a research monograph by the University of Edinburgh. Goffman argues very tersely on p. ix: "I shall consider the way in which the individual in ordinary work situations presents himself and his activities, the ways in which he guides and controls the impression they form of him, and the kinds of things he may or may not do while sustaining his performance before them." In this sentence, Goffman states that dramaturgy is about the actor's impression management. His strong connection to dramaturgy in spite of variations in emphases in his career is signaled best by the organizing metaphors he employs, many of them taken from the theater – front and back stage, script, and role. PSEL stimulated both efforts to summarize it and a number of collections.

PSEL has sold well and remains in print after some 40 or so years; it has been very influential on two generations of graduate students. The book is controversial because it renders interaction as a puzzle resolved only in and through interaction, not via a priori concepts such as personality, values, norms, or social systems. Goffman struggled to show how actors display order and ordering conventions in many situations, with an eye always to ways humans adapt, interpret, read off, and make sense of others' behavior. This does not assume life as chaos, nor does it require positing people as "puppets" with attributed feelings, aims, goals, and a repertoire of strategies and tactics. It does assume that they act to display for others and to elicit a response. Goffman was associated with dramaturgy, but his work evolved, evading easy understanding or simplification.

The complexity of his ideas, as well as his abiding significance as a scholar, lead many to

agonize over his concepts, seeking to fit them to this or that scheme; rendering his work as a cynical dismissal of modern life; attempting to embed his ideas in a sociohistorical context; dismissing them as trivial; seeing them as a paradigm of modern life or an impenetrable enigma. None of these is fully accurate. Tom Burns, an early colleague of Goffman's at Edinburgh, perhaps most accurately dismisses attempts to discover a single consistent theory in Goffman's writing. Philip Manning disagrees, arguing for an emergent puzzle composed of constituent parts.

Scholars have struggled with the basic notions of dramatism with varying success, some shaping it in line as a version of symbolic interaction; performance ethnography that emphasizes the "performative" nature of human action; post modernism; quasi organizational theory; of quintessential democratic interactions, and as politics as a grand spectacle arising from the need to dramatize and manage conflicts. The most troubling connections are to structuralism and semiotics, as Goffman cites scholars such as Bakhtin and Russian linguists, and refers to signs in several of his publications. A few salient and useful attempts at exegesis exist.

Criticisms of dramaturgy as theory often come from unsympathetic sources (Brissett & Edgley 1990 summarize these). The point most frequently made, that dramaturgy asserts ontological assumptions about the reality of life as theater, is clearly wrong. It is one among many possible perspectives; it is not a perspective on perspectives. A second common criticism is that it is not a theory of the deductive/propositional sort. This perhaps hinges more on a definition of "theory" than on whether dramaturgy qualifies. A third trenchant criticism is the view that the extensive accommodation and impression management of the modern citizen is an indication of normality, not deviance. This modern citizen, sensitive to impressions and their management, seeking to be liked, is an ideologically captured consumer, a shadow of more powerful economic and political forces. Modernity is perhaps more than this, but not less. In this way, Goffman echoes ideas of Robert Musil, Ortega y Gasset, Sartre, and Camus.

SEE ALSO: Chicago School; Conversation Analysis; Ethnomethodology; Everyday Life;

Goffman, Erving; Mead, George Herbert; Postmodernism; Self; Semiotics; Symbolic Interaction; Trust

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dropping out of school

Ralph B. McNeal, Jr.

Dropping out of school in a post industrial society comes with many risks. In the United States, as with most industrialized societies, education is a key factor for predicting social mobility; dropping out clearly undermines one's prospects of moving up the socioeconomic ladder. Dropping out of high school is also accompanied by many other negative outcomes or consequences, including an increased propensity for subsequent criminal behavior, lower

occupational and economic prospects, lower lifetime earnings, an increased likelihood of becoming a member of the underclass, lower levels of academic skills, and poorer levels of mental and physical health than non dropouts.

In addition to the negative consequences for the individual dropout, areas with high concentrations of dropouts also suffer. Areas with higher concentrations of dropouts have decreased tax revenues, increased expenditures for government assistance programs, higher crime rates, and reduced levels of social and political participation. Given all of these negative consequences, what do we know about high school dropouts? Who are they? Why do they fail to complete high school?

Before answering any of these questions, we should first define *dropout*. This is not as easy as it might appear. Oftentimes, attempts to define high school dropouts and actually measuring this status in the many available data sources are at odds. In the purest sense, a high school dropout is *anybody who fails to acquire a high school diploma*. There are two major national studies that are often used to conduct research on high school dropouts, High School & Beyond (1980) and the National Education Longitudinal Study (NELS, 1988). These two databases account for the lion's share of what we know about dropping out of high school during the past two decades, but each data source has its own limitations. In High School & Beyond, dropouts are those students who drop out of school between the tenth and twelfth grades; this clearly misses a large number of dropouts who either leave school prior to the tenth grade (one estimate is that between 10 and 20 percent of dropouts leave school prior to the tenth grade) or those who are still in school in the twelfth grade, but eventually drop out. In NELS:88, high school dropouts are often defined as those who have left school during or after the eighth grade and still have not returned to school or acquired a high school diploma as of two years post the anticipated graduation date (a six year window). NELS is far more inclusive, but still leaves some students out of the definition because they return to complete their high school diploma outside of the allotted window. Thus, while the abstract definition of a high school dropout is very clear, the actual measurement of who

has, or has not, dropped out is questionable. To help clarify the various statuses, any number of terms have been applied, including "stopouts," "dropouts," "early leavers," and "returnees," just to name a few (Pallas 1986).

To further complicate matters, researchers often define high school dropouts differently than do educators. In some instances, educators actively track students who have left their school and do not include the student as a dropout if he or she enrolls in an alternative education or adult learning program. In other instances, educators do not track the student once he or she has left the school but classify the student as a dropout if that individual withdraws from school and there is no accompanying request to forward the student's academic record to another educational institution. Regardless of how it defines a student who has left school, it is often in the school's best interest to record the lowest possible dropout rate since it is one measure of school quality. Somewhere in the midst of these various operationalizations lies the truth – those students whose educational careers fall short of acquiring a high school diploma.

WHO DROPS OUT AND WHY?

It is not difficult to paint a portrait of the typical high school dropout. There have been a plethora of studies trying to determine who drops out (or does not). Racial and ethnic minority students – in particular blacks and Hispanics – are more likely to drop out than white students. Students of lower academic ability are more likely to drop out than are high ability students. Lower socioeconomic status (SES) students are more likely to drop out than higher SES students. Being older than one's peers and/or from a single headed household have also been linked to higher likelihoods of dropping out. Gender prominently factors into the dropout equation; teenage pregnancy is more likely to lead to dropping out for women, whereas acquiring a full time job has a greater increase on the likelihood of dropping out for men. Beyond demographics, researchers have also examined other individual level measures including student involvement in extra curricular activities and adolescent employment. Students who are

more involved in extra curricular activities are less likely to drop out; students who work more than 20 hours a week during the school year have an increased likelihood of dropping out.

Many of these individual level effects were established by researchers in the 1980s and 1990s using a variety of theoretical models, including the participation identification model, the social control model, the rational choice model, various integration and process models, and zero sum models. During the past decade, various elements of social context have also been incorporated into theoretical models, including peer group, family, school, and community factors. In terms of family based explanations, parents' level of education and/or occupational standing, select aspects of the home environment such as the availability of cultural capital resources, and the relevant social support system (e.g., social capital) have been found to significantly affect a student's likelihood of dropping out. Students with parents or older siblings who are dropouts are at higher risk of dropping out, as are students with uninvolved parents.

More recent research further expands the boundaries of meaningful social context(s) by examining the school's role in producing high school dropouts, as well as the influence of various neighborhood characteristics. Research has consistently found that school size, level of social integration or involvement within the school, resources, and various indicators of school climate all affect whether a student drops out of school. Studies have also shown that spatial/context measures such as higher dropout rates and greater rates of poverty have a disproportionate effect on an individual student's likelihood of dropping out. The majority of studies examining school or community context use some variant of opportunity theory, coupled with the assumption that adolescents are rational actors in the educational decision making process, to explain dropping out within a multilevel framework.

In summary, research to date has examined an exhaustive number of predictors of dropping out of school at the individual, familial, peer group, school, and community levels. Most of the aforementioned concepts can be thought of as "pushing" or "facilitating" factors. An

alternative set of factors can be viewed as "pulling" or "attracting" measures. Previous research established that students often leave school early because they wish to obtain the status of various adult roles, such as mother or worker. These two findings are clearly gender related. For many young women, pregnancy is a key contributing factor to their decision to drop out of school; scholars contend that the attraction of motherhood draws young women out of school to start families. For many young men, the lure of full time employment is sufficient for them to prematurely terminate their education; this is especially true in impoverished neighborhoods where full time jobs are a rare commodity. The so called "tipping point," the point where school year employment becomes detrimental to a student's chances of completing high school, seems to be approximately 20 hours a week. What distinguishes both of these effects (pregnancy and employment) from other predictors is the strong possibility of a selection effect. In other words, the research clearly establishes these links, but there is disagreement on the direction of causality. Proponents of adolescent work contend that students who are already disengaged from school choose to work; opponents of adolescent work contend that greater than part time work draws otherwise engaged students out of school and into the workplace. Similar arguments are made concerning teenage pregnancy. Does the desire to assume adult roles come before or after the student's disengagement from schooling? The truth is, we do not know, because studies have yet to systematically control for the student's adult role orientation, making it impossible to draw a definitive conclusion.

FUTURE RESEARCH

Given what we know about the consequences of dropping out, and the major predictors, what is yet to be determined concerning high school dropouts? Future research should focus on one of four broad areas: defining and measuring dropout, disentangling early childhood attitudes and behaviors and determining their effect on dropping out, studying dropouts from non public school settings, and addressing the long term costs and consequences of dropping out.

As for the first broad need, there are several specific tasks that should be completed. First, there needs to be a clearly articulated and widely agreed upon method of defining, and perhaps more importantly of measuring, dropout. Most previous research tends to define school dropout in relation to high school, but many students drop out of middle school and are not captured in most studies. Additionally, the category of "dropout" should be more fully refined to recognize that not all dropouts are the same. For example, there are dropouts who fail to acquire any further education, dropouts who return to get their high school diploma, dropouts who earn an equivalency certificate (e.g., GED), and dropouts who continue on to attain college or post graduate degrees. Future research should strive for better clarity when professing to study "dropouts" and address the subtle, but likely very important, differences across these groups.

The second broad need is to disentangle early childhood attitudes and behaviors, and to determine their effect on dropping out. Some preliminary research has examined how early childhood predictors such as attitudes toward school, exposure to delinquent behaviors, and early childhood parenting practices affect adolescent delinquency and drug use. This is a line of social psychological research that should be applied to dropping out of school since items such as early childhood school readiness, literacy, and elementary school experiences should be critical for understanding dropping out of high school. After all, dropping out often is the final step in a very long and gradual process of disengaging from school.

The third broad area where future research might prove fruitful is the investigation of dropouts from non public school settings. To date, the lion's share of research has focused on dropouts from public high schools. Research is clearly needed on who drops out of private schools (religious, non religious, and alternative/charter schools), and why. As with most other educational processes studied during the last 40 or more years, there will surely be differences between public and private schools in this regard. The lack of current research on this matter seems to imply that dropping out of school is only an issue faced by public schools, and this is clearly not the case.

Finally, research should more clearly conceptualize dropping out in a longitudinal framework. Too often research on dropouts looks at predictors approximately two years prior to dropping out and outcomes approximately two to four years after dropping out. Given the importance of educational credentials in a post industrial society, research should place dropping out of school into the context of the life course perspective and investigate how this act is related to a wider variety of predictors in childhood and outcomes in later life. Such studies should clearly define dropout, including its many subcategories, and investigate the similarities and differences in a variety of outcomes in the later stages of the life course such as life satisfaction, lifetime earnings, and mental and physical health (to name a few).

SEE ALSO: Educational Attainment; Gender, Education and; School Transitions; Schooling and Economic Success; Social Capital and Education; Tracking; Transition from School to Work

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drug use

Larry Gaines

Drug addiction and abuse constitute a major social problem that is interlaced throughout our society. Each year it costs billions of dollars in terms of interdiction, prevention, enforcement, treatment, and lost productivity. Moreover, the drug problem exacerbates a number of other social problems including poverty, homelessness, crime, and family discord. Historically, society addressed the drug problem, as well as other social problems, using a generalized, simplistic response. However, if the drug

problem is better understood in terms of who is using drugs and what types of drugs are being used, tailored responses can be developed that in the end may be more effective and beneficial.

American society is bombarded constantly by all sorts of messages advocating the use of drugs. Pharmaceutical companies and vendors have inundated society with drug advertising. Few people can open their email accounts without having at least one message that attempts to sell some type of drug. Many of these vendors have their own physicians who can prescribe drugs in absentia. A significant proportion of television advertising is now devoted to prescription drugs, and they all end by urging viewers to ask their physician about some drug that will enhance their lives by making them feel better, look better, or have enhanced sexuality. There are approximately 3 billion prescriptions written annually, and the Center for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) notes that each year physicians write about 1.5 prescriptions per office visit, demonstrating a substantial amount of medicating in the United States (Cooper et al. 1993; NIDA 2004).

In some quarters of our society, the same pressures exist for using illicit drugs. Young people are enticed to use drugs as a result of cultural norms and expectations. Ample friendship networks exist to deliver club drugs such as Ecstasy, cocaine, and Rohypnol. For many youth, drugs are solidly embedded in the culture, and they desire to be accepted as one of the group. Since alcohol and tobacco consumption is high for young people, it is rather easy for them to slip into using drugs. Research indicates that adolescents who use alcohol and tobacco cigarettes are significantly more likely to use illegal drugs than adolescents who abstain from these legal drugs.

The vast majority of efforts attacking the drug problem are concentrated on illegal drugs, but it must be understood that prescription drugs are just as problematic, although they receive less notoriety. Quantities of prescription drugs are diverted to the street and abused. Nicotine and alcohol are the two most widely used drugs in society, but because of their legal status most people do not see them as such, although this has been moderated somewhat as

government and public groups have attempted to negatively label their use and abuse. Substances that are psychoactive, that is, influence the workings of the mind – and therefore the behavior of organisms that take them – are legally governed in the United States by the Controlled Substance Act of 1970. This Act divides substances into “schedules” according to their medical utility and their potential for abuse. Those substances the federal government regards as having “no medical utility” and a high potential for abuse are Schedule I drugs: it is illegal to possess or sell Schedule I drugs. They include heroin, LSD, marijuana, and Ecstasy. (It must be pointed out that bodies other than the United States government regard a number of Schedule I drugs – marijuana most notably – as having considerable medical utility.)

Many in our society are concerned with America’s drug problem. However, America does not have a single drug problem; it has multiple drug problems. Although marijuana is the drug of choice across the social spectrum, different constituencies or groups have a propensity to use or abuse other drugs. Young people tend to abuse marijuana, Ecstasy, and Rohypnol and inhalants. Methamphetamine is predominately a rural drug, while crack cocaine and heroin are associated with inner city youth and young adults. Middle and upper class professionals tend to use powder cocaine at a higher rate relative to other groups. Synthetic narcotics such as Lortab, Dilaudid, and OxyContin are more likely to be abused by middle aged and older Americans, and a number of prescription drugs are abused by housewives. Although there is overlap in terms of drug consumption, there is a measure of stratification of drug usage within the overall population.

There are different levels of drug usage. Legalistically, the use of any illegal drug or prescription drug in a manner not recommended by the physician is considered abuse, but some people have more problems with drug use than others. Goode (2005) notes that the drug problem cannot be fully understood without considering the amount of drugs that individuals consume. Abdinsky (2004) has developed a continuum of drug use that better illustrates the point. First, there is experimental use where a

drug is tried to see what happens. Individuals may experiment with a drug once or a few times and never use the drug again. This is a fairly common occurrence. Second is culturally endorsed use where an individual's culture or peer group has adopted or accepted the use of a drug or set of drugs as normative behavior. When this occurs there is pressure on the deviant non drug user to conform to the norms of the group. Such pressures are extremely enticing and many youngsters and teens have difficulty resisting. The same can be said of many marginalized neighborhoods where drugs are an everyday part of life. Recreational use is the third category, and this is where drugs are consumed more frequently. Drugs are used increasingly in more social contexts, and the abuser tends to look for opportunities or excuses to consume drugs. Finally, compulsive use is where individuals have developed a physiological or psychological dependence on the drug. Many more life events center around the acquisition and use of drugs as opposed to work or family responsibilities. The Department of Health and Human Services (2003) estimates that there are 22 million Americans classified with substance dependence or abuse, which includes alcohol as well as illicit drugs. This constitutes 9.4 percent of the population aged 12 and older.

Although compulsive drug use begins with experimentation, it is not true that all drug experimenters end up as compulsive drug users. Indeed, many people do not venture beyond the experimentation stage of drug use. For example, the National Survey on Drug Use and Health, which is conducted by the Department of Health and Human Services, provides data on lifetime and past month drug usage. In 2002, 46 percent of the American population aged 12 or older had used an illicit drug in their lifetimes, but only 8.3 percent had used an illicit drug in the past month. While 8.3 percent of the population perhaps showed a pattern of drug usage, about 38 percent of the population appeared to be infrequent drug users or people who were experimenters. Thus, the vast majority of drug users do not become compulsive users.

It is informative to examine drug usage patterns when attempting to understand the

amount and patterns of drug consumption in the United States. To this end, there are a variety of surveys that can be enlightening. In 2002, the National Survey on Drug Use and Health survey found that approximately 19.5 million Americans were current drug users. The most widely used drug was marijuana with a use rate of 6.2 percent. There was an estimated 2 million cocaine users with a little over 25 percent being crack cocaine users. This represented less than 1 percent of the population. Cocaine use declined in the early 1990s for youth, but the trend has reversed and in 2002, an estimated 2.7 percent of the population had used cocaine at some point. There were 1.2 million hallucinogen users, and a little over 50 percent of the hallucinogens being abused was Ecstasy. Ecstasy has been driving an increase in hallucinogens for several years. There were 166,000 heroin users in 2002, and the rate of usage has been steadily climbing since the mid 1990s, although these figures are suspect since many heroin users such as the homeless are not counted in the household survey. A substantial proportion of the increase is attributable to young people whose rate of usage has increased 400 percent in the last seven years (DHHS 2003).

There is a substantial portion of the population that is abusing psychoactive prescription drugs. Approximately 2.6 percent of the population or 6.2 million people reportedly are current users of psychoactive drugs for non medical purposes. The most commonly abused prescription drugs are pain relievers, followed in order of use by tranquilizers, stimulants, and sedatives. As an example, OxyContin, a synthetic narcotic and a relatively new drug, has about 2 million abusers, which is similar to the number of cocaine users in the United States (DHHS 2003). Psychoactive drugs are diverted from pharmacies and medical providers, manufactured in clandestine labs, and smuggled into the United States from foreign countries.

As noted above, drug use is interlaced with a variety of problems. The relationship between drugs and crime is of most importance and drives a substantial proportion of the concerns with drug abuse. Thus, it is cogent to examine drug use in the criminal population. However,

before examining these statistics, it is important to note that there is considerable debate on the degree to which drugs cause crime. Although drug use is attributable to some crime, many experts agree that the drug problem commingles with the crime problem and that criminals reside in a culture that is conducive to drug use. These experts argue that it is not a clear cut causal relationship (McBride & McCoy 2003; Faupel et al. 2004).

To this end, three models explaining the crime–drug relationship have evolved (Goode 2005). First, the enslavement model posits that individuals become addicted to drugs as a result of some life situation or happenstance. They become trapped in their addiction and must resort to crime to support their drug needs. Proponents of the enslavement model see legalization of drugs as a viable method of reducing drug related crimes. Second, the predisposition model states that criminals are deviants or anti social people who have a predisposition to commit crime and take drugs, and reside in a culture where drugs are accepted and plentiful. Drugs and crime become an accepted part of life. Finally, the intensification model basically states that drug usage intensifies criminal behavior. This is supported by the fact that when addicts desist from drug usage, the number of crimes they commit declines precipitously (Ball et al. 1983). Inciardi (1992) sees drug use as intensifying an already existing criminal career.

A significant proportion of those arrested regardless of crime are abusing drugs. The Arrestee Drug Abuse Monitoring Program (ADAM) examines drug use rates in 39 large and medium sized cities in the United States. Essentially, jail inmates are interviewed about their drug use and asked to provide a urine sample, which is analyzed to determine if drugs are present and the kinds of drugs inmates were taking at the time of their arrest. Screening concentrates on illegal drugs and a limited number of prescription drugs: cocaine, opiates, marijuana, methamphetamine, PCP, barbiturates, benzodiazepines, methadone, and propoxyphene. ADAM is an important program in that it provides access to drug use information about the criminal population, which assists in the development of more effective criminal justice policies.

In terms of male arrestees, the median percentage of arrestees testing positive for one of the above nine drugs in 2003 was 67, and the median percentage for females was 68. The 2002 National Survey on Drug Use and Health reported that 11.6 percent of the population aged 12 or older had used an illicit drug in the past month. Although ADAM and the National Survey use different methodologies, the differences between arrestees and the population are striking and demonstrate that drug usage among the criminal population is significantly higher. The median use rate for female arrestees across cities was one percentage point above the male rate. Females used crack cocaine, cocaine, and heroin at a higher rate, while males used marijuana and methamphetamine at a higher rate (Zhang 2004). The difference in usage rates between males and females may be the result of sample characteristics or police discretion when deciding to make an arrest as opposed to actual use rates. The police may apply laws more strictly to the males. Regardless, the data show that drug usage and abuse is high among all arrestees with some differences across cities.

The ADAM statistics reveal that for the most part, cocaine and marijuana primarily are being used by those arrested. PCP appears in the drug testing fairly infrequently, and methamphetamine and heroin use, although widespread, seem to be regionalized with some locations having moderate numbers of users, while other locations have minimal numbers of users who are arrested.

If drug usage statistics were examined in detail for a period of several years, it would reveal that there is an ebb and flow of drug problems. Drugs of choice, to some extent, vary by region of the country, age of the population, and city. Historically, society and government have not recognized that there are multiple drug problems, and for the most part have developed prevention, suppression, and treatment programs that may be applicable to one part of the country or one type of drug, but have less utility for other parts of the country and other drugs. The drug problems must be fully understood in terms of patterns of usage, and more effective programs must be fashioned that address specific populations and types of

drugs. This can only be accomplished by monitoring drug usage patterns and researching programs at the micro level. An understanding of what works and the conditions that facilitate success must be understood. Only then can effective responses to the drug problems be implemented.

SEE ALSO: Addiction and Dependency; Alcohol and Crime; Drugs, Drug Abuse, and Drug Policy; Drugs and the Law; Drugs/Substance Use in Sport

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drugs, drug abuse, and drug policy

Emma Wincup

The term “drug” has been both broadly and narrowly defined. At its simplest, it is reserved for substances which are prohibited under criminal law. Deploying this definition, the range of substances classified as drugs varies across time and across jurisdictions. However, typically, it refers to substances such as heroin, cocaine, ecstasy, and amphetamines. At the other extreme, more inclusive definitions of the term have been adopted. In addition to outlawed substances, in these instances, drugs can refer to alcohol and tobacco, plus substances such as solvents, prescribed medication, and over the counter remedies used illicitly. When developing policies, countries are most likely to utilize a narrow definition and focus attention on illegal drugs.

The terms “drug abuse” and “misuse” are frequently used in policy documents to describe the most harmful forms of drug use which warrant attention. However, there is an emerging consensus that these terms should be avoided because they are highly subjective and judgmental descriptions of patterns of drug use. Instead, the term “problem drug use” is preferred, which typically describes patterns of use which create social, psychological, physical, or legal problems for an individual drug user. Although many problem drug users will be classified as emotionally or physical dependent on drugs, this is not inevitably the case. Instead, their drug use can be regarded as problematic because they engage in high risk behaviors (e.g., injecting drugs or consuming large quantities in one session). It is important to note that unambiguous distinctions between patterns of drug use are difficult to draw, not least because at one level all drug use can be viewed as problematic due to its potentially negative implications for an individual’s health and well being.

Problem drug use has been defined as a law and order, social, medical, and public health problem. Defined as a law and order problem, policy attention is likely to be focused on

strategies to reduce the supply of drugs through tackling drug markets or to decrease the demand for drugs through attempts to break the link between drugs and crime. This link is often viewed simplistically as a causal one, with drug users committing crime to finance their drug use. Consequently, policies such as coercive drug treatment are advocated to break the link.

Problem drug use has also been understood as a social problem. A challenge for sociologists is to explore why problem drug use has been defined in this way and who has done the defining. The policy implications which flow from understanding problem drug use as a social problem are not readily apparent. On the one hand, it could lead to a policy agenda which tries to overcome the social exclusion experienced by problem drug users by understanding the social structural factors related to problem drug use. However, on the other hand, it could lead to policies based on the premise that problem drug use is the result of the personal characteristics of individuals who experience it, further marginalizing them from society.

Approaching problem drug use as a medical problem involves equating it with a disease. The development of a medical model for understanding problem drug use was influential in moving understanding away from moral failure. Policies which flow from conceptualizing problem drug use in this way emphasize particular forms of treatment, and have been criticized for failing to appreciate the social causes and consequences of problem drug use.

Perceiving problem drug use as a public health problem stems from a concern about its effects on health and well being for individuals and the communities they live in. For example, community members may be exposed to used drug paraphernalia. Consequently, advocates of this approach suggest the need to pursue a harm reduction strategy, which includes practices such as operating needle exchange schemes and prescribed substitute medication.

Different conceptualizations of the type problem drug use presents have influenced, at different times, the policy approach adopted by individual countries. For example, during the 1980s and most of the 1990s, the UK adopted a

public health approach to drug use. This was a response to the realization that unsafe injecting practices could transmit HIV. As the new millennium drew near, a criminal justice approach to drug policy was adopted: problem drug use and offending became increasingly interlinked. This can be perceived as an example of policy transference, with the UK following – in part – policies adopted in the US. On both sides of the Atlantic critics have suggested that pursuing a law and order approach to tackling drug use amounts to a war on drug use and a war on drug users. Contemporary drug policy in the UK, as in other countries, is best described as based upon a range of different conceptualizations of the type of problem drug use poses, which results in a wide range of policies being adopted. These policies are implemented by a varied group of organizations (e.g., criminal justice, health care, and social work agencies). In reality, this may mean that drug users are exposed to seemingly contradictory policies; for instance, policies which have the effect of criminalizing growing numbers of drug users can be pursued alongside policies which increase opportunities for drug users to give up drug use or to use drugs in a less harmful manner.

SEE ALSO: Addiction and Dependency; Deviance, Crime and; Drug Use; Drugs and the Law; Social Problems, Concept and Perspectives

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drugs and the law

Brian K. Payne

At the broadest level, law can be defined as a written policy designed to control human behavior. Drug laws, then, are written policies designed to control drug using behaviors. The aggressive response to drug using behaviors, however, is a relatively modern phenomenon in the United States. A series of early American drug laws precipitated current efforts to control drug related behaviors. These laws included the Pure Food and Drug Act of 1906, the Harrison Narcotics Tax Act of 1914, and the Marijuana Tax Act of 1937. In fact, between the early 1900s and 1969, hundreds of federal drug laws were passed in the United States.

Perhaps the most influential piece of drug legislation framing the current response to drug using behaviors, the Comprehensive Drug Abuse Prevention and Control Act of 1970 repealed all prior federal drug laws and placed all drug laws under this broad, encompassing law (Payne & Gainey 2005). One of the significant aspects of this law was that it created a mechanism by which drugs could be categorized into various “schedules” based on the drug’s medical utility and harm. Schedule I drugs (e.g., heroin, methaqualone, LSD, marijuana, and hashish) are considered to have no medical use and a high potential for abuse. Schedule II drugs (demerol, methadone, cocaine, PCP, and morphine) are those that do have currently accepted medical uses but also have high potential for abuse. Schedule III drugs (opium, vico dan, Tylenol with codeine, and some other amphetamines and barbiturates) have an accepted medical use and a medium potential for abuse. Schedule IV and V drugs have medical uses and a low potential for abuse. These schedules are significant, not just for a classification scheme, but because of the fact that criminal penalties parallel the drug’s schedule. Offenses involving Schedule I drugs would warrant the stiffest penalty, followed by Schedule II, III, IV, and V drugs respectively.

The Comprehensive Drug Abuse Prevention and Control Act of 1970 also included a civil asset forfeiture clause which allowed for seizure of drugs and items used in the drug trade. It

was expanded in 1986 with the “Substitute Assets Law,” which said the government could take the suspect’s property if the drug assets are no longer available (Blumenson & Nilsen 1998).

Asset forfeiture is justified on punitive, deterrent, and economic grounds. Problems that have arisen with these policies include the use of the asset forfeiture as revenue, changing priorities in the drug war, goal displacement, and systemic failure (Payne & Gainey 2005). In terms of asset forfeiture’s revenue generating phenomenon, there is reason to believe that some police departments have come to rely on asset forfeitures as a form of revenue needed for the department to survive at the most basic levels. In fact, a survey of 1,400 local law enforcement agencies found that the department depended on a significant amount of civil asset forfeiture funds “as a necessary budgetary supplement” (Worrall 2001: 171). With regard to the changing priorities of the drug war, it is believed that rather than taking efforts to control and prevent crime, police may select cases which can generate the largest profit with little regard for the social benefit of the case (Miller & Silva 1994). On a related point, goal displacement occurs inasmuch as “revenue generation becomes a sub goal of the criminal justice response to illicit drug activity” (Payne & Gainey 2005: 128). Finally, systemic failure occurs when asset forfeiture policies keep the justice system from attaining its goals (Vecchi & Sigler 2001a, b).

Though drug laws vary from the federal to the state level and across the states, today, at least five types of drug laws exist (US Department of Justice 1993). First, *possession laws* are those drug laws that stipulate it is illegal for individuals to possess certain types of substances. *Trafficking laws* are those drug laws which aim to control the movement and distribution of drugs. The difference between possession and trafficking laws usually has to do with the amount of drugs possessed. If an individual possesses a large amount, it could be regarded as a trafficking offense, regardless of whether that individual intends to distribute or sell the drugs. Penalties attached to trafficking offenses are much more severe than those attached to possession offenses.

Use laws are those drug laws that stipulate that individuals cannot use certain substances.

For example, if an individual tests positive for marijuana use after being pulled over for a traffic violation, he can be arrested and prosecuted for using the drug even if he does not possess it. In contrast, *misuse laws* are those laws which regulate the amount of a particular substance individuals are permitted to use. Driving while intoxicated laws are an example. Finally, *paraphernalia laws* are those laws which regulate the possession and sale of items that can be used to promote the use or distribution of controlled substances.

Penalties attached to drug offenses have received a great deal of scrutiny and criticism. In particular, some argue that the drug laws assigning penalties for cocaine and crack cocaine are racist and unfair. Individuals convicted of cocaine possession tend to be more affluent while those convicted of crack possession tend to be poorer. The effects of the two drugs are believed to be similar, but the penalties for crack offenses are much more severe than the penalties for cocaine offenses.

SEE ALSO: Addiction and Dependency; Alcohol and Crime; Drug Use; Drugs, Drug Abuse, and Drug Policy; Law, Sociology of

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drugs/substance use in sport

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In the *Commission of Inquiry into the Use of Drugs and Banned Practices Intended to Increase Athletic Performance* (Dubin 1990), commissioned by the Canadian government in the aftermath of the infamous Ben Johnson drug scandal at the 1988 Seoul Summer Olympic Games, Chief Justice Charles Dubin stated that the problem of drug/substance use represented the single greatest moral crisis in high performance sport today. His statement was prescient in that there is probably no other issue that is seen by either the general public or authorities in major sport organizations to be a greater threat to the integrity of international sport than the use of banned drugs/substances. Certainly no other issue warrants the same commitment of resources and bureaucratic effort, especially since the creation of the World Anti Doping Agency in 1999, which now oversees anti doping efforts worldwide. The problem of drug use in sport also presents for sociologists and those in related academic disciplines in sports studies an opportunity to study the deviant subculture of drug use, the social and political dynamics of modern sport, and even more generally to explore the sociology of deviant behavior and the social construction of "normal" and "pathological" categories in a major sphere of social life.

An intriguing aspect of the use of banned substances and methods in sport is the fact that, according to historical evidence, it was only at a relatively recent moment in history – the International Olympic Committee formally banned drugs in the Olympic Games in 1967 – that certain substances and methods have been

defined as unethical or deviant. Athletes have used a variety of performance enhancing substances during many time periods and in diverse cultural contexts, including the ancient Greeks who had few qualms about the use of performance enhancers in the ancient Olympic Games. So referring to incidences as “cheating” in sport’s now distant past is more a reflection of transposing contemporary sensibilities onto history than it is the reality of those practices and morals. During multiday, ultra marathon cycling races and the late nineteenth century pedestrianism craze, for example, there were few attempts by athletes or trainers to hide the use of various performance enhancing concoctions, except to keep the composition of the mixtures undisclosed to competitors.

Given its recent construction as a “deviant” or “unethical” practice, then, the use of banned substances and methods, and the various organizational efforts to create and enforce “anti doping” policies, provide an opportunity to study first hand the creation of deviant behavior and a deviant category, and more general issues of power and control over the ongoing construction of what is considered normal versus pathological behavior in sport.

Four streams of thought and research have emerged in sociology and related disciplines in sports studies to consider this important social problem. First, in the philosophy of sport, debates regarding the ethical arguments that underlie the prohibition of drugs have been ongoing, especially since the early 1980s at the height of Olympic Cold War sport when the organized and systematic use of drugs in various national high performance sports systems became impossible to ignore. More specifically, three main arguments, which have been most commonly used to warrant the prohibition of banned substances in official policy statements, have been debated: that drugs are harmful to athletes; that drugs corrupt the ideal of the “fair playing field” in sport; and finally, that drugs corrupt the central ideals, ethos, or “spirit” of sport. While debates regarding these fundamental issues are ongoing, and while the philosophical arguments have become more sophisticated over time, the justifications themselves continue to be plagued by often obvious contradictions of performance enhancing techniques, technology, science, and the like that

are permitted but still contradict the central arguments used in support of anti doping prohibitions.

The second stream of research falls within policy studies, which considers the efficacy of procedures to detect and deter athletes; the power, structure, and legitimacy of organizations that attempt to control drug use; and, more recently, the rights of athletes and their involvement – or lack thereof – in the policy creation and implementation process. Most policy analysis has concentrated on three important organizations: the International Olympic Committee, the various International Sport Federations that oversee policies for separate sports within the Olympic Movement, and the World Anti Doping Agency.

Third, studies in the sociology of deviance and deviant behavior consider the issue from the perspective of the creation of deviant subcultures in which substances are both latently and manifestly encouraged, and more generally from the perspective of the general social construction of deviance, including issues of organizational power that have come to play in defining certain substances as deviant or unethical.

Finally, critical historical accounts have attempted to understand the specific social and political circumstances out of which the widespread use of performance enhancing substances and methods – banned or otherwise – emerged. Here efforts have concentrated on the post World War II era, and specifically the development of bureaucratically organized national high performance sports systems in the Olympic Movement, because it was in this context that the scientifically, technologically, and medically assisted pursuit of the linear record became the sine qua non of international competitive sport. The most obvious example was the former German Democratic Republic, which for approximately three decades maintained a state run system of “supplementary materials.” However, performance enhancers became integrated components of the high performance sports systems of many East and West bloc countries during the Cold War era, and these practices continue today.

The latter two disciplinary streams are the most important for sociologists and their attempts to understand the drug/substance use issue. In terms of critical historical accounts, a

seminal text is John Hoberman's *Mortal Engines* (1992). Hoberman traces the birth of performance enhancement in sport back to the original development of relationships formed between biomedical scientists and athletes in the late nineteenth century. Interestingly, however, scientists had little interest in helping athletes boost performances; the real interest was merely studying athletes – because of the physical extremes to which they pushed their bodies in training and competition – to discern biophysiological “truths” about the human body as a whole. Only later in the 1920s and 1930s did the idea begin to emerge that athletes' bodies might have unlimited physical potential. From that point on, biomedical scientists were joined by a cadre of other self proclaimed experts who attempted to use virtually any means possible to enhance athletes' abilities to train, compete, and push the body to ostensibly endless limits. This trend only accelerated during the Olympic Cold War years as national sports systems vied for gold medals and national ideological aggrandizement. Hoberman convincingly demonstrates that the push toward the use of increasingly sophisticated scientific and technological means of enhancement developed into a mania of sorts in the last half of the twentieth century, during which time drug use became only the more visible symptom of this uninhibited obsession. Hoberman cautions, then, that we need to think carefully about the ultimate purpose of this obsession, because while science and technology have almost limitless possibilities, the human body does not.

With respect to understanding substance use from the perspective of the sociology of deviant behavior, a landmark study is Robert Hughes and Jay Coakley's “Positive Deviance Among Athletes” (1991). Adding to Robert Merton's classic typology of modes of individual adaptation to cultural goals and institutional means, the authors maintain that in the right environment athletes “overconform” to a “sport ethic” – a set of value orientations that guide the decisions and actions of serious athletes. The ethic's criteria – unwritten but nevertheless extremely pervasive in athletes' lives – include making sacrifices, taking physical risks, and refusing to accept limits in the pursuit of performance potentials and goals. With respect to drug use, the implication of the model

developed by Hughes and Coakley is that the constellation of criteria that determine the sport ethic constitute for serious athletes a very different line of demarcation between what is normal versus pathological than what the general public or, for that matter, many sports authorities might consider it to be. The sport ethic – and not just drug use per se – will, the authors claim, have to be taken into account before the “moral crisis” of drug use can be resolved.

These studies reflect two major streams of inquiry that are crucial in developing a more complete understanding of the drug/substance use issue. First, a better understanding of the historical development of modern high performance sport as a whole is necessary. While Hoberman's work has brought attention to the important role the development of biomedicine played in the general emphasis on performance enhancement, surprisingly little is known about the specific social and political environments out of which the use of drugs has emerged. Today, while the decision taken by an individual athlete agent to use a banned substance may appear to be an isolated and perhaps voluntary one, in reality that decision takes place within the context of a large, complex set of historically created and socially situated actions and relationships. The use of performance enhancers reflects, at minimum: the general historical forces and relations that have comprised the real world of high performance sport as it has developed in the twentieth century, especially since World War II and during the Olympic Cold War years; the particular set of political circumstances that motivated nation states to develop sophisticated and well funded sports systems in the pursuit of the linear record and gold medals, utilizing virtually any available scientific and technological means necessary, including drug supplementation; and the general emphasis on and triumph of instrumental rationality in modern life, which affected high performance sport as much as, if not more than, any other sphere of social life.

Second, there is a glaring lacuna in the sociological literature in that very little is understood about the real lived experiences of high performance athletes, their training and working conditions, and the processes through which their athletic identities are created. To

a much greater degree sociologists have studied the socialization processes that lead boys and girls into sport and physical activity, and to a lesser but nevertheless still significant degree the social and psychological process of serious athletes retiring or disengaging from sport and the athlete identity. However, there is little understanding of the experience of becoming a competitive, national or world class athlete and the processes through which methods of performance enhancement – banned or otherwise – become part of an athlete's identity and his or her everyday, lived experience.

These two macro and micro streams of analysis are crucial when trying to explain the moral crises in high performance sport to which the Canadian *Commission of Inquiry* referred. The existence of the World Anti Doping Agency reflects the legitimacy of efforts to rid sport of drug and substance use but it also attests to the fact that the problem persists unabated. Like all similar elements of social life defined as deviant and regarded as major social problems, the issue of substance use in sport will continue to play an important role in the development of provocative streams of sociological thought and research, especially as the use of drugs and other performance technologies in sport intensifies on a global scale.

SEE ALSO: Deviance; Deviance, Sport and; Drug Use; Drugs, Drug Abuse, and Drug Policy; Drugs and the Law; Health and Sport; Olympics; Socialization and Sport; Sport as Work

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Du Bois: "Talented Tenth"

Rutledge M. Dennis

At crucial moments in a people's history, the question "What is to be done?" is raised. Alongside this question, additional questions will follow, such as "Who will do it, when, and how?" When one explores such works as Plato's *Republic*, Machiavelli's *The Prince*, Comte's *Course in Positive Philosophy*, and Marx's *Communist Manifesto*, one is deeply aware of the sense of crisis expressed by the writers and the urgency with which they raised the questions posed above. One must therefore understand the responses to group or national crises and the urgency of responses to such crises before fully understanding W. E. B. Du Bois's own urgent response to the national crisis of race, and to the many ways in which the crisis was more pronounced and devastating to blacks.

Du Bois first proposed a highly visible role for the educated segment of the black population in an article entitled "The Talented Tenth" (1903), and throughout his long life, at least until the 1950s, his life and the organizational and institutional networks he constructed both amplified and represented the importance of the role of the educated. But what was successful in practice was, however, not quite as successful when it came to justifying the theory. In fact, Du Bois's theory was

attacked from two main quarters. First, Booker T. Washington criticized the usefulness of those who had devoted much of their life to book learning, and he doubted their proficiency in dealing with real people and their problems. Secondly, the very idea of an elite stratum, even one devoted to a good cause, did not sit well with many. Indeed, the elite theme was one closely associated with white supremacy, white privilege, and black exclusion. But a careful scrutiny of Du Bois's logic surrounding an educated elite would lead one to disavow and refute both criticisms.

The justification for such a stratum was deeply rooted in the economic, cultural, and political realities of the United States, especially the South, during the last quarter of the nineteenth century. Du Bois urgently wanted to jump start and accelerate racial and social change within black communities as well as open the larger society to black participation in all realms, especially the political. In this sense, the educated cadre had a dual mission, one of which would be addressing internal black matters such as education, health, and economics; the other, that of addressing the resistance to freedom, democracy, and justice which permeated white society. What is often missing from the criticisms leveled against the concept was the heightened sense of dedication, sacrifice, and special mission of this stratum that was at the core of Du Bois's rationale for such an elite. The "Luke theorem" could be presented as a justification for expecting much from this educated stratum. The theorem found in Luke 12:48 asserts that: "For unto whomsoever much is given, of him shall be much required: and to whom men have committed much, of him they will ask the more." Du Bois would certainly have disavowed any grounding of his idea in scripture given his general agnostic views, but the theorem clearly states the terms in the manner in which Du Bois often stated why the educated stratum had an obligation to assist the black community: with its talent, skills, and opportunities, this stratum, Du Bois believed, comprised the natural leadership of black America.

Du Bois embedded his talented tenth concept in an array of organizational and institutional structures. This point becomes obvious in any analysis of the organizations Du Bois assisted in founding: the Negro Academy, the Niagara

Movement, the National Association for the Advancement of Colored People (NAACP), the various Pan African Conferences and Assemblies, and the Atlanta University Studies. In addition, there were the journals and periodicals: *Crisis*, *Phylon*, *Moon*, and *Horizon*. Du Bois viewed these organizations and periodicals as essentially tools to be used in propagandizing the population, blacks and whites. For blacks, the tools represented vehicles for presenting a more accurate and objective view of themselves, their successes and failures, but also their hopes and aspirations for new and rewarding racial and social advancements. For whites, Du Bois wanted to dislodge racial stereotypes and feelings and to present a picture of the New Negro, a term made popular by the anthology edited by Alain Locke (1969 [1925]).

The idea of a viable and unique educated cadre would decline in importance in the 1950s, partially due to Du Bois's disappointment at the lack of support for him among educated blacks when he was arrested and charged with treason during the McCarthy era, and perhaps partly due to a slow movement by Du Bois into the international communist movement. He formally joined the party in 1961, but even before doing so, he ceased to view black Americans as a possible beacon of strength and devotion to the cause of their own liberty, believing instead that freedom from the worst vestiges of segregation and terror only enabled blacks to follow whites down a path of worshipping money and success rather than a devotion to struggles for their liberation. But this view coincided with an increasing emphasis on the class factor in contemporary life.

A review of Du Bois's concept of a talented tenth does not suggest that he wanted this cadre to lord over blacks, as Washington and others suggested. Rather, his rationale was a simple recognition that there were individuals with skills, talents, and interests who were willing to place their economic, educational, and cultural assets where they might be more useful to an entire population for its collective benefit; that there were those whose leadership skills would serve, from Du Bois's perspective, as the natural bridge between the black and white worlds. What Du Bois wanted, above all, was a fighting cadre, one which would confront people

and issues and fight the good fight for blacks, just as he had been doing himself.

Du Bois would agree with the assertion that the talented tenth is alive today, though many who comprise this group would refrain from using the term. They are organized into many professional, educational, political, social, and cultural groups. The Congressional Black Caucus would constitute such a group, as would groups such as the Association of Black Sociologists, associations of political scientists, psychologists, historians, anthropologists, and the various Black Studies Associations, and literally hundreds of other professional organizations and associations. Included in this group would also be the numerous black fraternities and sororities, as well as other interest groups. When one reads the goals and objectives of these organizations and associations, it is clear that the shadow of Du Bois lurks over them, because they all speak of a need to address and redress issues in black life. Black Americans were not unique in having one of their great scholars and leaders enunciate a theory of leadership to address pressing social issues. What was unique was the timing of such a leadership strategy and its emergence in an evolving American democracy during the last quarter of the nineteenth century when the nation, especially its black population, was in great emotional, political, social, economic, and cultural disarray. What was also unique was the enunciation of such a scheme in a society in which blacks were hated by many, greatly disliked by others, and largely ignored by still others. Du Bois's concept of black leadership continues to be a viable and necessary feature of the American reality as long as race and the black presence continue to be a bone, as de Tocqueville so clearly stated it, in the throat of white America.

SEE ALSO: Double Consciousness; Du Bois, W. E. B.; Marginality; Race

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Du Bois, W. E. B. (1868–1963)

Rutledge M. Dennis

W. E. B. Du Bois was a sociologist and historian, born in Great Barrington, Massachusetts. Though he wanted to attend Harvard after high school, the lack of funds and the advice of a few of his teachers dissuaded him, so, instead, he attended Fisk, where he received his BA in 1888. He received a second BA from Harvard University in 1890, from where he was also awarded an MA (1891) and a PhD (1895) with the dissertation "The Suppression of the African Slave Trade to the United States of America, 1638–1870." Between 1892 and 1894 Du Bois was a graduate student at the University of Berlin, made possible by a combination gift/loan from the Slater Fund. This experience would have enduring consequences on both his personality and his scholarship, though, as he stated in his classic *Souls of Black Folk* (1903), his experiences at both Fisk and Harvard had already shaped some of his views on race, class, and philosophy.

Du Bois's sociological significance rests on three major themes: (1) his role as one of the early sociology pioneers; (2) his role as a sociologist of race; and (3) his role as a scholar activist. As one of the early modern pioneers, along with Durkheim, Weber, and Simmel, Du Bois viewed the connection between theory and research as inextricably linked to the alleviation of social problems and as contributors to overall societal reform. This was important to Du Bois because so little data had been collected in areas in which scholars allegedly knew so much. For his first major social research project Du Bois used some of the methodologies culled from Charles Booth's famous London study. Indeed, Du Bois was the first American scholar to use

sociological methods – questionnaires, interviews, and participant observation, use of city directories, and church and civic organizational records – to study the social structure and behavioral characteristics of a minority group within a larger majority and dominant class and amid a racially exclusive urban setting. This study provided much insight into the significance of the black church as a religious and social center in black life. The result was the classic urban community study, *The Philadelphia Negro* (1899). Earlier, he conducted a study of a small Virginia town, *Farmville Negro* (1897). These two studies, one of the North, the other of the South, permitted Du Bois to delve into comparative analyses between the black North and the black South, some of which are seen in *The Souls of Black Folk* and in a series of articles (which were in fact sociological essays) written for Northern newspapers and later collected by others and published as *The Black North* (1901). The research–reform dialectic can also be seen in Du Bois’s editorship of the Atlanta University Studies which sought, via research, to study almost every facet of black life and culture in the US, and to use the results to push for societal reform, especially along racial and class lines. But his youthful faith in science, knowledge, and truth as obviating factors in prejudice and discrimination would be greatly shaken by the realization that knowing the truth would not offset the great economic, political, and sociocultural advantages groups derived from oppressing other groups.

Even as Du Bois fought mightily to believe that science and objectivity would make a difference in matters of race, class, and social justice, his scholarly and sociopolitical activities illustrated that he would be the Great Dialectician, whose mind, interests, and concerns might reflect shifting intellectual modes and themes. So, even as theme (1), science and research, was in operation, as a good dialectician he was already into theme (2) with its focus on a sociology of race. For example, his paper “The Conservation of Races” (1897) was a justification for maintaining certain racial/cultural values, even as blacks sought greater entry into the larger society. Today, such a claim is understandable under the rubric of social and cultural pluralism. This article and a later one, “The Study of the Negro Problem”

(1898), but especially *The Souls of Black Folk*, would make race analysis, its shape, depth, and contours, as important for many as Marx’s class analysis had been and continues to be. It is here as a sociologist of race that later generations of scholars and students would find sociological richness in concepts such as the talented tenth, double consciousness, the color line, the veil, racial solidarity, and masking.

Du Bois’s prescient assertion in *Souls* that “the problem of the twentieth century is the problem of the color line” was a bold prediction for what was in store for the western world, but also presaged a lifetime struggle for himself, as he vowed to lend a hand in the destruction of that color line. The very title, *The Souls of Black Folk*, would be an exploratory search and revelation as Du Bois would lay bare, for whites to see, the heart and soul of a people. What was also patently visible was the heart and soul of the young scholar Du Bois, for even before C. Wright Mills asserted his version of a sociological imagination, Du Bois, in *Souls* (p. 87), had inserted himself personally into a larger national and international sociology and history. He was to define himself through his race, and conversely he wanted to define his race through his exemplary bearing, behavior, and sense of self worth: “I sit with Shakespeare and he winches not . . . I summon Aristotle and Aurelius and what soul I will . . . So, wed with truth, I dwell above the Veil.” It was clear in *Souls* that Du Bois would not only be a part of the great history he foresaw for the twentieth century, but would also make and shape that future history. This was no clearer than in his great debate with and attack on the preeminent black leader of the early twentieth century, Booker T. Washington. The intellectual skirmishes, flank attacks, and the subtle and not so subtle innuendoes from both men and their respective camps reflected the belief of each that he had the key to the black present and future. Neither succeeded. That is why the profound issues in the Du Bois–Washington debate – the importance of industrial vs. higher education, the priority of economics vs. politics and civil rights, and the style and type of leadership needed for black America – continue to resonate today, often with the same vigor and emotion as they did during the height of the debate.

The more one researches the life of Du Bois, the more it becomes abundantly clear that neither his life nor his intellectual and scholarly activities can be neatly compartmentalized, and his ideas are found in so many intellectual niches and corners. So profound were his scholarly output and the causes for which he fought that one could objectively view his era as the Age of Du Bois, and it is in theme (3), the scholar activist, that this is best expressed (Dennis 1996, 1997). With the increasing loss of faith in science Du Bois began to define himself as a scholar activist – he uses the term “propagandist” – and would become, as the chief “propagandist for the race,” the scholar as organizer: organizer of four Pan African Congresses; founder and general secretary of the Niagara Movement; one of the founders of the NAACP; founder and editor of *The Moon*; founder and editor of *The Horizon*; founder and editor of *The Crisis*; founder and editor of *Phylon*. And during this same period he writes sociologically significant books, books reflecting his markedly leftward political shift: *John Brown* (1909), *Black Reconstruction* (1935), *Dusk of Dawn* (1940), and *The World and Africa* (1947). *In Battle for Peace* (1952) was written after he had been indicted, placed on trial, and acquitted for being an unregistered foreign agent of the Soviet Union, as a result of his leadership in various peace movements and organizations. Given his pronounced political preferences and pronouncements throughout the 1940s and 1950s, it was not surprising to many when in 1961 Du Bois joined the Communist Party of the United States. In a masterful stroke marking him as a true dialectician, Du Bois, that same year, accepted an invitation from President Nkrumah to go to Ghana to complete his Encyclopedia Africana Project, a project which would be a version of the Encyclopedia of the Negro, which Du Bois initiated in 1909. In 1963 he renounced his American citizenship and became a citizen of Ghana. He died on August 27, 1963 on the eve of the historic March On Washington. Four autobiographical works (Du Bois 1903, 1920, 1940, 1968) aptly document Du Bois the scholar, the intellectual, the academician, the social activist, the organizer propagandist, and the international political spokesman. Each volume also provides more than a glimpse of Du Bois the sociologist.

Du Bois is a man of many parts, and these parts are significant to many laypersons and scholars in a variety of disciplines. Since the 1960s – when he was largely the “forgotten sociologist” – we have entered an era in which there is increased attention on Du Bois the sociologist, who historically tended to be overshadowed by Du Bois the activist. A brief perusal of today’s introductory texts and books on theory illustrates the strides many have made in fighting to ensure Du Bois’s rightful place in the sociological pantheon among the other great pioneers.

SEE ALSO: Accommodation; Color Line; Double Consciousness; Du Bois: “Talented Tenth”; Pluralism, American; Race and Ethnic Consciousness; Separatism

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dual-earner couples

Pamela Aronson and Sara Gold

Dual earner couples are romantically involved (either married or unmarried) and each contribute to the financial support of their household through their work outside the home. The presence of dual earner couples has increased over the last 40 years, as there has been a shift away from the traditional male breadwinner and female homemaker family type. The breadwinner homemaker model waned in prevalence as women entered the workforce in large numbers, especially after the 1950s. For example, in 1976, 31 percent of women with infants under 1 year old worked outside the home; by 2002, 54.6 percent did so (US Census Bureau 2002). These figures are significantly higher for women with school aged children and women who are not parents. The influx of women into the workplace occurred for a number of reasons, including more equal access to education and occupations, greater demand for workers in the service sector of the economy, and social changes brought on by the women's movement. As a result, an increasing number of women provide significant financial support to their families (Gornick & Meyers 2003).

Families with lower incomes have historically been more likely than those with middle or higher incomes to rely on the earnings of two workers. Today, however, advantaged women (such as middle class, white, married women) are increasingly likely to contribute to their family incomes. Dual earner couples are more common in part because of the declining value of men's wages. Women's earnings have been extremely important in helping families maintain their standard of living, especially for working class and lower middle class

couples (Bianchi & Spain 1996). Although women's wages have risen over time, women still earn substantially less than men for nearly all occupations (US Census Bureau 2000).

Dual earner couples are diverse in their family situations and experiences. They can be married with children, married without children, cohabitating heterosexual couples, or cohabitating same sex couples. The experiences associated with having two workers in the household also vary depending on one's stage of life. For example, dual earner couples with young children face different rewards and challenges in balancing work and family than "empty nest" couples who are looking toward retirement (Moen 2003). Despite this diversity in experience, dual earner couples often encounter particular benefits, strains, and tensions as they integrate and balance two careers with a romantic relationship and home life.

Dual earner couples often make decisions about when and whether to have children with the concerns of balancing two careers and a family in mind. Dual earner couples are increasingly delaying having children until their career paths are established. In 1960, 60 percent of women aged 20 to 24 and three quarters of women aged 25 to 29 had become parents (White 1999). Forty years later, the percentage of women with children in these age groups had declined to 33 and 55 percent, respectively (US Census Bureau 2002). In addition to delaying children, some dual earner couples choose not to have children.

Dual earner couples frequently must decide whose career will receive a higher priority. Decisions that advance one member of the couple's career may, at the same time, put the other's career on hold. In the past, priority was almost always given to the husband's career. Presently, though this approach remains a common strategy, these couples are less likely to place a higher priority on the husband's career and are more likely to take a variety of factors beyond gender into consideration.

Dual earner couples must redefine what their breadwinner/homemaker counterparts have already classified as measures of success. Traditionally, a breadwinner husband is successful when he financially supports his family and a homemaker wife is successful when she emotionally supports her family and takes care

of their home. Dual earning affords both members of a couple opportunities to feel successful by fulfilling both home and work responsibilities. Moen et al. (2003) report that feelings of success are not dependent on a tradeoff or balancing act between the two realms of home and work, but on a sense of living a well rounded life. The benefits of the dual earning situation include financial stability, the potential for greater gender equality, and positive mental health.

To meet their personal and professional needs, dual earner couples rely on a number of strategies to structure their work and home lives, such as carefully negotiating schedules or number of work hours. Those with children are more likely to have a large discrepancy in the number of hours that each parent works, whereas couples without children typically have similar work hour arrangements. Mothers are still much more likely than fathers to scale back or rearrange their work hours in order to take care of children. This gender difference reveals that dual earner couples' choices are often "neo traditional" in character (Moen & Sweet 2003). Many of these families with children work different shifts – such as weekends or nights – in order to minimize the amount of necessary childcare. One study, for example, found that one third of dual earner couples with preschool aged children worked such a "split shift" (Presser 1999).

The absence of a full time homemaker makes it necessary for these families to employ a variety of strategies to achieve a well managed household, as they must fit the responsibilities of running a household into their often limited time at home. The total amount of time spent doing housework in America has been declining, especially among employed wives. Many families hire outside help to fill this time gap. Although some dual earner couples strive for an egalitarian division of labor, others do not. As a result, women are more likely to take on the "second shift" responsibilities at home (Hochschild 1989). That is, despite labor force participation, women are more likely to take on a managerial role in the home and perform about twice as much of the housework as men. The "time bind" that results from combining long work hours with home responsibilities can be a source of stress for many families. As work offers greater

external rewards than home, many families report feeling more successful and relaxed at work, while time pressed at home (Hochschild 2000).

Dual earner couples often experience what is known as "spillover:" "the transfer of mood, affect, and behavior between work and home" (Roehling et al. 2003: 101). Spillover can be both positive and negative. For example, positive work to family spillover occurs when feelings of success at work lead to a relaxed attitude at home. Conversely, when stress at work causes a parent to lose patience with a child at home, negative work to family spillover may be to blame. An example of positive family to work spillover occurs when workers are more productive on their jobs as a result of experiencing a satisfying family life. An example of negative family to work spillover includes family intrusions on work time. Workplaces that are supportive of employees' home commitments and that offer higher levels of worker autonomy tend to result in less negative spillover. The opposite is true of jobs with lower levels of support or flexibility. For dual earner couples, negative spillover can have a significant impact, as both partners are negotiating similar work and family commitments. Negative spillover tends to be less of a problem for those couples who work similar, and fewer (less than 45), hours per week (Roehling et al. 2003).

The benefits, strains, and tensions of the dual earning situation are commonly thought of as personal matters. This perception persists even though there is a widening gap between workers' needs and governmental and workplace policies. For example, the Family and Medical Leave Act of 1993 guarantees many workers up to 12 weeks of unpaid leave to care for an immediate family member during a time of serious illness. While this policy is helpful for many workers, not all employees are covered under the law and its unpaid nature makes it difficult for many workers to take leave from their jobs. Workplace policies, the most common of which is flextime, do not adequately recognize the demands facing dual earner couples. For example, employers often expect workers to place all home life responsibilities on their spouses. Issues pertaining to childcare, health care benefits, and the number of hours that employees must work to be considered

“full time” are all ripe for new policy innovation to support the most common working arrangement among American families. Whether policy makers will push for more changes to bring work life policies in line with home life realities remains to be seen.

SEE ALSO: Divisions of Household Labor; Gender, Work, and Family; Life Course and Family; Marital Power/Resource Theory; Stratification, Gender and; Stress and Work; Women, Economy and; Work, Sociology of

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dual labor markets

Tony Elger

The concept of labor market dualism was first developed by institutionalist economists critical of conventional analyses of the labor market (Peck 1996). They argued that different categories of workers faced contrasting management policies, as white male workers were preferentially recruited to jobs offering training, pay gains, promotion, and job security. This meant access to organizational job ladders which constituted “internal labor markets” governed primarily by organizational rules. Meanwhile, women and minority ethnic groups generally had access to insecure, low paid jobs without internal training and promotion prospects, and were confined to the external labor market constituted by such jobs. This analysis contested neoclassical economic models of the allocation of individual workers across a spectrum of jobs according to individual skills and preferences, and emphasized the ways in which organizational structures and management decisions generated a division between primary and secondary labor markets which operated according to different logics.

Dual labor market theorists nevertheless differed in their analyses of the organizational logic of dualism. Some linked it to the contrast between large oligopolistic employers and small competitive enterprises. Since large employers themselves differentiated between primary and secondary workforces, however, others argued that managers constructed primary labor markets to retain relatively skilled workers, especially after investing resources in firm specific training. Finally, radical commentators suggested dualism was often the result of management tactics of divide and rule, rather than technical calculations about protecting investment in training.

These analyses were primarily designed to explain the *persistence* of labor market dualism, but recent organizational restructuring has involved a reduction in stable routes of career progression and a growth in less secure forms of employment (Grimshaw et al. 2001). Meanwhile, areas of skills shortage, combined with equal opportunities policies, have opened *some*

doors for qualified but hitherto excluded groups. One dual labor market analysis which addressed change rather than stability was the “flexible firm” model, which contrasted core “insiders” providing functional flexibility with peripheral “outsiders” characterized by numerical flexibility (Kalleberg 2003). The core experienced horizontal movements within teams or across tasks more than vertical advancement, while the periphery included part time, temporary, and subcontract work. However, this model was more a prescription than an analysis, recommending that employers and the state codify and develop their employment practices in this way. It was criticized for (1) imputing a coherent strategic orientation to management, when such policies are often ad hoc, reactive and constrained; (2) conflating distinctive forms of numerical flexibility, such as part time, casual, and consultancy work, with quite different labor market implications for those involved; and (3) ignoring substantial sector differences (Pollert 1988).

Debates from the 1980s have prompted the development of more complex analyses of labor market *segmentation* by institutionalist economists and economic sociologists (Rubery & Wilkinson 1994; Peck 1996). Descriptively this has involved identifying multiple labor market segments rather than a simple dualism. Distinctions have been made between professional and managerial segments involving vertical progression through moves within and between employers; semi professional and craft segments involving predominantly horizontal moves between relatively secure positions with different employers; white collar and manual segments involving modest internal job ladders within specific organizations; relatively secure non career jobs often associated with part time work; and persistently insecure forms of employment. Such segments are not seen as entirely stable, but rather as modified and remade. They involve shifting clusters of opportunities and insecurities, sometimes linked to changing sources of labor supply, rather than a uniform movement towards flux and insecurity.

Such segmentation analyses have been underpinned by discussions of both the social organization of the demand for labor and the social organization of the supply of labor (Peck 1996). While management decisions are pivotal

on the demand side, changing family and household relations are central to the supply side, while state policies help to structure both. The elaboration of this conceptual framework has provided leverage in the analysis of differences in the social organization and regulation of labor markets over time and between different states, as they embedded in distinctive social institutions of capitalism.

SEE ALSO: Capitalism, Social Institutions of; Ethnic and Racial Division of Labor; Ethnicity; Households; Labor/Labor Power; Labor Markets; Stratification, Gender and

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Durkheim, Émile (1858–1917)

Anne Warfield Rawls

Émile Durkheim, often referred to as the founder of sociology, was born April 15, 1858 in Épinal, France. Appointed to the first professorship of sociology in the world, he worked tirelessly over three decades as a lecturer and writer to establish sociology as a distinct discipline with its own unique theoretical and methodological foundation. After an illustrious career, first in Bordeaux and then after 1902 in Paris at the Sorbonne, Durkheim died in

November 1917, still a relatively young man, never having recovered from grief after most of the young sociologists he had trained, including his own son André, were killed in World War I.

Durkheim's basic argument was that the human rational being is fundamentally a creation of social relations. His related arguments against all forms of individualism, and for a distinct sociological object and method, stand at the heart of sociology as a discipline. Motivated from the beginning by a recognition that the organization, rationality, and morality of modern societies are different from traditional belief based social forms in fundamental ways, he argued that these differences pose serious challenges to contemporary society. He credited Rousseau and Montesquieu with inspiring his emphasis on the social origin of the individual, an emphasis he holds in common with other classical social thinkers (e.g., Comte, Marx, Weber, and Mead). The individual as a social production, and the centrality of social phenomena in all aspects of human experience, are ideas that distinguish sociology from other disciplines' approaches to social order, social action, modernity, economic exchange, mutual intelligibility, and justice.

Durkheim's arguments have played a central role in the development of almost every aspect of sociology since its inception. His position was popularized as functionalism by Talcott Parsons in the late 1930s, and as a focus on symbolic systems by Lucien Lévy Bruhl and Claude Lévi Strauss from the 1920s to the 1960s. Postmodernism and poststructuralism, which developed in the 1960s and remained popular through the turn of the century, are both reactions to the way these two earlier conflicting interpretations of Durkheim's arguments developed over time.

Durkheim's innovative use of statistics in *Suicide*, and his articulation of a sociological method of measuring what he called "social facts" in *The Rules of the Sociological Method*, remain a foundation for sociological methodology even today. His arguments with regard to the social origin of ideas inspired the development of the sociology of knowledge and, more recently, cultural sociology. His arguments regarding universes of discourse have also been taken up by the sociology of science

where they rival those of Wittgenstein in their importance with regard to various sociologies of practice.

Durkheim's emphasis on practices, first articulated in *The Division of Labor in Society* (1893), then elaborated in *The Elementary Forms of the Religious Life* (1912), stands as one of the most modern approaches to social order of its time and continues to pose challenges to the sociological understanding of modernity. In that work, what would later emerge in the arguments of Wittgenstein and others as problems with the conception of meaning and rules took shape as Durkheim sketched out the problem of meaning in a modern context of differentiated multicultural exchange. He formulated a distinction between two forms of society, one modern and based on differentiated labor, the other traditional and based on shared beliefs. The contrast between the two, he argued, involved a contrast between rules that self regulate and rules that depend on external beliefs and sanctions for their efficacy. Only the former, he argued, could sustain order and meaning in a modern context. The latter belonged strictly to traditional social forms. The way Durkheim used different types of law to illustrate his argument about the new form of rules inspired sociological studies of crime and law.

Durkheim argued that a confusion about the difference between traditional and modern social forms and a tendency to try to apply traditional forms of law/rule to modern societies were responsible for many social problems. Arguably, the tendency of Durkheim's interpreters to confuse the two social types has had a detrimental effect on the field's development. His emphasis on the distinctiveness of the modern is an essential part of the sociological legacy.

Durkheim's position was modern in crucial ways. For instance, whereas Freud's *Totem and Taboo* (1913) reflected the prejudices of the times by likening the primitive mind to the mentally ill, Durkheim's *The Elementary Forms of the Religious Life*, published a year earlier, insisted that aboriginal social forms and their corresponding beliefs were as rational as their modern counterparts. This was a surprisingly modern stand against the explicit and politically accepted ethnocentrism of Durkheim's time. He regarded

reason as a social product, rendering nonsensical distinctions such as mentally inferior or superior, and infusing his sociology with a fundamental egalitarianism – a new moral philosophy grounded in social facts, and a new sociological epistemology with universal applicability.

Students of Durkheim's who survived the war – the most famous of whom was his nephew, Marcel Mauss – contributed to anthropology rather than to sociology. Because of Durkheim's early death, the long and influential careers of Mauss and others of these students constitute Durkheim's main influence in France. In *The Gift*, Mauss introduced the idea of gifts as reciprocal and symbolic exchanges that create networks of mutual obligation, an idea that challenged the established contrast between "pure" gift and economic exchange. Like Durkheim, Mauss disputed the prevailing individualism of an economic approach to exchange, imbuing it with a thoroughly social character.

For many years Durkheim's popularization in sociology was left to Parsons, resulting in interpretations of Durkheim that were consistent with Parsons's own structural functionalism. It was only with the increasing unpopularity of structural functionalism in the 1960s and 1970s that sociologists began to look for alternative interpretations of Durkheim's work. Thus, there was a revival of Durkheim studies at the end of the century.

Feminists sometimes argue that Durkheim's work ignored women, or adopted an insensitive stance toward them. He certainly did not theorize about women in any depth, but very few men were aware of women's issues at all in the 1890s. Even so, it is significant that Durkheim not only argued for the rational status of aboriginal people, but also had some awareness of the position of women. For instance, in *Suicide* he noted that there seemed to be a fourth form of suicide which he called "fatalistic," particularly prevalent among women. While noting that he lacked sufficient evidence, he suggested that marriage, while beneficial to men, may have a negative effect on women. Durkheim also noted in *The Division of Labor* that studies of aboriginal people suggest women were once as strong as men and that the development of society, and the positions women hold in modern societies, have made women weaker. Given the turn of the century tendency to view women as innately

gentle and weak, Durkheim's opinion in this regard is noteworthy.

PERSONAL HISTORY

Durkheim married Louise Dreyfus in 1887, the year he first accepted teaching duties at Bordeaux. Her family was from Alsace and her father owned a business in Paris. Not much has been written about Louise, but by all accounts theirs was a very happy marriage in which she acted as a companion in work, as well as household manager. Lukes (1973: 99ff.) quotes from a letter written by Mauss that Louise "never left his side, and that, being well educated, she even collaborated with him in his work; she copied manuscripts, corrected proofs and shared in the administrative and editorial work of the *Année sociologique*."

There were two children from this marriage: André Armand and Marie. André studied with Durkheim at the Sorbonne and had just completed his aggregation when the war broke out. He was sent to the Bulgarian front late in 1915 (Lukes 1973: 555). Marie's husband also was drafted by the army, as were five of Durkheim's nephews. Of the 342 students at the École Normale Supérieure called up for service, 293 went to the front and 104 were killed (Lukes 1973: 548), and many more would suffer crippling physical and emotional wounds.

For Durkheim, the loss of his son André was particularly acute for they had been close intellectual companions. Durkheim wrote in his son's obituary that "for a long time I was his sole teacher and I always remained closely associated with his studies. Very early he showed a marked interest in the researches to which I have devoted myself and the moment was near when he was about to become a companion in my work. The intellectual intimacy between us was thus as complete as possible" (1917: 201).

Sociology was a family enterprise for the Durkheims. As in the marriages of other major figures at the time, notably that of Marianne Weber (a scholar in her own right who compiled the posthumous papers of her husband Max), Louise shared significantly in Durkheim's intellectual labors. Not only his son André, but also various nephews and their friends studied sociology with Durkheim. André in particular seems

to have been present for the lectures on pragmatism (Durkheim 1960 [1913–14]). Long hours spent with students and extended family, lecturing, editing, and discussing, would have made sociology a congenial focus of family relations. Thus, the personal losses of the war for Durkheim also devastated French sociology precisely because it had been such a collaborative effort among close friends and family.

The damage to French sociology caused by World War I was compounded when the Nazis invaded Paris in World War II. Durkheim's daughter Marie, who had inherited his papers, was forced to flee and the entire archive of his papers and notes, kept carefully in a separate room, was destroyed by the Nazis (Mestrovic 1988).

Like other classical social theorists, often referred to disparagingly as “Dead White Men,” Durkheim was not a member of the ruling elite in France, holding instead the marginal status of a Jewish minority. Born on the border between France and Germany and descended from a long line of rabbis, Durkheim experienced anti-Semitism and his social situation was always fragile. The idea of “whiteness” and of “white men” as a dominant social group is a peculiarly American idea. In Europe, distinctions on the basis of class, religion, and ethnicity always rivaled those of race in importance.

Durkheim would have carried his Jewish origins with him always and would never have enjoyed the privileged status of a white male in America. Shortly after the death of his son in the spring of 1915, while overcome with grief, Durkheim was subjected to several serious public incidents of anti-Semitism. His French residency was challenged and defended in the Senate, the dispute finding its way into the papers. On January 19, 1916 in the *Libre Parole*, Durkheim was called “a Boche with a false nose” and accused of working for the Germans (Lukes 1973: 557). Given the battle he was waging to regain focus after the death of his son, these incidents would have weighed heavily on Durkheim and likely contributed to the stroke he suffered later that year.

Durkheim's argument in *Division of Labor* that justice is required by the self-regulating practices of modern states, and that modern social forms that do not achieve justice are abnormal and cannot persist over time, is

illustrated in a letter he wrote about the war on September 15, 1914: “Never had the ideal to which we are all attached shown its strength more clearly . . . Prussia and Austria are unnatural aggregates, established and maintained by force, and they have not been able gradually to replace force and compulsory subjection by voluntary support. An empire so constructed cannot last. The geography of Europe will be remade on a rational and moral basis” (Lukes 1973: 547–8). In the midst of the war, Durkheim found confidence in his own argument that modernity required a new form of moral solidarity. Germany might rail against the new egalitarian and democratic forms of society and resist by force, and many of Durkheim's students and family members might be killed, but in the end it could not work. The cost in terms of the war would be great, but the outcome always was certain.

MAJOR SUBSTANTIVE CONTRIBUTIONS

According to Durkheim, the transformation of the individual biological being into a social being cannot be explained by either individual biology or psychology. Biological capacities exist, but they require redirection and reformation by social processes. Durkheim argued that dualism, a popular philosophical argument referring to the distinction between mind and body, really represented the distinction between the pre-social animal being and the social human being. The former, he says, is not a rational being. There is no innate human reason or personality. Reason is a result of social processes. In fact, he argued that particular social processes and forms of association, or social bonding, are required to create and maintain social individuals. There are no social individuals except in the context of particular social configurations. Consequently, any position that begins with the individual, such as psychology, economics, or philosophy, and tries to explain social phenomena on the basis of aggregations of individual actions will miss exactly what is important about society.

Durkheim elaborated these ideas in four major works, *The Division of Labor in Society* (1893), *The Rules of the Sociological Method*

(1895), *Suicide* (1897), and *The Elementary Forms of the Religious Life* (1912). Each was designed to illustrate a different point. In addition, Durkheim wrote a second thesis on Montesquieu, countless articles for *l'Année sociologique* (which he also edited), and gave lectures on pragmatism, socialism, moral education, and Rousseau. Taken together, these substantively different sociological studies make up a unified, empirically based theoretical view.

It was Durkheim's position that social processes create entirely new dimensions of persons and associations between persons, creating social configurations in ways that add up to more than the sum of the individual parts. He explored the differences between two social forms, which he associated with traditional and modern society in *The Division of Labor*. There Durkheim explained the need of social beings for particular sorts of social bonding, which could only be maintained by fulfilling certain basic *functional requirements*. Social entities have a coherence in their own right that makes demands on participants. For this reason, Durkheim argued that it is necessary to focus on the effects of social processes on individuals, not the other way round, and that a new discipline was needed. The concrete nature of these social processes manifests in institutions and practices that can be studied empirically. Durkheim called these *social facts*. He outlined the new discipline of sociology and its methodology in *Rules* and referred to sociology as the study of social facts.

Social facts have a coherence that does not result simply from an aggregation of individual parts, and cannot be studied by a focus on the parts. The study *Suicide* was designed to demonstrate that even this most personal of acts could be explained on the basis of the ways in which persons were associated with one another and bonded together socially. What appear as individual feelings, thoughts, and values, he argued, are the products of social participation.

In *Elementary Forms*, Durkheim lays out an argument connecting social forms to individuals. The social experience of the sacred is the moment at which social connections are born and also gives rise to the individual social being. Reason is a result of this process. Symbols also first acquire shared meaning through

totemism and its enacted rituals. Durkheim employed his analysis of totemic rites in formulating a challenge for all individualist approaches.

THE DIVISION OF LABOR: FUNCTIONALISM, PRACTICES, AND JUSTICE

Durkheim's brand of functionalism was first elaborated in *The Division of Labor*. It addresses equilibrating processes in two very different kinds of large systems. In the first of these, *mechanical solidarity*, equilibrium is created and sustained through shared beliefs. In the second, *organic solidarity*, self-regulating rules provide for stable and coherent social contexts through shared practices. Because shared beliefs require the authority of a common and enforced morality, equilibrium based on shared beliefs can only succeed if beliefs and values can be controlled by force and constraint. This social form results in a conventional morality that varies from social group to social group and requires a repressive form of law. When the equilibrium of societies is based on shared practices, however, different beliefs and values can be accommodated, and laws guaranteeing the autonomy of these contexts and their contracts emerge. Participation in self-regulating practices requires trust, reciprocity, equal access, and other qualities only possible in a system based on freedom, equality, and justice. Durkheim's functionalism proposed that justice becomes a requirement as reciprocity in self-regulating practices replaces the external constraints of traditional social forms.

Durkheim illustrated this functional argument in two ways. First, throughout the body of the text he contrasts the way legal sanctions developed and are applied in traditional and modern social forms. Modern contractual economic exchange, he says, requires a legal support that protects contracts and the autonomy of self-regulating practices, whereas traditional belief-based systems of ritual reciprocity require a legal system that protects and enforces the harmony of shared beliefs that sustain it. Durkheim's assessment of the relationship between law and society remains important and was the foundation for the development of both criminology and legal studies in sociology.

Durkheim's second way of illustrating the difference between traditional belief based and modern practice based social forms consisted of contrasting professional groups based on self regulating practice – particularly scientific practice – with religious ritual and belief. Both produce solidarity and make intelligibility possible, but in very different ways. Only the self regulating practices of professional groups, he argued, are compatible with differentiated labor, science, and truth.

While functionalism is often associated with political conservatism, in Durkheim's analysis it is only conservative with regard to traditional social forms. In a modern practice based system, Durkheim's functional argument supports a strong egalitarianism. It is his position that even the practice of inheritance, which most scholars consider to be an integral part of a modern property based system, is a holdover from earlier collective social forms, and as such threatens the necessary equality. "Every form of superiority has repercussions on the way in which contracts are arrived at," he says (1984 [1893]: 319). "If therefore it does not depend upon the person of individuals and their services to society, it invalidates the moral conditions of the exchange . . . In other words, there can be no rich and poor at birth without there being unjust contracts."

One source of confusion is that Durkheim's functionalism consists of two corresponding sorts of arguments. The first way of thinking about functionalism involves Durkheim's use of examples drawn from the human body. The brain needs the heart to pump blood to it. But, the heart also needs the brain to signal the muscle to contract. There is a functional interdependence between the two. This form of functionalism tends to be associated with a conservative relativism: things may be bad for individuals, but nothing can be changed without damaging the whole society.

Durkheim's functionalism could also be described as an *if/then* statement, however. *If* the brain depends on oxygen, *then* in order to stay alive it needs to get oxygen. Many of Durkheim's arguments are of this form. *If* a social form depends on shared belief, *then* in order to sustain it shared beliefs must be maintained. *If* a modern social form depends on shared practices and not on shared beliefs, *then* that which

shared practices require becomes necessary. This latter form of functional argument is not subject to the usual criticisms. It also overcomes the contingency usually associated with social phenomena, allowing for a degree of philosophical necessity with regard to practice based societies.

In the context of modern differentiated societies, Durkheim's functionalism does not emphasize either conflict or consensus. He argued that modern practices require freedom, equality, and justice. Therefore, in a modern context the functional prerequisites of practices are, not coincidentally, the same thing individuals strive for. Conflict occurs only in abnormal forms where freedom, justice, and equality have not been achieved. Furthermore, shared beliefs, which place contingent moralities before individual good, are no longer necessary in a society based on justice, and the coercion they require to produce consensus is problematic because it interferes with the development and maintenance of self regulating practices.

RULES AND SUICIDE: METHODS, SOCIAL FACTS

In his classic study *Suicide*, Durkheim introduced the sociological use of statistics, demonstrating that different suicide rates could be explained on the basis of differential patterns of social connectedness when they could not be explained on the basis of individual psychology. For instance, individual characteristics do not explain why older men commit more suicide, but their unmarried – unconnected – status does. In addition to introducing the use of statistics, Durkheim also used various qualitative and archival methods, particularly in his research on law and religion. Durkheim's method, whether statistical or qualitative, focused on the character of forms of association and on the consequences of those associations for the health of the social individual and/or group. By contrast, statistics in contemporary sociology are generally used to measure relationships between the demographic character of individual actions and various institutional constraints (values, goals, sanctions). This has been the predominant sociological method since the 1940s and is often equated with "macro" sociological concerns. It

is, however, a later interpretation of Durkheim's method, influenced by structuralism and not entirely consistent with his own approach.

Durkheim used statistics as indicators of social facts. For Durkheim, social facts in a modern differentiated society consist of forms and patterns of association, not beliefs and values. What matters are the ways in which members of various groups are associated with one another, not their orientation toward valued courses of action, which had been important in earlier social forms. Where statistics such as suicide rates provide indicators of these associations, they may be of use to sociologists.

Durkheim's approach did not correlate individual characteristics with value oriented behavior, however. He used statistics to indicate the strength and character of various forms of association. For instance, if the forms of association in a group were very weak, then people in the group could be expected to have a greater number of moral and psychological problems. If the forms of association in a group were too strong, then people could be expected to sacrifice themselves for the group whenever necessary. The tricky part is specifying the ideal forms of association. Durkheim argued that this varies across societies. *The Division of Labor* worked out the difference between two forms of social solidarity whose forms of association were entirely different, and *Suicide* demonstrated that the conditions under which ties to the group would be too weak or too strong also differ. Suicide in traditional and modern societies would therefore have to be understood in entirely different terms – for Durkheim, more proof that suicide was a function of social relations.

This approach differs from that of many contemporary sociologists who use statistics to measure and predict the behavior of individuals as effected by their orientations toward social goals, values, and sanctions. The focus on individuals and their relationship to social factors runs counter to the method Durkheim proposed: demonstrating the impact of social facts, assessing solidarity mechanisms, and measuring the group level effects of beliefs and values.

Furthermore, the popular characterization of Durkheim as a quantitative macro sociologist implies a disinterest in qualitative approaches. In fact, *The Division of Labor* is based largely on

an analysis of historical changes in the law, and *Elementary Forms* both adopts and advocates a qualitative approach. In the latter, Durkheim argued repeatedly that if order cannot be found in a single case, then it cannot be established however many cases are examined.

It was Durkheim's position in *Rules* that sociologists should focus on the social facts of recurrent institutional and orderly social forms. He treated social order as a central topic for sociology and argued that methods should treat the social as primary, avoid individualism, and be broadly scientific (i.e., consist of practices recognizable to other scientists). He did not argue for methodological hegemony and in Durkheim's work the character of particular social facts, and not some a priori prescription, seems to have determined the methods he used.

ELEMENTARY FORMS: DUALISM, EPISTEMOLOGY, UNIVERSES OF DISCOURSE

In *Elementary Forms*, Durkheim argued that it is through participation in religious practices that social beings acquire the basic forms of human reason: space, time, classification, force, causality, and totality. He argued that the concept of classification has logical primacy. The first emotional experience of the distinction between sacred and profane gives birth to this category and makes possible the enactment of the rituals that create the other categories.

In his conclusion Durkheim outlined the view that all concepts, or *collective representations* as he calls them, have a social origin. Concepts adhere in universes of discourse and a proper understanding of reason, language, and mutual intelligibility would require a study of the way various words/concepts have meanings in the context of the social forms of association in which they are used.

The argument that religion developed to serve functions that were primarily social, rather than society developing to serve religious functions, would have been very unpopular in 1912 and remains so today. To the religious, the meaning of religion has nothing to do with sustaining social orders. Durkheim does not deny that religious beliefs may be true. But for him their "truth" lies in their capacity to

motivate ritual practices. Beliefs alone do not explain the development of organized religions. Frequently they serve to coerce and constrain individual faith so as to support traditional social forms.

External constraint is part of the social control function of religion in traditional societies. In modern societies, however, this function is no longer required and religious diversity becomes possible. Thus, religion does not fulfill exactly the same functions in modern and traditional societies. Rituals create and sustain shared practices in both, but the need for homogeneity differs. So, while religion still fulfills epistemological functions, it is no longer connected with social orders in the same way.

For Durkheim the essential first human moment came with the creation of the first distinction between sacred and profane, and because of the importance of this moment it permeates the argument of *Elementary Forms*. In his view, it is essential that social connections and symbolic meanings are established through ritual practices. Only in this way can individual social actors be created in the first place. Without engagement in ritual practices humans are only animals, he says, and can only think like animals.

In giving the social primacy over the biological or individual rational being, Durkheim was also taking a position on the equality of all persons. He regarded *reason* as the *function* of social forms and all successful societies must produce it. Differences in the apparent reasoning powers of people, therefore, were not due to differences in innate intelligence, but rather to the different needs of the societies in which people lived and the varying ways in which reasoning was socially structured.

Durkheim's position was remarkable given the pervasiveness of the belief in racial and gender inequality, not only in his day but extending into the present. One early American critic dismissed Durkheim's sociology for proposing the allegedly absurd view that if "Negroes or Eskimos" were to live in the same society with whites they would become their equals. Not until the late 1960s would the developing public awareness of human equality begin to catch up with Durkheim's position. We can only imagine how large a price sociology paid for the inability of popular opinion to

appreciate Durkheim's position in this regard at the time. According to Durkheim, popular opinion with regard to racial and gender inequality was simply wrong. It was only in their social forms, and the ways in which persons were transformed by participation in those social forms, that human beings differed. Thus, Durkheim gave sociology a distinctively democratic and egalitarian foundation.

MAJOR INTERPRETATIONS, INFLUENCES, AND CONTROVERSIES

There have been five major streams of interpretation of Durkheim's work. From the 1930s onward Talcott Parsons, who incorporated Durkheim into structural functionalism, became the primary interpreter of Durkheim's work in English. As a consequence, a positivist and functional interpretation of Durkheim became prevalent in the United States. In France, by contrast, his work was taken up by anthropologists, the best known being Lévy Bruhl and Lévi Strauss, who elaborated his argument regarding the relationship between the development of concepts, ideas, and societies, developing symbolic anthropology on this foundation. Each of these two early interpretations distorted the original work by capturing only parts of it. The movements that emerged against structural functionalism and symbolic anthropology – poststructuralism and postmodernism – thus also have certain shared roots.

In the wake of these intellectual revolutions, there was a revival of interest in Durkheim in both the humanities and social sciences. In the US the "cultural" side of Durkheim that had been eliminated by structural functionalism began to come to the fore and was elaborated by Jeffrey Alexander in particular. There was also an effort, beginning with and inspired by Randall Collins, to draw out the connections between Durkheim and contemporary interactionism, notably the work of Erving Goffman and later Harold Garfinkel. This interpretation also made its way into the sociology of science where it found affinities with the arguments of Ludwig Wittgenstein. Among Marxists there have been a number of persuasive articles emphasizing the radical political character of Durkheim's work (e.g., Sirianni; Parkin) that

challenge the Parsonsian view of Durkheim as a conservative.

In the wake of this renewed interest, some of Durkheim's work has been retranslated and republished. Durkheim's "Sens Lectures," previously unavailable in English, were published in 2004.

While at the Sorbonne, Durkheim studied philosophy and wrote a dissertation on Montesquieu before completing his final thesis on the division of labor. Montesquieu and Rousseau were important for Durkheim because both treated social forms and processes as prerequisites for the social person. He studied with neo Kantians like Renouvier, studied for a year in Berlin, and was caught up in the interest in the work of William James that swept through Paris at the turn of the century. It is clear from Durkheim's 1913–14 lectures that he saw pragmatism as another individualistic argument, and thus sharpened his own vision of a science of social facts against the philosophy of James.

When Durkheim arrived at the Sorbonne, sociology was associated with the work of Auguste Comte (1798–1857), Saint Simon (1760–1825), and Herbert Spencer (1820–1903). Spencer's was an evolutionist sociology that soon fell out of favor. Comte and Saint Simon, on the other hand, influenced such disparate thinkers as John Stuart Mill (1806–73) and Karl Marx (1818–83). It was Comte's position that as the shared beliefs and values of an earlier age diminish through the effects of progress they need to be replaced. Comte proposed a general philosophy as a more enlightened and scientific ideology that could serve the purpose. Early on Durkheim associated this position with socialism, and was critical because of the central role accorded to beliefs and ideology.

It was Durkheim's position that modernity produces new social forms, bound together not by ideology but by forms of association and self regulating practices. Social solidarity was a product not of shared beliefs but of the diversity of interdependent positions in the division of labor. Where social solidarities formerly depended on shared beliefs enforced by strong sanctions, new forms of association produced a form of self regulation requiring no external sanction. Durkheim argued that in modern society the state needed to support,

rather than sanction and impede, self regulating practices.

Durkheim's first example of self regulation in *The Division of Labor* was scientific laboratory practice. When he published the second edition in 1902, he added a preface on professional groups that offered a more extensive example of how social solidarity in modern differentiated social forms is based on many different sets of shared self regulating practices rather than on shared beliefs.

Because he studied with Renouvier and wrote about the dualism of human nature, many scholars have associated Durkheim with Kant. Certainly Durkheim was well versed in Kant's arguments and mentions him frequently in his writings, but he was generally critical. There are also many references in Durkheim's work to Hume and James, with whose arguments he also was well versed but critical.

At the time Durkheim began his studies there were no sociologists per se. Although Comte is sometimes called the first sociologist, Durkheim was the first to officially hold that title. His training would have consisted primarily of courses in philosophy, political economy, psychology, and anthropology, disciplines which treat social phenomena as the secondary, or aggregated, result of individual action. From the first it was Durkheim's objective to replace these perspectives with a new, more scientific way of working that replaced the inherent individualism of the other disciplines with a study of social forms and processes as primary phenomena. In *The Division of Labor*, he introduced this argument and the original introduction presented sociology as a new form of moral philosophy. The same theme of replacing philosophy with sociology can be seen clearly in his last work, *Elementary Forms*. Durkheim was trying to deliver firm imperatives about justice on the basis of social argumentation – to remove the contingencies from the social.

Because philosophers consider anything social to be contingent, Durkheim's efforts to establish a moral philosophy on social facts are generally interpreted as relativistic. Furthermore, because of the emphasis he placed on the universal and positive character of his findings, he is often taken by philosophers to have contradicted himself. This was true for the earliest of his American critics (Elmer Ghelke;

Charles Schaub) and consistently has been reflected in his reception among philosophers.

What Durkheim argued is that a universal sense of justice can be established on the basis of the social facts of self regulating practices in modern societies. He does not accept the assumption that anything social is contingent. One of the points of Durkheim's functionalism is that if a social form needs a particular thing in order to survive, then its survival implies that it must have achieved that thing. These are statements of necessity, not contingency, and in his view are not teleological.

One of the more important issues confusing the reception of Durkheim's work is his rejection of philosophical individualism and his argument that the social comes before the individual. Durkheim's position is that those elements of reason that distinguish persons from animals, particularly moral reasoning, are not inborn. His position, which he attributes to Rousseau, is that only in society is there a need for moral reasoning and therefore only as participants in social processes do people develop this capacity.

This was a complete shift in thinking away from individualism. One of the many difficulties the argument has faced is that it continues to be appraised by people who take an individualist position, believing the social is therefore contingent, then applying individualistic criteria in its evaluation. This leads to labeling Durkheim falsely as an idealist, positivist, subjectivist, objectivist, rationalist, and so on. It has also often led to the view that there are two Durkheims – or that he has contradicted himself. But, the rational individual simply does not exist for Durkheim. In this he is in agreement with other classic sociological thinkers like Marx and Mead, and with more contemporary thinkers like Goffman and Garfinkel.

RELEVANCE TO THE HISTORY OF CONTEMPORARY SOCIOLOGY

Durkheim created a blueprint for the discipline of sociology that defined it in entirely new terms. Understanding social theory, and engaging in the practice of sociology without contradiction, entails giving up philosophical

positions like individualism from which the sociological object, as Durkheim defined it, is rendered absurd.

As sociology has struggled over the decades to define itself against philosophical individualism and to establish the social at its center point, Durkheim has always been the inspiration. Structural functionalism, cultural anthropology, cultural sociology, postmodernism, poststructuralism, sociological studies of science, sociology of knowledge, and legal studies were all inspired by Durkheim's arguments, some negatively and some positively. The work of Garfinkel, Goffman, symbolic interaction, and social constructivism is similarly indebted. Durkheim's arguments with regard to social character of the individual self, the importance of concrete forms of association between people, and the special characteristics of self regulating practices in modern social contexts are an important foundation of these contemporary arguments.

The true importance of sociology as Durkheim envisioned it was not to play hand maiden to philosophy and to submit empirical studies for philosophical appraisal and evaluation. He envisioned a sociology that evaluated social facts on their own terms. He rejected the idea that social facts were contingent and wanted to establish that certain social forms and processes were necessary or, put another way, that certain social needs must be fulfilled in order for society to go on. Once this is established, those necessities become the non contingent social facts against which arguments can be anchored.

Durkheim would have objected to the idea of theory as a perspective of dead white men or anyone else. It was his idea to deconstruct the individualism that comprised the Enlightenment perspective, and he did so from a position that was both scientific and marginal. If we cannot see what we take for granted, then we need incongruities to crack open the surface of the taken for granted so that we can see beneath. It is science, the practices of observation and analysis of what incongruities make available to us, that makes this a worthwhile exercise for sociology.

Durkheim would have resisted allowing individualistic perspectives or disciplines to judge the validity of sociological arguments. He also would have disagreed with the

currently popular position (Coleman) that the problem with sociology is that it does not focus enough on individuals and on individual reason. Other disciplines would regard sociology more favorably if it did so, but the whole point of sociology from the beginning has been to challenge them in this regard. Sociology begins with the premise that individualism is wrong. To argue that it could become more popular by adopting an individualist view is to argue that sociology should surrender that which defines it as a unique and viable discipline. There would be no sociology if the individualism of philosophy, economics, and psychology were accepted. Only if the social is primary does sociology have a reason to exist as a discipline in the first place. On this foundation, Durkheim hoped to ground a sociological understanding of the requirements for justice in modern society.

SEE ALSO: Anomie; Anthropology, Cultural and Social: Early History; Collective Consciousness; Comte, Auguste; Criminology; Durkheim, Émile and Social Change; Ethnomethodology; Goffman, Erving; Individualism; James, William; Knowledge, Sociology of; Marx, Karl; Mead, George Herbert; Parsons, Talcott; Postmodernism; Poststructuralism; Pragmatism; Religion, Sociology of; Scientific Knowledge, Sociology of; Social Justice, Theories of; Solidarity, Mechanical and Organic; Statistics; Structural Functionalism; Weber, Max

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Durkheim, Émile and social change

Edward A. Tiryakian

One may look in vain in Durkheim's oeuvre for an explicit discussion of social change, to be found neither in his major texts nor as a rubric in the 12 *Année Sociologique* volumes published in his lifetime. *Social change* does not figure in Durkheim's major divisions of sociology. Yet, like the Scarlet Pimpernel, it is here, it is there, it is everywhere. No consideration of Durkheim can be considered complete without taking into account his immanent social realism: societal systems structurally change from within, ultimately from qualitative and quantitative changes in social interaction (a presupposition widely shared with Marx and Weber, albeit for different primary factors). This seeming paradox can be best understood if one takes into account that the nineteenth century which provided the context for Durkheim was the modern period's crucible of enormous economic, political, cultural, and technological transformations of the social order, with Durkheim's predecessors and contemporaries all seeking to ascertain the major features, causes, and outcomes of the transformation. If Durkheim did not write explicitly about social change, he and his immediate followers (the "Durkheimians," who will be briefly mentioned here) were indeed very cognizant and attentive to addressing social change. This was at least partially recognized long ago by Robert Bellah in a seminal article (1960) pointing to the significance of history in Durkheim's epistemological and substantive thought.

Ultimately, following the general dictum of Durkheim that to explain social facts one must

seek recourse to social processes, to account for social change one needs to consider changes in the thickness or density of social interaction in time and space (i.e., in the frequency and extent of social interaction). This paramount focus is to be found in at least three major works, where social change takes on different manifestations.

As Lukes noted in his landmark intellectual biography (1977: 167), Durkheim proposed in his doctoral dissertation *The Division of Labor in Society* a misunderstood theory of social change invoking a morphological key variable: an increase in the "moral" or "dynamic density" of society. The division of labor and its concomitant "organic solidarity" are advanced by demographic factors of population increase in urban areas and by technological factors of increased means of communication and transportation. This perspective has been at the core of much of the initial modernization theory of the 1950s and 1960s stressing structural differentiation as change internal to social systems. As such, Durkheim's theory of societal change as structural differentiation is not altogether novel, since elements of it are to be found in Spencer. However, Durkheim proposed not only the mechanisms of change but also the problematic of the (normative) integration of societal systems in the wake of structural differentiation. This of course involves the question of *anomie* in the modern social order, which is treated in a separate entry.

Much of the treatment of long term social change in Durkheim as well as other social scientists of the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries rests on the evolutionary paradigm. An understanding of the contemporary present forms of society and their interrelationships was viewed in the optic of biological evolution, by tracing the development of origins from simpler to more complex forms of social organization: the more complex, the more organized a social species, the more advanced it is in the evolutionary ladder. While Durkheim analyzed social change in such evolutionary terms (Durkheim 1978 [1899–1900]: 154), he rejected a linear view of the succession of societies (and of institutions), and even more of social Darwinism, which lent itself to colonialism and imperialism in justifying the rule of "advanced" societies over those seen to be more "primitive."

Durkheim's deployment of an evolutionary perspective, utilizing historical data, is evidenced in his various analyses of long term institutional change. Among these may be mentioned his study of (1) the evolution of penal institutions, formulated in terms of laws of quantitative and qualitative changes in punishment (1978 [1899–1900]); (2) the evolution of individualism in its interrelation with the evolution of the state and political society (1957); and (3) the evolution of the institution closest to Durkheim's heart, higher education (1977 [1938]). The last named represents his most elaborate tracing of the development of an institution critical to modernity, written at a time when France in a period of turmoil and uncertainty was grappling with the course to take in educational reforms (p. 7).

Durkheim maintained in positivist fashion that secondary education needed a sound theoretical foundation based upon knowledge of how educational theory and its applications developed over time. The strengths and weaknesses of these theories in different epochs should be uncovered so as to inform policy makers and public opinion and connect proposed legislation and decrees with reality. We need not detail the evolutionary historical path Durkheim drew in going back to the origins of modern education to Rome as the initial starting point of modern higher education, and then following it forward at various stages. It is a richly textured organizational analysis of the emergent university system, seeking to cull what features in an evolutionary perspective appear to have lasting merit and hence deserving to be part of the contemporary educational system, and which do not and should be discarded (p. 160).

Durkheim's rejection of linear progress in evolutionary change is manifest in his redressing of the negative image of the Middle Ages (as an era of coarseness, harsh discipline, and little educational merit of the Scholastics); instead, he argued, this was a dynamic setting for educational development, bringing forth virtually from scratch "the most powerful and comprehensive academic organism which history has ever known" (p. 160). On the other hand, later educational systems had shortcomings: the Renaissance, with its overwhelming stress on classical education and self centeredness, or the

later Renaissance, with Jesuits in charge who made discipline and control more important than students exploring and discovering on their own.

Durkheim's study of the evolution of education, and in particular of the university system, is still of twofold merit, besides an important congruence between Durkheim and his great contemporary educator, John Dewey, with whom he shared the view that educational reforms should promote and facilitate the development and creativity of the student. First, because *The Evolution of Educational Thought* documents that at different periods of modernity, the university and secondary education have felt the need to reinvent themselves. Durkheim's study presents here comparative materials that may provide a perspective for the twenty first century, where higher education is subject to new challenges (multiculturalism, new fiscal constraints, and so on). Second, because it lays to rest the criticism that the functionalist mode of analyzing complex modern social institutions does not address the question of social change.

There is a third sort of social change in Durkheim's work, one which has as its focus short term, intensive transformation of the social whole. Some elements of the analysis in *The Elementary Forms of Religious Life* (1995 [1912]) are surprisingly similar to the analysis of long term structural differentiation in Durkheim's first period, yet the accent is on what may be termed "dedifferentiation" rather than "differentiation." In common with *The Division of Labor*, written 20 years earlier, Durkheim posits that increased interaction and the density of actors interacting, in a concentrated time and place, underlie changes in social consciousness. Brought about by religious rituals in the case of the Australian aborigines or by extraordinary events as in the case of the all night meeting of the French National Assembly in August 1789, or by similar "effervescent social milieux" in our own times from Managua and Tehran in 1979 to Eastern Europe in November 1989 (Tiryakian 1995), what is at stake is the renovation of collective solidarity at a critical moment. Durkheim sees such extraordinary moments of interactive intensity unparalleled in ordinary quotidian life. They are moments of destructuration or dedifferentiation, moments of collective enthusiasm,

attended by a collapse of hierarchical status distinction and even, on occasion, of antinomian behavior. While Durkheim drew his theory of the genesis of the sacred in the extraordinary interaction setting involving the whole social group, he also pointed out that social life oscillates between two poles: colorful, festive periods of “hyperexcitement” and periods of “secular activity” of “utter colorlessness” (Durkheim 1995 [1912]: 221). Short term intensive change gives way to “normalcy.” In modern society, the contrast, as Durkheim noted, is more muted, although the need for periodic assemblies and reaffirmation of collective sentiments remains.

Various of Durkheim’s collaborators dealt with social change, some with traditional and some with modern society. As an instance of the former, Mauss and Beuchat, in advance of *The Elementary Forms*, published a monograph on the social life of the Eskimo in two major seasonal cycles, winter and summer (Mauss & Beuchat 1979 [1904–5]). A study in social morphology, it analyzed variations in social organization and density of interaction. In the summer, the group is disbanded and the cultural life that integrates Eskimo society is at a minimum, as individual families are on their own. In the winter, they come together and cultural life is thick with the renovation of “a genuine community of ideas and material interests” (p. 76). Quantitative changes in interaction produce qualitative changes of increased group solidarity and consciousness, sometimes even leading to sexual license. Finding similar seasonal patterns in other North American native settings, Mauss and Beuchat proposed a general law: social life goes through cycles (phases) of increased and decreased intensity, of activity and rest, of dispersion and concentration, at the individual and collective levels (p. 79). Essentially, changes in the cultural life of a group correlate with changes in the form of a group.

François Simiand, a collaborator of the *Année Sociologique* who, with Maurice Halbwachs, was in charge of the major rubric “Economic Sociology,” also developed a long term, cyclical view of change, one applied to economic cycles (Simiand 1932). After extensive historical studies of the movements of prices, wages, economic production, and other indices of economic life, Simiand proposed that there are fluctuations with two major cycles: a

cycle of general expansion – the major A cycle – and one of contraction – the major B cycle. Writing in a period of global economic crisis, Simiand analyzed it as the early phase of a B cycle and criticized patchwork economic solutions that failed to realize the complex set of factors that make up economic life, including as a critical variable the social psychological reality of confidence or trust in economic conditions (1932: 113). The reality of economic progress, economic development, Simiand argued, is A + B, and mistaken are those theories or models of society that ignore fluctuations and believe they can organize a static economy. There is no general panacea for economic ills, but various options are present that require a knowledge of previous economic conditions in periods of transition from A to B or B to A.

Simiand’s two phases have been utilized in world systems theory, which has developed cycles complementing long term (secular) growth of global capitalism. However, more attention has been paid to a Russian contemporary of Simiand, Nikolai Kondratieff, whose theories of alternating “long waves” of expansion and contraction did not fit in the Soviet model of a planned economy. A comparative assessment of Simiand and Kondratieff would provide an important chapter in the history of political economy.

SEE ALSO: Anomie; Dependency and World Systems Theories; Dewey, John; Division of Labor; Durkheim, Émile; Kondratieff Cycles; Solidarity, Mechanical and Organic; Spencer, Herbert

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dyad/triad

Dan E. Miller

The smallest and most elementary social unit, a dyad is a social group composed of two members while a triad is a social group composed of three members. The study of dyads and triads is significant in two respects. First, dyads and triads form the most basic elements of sociological analysis. That is, most structural conditions and social processes can be found in dyadic and triadic interaction. Second, the analysis of dyads and triads clearly demonstrates the poverty of strict psychological reductionism, and calls into question the validity of methodological individualism. These issues and others were first addressed by Georg Simmel (1950) in his pioneering work on pure social forms.

A dyad differs from other quantitative social groupings in that each member interacts with only one other. Thus, in order to maintain the group both participants must construct reciprocal interaction with a high level of involvement with each other. Subsequently, a dyad is more fragile and precarious than other social units. If one person leaves or if one's attention is diverted elsewhere, the dyad dissolves. Because dyads are characterized by reciprocal interaction and relatively equal involvement, they tend

to become egalitarian over time. This egalitarian element is enhanced by the tendency for each member to relate to the other as an individual and not in terms of a categorical identity. In addition, the intensity and necessary constancy of interaction create the conditions in which intimacy can develop between the dyad's members. A dyad's intimacy is dependent on the exclusivity of shared knowledge and experience, on the fact that whatever is shared is shared only by the two and stays within the dyad. In such circumstances the dyad's members may become devoted to each other, a quality found in close friendships and romantic love.

Three distinct types of dyads can be identified. In *pure dyads* both members are free of other obligations and responsibilities. Each is responsible only to the other for the maintenance of the relationship. The world external to the dyad, including the passage of time, tends to evaporate in pure dyadic interaction. With *representative dyads* one or both members have allegiances to other social units. How they act and respond to the other is, in part, based on their identities as representatives of the larger social units. For example, sales managers from two companies meeting over lunch to discuss a possible business arrangement constitute dyadic interaction, but their interaction differs significantly from the pure form of two lovers having lunch, lost in each other's company. Dyads (and triads for that matter) need not be made up of individuals. *Supra individual dyads* are comprised of larger social units such as families, organizations, tribes, or societies. That is, larger social networks take on dyadic qualities when they communicate with each other. In this way we can understand how two businesses compete, two governments cooperate, and political party coalitions form.

It is common in the opening phase of dyadic interaction for new participants to engage in reciprocal self disclosure in order to get to know each other. This shared knowledge is instrumental in the formation of a bond between the two, opening up the arrangement to further possibilities. The two members may form a cooperative social unit in order to accomplish a common goal, or the two may disagree with each other, argue, and develop a conflict relationship or a rivalry. The participants may enter into polite

conversation, or they may decide to play a game with each other.

On the other hand, participation in dyadic interaction may be disagreeable for one or both parties. This disagreeableness often is accompanied by a sense of being stuck with no easy way to escape. Ironically, in pure dyads, leaving is relatively easy in that only one other person stands in the way. The knowledge of impending freedom from the constraints of dyadic interaction can be liberating. These qualities are not evident in representative dyads whose members are constrained to keep the dyad intact at least until practical matters are accomplished.

In its most elementary form a dyad comes into being when one member enters another's perceptual space. Interdependence develops when each becomes aware of the other's presence, attention, and responsiveness. Once copresence has been established, both members of the dyad take into account the anticipated response of the other as they construct and regulate their own behavior (Goffman 1963). Two people sitting on adjacent park benches notice each other, quickly establish eye contact, and return to their previous activities. Each is accessible to the other. In order to minimize the potentialities of sensory accessibility both must act in a way that will communicate that, while they are aware of each other's presence, neither person is available for more focused interaction. Identifying each other as non-threatening strangers the dyad most likely will settle into a minimal degree of interrelatedness, one of civil inattention. In this situation each accommodates the other by not interfering, while maintaining a degree of attention with minimal responsiveness. The two, constrained by their interrelatedness, inhibit untoward and potentially embarrassing behaviors.

When two people who know each other establish copresence, they may join together to become a couple. Being a couple is a more complex and focused form of dyadic interaction than mere copresence (Goffman 1971). People who constitute a couple maintain ecological proximity allowing easy access to each other, including the intimate element of touch, while at the same time restricting availability to outsiders. Unlike a copresent dyad, couples are more attentive and responsive to each other. Their interactions can range from minimal

involvement, as when they are reading together in a library, to walking together down a street or to being highly involved in conversation with each other.

Moving from situations of copresence and couples to cooperative social action requires an increasingly focused and complex form of interaction. In order to construct cooperative social interaction the following elements of interrelatedness must be established and maintained by the members of the dyad. Both must attend to the other, acknowledge that attention, and become mutually responsive to each other's behavior. On this foundation members must establish congruent situated identities and agree on the shared focus of their interaction. Finally, the dyad must designate a social objective (a desired future state) if the purpose of the cooperative interaction is to accomplish some goal (Hintz & Miller 1995). A couple sitting in a coffee shop discussing an upcoming vacation must establish and maintain the aforementioned elements of interaction if they are to successfully complete their vacation plans. If any of the dimensions of interaction are not established or maintained, then the interaction will cease, in which case the dyad will dissolve or the couple must repair the structure before they can continue.

When a third member joins a dyad, forming a triad, not only do the interpersonal dynamics of the dyad change, but also a new array of possible social relationships emerges. The addition of a third member creates a supra individual quality to the group. That is, if one member leaves, the group continues. Other members can be recruited and socialized with little interference in the group's activities. When a third person enters a dyad's copresence the dyad's behavior becomes public. The special character of the dyad is lost. Intimacy is compromised. A couple with a new child loses much of the intimate reciprocity that previously dominated their relationship. The new parents must focus a great deal of their attention and actions toward the needs of the child. No matter how civilly inattentive the third party behaves, the dyad has acquired an audience that at once inhibits certain actions and alters others. The members of the dyad take the presence of the third into account as they construct their actions. If the third party is a stranger and merely copresent, then an

element of surveillance or voyeurism emerges. If the third party is known to the other two he may be invited to join, or he may be treated as an unwanted intruder who is not only excluded but also alienated from the dyad and the interaction.

In his brilliant essay "Quantitative Aspects of the Group," Georg Simmel (1950) describes three forms of interaction that emerge with the formation of a triad – *divide et impera* (divide and rule), *tertius gaudens* (the third who enjoys), and the impartial mediator. Divide and rule is a form in which a third party engenders conflict between a solidary dyad, thus dividing them and then gaining advantage over them. A well known example in the social sciences and in crime dramas is the prisoner's dilemma. In a prisoner's dilemma (Axelrod 1990) two suspects to a crime are arrested, brought to the police station, placed in separate interrogation rooms, and questioned by a detective. After a time the detective informs each suspect that the other is beginning to talk and that the suspect's punishment will be much lighter if he confesses. The dilemma is whether to talk or not. Both suspects will go free if neither talks, but talking means a shorter sentence. Faced with this dilemma most suspects cooperate with the detectives and confess. By employing the strategy of divide and rule, the detective was able to gain the necessary advantage.

In *tertius gaudens* triadic interaction the third member turns a disagreement (or competition) between the other two to his or her advantage. Unlike divide and rule, in *tertius gaudens* the other two are not a solidary unit. For example, a gasoline price war between two rival oil companies is advantageous to the consumer, who enjoys a break in high gasoline prices. Similarly, a child of a divorcing couple may enjoy the attention and gifts received from parents competing for the child's affection. In another situation two job candidates competing for the same position in a tight job market allow the employer to offer a lower salary and a smaller benefits package.

The third triadic form described by Simmel is that of the impartial mediator whose interaction with the other two is intended to bring them together to settle their differences. Marriage counselors exemplify the impartial mediator with the married couple and the counselor entering into cooperative interaction. However,

the impartiality of a mediator is not always a certainty. It is not uncommon for a marriage counselor or a therapist to unwittingly align with one party in a dispute, thus altering the relationship and further dividing the dyad. A variation on the role of impartial mediator is that of the arbitrator. Whereas the impartial mediator brings people together to help them settle differences through cooperative interaction, the arbitrator in an authoritarian role decides how the dispute will be settled. When contract negotiations between labor and management break down with little chance of reaching an agreement, an arbitrator may be brought in to settle the dispute in a fair and just manner. In a more elementary situation, a father may intervene in an argument between his two children over who controls the television by turning it off and instructing the children to not turn it on.

Coalitions are formed when two parties join together for the purpose of gaining advantage over a third party (Caplow 1969). Coalition formation in triads is about control – majority control. The tendency for coalitions to form in triads constitutes a social fact and, thus, is not reducible to the characteristics of the individuals who form them. In a revolutionary coalition a control hierarchy is overthrown when the member with the least power joins with the party with the second degree of power to wrest control from the most powerful party. With a conservative coalition the power hierarchy is maintained. A more prosaic form of coalition interaction arises when two people (a majority) formally or informally demand conformity on the part of the third person under the threat (or fear) of exclusion.

A coalition is unstable if the two parties who control the third have relatively equal power. In such situations the one with the least power can exert considerable influence by the known possibility that the low power party may join with one of the coalition members to gain control over the deposed other. For example, a small political party may gain numerous concessions by joining with one or the other more powerful parties. More interesting is the situation in which the majority parties modify their own policies in order to mollify the minority party who, each fears, may form a coalition with the rival majority party.

Triads forming one to two situations are commonplace. In one to two triads differentiation is established identifying the "one" as distinct from the others – as a leader or representative. The "one" defines and acts toward the others as a unit – as an audience, as students, as followers, or as captives. In one to two situations responsibility for the actions within the triad falls to the "one." A public speaker commands the attention of the audience, a tutor controls the focus of attention and behavior of her two pupils, and a tyrant controls his subjects. One to two triads are asymmetrical, ranging from the modest asymmetry of a one on audience situation to the increasingly asymmetrical arrangements found in authority relations, followings, and tyrannies.

The study of dyads and triads is relevant in many areas within the social sciences, including: bargaining and negotiation studies; counseling and psychotherapy; courtship, marriage, and family; conversation analysis; leadership; obedience and compliance research; and politics.

SEE ALSO: Group Processes; Interaction; Interpersonal Relationships; Simmel, Georg

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E

early childhood

Harriett Romo

Early childhood includes infancy, preschool, and the early years of formal schooling. Sociologists are interested in early childhood for a number of reasons. The children in a society will continue the social organizations, values, and mores of that society. Moreover, the ways a society cares for and socializes its children tell much about the structure and nature of that society.

Ariès (1962) documented the ways childhood has been viewed over time and how those views have changed over different centuries in western society. He studied depictions of children in medieval art and other historical documents to show that the concept of childhood as we recognize it today did not exist in those times. Instead, children were dressed and treated as little adults. Then thirteenth century artists portrayed children as sweet, innocent angels quite different from adults. Perceptions shifted again when sixteenth and eighteenth century moralists argued that childhood was a period of immaturity when children must be trained and disciplined in preparation for adulthood. Ariès claimed that modern society has focused on social problems of children, such as abuse and neglect, and separated children from the adult world. Although Ariès's work has been criticized for his generalizations, his analysis provided convincing evidence that children and childhood are perceived differently in different time periods.

Sociologists are also interested in childhood because child socialization and childrearing practices differ across cultures (Ochs & Schieffelin 1986). Childhood socialization involves children acquiring language skills, forming the

core of personality, and learning the central norms and values of the adults of their society. The parent-child relationship has been studied extensively, especially the interactions between the mother and the child. Attention has also been given to how others in society, including fathers, extended family, siblings, peers, and other significant adults, influence the growing child. Corsaro and others (Corsaro & Miller 1992; Corsaro 1997) have argued that the socialization of children is a collective process that occurs in the public as well as a private realm. They emphasize the importance of language and cultural routines in children's socialization. As children participate in cultural routines, they acquire social skills and knowledge and also creatively contribute to the production of culture through their interactions with adults and other children.

Concerns about the separation of children from the world of family and adults appeared in much of the sociological research on families and children during the 1970s as more parents and other adults worked longer hours, and families struggled to find appropriate care for their children. Issues of quality and adequacy of childcare became crucial for mothers who pursued careers opened up as a result of the women's movement.

As very young children had greater contact with institutions outside the family, more attention was paid to their social, moral, and educational development outside the family. Preschool in many societies has become a common solution to the problem of how to care for, socialize, and educate children between infancy and the start of formal schooling. In the US, early childhood education has been a response to the changing patterns of men's and women's work, high divorce rates, and the needs of single parent families (Tobin et al. 1989). Researchers in the twentieth century

emphasized that children are shaped by their own personal histories and experiences, and they are also actors in the shaping of their experiences and of their environment and culture (Corsaro 1997). For example, children socialize their parents into how parents should behave. Infants demand attention by crying and initiate contacts with adults in interactions. In social learning, children observe the behavior of others, repeat behavior that is rewarded, and avoid behavior that is punished. Children organize and interpret experiences for themselves and make judgments about behaviors. The work of Corsaro has suggested that sociologists can learn much about the daily lives and mores of adults in a society by observing and analyzing the behaviors of children and what they say.

As children spend greater amounts of time in educational institutions, sociologists have focused on the socialization and stratification that occur in schools and classrooms. Peer and media influences on children, the social problems of children, and the effects of changes in family composition on early childhood have also been topics of research. Contemporary research in psychology and education has suggested that infants and toddlers have many more cognitive capacities than previously realized, and a multitude of new research has been generated on infant brain development, cognition, the importance of play in children's lives, peer and family relationships, and emergent literacy.

The research focused on children's educational development has meant a greater awareness of the serious gaps in achievement between children from different socioeconomic, racial and ethnic, and linguistic backgrounds. As more and more US children attend preschool programs, a growing gap exists between children who arrive at formal schooling with extensive preschool experience and those who have not had access to early formal learning. Early childhood represents a critical opportunity for children to develop language and emergent literacy skills that constitute the foundation for more sophisticated literacy skills (Tabors & Snow 2002). Increasingly, children arrive at the first grade of schooling knowing how to write their names, count and recognize numbers, and recite the alphabet. Skills formerly taught in early kindergarten programs are now

taught in preschool programs for 3 and 4 year olds, giving children who have access to such programs an advantage in learning formal school skills.

Immigrant children are the fastest growing sector of the US population. Roughly one in six children in the US today lives in an immigrant headed household. The effect of immigration and the experiences of second generation US born children are topics of increasing research interest. A number of distinguished scholars have argued that immigration is structured by forms of transnationalism, suggesting that families and children often live in more than one nation state simultaneously. Children may be born in the US but schooled in their native community, or vice versa. Immigrant children may be raised by relatives in the native community while their parents work in the US and then join their parents in the US when they reach school age. Large numbers of immigrant children find themselves increasingly segregated from white, English speaking children (Portes & Rumbaut 2001). Some immigrant children do quite well in US schools, surpassing native born children in performance on standardized tests and attitudes toward education. Other immigrant groups tend to achieve below their native born peers. Successful adaptations among immigrant children may relate to cultural values or patterns of economic and social capital. Immigrant parents often struggle to maintain social control of their children as their offspring enter the formal US school system. Recent research suggests that length of residence in the US may be associated with declining health, school achievement, and aspirations. Many parents find it difficult to encourage their children to maintain their home language or their cultural values as they interact with others outside their home and family. Segregation or exposure to American society, English language skills, place of birth, age upon arrival, length of residence in the US, and the social and economic resources of their family influence the adaptation of immigrant children. Outcomes of adaptation are also influenced by where the immigrants settle, the type of childcare or school they attend, and the group of peers with whom they associate. Children with poorly educated parents often find themselves growing up in underprivileged

neighborhoods, poor schools, and a generally disruptive social environment.

There has been much emphasis on the impact of poverty on children. Families from racial and ethnic groups are disproportionately represented among the poor in the United States. Duncan and Brooks Gunn (1997) compiled research on the effects on children of growing up poor. They emphasized key transitions or turning points in child development that might alter behaviors or contexts for children and may be affected by income poverty. Nutrition in the prenatal and early infancy period can affect birth weight and later outcomes in school achievement and behavior. Infants from poor families are less likely to have immunizations or early health care and often receive childcare of lesser quality than that provided for families of different income levels. Persistent poverty has very negative effects on all children's achievement scores and verbal abilities.

A number of social policies and programs have aimed at interventions to assist children during this key period of early childhood. Fruitful strategies have been to improve the school readiness and cognitive ability of young children. Head Start is a preschool program for low income 3 and 4 year olds and Early Head Start reaches mothers, infants, and toddlers. Other effective strategies include helping parents read more to their children and teaching parents about effective parenting and stimulating learning activities they can do with their children.

SEE ALSO: Child Abuse; Childcare; Childhood; Consumer Culture, Children's; Differential Treatment of Children by Sex; Divorce; Family Structure and Child Outcomes; Parental Involvement; Socialization

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earner–carer model

Joya Misra

The earner–carer model is a fundamentally gender egalitarian welfare state approach, which assumes that men and women equally engage in both caregiving and paid employment (Gornick & Meyers 2003). Welfare state structures always rest on gendered assumptions about men's and women's roles in the family and workplace. Through social policies, such gender ideologies reflect but also reinforce supposed roles of men and women as citizens, workers, and carers.

The dominant vision of the western welfare state during the twentieth century was the “male breadwinner–female caregiver” or “family wage” model (Sainsbury 1999). According to this model, families were presumed to be composed of a man working outside the home, a woman providing care within the home, and children. In order for this model to operate effectively, men needed to earn a wage large enough to support all of the members of this family. The welfare state would only intervene to replace the male breadwinner's wage in case of unemployment, disability, sickness, or old

age, or occasionally to support women's caretaking within the home (Fraser 1994). However, by the late twentieth century, it became increasingly clear that the male breadwinner model, which had never been accurate for most working class and poor families, was no longer tenable for even middle class families – both because few jobs pay enough to support an entire family, and because most women are now also labor market participants (Crompton 1999). Scholars suggest three main models to replace the family wage model: the universal breadwinner model, the caregiver parity model, and the earner–carer model.

The “universal breadwinner” model posits a society in which both men and women are equally invested in labor market participation. Rosemary Crompton (1999) refers to this model as the “dual earner/state carer” or “dual earner/marketized carer” model. In such a model, the welfare state should work to eliminate differences between men and women by engaging women in the paid labor force. Such a model requires workplace reforms aimed at equalizing women's opportunities, state or market provision of childcare, eldercare, and other care services, and the development of high quality full time positions that carry full social insurance benefits for women workers. This model would require either state or market provision of care, so that women are free to pursue paid employment (Fraser 1994).

The “caregiver parity” model posits a society in which women are valued and rewarded for providing care. In such a model, the welfare state should recognize gender difference and value care (Sainsbury 1999). Rather than encouraging women to pursue employment patterns that mimic men's, a caregiver parity strategy would make the difference between men's and women's employment patterns cost less to women, by supporting the time and effort women spend on care. Such a model would require the state to provide generous caregiver allowances in order to support informal carework, as well as workplace reforms such as parental leaves and flextime that make it easier for women to pursue care and paid employment. Rather than shifting care to the market and state, such a model emphasizes the family as the primary site for the provision of care (Fraser 1994).

The “earner–carer” model rejects both of these strategies to suggest a new vision, in which men and women both must balance informal carework and labor force participation. In this model, feminists pursue a strategy that encourages men's lives to more closely resemble women's lives, and requires social institutions to adjust to meet the needs of men and women who do not specialize in either formal work or informal care, but instead are involved in both formal work and informal care. Such a model would require all jobs to assume workers who are both earners and carers, with shorter workweeks, and employment enabling services. Unlike the universal breadwinner strategy that privileges state and market provision of care, the earner–carer model assumes that care will take place both inside and outside of households. Unlike the caregiver parity model, the earner–carer model attempts to break down gendered norms of care and employment (Fraser 1994; Crompton 1999; Gornick & Meyers 2003). However, this model remains difficult to institute effectively. As Anne Lise Ellingsaeter (1999) and Diane Sainsbury (1999) suggest, despite efforts to institute a more flexible combination of employment and care in Norway and Sweden respectively, gendered models remain. However, as Sainsbury (1999: 196) notes, “The lack of far reaching change . . . should not blind us to the merits of policy construction which integrates market work and care work in the home and simultaneously grants equal entitlement to men and women.”

SEE ALSO: Carework; Citizenship; Gender Ideology and Gender Role Ideology; Gender, Work, and Family; Inequality/Stratification, Gender; International Gender Division of Labor; Maternalism; Social Policy, Welfare State

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ecofeminism

Noel Sturgeon

Ecofeminism refers to theories and political practices that make connections between feminisms and environmentalisms. Basically, ecofeminists claim that the oppression, inequality, and exploitation of certain groups (people of color, women, poor people, LGBT people, third world people, animals) are theoretically and structurally related to the degradation and overexploitation of the environment. Ecofeminism involves a double intervention: the claim that feminist issues need to be part of environmentalist agendas and analyses; and the claim that environmental issues need to be part of feminist agendas and analyses. Outside of this basic insight, there is little agreement over the specific character or mechanism of the connection between social inequalities and environmental problems.

Both an activist and an academic phenomenon, ecofeminisms can be found in most parts of the world and in many disciplines, especially women's studies, philosophy, literary criticism, religious studies, history, sociology, geography, cultural studies, and ethnic studies. Several major areas of theoretical and political conflict and disagreement exist. One of the major areas of conflict is how to conceptualize the "woman/nature" connection. Are women the majority of grassroots environmental activists because the gender division of labor puts them in charge of domestic responsibilities such as familial health,

food purity, community viability, and – especially in the global South – access to potable water, availability of fuel, and small scale agricultural sustainability? Or are women concerned about the environment because they are associated ideologically with nature, the body, and animals – especially in western cultures? These aspects, however, are not necessarily opposed, but can be conceptualized from constructivist or essentialist positions. Still, one of the major internal and external critiques of ecofeminism has been of the apparent biological essentialism of some (especially early) ecofeminist arguments that women have a special role to play in environmentalism (Sturgeon 1997).

The set of interconnected ideas called ecofeminism (that nature and women are similarly exploited by the patriarchal system's disregard for life, health, and equality; that access to clean water, air, and food is part of a broader feminist concept of human rights) has served as an inspiration for many activists since the late 1970s. Different versions of ecofeminism have been articulated over time by activists in the anti nuclear, anti militarist, anti colonialist, and anti corporate globalization movements, as well as in environmental movements involving species extinction, wilderness preservation, animal liberation, environmental justice, sustainable agriculture, and anti GMO foods. Ecofeminism cannot be manageably characterized as one social movement, but appears more or less simultaneously in a number of political arenas in the late 1970s and the early 1980s, especially in the context of feminist anti nuclear activism in the US (Starhawk 1982), England, Australia, and the South Pacific. The label, often attributed to François D'Eaubonne, a French activist and writer who used the term in 1974, is more likely a neologism produced by feminist activists from a number of different environmental movements (King 1990). Questions of racism in white feminism, and ethnocentrism in northern/western hegemonic feminism, were also contentious issues for ecofeminist politics.

In the international context, beginning at the 1980 World Women's Conference in Nairobi, many feminist activists from the global South insisted that environmental issues such as deforestation, desertification, and water purity were central parts of women's struggle against

poverty and colonialism. They argued for more materialist analyses of the relation between environmental and women's issues than was common in western ecofeminist activism, which in the 1980s had a strong spiritualist and ideological strand (Agarwal 1992). The label "ecofeminism" was criticized (in both political and academic interventions) as standing in for universalistic, essentialist conceptualizations of the "woman/nature connection" that did not account for unequal power and privilege in the distribution of exposure to environmental problems. The development of this critique accompanied the growing interest in environmentalist feminism in the NGO and UN political arenas, sometimes going under the name "gender and development" (Braidotti et al. 1994). NGOs such as DAWN, WEDO, WEED, and the Committee on Women, Population, and the Environment, as well as movements such as the Green Belt movement in Kenya (headed by Wangari Maathai, awarded a 2004 Nobel Peace Prize for her work) and the Chipko movement in India, constituted a loose set of affiliations that brought environmental issues to the attention of international feminist organizers, and vice versa (Sturgeon 1997).

Ecofeminist arguments have had a noticeable effect on both environmental and gender policy (Buckingham 2004). At the 1992 UN Conference on Environment and Development in Rio, the final document, Agenda 21, contained a chapter on women's stake in environmental issues; and in 1995, at the UN Conference for Women in Beijing, the environment was prominent in the list of women's concerns. Ecofeminism is not just a western movement: for instance, the activism and writing of Indian ecofeminist Vandana Shiva has raised the profile of new issues, such as corporate ownership of genetic materials, as both feminist and environmental concerns within a global political economy, despite what some feminist critics of Shiva see as her essentialist and ahistorical vision of women subsistence farmers. Since the 1970s, the journal *Women and Environments International*, located in Toronto, has published accounts of different environmental feminist activist efforts around the world.

In the academy, a burst of ecofeminist publications has made it difficult to keep pace, especially given that the literature spans so

many disciplines. As indicated above, the label "ecofeminism" itself is now controversial, so much contemporary scholarship tends to use the terms environmental feminism, ecological feminism, or feminist environmentalism, or other more specific emendations of the label such as ecowomanism, environmental justice ecofeminism, or materialist ecofeminism. Early writing that was important to the first theorizations of the field, such as Sherry Ortner's anthropological article "Is Female to Male as Nature is to Culture?" (1974), Annette Kolodny's historical and literary *The Lay of the Land* (1975), Susan Griffin's literary *Woman and Nature* (1978), and Carolyn Merchant's historical *The Death of Nature* (1980), demonstrated the disciplinary variety present at the outset, as well as the theoretical problems of establishing connections between feminism and environmentalism. *The Death of Nature* was not just an inspiration for ecofeminists, but also an important foundation for feminist science studies, which has had an interestingly intertwined but sometimes antagonistic relationship with ecofeminism. All four of these works demonstrate the power of an analysis that simultaneously addresses the means by which sexism and environmental overexploitation are reproduced and maintained, but they also demonstrate some of the dangers of such an analysis. The temptation to lump all women together without cultural, racial, class, and historical distinctions leads to universalisms that are politically and theoretically problematic. Merchant's later work, *Ecological Revolutions* (1989), *Earthcare* (1996), and *Reinventing Eden* (2004), constitutes a detailed historical environmental feminist treatment that carefully accounts for race and class differences, ranging from the European conquest of the US to the present.

Early ecofeminist scholarship located the twin problems of the oppression of women and the exploitation of the environment in a western dualism that separated and unequally valued men/women, culture/nature, reason/emotion, mind/body, white/black, and human/animal. Ecofeminist philosophers Karen Warren (2000) and Val Plumwood (1994) have separately developed a detailed critique of this dualist framework and implicated it in a number of structures of domination, not just those

affecting women and nature, but also in racism, colonialism, and speciesism. Other ecofeminist theorists such as Greta Gaard (1997) and Catriona Sandilands (1999) have examined the ways in which heterosexism is also upheld by dualist structures of domination as well as other problematic concepts of nature. Carol Adams (1990), among others, has written extensively on the relation between the exploitation of animals and sexist/heterosexist ideologies. Vandana Shiva (*Staying Alive*, 1988), Maria Mies (*Patriarchy and Accumulation*, 1986; Mies & Shiva 1993), and Mary Mellors (*Breaking the Boundaries*, 1992) have written about the dangers of capitalist and colonialist economies for both women and the environment. Joni Seager (*Earth Follies*, 1993) has argued that the patriarchal structures of corporations, governments, and militaries are implicated in these institutions being the three major causes of environmental problems.

As a corrective to the narratives and practices of domination identified by this wide ranging scholarship, Warren (2000) and Merchant (2004) have offered the idea of a partnership ethic, a way of understanding nature not as other, or as resource, but as active agent in a process of co construction of reality with human beings. These ideas are close to those of Donna Haraway (*The Companion Species Manifesto*, 2003; *The Haraway Reader*, 2004), who has allied herself with a thoroughly non essentialist version of ecofeminism in several places (Sandilands 1999), though she never uses the language of partnership with nature, but rather the notion of "naturecultures" as a way to shake up notions of binary difference and to see nature as composed of multiple, interdependent actors. Chris Cuomo (1998) has written about another way of conceptualizing a more positive social and environmental ethics, using the complex and promising concept of "flourishing" as a guidepost to constructing social and environmental relationships that are just, flexible, and sustainable.

Sociological work on the relationship between feminism and environmental issues has analyzed particular movements, explored overlap between feminist and environmental values, and surveyed ecofeminist theoretical arguments (Norgaard 1996). Overviews of environmental movements sometimes include

ecofeminism as a variant (Merchant, *Radical Ecology*, 1992) but ecofeminism is often ignored or excluded by social movement historians or theorists, despite, or perhaps because of, ecofeminism's widespread manifestations in a number of different environmental political contexts (Sturgeon 1997). Robert Gottlieb (*Forcing the Spring*, 1993) and Dorceta Taylor (1996) have both done interesting and useful work in challenging standard environmental histories that emphasize wilderness preservation and white male founders such as John Muir. Instead, Gottlieb and Taylor have emphasized working class (occupational health), female (progressivism and social welfare), and African American (urban reform and civil rights) movements as historical antecedents to the common concerns of feminist environmentalists and environmental justice advocates.

Environmental justice and ecofeminism movements have similar foci, operating from slightly different but related frameworks, with ecofeminism stressing gender, and environmental justice stressing race. Both positions, however, end with emphasizing the interconnections of race, class, gender, and class inequality with environmental issues. The exploration of the relationship between ecofeminism and environmental racism, however, is a fraught discussion, given that the label ecofeminism has been associated early in its existence with white feminists not necessarily allied with the issues of race and class important to environmental justice activists (Kirk 1997). Yet, there is a set of historical, political, and theoretical interrelations here worth exploring, given the large number of women who have been activists in grassroots environmental justice organizations, and some of the struggles they have had with sexism in these organizations (DiChiro 1992). Laura Pulido (*Environmentalism and Environmental Justice*, 1996) and Devon Peña (*Chicano Culture*, 1997) also recognize the importance of gender as well as race and culture in constructing and analyzing environmental justice movements. A recent attempt to bridge the divide between environmental feminisms and environmental justice is the collection edited by Rachel Stein, *Environmental Justice: Gender, Sexuality and Activism* (2004).

The future of activist ecofeminism might very well lie in directions that will cause the

label to disappear entirely. Ironically, as the label becomes less used, the cornerstone of ecofeminism, the interconnections of the issues of social inequality and environment, is an analysis widely accepted by the global justice movement, and scholarly approaches which deploy environmentalist and feminist analyses together are becoming more critical as tools in understanding a broad array of social and cultural phenomena. Joni Seager (2003: 950) identifies four areas in which “the best of the recent feminist environmentalist scholarship engages with and extends transnational, postcolonial, and poststructuralist deconstructions and challenges.” These four areas, according to Seager, are the work being done by feminist environmentalist scholars on animal rights, public health, global political economy, and population issues. More and more environmental feminist work includes the ecofeminist critique of dualist structures, but also looks more generally at the use of ideas of nature and the natural as tools of legitimation in a global political economy (Sturgeon, *The Politics of the Natural*, 2006). This expanded theoretical agenda provides a broader scope on the world’s present problems, in which the interrelated issues of growing inequality and planetary environmental crises are central.

SEE ALSO: Environment, Sociology of; Environmental Movements; Essentialism and Constructionism; Ethic of Care; Feminism and Science, Feminist Epistemology; Feminism; Feminism, First, Second, and Third Waves; Gender, Development and; Gender, Social Movements and; Strategic Essentialism

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ecological models of urban form: concentric zone model, the sector model, and the multiple nuclei model

Kent Schwirian

Ecological models of urban form describe and explain the spatial patterns taken by the distribution of people, buildings, and activities across a city's terrain. This orderly set of spatial arrangements is known as the city's land use pattern or spatial form. Through the years ecological researchers have identified three major models of the geometry of city form: concentric zone, sector, and multiple nuclei. While the three models are conceptually distinct, in the actual development of most cities various elements from the three models become uniquely combined into a spatial pattern that gives each city its own individual spatial geometry. Each of the three models was developed to explain urban morphology in industrial cities of the twentieth century. The concentric zone model was presented by Ernest Burgess in 1925. The sector (Hoyt 1939) and multiple nuclei (Harris & Ullman 1945) models were presented later as alternatives to the concentric zone model. Through time the three have become intellectually linked and widely considered as "the classic models of urban land use." They are "classic" in the sense that the three models have stood the test of time and have proven to be catalysts of research on cities in both developed and developing societies.

The three models share common assumptions: (1) that the city is growing in population and expanding in economic activities; (2) a relatively free land market that is responsive to the economic principles of supply and demand with little in the way of government regulation; (3) an economic base that is mainly a mix of industrial commercial activities; (4) private ownership of property; (5) specialization in land use; (6) a transportation system that is fairly rapid and efficient, and generally

available in terms of cost to the majority of the population; and (7) freedom of residential choice, at least for the higher socioeconomic strata. Even though sharing these assumptions, the three models predict different spatial geometries (see Figure 1).

CONCENTRIC ZONE MODEL

For the Chicago School sociologists (1914–45), Chicago was the prototypical growing industrial city. What was true for Chicago, they argued, was true for most others. Chicago was both their window on city life and their laboratory for community study. The concentric zone model described Chicago, they argued, and, in essence, described other cities as well.

The concentric zone model, attributed to Ernest Burgess, posits a city undergoing rapid population and economic growth. As different population groups, industrial enterprises, and organizations come to the city, an enormous land market competition develops for highly prized locations. The groups with the most available resources (e.g., business and industry, the upper class) are able to obtain the locations they desire while those with fewer resources (e.g., impoverished immigrant groups) have to make do elsewhere. In 1929 Robert Park called the city, through the operation of its land market, a "great sifting and sorting mechanism . . . so that every individual finds, eventually, either the place where he can, or the place where he must live" (Park 1952: 79).

Central location is valued most highly since the old industrial city had but one vital downtown center. Central location minimizes transportation costs to all other locations in the city. Consequently, land values at the city's center soar and can only be afforded by the most resource laden groups – typically, business and industry. The *central business district* (CBD) forms the organizing node of the city and is identified as Zone 1 of the model. It includes banks and other financial institutions, corporate offices and headquarters, large department stores and specialized retailers, museums, hotels and night clubs, bars and restaurants, theaters and other entertainment venues, and government administrative offices.




Figure 1 Classic models of urban spatial geometry.

Zone 2, the *zone in transition*, is located around the CBD on all sides. It is in the process of shifting from residential to industrial commercial land uses as the growing CBD spills its various activities into it. It is an area of intense land speculation and profit taking by property owners. The area's increasing blight and deterioration drive out the middle and working class residents. Their leaving makes the zone an available place of residence for those groups that cannot obtain housing elsewhere – the segregated racial and ethnic minorities, the socially stigmatized, the downwardly mobile, and those seeking impersonality, anonymity, and seclusion. Slums, prostitution, crime, mental and physical illness, and the drug war flourish in the zone in transition. It is a socially distressed area inhabited by socially distressed individuals.

Just beyond the zone in transition is found Zone 3, the *zone of workingmen's homes*. It is a

blue collar neighborhood inhabited by stable families where “respectability” is a driving ethos. The housing is neat and tidy and the residents are alert and “on guard” against incursions of minorities from the zone in transition. Residential invasions of the poor and ethnic minorities are usually met with resistance. Blockbusting realtors operate in the zone to open housing opportunities for those minority group members moving up socioeconomically and out spatially. Once a “tipping point” has been reached and immigrating minorities flood the zone, the working class residents flee further out, typically into the adjacent Zone 4, the *zone of better residences*, which houses the middle class. In turn, the middle class moves further out in response to the perceived downgrading of its neighborhoods by the newcomers. It relocates to the next adjacent zone, the *commuters' zone*, which at one time housed the city's upper crust. Later Burgess identified

two additional zones in the metropolis – the agricultural districts and the metropolitan hinterland (Burgess 1930).

The shifting of people and activities from one zone to another according to this model resembles the pattern that is observed when a pebble is tossed into a lake. The concentric ripples it creates follow and run into each other in their outward rush. The turnover rate of urban neighborhoods from one population type or activity type to another is governed by several factors. First is the rate of growth in people and activities that demand housing or buildings. Second is the rate of construction of dwellings, industrial buildings, and commercial confines. Third is the investment decisions made by developers, financial institutions, and political regimes. If construction lags behind population and economic growth, stagnation and the piling up of people and activities take place. Demand for developed land increases and the prices for developed parcels escalate. If construction exceeds population and economic growth, vacancy rates rise and land prices decline, but new opportunities are created that may serve to attract future growth. Or, in the extreme, with high vacancies and little growth, a collapse of the local development economy may take place which sends the city into economic depression.

SECTOR MODEL

On the basis of studying 142 American cities, Homer Hoyt (1939) argued that, contrary to the concentric zone model, the city's urban geometry is better described by a sector pattern of land development. The distributions of rents and the city's socioeconomic status groups are organized in homogeneous, pie shaped wedges or sectors that run from the city's CBD to the periphery. The characteristic land use, activity mix, and population composition for any sector are different from those sectors adjacent to it. The implication is that if one were to drive from the CBD to the periphery while remaining in the same sector, one would remain in generally the same type of land use, resident population composition, and activity mix. The concentric zone model provides the driver with a much different view of the city. As one travels

from the CBD to the periphery, regardless of direction, one passes through the same gradation of an ever increasing status composition of neighborhoods.

The sector model is based on an axial conception of the city. It incorporates Richard Hurd's (1924 [1903]) idea that growth and development first take place along main transportation routes from the city's center to the hinterland; these include rail lines, highways, and navigable bodies of water. At some point, it becomes cheaper in travel time and money to develop the open land between the axes than to continue the outward push along the axes. As the area between the axes becomes filled, another cycle begins with development shifting to the axes again and pushing out along them into the undeveloped hinterland.

In a city with a sector spatial geometry, sectors of industry, warehousing, and poor quality land tend to be surrounded by sectors of low income and working class residents. Middle class housing sectors tend to buffer those of upper status from the sectors of low income, industry, and noxious activities. The high status populations command the most desirable sites in the city. The high rent sectors tend to occupy high ground that is free from risk of floods and deluxe apartment areas tend to be established near the business centers in old established residential areas. Low rent areas and the areas occupied by the poor and marginalized race and ethnic groups tend to be located on the opposite side of the city from the high income sector.

The location and movement of the sectors occupied by the wealthy and upper socioeconomic groups have a major impact on the location of the other sectors. Hoyt's model argues that high rent residential growth tends to proceed from its given point of origin along established lines of travel or toward another existing nucleus or trade area. The high rent sectors tend to spread along lake, bay, river, and ocean ports where the waterfronts are non industrial. High rent residential districts tend to grow toward open country, away from "dead end" sectors that prevent expansion by natural or artificial barriers, and toward the homes of the community leaders. The growth of high rent neighborhoods continues in the same direction for a long time. Real estate developers may

bend the direction of high grade residential growth, but they cannot negate or reverse the effects of the general principles embodied in the model.

MULTIPLE NUCLEI MODEL

Unlike the other models, the multiple nuclei model of Chauncy Harris and Edward Ullman (1945) does not view the city as being organized around the CBD. Rather, it postulates that there are a number of different growth nuclei, each of which exerts influences on the distribution of people, activities, and land uses. Each nucleus specializes in markedly different activities, ranging from retailing through manufacturing, education and health services to residential. Nuclei vary in size. Some are large, such as the industrial sites; other are small, such as a strip shopping center. Thus, the city's spatial geometry is much like a patchwork quilt of differing nuclei that are not organized around a single center. The CBD is but one of several functionally important nuclei.

The multiple nuclei model uses four basic principles to explain both the emergence of separate nuclei and the change in them through time. (1) Certain activities require specialized facilities located in only one or a few sections of the metropolis, as seen in the case of manufacturing plants requiring large blocks of undeveloped land located near rail lines. (2) Certain like activities profit from adjacent congregation, as seen in the clustering of retail establishments into malls and shopping centers. (3) Certain unlike activities are antagonistic or detrimental to each other, as seen in the case of manufacturing plants and upper class residential developments. (4) Certain activities are unable to afford the costs of the most desirable locations, as seen in the case of low income residential areas and high land with a much sought after view.

The number and mix of nuclei in a city vary greatly. Larger cities have more nuclei than do smaller places, and they tend to be more specialized in the larger community. For example, a small city may have a retailing nucleus, but in a larger city the separate retail activities may spin out into their own nucleus, as seen in the "diamond" district in New York City. Some

nuclei have existed from the origins of the city, as seen in the CBD; others developed as the city grew, such as ethnic enclaves established by arriving immigrant groups, and through urban redevelopment as one land use supplants another, as in the case of an arena project being built on the site of a former prison.

MODELS IN COMBINATION

In examining the comparative utility of the three models, researchers have found that in many cities socioeconomic status tends to vary by both sector and distance. That is, some sectors tend to contain a larger percentage of the affluent than do others, and there is a general tendency for the socioeconomic standing of neighborhoods to increase with distance from the CBD. Studies have also shown that housing types and values often vary by sector. Regardless of the extent to which a city's spatial geometry approximates concentric zones or sectors, overlaying the whole pattern tends to be numerous nuclei devoted to such things as educational campuses, medical complexes, race and ethnic group ghettos and enclaves, industrial plants, parks, and historic districts.

In applying the models to other societies, researchers have identified elements of the three models in the geometry of spatial structure of their cities. A main difference between the geometry of cities in developed and developing societies is that in the developing societies, socioeconomic status tends to be inversely related to distance from the core, while in cities in developed societies, status tends to have a direct relationship with distance. Some have suggested that as cities in developing societies increasingly become part of the global network, they experience economic, social, and political changes and those changes are manifest in the transition of their spatial geometries to a pattern consistent with the patterns of cities in developed societies (Schwirian 1983).

Increasingly, researchers have argued that the spatial geometry of post industrial cities such as Los Angeles does not conform to the classic models. Their origin lies not in the industrial centralization of the twentieth century as assumed by the classic models, but, rather, in the decentralized and dispersed multicentric

metropolitan region of the postmodern age (Dear 2001).

SEE ALSO: Blockbusting; Built Environment; Central Business District; Chicago School; City Planning/Urban Design; Ethnic Enclaves; Exurbia; New Urbanism; Park, Robert E. and Burgess, Ernest W.; Restrictive Covenants; Suburbs; Urban Ecology; Urban Renewal and Redevelopment

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ecological problems

Peter Preisendorfer and Andreas Diekmann

Although human beings have overused natural resources and local environments throughout history, today's ecological problems such as the greenhouse effect, the reduction of biodiversity, overfishing of the oceans, or shortages

of clean drinking water are relatively recent phenomena. They started with the period of industrialization in the first half of the nineteenth century, and had their real takeoff after World War II. Serious warnings about impending global ecological disasters were first issued in the 1960s by scientists like Rachel Carson (1962), Paul Ehrlich (1968), Garrett Hardin (1968), and Dennis Meadows et al. (1972).

Given Durkheim's view that sociology should concentrate on social facts and their social origins, sociologists were long reluctant to deal with the environmental challenge and to incorporate it into their discipline. Although the Chicago School in sociology pioneered urban "ecological" studies in the first half of the twentieth century, it took a relatively long time before a specialty called environmental sociology was established. Today, an environmental sociology devoted to describing, explaining, and contributing to the solution of ecological problems is an institutionalized subsection of sociology. It has its own textbooks and review articles (e.g., Berger 1994), and is part of the teaching program at many universities. There are at least three major areas of research in which environmental sociologists are active: theories of the emergence of ecological problems, environmental attitudes and behavior of the general public, and environmental behavior of corporate actors (business firms, environmental movement organizations, and the state). Other research topics deal with the social diffusion of environmentally friendly technologies, the perception of ecological risks, and the social distribution of ecologically harmful emissions ("environmental justice").

THEORIES OF THE EMERGENCE OF ECOLOGICAL PROBLEMS

Overwhelming majorities of people answer in surveys that they want to live in a sound and healthy environment – one without noise, air pollution, toxic waste, traffic jams, and the like. However, such unpleasant collective effects occur, and the question is why. Theories of ecological problems developed in answer to this question fit neatly into the four general paradigms of sociological theory: functionalism/system theory, conflict theory/the political

economy perspective, rational choice theory, and interactionist/constructivist approaches.

Approaches developed in the tradition of functionalism/system theory locate the reasons for ecological problems in the complexities of systems, both ecosystems and social systems. Systems usually consist of many elements and the relations among them, which may be understood to a better or worse extent. Changes in one or a few system elements can have far reaching and unexpected consequences. The discernment of such contingencies is hampered by the existence of feedback processes, interactive linkages, positive and negative loops, and the fact that, while some changes have short term consequences, others have only long term consequences. Caught in simple "cause and effect" thinking, human beings have difficulty perceiving and predicting the dynamic system effects of their actions, so they endanger and destroy the equilibrium of well adapted and finely tuned ecosystems. The most prominent examples of such a system theoretic approach to environmental problems are the "limits of growth" scenarios from the Club of Rome and its members (e.g., Meadows et al. 1992). One of sociological system theory's core ideas is that modern societies are characterized by functional differentiation, i.e., that they consist of a set of relatively autonomous subsystems (political, economic, and legal subsystems, and so on). All these subsystems have their own "codes" and their own logic, and maintain efficiency at the cost of a certain amount of one sidedness. The problem of environmental protection affects several different societal subsystems, which is seen as an impediment to a reasonable solution of this problem in functionally differentiated societies (e.g., Luhmann 1986).

The conflict theory/political economy perspective, which has its historical basis in Marxist theory, blames mainly the logic of the capitalist and/or neoliberal economic system for the environmental crisis. In a neoliberal world, successful businesses and prosperous economies require permanent growth, which involves new products and innovations, short product cycles, and a rapid process of creative destruction. The built in dynamics of industrial production (the industrial metabolism) relies not only on the exploitation of workers and human resources, but to an even greater

extent on that of natural resources. The profit seeking exploitation of resources is not confined to the industrialized countries, but has instead expanded to the whole world during a process of mainly economic globalization. Proponents of the political economy perspective of ecological problems are authors in the tradition of the neo Marxist world system theory, prominent anti globalization activists, and scientific writers like Allan Schnaiberg who have often focused on the "treadmills of production and consumption" in western countries (e.g., Schnaiberg & Gould 1994).

The first contribution of rational choice theory to the explanation of ecological problems is the elementary assumption that, if environmental behavior is not optimal, something must be wrong with the incentive structure. People might not act in an environmentally responsible way because environmentally responsible behavior would cost them something they value, for instance, because prices of ecoproducts are too high or because driving a speedy (but fuel inefficient) car enhances social status. Rational choice theorists insist that environmental behavior cannot be well understood if it is conceptualized as altruistic behavior, but only if it is seen as subjectively rational, self interested behavior. One of the important reasons why incentives to pro environmental behavior are often distorted stems from the fact that many environmental goods and services are public goods. A defining element of such goods is that no one can be excluded from their use, which induces people both to overuse these goods and to withhold their own contribution to their production (the problem of free riding). Market prices are often poor signals of the real value not only of such public goods, but also of the value of private goods, because they do not include the true costs of negative externalities (e.g., the water pollution caused by the production of these goods). In other words, rational choice theory states that ecological problems often have the structure of a social dilemma such as a "commons dilemma" or a "prisoner's dilemma." In a social dilemma, the rational individual strategy is non cooperation, i.e., in this case pursuing one's own interests at the expense of the environment. For a public good, individual and collective rationality diverge, lowering cooperation among actors.

A solution to a social dilemma is establishing enforcing institutions to help change the incentive structure so that cooperative behavior will be in the self interest of individual actors. A well known study reflecting this line of reasoning is Elinor Ostrom (1990).

Proponents of interactionist/constructivist approaches emphasize that environmental problems – like all other societal problems – are socially defined and culturally patterned. The social construction of the environmental crisis can be demonstrated by looking at historical differences in the definition of the problem and by cross national comparisons of problem solving preferences. Given this focus, constructivist theorists are interested primarily in the social and political processes through which ecological problems are placed and kept on the problem agenda. Groups with vested interests in environmental issues and the presence or absence of pro environmental movements play a crucial role in the modern construction of the environmental crisis, as does the focus of the mass media. Douglas and Wildavsky (1982) are the authors of a classic study on social and cultural influences on the definition of environmental problems (and especially on the perception of risk).

Another analytical tool is provided not by those four theoretical approaches but by a useful conceptual scheme, the IPAT formula suggested by Ehrlich and Ehrlich (1991). According to this “accounting scheme,” ecological impact (I) is the product of the population (P), the pro capita consumption level (affluence A), and technology (T). As an example, consider the impact of carbon dioxide emissions from private cars. Impact measured in tons per year results from the population P times the average number of miles a person drives per year (A) times the average CO₂ emission per mile (T). There are two main ways to reduce environmental impact: less consumption (the “sufficiency strategy”) or better technology (the “efficiency strategy”). Programs aimed at uncoupling economic growth and energy consumption or “factor x programs” (those intended to enable affluence with lower overall energy input) follow the latter strategy (Weizsäcker et al. 1998). Economic and sociological theories such as modernization theory or social diffusion theory try to explain how social and

economic conditions affect lifestyles, the consumption level, and the development of more environmentally efficient technologies.

ENVIRONMENTAL ATTITUDES AND BEHAVIOR IN THE GENERAL PUBLIC

Moved to action by alarming scientific studies, in the 1960s a growing part of the general public began to develop an attitude summarized by the term “environmental concern.” This concern was first observed in the US, but it spread to other countries in a rapid social diffusion process. Today, we can speak of a global or worldwide environmental concern (Dunlap et al. 1993). Judging by the results of surveys in different western countries, environmental concern increased to a peak around 1990, but has since decreased or at least stagnated. Those who retain an attitude of environmental concern are more likely to be young, female, highly educated, have a higher income, and hold a progressive/liberal political worldview. Comparing different countries, a higher GNP is associated with more widespread environmental awareness. The positive correlation between income/GNP and environmental concern has often been interpreted as an indication that the quality of the environment is a luxury good, important primarily to the rich.

There are two main expectations in focusing on environmental concern in attempting to resolve ecological problems. First, that it can put pressure on the political system to take action in favor of the environment. Second, that it can directly affect citizens’ environmentally relevant behaviors. The first mechanism has some intrinsic appeal, but is difficult to validate. The second, that environmental attitudes strongly influence environmental behavior, has been proven shaky because the relation between environmental concern and behavior reported in numerous studies is of only modest strength. Although there has been some lamentation about the discrepancy between environmental attitudes and behavior, this discrepancy is typically observed in attitude-behavior research in general. The disconnect between environmental attitudes and behavior has roots similar to inconsistencies in other areas of study. Environmental attitudes

are simply one of many factors influencing environmental behavior.

Empirical studies on the behavioral effects of environmental attitudes are regularly confronted with the problem of measuring and conceptualizing "environmental behavior." If we define it only as behavior that affects the natural environment, most behavior belongs to the category. It is therefore necessary to rank different kinds of behavior according to their impact on the environment. Concentrating on those behaviors with the largest impact leads to "indicators of sustainable household consumption" (Lorek & Spangenberg 2001). These indicators can be used to provide the public with recommendations on how to improve their environmental performance. Mobility/transport (the use of cars, airplanes, public transportation), housing (size of one's home, the presence of a heating system or air conditioning), and nutrition (local ecofood, the consumption of meat) are the three areas in which individual behavior has the strongest environmental consequences. Common wisdom about and public attention to what constitutes environmentally relevant behavior tend to diverge from these scientifically established facts.

Starting from the premise that ecological problems are (also) caused by maladaptive individual behavior, much research focuses on the question of which factors determine this behavior and how environmentally harmful behavior can be changed. There are two opposing schools of thought on that issue: attitudinal approaches and structural approaches. Whereas psychology tends to give priority to influencing attitudes (through moral suasion, value change, environmental education, and so on), sociology and economics have a clear preference for structural settings (convenient access to preferred alternatives, legal restrictions, financial rewards for desirable behavior, and the like). These two views may be reconciled through the hypothesis that environmental attitudes are important when stakes and/or inconvenience of a certain behavior are low (low cost condition), but lose their influence in favor of structural circumstances when stakes and/or inconvenience is high (high cost condition). Diekmann and Preisendörfer (2003), along with others, have presented findings supporting this low cost hypothesis.

ENVIRONMENTAL BEHAVIOR OF CORPORATE ACTORS

Modern societies consist not only of individual actors, but also of corporate actors. The interests and behaviors of these corporate actors are as important for the quality of the environment as those of individual citizens. The activities of business firms and corporations have tremendous effects on the state of the environment, both direct and indirect. They use natural resources as inputs in their production process, they decide which types of goods and services they produce and how they produce them, they have the capacity to influence the consumers and to direct their wishes and their demand for certain products, and often they use the environment as "waste sink." Given all these forms of potential impact, it is important to monitor and to explain firms' environmentally relevant activities. Empirical studies by environmental sociologists investigate which industries cause the most serious environmental damage, under what conditions firms are motivated to improve their ecological performance, which instruments or strategies they use to do so, and what barriers prevent a successful implementation of technological devices developed to reduce negative environmental impacts (e.g., Schot & Fischer 1993). Empirical evidence demonstrates that most pro environment policies pursued by firms and industries are forced upon them by governmental regulation (ecological push incentives, as opposed to ecological pull incentives). Even though there are some dedicated entrepreneurs deeply motivated by environmental considerations, the typical firm engages in voluntary environmental action only if there is (the expectation of) a positive financial payoff. Economically successful businesses have been observed to invest more in pro environmental behavior than less successful firms. Most studies on the causal order of this relation between firm performance and pro environmental activity indicate that good performance induces firms to engage in pro environmental action, and not vice versa (or at least to a lesser extent).

Corporate actors directly fighting for an improvement of environmental conditions (those such as Greenpeace, the WWF, or Robin Wood) have grown out of the so called environmental movement that began at the end of

the 1960s in many countries. These environmental organizations have traditionally varied in the radicality of their strategies (and continue to do so), follow somewhat differing ideologies, and concentrate on different kinds of ecological problems. Sociologists have established a separate line of inquiry called social movement research, which is also dedicated to the environmental movement and to environmental NGOs. This research now has its own theoretical approaches (resource mobilization, political process, and framing theories), and it has a core set of substantive research questions (e.g., Rucht 1991; Giugni 1998). These include the social profile of movement entrepreneurs, the individual decision to join a movement or the organizations involved (even though they are engaged in producing a public good, namely, better environmental quality), causes of cross national variation in the strength of environmentalism, the mobilization strategies adopted by different groups, and the temporal processes of the institutionalization of a social movement. As is the case with environmental concern in the general public, the environmental movement seems to be on the decline in many parts of the world.

One reason for the shrinking importance of the environmental movement in rich countries is that many claims and proposals originally articulated by environmental activists and organizations have found acceptance in the conventional political system and are now part of the programs and platforms of mainstream political parties, governmental agencies, community councils, and so forth. This means that corporate actors in the political arena have become the dominant players in the field of ecological problems. On the national level, governments have founded their own ministries for the environment, enacted numerous environmental laws, and initiated many other policies aimed at the protection of natural resources. Despite disagreement over strategies and measures of success, most governments today declare "sustainable development" to be the guiding principle behind their environmental policies. Of course, in many countries there is still a large gap between official environmental goals and the actual state of the environment. Ecological problems are also an object of regular negotiation among countries. Whereas these processes

have been relatively successful in the case of stopping the depletion of the ozone layer, progress is very slow in the case of the reduction of carbon dioxide emissions, preserving biodiversity, providing clean water in developing countries, stopping deforestation, averting soil degradation, and preventing the depletion of resources like ocean fish.

On a global scale, a large proportion of the world's population is excluded from living in an intact and healthy environment, and in some rapidly growing economies such as China the state of the environment will deteriorate in coming years. Within a given country, the poorer population is usually the group exposed to higher environmental and health risks such as noise, pollution, and toxic substances. Since the 1980s the "environmental justice movement" has addressed the social problem of an unequal distribution of the environmental impact among members of different social classes or income categories. A large amount of empirical research, particularly in the health sciences and to a lesser degree in sociology, demonstrates the existence of a "social gradient," i.e., a negative correlation between socioeconomic status and various environmental risks (Evans & Kantrowitz 2002; O'Neill et al. 2003). There is also evidence that environmental risks have a larger detrimental impact on health among the poor than among wealthier people.

According to the well known Brundtland Report (Brundtland 1987) which elaborated and disseminated the idea of sustainable development on the international stage, such a development can and should guarantee that future generations will have a chance to fulfill their basic human needs in a sound and healthy environment. Two decades after the release of this report, it is safe to say more remains to be done in order to narrow the gap between sustainability goals and the actual condition of the environment.

SEE ALSO: Conflict Theory; (Constructive) Technology Assessment; Decision Making; Ecology and Economy; Environment, Sociology of the; Environment and Urbanization; Environmental Movements; Framing and Social Movements; Functionalism/Neofunctionalism; Interaction; New Social Movement

Theory; Political Process Theory; Rational Choice Theories; Resource Mobilization Theory; Risk, Risk Society, Risk Behavior, and Social Problems; Social Movements; Social Problems, Concept and Perspectives; Social Problems, Politics of

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ecological view of history

Harumi Befu

An ecological view of history has to do with how history is accounted for in relation to the ecological conditions in which civilization is situated. The Japanese have developed a unique approach to the understanding of this issue. The idea that ecology has an impact on culture and history and the philosophical underpinning of the particular Japanese approach have their history in the pre World War II era. A short review of the genealogy of this concept is called for.

The distinctly Japanese ecological approach is closely associated with the Kyoto School of thought. This school encompasses philosophy, history, civilization, evolution, and other fields. The best known scholar of this school is arguably Kitarô Nishida (1870–1945), a philosopher who amalgamated western philosophy, notably that of Henri Bergson and the neo Kantians, with Zen philosophy and developed his own unique philosophy, the representative work being *Inquiry into the Good* (1990). One important element of his philosophy is his concept of self, which sees the self and its environs – other beings, nature, and the universe – as an integrated whole, rejecting the dichotomy between self and its environs – an approach accepted in western philosophy.

This conception of oneness of self and the universe was inherited by Tetsurô Watsuji (1889–1960), a major figure in ecological history. Watsuji is probably the first in modern Japan to systematize the interrelationship between environment and culture. His work was first published in *Fudo* (1935) and later translated into English (1961, 1988). Having studied in Germany, Watsuji was heavily influenced by German philosophy, in particular that of Herder and Hegel. It is important, in terms of the sociology of knowledge, that he was moved to construct his theory in direct response to the western theory of the relationship between nature and humans. Watsuji reviews the genealogy of scholarship on the human–nature relationship in western intellectual history from Hippocrates on. He homes in on Herder’s conceptualization of the human–nature relationship in terms of *Geist* (spirit). Watsuji sees Hegel as the inheritor of Herder’s theory, which places western civilization as the latest and crowning achievement in human history. Watsuji, however, unsurprisingly takes exception to Hegel’s claim of Europeans as “the chosen people.” Thus Watsuji’s ecological theory was developed in reaction to the western supremacist bias he saw in Herder and Hegel.

Watsuji also rejects the basic stance of western philosophy where humans and nature are distinguished and pitted against each other. Watsuji additionally rejects scientific causality and determinism, where environment determines human action, culture, and civilization. In this conception of *fudo*, environment and humans are not separate entities defined by a causal relationship between them, as Berque (1996) explicates. Watsuji instead develops the idea of oneness of humans and nature (Befu 1997). This fusion is expressed in the very term *fudo*, the title of his major work. To Watsuji, *fudo* refers to humans and their environment as one, not to be analytically separated into various conventional components such as the individual, social groups, natural environment, and so on. Berque (1990) has coined the term “*médiance*” to refer to Watsuji’s concept of *fudo*.

Watsuji develops a tripartite ecological classification of (1) monsoon type, (2) desert type, and (3) pasture (German *Wiese*) type. The first “monsoon” type is represented in Asia, East and South. Its salient meteorological characteristic

is humidity, which according to him is expressed in just about every aspect of human life. The Middle East represents the second type, climatically characterized by aridity as the major metaphor for its civilization and as a way of life. The third “pasture” type is represented by Europe, which combines the humidity of the monsoon type and the aridity of the desert type. In this classification, Africa is curiously missing, except for North Africa, which might be classified in the desert type. Likewise missing in his classification is the western hemisphere.

Watsuji’s main focus is on the first type, especially as it affects Japan. Japan’s uniqueness within the monsoon region arises from the fact that although impacted by the monsoon in the summer, it is also subjected to a severe winter climate originating in Siberia, traversing the Japan Sea, and ultimately enveloping the whole island chain of Japan. It is manifested, according to Watsuji, most directly in human character and the pattern of subsistence economy in Japan, which is based on rice cultivation. This in turn affects village organization and the family system as well as the aesthetics of a people. Ultimately, as he develops his ideas in subsequent publications, this ecological argument is expanded to the levels of the national polity (*kokutai*) of Japan and to its imperial system.

His argument persuaded generations of Japanese scholars all through the war period and into the post war era, setting the stage for legions of younger scholars to select themes from his theory and develop their own. For example, rural sociologists like A. Tamaki (1978) and H. Tsukuba (1969) cite Watsuji in discussing village structure and peasant personality. Even business management specialists such as K. Odaka (1981), an erstwhile dean of industrial sociology (now glossed as “management science”), and M. Tsuda (1977) explained the reputed Japanese management style by deriving it ultimately from the rice growing rural community structure. Nippon Steel Corporation, in its handbook for employees destined for foreign posts, also derives the Japanese management style from the rice growing rural community structure.

Another giant in the intellectual genealogy of the Kyoto School is biologist Kinji Imanishi, who developed his own unique, explicitly anti-Darwinian theory of biological evolution. A key

concept in his theory is *specia*, in which a species and the social organization it constitutes are treated as a unitary, indivisible unit of evolution (Imanishi 2002). Here again one sees a rejection of opposition and dichotomy between an object and its environment in diachronic development.

The last in this genealogy of intellectual giants in the ecological view of history is Tadao Umesao, one of Imanishi's direct intellectual descendants and the acknowledged doyen of the anthropological profession in Japan. His views were made well known initially through his 1957 work, which has been revised and updated several times. The latest version has been translated into English, with a new chapter added (Umesao 2003). Umesao shares his intellectual stance with his predecessors in the Kyoto School. He too starts by rejecting western thinking. His treatise on ecological history was in fact triggered by Arnold Toynbee's theory of civilization, and is an explicit rejection of it.

Umesao does not acknowledge his debt to Watsuji. But Umesao's ecological theory does show some critical similarities to Watsuji's. For instance, Umesao, like Watsuji, divides the Eurasian continent into three sections. He acknowledges the arid middle zone, which he calls *Chuyo*, or "mediant." Moreover, Umesao also more or less ignores Sub Saharan Africa and the western hemisphere. But similarities end here. Rather than seeing the eastern and the western portions of the Eurasian continent as being different, as Watsuji does, Umesao collapses the two regions into one type.

Also, rather than working out just three arche types, as Watsuji does, Umesao fine tunes the variable civilizational characteristics of regions bordering the central "mediant" and the two zones lying east and west of it through contingent historical interactions between them. He sees the middle region, the mediant, as one in which historical ravages of one war after another, one conquest after another, in its hostile arid environment, have created a situation inimical to civilizational development. In the zones at the eastern and western extremes of the Eurasian continent, on the other hand, the relative geographical protection made for an environment in which civilization could modernize. In both regions, civilizations developed in a similar fashion, both going through the feudal age and industrialization with relative ease.

When Umesao's theory first appeared in 1957, it immediately received wide acclaim in the intellectual community. Since its publication, this work has impacted generations of Japanese and has now become a classic. It was selected as the fourth most important book, pre or post war, fiction or non fiction, for its intellectual influence on modern Japanese history by a jury of 58 leading Japanese intellectuals in all fields, including politics, the arts, literature, and business.

As early as 1957, like his intellectual predecessors, Umesao rejected the hegemonic status claimed by the West vis à vis Japan, a position which is increasingly acknowledged by Asian as well as western scholars in the past few decades. One thing that characterizes all these efforts at understanding the nature of human ecology is that Japanese theorists are all reacting against the West's hegemonic claim of knowledge and proposing alternative views. In these alternative views, humans are conceptualized as an integral, and even indivisible, part of the universe and nature, rather than being pitted against them. In opposition to western metaphysics, Japanese intellectuals are staking out a claim that historical and evolutionary changes take place through integrated transformation of the whole, rather than by one segment causing change in another.

SEE ALSO: Civilizations; Culture, the State and; Ecological Problems; Ecology; Ecology and Economy; Empire; Environment, Sociology of the; Environment and Urbanization; Micro-Macro Links

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ecology

Marc M. Sanford

Ecology generally refers to the scientific study of an organism or community of organisms and their relationship to each other as well as to the environment. The ecological framework is used in biological sciences, social sciences, botany, zoological sciences, and other research areas and is applied to myriad subareas including human ecology, cultural ecology, organizational ecology, plant ecology, population ecology, spatial ecology, and more. Early writings on ecology were influenced by the works of Malthus and Darwin. This can be seen in ecology's use of natural selection and the presence of other competing species in the race for survival.

The concept was developed by famous phytogeographers such as Humboldt and Grisebach in the first half of the nineteenth century. However, many acknowledge that the term's modern meaning became fixed in a publication by Haeckel in 1865, in which he coined the term "oekologie" and defined it as the relation of an animal to its organic and inorganic environment. Despite the widespread credit given to Haeckel for coining the term,

there are sufficient claims that the term ecology was in use at the same time by at least seven other biological researchers. One researcher on the topic credits the very first use of the term to Henry David Thoreau in 1858.

Many early studies in botany and biology employed the term "plant geography" and ecology. Early writings on plant ecology looked at vegetation in different climates and discussed how each type was determined by climatic and edaphic factors. Botanists, biologists, and zoologists in the late nineteenth century were interested in the interdependent nature of life, or the "web of life" that intertwines all living creatures. They were interested in recording the mutual adaptations of one species as it depended on another for its survival. Later research on the subject matter of animal ecology, at least through the mid twentieth century, focused on the individual organism, the population of organisms, and the community.

Social scientists borrowed the ecological framework directly from the biological and plant sciences. Ecology's quantitative approach influenced both the conceptual approach to the human community and the methodological one. The term "human ecology" was used in the social sciences by Charles C. Adams in 1913. However, ecology as a social scientific approach received systematic formulation around 1915 from Robert Park. The classical human ecologists writing in the 1920s and 1930s applied to the interrelations of human beings a type of analysis previously applied to the interrelations of plants and animals. The human ecologists claimed that although the conditions that affect and control the movement and numbers of populations are more complex in human societies than in plant and animal communities, they exhibited extraordinary similarities.

Robert Park (1936), Ernest Burgess (1925), and Roderick McKenzie (1929) applied biotic principles of competition, differentiation, and invasion/succession to ethnic groups, class groups, and other subcultures in the city of Chicago. Competition operates in the form of communities vying for land and housing. The highest land values are found in the central shopping district and central banking area. From these points land values decline and determine the locations of other social institutions and businesses. As the city expands, the

pressures of businesses and social institutions steadily increase at the center. This pressure is then diffused to every other part of the city and acts to sort businesses and population groups. Differentiation occurs through population groups settling in areas that do not match official administrative boundaries. These areas became known as "natural areas." Throughout the ecological process, generally, we expect increased functional differentiation or specialization of populations and communities. Invasion and succession occurs when population groups move into areas where they were not present beforehand.

Custom, tradition, and culture also occupy a central role in human ecology. Robert Park hypothesized that the individual is both incorporated and subordinated to the local community and local social order. This community and social order is comprised of ecological, economic, political, and moral components. The move away from the biotic was further emphasized by Roderick McKenzie. McKenzie claimed that "human ecology is the study of the spatial and temporal relations of human beings as affected by the selective, distributive, and accommodative forces of the environment." Although McKenzie continued to speak of invasion and succession, he tied the ecological approach to specific divisions of space and developed a typology of city functions: the primary service community, the commercial community, the industrial town, and the community which lacks a specific economic base. The human ecology perspective focuses on the form and functions of populations, communities, and cities and carried a great amount of weight until the early 1960s.

Another application of ecology in the social sciences is organizational ecology. Organizational ecology emerged from economic and general systems theory and places a distinct emphasis on selection mechanisms. Organizational ecology generally focuses on the environmental and organizational determinants of the formation of the firm, including organizational life cycle transitions and the competitive and demographic structures of industry. Organizational ecology considers the implications of changes in the firm's environment that are a result of organizational actions. Organization theory often focuses on firm level

demographic processes, including entry, exit, and reorganization.

Within organizational ecology organizational structures are affected by the social conditions at the time of their creation. An organization's structure and organizational goals are historically shaped. Both a firm's organization and historical conditions influence its organizing activities in various social environments and entrepreneurship. Organizational ecology also speaks to whether firms should specialize or generalize depending on the uncertainty of the business and economic environment. In uncertain environments, organizations should become more generalist in their orientation in order to survive.

Criticisms of the ecological approach within the social sciences include whether change can originate from within the socio ecological system and whether communities and environments can be analyzed as truly being closed systems. Furthermore, recent use of the ecological framework in the social sciences is scarcely influenced by the original biological analogy. Despite the wide variation in the use of the term "ecology," the term for sociologists often becomes a synonym for "spatial" and loses much of the systematic interplay between environment and community.

SEE ALSO: Ecological Models of Urban Form: Concentric Zone Model, the Sector Model, and the Multiple Nuclei Model; Ecological Problems; Ecology and Economy; Environment, Sociology of the; Environment and Urbanization; Invasion Succession; Organization Theory; Urban Ecology

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ecology and economy

David John Frank

For sociologists, the consideration of ecology – and thus ecology’s role in the economy – is relatively new to the agenda. In a semantic sense, this is necessarily the case. The word “ecology” and its apparatus of meaning only recently entered the vocabulary. But sociology’s ecological turn is much more than the result of semantic invention. It embodies a profound shift in the institutionalized model of nature itself (Frank 1997).

From roughly the mid nineteenth through the mid twentieth centuries, what we now call “ecology” barely existed in the social imagination. Nature appeared in the public realm mostly in the narrowly rationalized form of resources – particular material goods, with status external and subordinate to human society. For instance, in the guise of natural resources, trees materialized as timber and cows took form as livestock. The ecology–economy relationship was uncomplicated accordingly. The ecological system served both as store of natural inputs – raw materials to economic production – and sink for outputted wastes (Berger 1994). In utilizing this system, humans exercised their rightful dominion over earth.

Especially in the West, this resource model of nature grew deeply institutionalized – i.e., taken for granted in culture and organization. Most importantly, perhaps, the resource model helped fuel the twin expansions of industrialism and capitalism, both of which required the exploitation of natural goods on historically unprecedented scales. Even at the world level during this period, natural resource views gained precedence over the alternatives, expressed for instance in the 1911 International Fur Seal Convention, which set conservation measures aimed at maintaining the commercial exploitation of North Pacific fur seals.

By and large in this era, sociologists took the terms of discourse at face value. This means that to the limited extent they noticed at all, sociologists interpreted ecology’s role in the economy in straightforward resource terms (Buttel 2002). Certainly, sociologists recognized that societies differed in relative shares of nature’s bounty and varied by advances in the means of utilization. But seldom did sociologists challenge the central imagery itself, in which ecology referred to natural resources, meaning basic economic provisions.

During the latter twentieth century, much of this changed. To a striking and extraordinary extent, scientists extended and intensified nature’s rationalization well beyond the resource frame. What had formerly been defined in terms of inputs and outputs acquired a host of new meanings, which rendered nature as ultimately valuable and functional to human society. Scientists reconceived nature as an interconnected ecological “environment” – a planetary life support system. In this resource to ecology shift, for example, trees transcended the meaning of timber and came to appear as oxygen producers, greenhouse gas sinks, species habitats (endangered and otherwise), and themselves essential nodes in the web of life.

Of course this broad redefinition of nature hardly meant that resource imageries disappeared. On the contrary, scientists participated in the invention of technologies that opened vast new natural territories to utilization. Still with the rapid profusion of the environment’s life sustaining properties, the warehouse imagery of nature quickly lost dominant standing.

Within the new paradigm, the old one way road from ecology to economy got widened,

bringing new focus to the reverse economy to ecology relationship. Most strikingly, there appeared widespread public concern over the ways economic systems damaged ecological systems, thereby threatening not only material goods but also earth's life bearing capacities (Berger 1994).

The emergent ecological model of nature gained institutionalization most rapidly in the West, where scientific authority stood tallest. There it catalyzed, for example, changes in the longstanding conservation movement, participants in which began to pose economic activity as the antagonist of environmental vitality. And even at the world level, the new imageries acquired legitimacy, as exemplified by the 1972 founding of the United Nations Environment Program, around the mission "to provide leadership and encourage partnership in caring for the environment."

As they had previously, sociologists operated within the set parameters of discourse. Most importantly, sociologists offered analyses of the logics and mechanisms whereby different economic configurations caused more or less ecological damage (e.g., Schnaiberg & Gould 1994). Capitalism in particular came under scrutiny. Researchers showed, for instance, ways the profit motive and private ownership combined to exacerbate ecological ills. For the private owner, maximized profit meant maximized exploitation, extracting nature's commodity values without regard to environmental consequences, as exemplified by the clear cut forest. Likewise for the private owner, maximized profit implied minimized amelioration, privileging the least costly means of exploitation, even when those means wreaked the greatest ecosystem havoc, as illustrated by the strip mine. Furthermore for the private owner, maximized profit rewarded the disposal of "wastes" into the commons, polluting those aspects of nature (notably air and water) shared by the public at large, as in the case of smokestack industries. In virtually all such sociological analyses, the revised ecological definition of nature took priority over the old resource one.

Of course changing conceptions of "nature" continue apace, spurring ongoing reconsideration of the ecology-economy linkages. Along with society at large, sociologists now

increasingly notice that economic activity need not be antithetical to ecological well being. Indeed, some sociologists have recently called attention to the environmental benefits of economic activity, which may cause birth rates to decline and environmental values to rise (Inglehart 1990). As the new ideas take hold, such concepts as sustainable development – promising the union of robust economies with healthy ecologies – seem less like pipe dreams than previously. A new ecology-economy partnership may be forging in the public eye.

In some quarters, of course, nature continues to be seen through the resource lens – in simple input-output terms. In other quarters, meanwhile, any economic rise still indicates certain ecological fall. Both views increasingly, however, seem simplistic and divisive (as seen, for example, in conflicts between wealthy northern and poor southern countries at recent environmental conferences [Shiva 2000]). In the contemporary world, the aspiration to economic betterment seems unwavering and universal. And in the same world, environmental protection is becoming ever more rule like. The satisfaction of both ends will require ingenuity and compromise. In this middle ground, the sociological study of ecology and economy may be most promising.

SEE ALSO: Consumption, Green/Sustainable; Ecological Problems; Economic Development; Environment and Urbanization; Environmental Movements; Nature; Population and the Environment; Science, Social Construction of

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economic determinism

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The concept of economic determinism refers to monocausal determinism by material, economic factors. The idea is often associated with Karl Marx's "historical materialism," but it is not clear that Marx himself was a strict economic determinist, or even a materialist (Gouldner 1980; Simmel 1990 [1900]; Landry 2000). The Romantic strain in the work of the early Marx did not disappear entirely, which is evident in terms of his view of species being and the teleology of communism. Some commentators differentiate between economic determinism and dialectical materialism, where dialectical materialism allows for more flexibility and may even include a feedback mechanism. Rigid versions of economic determinism are often associated with Marxist Leninism and Stalinism. In Marxist parlance, the forces of production determine the relations of production in any mode of production. Sometimes that statement is modified to include the disclaimer that such economic determinism is only true in the final analysis. But precisely what "in the final analysis" means is rarely specified exactly. Closely related is the concept of economic reductionism (Robertson & White 2005: 355–7), where emphasis is placed on the idea that the economy is closely intertwined with all forms of the culture of consumerism. Thus, for example, advertising images can be viewed as ideological constructs that are the product of economic forces working on decision makers in corporations. Concern with capitalist globalization has

been premised in part on the theory that economic globalization is determinative of all aspects of civil society, not just consumption. Studies of the origins of the "capitalist world system" have moved the classical Marxist argument about economic determinism from relations of production within nation states to a global arena that involves the interaction among societies. Wallerstein (1974, 1980, 1989) "emphasized the causal significance of economic material factors, relegating other aspects of epiphenomenal status" (Robertson & White 2005: 357). There are also counterarguments which stress "civilizational" or "cultural" factors as determinative (e.g., Huntington 1996). Weber's 1904–6 thesis (2002: 125) concerning the Protestant ethic is often misinterpreted as a one sided idealist argument, but he explicitly points out that it is not his intention to replace a one sided economic determinism with an equally misleading, one sided idealist (ideological cultural) determinism. There are few sociological writers who take a strictly economic determinist view, but there is a strong movement to go beyond the labor theory of value and classical and neoclassical economics models and to recognize the importance of multivariant and reciprocal social factors within economic institutions.

SEE ALSO: Althusser, Louis; Base and Super structure; Dependency and World Systems Theories; Dialectical Materialism; Globalization; Gramsci, Antonio; Marx, Karl; Weber, Max

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economic development

Thomas D. Beamish and Nicole Woolsey Biggart

Economic development studies are concerned with how societies have, could, and should pursue improvement in the quality and quantity of life for their inhabitants. Since the decades following World War II when development studies began and were implemented as policies, there has been neither consensus on how to pursue the goal of economic and social improvement nor unqualified improvement in the quality of life for most of the world's population. Nonetheless, the politically and socially important pursuit of economic development continues and involves academics, nation states, regional and international organizations, non-governmental organizations, and philanthropic foundations.

Development scholarship arose out of the major social, political, and economic changes that accompanied the end of World War II and the restructuring of the global geopolitical map. As a consequence of the war, there was both a felt need to reconstruct the destroyed economies of Europe and Japan, and to supply financial assistance to the newly freed colonial possessions of losing states. Early efforts focused on the construction of critical industrial goods and state owned infrastructures, and the overall modernization of political and economic institutions. Rebuilding activities were based on assumptions of social and economic "convergence": a belief that all societies progress in a stepwise fashion from traditional social orders toward increasingly modern social and economic systems as manifest by western industrial states.

The most stubborn development problem to defy eradication is the unequal relationship that

remains between developed and underdeveloped regions. Events such as the fall of the Soviet Union and the dissolution of the tripartite breakdown of global nation states – first world, communist world, and third world or neutral countries – brought a new set of social and geopolitical issues that theories of the post World War II modernist tradition, as well as those critical of modernist assumptions, could not adequately address. Continuing economic hardship in Asia, Latin America, and Russia called into question the economic strategies of global development organizations such as the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund. Standardized protocols for development did not stimulate the expected convergence of the underdeveloped and developed economies and rarely sustained development in undeveloped regions.

Proposed economic treatments for laggard economies tended to reflect a common belief that all economies are fundamentally the same and operate on a universal set of economic principles that when violated lead to suboptimal outcomes. Economic policies were premised on the assumption of a neoclassical market ideal where firms are dispersed and contracts assured by a regulatory state. Deviations from this ideal are assumed to need restructuring to better approximate the ideal market model, the basis for Anglo American economies.

Critics argue that economic differences are not necessarily imperfections of an ideal market economy. Rather than assume that all economies are the same and destined to converge as they modernize, critical development scholars cite important differences on which economic competitiveness can be built. These differences – the result of history, social traditions, and institutionalized political structures – allow nations to organize themselves politically, culturally, and economically in ways that are culturally meaningful and that enable them to successfully leverage their capabilities and social predispositions in the economy. For example, research has shown that French, German, Japanese, British, and American firms (among others) excel at different things in the global economy because of their different social structures and endowments.

During the early period, economic development theories were largely based on the belief

that all societies developed through a set of stages that ultimately would lead to a modern nation state and industrial economy. This evolutionist approach urged political and social reforms that would develop “primitive” or “backward” societies into modern economic systems like those in the West. This approach is rooted in western cultural beliefs about progress. It encouraged individualism and western style institutional structures, such as constitutional democracies, even in places based on radically different social arrangements such as lineage structures and group based economic institutions. New institutions and practices were taught by development specialists who worked with governments and educational ministries in developing countries, and were reinforced by economic incentives that tied loans and funding packages to reforms.

By the mid 1960s ideas about evolutionary progress and convergence toward a single model had been formalized in scholarly research and development policy such as modernization theory. Modernization theory (Rostow 1969) reflected three geopolitical trends that characterized this period: (1) the rise of the US as a superpower and with it Anglo American style capitalism; (2) the simultaneous rise of the Soviet Union and its influence over Eastern Europe, China, and North Korea; and (3) the disintegration of the European colonial empires in Asia, Africa, and Latin America. The threat of communist expansion produced generous funding and attention to development research. Social science theorizing that supported western industrial practice and the expansion of capitalist social and economic forms played a key role in producing a body of thought to counter the influence of socialist development schemes.

By the 1970s, another state centric view of development emerged to counter the modernist view. An outcome of the turbulent experiences of Central and South America, Asia, and Africa as states there attempted to mimic first world economies and states, scholars such as Frank (1969) noted that developing countries, far from improving their economic circumstances, continued to be both dependent on and increasingly impoverished because of their relationship with western industrial states. Called dependency theory, these theorists pointed out

that the underdeveloped world reflected colonial pasts that had not been substantially changed despite decades of development attempts to alter institutions and practices through economic loans and subsidies. According to dependency theorists, direct political domination under pre World War II colonialism had merely been exchanged for post World War II economic dependence on former colonizers. Third world states were dependent on first world states for economic opportunities, financing and development loans, new technology and training, and access to first world markets, all of which retarded the third world from developing.

By the early 1980s, however, it became increasingly evident that state centric ideas, whether of the modernization or dependency schools, could not entirely capture the whole of development outcomes for the rich and especially the poorer parts of the world. Attention by Wallerstein (1980) and others to global exchange structures painted a picture of a capitalist world economic system where economic outcomes are not determined by the actions of any one state. All states are part of a networked capitalist system and the prospects of any one state are influenced by its place in that system and its relation to other states.

During the 1980s and continuing into the 1990s, a resurgence in economic theorizing had an especially strong influence over global development institutions, especially lending institutions and donor countries. The World Bank and International Monetary Fund promoted neoclassical economic precepts, including laissez faire trade policies such as low tariffs, few import controls, no export subsidies, and free labor markets through loan conditions and repayment terms. Taken together as a neoliberal policy agenda, these practices are known as the Washington Consensus and include the willingness of a developing nation to conform to fiscal discipline, lower taxes, a competitive exchange rate, liberalized foreign direct investment policies, privatization, property rights, and deregulation. These conditions have been a prerequisite for developing nations receiving funds from global development bodies.

Critics of the Washington Consensus point out that these policies and programs create an

environment favorable to transnational firms wanting to do business in developing countries, and do not place the social and economic needs of those countries first.

In the late 1970s and 1980s, with the rise and economic success of the “East Asian Tigers” – Japan, Taiwan, Hong Kong, and Singapore – state centric scholarship resurged as the “developmental state” approach, a belief that development outcomes could be explained in part on the role of states as active participants in the economy. According to this theory, the success of these East Asian states reflected key interventions by quasi authoritarian states. The economic principle that state intervention retards capitalist development was not validated by the empirical record of the industrializing East. The developmental states argument stands in marked contrast to the *laissez faire*, “hands off” state model advocated by traditional economics, but it also complicates ideas of earlier dependency, modernization, and world systems theories that do not consider individual state actions as central to development outcomes.

Finally, resurgence in the 1990s of institutional analysis also affected development studies. For example, Biggart and Guillén (1999) identify three important premises that neo institutionalism brings to development: (1) that institutional arenas, such as developing societies, are internally coherent and based on organizing logics that inform action and meaning; (2) that economic and managerial practices and actions not consistent with the institutional logics of a society, even if they are in the abstract “technically superior” or more “efficient,” will not be readily recognized or incorporated; (3) that organizing logics are not merely constraints on development as traditionally conceived, but provide the basis for successful economic activity because they represent social and culturally based repositories of distinctive capabilities and competencies. This scholarship points out that in pursuing uniform policies and single minded development strategies that ignore the unique experience of each society, developing countries lose the possibility of building on the existing strengths of any “institutional endowments” they may have developed over time. Ignoring the import of the social, historical, and cultural

basis of a society, according to institutionalists, is tantamount to ignoring what specialized capabilities and talents that society brings to development, and the legacy on which any customized development plan might be premised.

Economic growth typically has been measured in terms of an increase in the size of a nation’s material output. Gross domestic product, which supplanted the use of gross national product in the 1990s, is the most frequently used index of both the size and health of a domestic economy. Calculating a nation’s GDP involves adding domestic consumption rates with investment, government purchases, and net exports. Increasingly, consumption has become the largest component in this measure.

While GDP details gains of economic significance, according to development scholars critical of this metric, it masks declines in the quality of life experienced by a good portion of the world’s population, instead mostly capturing gains for elite countries and specifically the elites within those countries. Critics have devised a number of more inclusive measures of “well being,” such as Osberg and Sharpe’s (2002) Index of Economic Well Being (IEWB), Redefining Progress’s Genuine Progress Indicator (GPI) (Cobb et al. 1995), and the United Nations Development Program’s Human Development Index (HDI) (UNDP 2001), among a growing list of such efforts (Hagerty et al. 2001). In addition to the traditional economic indicators of growth, “Quality of Life Indexes” typically try to move toward a fuller representation of both economic and non economic well being and include measures of “social health” such as education rates, income distribution, and national health. In some instances, indexes go so far as to include crime rates, measures of social benefits and safety nets, and rates of pollution, resource depletion, and long term environmental damage. Advocates contend that these metrics better assess the overall health of a nation, not just the state of its material economy.

These measures also provide a very different picture of development trends than does GDP. Using social, economic, and environmental indicators, GPI shows there has been an overall decline in quality of life in the US since World War II and Osberg and Sharpe (2002), using the IEWB (a more conservative model), found

that gains were also much flatter than those represented by US GDP. Ultimately, such quality of life measures have sensitized development scholars to the reality that social and environmental deterioration can accompany robust economic growth. This has been almost entirely missed by traditional development policies and policymakers, which have been dominated by assumptions of social and economic convergence, and traditional economic measures of growth as proxies for social health and environmental well being.

In the early twenty first century development studies have been concerned with forces opposed to western ideas of progress and economic success. Ethnic awareness and the resilience of cultural identity in many parts of the world have created strong local opposition to policies that favor western institutions, programs, and culture, and to regimes that favor western alliances. At the extreme, religious fundamentalism has spurred the development of anti western terrorist organizations. At the minimum, there is skepticism that economic riches are available to all countries, or that one standard of quality of life need be universally applied. Environmental movements are increasingly powerful actors in development debates, arguing that unbridled consumption, of the sort at the foundation of modern industrial economies, is economically and socially unsustainable.

SEE ALSO: Dependency and World Systems Theories; Developmental State; Economic Sociology: Economy, Culture and; Economy (Sociological Approach); Neoclassical Economic Perspective; Global Economy; Modernization

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economic geography

Jurgen Essletzbichler

According to Lee (2000), economic geography is “the geography (or, rather, geographies) of people’s struggle to make a living.” Economic geography is concerned with spatial variation in the organization of production, distribution, and consumption of commodities and the influence of externalities, place specific institutions (on various spatial scales), and cultural practices on economic activity. As in other disciplines, the research foci of economic geography shifted as a result of exogenous changes and as a consequence of internal discourse, cooperation, and rivalries among members of the discipline. And although the discipline has never been homogenous and progressing towards some “preordained epistemological mission” (Scott 2000), it is possible to trace out a set of paradigm shifts that have occurred in the discipline over time (Livingstone 1992; Barnes 1996, 2001; Martin 1999; Scott 2000).

Geography’s origin as an academic discipline was tied to the needs of colonialism in the nineteenth century, the exploration and exploitation of new territory and, in the case of economic geography, the mapping of resources and transportation routes. The first disciplinary crisis resulted from the apparent end of colonial and polar exploration and the closure of continental frontiers that seemed to leave geography without a purpose. Two world wars provided ample

work for geographers, however. Until the end of World War II, economic geography adopted idiographic methods of investigation and was concerned with regional description and synthesis. Theoretical and methodological changes that occurred in other disciplines – such as a move towards logical positivism in the social sciences and a shift to general equilibrium modeling in economics and to rational choice theory in sociology – had, at first, little or no impact on the direction of the discipline.

At the end of World War II the discipline was once more confronted with a serious identity crisis. Although a number of the disciplinary rank and file defended the idiographic approach, theoretical and methodological changes outside geography, practical problems posed by the needs of a fast expanding economy, and the rise of young, ambitious faculty eager to apply their quantitative skills to address those problems triggered the “quantitative revolution” and ushered in a new phase in economic geography, best described as spatial analysis and/or regional science paradigm (Johnston & Sidaway 2004). This new generation of quantitative economic geographers was strongly influenced by the old German location theorists and regional scientists who aimed to incorporate distance as a major variable in neoclassical economics and demanded that “geography as a whole must become an analytical, law finding discipline conjoined with quantitative methodologies” (Scott 2000). While regional science reached its peak in the late 1960s in the US and diffused to the UK in the mid 1960s, it was unable to penetrate French or German geography. By the end of the 1960s, the external circumstances shifted again. The slowdown of the economy, rising rates of unemployment and inflation, and the gradual abandonment of the Keynesian welfare state combined with political and social upheaval to pose new problems and opportunities that required new theoretical and methodological approaches.

Regional science and the underlying equilibrium models had little to say about social and spatial inequality, the rise and persistence of poverty, job loss, deindustrialization, and regional decline. On the contrary, the methodological individualism underpinning its models and claims to objective truth delivered

by quantitative methods were considered increasingly as smoke screens to hide structural inequalities produced through capitalist accumulation. As a result, the applications of Marxist approaches to explain the evolution of the capitalist space economy started to dominate research in economic geography in the 1970s and early 1980s. While the immanent crisis of the 1970s necessitated the engagement with the destructive aspects of capitalism, in particular the causes and implications of the decline of old industrial regions, the early 1980s witnessed the emergence of new, formerly “backward” regional production systems in Italy, Southern Germany, and California that were inhabited by different kinds of industries, characterized by different labor processes and forms of industrial organization, and appeared to be strongly embedded in particular cultural and institutional practices.

Economic geography in the 1980s then turned to examine and explain the economic, organizational, cultural, social, and political characteristics of these new industrial spaces. Different research groups emphasizing Marshallian industrial districts, vertical disintegration and local linkages, flexible specialization, or innovation driven regional growth, emerged. This research was in part influenced by French Regulation Theory used to tie region specific changes to broader economic and sociopolitical shifts. It became obvious that national and regional variation of economies could not be explained through economic principles alone, but that differences in governance systems, conventions, culture, and institutions had to be introduced to account for existing variation. The success of this research area may be attributed to the importance attributed to “place” as explanation of economic success. Rather than treating place as a container where socioeconomic processes unfold, social interaction between agents embedded in a common, region specific institutional environment was said to result in emergent properties at the level of the region that would not emerge from interaction of actors in networks that span over long distances. The work on regional economies constituted probably the last identifiable core research area of economic geography.

While the region provided a focus for economic geography, it also meant a branching out

and fragmentation of the discipline. Recognizing the importance of “non economic factors” such as culture and institutions, meant a move away from economics (orthodox or Marxist) and alignment with other disciplines such as anthropology, cultural studies, management, sociology, or evolutionary and institutional economics. For Barnes (2001), this fragmentation also signified a more fundamental move from “epistemological” to “hermeneutic” theorizing, a move away from foundationalism to theorizing as social practice, a “cultural turn” in economic geography.

Economic geography has arrived, once again it seems, at a critical juncture to decide its future disciplinary trajectories. However, contrary to earlier periods where the lack of a core research area triggered an identity crisis, the present absence of a well identified core has resulted in a flourishing of theoretically and methodologically diverse approaches addressing a variety of research questions that would not have been classified as economic geographic only 15 years ago. Instead of a single core, a number of theoretical avenues pursued by economic geographers can be identified.

Regional science has been resurrected and rebuilt on “solid” microfoundations in the form of the “new geographical economics,” modeling equilibrium landscapes and urban hierarchies (Martin 1999). The main addition is the incorporation of increasing returns at the regional level allowing for multiple equilibria and unequal development.

Political economic approaches continue to emphasize the operation of structural forces that enable and constrain economic actors, but have become more sensitive to space/time contingencies that influence the crystallization of these processes in unpredictable ways. The bodies of research produced in this mold include work on the scalar reconfiguration of governance systems, the relationship between nature and society, work on neoliberalism and the new imperialism, the dynamics of regional growth and decline, labor geographies, political ecology, and gender studies.

The work on regional worlds has evolved into a series of research areas, including work on global city regions as motors of the globalization process; the analysis of culture, conventions, and untraded interdependencies to promote or

obstruct regional development; and research on clusters, regional innovation systems, and learning regions. This work borrows heavily from economic sociology (in particular, Mark Granovetter) and reaches back to Polanyi’s work on tacit knowledge.

A relatively new research area in economic geography borrows from evolutionary and institutional economics to understand the relationship between variety of individual behavior, firms, sectors, and institutions in a region on the one hand and the aggregate pace and direction of regional growth on the other; path dependent regional development; and the emergence and evolution of industry regions. The inclusion of cultural practices is not restricted to analysis of the commodity producing sectors, but penetrates work on consumption and retailing, the financial sector, and cultural products.

Economic geography is not confined to market transactions, but is increasingly interested in alternative forms of exchange, household economies and, more generally, the reproductive sphere.

Work on the body bridges the productive and reproductive sphere and is linked to a variety of issues ranging from consumption to prostitution and performance.

Diversity in research topics also fuels a variety of theoretical approaches ranging from positivism on the one end to non representational theory on the other. While inspiration is still drawn from Descartes, Popper, and Marx, much of the recent work in economic geography is influenced by Foucault, Derrida, Deleuze, and Latour. Not surprisingly, this diversity in theoretical frameworks is also reflected in the methodological approaches employed by economic geographers who conduct secondary data analysis, interviews and focus groups, textual and visual analysis, and experiment with creative writing and visualization to capture complex and dynamic problems. The majority of practitioners interpret this development as a sign of a viable and active discipline that builds bridges with other disciplines where necessary and appropriate and understand it as the way forward in a world of increasing complexity, where disciplinary boundaries start to wither away. On the other hand, the dissolution of a core identity and the diversity of subjects covered might result in a widening gap among

members of the discipline, each group trapped in its theoretical, methodological, and linguistic worlds that they share with colleagues outside the discipline, but that prevent them from communicating with other economic geographers. Economic geography has become hard to define and the discipline is likely to maintain its diversity of research questions, theoretical frameworks, and methodologies in the near future. But if the history of economic geography has taught us anything, it is the inherent unpredictability of the future disciplinary trajectory entailed in a dynamic, fast changing environment.

SEE ALSO: Culture, Economy and; Economic Sociology: Neoclassical Economic Perspective; Hermeneutics; Institutionalism; Paradigms; Political Economy; Positivism; Rational Choice Theory (and Economic Sociology)

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economic sociology: classical political economic perspectives

Milan Zafirovski

Classical political economy broadly understood is the stage and branch of economics during the period from the late eighteenth century to the second half of the nineteenth century. In a narrower specification (by Schumpeter) it encompasses the "publications of the leading English authors from 1776 to 1848," specifically from Adam Smith's *Wealth of Nations* to J. S. Mill's *Principles of Political Economy*. In addition to Smith – usually considered the "father" of (classical) political economy – and Mill as its codifier, its other prominent representatives include David Ricardo, Thomas Malthus, Jean Baptiste Say, and William Senior, as well as Karl Marx (described as a "dissident") and John Cairnes (deemed the "last" classical economist). Following Smith's implied definition, its representatives typically define classical political economy as the study of the production, distribution, exchange, and consumption of wealth.

In general, classical political economy can be divided into two broad branches: pure economics or the theory of a market economy (catallactics), and social economics or economic sociology. For example, Smith's political economy is sometimes described as a blend of market theory (catallaxy) and economic sociology or sociological economics, as are its versions in Say, Mill, and Marx. Presumably, the theory of a market economy is primary and foundational within classical political economy and of

more interest to pure economists, and social economics secondary and supplementary, but more interesting for economic sociologists.

Classical political economy involves a number of versions and elements of social economics or economic sociology understood as an analysis of the societal setting of economic life, frequently intertwined with those of pure economics or market theory. The archetypical instance is what some economists identify as the “economic sociology of Adam Smith” (Schumpeter 1949), concentrating on the institutional social structure of the economy, or Smithian “sociological economics” (Reisman 1987) that, interlaced with his market theory, attributes comprehensiveness to his political economy and makes him a broad “sociological economist” (Reisman 1998). Moreover, others state that “precisely” on the account of this comprehensiveness, specifically his “concentration on structural institutional change, Smith deservedly won acclaim as the father of Political Economy” (Buchanan 1975: 171).

Another version of economic sociology or social economics within classical political economy is provided by Say, Smith’s continental (French) follower. Say can probably be credited with inventing the concept of “social economy” (Swedberg 1998), as acknowledged and adopted by Mill later. Further, Say proposes social economy as a more appropriate conception and designation than political economy for economics on the grounds that this is a science involving observations on the “nature and functions of the different parts of the social body,” specifically the “economies of societies.” Notably, Say implies that social economy treats economic laws as special instances of the “general laws” or “general facts” of society (i.e., of sociological uniformities) as the domain of sociology (the “science of politics and morals”).

Mill furnishes still another version of economic sociology within classical political economy. For instance, Schumpeter estimates that about a third of Mill’s magnum opus *Principles of Political Economy* contains elements of economic sociology – a remarkably high proportion by the standards of contemporary economics – which are mixed with the two thirds of market theory. The influence of Comte’s sociology on Mill is mostly responsible (along with that of

Say’s social economy) for the presence of such elements. Moreover, reportedly Mill, “when he came to write his *Principles*, abandoned his ambition to work out a purely abstract theory and adopted a broader view of the scope and method of political economy under the [sociological] influence of Comte” (Bladen 1941: 18). In general, Mill proposes a “science of social economy” defined as a study of the “laws of society,” “laws of human nature in the social state,” “conduct or condition of man in society,” or “natural history of society,” thus as essentially equivalent to Comte’s sociology. Further, Mill considers political economy, understood as the study of “acquiring and consuming wealth,” an “important division” or “branch” of the science of social economy, apparently influenced by Comte’s consideration of economics as part of sociology.

Economic sociology within classical political economy centers on, generally, the “social framework of the economic course of events” (Schumpeter 1949: 61), particularly the impact of society on the economy, and comprises a number of elements. For example, the “division of labor, the origin of private property, increasing control over nature, economic freedom, and legal security – these are the most important elements constituting the economic sociology of Adam Smith” (Schumpeter 1949: 60). A particularly important element of Smith’s and other economic sociology in classical political economy is recognizing the impact of institutional arrangements, as an integral part of the social framework of economic life, on the latter. This impact includes institutional political influences on economic welfare, for example. Thus, Smith observes that there are many social institutions (and laws) tending to enhance the “public welfare,” noting in particular that those of civil government may tend either to “promote or to disturb the happiness both of the individual and of the society.” Similarly, so does Say, remarking that the state often provides a “powerful stimulus” to individuals’ economic activities (e.g., through “well planned public works”) and so their well being. The economic impact of social institutions also involves institutional influences on wealth distribution, as Senior suggests in observing that the latter is affected by the “peculiar institutions of

particular Countries,” such as slavery, legal monopolies, and poor laws. Developing and reinforcing this observation, Mill states that wealth distribution “is a matter of human institution only” in the sense of being dependent on the “laws and customs of society.” Notably, he adds that the institutional rules which determine wealth distribution “are what the opinions and feelings of the ruling portion of the community make them,” thus echoing Smith and even anticipating Marx. In particular, following Smith and Ricardo, Mill describes private property as the “primary and fundamental” institution which underpins the “economic arrangements of society.”

In addition, Smith and Mill suggest that the institutional or political regulation of prices and markets is a salient instance of the influence of social institutions on the economy. For instance, Smith notices that particular policy regulations can hold the market prices of many commodities for a long time a “good deal” above their “natural” value (i.e., labor cost). He finds another example in the prohibition of interest (as the “price” of money) in medieval Europe and “Mahometan nations” on extra economic, especially moral religious grounds. Mill especially emphasizes the effects of traditions on markets, prices, and wages, observing that in early society “all transactions and engagements” are under the “influence of fixed customs.”

Another prominent element of economic sociology in classical political economy is identifying and examining the role of social classes in and as part of the societal setting of the economy. This includes in particular what Schumpeter (1954) identifies as the “connection between the social rank of a class and its function” (and rewards) in the economy. Thus, Smith observes the existence of “different ranks and conditions of men in society,” specifying that “three great, original, and constituent orders of every civilized society” are landowners (“those who live by rent”), laborers (“those who live by wages”), and capitalists (“those who live by profit”). Notably, he admonishes that no capitalist society can be “flourishing and happy” if laborers – the “far greater part” of its members – are “poor and miserable.” In particular, he deplores the “rich and powerful” (“men of rank and fortune”) for merely selecting from the “heap what is most precious and

agreeable,” lamenting that their “sole end” is gratifying their “own vain and insatiable desires” from the labors of those they employ. Also, Smith says that “whenever the legislature attempts to regulate the difference between masters and their workmen, its counselors are always the masters,” thus anticipating Mill’s “ruling portion of the community” and even Marx’s ruling class.

Elaborating on Smith’s ideas, Ricardo (considered the most able classical economist) posits that wealth is distributed among “three classes of the community” (landowners, capitalists, and workers) in the form of rents, profits, and wages as respective class rewards. Further, Ricardo implies that social classes have a central economic role by arguing that discovering the laws governing wealth distribution is the “main problem” of political economy.

Building on but also going beyond Smith, Ricardo, and Mill, Marx’s ideas about the role of social classes in the economy, notably capitalism, are so numerous, manifold, and controversial, as well as (un)popular, that they require a separate treatment. At this point, suffice it to mention that Marx treats the totality of class (or property) relations as the “economic structure of society – the real foundation, on which legal and political superstructures arise and to which definite forms of social consciousness correspond.”

Still another important element of economic sociology in classical political economy pertains to the social conditions or requisites of production, consumption, and related activities. An instance is the effect of the (societal and technical) division of labor, another element of the social framework of the economy, on economic productivity, as analyzed and celebrated since Smith. Smith famously contends that the “greatest improvements” in productivity result from the elaborate division of labor and that in civilized society individuals are “at all times in the need of cooperation and assistance of great multitudes.” Another instance involves the impact of overall social conditions on economic laws, including those of production and distribution. This is what Cairnes suggests in viewing the laws of production and distribution of wealth as the effect of the “combined operation” of political social conditions (along with the “principles of human nature” and the

“physical laws of the external world”). So does he, alternatively, by acknowledging that the production and distribution of wealth have their causes in the social political (and physical) “laws and events” of the “external world” (alongside the “principles of human nature”). An additional instance of the above element of economic sociology is treating the process of production as a specific social condition or relation involving individuals and groups (classes). This is particularly characteristic for Marx, who treats material production as (also) a “social relationship” between its participants, specifically, workers and property owners. Thus, he states that producers establish “definite social and political relations,” which indicates the “connection” of social political structures with productive processes in the sense that a certain “mode of production” connects to a “certain mode of cooperation or social stage” (as a productive force). Notably, Marx treats economic capital as a “social relation of production” (i.e., a sum of “social magnitudes” like exchange values), more precisely a “bourgeois relation of production, a relation of production of bourgeois society.”

Still another case of the social conditions of production and consumption concerns the sociocultural origins, multiplicity, and development of economic (and other) preferences and wants, as Mill, Cairnes, and Marx suggest. Thus, Mill posits the social multiplicity of preferences in stating that many economic activities actually ensue from “a plurality of motives,” not only the “mere desire of wealth” (though he concedes that political economy usually makes “entire abstraction of every other human passion or motive”). So does Cairnes, who even goes further by suggesting not only this multiplicity of motives, but also the social formation and development of material wants and tastes. He does so by observing that the “desires, passions and propensities” influencing actors in their pursuit of wealth are “almost infinite” and, notably, “may be developed in the progress of society,” citing the role of customs in “modifying human conduct” in this pursuit. Marx suggests that preferences are subject to societal formation and historical evolution, stating that human tastes or wants (and pleasures) have their origins in society, which gives them a social (and so relative) character.

Lastly, some other explicit or implicit elements of economic sociology within classical political economy may include the long run interaction between population and the economy (Malthus), institutional and other non market restrictions on market competition, including free trade (Smith, Mill, Cairnes), the economic implications of “moral sentiments” like sympathy, justice, and benevolence (Smith pre 1776), and so on.

SEE ALSO: Economic Sociology: Neoclassical Economic Perspective; Malthus, Thomas Robert; Markets; Marx, Karl; Marxism and Sociology; Mill, John Stuart; Political Economy; Population and Economy; Schumpeter, Joseph A.; Smith, Adam

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economic sociology: neoclassical economic perspective

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Neoclassical economics is the stage and branch of economic science since the 1870s through the 1930s and beyond. It was mostly the product or sequel of what economists (Schumpeter

1954) call the Copernican marginalist revolution in economic theory during the 1870–90s. Specifically, the crux of marginalism was a marginal utility theory of exchange value and its extensions (e.g., marginal productivity principle of income distribution) in reaction and contrast to the labor cost conception in classical political economy. The founders or pioneers of marginalism are commonly considered to be William Jevons (England), Carl Menger (Austria), and Leon Walras (Switzerland/France), who almost simultaneously in 1871–4 “discovered” marginal utility value theory as a putative revolutionary alternative to its labor based versions in Smith, Ricardo, Mill, Marx, and others. (For instance, Jevons specifically attacked Ricardo and Mill’s theories, prompting neoclassical economists like Alfred Marshall to rise in their partial defense.) The term neoclassical economics was invented by Thorstein Veblen (Groenewegen 1995), a heterodox institutional economist, in the early 1900s to indicate that marginalism (e.g., marginal utility theory) was, in virtue of utilitarianism and hedonism, essentially continuous with and so “scarcely distinguishable” from classical political economy (which apparently overlooks the opposition of the marginalist revolution to Ricardo et al.’s labor theories of value). In this sense, the terms marginalism and neoclassical economics become interchangeable, though the first term is probably more accurate and precise for describing this stage and type of economic theory. Moreover, historians of economics such as Schumpeter (1954: 919) object that “there is no more sense in calling the Jevons Menger Walras theory neoclassic than there would be in calling the Einstein theory neo Newtonian.” This suggests that neoclassical economics is essentially marginalism (with partial exceptions like Marshall), but not conversely: the marginalist revolution is not newly, but counter classical (that is what makes it presumably “Copernican”).

In addition to Jevons, Menger, and Walras, some other prominent representatives of marginalist or neoclassical economics include Philip Wicksteed, Eugen Böhm Bawerk, Friedrich von Wieser, Knut Wicksell, Francis Edgeworth, Vilfredo Pareto, Marshall (in part), Irving Fisher, and John B. Clark. Although narrower in analysis and more formal (mathematical) in

method than classical political economy, neoclassical economics also comprises two general branches: pure economic theory premised on the principle of marginal utility and social economics or economic sociology. For instance, Jevons proposes incorporating what he (perhaps for the first time in social science) terms economic sociology into the divisions of economics, alongside pure (marginal utility) theory. So does Walras, who seeks to integrate what *à la* Say he calls social economy with “pure” political economy. If pure (marginal utility) market theory is a primary and defining division of neoclassical economics and in the focus of most economists, economic sociology is a secondary and supplementary one, yet more appealing to sociologists as well as to social economists.

Some pertinent formulations or anticipations of economic sociology within neoclassical economics include the following. A remarkable (and perhaps surprising) moment is that an ostensibly pure marginalist economist, Jevons, probably invented the term economic sociology (Swedberg 1998), though under the likely influence of Comte (filtered through Spencer and Mill). Notably, within marginalism and beyond, Jevons provides the first explicit proposal for economic sociology as an integral branch of (neoclassical) economics. Moreover, he proposes that “it is only by subdivision, by recognizing a branch of Economic Sociology . . . that we can rescue our [economic] science from its confused state.” Jevons implicitly defines economic sociology as the “Science of the Evolution of Social Relations” in relation to the economy (apparently adopting a Spencer type definition of sociology in general). Jevons’s early follower, Wicksteed, carries this proposal even further by suggesting, under the acknowledged sociological influence of Comte, that economics “must be the handmaid” of sociology, which implies an idea of economic sociology. So does the project of Edgeworth (also Jevons’s follower) for what he calls mathematical sociology (or “mathematical psychics”). Moreover, he states that marginal utility theory (“Calculus of Variations” in utility) is the “most sublime branch” of sociological analysis, invoking Comte’s view of economics as the branch “most applicable to Sociology.”

Walras’s counterpart to Jevonian economic sociology is social economy, a concept he

probably adopted from Say and Mill. Walras specifically defines social economy as the “theory of the distribution of social wealth” in contrast to “pure” political economy defined as the “theory of price determination under the hypothetical regime of absolutely free competition.” Moreover, Walras goes a step further than Jevons in implementing the proposal for economic sociology by writing a book on social economy in a deliberate attempt at its integration with pure (and applied) economics. Closely following Walras, Wicksell adopts the idea of social economy defined as an “investigation of the issue how economic laws and practical precepts would be properly applied for getting the most possible social gain, and what changes in existing economic and legal structure of society are necessary for this end.” Like Walras, he seeks to integrate social economy thus understood with pure or theoretical (and applied) economics within economic science as a whole. So does Clark, who considers what he calls social economic dynamics as a proxy for dynamic economic sociology, economics’ “third division” to be integrated with its other “natural divisions.” Notably, he establishes these divisions of economics on the basis of “sociological evolution.” Also, Walras’s successor, Pareto, implies an idea and approach of economic sociology by suggesting that economists “have to consider not just the economic phenomenon taken by itself, but also the whole social situation, of which the economic situation is only a phase.” Pareto therefore implicitly conceives economic sociology in terms of a consideration of the “whole social situation” of the economy as its integral part.

Still another proposal for economic sociology within marginalism is implicit in Wieser’s project of social economics, mostly prompted and influenced by Weber. Wieser (a sociologist turned marginalist economist) implicitly defines economic sociology as an analysis of the “social relations of the economy” or the “sociological problems of economic theory” (which reveals Weber’s influence). He suggests that economists should describe and explain economic processes with “sociological phenomena,” citing exchange value as one of those “sociological fields” which makes possible “more rapid and certain progress” in analyzing the economy than do others. Also, Marshall’s neoclassical

economics implies some ideas or intimations of economic sociology. For instance, Schumpeter (1941) comments that, reminiscent of Mill, Marshall’s *Principles of Economics* contain (“behind, beyond and all around the kernel” of pure market theory) an “economic sociology of nineteenth century English capitalism which rests on historical bases of impressive extent and solidity.” Other economists also notice that, like Smith, Marshall produces “sociological insights” and displays a “sociologist’s awareness that approbation and self approbation are relevant even in the economic marketplace” (Reisman 1990: 264).

Like that of Smith and other classical economists, Jevons et al.’s economic sociology identifies and examines the social character and context of the economy (Schumpeter 1949: 61). First, some neoclassical economists acknowledge that the economy represents a social category by virtue of existing and functioning within society. This is what Walras does by observing that economic relations, including market transactions, necessarily take place in society. So does (more strongly) Pareto, who argues that the “states” of the economy are “particular cases of the general states of the sociological system,” described as “much more complicated”; he considers, consequently, economics as an “integral” part of sociology in which “complications are greater still and by far.” Moreover, he adds that in many situations economic problems are “subordinate” to the sociological; for example, material interests and rational actions to sentiments (“residues”) and non rational conduct. Also, Menger describes the (national) economy as the “social form” of economic activity or simply a social economy, and economic processes as instances of “concrete social phenomena.” His follower Wieser provides an instance in this respect by observing that every actor interprets the (marginalist) economic principle of attaining the highest total utility at the lowest cost “in the light of his social environment.”

Walras and Menger and Wieser imply what Wicksteed states explicitly: the reason the economy is a social phenomenon is that it “compels the individual to relate himself to others,” which makes economic laws the “laws of human conduct” – so psychosocial rather than physical ones. Marshall presents a case of such relations

in which market actors can create “particular” markets involving “some people or groups of people” in “somewhat close touch” with each other, such that “mutual knowledge and trust” lead to favoring these insiders at the expense of strangers, thus perhaps anticipating the social embeddedness conception of modern economic sociology. Similarly, Clark observes that the “socialization” of the economy leads to social differentiation by arranging producers (and consumers) into differentiated and unequal social groups and subgroups. Also, he essentially treats economic change or dynamics as a particular dimension of “sociological evolution,” as do later neoclassical economists like Schumpeter, who places economic development within a “theory of cultural evolution” on apparent Durkheimian grounds that the “social process is really one indivisible whole.”

Second, neoclassical economists recognize the impact of society, including politics and culture, on economic life. Thus, Clark acknowledges that many economic phenomena (e.g., “hired labor” or “loaned capital”) are dependent on “social organization.” In particular, Walras, while advocating the *laissez faire* doctrine, admits that an economy cannot properly operate without “interference” from some political and other authority. Further, Wicksteed observes that, due to political and other interference, the market “never has been left to itself,” even suggesting that it “never must be,” which provides an empirical rationale to his proposal for making economics the “handmaid” of sociology. Wicksteed thereby adopts and generalizes Jevons’s observation that in many cases market transactions “must be settled upon other than strictly economical grounds” (e.g., bargaining power), as well as that the future supply and demand in markets often hinge on the “political considerations of the moment.” In addition, some neoclassical economists register the impact of cultural phenomena, like traditions or customs, on economic agents and behaviors. Specifically, evoking and developing Mill’s views on the economic impact of rigid traditions in early society, Marshall emphasizes what he describes as the cumulative inhibiting effects of customs on the “methods of production and the character of producers.”

SEE ALSO: Economic Sociology: Classical Political Economic Perspectives; Jevons, William; Markets; Mill, John Stuart; Pareto, Vilfredo; Schumpeter, Joseph A.; Smith, Adam; Veblen, Thorstein; Weber, Max

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economy, culture and

Marion Fourcade Gourinchas

In traditional academic discourse, “culture” and “economy” have long been regarded as separate analytical spheres: on the one hand, the realm of shared cognitions, norms, and symbols, studied by anthropologists; on the other, the realm of self interest, where economists reign supreme. Though the two disciplines overlap occasionally (in economic anthropology mainly), radical differences in the conceptual and methodological routes each field followed during the twentieth century have prevented any sort of meaningful interaction.

By contrast, the interaction between culture and the economy has always been a central component of sociological analysis. All the founding fathers of sociology were, one way or

another, interested in the relationship between people's economic conditions and their moral universe. In his famous presentation in the *Preface to a Contribution to the Critique of Political Economy*, for instance, Marx described "forms of social consciousness" essentially as an epiphenomenon of material relations. Later interpretations, however, have suggested that even for Marx and Engels the relationships between "material base" and "superstructure" were far from deterministic. The "western" Marxist traditions that developed in Europe after World War I proposed a somewhat more sophisticated analysis that emphasized the integration of culture into the apparatus of domination – either because the hegemony exerted by bourgeois culture induces the masses into implicitly consenting to their own economic oppression (Gramsci 1971), or because the incorporation of culture into the commercial nexus of capitalism leads to uniformity of spirit and behavior and the absence of critical thinking (Adorno & Horkheimer 2002). Still, in these formulations, culture remains wedded to its material origins in capitalist relations of production.

Partly reacting against what they perceived to be a one sided understanding of the relationships between base and superstructure in Marxist writings, Weber and Durkheim both sought to demonstrate the greater autonomy of the cultural realm, albeit in quite different ways. Both insisted that people's behavior is always infused with a meaning that is not reducible to their material positions. Weber, more than anyone else, demonstrated the influence of preexisting ideas and, in particular, religious worldviews on the economic conduct of individuals. For instance, even though their actions may look rational from the outside, the behavior of early Protestant capitalists was quite illogical from the inside: anxiety about salvation, rather than self interest, motivated them to accumulate (Weber 2002). In other words, their search for profit was not based on instrumental rationality, but it made *psychological* sense given the religious (cultural) universe in which they lived. In fact, Weber considered that all religions condition individual attitudes toward the world and therefore influence involvement in practical affairs – but they, of course, all do it differently, so that the "economic

ethics" of individuals varies substantially across social contexts.

It is Durkheim, however, who best articulated the *collective* basis of our meaning making orientation: groups of individuals share certain understandings that they come to take for granted in their routine dealings with each other. Hence how people behave, including in economic settings, is not a priori reducible to a set of predetermined individual preferences and the interests they support. Rather, most of people's actions are motivated by habit and routine; and preferences, as well as the institutions they support, are informed by cultural norms (Meyer & Rowan 1977). In each society, then, culture and institutions act in tandem to shape individual consciousness and thereby representations of what is understood to be "rational." This is what DiMaggio (1994) calls the "constitutive effect" of culture. Because these mental maps are widely shared, they have much greater efficacy than others that would be out of place, or misunderstood, in the same context.

THE CULTURAL SHAPING OF ECONOMIC INSTITUTIONS

As a system of representations that exists separately and independently of individuals, culture may shape economic behavior in many different ways. It may be more or less institutionalized. Corporate cultures, for instance, are often highly formalized, even bureaucratized, but the rules that underlie bazaar interactions, though obviously codified, remain very informal (Geertz 2001). Second, the effect of culture may be more or less profound: Meyer and Rowan (1977), for instance, have famously suggested that many organizational rules are adopted in a purely ceremonial way but have little impact on actual practice – a claim that has been notably supported by research on educational institutions and hospitals. On the other hand, substantial evidence has come out of cross national studies of a deep patterning, not only of economic values and norms (Hofstede 1980), but also of economic institutions and organizations (e.g., Dore 1973; Hamilton &

Woolsey Biggart 1988). The critical question, then, is whether the two are related, and how.

NATIONAL CULTURES AND THE ECONOMY

One possible answer has been provided by Dobbin's (1994) suggestion of the existence of an elective affinity between economic and political culture (see also Beckert 2004). In his comparative analysis of the development of the railway sector in the nineteenth century, Dobbin shows that public officials in three countries sought to achieve economic growth in very different ways, and were influenced in doing so by their cultural perceptions about the nature and sources of the political order in their own nation. In the United States, they strove primarily to protect community self-determination; in France, they oriented themselves toward centralized planning by the state in an effort to avoid logistical chaos; and in the United Kingdom, they were mainly concerned with protecting the individual sovereignty of firms. Ultimately, then, the economy of each country ended up "reflecting" the polity it originated from.

Some sociologists, however, would argue that there is no such inherent consistency to national cultures. Biernacki (1995), for instance, finds that the process of their formation is eminently fragile, almost serendipitous. In his comparative study of textile mills at the onset of the industrialization process, he finds that the concept of "labor" had a substantially different meaning in Britain and Germany, but that these differences originated in on the ground practices by workers and employers rather than in some preexisting mental categories. These practical conceptions, derived from the material context of industrialization in each country, tended then to crystallize into full fledged meaning making systems, which became eventually codified in writing – by political economists and other intellectuals. Through this process they acquired a great cultural depth, and ended up shaping a whole set of outcomes in the development pathways of the two countries – such as the wage calculation system, disciplinary techniques

within factories, forms of workers' collective action, and even industrial architecture. Yet even then, the systems remained vulnerable to a change in practices (which eventually took place in the early twentieth century).

THE EMERGENCE OF CULTURE WITHIN THE ECONOMY

Biernacki's study illustrates particularly well the fact that we should think about the role of culture primarily through its inscription in *practices*. Economic settings, therefore, do not simply display, or reflect, preexisting cultural understandings, but should be regarded as places where distinctive local cultures are formed and carried out. There are two main ways in which this point has been articulated in the sociological literature. The first emphasizes the social meanings people produce (whether voluntarily or involuntarily) through their use of economic settings and economic objects, and is best illustrated by consumption studies. The second suggests that some form of social order – i.e., regulating norms and practices – emerges out of the interpersonal interactions that take place within economic settings, particularly for formal organizations and markets.

Consumption

The first set of questions goes back to Veblen's and Simmel's analyses of consumption, and was most noticeably extended by Bourdieu (1984). The fundamental idea here is that consumption is not about individual parameters (preferences, income) but is profoundly *relational*. Consumption practices are the site of a competitive struggle whereby individuals seek to position themselves vis à vis other individuals in the social space. For Veblen (1994 [1899]), it is essentially about vertical hierarchy – leisurely elites seek to demarcate themselves from those below them by wasting money and time on perfectly useless purchases and activities. For Bourdieu, the structure of the social "space" is more complex: education and socialization into high culture (or not) play as much a part as money in determining taste and, beyond, consumption practices. What structures consumption

practices (as all forms of action), then, is what Bourdieu calls “habitus” – a system of dispositions that is formed through the individual’s trajectory in the social space (understood, again, in a relational manner vis à vis other individuals).

The study of consumption practices thus provides an extraordinarily rich terrain for analyzing how people relate to one another, both structurally and cognitively. In a creative variation on this theme, Zelizer (1994) has shown that these relational meanings are not only expressed through *what* people purchase, but often in *how* they pay for it – cash, gift certificates, checks, food stamps. People, in fact, constantly personalize, differentiate, and earmark money in ways that can be understood as metaphors about social relations and identity. (Whether the *how*, like the *what*, is also subject to the logic of habitus remains to be studied systematically.)

Organizations

The second question – the cultural universe produced within and by economic institutions – has also given rise to a diverse and extremely rich literature. We may illustrate this point with three examples: antitrust law; financial markets; and the McDonald’s corporation. Fligstein (1992), most prominently, has studied the way in which the legal environment shapes the formation of distinctive economic cultures. Corporate managers, he argues, act on the basis of “conceptions of control” – shared understandings about how a particular market works. These conceptions evolve in close connection with changes in the legal regulation of corporate competition, which tip the balance of power toward management groups with certain organizational cultures at the expense of others. In the course of the twentieth century, for instance, the American corporation was a contested and historically evolving cultural terrain, where conceptions of control shifted from production to sales and marketing, and finally finance and shareholder value. In this case, organizational culture fundamentally emerges out of a combination of institutional forces and power struggles.

Of course, such tacit understandings and patterned practices may emerge in a more decentralized way, out of interpersonal interactions in corporations, factories, workshops, and markets, including the most “rational” ones. Sociologists, for instance, have revealed the existence of all kinds of rituals, beliefs, customs, and informal control structures that regulate social life in the financial markets – the very heart, supposedly, of instrumental action. In fact, the economic potential of culture has not been lost on corporations, many of which try actively to “engineer” predictable behaviors and commitments on the part of their employees through the use of quasi religious rituals and the enforcement of strict codes regulating social interactions.

The organizational innovations introduced by the McDonald’s corporation are probably among the most potent examples of the cultural effects of corporate logics. As Ritzer (2004) has shown, they had a dramatic effect on human experience and social organization well beyond the boundaries of the firm of origin – helping spread the values and practices of efficiency, calculability, predictability, and control to various organizations and social institutions (education, medicine, or the criminal justice system), both in the United States and abroad. The sheer success of this model is thus a precious reminder that instrumental rationality – as Weber worried – is also a very powerful “culture” in and of itself.

THE ECONOMY AS THE CULTURE OF MODERNITY?

The example of McDonald’s suggests a broader point, then: the constitution of economic categories themselves is through and through a social process. Consequently, what gets incorporated (or not) into the sphere of the market place reveals much about how we understand ourselves, about our “culture.” As Polanyi (2001 [1944]) argued long ago, the hallmark of post eighteenth century modernity was the emergence of a distinctive social order dominated by market relations. Following nineteenth century critics (among them Marx,

Weber, and Simmel), Polanyi articulated the dehumanizing effect of modern capitalism and calculative rationality on personality and human relations, whereby individuals come to be seen as commodities and means to an end rather than as ends in themselves.

Empirically, however, there is quite a bit of debate about whether such effects really exist: recent economic experiments in small scale societies, for instance, have suggested that market integration is *positively* correlated with human cooperation (Henrich et al. 2004), thereby vindicating earlier commentaries about the civilizing (Hirschman 1977) and socially integrating effects of commerce. It is also unclear whether the penetration of markets has been as universal and far reaching as some skeptics believe. Modernity certainly does not mean that everything has been engulfed into the sphere of the marketplace: for instance, the study of the conditions under which boundary “objects” such as children, death, organs, or art are subject to economic exchange has revealed a quite varied landscape. Hence, as sources of economic benefit, children were *removed* from labor markets around the turn of the twentieth century in the United States (and countries that continue to authorize such practices today face grave political and economic pressures). On the other hand, as sources of emotional and social benefit, they were commodified in ways that were not foreseen in the nineteenth century, mainly through the adoption, insurance, and consumption markets (Zelizer 1985).

The intellectual challenge, then, is twofold: to specify the distinctive nature of the moral order capitalism relies upon, and to understand how it is produced. Perhaps this challenge is nowhere as obvious as in the current emergence of a new and eclectic vocabulary that seeks to overcome the conceptual divide between culture and economy, and focuses instead on the always inextricably moral dimensions of economic discourses and practices (Amin & Thrift 2004). Particularly noticeable is the work on logics of moral justification, which identifies the recent appearance of the discursive figure of “connectivity” as a new regime of justification conceived in and for the post industrial capitalist economy (Boltanski & Chiapello

2005). Dezalay and Garth (2002) explore another exciting avenue in their analysis of the mutually reinforcing, profoundly entangled, discourses of economic and political individualism – e.g., human rights and the market – and their worldwide diffusion under US hegemony. Finally, Callon (1998) and others have investigated the *performative* nature of the knowledge forms that sustain the development of capitalism, mainly economics and accounting. They have shown that through their language, techniques, and representations, these disciplines produce a world of “calculative agencies” and create a host of new institutions in which these agencies may exercise their calculative power – thereby formatting, little by little, our cultural selves onto the model fiction of *homo economicus*. This outburst of work seems to signal that sociology is finally ready for a real engagement with economics that will demystify it as a cultural form, as the discursive rationalization and active formatting, by capitalism, of itself and for itself – not merely the science of how the economy “works.”

SEE ALSO: Civilization and Economy; Consumption; Culture; Globalization; Globalization, Culture and; McDonalidization; Moral Economy

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economy, networks and

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The intersection of economic and social behavior has long been an interest of sociologists. Since Simmel's (1955) seminal work on affiliation, it has become clear that the extent, kind, and structure of relations in a society have a potentially crucial impact on how well it functions, and by implication how much wealth it creates. Two current research programs are outlined here, small worlds and interfirm networks, which are related broadly to market creation and robustness. Both of these research programs capture core aspects of Granovetter's (1985) concept of embeddedness and suggest new directions for examining the sociological roots of economic behavior.

An economy runs on its volume of transactions, both between businesses and between businesses and consumers. An increase in transactions is generally considered a sign of economic health; a drop in volume a sign of weakness. One of the most important mechanisms that stimulates transaction volume is the fabric of institutional and social relationships that connects potential transaction partners with each other. Such a network, extending broadly across the economic, demographic, and class strata of a society, is essential for the creation and distribution of wealth through market forces. The more constrained the range of network ties, the greater the limitation placed on economic growth and ultimately on the viability of the economy. To understand the probity of this assertion, one need only consider the severe long term problems faced by command societies or the huge short term loss caused by the national shutdown in the United States after September 11, 2003.

Perhaps the best developed model of an extensive network is the small world. Milgram's (1967) early experiments showed that individuals in a referral chain can use simple social markers to home in on a targeted person, even across wide geographical distances. The average chain in his study was composed of six people, connected in sequence, hence the title

of John Guare's play *Six Degrees of Separation*. But if we are all tied to each other through just a few ties, how is it that we are surrounded mostly by people whom we know and who frequently know each other?

Watts and his colleagues (Watts 1999) have developed a variety of models of small world structure that answer this question. Their basic model has two salient components consistent with intuition. The first component is high local clustering (my friends are also friends of each other), and the second is a low global path length (it only takes a few steps to get from my position to someone on the other side of the network). Many networks with important economic implications have been found with such a structure, including the Internet, interlocking boards of directors, and interlocking groups of corporate owners (see Kogut & Walker 2001).

Where do small worlds come from? What determines them? The classic answer to this question is the following. At first, a population of potential transactors is segmented into discrete groups, like cavemen clustered in isolated tribes. Then, one or a few members of each tribe strike out on their own and make contact with other groups, establishing relationships, even as the tribes themselves remain highly internally related. Interestingly, Watts (1999) finds that just a few of these intergroup connections are sufficient to tie the network together, consistent with Milgram's results, and preserve the inbred relationships of the tribes. Although this story of global network development is appealing, it has problems.

The first concerns why isolated tribes connect with each other. A reasonable intuition is that they are looking for things they don't have. That is, without the promise of gain, there is no economic motivation to leave home. So trade across the network, not just with neighbors, implies a search for value enhancement. Unfortunately, the distribution of information in the network has to be just so in order for a broad search process to be efficient; and as this distribution departs from the optimum, search becomes highly inefficient very quickly. In most networks, then, search alone will not be a feasible explanation of small world development.

What other mechanisms might lead to the emergence of a small world? There are two possibilities. One is that relationships are

formed randomly, since chance encounters can surface opportunities. However, Watts and his colleagues have shown that randomly generated ties ultimately destroy local clustering, which violates the small world model where strong neighborhood relations endure. Moreover, casual observation suggests that not all contacts among individuals or firms are random; the fact that those that are make a strong impression proves that they are exceptional. A second possibility is that relationships between tribes emerge as their members meet in one or more secondary social or economic institutions, such as schools, professional associations, social clubs, governing boards, and places of work. These groups constitute a sociologically distinct dimension from the local clusters, since in the tribes first model clustering occurs before the network is integrated. Thus, networks become integrated as small worlds when social institutions develop or are made available to link up isolated tribes.

An important characteristic of small world properties of networks constructed through common memberships in institutions is that these networks can be highly dependent on the size distribution of the groups that individuals belong to. Larger groups obviously provide more individuals with exposure to each other. In fact, for some networks, both the degree of clustering in local neighborhoods and the number of ties to span the overall population have been shown to be completely dependent on group sizes.

Therefore, in order to understand the formation of a small world, one needs to attend more closely to the opportunity structures that bring individuals together. Without a sufficient set of opportunities for gathering individuals with differing backgrounds, the network is fragmented, search is frustrated, and the volume of transactions remains small. Where these institutions originate depends on the network being integrated. However, it seems unlikely that an isolated set of tribes would be able to establish ties with each other through common membership in institutions that they themselves would have to develop. A more likely possibility is that institutions enter the tribes' domain from the outside, suggesting that small world development cascades across networks from the more to the less developed, bringing with it greater

integration and the potential for an increased transaction frequency and economic growth.

Another problem with the caves first model is that not all networks start off as fragmented. That is, some networks are integrated first and develop local clusters second. The US venture capital syndication network, for example, was highly integrated nationally very early in the history of the industry. The network only slowly developed an identifiable structure of clusters, based on the common geographical location of the firms in cities or regions, such as New York, Boston, Northern California, Dallas, Minneapolis, and Chicago. What stimulated the rise of such a local focus is not known, but some possibilities are that: common preferences arose within a region to invest in local startup firms as the volume of opportunities increased; regional specialization in local startup industries increased (Silicon Valley – semiconductors; Boston and San Diego – bio technology), leading to venture capital firm specialization and co venturing; and venture capitalists became more mobile across firms within the same city or region. All of these represent opportunities for expanding local search and hence for the development of regional syndication clusters. Such a pattern indicates that economic motivations may spur the development of clusters just as they may influence building ties between them.

To understand a small world, then, one needs to identify and analyze the relevant social and economic trends and structures that infuse it. These create and shape the opportunities individuals and firms have to form relationships and therefore for network development overall. In this regard, it would not be inappropriate to explain the emergence of regional production clusters, which have attracted so much study over the last 30 years, as a creative combining of geographically bounded technological, social, and demographic factors that together enable a local interfirm network with small world properties. Focusing on relationships alone is insufficient to understand how the small world develops to facilitate economic behavior. These ties need to be motivated and sustained by substantive opportunities and venues for interaction.

In addition to the effect of small worlds on the volume of transactions throughout an

economy, other kinds of network structure have important economic consequences by affecting behavior within industries (see Burt 1980). We have evidence of network influence on five areas of economic activity: technological innovation, financial performance, investment behavior such as venture syndication and acquisitions, entry into an industry, and further development of the network itself. These cases vary in the types of network structure and linkages among firms that constitute the network. Some of these structures can be embedded within the small world, but they differ in their consequences, depending on the industry in which they occur. Interestingly, we observe interfirm alliances in almost all sectors, including extractive industries, financial services such as investment banking and venture capital, high technology, discrete manufacturing, and large scale processing industries. So industry networks in general are pervasive and important for the overall economy.

A frequently stated assumption about an interfirm network is that it is a complex pathway for the flow of information, and within the network the position of the firm determines the information available to it (see Podolny 2001). A common additional assumption is that the information a firm receives from partners that are related to each other in a cluster is to some extent redundant, since these partners are likely to share it in their relationships with each other. Thus, the more information a firm receives through its alliances with organizations that are not related to each other, the broader the firm's exposure to market and technological trends and opportunities. A broader exposure in turn leads to a higher rate of innovation (Ahuja 2000) and, in moderation, to higher rates of firm survival (Uzzi 1996). In some cases, greater exposure to information may also increase firm performance.

Redundant information can also provide an economic benefit. Tight clustering among firms through their alliances can lead to technological spillovers, which increases the rate of innovation. Alternatively, clustering can impose normative constraints on behavior (Coleman 1988), which induces firms to cooperate and raises the likelihood of future partnering (see Ingram & Roberts 2000). Thus, the most effective structure for a firm's alliance network seems to be

partners that are closely connected to each other but not tied to the same firms outside the local neighborhood.

Occupying a central position in a network of alliances (Gulati & Gargiulo 1999) also provides more information, with a variety of possible economic consequences for firms. In the semi-conductor industry, central firms experience stronger firm growth; and centrally positioned banks tend to diversify more extensively. Further, venture capital firms that are central in the industry's network of syndications are more likely to invest in startups that are geographically distant. Finally, because they are closer to more potential partners, central firms are more likely to enter into more alliances. This broad range of centrality benefits shows clearly how network position affects firm behavior and through it the distribution of assets in the overall economy.

Just like firms, an industry wide network may be more or less centralized, and higher centralization indicates that one or a few firms dominate the industry through their alliances, possibly because their technologies have become standard. In fact, by reflecting the competition for standards dominance, the trend in industry centralization affects the pattern of entry by suppliers to the competing firms. It has been observed that potential suppliers tend to enter the industry when its level of centralization is rising, indicating that some firms are winning the standards competition and therefore that they are safer as long term partners. When standards competition is fierce and industry centralization is falling, it is less clear who the eventual winners will be; so suppliers, in the interest of not choosing a failing customer, hold off and do not enter. In technology based industries, the signaling role of network structure can thus have an effect on the structure of adjacent markets and therefore indirectly on the economy.

Local interpersonal and interfirm networks provide the normative context for exchange. But they also influence the economy through extensive, global structures, such as the small world, that facilitate the efficiency and increase the volume of transactions. The creation and persistence of these global networks, often through societal institutions, therefore expand

economic behavior. Moreover, in a developed economy, networks of alliances within industries influence many important economic variables, including the rate of innovation, firm performance, and investment behavior. These may have an indirect, but ultimately powerful, effect on the growth and overall robustness of a nation's economy.

SEE ALSO: Capitalism, Social Institutions of; Economy (Sociological Approach); Exchange Network Theory; Management Networks; Networks; Organizations; Organizations and the Theory of the Firm; Political Economy; Social Network Analysis; Social Network Theory; Weak Ties (Strength of)

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economy, religion and

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The modern study of religion and economics begins with Adam Smith's *An Inquiry into the Nature and Causes of the Wealth of Nations* (1776). Smith applied his economic analysis to several aspects of religion that researchers since developed with quantitative research. Smith's fundamental contribution to the study of religion was that religious beliefs and activities are rational choices. As in commercial activity, people respond to religious costs and benefits in a predictable, observable manner. People choose a religion and the degree to which they participate and believe (if at all).

In the 1970s, the rational choice approach to religion, or the economics of religion, reinvented social science investigation of religion (Young 1997). The first formal model of religious participation was developed by Corry Azzi and Ronald Ehrenberg (1975). Laurence Iannaccone's (1998) literature survey of economics attributes to Azzi and Ehrenberg the framework that served as the basis for future research on religion. Using Gallup survey data, Azzi and Ehrenberg found that the opportunity cost of time influences religious behavior. Within a given household, women whose wages are typically lower will spend more time in religious activity. Likewise, individuals whose real wages increase over time can be expected to participate less in religious activities. Education, just as wages, plays an important role in participation in religious activities. Edward Glaeser and Bruce Sacerdote found that the level of education of believers influences their choice of religion. The payoff for higher educated people is social capital in the form of networking rather than stronger religious beliefs. Benito Arruñada found that more education increases the costs of participating in the institution of confession. Individuals with higher education tend to engage in moral "self policing," relying less on priests for such enforcement.

The family and its dynamics, a popular subject of anthropology, sociology, and psychology, are currently undergoing reinterpretation by rational choice theorists. Evelyn Lehrer

(1999), using data from the National Survey of Families and Households, looks at how religious upbringing influences the number of years of schooling a person attains. She also explores how a woman's religious preference influences her choice of marriage or cohabitation. Maristella Botticini and Aloysius Siow (2003) reexamine the dowry institution and seek to explain parental choices in using different forms of intergenerational transfers.

Religious extremism, both in non violent and violent forms, is explained according to rational choice theory for similar reasons. Iannaccone's cost benefit analysis of strict religions led to the development of a theoretical model of the evolution of organized religion. Taking Ernst Troeltsch's (1931) sect–denomination distinction, Iannaccone applied a cost induced commitment to organized religion. He argued that denominations and extremist sects can be construed as distinct modes or "clubs" of religious organization based on consumer (believer) preferences. Using the club model of religion, Iannaccone sought to explain the success of strict religions (cults, sects). Using a cost benefit analysis, Iannaccone argued that people choose to undergo stigma and self sacrifice and engage in unconventional behavior to eliminate free riders, thereby increasing the commitment of believers and benefits to members. Iannaccone's economic analysis provided a rational explanation for behavior that other professions categorized as brainwashing or a form of pathological behavior.

Eli Berman (2000, 2003) applied the club model to Israeli Ultra Orthodox Jews, as well as to Hamas, the Taliban, and the Jewish underground militias. Berman found in the case of the Israeli Ultra Orthodox community that the benefits of remaining in the group outweighed the costs of sacrifice and stigma. For the Taliban, the sacrifices demanded by the group, seemingly gratuitous acts of violence, destroyed outside options and, thereby, increased group loyalty.

Scholars who investigate the demand side of religion tend to favor the view that religious preferences change over time for both the individual and social groups. Sociologists Roger Finke and Rodney Stark (1992) maintain that individual preferences remain constant. Finke

and Stark contend that the supply of religious goods changes over time, not the demand for them. Analyzing membership data beginning in the American colonial period, Finke and Stark argue that religions begin small, supplying the religious goods that consumers want. As the religion grows and more members join, the religion accommodates the variety of membership demands by becoming less strict until it loses its religious relevance and declines.

However, religious strictness can reach an optimal level, after which it becomes detrimental to a religion. Extreme religions deter people from joining. A common example is the Shaker movement that practiced celibacy. Because of its inability to attract new members, it became obsolete. Religious strictness is not the only reason a religion declines. Adam Smith argued that state subsidies to organized religion create a dependency upon a regular and enforceable income. State subsidized religion tends to change in two ways. It devolves, losing those aspects of religious devotion that are relevant to people practicing their faith and the authority of its doctrine. Second, it tends to become a religion for elites, and to the degree that the clergy itself becomes an elite group in society, of elites. By contrast, those religious groups that depend solely on voluntary contributions must continually address the religious needs of their congregants to stay in existence.

Smith extended his analysis to the evolution of organized religion. Observing the nonconformist religious groups – “upstarts” – Smith noted that the spiritual, imaginative, and emotional bases of the new religious movements successfully challenge state sanctioned religion. As a reaction to popular criticism of its elitist ways, state religion resorts to coercion, repression, and even violence to maintain its financial, political, and social arrangement in society. Religion, Smith concluded, is more vibrant where there is a disassociation between church and state. The absence of state religion allows for competition, thereby creating an environment for a plurality of religious faiths in society (Smith 1791 [1776]). By showing no preference for one religion over others, but rather permitting any and all religions to flourish, the state encourages an open market in which religious groups engage in rational discussion.

This competitive but non coercive environment supports an atmosphere of “good temper and moderation.” Where there is a state monopoly on religion or an oligopoly among religions, one will find zealotry and the imposition of ideas on the public. Where there is an open market for religion and freedom of speech, one will find moderation and reason.

Correcting Adam Smith’s argument, it has been contended that the relaxing of state regulation on religion unleashes competitive forces in the economic marketplace but not necessarily competition among religious faiths (Jeremy 1988). The focus of this variant argument lies with the legal recognition in England during the Industrial Revolution of nonconformist religious groups – the upstarts. These groups challenged the dominant religion – in some cases state religion – with different views of the linkages between salvation and economic activity. Although these nonconformist religious groups did not necessarily increase in membership to challenge the dominant position of the state religion or mainstream faiths, they contributed to and altered economic activity. Thus, state inclusion of nonconformist religious groups can have a positive effect on the economic productivity of society without seriously challenging state religion. This variant view is compatible with what Smith said the effect of religious pluralism would be: the continual subdividing of sects into numerous ones and small units so that a single religion does not dominate (Smith 1791 [1776]).

Economic historians have applied economic analysis to religious institutions. For example, Robert Ekelund, Robert Hebert, and Robert Tollison treat a religious organization as an economic firm to explain the rent seeking practices of the medieval church. More recently, they assess the competitive entry of Protestants into the medieval religion market (Ekelund et al. 2002). They analyze the Roman Catholic Church’s response in the form of the Catholic Reformation. Timur Kuran (2004) investigates the effects of Islamic legal institutions on economic growth and the distribution of goods. Kuran finds the institutions that generated evolutionary bottlenecks include the Islamic law of inheritance, which inhibited capital accumulation; the absence in Islamic law of the concept

of a corporation and the consequent weaknesses of civil society; and the *waqf* – the religious endowment of property for specific, usually philanthropic, purposes to the exclusion of all other uses – which locked vast resources into unproductive organizations for the delivery of social services. All of these obstacles to economic development were largely overcome through radical reforms initiated in the nineteenth century. Nevertheless, traditional Islamic law remains an impediment to economic growth.

A recent application of economic analysis to religion and religious beliefs is the cross country quantitative analysis of Robert Barro and Rachel McCleary (2003). Using international survey data on religiosity for a broad panel of countries, they investigate the effects of church attendance and religious beliefs on economic growth. They find that religious beliefs are more important for economic activity than religious participation. Rene Stulz and Rohan Williamson, using data on financial markets of various countries, find that a country's principal religious preference is relevant for predicting creditor rights. The improvement of data collected on various religions as well as aspects of religious preferences and institutions will continue to spur research on religion, particularly from an international perspective. The more important data sets used are described below.

The World Values Survey (WVS), directed by Ronald Inglehart at the Inter University Consortium for Political and Social Research (ICPSR), offers four waves of surveys (1981–4; 1990–3; 1995–7; 1999–2001), now covering over 50 countries. Each survey includes a series of questions on religious beliefs, activities, commitments, and values, as well as a variety of economic, political, and social variables. For discussions and uses of these data, see Inglehart and Baker (2000).

Another useful data set is the International Social Survey Program (ISSP), which is a cross national collaboration of surveys (including the General Social Survey or GSS for the United States). The 1991 and 1998 waves are dedicated to religion, the latter for 30 countries. As with the WVS, the ISSP includes an array of other variables. For discussions and uses of the ISSP data, see

International Social Survey Program 2002 (available at www.issp.org/data.htm).

Gallup International has collected cross national survey data on religion for many years. The Gallup Millennium Survey has useful indicators on church attendance and religious beliefs for over 50 countries in 1999; see Gallup International Millennium Survey 2002 (available at www.gallup-international.com/survey15.htm). Currently, these data are not easily accessible to researchers, although negotiations with Gallup International are underway.

Jonathan Fox and Shmuel Sandler (2004) are assembling a religion and state database (RAS) in which they classify the relation between religion and state into four broad groupings: separation of religion and state, discrimination against minority religions, restrictions on majority religions, and religious legislation. They examine religion and state separation between 1990 and 2002 in 152 states with populations of over 1 million.

The American Religion Data Archive (ARDA), under the leadership of Roger Finke at Penn State University, will prove beneficial. The ARDA (available at www.thearda.com) is widely used as a source of data on religion for the United States and Canada. It provides additional software enhancements for selected ecological files. For the most heavily used files, such as Church and Church Membership Surveys, the site offers “Mapping” and “Report” options. Here state or national maps on church membership totals or rates can be constructed for any denomination in the data file. Users can also get a profile of religious denominations for any state, county, or metropolitan area selected.

SEE ALSO: Attitudes and Behavior; Buddhism; Capital: Economic, Cultural, and Social; Catholicism; Hinduism; Political Economy; Protestantism; Religion; Religion, Sociology of; Smith, Adam

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economy (sociological approach)

Thomas J. Fararo

The general problem of how to conceptualize and explain the relations of the economy to wider contexts of human behavior has been one of the main themes of major theorists in the sociological tradition. In the classical phase of the tradition, Marx, Weber, and Durkheim each treated the problem. In the writings of Marx, what has been called the base–super structure model rests upon the concept of a mode of production that includes social relations of production and forces of production, corresponding approximately to economy and technology, respectively. Social classes consist of persons who occupy the same position in the social relations of production, such as lord and serf in the feudal mode of production and capitalist and wage laborer in the capitalist mode of production. The dominant class employs its power advantage to shape a superstructure consisting of non economic institutions along with a dominant ideology reflecting the interests of the ruling class. This model is associated with a theory of social change, as in *The Communist Manifesto*, in which Marx and Engels analyze the historical dynamics of the rise and fall of capitalism in terms of revolutionary change involving conflicts among aristocrats, who represent the declining feudal mode of production, and the bourgeoisie, who in ushering in the capitalist mode of production are also giving birth to their own “gravediggers,” the class of wage laborers.

One implication of this analysis is that cultural phenomena are reflections of economic and political interests, whether in support of the status quo or antagonistic to it. In the writings of Weber, however, we find cultural orientations playing not just a reflective role relative to the economy. In *The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism* (1904), unintended consequences of religious ideas arising out of the Protestant Reformation are hypothesized to have been an important factor in the rise of modern rational capitalism in the West.

Calvinists were motivated by their religious ideas to seek economic success in the world and yet to maintain an ascetic lifestyle, a combination quite favorable to the formation of a bourgeois class. Eventually, however, as some of the religious spokesmen of the time feared, the religious element of the ethic was undermined by its very success in stimulating material gain. The result is the culture of modern rational capitalism, which no longer has or needs a religious meaning. In this and other studies, Weber set out a wide ranging sociology of the economy that included, in particular, complex and historically variable relationships between culture and economy. For Weber, the emergence of modern rational capitalism is only one instance of a wider historical process in which other institutional forms of rational social organization developed, especially bureaucracy. Indeed, he emphasizes that the modern capitalist enterprise, no less than the modern state, is a bureaucratic structure within which all action is organized in terms of norms of efficiency.

Durkheim made another type of theoretical contribution pertaining to economy and society. In one of his major works, *The Division of Labor in Society* (1893), he produced a new type of analysis of the division of labor. More than a century earlier, Adam Smith, in his treatise *The Wealth of Nations* (1776), had demonstrated the economic function of the division of labor in terms of gains in productivity. By contrast, Durkheim traces out its *social* function in the sense of social integration. He argues that simpler societies with little division of labor are held together mainly by the similarity of sentiments and ideas of their members, while complex societies with an extensive division of labor are held together by an organic form of solidarity, i.e., by the effects of the extensive interdependence of the differentiated members. Thus, in a somewhat oversimplified statement, we can say that just as Weber's study illuminated the relation between the economy and its cultural environment, Durkheim's study illuminated the relation between the economy and what the later social theorist Talcott Parsons called "the societal community," a system of social relationships among individuals and groups.

The approach that Parsons took was to place the economy in its larger setting of human

action and society in such a way as to delineate its various environments and how they constrained and enabled economic action. This approach is grounded in an action frame of reference and in a methodology of functional analysis. Any system of action has four functional problems: adaptation to its environment (A), definition and attainment of its goals (G), the integration of action elements (I), and the maintenance of meanings that are presupposed in the various actions (L). This AGIL scheme is applied recursively starting from the most general level of human action in which there is a non action (biophysical) environment. Behavioral systems, personality systems, social systems, and cultural systems respectively arise as solutions to the AGIL problems at this general action level. In particular, a social system has a structure that consists of institutionalized normative culture, e.g., the definition of rights and obligations.

From this analytical standpoint, the biophysical environment of the action system as a whole includes the living bodies of the members of the social system and the nature of the habitat in which they are collectively embedded. Thus the social system's adaptation problem – which we may denote IA – is one of gaining some degree of institutionalized control of these environmental states. For instance, human bodies have their own functional imperatives, such as adequate food, water, and shelter. The habitat may enable but also constrain how these needs can be satisfied. Thus, provision of these primary needs in the given biophysical environment and of other needs of personalities that arise in and through action processes within a cultural tradition constitutes a functional imperative of the social system to which its economy is the ongoing institutional solution, perhaps quite inadequate from a normative point of view in the sense that what prevails may be a condition of widespread hunger and/or alienation.

As a subsystem of the social system, the structure of the economy is defined in terms of differentiated institutionalized normative culture in the sense of socially sanctioned rights pertaining to ownership, contract, employment, and the like. The actions of the members of the social system also may be analyzed, not only in terms of how the social system "solves" its

adaptation (IA) problem but also in terms of how it produces some solution to its political (IG) problem, its social integrative (II) problem, and what Parsons later called its “fiduciary” (IL) problem of maintaining social value commitments.

Parsons and Smelser in their volume *Economy and Society* (1956) treat each of these problems and solutions in terms of their system model, so that a social system includes an economy, but also three other functional subsystems, namely a polity, a social community, and a fiduciary system, respectively, which form the *social* environment of the economy. Its wider *action* environment consists of behavioral, personality, and cultural systems. Parsons and Smelser also attempt to delineate the nature of intra economic processes in terms of the AGIL scheme as applied to the economy as a system with its own four functional problems, e.g., adaptation of its social environment with its political, social integrative, and fiduciary features. Concretely, these features may include, for instance, a weak or strong state, a weak or strong legal tradition, and an educational system that provides more or less appropriate skills and motivation for participation in productive activities. That these variable features profoundly constrain and/or enable productive economic activity is illustrated by the contemporary difficulties of establishing a market economy in a social environment in which there is an unstable polity, little by way of enforceable laws protecting private property, and an educational system that discourages individual initiative.

Functional analysis has certain conceptual implications. Parsons and Smelser (1956: 14) note, for instance, that “the whole society is in one sense part of the economy, in that all of its units, individual and collective, *participate in* the economy. . . . But no concrete unit participates *only* in the economy. Hence, no concrete unit is ‘*purely* economic.’” This is best illustrated by reference to collective units. Schools (fiduciary specialists) participate in the economy as purchasers of needed facilities, services, and supplies. In a capitalist system, firms (economic specialists) participate in the fiduciary system that reproduces capitalist values simply by hiring workers, making profits, distributing dividends, and the like, all of which contribute to retention of value orientations supportive of

capitalism. As Weber noted, modern capitalism no longer requires religion for the reproduction of the culture of capitalism. It should be noted, however, that financial scandals involving corporations are dysfunctional in terms of the fiduciary function, undermining faith in the virtues of capitalism.

Many of the interactions in a differentiated social system are functionally specialized exchanges of various sorts and, in the aggregate, produce market or market like phenomena. For instance, the labor market connects the economy to the fiduciary system in that the latter produces actors who can take positions in some context of production that enables them to enact the corresponding roles in relation to others. At the micro level, two people may engage in an exchange process, one of whom is in a representative role for a firm while the other may be connected to a household as one of its employed members and whose income performs a significant function in the context of that social subsystem of the system under analysis. At the macro level, this is but one exchange among numerous others that together form what Parsons and Smelser call an “interchange system,” which connects the economy and the fiduciary system.

Since the Parsons–Smelser model is abstractly general, it can have applications at various levels. As one example, consider the social system of the world, “world society.” Its polity is a fractured one, consisting of numerous sovereign states with competing claims and incessant outbursts of violent conflicts. Its social integration is proceeding rapidly, however, via the impact of increasingly faster and more efficient modes of communication as well as the formation of collectivities that transcend nation state boundaries. In this context, there is the world economy with its increasing globalization of production and consumption as well as numerous markets still enclosed within more local sectors of the world society. This world society is embedded in a world system of human action that includes cultural systems such as value systems, religions, ideologies, and sciences. World fiduciary processes in the form of education, for instance, reproduce particularistic values associated with national or other identities but also, although not uniformly, other more universalistic values

that are incompletely realized in world institutions such as the United Nations. Globalization, in large part driven by economic actions, is a historical process that has increasingly come under analysis by sociologists as they interpret the world economy as embedded in a larger system of action that includes world culture, world polity, and so on.

Although the model proposed by Parsons and Smelser is of considerable value in addressing the question of how the economy relates to its environments, issues relating to lack of clarity and rigor in the formulation of the model have limited its usefulness to other analysts of economy and society. Perhaps for this reason, the tradition of economic sociology went into a kind of hibernation for about two decades before being revived in the mid 1980s. At about that time, a number of research programs that involve both theory and empirical investigations were initiated. Taken together, these programs have been called "the new economic sociology" by Granovetter (1985) in an influential article that stimulated the rebirth of the field.

The key theme of this new economic sociology is the analysis of economic phenomena in terms of social structure and culture, treating economic action as embedded in a wider context of social and cultural relationships. Although the formulation is similar to that of Parsons and Smelser, the newly reborn field emphasizes the empirical application of more recent sociological ideas such as social network and social capital and also intersects cultural sociology, another major field of sociological investigation. Very importantly, the field now includes a relatively large number of empirical investigators in contrast to the small number of earlier analysts. Hence a summary statement of the state of sociological research on economy and society is difficult to make in a very fluid and rapidly growing field. Swedberg (2003) sets out a rare effort in this direction and also has co edited a handbook (Smelser & Swedberg 2003). Chapters in the latter point to the way in which recent work has added rich empirical detail to the relationships between the economy and its social environments, for instance political and educational institutions.

A brief indication of the sort of theory and research characteristic of the new economic

sociology can be communicated by reference to investigations that emphasize social structural elements, especially those relating to the concepts of social network and social capital.

A social network is a population of actors – individual or collective – that are in some mode of connection with one another which mediates the form and content of their interaction. Actors may be dependent upon certain others for resources or they may trust certain others, among other types of connections. For instance, in application to an economy, one theory pertains to the argument that there are advantages to actors in certain positions within networks. A network may consist of a series of largely disconnected components except for certain relations that connect actors in distinct components. Such a network has "structural holes" – sectors with many absent relations. Actors whose relations form a bridge between otherwise disconnected components have certain competitive advantages in terms of information and control. It has been shown that they "enjoy higher rates of return on their investments because they know about, have a hand in, and exercise control over, more rewarding opportunities" (Burt 1992: 46). In another example of a social structural approach to economic phenomena, Baker (1984) analyzes stock options trading on the floor of a major securities exchange in the US, showing how price volatility is a function of network variables.

The economic concept of capital includes physical and financial resources employed in productive activities. Economists have extended this concept in referring to educational training as "human capital," consisting of resources in the form of learned skills and the like. Sociologists have made use of a still further extension of the concept in analyzing the benefits of "social capital," whereby social relationships function as resources that actors can employ to attain their ends. Like much else in social life, this particular form of capital is a byproduct of social relations formed for other reasons. For instance, among members of a certain occupation, a social club may be formed in order for the members to enjoy convivial activities, but at a later time, when some of the members become unemployed, the club may function as an informal employment service (Coleman 1990).

The extended concept of capital also plays a major role in the field theory of Pierre Bourdieu (1986), whose studies intersect economic and cultural sociology. A field may be defined as a competitive social space of positions characterized in terms of the total volume and relative composition of various forms of capital. While economic theory postulates consumers who make rational choices based on given preferences or tastes, field theory provides a conceptual basis for representing the heterogeneous social structural basis for such tastes, treating them as modes by which actors make distinctions (e.g., in the clothing or cars that they can afford to purchase) which in turn serve to distinguish them from other actors. In a somewhat similar mode in terms of investigating meanings and functions of economic phenomena from a wider perspective, Zelizer (1994) has emphasized that the social meaning of money extends beyond its function as a medium of exchange in the economy.

Comparing the new economic sociology to “the old” in the sense of the systems model of Parsons and Smelser, a major contrast is that Parsons and Smelser aimed to integrate sociological theory and economic theory by embedding economic concepts and mechanisms within a unified framework consisting of the general theory of action and an accompanying methodology of functional analysis. For instance, they attempt to “find a place” within the AGIL scheme for the factors of production set out by economic theorists. Labor, for instance, is a value commitment to work – with a variable cultural work ethic, following up Weber’s ideas in this regard – that is acquired in the fiduciary system (in this instance in households) and enters the economy through an interchange process rooted in exchange processes regulated by an institution which, in market societies, is the employment contract. In a similar mode, but not always clearly or convincingly, it is argued that through interchange processes, capital enters the economy from the polity and organizing (entrepreneurial) activity enters it from the social integrative system. The fourth factor of production, traditionally “land” in economics, is somewhat vaguely treated in terms of facilities that are “givens” for the shorter term economic processes. Similarly, the various types of markets and other processes

(e.g., investment) treated in economic theory are “located” in terms of the AGIL scheme.

By contrast, the new economic sociology largely disavows any attempted integration of the two disciplines and, in fact, the research often is initiated in a polemical mode as opposing some assumptions made in economic theory. However, in both its old and its new form, the sociology of the economy is characterized by the application of sociological concepts and theories to analyze economic phenomena. In some instances, the concepts relate closely to some traditional economic concept such as capital. In other instances, the concepts have no linkage to traditional economic ideas. This is especially true of network concepts such as structural holes and bridges. In either case, the sociological analysis – whether in older forms or the new forms – tends to differ from economic analysis. The reason for this is that sociology, as a discipline, is concerned above all with patterns of social relations arising out of and shaping social interaction. It is this shared perspective that sociologists have employed in the analysis of the economy in relation to society.

SEE ALSO: Bourdieu, Pierre; Capitalism, Social Institutions of; Culture, Economy and; Durkheim, Émile; Ecology and Economy; Economic Development; Economic Geography; Economy, Culture and; Economy, Networks and; Economy, Religion and; Education and Economy; Emotions and Economy; Engels, Friedrich; Ideology, Economy and; Marx, Karl; Parsons, Talcott; Smith, Adam; Social Network Theory; Weber, Max

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education

Anna Strassmann Mueller

Changes in developed economies and societies stemming from the Industrial Revolution have shifted responsibilities for the education of young people from the family and community to schools. Schools are now a major institution, educating the vast majority of children and youth in the developed world and functioning as a primary engine of change in developing countries. Although education brings about changes in society as a whole as well as in individuals, schools are also influenced by larger social forces. Sociological theories address these central roles that schools play in society from differing perspectives.

The functionalist paradigm emphasizes the role that education plays for society. Émile Durkheim, one of the founders of sociology, was among the first educational researchers to focus on the function schools serve for the larger society. Durkheim (1961) argued that the main goal of education was to socialize individuals so that they share values with the larger society. Ensuring that all students received the same moral education allowed for a more integrated society with less social conflict about wrong behaviors or attitudes. A second important functionalist perspective on education developed in economics through research on human capital (Schultz 1961). The human capital perspective describes education as a set of investments that increase individuals' knowledge and skills, which in turn

improves national labor productivity and economic growth. Education then becomes an important tool for societies to increase the efficiency and size of their economy.

While the functionalist perspective emphasizes the role of education for society as a whole, the conflict paradigm focuses on divisions within society that education maintains or reinforces. Max Weber (2000) was one of the first to argue that education serves dual and potentially conflicting functions for society. First, schools can be an equalizing institution where individuals, regardless of their social status, can gain access to high status jobs through their own talent and hard work. Second, schools can reinforce existing status hierarchies by limiting opportunities to individuals from high status backgrounds. In other words, Weber recognized schools' potential to either facilitate or block social mobility. Weber's incorporation of the notion of social status into the function of schools in society was extremely influential in shaping sociological research on education. Randall Collins (1979), Samuel Bowles, Herbert Gintis, and others furthered Weber's ideas on status attainment by arguing that schools socialize individuals to accept their place in an unjust, capitalist society. This work shifted the emphasis found in human capital theory away from schools as providers of skills and training to schools as providers of hollow credentials that are rewarded in the labor market. Critically, these credentials do not represent higher levels of skills, but simply serve as status markers that employers use to sort workers into low and high prestige occupations.

Both historically and when comparing countries today, the structure of a country's educational system is closely linked to its economic and political history. Developed countries are generally characterized by a history of relatively steady economic growth, a stable political system, and freedom from the devastation of war. This common context enables developed countries to form a cohesive formal schooling system that serves all children until at least the age of 15 or 16. In recent decades, developed nations have incorporated the ideals of equality of educational opportunity and providing opportunities to children from disadvantaged backgrounds into their goals for educational policy.

Though all developed nations provide universal education and many are motivated by similar ideals, the structure of schooling can vary drastically from developed country to developed country (for an overview, see Brint 1998). In Japan, France, and Sweden, the school system is run by a central governmental ministry of education that ensures standardized curricula and funding. Other countries, such as Germany, Canada, and the US, are more decentralized and allow local or regional governments to maintain control over public education. Additionally, the school systems in these nations vary in how they structure opportunities to learn and earn credentials. In his classic article, Ralph Turner (1960) contrasted the English and US school systems, characterizing the former as a “sponsored” system, in which talent is identified in the early years and nurtured in a stratified system. The US system, on the other hand, is a “contest” system, consisting of a series of contests in which all students compete on a level playing field. Though “sponsored” and “contest” systems are “ideal types,” most developed nations’ school systems reflect aspects of sponsored or contest systems.

In the developing world, many countries have been independent from colonizing powers for approximately only 50 years and do not have the same history of political stability, economic security, and times of peace that privilege developed countries. These instabilities (along with problems related to poverty) affect the ability of developing countries to provide and prioritize universal education. In many developing countries, the school system is inherited in large part from former colonizers and is heavily shaped by the policies of the World Bank. The World Bank promotes a model of schooling that emphasizes primary schools, private spending, balances equity and efficiency, and discourages vocational education. Though the structure and experience World Bank policies provide can improve schooling priorities in developing nations, they sometimes do not recognize that factors unique to a particular country may require modifications. A central question concerning the role of education in developing nations concerns how important education systems are to economic growth. Much of the research on education in

developing nations examines this question and generally finds that having a disciplined and educated labor force is a positive and important step in economic development.

Though commonalities in the structure of schooling exist across countries in the developed and developing world, each country is generally unique in the development of its particular educational system. Systems of education not only reflect national values and attitudes, they also play a major role in shaping national culture and social status hierarchy. In the US, the idea of public schooling – or the common school – developed in the early nineteenth century as a response to political and economic shifts in American society (see Parkerson & Parkerson 2001 for a history). Prior to common schooling, the majority of Americans were educated by their families, and only children from wealthier families could afford formal schooling. As the US moved away from a barter and trade economy toward markets where goods were exchanged for cash, white Protestant Americans from the middle and working classes recognized that the fragmented and informal system of schooling was no longer adequate preparation for their children to be competitive in the market driven economy. This realization led these Americans to demand that a quality primary education be made available to their children. The ideal of equality emphasized during the American Revolution meant that there was already growing political support among the Protestant political elite for the idea of public education for white children.

The end result of these forces was the development of the common school. Common schools had two main goals: first, to provide knowledge and skills necessary to being an active member of economic and social life; and second, to create Americans who value the same things – namely, patriotism, achievement, competition, and Protestant moral and religious values. Significantly, these goals were important both to individuals trying to make it in the new economic and social order and to the success of solidifying the young United States into a coherent nation. Religious diversity was not tolerated in the nascent nation, and Catholic immigrants were often seen as threats to the dominant Protestant way of life. Therefore, though common schools were open to all white

Americans, the emphasis on Protestant values (which went hand in hand with anti Catholic attitudes) alienated many Catholics. This religious tension eventually led Catholics to pursue alternative schooling and resulted in the development of Catholic private schools.

Though common schools provided more equitable access to education than the previous informal system, these schools still reflected the values of the ruling elite – white Anglo Saxon Protestants – in US society. In addition to appreciating Protestant values over those of other religions, educating white boys was generally seen as more important than educating white girls as white boys were more likely to benefit from their education upon entry into the formal labor market. Furthermore, African Americans, freed or enslaved, were almost categorically excluded from common schools in the early 1800s as the flawed “ideal of equality” applied only to white Americans.

Despite the development of the common school, elite white Protestant Americans were able to maintain educational superiority by opting out of the common school system. The elite private and boarding school system began before the American Revolution and flourished during the nineteenth century (at the same time that the common school system was expanding). Though the growing public education system diminished the percentage of secondary students in private schools, private schools maintained an exclusivity that appealed to elite parents eager to pass on status and advantage to their children. In *Preparing for Power: America's Elite Boarding Schools* (1985), authors Cookson and Persell explore the admissions process and the demographic characteristics of “the chosen ones,” America’s most privileged students. Historically, these elite schools tended to have a homogeneous student body in terms of family background, religion, and race, and admission was based not on openly stated academic requirements but on a complicated balance of merit, family wealth, social standing, and an individual’s ability to fit the school’s ideal. Thus, the presentation of self as a person of status – someone with ambition, confidence, and poise – was just as important as academic capacities to gaining access to America’s most elite secondary education. Though these private schools continue to promote an

elite social class identity, currently they also face pressure to diversify the racial composition of their student bodies.

While elite private schools have historically allowed privileged Americans to opt out of public schooling, religious schools have offered an important private alternative to non elite, and sometimes marginalized, Americans throughout the history of the US. Catholic schools were a part of Colonial America and are among some of the oldest educational institutions in the US. In contrast to elite private schools, religious schools had a moral purpose of teaching religious beliefs and producing religious leaders. Beginning in the 1800s, Catholic schools provided an alternative to the public school where children read the Protestant version of the Bible. Today, Catholic schools serve a more diverse student population in terms of race, social class, and religious beliefs. Catholic schools today are known for providing good opportunities to learn and prepare for college (Bryk et al. 1993). Critics suggest that Catholic schools select more promising students, an option not available to public schools.

Though research on elite and Catholic private schools suggests that access to a private versus public education affects students’ academic opportunities, inequalities between schools within the public sector have long plagued the American educational system, with serious implications for children with no choice other than public schooling. As mentioned previously, the common school system generally excluded African American children until after the end of the Civil War and Reconstruction. Though the end of slavery meant that the common school system finally included African American children, they were generally educated in separate facilities (see Orfield & Eaton 1996 for a history). By 1896, the idea of “separate but equal” schools was officially sanctioned by the Supreme Court through its decision in *Plessy v. Ferguson*. Racially segregated schools became the norm across the US, though whether this segregation was by law or by practice varied by state and region. Equitable distribution of resources between racially segregated schools never existed; white schools received substantially more financial and academic support. “Separate but equal” schools were eventually declared inherently unequal in

the Supreme Court decision *Brown v. Board of Education of Topeka* (1954), and schools were ordered to desegregate “with all deliberate speed.”

Though *Brown* is perhaps one of the most widely celebrated Supreme Court decisions, schools in the US have failed to reflect the ideals of desegregation and educational equality put forth in the ruling. Early research in sociology of education recognized that stratification in educational attainment was related to students’ family background, such as race or ethnicity, rather than simply differences in achievement test scores (e.g., Coleman et al. 1966). These differences were social and had to do with the schools’ social context rather than factors that could be affected by redistribution of funding levels alone. Since the Coleman Report (1966) and its political consequences of busing that shocked the nation, educational researchers and policymakers have struggled to know how to provide equality of educational opportunity within a context of socioeconomic inequality.

Beginning around 1980, sociologists of education turned their attention to stratification systems at work *within* schools. Secondary schools tend to group students in courses or “tracks” (such as academic, general, or vocational), and through these groupings schools can either reinforce or disrupt the relationship between family background and attainment. Typically, the high school curriculum is organized into sequences of courses in which subject knowledge gained from one course prepares a student for the next course. Mobility between sequences is restricted and forms the foundation of a stratification system for adolescents. Furthermore, schools tend to provide more resources, such as higher quality instruction, to students in higher level courses, which can have serious consequences for low ability students (Hallinan 1994). The result is that students’ course taking patterns follow a trajectory or sequence of courses over the years of high school in which mobility between course sequences is unusual. This is especially true in mathematics, where mobility into the elite college preparatory classes is nearly impossible after the sequence has begun. Students’ placement in these sequences explains much of why family background is linked to students’ attainment and is strongly related to a variety of

outcomes that indicate students’ basic life chances.

Research on stratification within schools further confirmed the results of Coleman’s earlier analysis on equity in education – schools are more effective at educating students from privileged family backgrounds. Because schools have been idealized as a great equalizing force, understanding why family background is linked strongly to education became the next important goal of sociology of education.

Annette Lareau (1987), building on Pierre Bourdieu’s (1973) idea of cultural capital, offered one explanation of how parents transmit advantages to their children when she found that parents interacted with teachers and schools very differently depending on their social class backgrounds. In addition to conditioning how parents interact with the school, parents’ cultural capital also influences how they socialize their children. Lareau describes middle class parents’ childrearing strategies as “concerted cultivation” or active fostering of children’s growth through adult organized activities (e.g., soccer, music lessons) and through encouraging critical and original thinking. Working class and poor parents, on the other hand, support their children’s “natural growth” by providing the conditions necessary for their child’s development, but leaving structure of leisure activities to the children. These different styles have implications for students’ abilities to take advantage of opportunities in schools.

Coleman’s concept of social capital articulated another way that families transmit advantages to their children. In parenting, social capital refers to “the norms, the social networks, and the relationships between adults and children that are of value for the child’s growing up” and can exist within families and communities (Coleman 1987: 334). Social capital within families taps how close parents and children are and how closely parents are able to monitor their child’s development. For example, Coleman (1988) found that a higher percentage of children from single parent families (who have less social capital in the home) drop out during high school than children from intact families. Social capital in communities is also important, as Coleman et al. (1982) demonstrated: students in Catholic high schools were less likely to drop out compared to their peers

in other private and public schools, not because of school related differences (such as quality curriculum), but rather because of the close knit adult relationships surrounding Catholic schools. The cohesive Catholic community allowed adults to better transmit norms about staying in school to teenagers.

Though the principal manifest function of schools is undoubtedly to provide opportunities for learning, schools also serve as the primary location for social interaction with peers and for the development of adolescent cultures. Since Durkheim first emphasized schools as a socializing institution, sociologists have investigated how schools' adolescent cultures affect adolescents' priorities, goals, and behaviors. James Coleman's *The Adolescent Society* (1961) recognized the importance of "adolescent culture" in schools to the decisions, both academic and social, that adolescents make. Coleman stated that adolescents turn to each other for social rewards, not to adult communities; therefore, understanding the value systems of adolescent society is key to understanding what motivates students. Importantly, for some adolescents, the goals of formal schooling – achievement, engagement – are reflected in the adolescent culture; however, when students rebel against the formal goals of schooling, it can reinforce preexisting inequalities based on family background.

Fordham and Ogbu (1986) have examined how adolescents' oppositional culture to schooling develops and how it explains in part the links between family background and students' achievement. Given the history of racism in the US, Fordham and Ogbu argue that doing well in school has come to represent "acting white" to African American youth in an urban school. This may lead many African American students who are academically able to perform significantly below their capabilities. It also creates a tension for African American students who want to succeed academically; not only do they have to cope with the challenge of coursework, but they also have to deal with the burden of appearing to act white. More recently, this perspective has been challenged by researchers who argue that African American students actually hold educational values in high esteem and do not reject academic success.

Much of the sociological research on education has focused on equity – with good reason. Education has serious implications for adolescents' future lives. Individuals' academic credentials affect the jobs they are able to get and the incomes they earn. Individuals with a college degree earn higher wages than those with a high school degree who earn more than high school dropouts (Arum & Hout 2000). Educational attainment also has serious implications for health throughout the life course. More highly educated individuals experience better health (including self perceived health, morbidity, and mortality) than people with less education (Ross & Mirowsky 1999). Education also shapes the social relationships that individuals form. People tend to marry others with similar amounts of education. Taken together, these findings indicate that education plays a powerful role in individuals' lives. Though we don't fully understand *how* education affects these diverse aspects of the human experience, it is clear that education is an important social institution.

SEE ALSO: *Brown v. Board of Education*; Colleges and Universities; Community College; Cultural Capital in Schools; Dropping Out of School; Educational Attainment; Educational Inequality; Globalization, Education and; Opportunities for Learning; School Segregation, Desegregation; Schools, Common; Schools, Public; Schools, Religious; Social Capital and Education; Status Attainment; Tracking

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education, adult

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Perhaps because so much adult education takes place outside the boundaries of formal educational institutions, sociologists have devoted less scholarly attention to adult education than they have to most other kinds of schooling. There is little agreement on the boundaries of adult education and no clear consensus on a definition that specifies what is included and excluded. Even the terminology pertaining to adult education is inconsistent and shifting, as the range of terms used to refer to this broad and diverse category of education has included continuing, adult, further, recurrent, popular, second chance, educational extension, and life long learning (Kett 1994). One could add even more recent additions to this list of terms.

But while any definition of adult education is inevitably somewhat arbitrary, a few common features emerge. Perhaps the salient feature of adult education is that it is non compulsory or voluntary. Adult education typically involves educational reentry after one has left formal schooling to pursue work or family activities. It does not traditionally include full time enrollment in postsecondary degree or diploma programs although it often includes part time enrollment in such programs (Kim et al. 2004: v). Some analysts consider vocational education, worker training, and other clear forms of "human capital investment" as components of adult education, while others prefer to focus on education for leisure, self improvement, and personal development. Kett (1994) argued that adult education has more to do with its function of providing additional learning for those who have left the educational system than it does with age.

There is nothing in the United States that could be characterized as an "adult education system." The vast panorama of adult education programs and offerings in the US is an utterly non coordinated and decentralized "non system," ranging in quality from atrocious to excellent and in cost from free to prohibitive for most would be participants. The many professional associations and accreditation agencies with an

interest in adult education are at best loosely confederated and organized.

Because of the diversity of adult education, definitional uncertainties about its boundaries, and the lack of any national database on adult education, it is impossible to offer any definitive statistical portrait of its distribution. Still, a few kinds of adult education are especially prevalent. One of the most common is a huge infrastructure of providers of instruction to prepare high school non completers to take the General Educational Development, or GED, examination. The GED has been used for decades in the US to signify the equivalence of a high school degree. In the year 2000, about 860,000 people took the GED exam, with about 60 percent successfully passing it.

While statistics are less reliable, even larger numbers of people have participated in various kinds of adult literacy programs. These vary greatly in length, intensity, and pedagogical sophistication. Adult literacy programs are deeply rooted in American history, resurging particularly during waves of heavy immigration. While often presented as a means to alleviate educational and economic inequality, their actual impact on this, despite their other virtues, has been modest (Raudenbush & Kasim 1998).

A great deal of adult education is offered in response to the demand for instruction in avocational interests, hobbies, and personal growth. Unlike most compulsory education, much adult education is better characterized as consumption than as investment. That is, the goals of K 12 schooling are routinely stated in terms of the development of desired changes in young people's repertoires, preparing them to effectively assume adult roles as citizens, workers, and community members. In contrast, a large share of adult education is "consumed" for its own sake, for the personal satisfaction and edification that it offers. Sociological models of adult education that adopt the economic perspective of "education as investment" are often of limited value in explaining people's decisions to invest time and money in adult education from which they expect no economic returns.

Individuals pursue adult education from a wide variety of providers. Many providers are located in traditional educational institutions,

from K 12 settings to community colleges to four year colleges and universities. Other adult learning is situated in community organizations, business and industry, church groups, and libraries. Increasingly, vendors are providing adult education through various distance learning technologies, notably the World Wide Web and other asynchronous forms of instructional delivery.

Sociologists have had limited engagement with the mainstream adult education field and rarely draw on even the recognized classics of the adult education literature. Much of the adult education literature is quite normative, being rooted more in social movements of self improvement than in a systematic understanding of the sociology of adult education. Statistically and methodologically sound analyses and evaluations of virtually any aspect of adult education – participation, effectiveness, outcomes – are extremely rare.

The uncertainty about definitional boundaries creates a host of measurement and other methodological problems in the study of adult education. Even the inclusive definition offered by the National Center for Education Statistics (see Kim et al. 2004) is restricted to adult education activities in which an instructor is present. A wide variety of self paced, non certified, non formal learning activities that would clearly fall into any accepted categorization of learning (e.g., reading professional journals in one's field, or watching the History Channel) are often systematically excluded from consideration.

Adult education is a critical part of one of the most enduring social movements in American history, that of self betterment. Since the earliest days of the republic, adult Americans have pursued educational opportunities through such diverse venues as Chautauqua institutes, voluntary associations, libraries, reading groups, correspondence study, elder hostels, and church organizations (Kett 1994). The pursuit of adult education figures prominently in the American myth of the "self made man."

More recently, such impulses toward self improvement have given way to a more economically motivated agenda of "Lifelong Learning" or "the Learning Society." The rhetoric of Lifelong Learning is not as deeply institutionalized in the US as in many other

postindustrial nations, some of which have elevated the model of the Learning Society to the top of the economic development agenda. Advocates of the Learning Society believe that globalization and rapid technological change are increasingly rendering one's current stock of education obsolete. They add that policies to promote ongoing learning throughout the life course are needed to compete in the global marketplace. Even in the United States with its traditions of adult education for self betterment, most proposals to reform adult education eventually appeal to economic logic. Despite the cautions of many observers that the provision of skills is not sufficient in itself to meet the demands of changing markets (Crouch 1997), the engine driving adult education is changing quite inexorably from self improvement to social mobility.

There is no single data series that can document trends in adult education over more than a few years. Under any definition, however, participation in adult education has grown substantially over the past 30 years. Using the rather expansive definition adopted by the National Center for Education Statistics (NCES), in 2001 about 46 percent of American adults (about 92 million people) participated in some form of adult education. This was up from 40 percent in 1995. The most common form of adult education was work related, but personal development education was also very popular. In fact, fee based personal development education attracts more students to many community colleges than does tuition based coursework in degree programs. Less common but still very significant forms of adult education were English as a Second Language (ESL), basic skills education, vocational and technical degree programs, and apprenticeships.

Collectively, adult education adds a great deal to the nation's overall stock of formal schooling. Jacobs and Stoner Eby (1998) estimated that about 7 percent of the total educational attainment of recent American cohorts is the result of reentry education.

Individuals have very different opportunities to participate in adult education. For the most part, access to adult education is influenced by many of the same factors that influence access to other valued educational and socioeconomic outcomes. Whites participate at higher rates

than African Americans and Hispanics. Women participate at higher rates than do men, and have done so at least since the late 1970s. There is evidence, however, that the sorts of job training in which women participate tend to yield lower economic returns than the job training provided to men. There is little variation in participation rates for adults aged 16–50 (about 54 percent), but rates of participation in adult education drop sharply for those aged 51–65 (41 percent) and over age 65 (22 percent). More highly educated individuals are far more likely to participate in adult education than are those with less schooling (a finding that holds in many nations). Those in more privileged occupational and employment positions have greater likelihoods of participating in adult education than do those in less advantaged work situations, and those with higher household incomes are similarly advantaged (Kim et al. 2004).

Because much adult education is not based in formal school settings, the decision to pursue adult education is not strictly the same as the decision to return to school. Particularly for women, the ability to return to school hinges on a variety of marital and family factors, such as responsibilities for childcare and the amount of emotional and financial support received from one's partner. Most often, analysts focus on the "barriers" that stand between people and their ability to participate in adult education. There is as yet no widely accepted conceptual framework for understanding these barriers.

The growth in adult education is closely related to some important long term demographic trends. Foremost among these is the increasingly "disorderly" life course lived by many Americans. By "disorderly," demographers direct attention to the dissolution of the normative life course of linear and predictable sequences from one social role to another and its replacement with a life course regime in which people hold educational, employment, and family roles out of their traditional sequence and in many cases simultaneously. Thus, individuals are increasingly likely to structure their lives in ways that facilitate occasional or even frequent episodes of educational reentry.

Moreover, the aging of the population, in particular those born during the 1946–64 baby

boom in the United States, is resulting in a large “supply side” of potential participants in the adult education market. There are many more people in the typical “adult education” ages than ever before. Even though baby boomers evidently do not return to school at higher rates than earlier cohorts did, their sheer numbers have put enormous upward pressure on adult education. On the demand side, many American colleges and universities, to say nothing of community colleges, have expanded their adult education course offerings while redoubling their efforts to make education accessible to adults with work and family commitments. The adult education market is particularly open to adult education aspirants because of the relatively easy access to virtually any form of adult education in the US. Of course, as baby boomers are coming to be replaced by the much smaller 1965–82 birth cohort of “baby busters,” the supply of potential adult learners available to colleges and universities will shrink quite precipitously. As Jacobs and Stoner Eby (1998) observed, in the near future the college population of the US will return to its traditional demographic composition of young adults.

SEE ALSO: Aging, Demography of; Aging and the Life Course, Theories of; Community College; Educational Attainment; Educational Inequality; Educational and Occupational Attainment; Life Course and Family; Life Course Perspective; Socialization, Adult; Transition from School to Work

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education and economy

Richard K. Caputo

The relation between education and economy is interdependent and reciprocal. Education is a form of human capital, an intangible form of accumulated capital stock, which includes level and dispersion of education as well as those of applied and basic research. It has many measurable forms, including years of aggregate schooling, rates of enrollment, public education expenditures, and levels, types, and use of on the job training programs. Economic activity is understood as economic growth, usually measured as changes in the size or rate of gross or per capita gross domestic output, and determinant of how much improvement will occur in a society’s standard of living. Unlike business cycles, which reflect short term (<10 years) aggregate fluctuations in output, incomes, and employment, economic growth is a long term concept, depending on past investments in physical capital like industrial plants and machinery, human capital, and the pace of technological innovation.

The major dimensions of education and economy include the causal directions and the levels of analysis for effects. The effects of education on economic growth are to be distinguished from effects of the economy on educational expansion. Microscopic research analyzes the effects of education on individual characteristics such as wages and occupational status. Macroscopic research focuses on the effects of education on aggregate output and productivity for national economies. Five theories guide related research: class reproduction, human capital, functional, institutional, and stratification. In addition, contemporary growth models are more likely to rely on total factor production, addressing the efficiency with

which factors of production are used and reflecting a broad range of economic and socio-cultural influences, rather than growth accounting, which is limited to a narrower range of economic factors of production.

Early reliance on human capital theory in economics and functional theory in sociology posited that education increased the productivity of national economies through increasing the productivity of individuals. Human capital and aggregate productivity studies assumed that more highly educated workers were more productive on the job, arguing that wages were the measure of worker productivity. It was questionable, however, whether wages should be used as a measure of marginal productivity, since this assumed a perfectly competitive labor market in equilibrium.

In regard to effects of the economy on education, earlier empirical studies challenged the functional theory view that as economies industrialize and jobs require greater literacy and technical skills, education expands in response. Secular mass schooling often preceded demand for high level industrial jobs in industrial and undeveloped countries. Early industrialization was also found to retard educational development. Early pressures to develop formal schooling were typically from political, religious, or cultural elites and focused on training state bureaucrats, military leaders, and religious cohorts, not on developing economic skills.

Class reproduction, human capital, functional, institutional, and stratification theories on the whole present clear though different images of education and the economy. The empirical evidence through the mid 1990s blurred lines separating them, many variables used were proxies for difficult to measure attributes, and the quality of data varied across studies.

Bleaney and Nishiyama (2002) examined three competing models of economic growth. All three study models had 26 explanatory measures in common, including the log of initial per capita GDP. No one model dominated the others, implying that an encompassing model with explanatory variables from all three fit the data better than any of the original models or any pair of them. In the final encompassing model passing a battery of tests for adequacy, human capital (that is, male schooling),

institutions, specialization in primary products, and terms of trade changes were all determinants of growth between 1965 and 1990.

Although inconsistencies across studies and complexities about relationships remain, contemporary research benefits from cross country, cross sectional panel data with a focus on the question, "Under what conditions does education contribute to economic growth and vice versa?" Barro (2001) has shown that economic growth is positively related to the starting level of average years of school attainment of adult males at the secondary and higher levels and has no relationship to primary education. Judson (1998) has shown that allocation matters: higher investment in universal primary education plays a positive role in economic growth, especially in poorer countries.

Kalaitzidakis et al. (2001) show a nonlinear relationship between education, measured as mean years of schooling, and economic growth, measured as per capita GDP growth between 1960 and 1990. They also report no relationship between education and economic growth for *high income/capital countries*, due in part to contrasting effects of male (positive) and female (negative) education.

Krueger and Kumar (2004) contend that higher rates of publicly subsidized investments in vocational education was one possible factor contributing to increased economic growth in Europe vis à vis that of the US in the 1960s and 1970s. As the rate of technological progress increased throughout the 1980s and 1990s, such subsidies contributed to the slower rate of economic growth than that of the US.

Bils and Klenow (2000) show that schooling accounted for less than one third of per capita GDP growth and that schooling responded to the anticipated rate of growth from income accompanying increases in GDP. They also note the importance of institutional factors such as better enforcement of property rights and greater openness in inducing faster GDP growth and higher school enrollments.

Galor and Tsiddson (2002) show that the evolutionary pattern of human capital distribution, income distribution, and economic growth were determined simultaneously by the interplay between a local home environment externality and a global technological externality. When the home environment externality was

the dominating factor, the distribution of human capital and the wage differential between skilled and unskilled labor became polarized. Inequality enabled members of more highly educated segments of society to overcome forces of a low, stable, steady state equilibrium and to increase investment in human capital. As such investment increases and “trickles down” to the less educated segments of society via technological progress in production, the return to skill improves, and investment in human capital becomes more beneficial to members of all segments of society.

Finally, correcting for the conceptual unsuitability of many indicators of institutional quality, both political and social, Glaeser et al. (2004) show that human capital investment between 1960 and 2000 was a robust predictor of economic growth independently of institutional development and that institutional improvement follows economic growth. Equally important, findings of this cross national study indicated that the key human capital externality was not technological, but political: courts and legislators replaced guns. These institutional improvements in turn brought about greater security of property and economic growth.

SEE ALSO: Economic Development; Economic Sociology; Neoclassical Economic Perspective; Educational Attainment; Educational Inequality; Educational and Occupational Attainment; Institutionalism; Rational Choice Theory (and Economic Sociology)

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educational attainment

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Educational attainment refers to the highest level of formal education completed by the members of a population. Because national systems of education differ greatly from one another, the measurement of educational attainment is typically restricted to education completed in the country where the education was received (Siegel & Swanson 2004: 220), although researchers have developed various metrics to translate levels of completed schooling across countries (Kerckhoff & Dylan 1999). Educational attainment is sometimes recorded as the number of years of schooling that individuals have completed, but is more often measured as the highest grade or highest level completed. The distinction between years of schooling and highest level completed is particularly important in highly schooled and highly economically developed societies in which primary and secondary schooling are virtually universal. Moreover, in highly economically

developed societies distinctions at the upper levels of the educational distribution are of more social consequence than are distinctions expressed simply in years of schooling.

Educational attainment is a measure of the *stock* of education in a population (Duncan 1968). It is useful to distinguish educational attainment from various measures of the *flow* of education through a population. The most common measures of flow are school enrollment and educational progression. Educational attainment also differs from educational achievement, which pertains to various kinds of cognitive and analytic skills acquired in school, and literacy, a more judgmental measure of the distribution through a population of proficiency in reading and writing.

A difficulty in measuring educational attainment is that there is no fixed age at which individuals permanently sever their participation in formal schooling. The inclusion of individuals who have not yet completed their education in the calculation of the educational attainment of a population systematically underestimates the overall level of educational attainment. Because of this, the measurement of educational attainment must specify a lower age boundary in order to include only those who are most likely to have completed their education. Age 25 is a quite standard cut off for this purpose, but even this definition can become problematic as increasing shares of the population continue their education later in the life course and as educational re entry becomes more common.

The US Census Bureau began to measure educational attainment in the 1940 census by asking about the highest grade of schooling that the respondent had attended and completed. It maintained that practice through the 1980 census. Because this conceptualization of educational attainment failed to provide data on the degrees earned by respondents to the census (in particular, post secondary degrees), in 1990 the Bureau began to ask about the highest level of education completed. This change from years of education to levels of education had important implications for charting historical trends in the educational attainment of the population. Specifically, it is no longer possible to use census data to calculate the mean and the

median number of years of completed schooling in the population. Demographers generally regard this as an acceptable tradeoff for the greater precision and timeliness afforded by the new measurement procedure (Kominski & Siegel 1993).

The US Census Bureau publishes an annual report on the educational attainment of the population using data collected in the Current Population Survey. This administration of the CPS was once known as the Annual Demographic Survey, or more commonly the March Supplement. It is now entitled the Annual Social and Economic Supplement (ASEC).

The educational attainment of the American population has risen steadily since the mid nineteenth century. This upward trend was especially rapid in the twentieth century. The US attained virtually universal primary education before the end of the 1800s, near universal secondary education a half century later, and mass higher education not long after that (Walters 2000). The story is not simply one of uninterrupted growth in educational attainment. The trend line has shown some fluctuations, not all sociodemographic groups have participated equally in the growth of attainments, and there are recently signs of decelerating or even reversed growth. Still, the enormous growth of the educational attainment of the American population has been of unquestioned social, cultural, and political economic significance (Goldin 1998).

The US has historically been a world leader in the mass provision of opportunities for educational attainment, but the growth of educational attainment has been a worldwide phenomenon. This growth has often been rapid and dramatic. An important series of publications by Meyer and his colleagues have characterized the global expansion of formal education as "the world educational revolution" (Meyer et al. 1977).

Analysts of social stratification have regularly regarded educational attainment as pivotal to modern systems of social stratification. As conceptualized in Blau and Duncan's classic *The American Occupational Structure* (1967), opportunities for educational attainment are unequally allocated across several fundamental socioeconomic dimensions. Varying levels and

types of educational attainment are in turn crucial in allocating people into unequally rewarded positions in socioeconomic hierarchies.

Key to this simple model of social stratification is the distinction between ascription and achievement. Ascription (or ascribed status) refers to individual and aggregate level characteristics over which the individual has no control. Many of these have been hypothesized and empirically demonstrated to influence educational attainment. These include such factors as race, socioeconomic background, and sex. In contrast, achievement (or achieved status) includes those factors that are more under the control of the individual, such as effort, motivation, or ambition. These too have been shown to have significant impacts on educational attainment.

In the US, the relative importance of different ascribed characteristics has changed over time. For many years, girls and women received significantly less educational attainment than did boys and men. More recently, however, American females are receiving higher levels of educational attainment than are males at all but the very highest levels of the educational system. In many cases, such as many professional post secondary programs leading to remunerative careers, even these barriers are beginning to fall. The transformation of female educational disadvantage into female advantage is evident in many other countries as well.

The gap in educational attainment between white Americans and African Americans, which was once extremely large, has narrowed significantly. On some measures of educational attainment African Americans have even reached relative equality with the white population. Adducing many of the same social and historical factors that contributed to the decline in the educational gap between males and females, Gamoran (2001) anticipates that the racial gap in educational attainment too will continue to decline. At the same time, some Asian American groups have among the highest levels of educational attainment in the nation, while the gap in educational attainment between many Hispanic and Latino populations and the majority population has narrowed more slowly.

On the other hand, the role of socioeconomic status or class (including such indicators as parental education levels, neighborhood

poverty, parental occupational status, and family income) as a determinant of educational attainment has shown little sign of weakening over time and considerable evidence of persistence. The ability of researchers to understand the critical role of socioeconomic background as a determinant of educational attainment was greatly enhanced with the introduction and elaboration of the influential "transition model" of school continuation decisions developed by Mare (1980, 1995). This model drew attention to the continuing importance of social class at transitions from one level of the educational system to another, processes that were often overlooked under earlier linear conceptualizations of the determinants of educational attainment.

Not all of the factors that have been demonstrated to lead to variations in educational attainment are straightforward measures of ascription or achievement. Many researchers have assessed the role of cultural capital and social capital as important determinants of educational attainment (Coleman 1988). Cultural capital refers to culturally valued resources and dispositions that are held disproportionately by the more highly educated. Cultural capital need not reflect job skills or productive capacity in any significant way, but can nonetheless lead to enhanced life chances because of its association with the culture of privileged and elite classes. By social capital, analysts draw attention to how the placement of individuals in supportive social networks can provide educational advantages beyond those offered by an individual's own skills and talents.

While educational attainment is itself an unequally distributed and scarce social good, in a similar way the possession of educational credentials is a principal means by which status, prestige, and other aspects of life chances are distributed in modern societies. Higher levels of educational attainment are statistically associated with all manner of positive social outcomes. Relative to less educated individuals, more highly educated people have greater access to high paying and prestigious work with which they are more satisfied. They are generally in better health and display more healthy behaviors. Further, more educated people exhibit higher levels of community and civic participation. These findings should be

interpreted with care. In part, the benefits of educational attainment are due to the socializing effects of education itself, in part they are due to the greater access to economic resources facilitated by educational attainment, and in part they arise from selection effects into advanced levels of education.

These generalizations about the salutary benefits of educational attainment are true at the aggregate levels of states, regions, and nations, as well as the individual level (Buchmann & Hannum 2001). In comparison with less educated nations, more educated nations are more economically prosperous, healthier, and politically open. Once again, questions of cause and effect need to be carefully considered.

SEE ALSO: Education, Adult; Educational Inequality; Educational and Occupational Attainment; Meritocracy; School Transitions; Status Attainment

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educational inequality

Yossi Shavit

In their classic study of stratification in the US, Blau and Duncan (1967) found that the effect of education on occupational attainment increased over time. They interpreted this to mean that America was becoming increasingly meritocratic. A meritocratic social system is one in which the attainment of desirable social rewards, such as good jobs, is determined by effort and ability rather than by inherited privilege. It is often assumed that the attainment of educational credentials requires both effort and ability and that education represents merit. However, educational attainment is also determined by social origin. An equally valid interpretation of Blau and Duncan's finding is that the intergenerational transmission of social privilege is increasingly mediated by education. The extent to which this is so is determined by the relative magnitude of two factors: the effects of social origin on educational attainment and the effect of education on occupational and economic attainments. Searching for a social system that is both meritocratic and egalitarian, researchers try to understand why there is a strong association between social origin and educational attainment and how to weaken it. This entry reviews the main determinants of educational attainment and of educational

inequality between social strata and between men and women. Sociologists attribute educational inequalities between strata to processes at work in families and the educational system.

FAMILY FACTORS

Ability, Encouragement, and Aspirations

The Wisconsin model is arguably the single most influential model of social stratification (Sewell et al. 1975). The model posits a chain of relationships between variables that affect educational and occupational attainment and begins by showing that there are substantial differences between social strata in students' scholastic ability. Next, it shows that both students' social origin and their ability affect their grades in school. The three groups of variables determine how much encouragement students receive from significant others (teachers, peers, and parents) regarding their future educational and occupational aspirations. Aspirations, in turn, affect students' ultimate educational and occupational attainments. However, the model explains only about 30 percent of the variance in educational attainment. This means that it explains a large part of the difference between people in educational attainment but also that most of the variance between them is due to other factors, such as luck, cultural differences between families, school differences, and more. The Wisconsin model has been replicated in many other countries.

Cultural Capital

Bourdieu (Bourdieu et al. 1977) has argued that school curricula reflect the codes and values of the dominant culture in society. He defined cultural capital as familiarity with these codes and values. The dominant culture is the culture of the privileged social strata. Children raised in these strata internalize the values of the dominant culture effortlessly and enjoy an advantage in the educational attainment process. In this way, the intergenerational transmission of cultural codes facilitates the reproduction of educational and social inequality between generations. These claims are cited often in studies of educational inequality, but

empirical data show that they overstate the extent to which cultural capital actually reproduces social inequality. Cultural capital is often measured by familiarity with highbrow cultural codes (the names of composers or painters) or by the frequency of participation in highbrow activities (visits to museums or classical concerts). Bourdieu's model expects to find rather strong correlations between these measures and school performance, but studies typically find weak ones. Recently, scholars like De Graaf et al. (2000) found that the main component of cultural capital that affects educational achievement is not the students' familiarity with highbrow culture or participation in it, but rather their exposure to books and reading at home. Children raised in affluent homes and whose parents are educated are more likely to benefit from the availability of books in the home and to do well in school. These findings are consistent with a large body of research showing that the home reading environment is important to the early acquisition of scholastic aptitude and reading and writing skills.

Family Size and Cohesion

There is a substantial body of research on the US and other developed countries showing that sibship (the number of one's brothers and sisters) is inversely related to children's cognitive ability and educational achievement. The resource dilution hypothesis suggests that children raised in small families benefit from a larger share, on average, of the families' resources, including parental attention which, in turn, enhances their cognitive development and educational attainment. The negative effect of family size is stronger when siblings are closely spaced because they draw on family resources simultaneously. The negative effects are weak when some siblings are old enough to contribute to the resource pool and can help in the development and education of younger ones (for a detailed exposition of this idea, see Zajonc & Markus 1975).

Studies on non western and some religious communities do not find a uniform negative effect of sibship size on achievements. For example, for Muslims living in Israel, students attending Catholic schools in the US, and

Orthodox American Jews the negative effect of sibship size on educational achievement is weak or even reversed. In these subpopulations, nuclear families are embedded in extended families or supportive communities whose assistance and resources mitigate the dilution effects of large sibships. Thus, whereas family size can be a liability in the educational attainment process, the social cohesion of extended families and communities is an important asset.

Social Capital in Families

Sociologists often refer to social cohesion of this kind as social capital, defined as the characteristics of one's social network (family, friends, etc.) that can facilitate the attainment of a goal (Coleman 1988). An important aspect of a family's social capital is family structure, namely whether or not both parents are present while the child is growing up. The educational achievements of children raised in two parent families are substantially higher than those of children raised in one parent families (McLanahan & Sandefur 1994). Research identifies three main reasons for this: first, single parent families, especially those headed by mothers, are economically disadvantaged; second, children raised by single parents receive less attention and guidance, on average, than those raised by two parents; and third, single parent families maintain a weaker social bond with the community and lack the social capital upon which other families can draw when in need.

Financial Resources

Children's educational attainment is also affected by their family's income because high income families can afford the direct and opportunity costs of education. The effects of family income on cognitive development and educational attainment are larger in the early ages (0–5) than in adolescence. Moreover, family income in childhood has a stronger effect on educational attainment at the secondary level than does contemporaneous family income (Duncan et al. 1998). This suggests that the effect of family income on educational attainment is mediated by developmental processes

rather than simply the ability to afford the costs of schooling. As Duncan and associates point out, preschool ability sets the stage for subsequent educational achievements, and children raised in poverty are less likely to develop the cognitive skills necessary for educational success.

And yet a recent study suggests that most research tends to underestimate the magnitude of the effect of financial resources on children's educational attainment. Conley (2001) compared the effects of current family income to the effect of the family's total wealth (including savings and home ownership) and found that the latter has a much stronger effect on American adolescents' likelihood to obtain a college education. Evidently, wealthy families can draw on their savings to pay for college expenses.

SYSTEMIC FACTORS

Most of the explained variance in students' educational achievements is due to individual and family characteristics of the kind discussed above. However, some variance is also explained by characteristics of the schools that students attend. Students benefit from attending small schools and from having a small student–teacher ratio in the classroom, as well as from attending schools that are attended by peers of privileged social origin. Two additional institutional characteristics of schools affect variance in educational achievement: curriculum organization and tracking, and the expansion of the educational system.

Organization of the Curriculum and Tracking

Fields of knowledge and school subjects are stratified by prestige. Although the hierarchy of subjects varies between societies, academic and scientific subjects usually enjoy higher prestige than utilitarian or nonscientific ones. Prestigious subjects are considered more difficult and deemed more suitable for able students who are likely to come from privileged families. The utilitarian and nonscientific subjects are offered to weaker students who often come from lower socioeconomic strata (Ayalon 1994). In most countries, success in prestigious subjects at the secondary school level is a prerequisite for

admission to selective colleges or universities. Therefore, curricular hierarchies play a role in the intergenerational reproduction of inequality of educational opportunity.

Most educational systems place students into distinct curricular tracks or streams. The most common distinction is between the academic tracks that teach the prestigious subjects and prepare students for higher education, and tracks that prepare them for immediate entry into the labor force. Track placement is determined largely by the students' prior achievements. But because student achievements are correlated with their socioeconomic origins, students from less privileged strata are more likely to attend non academic tracks; track placement, in turn, affects their subsequent educational attainment. Not surprisingly, academic track students are more likely to attend higher education and obtain lucrative jobs in the labor market. Thus, tracking transmits inequality between generations (Shavit 1990).

Expansion of Education

In recent decades, educational systems in most countries have expanded dramatically. In the 1950s and 1960s only about a third of children living in economically advanced countries completed upper secondary schools. This proportion has since increased sharply and now approaches 90 percent. Tertiary education in these countries expanded as well. In the 1960s higher education was attended by less than 20 percent of the relevant age group; by the 1990s attendance rate reached about 50 percent. Many policymakers believe that the expansion of education can reduce educational inequalities because expansion draws in adolescents of less privileged origin, raises their educational attainment, and reduces inequality between their education and that of the middle and upper classes. Scholars of social stratification are less optimistic. In the early 1980s, Mare (1981) developed a sophisticated model for analyzing educational stratification. The model views the educational attainment process as a sequence of transition points at which students and their families decide whether to continue to the next level or drop out. Their decisions are determined by variables representing the student

and family characteristics discussed above. Inequality of educational opportunity is measured as the effect of these variables on the odds of making the various transitions. The odds may decline at some transition points and increase or remain stable at others. Mare studied change in the stratification of education in the US during the first seven decades of the twentieth century. Although this was a period of dramatic educational expansion in America, the effects of social origin did not decline and even increased slightly. Replications of Mare's study in many countries, both industrialized and developing, produced similar results (Shavit & Blossfeld 1993). Several studies found exceptions to this pattern, but especially at lower educational levels where attendance rates of the privileged strata are approaching 100 percent. Any further expansion at these levels can only draw on the lower strata, among which attendance is not yet universal, and reduce inequality between strata in attendance rates.

Gender Gap in Education

Historically, when the rates of labor force participation by women were low, families preferred to invest resources in the education of their sons, which was viewed as an investment that would yield substantial income gains, rather than that of their daughters. Daughters were expected to function primarily in the private sphere: marry, bear children, and perform housework, activities not deemed to require an education above the very basic levels. The ensuing gender gap in education persisted for generations. Recently, this has changed dramatically. Women's educational levels have caught up and, in some countries, surpassed those of men (Bradley 2000). The equalization of gender differences in educational attainment is due to a pervasive change in the role of women in modern society. First, since the 1970s, there has been a global effort to promote norms of gender equality. Several international organizations, such as the United Nations, the World Health Organization, the World Bank, and the OECD, actively promote the status of women. Gender equality in education was identified as the primary mechanism by which women's status could be improved. Second, the expansion

of the public sector and the welfare state created demand for workers in service providing occupations. Third, the expanded provision of these services by the state played a double role: it relieved wives and mothers from some of their housework, and created jobs for them in the labor market. As a consequence, the labor force participation rates of women increased sharply.

While gender differences in access to higher education were eliminated and even reversed, differences between men and women in the type of institution and in fields of study remain. Women are still more likely than men to attend lower tier institutions such as two year or less prestigious colleges and are less likely to study the exact sciences and engineering. But these differences are also declining.

SEE ALSO: Capital: Economic, Cultural, and Social; Cultural Capital in Schools; Dropping Out of School; Educational Attainment; Educational and Occupational Attainment; Meritocracy; Opportunities for Learning; School Transitions; Schooling and Economic Success; Stratification and Inequality, Theories of; Tracking; Transition from School to Work

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educational and occupational attainment

Juanita M. Firestone and Richard J. Harris

Both educational and occupational attainments are important (and related) aspects of prestige differences in the United States as well as throughout the more developed and developing countries. Prestige is used as a measure of social status and therefore is a part of the broader social stratification system. Social status is viewed as a subjective concept, based on individuals' perceptions about lifestyles. Most of us are aware of differences in lifestyles based on styles of clothing, types (and numbers) of automobiles, value and location of housing, and so on. The point is that differences in occupation

and education combine to produce differences in income, which then allow individuals and families to live a certain lifestyle. We then attach differences in social value to the different lifestyles; some are awarded high standing in society, while others are deemed to have little or no value. These judgments are played out within the contexts of gender, race/ethnicity, and class, and have been remarkably constant over time (at least since 1947 in the US) and across a wide variety of countries.

OCCUPATIONAL PRESTIGE

Most individuals place a lot of emphasis on a person's occupation when assessing prestige. For example, we make systematic judgments about a person's lifestyle based on whether we know they are a blue collar or a white collar worker. Sociologists often use prestige scores to rank occupations, which hypothetically could fall along a continuum from a low score of zero to a high score of 100. However, results for research generating occupational prestige scores indicate they rarely drop below 20 or above 80. Prestige scores, which are based on averages of individual scores, remain fairly stable over long periods of time and across different subgroups in the population. The lowest ranked occupations tend to be manual laborers (e.g., janitor, housepainter, garbage collector, housecleaner) or basic sales (supermarket cashier, furniture sales clerk, shoe/clothing sales clerk) or office (file clerk, telephone solicitor) positions. Medium prestige jobs include skilled manual (electrician, plumber, mechanic) or office (secretary, bookkeeper, bank teller, postal clerk) jobs. The highest prestige jobs are professional (judge, physician, professor, lawyer, registered nurse) or managerial (hospital administrator, general manager, accountant), which are typically ranked by level of expertise or responsibility. Importantly, there is a lot of within group variation as well, thus the prestige of neurosurgeons is much higher than that of general practitioners, although both fall in the highest prestige range. Interestingly, while specific types of occupations may vary, especially in developing countries (e.g., from a high score for chief of state to a low score for gatherer), the standard occupational prestige scale is

extremely highly correlated with prestige hierarchies of other countries, indicating similar prestige rankings cross nationally.

Gender and Occupational Prestige

In recent decades women's entry into the paid labor force has accelerated, especially among those with young children and babies. One important characteristic has been associated with the entry of larger percentages of women in the labor market – occupational segregation. Women have been segregated into a relatively small number of occupations, which are associated with stereotypes about feminine skills (e.g., secretaries, cashiers, hairdressers, nurses, elementary and kindergarten teachers). On the one hand, women's increasing labor force experience along with the decline in blue collar employment is creating a slow decline in occupational segregation. On the other hand, even when employed in higher prestige occupations, most women are concentrated in three fields: nursing, teaching, and social work. Thus, women's occupational profiles remain different from men's, and the average prestige scores for women's jobs within categories are lower than those for men. This is especially true in the technical/sales and skilled blue collar jobs. At the professional/executive level, the prestige scores are virtually identical, though there are still substantial differences in earnings.

These general patterns are consistent across different countries in spite of differences in the types of jobs available in developing compared to more developed countries. Cross culturally, stereotypes related to differences in job related skills between men and women remain strong. For example, students in various countries (both developing and more developed) identify managerial skills in stereotypical masculine terms. Furthermore, differences in career advancement of men and women are affected by the fact that differences in levels of career ambition vary according to national values. In many developing countries, career aspirations for women are optional at best and resisted strongly at worst. In the latter case, women are prevented by custom or policy from attaining the requisite skills to work in high prestige occupations.

Race and Occupational Prestige

Changes in race relations in the United States, along with anti discrimination legislation and equal opportunity and affirmative action programs, created dramatic changes in the occupational distribution of blacks over the years. For example, based on looking at the 10 highest and lowest ranked occupations in 1940, almost 80 percent of black workers were concentrated in the four lowest ranked categories, but by 1980 about 70 percent of black workers were in the upper six categories. In spite of these dramatic changes, blacks are still underrepresented at the top of the occupational hierarchy and overrepresented at the bottom, especially among service workers, which remained in 2000 the largest single black occupational category, as it had been in 1940. Recent occupational shifts (fewer blue collar jobs, growth of white collar jobs) have had a negative impact on black workers, thus in relative terms many young blacks have lost ground compared to whites because of higher unemployment and underemployment rates.

In the world context, racial differences in occupational prestige are often associated with the extent to which members of different races or ethnicities are perceived as outsiders with alien values. Thus "guest workers" or immigrants of different races and who exhibit other differences in cultural values (e.g., language, dress, religion) may be relegated to lower prestige jobs or to specific types of occupations (diamond cutters, sailors, traders). In both cases, members of races considered outside the typical citizenry are segregated occupationally based on stereotypes about their race; however, the latter groups are more likely to become integrated into a larger society.

Ethnicity and Occupational Prestige

Because of high birth rates and immigration rates, Hispanics as a group (including various subgroups, e.g., Mexican, Cuban, South/Central American, Puerto Rican) have become the largest minority group in the United States. As a result, Hispanics will become an increasing share of the future labor market. While the

various subgroups of Hispanics have different labor force characteristics (education level, experience, skills), one issue that may impact their position in the occupational hierarchy is English proficiency. This may be particularly true for recent immigrants, who may become underemployed or unemployed if they do not have the English proficiency to get and hold a professional or managerial position. The changes in the US occupational structure which positively impacted African Americans have had similar impacts on Hispanics. Thus, the percentage of Hispanics in higher prestige jobs has increased since 1980, although the largest percentage of Mexican origin workers are still concentrated among operators, fabricators, laborers, and lower level sales clerks. On average, the prestige of Hispanics in the US remains lower than that of white, non Hispanic workers.

As with different racial groups, intercultural encounters within countries can produce situations where individuals are stereotyped as incapable of working in higher prestige jobs. While it may be possible to learn superficial aspects of a different culture within a short period of time, it may be more difficult to absorb underlying values, especially if they are radically different from one's own culture. Thus, even foreigners who attempt to fit in to a new culture may be viewed with suspicion. One way of controlling suspicious individuals can be to limit their ability to climb the occupational ladder and achieve greater economic success.

EDUCATIONAL ATTAINMENT

The average education level of Americans is increasing, so that most adults in the US have a high school degree, and between 25 percent and 75 percent of individuals attend a college or university, depending on the economic background of their families. Thus, 25 percent even of individuals from lower socioeconomic circumstances attend at least a community college. In a general sense, everyone seems to understand that staying in school until you complete a degree pays off economically. With some exceptions, people with higher levels of education tend to have higher status jobs and earn more income. Sociological research indicates that

education does pay a dividend for all categories of workers. However, the less educated, those with fewer or outdated skills, and those with less experience may be losing ground with respect to wages. Research demonstrates considerable variation in wages within education levels (e.g., those with a high school degree, BA degree, or higher level degree) based on group memberships (e.g., gender, race, ethnicity). As with respect to occupational attainment, women and race/ethnic minorities tend to be on the lower end of statuses and wages within those groupings.

While a college education has a positive impact on individuals' prestige and earnings, access to college remains unequal based on the socioeconomic background of students. Graduation rates also vary based on group membership of students. In 2000, more than half of 18 to 24 year olds from families in the top income quartile completed college degrees, but only 1 percent of those from families in the bottom half of the income distribution completed degrees. The black-white difference in completing a college degree is smaller than in the past, but remains large.

Comparing educational attainment across different countries is a difficult task because of the heterogeneity of educational systems, particularly vocational and non academic training across various countries. Some researchers argue that it may not yet be possible to compare quantity of education (e.g., years, levels) across nations, but rather some system measuring quality of education would be preferable. One such process suggests assessing the differences in earnings or employment of educated workers that are attributable to the individuals' schooling. To accomplish this, a labor income based measure is created by weighting different segments of the workforce by the ratio of earnings at different levels of education. An alternative approach uses estimated rates of return to education rather than duration of schooling as weights in creating a comparative measure. The variations in available estimates for different countries highlight how such comparative measures can be sensitive to political assumptions about the social benefits of education, opportunity costs of missed wages, and other cultural values.

Gender and Educational Attainment

In recent decades the educational attainment of men and women has narrowed considerably. While the gap in college degrees between men and women has narrowed, the types of degrees earned vary by the sex of the individual. Men tend to earn degrees in fields associated with higher statuses and higher wages. In addition, educational attainment yields greater economic returns to males than to females. A part of this disparity is due to the occupational segregation discussed earlier. In the past, another part was due to women's intermittent labor force participation, when they were likely to move in and out of the labor force for family reasons (pregnancy, young children, husband's job moved elsewhere). Increasingly, maintaining a middle or upper middle class standard of living requires two incomes, and women's labor force participation is becoming more continuous over time.

In spite of a decreasing gap in male-female educational attainment, the gender gap in earnings remains larger than the race/ethnic gap. Some argue that at least a portion of the remaining gap among women of different race or ethnic groups results from minority women's greater likelihood of becoming single parent householders, being out of the labor force, living in low income neighborhoods, and facing various forms of discrimination. The gap between educational attainment of minority and white women leads to the continuing problem of double jeopardy. In sociology, double jeopardy refers to the compounding effects of being in two different minority groups (e.g., black and female or Hispanic and female).

Historically, Hispanic women have had significantly lower levels of education than non-Hispanic women and lower than all groups of men. Early explanations of this difference focused on an idealized model of motherhood supposedly common among Hispanics that supported a patriarchal system that devalued female educational attainment in favor of becoming a wife and mother. Recent data suggest that increases in female headed households and marginal economic circumstances among many Hispanic groups have led to increasing awareness of the need to complete more years of education. As with other groups of women,

research indicates that Hispanic women do not receive the same returns for increasing levels of education. Language difficulties would likely compound these negative impacts.

Race and Educational Attainment

Sociological studies indicate that the economic penalty of race has declined since the 1960s – occupational mobility has increased, as has movement toward wage parity. These differences vary a lot based on the age of the individual. For example, among younger workers with college degrees, race disparities in occupational status and earnings have decreased considerably. A college degree moves black wages closer to parity with whites, although black incomes do not attain equality with whites. As noted earlier, however, access to education and completion rates for college degrees fluctuate across racial groups. Thus, to the extent that many blacks remain segregated from whites in inner cities and income disadvantaged areas, their access to the same educational and occupational opportunities as whites is limited.

Ethnicity and Educational Attainment

Past research has focused on differences in the ways Hispanics invest in higher education. Because of lower income and high poverty levels, many Hispanics attend community colleges or trade schools rather than attending universities or four year colleges. Because they often are also employed to support family needs, the opportunity costs associated with attending a university can be higher. Additionally, the increase in tuition costs and the lack of access to financial aid have impacted those from lower income families dramatically. In combination, these mean that Hispanics are more likely to delay a college education, drop out of college, or attend a community college, all of which can have a negative impact on educational and, as a result, occupational status.

CURRENT STATE OF RESEARCH

Changes in modern society have created opportunities for well educated professionals,

technicians, and managers. Alternatively, there have been important losses of well paid blue collar jobs because of the decline in manufacturing. Increases in the occupational service sector are associated with a polarization of the occupational status structure. On the one hand, opportunities for higher status jobs such as hospital administrators, medical technicians, accountants, hotel managers, and computer specialists have increased. On the other hand, there has been a commensurate increase in low status jobs such as fast food workers, janitors, and hospital orderlies. In addition, the distribution of individuals within occupational classifications is unequal, with women and race and ethnic minorities to a greater extent located in the lower status positions within classifications.

Along with this process, access to the college education needed to enter the high status occupations remains unequal. For example, the percentage of students enrolling in universities is much lower for race/ethnic minority groups and for individuals from the lowest income levels. Even among those who attend college, the background characteristics of students vary based on sex and race/ethnicity, and impact the type of degree attained. Thus, white males tend to receive degrees associated with higher status jobs (engineering, medical research), while women receive degrees associated with pink collar positions (human services, social work, elementary teaching) and race/ethnic minorities receive degrees associated with lower occupational status (general manager, office manager).

Cross nationally, changes include stronger focus on educating the populations of more developed countries. In the transition from rural to urban existence, education plays an increasing role for access to occupational positions. One interesting aspect of this process links directly both to the occupational structure of developing countries and to the occupational structure of more developed countries like the US. Outsourcing may mean an even stronger focus on education and professional skills in more developed countries, which could help stem the tide of highly educated and or skilled natives seeking to immigrate to places that pay better wages. Labeled by many as the “brain drain,” selective out migration has depleted the ranks of better educated individuals, especially in countries like India and Taiwan that are in

the process of becoming highly developed. Less developed countries still lag behind or may link education to sex, so that only boys are provided educational opportunities, or education may be linked to upholding traditional cultural values rather than creating an educated populace (e.g., Middle Eastern countries).

CONCLUSION

The occupational structures of the US and the more developed countries in the world have changed from one in which most workers were employed in predominantly goods producing jobs to one in which most are employed in service sector jobs. This change has produced a considerable amount of polarization with respect to occupational prestige, because it creates a demand both for professional jobs where high educational credentials are expected and for those that can be filled by individuals with limited educational credentials.

Educational status has increased along with this change in the occupational structure, although the changes have been non linear. The greatest gains in status in the US have gone to those with post high school degrees, especially those from prestigious institutions. Thus the absolute worth of some educational credentials may be devalued, creating a situation where individuals are underemployed given their educational attainment. For example, some argue that in the US at least, a bachelor's degree has the same value in today's labor market that a high school degree had ten years ago. Similarly, a master's degree today has the same value today as a bachelor's degree had ten years ago. In more developed countries, the greatest gains in status are associated with the skills that are utilized by multinational firms for outsourcing.

Changes in occupational and educational attainment are further impacted by gender, race/ethnicity, and class. Women, race/ethnic minorities, and those from lower income groups are more likely to be undereducated, have degrees from less prominent institutions, be employed in lower prestige occupations, or be underemployed relative to their educational credentials, contributing to increasing stratification within American society. In less developed countries, minority group status, whether

based on religion, sex, race, or ethnicity, still has the largest impacts on educational and occupational attainment.

SEE ALSO: Class; Education, Adult; Education and Economy; Educational Attainment; Educational Inequality; Ethnic and Racial Division of Labor; Income Inequality and Income Mobility; Lifestyle; Occupational Mobility; Occupational Segregation; Outsourcing; Status Attainment; Stratification, Gender and; Stratification, Race/Ethnicity and; Women, Economy and

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effect sizes

Bruce Thompson

Sociologists historically have emphasized statistical significance testing as the *sine qua non* of empirical research. Statistical significance tests yield a $p_{\text{CALCULATED}}$ value that estimates "the probability (0 to 1.0) of the sample statistics, given the sample size, and assuming the sample was derived from a population in

which the null hypothesis (H_0) is exactly true” (Thompson 1996).

Effect sizes, on the other hand, are indices of practical significance that may be used either in place of, or as a complement to, statistical significance tests (Kirk 1996; Thompson 2006). Effect sizes quantify the extent to which sample results diverge from the expectations specified within the null hypothesis. Thus, if sample results exactly correspond to the null hypothesis (e.g., for the null hypothesis that the medians of three groups are equal, and the sample medians of the three groups are all 12.5), the effect size is zero. Effect sizes deviate further from zero as the sample results diverge increasingly from the null hypothesis (Thompson 2006a).

Across disciplines as diverse as economics, education, psychology, and the wildlife sciences, the frequency of published criticisms of this reliance has grown exponentially over the last few decades (Anderson et al. 2000). Indeed, some of these critics have argued that statistical significance tests should be banned from journals. As an example of the tenor of some of these views, Schmidt and Hunter (1997) can be cited as arguing that “statistical significance testing retards the growth of scientific knowledge; it never makes a positive contribution.” Similarly, Rozeboom (1997) suggests that “null hypothesis significance testing is surely the most bone headedly misguided procedure ever institutionalized in the rote training of science students . . . It is a sociology of science wonderment that this statistical practice has remained so unresponsive to criticism.”

During this same period, advocacy for the use of effect sizes as the basis for result interpretation has grown steadily. The 1994 *Publication Manual* of the American Psychological Association, used by more than 1,000 journals, first mentioned effect sizes and “encouraged” their use. The 2001 fifth edition of the *Manual* went further and described the failure to report effect sizes as a “defect.” Because these admonitions are easily lost within the book length *Manual*, the editors of 24 journals have made effect size reporting an explicit manuscript requirement. Included are the flagship journals of two associations that are both received by more than 50,000 members. Indeed, as

Fidler (2002) recently observed: “Of the major American associations, only all the journals of the American Educational Research Association have remained silent on all these issues.”

There are dozens of different effect size statistics (Kirk 1996). Common examples are Cohen’s d , Glass’s delta, η^2 , ω^2 , R^2 , adjusted R^2 .

Some effect sizes are in a standardized score metric (e.g., Cohen’s d , Glass’s delta). Other effect sizes are in a squared, variance accounted for metric (e.g., η^2 , R^2).

Some effect sizes are *not* corrected for the estimated influences of sampling error (e.g., η^2 , R^2). On the other hand, for some effect sizes adjustments are made for estimated sampling error influences (e.g., ω^2 , adjusted R^2). These types of estimates will differ less as (1) sample size is larger, (2) the number of measured variables is smaller, and (3) the true population effect size is larger. Effects are also attenuated by poor score reliability.

Because there are so many effect sizes, with more constantly under development, authors should be expected to note explicitly which effect size is being reported (Vacha Haase & Thompson 2004). Such reporting also facilitates the use of conversion formulas with which effect sizes can be converted into alternative effects (Thompson 2006b).

The correct use of effect sizes is not as widely understood as might be hoped (Thompson 2002). Many researchers tend to rely on Cohen’s benchmarks for “small,” “medium,” and “large” effects as regards result typicality. However, as Thompson (2001) noted, “if people interpreted effect sizes [using fixed benchmarks] with the same rigidity that α [i.e., the probability of a Type I error] = .05 has been used in statistical testing, we would merely be being stupid in another metric.” At least in relatively established areas of research, “there is no wisdom whatsoever in attempting to associate regions of the effect size metric with descriptive adjectives such as ‘small,’ ‘moderate,’ ‘large,’ and the like” (Glass et al. 1981).

Instead, effect sizes should be interpreted by *explicit, direct* comparisons of effects with those reported in the related prior literature. These comparisons, unlike statistical significance tests, inform judgments regarding result replicability.

SEE ALSO: Hypotheses; Reliability; Statistical Significance Testing

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elder abuse

Chris Phillipson

Recognition of abuse as a feature of older people's lives has been present in research and social policy for at least three decades. Mistreatment of elderly people has, however, had a much longer history. At worst, it has taken the form of outright persecution of those who, lacking resources of any kind, were thrown upon the mercy of their fellow citizens. At another level, mistreatment has been expressed through inter-generational tensions, for example during periods of economic recession as families struggle with the pressures arising from meeting the care needs of older as well as younger generations (Stearns 1986). At the same time, the meanings attached to, and the concerns expressed about, mistreatment of the old have varied from generation to generation. It is only very recently (in historical terms) that attempts have been made to translate a generalized concern about the suffering of the old into a more precisely defined concept of abuse. This transition has not been without difficulty, with complex issues raised about distinctions regarding the experience of abuse among different age groups, between various types of abuse, and the reasons for abusive behavior.

In the UK, the first discussions about elder abuse occurred in the mid 1970s, although no systematic research on the topic was completed until the early 1990s. Thereafter, there was a significant growth of interest, with research reviews and surveys (Ogg & Bennett 1992), the development of pressure groups (notably Action on Elder Abuse), and guidelines designed to protect vulnerable adults (e.g., Department of Health 2002).

Among researchers and practitioners there has been extensive debate about the precise nature of abuse and neglect, with a range of definitions circulating in the literature. Following the work of Wolf and Pillemer (1989), the main elements of elder abuse are generally agreed to comprise:

- *Physical abuse*: the infliction of physical harm or injury, including physical coercion, sexual molestation, and physical restraint.

- *Psychological abuse*: the infliction of mental anguish.
- *Financial abuse*: the illegal or improper exploitation and/or use of funds and resources.
- *Active neglect*: the refusal or failure to undertake a caregiving obligation (*including* a conscious and intentional attempt to inflict physical or emotional distress).
- *Passive neglect*: the refusal or failure to fulfill a caretaking obligation (*excluding* a conscious and intentional attempt to inflict physical or emotional distress).

Glendenning (1997) concluded from his review that a number of uncertainties still surrounded definitions of elder abuse. These he identified as (1) the relationship between domestic and institutional abuse; (2) the issue of whether elder abuse can be clearly differentiated from the abuse of other adults; and (3) the relationship between neglect and other forms of abuse.

A limited number of studies have been carried out attempting to provide estimates of the prevalence (total number of cases) and incidence (new cases) of abuse and neglect. The first major prevalence study was the Boston study of Pillemer and Finkelhor (1988), which involved interviews with 2,000 older people and focused on three types of maltreatment: physical abuse, verbal aggression, and neglect. The study found that slightly more than 3 percent of the population aged 65 plus had been mistreated: 20 cases per 1,000 were physically mistreated; 11 per 1,000 were psychologically abused; and 4 per 1,000 were neglected. The authors estimate that if a national survey produced similar results, such numbers would represent almost 1 million people in the US.

A UK survey with a nationally representative sample conducted in 1992 by Ogg and Bennett (1992) reported on results from interviews with almost 600 people aged 65 and over, as well as 1,366 adult members of households in regular contact with a person of pensionable age. The study focused on older people's experience of physical, verbal, and financial abuse with family members and relatives. Approximately 5 percent of older people (60 plus) had experienced psychological (verbal) abuse, and 2 percent

reported physical or financial forms of abuse. Adults in contact with elderly people were asked whether they had recently found themselves "shouting at, insulting or speaking roughly to them or pushing, slapping, shoving or being rough with them in any other way." Responses indicated verbal abuse of older people running at 9 percent, but a lower rate of physical abuse (less than 1 percent).

The most detailed survey to date has been the American National Elder Abuse Incidence Study (NEIS) conducted in 1994–8, which focused on abuse and neglect of older people 60 years and over living in non institutionalized settings. The objective of the study was to collect reports of a random sample of cases of abuse and neglect occurring within a specified time period that could be weighted to represent annual estimates of *incidence* for the nation as a whole (Thomas 2000). Findings identified 450,000 older people experiencing abuse and/or neglect in domestic settings; taking account of self neglect increased the figure to 551,000. Of these, women were abused at a higher rate than men; the very elderly (80 plus) stood out as the most vulnerable age group; and perpetrators were most likely to be adult children and spouses.

In general, studies have found that risk of abuse appears to be higher for those older people living with someone and who have problems linked to mental or physical incapacity. Perpetrators are invariably presented as experiencing stress and/or social isolation. An under researched area concerns abuse and neglect of older people in residential care homes. McCreadie and Tinker (2003) cite research in 57 residential and nursing homes in the US which found that 10 percent of staff admitted to at least one act of physical abuse in the preceding year, with excessive restraint as the most frequently recorded form. Staff reported a very much higher rate of verbal abuse in comparison to physical abuse.

Attempts to define and map the extent of elder abuse indicate that it should not be viewed as a single, monolithic phenomenon, but that it takes a variety of forms in different settings and in different kinds of relationships. Victims and perpetrators exhibit a variety of characteristics depending on the nature of the

abuse. From a sociological perspective, elder abuse must be located across a number of levels, including familial, institutional, and societal. Research has tended to focus on the first of these, drawing on models of family violence. But institutional settings such as residential homes are also important and may generate different types of abuse and neglect. Finally, it is important to acknowledge the extent to which abusive situations are themselves socially created, through poverty, inadequate community care, and agism within society. Informal care and family care in particular may be affected by inequality in later life. The tendency has been to focus on the influence of “family pathology” in creating certain types of abuse. But highlighting the role of individual families ignores wider issues about the labels attached to older people and the resources available to them to resist mistreatment. Attention to these broader issues is vital for a proper understanding of the range of factors influencing abuse and neglect in old age.

SEE ALSO: Aging and Social Support; Elder Care; Family Conflict; Gerontology; Gerontology; Key Thinkers

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elder care

Norah Keating

Elder care is assistance provided to a senior because of that senior's chronic health problem or disability. Tasks include household work, indoor and outdoor home maintenance, banking and financial management, personal care, and care management (Keating et al. 1999). The term has been part of the gerontology lexicon for many years. Its origins lie in the description of the tasks provided by formal or paid caregivers (i.e., nurses or home support workers) to seniors with chronic illnesses such as dementia. More recently, the term has also been used to describe family members and friends who care for frail older adults. In contrast to formal caregivers, their care is called informal. Tasks done by these formal and informal caregivers are not unique and may be provided to younger adults as well. While adults over age 65 are considered seniors, in contemporary discussion elder care denotes assistance to those who are very old. In developed countries, onset of age related chronic illnesses is prevalent after age 75 and most people in residential (nursing home) settings are over age 80.

Formal and informal caregivers to frail seniors differ in a number of ways. Formal caregivers have an agency-client relationship based on an agreement to provide services, most often for pay. The services they provide in community settings are discrete, based on the mandate of the organization and time limited. In residential settings services are provided to support the health and daily living needs of frail older adults; in these settings employees are more likely to provide a variety of tasks. In contrast, family members and

friends provide care because of the personal history that exists between giver and recipient – one that is based on kinship, other affective ties, or a longstanding relationship. These care givers spend most time on household tasks and personal care that help keep seniors at home. If the senior is placed in residential care, their tasks shift toward care management, which includes monitoring and managing formal care and visiting (Keefe & Fancey 2000).

Kinship ties make family members more obliged to help; spouses and adult children are the most common family caregivers, though more distant kin such as nieces, nephews, and grandchildren also assist. About 20 percent of informal caregivers are friends and neighbors who are most likely to provide tasks other than personal care or to give high levels of assistance in the absence of kin (Wenger 1997).

Providing care to increasing proportions of frail seniors is one of the challenges of a worldwide trend toward population aging. A contemporary approach to this challenge is reducing the amount of residential and formal care and shifting toward an emphasis on community based care with high levels of family friend involvement (Ward Griffin & Marshall 2003). This approach has been called sending care home. Care in the community is seen as more responsive to the needs of frail seniors because it is provided in familiar settings by people who know them best. Yet community care has costs to informal caregivers who provide the majority of this care and whose work is likely to be unpaid, invisible to others, and who may receive little respite from their caregiving duties. Countries are engaged in debates about the ideal mix of public/family friend elder care services and have found different solutions. For example, Scandinavian countries have higher levels of publicly funded elder care services than do countries in Southern Europe. In community settings in Canada, informal caregivers provide substantially more assistance to frail seniors than formal caregivers, often caring for more than 2 years with multiple caregiving responsibilities for seniors and others. Almost one quarter of frail seniors receive no care from either formal or informal sources.

The terms elder care, care giving, and informal care are controversial. Elder care is viewed

as a useful concept in fostering recognition of the support needed by frail older adults and raising awareness of the activities and commitments of their caregivers. Yet elder care also has been criticized as having connotations of decline, disease, and illness which have become associated with aging (Sims Gould 2005). Though this is not always understood, elder care is meant to denote a response to frailty in old age, not to old age itself. The term caregiving is broader in scope and is useful in distinguishing everyday exchanges of support from tasks provided in response to a chronic health problem. Caring families who are concerned about their older family members are not the same as caregiving families who do things for their older relative because of that person's chronic health problem and in order to help the person maintain their independence. Yet the word caregiving is criticized because it seems unidirectional, placing frail seniors as passive recipients of tasks rather than as members of social groups which evolve, have complex interactions and provide to, as well as receive from, others in the group (Guberman & Maheu 1999). The term informal caregiver was created to provide a clear contrast to those whose caring work was designated as formal. Because of the intensity and duration of care, the term family/friend care increasingly is used as an alternative to informal, which can denote involvement that is casual, intermittent, or periodic.

New directions in understanding elder care are addressing some of these controversies. These include considering how groups of family members and friends organize to provide care and focusing on caregiving as a career rather than a static situation.

Current knowledge of elder care is based primarily on studies of dyads of individual family friend caregivers and care recipients. The term primary caregiver comes from this tradition. A single caregiver, normally a family member, is identified as the main provider of services to the frail senior. This approach, while convenient, has led to a view that elder care is the domain of women and close kin.

Researchers have begun to analyze how groups of people with social or kin ties to older adults organize themselves to provide care.

Networks differ on a number of dimensions, including network size, age and employment status composition, and proximity to the frail senior, as well as proportions of kin and friends and women and men (Litwin & Landau 2000). Men are just as likely to be part of elder care networks as women, but they do different tasks such as home maintenance, while women are most likely to do household work and personal care. Some networks have substantial proportions of friends and distant kin, as well as close kin such as adult children. Half of frail seniors with family friend care networks receive formal care as well.

Increasingly, elder care is seen as an evolution of previous patterns of family interaction. Viewing caregiving as part of family solidarity and interaction over time shows how elder care emerges from families' history of relationships with one another. It provides a dynamic view of how caregiving changes in response to health or other transitions (Martin Matthews 2000) and of which family members and friends can sustain support as it evolves into more intensive elder care. This information is important in intervening to support family friend caregivers. Families with a history of difficult relationships may not do well in the intense task and intimacy requirements of elder care. Their relatives may be better served by receipt of care from formal services.

Elder care research is moving toward more qualitative studies to create deeper understandings of the experiences of caregivers and of the frail seniors for whom they care. Understanding their experiences is providing better conceptualizations of how social networks evolve into care networks and which frail seniors are likely to be without care. Further methodological development will help move elder care research from dyads to networks so that the sharing of care can be better understood. Rural researchers have begun to examine how communities might differ in creating supportive environments for older adults with chronic illness. This research also needs to include a time dimension to track changes in supportiveness of communities over the lifetime of adults who live there. Analyses of the interactions of family friend, formal, and community networks

are needed to have a more complete view of the contexts and sources of elder care.

SEE ALSO: Age Prejudice and Discrimination; Aging, Demography of; Aging and Social Support; Elder Abuse; Gender, Aging and; Intergenerational Relationships and Exchanges; Later Life Marriage; Longevity, Social Aspects (the Oldest Old)

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elective affinity

J. I. (Hans) Bakker

The term elective affinity is currently associated with Weber's thesis concerning modern capitalism. A key aspect concerns the linkage, attraction, or inner "affinity" between "the Protestant Ethic/Protestant sects" and the "spirit" of modern capitalism. The idea of an affinity could be indicated by any two factors seeming to go together – to be "connected." Weber argues that there is an "inner affinity" (*innere Verwandtschaft*) between several things, especially between (1) a this worldly asceticism of sects (e.g., Quakers, Mennonites) and (2) the underlying "spirit" (*Geist*) of modern capitalism. Rather than hedonism, among Protestants there is an ascetic outlook, an estrangement from joy, as indicated by Benjamin Franklin's maxims.

The modifier "elective" is a vestige from Albertus Magnus, Scholasticism, Galileo, and the Latin of chemists like T. O. Bergman: *tractio electiva simplex* or *affinitas electiva*. The German term *Verwandtschaft* alone means "affinity," but the classical Latin phrase "elective affinity" had an impact on Goethe (Adler 1990). The term Elective Affinity (*Wahl verwandtschaft*) became a title for one of Goethe's romantic novels about marriage and "chemical" erotic attraction. Weber greatly admired Goethe and accepted an epistemology that stresses complexity rather than reductionism in the study of social action. Weber does not presuppose the same ontology as Goethe, but he used Goethe's word knowing his readers would understand the implicit referent. However, it gets lost in translation.

Many thinkers have been critical of Weber's thesis. Some critics have assumed that Weber's argument is a temporal, *causal* argument concerning the effects of an ethos on a material mode of production. Cohen (2002 29, 79–89) provides a thorough statement of the elective affinity argument in terms of "degree of similarity" and "rational effects," but concludes critically that "Weber's method of elective affinities can do nothing to sort out the causal ordering." The lack of possibility of a temporal causal argument is already emphasized in Weber's 1905 statement (Weber 2002a), published at the

same time as his famous methodological essay on "Objectivity." Weber was attempting to avoid positivistic causal argumentation of the sort characteristic of dialectical materialism. He was not attempting to replace a one sided materialist argument with an equally misleading one sided idealist argument. Since statistics had not yet been invented there was no universally agreed term to represent the notion of an "association" or "co relationship" between two factors or variables.

SEE ALSO: Dialectical Materialism; Weber, Max

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elementary theory

Pamela Emanuelson

Consistent with the classical theories of Marx, Weber, and Simmel, elementary theory is a multilevel theory of interaction in social relations. For example, elementary theory (hereafter ET) predicts power exercise, who benefits in

social relations such as exchange, coercion, and conflict. ET's actor level assumptions are (1) that actors pursue valued states called interests within social relations and (2) that an actor's interests can be inferred from the social relations and structures in which activity occurs. On a structural level, ET embeds social relations in social structures, which consist of two or more connected social relations. Social structures are in turn characterized by rules and restrictions, including but not limited to rules delimiting the maximum and minimum number of exchanges at a position and rules mandating the sequence of social interaction across a structure. ET makes predictions in light of the interrelations among relational and structural conditions and actor's interests.

Willer and Anderson (1981) demonstrated that ET predicts action in a diversity of social structures ranging from legal systems to political networks to several distinct community systems. Through an interactive process involving the relaxation of scope conditions, the discovery and conceptualization of new structural conditions, theory integration, and experimental testing, ET expanded beyond its original formulation in 1981 to predict action in increasingly complex structures. Major contributions made to the growth and development of ET include the discovery of new structural conditions (Patton & Willer 1990; Szmataka & Willer 1995; Corra & Willer 2002), the conceptualization of distinct network types (Markovsky et al. 1993; Lovaglia et al. 1995), and bridging between ET and status characteristics theory (Willer et al. 1997; Thye 2000). Recent growth in ET addresses the phenomenon of power at a distance (Willer 2003; Emanuelson & Willer 2003) and the effects of coalition formation on power exercise (Borch & Willer 2006). ET continues to grow with the goal of achieving a fully general theory of human behavior in relations and structures. To date, ET applies a modeling procedure, two principles, two laws, and seven structural conditions to predict action in relations embedded in structures.

MODELING PROCEDURE

ET uses network models to conceptualize relations in social structures. For instance, letters




Figure 1 Exchange relations.

such as A and B represent social actors. Paired signed arcs connecting social actors represent ing sanctions from social relations. The positive and negative signs at each end of the arcs represent the effect of transmitting or receiving. Signs at the receiving end of a sanction differentiate positive and negative sanctions. For instance, in Figure 1(a), the receipt of a positive sanction from A increases B's preference state but transmitting that positive sanction is costly and decreases A's preference state. Pairing negative and positive sanctions results in the three basic social relations, exchange (Fig. 1a), coercion (Fig. 1b), and conflict (Fig. 1c).

PRINCIPLES AND LAWS

Principle 1 defines ET's actor model. It asserts that *all social actors act to maximize their expected preference state alteration*. For instance, employees seek to maximize wages while employers seek to minimize wages. The first law is a payoff function. For employee *j*, Law 1 states that the payoff to *j* equals the value per unit times the quantity of money received plus the value per unit times the quantity of labor expended. Although Principle 1 accounts for employers' and employees' interests, determining the wage agreed upon requires a principle that applies to mixed motive relations.

In mixed motive relations both actors (1) prefer agreement to disagreement and (2) seek to increase their preference state at the other's expense. In the above example, when the payoffs to employer and employee are both positive, both benefit from continuing the relation, and the wage changes that increase the employers' benefit decrease the employees' benefit and conversely.

In this and other mixed motive relations, ET applies Law 2, resistance. An actor's resistance is the ratio of an actor's interests. The numerator represents the interest in receiving the best possible payoff while the denominator represents the interest in avoiding disagreement.

Assume that an employer breaks even when paying \$16/hour of work and assume further that dollar bills are not divisible. Then the maximum for an hour of work is \$15. If j , the employee, does not reach an agreement with the employer, j receives nothing. The employee's resistance takes into consideration the \$15 maximum benefit and the \$0 payoff at confrontation. The employer k 's resistance for both of his/her relations is determined in a like manner.

Principle 2 sets the resistance of two actors equal to each other. More specifically, Principle 2 states that *agreements occur at the point of equisistance for undifferentiated actors in a full information system.*

STRUCTURAL CONDITIONS

ET asserts that structural conditions affect relations embedded in social structures. The theory (1) identifies seven structural conditions and (2) offers point predictions for the conditions' effects on outcomes in exchange relations. For exclusion, the strongest, most widely studied, and tested structural condition, three distinct network types have been identified: strong, equal, and weak power. The three are discussed below. Other structural conditions are four connection types, null, inclusion, inclusion null, and inclusion exclusion, and two variants, hierarchy/mobility (a variant of exclusion) and ordering (a variant of inclusion).

A typology identifying the number of an actor's connections and the maximum and minimum number of relations in which an actor can benefit generates types of connection. For the employer example, N_k is the number of potential employees k can reach, M_k is the maximum number of employee relations in which k can benefit, and Q_k is the minimum number of those relations in which k must reach agreement to benefit from any one.

An actor is exclusively connected if $N > M$. For example, imagine that employer k can

reach j_1 , j_2 , and j_3 all of whom need employment. Employer k , however, needs and wants only one new employee. Since $N_k = 3$ and $M_k = 1$, two potential employees will necessarily be excluded and the relations are exclusively connected at k . When the j s have no alternative employment, the structure is strong power. Networks containing exclusive connection can also be weak or equal power.

Strong power networks are networks with one or more high power positions that are never excluded and two or more low power positions at least one of which is always excluded. Low power positions are connected only to high power positions. In strong power networks, high power positions gain maximally at the expense of low power positions. In the above example, the j s compete to be hired by k until the one j is hired to work for \$1/hour while k profits maximally at \$15.

Equal power networks are networks in which all positions are identically connected. It follows that either no position is excluded or all face an equal probability of exclusion. Since positions are identical, none has a structural advantage over any other and payoffs are equal to all.

Weak power networks include all networks in which power is produced by exclusion that are not equal or strong. In weak power networks, positions have different likelihoods of being included in an exchange relation. An actor's likelihood of being included is calculated under the assumption that actors seek exchange equally with all other connected actors. As network size increases, the difficulty of calculating likelihood values increases; however, an applet program for calculating likelihood values is available on the faculty web page of David Willer at the University of South Carolina.

The resistance likelihood assumption asserts that the actor's evaluations of best possible payoff and confrontation payoff vary with the likelihood of being included (Lovaglia et al. 1995). When V is the total value in the relation, the confrontation payoff ranges between 0 and $V/2$ and the best possible payoff ranges between $V/2$ and V .

Compound networks are composed of "sub networks," at least one of which is strong power: they break between the high power position(s) and position(s) which are never

excluded. All breaks occur at suboptimal relations, but not all suboptimal relations are breaks. A relation is suboptimal when exchange in it reduces the number of exchanges that can occur in the network. To predict the distribution of benefit, the first step is to find and remove breaks. Once they are found, the resulting subnetworks are solved individually.

Hierarchy/mobility is not a connection type: it is a variant of exclusion. Hierarchy/mobility occurs when each step up in a bureaucratic organization decreases the number of offices, increases the salary and perquisites associated with each office, and promotion is competitive. Hierarchy/mobility's competitive mobility centralizes power to the top. Applying hierarchy/mobility, the effects of discriminatory practices on organizations are apparent. For instance, if an organization discriminates against promoting women, no woman will have an interest in competing. Therefore, the power of upper offices over those women decreases and may also decrease over men because of reduced competition.

An actor is inclusively connected if more than one exchange is necessary to benefit: $Q > 1$. For example, if employer k needs both j_1 for specialized task s_1 , and j_2 for specialized task s_2 to benefit, k is inclusively connected. Actor k 's minimum number of exchanges is $Q_k = 2 > 1$. Inclusive connection increases the costs of confrontation for the inclusively connected actor, thereby decreasing that actor's power.

In inclusively connected networks, power differences increase sequentially. Assume that k exchanges with j_1 and j_2 in that order. The consequence of disagreement in the first exchange is that k and j receive nothing. Hence, the k - j_1 exchange is at equipower. In the k - j_2 exchange, k will lose the investment made in the first exchange if agreement between k and j_2 is not reached. In contrast, j_2 has invested in nothing and has a confrontation payoff of zero. k is less powerful than j . When $Q > 2$, across exchanges, the inclusively connected actor's investments increase, as does the potential cost of not completing the next necessary exchange. Consequently, the last position to exchange with the inclusively connected position is the most powerful.

Ordering is not a connection type: it is a variant of inclusion. An actor connected by

ordering must complete $Q > 1$ exchanges in a specified sequence. For example, ordering advantages gatekeepers. A gatekeeper controls access to valued goods that he or she does not own. For example, suppose that employer k has a secretary that determines which js k interviews. If the secretary is dishonest, he or she can demand fees for admittance to the valued interview. The power exercised by the secretary varies with the value of the interview to the interviewees.

By definition, an actor disadvantaged by ordering must complete exchanges in sequence; however, the incidence of power effects in the sequence is the reverse of the incidence found for inclusive connection. For ordering, the largest effect is in the first relation and decreases across exchanges until, in the last exchange, the power is equal. In the above example, the secretary is in the first relation and is powerful because he or she can block j 's valued outcome.

Whereas for exclusive connection N_k the number of k 's relations is greater than M_k , the largest number of exchanges from which k can benefit, for null connection $N_k = M_k$. Therefore, when k is null connected to all js , k can complete all k 's exchange relations and benefits from each. Actors have identical estimations of maximum possible payoff and payoff at confrontation. All actors and exchanges are equal.

Inclusion null and inclusion exclusion are each a single connection type which mixes qualities of two other types. For inclusion null $N = M > Q > 1$ but for inclusion exclusion $N > M \geq Q > 1$. Imagine that employer k needs at least two ($Q_k = 2$) of three ($N_k = 3$) js to complete a project. If k hires all three js ($M_k = 3$), the project will be completed faster. Since $N_k = M_k = 3$ and $Q_k = 2 > 1$, k is inclusive null connected. Because k need not necessarily include all three js , any inclusive advantage is eliminated and the three exchanges are equal power.

Now imagine that k needs at least three ($Q_k = 3$) of four ($N_k = 4$) js to complete the project, and k can hire a maximum of only three js ($M_k = 3$). Since $N_k = 4 > M_k = 3$ and $Q_k = 3 > 1$, k is inclusive exclusive connected. Because k must necessarily exclude one j , any inclusive advantage is eliminated and k benefits maximally in each exchange.

COERCIVE STRUCTURES

Positions in coercive relations are distinct; one is the coercee and the other the coercer. The coercee is under threat of receiving the negative sanction while the coercer can transmit the negative sanction or receive positive(s) from the coercee. The coercer's power is based on the effect on the coercee of the negative sanction; the larger that effect, the larger the flow of positives at agreement. Resistance predicts that flow in applications is not unlike its applications to exchange.

The asymmetry in the coercive relation produces power differently for coercee central and coercer central structures. For example, imagine that coercee j has an option of three coercers, ks . The j must choose a coercer, but once chosen, j cannot be coerced by any other ks . The ks will bid against each other until j pays the minimum possible for protection. In this coercee central structure, exclusion produces power like it does in exchange. Now imagine that k is connected to three js . The js are told that the j that does the least work will receive a negative sanction. In fact, this is a strong coercive structure in which the js compete to not be the least productive and k benefits maximally.

DIFFERENTIATED ACTORS IN EXCHANGE

Status value theory bridges between ET and status characteristics theory, a theory of status and influence, to make predictions in exchanges that include actors differentiated by status. Status value theory assumes that resources of high status actors are valued more highly than resources of low status actors. As a consequence, high status actors gain favorable outcomes. A recent advance in ET combines values quantifying status effects into resistance equations to make point predictions for exchange outcomes in networks with status differentiated actors.

Current research seeks to link legitimacy theory to ET. The goal is to determine whether legitimacy of coalitions in exchange networks affects actors' willingness to join. Coalitions are organizations of individuals that act as a single actor. Previous research has shown that

coalitions substantially improve payoffs to low power actors. At issue in research now being conducted is whether legitimacy stabilizes coalitions by resolving first and second order free riding and thus countervails power.

THE EFFECT OF RESOURCE MOVEMENT ON EXCHANGE

ET offers predictions for networks where resources move only between adjacent positions (discrete networks), and networks where resources move across a network (flow networks). The structures discussed above were all discrete networks. Nevertheless, the structural conditions discussed above also apply to flow networks. In a flow network, k sells X to j and j sells the X bought from k to h . Since only k starts out with X , and k is not connected to h , for h to receive X the sequence of exchange is determined: first $k-j$ and then $j-h$. Therefore, ordering affects power in the first relation. Since $Q_j = 2$, j is disadvantaged by inclusion in the $j-h$ relation. Whereas all flow networks contain ordering in first exchange and inclusion in the second, exclusion can mask their effects. For instance, if j was connected to two ks and j could buy X from only one, exclusion would mask the effect of ordering and j would pay the minimum price for X .

Predictions for flow networks take into consideration the structural conditions of exclusion, inclusion, and ordering, and the effect of sequence in reducing value available for negotiation in exchange relations across a flow network. As the resource X moves across the network, the total value of exchanges in the network is the difference between X 's initial and final value. In each exchange relation, some of that value is appropriated. For example, let h value X at \$16 and let resources be highly divisible. Suppose j pays k \$8 for X . Now the value available for negotiation has reduced from \$16 in the first exchange to \$8 in the second. Thus, the most j can make selling X to h is \$8 or the most h can profit is \$8.

CONCLUSION

ET is still growing. Initially, its applications were largely limited to micro level structures.

Now, research on coalitions and flow networks is applicable to complex meso and macro structures such as bureaucratic organizations and interorganizational networks. Furthermore, most work in ET uses experimentation with the aim of building strong theory. The rigorously tested and scope expansive theory is now useful for applications outside the laboratory. Lastly, much of the recent growth in ET has focused on networks of exchange relations. ET would benefit from new research aimed at examining coercive and conflict networks.

SEE ALSO: Exchange Network Theory; Experimental Methods; Legitimacy; Mathematical Sociology; Power Dependence Theory; Power, Theories of; Rational Choice Theories; Social Exchange Theory

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Elias, Norbert (1897–1990)

George Ritzer and J. Michael Ryan

Norbert Elias was born in Breslau, Germany in 1897. He was the son of a small manufacturer and was brought up in comfortable surroundings. After serving in the German Army during World War I, Elias returned home to study medicine and philosophy at the University of Breslau. It was his study of medicine that gave him a sense of the interconnections among the

various parts of the human body that would be so important to shaping his understanding of human interconnections – what he would term figurations. Elias received his PhD in 1924 and then went to Heidelberg, where he became very actively involved in sociology circles, most notably one headed by Marianne Weber. He also became friend and assistant to Karl Mannheim. This relationship led Elias to follow Mannheim as his official assistant to the University of Frankfurt in 1930.

After Hitler came to power in early 1933, Elias and many other Jewish scholars (including Mannheim) left Germany, first for Paris and later for London. Elias's most famous book, *The Civilizing Process*, was published in Germany in 1939. Unfortunately, there was no market in Germany for a book authored by a Jew and it also received little attention in other parts of the world. During the war and for nearly a decade after it ended Elias could not obtain secure employment and remained a marginal figure in British academic circles. In 1954, however, Elias began his career (at the age of 57) at the University of Leicester. He remained unpopular, however, among both faculty and students and during his time there none of his books were ever translated into English. However, during the 1950s and 1960s on the Continent, particularly in the Netherlands and Germany, Elias's work began to be discovered. It was during the 1970s that Elias's work began to receive both academic and public attention in Europe. This recognition is still growing today throughout the world. Elias died at the age of 93, living just long enough to bask in the early years of the much delayed recognition of his work.

FIGURATION

Elias proposed the concept of figuration as an alternative to thinking of the “individual” and “society” as different or antagonistic (Elias 1978). Figurations are not static, but instead are social processes. In fact, during the latter part of his career, Elias chose the label *process sociology* to describe his work (Mennell 1992: 252). Figurations involve the “interweaving” of people. They describe the relationships between people rather than describing a type

of structure which is external to or coercive over people. In other words, individuals are viewed as open and their relationships with one another compose figurations. Figurations are in a state of constant flux because of the changing nature of power, which is central to their understanding. They develop in largely unforeseeable ways.

The idea of a figuration is a broad one in that it can be used to apply to the micro and the macro, and to every social phenomenon in between. This image is best represented by Elias's notion of “chains of interdependence,” which constitute the real focus of his work.

CIVILIZATION

In addition to figurations and chains of interdependence, Elias's work is largely concerned with the “sociogenesis” of civilization, especially in the Occident (Bogner et al. 1992). In particular, Elias (1997) is interested in what he perceives to be the gradual changes that have occurred in the behavioral and psychological makeup of those living in the West. In his study of the history of manners, for example, Elias is concerned with the historical transformation of a wide array of rather mundane behaviors which have culminated in what we would now call civilized behavior. Some of the behaviors which most interest Elias include what embarrasses us, our increasing sensitivity, how we have grown increasingly observant of others, and our sharpened understanding of others.

Elias uses books (and other sources) on manners written between the thirteenth and nineteenth centuries to get at these changes. He concludes that our threshold of embarrassment has gradually advanced. For example, what people did at the dinner table in the thirteenth century – passing gas, for one – would cause great embarrassment to one in the nineteenth century (and twenty first century as well). Thus, that which is considered distasteful is over time increasingly likely to be “removed behind the scenes of social life” (Elias 1994a: 99). In another example, one thirteenth century poem warns, “A number of people gnaw on a bone and then put it back in the dish – this is a serious offense” and another volume states: “It is not decent to poke your fingers in to your

ears or eyes, as some people do, or to pick your nose while eating” (pp. 68, 71). The implication is that such behaviors were typical at that time and did not cause those who engaged in them much embarrassment. These texts provide admonitions against such behavior in an effort to “civilize” people. As time goes by, the knowledge that these things are not appropriate spreads throughout society and there is no longer a need to remind people that such behavior is inappropriate. Thus, a late sixteenth century document says: “Nothing is more improper than to lick your fingers, to touch the meats and put them into your mouth with your hand, to stir sauce with your fingers, or to dip bread into it with your fork and then suck it” (p. 79). Of course, there are some things (e.g., picking one’s nose) that are deemed more improper than others (e.g., licking one’s fingers), but by this time civilization has already progressed to the point where it is widely recognized that such behaviors are uncivilized. With certain behaviors safely behind the scenes, society then moves on to find other, less egregious behaviors that it defines as uncivilized.

POWER AND CIVILIZATION

In *Power and Civility* (1994b) Elias is concerned with changes in social constraint that are associated with the rise of self restraint, the real key to the civilizing process. The most important of these social constraints is the macrostructural phenomena of the lengthening of interdependency chains. This also contributes to the corresponding need for individuals to moderate their emotions by developing the “habit of connecting events in terms of chains of cause and effect” (p. 236). Thus, the ever increasing differentiation of social functions plays a central role in the process of civilization. In addition and in conjunction with this differentiation is the importance of “a total reorganization of the social fabric” (p. 231). This is how Elias describes the historical process of the emergence of increasingly stable central organs of society that monopolize the means of physical force and taxation. Central to this development is the emergence of a king with absolute status, as well as of a court society. Elias is especially interested in the case of France during the

reign of Louis XIV, although he points out that the courts of Europe all came to be closely linked. What Elias calls a “royal mechanism” is operating here in that kings are able to emerge in a specific figuration where competing functional groups are ambivalent (they are characterized by both mutual dependency as well as mutual hostility) and power is evenly distributed between them, thus prohibiting either a decisive conflict or a decisive compromise. As Elias puts it, “Not by chance, not whenever a strong ruling personality is born, but when a specific social structure provides the opportunity, does the central organ attain that optimal power which usually finds expression in strong autocracy” (p. 174). In other words, a king emerges only when the appropriate figuration is in place.

The king and his court were of particular importance to Elias because it was here that changes took place that would eventually affect the rest of society. The court noble was forced to be increasingly sensitive to others while simultaneously curbing his own emotions because, unlike the warrior, his dependency chains were relatively long. The noble was further restrained in that it was the king alone who was gaining increasing control over the means of violence. This monopoly of violence, in turn, is strongly related to the king’s ability to hold a monopoly over taxation, since it is taxes that allow the king to pay for the control of the means of violence (p. 208). The noble is further disadvantaged in that while taxes increase the king’s income, they reduce the nobility’s, further enhancing the power of the king (Elias 1983: 155). The nobles play an important role in the civilizing process because they carry the changes from the court to the rest of society. Further, changes in the West are eventually spread to other parts of the world. Thus, the rise of the king and his court and the shift in importance from warrior to courtier represent a key “spurt” in the civilizing process. This idea of a spurt is how Elias deals with social change – it is not an even, unilinear process, but rather one that stops, starts, and goes back and forth.

Despite the importance of the king, the nobles, and the court, the ultimate cause of the most decisive changes is related to the changes in the entire figuration of the time. In other words, the real importance of change is

found in the changing relationships between groups, as well as those between individuals in those groups. Further, this figuration ends up constraining both the king and the nobility, as there is a gradual movement toward a state. It is the private monopoly of the means of violence and of taxation (by the king) that sets the ground for a public monopoly of those same resources (by the state). The rise of the controlling agencies in society is linked to the rise of the controlling agencies within the individual. These two processes work in tandem to wield unprecedented power over individuals' ability to act on their emotions. That is not to say that individuals before this time were completely unrestrained and emotionally flamboyant, but rather that self control and moderation became increasingly important in constraining people's emotional lives. Elias recognizes that this increasing control is not entirely good. While life has become safer (fewer people act out violently), it has also grown less enjoyable. Unable to express their emotions directly, people turn to alternative outlets such as dreams and books to express themselves. Further, external struggles become increasingly internalized as (to use Freud's terms) battles between the id and the superego. Thus, a reduction in violence is accompanied by an increase in boredom and restlessness.

Longer dependency chains are thus ultimately associated with greater control of emotions and a simultaneous increasing sensitivity to others. This causes people's judgments about one another to become more finely nuanced and they are better able to control both themselves and others. With a reduction in the fear of violence and death, people turn their concerns to more subtle threats. This increasing sensitivity is a key contributor to the civilizing process and its continuation.

Another important aspect of the civilizing process is the socialization of the young to develop appropriate self restraint. This increase in self restraint, however, is also accompanied by problems, as "the civilizing of the human young is never a process entirely without pain; it always leaves scars" (Elias 1994b: 244).

SEE ALSO: Civilizations; Civilizing Process; Figurational Sociology and the Sociology of Sport; Micro-Macro Links

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elite culture

Adrian Franklin

Elite culture can be defined as those "high" cultural forms and institutions that were exclusive to, and a distinguishing characteristic of, modern social elites. It is a term that particularly references the cultural tastes of the established aristocracy, the commercial bourgeoisie, educated bureaucrats and political power brokers, and the professions in the eighteenth, nineteenth, and twentieth centuries. Over most of this period such groups dominated those who consumed and supported such cultural styles as opera, symphony orchestras, ballet and dance companies, the decorative arts, fine art, museums and galleries, and the literary end of live theater. While these forms all thrive in contemporary times, it is no longer clear that elite culture can be distinguished from popular culture in the way it was before the mid twentieth century (Blau 1986, 1989). While sociologists still identify the power and significance of social elites and their relatively closed cultural domains, their exclusive grip on elite culture has relaxed while at the same time they have become more *omnicorous* in their taste and now consume widely and freely from all styles, from the lowbrow to the highbrow. At the same time, new styles that blur elite and

popular cultural forms emerged from around the 1960s: the Beatles, for example, combined African American rhythm and blues with British working class “brass band,” with western elite orchestral and strings, *and*, in places, with traditional Indian music. In turn, their audience base spanned the entire social spectrum. Artists such as Andy Warhol and Damian Hurst produced other such blurring or fusions and are credited with popularizing modern art.

According to Raymond Williams (1981: 97), the word *elite* does not emerge until the mid eighteenth century but was more commonly in use around the early nineteenth century. It was used to express social distinction by rank and Williams argues that its emergence can be attributed to a crisis over leadership. As he says: “there had been a breakdown in old ways of distinguishing those best fitted to govern or exercise influence by rank or heredity, and a failure to find new ways of distinguishing such persons by formal . . . election.” Secondly, in response to socialist arguments about rules by class and class political conflict generally, it was widely argued that elites were more effective than classes (for example, by the Italian sociologists Pareto and Mosca). It is no accident therefore that this elitism, and the elite culture it produced, soon drew a cultural drawbridge up to distinguish itself from and cut out the “others.” This is evident in Kant’s “principle of pure taste,” which identified absolute aesthetic value and valorized refinement, the attainment of virtuosity, and educated reflection over the popular, easygoing, immediate, simple, or traditional. But as Bourdieu argued, pure taste and its aesthetics were based on a *refusal* of the vulgar, simple, primitive, or popular and therefore constituted a *social* device or techniques of distinction. In the nineteenth century particularly, and long into the twentieth century, considerable energy was put into the creation of “high” cultural institutional development. At the same time, those low cultural forms which had hitherto been part of mainstream everyday culture were undermined and devalued as shallow and vulgar.

In the second half of the twentieth century, the possession of education (or what Bourdieu calls *cultural capital*) which distinguished the social elite became more commonplace through mass secondary education and the expansion

of the universities. Hitherto the social elite had been a relatively closed and circumscribed social group, sharing not only culture in common but also background, schooling, social networks, and experience. However, from the 1960s many from non elite backgrounds were being recruited into elite positions and making it in the culture industries and professions. It was this generation that reclaimed the cultural value and aesthetic depth of popular culture and placed it on an equal footing with elite culture. Meanwhile radio, television, and other media alongside new electronic technologies made elite culture more available to a wider audience and popular culture more popular with the elites. From the 1970s onwards, while it is still possible to identify elite culture, it has become more entwined in a broadening of popular, indeed globalized culture (DiMaggio 1997) and has now been identified in a new class formation, what Florida (2002) calls the *creative class*.

This is reflected in sociological surveys of consumer taste. Peterson and Kern (1996) looked at musical taste in the United States and found that highbrow consumers (those who mainly like opera and classical music) are increasingly consuming middlebrow (say, musicals) and “lowbrow” (country music, rock and pop). However, as with Bourdieu’s pathbreaking book *Distinction*, a study of cultural taste in France, it is still possible to detect broad patterns of taste based on different combinations of cultural and economic capital and the habituses in which they combine. In Australia, another survey modeled on Bourdieu’s (Bennett et al. 1999) found the cultural elite still cultivated a taste for highbrow cultural forms. So, while two thirds of those with minimal education could identify only two classical composers from a list of ten music works, almost half of those with higher degrees knew eight or more. In broad terms, Bourdieu’s distinction thesis was found to be true for Australia. However, an important caveat was that “the entire configuration of relations in our sample appears to have been skewed towards cultural forms which in Bourdieu’s terms are ‘popular,’ devalued, or of diminished aesthetic value. Moreover, class judgments of taste seldom display a logic that is separate from the confounding effects of age and gender.”

SEE ALSO: Bourdieu, Pierre; Cultural Capital; Culture; Culture Industries; Distinction; Elites; Globalization, Culture and; Highbrow/Low brow; Mass Culture and Mass Society; Media; Media and Consumer Culture; Music; Popular Culture; Television; Williams, Raymond

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elites

Jaap Dronkers and Huibert Schijf

“History is a graveyard of aristocracies.” With this phrase the Italian Vilfredo Pareto, who introduced the word elite in social sciences, formulated his idea of the decline and fall of elites, especially the political elite. For both him and Gaetano Mosca, the second founding father, the key concept was the circulation of elites (Bottomore 1993: 35). Many of these early writings on elites have a moral trademark. This can be seen in Machiavelli’s *The Prince* (1513), where he gives a somewhat cynical but insightful analysis of the behavior of a ruler, but also provided instructions on how to act.

Theoreticians like Pareto and Mosca, but also the German Robert Michels (who formulated the famous “iron law of oligarchy” based on the inevitability of minority rule within the German Social Democratic Party), hold strong opinions on how elites should act and how their positions can be justified. The rightful behavior of elites is still, of course, fiercely debated in the public arena, but less so in modern social research on elites.

Today, the word elites is used in a very wide sense, for instance by speaking of a “sport elite.” Nevertheless, in modern studies, elites are usually defined as the incumbents of top positions in both the public and private sector, like members of parliament or boards of executives. The focus is on the individual characteristics of these incumbents, the extent to which they are interconnected with each other, or the chance that people with certain characteristics are able to obtain such an elite position. However, the problem of sampling is transferred from individuals with high qualities to institutions (their influence in society is sometimes debated).

Information on elites (after all, public figures who draw much attention from the media) is easy to collect. Biographical summaries abound, both for the public and private sector, but publications like *Who’s Who* are always a collection of persons where the criteria of inclusion of people, the rich and famous, very much depend on the bias of the editors and the information does not always have the quality required for thorough social research. However, many printed sources exist and are useful in situations where specialized surveys or interviews are difficult and certainly expensive (Moyser & Wagstaffe 1987; Bürklin et al. 1997).

By emphasizing the circulation of elites, Pareto and Mosca tend to underestimate the potential of elites to adapt to changing circumstances. Today, questions about openness or closeness of certain institutions and the chance that a particular person with certain characteristics will occupy an elite position are at the top of the agenda for sociological elite studies. Such investigations can be incorporated into the wider field of social stratification and mobility. Thus, the French sociologist Pierre Bourdieu emphasizes the process of *reproduction* of elites through scholarly and cultural capital and

spends much time in describing the French elite schools, les *Grandes Écoles*. A large study conducted by Bürklin et al. (1997) on members of the German elites in several public and private sectors tried to answer the question of whether elites from East Germany have been integrated into the local and national elites from West Germany.

Studies on elites can be summarized by means of two dichotomies. The first is directed to questions on *horizontal* and *vertical* integration. A classical study on horizontal integration of the American elite is C. Wright Mills's *The Power Elite* (1956). Mills wanted to show that the governmental, military, and business elites – all male, white, and Christian – are highly interconnected. The term *pantouflage* is used in France to describe the quite common shift of the French governing elites from the public to private sector and vice versa. In societies with cleavages along religious lines elites from each group are sometimes able to cooperate at the national level. On the borderline between studies of corporate networks based on linkages between corporations, created through multiple functions of some members of the boards of executives, and elite studies, is work by Windolf (2002). Vertical integration deals with the question how representative are incumbents with respect to the population as a whole. Usually, they are not representative and elites prefer contacts among their own kind than with people 'below'. Much debate on the trust of citizens in democratic institutions can be seen in the light of a steady decline of vertical integration.

The second dichotomy is between an *individualistic* and a *structural* approach. The first emphasizes the characteristics of individual persons, while the latter focuses on the links between these individuals and larger structures ranging from family connections to common membership in an institution, past or present. Many studies within the individualistic approach focus on parliamentary representatives (Best & Cotta 2000), other political figures, or civil servants (Page & Wright 1999). Families can be seen as a separate research unit, where both approaches are incorporated. Harbor barons or industrial families sometimes show a great ability to stay in top positions, creating an almost dynastic continuity. In contrast to the

accepted open and meritocratic character of modern societies, research shows that the ability to obtain an elite position in the Dutch nobility, an elite based on birth, has hardly declined during the twentieth century, although nobility is often seen as a relic from the past in Dutch public opinion (Schijf et al. 2004).

Very much in the tradition of research on social mobility, the German sociologist Hartman (2002) looked at the social background of engineers, lawyers, and economists who finished their high school education in 1955, 1965, 1975, and 1985. He then examined who was able to reach an elite position later in life. His conclusion is that the openness of the German educational system has increased, but that this is not true for the chance of obtaining an elite position, which still depends on an appropriate high social background. This use of longitudinal data seems to be promising for elite research in the future, because this research focus on the chances of obtaining such an elite position for a large group of persons and therefore highlights the openness or closedness of a society as a whole.

During the twentieth century many members of local elites became members of national elites. Today, one can see rapid development of a global economy, increasing popularity of international business schools, and the availability of large scale international communication. Nevertheless, although rather scarce, research shows (e.g., Hartman 1999) that so far there are few indications of the rise of an international business elite. In the boards of executives in countries like France, Germany, Great Britain, and the US, the overwhelmingly majority of members of these boards have the same nationality as the countries where these corporations are located. The only exceptions are foreign subsidiaries. Many executives had educational careers in their country of birth. This might change in the future, but it is very likely that top managers will follow a mainly local career instead of a global one. With the development of the European Union and its institutions, there might be an international bureaucratic elite in the making, but that is still not certain.

Other research topics on elites are less developed. For instance, little knowledge is available about the lifestyle of the elites or the neighborhoods they live in. The study by Pinçon and

Pinçon Charlot (1989) on elite quarters in Paris offers an inspiring example of such research. The present research on elites also shows much emphasis on formal characteristics of incumbents. Far less information is available on how elites operate in (in)formal settings, or how the horizontal connections really work.

Evidence of much modern research shows that countries where no dramatic changes have taken place show a remarkable stability in their elites. Of course, the circulation of political elites often happens due to regular elections as part of the democratic process, but other groups or families turn out to be able to maintain elite positions over several generations by adapting to new circumstances.

SEE ALSO: Bourdieu, Pierre; Elite Culture; Michels, Robert; Mills, C. Wright; Pareto, Vilfredo; Power Elite

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Ellis, Havelock (1859–1939)

Jeffrey Weeks

Havelock Ellis, editor, critic, essayist, and pioneer sexologist, was born on February 2, 1859 in Croydon, Surrey. His father was a sea captain and rarely at home, so Ellis's mother was the dominant influence in his early life. She was an ardent evangelical Christian who had experienced a conversion at the age of 17, but Ellis early on slipped away from the more rigid aspects of her faith. He was provided with a basic education in private schools in south London, but his main education derived from wide reading. The crucial formative influence was his stay in Australia for four years from the age of 16.

Here, in the outback, in almost total isolation, he began to experience conflicts in his awakening sexual life and in his spiritual outlook. Born in the year of the first publication of Charles Darwin's *On the Origin of Species*, Ellis was a child of a new scientific optimism, unattracted to a religious world outlook which he saw as dying, but repelled by the absorption of science into a chilly utilitarianism. It was in this state of mind that he reread a book by James Hinton, a writer on political, social, religious, and sexual matters, entitled *Life in Nature* (1862). The book sparked a spiritual transformation. In particular, for the young Ellis, the belief that sexual freedom could bring in a new age of happiness helped direct him towards the scientific study of sex. To prepare him for this, he resolved to train as a doctor, and returned to London in April 1879 ready to face his new life.

His actual work as a doctor was spasmodic. During his training and in the years that followed his real preoccupation was with his literary and scientific studies. The London of the 1880s was a focus of intense intellectual and political ferment, and Ellis immersed himself in this new culture. Through his involvement in various progressive groupings he met many of the radical luminaries of the time. He began editing and writing, publishing essays on religion, philosophy, travel, and politics. However, Ellis was never a political activist. Even as a

well known writer in later life, giving his formal support to campaigns for sex reform, eugenics, abortion, and voluntary euthanasia, he was extremely reluctant to become involved in public controversy. It was in private involvements, through a vast daily correspondence, and by his voluminous writings that he exercised his influence. Even in his publications, his manner was often indirect, preferring, as he put it, to express the shocking things in a quiet, matter of course way, sugar coating the pill. Yet both his private life and his public writings had the potentiality to shock his contemporaries.

It was in these early years of incessant intellectual activity that Ellis began the two most important emotional involvements of his early life. The first was with the South African feminist author Olive Schreiner, already famous for her novel *The Story of an African Farm* (1883) when they met early in 1884. It is not clear whether their relationship was conventionally consummated. Ellis himself appears not to have been strongly drawn to heterosexual intercourse, and had a lifelong interest in urolagnia, a delight in seeing women urinate. The sexual ardor, certainly on Schreiner's part, appears to have soon cooled, though the emotional intensity remained. It survived Schreiner's return to South Africa in 1889, continuing until her death via an almost daily correspondence and occasional meetings.

Ellis's relationship with the woman who was to become his wife, Edith Mary Oldham Lees, began the year after Schreiner's departure, and was strengthened by a common interest in the work of Hinton. She too was a passionate woman, who, despite an intense mutual involvement with Ellis (he was to devote almost half of his autobiography to their relationship), pursued an independent life as a lecturer and writer. By Victorian standards the partnership was highly unconventional. Edith's emotional and sexual passions were primarily lesbian, and both she and Ellis were to have a series of close emotional involvements with other women, certainly sexual in Edith's case, more ambiguously erotic in Ellis's case.

By the early 1890s Ellis was ready to embark on what he regarded as his crowning achievement, *Studies in the Psychology of Sex* (1897–1910, with a seventh, supplementary,

volume in 1928). The series began with *Sexual Inversion*, the first serious study of homosexuality published in Britain. It was conceived as a collaboration with the poet and critic John Addington Symonds, himself homosexual, and anxious to promote a more tolerant climate towards homosexuality. He completed the book after Symonds's death in 1893, the first printing appearing in German, then in English in 1897 under their joint names. Ellis now became embroiled in an unfortunate series of events. First of all, Ellis was forced by Symonds's family to withdraw his co author's name from the book. The aftermath of the trials of Oscar Wilde was not the best time to publish a major text on homosexuality that might sully another aesthete's reputation. Then Ellis found himself caught in the web of a dubious publisher, and a subsequent trial of the secretary of the sexually progressive Legitimation League, George Bedborough, for selling the book. In the 1898 trial, which did not directly involve Ellis, the book was labeled a "certain lewd, wicked, bawdy, scandalous libel" and subsequently withdrawn from sale. Ellis was confirmed in his caution about getting involved in public controversy. More crucially, he determined thereafter that the *Studies* should be published in the US; no complete edition has ever appeared in Britain.

Despite this unfortunate beginning, the *Studies* were to prove enormously influential. The first volume set the tone. By collating all the available evidence, historical, anthropological, social, and scientific, the aim was to demonstrate that homosexuality (or inversion, his preferred term) was not a product of peculiar national vices or periods of social decay, but a common and recurrent part of human sexuality, a quirk of nature, a congenital anomaly. In line with what was then considered advanced thinking, his conviction of the biological origins of human behavior was to color much of his thought. First, he sought to establish the natural basis of human sexuality in all its forms; nothing that was based in nature could be seen as inherently wrong. But secondly, he attempted to reconcile these variations to what he regarded as the supreme biological origin and function of sex, the man wooing a woman for the purpose of reproduction. Though an advanced advocate of a woman's right to sexual fulfillment, his view of an essential female

passivity in sexual matters subsequently attracted sharp criticism, particularly as it appeared to subordinate female sexuality to male. His biological determinism was to lead him to give support throughout his life to eugenics, the planned breeding of the best, and to differentiate him from his great contemporary, Sigmund Freud. Yet despite his biological preoccupations, Ellis was no empirical scientist. His method was that of the naturalist, collecting facts from a vast variety of sources and presenting them in an ordered, but essentially descriptive fashion. As a result, he never established a scientific school. But for his progressive contemporaries he seemed a prophet of a more humane attitude to sex. Through the *Studies*, probably more read about than read, he became internationally famous as a sexologist, and a magnet for other would-be reformers.

On completing the sixth volume of the *Studies* Ellis wrote: "The work that I was born to do is done." In fact, many years of productive writing, and growing fame, lay ahead. He continued writing on sexual matters, including a textbook, *The Psychology of Sex* (1933). His various other interests were reflected in a number of collections of essays; and the publication of *The Dance of Life* (1923) for the first time made him a bestselling author. From the 1920s he also contributed short articles to American newspapers and journals, which did little for his intellectual reputation, but contributed significantly to his finances.

Edith Lees had died in 1916, after some years of growing ill health. In the last months she had secured a legal separation from Ellis, but her death left him emotionally bereft. His emotional life was not, however, over. From 1918 he shared his life with an acquaintance of Edith's, Françoise Lafitte Cyon, also known as Delisle (1886–1974), separated wife of a Russian journalist, and mother of two boys. As with Edith, for many years, Ellis retained his own home, and each of them continued to cultivate strong relationships outside their partnership. But in the last years they lived together. These final years were shadowed by ill health, as well as continuing poverty. He died on July 8, 1939.

Havelock Ellis has been described as one of the great "modernizers" of sex. Certainly, he was to become an inspiration to many liberal

reformers of the 1950s and 1960s. In retrospect, however, perhaps his major contribution was not as a scientist or theorist, or even great reformer, but as an outstanding example of a pioneer in writing about sex and sexuality in a calm and dispassionate way. He put sexuality into words that helped shape the erotic climate of the twentieth century.

SEE ALSO: Femininities/Masculinities; Freud, Sigmund; Sexuality Research: History

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emergent norm theory

Mikaila Mariel Lemonik Arthur

Emergent norm theory hypothesizes that non-traditional behavior (such as that associated with collective action) develops in crowds as a result of the emergence of new behavioral norms in response to a precipitating crisis. For proponents of emergent norm theory, collective action includes all types of social behavior in which the conventional norms stop functioning as guides to social action, and instead people collectively overturn or go beyond the normal institutional practices and frameworks of society (Turner & Killian 1987) and therefore new conventions must form as part of the collective action. The basic suppositions of emergent norm theory are that collective action is rational, that collective action is a response to a precipitating event, and that new norms of behavior appropriate to the collective action situation emerge through group processes without prior coordination and planning.

First proposed by Turner and Killian in 1972, emergent norm theory has grown out of two main traditions. The LeBonian tradition of thinking of crowds as normless entities and collective action as irrational behavior led Turner and Killian to think about how norms are instituted in crowds. Second, symbolic interactionism and small group analysis contributed a model of norms as developing through interaction.

Emergent norm theory suggests that crowds come together because a crisis occurs that forces people to abandon prior conceptions of appropriate behavior and to find new ways of acting. When a crowd forms, there is no particular norm governing crowd behavior and no leader exists. But the crowd focuses in on those who act in a distinctive manner, and this distinction is taken on as the new norm for crowd behavior. As this new norm begins to be institutionalized within the crowd, pressures for conformity and against deviance within the crowd develop, and discontent is silenced. This silencing of alternative views contributes to the illusion of unanimity within the crowd.

The norms that develop within crowds are not strict rules for behavior. Rather, they are more like overarching frameworks for behavior that set limits on what is appropriate (Turner & Killian 1987: 9–11). These norms develop through either emergent or preexisting social relationships. Turner and Killian suggest that anything which facilitates communication among crowd participants facilitates the emergence of norms, and they call this process “milling.” In addition, though the emergent norm theory perspective does, as noted above, contest the notion that crowd behavior is particularly irrational, it suggests that many crowd participants are suggestible and that this suggestibility contributes to the spread of emergent norms.

There are two main avenues of criticism that have faced emergent norm theory. The first, proposed by Reicher (1987), suggests that when crowds come together, they bring norms with them. Therefore, new norms do not have to emerge. These norms are different depending on the group making up the crowd – for instance, an urban mob will exhibit different norms than a group of suburban teenagers at a rock concert. These differences reflect the

different ways that crowds behave, but are norms nonetheless.

The second line of criticism suggests all social behavior results in the renegotiation of social norms, and second, that the creativity in norm creation and behavior that has come to be seen as “norm emergence” emerges not from interaction but rather through long term rational planning processes or through reliance on small changes to established repertoires. Couch (1968), while writing before the development of emergent norm theory, is often cited to support this criticism. An additional area of criticism suggested by some researchers is that there are significant methodological difficulties in tracing the emergence of a norm in a crowd setting.

While emergent norm theory was originally applied to a variety of forms of collective behavior, it is most commonly relied on to help understand the behavior of large groups, or crowds. In particular, emergent norm theory has gained a strong foothold in disaster research, as it is used to understand the behavior of groups who experience a precipitating crisis (a disaster) and then are forced to find new ways to respond that will help to ensure the safety and survival of as many people as possible. Tierney (2002), for instance, has used emergent norm theory to help understand the civilian initiated evacuation of the World Trade Center on September 11, 2001. Other researchers, such as Johnson (1987), have suggested that emergent norm theory can explain not just orderly civilian initiated evacuation but also the aggressive and selfish behavior sometimes seen in mass panics. Johnson believes that in certain situations, the breakdown of social order leads to these types of behavior as rational responses to the new social circumstances.

SEE ALSO: Collective Action; Crowd Behavior; Disasters; Norms; Riots; Social Movements, Networks and; Symbolic Interaction

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Emerson, Richard M. (1925–82)

Karen S. Cook

Richard Marc Emerson, a primary architect of social exchange theory and power dependence theory, received his PhD from the University of Minnesota in 1955 where his primary advisors were Don Martindale (sociological theory) and Stanley Schachter (psychology). He attended graduate school after serving during World War II in the elite 10th Army Mountain Division upon completing college at the University of Utah, where he majored in sociology and minored in philosophy. His first academic appointment was at the University of Cincinnati. He joined the faculty in 1955 and received tenure in 1957. While at Cincinnati he wrote a number of important papers and participated in research projects related to family relations (as a senior research associate in psychiatry) and in leadership training, a popular field of study post World War II. He was recruited to the Department of Sociology at the University of

Washington in 1965, where he served on the faculty until his premature death in 1982 at the peak of his academic career.

Richard Emerson is best known for his work on social power. In the early 1960s he published two highly significant papers, “Power–Dependence Relations” (1962) and “Power–Dependence Relations: Two Experiments” (1964), that changed the way social scientists subsequently viewed social power. Both are now citation classics. The 1962 article is one of only 30 that have received over 500 citations since being published in the *American Sociological Review*. The primary significance of this work is that it changed the way power was typically defined in sociology and political science. In Emerson’s theoretical framework, power is viewed as a function of a social relation rather than as an attribute of a particular person, group, or collectivity. This conceptualization is the basis of what is known as *power dependence theory*. The key insight in this formulation was that power was determined by the dependence of one party on another for resources or services of value. Dependence is a function of: (1) the *value* of that service or resource and (2) its *availability* from alternative sources. Emerson later used this conception of power in his analysis of social exchange relations. Thus the power of actor A over actor B in a two party exchange relation specified as $Ax:By$ (where A and B are actors and x and y are resources of value) increases as a function of the value of y to A and decreases proportional to the degree of availability of y to A from other sources. The more dependent B is on A, the more power A has over B in the $Ax:By$ exchange relation. The postulate that power is based on dependence is the central proposition in Emerson’s theoretical formulation: $Pab = Dba$.

Emerson developed his exchange theory in two papers written in 1967 and circulated widely in unpublished form before they finally appeared in 1972. In these papers he laid out a micro foundation for social exchange (Part I) based on behavioral psychology similar to the basis of the exchange formulation developed in 1961 by George Homans. In Part II Emerson developed a theory of social exchange networks building upon his dyadic exchange formulation.

The extension of exchange theory from dyads to networks laid the foundation for much of the subsequent theoretical and empirical development of exchange theory in sociology in the three decades after the publication of these seminal papers. An important feature of this work was its focus on network positional determinants of power.

Networks, according to Emerson, were sets of connected exchange relations. They could be simple or complex networks that represented actors linked by ties of exchange. The nature of the exchange connections depended upon whether or not the exchange relations involved cooperative social exchange (positive connections) or competitive access to alternative resources (negative connections). If exchange in one network relation enhanced exchange in another, the two exchange relations were positively connected at a node (actor). If exchange in one network relation reduced the likelihood of exchange in another relation, the two relations were defined as negatively connected (or as alternative exchange relations). More complex variants of the nature of connections and the determinants of positional power were subsequently developed by Markovsky et al. (1988), Willer, and their collaborators who developed not only an alternative method of representing network connections, but also different methods for calculating the locus of power in a network (e.g., using the graph theoretic index of power or *GPI* and its modifications). Experimental research supports the idea that the link between power and centrality in a network is dependent upon the nature of the exchange connections involved, among other factors (Cook & Emerson 1978; Cook et al. 1983; Yamagishi et al. 1988).

To analyze change in networks, Emerson proposed that power balancing mechanisms often came into play to alter the distribution of power in a network of exchange relations. For example, coalitions could form among power disadvantaged actors in a network and such collective action could result in a redistribution of power if the disadvantaged actors could act collectively to alter the terms of trade to their advantage. Emerson referred to this form of structural change as network consolidation. A different form of change involved network

extension. In this case power disadvantaged actors could seek alternative exchange partners to reduce their dependence upon a particular powerful actor by gaining access to resources from others. These were two of the main forms of structural change posed by Emerson as potentially “power balancing” forces within exchange networks. Two other mechanisms of “power balancing” focused on changes within the dyadic exchange relation, not the network. These mechanisms included “status giving” or an effort to enhance the value of the resources offered to the one in power in the exchange relation, and “withdrawal,” which entailed terminating the relationship, a more drastic means of reducing dependence.

While the focus of much of the work on social exchange has been on the determinants of power in dyadic exchange relations and in exchange networks, other features of social exchange relations have also been examined, including social cohesion, relational satisfaction, fairness or distributive justice, commitment between exchange partners, especially under uncertainty, and trust. Even though some of these topics were included in Emerson’s original theoretical formulation, they were not empirically investigated very extensively in the laboratory until after his death, with the exception of the study of commitment, which was included in an early experimental study by Cook and Emerson (1978; see also Cook & Emerson 1984). Linda Molm and Edward Lawler are two of the investigators in the past decade who have studied relational cohesion, trust, and commitment experimentally. Lawler’s focus has been on affect and relational commitment. Molm has focused on comparing different forms of exchange, such as negotiated and reciprocal exchange, and their differences not only in terms of the use of power, but also in the levels of cohesion, relationship satisfaction, and trust that develop between the partners.

Emerson’s fieldwork on power and authority relations in Pakistan is less well known than his theoretical work on exchange and his collaborative laboratory studies of exchange networks with Cook, Yamagishi, and others. He published several papers before his death on the effects of the British system of authority and rule on the small villages and principalities

of Pakistan and India. These articles relied more on historical data and observations that Emerson collected while in the field in Pakistan and India, where he spent time on several sabbaticals as well as on various mountaineering expeditions. In fact, some of his laboratory studies of power were representations of his interest in the factors that resulted in the centralization or decentralization of power in various village structures. Although he is best known in the current era for his laboratory work on exchange theory and power in exchange networks in collaboration with his colleagues at the University of Washington, he is also known there for his love of mountains and his interest in the anthropology of the remote mountain villages he often visited during his career as a sociologist.

Apart from his love of academia, Emerson had considered becoming a sculptor before entering graduate school and was an excellent photographer. He was also a serious mountaineer, having grown up surrounded by snow-capped mountains in Utah. While in the Northwest he climbed mountains for much of his life and was a member of the first expedition on Mount Everest to make a successful ascent up the West Ridge (in 1963). The National Science Foundation funded his involvement in the expedition as part of a research project that he had initiated on reactions to performance feedback under conditions of high stress. The mountain climbers were required to keep diaries during the ascent to record their reactions to various performance feedback studies that Emerson was conducting during the climb. Just before his assassination, President Kennedy decorated Richard Emerson with the Hubbard Medal on behalf of the National Geographic Society for this research. Two of Emerson's climbing partners on this adventure suffered serious injury from frostbite and one of the porters died on the climb. During his life Emerson returned a number of times to the mountains of Pakistan, often with a new research idea in mind.

SEE ALSO: Blau, Peter; Collective Action; Elementary Theory; Homans, George; Networks; Power Dependence Theory; Power, Theories of; Social Network Theory

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emic/etic

Michael Agar

“Emic” and “etic” have become shorthand terms, especially in anthropology, for an “insider” versus an “outsider” view of a particular social world. For example, an outsider view of an economic exchange might hold that the seller’s goal was to maximize profit. An insider view from people actually involved in the exchange might show that profit was only one of many concerns. Kinship ties, a long relationship history, previous social favors, earlier non cash trades, a desire to curry favor – such social threads in a relationship might result in an exchange that, to an outsider, would look “irrational,” while to an insider it would make perfect sense.

The distinction between emic and etic, insider and outsider, originated in the linguistics of the 1950s, most famously in the work of Kenneth Pike (1967). Linguists of that era were primarily concerned with learning and describing unwritten languages in field settings. As part of this larger task, they had to master the phonology, or sound system. As a means to this end, they created a notational system that allowed them to describe all possible sounds that the human organism can produce. This notational system was called phonetics, and that term later became abbreviated to etic.

Phonetics offered a classification of sounds that humans could produce, given the physiological possibilities of the articulatory system. Training tapes, much like a foreign language

course, taught the budding linguist how to hear sounds that his own language had trained him not to hear. For example, if one raises the tongue so that the two sides touch the alveolar ridges while allowing air to pass through the middle, one is producing what a phonetician would call a “lateral fricative.” While the sound is unfamiliar to most English speakers, it is critical for a speaker of Navajo.

The fact that a lateral fricative would sound strange to an English speaker is why the concept of “phonemic” was invented. The speakers of a particular language, like English or Navajo, will not perceive all the sounds described by phonetics. Instead, they will hear only a subset. As they acquire language as children, speakers learn to hear some sounds and ignore others. The sounds that speakers of a particular language hear as significant, the units of sound that make a difference for them, are the “phonemes” of that language. “Phonemic,” as we will see, was shortened to “emic.”

Here is an example. In English, say the word “pin” and the word “spin” with a hand held in front of the mouth. After the “p” in “pin” a puff of air will be felt on the hand. After the “p” in “spin” little or no air will be felt. A linguist doing phonetics would say the first “p” is aspirated while the second “p” is not. This difference makes no difference to a native speaker of English. One could say “pin” with out aspiration or “spin” with it, and though it might sound unusual, the different pronunciations would still be heard as the same words. Aspiration, in English, is not phonemic. In other languages, such as Hindi, it is. “Pin” with aspiration and “pin” without it would signal two different words.

Here is another example. In Kannarese, a language of South India, a “d” can be alveolar or retroflex. Say “d” with the tip of the tongue along the alveolar ridge just behind the teeth. Now say “d” with the tongue rolled back, the tip tapping the back of the ridge as it moves forward to articulate the “d” sound. That is retroflex. In Kannarese, there are two words that an English speaker would spell “nadi” and hear as the same. One – with the alveolar “d” – means “river.” The other, with the retroflex “d,” means – loosely translated – an impolite “get out of here.”

The field linguist began by first writing things down using phonetic notation. Then, using methodologies that are beyond the scope of this entry to describe, the linguist would analyze the phonetic transcription of the language to determine which differences made a difference for native speakers and which did not. The linguist would then develop a phonemic notation to symbolize those differences.

What about the phonetic variations? To return to the earlier English example, a linguist would note that aspiration after a “p,” or any other “stop,” is *not* phonemic for English speakers. Instead, the linguist would posit a rule that aspiration occurs after a stop that begins a word which is then followed immediately by a vowel, a word like “pin.” This kind of phonemic rule lets the linguist use the single symbol “p” for both aspirated and unaspirated versions. The rule works for other stops in English as well, sounds like “b,” “t,” “d,” “k,” and “g.” Now, instead of writing a full phonetic transcription, the linguist can shift to a less cumbersome phonemic transcription that reflects the psychological significance of sounds to local speakers.

Now consider the earlier example from South India, the alveolar and the retroflex “d.” Since these two “d’s” do make a difference to speakers of Kannarese, a linguist has to represent that difference in the phonemic transcript. He can’t just use the single symbol “d.” Fortunately, the original phonetic notation with which the linguist began his work provides a way to write this difference down, usually with a dot under the “d” for the alveolar version and a wedge under the “d” for the retroflex.

In the 1960s, anthropology borrowed and shortened the linguist’s distinction between phonetic and phonemic and began talking about “etic” and “emic.” But the abbreviated concepts were applied to ethnography as a whole, not just to language. Just as in the case of phonetics, an etic approach meant an ethnographer described and explained events with a language external to the social world in which those events occurred. And like phonetics, the etic language of description might be rooted in human biology, as in Edward T. Hall’s studies of “proxemics,” his shorthand term for the use of social space (Hall 1959). Measures of physical distance or bodily motion served as the etic framework. Other etic

approaches drew on “outsider” languages from social theory, exemplified by Marvin Harris’s writings of the time (for a recent version of his arguments for etic ethnography which began in the 1960s, see Harris 1998). He advocated an etic framework grounded in his commitment to neo Marxian theory.

Halls’s proxemics, as the name suggests, was also emic, since his ultimate goal was to describe how different groups had different interpretations of social space. For example, one group might expect two people to stand closer than another group would during an informal conversation between strangers. Where such emic differences existed, a person from the former group would read the other as “cold,” while a person from the second group would read the first person as “pushy.”

The concept of emic ethnography flourished with the growth of cognitive anthropology (D’Andrade 1995), an approach that concerned itself with what was then called psychological reality. Their “phonetics” were assumed universals of human cognition, for example, taxonomy. Their “phonemics” were the way particular taxonomies of plants and animals were filled in by different peoples living in different parts of the world. Many other kinds of emic studies were done as well, involving local concepts and their organization, to reveal the variety of ways that people organized their experience, their emic, using their universal human capacity to do so, the etic.

Unfortunately, because of acrimonious debates between “materialist” or etic and “symbolic” or emic approaches to anthropology during the era, “etic” and “emic” turned into labels for competing kinds of ethnographic descriptions. This was a fundamental error, since neither the original linguistic concepts nor their development in cognitive anthropology had defined an “either/or” use of the terms. The shift to etic/emic as a partition of the ethnographic space rather than a process by which it was explored introduced distortion into the use of the terms that continues to this day. The question should not be, does one do emic or etic ethnography? The question should be, how does one tack back and forth between human universals and the particular shape that a social world takes at the time an ethnographer encounters it?

The emic/etic distinction appeared about half a century ago. With the many changes in the world and in our theories about it since then, the emic/etic distinction looks more complicated than it used to. It is worth considering a few examples here to foreshadow the future of the concepts, as well as to reflect on their past.

Phonetic/phonemic endows the linguist with the privileged position in language description. She is the one who defines the universals that limit what the local differences might be. She controls the methods that will make that determination, and she declares what the phonemic is and when it is done. With work in socio linguistics that began with Labov in the 1960s (Labov 1966), we learned that sound differences that were not “phonemic” according to the old 1950s approach in fact signaled important social meanings that convey a speaker’s and listener’s sense of identity and situation. Phonetic was more important than the original distinction allowed.

This problem of authority becomes even more striking when phonetic/phonemic in linguistics shifts to etic/emic in ethnography. What is the etic for humanity in general and who decides? What is the universal set of beliefs, values, or rules for behavior that cover all possible configurations that are human across regions and through history? And on what grounds would a researcher claim to know what they are whereas the subjects of his research could not? Recent anthropological debate centers on just this bias in an academic field that traditionally considered itself “culture free.” Those who privilege themselves to define the etic, one could argue, are just another kind of emic.

Say an encounter between an outsider and an insider is an encounter between two kinds of emic, not between an etic and an emic. In this formulation, the encounter is cast in a more egalitarian light. Two different meaning systems, two different emics, try to make sense out of each other, rather than an outsider with prior knowledge of universal human universals figuring out the locally relevant system that draws on that universal scheme. But what about the etic? Don’t universals play a necessary role in bridging local differences? They have to, or else no bridge would be possible. In our poststructural, postcolonial era, though, we see that the etic has also become more

complicated. There are no clear lines between “insider” and “outsider” in today’s world. In our transnational times we can expect that any two people who share a local social world will to some extent have different interpretations of that same world. The fact that they share activities will not imply a perfectly overlapping emic perspective. On the other hand, any two people from anywhere in the world will to some extent share interpretations of some phenomena, as soon as they meet, without any prior contact. They will partially overlap in emics, even though they have never had anything to do with each other directly.

With all these complications, what are we to make of the emic/etic distinction in contemporary research? It still has value as a general alert, a caution that what X says about what Y is doing or thinking probably doesn’t correspond to what Y would say, certainly not perfectly, sometimes off by several orders of magnitude. This fairly simple – and usually accurate – principle is worth contemplating for its breadth of application, its explanatory power, and its call for uses of the distinction in public policy. It is also worth contemplating why this simple principle is so seldom attended to.

A second enduring use of the emic/etic distinction returns us to its linguistic roots in the 1950s. One useful definition of ethnography is making sense out of human differences in terms of human similarities. Recall the early use of the phonetic/phonemic distinction as a tool to help a field linguist achieve exactly that goal. Phonetics laid out the human territory; phonemics described its particular shape among a particular group at a particular point in time.

Any ethnography is a mix of human universals and local histories. Without the universals, comprehension across differences would not be possible. Without the local histories, the universals would mislead when it came to understanding a different world. Here, etic and emic signal a still undeveloped strain of social research, one that celebrates the richness of particular human moments while at the same time integrating the various universal theories of the human situation that they bring to life. Long ago, Robert Redfield, engaged in a post World War II review of anthropology sponsored by the Social Science Research Council,

said that good ethnography was like good literature. It gave a “glimpse of the eternal in the ephemeral” (Redfield 1948). Etic and emic are ways, in ethnographic jargon, to continue the spirit of the wise writing of that ancestor. Etic and emic are both part of any human understanding, not distinct varieties of it.

SEE ALSO: Analytic Induction; Culture; Ethnography; Interviewing, Structured, Unstructured, and Postmodern; Observation, Participant and Non Participant

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emotion: cultural aspects

Jack Barbalet

The relationship between emotions and culture has been discussed ever since there was interest in what it means to be human, and since then that relationship has been contrastingly characterized as either inimical or reconcilable. Culture can be understood as the defining values, meanings, and thoughts of a local, national, or supranational community. When emotions are conceived in terms of psychological feelings and physical sensations, then they appear inimical to culture. This is because such a perspective suggests the involuntary nature and disorganizing consequence of emotions. The opposition between cognition as reason and

emotion, implicit in this representation, is classically defended in Plato's critique of dramatic poetry in the *Republic*, for instance. Plato's supposition that emotion is pleasure or pain dissociated from thought or knowledge was corrected, however, by Aristotle's more comprehensive appreciation of emotion as not merely physical but also cognitive, in which culture and emotions are reconciled.

In his treatment of anger, for instance, in *Rhetoric*, Aristotle agrees that emotion has a biological component, the physical sensation of pain, and also a complex cognitive component, including perception of an undeserved slight, and an intention, desire for revenge. Thus Aristotle distinguishes between emotions in terms of both the different physical sensations associated with them and their different cognitive or cultural elements: hatred and anger are different not just in their physical sensations, but also in the way in which each emotion conceives its object, as when Aristotle says that anger has an individual as its object whereas hatred applies to classes such as thieves or informers. Similarly, fear and shame are distinguished not just physically but cognitively, as expectation respectively of imminent harm or disgrace. There is something else, then, that should be noticed in this account, even though Aristotle does not make it explicit; namely, that imagination is important in the experience of emotion. Thus culture is unavoidable in emotion through a number of routes. The situation that provokes an emotion, as opposed to the physical or biological structure that supports it, is broadly cultural, and so is the intention it promotes; finally, thought itself or imagination may lead to emotional experience.

The different conceptions of the relation between emotion and culture found in Plato and Aristotle stand as models for all subsequent statements. Relevant changes in accounts of emotions since classical Athens have included improvement in understanding the physical structures and processes underlying emotions, but also a difficulty in maintaining the methodological reach of Aristotle's approach to the cultural dimensions of emotions. In the Middle Ages, for instance, because the only emotional commitment approved by the Church was love of Christ, emotions were seen as ardent,

vehement, and overpowering, as passions, a term unavoidably also associated with Christ's suffering. Any emotion apart from Christian devotion was thus regarded as subversive of religious faith and correspondingly condemned as irrational. By the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, probably through the emergent significance of market exchanges and diplomacy in which it was necessary to form a view of the intentions of others, an operational interest in emotions loosened from theological prejudice and emphasizing their expressive and rhetorical significance became the subject of numerous publications in France, Spain, and England. This trend was consummated in the eighteenth century discussion of moral sentiments, in which "moral" meant not merely ethical but especially social and cultural analysis, and "sentiments" implied the cognitive, even intellectual, content of emotions and feelings. From the nineteenth century, however, treatment of emotion focused on its physical basis at the expense of its ideational components, a development encouraged by enormous strides in anatomical, physiological, and neurological sciences. This trend was reinforced by subsequent psychological experimentation that treated only those emotions amenable to laboratory investigation – visceral, reactive, and of short duration – and thus reinforced the partial and limited idea that emotions disrupted thought and were therefore inimical to culture.

By the 1980s the cultural dimensions of emotions were again given their due. In some quarters this meant a focus on the cognitive elements of emotion to the exclusion of any thing else. This arose through a number of factors but was legitimated intellectually by broad recognition of the significance of what psychologists call the cognitive appraisal process, namely, that the type and intensity of an emotion elicited by an event depend on the subject's interpretation and evaluation of perception of its circumstance and environment. Psychologists recognized that this process is extremely complex involving both inordinately rapid and automatic central nervous system processes as well as more controlled and conscious activities, sociologically described as "interpretation and definition of the situation." The neurological revolution in emotions research came from focus on the first aspect of

this process and the constructionist theory of emotions from the second.

The majority of sociologists and anthropologists and large numbers of psychologists and philosophers who have written on emotions over the last 25 years believe that emotions are constructed by cultural factors. The constructionist position holds that emotional experiences depend on cultural cues and interpretations, and therefore that linguistic practices, values, norms, and currents of belief constitute the substance of experience of emotions (McCarthy 1994). Biological and even social structural factors are irrelevant for this approach. A corollary of constructionism is that persons can voluntarily determine the emotions they experience, that the cultural construction of emotions entails emotions management. The constructionist approach has enlivened discussion of emotions and drawn attention to the ways in which emotions are differentially experienced across societal divisions and through historical time. The object of any emotion will be influenced by prevailing meanings and values, as will the way emotions are expressed; thus what is feared and how people show fear, indeed how they may experience fear, will necessarily vary from culture to culture. The strength of this perspective is demonstrated by the fact that emotions attract cultural labels or names. In this way emotions become integrated into the broader conceptual repertoire of a culture and prevailing implicit cultural values and beliefs are infused into the meaning of named emotions (Russell 1991). Thus the notorious difficulty of translating emotion words from one language to another.

But by treating emotions exclusively as strategic evaluations derived from local meaning systems, the constructionist approach is arguably itself captive of cultural preferences. It is important to remember that emotions that escape cultural tagging are not thereby without individual and social consequence. Indeed, there is much evidence that socially important emotions are experienced below the threshold of conscious awareness and cannot be fully accounted for in only cultural terms (Scheff 1990). If culture shapes or constructs emotions, what is it that is shaped or constructed?

In a neglected but important discussion, Agnes Heller (1979) argues that cultural

adaptation of innate emotions involves elaboration of cognitive situational feelings that regulate them. These affective interpretations of emotions achieve their regulatory capacity by virtue of being secondary modifications of physically based affects or emotions, such as fear, that are provoked by events and expressive of them. Thus it is necessary to describe the cause of fear, for instance, in physical (endocrine/neurological) or social structural (insufficiency of power) terms, while the object of fear – what persons are afraid of – must largely be defined culturally. From this perspective the cognitive dimensions of emotions are not treated at the expense of their physical and social structural elements, but together with them. The real significance of this position, found in writers such as Norbert Elias (2000) and Émile Durkheim, is that it permits exploration of an aspect of the relationship between emotions and culture ignored by the constructionist approach, namely, the contribution emotions make to cultural experiences and components.

In *The Division of Labor in Society* (1893), Durkheim includes emotions within the category of collective conscience, the latter standing for a determinative cultural formation. In *The Elementary Forms of Religious Life* (1912), his treatment of cultural institutions refers to the sustaining importance of emotional effervescence. Ritual settings, argues Durkheim, provide a framework within which emotional experiences are formed, and the affective dimensions of the emotions and their directing energy give life to cultural practices and institutions. In particular, attention to common cultural objects, coordination of actions and symbolic gestures, and diffusion of orientation and practice through a society are all achieved as a result of emotional focus and contagion. Unlike constructionist arguments, Durkheim's discussion regards emotions as irreducible foundational forces of cognitive and cultural phenomena.

There are a number of ways in which emotions support and shape culture. Randall Collins (1990: 27), for instance, has suggestively claimed that values "are cognitions infused with emotion." This is an insightful corrective to the position found in sociology through the influence of Max Weber's approach, for instance, namely, that values and cognitions

operate through exclusion of emotions. Indeed, Adam Smith's pioneering cultural sociology, *The Theory of Moral Sentiments* (1759), shows how self judgment and judgment of the conduct of others are based in emotional appraisals, and how such emotions interact with what he calls custom and fashion. More recently and from a quite different perspective, Jonathan Turner (2000) demonstrates that emotions underlie not only attunement of interpersonal responses and social sanctioning, but also moral coding and the evaluations of social resources. On a more macrosociological level, it is useful to consider the composition of broad cultural temper in terms of underlying emotional patterns. Suggestive statements of the relevant processes are in papers by Joseph Bensman and Arthur Vidich (1962), and Joseph de Rivera (1992).

In their discussion of the differential impact, both positive and negative, on opportunities for income through movements in the business cycle, Bensman and Vidich indicate the sources of emotionally informed outlooks of distinct economically defined groups that impact on the broader societal culture, as when descending real income gives rise to status defensiveness and resentment of others. In a similar fashion, Rivera shows how political developments impact on the cultural ambience of whole societies through what he calls emotional climates. These studies point to the economic and political sources of the aggregation of collective emotional patterns from individual level emotions arising out of structured situations. The emotional climates that are identified in this process function as both orienting patterns of culture, which influence individual appraisals, and collective outcomes of individual emotional experiences.

The role of emotions in the construction of culture points not only to the composition of emotion but also significantly to its function. Emotions alert individuals to changes in and elements of their environment that are of concern to them, provide focus to situations in which these things are integral, and facilitate appropriate strategies to normalize these situations. That is, emotions both define the situations of persons and indicate what their interests are or intentions might be within them. It is a short step from this statement of the

function of emotion to one concerning the emotional contribution to culture. It was mentioned above that cultural regulation of emotion occurs through elaboration of cognitive situational feelings. It is likely that this process can be understood as emotional reaction to emotional experience, and that much cultural variation can be understood in this way. Jealousy, for example, is a widespread if not universal emotion. But in "traditional" or "Mediterranean" societies people are proud of their jealousy, whereas in "modern" or "western" societies people may be ashamed of it. Even the apparent absence of certain emotions from particular cultures can be explained in this way, as with Simmel's "blasé feeling," the emotional antidote to self regarding emotions under conditions of metropolitan life.

This discussion encourages reconsideration of the process of cultural appraisal or definition of the situation, which constructionists typically explain through application of "feeling rules." But artifacts such as feeling rules, following Bourdieu, might better be understood as outcomes rather than determinants of practices. That insult of Untouchables leads to acquiescence rather than anger may be explained through cognitive appraisal implicit in Hindu religious belief, in which gratitude results from receiving caste deserts. But such cultural explanations fail to account for the sustained coercion by higher caste persons in maintaining Untouchable subservience, or the mass conversions of Untouchables to Islam or Christianity when opportunity permits. Alternatively, constraints of social inferiority provide a sufficient structural antecedent precondition to account for Untouchable emotional experience of apathy and hopelessness, emotions that contribute to Untouchable culture. In this account, social structural relations elicit emotional reactions that then contribute to cultural experience (Kemper 1978; Barbalet 1998).

Not all social relations generative of emotional experience are current or past; they may also be imagined. Imagined relations are central to future oriented emotions, such as fear, anxiety, and hope, but also vicarious emotions in which persons at some level and in some manner imagine themselves to be others. This latter form is especially important for an

understanding of cultural experiences led by entertainment and advertising industries that pervade, indeed dominate, the present (Illouz 2003). As the rapid communication and electronic projection of images stimulating vicarious emotions are characteristic of modern commercial culture, so the significance of emotions for the support of cultural experience is to that degree reinforced.

SEE ALSO: Affect Control Theory; Emotion: Social Psychological Aspects; Emotion Work; Emotions and Economy; Emotions and Social Movements

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emotion: social psychological aspects

Leslie Wasson

People may perceive emotion as residing in the individual and composing some portion of personal subjective experience. However, certain common patterns of emotional experience exist. We have shared social definitions of emotions, which are generally recognized and which can be evoked or referenced in socially appropriate situations. These emotion norms then become incorporated into the definition of the situation. While psychology and psychiatry have investigated emotions as internal to the individual, sociology has only recently contributed a social, interactionist analysis of emotion, or affect, to scholarly discourse.

The sociological approach to the study of emotion rests on a two stage theory of emotion. The first stage is an internal state of biological arousal, and the second is a reflexive process using situational cues to interpret or identify which emotion is an appropriate response in that situation (Rosenberg 1990). There may also be a process of negotiation with others as to the emotional definition of the situation.

One of the most fundamental issues in the sociology of emotions is the tension between universality and variability in the experience and expression of emotions, particularly the emotions of shame or embarrassment, since these are so evocative of sympathy or empathy from situated others. Data from cross cultural research imply that the type of community or social structure is a determining factor in the variability of emotional experience and expression. Yet, when we behold expressions of certain emotions from other societies, such as the grief of the Iranians at the death of Ayatollah Khomeini, we have little difficulty recognizing the emotions they represent (Flaherty 1991). Universality, then, may be found in the subjective experience and expression of these emotions, and variability is found in the situations in which these emotions are negotiated as appropriate responses.

The sociology of emotions claims adherents from two different theoretical orientations:

positivists and constructionists. Extreme positivists would assert that there are affective roles which are coercive or deterministic in their effect on people's behavior and emotions, and that these emotions are somehow "hardwired," or biologically inherent in the human species. From this standpoint, the individual would presumably feel only those emotions that were appropriate to the operative role. While not denying the existence and influence of affective roles and conventions, the constructionist paradigm states that these affective roles are manipulated and negotiated situationally by the individual through interaction with other participants. Under the constructionist paradigm, an individual might or might not feel appropriately in a given situation, but may in fact be giving a sufficiently convincing portrayal of the emotional conventions for the interaction to proceed as negotiated (Goffman 1959). These two positions define the extremes of a theoretical continuum. Presumably, many sociologists would employ some combination of the two positions, such as the social psychological approach discussed below, which focuses on structural influences on individual experiences of emotion.

In keeping with this distinction between determinism and constructionism, the sociology of emotions literature demonstrates many other analytical and theoretical differences common to much of sociology as a whole. The most important theoretical or analytical differences are as follows: cognition vs. emotion, structure vs. interaction, biology vs. socialization or political economy (e.g., gender), the social control of emotions vs. emotional forms of social control, and physiology vs. phenomenology (Kemper 1990). Similarly, the chief methodological debates center on questions of quantitative vs. qualitative methods of analysis, and prediction vs. description. Although there are significant areas of overlap, one convenient way to characterize the field of sociology of emotions is to examine it in terms of symbolic interactionist approaches and social psychological approaches.

Traditional sociological examinations of the self (Mead (1962 [1934]); Goffman 1959) have generally left open the question of emotion. Emotion has often been mentioned in passing, relegated to the discipline of psychology, or

carefully skirted in treatises on motivation or motive. Social psychological research on emotions had until recently focused extensively on the use and recognition of physiological cues connected to emotional states, primarily under experimental conditions.

There are some notable exceptions, however. In 1962, Schachter and Singer undertook an experiment to test the source of emotional definitions of the situation. Their participants were injected with substances that stimulated states of physiological arousal for which there were no affective cues in the situation. Subjects were then provided with cognitive cues toward one or another emotion. After controlling for the influences of the experimental setting, Schachter and Singer concluded that, although physiological arousal is necessary to emotion, it is not sufficient. Cognitive or, in symbolic interactionist terms, situational cues or definitions indicated the appropriate emotion label for the participants.

Affective arousal can be ambiguous, but so can situations. Certainly, something is happening physiologically that we are interpreting as the presence or occurrence of emotion. However, the same physiological sensations may be defined as any one (or more) of a variety of emotions, or, in some cases, as symptoms of illness. Affective roles do exist and are passed along through socialization. However, the implementation of all or part of these affective roles is subject to a good deal of interpretation and negotiation. While the affective convention is the unquestioned default for many situations, the endless variation of human interactions (and their sometimes unanticipated consequences) creates environments in which improvisation may be the most successful interaction strategy for the individual.

Gross and Stone (1964) wrote a pioneering article on the emotion of embarrassment, in which they proposed a theoretical justification for the treatment of embarrassment (and, by association, emotions in general) as a social phenomenon. Gross and Stone contributed two key ideas to the study of embarrassment. First, they commented on the social nature of embarrassment, and pointed out that certain situations are more prone to the effects of embarrassment than others (i.e., situations requiring "continuous and coordinated role performance" [1964:

116]). Second, they pointed out that certain situated identities are more precarious than others, and are therefore more prone to embarrassment, such as the identity of adolescents. Early work by Goffman (1959) also indicated that emotions could be described as forms of situated interaction.

Research in the sociology of emotions has, to some extent, left out the feeling actor, whether as researcher or as participant. It may leave unexamined the tension between reflecting and feeling described by Mills and Kleinman (1988). Mills and Kleinman suggest that reflexivity (or cognition) and emotionality are not two ends of the same continuum, but rather two entirely different processes. This approach suggests one possible resolution of the cognition versus emotion debate.

Randall Collins (1990) argues that emotions are the third element of a core theory of society, along with structure and cognition. Emotions, for Collins, make up a "moral order" in society, without which social solidarity would not be possible. Emotions then become a medium of exchange, in which emotional energy is the coin. Collins's model is unusual in that he portrays the positive emotions as being of high emotional energy, and the negative emotions are perceived as low emotional energy. Emotional interaction is a manifestation of structural needs in this model, and, in a sense, the needs of this market structure predict individuals' emotional states.

Hochschild (1979) proposes a conceptualization of emotion which resembles that of Collins (1990), but which provides greater autonomy for the subjective individual. Her model links structure and interaction via ideology to explain ways in which structure influences or limits emotion. She proposes a gender strategy of emotion management (as well as a class or ethnic strategy) to explain differences in expressivity between men and women. Hochschild contends that the public ideology of emotion (the situational emotion norm) becomes the private (or at least the appearance of the private) experience. Gordon (1990) provides a treatment of structural effects on emotion resembling that of Hochschild (1979). However, his mechanism for the influence of structure and culture on emotional states is language rather than ideology. His "open system" model has four

components: bodily sensations, expressive gestures and actions, a social situation or relationship, and emotional culture.

Kemper (1990) provides a more interactionally based, if also more deterministic, picture of emotions in social relations by calling for a systematic codification of situational conditions that predict emotions. Kemper compares these systematic rules to the laws of motion or physics. However, his formulation cannot account for the deviance phenomena or for the frequent occurrence of mixed emotions and ambivalence.

Theories of socialization have postulated the existence of learned patterns of emotional experience (Schott 1979). Through internalization of emotion norms in early socialization, individuals learn what emotions are appropriate to types of situations, and are therefore equipped to manage situated emotional identities. At minimum, an examination of emotional socialization and the uses of emotions in social control provides some idea of the contents of the emotional and interactional resources carried by individuals from one encounter to another. At about age 1 year 6 months, a child shows tenderness or affection toward significant others. However, it is not until the age of 5 or 6 that the child recognizes the selfhood of themselves and others. This development of the "looking glass self" (Cooley 1902) allows the growing social actor to experience sympathy or empathy, which Shott considers a prerequisite for the adoption of the "role taking" emotions of pride, shame, or envy.

A figurative or virtual audience, which Mead (1962 [1934]) might have identified as the "generalized other," serves an internal regulative function similar to that provided by the literal social audience. Feeling rules and the consequent emotion work are the media through which the self learns to control his or her own behavior and feelings. This conforms to Schott's (1979) assertion that emotional social control becomes articulated in adult society as emotional self control. This is not the social control of emotions, but rather the attribution of an emotional social control from within the individual.

The development of a sociology of emotions has led to the formulation of several conceptual

models and middle range theories. In the intellectual dialogue surrounding the formulation of these constructs, theoretical, epistemological, and methodological issues have arisen. Theoretical issues in the sociology of emotions include the familiar debate between positivists and constructionists, and structural or cultural versus interactional causal arguments. Epistemological questions regarding the relative functions of cognition versus emotion are still being debated, and questions of objective emotional symbols versus subjective emotion and introspection have been posed by emotions researchers.

Contemporary research on emotions in the symbolic interactionist tradition is alive and well. A sample of recent publications might include: Lois (2001) on emotions in a volunteer search and rescue group, Lundgren (2004) on social feedback and self appraisals, and Sharpe (2005) on the emotional labor exercised by adventure guides.

Sociologists who posit a predictive, interactionally based model for emotion, called affect control theory, include David Heise and Lynn Smith Lovin (Smith Lovin & Heise 1988). An essential component of affect control theory is the belief that there are set patterns of emotional response that are situationally specific, and therefore predictable. Affect control theorists program a computer to model human affective responses based on situational inputs. If the researcher enters the proper contextual elements, supposedly the computer can predict the affective state of participants in the situation. This is a fairly structural model of emotionality. Affect control theory is concerned with prediction rather than description, and with objective emotional responses to situational contexts rather than the subjective experience of particular emotions.

Some researchers in the social psychology of emotion utilize quantitative or structural methods and models to measure the correlations between particular emotions and situational conditions or social arrangements (Robinson et al. 2004). Their research findings have implications at the micro level for the transformation of emotions in social group or organizational contexts, and at the macro level for the recognition of the influence of larger social characteristics and institutions on emotion.

Other examples of contemporary researchers using a social psychological framework might include Lawler (2001) on using an affect theory to explain social exchange, or Van Kleef et al. (2004) on the interpersonal effects of emotions in negotiations.

FUTURE DIRECTIONS

Some research on socialization supports the assertion that emotion rules and conventions are learned by novice social actors as part of the socializing process. Through interaction with caregivers, and later with peers, "the child gradually constructs a conception of the whole emotion with its components" (Gordon 1990: 159). Emotional socialization reflects the social position of the individual in the social structure as well as the prevailing emotional culture norms. However, less empirical research has been forthcoming on the mechanics of acquiring emotion norms or feeling rules.

Research on emotions is beginning to occur in disciplines besides sociology. In history, for example, one might read Strange (2002) on death, grief, and mourning among the working class at the turn of the twentieth century. In philosophy one might read Nichols (2002) on the role of emotion in cultural evolution, or in the theory literature Reed (2004) on emotions in revolutions.

Empirical research that explores the relationships among emotions, identities, socialization, and social control is needed to ground theoretical constructions about emotional social control. Research should explore not only the specific mechanisms through which emotional social control is exercised, but also the conditions under which these control efforts vary. This intersection of self and society, in which the internal characteristics of the individual come to replicate and reinforce the external structures of society, is an essential connection between micro and macrosociology.

SEE ALSO: Affect Control Theory; Cooley, Charles Horton; Emotion: Cultural Aspects; Emotion Work; Identity: Social Psychological Aspects; Mead, George Herbert; Psychological Social Psychology; Symbolic Interaction

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emotion work

Jackie Eller and Renata Alexandre

INTELLECTUAL AND SOCIAL CONTEXT

Emotion, hence emotion work, has been considered in the work of many early sociologists, such as Durkheim, Simmel, and Weber (see Barbalet 2002; Turner 2006), but it was not until Hochschild's work in the 1970s and 1980s that a sociology of emotions was taken seriously. Although today's researchers do not always agree with Hochschild on a precise definition of emotions, or how best to study them, there is general agreement that emotions are socially defined, made meaningful within socio-historical situations, and critical to any analysis of social interaction.

Drawing on the symbolic interactionist perspective and the rich heritage of Mills and Goffman, Hochschild (2003) states that an emotion has a signal function that communicates information telling us where we stand in

relation to the situation, to social expectations, to ourselves, and to other actors. Furthermore, emotions are managed (emotion work) through situationally and culturally relevant feeling rules so that ideally each encounter with others receives its expected and appropriate amount of feeling. Emotion work, according to Hochschild, is the management of one's emotions in private contexts, in contrast to emotional labor which is the management of feeling in public contexts. Context gives meaning to the *exchange value* of emotional labor (managing self and others' emotions as an aspect of one's labor power; commercialization of feeling in the marketplace) and the *use value* of emotion work, but both refer to the evocation, transformation, or suppression of one's feeling through surface and deep acting. Surface acting is purposeful management of behavioral expression so that one appears to feel the emotion called for in a given situation. Deep acting, on the other hand, refers to one's efforts to construct the genuine emotion that underlies the expected behavioral expression.

Of particular interest in Hochschild's examinations of emotion work and emotional labor have been gendered expectations within organizations and the costs of emotional inauthenticity, noting that women have historically shouldered the burden of emotion work in the household and in the workforce, specifically within the service industry. Her work helped to make visible this invisible labor done inordinately by women, as well as to stimulate studies of emotional labor of Wal-Mart greeters, midwives, paralegals, and academics, among others.

CHANGES OVER TIME

A great deal of research on emotions has been conducted over the past 30 years clearly indicating their significance in understanding social interaction and organizations. Research has also reiterated the importance of status, specifically gender, on emotional expectations and management. The major change though, has been in the agreement that emotion management (the more likely used synonymous term for emotion work) occurs within many work and work-unrelated contexts beyond the household and service industry and that it is a complex process

of managing self and others (e.g., Thoits 1996). Somewhat in contrast to Hochschild's work, the study of the sociology of emotion in the last couple of decades also tends to interpret cultural norms as being less influential on human behavior and attaches more authority to human agency with regard to emotion work.

CURRENT AND FUTURE EMPHASES

Drawing on such approaches as affect control theory, which "posits that sentiments about role identities, behaviors, settings, and individual attributes and emotions interrelate through three dimensions of affect" (Lively & Heise 2004: 1110), social constructionism, power and structural theories, and the deviance literature in addition to Hochschild's theory, current research on emotion work can be organized into four general, often overlapping, categories: (1) a particular identity, emotion (e.g., guilt, shame, remorse, anger, jealousy, envy, ambivalence, or anxiety) and its management in given situations (e.g., in the context of being ill or in response to the illness of others, as an aspect of terrorism, tragedy, or personal failure); (2) gender, emotions and emotion management, particularly within the context of feminist analyses (on gender and emotion, see Simon & Nath 2004); (3) emotion management within widely varying organizations (e.g., prisons, legal profession, among paramedics and firefighters, medical arenas, academia, service organizations, and commercial leisure) and social movement activism (e.g., women's rights, environment, animal rights, among hate groups, and in recruitment efforts); and (4) negative and deviant emotions (emotions or emotional expressions perceived as threatening to social order either for their connection to criminal behaviors or their inappropriateness to the social context). The management of remorse, for example, has been examined in the context of trials and jury deliberations.

As emotion work is first and foremost an interactive process, the majority of research is qualitative in nature, including participant observation, ethnographic, narrative, in depth interviewing, or focus groups. However, there is a significant body of research based in affect control theory which draws on mathematical

models to predict emotions called forth in particular situations and hence an examination of the likelihood and extent of emotion work (Heise 2002; Smith Lovin 1995). In fact, Lively and Heise (2004) use survey data to analyze the integration of emotion management and affect control theories which has led to broader micro and macrosociological understandings of emotion in social interaction.

An interesting business application of social science emotions research is found in the work place. Businesses/employers understand that they can gain in sales, repeat customers, and work place relations by facilitating effective emotion management among employees. In fact, this ability to effectively monitor, understand, use, and change one's own and others' emotional expressions is commonly referred to as one's emotion intelligence.

In his "Lifetime Achievement Award Acceptance Statement" (Emotions Section of the American Sociological Association) (2003), Kemper envisioned that the future study of emotions and emotion work would reflect the pervasiveness of emotions in social life, examining them in all institutional sectors of society and in large and small groups. His vision is apparently becoming a reality.

SEE ALSO: Affect Control Theory; Disneyization; Emotion: Cultural Aspects; Emotion: Social Psychological Aspects; Emotions and Economy; Emotions and Social Movements

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emotions and economy

Jocelyn Pixley

Emotions and economy, according to orthodoxy, are as far apart as passions from rationality. Some classical sociologists removed emotion categories from modernity; for others, emotions are significant (Durkheim and Simmel), uniform “residues,” sentiments (Pareto), or ambiguously traditional (Weber). Economics, with honorable exceptions (like Adam Smith), associates emotions with irrationality. Economy is the home of instrumental rational action. This distinction is completely inconsistent with uncertainty.

Social action oriented to future economic provision or gain must be launched by emotions, often below cognitive awareness. Dull compulsion may involve low levels of emotional energy, whereas emotions are heightened by choices which depend – tenuously – on future outcomes of relationships. Rationality and, preferably, reason can play a role in decisions, but only by accepting the future as inaccessible. In practice, this is hard to do (Pixley 2004). Uncertainties – possibly greatest in monetary economies – are here not trivial but “matter”: there may be vulnerabilities to losses, broken promises, or threatening prospects of a damaged reputation from mistakes or default. In face of perceived and unperceived, unimaginable futures, a range of emotions is involved in this largely internal process (i.e., endogenous, not just exogenous, as neoclassical theory concedes, at least). Specific anticipatory emotions disregard, play down, or help suppress the future’s unknowability, and so provoke decisions and action. Gullibility, distrust, trust,

caution, and fear are the main emotions in forming expectations. Such practices are colloquially called consulting gut feelings, soothsaying, intuition, or, more grandly, prognostications.

With the later outcomes or unexpected events come equally uncontrollable emotions, immediately and then retrospectively cast. All are just as diverse and unpredictable. Expected outcomes may lead to smugness, *entscheidungsdräudig* (joy in decision making), arrogance, or vice versa: grim confirmation, even despair. Unexpected outcomes give shock and anger, or relief, whereas the unintended events (a backfire) may provoke shame or *schadenfreude*.

Emotion categories are theoretically included in economy by a number of contemporary sociologists (e.g., Collins, Kemper, and Barbalet) and economists (e.g., Heilbroner, Hirschman, and potentially Minsky), but excluded from both ends of the ideological spectrum (Pixley 1999). Orthodox economic theories of “markets,” even of “firms,” assume rational actors can make predictions, while Soviet theories of command economies assumed that planning overcomes uncertainty. In practice, command economies removed choice and devolved anxiety, fear, or fatalism onto workers and, basically, whole populations. But “in theory,” trust and trepidation play no role in decisions: in neoclassical theory, failures occur mainly from *the intrusion* of emotions – as would a “virus” or psychological “disability” – and their complete irrationality. Few sociologists have any faith in probability theory or fervent conviction in planning. In fact, both types of positivism deny choice and the unknowability of the future. Yet sociologists are not usually well versed in Keynesian notions of expectations, or how these “govern” economic action. In the Keynesian view, because decision makers do not know the future, they act on “imagination and hope” (Shackle 1972).

Typical emotions are diverse, then, and depend on the prevailing economic and cultural arrangements (Luhmann). Emotions also vary by status, class, other social positions (resentment, humiliation), and further vary by phases in the business cycle (Barbalet; Collins). Orthodox economics, however, reduces human motivation to a universal and *timeless* emotion, namely, greed, cast at the macro level of an aggregate of individuals. Its watered down

version – “interest” – is said to be rational, not emotional like greed or avarice. “Interest” comprises orthodoxy’s hope for theoretically predictable models. But events are not predictable, *nor is greed* (Pixley 2002): outcomes of its pursuit are unknowable and even identifying what future interests “will be” is fraught. In contrast to economics, sociological perspectives include a whole range of likely emotions induced by various factors. Individuals, in aggregate, sharing a common social experience (rural labor for survival, or modern unemployment) may share similar emotions. Luhmann distinguishes premodern emotions – of faith in, or resignation to, fortune and fate – from modern, strategic emotions of trust for gain. Other sociologists focus on group emotions arising out of interactions between members. Durkheimian ideas about the emotional power of ritual processes which foster collective symbols, and the way effervescence in group life can spread contagiously, have been taken up by economic historians. Contagions, “manias,” or panics may cause an emotional “climate” – a depression, irrational exuberance, or animal spirits. Unsurprisingly, this is seen as invariably dysfunctional. In contrast, emotion research shows that impersonal organizations *require and elicit specific emotions*, some cognitively managed and others below the threshold of awareness.

When the term “economy” is reduced to a machine like entity or sole aim like “maximizing utility or profits under scarcity” – “constrained maximization” – or action directed to “means of survival,” it is difficult to identify relevant emotions. Aristotle’s distinction between householding – *oikonomia* – and *chrematistics* is useful to make comparisons and to direct research on emotions to the various ways of “studying up” and “studying down.” Expectations in the first, *oikonomia*, may entail emotions of caution, prudence, and trepidation, because householding is long term management for increasing value and conserving resources for the members of the household and their future generations. The second, *chrematistics* – manipulation of property and wealth for short term returns to the owner – presupposes a continual future orientation with all its anticipatory emotions like distrust and hope.

Modern households have “expectations” somewhere between these cautious and relentless

future gazing poles. Engaged in both market and non market economic activities, households are only marginal economic decision makers in either householding or manipulative terms (*oikonomia* or *chrematistics*), being so dependent on broader social relations. Households form expectations that depend on crucial decisions in corporate and bureaucratic domains, and must cope with intended, unintended, and unexpected consequences of decisions imposed top down.

Constant short term manipulation of wealth or cautious long term conservation are both beyond the effective capacity of modern households in aggregate. It is true that a rise or fall in consumption patterns, in “climates” of depression, confidence, or exuberance, can easily effect great change, but modern households are positioned by the money economy. Thus Simmel sees cynicism and the blasé attitude not only as typical emotional and defensive responses to the market, but also as the emotional sources for modern rationality. Even so, present and future orientations provoke different levels of emotional intensity. The unknowable future can be “unbearable” at the economic peak, but plays a reduced role in domestic and much paid labor (i.e., *oikonomia*), with their focus on immediate tasks and skills. Service sector, creative, professional, productive, and unpaid caring tasks are absorbing and present oriented, often with low level economic emotions: pride in a job well done (or self blame) and generally vague confidence in large scale organizations (like banks) or anxiety about future life chances of family members.

Confidence is a matter of lack of choice: if misfortune occurs (e.g., from a corporate collapse), blame is cast elsewhere at the actors making decisions to trust the unknowable future. If paid labor requires cut throat competition, trust and fearlessness may be required from above: this often induces recklessness and necessary scapegoats after the fallout. These are corporate policy issues. Emotions also vary according to historical memory of economic events across all economic and political spheres, and how the household sector is positioned by states, corporations, and markets (short term manipulation) and social movements’ impact on states (long term conservation policies “from below”).

In democratic welfare states where many households are mutual or social property owners, through state pensions, public housing and health, anxiety may be reduced by the “freedom from fear” of joblessness or homelessness. Under privatized arrangements, households are positioned – indirectly – as individually “responsible” property owners through banks, real estate markets, and investment fund firms. Individuals may be enthusiastic speculators from a contagion of optimism fostered by the investment firms dealing in stock and property markets. Others may experience anger, cynicism, or fear when let down by their confidence or loyalty in banks and corporations. Lack of confidence in economic institutions varies among countries. The principle of “buyer beware” implies a distrust that is ineffectual for lone individuals if consumer regulations are weak. Confidence in the safety of products for sale may hold under more regulated regimes (usually brought about by social movement protest).

These emotions connected with economy may seem starkly different from Weber’s line that affective emotional action is opposed to goal directed rational action. Yet Weber’s analysis of passionately held values to guide rational action, the modern loss of brotherliness, and his famous attribution of extreme anxiety to Puritans facing the uncertainty of everlasting damnation all suggest his ambivalence toward emotions. Whether the rise of capitalism depended, unintendedly, on an anticipatory emotion focused on predestination, today, corporate and financial attempts to control the future are routine.

Modern large scale organizations are highly future oriented and relentlessly engaged in short term decisions (the “iron cage”). The more competitive the situation, the more actors tend to rely on trust and distrust. Inside the mighty investment firms, emotions and their physiological symptoms – sweaty palms, rapid pulse – are fairly well documented. Fearlessness and arrogance are standard operating procedures to cope with daily uncertainty and to avoid the future abyss altogether (the latter point also argued by the late Robert Heilbroner). Traders who learn fear are often sacked because it takes time to unlearn fear. This intensity of the preoccupation with the future

is emotion generating. It is extremely hard to *accept* the inaccessible future if one is constantly dealing in it. This may explain the attractions of orthodox rational choice and rational expectations – in providing business with a sense of certainty – owing to their theoretical inability to conceptualize present and future. Likewise, futurists (from Toffler to Bell) offer their comforting technological determinism, and so too, at worst, do financial “gurus.” Yet temptations to gain and use “insider” knowledge are ubiquitous. It is the illegal recourse to a “sure thing” (and “unfair” in breaking stock exchange, or horse racing, rules of spreading “risk”) which emphasizes the unknowability of the future. Also, why insure if the future is “certain”? Herein lies the ambiguity between prudence, speculation, and gambling: life insurance started with gambling on “lives,” but needed legislation so as not to “hasten deaths.”

The business and financial world is preoccupied by the future – indeed, “overwhelmed by numbers” – with endless forecasts and inquiries into the “state” of individuals’ current feelings (business and consumer confidence surveys). However, economists conduct little research on the emotions essential to future gazing. In contrast, contemporary sociology has developed an impressive literature on trust and risk. This includes warnings about collapsing the future into the present, on the unavoidable and often highly rational emotions like trust, the institutions of impersonal trust, and the reflexivity of risk society. But the focus tends to be on risk, not the “radical uncertainty” argued by Keynesians (money being radically uncertain).

Economists mostly see emotions as irrational sources of error (and, save for “interest,” unpredictable), whatever their disputes about uncertainty. Pareto lies somewhere midway between marginalist economics and sociology. His conservative conclusions about emotions dictating all social action are partially behind today’s elitist assumptions about the “masses” or “mom and dad investors” suffering from irrational exuberance or panics. In this view, emotions apparently do not afflict rational or “smart” financiers. Pareto is more ambivalent. Rational actions *mainly* arise from “interest,” whereas non rational or “non logical” actions originate in sentiments or “residues” which are

ideologically justified in “derivations,” most notably or coldly by elites. Although these extra-rational or irrational elements of human nature lead to “errors,” there are positive aspects to non-logical rituals. In Pareto’s view, relatively changeless sentiments are best manipulated by “elites” (Meisel 1965; Finer 1966).

Although Pareto qualifies the economic view of rationality, his conservatism influenced managerial theories (Burnham) about rational decision making being an exclusive “property” of elites. But the modern economy faces *radical uncertainty* with frequent outcomes – quite frankly – of gross corporate errors. The future cannot be controlled by unknowable future “interests” or calculated by probabilistic risk. Risk is the only future for neoclassical approaches, rational choice theory, and behaviorists (apart from external “shocks” or allegedly neutral “technical change”). Neoclassical economics argues predictions are possible, and denounces emotion per se as an irrational interference at the level of its microeconomic models. Behavioral economists take another line on risk, and use emotions as another *deus ex machina* to explain unexpected events, such as “irrational exuberance” and crashes. For behaviorists, “people” fail because they lack mathematical skills or forget basic skills – in fact, often blinded by their models of a risk-free future. This makes them all “overconfident,” leading to mistakes in calculating probability, not because no one knows the future.

The distinction between risk and uncertainty was set out clearly by Frank Knight (see Pixley 2004: 35). Risk must comprise a set of known chances to be measurable. Anything that is unmeasurable is a true uncertainty: this was taken up by Keynes and Hayek, later by Minsky. Keynesians, institutionalists, and chaos theorists insist on radical uncertainty, not a future of mere risk. The weather is “only moderately uncertain” compared to the unpredictability of finance (Keynes 1937: 24). Probability can only be assessed “objectively” by comparing invariant factors, such as two dice and a table. Subjective probability is about imagining completely incompatible and unknowable futures which cannot be weighed or compared: extrapolation is frequently pointless.

Economic and financial forecasting is usually published with a *ceteris paribus* escape clause;

however, “other things” rarely remain equal because forecasting is about past, recorded trends of discrete factors, not endlessly surprising “new” endogenous events, nor policy changes, external events, and their unimaginable combinations. Forecasts tend to “cluster” due to forecasters’ competitive fear of being alone and wrong. These are reputation issues which matter inordinately in economic action, yet reputations are always retrospective: a reputation is built on lack of contrary evidence, whereas a potential default or mistake can only be imagined.

In addition, during the last 30 years, money has been treated as a commodity capable of infinite trading, but money involves claims and credits, a social relation itself (Ingham 2004). This commodification of promises and privatization of social or mutual security into “securities” has heightened the emotions of distrust and gullibility. Such a climate of oscillating emotions – anxiety, hope, anger, and fear – is due to the excessive impact of financial trading and demands for shareholder value on the “non-financial” sector (itself heavily trading in securities and debt these days). It explains, more starkly, how cynicism and the blasé attitude are recreated once trust is broken.

A major unresolved research issue in emotions and economy is the extent to which trust is *only* an emotion or is completely strategic: this is a huge debate (e.g., Cook; Swedberg). Another is about how to characterize impersonal, interorganizational relations as emotional. Emotions create physiological symptoms in individuals. Faceless organizations cannot be said to “feel” any more than they “think” or have a “conscience.” One debate is over how emotions are institutionalized in specific organizations. A more controversial dispute is how interorganizational relationships are emotionally structured. For example, the organizations in the business of impersonal trust, like credit rating agencies and accountancy firms, are required to *access the future*. They are paid to predict what amount of capital will be needed in the future or how creditworthy a firm or country will be. All other sectors rely on these predictions and some collapse when inevitable failures occur. Reputations for trustworthiness are lost, credibility disappears under claims and counterclaims about which organization is to blame. Huge global banks were “bedazzled”

by the arrogance of long term capital management in 1998, said the chair of the US Federal Reserve, a disaster which apparently brought the entire financial “system” to near collapse (until its bailout). Methodologically, it is difficult to account for endogenous emotions like “bedazzlement” among “organizations,” if they can only be “felt” by the office bearers of those entities: competition plays a part, but also the virtuosity of *entscheidungsdfreudig*, as Neil Smelser alluded to, in passing, years ago.

This question of credibility is not tautological (i.e., credibility means “believability”) if one includes social processes of attribution (Mieg 2001). Meso level struggles over attributions are continuous, as evident in lawsuits and public relations campaigns. Private and public institutional reputations can be subject to impression management for only so long. The point at which such “confidence games” start to resemble “con games” is unpredictable, but these processes (“rituals” even?) are ubiquitous, as evident in the way that struggles over attributions of success, failure, and blame are reported daily in the business news.

Many post war Keynesian policymakers hoped to *reduce emotions* from economy with demand management and global control over money. They hoped to provide stability by trying to give certainty to the convention that the future will validate present decisions. For sociological emotions research, emotions are not irrational, needless intrusions into economy, nor extraneous and dysfunctional interferences with economic action. In this conception emotions are unavoidable, although cautious emotions (required SOPs) would provide more stability than corporate demands for fearlessness. Past data – rational calculations, extrapolated under the convention that the past continues into the future – combine with retrospective emotions about outcomes of previous decisions (and outcomes of attribution struggles). These retrospective feelings and extrapolations create an imagined future, while a projected hope, trust, or distrust motivates decisions and *moves* a boardroom to act today: after the event, these emotions can rapidly turn into their contraries: shame, anger, disappointment, or relief; smugness for “prescience” and foolish arrogance.

Contemporary debates on emotions and economy have been revived by renewed sociological

analysis of emotions in general: one future direction that needs developing is research on emotions at “global” interorganizational levels. Another is the problem of trust in face of the unbearable future.

SEE ALSO: Attribution Theory; Durkheim, Émile; Economic Sociology: Neoclassical Economic Perspective; Emotion: Cultural Aspects; Emotion, Social Psychological Aspects; Emotion Work; Emotions and Social Movements; Luhmann, Niklas; Positivism; Rational Choice Theory (and Economic Sociology); Risk, Risk Society, Risk Behavior, and Social Problems; Simmel, Georg; Smith, Adam; Weber, Max

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emotions and social movements

Guobin Yang

Emotions are spontaneous, self induced, or externally produced self feelings. Examples include positive feelings of love, loyalty, pride, joy, and enthusiasm and negative feelings of hatred, sympathy, fear, anger, sorrow, sadness, jealousy, shame, and dejection. Emotions are both embodied and take symbolic forms. A sense of anger or joy has tell tale somatic signs; often, it finds symbolic expression in voice, gestures, words, and tones, not to mention literary and artistic forms.

Emotions have a distinct social character. They often occur in social situations and arise out of social interactions. A society has its emotion culture, which sets social rules and norms for the appropriate kinds of emotions on specific occasions and for the legitimate ways of publicly expressing emotions. The emotion culture of a society embodies and expresses the values of that society. If a feeling of indignation is directed at an act of injustice, it is because society condemns injustices. Emotion culture therefore resembles a habitus, an embodied cultural and social milieu that shapes feeling and action. Practical action activates emotion culture and is guided by it.

Emotions condition and accompany collective action and social movements. Their absence or presence, as well as the types and intensity of emotions present, underpin every phase of a social movement from emergence to

decline. Preexisting social networks of friends and neighbors are crucial for mobilization – they are networks of trust and loyalty. Events of social injustice may provoke moral shocks, indignation, and anger and thus move citizens to action. Once initial mobilization starts, the emotional dynamics of collective action become complex and fluid. Both movement activists and their opponents perform emotion work in order to shape the outcomes of the movement. Activists strive to build emotional solidarity and a sense of collective identity. Opponents typically attempt to sow fear as a deterrent to collective action. When this happens, movement participants mobilize “encouragement mechanisms” (Goodwin & Pfaff 2001) such as communal gatherings to manage fear.

These “encouragement mechanisms” are among many possible practices used by movement activists to reduce negative emotions and create positive emotional energy. Activists’ emotion work varies depending on whether it is directed at themselves, at the public, or at opponents. The most common practice is rituals. Rituals encompass a wide range of patterned and ceremonial activities such as anniversary celebrations and public parades. As Émile Durkheim long ago understood, rituals create emotional effervescence and revitalize the ritual group. In social movements, rituals are used to build internal solidarity, to move the bystanders and the general public, and to shame opponents. In repressive political environments, activists may appropriate official rituals for mobilization purposes.

Rituals have symbolic components – singing, dancing, and the like. Yet not all symbolic forms are ritualistic. The symbolic expression of emotions in collective action is analytically a distinct practice. To build pride and enthusiasm among participants, to win sympathy from the public, and to arouse anger at the opponents, movement activists tell stories, sing songs, play music, compose poems, chant slogans, and dress up in colorful costumes. These symbolic expressions can be serious or playful. A spirit of play is a familiar part of social movements. Jokes, humor, and parody can undermine the seriousness of power in forceful ways.

Emotions not only influence various phases of a movement, they are also the very stakes of struggle. Structures of power and inequality

shape what emotions are appropriate to what social groups. For example, in bureaucratic institutions, anger is the privilege of the superiors, not the subordinates. The dominant emotion culture in contemporary society is emotion management. As Arlie Russell Hochschild (1983) shows, this culture forces individuals to manage how they feel – to stir up or suppress a feeling as the occasion requires. Such management serves instrumental rational purposes at the expense of emotional fulfillment. Emotion management is thus a culture of instrumental control over emotions. It has a built in mechanism against collective action. To free collective action of this cultural constraint, social movements, at least in their more radical moments, operate outside, not within, the dominant emotional codes. They seek to subvert existing feeling rules and mobilize counteremotions. In this way, emotions become the stakes of struggle.

Emotions long took a back seat in modern sociology. They were either ignored or conceptualized as the opposite of rational and purposive action. This was so even in the study of collective action and social movements. Before the 1960s, emotions were used to explain away crowd behavior. The standard theory was that crowd behavior was irrational and pathological, and so were the emotions that drove it. In the 1970s, many students of social movements rejected this line of thinking and its associated categories. They abandoned the concept of crowd behavior and talked instead about collective action and social movements. A resource mobilization theory based on rational actor assumptions was developed. Studies exemplary of this new thinking postulate that individuals' inclination to join social movements depends on the material and organizational resources available to them. Emotions disappear from this picture.

These two theoretical orientations were shaped by the social conditions in which they were born. In post World War II Europe and the United States, material prosperity, a cozy family life, and law and order were the concerns of the day. Thus when sociologists rejected crowd behavior on the basis of its irrationality and pathology, they were responding to the moods of the times. The new thinking that rejected theories of crowd behavior and gave rise

to resource mobilization models of social movements similarly reflected the social conditions. The tumultuous days of student protests had just gone by. The new generation of intellectuals had first hand experiences in the protest activities. Not surprisingly, these scholars affirmed social movements as rational, democratic political struggles. In their endeavor to rationalize social movements, however, they went to another extreme and dropped emotions from their theoretical models.

Emotions reentered the study of social movements in the late 1980s. By then, cultural analysis and the sociology of emotions had gained influence. These new intellectual trends reflected renewed attention to the centrality of meaning and human agency in sociological explanation. Among others, the works of Norman Denzin, Randall Collins, Theodore Kemper, and Arlie Hochschild significantly advanced the understanding of the social nature of emotions, opening the way for a new wave of sociological studies of emotions and movements. Since then, many articles have appeared. *Passionate Politics* (2001), a volume of articles based on a conference held in 1999, marked the first major collective endeavor made by sociologists to bring emotions back to the study of social movements. In 2002, the international journal *Mobilization* published a special issue on emotions and social movements. Another edited volume, *Emotions and Social Movements*, was published in 2005.

While the growing literature on emotions and movements is diverse in theoretical and methodological approaches, there are two distinct trends. First, there are many efforts to bring emotional dynamics into the explanation of all aspects of collective action and social movements. Emotions are considered to affect recruitment processes, movement emergence, the internal dynamics of a movement, as well as movement demise. The most exciting current research on this topic is in this area. Second, there is an attempt to incorporate emotions into existing categories of social movement theory, including organization, identity, framing, repertoires, and political opportunity structures. There is a growing understanding, for example, that studies of collective identity prioritize the cognitive dimension of identity at the expense of its emotional dimension.

These two lines of research have greatly enriched the understanding of collective action and social movements. But many challenges remain for students of emotions and movements (Polletta & Amenta 2001). One is methodological. One reason for the neglect of emotions in the study of social movements and sociology more broadly has to do with the fact that emotions, despite somatic signs, are not directly observable. The texture of emotional events consists of fleeting and ephemeral details such as gestures, voices, and smiles, yet these details do not often leave concrete records. Of course, many movements have left behind narratives of various kinds, and so far these have provided a main source of data analysis. But these narratives cannot fully capture the fluid dynamics of emotions. A possible corrective is to rely more on ethnography and visual sociology.

Secondly, in attempting to incorporate emotions into the study of social movements, many analysts tacitly or explicitly treat emotions in an instrumental manner. As Craig Calhoun (2001) cautions, some scholars have simply considered emotions as just another thing for movement organizers to manage or another resource to use against the opponents. In effect, then, emotions are turned into another kind of rational preference. Such an approach falls into the same trap as theories devoid of emotional components. This tendency is rooted in the dichotomizing of mind/body and reason/emotion that fundamentally structures modern western thinking. "Putting emotions in their place," as Calhoun puts it, is to study emotions in such a way as to transcend, not reproduce, this pervasive dualism.

To meet this challenge, one research agenda is to conduct more studies of collective action and social movements in non western societies. As anthropologists (Lutz 1988) have shown, these societies have different emotion cultures. Emotions may thus have very different meanings and expressions. Do interests have the same kind of influence on collective action as in modern western societies? Is it possible to separate emotions from interests? How do emotions structure social action in such cultures? Exploring these questions will help to uncover ways of transcending the reason/emotion dualism still prevalent in current research. Another

research agenda is to study how social movements are not only suffused with emotions, but also aim to transform emotion cultures. Are there influential movements that target or change emotion cultures? What are their characteristics? How do they compare with other movements in their trajectories? Addressing these questions will contribute to the understanding of both the constraints of the dominant culture of instrumental rationality in contemporary society and the possibilities of emotional emancipation.

SEE ALSO: Collective Action; Collective Identity; Culture, Social Movements and; Emotion: Cultural Aspects; Emotion Work; Emotions and Economy; Resource Mobilization Theory; Ritual; Social Movements

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empire

Lloyd Cox

In its broadest transhistorical sense empire refers to a large scale, multi ethnic political unit (usually with a state at its core) that directly or indirectly rules over, and therefore encompasses, smaller political units that were previously independent. Hence, empire always involves relations of domination and subordination between core and peripheral areas and their populations, which are most often established by conquest and maintained, in the last instance, by the exercise or threat of force. Nevertheless, empire may fall short of direct colonial rule and instead be implemented through informal mechanisms of political control based on indigenous elites and indirect methods of cultural domination and economic exploitation. These formal and informal practices of empire, and the ideologies that justify them, constitute *imperialism*. Both terms have their etymological roots in the Latin *imperium*.

In ancient Rome, the meaning of *imperium* was originally restricted to the authority of

Roman magistrates to act in the name of Rome and its citizens, at home (*imperium domi*) and abroad (*imperium militiae*). With the territorial expansion of Roman rule around the time of Julius Caesar and Augustus, the term came to connote authority abstracted from any particular bearer of that authority; the distinction between *imperium domi* and *militiae* progressively collapsed; and the term took on an explicitly territorial dimension. Rome and the territories over which it ruled were now considered to form a single *Imperium Romanum* (Armitage 1998: xv–xvi). This *imperium* was in principle limitless, embodying a universalist ethos that distinguishes it from modern empires premised on the particularist and territorially circumscribed claims of national states. It also defined itself as coterminous with “civilization,” labeling all those outside its parameters as barbarians and therefore legitimate targets of conquest – a Manichean distinction borrowed from the Greeks, but one that is overtly or covertly a feature of all empires.

The existence of empire in antiquity was not, of course, limited to the Romans. The ancient Egyptians, Assyrians, Babylonians, and Greeks all built significant empires, as did the Macedonians, Persians, Incas, and Chinese. In fact, the unification of the latter under the Ch'in and Han dynasties in the two centuries BCE eventually realized an imperial dominion that rivaled if not exceeded that of Rome, both in terms of geographical extent and technological dynamism. The ocean going exploits of the Chinese eunuch Admiral Cheng Ho in the early 1400s even held out the possibility of a Chinese alternative to European modernity and global expansion, albeit one that was, for reasons that were bound up with China's domestic political economy, ultimately not realized.

If for the moment we leave aside the empires of Christian Europe, the other great premodern empire is represented by the expansion of Islam out of the Arabian peninsula from the seventh century CE, followed by its various off shoots in the second millennium (principally the Mogul and Ottoman empires). During the course of this thousand year expansion, what had initially been an empire was politically fragmented. From the early centuries of the second millennium it is therefore more appropriate to speak

of Islam as a *civilization* encompassing several empires, rather than as an empire in its own right. What lent it a degree of coherence was the written Arabic language and the capacity of shared Islamic religious values to impose a pattern of family resemblance on the institutions of otherwise diverse localities. By the end of the eighteenth century, Islam and its last great imperial vestige – the Ottoman Empire – was coming under increased pressure from European imperial powers, which had begun their inexorable global expansion from the late fifteenth century.

EUROPEAN EMPIRES OLD AND NEW

The establishment of modern European empires can be roughly divided into three periods. The first runs from the late fifteenth to the middle of the seventeenth century, and is marked by Portuguese and Spanish expansion and then decline. The Iberian invasion of the Americas was sealed with the ideological and legal imprimatur of the Roman Catholic Church, which legitimized the invasion in terms of the salvation of the Godless. The subjugation of the indigenous populations, and their forced induction into slavery and other forms of coerced labor, laid the foundation for the massive export of silver and gold bullion back to Europe from the 1530s. This not only helped to maintain the power of Iberian and Austrian monarchs, under the auspices of the Habsburg Empire and Holy Roman Emperor, it also oiled the wheels of European commerce and contributed resources to future maritime exploration, conquest, war, and empire building. It also, however, elicited multiple challenges to Spanish/Habsburg power, instantiating the historical tendency for empires to beget resistance to their further expansion.

The second period runs from approximately the middle of the seventeenth to the middle of the nineteenth century, and was initiated by successful challenges to Spanish/Habsburg hegemony by Holland, Britain, and France, and by their own establishment of maritime empires. Along with the expansion of the African slave trade, this period of European empire building is marked out by two key attributes that distinguish it from the previous

imperial periods. On the one hand, a new conception of sovereignty was institutionalized in Western and Northern Europe, which recast the relationship between political power, territory, and property. In this new conception, sovereignty was idealized as the absolute and indivisible condition of states, whose rule was uniformly exercised over a clearly defined, bordered territory into which other states could not legitimately intervene. Political space became increasingly nationalized and decoupled from church and dynasty, which prefigured the formation of empires conceived in national terms. On the other hand, this was the period in which the great national trading companies (the French India Company, the Dutch and English East India Companies, and many more) and the associated doctrine of mercantilism became key factors in the extension of European imperial dominance across much of the world. These companies secured special trading rights and military protection in return for the revenues and territorial influence that they extended to their respective states, which was expressed in accelerating commercial and military rivalries. In many ways, the national trading companies represented the thin end of the colonialist's wedge, as they were often the forerunners to direct colonial rule.

The third and final period of European Empire begins in the second half of the nineteenth century and is not concluded until widespread decolonization in the decades following World War II. The decades between 1870 and 1914 represent the zenith of European imperialism, with the vast majority of the planet's surface being ruled directly or indirectly by Europeans or their descendants. This period was characterized by several widely acknowledged defining features. First, colonial annexation became the rule rather than the exception, though it was exercised rather differently depending on the colonial power. British rule, for example, was typically more indirect (frequently deploying modified indigenous structures of power to secure its dominance) than say French rule, which was more centralized and assimilationist. Second, the imperialism of this period was coupled with a virulent nationalism that embodied the pseudo scientific language of racial superiority. The hierarchy engendering realities of European empires

required an explanation and legitimization, for which theories of racial superiority and survival of the fittest were perfectly suited. The coincidence of political, military, and economic inequalities with differences of phenotype offered a seemingly self-evident reason and justification for the continued domination of non-whites by whites. Third, it was a period of intensifying militarism and inter-imperialist rivalries between the great powers. The acquisition of colonial territories both contributed to and was a gauge of a state's status as a great power. This helps explain why European states were so keen to acquire colonial territories, even in some circumstances where the economic benefits of doing so were marginal or even negative. Finally, the last decades of the nineteenth century were ones where the character of capitalism underwent important changes, which many contemporaries of the period argued had profound implications for the trajectory of empires and imperialism.

THEORIES OF EMPIRE AND IMPERIALISM

In the *Communist Manifesto* (1847) Marx and Engels had famously provided a thumbnail sketch of the globalizing logic of capitalism. It is principally the needs of a constantly expanding market for its products which, they suggest, "chases the bourgeoisie over the whole surface of the globe," with cheap commodities being "the heavy artillery with which it batters down all of the Chinese walls." They were ambivalent in their normative judgments about this process, with early articles on India and China arguing for the historically progressive role of capitalism imposed from the outside (notwithstanding the brutal means by which this was accomplished), while articles on Ireland suggested that colonial rule could just as likely retard as promote economic development. Such ambivalence was mirrored in the views of later liberal and socialist commentators, as capitalism matured beyond its free market, competitive forms that were the backdrop to Marx's theorizing.

The most important early twentieth century liberal analysis of empire and imperialism is that of John Hobson (1938). His argument is

basically that monopoly capitalism, unlike its competitive predecessor, entails a tendency to over savings and therefore under consumption. Depressed domestic demand in turn depresses opportunities for profitable investment at home, which drives capital export and overseas investment. These investments, plus possibilities for future investment, must be protected from the predatory capitalists of other national states. This creates economic and political pressures for the formal annexation of colonies and thus intensified imperialist rivalries and militarism. He was adamant that a small group of financiers were the main culprits driving government policy in this imperialistic direction.

In subsequent critiques of Hobson and those who followed his lead, it has been pointed out that his "financiers" were not nearly as homogeneous in their interests as he assumed, and nor were they the exclusive or even main beneficiaries of imperialism. Moreover, the alleged link between under consumption and capital export is tenuous. As many commentators have suggested, capital may be exported not because opportunities for profitable investment do not exist at home, but because the rate of return on investment is simply greater abroad. And nor do such investments depend upon colonial annexations. The US and Argentina, for instance, were key destinations for British investment in the late nineteenth century, while many of its colonial possessions proved to be of little value in terms of investment or trade.

Despite the weaknesses, Hobson had a significant influence on early twentieth century debates on empire, not least those within the socialist movement. Traces of Hobson's ideas can be found in the substantial treatises on imperialism by Luxemburg, Hilferding, and Bukharin, as well as in the more synoptic work by Lenin. While the former works are more weighty in their intellectual contributions, it is Lenin's *Imperialism* that has had the most enduring historical legacy, as it was canonized by orthodox Marxists, becoming the standard against which other theories and praxis were piously judged.

Lenin defined imperialism as the "highest" stage of capitalism, characterized by five main features: (1) the concentration and centralization of capital into great monopolistic trusts

and cartels; (2) the progressive merging of banking and industrial capital into “finance capital”; (3) the centrality of capital export as opposed to commodity export; (4) the emergence of international capitalist monopolies that share the world among themselves; (5) the completion of the territorial division of the planet among the capitalist powers. Like Hobson, Lenin placed particular emphasis on the third of these features, with capital export being necessitated because capitalism becomes “overripe” in some advanced countries, with a “superabundance” of capital outstripping opportunities for profitable investment at home. The competitive quest for spheres of profitable investment in the capitalist periphery would, he argued, ultimately lead to militarism and war.

Lenin’s *Imperialism*, and implicitly all of those theories largely based on it, has been criticized on empirical and theoretical grounds. Empirically, the merging of industrial and banking capital has not proven to be the inexorable trend that Lenin expected, and nor has capital export been mainly from more to less economically developed parts of the world. In Lenin’s time, and even more so today, the predominant trend has been for the bulk of foreign direct investment to occur within and between the advanced capitalist states – those that are, in Lenin’s terms, overripe and exhibiting a superabundance of capital. Theoretically, Lenin has also been taken to task for failing to specify adequately the causal relationship between his five key characteristics of imperialism, and between them and the broader tendency he identifies toward militarism and war. In addition, his work has been criticized for defining imperialism as a *stage* of capitalism. This unduly narrows the compass of the term imperialism. A strict application of Lenin’s criteria would place many clear cut examples of empire outside of his definition, including the Soviet, Nazi, and Japanese empires established between the wars.

In the quarter century following World War II, the almost universal process of decolonization marked the denouement of formal European empires. It did not, however, engender the expected fruits of modernity in many of the new states or end foreign involvement in their politics and economies. On the contrary, political independence frequently concealed

continued economic and political subjugation which, from the 1960s, inspired new generations of radical theories focused on “neo imperialism” or “neocolonialism” – basically the idea that postcolonial societies, while formally independent, were in substance still politically and economically dominated by a few wealthy imperialist states and multinational corporations based in those states.

André Gunder Frank’s theory of the “development of underdevelopment,” Arghiri Emmanuel and Samir Amin’s analysis of unequal exchange, and Immanuel Wallerstein’s world systems theory were hugely influential in this new generation of thinking about imperialism. Following the theoretical leads of radical theorists Paul Baran and Paul Sweezy, and in Wallerstein’s case that of the *Annales* school of French historiography, these theories shared the view that a lack of development in the “third world” was not an original condition, but one that was the product of the 500 year expansion of European powers and the capitalist world market. Simplified greatly, the argument was that this history had divided the world into mutually conditioning metropolitan/core or satellite/peripheral areas, with the former systematically retarding development in the latter by expropriating its economic surplus and imposing relations of dependency through unequal terms of trade. Such positions have been criticized for homogenizing diversity with all embracing labels such as core and periphery (and, for Wallerstein, semiperiphery), and for failing to account for dramatic economic advances in peripheral states such as South Korea, Taiwan, Mexico, and Brazil. They have also been disparaged for their economism and disregard of culture.

Intellectual currents that emerged in the 1980s sought to remedy this neglect of culture. Edward Said’s *Orientalism* (1978) prompted a plethora of new studies emphasizing how discursive practices constitute the colonized “other” in ways that help to reproduce relations of domination. While not ignoring economic subordination, Said’s primary focus was on Orientalism as “a political vision of reality whose structure promoted a binary opposition between the familiar (Europe, the West, ‘us’) and the strange (the Orient, the east, ‘them’).” Through a close textual analysis of novels,

travelogues, colonial records, and other cultural artifacts, Said demonstrates how European self image is itself a construction of Orientalism, essentially derived from the counterposing of a rational, progressive, and civilized “us” to an irrational, inert, and barbaric “them.” Such insights had been anticipated by an earlier generation of intellectuals and activists in the colonized world, such as Frantz Fanon and Aimé Césaire, who had drawn attention to colonialism’s objectifying, dehumanizing, and stereotyping of the colonized subject. Where Said went beyond them was in his treatment of the mutually constitutive relations between knowledge and power, and in his use of literary materials to illustrate and substantiate these relations.

Said’s Orientalism thesis, and the numerous contributions that follow his lead, often brought under the label of postcolonial studies, has generated much controversy, and not just from those whom Said would label as Orientalists. Many have pointed out that Said presents Orientalism’s binary oppositions as relatively static categories, which underplay the extent to which they have been a site of continual contestation and change. Others have taken Said to task for homogenizing the West, and thereby falling into the very ways of thinking that he is seeking to challenge. Finally, Said, and postcolonial theorists more generally, has been criticized for over inflating the importance of literature and discourse, at the expense of the material and institutional factors upon which all empires stand or fall.

In the 1990s, discussion of empire and imperialism was overshadowed by the new conceptual innovations centered on globalization, globalism, and globality. Much of this literature questioned the contemporary applicability of concepts such as imperialism, arguing that the maturation of multilateral institutions, international law, and global cultural flows rendered them anachronistic. A recurring motif is the erosion of state capacities in the face of accelerated cross border flows of information, capital, and people, which is said to decenter political power on the world stage. In this view, empire is a phenomenon of the past, not of the present or future.

More recently, however, new theories of empire have proliferated, largely in response to the foreign policy stance adopted by the US

since the events of September 11, 2001. This has re raised debate about the nature of empires and the factors contributing to their decline, such as imperial over stretch. A major contribution is Hardt and Negri’s *Empire* (2000), which has enjoyed widespread popularity and publicity. Its main thesis is that sovereignty has been rescaled upwards from the national to the global level, thereby constituting empire as a deterritorialized global entity. In this view, empire is transnational rather than American. Many subsequent analyses have rejected this deterritorialized, non national vision of empire, instead arguing that the global projection of US power and its readiness to undertake unilateral and preemptive military action is evidence of the existence of, or aspirations to acquire, an empire (Mann 2003; Johnson 2004). Others agree that the US is an empire, but argue that it is a liberal empire that may well be beneficial for those populations that are subject to US rule (Ferguson 2004). The continued US occupation of Iraq, and its military involvement in many other regions of the world, promises to sustain this renewed interest in empire and imperialism, whatever our normative judgments about its costs and benefits might be.

SEE ALSO: Colonialism (Neocolonialism); Decolonization; Global Politics; Nation State and Nationalism; Orientalism; Socialism; Sovereignty; War

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empiricism

Charles McCormick

The term empiricism refers to both a philosophical approach toward understanding the world and the principles and methods that ground modern scientific practices. The philosophy of empiricism, which was first stated by Aristotle and other classical philosophers, came to fruition in the writings of Enlightenment era scholars including David Hume and John Locke. A key philosophical question at the time was whether knowledge should be generated based on experience, as the empiricists argued, or on a combination of intellect and intuition, as proposed by rationalists such as René Descartes. An increased acceptance of the empirical approach to understanding the world fostered the growth both of modern science and the Industrial Revolution.

Empiricist philosophy has become codified as modern principles of scientific inquiry which include the formulation of verifiable hypotheses that are tested through unbiased and repeatable experiments. While physical sciences allow for precise measurement of phenomena of interest, this is more difficult in the social sciences for several reasons, including the “observer effect,” where people who are aware they are under scientific observation may change their behaviors to conform with or thwart researcher expectations, and the fact that the effects of social pressures cannot be measured directly. The founders of sociology, including Émile Durkheim and Max Weber, helped create an empirical approach to studying society when they addressed these issues.

Durkheim helped found the scientific approach to the study of society with his publication *Rules of Sociological Method* in 1895, which explains that sociology rests on the observation and measurement of the effects of social forces on people through measurable phenomena such as crime and suicide rates. The hermeneutic approach to sociology provides an alternative approach toward understanding the effects of society on human behavior, by using methods such as interviews, textual analysis, and self observation to understand social phenomena. Max Weber is considered a foundational researcher in this approach primarily as a result of his study *The Protestant Ethic*, which argued that the Protestant belief system provided a strong foundation for the growth of capitalism.

The scientific approach to sociology popularized by Durkheim and the hermeneutic approach roughly correspond to the modern quantitative and qualitative approaches to sociology. Within each of these camps there is a further division over the role that social theory should play in driving social research.

Researchers who support the deductive or “theory driven” approach argue that studies should focus on testing existing social theories, while supporters of the inductive or “data driven” approach argue that researchers should approach social phenomena with few preconceived notions and then allow their theories and research questions to evolve over the course of their research.

Perhaps the best way to understand the difference between the inductive and deductive approaches is to consider two very different studies that attempted to explain the causes of minor crimes.

In *Fixing Broken Windows: Restoring Order and Reducing Crime in Our Communities* (1998), criminologists George Kelling and Katherine Coles used the deductive approach to test the “broken windows” theory of crime. Kelling and Coles gathered evidence on the enforcement of minor crimes such as aggressive panhandling and found that lack of enforcement of these crimes sends a sign to criminals that additional crimes will be tolerated, in turn suggesting that police and community groups should focus much of their attention on prevention and rapid punishment for minor or

“nuisance” crimes, rather than on higher profile detective work, and on “community building,” which helps convince the landlord of a property, for example, that a broken window is worth fixing. In accord with the deductive approach, Kelling and Coles’s research was tested and refined in a large scale longitudinal study in Chicago which found that collective efficacy, or “social cohesion among neighbors and their willingness to intervene on behalf of the common good,” is at least as important as the enforcement of minor crimes emphasized in most municipal reforms in preventing crime.

The inductive approach to researching crime was taken by sociologist Jack Katz in his book *Seductions of Crime* (1990). Katz approached the problem of crime with few preconceived notions about whether poverty, a lack of education, or other factors drive crime and his inductive approach yielded surprising and controversial results. After talking with shoplifters and analyzing detailed narratives of situations that precipitated murders and other crimes, Katz finds that the immediate emotions associated with committing the criminal act are a fundamental driver behind many crimes. In the case of murder, Katz explains that murder rarely provides economic benefits to perpetrators and that murders are generally committed by otherwise sane individuals. The primary driver of most murders, Katz argues, is the murderer’s feeling of righteous indignation which is used to justify his act as in defense of “the Good.” For example, when an individual repeatedly refused to move a car that was blocking another man’s driveway, even at gun point, the property owner shot and killed him. As in this case, Katz found that murderers are often attempting to defend moral goods that most people support, such as property rights or self respect, but using unjustifiable means to do so. Similarly, he found that minor crimes such as shoplifting are driven by “sneaky thrills” as much as by economic need, again providing evidence that the “criminal mind” is driven by normal human emotions rather than by psychological pathology or cold blooded economic calculations.

Both inductive and deductive studies are important building blocks of the social sciences. Inductive approaches often generate theories

which can be tested with deductive methods, and deductive theories can form a framework for inductive studies. For example, researchers have used more formal methods to test whether the “seductions of crime” are major drivers behind crime (Phillips & Smith 2004), and researchers have used broken windows theory as a starting point for an inductive study of *how* and *why* minor crimes act as a signal that more and more serious crimes will be tolerated (Sampson & Raudenbush 2004). This integration of inductive and deductive approaches is important because it helps to resolve some of the limitations of social science that only emphasize one approach.

SEE ALSO: Methods; Quantitative Methods

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employment status changes

Richard Layte

The three decades that followed the end of World War II are often referred to by social scientists as the “Golden Age of Capitalism” in Europe and North America. This period of relative peace was marked by rising living stan

dards and high levels of employment within societies where the “traditional” family structure still held sway. In this environment, individual employment status changes were fairly few – into a job or career following education and retirement sometime around age 60, with women moving out into full time motherhood at the birth of their first child. This “Golden Age” began to unravel in the 1970s as wide spread changes in attitudes changed behaviors and high oil prices increased inflation and constrained growth. By the early 1980s, the labor markets of western industrial nations were very different from earlier decades, with high levels of structural unemployment and an increasing “feminization” of the labor force as women sought to combine marriage and childbirth with a job or career. In this new environment, simple models of a homogeneous “life cycle” were replaced by more complex and dynamic understandings based on the “life course,” where uncertainty and instability were the norm and individuals experienced multiple employment status changes across their life.

This interest in the role of structural change was accompanied by a growing awareness among social scientists that there were winners and losers in this more fluid environment, and that social class processes and educational qualifications were essential for understanding the problems some individuals had in entering the labor market initially and avoiding unemployment once in the labor force. Social behavior occurs within a context, however, and this was increasingly recognized as European integration and particularly European Commission funding for comparative research focused attention on the role that varying educational systems, labor market institutions, and legal regulation had on the pattern of employment status change. The role which labor market structure, education, and social class processes and institutional context play in the increasingly complex patterns of employment status change is discussed below. The focus is on the processes associated with entry into the labor market and the role of flexible working practices in increasing employment status volatility across the life course.

The transition from education to work is one of the central changes in a person’s life

and research suggests that its impact can last a lifetime (Korpi et al. 2003). The transition from education to work has changed considerably across most countries in the last three decades. Unemployment among young people increased sharply in the 1980s, with the consequence that young people stayed in education longer and gained higher level qualifications. The transition itself also became more protracted, with young people taking longer to make the transition and more likely to experience spells of unemployment, particularly those with lower educational qualifications, from manual social classes, or from ethnic minorities. From a microsociological or microeconomic perspective, the transition into the labor market is a “matching process” within which young people balance their present and future returns with continued education and training and employers attempt to recruit those individuals who are most productive and least costly to train. This matching process will be reflected in the stratification of outcomes for individuals. Higher levels of education, skills, and productivity will be of vital importance, but these are also structured by the social class background of the individual, their sex, and their ethnicity (Shavit & Müller 1998). However, this micro level understanding also needs to be placed within the structural context of the prevailing economic environment and the impact of differential education and labor market systems. In some countries (notably the US, Ireland, and Southern Europe), the education system is oriented toward providing general qualifications with little concern for the relevance of these qualifications for employers. In this sense, qualifications are general “signals” of the individuals’ possible productivity. Other countries (Germany, Austria) have extensive vocational training systems featuring large scale apprenticeship schemes, with training in the work place as well as in the classroom. The latter have been shown to provide a much smoother entry for young people into the labor market, which avoids spells of unemployment and entrapment in poorly paid insecure work. Poor outcomes for young people have also been associated with “rigid” labor market regulation in terms of the employment protection for those already in the labor force (Bernardi

et al. 2000). Changing economic structures in industrialized countries after the mid 1970s led to increasing levels of unemployment and worklife turbulence for those in employment, with redundancy reaching far into the previously stable middle classes, although unemployment was still more concentrated among the manual classes and unskilled. Across Europe, many states responded to higher levels of unemployment with deregulation, or “reregulation,” of the labor market to allow greater use of “fixed term” or short term contracts and part time working in an attempt to stimulate employment. This led to a surge in these types of contracts across many countries and to a substantial growth in the numbers of women working (Gallie et al. 1998). The question for researchers was whether fixed term contracts and part time hours were a “bridge” to better employment, or rather a “trap” locking people into jobs with poor prospects, conditions, and security. Research (Layte et al. 2000) has shown that previous unemployment spells are a major determinant of future unemployment and of downward occupational mobility, but research on the impact of fixed term contracts is mixed. Although research suggests that fixed term contracts are more likely to lead to unemployment, they can also act as a stepping stone to a more permanent contract, although evidence for both is mixed. Part time work has also been shown to be complex in its impact, with employment conditions and prospects dependent more on the type of job and contract rather than on the number of hours worked per se (Gallie et al. 1998). In conclusion, it is clear that the last three decades have seen an increase in volatility in employment status changes, with an increased risk of unemployment both for those entering the labor market and for those already working. However, these risks are not evenly spread and sociological research has detailed the influence of individual and social characteristics such as social class and the role of national educational and labor market systems.

SEE ALSO: Educational and Occupational Attainment; Life Course Perspective; Unemployment; Unemployment as a Social Problem; Women, Economy and

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en

Hirochika Nakamaki

En is originally a Buddhist concept for indicating causal relations, but it is also a term that is used regularly in Japanese social life. It has also proved to be a very convenient term in academic analysis. In Buddhist terms, *en* is used as a common idiom to refer to an individual's destiny from a previous reincarnation. *En*, however, refers to an indirect causal relationship rather than a direct causal relationship. In Buddhist usage, the concept of *kechi en* refers to relations with a particular Bodhisattva (Enlightenment Being). In Esoteric Buddhism, the *kechi en kanjou* is a rite based on *kechi en*. Here, in a secret ritual, the disciple throws flowers onto the top of a Mandala, and establishes a relation or tie with the Bodhisattva hit by them. *En* days are specially designated days said to have a special connection with the Bodhisattvas. Kannon day is the 18th day of the month, Jizou is the 24th, and Fudou is the 28th. On these days, a visit to a temple is said

to be a particularly pious act that brings substantial rewards.

The concept of *en* became separated from stricter Buddhist usage, and came to be used as a term to refer to general social and personal relations. *En gumi*, to make a connection, is a common term to indicate marriage, and *en dooi*, a “distancing of relations,” refers to a state where a potential marriage is considered impossible. Good *en* refers to a happy married life, and one particular form of bad *en* is “rotten relations” between a husband and wife, where one cannot separate even if one tries, what is recently termed co dependency. To have *en* indicates a positive prospect for the construction of human relations, whereas to lack *en* implies a resignation, a lack of probability for the building of a successful relationship. These are all commonly heard expressions in daily life.

En came to be used as a new term in academic analysis, and is found in use in the media and general society. *Chi en* and *ketsu en* are good examples. In the former, the term indicates local social relations, the latter refers to relations of kith and kin. Also, compound terms that utilize the word *en*, such as “kin groups” and “residential groups” or “local society,” are connected to references to society and group. The terms “local relations” and “kinship relations” refer to exceptionally restrictive social relations, what Chizuko Ueno has referred to as “non optional relations,” or ascriptive relations. Examples of such kin *en* (*ketsu en*) have continued since the times of hunting, fishing, and gathering societies. It is thought that local *en* (*chi en*) have become stronger since agriculture developed. In sociology and social anthropology, there is a huge body of knowledge about kin relations such as family, and consanguineous and affinal kinship relations. Moreover, within the East Asian civilizations sharing the Chinese writing style, there is a special quality in the application of the term *en* to newer types of human relations. To give two examples, the corporate or company relations of Japan (*sha en*), and the academic relations (*hagyeon*) of the Republic of Korea.

When Europe entered the modern era, ties of locality and kinship came to be replaced by new forms of social relations, and concepts such as *gesellschaft* and association were provided by

scholars. In Japan, on the other hand, the cultural anthropologist Toshinao Yoneyama proposed the concept of “associational ties” (*kessha en* or *sha en*) in the early 1960s. He reworked the concept of “association” (*sha en*) to provide a more inclusive meaning than that then being used by journalists (*kaisha en* or corporate association), in order to emphasize the function by which companies were associated with each other in corporate social networks. It was worked out specifically as a relational concept, an equilateral accompaniment to associations based on kin and locality, and also intended to emphasize the remarkable increase in the importance of these relations that accompanied industrialization and urbanization. As a background note to this work, during the post war period, one in which continuously high levels of socioeconomic growth were achieved, social groups based on company/corporate association came to stand in equal importance to associations of kinship and locality. The very concept of corporate associations (*sha en*) is itself a product of that period, the background of which was the substantial levels of corporate development that occurred. Naturally, the roots of corporate associations can be found in the various forms of ascriptive and associative units of sociopolitical organization dating from the Edo period (1600–1868). Another primary factor contributing to the development of corporate association is the fact that, compared to China and Korea, Japan has always had a relatively weak principle of paternal succession. As pointed out by the anthropologist Tadao Umesao, the origins of corporate association as a social unit are to be located first and foremost in the Japanese household, characterized by a strong paternal authority (*ie*). It was that particularly Japanese legal fiction known as the parent–child (*oya ko*) relationship that led the way from the household unit to the modern form of corporate association. The latter, born in this manner, is without a doubt the most important development in social relations in modern Japanese society. Yoneyama has emphasized that the so called License/Qualifications Society (*shikaku shakai*) is the result of these developments.

Technically speaking, since corporate associations are voluntary forms in terms of association and withdrawal, the term itself refers to a

second order social unit. Nonetheless, looking at the typical form of associations found in Japanese corporations until the bursting of the bubble economy in the early 1990s, the difficulty of resigning from a company once employed was such that these forms must be seen as having a highly restrictive quality. In this connection, the sociologist Chizuko Ueno has proposed the concept of optional associations, or associations of choice (*sentaku en*) as a residual category to kin, locality, and company associations. Born as an effort to better conceptualize new forms of human relations in urbanizing societies, such forms are free in association and withdrawal, and so lacking in the restrictive qualities of other forms. Examples of such social groups include the audiences at concerts, and so called “e friends,” persons whose social networks are mediated by electronic media such as the Internet. Further examples include hobby associations such as poetry or bird watching circles. Ueno has paid particular attention to urban women, especially socially isolated housewives. In opposition to the ways in which their husbands were immersed in their corporate social networks, these women found it necessary to construct a whole new variety of social groups based on voluntary association, such as those centered on their childrens’ education, their hobbies, and so on. Teruko Yoshitake has also christened such forms as “women’s associations” (*jo en*). In fact, there is even such a women’s group based on the joint ownership of grave plots. These optional associations, however, have little restrictive power, and so tend to be unstable in nature. Nonetheless, as Ueno has pointed out, as we face a rapidly aging society, we have reached a period where such optional forms of association are increasingly in demand, to replace associations of kinship, locality, and corporation.

In Japan there have been a number of terms coined using the root term *en* to define different forms of association, besides company associations, optional associations, and women’s associations. Yasuyuki Kurita and Tadashi Inoue have defined “information associations” (*jouhou en*), and Teruhiko Mochizuki has defined “value associations” (*chi en*) and “knowledge associations” (*chi en*). At the same time, the historian Yoshihiko Amino has discovered material regarding the use of the term

association (*en*) in medieval documents. He has reinterpreted the term *mu en* (literally, no relations), a term seeming to imply a lack of social associations or relations. He argues that this term does not in fact refer to a lack of social relations, but rather to the social situation of people removed from restrictive social relations based on fixed residence, as implied in the term *u en*, that is, “to have” social relations. Moreover, Amino has pointed out that the *mu en* form of association is itself seen as the associational basis of urban social relations.

The term *en* has proven so useful for expressing particular forms of social association that it has even appeared in texts translated into Japanese. As an example, Francis Hsu’s term “kin tract” has been translated into Japanese as “*en tract*.” Furthermore, based on Hsu’s term, Tsuneo Ayabe has provided a definition of club associations as a contractual type of association (*yaku en*).

In this current era, characterized by social trends such as global population flows, nomadic lifestyles, aging societies, and so called “gender free” marriages, we are seeing the attenuation of the restrictive nature of older forms of association based in kinship, locality, and company associations. At the same time, we are groping for new kinds of association that will entrust social bonds in the future. One phenomenon spurring on such developments is the spread of information technologies. A major focus of attention in coming years will certainly be the “virtual *en*” found in IT networks.

SEE ALSO: Buddhism; *Chonakai*; *Ie*; Kinship; *Nihonjinron*; Organization Theory; *Seken*

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encoding/decoding

James Procter

The terms encoding and decoding are key words within a theory of communication first developed by Stuart Hall (1973). This paper challenges the established, empirical theories of mass communications research, which assume media messages are relatively transparent and stable. Hall uses the terms encoding and decoding to demonstrate that the media message is neither transparent nor dependent on the competence of individual receivers/viewers, but is in fact *systematically* distorted by the entire communication process.

In particular, Hall argues there is a lack of fit between the two sides in the communicative exchange between the moment of “encoding,” when the message is translated into the aural visual signs of televisual discourse, and the moment of “decoding,” when the viewer translates the encoded message. Hall notes that the visual nature of televisual discourse means we tend to overlook the mediated nature of media imagery, which appears to be a transparent reflection rather than a systematic construction of the world around us. Hall’s sense that televisual discourse creates a communicative boundary that distorts media messages is informed by structuralist theory. Just as structuralism argues that language and sign systems do not reflect, but structure and construct, the real, so Hall argues that the visual discourse of television translates reality into two dimensional planes, and therefore is not to be confused with the referent it signifies. As he famously put it: “The dog in the film can bark but it cannot bite!”

Hall goes on to employ the structuralist distinction between denotation (a sign’s literal meanings) and connotation (a sign’s associated meanings) in order to pursue the competing meanings generated by the same media message. If at the denotative level there is a general agreement about the meaning of a sign – “the photo image of a sweater *is* (denotes) an object worn” – at the connotative level, meaning is contingent and can change depending on the context in which it appears and is read. Within the discourse of the fashion industry, Hall

suggests, the sweater may connote *haute couture* style of dress.” However, located within the discourses of contemporary (1970s) romance, it may connote “long autumn walk in the woods” (Hall 1973: 12–13). It is at the level of connotation that the sign acquires its ideological significance, a significance that is capable of changing depending upon the context in which it is used. Hall is particularly interested in the “polysemic values” of the televisual sign within this context. An apparently innocent item such as a sweater acquires different, potentially conflicting meanings and ideological values depending on the context in which it is encoded and decoded.

Hall’s account ultimately differs from an orthodox structuralist reading in that it is not simply interested in language and discourse as a closed, formal or ahistorical system, but with the “social relations” of the communicative process at any given moment. Adopting Marx’s theory of commodity production, Hall likens encoding to “production” and decoding to “consumption.” When an item is depicted on the news, it does not appear as a raw unreconstructed event; it is discursively produced, or encoded in terms of what Hall calls the “institutional structures of broadcasting.” These might include such things as conducting interviews with authority figures, specialists, and eyewitnesses, researching news archives, obtaining relevant photographs and film clips, and so on. While these institutional processes help to secure or determine meaning in significant ways, creating what Hall calls “dominant” or “preferred” meanings, there is no intrinsic meaning embedded within televisual discourse. For the encoded message to generate meaning it must first be decoded by the viewer. It is only at this moment that the television message acquires “social use or political effectivity.”

Hall regards decoding as the most significant and the most overlooked aspect of the communication process. Where mass communications theory suggested the viewer plays a passive role in the construction of meaning, Hall regards audiences as active consumers. If audiences were once regarded as an undifferentiated “mass,” Hall is keen to distinguish between different positions taken up by audiences. In order to do this he develops three hypothetical

categories first posited by Frank Parkin in *Class Inequality and Social Order* (1971): the dominant hegemonic position, the negotiated position, and the oppositional position.

Viewers that decode a particular media message in terms of the preferred meanings of the dominant social order might be said to occupy the dominant hegemonic position. For example, a viewer watches a report on the "War on Terror" led by President George Bush following 9/11 and concurs that, yes indeed, some thing must be done to stop global terrorism. The negotiated position refers to viewers who adopt a more contradictory response to the media message, and whose acceptance of the preferred or dominant meaning is conditional. For example, a viewer watches the same report on the "War on Terror," accepts the need for action, but questions the treatment of prisoners at Guantanamo Bay on humanitarian grounds. The oppositional position refers to that of the viewer who recognizes but rejects the dominant meanings of the media message. For example, a viewer who watches the "War on Terror" report, but reads it in oppositional terms as a war to secure US hegemony. As Hall views it, these three positions are not static or discrete, but constitute an overlapping continuum across which viewers move. Nor are these positions individual, personal, and self-conscious responses to particular media messages. Rather, they refer to ideological and therefore largely unconscious positions taken up by certain social groups, communities, and constituencies relating to class, gender, ethnicity, and so on.

Hall's paper became particularly influential in the 1980s and early 1990s, when it prompted fresh research within cultural studies into the neglected issue of audiences. One of the most influential research projects to develop Hall's encoding/decoding model was conducted by David Morley in *The "Nationwide" Audience* (1980). *Nationwide* was a popular early evening light news program broadcast by the BBC until 1983. Morley applied the three hypothetical positions associated with dominant, negotiated, and oppositional readings to actual audience responses to *Nationwide*. Morley, who grouped his audiences in terms of occupation, class, and so on, found that reading positions did reflect the ideological values of these different social

groups to an extent, but concluded that these positions were in no way reducible to social categories such as class.

SEE ALSO: Audiences; Birmingham School; Hegemony and the Media; Semiotics; Television

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endogamy

Nazli Kibria

"Endogamy" refers to in-group marriage, or a pattern of marriage in which the partners have a shared group affiliation. Its conceptual counterpart is exogamy, or a pattern of marriage in which the partners are different in their group affiliation. For scholars of race and ethnic relations, the significance of endogamy stems from its relationship to group boundaries and the processes by which they are maintained, transgressed, and negotiated. Indeed, endogamy is

generally understood to be among the most important social mechanisms in the formation and re formation of racial and ethnic groups.

Endogamy is increasingly recognized to be a complex and emergent social process. Underlying this recognition are theoretical developments in the study of ethnic identity, which is increasingly seen as multiple and fluid rather than singular and stable in character. This conceptualization also suggests that definitions of endogamy will also shift, depending on what particular aspect of identity is under consideration as well as the historical circumstances and meanings that surround it. As, for example, in the case of a marriage in which the partners are different in their ethnic affiliation but similar in their religion, a marriage that is endogamous in one respect may not be so along another dimension. Furthermore, there is a sense in which marriage itself, regardless of whether it initially involves persons who are similar or different in a particular way, may work to create endogamy or at least make exogamy invisible. As highlighted by situations in which one spouse undergoes conversion into the religious affiliation of the other spouse, marriage may result in the incorporation of the “outsider” into the group in question.

Even with these considerations, it would be fair to say that endogamy, defined as a marriage pattern that preserves the primary group distinctions prevalent within a society, has been and continues to be a widespread norm. In pre modern societies, endogamy was largely ensured by prevalent structural conditions, in particular the limited degree of social and geographical mobility available to and experienced by most persons. In addition, marriages were understood not as matters of individual negotiations of romantic love but as practical contracts that were closely intertwined with the authority and interests of the larger kin group (Giddens 1992). These conditions too were encouraging of in group marriage in the sense that in pre industrial societies the endogamy of members was generally advantageous to the kin group, allowing it to consolidate and to expand its local networks and resources.

In late modern societies, endogamy continues to be the norm, particularly with respect to the boundaries of social class and race. This

is certainly the case in the contemporary United States. In some parts of America, interracial marriage remained illegal until the 1960s. To day, however, it is maintained not by laws but by other dynamics, most importantly perhaps by the presence and power of informally segregated social networks in the organization of people’s lives. Writing of the contemporary US, Whyte (1990) observes that “dating and mating” almost invariably take place within rather than across race and class based networks. However, while racial endogamy continues to be the norm in the US, it is also the case that it has declined over time. In 1960, 99.6 percent of all marriages were racially endogamous, in comparison to 94.6 percent in 2000. As noted by Nagel (2003), rates of racial exogamy are highest among Native Americans (67 percent), followed by Asians (26.3 percent), Hispanics (26.1 percent), blacks (10.9 percent), and whites (6.1 percent).

The rise in racial exogamy has generated a growing body of literature on its implications, particularly for the “mixed race” children who emerge from these unions. Scholars writing about interracial marriages in the 1930s and 1940s were overwhelmingly pessimistic about the fate of the children, emphasizing their identity confusion and lack of acceptance by others (Song 2003). Much of the contemporary literature has a very different tone, emphasizing the positive aspects of a mixed heritage. Instead of choosing the affiliation of one parent over another, “mixed race” persons are increasingly inclined to acknowledge and to maintain their diverse heritage, thereby challenging the singular conception of racial identity that has been prevalent in the US (Root 1992). This is so even among those who have one black parent, and who thus face the deeply rooted US “one drop rule” whereby any black ancestry results in one’s automatic assignment by others to the category of black. It was in part due to the efforts of “mixed race” persons that the US Census underwent an important policy shift in 2000. Respondents are now allowed to check off as many race affiliations as they wish instead of being limited to a single one.

SEE ALSO: Biracialism; Color Line; Interracial Unions; Marriage; One Drop Rule; Passing

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endogenous development

Kosaku Yoshino

Endogenous development was presented as an alternative perspective on development that reconsidered modernization theory, which had until the 1960s been the dominant analytical paradigm of social change, especially in American sociology. From the late 1960s throughout the 1970s, criticisms were directed against modernization theory on the grounds that modernization was a West centric model and that as such it would not necessarily lead to industrial growth and fair distribution of social benefits in non western settings.

The notion of “endogenous development” originates in two sources. One is a report entitled “What Now: Another Development,” produced by the Dag Hammarskjöld Foundation. It was presented to the Seventh Special Session of the United Nations General Assembly in 1975. The Assembly met in the midst of a deep crisis in development and international economic relations, with problems being brought to the fore in areas such as food, energy, population, the environment, and economic and monetary matters. The central elements of this alternative mode of development, according to the report, are that it is (1) “geared to the satisfaction of needs, beginning with the eradication of poverty”; (2) “endogenous and self reliant, that is, relying on the strength of

the societies which undertake it”; and (3) “in harmony with the environment.” It was proposed that an endogenous and self reliant development stems “from the inner core of each society,” relies on “the creativity of the men and women who constitute” a human group, becomes “richer through exchange between them and with other groups,” and entails “the autonomous definition of development styles and of life styles.” Thus, the notion of endogenous development is not narrowly that of economic development per se, but deals also with cultural and social development (Dag Hammarskjöld Foundation 1975).

The other original contribution came from a Japanese sociologist, Kazuko Tsurumi. She first used the term “endogenous development” in 1976. As someone who studied under the supervision of Marion Levy, Jr. and as a long time student of the indigenous scholarship of Kunio Yanagita, a founding father of Japan’s folklore studies, Tsurumi was in a good position to critically examine western theories of social change and modernization in light of non western experiences. In an attempt to construct an alternative model of development to modernization, she emphasized the value of “endogeneity” of development on the following grounds.

First, modernization theory as formulated in Europe and culminated in the United States in the 1960s identified early developers such as England, the US, and France as endogenous developers who pioneered the model of modern society. By contrast, latecomers to modernization such as Japan, China, and other Asian, African, and Latin American countries are exogenous developers or model receivers. Endogenous refers to something internal that is generated from within a system, as opposed to exogenous, which means something generated from outside. The early developers created models of modernization out of their own traditions, whereas all latecomers borrow models from the early developers. This, of course, causes tensions between exogenous models of technology, science, and social organization and the indigenous patterns of technology, social structure, and values.

Second, from the point of view of the non western world, Tsurumi emphasized the

development of the non material life. Through “spiritual awakening” and “intellectual creativity,” people can become active agents of social change. This theme was explored at the United Nations University’s Asian Regional Symposium on “Intellectual Creativity in Endogenous Culture” at Kyoto in 1978 (Abdel Malek & Pandeya 1981). In offering some concrete examples of such development, Tsurumi drew attention to the revival of the idea of symbiosis of nature and people in the movement to regenerate the pollution devastated area of Minamata in Japan, the conscious use of traditional social structure to avoid or mitigate the more negative aspects of industrialization and urbanization in the Jiangsu Province of China, and the Buddhism based self help movement in Thailand and Sri Lanka.

Tsurumi summarizes the essential elements of endogenous development as follows. The goal of endogenous development, first and foremost, is for all humans and their groups to meet basic needs in food, clothing, shelter, and medical care as well as to create conditions in which individuals can fully utilize their potentialities. This goal is common to all human beings, but paths to it follow diverse processes of social change. To achieve this goal, individuals and groups in each region must autonomously create social visions and ways forward to the goal by adapting to their own ecological systems and basing development programs on their own cultural heritage and traditions. With this as a starting point, foreign knowledge, technology, and institutions can be more effectively and harmoniously adopted to aid the development process. She argues that “the expansion of endogenous development on a global scale would mean the achievement of multilinear development. We can then exchange models with one another regardless of whether the models are those of early comers or latecomers” (Tsurumi 1989).

Modernization theory was constructed using a society (a nation state) as the basic unit. In turn, dependency theory, formulated as a critical response to modernization theory, focused on relations between center and periphery. As such, dependency theory, too, presupposes a nation state and its subsystems as its basic units of analysis. By contrast, the theory of

endogenous development identifies a region as its analytical unit. Here, region is not the same as a subsystem of a nation state but an entity that quite often crosses boundaries between nation states. In formulating the concept of region, Tsurumi relies on Tamanoi (1979), who defines “regionalism” as “a pursuit of administrative autonomy and economic self reliance as well as cultural independence by the residents of a region, who hold a sense of attachment to their regional community on the basis of its climatic and ecological characteristics.”

The notion of endogenous development began to be employed extensively in the late 1970s by organizations, including the United Nations and UNESCO, as well as by individual researchers in various countries and regions. It was an attempt to explore an alternative route to development in a world faced with dangerous and seemingly intractable global problems, such as disruption of ecosystems, poverty, and famine.

SEE ALSO: Dependency and World Systems Theories; Development: Political Economy; Developmental State; Modernization

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Engels, Friedrich (1820–95)

Clifford L. Staples

Without Karl Marx, of course, few people today would know the name of Friedrich Engels; but without Engels we might have heard much less from Karl Marx.

Engels was born into a wealthy, devout, Protestant family in the industrial town of Barmen (now Wuppertal) in the Rhineland region of what is now Germany. The industrialist father wished his eldest son to follow in his footsteps, and so in 1838, before he could even finish high school, Engels was sent to clerk for a business in Bremen. But his lack of higher education did not prevent Engels from tackling difficult philosophical issues. In Bremen, free from the fundamentalism of his Pietist parents and teachers, he became a voracious reader of literature, philosophy, history, and science. Critically, neither his privileged family background nor his own eventual success as a capitalist prevented him from devoting his life to destroying capitalism. He also had a natural talent with languages – a skill he would put to good use in his later years as an international political figure and organizer.

It didn't take much to be a political radical under the Prussian monarchy in the 1830s, and so Engels published his early anti-Pietist and democratic views under the pen name of Friedrich Oswald. He was soon drawn, however, to the more intellectually challenging work of the "Young Hegelians," a cluster of Hegel's followers. In 1841, at the age of 21, Engels moved to Berlin and volunteered for the military. Doing so allowed him to satisfy his required military service while attending university lectures, writing articles and pamphlets, and meeting with the Young Hegelians. While Engels would retain a keen interest in military science and strategy throughout his life, he seems to have had plenty of energy, as well, for books and bars and in causing as much trouble for the authorities as possible.

The Young Hegelians wanted to apply Hegel's philosophy of dialectical change, development, and progress to church, state, and

society: a radical turnabout that was most unwelcome by the establishment. But there were disagreements among the young radicals and many of them, while expressing anti-establishment views, remained committed to Hegel's idealism – an idealism that others (Ludwig Feuerbach, Karl Marx, and Friedrich Engels among them) found untenable.

While Engels was in Berlin, Ludwig Feuerbach published *The Essence of Christianity*, a book that, for some, pointed the way out of the confines of the Hegelian system and urged a reconsideration of materialism. And while Engels as well as Marx would reject the somewhat crude materialism of Feuerbach, Engels some years later described Feuerbach's view as an "intermediate link between Hegelian philosophy and our own conception."

In 1842, after completing his military service, Engels traveled to Cologne, where he met with Karl Marx and Moses Hess, both of whom were editors at the *Rheinische Zeitung*, which Engels had written. Hess saw England as the country most likely to produce his hoped-for communist revolution. As it happened, Engels's father had significant financial interests in a large textile factory in Manchester, and so Engels, now a communist himself, went for two years to Manchester to work in the factory as a clerk. In addition to directly observing conditions in the factory, he also met trade unionists, socialists, and other radicals, and based on fieldwork in the neighborhoods of Manchester, wrote articles about social and economic conditions for Marx's *Deutsch-Französische Jahrbucher*. He also began a critical study of the works of English political economists. In 1845 he would publish a book entitled *The Condition of the Working Class in England, 1844* based on his fieldwork in Manchester, and his work on the English political economists would point Marx toward the material for *Capital*.

On his way home to Barmen, Engels made a brief stop in Paris and again met with Marx. As Engels later wrote: "When I visited Marx in Paris in the summer of 1844 we found ourselves in complete agreement on questions of theory and our collaboration began at that time." In the next two years Engels would marry Mary Burns – a working class Irish woman – with whom he would live until her

death in 1867 (after which he lived with her sister), and he and Marx would collaborate on several manuscripts, including *The Holy Family* and *The German Ideology* in which they would make some attempt to flesh out their philosophical and political positions and distinguish themselves from a number of rivals. This writing – or theory – was done, of course, in the interest of furthering the radical political practice to which both were committed. And it was out of this collaboration, and at the request of the London based League of the Just, that perhaps the world's most famous political pamphlet, *The Communist Manifesto*, was written.

In 1848 the rebellions in France spread to Germany, and Marx and Engels quickly took up the fight against the Prussian monarchy by moving to Cologne and taking over editorship of the *Neue Rheinische Zeitung* newspaper. But afraid of the growing strength of the workers, the German bourgeoisie sided with the aristocracy and moved to crush the workers. Marx was soon deported, but Engels took an active part in the uprising, serving as an aid to a commander fighting against the Prussians. As defeat neared, Engels escaped to Switzerland, and from there made his way to London.

With the defeat of the 1848 rebellion, Marx and Engels concluded that the near term prospects for revolution were unlikely and so turned their attention to scholarly and organizing work that they hoped would prove useful when the revolutionary moment reappeared. Marx began his work on political economy in the British Library while Engels once again took up the position of clerk, and eventually partner, in his father's Manchester factory. For the next 20 years Engels lived and worked in Manchester, providing both for himself and for the Marx family living in London.

While Marx worked on *Contribution to the Critique of Political Economy*, published in 1859, and the first volume of *Capital*, in 1867, Engels would clerk by day and by night keep up an almost daily correspondence with Marx, ghost write many of the articles that Marx had agreed to write for the *New York Daily Tribune*, and continue with his own wide ranging studies in natural sciences, history, and military science. A man of boundless energy and optimism, Engels also managed to find time for a lively social life.

In 1870 Engels sold his share of the Manchester factory, moved to London, and joined Marx on the General Council of the International Workingmen's Association – the First International – which had been founded in 1864. Now retired, he took over the burden of the organization's correspondence, freeing Marx for his more scholarly work.

Of particular concern to Engels and Marx at this time was the emergence of the German Social Democratic Party in 1875, a move they supported, though not unconditionally, as Marx wrote in the *Critique of the Gotha Program*. For his part, Engels wrote a series of articles defending Marx and himself against the attacks from within the Social Democratic Party by the followers of Eugen Dühring. Later, these articles were collected together into a book known as the *Anti Dühring*, selected chapters of which were then excerpted and published in a widely read pamphlet entitled *Socialism: Utopian and Scientific*. In 1981 the German Social Democratic Party dropped the Gotha program and adopted a Marxist program largely because of the influence of the *Anti Dühring*.

After Marx's death in 1883 Engels devoted the rest of his life to Marx and Marxism, largely at the expense of his own work. Although he did manage to publish *The Origins of the Family, Private Property, and the State* in 1884, his *Dialectics of Nature* was published in 1925, long after his death. His first priority was to see to it that the remaining volumes of *Capital* were published – no simple task given the disorganized state in which Marx left his papers. Volume 2 was published in 1885 and Volume 3 appeared in 1894. His second priority was leading the international socialist movement, which he did by continuing his worldwide correspondence, writing articles for and advising the leaders of the Second International, and meeting with visiting intellectuals and revolutionaries, such as Georgi Plekhanov, one of Russia's first Marxists. Engels also managed to visit the US for two months in 1888, and in 1893 addressed the final session of the Congress of the Second International in Zurich. Vigorous until the end, Engels died of throat cancer in 1895.

Much of what Engels had to say to sociologists is learned via the study of his more famous

collaborator, Karl Marx. But, as is evident from the multiple ways in which Engels supported Marx during, and even after, Marx's life, without Engels Marx might never have become the legendary figure we know today. This is why we continue to recognize Engels's contribution to Marxist sociology.

But Engels is and should continue to be appreciated on his own. As capitalism spreads to all corners of the globe, the conditions of the English working class in 1844 are today being reproduced in the conditions of the Chinese, Mexican, and Malaysian working classes. Thus, Engels's *The Conditions of the English Working Class in England, 1844* could continue to be studied and analyzed by fieldworkers as one approach to critical ethnography. Beginning in the 1970s, feminist anthropologists and sociologists read Engels's *The Origin of the Family, Private Property, and the State* as they sought to understand women's subordination and oppression across cultures and over time. To this date, Engels's book is often included on lists of key works in feminist theory, though of course his claim that women were the first oppressed class continues to be critiqued and debated. Finally, many sociologists have come to believe that the discipline should be more attentive to and focused on the needs of the public rather than the needs of elites, and it is difficult to think of anyone who might better fit the description of a "public sociologist" than Friedrich Engels. We should, therefore, continue to study his life as well as his work – with and without Karl Marx.

SEE ALSO: Communism; Feminist Anthropology; Marx, Karl; Materialism; Socialism; Theory

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enterprise

Alberto Martinelli

The sociological analysis of the enterprise focuses on the relationships between enterprises and their social environment (Martinelli & Smelser 1990), with specific regard to two major topics: the study of organizational models and social systems of production and the study of the context of entrepreneurship.

Since the 1970s the productive model based on mass production and Fordist/Taylorist work organization in the large corporation have undergone crisis and transformation. As a consequence, a new economic sociology has arisen, which centers on the origins and developments of new organizational models of production based on flexibility. These changes at the micro level of the enterprise's organization were accompanied with parallel changes at the macro level of the relationships between state and market, as Fordism in the work place was often related to a government's Keynesian policies.

The Fordist/Taylorist model was the dominant model of enterprise organization in the twentieth century and reached its peak in the two decades after World War II. Its key distinctive elements were mass production, vertical integration, the use of a low skilled labor force, and the fragmented organization of working tasks. This model of enterprise organization had been analyzed in the earliest studies of economic sociology (like those of Sombart and Weber), but it became the main object of sociological industrial research in the course of the twentieth century, although the timing and speed of its diffusion varied in the different capitalist countries. Typical examples of this kind of research are the work of Kerr et al. (1960) on the organization of

American enterprises, the studies of the French school of *Sociologie du travail* on the consequences of technological change, and Dore's (1973) comparative research on British and Japanese enterprises.

In the last decades of the twentieth century the internal structure of the enterprise organization underwent major changes, first of all in the decline of mass standardized production in favor of flexible specialization, customized production, and diversified quality mass production. The main factors accounting for this change – a true “second industrial divide” (Piore & Sabel 1984) – were the growing demand for more diversified and higher quality products by better informed and more demanding consumers in the mass markets of developed countries; and the spread of the new information and communication technologies that allow just in time production and better quality controls. These changes fostered a diversification of productive models and a reframing of the firm's relationships with the social context. In the light of these changes a new economic sociology has developed, which focuses on the analysis of “social systems of production.” These systems include the internal structure of the enterprise, industrial relations, training systems, relationships with competitors, suppliers, and distributors, the structure of capital markets, the nature of state interventions, and the conception of social justice (Hollingsworth & Boyer 1997). Analyses of these systems explore the links between the various institutional forms of the enterprise and its social environment using concepts like social networks, trust, social capital, cultural values, and norms.

In the new phase of industrial organization we witness multiple and diversified productive models affecting both large and small enterprises. The most interesting organizational developments studied by sociologists concern the large enterprises as networks and industrial districts. The need to reduce the separation between the design and the making of products – which was typical of Fordism – meant that large enterprises changed both the internal organization of labor in the direction of just in time production and greater cooperation with workers, and the external networks of cooperation with specialized suppliers all along

the supply chain. As far as small firms are concerned, sociological research has focused on industrial districts, which grow where either one or both the following contextual factors are present: traditions of good craftsmanship and strong community ties (as in areas of northern and central Italy) and first quality higher education and research institutions (as in areas like Silicon Valley, Boston Route 128, Baden Wurtemberg, and the Fukuoka region). Critical elements in the success of industrial districts are such intangible assets as trust and capacity to cooperate, which are in turn rooted in strong local identities.

Enterprise as networks and districts of small and medium size firms are not, however, the only forms taken by flexible specialization. The other side of flexibility is the informal economy or, more specifically, the hidden economy. The informal economy includes, besides the production of illegal goods and services with illegal means (criminal economy), and the production of goods and service for self consumption without the intermediation of money (family or communitarian economy), the production of legal goods and services by illegal means (hidden economy). The hidden economy develops wherever greater flexibility and competitiveness are sought by violating fiscal and labor laws and disregarding standards of both environmental sustainability and social responsibility. The enterprises of the hidden economy are influenced by their cultural and institutional context: areas of the hidden economy are, for instance, well entrenched in immigrant communities of major American and European cities. Actually, all the new flexible forms of productive organization are more embedded in their social contexts than those predominant in the Taylorist/Fordist phase.

The other major sociological contribution to the study of the enterprise is the analysis of the context of entrepreneurship. Sociologists have contributed significantly to the study of entrepreneurship, critically integrating economic theory. Most economists, with notable exceptions like Schumpeter and Kirzner, seem to think that entrepreneurial activities will emerge more or less spontaneously, whenever economic conditions are favorable, as an instance of rational profit maximization. Context is either ignored or taken into account, disregarding its

social and cultural complexity and the variety of different historical settings, and there is no appreciation of the interaction between actor and context.

Most sociologists consider entrepreneurship as a much more problematic phenomenon, deeply embedded in societies and cultures; they focus on the influence of, and the mutual interplay among, non economic factors such as cultural norms and beliefs, class and ethnic relations and collective action, state intervention and control, organizational structures, bounded solidarity and trust, deviant behavior and marginality status, social approval of economic activity, business ethics, and motivations for achievement. A key concept in the sociological analysis of entrepreneurship is that of double embeddedness (Kloosterman et al. 1999), which highlights the two major ways in which the context of entrepreneurship can be analyzed: first, as the politico institutional environment of market capitalism, such as types of markets (of factors of production and of goods and services), and types of laws (fiscal, labor, anti trust) and institutions of governance; second, as the social and cultural background of entrepreneurs, such as cultural attitudes favoring technological innovation and risk taking and networks of social relations and social capital.

The study of the institutional context of entrepreneurship is a longstanding tradition of research, from the Harvard Center for Entrepreneurial History to recent studies on institutional coordinating mixes and on the varieties of capitalism. Entrepreneurship is basically defined by technological innovation in a competitive market. However, both technology and competition require an extensive social organization. Successful entrepreneurs are those who succeed in establishing stable relationships with their internal and external stakeholders (i.e., persons or groups who claim rights or interests in a corporation and its activities, past, present, or future – not only shareholders but also workers, suppliers, customers, and local communities). The ability to establish these relationships is itself dependent on the production of stable societal institutions such as governments and laws. Contrary to the view that firms are efficient wealth producers while

governments are intrusive and inefficient, the sociological analysis of entrepreneurship shows that the establishment of a stable and reliable legal and political environment through government legislation and policies (patents, anti monopolistic laws, consumers' protection laws, public spending to sustain aggregate demand, support for exporting firms, etc.) is required for entrepreneurial activities to develop and endure.

There is no single appropriate institutional environment for entrepreneurial development that can pretend to universal validity. Different varieties of capitalism exist and evolve through time, as do different modes of corporate control (Fligstein 1990). But the institutional context of entrepreneurship is not limited to the interplay between markets, firms, and governments. Studies on the institutional varieties of capitalism have shown how more complex institutional mixes of markets, states, hierarchical organizations, communities, clans and networks, and associations coordinate and regulate business activities (Crouch & Streeck 1997). Each of these coordinating mechanisms has its own logic – its own organizational structure, its own rules of exchange, its own procedures for enforcing compliance both individually and collectively; each can be evaluated in terms of efficiency, effectiveness in delivering private and collective goods, and capability to meet the claims and expectations of various stakeholders of the firm.

This richness of institutional contexts has not diminished because of globalization. Contrary to a widespread belief, globalization does not induce homogenization toward a single model, but stimulates a variety of institutional responses, which are rooted in the specific cultural codes and social relations of different countries and regions.

Sociological research on entrepreneurship has also focused on the other side of double embeddedness: the social and cultural background of entrepreneurs. The question of the contextual conditions which produce entrepreneurs has been traditionally addressed in terms of deviance and marginality. Acting in a hostile social milieu, where prevailing attitudes are against innovation, and being excluded from political power, marginal entrepreneurs

concentrate on business, but, being outside the dominant value system, they are subjected to lesser sanctions for their deviant behavior. More recent works on ethnic communities (Portes 1995) and women show that factors like racism, sexism, and credentialism render people “outsiders” through processes of exclusionary closure; such outsiders often form “feeder groups” from which new entrepreneurs emerge.

Weber’s comparative analysis of religious ethics and economic action in the origin of capitalism provides the basis for studies stressing cultural context variables. Neo Weberian research focuses on the degree to which the forces of rationalization responsible for dislodging individuals from their embeddedness in nature, religion, and tradition continue to shape economic growth and social modernization (Berger 1991). Economic growth develops from the bottom up, not from the top down: ordinary individuals, competing with each other to achieve a variety of goals – including economic profit and self advancement – in their everyday activities, practices, habits, and ideas, create the basis for other distinctly modern institutions to emerge that may mediate between them and distant, large scale structures of society.

The most convincing contributions to the study of the context of entrepreneurship are those integrating various approaches and selecting the most appropriate mix for the analysis of specific empirical questions and historical realities, as in the case of research on ethnic entrepreneurship (Waldinger et al. 1990). All these studies work out models which try to combine a plurality of variables in order to understand the relation between the entrepreneur and the context in which he or she is embedded: social networks, selective migration trends, settlement patterns, structure of markets, access to ownership, residential patterns, group culture and aspiration levels, immigration, and labor market policies.

SEE ALSO: Capitalism; Immigration; Institutionalism; Management Theory; Markets; Modernization; Organization Theory; Post Industrial Society; Social Embeddedness of Economic Action; State and Economy

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enterprise unions

Ross Mouer

The enterprise union (*kigyobetsu kumiai*) has been the dominant form of union organization in post war Japan. When the interest in Japan’s economic prowess suddenly surfaced in the 1970s, the *kigyobetsu kumiai* was singled out as one of the three features constituting the Japanese model of industrial relations. Possibly the least understood of the three, the enterprise union was often confused with the company union and an approach to employee relations

whereby the union is coopted by management to foster and to maintain a compliant labor force subservient to the needs of management (Galenson & Odaka 1976). The Japanese have a term (with a negative connotation) for this kind of unionism – the *goyo kumiai*, literally, a union at his majesty's (i.e., management's) service. The debate on the nature of the enterprise union in Japan brought to the general discussion of unions a more subtle delineation between different types of union organization (e.g., as in Kawanishi 1992).

Kigyobetsu kumiai refers to a form of union organization which restricts union membership to regular employees at a given enterprise. "Regular employees" are those employed on a permanent long term basis. In larger firms these employees have access to career paths within the firm's internal labor market(s). Two or more enterprise unions may exist at the same enterprise. Generally, "the enterprise" is a designated place of business, and each firm, company, or corporation may have multiple places of business. Accordingly, a manufacturing firm with five factories might have one (or more) independent enterprise union at each factory. It is common for ideologically aligned unions at different enterprises operated by the same firm to join together in a firm wide federation (known as a *kigyoren*). Such a federation may recast itself as an enterprise union with the union organization at each enterprise (e.g., factory) having branch status (as a *shibu*). Enterprise unions may affiliate with an industrial federation either directly or through a firm level federation. It should be noted that several forms of union organization exist in Japan at the enterprise level.

The labor movement in post war Japan has been characterized by ideological fissures, with a good proportion of firms in the 1960s embracing the branch of a left wing, politically active industrial union (known within the firm as a "number one union") and an economically oriented conservative enterprise union (known as a "number two union") (see Fujita 1968). Number one unions were in many cases affiliated with a left wing national center known as "Sohyo" (General Council of Trade Unions of Japan) via an industrial federation or directly as a branch of an industrial union; the number two unions were affiliated with a national peak

organization known as "Domei" (Japanese Confederation of Labor) through their industrial federation (see Fig. 1).

In many firms the antagonistic competition between these two types of enterprise unions produced an interesting dynamic in many firms and, more generally, within the economy as a whole. Sohyo (founded as a national center in 1949), its industrial unions (and federations), and the number one unions tended to focus more on workers' rights, social justice, and other issues related to the autonomy of workers on the shop floor. Domei (founded as a national center in 1964), its industrial federations, and the number two unions tended to focus more on ways to cooperate with management to improve productivity and, ultimately, the remuneration which could be paid to employees. Although each approach had its own rationale, during Japan's first four post war decades many workers entertained a dual consciousness which was open to both emphases. Management at many firms responded by adopting a middle of the road approach which combined, for example, the egalitarian demands for an age based wage system with elements that rewarded performance and other characteristics more tightly linked to improving efficiency. However, the merger of the two major national centers at the end of the 1980s to form Rengo (Japan Union Confederation) diminished the significance of this form of "latent functional specialization" which resulted from the way Japanese workers organized themselves.

The pros and cons of the *kigyobetsu kumiai* were vigorously debated during the 1970s and 1980s, owing in part to the relevance attached to it as part of the Japanese model (e.g., Shirai 1983). Among the positives, various observers have pointed to the ability of the enterprise union to understand the financial realities of a particular firm and the various individuated needs of its employees within the context of a dynamic labor market. To the extent that those needs revolved around employment security and higher incomes, the union was seen to be in a superior position when it came to tailoring an overall package of demands which would be predicated on the firm's economic health as the basis for achieving the long term employment security and income related goals of its




Figure 1 Enterprise unions.

members. It was argued that leaders of the enterprise union were as “insiders” better positioned than “outsiders” from an industrial union (1) to obtain relevant information from management in their firms and (2) to understand the decision making/negotiation strategy

of their own firm. This in turn would result in a greater likelihood that concessions would be won. In return for a conciliatory approach, it was argued, a firm would later reimburse its labor force as the economy continued to expand. Some would see in this arrangement a

tradeoff between wage restraint and the maintenance of the other two components of the model mentioned above – especially the guarantees of long term employment.

There was in this approach, however, a feeling among some critics that firms were “buying off” union leaders and their membership. Critics of the *kigyobetsu kumiai* have maintained that too much closeness between labor and management resulted in labor and management postponing many of the hard decisions that needed to be made to establish sustainable rates of change in the enterprise. Recognizing the ability of union leaders to discipline the labor force in a responsible manner, some critics have focused on how enterprise unions have functioned like adjunct personnel departments facilitating management programs that intensified workloads or even implemented redundancy packages and other measures designed to rationalize further the way firms are run. Performing this kind of personnel management function for management, such critics would argue, many enterprise unions ended up sacrificing the interests of their members. The enterprise union has also been criticized for keeping union assets and resources in a segregated state, and for relying on locally generated leadership which is often more committed to resuming roles on the firm’s management team than to training as professional leaders for the union movement. In this regard, the tendency for effective union leaders to be promoted back onto the management team has been noted.

These concerns have focused attention on the ability of enterprise unions to negotiate successfully with management to achieve long term and short term outcomes in the interests of their members. Another set of concerns has revolved around the elitist characteristics of the enterprise union as an organization reserved for the privileged regular (male) employees in Japan’s largest firms. Here critics have noted the tendency of the enterprise union to ingrain among its members a fairly strong consciousness that they are the aristocracy of labor. Over time, it has been argued, members of many enterprise unions came to believe that their own interests were well served by tiered subcontracting, an arrangement from which they benefited when the working conditions for

employees doing the same work in smaller subcontracting firms were inferior to their own. In this sense, then, the enterprise union has been predicated on the assumption that fairly extensive internal labor markets would ensure the future well being of union members, and has been extremely effective in representing the interests of the workers it represents. From this perspective, however, the most lasting criticism might be that enterprise unions have tended not to be concerned with non members – those casually employed by the firm, those who are no longer employed by the firm (as a result of voluntary and involuntary separation), and those in the firm’s tiered pyramid of subcontractors. It is not surprising, therefore, that the enterprise union has been prevalent mostly in Japan’s large firms.

A final debate concerns to what extent enterprise unionism accounts for the decline in the unionization rate in Japan from about 35 percent in 1975 to just over 20 percent in 2000. However, declining rates seem to be rather universal, and aspects of this phenomenon have been noted overseas (e.g., concerning globalization and changing industrial structures). Already in the 1990s moves were made to form new types of special interest unions (e.g., for women employees or for line supervisors – *kacho* – or for part time workers) or more general unions (which could embrace unemployed workers). The immediate challenge in Japan will be for the union movement to somehow embrace both the non regular employee and the 60 percent of the labor force still employed in Japan’s smaller firms that employ fewer than 100 persons. For the enterprise union, the organization of those in the first group may be possible in large firms, but efforts of such unions are likely to run against the diseconomies of (small) scale when it comes to doing so in Japan’s smaller establishments. However, as the first group becomes more diverse, there, too, the difficulties faced by the enterprise unions in trying to differentiate their appeal may be insurmountable.

For some time the enterprise union has been seen as the most uniquely Japanese component of the Japanese industrial relations model (the other two components being long term employment and seniority wages). Its prevalence was explained largely in cultural terms.

However, as an appreciation of how it functions in structural terms, the merits of enterprise bargaining have been recognized abroad to the extent that it was introduced (without the enterprise union) to Australia in the late 1980s and early 1990s to remove the complexity which comes from management (and union negotiators) having to deal with a large number of industrial unions, and the complex array of industrial awards that often resulted from having multiple unions involved across an array of jurisdictions.

SEE ALSO: Japanese Style Management; *Nenko Chingin*; *Shushin Koyo*; Unions

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environment, sociology of the

Riley E. Dunlap

Environmental problems attract sociological attention because they are fundamentally social problems: they result from human social behavior, they are viewed as problematic because of their impact on humans (as well as other species), and their solution requires societal effort. It is therefore not surprising that sociologists

have shown growing interest in environmental issues in recent decades and that environmental sociology has become a recognized field. Yet, sustained sociological investigation of environmental problems did not come easily.

To establish a new discipline, the founders of sociology emphasized its unique focus on the explanation of social behavior by *social* as opposed to biological and physical phenomena. The Durkheimian emphasis on explaining social phenomena only in terms of "social facts" created an anti reductionism taboo that delegitimized use of biological and geographical factors in sociological analyses. It was important for sociology to move beyond, for example, explanations of racial and cultural differences in terms of genetics and climate, respectively. In the process, however, sociology adopted an implicit sociocultural determinism that provided infertile ground for sociological analyses of environmental problems. In mainstream sociology, "the environment" came to refer to the social context of the entity (group, community, institution, etc.) being examined, and the physical environment was seen as little more than the stage on which social behavior was enacted (Dunlap & Catton 1979).

Consequently, when environmental issues burst upon the scene in the 1970s in North America and shortly thereafter in Europe and the rest of the world, sociologists were not among the vanguard studying them. And when sociologists did focus on environmental issues, they typically analyzed the social processes involved in "constructing" environmental conditions as problems. There were numerous studies of the roles played by environmental activists, the media, scientists, and policymakers (including Green parties) in placing environmental problems onto the public agenda, as well as of the public's perceptions of such problems. Sophisticated models of the social construction of environmental problems gradually evolved (Hannigan 1995).

The onset of energy shortages and wide spread discussion of the "limits to growth" in the 1970s led a few sociologists to question the popular notion that modern societies had overcome resource constraints (Catton 1980). Likewise, continuous discoveries of serious pollution (from local toxic contamination to acid rain) and increasing incidences of resource

degradation (from strip mining to deforestation) led others to accept the reality of environmental deterioration and to investigate its social causes and consequences (Schnaiberg 1980). This generated an interest in societal–environmental relations (and at least an implicit rejection of anti reductionism), which some sociologists saw as representing the arrival of an “environmental sociology” (Dunlap & Catton 1979).

The constructivist and realist approaches to the sociological investigation of environmental problems have both continued to evolve. Although an intensive debate occurred between their proponents over the past decade, both traditions remain strong, with the realist camp predominating in North America and the constructivist being strong in Europe.

Sociological work on environmental issues continues to reflect the inherent social dimensions of environmental problems, encompassing investigations of the causes of environmental problems, the societal impacts of such problems, and strategies and prospects for ameliorating these problems. These realist oriented approaches are complemented by constructivist analyses not only of how conditions come to be defined as problems, but also of controversies over the causes and impacts as well as the very existence of environmental problems.

CONSTRUCTIVIST AND REALIST APPROACHES

Building upon such basic observations as levels of airborne particulates being ignored in one era and/or locale but seen as “pollution” later on or in other places, a rich body of sociological literature clarifies how various environmental conditions become defined as “problems”; the frequently contested nature of such problems; and the implications of competing interpretations of the sources, impacts, and solutions of the problems. Originally relying heavily on perspectives from social problems and the sociology of science (Yearley 1991), over time such analyses have drawn on social movement theory, discourse analysis, cultural sociology, and postmodern theorizing.

Numerous studies of claims, claims makers, and claims making activities have yielded

valuable insights into the social processes necessary for gaining widespread acceptance of conditions – ranging from local toxic wastes to global environmental change – as “problematic.” Originally the emphasis was on environmental activists as key claims makers, but the importance of scientists has drawn increasing attention. The vital role of the media both in publicizing and in interpreting claims has also received attention. Such analyses have demonstrated that environmental problems do not simply emerge from objective conditions, but that their recognition is contingent upon issue entrepreneurs being successful in overcoming a series of barriers and gaining widespread societal acceptance of their definition of the situation (Hannigan 1995).

Besides clarifying how various conditions come to be accepted as environmental problems, constructivist analyses have shed light on the importance of how the problems are defined. For example, the notion of “*global* environmental change” conveys an image of global contributions to climate change, deforestation, and biodiversity loss, and thus shared responsibility for dealing with them – thereby masking crucial differences between the contributions and capabilities of rich and poor nations.

Early environmental problems like air and water pollution were readily perceptible, but newer problems such as toxic wastes, ozone depletion, and climate change depend on scientific measurements and interpretation for their discovery, analysis, and possible amelioration. The resulting heavy dependence of environmental advocates on scientists has received scrutiny from sociologists. Analysts such as Yearley (2005) have emphasized that the environmental movement’s heavy reliance on science is a mixed blessing for several reasons: (1) demands for scientific proof can be used to stall action, particularly by unsympathetic politicians; (2) the probabilistic and tentative nature of scientific evidence falls short of the definitive answers laypeople and policymakers seek; and (3) reliance on scientific claims makes environmentalists vulnerable to counterclaims issued by “skeptical scientists” supported by industry.

Attention to discourse has allowed other analysts to provide insight into the importance of how environmental problems and policies are

“framed” by different interests. In addition to the above noted implications of framing macro level issues such as climate change and loss of biodiversity as “global” problems, sociologists have noted how dominant conceptions of sustainable development fostered by powerful institutions such as the World Bank reflect a “green neoliberal” ideology that serves the interests of wealthy nations and western capital (Goldman 2005). On the other hand, attention has also been given to how an “environmental justice” frame has been created to represent the interests of minority and working class communities exposed to disproportionate levels of environmental hazards, illustrating that the underprivileged can also benefit from strategic framing.

Constructivist work demonstrates that environmental problems do not simply emerge from changes in objective conditions, that scientific evidence is seldom sufficient for establishing conditions as problematic, and that the framing of problems is consequential. These are major insights, and represent a quintessential sociological contribution that, for example, helps environmental activists and scientists understand why their claims frequently fail to produce the desired effect while still allowing constructivists to avoid charges of environmental reductionism or determinism.

In the 1990s some constructivists followed postmodern fads and “deconstructed” not only environmental problems and controversies, but also “the environment” (or, more typically, “nature”) itself. Proclamations that “there is no singular ‘nature’ as such, only a diversity of contested natures” (Macnaghten & Urry 1998: 1) were not uncommon. This provoked a reaction from environmental sociologists of a realist bent, who argued that while one can deconstruct the concept of nature, an obvious human (and culturally bound) construction, this hardly challenges the existence of the global ecosystem and by implication various manifestations of ecosystem change construed as “problems.”

Representatives of the realist camp such as Ted Benton, Peter Dickens, Raymond Murphy, and Riley Dunlap argued that a strong constructivist approach that ignores the likely validity of competing environmental claims slips into relativism, has the potential of

undermining environmental scientists and playing into the hands of their opponents, precludes meaningful examination of societal–environmental relations seen as fundamental to environmental sociology, and at least implicitly resurrects the disciplinary tradition of treating the biophysical environment as insignificant (Benton 2001).

In response, many constructivists replied that they were not denying the “reality” of environmental problems, as their postmodern rhetoric sometimes suggested, but were simply problematizing environmental claims and knowledge. In eschewing relativism in favor of “mild” or “contextual” constructivism, most constructivists have moved toward common ground with their realist colleagues. The latter, in turn, have moved toward a “critical realist” perspective that, although firmly grounded on acceptance of a reality independent of human understanding, recognizes that scientific (and other) knowledge is imperfect and evolving (Carolan 2005). The result is that the “realist–constructivist wars” of the 1990s are subsiding and the sociology of environmental issues (increasingly grounded in ontological realism and epistemological relativism) is a more intellectually vital area as a result of housing both approaches.

While seldom problematizing environmental knowledge, environmental sociologists in the realist camp often go to pains to examine the validity of measures of environmental problems such as deforestation (Rudel & Roper 1997). The defining feature of their work is use of empirical indicators of environmental conditions – from local air pollution to national CO₂ emissions – in their analyses. Such work is often quantitative, and bears on each of the three aspects of environmental problems noted above – their causes, social impacts, and potential solutions.

CAUSES OF ENVIRONMENTAL DEGRADATION

A central focus of environmental sociology, particularly in the US, has been to explain why environmental degradation seems endemic to modern industrial societies, and thereby provide sociological insight into the causes of

environmental problems. Early work often critiqued natural scientists' monocausal explanations, emphasizing factors such as population growth, technological developments, or overconsumption. Frequently coming from a neo Marxist or political economy perspective, sociologists called attention to the roles of capitalism and its supporting governmental structure ("the state") in creating environmental degradation.

Arguably the most influential analysis was offered by Schnaiberg (1980), who provided a cogent critique of Paul Ehrlich's emphasis on population growth, Barry Commoner's emphasis on technological developments, and the widespread emphasis on materialistic consumers as the key sources of environmental degradation. Schnaiberg's "treadmill of production" model offered a sophisticated alternative that stresses the inherent need of market based firms to grow, the accompanying pressure to replace costly labor with advanced technologies, and the inevitable increase in resource use and pollution that results. He further clarified how a powerful coalition of capital, state, and labor develops in support of continued growth, making it difficult if not impossible for environmental advocates to halt the resulting "treadmill."

A number of other environmental sociologists working from a Marxist tradition, most notably Ted Benton and Peter Dickens in the UK and James O'Connor and John Bellamy Foster in the US, have offered alternative insights into why capitalism produces environmental degradation, but the treadmill argument has thus far garnered more attention.

Despite the appeal of Schnaiberg's treadmill model, it has proven difficult to test empirically on a macro level, and has been used primarily to explain the lack of success of local recycling programs and environmental campaigns. In an era of economic globalization, the treadmill model needs to be integrated with global level perspectives such as world systems theory in order to provide the theoretical leverage necessary for adequately examining the relationship between the globalization of capital and environmental degradation. In addition, recent sociological attention to the importance of consumption raises questions about Schnaiberg's dismissal of consumers' contributions to

environmental degradation (Yearley 2005). And finally, proponents of "ecological modernization" have challenged the fundamental premise that capitalism inevitably produces environmental degradation.

Ironically, given the dismissal by Schnaiberg and many other sociologists of the perspectives of Ehrlich and Commoner, a recent alternative to the treadmill draws explicitly from the "IPAT equation" (holding that environmental impact is a function of population, technology, and affluence) that evolved from debates between the two ecologists. Rooted in the human ecology tradition espoused by some early environmental sociologists (Benton 2001: 5–6), the "STIRPAT" (or "Stochastic Impacts by Regression on Population, Affluence, and Technology") model developed by Dietz, Rosa, and York offers a way of testing the relative impacts of various driving forces on environmental degradation (York et al. 2003). Early results, which will no doubt provoke further studies, suggest that population is more important than most sociologists believe, resurrecting the neo Malthusian perspective of Catton (1980).

In between the neo Marxist and human ecology perspectives lie a host of efforts to explain the sources of environmental degradation, exemplified by Rudel and Roper's (1997) sophisticated analyses of the origins of tropical deforestation. The past decade has witnessed a flood of empirical, comparative studies – often taking the nation state as their unit of analysis – that investigate the relationship between a range of factors (demographic, technological, economic, political, etc.) and various indicators of environmental degradation ranging from deforestation to CO₂ emissions to ecological footprints (e.g., York et al. 2003).

IMPACTS OF ENVIRONMENTAL DEGRADATION AND RESOURCE SHORTAGES

Sociologists have devoted less attention to the social impacts of environmental degradation, perhaps due to lingering fears of environmental determinism. The earliest focused not on environmental degradation but on the impacts of the 1970s energy shortages. While diverse impacts,

from regional migration to purchasing behavior, were investigated, equity impacts were the primary focus. Studies documented that both the shortages and policies for dealing with them (e.g., higher prices and taxes) tended to be regressive, with lower socioeconomic strata bearing a disproportionate cost.

Inequities have been a persistent concern in environmental sociology and attention next shifted to the distribution of environmental hazards such as air pollution and waste sites. A consistent finding from US studies is that lower socioeconomic strata are disproportionately exposed to environmental hazards, and the same is true for racial/ethnic minorities. While there has been debate over the relative importance of income and race in generating inequitable exposure, many analysts argue that the evidence suggests a pattern of "environmental racism" (Brulle & Pellow 2006).

The environmental justice theme is increasingly extended to the international level, as numerous studies find that the lower strata (and sometimes ethnic minorities) in poor nations also suffer disproportionately from environmental degradation. More generally, sociologists have documented unequal ecological exchanges among nations, with rich countries importing poor country's natural resources at bargain prices while shipping their own wastes (sometimes directly, but often by relocating dirty industries) to those same countries. These findings of consistent inequalities in exposure to the burdens of environmental degradation are at odds with Beck's model of the "risk society," which posits that exposure is becoming a universally shared experience.

Studies of communities that have been subjected to toxic contamination or other serious environmental hazards are also common, and often bridge the realist-constructivist divide. While some document the debilitating community impacts stemming from obvious contamination, many focus on the controversies that arise when allegations of contamination are countered by denials. Communities subjected to a "technological disaster" such as toxic contamination tend to experience severe conflict between parties holding competing views of its seriousness. This results in a "corrosive" community that stands in stark contrast to the "therapeutic" community that typically

develops in response to a "natural disaster" such as an earthquake, hurricane, or flood (Freudenburg 1997).

SOLUTIONS TO ENVIRONMENTAL POLICIES

Sociological contributions to environmental protection policies have largely occurred via policy evaluations. Sociologists commonly question the efficacy of information campaigns to stimulate pro environmental behaviors among consumers, emphasizing, for example, that providing community wide collection of recyclables along with garbage collection is more effective than encouraging people to use recycling centers. In a similar vein, research has highlighted the degree to which energy consumption is embedded in sociotechnical systems over which consumers have little control, and that promoting energy efficient construction standards may be more effective than appealing for household conservation. Studies highlighting the structural constraints on consumer behavior have enabled sociologists to offer valuable input into assessments of environmental policies (Dietz & Stern 2002).

Some environmental sociologists in Northern Europe have engaged more fully with environmental policy by attempting to explain what they see as a pattern of significant progress in environmental protection in their nations. Reversing the field's traditional focus on explaining environmental degradation, proponents of "ecological modernization" argue that a core task of environmental sociology is to explain environmental progress (Buttel 2003). Their evolving theoretical efforts have emphasized the importance of technological innovations, new patterns of cooperation between industry and government, and the gradual growth of an "ecological rationality" that offsets the traditional dominance of economic criteria in decision making. More generally, advocates of ecological modernization have argued that economic growth and environmental protection are compatible, and that capitalism can lead to environmental improvement rather than degradation (Mol & Sonnenfeld 2000).

Ecological modernization has encountered heavy criticism, particularly from American

scholars who have questioned the adequacy of its standard methodology (case studies of particular industries or governmental entities), its focus on institutional change rather than improvements in environmental quality, and its generalizability beyond Northern Europe. Most fundamentally, trends toward ecological modernization such as improvements in the eco efficiency of industries have not been adequate to offset economic and population growth, with the result that the “ecological footprint” of most nations and certainly the entire world continues to grow at an unsustainable rate.

Although ecological modernization has been found deficient by a growing number of critics, and certainly lacks face validity given downward trends in most indicators of global ecological health, it may offer insights into how and why particular industries and governmental entities (such as US corporations and communities that voluntarily develop CO₂ emission reduction programs) become more environmentally responsible.

Debates such as those between constructivists and realists, neo Marxians and neo Malthusians, and proponents of ecological modernization and their critics reflect the intellectual vitality of environmental sociology, and resolution of these debates via empirical tests and theoretical syntheses promises to move the field forward. Add in the fact that strong environmental sociology organizations exist in many nations, as well as within the International Sociological Association, and that the subject matter of the field (environmental problems) shows no sign of disappearing, and it seems safe to assume that sociological study of environmental issues has a promising future.

SEE ALSO: Built Environment; Ecofeminism; Ecological Problems; Ecology; Environment and Urbanization; Environmental Criminology; Environmental Movements; Life Environmentism; Population and the Environment

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environment and urbanization

Richard York and Eugene A. Rosa

The rapid urbanization of the world's population (accompanied by the rise of megacities) and the profound growth in the scale of impacts on the natural environment were two dominant trends of the twentieth century. Today over 3 billion people, nearly one half the human population, live in urban areas (United Nations 2004). Humans have altered the composition of the atmosphere, contributing to global climate change, have changed land cover over a large proportion of the earth's surface, and have contributed to a dramatic rise in the rate of species extinction.

All signs point to a continuance of these trends in the twenty first century. More than half the world's population will live in urban areas before 2010 and nearly two thirds will be urban residents by 2030 (United Nations 2004). It appears that environmental impacts will likely follow a similar pattern of growth. The parallelism of these trends points to the importance of assessing the connection between urbanization and environmental degradation. The causes and consequences of urbanization are highly complex as they are embedded in other global processes, such as modernization, population growth, trade liberalization, migration, and the expansion of global capitalism. Global environmental change is similarly embedded in a complex of transformative processes.

Nevertheless, urbanization plays a dominant role in the mounting global pressures on ecosystems. It is largely responsible for greenhouse gas accumulations, upper atmospheric ozone depletion, land degradation, and the destruction of coastal zones. There are broad reciprocal dynamics between urbanization and environmental change and the consequences for ecosystems and human capital.

ENVIRONMENTAL DEGRADATION AS A DRIVER OF URBANIZATION

Natural increase accounts for 60 percent of urban growth while migration, particularly

rural–urban migration, accounts for the remaining – substantial – 40 percent (United Nations 2004). There is a reciprocal, reinforcing dynamic between migration from rural to urban areas and environmental degradation. The rapid rise in global urbanization accounts for one side of the environmental degradation dynamic. Around the world, human concentrations pressure nature's capital and services primarily in rural areas with natural resources, contributing to the degradation of rural environments (deforestation, soil erosion, and desertification) and undermining the livelihoods of many people, particularly the rural poor in developing countries. This rural degradation has often served to limit the ability of rural peoples to maintain their way of life and, therefore, has served as a major push factor in rural to urban migration. Indeed, Shandra et al. (2003) found substantial empirical support that rural environmental degradation is a major driving force behind urbanization in developing countries. There is little doubt that part of the reason for rural environmental degradation can be traced to the activities of rural populations themselves – such as forest clearing for subsistence agriculture. But, increasingly, rural environmental degradation is driven in large part by non local forces. Hence, urbanization drives environmental degradation in rural areas, which, in turn, drives rural–urban migration, resulting in further urbanization and further degradation.

URBANIZATION AS A DRIVER OF ENVIRONMENTAL DEGRADATION

Urbanization introduces direct internal and external environmental impacts. For example, cities account for 80 percent of all CO₂ emissions and 75 percent of industrial wood use (Hinrichsen et al. 2001). The immediate and direct environmental consequences of urban development, such as congestion, concentrated pollution, and paved over natural habitats, are obvious to everyone, particularly to the urban population itself. Temperatures tend to be higher in city centers than in surrounding areas and nighttime cooling is less, due to the large heat trapping structures and treeless concrete jungles of cities. These concrete jungles affect

“heat retention, runoff, and pollution, resulting in urban heat islands” (Karl & Trenberth 2003: 1720) that impact public health. Furthermore, the environmental consequences of urbanization stretch well beyond their urban point source, contributing to regional and even global pollution. The pollution problems of urbanization are orders of magnitude larger for megacities (generally defined as those with populations over 10 million, like Mexico City), of which there are now 17 according to the United Nations.

Urbanization is responsible not only for direct impacts, but also for diffuse ones. However, the consequences of urbanization for the environment are complex. On the one hand, all else being equal (e.g., total population, economic production, level of industrialization), urban populations have a lower impact on the environment than rural populations because concentration in urban areas allows for more efficient use of space and transportation. For example, per capita energy use for climate control (heating and cooling) is typically much lower in urban areas due to the preponderance of multifamily housing with their common walls, floors, and ceilings (Darmstadter et al. 1977). On the other hand, despite these direct internal benefits, the most important environmental consequence of urbanization is the effect it has on the structure of regional, national, and global economies, production systems, and political structures.

Historically, economic, cultural, social, and military power has concentrated in cities, which have controlled social systems over large areas. In fact, over the past five millennia the world system has been dominated by a handful of cities exerting dramatic influence over global production (Chew 2001). As noted above, the environmental consequences of urbanization, therefore, are not restricted to the immediate environs of the city. In fact, the most severe impacts of urbanization may be felt at great distances from cities themselves, where resources are extracted for consumption in urban areas. For example, Chew (2001) documents the environmental consequences, such as deforestation, driven by the demand of ancient cities for natural resources. A more recent example documents how the growth of Chicago in the nineteenth century was in large part responsible

for the rapacious extraction of natural resources from the American West (Cronon 1991). Cities require massive quantities of resources for their construction and maintenance, and, therefore, shape land areas much larger than themselves to provide for their material appetites. For example, the highly urbanized Netherlands consumes resources from a total surface area equivalent to 15 times larger than itself (McMichael 2000: 1122).

Urbanization leads to changes in the culture and lifestyle of the population, including expanding the consumption of resource intensive goods – with clear consequences for the global environment. For example, urbanization, at least in the modern world, generally increases the per capita consumption of meat, which is particularly resource intensive to produce. The modern city is also intimately associated with the rise of the automobile. For example, Riley (2002) argues that urbanization may lead to the acquisition of cars not only by urban residents (due to their affluence and car friendly urban infrastructure), but also by rural residents seeking access to urban amenities. Private car ownership, which is increasing at a spectacular rate, totals more than 750 million vehicles worldwide (McMichael 2000).

Urbanization impacts lifestyle and human capital in indirect ways, too. It increases the demand for centrally generated commercial energy (as opposed to the individual use of traditional fuels, such as biomass), resulting in the accelerated combustion of fossil fuels in power plants. An unavoidable consequence of fossil fuel burning in power plants and in transportation is the production of greenhouse gases, such as CO₂, and a whole host of air pollutants such as particulate matter, ozone, carbon monoxide, sulfur dioxide, and nitrogen oxides. Virtually all of these pollutants have adverse effects on public health, a key component of human capital, and the World Health Organization (WHO 2002) estimates that worldwide air pollution is responsible for 3 million deaths annually.

The most serious consequence of urbanization for the natural environment may be the changes it introduces in the quality of human interaction with nature. Building upon a foundation laid by Marx, Foster (2000) argues that urbanization, in large part driven by capitalism,

generates a “metabolic rift” between town and country – between changing forms of social organization and the environment. The primary factor generating such a rift is the separation of people from the land when they become concentrated in urban centers.

The separation of people from the land leads to two reinforcing dislocations. First, organic matter (e.g., agricultural and human waste) that can provide nutrients to biological systems (a potential ecological benefit) is separated from where it can be recycled into the rural soil and becomes concentrated in urban areas. Second, due to the separation between the sites of agricultural production (rural areas) and the sites of consumption (urban areas), a potential ecological benefit (nutrient rich organic matter) is transformed into an ecological cost (a waste problem). Instead of fertilizing the soil, as it would if it were not concentrated in urban areas, this “waste” must be disposed of, which leads to second order demands on resources and attendant ecological disruptions, due to, for example, the energy and land needed for sewage treatment plants and landfills.

Note that the metabolic rift thesis does not necessarily suggest that urban residents have a higher per capita impact on the environment than rural residents. Rather, it argues that the process of urbanization affects the structure of national production and consumption systems, resulting in an upward spiral of environmental degradation. In a sense, the urbanization process can “urbanize” the countryside too, so that rural residents may in fact adopt lifestyles similar to urban residents (e.g., rural residents may consume non local products and landfill “waste” that could be recycled into the soil).

Counter to the claims that urbanization leads to a metabolic rift, some scholars of modernism argue that urbanization, by contributing to the development of the structures of modernity, serves to *reduce* environmental degradation (Ehrhardt Martinez 1998). This body of work comes out of either the “ecological modernization” perspective in sociology or the “environmental Kuznets curve” perspective in economics. Ecological modernization theorists argue that the structures of modernity contribute to the development of ecologically rational institutions, policies, and technologies that help to curtail environmental degradation

(Ehrhardt Martinez 1998). Likewise, environmental Kuznets curve (named after economist Simon Kuznets) theorists propose an inverted U shaped relationship between economic development and environmental degradation, where environmental impacts increase in the early stages of development, but level off and then decline as societies modernize (Grossman & Krueger 1995).

Although the work of Ehrhardt Martinez (1998) has demonstrated that national deforestation tends to follow a Kuznets curve relative to urbanization, other work (York et al. 2003b) suggests that this finding, considering the full effect of urbanization, and modernization more generally, on the environment, is spurious. Since, particularly in the contemporary era of globalization, the resources a nation consumes do not necessarily come from within its own borders, environmental degradation in a particular nation may not be tied to the consumption of that nation, but, rather, to the consumption of other nations linked to global markets. Cross national research on the “ecological footprint,” a measure of the amount of land area needed to support the resource consumption and waste emissions of nations that takes into account imports and exports, suggests that urbanization, as well as other indicators of modernization, tend to increase, not decrease, pressure on the environment (York et al. 2003b). Furthermore, urbanization also tends to drive up national CO₂ and methane emissions, the principal greenhouse gases (York et al. 2003a). In fact, urbanization appears to have a greater effect on methane emissions than does economic growth (York et al. 2003a). Taken together, these results suggest that continuing urbanization represents a serious threat to the environment and new patterns of urbanization may exacerbate that threat even further. For example, the growing suburban sprawl taking place in many developed countries, particularly the United States, represents a severe threat to the environment, since it devours land and is strongly associated with motorization.

Of course, not all types of urban development are the same, and the hope for the twenty first century is that the worst effects of urbanization can be avoided or mitigated. The current challenge around the globe, then, is threefold. First, it appears important that

“overurbanization” be curtailed. This will require a greater understanding of the factors that drive urbanization in the first place, and the identification of socially acceptable options for limiting unnecessary urban development. Second, less environmentally destructive forms of urban development need to be devised since it is clear that, for the foreseeable future, many urban areas around the world will experience rapid growth. Third, empowering those in rural areas by addressing social, political, and economic inequalities around the world may help curtail the unsustainable exploitation of the rural periphery by the urban core.

SEE ALSO: Ecological Problems; Political Economy; Population and Development; Population and the Environment; Urban Ecology; Urban Political Economy; Urban–Rural Population Movements; Urbanization

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environmental criminology

Jacqueline L. Schneider

Environmental criminology is a generic phrase that encompasses a number of different approaches aimed at reducing the occurrence of criminal events by examining the physicality in which the crimes occur. Rooted in human and social ecology, environmental criminology studies crime, criminality, and victimization as they relate to place, space, and their interaction (Bottoms & Wiles 2002). Specifically, environmental criminology explores how criminal opportunities are generated given the nature of the existing setting (see Felson & Clarke 1998). The aim is to identify ways to manipulate attributes of space in order to reduce opportunities to commit crime at various points in time.

Crime has four determinants: law, offenders, targets, and places (Brantingham & Brantingham 1991). Classical criminology addresses legal aspects of criminal activity, while the positivists have traditionally focused on offenders.

The pioneering work of Jacobs (1961) and Newman (1972) brought targets and places into focus, thus redressing the balance between the four determinants. It is the emphasis on targets and place that sets environmental criminology apart from other more traditional criminological schools of thought such as classical criminology and positivism. For example, rather than seeking to understand why offenders commit crime, preventive measures are designed after analyzing the ways in which the environment generates crime opportunities. In other words, crime can be designed out of an area once patterns of crime events are identified. The behavior of the offender in terms of where and how crime is committed becomes more important to the environmental criminologist than the motivation behind the behavior.

According to the Brantinghams (1991), locations, characteristics of locations, and movement paths that allow the intersection of victims and offenders, along with the perceptions of crime locations, fall under the auspices of environmental criminology. According to Cohen and Felson (1979), patterns of interaction and activities of daily life are not random; rather, patterns of interaction across time and place are routine, thus bringing routine activity theory to light. Since the organization of our routine activities pertaining to time and space is predictable, explanations of crime patterns can be identified and preventive measures designed. Eck and Weisburd (1995) expand our understanding of crime events by combining rational choice theory (Cornish & Clarke 1987) with routine activity theory in order to explain the distribution of crime events.

Several themes run through the environmental criminological philosophy: (1) activities are routine; (2) location is chosen by a structured search and decision making process by participants; (3) crime generators and attractors exist; and (4) measurement issues pertaining to spatial reliability need exploring (see Bottoms & Wiles 2002). Target and place are studied at three basic levels: macro is the highest level of spatial aggregation and focuses on the distribution between countries, states, or cities; the intermediate or meso level of analysis examines subarea distributions of targets, offenders, populations, and routine activities; and

micro level analysis studies specific crime sites, focusing on building types, landscaping, lighting, or other physical interventions.

Environmental criminology, while underutilized, has slowly gained in prominence since the 1970s. Crime mapping, a tool used by environmental criminologists, has raised the profile of crime pattern analysis and has helped identify areas where crime is occurring. This technology, however, has also become useful in predicting where crime events are most likely to occur (see Bower et al. 2004; Ratcliffe 2004).

SEE ALSO: Crime; Criminology; Criminology: Research Methods; Rational Choice Theory: A Crime Related Perspective; Routine Activity Theory

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environmental movements

Christopher Rootes

Environmental movements are networks of informal interactions that may include, as well as individuals and groups who have no organizational affiliation, organizations of varying degrees of formality (including even political parties, especially Green parties) that are engaged in collective action motivated by shared identity or concern about environmental issues. Such networks are generally loose and uninstitutionalized, but their forms of action and their degree of integration vary. However, environmental movements are not identical to organizations or episodes of protest. It is only when organizations (and other, usually less formally organized actors) are networked and engaged in collective action, whether or not it involves protest, that an environmental movement exists (Diani 1995: 5; Rootes 2004a).

Such linkages are not always readily visible. Where environmental movements are well established, the balance of their actions is likely to have shifted from highly visible protest to less visible lobbying and even “constructive engagement” with governments and corporations. Just as the collective action of the movement may become less visible, so too, where environmentalism has become most entrenched, there are many “subterranean” linkages among groups and organizations, and the full range of movement activities is less and less adequately represented in mass media.

The methodological implications of this are that no one strategy is likely to yield anything approaching a complete picture. Although studies of protest events (Rootes 2003) may represent the most visible face of the movement and escape the constraints of organizational studies that necessarily omit the less organized part of the movement, they are unlikely to give an adequate account of the less public – or simply less publicized – activities of the movement, including a great deal that happens locally and beyond the focus of mass media. Careful ethnographies of both national organizations and

local campaigns are thus a necessary complement to event based studies.

FORMATION OF THE MODERN ENVIRONMENTAL MOVEMENT

Although concern about the environment has a long history, modern environmental movements date from the late 1960s. The increasingly obvious effects of accelerating industrialization and exploitation of natural resources provided growing audiences for the alarms of conservationists and preservationists. It was, however, the radical critique of capitalist industrialism and representative democracy associated with the New Left and the counter culture that created the public space for the development of new social movements, as well as furnishing their tactical repertoire. Especially in the US, environmentalism benefited from being a relatively consensual issue in a period of intense political polarization, but concern about the environment soon gave rise to new and more radical environmental movement organizations (EMOs) that embraced nonviolent direct action, and rapidly spread to Western Europe. Thus, Friends of the Earth (FoE) and Greenpeace arose in response to the apparent timidity of conservationist EMOs such as the Sierra Club. The internationalism of these EMOs, as well as their skilful exploitation of mass media to put pressure on governments and corporate decision makers, struck a chord, and these were the fastest growing EMOs during the 1980s.

Their rise encouraged innovation in the tactics, and especially the agenda, of older conservation organizations, and by the end of the 1980s networking among older and newer organizations and joint campaigns were increasingly common. Indeed, the history of environmentalism on both sides of the Atlantic has been one of successive waves of critique, innovation, and incorporation, and radical ecologist groupings and the environmental justice movement (EJM) have in turn grown out of dissatisfaction with increasingly institutionalized reform environmentalism.

Many organizations formed in earlier waves of environmental concern have, to varying degrees, adapted to accommodate subsequent

concerns and developments in ecological consciousness. In the US, despite observers' doubts that established, "wilderness obsessed" EMOs are capable of accommodating the concerns of the EJM, especially since 2000, the Sierra Club and Greenpeace have taken the environmental justice agenda seriously. In Western Europe the environmental justice frame has been increasingly adopted, especially by FoE, while established EMOs such as the World Wide Fund for Nature (WWF) and the national bird protection societies have developed a more inclusive ecological perspective and have broadened the range of their campaigns to include issues of habitat and the welfare of human populations (Rootes 2005). The rhetoric of conflict and critique may give a misleading impression of divisions within environmental movements whose existence can be demonstrated by the persistence, despite such differences, of network links of varying degrees of strength and intensity (Dalton 1994).

VALUES AND SOCIAL BASES OF ENVIRONMENTAL ACTIVISM

The rise of values and attitudes favorable to environmentalism is frequently explained in terms of "post materialism" (Inglehart 1977). According to this thesis, post material values prioritizing aesthetic, intellectual, and self actualization needs are gradually supplanting materialist values that place a higher priority on economic and security needs, chiefly because new, younger generations raised in relative affluence and security are replacing older generations who had, during their formative years, more often experienced economic privation and the insecurities of war. The rise of environmentalism was counted among the consequences of this "culture shift," but post materialism may not be as good a predictor of environmentalism as has been supposed because it embraces both post materialist aesthetic and principled concerns with environmental protection *and* essentially materialist concerns with safety and security. Even global environmental concern, often portrayed as unproblematically post materialist, might be represented as a materialist concern.

Post materialism is relatively weakly correlated with support for environmentalism because concerns for the environment are held both by highly educated "post materialist" ecologists, who are not so much fearful for their own security as concerned about global environmental problems whose effects are relatively remote, as well as people, usually less well educated, who are more exercised by fear of the threats that pollution poses to their own immediate material security. Post materialism is a better predictor of environmental *activism* than of environmental concern because activism, unlike concern, is highly correlated with higher education, which is itself an antecedent of most forms of political activism.

Most research on the social backgrounds of environmental activists and the members of national EMOs has concluded that they are disproportionately highly educated and employed in the teaching, creative, welfare, or caring professions and, especially, the offspring of the highly educated (Rootes 1995). As a result, environmentalism has sometimes been interpreted as the self interested politics of a "new class" of traffickers in culture and symbols, opposed or indifferent to the interests of those whose labor involves the manipulation of material things. However, environmental activists are not exclusively drawn from such backgrounds, and approval of EMOs and environmental activism, as well as pro environment attitudes, are widespread among most segments of society.

Grassroots environmental movements involve a broader cross section of society than do the major national EMOs, in part because locally unwanted land uses are more often imposed upon the poor. Women play more prominent roles in grassroots mobilizations than in national EMOs, reflecting women's greater attachment to and confidence in acting in the local community than in the wider public sphere, and the fact that the barriers to entry to the local political sphere are lower than in national politics. Grassroots environmental activism is thus an important means of social learning about environmental issues, a school for participation generally, an entry point for new activists and new issues, a source of revitalization of the environmental movement, and a

means by which it may be made more socially representative.

VALUES AND FORMS OF ACTION

Theorists have distinguished among conservatism, environmentalism, and ecologism, but it is unusual for such clear philosophical distinctions to be precisely mirrored in divisions among movement organizations, their members and supporters. Organizational formalizations of ideological division are more likely in the formal political sphere, where membership tends to be exclusive, than in the movement milieu, where organizations are more fluid, overlapping memberships are common, and where the flexibility of the network structure is better able to accommodate differences without their becoming overtly conflictual.

The discursive frames adopted by environmentalists have consequences for the ways in which they campaign and the forms of organization they adopt (Brulle 2000). Yet, as Dalton (1994) discovered, whether European EMOs had been originally committed to conservationism or ecologism made surprisingly little difference to their choices of strategies, tactics, and styles of action. The apparent convergence within the broad environmental movement sector was not simply a matter of the progressive institutionalization and incorporation of more radical organizations such as FoE and Greenpeace; just as FoE and Greenpeace learned the etiquette necessary to smooth dealings with the powerful, so traditional conservationist organizations became less conflict averse in their tactics and more skilled in the use of mass media. Although EMOs' values do influence their strategy and tactics, greater effects are attributable to "political opportunity structures" – the pattern of opportunities and constraints inherent in the structures of the national political systems within which those organizations operate.

Even where they embrace direct action, environmental movements are almost wholly nonviolent, but movement cultures do not exist in a social and political vacuum. Violent environmental protests in Italy and Spain were carry overs from other, wider political ructions

– in Italy, the tail end of the political violence of the 1970s and 1980s, and in Spain, the temporary association of militant Basque nationalism with environmentalist struggles. Similarly, confrontational environmental protest in Britain in the 1990s rode the wave of more general confrontational protest that rose with the campaign against the poll tax (Rootes 2003). National political cultures explain less than political conjunctures.

INSTITUTIONALIZATION AND ITS DISCONTENTS

Conventionally, it has generally been assumed that "success" for a social movement means its institutionalization, usually as a political party. However, Eyerman and Jamison (1991) argue that a movement exists only in the relatively brief liminal period when a new, autonomous public space is created. Thus, from their perspective, the identity of the environmental movement dissolves as its organization fragments and its "movement intellectuals" become established in universities, industrial organizations, law and journalism, professionalized campaigning organizations such as Greenpeace, and political parties, including Green parties. For Eyerman and Jamison, movements are by definition transient, and the institutionalization of the environmental movement is a contradiction in terms.

Recent history suggests that environmental movements may have squared the circle. Whether measured by size, income, degree of formality of organizations, number and professionalization of employees, or frequency and kind of interaction with established institutional actors, EMOs in most industrialized countries have, since the late 1980s, become relatively institutionalized. Yet such institutionalization has not simply entailed the deradicalization of the movement or a loss of shared identity.

Some have worried that institutionalization has turned EMOs into "protest businesses" (Jordan & Maloney 1997) or a "public interest lobby" (Diani & Donati 1999) increasingly incapable of mobilizing supporters for action. Yet, in Germany, a substantially institutionalized

movement coexisted in the 1990s with the revival of highly confrontational, at times violent, anti nuclear protest, and established EMOs gave assistance to local anti nuclear groups (Rucht & Roose 2003). In Britain, during the 1990s, EMOs grew in numbers and size as well as access and influence, but reported environmental protest also increased and became more rather than less confrontational (Rootes 2003).

The rise of new, more radical groupings such as Earth First! can be traced in part to dissatisfaction with the apparent timidity of more established EMOs, but shared identity among environmental campaigners survived even as their tactical repertoires varied. Even the radical “disorganizations” most committed to direct action were connected by networks of advice and support to more established organizations. The sense of identity among the constituent parts of the British environmental movement did not dissolve as a result of the institutionalization of its more established organizations and the reactions against it, but instead grew as groups came to practice a division of labors and to realize the advantages of cooperation.

The European experience shows that it is possible for an environmental movement to retain many of the characteristics of an emergent movement while taking advantage of the opportunities presented by institutionalization, and that institutionalization is no barrier to the mobilization of protest. While some writers have referred to the “self limiting radicalism” of Green parties, it is the “self limiting institutionalization” of environmental movements that is the more striking and that has more profound implications for sociological theory. Their survival and their resistance to the deradicalizing effects of institutionalization has distinguished environmental movements from the other “new social movements.” Because pressing environmental problems are part of the chronic condition of an industrialized world, western environmental movements, although by no means universally anti capitalist, are recurrently influenced by the critical analyses of their radically anti capitalist constituents, as campaigns against genetically modified organisms and neoliberal globalization have shown.

BEYOND THE NATIONAL

The character of environmental movements varies from one country to another according to material differences in their environments. Thus, in the US, Canada, Australasia, and the Nordic countries, wilderness issues have often been more salient than pollution issues. In Western Europe, where the physical environment is more obviously a human product, the concern to protect landscapes is more readily combined with concerns about the consequences of environmental degradation for people.

In the most recently industrialized parts of Southern Europe and in the countries of Central and Eastern Europe ravaged by rapid industrialization under communism, environmental concern is more often a matter of personal complaint than of global environmental consciousness. As a result, despite occasionally intense local campaigns, EMOs are relatively weak. Environmental movements were credited with a major role in the popular mobilizations against communist regimes, but their subsequent weakness suggests that green was often protective camouflage for anti regime activists who subsequently turned to mainstream political roles, or that the political and economic urgencies of post transition states have sidelined environmental concerns.

Especially in the less industrialized countries of the global South, environmental issues are bound up with struggles surrounding the distribution of social, economic, and political power and resources, and mobilizations rarely take the form of environmental movements. The lack of safeguards for democratic political activity or possibilities of judicial redress of grievances, and the underdevelopment of civil society, present severe impediments, and success for their campaigns often depends upon the support of Northern environmental or human rights organizations.

It is not, however, only in the global South that environmental struggles bundle claims for environmental protection with demands for social and economic justice, and often for substantive democracy as well. Thus, in Britain, EMOs have increasingly been prominent participants in a variety of humanitarian and

anti war campaigns. In the US, environmental demands have, especially in and since the 1990s, been conjoined with the critique of class and especially racial inequalities. Distrustful of the alleged elitism of established EMOs, the environmental justice movement took the form of a loose network of local campaign groups (Schlosberg 1999).

A preference for deliberately informal networks rather than formal organization is characteristic of recent waves of environmental activism on both sides of the Atlantic, but the relationship of local environmental protests to environmental movements is problematic. Most local protests are NIMBY in origin and, although some undergo a convincing transformation into universalist campaigns that reach out to and link up with others and with the environmental movement generally, others remain particularistic and do not centrally involve even the local branches of established EMOs. Only exceptionally do local campaign groups grow into more general EMOs, but they may nevertheless serve as sources of innovation and renewal within national environmental movements, by “discovering” new environmental issues, initiating new generations of activists, and devising new tactics.

National and local political cultures and material differences affect the forms, development, and outcomes of environmental movements, as do differences among political opportunity structures. National EMOs are dependent for their resources and legitimacy upon national publics, and their dynamics and trajectories are shaped by locally and nationally idiosyncratic events and institutions. Consequently, the concertation of transnational environmental activism is difficult. Even within the best developed supranational polity – the European Union – EMOs remain primarily national in their networks, collective action repertoires, and thematic concerns, despite the EU’s importance as the principal locus of environmental policymaking (Rootes 2004b).

The absence of a developed global polity presents even greater obstacles to the formation of a global environmental movement. Although international agreements and agencies encourage the development of transnational environmental NGOs, the latter are not mass participatory organizations and, outside the

North, rarely have deep roots in civil society. The consequent lack of democratic accountability is unlikely to be merely temporary. However, if the prospects for an effective and genuinely democratic global environmental movement appear limited today, better and cheaper means of communication promise to erode distance just as increasing access to higher education gives more people the skills and resources necessary to operate transnationally. The example of Earth Action International, and the increasingly effective internationalization of FoE International, may be straws in the wind.

Since the 1980s the study of environmental movements has increasingly moved beyond local and national case studies (which have nevertheless proliferated) and toward systematic comparative studies. Since the mid 1990s these have come increasingly to revolve around the issues raised by the prospect of a transnational movement addressing global environmental issues. It is here that the practical challenges and the need for sociological work are greatest.

SEE ALSO: Direct Action; Ecofeminism; Ecological Problems; Global Justice as a Social Movement; Globalization and Global Justice; Political Opportunities; Social Movements; Social Movements, Networks and; Social Movements, Non Violent; Social Movements, Political Consequences of; Transnational Movements

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epidemiology

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Epidemiology is the study of the distribution of disease as well as its determinants and consequences in human populations (Bhopal 2002). It uses statistical methods to answer questions on how much disease there is, what specific factors put individuals at risk, and how severe disease outcomes are in patient populations, in order to inform public health policymaking. The term disease encompasses not only physical or mental illnesses but also behavioral patterns with negative health consequences, such as substance abuse or violence.

The measurement of disease occurrence begins with the estimation of incidence and prevalence. Disease incidence is the number of new cases in a population within a specific period of time. First ever incidence picks up only first ever onsets; in contrast, episode incidence records all onsets of disease events, including those of recurrent episodes. Cumulative incidence expresses the risk of contracting a disease as the proportion of the population who would experience the onset over a specific time period.

Prevalence is the number of people in a population with a specific disease. Point prevalence counts all diseased individuals at a point in time, whereas period prevalence records those with the disease during a stated time period. Cumulative prevalence includes all those with the disease during their lives or between two specific time points. The nature of the disease itself determines the appropriate choice of measure. For example, for single episode conditions with a clearly defined onset such as chickenpox, first ever and cumulative incidence rates are most useful, but for recurrent conditions with ill defined onsets such as allergy, period and cumulative prevalence rates are most often analyzed.

Population epidemiology attempts to unravel causal mechanisms of disease with a view to prevention. Since most diseases are determined by multiple genetic and environmental factors, exposures to single risk factors are usually neither sufficient nor necessary causes of a disease. Consequently, efforts are devoted to

quantify the level of increased risk when exposed to a particular risk factor. Risk is normally measured as either a ratio of the prevalence of disease in two populations or the ratio of the odds of exposure to a particular risk factor between two groups. Clinical epidemiology, in turn, aims at the identification of disease outcomes with the goal of controlling the damage done to patients.

The successful application of epidemiological methods to the study of social maladies (e.g., divorce, homicide, drug addiction, etc.) and the emergence of social epidemiology using sociological constructs (e.g., social inequalities, racial discrimination, sexism, residential segregation, etc.) in the analysis of disease herald an even closer collaboration between epidemiologists and sociologists in the coming years (Berkman & Kawachi 2000).

SEE ALSO: Disease, Social Causation; Gender, Health, and Mortality; Health and Social Class; Health Risk Behavior; Race/Ethnicity, Health, and Mortality; Social Epidemiology

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epistemology

Thomas A. Schwandt

The Greek words for knowledge and explanation are *episteme* and *logos*, respectively. Epistemology is the study of the nature (theory) of knowledge and justification. Epistemology is the kind of philosophy (or the primary role assigned to philosophy) valued in the scientific view of the world. In such a world, significant emphasis is placed on providing evidence for our claims to know, and philosophy has the task

of examining the logic and methods involved in questions of *how* we know and what gives knowledge the property of being valid. The phrase “after epistemology” or “overcoming epistemology” often heard in philosophical circles is, in part, a reaction to restricting philosophy to epistemological concerns, to matters of “knowing about knowing.” The tradition of Continental philosophy (hermeneutics, existentialism, critical theory, phenomenology, etc.) that inspires much thinking in the social sciences today, expands the concern with knowing to “knowing about being and doing.” In other words its concerns are not strictly epistemological, but also metaphysical and aesthetic.

Debates between the two great classical modern philosophies of rationalism and empiricism that developed in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries form the backdrop for understanding the emergence of social science methodologies. Empiricist epistemology (Locke, Hume, Berkeley) argued that knowledge is derived from sense experience; genuine, legitimate knowledge consists of beliefs that can be justified by observation. Rationalist epistemology (Descartes, Spinoza) held that reason is the sure path to knowledge. Rationalists may claim that sense experiences are an effect of external causes; that a priori ideas (concepts, theories, etc.) provide a structure for making sense of experience; and/or that reason provides a kind of certainty that the senses cannot provide. Kant’s philosophy is recognized for (among other things) its grand synthesis and reconciliation of the key insights of these two theories of knowledge.

Empiricism as an epistemology continues to occupy a central place in thinking about methodology, particularly in Anglo American traditions. It is one of the cornerstones of the naturalistic interpretation of the social sciences – the view that the explanatory and predictive methods of the natural sciences, as well as the aim of developing a theory of the way the natural world works, ought to be extended to the social (human or moral) sciences. Empiricism today in the social sciences most often appears within a mix of ideas drawn from positivism, logical positivism, behaviorism, representationism, meaning realism, and operationalism, such that it is probably more proper to speak of empiricist epistemology as an orientation or

disposition toward investigation of social (and behavioral) phenomena. Key components of this disposition include placing primary emphasis on a set of epistemic (cognitive) virtues thought to comprise scientific rationality (e.g., objectivity, value neutrality, critical reliance on method), objectifying that which one studies (i.e., treating it as an object that stands independent of the inquirer), distinguishing meaning from significance (meaning inheres in texts and social action and is discoverable; grasping that meaning is not to be confused with judging its significance for any person at any particular place and time); and deep skepticism of the scientific status of interpretation and understanding. What is widely recognized as the “interpretive turn” in the social sciences arises from, in part, a strong critique of this nexus of beliefs within which the epistemology of empiricism occupies a central place.

Rationalist and empiricist epistemologies are foundationalist; that is, they hold that any claim labeled as “knowledge” must rest on a secure (i.e., permanent, indisputable) foundation. The rationalist locates this foundation in reason; the empiricist, in sense experience. While acknowledging that reason and experience are important in understanding the nature of knowledge, much contemporary epistemology is nonfoundationalist – it rejects the view that knowledge must be erected on an absolutely secure foundation. Nonfoundationalists argue there simply are no such things as secure foundations; hence, our knowledge is always conjectural and subject to revision. This distinction between foundationalist and nonfoundationalist epistemologies is one way of marking the difference between philosophies of positivism and postpositivism. The former believe in the possibility (and necessity) of unassailable ground for any claim to knowledge; the latter abandon this idea. However, postpositivism does not discard the idea that knowledge is built up from (relatively) neutral observations of the “way things are.” It simply acknowledges that, at any given time, our understanding of the way things are might be mistaken. Postpositivists are thus fallibilists with respect to knowledge – the presumption is that current knowledge is correct given the best available procedures, evidence, and arguments, yet current understandings can be revised in light of new criticism or evidence. In Popperian

and other critical rationalist postpositivist philosophies, empirical data continue to serve as a very important basis or underpinning of knowledge, but evidence (empirical data) is never considered to be forever beyond dispute, and subsequently knowledge claims based on data should never be considered beyond the possibility of revision.

Some postpositivist epistemologies significantly depart from empiricist thinking in this regard while accepting the general idea of fallible knowledge. Philosophical hermeneutics, critical theory, pragmatism, and some versions of feminist epistemology argue that knowledge is never something created out of neutral empirical data; rather, it is actively constructed – hence, knowledge claims are always interpretations that are culturally and historically contingent, reflective of certain interests, and infused with moral and political values. Of course, efforts to know always have at their disposal something to work with (i.e., material events, actions, texts, people, and so on). But what we make of the meanings of what is to be known is always constructed in some significant way. These epistemologies reject the notion that a subject (inquirer) can remain disengaged from the object of understanding, as well as the idea that a subject’s knowledge is a straightforward representation of “what is out there.” Distinctions among these constructionist epistemologies relate, in part, to how they interpret the consequences of the fact that all knowledge is constructed in and out of interaction between human beings and their world.

Some constructionist epistemologies endorse a pragmatic and practical rationality and look to dialogue, argumentation, and practical reason in an Aristotelian sense as the ways in which knowledge is created in social practices. They accept that knowledge is by definition uncertain and that the best we can do is make a stand on the basis of (admittedly fallible) human judgment that requires the use of both reason and evidence. We make this stand in light of contingent, practical circumstances. In other words there is no ultimate test for what constitutes adequate and legitimate knowledge independent of the demands of a given situation. We are always deciding what is appropriate and effective action and knowledge given the moral practical situation in which we find ourselves.

So, for example, one could never give an unconditional and unqualified answer to the question, "What would it mean to intervene effectively in this situation?" absent a full grasp of the situation in question. This response abandons epistemology with a capital "E" – the search for the foundations or essences of knowledge – but retains the idea of epistemology with a lower case "e" – reflection of various kinds about what it means to know in given circumstances. Operating in this way, these constructionist epistemologies are relatively continuous with the Enlightenment belief in the emancipatory power of reason.

Other constructionist epistemologies are, at the very least, a good deal less hopeful about the power of reason (and dialogue, argument, etc.) and, at worst, seek to rupture the connection with this Enlightenment notion. These epistemologies promote radical skepticism or epistemological nihilism. They hold that plural constructions of meaning, diverse perspectives, the absence of certainty and foundations, shifting identities of subjects, and the like all add up to either a radical undecidability of all claims to know, or that what constitutes knowledge is inextricably connected to analytics of interest/power. These epistemologies (if they can be called this) are dedicated to demonstrating disensus and disruption in supposed understanding, and constantly aiming to unsettle any claim to know.

SEE ALSO: Feminism and Science, Feminist Epistemology; Knowledge; Knowledge, Sociology of; Objectivity; Postpositivism; Pragmatism

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essentialism and constructionism

Ken Plummer

The debate over constructionism and essentialism is a longstanding philosophical argument, from Plato and Aristotle to contemporary debates over deconstruction in literary theory. Broadly and simply, essentialism suggests that qualities are inherent in objects of study, with little reference to contexts, ambiguities, and relativities. It is a "belief in the real, true essence of things" (Fuss 1989: xi). By contrast, constructionism (and its allied concept deconstruction, as put forward by Derrida) suggests qualities are always bound up with historically produced, contextually bound meanings or discourses. They are always open to change and never fixed. Many terms are allied antinomies such as absolutism and relativism, realism and interpretivism, and holism and methodological individualism. Other terms, such as humanism, can be used by either camp.

These ideas came to be applied to the field of sexuality during the late 1960s and 1970s and for two decades it was the primary debate in the newer groups studying sexuality. Drawing initially from the work of symbolic interactionists (Blumer's *Symbolic Interactionism*, 1969; Gagnon and Simon's *Sexual Conduct*, 1973), the highly influential work of Peter Berger and Thomas Luckmann's *The Social Construction of Reality* (1967), of feminism, and of the later Foucault (in *The History of Sexuality: Volume 1*, 1977), the core idea emerged that

human sexuality was socially constructed. This meant that, for example, homosexuality was also socially constructed: it had a history, and was produced in different ways at different times. There was no uniform type of homosexual; it was a multiple experience that was constantly open to change. By contrast, essentialists clung to the idea that sexuality was a fixed and powerful biological drive and that the homosexual was a clear kind of being (often defined by biology). Conflicts over these positions became widespread, culminating in two international conferences in Amsterdam – one headed by the essentialists, the other by the constructionists (Van Nierkerk & Van Der Meer 1989).

Essentialist theories of sexual identities suggest that an inner sense of self unfolds through biological or psychic processes, and the task is to uncover the “true” meaning of who one is sexually. A classic reading of Freud would suggest that although one is born of “polymorphous perversity” and potential bisexuality, that is channeled into a relatively stable and repressed sexual and gender identity through the resolution of the Oedipal complex. Through inner struggles with feelings towards the mother and father, children assemble a (largely unconscious) libidinal structure which helps to define then as male and female, homosexual and heterosexual.

Constructionist theories of sexual identities are concerned with locating oneself within a framework of sexual categorizations. Most commonly, identities are seen as heterosexual, homosexual, bisexual. But there are many others, such as sado masochistic, sex worker, pedophile, or person with AIDS (PWA). Such terms, once invented, can be seen to characterize a person. But many of these are new; they are historically produced. Thus, Ned Katz in *The Invention of Heterosexuality* (1995) suggests that the idea of the heterosexual was not invented until the late nineteenth century, and that indeed the identity of homosexual was invented prior to this. This was also a period of clear sexual polarization – identities of being sexual were divided into a clear binary system that did not exist before (as Thomas Laqueur suggests in his *Making Sex*, 1990).

VARIATIONS AND PUZZLES

Several problems have been identified with this debate. The first suggests that the debate tends to erect a false dualism or binary tension, in which each term actually comes to depend on the other. Without essentialism, constructionism would not make sense (Fuss 1989). Secondly, it is suggested that the debate is frequently drawn too starkly and sharply and that there are in fact “different degrees of social construction,” ranging from those who more modestly suggest historical and cultural variability of meanings to those who suggest “there is no essential . . . sexual impulse” (Vance 1989). Thirdly, it has been suggested that ideas of constructionism when taken in their simplest form create ways of thinking that are almost commonplace. And finally, the political implications of the debates are unclear. Constructionists can be radical and conservative; and so can essentialists. Spivak (1984–5) suggest that strategic essentialism champions essentialism even if it is not fully believed in because it is needed in the fighting of conflicts, intellectual arguments, and political battles. It can be a useful shorthand.

This debate has been one of the most prominent in sexual theory in the latter part of the twentieth century and has at least had the virtue of making researchers more aware of the shifting social meanings of sex and the sexual cultures that are linked to them.

SEE ALSO: Constructionism; Foucault, Michel; Homosexuality; Lesbianism; Symbolic Interaction; Womanism

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ethic of care

Joya Misra

During the 1980s, a number of feminist scholars developed the concept of an ethic of care, which posited an approach to morality focused around caring. This approach drew upon many earlier currents of thought, which argued women's morality centers around nurturing/mothering, cooperation, and maintaining relationships. Sara Ruddick (1980, 1989) espoused an ethics focused around "maternal thinking" (attentive love and trust), which she argued could be used to transform private relations of love and caring into public discussions of peace. Nel Noddings (1984) similarly suggested that an ethic of caring could help create moral people, criticizing dominant ethical approaches as problematically placing "principles above persons." These works valorize the assumed ethical values of "women," and have been criticized for their essentialist tendencies.

During the same period, Carol Gilligan (1977, 1982), in her groundbreaking research on moral development, coined the term "ethic of care," which she compared to an "ethic of justice" to describe two modes of gendered moral reasoning. Gilligan argued that while an ethic of justice primarily reflects fairness and abstract, individual rights, an ethic of care centers around specific contextual circumstances and responsibility in relationships (Lister 1997). According to Gilligan, men are more likely to draw upon an ethic of justice, while women express both ethics, in part because women are more likely to view themselves as connected to others relationally. Gilligan's work has been tremendously influential. However, it has also been roundly criticized for an implied gender essentialism, though Gilligan herself rejects any notion of absolute gender differences (Larrabee 1993; Tronto 1993). Scholars such as Linda Nicholson and Carol

Stack also effectively critique Gilligan's lack of focus on historical context and the potential differences in moral reasoning among women, by class, race/ethnicity, age, and so on. (Larrabee 1993). Yet, Patricia Hill Collins (1990), while critical of Gilligan's formulation, draws from the ideology of an ethic of care in discussing black feminist approaches, linking caring to political activism.

For more recent theorists, an ethic of care must be separated from essentialist notions of "women's morality," which places women on the outside of political and cultural institutions, and excludes many women from its definition. In doing so, recent scholarship emphasizes the importance of bringing the ethic of care into the public sphere, or politicizing care (Larrabee 1993; McLaughlin 1997). Joan Tronto (1993) argues for shifting from a "feminine" to a feminist care ethic by placing care within its political context, and in doing so, recognizing how care is central to existing structures of inequality and power in society. An ethic of care requires attentiveness to the need for care, taking responsibility for care, providing competent care, and responsiveness from the care receiver. The central moral question for an ethic of care then revolves around how we can best meet our care responsibilities, taking account of the needs of both caregivers and care receivers (Tronto 1993). Yet, in order to improve the status of care and caregivers and the quality of care, we must understand care as a political idea, and recognize how social, political, and cultural institutions shape care and could be reformulated to support care more effectively. Tronto (1993) suggests that an ethic of care requires dedication to both valuing care and reshaping institutions to reflect the importance of care. An ethic of care is then not simply an abstract principle, but an ethic that forces us to consider inequalities inherent at both local and global levels.

Recent scholarship emphasizes the importance of viewing the ethic of care as related to and interdependent with an ethic of justice based on rights. For these scholars, an ethic of care is a necessary but not sufficient element to create a moral and just society. As Ruth Lister (1997: 115) argues, both an ethic of care and an ethic of justice are enriched in combination; indeed, an ethic of care without an ethic of

justice could “perpetuate the exploitative gendering of care relationships.” These works also emphasize the importance of placing an ethic of caring within its political context, and recognizing its potential role in activism and social change.

SEE ALSO: Black Feminist Thought; Caregiving; Carework; Elder Care; Gender Ideology and Gender Role Ideology; Maternalism; Socialization, Gender

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ethics, business

Martin Kornberger and Carl Rhodes

The concept of ethics has a long history in western philosophy. Usually, ethics is understood as reflecting on and recommending concepts of right and wrong behavior. Following this

definition, business ethics is the reflection on the ethical behavior of business organizations.

Much discussion of business ethics focuses on the ethical consequences of the pursuit of economic interests by business. On the one hand, some argue “good ethics is good business,” suggesting that the pursuit of economic interests within law-given restrictions will automatically lead to ethical behavior. On the other hand, more critical ethicists argue the pursuit of economic self-interest by firms is fundamentally opposed to ethical conduct. In their perspective, financial profit and moral principles cannot be aligned. Such considerations engender considerable debate both within organizations and in the public sphere more generally. The practical implications of this in contemporary times is that organizations are more and more under pressure to rethink the ethical consequences of their behavior and readjust their actions accordingly (for a business example, see Royal Dutch/Shell Group 1998).

The young but rapidly growing body of academic literature reflects the importance of business ethics. Although ethics have their antecedents both in ancient philosophy and religion, business ethics is an emerging discipline. Further, while a consideration of the ethics of business can be traced to the seminal work of Adam Smith (1863), the explicit development of business ethics as a field of research and study is much more recent. The first *Journal of Business Ethics* was founded in 1981, quickly followed by others such as *Business and Professional Ethics Journal*, *Journal of Business and Professional Ethics*, and *Business Ethics Quarterly*. The breadth of research areas within business ethics includes ethics and trust, ethics, management and leadership, ethics and organizational reward systems, ethics and organizational culture, ethics and empowerment, ethics and organizational power, interpersonal relationships and ethics, corporate social responsibility, corporate sustainability, ethics and financial investment, and ethical decision making.

NORMATIVE AND DESCRIPTIVE ETHICS

For some, business ethics is conceived of as a *normative* ethics in that it seeks to establish

means of judging whether business practices are right or wrong. This can be done both to assist managers in dealing with moral dilemmas and to enable past actions to be judged as to their ethicality. Business ethics is also an applied ethics because it seeks to use such normative models in order to investigate the ethicality of the nature and consequences of particular events or practices in business. In this normative approach, business ethics in practice is generally understood as being related to the rules and/or cultural norms that govern, or should govern, organizational conduct. In organizations this commonly means that managing ethics is done through formalized codes of conduct that should govern everyday actions and decisions. Indeed, it is reported that 78 percent of the US top 1000 companies have a code of conducts (Nijhof et al. 2003). This approach is also used in theories of business ethics which develop normative models for passing ethical judgment on business practices (Gatewood & Carroll 1991) or propose the development of ethical rules for organizations (Beyer & Nino 1999).

The study of business ethics has also been pursued as a *descriptive* exercise because it uses scientific analysis to describe the actual behavior of organizations and their members. This descriptive approach would not seek normative guidelines that ought to be applied in practice, but rather monitor and describe what actually happens. The key question in both approaches is whether ethics are *relative* to history and tradition (e.g., given that bribery might be an established part of one country's business culture, it would be considered unethical in other countries) or whether is a set of *absolute* norms that are valid any time, anywhere in the world (e.g., men and women should be treated equally regardless of religious belief). These differentiators are contested in the face of key issues in business ethics such as corruption, manipulative advertising, whistle blowing, the environmental impact of business, customer rights, workplace harassment, and equal opportunities for women and minorities. Business ethics is also concerned with the ethical treatment of employees, echoing longstanding concern over the possibilities of worker exploitation in the capitalist labor process. Conversely, there have also been controversies over rising levels of

remuneration for chief executives and other top level managers.

RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN ETHICS AND BUSINESS

A key issue that has been addressed and debated within business ethics is the possible relationship between ethicality and business activity in general. One approach suggests that ethics and business can and should be aligned in order to create competitive advantage (Raiborn & Payne 1996). The core argument is that ethics does not contradict the driving forces behind business organization and that there is no conflict of interest between profits and principles. As an example, Francis and Armstrong (2003) argue an ethically informed risk management strategy increases commercial outcomes, prevents fraud, and lifts corporate reputation. This reflects a more general position that an organization's ethical commitment is aligned with its self interest. Such a perspective dates back to Adam Smith's argument that maximizing personal advantage will lead through the mechanism of self interested actors competing in the market to a maximum of collectively beneficial outcomes. In sum, this suggests that "good ethics is good business" and that profits and principles are mutually inclusive. Another example of this is the practice of "strategic philanthropy" (Porter & Kramer 2002), where organizations choose to make charitable and philanthropic donations in order to strengthen their competitive position by, for example, developing the business environment in the markets where they operate or enhancing their public image. Similarly, it has been argued that an increased focus on ethics by organizations can lead to an increase in organizational commitment and hence productivity (Cullen et al. 2003). According to this approach, good management will be by definition both a harbinger of profits and ethical outcomes.

More critical approaches to business ethics question the convenience of the arguments outlined above and are skeptical about the possibility of profit seeking organizations being ethical. This approach criticizes the core assumptions that provide the cornerstones of classic

management and organization theory by suggesting that moral principles are of higher priority than profits (Quinn and Jones 1995). Here, ethics are seen as confronting business rationality because each abides by different and contradictory values. At an extreme, this approach asks whether business ethics is possible in a (capitalist) system driven by the pursuit of profits (Jones 2003). This suggests that the reason for labeling strategic behavior as ethical, or for developing ethical rules, is seen as calculative by nature and thus ethically dubious. Further, even when ethical rules are developed, this may be done not with a concern for the ethicality of organizational action, but rather for external consumption (Kjonstad & Willmott 1995) by shareholders, customers, governments, and other stakeholders. The argument is that the very idea of business ethics is an oxymoron.

ORGANIZATIONAL AND INDIVIDUAL RESPONSIBILITY

Another key issue for understanding business ethics is a consideration of the relationship between the ethical responsibility of individuals and that of the organization as a whole. For some, ethics resides very much with the individual human being (manager or employee) who has to defend ethical values and make ethical choices, often in spite of their organization. This also suggests that unethical organizational behavior results from the individual actions of "bad apples" who are either amoral or guided by immoral principles. Such an individualization of ethics suggests that it is particular people who are ultimately responsible for ethical behavior and that the organizational requirement is for an "empowering ethics" which supports moral learning and development instead of restricting ethics through codes (Konjstad & Willmott 1995). Business ethics thus emerges when people are "morally assertive" and use their personal ethics to mediate corporate priorities (Watson 2003). In short, this suggests that ethics is a moral task of managers who are personally "in charge" of ethics. In relation to ethical rule systems in organizations, such a view has been used to argue that because rules reduce individual margins of

freedom they provide a form of discipline that can prevent people from acting ethically in order to transform organizations (Ibarra Colada 2002: 178). In this scenario, the organization (and its rules) is a powerful, restricting machine, against or within which the ethical individual can/should act ethically. From this perspective, an organization is an ethically questionable entity whose ethicality can only be tempered by individuals who act in relation to the rules that constitute organizations through behavior guided by a personal ethics (ten Bos 1997).

In contrast, others have argued that organizational systems can provide the basis for ethics in a way that transcends individual action alone. Such an approach can be traced to Weber's seminal work on bureaucracy in the early twentieth century. In contemporary times this has emerged from a critique of changes to organizations that have seen them move away from bureaucratic forms of organizing. This suggests that organizational changes favoring flexibility, enterprise, and short termism wither away trust, loyalty, and mutual commitment in organizations (Sennett 1998). Thus, organizations can and should be organized such that they pursue a communal ethics. This opposes an individualistic ethics which stresses autonomy, moral responsibility, and freedom towards one of mutual obligation and respect for standards. From this perspective, it is argued that it is precisely formal organization that makes ethics possible by training managers in technical expertise, and through a clearly defined hierarchy that describes everybody's responsibility, duty, and rights, through the understanding of the office as "vocation," detached from personal privileges, passions, and emotions (du Guy 2000).

Given the growing impact of business organizations on the lives of individuals, global politics, and the environment, a consideration of business ethics is critical to responsible forms of business. As corporate disasters such as Enron, the rise of NGOs such as Greenpeace, and the success of "ethical" businesses such as the Body Shop show, business ethics will be one of the key future challenges for businesses. Thus, managing ethics will be just as important as managing finance, production, or distribution.

SEE ALSO: Culture, Organizations and; Ethics, Fieldwork; Ethics, Research; Norms; Values

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ethics, fieldwork

Jane Zeni

Ethics in social sciences fieldwork draws on the perspectives of philosophy, law, and psychology to guide decision making by researchers and policymakers. Ethics can be defined as "the study of right and wrong; of the moral choices people make and the way in which they seek to justify them" (Thompson 1999: 1). Consciously or otherwise, field researchers make ethical decisions whenever they gather, interpret, or present their data. There is a growing consensus that ethical practice in field work cannot simply be guided by the rules that govern biomedical or psychological research in laboratory settings.

These rules are based on the Nuremberg Code (1949), which established the principle of "informed consent," and the Declaration of Helsinki (1964), which mandated the protection of human participants in biomedical research. Institutional Review Board (IRB) and Research Ethics Committee (REC) reviews have their roots in such notorious abuses as the experiments by Nazi physicians on concentration camp prisoners. In the United States, the Tuskegee syphilis study recruited indigent black men for research they believed would include treatment; instead, researchers documented their illness and eventual deaths for 40 years, even after the discovery of penicillin offered a cure.

Since 1974, all research conducted in US colleges and universities that receive federal funding must be approved by an IRB; in Australia and increasingly in the UK, the REC plays a similar role. This process has now been adapted by many schools and public agencies. The protection of human participants has expanded to research across the social sciences,

in qualitative as well as experimental modes. An IRB review typically starts with a set of yes/no questions:

- Is this research designed to study normal educational practices conducted in an established educational setting?
- Does the research use survey procedures, interviews, educational tests, or observation of public behavior? (Subquestions ask if participants will remain anonymous, and if not, whether they will be at risk.)
- Does the research involve collection or study of existing data, documents, or other records? (Anonymity is encouraged except in public records.)

The prospective researcher next explains the purpose and methods of the study and attaches the consent documents to show that research participants will be clearly informed before they agree to participate. Research using data from vulnerable and underage participants must undergo a more extensive review.

An IRB also mandates training in research ethics. Many US universities have adopted a free web based course from the National Institutes of Health (NIH) that guides novice researchers through the principles underlying ethical review with a set of cases and dilemmas (www.nihtraining.com/crtpub_508/index.html). While these reforms are significant, the ethical reviews pose problems for qualitative researchers in the social sciences.

As the use of NIH training suggests, the model is quantitative experimental and survey research. Cases are drawn from biomedical and psychological studies. If “research ethics” in qualitative fieldwork is identified with IRB/REC principles, some important risks may be misconstrued. Two such principles – “informed consent” and “anonymity” – can illustrate the dilemma.

Informed consent has been considered the core of ethical review. However, at the start of most qualitative studies even the researcher cannot fully predict the course of the inquiry. Trying to cover all possibilities, the researcher may prepare a document in legal language that is meaningless or frightening to the uninitiated. One solution is to negotiate informed consent in stages. A teacher might launch a

classroom study with a newsletter asking parents for a simple consent to participate. During the months of data gathering and interpretation, the teacher researcher would communicate openly with participants. Later, if the work will be published, certain parents would be asked for explicit consent to share their child’s data (Clayton Research Review Team 2001). People need to know the kind of text or presentation, the audience(s) who will have access, and the context in which their words, names, or pseudonyms will appear.

Anonymity to protect the privacy of research participants is generally recommended for research in all genres. However, anonymity may offer little protection in fieldwork involving literate and knowing participants. For example, if a sociologist conducts a small scale qualitative study of dating practices among university students, the published report may lead to lively speculation on campus. Similarly, if a vivid case study appears under a teacher author’s name, the students may be recognized from the lunch room to the school board. Any social researcher should realize that publication may touch the “subjects” of a study – whether or not they are named.

Ethical dangers in fieldwork usually arise, not in the methods or process of research, but in its later dissemination. The findings may place individuals at risk of professional embarrassment, personal reprisals, or loss of reputation. On the other hand, participants who have worked collaboratively with the author may want credit for their intellectual contributions rather than anonymity. Choosing the most ethical approach to informed consent, anonymity, or intellectual property rights requires thinking through the local situation as well as the global principles of the ethical review.

Ethical guidelines specific to field researchers doing qualitative studies have been developed inductively through analysis of a growing body of cases. A useful way to organize this body of material is to examine the researcher and the researched – how each is constructed, their roles in the study, and the relationships between them. Studies can be arranged on a continuum from traditional “outsider” (researcher enters the field as a stranger) to complete “insider” (researcher has an established role – educator, social worker, community organizer – within

the field being studied). Moving along the continuum will foreground certain ethical issues while resolving others.

At one end of the continuum are “outsider” studies in which a scholar, typically from a university or research institution, examines a community that is both unfamiliar and distinct from the communities where the scholar normally resides. If the researcher maintains the outsider stance, revealing little of his or her own subjectivity, then the ethical decisions and dangers seem clear cut: present the facts, avoid bias, do no harm. Smith (1990) describes three notorious cases from the 1960s and the 1970s in which social researchers assumed roles that gave them access to observe gay sex, terrorist plots, and apocalyptic religion. Today’s IRBs, however, forbid deception in field studies unless the researcher has evidence of proportionate benefits and a plan for honest and prompt debriefing.

Since the 1980s, discussions of ethics in fieldwork have increasingly advocated knowing interaction between the researcher and the researched. According to the principles of “participant observation,” rooted in the social sciences rather than in medicine (Glaser & Strauss 1967; McCall & Simmons 1969), a researcher enters the field from somewhere outside, but strives to understand the perspective of the insider. The researcher is ethically obliged to present his or her role and purpose to participants; the researcher is also obliged to represent the participants respectfully in published findings.

Recent scholars are moving further along the continuum, away from the ideal of the neutral observer. The anthropologist constructs an authorial “signature,” a sense of “being there” (Geertz 1988) to become for the reader a trustworthy narrator of this story. This increasing self representation in fieldwork has generated two ethical arguments. According to one, the author should “bracket” whatever personal experience or bias might distort the picture; according to the other, the author should claim that insider position as the source of credibility. The former view, associated with phenomenology, has been criticized for an underlying post positivism (Guba 1990: 20–3). The latter, called standpoint theory, is associated with feminism and critical social theory. Standpoint

theorists propose that researchers who resemble the participants in race, class, gender, ethnicity, sexual orientation, disability, or other dimensions of culture are best positioned to understand their experience. Researchers from marginalized groups are “outsiders within,” having access to the perspectives of the majority culture as well (Banks 1998; Collins 1998). Critics, however, warn that standpoint theory makes the self, and one’s own roles and communities, the only legitimate field of study.

Researchers from a dominant culture are also exploring these issues. They hope to offer trustworthy insights by analyzing their own lenses as well as the experiences of the Other. By shedding the mask of cultural invisibility, perhaps any researcher can gain a double perspective that minimizes distortions (Kirsch 1999). “Covenantal ethics” (Smith 1990) aptly names such relationships of mutual respect and caring.

If traditional scholarly “outsiders” represent one end of a continuum, then the opposite end is represented by researchers who are themselves “insiders,” full participants with roles to play that did not originate with the study. This is the action research stance (also called “practitioner research” or “teacher research” in the field of education). An action researcher does not struggle with the challenges of entering the field, and the risk of deception is small. Yet new ethical questions emerge. Mitchell (2004) warns of the tension between the researcher role and the teacher role, and the risk that students will be exploited. Maclean and Mohr (1999), however, argue that the professional role and commitment to students, co workers, and community members must always take priority over the data; they define ethics among colleagues as “respect for each other’s professionalism” (p. 129).

Practitioners doing action research or collaborative studies should especially beware of relying on the traditional approaches to informed consent and anonymity. Reputations can be at risk if the findings include “bad news.” Should a researcher protect certain participants by composite portraits rather than traditional interviews? Should some fieldnotes remain unpublished if the point can be supported by data that will not embarrass participants? Such ethical questions can be answered

only at the level of specific studies in specific field settings.

One new field setting is not a physical place, and it disrupts such categories as “being there,” “interviewing,” and “participant observation.” Social research in electronic communities is burgeoning, along with new ethical dilemmas for researchers. Privacy is difficult to protect when numerous, perhaps unknown “others” participate in a listserv or blog. Consent forms present new challenges, and electronic signatures may or may not be accepted by an IRB. Following an action research model, a researcher might send an electronic newsletter explaining the study, inviting questions, and promising to omit any data from people who opt out. Later, if there is to be a publication quoting certain participants, a paper consent letter would be sent by regular mail. Mann and Stewart (2000) suggest that since the “online world” lacks the network of laws and traditions that regulate most social behavior, it gains an aura of transgression.

Field researchers must accept that no perspective can be free of ethical dilemmas. Instead, a research dialogue should bring together insiders and outsiders. Such approaches include “constructivist inquiry” (Denzin & Lincoln 2000) or the “deliberative democratic view” (House & Howe 1999). The ethical mandate is inclusion, representing the perspectives of multiple others as well as the self. As Fred Erickson quipped, “Neither the insider nor the outsider is gifted with immaculate perception” (in Cochran Smith & Lytle 1993: ix).

Turning from the researcher to the researched, Sharon Lee (2001) proposes a parallel continuum: subject, informant, participant, collaborator. The traditional term, “human subjects,” falls at one end, isolating the researched from any contamination by the researcher, and stripping the context where the research happens. Currently, the preferred federal language is “human participants,” implying some level of involvement rather than passive consent. Going further, van den Berg (2001) refers to the “inhabitants of the research,” suggesting context as well as collaborative relationships. Reflecting on this continuum, Eikeland (2006) rejects the “condescending ethics” of protecting research subjects, arguing that the standard for fieldwork is the “community of inquirers and interpreters.”

Nevertheless, respect for participants calls for the acknowledgment that most research communities have a fixed time period and predictable end. Seeing an interviewer as a friend and sharing personal life stories is an abuse of trust if that “friend” will disappear to write up a case study (Kirsch 1999: 30). The “therapeutic assumption” or the “educative assumption” may lead participants to see a doctor’s main goal as healing and a teacher’s main goal as student learning. They may consent to a study whose goal is to benefit, not themselves, but some wider population in the future.

Fieldwork usually takes place amid asymmetrical power relations. Most researchers “study down” (portraying the experiences of people with less social or institutional power, from families in poverty to college students) rather than “study up” (portraying the experiences of corporate executives or elites). Ethical field studies must treat a participant holding less power with the respect that participants holding more power would demand. Issues of ownership and intellectual property rights are now being discussed in English departments, where composition studies include samples of student writing, and in social sciences, where oral histories are recorded (Anderson 1998).

Collaborative research introduces another set of power issues. When a university professor or doctoral candidate engages in research with a community leader, teacher, or others in the field, the research may benefit one party disproportionately; university careers require publication, while the others do not. One party may also incur more risk than another; in the classic Smith and Geoffrey study (1968), the professor used his real name and the teacher, “Geoffrey,” chose a pseudonym.

The “voice” of the report is rarely discussed as an ethical decision. While scholarly dialect can facilitate conversations among researchers, it can also exclude others from those conversations. A fieldworker should report at least some findings in language comprehensible to the stakeholders. To convey the variety of perspectives, some researchers create multigenre and multivoiced texts that honor the participants’ right to co interpretation (or counterinterpretation). For example, van den Berg (2001) redefines “accountability” as the researcher’s

ethical and political responsibility to people in the research scene. Participants are invited to review a draft, and their responses may be woven into the final report or appended as an alternative view. Gloria Ladson Billings (1994), in her ethnographic portraits of urban teachers, also portrays herself in three voices: as scholar, as teacher, and as child recalling her own school experiences. Such texts call attention to them selves as constructions. Some readers find them powerful and convincing, literary as well as scholarly; others may question how the portrait was shaped by the writer.

As these examples suggest, an ethical review of fieldwork should be more (not less) complex than what is typically recommended for laboratory experiments. Instead of yes/no questions, the researcher can adopt an inquiry stance, returning to examine ethical issues at several points in the process. Mason (1996: 29) suggests “a practical approach to ethics which involves asking yourself difficult questions – and pushing yourself hard to answer them.”

To supplement the ethical review questions cited above, field researchers have proposed alternative lists (Sunstein 1996; Zeni 1998, 2001; Bishop 1999):

- What question am I exploring? Why?
- To whom am I professionally accountable?
- Which participants do I have some power over? Which have some power over me?
- Whose views of reality am I representing?
- Am I trying to interpret the experience of those who differ from me in culture (race, gender, class, etc.)?
- How have I prepared myself to understand the “other”?
- Is this my story, my informants’ story, or a story that fits someone else’s theory?
- What would happen if I shifted point of view to tell this story?
- Should my report include the voices of others, especially when their views differ from mine?

Such “difficult questions” can move ethical decisions beyond the legalistic into the personal, the relational, the covenantal. Dialogue among insiders and outsiders can help to nurture an ethical practice of fieldwork.

SEE ALSO: Action Research; Ethics, Research; Ethnography; Feminist Methodology; Feminist Standpoint Theory; Institutional Review Boards and Sociological Research; Naturalistic Inquiry; Observation, Participant and Non Participant; Postpositivism; Trustworthiness

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ethics, research

J. I. (Hans) Bakker

It has always been important to recognize the rights of research subjects as individuals and as members of various kinds of groups or collectivities. Ethnic minorities and racial groups, for example, should not be treated any differently.

They should be given the same respect as any other subgroup. That has not always been the case in the past. That was brought home particularly as a result of atrocities during World War II. “Ethics review . . . emerged from the aftermath of the horrors of the Second World War, when Nazi sponsored medical experiments furthered macabre social aims” (Hoonard 2002: 3). The Nuremberg Code was an important step. The UN’s Universal Declaration of Human Rights is another. However, beyond the more obvious concern with extreme violations, the precise philosophical articulation of ethics can vary according to whether the ethicist holds to some kind of theologically based or secular perspective.

There has been very little consideration of the context in which discussions of ethics occurs; societal “frames” and sets of such frames are often unstated assumptions which do not have conceptual or operational definitions outside of very specific times and places (Scheff 2005). Generally, humanist, neo-Kantian, pragmatist, or other secular ethical systems are most common (Canti 2004). The principle of the separation of church and state makes it difficult to adopt religiously based notions of the sacredness of the individual, but Kant’s secular version, emphasizing respect for individual human dignity and autonomy, results in a similar awareness of the importance of not violating human dignity. While the philosophical questions concerning ethics are not frequently asked, there nevertheless are implied ethical standards that can be traced to ancient Greek and Enlightenment ethical viewpoints. For example, the ethics proposed by Descartes are quite different from Aristotelian ethics (Kahn 2005), but much current thinking goes back to Aquinas and Aristotle rather than Cartesian Enlightenment themes. Yet such issues are rarely discussed. A commonsense version of respect for human dignity and civil liberties is usually in the forefront. The general notion of utility is also frequently mentioned, with beneficence outweighing any possible harm. Mention of Aristotle’s non-utilitarian notions of justice and equity (Smith 2001) would be considered out of place. The concept of ethics that is applied is not universal, but specific to a “modern” historical and societal context. That became apparent in the case of a sociological

study of casual sex in public places (Humphries 1970). In the US, practical interpretations have been largely based on a form of pragmatist philosophy that does not attempt to interfere with research that could be considered reasonable, but also does not try to impose too many rules. Denzin and Lincoln (2003) take a somewhat critical view of some of the assumptions underpinning current notions of “interpretation” and their well known book has had a significant impact among qualitative researchers. Denzin (2003: 486–9) projects greater interest in research guided by “postpositivist, constructivist, critical theory, and poststructural sensibilities.” Ethical guidelines which operate now do not directly confront such postmodern approaches at a philosophical level, hence “ethics” is mostly regarded from a strictly “modernist” perspective.

While there has not been much discussion concerning philosophical underpinnings, there has been great concern expressed with regard to practical application. It is clear to all that there should be some ethical guidelines. Nevertheless, many researchers have felt inhibited by specific aspects of the protocols. The question of written versus verbal consent is deemed to be of great practical importance by many researchers. It may be difficult, for example, to obtain candid opinions from individuals or members of communities if the researcher has first to obtain written consent. Similarly, certain forms of experimental research may be considered too likely to interfere with respect for privacy or respect for autonomy. Institutional concerns are not necessarily deeply rooted in philosophical ethics. Instead, there is a desire to conform to the letter of the law. It is common practice to have a lawyer on an ethics board since the legal implications of violation of ethics are frequently a cause for concern among administrators. The importance of research ethics in the social sciences has been emphasized a great deal more as a result of legislation in the US which has created Investigative Review Boards (IRBs) that are ultimately the responsibility of the Office for Human Research Protection (OHRP). US federal guidelines for the protection of human “subjects” or participants have been interpreted in different ways by various actors (Levine 2001). According to the “Common Rule” (Section 46.101

[b]), certain categories of research may be exempt, but individual researchers are not free to exempt themselves. Key components which members of an IRB committee may consider for IRB approval involve (1) informed (written) consent, (2) confidentiality, (3) anonymity, (4) permission to drop out of the study at any time, (5) feedback to research participants, and (6) further steps in the approval process should the research be varied in any way. The data must be stored in a secure environment and is supposed to be destroyed after the study has been completed. Complete anonymity is often difficult to accomplish. Any deviation from any of those principles may result in lack of approval. Permission must be secured in writing. However, it is not always possible to secure informed consent in written form. Hence, for fieldwork in a developing country, a researcher may be granted permission to obtain only verbal consent, as per Section 46.117(c) of the regulations (AAA 2004). Information collected in everyday situations cannot be used retrospectively, since ethical approval was not obtained in advance. Then, too, there may be studies which require some degree of ruse. Obviously, it is not possible to obtain written informed consent from research participants who are not actually being informed about the true intent of the study. In psychological research, however, it is frequently necessary to keep the actual goal secret in order to obtain spontaneous responses. When interviewing mentally challenged individuals it is not always clear what guidelines should prevail (Flynn 1986).

Discussions of practical aspects of the IRB/REB model in the US and Canada have led to critiques of managerial aspects of the status quo and those practical concerns have in turn led to a rekindled interest in some of the broader methodological questions. The IRB model has been criticized for being basically a “biomedical” approach to research (WMA 2002), sometimes involving physically invasive procedures and frequently based on the application of a strict version of the “hypothetico deductive method” as the key part of the scientific method (Nagel 1961). That deductive approach has not been easy to translate into ethnographic fieldwork and other forms of qualitative sociological research. Many qualitative researchers take a

“grounded theory” approach and do not begin their research with hypotheses drawn from the existing literature. Hence, it is difficult to decide in advance what research instruments will be used. At the same time, “there is no logical reason to believe that qualitative analyses cannot be used to test deductive theory” (Lucas 2003).

Recent approaches which stress the way in which different models of science lead to different kinds of considerations concerning “values and objectivity” (Lacey 2005) are frequently left out of consideration. For example, a phenomenological approach to sociology (Barber 2004) can involve “ethnomethodological” research (Garfinkel 1972). In attempting to study nuances of expectations in everyday situations it would be deeply disturbing to announce ahead of time what is happening. The study of a “breach” in normal expectations requires that participants not be informed before the fact. Moreover, the research may not even be inductive. It may be exploratory research which involves a certain amount of guesswork, or “abduction.” Such studies might at one time have been dealt with in an expedited manner by one or two individuals, but they now often require approval by a full committee. In reaching a decision the members of the committee may not all be equally well informed about all relevant questions pertaining to the theory being investigated, since they cannot all have expert knowledge on all social science theories. There may be a bias for or against experimental research as opposed to research in naturally occurring settings.

Certain categories of research do not require ethical approval from IRBs. For example, survey questionnaires which are distributed by an organization for the purposes of administrative change are not considered true research requiring ethical approval. Moreover, certain aspects of research are not subject to IRB approval. For example, the IRB is not concerned with the methodological approach of the research and does not offer advice concerning research design, use of statistical tests, and other such details of implementation. The primary concern is with research participants. Indeed, the move away from using the word “subjects” is probably indicative of the greater awareness of the importance of ethics, an awareness prompted by certain extreme cases of abuse.

Instances where research participants were administered drugs such as LSD without their knowledge or consent and earlier cases where subjects were given sexually transmitted diseases (Jones 1993) are grievous examples. Of course, much social science research is relatively harmless, or would appear to be so on the surface (Hoonard 2002). An undergraduate or graduate research project involving a survey questionnaire does not necessarily constitute a great risk to participants. Nevertheless, all research has to be vetted by IRBs in the US. In Canada a similar approach is maintained by Research Ethics Boards (REBs), with similar concerns. The REBs were established in accord with a statement issued by the three major funding councils. The so called “Tri Council Policy Statement” of September 17, 1998 has had a major impact on the regulation of funded research proposals in Canada. The type of research being conducted can influence the way in which ethical guidelines are interpreted. The normative framework can also be influenced by the source of funding. Generally, there is less concern with ethical considerations in non funded, social science student research that is not invasive and more attention paid to detail in heavily funded biomedical research that is heavily invasive (e.g., administration of drugs or carrying out of surgical procedures). Similarly, minors and “incompetent” adults may be regarded as having greater risk even if the research is perceived as being balanced by significant long term benefits.

Confidentiality involves the data only being used for the explicit purposes for which permission had been granted and further consent prior to disclosure to third parties. Recontacting participants in order to obtain consent for secondary use of data requires further IRB (REB) approval. Whenever a human being is vulnerable it is highly likely that ethical approval should not be granted, especially if it is clear that their compromised position makes such persons manipulable. It can be argued that the principle of distributive justice requires that the burdens and benefits of all forms of research should be distributed among all sectors of the population.

Aunger (2004) argues forcefully that in ethnographic research a high degree of reflexivity is necessary. For example, informants may

learn new information between one interview and the next. His comments can be applied to the ways in which all applications of research ethics procedures may sometimes disturb the way in which a subject is presented and understood. It is not just a matter of the skill level of the researcher; it is a systemic problem related to research design. The most extreme criticism comes from some postmodern ethnographers who deny the “objectification” that goes with “essentialist” notions of the self and therefore conclude that certain ethical guidelines do not easily fit in with their nuanced objectives (Angrosino & Mays de Pérez 2003; Taylor 2003). A pragmatic balance between methodological and practical concerns continues to be an elusive goal and the enormous variety of types of research undertaken make straightforward generalizations highly problematic and sometimes contested.

SEE ALSO: Ethics, Fieldwork; Ethnography; Institutional Review Boards and Sociological Research; Pragmatism

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ethnic cleansing

Dusko Sekulic

The term ethnic cleansing refers to various policies of forcibly removing people of another ethnic group. At the more general level it can

be understood as the expulsion of any “undesirable” population from a given territory not only due to its ethnicity but also as a result of its religion, or for political, ideological, or strategic considerations, or a combination of these characteristics.

The term entered the international vocabulary in connection with the Yugoslav wars. It comes from the Serbian/Croatian phrase *etničko čišćenje*, whose literal translation is ethnic cleaning. In the Yugoslav media it started to be used in the early 1980s in relation to the alleged Kosovar Albanian policy of creating ethnically homogeneous territory in Kosovo by the expulsion of the Serbian population. The term itself was probably taken from the vocabulary of the former JNA (Yugoslav People’s Army), which spoke of cleansing the territory (*čiscenje terena*) of enemies to take control of a conquered area. In the wars of Yugoslav succession, ethnic cleansing was a strategy used widely by all sides, starting with the expulsion of Croats from the areas in Croatia inhabited by Serbs. The main goal of these actions was to alter the demographic structure of the territory by getting rid of the unwanted ethnic groups.

The origin and the extended usage of the term ethnic cleansing in the public discourse of the 1990s could create the impression that it describes a historically new phenomenon. In reality it was only an invention of a new term to describe an age old practice. It was carried out widely with or without significant coercion or as part of murderous genocidal campaigns. Ethnic cleansing could be used as a component of state policies, sometimes even based on international treaties, or as a consequence of spontaneous outbursts motivated by prejudice, hatred, and/or revenge. It was employed by empires, small communities, dictatorial and democratic regimes, and in all historical periods. Mann (1999) puts ethnic cleansing on a continuum together with assimilation and genocide. The targeted population for cleansing could be a religious minority, an ethnic group, or simply political ideological opponents. The political and historical context of cleansing can also be strategic, with the goal of removing the population that presents a potential threat.

Historical evidence reveals numerous examples of the practice. Some historical accounts

indicate, for example, that Assyrian rulers made a state policy of forced resettlement of their conquered lands and the replacement of the population by settlers from another region (Bell Fialkoff 1999). In the Middle Ages cleansing was mainly applied against religious minorities. Anthony Marx (2003) argues that religious intolerance – specifically, the exclusion of religious minorities from the nascent state – provided the glue that bonded the remaining population together.

The rise of modern nationalism and the nation state created a new framework for such cleansing activities. It is inherent in the modern project of nationalism that “We the people” generates a sense of the alien “other.” And because the sovereignty of the modern nation state is territorial, the “other” may be physically excluded from the territory of the people.

There are endless examples of cleansing, exchanges, or exoduses of populations accompanying the creation of modern nation states. Exchanges of populations between Greece, Bulgaria, and Turkey were sanctioned by international treaties (the 1913 Convention of Adrianople and the peace treaty between Bulgaria and Turkey). The partition of India, the creation of the state of Israel, the division of Cyprus, and the successor states of the former Yugoslavia are just a few examples.

One of the biggest ethnic cleansings, culminating in extermination, was the Nazi campaign against the Jews. The Holocaust combined elements of deportation, expulsion, population transfer, massacre, and genocide. Some other examples of very similar practices in modern times are the holocaust of Armenians and the massacres of Tutsis by Hutus known as the Rwandan genocide.

Stalin’s regime cleansed ethnic groups because of strategic considerations and also perceived internal political enemies on a grandiose scale. The expulsion of Poles from Belorussia and the Ukraine (1932–6) to Kazakhstan, the deportations of Poles, Lithuanians, Latvians, and Estonians from areas occupied by the Soviet Union in the 1930s, the mass deportations and exile of the Chechens, Ingush, Volga Germans, Balkars, Kalmyks, and Crimean Tatars in 1943–4, all fall into the first category.

The second type of cleansing was directed toward different types of class enemies – kulaks,

alleged enemy spies, and collaborators. In Asia, the Chinese and Cambodian communists accepted bloodlines as a way of identifying class enemies. The Khmer Rouge took this approach a step further into something that Mann (1999) calls “classicide” as an analogy to genocide. It killed about half the number of Cambodians with a bourgeois background.

In analyzing the transformation of empires into nation states, Brubaker (1995) states that the occurrence of migrations and different forms of ethnic cleansing depended on the extent to which disintegration was accompanied by war or other types of violence, on the established nature of the potential target for cleansing, on the anticipated and actual policies of the successor states toward the minorities, on the availability and quality of resettlement opportunities, and on “voice” as an alternative to “exit.” There is nothing preordained about its occurrence. It happens under conditions that can be understood, explained, and predicted.

SEE ALSO: Assimilation; Ethnic Groups; Ethnicity; Genocide; Holocaust; Nationalism; Pogroms; Prejudice; Race; Race (Racism)

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ethnic enclaves

Jan Lin

The ethnic enclave is a subeconomy that offers protected access to labor and markets, informal sources of credit, and business information for immigrant businesses and workers. Ethnic enclaves offer entrepreneurial opportunities and earnings for immigrant owners and managers through the exploitation of immigrant labor in poor working conditions. They are phenomena that advance our understanding of the changing experience of immigration and social mobility in America. The enclaves of Asian and Latino immigrants emerging since the 1960s are comparable to the enclaves of Jewish and Italian immigrants at the turn of the twentieth century. They present a route for economic and social mobility by promoting positive returns on human capital for immigrants in the labor market. During the decades of immigrant restriction, ethnic enclaves were shunned in the US as economic and spatial barriers to the successful assimilation and upward mobility of immigrants to American life. Since the 1960s, however, ethnic enclaves have been increasingly seen as agents for economic and social mobility. Ethnic enclaves are proliferating in both the cities and suburbs of contemporary immigration gateway cities such as New York, Miami, Houston, and Los Angeles. They constitute and convey the process of globalization as nodes of trade and transaction in flows of ethnic labor, capital, commodities, and cultural products across trading regions. There are costs as well as benefits that come with the insertion of ethnic enclaves into the complex social dynamics of contemporary global cities.

Pathbreaking research in the early 1980s on the concept of the enclave economy initially focused on the contrast between the Cuban enclave and the black economy of Miami (Wilson & Portes 1980; Wilson & Martin 1982). This research methodology utilized input–output multiplier matrices. The Cuban owned firms of the Miami area were found to comprise a dynamic subeconomy of construction, manufacturing, retail and wholesale trade, and banking firms that recirculated and multiplied income through interindustry and

consumption linkages. The economy of black neighborhoods, by contrast, was impoverished and capital scarce, with income constantly leaking out of the community through branch manufacturing plants and chain stores owned by whites and large corporations. The enclave economy was conceptualized as an alternate subeconomy from the segmented mainstream economy, which was split into an upper tier of jobs with good mobility ladders, and a lower tier of dead end jobs in which minorities and the economic underclass predominated. Investment capital was commonly raised in ethnic enclaves through devices such as kinship networks and rotating credit associations. These ethnic enclaves offered a protected sector for immigrants newly arrived without English language skills, good education, or official papers.

The study of the enclave economy was extended to a number of Latin American and Asian enclaves and comparisons made with earlier European immigrants (Portes & Manning 1986). In her research on New York's Chinese enclave, Min Zhou (1992) drew a distinction between an "export sector" that derived earnings from outside the enclave, and a "protected sector" that derived from earnings from sales to co ethnics. The dynamism of the ethnic enclave economy is based in large part upon the multiplier effect, by which export earnings are spent and recirculated among co ethnic enterprises throughout the remainder of the protected sector. For example, garment manufacturing can be viewed as an export sector that multiplies enclave income through forward and backward linkages with co ethnic suppliers and buyers, as well as consumption linkages with other co ethnic enterprises such as restaurants and markets. On the other hand, ethnic restaurants and other retail businesses comprise characteristics of both an export and protected sector. The concept of an "export sector" is clearer in theory than in practice, comment John Logan et al. (1994). They concluded that ethnic enclave economies are best typified by co ethnicity of owners and workers, spatial concentration, and sectoral specialization. Evidence of sectoral specialization can be found in measuring overconcentration of ethnic enterprises or labor in particular industries as compared with the general population. A greater

degree of sectoral specialization indicates a more successful ethnic enclave.

A segment of the research utilized a "returns on human capital" research methodology, which determined that positive returns accrued to employers at the expense of workers. This research found that ethnic enterprises undertook a kind of ethnic self exploitation by which immigrant employers profited from their ability to exploit co ethnic workers in a "sweatshop" sector under poor working conditions and poor labor rights. There was some debate regarding whether the enclave should be defined by place of work, place of residence, or industry sector (Sanders & Nee 1987). "Sweatshop" is a label for an enterprise that exploits workers with poor wages and benefits, bad working conditions, and low occupational security. Some researchers found evidence of significant gender differences in labor market outcomes. Positive returns for men were to some degree derived from negative returns to women as subordinate workers (Zhou & Logan 1989). The surplus value generated through ethnic solidarity in the enclave economy was derived effectively through worker exploitation by socioeconomic class and gender. The disparity in short run benefits is followed by positive aggregate benefits in the long run.

Contemporary Asian and Latin American immigrants have succeeded the European immigrants of the turn of the twentieth century, in the urban industrial districts and residential neighborhoods of many US cities. Their appearance has helped revive many commercial, warehousing, and manufacturing districts that had been declining since the 1950s, as a result of suburbanization, the outmovement of industry, and the "runaway shop" to the developing world. The new ethnic enclaves are not just an illustration of immigrant succession, they are an outgrowth of neoliberal economic and free trade policies since the 1960s, which promoted the mobility of labor and capital between the US and its trading partners. The Hart Cellar Immigration Act of 1965 removed restrictive quotas and restrictions on immigrant flows, as well as introducing banking deregulation to encourage capital outflow and inflow, and policies oriented to encouraging the import and export of goods (Sassen 1988). The new gateways of globalization include cities

such as New York, Washington, DC, Miami, Atlanta, Houston, Los Angeles, and San Francisco. The growth of ethnic enclaves in the Frostbelt as well as the Sunbelt leads us to a revision of our understanding of post industrial urban transition, through which the dynamism of globalization and immigration can be seen as superseding the decline associated with deindustrialization.

Ethnic enclaves are not just a factor in the insertion of immigrants into the American economy. They are nodes in the flow of immigrant labor, capital, and culture between the US and the emerging economies and trading regions of Asia, Latin America, and the Caribbean. The sweatshops of the immigrant garment industry are connected with trends of global sourcing in manufacturing. The banks of the ethnic enclave are crucial institutions in mediating transnational capital flows, whether they are inflows such as investments for overseas investors or outflows such as remittances for immigrant labor. New Asian and Latino immigrants have succeeded the earlier generation of Italian and Jewish immigrants in the traditional central city "urban village," but many enclaves are appearing in suburban locations, with ethnic signage proliferating in strip malls and commercial arterials. The ethnic suburb, or "ethnoburb," has become a common feature of life in some American cities. The ethnoburb is a symbol not only of immigrant success, but also of intergroup conflict in the global city.

The insertion of ethnic enclaves into the social and economic dynamics of the post industrial cities has been in some areas a vociferously conflicted and contested process. In some cases such as the Cuban enclave of Miami and the Chinese enclave of Monterey Park, California, in the 1980s, the proliferation of ethnic businesses and signage led to the growth of nativist and xenophobic reactionary local social movements, and support for English only language ordinances. In Monterey Park, the link between the ethnic enclave and rapid commercial development also sparked a growth control movement among local homeowners and politicians (Horton et al. 1987; Li 1999). Some immigrant entrepreneurs focus on certain occupational niches as economic and social "middleman minority" between dominant white

groups and poor minorities. Chinese, Korean, and Indian immigrants commonly operate small business groceries, liquor stores, and motels. They fulfill a function undesired by white elites. They act as a social buffer between the dominant and oppressed groups of a society, and in situations of crisis may bear the brunt of underclass anger, as seen in the black/Korean violence that followed the Rodney King disturbances of 1992 in Los Angeles (Min 1996).

For most of US history until the 1960s, ethnic identity and customs were generally suppressed in cities through projects of urban settlement and social reform work that sought to assimilate immigrants to the English language and American values. Chicago was the seminal expression of the modern industrial city in the early twentieth century, the paradigm of the "human ecology" school of urban sociology. The ethnic ghetto was stigmatized as a place of vice, crime, moral corruption, and public health hazards. This was a time of immigrant restriction and Americanization campaigns. Chicago School sociologists such as Robert Park codified the view that immigrant colonies such as the Jewish "ghetto," Little Italy, and Greek Town, which occupied the "zone in transition" surrounding the central business district, would eventually dissipate with the eventual upward mobility of working class immigrants into the suburbs and their cultural assimilation into the middle class. Douglas Massey (1985) later articulated this phenomenon as the "spatial assimilation" thesis. Upward social mobility into better jobs and social status was linked with spatial mobility into better homes and neighborhoods. Ethnic enclaves were seen to create social immobility and spatial entrapment.

The human ecology school held the prevailing view of the social reformers in the early twentieth century that ethnic enclaves were dysfunctional slums that harbored social pathologies and blight (Ward 1989). During this period of urban growth, city managers and the federal government actively began bulldozing ethnic enclaves under slum clearance policies of the interwar period and urban renewal in the post war period, to make room for expressway arterials, middle class housing, expansion of the central business district, and

government buildings. Chinatowns, Little Italies, and Mexican neighborhoods were viewed as obstacles to modernization and cultural assimilation. Herbert Gans, in the seminal study *The Urban Villagers* (1962), decried the officials and policymakers who designated the Italian American West End neighborhood as a slum and led to its demolition to make way for middle class housing. In Los Angeles during the same period, a celebrated Mexican American community was razed to make way for the construction of Dodger Stadium. Since the 1960s, however, city managers and planners have increasingly come to see ethnic enclaves as tools rather than as obstacles to growth. The preservation of ethnic places and neighborhoods is of growing utility in efforts to promote globalization in metropolitan economies through the construction of world trade centers, convention centers, and urban tourism.

The growing emergence and persistence of ethnic enclaves has changed the meaning of ethnicity and American identity. Ethnicity in contemporary America is becoming less of an ascribed experience that preserves ancestral traditions, and more of an achieved experience where these traditions may be created and enacted for outside consumers as much as co ethnic participants. Ethnic enclaves are increasingly producing for the export sector of American consumers as well as the protected sector of immigrant consumers. At the turn of the last century, when ethnic minorities were suppressed by doctrines of manifest destiny and assimilation, the sustaining of ethnic food ways and folkways protected bonds of communal social capital and spiritual meaning. In the current era of the multicultural and global city, ethnicity is increasingly tolerated, celebrated, and transacted. Ethnicity has been activated and affirmed by consumers of such culinary trends as Japanese sushi, Chinese dim sum, and Spanish tapas. Ethnicity has also been appropriated and branded by transnational fast food franchises such as Taco Bell. As ethnicity becomes increasingly transacted in the era of global consumer capitalism, the original intention, authenticity, and ownership of local ethnic culture can come under threat.

In the current era of economic and cultural change, ethnic enclaves constitute and

convey global processes in US immigration gateway cities. Opportunities have arisen for ethnic entrepreneurs to profit from a growing American interest in consuming and experiencing ethnic foods, music, theater, arts, fashion, museums, and festivals. The Civil Rights Movement also resulted in legal and political protections for racial and ethnic minorities, dampening the power of assimilation rhetoric and promoting the sustaining of ethnic cultural heritage and a politics of cultural pluralism. Trends of economic globalization have led to widespread outsourcing of manufacturing employment to offshore locations, stimulating growth of post industrial activities onshore in a range of industries involving the production of culture for consumption. The cultural endowments of urban regions, like the mineral or agricultural resources of their hinterlands, have become important components in their repertoire of economic activities. The competition among cities for prosperity in the global economy has promoted strategies of urban "branding" for entertainment and tourism, to help boost cities suffering economic decline. The "branding" process is promoted through corporate trademarking of office buildings, sports stadiums, concerts, and festivals. Urban redevelopment in the new "symbolic economy" involves the use of devices such as museums, theaters, restaurants, and local cultural districts (Zukin 1995). The growth of the ethnic cultural economy involves the mobilizing of the "creative capital" of a new talented and credentialed class of workers including artists, curators, designers, and chefs, who are qualified in the production and distribution of creative goods. The creative economy has an innovative edge in the area of high technology and a cosmopolitan edge since it prospers in areas of cultural diversity and tolerance (Florida 2002). In the new creative economy of cities, economic innovation links with a pattern of urbanity that draws talented individuals and traders from the hinterlands and other trading regions to create value in products based on taste, fashionability, and design.

A host of social conflicts and contradictions affecting ethnic producers of culture as well as white consumers accompany these trends. Many ethnic enterprises such as restaurants

provide opportunities for a “front region” staff of owners, gourmet chefs, and waiters while exploiting a “back region” staff of dishwashers and kitchen assistants (Zukin 1995). Immigrant restaurants may exploit the back region staff with poor wages and working conditions. For the manual workers in the back region of the restaurant, the enclave economy offers certain economic opportunities, but their chances for upward social mobility are as limited as for those who toil in the low wage service sector in such enterprises as cleaning, security, and fast food restaurants. The best advantages of the ethnic restaurant sector accrue to the front region staff, whose profitability depends upon their ability to effectively mobilize their ethnic creative capital.

The marketing of ethnicity carries a host of positive as well as pernicious implications. The consumption experience of “eating the Other” is problematic insofar as it permits white Americans to assume a positive association with the culture of subaltern racial/ethnic minorities while camouflaging ongoing social inequality and white privilege. The growth of an ethnic “creative class” is a stimulus to urban redevelopment through a cultural affairs strategy that promotes the gentrification of inner city neighborhoods and the displacement of low income residents. Issues of cultural authenticity and ownership come to the fore as ethnic neighborhoods are preserved and marketed like theme parks in American cities. As it becomes increasingly acceptable for ethnic foods and cultures to be consumed and transacted, some forms may become aesthetically incorporated into the repertoire of tastes and “cultural capital” associated with the elite social classes in America. Increasing the aesthetic appeal of a cuisine increases its chances for marketability. Some ethnic groups, such as Puerto Ricans, have faced more challenges than groups such as Cubans or Japanese immigrants in successfully creating and defining a market for their cultural products. The production and consumption of ethnicity is a growing factor in the larger dynamics of American social inequality and stratification.

SEE ALSO: Assimilation; Ecological Models of Urban Form: Concentric Zone Model, the Sector Model, and the Multiple Nuclei Model;

Ethnic/Informal Economy; Ethnic Groups; Ethnicity; Global/World Cities; Globalization, Culture and; Immigration; Migration and the Labor Force; Mobility, Horizontal and Vertical

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ethnic groups

John Stone and Bhumika Piya

Ethnic groups are fundamental units of social organization which consist of members who define themselves, or are defined, by a sense of common historical origins that may also include religious beliefs, a similar language, or a shared culture. Their continuity over time as distinct groups is achieved through the inter-generational transmission of culture, traditions, and institutions. Ethnic groups can be distinguished from kinship groups in as much as ties of kin arise largely from biological inheritance. The term is derived from the Greek word *ethnos*, which can be translated as a people or a nation. The sociologist Max Weber provided one of the most important modern definitions of ethnic groups as “human groups (other than kinship groups) which cherish a belief in their common origins of such a kind that it provides the basis for the creation of a community.”

There are two competing perspectives on ethnic groups: objectivist and subjectivist. Objectivists, taking an etic stance, assert that ethnic groups are inherently distinct social and cultural entities that possess boundaries which delineate their interaction and socialization with others. Subjectivists, on the other hand, embrace an emic perspective and regard ethnic groups as self-categorizations that determine their social behavior within and outside the group. Subjectivists like Frederik Barth argued that ethnic groups should be defined on the basis of self-identification or categorical ascription. Such a standpoint has led to the creation of legislation such as an Australian government policy in the early 1970s which classified Aboriginal people on the basis of self-identification by an individual and acceptance by an Aboriginal community. Conversely, the objectivists have adopted the idea that ethnic groups are characterized by cultural and historical traits that have been passed down from generation to generation rather than on pure self-conception. Despite the lack of consensus while defining ethnic groups, it is safe to assume that such groups are distinct entities with boundaries, be they real or constructed. The boundaries of ethnic groups often overlap with

similar or related categories such as “races” or nations. There is a consensus among scholars that “race” is a socially defined category that has no biological significance, despite lingering popular beliefs that still regard “races” as biological groups made up of a people with a distinct genetic heritage. There is no scientific evidence to support these notions. However, one could regard race as a variant of ethnic group, for racial groups are perceived to be physiologically different by outsiders, if not by the group members themselves.

The term nation implies a self-conscious ethnic group mobilized with the goal of creating or preserving a political unit in which it is the predominant or exclusive political force. According to Weber, nations are politically mobilized ethnic communities in which members and their leaders try to create a special political structure in the form of an independent state. Ethnic groups may also embrace solidarity and group enclosure in order to achieve advantages over other groups. Such enclosure tactics could take several forms, such as endogamous marriage, which is marriage within a social group, or business practices such as the dominance of Jews in the Antwerp diamond cutting industry.

In those societies that have been influenced by large-scale immigration – like the United States, Canada, Australia, New Zealand, and Argentina – the importance of ethnic groups can be seen as a central feature of their social, economic, and political life. However, it is useful to note that immigrants having the same region of origin are often categorized under generic ethnic groups despite the absence of cohesion and common culture. Systematic research on American ethnic groups can be traced to the sociologists of the Chicago School during the 1920s, led by W. I. Thomas and Robert Ezra Park, who were concerned with the processes of ethnic group assimilation into the dominant white Anglo-Saxon Protestant (WASP) mainstream. Park’s *race relations cycle*, which outlined a sequence of stages consisting of “contact, competition, accommodation, and assimilation,” implied that successive immigrant groups would be gradually absorbed into a relatively homogeneous US society. The underlying assumption of ethnic group theory was that these long-term trends would

result in the disappearance of separate ethnic communities as they merged into a wider American melting pot.

This model implying a straight line progression gave way to more pluralistic conceptions of ethnicity in the US, in which various dimensions of assimilation were identified by sociologists like Milton Gordon, who wrote the classic work on the subject. In *Assimilation in American Life* (1964), Gordon distinguished between cultural assimilation (*acculturation*) and structural assimilation, the former signifying the adoption of the language, values, and ideals of the dominant society, while the latter reflected the incorporation of ethnic groups into the institutions of mainstream society. While cultural assimilation did not necessarily result in an ethnic group's inclusion within the principal institutions of society, structural assimilation invariably meant that assimilation on all other dimensions – from personal identification to intermarriage – had already taken place.

Scholarly concern with ethnic groups and ethnic conflict became increasingly salient in the second half of the twentieth century. Inadequate assumptions about the nature of modernization and modernity have been demonstrated by the pattern of social change under capitalism, socialism, and in the developing world. Expectations that modernity might lead to a smooth transition from *gemeinschaft* to *gesellschaft*, accompanied by the gradual dissolution of ethnic group affiliations, were no longer plausible. Some social scientists argued that there was a primordial basis to ethnic group attachments, while others explained the apparent persistence of ethnicity as a criterion of group closure in more instrumental terms, as a political resource to be mobilized in appropriate situations which may be activated by power or guided by cultural factors. Not only has ethnicity failed to recede in industrial and post industrial societies, but also ethnic divisions have continued to stand in the way of movements to promote democracy and economic growth in large sectors of the non industrial or industrializing world. The failure of the political regimes in the communist bloc unleashed an upsurge in ethnic and national identity, some of which filled the void created by the demise of Marxism, while other elements of the same development, notably in

the former Yugoslavia, turned into bloody ethnonational conflicts and ethnic cleansing (Sekulic 2003).

The increasing visibility of ethnic diversity due to postcolonial migration and globalization has engendered remarkable responses, ranging from expulsion or persecution of ethnic groups to their integration and assimilation into dominant cultures. The extermination of Jews and Gypsies during World War II under the Nazi regime is a classic example of the persecution of people to dispose of “undesired” ethnic groups; hence, it is claimed, deterring potential ethnic discord. The expulsion of ethnic groups can take the form of a forced exodus as well. Forced eviction of more than 100,000 of the Lhotshampas ethnic groups from Bhutan, starting from 1989 and still continuing under the “Driglam Namzha” decree, is another example of ethnic cleansing. The royal decree, declaring the recent “one country, one people” policy, seeks to homogenize the Bhutan population by imposing the indigenous Buddhist culture of the majority Drukpa, including their language, dress code, and customs, on the rest of the people (Hutt 2003). In contrast to the aforementioned policies, the majority of contemporary responses have been toward assimilation or acculturation and pluralism.

The example of more or less voluntary assimilation is seen in the US, where ethnic groups, including immigrants and natives, have embraced the mainstream American culture. This is advantageous to ethnic minorities in terms of upward mobility in the economic and political spheres of the society. An archetypal pluralistic society is Switzerland, which has separate cantons for different ethnic groups. Ethnic groups remain socially and politically differentiated, and enjoy a certain degree of autonomy within the democratic federation. Besides assimilation and pluralism, a new trend of embracing pan ethnic identity is emerging. Ethnic groups form a conglomerate and join together under larger umbrella groups. Such practice is common among South Asians and Latinos in America.

The escalating incidence of interethnic conflicts has incited heated debate amongst policy makers and scholars as to how the state should respond to ethnic divisions. Some scholars such as Jürgen Habermas assert that all people

should be treated equally, regardless of their ethnic backgrounds or national origin. Hence, they are entitled to equal legal and political rights as autonomous individual subjects. Others, like Will Kymlicka, have criticized the notion of autonomous individual subjects as being impractical. Kymlicka advocates the recognition of ethnic group membership and a pluralistic approach in policymaking to accommodate the distinctive needs of ethnic groups. Some also stress the point that ethnic conflicts are not really “ethnic” but mainly political or economic.

At the end of the millennium, the focus of research on ethnic groups was shifting away from studies of specific groups toward the broad processes of ethnogenesis, the construction and perpetuation of ethnic boundaries, the meaning of ethnic identity, the impact of globalization (Berger & Huntington 2002), and the importance of transnationalism (Levitt & Waters 2002). While traditional patterns of international migration continue to play an important role in the generation of ethnic diversity, they have been modified and changed by political and economic factors in complex and unpredictable ways. In the United States, large numbers of Mexican migrants, both legal and undocumented, have contributed to the growth of the Latino population into the largest single minority group (Bean & Stevens 2003). In Germany, the central economic component of the European Union, the relations with immigrants and ethnic minority groups will be a crucial element in determining the progress and stability of the emerging political structure, no matter whether it becomes a superstate or remains a loose federation (Alba et al. 2003).

SEE ALSO: Acculturation; Assimilation; Boundaries (Racial/Ethnic); Conflict (Racial/Ethnic); Ethnic Cleansing; Ethnicity; Ethnonationalism

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ethnic/informal economy

Jimmy M. Sanders

Ethnic/informal economies are inconsistently defined by scholars. This slows progress in explicating the social underpinnings of ethnic/informal economies and in understanding how these economic systems affect the socioeconomic well-being of members of various ethnic groups. Fortunately, there is a common theme to the definitions one finds in the literature. All variants convey a sense of economic action embedded in solidaristic, co-ethnic social relations. Economic behavior is influenced by informal rules and practices that govern the normative behavior of group members. Beyond this common theme, however, widely differing definitions involving self-employment, employment niches among those who are not self-employed, and geographical clustering have been applied. Light and Gold (2000) suggest three definitions as a way to reduce this chaotic

state of affairs. The first is the combination of business owners, unpaid family labor, and paid co ethnic employees (ethnic ownership economy). The second includes the first, but adds the requirement of spatial clustering (enclave economy). The third points to occupational and industrial employment niches (not business ownership) where the overrepresentation of an ethnic group enables its members to benefit from the advantages of informal control (ethnic controlled economy).

An informative literature has emerged despite the lack of consistency in defining ethnic/informal economies. Researchers concentrate on how foreign born groups establish and maintain economic niches that are usually accentuated by a profusion of small businesses. The field examines how limited acculturation and structural assimilation in the immigrant generation gives rise to collective action that promotes enterprising economic action. A substantial body of research documents how immigrant minorities draw on social ties in order to facilitate the development of informal economic relations. Family ties and ethnic group membership typically provide the social underpinnings of these economic relations.

The ability to draw on social connections in order to gain access to resources that are useful for economic action is an example of what scholars refer to as social capital. The literature describes many ways in which immigrants make use of family and ethnic based interpersonal connections in gaining access to resources such as business related information and financial credit. Understanding these practices, which are often steeped in informal institutionalized arrangements, is essential for understanding the origins and maintenance of ethnic/informal economies.

Bonacich and Modell's (1980) study of three generations of Japanese Americans reveals how hostility from the dominant group can generate a defensive reaction from minority groups. In the case of the Japanese on the US West Coast, this encouraged ethnic solidarity and strengthened social boundaries that were reinforced by a shared sense of ethnic identity. This strong sense of community, in turn, gave rise to cooperation and collective action that generated and distributed group resources that facilitated the rise and expansion of the Japanese ethnic

economy. This economic system was the basis of Japanese upward mobility prior to World War II. Scholars show how ethnic businesses fill niches created by the demand for goods and services in an ethnic community. These markets are partially closed to out group businesses due to cultural and ecological barriers. Research also considers the role of informal credit and savings associations in helping prospective entrepreneurs acquire startup capital and in expanding the availability of credit to those who already own a business. Such economic activities, embedded in social relations, necessitate a sense of interdependence among in group members that engenders trust and solidarity, and allows for sanctions to be imposed on those who violate the trust of others (Portes & Sensenbrenner 1993).

Interest in ethnic/informal economies is part of a larger scholarly interest in economic segmentation. This view conceives of the labor market as divided into a primary market where opportunities for advancement are prevalent and a low wage secondary market with little opportunity for advancement. In the wake of growing international migration in the 1960s and 1970s, scholars concerned themselves with the range of economic options encountered by immigrants. Concluding that these opportunities were limited, researchers began to explore how the economic advancement of immigrant minority groups might be generated in a context of labor market segmentation and ethnic based strategies of economic action.

Thus far, a large share of this research has been produced in the United States. This is not surprising given the importance of immigration in the history of the country's development, the large number of scholars at American universities who are engaged in research, and that the country has once again become the host society for large numbers of international migrants. But the United States is not alone in opening its doors to immigration. Research into ethnic/informal economies is also conducted in immigrant receiving societies such as Canada, Australia, and in several European nations. Earlier immigration to South America also receives a good deal of attention. Numerous studies from various societies are reviewed in Aldrich and Waldinger (1990). This excellent review considers how characteristics of an

ethnic group and the structural opportunities (or lack thereof) they encounter jointly influence the emergence of ethnic strategies that facilitate the rise and maintenance of an ethnic/informal economy. The review includes several historical and contemporary examples of the importance of both structural opportunity (e.g., elite sponsorship of middleman minorities in Southeast Asia, Africa, the Ottoman Empire, and tsarist Russia) and group characteristics (e.g., the rise of the Chinese Vietnamese informal economy in Paris). Inasmuch as some relatively rich Asian nations are making use of guest workers from poorer Asian nations, we will probably see more research from this part of the world in the future – to the extent that these workers establish ethnic/informal economies.

Studies of how ethnic strategies develop and support ethnic/informal economies often consider the importance of ethnic based social networks. Focusing on the role of social networks in generating economic opportunities, Portes and colleagues (e.g., Portes & Bach 1985) conducted an important study on an emerging Cuban economy in Miami. Ethnic solidarity facilitated the vertical and horizontal integration of a burgeoning business community. But an unclear picture emerged as to the economic implications of participating in the Cuban economy. Some of the research finds that working with fellow Cubans or other minorities negatively affects earnings and working under a Cuban boss has no effect on earnings. By contrast, other publications report that participation in the Cuban economy gives rise to advantages in occupational prestige, and occupational prestige positively associates with earnings. The importance of this latter finding is that it appears to counter the ecological hypothesis of assimilation theory, which contends that continued spatial segregation in terms of the labor market and residential patterns limits the upward mobility of ethnic groups.

An engaging debate arose over the question of whether the ecological hypothesis of assimilation theory was indeed inconsistent with the experiences of Cubans in Miami. The first exchange was initiated by the criticism that failure to distinguish between self employed Cubans and their employees accounts for the apparent disconfirmation of the ecological hypothesis. Sanders and Nee (1987) appear to

show that the positive association between participating in the Cuban economy and occupational prestige is largely due to the occupational prestige of business owners rather than that of their employees. Hence, business owners financially benefit from participating in the densely co ethnic regional economy, but their employees tend not to experience such a benefit. This pattern implies the Cuban experience is similar to that of earlier immigrant groups. The debate was rejoined by Jensen and Portes (1992) and Sanders and Nee (1992). An earnings advantage is confirmed for Cuban business owners, but no comparable advantage is found for Cuban employees. Indeed, for men, a negative main effect obtains for employment in the Cuban economy. The bottom line is that ethnic/informal economies, like other market driven systems, not only generate wealth, they also generate inequality.

The field was beginning to concentrate less on any supposed earnings advantage that ethnic/informal economies provide to employees and more on how shared ethnicity facilitates internal forms of social organization and institutional behavior that increase employees' chances of becoming self employed. Bailey and Waldinger (1991), for example, show how informal ethnic networks in New York City's Chinese garment industry provide information to employers that helps them recoup the cost of training employees. These networks also provide employees with inside information that increases their chances of becoming self employed. Several subsequent studies have documented that informal training systems operate in various ethnic economies. But these systems, by facilitating greater self employment within an ethnic group, can drive up the cost of co ethnic labor and therefore immigrant entrepreneurs often draw from out group minorities to fill their labor needs.

As the literature converged on the importance of ethnic/informal economies as an engine to increase self employment, and thereby improve opportunities for upward mobility, some scholars were questioning the evidence that ethnic small business owners experience an earnings advantage. A key part of this critique is that the economic benefit to ethnic self employment may be largely due to business owners practicing self exploitation by working

70 or 80 hours per week. Others recognize the long hours of work required of ethnic entrepreneurs, but the literature generally regards this to be one of the costs of economic success through self employment. Portes and Zhou (1996) examine the argument that ethnic self employment fails to produce an earnings advantage. They find a substantial advantage to self employment, but this advantage is concentrated among unusually successful entrepreneurs as opposed to being spread throughout the business community.

Toward the close of the twentieth century, scholars continued to refine their understanding of the social bases of ethnic entrepreneurship. Sanders and Nee (1996), for example, demonstrate that the family plays a key role in ethnic enterprise, much as it had with earlier immigrant groups. The family is a strategic resource in ethnic entrepreneurship because the social ties it embodies tend to be the most intense and trust evoking of all interpersonal relationships. This literature shows that, by focusing on the ethnic group as a resource for collective economic action, many scholars have overlooked the role of the smaller, more tightly integrated social institution of the family.

What has the literature taught us about the social bases of ethnic/informal economies? Researchers have revealed a number of informal mechanisms based on social relations that facilitate economic action. The most important outcomes of these mechanisms are the dissemination of employment and business related information, and providing access to informal financial institutions. Normative use of these resources and the repayment of debts are encouraged by enforcing trustful behavior under the threat of sanctions. Informal social bases of economic action tend to emerge among groups as members try to overcome limited economic options due to language barriers, poor human capital, or non fungible foreign earned human capital. And immigrant groups often face discrimination and prejudice. A tendency for group members to react to these problems by looking within their group for practical and emotional support encourages ethnic solidarity, which in turn encourages informal group practices that provide access to resources. Internally generated resources contribute to the growth of self employment and

this leads to increased opportunities for getting ahead. But there are winners and losers in the ethnic community. People seeking to better their lives and that of their family are involved in the rough and tumble environment of market economics. Even a modicum of success in small business usually requires outperforming some competitors and matching the performance of others. This is a daunting task because ethnic/informal economies tend to be hotbeds of competition between small businesses.

SEE ALSO: Economy, Networks and; Ethnic Enclaves; Ethnic and Racial Division of Labor; Immigrant Families; Immigration; Social Embeddedness of Economic Action; Transnationalism

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ethnic and racial division of labor

Michael Lichter

An ethnic or racial division of labor exists in a society in which ethnic or racial groups have distinctive concentrations or specializations in particular lines of work. Ethnic/racial divisions of labor may arise through relatively benign labor market sorting processes, or they may be the result of systematic acts of bigotry and discrimination, often with state sanction. Regardless of how they arise, ethnic/racial divisions of labor can be observed and traced over time, and they can have measurable effects on social and political dynamics within societies.

Ethnic/racial divisions of labor have a long history. For example, in Athens of classical antiquity, landowners and other free citizens were almost exclusively Athenian, but the slaves who performed the bulk of the society's work were typically (but not universally) ethnic outsiders, as were the *metic* and *xenoi* artisans and merchants who dominated many areas of trade. More recently, European colonial powers created ethnic divisions of labor across the globe, installing themselves as a ruling class and frequently selecting a specific ethnic group within a colonized territory to fill privileged positions in colonial administration or trade. Apartheid in South Africa and slavery and Jim Crow in the American South are two examples of legal systems in former colonies that enforced racial divisions of labor, reserving desirable positions for whites while largely restricting subordinated groups to menial occupations. Ethnic divisions of labor in many countries are among the most persistent legacies of European colonialism.

Social theorists have developed a number of explanations for the creation and maintenance of ethnic divisions of labor. Neo Marxists have

alternated between two seemingly contradictory positions. The first position, which dates back to Marx, holds that capitalists are the architects of ethnic/racial divisions of labor, offering privileged positions to some groups of workers while assigning the most onerous tasks to others. The capitalists' goal is to foster conflict and competition within the working class, keeping it divided and weak. So called radical theories of labor market segmentation mostly adopt this position. The second position, espoused most forcefully by Bonacich in the early 1970s, does not hold capitalists responsible for anything beyond creating a context that forces workers to compete with each other in order to survive. In Bonacich's scheme, when relatively privileged workers face a threat from ethnically or racially distinct others, they use ethnic solidarity, labor organization, and other social and political resources at their disposal to insulate themselves from competition. When they are unable to completely exclude the other group from the labor market, they are often able to create an ethnically/racially split labor market, reserving the best positions for themselves. The split labor market persists as long as ethnic/racial others remain a threat.

Development in these macro level neo Marxist theories has virtually stalled since the late 1980s. Most recent work has focused at lower levels of abstraction – the metropolitan area, the industry, or even the individual firm. Ecological approaches to the ethnic/racial division of labor, for example, typically concern metropolitan labor markets. These approaches treat local labor markets as metaphorical ecologies, with ethnic/racial groups pictured as metaphorical species struggling to find and expand their "niches." In his study of native blacks and white immigrants at the dawn of the twentieth century, Lieberman (1980) proposes a "model of occupational composition" that frames the ethnic/racial division of labor as the outcome of a struggle for group position within a fixed hierarchy of occupational positions. For a particular group, the outcome of this struggle is determined by the overall group composition of the metropolitan area, group members' "objective" qualifications, group members' occupational preferences, the desirability of particular occupations, and, perhaps most importantly, the ethnic/racial preferences

of employers and potential co workers and customers. This approach helps account for collective upward mobility among ethnic groups, although it does little to explain the extra efforts made by immigrant whites to exclude blacks.

While Lieberson focused on earlier immigrant waves, mass movements to the US and Europe since the mid 1960s have sparked considerable interest in understanding how ethnic divisions of labor are formed and transformed over time. In the 1980s and early 1990s, the phenomenal growth of immigrant enterprises and the role of these businesses in providing co ethnic workers with employment niches attracted much attention. Portes and his colleagues developed the notion of the ethnic enclave economy, a separate economy semi detached from the mainstream economy in which ethnic entrepreneurs both exploit co ethnic workers and provide new business opportunities for them. Among immigrant groups that bring entrepreneurial expertise and a modicum of capital, opportunities for small business play a major role in shaping the group's place in the overall ethnic/racial division of labor.

Views on the consequences of ethnic/racial divisions of labor vary. Few disagree about the destructive consequences of coercive systems like apartheid and Jim Crow. Contemporary immigration scholars who study the entry of comparatively small groups of newcomers into larger ethnic/racial divisions of labor, however, tend to view these divisions of labor as inevitable. They also often see the consequences as very favorable to the new immigrants. Some, however, point out that not all immigrants locate favorable niches and that, furthermore, immigrants may be squeezing native minorities out of opportunities.

Neo Marxists tend to view ethnic divisions of labor as wholly undesirable because they are based on discrimination, leave some groups disproportionately impoverished, and undermine class unity. Hechter's influential work on the "cultural division of labor" provided clarification on this last point. Hechter distinguishes two major dimensions to the ethnic or racial division of labor: the degree of between group hierarchy and the degree of group specialization or distinctiveness. To the extent that an ethnic or racial group is concentrated at one

level in the occupational hierarchy, whether at the top, bottom, or middle, it will share interests with other groups at the same hierarchical level and tend toward class politics. On the other hand, to the extent that a group specializes in particular lines of work, and thus has high levels of within group interaction and interdependence, the greater is the salience of ethnic politics.

Three areas promise to be most fruitful in the future study of racial/ethnic divisions of labor. First, studies of the "new second generation," the children of the post 1965 immigrants to the US, should expose the extent to which specifically ethnic and racial factors still structure the opportunities available to natives. Second, feminist scholars, particularly those studying immigration, have been making progress in gendering our understandings of ethnic/racial divisions of labor, and this progress is likely to continue. Third, as global integration grows more important, so does attention to its effects on national ethnic/racial divisions of labor. Continuing research on, for example, how the new "transnational" migrants fit into ethnic/racial divisions of labor will be invaluable.

SEE ALSO: Affirmative Action (Race and Ethnic Quotas); Apartheid and Nelson Mandela; Discrimination; Immigration; Middleman Minorities; Racial Hierarchy; Transnationalism

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ethnic, racial, and nationalist movements

Susan Olzak

Political expressions of ethnicity and nationalism range broadly, from small scale or sporadic protests that may be relatively peaceful (as in civil rights marches), to sustained campaigns of violence against authorities or others (such as ethnic cleansing). Though often analyzed separately, ethnic, racial, and nationalist (E/R/N) movements voice strikingly similar demands for sovereignty and invoke rights of self-determination. The major E/R/N movement categories are distinguished by claims, goals, tactics, and organizational forms. Once these definitions are established, some key explanations of the emergence, persistence, transformation, and decline of these social movements are outlined.

Social movements generate collective action advocating fundamental changes in the political or economic arrangements in a society. Social movements typically involve sustained activity over time and place (whereas collective action may be fleeting). Most scholars also find that adherents of a social movement tend to support a coherent set of values that define its core identity. Boundary perspectives further explore how race and ethnic groups use ethnic markers to demarcate membership with reference to core features of group identity (Barth 1969).

The defining feature of ethnic and racial social movements (E/R) is that, in such movements, claims are made based upon a particular identity or boundary, defined by the presence of racial or ethnic markers. These markers typically include skin pigmentation, ancestry, language, and history of discrimination, conquest, or other shared experience. For simplicity (and to avoid invoking unscientific assumptions about the genetic basis of race), many researchers prefer the more generic label of *ethnicity* over race.

Ethnic mobilization can be defined apart from ethnic solidarity. Solidarity is characterized as the conscious identification (and loyalty) with a particular race or ethnic population, measured by attitudes, institutional involvement (or organizational participation), and monitoring capacity. Mobilization is the capacity to harness resources (including solidarity, organizations, and material resources) in an effort to reach some collective goal.

Nationalist movements generally express claims over the legitimate right to govern a specific geographical area (Hechter 2000). The pursuit of sovereignty rights typically also provokes conflict (and perhaps also warfare) with existing regimes. Such conflict can remain quiescent for long periods of time, erupting suddenly into full blown armed guerrilla warfare, or civil war, depending on regime strength, outside support, primary export commodities, internal mobilization of resources, and reaction by state authorities to nationalist movements (Fearon and Laitin 2003, 2005).

It is important to note that nationalist movements do not always depend upon a shared race or ethnic identity. Instead, they may rest upon a group's geographical concentration, political jurisdiction and leadership, and/or legacy claims to legitimate authority. Alternatively, nationalist movements may claim sovereign rights by invoking other types of identities, based upon religious identities, as in the case of nationalistic Islamic movements. Other forms of nationalist movements make claims that they had been forcefully removed and dispersed from their ancestral homeland, as in the case of some diaspora movements. Members of nationalist movements may share a territory that lies under another jurisdiction (e.g., Québécois nationalism), or they may invoke a national

identity spread across multiple regions (e.g., Kurdish nationalism). A final type involves state building movements in which a single identity is being forged from many different, smaller ethnic or regional identities within an existing territory (e.g., pan Indian identity in the US) (Nagel 1996).

By sharpening the differences between ethnicity and nationalism, empirical studies of these movements gain precision and focus. While race and ethnicity are designated by reference to cultural markers, phenotype, outward expressions of loyalty, celebration, or self identification, nationalism is a social movement making a territorial claim. According to Hechter (2000), the distinguishing features of nationalist movements include the presence of claims for self determination and authority over a specified territory and the fact that these demands are not now satisfied. Gellner (1983) adds that nationalism is “primarily a political principle” in which a governing unit should not cut across nor exclude members who share a common cultural boundary.

Brubaker (1996: 6–12) categorizes nationalism as one of three types of collective action mobilized by national minorities, nationalizing states, and external national homelands. This tripartite definition has the advantage of treating the outcomes of nationalist movements as contingent upon the behavior of a nationalizing group in contest with an existing regime, empire, colonial power, or host nation. Put differently, ethnicity becomes transformed into nationalism when it makes specific historical claims and attempts to administer the group as a political community.

Social movement perspectives add the insight that movements can be further distinguished by their relative duration, target, tactics, violence, and audience. These distinctions yield six broad categories: (1) regional or national minority movements that demand sovereignty over a particular territory; (2) civil rights protests that demand expansion of a group’s civil and economic rights or demand an end to discrimination; (3) antagonist movements directed against specific ethnic targets, including collective attacks ranging from genocide, ethnic cleansing, and mob violence, to symbolic threats; (4) state strengthening nationalism, which attempts to unify diverse cultures

(state building nationalism) or merge politically divided territories into one state (unification nationalism); (5) separatist or secession movements, claiming rights of withdrawal from formal state authority; and (6) genocide or ethnic cleansing, which is an extreme form of violent social movement against a target population.

While these definitions clarify some important distinctions, the application of these terms often becomes tricky when conducting research on E/R/N movements because race and ethnic boundaries are porous, dynamic, and flexible. From different political vantage points and at different times, the same movement may be seen as engaging in senseless violence or as a nationalist liberation movement. Moreover, movements commonly adapt to changing political environments, espousing new goals and engaging in new tactics. Such changes may engender fears that the movement has been coopted and that its authenticity has become compromised. While these transformative qualities of social movements undoubtedly create problems for researchers, there is a hidden advantage as well. Taking these shifts into account might reveal new information about how group identity becomes transformed into social movements.

CORE RESEARCH QUESTIONS

Questions about the origins, persistence, and success of movements drive research efforts in this area. First, how does ethnic, racial, religious, territorial, or national identity become transformed into active social movements? This question underscores the importance of maintaining a distinction between cultural expressions of identity (e.g., ethnic self help organizations, immigrant festivals, head scarves) from social movements that express claims for expanded rights to some set of authorities, or violence directed against specific groups. Accordingly, scholars ask under what conditions will specific boundaries (e.g., language vs. skin pigmentation) come to be *politically* activated (Barth 1969; Olzak 1992). By posing the issue of mobilization as a question, researchers can analyze the dynamics of ethnic mobilization (or nationalism) based upon ethnicity without assuming it.

Scholars have analyzed the transformation of identity into collective action in terms of the diffusion of protest (Beissinger 2002), event history analyses of rates of ethnic conflict among groups (Olzak 1992), and ethnic nationalism from a comparative/historical perspective (Brubaker 1996). Such studies highlight the instrumental importance of resources and organizational infrastructure support. The evidence further suggests that favorable changes in economic, legal, and political opportunities facilitate (or hinder) ethnic movements (McAdam 1982).

Second, what factors explain the emergence and persistence of E/R/N movements? Until recently, social scientists focused mainly on the internal characteristics of states to explain E/R/N movements. Thus, poverty, rough terrain, imposition of direct rule, warlord corruption, or some other structural feature of the political system or economy triggers have been identified as factors raising levels of ethnic conflict (Fearon & Laitin 1999, 2003). Others have drawn attention to the advantages of viewing social movements as a function of global and transnational mechanisms that transform local organizations into global movements of violence and claims making activity (Olzak 2006).

A third question asks whether ethnic movements are truly novel, or whether they are simply political movements that once, earlier in history, adopted other forms. Without undertaking a long historical analysis, answering this question is difficult. However, it seems plausible that social movements are now more likely to be couched in distinctly ethnic terms, as a function of self-determination norms and UN declarations on minority rights. Some scholars claim that E/R/N movements are distinct from other bases of political contests (such as regional or religious social movements) because they employ distinctly *modern* claims (Gellner 1983; Smith 1991). However, this characteristic does not imply that such movements espouse modern values or contemporary themes. Indeed, many nationalist movements (e.g., Islamic nationalist movements) have invoked themes demanding a return to the past. Instead, for most scholars, evidence that these movements are modern rests on the idea that there is a shared identity of a “people” with boundaries beyond a parochial village or town (Anderson 1991).

A fourth orienting question concerns the shift in the scope of activity: What are the mechanisms that cause social movements to expand their scope from local concerns to encompass national goals? Brubaker (1996) describes “nationness” as an institutional process that begins to crystallize with state expansion. Similarly, Anderson (1991) posits a causal relationship between the development of ethnic movements that coincided with state building and the spread of literacy; such models suggest a causal link between state building and ethnic mobilization. Yet recent research suggests that the density of international connections among states may be reducing the number of nationally based movements, as transnational movements now mobilize across state administrative units in reaction to global processes (Olzak 2006).

Another set of issues raises questions about the nature of the relationship between ethnic conflict and internal civil war. For instance, they ask, under what conditions does ethnic conflict promote civil war? Alternatively, others are concerned with the duration of conflict, asking whether the presence of ethnic conflict prolongs the duration of civil wars. Several innovative lines of research have suggested that there is a strong link between ethnic cleavages and violence, in which group differences mobilize and sustain the capacity for groups to incite civil wars. For instance, Sambanis (2001) finds that civil wars based upon ethnic and/or religious identities are more likely to erupt in countries with high levels of ethnic heterogeneity and low levels of political democracy. In contrast, in nonethnic (or revolutionary) civil wars, economic and development indicators (especially energy consumption) have more influence than do measures of ethnic heterogeneity and indicators of democracy.

Scholars have also explored a reverse causal argument. In this view, economic (or political) instability *results from* prior conflict, or economic decline follows the public’s anticipation of civil unrest. In an attempt to sort out the causal ordering of economic effects on ethnic wars, current empirical evidence supports the notion that economic decline raises rates of internal civil war, rather than the reverse, but that political instability and state strength may be endogenous to the process of ethnic and nationalist mobilization (Olzak 2004).

Ethnic diversity also prolongs the duration of civil wars. Fearon and Laitin (2003) find that the duration of violent civil conflict increases when there are a small number of large ethnic groups, when there are conflicts over land use, and when rebels have access to external (or contraband) resources. Not surprisingly, the evidence shows that ethnic wars and civil wars are causally and temporally related.

LEADING THEORETICAL PERSPECTIVES

Perspectives offering explanations of the emergence, growth, and decay of E/R/N social movements emphasize one or more processes of changing economic, political, or social conditions. Each tradition has generated a number of important empirical studies, which are linked by common theoretical concepts and mechanisms.

Periods of nation building apparently play a central role in determining the nature of the identity of an imagined "nation." Thus, one explanation for the fact that ethnic movements take on different forms is related to the events surrounding a country's national origin. The literature on nation building has suggested that ethnic movements are most likely to turn violent early in (more or less legitimate) administrative unit stages of nation building, when contested claims of power and legitimacy remain unresolved (Hechter 2000). In this view, nations were "birth marked" by the nature of conflicts – religious, territorial, ethnic, or otherwise – that prevailed during a particular historical period.

The legacy of colonialism provides a number of instructive lessons for understanding the emergence and timing of nationalist movements. Territorial boundaries drawn during periods of colonialist rule (especially in Africa and the Middle East) provide examples of how ethnic cleavages can turn into violent rebellions against attempts to subdue indigenous populations. During nation building and state formation, outcomes depend upon complicated negotiations between opponents, nation builders, and external participants. Reactive anti colonialist movements can become transformed into nationalist movements when regimes become perceived as illegitimate and artificial, when repression

recedes, and when allies infuse new resources into nationalist movements.

Ethnic movements are fundamentally embedded in (often contradictory) legends and myths about various group identities and actions that have shaped their histories. Language, religion, immigration, and migration histories all play a role in building the defining characteristics of a region. However, periods of nation building apparently play a central role in determining the nature of identity of an imagined "nation." Thus, one explanation for the fact that ethnic movements take on different forms is related to the events surrounding a country's national origin. The literature on state formation has suggested that ethnic movements are most likely to turn violent during the early (and less legitimate) stages of nation building, when contested claims of power and legitimacy remain unresolved.

During periods of instability within states or colonial empires, the content of ethnic claims (especially territorial rights) often brings them into confrontation with regimes that have not completely won the hearts and minds of the inhabitants of the contested territory. Outcomes depend upon complicated negotiations between opponents, nation builders, and often external participants, who may favor one or the other side. Although some theorists once assumed that the process of nation building could be analyzed as an evolutionary set of stages, such assumptions seem naïve today. Evidently the process of creating a legitimate nation with an accepted system of authority and leaders is better conceptualized as a dynamic set of negotiated meanings (Brubaker 1996). National identities and ethnic communities are constantly being reconstructed and boundary lines redrawn. Social construction theories of race/ethnic social movements have helped clarify Anderson's (1991) claim that nations are "imagined communities," whose organizational form serves obvious political purposes and ends, but may have little factual basis.

Anderson's work has provided a useful starting place for understanding why nationalist and ethnic movements aim to reconcile the lack of correspondence between state boundaries and national identity. Smith (1991), Hechter (2000), and many others have emphasized the fact that few (if any) nation states are homogeneous

entities; not only do states sometimes encompass many nations (as in the notion of multiculturalism), but also many nations exist without a state. If a "nation" is demarcated by a self-identified boundary, then one nation may be dispersed across multiple state boundaries (as in the concept of a Kurdish nation), which may ultimately acquire its own state (Brass 1991). This implies that, even if they are only temporarily successful, ethnic movements can undermine the legitimacy of a state attempting to unify under assumptions of ethnic homogeneity.

During the mid 1970s an important tradition emerged suggesting that the combination of economic deprivation and cultural subordination produces enduring cleavages facilitating ethnic political mobilization. Internal colonialism theory suggests that a combination of uneven industrialization and cultural differences among regions in core nations causes ethnic grievances to become the basis of enduring political contention (Hechter 1975). This tradition has also been applied to local markets that are based upon an ethnic stratification system. Within internal colonies, this theory suggests that a *cultural division of labor* often emerges, in which dominant ethnic populations monopolize administrative and supervisory occupations (and rewards), while subordinate ethnic populations are relegated to lower status occupations (often in extractive industries). As a consequence, ethnic and labor market cleavages triumph over other types of possible loyalties.

Competition theories of race/ethnic movements emerged during the early 1980s to counter these claims (Olzak & Nagel 1986). These perspectives suggested that economic changes and political opportunities that favor disadvantaged groups can intensify competition among groups, which in turn activates ethnic boundaries and provokes ethnic mobilization. According to competition theory, declining inequality among regions (or groups) promotes competitive conflict among groups. This is because declining inequality and intergroup contact release forces of competitive exclusion and conflict (Barth 1969). In this view, E/R social movements result from conditions of *niche overlap* (rather than from niche segregation, as in internal colonialism theory). For example, competition theorists

argue that ethnic conflict rises when ethnic groups within nations come to compete in the *same* labor markets and increase their access to similar sets of political, economic, and social resources (Bonacich 1972; Olzak 1992).

A key variant of competition theory is split labor market theory, which holds that ethnic antagonism peaks when two or more ethnically or racially differentiated groups command different wage prices within the same labor market niche (Bonacich 1972). This theory has been supported by evidence on Chinese laborers, the US labor movement, contemporary South Africa, analyses of post-industrial racial conflict in the US, analyses of race and ethnic conflict in cities in the nineteenth century US, and the former republics of the Ukraine, Latvia, Estonia, and Lithuania (Beissinger 2002).

Rational choice theorists state that modern ethnic movements occur with regularity because ethnic groups lower monitoring costs and increase benefits attached to ethnic mobilization, allowing ethnic groups to overcome the free rider problems attached to other types of mobilization efforts (Hechter 2000). Because ethnic groups are able to form dense social networks easily, costs of monitoring commitment are minimized, which fosters ethnic mobilization. Building on rational choice models, Fearon and Laitin (1996) have linked the strategic aspects of ethnic identity to violence, as elites build on existing ethnic loyalties (see also Petersen 2002). Such loyalties can prove fatal to group members. Moreover, the presence of genocidal norms (defined as a threat of sanctions to in-group members who decline participation in ethnic mayhem) increases the scale of ethnic violence. These authors offer an explanation for one persistent and counterintuitive finding in the literature: despite a history of intergroup cooperation, tolerance, intermarriage, and trust among different groups interacting within a region, the intensity of ethnic killing and violence may remain high due to the presence of genocidal norms.

Similarly, theorists have extended prisoner's dilemma models to consider the implications of game theory for ethnic mobilization, including outbreak of ethnic war (Fearon & Laitin 1996). While armed ethnic rebellions tend to last longer than nonethnic ones (Fearon 2004), a variety of ethnic and cultural characteristics

have few systematic effects on the onset or duration of civil wars in general (Fearon & Laitin 2003).

Applying game theory models to four specific ethnic movements, Laitin (1995) compares violence in the Basque country and Catalonia in Spain and post Soviet Georgia to ethnic mobilization in the Ukraine. Laitin finds that three factors predict the outbreak of violence (holding a number of cultural and historical factors constant): (1) rural social structure, which facilitates group monitoring and expedites militant commando operations; (2) tipping game mechanisms that explain the conditions under which costs to joining nationalist campaigns (and recruitment of soldiers to nationalist armies) are reduced; and (3) sustaining mechanisms, which rely on several random shocks which trigger a culture of violence that becomes culturally embedded in regional and collective memories.

Political perspectives emphasize the role of shifts in political constraints and opportunity structures that influence the trajectory of E/R social movements. These theories emphasize institutional arrangements, court rulings and reforms, and regional concentration of ethnic populations as viable political instruments leading to mobilization. Two studies from India illustrate these points. Chandra (2004) argues that political systems based on ethnic patronage systems can inadvertently provide the foundation for permanent hostilities. Alternatively, Varshney (2002) finds that when business, civic, and voluntary associations integrate and/or cross cut ethnic lines, confrontations are significantly less likely to erupt.

In cross national studies of the influence of political structures, Gurr (1993) and Gurr and Moore (1997) emphasize the centrifugal force of ethnic political parties, which maintain ethnic loyalties through institutional arrangements and patronage based on ethnic loyalties. Such forces produce fierce loyalties when language, religion, or some other marker also distinguishes a population that is geographically concentrated (Fearon & Laitin 2003). Other scholars have argued that while ethnic regional concentrations are important, they do not necessarily lead to ethnic violence. Instead, these scholars emphasize proximate causes or triggering mechanisms, such as political changes in authority, collapse of

colonial authorities or empires, or transition to market economies or democracies.

Social movement perspectives suggest that shifts in political opportunities (either positive or negative) drive the rates of protest activity and insurgency. Political shifts in regimes or power arrangements that offer new opportunities for formerly disadvantaged ethnic minorities within the newly democratizing states can encourage mobilization. So the decline of authoritarian regimes seemingly coincides with the resurgence of E/R/N movements, because the retreat of strong repressive authorities leaves a power vacuum. As the former military and administrative structures recede, local level elites mobilize ethnic loyalties and take advantage of this vacuum.

Evidence from civil wars in Bosnia and Kosovo provides another example of how regime instability shapes opportunities for E/R/N movements. At the same time, policies that involve ethnic resettlement programs often concentrate ethnic populations and create new networks that provide new recruits for mobilizing ethnic violence, as examples from the West Bank in Israel, or the Kurds in Germany, suggest. Thus, transitions to democracy may mobilize ethnic movements by offering new political advantages to ethnic groups that were more easily submerged in repressive regimes.

States often respond to challenges from nationalist movements by alternating between strategies of repression and concession (Hechter 2000). For example, the evidence suggests that states shift from strategies of repression to accommodation, depending on both the virulence of dissident protest behavior and state capacity to repress these challenges. However, others have suggested the intriguing hypothesis that it is the vacillation of states itself that incites nationalist violence, signaling a weakness in the state's internal capacity to act (for reviews, see Olzak 2004).

The potential for ethnic separatism also influences the intensity of collective violence in a country and this effect is stronger in states with weakened political institutions. The evidence finds that the potential for ethnic separatism increases political violence overall, but that this relationship holds only in countries with relatively low levels of political institutionalization (defined by the presence of binding

rules on political participation) (Sambanis 2001).

The imposition of external political authority on ethnic minorities compared to imposition of structures of indirect authority has important consequences for ethnic and nationalist movements. Hechter (2000) has argued that the seeds of nationalist movements are embedded in specific political structural arrangements in which colonialist or federated authority cedes formal authority to local leaders. Under such conditions, local elites are delegated political power and authority by centralized authorities, yet the power of local elites is fundamentally based upon regional identities and loyalties. When central authority is weakened or challenged (by external events such as war, famine, or economic crises), or when central authority is withdrawn (as in the case of the Soviet Union), local elites can mobilize on the basis of regional/ethnic identity. According to this argument, the imposition of direct rule at this point can encourage both state building nationalism (due to its centralizing authority and integration processes) and peripheral nationalism, cultural politics, or regional subnational movements within states.

Brubaker (1996) reflects these themes in his work on “new nationalisms” in Western Europe. Instead of arguing that the erosion of Soviet power and authority allowed ethnic tensions to surface and diffuse across former Soviet territories, Brubaker argues that the federated system of regional and ethnically defined republics in the Soviet Union created the structural basis for the ultimate disintegration of these republics. Wilkinson (2004) finds empirical support for this argument, reporting that states in India with a high degree of institutionalization of ethnic parties produce significantly higher rates of ethnic violence and hostility.

Recent theoretical analyses emphasize both the cultural and cognitive components of social movements, suggesting that group identity is both an important mobilizing strategy and a consequence of mobilization. In particular, movements invoke one or more cultural themes of nationalism, rights of self-determination, expansion of human rights, and basic rights of sovereignty (Smith 1991; Brubaker & Laitin 1998; Brubaker 2004). In this view, a socially constructed ethnic identity is not a given, but it

may be the *result* of prior collective action. This perspective allows researchers to study how social mechanisms of contact, conflict, borrowing, and other forms of interaction might influence the emergence of new ethnic or racial categories. Over time, as ethnic conflicts recur along the same cleavage lines, identities (and revenge tactics) fall along recognizable race and ethnic categories. As group violence and revenge escalates on either side to a conflict, small scale or individual skirmishes became redefined as collective events requiring a response. In analyzing forces escalating group conflict, social movement scholars tend to underscore the emergent properties of both identities and conflict.

Although useful for case studies of social movements that did happen, one drawback of a purely constructionist perspective is that it becomes difficult for researchers to determine the causal ordering of emergent group identity and ethnic mobilization. In studying the impact of ethnic identity on ethnic social movements, Smith (1984) provided a (as yet untested) framework that might unravel the causal steps implied by this process. Smith lists the conditions under which ethnic identity is likely to become activated. These include intervals (1) during prolonged periods of conflict and warfare, when group identities are under siege or are threatened by others (including third parties to the conflict, as in the Cold War), (2) during periods of secularization or cultural change, in which a technologically superior or economically dominant culture threatens a more traditional culture, and (3) during periods of intense commercialization, which integrate a society into a broader system of economic exchange dominated by more advanced technologies or more powerful adversaries.

Economic and political crises that once affected only local areas now have repercussions in vastly different and formerly unconnected regions and states. Since the advent of modern media, civil wars, terrorist acts, and acts by ethnic social movements have produced reactions across national borders. Transnational social movements (TSMs) are social movements that span multiple national borders, target forces of global integration, or are social movements that concern global level issues (e.g., global environmental concerns). Taking an international perspective helps clarify how

economic interdependence within states has reinvigorated ethnic politics. Regional associations such as the EU, OPEC, NATO, and other supranational organizations promote interstate migration and decrease reliance of regions within states on the military and economic power of the nation state (Olzak & Nagel 1986). Multistate organizations also provide an audience for insurgent groups demanding new sovereignty rights (Koopmans & Statham 2000). In this view, an increasingly dense network of international economic relations, exemplified by multinational corporations, growing trade and foreign investment, and supranational economic associations, will continue to produce more large scale ethnic movements.

A global strategy offers arguments about forces of globalization that produce inequality, competition, and mobilization. Olzak (2006) holds that integration of a world economic and political system has encouraged ethnic fragmentation within states. It does so by increasing the access of formerly disadvantaged groups to political resources, creating new political opportunities for mobilizing, and increasing levels of economic inequality in peripheral countries, which increases the potential for competition and conflict among groups within these states. Competition among groups escalates the number of demands for amelioration of injustice or ethnic inequalities. Moreover, the process of integration of the world's states has varying effects on different sectors of the world system.

As the world's states have become more directly linked through communication and media channels, information about inequality and claims for redress of this inequality have increased sharply. Thus, the global forces of integration tend to crystallize and empower local level cleavages, increasing solidarity and heightening the capacity to mobilize movements challenging state authority. Together, the dual trends of increasing political access and decreasing ethnic economic disparity shape ethnic protest.

This perspective suggests that individual states will become less powerful in negotiations when confronting non state actors and/or transnational movements than in the past. As state economies and politics become more integrated, international associations and events occurring outside state boundaries will become

increasingly salient. It seems likely that as integration of the world's states (politically, diplomatically, and economically) proceeds, ethnic groups within states will become less constrained by their own state authorities. The growing predominance of an integrated set of states ironically decreases the ability of any one state to dominate its internal borders. Highly integrated nation states cannot simply repress, jail, or torture the ethnic challengers without risking international condemnation, sanctions, and boycotts. Furthermore, neighboring countries may directly or indirectly finance campaigns of instability, using political refugees or exiles as mercenary soldiers. There is growing evidence on transnational environmental and human rights movements that supports these contentions (Olzak 2006).

Diffusion of ideologies, resources, and personnel accelerates these trends. Ethnic social movements occurring in neighboring countries have powerful diffusion properties, destabilizing or threatening nearby regimes. Sambanis (2001) argues that elite factions (or warlords) offering military and financial support from neighboring countries have played crucial roles in prolonging ethnic wars in Africa and Central Asia in recent years. Although it is difficult to study (because many of the transactions are clandestine and sources of data are unreliable), corruption feeds upon an increased flow of arms, mercenaries, and illegal drugs. It is likely that networks of local warlords also fuel ethnic wars (without state or international sanctions) in neighboring countries (Fearon & Laitin 2003; Fearon 2004).

Global perspectives suggest another way that an ideology supporting human rights has accelerated the spread and acceptance of an ideology supporting ethnic rights. In this view, as the worldwide human rights movement gained momentum, claims for national sovereignty, group rights, and freedom became intertwined. Recent analyses of the diffusion of world culture and ideology have shifted the emphasis of world systems theory to consider the ideological implications of the integration of the world system (for reviews, see Olzak 2006). In this view, the diffusion of human rights organizations and intergovernmental associations (including social movement organizations) has motivated social movements to increase demands for expansion

of group rights in states that declared independence since 1945.

Global approaches suggest that, as nation states became linked in networks of military and economic associations, national political boundaries weaken and political regimes become vulnerable to international and external challenges. The same forces that encouraged the diffusion of nationalism as an ideology also affect ethnic movements within and between state boundaries.

Several lines of research on ethnic conflict support these contentions. Thus, one (perhaps unanticipated) consequence of the integration of the European monetary system is that ethnic tensions have risen rather dramatically (for examples, see Koopmans & Statham 2000). Furthermore, as political and economic barriers have declined, labor (and capital) flow more freely across states. However, one potential consequence of increasing flows of foreign workers across borders has been that new right wing parties across Western Europe have mobilized sentiment against foreign workers. To the extent that the integration of the European Union has restructured local politics within European countries, the opportunity has arisen for ethnic politics on both sides of the immigration question. As a consequence, anti foreigner sentiment, nationalist political parties, and attacks on foreigners also appear to be rising in most Western European countries, especially in Germany, France, the Netherlands, and England (Koopmans & Olzak 2004).

Military interdependence constitutes an obvious way that international relations affect conflicts within countries. Although such strategies are not new, superpowers arm and train ethnic and subnational groups in order to stabilize or in some cases destabilize regimes. The cases of recent rebellions financed and supported by transnational forces (on both sides of the struggles) in civil wars in Afghanistan, Nicaragua, Vietnam, Iraq, and many other settings illustrate this point. If arguments suggesting a link between international networks and E/R/N movements are correct, then an increase in transnational processes could potentially weaken the viability of the nation state as a main organizing strategy for territorial authority and control.

A final international trend in social movements deserves attention. This is reactive movements that span national borders, making vague claims about identities that are contrary to existing modernization or development efforts by dominant countries, ideologies, or ethnicities. In the contemporary era, some of these movements have been characterized as loosely connected by anti modernist claims that have a basis in religious fundamentalism. These movements share a concern with symbols of identity politics (and with symbols that seem ethnic – such as the wearing of head scarves), but they diverge from most E/R/N movements because they rarely express specific claims to territorial rights and instead voice demands for ethnic/religious purity. Whether or not such movements will continue to gain momentum remains an open question.

EVALUATION OF VARIOUS PERSPECTIVES

Many scholars analyze different types of E/R/N movements separately, by historical period, regional groupings, and by specific goals or tactics. While it has become popular for scholars to claim that E/R/N movements are produced by a constellation of historically contingent factors, this strategy has hampered our ability to develop powerful explanations that identify some general mechanisms of social change. Yet other social scientists have demonstrated that there are substantial theoretical payoffs attached to analyzing the similarities across E/R/N movements. By paying attention to the commonalities among forms of ethnic and nationalist movements, we stand to gain more leverage over questions about how protest escalates and diffuses, or how spontaneous protests become transformed into sustained (or violent) social movements that challenge existing authority structures.

Approaches that seek to emphasize the continuities and discontinuities among social movements and their emergent forms allow cumulative and testable theories to be constructed and evaluated. In contrast, if multiple types of ethnic mobilization (from civil rights movements to ethnic civil wars) are analyzed separately by country, time period, and movement goals, it becomes

impossible to know when to stop creating new categories and crafting unique explanations to cover each new occurrence of a nationalist event or ethnic campaign. Truly comparative work that seeks to build theories that can be falsified empirically holds far more promise than does a strategy that views each movement as a unique and separate category. In the context of complex dynamics of transnational social movements, activists and organizations engage in activity that engages and activates ethnic identity within nations. Such reactive movements can have reverberations to kindred or diasporic groups beyond a single nation. Understanding the commonalities among these forms in the context of a global system seems especially relevant.

Assessing the relative importance of various causal factors explaining ethnic movements over time is also hampered by the fact that ethnic and racial boundaries (and labels) often change over time. Answers to questions about the nature and trajectory of ethnic movements lie in conducting careful empirical analyses and comparisons of different kinds of events – ethnic, civil rights, national, religious, civil wars, and autonomy social movements of various kinds that share some (but not all) root causes.

Recent trends have taken these dynamics into account by emphasizing the emergence of a more densely connected global system. The globalization of social movements has led current research on ethnic and national movements away from a sole emphasis on internal features of states and toward the international context of collective actions. Clearly, the internationalization of the world economy and political integration of organizational, diplomatic, and trade linkages have prompted us to reconsider previous assumptions that rest on stable characteristics of states. Research reviewed here depicts social movements that have produced strikingly similar social movements that share similar forms, goals, tactics, and ideologies. Thus, theories that focus solely on the internal bases of discontent now seem shortsighted. A resulting network of economic and political ties cuts across the state system. As a consequence, ethnic mobilization at the global level provides fertile ground for new types of movements based upon national, ethnic, and other cultural identities.

Applying lessons from colonialism and imperialist regimes to new forms of nationalism may allow us to better understand sources of fundamentalist nationalism, terrorist networks, and international networks of social movement recruitment and training. Such movements are both local and international in scope, and, because of this flexibility, they are able to shift direction quickly, often without warning. By turning to explanations firmly based on theories of international connections and processes, we may be able to understand the emergence of this new form of nationalism.

SEE ALSO: Collective Identity; Nation State; Nationalism; Protest, Diffusion of; Race; Race and Ethnic Consciousness; Race and Ethnic Politics; Race (Racism); Social Movements; Transnational Movements

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ethnicity

Richard Jenkins

The ancient Greek word *ethnos*, the root of “ethnicity,” referred to people living and acting together in a manner that we might apply to a “people” or a “nation”: a collectivity with a “way of life” – some manners and mores, practices and purposes – in common, whose members share something in terms of “culture.” Thus the anthropologist Frederick Barth (1969) defined ethnicity as “the social organization of culture difference.” Ethnicity is not only a relatively abstract collective phenomenon, however: it also matters to individuals. To quote another anthropologist, Clifford Geertz, ethnicity is “personal identity collectively ratified and publicly expressed” (1973: 268).

After kinship, ethnicity is perhaps the most ubiquitous way of classifying and organizing humans into collectivities. It requires shared perceptions that certain people are similar to each other and different from others. Ethnic inclusivity and exclusivity build on the cultural differences and similarities that people regard as significant to generate boundaries and dramatize them. How the nuanced complexities of culture are organized into ethnicity is, however, neither obvious nor straightforward. People may appear to differ enormously in terms of culture and yet be able to identify themselves as ethnic fellows: think, for example, about the diversity that is subsumed within Jewishness. Nor does apparent cultural similarity preclude strong ethnic differentiation. Viewed by an anthropologist from Mars, Danes and Norwegians, for example, might look very similar, or even the same; they, however, do not see things this way.

This suggests that our understanding of ethnicity cannot simply depend upon a crude

model of discrete and different cultures seen “in the round.” Some cultural themes offer more scope for ethnic identification than others: language, notions of shared descent, historical narratives, locality and co residence, and religion have all proved to be particularly potent ethnic markers. Even so, a common language, for example, or shared religious beliefs and practices do not necessarily do the trick in themselves. Nor do shared space and place: living together may be a potent source of common identification, but space and place can also divide people. They may be a resource for which to compete and the interaction that is necessary for a sense of difference to emerge takes up space: it needs a terrain. Lines are drawn in the sand, and borders and boundaries come to delineate arbitrary group territories.

This further suggests that ethnicity is not a matter of definable degrees or obvious kinds of cultural similarity or difference. There is no checklist with which to determine whether or not members of Group A are *really* ethnically different to members of Group B, or whether Group C is an ethnic group or some other kind of collectivity. Enumerating cultural traits or characteristics is not a useful way to understand or identify ethnic differences. Human beings are distinguished by their voices, and the base line is always whether a group is seen by its members to be different.

Self definition is not *all* that matters, however. It is also necessary that a group be categorized as distinctive by others (Jenkins 1997: 51–73). This means that power – whose definition counts in any given situation – is always a lurking presence. There can be no such thing as unilateral ethnicity. Ethnicity always involves ethnic *relations*: connections and contacts between people who are seen to be different, as well as between those who are seen to be the same. A sense of ethnicity can only arise in the context of relationships and interaction with others: without difference there is no similarity. Defining *us* implies – if nothing stronger – an image of *them*. It is difficult to imagine a meaningful identification, ethnic or whatever, that is not at least recognized by others. It is not enough to assert, “I am an X,” or “We are Xs,” for either of these things to become so.

To say this, however, begs a question: what counts as “being an X” in the contemporary

world? Looking at the range of relationships of similarity and difference that might be said to involve “culture” reveals a broad spectrum of possibilities. Neighborhood and locality are among the more immediate. Local senses of belonging that we call “community” – built on an “us” and a “them,” apparently shared understandings, and ways of doing things in common – are well documented (Cohen 1985). Kinship ties may also be invoked as criteria of membership. More abstract regional identities, such as the North–South distinctions that still play so well in England and the United States, are also clearly related. From here it is but a step to the nation (Anderson 1983). While the boundaries of community and region are policed by the informal powers of individuals and groups to accept or reject identity claims, national identity is a formal package that includes citizenship, a passport, political rights and duties within and without the national borders, and so on. This is a domain of formal power and authority. Even here, however, everyday practices such as language, taste in food, and perhaps religion may come into the picture: ways of life are still significant.

Descent and kinship may also be important in understandings of the nation (as in the German model of the national identity, defined in terms of “blood” rather than “soil”; Bauman 1992). This requires us also to look at “race,” the belief in distinctive populations sharing common ancestors in the remote past, human stocks with their own characteristics. From this point of view, Germans are different from Poles, for example: they are not the same “kind” of people. And although “racial” categories may draw upon the visible features of bodies to assert the “naturalness” of particular similarities and differences, let us remember that “race” is culturally defined, not natural.

The words “ethnic” or “ethnicity” do not appear in the two paragraphs above. Yet in terms of the definition of ethnicity offered earlier, much of the similarity and difference that has been referred to looks something like ethnicity. This suggests some questions. Where does ethnicity end and communal identity, or local identity, or regional identity, or national identity, begin? What is the relationship between community and locality, or locality and region? And what are the differences

between all of these things? Where does “race” fit in with them? Are community, locality, region, nation, and “race” even the same kind of thing? The answer is no, and yes. No, in that they appear to be about different things, each evoking its own combinations of criteria of similarity and difference. No, in that some of these criteria are more flexible than others. Locality or citizenship, for example, are easier to change than descent based criteria such as family or “race.” No, in that some of these identities are more likely than others to find expression through ideologies, such as nationalism and racism, which describe the world as it is believed to be and as it should be. But yes, in that the criteria of similarity and difference in each case are cultural. Yes, in that they all contribute to the social organization of a broad and distinctive genre of collective identification, which is not reducible to either kinship or social class, to pick only the most obvious comparisons. And yes, in that they all offer the potential for political organization.

Instead of searching for ever more precise definitions, a better approach might suggest that communal, local, regional, national, and “racial” identities are locally and historically specific variations on a generic principle of collective identification, ethnicity. Each says something about “the social organization of culture difference” and “the cultural organization of social difference.” They are culturally imagined and socially consequential, a way of phrasing the matter which recognizes that distinctions between “the cultural” and “the social” may not be particularly helpful. These communal, local, regional, national, and “racial” identities also offer the possibility of “collectively ratified personal identity.” They may make a considerable personal difference to individuals, both in their sense of self and in their judgment and treatment of others.

This broad understanding of ethnicity acknowledges that ethnic identification is a contextually variable and relative process. That ethnicity may be negotiable, flexible, and variable in its significance from one situation to another is among the most important lessons of the specialist social science literature (Cornell 1996). Which also means that, depending on cultural context and social situation, ethnicity may *not* be negotiable. There may not be much

of a choice. And when ethnicity matters to people, it has the capacity to *really* matter, to move them to action and awaken powerful emotions.

That ethnicity can be a source of powerful affect and meaning is at the heart of a long standing debate between “primordialists,” who believe that ethnic attachments are immutable and irresistible, and “constructionists,” who argue that they are a matter of strategy and negotiation; between what Marcus Banks (1996: 186–7) has evocatively described as models of “ethnicity in the heart” and “ethnicity in the head.” There are several things to bear in mind about this debate. First, the degree to which ethnicity and its variants matter, and to whom, differs demonstrably from epoch to epoch and place to place. There is no consistency with respect to the strength of ethnic attachments, although that humans form ethnic attachments seems to be fairly universal. Nor do we need to resort to notions of essence and nature to explain why, when ethnicity matters to people, it can matter so much: the nature and content of primary socialization, the power of symbols, the implacability of some local histories, and the often considerable consequences of identification are probably sufficient to account for this. What matters is not whether ethnicity is a primordial personal and cultural essence, into which we are born and about which we can do nothing, but that many people fervently believe this to be so and behave accordingly.

Recently, questions have been asked about whether concepts such as ethnicity and identity actually explain behavior (Martin 1995; Brubaker & Cooper 2000). Does ethnicity shape what people do? Does it, in fact, *matter*? This is partly a response to ambitious postmodern claims about “identity politics,” “hybridity,” and the like. The argument is that words such as “identity” and “ethnicity” have been bandied about so much that they have become analytically meaningless. While it is easy to sympathize with this view, it is an argument for rehabilitating these concepts, not abandoning them.

The debate is also about the relationship between ethnicity and interests (Goldstein & Rayner 1994): is talking about ethnicity an analytical and political smokescreen to obscure the fact that people are, as they have always done, simply pursuing their material interests? We

are back here with Barth's original account of ethnicity as an emergent property of transactions and negotiations. Now, as then, we have to ask whether it is possible easily to disentangle identification from interests. For example, who I am, whether that is defined individually or collectively, will influence how I define what is in my interests and what is against them. From another direction, how other people identify me has some bearing on what they perceive my – and, indeed, often *their* – interests to be. What's more, my pursuit of particular interests may cause me to be identified in particular ways by myself and by others. Finally, how I identify others may have influences on which interests I pursue.

Interests and ethnicity are entwined in each other, not opposing principles of motivation: where ethnic identification is locally salient, one cannot be understood without the other. Locally – and ethnicity is always a local matter – primary socialization, the affective power of symbols, obstinate history, and the consequences of being identified in a particular way by others conspire to ensure that where it matters, ethnicity really matters. Ethnic attachments do not determine the choices that people make, but they cannot be ignored either.

SEE ALSO: Boundaries (Racial/Ethnic); Collective Identity; Ethnic Groups; Ethnocentrism; Identity Politics/Relational Politics; Identity Theory; Imagined Communities; Nationalism; Race; Race and Ethnic Consciousness; Race (Racism)

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ethnocentrism

Stephen E. Brown

Ethnocentrism is a belief that the norms, values, ideology, customs, and traditions of one's own culture or subculture are superior to those characterizing other cultural settings. The term was coined by William Graham Sumner in his *Folkways* (1906) and has long served as a cornerstone in the social analysis of culture. While ethnocentrism arguably is a universal phenomenon that facilitates cohesion and continuity at all levels of social organization, it provides the rationalization for attack on other cultures or subcultures in its more extreme forms. It may, for example, motivate criminalization of practices within subcultures or be used to justify going to war with other nation states. Ethnocentrism is intricately tied to definitions of deviance wherein the deviant is seen as not only different, but also as morally inferior or even evil. Members of the in group stereotype those in the out group as ignorant, bad, or even subhuman and these characterizations provide the basis for culture conflict.

Ethnocentrism falls on a continuum along which the more ethnocentric tend to hold to more absolutist or objectivist moral positions. That is, as ethnocentrism grows stronger, there is more acceptance of the notion that there is a single proper way to behave at all times and places. Conversely, cultural and moral relativism is associated with lesser degrees of ethnocentrism. The relativist views social reaction as playing an important role in defining norms

and deviance. From such an interactionist perspective people absorb the values and norms of their own culture through a process of enculturation. Cultural values are transmitted down through generations as a result of learning experiences within any cultural setting. Acknowledging such culturally specific learning processes serves to undermine harsher judgments of cultural disparities.

While ethnocentrism in its various degrees is considered a universal cultural phenomenon, a rare, but intriguing phenomenon is inverse ethnocentrism, wherein an individual holds a reverse cultural bias. The more usual derogatory stereotyping of other cultures is replaced by a tendency to see characteristics of other cultural milieus as inherently superior to those of one's own culture. Obviously, persons holding such views tend to be at odds with their own cultural environment and are likely defined by others as eccentrics, traitors, or other deviant identities. Another variation of this is the critique that the relativist is not firmly committed to any moral standards or is tolerant of moral abuses occurring in other cultural settings. The classic argument offered to bolster this concern is that complete relativity would withhold condemnation of atrocities such as genocide. Cultural relativism, however, is central to sociological and anthropological analysis, but does not mean that the sociologist cannot apply any moral criteria to the examination of cultures. It only means that one should not blindly apply the values and standards of one culture to another. Practices within a culture should be analyzed within their own cultural context and moral judgment held in abeyance until their meaning is identified.

Sensitivity to ethnocentrism is vital to understanding social relations because it constitutes blinded bias. Thus, ethnocentrism is at the heart of prejudice and discrimination toward out groups. Understanding the dynamics of ethnocentrism is thereby central to analyzing human conflict.

SEE ALSO: Acculturation; Assimilation; Deviance, Absolutist Definitions of; Diversity; Ethnic Groups; Ethnicity; Ethnonationalism; Eurocentrism; Homophobia; Multiculturalism; Race; Race (Racism)

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ethnography

Martyn Hammersley

Literally, ethnography means writing about people, or writing an account of the way of life of a particular people. In early anthropology, what was aimed at was a descriptive account that captured a distinctive culture. Initially, ethnography was contrasted with ethnology, which was concerned with the historical and comparative analysis of cultures based on ethnographic accounts, the latter often being produced by travelers and missionaries. Over time, the term ethnology has fallen out of favor, and ethnography has come to refer to a combination of theoretical interpretation of cultures and firsthand investigation carried out by anthropologists themselves. Moreover, the term has a double meaning, referring both to a form of research and to the product of that research: ethnography as a practice produces ethnographies. And, recently, a distinction has sometimes been drawn between doing ethnography and using ethnographic methods. This has been employed by some anthropologists in an attempt to mark off their own practice from what passes for ethnographic work within sociology and other areas (Wolcott 1999).

For most anthropologists in the past, ethnography required living with a group of people for an extended period, for a year or several years, in order to document their distinctive way of life and the beliefs and values integral to it. However, the term is used in a much looser way within sociology today, to refer to

studies that rely on participant observation and/or in depth, relatively unstructured interviews. As a result, there is considerable overlap in meaning with other concepts, these also often being ambiguous or having fuzzy boundaries, such as “qualitative research,” “fieldwork,” “interpretive method,” and “case study.” There is also no firm distinction between ethnography and the study of individual life histories, as the example of “autoethnography” shows, this term referring to an individual researcher’s study of his or her own life and context.

In practical terms, as a method, ethnography usually involves most of the following features:

- People’s actions and accounts are studied primarily in everyday contexts rather than under conditions created by the researcher, such as in experiments or highly structured interview situations. In other words, research takes place “in the field.”
- Data are gathered from a range of sources, including documentary evidence, but participant observation and/or relatively informal conversations are usually the main ones.
- Data collection is “unstructured” in the sense that it does not involve following through a fixed and detailed research design set up at the beginning. Nor are the categories that will be used for interpreting what people say or do built into the data collection process itself via prestructuring of observation, interviews, or documentary analysis.
- The focus is usually on a small number of cases, perhaps a single setting or group of people, typically small scale, with these being studied in depth.
- The analysis of the data involves interpretation of the meanings and functions of human actions and how these are implicated in local and wider contexts. What are produced, for the most part, are verbal descriptions, explanations, and theories; quantification and statistical analysis play a subordinate role at most.

As a set of methods, ethnography is not far removed from the means that we all use

in everyday life to make sense of our surroundings. However, it involves a more deliberate and systematic approach and, also, a distinctive mentality. This can perhaps best be summarized as seeking to make the strange familiar, in the sense of finding intelligibility and rationality within it, and making the familiar strange, by suspending those background assumptions that immediately give apparent sense to what we experience (Hammersley & Atkinson 1995).

Over the course of its development, ethnography has been influenced by a range of methodological and theoretical movements. Early on, within anthropology, it was shaped by German ideas about the distinctive character of history and the human sciences, by folk psychology, and by positivism. Subsequently, in the form of the case study approach of the Chicago School, it was also influenced by philosophical pragmatism, while in more recent times Marxism, phenomenology, hermeneutics, structuralism, and poststructuralism have all played an important role.

While these influences have led to a diversification in approach, ethnography still tends to be characterized by a number of distinctive methodological ideas about the nature of the social world and how it can be understood. As we shall see, these ideas overlap in their implications, but also conflict in some respects. To one degree or another, ethnographers tend to make the following assumptions about the nature of the social world:

- Human behavior is not an automatic product of either internal or external stimuli. Responses to the world are constructed and reconstructed over time and across space in ways that reflect the biographies and socio-cultural locations of actors, and how they interpret the situations they face.
- There are diverse cultures that can inform human behavior, and these operate not just between societies or local communities but also within them; and perhaps even within individual actors.
- Human social life is not structured in terms of fixed, law like patterns, but displays emergent processes of various kinds that involve a high degree of contingency.

In recent times, there has been significant dispute over the character of the phenomena that ethnographers study. We can formulate this as a tension between naturalism and constructionism. The first takes the task of ethnography to be documenting stable cultures, patterns of social interaction, institutions, and so on, as they exist in the world independently of the researcher. By contrast, constructionism is concerned with the interactional or discursive processes whereby cultures, institutions, etc. are continuously and contingently produced and sustained. In line with this, constructionists do not use informants' accounts as a source of information about the world, or even about informants' own experience, but rather study them as exemplifying discursive practices, narrative strategies, or distinctive voices. Moreover, in its more radical forms constructionism treats the social phenomena studied by ethnographers as effectively constituted in and through the research process itself, and especially through the process of writing (Clifford & Marcus 1986).

These assumptions about the nature of the social world are closely linked with ideas about how we can understand it. And here too significant tensions come to the surface. One of these is between a focus on the details of what happens in particular contexts on particular occasions, and a concern to locate what has been studied within the context of some larger whole, or even to use it to show what is happening within that larger whole. Over the past few decades there has been a trend towards more micro focused ethnographies, perhaps stimulated by the availability of highly portable audio and video recording equipment which generate large amounts of data, and also by the rise of discourse analysis. By contrast, in the past, under the influence of functionalism and Marxism, there was emphasis on locating what is studied in a wider context, where the unit of analysis was usually taken to be a particular community or society. More recently there have been calls for ethnographies to take account of global social forces. Parallel to this have been criticisms of much ethnography for being preoccupied with describing and explaining what happens in relatively short time periods, thereby neglecting longer term trends. One response to this has been to advocate

longitudinal ethnographies, for example following the development of a group of people's lives over several years and focusing on the patterns of change experienced. Also relevant here are attempts to link ethnographic with historical work.

A second tension is between seeking to study cases in all their uniqueness or being concerned with producing generalizations or engaging in comparative analysis to build theories. Ethnographers vary considerably in their position on this spectrum, but most seek to satisfy all these demands in one way or another. The concept of thick description represents one sort of trade off, where theories are relatively low level and are means for understanding what is going on in particular cases. Towards the other end of the spectrum are grounded theorizing and analytic induction, where the product of ethnographic work is some kind of general theory, albeit instantiated in detailed analysis of particular cases.

A third issue concerns whether the primary task is seen as explicating the perspectives, or cultural orientations, of the people being studied, or as explaining why they see the world and act in the ways that they do, and the consequences of this. The first approach emphasizes the role of careful description, of understanding what people say and do in its own terms; whereas the second often produces accounts that raise questions about the validity of people's beliefs about themselves and their world. This may involve explaining why people believe what they believe and do what they do in terms of causal factors whose existence or significance they do not acknowledge or even explicitly deny. Indeed, there may be a hermeneutics of suspicion in operation which assumes that what people say hides as much as it reveals. There is variation here in the extent to which an aim is to challenge official appearances, or the fronts people display, in order to find out what they really believe or what really goes on; or whether social life is viewed as inevitably a matter of performative fronts, with the task of analysis being to study the processes or strategies by which people bring off particular performances on particular occasions.

Even for those ethnographers who place emphasis on understanding insider perspectives, there are questions about how far it is

ever possible or necessary for ethnographers to understand participants' perspectives "from the inside." It has been suggested that this involves reducing the Other to the Same, forcing what is different into terms that are familiar. At the same time, ethnography has also sometimes been accused of "othering," of rendering other societies exotic and alien, a criticism that parallels Said's discussion of "orientalism" (Said 1978). Closely related are criticisms of the totalizing orientation of much older ethnography, where cultures are described as if they were objects in the world, and as if membership of a culture determined everything of importance about any individual person.

In its early forms, ethnography involved a concern to capture the beliefs and actions of the people being studied in such a way as to minimize the effects of the research process. As a result, ethnography was usually distanced from concerns with practical improvement, and therefore adopted a non judgmental or appreciative orientation (Matza 1969). However, in the mid twentieth century there developed forms of applied anthropology that treated ethnography as a basis for interventions designed to improve the lives of the people being studied. And, later, some ethnographers adopted Marxist or "critical" perspectives in which the phenomena studied were to be located within a political perspective generating evaluations and recommendations for social change. The influence of feminism and anti racism reinforced this tendency, while that of poststructuralism and postmodernism challenged reliance on political positions involving metanarratives in favor of subordinating ethnographic work to local struggles, with one of its tasks being seen as liberating those repressed forms of knowledge to be found on the margins of conventional society.

Closely associated with these developments have been pressures to do ethnographic work *with* people rather than *on* them, in the manner of various participatory forms of inquiry. In some cases this built on a commitment to advocacy by anthropologists and on the notion of indigenous ethnography, while within sociology it derived from feminist and other approaches to research ethics which challenged what was seen as the hierarchical relationship between

researcher and researched. However, there is a tension here not only with older approaches to ethnography but also between subordinating research to participants' orientations and using it as a means of raising their consciousness, in the form of a "critical" orientation designed to generate desirable social change.

There has also been increasing pressure to recognize the extent to which and ways in which all research, including ethnography, plays a political role in the world. To some degree this began long ago with criticism of how anthropological ethnography was implicated in western imperialism. In more recent times the concern with the politics of ethnography has become much broader, reflecting the influence of new social movements of various kinds. On the part of some commentators what is at stake is not simply how research might be distorted by its social context, or even the consequences that it could have, but rather how the whole enterprise of research is political through and through, in the sense that it cannot but involve reliance on value assumptions, and that these cannot but reflect the identity, commitments, and social location of the researcher as a person. This runs against earlier forms of ethnography where research was treated as concerned simply with producing objective scientific knowledge about diverse cultures, an orientation that is now regarded by many, though not all, ethnographers as simply an ideological disguise for political interests that serve the status quo.

As indicated earlier, ethnography refers not just to a process of inquiry but also to a particular type of product: to the written account generated by ethnographic research. Prior to the early 1980s the task of "writing up" ethnographies was given relatively little attention in the methodological literature. Most of the focus was on problems surrounding data collecting and analysis. However, in the last three decades there has been considerable interest in this topic, not just from a practical point of view but also in terms of analyzing how ethnographic accounts represent or effectively constitute the social contexts and people investigated. Epistemological, political, and ethical concerns are intermingled in what has come to be seen as a "crisis of representation."

Developments in technology have also had an important impact on ethnographic work over the past few decades. In particular, the availability of easily portable audio and video recorders has meant that fieldnotes have come to play a subordinate role in much ethnographic work, and as noted earlier it may have encouraged an increasingly micro focus concerned with the details of what is said and done on particular occasions. Furthermore, video recording has built on earlier developments in visual ethnography that employed photographs and film. The development of microcomputers and of software for processing qualitative data is another important area of development, one where there is disagreement about whether the technology serves or distorts ethnographic practice. What seems clear, though, is that digitization of data and the increased capacity of computers to handle multimedia material will open up considerable opportunities for ethnographers, as well as no doubt also raising new problems, or old problems in novel forms. Closely related here is the development of the Internet and the opportunities that this provides, not just as a source of information but as a collection of virtual sites that can be studied by ethnographers (Hine 2000).

Finally, it is worth mentioning a significant feature of the changing environments in which ethnographers seek to carry out their work. Both anthropologists and sociologists have encountered increasing barriers in gaining access to settings in many societies. These stem from a variety of factors, among which are increasing governmental control, commercialization, and forms of regulation within both privately owned and publicly funded organizations. Another important external factor is increasing ethical regulation, notably in the field of health, but also more widely for research sponsored within universities. The ethical codes on which this is based often assume a model of research that is at odds with both the theory and practice of ethnography.

SEE ALSO: Autoethnography; Chicago School; Constructionism; Culture; Ethics, Fieldwork; Ethics, Research; Interviewing, Structured, Unstructured, and Postmodern; Observation, Participant and Non Participant; Performance Ethnography

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ethnomethodology

Douglas W. Maynard and Teddy Elizabeth Weathersbee

Ethnomethodology is an area in sociology originating in the work of Harold Garfinkel. It represents an effort to study the methods in and through which members concertedly produce and assemble the features of everyday life in any actual, concrete, and not hypothetical or theoretically depicted setting. Ethnomethodology's proposal – one that is incommensurate with respect to other sociological theory (Garfinkel 1988) – is that there is a self-generating order in concrete activities, an order whose scientific appreciation depends upon neither prior description, nor empirical generalization, nor formal specification of variable elements and their analytic relations. Moreover, raw experience – the booming buzz of William James – is anything but chaotic, for the concrete activities of which it is composed are coeval with an intelligible organization that actors already provide and that is therefore available for scientific analysis. Members of society achieve this intelligible organization through actual, coordinated, concerted, procedural behaviors or *methods* and *practices*.

Garfinkel was a student in Harvard's Department of Social Relations where he went to study with Talcott Parsons, although Garfinkel's developing concerns with the empirical detail of ordinary life and activity came to be at odds with Parsons's emphasis

on conceptual formulation and theoretical generalization. While at Harvard, Garfinkel deepened his knowledge of phenomenology – an interest that had been sparked at the University of North Carolina where he had completed a master’s degree – by meeting with Alfred Schütz and Aron Gurwitsch, who were both European “philosophers in exile” at the New School for Social Research. There is a strong influence of phenomenology on ethnomethodology, but Garfinkel deemphasized perceptual knowledge as a mental process or activity in favor of a concern with embodied activity and the practical production of social facts as that production resides in lived experience, whether that experience involves rhythmic clapping, responding to a “summoning” phone, traveling in a freeway traffic wave, standing in a service line, or any other ordinary matter.

After finishing his degree at Harvard and a short stint at Ohio State University, Garfinkel moved to Kansas where Harvard classmate Fred Strodtbeck invited him to help with a project on jury decision making. While working on how jurors, in their deliberations, struggle with issues of evidence, demonstration, relevance, facts versus opinion, and other “methodological” matters, Garfinkel turned to the Yale cross cultural area files and came upon terms such as ethnobotany, ethnophysiology, ethnophysics, and others. It was then he realized that *methodology* was something jurors were producing as a prominent and serious feature of their deliberations. Hence, Garfinkel coined “ethnomethodology” (see Garfinkel 1974) to refer to the study of how members of the jury engage in practices whereby they could decide indigenous problems of adequate accountability, description, and evidence in relation to the deliberative outcomes they produced.

In the fall of 1954 Garfinkel joined the faculty at UCLA. While there, he trained several generations of students and produced his most well known work, *Studies in Ethnomethodology* (Garfinkel 1967). To obtain access to members’ methods in a variety of settings, Garfinkel introduced his famous “breaching experiments,” which reversed the usual sociological preoccupation with factors that contribute to social stability. Breaching involves asking what can be done to make for trouble

in everyday events, and demonstrates that troublesome events are themselves revelatory of the ordinary practices whereby stability is achieved.

A tic tac toe exercise, for example, involves the experimenter inviting a participant to play. After the participant starts the game by placing an “X” in a square formed by the tic tac toe matrix, the experimenter puts an “O” on a line of the game matrix rather than in a square. The trouble thereby created brings members’ methods to the fore as sources of order. These methods are manifest in the restorative or reparative efforts of participants. When a participant protests to the experimenter, “Is this a joke?” it shows that an ordinary game is to be engaged seriously and by respecting common sense practices for placing Os and Xs. The practices of common sense are employed not by following rules of the game but by behaving in ways that are retrospectively consistent with those rules. In other words, behavior is to be accountable to rules and this means engaging in concrete and embodied practices that are orderly in their own right and are not explained or provided for in the rules that these practices make visible.

However, Garfinkel also went beyond experimental breaches to examine more naturally occurring disruptions to everyday life. In his influential *Studies* chapter on Agnes, a male to female transsexual, he set the agenda and tone for many subsequent investigations into the accomplishment of “gender.” Garfinkel’s extensive interviews and observations concerning Agnes provide access to something that is utterly routine in everyday life: the achievement of one’s visible and objective status as a man or woman, boy or girl. Because Agnes did not experience her gender visibility as routine or taken for granted, Garfinkel was able to document how members regularly employ tacit means for securing and guaranteeing the rights and obligations attendant upon being seen as a normal, natural, adult female. Agnes was a “practical methodologist” and artfully displayed what is required of anyone who claims to be a bona fide woman.

Garfinkel notes that he initially attempted to use a game metaphor in order to comprehend the various occasions in which Agnes had to “pass” or come across as the normal female

person. But he realized that Agnes's passing eluded attempts to reduce it to playing a game by the rules. There are, he argued, various "structural incongruities" between playing a game and sexual passing. Unlike a game, to pass as a member of a particular gender has no "time outs," no exits from the work of passing, and only limited capacity for planning one's strategies for passing because of the ubiquity of unanticipated happenings. Agnes could not be a strategic actor in the way that sociologist Erving Goffman portrays the matter, because she could never know in advance exactly what would be required of her for displaying herself as the natural female in any given interaction. She was learning what it took to be a woman even as she acted as if she were non problematically a woman in the first place.

In 1959, while on sabbatical from UCLA, Garfinkel met Harvey Sacks, who was pursuing his law degree at Yale but would eventually move to the department of sociology at Berkeley for graduate work. Sacks remained in touch with Garfinkel, who brought him to Los Angeles in 1963. Sacks's lectures and thinking formed the beginning of what would become the field of conversation analysis. Mutual influences between Garfinkel and Sacks are of considerable interest. Their collaborative endeavors are partially embodied in a joint publication, "On Formal Structures of Practical Actions" (Garfinkel & Sacks 1970), where they argue that sociological reasoning has often aimed to distinguish between "indexical" expressions, whose sense derives from their relation to aspects of the immediate context in which they are used, and objective expressions, whose sense is purportedly context free. Garfinkel and Sacks argue that the quest for objective expressions is endless, because such expressions always depend upon an orderliness that necessarily ties them to the situation of their use. Accordingly, Garfinkel and Sacks recommend a policy of "ethnomethodological indifference," whereby investigators abstain from judging the status of objective expressions in terms of their adequacy, value, or consequentiality. Instead, the orderliness of any and all human expressions – the practical means by which those expressions attain their sense – is to be brought under study. The orderliness that

Sacks and collaborators in conversation analysis began to pursue was the sequential organization of everyday talk and interaction, although there is also a stream of conversation analytic work on "membership categories" as devices that are deployed for purposes of making interactional sense.

Meanwhile, Garfinkel's own interests developed in the direction of scientific and work practice, and his contributions have been taken up in sociological studies of technology and science. In the 1980s, Garfinkel and his students turned to the examination of technical competencies in mathematics and the natural sciences, including astronomy (Garfinkel et al. 1981) and other domains. These studies probe the details of "shop work and shop talk" that form the tangible fabric of scientific practice. There is always "something more" to methodological practice than can be provided in highly detailed instructions, formalized guidelines, or accounts of inquiry. The "something more" includes routine practices at the workbench in laboratories and other settings of work. Indeed, lately Garfinkel (2002) has become preoccupied with what he calls the "shop floor problem," having to do with how generic descriptions of work settings, which attempt to specify the constituents of practice within those settings, confront "details in structures" or coherences in embodied practices that cannot be anticipated by, and utterly defy, the generic descriptions.

In his recent book, Garfinkel (2002) makes more explicit the central claim of ethnomethodology – namely, that it is in the business of working out Durkheim's aphorism, "the objective reality of social facts is sociology's fundamental phenomenon." Rather than claiming that order can only be revealed by aggregating across large sets of data and replacing the concrete, observable detail of "immortal ordinary society" with concepts, ethnomethodology claims that there is a plenitude of order that is lost to the formal analytic theorizing as it exists in the field of sociology and elsewhere in the human sciences. Indeed, ethnomethodology "respecifies" Durkheim's aphorism in a way that formal analytic techniques do not and in fact cannot. Garfinkel is careful here to emphasize that ethnomethodology is not proposing itself as an alternative to formal analysis as if

it were possible to escape from the search for objective expressions by engaging in a more interpretive endeavor. Rather, ethnomethodology proposes *alternates* that are not only coeval but also autochthonous, i.e., grounded practices that spring up and exist alongside formal analytic inquiries. The ethnomethodological alternate is, however, asymmetrical to formal analytic theorizing, meaning that ethnomethodology – but not formal analysis – makes it possible to investigate how members of any grouping achieve, as practical, concerted behaviors, the sense of formal truth and objectivity as this sense is necessarily embedded in their everyday casual and work lives.

SEE ALSO: Conversation Analysis; Information Technology; Language; Phenomenology; Sacks, Harvey; Schütz, Alfred; Science and Culture; Social Psychology; Theory

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ethnonationalism

Walker Connor

Ethnonationalism (variant: *ethnic nationalism*) connotes identity with and loyalty to a nation in the sense of a human grouping predicated upon a myth of common ancestry. Seldom will the myth find support in scientific evidence. DNA analyses of the patrilineally bequeathed Y chromosome attest that nations tend to be neither genetically homogeneous nor hermetical, and analyses of the matrilineally bequeathed mitochondrial DNA customarily attest to still greater heterogeneity and transnational genetic sharing. However, the popularly held conviction that one's nation is ethnically pure and distinct is intuitive rather than rational in its wellsprings and, as such, is capable of defying scientific and historic evidence to the contrary.

Ethnonationalism is often contrasted with a so called *civic nationalism*, by which is meant identity with and loyalty to the state. (Until quite recently the latter was conventionally referred to as *patriotism*.) The practice of referring to civic consciousness and civic loyalty as a form of nationalism has spawned great confusion in the literature. Rather than representing variations of the same phenomenon, the two loyalties are of two different orders of things (ethnic versus civic), and while in the case of a people clearly dominant within a state (such as the ethnically Turkish or Castilian peoples) the two loyalties may reinforce each other, in the case of ethnonational minorities (such as the Kurds of Turkey or the Basques of Spain) the two identities may clash. World political history since the Napoleonic Wars has been increasingly a tale of tension between the two loyalties, each possessing its own irrefragable and exclusive claim to political legitimacy.

The concept of political legitimacy inherent in ethnonationalism rests upon the tendency of people living within their homeland to resent and resist rule by those perceived as aliens. Evolutionary biologists classify xenophobia as a universal which has been detected on the part of all societies studied thus far (Brown 1991). Butressing this finding of universality are the histories of multi ethnic empires – both ancient and modern – which are sprinkled with ethnically inspired insurrections. The modern state system has proven even more vulnerable. In the 130 year period separating the Napoleonic Wars from the end of World War II, all but three of Europe's states had either lost extensive territory and population because of ethnonational movements or were themselves the product of such a movement. Ethnonationalism's challenge to the multinational state continued to accelerate during the late twentieth century, culminating in the dissolution of the Soviet Union and Yugoslavia.

During the course of its development, the equating of alien rule with illegitimate rule came to be called *national self determination*, a phrase probably coined by Karl Marx and subsequently frequently employed by the First and Second Internationals. Two points are worth noting. (1) The phrase only gave name to a force present throughout history; it did not create it. Marx was no proponent of national self determination, but he had come to recognize its influence and the wisdom of appearing to ally with it as a means of fostering the proletarian revolution. (2) Although national self determination is often described as a principle or a doctrine, the impulse underlying it is far more universal and deeply felt than either term conveys.

National self determination holds that any group of people, simply because it considers itself to be a separate nation (in the pristine sense of a people who believe themselves to be ancestrally related), has an inalienable right to determine its political affiliations, including, *if it so desires*, the right to its own state. *If it so desires* is a key consideration. The essence of self determination is choice, not result. The Soviet Union on the eve of its decomposition offers a number of illustrations of ethnonational groups opting for separation: a poll conducted in October 1990, for example, indicated that

91 percent of the Baltic nations (Estonians, Letts, and Lithuanians) and 92 percent of all Georgians favored secession. Similarly, in September 1999, 78.5 percent of those East Timorese who risked death to vote, voted for independence from Indonesia. On the other hand, in the overwhelming number of cases for which there are attitudinal polling data, a majority – usually a substantial majority – of homeland dwelling people are prepared to settle for something less than independence. However, the attitudinal data also show that a substantial majority of each of these same homeland dwelling people do desire alterations in their state's power structure, alterations which would result in greater autonomy. The minimal changes that will satisfy the ethnonational aspirations of those individuals desiring greater autonomy can vary across a broad spectrum from homeland primacy in policymaking over matters involving education and language to everything short of full independence. But when aspirations for greater autonomy are denied, the appeal of separate statehood strengthens.

The willingness of nationally conscious homeland dwelling people to remain within a state in which they are a minority if they are granted sufficient autonomy should not be viewed as a renunciation of their right of self determination. Autonomy has the potential for satisfying the principal aspirations of the group. Devolution – the decentralization of political decision making – has the potential for elevating a national group to the status of master in their own homeland. As reflected in their chief slogan – *Maitre Chez Nous* – the Québécois feel that within the homeland of Québec they must have ultimate power of decision making over those matters most affecting ethnonational sensibilities and nation maintenance. Such power within the homeland may be quite enough to appease the self determination impulse. Ethnonational aspirations, by their very nature, are driven more by the dream of *freedom from* – freedom from domination by outsiders – than by *freedom to* – freedom to conduct relations with states. Ethnocracy need not presume political independence, but it must minimally presume *meaningful* autonomy.

Growing acknowledgment by the central governments that the national self determination impulse can perhaps be accommodated within a

sufficiently decentralized multinational structure is becoming increasingly manifest. Whereas the tendency prior to the very late twentieth century was toward the ever greater concentration of decision making power in the center, evidence of a possible countertrend is now present. Belgium, Canada, Italy, Spain, and the United Kingdom are examples of well established states with a tradition of centralized control that have transferred significant powers from the center to ethnic homelands in order to assuage ethnonational resentments. But while perhaps portentous, such cases are still exceptional. The central authorities of most multi homeland states have tended to perceive any significant increase in autonomy as tantamount to, or an important step toward, secession. As a result, the challenge of ethnonationalism to the territorial integrity of states continues to spread.

SEE ALSO: Ethnic Groups; Ethnicity; Nation State; Nation State and Nationalism; Nationalism; Race and Ethnic Politics; Self Determination

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eugenics

Gabriele Abels

The term eugenics is derived from the Greek *eugenes* (“good in birth” or “noble in hereditry”). Eugenics refers to a set of ideas and activities aiming to improve the quality of the human race by deliberate selection of parents

and their offspring. In contrast to Social Darwinism, which applies categories of evolutionary biology (survival of the fittest) to the social world, the key feature of eugenics is *deliberate* selection of the “genetically fit” and corresponding active policies. Eugenics relies on two strategies: (1) manipulation of heredity or breeding practices in order to produce “genetically superior” or “fit” people (“positive” eugenics), and (2) extermination of those considered “genetically inferior” (“negative” eugenics).

The history of eugenics goes back to ancient Greece (Kevles 1985). For example, Plato proposed the idea of “breeding better people” and government control over human reproduction. Sir Francis Galton (1822–1911), an English anthropologist and cousin of Charles Darwin, founded modern eugenics and coined the term in 1883. He defined eugenics as “the science which deals with all influences that improve the inborn qualities of a race; also with those that develop them to the utmost advantage.” According to him, the social status of Britain’s ruling class was determined by inherited leadership qualities. He advocated improving the human race in the manner of plant and animal breeding.

Eugenics is based, firstly, on the development of genetics as a scientific discipline in the late nineteenth century and, secondly, on new concepts of social planning and rational management. The social context is the development of industrial society, which went along with urbanization, the growth of a poor “working class,” and also the rise of the labor movement and socialist political parties. Eugenic “science” was considered by its proponents to be the application of human genetic knowledge to social problems such as pauperism, alcoholism, criminality, violence, prostitution, mental illness, etc. Such problems were thought to have biological roots based in people’s defective genetic make up and biological “solutions” were proposed. Thus, the early concept of eugenics had a strong class and racial bias.

In the early twentieth century eugenics became a social movement first in Great Britain and then in the US, as well as in many other (European) Protestant countries. The First International Congress of Eugenics was held

in London in 1912. In the 1920s and 1930s eugenics became part of popular culture. Eugenic societies organized public information campaigns using eugenic exhibits, educational movies, “fitter family contests,” etc. and eugenics was widely taught in schools and at universities. Influential biologists such as Hermann J. Muller, Aldous Huxley, and Charles B. Davenport advocated eugenics.

Concurrently, eugenics entered public policy and found support from across the political spectrum, ranging from conservatives (e.g., Rockefeller Foundation) to progressives (e.g., Civil Rights activist W. E. B. Du Bois and feminist and founder of Planned Parenthood, Margaret Sanger) and leftists (e.g., social democratic parties and the social author H. G. Wells). While there was agreement on some eugenic principles (e.g., biological foundation of social problems), there was, however, disagreement about policies, means, and political aims (e.g., the role of coercion; social change). Many countries introduced eugenically motivated sterilization laws or laws requiring premarital screening for genetic or mental illnesses. The first such law was adopted in 1896 in Connecticut, USA; it prohibited the marriage of “feeble minded” persons and was later enforced by compulsory sterilization. Similar laws to sterilize not only the mentally ill, but also epileptics or criminals were adopted up to 1917 in 15 US states. After World War I, eugenic sterilization laws were also introduced in many European countries. Some were still in effect into the 1970s (e.g., Sweden and Canada), while in the US compulsory sterilizations came to an end in the 1960s. In general, European eugenicists were preoccupied with class issues, while the focus of eugenic policies in the US was on racial and ethnic minorities. For example, the Racial Integrity Act and also the 1924 US Immigration Act were informed by eugenic ideas.

The largest and most radical eugenic movement was German Fascism. In the 1920s the Nazi concept of “racial hygiene” was associated with eugenics (Weingart et al. 1988). Immediately after Hitler’s rise to power in 1933, the Law for the Prevention of Defective Progeny was adopted and put into force. Until 1945 about 360,000 compulsory sterilizations were conducted. In addition, tens of thousands of people belonging to minority groups considered

“not worth living” (*lebensunwert*) – such as Romanies and Sinti, disabled and mentally retarded persons, and homosexuals – were killed in a policy called euthanasia or mercy killing. By referring to eugenic arguments, the Nazi “selection and eradication” program claimed to have a scientific basis – a reasoning later used by the Nazi defendants in the Nuremberg trials. This program of the extermination of minority groups can be regarded as an ideological and practical bridge to the genocide against the Jewish population, the Holocaust. In addition to coercive “negative” eugenics, the Nazis also implemented policies of – coercive as well as voluntary – “positive” eugenics aiming at the breeding of “Aryans.” Examples are the introduction of rewards for “Aryan” mothers with large numbers of children (*Mutterkreuz*), a program for impregnating “racially pure” single women by SS officers (*Lebensborn*), and the prohibition of abortion for “Aryan” women.

Eugenic policies were justified on grounds of societal or state interests: those deemed “genetically unfit” were stigmatized as an *economic* and *moral* burden. The Nazis also referred to genetic damage to the healthy *Volkskörper* (the nation’s body). Eugenics became discredited after World War II, firstly on political grounds because it was associated with Nazi politics; and secondly, scientists started to question the scientific foundation of the “old” eugenics. However, some “reform eugenicists” (Kevles 1985) such as Muller, Huxley, and J. B. S. Haldane proposed developing sound scientific human genetics free of any racial and class bias; many eugenicists became highly respected scientists in related disciplines. With new discoveries (e.g., the double helix structure in 1953) and the rise of molecular biology, human genetics was slowly “freed” from its eugenic heritage. Yet some scholars argue that there are not only continuities among the promoters of eugenics and human genetics as a scientific discipline, but also ideological continuities. A prominent example is the 1962 CIBA Symposium “Man and his Future.” Twenty seven well known geneticists and molecular biologists (e.g., Huxley, Haldane, Muller, Joshua Lederberg) met in London to discuss their visions for human genetic manipulation and enhancement.

Historically, eugenics has been part of an oppressive and discriminatory ideology; it was

defended on societal interests and often mandated by the state. Critics believe that this is part of the very nature of eugenics. However, since the 1980s a public debate has begun on whether or not there has been a rise of a “new” eugenics and how to assess the development normatively. There is agreement that the justification of eugenic policies has changed over time. Modern eugenics is based on the notion of individual rights instead of societal interests; it is not the state that decides on selection criteria, but individuals themselves. State neutrality distinguishes the old from a “new” or “liberal” eugenics. It is freed of its classist bias, yet not totally of its racist or ethnic bias (cf. the “bell curve” debate).

This debate developed against the background of technological progress in the field of human genetics and genetic engineering. A major application of human genetics is prenatal diagnosis, which identifies the genetic status of the unborn. If the embryo or fetus has a genetic or biological “defect,” the only alternatives usually available are carrying it to term or aborting. Sometimes abortion laws allow for (late term) abortions based on embryopathic or eugenic reasons (i.e., the fetus is diagnosed as potentially disabled). This practice is criticized especially by anti abortion activists and also by (some fractions of) the disability rights movement as a threat to their “right to life.” A recent additional technology is preimplantation genetic diagnosis (PGD) on the early *in vitro* embryo. In case of a “defect,” the embryo is not used in the follow up IVF procedure, but discarded. PGD allows for the selection of embryos not only for therapeutic, but also for eugenic reasons. With the advent of “reprogenetics” (i.e., the linking of genetic engineering with new reproductive technologies), “designer babies” via genetic manipulation or even human enhancement via germ line engineering, exchanging genes, or adding new ones, now seem possible. Once again, eugenics and genetic manipulation have reappeared in popular culture; in particular, the genre of science fiction has taken up genetic engineering.

Two arguments have been raised against human genetic engineering: firstly on technological grounds (i.e., the techniques are not (yet) safe), and secondly on the basis of ethics. While the first of these may be overcome in time, the

second one is a matter of principle. Philosophers and bioethicists have begun to debate the ethics of eugenics and human genetic engineering. Some distinguished scientists involved in the Human Genome Project, for example, have announced their support for voluntary eugenics. Proponents of eugenic practices that rely on genetic manipulation are labeled liberal eugenicists. Fletcher (1974) laid the groundwork for liberal eugenics; he proposed active family planning via deliberate genetic control instead of the natural “reproductive roulette.” Since the 1990s, proponents of liberal eugenics (e.g., Agar 2004) argue in favor of individual choices: parents should have the right to choose if they want to enhance the genetic traits of their offspring as part of their parental authority (e.g., by choosing egg and sperm or direct manipulation), at least as long as the eugenic freedom of parents does not collide with the personal freedom of children. They criticize the distinction between genetic and social (i.e., educational) modification (e.g., dietary improvement, use of non medical drugs, or cultivating the child’s talents) as incoherent, and they speak out against a remoralizing of human nature. A further voice promoting human selection and enhancement is the transhumanism movement (e.g., Hughes 2004), a philosophy that is in favor of improving the human condition by the use of science and technology such as genetic engineering.

Some utilitarian bioethicists are proponents of extending selection practices to newborns, thereby linking eugenics to euthanasia. The most prominent examples are the Australian philosophers Peter Singer and Helga Kuhse, who argue for the euthanasia of severely mentally retarded newborns (infanticide) by excluding them from medical treatment. They argue that those newborns lack substantial qualities of personhood such as self awareness. “Letting them die” would on the whole maximize happiness for the parents.

Anti eugenicists and critics of liberal eugenics (e.g., Jonas 1985; Fukuyama 2002; Habermas 2003) are overall in favor of therapeutic options of biomedical technologies, but oppose any form of enhancement. Furthermore, they argue that the therapeutic/eugenic distinction is not clear cut. They fear that allowing new technological options for genetic

engineering opens a “backdoor to eugenics” (Duster 1990) or inevitably leads to a slippery slope of unethical measures. They also criticize the economic approach to procreative behavior. The new eugenics is “privatized” and takes the “free market” route: “old eugenics meets the new consumerism” (Michael J. Sandel). Therefore, many critics argue in favor of absolute moral limits. They also argue against an instrumental and utilitarian perspective on human life, which is more ubiquitous in Anglo American bioethics. Their key argument, usually based on Kant’s post metaphysical categorical imperative, is that genetic manipulation, enhancement, and human cloning are a violation of human dignity and rights, and, as some claim, also of human nature. Habermas, for example, opines that all enhancements, even if they are favorable ones such as musical talent or athletic prowess, can violate children’s right to choose their own lives, thereby constituting an encroachment upon their autonomy.

Many countries have started the legal regulation of genetic engineering and its application to humans; profiting from medical progress while avoiding eugenics is a prominent theme. Also, international (e.g., UN) and European (e.g., Council of Europe) regulation has only just begun. The “old” eugenics is well researched. The future development of eugenics and its normative assessment depend on the dynamic interlinkage between technological and social change. Therefore, research on modern eugenics has to link social studies of science and technology to normative bioethical debates.

SEE ALSO: Abortion as a Social Problem; Disability as a Social Problem; Euthanasia; Family Planning, Abortion, and Reproductive Health; Fascism; Genetic Engineering as a Social Problem; Human Genome and the Science of Life; Marriage, Sex, and Childbirth; New Reproductive Technologies

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Eurocentrism

Syed Farid Alatas

Eurocentrism is a particular case of the more general phenomenon of ethnocentrism. Ethnocentrism refers to the regard of one’s own ethnic group or society as superior to others. Other groups are assessed and judged in terms of the categories and standards of evaluation of one’s own group. Eurocentrism, therefore, is defined as a thought style in which the assessment and evaluation of non European societies is couched in terms of the cultural assumptions and biases of Europeans and, by extension, the West. Eurocentrism is a modern phenomenon and cannot be dissociated from the political, economic, and cultural domination of Europe and, later, the United States. It may be more accurate to refer to the phenomenon under consideration as Euroamericentrism. Eurocentrism is an important dimension of the ideology of modern capitalism (Amin 1989) and is manifested in both the daily life of lay people and the professional lives and thought of sociologists and other social scientists. Furthermore, although Eurocentrism originates in Europe, as a thought style it is not confined to Europeans or those in the West.

Eurocentrism in sociology is defined as the assessment and evaluation of European and other societies from a decidedly European (read also American) point of view. The European point of view is founded on concepts derived from European philosophical traditions and popular discourse which were gradually applied to the empirical study of history, economy, and society, giving rise to the various social science disciplines including sociology. The empirical field of investigation is selected according to European criteria of relevance. Constructions of history and society are based on European derived categories and concepts, as well as ideal and material interests. Generally, the point of view of the Other is not presented (Tibawi 1963: 191, 196; Tibawi 1979: 5, 13, 16–17).

There was concern with the phenomenon of Eurocentrism before the term itself came into usage in the nineteenth century among thinkers living in colonial societies. The Muslim thinker and reformer Sayyid Jamal al Din al Afghani (1838/9–1897) debated against western constructions of Islam and was conscious of the need to appropriate relevant western ideas without blindly imitating the West. Among the earliest of thinkers to critique Eurocentric perspectives was the Filipino José Rizal (1861–96), who attempted revisions of Filipino history from a Filipino point of view via his annotation of Antonio de Morga's history of the Philippines (Morga 1962 [1890]). The first sociologist to critique the dominance of Eurocentric constructions was probably the Indian Benoy Kumar Sarkar (1887–1949), who wrote against the prevailing Indology of his time, noting its one sided emphasis on the idealistic, mystical, and metaphysical aspects of Hinduism (Sarkar 1985 [1937]). One of the first among the Dutch in particular, and Europeans in general, to raise the problem of Eurocentrism in the social sciences was Jacob Cornelis van Leur (1937, 1940). He was critical of Eurocentric tendencies in Dutch scholarship on the Netherlands Indies and is well known for his critique of perspectives arrived at from “the deck of the ship, the ramparts of the fortress, the high gallery of the trading house” (1955: 261). For example, he questioned the appropriateness of the eighteenth century as a category in the history of the Netherlands Indies, as it was a category borrowed from western history (1940).

Van Leur, nevertheless, was himself Eurocentric in several of his pronouncements and remarks. Joseph Needham wrote on the basic fallacy of Eurocentrism, namely, the view of the universality of European culture (Needham 1969 [1955]: 13–14). In 1956, Syed Hussein Alatas from Malaysia referred to the “wholesale importation of ideas from the Western world to eastern societies” without due consideration of their sociohistorical context as a fundamental problem of colonialism.

The traits of Eurocentrism as manifested in sociology and other social sciences include (1) the subject–object dichotomy; (2) the foregrounding of Europeans; (3) the view of Europeans as originators; (4) the imposition of European categories and concepts; and (5) the view of the objective superiority of European civilization.

The subject–object dichotomy: Europeans are the knowing subjects while non Europeans remain as unheard objects whose standpoints are conveyed only through the agency of Europeans. Non Europeans are passive, non participating, non active, non autonomous, and non sovereign (Abdel Malek 1963: 107–8). Non Europeans are like Flaubert's Egyptian courtesan who never represented herself. Rather, it was Flaubert who spoke for her (Said 1979: 6). This “omniscience” resulted in problematic constructions of non European or “Oriental” history and society. These constructions had come under attack at three levels – they do not fit empirical reality; they overabstract, resulting in the erasure of empirical variety; and they are founded on European prejudices (Wallerstein 1996: 8).

Europeans in the foreground: Europeans are foregrounded, resulting in the distortion of the role of non Europeans. For example, modernity is seen as a specifically European creation and encounters with non Europeans are not viewed to have brought about significant changes relevant to the emergence of European modernity.

Europeans as originators: Europeans are generally seen as originators of modern civilization where in fact there should be the consideration of its multicultural origins. In texts, Muslim philosophers are often seen as having simply transmitted Greek thought to the European world of the Renaissance. Alfred Weber, the younger brother of Max Weber and author of

a history of philosophy, notes that the Arabs were “apt pupils of the Greeks, Persians, and Hindoos in science. Their philosophy . . . is more learned than original, and consists mainly of exegesis, particularly of the exegesis of Aristotle’s system” (Weber 1925: 164n).

The imposition of European categories and concepts: Tibawi brought attention to the “persistence in studying Islam and the Arabs through the application of Western European categories” (1979: 37). To the extent that the process of modernization in Europe was universal and replicable elsewhere, so too were the social sciences that explained modernization. Non European societies are regarded as worthy objects of analysis but rarely as sources of concepts and ideas.

Belief in the objective superiority of European civilization: Modern civilization as modernity is a European creation and is due to European superiority whether this is viewed in biological, cultural, or sociological terms.

While the Eurocentric nature of sociology and other social sciences has been noted, efforts to address the problem in the teaching of sociology and in research has not been forthcoming. In the teaching of both the history of sociological theory and sociological theory itself, the five traits of Eurocentrism are present.

In most sociological theory textbooks or works on the history of social thought and theory, Europeans are the knowing subjects, that is, the social theorists and social thinkers. To the extent that non Europeans figure in these accounts, they are objects of the observations and analyses of the European theorists, such as the Indians and Algerians in Marx’s writings or Turks, Chinese, and Jews in Weber’s works. They do not appear as sources of sociological concepts and ideas. In works on the history of social thought, the focus is on European thinkers at the expense of thematizing intercivilizational encounters that possibly influenced social theory in Europe. For example, Maus does not refer to any non European in his chapter on the antecedents of sociology (Maus 1962 [1956]: ch. 1). This absence can also be seen in teaching. The *Resource Book for Teaching Sociological Theory* published by the American Sociological Association contains a number of course descriptions for sociological theory. The range of classical theorists whose works are

taught are Montesquieu, Vico, Comte, Spencer, Marx, Weber, Durkheim, Simmel, Tönnies, Sombart, Mannheim, Pareto, Sumner, Ward, Small, Wollstonecraft, and several others. No non European thinkers are included.

European (and by extension, western) sociologists continue to be foregrounded in works on the history of the discipline, although there are exceptions. Becker and Barnes in their *Social Thought from Lore to Science*, first published in 1938, devote many pages to the social thought of Ibn Khaldun. While non western sources of sociology have been acknowledged by some in the West in a few early works, they are not discussed in mainstream theory textbooks and other works.

Europeans, therefore, tend to be seen as the sole originators of sociology. There were a host of other thinkers in India, China, Japan, and Southeast Asia during the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries who would qualify as modern social thinkers but who are only briefly mentioned in the early histories of sociology (e.g., Maus, Becker & Barnes) or totally ignored in more recent works. Not all European thinkers, however, ignored their non European counterparts. For example, Becker and Barnes discuss the influence of Ibn Khaldun on Gumplowicz (1928 [1899]) and Oppenheimer (1922–35), a theme that was never taken up in later accounts of the history of social thought. The generations after Gumplowicz, Oppenheimer, and Becker and Barnes have erased non European thinkers from the history books.

Connected with the above is the dominance of European concepts and categories in sociology at the expense of non European ones. This dominance also translates into research. In the study of religion, for example, the bulk of concepts originate from Christianity. Concepts in the philosophical and sociological study of religion such as church, sect, denomination, and even religion itself are not devoid of Christian connotations and do influence the social scientific reconstruction of non Christian religions. The field of the sociology of religion has yet to enrich itself by developing concepts and categories derived from other “religions” such as Islam, Hinduism, Judaism, and so on. Underlying this is an assumption of the greater suitability of categories and concepts developed in the social sciences in Europe and North America.

There is a danger that the critique of Eurocentrism in sociology may lead to nativism, that is, the trend of going native among western and local scholars alike, in which the native's point of view is elevated to the status of the criterion by which descriptions and analyses are to be judged. This involves an intolerant stance with regard to western knowledge. Nativism is founded on an essentialist approach. For example, there is a tradition in Japanese sociology that is defined by *nihonjinron* (theories of Japanese people), which are informed by essentialized views on Japanese society, with the stress on cultural homogeneity and historical continuity. This remains squarely in the tradition of western scholarship on Japan with the difference that the knowing subjects are Japanese. Hence the term auto Orientalism as discussed by Lie (1996: 5). The challenge, therefore, is to correct the Eurocentric bias in sociology.

A more universalistic approach to the teaching of sociology as well as research in sociology would have to raise the question of whether it is possible to identify examples of sociological theorizing and concept formation outside the western/European cultural milieu. This would in turn imply radical changes in sociology theory curricula (Alatas & Sinha 2001). This does not require that western sociological content be removed from the sociology syllabi. Rather, more and more sociologists are recognizing the need to look to additional sources of concept formation and theory building from outside the usual corpus of knowledge that is confined to one civilization.

SEE ALSO: Captive Mind; Colonialism (Neocolonialism); Ethnocentrism; Hidden Curriculum; Multiculturalism; *Nihonjinron*; Orientalism; Race; Race (Racism); Rizal, José; Scientific Racism; Third World and Postcolonial Feminisms/Subaltern

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euthanasia

Clifton D. Bryant

The dictionary defines euthanasia as an “act or method of causing death painlessly so as to end suffering: advocated by some as a way to deal with victims of incurable diseases.” This is something of an over simplification, however. The practice of euthanasia has long been a contentious issue and a matter of disputatious debate. Some have termed euthanasia “mercy killing” (Vernon 1970: 310), but others have reported that some critics have labeled it as murder (Sanders 1969; Charmaz 1980: 112).

While euthanasia has generally taken place within a medical context, historically, euthanasia, as a humanitarian act, has also occurred within other contexts, such as war. There are historical accounts (from all wars) of soldiers encountering badly wounded fellow soldiers or wounded enemy soldiers. If their wounds were severe and it appeared they would not survive and they could not be transported to a medical facility, the soldiers sometimes killed the wounded individual out of compassion, administering the “coup de grace” – in effect, putting the wounded man out of his misery (Leming & Dickinson 2002: 283). Euthanasia most frequently, however, has occurred within a medical context, and this term has come to be associated with terminal illness and the medical setting. The discomfort of terminal illness is not the only motivating factor in euthanasia. Grossly deformed infants have sometimes been euthanized (or it was intended that they be euthanized until a court intervened) (Vernon 1970: 310; Charmaz 1980:113; DeSpelder & Srickland 2002: 203–4).

There are two distinctly different modes of operationalizing euthanasia: *positive* euthanasia and *negative* euthanasia (Charmaz 1980:112). Positive euthanasia refers to the practice of deliberately ending the life of a patient through active means (e.g., giving the patient an over dose of sedatives, knowing that this will kill the individual). This practice is sometimes euphemistically termed “snowing.” Negative euthanasia describes the practice of discontinuing interventive treatment, or withholding some life sustaining “drugs, medical devices,

or procedures” (DeSpelder & Srickland 1999: 200). Charmaz (1980: 113) describes positive euthanasia as an act of *commission* and negative euthanasia as an act of *omission*. DeSpelder and Srickland (1999: 200) indicate that “this distinction is sometimes characterized as the difference between ‘killing’ and ‘letting die.’” Some writers (e.g., Leming & Dickinson 2002: 290, 294) apply the terms *passive* euthanasia (rather than negative) when treatment and drugs are withdrawn or withheld, and *active* euthanasia (rather than positive euthanasia) when “the individual is helped to die.”

Another dimension of euthanasia is the matter of who makes the decision concerning the termination of the life of an individual. Most writers bifurcate euthanasia into *voluntary* euthanasia, where a competent individual requests and gives informed consent to withhold treatment, and *informal* euthanasia, where the decision to terminate an individual’s life is made by others. One set of writers (Corr et al. 2003), however, suggest that there are three variations of decision making in euthanasia. They also articulate the definitions of the variations somewhat differently. As they conceptualize the paradigm, *voluntary* euthanasia refers to the instance of an individual asking for and/or assenting to their death. Where the individual is unable to make such a decision (such as a person who is unconscious or in a coma, or, perhaps, an infant) and “a second person somehow intentionally contributes to the death of this sort of person, it is *nonvoluntary* euthanasia.” They further assert that where a person wishes to be kept alive but someone else elects to terminate the individual’s life, the process should be correctly labeled *involuntary* euthanasia (more like homicide than like a “good death”).

Euthanasia, whether active or passive, voluntary or involuntary, or nonvoluntary, is socially (and legally) controversial. Assertive and persuasive arguments concerning euthanasia have been advanced by both proponents and opponents. According to Charmaz (1980: 112) there are “three interrelated ethical questions constitutive to the controversy.” First, should individuals have the right to *elect* and *control* death? Second, at what *point* might an individual legitimately exert these rights? Third, whose *interests* are going to be given priority, those of the individual or those of the society?

Euthanasia (and also sterilization) has some times been carried out with the presumed best interest of the society as rationale. This is essentially an operationalization of “the utilitarian doctrine of the greatest good for the greatest number” (Charmaz 1980: 114). Opponents often cite examples of the programs of euthanasia such as those where individuals considered to be “unproductive,” “defective,” and “mentally unfit,” such as handicapped and retarded persons, Gypsies, Jews, and homosexuals, were systematically euthanized (exterminated) at concentration camps like Auschwitz for the so called benefit of society (Leming & Dickinson 2002: 300). This is known as the “slippery slope to Auschwitz” argument (Potter 1993; Wilkinson 1995).

“Altruistic” euthanasia has not only occurred in Nazi Germany. Some years ago a famous American novel, *Not As a Stranger* (Thompson 1954), chronicled the experiences of a young idealistic physician who had just begun to practice medicine in a small town in the upper Midwest in the 1930s. The young physician learned, to his horror, that the administrator of the local county hospital was systematically having long term elderly senile patients placed in beds in a cold room with open windows at the rear of the hospital during the winter. Predictably, the elderly patients contracted pneumonia and died. This freed up additional bed space for younger sick patients coming in for treatment. This initiative was viewed by the hospital administrator as a necessary effort for the good of the community. While the account is fictional, there is little doubt that this and other similar instances of systematic euthanasia have been carried out in real life for the presumed “good of society.”

Arguments for and against euthanasia were advanced many decades ago and have proved to be quite durable. Charmaz (1980: 114), for example, articulated four potent arguments in favor of voluntary euthanasia. These include:

- 1 Individuals have the right to choose their deaths.
- 2 This right is underscored by the fact that technological medicine obscures the moral dimensions of the dilemma and usurps choice.
- 3 Individuals may decide that suffering is of a magnitude to warrant release through death.
- 4 Individuals may specify that they do not wish dying to be prolonged when irreversible damage results in the loss of human attributes.

Charmaz also detailed the arguments against euthanasia. These include the belief that euthanasia is immoral on religious grounds; that it is incompatible with the belief in the sanctity of human life; that the state of knowledge (errors in tests and diagnosis, sudden new medical breakthroughs) may radically alter the circumstances; and that there is no way of knowing what patients would want once they are unable to communicate.

More recent arguments in favor of intentionally ending a human life have been summarized by Corr et al. (2003: 495–6), who articulate three such arguments, including prevention of suffering, enhancement of liberty, and quality of life. They also point to arguments against intentionally ending a human life, including a commitment to the preservation of life, the slippery slope argument, and additional arguments (“Medicine is at best an uncertain science; medicine moves quickly and . . . new therapies and new cures are discovered at unknown moments; . . . assisted suicide and euthanasia . . . may detract from the role of the physician as healer and preserver of life”).

The main thesis of voluntary passive euthanasia is that in the case of terminally ill patients, they may desire that no *extraordinary* methods be used to prolong life. There is great ambiguity in the term *extraordinary*, however. Corr et al. (2003: 493) have provided several criteria for a refined definition of these terms. They indicate that *ordinary* means of treatment are those that have outcomes that are predictable and well known, offer no unusual risk, suffering, or burden for either the person being treated or others, and are effective. *Extraordinary* means of treatment, on the other hand, fail to meet one or more of these criteria. Such means of treatment have sometimes been referred to as “heroic measures,” suggesting that interventive initiatives of this variety tend to constitute treatment efforts “above and beyond” what might be

normally expected within conventional medical protocol.

Much of the controversy surrounding euthanasia rests on the issue of the priority of two disparate perspectives or values. These two ideological value postures are the *sanctity of life view* and the *quality of life view*. The former invokes the notion that “all ‘natural’ life has intrinsic meaning and should be appreciated as a divine gift” (Leming & Dickinson 2002: 284). In the instance of the latter, these writers assert “the quality of life orientation holds that when life no longer has quality or meaning, death is preferable to life.” Both views have obvious merit, but the question of primacy is both philosophically weighty and obviously disputatious.

Passive (or negative) euthanasia, generally speaking, is legal in the US. Active euthanasia, by and large, is not legal, although there is some degree of social toleration for this procedure. Such toleration might include such examples as a physician actively bringing about the death of a terminally ill patient, with the knowledge and tacit assent of nurses and medical staff, who do not report such an act to law enforcement officials. Another example might be an instance of jury nullification, whereby an individual who killed a terminally ill spouse or parent is not convicted, contrary to law and the facts, by a jury who viewed the murder as a mercy killing (Sanders 1969; Vernon 1970: 310).

While active euthanasia is illegal, there are nevertheless organizations that support that mode of death. The Hemlock Society advocates active euthanasia for persons who have terminal illnesses and who are experiencing unrelieved pain, or who are facing a “life devoid of meaning and purpose” (Leming & Dickinson 2002: 299). The Hemlock Society makes a distinction between suicide, self deliverance, and mercy killing. According to Leming and Dickinson, the Hemlock Society describes suicide as a socially condemned stigmatized act, “religiously selfish,” and an “overreaction of a disturbed mind,” and self deliverance as “a positive action taken to provide a permanent solution to long term pain and suffering for the individual and her or his significant others faced with a terminal condition.” Mercy killing is essentially homicide, although temporary

insanity and compassion may be invoked as defenses.

Generally speaking, most religious faiths, including Christianity, Judaism, Hinduism, Islam, and Buddhism, condemn active euthanasia as morally unacceptable (Walker 2003).

Euthanasia as a controversial concept overlaps with several other controversial issues. These include abortion, which has been classified by many as involuntary (or nonvoluntary) active euthanasia. Another overlapping issue is suicide, which can be technically viewed as self directed voluntary, active euthanasia. This would seem to be especially the case if the suicide is conceptualized as self deliverance as articulated by the Hemlock Society. Similarly, assisted suicide and particularly physician assisted suicide would be tantamount to voluntary active euthanasia. Arguments pro and con are essentially the same for all of these processes.

The enactment of legislation recognizing the legal legitimacy of “living wills” in all 50 US states and the District of Columbia has effectively institutionalized passive euthanasia. Active euthanasia, while currently illegal in almost all states, may well undergo a legal metamorphosis in the US in the decades ahead. In 1994 Oregon passed the Death with Dignity Act, which allowed physician assisted suicide. Physicians can legally prescribe lethal medication for patients who request it, who have requested hastened death three times, who are 18 years of age, and who have a life expectancy of 6 months or less. There are additional requirements. This legislation effectively legalizes active euthanasia. Oregon renewed the act by referendum in 1997 (Walker 2003). Undoubtedly, other states will follow suit. In 2001 the Netherlands passed a law that decriminalized active, voluntary euthanasia.

With an aging population in the US and in many other countries of the world, euthanasia will assume more and more relevancy with time. Passive euthanasia is legal and widely practiced and active euthanasia is obviously moving more in the direction of social acceptance. Euthanasia would seem to be an idea whose time has arrived.

SEE ALSO: Abortion as a Social Problem; Death and Dying; Suicide

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evaluation

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Evaluation is a systematic process of determining the merit or worth of some entity, which is commonly referred to as the evaluand (Scriven 1967, 1991). Evaluation, like research, is a form of disciplined inquiry (Cronbach & Suppes 1969). As such, emphasis is placed on public examinations of arguments and inquiry methods, on discussion of limitations and margins of error in conclusions, and on adherence to generally accepted standards of practice, which

include impartial, detailed, and unambiguous methods of inquiry. The systematic processes of evaluation and research can be compared on several dimensions. This conception of evaluation contrasted to research began with discussions of the emerging methodology of evaluation in the late 1960s, as described by Worthen and Sanders (1973).

The goal of evaluation is to determine value (merit, worth) of an evaluand, while the goal of research is to develop generalizable knowledge. The roles of evaluation include use for product, performance, and program improvement, as well as use for guiding choices among decision alternatives. The roles of research include building a body of knowledge on which theories and product development can draw. The motivation of evaluators toward what to study is primarily external, whereby evaluators provide services to others. The motivation of researchers in choosing what to study is primarily internal, whereby curiosity and a desire to extend existing knowledge are prime stimuli for research. Related to motivation of the inquirer is autonomy of the inquiry. Evaluators mostly serve clients and are accountable to them. Researchers often establish their own problems and direction of inquiry.

Investigative techniques used by evaluators must be diverse so that a broad range of questions that comprise the conception of value of an evaluand can be addressed. Researchers will often pursue a small number of important questions that require few investigative techniques. Evaluators are methodological generalists, while researchers tend to be methodological specialists. The disciplinary base and, consequently, the breadth of training of evaluators is necessarily broad in order to enable them to seek answers to a broad range of questions. The disciplinary base of researchers is usually found in mastery of a single field of study. Psychologists conduct psychological research, sociologists focus on sociological problems, and so on. And researchers tend to use the methodologies of their home disciplines.

Standards for judging the adequacy of evaluations include utility, feasibility, propriety, and accuracy (Joint Committee 1981, 1988, 1994, 2003), while research is judged on

internal and external validity of the inquiry, as well as its contribution to the existing knowledge base (Campbell & Stanley 1963; Cook & Campbell, 1979). The salience of the value question in evaluation is high, while judging the value of an object of study does not dominate research.

These distinctions are useful for making the point that research and evaluation are different in important ways, even though there are areas of overlap. In the real world of inquiry, more over, many of these distinctions blur, as complex projects may have multiple roles, goals, and motives, where both research and evaluation are needed.

METHODOLOGY OF EVALUATION

Discussions of a methodology of evaluation grew in the late 1960s when it became evident that traditional research methodologies could not address the needs of evaluators who were being asked to evaluate existing and newly funded social, educational, economic, engineering, health, and technological programs, products, and performances. A seminal work that established a foundation for the theory and practice of modern evaluation methodology was published in 1967 by Michael Scriven. In this work, Scriven distinguished between the roles of formative and summative evaluation, and the implications of this distinction for evaluation methodology. Formative evaluation was defined as feedback during the developmental stages of an evaluand that serves to improve it. It is kept internal to the group engaged in development. Summative evaluation was defined as information about a finished evaluand that is used to make decisions such as continuation, termination, adoption, and funding level.

A distinction must be made between formative/summative roles of evaluation and process/product questions about an evaluand. Confusion often appears when formative and process evaluation are seen as synonymous, and summative and product evaluation are seen as synonymous. They are not. Perhaps the best way to illustrate these distinctions is through the following matrix:

	<i>Formative</i>	<i>Summative</i>
<i>Process</i>	Evaluation of means to some ends as a way of improving the means.	Evaluation of alternative means to some ends in order to select the best means.
<i>Product</i>	Evaluation of the ends accomplished by an evaluand under development as a way to identify where changes may be needed.	Evaluation of the acceptability of ends of competing evaluands in order to identify the evaluand with the best ends.

Formative process and formative product evaluations are aimed at improving means and ends, respectively, during developmental stages. Summative process and summative product evaluations are aimed at selecting the best means and ends from among competing alternatives.

EVALUATION APPROACHES

Depending on such factors as the training background and experience, the philosophical orientation, and methodological preferences of the evaluator, and the stated needs for evaluation, evaluators have developed different evaluation approaches, sometimes called models for evaluation. Stufflebeam (2001) has identified 22 different approaches. Among the most popular are those that are:

- *Goal based:* The focus is on achievement of desired ends as a basis for judging an evaluand.
- *Program theory based:* The focus is on the logical relationships and adequacy of program inputs, activities, and outcomes as a basis for judging programs.
- *Decision based:* The focus is on addressing the administrative decisions faced by managers in organizations. Planning, designing, budgeting, monitoring, and accountability decisions are all important sources of evaluation questions.
- *Consumer based:* The focus is on product decisions faced by consumers.
- *Expert based:* The focus is on standards and criteria identified by credible and qualified experts in the specific field of the evaluand.

- *Participant based:* The focus is on issues and concerns identified by stakeholders in the evaluand. Stakeholders are defined as those who are affected by the evaluand and those who affect the evaluand in some way (such as staff and funders).

EVALUATION DESIGN

The design of evaluation studies begins with the questions that are to be addressed in the evaluation. Some designs are narrow in scope because they seek to address one or a small number of questions. Others are very broad in scope because they seek to address many, often complex and diverse, questions related to the value of the evaluand. Some evaluators see their role as having the responsibility of determining the questions to be addressed. Others see the questions being generated by a negotiation process between evaluator and client (the funder of the evaluation), while still others see the questions being determined by stakeholders of the evaluation.

Evaluators typically begin designing an evaluation by identifying potentially important value questions. This is called the *divergent* phase of the design (Cronbach 1982). Once questions are listed, the evaluator determines for each question (1) the information needed to answer the question, (2) the source(s) of this information, (3) the tasks or steps required to generate answers, (4) who will perform each task, and (5) the cost of completing each task. A draft budget, time schedule, and staffing plan can then be prepared so that the *feasibility* of the design can be seen. If the design needs to be reduced in scope, as is usually the case, the evaluator begins the *convergent* phase of the design, during which some questions are eliminated. The questions that are dropped constitute in part the *limitations* of the evaluation.

Most evaluators agree that it is impossible and imprudent to identify the final set of evaluative questions at the beginning of the study. Evaluators learn as they become engaged in the evaluation, and consequently the evaluation design evolves. The distinction between *preordinate* evaluation designs (where all questions are determined beforehand) and *responsive* or emergent evaluation designs (where questions emerge as

learning about the evaluand takes place) is described by Stake (2004).

EVALUATION TECHNIQUES AND PROCEDURES

Stufflebeam (1969) defined five processes involved in evaluation: design, data collection, data analysis, reporting, and management of the evaluation. Design was covered in the preceding section. The remaining four processes will be discussed next.

Data collection involves the gathering of information needed to answer the questions posed for the evaluation. These data may be quantitative (numerical) or qualitative (non numerical). Quantitative techniques and procedures have been well developed by researchers in the social and physical sciences. They include such methods as testing and psychometrics, surveys, physical measurements, cost analysis and econometrics, sociometrics, and scaling. Qualitative techniques and procedures have also been well developed by researchers, particularly in the social sciences. They include such methods as ethnographies, case studies, and observation, including participant observation, focus groups, document analysis, narrative interviews, unobtrusive measures, and photography.

In addition to the data collection techniques and procedures that have been developed by researchers there are data collection methods that have been developed by evaluators to serve the unique demands of evaluation. These methods include needs assessment, advocate team studies, logic models and program theory, values analysis and validation, goal free evaluation, and cluster evaluation.

Data analysis involves the reduction and summarization of data so that evaluative meaning can be derived for the complex combination of data generated by most evaluation studies. Descriptive and inferential statistics, graphs, tables, and charts are most often used to analyze quantitative data collected during an evaluation. Searching for key incidents, patterns, and categories is a common method of qualitative data analysis. Analytic induction in qualitative data analysis involves several steps, including (1) exploring qualitative data and forming impressions, (2) identifying themes, (3) focusing

for further observation and documentation, often using working hypotheses, (4) verification and support of tentative conclusions, and (5) assimilation into the broader context of what is known about the evaluand.

Data analysis in evaluation also involves a valuing process whereby conclusions based on evidence are combined with values to arrive at evaluative interpretations. It is this aspect of data analysis that sets evaluation apart from other forms of disciplined inquiry.

The reporting process of evaluation can take many forms, ranging from daily updates and discussions to compilations of written final reports. The utility of evaluation is highly dependent on the reporting and communications process (Fitzpatrick et al. 2004: ch. 16). Characteristics of effective evaluation reporting include accuracy, timeliness, frequency, balance, fairness, clarity, level of detail, communication style, and providing an opportunity to intended users for reviewing draft reports.

Evaluation management begins at the design stage of the evaluation process and continues through helping users of the evaluation to move from evaluative conclusions to application and action. Coordinators of evaluations must ensure that adequate time, funds, expertise, and communications are present. They must supervise and direct evaluation operations so that the results of the evaluation are as accurate and valid as the limitations of the evaluation study allow. Delivering a product that is on time, within budget, and meets professional standards and principles (Joint Committee 1994; American Evaluation Association 1995) depends on sound evaluation management.

METAEVALUATION

All evaluations inevitably have some degree of uncertainty and bias, as do any other scientific undertakings. For this reason the professional evaluator will typically plan for a metaevaluation, or evaluation of the evaluation. Internal review can be a continuous part of the evaluation process, whereby qualified colleagues can provide formative feedback to the evaluator beginning with the evaluation design, and continuing through the evaluation process and final communications with the client. External

reviews can be arranged with independent qualified consultants who may prepare reports and recommendations at discrete points in the evaluation process, such as when the design is submitted, when reports are delivered, and when the evaluation has been completed. These outside reviewers most often report to the client with an opportunity for the evaluator to respond. The metaevaluation process is intended to strengthen the evaluation and to increase the certainty that may be placed on evaluative findings.

SEE ALSO: Effect Sizes; Grounded Theory; Organizational Learning; Performance Measurement; Quantitative Methods; Validity, Qualitative; Validity, Quantitative; Values

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everyday life

Martha Easton

Everyday life, in the field of sociology, has been positioned as a condition, a social space, a political goal, and a methodological analytic. Its meaning has shifted with time, and its potential consequences have shifted with its meaning. One thing that has not changed has been the home of the concept, under the wing of the conflict school of theory. But while everyday life started its move into theory as a negative extension of Marx's idea of alienation, it has evolved into a celebrated realm for modern day feminist sociology.

Henri Lefebvre, one of the most important French Marxist sociologists of the mid century, first wrote of everyday life as a mind numbing, alienating set of social conditions. His book *Critique of Everyday Life* was published in 1947. In it he linked what he called "everydayness" to Marx's theory of alienation. According to Lefebvre, everydayness was a modern day extension of the grip of alienation, part of the consequence of the rise of a modern form of capitalism. Lefebvre argued that capitalism had gotten so powerful that it had grown beyond organizing our productive and social relations in society; it also actually sucked the meaning out of everyday life. Alienation, the feeling of exhaustion, stress, and poverty consequential from the act of being forced to sell one's labor, was experienced more painfully under modern capitalism precisely because the experiences of everyday life outside of work had been invaded by capitalism. Without the

genuine meaning and connection that had once taken place in everyday life outside of work, modern workers turned to consumption to fill the gap. The lifestyle of consumption grew stronger and stronger under modern capitalism, and everyday life was marked by the purchase of commodities, which furthered the cycle of alienation.

Lefebvre's view of everyday life as a kind of negative alienating condition shaped by the structural influences of capitalism was a powerful position in social theory during the mid twentieth century. But by the 1960s, a different view of everyday life began to emerge in social theory.

Everyday life got a new set of meanings along with the reemergence of arguments about the public sphere and the private sphere. As the concept of the public sphere began to be increasingly defined as the world of work, politics, and the service of citizenship, the private sphere began to be seen as the space of everything else, or the space of everyday life. This loaded the idea of everyday life with the content of all that was seen as somehow being personal and private: love, family, sex, relationships, housework, emotions, and so on.

It was in this context that feminist sociologists retrieved the idea of everyday life, and reinterpreted it as a social space that primarily contained that which was seen as belonging to women. The public sphere was the world of men, while the private sphere (and everyday life) was the realm of women. Feminist sociologists argued that the world of women and the social relations of everyday life should be celebrated and valued. Some also argued that the line between the public and private sphere should be obliterated, allowing women into the public realm and, more important, removing value judgments from the assessment of the realms in which people pursue social interaction. In other words, the obligations of everyday life – like helping a child with homework – are just as important as the work of the public realm – like participating in the work of a political party.

The women's movement politicized the idea of everyday life. Home, and the private world, were sites for battle over the work and role of women. The "personal is political" was a key theme for analysis and activism, and everyday life became a battleground.

By the 1970s, feminist sociologists such as Dorothy E. Smith had added an important new dimension to the concept of everyday life. They argued that the social reproduction of inequality could be seen in the normal interactions of everyday life. This analytical insight helped reshape the focus for feminist research. As a topic of analysis, the social relationships of everyday life became increasingly important. New empirical research during this time period began to focus on topics that had formerly been seen as banal, or unimportant, or too “everyday.” Topics such as domestic violence, housework, mental illness, and childrearing emerged as critical – and controversial – areas for research. Everyday life was not just what was left over from the important work of the public realm, but was in itself a set of social relations that created and reproduced social inequalities. The experiences of everyday life were important pieces of knowledge about our social world, and everyday life became a key focus of empirical study.

In addition, everyday life anchors an important feminist methodological tradition. The practice of institutional ethnography depends on a close analysis of the ways in which normal people experience and know their own everyday lives. Dorothy E. Smith first articulated the importance of this method in 1983, growing out of her previous work on the knowledges of women’s everyday experiences in the private sphere. This method looks at the institutions that organize the experiences of everyday life, and works backwards from individual experience to make visible the power behind the relations of ruling. Smith takes as an example her experiences as a single mother dealing with the school her children attended. As she worked with the school to help one of her children who had a problem with reading, she began to see that the problem was that she was a single mother. Helping a child learn to read was not seen as work, and yet the school was highly dependent on the work of mothers in socializing their own children. The institution of education rested on unrecognized class and gender assumptions: that essential child socialization would be done by women who had no other jobs (i.e., were middle class). Children raised by families that did not conform to middle class gender and social standards were

constituted by their everyday behavior as abnormal or problemated. By reading backward from the experiences of everyday life, institutional ethnography can explicate the power relations behind important social institutions.

Everyday life is an important part of social theory. It is a condition, a political focus, and a set of experiences. Historically, the idea of everyday life was associated with Marxist ideas of alienation. Currently, the concept of everyday life is strongly associated with feminist sociology, and is an important focus of the feminist work.

SEE ALSO: Alienation; Feminism; Feminism and Science; Feminist Epistemology; Feminist Methodology; Lefebvre, Henri; Personal is Political; Public and Private

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evolution

Amanda Rees

The concept of evolution has a vexed and often misunderstood history as far as the social sciences are concerned, and one that has consistently been mired not just in intellectual and scientific debates, but also in political and economic confrontations and conflicts, ranging from the eugenic policies practiced by many western nations at the beginning of the twentieth century, to the execution and exile of Soviet biologists unwilling to toe the Lysenkoist party line in the 1950s, to the decision of the Kansas Board of Education in 1999 to delete the teaching of evolution from the state’s science curriculum. There are a number of reasons why this concept – which at its simplest can be defined as the way things (people,

societies, ideas, environments) change over time – has been bogged down in so many confusions and conflagrations, most of which can be found in the particular contexts and purposes in which evolutionary ideas are and have been expressed.

At present, the idea of evolution is most commonly associated with Charles Darwin's (1859) theory of evolution through natural selection. This is based on four key assumptions: that more individuals are born than can possibly survive; that each of these individuals differs in some distinctive way; that these differences will mean that some of these individuals will be better able to survive in particular environmental circumstances than others; that those better able to survive will leave more offspring than those less well adapted to their environment. In other words, to use the phrase coined by an early Darwin enthusiast, Herbert Spencer, evolution is a process based on the "survival of the fittest." Clearly, this account of how populations evolve or change over time is based on an entirely contingent match or "fit" between individual characteristics and current environmental context: if the demands placed on the individual by the environment change, then so will the nature of the characteristics that promote survival. Dinosaurs were enormously well "fitted" to the environment that existed prior to the atmospheric upheavals known to have taken place at the K/T boundary, but it was the small, rat like mammals that were to prosper in the millennia that followed that ecological catastrophe.

Nonetheless, one of the key reasons for the confusion surrounding the concept of evolution in social and political theory and thinking has been the persistent ambiguity attached to the term "fittest." In the classic sense, it refers to the "fit" between individual and environment; however, it was in both the nineteenth and the twentieth centuries also used to refer to the ideal of progress. Evolution could be taken to mean "evolving toward" ever more complex or ever more intelligent organisms or individuals, progressing toward the attainment of ever higher levels of biological, social, and psychological being. Consequently, for the social sciences, it became associated with particularly hierarchical conceptions of the political and cultural world, both within and between particular

societies and communities. It was used as, and was taken to be a justification for, the dominance of men over women, of white people over black, of Christians over Jews, of Europeans and North Americans over the peoples of Africa, Asia, and South America. As a result, and for these good historical reasons, a distaste for explanations of society and social interactions based on explicitly biological evolutionary theory developed among the social sciences and the humanities, an unease which first became unequivocal in the aftermath of World War II, and then was exacerbated during the 1970s with the publication of E. O. Wilson's *Sociobiology* (1975) and the UNESCO declaration on race and racial prejudice (1978). Social theorizing based on biological principles was declared anathema, and the extent of the opposition to the intrusion of biology into sociology can perhaps be judged from the famous incident where Wilson, speaking at an American Association for the Advancement of Science meeting in 1978, was drenched with water by a group of activists who had stormed the stage chanting "Racist Wilson, you can't hide, we charge you with genocide" (Segerstrale 2000).

Yet the story of evolution is far more complex and complicated than this. The concept itself was not the sole product of the biological sciences, but was a key element in the work of many nineteenth and twentieth century social theorists. Even within the biological sciences, the word "evolution" was and is not restricted to Darwinian natural selection, but can be taken to mean many different aspects of the way in which populations change over time. The use of the concept for political purposes was not restricted to fascist, or even conservative, social thinkers, but can also be tied to the development of socialist and Marxist philosophy. Ironically, bastions of conservatism, particularly in the United States, have explicitly rejected evolution and evolutionary thinking, condemning it as the source of moral laxity, the emergence of the permissive society, and the breakdown of social and community spirit. Finally, and perhaps most interestingly, the latter half of the twentieth century has also seen the emergence of a perspective that uses evolutionary principles to put forward an explicitly feminist agenda. Evolution as a word, as a concept, and as a rule is slippery at best, and predictably unpredictable at worst.

It is clear that many different scientific interpretations of “evolution” have existed, different interpretations that have both been firmly based within particular cultural contexts and had social and political consequences. So, for example, the development of the concept of evolution in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries was tied to the development of geology and natural history, and based on the emergent cultural acceptance that the myth of creation outlined in Genesis did not explain or even necessarily accord with the conclusions that natural philosophers were reaching with regard to the age of the earth or the existence of fossilized creatures unknown and unrecognizable to modern eyes. This period saw an increased willingness to seek out and to create accounts of the world that did not involve the work of intangible or preternatural forces, but instead could be shown to depend on the interaction of material and utterly apprehendable rules of nature. The most famous alternative to Darwin’s theory emerged in the early years of the nineteenth century – the work of the chevalier de Lamarck. Writing many years prior to the publication of Darwin’s theory, Lamarck focused on what has come to be called the “inheritance of acquired characteristics.” This is the presumption that parents can pass to their offspring those characteristics that they have physically achieved in their lifetimes. So, for example, giraffes acquired their extraordinarily long necks because each generation of giraffes stretched their necks as far as they could to eat the leaves on tall trees, passing this on to the next generation who in turn stretched their necks a little further. Alternatively, to give a human example, this interpretation of evolution would mean that a blacksmith’s son would be blessed with significantly stronger muscles than the son of a clerk. This was the version of evolution that was to be taken up by Trofim Lysenko in the USSR during the 1950s, as a much more acceptable kind of evolutionary thinking than that based on the cutthroat individualistic competition of Darwin’s natural selection. Lamarck preceded Darwin, but even after the publication of *The Origin of Species*, scientific debates continued on the nature of evolution and the mechanisms through which it proceeded. By the end of the nineteenth century and the beginning of the twentieth, Darwinism had

been abandoned by most biologists. Evolution as a concept, and understood to refer to “change through time,” remained unquestioned, but the principles of natural selection had been rejected – not least because they were unable to explain exactly how new species could emerge. Lamarck’s views seemed much more useful here, and other perspectives such as orthogenesis (evolution toward fixed goals) flourished. It was not until the fusion of Darwinian natural selection with Mendelian principles of inheritance in the 1930s and 1940s that the place of Darwin in the history of evolution was assured.

However, the nineteenth century had also seen the adoption of evolutionary principles by many social philosophers. In contrast to the conception of society commonly held before the Enlightenment – that “mankind” was in the process of steadily declining from the achievements of antiquity – the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries had seen a steady growth in the confidence of European societies, aided by the material achievements of the Industrial Revolution, the intellectual accomplishments of the Scientific Revolution, and the political and military consequences of the developing European imperial project. Anthropologists were quick to make use of evolutionary and hierarchical ideas to explain the different levels of technological and political development achieved by the different societies that were increasingly coming under, not just the European gaze, but also European political and economic control. Writers such as Lewis Henry Morgan and Edward B. Tylor argued that all cultures were in the process of evolving from the simple to the complex, and that each encountered society could be placed correctly on the hierarchy of progress. European societies, naturally enough, occupied the highest steps, but other societies were in the process of evolving toward such heady pinnacles – they had simply not progressed up the ladder of progress from savagery to civilization as far as they might. This perspective was to become one of the key justifications of imperialism and colonialism, as administrators and politicians spoke of their “civilizing mission,” the “burden” placed on the “white man” to provide the example, and the education that would enable these communities to accelerate their social evolution.

Several of the founding fathers of sociology were also eager to adopt the notion of development through time, not so much to explain the relationships between different societies as a means of making sense of the nature of the social developments that were occurring within European societies. The idea of progressive evolution was at the heart of Auguste Comte's positivist philosophy, with the assertion that human understanding of the world was naturally constituted so as to pass through three stages – the theological, the metaphysical, and the scientific – each constituting a more complex and more accurate comprehension of mundane reality. As people proceeded through these stages, so society itself would evolve toward a higher state, and part of the reason for his desire to establish a scientific sociology was his belief that the existence of such a science would aid humanity in its progress toward the most superior kind of society. Similar approaches to the notion of social evolution can be found in the work of Émile Durkheim and Karl Marx. Durkheim cast his account of society in terms of the consequences of the shift from mechanical solidarity to organic solidarity; from simple solidarity based on shared understanding of the nature of a largely agricultural community to a complex interdependence based on the increasing complexity of the division of labor in an increasingly industrial society. Again, we see evolution presented as the movement from the simple to the complex, heavily overlaid with the assumption that by these means, social progress is achieved. Similarly, Marx and Engels drew on the notions of change over time not just to develop their materialist account of the immediate and antique past, but also to project into the future their understanding of the nature and apparatus of social change and progressive evolution toward a more perfect form of society. Inherent in all of these approaches to the study of human cultures is the idea that there are universal laws that govern the development of all forms of society – and that these laws can be best apprehended through the principles of evolution and progress. It was this notion of “universal laws” of human development that was to come under such sustained critique over the course of the twentieth century.

Perhaps the most famous nineteenth century social evolutionist, however, was Herbert

Spencer. It was he who coined the phrase “survival of the fittest,” with all the ambiguity which that entails, and it was he who did most to introduce the philosophy known as “social Darwinism” to a wider public. However, he was not a Darwinist in the sense that he accepted natural selection as the principal means through which evolution operated. Instead, Spencer chose to stress the influence of external forces on the organism or society, and additionally, maintained a strong Lamarckian perspective. Moreover, for him, “social progress” meant the progression toward a society in which individuals experienced ever more freedom, leading him to oppose the introduction of governmental programs intended to alleviate the suffering of the poor and needy. Spencer had accepted the Malthusian argument concerning the role of population pressure, and considered this to be both the means through which the unfit were eliminated and the dynamo behind economic development: increasing population meant a constant drive to improve technological capacity in order to prevent people's needs entirely outstripping scarce resources. However, the logical result of the application of social Darwinism would be the adoption of an extreme form of *laissez faire* capitalism, with the state restricted from any interference. The market alone would determine success or failure, and individuals must be left to sink or swim according to their capacities. This attitude toward cutthroat economic competition, combined with the increasing popularity among the middle classes of the eugenic theories first put forward by Darwin's cousin, Francis Galton, meant that by the turn of the twentieth century, evolutionary theories and concepts were not just being used to justify the class system as a reflection of natural reality, but were in some cases being used in an attempt to manipulate the composition and interrelationships between social classes in order to create a more perfect and progressive society.

The particular nature of that society, however, depended on one's political philosophy. There was nothing about the concept of evolution that marked it as the natural ally or particular property of one party or another. Having read *The Origin of Species*, Marx is said to have been so impressed with its account of the competitive basis of individual survival that he offered to dedicate part of *Das Kapital* to

Darwin. This story has been shown to be a myth, but it is one that reflects the close correspondence that many authors have felt exists between a description of the biological struggle for the “survival of the fittest” and the ruthless competition characteristic of the late Victorian capitalist society that Marx analyzed. Similarly, Lysenko’s adoption of a Lamarckian conception of evolution was endorsed by the Soviet authorities because it eliminated the random competition characteristic of Darwinian evolution, and emphasized the potential for the development of a self improving society. But the link between Darwinism and capitalism is not unproblematic, nor is it necessarily the result of controversy between the natural sciences and social sciences: the most vicious evolutionary debates of the twentieth century have been conducted not between biologists and social scientists, but within biology itself, as “Marxist biologists” have battled “sociobiologists” for the ultimate prize of inheriting Darwin’s biological legacy.

This debate began in 1975, with the publication of E. O. Wilson’s magisterial *Sociobiology: The New Synthesis*. For 26 chapters, Wilson, an entomologist based at Harvard University, provided a state of the art review of what was then known about how and why animals behaved in the way in which they did. The book was a synthesis of the revolutionary new thinking about the ways in which selection and adaptation could work on a population, and introduced the word “sociobiology” to the wider public. Essentially, “sociobiology” was a project intended to explain the rules that both encouraged and made it possible for animals to live in social groups, showing how Darwinian natural selection could be supplemented by theories of kin selection and inclusive fitness (or the idea that an animal’s “fitness” is measured not only by his or her own reproductive success but also by the success of close genetic relatives) to elucidate the basis on which altruism, for example, might evolve. After all, if the business of an animal is to concentrate on maximizing the genetic contribution to the next generation – that is, have as many offspring as possible – then why should any animal be willing to share resources or to refrain from reproduction? The answer was to be found in the closeness of the relationship between the altruist and the recipient and in the adoption

of a perspective that considered the reproduction of the gene to be more significant than the reproduction of the individual, a position now associated most publicly with the work of Oxford biologist Richard Dawkins. J. B. S. Haldane encapsulated this calculative, genetic perspective when he joked, in response to the question of whether he would lay down his life to save that of his brother, “No, but I would for two brothers, or for eight cousins.” Since one shares half of one’s genes with one’s brother, and one eighth with a cousin, Haldane was specifying the conditions under which it would make sociobiological sense to risk one’s life. This perspective on the evolutionary basis of social behavior was uncontroversial (and has remained largely so) when applied to animals. However, in Wilson’s twenty seventh chapter, he extrapolated these rules of animal behavior and applied them to human beings. And the result was explosively dramatic.

Wilson’s final chapter was, in practice, the first sustained attempt to analyze the impact that human biological evolution might have had on the development of human culture and society since World War II had ended. Opposition to Wilson’s speculative attempt to extend his account of animal society to human society was immediate, intense, and passionate. However, what was interesting was that this hostility initially arose not from the social sciences – who had, by the 1970s, reached a consensus that biology was irrelevant as an explanatory factor in dealing with human society – but from other biologists. In fact, and ironically, the core of the opposition to Wilson’s sociobiology was to be found in the office beneath his own at Harvard’s Museum of Comparative Zoology – the office belonging to Richard Lewontin, another Harvard biologist, but one who was at that point committed to the development of a holistic, Marxist biology that would work toward the attainment of greater human freedom and equality. Lewontin was a key figure in the establishment of the Sociobiology Study Group, which along with the Boston based organization Science for the People wrote a letter to the *New York Review of Books*, which condemned sociobiology on two fronts: first, the absence of adequate scientific evidence in its support, and second, the restrictive and anti democratic political philosophy that they

felt underpinned the theory. When the letter was published in November 1975, it compared Wilson's account of human sociobiology to the eugenic sterilization laws introduced in the years before World War II by the United States, and to the gas chambers of Nazi Germany. Wilson's final chapter may not, as he maintains, have been an attempt to demonstrate that aggression, war, and xenophobia were inevitable and natural aspects of human society, but it certainly provoked violence and intemperate language on both sides of the debate, including the public and physical assault on Wilson himself – a rare event in modern scientific debate, but one which demonstrated the depth of the passions that had been provoked by the suggestion that human culture and society might have their basis in biological evolution.

Biological opponents of sociobiology, such as Lewontin and his late Harvard colleague Steven Jay Gould, adopted a holistic rather than a reductionist account of how evolutionary processes might work, opposing the adoption of an overwhelmingly genetic perspective and attacking what they considered to be the adaptationist assumption. They criticized the presumption that most, if not all, of an organism's features must be "adaptive" – that is, must have some kind of biological purpose – as the modern version of the older assumption that evolution must in some sense be progressive, and emphasized the difficulty of identifying individual genes, much less specifying what they might prove to be genes "for." They stressed the need to consider gene and environment in interaction, drawing much more strongly from the themes and methods of natural history rather than the experimental tradition in biology. Rather than attempting to isolate genes in the laboratory, they chose to use particular historical and observational examples to demonstrate the way in which, for example, the particular genetic heritage of an individual (their "genotype") is limited in its physical expression (the "phenotype") by the nature of the environment in which the individual finds itself. In one of their most famous examples, they pointed to the fact that while genetics determines how tall an individual could potentially grow, it is the environment that determines the extent to which that potential will be realized. Individuals with the capacity to

grow to 6 feet 2 inches will not reach that scale in the absence of adequate childhood nutrition – and in fact, may turn out to be shorter than individuals with a smaller genetic capacity but a better nurturing environment. If the ultimate cause of a clearly measurable and unarguable factor like height can be so difficult to define, then they emphasized that it must be even more important to consider the environmental (social, cultural, economic) context when examining such politically charged and difficult to define notions as "aggression," "intelligence," and the differences between the sexes.

By the early 1990s, the sociobiological dust had largely settled, but the role of evolution in explaining human society and culture had by no means been settled. At least three different sets of linked debates were now taking place in academic discussions of evolution. In the first place, while sociobiology per se had for the most part disappeared, in its place had emerged two different disciplines. One, behavioral ecology, applied a sociobiological perspective to animal behavior. The other, evolutionary psychology, worked from the premise that the human mind, like the human brain, was the product of evolution, and that if one wished to explain how the mind worked, the place to start was from the evolutionary perspective. In the second place, what has become known as the "Science Wars" had broken out between groups of scientists and social scientists. Ironically enough, at least part of the impetus for these "wars" had been the attempts by some sociologists and historians to study and to explain science and scientists; just as the social scientists had been affronted by the presumption that natural science could explain the complexities of human social behavior, so natural scientists were perturbed by the premise that scientific activities might have social or cultural explanations. Thirdly and finally, another new discipline had emerged, in the United States at least – that of "scientific creationism," the idea that it was possible to provide a scientific explanation of the events in the biblical story of Genesis – or at least, that it was possible scientifically to disprove the theory of evolution.

Evolutionary psychology, along with associated disciplines like memetics and gene-culture coevolution, sought to take the sociobiological project a few steps further, basing their

approach on the idea that it was both possible and useful to identify specific mechanisms within the human brain that were the product of evolution, in the sense that they could be shown to impact on the presumed reproductive success of a given individual. While the term evolutionary psychology had been coined in the 1970s, it was not until the publication of Leda Cosmides and John Tooby's book *The Adaptive Mind* (1992) that the term came to be widely used, and in 1995, the "Darwin@LSE" research group was established at the London School of Economics, with the intent of raising the public profile of Darwinism both within the social sciences and with regard to a more general audience. At the heart of evolutionary psychology was the premise that there existed within the human mind "evolved psychological mechanisms," which are universal to the human species, but may be expressed in one sex rather than another, or at particular points in the life cycle of the individual. These psychological mechanisms were largely identified by reference to what evolutionary psychologists call the "environment of evolutionary adaptedness" (EEA) – or the hypothesized, hunter-gatherer type societies in which humanity evolved, and which were therefore the environments in which, unlike industrial urban capitalism, humanity is biologically adapted for success. Thus, for example, one controversial explanation for the apparent fact that men prefer younger, slimmer women, and women prefer older, richer men, could be that in the EEA female fertility could be directly linked to youth and the pattern of bodily fat deposits, or the hip to waist to breast ratio (hence, "slimness"). Men would therefore prefer to mate with those females whose physique seemed to offer the best chance of reproduction, while those females who restricted their reproductive activity to males with adequate resources (wealth) to take care not only of them, but also of any children that might result, would reap larger benefits in terms of their contribution to the next generation.

This perspective has attracted much criticism from social scientists. Like sociobiology, the basic premise of evolutionary psychology was that universals of human nature existed, but the question remained of whether such universals can be proven to have a biological

or psychological existence, or whether they are the product of the dominance of certain cultural stereotypes – were they the result of socialization rather than evolution? Similarly, many critics have pointed out that paleoanthropology can realistically be certain about very few of the characteristics thought to be associated with the posited "environment of evolutionary adaptedness," making many evolutionary psychology hypotheses seem speculative at best, and at worst attempts to naturalize the political and sexual inequalities of western industrial capitalism. Similar critiques were made of the other novel disciplines that emerged in the 1990s with the intent to apply evolutionary insights in order to explain human culture and society. Memetics, for example, sought to treat culture in the same way that biologists dealt with the body, searching for the "memes" that formed the basis of cultural interaction in the same way that "genes" were the basis of sexual reproduction – but defining "memes" was shown to be problematic at best, since examples of memes provided by memeticists tended to range from advertising jingles to western Christianity.

However, the 1990s also saw the emergence of what has become known as the Science Wars, and the debate surrounding the place of evolution in cultural and public life soon became caught up in the wider struggles over the relationships that existed, or were thought to exist, between science and society. In 1994, Paul Gross and Norman Levitt, a biologist and a mathematician, published a book called *Higher Superstition*, which sought to expose and to denounce what they considered to be the insidious attacks on science and rationality that were being made by feminists, multiculturalists, environmentalists, and sociologists. They argued that the programs for understanding the social context of science that had been in the process of development since the publication of Kuhn's *Structure of Scientific Revolutions* (1962) were not in fact intended to study science at all, but to subvert and to denounce it by demonstrating that science was "merely" a cultural construction. Exacerbated by Alan Sokal's "spoof" article in the journal *Social Text*, the Science Wars blazed for most of the latter half of the decade, and at their heart was the question of whether scientific knowledge was a true representation of natural reality or the product

of social constructionism. Since many of the debates surrounding the role and impact of evolution on the understanding of human social life tend to turn on a similar pivot, it is understandable that they came to be partly subsumed within the bigger picture. However, it was unfortunate, since it led to a situation in which battle lines became drawn even more deeply than might otherwise have been the case. As in the example of sociobiology, this also divided biologists. Many biologists were unhappy with a situation in which what they considered to be speculative and tentative claims about the evolutionary basis of human society were being treated as hard fact and presented to the public as such. In response, they found themselves lumped by their colleagues with unspecified hardline feminist multiculturalists, were accused by these colleagues of being unwilling to accept the existence of “facts,” and were, for example, invited to “test” the law of gravity by jumping out of an upper story window.

In some senses, particularly in the American case, there were genuine grounds to fear that science, and especially evolution, was indeed under attack. The potential for conflict between the revealed truth of the Christian religion and the developing scientific worldview had existed since geological and paleontological research had indicated as far back as the eighteenth century that the earth might be far older than the Bible suggested, and the relationship between science and religion in the West had been seriously damaged by the publication of Darwin’s theory of evolution. However, in most cases and countries the debate was resolved in science’s favor, even though it took the pope until 1996 to recognize that evolution was more than a hypothesis. Science and scripture could largely live in peace, since the one concerned itself with *how* things happened, the other with *why* these things occurred. The prominent exception to this separate spheres argument could have been found in the Bible Belt of the American Midwest. Opposition to the teaching of Darwinism and evolution had grown more fervent after the end of World War I, culminating in the state of Tennessee’s Butler Act of 1925, which forbade the teaching of evolution in public schools. This Act directly led to the Scopes trial of 1925, in which Christian fundamentalism won the battle but eventually lost the war; John T. Scopes was

found guilty of teaching evolution and fined, but the coverage of the trial made creationists, as they were shortly to become known, into a laughing stock. However, by the late 1970s, fundamentalism was on the rise in the United States once more, and with increased numbers, self confidence, and a new theoretical twist focusing overwhelmingly on the notion of “intelligent design,” creationists began to set in train a number of legal challenges to the teaching of evolution.

By 1980, a number of institutes such as the Institute for Creation Research and the Center for Scientific Creation had been established and the pattern of the modern day battle between science and religion had been set. A key difference between the present day debates and those characteristic of the past has been the role played by “science,” and incidentally, by the sociology of science. Emphatically, modern opponents of evolution have done their best to don the robes of science. The names “scientific creationism” and “creation science” themselves indicate the extent to which creationists have attempted to adopt the language, rhetoric, and at least ostensibly, the methodology and philosophy of science to justify their position in the public sphere, presenting themselves as more “scientific” than their opponents. So, for example, creationists have tried to demonstrate that the theory of evolution is not falsifiable in the Popperian sense, and therefore cannot be scientific. They have adopted Kuhn’s account of paradigm change as a justification for the existence of two incompatible but equally scientific accounts of life on earth – that given according to the theory of evolution by natural selection, and that provided in Genesis. They have seized on evolutionary debates such as those surrounding punctuated equilibrium (the idea that major biological change might occur suddenly and swiftly, rather than steadily and gradually) as evidence that the evolutionary consensus was falling apart, requiring more and more special pleading to be allowed to stand as science. A number of legal challenges to the teaching of evolution in schools were made in the closing years of the twentieth century, and more have occurred in the new millennium. In early 2005, the Kansas State Board of Education again held hearings on the topic of the scientific status of evolution and concluded

that it was indisputably in doubt. Opponents of evolution have, in some cases successfully, managed to portray evolution publicly as a theory in crisis, and to accuse scientists of fraudulently seeking to hide this in planning school textbooks. Ironically, the theory that was initially criticized by social scientists for naturalizing and therefore legitimizing the social and political inequalities of capitalist society is itself now the target of ultra conservatism in the United States.

At the same time, another strand of evolutionary theorizing has developed over the course of the twentieth century, a position that has become known as feminist sociobiology. Initially, one of the major criticisms of sociobiological thought had been that it portrayed men and women as fundamentally and naturally different types of beings with separate spheres and interests, which therefore accounted for the fact that most societies are patriarchal to a greater or lesser degree, that there is inequality between the sexes, and that woman's ultimate concern was with her children. This depiction of the woman's place as firmly situated within the home had been one of the key reasons for the intense and furious feminist opposition to sociobiology when it emerged in the late 1970s – and the emergence of such a perspective at the point when the equal rights movement was gaining ground on both sides of the Atlantic was not treated by activists as a coincidence. However, during the late 1980s and the 1990s, an increasing number of scientists and social scientists have been willing to put themselves forward as “feminist sociobiologists.” The intent of writers such as Sarah Hrdy, an anthropologist from UC Davis, Barbara Smuts (a primatologist at the University of Michigan), and Patricia Gowaty (a biologist from the University of Georgia) has been to address the initial feminist critique of sociobiological thinking and to seek to use insights from evolutionary theory to understand the nature of gender relations in the twenty first century as a first step to learning how to change them. They have revolutionized the way in which biology has studied and portrayed reproduction in humans and other animals, most famously by challenging the association between the feminine and the passive, demonstrating the active role that female animals take in making

reproductive decisions. Overall, this new take on understanding the nature of evolution represents an active attempt by some scientists to combine their feminist politics with their scientific practice, identifying and avoiding both the naturalistic (that what *is* is what *ought* to be) and the moralistic (that what *should not* be *is not*) fallacies, in order to develop new perspectives on both sexual politics and evolution as well as the reconsideration and the reordering of the relationship between evolutionary theory and human societies in the new millennium.

SEE ALSO: Comte, Auguste; Durkheim, Émile; Falsification; Fundamentalism; Gay Gene; Kuhn, Thomas and Scientific Paradigms; Malthus, Thomas Robert; Marx, Karl; Neoconservatism; Science and Religion; Science, Social Construction of; Scientific Knowledge, Sociology of; Society and Biology; Spencer, Herbert

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exchange network theory

Henry A. Walker

Exchange network theories focus on the processes through which network structures affect power distributions, power exercise, and benefits gained in exchange. Sociologists use the term exchange network theory to describe several theories, models, and research programs. The field grew out of research in social exchange theory – an orienting strategy that traces its roots to Aristotle and other philosophers of classical antiquity. George C. Homans's *Social Behavior* (1961, 1974), John Thibaut and Harold H. Kelley's *The Social Psychology of Groups* (1959), Richard M. Emerson's paper on "Power–Dependence Relations" (1962), and other contemporaneous works are responsible for reinvigorating exchange research in the late 1950s and early 1960s.

Modern exchange theories focused initially on dyadic relations. Homans (1961) discussed triads, but exchange network research awaited theoretical statements from Emerson (1972), James S. Coleman (1973), and David Willer and Bo Anderson (1981). Their theories directed the attention of exchange analysts to the unique properties of triads and larger networks.

Emerson (1972) extended the dyadic power dependence theory to networks and devised the standard definition of a network as a system of two or more connected exchange relations. Two relations are connected if exchange in one affects exchange in the other. For example,

the system A B C is a three actor network built by connecting two dyads, A B and B C, at B. Power dependence researchers were also responsible for the innovative use of resource pool relations rather than exchange relations in experiments. Positions in resource pool relations do not exchange valued resources. Instead, they bargain for shares of a resource pool but gain nothing if they fail to reach agreement. Although they are not true exchange relations, the payoff matrices for resource pool negotiations mirror those in exchange situations.

Coleman's theory, *The Mathematics of Collective Action* (1973), was the first to create systematic procedures that locate power in network structures, describe power use and resource flows, and predict payoffs at equilibrium, i.e., the amounts at which exchanges stabilize in the long run. Willer and Anderson began work on elementary theory in the mid 1970s and presented it in *Networks, Exchange, and Coercion* (1981). Elementary theory presented models that make clear the distinctions between social exchange, economic exchange, conflict, and coercive relations. The late 1980s and early 1990s brought new developments. Elementary theory spawned network exchange theory (Markovsky et al. 1988; Willer 2000), Friedkin (1992) developed the expected value model, and Bienenstock and Bonacich (1992) applied game theory to network structures.

Exchange network theories differ in their assumptions about the processes that link structure to power. They also have different scope limitations, including the numbers and types of network connections to which their analyses apply. Finally, they use different procedures to locate power and to predict power use and payoff structures.

NETWORK CONNECTIONS

The distribution of power in exchange networks varies with the types of connections within them. Power dependence theory uses two characteristics of network relations – symmetry and valence – to devise a typology of connection types. Consider an A B C network. It is connected *unilaterally* if AB exchange affects BC exchange but BC exchange does not affect AB exchange. It is *bilaterally* connected if

AB exchange affects BC exchange and BC exchange affects AB exchange. The network is *positively* connected if exchange in one relation increases the likelihood of exchange in the other. Finally, it is *negatively* connected if exchange in one relation reduces or precludes the possibility of exchange in the second. Four connection types are possible: unilateral positive, unilateral negative, bilateral positive, and bilateral negative.

Network exchange theory uses alternative classifications that have the advantage of compatibility with standard logical operators (e.g., *conjunction* and *disjunction*). The classification takes into account N , the number of positions connected to a position i ; M , the maximum number of relations from which i can benefit; and Q , the minimum number of relations within which i must exchange before it can gain any benefit. Given two or more relations connected at i , the five connection types are defined as follows:

inclusive connection : $N_i = M_i = Q_i > 1$

exclusive connection : $N_i > M_i \geq Q_i = 1$

null connection : $N_i = M_i > Q_i = 1$

inclusive exclusive connection : $N_i > M_i \geq Q_i > 1$

exclusive null connection : $N_i = M_i > Q_i > 1$

For example, the A B C network is *inclusively* connected at B if B can benefit from exchanges with A and C, and B must exchange with both before gaining any benefit ($N=2=M=2=Q=2>1$). The network is *exclusively* connected if B can benefit from exchange with either A or C (but not both), and *must* exchange with one in order to gain any benefit ($2>1\geq 1$), and similarly for the remaining connection types. Dyads are a special connection type for which $N_i=M_i=Q_i=1$; they are *singularly* connected.

PROCEDURES FOR LOCATING POWER

Power, as structural potential, affects the benefits that positions gain in exchange. Early network research on ideas drawn from other theoretical perspectives (e.g., field theory)

identified a positive relationship between a position's centrality and its capacity to influence other positions. Bavelas's (1950) studies of communication networks are classic examples. Bavelas's work was followed by important advances in the mathematical theory of graphs, theories of structural and cognitive balance, and in other field theoretic conceptions like French's (1956) theory of power. Students of power and influence used that research to infer that positional centrality is an important determinant of power and influence.

Power dependence researchers explored the possibility that centrality had important effects on power distributions. Their experiments showed that centrality is not a reliable indicator of power in exchange networks (Cook & Emerson 1978). Moreover, the failure of network centrality as a criterion for locating power led theorists to develop alternative methods for locating power in exchange networks.

Coleman introduced a theory based procedure that can be applied to any number of actors who hold varying quantities of any number of valued resources. The procedure uses two matrices to characterize network structures. The first is an N (number of positions) \times R (number of resources) interest matrix (X) that describes the proportion of each position's interest in every resource. The second is a $R \times N$ control matrix (C) that describes the proportion of each resource controlled by every position. Matrix operations are used to estimate a final control matrix (C^*). Coleman's theory predicts that equilibrium is reached when the resources of a position, j , committed to control an event, i ($r_j x_{ji}$), are equal to the value of full control of the event times the proportion of the event j controls at equilibrium ($v_i c^*_{ij}$). That is, equilibrium is achieved when $v_i c^*_{ij} = r_j x_{ji}$ is true for all positions in the network. A very limited number of experiments and simulations have tested Coleman's ideas but the experimental networks include several types of network connections.

Power dependence theorists initially devised procedures that used the graph theoretic concept of *vulnerability* to measure a position's dependence. One measure, reduction in maximum flow (RMF), indexes the degree to which a network is disrupted by removal of a position. A revised procedure, CRMF, is based on removal

of a line, but both measures proved inadequate for analyzing a variety of networks. Current power dependence procedures measure B's dependence on A as the amount of resources that B can gain from exchanges with A minus the resources B can gain from alternative exchange partners (e.g., C in the A B C network). The theory claims that B will exchange with A (or C) over successive exchanges until they reach the point at which the partners are equally dependent on one another. With few exceptions, power dependence procedures have been applied to negatively connected networks.

The first elementary theory experiments had participants exchange resources, but researchers using network exchange theory typically use the resource pool paradigm. Network exchange researchers initially used a graph theoretic power index (GPI) – a weighted function of the non intersecting lines in a network's graph – to predict the distribution of power. Today, network exchange theorists use elementary theory's law of resistance to predict the distribution of power. The law of resistance holds that exchanges occur at the point at which partners are equally resistant to a proposed exchange. Analysts use an "iterative seek" procedure in which actors are presumed to negotiate exchanges in decreasing order of benefits. They negotiate exchanges in high benefit relations before turning to relations from which they can expect to gain lower maximum benefits. The law of resistance is highly general and the method has been applied to networks with several connection types, although most studies have examined exclusively connected networks.

Researchers using the expected value model use a five step process to calculate payoffs in exchange networks. First, identify the network structure. Next, identify *every* possible exchange. At the third stage, use empirical findings or theory to identify or calculate the probable frequency of occurrence for each exchange. The fourth stage requires calculating the amount of resources that can be acquired by each position in the network. Finally, calculate the expected values of payoffs and use them to infer power distributions. Researchers in this tradition were the first to apply their procedures to a variety of networks in which relations have unequally valued resource pools (Bonacich & Friedkin 1998).

Bienenstock and Bonacich's (1992) application of game theory to exchange networks is based on the core solution for cooperative games. The approach is organized around the characteristic function, v . For every subset of positions in a network, $v(S)$ is the total payoff members can gain no matter what other positions do. The core solution is the set of all payoffs that satisfies individual, coalition, and group rationality. Individual rationality exists when no position in a coalition will accept a payoff less than it could gain on its own. Coalition rationality exists if no set of actors will accept total benefits that are less than they could earn in a coalition and that is true of every coalition in the network. Finally, group rationality exists when a grand coalition of all members maximizes its total reward. Game theory implies that networks for which there is a core will have stable outcomes. Those without a core will have unstable outcomes because some positions can improve their payoffs by joining a coalition. The core solution has been applied to exclusively connected networks, but the method can be applied to a range of situations including many that fall outside the scope of exchange network theories.

FUTURE RESEARCH

Exchange network theories have substantially advanced sociological understanding of network power processes, but the limited range of settings to which they have been applied tempers their success. Exchange networks are dynamic. They change as ties are broken, as new and different ties with different network connections are added, and as resources gain or lose value in cycles of plenty and scarcity. Studies of dynamic systems will probably require settings in which actors with many valued resources make real exchanges. Revised theories will take into account and integrate understandings of other processes – like status and legitimacy – that affect network behavior. These are daunting challenges and much difficult work lies ahead.

SEE ALSO: Blau, Peter; Coleman, James; Collective Action; Elementary Theory; Emerson, Richard M.; Game Theory; Homans, George;

Power Dependence Theory; Power, Theories of; Social Exchange Theory; Social Network Theory

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exchange-value

Rob Beamish

Exchange value – the most misunderstood concept in Marx’s analysis of the commodity – is best grasped by moving from the immediate to the complex. Useful things found in nature or procured without exchange and used for private consumption (directly or in the creation of something else for private use) have a qualitatively distinct, concrete, natural form. Their utility is what matters; they have no relevant social substance even if they are produced through labor. They are not exchanged; they do not contain value.

Useful things intended for exchange are procured or produced by social labor. Exchangeable commodities have a visible, concrete, useful form and an invisible social substance of quantitatively comparable units of congealed, socially necessary, simple, abstract, labor time. This invisible substance is value; the commodities’ “plain, homely, natural form” is the physical repository of their value (Marx 1976: 138).

To be exchanged, the abstract value congealed within each commodity must achieve a particular form of expression. That form only arises in the social relations of exchange; it is, therefore, a social form. As the formal expression of value arising through exchange, Marx termed it the commodity’s exchange value.

It is often thought that value and exchange value are interchangeable concepts; they are not. Commodities’ value – the socially necessary, simple, abstract labor time congealed within them – only exists abstractly. One cannot directly see, touch, taste, smell, or hear value; immediately its reality is invisible. Value becomes manifest only in exchange – exchange value is the manifest expression of value.

Commodities’ values first became manifest in simple exchange. The congealed value of 20 yards of linen first became manifest in the “the equivalent form of value” – an equivalent form that could be seen, touched, etc. (one coat, for example). The coat became the visibly manifest, equivalent form of value for the linen – it is the manifest exchange value of the linen. The equivalent form is a particular instance of exchange value; it arose in the social process of exchange and because it became manifest in exchange, it was, and remains, a social form. Use value is the concrete form of the commodity, exchange value its visible, social form, while value remains abstract and not directly visible.

As exchange expanded, the particular social form of value changed (as did the name of each particular form). The “expanded, relative form of value” represented exchange where a number of commodities manifested each other’s value (e.g., 1 coat = 10 lb. of tea = 1 ton of iron = 20 yards of linen). The “general form of value” arose as one commodity began habitually to represent the abstract value of others (e.g., the value of 1 coat, 10 lb. of tea, 1 ton of iron was expressed in the form of 20 yards of linen). As one commodity habitually became

the general form – most often a precious metal – the “money form of value” arose. A sum of money became the mature, social expression of exchange value.

SEE ALSO: Labor/Labor Power; Marx, Karl; Money; Use Value; Value

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exercise and fitness

Joseph G. Grzywacz

Exercise, physical activity, and fitness are distinct but interrelated concepts (Caspersen et al. 1985). Physical activity is any bodily movement produced by skeletal muscle, while exercise is planned and repeated physical activity that is structured into individuals' lives with the purpose of maintaining or improving some attribute of either health or skill (i.e., fitness). Exercise, therefore, is a subset of physical activity that is characterized by being patterned and purposeful, and fitness is a consequence of exercise. Exercise and fitness are of major interest because they are implicated in premature death, a wide variety of disease states, and quality of life (US Department of Health and Human Services [USDHHS] 1996).

Sociological inquiry around exercise and fitness expanded and changed during the past 25 years. In the early to mid 1980s a small number of studies were catalogued in sociological abstracts delineating social status predictors of exercise and between group differences in beliefs about exercise. In the late 1980s to early 1990s research activity doubled. During this time researchers documented how different social processes such as victimization and job stress were associated with exercise among adults, and papers began describing exercise as a form of consumption. Research doubled again in the mid to late 1990s, with research

continuing to illustrate differences in exercise patterns *between* different groups (e.g., class), as well as examinations of exercise *within* specific contexts (e.g., rural) and social groups (e.g., age and gender groups). Body image research and papers examining the role of exercise in the social expression of self also established a foothold during this period. Research doubled again from the late 1990s to the present. New strands of research in this period included comprehensive models examining determinants of exercise from multiple levels, the role of exercise (and other health behaviors) in health trends over time and health disparities between groups, and essays examining the political agenda underlying the promotion of exercise.

This broad summary of the literature illustrates three major points about sociological research around exercise and fitness. First, exercise has only recently become an explicit area of sociological research. Second, there has been exponential growth in exercise research beginning in the mid 1990s. This growth coincided with ongoing initiatives to promote exercise as well as ongoing evaluations documenting limited success toward those goals (McGinnis & Lee 1995). Finally, the majority of research is characterized predominantly as “sociology for exercise” or the application of sociological concepts and tools for understanding variation in exercise so as to better refine or develop techniques for promoting exercise and fitness (Thorogood 1992).

There are several issues and areas for additional sociological analysis that would contribute to advancing middle range theorizing about exercise and fitness. Two lines of future inquiry that are particularly important are outlined below. The first advocates more sociological analyses that expose the inherent values and assumptions underlying the meaning of exercise and the widespread promotion of exercise (i.e., sociology of exercise). The second line of advocated inquiry involves continued application of sociological concepts and tools to enhance understanding of exercise (i.e., sociology for exercise).

Critical analysis of the interests and values underlying exercise is needed. Consider two individuals: the first person walks 3 miles each day for diabetes control whereas the second person walks 3 miles each day to work.

By definition (Caspersen et al. 1985), the first person is “exercising” while the second person is not; yet, the physiological (and presumably the health related) consequences of each person’s structured and repeated activity are similar. (Recent public health recommendations have shifted from physical activity with the explicit goal of health maintenance or improvement to simply regular sustained physical activity [USDHHS 1996]; nonetheless, discourse around exercise continues to prioritize leisure time physical activities that benefit cardiorespiratory health.) This example raises important questions, such as: “Whose interests are being served by widespread attempts to promote exercise?”; “Which values are being prioritized through advocacy and surveillance of exercise?”; and “What are the social consequences of defining exercise in terms of health intentions?” (Thorogood 1992).

A related area for critical analysis is an examination of the alternative approaches to health promotion that remain underdeveloped while social attention is directed toward exercise. Without question, exercise contributes to a variety of salutary outcomes; however, these same outcomes are frequently equally influenced by other factors. For example, results from the Alameda County study indicated that the nine year mortality risk for both women and men attributed to health behaviors (including physical activity) was comparable in magnitude to the mortality risk attributed to social integration (Berkman & Breslow 1983). Why is there widespread effort to increase the number of people who exercise, but no widespread effort to increase the number of people who volunteer in their communities or participate in civic organizations? Likewise, a focus on exercise and what are typically considered individual lifestyle “choices” diverts discourse from other strong determinants of poor health such as social inequalities and poverty. To what extent does public attention toward exercise distract from other viable targets for improving population health? Answers to questions such as these will expose the values and interests underlying a focus on promotion of exercise, and they would offer important insight for building comprehensive theories of exercise.

A second line of future inquiry involves more dynamic and multifaceted applications of

sociological concepts and tools for understanding exercise. Additional analyses in three areas appear particularly fruitful for theory building. First, additional analyses addressing the structure versus agency debate is essential for explaining trends in exercise over time, and for guiding attempts to increase rates of exercise. Kerry McGannon and Michael Mauws (2002) exemplify how sociological tools can be combined to explain how social and temporal contexts constrain exercise while they are simultaneously being created and recreated through individual activity and social discourse. Next, more research is needed that links exercise to social processes at multiple levels in the social ecology. Scholars have speculated exercise and other health promoting behaviors have been undermined by macrostructural changes such as modernization and deindustrialization (e.g., Kumanyika et al. 2002). However, very little empirical support exists corroborating these claims, nor is there documentation of the mechanisms through which these changes might occur. Finally, more research examining the complex influence of multiple social structures and processes on exercise is needed. Catherine Ross’s (2000) analysis of neighborhood crime, neighborhood poverty, individual poverty, and fear of victimization illustrates the relevance of multifaceted models of exercise, and it exemplifies the convergence of sociological methods of sampling, measurement, and analysis that allows for this type of research.

Sociological analyses around exercise and fitness have accelerated over the past 10 years; yet, sociology has much more to offer for building theory that adequately explains exercise. Two lines of future inquiry for advancing exercise theory have been advocated. The first involves critical analysis of exercise. The goal of this sociology of exercise is to more clearly expose the interests, values, and assumptions underlying exercise and the widespread promotion of exercise in the population. The second line of advocated research involves the continued study of exercise using sociological concepts and tools. The goal of this sociology for exercise is to move toward a more dynamic and multifaceted understanding of exercise. Results from each line of inquiry alone are insufficient, but together they provide the building material for useful theories of exercise.

SEE ALSO: Health Behavior; Health Life styles; Health Risk Behavior; Health and Sport

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exhibitionism

Brendan Gough

Sexual exhibitionism is often regarded as “deviant,” both in commonsense discourse where (male) “flashers” are categorized as “perverts,” and in psychiatric discourse where terms denoting pathology (such as antisocial and obsessive compulsive) are applied. In the

Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders IV (DSM IV, American Psychiatric Association, 1994), exhibitionism is considered a paraphilia in which sexual fantasies and behaviors involve exposing one’s genitals to a stranger. Diagnosis of exhibitionism is dependent on sexual fantasies and/or sexual behavior eliciting clinically significant distress or impairment in social, occupational, or other important areas of functioning.

The vast majority of literature on sexual exhibitionism can be located in a psychomedical context and is based on the assessment and treatment of men who have been incarcerated for criminal and/or disturbing behaviors. Despite this body of work, there is little consensus as to the defining characteristics of this population. While some researchers portray this group as shy, inhibited, and non assertive, others point to low self esteem, difficulty expressing anger, and poor self control. In addition, some research reports an association between men who exhibit and later violent sex offenses, such as rape and pedophilia.

The virtual omission of women from the literature on sexual exhibitionism is significant since the practice of exhibitionism by women is now more prevalent than ever. In early work on women exhibitionists, gender differences were highlighted. The implicit assumption is that women’s exhibitionism is somehow less real or less serious compared to that of men. For example, it has been claimed that a woman could not become erotically aroused by exposing her genitalia – unlike a man. It was thought that women are driven to exhibit themselves to gain attention and to prevent feelings of worthlessness. This emphatic disavowal of sexual desire for women who exhibit can be linked to wider cultural discourses which constrain the expression of an independent, assertive female sexuality – what has been termed the “missing discourse of desire.” Indeed, feminists have long criticized the role of medicine and psychology in reinforcing traditional gender relations through pathologizing “gender inappropriate” behavior. In particular, the unitary conceptualization of paraphilia within psychiatry does not account for variations in practice, context, and reception of sexual exhibitionism.

However, more recent work with non clinical samples of women exhibitionists and

strippers points to the liberating and transgressive potential of exposing one's body to others, including Internet exhibitionism, part of a burgeoning industry in interactive sex entertainment. For example, interviews with women exhibitionists highlight themes of personal fulfillment and control, peer group support, and a sense of responsibility concerning when and where to exhibit. Sociological and feminist debate, however, considers the social construction of women's exhibitionism in social contexts where patriarchal ideals and practices prevail. For example, while sexual exhibitionism might be regarded as emancipatory on an individual level, critical analysis may implicate this practice within the conventional male gaze on female "objects." It is clear that further theoretical and empirical work is needed to interrogate the place and meaning of women's exhibitionism in different contexts. In addition, research is required on male exhibitionists which is not constrained by psychiatric constructions of dangerous and deranged "flashers" so that the complexity and variability of this phenomenon are examined. Future work should thus explore exhibitionism with diverse samples differentiated by gender, age, social class, sexual orientation, and ethnicity.

SEE ALSO: Sex and Gender; Sexual Deviance; Sexual Practices; Sexualities and Consumption

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existential sociology

Joseph A. Kotarba

Existential sociology emerged in the late 1970s as the most recent version of everyday life sociology. Writers in this perspective have attempted to integrate symbolic interactionism's powerful concepts of the self and the situation, phenomenological sociology's emphasis on the social construction of reality, and ethnomethodology's telling critique of conventional sociological theory and methods, with an innovative argument for the centrality of embodiment and feelings to human agency. Thus, *existential sociology can be defined descriptively as the study of human experience in the world (or existence) in all its forms*. A key feature of experience in the (contemporary) world is change. Existential sociologists expect, if not assume, change to be a constant feature of people's lives, their sense of self, their experience of the social world, the other people that populate the social world, and the culture that provides meaning for life. Everyday life is more than merely situational and problematic, a point on which all the varieties of everyday life sociology generally agree. Everyday life is *dramatic* – in an aesthetic sense – and experienced as such. In contrast to Erving Goffman's dramaturgical model of social life, the drama that existential sociologists see in everyday life does not follow anyone else's script. The actor is simultaneously writer, producer, and actor on a stage not necessarily of his or her choosing, but one that cannot simply be exited without confrontation with the producer/director (e.g., agents of social control).

At a more general and intellectual level, existential sociology can be seen as part of the broad intellectual trend that can be traced back to the Copernican revolution that supplanted the Aristotelian belief in an inalterable and immutable universe. Since then, modern thought has progressed from the search for absolute and eternal ideas to a reconceptualization of reality as change, flux, complexity, and uncertainty. Robert Baumer (1977: 20) has referred to this historical trend as the movement from "being to becoming," that is, to "a mode of thinking that contemplates everything – nature,

man, society, history, God himself – *sub specie temporis*, as not merely changing but as for ever evolving into something new and different.” The notion of *becoming* is central to both existential philosophy and existential sociology.

Existential sociology reflects the renaissance occurring in existential thinking with, for example, renewed interest in the work of Friedrich Nietzsche, which served as a precursor to existentialism through its illumination of the dark and non rational side of humanity. Historical events also occasion a reconsideration of existentialist thought. The revitalization of intellectual life in the recently democratized central and eastern European societies has freed writers there to explore pro individualistic and anti collectivist paradigms such as existentialism. For example, Leszek Dzielicki's *Paradise in a Concrete Cage* (1988) is a first person account, written by this well known Polish ethnographer, of the strategies developed by intellectuals in post World War II Poland to maintain a semblance of individuality and intellectual legitimacy within that gray and depressing Stalinist era.

EXISTENTIAL (SOCIAL) THOUGHT

Existentialism gained its greatest popularity and acceptance in the years after World War II, at first in Europe, and then several years later in America. The writings of French philosopher and writer Jean Paul Sartre, as well as the novels and essays of Albert Camus, are among the most important reasons for existentialism's initial popularity and acceptance (Craib 1976). The formal literature of the existentialist tradition is known by its emphasis on these central themes: the nature of the individual; the central role of the passions and emotions in human life; the nature and responsibilities of human freedom; and the non rational aspects of life. Diverse existentialisms have arisen to address these questions, and all express a certain attitude of rebellion. It is a rebellion against the received and inherited “wisdom” of one's culture, against what most people think, against what most intellectuals consider true, against the herd mentality and its popular culture, against conformity. From

this, it is not surprising that existentialists have aligned themselves with the full range of human values and opinions, including fundamentalist Christianity, anti Christianity, atheism, humanism, communism, anti communism, socialism, anti socialism, left wing politics, right wing politics, anti politics, pro democracy, anti democracy, and so on. Even on some of the fundamental intellectual or philosophical issues, existential thought runs the full gamut: Sartre says that individuals have absolute freedom, whereas for Nietzsche, freedom is a philosophical myth.

Existentialist ideas began influencing the social sciences more than four decades ago. In 1962, Edward Tiryakian published *Sociologism and Existentialism*, an influential work of sociological theory, which sought to resolve two very different ways of thinking about human social life and existence. The first is “sociologism,” a term commonly associated with the seminal sociological scholarship of Émile Durkheim. The idea behind sociologism is very simple to grasp: individuals don't matter very much. Social reality is a reality *sui generis*, or in and of itself, to use Durkheim's phrase. The larger social structures of society are seen as superseding and transcending the lives and meanings of individuals, and are not dependent on individuals in any meaningful way. The second perspective is that of “existentialism,” and this view tends to place a much greater emphasis on individuals, their choices, their responsibilities, their passions, their decisions, their cowardice, their virtues, and so on. Tiryakian proposed to bring these two seemingly incompatible perspectives together in a manner that would retain the integrity of each. In 1967, Peter Berger and Thomas Luckmann published *The Social Construction of Reality*, which, like Tiryakian's work, sought to bring together two prevalent social science views about life. Berger and Luckmann used the terms *man in society* and *society in man* to draw a similar analytical contrast (see also Manning 1973).

In 1977, Jack Douglas and John Johnson edited a collection of essays titled *Existential Sociology*, in which the authors engaged structuralists and other cultural determinists, stressing the relative freedom of individuals, and the partial independence of individuals from their social and cultural contexts. They emphasized

that social and cultural realities are not determined, but rather are socially constructed, meaning that the agency, choice, will, intention, and interpretation of actual individuals were decisive for the determination of meaning. That early work additionally stressed the relative independence and dominance of feelings and emotions over thoughts and cognition, and in addition their relative independence and dominance over values.

FEELINGS AND EMOTIONS

Emotions and emotionality underlie all human experience and social life, shaping all subjectivity, intersubjectivity, everyday interaction, social exchange, social bonds, and social divisions. Emotions are not only inevitable, and not only forces destructive to the social order. Emotions are also essential for forming and perpetuating human societies.

As Candace Clark (2002) notes, since the scientific community made the conceptual and linguistic shift from the *passions* to *emotions* 300 years ago, most of the disciplines in the social and natural sciences – including sociology – proceeded to ignore emotions and emotionality. In short, for most of western history, common wisdom has presumed that emotion and reason are separate and contradictory, and the bias has been against emotions and in favor of cognition. In the midst of this overrationalized view of life, Jack Douglas strongly reminded other sociologists to take seriously the notion of *brute being*, the core of feeling and perception that is our innermost selves, our beings. He argued that we must recognize the crucial role that passions play in social life.

The study of feelings and emotions in existential sociology stresses the importance of seeing how people experience affect in concrete situations when they are attempting to define and master immediate problems and issues. Put differently, existential sociology argued early for the ethnographic study of feelings and emotions. Every culture and subculture includes its own emotion labels, definitions, feeling rules, roles, values, “knowledge,” and “social logics” pertaining to emotions and emotionality. Together, these make up what Clark refers to as *emotional culture*. The taken for granted

“knowledge” and “social logics” concerning when emotions occur, how emotions affect the individual, and what happens when emotions are expressed or displayed to others are also extremely variable. Emotional culture in western societies includes such capitalistic phenomena as the greeting card industry, which instructs us in the proper feeling rules toward mothers, fathers, friends, birthday boys and girls, the bereaved, benefactors, the sick, recovering addicts, valentines, and marriage partners through which authentic sentiments are reduced to small pieces of paper – with accompanying envelopes to facilitate delivery.

THE EXISTENTIAL SELF

In 1984, Joseph Kotarba and Andrea Fontana edited a collection of essays titled *The Existential Self in Society*. The book was an effort not only to refine the existential sociology perspective, but also to respond to a movement within sociology toward renewed interest in humanistic and interpretive concepts of the self as opposed to positivistic and measurable concepts. The concept of the existential self is concerned with the experience of individuality – through the perspective of the subject – as it unfolds, adapts, and copes in concrete, everyday life situations. Since existential sociology is designed to monitor closely the tone of and trends in contemporary life, attention is given to the many people in all walks of life who are dissatisfied with both their own sense of who they are and society’s demands of who they should be. Furthermore, new social forms, whether they are entirely innovative or simply reconstructions of existing social forms, are reflections of new and innovative ways in which members of our society are coming to think and feel about themselves. The conceptual relationship between innovative social forms and changes in the self is complex. But it is clear that many members of our society are actively seeking new ways of fulfilling and expressing themselves.

The following working definition of the existential self is intended to display the relative fluidity of the modern self and to account for the internal as well as external manifestations of the process of making sense of one’s being.

The existential self refers to an individual's unique experience of being within the context of contemporary social conditions, an experience most notably marked by an incessant sense of becoming and an active participation in social change. The following is a brief discussion of the major features of the existential self.

The existential self is embodied. Being within the world means that feelings and primordial perception precede rationality and symbol use and, in fact, activate them. Joseph Kotarba's (1983) research on chronic pain clearly illustrates the limitations on the rational/scientific/medical strategies for making sense of and mastering bodily afflictions. Most people in western societies, regardless of social class, trust modern medicine to alleviate pain. Yet, when pain fails to go away or respond to modern medicine, the person is likely to abandon unquestioned faith in modern medicine in favor of whatever alternative healing modalities promise help (e.g., chiropractic, faith healing, holistic health care). The primary definition of being sick comes from the person's body. Even the social definition, "it's all in your head" (or more professionally, "psychosomatic disease") that refers *directly* to the self, is disregarded. The wellness movement is another example of the ways people in late capitalistic American society attempt to perfect the self by perfecting the body in terms not only of health but also of appearance (Kotarba & Bentley 1988).

The existential self is becoming. Jean Paul Sartre, in his philosophical and literary writings, argued dramatically that we are condemned to be free, condemned to choose continually who we are, because existence in itself is empty and meaningless. The phenomenologist Maurice Merleau Ponty takes a more moderate view, and one more conducive to the sociological project, by insisting that our becoming must be grounded in the real, social world if we have any intention of being effective in coping with the given world. The individual is encouraged by the brute reality of life to acquire some distinctive *style* of self actualization. Freedom, therefore, is viable only to the degree that it allows us to *control* the goals of our endeavors and to utilize them for our own personal growth. Put differently, existentialism presents an image of the self to society relationship that is quite apropos to today's world: the image of

the self *confronting* society. We constantly attempt to shape and manipulate society – that is, society as we experience it – in order to have it as a meaning resource for fulfilling our most basic needs and desires. Existential sociology examines the various social activities in which people engage to preclude or escape meaninglessness including, for example, religion, spirituality, recreational drugs, music, dance, art, sex, athletics, self actualization, and intellectual endeavors.

The existential self evolves continuously throughout the life course. Joseph Kotarba (2003) has described the way rock 'n' roll music informs the becoming of self among middle aged people in our society. Rock 'n' roll can affect adults' sense of self in many ways: as continuing rock 'n' roll fans, as parents of rock 'n' roll fans, as adults who construct lifestyles and work styles incorporating rock 'n' roll, as citizens contending with the political and ethical issues surrounding rock 'n' roll, and simply as people who, over the course of their lives, have come to use rock 'n' roll music and culture as a source of meaning for their joys and their sorrows.

The existential self occasions social change. The sociological literature on social change commonly places the self in the position of dependent variable. From the existential perspective, the self is seen as an active agent in the process of social change. The intention is not to swing the pendulum of causality in the opposite direction, by asserting the preeminence of the Meadean "I" over the "me," but only to view the process of social change *reflexively*. By focusing on the self, we can arrive at the following tentative model of social change. The individual perceives an uncertainty or change occurring in the segments of the social world that impinge on his or her existence. This uncertainty, whether it is "real" or imagined, can occur at the level of technology, attitudes, values, rules, or any other realm of social life. What is crucial is that the individual views these changes as *critically relevant* to maintaining a coherent and satisfying self. This relevance can take two forms. The individual may decide that uncertainty in social conditions leaves existing modes of self actualization obsolete. Or the individual may perceive new possibilities for self actualization emanating from

changing social conditions. In either case, the individual will seek new means for self actualization, usually in the form of new social roles. This search is likely to be a *collective* endeavor, for the individual will either actively cooperate with others who are experiencing similar concerns for self and are therefore instituting new social forms, or he or she will passively share in new social forms created by others. The process is then perpetuated when these new social forms provide still other individuals with a new basis for perceiving uncertain social conditions. The recently evolved role of the ex nun and the emergence of the primitive house church are examples of the ways people respond to uncertainty occurring in organized religion (Kotarba & Fontana 1984).

THE POSTMODERN TURN IN EXISTENTIAL SOCIOLOGY

In 2002, Joseph Kotarba and John Johnson edited *Postmodern Existential Sociology*, a collection of essays examining similarities between the two perspectives, such as distaste for the master narratives of the Enlightenment and an appreciation for rich and metaphoric writing. Furthermore, the advent of postmodern thinking in sociology over the past 15 years or so provides some useful strategies for the continuing evolution of existential sociology.

An important similarity between postmodernism and existential sociology is the heavy emphasis both place on understanding the mass media. Postmodernism sees the mass media as virtually synonymous with culture in late capitalistic society. In existential sociology, the mass media are becoming one of the most compelling audiences to the self, supplanting religion, the community, and even the family to some extent (Altheide 2002). While it is clear that the mass media significantly shape politics, from an existential perspective politics and power reside in the same everyday life world as personal feelings and perceptions. Existential sociology views macro phenomena like politics and power as practical processes and tasks that are conducted and accomplished by real people in concrete situations. Following the existential notion of agency, politics becomes an organized method for people to manage personal feelings,

perceptions, and objectives. The techno/rave scene in popular music, for example, illustrates the way young people have given up on the politics of their (baby boomer) parents by disregarding the political values of the 1960s (e.g., revolt against tradition, commitment to changing the world) in favor of *existential strategies* (Hitzler & Pfadenhauer 2002) by which youth struggle dramatically for individuality through obstinate aesthetic tendencies, private preferences, or simply conspicuous patterns of consumption.

One of the most fruitful points of compatibility between the existential sociology project and postmodernism is in the area of research methods. Both perspectives agree that there is no inherent hierarchy of methods in terms of power or truthfulness. Research is inherently political/organizational and practical, and it is designed and conducted for practical reasons (e.g., journal editorial policies and contract obligations to funding agencies). Both perspectives also agree that the composition and style of research reports and the dissemination of research findings are personal to the writer. Finally, both perspectives argue that the researcher has an extremely wide range of presentation styles to choose from, many of which can be borrowed from the humanities as well as the social sciences. Innovative methods include video ethnography, such as Kotarba's (2003) portrayal of the impact of popular music on everyday family interaction, and the short story, such as Fontana's (2001) vivid autobiographical description of working as a pit crew member while studying racing at the Bonneville Speed Week.

Finally, existential sociology is critical of certain features of postmodern social thought. In addition to their tendency to rely on arm chair theorizing instead of direct observation of the everyday life world, some postmodern sociologists discard one of the most important concepts in everyday life sociology: the subject. The term "subject" refers to the object/actor we study in sociology. As Stanford Lyman (1997) notes, in everyday life sociology, including existential sociology, the subject is a real person of flesh who navigates through life encountering situations and making the best decisions possible, not merely a *narrative* or story created by mass mediated culture.

SEE ALSO: Emotion: Social Psychological Aspects; Ethnomethodology; Everyday Life; Phenomenology; Self; Symbolic Interaction

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expectation states theory

Joseph Berger and David G. Wagner

Expectation states theory is a set of closely related theories concerned with various processes by which social interactants or *actors* draw information from their social and cultural environment and organize that information into expectation states that determine their interaction with others. Together with research testing these theories and other research applying them to problems in everyday interaction (such as interracial interaction in schools), expectation states theory constitutes a *theoretical research program*.

POWER AND PRESTIGE THEORY

The earliest work in the expectation states program concerns the process by which actors come to develop differentiated performance expectations even in groups where there are no significant social or cultural differences among the group members. Extensive research by Bales and his colleagues (see, e.g., Bales et al. 1951) revealed that inequalities in the initiation of activity, in the receipt of activity, and on ratings of best ideas and group guidance regularly emerged in such groups. Moreover, these inequalities were highly stable and, with the possible exception of sociometric rankings, tended to be intercorrelated. Berger (1958) and Berger and Conner (1969) conceptualized these inequalities in their power and prestige theory as components of an *observable power and prestige order* (OPPO) consisting of four intercorrelated behaviors: (1) chances to perform (action opportunities); (2) problem solving attempts (performance outputs); (3) communicated evaluations of problem solving attempts (rewards); and (4) changes of opinion when confronted with disagreement (influence). They argued that actors communicate their evaluations of one another's contributions in the normal course of interaction, eventually leading members to anticipate differences in their future performances, and thus to develop differentiated expectation states for these actors. Once these states emerged, they determined the

group's OPPO. While OPPO behaviors are functions of the underlying expectations, they also operate to maintain these expectations. Consequently, the power and prestige order of the group tends to be stable. An important consequence of a generalized version of this theory (Berger & Conner 1974) is that inequalities in any of the OPPO components can determine an actor's position in the OPPO.

STATUS CHARACTERISTICS THEORY

While the power and prestige theory deals with groups in which actors initially are similar in terms of status, status characteristics theory is concerned with groups in which actors initially differ on such status distinctions as gender, race, or occupational positions. Extensive research already existed in the 1950s and 1960s that showed that such status distinctions consistently determine the distribution of power and prestige positions in task groups, whether or not the distinction is related to the group's task. The initial status characteristics theory (Berger et al. 1966, 1972) was formulated to provide a theoretical explanation for this important relation. Subsequently, this theory was elaborated and formalized (Berger et al. 1977).

Berger et al. (1977) explain the powerful effect of such statuses as gender or race on the basis of the activation in the group of cultural beliefs about these status distinctions. A coherent set of such beliefs defines a *diffuse status characteristic* (D). A characteristic (say gender) is a D for members of a given group at a given time if and only if they (1) differentially evaluate two or more states of D (e.g., men are in general more highly valued than women), (2) stereotypically relate these states to evaluated states of other characteristics (e.g., men are more mechanically skilled than women), and (3) stereotypically relate these states to similarly evaluated generalized expectation states (e.g., men are more capable at tasks in general than women).

Beliefs about D become *salient* in a group if D is relevant to the group's task (e.g., the task is believed to favor males or females) or if D is a basis of discrimination in the group (as in a mixed gender group). If salient and not initially

relevant, D will normally become relevant to the group's task by a *burden of proof* process, unless its relevance is challenged or it is dissociated from the task. By virtue of this process, status advantages tend to be generalized from situation to situation. If new actors enter the group, a *sequencing* process takes place. Status information relating to the new actor is processed by the original actors through the salience and burden of proof processes and adjoined to their previously processed information as long as the original actors remain in the situation.

If multiple status characteristics become relevant to the group's task, actors will combine the information in these characteristics in forming performance expectations for themselves and the others. This *combining process* takes into account whether the status information creates expectations for success or failure at the task, and the weight of that information, that is, how relevant it is to the group task. Finally, by the *basic expectation* assumption, once actors have formed expectations for self and others, their power and prestige behaviors are determined by these expectations.

Status characteristics theory is abstract and general and has been used to describe status processes involving a variety of status distinctions including gender, race, ethnic identities, educational attainment, occupational position, sexual orientation, physical attractiveness, and the status structures of work teams. In addition, the theory's arguments and consequences have been supported by extensive empirical studies (e.g., Wagner & Berger 2002).

GROWTH OF THE PROGRAM

Over the years the expectation states program has grown in different ways. Formulations have been constructed that represent theoretical *elaborations* of the core status characteristics theory described above. One such extension is the reward expectations theory that describes how reward expectations are formed in status situations, and how reward allocations generate performance expectations. Other formulations have been constructed that represent *integrations* of different theories in the program. This is the case with the behavior status theory that

Table 1 Expectation states theory^a

<i>Theory</i>	<i>Phenomenon of concern</i>
Power and prestige	Emergence and maintenance of differentiated OPPOs in status-undifferentiated groups
Status characteristics and expectation states	Formation of expectation states based on socially established status characteristics; maintenance of OPPOs in status-differentiated groups
Distributive justice	Reward expectations and justice norms arising from the relation of reward expectations to actual reward allocations
Sources of evaluation	Formation of expectations and their effects on behavior based on evaluations of actors with legitimated rights to evaluate others
Evolution of status expectations	Evolution of status expectations as actors move through different task situations with different others
Status cues	Role of verbal and non-verbal cues in attributions of performance capacities and status categories; their dependence on actors' established status positions
Reward expectations	Interrelation of status, task, and reward expectations and the inequalities created by these interrelations
Behavior-status	Integrates research from the power and prestige and the status characteristics branches
Evaluations-expectations	Integrates research from status characteristics and source theory branches
Legitimation	Legitimation and delegitimation of OPPOs
Sentiments and status	Interrelation of affect and sentiment processes with status and expectation state processes
Multiple standards	How multiple standards maintain prevailing status distinctions
Status construction	How institutionalized status characteristics are socially constructed and diffused through society

^aOPPO stands for "observable power and prestige order."

integrates concepts and principles of the power and prestige theory with those of status characteristics theory. Finally, there are formulations that represent *proliferations*. These theories tackle new substantive problems while building on the concepts and principles already established within the program, as with Foschi's theory of multiple standards. Table 1 presents a summary of the major current branches of the program.

An examination of two of these branches will illustrate how the concerns of the program have expanded and deepened. The first of these branches extends the core status characteristics theory to deal with the legitimation of power and prestige orders. The second focuses on an important new problem within the program concerned with the creation of status characteristics.

STATUS LEGITIMATION THEORY

Ridgeway and Berger (1986, 1988) have constructed an extension of the core status characteristics theory that describes the conditions and processes under which the power and prestige order in a group becomes legitimated. First, they argue that the cultural framework within which the group operates incorporates consensual beliefs about how high and low valued status positions are generally allocated to individuals, based on their status characteristics, capacities, and achievements. One such belief, for example, is that men occupy more highly valued status positions than women in contemporary American society. The theory describes the conditions under which such beliefs become salient to the members of a given task oriented group.

Actors use these consensual beliefs to form expectations regarding who will occupy which status positions in their immediate group. In turn, these expectations determine differences in the generalized deferential behaviors – the respect, honor, and displays of social importance that actors accord to different members of the group. Assume, for example, that the generalized deferential behaviors accorded to a high status member of the group are validated by the behaviors of others in the group. Then, the greater the number of others validating the original deferential behaviors, the greater the probability that the power and prestige order involving that high status member becomes a legitimated order. Behavior is *validated* if others engage in similar behavior, or at least engage in no behavior that contradicts the original behavior.

With legitimation, expectations become *normative* and there is a presumption that group members will collectively support them. The high status actor, for example, has the right to initiate problem solving behaviors for the group and to expect others to be receptive to such behaviors. At the same time, others have the right to expect more valued contributions from that actor than from the low status actor. In addition, high status actors come to have rights to exercise controlling behaviors, such as dominating behaviors, over the actions of others. Berger et al. (1998) extended this theory to explain how a legitimated power and prestige order can become delegitimated. This formalization shows, among other things, how the number of status distinctions in a group, the consistency of these status distinctions, and their relevance to the group's task each affect the likelihood that a power and prestige order becomes legitimated.

The legitimation theory explains why low status group members meet resistance when they engage in task behaviors that are "above their rank." It also explains the resistance that women and other minorities generally face when they employ directive behaviors while in task leadership positions. The theory argues that, because of their low external status, when such individuals become task leaders they are more likely to be working from a non legitimate OPPO, and therefore controlling and directive

behaviors are less likely to have collective support in the group.

The legitimation theory, like other theories in this program, is multilevel. Action in a group is conceived of as occurring with a pre given cultural framework. A particular process begins with the activation of status categories or cultural beliefs from that framework. But for a structure to emerge (say, a power and prestige order) or for it to be transformed (say, from a non legitimated order to a legitimated order) requires the contingent behaviors of the members of the group, whose expectations and validating behaviors are involved in creating the local realities within which the group operates.

STATUS CONSTRUCTION THEORY

Cecilia Ridgeway (1991, 1997) has theorized about the construction of institutionalized status characteristics. She argues that such characteristics are most likely to emerge out of what she calls *double dissimilar situations*. Imagine a population in which individuals are discriminated in terms of a characteristic, call it N, whose states partition the population so that there are two types of people, N(a) and N(b). Further imagine that there are differences in this population in the resources (rewards) possessed by individuals so that there are individuals who are resource rich and those who are resource poor. These resources or rewards may be either tangible (like honorary titles and corner offices) or intangible (like friendship or social acceptance).

Now consider an interaction situation involving N(a) and N(b) type individuals such that, say, the N(a)s are rich and the N(b)s are poor. Because of the resource difference in the group, Ridgeway argues, a power and prestige structure will emerge where those in higher positions tend to be the resource rich and those in lower positions are resource poor. On the basis of this inequality in behavior, individuals are likely to develop beliefs in the abilities of the N(a) and N(b) individuals that correspond to their different positions in the OPPO. In general, if particular states of N are consistently associated with high and low resources, and if they occur frequently enough, eventually

individuals come to attribute differences in individual abilities to their respective states of N. A new status characteristic will thereby emerge. Finally, for such an evolving characteristic to become part of actors' cultural framework, it must be diffused through a social population.

CONCLUSION

Expectation states theory is a cumulative program. Current theories say more than what was said in earlier theories, and current empirical research upon which these theories rest is more extensive than that of an earlier stage. Further, investigation of expectation states processes has spread beyond the United States, now including research in Israel, Germany, Australia, Canada, Holland, and Turkey. At the same time, researchers are tackling new theoretical and applied problems while working with the concepts and principles within the program. (For a more detailed review of much of this work, see Wagner & Berger 2002). Thus, although it clearly has grown (see Table 1), expectation states theory is still a program in progress.

SEE ALSO: Legitimacy; Mathematical Sociology; Micro-Macro Links; Social Influence; Status Construction Theory; Theoretical Research Programs; Theory Construction

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expectations and aspirations

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Expectations and aspirations, within sociological research on education and social inequality, are stable prefigurative orientations composed of specific beliefs about one's future trajectory

through the educational system and one's ultimate class or status position. As adolescents age, these expectations and aspirations are presumed to condition current behavior and, in the process, become self fulfilling prophecies.

Expectations are sometimes distinguished from aspirations in theory, with the former stipulated to refer to realistic appraisals rather than idealistic goals. Nonetheless, almost all empirical research has utilized the same straightforward operationalization for both concepts. Educational expectations and aspirations are usually answers that adolescents give to questions such as: "Do you plan to go to college?" and "As things stand now, how far in school do you think you will get?" Occupational expectations and aspirations are responses to questions such as: "What type of job do you plan or expect to have at age 30?" These survey questions elicit future plans which are generally quite optimistic, thereby qualifying as sufficiently idealistic for the analytic and explanatory purposes of those who wish to have a measure of aspirations.

Measurement of expectations such as these began with the work of educational psychologists employed by the Educational Testing Service in the early 1950s. Since then, sociologists have dominated their study. The 1953 article entitled "Educational and Occupational Aspirations of Common Man Boys," written by Joseph A. Kahl, is perhaps the most influential early piece, as it was completed as a research report for the Mobility Project led by Talcott Parsons just as structural functionalism was in its ascendancy. The central question of Kahl's study was: "What influences the aspirations of the boys in the lower middle levels of the status range whose environment gives them a wide choice?" (Kahl 1953: 189). In order to show that "these boys must make a conscious and pointed decision at some stage of their careers," he reported the results of in depth interviews with 24 boys of middling social origins, only half of whom expected to go to college. His goal was then to "explore the decision making of such boys," whose beliefs about the future were not predetermined either by expectations grounded in their class origins or by their cognitive abilities. And, out of this effort, he sought a reasonable causal account of how beliefs about

the future are shaped by one's social context and then compel future behavior.

Kahl identified parental pressure as the most crucial determinant. Corresponding roughly to two types of students, he saw two types of parents: those who sought to raise "getting by" children and those who sought to raise "getting ahead" children. Many of the factors that determined whether parents adopted the getting ahead rearing strategy were idiosyncratic, and yet there were some systematic differences, relating primarily to parents' own experiences with the labor market. The extent to which parents saw college as having a genuine payoff for occupational attainment, based on their own experiences in the workplace, was crucial.

Expectations and aspirations then became the central mediating variables in status attainment research, especially following the publication of what became known as the Wisconsin model of status attainment, which was based on early analyses of the Wisconsin Longitudinal Survey (a random sample of all high school seniors in the state of Wisconsin in 1957). The full model was first fully specified in two influential articles published in the *American Sociological Review* (Sewell et al. 1969, 1970) that reported results from both the original 1957 data and the follow up 1964 data on the educational and early occupational careers of young men. Beyond Kahl's focus on exploring the formation of college plans, these articles aimed to explain the entire process of educational and occupational attainment.

According to the original 1969 Wisconsin model, the joint effects of a high school student's family background and mental ability on his eventual educational and occupational attainments can be completely explained by the expectations that others hold of him. In particular, significant others – parents, teachers, and peers – define expectations that students then internalize as educational and occupational aspirations. Because the underlying theory assumes that students are compelled to follow their own aspirations, the model is powerfully simple and implies that significant others can increase a student's educational and occupational attainment merely by increasing their own expectations of him.

Regarding the specific processes of aspiration formation, the principal social psychological theorist, Archibald Haller, maintained that aspirations are formed in three ways: imitation, self reflection, and adoption. Once formed, Haller (1982: 5–6) wrote that aspirations are embedded in “approximately consistent and mutually reinforcing cognitions” which then “have an inertia of their own and are expressed in corresponding behavior.” Thus, students’ educational and occupational aspirations become stable abstract motivational orientations (see Spenner & Featherman 1978), and the measured Wisconsin model variables – college plans and expected future occupation – are merely realistic indicators of these latent status aspirations.

Although the theory underneath the original Wisconsin model was bold, its creators were well aware of its many limitations. Almost immediately upon publication, they began to qualify its basic mechanisms, and in the process they weakened its most parsimonious theoretical claims by allowing for the addition of supplemental direct effects of socioeconomic status on all endogenous variables. The addition of paths not predicted by the original socialization theory presented problems for the powerful claims of the 1969 article. In particular, the claim that significant others could raise students’ educational and occupational attainments by simply imposing higher expectations on them began to seem less credible. Instead, the revised models of the 1970s and 1980s suggested that significant others and educational institutions have direct effects on the educational and occupational attainment process. If so, then it had to be conceded that structural constraints (and perceptions of them) could play an important role in models of educational and occupational attainment.

These revisions were, in part, a response to research critical of the Wisconsin model and its supposed origins in structural functionalist sociology. Critics argued that structural constraints embedded in the opportunity structure of society should be at the center of all models of educational attainment, and hence that concepts such as aspirations and expectations offer little or no explanatory power. Most famously, Pierre Bourdieu dismissed the work of sociologists who assert that associations between

aspirations/expectations and attainments are causal. Rather, for Bourdieu, the unequal opportunity structures of society “determine aspirations by determining the extent to which they can be satisfied” (Bourdieu 1973: 83). And, as such, aspirations and expectations have no autonomous explanatory power, as they are nothing other than alternative indicators of attainment.

Critiques such as these helped to bring an end to the brief dominance of status attainment theory in the study of social inequality. The cutting edge of research in the sociology of education then shifted toward studies of institutional and demographic effects on educational achievement and attainment, as researchers generally sought to avoid debates over whether social psychological models unnecessarily blame the victims of a constrained opportunity structure. Even so, variables measuring expectations continued to be deployed as standard covariates in the sociology of education for the analysis of a variety of outcomes (for a review, see Morgan 2005: ch. 2).

In the most recent research, however, new models of educational attainment are now attempting to account for the beliefs that determine educational attainment. Some researchers have begun to focus on changes in post industrial society and how these are reflected in the processes by which adolescents plan for their futures. Others, seeking to integrate sociological and economic approaches, have attempted to build models of educational achievement and attainment that are sensitive to the exogenous impact of shifts in costs and benefits but that also give substantial scope to independent belief formation processes that can overwhelm narrow expected utility calculations. By and large, this new work has the potential to help determine how structural dynamics should be incorporated into models of educational attainment, as structure that is imposed from the outside as the rigid constraints maintained by institutions or via individual responses to perceived structural constraints.

SEE ALSO: Bourdieu, Pierre; Educational and Occupational Attainment; Parental Involvement in Education; Parsons, Talcott; Significant Others; Status Attainment; Structural Functional Theory; Teachers

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experiment

Javier Lezaun

Experiments play a central role in most theories of science as the key mechanism through which theories and hypotheses are corroborated or refuted. Most especially in the work of Karl Popper, the acceptability of a theory – the extent to which it can be conceivably characterized as “scientific” – is determined by its falsifiability, that is, by whether it can be put to the test in an experiment. Experimentation is thus the foremost *trial of strength* for knowledge claims, and the sociology of science has investigated the particular social practices on which this validating function rests.

Despite its centrality to most analytical accounts of the scientific enterprise, experimentation, as a social practice in its own right, has remained largely unexamined by philosophers

of science, partly because their emphasis tended to be on theory and theoreticians. Also, it was often assumed – rather than proved – that experiments were fundamentally logical processes reducible to a series of analytical steps, and thus capable of determining unambiguously the validity of a knowledge claim if conducted according to formal instructions.

In the 1980s the sociology of science began to take a closer look at how knowledge is put to the test under experimental conditions. This investigation was influenced by the groundbreaking historical work of Kuhn (1962), and received much of its inspiration from innovative reinterpretations of the history of science. A sociologically informed history of science and a historically grounded sociology of science have since walked hand in hand.

One of the most influential treatments of experimentation in the sociology of scientific knowledge (SSK) was offered by Collins (1985). Collins’s main target was the idea of replication: that success or failure in repeating of an experiment could provide unambiguous and definitive proof of the validity of a knowledge claim. The notion of replication can appear deceptively straightforward in most empiricist philosophies – a matter of simply repeating an experiment under slightly different conditions to prove or disprove a previous result. Yet Collins showed that the practice of replication cannot be reduced to a set of formal rules. A judgment of sameness or difference is always required, and such a judgment is irreducibly social. If, for instance, Experiment B fails to reproduce the result of Experiment A, the experimenters must still decide whether this is because Experiment A was faulty or wrong, or rather because Experiment B was dissimilar from A in key aspects and thus failed to truly replicate and therefore disprove it. According to Collins, any effort to formulate a set of definitive rules about this decision, the attempt to turn what is a matter of socially embedded judgment into a series of formalized, logical steps, would lead to an “experimenter’s regress.” The meaning of a particular experiment is thus a matter to be determined by a community of expert practitioners making a socially contingent judgment, a judgment that is dependent on, among other things, the distribution of tacit skills and instruments

among experimenters. This notion of a regress, or an incapacity to reduce the social practices and processes of experimentation to a set of formal instructions, was developed as the “testers’ regress” by MacKenzie (1989, 1990) in his sociological studies of technological communities and missile accuracy.

A similar concern with the role of material context and technical instruments, skills and tacit knowledge, the social organization of scientific groups, and the enculturation of its practitioners characterizes the work of Galison (1987) on the history of twentieth century experimental physics. Galison focused on the decision to end an experiment and declare an experimental inquiry completed. His study drew attention to the extent to which experimentation had become, at least in the field of physics, a distinct epistemological tradition and a social practice in its own right, shaped by the particular social and material conditions under which it was conducted (for a continuation of this research program, see Galison 1997).

Another strand of historical research helped shed light on the social uses of experiments and on the role of experimental practices in the production of public demonstrations of truth. The book of Shapin and Schaffer (1985) was groundbreaking in its analysis of the context in which experimentation emerged as a particularly forceful and persuasive form of demonstration in early modern England, and in its parallel treatment of experimentation as an instrument of knowledge production and as a disputed component in the political philosophies of the time. Shapin and Schaffer contrast the opposing philosophies of Boyle and Hobbes, which reflected diametrically different views of the epistemological value of public experiments, as well as of the proper ordering of a political community. Central to Boyle’s ultimately victorious emphasis on observable experiments as the key machinery for the production of “matters of fact” was, Shapin and Schaffer argue, a logic of witnessing, by which the public testimony of those watching the proceedings (or, eventually, of those reading the experimental report) was fundamental to the legitimacy of the trial and the trustworthiness of its results. Science and experimentation were an essentially public form of knowledge making, to be conducted and displayed, literally or

virtually, before the eyes of reliable audiences. The rise of scientific experimentation in England, Shapin and Schaffer argued, went hand in hand with forms of political experimentation that also granted public witnessing a central role in political affairs. In further articles, these authors explored in more detail the role of the particular sites where experiments are conducted (Shapin 1988) and the function of the experimental apparatus in the production of conviction (Schaffer 1989).

The public nature of experiments, the degree to which audiences and their influence are central to the logic of experimentation, has become a central theme in the sociology of science (Gieryn & Figert 1990). It is contestable whether, as Collins (1988) has argued, the sociology of science should still try to draw a distinction between proper experiments, in which the result is up for grabs and an element of surprise cannot be ruled out, and mere “displays of virtuosity” or “demonstrations,” in which previous rehearsals reduce to a minimum the possibility of upsets, revelations, or failures, and whose purpose is simply to illustrate a principle to an audience.

Finally, the sociological and historical interest in the experimental production of knowledge in the natural sciences has more recently been extended to experimentation in the social sciences, particularly economics (Guala 2005; Muniesa & Callon 2006) and psychology (Dehue 2001; Brannigan 2004).

SEE ALSO: Experimental Design; Experimental Methods; Falsification; Induction and Observation in Science; Materiality and Scientific Practice; Science; Scientific Knowledge, Sociology of

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experimental design

Roger E. Kirk

Experimentation involves the deliberate manipulation of one or more independent variables followed by the systematic observation of the

effects of the manipulation on one or more dependent variables. The emphasis on experimentation in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries as a way of establishing causal relationships marked the emergence of modern science from its roots in natural philosophy (Hacking 1983). According to the nineteenth century philosopher John Stuart Mill, a causal relationship exists if (a) the cause preceded the effect, (b) the cause was related to the effect, and (c) we can find no other plausible alternative explanation for the effect. Carefully designed and executed experiments continue to be one of science's most powerful methods for discovering causal relationships. An *experimental design* is a plan for assigning experimental units to treatment levels and the statistical analysis associated with the plan (Kirk 1995: 1). The design of an experiment involves a number of interrelated activities:

- 1 Formulation of statistical hypotheses that are germane to the scientific hypothesis. A *statistical hypothesis* is a statement about (a) one or more parameters of a population or (b) the functional form of a population. Statistical hypotheses are rarely identical to scientific hypotheses – they are testable formulations of scientific hypotheses.
- 2 Determination of the treatment levels (independent variable) to be manipulated, the measurement (dependent variable) to be recorded, and the extraneous conditions (nuisance variables) that must be controlled.
- 3 Specification of the number of experimental units required and the population from which they will be sampled.
- 4 Specification of the randomization procedure for assigning the experimental units to the treatment levels.
- 5 Determination of the statistical analysis that will be performed (Kirk 1995: 1–2).

In short, an experimental design identifies the independent, dependent, and nuisance variables and indicates the way in which the randomization and statistical aspects of an experiment are to be carried out.

The seminal ideas for experimental design as it is practiced today can be traced to Ronald A. Fisher, a statistician who worked at a small agricultural research station 25 miles north of

London. The publication of Fisher's *Statistical Methods for Research Workers* in 1925 and *The Design of Experiments* in 1935 gradually led to the acceptance of three key principles of experimental design: randomization, replication, and local control or blocking. Fisher's idea that experimental units should be randomly assigned to treatment levels initially met with disdain. Prior to Fisher, most researchers used systematic schemes, not subject to the laws of chance, to assign experimental units. According to Fisher, random assignment has three important benefits. First, it helps to distribute the idiosyncratic characteristics of experimental units over the treatment levels so that they do not selectively bias the outcome of the experiment. Second, random assignment permits the researcher to compute an unbiased estimate of *error effects* – those effects not attributable to the manipulation of the independent variable. Third, random assignment helps to ensure that the error effects are statistically independent. Through random assignment, a researcher creates two or more groups of experimental units that at the time of assignment are probabilistically similar on the average.

Sometimes, for practical or ethical reasons, random assignment cannot be used. It is necessary, for example, to use preexisting or naturally occurring experimental units when the research question involves the effects of a particular illness. In such cases, a *quasi experiment* that is similar to an experiment except for random assignment can be used. Unfortunately, the interpretation of the results of quasi experiments is always ambiguous. In the absence of random assignment, it is difficult to rule out all variables other than the independent variable as explanations for an observed result. In general, the difficulty of unambiguously interpreting the outcome of research varies inversely with the degree of control that a researcher is able to exercise over randomization.

Fisher popularized two other principles of good experimentation: replication and local control or blocking. *Replication* is the observation of two or more experimental units under the same conditions. According to Fisher, replication enables a researcher to estimate error effects and obtain a more precise estimate of treatment effects. *Blocking*, on the other hand, is an experimental procedure for isolating

variation attributable to a nuisance variable. As the name suggests, *nuisance variables* are undesired sources of variation that can affect the dependent variable. Three experimental approaches are used to deal with nuisance variables:

- 1 Hold the variable constant.
- 2 Assign experimental units randomly to the treatment levels so that known and unsuspected sources of variation among the units are distributed over the entire experiment and do not affect just one or a limited number of treatment levels.
- 3 Include the nuisance variable as one of the factors in the experiment.

The third experimental approach uses local control or blocking. The procedure, which is illustrated later, isolates variation attributable to the nuisance variable so that it does not appear in estimates of treatment and error effects.

A statistical approach also can be used to deal with nuisance variables. The approach, which is called *analysis of covariance*, combines regression analysis with analysis of variance. The procedure involves measuring one or more concomitant variables in addition to the dependent variable. The *concomitant variable* represents a source of variation that has not been controlled in the experiment and one that is believed to affect the dependent variable. Through analysis of covariance, the dependent variable is adjusted to remove the effects of the uncontrolled source of variation. The potential advantages are (a) reduction in error variance and, hence, increased power and (b) reduction in bias caused by differences among experimental units where those differences are not attributable to the manipulation of the independent variable. Researchers often combine analysis of covariance with one or more experimental approaches in an effort to control more nuisance variables. The three principles that Fisher vigorously championed – randomization, replication, and local control – remain the foundation of good experimental design. Next, the layout and randomization for several simple experimental designs are described.

One of the simplest experimental designs is the randomization and analysis plan that is used with a *t* statistic for independent samples.

Consider an experiment to compare the effectiveness of two ways of presenting nutritional information – newspapers denoted by a_1 and TV denoted by a_2 – in getting obese teenage boys to follow more nutritious diets. The dependent variable is a measure of improvement in each boy’s diet one month after the presentation. Assume that 30 boys are available to participate in the experiment. The researcher assigns $n = 15$ boys to each of the $p = 2$ presentations so that each of the $(np)!/(n!)^p = 155,117,520$ possible assignments has the same probability. This is accomplished by numbering the boys from 1 to 30 and drawing numbers from a random numbers table. The boys corresponding to the first 15 numbers drawn between 1 and 30 are assigned to treatment level a_1 ; the remaining 15 boys are assigned to a_2 . The layout for this experiment is shown in Figure 1.

The t independent samples design involves randomly assigning experimental units to two

levels of a treatment. A completely randomized analysis of variance design extends this strategy to any number of treatment levels. Again, consider the media experiment and suppose the researcher wants to evaluate the effectiveness of three media – newspaper, TV, and the Internet. Assume that 45 obese teenage boys are available to participate in the experiment. The boys are randomly assigned to the three media with the restriction that 15 boys are assigned to each. The layout and randomization procedures for the experiment are the same as those for the t independent samples design in figure 1, except that the completely randomized design has an additional treatment level, a_3 .

The two experiments just described use independent samples. Samples are independent if a researcher randomly assigns experimental units to p groups or randomly samples units from p populations. In both experiments, the nuisance variable of gender was held constant: only boys were used. Other nuisance variables such as initial obesity and age were probabilistically controlled by random assignment. Differences in improvement of the diets of the boys who received the same treatment level provide an estimate of error effects. Error effects reflect the idiosyncratic characteristics of the experimental units – those characteristics that differ from one unit to another – and any other variables that have not been controlled. Designs that are described next permit a researcher to use local control or blocking to isolate and remove some sources of variation that contribute to error effects.

One design for isolating a nuisance variable is the randomization and analysis plan used with a t statistic for dependent samples. As the name suggests, the design uses dependent samples. Dependent samples can be obtained by any of the following procedures:

- 1 Observe the experimental units under each treatment level.
- 2 Form sets (blocks) of experimental units that are similar with respect to a variable that is correlated with the dependent variable.
- 3 If the experimental units are people, obtain sets of identical twins in which case the units have similar genetic characteristics.

		Treatment Level	
Group ₁	Boy 1	a_1	$\bar{Y}_{.1}$
	Boy 2	a_1	
	M	M	
	Boy 15	a_1	
	Boy 16	a_2	
Boy 17	a_2		
M	M		
Boy 30	a_2		

Figure 1 Layout for a t independent-samples design. Thirty boys are randomly assigned to two levels of a treatment with the restriction that 15 boys are assigned to each level. The mean diet improvement for the boys in treatment levels a_1 and a_2 is denoted by $\bar{Y}_{.1}$ and $\bar{Y}_{.2}$, respectively.

- 4 If the experimental units are people, obtain units who are matched by mutual selection (e.g., husband and wife pairs or business partners).

Let us reconsider the media experiment. It is reasonable to assume that responsiveness to nutritional information is related to the amount by which a boy is overweight. The design of the experiment can be improved by isolating this nuisance variable. Suppose that instead of randomly assigning 30 boys to the treatment levels, the researcher formed pairs of boys so that prior to administering a treatment level the boys in each pair are overweight by about the same amount. The boys in each pair constitute a block of matched units. A simple way to form the blocks is to rank the boys from least to most overweight. The boys ranked 1 and 2 are assigned to block one, those ranked 3 and 4 are assigned to block two, and so on. In this example, 15 blocks of dependent samples can be formed from the 30 boys. After all the blocks have been formed, the two boys in each block are randomly assigned to the two media presentations. Clearly, the randomization plan for the t dependent samples design is more complex than that for a t independent samples design. However, the added complexity is usually accompanied by greater power to reject

	Treatment Level	Treatment Level
Block ₁	a_1	a_2
Block ₂	a_1	a_2
Block ₃	a_1	a_2
M	M	M
Block ₁₅	a_1	a_2
	$\bar{Y}_{.1}$	$\bar{Y}_{.2}$

Figure 2 Layout for a t dependent-samples design. Each block contains two boys who are overweight by about the same amount. The two boys in a block are randomly assigned to the treatment levels. The mean diet improvement for the boys in treatment levels a_1 and a_2 is denoted by $\bar{Y}_{.1}$ and $\bar{Y}_{.2}$, respectively.




Figure 3 Comparison of designs with crossed and nested treatments. In (a), treatments A and B are crossed because each level of treatment B appears once and only once with each level of treatment A and vice versa. In (b), treatment B is nested in treatment A because b_1 and b_2 appear only with a_1 while b_3 and b_4 appear only with a_2 .

a false null hypothesis. The increased power results from isolating the nuisance variable – amount by which the boys are overweight – so that it does not appear in the estimate of the error effects. The layout for this experiment is shown in Figure 2.

The layout and randomization procedures for the t statistic for dependent samples design can be extended to a design with any number of treatment levels. The design is called a *randomized block analysis of variance design*. It has $p \geq 2$ treatment levels and n blocks of dependent units. When the design has two treatment levels, the layout and randomization procedures are identical to those for the t dependent samples design shown in Figure 2.

Often, researchers want simultaneously to test hypotheses for two or more treatments each having two or more levels. This can be accomplished by using either a factorial design or a hierarchical design. As shown in Figure 3, a factorial design uses crossed treatments in which each level of, say, treatment B appears once and only once with each level of treatment A and vice versa. In a hierarchical design, each level of treatment B appears with only one level of treatment A . A hierarchical design has at least one nested treatment; the remaining treatments are either nested or crossed. For a discussion of these and other experimental designs, the reader is referred to the books on experimental design in the References and Suggested Readings.

SEE ALSO: Experiment; Experimental Methods; Hypotheses; Random Sample; Scientific Knowledge, Sociology of; Statistical Significance Testing; Variables, Dependent; Variables, Independent

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experimental methods

Henry A. Walker and David Willer

An experiment is a research method for which the investigator plans, builds, or otherwise controls the conditions under which phenomena are observed and measured. Experiments are the investigative method of choice in the physical sciences, and increasingly in economics, but they are used less frequently in sociology. Experimental sociologists are disproportionately located in the research subfields of (small) group processes and social psychology.

There are two interdependent reasons why sociologists rarely use experiments. First, very few sociology training programs include courses or course materials that focus on the experiment as an investigative technique. As a

result, researchers unfamiliar with experiments turn to commonly used research techniques to study problems even if they are better studied experimentally. In turn, low demand for information about experimental methods contributes to the scarcity of systematic training. Second, limited information about experimental methods combines with unresolved debates within sociology to reduce further the numbers of sociologists willing to design experimental investigations. Unresolved issues include (1) the possibilities and uses of abstract explanatory theory in sociology, (2) the unique character of social phenomena, (3) the suitability of physical science techniques for sociological research, and (4) the artificiality of experiments.

Many sociologists and some non sociologists associate experimental research with theoretical explanation. They assume that experiments only test abstract theories and point to research in physics, chemistry, and other physical sciences as the standard. Abstract explanatory theories are presumed to be in short supply, if they exist at all, in sociology. In the most optimistic view, theoretical development in sociology is stalled by the unique character of social phenomena.

Those who presume that the uniqueness of social phenomena precludes application of experimental methods to them can hold any or all of several positions. Some take the position that sociological phenomena are temporally bound – much like events studied by historians. This position is often used to buttress a related idea – that social phenomena are inconstant – and it reinforces the (false) assumption held by many that science only explains immutable phenomena. In this view, temporal specificity and inconstant phenomena make social behaviors and processes unfit candidates for theoretical analysis and experimental tests of theory. Finally, some sociologists point to the artificiality of experimental situations as an objection to experimentation in sociology. They claim that experiments use artificially contrived settings and, in the worst case, studies of artificial situations are uninformative. In the best case scenario, experimentation can make only limited contributions to sociological knowledge.

Experimental sociologists recognize that each experimental study is only one stage in a

complex, multistage research process. The process begins when a researcher identifies constructs, conditions, or factors that are thought to be important for understanding the phenomenon of interest. For some experiments, researchers devise hypotheses – concrete statements about relationships between variables or operational measures – and identify *initial conditions*. Initial conditions are concrete empirical conditions that create a framework for the experiment. In many instances, the initial conditions persist for the life of an experiment, ending only at its conclusion. Experimental researchers also identify or develop *measures* to track changes in variables and to record *intermediate* and *final conditions*. Experimental data include measurements taken before, during, and at the end of an experiment. Taken as a whole, an experiment begins when a researcher creates or establishes the initial conditions. It continues with measurements of the processes under study and ends with observation, analysis, and interpretation of outcomes.

OBJECTIVES OF EXPERIMENTS

At the conceptual level, there are two and only two kinds of experiments. One class of experiments is designed to explore or discover phenomena and the other is designed to test theories. All experiments bring evidence to bear on hypotheses but only *theory driven experiments* test hypotheses drawn from theories or theoretical models. Exploratory experiments investigate purely speculative or pre theoretical hypotheses. Experimenters who design exploratory experiments create conditions in order to learn (or discover) what happens when a particular factor is present or absent in varying degrees. Researchers hope to uncover phenomena or relationships between phenomena. The conditions they create do not follow from the application of contrasting theoretical models. Instead, their designs follow the logic of Mill's (1919 [1875]) canons or of statistical tests. Most exploratory experiments have clearly defined *experimental* and *control* conditions. A typical control condition measures outcomes when a variable under study is absent (i.e., its value is set at zero). Results from control conditions are compared with results drawn from other

experimental conditions for which the value of the variable under study is non zero.

Many medical experiments are methods of discovery. A research team administers a new drug or treatment to a group of patients and observes changes in their conditions. Observations taken on participants in the experimental conditions are compared with participants in the control condition who do not receive the treatment. Control participants are often given placebos in medical experiments. Since placebos do not affect the phenomena under observation, the “experimental” variable under study is set at zero. Researchers use placebos to hold constant the effects of social psychological processes that might be triggered by the participant’s awareness that she is being treated and observed.

Experiments designed to test theory investigate contrasting models that explain relations between theoretical constructs. Said somewhat differently, theory driven experiments observe relations between variables that measure key theoretical constructs in theories and models. As such, it is arbitrary to classify the conditions they study as either experimental or control conditions. For example, in his pioneering test of status characteristics theory, Moore created a condition in which female participants believed they had high education status compared with their partners. Moore compared results from that condition with a second condition in which female participants believed they had low education status relative to their partners. Actually, neither treatment condition is a control condition. Moore’s objective was to determine whether variations in status affected behavior consistent with hypotheses drawn from the theory’s basic arguments.

Exploratory and theory testing experiments have different roles in science and it is inappropriate to characterize either type of experiment as “better.” A researcher’s choice of design depends on the question under investigation and the state of theory development in her field of endeavor. Researchers exploring questions that ask for systematic description or historical/empirical explanations will build method of discovery experiments. Researchers who have a well developed theory in hand will use the theory to design experimental tests of theory.

UNITS OF ANALYSIS

Participants in many sociological experiments are drawn from available pools of university students. The use of college students leads many non experimentalists to conclude that experimental researchers only study individual phenomena. The perception is accurate, but only for a select group of experiments. Experiments that investigate social psychological phenomena often focus on individuals. For example, many classic studies in the literature on equity and justice processes (Hegtvedt & Markovsky 1995) measure individual responses to situations that produce varying degrees of injustice. Data are collected on individuals and the individual is the proper unit of analysis.

By way of contrast, other studies conducted by sociologists who study group processes and social psychology collect data from individuals but relations and social structures are the proper units of analysis. Moore's study of status organizing processes involved participants who had either high or low status relative to their (simulated) partners. Observations were taken on individual participants but the data are informative of the processes that create power, prestige, and influence hierarchies in collectively oriented task groups. Neither the theory under test nor researchers in the status characteristics theory tradition are concerned primarily with the behavior of individuals.

Exchange network theory brings individuals into situations that require them to negotiate resource distributions under a variety of structural conditions. All exchange network theories make predictions for exchange outcomes – outcomes that vary with the structural conditions of exchange. The focus of such research is not on individuals' behaviors during negotiations but on how contrasting kinds of social structures affect the exchanges they make. Here, the exchange relation as it is embedded in a structure is the proper unit of analysis.

EXPERIMENTAL SITUATIONS

Researcher control is the hallmark of experimental investigations. However, sociological experiments are conducted in a variety of situations (or sites) and the degree to which

researchers can exercise control varies substantially across research sites. We describe natural, field, survey, and laboratory experiments in order of increasing experimenter control.

Natural Experiments

As the term implies, natural experiments occur in settings free of artificial contrivances. At times, researchers are able to take advantage of naturally occurring events to study important social phenomena. Natural experiments are distinguished from other forms of experimentation by the *absence* of experimenter control of key events. Natural experiments can either test existing theory or uncover phenomena that require theoretical explanation. The Nixon administration's implementation of a draft lottery during the Vietnam War is an example of an event that permitted natural experimentation.

The draft lottery organized men's eligibility for the military draft by randomly selecting days of the year. Men whose birth dates were selected early in the lottery were very likely to be drafted. Those whose birth dates came later (e.g., number 340) could anticipate being bypassed by the draft. As such, the lottery created "natural" experimental groups, for example, (1) men with low numbers who would almost certainly be asked to report for the draft, (2) men who had a high probability of being asked to report, and so on. Researchers have found that those with low draft numbers had higher long term, non military mortality rates than those with high numbers (Hearst et al. 1986). In an unpublished study, Walker found that draft eligible male students with very low lottery numbers (1–50) expressed more positive attitudes toward the Vietnam War than students with high or very high numbers. The finding was explained by applying cognitive dissonance theory to the findings.

Field Experiments

Field experiments, like natural experiments, are conducted in naturally occurring situations. However, field experimenters exercise some degree of control over participants, events, and key theoretical or practical factors. Social

psychological research on bystander intervention is an example of field experimentation. Piliavin et al. (1969) chose particular subway cars but they could not select the passengers who became their experimental “participants.” Their sample is properly described as an accidental or convenience sample. However, characteristics of the “victims” in need of assistance were under strict experimental control.

Piliavin et al.’s research can be contrasted with the Robbers Cave experiments conducted by Muzafer Sherif and his colleagues (Sherif et al. 1961). Sherif et al. exercised substantially greater control over conditions in their studies. The researchers exercised some control over (1) the process used to select youthful participants, (2) key elements of the site at Robbers Cave State Park in Oklahoma, (3) the assignment of boys to two groups (e.g., putting friends in separate groups), and (4) events that were presumed to affect relationships between the two groups.

Survey Experiments

Survey experiments combine all the advantages of experiments with many desirable characteristics of survey research. Survey researchers can conduct studies with large samples, control the selection of participants, and randomly assign participants to treatments. The result can be a powerful tool for discovering important social relationships or for testing sociological theory. Small scale surveys may use face to face interviewing or survey administration of survey instruments. However, many contemporary surveys use computer assisted interviewing (CAI) and they can be conducted by telephone or through Internet connections.

Experiments using the vignette technique pioneered by Rossi (1979) are increasingly common in sociological social psychology. Participants in contrasting experimental treatments respond to situations described by vignettes embedded in survey instruments. Jasso and Webster’s recent research studying gender of evaluators, gender of putative employees, and assessments of just (fair) wages is an outstanding example of this experimental form. Other social psychologists control important features of the situations under which participants

respond to survey items. For example, Krysan and Couper varied the presence of interviewers (whether in the room or on a video screen) and interviewers’ race. Their experiment studied the responses that black and white participants gave to surveys that contained items designed to measure attitudes toward race or ethnic groups and issues important to race relations. Among their important findings, Krysan and Couper discovered that “subtle” items designed to expose hidden or covert race prejudice were the most sensitive to race of interviewer and presence effects. Their findings are inconsistent with the rationales that previous researchers had advanced for incorporating subtle items in survey research on politically and personally sensitive topics.

Laboratory Experiments

Laboratory experiments offer the greatest opportunities for experimental control. Laboratory scientists can select participants and control the conditions under which participants are studied. The ability to select participants can be very important when an experiment is testing a scope delimited theory. As an example, we can use Moore’s selection of women from a particular community college for his study of status organizing processes. Since all were women and students at the same institution, Moore could tell participants that their simulated partners were also women who differed from them on a single characteristic – the school the partner attended. The high degree of control was important because one scope restriction on the theory under test required group members to differ on one (and only one) characteristic.

Experimenter control is also crucial in the Krysan and Couper study described above. Krysan and Couper’s surveys were administered in a laboratory. Under laboratory conditions, the researchers could standardize the actions of virtual and live interviewers. Participants in the virtual interview treatment saw the interviewer on a split screen monitor as they read survey instructions. Participants in the live interview treatment read survey instructions on the same computer screens but interviewer images were not projected on their screens. The high degree of control that is exercised in

laboratory experiments permits more accurate and useful tests of hypotheses drawn from theory.

THE FUTURE OF EXPERIMENTATION IN SOCIOLOGY

Experimental research in sociology appears to have a bright future. First, social scientists in other disciplines are increasingly aware of the utility of experimental research as a technique for testing theory. Experiments were very rare in economics and political science as recently as the 1960s. Today, experimental economics is a burgeoning field and experimentalists in economics, political science, and sociology are using the Internet to conduct experiments in virtual laboratories (Willer et al. 1999). It remains to be seen whether the spread of experimental techniques to other social and behavioral sciences will increase their visibility in all fields and create greater demand for sociologists trained in experimental methods.

SEE ALSO: Experiment; Experimental Design; Group Processes; Methods; Social Psychology; Survey Research

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expertise, "scientification," and the authority of science

Stephen Turner

The problem of the role of experts in society may seem to be a topic marginal to the main concerns of sociology, but it is in fact deeply rooted in the sociological project itself. Sociologists and social thinkers have long been concerned with the problem of the role of knowledge in society. Certain Enlightenment thinkers, notably Turgot and Condorcet, believed that social progress depended on the advance of knowledge and the wider dispersion of knowledge in society. But Condorcet especially recognized that this idea had complex political implications. On the one hand, it required science, which for him included social science, to be supported by the state, yet retain independence or self governance in order to advance without political interference. On the other hand, he recognized that social advance required that the most enlightened be the rulers, and that this conflicted with the ideas of democracy and equality.

Condorcet's solution to this problem was education. But he also recognized that even the educated citizen would never be the equal of the scientist. Thus, his conception of the role of the expert in politics depended on the hope that a more educated citizenry would defer politically to the most enlightened, thus bringing about *de facto* expert rule through

democratic means. Saint Simon extended this reasoning, but it was made into a sociological system by Comte, and, in the course of doing so, Comte created the term sociology.

Comte's central idea was the law of three stages, which held that every science goes through the successive stages of theological, metaphysical, and positive. He argued that sociology was to be the last science to reach the positive stage, and that this law itself was the first and most fundamental positive law of sociology. Comte also believed that consensus was a central requirement for order and orderly progress in society and looked to science to provide the intellectual basis for this consensus.

Comte regarded freedom of opinion as inappropriate to an age of knowledge. If the facts of a social life could be reduced to science, the principles of this science should be the basis of state action rather than the misguided views of citizens, who, if they disagreed with the principles, were merely ignorant and needed education rather than the right to voice their ignorance. Expertise thus would correct the anarchy of opinion of liberal discussion. The authority of science was to be the basis of state authority. This posed the problem of education, to which Comte had an authoritarian solution: the lessons of sociology should be inculcated in the masses through the same kind of techniques that the Catholic church in the past had used so effectively to inculcate religious dogma.

His critics, such as John Stuart Mill, saw in this a kind of authoritarianism, but acknowledged the logic of his position. Later thinkers such as Karl Pearson defended similar views about the necessary role of experts. These ideas in turn influenced such movements as Fabianism in Britain, technocracy in the US, and the social relations of science movement of the 1930s, whose ideas were a precursor to the modern sociology of science. The social relations of science movement was dominated by communists, and communism itself may be understood as a form of expert rule in which experts direct social life "scientifically" (through planning) on behalf of the people rather than as their instructed representatives.

In the 1940s and 1950s the sociology of science concerned itself with the related problem of the authority of science. Robert Merton was

particularly concerned with conflicts between science and democracy. In some of his later writings he discussed what he called the ambivalence of ordinary citizens to science and expertise. Later sociologists of science, influenced by social constructionism in the study of the generation of scientific facts, turned their attention to expertise as well. They identified specific mechanisms, such as "boundary objects," through which scientific or expert claims were constructed into a form of "fact" that was usable by the public, and considered issues about the construction of the appearance of expert knowledge and the kind of citizenship education that might be required in the face of a politics in which expert claims played a large role. Some influential research in this tradition concentrated on failures of expertise and the problem of integrating relevant lay knowledge with expert opinion, one of the sources of failure in the application of expert knowledge in concrete situations.

Other research focused on the social and organizational roles of experts, the place of expert knowledge in the law, judges' construction of expert knowledge, and the implicit conception of science which is assumed in legal decision making about scientific questions. This literature deals with such issues as the gap between the law's treatment of scientific results and scientists' view of them.

Another body of research related strategies came from the professionalization literature in American sociology in the mid twentieth century and focused on the professionalization of domains of practice and the consequent transformation of these domains into subjects governed by expert knowledge. An important example of this is the medicalization of issues (e.g., behavioral issues) which had previously been regarded as matters that could appropriately be dealt with by lay knowledge. Many forms of social behavior, such as child abuse and alcoholism, were transformed in this way. Subsequently, a social constructionist literature grew up discussing the process by which these transformations occurred.

These discussions had the effect of questioning the concept of expert knowledge itself, and pointing to the difficulties of judging expertise. Experts may have specialized knowledge, but they are not universal experts. They often do

not have the local knowledge necessary to apply this knowledge correctly, and are often unaware of the limitations of their own knowledge. Lay people also may have specialized forms of knowledge that need to be integrated into decision making in order for knowledge to be effectively used. Thus, there is a problem of aggregating or bringing expert knowledge and other forms of knowledge together. Similar issues arise when experts from different fields must cooperate in decision making. Experts in one field become lay people when faced with expertise in another field, and must make non expert judgments about the validity, relevance, and significance of the expert claims made by other experts.

The issues raised by Condorcet about the conflict between expert knowledge and democracy are still relevant today. They point to a fundamental conflict between a participatory model of democracy and the undeniable fact that many of the issues that face modern states are understandable only by experts. The newer literature on expertise points to the fact that expert knowledge, and the “facts” which citizens accept as matters of expertise and act on, are the product of complex processes of social construction, and thus of a kind of politics.

SEE ALSO: Controversy Studies; Merton, Robert K.; Science and Public Participation: The Democratization of Science; Scientific Literacy and Public Understandings of Science; Speaking Truth to Power: Science and Policy; Scientific Literacy and Public Understanding of Science

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exploitation

Andrew Kliman

Exploitation occurs when someone or something (e.g., a material resource, an opportunity) is used or taken advantage of. Social scientists are chiefly concerned with the exploitation of people and classes, who are generally considered exploited if they are required, by force or by circumstances, to contribute more to some process than they receive in return. Crucially important to Marxian thought, the concept of exploitation is also employed in neoclassical economics and related sociological work. Yet the concept is controversial among sociologists; many eschew it entirely.

Karl Marx held that working people are exploited if some of the labor they perform is surplus labor, labor for which they receive no equivalent. The extraction of surplus labor is most transparent in the *corvée* system, in which serfs worked part of the time for themselves on one plot of land, and for the lord, on another plot of land, during their remaining working time. This division of working time is not so transparent in other cases, but Marx regarded it as a feature of all class divided societies. Workers in all such societies, he argued, are compelled to perform surplus labor because they lack access to land and other means of production. To survive, the workers must work for other people or companies. The latter can require the performance of surplus labor because they have exclusive ownership or control of the means of production.

Marx employed this theory in three main ways. First, he defined classes and identified divergent class interests and antagonisms in terms of surplus labor extraction. Exploited working classes perform surplus labor; exploiting non working classes live off of it. The former have an interest in ending this exploitation; the latter have an interest in perpetuating it. Class antagonisms and struggles arise as a result

of: (1) these contrary interests; (2) efforts by one side or the other to lessen or augment the amount of surplus labor performed; (3) domination, oppression, and violence employed in order to perpetuate and augment this exploitation; and (4) social conditions associated with it, such as alienation, poverty, and inequality.

Secondly, Marx distinguished among different class divided societies in terms of their different "forms," or systems, of surplus labor extraction. He argued that a society's other economic and political relationships are based upon and correspond to its specific form of surplus labor.

Finally, and most controversially, he utilized the theory in order to explain the existence and magnitude of surplus value, or profit, under capitalism. Marx argued that surplus labor is the exclusive source of surplus value and its subcomponents (profits of industrial firms, rent, interest, etc.). Although capitalists seemingly pay for workers' labor, and thus workers seemingly receive as wages a sum of value equal to the value that their labor adds to the product, Marx (1990) argued that capitalists actually purchase workers' *labor power*, or capacity to work. The amount of labor they subsequently perform is therefore not determined by the wage contract. Consequently, surplus value arises when, and to the extent that, workers are made to work longer than the amount of time during which their labor adds an amount of new value equal to their money wages.

The magnitude and rate of surplus value, or rate of exploitation, thus depend upon struggles over the length and intensity of work, as well as wages. Marx argued that, owing to the dynamics of the business cycle and the replacement of workers by machines, wages cannot rise to levels that would seriously threaten the generation of surplus value.

Many Marxist and non Marxist authors maintain that the production of surplus value cannot rightly be deemed exploitative unless an ethical argument is provided. That workers are required to perform surplus labor is insufficient. Marx, on the other hand, held that the exploitation of workers is fair and lawful, violating none of their rights. From the perspective of present day society, there is nothing to criticize. It admits of criticism only from the perspective of a future classless society.

Marx's profit theory seems to contradict the fact that industries which extract the same amounts of surplus labor obtain quite different amounts of profit. Although he acknowledged this fact, Marx (1991) argued that if some industries obtain more profit than they generate by means of surplus labor extraction, others must obtain less, and the gains and losses exactly offset one another in the aggregate. It is thus at the level of the aggregate economy that surplus labor is the exclusive source of profit.

Critics have persistently claimed, however, that Marx's demonstration of this proposition has been proven internally inconsistent. The alleged inconsistency has profoundly affected the trajectory of subsequent profit theory and class analysis. It is the principal reason given for rejection of the exploitation theory of profit. Theorists seeking to preserve some elements of that theory, but to jettison Marx's theories of value and surplus value, also invoke the alleged inconsistency as their principal justification. This latter category includes economists who have advanced revised versions of the exploitation theory of profit, Marxist sociologists who seek to ground class analysis in a revised account of surplus labor extraction (e.g., Wright 2000), and a non Marxist sociologist who proposed a different concept of exploitation as the basis for class analysis (Sørensen 2000).

Key to the attempted reformulations of the exploitation theory of profit is the fundamental Marxian theorem (FMT). The FMT has widely been held to have rigorously proved, without the use of Marx's value concepts, that surplus labor is necessary and sufficient for the existence of profit. Thus, even though he was supposedly wrong to claim that aggregate profit and surplus value are equal, the FMT has seemed to confirm Marx's conclusion that surplus labor is the exclusive source of profit.

The FMT was also at the basis of Roemer's (1988) effort to root class differences and surplus labor extraction in initial differences in wealth. In his rational choice model, initial differences in wealth lead, with rare exceptions, to strictly corresponding differences in class and exploitation status. Moreover, the initial distribution of wealth is the sole determinant of the class and exploitation hierarchies. Whether poor people become proletarians, or independent producers exploited in credit

markets, makes no difference. These results significantly influenced the thinking of many economists, sociologists, and philosophers. Prior to Roemer's work, many Marxists had simply assumed that labor markets and capitalist control of the labor process were important determinants of the degree of exploitation.

Yet recent counterexamples may have demonstrated that the FMT actually fails to prove that surplus labor is either necessary or sufficient for profit. If these counterexamples are valid, they show that the theorem applies only to very special cases – static equilibrium and an economy in which all physical surpluses of all goods are always positive. (If, on a given day, the steel industry produces less steel than the auto, construction, and other industries use up, then the physical surplus of steel is negative.) Given even a slight relaxation of these special case restrictions, profit can be negative when surplus labor is extracted and positive without surplus labor having been extracted, according to the FMT's definitions (Kliman 2001).

This does not mean that profit theory and class analysis rooted in surplus labor extraction have necessarily come to an end. During the past quarter century, a new school of Marx interpretation claims to have refuted the alleged proofs of internal inconsistency in his value theory. It maintains that the apparent inconsistencies, including the one discussed above, are simply the byproducts of a particular mathematical formalization of his theory, since the inconsistencies disappear under this school's alternative interpretation (see, e.g., Freeman & Carchedi 1996). If these findings are correct, they do not prove that Marx's profit theory is empirically correct, but they do remove the standard justification for dismissing his theory as logically unsound.

Unequal exchange theory, pioneered by Emmanuel (1972), is often understood as a theory of exploitation. However, Emmanuel himself did not refer to unequal exchange as exploitative; he sought to supplement, not replace, Marxian exploitation theory. He argued that less developed countries (LDCs) receive relatively low earnings, and developed countries (DCs) receive relatively high earnings, for their exports. The distortion of export earnings serves to retard economic growth in the LDCs while stimulating it in the DCs. Unequal exchange theory is thus

closely associated with dependency theory, especially with the notion that underdevelopment is an active process, not a static condition.

The source of unequal exchange, proponents of the theory argue, is the confluence of unequal international wage rates and the tendency of rates of profit to equalize. Wages and thus costs of production are high in the DCs and low in the LDCs. If rates of profit are equal, prices will likewise be high in the DCs and low in the LDCs.

The reason why exchange at these prices is deemed unequal is that the earnings of LDCs are low, and the earnings of DCs are high, in relation to the amounts of labor that workers in these countries perform. Yet since this inequality is mainly the result of LDCs' relatively low *productivity*, other authors deny that a distinct theory of unequal *exchange* is needed in order to account for it. For instance, some hold that Marx's value theory already accounts for it: low productivity producers create less value ("social value") per labor hour than high productivity producers.

In contrast to Marx's theory, neoclassical economics implies that exploitation of capitalists by workers (through, for instance, the formation of unions) is as likely as the exploitation of workers by capitalists. All people who provide productive inputs (labor, machinery, etc.) are considered exploited if they are paid less, or exploiters if they are paid more, than what neoclassical theory regards as the input's contribution to production: the value of its marginal product. The marginal product is the extra physical output that results from the employment of an extra unit of the input; the value of this extra output is the hypothetical price it would command if the economy were perfectly competitive and in equilibrium. Exploitation would therefore be absent in a perfectly competitive equilibrium, but the conditions needed for perfect competition – perfect information and the inability of any seller or buyer to set prices – cannot be satisfied in the real world.

Another key difference is that, while Marx assessed workers' contributions to production in terms of the amount of labor they perform, neoclassical theory assesses an input's contribution to production in terms of the extra physical output it yields. This procedure is frequently criticized as conceptually dubious. Critics argue that physical output is the result

of many inputs operating in concert, and that it is frequently impossible, even in principle, to ascribe distinct contributions to each. If, for instance, every delivery requires a driver and a truck, then the marginal product of an extra driver or extra truck (given no increase in the other input) is zero, so there is no way of determining whether the trucking firm exploits its drivers or vice versa.

The recent work of Sørensen (2000) seeks to make the neoclassical concept of exploitation the basis for sociological class analysis. He argues that those who can exact what neoclassical economists call “rent” – payments for their inputs that exceed the minimum amount needed to make the inputs available – constitute exploiting classes. Not only are they better off, and others worse off, than if there were no rent, but the very purpose of rent seeking behavior (e.g., lobbying the government for protection from competition) is to enhance one’s well being at the expense of others. As an adaptation and application of neoclassical exploitation theory, Sørensen’s work shares its main features and possible shortcomings.

The various theories of exploitation are controversial partly because of their political and ideological implications, and partly because assessment of whether individuals and groups are exploited gives rise to significant conceptual problems. Although some key controversies – particularly those surrounding Marx’s theory, the FMT, and neoclassical exploitation theory – can seem to be purely technical controversies over measurement, they are, at a deeper level, controversies over these difficult conceptual problems.

SEE ALSO: Bourgeoisie and Proletariat; Capitalism; Dependency and World Systems Theories; Distributive Justice; Economic Sociology: Neoclassical Economic Perspective; Labor/Labor Power; Labor Process; Marx, Karl; Marxism and Sociology

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extracurricular activities

Anna Strassmann Mueller

Extracurricular activities such as band, debate, or soccer are optional activities offered by the school that complement the academic curriculum and enhance the school’s sense of community. These activities provide settings within schools for adolescents to develop facets of their personalities that contribute to their emerging independence and their eventual assumption of adult roles. Extracurriculars offer opportunities for leadership, travel, skill development, and social engagement and integration in the school. There is growing evidence that adolescents who are involved in extracurricular activities are generally happier and healthier than their uninvolved peers. In particular, research suggests that extracurricular participation positively influences adolescents’ psychosocial development, problem and risk behaviors, relationship formation, and, perhaps most importantly, their academic achievement.

Since James Coleman’s classic study *The Adolescent Society*, researchers have recognized that schools serve as the primary location for adolescent social development. In schools, adolescents meet friends, internalize values, and develop interests and talents. Often, extracurricular activities play a major role in these processes. Because adolescents choose to engage in

extracurricular activities, these activities can become important defining experiences for their budding sense of identity. In fact, there are close ties between adolescent participation in particular activities such as sports or debate and self reported identity, as, for example, a “jock” or a “brain” (Barber et al. 2001). These self reported identities then shape other aspects of adolescents’ lives, such as drinking and marijuana use, or college matriculation and graduation. Additionally, extracurricular activities may provide a forum for the development of adolescent gender identity. Athletic extracurricular activities for males and cheerleading for females may contribute to the development of traditional gender roles because of the emphasis on competition found in sports as opposed to the emphasis on appearance found in cheerleading (Eder et al. 1995). Though girls are significantly less likely to participate in team sports, those who do may experience a non traditional gender socialization that includes skills that may help them succeed in domains of life outside of sports.

The status hierarchy of extracurricular activities within the school can also shape how extracurricular involvement impacts students’ lives. In some schools there is substantial overlap between the schools’ learning objectives and officially sponsored extracurricular activities. In these schools, extracurricular activities become another way for schools to promote their academic goals. Another common emphasis in schools is on athletic competitions such as football: athletes in these schools may find that their athletic identity is central to their sense of self. If the school sponsors events such as pep rallies that increase the visibility of athletes, being an athlete may also come with more social status and increased popularity with peers (Eder et al. 1995). Though extracurriculars can reinforce or create adolescent status hierarchies, they can also provide adolescents safe alternative contexts in which they can explore identities that do not match the popular norms of the school. For example, nerds may take refuge in extracurriculars that allow them to be themselves and not worry about adhering to popular student norms (Kinney 1993). Thus, extracurricular activities serve an important social function for the school. They diversify the school experience for adolescents and allow

students to feel integrated and connected to the school. They also provide a physical and social location in the school where school policies and priorities can shape the adolescent culture.

Because keeping students engaged and enrolled in school is an important policy issue, the role of extracurriculars as a tool for improving students’ achievement has been considered seriously in the academic literature. This body of literature has demonstrated that extracurricular activities have an important impact on adolescents’ academic achievement. Even after controlling for socioeconomic status and family background, adolescents involved in extracurricular activities do better in school and have more positive attitudes toward their education. Students who are extracurricularly involved have higher grades, attend school and complete their homework more regularly, and are more likely to select college preparatory coursework. They also feel more confident in their academic work and both plan and realize higher educational goals (like attending college) more than students who are not involved in extracurriculars. In low class and middle class schools, where less than half the students go on to 4 year colleges, identifying as an athlete is particularly strongly associated with higher grades and higher educational aspirations. Though it is possible that in this body of research better students are more likely to participate in extracurricular activities (rather than the extracurricular activities improving the students who participate), similar results have been obtained in longitudinal studies controlling for relevant behaviors prior to participation. This implies that extracurricular activities to some extent do improve the academic achievement of participants. In addition to improving the achievement, being involved in extracurriculars can be crucial for students who are seriously struggling in school, as it can dramatically reduce their likelihood of actually dropping out.

In addition to better integrating students into schools, extracurricular involvement can improve students’ experiences during the sometimes difficult adolescent years. Students who participate in the extracurriculum tend to make better life decisions particularly with regard to high risk behaviors. They take fewer risks sexually and are less likely to engage in delinquent or problem behaviors. Generally,

students involved in extracurriculars are less likely to drink, smoke, or use drugs, although some research has shown that students who participate in team sports (such as football) consume more alcohol. Perhaps even more importantly, adolescents who participate in extracurricular activities tend to exhibit better mental health as indicated by higher self-esteem and healthier self-concept. They also tend to report greater self-efficacy and more control over their lives, an important developmental step toward a healthy adulthood. Furthermore, involved adolescents generally experience higher levels of life satisfaction than their peers who do not participate. These positive influences do not necessarily end during adolescence. Extracurricular involvement can shape adolescents' adult lives, producing more conscientious citizens in early adulthood. For example, extracurricular participation has been linked to greater civic involvement, such as voting and volunteering.

While much research has focused on how participation in extracurriculars improves adolescents' developmental and academic trajectories, participation in these events also provides an invaluable opportunity for adolescents to form social relationships with adults. During a period of adolescent development that involves large gains in independence from parents and families, extracurricular activities offer an institutionally structured opportunity to engage in extra-familial relationships. These activities provide opportunities for adolescents to connect with adults who can guide them on their academic paths and serve as advocates if necessary, helping to maximize the school's ability to meet students' needs. Research has shown that adolescents involved in school-based extracurricular activities do tend to seek out educational and occupational advice more frequently and from a wider range of adults than their uninformed peers. These sources of engagement with encouraging adults outside of the household are particularly important for at-risk adolescents, who generally lack access to such social support. In addition, extracurricular activities can strengthen the social ties between students, parents, and the school. When parents and school personnel know one another (thus increasing the social capital available to adolescents within the school), the school can

more effectively realize its developmental and academic goals for students.

Just as extracurricular activities structure relationships between students and adults, they can shape who adolescents are exposed to within the school context. In particular, extracurricular activities provide a potentially unique opportunity within the school structure for exposure to students from different backgrounds. Unlike classes which tend to draw students with similar academic histories (and thus from more homogeneous family backgrounds), extracurricular activities draw anyone with talent or interest. This opportunity, the influence of institutional support, and the equal contribution and contact of a group of individuals combine to position extracurricular activities as a conduit by which to promote positive race and ethnic relations. However, this potential is limited by race and gender differentials in individuals' likeliness to participate in extracurriculars and how participation affects students' academic and personal trajectories. Further, how integrated extracurricular activities are may vary by school, and in some schools opportunities to participate may be extended to only a small number of students.

Because extracurricular activities appear to have a resoundingly positive role in adolescent life, these inequalities in participation are of concern, as they imply that involvement works better for some adolescents than for others. Although across race and ethnic groups, girls' participation in sports is increasing, their rates still lag behind those of boys. The reverse is true of non-athletic activities and school and community service activities: girls participate in much higher percentages than boys (American Association of University Women 1999). Girls are underrepresented in activities that encourage exercise, which has important implications for health, while boys are underrepresented in non-athletic activities, which can play an important role in their academic achievement. In addition to being stratified by gender, participation rates differ based on socioeconomic background: students from families with higher socioeconomic status are more likely to participate in extracurriculars, particularly sports, academic clubs, and music. School size and school sector (public or private) also influence the rates and effects of participation.

Though the majority of research on extra-curricular activities is based on the experiences of US adolescents, there is some research that suggests leisure and extracurricular activities are important cross nationally (Verma & Larson 2003). Internationally, these activities seem to serve a similar developmental purpose: they provide adolescents with opportunities to gain skills, to integrate into social groups, and to develop personal interests and talents. Though there are some commonalities in participation across countries (the popularity of sports is almost universal), the national context does shape the role of participation in adolescent life. For example, in Japan where achievement and competition are important elements of the national culture, extracurricular activities are viewed as an additional way for students to cultivate discipline and become well rounded. Because of this motivation, participation tends to add stress to Japanese adolescents' lives and is linked to negative emotional states. This is contrary to findings from the US and Europe and points to the importance of international research on extracurricular activities and adolescent development.

Academic achievement and engagement, health and risk behaviors, and formation and maintenance of social relationships have been linked to high school extracurricular activities. Students spend many intense hours in extracurricular settings during their adolescent years, rendering these contexts crucial to understanding how adolescent society operates in schools and how experiences in extracurriculars influence adolescent identity and behavior. Though these generally positive forces have been widely explored in the literature, there is still much that researchers do not know. For example, extracurricular participation may not be stable over the high school years. Students may experience a trajectory of extracurriculars; they may focus on drama one year and basketball the next. How do these trajectories affect the developing adolescent? Continuing to explore adolescents' dynamic experiences in extracurriculars over the course of the middle and high school years should be an important goal of future research. An improved understanding of participation in extracurricular activities will enable policy makers to more effectively harness the school

as a powerful force in shaping adolescent culture and outcomes.

SEE ALSO: Dropping Out of School; Educational Attainment; Expectations and Aspirations; Parental Involvement in Education; School Climate; Social Capital and Education; Sport, College

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exurbia

Jeff Crump

Exurbia is a form of residential development that straddles an often ill defined zone between densely packed suburbs and rural and small town locations. Although its boundaries are usually indistinct, exurban development begins somewhere beyond the sprawling suburbs and lies outside easy commuting distance to the central city. At its far reaches, exurbia does

not so much end as it blends into the surrounding agricultural countryside. Residents of exurbia occupy an uneasy middle ground between the perceived ills of the city and adjoining suburbs and rural places where it is believed that people live in harmony with the bucolic rural landscape (Marx 1964).

At the core of the debate over exurbanization is the question of whether exurbia represents a "clean break" in prevailing patterns of suburban development or if it is simply another form of suburban sprawl (Nelson & Sanchez 1999). Proponents of the "clean break" hypothesis argue that exurbia represents a new settlement form populated by a distinctive group of residents who seek out particularly rural environments. The residential choices of exurbanites are driven by an anti urban bias which leads them to seek out idealized rural and small town locations (Nelson 1992).

Here, the argument is that exurbia and exurbanites are somehow unique and their choice to live in exurbia is reflective of a different set of values than those of people who choose to live in suburbs (Nelson & Dueker 1990). Exurban residents are said to base their residential location decision on a calculus that places an overriding value on the perceived environmental amenities offered by a rural location. Rural environments, open space, privacy, and the pursuit of "hobby farming" (e.g., raising a few head of cattle or a 5 acre vineyard) are characteristics that set exurbanites apart (Crump 2003).

Not everyone accepts the argument that exurban development is distinctive. By contrast, those arguing against the uniqueness of exurbs argue that exurban development is simply another form of suburbia. For example, Nelson, who at one time argued for the distinctiveness of exurbia, recently found that exurbanites are no different than those who seek solace in more traditional suburbs (Nelson 1992; Nelson & Sanchez 1999).

Much of the writing on exurbia is found in the popular literature. For example, the terms exurban and exurbanite were first popularized in 1955 with the publication of *Exurbanites* by the journalist A. C. Spector (1955). According to Spector, exurbanites are a unique group seeking relief from the "rat race" of Manhattan. The exurban émigrés transformed

many formerly rural enclaves such as Westport, Connecticut.

Anti urbanism is often cited as the main motivating factor for exurban migration. Marx (1964) argued that Americans have a prevailing anti urban bias which leads them to idealize rural life and seek out rural environments in which to live. In addition to anti urbanism, improved transportation and communication were crucial to the development of exurbia. Increasing affluence, when coupled with advances in transportation and communication, has also allowed people to express their residential preferences more easily. In this process, a new kind of city is being created which defies traditional definitions over what is and is not urban.

Interest in exurbanization reached a peak during the 1970s and 1980s. In the 1980s the increased research on exurban growth was largely stimulated by significant rural population gains. Termed the "rural renaissance," rural population growth represented a reversal of long term patterns of rural depopulation in the US. However, although there was little doubt that rural areas were growing, the question was why. Several surveys of rural residents identified two major factors. First, anti urbanism was leading people to seek out exurban locations. Second, industrial growth in rural areas was also expanding the employment options available in rural locations.

Exurban expansion has led to the spread of residential development across wide swaths of formerly rural landscapes (Davis et al. 1994). The ever growing exurban landscape is the result of innumerable local planning decisions that result in a sprawling, patchwork quilt of development. Controlling exurban development is difficult as developers resist growth limitations and seek jurisdictions that present the easiest path toward profitable development. They leapfrog places that seek to control growth, thereby increasing the cost of service provision.

Although academic interest in exurbanization has waned in recent years, newer studies find that the continued decentralization of employment is an important factor in exurban growth (Nelson 1992). Certainly, numerous employment nodes have grown on the edge of US cities and provide employment options for exurbanites. Termed "edge cities" by the

journalist Joel Garreau (1991), satellite business and retail centers now characterize the freeway interchanges that mark the beginning of exurbia in the 1990s.

Hayden (2003) develops a three way classification of exurban development. According to Hayden, the three emblematic landscapes of exurbia are reluctant suburbs, hot towns, and Valhallas. Reluctant suburbs are rural towns that often find themselves overwhelmed by population growth. Hot towns are well off locations that attract telecommuters, sometimes termed "lone eagles." Certainly, telecommuting has grown apace with the advent of high speed Internet service and allows exurban residents to avoid long and tiring commutes. Yet, even though the proponents of telecommuting celebrate the end of the conventional commute, critics argue that telecommuting destroys the boundary between home and work (Hayden 2003). Many telecommuters, especially women, find themselves on call 24/7. For them, telecommuting means balancing household chores with job demands. Lastly, there are the exurban Valhallas. These exclusive communities are located in environmentally attractive areas. However, access to nature's bounty is restricted to high income residents who can afford to purchase homes within the confines of high security gated "communities."

Interest in exurbia continues, particularly in the popular media. Here, exurban residential development is often linked with the growth of edge city employment and retail centers. Some observers go so far as to claim that exurbia is now the trendsetting political landscape

for America (Brooks 2004). Interestingly, that's the same claim made by Spectorisky in 1955.

SEE ALSO: Built Environment; City Planning/Urban Design; Multinucleated Metropolitan Region; New Urbanism; Suburbs; Urban Policy; Urban Space

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facework

J. I. (Hans) Bakker

The concept of “facework” (or face work) was articulated by Erving Goffman in 1955 in his book *Interaction Ritual*. He provides a “subject–object” model of human symbolic interaction in which individuals interact with other individuals in terms of subjective perceptions. Whatever is “universal” about human beings, it is not – according to Goffman – something automatic. Instead, it is a matter of self regulation and the ritual recreation of “face.”

He defines the term “face” as “the positive social value a person effectively claims for him self.” If a person makes “a good showing,” then the image of him or her is perceived by that social actor as approved by members of the reference group. If there is a mismatch between expectations and events, there is likely to be a negative emotional reaction. When a person presents a certain face, then we say she “has” that face. In conventionalized encounters there is little choice about which face to “be in” or “maintain.” A person can be said to be “in wrong face” or “out of face” when she cannot integrate the situation or deal with it in expected ways. When one is out of face there may be a sense of shame, while being “in face” tends to be associated with pride.

An interaction involves people trying to follow expected patterns. Expected signs such as glances and gestures are either given or withheld (Collins 1988: 16). Greetings and farewells are ritualized ceremonies which compensate for previous or future separations. The tendency, according to Goffman, is for all actors to support one another’s face, an idea similar to the “etcetera principle” in ethnomethodology.

Moreover, human encounters help one to construct a sense of one’s own face, or “self image.” People tend to try to protect their own inner idea of themselves even when, like the proverbial schoolboy, they may rebel in open or hidden ways. The ritual code requires that self regulating members of an interaction express a “face” and help preserve the “faces” of other participants. If a ritual order is going to be sustained, then a great deal of facework has to be done in the course of any social activity in order for the group to maintain equilibrium. There is an element of “make believe” (Winkin 1999: 33). Thomas (1923: 1–69) stresses that “recognition” from others is one of the key “wishes” and that it is related to the “definition of the situation.”

These ideas can in principle be applied to any symbolic interaction at any level of social organization, from dyads and small groups to neighborhoods and communities, although Goffman tends to stress examples from small groups. (In other works he often makes more macro statements.) In complex formal organizations such as the military or industry there is also a process of “saving face.” The unwritten rules are followed by most social actors most of the time. One not only tries to “save” one’s own face, one also tries to arrange things so that others will not lose face. (The Chinese saying is “to give face.”) The visual imagery of the concept of “face” is very concrete and Goffman claims it is manifest in a person’s whole bodily demeanor, not just the expression on one’s face.

The idea of facework is heuristic but can be criticized empirically and epistemologically. At the empirical (“ontological”) level, one limitation of Goffman’s approach is that he does not give adequate recognition to the possibility that one’s “voice” (Walker 1999: 279–82) may be silenced and that this “loss of face” is not just determined by a ritual process that occurs

within the smaller collectivity. Especially in larger groups – such as complex formal organizations or national level institutions – there may be utilitarian, goal rational exchange principles at work as well as the internal social constructions that Goffman is more directly concerned with. Epistemologically, the idea of facework tends to reinforce a Cartesian split between the “inner self” of the subject and the “objective” status of the “other” in the environment. The stereotypical version of the ethnographer is that of a bit of a loner, a lone “subject,” a utilitarian rational actor and streetwise researcher who is not easily duped (Winkin 1999: 35). An example would be Nels Anderson (1923), author of one of the first Chicago School ethnographic studies. His work was done before the modern concept of “participant observation” emerged (Platt 1996: 117–22). But that highly “individualistic” epistemological stance may reduce awareness of the embeddedness of all social relations and the importance of “the field,” or what Goffman himself refers to as “syntactical relations” (Goffman 1967 [1955]: 2). A more Peircian pragmatist epistemology, by stressing the way in which all subject–object relations are mediated by “signs,” might have made it possible for Goffman to more easily generalize his conclusions about the construction of face to all “syntactical” forms of symbolic interaction in general, providing a way for him to more easily connect his earlier work on explicit interactionist events of the 1950s with his later, more implicit and “structurationalist” analysis of “frames.” The key linking concept might be “frame attunement” as a ritual and system requirement (Collins 1988: 31).

SEE ALSO: Ethnomethodology; Generalized Other; Goffman, Erving; Labeling Theory; Looking Glass Self; Phenomenology; Role; Role Taking; Self; Symbolic Interaction

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fact, theory, and hypothesis: including the history of the scientific fact

Stephen Turner

The terms theory, fact, and hypothesis are sometimes treated as though they had clear meanings and clear relations with one another, but their histories and uses are more complex and diverse than might be expected. The usual sense of these words places them in a relationship of increasing uncertainty. A fact is usually thought of as a described state of affairs in which the descriptions are true or highly supported. A highly corroborated or supported hypothesis is also a fact; a less well corroborated one is still a hypothesis. A hypothesis which is not supported by or corroborated by other evidence would not be a fact, but could become a fact if it came to be corroborated to a high degree of certainty by other evidence. Similarly, a theory, which is a logically connected set of hypotheses, could come to be a fact if the hypotheses in the theory were to be highly corroborated by the evidence.

THE CONCEPTUAL CHARACTER OF “FACTS”

Even with this simple picture of the relationship between these terms, one can see a number of potential difficulties and raise a number of difficult questions. Begin with the notion of corroboration. If a fact is a highly corroborated hypothesis, this would seem to mean that there is a level that is prior to facts which supplies the evidence that goes into corroboration. If the corroborating evidence consists of other facts, one would want to know how these facts were corroborated. So it is more common to talk about some more fundamental level of evidence, such as data. “Data” literally means “given.” But the idea that there is something in the world that is simply given, and true or valid as such, has its own difficulties.

However, when we collect data we have already described them or have a conceptual category for them. Since the “data” are already in a predefined category, we are not dealing directly with the world but with an already categorized world. This idea of fact as already conceptual had a long history in writing about science and is particularly associated with the nineteenth century philosopher William Whewell. Whewell said the following: “*Fact and Theory* correspond to Sense on the one hand, and to Ideas on the other, so far as we are *conscious* of our Ideas; but all facts involve ideas *unconsciously*; and thus the distinction of Facts and Theories is not tenable, as that of Sense and Ideas is” (Whewell 1984: 249). And this raises the questions of where the categories themselves come from and what their status is. In 1932, L. J. Henderson wrote an article which was cited by the sociologist Talcott Parsons (Parsons 1968: 41) which defined a scientific fact as an “empirically verifiable statement about phenomena in terms of a conceptual scheme” (Henderson 1932). What this implied, especially for Parsons, was that to be a fact it was necessary to be a part of or to depend on a conceptual scheme. And conceptual schemes were not givens but were, like theories, invented for the purpose of enabling us to make statements such as the statements in theories.

The question of where categories come from and how something becomes a fact has been a major concern of sociologists of scientific

knowledge. An important book by Ludwig Fleck (1979), a physician scientist, provided the basic framework for this study. Fleck argued that to be accepted as a fact required something social, which he called a “thought collective,” in terms of which a concept is transformed from idea into accepted truth. The emphasis was on the social phenomenon of acceptance, something which, Fleck showed, did not merely result from the accumulation of evidence, but rather from the activity of a community of persons, with a common thought style, exchanging ideas. This implied that “discovery” was never an individual act, but rather collective; and that conceptual content was part of the collective thought of the community, which developed in the course of exchange. Only retrospectively, once the discovery had been fit into the collective thought of the community, could the significance of discoveries be fully understood.

INDUCTIVISM VS. HYPOTHETICO DEDUCTIVISM

The methodological understanding of science that fits best the insight that facts are already conceptual is hypothetico deductivism, which contrasts to a different view of methodology called inductivism. Inductivism was the traditional understanding that science consists of generalizations which can be built up on the basis of the collection of information or data which can then be arranged into generalizations. The problem with inductivism is that there is no logical way to get from a collection of finite singular pieces of information to a generalization which goes beyond the particulars that have been collected. Hypothetico deductivism deals with this limitation by turning the problem upside down by beginning with hypotheses that are generalizations and asking whether the observable particulars are consistent with (because they are implied by) the generalization. The hypothesis “all crows are black” has the potential to be contradicted every time we see a crow. Thus, each particular crow can be used as a test of the hypothesis and the more stringently we test the hypothesis, the more secure we are in our belief that the hypothesis is true.

Hypothetico deductivism has an advantage over inductivism as a method in that hypothetico deductivism can be used to corroborate theories where the concepts in the theories are not themselves directly observable. The wave hypothesis in physics is a traditional example of this. The hypothesis logically implied generalizations for which observations could be collected. Because the theory correctly predicted these and other facts that could be observed, the claims about what could not be observed were themselves corroborated. This is an especially important possibility in sociology because many of the concepts in sociology do not directly apply to observable facts in the world, but instead to grounding concepts such as "society," or "role," or "attitude." These concepts can be understood as having observable manifestations, but are not limited to or equivalent to observable manifestations.

In physics the term observation and the notion of the logical relations between claims in a theory had a more straightforward meaning. The logical relations were mathematical. The way in which an implication was derived from a theory was by deriving it mathematically through a proof. The theories of sociology, in contrast, rarely if ever have this structure, although in many cases theories are presented with verbal formulations which have "logical connections" in a looser sense, namely that the claims in the theory provide a good reason, in context, for expectations that can be tested or applied to cases. Sociological theories thus resemble physical theories in the hypothetico deductive sense in some ways, but differ in others. A "theory" may be a part of a theoretical structure, such as a system of conceptual categories which enable description. But it may instead be a description of unobservable forces or unobservable mechanisms, such as the mechanism that reinforces social hierarchy by selectively excluding members of the lower classes from the paths which lead to positions of wealth and power.

SENSE MAKING IN THEORIES

The major difference between sociological and physical theory is that the concepts in sociology are typically sense making: they serve to enable

a fact described in its terms to be more fully intelligible. Making a fact more intelligible will usually make its consequences more predictable. If I even do something as simple as characterizing an action as a product of the agent's beliefs and positive attitudes towards some outcome specified by the agent's beliefs, I have improved the prediction over alternative descriptions or over chance. This is not the same thing as a prediction in physics, but it is predictive nevertheless.

If the sociologist can add to this simple situation of explaining in terms of beliefs and attitudes by characterizing the set of beliefs that support the particular belief that relates directly to the action, for example by understanding a religiously motivated action in terms of a typology of religious belief, and if the sociologist can explain how those beliefs come to be distributed in particular groups, she will have something that begins to look like a theory that explains those actions sociologically, that is to say at some level beyond the level of the individual. Similarly, for characterizations about such things as role, for example. If an individual's behavior can be characterized in terms of the roles which they are fulfilling, this explanation can be extended by accounting for the process of socialization into the role in question and the ways in which role behavior is enforced as normative, or enacted and supported by the expectations of other agents.

These descriptions of mechanisms are more general claims than the explanation of the individual's action; they are "social" in the sense that they serve to organize the behavior of individuals in relation to a limited category of individuals. The characterizations are sense making in that they explicate the beliefs and expectations of the people involved, and predictive in the sense that they improve our own expectations about what people will actually do and what role conduct is likely to persist or appear in different social settings. Similarly, a good categorization scheme using intelligibility enhancing concepts (e.g., Weber's categories of legitimate authority) will enable the sociologist equipped with it to improve expectations as well as achieve understanding.

Sociologists have traditionally differed with respect to the emphasis they place on different aspects of these kinds of loose theories.

Parsons, for example, was particularly concerned with the elaboration of conceptual distinctions which could be used to organize comprehensively the concepts of sociology and relate them to one another and to the concepts of other disciplines. Parsons placed little emphasis on making individual actions or beliefs intelligible and little emphasis on prediction; although he envisioned future possibilities of prediction he also believed that many of the central variables of sociology were unquantifiable and that this was an inherent limitation on sociological theories approximating physics.

DIVERSITY IN THEORY IN SOCIOLOGY

Some sociologists have tried strictly to adhere to the idea of deductive theorizing as modeled on physics. Typically, these sociologists have attempted to devise experimental settings in which limited variables or sets of variables can be measured in relation to other variables in such ways that predictions can be made and confirmed. This strategy has the potential of illuminating basic concepts which can then be applied to social life outside the laboratory as fundamental theories which approximate the more complex realities of actual social life. One problem with this strategy is that there are often alternative theories which are equally effective or ineffective as means of making sense of and predicting in the more complex actual settings of the real world.

Some theories, generally called interpretive theories, are focused primarily on intelligibility itself. For these theorists, providing a more fully realized and rich interpretation of the actions, attitudes, and beliefs of individuals is the appropriate and most productive strategy for dealing with a world of agents, that is to say a world of individuals who are themselves interpreters of one another and who act in terms of these interpretations.

Other theories, such as rational choice theory, borrow the theoretical structure of decision theory, game theory, or economics to provide a particular kind of intelligibility to actions of individuals who are treated in abstraction from considerations about the specific actual beliefs and attitudes of the individuals, and the explanations are evaluated in terms of their ability to

predict the choices of these individuals. In one sense this represents the highest level of intelligibility, namely rational choice. In another sense it is removed from the subjective experience and ongoing interpretive activities of individual agents and thus serves as a poor guide to these aspects of experience.

SEE ALSO: Chance and Probability; Experimental Methods; Laboratory Studies and the World of the Scientific Lab; Metatheory; Science, Social Construction of; Scientific Models and Simulations; Theory Construction; Theory and Methods

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factor analysis

Bruce Thompson

Factor analysis is a statistical method for empirically identifying the structure underlying measured or factored entities (e.g., variables). The three purposes for which factor analysis can be used are (1) empirically creating a theory of structure (e.g., Cattell's Structure of Intellect model), (2) evaluating whether factored entities (e.g., variables) cluster in a theoretically expected way (e.g., construct validity evaluation), and (3) estimating latent variables scores (i.e., factor scores) that are then used in subsequent statistical analyses (e.g., MANOVA, descriptive discriminant analysis) in place of the measured factored entities (e.g., variables).

In common analytic practice, the factored entities are usually (1) variables, although (2) people and (3) occasions of measurement also can be factored (Thompson 2000). Factor analysis statistical software does not know if it is factoring variables, people, or time, and from a statistical point of view, the mathematics of factor analysis can sensibly be invoked for any of these possibilities.

The data matrix for the analysis is created such that the entities to be factored (e.g., variables) constitute the columns of the matrix. The rows constitute the dimension over which patterns of association (e.g., correlation, covariance) among the factored entities are estimated. The factors are then estimated based on these association statistics.

Cattell (1966) identified six possible two mode combinations of factored entities and raw data matrix row replicates of the association patterns: (1) *R* technique factor analysis, which factors variables with people defining the rows of the raw data matrix, with measurement at a single time; (2) *Q* technique factor analysis, which factors people with variables defining the rows of the raw data matrix, with measurement at a single time; (3) *O* technique factor analysis, which factors occasions with variables defining the rows of the raw data matrix, with measurement of a single person (or use of a single group mean or median for each unique combination of occasions and variables); (4) *P* technique factor analysis, which factors variables with occasions defining the rows of the raw data matrix, with measurement of a single person (or use of a single group mean or median for each unique combination of occasions and variables); (5) *T* technique factor analysis, which factors occasions with participants defining the rows of the raw data matrix, with measurement using a single variable (or use of a single group mean or median for each unique combination of occasions and participants); and (6) *S* technique factor analysis, which factors participants with occasions defining the rows of the raw data matrix, with measurement using a single variable (or use of a single group mean or median for each unique combination of occasions and participants).

Although factor analysis is relatively old, the required mathematics are so complex that the methods were not widely used until the advent

of modern computers and statistical software. There are two major classes of factor analytic methods (Thompson 2004). First, exploratory factor analysis (EFA) can be used when the researcher has no theory about structure, or does not wish expected structure to be invoked as part of the analytic calculations. EFA dates back to the first decade of the 1900s, when Spearman (1904) conceptualized the method to address questions such as the nature of IQ. Second, confirmatory factor analysis (CFA) requires that the researcher has a theory of factor structure, and this theory must be declared as part of the analysis, and is used in the analysis to limit which parameters are and are not estimated. CFA originated in the 1960s and 1970s, largely in the work of Jöreskog (1969).

Factor analysis can be used to address three primary research questions. These three issues involve (1) the number of factors, (2) which factored entities (e.g., variables, people) are most associated with a given factor, and (3) how correlated the factors are with each other.

In EFA, either four or five decisions must be made, in turn. First, which matrix of association statistics to analyze (e.g., a Pearson *r* matrix, a covariance matrix) must be decided. Second, how many factors to extract must be decided. There are numerous ways to inform this EFA decision, including use of Guttman's suggestion to extract all factors with eigenvalues greater than 1.0 (sometimes erroneously called the "Kaiser > 1" rule), Cattell's scree plot (based on a plot of eigenvalues), and more sophisticated methods, such as parallel analysis or the bootstrap (see Thompson 2004). Third, a statistical method for computing the factor pattern coefficients, which are weights algebraically equivalent to beta weights in regression, or standardized function coefficients in descriptive discriminant analysis or in canonical correlation analysis, must be decided. Common factor extraction methods include principal components analysis and principal axis methods. Fourth, a factor rotation method must be selected, if more than one factor is extracted. Rotation is necessary to ensure the interpretability of the factors. Two classes of rotation methods are orthogonal rotation, in which the uncorrelated initial factors are rotated such that they remain perfectly uncorrelated, and oblique

rotation, in which the uncorrelated initial factors are rotated such that they become correlated. The most commonly used orthogonal and oblique rotation methods are varimax and promax, respectively.

Orthogonal rotation is more parsimonious, and consequently varimax rotation tends to yield results that (1) fit sample data less well than oblique methods (because there is less opportunity to capitalize on sampling error), but (2) replicate better in future samples (for the same reason). Thompson (2004) estimated that varimax rotation works well in roughly 85 percent of applied EFA research situations.

Fifth, if factors scores are to be used in a subsequent analysis (e.g., MANOVA), a factor score computation method must be selected. However, if principal components has been selected as the analytic method, the various factor score algorithms all yield identical factor scores. Another benefit of principal components analysis is that only with this method do the correlations of the factors with each other and of the factor scores with each other exactly match.

Commonly used statistical packages have as the default choices factor extraction from the Pearson r matrix, principal components extraction, and varimax rotation. Most applied researchers rely on these defaults, and thus the preponderance of published EFA research invokes these choices. However, these choices do often work quite well for many data sets.

In CFA, most of the same analytic decisions must be made. However, in CFA factors are never rotated. Instead, a “simple,” interpretable factor structure is realized in CFA by fixing certain factor pattern coefficients to be zero, and freeing other factor pattern coefficients to be estimated. Researchers make these decisions to free and fix parameter estimates such that the nature of the factors is interpretable.

SEE ALSO: General Linear Model; Replicability Analyses; Statistical Significance Testing; Structural Equation Modeling

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Fajnzylber, Fernando (1940–91)

Norma Rondero López

The vastness of Fernando Fajnzylber’s work clearly places him among the most important Latin American thinkers. Rather than highlighting the many documents he wrote or the many projects he participated in, it is indispensable to note that what is outstanding in Fajnzylber’s work is not only its importance as a critical vision of the development conditions in Latin America, but also the influence his ideas had on the development of policy strategies for the region.

Born into a family of Jewish immigrants in Santiago de Chile in 1940, Fernando Fajnzylber studied economic sciences in Chile. His work is without doubt a detailed analysis of the economic conditions in developing countries in Latin America. It is nevertheless important to acknowledge his influence on the development of sociology in Latin America in the 1970s and 1980s thanks to his contributions toward an explanation of the social and political

problems in Latin America that showed the conditions of inequity of the poorest populations in the region based on the economic formulae Fajnzylber developed to reach economic growth.

Fajnzylber's work was mainly based on case studies and comparative studies between countries or sectors and/or productive branches. Fajnzylber's research was typically based on empirical work, the generation of studies that could provide "first hand" information, which allowed him to master a method of carrying out research on industrial organizations based on recognizing the non linear causal relationships between growth, international competitiveness, technical progress, and equity.

Fajnzylber's most important work started with the publication in 1970 of *Sistema industrial y exportación de manufacturas: análisis de la experiencia brasileña*, an analysis of the Brazilian industrial system and the export of manufactured goods. He studies the role transnational corporations play in industrial development and the potential of industrial spaces considered "sectors that carry technical progress" to expand competitively and the capacity to develop the productive apparatus.

During the early 1970s, Fajnzylber's work focused on the analysis of international industrial organizations. These studies led Fajnzylber to lay down one of the primary lines of his research: the growth problems in the manufacturing sector. This created the foundation for concepts that would emerge in his later work. Among the most important of these concepts is the notion of "sectors that carry technical progress." He would later analyze them as "endogenous nuclei of growth" because of the role they played in industrial development. These sectors are typically spaces with a high technological content that articulated with a broader productive apparatus to allow substantial advances in crucial productive sectors and branches.

In this sense, Fajnzylber's first works, which include the research he carried out on Mexican industry, "Las empresas transnacionales y el sistema industrial de México" ("Transnational Firms and the Mexican Industrial System") (1975), configured the core issue Fajnzylber never abandoned: the macroeconomic determination of competitiveness. In these first studies,

Fajnzylber emphasized the structural analysis of export oriented industries, the development of export strategies for the countries in the region, and, to a lesser extent, the analysis of business strategies related to international markets.

The competitiveness axis stands out due to the notion of the prevailing need for national industries to link up with areas of production that are better positioned in the international markets. This issue was based on notions that took into account the importance of advanced technologies of certain productive areas, the incorporation of diversified structures, and, in general, the strategies set forth by leading firms that could be incorporated by industrial branch or sector, considered nuclei of competitive development.

As can be seen in this first stage of Fajnzylber's work, the core problem is located in the organizational analysis of certain industrial branches (export oriented goods and manufactured goods). Although this stage of Fajnzylber's work is haunted by topics associated with the development of industrial leaderships and nuclei of technological development, Fajnzylber's thinking and analytical elaborations had not yet reached their greatest complexity.

In the 1980s, exiled in Mexico, Fajnzylber participated directly in the United Nations Industrial Development Organization (UNIDO), focusing on the analysis of technological modernization and the export possibilities of Latin American industry. With works like *La industrialización trunca de América Latina (The Truncated Industrialization of Latin America)* (1983), Fajnzylber was developing a system of associated ideas with a greater emphasis on recognizing technological lags and the lack of an industry of capital goods as elements that explain the region's development problem more firmly. This axis of his work thus incorporated more complex concerns: the capital goods industry in itself is not enough for economic development. It is here that Fajnzylber developed more specifically the theme of the endogenous nuclei of growth, since it is their articulation with the whole of the productive apparatus that enables the branches in which it is possible to compete internationally to become more dynamic.

This brought an understanding of the actual export possibilities of the Latin American

industry. It should be noted that the kind of studies set forth in this stage see Latin America as a whole, acknowledging differences between the countries that have relatively stronger economies, such as Mexico and Brazil, which Fajnzylber considered to be economies that had important lessons to teach regarding exports. Diagnostics and projections in specific industrial sectors allowed Fajnzylber to set forth specific strategies that would serve as points of reference for the generation of concrete industrial policy and actions of the regional institutions for development.

Later on, in the second half of the 1980s, Fajnzylber went back to Chile where he joined the Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC) as director of the Department of Industrial Development. By 1987, a new stage was initiated in the analysis of themes associated with development. This stage was opened with the publication in 1987 of “La industrialización de América Latina: de la ‘caja negra’ al ‘casillero vacío’” (“Industrialization in Latin America: From the ‘Black Box’ to the ‘Empty Locker’”). In this work, again based on empirical comparisons, Fajnzylber analyzes technological development in a more refined way: this is theme of the “black box” for Latin America, which, as Fajnzylber shows, constitutes the shadow of Latin American industrial development. In addition, he delved more deeply into issues that he had already set forth, such as productive dynamism and competitiveness.

From this point, technical progress will constitute an important aspect of Fajnzylber’s reflections and contributions to the formulation of development strategies. It is therefore important to record that it is now that one of Fajnzylber’s most polemical themes emerged: the differences between the more traditional structuralist perspectives of ECLAC members and Fajnzylber’s so called “neo structuralist” vision. In his perspective, Fajnzylber uses the same diagnosis as the original structuralist perspective, but recognizes that in the 1980s the conditions in Latin America, given the economic crisis it was going through, were substantially modified. This recognition is in fact his core innovation. He therefore set forth new development options for the Latin American countries. These options were contrary to

previous formulae of “inward growth” and suggested promoting new pathways to development within the framework of international markets as well as industrial strategies that would place productive sectors in a more competitive position vis à vis international markets.

Fajnzylber developed in greater detail the aforementioned ideas, such as creative integration into the international economy based on strengthening the endogenous nuclei of growth. This integration aimed to incorporate not only the more developed industries with foreign markets but also all those agents involved in the implementation of more general industrial and economic policies. In other words, it did not exclude the state as an important agent. Had he excluded the state, he would have left the possibility of promoting development exclusively in the hands of market conditions. Above all, he gave transnational corporations an important role to play, which generated intense polemics especially in comparison to ECLAC’s traditional structuralism.

Fajnzylber’s core idea of “empty lockers” refers to the incapacity of the countries in the region to relate sustained growth with equity. It refers to a more specific development of the problems related to social inequality, social opportunities, and even some ideas associated with social mobility. All the works Fajnzylber headed as coordinator of the ECLAC work teams addressed these issues.

With this step, we find one of the most interesting lines in Fajnzylber’s research profile: it is here that his work is enriched through its adoption of a more sociological perspective. The studies of problems of economic development, competitiveness, industrial strategies, and the promotion of endogenous nuclei of development are now accompanied by studies on inequality and equity as crucial problems to be faced in order to achieve sustained growth, based on an evaluation of the real conditions of the third world economies focusing on social equity.

In these studies, equity is embedded in a context that includes other countries beyond the Latin American region. These studies aim to approach the issue of globalizing trends and the changes experienced in national policies on technological development. These globalizing tendencies are related not only to the opening

of markets but also to the crisis of the Taylorist–Fordist model of production, until then followed by the countries of developed capitalism in the western world. Fajnzylber therefore turned his eyes to the East Asian countries, in comparison to which the Latin American countries lack technological development, the “black box” and the “empty locker” of distributional equity.

From this perspective, the themes of Fajnzylber’s later works diversified, constructing a more complex vision. Fajnzylber later looked into themes such as the structures and working conditions of labor that lead to low productivity in the region and associated this problem with the social conditions that can have an adverse impact on competitiveness.

The inclusion of these social issues strongly reinforces the arguments of the analysis and proposals on structural strengthening and competitiveness. Fajnzylber thus comes up with another crucial concept, for the understanding of his position of “authentic competitiveness” incorporates equity as a fundamental factor because of its direct relation to technical progress and therefore to competitiveness and growth.

The analysis linked to this new concept is directly associated with the public policy making processes. The core recommendations incorporated equity not only in areas such as labor but also in impulse reforms within national institutions, as the concept of equity that is set forth not only refers to addressing and integrating the sectors of the poor, but is also a concept that aims to articulate society as a whole: from the poor to the entrepreneurs.

This point leads to a fair understanding of the complexity of Fajnzylber’s thought around the more global idea of regional growth. It implies understanding the role played by both national and transnational firms especially in the space of the endogenous nuclei of development, these nuclei’s drive toward technological progress, and the recognition of the global conditions of competitiveness and national institutional conditions. All these spaces are composed of public and private actors who could influence the development and implementation of national policies. In this sense, Fajnzylber clarifies that it is not a question of transferring formulae from other countries, but

of recognizing and seeing to the specific local and national contexts.

This is why institutional reforms that promote equity are gaining increasing importance. They set out by considering inequalities not only or even primarily as an economic problem, but as a challenge to be faced by the various political, economic, and social actors. It is no longer a question of seeing to the poor sectors through a welfare state, as ECLAC’s past perspective foresaw. It is now a question of integrating all the social sectors in a structural transformation.

The most refined development of these ideas was materialized in an ECLAC document, *Transformación productiva con equidad (Productive Transformation with Equity)*, published in 1990. Although this document is signed by ECLAC as a product of institutional authorship, it was the product of the hard work of a team headed by Fajnzylber, recognizing the so called “renovation of ECLAC thought.” In this document, we can find once again the construction of more complex versions of the concepts originally incorporated in earlier works. It refers to authentic competitiveness, but with a systemic character. The specific proposals for institutional reforms are precisely systemic. It is now a question of reaching a transformation that goes beyond partial agreements between unconnected levels that take decisions around sectoral public policies.

This transformation should be sought not only in the economic sector but also in the political realm. This is clearly expressed in the emphasis placed on the theme of democracy, which is understood as an indispensable, but not sufficient, condition in the search for equity since it broadens the possibilities of participation of sectors that have so far been excluded. It is thus a transformation that is based on the possibility of having a “framework of social and political coexistence.”

According to this work, institutional change, indicated in the political system, should include broad sectors and institutions. Education is one of the most important sectors that will gain significance with the ideas associated with the development of necessary and indispensable human resources to promote productive and technological development.

Bringing in the educational issue offers a very interesting shift in what we have

recognized as one of Fajnzylber's most important sociological contributions. *Transformación productiva con equidad* introduces the possibility of exploring the analysis and search for strategies to deal with the relationship between technological development and the productive system, on the one hand, and education, training, science, and technology, on the other. This relationship is based on ideas that became part of the education policies in the late 1980s and early 1990s and which are guided by the notion of a "society of knowledge," based on the consideration that access to knowledge – i.e., educational equity – is the essential foundation for the development of both individuals and nations.

The emphasis on education is also placed on the process of institutional transformation. This is the reason why, beyond the reforms to economic and political spaces, educational institutions at all levels must also be reformed. In this sense, it is indispensable to talk about another of ECLAC's works that delves more deeply into the need to face a series of conditions of educational equity and the development possibilities of the productive system: *Educación y conocimiento: eje de la transformación productiva con equidad (Education and Knowledge: An Axis of Productive Transformation with Equity)*. This work was published in 1992, after Fernando Fajnzylber's death, but the research and the work behind this publication were still carried out by Fajnzylber. An introductory note in the document mentions Fajnzylber's guidance.

Fajnzylber's influence can still be appreciated in this document, which sustains the arguments set forth in their initial stage in ECLAC's previous works: the need for institutional reforms, the systemic character of growth and competitiveness, as well as the need to train and develop human resources not only to face the technological changes coming from other countries, but also to participate in the technological drive of the Latin American countries.

The role sustainability plays in economic development is just as important as the role of education. Fajnzylber's thinking always included the ecological dimension, particularly in *Transformación productiva con equidad*, and in ECLAC's *El desarrollo sustentable: transformación*

productiva, equidad y medio ambiente (Sustainable Development: Productive Transformation, Equity, and the Environment), published in 1991. The ecological dimension was also considered a basic condition linked to economic development and was set forth as a "condition that enables competitive patterns to be sustainable."

In retrospect, these latter ECLAC publications can be considered Fajnzylber's first steps in a new line of work that was even more complex than the initial publications. Unfortunately, this new line of work only remained as a proposal since Fajnzylber's early death interrupted what promised to be the consolidation of this "new ECLAC perspective."

Those who study ECLAC and Fajnzylber's work have recognized that his ideas, concepts, and analysis were constructed while foreseeing the changes he was studying. The apparent simplicity of Fajnzylber's developed, detailed, and deep research work, mostly based on comparative experiences, allowed him to present his ideas in an accessible and understandable way.

Over 20 years of uninterrupted production (publications, courses, conferences, and documents) distinguished Fernando Fajnzylber. His work never ceased to reflect his commitment to Latin American development. Fajnzylber's work is not only an exemplary analysis of Latin American economic conditions, but also managed to be transferred into direct action in developing and implementing public policies for the productive sector that faced economic growth and social justice at the same time. While Fajnzylber had an undeniable influence on economics, his contribution to sociology was equally important.

SEE ALSO: Culture, Economy and; Democracy; Development: Political Economy; Education and Economy

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Faletto, Enzo (1935–2003)

Ricardo Gamboa Ramírez

Enzo Doménico Faletto Verné was born in Chile in 1935 and died in Santiago de Chile on July 22, 2003. He studied history in the Faculty of Philosophy and Education at the University of Chile and received an MA in sociology at the Latin American Faculty of Social Studies (FLACSO). Faletto must be considered as a representative of social sciences and humanities in Latin America, two disciplines which achieved the peak of their development in the early 1970s.

Faletto's social and humanist vocation can be appreciated in the various disciplines treated in his books and articles, as well as in the lectures he gave while a teacher at the Sociology Department of the University of Chile and at FLACSO. From 1967 to 1973 he taught classes to students of sociology and journalism at the University of Chile. In addition, Faletto was a researcher at the Latin American Institute for Economic and Social Planning (ILPES), and after 1973 he worked as an expert in the Social Development Division of the United Nations Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC). He also worked in several foreign universities, including the University of Rosario in Argentina, which awarded him an honorary doctorate.

Faletto combined his academic career with political activity in the heart of the Socialist Party of Chile, where he was part of a group known as the “Swiss” faction which included Ricardo Lagos, president of Chile (2002–6),

among its members. Two important aspects of Faletto's political career should be highlighted.

The first is that, despite the intellectual and friendship bonds he enjoyed for most of his life with Fernando Henrique Cardoso and Ricardo Lagos, presidents of Brazil and Chile at the end of the twentieth century and beginning of the twenty first, Faletto refused to be present when they assumed their respective terms of office. After Lagos had won the elections in 2000, Faletto even warned him that he would not see him again until the end of his term in 2006. This attitude reveals how Faletto, a convinced social democrat, understood the kind of relationship that an intellectual should have with the highest political circles.

The second aspect is that after the coup d'état which overthrew president Salvador Allende on September 11, 1973, Faletto decided to remain in Chile instead of living in exile. Even though this decision led to many problems on account of the military junta's censure, it also offered Faletto the opportunity of holding a point of view on the Chilean reality during the hard years of the military dictatorship different from that of his exiled colleagues.

Nevertheless, the circumstances imposed by the repression made him abandon the university to "take labor refuge" in the heart of ECLAC and FLACSO, until finally in 1990 he was reinstated to his academic work at the house of Andrés Bello, where he was the head of the Seminar of Social History of Latin America until his death.

As with his vast written work, the name of the seminar was only a pretext to develop an analysis of the reality of Latin America, where economy, sociology, politics, and history merged in a multidisciplinary exercise that gave rise to works that constitute real milestones of social knowledge. Before the avalanche of the so called unique thought characteristic of neoliberalism, these works deserve to be rescued in a double sense: as a sample of the history of social thought in Latin America, and as an example of a methodological and epistemological approach that nowadays should be incorporated into the knowledge of disciplines such as sociology and particularly economy, which has strayed so far in recent years from its social and humanist origins.

HISTORICAL CONTEXT OF ENZO FALETTO'S WORK

Throughout his academic career, Faletto published a wide range of books and articles in specialized journals. To gain an idea of the extent of his written work, it should be mentioned that in January 2005 the dean's office of the University of Chile announced the creation of the Enzo Faletto Seminar. During this ceremony Carlos Ruiz, a disciple, colleague, and friend of Faletto, mentioned that work had just begun on compiling the scattered writings of this prominent scientist, and so far there were already 80 titles.

Faletto published articles in specialized journals, the most relevant ones since 1990. Without doubt, the circumstances associated with the fall of the Soviet bloc, as well as the predominance of social, political, and economic individualism imposed by neoliberal policies, motivated his work on topics such as the role of the state in contemporary capitalist societies, particularly in Latin America; modernity and the role of social classes in today's world; the relation between democracy and political culture; and the theory of dependency and its role in the neoliberal project at the end of the twentieth century.

Of all the books by Faletto, undoubtedly the most powerful is that co written with Fernando Henrique Cardoso, *Dependencia y desarrollo en América Latina (Dependency and Development in Latin America)*, first published in 1969. Because of its number of printings (30 until 2002), this is one of the most important social science publications throughout the world; it has also been translated into other languages, including English and Portuguese. The importance of this work lies in the fact that it was the first attempt to systematize an interpretive model of the economic development of Latin America, having as the focal point of its line of argument the dependency relation between developed countries and the periphery, from the first world expansion of capitalism in the sixteenth century to the internationalization of capital in the second half of the twentieth.

Nevertheless, as with other intellectual undertakings, this book is not a product of chance. It was written by professors Faletto and Cardoso at the peak of a process in which

the relationship between academia and politics, between the theoretical and the ideological, would define many of the characteristics of political culture in Latin America after 1950.

The background of 15 years' work by ECLAC interpreting Latin America's economic development, taking as its starting point the relationship between center and periphery, was one of the primary influences in Faletto and Cardoso's work. ECLAC was created in 1948 by the Economic and Social Council of the United Nations. This international organization was headed for almost 15 years after its foundation by the Argentinean economist Raúl Prebisch.

The Latin American and Caribbean Demographic Center (CELADE) as well as ILPES were created inside ECLAC. In 1964, the second event influencing the intellectual trajectory of Cardoso and Faletto's work occurred. Following the 1964 coup d'état in Brazil, a group of Brazilian intellectuals and scholars sought refuge in Chile where they could continue developing their academic and political reflection. At this time important figures in the academic world could be found at ILPES, such as Ruy Mauro Marini, Theotonio Dos Santos, Fernando Henrique Cardoso, American professor André Gunder Frank, and the still young Enzo Faletto. The discussions inside ILPES daily recreated many of the topics of interest defined by ECLAC, which considered that an essential element of Latin America's backwardness was the unequal relations in terms of technology, productivity, and commercial exchange established between central and peripheral countries.

There are three overarching topics. The first two relate to the industrialization of Latin America and to the state's role in developing that process as a way of analyzing the unequal conditions imposed by the core-periphery relation. The third consists in a thorough understanding of the economic problems faced by Latin American countries as a result of structural conditions historically confronted by those nations, and not only of monetary phenomena such as price rises and inflation.

Another important factor in Faletto and Cardoso's work was the publication in 1960 of Washington Whitman Rostow's *Stages of*

Economic Development. In this work, Rostow argues that the underdeveloped nations must repeat the economic growth styles of developed countries, particularly in their definitions of economic policies, in order to move beyond the stage of underdevelopment. This apparently simple formula met with immediate criticism from Latin American social scientists, especially in relation to its ahistorical, indeed anti-historical, nature, since it left aside an element that would afterwards be taken up again by Faletto and Cardoso: the historical nature of dependency relationships between center and periphery.

Rostow's position in relation to the economic takeoff was influenced by the German historicist stream of thought at the end of the nineteenth century, but above all by the quantitative historical studies on the economic variables associated with growth promoted mainly by the American economist Simon Kuznets. The transposition of economic growth behavior from the central countries to the underdeveloped nations faced immediate theoretical rejection from the different streams that merged in ECLAC and in the Chilean ILPES.

This theoretical rejection emerged from a cultural tradition in Latin America that stressed the importance of understanding the historical process of the development of nations and states, as well as the inequality of prevailing conditions in the region. This tradition began in the nineteenth century in the context of the struggles for independence and in the political processes that gave rise to the formation of Latin American states.

The Cold War and its particular features in the area provide an additional element in the context in which Faletto and Cardoso wrote the book. The victory of the Cuban Revolution in 1959, and its early definition as a socialist revolution, cleared the way for the possibility of economic development different from the capitalist system. This essentially ideological discussion prevailed among Latin American social scientists beginning in the 1960s. Moreover, the determined political attitude and affiliation of many of these intellectuals made it inevitable that their theoretical developments would be accompanied by an essentially anti-capitalist definition.

DEPENDENCY AND DEVELOPMENT IN LATIN AMERICA

Most Latin American experts agree on characterizing the work of Faletto and Cardoso as part of the structuralist stream that finds in dependency the key to explaining the roots of Latin America's underdevelopment. Structuralism attributes the main causes of economic backwardness to the deformations and imbalances in the economic structures of Latin American countries.

In Faletto and Cardoso's book, the imbalances in the economic structure are determined by the dependency relations established between peripheral and central countries, dependency relations that have their own historical features depending on the kind of integration within the global market that developed after the colonial pact was broken off. The characterization of the different historical stages of integration within the global market is one of the book's major contributions. The first stage is outward development, the second is the transition to capitalism, the third is the consolidation of the inner market and the beginning of the industrialization process, and the final stage relates to the internationalization of Latin American economies. In this historical model, Faletto and Cardoso distinguish between consolidated national economies and enclaved economies. However, this structuralist vision surpasses the economic sphere. As Faletto repeatedly stressed, his intention was to give a sociological dimension to economic backwardness and to dependency.

One of the main contributions of Enzo Faletto's work can be found in the definition of the sociological dimension of dependency and economic backwardness, which is still useful for the analysis of contemporary societies in the early twenty-first century. For Cardoso and Faletto, the problem of backwardness in Latin American countries cannot be considered only from the point of view of economic variables, least of all by comparing them to how they behave in developed countries. Comparison makes no sense unless the following elements are considered:

- The special features of historical processes that led to the formation of national economies.

- The role of the state in the formation of the economic structures of individual countries.
- The formation of the different social classes, particularly the entrepreneurs and the oligarchy, as well as the working class.
- The way in which these social classes are linked with the oligarchies of the central nations.
- The way in which the national economies integrate into the international market.

In this respect, an essential element emerges for an understanding of the neoliberal order in recent years. From the publication of *Dependency and Development in Latin America* and in later articles and essays, Faletto defines Latin American national economies as capitalist economies integrated into the world market, particularly since the internationalization of capital that took place after 1950.

This definition is neither obvious nor pointless. Since so-called globalization turned out to be a kind of leitmotif of social analysis after 1990, there was a tendency to define Latin American societies as isolated from the tendencies of the market that supposedly encouraged capitalist development after the Bretton Woods Agreements in 1944. The contributions of Faletto demonstrate that there is nothing more distant from reality; the presence of capitalism and integration within the global market has been constant in the history of Latin America.

The consequence of the loss of sociological perspective, in the sense that Faletto understood it, was the emphasis on market forces as the means by which the nations of Latin America would gain access to economic development. This led to the idea that it was sufficient to imitate the so-called emergent market economies, like those in Southeast Asia, in order to achieve high standards of economic growth and welfare. The revision of economic takeoff theory, now based on the impulse of market forces and of so-called economic miracles, suffers from the same flaws as its distant and forgotten predecessor devised by Rostow: its clearly unhistorical element, which in itself makes it necessary to return to theoretical aspects developed by Latin American social scientists, of whom Enzo Doménico Faletto Verné was one of the main exponents.

SEE ALSO: Dependency and World Systems Theories; Development: Political Economy; Economy (Sociological Approach); Neoliberalism; Organizations; Structuralism

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false consciousness

Brian Starks and Azamat Junisbai

False consciousness is a Marxist theoretical concept referring to the circumstance, or state of being, in which workers hold views that are contrary to workers' objective class interests. This subjective consciousness does not arise organically from among workers, but is imposed (or foisted) upon them by the dominant ideology of the capitalist class. False consciousness and class consciousness are intimately linked. Whereas class consciousness

denotes workers' awareness of their historical position and enables the transformation of society, false consciousness denotes workers' failure to recognize their position and bring about the transformation of society. Because of its elitist and arguably negative view of workers (as dupes), the concept of false consciousness often offends modern democratic sensibilities. Not only that, but with its apparent reference to objective truth, false consciousness in an era of postmodernism smacks of intellectual arrogance. Perhaps for these reasons, the concept has fallen into disuse among sociologists.

It appears that the term was first coined by Friedrich Engels; there is no evidence that Karl Marx himself ever used this in his writing (Eagleton 1991). The term's initial appearance in print was in a letter written by Engels to Franz Mehring in 1893:

Ideology is a process accomplished by the so-called thinker consciously, it is true, but with a false consciousness. The real motive forces impelling him remain unknown to him; otherwise it simply would not be an ideological process. (Tucker 1978: 766)

The concept, as developed in Engels's letter and in later writings, is rooted in the earlier writings of Marx and Engels in *The German Ideology*. While theorists have debated whether Marx himself would have accepted the precise term *false consciousness*, the concept is closely tied to Marx's notion of a "dominant ideology" and is useful for understanding Marx's theory of historical change. As with many sociological ideas, the meaning of false consciousness has varied and changed over time as new theorists have drawn upon it and as these new formulations have been challenged and contested (see Eyerman 1981; Eagleton 1991).

Engels, for example, tended to equate false consciousness with ideology and applied the concept primarily to intellectuals and capitalists, whom Marx and he had always criticized for producing a distorted picture of reality. Somewhat idealistically, Marx and Engels tended to credit the working class with freedom from illusions due to its subordinate position in capitalist society. Aware that not all of the working class fit this description, however, they reasoned that the working class was composed

of not just the proletariat but also the lumpen proletariat, or rabble who failed to act as revolutionaries. Later Marxists, such as Antonio Gramsci and Georg Lukács, expanded upon these ideas in their elaborations on false consciousness.

For Gramsci, the concepts of dominant ideology and false consciousness are distinct. False consciousness refers to flawed perception on the part of workers, whereas the dominant ideology is understood as a system of ideas and propositions espoused by owners to support the status quo. In an effort to understand the power of capitalist ideology over the working class, Gramsci examined the effect of culture and especially religion (part of Marx's superstructure) on the ideas and consciousness of the working class. Gramsci argued that hegemonic rule, in which a majority of the population supports or accepts the status quo, requires that owners manufacture consent and this is made possible by false consciousness on the part of the oppressed. Gramsci believed that movements for progressive social change must reeducate the masses to liberate them from false consciousness. Workers' support for gradual political and economic reforms rather than revolutionary action is a sign of their false consciousness or failure to recognize the true origins and proper means to end class based oppression. Thus, genuine reeducation would occur only with the illumination of Marxist ideology, which offers an explanation of exploitation and poverty to workers. For Gramsci, false consciousness is a problem of working class (mis)perception that can be countered only by a competing ideology (i.e., Marxism).

Whereas Gramsci emphasized the need for Marxist ideology to combat capitalist hegemony, Georg Lukács argued that false consciousness is not purposefully manufactured by the bourgeois intellectuals to subjugate the proletariat; rather, it is an outcome of living and working in a capitalist society permeated by exchange relations and commodity fetishism (in which people commodify and objectify not only things but themselves). Consequently, capitalist societies create a veil of mystification that precludes a true understanding of the social order. Functioning in a world of commodity relationships, in which markets appear to determine outcomes and in which the value

of something is understood as its price in exchange rather than the labor contained within it, inevitably produces false consciousness. To the extent that commodity fetishism dominates, false consciousness becomes the normal way of perceiving and acting within capitalist society, thereby concealing the true nature of capitalism from all involved. While this mystification is beneficial to the bourgeoisie, the working class suffers from it. For Lukács, not surprisingly, only the working class is structurally capable of achieving a total/real understanding of itself and of capitalism as a social system, and eventually transforming it into a more rational system. This is because of its location at the center of the main capitalist contradiction and irrationality – the workplace where surplus value is extracted.

Lukács's approach to false consciousness served as a point of departure for members of the Frankfurt School (Max Horkheimer, Theodor Adorno, Herbert Marcuse, Erich Fromm, etc.). These scholars sought to understand the striking absence of working class opposition to the rise of fascism in Germany in the 1930s. They argued that a full explanation of working class acceptance of Nazi authoritarianism must examine workers' activities outside of the labor process and must take into account their unconscious or "irrational" impulses and emotions. For example, Fromm added an affective psychological dimension to the study of false consciousness and attempted to synthesize Marxist and Freudian theory. Consequently, he argued that working class experience in a capitalist society produces not only a false perception of one's economic interest but also a false sense of self/identity. Thus, false consciousness has an emotional as well as cognitive dimension and is not easily demystified or transcended by a mere rational ideology such as Marxism. As the Frankfurt School broadened the definition of false consciousness to include self and identity, it became increasingly difficult to speak of "objective" class interests and discussions of false consciousness became embroiled in philosophical debates regarding the nature of "true experience."

While the term false consciousness has been variously used by a number of European scholars, sociologists in the US have rarely used it. A modern day application of the concept of

false consciousness, however, can be found in some explanations of American exceptionalism. The absence of a well developed working class party in the US has lent itself to many different hypotheses and explanations over the years. Whereas some sociologists and historians have sought to explain the lack of a working class labor party by reference to the US's higher standard of living, increased capitalist organization and resistance, and/or absence of an aristocracy, others have argued that it is the widespread ideology of the American Dream that has hampered the development of working class consciousness.

In this latter view, the American Dream of "rags to riches" and "opportunity for all" is the dominant ideology in America. It serves to legitimize inequalities within the US by providing workers with "false promises." When workers believe promises that they will be able to get rich in the future, they accept their disadvantaged positions in the present (Robinson & Bell 1978). As Aronowitz (1973) recounted, the labor movement in the US emerged largely as a trade union movement seeking a place at the table rather than to revolutionize the means of production itself. This is due, in no small part, to the fact that workers are focused on moving up economically rather than in transforming the capitalist system itself. In accepting this system, however, Americans often end up blaming themselves, rather than the economic system, for their own lack of success (Sennett & Cobb 1972).

While belief in the American Dream can thus be understood as a form of false consciousness, the term false consciousness is almost never used by these researchers. The conspicuous absence of this term may simply reflect a diminished Marxist influence on sociologists in the US. More likely however, its absence from modern American sociology underscores most sociologists' attempts to grant authenticity to workers' own views, even if these views sometimes have negative repercussions for workers themselves. Much to the chagrin of committed Marxists, in the current age of identity politics, the prospects for this term in US sociology appear bleak.

SEE ALSO: Adorno, Theodor W.; Class Consciousness; Engels, Friedrich; Fromm, Erich;

Gramsci, Antonio; Horkheimer, Max; Ideological Hegemony; Lukács, Georg; Marcuse, Herbert; Marx, Karl

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falsification

Andrew Tudor

The concept of falsification is indelibly marked by the methodological doctrine of falsificationism, associated above all with the work of Karl Popper. He first developed the elements of his position in the early 1920s as part of a project to establish a logically defensible criterion of scientificity, culminating in the publication of *Logik der Forschung* (later translated as *The Logic of Scientific Discovery*) in 1934. Falsifiability emerged as the basis of his solution to the so called "problem of demarcation." Much elaborated over subsequent years, his analysis of falsification became the foundation for the Popperian school in the philosophy and history of science and the central feature in their influential account of scientific growth. However, in the 1960s and 1970s, dissatisfaction with this analysis, not least among some of Popper's own

followers, gave rise to variously radical revisions of the basic falsificationist position. Today, both the Popperian doctrine and the concept of falsification should be understood as component elements in a more diverse, though perhaps less rigorous, conceptualization of theory testing in science.

Falsificationism was inextricably bound up with the problem of demarcation: the perceived need to distinguish science from a variety of other intellectual activities, not least what Popper called “pseudo science” – a category within which he included the theories of Freud and Marx. His argument begins with the recognition that the traditional view of science as based on systematic, inductive generalization is logically indefensible. Echoing Hume, Popper suggests that there is no reason why we should expect that further instances of a phenomenon will resemble those that we have already experienced: famously, however many white swans we may observe will not justify the conclusion that all swans are white. There may be a black swan just around the corner.

What, then, does distinguish the statements of empirical science? By the logic of the *modus tollens* it is permissible to argue from the truth of a singular statement (this swan is black) to the falsity of a universal one (all swans are white). So, although we cannot confirm a general statement without fear of subsequent contradiction, we can falsify it. This, then, is the criterion of demarcation: “it must be possible for an empirical scientific system to be refuted by experience” (Popper 1968: 41). In principle, scientific conjectures must always be open to refutation.

Taken as an isolated logical point about the relation between hypothesis and evidence, this view attained widespread legitimacy in the social sciences and elsewhere in the mid twentieth century. Indeed, as late as 1993 the US Supreme Court elaborated its *Daubert* criteria for scientific expert witness testimony in unashamedly falsificationist terms. However, interpreted thus, falsificationism is little more than a dogmatic application of the Popperian view. Even “naïve falsificationism” – the term Lakatos (1970) uses to describe Popper’s initial formulation – is not as reductively simplistic as this. Falsifiability in principle, after all, is a general criterion of scientificity, not a specific methodological instruction. Furthermore, when

a statement is actually falsified, it is the whole system from which it is derived that is rendered suspect, and quite what aspect of that system is taken to be problematic remains a matter for scientists’ practical decision making. As Duhem and, later and more forcefully, Quine suggested, there is no simple thread of falsification relating the world of observables to that of theory. And as sociology of science studies of scientific controversies suggest, the reasons for actually rejecting a hypothesis or theory are many and varied.

Nevertheless, there always remains an element in the falsificationist doctrine which understands the growth of scientific knowledge in terms of the successive improvement of theories in consequence of attempts at falsification: “severe tests,” as Popper describes them in his discussion of corroboration. It is this core belief that scientific progress is fostered by critical rational method which was increasingly to founder on the rocks of historical evidence. Scientists, it was observed by historians and sociologists of science, did not behave as the falsificationist model proposed. To such observations Popper was inclined to reply, well they should, a reflection of his perception of philosophy of science as an essentially normative endeavor. But that commitment was increasingly at odds with the more relativistic tenor of the times, and criticism of falsificationism became more vocal even from within the Popperian camp.

The most interesting of the critical revisions, and certainly the one most focused upon issues of falsification, was that advanced by Imre Lakatos (1970). He suggested that Popper’s position had been misrepresented as a somewhat naïve and dogmatic account of falsification. While in some respects the Popperian model was dogmatic, there was also an implicit, more “sophisticated” Popper who was aware of the limitations that needed to be placed upon the initial, naïve model. Thus, although Popper does not fully incorporate the insights of other more conventionalist and historically aware accounts of science, his views do not exclude that possibility. So in proposing his “methodology of research programmes,” Lakatos sets out to modify falsificationism accordingly. In effect, he replaces the core supposition, that specific theories must be falsifiable, with a

more pluralist account which emphasizes (in) consistency among theories. "It is not that we propose a theory and Nature may shout NO," he writes; "rather we propose a maze of theories, and Nature may shout INCONSISTENT" (Lakatos 1970: 130).

Nonetheless, Lakatos remains committed to the characteristically Popperian view that, although much of scientific inquiry is a matter of convention, science is at heart a critical rational enterprise. He wants to "save science from fallibilism." Extensive historical and sociological study of science and scientists in the later twentieth century has made that an increasingly difficult position to defend, with the result that falsificationism is no longer central to academic debate. However, the issues of method raised under its flag remain vital to any full understanding of the processes whereby we seek to confront our statements about the world with what Quine once called "the tribunal of sense experience."

SEE ALSO: Controversy Studies; Fact, Theory, and Hypothesis: Including the History of the Scientific Fact; Induction and Observation in Science; Kuhn, Thomas and Scientific Paradigms; Positivism; Realism and Relativism: Truth and Objectivity

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families and childhood disabilities

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Families of children with disabilities experience challenges that other families do not face. They may experience stigma as a result of having a child with a disability and may perform health care and advocacy work for their children beyond that performed by other families. The extent of these additional concerns varies tremendously across families, depending upon the nature and severity of the children's disabilities and the social context in which the meaning of the children's disabilities is interpreted and acted upon. At the individual level, some children may have disabilities that affect their functioning slightly, while others may have disabilities that affect their functioning severely, across multiple areas, including physical, cognitive, emotional, and behavioral functioning. At a broader social level, some children with disabilities live in families and communities that attempt to eliminate social barriers that could result from disability, while others live in social contexts that do not strive to promote children's full participation.

While it is important to acknowledge these ways in which children with disabilities and their families are "exceptional," it is equally important to acknowledge that families of children with disabilities are in many ways just like other families. Over the past four decades, parents of children with disabilities in the US, UK, and Canada have sought recognition for the caring labor that they perform, and some have fought against the ways that some professionals, researchers, and public programs have treated them as pathological and in need of intervention.

Disability is often stigmatized in the way that Erving Goffman described in his 1963 book, *Stigma: Notes on the Management of Spoiled Identity*, and families may face what Goffman called "courtesy stigma" when individuals stigmatize the entire family because of the child's disability. In its most severe form, this stigmatization of families may be found in Bruno Bettelheim's 1967 book, *The Empty Fortress*.

There, Bettelheim presented his “refrigerator mother” theory of autism, which blamed mothers for their children’s autism. Less severe forms of courtesy stigma may also be found in social science research and in service systems that focus only or primarily upon families’ needs and weaknesses, ignoring their knowledge and strengths. Recent social research and public policy provide a more balanced view of families of children with disabilities, and of the children themselves, acknowledging that they face added concerns and stresses as a result of disability, but also documenting the capabilities, expertise, and strengths that children and families may bring to these challenges.

These changes in policy and professional attitudes regarding families of children with disabilities are the result of parental activism over the last 40 years. Children with disabilities and their families were largely invisible in public policy until the 1960s and 1970s, when the parents organized on behalf of their children, transforming the nature and location of therapeutic care and education for children with disabilities. Until the 1960s in the US and the 1970s in the UK, parents had to choose between keeping their children at home and not receiving any public services, or placing their children in residential institutions, called “schools” in the US and “long stay hospitals” in the UK (Read 2000; Leiter 2004).

In the UK, the thalidomide disaster and problems regarding vaccine damage created public concern regarding children with disabilities (Read 2000). Parents’ organizing began a little earlier in the US, in the 1960s and 1970s, when parents borrowed tactics from the Civil Rights Movement to fight for community based services that would allow them to keep their children at home. Most of those battles centered on public education, resulting in the US Congress passing the Education of All Handicapped Act in 1975, which is now called the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (IDEA). Then in the 1980s, parents collaborated with professionals who provided services to children with disabilities and lobbied the US Congress to extend public services to children with disabilities from birth. This parent–professional collaboration resulted in the creation of additional community based public services, in substantial changes in the way that

public programs describe families, and in additional legal rights for parents. There is now considerably more emphasis upon families’ strengths, knowledge, and capabilities in programs that serve children with disabilities. Parents also have more rights to participate in making decisions about their children’s health care and education. Parents’ uptake of those rights varies tremendously, and parents with higher levels of education are more likely to advocate for their children within service systems. While parental rights have been an important tool for families when advocating for their children within public programs, this rights based approach to social change has put the burden of creating change upon parents rather than upon the professionals within public programs who wield decision making authority.

In addition to advocacy work, families may also provide substantial health and therapeutic care to children with disabilities (Read 2000). Although fathers may perform some carework, most carework is performed by mothers, due to traditional gender roles that emphasize mothers’ provision of care to children and fathers’ economic support of the household. There is an important distinction here between the carework that mothers *typically* provide, such as taking care of children when they have colds, etc., and the *additional, atypical* carework that mothers provide that is associated with their children’s disabilities. Both the extent and scope of carework are greater within families of children with disabilities. Within a sample of mothers of children with special health care needs, Leiter et al. (2004) found that almost one fifth of the mothers performed 20 hours or more of carework per week, doing therapies, dressing changes, care of feeding or breathing equipment, and so on. Mothers’ provision of carework to their children with disabilities can also have other ripple effects within the family. For example, mothers may cut down their working hours or stop working altogether, and families may have less income as a result.

Much of the current knowledge regarding families of children with disabilities focuses upon the early parts of a family’s life course, when the child is still a minor, with few exceptions (such as Krauss & Seltzer 1997). Far less is known about families of children with

disabilities later in life, providing a rich area for future sociological research.

SEE ALSO: Childcare; Childhood; Disability as a Social Problem; Social Problems, Politics of; Social Services

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family and community

Betty Hilliard

From the earliest days of sociology, family and community have been central concerns of the discipline. The dense interpenetration of these two dimensions of life was associated in particular with simple societies. This is especially evident in the work of early social thinkers such as the German Ferdinand Tönnies and the Frenchman Frederick Le Play.

The development of more complex societies brought with it the emergence of specialized

institutions catering to discrete aspects of social life which previously were catered to within the family and local community (e.g., economic, educational, and religious activities). With the development of these more complex societies the nature of social relationships also changed. It was thought that both family and community, if not actually in decline, were certainly less pivotal than before in the life of society. This was the theme of much work in English language sociology in the middle decades of the twentieth century. Aspects of it may even be traced in the writings of the highly influential American sociologist Talcott Parsons in his discussions of societal differentiation, the narrowing of the functions of the family, and the sometimes misrepresented concept of the "isolated" nuclear family.

In subsequent decades of the twentieth century the study of family and community became less fashionable in sociology, as an overview of many textbooks of the time will testify. It seemed that in modern society community extended beyond the locality and the family, and their interrelationship no longer seemed unproblematic. In practice, empirical research continued to attest to the persistence of both family and community, and in more recent times the centrality of the family, the significance of community, and the continued importance of the relationship between them have been reasserted (Crow & Maclean 2004).

MEANING OF FAMILY AND COMMUNITY

The definition of these concepts is contested. In empirical terms what constitutes a family has varied throughout history and between cultures. For present purposes the discussion of family and community refers only to these phenomena in western societies. In sociology the debate around a standard definition of family dates from the late 1960s. A functionalist definition of the family as an adaptive system which takes responsibility for a particular range of tasks had been dominant, particularly in the middle decades of the twentieth century. These tasks may include the reproduction, socialization, and maintenance (emotional as well as physical) of members, as well as the exercise

of social control and the transmission of culture. However, it is widely recognized that the existence of different family forms across time and cultures makes it very difficult to formulate a definition of family which is both comprehensive and concise.

As a result, many writers now prefer to speak of “families” (Allan & Crow 2001), “family life” (Cheal 2002), or “family practices” (Morgan 1996) rather than deal in such a contested term as “the family.” Recent practice in many western welfare systems has expanded the concept of family units to nonmarital cohabiting couples and in some countries to same sex marriage and partnerships. There is an ideological complexion to much of the debate on what should or should not be regarded as a family. The empirical reality is of course that “family” is not a static construction, but a dynamic phenomenon which is negotiated and renegotiated in relationships, always within the context of a social structure which itself is subject to change. Also, a family exists as part of a network of kin relationships, the salience of which may vary significantly even within a culture, and certainly across cultures.

Similarly, the concept of community refers to a dynamic phenomenon which does not readily lend itself to narrow definition (Crow & Allan 1994). Over 50 years ago Hillery (1955) identified over 90 definitions of community even then. Tönnies’s (1963: 65) idea of community as a group of people “essentially united in spite of all separating factors” is still relevant. The concept is essentially associated with a body of people who, although unrelated in a family sense, are conscious of having some things in common which contribute to a sense of shared interests, shared identity, and feelings of solidarity, whether weak or strong. In societies where mobility is limited, people share a common life, and there is much neighborly contact, the resultant interaction builds up a sense of solidarity and “we ness” associated with a locality, or in the case of nomads, a tribe. Even in neighborhood communities, however, relations of solidarity are not simply between neighbors as a category, but between particular neighbors who have developed sufficiently close relationships. In more recent times the concept of community has been expanded to include groupings beyond the local. Giddens (1990: 21)

asserts that social relations have suffered a “dis embedding,” meaning “the ‘lifting out’ of social relations from local contexts.” Even as Giddens made this claim, however, there was ample evidence to suggest that in fact locality still persisted as a vibrant dimension of community life in many settings.

INTERWEAVING OF FAMILY AND COMMUNITY IN SOCIAL RESEARCH

As in the theoretical discussions of the nineteenth century, in the middle decades of the twentieth century sociological research reflected a close relationship between the concepts of family and community. Community studies were especially popular at this time, with the emergence of several classic works such as those of the Chicago School in America, Gans’s Boston study published as *The Urban Villagers* in 1962, the 1950s Bethnal Green studies in Britain, and the 1930s County Clare study by Arensberg and Kimball in Ireland. Many of these community studies were closely interwoven with accounts of family life. Indeed, some of them may not have been so successful were it not for the involvement of the researcher with families in the community, as was the case with Whyte’s association with the Martini family in his study of *Street Corner Society* (1943). This interpenetration of family and community is further borne out in Frankenberg’s (1966) overview of community research in Britain.

Similarly, much family research was inextricably linked to community, as for instance the seminal study of *Family and Kinship in East London* (1957) by Young and Willmott. What is evident from much of this work is the identification of family and community with a spatial location; the social linkages are primarily those of family, kin, and neighbors, who were often also friends.

It would not be fair to say that these social linkages did not extend into other domains; frequently, the world of work is a central feature of family and community study. However, there was a particular emphasis on the identification of family and community with a spatial location, and the spatial reconfigurations of modern society impacted on this. The mobility and dispersion which became a more common

feature of family life in the 1960s fed into concerns regarding the “eclipse of community,” arising from the growth of the suburbs and the establishment of dormitory towns and commuter belts. Indeed, with such change, it has been suggested that family and kinship relations came to be perceived as “the chief, if not the sole, carrier of the idea of community or of a sense of locality” (Morgan 1996: 5). There is a great deal of evidence that family and kin continue to be highly significant in modern society, fulfilling many community like functions; however, family and community are not interchangeable terms.

Besides significant spatial reconfigurations in modern society, a number of developments in sociology from the 1960s on contributed to what was sometimes perceived as a separation of the two areas of family and community as interrelated foci of sociological research. Penetrating critiques of the sociology of the family, from feminist sources in particular, opened up the family unit to considerable scrutiny and to a recognition of the individual interests, economic dimensions, and power relations within the group.

The subsequent concern with relations *within* the family contributed to moving the focus away from community dimensions of family life. This has been further exacerbated by the emphasis in more recent work on the individual rather than the group, as portrayed in the work of Giddens (1991), Beck (1992), and Beck and Beck Gernsheim (2002) on individualization. These writers point out that modern society presents us with a myriad of choices not available to earlier generations, which necessitate a degree of personal reflexivity more conducive to individual action than to a collective orientation. Beck (1992) alerts us to the expanded possibilities for individual choice regarding participation in community, and others have identified communities which need roots in neither family nor locality (Willmott 1986). Families, however, continue to be studied in context and that context includes the local spatial setting.

FAMILY AND COMMUNITY IN SIMPLE SOCIETIES

The portrayals of family and community in earlier societies, and particularly in relatively

simple peasant societies, indicate that these dimensions of life, if not exactly coterminous, were at least closely interwoven. For example, Tönnies conceptualized simpler societies as those characterized by close, intimate, holistic bonds of a primary nature, with the dominant social relationships being those of kinship, neighborliness, cooperation, and fellowship (*Gemeinschaft*), and more developed societies as characterized by rational calculation and segmented, specialized, secondary type association or relationships (*Gesellschaft*). These two terms have been commonly translated in the sociological literature as community and society, respectively. An example of the portrayal of a *gemeinschaft* type society is to be found in the classic work by the Harvard anthropologists Arensberg and Kimball (2001), *Family and Community in Ireland*. This book, based on ethnographic research in the 1930s, paints a picture of rural life characterized by familism, where family ties are the main organizing and structuring principle in the community, both as a social and an economic system. Economic life in particular revolved around the cooperative interpenetration of family and community. The *meitheal* was a common feature of life in this peasant society; this was a cooperative work group where neighbors worked alongside each other to complete various farm tasks which necessitated help beyond that of the immediate family, such as saving the hay in season. Such cooperative practices brought about an identification of the family with the wider community. This identification of course comes also from many other shared experiences, including local schooling, shared social activity, and participation in group religious practices, identified by Durkheim as a particularly powerful form of community cohesion.

One of the features of community type societies is an orientation towards the collectivity, as distinct from a focus on the individual. Family members put the collective interests of the group before their own individual needs; this is especially the case as depicted by Arensberg and Kimball (2001) in relation ship to landownership and inheritance. (Their portrayal of such issues as non conflictual has been robustly critiqued: see Gibbon 1973.) Le Play saw this collective orientation as revolving around family enterprises, which acted as a sort

of magnet keeping the larger family grouping together in a specific location as a form of community.

Tönnies's ideas were developed, not only theoretically (e.g., by Parsons in his discussion of the pattern variables), but also in the empirical research of the Chicago School, of which Redfield was an exemplary member. While Tönnies recognized that kin networks were not incompatible with urban life, Redfield hypothesized from his comparative research on families and communities in Mexico that the embeddedness of an individual in his family and neighborhood group was a feature of non city life. In his view, as peasant societies come into contact with urban culture they tend to change in the direction of *Gemeinschaft* type society. Redfield contrasted "folk" with "urban" societies and associated the latter with a weakening of the cohesive nature of community.

For Le Play and others, the advent of the industrial revolution, and with it the growth of cities, changed the close identification of family and community described above. In his view the movement of individuals off the land to seek paid employment in centers of industrialization led to individualism, self interest, and a rootlessness which threatened the family. It gave rise to smaller family forms of the type now called nuclear, which lacked the strong structural ties of local community and pre industrial kinship systems; for this reason he identified the new type of family as "unstable" as compared to what he believed to be the "traditional" stem family (*la famille souche*).

He was not alone in seeing industrialization as a threat to group cohesion. Tönnies and others believed that the modernization which accompanied it was eroding the old ways of life and with them the interpenetration of family and community.

INDUSTRIALIZATION AS A THREAT TO FAMILY AND COMMUNITY

The identification by Le Play and others of nineteenth century industrialization with an unraveling of ties between family, the wider kin group, and the community became a dominant theme in twentieth century sociology.

A rapidly changing division of labor was seen as leading to the disruption of social solidarity. The demise of the so called "traditional" family was linked to the theme of the eclipse of community. In revisiting the research interests of Arensberg and Kimball 30 years later, for example, Brody (1973) represented the changed roles of family members in the community as coinciding with the overthrow of the traditional family.

The mainstream perception of the role of industrialization in the unraveling of the ties between family and community, with the decline of both, has been widely challenged. Many argue that the most significant change factors for social relations occurred much earlier, with Stone (1977) claiming that significant changes in the nature of family relations can be dated to the mid seventeenth century with the development of affective individualism. Others pointed out that despite theoretical claims concerning the collapse of community, empirical research indicated that community was indeed alive and well. Not only that, it would seem that the concepts of community and family are still perceived as interconnected; Dempsey's (1990) concept of community as "one big happy family" is strongly evocative of Tönnies's perception of communities as large families. To evaluate the extent to which industrialization, along with its attendant features of urbanization and mobility, has indeed caused an unraveling of the interpenetration of family and community, it is necessary to consider these themes in modern sociology.

Family and community exist within the context of society, and the changes in developed western society cannot but be reflected in its members, however they are grouped. Thus the phenomena of globalization and of individualism, so central to discussions of modernity and postmodernity, are also central to discussions of family and community in developed western societies. The development of the concepts of choice, reflexivity, individualization, and globalization in late twentieth century sociology contributed to a rethinking of the bases of social cohesion in groupings such as family and community. For example, Beck (1992) suggests that there is now a much greater element of individual choice regarding participation in community. Giddens (1991) emphasizes the centrality

of reflexivity in the project of the self as an aspect of contemporary life, with its attendant obsessive anxiety and lack of focus on the collective. This theme of individualization was further developed by Beck and Beck Gernsheim (2002). All of this suggests a movement away from the ascribed nature of group membership associated with family and community.

Nonetheless, as Bauman (1988: 53) asserts, “the need for freedom and the need for social interaction – inseparable, though often at odds with one another – seem to be a permanent feature of the human condition.” This, in his view, gives rise to the “dream of community,” a fantasy embraced to alleviate the twin fears of loneliness and lack of freedom. Community is in a sense an aspiration. It is one, however, which has tended to enjoy widespread and continuing support, despite exaggerated rumors of its demise. Even very recent work on community attests to positive associations with the concept, despite attention to its potentially negative dimensions.

In the late twentieth century new conceptions of community emerged. Cohen (1985) made a distinction between community as structure and community as symbol. Willmott (1986) distinguished three bases for community; these were locality (“place community”), communities of interest (e.g., occupational groupings), and communities of attachment (e.g., ethnic communities, or groups of people identified as sharing a disability such as deafness). Although it is impossible to draw firm boundaries around these different conceptions, it would seem that the first one, place community, is most likely to be involved with family. Occupational groupings, for example, are less likely to involve all members of a family, although there are many exceptions to this, as in the case of large scale local employment, local family businesses, or among clergy families. Some have written of “personal communities” beyond the confines of locality, encompassing friends and colleagues as well as kin. Others draw on the concept of “imagined communities,” which involve a sense of identification with a notional grouping which does not necessarily involve direct contact (e.g., the idea of nationhood). Recently, too, the idea of Internet communities has also been receiving attention. Clearly, concepts of community in

modern and postmodern times emphasize that community does not *necessarily* imply propinquity, although it is a relevant dimension of some kinds of community.

In traditional community studies, however, where there was an interpenetration of family and community, the type of community in question was overwhelmingly that which was associated with a geographical locality. The locality was frequently used as the title of the published study, albeit disguised. Examples of this are *Greenwich Village* by Ware (1935), *Middletown in Transition* by Lynd and Lynd (1937), Littlejohn’s (1954) *Westrigg*, Mogeys’s (1956) work in Oxford and Williams’s (1956) in Gosworth, Durant’s (1959) *Watling*, Stacey’s (1960) work in Banbury, *Yankee City* by Lloyd Warner (1965), Brody’s (1973) *Inniskillane*, and Dempsey’s *Smalltown* (1990). It has also been noted that the interpenetration of family and community continues to be an important aspect of life in more recent times in places where there is little geographic mobility. It can be argued, then, that while the interpenetration of family and community can be seen to survive in such studies, it is bound up with geographic locality and the significance of shared place for the establishment of personal relationships. However, geographic locality is not an essential feature of the many new conceptualizations of community identified earlier. Further, even in small, relatively static communities, the amount of face to face interaction may be lessened with the advent of high levels of car ownership and usage.

A relevant feature of the relationship between family and twentieth century concepts of community is the privatization of the domestic sphere. This is hypothesized as coinciding with the separation of paid and unpaid work, most especially perhaps in the middle decades of the twentieth century, and suggests the physical restriction of family life to a limited area. Once communities extending beyond the boundaries of geographic locality became common, and family life became more privatized, the interpenetration of family and community could no longer be taken for granted. Perhaps because of this, family and kin often came to be thought of as a community in itself. Crow and Maclean (2004) draw attention to studies showing the enduring nature of kin support even in the face of geographical mobility.

As the aspiration to some form of community has persisted, so has the aspiration to family. Despite the enduring claims of family crisis – which indeed stretch back into at least the nineteenth century – and individual negative experiences, people still look to this human grouping with hope and longing. Both small scale locally specific and large scale international empirical research attest to its continued importance for ordinary individuals in everyday life. There is also strong evidence for the persistence of intergenerational bonds. In that family continues in general to embody such attributes as supportiveness, solidarity, and identity, it is sometimes represented as a form of community in itself.

However, an essential aspect of community is that it exists on a more inclusive level than that of family. Even in the geographically local community there are networks of friends and neighbors as well as kin. In other forms of community family may not be of more than tangential significance. Community as it is commonly understood in both a traditional and a contemporary sense is greater than individual families and households. It has essential elements of linkage between individuals and the larger social structure which are on a scale different from the linkages offered by family and kin. In that sense it is always different from, even if sometimes interwoven with, family.

It must also be borne in mind that great variations exist in the relations between individual family members and the family's networks. Such relations are often highly gendered. In Arensberg and Kimball's (2001) study, for example, while the men went out "visiting" (*ag bothántaíocht*), women, once married, were largely confined to the home place. In other studies of traditional industries like mining, men are often portrayed as socializing with workmates while their wives were, again, far more home and kin centered. Women have often been seen as central to community life, especially in urban working class settings. In some welfare provision there may even appear to be a confusion of "community" with "women"; there has been much comment on how the state has embraced a version of "community care," which in practice has meant imposing heavy responsibilities for care on the

family, and usually on women in the family. In another vein, Bott in her classic study *Family and Social Network* showed that spouses' linkage with their wider networks varied with the nature of the conjugal role relationship. Other structural factors are also of significance for variations in the family – community relationship, including age, class, ethnicity, and differential power. The significance of local community networks is often a feature of an individual's stage in the life course. A potential local network is likely to be much more salient for families with young children than for young single employed persons.

A particularly important development is the now widespread engagement of mothers in the paid labor force. This has prompted a rethinking of gender roles. Much of the putative change is in attitude rather than in behavior, but one outcome has been the emergence of a new concern with work–family balance. This in turn has led to a new interest in the related areas of community, work, and family. Indications of this focus are seen in the establishment of the journal *Community, Work, and Family* in 1998. While the orientation may be changing, there can be no doubt that the themes of family and community will continue to exercise the sociological community on into the twenty first century. While there is change, there is also continuity, and above all there is diversity in the relations between the two phenomena.

CONCLUSION

Having considered some of the issues relating to the interrelationship of community and family, it is clear that these two aspects of society continue to be of major concern to sociologists. Both are understood differently today, however, than they were by the social theorists of the nineteenth century. Various concepts of community have developed which no longer assume that family is a central component. The emergence of communities of interest and of attachment suggest that the interpenetration of family and community associated with simpler societies is no longer an *indispensable* feature of community. Globalization contributes to the development of occupational communities not rooted in family or

kinship networks (although in the case of employment by transnational corporations in less developed societies these links may endure). However, family and community continue to be closely interwoven in settings characterized by limited geographical or social mobility. Even where there are high levels of such mobility in modern western societies, shared place remains an important basis for the establishment of personal relationships, and technological advances in transport and communication facilitate the maintenance of such relationships. While the relationship between the concepts of family and community has changed, and the dense interpenetration of these phenomena has become attenuated, it is by no means defunct. Notwithstanding the reality of expanded choice and its attendant anxieties in modern society, both family and community have remained central values in western cultures, albeit with more developed conceptualizations of each. These are, after all, the contexts within which most people spend the major part of their lives.

SEE ALSO: Community; Community and Economy; Family Diversity; Family Migration; Family Structure; Immigrant Families; Retirement Communities; Secondary Groups; Social Worlds; Urban Community Studies; Urbanization

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family conflict

Jean Kellerhals

Although present since the nineteenth century, particularly in Marxist thinking (more specifically in Engels's work), interest in family conflict within the sociology of the family only really developed as a theme during the 1960s and 1970s.

In the 1950s the dominant functionalist perspective tended to analyze the family in terms of internal equilibrium and its complementarity to the global society. Parsons's point of view (notably, Parsons & Bales 1955) is that the values of competition, achievement, and rationality in relation to the workings of the economic, educational, and political systems find a necessary counterweight in the family. This privileges affective expression, emphasizing "being" over "having," and the totality of the person over his or her division into functions. In addition, the division of work between the

man and the woman ensures good management of the expressive group dimension (by the woman) and the instrumental group dimension (by the man), and assures adequate socialization of the children. Through this process of socialization on the one hand, and the stabilization of the adult personality on the other, the family was seen to provide society with motivated and well oriented "normal" people, and at the same time procure the resources and abilities necessary for the family to function.

Important socio demographic changes started intervening in the western world during the 1960s, including rapid growth in divorce rates, falls in marriage, significant declines in fecundity, increases in cohabitation, and higher levels of employment of married women (Roussel 1985). Somewhat paradoxically, research attention was drawn at this time to concerns about overloading the family system; the reproduction of the inequalities in marriage and the family; the effect of cultural tensions on domestic intimacy; and the lack of resources available to some families.

As much in conservative theories as in radical ones, conflict has consequently been viewed as an intrinsic component of family dynamics, with its nature and causes being investigated along with its management.

MODELS OF FAMILY CONFLICT

In examining the nature of family conflict, we need to be clear about some commonsense assumptions. First, separation and divorce are not valid indicators of family conflict overall: a frequent observation is that many marriages are very stable, although unhappy or conflicting. Second, family conflict is not limited to open fights: quite often, tensions in the couple or the family remain silent; quite often also, they are not perceived as such by the entire family. And third, reciprocated differences of opinion or taste do not necessarily entail family conflict. More constructively, family conflict can be understood as relational tensions – overt or latent – arising out of the difficulty the family group has in defining its objectives, in finding the resources and the organizational structure suitable for reaching its goals, or in safeguarding

sufficiently its members' individual interests. In broad terms, five distinct models for explaining the reasons for such family conflict have been produced.

"Deficit" Model

This model highlights the role of socialization, arguing that inadequacies in people's socialization experiences contribute to family conflict. For example, those who marry at a young age tend to be relatively immature psychologically and socially. This is liable to compromise how well they adapt to marriage and family life, a factor linked to high rates of separation and divorce. Similarly, growing up in a disunited or conflictual family not only increases the probability of maladjustment but is also likely to limit opportunities for learning suitable modes of relating. Poverty and economic insecurity of the family during one's childhood are seen as undermining processes of childhood socialization and increasing the risk of conjugal conflict in adulthood. Low levels of educational achievement are also seen as compromising the development of aptitudes for negotiation and communication, both of which are judged as essential for success in contemporary marriage. Above all, the deficit model stresses the lack of resources available in particular families (Cherlin 1999: 365–422). In these, the gap between the family's objectives and the means at its disposal becomes too great, resulting in high levels of frustration (Webster et al. 1995). From the same point of view, such families may also be deprived of support because they lack the social integration and/or links with kin which can help prevent conflict (Shelton 1987).

"Overload" Model

This model takes a more historical perspective and stresses the extent to which the progressive weakening of public participation has led to individuals placing too great an emphasis on the private sphere of home, family, and children (Ariès 1978). Under these conditions, the individual is led to expect the family to compensate for the failings of the wider society by meeting all his or her needs. Some, such as

Sennett (1974), see this as the product of the disappearance of the "public man." Others, like Donzelot (1977), see it as the consequence of specific family policies designed to undermine class consciousness and solidarity. Either way, the family as a refuge is transformed into the family as a ghetto. The growth of family conflict as expressed through increasing levels of divorce is thus interpreted, by Berger and Kellner (1964) for instance, not as a loss of family functions, but as the expression of this excessive investment in these very important expectations of family and conjugal life (Roussel 1985).

"Cultural Tensions" Model

In this model the emphasis is placed on the gap that exists between the commitments required by and implicated in family life and the importance attached to the individual in contemporary culture. For authors such as Bellah et al. (1986), the individual today is seen above all as having a moral responsibility to search for personal identity and authenticity of the self. That is, they have a "duty" of "self discovery" and "self fulfillment." This endless quest for the self translates into a weakening of family commitments and responsibilities. It is this same critique of the growth of individualism within contemporary social life that makes Popenoe (1988) state that the family is functioning increasingly less effectively as a mediator between the individual and society.

"Conflict of Interest" Model

In this model the drive for equality in contemporary family relationships is seen as in opposition to broader structural inequalities affecting both employment and the domestic sphere. More specifically, the growth of dual career families has not translated into conjugal equality, as most wives continue to carry a far greater responsibility than their husbands for domestic labor and household management. Moreover, in spite of increasing educational achievements, women are generally the ones who adapt their employment commitments to family needs, thereby often compromising their promotion prospects. In contrast, husbands are more often

able to use the family resources as a spring board for their occupational mobility. Of course, this tension between equality and inequality frequently leads to feelings of injustice which are sometimes expressed in divorce, sometimes in psychological distress, and sometimes in violence towards the children. However, as equity theory would suggest, feelings of injustice are not directly proportional to the degree of inequality: different cognitive processes often lead to both the husband and wife tolerating this for the sake of higher interests judged to be more important. From this point of view, the concept of power acquires great importance. The first empirical studies on this theme notably showed that decision making powers in the family are strongly correlated with the gap in the respective socioeconomic resources of the spouses (Blood & Wolfe 1960). Moreover, later studies drawing on resource theory also show that family negotiation depends heavily on the resources available to each spouse outside the nuclear family. While these gender divisions may benefit the family collectively, they also increase the social distance between the husband and wife.

"Anomie" Model

This model focuses on the degree to which contemporary couples are required to negotiate the organization of their relationship individually because traditional models of marriage are no longer considered appropriate or legitimate. Among other things, this involves defining family priorities; organizing the division of work inside and outside the home; defining the areas of intimacy and privacy; agreeing on the sharing of material resources; and defining the extent and intensity of contacts with the world outside. Yet these constructions are often rendered conflictual by (1) subjective uncertainty toward the duration of the union; (2) incompatibilities between individualist aspirations and fusional models of conjugal relationships; and (3) tension between the equalitarian aspirations and the unequal status of the husband and wife. This situation can generate very high levels of stress, particularly when children are young (Kellerhals et al. 2004).

MANAGEMENT OF CONFLICT

Various sociologists have been concerned with investigating ways in which family conflict can be resolved. Many recognize that ideologies of love often result in the husband and wife feeling guilty about any conflicts they have, with the result that any potentially positive consequences of these conflicts tend to be masked. Not only can this compound the conflict, but it may also lead to a more serious crisis (Eshleman 1997; Olson & DeFrain 1997).

Different approaches have been developed to facilitate conflict resolution. Some, such as Kilmann and Thomas (1975), focus on the degree of aggression and cooperation within the relationship, and on this basis define different strategies for conflict resolution – collaborative, competitive, compromise, avoidance, accommodating. Other approaches oppose “task oriented” strategies with “relation oriented” strategies (Kellerhals et al. 2004), with conflict resolution being dependent on the equilibrium established between these two. A synthesis of studies on this theme lead Olson and DeFrain (1997) to identify six basic steps in conflict resolution: (1) clarifying the issue; (2) finding out what each person wants; (3) identifying various alternatives; (4) deciding how to negotiate; (5) solidifying the agreements; and (6) reviewing and renegotiating. Other approaches suggest that there are three principal dimensions to the resolution process: the degree of activity (decision taking, investment of ad hoc resources, evaluation of the effects); cognitive elaboration (definition of the stressor, communicating its purpose, gathering pertinent information); and the extent of relational concern (attention given to cohesion, to mutual support, and to relational re equilibrium) (Widmer et al. 2003). These authors show that a propensity to over invest in one of the terms (action, cognition, or relation) is a frequent reaction to the anxiety engendered by the conflict. Equilibrium between the three dimensions can be expected more commonly in families with good levels of cohesion and flexibility.

SEE ALSO: Divisions of Household Labor; Domestic Violence; Engels, Friedrich; Family Poverty; Family Therapy; Inequalities in Marriage; Marital Power/Resource Theory; Marital Quality; Socialization

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family demography

Lynne M. Casper

Family demography is a subfield of demography and is the study of the changing nature of intergenerational and gender ties that bind

individuals into households and family units. The core of family demography uses basic demographic information collected about household members, including the numbers of members, their relationships to each other, and each person's sex, age, and marital status, to describe the composition of families and households. *Composition* describes the *structure* of families and households: the set of statuses and associated roles that are important for the functioning of society. American families and households have diverse and complex structures. For example, households can contain married couples, cohabiting couples, single mothers, children, grandparents, other relatives (e.g., brothers, sisters, or in laws), roommates, or simply one person living alone. Family composition is the result of demographic *processes* or family related events such as marriage, divorce, and fertility or childbearing. Changes in the timing, number, and sequences of these events transform family and household composition. Family demographers aggregate the composition and processes of individual families into larger units (e.g., nations, states, counties, neighborhoods) to examine family change in societies and other units. They aggregate them separately by other social and economic groups (e.g., racial and ethnic groups, poor families, immigrants) and by countries to examine family variation. Thus, family demographers study family change and variation to understand both individual and societal behavior.

Several theoretical strands are influential in interpreting family change and variation in family demographic research. They include (second) demographic transition theory, the life course perspective, household and family decision making theories, biodemographic interactions, and the focus on culture and context.

The bedrock of demographic data analysis on family change is descriptive cross sectional and trend analysis of family structures and processes, most often with census or survey data, although increasingly qualitative methods are also used. The field of demography has its own toolkit full of measures and methods that are suited to studying family change. Measures of age and age related processes are fundamental. Change is understood as reflecting age, period, or cohort processes or effects; explanations of change emphasize the aging of

the population (or life course change of individuals), broad, sweeping societal or time period effects, and/or the replacement of older cohorts by successively younger ones with different life experiences. An indispensable measure in family demography is the rate: the number of people experiencing the event out of the population "at risk" of experiencing that event. Another important tool for examining family change is decomposition, in which family change is empirically separated into two components: the proportion of change attributable to shifts in population composition versus that part that is due to change in the likelihood that some family event occurs. However, family demography has increasingly moved toward explaining family change and variation. In the last three decades, a number of panel surveys and various labor force and educational cohort studies have been developed. These studies include many more "explanatory" variables and provide prospective sequencing data that are better suited to inferring causality.

COMMON DEFINITIONS

The core of family demography continues to be based on concepts developed by the US Census Bureau. A household, as defined by the US Census Bureau, consists of one or more people who occupy a house, apartment, or other residential unit (but not "group quarters" such as dormitories). One of the people who owns or rents the residence is designated the *householder*. The householder is said to *maintain* the household. For the purposes of examining family and household composition using census data, two types of households have been defined: family and non family. A *family household* has at least two members related by blood, marriage, or adoption, one of whom is the householder. *Families* consist of all related people in a family household. Families can be maintained by married couples with or without children or by a man or woman with children and no spouse in the home. A *non family household* can either be a person living alone or a householder living only with non relatives. Family units within family or non family households that do not include the householder are *subfamilies*. Subfamilies include either a

married couple, with or without children, or a parent–child pair. A *related subfamily* is related to the householder, whereas an *unrelated subfamily* is not. *Family groups* are family households plus all related and unrelated subfamilies. For example, a family household that is maintained by a grandmother and contains her daughter and her daughter's daughter has two family groups. *Children* include sons and daughters by birth, stepchildren, and adopted children of the householder regardless of the child's age or marital status. *Own children* are a subset of *children* and identify the householder or family reference person as a parent in the household, family, or subgroup – they are usually defined as never married children under the age of 18.

FAMILY AND HOUSEHOLD COMPOSITION AND LIVING ARRANGEMENTS

Changes in the number and types of households depend on population growth, shifts in the age composition of the population, and decisions individuals make about their living arrangements. Demographic trends in marriage, cohabitation, divorce, fertility, and mortality also influence family and household composition. Economic shifts and improvements in the health of the elderly over time can also have an impact.

In the US, families have traditionally accounted for a large majority of all households – as recently as 1940, nine out of ten households were family households. This proportion decreased steadily to 81 percent in 1970 and by 2003 family households made up only 68 percent of all households, with the remaining 32 percent accounted for by non family living arrangements. Part of the increase in non family households was due to the growth in one person households – people living alone. The proportion of households containing one person increased from 17 percent in 1970 to 26 percent in 2003.

The increase in non family households resulted from many social, economic, and demographic shifts. A postponement of marriage took place after 1960 leading to a substantial increase in the percentage of young, never married adults and to greater diversity and fluidity in living

arrangements in young adulthood. In 1970, 6 percent of women and 9 percent of men aged 30–34 had never married. By 2003, these figures increased to 23 percent and 33 percent, respectively. The delay of marriage means that young adults in 2003 were less likely to be living with their spouses and more likely to be living alone, in a parent's home, or with roommates, than they were in the past. Thirty one percent of men aged 18–24 lived with their spouses in 1970, for example, while only 9 percent lived with a spouse in 2003. A similar drop occurred for women: from 45 percent in 1970 to 16 percent in 2003. As a declining share of young adults chose married life, a greater share lived on their own, with roommates, or cohabited with an unmarried partner. In 1970, 15 percent of women and 13 percent of men were living in these arrangements compared with 38 percent and 37 percent, respectively, in 2003.

The delay in marriage coincided with an increase in cohabitation and these trends also decreased the proportion of married couple families and increased the proportion of non family households. Unmarried couple (cohabiting) households have grown dramatically since 1970 and in 2003 numbered 4.6 million, or over 4 percent of households. Cohabitation historically has been most likely to occur before a first marriage, but, more recently, cohabitation has been replacing remarriage after divorce occurs. Researchers have offered several explanations for the rapid increase in cohabitation, including increased uncertainty about the stability of marriage, the erosion of norms against cohabitation and sexual relations outside of marriage, the wider availability of reliable birth control, and increased individualism and secularization. Some have argued that cohabitation allows a couple to experience the benefits of an intimate relationship without committing to marriage. If a cohabiting relationship isn't successful, one can simply move out; if a marriage is not successful, one suffers through a some times lengthy and messy divorce.

Significant improvements in the health and economic well being of the elderly over the period have increased the life expectancy and the quality of life of both men and women. This means that elderly men and women are increasingly able to maintain their own homes.

Not only has this augmented the number of households, but also the fact that women continue to outlive men by a significant number of years has led to a greater number and proportion of one person non family households. The proportion of women 65 years and over who live alone grew from 34 percent in 1970 to 40 percent in 2003.

Households and families have become smaller over time, with the most profound changes occurring at the extremes – the largest and smallest households. Between 1970 and 2003 the share of households with five or more people decreased from 21 percent to 10 percent. During the same period, the share of households with only one or two people increased from 46 percent to 60 percent. Another measure of household size is the average number of members in the household. Between 1970 and 2003 the average number of people per household declined from 3.1 to 2.6.

Changes in fertility, marriage, divorce, and mortality all contributed to the shrinkage of American families and households. Between 1970 and 2003, births to married women declined sharply while births to unmarried women increased. These two trends decreased the proportion of two parent families and increased the proportion of one parent families, which also tend to have fewer children. The cumulative effect of these trends was to shrink family and household size. Increases in divorce also reduced the size of households and families; divorce generally separates one household into two smaller households. Meanwhile, the proportion of divorced people increased about fourfold from 2 percent to 8 percent for men and from 3 percent to 11 percent for women from 1970 to 2003.

The delay in marriage and improvements in the mortality and health of the elderly increased one person households, thereby decreasing the average family and household size.

Other aspects of the composition of families changed as well. The number of families maintained by people with no spouse at home increased rapidly from 1970 to 2003. Single mother families grew by 147 percent from 5.5 million in 1970 to 13.6 million in 2003. Single father families grew even more over the same period, tripling from 1.2 million to 4.7 million. By contrast, married couple families grew from

44.1 million to 50.7 million over the same period – only a 15 percent increase. These differential increases shifted the composition of family households from married couple to single mother and single father families. In 1970, married couples maintained 89 percent of family households, but by 2003 this proportion had declined to 72 percent.

Several demographic trends have affected the shift from two parent to one parent families. A larger proportion of births occurred to unmarried women in 1990 compared with 1970, increasing the proportion of never married parents. The delay of marriage also augmented the risk of a nonmarital birth, because adults were single for more years. In addition, the growth in divorce among couples with children increased the proportion of unmarried parents.

Most of the decline in family households reflects the decrease in the share of married couple households with children. In 2003, 48 percent of families contained own children compared with 56 percent in 1970. These changes reflect several demographic trends, including the delay of childbearing, the decline in the number of children people have, the delay of marriage, and the aging of the population. Due to the trend toward delayed marriage and childbearing, younger families were more likely to be childless in 2003 than in 1970. For example, in 1970, 94 percent of women aged 30–34 had been married at least once; of them, only 12 percent were childless. In 2002–3, only 77 percent of women aged 30–34 had ever been married; of them, 19 percent were childless. Thus, fewer women in these prime childbearing ages had ever been married in 1990 and nearly twice as many of them were childless (reflecting primarily a delay in childbearing, but also a delay in marriage).

Change in family and household structure began slowly in the 1960s, just as society was embarking on some of the most radical social changes in US history, and the leading edge of the huge baby boom generation was reaching adulthood. The steepest decline in the share of family households was in the 1970s when the first baby boomers entered their twenties. By the 1980s, change was still occurring, but at a much less rapid pace. By the mid 1990s, household composition reached relative equilibrium, where it has been since.

FAMILY CHANGE IN OTHER INDUSTRIALIZED COUNTRIES

The changes in family that occurred in the US have also occurred throughout most industrialized countries, for many of the same reasons. In most European countries marriage rates have been declining since the late 1960s and early 1970s. Since the 1980s, marriage rates have continued to decline, but at a slower pace. Europeans are also postponing marriage. For example, the median age at first marriage in Sweden was 25 in 1975, but increased to 29 by 1995. The increase was even greater in Denmark: from 23 in 1975 to 29 in 1995. Although women tend to marry earlier in most other Northern and Central European countries, the average age of marriage increased from 1975 to 1995 and now stands at 26 or above in these countries.

As in the US, a rise in cohabitation has contributed to the decline and postponement of marriage. In the 1960s in Sweden and Denmark, cohabitation as a prelude to or an alternative to marriage began to rise. By the 1970s, this type of cohabitation began to rise in other countries. Postmarital cohabitation has also increased.

Women in other industrialized countries are postponing births and having more nonmarital births. For example, in most European countries, the age specific fertility rates declined for women under 25 and rose substantially for women aged 30 and over in the 1980s. Nonmarital births in Scandinavia grew about 20 percent between 1975 to 1988. In Northern Europe, Australia, and New Zealand the growth rate was not as large – in the single digits for all countries except for the United Kingdom (16 percent) and France (18 percent).

SOCIAL DEMOGRAPHY OF THE FAMILY

Early family demographic studies documented change and variation in fertility, marriage, households and families, and living arrangements, with each of these areas typically studied in isolation. Growing diversity in the timing, number, and sequencing of family events led researchers in the US and other

industrialized countries to study the interaction of these events (e.g., nonmarital childbearing) and to incorporate other events (e.g., cohabitation) into family demography to provide a more accurate accounting of family change and variation. Family demography has also expanded to examine the causes and consequences of family change and variation, including the social and economic context in which it occurs. This change has led many demographers who study the family to refer to the field as *social demography of the family*. It has also increased the number of disciplines that have adopted the demographic perspective. Historically, the majority of family demographers had training in sociology and a substantial minority had training in economics. More researchers in the fields of anthropology, child development, family studies, genetics, geography, medicine, psychology, and public health have come to employ the concepts and tools of family demography.

Several key changes in the family occurring in developed countries in the second half of the twentieth century have expanded the borders of family demography beyond the traditional measures of family composition, processes, and living arrangements. Historically, family demography only included the study of marriage, remarriage, and divorce. However, changing union (marriage and cohabitation) formation and dissolution, low fertility, increases in nonmarital fertility and a growing diversity of family structures, changing intergenerational relations, and increases in women's paid work have made it necessary for family demographers to study a broad set of processes to adequately characterize and explain family change and variation and to explore the consequences of these changes.

The rise of cohabitation and the delay and decline in marriage have prompted family demographers to examine cohabitation. Cohabitation, marriage, divorce, and childbearing are entwined in complicated ways. Cohabitation increasingly precedes marriage, is often an alternative to remarriage after separation and divorce, and, in several European countries, has become a long term substitute for marriage. Intimate Union Formation and Dissolution Tracking and explaining the increase in cohabiting couples, both heterosexual and

same sex, and examining the consequences of cohabitation for adults and children require not only a better understanding of cohabitation, but also a better understanding of marriage; the meaning, value, and nature of both of these relationships are poorly understood in contemporary developed economies.

A second area of family change of increasing interest is explaining low fertility in industrialized economies. Fertility is a core focus of family demography, but until relatively recently most research focused on high fertility in developing regions of the world. The rapid decline in fertility in all parts of the developing world has shifted attention away from high fertility and toward the very low fertility levels of Southern and Eastern Europe and Japan. Most of these countries have fertility levels far below the 2.1 children per woman needed to replace the population. Explanations for these low levels of fertility include changing normative, social, and economic contexts, particularly women's changing work and family roles.

Third, recent increases in childrearing within cohabiting and other nonmarital unions have also heightened the awareness that trends in childbearing and childrearing cannot be studied independently of union (marriage and cohabitation) formation and dissolution. Whereas timing of entry into marriage, parent hood, and, to a much lesser extent, cohabitation can be distinguished empirically, conceptually and analytically they are intertwined. In the US, where fertility levels remain close to replacement (around two births per woman, on average), the questions of greatest interest are about two distinct fertility behaviors that characterize US fertility trends. On the one hand, both marriage and children are being postponed to older ages among the better educated segments of the population. On the other hand, there seems to be increased willingness to disassociate childbearing from marriage altogether, particularly among less educated, minority groups – to have children relatively early, outside of marriage, and to raise them in environments that will not include two co-residential biological parents. Policymakers and researchers seek to better understand the underlying causes of these different behaviors. They are also interested in the consequences for children and men and women of the separation of marriage and

childbearing, on the one hand, and the postponement of both, on the other, and how the consequences vary for different groups within the population.

Fourth, the intergenerational family is changing in form – from a *pyramid* structure with few living grandparents and many children and grandchildren to the *beanpole family* with more grandparents than parents and, increasingly, more parents than children. Demographically, these changes occur when mortality is low, life expectancy is high, and fertility is relatively low, as in most industrialized countries. Changes in marriage, divorce, and childbearing complicate the intergenerational picture, as financial and care obligations are no longer necessarily dependent on biological or marital ties. In groups where marriage is increasingly fragile, intergenerational ties may supersede nuclear ties in the rearing of children. Researchers are interested in the economic and social consequences of these changes.

Fifth, the steady increase in women's labor force participation in the US and most other industrialized countries, especially among married women, in the second half of the twentieth century, and the accompanying decline in the one wage earner, two parent family, provides a greatly altered context for understanding and interpreting family demographic trends. The interrelationship between increased female employment and changes in union formation, fertility, cross generation caregiving and the gender division of labor in non market spheres is receiving increased attention in the family demographic literature of both developed and developing economies.

SEE ALSO: Demographic Transition Theory; Family Theory; Fertility: Low; Fertility: Transitions and Measures; Households; Intimate Union Formation and Dissolution; Life Course and Family; Marriage; Second Demographic Transition

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family diversity

Brad van Eeden Moorefield and David H. Demo

Family living arrangements in the US and throughout much of the world are considerably more diverse, pluralistic, and fluid than they were just a few decades ago. We have witnessed profound demographic changes,

including longer life expectancy, postponed marriage and childbearing, dramatic increases in both childbearing and childrearing outside of marriage, and substantial growth of singlehood, cohabitation, divorce, and remarriage (Teachman et al. 2000). As a result, there has been a sharp increase in the visibility of diverse family forms such as single parent (mostly single mother) families, stepfamilies, households headed by gays and lesbians, and families living in poverty (Rank 2000). These changes have stirred considerable debate surrounding the definition of family. For example, do two cohabiting adults and their dependent children constitute a family? Are they still a family without the presence of children in the household? What if the two adults are gay or lesbian?

Beginning in the middle of the twentieth century, a strong value was attached to a "benchmark" family type in the United States, or what is commonly termed the "traditional" nuclear family. Following World War II, rapid social changes including men returning to the labor force, a post war economic boom, an increasing standard of living, increases in marriage and birth rates, and a decline in the divorce rate supported a set of values and beliefs that privileged the two biological parent, male breadwinner, female homemaker family. Although families of the 1950s often are viewed with nostalgia, evidence shows that many traditional families were characterized by severe inequities, male dominance, men's overinvolvement in work and underinvolvement in family activities, wife abuse, and alcoholism (Coontz 1992). Since then, changing historical contexts and powerful social movements (e.g., civil rights, women's rights, gay and lesbian liberation, and men's movements) have been associated with the establishment of a wide variety of family forms, making the diversity of families more visible and normative, and sparking debates over the future of marriage and whether there is one best type of family.

There are many issues and complexities inherent in studying and defining families. Our purpose here is to provide an overview of family diversity by (1) defining the study of family diversity and its historical context; (2) defining family; (3) discussing the major structural dimensions of diversity (e.g., ethnicity, socioeconomic status, sexual orientation); and

(4) illustrating the diversity characterizing family processes.

DEFINING FAMILY DIVERSITY AS A FIELD OF STUDY

Historically, the term family diversity referred to variations from a traditional family. This implied that there was one best type of family, and that all other family types were dysfunctional and deviant. In a more contemporary view, family diversity refers to a broad range of characteristics or dimensions on which families vary, along with a recognition that there are a multitude of different family types that function effectively. Family diversity thus refers to variations along structural or demographic dimensions (e.g., race/ethnicity, socioeconomic status), as well as in family processes (e.g., communication and parenting behaviors).

We caution readers to be particularly mindful of comparisons in which one family is upheld as a "better" family than that to which it is compared. In this, we do not take a purely relativistic view by assuming that all families function effectively, nor do we believe there is one best type of family. Our view is that families are diverse and there are many ways that families can function effectively regardless of family type. As stated earlier, historical accounts of family diversity were concerned with pathological views that perpetuated marginalization of many family types. However, social movements and demographic changes have increased the visibility of diverse families, thus facilitating a shift away from pathological views to a recognition of family strengths and resilience (Walsh 1998). Thus, the study of family diversity is embedded within historical and social contexts, as is the intensifying debate over how to define family.

DEFINING FAMILY

Families are characterized by a rich variety of compositions that mix gender, ethnicity, sexuality, and marital history. Families also vary widely in their dynamics, or how family members interact with and relate to one another. As a result, family researchers have invested considerable energy in designing and conducting

studies that examine the flexibility and creativity with which individuals create and sustain a sense of family. To be sure, there are myriad ways that individuals experience and define family. However, there is a need to define family in a way that is useful, meaningful, and inclusive, yet not devoid of theoretical or empirical meaning. It also is important to recognize the difficulty in establishing an appropriate and inclusive definition of family that is flexible over time, i.e., a definition that reflects historical, demographic, social, and family change. No definition of family applies universally across cultures and historical periods (Coontz 2000).

The US Census Bureau defines a family as two or more individuals related by birth, marriage, or adoption. While practical, this definition excludes many groups who consider themselves to be families, such as couples who cohabit (with or without children), foster parents residing with their children, and gay and lesbian couples. Further complicating this debate and its implications for families is the disparity in family policies and laws across local, state, and federal levels. For example, the state of Massachusetts now recognizes same sex marriages, but such marriages are not recognized by other states or by federal law. A second example is a woman who adopts a child and lives with her lesbian partner. According to the US Census Bureau definition, the lesbian partner is considered a member of the household, but not a member of the family.

For our purposes, family is defined more broadly and involves consideration of both family structure and family process. Structurally, a family is defined as two or more persons related by birth, marriage, adoption, or choice (Allen et al. 2000). Adding the element of choice recognizes that individuals have human agency, or the ability to choose those whom they consider family, such as individuals who might be close friends. An inclusive definition of family also recognizes that family members do not need to be physically present or live in the same household. To illustrate, non residential fathers are family members even though they typically live apart from their children much of the year. Similarly, individuals may consider a deceased parent or other relative to be part of their family.

Typically, families also provide emotional and financial support, recreational opportunities, nurturance, discipline, and affection (Allen et al. 2000). As such, family also needs to be defined by process. Again, we do not take a purely relativistic view and assume all families function adequately, but we do believe that we need to be explicit about the definitions we use. Taken together, incorporating choice and process allows for a broader, more inclusive, and more meaningful definition of family.

DIMENSIONS OF FAMILY DIVERSITY

Race/Ethnicity

In the early twenty first century, racial/ethnic families represent a growing proportion of society, including substantial numbers of interracial couples and transnational families. Understanding the diversity of intersecting cultures and the influence of diversity on society and family life is important, particularly when developing public policy. Given that the proportion of Hispanic families is growing faster than any other family groups, we are witnessing an increased research emphasis on Hispanic family life, including examination of the effects of immigration and acculturation (see Zinn & Wells 2000). According to the most recent Current Population Survey (Fields 2004), 71 percent of all family groups in the US are white, with 12 percent black, 4 percent Asian, and 13 percent Hispanic. (It is worth noting that many of those categorized as Hispanic may have reported as being both white and Hispanic.)

Socioeconomic Status

Socioeconomic status (SES) is defined in terms of a family's combined index of income, education, occupational prestige, and the number of related adults and dependent children in the household (Rank 2000). Research consistently shows that economic hardship and stress adversely affect individual and family well being (White & Rogers 2000). Unemployment, underemployment, and low family income are associated with poor mental and physical

health, lower marital quality, diminished parenting effectiveness, and child maladjustment (Fox & Bartholomae 2000). Currently in the US, 12.4 percent of the total population lives below the poverty level, and 10.8 percent of all people living in families and 16.1 percent of families with children under age 18 live below the poverty level. A disproportionate number of black (24.9 percent) and Hispanic (22.6 percent) families live in poverty compared with white (9.1 percent) and Asian (12.8 percent) families. Interestingly, 15.8 percent of single fathers live below the poverty level compared to 32.2 percent of single mothers. As troubling as these statistics are, they do not include millions of children and adults in the US who live in severe economic hardship but have family income that falls just above the official poverty threshold (Rank 2000).

Gender

Gender refers to social meanings regarding masculinity and femininity that are produced through social processes and interactions (West & Zimmerman 1987), whereas sex refers to biological distinctions between a man and a woman. Each individual, whether male or female, is the product of complex configurations of both masculine and feminine characteristics that influence daily interactions (Thompson & Walker 1995). As a dimension of family diversity, gender is an ever present and powerful force in family relationships. For example, one family might divide labor on the basis of traditional gender beliefs and values such that the woman "stays home" to care for children and the man is the sole or primary earner. In this instance, gender is related to power in families because the man makes all or most of the family's income and controls the family's financial decision making. With each choice families make, such as how mothers and fathers parent, how they divide household labor, and how they provide care for aging parents, they are doing gender (West & Zimmerman 1987). Patterns unfold with enormous implications for family life and future generations because families exert a primary influence on gender socialization. Gender is

thus a critical axis of both social stratification and family diversity.

Sexual Orientation

One of the influential social movements of the twentieth century was the gay and lesbian liberation movement, which continues to draw attention to issues of civil and family rights. Sexual orientation refers to an individual's beliefs, attractions, and behaviors toward members of the opposite and same sex. From a family diversity perspective, families do not have a sexual orientation, but are comprised of individuals with varying sexual orientations. Consider, for example, a family in which one parent identifies as heterosexual, the other as gay, an aunt as bisexual, and a child as transsexual. These variations are of increasing importance as more families are faced with how to accept, or whether to accept, a family member whose sexual orientation differs. Due to the difficulties involved in collecting sensitive information regarding sexual orientation, available statistical evidence regarding the prevalence and types of gay and lesbian headed households is likely to be conservative. Using data from the 2000 Census, Gates and Ost (2004) suggested that approximately 5 percent of the US population over age 18 are gay or lesbian. Of those who were identified as gay or lesbian and in couple relationships, 27.5 percent had children present in the household. Other estimates suggest anywhere between 9 and 11 million children are being reared by a gay or lesbian parent (Patterson 2000). Studies of sexual orientation often compare the adjustment of children who live with gay or lesbian parents with that of children who live with heterosexual parents (Patterson 2000). This area of research is of great concern given current policy debates concerning same sex marriage, adoption, and foster care. Collectively, research in this area suggests no negative differences in child outcomes based on parental sexual orientation (Patterson 2000). Studies also suggest that relationship quality and relationship outcomes are similar for families of gays and lesbians compared with families of heterosexuals (Kurdek 2004). Unfortunately, we know little about the important topics of

bisexuality, transgenderism, transexualism, and family life.

Family Structure

Recent demographic changes, notably including high rates of non marital childbearing, divorce, and remarriage, have changed the face of American families. Less than half of American children now live in traditional nuclear families, defined as families consisting of two biological parents married to each other, full siblings only, and no other household members (Brandon & Bumpass 2001). Variations in family structure and the consequences for individual well being have been widely studied. Most of the research has focused on the impact of different family forms (e.g., first married families, divorced families, and remarried families) on children's development and well being. In general, when compared with children in first married families, children in single parent families and remarried families are slightly disadvantaged on measures of academic performance, psychological adjustment, conduct, social competence, and physical health (Amato 2000; Demo et al. 2004). However, for most children the effects of family disruption are temporary. Studies suggest that 80 percent of children who have experienced parental divorce function within normal ranges of adjustment within one to two years of the divorce (Barber & Demo 2006). Similarly, divorced adults report more negative life events, more difficulties in parenting, and lower psychological well being during the separation process, but most are resilient and function normally within a couple of years post divorce. Although family composition and family transitions are important to understand, the evidence suggests that family processes exert stronger effects on the well being of family members.

Family Process

Family process refers to the interpersonal dynamics (e.g., support, communication, decision making, conflict resolution, violence) between family members (e.g., parent-child, husband-wife, partner interactions). Given

societal concerns related to couples who divorce or dissolve their relationships, examination of family process is especially important and has the potential to provide valuable insight. For example, once a conflict between partners starts, the discussion that follows and the rate at which the conflict escalates is related to the prediction of divorce/dissolution. Gottman et al. (2003) examined communication among heterosexual, gay, and lesbian couples and found that gay and lesbian couples used humor more effectively during initial stages of conflict discussions, leading to lower escalation rates compared to heterosexual couples. Attending to the diversity of family process provides a better understanding of family dynamics and has potential to guide prevention and intervention efforts for practitioners.

CONCLUSION

Contemporary families are remarkably diverse both in structure and process, and the social and demographic changes propelling family diversity are likely to accelerate (Stacey 2000). Unfortunately, much of the extant research relies on samples of predominantly white, middle class, heterosexual families and their children, limiting our ability to generalize to increasingly pluralistic family forms. Students, scholars, practitioners, and policymakers need to be more inclusive and explicit with their definitions of families and attend more fully to the rich, fluid, and multidimensional diversity of family experiences.

SEE ALSO: Class, Status, and Power; Cohabitation; Divorce; Family Conflict; Family Structure; Family Structure and Child Outcomes; Gender Ideology and Gender Role Ideology; Inequality/Stratification, Gender; Lesbian and Gay Families; Lone Parent Families; Stepfamilies; Stratification, Race/Ethnicity and

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family, history of

Mark Hutter

European societies during the nineteenth century underwent massive changes. The old social order anchored in kinship, the village, the community, religion, and old regimes was attacked and fell to the twin forces of industrialism and revolutionary democracy. The sweeping changes had particular effect on the family. There was a dramatic increase in such conditions as poverty, child labor, desertions, prostitution, illegitimacy, and the abuse of women and children. These conditions were particularly evident in the newly emerging industrial cities. The vivid writings of a novelist such as Charles Dickens in *Oliver Twist* and *Hard Times* provide startling portraits of a harsh new way of life.

The industrial revolution dramatically changed the nature of economic and social life. The factory system developed, and, with its development, there was a transformation from home industries in rural areas to factories in towns and cities of Europe and America. Rural people were lured by the novelty of city life and the

prospects of greater economic opportunity. The domestic economy of the pre industrial family disappeared. The rural and village based family system no longer served as a productive unit. The domestic economy had enabled the family to combine economic activities with the supervision and training of its children; the development of the factory system led to a major change in the division of labor in family roles.

Patriarchal authority was weakened with urbanization. Previously, in rural and village families, fathers reigned supreme; they were knowledgeable in economic skills and were able to train their children. The great diversity of city life rendered this socialization function relatively useless. The rapid change in industrial technology and the innumerable forms of work necessitated a more formal institutional setting – the school – to help raise the children. Partially, in response to the changing family situation, the British passed legislation to aid children. Separated from parental supervision, working children were highly exploited. Laws came into existence to regulate the amount of time children were allowed to work and their working conditions. The law also required that children attend school. These legal changes reflected the change in the family situation in the urban setting; families were no longer available or able to watch constantly over their children.

The separation of work from the home had important implications for family members. Increasingly, the man became the sole provider for the family and the women and children developed a life comprised solely of concerns centered on the family, the home, and the school. Their contacts with the outside world diminished and they were removed from community involvements. The family's withdrawal from the community was tinged by its hostile attitude toward the surrounding city. The city was depicted as a sprawling and planless development bereft of meaningful community and neighborhood relationships. The tremendous movement of a large population into the industrial centers provided little opportunity for the family to form deep or lasting ties with neighbors. Instead, the family viewed neighbors with suspicion and weariness. Exaggerated beliefs developed on the prevalence of urban poverty, crime, and disorganization.

This entry deals with the different approaches taken by social scientists in their analysis of the family in the wake of the industrial revolution. Throughout the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries they voiced concern about the excesses of industrial urban society and the calamitous changes in the family system. Social Darwinists and Marxists tried to make sense of these changes through utilization of evolutionary theories. Radicals, conservatives, and social reformers called for fundamental changes in the society and in the family and its new way of life. However, by the mid twentieth century, the dominant perspective in sociology, structural functionalism, proclaimed that the family was alive, well, and functioning in modern industrial society.

EVOLUTIONARY THEORIES

Sociological interest in the study of the history of the family was very strong in the mid nineteenth century in Western Europe. Prior to the nineteenth century, western thought generally held to a biblical belief in the origins of the family stemming from God's creation of the world, including Adam and Eve. Although there was recognition of relatively minor familial changes over time, the biblical family form and its underlying patriarchal ideological precepts were seen as continuing intact into the nineteenth century. Western thought clung to uniformity throughout the world in terms of family structures, processes, and underlying familial beliefs and values. These governed the behavior of men, women, and children in families. The belief in universal family uniformity led to ramifications on the nature and place of the human species and affected the traditional institutions of the church, the state, and the family. Coinciding with the doctrine of evolutionism was the development of individualism and democracy.

There are a number of important factors to help account for the historical study of the family. First, the fabric of Western European and American society was undergoing major changes. Societies were rapidly industrializing and urbanizing. The old social class systems were being reworked and a new class structure was developing. Family relationships were also

undergoing radical changes. The individual's rights, duties, and obligations to the family and, in turn, to the larger community were being questioned and challenged. Second, western colonial expansionism and imperialism were developed fully. Unknown and hitherto unsuspected cultural systems with strange and diverse ways of life were discovered and analyzed. Family systems were found to have differences almost beyond imagination. Third, an intellectual revolution was occurring. The controversy surrounding evolutionary theory was sweeping Western Europe and America. Developing out of this social and intellectual ferment was the application of evolutionary thought to the analysis and understanding of the social origins of the human species. This discussion is concerned with the resultant theories of social change and their applicability to the study of the history of the family and to family change.

The theory of evolutionary change developed by Charles Darwin in his *Origin of the Species* in 1859 was the culmination of an intellectual revolution begun much earlier that promoted the idea of progressive development. Progressive development believed that the human species evolved from stages of savagery to civilization. As the theory of evolution became the dominant form in explaining biological principles, social scientists of the nineteenth century developed the belief that there was a link between biological and cultural evolution. The basic argument was that since biological evolution proceeded by a series of stages (from the simple to the complex), the same process would hold for cultures. Thus, the Social Darwinists shared in the basic assumption of unilinear evolution (the idea that all civilizations pass through the same stages of development in the same order). They then sought to apply the ideas of progressive development to social forms and institutions – a primary concern being the development of explanatory schema on the evolution of marriage and family systems.

Social Darwinism was associated with, among others, Herbert Spencer (*The Principles of Sociology*, 1897), J. J. Bachofen (*Das Mutterrecht* [The Mother Right], 1861/1948), Henry Sumner Maine (*Ancient Law*, 1861/1960), and Lewis Henry Morgan (*Ancient Society*, 1877/

1963). Social Darwinists seemingly dealt with such non immediate concerns as the origins and historical development of the family, yet their theories had social and political implications. Social Darwinism provided "scientific" legitimation for western colonization and exploitation of "primitive" peoples through the erroneous belief that western culture represented "civilization" and non western cultures (particularly among nonliterate, low technology societies) represented a primeval state of savagery or barbarity. And through its advocacy of evolutionary progress, Social Darwinism provided laissez faire guidelines that supported neglect of the poorer classes of American and Western European societies.

The Social Darwinists differed concerning specific lines of development. Some argued that there was a historical stage of matriarchy in which women ruled the society, whereas most others argued that a patriarchal stage of social evolution never existed. This controversy had implications for the roles of men and women in nineteenth century family systems. The prevalent view was for a patriarchal evolutionary theory of male supremacy and dominance over females. Thus, Social Darwinists gave implicit support to the Victorian notions of male supremacy and female dependency.

In summary, the evolutionary theory of the Social Darwinists ostensibly dealt with such non immediate concerns as the origins and historical development of the family, but underlying their theorizing were implications for the roles of men and women in contemporary nineteenth century family systems. Indeed, their twentieth century evolutionary theory counterparts continued to put forth these same arguments over a century later. The initiative for this rebirth of interest in the evolutionary reconstruction of family forms has been the development of arguments and counter arguments stemming from the concern of the women's movement with the origins of patriarchy and male sexual dominance.

An important rebuttal to Social Darwinism that in part developed out of evolutionary theory was made by the nineteenth century founders of communist thought, Marx and Engels. They made gender role relationships a central and dominating concern of evolutionary theory. Engels (1972) used it to address his primary

concern: the social condition of the poor and working classes and the exploitation of men, women, and children. Concern for gender role egalitarianism, as opposed to patriarchy and male sexual dominance, achieved their fullest evolutionary theory expression in this work. Engels's evolutionary theory saw economic factors as the primary determinants of social change and linked particular technological forms with particular family forms. Echoing Lewis Henry Morgan, Engels depicted a stage of savagery as one with no economic inequalities and no private ownership of property. The family form was group marriage based on matriarchy. During the stage of barbarism, men gained economic control over the means of production. In civilization, the last stage, women became subjugated to the male dominated economic system and monogamy. This stage, in Engels's view, rather than representing the apex of marital and familial forms, represented the victory of private property over common ownership and group marriage. Engels speculated that the coming of socialist revolution would usher in a new evolutionary stage marked by gender equality and by common ownership of property. Engels's main achievement was in defining the family as an economic unit. This has become a major focus in much of the subsequent historical research on the family and is of great theoretical importance in the sociology of the family. But, insofar as Engels's Marxist view constituted a branch of evolutionary thought, it was subject to many of the same objections raised against other evolutionary theories.

By the end of the nineteenth century the popularity of Social Darwinism was rapidly declining. Contributing to this decline were the methodological weaknesses of the approach (data obtained by untrained, impressionistic, and biased travelers and missionaries) and a growing rejection of both its explicit value assumptions on the superiority of western family forms and its belief in unilinear evolutionary development of the family. This belief was replaced by multilinear evolutionary theory that recognizes that there are many evolutionary tracks that societies can follow. It rejects the unilinear evolutionary view that all cultures advance toward a model represented by western culture as ultimately ethnocentric and often racist.

Social Darwinism also made the fatal error of equating contemporary nonliterate cultures with the hypothetical primeval savage society. It failed to understand that *all* contemporary peoples have had a prolonged and evolved past. The failure of many of them to have a written record of the past led the Social Darwinists to assume erroneously that they had none. Further, they did not understand that many nonliterate societies deemphasize changes in the past to stress their continuity with it. This is especially true in cultures that glorify traditions and reify their sameness with their ancestors. Social Darwinists made ethnocentric and subjective pronouncements. They viewed their own society's art, religion, morals, and values according to their notions of what was good and correct, explaining such "barbaric" practices as polygamy and sexual promiscuity based on their own national and individual norms. They biased their analysis with their own moral feelings on such customs and practices.

Another factor in the decline of evolutionary theory was that it was involved with an irrelevant set of questions. For instance, what difference does it make which society represents the apex of civilization and which the nadir if it does not aid in understanding contemporary marriage and family systems? This is especially the case in a world undergoing revolutionary changes and one in which formally isolated cultures are becoming more and more involved with western civilization as a result of colonization. Social scientists felt that attempts to theorize about the historical evolutionary process were not as important as examining the influences which cultures had on each other. Societies did not evolve in isolation, but continually interacted and influenced each other. One final factor in the decline of evolutionary theory was the shift in focus of the sociology of the family. This shift was in part precipitated by the sweeping changes in American and European societies during the nineteenth century. Social scientists were appalled by the excesses of industrial urban society and the calamitous changes in the family system. The precipitating factor seen in this change in the family were the sweeping changes in American and European societies during the nineteenth century brought about by the industrial revolution.

SOCIAL POLICY AND REFORM

Toward the end of the nineteenth century and through the early twentieth century social scientists concerned about the abuses arising from rapid urbanization and industrialization began to see the decline in the importance of kinship and community participation and the changes in the makeup of the nuclear family as more important areas of investigation than the study of the evolutionary transformations of the family. Their research and theories focused on the causal connections relating family change to the larger industrial and urban developments occurring in the last two centuries. Much attention was given to theoretical analyses of the effects these changes had on the individual, on women, men, and children, on the family, on kinship structures, and on the larger community and the society.

Sociology in the US shifted its emphasis away from the study of social evolution to the study of social problems and the advocacy of social reform. The paramount concern was the study of the family in the context of the abuses of rapid industrialization and urbanization. The emphasis switched from the development of theories of family systems to the more urgent concerns of individual families and their members. Illegitimacy, prostitution, child abuse, and other resultant abuses were seen as arising from non governmental supervision of industrial and urban institutions. This underlying assumption about the causes of social problems was held by the social reform movement's major advocate, the Chicago School of Sociology, which was composed of such important sociologists as Robert E. Park, Ernest W. Burgess, Louis Wirth, E. Franklin Frazier, W. I. Thomas, and Florian Znaniecki. They contributed much to the development of family sociology and urban sociology. The Chicago School developed a distinct contrast between urban and rural life. They saw traditional patterns of life being broken down by debilitating urban forces, resulting in social disorganization within the family. An underlying theme was the loss of family functions as a result of urbanization and industrialization.

In traditional societies, the family (following the argument of Chicago School sociologists William Ogburn and Ernest Burgess) performed

economic, educational, recreational, religious, and protective functions. In modern society most of these functions have been taken over as a consequence of the increased participation of government, economic enterprises, and education. The cornerstone of family life was its companionship and emotional functions. This shift in family functions led to Burgess's famous classification of family types as moving from "institution to companionship." According to Burgess, the institutional family is sustained by external community pressures and involvements; the companionate family, on the other hand, is sustained by the emotional attachments among its members.

Beginning in the late 1930s and accelerating after World War II, many of the views of the Chicago School either merged with or influenced newer perspectives. By the 1950s the dominant school was structural functionalism, under the intellectual leadership of Talcott Parsons, who was one of the most predominant and influential sociologists of the twentieth century. According to Parsons (1943), the isolation of the nuclear family "is the most distinctive feature of the American kinship system and underlies most of its peculiar functional and dynamic problems." The typical American household consisted of a husband, wife, and children economically independent of their extended family and frequently located at considerable geographical distance from it. Parsons viewed American society as having been greatly changed by industrialization and urbanization. In particular, he believed it had become highly "differentiated," with the family system's previous educational, religious, political, and economic functions being taken over by other institutions in the society. By differentiation, Parsons meant that functions performed earlier by one institution in the society are now distributed among several institutions. Thus, schools, churches, peer groups, political parties, voluntary associations, and occupational groups have assumed functions once reserved for the family. Rather than viewing industrialization and urbanization negatively, Parsons saw the family as becoming a more specialized group. It concentrates its functions on the socialization of children and providing emotional support and affection for family members.

Parsons further suggested that the isolated nuclear family may be ideally suited to meet the demands of occupational and geographical mobility inherent in industrial urban society. Unencumbered by obligatory extended kinship bonds, the nuclear family is best able to move where the jobs are and better able to take advantage of occupational opportunities. In contrast, the traditional extended family system of extensive, obligatory economic and residential rights and duties is seen to be dysfunctional for industrial society.

Arguing against the social disorganization thesis on the breakdown of the contemporary family, Parsons (1955) found support for the importance of the nuclear family in the high rates of marriage and remarriage after divorce, the increase in the birthrate after World War II, and the increase in the building of single family homes (particularly in suburbia) during this period. All these trends provided evidence of the continuing visibility, *not* social disorganization, of the family and of the *increased* vitality of the nuclear family bond. Thus, a specialized family system functionally meets the affectional and personality needs of its members. Further, it may be admirably fitted to a family system that is a relatively isolated and self-sustaining economic unit of mother, father, and children, living without other relatives in the home and without close obligations and ties to relatives who live nearby.

In summary, Parsons emphasized the importance of the nuclear family – in the absence of extended kinship ties – in that it meets two major societal needs: the socialization of children and the satisfaction of the affectional and emotional demands of husbands, wives, and their children. Further, the isolated nuclear family, which is not handicapped by conflicting obligations to extended relatives, can best take advantage of occupational opportunities and is best able to cope with the demands of modern industrial urban life.

MODERNIZATION THEORY

Modernization theory combines conceptual orientations from both Social Darwinism and structural functionalism to elaborate the theoretical relationship between societal

development and family change. The concept of modernization, derived from structural functionalism, and the theories stemming from it have been the dominating perspective in the analysis of global social change and the family since the last quarter of the twentieth century. Modernization is usually used as a term in reference to processes of change in societies that are characterized by advanced industrial technology. Science and technology are seen to guide societies from traditional, preindustrial social institutions to complex, internally differentiated ones.

Modernization is often linked with a wide range of changes in the political, economic, social, and individual spheres. For example, there is a movement from tribal or village authority to political parties and civil service bureaucracies; from illiteracy to education that would increase economically productive skills; from traditionalistic religions to secularized belief systems; and from ascriptive hierarchical systems to greater social and geographical mobility resulting in a more achievement based stratification system. Likewise the extended family kinship ties are seen to lose their pervasiveness and nuclear families gain in importance.

Modernization theory, while it recognized to some extent that cultural values of non western societies might have an impact on the pace of industrialization, argued that they would not affect its inevitability. Diffusion theory and the convergence hypothesis, offshoots of modernization theory, predicted that cultural differences would diminish as less developed countries industrialized and urbanized. The held belief was that as societies modernized, they would come to resemble one another more and more over time. These societies would lose their cultural uniqueness as they began to act and think more like one another and more like the more developed countries. Accompanying modernization would be a shift to "modern" attitudes and beliefs and a change in the family and kinship system. The family change would see the diminishing control and power of extended kinship systems and emergence of affectional ties and obligations with the nuclear family.

The classic statement of modernization theory, centering on the family and change, is

William J. Goode's *World Revolution and Family Patterns* (1963). This work has had a profound impact on the comparative study of social change and the family. Goode's major contribution is the comprehensive and systematic gathering and analyses of cross cultural and historical data to attack the notion that industrial and economic development was the principal reason that the family is changing. Goode concluded that changes in industrialization and the family are parallel processes, both being influenced by changing social and personal ideologies – the ideologies of economic progress, the conjugal family, and egalitarianism. Finally, Goode proposes that in the "world revolution" toward industrialization and urbanization there is a convergence of diverse types of extended family forms to some type of conjugal family system.

DEPENDENCY THEORIES

Dependency theories take strong exception to these predictions articulated by modernization theory's hypotheses. Further, and more importantly, proponents of dependency theories have changed the focus of the analysis of the impact of industrialization and globalized economy. Rather than focus on whether or not there is a convergence to western models of modernity and family structure, they have focused on the impact of the globalization of the economy on the poor, not only in third world societies but in industrial ones as well. Dependency theories are of particular relevance in their analysis of global inequality on those who are most economically vulnerable: women, children, elderly people, and families living in poverty.

Women are particularly impacted by global poverty. Modernization theory often does not examine the experiences or structural location of women in their own right as societies undergo change. The belief that women's status improves with economic development does not fully realize that widespread structures of patriarchy often keep women in subordinate positions. Patriarchy is the ideology of masculine supremacy that emphasizes the dominance of males over females in virtually all spheres of life, including politics, economics, education, religion, and the family. Its worldwide

pervasiveness is particularly acute in the third world, where women have relatively little political power. Economically, when women's work is not solely relegated to the household they are often found in lower echelon jobs where they work longer hours for less pay than men. Land, the principal source of wealth in most third world countries, continues to be controlled by men. Education is often seen as a male prerogative, and lacking education they have fewer economic options. Women's role in religion often is of secondary or of little religious importance. Modernization, rather than significantly increasing women's independence, often results in and perpetuates their dependency and subordination.

GLOBALIZATION THEORY

Globalization theory has become another perspective in examining family change. Here the emphasis is on an examination of the transnational processes that have an impact on families. Rather than focusing solely on families in the modernized countries or on families in third world societies, of paramount importance are relationships that exist and are experienced by individuals who have family members living in both rich and poor countries. For example, one concern is the impact of globalization on generational relationships among family members, particularly as a consequence of differential socialization experiences in different cultural settings. Also of much interest (Ehrenreich & Hochschild 2002) is the broad scale transfer of domestic service associated with female migration of women whose traditional roles result in their employment as child and elderly caretakers or as domestics in affluent countries while their families in their home countries suffer the absence of their services. The problems associated with international sex tourism are also of great concern. Another area of interest is the involvement of men who have migrated from poorer countries to wealthier ones primarily for economic motives. Not only do they maintain their contacts with their families in their home countries through financial support, but they develop trader communities that are transnational and which link them to their families and to economic networks (Stoller 2001).

Essentially, in evaluating contemporary perspectives on family change, we become cognizant of a twentieth/twenty first century replay of the ideological positions and arguments put forth by the Social Darwinists in the nineteenth century and underlining moral valuations inherent in these orientations. Modernization theory, through its utilization of structural functionalism, can be seen as the twentieth century counterpart of Social Darwinism. Likewise, developmental theory can be seen as a twentieth century counterpart that shares many of the assumptions put forth by nineteenth century radicals such as Marx and Engels.

SEE ALSO: Chicago School; Family and Community; Family, Sociology of; Family Theory; Modernization; Parsons, Talcott; Social Darwinism

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family, men's involvement in

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Father involvement refers to involvement by fathers in the daily responsibilities of parenthood. According to data from the early 1990s, only 12.6 percent of men 45 to 64 years of age report never having had children (Bachu 1996). Thus, although not all men are fathers, most eventually father a child and have, therefore, the opportunity to act as a father to their own children. Men without their own biological children have the opportunity to be a father to their partners' children through marriage or cohabitation. Sixty-four percent of children live with their biological or adoptive mother and father, 6.7 percent live with a biological parent and a stepparent, 21 percent live with a single mother, another 2 percent live with their single mother and the mother's cohabiting partner, 2.5 percent live with their single biological father, and 4 percent do not live with a parent (Hofferth et al. 2002).

SOCIAL AND DEMOGRAPHIC CHANGES AFFECTING FATHERS AND FATHERING

Adjustments in the roles of fathers and mothers have resulted from social changes over the past decades. Such changes include women's increased labor force participation, the absence

of many men from families, the increased involvement of other types of fathers in children's lives, and increased cultural diversity in the US (Cabrera et al. 2000). A concern about the well-being of children raised in low-income families is linked to these same changes. Although many of the same concerns are recognized in developed countries across the globe, this discussion is limited to the US context.

In the recent past much of the focus on fathers was occasioned by their absence. The focus on father absence sprang from large increases in divorce and separation beginning in the 1970s that resulted in fathers substantially reducing their financial and other commitments to family and children. Early research focused upon the effects of the absence of the father on the financial condition of the family. Since the mid-1990s, research has focused on the involvement of non-residential fathers with children, not just on the father's financial contribution. Research from the Fragile Families and Child Wellbeing study suggests that unmarried fathers are more involved with their families than popularly believed. At birth 82 percent were romantically involved with the baby's mother and 44 percent were living together (Fragile Families and Child Wellbeing 2000).

The other major change is the increased labor force participation of married mothers. Women have always worked; however, the increase in employment of married mothers with young children in the 1970s and 1980s, and in the 1990s of single mothers, was remarkably rapid. Maternal labor force participation, which has increased maternal financial support for the family and removed financial support as fathers' primary responsibility, has led to the focus on paternal responsibility for non-financial involvement and care of children.

CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK

The most frequently used framework conceptualizes father involvement as having three major components: (1) the time fathers are engaged with or accessible to children overall or in specific activities; (2) the responsibility they take for them; and (3) the quality or nature of the relationship (Lamb 2004).

Research has found that fathers in intact families spend about 1 hour and 13 minutes on a weekday and about 3.3 hours on a weekend day with children under age 13 (Yeung et al. 2001). Because both parents' time with children may vary, relative levels of involvement may provide a better sense of father involvement. Based upon data from the 1980s and 1990s, fathers' time engaged in activities with their children is about two fifths of mothers' time. Fathers are accessible to their children about two thirds as often as mothers. These figures are higher than in the 1970s and early 1980s. A recent study from the mid 1990s shows that fathers' time engaged with children on a weekday is about two thirds of mothers' time, and on a weekend day almost 90 percent of mothers' time, additional evidence for increased father involvement. In these more recent data, the ratio of fathers' to mothers' time accessible to their children is about the same as that of engaged time. As children get older and the absolute amount of parental time declines, fathers' time rises as a proportion of mothers' time with children.

Of course, the increasing ratio of fathers' to mothers' time since the 1970s could be due to either a decline in mothers' or an increase in fathers' time. However, one comparison between 1965 and 1997 suggests that mothers' time with children has remained fairly constant, and, hence, the rise in the ratio of fathers' to mothers' time with children is not due to a decline in mothers' time, at least in two parent families. Other research also suggests that fathers' time with children has risen in two parent families where the average amount of time children spent with fathers rose about 3 hours per week between 1981 and 1997 and time with mothers rose as well. The time children spent with fathers did not rise significantly over all families because of the offsetting increased number of single parent families and because non residential fathers are less involved with their children (Sandberg & Hofferth 2001).

Although the overall amount of time may be important to child development, developmental psychologists are concerned about the nature of those activities. As has been found in several studies, play and companionship account for the largest fraction of time children spend with

their fathers. About 39 percent of children's engaged time with fathers is spent in play and companionship on a weekday or weekend day. Learning, household work, and social activities comprise a relatively small fraction of children's time with their fathers, about 31 percent. The time children spend in learning and educational activities with their fathers is quite small, averaging only 3 to 5 percent of engaged time.

A second important category is personal care received by the child from the father, about 25 percent of the father's engaged time on a weekend day and 35 percent on a weekday. Childcare by fathers when mothers are working is an important aspect of caregiving. In the US a substantial minority of dual earner parents keep their use of non parental care to a minimum by adjusting their work schedules so that a parent can care for their children when needed. About one third of working parents in two parent families with a preschool child work different schedules and can share child care responsibilities. The proportion of fathers who care for children during the hours when mothers work rises to three quarters as the number of non overlapping hours increases. Other evidence that fathers' time in childcare is responsive to available time is that, during the 1991 recession in which more men were presumably out of work or working fewer hours, the proportion of men who provided childcare as primary or secondary provider while their wives were working rose by one third. It declined again following the end of the recessionary period.

Much of what parents do for children demands time indirectly, through management of their lives and activities – the extent of responsibility fathers take is a key variable across families. Fathers can participate in a wide variety of managerial and supervisory activities, including selecting doctors and child care programs, managing appointments, arranging transportation, coordinating with schools, and monitoring children's activities (Cabrera et al. 2000). Although fathers take less responsibility than mothers, and few fathers take sole responsibility for any parenting tasks, fathers are likely to share direct care, to transport children to activities, and to participate in choosing activities and selecting a childcare

program, preschool, or school (Hofferth et al. 2002). They are less likely to be involved in purchasing clothing, and in selecting and making appointments for doctor visits.

An additional aspect of fathering considered here is the quality of the father-child relationship. Most developmental psychologists argue that the quality of parenting and of the parent-child relationship is crucial to developing competent children. A combination of responsiveness with control has been shown by research to be linked to optimal child development. Fathers who were affectionate, sensitive, spent time with their child, and had more positive attitudes had securely attached infants at 9 months. Positive father involvement has also been linked to greater social skills, cognitive ability, school performance, self esteem, and social confidence in children (Lamb 2004).

WHAT FACTORS MOTIVATE FATHERS TO BE INVOLVED WITH THEIR CHILDREN?

Family structural variables are expected to be associated with paternal involvement because they may influence fathers' motivation to participate. Particularly important are the relationships of the male to the child (biological/other) and to the mother (married/cohabiting). From the point of view of evolutionary psychology, genetic benefits arise from fathering and investing in one's own natural offspring. Such "parenting investment" increases the reproductive fitness of the next generation. Stepfathers gain little genetic benefit by investing in the care of stepchildren, and such investment detracts from time they might otherwise spend ensuring their own biological progeny. However, many examples of caring behavior by stepparents exist, suggesting that paternal investment is not restricted only to biological offspring. One of the mechanisms behind such investment is "relationship investment." By investing in their spouse's children from a prior union, remarried men increase the prospect of further childbearing as well as continuation of supportive exchanges with their partner. Thus investment in one's partner's children may have payoffs. However, there is also less normative support for involvement by stepfathers than biological

fathers, consistent with findings that stepfathers are behaviorally less involved (Hofferth & Anderson 2003). It is likely that cohabiting (especially non biological cohabiting) fathers also receive less normative support for being involved. In addition, both stepfathers and cohabiting fathers may receive less support than married biological fathers for involvement from the child's mother.

Fathers are likely to differ on a variety of social and demographic factors that could also be linked to father involvement. For example, fathers' motivation for involvement with older children may be greater because interaction with them is more gratifying. On the other hand, adolescent children may become less interested and motivated to spend time with their father. Cultural variation also exists. Recent research found African American and Hispanic fathers taking more responsibility for managerial tasks than white fathers, even after adjusting for differences in socioeconomic and demographic characteristics (Hofferth 2003). African American fathers have been found to be less warm and more controlling than white fathers and Hispanic fathers equally warm but less controlling than white fathers. Better educated fathers may have more positive fathering attitudes and more equitable gender role attitudes, which may relate to greater engagement with children. Their expectations may also be higher. On the other hand, fathers with longer work hours will be constrained from spending more time with children. Fathers' income could be positively or negatively related to engagement with children, depending upon whether the level of income is a function more of education or of work hours.

CURRENT RESEARCH ON FATHER INVOLVEMENT

Much of the current research focuses on effects of father involvement on child development (Lamb 2004). One of the major issues in examining outcomes of father involvement is to identify unique effects of fathers separate from mothers. There are three basic ways it is thought that fathers affect their children's development. The first is by direct interaction and involvement with the child, including

teaching, helping, playing, etc. A second is by taking responsibility for aspects of the child's life, such as making appointments, talking with teachers, arranging care, and monitoring the child's activities. The third is through interaction with the mother, including supporting the mother in childrearing, both emotionally and financially. All avenues are likely to be important, but only the first has been widely researched.

Research has failed to find a strong association between amount of time spent doing things with children and their well being and development. Rather, research tends to find significant links between the warmth of the father and mother and child development. It has been extremely difficult to show links between specific parenting behaviors, such as helping with homework, and child achievement. Parental involvement in children's schooling, for example, has been found to be associated with greater school achievement. Thus it is likely that the quality and type of parenting matters more to child development than the total amount of father involvement. It is possible, of course, that the types of involvement measures used to date are not specific enough to capture these linkages.

There is substantial support for the hypothesis that a positive relationship between mother and father is good for children. Parents who have a good relationship feel better about themselves, are better parents, and their children are better adjusted, whereas conflict leads to maladjustment.

Most of the above research has been conducted on residential parents. Increasing research on amount and quality of involvement has focused on non residential fathers (Hofferth et al. 2002). Research has found greater frequency of contact with the non resident father to be associated with better child outcomes (Amato & Gilbreth 1999).

METHODOLOGICAL ISSUES IN STUDYING MEN AS FATHERS

Fathers are difficult to study. A report that summarized some of the methodological issues in studying fathers was produced in the 1990s by the Forum on Child and Family Statistics

(Federal Interagency Forum on Child and Family Statistics 1998). Obtaining the cooperation of fathers in order to obtain the best information about their involvement is not the easiest task. To begin with, men are undercounted in surveys. Many men are loosely connected to households and are simply not included in our enumeration of households. Low income fathers, in particular, may be living in several places, on the street, or be in jail or in the military. Even if they are identified, men's fertility is usually underestimated. Fathers are accessed mainly through the mothers of their children. Married fathers can be located; however, fathers are much less likely to agree to participate than mothers. They work full time more often, are at home less frequently, and are less likely to agree to be interviewed. Thus much of the information on fathers that is used today is reported by the mother. That is unlikely to provide the best information about father involvement as it may depend upon the mother's attitude toward the father. This has always been a problem for non residential fathers, because many mothers do not want to provide access to these fathers or do not know their whereabouts. The Child Development Supplement to the Panel Study of Income Dynamics (PSID CDS) was able to interview only about 25 percent of the non residential fathers of the children in the study. Most of the contact problem was due to failure to obtain contact information from the mother. Mothers refused in one third of the cases and one third could not be located. Upon contacting the father, cooperation was reasonably high, about 64 percent. In the Early Head Start Study, 60 percent of mothers gave information that could be used to identify the father of the child, and of these 60 percent participated.

Interviewing residential fathers is also problematic. Obtaining an interview with a second family member is expensive and time consuming because it takes additional contact and interview time. The use of a self administered questionnaire in the PSID CDS resulted in a response rate of only about 60 percent of fathers.

An alternative way to obtain information about fathers is by starting with the man as the study respondent and following him as he becomes an adult. The problem here is in obtaining accurate reports of having fathered a

child. Men who were without a high school degree, who were black, who fathered a child at a young age, and who did not consistently live with the child from birth were less likely to be verifiable as children's fathers in the National Longitudinal Survey of Youth 79 (NLSY79). Besides reports that may not be accurate, male fertility reports are often missing. In the Survey of Income and Program Participation (SIPP), 8 percent of men did not report on the number of children ever born (Bachu 1996). An alternative strategy that has worked well is to start with the birth of a baby and get the couple at this "magic moment." In the Study of Fragile Families and Child Wellbeing, which took this approach in studying unmarried couples, response rates for mothers were 87 percent and for fathers were 75 percent (Fragile Families and Child Wellbeing 2000).

FUTURE DIRECTIONS

The research on fathers' involvement in the family increasingly focuses on two areas: (1) examining the relationship between father involvement and child development in special types of families, such as minority families, low income and "fragile" families, and stepfamilies; and (2) conducting qualitative interviews with fathers to examine such topics as the meaning of fatherhood in men's lives and how men become fathers to children they did not sire. These qualitative studies should be helpful in designing a new generation of studies that examines the process of becoming a father and how becoming a father links to men's later involvement with children.

SEE ALSO: Childhood; Family Structure and Child Outcomes; Fatherhood; Fertility: Nonmarital; Life Course and Family; Life Course Perspective; Marriage; Parental Involvement in Education; Stepfamilies; Stepparenting

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family migration

Darren P. Smith

Since the late 1970s the topic of family migration has increasingly been examined by sociologists, geographers, economists, and demographers. Studies of family migration have clearly become a wide ranging, interdisciplinary endeavor, with discussions cross cutting the social sciences. Although family migration occurs at many geographic scales, from the neighborhood to the global, academic discourses within the developed world have

tended to focus on the movement of family units over long distances at a subnational level. Kofman (2004) and Smith and Bailey (2006) argue, for example, that the “family” has been lost from accounts of population movements between European states, or across wider international boundaries, respectively. In addition, there is limited interchange between accounts of family movements within the developed and developing world, with the latter often being absorbed within wider development studies.

North American and European studies of family migration have generally focused on the *outcomes* of family migration (Halfacree 1995). More specifically, there has been an emphasis on pinning down the *socioeconomic* effects, which are often measured by the post migration employment or occupational status of family migrants. There has been less concern with the non economic outcomes of family migration (e.g., quality of life, caring, family forming, marriage). At the same time, there have been limited empirical explorations of *how* and *why* family migration unfolds, or the subjective dimensions which underpin the decision to move the family unit.

This longstanding perspective is tied to an epistemological and methodological engagement, with many scholars of family migration drawing upon the tenets of positivism. As a result, researchers of family migration have tended to adopt quantitative research methods, particularly statistical modeling, and utilize large scale aggregated data sets to test hypotheses about the general patterns and trends of family migration (Smith 2004). Indeed, during the 1970s and 1980s there were a number of defining hallmarks associated with studies of family migration. First, one of the major conventions was to view labor motivations as the primary stimulus of family migration. To investigate this dimension hypotheses were often constructed from the theoretical models of neoclassical economics, and the a priori behavior of economic rational actors (see Bailey & Boyle 2004). Second, there was an underlying assumption that family migration is triggered when the movement of the family unit yields an increase in total family income, irrespective of the impacts on the employment earnings or career aspirations of individuals

within the family. Third, family migration was often viewed as being induced by the male partner, in order to enhance his career development. This normalization of family life and behavior is clearly influenced by the taken for granted model of the traditional “male breadwinner/female homemaker” couple. Many early studies therefore asserted that the employment aspirations of female partners are often “sacrificed” (i.e., unemployment or economic inactivity) or “satisfied” (i.e., part time employment) following the movement of the family. Such a disenfranchisement of female partners within the labor market is borne out by the widely used terms “female tied migrant” and the “trailing spouse.” Importantly, since the early 1990s this treatment of family migration has been widely critiqued, and theorizations and conceptualizations of family migration have shifted in three important, and interconnected, directions.

First, within quantitative studies of family migration there has been a more critical thinking to the ways in which family migrants are conceptualized and categorized. Traditionally, and tied to the limitations of data sets, analyses of family migration were predominantly based on aggregations of family migrants, with family migrants generally treated as “homogeneous lumps.” With this in mind, some recent studies have constructed more nuanced categorizations of family migrants, which are more sensitive to intra familial differences and diversity. One example is Boyle et al.’s (2002) use of microdata from the 1990 US and 1991 UK Census to reconstruct family units by linking together male and female partners. This technique allows an examination of the relational characteristics between migrant partners, and a consideration of the effects of different family and household arrangements and relations. In addition, early studies of family migration tended to focus on wholly moving family units (i.e., male and female partners moving together), which implicitly treats family migration as a simplistic “neat” event.

Understandings of the links between family migration and processes of family and household formation were therefore, until recently, extremely limited (Smith 2004). This point is integral to Smith and Bailey’s (2006) manipulation of UK Census microdata to explore how

migrant families use different strategies which involves partners joining or moving together, and how these different strategies influence the post migration labor market status of both partners. Moreover, the above studies clearly adhere to Halfacree's (2001) call for scholars to be more reflexive when establishing taxonomic classifications of family migrants.

Second, ideas from social theory are now more fully embraced by scholars of family migration. One fruitful development has been a more critical perspective of the gendered dimensions of family migration, linked to critiques of the substantive relevance of human capital hypotheses to explain tied migration. A pioneering work here is Halfacree's (1995) commentary of how and why female tied migrants are, in part, reproduced through the "structuration of patriarchy." This structuralist reading of family migration explicitly draws upon the writings of Anthony Giddens and Sylvia Walby, and demonstrates how the orientations of family migration can be usefully informed by wider social theories. In a similar vein, other recent studies have provided insights of the ways in which diverse familial arrangements and relations mediate family migration. Important accounts include Cooke's (2001) investigation of the effects of the onset of parenting and childrearing, and the presence and different numbers of dependent children; Bailey et al.'s (2004) assessment of how childcare and the care of elderly family members allow and constrain family migration; and Bonney et al.'s (1999) examination of the implications of marriage events and the rise of cohabitation on family migration. All of these studies incorporate a deeper level analysis of the impacts of gendered power relations, and gender role ideology and task allocation on family migration decision making and behavior.

A third development, and linked to the above, has been the implementation of post positivist, inductive approaches within studies of family migration. Recent theory building endeavors have involved the use of in depth, qualitative research methods and the gathering of rich qualitative data to tease out the decision making processes and behavior of family migrants. In the British context, for example, Hardill et al. (1997) and Green (1997) utilize

biographical methods to explore the complex intra familial negotiations, compromises, and tradeoffs which take place between male and female partners within dual career couples. These studies draw attention to the importance of non economic and cultural concerns (e.g., locational and residential preferences) within family migration decision making processes, particularly quality of life aspirations, and stress that family migration is not always motivated by labor related issues. In doing so, recent qualitative studies also reveal that family migration is not a straightforward, neat event. Rather, family migration is identified as a complex and experiential process, which involves many compromises, stresses, and anxieties for family members. One particular benefit of such qualitative research is that it is possible to more accurately assess changes in the pre and post migration status of family migrants, therefore providing a precise understanding of the effects of family migration when compared to quantitative studies using cross sectional data sets (e.g., US and UK Censuses).

The above three interconnected developments have undoubtedly enabled scholars to capture the diversity of the processes and effects of family migration. However, one general commonality between recent findings is that family migration often has a negative impact on women's labor market status. On the whole, the female tied migrant thesis is reaffirmed by recent studies; although it is important to note that many of the interpretations are based on short term measures (i.e., within one year of move) of post migration labor market participation. Indeed, in a cross national study of the effects of subnational family migration on the labor market status of female partners in the US and UK, Boyle et al. (2002) reveal that the socioeconomic effects are remarkably similar for women in both contexts, despite major institutional and ideological differences. Likewise, studies in the Netherlands and Sweden point to family migration having a negative effect on women's labor market status. It would appear, therefore, that despite rising levels of female employment in Europe and North America, family migration continues to be detrimental to women's labor market participation.

Nevertheless, some recent studies disrupt the tied migrant thesis, and have demonstrated that geographical contingencies (e.g., labor market opportunities, childcare support, public transportation) have a major impact on post migration labor market status of male and female partners. For example, Cooke and Bailey (1996) show that long distance migration can have a positive effect on female labor market status in some contexts within the US. It is contended that this positive effect is tied to family migrants moving into economic growth areas. Importantly, this interpretation overlaps with other migration studies which have examined links between rising female occupational status and movement into specific locations, such as Fielding's (1992) conceptualization of London and the southeast of England as an "escalator" region. In essence, these studies beg questions of the wider geographic pertinence of the tied migrant thesis.

Overall, the shifting treatment of family migration since the early 1990s has stimulated a vibrant interdisciplinary research agenda, with scholars now posing a broader range of research questions to investigate the diversity of family migration. This includes a richer appreciation of the influence of sociospatial contingencies on processes and outcomes of family migration. Tied to this is a growing interest with the ways in which family formations, ethnicity, race, age, life course, sexuality, class, and culture cross cut with different expressions of family migration. Another useful entry point for future research is the inclusion of other types of family structure, such as lone parent, single adult, multi person, and same sex couples within analyses of family migration, and the need to transcend the considerable focus on heterosexual nuclear families.

SEE ALSO: Immigrant Families; Migration: International; Migration and the Labor Force

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family planning, abortion, and reproductive health

Ann E. Biddlecom

Many societies have made the transition from high mortality and large family sizes to settings where most children survive, small families are desired, and most people control their fertility. In the early 1960s, the average woman could expect to have almost five children over her life, but now she can expect to have fewer than three children. The conscious use of contraception and abortion to control fertility thus assumes paramount importance in explaining basic aspects of contemporary human society. However, substantial differences exist in fertility and contraceptive levels and access to services between developed and developing regions of the world. For example, while in more developed regions women now have fewer than two children on average and nearly 7 in 10 women in marital or consensual unions use contraceptives (mainly sterilization, the pill, or the male condom), women in Africa have about five children on average and fewer than 3 in 10 women in marital or consensual unions use contraceptives (mainly the pill, injectables, and implants) (United Nations 2004). Other factors such as social structure, culture, gender relations, and economic opportunities also contribute to these regional differences.

The area of sexual and reproductive health is broad and encompasses *sexual behavior* (as it relates to marriage, pregnancy, and fertility; adolescents' sexual activity; and risky sexual behaviors that can lead to unintended pregnancy, sexually transmitted infections (STIs) and the human immunodeficiency virus (HIV)); *STIs and other reproductive tract infections* (the prevention, diagnosis, and treatment of these infections); *contraceptive use* (measuring the demand for and effective use of contraceptive methods, reasons for non use, and method choice and discontinuation); *abortion* (levels of and access to abortion, unsafe abortion and its consequences, and post abortion care); *reproductive morbidities* (e.g., infertility and

reproductive cancers, obstetric fistula, and consequences of female genital cutting); *contraceptive and abortion technology* (the feasibility, acceptability, and demand for new methods such as medical abortion, female condoms, microbicides, and various male contraceptive methods); *family planning related information and education* (including sex education in schools and condom promotion); and *reproductive health care* (e.g., financing, access to, and quality of reproductive health care and its effects on reproductive outcomes). Studies tend to have close ties to health policies and programs and focus on levels, determinants, and consequences of family planning, abortion, and sexual and reproductive health related problems. Sources of evidence have changed immensely over time, moving from a heavy reliance on indirect estimates based on census data to population based surveys (from the 1970s onward) and clinic based studies to the use of qualitative evidence (from the 1990s onward), mainly from focus group discussions, in depth interviews, and ethnographies.

Research and public policy emphases up until the early 1990s were grounded in arguments for reducing population growth, and the areas of abortion and reproductive health were not very visible. The 1994 International Conference on Population and Development (ICPD) in Cairo, Egypt, and its final document, the Program of Action, shifted the focus from overpopulation concerns and demographic targets to an emphasis on reproductive rights. An example of this shift is reflected in the increasing use of the concept of "unmet need for family planning," which includes both contraceptive behavior and fertility preferences and reflects the situation of individuals who want to avoid or delay a birth but who are not using any method of contraception, as a justification for and indicator of family planning program efforts and needs (Casterline & Sinding 2000). Understanding why people are in this apparently paradoxical situation and how best to meet their contraceptive needs adheres to the overall approach of satisfying individual reproductive choice rather than meeting national targets. Recent studies point to lack of knowledge about contraceptive methods, social opposition to contraceptive use, and concerns about health side effects as important reasons for why

women and men do not use contraceptives though they want to delay or avoid pregnancy (Casterline & Sinding 2000).

The ICPD conference also expanded sexual and reproductive health to encompass a broad set of issues beyond family planning, such as women's rights to control their sexuality. Subsequent policymaking, advocacy, and scholarship turned to gender inequities that affect key determinants of sexual and reproductive health. The often unstated assumption that women hold full decision making power over their health has been supplanted by research on the influence of spouses, parents, and peers, gender based power and violence in sexual relationships, women's status and access to resources, and neighborhood and community level characteristics. For example, while a community based family planning program in Ghana led to increased contraceptive use, there were related strains in gender relations in the communities and fears among women of beatings by their husbands if they used contraceptives (Bawah et al. 1999). There is also increased attention to how voluntary sexual intercourse is, especially for young women, and the implications of these findings for women's rights as well as sexual and reproductive health. Several studies in developed and developing countries show evidence that women who experience sexual or physical abuse (in childhood or in relationships as adults) are also more likely to experience STIs, pelvic inflammatory disease, and unwanted fertility (Jejeebhoy & Koenig 2003).

Broadening the interpretation of reproductive health to include more than family planning has been supported by the dramatic spread of HIV/AIDS since the 1980s. The epidemic has spurred research on male condom use for HIV and STI prevention, including investigations of the barriers to consistent and correct use of condoms and women's difficulties in negotiating condom use, and has legitimated the study of sexual behavior as it relates to sexual and reproductive health. Issues that continue to plague researchers and program planners alike include the difficulty of increasing condom use (especially within marriage), how protection from disease is reconciled with planning births, and how the nature of reproductive decision making has changed in the

context of HIV/AIDS, especially for people who are HIV positive.

Historically, women's experiences dominated research studies and data on family planning, abortion, and reproductive health, since women were deemed more accurate reporters of reproductive events and perceived as the people "at risk." Many data collection efforts in the 1960s were limited to married women and then expanded in the 1970s, and later in some regions, to include unmarried women. Evidence on men's sexual and reproductive health is mainly from the 1990s and 2000s. A recent worldwide study documented that men are involved in family planning decisions – many have discussed family planning with their partners and used methods to space or limit births – and many men who have an STI say they have informed their partners of the infection or have sought treatment (Alan Guttmacher Institute 2003). Nevertheless, established family planning and reproductive health care services are much better developed for women in most countries (though there are still subgroups of women who are underserved) than for men.

Recent research incorporates men's views and experiences by studying couples and their reproductive behaviors. Studies of couples reflect the broader social context in which decisions like contraceptive use are made, and evidence shows that partners have significant influence over one another's contraceptive behavior via their individual fertility preferences and approval of and communication about family planning. Couple studies have tended to focus on contraceptive use (including condom use for preventing STIs), and much less on abortion or other sexual and reproductive health outcomes. One methodological challenge which arises is when partners have different reports of the same behavior. For example, men have been shown to report much higher levels of condom use than do women, both in the aggregate and within couples.

Abortion remains one of the more difficult topics to study despite its widespread practice – estimates suggest that about one quarter of pregnancies worldwide end in abortion – because of the moral arguments surrounding abortion, the criminalization of the practice in many countries, and the clandestine nature of abortion for many women and abortion

providers. Measuring the extent of abortion and abortion related complications, particularly in countries where abortion is illegal and records are not maintained at health facilities, is critical to understanding the magnitude of the public health impact of abortion. Methods to measure the prevalence of abortion include records from registration systems (based on reports from hospitals, clinics, and private doctors), surveys of abortion providers, and surveys of women in the community. Other techniques, such as third party reports, where women report on abortions they know other women in the community or in their social networks have had, have also been used. Most evidence is on the level of abortion and much less on reasons why women obtain abortions and the social, health, and economic consequences of unsafe abortion. Monitoring changes in public opinion toward abortion, especially the conditions under which it should be legal, is also important given links between popular acceptance of abortion and the politics of its legal status. Yet even abortion attitudes are difficult to measure; for example, more people in the United States agree that abortion should be legal for any reason when a survey question specifies a first trimester pregnancy than when no pregnancy gestation is stated (Bumpass 1999).

With the continued decline of fertility world wide, persistent inequities in sexual and reproductive health (including access to services), and the spread of HIV/AIDS, questions about the ways that women and men – as individuals and as partners in sexual relationships – can better achieve their childbearing desires and protect their sexual and reproductive health become increasingly important to address. Future directions for social research will include a focus on the contextual factors that shape individuals' use of contraception, abortion, and reproductive health services; the continued inclusion of men in analyses of sexual and reproductive health; understanding the barriers to effective contraceptive use; ways to increase the dual use of contraceptive methods for pregnancy and STI prevention; the conditions under which risky or coercive sex occurs; greater attention to sexual and reproductive decision making; and new techniques to improve reporting of sexual behavior and abortion.

SEE ALSO: Abortion as a Social Problem; Fertility: Adolescent; Fertility: Nonmarital; Fertility and Public Policy; HIV/AIDS and Population; Infant, Child, and Maternal Health and Mortality; Infertility; New Reproductive Technologies

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family poverty

Mark R. Rank

Family poverty generally refers to households lacking a minimum amount of income. However, specific definitions and measurements of poverty vary widely across countries. In the US, family poverty is officially measured in terms of whether various sized households fall below specific annual income levels. In Europe, poverty is frequently defined as residing in a household that falls below one half of the national median income. In developing countries the standard is often that of living in a family earning less than a dollar a day. The underlying concept behind all of these approaches is that there is a basic minimum amount of income necessary in order for families to carry on their day to day activities adequately. Families that fail to acquire such income are considered poor.

The social scientific study of family poverty dates back to the turn of the twentieth century with Seebohm Rowntree's study of 11,560 working class families in the English city of York. Rowntree's research indicated that working class families were more likely to experience poverty at certain stages in the family life cycle during which they were particularly economically vulnerable (e.g., the period of starting a new family and during retirement). Since that time, social scientists have been interested in family poverty for at least three major reasons. First, there has been a longstanding concern regarding the role that families play in the intergenerational transmission of poverty. Second, there is considerable interest in the importance of family structure as a causal factor leading to poverty, and in particular, understanding the relationship between single parent families and the risk of poverty. A third line of research has examined the detrimental effects

that poverty exerts upon family functioning and development. In each case, much of the social scientific research on poverty has taken place in the developed world, particularly within the US.

Early work addressing family poverty frequently assumed that poverty was chronic and handed down from generation to generation. One longstanding argument to explain this pattern was that it resulted from the larger economic reproduction of social class. Families with few resources are unable to provide their offspring with the types of advantages necessary for getting ahead economically, resulting in a perpetuation of poverty from one generation to the next. Recent economic and sociological work in this area has shown a strong correlation between parents' and children's socioeconomic status.

An important variation of this perspective was the culture of poverty framework derived from the ethnographic work of Oscar Lewis in the 1950s and 1960s. Lewis studied lower class Mexican and Puerto Rican families residing in slum communities in both New York and Puerto Rico. He argued that chronic high unemployment and underemployment, coupled with little opportunity for upward mobility, led to what he called a culture of poverty. Such a culture was most likely to arise in economically depressed and isolated areas such as urban inner cities or remote rural areas. The culture provided families with a means for coping with their poverty. Traits include a present time orientation, strong networks of kinship ties, and an unwillingness to delay gratification. These traits were then passed on from parents to children, contributing to an intergenerational transmission of poverty. Lewis wrote: "it is both an adaptation and a reaction of the poor to their marginal position in a class stratified, highly individuated capitalistic society . . . Once the culture of poverty has come into existence it tends to perpetuate itself" (Lewis 1966: 22). While such a culture allows families to better cope with their environment, it also makes it more difficult for them and their children to break out of poverty.

Although Lewis stressed that only approximately 20 percent of US poor families fell into such a culture of poverty, those who utilized this perspective during the 1960s and 1970s

often linked the majority of families in poverty with a culture of poverty. In particular, it was closely associated with poverty among African American families. The culture of poverty perspective also exerted a significant effect on the social policy of the US in the 1960s. Policy initiatives and programs arising out of the War on Poverty such as the Moynihan report, Head Start, and community action were all influenced by this perspective. In addition, popular books such as Michael Harrington's *The Other America* (1962) were strongly influenced by the culture of poverty framework.

With the advent of several large, longitudinal data sets such as the Panel Study of Income Dynamics (PSID) and the National Longitudinal Survey of Youth (NLSY) in the late 1960s and 1970s, the assumption that family poverty was chronic, longlasting, and intergenerational could be empirically examined. Of particular significance was the 1984 book by Greg Duncan entitled *Years of Poverty, Years of Plenty*. Using 10 years of the PSID data, Duncan demonstrated that family poverty was to a large extent episodic rather than chronic. The typical pattern was that households were impoverished for one or two years and then managed to get above the poverty line, perhaps experiencing an additional spell of poverty at some later point in their lives. This and other longitudinal work showed a much more fluid and dynamic picture of family poverty than had frequently been assumed. Duncan and others also demonstrated that one of the critical factors leading households into poverty was family dissolution and the formation of single parent (generally female headed) families.

The rise of female headed families with children during the last third of the twentieth century (fueled by the high rate of divorce and an increasing number of out of wedlock births) became a major area of research among US sociologists and social scientists studying the patterns and causes of poverty. The popularity of the term *the feminization of poverty*, coined by Diana Pierce, illustrated the emphasis in the 1980s and 1990s of looking at gender and family structure as important factors leading to poverty. A large volume of research demonstrated that female headed families with children were at a significant risk of encountering poverty and economic destitution. Various

studies showed that following a divorce, the standard of living for women and their children declined sharply. Many women worked at lower paying jobs and lacked child support payments. The result was that female headed families with children had a substantially higher rate of poverty than other types of families, and experienced poverty for longer periods of time.

Of particular importance to the area of single parent families and poverty has been the work of William Julius Wilson. In both of his two major books, *The Truly Disadvantaged* (1987) and *When Work Disappears* (1996), Wilson focused on the deteriorating conditions of inner city minority families in Chicago. Somewhat along the lines of Oscar Lewis, he argued that declining economic opportunities in central cities have led to the breakdown of the family and to the rise of poverty. In particular, Wilson notes there has been a decreasing number of employable men in central cities, resulting in greater numbers of female headed families with children. Such families, in turn, are at a heightened risk of long term poverty.

These and other research findings spotlighting the significance of family structure have led to an academic and political debate regarding the importance of encouraging marriage as a strategy for alleviating family poverty. Recent welfare reform legislation in the US has placed a strong emphasis on policies and programs to encourage marriage and to discourage out of wedlock births. Others have argued that a more reasonable and effective policy approach is to provide the supports necessary for all families and children to succeed, not just those in married couple families.

A third research emphasis within the area of family poverty has been to examine the independent effect that poverty has upon family development and functioning. This body of research has shown that poverty influences family functioning in a variety of ways. Poverty exerts a profound influence upon the health and development of family members. Poverty is associated with a host of health risks, including elevated rates of heart disease, diabetes, hypertension, cancer, infant mortality, malnutrition, mental illness, and a variety of other diseases. The result is that family members living in poverty have significantly higher

mortality rates and shorter life expectancies than the non poor. Furthermore, poor infants and young children are likely to have far lower levels of physical and mental growth (as measured in a variety of ways) than their non poor counterparts. Both the duration and the depth of poverty intensify these negative outcomes. The result is that poverty can have longlasting physical and mental consequences as children become adults.

Research has also demonstrated that poverty affects family structure and functioning. First, the likelihood of marriage is substantially reduced among the poverty stricken. Second, women at lower income and educational levels tend to have children at earlier ages and are more likely to bear children out of wedlock. Third, several ethnographic studies have indicated that the poor are more likely to use a larger network of kinship than the non poor to exchange resources and services. Fourth, poverty and lower income are associated with greater levels of marital stress, dissatisfaction, and dissolution. Fifth, higher levels of domestic violence tend to be found within poverty stricken households. In each of these cases, the economic stress caused by poverty is hypothesized as an important factor behind these associations.

In addition to the direct effects on the family, researchers have also examined the effect that high rates of neighborhood poverty have on the viability of the community, which in turn influences the viability of the family. Major research areas include the relationships between neighborhood poverty and elevated rates of crime, neighborhood poverty and declining social capital, and neighborhood poverty and the increasing risk of environmental pollution and hazards. Each of these in turn have been shown to have a detrimental effect on the health and functioning of low income families residing in impoverished neighborhoods.

Finally, recent work has examined the wider effects of family poverty upon society at large. Mark Robert Rank's book *One Nation, Underprivileged* (2004) illustrates the connections between family poverty and a host of societal problems and issues. This body of work has also documented the widespread risk of family poverty and economic vulnerability for the population as a whole. Between the ages of

20 and 75, approximately three quarters of Americans will reside in a household that experiences poverty or near poverty for at least one year. Research in European countries has also begun to demonstrate the prevalent nature of families experiencing poverty at some point during the life course.

SEE ALSO: Children and Divorce; Culture of Poverty; Family Structure and Poverty; Feminization of Poverty; Lone Parent Families; Poverty; Welfare Dependency and Welfare Underuse

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family, sociology of

Joel Powell and Karen Branden

Sociology of family is the area devoted to the study of family as an institution central to social life. The basic assumptions of the area include

the universality of family, the inevitable variation of family forms, and the necessity of family for integrating individuals into social worlds. Family sociology is generally concerned with the formation, maintenance, growth, and dissolution of kinship ties and is commonly expressed in research on courtship and marriage, childrearing, marital adjustment, and divorce. These areas of research expanded in the twentieth century to encompass an endless diversity of topics related to gender, sexuality, intimacy, affection, and anything that can be considered to be family related.

A recognizable, modern sociology of family emerged from several different family studies efforts of the nineteenth century. Early anthropologists speculated that family was a necessary step from savagery to civilization in human evolution. Concentrating on marital regulation of sexual encounters, and debating matriarchy versus patriarchy as the first enduring family forms, these explanations framed family studies in terms of kinship and defined comprehensive categories of family relations. In consideration of endogamy, exogamy, polygamy, polyandry, and monogamy, these efforts also fostered discussion of the best or most evolved family forms, with most commentators settling on patriarchy and monogamy as the high points of family evolution.

Nineteenth century sociologists such as Herbert Spencer and William Sumner adopted evolutionary views of family and made use of anthropological terms, but discussions of best family types gave way to considering the customs, conventions, and traditions of family life. The evolutionary view of family pushed sociology toward the pragmatic vision of the family as adaptable to surrounding social conditions. And sociology's emphases on populations, societies, and the institutions embedded within them allowed the observation that American and European families were rapidly changing in response to the challenges of modern society.

Another important development in early family sociology resulted from the growing distinction of sociology from religion, charity, and activism. Commentaries of the middle and late nineteenth century warned urgently of the social problems of divorce and abandonment – citing individualism, easy morals, and lax divorce laws for a breakdown of family. Family

advocates saw such decline as a sure cause of more social calamities and sought reliable social data and solutions. While sociologists of the day were concerned with social pathologies, they were also working to establish sociology as an objective, scientific discipline. Scientific work on family issues specifically had already been completed. Shortly after the US Census Bureau published a report on marriage and divorce statistics in 1889, Walter Willcox completed *The Divorce Problem: A Study in Statistics* (1891). This study presented the family as a strong, flexible institution, and linked divorce to social conditions. Casting family change as a dependent variable and subjecting divorce to demographic analysis were two strong indicators of an emerging science of family that would be relatively independent from moral concerns. This type of analysis also satisfied scientific urges to predict and explain.

Interest in the properties of family as an institution, and the incidental necessity of describing family for other sociological work, contributed to the development of scientific, sociological approaches as well. This was shown in the breadth and scope of Thomas and Znaniecki's *The Polish Peasant in Europe and America* (1929). The family as a socializing agency, the pressures of urbanization and industrialization on family, the effects of immigration, and the problems of migration from rural to urban life were all addressed in *The Polish Peasant*. Thomas and Znaniecki cast the Polish immigrant family as an object for neutral sociological analysis and examined the effects of rapid change and disorganization on the integrity of the family. In these ways the family was revealed as an institution situated in society and subject to social influences.

During the first two decades of the twentieth century, sociological study was seldom devoted exclusively to family. The family as a topic in its own right was still most often the province of social workers concerned with social problems and therapeutic issues. Still, these interests overlapped with sociological concerns about social pathologies and helped to maintain general, academic interest in a scientific sociology of family. In the 1920s the landmark accomplishments for sociology of family included the first American Sociological Association sessions on family and the development

of a section on family in the journal *Social Forces*. At the University of Chicago, Ernest Burgess elaborated the properties of family as a collection of interacting individuals, and encouraged a commitment to prediction and explanation in all of sociology including the area of family. This further distinguished sociological family research from the concerns of activists and social workers, and by the end of the decade a fully formed, scientific sociology of family was visible in textbooks, classrooms, and scholarly journals.

During the institution building phase (Maines 2001) of sociology up to World War II, sociology was empirical, quantitative, and theoretical. Family sociology was compatible with abiding, understandable variables in sociology such as race, class, and religion, and topics associated with family sociology multiplied rapidly in the 1930s, 1940s, and 1950s. Sociological research on family investigated rural, urban, and black families, explored the impact of the Depression, observed the migration of families from the country to the city, and described the characteristics of single parent families. Much of this work presented families in structure and process (as in the roles of grandparents and the process of grand parenting), types of families (like military families), internal dynamics such as decision making or emotional conflict, or basic life processes such as housing and employment. Many more topics were developing, of course, and research continued on the topics that had come to represent family sociology – courtship, marriage, socialization, and divorce. Family sociology grew to be among the largest specialty areas of the discipline during the middle decades of the twentieth century. It was a robust and diverse area. Family sociology also became historical in its orientation to changes, trends, and patterns over time. For example, researchers noted a constant increase in the percentage of marriages ending in divorce and linked the increases to changes in economy, law, and the changing roles of women who were entering the workforce in increasing numbers. Family sociology was comparative within and between cultures. It compared families by race, geography, income, and occupation in the United States, and as the sociological community became more global, American sociologists

conducted more international family comparisons and American journals published significant international work. As was much of American sociology at mid century, family was relentlessly empirical, demographic, and quantitative. The known and understood areas of family such as marriage, fertility, and divorce were particularly amenable to statistical analysis.

Although the popularity of family sociology was represented in a large body of empirical research, the theoretical contributions of family sociologists were relatively narrow. The commitment to an explanatory and predictive family sociology first expressed by Burgess came to be represented by a sociology of straightforward, testable propositions and quantitative descriptions of phenomena. For example, family sociologists might be interested in measuring the effects of divorce on the school performance of children, determining the influence of birth order on personality, or collecting the personal traits of the ideal mate. Family theory aimed at phenomena no more general than family roles, organization, life cycles, and the like. While theoretical work tended to be topic specific, and did not offer refinements to established sociological perspectives, it was also evident that family sociology was relatively free of the intellectual directives of major schools. Attempts to show how family sociology should be framed by theory were rare; so much so that a 1979 collection by Burr and his associates is still considered particularly noteworthy. Family sociology rather kept pace with advances in descriptive and inferential statistics. Researchers produced thousands of journal articles from the 1950s through the 1980s that were increasingly data driven and quantitative. Half of all articles in the *Journal of Marriage and Family* were empirical by the end of the 1970s. By the end of the 1980s, 90 percent of *Journal of Marriage and the Family* articles were empirical (Adams 1988).

Because research and commentary in family sociology are guided more often by topical interests than by gaps in theory, family has been one of the most fluid and open areas of sociology. The open quality of family sociology has widened the array of staple topics to include cohabitation, childlessness, and extra marital sex, to name only a few, and family is clearly among the most responsive specialties to

popular and political issues. In the 1980s this was already apparent in the frequency of research enterprises related to policy. Responding to conservative shifts in fiscal politics, family sociologists in the US conducted extensive research on the impact of changes in welfare, Medicaid and Medicare, and Aid to Families with Dependent Children (AFDC). Family planning, contraception, and abortion policies also received attention during the 1980s in a time of a perceived reactionary cultural climate. This attention has persisted as private sector funding sources reevaluate their support for family planning agencies, state legislatures tighten abortion restrictions, and contraceptive technologies advance. Real and proposed changes in social security in the late twentieth century have pushed policy research on aging families. Government and business practices associated with a globalizing economy have been scrutinized in recent years. In these and other areas, family sociologists have explored reciprocal effects of family and family policy, considering how changes in family behavior have influenced policies, and how policy changes have affected different types of families.

The large balance of sociological research on family is still as insulated as most professional intellectual activity, and concentrates on issues primarily of interest to scholars. But the policy and issue discussions of the 1980s reflected deeper cultural and political divides that did become important to public presentations of contemporary family sociology. In the most accessible venues of classrooms, texts, trade books, periodicals, and weblogs, family sociologists have slipped into debunking roles in responding to popular social criticism or common myths and misunderstandings. Typically this involves minor factual correctives that address sensational but accepted media narratives – there is not an epidemic of teen pregnancy (rates continue to decrease), there is no precipitous decline in US households with children, but slow changes related to delayed marriage, low unemployment, and an aging population. More often family sociologists address diffuse, popular anxiety about the family in “decline,” in “crisis,” or the “breakdown” of the family. The common view of divorce rates as an indicator of family decline

can be addressed by historical analysis of changing divorce laws, the relative marital satisfaction of modern couples, the desire for marriage expressed by the overwhelming majority of young people, the blending of families after divorce, or the abiding interest in their children shared by divorced parents. Common concerns about the negative effects on children and marriage of two career families are countered by an examination of the benefits – more income, less stress, healthier and happier women, and men more engaged with their children. What is brought to the public from family sociology is the established and unified view that the family is a tough, flexible institution that is constantly in transition, and that decline and crisis are critical evaluations rather than scientific conclusions.

In recent years family sociologists seem especially sensitive to national discussions of family issues. Family research and commentary often amplify political rhetoric, and scientific findings are obscured by political debate. Moreover, well funded moral entrepreneurs (Becker 1973) have adopted nomenclatures and trapings that ape the process of peer reviewed science. Clinicians and academics from a variety of disciplines founded the Council on Contemporary Families in 1996 specifically to bring accurate information about family research to the public. The foundational assumption of the Council is that shifts in family life are best met with investigations of underlying causes rather than moralizing discourse. Though a decidedly progressive organization, its stance against the framework of families in decline because of selfishness and immorality is within the mainstream of sociological thought.

If family sociology were more visible to the lay public, its basic assumptions would be recognized as politically liberal and culturally progressive. This is nowhere more apparent than in the passionate inclusiveness of sociological definitions of family. Having established the perspective that family is plastic and resilient, rather than fixed and vulnerable, sociology necessarily accounts for families in all of their emergent forms. This standpoint was manageable for a twentieth century sociology that had variations of the two parent household as its units of analysis. Now, along with single parent families, extended families, stepfamilies,

and blended families, contemporary family sociology accounts for gay and lesbian families. That gay and lesbian relationships are accorded the family label attests to the non judgmental attitude popularly associated with liberal thinking. Invocations of family in political debate reveal the deep understanding that most people belong to families and hold cherished values associated with family life. And family sociologists commonly observe that everyone who has been in a family is somewhat expert in family sociology. However, in its refusal to find an ideal family form and the causes of family decline, family sociology departs from this commonsense expertise. This is the scientific quality of family sociology. It will remain topical, comparative, and empirical, but the politics and rhetoric of family will increasingly frame its issues.

SEE ALSO: Divorce; Family Demography; Family Diversity; Family, History of; Family Structure; Family Theory; Kinship; Lesbian and Gay Families; Marriage; Socialization

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family structure

Graham Allan

Within any society there are more or less common ways of “doing” family relationships. That is, there are ways of organizing family relationships which are broadly accepted as appropriate and given legitimacy in that society. This does not mean that all family relationships are similar or that all follow the same societally imposed “rules.” There are always variations, exceptions, and alternative practices. Moreover, the more complex and diverse the society, the more variation there will be in the family practices given legitimacy by different social groupings within it. Indeed, one aspect of different family systems is the social tolerance given to divergent patterns of family relationships. Nonetheless, it is useful, at least heuristically, to ask questions about the dominant family structures existing in different societies, in part to facilitate comparison and understand the variations that arise. The types of questions posed by sociologists concerned with family structures involve such issues as the distribution of power and authority within families; the patterns of solidarity and obligation that arise between different family members; and the differential access to resources that different family members have. A key prior question concerns the boundaries of family membership and belonging: Who is considered “family,” when, and for what purposes?

In examining family structure it is important to distinguish “family” from “household,”

though the two are frequently elided, a tendency which itself is indicative of contemporary understandings of family structure. Household structure refers to the demography of households, domestic living arrangements, and domestic economies. Family structure, on the other hand, is concerned with the organization of kin relationships, though part of this also concerns how domestic life is framed and the different roles and responsibilities that different family members have within this. Indeed, historically, many of the key debates in the early years of family sociology were integrally concerned with the types of household structure that predominated in different societies. In particular, debates about the transformations that industrial capitalism generated in family structures often reflected the changed household composition found in developing industrial urban areas, legitimately so as these demographic changes reflected different familial obligations and solidarities. Nonetheless, analytically it is important to recognize that family structure reflects more than just household structure.

This becomes of consequence in examining some of the key theoretical developments in family sociology in the mid part of the twentieth century. In these, the dominant model of change, expressed with greater or lesser subtlety, was one that highlighted the movement from an "extended family" system to a "nuclear family" – one of parents and dependent children. The most compelling and sophisticated account of this shift was produced by Parsons (1943), who argued the "structural isolation" of the nuclear (or in Parsons's terms, "conjugal") family was a dominant aspect of mid twentieth century American kinship. Parsons's starting point was that industrialization involved increased functional specialization. The family as a social institution was affected by this as much as any other institution. It too became more specialized, with its prime roles becoming the socialization of the young and the stabilization of adult personalities. The family structure that Parsons saw as most compatible with this was a nuclear family structure in which husbands and wives also had differentiated roles – employment for husbands and domestic responsibilities for wives. Parsons's argument was that within this family structure,

each individual's primary kinship responsibility was to the other members of his or her nuclear family. An advantage of this family structure for industrialized societies was that it facilitated geographical mobility, seen as essential for meeting the dynamic workforce requirements of a developed economy.

Parsons did not argue that other kinship responsibilities were of no consequence. Rather, he claimed these were secondary to the responsibilities individuals had to nuclear family members (Harris 1983). Nonetheless, other writers took issue with Parsons's work, arguing that kin outside the nuclear family remained significant in people's lives, especially parents, siblings, and (adult) children. This is undoubtedly so. Many studies in different developed societies have shown that kin outside the household are routinely drawn on to provide support, assistance, and companionship. At this level, it is evident that nuclear families are not *socially* isolated from other kin. However, this does not of itself contradict the argument that nuclear families are *structurally* isolated within economically developed societies. As noted, structural isolation refers to primacy of obligation rather than level of social contact, though clearly the two are not entirely discrete.

Other tendencies within contemporary family patterns also indicate the structural priority given to nuclear families. In particular, the increased emphasis placed on "the couple" reflects the centrality of nuclear families over wider kinship ties. The trend towards higher rates of marriage, and more youthful marriage, across much of the twentieth century is one indication of this, as is the growth in the number and variety of different experts and guides offering advice on how couples should best maintain and organize their relationships. At a cultural level, this clearly reflects the continuing shift from marriage as an institution to marriage as a relationship. Similarly, the emphasis placed on the rights and needs of children, the increased responsibilities of care, and the growth of child and adolescent centered markets highlights the level of priority given to dependent children within contemporary family systems. While recognizing the emotional and practical significance of some kin relationships outside the household, it is evident that in terms

of structural properties, the conjugal family continues to be prioritized.

However, recognizing this does not imply that family structure has been unaltered since the mid twentieth century when Parsons was writing. It very clearly has, throughout the developed world. Two aspects of this are particularly significant. First, the family structure characteristic of the mid twentieth century involved a very marked division of labor between spouses. Each spouse had their own sphere of responsibility and obligation: employment for husbands, childcare and domestic servicing for wives. While this gendered division of labor is still evident, it is not now as powerful as it previously was. Wives usually continue to carry primary responsibility for domestic organization and care within the family, but changes in employment patterns as well as the cultural impact of second wave feminism have reduced the level of their financial and social dependence on husbands. In this regard, while the distribution of responsibilities and obligations within families remains gendered, there is now somewhat less rigidity about this than there was throughout most of the twentieth century.

And just as there is now greater flexibility in the division of familial responsibilities, so too there is greater acceptance of diversity in other family practices. Patterns that were previously understood to be in some sense problematic, if not pathological, are now accepted as legitimate alternative family forms. The most obvious example here is lone parent families, which have increased dramatically since the early 1970s, but other examples include stepfamilies, cohabitation, and gay partnerships. Moreover, life course trajectories are now far more diverse than they were. With new forms of partnership, increasing levels of separation and divorce, and what can be termed "serial commitment" (i.e., committed relationships which may or may not involve marriage), the patterning of people's family lives over time has become increasingly variable. Indeed, there is now greater cultural uncertainty about who counts as "family." Think here of stepparents who may be household members but not necessarily regarded by stepchildren as family members; cohabiting heterosexual and gay partners where the commitment is comparatively recent; or even non custodial fathers where there has been no

relationship. In addition, with globalization, in most developed societies there is now also increased ethnic variation, which frequently entails diverse beliefs about the legitimacy of different family practices.

This greater diversity within the familial relationships people construct is a key characteristic of contemporary family structure in developed societies. It is linked to both the growth of individualization and an increasing recognition that sexual and domestic arrangements are matters of choice, and thus legitimately located within the private rather than the public sphere. However, it also makes the specification of family structure within contemporary developed societies more problematic. No single form of family organization or pattern of constructing familial relationships holds normatively or experientially in the way Parsons's nuclear family model did in the mid twentieth century. Yet accepting this diversity as a feature of contemporary family life, it is also clear that there are continuities and consistencies patterning the ways family members usually construct and negotiate their relationships. Three warrant highlighting. First, as noted above, gender remains a primary organizational principle within most families, in part as a consequence of gendered labor market realities. Second, in the main, people prioritize their commitment to their partner and dependent children above those to other family members, though this does not imply that relationships with these latter are necessarily inconsequential. Many studies have shown the reverse is true, with ties to parents and siblings in adulthood continuing to be significant in people's lives. And third, albeit with some ethnic diversity, love as a personal and emotional commitment is generally understood as the prime basis for contemporary partnership, whether or not this involves marriage. Conversely, the evident absence of emotional commitment within a partnership is accepted legally and culturally (in most instances) as a *prima facie* reason for ending the partnership.

SEE ALSO: Cohabitation; Divisions of Household Labor; Divorce; Family Diversity; Family Structure and Child Outcomes; Family Structure and Poverty; Households; Inequalities in Marriage; Kinship; Lone Parent Families; Marriage

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family structure and child outcomes

Susan M. Jekielek and Kristin A. Moore

The implications of family structure for child well being have been a central topic of research for several decades. In its simplest form, it is the comparison between two parent and one parent families that is the root of concern for child well being. Children who live with two married parents are defined in most government statistics as living in two parent families, whereas children who live with just one biological parent due to death, divorce, or having never married have been considered to live in single parent families. However, the issue is much more complex, and trends in family structure among American children over recent decades make it increasingly necessary to specify the biological and social relationships between children and the adults in their lives in order to understand the implications for child well being.

The most highly researched areas of child well being in the context of family structure

include socioemotional well being, such as aggressive behavior problems and emotional distress; academic outcomes, such as math and reading scores; economic well being, such as family poverty; and life course and intergenerational outcomes, such as low weight at birth, educational achievement, and offspring's own marital stability and quality in adulthood.

This entry focuses primarily on family structure and child well being in industrialized countries, and particularly in the US. The implications of family structure for children in other countries may differ to the extent that family and child policies also differ, cultural definitions of family differ, and the patterns of family structure differ, among other factors.

SOCIAL CONTEXT

Since the family is a primary setting for the care and socialization of children, it is of interest to both scholars and the general public that an increasing proportion of children have been growing up with a single parent, although this trend may be leveling off. In 1960, about 9 percent of all children lived in a single parent family in the US; this percentage was up to 28 percent in 2003, with 68 percent living in married parent families. Both estimates have remained within 2 percentage points in each year since 1994.

In the 1970s, divorce replaced parental death as the primary cause of single parent families. It is estimated that about four in ten children will eventually experience their parents' divorce. However, divorce is only one factor contributing to estimates that about half of all children are expected to reside with a single parent at some point during their childhood. More recently, the increased proportion of births to unmarried women has also contributed. In 1970, 11 percent of children were born to unmarried couples. By 2002, about one in three births occurred outside of marriage. Contrary to popular perceptions, teenagers account for less than three in ten nonmarital births, with women in their twenties accounting for more than half.

Of recent interest are nonmarital births of second or higher order parity. Only about half of all nonmarital births were first births in 1998. Between 1992 and 1995, more than one

in three nonmarital births to women aged 20 or older were preceded by a teenage birth. There is a growing recognition that multiple births to the same woman may not be births by the same father.

An unmarried parent is not necessarily a parent without a partner. In the early 1990s, 39 percent of all nonmarital births occurred to cohabiting couples, up from 29 percent ten years earlier. A national study places this at 51 percent, based on a survey of mothers who gave birth in large cities between 1998 and 2000. According to this survey (the Fragile Families Study), the majority of nonmarital births (82 percent) are to parents who are romantically involved at the time of birth, either in a cohabiting or a visiting relationship. All in all, about 40 percent of all children are expected to spend some portion of their childhoods living with cohabiting parents, and cohabitation has become an increasingly recognized family form.

Living in a stepfamily is also a common experience. About half of current marriages are actually a second or higher marriage for at least one of the spouses. About one in three children will spend some of their childhood living in a remarried or cohabiting stepfamily.

These social changes are also apparent in people's attitudes. Acceptance of cohabitation and nonmarital childbearing, as measured in public opinion surveys, has increased since the 1960s–1970s, although having a birth out of wedlock is still not viewed as a positive goal. This pattern is consistent with research that examines how single parent families are depicted in popular magazines. Portrayals of single parent families as unacceptable or negative for children have declined over time.

After decades of increase, accepting attitudes toward divorce have stabilized, although the plateau of acceptance is quite high. About four of every five young people believe that divorce is acceptable even if children are involved. At the same time, “having a good marriage and family life” was rated as extremely important to 81 percent of females and 72 percent of males who were high school seniors in 1997 and 1998.

A child's family structure is often viewed in terms of the child's connections to the parent figures in the household. It is notable, however, that 8 percent of all children resided with a

grandparent in 2002, most of whom were the heads of households.

IMPLICATIONS OF FAMILY STRUCTURE

For some, having children within marriage and preserving the sanctity of marriage are essential societal functions. Others argue for the importance of marriage based on research indicating that married adults tend to be wealthier, healthier, live longer, and have more social support than unmarried adults. Others argue that changes in family structure are inevitable and represent “new” family forms that are not necessarily inferior family forms for raising children. Still others take a policy perspective, arguing that reducing the number of single parent families would reduce the economic burden on the taxpayer, and this is a goal of current welfare reform law. Despite this disagreement, at the heart of these concerns, and cutting across many different perspectives, is the well being of children.

Research on family structure is consistent: the majority of children who are not raised by both biological parents manage to grow up without serious problems. Yet, on average, children in single parent families, children who experience divorce, and children who live in stepfamilies all experience worse outcomes, on average, compared with children who are brought up with both biological parents.

There are many possible explanations for these patterns. A stressful life events perspective posits that family structure transitions cause instability in family routines and therefore are detrimental to both parental and child well being. Indeed, multiple family transitions themselves increase a child's risk of negative outcomes. A parental absence perspective suggests that biological parents are the most likely to provide social and economic resources to their own children, and therefore the absence of a parent puts children at risk of diminished well being. A selection perspective suggests that the characteristics that predate family transitions are actually responsible for negative effects. An economic resources perspective would posit that children are at a greater risk of living in poverty and having poor outcomes

when they do not have access to two parents – in part due to the economies of scale involved in maintaining one household as compared to two.

Indeed, compared to children who live with two married parents, those whose parents divorce are more prone to academic and behavior problems, including depression, anti social behavior, impulsive/hyperactive behavior, academic achievement, and school behavior problems. Mental health problems linked to marital disruption have also been identified among young adults. These findings are consistent across many outcomes and many studies; however, there are also many caveats.

Advances in data collection, namely longitudinal surveys that collect data on the same children over multiple time points, have shown that many of the problems that are observed in children post divorce can actually be attributed to pre divorce factors – this is often referred to as selection bias. For example, parents with anti social personalities are more likely to both administer poor parenting and also divorce, and therefore the observed relationship between divorce and child well being is due, in part, to parental characteristics. Using longitudinal, national survey data, Andrew Cherlin and colleagues (1991) demonstrated that much of the difference in well being scores between children of divorced and intact families is apparent prior to the date of divorce.

Numerous studies indicate that parental conflict is detrimental to child well being, and a handful of studies measuring both divorce and marital quality have shown that children from high conflict families are better off on a number of outcomes when their parents divorce rather than remain married. However, it has been estimated that fewer divorces are preceded by high conflict than are preceded by low conflict. It is also noteworthy that the differences between children of divorced and intact couples, although arguably small at about one fifth of a standard deviation, tend to remain significant, even after accounting for important pre divorce factors. Further, due to the variability in the capacity of children and families to cope with divorce, this average “small” effect likely masks larger effects among certain subgroups of children.

An additional advance in research on children of divorce is the investigation of outcomes

that might occur later over the life course when they are adults. For example, research has shown that children whose parents divorce are more likely to experience divorce themselves as adults, to have increased marital problems and lower socioeconomic achievement, and to report poorer subjective well being.

Stepchildren also do not do as well, on average, as children living with both biological parents. A review of the literature suggests that, on average, stepchildren have lower grades and scores on achievement tests, and have greater internalizing and externalizing behavior problems. They fare worse in terms of dropout rates, school attendance, and high school or GED completion. Similar to explanations for the effects of divorce on children, researchers often posit that the stress of reorganizing as a stepfamily is an important reason for these differences. Children often move to new cities and possibly lower quality schools; children in stepfamilies have likely experienced a number of other family changes; and conflict might still exist between the child’s original two parents. In addition, children in stepfamilies are found to have less access to parental involvement than children living with two biological parents. Not only might a child’s biological parent be distracted and focus attention on her/his new spouse, but stepparents tend to spend less time with stepchildren than biological children, and relationships with absent biological parents, namely fathers, tend to diminish with time.

Children in single parent families are about twice as likely to have problems as children who live in intact families headed by two biological parents. Children born to unmarried mothers are more likely to be poor, to grow up in a single parent family, and to experience multiple living arrangements during childhood. These factors, in turn, are associated with lower educational attainment and a higher risk of teen and nonmarital childbearing.

It is important to note that the implications of single parent family structure can differ for children in other countries. For example, single parenthood has been found to be less detrimental for children’s academic achievement in countries where family policies equalize resources between single and two parent families.

CHANGES OVER TIME AND CONTEMPORARY RESEARCH ISSUES

The study of family structure and child outcomes has paralleled the changing demographic trends in children's families. Research has shifted from a focus on the effects of divorce on children to an increasing focus on the diversity of family structures, especially those other than the biological two parent family as a setting for bearing and raising children.

As described above, the majority of nonmarital births are to couples who are romantically involved at the time of the birth. While most unmarried couples have plans to stay together and get married around the time of the birth of their child, one year later only 9 percent were actually found to marry, while another 49 percent of parents continued to be romantically involved. In general, cohabiting relationships are more likely to break up than marriages. Parents of children in cohabiting unions typically have lower earnings, lower levels of education, higher rates of poverty, and elevated rates of incarceration, substance use, and domestic violence, compared with parents of children in married couple families. In addition, their children may not have full legal access to paternal resources. We would expect that these characteristics would undermine child well being compared with married parent families. On the other hand, cohabitation might incur greater economic resources for children than single parent families, but there is as yet little documentation of whether and how cohabitators share their resources. Overall, we know very little about actual child outcomes in relation to cohabitation, although a recent study documents significantly fewer behavior problems and greater school engagement among school age children living with two biological married parents compared to children living with two biological cohabiting parents.

As divorce has become more common, so has the study of how custody after divorce affects children. It is not clear whether joint physical custody of children is beneficial, and frequency of father visitation is not consistently linked with better child well being. While more work is needed, some research suggests that contact with a non resident father is beneficial when

conflict between parents is low or when the non resident father is warm but sets limits in his parenting.

Gay marriage and family life has received much attention, but research on gay families is still in development. Census questions in 1990 and 2000 included categories that made it possible for researchers to identify same and different sex couples in "marriage like" relationships, but even these are not direct measures, and the census data do not include child outcome assessments. It is rare for any national data set to collect information on gay couples, let alone match it to children in the household. Nonetheless, in the 2000 Census, approximately one third of female householders with same sex partners were living with their own children, and about one fifth of male householders with same sex partners were living with their own children. Marriage between same sex partners gained particular relevance in 2004 and attempts were made to confine marriage to heterosexual couples as a constitutional amendment. In terms of child development, rigorous research on representative samples is lacking.

METHODOLOGICAL ISSUES

There are at least three clear methodological issues in the study of how family structure affects child outcomes. First, addressing selection bias is perhaps the most critical issue. Longitudinal data are critical here.

A second critical methodological element is that when children experience one family structure outside of the traditional married two parent family, they typically experience multiple changes. Therefore, it becomes difficult to disentangle the effects of previous family transitions, such as divorce, from the effects of current family structure, such as a stepfamily.

Third, data quality has not "caught up" with the many different types of family structures in which children live. Knowing a mother's marital status is not enough information to determine whether she is living with her child's father, or whether all children in the household share the same father. It has become increasingly critical to understand the biological

connection of that child to the people in the household, as well as the marital status of that child's parents, and also the timing of parental marital/cohabiting/dating transitions. While this seems straightforward, there are very few data sets that collect such information (for an exception, see the Survey of Income and Program Participation), and it is even more of a rarity for child outcomes to be assessed in the same data source.

Further development is also necessary to accurately measure parental cohabitation. For example, couples who are living together do not necessarily identify with the terms "cohabiting" or "unmarried partner" on questionnaires.

FUTURE DIRECTIONS

The family context for childrearing in the US is changing. Significant proportions of children will spend time living in single parent families, families headed by cohabiting biological parents, or families headed by their biological parent and a cohabiting or married stepparent, and will experience transitions in their family structure in general.

With regard to child well being, it will be important to examine how cohabiting biological parents rear their children and how children in cohabiting families fare relative to others. A point of departure for this inquiry is to assume that cohabiting biological parents provide the same home environments for their children as married biological parents, but empirical evidence is not definitive with regard to this assumption. Empirical evidence is also lacking in regards to children whose parents may not reside together but remain romantically involved.

The past two decades of research have shown that there is diversity in how children adjust to divorce. Understanding the conditions under which children adjust poorly or successfully to divorce, and disruption in general, is an important next step. In the same vein, most research on the effects of family disruption examine potential *negative* effects. Qualitative research suggests that there also may be *positive* implications of divorce transitions. Systematically

testing this possibility could help inform the knowledge base of the conditions under which children might adjust well to family disruption.

While children in one parent families typically have fewer economic and social resources at their disposal than do children in two parent families, accumulating evidence warns that socioeconomic inequality for children in these two family structures is growing. This is due in part to the rise in dual earner families. For the sake of child well being, it will be important to monitor this trend.

Child outcomes with regard to the structure of siblings in the household are also likely to be a topic of continued research interest. Some research suggests that paternal investments in children may depend upon whether the children in his household are his own, his wife's, or a combination of both.

With federal funding targeted at experimental evaluations of interventions to improve the marital quality and stability of low income couples, a much anticipated topic of future research is whether an intervention can improve marital stability and quality among low income families. If such an intervention is successful at improving child well being, this would be a significant milestone. However, low income couples face many challenges to marital stability, such as inadequate employment and economic hardship. Further, most research showing evidence that couple interventions can affect relationship stability has been targeted towards white, middle class samples. The same is true for the development of marital quality measures. Therefore, a great deal of research is needed to answer the question of whether an intervention can improve marital stability and quality and enhance child well being in low income families.

Pregnancy intentions have been monitored for decades as indicators of control over fertility and the need for reproductive health services. Moreover, the implications for children of being mistimed or unwanted has received increased attention; but more work is needed. In addition, the effect of having unintended or unwanted pregnancies on marriage and family formation more generally, as well as on marital disruption or family disruption, needs further examination with data from males as well as

females. What are the implications of different levels of intendedness for each partner? How does pregnancy intendedness affect male commitment to their partner and investments in the child? Under what circumstances do unintended pregnancies undermine couple stability? Finally, there is a need for research on the implications of infertility and new fertility technologies for family formation and stability.

Long overlooked is systematic investigation of family processes and child well being in non white families. Studies in the past decade have made strides towards describing fathering and gender roles, particularly in African American and Hispanic families, and also describing how parenting is shaped by grandparents and neighborhood context. Further high quality longitudinal studies are needed, not only for high risk families of color, but also for families of color in general. Further highlighting the need to pay attention to race and ethnicity is the fact that immigrant children are the fastest growing segment of the child population, up by over 50 percent in the last decade.

SEE ALSO: Children and Divorce; Cohabitation; Family Demography; Family Structure and Poverty; Fertility: Nonmarital; Intimate Union Formation and Dissolution; Lesbian and Gay Families; Stepfamilies

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family structure and poverty

Daniel T. Lichter

Family structure and poverty are inextricably linked. Different types of families have much different risk profiles for poverty and welfare dependence. Family structure typically refers to the myriad organizational and compositional parts that make up the family. Among others, these include headship patterns (e.g., female headed families), the marital histories of family members (e.g., single or married or cohabiting), the presence of multiple generations, family size, and the presence of co residential children. These structural features of families (hence, family structure) reflect individual choices that are shaped by cultural values and norms, economic constraints, and demographic events, such as childbearing or death.

Data from the US Census Bureau highlight the strong statistical relationship between family structure and poverty in the United States. The poverty rate of female headed families with children was 35.5 percent in 2003, compared with 7.0 percent among their married couple counterparts. The Census Bureau defines poverty on the basis of absolute money income of all family members, i.e., whether annual family income falls below a specific poverty income threshold. Poverty thresholds vary by family size and other structural features of the family, such as the number of adults or children. In 2003, for example, the official poverty threshold for a three person family of one adult and two children was \$14,824. Family structure is also linked to other manifestations of low

income – inadequate housing, food insecurity, lack of access to health care, and poor physical and mental health.

In most other western industrial societies, the relationship between family structure and poverty is much weaker. Lee Rainwater and Timothy Smeeding report in *Poor Kids in a Rich Country* (2003) that about 20 percent of children in the United States and Sweden live in single mother families. Yet, data from the Luxembourg Income Study show the child poverty rate for these children is over 50 percent in the United States, compared with only 7 percent in Sweden. Moreover, the poverty rate of children living in single mother families increases sharply as family size increases. This is much less true in other countries, where income transfers help offset the tendency for single mother families and larger families to be less well off economically.

In the United States, the strong statistical relationship between family structure and poverty is rarely questioned. Instead, debates center on the appropriate interpretation of this relationship and on the alternative policy solutions they imply. At the heart of the debate is whether poverty is a *cause* or a *consequence* of changing family structure. This debate is not new. Indeed, the key issues were probably encapsulated first in scholarly reactions to Daniel Patrick Moynihan's controversial 1965 report entitled *The Negro Family: The Case for National Action*. An excerpt from the so called Moynihan Report states: "The fundamental problem [of blacks] . . . is that of family structure. The evidence – not final, but powerfully persuasive – is that the Negro family in the urban ghettos is crumbling. . . . So long as this situation persists, the cycle of poverty and disadvantage will continue to repeat itself."

Moynihan's views were seemingly straight forward: (1) "crumbling" black families were typically poor families; (2) changes in black family structure contributed to growth in poverty and its many manifestations (e.g., welfare dependency, crime, alienation, unwed child bearing); and (3) changes in black family structure exacerbated black-white inequality in poverty and welfare. The policy implications followed accordingly. In Moynihan's view, a concerted national effort was needed to strengthen the family, which had created a

"tangle of pathology" in the black community. Many scholars today view Moynihan's conclusions as prescient. In 1965, the percentage of black women raising children alone exceeded in 2000 the percentage of white unmarried mothers.

At the time, however, Moynihan's critics charged him with "blaming the victim." They questioned whether changes in family structure caused poverty among blacks or instead reflected the effects of poverty. His critics argued that chronic poverty or welfare dependence undermined marriage, contributed to more marital dissolution, and led to out of wedlock childbearing – the underlying components of changing family structure. Some also believed that poverty and family structure simply reflect the effects of other conditions in the black community, such as low education or too few job opportunities. In other words, the relationship between family structure and poverty was spurious rather than causal.

Establishing causality is difficult in the absence of experimental data. Instead, most non experimental studies are based on survey data that compare the economic circumstances of married and unmarried women, while controlling for other observed variables associated with both (e.g., education). The problem is that other unobserved variables may cause a spurious association between family structure and poverty. More generally, we do not know what the poverty rate would be for currently single or unmarried women if they actually married. And we do not know the poverty rate of currently married women if they divorced or became widowed. Simply, the counterfactual situation is not observed.

Much of the recent research on racial differences or trends in poverty has employed a demographic accounting framework that avoids issues of causality altogether. These descriptive studies estimate the share of racial or temporal change in poverty that is accounted for by shifts in family structure, such as the rise in single parent families. These analyses are often based on methods of demographic standardization or shift share analyses. Researchers ask what percentage of individuals would be poor today if (1) the distribution of family types had not changed over time or if the distribution was identical to a comparison

group (e.g., whites), and (2) they experienced current family specific poverty rates. Differences between the observed and expected poverty uncovers the effects of changing family structure. Using such an approach, Eggebeen and Lichter (1991) reported that roughly one half of the upward rise in child poverty in the 1980s was accounted for by increases in the percentage of US children in “high risk” families (e.g., female headed). More recent studies have shown that changes in poverty during the 1990s were largely unrelated to changes in family structure; changes in maternal employment matter more (Iceland 2003; Lichter & Crowley 2004).

As with Moynihan’s report, it remains controversial to claim that poverty differences across racial groups are due to racial differences in family structure. The debate pivots on the usual canard: are individuals (in this case blacks) to blame for making economically self destructive decisions about unwed childbearing, marriage, and divorce? Or are larger structural forces (e.g., economic restructuring and high unemployment) responsible for high poverty rates? Eggebeen and Lichter (1991), for example, reported that about two thirds of the black–white difference in family structure is responsible for black–white differences in child poverty. At the same time, even if blacks had the same family structure as whites, their poverty rates would remain high. Family structure is only part of the explanation, and such analyses cannot assign causality. Demographic studies typically do not address the question of why family structure changes, although a large literature suggests that economics – the availability of good jobs and good incomes – is fundamental.

These demographic approaches contrast sharply with behavioral models that emphasize individual decision making. Such analyses typically link out of wedlock childbearing, divorce, or marriage changes or other factors to individual changes in poverty or economic deprivation (Bianchi 1999). Perhaps the largest body of work is on the economic consequences of divorce. These studies show that divorce is strongly associated with subsequent declines in women’s economic well being. One recent study showed that poor women were more likely than non poor women to subsequently

divorce (Smock et al. 1999). More significantly, this study attempted to estimate the counterfactual situation. If these poor women had not divorced they would be much better off economically, but not as well off as other women who had remained married. This study illustrates the potential inferential problems – common to most previous studies – with statistical comparisons of the economic well being of currently divorced and married women.

Studies of divorce disagree most often about the magnitude of economic declines and on the specific economic and demographic pathways that shape income trajectories. Lenore Weitzman, in *The Divorce Revolution* (1985), for example, reported a 73 percent decline in women’s standard of living after divorce and a 42 percent increase in men’s standard of living. Other work shows much smaller negative effects on women’s economic well being. Peterson (1996) estimates a 27 percent decline in women’s standard of living after divorce and only a small increase (10 percent) in men’s standard of living. Studies show that the loss of husband’s income, even after several years, cannot fully offset increases in cash assistance from the government, earnings from more work, or financial assistance from friends or relatives. Moreover, the best route to economic recovery seems to be remarriage (Morrison & Ritualo 2000).

Indeed, scholars have increasingly emphasized the link between marriage and economic well being. Transitions to marriage are associated with declines in poverty and reductions in welfare dependency (Lichter et al. 2003). The improvement reflects the addition of another potential source of family income (i.e., the spouse). Marriage also seems to make men more productive in the workplace, if measured by hours worked and earnings. The counter argument is that marriage selects on those with the greatest earnings potential. Earnings growth is reinforced by marriage itself, which strengthens the underlying economic foundation of marriage, while reducing the likelihood of divorce and poverty. This is a mutually reinforcing process. Drawing strong causal arguments, however, is difficult. Individuals who marry or divorce may be different from single people on a number of observed and unobserved characteristics. This is the

fundamental problem in drawing strong causal inferences about links between family structure and poverty.

More recently, efforts to establish causality have made use of natural experiments. In the early 1990s, Geronimus and Korenman (1992) claimed that out of wedlock childbearing was not responsible for the negative outcomes experienced by disadvantaged unwed mothers (e.g., low schooling, higher poverty, etc.). Despite sharing genes and family background, adolescents who became unwed mothers were no different on a variety of adult outcomes than their sisters who did not bear children. Other studies have drawn similar conclusions by comparing women who miscarried a pregnancy with those whose pregnancies ended in live births. Any differences between women who miscarry and women who become mothers arguably must be due to unwed childbearing if miscarriages are randomly drawn from the same population of unmarried women. No differences suggest that out of wedlock childbearing is a symptom of poverty and family disadvantage rather than a cause. Such studies have spawned many subsequent studies that have critically evaluated the putative causal effects of teenage childbearing on later life outcomes (Hoffman 1998).

Conceptual and technical debates in the scholarly community about causality have not prevented lawmakers and the public policy community from addressing the issue of changing family structure and its potential deleterious relationship with poverty. This willingness to act on behalf of American families is new. For example, the 1996 welfare reform bill, the Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act, has "encouraging the formation and maintenance of two parent families" as a way to increase economic self-sufficiency. States have developed and implemented experimental marriage initiatives aimed at encouraging marriage or reducing divorce. These have taken the form of public announcement campaigns about the value of marriage, counseling programs that develop conflict resolution techniques or promote relationship skills, and new efforts to change the tax code or welfare system to eliminate any economic disincentives to marriage or out of wedlock childbearing.

Whether such programs will work to reduce poverty and promote economic self-sufficiency is unclear a priori. This is a social experiment on an unprecedented scale in American history. As state program evaluations are completed, however, scholars will have a much stronger basis in evidence concerning whether manipulating family structure (i.e., promoting stable two-parent families) will have the intended salutary effects on poverty and welfare dependency.

SEE ALSO: Culture of Poverty; Divorce; Family Poverty; Family Structure and Child Outcomes; Feminization of Poverty; Marriage

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family theory

David Cheal

Family theory consists of sets of propositions that attempt to explain some aspect of family life. Theorizing involves making general statements about some phenomenon, and an important characteristic of family theory, therefore, is that it involves a degree of abstraction from reality. Theoretical statements are abstract statements employing concepts that refer to things in the real world. Theories differ in the concepts that they use, and in the statements that are made about them. There are many different theories in family theory, and the relationships between them range from complementary borrowing of ideas, through mutual indifference, to antagonism.

INTELLECTUAL AND SOCIAL CONTEXT

The history of family theory varies according to the national context of family theorists. For example, in the 1970s and early 1980s Marxism had a significant influence on family theorizing in Britain and, especially, in Canada, but it was rarely mentioned in the United States. On the other hand, British and other European theorists have not paid much attention to exchange theory, which has been popular in the United States.

Family theory has changed from a consensus on the value of nuclear family living in the period immediately after World War II to the current situation of theoretical pluralism. In the post war period the standard theory of family life held that the nuclear family was an adaptive unit that mediates between the individual and society. An early, and very influential, version of standard sociological theory was structural functionalism. This approach held that families perform essential functions for family members and for society. Talcott Parsons, for example, argued that the nuclear family household has two main functions in modern industrial society. It socializes children and manages tensions for adults.

Influenced by the prestige of grand theory in structural functionalism, the period of the late

1960s and 1970s saw a move in family studies toward theory construction combined with the theory integration. The phrase that was most often used to describe the goal of creating a unified body of family theory was theory systematization. By the early 1970s the sociology of the family had entered a phase of systematic theory building and theory unification. However, this phase did not last long.

Beginning with the impact of feminism on family studies, the sociology of the family went through a Big Bang in the mid 1970s. There was a rush of theorizing about family issues, but only a portion of this growth resulted from the application of theory construction techniques. By the mid 1970s it was clear that the move toward theoretical convergence had omitted issues and theories which did not fit the image of the family favored in standard sociological theory. New types of theory were developed that asked new kinds of questions. This was especially true of feminism.

From the 1980s onwards family studies has been characterized by the acceptance of theoretical pluralism. One way of looking at this theoretical pluralism is presented next.

MAJOR DIMENSIONS

In North America, James White and David Klein (2002) have identified seven major dimensions of family theory. These are theoretical frameworks from which specific theories are derived. The seven theoretical frameworks are: (1) the social exchange and choice framework; (2) the symbolic interaction framework; (3) the family life course development framework; (4) the systems framework; (5) the conflict framework; (6) the feminist framework; and (7) the ecological framework.

Exchange Theory

The individual is the unit of analysis in exchange theory. Individuals are seen as making rational choices about behavior based on the balance of rewards and costs that the behavior has for them. The relationship between rewards and costs defines the profit that is derived from behavior, and individuals are assumed to try to maximize their profits. Actors rationally

calculate their expected profits for all possible choices in a situation and then choose the action that they calculate will bring the greatest rewards for the least costs. A theory of choice is at the heart of the exchange approach to family interaction. Behavior becomes exchange when the actions of one individual enter into the rewards and costs of another individual, and each individual modifies the behavior of the other.

Applications of exchange theory include the study of the choice of marriage partner, the quality of the marriage relationship, marriage bargaining, and separation and divorce. One of the advantages of exchange theory is that it enables the investigator to think about rewards provided within the family, and rewards provided by sources outside the family, as alternatives between which individuals choose. Marriages are seen as breaking down when one or both partners no longer find them profitable by comparison with the alternatives. The probability of divorce is thought to be a result of two comparisons that individuals make. First, individuals compare the profits they derive from their own marriage with the profits that others derive from their marriages. If the sense of relative deprivation is high then the motive to divorce is enhanced. Second, individuals compare the rewards and costs associated with the alternatives to the existing marriage, including being divorced or remarrying. Rewards might include finding a more compatible partner, and costs might include social disapproval for divorce.

Symbolic Interactionism

Symbolic interactionism rests on three simple premises. First, human beings act toward things on the basis of the meanings that things have for them. Symbolic interactionists therefore believe that to understand social behavior, the researcher must understand the meanings that actors assign to the situation and action. Second, the meanings that people assign to the objects in their environment are drawn from the social interactions in which they engage. That is to say, we do not simply form our meanings as a result of psychological elements in our personalities, but other people's actions

define the meanings for us. Third, the meanings of things are handled in, and modified through, an interpretive process. There is a process of interaction that goes on within the individual, as people engage in an internal conversation about what things mean and how they should respond.

The emphasis in symbolic interactionism is on the family as a unity of interacting personalities. Whatever unity exists in family life can only be the result of interactions between family members. One of the most basic concepts in symbolic interactionism is that of role. Roles are the rules of behavior for positions in a family, and as such they are taken into account by individual members as they construct their lines of action. Symbolic interactionists have therefore often believed that individual behavior can only be understood within the context of the family role that an individual occupies. Interactionist work on patterns of family life includes studies of the ways in which behavior is negotiated and renegotiated among family members. It is through negotiations that members adjust their individual claims to produce joint actions.

Family Life Course Development

The family life course development framework is a dynamic approach that looks at family life as a process that unfolds over time. It focuses on the systematic and patterned changes experienced by families as they move through stages and events of their family life course. This approach has gone through several phases itself. The first phase consisted of an approach that studied families as moving through deterministic, invariant stages of the family life cycle. This approach was heavily criticized. The principal difficulty has been the impossibility of fitting all of the many different living arrangements that exist into a universal set of stages. Accordingly, this approach was replaced by an emphasis on family careers. More recently, it has been followed by an approach stressing patterns of the life courses of individuals. The focus here is upon the individual life course, and on how it affects and is affected by the life courses of other individuals.

Systems Theory

A system is a set of interconnected parts that exhibits some boundary between itself and the surrounding environment. Families may be considered as systems, as they are in the systems framework. Assumptions of the systems framework include the idea that all parts of the system are interconnected; the idea that understanding is only possible by viewing the whole; and the idea that a system's behavior affects its environment, and in turn the environment affects the system. It is also commonly held that systems exhibit equilibrium, that is to say, they tend to maintain a steady state in the face of environmental changes.

Family processes are understood as the product of the entire system. Family systems theory therefore shifts the primary focus away from the individual family member toward relationships among the members of the family system. The systems approach to the family has therefore been welcomed by some scholars and practitioners as a way to understand family problems and intervene in family processes without blaming any one family member. For example, the eating disorders of bulimia and anorexia nervosa can be conceptualized as disorders involving the entire family system rather than the identified patient alone.

The concept of boundary is an essential one in systems thinking. Systems theorists have therefore been interested in the issue of boundary redefinition when spouses divorce and remarry. Boundaries are defined by rules that identify who participates in a family, and how they do so. Blended families require drawing new boundaries and establishing a consensus on those boundaries. Confusion over boundaries, in other words boundary ambiguity, is thought to create a variety of interpersonal problems. It is held that boundary confusion in remarried families leads to confusion in the rights and duties associated with different positions in the family.

Conflict Theory

Conflict theory maintains that conflict is a normal part of social life, and it therefore deserves to be a focus of explicit attention. Sources of

conflict include the competition for scarce resources, and incompatible goals, such as the tension between privacy and jointness. Most conflict theorists accept the assumption that individuals act out of self interest, and that interests are often contradictory. There are many dimensions of conflict, such as class conflict, age based conflict, and gender conflict. Conflict can occur between groups or within groups.

The concept of power is as central to many versions of conflict theory as is the concept of conflict itself. The resources that are available within families are not only the subject of competition, they are also the means by which one individual may gain power over others. The unequal distribution of power can be seen as important in several respects. First, the distribution of legitimate power can be seen as a structural mechanism of conflict management that operates to suppress overt conflict. Second, power differentials can themselves become a source of conflict. And third, power inequalities influence the outcomes of conflict, including who wins and who loses.

Applications of conflict theory include the study of family violence. One of the major issues here is the fact that most family violence is violence against women. Because of the interest in gender divisions, there is some overlap here between conflict theory and feminist theory.

Feminist Theory

Feminist theory is concerned with the position of women in society, and specifically with the disadvantages that women face in a society that is dominated by men. It is a diverse approach, but three premises can be identified as it is applied to the study of family life. First, family life is envisaged as an arena within which individuals who pursue different economic and social interests meet and struggle. That struggle is not equal. There is thought to be an internal stratification of family life, in which men receive more benefits than do women. The allocation of tasks among family members is seen as taking the form of a gendered division of labor. Although this division of labor has the appearance of an equal exchange, feminists

maintain that women contribute more than they receive in return. Second, processes of control and domination are thought to come into play whenever men and women interact. Relations between husbands and wives are identified as power relations, in which men dominate over women. Feminist theories of marriage and family therefore devote much attention to analyzing structures of patriarchy, or the oppression of women by men. Third, ideological legitimations of gender inequality are held to be responsible for the acceptance by women of their own subjection. It is claimed that there exists an ideology of familism, or familialism, that supports traditional family norms, including traditional gender norms. Feminist theory considers familism to be a restrictive ideology that is a barrier to women's liberation. For example, there is the domestic ideology which encourages girls to think that putting family responsibilities first is the normal pattern for women.

Viewed from the perspective of feminist theory, the family is a concept which has been created and distributed by those whose interests it serves (mainly men). Scholars working in the feminist tradition therefore argue that existing concepts of the family must be deconstructed, or decomposed. As a result, the social scientific concept of the family as a system is replaced by the concept of the family as an ideology. That is to say, "the family" is thought to be a set of ideas which obscures more fundamental relations, such as the sex/gender system.

One of the most obvious applications for feminist theory has been the study of the division of household labor between husbands and wives. For example, feminists have been interested in time use studies which have examined the contrasting amounts of time that men and women devote to housework.

Family Ecology

A concern with individuals and their environment is at the heart of the ecological approach. A person's behavior is seen as a function of the interaction between the person's traits and abilities and their environment. One of the most popular ways of thinking about this is to

conceive of the nested ecosystems in which the individual human being develops. First, there is the microsystem of connections between persons who are present in the immediate setting directly affecting the developing person. Second, there is the mesosystem consisting of linkages between settings in which the developing person actually participates. Third, there is the exosystem that consists of linkages between settings that do not involve the developing person as an active participant, but in which events occur that affect, or are affected by, what happens in the setting. And finally, there is the macrosystem consisting of overarching patterns of ideology and organization of the social institutions common to a particular culture or subculture. Individuals develop within the family microsystem, and families are situated within society. The relations between a family and the larger society are meso-, exo-, and macrosystem issues.

An ecological approach can be taken to family decision making. Here the family is viewed as a system interacting with its environment. The embeddedness of the family system in the larger ecosystem is emphasized, and the interchanges that take place between the various levels are described.

CURRENT EMPHASES

The main current emphasis in family theorizing does not fit into any of the theoretical frameworks identified above. Perhaps it deserves to be identified as a distinctive theoretical approach. This approach is concerned with the deinstitutionalization of family life. It is associated with the work of Ulrich Beck and Elisabeth Beck Gernsheim as well as the work of Anthony Giddens.

Beck and Beck Gernsheim have advanced individualization theory. This states that many of the changes occurring in families are the result of a long term trend in modern societies to accord more autonomy to individuals. Individualization involves liberation from traditional commitments and personal emancipation. Individuals construct their own lives, and they therefore make decisions about whether and whom they shall marry, whether or not to have children, what sort of sexual preference

they will have, and so on. As a result, the traditional family, which consisted of a lifelong officially legitimated community of father–mother–child, is being replaced by a diverse array of ways of living.

Giddens argues that traditional family ties have been replaced by the pure relationship as the foundation of personal life. A pure relationship is one based upon emotional communication, where the rewards derived from such communication are the main basis for the relationship to continue. It is not maintained by external forces, but it is constructed by the participants out of their own unaided efforts. Interpersonal trust is, therefore, no longer based on customary obligations between the occupants of well defined roles. In a pure relationship trust can only be gained through the mutual disclosure of feelings and beliefs. There is therefore a great demand for intimacy in pure relationships. Intimacy is found within marriage, but it is also found outside marriage, in cohabitation for example. The focus of attention today is the relationship between a couple, not the institution of marriage.

SEE ALSO: Conflict Theory; Divisions of Household Labor; Family and Community; Family Conflict; Family Diversity; Family Structure; Gender, Work, and Family; Inequality/Stratification, Gender; Life Course and Family; Love and Commitment; Marital Power/Resource Theory; Marital Quality; Marriage; Structure and Agency; Symbolic Interaction; System Theories; Theory

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family therapy

Leigh A. Leslie

Family therapy is a clinical approach to treating mental health and relationship problems based on the assumption that dysfunction can best be understood and treated by examining the social context in which it exists. Emerging as an identifiable “field” in the 1950s, family therapy was, and continues to be, characterized by attention to the interaction and communication patterns existing within couples and families. Several precursors set the stage for what, at the time, was thought to be a dramatic and controversial shift in clinical treatment from a focus on individuals to families.

First, the profession of social work emphasized the need to treat families as units. Recognizing that treatment of one family member would both impact and be impacted by other family members led to the practice of family casework in the early 1900s. Second, the early 1900s also saw the child guidance field begin in Europe and move to the United States. Psychiatrists working with children gradually came to acknowledge and write about the significance of the family in understanding the child. Nonetheless, this new orthopsychiatry movement continued to promote individual psychoanalytic treatment with children. Third, the 1920s and 1930s gave rise to the marriage counseling movement in the US. Made up largely of physicians, clergy, and social workers, this group began working with spouses together.

While writings and practice from the fields of social work, child guidance, and marriage counseling readied the larger mental health field for a paradigm shift, it was changes in psychiatry that are generally seen as the major

impetus in the development of family therapy. Frustrated by the limited effectiveness of psychoanalysis for mental illness, particularly schizophrenia, and influenced by the writing emanating from social psychiatry, most notably the work of Harry Stack Sullivan, several individuals and teams began to study and develop new treatment modalities with families of schizophrenic patients. Although the treatment models developed throughout the late 1940s and 1950s varied on many dimensions, it was their similarities and their contrast to the prevailing psychoanalytic thought of the time that led ultimately to a unified field. The primary theme that ran throughout the models was the concept of wholeness; families were more than the sum of their members and the emergent relational and interactional components were the focus of the therapist's intervention. Common characteristics of what came to be called "family systems" models of therapy included circular causation, function of symptoms, boundaries and organization, and communication patterns.

Multidirectional/circular causation is the notion that change in any part of the family impacts all other parts and that any given behavior cannot be understood linearly by what preceded or followed it. Instead, behavior must be considered by looking more broadly at the interactional field in which it is located.

Function/purpose of symptoms refers to the assumptions that symptoms exist for reasons in families. Although the purpose a symptom served may not be obvious to family members and be counter to stated family goals, early family therapy maintained that the symptom was currently or had been functional at some point in a family's history. For example, while the young adult child who cannot successfully separate from parents and lead an independent life may seem like a problem to parents, the continuation of this behavior may serve to keep the parents united by their joint focus on a troubled child.

Boundaries and organization refer to structural characteristics of families. Organization addresses how the family has structured roles and relationships to meet its tasks or goals. Boundaries, on the other hand, address the degree of fluidity and adaptability in family organization. While boundaries need to be

flexible enough to respond to changes in family needs and environmental demands, they should not be so malleable that family members and subsystems lose their sense of distinctiveness. For example, parents who allow children to become involved in their arguments, or share marital discontents with their children, would be said to have weak boundaries around the marital subsystem. Conversely, families who could not adapt and take on different tasks when a mother becomes ill, or families that could not respond effectively to age appropriate changes in children's needs for guidance and affection, might be thought of as rigid in their boundaries and organization.

Communication patterns refer to the messages that family members send one another. The emphasis here is not simply on the words spoken but on both the multiple levels of messages sent and the metacommunications about how messages are to be interpreted in the context of this relationship. Thus, the statement, "tell me how you feel," will be interpreted and responded to very differently in a family that has low tolerance for anger and dissension than in a family that respects differences of opinion.

Throughout the 1960s and 1970s family therapy increased in prominence in the mental health field as publications and training programs proliferated. However, the late 1970s and 1980s saw several critiques of the field. The field's singular focus on the system and lack of attention to individual biology, psychology, and responsibility were criticized from two primary quarters. Families of the mentally ill challenged family therapy for blaming them for their children's illnesses by focusing on the function of a symptom in the family and using language (such as "schizophrenic family" or "alcoholic family") that held the entire system accountable for a problem. Likewise, feminist scholars criticized the circular systemic thinking and language that held both victim and abuser responsible for the violence. Additionally, feminists criticized the field for promoting traditional family structure and failing to incorporate the larger cultural system into therapists' understanding of how gender and race impact family dynamics.

Both in response to these criticisms and as part of the movement toward integration in the

mental health field in general, family therapy is continuing to evolve.

The last decade has seen a refocusing on the individual within the family system, and increased attention to issues of race/ethnicity, gender, and sexual orientation in treatment. Further, the strict division between models is eroding as integrative models emerge, and non-systemic postmodernist models – such as narrative and social constructionist models – grow in prominence in the field. An additional change is the integration of family therapy with other systems of service delivery, most notably family medicine.

The primary challenge currently facing family therapy is the challenge facing all mental health fields. The increased demand by insurers for evidence based treatment has led to an increase in research assessing the effectiveness of specific treatment protocols with specific populations.

SEE ALSO: Bateson, Gregory; Family Conflict; Family Structure; Interaction; Interpersonal Relationships

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Fanon, Frantz (1925–61)

Alan Bairner

Born in Martinique and a psychiatrist by training, Frantz Fanon's sociological legacy lies mainly in the study of "race" and, above all, in the development of postcolonial studies. Having fought for the Free French Army during World War II, Fanon studied medicine and psychiatry in Lyon. In 1952 he began to practice psychiatry in Algeria and thereafter he became associated, particularly in the minds of the political left for whom he became an iconic figure during the 1960s, with the cause of Algerian independence. In arguably his most famous work, *The Wretched of the Earth* (1961), Fanon sought to combine traditional Marxist revolutionary theory with ideas more appropriate to struggles in the developing world.

For some, he was an unattractive thinker who romanticized killing and whose rhetoric was typical of a strain of politics which glorifies violence in pursuit of an imagined future. Others, however, saw in his forensic analysis of the dehumanizing impact of the colonized condition, as evidenced in his first book, *Black Skin, White Masks* (1952), an honest and compelling justification for the use of political violence. Only through acts of violence could the subjugated individual destroy not only the colonial oppressor but also his or her former self.

It could be argued that national liberation struggles of the type for which Fanon proved to be a source of inspiration have been superseded by new challenges centered on globalization. On the other hand, there is an equally strong case for asserting that questions about "race" and about the extended repercussions of colonialism which Fanon sought to answer are as relevant today as when he was writing.

In many respects, for example, it is possible to situate the events of 9/11 or the war in Iraq as the direct consequences of the kind of trauma that Fanon explored both as a physician and as a political activist. Ironically, however, despite Fanon's undoubted contribution to postcolonial studies, his own theoretical approach, like that of C. L. R. James, owes almost everything to the western tradition of social and political thought. To that extent, therefore, while he would most certainly have understood the reasons that lie behind the violence of some Islamic fundamentalists, he would have been ill at ease with the theocratic ambitions of men such as Osama bin Laden. Regardless of the deep seated psychological need for third world revolution, the concrete objective of revolutionary movements, as understood by Fanon, consisted of material goals, including an equitable distribution of wealth and technology. At no time did he advocate a return to precolonial conditions or, indeed, a requirement to view the world from a perspective that was wholly distanced from western Enlightenment thought.

Having resigned from his position as director of the psychiatric department at Blida Joinville's hospital, Fanon became more directly involved in the struggle of the National Liberation Front (FLN) to free Algeria from French rule and in 1959 was seriously wounded. He served briefly as the provisional Algerian government's ambassador to Ghana. In 1960 he became seriously ill and died of leukemia in Washington, DC, on December 12, 1961. He was buried in Algeria.

Fanon's other major works were *A Dying Colonialism* (1959) and *Toward the African Revolution* (1964).

SEE ALSO: Marx, Karl; Marxism and Sociology; Methods, Postcolonial; Revolutions; Revolutions, Sociology of; Violence

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fans and fan culture

Matthew Hills

Fans have become important to work in media sociology and cultural studies for a variety of reasons: they can be taken to represent a dedicated, active audience; they are consumers who are often also (unofficial, but sometimes official) media producers (Jenkins 1992; McKee 2002); and they can be analyzed as a significant part of contemporary consumer culture. Fandom – the state of being a fan – is usually linked to popular culture rather than high culture. People who appreciate high culture, often being as passionately partisan as pop culture's "fans," are described as "connoisseurs" or "aficionados" rather than as fans (Jensen 1992). Whilst connoisseurship is typically deemed culturally legitimate, fandom has been analyzed as rather more problematic: the stereotype of "the fan" has been one of geeky, excessive, and unhealthy obsession with (supposedly) culturally trivial objects such as TV shows. Henry Jenkins has highlighted and opposed this negative fan stereotype, arguing that such portrayals of fandom should be critiqued, and that fans should instead be viewed more positively as building their own culture out of media products, and as selectively "poaching" meanings and interpretations from favored media texts. Jenkins, whose seminal work *Textual Poachers* (1992) helped to make fandom a viable object of academic study, suggests that the creativity of fans is downplayed in cultural common sense in favor of viewing fans as "cultural dupes" who are perfect consumers, always accepting what the culture industry produces for them. Against

this narrative, depicted as belonging to the Frankfurt School of Marxist theorists such as Theodor Adorno as much as to forms of cultural common sense, Jenkins argues that fans discriminate keenly between and within their objects of fandom, developing an aesthetic sense of what counts as a “good” episode of television series such as *Star Trek* or *Doctor Who* (see Tulloch & Jenkins 1995).

Fans develop extensive knowledge and expertise about their shows or sports teams, also characteristically feeling a sense of ownership over “their” object of fandom. They also “tend to seek intimacy with the object of their attention – a personality, a program, a genre, a team” (Kelly 2004: 9). This “intimacy” could involve meeting a celebrity, getting a sports woman’s autograph, seeing an actor give a talk onstage at a convention, chatting with him or her in the bar afterwards, or even visiting real locations used in the filming of a TV series (see Hills 2002). Fans thus seek to break down barriers between themselves as subjects and their objects of fandom, their fan identity becoming a meaningful aspect of cultural and self identity. Indeed, Tulloch and Jenkins (1995: 23) distinguish between “fans,” who claim a cultural identity on the basis of their fandom, and “followers,” who despite following pop cultural texts, pop groups, TV series, and so on more than casually, do not make such an identity claim.

As can be seen from this, fandom is generally discussed in relation to media consumption and media texts, sometimes being referred to specifically as “media fandom” (Jenkins 1992: 1), although this prefix is often assumed. Scholars have tended to isolate out and focus on specific fandoms such as fans of science fiction film and TV (Bacon Smith 1992; Jenkins 1992); fans of soap operas (Harrington & Bielby 1995; Baym 2000); fans of the *Star Wars* films (Brooker 2002); fans of particular TV series and radio shows (Thomas 2002); and sports fans (Crawford 2004).

Fans and fan culture are, however, not quite the same thing. By using the term “fans” we can refer to individuals who have a particular liking or affection for a range of popular cultural texts, celebrities, sports (teams), or artifacts. These individuals – typically displaying an affective relationship with their fan object;

that is, they are passionately interested in and committed to following their beloved pop group, sports team, or soap opera – may nevertheless *not* take part in socially organized fan activities. They may not attend fan conventions, be part of fan clubs, post to online fan message boards, or even attend live sporting events – instead perhaps supporting a baseball or football team by reading about games or watching them on television.

By contrast, collective activities such as convention going or fan club membership are very much indicative of what is meant by “fan culture.” Nicholas Abercrombie and Brian Longhurst (1998: 138) mark this distinction by contrasting “fans” with what they term “cultists”: the former display their fandom privately or personally rather than communally, whilst the latter are participants in communal fan cultures and activities. However, many writers simply use the term “fans” when referring to members of a fan culture (Bacon Smith 1992; Jenkins 1992; Hills 2002).

Here, fans are socialized within affective communities of fandom, and engage in subculturally distinctive fan practices such as writing their own fan fiction (“fanfic”) based on characters and situations from official films and TV shows, producing their own fan magazines (“fanzines”), writing their own lyrics to popular songs or standards (“filking”), and engaging in costuming at fan conventions by making replicas of costumes worn onscreen by film or TV actors (Jenkins 1992; Joseph Witham 1996; Hills 2002). “Fans” in the first, socially atomized, sense have been far less studied than “fan culture,” probably in part because the latter is more sociologically and culturally visible to researchers, and because such socially organized communities and practices have provided a rich terrain for media ethnographers such as Camille Bacon Smith (1992) and scholars such as Henry Jenkins (1992). Despite this partial focus in fan studies to date, scholars and students of media fandom should take care not to replay fan debates over “authenticity,” where socially atomized fans are considered to be somehow not “true” or “authentic” fans in comparison with those organizing or attending conventions, or regularly attending live sports matches (see Crawford 2004). Furthermore, we should take care not to always explore specific

fan cultures as singular objects of study: many soap fans may also be fans of particular celebrities or popular music, and many science fiction TV fans may also be fans of horror movies, and so on. Repertoires of media fandom are thus also important, as fans move between different fan objects and navigate through intertextual networks of TV shows and films (Jenkins 1992; Hills 2002, 2004).

Although it would be fair to say that there is no singular body of work that can be counted as the “sociology of media fandom,” the work of French sociologist Pierre Bourdieu has nevertheless been key to studies of fan cultures. John Fiske (1992) has drawn on Bourdieu’s theorization of cultural distinction to illuminate how fans, meaning participants in fan cultures, distinguish themselves from non fan audiences. Fiske emphasizes how such fans work to accumulate “fan cultural capital” or “popular cultural capital,” namely, knowledge about, and literacy in relation to, their object of fandom. In this instance, Fiske applies and develops Bourdieu’s (1984) take on “cultural capital,” by which is broadly meant the level of education and “training” in legitimate culture and its appreciation that a cultural agent holds. Sarah Thornton and Mark Jancovich have also applied Bourdieuan theories to fandom, with Thornton (1995: 11) coining the term “subcultural capital” to describe that form of capital which is not common across an entire culture, but is, instead, specific to a subculture or fan culture. Hills (2002: 57) has further related Bourdieuan concepts to media fandom, discussing “fan social capital” (the network of contacts that a fan has within his or her fan culture) as well as fan cultural capital. This sociological focus has led to fan cultures being thought of as hierarchical rather than romanticized as anti capitalist, “resistant” communities magically free of power differentials and struggles over status. Many media fandoms and sports fandoms can also be analyzed as male dominated cultural groups as well as middle class dominated elective affinities, meaning that Bourdieu’s emphasis on structural inequality in the distribution of forms of capital, beyond economic capital (money) alone, remains important here.

Nick Couldry (2003) has suggested that Bourdieu’s work is somewhat weakened by its

lack of focus on the operation of the media in relation to “symbolic capital” (prestige), arguing that sociologists should consider the “media’s meta capital” (p. 672), through which “what counts as symbolic capital in particular fields” is altered (p. 668). Thus, fans who become regular sources for the media – or who run popular message boards or websites/Internet news sites – may not merely be reflecting their already acquired fan cultural capital. Rather, by virtue of their own role within mass or niche mediation, these fans, people such as cinephile Harry Knowles (founder of aintitcoolnews.com) or *Doctor Who* fan Shaun Lyon (founder of gallifreyone.com), may be accruing and exercising “media meta capital.” Such fans can even become “subcultural celebrities” in their own right (Hills 2003), being recognized and respected by many others in their subculture or fan culture, while being largely unknown outside this subculture.

Alongside the importance of Pierre Bourdieu’s (1984) work on forms of capital, other key theories within recent work on fandom have been those of performance (Abercrombie & Longhurst 1998; Lancaster 2001) and performativity (Hills 2002; Thomas 2002; Crawford 2004). In particular, and drawing on Judith Butler’s work, Matt Hills (2002) has suggested that fans should not be thought of either as “consummate consumers” (Kelly 2004: 7) or as “cultural dupes” in thrall to the culture industry. Rather, Hills (2002: 159) suggests that fans display “performative consumption,” performing their identities as fans in ways that are simultaneously highly self reflexive or self aware *and* non reflexive or self absent, given that they cannot always account for why they became fans in the first place (Harrington & Bielby 1995). Crawford (2004: 122) applies Hills’s concept to sports fans, finding it to be of use here. The notion of “performative consumption” indicates that we should not treat fandom via a sociological either/or, where fans are either agents whose fan cultural practices can be celebrated, or they are subjects whose fan cultural practices can be accounted for, and critiqued, as effects of structural/capitalist forces. It also suggests that depth psychology or psychoanalytic theories may be useful in exploring aspects of fan identities that operate below the level of discursive consciousness (and

a number of writers have pursued post Freudian and sociologically contextualized discussions of this: see Harrington & Bielby 1995; Hills 2002).

In short, media fandom acutely poses problems of “structure” versus “agency” that have dogged contemporary sociological debate, and although Bourdieu’s work has been influential in work on fan cultures, surprisingly little attention has yet been paid to utilizing other competing theories of structuration such as those of, for example, Anthony Giddens and Margaret Archer, although J. B. Thompson and Sean McCloud have sociologically analyzed fandom as a “late modern project of the self” (McCloud 2003: 199), using the Giddens of *Modernity and Self Identity* (1991) rather than *The Constitution of Society* (1984).

As the sociology of media fandom moves toward maturity, we might therefore expect further work on structuration theory, as well as further applications of post Marxist work on commodification and post Durkheimian work on ritual and the “collective effervescence” of contemporary neotribes (Hills 2002). Work to date has either tended to push toward the status of a general theory of media fandom (Hills 2002), or it has taken specific (and limited) fan cultures as objects of study (see McKee 2002). These maneuvers have left a range of comparative questions open: are all fan cultures similarly structured through issues of “fan cultural capital” and “fan social capital”? And are fan cultures in Japan, say, structurally and affectively similar to those in the US? Indeed, what of transnational fan cultures? A research agenda relating fandom to matters of globalization has yet to be fully pursued, although one major research project under way at the University of Aberystwyth, and headed up by Martin Barker, promises to deal with the transnational consumption and meanings of *The Lord of the Rings* trilogy of films. Fans and fan cultures have offered one test case for theories of audience “activity” (Fiske 1992) and “performance” (Abercrombie & Longhurst 1998), as well as allowing for the ethnographic exploration of fan communities (Bacon Smith 1992), but the study of fandom continues to face many challenges and new opportunities.

SEE ALSO: Audiences; Bourdieu, Pierre; Consumption, Mass Consumption, and Consumer

Culture; Ethnography; Popular Culture; Structure and Agency; Subculture

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fantasy city

John Hannigan

“Fantasy City” refers to a new urban form located at the intersection of leisure, consumption, tourism, and real estate development. In *Fantasy City: Pleasure and Profit in the Postmodern Metropolis* (1998), Canadian sociologist John Hannigan points to six defining features: fantasy cities are characteristically thematic (scripted), aggressively branded, active day and night, modular (mixing a standard array of retail and entertainment components), solipsistic (isolated physically and economically from the neighborhoods that surround them), and postmodern (in their reliance on simulation and spectacle). This set of phenomena is empirically manifested in an infrastructure of themed restaurants, nightclubs, shopping malls, multiplex cinemas, virtual reality arcades, casino hotels, book and record megastores, sports stadiums and arenas, and other urban entertainment destinations. While the only urban centers that currently qualify as full scale fantasy cities are Las Vegas and Orlando, Florida, most cities today have some commercial neighborhoods and developments that display these characteristics to a greater or lesser extent. Furthermore, fantasy city development has spread aggressively beyond the borders of North America, with large scale projects currently operating or under construction in such

countries as Australia, Singapore, Malaysia, China, Saudi Arabia, and Dubai.

The contemporary trend toward saleable leisure spaces in the city has its roots in the past. During the “golden age” of popular urban entertainment (1890–1930) in North America, an extensive array of amusements emerged, from the “Trip to the Moon” ride at Coney Island to the elaborately themed vaudeville theaters and motion picture palaces of the 1920s and 1930s. Despite claims by leisure merchants of the day that they were front and center in the movement toward the democratization of leisure, most urban leisure spaces were, in fact, effectively segregated by social class, race, and gender.

The contemporary fantasy city differs from its earlier predecessor in several key aspects. First, it is more pervasive and portable, the cornerstone of urban economic development efforts in North America, Europe, Asia, and the Middle East. Second, fantasy city construction has been undertaken on an unprecedented scale, encompassing not only single venues but also entire neighborhoods and districts. Third, fantasy city development has spread beyond its traditional base in the central city to exurban malls, sports complexes, and lifestyle centers, as well as port lands and other reclaimed waterfront locations. Fourth, these new urban spaces are conceived, branded, and managed by a new set of corporate players – multinational retail, media, and entertainment conglomerates such as Disney, Nike, and Sony – in partnership with the local and regional real estate developers and construction firms that previously shaped the commercial landscapes of the city.

Fantasy cities appeal especially to tourists and suburban visitors because they satisfy a bourgeois preference for sanitized environments of “riskless risk.” That is, they are the end products of a longstanding cultural contradiction between the American middle class desire for experience and their equally strong parallel reluctance to take risks, especially those that involve face to face contact with the “lower orders” in big cities. In this regard, the technologies of simulation and virtual reality that characterize the theme park city at one and the same time both dazzle and reassure. Excitement is divorced from actual experience and made safe. The sanitized consumption that is

characteristic of the fantasy city is realized by three central, strategic processes: theming, branding, and experiential storytelling.

Theming invites consumers to participate in structured fantasies derived from an exotic geographical locale (a tropical rainforest, a Moroccan bazaar), a distinctive historical period (pioneer days, medieval times), a popular motion picture or television show (Star Trek, the Flintstones), or a sports, music, fashion, or film celebrity (Wayne Gretsky, Dolly Parton, Cindy Crawford). As such, theming serves both to unify and market leisure sites, rendering them entertaining, easy to read visually, and controllable through a centrally directed corporate script. Theming has become pervasive, George Ritzer (1999) suggests, because it is a unique means of “re enchanting” a world that has become excessively dull and practical. Ritzer refers to such themed venues as “cathedrals of consumption” to indicate their quasi religious appeal for postmodern consumers in search of enchantment and identity.

Branding has three interrelated dimensions, each of which relates to the production and marketing of fantasy cities. Insofar as it invites instant consumer recognition, branding encourages “synergies” with global sports and entertainment conglomerates such as Nike, Disney, and Sony with their rosters of widely publicized and recognized celebrities. Furthermore, successful branded leisure spaces play on our desire for comfort and certainty, key attributes of postmodern theme parks. Third, branding provides a ready made point of identification for consumers in an increasingly crowded commercial marketplace.

Finally, fantasy cities are constructed around the creation of guest centered experiences. This is a testament to the power of narrative to imbue leisure environments, products, and services with an added dimension of interest and meaning. Urban entertainment destinations and attractions are increasingly outfitted with a “back story” that purports to link them with a historical (or mythical) repertoire of iconic events, personalities, and milestones.

Consumption in the fantasy city is further characterized by a dedifferentiation of the spheres of education, shopping, dining, and entertainment. This results in the growth of synergistic, hybridized consumer activities, as

described by the terms “shopertainment, entertainment, and edutainment.” This further extends the urban entertainment economy into such community institutions as museums, hospitals, churches, and schools.

Promoted by civic boosters as the panacea of urban revival, fantasy cities nevertheless bring with them a host of social, political, and economic liabilities.

As Mike Davis demonstrates in *City of Quartz* (1990), his apocalyptic vision of contemporary Los Angeles, fantasy city style development aggressively colonizes public space, limiting access to a select leisure class. It is an environment constructed out of fear, uncertainty, and the desire for exclusion, just the opposite of the traditional city park or market. In order to guarantee a sense of security, these spaces are regulated through a battery of surveillance and control techniques. Chief among these are CCTV (closed circuit television) and privately operated BIDs (business improvement districts). The latter routinely utilize private security guards and street clean up crews and lack any direct public accountability. This infrastructure of surveillance and control is especially evident in urban settings in which the pleasure seeking, entertainment economy operates at night and where bars, nightclubs, and the like are suspected of fostering a higher degree of lawlessness and disorder. The current proliferation of entertainment development endangers what Sharon Zukin (1995) calls “the dream of a public culture.” That is, the ideal of a diverse metropolis where residents of varied ethnic, racial, and socioeconomic backgrounds mingle freely and work together to build a civil society is undercut by the operation of pre packaged urban entertainment destinations that furnish safe, random encounters within the confines of a “tourist bubble.” This contributes to the growth of what Sorkin (1992) has termed “ageographical cities,” urban spaces that are stripped of any identifiable sense of place and sealed off from the surrounding environment.

Furthermore, the argument that fantasy city development functions as an economic multiplier more often than not turns out to be deeply flawed. The “urban growth machines” that control municipal business and politics justify sports and entertainment projects on the

grounds that they act as catalysts, generating increased trade for the local small businesses such as bars, restaurants, and corner stores that dot local neighborhood streets. Alas, in this context the oft cited saying that “a rising tide lifts all ships” is faulty. Rather, these are more likely to be cannibalized by entertainment megaprojects than to be catalyzed by them. In Baltimore, Maryland, after nearly a quarter century of festival marketplace development around the Inner Harbor, much of it publicly financed, prosperity has scarcely spilled over to the surrounding inner city. Visitors rarely venture far from the waterfront. This further erodes an inner city landscape of vacant storefronts, dilapidated residential buildings, and escalating poverty. Most jobs in the tourism and entertainment industry are of dubious quality: part time, minimum wage, few fringe benefits or career ladders (Levine 2000).

Finally, fantasy cities are problematic insofar as they exhibit marked undemocratic qualities. Poster children for the “new entrepreneurial city,” they are designed, built, and managed by “public-private partnerships” in which the latter holds the upper hand. As such, they stand apart from everyday municipal governance. Key decisions are increasingly made by public/private institutions rather than by elected representatives. Grassroots input is minimal. What has paved the way for this is the widespread deindustrialization and movement of manufacturing offshore encountered by North American urban economies in recent decades. In the face of this downward spiral, local government has embraced a promotional and marketing role, encouraging the privatization of urban development and culture.

Since the term was introduced in the late 1990s, fantasy city has proven to be a useful construct in a variety of different theoretical and empirical contexts. Bauman (2003: 25) locates its “magic blend of security and adventure – of supervision and freedom, of routine and surprise, of sameness and variety” as central to the contradictory desires and expectations of urban residents. This reflects, he says, the combination of globalizing pressures and territorially oriented identity search that shapes the structural development of the contemporary city. Atkinson and Flint (1995) link the idea with “gated communities.” The key imperative

of the fantasy city for city center development, they observe, is the desire for experience without danger leading to the desire for “urbanoid spaces” (spaces that resemble “real” streets but are devoid of the diversity that they formerly supported). This provides the means for people to exercise control over where, how, and when social encounters are made. Chatterton and Hollands (2003) focus on the production, regulation, and consumption of “urban nightscapes,” most notably those that provide branded, themed, and stylized experiences to young adults in search of hedonism and cool. In the brew pubs, themed “super clubs” (combined bar, restaurant, and club) and sports bars that are proliferating in urban entertainment districts, they encountered many of the same elements of “Disneyfication” and global corporate ownership that are characteristic of the fantasy city, as described by Hannigan (1998). Hubbard (2003) situates fantasy city development in the exurban fringe of the metropolis, where urban dwellers “increasingly seek distraction in spectacular, peripheral landscapes located away from the ‘inner city.’” He empirically illustrates this with survey data describing patterns of cinema going among the population of Leeds (UK). McGuire (2003) writes that Sony’s PlayStation 2 gaming environment not only exhibits all of the features that characterize the fantasy city, but also builds on its central attraction – amplifying the thrill of the spectacle without any exposure to the personal risks found that physical presence entails. As is the case with other 3D virtual communities, players are guaranteed freedom from the confines of the physical body, freedom from the constraints of geographical space, freedom from strangers, and freedom from control.

SEE ALSO: Brands and Branding; Consumption, Cathedrals of; Consumption, Landscapes of; Consumption, Spectacles of; Consumption, Tourism and; Consumption, Urban/City as Consumerspace; Shopping Malls; Urban Tourism

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fascism

Mabel Berezin

Fascism as a historical entity began in 1922 when Mussolini came to power in Italy. As a political ideology, fascism defines many of the movements that were present in post World War I Europe from the British Union of Fascists to the Romanian Iron Guard. Fascism could have remained simply a characteristic of a group of historically specific political formations, but the term rather quickly developed a life of its own. Today, it serves as what Alexander (2003) has described as a bridging metaphor, that is, a term that one uses independently of historical or definitional context

when confronted with acts of arbitrary violence or authoritarianism in political and, in some instances, social life.

The entries in the 1931 and 1968 editions of the *Encyclopedia of the Social Sciences* discuss fascism exclusively in terms of the regime in Italy. The authors make some effort to distinguish Italian Fascism from German National Socialism. The 2002 edition of the *Encyclopedia* 1990s, scholars viewed fascism as a descriptor of events in post World War I Europe or as an ideology with only historical interest. Precise conceptualization has eluded past, as well as current, exegeses of historical fascism. Attempts to theorize fascism have mined specific historical instances for generalities and yielded catalogs of characteristics. Even a cursory reading of this scholarship suggests that it is difficult to generalize across cases and leaves the impression that Benedetto Croce was correct when he described fascism as a “parenthesis” in European history.

The historian Gilbert Allardyce (1979) wrote a frequently cited analysis that claimed to have closed the question of “generic” fascism. He asserted fascism had no meaning outside of Italy and that it was neither an ideology nor a mental category. Comparing fascism to romanticism (and curiously obtuse to fascism’s other ideological kin, modernism), he stated that both terms “mean virtually nothing.” Resigned to the fact that “fascism [as a political term] is probably with us for good,” Allardyce asserts the proper analytic task is to “limit the damage.” Allardyce argues that fascism should be considered as descriptive of a historical period within a single nation state. The historicity of fascism renders it imprecise as an analytic frame.

The death knell of fascism has not sounded either in the real world of political practice or in the relatively cloistered world of the academy. For example, Griffin (1991: 26) begins where earlier studies left off. He argues that the term fascism has undergone an “unacceptable loss of precision” and proposes a new “ideal type” of fascism based on the following definition: “Fascism is a genus of political ideology whose mythic core in its various permutations is a palingenetic form of populist ultra nationalism.” The collapse of communism in 1989, the electoral success of European

right wing populist parties that began in the early 1990s coupled with a resurgence of neo-Nazi violence, and the more recent rise of Islamic fundamentalism have reawakened social science interest in historical fascism. Three basic approaches to fascism have emerged over the last 50 years.

Existing studies of fascism fall into two schools that may be broadly categorized as follows. The first tries to answer the "what" or definitional question. Frequently, this is articulated in a discussion of whether or not fascism is a "generic" concept or a national variation of historically specific political instances. Of those who try to define fascism, the central theme is the impossibility of definition. The second approach bypasses definition and tries to establish the characteristics of regimes and constituencies. Lipset's (1981) classic account of the class composition of fascist movements attributes fascism's success to the political disaffection of the middle classes. Linz's (1976) approach to constituency formation starts from the premise that an independent "phenomenon" of fascism existed and defines it as "hyper nationalist, often pan nationalist, anti parliamentary, anti liberal, anti communist, populist and therefore anti proletarian, partly anti capitalist and anti bourgeois." Linz emphasizes that European fascists (he uses the term for a range of cases while recognizing national differences) combined paramilitary tactics with standard electoral procedures to gain legitimate power. Fascism, for Linz, was a peculiar combination of law and violence.

Linz's definition rests on his assumption that fascism occupies a residual political field. As a "late comer" to the political scene, fascism had to capture whatever "political space," in the form of ideological doctrine and political constituencies, was available to it. His argument is dependent upon analyzing the social bases of fascism's political competitors (Linz 1980). Linz recognizes the importance of national case studies and the characteristics that he outlines are applicable in various combinations to a broad range of fascist movements and regimes. In general, studies of institutions and constituencies display greater degrees of analytic precision than those that wrestle with definition.

A central weakness in much of the writing on fascism, past and present, has been a failure to

draw a sharp distinction between fascist movements and regimes, between fascism as ideology and fascism as state, between political impulse and political institution. In general, analysts elide the question of culture and ideology or simply deal with it in a descriptive manner. The forces that enable a political movement to assume state power are different from, but not unconnected to, the forces that define a new regime. During the 1920s and 1930s virtually every country in Europe had a fascist movement, or political movements that displayed the characteristics of the fascist impulse, but relatively few of these movements progressed to political regimes, that is, took control of the state. Culture and ideology figure differently at both stages. In the movement phase, culture and ideology act as a powerful mobilizing device that frames the political beliefs of committed cadres of supporters. In the regime phase, culture and ideology serve as conversion mechanisms to ensure the consent of a broad public constituency.

Totalitarian states are not necessary outcomes and historical evidence suggests that they are as much fascist fictions as political realities. Mussolini declared that his regime was the first totalitarian state. Although recent historiography has shown that the fascist cultural project was highly fissured, the intention (if not the reality) of coherence was a goal. Arendt (1973) built terror into the definition of totalitarianism. Her quasi psychoanalytic approach to fascism paints a portrait of mass societies, mobs, and atomized individuals responding to the congeries of a police state and evokes contemporary neo Nazis and images of an Orwellian 1984. Terror and violence as analytic frames may capture the political realities of Stalinist Russia and Holocaust horrors, but terror did not represent the quotidian experience of Italian Fascism and distracts from historical and theoretical understanding. In contrast to Nazi Germany and Stalinist Russia, the Italian Fascist regime was relatively non-repressive.

Scholars have argued that it should be possible to establish a "fascist minimum," by which they mean a set of criteria without which fascism could not exist. Yet they have been reluctant to ascribe greater or lesser degrees of importance to the variables that they view as

characteristic of fascism. For example, Italian Fascism was anti Socialist and anti clerical, despite its conciliation with the Catholic Church, but above all it was anti liberal as liberalism was understood in early twentieth century Italy.

Discussions of Marxism have confounded discussions of fascism. Positing that fascism is not Marxism, or is a form of “anti Marxism,” fails to address the salient features of both ideologies. Many Fascists – including Mussolini himself – began their political careers as socialists. What were the differences and points of confluence between Fascism and Marxism which made the transition from one to the other possible?

The beginning of an answer lies in Sternhell’s (1994) analysis of fascism as an “independent cultural and political phenomenon” representing a “revision” of Marxism. According to Sternhell, fascism was a political hybrid that rejected, first, the liberal ideals of rationalism, individualism, and utilitarianism, and second, the materialistic dimensions of Marxism. From Marxism, fascism borrowed a concept of communitarianism embodied in a new form of revolutionary syndicalism; and from liberalism, it borrowed a commitment to free markets. Sternhell’s contention that market economies are compatible with fascist ideology and regimes forecloses purely economic interpretations of fascism. Sternhell’s analysis lends support to fascism’s disavowal of liberal political culture, but it is overly dependent upon the writings of national, and sometimes obscure, avant garde intellectuals to serve as a fulcrum for generating new theories of fascism.

Fascism refuses to go away. There are four identifiable stages in the career of fascism as a concept: first, the post World War II period when the classic analyses were written, spanning roughly from 1950 to the early 1970s (much of these writings have been discussed above); second, the social interpretations phase; third, the cultural institutional turn; and fourth, the return to political explanations.

Social interpretations of fascism began to reemerge in the 1980s. Heirs of Lipset’s mode of analysis, these studies were less deterministic and grounded in a nuanced notion of class and political action. De Grazia’s (1981) study of the

Fascist leisure organization the *Dopolavoro* examines how Fascism coopted the Italian working classes through the regime’s colonization of its leisure time. De Grazia focuses on how workers pursued political projects that on the face of it were against their interests instead of locating the charisma of Fascism in the collective psychology of class groupings.

Social interpretations have occupied more historians of Nazi Germany than of Fascist Italy. Two central and contrasting works in this genre are Browning’s (1992) history of a German police battalion in Poland and Goldhagen’s (1996) study of how ordinary Germans were not only complicit but actively engaged in the murder of the Jews. Browning provides a measured analysis of how ordinary citizens became involved in the Nazi genocide. Goldhagen argues “ordinary Germans” became killers because they were inherently anti Semitic and enjoyed hunting down their Jewish neighbors and engaging in acts of violence against them. Brustein (1996) argues membership in the Nazi Party was a rational and not an emotional decision. Career advancement demanded party membership and German citizens who wanted to feed and clothe their families fell in line.

In the mid 1990s the social approach to the study of fascism shaded into an approach that focused on political culture. Gentile (1993) studied the symbols of Italian Fascism and concluded that it was a form of political religion that sacralized politics. Another thread of the cultural analysis was the focus upon how cultural institutions intersected with political regimes. Berezin’s (1997) study of public political events links the study of fascist ritual to comparative political analysis.

The millennium has seen a resurgence of interest in fascism within the social sciences. Paxton (2004) begins where earlier generations of studies left off. Paxton sets himself the task of trying to define the parameters of fascism as a political phenomenon and he astutely chooses the term “anatomy” to characterize his project. As his title *Fascists* suggests, Mann (2004) rein vigorates the class approach to fascism. Mann analyzes six cases of inter war European fascism and identifies the presence of paramilitarism combined with the usual array of

anti statism and nationalist ideology as a distinguishing feature of fascism. Despite the vast array of new scholarship at their disposal, Mann and Paxton more or less conclude that fascism was an inter war European phenomenon that is not likely to repeat itself in its early twentieth century form.

Political scientist Nancy Bermeo's *Ordinary People in Extraordinary Times* (2003) is not exclusively a study of fascism and it has the advantage of including Latin America in the analysis. Bermeo views transitions to and from democracy as a series of choices that ordinary people make as they try to get on with their lives. This book taps into the attraction of individuals to political groups who offer solutions to practical problems. The attraction is based on potential efficacy rather than any prior moral assessment of ideology – whether that ideology is democratic or not. Bermeo offers a first step in demarcating the experience of the varieties of popular political choice.

A striking feature of various approaches, past and present, to fascism is lack of specificity. For example, violence is constitutive of political ideologies that are not fascist as well as those that have been labeled fascist. Berezin (1997) reviews an array of available theories. She argues that if one examines fascism in the historical moment in which it occurs, the early twentieth century, then its ideological opposite was socialism and communism. Indeed, many prominent fascists such as Mussolini himself began their careers as socialists and then became fascists. She concludes that the defining characteristic of fascism was that it was political disposition that conflated the public and private dimension of the self. The fascist self was a political self submerged in the nation. As such, fascism privileged public life over private life and demanded a perpetually mobilized citizenry. This conception of fascism has the advantage that it dehistoricizes fascism and creates an analytic frame that can be applied to other ideologies and historical instances. Examining other movements, regimes, and ideologies that demand the fusion of public and private self has the potential to lead to a more precise and conceptually refined definition of fascism.

SEE ALSO: Authoritarianism; Communism; Democracy; Ideology; Totalitarianism

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fatherhood

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Fatherhood is a social institution and includes the rights, duties, responsibilities, and statuses associated with being a father. A useful

distinction is made between the terms father, fathering, and fatherhood. The first refers to the connection made between a particular child and a particular man (whether biological or social). The second refers to behavior; the actual practices of “doing” parenting. The third refers to more general ideologies and public meanings associated with being a father.

Fatherhood research is conducted in a number of academic disciplines and commentaries on fatherhood have also become commonplace outside academia in literature and non fiction. Within the social sciences, researchers working from a developmental perspective use quantitative techniques to explore the effect of paternal influence and father–child relationships on the well being of children and fathers. Statistical techniques, applied to survey material, are also used to develop cause and effect linkages between men’s structural positions and their fathering behavior. Qualitative approaches, often associated with a symbolic interactionist perspective, are adopted by scholars interested in exploring individuals’ perceptions and experiences of diverse forms of fatherhood. Discourses of fatherhood are examined by poststructuralists using images of fatherhood in policy documents and the popular media. Apparent discrepancies between representations of fatherhood and fathering behavior mean that exploring the alleged gulf between the “culture” and “conduct” of fatherhood (La Rossa 1988) has become a major focus for scholarly attention.

The breadth and depth of research on fatherhood have developed exponentially since the 1970s. Debates about women’s role in society that emerged at this time stimulated a complementary interest in exploring masculinity. Women’s increasing participation in the labor market intensified discussion about the construction of motherhood and led to an awareness of the relative lack of comment about men’s roles in the family. Thus fatherhood research gained attention to provide balance to family research that was dominated by analyses of motherhood. Justification for the significance of fatherhood as a research topic in its own right drew on psychological evidence, which emphasized the importance of fathers for the successful emotional and educational development of children (Lamb 2003).

The changing nature of fatherhood is a consistent theme in research. The stereotypical image of Victorian fatherhood as strict and detached has been frequently adopted as a basis for comparison with contemporary ideas, and the emergence of scholarship on fatherhood in the 1970s sometimes led to an impression that a fundamentally different kind of fatherhood began during this period. The absence of a “usable past” (La Rossa 1997) may explain the tendency towards making overly neat distinctions between old/traditional and new fatherhood. A simplistic historical pattern describes the father as moving from moral guardian, disciplinarian, and educator, to the single role of financial provider, to the modern version of nurturing involvement (Pleck & Pleck 1997). However, more nuanced accounts have challenged this narrative by drawing attention, for example, to the presence of emotional responses to parenthood in men’s lives in earlier periods. It is now widely accepted that a linear progression does not easily fit onto historical reality or adequately indicate the complexity of fatherhood.

While there is general agreement that the meanings of fatherhood have altered, there is less consensus over the extent of change and the meaning of modern fatherhood. A key question is the degree to which being the financial provider remains a significant aspect of fatherhood. Those who claim the ideology of breadwinner/ricewinner has been replaced with the nurturing father model suggest it is the quality of the father–child relationship and childcare that is increasingly prioritized by men. Given women’s higher levels of participation in the labor market throughout the life course and the rise of dual income households, providing money to support family life can no longer be described as the preserve of the male parent. On the other hand, in two parent households men continue to contribute a larger proportion of the family income than women and the continuing expectation that men will provide for their family is exemplified in the common legal requirement that a father continues to be financially responsible for his children after divorce or separation.

Another focus is describing the components of “new” fatherhood. One characteristic is the development of an emotional relationship between father and child, but there is an

increased emphasis on “caring for” in addition to “caring about.” The words “nurturing” and “involved” are frequently invoked in order to capture this aspect of modern fatherhood. Nurturing is often applied to mothers and can be conceptualized as encompassing day to day care within the private sphere and focused on child development. Its application to men suggests a growing similarity between the roles of mothers and fathers. Involvement is a broad term that has been the subject of further qualification. In terms of childcare, three aspects have been demarcated: engagement, accessibility, and responsibility (Lamb et al. 1987). These refer respectively to interaction with a child through care or play; availability for interaction; and taking on the planning and forward thinking around children. Some authors have commented that providing money should be recognized as a form of involvement, although this suggests that involved fatherhood is a counter to negligent or absent fatherhood rather than to “traditional” fatherhood.

There is an awareness of fatherhood in political and policy arenas, which both reflects and encourages academic discussion. Concern over deadbeat dads (US) or feckless fathers (UK) is mainly associated with the absence of financial support for families, but also the potential impact of the lack of male role models and paternal influence over children’s lives. This has been characterized as the problem of “fatherless families” and has prompted right wing authors to support a return to traditional family values and the male breadwinner model. An alternative explanation for fathers’ absence from families is because they are undervalued and discriminated against in society. Many of the expanding fathers’ rights groups focus on the legal position of fathers with respect to issues such as the right of fathers to insist on or veto abortions and, perhaps most notably, custody access post divorce. Structural, especially workplace, constraints have also been noted as influential in men’s frustrated attempts to be “good dads.” Authors interested in this position concentrate on the extension of parental rights to fathers, such as paternity leave and access to reduced working hours. From a feminist perspective an increased role for men in relation to childcare seems essential in order to move towards gender equality, but

there is skepticism over whether an extension of rights by employers and states will lead to wholesale transformation.

Recognition of the heterogeneity of fathers’ social situation and relationship to their children has been an important development in fatherhood studies. Until recently, fatherhood, unlike motherhood, has not been a proven biological fact. Instead, fatherhood was confirmed indirectly through a man’s relationship to the mother of a child. The significance of biological fatherhood has increased with the arrival of DNA testing and the possibility of identifying the genetic parent. Perhaps paradoxically, social fatherhood without any biological tie is also gaining more attention. Increasing divorce and remarriage rates have led to more men entering fatherhood through either formal or informal adoptive and step relationships. Variations in the experiences and ideals of fatherhood due to differences in residency, age, class, sexuality, and ethnicity are also increasingly the subject of study. Further research can be expected to explore these terrains in order to develop a fuller picture of fatherhood. The future aim will be to establish the sociology of fatherhood as a *sui generis* area of study within the social sciences, albeit one which draws strongly on interdisciplinary perspectives.

SEE ALSO: Child Custody and Child Support; Childhood; Family, Men’s Involvement in; Gender, Work, and Family; Marriage, Sex, and Childbirth; Motherhood; Stepfathering

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fear

Jackie Eller and Andrea Eller

How do sociologists theoretically and empirically study fear? A simple answer is that the literature can be divided into two rather broad and overlapping areas of emphasis: fear as an emotion and fear as a consequence of or motivation for social relations.

While fear has its traditional roots in psychology, the sociological study of emotions draws on a rich heritage from theorists such as Durkheim, Mead, Cooley, Freud, Homans, and Goffman. It has been over the past 30 years that the sociology of emotions has emerged, emphasizing emotion as a crucial aspect of both micro and macrosociological examinations of social reality. Although there is general agreement among sociologists that emotions (fear included) are socially constructed and made meaningful within sociohistorical contexts, there is also some disagreement as to the importance of including certain elements such as biological and cognitive processes in the sociological examination of emotions (Barbalet 1998, 2002; Turner & Stets 2005; Turner 2006).

When sociologists examine fear as an emotion, they are in general consensus that it varies in interpretation and expression. But fear is also considered to be universal to the human experience, along with happiness, anger, and sadness. As a primary emotion, then, fear contributes to the experience of such secondary emotions as anxiety, shame, repulsion, and regret (Kemper 1987; Scheff 2000). However, as Tudor (2003: 244) notes, a sociology of fear “must examine the cultural matrix within which fear is realized and attend to the patterns of social activity routinely associated with it.”

In the conceptualization of fear as a consequence of or motivation for social relations, the concern is less with the examination of the emotion per se and more with the relationship of fear to anxiety, panic, risk, victimization, and social control. Of particular interest for researchers and apparently the public in general is fear of crime and victimization, especially as it relates to children, women, the elderly, drugs, terrorism, and the media (Glassner 1999; Altheide 2002, 2004; Elchardus et al. 2005).

The study of fear as an emotion has emerged alongside the 30 year development of a sociology of emotions in general. Of particular relevance for theorizing fear is the work of Kemper (power status model), who argues that loss of power and status leads to fear and that fear can be meaningfully conceptualized as an emotion that differentiates people. Drawing on Kemper’s work, Barbalet’s macrostructural theory of emotion argues not only that fear is potentially incapacitating, but also that it can motivate groups either to increase power in order to enhance interests or to work to maintain current power levels.

Although crime and concerns with security dominate the “fear of” literature, it is of significance to mention the emergence of an ever expanding list of that which is feared, by whom, and with what consequences for social control: falling from the middle class, gaining or losing weight, growing old, “different others,” impotency, disasters, and even knowledge. Most relevant is the growing body of literature that seeks to understand the relationship of fear and the media.

In addition to Turner and Stets, who work toward an integrated theory of the sociology of

emotions, current and future work on fear can be separated into three main areas: a (macro) sociology of fear, fear of crime, and media consumption and the discourse/politics of fear.

Tudor frames the social construction of fear in terms of six interlocking but distinct parameters: environments, cultures, and social structures (the modes of institutional fearfulness) and bodies, personalities, and social subjects (the modes of individual fearfulness). He then argues that this model may be used to test and further develop our understanding of a “culture of fear.”

Elchardus et al. argue that the empirical literature addressing the relationships between victimization and media consumption can be used to test the two most frequently appearing, although not necessarily identified, paradigms of fear: a rationalistic paradigm of fear of crime (consequence of risk and vulnerability) or a symbolic paradigm (consequence of a “collective malaise”). Ditton et al. (2004) add to this discussion by emphasizing that the weak relationships found between the counting of fear of crime and media consumption are less important than the consumers’ interpretation of the relevance of media content to their lives.

Despite the many “fear of” approaches, Altheide, among others, argues that a more useful approach is to study fear as “a perspective or an orientation to the world” (2002: 178) that emerges through a mass mediated discourse of fear – “the pervasive communication, symbolic awareness, and expectation that danger and risk are a central feature of the effective environment” (p. 41). He convincingly explains this discourse through the analysis of framing strategies, topics of fear, and the expanding list of victims and victimization. As Weigert (2003: 95) notes, fear and anxiety sow “dis ease,” the “social pathology of interaction” which threatens public order and personal identity. Altheide concludes that this discourse of fear has implications for the possible realization of a just society. Fear becomes the framework for constructing the social world but not necessarily a *safer* or more humane one.

SEE ALSO: Deviance, the Media and; Emotion: Cultural Aspects; Emotion Work; Insecurity and Fear of Crime; Moral Panics; Terrorism

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federalism

Brian Galligan

Federalism consists of two spheres of government, national and state, operating in the one political entity according to defined arrangements for sharing powers so that neither is sovereign over the other. According to William

Riker (1964), the activities of government must be divided in such a way that each government has some activities on which it makes final decisions. Daniel Elazar (1987) summed up federalism as a system of “self rule plus shared rule” – self rule in regional communities and shared rule at the national level. The older notion of federalism was an association of associations, or a league or confederation of independent member states whose delegates managed central institutions. This was the institutional form of the American Articles of Confederation that provided a weak form of national government during the War of Independence. In the 1789 Constitution, as explained in the *Federalist Papers*, the American founders created modern federalism by strengthening the powers of national government and making its key offices directly responsible to the people. Modern federalism was a significant innovation in both institutional design and popular sovereignty: the people became dual citizens, or members of the new national union while remaining members of the smaller state unions. Federalism was also a key feature of republican government, with powers controlled and limited through being divided between governments and constitutionally specified. The federal constitution was based upon popular sovereignty, with the leading institutions either directly elected or indirectly accountable to the people.

Federalism is a popular form of government adopted by quite heterogeneous countries. A survey by Ronald Watts (1999) lists 24 countries – 23 since the collapse of Yugoslavia – that account for about 40 percent of the world’s population, although the bulk of these are in India. The list includes quasi federations and federations that retain some overriding national powers that are more typical of unitary government. Examples are India, Pakistan, and Malaysia that have central emergency powers, while South Africa retains elements of its pre-1996 unitary system. Because of their diversity in political culture and stage of development, federations are usually grouped in clusters of more similar countries by scholars. The well established Anglo and European federations, Australia, Canada, and the United States, together with Austria, Germany, and Switzerland, are often assumed to be the core federal

systems. Other groupings in comparative studies are Latin American federations, to which Spain is now added, and less developed countries, of which Nigeria is a leading example. India tends to be studied separately because of its vast size and complexity. Federalism is also used as a paradigm for articulating federal tendencies in unitary countries, for example fiscal decentralization in China, or describing aspects of groupings of countries such as the European Union, which is more a confederation of nation states.

Federalism’s popularity is due to its flexibility as a form of government that can serve diverse and multiple purposes. It has proved resilient in the enduring older federations of Switzerland, the United States, Canada, and Australia, all of which have their origins in smaller established states coming together to form new national unions, and have prospered for more than a century. Federalism has been successfully reestablished in Germany and Austria, countries with long federal traditions, after World War II and periods of centralist rule. Federalism has become an attractive way for enabling unitary states like Belgium, Spain, and South Africa to decentralize. Federalism can be adopted primarily for any or all of a variety of purposes: to decentralize government and serve regional communities in large and diverse countries, to control government powers in order to safeguard individual rights and preserve market economies, to serve ethnically diverse societies that are regionally based, or to accommodate regions that are geographically distinct or at different stages of economic development. The United States and Australian federations have mainly decentralist and liberal purposes; Switzerland and Canada have a more fundamental ethnic purpose, as does Ethiopia, which allows a right of succession; Russia and the Latin American federations, Argentina, Brazil, Venezuela, and Mexico, have a combination of purposes including accommodating different stages of economic development among regions; while India has elements of all purposes.

While federalism is embodied in a variety of ways in federal countries, there is a set of institutions commonly identified as typical by federalism scholars. These are (1) a written constitution that specifies the division of

powers between national and state governments and is hard to amend; (2) a bicameral legislature with a strong federal chamber to represent the states; (3) a supreme court to protect the constitution through exercising the power of judicial review; and (4) a system of intergovernmental institutions to facilitate collaboration in areas of shared or overlapping jurisdiction. None of these features is exclusively federal, and each one can be found in varying forms in non federal countries. Taken together, they are considered to constitute the core federal institutions. Additional institutions that have been proposed as essential for federalism are a political party system that channels elites' behavior to support federalism; and well established state institutions that are sufficiently robust to withstand the tendency toward centralist power. Whether federalism suits a particular country and how well it works depends as much on political culture, traditions, and politics as it does on institutional design. For example, state governance that serves ethnically distinct regions can facilitate national integration or fragmentation.

While some have advocated a coordinate model of federalism – having separate and distinct powers for each sphere of government – concurrent or shared jurisdiction is the norm. Both levels of government are usually present in most major policy areas, so that intergovernmental arrangements and management are required to keep the systems working. Federal policymaking can be “interstate,” with varying degrees of competition between national and state governments, as tends to be the case in Anglo federations, or “intrastate,” as in the German and Austrian cases where the states, or *Länder*, are incorporated into national policymaking. Federalism has been variously criticized in the past as a weak, obsolete, or obstructive form of government, but its survival and recent flourishing belie those claims. The ways in which federalism affects policy innovation and development are complex, variable over time, and contingent upon political and cultural developments. Federalism provides both multiple veto points for blocking new policies and multiple entry points and sites for innovators. Federalism seems more compatible with the paradigm shift from a world of sovereign nation states to one of increased

interstate linkages and international rule making and standard setting. Even so, the effects of globalization, for better or worse, will be mediated through national institutions including federalism, and depend to a considerable extent upon national attributes, including heritage, ethnocultural composition, and political economy.

SEE ALSO: Democracy; Institution; Nation State; Organizations; Pluralism, American; Power

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female genital mutilation

Susan Hagood Lee

Female genital mutilation (FGM) is the ancient cultural practice of removing portions of a girl's genitalia. It occurs extensively in northern Africa on girls from infancy to puberty, with significant negative medical consequences. Many Muslims believe that it is a religious duty. The procedure reduces sexual desire and the patriarchal groups which practice FGM consider it necessary to maintain a girl's good reputation for marriage. Uncircumcised girls are believed to be unclean and promiscuous. In response to political pressure from African women's organizations, 14 countries have banned the procedure. Nonetheless, it continues to be practiced and has become increasingly medicalized. Grassroots change efforts working within cultural norms have been the most successful.

The World Health Organization defined FGM in 1995 as follows: “Female genital mutilation comprises all procedures that involve

partial or total removal of female external genitalia and/or injury to the female genital organs for cultural or any other non therapeutic reasons." The practice is also known as female circumcision (FC) or female genital cutting (FGC). The term FGM is used by international agencies, led by the World Health Organization. Some see the term as culturally judgmental and prefer the terms used by practitioners, namely circumcision (English speaking areas), excision (French speaking areas), or cutting. In Arabic, the language of many proponents of female circumcision, the practice is known as *tahara*, cleanliness or purification.

FGM occurs in four patterns or types. In Type I, the prepuce or hood over the clitoris is removed, sometimes together with part or all of the clitoris itself. This type is known by some as Sunnah circumcision, meaning in accordance with Muslim law. In Type II, the most common form with 80 percent of cases, the clitoris is removed (clitoridectomy), together with parts or all of the labia minora. Type III excision involves removal of all external genitalia, including clitoris, labia minora, and labia majora, and stitching together of the remaining tissue with a small opening for the passage of urine and menstrual blood. This type is called infibulation, Pharaonic circumcision, or Sudanese circumcision, and comprises 15 percent of cases. Type IV refers to other sorts of female genital mutilation, such as pricking, piercing, stretching or incision of the clitoris or labia, cauterization of the clitoris, cutting of the vagina, and introduction of corrosive substances or herbs into the vagina.

The practice occurs most frequently in northern Africa. In Somalia, Egypt, and Djibouti, 97 percent to 98 percent of all adult women have been circumcised. In the Sudan, 90 percent of adult women have been circumcised. Infibulation, the most severe type of FGM, is the traditional practice in these countries, though clitoridectomy has become more common in Egypt. Female circumcision is practiced in 28 African countries in all, including the East African countries of Ethiopia and Eritrea as well as the West African nations of Mali, Sierra Leone, Gambia, Guinea, Burkina Faso, and Nigeria. The prevalence within these countries sometimes varies dramatically by ethnic group. Education and urban residence reduce

the incidence of FGM somewhat. However, as many as 90 percent of Egyptian women with a secondary degree have been circumcised. Arabian countries near eastern Africa, such as Yemen, Oman, and the United Arab Emirates, also practice female circumcision. Muslim communities in other parts of the world, such as Indonesia and Malaysia, practice a less severe form of female circumcision, where a single drop of blood is drawn from the prepuce or clitoris. The practice of FGM has been carried to Europe and North America by African immigrants. It is estimated that in the US, 10,000 girls are at risk of being circumcised. Worldwide, around 140 million women or about 5 percent of the world's female population have been subjected to FGM. Two million additional girls are circumcised annually, around 6,000 girls per day.

The age at which girls undergo FGM varies according to the customs of their local village and region. The most common age is from 4 to 8 years. In some areas, infant girls are circumcised, while in other places, circumcision takes place upon the onset of menstruation or when a girl reaches the marriageable age of 14 to 16 years. In Egypt, girls are circumcised between the ages of 8 and 14 years. Typically, the procedure is performed in unsanitary conditions with ordinary cutting utensils such as razor blades, scissors, kitchen knives, or broken pieces of glass. The same cutting utensils are often used on several girls in succession without cleaning. Anesthesia is rarely used in village settings. In most areas, circumcision is carried out by older women, known in eastern Africa as *dayas*, who derive a substantial portion of their income from the ritual. In Sierra Leone, circumcisers are highly respected women viewed as priestesses by their followers. They head the traditional secret societies for excised girls in West Africa.

In a typical circumcision, according to Kathleen Kilday (1990), the girl lies down or sits on a low stool while her female relatives hold her head and arms tightly and stretch her legs apart. The women shout chants of encouragement to the girl, sometimes accompanied by loud drumming, as she struggles and cries out under the pain of cutting. After the excision, the relatives inspect the wound to verify that enough has been removed and the girl is sewn

up with catgut or silk. In Somalia, thorns are used. The open wound is covered with herbs to stem the bleeding and promote healing. The girl's legs are often bound together for a period of time during recovery and urination is particularly painful. According to Nawal El Saadawi (1980), who worked as a physician in rural Egypt, girls remember their circumcision as a searing pain, "like a burning flame" (p. 34). They feel betrayed by the people they trusted the most, their mother and other female relatives. Most come to accept the cultural explanation that the procedure is necessary to be a clean and pure woman prepared for marriage. When they become mothers of girls, they perpetuate the practice. Ellen Gruenbaum (2001) notes that women interviewed about their own circumcision remembered it vividly as a pivotal event of their childhood. Some laughed off the memories of the pain while others attributed it to the inevitable fate of women. A few work for cultural change.

Health consequences of FGM vary according to the conditions under which the procedure is conducted and the extent of the excision. In the typical village setting, the immediate health consequences for all types of FGM are infection from the use of unsanitary instruments, including HIV transmission. In some cases, girls die due to shock, hemorrhage, or septicemia. With infibulation, the urethral opening may be inadvertently blocked, preventing the girl from urinating, and she must be taken to a hospital for surgical intervention. Over the long term, women who have undergone FGM are more likely than non circumcised women to have urinary tract infections and pelvic inflammatory disease, sometimes resulting in infertility. Women who have experienced clitoridectomy and infibulation may have problematic abscesses and scarring as well as delayed menarche and difficulty reaching orgasm. Upon marriage, infibulated women must be opened for intercourse. In some areas, the husband is expected to open his wife with his penis or face dishonor. To avoid the humiliation of calling in the midwife if he is unable, a husband may cut his wife open himself with a razor or piece of glass. In other areas, the groom is expected to open his wife with a dagger on their wedding night.

Childbirth poses special risks for women with extensive excisions. Since scar tissue does

not stretch, labor is more likely to be prolonged and difficult and may involve additional cutting to permit delivery. Infibulated women may endure obstructed labor, resulting in a ruptured perineum for the mother and brain damage or death for the infant. Newborns of infibulated women are more vulnerable to infection. Infibulated women are almost always reinfibulated after delivery, and each subsequent delivery becomes more difficult as the amount of scar tissue in the area increases. Concomitant with these physical consequences of FGM, women may experience psychological repercussions such as depression, anxiety, and fear of sexual intercourse.

Female circumcision is a meaningful cultural event for practitioners. Among Muslim groups, it is widely believed to be a religious duty stipulated in the Qur'an. In reality, the Qur'an does not mention circumcision at all, for either females or males. Muslim references to circumcision occur in the secondary writings called the hadith or sayings of Mohammed where, in a conversation with an exciser called Um 'Atiyah, the Prophet confirmed that female circumcision was allowed within limits. Some Muslim commentators have challenged the validity of this hadith. Many Muslim leaders have supported the practice of female circumcision, with one imam ruling that while it is not obligatory, it is an honorable deed and recommended for Muslims. A few Muslim leaders have strongly condemned the practice and have led efforts to abolish it in places such as Senegal. They point out that the practice predates Islam and it is not observed in Saudi Arabia, the birthplace of Mohammed. Not only Muslims but also other religions engage in female circumcision in East Africa, including Protestants, Catholics, Coptic Christians, and Ethiopian Jews.

Practitioners give many non religious reasons for FGM. Concerns about virginity and marriage are paramount. Female circumcision reduces sexual desire and increases the likelihood that the girl will remain a virgin. A girl is considered unclean and promiscuous if she is not circumcised and so is a less attractive marriage choice. Marriage is the predominant occupation for women in these traditional low income societies. Parents who do not circumcise their daughters are seen as inexorably

neglectful of their daughter's future. Infibulation, the most severe sort of circumcision, increases a girl's marriage value since the very small opening ensures the girl's virginity. Infibulation is thought to increase male pleasure in sexual intercourse and so to contribute to a stable marriage. In the Sudan, infibulation confers higher class status on the girl and her family than more mild types of FGM. Parents consider these cultural benefits for their daughters and their families when deciding about circumcision.

FGM takes place in patriarchal cultures where women's status or even survival is dependent on pleasing men. Women take drastic steps to change their bodies in ways which improve their appeal to a male audience. Mothers arrange the circumcision of their daughters, midwives perform the operation, and female relatives serve as the cheering squad. One may compare the practice to cosmetic surgery in the West, another case where cultural notions of female beauty move women to engage in drastic medical interventions to increase their appeal to men. The significant difference is the lack of anesthesia or sanitary conditions in female genital mutilation.

FGM reveals the ancient patriarchal concern with control of female sexuality, key to maintaining the male dominated social structure. In regions which practice FGM, female sexuality is believed to be wild, aggressive, and threatening to the social order. Without preventive restraints, girls will be promiscuous and wives will wander. The West has also resorted to genital surgery to control female sexuality. In nineteenth century Britain and the United States, surgical removal of the clitoris was an accepted way to cure hysteria, masturbation, and other alleged female illnesses.

In colonial Africa, the British opposed the practice of FGM in their colonies, especially Sudan and Kenya, despite popular protests. Legal efforts to abolish FGM today are hampered by identification with colonialism. Some African leaders believe that to ban the practice is to undermine both African culture and Islam. They fear repercussions on other aspects of African culture, such as the West African female secret societies. Other African leaders have led the fight against FGM. The president of Burkina Faso, Thomas Sankara, strongly

opposed FGM before his assassination in 1987. Awa Thiam of Senegal was a pioneer in organizing female opposition and bringing political pressure on her country to abolish FGM. Fourteen African countries have passed laws banning FGM. The laws are not enforced, however. Low income countries do not have effective law enforcement even in urban areas, much less in rural villages. Progressive central governments, influenced by modern ideas, may pass laws that rural areas never hear of, much less obey. Even in urban areas, the cultural forces setting the stage for FGM require more than legislation to change.

In 1984, African women's non governmental organizations working on FGM met in Dakar, Senegal and formed the Inter African Committee on Traditional Practices Affecting the Health of Women and Children (IAC). The Committee has affiliates in 26 African countries and coordinates abolition efforts. The IAC opposes the growing medicalization of FGM in countries such as Egypt, which passed laws to restrict the procedure to medical settings with anesthesia. In Kenya, hospitals perform FGM despite a total legal ban. Medical professionals argue that the practice is better done in a hospital than in unsanitary conditions, while women's groups lobby the government to enforce the ban.

Successful efforts to change the prevalence of FGM have featured comprehensive action by government, the medical community, communities of faith, and public education. The most effective efforts have worked within the cultural context at the grassroots level. One such approach has been to replace FGM with another initiation ritual, such as a one week program in Kenya called "Circumcision through words." It teaches girls about self esteem, health issues, and problem solving and culminates in a coming of age ceremony with certificates, gifts, and feasting. In some areas, traditional midwives are trained to become salaried community health care workers who educate villagers on the dangers of FGM as well as other women's health issues. Some efforts have looked at the need for girls' education and economic development to lessen women's dependence on men. The most successful eradication efforts have been in Senegal with the Tostan project. Organized

by local women working with village religious leaders and supported by the national government, entire villages have taken a public pledge to refrain from circumcising their girls or marrying their sons to circumcised women.

SEE ALSO: Culture, Gender and; Gender, the Body and; Patriarchy; Sexual Cultures in Africa; Women, Religion and; Women's Health

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female masculinity

Silvia Posocco

Female masculinity refers to a range of masculine inflected identities and identifications. Debates over the status and meaning of female masculinity and the bodies and selves to whom the terms may be ascribed emerge in the context of analyses of sex, gender, and sexuality.

Research in social and cultural history has documented the lives of individual women who

defied gendered conventions, adopted masculine clothing, and/or engaged in gendered non-conformist behavior in Anglo American and European contexts from the eighteenth to the early twentieth centuries (Wheelwright 1989). The case of Colonel Victor Barker, for instance, caused notable controversy in England in the early twentieth century, as this military man was exposed to be female bodied and desiring a perjury trial (Wheelwright 1989). Scholarly approaches to archival material have tended to challenge transhistorical claims of stable forms of female masculinity across time (Halberstam 1998; Doan 2001). Assumed relations of equivalence and translatability between and across culturally specific practices relating to female masculinity have also appeared suspect (Blackwood 1998).

Key to the development of innovative conceptual trajectories on female masculinity in interdisciplinary academic gender studies are the numerous critical readings of Radclyffe Hall's novel *The Well of Loneliness* (1928) and related analyses of its cultural, social, and historical context. In her pioneering essay on the subject, anthropologist Esther Newton (2000 [1984]) notes that Hall's novel constitutes a central reference for paradigmatic imaginings of female masculinity in the twentieth century, and the ground for the entrenchment and popularization of a relation between female masculinity and lesbianism. Newton (2000 [1984]: 177) shows how, since the obscenity trial that took place in London in 1928, the novel's protagonist Stephen Gordon has acquired "mythic" archetypal status as a "mannish lesbian," that is, "a figure who is defined as lesbian because her behavior or dress (and usually both) manifests elements designated as exclusively masculine." Further analysis reveals that the subject matter of the novel exemplifies the cultural salience of discourses of sexology in early twentieth century England, the social significance of the medicalized category of "the invert," and the ways in which these discourses played out in the public domain (Prosser 1998; Doan 2001). A different reading is offered by de Lauretis (1994), who highlights the relevance of psychoanalysis to an understanding of the relation between masculine identification and lesbianism in *The Well of Loneliness*. It is de Lauretis's contention that

the Freudian “masculinity/virility complex,” with the female subject’s longing for a masculine identification, should be reinterpreted and not entirely dismissed. De Lauretis (1994: 211–12) argues that Stephen Gordon’s subjectivity comes into being through a fantasy of “bodily dispossession,” as the melancholic subject mourns a feminine embodiment that she can desire but does not fully embody, and a masculinity that she does embody but that is never maleness. In short, an original fantasy of castration underpins Stephen Gordon’s bodily dispossession, with her muscular body standing for the paternal phallus which ultimately places the female body beyond reach.

Halberstam (1998) challenges this psychoanalytic reading and instead proceeds from the premise that unhinging the relation between masculinity and men can yield important insights into the social and cultural production of masculinity. This theoretical move reveals a spectrum of female masculine inflected subject positions, identities, and identifications that in the nineteenth century included the androgyne, the tribade, and the female husband. In mid to late twentieth century Anglo American contexts, female masculinity comprises soft butch, butch, stone butch, and transbutch identities and identifications, the youthful exuberance of tomboys and the parodic performances of drag kings. Building on Rubin’s (1992: 467) classic definition of butch as “a category of lesbian gender that is constituted through the deployment and manipulation of masculine gender codes and symbols,” Halberstam (1998) aligns her spectrum of female masculinities, including the figure of the stone butch, firmly with lesbianism. However, in his analysis of transsexual autobiographies, Prosser (1998) contests this point and speaks of butch and stone butch identities as “propellers” toward transgender and transsexual identifications. Butch and stone butch thus become entangled in “border wars” (Hale 1998) that are as much about subjectivities as they are about the intellectual strategies at our disposal for understanding the articulation and experience of sex, gender, and sexuality.

In view of this, future research should aim to clarify the relation between female masculinity and queer theory. Whilst the emphasis on masculinity may correspond to a generalized rejection of the feminine and a specific form

of misogyny associated with queer theory (Martin 1994), previous analyses should be complemented by a sustained focus on the psychic and performative processes of production of masculine inflected identities and how these may be implicated in processes of identification and disidentification with, for instance, femme and feminine identities. Second, a response to Newton’s call (2000 [1984]: 66) for analyses that address the ways in which aesthetic, social, and cultural categories may function ethnographically is long overdue. This confirms the importance of investigating social taxonomies of female virility and masculine experience, their contexts and meanings in everyday life.

SEE ALSO: Drag Queens and Drag Kings; Femininities/Masculinities; Lesbianism; Queer Theory; Transgender, Transvestism, and Transsexualism

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female sex work as deviance

Ronald Weitzer

Sex work (in this case, involving female workers) refers to sexual services or performances provided in return for material compensation. Examples include pornography, prostitution, stripping, and telephone sex. The most common forms of sex work involve female workers and male customers – which reflects larger, traditional gender relations between men and women. Objectification of women is taken to the extreme in sex work, where the workers are valued almost exclusively for sexual purposes. The existence of commercial sex also provides men with an avenue for reaffirming their masculinity, by satisfying their “need” for sexual stimulation and fantasy or their desire for a certain type of sex with a certain type of woman. The gendered character of the sex industry is also evident in its power structure: most managers are men who exercise control over female workers and reap much of the profit. In general, power is largely concentrated in the hands of pimps, traffickers, and those who run brothels, strip clubs, and companies that produce and distribute.

Many people view sex work as deviant behavior. The opinion polls presented in Table 1 reveal that the majority of Americans see both prostitution and pornography as immoral;

three quarters believe that we need “stricter laws” to control pornography; and a substantial number want prostitution to remain illegal, strip clubs and massage parlors closed, and pornographic magazines/videos banned.

Over the past three decades some cities and suburbs have indeed banned or restricted massage parlors, strip clubs, and X rated video stores. During the Reagan administration the Justice Department launched a massive campaign against distributors of adult pornography, prosecuting them for obscenity in conservative areas of the country (“obscenity” is determined by local “community standards” as determined by a jury). The campaign was successful in putting a significant number of distributors out of business. Under President Clinton the Justice Department shifted its attention away from adult pornography and intensified enforcement against child pornography (Weitzer 2000: 11–12). Prostitution is illegal throughout the US, with the exception of rural counties in Nevada, where legal brothels have existed since 1971.

Americans are less tolerant of the sex industry than citizens in several other western societies. Certain types of prostitution, for example, are legal or tolerated in some European nations (e.g., the Netherlands, Germany), and opinion polls indicate that a majority of the population in Britain, Canada, France, and Portugal favor legalizing prostitution (Weitzer 2000: 166).

Some types of sex work are more heavily stigmatized than others. As Table 1 shows, stripping is less widely condemned than work

Table 1 Public opinion on sex work

	<i>% Agreeing</i>
Pornography leads to a “breakdown of morals”	62
Internet porn is a “major cause of the decline in moral values” in US	62
Looking at pornographic magazines is morally wrong	58
Pornography “degrades women because it portrays them as sex objects”	72
Need “stricter laws” to control pornography	77
Telephone-sex numbers should be illegal	76
Strip clubs should be illegal	46
Morally wrong for a “man to spend an evening with a prostitute”	61
Prostitution should be illegal	70
Media should publish names and photos of men convicted of soliciting prostitutes	50
Close massage parlors and porn shops that “might permit casual sex”	70

Sources: Opinion polls of Americans conducted between 1977 and 1996 (Weitzer 2000).

that involves direct sexual contact (prostitution, pornography). In general, sex workers are more stigmatized than their customers. This is because, first, the former engage in disreputable activity more regularly, whereas the customers typically participate occasionally and, second, a cultural double standard exists, whereby the sexual behavior of female sex workers is more circumscribed than the sexual behavior of their male clients. One reason for this disparity is that female sex workers break gender norms for women – by being sexually aggressive and promiscuous – whereas male customers' behavior is consistent with traditional male sexual socialization, which puts a premium on sexual titillation and valorizes sexual conquest as evidence of masculinity. Many men are willing to pay for sexual titillation in the form of pornography, exotic dancing, and Internet and telephone sex, and a minority has had contact with a prostitute. One third of American men report that they have watched an X rated video in the past year, 11 percent have been to a strip club in the past year, and 18 percent admit to having paid for sex at some time in their lives (Weitzer 2000: 1–2).

Because they are stigmatized, female sex workers typically attempt to deflect the stigma. They compartmentalize or separate their deviant work persona from their “real identity”; conceal their work from family and friends; describe their work in neutral or professional terms (“dancer” or “entertainer” instead of “stripper”; “actress” instead of “porn star”); and they may see themselves as performing a useful service (keeping marriages intact, engaging in sex therapy, providing emotional support to customers).

There are some major differences between street prostitution and indoor sex work (escorts, call girls, strippers, telephone sex workers, workers in brothels and massage parlors). First, street prostitutes are more heavily stigmatized than indoor workers. Some popular cultural depictions romanticize call girls while denigrating women who work the streets. Second, risk of exposure to sexually transmitted diseases varies between street and indoor workers. HIV infection rates vary markedly among street prostitutes (with the highest incidence among street workers who inject drugs or smoke crack cocaine), but HIV infection is rare among call

girls and other indoor workers. Third, indoor workers, and especially call girls and escorts, generally exercise more control over working conditions, express greater job satisfaction, and have higher self esteem than do street workers (Weitzer 2005). Fourth, street prostitutes are much more likely to be victimized. Street workers are more vulnerable to being assaulted, robbed, and raped by customers, pimps, and other men, and some have been kidnapped and killed. Indoor workers are much less vulnerable to such victimization, as several comparative studies show (Weitzer 2005). There is one important exception: women and girls who are recruited by force or fraud and trafficked to work in indoor venues (brothels, massage parlors, etc.) in another country (Kempadoo 2005). Such individuals are victimized from the very outset, and they differ dramatically from other types of indoor workers who make a conscious choice to enter the trade and have more control over their working conditions.

In sum, workers in different sectors of the sex trade have different kinds of work experiences – that is, varying degrees of stigma, victimization, exploitation, and freedom. The type of sex work makes a significant difference, and grand generalizations about “sex work” should be avoided.

Traditionally, the authorities in the US and elsewhere paid fairly little attention to customers involved in the purchase of illegal sex services or products. Until recently the criminal justice system targeted workers almost exclusively, all but ignoring the customers of prostitutes (or “johns”). Laws in the US and other societies continue to punish patronizing less severely than prostitution, and in most jurisdictions arrests of prostitutes far exceed those of customers. Customers who are prosecuted and convicted typically receive lower fines and are less likely to receive custodial sentences than prostitutes. This, despite the fact that arrested johns are much less likely to recidivate than arrested prostitutes. Only recently have the authorities in some cities begun to arrest customers in substantial numbers, but this is exceptional. But a substantial number of Americans want customers sanctioned: in a representative poll conducted in 1995 for *Newsweek*, half the population favored

a policy of displaying in the media the names and photos of men convicted of soliciting a prostitute (see also Table 1). The one area where law enforcement has intensified the most is against those who possess child pornography. This development is a fairly recent trend in the social control of persons involved in sexual exploitation of minors.

Customers have attracted far less research than sex workers, but some recent studies do focus on the clients. Many johns are middle aged, middle class, and married, but we are only beginning to understand their motivations, attitudes, and behavior patterns. A few studies suggest that customers patronize prostitutes for the following reasons: they desire certain types of sexual experiences (e.g., oral sex); they desire sex with a person with a certain image (e.g., sexy, raunchy, etc.) or with specific physical attributes (e.g., racial, transgender); they find this illicit and risky conduct thrilling; they wish to avoid the obligations or emotional attachment involved in a conventional relationship; they have difficulty finding someone for a conventional relationship (Jordan 1997; Monto 2000).

In the largest study yet conducted, 43 percent of customers reported that they “want a different kind of sex than my regular partner” provides; 47 percent said that they were “excited by the idea of approaching a prostitute”; 33 percent said they did not have the time for a conventional relationship; and 30 percent said they did not want the responsibilities of a conventional relationship (Monto 2000). Men who patronize call girls or escorts are often looking for companionship and emotional support, in addition to sex. Lever and Dolnick’s (2000) comparison of call girls and street prostitutes in Los Angeles found that customers expected and received much more emotional support from the call girls, and Prince (1986) found that 89 percent of call girls in California and 74 percent of Nevada’s brothel workers believed that “the average customer wants affection or love as well as sex” – the view of only one third of streetwalkers.

Some other studies examine customers of legal sectors of the sex industry, such as men who watch pornography, who call telephone sex lines, and who visit strip clubs. Flowers (1998) found that some telephone sex callers

want to fulfill ordinary sexual scenarios while others fantasized about incest, rape, pedophilia, bestiality, and mutilation. (Some phone sex operators refuse to take part in these fantasies and even try to curb some of the more extreme interests of the caller.) Customers of strip clubs, as Frank (2002) found, seek not only sexual stimulation and fantasy, but also want the company of attractive women. They enjoy talking, flirting, and sharing details of their lives with the women, and regular customers try to become friends with the dancers. Frank’s book is the only study to focus on the customers rather than the strippers.

A largely unexplored area is that of female customers of male prostitutes – a small but important fraction of the market. Some women tourists in the Caribbean and other vacation spots buy sex from young male prostitutes, whom they meet on the beaches and at clubs. Taylor’s (2001) study of 75 female tourists in Jamaica and the Dominican Republic who reported that they had had sexual encounters with local men found that 60 percent of the women had paid the men with money, gifts, and/or meals. There are some basic similarities between female sex tourism and male sex tourism (e.g., economic inequality between buyer and seller), as well as some differences (e.g., female sex tourists rarely assault or rob male prostitutes).

The sex industry has grown in the past two decades and has spread into new markets. This trend began with the creation of video recorders, followed by the advent of pornography on cable television, the rise of telephone sex operations, the growth of escort agencies, and the opportunities afforded by the Internet. The Internet offers unprecedented access to every kind of pornography imaginable, and also facilitates cyber exchanges, information sharing, and subsequent face to face encounters between clients and strippers, escorts, and other female sex workers. Furthermore, Internet message boards and chat rooms allow customers and others to discuss personal experiences with providers and share more general opinions of the sex industry. Participants discuss where to locate certain kinds of workers or a massage parlor; what to expect in terms of prices and services; “reviews” of a specific worker’s appearance and behavior; and warnings on

recent law enforcement activity in a particular city. The sites also provide unique insight into customer beliefs, expectations, justifications, and behavioral norms. Review of these sites confirms that many customers are looking for more than sex; they place a premium on the provider being friendly, conversational, kissing, cuddling, and providing what they call a “girlfriend experience” with a semblance of romance and intimacy (Weitzer 2005). Many of the cyber exchanges discuss appropriate and inappropriate client behavior toward sex workers, and errant individuals are chided for violating this emergent code of ethics. This normative order is a byproduct of discourse on Internet sites, something that did not exist previously.

Despite the proliferation of commercial sex over the past two decades, sex workers and their customers continue to be seen by many Americans as involved in disreputable, deviant behavior. In other words, it would be premature to say that any part of the sex industry has become “mainstream.” Both the workers and their clients remain stigmatized.

SEE ALSO: Gender, Deviance and; Pornography and Erotica; Prostitution; Sex Tourism; Sexual Deviance

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femininities/ masculinities

Amy Lind

Femininities and masculinities are acquired social identities: as individuals become socialized they develop a gender identity, an understanding of what it means to be a “man” or a “woman” (Laurie et al. 1999). How individuals develop an understanding of their gender identity, including whether or not they fit into these prescribed gender roles, depends upon the context within which they are socialized and how they view themselves in relation to societal gender norms. Class, racial, ethnic, and national factors play heavily into how individuals construct their gender identities and how they are perceived externally (hooks 2004). Gender identities are often naturalized; that is, they rely on a notion of biological difference, “so that ‘natural’ femininity [in a white, European, middle class context] encompasses, for example, motherhood, being nurturing, a desire for pretty clothes and the exhibition of emotions” (Laurie et al. 1999: 3). “Natural” masculinity, in contrast, may encompass fatherhood, acting “tough,” a desire for sports and competition, and hiding emotions (Connell

1997; Thompson 2000). In both cases, these constructions of gender identity are based on stereotypes that fall within the range of normative femininities and masculinities. Yet, as many sociologists have pointed out, not all individuals fit within these prescribed norms and as such, masculinities and femininities must be recognized as socially constituted, fluid, wide ranging, and historically and geographically differentiated (Connell 1997; Halberstam 1998; Laurie et al. 1999).

Feminist scholars have long addressed the social construction of femininities, particularly in the context of gender inequality and power (Lorber 1994). Early second wave feminist scholars such as Simone de Beauvoir (1980) argued that women's subordinated status in western societies was due to socialization rather than to any essential biological gender difference, as evidenced in her often cited phrase, "One is not born, but rather becomes, a woman." Many feminist scholars in Anglo Saxon and European countries have emphasized social construction over biological difference as an explanation for women's ways of being, acting, and knowing in the world and for their related gender subordination (Gilligan 1993). Some feminist scholars have addressed the social construction of femininities as a way to explain wage inequality, the global "feminization of poverty," and women's relegation to "feminine" labor markets (e.g., secretarial labor, garment industry, caring labor) and to the so called private realm of the household and family (Folbre 2001). Because feminists were primarily concerned with the question of women's subordination, masculinities themselves were rarely analyzed except in cases where scholars sought an explanation for male aggression or power. Likewise, hegemonic femininity was emphasized over alternative femininities such that the experiences of women who did not fit into socially prescribed gender roles were either left unexamined or viewed through the normative lens of gender dualisms (Halberstam 1998).

Particularly since the 1980s, at least three areas of research on gender identity have helped shift the debate on femininities and masculinities: (1) masculinity studies, which emerged primarily in the 1980s and 1990s; (2) queer studies and lesbian, gay, bisexual,

and transgender (LGBT) studies, including the pivotal research of Butler (1990); and (3) gender, race, ethnic, and postcolonial studies, a trajectory of scholarship in which researchers have long critiqued hegemonic forms of masculinity and femininity on the basis that these racialized constructions helped reinforce the criminalization and subordination of racial/ethnic minorities in industrialized societies and the colonization of both men and women in poor and/or non western regions.

In contrast to feminist scholarship that focused primarily on women's experiences with femininity, Connell's (1987) research on "hegemonic masculinity and emphasized femininity" was among the first to systematically analyze both sets of constructions as they contribute to global gender inequality. Connell argues "hegemonic masculinity," a type of masculinity oriented toward accommodating the interests and desires of men, forms the basis of patriarchal social orders. Similarly, "emphasized femininity," a hegemonic form of femininity, is "defined around compliance with [female] subordination and is oriented to accommodating the interests and desires of men" (p. 23). Borrowing from Gramsci's analysis of class hegemony and struggle, Connell develops a framework for understanding multiple competing masculinities and femininities. He argues that hegemonic masculinity is always constructed in relation to various subordinated masculinities as well as in relation to women. Thus, for example, non European, poor, non white, and/or gay men tend to experience subordinated masculinities, whereas men of middle class European, white, and/or heterosexual backgrounds tend to benefit from the privileges of hegemonic masculinity.

Especially since the 1980s, scholars of masculinity studies have produced innovative research on various aspects of men's lives and experiences. Messner (1992), for example, examines men's identifications with sports as an example of how masculinities are constructed and maintained. Messner analyzes the "male viewer" of today's most popular spectator sports in terms of the mythology and symbolism of masculine identification: common themes he encounters in his research include patriotism, militarism, violence, and meritocracy. Scholars of gay masculinities have

addressed how gay men of various ethnic, racial, class, and national backgrounds have negotiated hegemonic masculinity, sometimes in contradictory ways, and constructed alternative masculinities through their everyday lives (Messner 1997).

Importantly, research on hegemonic masculinities sheds light on how and why masculinity has been largely “invisible” in the lives of men who benefit from hegemonic masculinity and in the field of women’s/gender studies, which tends to focus on the experiences of women. Although there are obvious reasons why the field of women’s/gender studies has focused primarily on women, since women experience gender inequalities more than men, scholars increasingly have pointed out that male socialization processes and identities, as well as masculinist institutions and theories, should be examined as a way to rethink gender inequality. As Kimmel (2002) notes: “The ‘invisibility’ of masculinity in discussions of [gender] has political dimensions. The processes that confer privilege on one group and not another group are often invisible to those upon whom that privilege is conferred. Thus, not having to think about race is one of the luxuries of being white, just as not having to think about gender is one of the ‘patriarchal dividends’ of gender inequality.”

Judith Butler’s research on gender performativity has opened space for discussion about the naturalized linking of gender identity, the body, and sexual desire. Butler (1990) argues feminism has made a mistake by trying to assert that “women” are a group with common characteristics and interests. Like sociobiologists, feminists who rely exclusively on a sociocultural explanation of gender identity construction also fall prey to essentialism. Many individuals, especially those who define as “queer” or as lesbian, gay, bisexual, or transgendered, do not experience gender identity, embodiment, and sexual desire through the dominant norms of gender and heterosexuality. Influenced by Foucault, Butler suggests, like Connell, that certain cultural configurations of gender have seized a hegemonic hold. She calls for subversive action in the present: “gender trouble,” the mobilization, subversive confusion, and proliferation of genders, and therefore identity. This idea of identity as free floating

and not connected to an “essence” is one of the key ideas expressed in queer theory (EGS 2005).

Butler and other queer theorists have addressed how normative femininities and masculinities play a role in disciplining the lives of LGBT individuals. Halberstam’s (1998) research addresses constructions of “female masculinity” and argues that scholars must separate discussions of gender identity (e.g., masculinities, femininities) from discussions of the body. Women can “act masculine” just as men can “act feminine”; how individuals identify in terms of their gender is not and should not be linked to their biological anatomies, however defined. Halberstam’s own research addresses how masculine identified women experience gender, the stratification of masculinities (e.g., “heroic” vs. alternative masculinities), and the public emergence of other genders. Other scholars have examined how medical and scientific institutions have managed normative gender (and sexual) identities through psychological protocols and surgical intervention (Fausto Sterling 2000). This type of research points toward a broader understanding of gender that places dualistic conceptions of “masculine” vs. “feminine” and “male” vs. “female” into question.

Scholars of race, ethnic, and postcolonial studies have addressed how normative femininities and masculinities, which tend to benefit those with racial/ethnic privilege, help reinforce a racialized social order in which subordinated groups are demasculinized or feminized in ways that maintain their racial/ethnic subordination in society. One example involves the stereotyping of African American men as unruly and hypersexual. The “myth of the male rapist,” as Davis (2001) has discussed, has played a highly destructive role in black men’s lives and has influenced legal, political, and social actions toward them, including their disproportionate criminalization for rape, often based on fraudulent charges. Another example concerns immigrant men racialized as minorities in the US. Thai (2002) illustrates how working class Vietnamese American men have developed innovative strategies to achieve higher status in their communities by marrying middle to upper class Vietnamese women and bringing them to the US. Faced with few

marriage options and low paying jobs in the US, working class Vietnamese American men who experience a form of subordinated masculinity seek upward mobility through these transnational marriage networks.

Women of color in the US and working class women in developing countries also face unequal access to hegemonic femininity, as defined in western terms. Hill Collins (2004) addresses how African American women have been hypersexualized in US popular culture, thereby placing them outside the realm of normative femininity according to hegemonic white, western standards. Postcolonial studies scholars have demonstrated how poor women in developing regions (particularly non white women) have been sexualized by male tourists from industrialized countries and sometimes also by local men (Freeman 2001). More broadly, scholars of masculinities and/or femininities have pointed out how constructions of masculinities and femininities are embedded in social institutions (e.g., the state, economy, nation, educational system) and processes (e.g., social welfare policy, globalization, colonization, political campaigns, popular culture, everyday life) and shape individuals' everyday experiences and gendered self perceptions (Connell 1987, 1997; Laurie et al. 1999; Freeman 2001; Hill Collins 2004).

Critics have defended normative femininity and masculinity on religious, moral, and/or biological grounds. Some, for example, have argued that these social norms (what Connell would call hegemonic masculinity and emphasized femininity) are "naturally" aligned with men's and women's assumed biological roles in reproduction and/or with their assumed heterosexual desire (see Lorber 1994; Messner 1997). On all sides of the ideological spectrum, individuals have participated in interesting political responses and social movements that either embrace or challenge dominant societal constructions of masculinity and femininity. Some women have joined feminist movements and challenged traditional notions of femininity; whereas other women have joined right wing women's movements that embrace traditional gender roles and identities (e.g., Concerned Women for America). Men have formed feminist men's movements, based largely on the principles of women's feminist

movements, as well as movements to embrace traditional notions of fatherhood, as in the divergent examples of the Christian based (and largely white, middle class) Promise Keepers and the Million Man Marches, first organized in 1995 by Nation of Islam leader Louis Farrakhan and attended by over 800,000 African American men as part of a movement to reclaim black masculinity (Messner 1997).

Future research on femininities and masculinities will likely be influenced by the recent scholarship in the fields of masculinity studies, queer theory and LGBT studies, and race, ethnic, and postcolonial studies. Although scholars vary in their disciplinary backgrounds and methodological approaches to the study of femininities and masculinities, most would agree that femininities and masculinities can be seen as sets of rules or norms that govern female and male behavior, appearance, and self image.

SEE ALSO: Consumption, Girls' Culture and; Consumption, Masculinities and; Female Masculinity; Gender Oppression; Gendered Organizations/Institutions; Sex and Gender; Sexuality, Masculinity and

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feminism

Patricia Lengermann and Gillian Niebrugge

Feminism is the system of ideas and political practices based on the principle that women are human beings equal to men. Feminism may be the most wide ranging social movement in history, effecting change in the institutions, stratificational practices, and culture of nearly all societies. Its impact on sociology is the focus here. A study of this impact shows that sociology as an intellectual discipline and as a professional organization is itself deeply gendered, located in and affected by the society it attempts to study, and that its gendered

character changes only in response to changes in the gender dynamics within society – changes in part produced by the action of feminist sociologists.

As a system of ideas, feminism includes alternative discourses: liberal, cultural, materialist or socialist, radical, psychoanalytic, womanist, and postmodernist. Among these, liberal feminism and materialist feminism have been most important to sociology. Liberal feminism argues that equality with men means equal rights for women; it has focused on achieving those rights through political action, enlisting the state to prohibit practices of discrimination against women; while basically accepting the capitalist organization of society, it works for a more level playing field for women in that society. Materialist feminism attempts to incorporate Marxist or socialist ideas and focuses on social production as the key social process wherein equality must be achieved. Radical feminism has helped sociology define violence – domestic violence, spouse abuse, rape – as central to gender dynamics. Psychoanalytic feminism has effected a reworking of socialization theory. Womanist feminism challenges the concept of a unitary standpoint of “woman,” making intersectionality a key idea in feminist analysis. Postmodernist feminism has, as postmodernism has done everywhere, challenged some of the basic conceptual categories of feminist analysis, such as woman and gender.

As political practice, feminism is understood as a social movement with several periods of high mobilization, called “Waves.” First wave feminism is the period from about either 1792 (the date of Mary Wollstonecraft’s *Vindication of the Rights of Women*) or 1848 (the date of the first Women’s Rights Convention in Seneca Falls, New York) to 1920 (the date that US women got the vote). Second wave feminism is the period of activism that began in the 1960s – starting events were President Kennedy’s 1961 Commission on the Status of Women headed by Esther Peterson and Betty Friedan’s *The Feminine Mystique* (1963). Third wave feminism refers to the ideas and actions of women and men who will spend the majority of their lives in the twenty first century. Between first and second wave feminism there was a period of relative quiet, a seeming hiatus (though this is debated among scholars).

The relationship between feminism and sociology has existed from the beginning of the discipline. Women have been contributors to the enterprise of sociology as creators of professional organizations, sociological theory, sociological methods, and empirical research; they have made these contributions in the discipline's founding, classic, modern, and contemporary generations – and the majority of these women have been feminists, attracted to sociology's promise that social life can be studied as a human creation, that as such it can be controlled and changed in directions that are more just. It is possible to trace four generations of feminist sociologists. First wave feminism spanned two generations of sociology: the founding (1830–80) and classic (1890–1930) generations. The primary message of first wave feminist sociologists was that women could claim a right to participate in the discipline, to do sociology – theory, method, practice. Second wave feminism began at the midpoint of modern sociology (1930–90) and continues to influence the momentum of feminist sociologists in the contemporary generation (1990–). The primary message of second wave feminist sociologists has been that women have a right to participate equally with men in the enterprise of sociology and that sociology itself is not free of the sexism that shapes the societies it studies. Despite this long continuity, the history of women's sociology has followed the rule of women's history generally – it is lost and recovered, lost again, and rediscovered generation by generation. One work of second wave feminist sociologists has been the recovery of the founding and classic generations of women in sociology. Third wave feminism will presumably pattern the dynamics of the profession in the twenty first century – a prediction that draws its strength from the fact that women increasingly constitute the majority of students at all levels in sociology programs.

FEMINISM AND THE CONCEPTUAL PRACTICES OF SOCIOLOGY

Despite the gap in historical memory between the founding and classical generations and the modern generation of feminist sociologists, it is possible to generalize about themes that mark feminist sociology across all four generations.

These themes constitute feminism's contribution to the conceptual practices of sociology. But the presence and effect of these themes in sociology turn in part on their validity as descriptors of social reality and in part on the influence of feminism as a political movement.

The major contribution of feminism to sociological practice has probably been the concept of gender, which feminism has both centralized and refined. The first attempt at identifying gender as a sociological variable was made by Gilman (1898) when she described human society as distorted by "excessive sex distinction"; by "excessive" she means any distinction between men and women beyond the biologically necessary differentiation for reproduction. But Gilman's insight, while widely hailed by women, was not followed up in sociology. The term gender was used only infrequently in sociological publications until the 1970s – and only as a synonym for sex. A sample run of a computerized database shows that between 1895 and 1969 only 69 sociology articles used the concept and in none is it a major variable or title feature; but in the decade 1970 to 1979, over 500 articles are recorded as using gender, with many featuring it in the title.

In the modern usage of gender, feminist scholars worked to distinguish it from sex and sexuality. Three main understandings of gender have emerged from the engagement of feminism and sociology: gender has been understood as a part of role performance across institutions – and most recently as an institution in its own right (Martin 2004); as a product of ongoing individual activities in which social actors consciously and unconsciously "do gender" (West & Zimmerman 1987); as a stratificational category (Acker 1973) – including the concept of "gender class" (MacKinnon 1989). Whichever of these definitions a sociologist may work out of, the key feminist achievement has been to separate gender from sex as an analytic category and to define gender as a social construction imposed on perceived biological differences. The most radical claim urged by some feminist sociologists is that "gender" can and should be dismantled, that it is a dysfunctional social structure (Lorber 1994).

Central to all these approaches to gender is the process of gender socialization: the question

of how people learn to conduct themselves and to configure their identities around the socially constructed categories of masculine and feminine. Gender socialization is seen as occurring through a variety of social experiences – parent–child interaction, peer group experiences, children’s play, media representations. An important addition to this analysis is R. W. Connell’s discussion of “hegemonic masculinity,” a cultural construct that presents the exaggerated and idealized traits of manhood as a goal for all men; as idealizations, no individual can fully realize these traits, but they serve as an instrument of social control as individuals try to do so. Hegemonic masculinity legitimizes both male dominance over women and the dominance within patriarchy by some men – the most hegemonically masculine – over other men. The cultural complement to hegemonic masculinity is emphasized femininity.

The standpoint of women is the epistemological claim made by feminist sociologists that the social world can and should be analyzed from the perspective of women and that a complete sociological knowledge requires such an analysis. From Harriet Martineau’s Introduction to *Society in America* in 1836 to Charlotte Perkins Gilman’s analysis of food production in *Women and Economics* (1898) to Dorothy E. Smith’s landmark 1979 essay “A Sociology for Women,” feminist sociology has been shaped by the assertion that women’s standpoint offers an essential lens for discovering the organization of society and that the organization they discover is different from that of sociology based in male experience. The idea of a standpoint of women rests on three main claims in feminist epistemology: (1) that understanding of the world is created by embodied actors situated in groups that are variously located in social structure; (2) this understanding, therefore, is always partial and interest based; and (3) this understanding is shaped by the individual’s and the group’s experience of power or disempowerment in relation to others. There can be, feminists argue, a standpoint of women because women constitute a definable group, recognizable in part by their embodiedness, who share a common interest in terms of their assignment to specific tasks in social production and a common relation to power as it is exercised in patriarchy.

The idea of the standpoint of women has been limited and refined by Donna Haraway and Patricia Hill Collins (1998) to capture the fact of what Collins has termed “intersectionality” – the lived experience in an individual biography of the daily workings of social power as multifaceted and involving besides inequalities of gender, inequalities of race, class, geosocial location, age, and sexuality. This intersection produces what Haraway calls “situated vantage points” or shifting understandings of the world arising out of the relevant structures of a particular context at a particular moment.

Feminist epistemology charts the dynamic interplay between a standpoint of women and the experiences of intersectionality and situated vantage point. But in all forms, feminist epistemology challenges the universalizing voice of traditional and androcentric social theory.

MODEL OF SOCIETY

Feminist sociology’s model of society turns on a reworking of the traditional concept of social production. In this reworking feminists expand the concept of social production, critique the concept of “public and private spheres,” show how gender stratification permeates all of production, and offer a distinctive model of the way in which power and production in interaction organize the social world. From the standpoint of women, social production is seen as encompassing all the activities necessary to maintain human life – paid work in the economy, unpaid work in the home, the production of material goods – but also the production of emotional goods such as security, kindness, love, acceptance, etc., of order in time and space through coordination of schedules, waiting, cleaning, replenishing; and the reproduction of the worker both biologically in birth and childrearing and daily in all the activities of maintenance, including care of the sick.

This production is gendered. A gender ideology divides it into public and private spheres, and patriarchy as an organizing principle of social production means that women of every class find themselves responsible in some way for the private sphere. From the standpoint of women these spheres overlap so that

an individual's position in one sphere affects their position in the other. The public sphere is organized around the unacknowledged assumption of ongoing, uncompensated private sphere labor by women; a woman's work in the private sphere hinders her participation in the public sphere; her gender role in the private sphere patterns expectations of her in the public sphere; where public sphere participation for women intensifies the difficulty of private sphere performance, public sphere participation for men gives privileges in the private sphere; the sexual harassment of women is part of a battle between men and women over spheres and domains; for women who work as domestics, private sphere work is their public sphere participation; and for all women private sphere work is undervalued by the society. Feminist studies of the gendering of work have produced a vocabulary that has entered the everyday world: "women's double day or second shift," "sexual harassment," "equal pay," "pay equity," "comparable worth," "municipal housekeeping," "the glass ceiling," "domestic violence," "his marriage and hers," "the ideal worker norm," "juggling work and family."

Perhaps the most large scale generalization from this line of thought is Dorothy E. Smith's division of the social world into the local actualities of lived experience, where the world's production is done, and the relations of ruling, the interconnections of power which control and appropriate that production. In Smith's model all women are part of the local actualities of lived experience – as are most men; the domain of the relations of ruling is a masculine one, fulfilling what one might see as the ethic of hegemonic masculinity – control. This control is exercised through anonymous, impersonal, generalized texts – documents created by the apparatus of ruling that determine who can legitimately do what.

From the beginnings of their engagement with the discipline, feminist sociologists have been concerned with methodology, inventing many of sociology's most characteristic and innovative strategies for collecting and presenting data. They pioneered the survey, the interview, the questionnaire, personal budget keeping, participant observation, key informants, and secondary data analysis (census, legislation, memoirs and diaries, wage and cost

of living records, court reports, social worker reports, tax rolls, nursery rhymes, industrial accident reports). They were equally pioneering in methods of presentation, using photographs, detailed colored maps of neighborhoods, tables, bar charts, graphs, statistical analyses, narrative accounts, and extended quotation from subjects (Reinharz 1992; Lengermann & Niebrugge Brantley 1998).

Growing out of the lived experience of asserting the validity of women's standpoint in the world, feminist sociology has made as the cornerstone of its research ethic respect for the subject. It has argued from its beginnings (Holbrooke 1895) that the researcher is not at liberty ethically to "use" the subject as a source of information and then forget about him or her. Hallmarks of feminist research methodology are the practices of selecting research topics that may contribute to bettering the lives of women, taking the research back to the subject for comment, and active and helpful engagement in the life of the research subject as it is lived in the local actualities. Feminist method also emphasizes keeping alive the voice of the subject in the final report of the research.

FEMINISM AND THE ORGANIZATIONAL DEVELOPMENT OF SOCIOLOGY

The presence of these conceptual achievements of feminist practice in sociology rests ultimately on feminism as a political movement. Although the history of sociology is often told as a history of its great ideas transmitted from Europe to America, sociology in the US and Europe did not spring full grown as a set of ideas; its development turned equally on the establishment in the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries of organizational bases for professional practice. Of these, the academy was only one of many and in the establishment of these various bases feminists played an important but, until the 1990s, underappreciated role.

In the middle of the nineteenth century women spurred by first wave feminism were among the first adherents of the new social science movement (Bernard & Bernard 1943). The social science movement began as volunteer activity by concerned citizens who believed

that scientific inquiry could be used to address the social problems produced by the expansion of capitalism and industrialism. In Britain, feminist sociologist Harriet Martineau was an early supporter of the National Association for the Promotion of Social Science established in 1856. In the US, feminist Caroline Healey Dall corresponded with the British association and was one of the founding members of the American Social Science Association (1865) (ASSA). ASSA spawned and affiliated with many progressive organizations in which feminists played significant roles, including the National Conference of Charities and Corrections (NCCC) begun in 1874 and the Association for the Advancement of Women (which had begun as the Ladies' Social Science Association in 1873). State and local chapters of ASSA provided a base in which local feminists could play an important role. As sociologists began to establish an academic presence in the latter part of the nineteenth century, sexism in the academy meant that men became the professional face of sociology in that setting; women were welcome as students but not as professors. But between 1885 and 1910 sociology was also being practiced intelligently, innovatively, and self consciously outside the academy in the social settlements that grew up in America's major cities. For many citizens, settlement sociology was the face of the discipline and in that location women were the primary actors, particularly Jane Addams, consistently voted among the most admired Americans, in part for her sociological practice (Lengermann & Niebrugge Brantley 1998).

In the new American Sociological Society (ASS) formed in 1905, an indirect offshoot of ASSA, women were a very small minority; in the first year, women constituted about 12 percent of the society's membership – 15 out of a membership of 116. That percentage of professional activity within the association remained fairly constant down to about 1969. Though women maintained membership, presented papers at meetings, and wrote for the society's official publication the *American Journal of Society* (and had so done since its inaugural issue in 1895), they only occasionally were elected to national offices. Between 1932 and 1969 – a hiatus in the waves of women's activism – only 7 women reached the office of vice

president. Only one woman was elected president: Dorothy Swaine Thomas in 1952. Women in unknown numbers entered the profession indirectly as faculty wives, of whom the most influential for the profession was Helen McGill Hughes, who served the *AJS* as *de facto* and then acknowledged managing editor from 1944 to 1961, establishing practices for editing manuscripts and affecting the review process itself. In the years 1949 to 1958, while women represented slightly more than half of all bachelor's degrees in sociology in the US, they constituted only about one third of master's degrees, and only about 12 percent of all doctorates, authored only slightly more than 5 percent of journal articles in *AJS* and the *American Sociological Review*, and made up less than 10 percent of the attendance at annual meetings.

However, with the beginnings of second wave feminism, feminist sociologists began to organize – a move symbolized by Alice Rossi's 1964 declaration "An Immodest Proposal" that argued that society was free of "antifeminism" not because of an absence of sexism but because of an absence of feminist consciousness, that women had to "reassert the claim to sex equality." The reassertion of this claim within sociology had its first major impact on professional sociology at the 1969 ASA annual meeting in San Francisco, when the Women's Caucus produced a series of 10 resolutions voted on and accepted at the ASA Business Meeting, calling for equity in ASA organization, departmental hiring, training of graduate students, and in sociological curricula, for the promotion of women's history and for sociological study of sex inequality. In February 1971 some 20 members of the Women's Caucus met at Yale and formed Sociologists for Women in Society (SWS). Representative of the success of this effort is the 1973 *AJS* issue on "changing women in a changing society" in which Jessie Bernard (1973) described the four revolutions she had lived through in professional sociology, with feminism becoming the fourth.

But by the 1980s, while research on gender and women was certainly more present in journal discourse than in the past, what were considered the leading journals – *AJS*, *ASR*, and *Social Forces* – still published less on gender

and women than other journals. Responding to what Stacey and Thorne (1985) called the “missing feminist revolution in sociology,” the SWS in 1987 founded its own journal *Gender and Society*, which today has the largest readership of any SAGE sponsored journal. The SWS helped establish an ASA section on Sex and Gender which was in 2005 the largest section in the ASA. Since 1970 there have been 8 women presidents of ASA and 21 women vice presidents.

The 1990s represented a high water mark of feminist activism in professional sociology: 1993 marked the beginning of a period in which women have consistently received more doctorates than men; in 1994 women constituted 75 percent of the ASA Governing Council; by 1995 women were almost 50 percent of assistant professors and were approaching 40 percent of the associate professors; in 1996 they were 40 percent of the editors of ASA sponsored journals. Since then, there has been a leveling off of women’s participation in professional policymaking in the association. While from 2001 women constituted over 50 percent of all members of the ASA, this figure reflects the growth of female student membership – and also the general decline across the social sciences of male graduate students. The 2004 Report of the ASA Committee on the Status of Women in Sociology showed that women were still underrepresented in significant ways – on editorial boards, as editors, as recipients of major awards – and that women tend to leave the ranks of assistant professors in significantly greater numbers than men. One challenge for third wave feminist sociologists is to address equity issues in a situation where, while much has been achieved, much remains to be done.

SEE ALSO: Addams, Jane; Bernard, Jessie; Black Feminist Thought; Cultural Feminism; Ecofeminism; Feminism: First, Second, and Third Waves; Feminism and Science, Feminist Epistemology; Feminist Methodology; Feminist Pedagogy; Lesbian Feminism; Liberal Feminism; Materialist Feminisms; Multiracial Feminism; Postmodern Feminism; Psychoanalytic Feminism; Radical Feminism; Socialist Feminism; Third World and Postcolonial

Feminisms/Subaltern; Transnational and Global Feminisms

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feminism, first, second, and third waves

Jo Reger

The women's movement in the United States is generally broken into waves of protest, each set in different time periods with diverse tactics, ideologies, and goals. The waves are divided into a first wave, starting in the 1840s; a second wave, beginning in the late 1960s; and the third wave, emerging in the mid 1990s. Although most scholars and historians use the analytical device of waves to discuss the movement, a variety of debates have arisen around the concept, with some arguing that the wave model ignores some forms of collective action and groups.

Despite debates on the occurrence of waves within the movement, it is clear that in the United States, the women's movement shaped society, politically and culturally. As the result of campaigns addressing citizenship, suffrage, civil rights, and reproductive rights, US citizens live in a society where women are free to vote, own property, retain custody of their children, divorce and marry at will, work in traditionally male occupations, and obtain legal abortions. Beyond changes to the legislative and economic systems, feminist ideas have been incorporated into the mainstream. Ideas of feminine/female strength, independence, and free will are now a part of the cultural norms about women.

THE WAVE MODEL OF WOMEN'S MOVEMENTS

To understand why US women's activism is considered a movement, it is important to consider its characteristics. The US women's movement is enduring, having its roots in the abolition movement of the 1800s and continuing into contemporary times. It is organized, drawing on networks of activists and organizations from the first attempts at suffrage to current redefinitions of femininity and sexuality. Finally, it is dynamic, constantly changing and "spilling over" into other movements.

To describe this organized, shifting yet continuous movement, scholars break the movement into a series of waves that influence, yet differ from, each other. Each wave is characterized by a period of mass mobilization when women of different backgrounds united on common issues, followed by periods of fragmentation, when women searched for ways to acknowledge their differences and to work on a variety of issues, including those pertaining to race/ethnicity, class, and sexual identity. For example, in the first wave of feminism, women united over the goal of suffrage (among others) but experienced fragmentation when that goal was achieved and no consensus of future courses of action was identified. In addition, in the second wave of feminism, many disparate groups of feminists came together to fight for reproductive, occupational, and legal rights but experienced divisions as lesbian, working class and women of color began to articulate how their issues and identities have been left out of feminist activism and ideology.

Studies of the first wave tend to focus on the structural and organizational aspects of the movement. Therefore scholarship on the first wave investigates the organizations that emerged, activists' and organizations' relations with the political environment, and the larger social climate (e.g., demographic shifts). While these aspects continue to define the second and third wave of the movement, scholars also incorporate more cultural analyses to capture how individuals act politically, the role of identity and community, and multiplicity of oppression.

THE FIRST WAVE

The first wave of the US women's movement emerged in a time of great social change due to industrialization, national expansion, and a public discussion on individuals' rights. As the world that they knew began to change (i.e., growing rates of urban poverty, changes in workplace and family), women were drawn to social reform with the goal of helping the "unfortunate" in society. The issue of slavery drew many women into the public sphere and in the early 1800s, women were instrumental in organizing and participating in the Abolition

Movement. In 1837, women organized the first Anti Slavery Convention of American Women, without the assistance of men. Women were also active in the Temperance Movement struggles of the 1830s and 1840s. When denied the right to speak and visibly participate at anti slavery and temperance conventions, women reformers organized the first women's rights convention. The Seneca Falls Women's Rights Convention, held July 14, 1848, was organized by abolitionists Lucretia Mott and Elizabeth Cady Stanton and focused on multiple issues, including education rights, property reforms, and women's restrictive roles within the family. The convention attendees drew up a Declaration of Sentiments, modeled after the Declaration of Independence, which detailed how men had denied women their rights. It was only after much deliberation that the 300 attendees decided also to address the controversial issue of women's suffrage. The Seneca Falls convention sparked women's rights activism and spawned a decade of women's rights meetings and conventions throughout small towns in Ohio, New York, Pennsylvania, Massachusetts, and Indiana in the 1850s.

In addition to this focus on the politics and the state, first wave activists and organizations also worked for cultural change. From 1851 to 1854, there was a campaign to change women's dress. Dress reform activists argued that to change women's costumes would also work to change their lives. Women who adopted the "Bloomer" outfit of a loose tunic and pantaloons found it liberating. However, the dress reform movement brought a hostile backlash and consequently, activists advocated dropping the issue, fearing it was detracting from their other points of reform.

Race/ethnicity also became a divisive issue when some activists, such as Stanton, argued that white women should be given the vote to offset the votes of African, Chinese, and "ignorant" immigrant men. Although generally a popular speaker, Sojourner Truth, a former slave and women's rights reformer, often faced hostility as she spoke at women's rights conventions. The tendency for some suffragists to place gender disadvantage over other sources of discrimination served to drive a wedge between blacks and whites who were organizing together to win the vote. It is this history of racial

divisiveness, along with the later experiences of second wave feminists, that led feminists to reconceptualize oppressions as intertwined and intersecting instead of arguing over which oppression was the most relevant.

Scholars of the first wave have focused in particular on two organizations, each pursuing different strategies for winning women the vote. The National Woman Suffrage Association (NWSA), founded in 1868 by well known leaders Stanton and Susan B. Anthony, pursued a broad range of issues and endorsed more radical tactics. Stanton and Anthony believed that the courts were the fastest avenue to suffrage and eventually took their case to the Supreme Court. Adopting a different strategy was the American Woman Suffrage Association (AWSA), founded by Lucy Stone. Stone and her followers focused solely on suffrage issues and believed that working state by state was the most feasible strategy for winning national suffrage. The AWSA had success working with western states, and Wyoming (before it became a state) was the first to grant women suffrage.

By 1890, the focus of both groups had narrowed to suffrage so the two organizations merged, creating the National American Woman Suffrage Association (NAWSA). In 1913 the movement was again fragmented when a militant group called the Congressional Union formed. Led by Alice Paul, Congressional Union members engaged in dramatic tactics to draw public attention, such as marches, picketing, and hunger strikes. The Union, later renamed the National Woman's Party (NWP), brought new attention to suffrage and, in coalition with the NAWSA, the groups finally achieved their goal. Feminists had introduced the 19th Amendment every year since 1848 before it finally passed on August 26, 1920.

Along with the suffragist organizations, other women's groups emerged in the first wave. These organizations focused on a variety of concerns from child custody laws to lobbying for equal pay. The Women's Christian Temperance Union (WCTU) from 1874 to 1898 was one of the most visible and drew women into the public sphere as anti alcohol reformers and activists. Other organizations, perceived as less radical and scandalous than the suffrage groups, also mobilized women at a time when educational and career opportunities were

expanding for women but traditional ideas and practices constrained them. Through lobbying for suffrage and other issues and repeatedly presenting women's claims to legislators and other political actors, the first wave of the women's movement had left an important mark on American interest group politics.

In sum, the first wave of the movement has been characterized as seeking national level policy and legislative change, populated mostly by white upper and middle class women within organizational contexts, and subject to factions, divisiveness, and dwindling mobilization after the suffrage victory. This focus on organizational visibility led to the common belief that the women's movement ceased to exist in the 1920s. Starting in the late 1980s, feminist scholars began to examine the ways in which the women's movement was sustained but not visible to the public. The term "abeyance" was coined by social movement scholar Verta Taylor to illustrate how the movement had not disappeared but instead continued to exist in a period of dormancy, sheltered in organizations such as the NWP. Dialogues on women's equality also continued after suffrage in networks and communities such as the Communist Party in the 1940s, 1950s, and early 1960s. By the 1950s, despite the traditional images of women, more and more middle class white women were entering the labor force, and single motherhood and divorce rates were beginning to rise. The strain between societal expectations of domesticity and women's experiences in education and the workforce, along with other factors such as the rise of the cycle of new social movements that swept the United States and Western Europe, led to the reemergence of the movement in the 1960s and 1970s.

THE SECOND WAVE

While the structural changes that created opportunities for women to attain skills and establish networks through the workplace may have set the stage for the rise of the first wave, it was the actual lived experiences of women and the construction of a shared feminist identity among groups of women that led to the second wave. The emergence of the second

wave drew on activist networks from the first wave as well as other movements, particularly the New Left and the Civil Rights Movement. In addition, the publication of books such as Simone de Beauvoir's *The Second Sex* in 1952 and Betty Friedan's *The Feminine Mystique* in 1962 sparked primarily white middle class women's dissatisfaction with the roles of men and women.

Two events mark the reemergence of the second wave. First was the break from the New Left and Civil Rights movements by politically educated younger women dissatisfied with these movements' failure to address gender issues. Women in the New Left and Civil Rights movements participated in a variety of protests, gaining important political organizing skills. For example, Jo Freeman and Vivian Rothstein, who later became women's liberation movement organizers, participated in the Free Speech Movement's sit in and strike at Berkeley. However, by 1964, women were beginning to articulate their issues with the patriarchal structure and culture of the movements. In 1965, Casey Hayden and Mary King circulated a memo on sexism in the Civil Rights Movement and the "woman question" was raised at a Students for Democratic Society meeting that same year.

Second was the formation of the National Organization for Women (NOW) by a group of women enmeshed in government networks and upset at the lack of attention to workplace discrimination against women by the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC). NOW formed October 29, 1966 during a luncheon of women at the National Conference of State Commissions in Washington, DC. NOW was created when conference participants were blocked from passing a resolution pressing the EEOC to use greater force in investigating sex discrimination cases. Founding members include Friedan, lawyer and Civil Rights activist Pauli Murray, and Kay Clarenbach, head of the Wisconsin Commission on the Status of Women. Modeled after the National Association for the Advancement of Colored People (NAACP), NOW's original goal was to expand women's economic rights and responsibilities by fighting sex discrimination in the workforce. In one of its first actions, NOW pressured the EEOC to end the

practice of sex segregated help wanted advertisements in newspapers. Along with employment and economic issues, NOW formed task forces to deal with areas of discrimination in education and religion; family rights; women's image in the mass media; political rights and responsibilities; and problems facing poor women.

These two events, the split from contemporary movements and the formation of NOW, served as the seeds of two different branches of the movement. These branches are described in a variety of ways, including "small group sector" versus "mass movement," "collectivist" versus "bureaucratic," "younger women" versus "older women," "liberal" versus "radical," and "women's rights" versus "women's liberation." The two branches were connected through interpersonal and organizational networks, had overlapping memberships, and cooperated on some goals.

Drawing on younger, college age students, the women's liberation branch encompassed different ideologies and organizational structures. Women's liberation groups tended to be collectivist versus hierarchical in structure, and without established leaders and organizational positions.

The women's liberation branch endorsed a more radical feminist ideology, influenced by socialist, radical, and lesbian feminist theory, and participants believed that change came through personal and systematic transformation. For example, to accomplish personal transformation, The Redstockings, a radical feminist group, began to organize consciousness raising groups. Consciousness raising (CR) is a process by which women share personal experiences and beliefs as a means to illuminate patriarchal control and oppression. In CR groups, women discussed a variety of issues from sexuality to housework, connecting them to gender inequality. CR, as a form of a politicized personal strategy, spread into the dominant culture and into women's rights organizations, such as NOW, that recognized it for its recruitment potential.

The membership of the women's rights branch of the movement was predominantly older, middle class professional women concerned with legislative and policy issues. The women's rights branch of feminism focused on

change through legislation and placement of women in positions of power as the vehicle to equality. The ideas of liberal feminism, that men and women will become equal when they are in comparable positions in society, are reflected in the overall strategies of the women's rights branch.

Actions from both branches brought media attention and drew large numbers of women into feminism. From the years 1972 to 1982, the second wave was in what has been characterized as its heyday. Women's liberation groups continued to recruit women to feminism and caused cultural shock waves with their critiques of femininity, gender roles, and heterosexuality. During this period, the American culture was shaped by the creation of cultural institutions such as *Ms. Magazine* and Naiad Press, a lesbian book publisher, and the growth of women's music through such companies as Olivia Records. It was also during this time that women's studies programs began appearing on college campuses. In the meantime, women's rights groups won legislative victories with the 1972 passage of Title IX directed at ending sex discrimination in publicly funded education and the 1973 *Roe v. Wade* decision by the Supreme Court legalizing abortion. One result of this heightened activity in the United States and abroad was that in 1975 the United Nations sponsored the First International Conference on Women in Mexico City.

Although these years were times of success for feminists, it was also a period of conflict, fragmentation, and growing discord in the movement. Lesbians, working class women, and women of color critiqued white middle class women's control of both branches of the movement. NOW suffered from dissension over the presence of lesbians in the organization. Some lesbian feminists began to organize separately in the 1970s and, in 1973, held a national conference. NOW eventually changed its position and endorsed lesbian rights. Working class women also struggled with the movement, believing that their work and family lives were not being addressed, and created separate organizations. For example, the Coalition of Labor Union Women was formed in 1974, when 3,000 women met to address sexism in the unions and also women's inequality in society. Women of color also worked with and

separated from the second wave. Black women, along with Chicana and Asian American women, often had their racial, ethnic, and class based experiences of discrimination ignored, so they created organizations – including the National Black Feminist Organization, the Mexican American Women’s National Association, and the Pan Asian American Women – specifically designed to address their issues. Informed by the discord in the first and second waves, feminists and feminist scholars, such as the Combahee River Collective and, later, Patricia Hill Collins, conceptualized an intersectional feminist paradigm that views race/ethnicity, class, gender, and sexuality as interlocking systems of oppression, forming a “matrix of domination.”

As the second wave experienced fragmentation and dissension from within, it also faced growing countermovements, particularly opposing the Equal Rights Amendment (ERA) and abortion rights. By the late 1970s, the two branches had largely united in an effort to pass the ERA, an amendment originally introduced in the 1920s by the NWP to the Constitution that would guarantee women equal rights under the law; however, the amendment was defeated in 1982. The ERA’s demise and the election of conservative president Ronald Reagan instigated a period of backlash. Many of the gains of the past decade were eroded, and media pundits labeled the 1980s the “post feminist era.” Among the setbacks was a lack of compliance with Title IX, increased cases of work related sexual harassment, increasing state restrictions on abortion and related services, escalating anti abortion violence, and attacks on affirmative action. However, the movement survived with activists drawing on established organizations, networks, and women’s communities for stability and support. In sum, the second wave of the women’s movement brought about a resurgence, differentiation, and expansion of feminist activism and ideologies, along with shifting strategies and tactics from the confrontational strategy in the 1960s, to the organizational strategy in the 1970s, and the electoral strategy in the 1980s. In its two branches, movement activists influenced national policy as well as addressed personal experience and cultural norms.

Evident in these historical accounts is the continuity of feminist organizing in the United

States. Influenced by structural and political shifts and maintained by organizations, networks, and communities, the movement has undergone different levels of mobilization, but it has not died. In fact, feminism continues to shape political society. For example, political sociologists have shown how feminist ideas continue to shape the polity. Women identifying as feminists account for a large portion of the gender gap on specific issues, in particular domestic issues involving social service spending. For example, in the 1992 US presidential election, feminist consciousness emerged as a significant factor in shaping women’s voting behavior.

THE THIRD WAVE

The popular media and some political pundits have repeatedly declared feminism dead or in decline. Scholars and activists respond to these obituaries in different ways. Some argue that these “premature” death notices serve a larger goal, preserving the status quo by erasing women’s activism. Others argue that feminism is still alive, yet suffering from a backlash and is carried on through the efforts of “older” feminists and their organizations, institutions, and policies put in place in the 1960s and 1970s. Some argue that feminism diffused into the larger culture, bringing about a “post feminist” era where feminist goals and ideology are alive but submerged into the broader culture. Others see the movement in a state of abeyance, awaiting external impetus for remobilization. Others view the movement as fragmented, particularly because of issues of homophobia, classism, and racism, yet insist that it still remains active and vital. Related to this view, others argue that feminism has changed form and is now done in a different way by a new generation of activists.

Adopting the view that the movement has changed form and tactics, some scholars and participants refer to this phase of the women’s movement as “the third wave.” The idea of a third wave comes from the concept of a political generation, a period when common historical experiences form a political frame of reference for a group. Young women and men in the twenty first century enter into feminism

in a society dramatically shaped by the movement's first two waves. Through the efforts of second wave activists, a variety of feminist cultural events exist – ranging from feminist theater, cruises, and music and comedy festivals to camps, day care programs, and workshops on feminist spirituality. Young girls and boys can read non gendered children's books, listen to feminist music, and attend summer camps organized around gender equity. In addition, feminism is embedded in the institutions in which third wave feminists spend their lives. Their families, schools, health care providers, and political representatives have been influenced by the beliefs and values of first and second wave feminism.

While scholars of the first and second wave trace the emergence of feminist activism to specific organizational events (i.e., the Seneca Falls Convention or the formation of NOW), the third wave's emergence is less obvious. A variety of explanations for the origin of the third wave exist. In 1991, Lynn Chancer called for a "third wave" feminism to signify a turn from the defensive posture of the 1980s feminism and its backlash. Some credit its emergence to Rebecca Walker when, in 1995, she called herself "third wave" in the introduction of her anthology, *To Be Real*. For others, the Riot Grrrl movement in the Northwest United States in the 1990s signaled the conceptualization of a new, punk infused, generationally defined form of feminism. Finally, many credit the rise of the third wave as having its origins in the challenges made by women of color to the second wave for its lack of racial ethnic inclusivity. In all of these origins, third wave feminism is seen as drawing on the political, cultural, and institutional accomplishments of the second wave, while finding new forms of protest and working to undo norms of racism, classism, and homophobia that marred early waves of feminism.

The third wave has organizational roots, similar to the first and second waves, along with more subcultural and submerged roots. For example, the Third Wave Foundation was formed as a social justice organization addressing a variety of gender, racial, ethnic, and sexuality related concerns in 1997 for women aged 15 to 30. The Riot Grrrl movement shifted from being musically oriented to politically

oriented with a 1992 convention and saw several chapters form in the early to mid 1990s. In addition, second wave organizations such as *Ms. Magazine* also serve as a point of origin for several voices of contemporary feminism such as Jennifer Baumgardner, co author of *Manifesta*, and Rebecca Walker, editor of *To Be Real*. NOW has also launched several initiatives to involve young feminists in the organization.

Despite these groups, many view the third wave as cultural and submerged into broader subcultures of music, social justice activism, and art. In the early 1990s, several cultural events contributed to a growing sense of a generational change from second to third wave feminism. Singer Ani DiFranco launched her record company, Righteous Babe, in 1990 and became for many young activists the voice of contemporary feminism along with other performers such as Alix Olson and the Indigo Girls. Magazines such as *Bitch* and *Bust* emerged, expanding from their do it yourself 'zine inceptions.

Incorporated in these cultural vehicles are familiar political issues such as sexual harassment, occupational discrimination, violence, sexual abuse, and body image that continue to concern third wave feminists. Just as the first and second wave did with protests against restrictive dress, third wave feminists attack cultural norms of femininity. However, these protests have a new twist. Using the body as a site of protest, Lesbian Avengers, a group visible in the early to mid 1990s, "ate fire" to symbolize their strength and boldness. Other young feminists engage in disparaged feminine activities such as crafting, knitting, and embracing the color pink as a way to reclaim and redefine femininity. For example, a regular column in *Bust* magazine provides readers with how to instructions on a variety of crafts. This reclaiming of the feminine is not solely in the province of individuals. Political organizations also draw upon both traditional political strategies and inventive protests to reclaim the feminine. Code Pink, a grassroots peace and social justice movement, protested at the 2004 Republican National Convention, using the color pink as an antidote to the Bush administration state of emergency color coding system, and as a way to give President Bush the "pink slip."

Both collectively and individually, third wave feminists use the performance of identity to redefine femininity and make political statements. For example, some twenty first century young feminists play with gender by wearing short skirts with combat boots and masculine looking haircuts. In this case, feminists take cultural norms and, using the body, reinvent them as a display of feminine power. Along with playing with appearance, third wave writers and activists also talk of reinventing sexuality and gender norms. Young feminist scholars argue that activists need to fight against societally defined norms of feminine sexuality as well as second wave conceptions of sexual appropriateness, reclaiming pleasure through the use of sexual play and sex toys.

The culturally focused tactics of the third wave also emerge from institutional settings, such as education. Women's studies plays an important role in the continuity and continued mobilization of feminism. Young women come to feminism through transmission from their mothers and from women's studies courses that link the theoretical with the political. Much of contemporary feminist activism by young women is being done in college or university contexts in conjunction with women's studies departments and/or women's centers.

Along with shifts in issues, contemporary feminists are also turning to new ways to mobilize and communicate. Third wave feminists are increasingly turning to the Internet as the site of protest and the source of community. Cyberfeminism, a movement started in the 1990s, uses technology to redefine femininity and address a masculinist approach to technology that can alienate women. At a 1997 international conference in Kassel, Germany, cyberfeminists refused to define themselves and instead created a list of "100 Antitheses" of what the movement is not. Those antitheses include "cyberfeminism is not a fragrance," "cyberfeminism is not an ideology," and "cyberfeminism is not a structure" (Old Boys Network 1997). The Internet is also home to a multitude of sites dedicated to feminist organizations and to communities of activists who mobilize, support, and inform each other within web pages, or through blogs (i.e., Internet diaries) or ongoing journals.

One challenge facing the third wave is the sense of generational discord that pervades both

this wave and the second wave. Young feminists (i.e., third wave) often feel that older (i.e., second wave) feminists malign their more individual and performance oriented protests and would prefer to see more traditional, organizationally focused activism. Older feminists report that their histories and efforts are often oversimplified and that the complexity of earlier feminisms is ignored. These sentiments have led to serious dissension between the two groups. For example, at the 2002 Veteran Feminists of America meeting, a group of predominantly second wave feminists bemoaned the lack of clear activism by young women, while third wave feminists reported feeling patronized and ignored. Because of this, second and third wave feminists often have difficulties in working cooperatively with each other. One area in which the generations have different views is on the issue of racial ethnic inclusion. A major emphasis of third wave feminist ideology is acknowledging the differences between women and working to incorporate all women into feminist activism. This view is founded on the idea that first and second wave feminists failed to build inclusive organizations and networks. While many second wave feminists admit this is true, they also argue that the history presented by third wavers ignores the efforts of women who tried and sometimes successfully integrated feminist groups and worked to meet all women's needs, not just those of white middle class women.

In sum, contemporary feminism continues to shift and change, drawing on the ideas, strategies, and institutional gains of past waves of the women's movement, at the same time as it appropriates modern technologies, the media, gender codes, and the fabric of everyday life as sources of resistance. Simply stated, feminism in the twenty first century is the same but different. It draws on the first two waves of the women's movement, yet functions in a fundamentally different world that demands scholars' continued innovation in order to capture the complexity and dynamics of that world.

DEBATES ABOUT THE WAVE MODEL

Some scholars have argued that the wave model, although conceptually neat, ignores

forms of protest activity. Scholars, such as Mary Katzenstein, argue that one reason much feminist protest in modern society goes unnoticed is because it takes place inside mainstream institutions, such as medicine, education, religion, and the workplace, rather than in the streets, in what she labels “unobtrusive mobilization.” For example, the creation of sub merged networks within societal institutions such as the Catholic Church and the US military has sustained the women’s movement. Unobtrusive mobilization is also evident in the feminist activism inspired by cultural events such as women’s movement festivals, institutionalized organizations with feminist origins, and work oriented organizations such as unions. Within these organizations and institutions, feminism is carried out through an identity that activists use to make sense of their lives and is spread through networks promoting movement goals.

Outside of the institutional contexts, sub merged networks (i.e., those not readily evident to others such as scholars, media, and politicians) may also be left out of the conceptual framework of the “wave.” Scholar Nancy Naples documents the networks that emerged in neighborhood communities as a result of the 1960s War against Poverty. Activists, drawing on feminist ideologies and strategies, turned their attention from national level policy to focus on community work. While many of the low income urban women involved did not identify as feminists or label their work as “political,” they organize in their neighborhoods drawing on the rhetoric of “activist mothering.” In addition, although less visible than it was in the movement’s heyday, feminism in the late 1980s and 1990s established roots in other social movements of the period. Scholars argue that the women’s movement, through the creation of networks, heavily influenced the peace and anti nuclear movements of the 1980s by spreading feminist ideological frames, tactical repertoires, and conceptions of organizational structure and leadership. In sum, scholars argue that the women’s movement trained a large number of feminist activists in the 1970s who, through their networks, have participated in new social movements and integrated feminism into them. This spillover is evident in the ways in which contemporary

feminists engage in a variety of global concerns. For example, the New York City Radical Cheerleaders is a grassroots organization that subverts the traditionally feminine activity of cheerleading by protesting issues such as globalization, the war in Iraq, the occupation of Palestine, and sweatshops as well as sexual harassment, homophobia, and fat bias (New York Radical Cheerleaders 2005).

Along with the criticism that the wave model leaves out some contexts of protests is the argument that the wave model excludes movements of groups marginalized in society, such as women of color, lesbians, and working class women, and focuses more on the activities of white, middle class, heterosexual women. Scholars adopting this view argue that the second wave was in reality one of *feminisms*, with women of color and white women working on similar issues in organizationally distinct movements. This focus on the most visible groups creates a history shaped by hegemonic (i.e., dominant) feminism and ignores a justice based perspective toward feminism. By tracing the activism of women of color and anti racist white women, an understanding of multiracial feminism as a movement emerges, complicating the first, second, and third wave history and the overall use of the wave metaphor.

Perhaps one of the biggest challenges to the notion of feminist waves of activism is the carryover of strategies and tactics from one wave to the next, making the waves less distinct from each other. For example, both second and third wave feminists use sexuality as an every day political statement against hegemonic heterosexuality. Works by second wave authors such as Andrea Dworkin and Adrienne Rich are catalysts changing the way many women viewed sexual relationships and desire, along with third wave writers such as Inga Muscio, the author of *Cunt: A Declaration of Independence*. In addition, like third wave activists, first and second wave feminists challenged clothing and appearance norms, from the introduction of bloomers to the emergence of norms violating traditional femininity such as not shaving one’s legs or going without a bra. In sum, instead of embracing a set of distinct historical waves, some argue that our understanding of the feminism of the day should incorporate the ambiguity and contradiction that has been

present in all the “waves.” Along these lines, Ednie Garrison argues that we change the conceptual model from discrete “ocean” waves to the more fluid, overlapping, and competing structure of radio waves, allowing for multiple movements and interpretation of women’s activism to exist.

CONCLUSION

As we have seen, women’s movement activism has flourished and receded at different times in US history and has been conceptualized as a series of waves. While first and second wave feminism were viewed through a structural and organizational lens, contemporary or third wave feminism persists in a new, more loosely structured form that seeks changes in the realms of culture, identity, and everyday life, as well as through direct engagement with the state. The overall continuity of the women’s movement throughout each of these waves is sustained by distinctive feminist cultures, fostered in social networks and social movement communities, when mass political action declines. Although scholars agree that the US women’s movement has a long and dynamic history, some question the viability of the wave metaphor and seek to reintroduce forms of protests and social groups left out of its history, making a more complex and richer history of women’s activism.

SEE ALSO: Black Feminist Thought; Cultural Feminism; Feminism; Feminist Activism in Latin America; Gender, Social Movements and; Matrix of Domination; Riot Grrrls; Third World and Postcolonial Feminisms/Subaltern; Transnational and Global Feminisms; Women’s Empowerment; Women’s Movements

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feminism and science, feminist epistemology

Anne Kerr

Feminist scholars systematically began to focus upon the gender values in the biological and medical sciences in the 1970s, drawing upon and developing a radical social constructivism where facts were treated as social products rather than objective value free entities and knowers were seen to be part of communities rather than lone scholars. This work ran alongside other developments in social studies of science, but was shaped by political commitments to women's rights, in contrast to the intellectual agnosticism of the mainstream, predominantly male scholars of sociology of scientific knowledge.

A great deal of the focus of feminist studies of sciences has been on the ways in which gender seeps into scientific theories, and the very "discovery" of natural objects. For example, Oudshoorn (1994) showed how sex hormones were categorized during the 1920s as sexually specific: female hormones were said to make females more female and male hormones to make males more male. Scientists then went on to use these gendered molecules to explain wider biological processes such as development of gender and sexuality in embryos. However, as Oudshoorn and others have argued, sex hormones are very complex. Men and women both have so called male and female hormones; hormones are not only produced in the ovaries or testes, but also from the adrenal glands; hormones can also be converted. Gendered categories fail to account for such complexity. Feminists have also pointed out that there is a considerable overlap between what are considered to be male and female bodies on most physiological measurements. This complexity and overlap still tends to be overlooked in popular accounts of the differences between men and women, and scientific research has traditionally perpetuated the duality. The rise of molecular biology has involved a reinterpretation of biological sex which is no less determinist. As Fausto Sterling (2000) notes, Sry – the so called testes determining factor – privileges masculinity against a feminine "default" because Sry is cast as a "master switch" which makes a fetus male. The induction of testicular tissue is presented as active, while induction of ovarian tissue is presented as passive, so that male is represented as presence, female as absence. In these ways scientific studies of sex and gender often reinforce a fixed duality between male and female and overemphasize difference at the expense of an appreciation of diversity and change. Masculinity and heterosexuality are privileged, and femininity is seen as "lacking" or a "default position."

In the 1980s feminists also moved beyond criticizing the gender biases in science to advocate new ways of doing science based upon feminist epistemology. This took place against a backdrop of considerable intellectual interest, in philosophy and the social sciences, in developing a middle ground between postmodernism

and empiricism, where the social construction of knowledge was recognized, but relativism did not become a barrier to better knowledge. Once again feminists' commitment to tackling social problems, including inequalities, gave their inquiries an explicit political dimension. Three main types of feminist epistemologies of science which sought to bridge the gulf between traditional feminist theories and post modernism emerged: Harding's (1986, 1991) feminist standpoint theory developed from the work of Hartsock (1983) and Rose (1983), among others; Haraway's (1991) "situated knowledge"; and Longino (1990) and Nelson's (1990) versions of feminist empiricism.

Harding's main argument is that science would be better if scientists developed the ability to *think from women's lives*. She combines the work of Rose (1983), Hartsock (1983), Ruddick (1990) (who developed maternal thinking theory), and Gilligan (1984) (who developed theories on moral reasoning) to argue that women have a privileged standpoint because their caring labor gives them a better understanding of the world. For Harding, scientists need to learn to see the world from the perspective of the marginalized and the oppressed, with the assistance of critical social theories generated by the emancipatory movements. This type of critical reflection requires *strong* objectivity: it is essential for feminists to remain able to judge between the validity of different knowledge claims by looking to the social conditions of the knowledge production.

Haraway and others have criticized Harding's notion of a feminist standpoint, because people have a multitude of different standpoints, based on differences in class, race, and sexuality, as well as gender. This is said to undermine Harding's notion of "seeing from below" as a means of judging the validity of knowledge claims when there are so many different standpoints that one could adopt. Instead, Haraway (1991) prefers to emphasize "situated knowledge" where people do not hold one perspective on the world, but many, some of which are contradictory. This also means that people can see from other people's perspectives, the result of which is a constantly shifting set of alliances. With a sufficiently diverse group of scientists, Haraway suggests these coalitions could form the basis for

scientists' critical reflection about what influences their knowledge claims.

Longino favors a similar reinterpretation of objectivity, which she argues comes from a robust version of empiricism. This involves critical evaluation of knowledge claims based on the available evidence. She argues, as does Haraway, that it is important to focus on building a diverse community of knowers. Longino argues in favor of contextual empiricism where she says that scientists should allow their political commitments to guide their choice of particular models in science and not simply aim to uncover sexist bias. For Longino, explicit value commitments can underpin good science. Nelson advocates a similar model, drawing on the work of Quine, to argue that knowledge and values form a unified web of meaning and must therefore be explored and developed together. Both Longino and Nelson are more focused than Harding or Haraway upon change from within science.

Many scholars have engaged with these various versions of feminist epistemology of science from a range of disciplinary and political perspectives, not just feminism. Several common themes characterize their writings. The first is the issue of determinism and, more broadly, the uniqueness and value of women's perspective (and that of other marginalized groups) in guiding critical inquiry in science. The second is the precise nature of values and their relationships to scientific practice. The third is the operationalization of feminist epistemology, particularly in the physical as opposed to the social sciences.

Turning first to essentialism, despite her emphasis on women's diverse experiences and her rejection of biological determinism, Harding's feminist standpoint is often said to be problematic because of its implied gender essentialism. This is in part because she draws on Hartsock and Rose's analyses, which both incorporate a weak version of the radical feminist emphasis upon women's bodies within their broad materialism. Poststructuralist feminists' deconstruction of the sex/gender divide, and insistence on the constructedness of the biological as well as the social dimensions of womanhood, have also undermined Harding's and other feminist standpoint theorists' emphasis upon the commonality in women's

experience, biologically and socially. Other critics have noted that when white, middle class, western feminists homogenize women's experiences they perpetuate racist and imperialist erasure of black women's standpoint. Although scholars such as Hill Collins (1999) have developed feminist standpoint theory from the perspective of black women, the danger of feminist standpoint theory fracturing to represent ever smaller groups of knowers is well recognized.

Harding has defended her theory against these criticisms on the basis that her emphasis upon social location and political struggle has stimulated debate and further reflection. This, she argues, is a benefit to critical inquiry in itself, because it entails the active negotiation of modern and postmodern projects, objectivity and subjectivity, by diverse groups of knowers. Harding implies that the hostility that has been shown towards standpoint theory is a sign of resistance to the oppressed studying the oppressors and in so doing reversing the usual power relations between researchers and their subjects. Others, such as New (1998), have also defended feminist standpoint theory on the basis that it sets out a program for change – an exploration of commonality and a means of building links and shared agendas. Here the feminist standpoint is the end point rather than the starting point of critical inquiry. This means that the category of women is always open to revision and contestation rather than commonality being simply assumed.

However, many questions remain about the detailed relationships between values, knowledge, and scientific practice in feminist standpoint theory. Haraway's situated knowledge is also vague about the relationships between values, knowledge, and practice in science, stressing instead the importance of partiality and difference in perspective. Nelson's web of meaning is also difficult to unpack, given that empirical and social/political values form a "seamless web" of scientific knowledge. On an abstract level tensions between realism and constructivism can be productive. As feminist empiricists and standpoint theorists have argued, it is possible to be epistemic relativists, recognizing the social production of knowledge, without becoming judgmental relativists – all beliefs are not equally valid. Yet the problem

remains of how to adjudicate between values. In particular, the danger has been raised that values will drive inquiry so that scholars will simply find what they are looking for and use their values to insulate themselves from criticism.

The details of how values shape knowledge and how one decides between legitimate and illegitimate influences have been recently taken up by other scholars in a more rigorous fashion, more usually through the development of various types of feminist empiricism rather than standpoint theory per se. As Anderson (2004) has argued, all research design is biased in some sense because it opens some lines of inquiry while closing others. For Anderson, so long as this is acknowledged it is legitimate. However, bias in relation to hypotheses is illegitimate when it means that experiments are deliberately "rigged" so that researchers find what they are looking for. As she argues, good research involves unwelcome, surprising, and null results, for feminists as well as non feminists. She argues there is a range of methodological tools available to researchers to guard against these types of illegitimate values, or errors. Clough (2004) makes a similar point when she distinguishes between the deadlock of global skepticism about the values and the value of all knowledge and the necessity of fallibilistic worries about the empirical accuracy of knowledge claims which are an important part of robust scholarly inquiry. Yet, for others, these types of detailed accounts of legitimacy are not very different from standard empiricism, and therefore still unable to grasp the thoroughgoing social situatedness of knowledge and inquiry. Judgments about legitimacy remain just that, and are always shaped by the convictions of the research team and the community of scholars of which they are a part. This means that gender bias might remain "legitimate" despite feminist scholars' best efforts to the contrary.

On a more general level, operationalizing feminist epistemology has also proved to be difficult, especially in the physical sciences where bodies and behaviors are not the focus of inquiry. Starting from the perspective of women's lives, feminists have successfully theorized and offered alternatives to gender biases within biomedicine. In the US in particular, in

the 1980s feminists began to challenge mainstream medicine's omission of women from trials, and to put women's health on the agenda. This was taken up by the federal government and reflected in the National Institute of Health's policy on research funding. These changes were not only produced by outsiders, but also by insiders in science, and by women like Evelyn Fox Keller, who choose to locate themselves between inclusion and exclusion. Feminists have uncovered the ways in which gender structures science at the level of theory, taxonomy, research priorities, and subjects of study. They have asked questions about who stands to benefit from large scale projects like the Human Genome Project and looked critically at the ways new genetic technologies shape women's lives, crucially, in the arena of pregnancy and reproduction.

This development of feminist epistemology has been more difficult in the so called "hard sciences" of physics and maths. As Schiebinger (1999) has argued, questions of meaning are not typical fare for the physical sciences and are seen as matters of ethics or history. Their model of inquiry is of the individual knower rather than the collective. However, feminists have analyzed the gendered nature of the hierarchy of hard and soft science – in particular the Cartesian dualism between the practice and critical reflection about science, or objectivity and subjectivity. As such feminist epistemologies perform a valuable role in making us think more deeply about what a feminist science might mean, and of problematizing taken for granted paradigms and hierarchies of "soft" and "hard" sciences. Problems of essentialism are still present in the popular cultural representations of women's way of doing science, but the move towards a more grounded understanding of feminist transformations of science avoids this because it generates many different understandings of women's practice, emphasizing the local and incremental process of moving towards a feminist science, and the importance of "building bridges" between scientific and local communities.

SEE ALSO: Epistemology; Essentialism and Constructionism; Feminism; Feminism, First, Second, and Third Waves; Feminist Standpoint Theory; Gender, the Body and; Scientific

Knowledge, Sociology of; Sex and Gender; Social Epistemology; Strong Objectivity; Women in Science

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feminist activism in Latin America

Julie Shayne

Feminism has a variety of meanings. According to Nikki Craske, despite the often heated debates about the meaning of feminism, most would likely concur with Rosalind Delmar's assessment that feminism attempts to transform women from object to subject, specifically with respect to knowledge. In other words, feminism and by extension feminist activism is about centering the lives of women. Sonia Alvarez (1990), another leading scholar of Latin American feminisms, defines an act as feminist if it strives to transform social roles assigned to women while simultaneously challenging gender power arrangements, and advancing claims for women's rights to equality and personal autonomy.

From Julie Shayne's research about the relationship between revolutionary and feminist mobilization she argues that in Latin America feminism is most accurately defined as "revolutionary feminism." For Shayne, a revolutionary feminist movement is one born of revolutionary mobilization. Ideologically revolutionary feminists are committed to challenging sexism as inseparable from larger political institutions not explicitly perceived as patriarchal but entirely bound to the oppression of women. Or in the words of Salvadoran feminist activist Gloria Guzman, feminism is:

a political struggle for the eradication ... of women's subordination. It is a proposal for a change in the relations of power between people, men over women, and the relations of power expressed in the different realms of life. We [Salvadoran feminists] believe that it is a

political struggle that will take us specifically to new kinds of relations, economic as well as relationships of power between men and women. (Shayne 2004: 53)

HISTORY OF FEMINISM

One of the most thorough historical overviews of women, politics, and feminism in Latin America is Francesca Miller's *Latin American Women and the Search for Social Justice* (1991). Miller (and countless others) argues that, contrary to what many male leftists purport, feminism is not a western import into the region, but rather, an ideology that has emerged over the last century.

In the latter half of the nineteenth century, feminists were concerned with three specific issues: gaining women's suffrage, protective labor laws, and access to education. By the early twentieth century, the organization of International Feminist Congresses began with its first meeting in Argentina in 1910. Many of the attendees were members of women's groups and political parties, namely socialist or anarchist parties. Central to the congress was the theme of equality between men and women. A second congress then happened in Mexico in 1916, with several national ones following throughout the next 20 years addressing issues specific to women of different countries (e.g., the issue of race was quite important to Peruvian women).

Miller argues that the typical division of first and second wave feminism as applied to the US context does not entirely fit in Latin America. She suggests that the main reason for this is due to the fact that while first wave feminists in the US were successful in their campaigns to secure the right to vote (as evidenced in the passage of the 19th Amendment in 1920), parallel goals of Latin American and Caribbean women were not, thus necessitating ongoing mobilization. While women in some countries in the region earned the right to vote not long after women in the US (e.g., Ecuador in 1929), others would not obtain it until the mid 1960s (Belize 1964). In other words, if the end of first wave feminism is marked by women gaining the right to vote, then in Latin America first wave feminism did not end until the 1960s. However, even prior to the region's women

gaining collective suffrage, feminist mobilization was percolating in the context of non gendered liberation struggles.

WHAT CAUSES THE EMERGENCE OF FEMINIST MOVEMENTS?

Beyond understanding the meaning of feminism, scholars have also spent time analyzing how feminism has emerged in the region. In the 1970s and 1980s both violent and non violent revolutionary upheaval consumed the region. Despite many obstacles, women participated in these revolutionary movements in varying capacities (Jaquette 1973; Lobao 1990; Randall 1994; Kampwirth 2002; Shayne 2004). There is a fairly solid consensus among academics and activists that women's participation in leftist movements has been one of the central reasons for the development of Latin American feminisms. Recently, Kampwirth (2004) and Shayne (2004) have expanded the discussion through their combined analyses of Chiapas, Mexico, Chile, El Salvador, and Nicaragua.

Shayne (2004) proposes a model for the development of feminist organizations in the region. Drawing on the positive cases of El Salvador and Chile, she argues that five factors need to converge during and after a revolutionary struggle to lead to the emergence of what she calls "revolutionary feminism." First, women's experiences in revolutionary movements need to have presented permanent challenges to status quo understandings of gendered behavior and roles, or, gender bending. Second, women need to have acquired logistical training vis à vis their experiences in revolutionary movements. Third, a political opening of some sort needs to be available in the aftermath of a revolutionary struggle to provide the opportunity for feminists to organize. Fourth, women revolutionaries need to find themselves with many of their basic needs unmet by their revolutionary movements. Fifth, a collective feminist consciousness needs to emerge in order for feminists to have the will to organize.

WHAT ISSUES ARE IMPORTANT TO FEMINISTS?

Once such movements arise, upon what sorts of issues do women focus their collective

attention? According to Peruvian feminist Virginia Vargas (1992), post suffrage feminism in Latin America was organized around three streams: the feminist stream, the stream of women in political parties, and the stream of women from the popular classes. Some of the issues of greatest concern to feminist organizations are voluntary maternity/responsible paternity, divorce law reform, equal pay, personal autonomy, and challenging the consistently negative and sexist portrayal of women in the media. For some women, the primary agenda lies in the goal of increasing women's access to formal political representation, where as women of the popular classes tend to focus their agendas on issues of economic survival and racial and ethnic justice. In other words, just as women in the region are a diverse group, so too are their feminist goals.

Though many organizations had only short lifespans, attention to the issues did not necessarily fade away with the dissolution of organizations. The Salvadoran women's *Asociación de Madres Demandantes* (Association of Mothers Seeking Child Support) and Cuban women's *Colectivo Magín* are two such examples (*Magín* means intelligence, inspiration, and imagination in Castilian). The *Madres Demandantes* was a grassroots feminist organization in El Salvador in the mid to late 1990s. It worked with feminists inside the Legislative Assembly to pass a series of laws, which mandated that politicians would be unable to assume office if they could not verify that they were up to date on their child support payments. Though the organization eventually disbanded, the laws themselves remain on the books and the issue of responsible paternity, voluntary motherhood, and (implicitly) legal access to safe abortion have influenced the direction of feminism in that country.

Another very challenging issue that Latin American feminists have sought to organize around is the negative portrayal of women in various media outlets, including television, school textbooks, and the like. The Cuban organization *Colectivo Magín* took as its primary goal to challenge this negative portrayal. The organization was rather short lived (1993–96), as the Cuban Communist Party eventually decided its efforts needed to be thwarted. Despite its deactivation, the conversation about

the negative portrayal of women in the media as related to the subsequent negative self image internalized by Cuban women has remained a topic of feminist conversations, isolated though they may be.

ARE ALL POLITICALLY AND SOCIALLY ACTIVE WOMEN FEMINISTS?

Related to the emergence of post suffrage feminist activism in the region are political and social organizations of women, which have non feminist agendas, sometimes quite explicitly. Examples include the Federation of Cuban Women (FMC), the various committees of the Mothers of the Disappeared that continue to exist throughout the region, collective soup kitchens, and women's commissions of labor unions and leftist political parties. Such organizations have focused on issues like those listed above. However, more often than not, their actions are articulated in very non feminist terms.

Because women have played roles in various social and political organizations the tendency is to assume that all politically active women are feminists. However, in Latin America this is not always the case. Though there are many examples of this, perhaps the most illustrative are the Committees of the Mothers of the Disappeared that spread throughout the region during the dictatorships of the 1970s and 1980s. The women who organized their committees did so as mothers, wives, grand mothers, sisters, daughters, etc. of the "disappeared" men in their lives; they were in no way making a feminist statement. Rather, their efforts lay firmly in a human rights agenda which called for the end of dictatorships and their tactics of summary torture, kidnapping, and incarceration. In most cases the women demonstrated a political strength for midable enough to in part be responsible for the dissolution of the dictatorships in the region. Regardless of their strength, their goals were entirely separate from feminism. However, despite their lack of attention to feminist agendas, the women in these organizations did offer a model for women's mobilization that in some cases was mimicked by feminist organizations.

The distinction between women's activism and feminist activism is not necessarily articulated, but rather implicit. Maxine Molyneux coined this distinction "practical" (feminine) versus "strategic" (feminist) demands. Molyneux's (1985) classic article argues that a distinction exists between women organizing to meet basic needs which are the result of a patriarchal division of labor and those explicitly organizing to counter systems of patriarchy responsible for such a division. For example, a practical need would be a daycare center. The patriarchal division of labor mandates that women are the caretakers of children and thus institutionalized assistance with childcare would ease this burden. On the other hand, a strategic demand would be that of voluntary motherhood, or access to free and safe abortion. Implicit in this demand is a challenge to the patriarchal division of labor that positions women as caretakers of children and reframes it to argue that women should first be able to decide if they want to be mothers. This later political statement, from Molyneux's perspective, is feminist, whereas the former is not.

HOW HAVE WOMEN COORDINATED THEIR EFFORTS?

In addition to the national developments in Latin American countries that played a part in the evolution of feminism, regional and transnational events have also proved central to the emergence of the ideologies and movements. The most concrete example of regional and transnational influences are the Latin American and Caribbean feminist *Encuentros* (Encounters), which began in 1981 in response to the United Nations declaring 1975–85 the Decade of the Woman. The five meetings of the first decade of the *Encuentros* (1981–90) addressed questions related to the relationship between feminist movements and male leftists, and eventually between feminists and non feminist women activists. Central to these debates was the issue of feminist autonomy. It was during this period that revolutionary upheaval was fundamental to the political backdrop in the region, as was evidenced by the debates occurring among the feminists.

As the violence in the region subsided and the transitions to democracy began, the debates

that faced feminists changed significantly. Of central concern to the delegates at the 1993, 1996, and 1999 meetings were issues regarding local grassroots feminist efforts versus the increased institutionalization of feminist organizations resultant from what some have identified as hegemonic relationships between international non governmental organizations and local feminist organizations. The final meeting in 2002 centered on feminist interpretations of globalization and its impact on the lives of women.

The meetings have varied in size, with the first and smallest one in Colombia with only 200 women in attendance, in contrast to the fifth meeting in Argentina where over 3,200 women were present. By now, nearly every country in the region has sent delegates at one point or another, but the demographic makeup still favors the wealthier, whiter, and Spanish speaking segments of Latin America and the Caribbean.

HOW HAS THE RETURN OF CIVIL SOCIETY AFFECTED FEMINIST MOVEMENTS?

With the completion of the so called transition to democracy in the region, feminist movements have changed significantly. Because military regimes and conflicts have more or less become a thing of the past, the place of civil society and formal politics are the social venues in which feminist battles are now played out. Furthermore, with the intensification of globalization, national and international non governmental organizations are a permanent fixture in all aspects of politics. As a result, one manifestation of post transition feminism is what Alvarez (1998) has dubbed the NGOization of feminist organizations.

Many feminist theorists argue that the transition to democracy in the region has virtually led to the demobilization of grassroots feminist organizations and their absorption by state centered feminist entities (Waylen 1994; Friedman 1998). On the other hand, some scholars argue that feminist organizations have not demobilized, but taken on different forms to run parallel with the overall political and economic transformation in the region: neoliberalism.

For example, Franceschet (2003) (speaking to the case of Chile) argues that such institutionalization is not in and of itself the problem. She suggests that the National Women's Service in Chile (SERNAM), which basically functions as a ministry of women within the government, has provided an axis for the women's movement with respect to discourse and resources. She argues that the women's movement in Chile is indeed fragmented and heterogeneous, and SERNAM is fraught with problems. However, she maintains that its existence contributes to the strengthening of the movement by providing crucial resources, not the least of which is a discourse of women's rights that organizations can employ to mobilize their members. Though her research and findings speak specifically to the case of Chile, parallels certainly exist in other countries in the region, as so many had strong women's and feminist movements during the dictatorships that have since morphed with the onset of democracy.

CONCLUSIONS

The evolution of feminist mobilization in Latin America and the Caribbean is largely connected to national, regional, and global changes. When the region was consumed with militaristic regimes and civil wars, feminists and non feminist women activists had a whole different set of issues to confront (e.g., revolutionary struggles for national liberation and the ongoing search for disappeared loved ones). As the struggles subsided (some more successful than others), women have found themselves in a variety of positions. A common trend has been the virtual dismissal of women's political contributions to their various leftist social movements that consumed the region in the 1970s and 1980s. This often blatant ignoring of women's participation in many cases served to push women out of formal politics and to start their own autonomous feminist organizations. In other cases, women seized the opportunity provided by the emergence of civil society and new democratic structures to insert themselves into formal political structures that in many cases simply had never existed before. Some have argued that such shifts have resulted in the dissolution of previously vibrant feminist

movements, while others interpret such changes in structure as inevitable and even empowering.

SEE ALSO: Collective Identity; Feminism; Gay and Lesbian Movement; Gender, Social Movements and; Materialist Feminisms; New Social Movement Theory; Political Opportunities; Radical Feminism; Sexual Cultures in Latin America; Third World and Postcolonial Feminisms/Subaltern; Transnational and Global Feminisms; Women's Movements

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feminist anthropology

Helen Johnson

Feminism refers to the awareness of women's oppression and exploitation at work, in the home, and in society, as well as the conscious political action taken by women for progressive social and economic change toward equality and recognition of women's difference. Social anthropology has evolved from a dominant western discourse in which it explores cultural difference and uniqueness, while simultaneously seeking the similarities in human lived experiences. Feminist theoretical critiques entered social anthropology in the 1970s and are vital to ongoing theoretical and methodological developments. Feminist social anthropologists question many of the discipline's basic assumptions and have documented scholars' failure to fully explore the human experience due to the neglect of the organizing categories of "women" and "gender" as significant dimensions of social life.

The first wave of studies in the 1970s assumed universal sexual asymmetry through an assessment of the "global" subordination of women and thence tried to explain the situation

from various theoretical perspectives. Critical archeologists also joined with feminist social anthropologists to charge that the role of women in human evolution had been ignored due to inherent male bias in scholarly work that privileged hunting over gathering. And, although social anthropology had included women in its empirical studies due to anthropology's traditional concern with kinship and marriage, it had not problematized the representation of women. Thus the new "anthropology of women" that began in the 1970s confronted the thorny difficulties of how women were represented in anthropological writings. The preliminary issue of male bias was seen as having three tiers: the bias imported by the anthropologist to the culture being studied; the subordination of women in most societies which is then communicated to the anthropologist, predominantly by men; and the bias in favor of men inherent in western culture (Moore 1988). Simply adding women to traditional social anthropology would not resolve the obstacle of the invisibility of women, as male bias would not simply disappear. In turn, the assumption that women could effectively study women via the "anthropology of women" was also erroneous because, while successful in making women visible and as the precursor to feminist social anthropology, "the anthropology of women" was more remedial than radical. Furthermore, female scholars could easily become marginalized within mainstream academic studies (Moore 1988). Indeed, fears of the marginalization of female scholars and of the anthropology of women were linked to the sociological category "the universal woman" that was in favor at that time. The category did not recognize that because images, attributes, activities, and appropriate behaviors are always culturally and historically specific, both the categories of "woman" and "man" need to be investigated in their given context, not assumed.

The second wave in the 1980s saw feminist social anthropologists move away from totalizing assumptions of gender asymmetry to present analyses of women's oppression from neo Marxist perspectives. These argued that in societies prior to western invasion, gender relations were typically egalitarian because women

and men participated equally in the processes of production. As a consequence, European subjugation of societies and the imposition of capitalist forms of production *created* women's inequality in formerly egalitarian societies.

Feminist social anthropology in the 1990s and onwards introduced poststructural analytical frameworks that considered how women in contemporary communities actively construct and encounter globalization through their lived experiences as consumer purchasers, users of technology, controllers of land, and negotiators of its produce. As a consequence, feminist critique in social anthropology will continue to be central to theoretical and methodological developments within the discipline. The contemporary basis for the feminist critique of social anthropology, which grew out of a specific concern with the neglect of women in the discipline, is no longer the study of "women," but the analysis of gender relations, and of gender as a structuring principle in all human societies (Moore 1988).

Hence, feminist social anthropology now studies gender, the interrelations between women and men, and the role of gender in structuring human societies, their histories, ideologies, economic systems, political structures, and development projects. It is currently accepted that it is impossible to pursue valuable social science without incorporating analyses of gender.

A key problem relating to the theoretical and political complexities of women concerns the issues of race and ethnocentric bias in favor of one's own culture. Social anthropology has a critical involvement with its colonial past and the power relationships that characterized the encounter between the researcher and the researched. While edited collections such as Buckley's (1997) presented the "voices" of Japanese feminism, the often ethnocentric bias of feminist social anthropology provided a springboard for critiques by scholars from "Asian" nation states who questioned why they should establish further universals (re)presented through western experiences of modernity. Karim (1995) offered a critique of western concepts of power and their construction of gender hierarchies in Southeast Asian civilizations. She contended Southeast Asian civilizations derive theory and knowledge from

concepts of bilateralism, that is, the need to maintain social relationships through rules of complementarity, similarity, and the application of mutual responsibility and cooperation, rather than western concepts of hierarchy, opposition, oppression, and force (Karim 1995: 16).

From a predominance of western viewpoints about women's lived experience yet anchored in subaltern social analyses, examinations of what may best encompass many Asian societies' gender relations were made, especially through their attempts to centralize the informal and private and to provide clearer insights into daily activities which concern gendered actors in culture. Karim argued that many women enact their human agency in "Asian" societies via the use of informal structures. She contends this practice is considered to be "proper" behavior. Hence, she proposes that women operate as strategic agents within socially accepted notions of custom, by non cooperation, the strategic use of silence, leaving the household due to "overdue" visits to family, and discouraging open confrontation yet pressuring non compliant peers and superiors through the use of "hostile harmony" (1995: 18). While similar strategies and informal structures can be found in western cultures, Karim argues that "proper" behavior in terms of discouraging open confrontation forms part of South east Asian people's behavior in public as well as domestic arenas and social interactions, whereas open confrontation in public arenas is more acceptable in the West and, between men, is condoned as strong minded and/or purposive behavior (1995: 30).

Karim's (1981) early work on the belief system expressed by the Ma'Betisék of Selangor, Malaysia, in their relationship to plants and animals is concerned with the way in which ideas contained within a particular culture change from one situation to another. While drawing on Lévi Strauss's structuralism in terms of "culture" being the product of/constituted by real and abstract phonemic differences, Karim formulates her own concept of structure by focusing on the underlying rules which guide changes in the contents of the ideology of a particular culture. Her analysis of women, culture, and the entwining of Malay

custom with Islam (Karim 1992), and her co editing of a work that critiqued women, men, and the practice of ethnography, facilitated her work on the public social visibility of women in Southeast Asia (Karim 1995). She examined how their invisibility in formal politics or the great religions endorsed by the state has led to a questioning of the different valuations of power and prestige between women and men and the way that social intangibles such as patience, spirituality, and transference become sources of resistance and strength. She has also sought to examine the relationship between social sentiment and culture and society, and the relationship between individual emotions and social realities derived from collective sentiments, using Malay society as a basis for her research (Karim 1990). Her 1993 work is significant for its contributions to debates about how knowledge is made. She argued that it is no longer possible to separate clearly the researcher and the native into two neat categories as reflexive anthropology, generated by significant feminist social anthropology, has highlighted the ambiguous position of native scholars in anthropology and has promoted interest in western anthropologists doing research in their own societies. Further, the acquisition of knowledge about non western cultures in a reflexive mode can help generate perspectives on humankind that are more balanced and humanitarian and can overcome generalizations that are implicitly racist. Karim, in particular, highlights the challenges of doing anthropology as a non western anthropologist in cultures other than her own, but situated within her natal country.

Other female anthropologists have contributed to the discipline in similar yet varied ways. While Ong (1990) has examined the dynamic historical transformations of gender symbolism and gender relations wrought by massive changes in the political economy of the South east Asian region, Puri (1999) investigated the tensions of female bodies, desire, womanhood, and social class and the hegemonic codes that regulate the experiences and self definitions of middle class women's lives in the postcolonial nation state of India. Her work links with that of Sunder Rajan (1993, 2001, 2003), who reconceptualizes the stereotyped subjectivity of

“third world women” in essays that explore the representation of *sati*, wife murder, and the gender issues surrounding the construction of the “new woman” stereotype in postcolonial India. Moreover, while appreciating Tharu and Lalitha’s (1991) work as one of stupendous research, scholarship, and critical energy, Sunder Rajan notes they do not adequately theorize the category of “experience” within and across cultures, the legitimacy of the role of the subaltern/feminist historian and critic, nor the role of the “invention of tradition” in contemporary Indian society and politics.

Trinh (1989) incorporates postcolonial theory and modes of writing into her examinations of diaspora and displacement to question the normative stance of “male” as literary and theoretical producer of knowledge. Her work links to Mohanty’s (Mohanty et al. 1991; Alexander & Mohanty 1997; Mohanty 2003) theories of how knowledge is made about women across cultures, particularly under the umbrella of “development,” with Yoon’s (1998) focus on women’s potential roles in sustainable development, and Sen’s (1998) critique of the stereotypical Asian working woman as a laborer on the multinational factory floor. The work of a range of feminist anthropologists in Japan also complicates debates about the diverse roles of women in the varied cultures in the region and critiques western standpoints that too simplistically categorize these as “Asian.” Kondo’s (1990) exceptional field research and subsequent theorizations about how Japanese women’s subjectivity and identity are constructed in a work environment enduring the changes wrought by modernity are foundational to Iawo’s (1994) research and to Fujimura Fanselow and Kameda’s (1995) edited collection, which analyses how the notion of “the Japanese woman” has changed across and through time.

Nagata (1984) has built on her work that analyzed the revitalization of Islam in Malaysia, its impact on the tightening of ethnic boundaries, and the definition of personal identity. She has examined the potential for ethnic, political, and institutional pluralism in Malaysia (Nagata 1975), and has lately focused on the process of nation building in Malaysia, the role of Islam, and how it shapes the ways in which Malaysia is establishing a presence and image in

the international community (Nagata 1997). In analyzing Malay women’s veiling practices to explain how a symbol of dress takes on a local and global metaphor of anti modernism among the educated classes, Nagata (1995) contends that conformity to symbols of resistance in economic, political, and ritual life does not necessarily denote powerlessness or domestication but an active reconstruction of the image of the person amidst a world where modernity is equated with progress and virtue, and government control of social change. She has criticized Karim’s (1995) emphasis on the dress code of women in Malay Muslim sects as a metaphor of women’s oppression in Muslim societies, which Karim has countered with her view that the imitation of “Arab” dress styles is alien to Malay culture.

The contributions of feminist anthropological scholars from a range of non western cultures have been critical to the development of the discipline in the past decade. Throughout the 1990s feminist social anthropology confronted criticisms by indigenous and non western scholars that it was defined by the concerns of white, middle class western women who lacked understandings of race, class, and ethnicities in the constitution of social hierarchies. Contemporary feminist social anthropology acknowledged the validity of, and now works with, these challenges by paying attention to issues of international concern to women, experimenting in writing reflexive anthropology, and incorporating studies by non western scholars into the intersections of gender and other relations of power. Nonetheless, non western women’s work is still marginalized or ignored within many western anthropological arenas, as are non western scholars themselves. Cross cultural research teams are potential ways forward, as the edited collections of the 1990s demonstrated in terms of bringing a range of viewpoints together from different cultural bases.

SEE ALSO: Anthropology, Cultural and Social: Early History; Culture; Culture, Gender and; Feminist Methodology; Gender Ideology and Gender Role Ideology; Knowledge; Multiracial Feminism; Social Change, South east Asia

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feminist criminology

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Feminist criminology represents an effort by social scientists to center research, teaching, and activism around issues of gender and justice. Feminist criminology as a whole stands as a critique of the sexist nature of theorizing within the discipline of criminology. The history of this movement extends back to the 1960s when scholars began testing the application of traditional criminological theories and applying the philosophical tenets of the women's liberation movement (also known as the second wave feminist movement) to female criminal offenders. Up until this time very little attention was given to women or girls in the justice system. Over the last four decades, feminist criminology has come to represent a conglomeration of conscientious efforts that focus on women and girls (and, to some extent, men and boys) in the justice system. The focus has extended beyond criminality to include the victimization of women and girls as

well as women who work in criminal justice occupations. The intersections of race, ethnicity, social class, and sexual orientation with gender have also become significant to feminist criminological inquiries. A central tenet of such work, beyond theory development and empirical research, is activism (within both academe and the larger community).

The scant attention given to female offending prior to the 1960s produced distorted images premised largely on biological determinism. Genetic defects, stunted evolutionary development, chemical imbalances, particularly those arising from menstruation or menopause, and personality traits were all believed to play roles in causing women and girls to be predisposed to criminality. Such perspectives equated women's temperament and ability to control themselves strictly with their own bodily functions, excusing any need to consider social and structural components to their criminality.

Women and girls involved in the criminal justice system were necessarily deemed pathological or mentally ill, and their treatment in the justice system reflected such beliefs with heavy use of psychiatric hospitals and therapy, particularly for white women and women of middle to upper class standing. Because the belief was that proper social control and socialization could prevent them from yielding to their biological drives, the use of stereotypical gendered programming (e.g., sewing, cosmetology, childrearing) within correctional settings was also popular. The exception included poorer women, immigrant women, and women of color who were more often excluded from rehabilitative programming.

Even with the development of sociologically driven theories of crime during the early to mid 1900s, the social and structural components of female offending remained largely unexamined. The sociologically driven theories were predominantly created by scholars interested in the illegalities of men and boys; hence, theoretical development and empirical research were skewed toward explaining male criminality.

Beginning in the 1960s and correlating with the second wave feminist movement as well as the influx of women in graduate education, social scientists, primarily but not exclusively women, began formally and openly critiquing the state of criminological theory, research, and

practice. Several of the individuals who led this charge came out of the critical criminological tradition, where they had critiqued the role of class and criminal justice operations. These individuals, who became known as the first feminist criminologists, recognized the gaps within the critical criminological framework when gender was excluded from analysis. Most theories at this time, while sociologically driven, still neglected women or girls. They were often assumed to apply equally to males and females despite being based almost solely on men's or male adolescents' behavior. This was especially problematic in light of the fact that gender as a variable holds enormous power to predict who is most likely to commit crime. Throughout the subsequent decades, attempts were made to apply these theories to women and girls. Overall, the findings suggested that such theories needed to be altered or disregarded as explanations of female criminality.

In the 1970s, scholars, particularly in the United States, started developing theories to explain female criminality specifically. Freda Adler's *Sisters in Crime* (1975) and Rita Simon's *Women and Crime* (1975) were not aimed explicitly at critiquing earlier individual based theories or at applying previously developed sociologically based theories. Instead, both attempted to explain female criminality through an application of liberal feminism, arguing that greater emancipation for women would bring changes in the nature and frequency of female offending. While both works have been heavily critiqued, they did mark the first criminological studies explicitly focused on women, as well as the blending of feminism and criminology. Criminologists interested in either women's and girls' experiences in crime, or gender disparities in offending, began relying on various tenets of feminism (e.g., liberal, socialist, Marxist, radical, and later postmodernist) to understand these phenomena.

A plethora of feminist criminological research has been produced over the past four decades. Traditional criminological theories continue to be tested by feminist scholars as to their applicability to women and girls. Most of this research, termed feminist empiricism, continues to rely on the scientific (deductive) method, utilizing quantitative analyses on large datasets. A more recent trend has been the use

of feminist epistemology and methodology as a foundation for research. Much of this type of work is done qualitatively within a grounded or exploratory framework. Of particular relevance is standpoint epistemology wherein the contributions to research inquiries by members of socially, historically, or economically marginalized groups are privileged above the contributions of members of more privileged groups. The study of women and girls has fit well within this framework given their marginalization in society, as well as within criminological research.

Most recently, feminist criminologists have employed postmodern perspectives in their work in order to address the essentialism that has plagued earlier research that attempted to develop succinct and generalizable explanations for all women's and girls' illegality. By questioning the ability of social research to find an absolute and objective truth, postmodernist feminist criminology has served as a reminder of the importance of producing scholarship that is mindful of the nuanced complexities of women's lives. Postmodernist feminist criminology has also informed masculinities research wherein the hegemonic notions of sexuality and gender performance have been analyzed within the context of male criminality.

Of particular relevance to both postmodernism and standpoint perspectives is the intersectionality within women's lives, without which it is assumed a researcher could only hope to understand a small aspect of an individual's decision making and behavior. Attention to prior life experiences such as child maltreatment and intimate partner victimization, as well as to racism, ethnicity, culture, poverty, sexual orientation, age, and (dis)ability, have all become focal points in feminist theorizing about female criminality.

Feminist criminology has had an impact on victimology as well. The second wave feminist movement is credited with focusing greater attention on female victimization, particularly rape and intimate partner assault. Feminist criminologists have addressed the power dynamics involved with (mostly male) violence against women and girls, as well as the structural components of such violence. For instance, by examining law enforcement and court responses to domestic violence, institutional inaction,

erroneous action, or complacency have been formally documented. Feminist criminologists have extended their academic work into social activism by becoming advocates for victims, serving, for example, as expert witnesses in rape cases. A focus on victimization has also helped lead to one of the current themes within feminist criminological research – that is, the link between victimization and criminal offending. Often termed pathways research, this line of inquiry has produced several new insights on the ways in which women's and girls' criminality is often linked to, if not a direct result of, prior victimization, often in the form of child abuse, sexual assault, and partner battering.

Finally, feminist criminology has addressed gender and the workplace, specifically women workers in criminal justice occupations. Studies have examined the working conditions and environment for women in criminal justice occupations within law enforcement, the court system, and the correctional system, all of which have been predominantly male occupations. Harassment, victimization, and discrimination have been documented throughout the hiring practices, training, and promotional practices of these occupations. Specific attention has focused on the enhanced discrimination and hostility encountered by women of color and lesbians within these working environments. Such work has also focused on women's positions in academe within departments of criminal justice, criminology, and sociology where women, particularly those who identify as feminists, have historically faced isolation, devaluation, and sometimes direct harassment and discrimination. Many of the first criminologists were also the first women in their departments; hence, the struggle to center criminological inquiry on women and girls has coincided with efforts to gain legitimacy within the workplace.

Feminist criminology will continue to have a significant presence within criminology. As more women and girls become involved in the criminal justice system and as greater interest abounds as to the nature of their offending, it is probable that existing and perhaps newly developed academic journals will seek feminist criminological research. Debate currently ensues as to the future of feminist criminology in relation to the discipline of criminology, however. Some

scholars argue that feminist criminology ought to remain on the fringes of the discipline, where it can be given specific and concerted attention by researchers who are committed to blending academic inquiry with social justice and activism. Proponents of this perspective believe that specialized courses on gender and justice, and violence against women, are necessary in order to give the respective topics the amount of attention they deserve. They also argue that specialized journals provide critical forums for the highest quality feminist work and that professional legitimization will come as feminist scholars and practitioners reach positions of authority. Others assert that purposely keeping feminist criminology on the fringe of the discipline only contributes to its relative isolation and devaluation within academe. Advocates of this perspective argue that legitimacy of feminist criminological work within the larger discipline of criminology will come only when it has been incorporated entirely into mainstream criminology such that all types of journals accept feminist based work, all university and college courses include discussions of gender and feminist material, and feminist academics are as well recognized within the discipline as traditional criminologists.

SEE ALSO: Class and Crime; Criminology; Feminism; Feminism, First, Second, and Third Waves; Feminist Activism in Latin America; Feminist Methodology; Feminist Pedagogy; Gender, Deviance and; Gendered Organizations/Institutions; Inequality/Stratification, Gender; Intersectionality; Race and the Criminal Justice System; Victimization

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feminist disability studies

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Feminist disability studies is an emergent interdisciplinary field of inquiry shaped by a productive yet tense dialogue between feminist studies and disability studies. It is framed as a collaborative enterprise between feminist studies, which highlights vectors through which social relations and bodies are gendered and sexed, and disability studies, which focuses on

the ways socio-medico-legal discourses and practices construct impaired bodies as disabled (Thomson 2002). Both feminist studies and disability studies emerged out of twentieth century political projects emphasizing social justice and collective action. Intellectually, both fields address questions about subject formation, power, bodies, subjugated knowledges, and normalization. Feminist disability studies is kin to and stands alongside other critical, identity-based scholarship aimed at social justice, including queer theory, critical race theory, gender studies, and ethnic studies.

Disability studies scholar Rosemarie Garland Thomson (1994) cites a 1986 essay by Nancy Mairs, "On Being a Cripple," as one possible inauguration of feminist disability studies, in that Mairs attends both to her disability and to her gender in critiquing "normal" culture and society. Yet delineating an origin story for this field is complicated, as a number of scholars studying the relationship among gender, bodies, illness, medicalization, body image, and deviance can also be read as having pursued versions of feminist disability studies without directly naming their work as such. For example, Susan Bordo's *Unbearable Weight* topic, methodology, and cultural critique, could certainly count as feminist disability studies, as could Anne Finger's *Past Due: A Story of Disability, Pregnancy, and Birth* (1990). Indeed, a current project of feminist disability studies is articulating the field's roots, theoretical concepts, methodologies, political aims, and topics (Thomson 2002; Rohrer 2005). Locating the history of the field and its intersections with other fields of inquiry is a vital component of implementing feminist disability studies as both scholarly endeavor and activist project.

Thomson (2002) criticizes disability studies scholars for either ignoring or failing to draw upon feminist studies, suggesting that there is a great deal of "wheel reinventing" going on. On the other hand, disability studies scholars, including many feminists, have criticized women's and gender studies for ignoring or excluding disability from research projects and syllabuses (DePauw 1996). Feminist disability studies attempts to bridge these gaps and elisions, bringing the insights of feminist scholarship to the study of disability and vice versa. This means that the ability/disability system

(Thomson 2002) is included among gender, race, sexuality, class, and other systems of power as a category of analysis. Like feminist theory, disability studies offers a more complex history and political analysis of bodies and embodiment than can be gained through less self-conscious sociological approaches. Feminist disability studies recognizes that disability, like gender, is a pervasive concept constructed by and embedded in all aspects of culture, including institutions, identities, practices, politics, and communities (Thomson 2002). Feminist disability studies deepens our understanding of intersectionality and the ways in which multiple systems and identities are mutually created and performed.

The fit between feminist and disability studies is a seemingly logical one, in that a gender-aware disability studies is transformed by and activates ongoing feminist conversations about body image, weight, beauty, embodiment, medicalization, illness, prenatal diagnosis, reproduction, pregnancy, sexuality, sport, mothering, and a host of other topics. Indeed, a major strategy of feminist theory and gender studies has been to frame women's bodies as "disabled," that is, as non-normative. Feminist theory has long attended to questions of normalcy and normalization and the troubling ways in which women's bodies are sculpted physically and conceptually in and through institutions and cultural practices. Gender is constructed and performed in large part through a repositioning of female bodies as the deviant opposite of the standard male. While men and male bodies are framed as normal, women are perceived always to be "throwing like a girl" (Young 1990) and subjugated accordingly. The female body, like the disabled body, never quite measures up and must be continually refashioned to fit social norms of beauty, fitness, and appropriate behavior. In its attention to normalization practices, feminist disability studies can be woven into extant theories of gender, culture, and disability.

The interjection of feminist approaches into disability studies opens up spaces for considering the uniquely gendered experiences of disability, specifically the lived experiences of disabled women and the experiences of women caregivers. This does not mean that feminist disability studies is about only disabled women.

But it does mean that if women's bodies are always framed as "monstrous," as feminist scholars have argued, then disabled women's bodies are doubly excluded from cultural conceptions of normalcy. By focusing on cultural representations and experiences of disabled women, feminist disability studies reaffirms that the normative assumptions surrounding the body are, in fact, deeply and consequentially gendered. While feminist disability studies need not erase or devalue the experiences of disabled men, it does acknowledge that disabled men are privileged in spite of their disabilities because of their status as gendered persons. Race and class further complicate hierarchies of illness and disability experiences and of informal health care.

While there are now many scholars working in the area of feminist disability studies, few have been more central to the self-conscious development of the field than Thomson (1994, 1997, 2002). As a scholar in feminist studies and disability studies, her integration and linkage of both fields provides a model for intersectional analysis in practice. It is widely acknowledged that we can no longer speak in monolithic terms, yet Thomson challenges scholars interested in gender and disability to consider specificity by distinguishing *feminist disability studies* from a generic feminist studies or disability studies approach. In doing so, she posits a legitimate insider's critique of each intellectual progenitor while also laying important groundwork for learning to speak across these fields.

Specifically, she argues that disability studies has failed to produce a gendered analysis of disability and that feminist studies has failed to take into account real experiences of disabled women despite a stated value of intersectional analyses. For example, Thomson contends that certain strains of feminism have posited a romantic version of the female body that emphasizes reproduction and motherhood in such a way that neglects or infantilizes disabled women. Thomson (2002) identifies four key trajectories and objects of analysis for feminist disability studies: representation, the body, identity, and activism. In outlining these disciplinary concepts for future work in feminist disability studies, Thomson's articulation of the field establishes feminist disability studies within the realm of the humanities.

Thomson's project and the work of other scholars illustrates that feminist disability studies is an emerging field. While few have explicitly identified their work as part of a feminist disability studies project, much work located in feminist studies and disability studies is compatible with the vision of feminist disability studies offered by Thomson. For example, feminist disability studies inherits from disability studies skepticism toward definitions of disability anchored in "deviant" bodies. Rather, the focus is on cultural narratives that define some bodies as non-normative, thereby subjugating and devaluing particular embodiments. Feminist disability studies is a critical enterprise in that the underlying project is to illustrate how gender and disability function to privilege certain bodies over others, resulting in differential social access and recognition by and within human communities. Scholarship that may be identified as feminist disability studies has relied largely on ethnographic methods. Yet, as an emergent field, the full range of methodological possibilities has yet to be identified.

Some examples of feminist disability studies in practice highlight both emergent contributions of the field and ongoing tensions between the field and its intellectual kin. A particularly compelling example is Gelya Frank's (2000) account of the life of Diane DeVries. The book, a cultural biography, offers Frank's personal narrative about her friend DeVries, a woman born without arms and legs. The women met at UCLA when Frank was 28 and DeVries 26, one a graduate student and the other a funny, irreverent undergraduate. *Venus on Wheels* presents DeVries as a quintessential American woman of the second half of the twentieth century, in personal language that never erases DeVries's identity at the expense of Frank's academic voice and methodological aims. DeVries, a disabled woman with guts and a sex life, is positioned as an exemplar for feminist and disability rights politics, challenging boundaries of gender and embodiment. Yet locating DeVries within both arenas – feminist studies and disability studies – highlights the ways in which neither field adequately accounts for her. She is instead an ideal model for feminist disability studies, and indeed Frank draws on her relationship with DeVries to interrogate cultural representations of women with disabilities.

Herndon (2002) builds on feminist theory and disability studies to analyze medical and social constructions of fatness as disability. She locates fatness within social, cultural, and political contexts, thereby undermining the notion that “fat” is strictly a biological category. In doing so, she shows that medicalization is not a useful tool for explaining the stigma associated with being fat – a stigma that especially affects women. While framing fatness as a disability in order to showcase the various politics animating it, Herndon also points to intense social resistance to such a construction of fatness. Herndon names this resistance as chronic reluctance to recognize fat as a social, rather than natural, category, reflecting society’s aversion to acceding humanity, citizenship, and attendant benefits to fat people. She suggests that feminists express particular ambivalence about fatness, on the one hand wanting to politically resist “corporeal ultimatums” from the larger society and on the other hand, experiencing individual desires for a particular kind of acceptable body. Understood through a feminist disability studies perspective, fatness draws attention both to social fears of the non normative as well as to feminism’s inconsistencies, including aversion to certain body types.

Feminist disability studies broadens our understanding of reproductive technologies and politics, as well. Since the nineteenth century platform of “voluntary motherhood” up to present ongoing struggles to preserve *Roe v. Wade*, the ability of women to make choices about their own bodies has been framed as central to the larger goal of securing women’s liberation. Indeed, feminism has often defined reproductive choices as a litmus test of women’s social and political agency. Questions of reproduction have also dominated disability studies, but disability studies has come to different conclusions. Disability studies situates the “right to choose” and related issues in a social and technological landscape wherein choice may mean deciding to abort a fetus identified as disabled. Disability studies adopts an essentially sociological perspective, asking which fetuses are mostly likely to be aborted? For disability studies, selective abortion regardless of its potential to preserve women’s agency fundamentally interferes with the expression of disabled agency and embodiment.

Prenatal diagnosis, specifically, is revealed to be richly complicated when analyzed through a feminist disability studies lens. Medicalized notions of health and normalcy, along with women’s fears and desires, have contributed to the ongoing expansion of diagnostic technologies and categories (Rapp 1999). The termination or birth of an affected fetus are polarized choices stemming from interpretation of the results of prenatal diagnosis. The proliferation of fetal treatments (Casper 1998) makes possible an additional, quite limited option: “fixing” an impaired fetus. Feminist disability studies draws our attention to the ways in which prenatal diagnosis is not only about expanding women’s choices (a recognized feminist goal). It is also about normalcy, disability, and cultural intolerance of human variation.

Thomson (2002: 14–15) writes: “Preventing illness, suffering, and injury is a humane social objective. Eliminating the range of unacceptable and devalued bodily forms and functions the dominant order calls disability is, on the other hand, a eugenic undertaking.” Feminist studies alone, in its attention to women’s rights and bodily autonomy, often fails to recognize the implications of prenatal diagnosis with respect to disability and the lived experiences of people with impairments. Disability studies alone, in its attention to the eugenic implications of elimination of impaired bodies, often fails to consider the impact on women’s autonomy of limitations on reproductive choice. Feminist disability studies highlights medicine’s relentless focus on cure and/or elimination at the expense of collective health and well being and also interrogates biases in feminist and disability scholarship.

As these examples illustrate, for feminist disability studies to be rooted in both feminism and disability studies and yet different from either feminism or disability studies, it must take into account the ways in which disability studies and feminist studies may be in conflict. From the perspective of feminism and disability studies, society disables and genders people in ways that yield consistent and disempowering effects. Yet, as critical intellectual enterprises with activist roots, feminism and disability studies are in tension over what each imagines as the practical implications of its theoretical perspectives. Both feminism and disability studies are interested in

recovering agency lost through the hierarchical machinations of gender and disability. Each emphasizes the need for autonomy and choice for women and disabled people, respectively. A key project of feminist disability studies, then, is continually to work to disentangle conflicts and tensions between feminist agency and disabled agency, using the spaces and gaps between these productively and critically.

Feminist disability studies must also come to terms with its relationship to the academy, specifically to disciplines that may welcome feminist disability studies and simultaneously contribute to the methodological and theoretical underpinnings of the field. Feminist disability studies may find an institutional home and intellectual kinship in sociology, specifically in scholarship on the body and on differences. The project of sociology is denaturalization, in the sense that sociology is fundamentally about questioning the taken for granted. Feminist disability studies begins with the assumption that natural accounts of disability and of gender will always be inadequate for understanding people's experience. Both sociology and feminist disability studies work towards undermining or at least complicating essentialist notions of the body. Some strands of sociology, specifically symbolic interactionism and constructionism, are fundamentally concerned with how meaning is produced through social interaction, offering theoretical and analytic tools for feminist disability studies projects.

Sociology's emphasis on social structure and institutions may also contribute to feminist disability studies. As Thomson (2002) has noted, a core premise of feminist disability studies is that representation structures reality. Sociology has the tools to extend a reverse analysis revealing how social structures organize representations. In other words, a structural analysis illustrates how definitions of normalcy become embedded in social structures and thus reveals how disability is shaped on a macro level. As an activist enterprise, feminist disability studies must develop a multi level analysis in order to address the complex processes through which oppressions emerge. Narratives of the body, bodily experience, and representation are important for developing a gendered understanding of disability, but so too are structural exclusion and institutional norms.

Feminist disability studies has employed "disability" as a catch all to refer to bodies that are culturally identified as sick, impaired, ugly, deformed, or malfunctioning. One of the most valuable contributions of feminist disability studies is its emphasis on the importance of intersectionality. However, one question feminist disability studies must struggle with is the limitations of using "disability" in reference to widely varying bodily experiences. The deployment of disability as a universal category might be politically useful in its ability to unite large groups of people – particularly as biomedical technologies proliferate and challenge what it means to be human – and theoretically useful by highlighting the social processes underlying the identification of a variety of bodies, including those gendered female, as deviant. But there may be consequences of expanding conceptual categories of disability to include *all* non normative bodies, for the details of a particular embodiment or impairment may be central to understanding lived experiences. For studies of difference to be fully engaged and relevant, feminist disability studies must resist generic analyses of intersectionality in favor of contextual analysis focused on specific permutations of embodied, gendered difference.

SEE ALSO: Abortion as a Social Problem; Body and Sexuality; Body and Society; Chronic Illness and Disability; Deviance; Disability as a Social Problem; Ethic of Care; Eugenics; Euthanasia; Families and Childhood Disabilities; Gender, the Body and; Genetic Engineering as a Social Problem; Illness Experience; New Reproductive Technologies; Sexual Citizenship; Stigma; Stratified Reproduction; Women's Movements

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experiences of women and others who have been marginalized in academic research. Feminist methodology includes a wide range of methods, approaches, and research strategies. Beginning in the early 1970s, feminist scholars critiqued positivist scientific methods that reduced lived experiences to a series of disconnected variables that did not do justice to the complexities of social life. Feminists were also among the first scholars to highlight the marginalization of women of color in academic research and to offer research strategies that would counter this trend within academia (Baca Zinn 1979; Collins 1990). Feminist scholars also stress the importance of intersectional analysis, an approach that highlights the intersection of race, class, gender, and sexuality in examining women's lives (Crenshaw 1993). Some of the earliest writing on feminist methodology emphasized the connection between "feminist consciousness and feminist research," which is the subtitle of a 1983 edited collection by Stanley and Wise. Over the years, feminist methodology has developed a very broad vision of research practice that can be used to study a wide range of topics, to analyze both men's and women's lives, and to explore both local and transnational or global processes.

Feminist sociologists like Dorothy Smith (1987) pointed out that the taken for granted research practices associated with positivism rendered invisible or domesticated women's work as well as their everyday lives. She argued for a sociology for women that would begin in their everyday lives. Feminist philosopher Sandra Harding (1987, 1998) has also written extensively about the limits of positivism and argues for an approach to knowledge production that incorporates the point of view of feminist and postcolonial theoretical and political concerns. She stresses that traditional approaches to science fail to acknowledge how the social context and perspectives of those who generate the questions, conduct the research, and interpret the findings shape what counts as knowledge and how data is interpreted. Instead, she argues for a holistic approach that includes greater attention to the knowledge production process and to the role of the researcher. Harding and Smith both critique the androcentric nature of academic knowledge production. They argue for the importance of

feminist methodology

Nancy A. Naples

Feminist methodology is the approach to research that has been developed in response to concerns by feminist scholars about the limits of traditional methodology to capture the

starting analysis from the lived experiences and activities of women and others who have been left out of the knowledge production process rather than start inquiry with the abstract categories and a priori assumptions of traditional academic disciplines or dominant social institutions.

In 1991, sociologists Mary Margaret Fonow and Judith A. Cook published a collection of essays in a book titled *Beyond Methodology: Feminist Scholarship as Lived Research*. The authors in this collection discussed how different methodological techniques could be used to capture the complexities of gender as it intersects with race, sexuality, and class. The authors also explored the ethical dilemmas faced by feminist researchers, such as: How does a researcher negotiate power imbalance between the researcher and researched? What responsibilities do researchers have to those they study? How does participatory research influence analytic choices during a research study? Feminist scholars have consistently raised such questions, suggesting that if researchers fail to explore how their personal, professional, and structural positions frame social scientific investigations, researchers inevitably reproduce dominant gender, race, and class biases (see Naples 2003).

Fonow and Cook (2005) revisited the themes that were prevalent when they wrote *Beyond Methodology* and highlighted the continuity and differences in the themes that dominate discussions of feminist methodology at the beginning of the twenty first century. They found that the concerns about reflexivity of the researcher, transparency of the research process, and women's empowerment remained central concerns in contemporary feminist methodology. They also point out the continuity in the multiple methods that are utilized by feminist researchers, which include participatory research, ethnography, discourse analysis, comparative case study, cross culture analysis, conversation analysis, oral history, participant observation, and personal narrative. However, they note that contemporary feminist researchers are more likely to use sophisticated quantitative methods than they were in the 1980s and 1990s.

Another important text that provides an overview of feminist methods in the social sciences is that of Reinharz (1992). Following

a comprehensive review of feminist methods with illustrations from diverse feminist studies, Reinharz identifies ten features that appear in efforts by feminist scholars to distinguish how their research methods differ from traditional approaches. These include the following: (1) feminism is a point of view, not a particular method; (2) feminist methodology consists of multiple methods; (3) feminist researchers offer a self reflective understanding of their role in the research; and (4) a central goal of feminist research is to contribute to social changes that would improve women's lives. The themes of reflexivity and research for social change are two of the most important aspects of feminist methodology that distinguishes it from other modes of research.

REFLEXIVITY

Reflective practice and reflexivity include an array of strategies that begin when one first considers conducting a research project. Reflective practices can be employed throughout the research process and implemented on different levels, ranging from remaining sensitive to the perspectives of others and how we interact with them, to a deeper recognition of the power dynamics that infuse ethnographic encounters. By adopting reflective strategies, feminist researchers work to reveal the inequalities and processes of domination that shape the research process. Wolf (1996) emphasizes that power is evident in the research process in three ways: first, the differences in power between the researcher and those she or he researches in terms of race, class, nationality, among other dimensions; second, the power to define the relationship and the potential to exploit those who are the subjects of the research; and third, the power to construct the written account and therefore shape how research subjects are represented in the text. Feminist researchers argue that dynamics of power influence how problems are defined, which knowers are identified and are given credibility, how interactions are interpreted, and how ethnographic narratives are constructed. Feminist researchers stress that if researchers fail to explore how their personal, professional, and structural positions frame social scientific investigations, researchers

inevitably reproduce dominant gender, race, and class biases.

Harding (1987) argues for a self reflexive approach to theorizing in order to foreground how relations of power may be shaping the production of knowledge in different contexts. The point of view of all those involved in the knowledge production process must be acknowledged and taken into account in order to produce what she terms "strong objectivity," an approach to objectivity that contrasts with weaker and unreflective positivist approaches. In this way, knowledge production should involve a collective process, rather than the individualistic, top down, and distanced approach that typifies the traditional scientific method. For Harding, strong objectivity involves analysis of the relationship between both the subject and object of inquiry. This approach contrasts with traditional scientific method that either denies this relationship or seeks to achieve control over it. However, as Harding and other feminist theorists point out, an approach to research that produces a more objective approach acknowledges the partial and situated nature of all knowledge production (see Collins 1990). Although not a complete solution to challenging inequalities in the research process, feminist researchers have used reflective strategies effectively to become aware of, and diminish the ways in which, domination and repression are reproduced in the course of their research and in the products of this work. Furthermore, feminist researchers argue, sustained attention to these dynamics can enrich research accounts as well as improve the practice of social research (Naples 2003).

Feminist ethnography and feminist work with narratives are two of the methods in which feminist researchers have been the most concerned with processes of reflexivity. Examining work that utilizes both of these methods, the range of approaches that count as feminist is especially evident. For example, Chase's (1995) approach to oral narratives includes attention to the way women narrate their stories. Rather than treat the narratives as "evidence" in an unmediated sense of the term, Chase is interested in exploring the relationship between culture, experience, and narrative. Her work on women school superintendents examines how

women use narrative strategies to make sense of their everyday life experiences as shaped by different cultural contexts. In contrast, Bloom (1998) adopts a "progressive regressive method" derived from Sartre's notion of "spirals" in a life to examine how the individual can overcome her or his social and cultural conditioning, "thereby manifesting what he calls 'positive praxis.'" Drawing on Dorothy Smith's institutional ethnographic method, DeVault (1999) utilizes narratives she generates from ethnographic interviews to explore how relations of ruling are woven into women's everyday lives such that they are hidden from the view of those whose lives are organized by these processes of domination. The institutional and political knowledges that DeVault uncovers illustrate the link between institutional ethnography and feminist activism. In the context of activist research, feminist analysts using Smith's approach explore the institutional forms and procedures, informal organizational processes, as well as discursive frames used to construct the goals and targets of the work that the institution performs. This approach ensures that a commitment to the political goals of the women's movement remains central to feminist research by foregrounding how ruling relations work to organize everyday life. With a "thick" understanding of "how things are put together" it becomes possible to identify effective activist interventions.

POSTCOLONIAL AND POSTMODERN CHALLENGES

The call for reflective practice has also been informed by the critiques of third world and postcolonial feminist theorists who argue for self reflexive understanding of the epistemological investments that shape the politics of method (Alexander & Mohanty 1997). Postmodern and postcolonial critiques of the practice of social scientific research raise a number of dilemmas that challenge feminist researchers as they attempt to conduct research that makes self evident the assumptions and politics involved in the process of knowledge production in order to avoid exploitative research

practices. Postmodern feminist scholars emphasize the ways disciplinary discourses shape how researchers see the worlds they investigate. They point out that without recognition of disciplinary metanarratives, research operates to reinsert power relations, rather than challenge them. Many feminist researchers have grappled with the challenges posed by postmodern critics. Wolf (1996) explains that for some feminist scholars postmodern theories provide opportunities for innovation in research practices, particularly in the attention they pay to representation of research participants or research subjects and to the written products that are produced from a research study. However, many other feminist scholars are concerned that too much emphasis on the linguistic and textual constructions decenters those who are the subjects of our research and renders the lives of women or others whom we study irrelevant.

Postmodern analyses of power have destabilized the practice of research, especially research that involves human subjects. If power infects every encounter and if discourse infuses all expressions of personal experience, what can the researcher do to counter such powerful forces? This dilemma is at the heart of a radical postmodern challenge to social scientific practice in general, but has been taken up most seriously in feminist research. Naples (2003) argues that one partial solution to this dilemma is to foreground praxis, namely, to generate a materialist feminist approach informed by postmodern and postcolonial analyses of knowledge, power, and language that speaks to the empirical world in which one's research takes place. For example, in her work, by foregrounding the everyday world of poor women of different racial and ethnic backgrounds in both the rural and urban US and by exploring the governing practices that shape their lives, she has worked to build a class conscious and anti racist methodological approach (see also Alexander & Mohanty 1997).

While postmodern and postcolonial feminist scholars point to the myriad ways relations of domination infuse feminist research, they also offer some guidance for negotiating power inherent in the practice of fieldwork. For example, Mohanty (1991) calls for "focused, local

analyses" to counter the trend in feminist scholarship to distance from or misrepresent third world women's concerns. Alexander and Mohanty (1997) recommend "grounding analyses in particular, local feminist praxis" as well as understanding "the local in relation to larger, cross national processes."

RESEARCH FOR SOCIAL CHANGE

A consistent goal expressed by those who adopt feminist methodology is to create knowledge for social change purposes. The emphasis on social action has influenced the type of methods utilized by feminist researchers as well as the topics chosen for study. For example, feminists have utilized participatory action research to help empower subjects of research as well as to ensure that the research is responsive to the needs of specific communities or to social movements (Reinharz 1992; Naples 2003; Fonow & Cook 2005). This approach to research is also designed to diminish the power differentials between the researcher and those who are the subjects of the research. In an effort to democratize the research process, many activist researchers argue for adopting participatory strategies that involve community residents or other participants in the design, implementation, and analysis of the research. Collaborative writing also broadens the perspectives represented in the final product.

A wide array of research strategies and cultural products can serve this goal. Yet such strategies and cultural products can be of more or less immediate use for specific activist agendas. For example, activist research includes chronicling the history of activists, activist art, diverse community actions, and social movements. Such analyses are often conducted after the completion of a specific struggle or examine a wide range of different campaigns and activist organizations. This form of research on activism is extremely important for feminists working toward a broadened political vision of women's activism and can help generate new strategies for coalition building. However, these studies may not answer specific questions activists have about the value of certain strategies for their particular political struggles. Yet these

broad based feminist historical and sociological analyses do shed new light on processes of politicization, diversity, and continuity in political struggles over time.

On the one hand, many activists could be critical of these apparently more “academic” constructions of activism, especially since the need for specific knowledges to support activist agendas frequently goes unmet. The texts in which such analyses appear are often not widely available and further create a division between feminists located within the academy and community based activists. On the other hand, many activist scholars have developed linkages with activists and policy arenas in such a way as to effectively bridge the so called activist/scholar divide. Ronnie Steinberg brought her sociological research skills to campaigns for comparable worth and pay equity. She reports on the moderate success of the movement for comparable worth and the significance of careful statistical analyses for supporting changes in pay and job classifications. As one highlight, she reports that in 1991 systematic standards for assessing job equity developed with her associate Lois Haignere were translated into guidelines for gender neutral policies incorporated by the Ontario Pay Equity Tribunal. In another example of feminist activist research, Roberta Spalter Roth and Heidi Hartmann testified before Congress and produced policy briefs as well as more detailed academic articles to disseminate their findings about low income women’s economic survival strategies. Measures of a rigid positivism are often used to undermine feminists’ credibility in legal and legislative settings. Even more problematic, research generated for specific activist goals may be misappropriated by those who do not share feminist political perspectives to support anti feminist aims. For example, proponents of “workfare” programs for women on public assistance could also use Spalter Roth and Hartmann’s analysis of welfare recipients’ income packaging strategies to further justify coercive “welfare to work” measures.

Some feminist scholars working directly in local community actions have also brought their academic skills to bear on specific community problems or have trained community members to conduct feminist activist research. Terry

Haywoode (1991) worked as an educator and community organizer alongside women in her Brooklyn community and helped establish the National Congress of Neighborhood Women’s (NCNW) college program, a unique community based program in which local residents can earn a two year Associates degree in neighborhood studies. By promoting women’s educational growth and development within an activist community organization, NCNW’s college program helped enhance working class women’s political efficacy in struggles to improve their neighborhood.

CONCLUSION

Feminist methodology was developed in the context of diverse struggles against hegemonic modes of knowledge production that render women’s lives, and those of other marginal groups, invisible or dispensable. Within the social sciences, feminist researchers have raised questions about the separation of theory and method, the gendered biases inherent in positivism, and the hierarchies that limit who can be considered the most appropriate producers of theoretical knowledge. Feminist reconceptualizations of knowledge production processes have contributed to a shift in research practices in many disciplines, and require more diverse methodological and self reflective skills than traditional methodological approaches. However, some feminist scholars question whether or not it is possible to develop a reflexive practice that can fully attend to all the different manifestations of power (Stacey 1991). However, since feminist methodology is open to critique and responsive to the changing dynamics of power that shape women’s lives and those of others who have been traditionally marginalized within academia, feminist researchers often act as innovators who are quick to develop new research approaches and frameworks.

SEE ALSO: Black Feminist Thought; Consciousness Raising; Feminist Standpoint Theory; Intersectionality; Matrix of Domination; Methodology; Outsider Within; Strong Objectivity; Third World and Postcolonial Feminisms/Subaltern

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feminist pedagogy

Vicky M. MacLean

Although many, if not most, academics and others in the public arena today assume the need for a feminist pedagogy aimed at enhancing the educational experience of women and girls globally, this has not always been the case. A growing awareness of the need for feminist pedagogy was created by the pioneering research and pedagogy of committed feminist scholars (Hall & Sandler 1982; Sandler & Hall 1986; Harding 1987, 1992; Weiler 1988; Geismar & Nicoleau 1993; Rosser 1993, 1995; Maher & Tetreault 1994). *Feminist pedagogy* begins with the premise that gender and the social inequality it represents in the wider society are often reproduced in the classroom. Existing curricula and classroom practices contain sexist biases and patriarchal assumptions as reflected in the fact that the contributions of women are often absent from textbooks; girls and women are portrayed in stereotypic ways in much of the literature of all disciplines; girls and women are often directed to certain fields of study and are directed away from others; and teaching practices typically favor the learning styles of boys and men. Teachers informed by principles of feminist pedagogy seek to express feminist values and goals in the classroom and to challenge traditional androcentric knowledge (Geismar & Nicoleau 1993). Those adopting a feminist pedagogy ultimately seek to advance the status and education of women and girls by

providing them with educational experiences that encourage consciousness raising, empowerment, and voice through active and innovative educational strategies (Naples & Bojar 2002). While there is no single definition of feminist pedagogy, basic principles include: (1) the centrality of gender as an analytical tool; (2) multiculturalism and inclusion of all students; (3) collaborative knowledge construction; (4) collaborative teaching; (5) encouraging voice through linking personal experience with learning; and (6) democratization of the teacher's authority and power. *Feminist multicultural pedagogy* is sometimes used to emphasize an awareness of the ways in which differences of race/ethnicity, class, gender, sexual orientation, age, geopolitical location, and religious diversity can potentially translate into oppressive classroom interactions that reproduce dominant hierarchies, or alternatively, can contribute to enriching cultural interactions (Weir 1991; Brady 1993).

There are at least three distinctive variants of feminist pedagogical models: psychological, liberatory, and positional (Tisdell 1995, 1998; Grace & Gouthro 2000). The *psychologically oriented model* emphasizes the importance of relational connectivity in developmental learning and seeks to create a non combative and nurturing interaction dynamic in the classroom and between teacher and student. The psychological model is influenced by theories of women's psychology espoused by Carol Gilligan in her classic book, *In a Different Voice* (1982), and by Belenky, Clinchy, Goldberger, and Tarule's *Women's Ways of Knowing* (1986). These works provide a critique of the male stream moral development theory of Kohlberg, arguing that women's realities are fundamentally shaped by relational contexts of connection and attachment. The feminist psychological approach to teaching is therefore based on a model that seeks to create safe and non intimidating classroom environments for interaction, exchange, and instructor evaluation. In such environments a familial language of caring and responsibility replaces the more sterile technoscientific language of objectivity. Teachers may invest considerable energies in generating positive relationships with and among students early in the curriculum cycle, even sacrificing a measure of course content to positive experiential

exercises that promote social exchange. Using experiential learning strategies, educators anticipate a long term payoff in group dynamics and individual student development. In this context, a teacher's central authority is subtly redefined as facilitation; the teacher becomes a guide from the side as she or he facilitates the creation of a cooperative learning environment that features collaboration, mutual responsibility, and sharing. Knowledge (and sometimes evaluation) is co created through student participation rather than being centrally located in the unilateral authority of the teacher as expert. However, connection is not limited to student-teacher and student-student relationships; it is additionally emphasized in relation to the connection of knowledge to lived experience, and of learning in the classroom to learning outside of the classroom (Baxter Magolda 1992: 223-4; Naples & Bojar 2002). These other types of connectivity can be particularly important in the retention of women students who often fail to see the relevance of their learning to the applications of their everyday lives (Grace & Gouthro 2000). The primary strength of the psychological model lies in the importance placed on interpersonal connectivity in the developmental processes of learning. The underlying assumption of the model is that women will flourish and discover their own voices of authority in learning environments that promote connectivity, validate personal experience, and topically highlight the relevant connections of course information to everyday life outside of the classroom. Its major limitation is its tendency to universalize the generic woman, ignoring positional and subjective differences and structural relationships of power related to race or ethnicity, class, age, affectional orientation, and abilities.

The *liberatory model*, in contrast, focuses on difference in the intersections of relationships of power, not only in terms of social position such as race, ethnicity, class, and gender, but also important intersections in the personal, political, and the pedagogical. The focus is on the emancipation and empowerment of girls and women as a historically oppressed and politically disenfranchised group. Variations on the liberation model include critical approaches that take up issues of democracy, freedom, and social justice; postmodern approaches that address

identity, difference, and voice; poststructural approaches that interrogate language, meaning, and multiple subjectivities; and postcolonial and black insurgent approaches. The latter address revising history and countering tradition, exploring diaspora experience, and exposing privilege, exclusion, and distorted cultural representations of race and power (Grace & Gouthro 2000: 17). Liberatory models typically address the production of knowledge, assuming that knowledge that is valued is associated with valued identities or groups in a culture. Traditional school curricula rely on bases of knowledge that are often biased and/or exclude or marginalize the contributions and experiences of oppressed groups. It is not sufficient to simply “allow” these marginalized groups to participate in discourses on traditional topics; women and other minorities must be included in the design of curricula and instruction (Hughes 1998). Recognition of differences and of exclusions also informs liberatory pedagogical practices that seek to transform social relationships through raising critical consciousness and advocating equitable policies and programs for inclusion. Finally, liberatory models of critical pedagogy also seek to address issues of authority in relationship to voice and coming to voice for women. Coming to voice involves the politics of being heard, and this often means that authority is openly debated. Liberatory models break from psychological models in that they do not work from the premise that a safe environment is a necessary prerequisite for coming to voice. In fact, the classroom environment is a contested terrain where open debate and dealing with difference is often riddled with conflict and emotion. The underlying assumption of liberatory models is that in a transformative environment some danger and risk are necessary. Because education is political, those with a stake in maintaining the status quo will resist change (Grace & Gouthro 2000: 19). Tisdell (1995: 72) notes, for instance, that liberatory pedagogies address similarities and differences among women and that the point is coming to voice in spite of discomfort.

Positional feminist pedagogy has been influenced by poststructural feminism with its emphasis on the intersecting social locations of race/ethnicity, class, and gender. Positional pedagogies seek to construct a multiperspective

discourse of interrogation, disruption, and intervention in order to resist patriarchal control of knowledge, theory, and pedagogy (Luke & Gore 1992). Aware that institutional discourses as well as persons holding positions of authority coordinate knowledge, poststructural feminists value and address the multiplicity of intersections of power. Grace and Gouthro (2000: 20) note that multiple identities, subjectivities, meanings, and differences are explored with the goal of contesting the politics of patriarchal control in educational institutions as sites for the production of knowledge. Explorations of meaning and power are particularly explored from margin to center, that is, from the perspective of marginalized groups such as women and race or ethnic groups to white males as the center of power. The aim according to Luke and Gore (1992) is to develop feminist projects of *standpoint* that locate women in relation to one another and in relation to men. In the classroom this is translated to mean that pedagogical experience and texts are both politically significant and historically contingent. The feminist agenda is to confront masculinist language, theory, and cultural constructions that maintain the status quo; it seeks in the process to shift viewpoints by building a pedagogy of possibility (Ellsworth 1993). Central to this approach is the belief that knowledge is actively constructed in relationships of difference and position (Maher & Tetreault 1994; Maher 1999: 49). Maher (1999: 50) argues that in positional pedagogies, differences of authority and other variables brought to the classroom are not “fixed identities” needing bridging, but rather serve as important markers for shifting power relationships. Rather than seeking to replicate power relationships, the goal is to challenge and to change them.

Yet another example of positional pedagogy is *engaged pedagogy* promoted by bell hooks in her book *Teaching to Transgress: Education as the Practice of Freedom* (1994). Engaged pedagogy as conceptualized by hooks is not another model per se, but rather is an achievement. It is a pedagogy achieved within the intersecting locations of the personal, historical, and political spheres. It involves issues of naming and representation, agency and struggle, resistance and risk taking. For example, a common teaching practice used by hooks is to interrogate the

meanings and representations behind popular media presentations of gender and race/ethnicity within the context of contemporary “white supremacist capitalist patriarchy.” She raises the important question, “whose imagery, fantasy, experience or interest is portrayed?” As critical consumers of popular culture, it is up to the individual and groups with common interests to resist distorted representations of reality. Resistance requires a choice to transform existing social relations, but this is in fact a risky undertaking that may come at considerable costs. Nonetheless, the practice of freedom requires resisting distorted representations of the self and of others. Educators drawing from an engaged pedagogy thus become holistically connected in and to their teaching and refuse to disconnect the personal from the professional. Classrooms often become “untidy spaces” as conflict and difference inform critical thinking (Grace & Gouthro 2000). In connecting private experiences to public happenings, educators and learners build knowledge bases that recognize the complexity of social relationships and the needs of individuals to be understood as whole people. Drawing from Freire’s *Pedagogy of the Oppressed* (1970/1993), hooks argues that education can potentially become a practice of freedom when it is understood that knowledge is a field in which both student and teacher must labor. Hence, when the classroom becomes a place for participatory learning, personal experience and formal ideas are joined.

The models of feminist pedagogy described here are ideal constructions with many commonalities that inform teaching. Many teachers blend aspects of each of the three models described with other pedagogies that emphasize the different learning styles of different students. What sets feminist pedagogy apart is the attention given to the communal and supportive nature of learning, the recognition that social inequalities are reproduced in educational institutions, and the desire to improve the experiences and possibilities for women and girls as learners in institutions that often produce “a chilly environment” for education (Hall & Sandler 1982; Sandler & Hall 1986). The three models described are conceptualized from a common need to validate the personal experiences of students, especially women and girls, in a context that raises critical consciousness about

the masculine biases in the curriculum and in the organization of education and other social institutions. Whereas the psychologically oriented model turns on the importance of developing nurturing, non combative developmental relationships with students, liberatory and positional pedagogies recognize that “coming to voice” can be a political and conflicted process. Liberatory and positional pedagogies make overt the relationships of power both within and outside of the classroom. Knowledge is recognized and critiqued for serving dominant group interests. Teachers utilizing such approaches recognize that experimenting with new teaching methods and bringing the experiences of excluded groups from margin to center will disrupt the traditional canon and generate oppositional standpoints. The epistemological stance underlying these two models is that truth is “political, positional and linked to the struggle for social change” (Maher & Tetreault 1994: 47). Hence, there is no safe place. Struggle for knowledge and change in this context is clearly a group undertaking, one which cannot be achieved by individuals working outside of communities of those who share similar struggles. This stance presents a more sociological and collective orientation to learning and to liberatory empowerment.

In reality, translating theories of feminist pedagogy into practice is riddled with contradictions, particularly for women and for people of diverse ethnicity, race, religion, or sexual orientations. The institution of education, with its vested interests and canonical tradition, rarely promotes or supports innovative and critical processes among its teachers. In higher education, departments of Women’s and Gender Studies, African and African American Studies, and Centers for Multicultural Studies have become institutional havens for independent and radical thinkers in many respects, but they have also become “colonized” bastions for learning and political struggle. Too often teachers and academic scholars lack the community support of their home disciplines and of administrators when attempting to develop multicultural pedagogies. In higher education, feminist teachers who overvalue and/or overinvest in classroom work often pay a price when it comes to tenure and promotion. Balancing the pressures of teaching, student advising, and

committee work – which too often fall unevenly on women faculty – against research and publication demands is an area of interpersonal and political struggle (Weir 1991). Hard choices are made in prioritizing workload demands. Despite these constraints, however, since the 1970s all levels of education have become infused to some degree with the principles of feminist pedagogy. A growing body of publications in the field of education has come to reflect this social transformation, although it is still a work in progress (Weiler 1988; Maher 1999; Naples & Bojar 2002).

SEE ALSO: Bilingual, Multicultural Education; Critical Pedagogy; Cultural Capital in Schools; Educational Inequality; Gender, Education and; Globalization, Education and; School Climate; Teaching and Gender; Women's Empowerment

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feminist standpoint theory

Nancy A. Naples

Standpoint theory is a broad categorization that includes somewhat diverse theories ranging from Hartsock's (1983) feminist historical

materialist perspective, Haraway's (1988) analysis of situated knowledges, Collins's (1990) black feminist thought, Sandoval's (2000) explication of third world feminists' differential oppositional consciousness, and Smith's (1987, 1990) everyday world sociology for women. Many theorists whose work has been identified with standpoint theory contest this designation; for example, Smith (1992) has been particularly vocal about the limits of this classification. She explains that it was Harding (1986) who first named standpoint theory as a general approach within feminism to refer to the many different theorists who argued for the importance of situating knowledge in women's experiences. Standpoint theorists are found in a wide variety of disciplines and continue to raise important questions about the way power influences knowledge in a variety of fields. Harding (2003) has brought together the most influential essays on feminist standpoint theory to demonstrate the power and utility of standpoint theory for feminist praxis.

Feminist standpoint theory was initially developed in response to debates surrounding Marxist feminism and socialist feminism in the 1970s and early 1980s. In reworking Marx's historical materialism from a feminist perspective, standpoint theorists' stated goal is to explicate how relations of domination are generated in particular ways. Standpoint theory also developed in the context of third world and postcolonial feminist challenges to the so called dual systems of patriarchy and capitalism. The dual systems approach was an attempt to merge feminist analyses of patriarchy and Marxist analyses of class to create a more complex socialist feminist theory of women's oppression. Critics of the dual systems approach pointed out the lack of attention paid by socialist feminist analyses to racism, white supremacy, and colonialism. In contrast, feminist standpoint theory offers an intersectional analysis of gender, race, ethnicity, class, and other social structural aspects of social life without privileging one dimension or adopting an additive formulation (e.g., gender plus race). Standpoint theory retains elements of Marxist historical materialism for its central premise: knowledge develops in a complicated and contradictory way from lived experiences and social historical context.

SIMILARITIES ACROSS DIFFERENT APPROACHES

Despite the diverse perspectives that are identified with standpoint epistemology, all standpoint theorists emphasize the importance of experience for feminist theorizing. In this regard, many point out the significance of standpoint analysis's connection to consciousness raising, the women's movement's knowledge production method. Consciousness raising (CR) was a strategy of knowledge development designed to help support and generate women's political activism. By sharing what appeared as individual level experiences of oppression, women recognized that the problems were shaped by social structural factors. The CR process assumed that problems associated with women's oppression needed political solutions and that women acting collectively are able to identify and analyze these processes. The consciousness raising group process enabled women to share their experiences, identify and analyze the social and political mechanisms by which women are oppressed, and develop strategies for social change.

Standpoint theorists assert a link between the development of standpoint theory and feminist political goals of transformative social, political, and economic change. From the perspective of feminist praxis, standpoint epistemology provides a methodological resource for explicating how relations of domination contour women's everyday lives. With this knowledge, women and others whose lives are shaped by systems of inequality can act to challenge these processes and systems (Weeks 1998: 92). One example of this point is found in Pence's (1996) work to create an assessment of how safe battered women remain after they report abuse to the police. Pence specifically draws on Smith's (1987) approach to shift the standpoint on the process of law enforcement to the women who the law attempts to protect and to those who are charged with protecting them. Pence developed a safety audit to identify ways criminal justice and law enforcement policies and practices can be enhanced to ensure the safety of women and to ensure the accountability of the offender. Pence's safety audit has been used by police departments, criminal justice and probation departments, and family law

clinics in diverse settings across the country. Pence asserts that her approach is not an evaluation of individual workers' performances, but an examination of how the institution or system is set up to manage domestic violence cases.

Standpoint theorists are critical of positivist scientific methods that reduce lived experiences to a series of disconnected variables such as gender, race, or class. For example, Harding has written extensively about the limits of positivism and argues for an approach to knowledge production that incorporates the point of view of feminist and postcolonial theoretical and political concerns. She argues that traditional approaches to science fail to acknowledge how the social context and perspectives of those who generate the questions, conduct the research, and interpret the findings shape what counts as knowledge and how data is interpreted. Instead, she argues for a holistic approach that includes greater attention to the knowledge production process and to the role of the researcher. Harding and Smith both critique the androcentric nature of academic knowledge production. They argue for the importance of starting analysis from the lived experiences and activities of women and others who have been left out of the knowledge production process rather than start inquiry with the abstract categories and a priori assumptions of traditional academic disciplines or dominant social institutions.

STANDPOINT DEFINED AS EMBODIED IN SPECIFIC ACTORS' EXPERIENCES

Despite the shared themes outlined above, the notion of standpoint is conceptualized differently by different standpoint theorists. Naples (2003) has identified three different approaches to the construction of standpoint: as embodied in women's social location and social experience, as constructed in community, and as a site through which to begin inquiry. Many feminist theorists understand standpoint as embodied in specific actors who are located in less privileged positions within the social order and who, because of their social locations, are engaged in activities that differ from others who are not so located. The appeal to women's embodied social experience as a privileged site

of knowledge about power and domination forms one central thread within standpoint epistemologies.

Critics of this approach to standpoint theory point out that the reliance upon a notion of women or any other marginalized group as having an identifiable and consistent standpoint leads to the trap of essentialism. For example, feminist scholars who center on the role of mothering practices in generating different gendered "ways of knowing" (e.g., Belenky et al. 1986), or who argue that there are gendered differences in moral perspective (Gilligan 1982), have been criticized for equating such gendered differences with an essentialized female identity (Spelman 1988). However, many feminist theorists who contribute to the embodied strand of standpoint theorizing argue that due to relations of domination and subordination, women, especially low income women of color or others located in marginalized social positions, develop a perspective on social life in the US that differs markedly from that of men and middle and upper income people (Collins 1990; Sandoval 2000). Black feminist and Chicana standpoint theorists argue that the political consciousness of women of color develops from the material reality of their lives.

However, Collins and Hartssock emphasize that there is a difference between a so called women's standpoint and a feminist standpoint. Jaggar (1989) points out that a women's standpoint is different from women's viewpoint or women's specific experiences. In contrast, they argue, a standpoint is achieved and as a consequence of analysis from a specific social actor, social group, or social location rather than available simply because one happens to be a member of an oppressed group or share a social location (see Weeks 1998). Rather than view standpoints as individual possessions of disconnected actors, most standpoint theorists attempt to locate standpoint in specific community contexts with particular attention to the dynamics of race, class, and gender.

STANDPOINT AS A RELATIONAL ACCOMPLISHMENT

This second strand of feminist standpoint epistemology understands standpoint as relational

accomplishment. Using this approach, the identity of “woman” or class or other embodied identities is viewed as constructed in community and therefore cannot be interpreted outside the shifting community context. Collins (1990) draws on the construction of community as a collective process through which individuals come to represent themselves in relation to others with whom they perceive share similar experiences and viewpoints for her analysis of black feminist thought. Collins argues that a standpoint is constructed through “historically shared, *group* based experiences.” Like the embodied approach to standpoint theorizing, group based approaches have also been criticized for unproblematically using women’s class and racial identities to define who is or is not part of a particular group. However, those who draw on a relational or community based notion of standpoint emphasize the collective analytic process that must precede the articulation of a standpoint. Both Sandoval (2000) and Collins (1990) utilize this approach to standpoint (although Sandoval does not describe her approach as a “standpoint epistemology,” it does share many of the features outlined above). Sandoval’s (2000) analysis of oppositional consciousness has much in common with Hartsock and Collins’s approach, in that her analysis of oppositional consciousness focuses on the development of third world feminism as a methodology by which oppressed groups can develop strategies for political resistance. Sandoval’s model offers a methodological strategy that contests previously taken for granted categorization of women’s political practice such as liberal, radical, or socialist. The oppositional methodology she presents draws on multiple political approaches such as equal rights or liberal, revolutionary, and separatist political strategies. Rather than privilege one approach, Sandoval argues that oppressed peoples typically draw on multiple strategies to form an oppositional methodology. Sandoval treats experience as simultaneously embodied and strategically created in community and concludes that this dynamic interaction affects the political practice of third world women. Although Sandoval locates her analysis in a postmodern frame and Hartsock resists such a move, the legacy of historical materialism links their work within a broadly defined feminist

standpoint epistemology. In fact, Hartsock acknowledges the power of Sandoval’s analysis for challenging essentialized views of identity and identity politics.

STANDPOINT AS A SITE OF INQUIRY

The third strand of feminist standpoint epistemology provides a framework for capturing the interactive and fluid conceptualization of community and resists attaching standpoint to particular bodies, individual knowers, or specific communities or groups. Standpoint is understood as a site from which to begin a mode of inquiry, as in Smith’s everyday world institutional, ethnographic approach to epistemology. Smith (1992) explains that her approach does not privilege a subject of research whose expressions are disconnected from her social location and daily activities. Rather, she starts inquiry with an active knower who is connected with others in particular and identifiable ways. This mode of inquiry calls for explicit attention to the social relations embedded in women’s everyday activities. Smith’s analysis of standpoint as a mode of inquiry offers a valuable methodological strategy for exploring how power dynamics are organized and experienced in a community context.

POSTMODERN CRITIQUES OF STANDPOINT THEORY

Postmodern theorists are especially critical of standpoint theory (Clough 1994; King 1994). They argue that the notion of standpoint presumes that it is possible to identify and locate what are socially constructed and mobile social positions. While standpoint theorists emphasize that perspectives from the vantage point of the oppressed remain partial and incomplete, a central problematic of feminist standpoint analyses is to determine how partial are particular perspectives (e.g., Haraway 1988). Clough (1994) aims her criticism of Collins’s approach right to the heart of standpoint analysis when she emphasizes that privileging experience in any form, even with attention to the partiality of that experience, is a problematic theoretical move.

Few postmodern critics offer alternative research strategies. Those who do offer some

alternative often limit their approaches to textual or discursive modes of analysis. For example, following an assessment of the limits and possibilities of feminist standpoint epistemologies for generating what she calls a “global social analytic,” literary analyst Hennessy (1993) posits “critique” as materialist feminist “reading practice” as a way to recognize how consciousness is an ideological production. She argues that, in this way, it is possible to resist effectively the charge of essentialism that has been leveled against standpoint epistemology. In revaluing feminist standpoint theory for her method, she reconceptualizes feminist standpoint as a “critical discursive practice.” Hennessy’s methodological alternative effectively renders other methodological strategies outside the frame of materialist feminist scholarship. However, even poststructural critics of feminist standpoint epistemology within the social sciences also conclude their analyses with calls for discursive strategies. For example, Clough (1994: 179) calls for shifting the starting point of sociological investigation from experience or social activity to a “social criticism of textuality and discursivity, mass media, communication technologies and science itself.” In contrast, standpoint theory, especially Smith’s (1990) approach, offers a place to begin inquiry that envisions subjects of investigation who can experience aspects of life outside discourse. Standpoint theorists like Smith tie their understanding of experience to the collective conversations of the women’s movement that gave rise to understandings about women’s lives which had no prior discursive existence. In this way, despite some important theoretical challenges, standpoint theory continues to offer feminist analysts a theoretical and methodological strategy that links the goals of the women’s movement to the knowledge production enterprise.

CONCLUSION

In sum, standpoint theorists typically resist focusing their analyses on individual women removed from their social context. Knowledge generated from embodied standpoints of subordinates is powerful in that it can help transform traditional categories of analyses that originate from dominant groups. However, as

many feminist standpoint theorists argue, it remains only a partial perspective (Haraway 1988). Naples (2003) argues that by placing the analysis within a community context, it is possible to uncover the multiplicity of perspectives along with the dynamic structural dimensions of the social, political, and economic environment that shape the *relations of ruling* in a particular social space. Haraway (1988) explains that situated knowledges are developed collectively rather than by individuals in isolation. Hartsock (1983) and Collins (1990) both emphasize that standpoints are achieved in community, through collective conversations and dialogue among women in marginal social positions. According to Collins, standpoints are achieved by groups that struggle collectively and self reflectively against the *matrix of domination* that circumscribes their lives. Hartsock also emphasizes that a feminist standpoint is achieved through analysis and political struggle. Given standpoint theory’s emphasis on a process of dialogue, analysis, and reflexivity, the approach has proven extremely vibrant and open to reassessment and revision. As a consequence, standpoint theory remains an extremely important approach within feminist theory.

SEE ALSO: Black Feminist Thought; Consciousness Raising; Feminist Methodology; Gender Oppression; Intersectionality; Materialist Feminisms; Matrix of Domination; Outsider Within; Strong Objectivity

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feminization of labor migration

Mako Yoshimura

Feminization of migration is characterized by an increase in the number of female migrants since the 1980s and by a concentration on female specific work such as domestic helpers,

nurses, entertainers, and so on in the process of globalization. While the movement of peoples, both internal and international, has been observed historically in various forms, the feminization of migration has been highlighted during the period of rapid economic globalization since the 1980s. Early research on migration noticed the differences between men and women found in immigration statistics, but paid little attention to this aspect of the subject. Gender structure only became part of the discussion after the early 1980s.

In the 1980s, gender based academic work focused on rural–urban female labor migration in the domestic labor market in developing countries in Asia and Latin America. Many case studies focused on young women mobilized as wage labor in factories by multinational corporations in free trade zones and industrial estates. This research was part of a discussion on theories relating to the new international division of labor (NIDL) and the way global capital was relocating labor intensive production. There was a preference for female labor because women were considered to have “nimble fingers” that fit them for labor intensive processes, and women were therefore exploited as lower paid, unskilled wage labor, as had happened during the early stages of capitalist industrialization in western countries. In the late 1980s, at a second stage of internationalization of labor markets, research highlighted the fact that female migrants often worked in sweatshops and lower skilled and lower paid service jobs in urban areas of industrialized countries.

Research on these topics developed theoretically during the 1990s and various approaches were applied to the study of migration and gender, analyzing the topic by considering elements such as class, stratum, ethnicity, and age, along with nationality. Where traditional research on migration dealt mainly with settlement and assimilation, more recent works focus on temporary “sojourning,” relations with home communities, diaspora as the migrant community, cultural gaps, conflicts, prejudice in host countries, and the like. Transnationalism is also an important subject to be analyzed.

Much of the early work on gender and migration used quantitative methods. For example, one of the earliest collections of articles on gender and migration, a special issue of

International Migration Review published in 1984, had 19 articles, and nearly all were based on quantitative analysis (Willis & Yeoh 2000: xii–xiii). Quantitative methods, such as analyzing census data and mounting large scale questionnaire surveys, have always been popular. Interest in migrants' experiences and questions of identity have highlighted the importance of other methods. Recent trends in migrant research have led to greater use of methods such as interviews, life histories, and participant observation in order to learn about migrants' identities, networks, households, reproduction, carework, social constructions, transnationalism, gender relations, and so on. In dealing with these issues, a qualitative analysis is central to an examination of the complicated dynamics of migration and the changing gender structure at the micro level, and to compensate for the biases and omissions of macro level data analysis.

The International Labor Organization has estimated that there are currently 86 million migrants, half of them women. In traditional discussions, women migrants were assumed to be spouses or family members accompanying male migrants. Also, women immigrants increased as the spouses and family members of immigrants in the 1970s, when the western countries stopped new immigrants after the oil shock. However, recent works indicate that women migrate to seek economic independence and personal freedom or autonomy, as well as support for their own families.

The proportion of female migrants is high in many countries in Asia. For example, the female ratio of the total overseas migrant workers in the Philippines is 72 percent, in Indonesia it is 78 percent, and in Sri Lanka it is 84 percent. Women work primarily as domestic helpers and nurses. The female share in migration increased in the 1980s, when male migration to the Middle East (which had increased dramatically during the oil boom of the 1970s) began to fall off.

Some 7.76 million Philippine nationals work overseas (3.39 million registered, 1.51 million unregistered, and 2.87 million permanent residents) – equivalent to 10 percent of the population or 23 percent of total labor forces. While unemployment in the Philippines is nominally 10.2 percent, the estimated latent

unemployment rate was above 20 percent in 2003. It is not unusual for Filipinos/Filipinas to seek overseas jobs, as Filipinos/Filipinas have worked abroad since the early twentieth century. While the early overseas workers went to plantations in Hawaii and California, the current situation is different. The sexual division of labor is clear: women work overseas as domestic helpers, nurses, entertainers, and so on, while men work overseas as construction workers, engineers, seamen, and so on. Remittances from overseas workers amounted to US \$76.4 million in 2003. The Philippine government encourages overseas work and the Philippine Overseas Employment Agency (POEA), the Department of Labor and Employment (DOLE), and the Philippine Overseas Labor Office (POLO) support overseas workers by checking employers and training workers.

Domestic labor for housekeeping, childcare, or nursing care for elderly people is now engaged as paid work in the market. And it relies on migrant women and ethnic minority women. Not only in advanced industrialized or rich oil producing countries, but also in newly industrializing economies in Asia, migrant domestic helpers are employed because of the shortage of unskilled labor in local labor markets. In developing societies such as Singapore, Taiwan, Hong Kong, and Malaysia it is a kind of status symbol for the new middle class to employ migrant domestic helpers.

In the western world in the late nineteenth century a considerable part of domestic work in middle and upper class households was performed by servants. The nature of domestic work changed with the extension of electricity, gas, and water service and the development of home appliances. At the same time, most children ceased to be involved in economic activity and became school pupils. There was a decrease in the supply of labor from rural areas and the informal sector, along with a change in the nature of domestic work and childcare, as middle class housewives came to bear the domestic work and the childcare.

Married women in advanced industrialized countries increasingly worked as wage labor from the 1970s onwards. The increased burden of wage labor and domestic work borne by women, together with the decline in the birth rate, a growing proportion of elderly people,

labor shortages, and budget cuts for public welfare services, led to the externalization of carework, and migrant workers became an option for this sort of labor.

When women leave home to work overseas, their family members may hire women who are relatives, neighbors, or migrant women from rural areas to take their place as caregivers. A chain of carework is thus formed that transcends borders and the national framework. Hence, a discussion of migration should include transnational motherhood as well as the global chain of care work. Because of the externalization of carework, the reproduction of labor or human beings is often done outside of homes, and there are many countries that depend on migrant workers as lower paid caregivers. The feminization of migration dissolved and transformed the national framework of reproduction, as the globalization of the economy incorporates not only production, but also reproduction.

The rights of migrant women workers are often violated. Employers or agents may keep migrants' passports and travel documents, and many migrant workers are not paid until the end of their contracts. Differences of language, culture, and religion frequently cause miscommunication and misunderstanding and are a basis for discrimination and prejudice against migrant workers. There have been many reported instances of mental and physical abuse (including verbal abuse) against migrant domestic helpers. Some employers do not allow any holidays and restrict meals, telephone calls, and occasions for going out and meeting friends. Even when employers are nice to workers, they may be forced to endure long workdays and may be on call 24 hours a day if employers have babies or small children. Migrant domestic helpers often live in employers' houses and they are not thought of as "proper" workers, since domestic work is not considered as formal work.

Moreover, many women migrants work in the sex industry. In Japan, although entertainer visas are supposed to be for performers with special skills, most female migrant workers who come as entertainers engage in the sex related industry as bar hostesses, strippers, or prostitutes. Around 140,000 Filipino women came to Japan on entertainer visas in 2003. This is big business, partly related to the Japanese mafia and local mafias in Southeast Asia. The

trafficking in persons also involves forced labor and prostitution. Mail order brides or picture brides are sometimes used for unauthorized work or trafficking in persons in illegal sectors, including sex related activities. It is crucial to understand how this phenomenon is a byproduct of the globalization of the economy. Research on the topic must deal not only with migrant women, but also with the host community and economies that link migration and working circumstances.

The general problem is that the protection of human rights and workers' rights is poorly developed in the case of female migrant workers because they face discrimination in the societies where they work, and also because carework is generally identified as housework or shadow work and they are not considered as skilled labor. It is important that human rights are appropriately protected, and a migrant woman should be esteemed as a worker and as a human being, regardless of her legal status.

The feminization of migration displays many aspects of the gendered structure of migration, such as the global chain of carework, gender ideology, and transnationalism. It must be examined in the context of the globalization of the economy that transformed the capitalist mechanism of utilization of female labor, and global capital's reproduction process.

SEE ALSO: Carework; Diaspora; Gender, Development and; Immigration; International Gender Division of Labor; Traffic in Women

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feminization of poverty

Susan W. Hinze and Dawn Aliberti

Diana Pearce (1978) coined the term “feminization of poverty” in the late 1970s to describe the increasing overrepresentation of women and children among the poor in the United States. Since then the gender gap in poverty has increased, although some evidence suggests that improvements in women’s earnings are beginning to close the poverty gap between women and men (McLanahan & Kelly 1999). Currently, of those in poverty, 38 percent are women, 26 percent are men, and 36 percent are children (US Census Bureau, 2004). However, the economic disadvantage of women is not a uniquely American experience, and scholarship in recent years highlights the need for a more global perspective on the feminization of poverty.

GENDER AND POVERTY IN THE UNITED STATES

The poverty line in the US is set by the Social Security Administration and calculated by multiplying the lowest cost for a nutritionally adequate food plan (as determined by the Department of Agriculture) by three. This calculation assumes a family spends one third of its budget on food. Those falling below this set annual income are defined as poor and entitled

to government assistance (for criticisms of the absolute poverty definition, see McLanahan & Kelly 1999). The official poverty rate in 2003 was 12.5 percent, or 35.9 million people, and the official poverty line for a family of four was \$18,810 (US Census Bureau, 2004). The 2004 Annual Demographic Survey (a joint project between the Bureau of Labor Statistics and the Bureau of the Census) estimated that 11.2 percent of males fell below the poverty line, compared to 13.7 percent of females. Another framing is that adult women are 1.5 times more likely to be poor than are men.

McLanahan and Kelly (1999) examine trends in men’s and women’s absolute and relative poverty rates between 1950 and 1996. Using Census Bureau data to calculate sex poverty ratios (see Table 1), they find a dramatic increase in sex poverty ratios between 1950 and 1970. For white middle aged adults, a “defeminization of poverty” occurred in the 1970s and 1980s. However, among the elderly, the feminization of poverty has increased significantly. Overall, poverty rates for elderly women and men have decreased since the 1950s, but men’s rates fell more quickly. Hence, elderly women today are more than twice as likely to be poor as are elderly men. In summary, while women were only slightly more likely than men to be poor in the 1950s, today they are 50 percent more likely than men to be poor (US Census Bureau, 2004).

Family status matters for the feminization of poverty. In 1960, most poor families contained both men and women; by contrast, almost

Table 1 Sex poverty ratios, 1950–96

	<i>1950 Census</i>	<i>1960 Census</i>	<i>1970 Census</i>	<i>1970 CPS</i>	<i>1980 CPS</i>	<i>1996 CPS</i>
Whites						
Total	1.10	1.23	1.46	1.53	1.56	1.52
Young	0.83	0.99	1.00	1.33	1.48	1.47
Middle-Aged	1.16	1.24	1.51	1.50	1.43	1.33
Elderly	1.13	1.24	1.45	1.49	1.64	2.33
Blacks						
Total	1.17	1.19	1.37	1.47	1.69	1.71
Young	1.05	1.11	1.11	1.49	1.78	1.65
Middle-Aged	1.15	1.25	1.56	1.59	1.72	1.68
Elderly	1.05	1.05	1.14	1.16	1.44	2.09

Sources: Replicated from McLanahan & Kelly (1999), who used US Census data (1950–70) and Current Population Survey (CPS) (1970–96).




Figure 1 Poverty by household type.

51 percent of poor families today are headed by a woman with no husband present (US Census Bureau, 2004). By comparison, 41 percent of poor families are married couple families, and 8 percent are headed by a man with no wife present. (See Fig. 1.)

A look at gender differences in median family income by household type highlights the role of family status. Median family income for all families in 2003 was \$43,318. Clearly, having two parents in the home decreases the chances of poverty for families. In married couple families, the median income is \$62,405. However, even in married couple families, the poverty rate is 5.4 percent. The median family income for family households headed by women was \$29,307 for 2003 (with no husband present), compared to \$41,959 for households headed by men (with no wife present). Currently, 28 percent of all female headed households live below the official poverty line, compared to 13.5 percent headed by men. This is a significant issue since the percentage of female headed households has grown in the past few decades (up from 10 percent in 1950) and can be accounted for by a number of factors, including high rates of divorce, later ages at first marriage, less likelihood that pregnant teens will marry, and, in some communities, the high rate of incarceration of young men.

Past analyses of poverty by gender have been criticized for overlooking or downplaying racial and ethnic inequalities. The current scholarship recognizes that the feminization of poverty

can only be understood by an examination of how race/ethnicity and age intersect with economic status. Within each racial/ethnic category, women are more likely than men to be poor; however, older women and women of color have always been the most vulnerable. As Figure 2 reveals, 26.5 percent of African American women fall below the poverty line, compared to 11.5 percent of white women and 24 percent of Latino women. In short, an African American woman is almost two and a half times more likely to be poor than is a white woman and a Latino woman is twice as likely as a white woman to be poor (US Census Bureau, 2004).

Statistics also reveal that the face of poverty becomes disproportionately female with age. Figure 3 shows that 7.5 percent of men aged 75 and over are poor compared with 14.3 percent of women (US Census Bureau, 2004, March supplement). Another framing of the same data is that women 75 and over are 1.9 times as likely to be poor as men. Gender disparities are also significant for those in the 18 to 34 year category (coinciding with the childbearing years), with women 1.5 times as likely to be poor as men.

As Pearce (1978) noted in her now classic article, explanations center on work and welfare. Women are underrepresented among the beneficiaries of the more generous, work related social insurance benefits, but overrepresented as recipients of public assistance, a far less generous, means tested program. In short, the




Figure 2 Percent poverty by race and gender.
Source: US Census Bureau, Current Population Survey, 2004 Annual Social and Economy Supplement.




Figure 3 Percent poverty by gender and age.
Source: US Census Bureau, Current Population Survey, 2004 Annual Social and Economic Supplement.

dualistic structure of the US social welfare system works against women (Fraser 1993). The “masculine” social welfare programs are social insurance schemes (unemployment insurance, Social Security, Medicare, SSSI) primarily benefiting men as rights bearers and rewarding productive labor. The “feminine” social welfare programs (TANF, formerly AFDC, food stamps, Medicaid, public housing assistance) are less generous, have a heavy surveillance component, and devalue reproductive labor.

Following Pearce’s work, McLanahan and Kelly (1999) trace how changes in the family, changes in the economy, and changes in the welfare state have contributed to the feminization of poverty. We examine each in turn, with emphasis on social policies that help or hinder women’s economic progress.

First, several demographic shifts in family structure are important for understanding the feminization of poverty. Later ages at first marriage, combined with increasing divorce rates,

together produce a larger proportion of adult women living independently (McLanahan & Kelly 1999). Since women tend to earn less than men, they are at greater risk for poverty. Some argue that no fault divorce laws have contributed to the poverty of female headed households, by changing economic outcomes for women. Spouses are treated as equals, despite evidence that in financial terms, women are rarely equal. With no fault divorce, alimony awards are less frequent, and women are disproportionately penalized. The decline in income for women post divorce is estimated to be between 30 and 50 percent, in part because women's salaries are lower than men's. Along with the high divorce rates, the twentieth century has witnessed increases in the proportion of children born to unmarried mothers. In 1960, approximately 6 percent of children were born to unmarried mothers, rising to 34 percent of children by 2002 (CDC Division of Vital Statistics, 2002). Birth rates for unmarried women vary widely by race/ethnicity. The proportion of births to unmarried white women is 23 percent, followed by 43.5 percent for Hispanic women and 68 percent for black women. While birth rates have been increasing slightly for unmarried white and Hispanic women, they are decreasing for unmarried black women. Since women earn less than men, and since women are more often in charge of dependants, single mothers remain at risk for poverty. The poverty of female headed households is due, in part, to inadequate child support laws and lack of enforcement. Only about 62 percent of custodial mothers are awarded child support, and the average awards are relatively small (about \$3,800 per year) (US Census Bureau, 1999). Of those who receive awards, approximately 24 percent never receive payment and another 24 percent receive only partial payment (US Census Bureau, 1997). A final demographic shift contributing to the feminization of poverty is the increase in the proportion of elderly living independently. That trend, combined with increased life expectancy, has increased poverty for women relative to men given their longer life expectancies (McLanahan & Kelly 1999).

Second, economic changes in the twentieth century have contributed to the feminization of poverty. Ehrenreich and Piven (1984) trace the feminization of poverty to the "family wage"

system, which granted men wages sufficient to support a wife and children. This achievement, an outcome of late nineteenth and early twentieth century labor struggles, positioned women as secondary workers, reinforced occupational sex segregation, and legitimized systematic wage discrimination against women. The legacy of this system is apparent in the persistent wage gaps between women and men that characterize today's labor market. Figure 4 shows median incomes for women and men, full time workers only, from 1960 to 2000 (US Census Bureau, 2004).

As Table 2 shows, in 1960, women working full time earned 61 percent of male wages. By 2003, women full time workers earned 76.3 percent of male wages. Median earnings for women in 2003 were \$31,653 compared to \$41,503 for men. A robust, interdisciplinary literature exists on reasons for the wage gap; explanations include human capital differences, occupational sex segregation, wage penalties for motherhood, variation in job characteristics (e.g., industry, union membership), and discrimination. However, increases in women's labor force participation and educational levels in the past two decades have resulted in increased wages for women relative to men. Consequently, we find a "defeminization" of poverty or reduced sex poverty ratio, primarily for white, middle aged adults. In addition, men's wages have stagnated since the 1970s, which also contributes to the declining sex gap in poverty.

Jacobs and Gerson (2004) warn that corporations benefit from a bifurcated workforce, with some workers (mostly professionals and the highly educated) working overtime, and other workers, generally those with less education, working part time. Approximately 72 percent of part time workers are women. Since women are disproportionately represented in the "non standard" or contingent workforce as part time, temporary, or home workers, their wages and earning power over the life course suffer (Presser 2003), contributing to the feminization of poverty.

Third, McLanahan and Kelly (1999) present data on the role of social security in reducing poverty among elderly women and men, and the role of welfare in reducing poverty for single mothers. After 1970, government transfers for women of childbearing age began to decline;




Figure 4 1960-2000 median income by gender, full-time year-round workers^a.

^aAdjusted 2003 dollars.

Source: US Census 1960-2000.

Table 2 1960-2003 median income by gender, full-time year-round workers^a

	1960	1965	1970	1975	1980	1985	1990	1995	2000	2003
Female	17,348	18,862	22,318	23,261	24,509	26,500	28,102	28,500	31,109	31,653
Male	28,601	32,613	37,678	38,977	40,540	40,762	39,549	38,596	41,543	41,503
%	60.7	57.8	59.2	59.7	60.5	65.0	71.1	73.8	74.9	76.3

^aAdjusted to 2003 dollars.

% Female income as a percentage of male income (rounded to the nearest tenth).

Source: US Census Bureau, 1960-2003.

about the same time, poverty rates for women of childbearing age stopped declining. The passage of the Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Act in 1996 has contributed to decreased welfare caseloads, and increased employment among recipients. However, any increased earnings from work have been offset by the loss in public assistance (Institute for Women's Policy Research, 2002). In sum, welfare reform has not helped "solve" the problem of poverty for women, and some evidence suggests it has created new problems, especially for children. Finally, during the 1950s-1970s, the rise of social security benefits for retired adults contributed to declining poverty rates for the elderly. Despite the declines, the feminization

of poverty among the elderly has persisted into the twenty first century, for two primary reasons: (1) pensions for never married women are lower than pensions for never married men; (2) elderly women are more likely to live alone (given longer life expectancies), and thus more likely to live on one pension rather than two.

GENDER AND POVERTY CROSS NATIONALLY: THE ECONOMIC NORTH

A cross national picture of the feminization of poverty must be segmented into an examination of other Economic North (or industrialized)

countries and countries of the Economic South. Cross national comparisons with other industrialized countries prove particularly illuminating for understanding potential solutions for the US situation. In short, labor market and social welfare policies together can be significant deterrents to the feminization of poverty. As Goldberg and Kremen (1990: 36) note, “Cross national data reinforce the conclusion that one of the world’s wealthiest nations is not generous to single mothers and their children.”

In their examination of five capitalist and two socialist countries from the Economic North, Goldberg and Kremen (1990) conclude that the feminization of poverty is most pronounced in the United States, where it was first identified, and occurs where single motherhood is widespread and where labor market or social welfare policies are insufficient to reduce poverty. In Sweden, for example, single motherhood is as prevalent as it is in the US, but a combination of labor market and social policies has together helped Sweden achieve a relatively low rate of poverty for single parent families. Japan presents a very different case. The wage gap between women and men is much higher in Japan than in the US, and Japan has very minimal social assistance programs. However, what prevents the feminization of poverty in Japan is the low rate of single motherhood. Goldberg and Kremen (1990) argue that the prospects for single motherhood are so bleak that few mothers risk economic independence from men.

Using Luxembourg Income Study data, Christopher et al. (2000) present gender poverty ratios based upon pre transfer, pre tax income, and post transfer, post tax income (see Table 3). From row one, note that the gender poverty ratio (pre transfer, pre tax income) is highest

for the United States (1.42) followed, in descending order, by Australia (1.37), the Netherlands (1.34), the United Kingdom (1.30), Germany (1.19), Canada (1.15), France (1.12), and Sweden (0.92). Row two reveals that the US, Australia, Canada, France, and Germany reduce the ratio of women’s to men’s poverty rates by 5 percent or less through tax and transfer systems, while the Netherlands and Sweden, with the most generous welfare states, do the most for women relative to men. They conclude that “the welfare states of the five other nations (the US, Australia, Canada, France and Germany) make no more than trivial redistribution that reduces the gender disparity in poverty rates” (p. 213). They also note that if Sweden is “doubly blessed” (a lower proportion of single mothers and a more generous welfare state), the United States is “doubly damned” with “high levels of single motherhood and a welfare state that is relatively stingy and redistributes little, if at all, by gender” (p. 214). Christopher et al. (2001) conclude with a warning that single motherhood is on the rise in most industrial nations, placing more women at risk for poverty in the absence of increased earnings for women or improved state subsidization of the costs of rearing children.

GENDER AND POVERTY
CROSS NATIONALLY: THE
ECONOMIC SOUTH

What is the global evidence for the feminization of poverty among Economic South nations? Standardized poverty measures are difficult to obtain, but the United Nations reports issued for the Fourth World Conference on Women

Table 3 Ratio of women’s to men’s poverty rate in eight nations and under simulations

<i>Ratio based on:</i>	<i>US</i> <i>1994</i>	<i>Australia</i> <i>1994</i>	<i>Canada</i> <i>1994</i>	<i>France</i> <i>1989</i>	<i>Germany</i> <i>1994</i>	<i>Netherlands</i> <i>1991</i>	<i>Sweden</i> <i>1992</i>	<i>UK</i> <i>1995</i>
Pre-transfer, pre-tax income	1.42	1.37	1.15	1.12	1.19	1.34	0.92	1.30
Post-transfer, post-tax (disposable) income	1.38	1.30	1.13	1.11	1.18	1.14	0.73	1.20
% tax and transfer system changes ratio	3%	5%	2%	1%	1%	15%	21%	8%

Source: Replicated from Christopher et al. (2000).

(Beijing) in 1995 indicated that of the 1.3 billion people in poverty, 70 percent are women. The Platform for Action adopted at the conference called for the eradication of the persistent and increasing burden of poverty on women. However, according to a 2005 report from the Women's Environment and Development Organization, since Beijing, women's livelihoods have worsened, with increasing insecure employment and reduced access to social protection and public services. In general, women's economic contributions are undervalued (to the tune of \$11 trillion per year in 1995) and women work longer hours than men, yet share less in the economic rewards.

The male/female median earnings ratios are lowest (with women earning as little as 20 percent of men's earnings) in the North African and Middle Eastern countries of Libya, Iraq, Saudi Arabia, Bahrain, United Arab Emirates, Oman, and Qatar (State of the World Atlas, 1999). While some evidence suggests the pay gap is shrinking worldwide (e.g., see UN Development Fund for Women), as in the US, other evidence from the Women's Environment and Development Organization suggests poverty is on the rise for women in Economic South nations.

Understanding women's poverty in Economic South nations requires attention to the social and legal institutions that do not guarantee women equality in basic human and legal rights, including access to and control of land or other resources, in employment and earnings, and social and political participation. In particular, the lack of land rights in Western and Central Africa keeps women in an endless cycle of poverty. According to experts at the UN women's conference sponsored by the International Fund for Agricultural Development (IFAD), rural women own 1 percent of the world's land but head at least 25 percent of all households. Internal conflicts, HIV/AIDS, male migration within and outside the country, natural disasters, and structural adjustment policies all contribute to the poverty of rural women.

What kind of reforms are necessary to reduce female poverty in Economic South nations and meet Millennium Development Goals by 2015? According to experts at the IFAD conference, discriminatory inheritance practices

that disregard female ownership must be ended. Without property, women are denied credit, and without credit, women cannot generate income. Without resources, children are unable to go to school and the cycle of poverty continues. For example, in Malawi and Zambia, custom dictates that the husband's patrilineage, which includes his father, his father's sisters, his brothers, and any male descendants of the patrilineage, collects all property in event of his death. Widows, and they are increasing with the AIDS crisis, and their children are left destitute. Reforms include microfinancing programs, and greater inclusion of women in post conflict governments. While the CEDAW (Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women), adopted by the UN General Assembly in 1979, is a powerful tool for combating property discrimination, it is often trumped by traditional chiefs who dictate land ownership laws.

Since the 1970s, feminist scholars have produced an abundant literature on development and gender, highlighting the need for the use of a critical gender lens when developing measures to eradicate poverty. Development programs focused on helping southern countries convert to market economies have been criticized for being gender blind or "gender neutral," which ultimately disadvantages women (Ward 1990; Blumberg et al. 1995). For example, the introduction of high yield rice in Asia displaced wage earning opportunities for women through mechanization. Development projects that help local citizens grow crops for cash, rather than local food production, undercut women by diverting water from home gardens and for domestic use. Structural adjustment programs (SAPs) imposed by the International Monetary Fund resulted in cuts to wages and social services, as well as rises in the cost of basic goods and services. These cuts had a more deleterious effect on women given their greater responsibility for providing food, water, and health care for families (Blumberg et al. 1995). Furthermore, feminist scholars have argued that engendering poverty eradication measures requires close examination of gender relations and unequal distributions of resources and power, starting at the level of the household. Measures that increase women's income are more likely to positively affect family well being

than are measures to increase men's incomes because women tend to use a higher proportion of their earnings on children and household expenses. However, incorporating women into formal labor markets is not always sufficient (an "add women and stir" approach) if women end up in the informal sector of the economy, or on the lowest rungs of the labor hierarchy (Ward 1990; Blumberg et al. 1995).

In short, policies to eradicate poverty must incorporate a gender lens and close examination of the political economy of class, markets, and work processes. Beyond improving conceptual and theoretical approaches to poverty, a gender and development approach also works from the "bottom up" to empower women to transform the structures that contribute to their subordination. As women's activism in the 1980s and 1990s has demonstrated, women's agency is a powerful force for change. Sociological scholarship on the global feminization of poverty recognizes the importance of enhancing women's participation in local, national, and international decision making and policymaking.

SEE ALSO: Culture of Poverty; Family Poverty; Gender, Development and; Gender Oppression; Income Inequality, Global; Inequality/Stratification, Gender; Inequality, Wealth; Poverty

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fertility: adolescent

Elizabeth Cooksey

Adolescent fertility refers to the childbearing of women who are less than 20 years old. Despite recent declines in adolescent fertility levels throughout the world, over 15 million babies are born to adolescent women each year. Adolescent fertility rates (defined as the annual number of live births to girls aged 15–19 per 1,000 girls aged 15–19) vary considerably by world region. The worldwide average for the period 2000–5 is estimated at approximately 50 per 1,000, but rates in Sub Saharan Africa average 127 per 1,000 where countries such as Liberia, Niger, and Uganda have rates above 200 per 1,000. Adolescent fertility is also relatively high in Latin America and the Caribbean at 71 per 1,000. Together, the industrialized countries have an average rate of 24 per 1,000. As a region, East Asia and the Pacific has the lowest figure of only 18 per 1,000 due to rates of 5 or less in China, Japan, and Korea (UN Population Division 2002).

Regardless of the social setting within which adolescent childbearing takes place, there are potentially serious negative health implications associated with adolescent fertility, although the risks are higher in the developing world. Complications resulting from pregnancy and

childbirth are the leading cause of death for female youth in less developed countries where an estimated 70,000 teenage girls die each year from causes related to pregnancy and child birth. Maternal mortality is defined as the number of maternal deaths per 100,000 live births and is exacerbated by inadequate nutrition prior to and during pregnancy, and inadequate medical care during pregnancy, and especially during labor. Because adolescent girls have not finished growing themselves, especially in terms of their height and pelvic size, they are at greater risk of obstructed labor, which occurs when the infant cannot pass through the birth canal. Reproductive health is therefore especially worrisome when the mother is 17 or younger, as her own body is still developing and obstructed labor can lead to serious injury or death for the mother as well as for her infant. Maternal mortality ratios for girls aged 15–19 years can be more than double those of women who give birth in their twenties and early thirties, and very young mothers who are less than 14 years old when they give birth have maternal mortality rates five times higher than those of women in their early twenties.

Adolescents are also more likely than their older counterparts to suffer pregnancy related complications that can lead to infertility and disability. Obstetric fistula is the most devastating of all pregnancy related disabilities and is usually the result of obstructed labor. If the mother survives, she can sustain such severe tissue damage to her birth canal that she is left incontinent. Nerve damage to her legs can also make it difficult to walk. Affected women are often rejected by their husbands and shunned by their communities. They are also at risk of recurrent urinary tract infections that can eventually lead to renal failure and death.

Pregnancies may also be unwanted: an estimated 5 million girls aged 15–19 currently seek abortions every year rather than carrying their pregnancy to term. Forty percent of these abortions are performed under unsafe conditions, a factor that contributes to high rates of maternal mortality and morbidity. In Sub Saharan Africa, for example, where abortion is either illegal or severely restricted, complications resulting from abortions are a major cause of death among adolescent women.

Infants born to teenagers also run a higher risk of low birth weight, prematurity, birth injuries, stillbirth, and dying during infancy. Low birth weight infants have a far greater risk of experiencing lifelong disabilities such as mental retardation, cerebral palsy, and autism. Worldwide, approximately 1 million children born to teenage mothers die each year. Infant mortality rates for births to teenagers are as much as 80 percent higher than those for 20 to 29 year old women. Some of this age differential may be due to the higher level of first pregnancies among adolescents, as first pregnancies carry a higher risk of complications than do later births. However, even after the first month of life, infants born to adolescent mothers still have poorer survival prospects than those born to mothers in their twenties. Demographic and Health Surveys data from the mid to late 1990s showed that in Sub Saharan African countries such as Mali, Mozambique, and Niger, one of every six children born to teen mothers failed to live to age 1.

Approximately two thirds of the world's adolescents live in Africa, Asia, the Near East, Latin America, and the Caribbean, and 80 percent of adolescent births occur in the developing countries of Asia, Africa, and Latin America where children born to teenagers account for about 13 percent of all births. Due to a legacy of past high fertility, the number of adolescents worldwide is projected to increase, and by the year 2020 about three quarters of the world's adolescent girls will be living in the developing nations. However, this increase in numbers should be more than offset by declines in teenage birth rates as a result of ongoing urbanization, the progress being made by many nations toward providing better educational opportunities for girls, and the concomitant delay in age at first marriage.

In all developing countries, marriage constitutes the predominant context for childbearing. Teenage fertility levels are closely related to age at marriage as countries with large proportions of young women marrying in their teen years are also countries where adolescent fertility is elevated. Although the trend in many developing countries is toward a later age of first marriage, teenage marriages still prevail in many areas of the world. In Sub Saharan Africa, for example,

nearly 60 percent of women were married by age 20 in the late 1980s and early 1990s. By the late 1990s, this figure had dropped, but still about half of women married prior to age 20.

Not only is fertility closely related to the age at which women marry, but additional important related factors are urbanization and the provision of educational opportunities for girls commensurate with those available to boys. In developing countries, fewer urban than rural women begin childbearing in their teen years, in part reflecting later ages at marriage. Limited education is both a cause and effect of adolescent childbearing: girls who become pregnant are often forced to leave school, and women with more education also marry and have children later. Results from survey analyses using data from the 1990s show that, on average, the proportion of young women with primary schooling who begin childbearing as adolescents is approximately two thirds that of women with no schooling, and for young women with secondary or higher education the proportion is less than one third.

Education is also related to maternal and child health outcomes. In developing countries, poorly educated mothers are less likely to receive prenatal care and to be assisted by trained medical personnel at the birth of their children than are their more highly educated peers. Children of mothers with no education are also more than twice as likely to die or to be malnourished than children of mothers with at least a secondary education.

Although the negative health implications of adolescent pregnancy and childbirth exist regardless of societal structure, the extent to which adolescent fertility is viewed as problematic varies by country. In some parts of Asia and Africa where daughters are viewed as an economic liability and have the potential to bring shame on the family if they are not married at a young age, early marriage and childbearing is culturally desirable. Results from Demographic and Health Surveys data collected in the mid to late 1990s in 11 Sub-Saharan African countries show that in nine of these countries, more than one third of young women were married before age 18. Seventy percent of girls in Mali were married prior to age 18. In Côte d'Ivoire, Madagascar, Mali,

Mozambique, and Uganda, more than half of 18 year olds were either already mothers or were pregnant with their first child.

In other, more industrialized areas of the world, such as the United States, adolescent childbearing is viewed with concern by society in general as it is associated with reductions in human capital, decreased labor force options, depressed earnings, and a higher likelihood of long term poverty for both mothers and their children, increased total fertility, and a diminished likelihood of marriage. But although these associations are real enough, the question remains as to whether adolescent childbearing is the *cause* of these adolescent mothers' reduced socioeconomic well being and the concomitant increased societal costs. Alternatively, do these adverse outcomes reflect preexisting differences in the backgrounds of teens who give birth that differentiate them from their counterparts who delay childbearing?

The task of disentangling the effect of adolescent childbearing per se from any spurious association due instead to factors that might jointly determine both adolescent fertility and the adverse consequences that occur is a difficult one. However, several studies have taken unique methodological approaches to do so. To control for the selective differences in the background and personal characteristics of teen mothers, Geronimus and Korenman (1992, 1993), for example, compared the life course of pairs of sisters raised in the same family, only one of whom became a teen mother. Hotz et al. (1997) contrasted the later educational achievements, earnings, and receipt of public assistance of teens who miscarried with those of teens who carried their pregnancies to term. Lichter and Graefe (2001) also compared teens who gave birth with those who either miscarried or aborted in order to ascertain if unwed childbearing "caused" delayed or non marriage.

The results from these and other studies suggest that failing to account for selection bias can lead to a considerable overstating of the negative consequences that might accrue from teenage childbearing, at least with respect to achieved education and earnings, and hence to the magnitude of government subsidies expended. While teen childbearing reduces high school graduation rates, teen mothers are more

likely to earn their GEDs by age 30, to work more hours, and to earn more than those who delayed – although they earned less in their teens and early twenties, the situation was reversed in their late twenties and early thirties (Hotz et al. 1997). Sometimes, however, early childbearing does appear to have permanent effects, for example to increase the total number of children born, and, by reducing the likelihood of later marriage for the vast majority of American teens who give birth outside of marriage, to increase the time spent as a single mother (Lichter & Graefe 2001). The jury is still out on how detrimental these effects might be on the children born to young mothers.

In the United States, teenage birth rates have declined more than 20 percent since 1991. While increased abstinence among teens accounts for approximately one quarter of this fertility decline, most of the drop resulted from changes in the contraceptive behaviors of sexually experienced teens who were increasingly likely to use injectable contraceptives which have very low failure rates, and to use contraception at first intercourse, especially condoms. Abortion rates among teens also declined steeply over the same period.

Adolescent fertility rates in the United States today are less than half the level they were at the peak of the baby boom in the late 1950s: in 1957 the adolescent fertility rate was 96.3 per 1,000, whereas the comparable figure in 2001 was only 45.8 per 1,000. However, the vast majority of adolescent births during the baby boom era were to women who were married at the time of birth, and this situation is reversed today. Eighty five percent of adolescent births were within marriage in 1957, whereas only about one fifth of births to American teens currently occur within marriage. Most teens who give birth today continue to reside within their family of origin, and recent research has shown that adolescent childbearing can negatively impact other family members by increasing family financial hardship and stress, and by socializing younger sisters for early parenthood. Because adolescent parents have not acquired the necessary resources to parent, they need assistance from others, which also drains the resources of their extended families.

Despite quite dramatic declines in US adolescent fertility rates, US teens continue to

experience substantially higher birth rates than those of teens in other industrialized countries. Data from 1998 showed that more than one fifth of 20 year old women in the United States had given birth while in their teens. This contrasts with 5 percent or less in Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, Greece, Italy, Japan, Republic of Korea, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Norway, Spain, Sweden, and Switzerland (UNICEF 2001). Teenagers in the United States are also more likely than their counterparts in other developed nations to have sexual intercourse before age 15, and each year approximately 19,000 girls aged 14 and under become pregnant.

Within the United States there are significant differences in levels of adolescent fertility by various social, cultural, and demographic factors. For example, black, Hispanic, and Native American youth have traditionally had higher rates than white and Asian youth. Since 1990 the largest decline in adolescent birth rates has been among black teens, and Hispanic teens now have the highest teen birth rates among the five racial and ethnic groups. Native American youth currently have rates about one and a half times the white rate. The rate for black youth is approximately 1.7 times the white rate, and the Hispanic rate is more than twice as high. States with large rural populations, above average poverty rates, and below average education levels also have the highest adolescent birth rates. In some of the nation's poorest rural areas, adolescent fertility rates exceed those in many developing countries.

Adolescents are generally viewed as being too young to become parents, especially at younger ages when they may not be biologically, economically, or socially prepared for bearing and rearing children. A girl's body has yet to fully develop, making childbirth dangerous and debilitating. Parenthood can severely curtail future educational plans and it is often those adolescents who are least well prepared to successfully nurture and raise a child who are most likely to become teenage parents. Those who come from economic disadvantage tend to initiate sexual intercourse at younger ages, conceive less effectively, and have more unintended births. The cycle of poverty is a difficult one to break, but education is a key weapon in the fight as it is not only related to delayed marriage and

childbearing, which pushes motherhood into developmentally safer ages, but it also prepares girls to be better mothers and have babies that are more likely to survive and thrive.

SEE ALSO: Family Planning, Abortion, and Reproductive Health; Fertility: Nonmarital; Fertility and Public Policy; Infant, Child, and Maternal Health and Mortality; Infertility; Marriage, Sex, and Childbirth; Motherhood

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fertility: low

S. Philip Morgan

Low fertility implies a “not low” referent; there are two. The first is “high fertility.” High fertility can be defined as some maximal, hypothetical level for a population, i.e., one with early marriage, close birth spacing, and

no attempt to control family size. Fifteen births per woman provides a reasonable estimate of mean maximal fertility. The highest observed levels of fertility are closer to ten births per woman, and even in the absence of substantial contraceptive use and abortion can be one half this level. Regardless, low fertility implies much lower levels – levels approximating two or fewer births per woman. The fertility transition refers to the societal shift from “high” to “low” fertility (and is produced by deliberate attempts to achieve small family sizes).

A second definition, and one emphasized in most contemporary discussions of low fertility, adopts as a referent replacement level fertility. The concept is straightforward: a birth cohort of women replaces itself if the cohort averages one female birth per woman that survives to reproductive age. After adjustment for low levels of mortality and for normal sex ratios at birth (common features of developed countries), replacement fertility is approximately 2.1 births (male and female) per woman. Given this referent, low fertility implies levels well below what is needed for replacement.

A practical weakness of this cohort fertility measure is that it cannot be calculated until the cohort reaches (or nearly reaches) the end of the childbearing years. Thus, the most commonly used measures of fertility are not cumulative measures for birth cohorts, but are measures calculated for calendar years (i.e., period measures). The most commonly used period measure, the total fertility rate (TFR), is calculated from age specific rates for a given year and is thus unaffected by population age composition. It also has an intuitive meaning; i.e., the number of children women would have if they experienced a given year’s age specific rates throughout their childbearing years. As above, assuming low mortality levels and normal sex ratios, replacement level TFR approximates 2.1 births per woman.

Note that any fertility level below replacement, if maintained sufficiently long, would bring about dramatic population decline. But current concerns focus on very low fertility or “lowest low” fertility, levels that imply dramatic population decline within several generations. For 2000, Paul Demeny (2003: 2) calculates the population weighted average TFR of Europe as 1.37. Given Europe’s 2000

mortality rates and this fertility level, a population of 1,000 would replace itself with 645 persons and after a century the population size would be 232 persons! Of course, any designation is arbitrary, but the implications of TFRs of 1.8 and 1.3 are dramatically different. Thus, for our discussion here we define a TFR below 2.0 as low fertility and a level of 1.5 or below as very low fertility; but these two benchmarks indicate that low fertility is a matter of degree (more than kind).

THE GLOBAL SPREAD OF LOW FERTILITY AND ITS CONSEQUENCES

Low fertility is rapidly becoming a pervasive, global phenomenon. Using data for 2000, the United Nations lists only 16 (of a total of 187) countries as *not* showing clear evidence of a fertility decline. Lingering high fertility has become geographically isolated and affects fewer of the world's people. Only 3 percent of the global population lives in countries not yet in fertility transition. The UN projects that all of these countries will soon begin a transition toward replacement level fertility. In contrast, 64 countries had replacement level fertility or lower in 2000. Twenty three recently made the transition to low fertility and another set of 41 countries has had several decades of low fertility punctuated by a baby boom and bust. Taking these countries together, 44 percent of the 2000 global population lived in countries with low fertility.

Between these extremes are 105 countries now experiencing fertility declines, 96 percent of which have their most recent estimate as their lowest recorded fertility. Thus, we say they are in transition because empirical evidence shows that, once begun, these declines do not stop until fertility reaches replacement or below. As of 2000, only two countries (Uruguay and Argentina) had halted their transition at a fertility level substantially above replacement levels. Others with currently high TFRs could do so, but evidence clearly suggests that arrested declines will be rare.

Given the population growth concerns of the last half century, this evidence and UN projections of these trends portend a remarkable achievement: the diffusing of the "population

explosion" and the realistic potential for an end to global population growth shortly after mid twenty first century. However, concerns of rapid population growth are being replaced by concerns about very low fertility. At the aggregate level, low fertility implies declines in population size and an aging population. Declines in population size, in turn, mean fewer domestic consumers, producers, and warriors. An aging society implies an increase in the ratio of older, dependent persons to working age persons. These changes in size and composition require societal adjustments. Perhaps most crucial are labor force shortages and the provision of income maintenance and medical care for large elderly populations (compared to the working age population). Immigration provides a partial solution but requires that immigrants are willing to come and that natives are willing to tolerate immigrant flows large enough to offset low fertility. The latter are especially challenging when large flows of immigrants are needed to compensate for very low fertility. Societies could also dramatically transform social support for the elderly. Public support could be based on need and retirement ages could be dramatically increased. The political palpability of such changes is uncertain.

DECOMPOSITION AND PROXIMATE DETERMINANTS APPROACHES TO STUDYING LOW FERTILITY

Fertility research has benefited greatly from decomposition and/or proximate determinants approaches. The former disaggregates fertility into constituent parts to assess which ones are responsible for overall change. The latter links fertility to its most important proximate causes; in turn, these proximate causes become factors to be understood. The rationale for this level of explanation is that it identifies more precisely "what needs to be explained."

Decomposition Approaches

Classic demographic approaches disaggregate fertility along two dimensions: parity (e.g., the number of prior births of the woman) and the mothers' ages at births (or the timing of

fertility). If one examines fertility by parity, then one can see whether current trends are produced by changes in the birth propensity of childless women, those with one child, or those at higher parities. For example, the transition from high to low fertility has resulted from the declining incidence of higher parity births. In contrast, fertility trends in low fertility populations hinge on the behavior of women with no or few births. For instance, Norman Ryder (1980) shows that the fertility behavior of childless women and those with one child accounts for substantial parts of the American baby boom and bust (the 1945–80 period). John Bongaarts and Griffith Feeney's (1998) work illustrates the crucial importance of postponed first births for understanding contemporary cross national fertility trends and differentials.

As the mention of postponed first births indicates, the age of childbearing at each parity is important. As defined above, the TFR has an intuitive meaning; i.e., the number of children women would have if they experienced current age specific rates throughout their childbearing years. The TFR for women childless at the beginning of the year can be interpreted as the proportion that would have at least one child given current rates. This definition makes clear the hypothetical nature of the measure. No birth cohort of women necessarily experiences exactly the rates of a given period. In fact, timing shifts across cohorts are common and can be quite dramatic. For example, let us assume that 80 percent of women will always have at least one child. Now let us allow for a decline in the ages of first birth. As long as this trend toward earlier childbearing continues, the period measure will rise above 0.8. In effect, births that would have occurred in the future under the previous timing regime are being pushed earlier and are inflating the birth rate in the current year. In a parallel fashion, increases in ages at first birth push births into the future, depressing estimates of the first birth period rate in the current period. Bongaarts and Feeney (1998) show that a good estimate of this effect is the change in the mean age at childbearing at that parity. For example, if the mean age of first births increases by 0.15 a year, then the first birth TFR is reduced by a factor of 0.85 ($1.0 - 0.15 = 0.85$). Thus it

follows that given an underlying quantum of fertility (say 0.80 having a first birth), declines in mean age at childbearing increase the TFR, and postponement of fertility depresses TFR relative to underlying quantum.

These associations are important because changes in fertility timing can have prolonged and substantial effects on period rates. Part of the reason for low rates observed during the 1980s and 1990s was a pervasive shift upwards in the ages at childbearing (especially controlling on the woman's parity). Bongaarts and Feeney show that timing shifts can reduce period rates by 10–20 percent for up to two to three decades. Thus a country with a TFR of 1.7 may not have any birth cohort of women that averages fewer than 2.0 births ($2.0/0.85 = 1.7$). So shifts to later childbearing are a significant part of the contemporary story of very low fertility. But the end of postponement would still leave many countries with fertility well below replacement. Low fertility explanations thus must account for both fertility postponements (changes in timing or tempo) and for fewer births per woman (lower quantum). The causal explanation may differ for these two components and decomposition analyses push researchers to understand these twin causes: fertility postponement and fewer births.

Proximate Determinants

In settings where birth control and abortion are available and widely used, decisions to have children play a central role in models of fertility by linking more distal determinants to fertility. This framework does not suggest that intentions always play a dynamic role in contemporary fertility change. In fact, in developed countries fertility intentions have changed little in the past two decades and vary little across developed countries; there exists a remarkably persistent and pervasive desire for two children. Thus, cross country and cross time variation must be explained by timing changes (discussed above) and women's/couples' ability and determination to realize intentions (not changes or difference in intentions).

In this conceptualization, the level of current fertility (the TFR) equals the number of children women intend but increased or decreased

by a set of factors women cannot anticipate and thus have not been incorporated into their reports of childbearing intentions. If all women realized their intended parity (IP), then the $TFR = IP$. Some factors inflate completed parity vis à vis intended fertility, e.g., unwanted fertility, replacement of children that may have died, and additional children needed to satisfy strong gender preferences. Other factors would reduce fertility relative to intentions. These factors include changes in the timing of fertility discussed above, subfecundity and infecundity associated with older ages of childbearing, and competition with other energy and time intensive activities that may lead persons to revise downward their intentions, especially at older ages.

The primary explanation for very low fertility codified in this model is that women (on average) fail to realize their intentions for even small and modest sized families. This insight directs our attention to factors that influence attainment of these goals. The process producing this lower than intended fertility is a life course process of fertility postponement that increases the likelihood that at older ages intentions will be revised downwards or infecundity will come into play.

FUNDAMENTAL CAUSES OF LOW FERTILITY

The weakness of the decomposition and proximate determinants approaches (discussed above) is that they leave the fundamental or exogenous cause unspecified. As a result, these explanations are only partial and beg the question: why is it that childlessness is greater or intentions are more likely to be met in one country compared to another?

Few would dispute that the transition from high to low fertility results from industrialization and post industrialization that increased "costs" (broadly conceived) of bearing and raising children. The timing of these fertility declines vis à vis particular aspects of socioeconomic change (and the resultant changes in child cost) was variable because populations had to recognize and conceptualize changing child costs and rationalize new fertility regulation behaviors. The new fertility regime

was one of small families. No country has become economically developed without experiencing the transition to small families.

But this powerful explanation for the fertility transition is not very useful for explaining variation in low fertility or for predicting its future course. Instead, there are two competing explanations. The first focuses on the cost/difficulty of childbearing and rearing in all contemporary settings. But it views the degree of incompatibility as variable, contingent on a set of society specific factors that decrease/increase incompatibility. For instance, all developed countries have experienced increases in female labor force participation. However, some societies experience increases in women's labor force participation with little change in fertility; for others, similar changes have accompanied sharp fertility declines. To account for these variable responses, one needs to document the institutional factors that make work and family more (or less) compatible for women in some countries than others. The most complete explanations require idiosyncratic explanations. But general patterns can be described. Peter McDonald (2000) argues that societal gender equality reduces work/family incompatibility. Specifically, when women enter the workforce but other institutions (e.g., the family, gender relations) do not make adjustments, it makes the joint roles of mother/worker very difficult. Some employed women resolve this incompatibility by having no or only one child. Greater gender equality (accompanying increases in women's non family work) eases women's work/family burden. Such adjustments facilitate women having the moderate number of children that they intend. The state can also respond with policies that encourage gender equality and that recognize the burden of bearing and caring for children. Public provision of children's health care and day care provide important examples. Finally, the market can respond; examples include widely available flex time for employees and consumer goods and services that substitute for home production.

A second explanation (for variation in low fertility) focuses on a putative irreversible shift toward an ideology that stresses individualism and self actualization. This ideology encourages women/couples to consider whether becoming a parent or having another child would make

them happier or their life more meaningful. Dirk Van de Kaa (2001) and Ron Lesthaeghe and Paul Willems (1999) argue that this spreading ideology has fostered a second demographic transition – later union formation, greater cohabitation, frequent union dissolution, and very low fertility. Given the very high direct and indirect costs of childbearing and rearing and this ideology that makes parenthood one of a range of acceptable lifestyles, these authors are pessimistic about fertility recuperating to approximate replacement levels.

FUTURE RESEARCH AND KEY UNANSWERED QUESTIONS

A key unanswered question is whether countries now undergoing a fertility transition will experience fertility well below replacement levels in the coming decades. Current evidence and theory suggest that settings with great gender inequality may experience the most dramatic fertility declines as women in these societies undertake non familial employment. However, the experience of developed countries may encourage more rapid adoption of strategies to reduce work/family competition for women's time and energies. The widespread adoption of effective policy responses is a second plausible scenario. Thirdly, some societies may be able to maintain fertility at/above replacement levels by embracing fundamentalist ideology or identifying motherhood/parenthood strongly with group identity. Such cultural/ideological responses gird families and women to accept the high costs of parenthood.

But equally important is the course of future fertility in countries that already have low fertility. Fertility postponement explains a significant part of contemporary very low fertility, but when postponement abates (as it eventually must), many countries will still have fertility levels well below replacement levels. One of the key questions for the twenty first century is whether and how effectively societies will respond. Comparative research can contribute by identifying effective responses or “packages” of responses that prove effective. The challenge is fundamental because replacement of the population is required for societal survival and because the costs of childbearing and rearing in

contemporary settings are huge. The changes in institutions and the redirection of resources toward parents and children that will likely be required pose a huge challenge for societies with very low fertility.

SEE ALSO: Aging and Social Policy; Demographic Techniques: Decomposition and Standardization; Demographic Transition Theory; Fertility and Public Policy; Fertility: Transitions and Measures; Gender, Work, and Family; Immigration Policy; Infertility; Migration: International; Second Demographic Transition

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fertility: nonmarital

Kelly Musick

Nonmarital fertility – or having a child outside of marriage – has become an increasingly important phenomenon demographically, socially, and politically. Fully one in three US births were to unmarried women in 2000, compared to just 5 percent in 1960. This change has generated a great deal of concern. Many worry because unmarried mothers tend to be younger and less advantaged socially and economically than married mothers, and their children tend not to do as well as those living with two married biological parents. Others worry that the growing number of families formed outside of marriage is weakening the institution of marriage. Policy makers have introduced measures in recent years explicitly designed to reduce the number of births to unmarried women. The 1996 welfare reform legislation, Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act (PRWORA), for example, includes incentives for states to reduce their rates of nonmarital childbearing, and reauthorization legislation includes resources to strengthen and promote marriage through outreach and counseling.

Three indicators are used to measure the extent of nonmarital fertility: the number of births to unmarried women; the nonmarital birth rate, or the proportion of unmarried women who have a birth each year; and the nonmarital birth ratio, or the proportion of all births that occur outside of marriage. In the United States, each of these indicators shows a dramatic increase in nonmarital fertility between 1960 and 1990 and a slowing or stabilization thereafter. These trends reflect changes in marital behavior. Men and women are getting married later, they are more likely to live together before marriage, and their marriages are less likely to last. They are spending an increasing number of years unmarried and sexually active, putting them at greater risk of having a child outside of marriage.

The United States is not unique in experiencing changes in marriage and fertility. Nonmarital fertility, cohabitation, and delayed marriage are common features of family life in many western industrialized countries. The

level of nonmarital childbearing in the US falls about in the middle compared to its European counterparts. Nonmarital fertility rates in the US are comparable to those in the United Kingdom and France; rates are lower than those in the Scandinavian countries and higher than those in Germany, Italy, and Spain.

The underlying causes of nonmarital fertility in the US and elsewhere must be understood in the context of changes in marriage, i.e., changes affecting the desirability, feasibility, or necessity of marriage. Four main ideas have received considerable attention in policy and academic circles. First, Gary Becker and the new home economics posit that women's growing economic independence has eroded the benefits of marriage. According to Becker and others, gains to marriage are derived from a highly specialized division of labor in which women depend on men's earnings in the labor market and men depend on women's caretaking and child rearing at home. As men's and women's roles become more complementary, they become less dependent on marriage. Although the dramatic increase in women's labor force participation in recent decades mirrors the decline in marriage and the increase in nonmarital fertility, the bulk of the evidence does not support the economic independence hypothesis. Women with greater resources, i.e., those with more education and higher earnings potential, are in fact more likely to marry than women with poorer economic prospects.

The second commonly offered explanation for changes in marriage and fertility focuses on men's economic prospects. William Julius Wilson, Valerie Oppenheimer, and others have argued that declines in men's wages have made it more difficult for couples to establish stable family lives. In *The Truly Disadvantaged* (1987), Wilson emphasizes structural changes in the economy over the past 30 years that have drastically reduced the earning power of low skilled men. He argues that declines in labor force participation and wages have created a lack of "marriageable men," particularly among African Americans. Research shows that men's economic prospects are an important predictor of marriage, although they cannot fully explain declines in marriage rates.

Third, welfare has been blamed for declines in marriage and increases in childbearing

outside of marriage. In his 1984 book, *Losing Ground*, Charles Murray uses a fictitious couple to illustrate how the availability of government assistance makes remaining unmarried a rational choice for low income women. He argues that because single women are eligible for more help than married women, couples are better off living together than marrying. Although welfare reform legislation in the mid 1990s attempted to change this, disincentives to marry remain. Moreover, like female employment and earnings, welfare makes women less dependent on men. Although the welfare argument continues to have considerable political currency, trends in benefit levels and family change provide little support: real welfare benefits began to erode in the 1970s and 1980s, as nonmarital childbearing continued to rise. Robert Moffitt has extensively studied the micro level association between welfare and family formation, and concludes that welfare has affected marriage and childbearing over the years, but the magnitude of the effect is small relative to other factors.

Finally, attitudes and values have been discussed as a potentially important factor behind increasing nonmarital fertility. In recent decades, men and women have become more tolerant of nonmarital childbearing and related behaviors, including sex outside of marriage, cohabitation, and single parenthood. Greater acceptance of family life outside of marriage has reduced the social and family pressure to marry, even as young people continue to express the desire to marry. Attitudinal change has gone hand in hand with increases in nonmarital fertility and cohabitation. It is difficult, however, to determine whether changes in attitudes have fueled changes in the family or, rather, whether increasing diversity in family life has led to more tolerance of a range of family behaviors. Some see changing values as an inevitable reaction – with costs as well as benefits – to increasing individualism, secularization, and gender equality (e.g., Bumpass 1990). Others view them more skeptically as indicators of family decline with harmful consequences for children (e.g., Popenoe 1993).

A good theory of nonmarital fertility should explain not just why it has increased, but why it is more common among some groups than others. Patterns of nonmarital fertility vary considerably by socioeconomic status, race, and

age. Nonmarital births tend to occur to women who are relatively disadvantaged socially and economically. In the early 1990s, for example, over half of all births to women with less than a high school degree were to unmarried women, whereas this was the case for just 5 percent of births to women with a college degree. There has been little research on education differences between married and unmarried mothers in European countries with similarly high levels of nonmarital fertility. We do know, however, that unmarried mothers are less likely to be poor in Europe than in the US. This is due in part to Europe's relatively generous public assistance programs; it may also be related to the greater likelihood of unmarried mothers in Europe to be living with their partners when their children are born. In the US, levels of nonmarital childbearing also differ significantly by race, although the gap has been closing. In 2002, 23 percent of births to white women, 44 percent of births to Hispanic women, and 68 percent of births to black women were nonmarital (data from Table 7, *National Vital Statistics Report*, Vol. 52, No. 9).

Unmarried mothers are younger on average than married mothers. Thirty percent of all nonmarital births – and most first nonmarital births – are to women in their teens. Teenage childbearing has been a public issue of great concern since the 1970s. It entered the national agenda not when it was at its peak, but as the proportion of unmarried teenage mothers grew and fewer teenagers opted into marriage following a premarital conception. Rates of teenage childbearing have reached record lows in recent years (the lowest levels since the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention began calculating them in 1976), falling substantially over the course of the 1990s, particularly among blacks. Despite declines, rates of teenage childbearing continue to be much higher (by two to ten times) in the US than in other developed countries. They remain a public issue, moreover, because the vast majority of teenage births are outside of marriage; indeed, given the delay in marriage, a much higher percent are nonmarital today than when teen births were more common.

Although age is an important dimension of nonmarital fertility, nonmarital childbearing is too often viewed as synonymous with teenage

childbearing. Policy and academic discussions have focused on young first time mothers, paying little attention to the 70 percent of nonmarital births to women in their twenties and older, many of whom already have children. Because of the focus on teenage mothers, research and debate have primarily addressed the factors leading to early sex and unintended pregnancy. The processes leading to an unmarried birth are likely very different for older women.

There is little research on the consequences of nonmarital fertility for mothers and children. Two related literatures – on single parent families and teenage childbearing – shed light on the question but do not address it directly. Single parenthood results from nonmarital childbearing and divorce, and many studies do not distinguish between the two. Among those that do, families headed by never married and divorced mothers seem to be related in similar ways to child well being. Children from single parent families tend to fare more poorly than children from biological married parent families in terms of school achievement, occupational attainment, and income. Girls from single parent families are also more likely to become single mothers later in life. Teenage childbearing is associated with a host of negative outcomes for mothers: teenage mothers are less likely to graduate from high school and college and more likely to live in poverty. Young unmarried mothers are less likely to marry than women without children.

While associations between well being, single parenthood, and teen parenthood are well established, the extent to which negative outcomes are a consequence of single parenthood and teen parenthood remains unclear. Women who enter into these statuses are different from those who do not, and it is difficult to distinguish between preexisting differences and causal effects. Teenage mothers, for example, come from relatively disadvantaged families, which places them at greater risk of dropping out of high school and falling into poverty, independent of early childbearing. Analysts have carefully designed studies to minimize the preexisting differences between women who have had a teen birth and those who have not. One approach has been to compare later life outcomes of sisters or cousins – who presumably share many

important family characteristics – with and without a teen birth. Another approach has attempted to use the “random” event of having a miscarriage to compare the outcomes of teen women who did and did not give birth but are otherwise similar. These studies find that preexisting differences account for a sizable share of the association between teenage childbearing and mothers’ outcomes, but probably not all. Similarly, the relationship between single parenthood and child well being is due at least in part to preexisting differences between women who become single mothers and those who do not. For example, children who grow up in highly conflicted two parent families fare about as poorly on many measures as children from single parent families, suggesting that unmeasured differences in the quality of parental relationships may account for differences between children from single parent and two parent families. Family background, education, and income are other dimensions on which women are differentially selected into single parenthood.

In recent years, the focus on early childbearing has given way to a more detailed examination of the romantic relationships and living arrangements of unmarried mothers. This shift has been driven by changes in the characteristics of unmarried mothers, including increases in the average age at birth and, particularly, increases in cohabitation. Since the 1970s, cohabitation outside of marriage has become a common and acceptable behavior: half of all couples now live together before marriage. As of 1995, 40 percent of all nonmarital births were to cohabiting couples, and nearly all of the increase in nonmarital fertility since the late 1980s was due to increases in births to cohabitators. Cohabitation may have very different implications for father involvement, child well being, and welfare dependence than single motherhood. These facts are just beginning to be digested by policymakers and social commentators. Policy attention since 2000 has begun to shift from pregnancy prevention among teen women to marriage promotion among young adults.

Research is starting to address key questions about the relationship context of births to unmarried women, the stability of these relationships, and the level of father involvement

typical of them. Analyses are being extended to couples' decisions to cohabit rather than marry and implications of this choice for children. The Fragile Families Study, a representative sample of nonmarital births in cities of 200,000 and over, is unique in collecting information from both parents, irrespective of their living arrangements. These data have allowed researchers to examine a range of parental relationships into which children are born, including those in which parents are uninvolved romantically, romantic visiting relationships, and cohabiting relationships. These data have shed light on the role of unmarried fathers in the lives of their children and the relationships of unmarried mothers and fathers. Recent research is also moving away from the assumption that most births to unmarried women are unintended. Kathryn Edin and Paula England are analyzing qualitative data designed to distinguish between planning a child outside of marriage, ambivalence, and contraceptive misuse and failure.

Decisions about having children, cohabiting, marrying, and ending a relationship are closely intertwined. Nonmarital fertility is difficult to study because it lies at the intersection of these family processes. In addition to conceptual difficulties, small sample sizes and truncated life histories often limit our ability to empirically examine meaningful differences in the pathways women follow through childbearing, cohabitation, and marriage. The context of nonmarital births is heterogeneous with respect to mother's age, parental relationships, and father involvement, and this heterogeneity is likely important for child outcomes. Understanding differences in the contexts of nonmarital families, while at the same time paying attention to differences in how children experience family transitions according to their sex and developmental stage, is a challenge for future research.

SEE ALSO: Family Demography; Family Diversity; Family, Men's Involvement in; Family Planning, Abortion, and Reproductive Health; Family Structure and Child Outcomes; Family Structure and Poverty; Fertility: Adolescent; Fertility and Public Policy; Intimate Union Formation and Dissolution; Second Demographic Transition; Union Formation and Dissolution

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fertility and public policy

John Bongaarts

Fertility levels vary widely among contemporary populations, from a high of 7.9 births per woman in Niger to a low of 0.8 in Macao (United Nations 2005). These levels are largely

the result of decisions made by individual couples who are trying to maximize their families' welfare. In the least developed countries, fertility is high because children are valued for the social and economic benefits they provide to their families and the cost of childbearing and rearing is typically low. In contrast, in the most industrialized countries, couples want and have small families because the value of children is relatively low and their costs are high. The fertility that results from this individual decision making is not necessarily optimal from a societal point of view, thus suggesting a potential role for government intervention.

Many governments regard the fertility level of their countries as unsatisfactory. A world wide survey of population policies undertaken by the United Nations found that the proportion of countries that are not satisfied with their level of fertility has increased from 47 percent in 1976 to 63 percent in 2003 (United Nations 2004). In the developed world (Europe, North America, Japan, Australia, and New Zealand) 58 percent of countries consider fertility too low and none considers it too high. In the developing world (Africa, most of Asia and Latin America) 58 percent of countries consider fertility too high and 8 percent too low. A range of public policies have been developed in response to these concerns.

POLICY RESPONSES TO HIGH FERTILITY IN THE DEVELOPING WORLD

In the 1950s and 1960s declines in mortality caused a sharp acceleration of population growth throughout the developing world. This growth led to widespread concern about its potential adverse consequences for human welfare and the environment, particularly in the poor countries of Asia, Latin America, and Africa where growth was expected to be most rapid. As a result, in the 1960s and 1970s funding and technical assistance expanded enormously for developing country governments that were willing to take action. Efforts by these governments to curb rapid population growth focused on reducing high birth rates because other demographic changes (raising the death rate or massive emigration) were obviously not

desirable. The large majority of governments attempted to reduce high birth rates through the implementation of voluntary family planning programs. The aim of these programs was to provide information about and access to contraception to permit women and men to take control of their reproductive lives and avoid unwanted childbearing. Only in rare cases, most notably in China, has coercion been used. Newly available contraceptive methods such as the pill and IUD greatly facilitated the delivery of family planning services. Successful implementation of such programs in a few countries in the 1960s (e.g., Taiwan and Korea) encouraged other governments to follow this programmatic approach.

The choice of voluntary family planning programs as the principal policy instrument to reduce fertility is based largely on the documentation of a substantial level of unwanted childbearing and unsatisfied demand for contraception. When questioned in surveys, large proportions of married women in the developing world report that they do not want a pregnancy soon. Some of these women want no more children because they have already achieved their desired family size, while others want to wait before having the next wanted pregnancy. A substantial proportion of these women are not protected from the risk of pregnancy by practicing effective contraception (including sterilization) and, as a result, unintended pregnancies are common. In the mid 1990s, 36 percent of all pregnancies in the developing world were unplanned and 20 percent of all pregnancies ended in abortion (Alan Guttmacher Institute 1999). The existence of an unmet need for contraception, first documented in the 1960s, convinced policy makers that family planning programs were needed and would be acceptable and effective.

The effectiveness of this approach was supported by experiments such as the one conducted in the Matlab district of rural Bangladesh (Cleland et al. 1994). When this experiment began in the 1970s, Bangladesh was one of the poorest and least developed countries, and there was considerable skepticism that reproductive behavior could be changed in such a setting. Comprehensive family planning and reproductive health services were provided in the treatment area of the experiment. A wide

choice of methods was offered, the quality of referral and follow up was improved, and a new cadre of well trained women replaced traditional birth attendants as service providers. The results of these improvements were immediate and pronounced, with contraceptive use rising sharply. No such change was observed in the comparison area. The differences between these two areas in contraceptive use and fertility have been maintained over time. The success of the Matlab experiment demonstrated that appropriately designed services can reduce unmet need for contraception even in traditional settings.

The expansion of international and national investments in family planning programs in the 1970s and 1980s coincided with a massive decline in fertility in much of the developing world. Fertility had been high and stable at about 6 births per woman until the late 1960s, when a sharp decline began. By 2000 fertility had dropped by half to about 3 births per woman on average. The largest declines occurred in Asia and Latin America, but declines are now also underway in many parts of Africa. There is little doubt that family planning programs made a substantial contribution to this decline by reducing unwanted pregnancies (Bongaarts 1997). However, it is also true that much of the decline would have happened anyway because of the rapid social and economic changes that occurred in much of the developing world in recent decades. The resulting modernization of societies has reduced desired family size which, when implemented through the rising use of birth control, has brought about lower fertility.

Family planning programs are limited in their ability to lower fertility because they aim to reduce unwanted fertility and their effect on desired family size is apparently weak or non-existent (Freedman 1997). The implication of this finding is that countries in which wanted fertility is high will need declines in preferences to complete their fertility transition. Such declines are usually achieved by improvements in socioeconomic conditions. It is widely believed that desired fertility is most responsive to improvements in human development, in particular in female education and child survival (Caldwell 1980; Sen 1999). This conclusion is strongly supported by the fact

that low fertility has been achieved in some very poor societies such as Sri Lanka and the state of Kerala in India. Although poor, these populations have high levels of literacy and female empowerment and low infant and child mortality. The most effective public policies to reduce high fertility therefore pursue two general options: strengthen the family planning program and encourage human development. The former is aimed primarily at reducing unplanned pregnancy and the latter at reducing the demand for children.

POLICY RESPONSES TO LOW FERTILITY IN THE DEVELOPED WORLD

In the 1990s fertility transitions in most developing countries were well underway or even nearing completion and, as a result, these issues became less urgent. Attention of the scientific and policy communities then increasingly turned to a relatively new and unexpected development, namely the very low fertility observed in most developed societies. Until the 1990s demographers widely expected fertility to level off at or near the replacement level of about 2.1 births per woman at the end of the transition, and population projections made by international agencies such as the UN often incorporated this assumption. This view is now seen as ill founded because fertility in virtually all modern societies has dropped below the replacement level. The average fertility of the developed world in 2000–2005 is estimated at 1.6 births per woman and in several countries fertility is less than 1.3 (United Nations 2005).

Low fertility has become of concern because further declines or even a continuation of current levels will lead to rapid population aging and to a decline in population size. These demographic developments in turn will have substantial social and economic consequences. In particular, rapid population aging threatens the sustainability of public pension and health care systems (OECD 1998; World Bank 1994). These popular programs have been successful in improving the health and welfare of the elderly. However, expenditures by widely implemented pay as you go programs, which rely on transfers from younger to older generations,

are becoming increasingly burdensome on the contributors and are eventually unsustainable as old age "dependency rates" rise to high levels.

Identifying and implementing reforms of public pension and health care systems under these changing demographic conditions represent an urgent new challenge for public policy. Avoiding action is no longer a feasible option because an unprecedented and harmful accumulation of debt would then result. In the past, the rising cost of public support for the elderly has often been covered by raising taxes, but these have reached such high levels that expenditure-reducing approaches are now given highest priority. Reforms now focus on achieving reductions in future benefits even though this option is difficult politically because large proportions of pensioners receive public benefits. In addition, efforts are being considered to encourage later age at retirement by removing incentives to early retirement. Reforms adopted in recent years are generally phased in slowly, thus leaving current pensioners largely unaffected; their impact will therefore be felt mainly by future retirees.

Demographic options are generally ignored in the ongoing debate about reform. Many governments are reluctant to support pronatalist measures because of a disinclination to interfere with personal decision making regarding family size, or because of the apparent inconsistency of advocating pronatalism at home while supporting efforts to reduce fertility in poor developing countries; in addition, they may hope that fertility will soon increase again without intervention (Caldwell et al. 2002; Demeny 2003; Gauthier 1996). Furthermore, low levels of recent fertility have not yet led to declines in population size in most developed countries, because the effects of below replacement fertility have been offset temporarily by modest levels of immigration and population momentum. It seems likely, however, that growing concerns about the implications of population aging will stimulate more interest in efforts to encourage higher fertility directly or indirectly. For example, family support measures such as subsidized childcare, reduced taxes for families with children, and paid parental leaves are widely acceptable and could be expanded. A recent review of the impact of such measures by Caldwell et al. (2002) concludes that they do

raise fertility modestly provided the subsidies are sufficiently large. The fact that desired family size in most developed countries is still around 2 indicates that actual fertility is lower than desired and strongly suggests that birth rates can be raised by policies that reduce the cost of childbearing and help women to combine a career with childbearing.

Most governments of OECD countries are now well aware of the challenges posed by population aging caused primarily by low fertility. The modest ongoing reforms of pension and health care systems are a step in the right direction, but they are far from adequate. It is likely that further reform will include direct and indirect measures to support families to achieve their desired fertility.

SEE ALSO: Demographic Transition Theory; Family Planning, Abortion, and Reproductive Health; Fertility: Low; Fertility: Transitions and Measures; Population and Economy; Second Demographic Transition

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fertility: transitions and measures

Sharon Kirmeyer

Childbearing, or the fertility of human populations, has changed profoundly in the last several centuries. Four aspects are basic for measuring and studying human fertility: *age*, *parity* (number of children ever born), length of *birth interval*, and *population reproductivity*. Additionally, there are cross cutting issues of time perspective and of fertility dimensions. The variety of fertility measures at a given time is both a result of the data available and a precondition to expansions in data collection efforts.

COHORT VERSUS PERIOD ANALYSIS

Fertility measures are expressed to reflect childbearing either in the time period in which they occur, or at the end of the (reproductive) life time of a cohort.

Period fertility rates and analyses are cross sectional and give a “snapshot” of a population for a short period of time. A major advantage of period rates is that they are immediately calculable. A second is that they provide the annual contribution to population growth through fertility.

Cohort fertility rates and analyses concern a group of persons with a common temporal experience, such as a birth or marriage date. They take into account the events occurring to women (or men) until the end of their reproductive years. More stable than period rates, they provide the means to evaluate long term population evolution. The main disadvantage in calculating cohort measures is that they require, at minimum, 30 years of data.

The basic tool to translate period to cohort measures is through the Lexis diagram. The time of the event is on the horizontal axis, the time lapse on the vertical. A period rate employs events at given ages (or durations) for time on the horizontal axis. A cohort measure uses a diagonal span to calculate the rate for individuals entering the cohort at the stated points. More complex tools have been recently developed for period-cohort translation.

QUANTUM, TEMPO, AND DISPERSION

Fertility measures reflect three comprehensive dimensions of natality. Demographic *quantum* is the number of lifetime events per person. In fertility per se, it is the number of children ever born to a woman. Fertility *tempo* refers to the timing of births. This is most commonly expressed as the mean age of childbearing, and secondarily, the duration of intervals between births. A third dimension is that of *dispersion*. Dispersion measures variation, not central tendency, and can be based on age, parity, or birth interval.

Currently, the quantum and tempo aspects of fertility are drawing scrutiny as 20 European countries have period total fertility rates of 1.4 or below. A simple approach by Bongaarts and Feeney to remove major effects of tempo serves to approximate the fertility quantum by adjusting for changes in mean age of childbearing.

DIRECT (AGE BASED) MEASURES OF FERTILITY

Direct measures of fertility are classically obtained from vital registration records, which provide the numerators (births), and from censuses, projections, or continuous registration

systems, which provide the population denominators. Large population surveys can provide sufficient “person years” for stable estimates of direct measures.

The *crude birth rate* (CBR) provides the number of live births per 1,000 population in a given time period. The CBR is a measure of a population’s overall growth, but it can mask – or exaggerate – fertility differences between two populations which have very different age structures.

The *general fertility rate* (GFR) is the number of live births in a time period to women of reproductive age, usually expressed per 1,000 women aged 15 to 44 or 15 to 49. This measure is generally available from vital registration. It removes from the denominator most of the population not directly exposed to childbearing, and as such removes most of the age compositional differences between populations. However, it does not control for age variation within the reproductive years.

The *age specific fertility rate* (ASFR) is the number of births to women of a certain age divided by the number of women in that age group (e.g., women aged 25 to 29). The distribution of ASFRs resembles an inverted U, conventionally starting at age 15 and ending at age 50. Birth rates are low in the teen years, rising in the twenties, and tapering off in the late thirties and forties. Many consider studying fertility changes in terms of age specific rates the most fruitful for social and demographic comparison.

The *total fertility rate* (TFR) represents the average number of children ever born to a woman if she were to move through her reproductive years maintaining ASFRs of the current time period. Using period rates, it is a synthetic figure. As both a summary indicator and a standardized rate, the TFR is employed in health, economic, historical, and other analyses. The TFR plus coexisting mortality levels establish the “replacement level fertility” for a population.

When women begin having children at older ages, the *mean age of childbearing* advances and the period total fertility rate falls. If childbearing moves to younger ages, the period TFR increases, at least temporarily. In recent years, the mean age of childbearing has shifted substantially to later ages in all regions but Eastern

Europe. With this change in birth timing, the tempo effect depresses the TFR.

INDIRECT (AGE BASED) METHODS AND MODELS

From the 1960s through the 1980s, a plethora of *indirect measures* was generated which estimated primarily TFRs and secondarily ASFRs in developing countries. This was due to the dual conditions of data deficiency – censuses being then the primary data source – and the national and internationally funded family planning and development programs which needed fertility measures to track outcomes. Surveys like those produced by the World Fertility Survey program were not large enough to produce reliable direct estimates. While many national surveys have become larger, indirect estimation continues to be used due to the limitations in data supply and quality.

Indirect measures of fertility are used under a variety of conditions. Indirect measures are necessary when vital statistics and large surveys are not available for calculating ASFRs and TFRs – the case when only census data are available. Also, other data are often incomplete, of dubious quality (especially in reference to age), or are based on small sample size; hence indirect measures may provide better estimates than would direct measures. Similarly, indirect measures can aid in data quality evaluation. Also, estimates are based on five year age and time intervals; interpolation techniques provide useful single year rates. Meaningful short and medium range projections of fertility are well grounded in fertility models, especially those containing alternate scenarios.

Indirect methods (i.e., indirect measures which incorporate other demographic estimates) may be classified into four groups: methods based on average number of children ever born per woman of specified ages – and often information about births in the past year; methods based on census age–sex distributions and life table functions – which reverse survive enumerated populations; regression based methods yielding fertility measures from demographic variables or permitting translation among fertility measures; and methods which partially use models – the strongest employing mothers’

own children data classified by mothers' and children's ages. As surveys have increased in size, permitting statistically reliable direct estimation of age based period measures, these indirect methods retain utility in interpreting historical data, or producing small area (or sub population) estimates.

Many indirect measures are *biodemographical models*, that is, they are based on reproductive processes. Three are mentioned here, distinguished for their simplicity of expression and their ability to explain change in fertility levels and composition.

In the 1970s, the Princeton University based European Fertility Project was established to characterize the decline of fertility that took place in Europe during the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. A set of *indices* referring to total fertility (I_f), marital fertility, marriage, and illegitimate fertility formalized the theoretical fertility transition (Coale & Watkins 1986). Sar don provided the means to convert the I_f into the more easily interpretable TFR.

Coale and Trussell elaborated a general model consisting of marital states and fertility pertaining to those states which would closely describe age based fertility. Their three parameter model contains elements of natural fertility, deliberate control of childbearing (contraception and abortion), and cohabitation.

The *intermediate fertility variables* follow from the early framework of Davis and Blake and the subsequent work of many researchers who quantified elements of the reproductive process. Of the 11 variables named by Davis and Blake, Bongaarts identified four which explain the most variation between countries and are the most sensitive to change (marriage, contraception, induced abortion, and infecund ability). These are often referred to as the *proximate determinants of fertility*.

Non biodemographical models are of a statistical or mathematical nature. Through smoothing, interpolation, and projection, they generate natural ASFR curves. They have been classified as being curves expressed by parametric mathematical formulae; models based on the relational approach; non parametric statistical models, such as those based on the principal component method; and non parametric curves – such as the various splines and higher degree polynomials.

PARITY BASED MEASURES

The study of *distributions by completed parity* of either actual or synthetic (period) cohorts with emphasis on parity progression ratios represents an evolution in perspective. As such, modern fertility is not a series of spontaneous events subject to biological factors, such as age and exposure. Rather, it is a behavioral process controlled by individual decision making regarding whether or not to bear a subsequent child.

A *parity progression table* parallels a conventional life table, substituting r , the number of children ever born, for the time parameter of decrement, x . The cohort is initiated with all women having yet to bear any children. The principal *parity progression functions* and their life table counterparts are:

- $\lambda_r [\sim I_x]$, the parity attainment proportion;
- $\delta_r [\sim d_x]$, the proportion at parity r at completed fertility;
- $\rho_r [\sim p_x]$, the parity progression ratio; and
- $\eta_r [\sim e_x]$, the expected number of children after r ;

Additional key measures derived from the basic parity progression table include: the *maternal TFR*, which follows the observation that countries' total fertility rates vary substantially due to the proportion childless in a cohort. This rate is the mean number of children ever born to women who become mothers.

Samuel Preston transformed mothers' cohorts by parity to the number of children born to their mothers. This switches the perspective to the children's, making it possible to estimate *mean number of siblings*. Mean number of siblings is higher than a mother's average fertility rate due to overrepresentation from large families.

The *Gini mean difference*, derived directly from parity progression functions, measures heterogeneity (or concentration) of the parity distribution. This provides a simple indicator to evaluate populations in terms of their parity dispersions.

Finally, to evaluate the impact of changing parity progression ratios on a new (overall)

fertility level, Barkalov adapted Pollard's *decomposition* technique. Applying decomposition, the percent of change in TFR may be attributed to each parity progression ratio.

BIRTH INTERVAL BASED MEASURES

Birth interval analysis has not been given as much attention as age based analysis. But with the growth of large surveys containing many covariates, the study of birth intervals provides information on the dynamics of family growth, control of reproduction, health consequences for mothers and infants, as well as tempo measures for formal demographic analysis.

The extent and frequency of gathering data on birth intervals has expanded. Traditionally, limited data have come from censuses and vital registrations (primarily: last birth date). Longitudinal surveys are the most appropriate for accuracy, but are difficult to implement. An abundance of data have come from retrospective birth histories. The World Fertility Surveys of the 1970s included 60 surveys from developed and developing countries. The largest retrospective enterprise includes the multiple rounds of Demographic and Health Surveys (at least 170 surveys) and the similar Reproductive Health Surveys, both supported by the US Agency for International Development. Recently, another round of 20 surveys took place in more developed countries (Family and Fertility Surveys), including the ongoing US National Survey of Family Growth. The World Fertility Surveys spurred the development of methods to analyze birth intervals. They are based primarily on events as numerators and person years of exposure in the denominator.

Birth intervals are ultimately bounded by age of menarche and menopause. They are classified as *first* (from time of first exposure to pregnancy) *interval*, *closed intervals* (between births), and the *open interval* (between the last birth and time of survey or presumed menopause). Birth interval analysis encounters several problems. Birth interval analysis is subject to expected data deficiencies: misreporting of event dates and age of mother, and underreporting of events. The first birth interval is problematic, as the date of first exposure to

pregnancy is difficult to determine in almost any population. Censoring occurs when a birth interval is not complete; it biases estimates by eliminating the longer intervals characteristic of subsets of the population. Survival analysis, borrowed from mortality analysis, addresses many issues encountered in working with birth intervals.

REPRODUCTIVITY

Particular attention to measures of population replacement, or *reproductivity*, came into play during the fertility nadirs experienced by Europe and North America between the world wars and in the last decade of the twentieth century. Also, the sustained high fertility rates of many parts of the "third world" – particularly in the 1970s and 1980s – generated concern about long run population growth. A set of measures made it possible to map where a country was in terms of replacing itself, and what that portended in the long run.

The *gross reproduction rate* (GRR) is a simple means to show, on average, the number of girls born to a woman. It is closely approximated by multiplying the total fertility rate by the concurrent proportion of babies who are female. This simple method provides a sense of the ratio of daughters who will replace their mothers. But it does not take into account the possible mortality of women prior to reaching specific childbearing ages. As such, it may greatly overstate the number of daughters replacing their mothers.

The *net reproduction rate* (NRR) is the summary measure which best represents the ratio of female births in two generations. It is calculated using life table functions. The NRR is the average number of daughters which would be born to a woman if she passed through her lifetime conforming to the age specific fertility and mortality rates of a given year. A net reproduction rate of unity signifies that a population is exactly replacing itself. Above 1, the population is more than replacing itself; conversely, an NRR of less than 1 signifies a population which is declining in size. As the NRR takes mortality into account, a rule of thumb often uses a total fertility rate between 2.1 and 2.3 as being that which equates a *replacement level of fertility*.

For many years, the *intrinsic rate of growth*, or growth rate of a closed population with constant fertility and mortality, was of heuristic interest. Dublin and Lotka's (1925) formulation was incorporated into many formal analyses and long term projections, but had little immediate relevance. With the recent sustained low fertility and mortality of Europe, discussions concerning future national age structures and dependency ratios (vis à vis social security needs) are sparked by the longer generation lengths coupled with negative intrinsic rates of growth.

SEE ALSO: Age, Period, and Cohort Effects; Biodemography; Davis, Kingsley; Demographic Data: Censuses, Registers, Surveys; Demographic Techniques: Event History Methods; Demographic Techniques: Life Table Methods; Demographic Transition Theory; Fertility: Low; Fertility: Nonmarital; Intimate Union Formation and Dissolution; Second Demographic Transition

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fetishism

Gert Hekma

A fetish is a more or less concrete object of sexual desire. It can be a part of the body, an object, a situation, or some abstraction. Breasts, buttocks, feet, hair, and genitals belong to the parts of the body; clothing, shoes, whips, dildos, uniforms, cars, or specific materials such as leather, silk, satin, velvet, and rubber are possible objects; situations can be cinemas, saunas, dark rooms, dinner tables, beaches, or prison cells; and more abstract examples of fetishism include youth, beauty, hospitality, power, submission, and humiliation. Ultimately, any part of the body, object, situation, or abstraction can become a fetish and, on the other hand, all sexual pleasure depends on fetishes. Naming or reading the word can be as exciting as the object to which it refers.

The term fetish comes from religion studies. The Portuguese named an object of African religious veneration a *feticiao*, an object bestowed with surplus value (McClintock 1993; Nye 1993; Pettinger 1993). Karl Marx used the term in this sense for his economic theory, and in 1888 the French scholar Alfred Binet used it for the sexual theory he expounded in "Le Fétichisme dans l'amour." In the 1880s, which saw the beginnings of sexology, Binet asked why people had obsessive desires for nightcaps or women's ponytails. According to him, the coincidental association of sexual excitement and remarking a certain object produced the concrete, contingent, and individual form of a fetish. He differentiated between small and large fetishes, the first being additional and the second being essential to sexual pleasure. Many people like large breasts, but some can only

become excited when they have them in their hands or minds. Although Binet designed his view as a general theory of sexual perversion, his predominantly social theory was obscured by biological theories then current in psychiatry. The trend at that time was to explain perversion by way of physiology, not society. Several doctors wrote books in which they described concrete cases of fetishism. Only the Freudians adapted Binet's term and view for psychoanalysis, but it did not become one of their core concepts.

Since the recent postmodern turn, the erotic version of the term fetishism has been revived mostly in the humanities. It is an interesting term for the social sciences because it connects sexual pleasure to the social world where the fetish is picked up, and breaks down the dichotomy of homo and heterosexual and of subject and object. McCallum (1999: 154) suggests that the fetish challenges "the domination of the subject over the object" and eliminates the need for other subjects. The fetish is not abstract but instrumental and stimulates agency and passion. It is beyond the genders of sexual object choice. Different from love, sexual pleasures most often have a concrete and contingent aim and the concept of fetish captures this neatly. Apter and Pietz (1993: 4) can thus assert that "feminist essentialism is resisted through fetishism's implicit challenge to a stable phallic referent." In fetishism, the sexual aim is not a gendered object but something more specific, going beyond homo, hetero, or bisexual choices. These characteristics make the fetish an ideal concept for post feminist and queer theory where it has been applied profusely in the humanities (Apter & Pietz 1993), specifically in fashion studies (Steele 1996). In sociology, the concept is rarely used in its sexual meanings. It is remarkable that the grand masters of sociology, who lived in close proximity to the urban environments where sexologists and sexual subcultures are to be found, rarely paid any attention to sexual variation, and never to fetishism.

Although all people have fetishes, the term is mainly used in circles of sexual specialization such as subcultures, pornography, and Internet chat rooms and websites. The most common although still rare objects of sociological research have been leather or S/M commu-

nities. The main focus of research has been the origin of specific sexual choices or the organization of subcultures, but not specifically on fetishism. In surveys the topic of sexual choice goes rarely beyond homosexual and heterosexual, although in some cases unusual or deviant variations have been included, being an erotic interest of about 10 percent of the population. Fetishist preferences must be far more general. Most of those who are curious probably do not venture into the existing subcultures but instead play out their desires with their partner or in fantasy. The authors of the largest sex survey in the United States indicated that in most monogamous couples, sexual desires will differ. This means that the chances are minimal that partners will erotically satisfy each other's special wishes (Laumann et al. 1994). The absence of concrete physical places for the various fetishes, even in the largest cities, makes the desire highly abstract, as in most postmodern theorizing. It might be that the proliferation of web sites devoted to sexual variations will favor the emergence of relevant places and organizations, as occurred in the gay world with rubber, skin heads, sports clothing, and sneakers. The variety begs the question of how to find partners. Curiosity for each other's fetishes could bridge the gap between different desires.

Given the poor state of knowledge on fetishism, the most important first step in sociological research will be qualitative research to delineate themes and contexts, for example by interviewing people about their fetishes and putting down their sexual scripts. As no studies are available, the future direction will be to demarcate the contents and contexts of fetishist interests, their organization, and their place in sexual relations. The concept has a highly the-oretic quality, as it breaks down various dichotomies of gay and straight, object and subject, social and individual. It could be a central concept for a postmodern sociology of sexuality, while it reflects at the same time the realities of erotic pleasures.

SEE ALSO: Consumption, Fashion and; Cybersexualities and Virtual Sexuality; Homosexuality; Plastic Sexuality; Postmodern Sexualities; Sadomasochism; Scripting Theories; Sexual Deviance; Sexual Practices; Sexuality Research: History

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Feuerbach, Ludwig (1804–72)

Clifford L. Staples

Ludwig Feuerbach was born into a large, prominent, academic family in Landshut, Bavaria. His father was a distinguished professor of jurisprudence, and three of Ludwig's four brothers went on to noteworthy careers in mathematics, law, and archeology. But unwilling to heed his father's advice to steer clear of radical ideas, and unable to negotiate the repressive atmosphere of academic and political life in mid nineteenth century Germany, Feuerbach became an important academic failure. Some social theorists and sociologists are familiar with Feuerbach's writings on religion, but most sociologists know Feuerbach primarily because of his influence on the young Karl

Marx – a central figure within the sociological tradition. Feuerbach's critique of Hegel provided Marx with the occasion to, in turn, critique Feuerbach, and in the process Marx worked his way toward a thoroughly sociological approach to such core topics as history, ideology, and social evolution – topics approached before Marx usually as theological or philosophical problems. For his time and place, Feuerbach was a radical, though not quite radical enough for Marx.

Feuerbach's life took a familiar modern trajectory from youthful religiosity toward naturalism and eventually to a materialist humanism typical, if not universal, among contemporary sociologists. Having a highly learned and opinionated father, however, made it difficult for Feuerbach to develop an independent intellectual life. As a young man he was interested in studying theology, but soon (along with many of his contemporaries) was swept up in the excitement about Hegel. Unfortunately, Feuerbach's father despised Hegel, and young Feuerbach was forced to fib his way to Berlin to hear the master by telling his father he was going off to study with the respected theologian Friedrich Schleiermacher. Eventually, and against his father's wishes, Feuerbach moved into philosophy and in 1828 successfully defended a dissertation on Hegel. But even in this early work it was already clear that he would not remain a strict Hegelian. Famously, he sent Hegel a copy of his thesis along with a suggestion that Hegel's work was not as Hegelian as it ought to be. He also pointed out that Christianity was not – as Hegel had argued – the ultimate religion. Details aside, it is Feuerbach's approach to religion, and by extension all forms of ideology, that would prove so useful to Marx and others inclined to challenge religious and political orthodoxies.

Between 1828 and 1837 Feuerbach, as a professor at the university in Erlangen, published several well received books and articles and was on his way to a successful career as an academic. However, and once again against his father's advice, Feuerbach also published anonymously, in 1830, *Thoughts on Death and Immortality*. In this book he extended and developed his critique of Christian dogma. Specifically, he challenged accepted Christian views on the survival of the soul after death – a risky move in a

near theocracy – but, for good measure, he also poked fun at popular Christian religious beliefs. The authorities banned the book and when Feuerbach, widely suspected of being its author, refused to deny it, he found himself dismissed from his position. Thus, even before Feuerbach had written much of interest to Marx or to sociology, he had already managed to get himself fired from the only academic position he would ever hold. We might have heard nothing more from Feuerbach had he not married into a moderately wealthy family in 1837, allowing him to continue with his intellectual work without having to earn a living from it.

Up through his brief career as an academic, Feuerbach wrote in a very abstract and speculative style of metaphysics of little interest to modern sociologists. But with the publication in 1841 of *The Essence of Christianity* Feuerbach pointed the way toward a secular, materialist humanism that most sociologists, not only Marxists, now take for granted.

The Essence of Christianity made Feuerbach famous in Germany and established him as a leader, along with Bruno Bauer and eventually Karl Marx, of the “Young Hegelians” – students of Hegel who sought to realize the master’s idealism by grounding it in social and political realities. What Feuerbach had to say about Christianity is less important, for the sociologist, than the paradigm shift he initiated with respect to how we might think about and understand religion and, more generally, ideology. A theologian studies religion for what it promises to tell us about God, or the nature of our relationship to God. The humanist, however – and this would include all secular sociologists from the ardent positivist to the committed interpretivist – assumes that the study of religion tells us not about God, but about human beings. Indeed, the skilled sociologist of religion is, at least heuristically, an agnostic, suspending judgment about the reality of the supernatural in order to focus on religion as a human social practice. Feuerbach, in particular, viewed religion as a projection of human needs and desires. Feuerbach, like Marx after him, wants us to see that religious striving represents an alienation of man from himself, and it is only through the proper understanding of man’s relationship to himself that he will find the liberation he is seeking in God. It is

this turning away from the supernatural to the natural, material, and the human that marks Feuerbach’s contribution to social thought and social analysis.

In his Paris writings of 1844 Marx laid the philosophical foundation for all his later work. Marx constructed this foundation by combining Hegel’s idealism with Feuerbach’s materialism. The concepts of *species being* and alienation, as well as the anthropological and materialist approach to nature, human labor, and social existence, all owe a great deal to Feuerbach.

As important as Feuerbach was to Marx’s early thinking, Marx himself thought that Feuerbach’s signal contribution to philosophy was his “transformative method,” which Feuerbach had applied so tellingly to Hegel. Indeed, Marx himself was to use this same method to address another problem some years later. What Feuerbach found so troubling in Hegel was the master’s willingness to generate abstractions (like “spirit” or “thought”) which he then endowed with power and agency. Feuerbach’s “method” was to reverse the equation, showing the abstractions to be the consequence or result of human thought or action. So, studying religion tells us more about people than it does about God because people created God, God did not create people.

Feuerbach’s “transformative method” is nothing less than a guide to how a critical sociologist should confront the problem of reification. Reification occurs when people “forget” that ideas and institutions are created by human beings, and as a result they endow them with power and agency. This happens, for example, with the word “society,” as when someone says “society turns people into consumers.” At one level this is just a shorthand way of pointing to a problem that needs further analysis. However, too often, such statements are offered as an explanation or answer, and when used in this way they stunt critical sociological thinking because they treat an abstraction created by human beings, “society,” as an agent.

Marx, of course, put Feuerbach’s method to work on the key concepts of classical political economy, such as the commodity. *Capital* is subtitled “a critique of political economy” and by this Marx signaled that he intended to transform bourgeois abstractions into the capitalist class relations which produced them. In doing

so he was doing to capitalist ideology what Feuerbach had done to Hegelian ideology.

But, of course, Marx was not entirely happy with Feuerbach. However important it was to think oneself out of the dead ends of philosophical abstraction or the obfuscations of bourgeois economics, for Marx, philosophy was always undertaken for the purpose of social transformation or revolution. It is for this reason that his final word on Feuerbach was: "The philosophers have only interpreted the world, in various ways; the point is to change it." Content with his own interpretations, Feuerbach spent his latter years reworking his earlier work and dabbling in geology. He died in 1872 at the age of 68.

SEE ALSO: Alienation; Engels, Friedrich; Hegel, G. W. F.; Humanism; Ideology; Marx, Karl; Materialism; Religion, Sociology of; Socialism; Theory

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figurational sociology and the sociology of sport

Eric Dunning

The figurational tradition of sociological research and theory was pioneered by Norbert Elias (1897–1990), a German of Jewish descent who became a naturalized Englishman in 1952. His work is best seen as an attempt to synthesize the central ideas of Auguste Comte, Karl

Marx, Max Weber, and Sigmund Freud. Other influences were: Georg Simmel, Kurt Lewin, Wolfgang Koehler, J. B. Watson, and W. B. Cannon. Elias studied philosophy and medicine to doctoral level in Breslau before switching to sociology in Heidelberg in 1925. There, he came under the influence of Karl Mannheim, a founder of the sociology of knowledge, and Alfred Weber, brother of the more famous Max and a leading cultural sociologist.

Three aspects of Elias's life help to explain characteristic features of his sociology. First, his experience of World War I, in which he served in the Kaiser's army on the eastern and western fronts, and the rise of the Nazis sensitized Elias to the part played by violence and war in human life. Such experiences also intensified his awareness of "decivilizing" as well as "civilizing" processes – he described the rise of the Nazis as a "breakdown of civilization" – and reinforced his view that "civilizing controls" rarely, if ever, amount to more than a relatively thin veneer. Second, the repeated interruption of his career by wider events – World War I, the German hyperinflation of 1923, the Nazi takeover ten years later, exile to France and then to Britain, internment as an "enemy alien" – helped to sensitize Elias to the interdependence and interplay of "the individual" and "the social," "the private" and "the public," "the micro" and "the macro." And third, Elias's study of medicine and philosophy helped to problematize for him aspects of philosophy, contributing to his move to sociology and his original work in what are now known as the "sociology of the body" and the "sociology of emotions." That Elias was a pioneer of the sociology of sport is perhaps best understood in that context. He opposed the "mind–body" dichotomy and did not share the common prejudice that sport is a "physical" phenomenon of lower value than phenomena connected with the realm of "mind." The theory of "civilizing processes" is generally regarded as having been Elias's major sociological contribution.

THE THEORY OF CIVILIZING PROCESSES

Contrary to a widespread misconception, Elias did not use the concept of a "civilizing process"

in a morally evaluative way. He also frequently enclosed words such as “civilization,” “civilized,” and “civilizing” in inverted commas in order to signal this. “Civilizing process” was, for him, a technical term and he did not imply by it that people who can be shown to stand at a more advanced level than others, for example ourselves relative to people of the feudal era, are in any sense “morally superior” or “better.” That, of course, is almost invariably how the people who call themselves “civilized” view themselves. But how, Elias used to ask, can people congratulate themselves when they are the chance beneficiaries of a blind process to the course of which they have personally contributed little, if anything at all? To say this, of course, is not to deny that there are victims as well as beneficiaries of “civilizing” processes.

The theory of civilizing processes is based on a substantial body of data, principally on the changing manners of the secular upper classes – knights, kings, queens, court aristocrats, politicians, and business leaders, but not, for the most part, the higher clergy – between the Middle Ages and modern times. These data indicate that, in the major countries of Western Europe, a long term unplanned process took place involving four principal components: the elaboration and refinement of social standards; an increase in the social pressure on people to exercise stricter, more continuous, and more even self control over their feelings and behavior; a shift in the balance between external constraints and self constraints in favor of self constraints; and an increase at the levels of personality and habitus in the importance of “conscience” or “superego” as a regulator of behavior. That is, social standards came to be internalized more deeply and to operate not simply consciously and with an element of choice, but also beneath the levels of rationality and conscious control.

At the risk of oversimplification, one could summarize Elias’s theory by saying that he attributed these European “civilizing processes” to five interlocking part processes, which he also studied in considerable empirical detail. They included: the formation of state monopolies on violence and taxation; internal pacification under state control; growing social differentiation and the lengthening of interdependency chains; growing equality of power chances between social classes, men and women,

and the older and younger generations; and growing wealth.

Elias showed how, in the course of a civilizing process, overtly violent struggles tend to be transformed into more peaceful struggles for status, wealth, and power in which, in the most frequent course of events, destructive urges come to be kept for the most part beneath the threshold of consciousness and not translated into overt action. Status struggles of this kind appear to have played a part in the split between the “soccer” and the “rugby” forms of football (Dunning & Sheard 2005 [1979]).

THE “CIVILIZING” OF MODERN SPORTS

An aspect of these overall European “civilizing processes” that is crucial for understanding the development of modern sports has been the increasing control of violence and aggression within societies, though not to anything like the same extent in the relations between them. According to Elias, in “modern” societies in which the dominant groups consider themselves to be “civilized,” belligerence and aggression are socially tolerated in sporting contests, including in “spectating,” that is, in people’s imaginary identification with the direct combatants to whom moderate and precisely regulated scope is granted for the release of such affects. In Elias’s words, “this transformation of what manifested itself originally as an active, often aggressive expression of pleasure into the passive, more ordered pleasure of spectating (i.e. the mere pleasure of the eye) is already initiated in education, in the conditioning precepts for young people . . . It is highly characteristic of civilized people that they are denied by socially instilled self controls from spontaneously touching what they desire, love or hate” (Elias 2000 [1939]: 170).

A taboo on touching for all players except the goalkeeper has, of course, become the major distinguishing characteristic of the “soccer” or “Association” form of football. Data also suggest that sports themselves underwent “civilizing processes” in conjunction with these wider “civilizing” developments. That this is the case is shown by studies of: the antecedents of modern sports in the ancient and medieval

European worlds (Elias in Elias & Dunning 1986; Dunning 1999); the initial development of modern sports in eighteenth and nineteenth century England (Elias in Elias & Dunning 1986; Dunning 1999); the long term development of soccer and rugby (Dunning & Sheard 2005 [1979]); and football hooliganism as an English and world phenomenon (Dunning et al. 1988; Dunning 1999; Dunning et al. 2002).

THE FIGURATIONAL/ELIASIAN SOCIOLOGY OF SPORT AND ITS CRITICS

There have so far been six generations of figurational sociologists of sport in the United Kingdom: (1) Norbert Elias; (2) Eric Dunning; (3) Patrick Murphy, Kenneth Sheard (2004), and Ivan Waddington; (4) Grant Jarvie and Joseph Maguire (Jarvie & Maguire 1994); (5) Sharon Colwell (2004), Graham Curry (2001), Dominic Malcolm (2004), Louise Mansfield, and Stuart Smith (2004); and (6) Ken Green (2004), Daniel Bloyce, Katie Liston, and Andrew Smith. To this list must be added the names of Ruud Stokvis and Martin van Bottenberg (2001) in the Netherlands and Michael Krueger (1997) and Bero Rigauer (2000) in Germany. Interestingly, Rigauer has attempted to wed a figurational perspective with a Marxist one.

Criticizing and Testing Elias

Elias insisted on the testability of his concepts and theories and called for what he described as a “constant two way traffic” between research and theory. One consequence of this is that his concepts and theories are, like those in the natural sciences, permeated to a greater extent by factual observation, and hence are less abstract than has often been the case in sociology.

Elias’s insistence on the testability of his concepts and theories is contradicted by a frequently touted judgment to the contrary. For example, Dennis Smith (1984) argued that the theory of “civilizing processes” is “irrefutable.” Such an argument was echoed two years later by the anthropologist Edmund Leach when he suggested in a review of Elias and Dunning’s *Quest for Excitement* (1986) that the

“theory is impervious to testing.” An example from the sociology of sport is Gary Armstrong, who wrote that Elias’s theory “is a fusion of untestable and descriptive generalizations” (1998: 317). Richard Giulianotti went so far as to claim that Elias introduced the concept of “decivilizing spurts” in order “to rebut ... counter evidence” (1999: 45).

These kinds of argument are wrong because they involve the false projection into Elias’s work of evaluative notions such as “progress.” Elias’s work was about “decivilizing” as well as “civilizing processes” from the beginning. One of many examples is furnished by his discussion of feudalization (Elias 2000 [1939]: 195–236). Another is provided when he writes of “the whole many layered fabric of historical development” as infinitely complex,” and that “in each phase there are numerous fluctuations, frequent advances or recessions of the internal and external restraints” (p. 157).

Aspects of the theory have also been tested by scholars other than Elias and Dunning (see articles in Dunning et al. 2004). The sports on which these tests were carried out were: baseball, boxing, cricket, gymnastics, motor racing, rugby, and shooting. Figurational studies by Maguire and Waddington deal with sport in general, in Maguire’s case with sport and “globalization” and in Waddington’s with sport, health, and drugs.

SEE ALSO: Civilizing Process; Elias, Norbert; Globalization, Sport and; Sportization

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film

Douglas Kellner

Film emerged as one of the first mass produced cultural forms of the twentieth century and cinema became one of its distinctive and highly influential industries. Based on new technologies of mechanical reproduction that made possible simulations of the real and the production of fantasy worlds, cinema provided a novel mode of culture that changed patterns of leisure activity and played an important role in social life. Early films were the inventions of technicians and entrepreneurs like the Lumière brothers and Méliès in France and the Edison Corporation in the US.

The first silent films ranged from the documentaries and quasi documentary realist fictions produced by the Lumières and Edison to the fantasy fictions of Méliès. The genres that would characterize Hollywood film began to appear during the first decades of the century with Westerns like *The Great Train Robbery* (1903), the melodramatic social dramas of D. W. Griffith, costume and historical dramas like *Ben Hur* (the first of several versions appeared in 1899), horror films, and comedies by Mack Sennett, Charlie Chaplin, Buster Keaton, and others.

From the beginning, cinema was bound up with the vicissitudes of modernity. Film was a modern, technologically mediated art form, and it captured the novelties of modern life. Cinema's motion pictures depicted the faster pace of

contemporary life, showing railroads and trains, cars and buses, and airplanes changing individuals' experience of space and time in a faster, more dynamic world. Films depicted the vicissitudes of urban modernity with its styles and fashions, its class divisions, crowded streets, and surges of immigrants. Films accustomed audiences to the rhythms and forms of modernity and were, with broadcasting and other forms of media culture, an important force in integrating individuals into increasingly changing and conflicted modern societies. Early films were produced largely for working class, immigrant, and urban audiences, and some critics of the movies thought that they had negative or subversive effects (Jowett 1976). For example, the comedies of Charlie Chaplin made fun of authority figures and romantic dramas were attacked by the Legion of Decency for promoting promiscuity. And crime dramas were frequently attacked for fostering juvenile delinquency and crime. On the other hand, films were believed to help "Americanize" immigrants, to teach their audiences how to be good Americans, and to provide escape from the cares of everyday life (Ewen & Ewen 1982).

In capitalist countries, going to the movies was an important leisure activity that helped initiate audiences into the consumer society where entertainment was paid for and commodified and the commodity of films sold the styles, goods, services, values, and spectacle of the consumer society itself. In the Soviet Union, Lenin reportedly proclaimed after the revolution of 1917 that "of all the arts, film is the most important to us" (cited in Mailer 1967). The Bolsheviks supported a highly productive film industry that in the newsreels of Dziga Vertov documented the early years of the revolution and in the films of Eisenstein, Pudovkin, Dovzhenko, and others provided powerful expressions of Bolshevik ideology and values.

Cinema was part of modern industry, organized first in the US and eventually throughout the world on the assembly line model of production, with studios featuring houses of writers, set designers and buildings, costume and make up crews, the sets where scenes were filmed, and the buildings where films were edited and then marketed. Films in the US and elsewhere became integrated industries

combining production, distribution, and exhibition in one corporation. Its publicity apparatus helped establish the importance of advertising agencies and its star system helped to produce a new type of mass mediated celebrity culture. Film helped to generate new public spaces where individuals congregated to consume culture, and the great movie palaces of the early era of cinema created the impression that culture was becoming increasingly democratized and accessible to the masses.

Eventually, its increasingly massified and standardized products, especially in the Hollywood studio system, but also in national cinemas elsewhere such as Mexico, Brazil, India, China, and Taiwan, helped to contribute to the rise of what sociologists saw as a mass society emerging after World War II through its standardized products and what was assumed to be a homogeneous audience watching the same mass produced artifacts. In Europe, by contrast, the art film tradition that emerged in German Expressionism, a French poetic cinema, and individual works of auteurs like Carl Dreyer, Abel Gance, or Jean Renoir were often supported by the national state, as was the propagandistic cinema of Nazi Germany, the Soviet Union, and Italian Fascism.

Further, after World War II, many national cinema styles emerged as a reaction against Hollywood cinema, including Italian neorealism, French New Wave, Brazilian Cinema Novo, Latin American "Third Cinema," the New German Cinema, the New Taiwanese Cinema, and many other movements throughout the world that wanted to create distinctive styles and types of cinema relevant to local cultures, problems, and audiences.

Debates about relations between film and society and the social effects of film began during the silent era and the medium had both defenders and critics among major intellectuals of the era. Walter Benjamin claimed that the "mechanical reproduction" grounded in film technology and other reproducible forms of culture robbed high art of its "aura," of the aesthetic power of the work of art related to its earlier functions in magic, religious cults, and as a spiritual object in the religions of art celebrated in movements like romanticism or "art for art's sake." In these cases, the "aura" of the work derived from its supposed authenticity, its

uniqueness and individuality. In an era of mechanical reproduction, however, art appeared as commodities like other mass produced items, and lost its special power as a transcendent object – especially in mass produced objects like photography and film, with their photo negatives and techniques of mass reproduction.

While members of the Frankfurt School like T. W. Adorno and Max Horkheimer tended to criticize precisely the most mechanically mediated works of mass culture for their standardization and loss of aesthetic quality (while celebrating those works that most steadfastly resisted commodification and mechanical reproduction), Benjamin saw progressive features in high art's loss of its auratic quality and its becoming more politicized. Such art, he claimed, assumed more of an "exhibition value" than a cultic or religious value, and thus demystified its reception. Furthermore, he believed that proliferation of mass art – especially through film – would bring images of the contemporary world to the masses and would help raise political consciousness by encouraging scrutiny of the world, as well as by bringing socially critical images to millions of spectators:

By close-ups of the things around us, by focusing on hidden details of familiar objects, and by exploring commonplace milieus under the ingenious guidance of the camera, the film, on the one hand, extends our comprehension of the necessities which rule our lives; on the other hand, it manages to assure us of an immense and unexpected field of action. Our taverns and our metropolitan streets, our offices and furnished rooms, our railroad stations and our factories appeared to have us locked up hopelessly. Then came the film and burst this prison-world asunder by the dynamite of the tenth of a second, so that now, in the midst of its far-flung ruins and debris, we calmly and adventurously go traveling. (Benjamin 1972: 236)

Benjamin claimed that the mode of viewing film broke with the reverential mode of aesthetic perception and awe encouraged by the bourgeois cultural elite who promoted the religion of art. Montage in film, its "shock effects," the conditions of mass spectatorship, the discussion of issues which film viewing encouraged, and other features of the cinematic experience produced, in his view, a new type of social and political experience of art which

eroded the private, solitary, and contemplative aesthetic experience encouraged by high culture and its priests. Against the contemplation of high art, the shock effects of film produce a mode of "distraction" which Benjamin believed makes possible a "heightened presence of mind" and cultivation of "expert" audiences able to examine and criticize film and society.

A German exile, Siegfried Kracauer, once close to Benjamin and Adorno, provided one of the first systematic studies of how films articulate social content. His book *From Caligari to Hitler* (1947) argues that German inter war films reveal a highly authoritarian disposition to submit to social authority and a fear of emerging chaos. For Kracauer, German films reflect and foster anti democratic and passive attitudes of the sort that paved the way for Nazism. While his assumption that "inner" psychological tendencies and conflicts are projected onto the screen opened up a fruitful area of sociocultural analysis, he frequently ignored the role of mechanisms of representation such as displacement, inversion, and condensation in the construction of cinematic images and narratives. He posits film–society analogies ("Their silent resignation foreshadows the passivity of many people under totalitarian rule," p. 218) that deny the autonomous and contradictory character and effects of film discourse and the multiple ways that audiences process cinematic material.

Sociological and psychological studies of Hollywood film proliferated in the US in the post World War II era and developed a wide range of critiques of myth, ideology, and meaning in the American cinema. Parker Tyler's studies of *The Hollywood Hallucination* (1944) and *Myth and Magic of the Movies* (1947) applied Freudian and myth symbol criticism to show how Walt Disney cartoons, romantic melodramas, and other popular films provided insights into social psychology and context, while providing myths suitable for contemporary audiences. In *Movies: A Psychological Study* (1950), Martha Wolfenstein and Nathan Leites applied psychoanalytical methods to film, decoding fears, dreams, and aspirations beneath the surface of 1940s Hollywood movies, arguing: "The common day dreams of a culture are in part the sources, in part the products of its popular myths, stories, plays and films" (p. 13). In her sociological study of

Hollywood: The Dream Factory (1950), Horstense Powdermaker studied an industry that manufactured dreams and fantasies, while Robert Warshaw in *The Immediate Experience* (1970) related classical Hollywood genres like the Western and the gangster film to the social history and ideological problematics of US society.

Building on these traditions, Barbara Deming demonstrated in *Running Away From Myself* (1969) how 1940s Hollywood films provided insights into the social psychology and reality of the period. She argued: "It is not as mirrors reflect us but, rather, as our dreams do that movies most truly reveal the times" (p. 1). She claimed that 1940s Hollywood films provided a collective dream portrait of the era and proposed deciphering "the dream that all of us have been buying at the box office, to cut through to the real nature of the identification we have experienced there" (pp. 5–6). Her work anticipates later, more sophisticated and university based film criticism of the post 1960s era by showing how films both reproduce dominant ideologies and also contain proto deconstructive elements that cut across the grain of the ideology that the films promote. She also undertook a gender reading of Hollywood film that would eventually become a key part of film criticism.

Another tradition of film scholarship and criticism attempted to situate films historically and to describe the interactions between film and society in more overtly sociological and political terms. This tradition includes Lewis Jacob's (1939) pioneering history of Hollywood film, John Howard Lawson's theoretical and critical works, Ian Jarvie's (1970, 1978) sociological inquiries on the relation between film and society, D. M. White and Richard Averson's (1972) studies of the relation between film, history, and social comment in film, and the social histories written by Robert Sklar (1975), Garth Jowett (1976), and Thomas Schatz (1988). While this tradition produced useful insights into the relationships between film and society in specific historical eras, it tended to neglect the construction of film form and the ways that specific films or genres work to construct meaning and the ways that audiences themselves interact with film.

More theoretical approaches to film began emerging in the 1960s, including the ideological

analyses of the work associated with the film makers and critics in France who published in *Cahiers du cinema*. The *Cahiers* critics called attention to the creative achievements of certain Hollywood directors and in general extolled the work of the cinematic creative artist or *auteur*. Their interest in Western and gangster films helped to generate genre theory as well.

Building on this work, in the 1970s, the extremely influential British film journal *Screen* *Cahiers* texts and other works of French film theory, including Roland Barthes, Christian Metz, and various poststructuralist critics who produced more sophisticated formal approaches to film (see Metz 1974; Heath 1981). The *Cahiers* group in turn moved from seeing film as the product of creative *auteurs* or authors (their *politique du auteurs* of the 1950s, taken up by Sarris (1968) and others), to focus on the ideological, political, and sociological content of film and how it transcoded dominant ideologies and had certain political and social effects. At the same time, French film theory and *Screen* focused on the specific cinematic mechanisms that helped to produce meaning.

During the same period of intense ferment in the field of film studies during the 1960s and 1970s, the Birmingham Centre for Contemporary Cultural Studies was discovering that gender, race, and subculture were also important elements of analyzing the relationships between culture, ideology, and society. Pushed by feminism to recognize the centrality of gender, it was argued that the construction of dominant ideologies of masculinity and femininity was a central aspect of film (Kuhn 1982; Kaplan 1983). Studies of the ways that films constructed race, ethnicity, and sexuality also became a key aspect of films studies, and various poststructuralist influenced theories studied the role of film and media culture in the social construction of ideologies and identities (Kellner & Ryan 1988).

There are now a multiplicity of approaches competing to theorize the relations between film and society and to read and interpret film. The theory wars of the past decades have proliferated a tremendous amount of new theories that have been in turn applied to film. Consequently, structuralism and poststructuralism, psychoanalysis, deconstruction, feminism, post modernism, and a wealth of other theoretical

approaches have generated an often bewildering diversity of approaches to theorizing film which join and complexify previous film theory approaches such as the genre theory, auteur theory, and historical sociological approaches. Within the cacophony of contemporary approaches to film, it is not a question of either/or which forces the theorist to adopt one approach, but rather a variety of approaches can be deployed to engage the relations of film to society (for elaboration of a multiperspectival model, see Kellner 1995).

In retrospect, all one-sided approaches to theorizing the relation between film and society are problematical. Although some "authors" had created distinctive and impressive bodies of work, they were often created within the constraints of a specific genre and studio system; thus to fully understand Hollywood film, for example, one needs insight into the production system, its codes and formulas, and the complex interaction of film and society, with film articulating social discourses, embedded in social struggles, and saturated with social meanings. Thus, analyzing the connection between film and society requires a multidimensional film criticism that situates its object within the context of the social milieu within which it is produced and received.

Finally, one of the most dramatic technological revolutions of all time is now unfolding with new entertainment and information technologies emerging, accompanied by unprecedented mergers of the entertainment and information industries and the transmission of increasingly globalized culture (Branston 2000). These new syntheses are producing novel forms of visual and multimedia culture in which it is anticipated that film will appear in seductive new virtual and interactive forms, accessible through computer, satellite, and new mechanisms of transmission like video recorders, DVDs, iPods, and other devices. There is feverish speculation that the Internet and its assorted technologies will create a new entertainment and information environment and currently the major corporations and players are envisaging what sort of product and delivery system will be most viable and profitable for films and other entertainment of the future. Thus, one imagines that the relationships between film and society will continue to be highly significant as we enter a new

century and perhaps new cinematic era that will create novel forms of film and new perspectives on the film culture of the past.

SEE ALSO: Adorno, Theodor W.; Author/Auteur; Barthes, Roland; Birmingham School; Capitalism; Communism; Documentary; Globalization; Highbrow/Lowbrow; Ideology; Multimedia; Socialization, Agents of

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finalization in science

Wolfgang Krohn

Finalization in science is a theory concerning the relationship between science and society from a historical and political perspective. It was developed in the 1970s by Gernot Böhme, Wolfgang van den Daele, and Wolfgang Krohn (Böhme et al. 1972, 1973, 1976, 1978). Its main thesis is that modern science has internal dynamics that allow it to absorb external goals of research on an increasing scale. The expression “finalization” is meant to denote this tendency (Latin *finis*; purpose, goal). This theoretical model is continuous with the paradigmatic view of Thomas Kuhn and with Imre Lakatos’s methodology of scientific research programs, but adds additional features concerning the social contexts of science.

With respect to many fundamental disciplines of modern science the model assumes a typical three phase development. The first, or explorative, phase embraces the period prior to the emergence of theories which serve to organize the field. At this point a research program

internally determining the relevance and succession of problems is absent. Rather, all kinds of challenging problems can be experimentally analyzed and classified, and serve to induce competing theories. Examples can be found in mechanics previous to Newton; chemistry before the work of Lavoisier, Proust, and Dalton; electrodynamics before Maxwell; evolutionary biology before Darwin; and genetics before the double helix model. Contemporary examples are neurobiology, research on chronic diseases, and cancer research. The explorative phase allows for multiple, if contingent, couplings of external problems with scientific interests. These couplings are important because they carry the institutional and monetary support of the research fields.

The second or paradigmatic phase is determined by the emergence of an internal research program directed toward the elaboration of a fundamental and unifying theory replacing provisional middle range theories. At this point science policy can only promote, not direct, such research, though prospects of technological returns in a more or less distant future legitimate investment of tax money.

While the formulation of these two phases roughly corresponds to other models, especially those of Kuhn and Lakatos, the original contribution of the finalization model comes from adding a third phase of theory development. Whereas Kuhnian paradigms grant researchers the unedifying business of solving puzzles and the Lakatos research program loses its capacity of progressive problemshift, the finalization model proposes a phase of finalized, or goal oriented, theory development. Central to the argument is the fact that fundamental theories usually cannot be applied to complex empirical systems for which they are valid. Fluid mechanics is a good example of this. On the one hand, it is based on a set of equations – classical hydrodynamics – which basically cover the behavior of all fluids. On the other hand, it turned out not to be applicable to certain viscosity problems posed by aircraft technology. The development of a special “boundary layer” theory was needed – and achieved in the early twentieth century – in order to develop a theoretical model for the construction of aerofoils. These kinds of intermediary theories are called finalized theories, and make up the most

important share of contemporary science. Based on a set of fundamental paradigmatic theories and conditioned by technological, ecological, and social expectations, finalized theories continuously and indefinitely fill up the stock of scientific knowledge. As compared to disciplines in phase two, paradigm formation is no longer the driving force, but rather it is the societal orientation of science that is the force. This shift from internal to external problem generation calls into question received concepts of an autonomous science or of science as an independent social system. However, the emphasis on theory development of sciences in their third phase distances the finalization model from concepts of control and steering.

The three phase model can be taken as an ideal format of a discipline's life cycle. Additionally, finalization theory takes seriously the fact that – independent of Kuhnian revolutions – many paradigms that evolved in the disciplines' second phases remain in a stable state, which Heisenberg called "closed" theories. Classical mechanics, hydrodynamics, relativity theory, and quantum mechanics are cases in point. They serve as reliable knowledge bases for finalized research on externally induced problems. Case studies exemplify the relationships between closed and finalized theories. Contemporary science is predicted to turn to the development of finalized theories on an increasing scale. Epistemologically, such theories search for concepts that allow for the application of foundational theories to complex problems. Socially, they are guided by priorities set by institutions entitled to do so. The finalization model also accounts for normative implications. If societal issues become the guidelines of theory development, the question of interests becomes critical. Who is entitled to have a voice in setting research agendas, defining criteria of relevance, and negotiating the transformation of norms and values in theoretical knowledge? Modern ecology in its tension between including or excluding human goals from nature served as a prototype for pondering these questions.

Shortly after its first publication finalization theory caused a fierce debate among German philosophers of science that soon spilled over into the media. Their predominant point of attack in this early version of "science wars"

was the allegation that, under the cover of a new social epistemology of science, Marxian ideas of socialist planning and control were being advanced. The media resonance included accusations of seeking a "final solution" for science, of threatening science with a "1984 situation," of legitimizing "Lysenkoism." An important factor in this turmoil was the institutional setting. Finalization theory was developed in a newly founded research institute of the Max Planck Society, with its established worldwide reputation. The institute was directed by the physicist philosopher Carl Friedrich von Weizsäcker and the sociologist Jürgen Habermas. Von Weizsäcker's public commitment for social responsibility of scientists and Habermas's writings on "knowledge and human interests" were the hidden targets of the critics. Even if they bore no responsibility for the finalization model, they were implicated to the extent to which their ideas could be traced in its content. (The controversy is documented in Böhme et al. 1983: 275–306.)

More serious criticism was raised by researchers from the emerging field of the social studies of science. For these researchers, the use of the internal–external terminology was unwarranted, the concept of "closed theories" appeared to be too rigid, the adherence to epistemic norms in theory formation was not in line with the programs of relativism, and the focus on the development of research fields was not easily compatible with the rise of laboratory studies. A new interest in finalization theory has emerged in the context of the concept of "knowledge society" and especially in the controversial discussion of the Mode II model advanced by Gibbons et al. (1994). The Mode II model claims a complete shift of the role and function of science as its context of application prevails over its basic research (Mode I). A few reservations notwithstanding, finalization can now be seen as an early attempt at understanding the new order and policy of science that seems to emerge in the contemporary development of knowledge society (Weingart 1997).

SEE ALSO: Kuhn, Thomas and Scientific Paradigms; Political Economy of Science; Science, Social Construction of; Scientific Knowledge, Sociology of; Scientific Productivity; Technology, Science, and Culture

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financial sociology

Lois A. Vitt

Financial sociology is the study of the relationship between finance, defined as the science of money management, and human society. In addition to money management, finance includes the management of money surrogates, capital instruments and markets, organizations and institutions, households, and governments. Finance is defined, structured, and regulated within a system of national and international laws that reflect power relations within political economies and across state and global markets. In practice, finance is art (e.g., negotiation) and science (e.g., measurement). Financial

measurement of the firm and of investments constitutes the major emphasis within the field of economics as a subdiscipline of finance economics. The entire field of finance may be subsumed within the larger field of economics. Likewise, topics within financial sociology can be found in publications, or taught in courses, on economic sociology.

Relevant financial laws, structures, and policies govern the circulation of money within and among nations and cover various types of money surrogates as well: (1) checks, drafts, debit cards and other plastic cards that store value, or permit deferred payment such as charge cards and credit cards; (2) marketable and unmarketable securities such as notes, stocks, bonds, and shares of other pooled interests; (3) property and the resources that derive from property such as rents, commodities, debt and equity instruments and securities; and (4) business and the resources that derive from business enterprises including skills, labor, products, and services.

Three overarching levels of analysis include *personal finance*, the financial management of individual and household income, saving, and consumption; *corporate finance*, the financial management of organizations and business; and *public finance*, the financial management of government. Areas of prospective study within (and interactions among) these three levels touch all dimensions of social life: politics, taxes, art, religion, business, housing, health care, poverty and wealth, consumption, sports, transportation, labor force participation, and education. While each has a vast accumulated sociological literature of its own, the *financing* associated with these domains of modern social life has in the past usually been subsumed under "social policy."

Yet the financial policies, institutions, structures, and practices within any given society impact well being for every individual and social group within a society, and increasingly, global well being. George Ritzer (1995) clearly points this out in his analysis of credit cards and society: "Money and the credit card are so centrally important in modern consumer society that they take us very quickly to the core of that world."

The idea for a "sociology of finance" was probably introduced by Randall Collins who,

when reviewing Mayer's *The Bankers* (1979), wondered why sociologists were not rushing to study financial organizations. Although sociological analysis of life insurance companies and markets emerged about the same time, relatively few studies appeared until the 1990s. To date, sociological analysis that is intentionally trained upon the financial laws, policies, markets, networks, firms, transactions, costs, customs, and human interactions is still in its infancy but holds enormous promise.

Paul Hirsch, at the 1993 Annual Meetings of the American Sociological Association, suggested that sociology was still "asleep at the wheel" in tracking how the discipline examines social change and the institutions of banking and finance. At the same session, a typology of financial sociology was presented which demonstrated that relevant areas for sociological study, in fact, are so numerous that it is nearly impossible to find social reality not connected in some direct way to money and finance. Does the young but growing field of economic sociology take up the slack?

THE INTERSECTION OF ECONOMIC SOCIOLOGY AND FINANCIAL SOCIOLOGY

Auguste Comte coined the term "sociology" in 1838 and paved the way for other social thinkers to develop theories of society. As sociology became its own discipline, social problems increasingly were analyzed as if they had no economic dimension and economic problems as if they had no social dimension. Economists and sociologists seldom looked back until Richard Swedberg fostered a dialogue between the two fields. Swedberg's thought provoking interviews in 1990 with well known economists Gary Becker, Amartya Sen, Kenneth Arrow, and Albert O. Hirschman, and sociologists Daniel Bell, Harrison White, James Coleman, and Mark Granovetter, helped to bridge the boundary between economics and sociology.

There is a growing dialogue between these fields, as economists take on many more social topics and sociologists become interested in rational choice and other economic theories. While economic sociology begins to flourish, however, financial sociology is emerging as a

subfield that would have been impossible to conceptualize during the last half of the nineteenth and much of the twentieth centuries. Although closely related, the disciplines of economics and finance are distinctive. Whereas economics makes a number of abstract assumptions for purposes of analysis, finance is a socially constructed (and manipulated) set of principles that intentionally facilitate and manage transactions between and among governments, organizations, groups, and households. Financial sociology incorporates, by definition, the painstakingly constructed theories of sociology to analyze its impact on individuals, families, and societies, and there are important purposes for such specific sociological analysis.

Human societies have taken many forms throughout history, and remarkable diversity is still evident today in the world. So are the great differences among societies that flourish and those that still struggle. These differences have been attributed to what Lenski and colleagues termed *sociocultural evolution*, the changes that occur as a society gains new technology. The more technological information a society has, the faster it evolves. However, technology alone is not all that is needed for social and economic development. New technology must be *financed*.

Hernando de Soto's (2000) analysis of capital offers sociology some insights that further explain the great differences among societies. Why, he asks, have the efforts of third world and former communist nations to organize a modern capitalist economy not been met with more success? "From Russia to Venezuela, the past half decade has been a time of economic suffering, tumbling incomes, anxiety, and resentment." Although many of these nations have balanced budgets, cut subsidies, welcomed foreign investment, and dropped tariff barriers, according to de Soto, their efforts have been repaid with bitter disappointment. Yet the cities of the third world and the former communist countries teem with entrepreneurs who are talented, enthusiastic, and have an astonishing ability to grasp and use modern technology. In fact, the unauthorized use of communications, weapons, and consumer technology increasingly presents western nations with serious problems of patent violations and product control.

Even in the poorest countries, the poor save, according to de Soto and his team of researchers

who gathered data block by block, and farm by farm, in Asia, Africa, the Middle East, and Latin America. The aggregate savings, commercial and residential buildings, businesses, and other assets of these countries are often held, however, in defective forms. There are few modern laws, working infrastructures, institutions, and markets to turn these assets into capital for investment and growth. In short, there has been little or no ability to create the financing – for individuals, businesses, or governments – that exists and is generally taken for granted in the West.

Two modern movements, however, may be transforming societies worldwide: the industrialization of developing countries through globalization and the transition of advanced societies from industrial based into service economies. In his 1991 book *Money and the Meaning of Life*, Jacob Needleman observed: “money is the main, moving force of human life at the present stage of civilization. Our relationship to nature, to health and illness, to education, to art, to social justice, is all increasingly permeated by the money factor.” More recently, Peter Marber (2003) chronicled the sociofinancial changes already in process that are impacting life expectancy, literacy, education, consumption, and growing prosperity in developing societies as a result of globalization. While industrialization in the third world has its social costs and its detractors, according to Marber, “more people in more places have access not only to goods, but also to art, ideas, and innovation,” as a direct result of globalization. Radical changes are occurring globally that affect not only what people value and want, but also governance, the environment, the roles of women and families, religion, and religious conflict.

FINANCIAL SOCIOLOGY TODAY

Groundbreaking sociological research entered the literature on financial sociology during the past decade and a half. Studies of human emotions and behaviors in the context of money and finance have appeared (e.g., Millman 1991), as well as work on banking and credit at both the macro and micro levels. In *Expressing America*, George Ritzer (1995) focuses Georg Simmel’s “relationist” theories (as well as the theories of

Mills, Marx, and Weber) on money and credit cards to gain insight into fundamental characteristics of the social world. Ritzer finds evidence of rampant consumerism, debt, fraud and crime, and invasions of privacy, among other social problems, that go far beyond credit cards themselves. These problems are not new to sociologists, but approaching them via a financial route permits a different awareness of their causes and consequences. According to Ritzer (1995), “the credit card, as well as the industry that stands behind it and aggressively pushes its growth and expansion, is not only important in itself, but also as a window on modern society.”

Robert Manning’s *Credit Card Nation* (2000) chronicles the history of debt and credit since the deregulation of financial services in the US in 1980. Manning reveals the costs in human terms of Americans’ growing dependence on credit cards and predicts that tomorrow’s senior citizens are at risk for increasingly aging into debt. His work includes a chapter devoted to the social consequences of credit card debt on college students based on in depth interviews and 1999 cross sectional survey data of college students. The study, introduced by the Consumer Federation of America, was a national revelation that young lives were being ruined by credit card debt. Manning’s analysis of the consequences of student debt has been noted by credit card companies as well as universities and other organizations that sponsor so called “affinity cards” and profit by doing so.

The interactions between individuals and families and public–private interests that both enable and support the growth of financial innovations are not unique to credit cards. Such micro–macro interactions are present in many, if not all, consumer financial innovations. They positively or negatively impact the housing, health care, pension, insurance, education, retirement, and brokerage activities of modern society, depending upon the degree of oversight that exists to curb excesses. They positively or negatively affect individuals, families, and communities, and when large numbers of people are affected, they can become public issues (Ritzer 2001). For older adults, college students, low income individuals and families, and other affected segments of society, credit card excesses and punitive practices are fast becoming public issues.

SEE ALSO: Bankruptcy; Comte, Auguste; Consumption, Mass Consumption, and Consumer Culture; Credit Cards; Economy, Culture and; Economy (Sociological Approach); Money; Taxes: Progressive, Proportional, and Regressive; Theory Construction

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flânerie

Heidi L. Reible

Flânerie, in a narrow sense, refers to the act of idle strolling in nineteenth century Paris, while visually collecting social artifacts of metropolitan life – the human sights and material culture

of the urban crowd. In a wider sense, it is immersion in an anonymous, spectatorial gaze that gives license to wandering and observing. *Flânerie* engenders reflexivity as both an action and a process of observation that perceptively elucidates social phenomena. Text and sketches of the passing moment serve as witnesses to these random readings of the crowd. *Flânerie* embodies pleasure in the form of mobile observation. It is an aesthetic action, art form, and social phenomenon that resonate in masculine public space.

The *flâneur* is a figure of modernity, a solitary man of leisure with no destination. He passionately performs the act of idle walking while furtively consuming spatial and temporal impressions. Sociologically, he stands in a contested space, as an intellectual in mass culture, as a “natural” in an artificial environment. The *flâneur* has been described as a bum, idler, artist, observer, gastronome, social commentator, literary figure, scavenger, intellectual, and poet. At the core, he possesses a way of seeing the world and being in the world that intrinsically reveals meaningful, social commentary.

Charles Baudelaire, a mid 1800s poet, and Walter Benjamin, literary critic in the early 1900s, were instrumental in creating the poetic enigma and physical entity that became the literary figure of the *flâneur*. Both described him as a man who was simultaneously a part of the crowd and yet alone on the streets of the urban landscape. They conceptualized the social type of the *flâneur* as individualized, itinerant, and dissociated from discursive group or community contact. He was a collector, an accidental detective, and a rag picker, who possessed acuity in deriving social relevance from the fragments of everyday experience. They situated the concepts of *flâneur* and *flânerie* within visual sight of commodities and in spaces of leisure. Urban spectacle inspired Baudelaire’s poetic ruminations on the subject. It was the City of Lights that became the original city of *flânerie*.

Industrialization in Paris and a subsequent increase in production of saleable commodities were instrumental events that gave rise to visually spectacular places of consumption through which the *flâneur* strolled in the early

1800s. Architectural innovations in iron working techniques and glass manufacturing, as well as the proliferation of visual media, played an important role in developing the city. Large plate glass windows allowed strollers to view available goods. These places of consumption became spaces of leisure that privileged “visual” participation within mass culture. Buying, as well as window shopping, became a new pastime. Advertising, architecture, technology, and the emerging presence of women shoppers drew the gaze of the *flâneur*. Mid century, Baron Georges Eugène Haussmann developed reconstruction plans that would accommodate the economic and demographic growth that had changed the capital into a burgeoning city. More than 100,000 buildings were razed to replace old streets and disorganized districts. Several of the arcades of Paris, areas of elegant shops filled with displays of commodities, were built during implementation of the Haussmann project, and incorporated such structural innovations.

Flânerie was irrefutably a masculine pursuit. The female *flâneuse* was absent in the city, as reflected in the writings of Baudelaire and Benjamin. Gendered restrictions of movement reflecting customary societal limitations of the time excluded women from public spaces. The private space of home was a woman’s approved sphere of influence. Those who chose a public presence were often looked upon as prostitutes, a corporeal commodity. Though the arcades initiated a shift in access to gendered, public sites of leisure consumption, the masculine maintained a position of privilege. Even as these newly bounded public places became acceptable spaces of leisure for respectable women, *flânerie* remained culturally intolerable. “Looking” was problematized as a gendered act of consumption; woman was object to the *flâneur*’s gaze.

This history usefully informs a culture of consumption that continues privileging the “visual.” *Flânerie* maintains relevance as it raises the potential for understanding social phenomena collected as visual fragments embedded in performance of daily public life. Thorstein Veblen (1967 [1899]), in *The Theory of the Leisure Class*, was one of the first to critique leisure practices as conspicuous consumption,

and to emphasize leisure’s significance to society. Television, the Internet, newspapers and magazines, billboards, movies, as well as interiors and exteriors of mass transit buses are examples of a visual culture that continues to generate opportunities for new ways of “seeing” ordinary life as it interfaces with leisure.

Recent literary discourse brings emergent interpretations of *flânerie* and its social relevancy to the present. It has been suggested that *flânerie* is allied with browsing in shopping malls, with traveling to novel places, with aural grazing of radio waves, with channel surfing television, with cooking and eating food, with wandering in Disneyland, as well as with lurking in cyberspace in chat rooms on the Internet. Future directions in research may include the use of *flânerie* as a method in the study of everyday leisure, or induce efforts to locate and observe *flânerie* as it takes place in twenty first century life. In addition, it is germane to continue debates that legitimate evidence to support the physical presence and perspicacity of the *flâneuse* in the urban environment, past and present. Whether these ideas are consistent with the poetic thoughts of Baudelaire, or the writings of Benjamin in the context of modernity, requires further exploration and discussion.

SEE ALSO: Benjamin, Walter; Conspicuous Consumption; Consumption, Mass Consumption, and Consumer Culture; Leisure, Popular Culture and; Veblen, Thorstein

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folk Hinduism

Vineeta Sinha

Accounts of Hinduism have predominantly been approached via literary and textual avenues, through which its ancient, philosophical, abstract, and transcendent features are highlighted. Even ethnographic accounts of Hinduism have been dominated by attention to the Sanskritic and Brahmanic elements derived from such a scriptural, elitist grounding. Such foci are limited because of the neglect of oral traditions and attention to Hindu practices, particularly at the local, regional levels and the role of specific household and cult deities, rituals, and festivals in sustaining a religious worldview. Writing in 1976, the late Indian social anthropologist M. N. Srinivas noted the “downgrading of folk religion” (1976: 288–90) and the scholarly neglect of the “folk” elements in Hinduism both by western and Indian social scientists, arguing that this is a viable, independent, and legitimate realm for social science theorizing.

By a “folk” variety of Hinduism is meant these specific features: the privileging of mediums and trance sessions; the intimate, familiar, unmediated approach to the deity (given the absence of a religious intermediary); the ability to sense, feel close to, and talk to deities; the importance of devotion, intuition, emotion, and religious experience; the offerings of non vegetarian items, alcohol, and cigars to the deity; the absence of text based, ritual procedures (*arccanai*, *abishegam*, and the chanting of *mantras*, *slokas*) for approaching the deity; a pragmatic, day to day orientation, valuing rituals of self mortification and equality of all before god. The eventual turn to “folk” dimension and “little community” (Redfield 1956) has been consequential for the simple reason that it rightly draws attention to an erstwhile neglected empirical domain of study. Much is now known about the ritual universe of folk Hinduism, the mythology of specific village deities, the logic of ritual performances, the significance of festivals and other ritual events to manage the uncertainties of daily living. This description of “folk Hinduism” does not exist in isolation. This is only one half of a dichotomy that has

identified, named, and ranked two types of religious styles – captured in the more universal metaphor of the “Great” and “Little” traditions (Singer 1972). In the Hindu context, the “Sanskritic”–“non Sanskritic” divide approximates this classification.

Despite the pervasive use of such descriptions as “folk religion” and “folk Hinduism,” the category “folk” has not been sufficiently problematized (Chatterji 2001). An etymology of the English word “folk” leads to such connotations as “ordinary,” “common people,” and “masses.” The association of “folk” with peasants and rural populations – who are further typified as being illiterate, unsophisticated, and simple minded in contrast to the more urbane, cultured, and educated city dweller – has meant that the term is by no means neutral. Extending such logic, the folk dimension already being ranked lower, members who participate in “folk” practices are assigned specific sociological identities, and are further presumed to be carriers of specific values and mores. This awareness prompts us to ask: What is meant by “folk” varieties of religion and Hinduism? So far, there has been little debate in the literature about what these descriptions signify and the value, if any, of continuing to use them as frames of analysis. Yet, they continue to be used in a taken for granted manner without being adequately conceptualized. Given the history of “folk Hinduism” and the awareness that it does have a built in comparative dimension vis à vis “elite” notions of Hinduism, its unreflective use is highly problematic.

Although some aspects of the folk/little/popular/non Sanskritic Hindu (descriptions which have been used interchangeably) practice have been marginalized over time, this domain reveals a persistence (and in some places shows signs of being revived) within India, and especially amongst overseas Hindu communities in Fiji, Mauritius, South Africa, Singapore, and Malaysia. The overwhelming evidence for the preferred attachment to village based religious practices amongst fourth and fifth Singapore and Malaysia born Hindus is sociologically fascinating. Despite specific substantive shifts in the constitution of Hinduism in this region over time, the ritual complex surrounding the veneration of local, household, and village deities – a strong feature of folk Hinduism – is

one stable element that continues. This is to be expected given the specific profile of Indian and Hindu presence in British Malaya since the nineteenth century. Large numbers of Indians were brought in from Tamilnadu to undertake infrastructure work in British Malaya. Much of this labor was drawn from the lowest rungs of the Indian class and caste hierarchy, that is, from the non Brahmin and Adi Dravida communities. The veneration of village deities and rituals associated with them were continued by these sectors of the migrant community in their new homes. The village deities – *gramadevata* – from Tamilnadu thereby came to Malaya and were firmly placed in the religious landscape of the Malayan Peninsula. Today, the observance of festivals such as *timiti* (fire walking) and *tai pucam*, the large numbers of temples dedicated to village deities, and the attraction to village rituals tell the story of Hindu migration to Malaya.

The Hindu communities in Malaysia and Singapore have been in the region for close to two centuries. From the outset, they have existed in a societal context that is not structured according to principles of caste and embedded in a largely non Hindu, multiracial, multireligious environment, where Hinduism is a minority religion. The Hindu community is clearly not homogeneous in this diasporic location: caste may not be an issue as before, but new class barriers have been erected, and are felt to be in force. Agamic temples (i.e., temples adhering to the Agamas, a set of texts that outline rules and procedures for temple worship) are associated with the “well off” crowd Hindu elites, temple administrators, Hindu authorities, and the government, but not the Brahmin priests, who are not seen as having any real power or autonomy. This is the domain of “Official Hinduism,” framed by Agamic, Saiva Siddhanta (literally, “the doctrine of Siva” and the name by which the body of literature of the Saivas – followers of Siva – is known) precepts. A preference for a different religious style sees the persistence of the “old” ways, encapsulated as the realm of “Popular Hinduism” (Vertovec 1994). Often the two Hindu spheres, which are quite different, are brought into uncomfortable proximity.

In Singapore and Malaysia, the field of “folk Hinduism” is defined by diversity. The need

for protection from, and control over, unforeseen forces in the management of concrete, day to day problems is cited for the continued reliance on *kaaval devam* (guardian deities), demonstrating the prevalence of a pragmatic orientation – recognized as a typical feature of folk Hinduism. For the middle class and upper middle class Hindus the realm of trances, spirit mediums, and the phenomenon of animal sacrifices are intriguing, unfamiliar, and exotic, and often deemed a superficial form of religiosity. The recognition and labeling of these as the “old” ways reveals a desire to connect with the “past.” In an adherence to the ways of the ancestors, connections with “tradition” are maintained and this is seen as continuity, ideas which are collectively carried in the notion of “persistence.” Yet it is precisely also in the name of tradition that new ground is being broken and boundaries transgressed. This certainly challenges the simplistic equation of modernity with change, and tradition with conservatism and backwardness. Strikingly, there is no accompanying effort to standardize the multiplicity and variation that reign here. One encounters instead a “live and let live” attitude with a desire to remain outside the purview of institutionalized religious boundaries, to practice a style of religiosity that does not need to rely on scarce and guarded resources – such as ritual procedures as dictated by religious texts, the framework of Agamic temples, Brahmin priests, and other ritual specialists and ritual paraphernalia. But their religious universe is sustained through creating and legitimating an alternative set of norms and procedures as guiding principles, but with no accompanying desire for uniformity, or the presence of a central agency trying to regulate the ritual domain. It is not without significance that these very practices which are embraced positively by proponents of the “old ways” are devalued by critics (who are supporters of “Official Hinduism”) as “extreme rituals” and “superstition,” and therefore rejected as “primitive and embarrassing” – in fact deemed to be “un Hindu.”

Substantively, the domain of activities and thinking defined by the phrase the “old ways” is a complex mixture of elements, drawn from diverse religious traditions. Its empirical boundaries could by no means be seen to be replicating fully the ritual style in Tamilnadu

villages. In the Malaysian and Singaporean context, the world of “folk Hinduism” is defined first and foremost by a strong sense of religious syncretism. This entails a free and liberal use of deities, symbols, and ritual practices associated with “other” religious traditions, foremost amongst which is a variety of religious/folk Taoism. Almost without exception, religious structures in this domain reveal the strong presence of deities and other religious paraphernalia from the latter, together with such Taoist deities as Tua Peh Kong, Kuan Yin, and Tai Sing. Physical constructions of religious altars that would be typically recognized as part of a “Chinese temple,” ritual objects such as tall joss sticks, large and small Chinese style urns, floating oil candles, oranges, wooden pieces for seeking permission for 4 digits (a lottery popular in Singapore and Malaysia with a combination of 4 numbers), and so on, together with deities from the vast Hindu pantheon, are also present. Thus one witnesses what the purists would consider “indiscriminate borrowing” from all strands of Hinduism, without concern for recognizing boundaries, almost to the point of being irreverent. The truly syncretic nature of “Hinduism” is evident in the co presence under one roof of deities of the Vaisnavite, Saivite, and Sakti tradition (in the coexistence of Hanuman, Ram, Mariamman, Periyachee, Bhagvati, and Kali), the Brahmanic and non Brahmanic styles of worship (in the veneration of village deities such as Muneeswaran, Sangali Karuppan, Madurai Veeran with Saivite deities like Murukan, Siva, and Ganesh) and in conducting “vegetarian” and “non vegetarian” prayers for respective deities on the same grounds, but with appropriate procedures and deference. For instance, if meat is offered to Muneeswaran, the shrine of Murukan or Ganesh is encased with a curtain or the door closed. Often the presence of a *keramat* (Malay, “grave of a Muslim saint”) and “Datuk God” (literally, “Grandfather God,” the name of a localized deity popularly invoked in religious Taoism, as practiced in Malaysia and Singapore) completes the mixed up but coherent and legitimate religious scene. The prominent presence of ethnic Chinese in these spaces, as devotees, is conspicuous, and these numbers seem to be on the rise in Singapore, Penang, Ipoh, and Kuala Lumpur.

In the Indian context, the different levels of Hinduism carry a strong connotation of caste identity. The categories of “Sanskritic” and “folk” Hinduism explicitly associated the “Great Tradition” with rituals and ideas of the higher castes (if not the Brahmins), and the various instances of “Little Tradition” emanated from the ritual practices of the lower caste groupings, if not those of the outcastes (the Harijans, untouchables). While the category “folk” carries some conceptual utility, its implicit judgmental tone and the assumed low ranking assigned to “folk” practices must be questioned. The sociopolitical, cultural, intellectual, and ideological conditions that led to the emergence of these analytical categories for making sense of Hinduism in India clearly do not exist in the vastly different spaces where migrant Hindu communities are now located. Research from the latter speaks rather of a fusion, synthesis, and reconfiguration of elements drawn from different strands of Hinduism and outside, producing a hybrid, syncretic, and innovative style of religiosity even as tradition is invoked. The continued persistence of a style of Hindu religiosity (including features that would be drawn from “folk Hinduism” but also from other sources) amongst overseas Hindu communities, such as in Singapore and Malaysia, illustrates this point well.

SEE ALSO: Hinduism; Popular Religiosity; Religion; Religion, Sociology of; Sanskritization

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football hooliganism

Gary Armstrong

Combine masculinity, physicality, fantasy, and local pride, mix in sporting excitement and collective grievances, and the possible outcome, dating back to the formation of Association Football in the mid nineteenth century, has been disorder. Since the mid 1960s, incidents in Britain involving football spectator disorder and violence have been labeled "hooliganism." Lacking a precise definition or a legal status, "football hooliganism" has for some 40 years served as a receptacle for a spectrum of prejudices and attributes. Without a precise meaning, hooliganism can have no precise causes. The research process thus needs to examine both the *concept* (and its manifestation) and the *interaction* between definer and defined (Pearson 1983). Negotiations around the criminal justice system are crucial because definitions of deviance can depend on the demands of bureaucracies and the moral entrepreneurship of police, media, and the football authorities. The resulting boundary maintenance mechanisms result in stigmatizations and degradation ceremonies offered by courtrooms and media "name and shame" projects. The establishment of police databases, increasingly via the eye of a lens, provides the ever expanding roll call of "categorical suspicion" crucial to the construction and maintenance of a "social problem" (Armstrong & Giulianotti 1998).

Termed since the 1970s the "English disease," it is unsurprising that academics in the UK are pioneers of the hooliganism debate. Sociologists and psychologists have contributed to related social control policies, often on the

basis of preconceived and, at times, bewildering arguments based on little or no empirical evidence. Early sociological explanations portrayed hooligans as a growing subculture resisting the commercial imperative pursued by many soccer clubs (Taylor 1971). In the early 1980s the hooligan problem was framed within a political crisis that threatened capitalist hegemony, and analyzed within the different conceptions of class relations in Britain (Taylor 1982). However, some scholars became disillusioned in the late 1980s as they saw their ideas enveloped in a belief that all troublemaking fans, believed to be drawn from the aspiring and residual strata of the proletariat, were morally and culturally shallow. This in turn made young working class men fodder for racist movements and a collectivity unworthy of left liberal sympathy (Taylor 1987, 1991).

Crowds and disorder have attracted psychologists and theories since Le Bon (1952). However, research on hooliganism has often been informed by an academic obsession with predictive profiling and "models" of disorder. Typically, avoiding contact with hooligan participants has not prevented the production of elaborate texts that bewilder the sociological imagination. Those that attempted ethnography could only retreat to the classroom and dismiss hooligan disorder as "issue less." The fundamental problem with such an approach is this: when collective behavior occurs, which circumstance is an issue and which one is it? At the same time that politicians first debated the issue in the British Parliament, Marsh (1978; Marsh et al. 1978) attempted to produce an "ethnogenic" social psychological analysis that used observation and interviews to claim that hooliganism was ritualized conflict, common to all civilizations, and played out in particular confines by a career structure of recognizable participant "types." The work of Marsh and his colleagues provided the first attempt at qualitative understanding, but it ignored the complex sociohistorical context of rivalries.

More sophisticated applications of sociological theory appeared in the 1980s when figurationalist metatheory, organized around the idea of network interdependency as advanced by Norbert Elias, was combined with Suttles's (1968) concept of "ordered segmentation" derived in his studies of ethnicity and gang

membership in Chicago. The result was a trilogy of texts from the Leicester School (at the University of Leicester) explaining that hooligans were a product of lower working class exclusion that produced an aggressive masculinity, uncontrolled by civilizing processes, and expressed in disruptive actions, some of which would occur at football matches (Williams et al. 1984; Dunning et al. 1988; Murphy et al. 1990). This theory has been challenged on its historical validity, questioned for its application to football hooliganism, and critically scrutinized on methodological and interpretive grounds by those who conducted qualitative research with hooligan groups. Aside from these criticisms, arguments around civilizing and decivilizing processes are impossible to test and, during a century filled with wars, seemingly inappropriate to use as explanations for fights associated with football matches. Furthermore, the transmission of social values and ideas of emulation or avoidance is complex when examining the reality of the lived experience and the fluidity of social class.

Since the early 1990s, academic research in the UK has addressed ideas about hooliganism as publicized by the police and media and favored by law and order politicians campaigning for support. The police and politicians, themselves coming from notoriously hierarchical occupational cultures, explained that hooligan gatherings could exist only if they had quasi military structures. Therefore, the past 20 years have seen an obsessive search in Britain for the conspiracies of the hooligan “generals” who have a wider political and criminal agenda and whose capture and incarceration are necessary if hooliganism is to be eliminated. Subsequent high profile arrests of suspects identified in these terms produced court cases that could not be prosecuted due to falsified evidence presented by the police. Research since the mid 1990s moved beyond Britain to study actions associated with international soccer matches. Studies by anthropologists and sociologists are generally enlightening because they present data on local sociopolitical contexts. Since the late 1990s, research on global football culture shows that disorder is endemic to the game. Whether observers label such disorder as “hooliganism” will depend on their perceptions of causes.

Research has shown that football hooliganism consists of emerging public enactments of ritualized procedures by constantly changing collections of people. It exists via inter and intragroup negotiations which are never fully agreed upon but which give rise to future discord. Confrontations occur within normative or pragmatic confines. They involve semi choreographed situational scenarios acted out as authorities, playing umpire, persistently try to narrow the boundaries of disorder (Giulianotti & Armstrong 2002). The young people resemble Maffesoli’s (1996) “neotribes”: open ended, mainly urban groups seeking a cause to be pursued through risky actions occurring in spaces that supply them a multiplicity of meanings. Notions of “performance” and “conduct” are integral to such processes, embedded in notions of social class and habitus (Bourdieu 1984).

Unfortunately, issues of selfhood, agency, and structure have been ignored, often because research on hooliganism has been fueled by narcissistic contemplations combined with crude voyeurism. At the same time, former participants have produced popular autobiographies that often ridicule sociologists. The phenomena and epiphenomena that hooliganism generates are useful sites for exploring social performance, idealized masculinity, media imperatives, applications of commerce to public order policing, identity in urban milieu, and the construction of the status of “expert” social commentators.

SEE ALSO: Soccer; Sport; Violence Among Fans

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Fordism/post-Fordism

Harland Prechel

Taylorism and other forms of scientific management were implemented in many industries in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. However, the formalization of control over the labor process was accelerated when Henry Ford and his engineers systematically applied the principles of scientific management to the entire labor process. *Fordism* represents two critical changes in the historical process of

fragmenting tasks and increasing the division of labor. First, whereas Taylorism developed work rules to standardize the production of parts, Fordism brought these standardized parts to the worker and further separated conception from execution by specifying how the assembly of parts was to be done. Second, using the assembly line to bring work to the worker made it possible to limit interruptions in the labor process and increase control over the pace of work.

By creating more precise control over the labor process and setting the pace of work, Ford discovered that he could pay high wages while maintaining high profits. His capacity to pay higher wages than other capitalists permitted Ford to be more selective when hiring workers and to impose stricter standards on those workers. The incentive of higher wages was particularly important because it allowed Ford to overcome some of the central impediments to capital accumulation during this historical period: absenteeism and labor turnover. Ford's selection of workers was done by his "sociological department," which scrutinized workers' behavior and implemented hiring practices based on his conception of a moral worker. Fordism also entailed internal labor markets by creating job classifications and hierarchies that allowed workers to be upwardly mobile within the company. These internal labor markets created competition among workers, which divided workers against one another and reduced worker solidarity. In addition to transforming the labor process, Fordism is associated with other social changes. Most notable, the mass production of inexpensive commodities contributed to a culture of mass consumption. Fordism also entails a mode of state regulation that attempted to institutionalize economic growth and stability by limiting workers' rights, creating a welfare state, and implementing Keynesian economic policies.

The limitations of Fordism became apparent in the mid 1970s when the 1973 oil crisis and the economic downturn in 1974 resulted in an abrupt halt to economic growth and stability. This capital accumulation crisis represents the transition to *post Fordism*, which represents a new phase of capitalist development. These new institutional arrangements include an acceleration of globalization, the increased role

of the state in balancing production with consumption, restructuring the production process, and the emergence of giant global corporations and financial institutions that exercise control over trade, domestic companies, and many nation states. Despite agreement that a transition occurred, there is considerable debate among social scientists over how to characterize this form of social organization. In contrast to those who characterize post Fordism as global corporate dominance, other scholars view this transition as creating a more flexible form of economic organization and increasing individualism and pluralistic lifestyles. There is also considerable debate over whether post Fordism represents a historical transition or modifies previous trends. Still other scholars challenge the broad generalizations in post Fordist theory for denying the complex and heterogeneous causal processes that operate in different places in the global economy (for more detail, see Amin 1994; Hall et al. 1995).

One dimension of this debate that has been the subject of considerable empirical research is the use of information to control the manufacturing processes. Post Fordism maintains that access to information creates the organizational capability for instant data analysis that is essential to decisions concerning flexible manufacturing, the manufacture of specialized products, and the coordination of diverse corporate interests (Harvey 1991). Whereas some arguments suggest that information fosters decentralization and autonomy at lower levels of the organizational hierarchy (Piore & Sabel 1984), others suggest that access to information contributes to centralization (Dohse et al. 1985). These perspectives have been criticized because they represent a binary logic, conceptualize information in highly abstract terms, and fail to give explicit attention to the kind of information used, the location of information in the organizational hierarchy, who has access to it, and how it is used in the decision making process. To determine whether decision making is tightly controlled or subject to wide discretion, researchers have analyzed the design of information systems, and the organizational distance between the conception and execution of decisions. *Neo Fordism* formulations suggest that contemporary forms of control have continuity with the past and share important

characteristics with Taylorism and Fordism. This line of theorizing maintains that centralization and decentralization must be treated as theoretical constructs that illuminate empirical processes rather than as empirical absolutes, and that decision making and authority must be treated as separate variables so that the spatial location of authority apart from decision making can be considered (Prechel 1994). This research shows that to increase product quality, corporations standardized the decision making process by introducing more formally rational controls (Weber 1978: 224). Advanced accounting techniques and information processing systems were established to further standardize decision making criteria and create a unified system of control over the managerial process. These controls created the organizational flexibility to centralize authority while decentralizing the responsibility to execute production activities conceptualized by engineers and other experts in a centralized plant planning office. These formal controls made it possible to establish control over the managerial process by defining the premise of decision making and distributing information to operating managers on a "need to know basis," which subjects these social actors to a higher level of discipline.

Despite agreement in some areas, there are many unsettled debates in the post Fordist literature. Resolution of these debates will require more precise theorizing about the contingencies (e.g., geographic, historical) within which economic activity is embedded at both the societal (e.g., political legal) and corporate levels.

SEE ALSO: Capitalism; Decision Making; Global Economy; Information Technology; Labor Process; Taylorism; Weber, Max; Work, Sociology of

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Foucauldian archeological analyses

James Joseph Scheurich and Kathryn Bell McKenzie

To begin to understand Foucault's archeology, it is first crucial to know that Foucault was *not* referring to archeology as an academic discipline or to any popular picture of an archeologist. Indeed, thinking of Foucault's archeology as having anything to do with digging in the earth for ancient artifacts is not useful at all. As Foucault (1972) says, *The Archaeology of Knowledge* "does not relate to geological excavation." For the most part, these allusions will only get in the way of building an understanding of his archeological method.

The archeologies are his most difficult methodologies to understand and, as a separate, second issue, his most difficult to apply. For example, Scheurich supposedly developed a "policy archeology" as a method for addressing public policy issues, but it fails as a Foucauldian archeology. The reason for this is it uses some archeological concepts, but Foucault's archeology is a complex, tightly interwoven methodology that directly depends on such concepts as *savoir*, *connaissance*, positivity, enunciations, statements, archive, discursive formation, enunciative regularities, correlative spaces, enveloping theory, level, limit, periodization, division, event, discontinuity, discursive practices, and so on. In other words, the nature of this method is

that these constructs cannot be pulled out and deployed separately without fundamentally violating the method itself. To deploy Foucault's archeology with integrity or rigor, then, requires *both* a comprehension of the meaning of each of his numerous constructs (and their relationships and connections) *and* a use of the set of constructs as an interrelated or interwoven whole.

Foucault's best synopsis or summary of his archeological methodology is available in the "introduction" to *The Archaeology of Knowledge*, which was written after he had done three book length archeologies. He says in this introduction that this retrospective revision of his methodology is not exactly the same as he applied it in the three prior archeologies because of the problems he discovered in his three applications. Accordingly, the best suggestion for learning how to do Foucault's archeology is to read carefully and thoroughly, more than once, the three archeologies – *Madness and Civilization* (1988), *Birth of the Clinic* (1994), and *The Order of Things* (1973) – and then read in the same way his reflections on archeology as a method in *The Archaeology of Knowledge*. We suggest this course of study is suggested because virtually all social science texts, even fairly complex theoretical ones, are relatively easy to read and understand compared to reading and understanding Foucault, especially the archeologies.

Some of the difficulty with reading Foucault is typically blamed on his writing style, though this explanation is over blown. For example, the main problem with his writing style is that he uses long sentences, and as the sentences proceed, the referents to key concepts are difficult to follow. However, once a reader has picked up the habit of carefully following the referents, Foucault's sentences are not that difficult to understand. Instead, the main problem in reading Foucault is a lack of knowledge of the French philosophical context within which he wrote and a lack of familiarity with his epistemological approach, which is poststructuralist in its assumptions and which is critical of dominant assumptions and discourses, including those of critical theory, broadly defined. Indeed, part of the difficulty in reading Foucault is that while he is inarguably "critical," his critique significantly diverges from and is critical of

what we typically know as critical theory in the social sciences. Nonetheless, despite the difficulties, it is worth the effort to do the work necessary to develop an understanding of his archeologies and his archeological method. And, in doing so, a “strong” understanding of Foucault’s archeological method does require the development of a solid understanding of his complex, interrelated set of concepts.

Two of the more important of these concepts illustrate the fundamental points that Foucault is making with his archeologies. These are *savoir* and *connaissance*. In a particularly useful interview, which appeared in French in 1966 and then in English in 1994 and which was done after *Madness and Civilization*, *Birth of the Clinic*, and *The Order of Things* but before *The Archaeology of Knowledge*, Foucault defined how he saw archeology at this point:

By “archaeology” I would like to designate not exactly a discipline but a domain of research, which would be the following: in a society, different bodies of learning, philosophical ideas, everyday opinions, but also institutions, commercial practices and police activities, mores—all refer to a certain implicit knowledge [*savoir*] special to this society. This knowledge is profoundly different from the [formal] bodies of learning [*des connaissances*] that one can find in scientific books, philosophical theories, and religious justifications, but it [*savoir*] is what *makes possible* at a given moment the appearance of a theory, an opinion, a practice.

Thus, he is differentiating or contrasting these two concepts, *savoir* and *connaissance*, both of which are critical to understanding his archeological approach.

Connaissance is “formal” knowledge or bodies of knowledge that exist in “scientific books, philosophical theories, and religious justifications.” That is, *connaissance* in the social sciences is the production of social scientists as part of their work; it is what academicians would know as scholarly publications or presentations in articles, books, proceedings, reports, and conferences. In sharp contrast, *savoir* includes “everyday opinions, but also institutions, commercial practices and police activities, mores,” but (and this is critically important) it is *savoir* that “*makes possible* at a given moment the appearance of a theory, an opinion, a practice.” Gutting (1989: 251) makes

this same contrast when he argues: “By *connaissance* [Foucault] means . . . any particular body of knowledge such as nuclear physics, evolutionary biology or Freudian psychoanalysis.” In contrast, *savoir*, Gutting continues, “refers to the [broad] discursive conditions that are necessary for the development of *connaissance*.”

A specific example of the application of these two key archeological concepts can be drawn from *The Archaeology of Knowledge* (1972: 179):

The lynch-pin of *Madness and Civilization* was the appearance at the beginning of the nineteenth century of a psychiatric discipline. This discipline had neither the same content, nor the same internal organization, nor the same place in medicine, nor the same practical function, nor the same methods as the traditional chapter on “diseases of the head” or “nervous diseases” to be found in eighteenth-century medical treatises.

Here, Foucault is showing that the “psychiatric discipline” that appears at the first half of the nineteenth century is qualitatively or substantively different than the “diseases of the head” and “nervous diseases” of the eighteenth century. But on examining this new discipline, we discover two things:

what made it [i.e., the emerging discipline of psychiatry] possible at the time it appeared, what brought about this great change [i.e., changes from eighteenth-century diseases of the head to nineteenth-century psychiatry] in the economy of concepts, analyses, and demonstrations was a whole set of relations between hospitalization, internment, the conditions and procedures of social exclusion, the rules of jurisprudence, the norms of industrial labor and bourgeois morality, in short a whole group of relations that characterized for this discursive practice [i.e., psychiatry] the formation of its statements.

Thus, what created the conditions for the psychiatric discipline to appear as a formal discipline—a *connaissance*—were changes in the broader *savoir* (i.e., changes in practices, procedures, institutions, norms, etc.). For example, “this [discursive] practice is not only manifested in a discipline [i.e., psychiatry] possessing a scientific status and scientific pretensions [*connaissance* or psychiatry as a formal discipline]; it is also found in the operation in legal

texts, in literature, in philosophy, in political decisions, and in the statements made and the opinions expressed in daily life [i.e., *savoir*].”

As a result, Foucault is arguing that to understand the emergence of psychiatry as a formal discipline, it is necessary to understand not only some evolution of formal knowledge (*connaissance*), but also the much less formal “hospitalization, internment, the conditions and procedures of social exclusion, the rules of jurisprudence, the norms of industrial labor and bourgeois morality” and medical texts, popular literature, political agendas, and many other, seemingly mundane, aspects of everyday life; that is, *savoir*.

It is *savoir* that is the focus of study for Foucault’s archeology. He is showing that psychiatry or other formal social science disciplines do *not* simply evolve out of any prior formal disciplines. Instead, he is contending that understanding the emergence of a discipline like psychiatry requires a focus on *savoir*. Foucault’s larger point, though, is that formal disciplines do *not* have a rational historical trajectory since, in fact, these disciplines emerge from the much less rational or even irrational array of practices, procedures, institutions, politics, everyday life discourses, and the like, which, as a result, undermines the rational modernist story of formal disciplines.

Thus, the larger purpose of Foucault’s archeologies is to interrogate various examples – *Madness and Civilization*, *Birth of the Clinic*, and *The Order of Things* (the human sciences) – of the work of reason. And these generate one of Foucault’s most important archeological contentions: the history of reason is “in *Madness and Civilization*, not wholly and entirely that of its progressive refinement, its continuously increasing rationality” (Foucault 1972: 4). In other words, when specific cases of the work of reason are examined, Foucault finds that the historical trajectory of reason is not “progressive refinement” or “continuously increasing rationality.” Instead, there typically is a “discontinuity (threshold, rupture, break, mutation, transformation)” in a particular trajectory – similar, for example, to the one he found between “diseases of the head” and “nervous diseases” of the eighteenth century and a psychiatric discipline in the nineteenth century. Consequently, instead of merely critiquing the

master narrative of reason, Foucault is providing research that demonstrates that the typical characterization of this narrative of reason is not accurate, at least in his three archeological studies.

A second critical contention that emerges out of the archeologies is that disciplines or formal knowledges (*connaissance*) cannot be adequately studied in terms of only the historical trajectories of the formal knowledges themselves (*connaissance*). In contrast, Foucault argues that *connaissance* emerges out of *savoir*, which does include formal knowledge, such as academic books, but also encompasses institutions, legal decisions, mores, corporate practices, norms, and everyday discourse. Thus, in his archeologies, he shows how institutional practices, morality, and the like create the conditions or the possibility for a formal knowledge to emerge. Again, though, this contention undermines the modernist metanarrative of reason. It is no longer so pure or exalted; that is, reason is being problematized.

Problematizing reason, however, is not Foucault’s last larger purpose in the archeologies. For Foucault, the other side of the coin of reason is the human subject: “Making historical analysis the discourse of the continuous [e.g., portraying formal knowledge, *connaissance*, as emerging through a rational, logical, continuous trajectory] and making human consciousness [i.e., the human subject or subjectivity] the original subject of all historical development and all action are the two sides of the same system of thought [i.e., modernity]” (p. 12; emphasis added). What Foucault contends here is that “man” or the human subject, especially “man” as the creator of history and reason, is an ideological assertion or assumption of modernity. However, social scientists then take this assumption as a given as they construct their theories and research. Moreover, Foucault argues that this ideologically constructed central agent – “man,” the privileged subject of history and life – is simultaneously positioned as both the researcher or theorist and the object of the research or theory. However, for Foucault, this modernist ideology of humanism can be interrogated through his anti-humanist archeological methodology, especially in terms of showing that the conditions of emergence of *connaissance* occur through or

within *savoir*. In other words, archeology decenters the modernist subject as the heart of history and reason. As Foucault says in the *Archaeology of Knowledge*, the purpose of his final archeological work before he turned to genealogy as a new method was “to define a method of historical analysis freed from the anthropological [the human subject as the center] theme” and “a method purged of all anthropologism” (p. 16; emphasis added). Unfortunately, Foucault’s problematization of reason and the agentic subject as “two sides of the same system of thought” (Foucault 1972: 12) has largely been ignored by many of those who have appropriated his work. These theorists have used his problematization of reason, while ignoring his problematization of the subject. However, appropriating “one side” of Foucault’s archeology without the other side represents a deep violation of archeology.

For those interested in Foucault and especially for those interested in his archeologies, single archeological concepts cannot just be cherry picked and used by themselves. Foucault intended his array of archeological constructs to be deployed as an integrated set. To learn to do a Foucauldian archeology requires several readings of the three archeologies and the same for his retrospective revision of his archeological methodology in *The Archaeology of Knowledge*. In addition, there are a few books (e.g., Gutting 1989) that are useful, but there is no substantive application of Foucault’s archeology available for study except his own.

SEE ALSO: Foucault, Michel; Knowledge; Knowledge, Sociology of; Poststructuralism

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Foucault, Michel (1926–84)

Margaret E. Farrar

Michel Foucault was a French philosopher whose work has greatly influenced sociologists and many others, particularly in the areas of crime and deviance, gender and sexuality, health and illness, and social welfare.

Foucault was born into an upper middle class family in Poitiers, France, where his father was a prominent surgeon. Beginning in 1946, he attended the École Normale Supérieure, where he studied with such intellectual luminaries as Maurice Merleau Ponty and Louis Althusser. At ENS he received his licence in philosophy in 1948, in psychology in 1949, and his *agrégation* in psychopathology in 1952. He published *Maladie mentale et personnalité* (Mental Illness and Personality) in 1954, a book that he later disavowed. After a series of jobs in Uppsala, Hamburg, and Warsaw, he returned to France in 1960 to chair the philosophy department and teach at the University of Clermont Ferrand. He received his *Doctorat ès lettres* in 1960 for *Folie et déraison: Histoire de la folie à l’âge classique*, a history of mental illness that focused on the relationship between madness and reason (this would be abridged and published in English as *Madness and Civilization* in 1961). In 1963 Foucault published *Naissance de la clinique* (The Birth of the Clinic). Foucault’s next book, *Le Mots et les choses* (published in English as *The Order of Things*), was a sweeping study of the preconditions for knowledge in the disciplines of biology, philology, and economics. It became a

surprise bestseller in France when it was published in 1966, launching Foucault to international prominence.

May 1968 inaugurated what some have called Foucault's "political turn," when confrontations between students at the Sorbonne and the police ignited a general insurrection across France. Initially, groups of workers spontaneously sided with the students in the conflict; the series of strikes that ensued, however, was discouraged both by union leaders and by the French Communist Party. The rebellion was finally suppressed by the de Gaulle administration. During this time, Foucault was teaching in Tunisia, but he was profoundly affected by the events nonetheless; they confirmed Foucault's deep suspicions regarding universalist and humanist appeals to truth and history, and sparked his interest in studying the many different places that power is exercised in people's daily lives: schools, factories, hospitals, and prisons. When he returned to France, Foucault (and others of his generation, including Jacques Derrida and Gilles Deleuze) renounced the intellectual and political tradition exemplified by Jean Paul Sartre. Speaking out against Sartre and the Marxist tradition he represented, Foucault quickly became a galvanizing figure in intellectual public life. He subsequently helped to found the *Groupe d'Information des Prisons* (the Prison Information Group, or GIP), an organization dedicated to providing a forum for addressing prisoners' concerns and needs.

In 1969 Foucault was elected to the Collège de France, the country's most prestigious institution of research and learning, where he became Professor and Chair of the History of Systems of Thought. Foucault published perhaps his most influential and overtly political book, *Surveiller et punir: Naissance de la prison*, in 1975 (translated into English as *Discipline and Punish* in 1977) from research that originated from his work with GIP. Soon after, he began his multi volume history of sexuality. The first volume, *The Will to Knowledge* (previously known as *The History of Sexuality: An Introduction in English; Histoire de la sexualité, I: la volonté de savoir*) was published in France in 1976. The second and third volumes (*The Use of Pleasure* and *The Care of the Self*) were translated into English shortly before Foucault's death in 1984.

THEMES IN FOUCAULT'S WORK

In an essay written near the end of his life, Foucault explained that the goal of his work over the previous two decades was not, as many thought, to elucidate the phenomenon of power. Rather, he wrote, "my objective . . . has been to create a history of the different modes by which, in our culture, human beings are made subjects" (Foucault 1983: 208). According to Foucault, the human sciences (as he called them) are disciplines in both senses of that word: they are fields of expertise (i.e., in the sociological sense, they are "professions"), but they also are implicated in a particularly insidious form of power, whereby man becomes "the enslaved sovereign, the observed spectator" in the production of knowledge (see also Goldstein 1984). Heavily influenced by and indebted to Nietzsche, Foucault's work critiques the "will to knowledge" inherent in the human endeavor to understand ourselves. For Foucault, this will to knowledge operates at the intersection of knowledge and power. Foucault's studies of illness, criminality, and sexuality challenged linear narratives of progress that regard advances in knowledge as part of a clear path to emancipation (Thiele 1990; Owen 1996). For Foucault, the interplay between knowledge and freedom is never that straight forward; in fact, he argued, the modern proclivity to identify and divide the normal from the abnormal can and often does serve as a means of social control. Such categorizations always entail a normative divide between one half of the binary (healthy, sane, law abiding, heterosexual) and the other (sick, insane, criminal, and homosexual). In his earlier work (through *The Order of Things*) Foucault called this juncture of knowledge and power an episteme, a system of thought that defines the field of possibility for the production of knowledge. With the publication of *L'Archeologie du savoir* (*The Archeology of Knowledge*) in 1969, Foucault began to write about "discursive formations" rather than epistemes, perhaps to put some distance between himself and the methods and concepts employed by theorists of structuralism (Foss et al. 1985: 194). Foucault's main concern was the way that certain kinds of language – language enmeshed in professional standards, methodological requirements, and a

community of experts – are endowed with greater claims to truth than others (Dreyfus & Rabinow 1983: 48). Foucault regarded discursive formations as having a constitutive function: discursive practices make subjects by delimiting the boundaries of what it is possible to think. For Foucault, then, knowledge and power are always, and necessarily, intertwined, so that “we are subjected to the production of truth through power and we cannot exercise power except through the production of truth” (Foucault 1980: 93). For example, in *Discipline and Punish* Foucault begins with a startling juxtaposition between the gruesome public execution of Damiens the Regicide in 1757 and a blandly regimental prison timetable from 1837. How, Foucault asks, have we made the enormous transition from one form of punishment to the other in less than 80 years? Foucault’s provocative answer is that it is not that we have become increasingly humane or civilized in our treatment of prisoners; rather, he contends, we have developed more efficient forms of punishment, more sophisticated technologies of power. Through observation, classification, examination, and internment, we have rationalized crime and punishment in both language and practice. The point of shifting from public executions to prisons, Foucault claims, is “not to punish less, but to punish better” (Foucault 1977: 82), and marks a sea change in how we think about crime, criminality, and society. Foucault describes this as the shift from sovereign or juridical power to disciplinary or bio power.

In *Discipline and Punish* Foucault also describes his best known metaphor for this new form of power: the Panopticon, Jeremy Bentham’s unrealized and yet enormously influential design for prisons. The Panopticon consists of a central tower with windows on all sides that look out over a ring of cells that face the tower. Space is organized around vision, so that a maximum number of people can be observed at a minimum cost. In its ideal, most effective form, this disciplinary machine does not even need the guard in the tower in order to operate; all the prisoners require is the possibility of being watched in order to monitor their own behavior. One way glass, for example, can take the place of an actual guard and produce the same results. As an institution that allows for

those in authority to see without being seen, the Panopticon fashions subjects that internalize the force of this authoritative gaze.

Moreover, Panopticism is not limited to prisons and prisoners. According to Foucault, the kind of power exemplified in the Panopticon has been replicated across the modern world in all kinds of institutions. “Is it surprising,” he asks, “that prisons resemble factories, schools, barracks, hospitals, which all resemble prisons?” (Foucault 1977: 228). Through panopticism specifically and bio power more generally, Foucault contends, “visibility becomes a trap.” These observations lead Foucault (1977) to describe the expansion of what he calls a “carceral society” or a “society of normalization” (Foucault 1980).

In his later work, Foucault turned his attention to the production of human sexuality. In “The Will to Knowledge (An Introduction),” Foucault criticizes what he calls the “repressive hypothesis,” the belief that since the nineteenth century we have “repressed” our sexuality under the influence of the Victorian bourgeoisie. Instead of repression, Foucault argues, western society “speaks verbosely of its own silence, [and] takes great pains to relate in detail the things it does not say” (Foucault 1990: 8). Foucault contends that the human sciences make sex an object of study, and serve to “discipline” and normalize various forms of sexual behavior. For Foucault, this discipline is particularly insidious because it shapes individuals’ understanding of themselves. The second two volumes in the series, *The Use of Pleasure (Histoire de la sexualité, II: l’usage des plaisirs)* and *The Care of the Self (Histoire de la sexualité, III: le souci de soi)*, deal with the construction of human sexuality in Greek and Roman antiquity.

It is important to note that the various transformations that Foucault documents – whether in the realm of crime and punishment, mental illness, or human sexuality – were not the result of one point of origin or a single systemic cause (Foucault 1977: 81); bio power is not initiated by a piece of legislation, a particular group of thinkers, or even a specific economic system. Rather, it is “a multiplicity of often minor processes, of different origin and scattered location” (p. 138). What is more, Foucault contends, this form of power is never reducible to the state or to the prohibitive function of law.

Instead of focusing intellectual energy looking for the centers of power, Foucault famously claims, we need to “cut off the king’s head” and examine the ways that power “induces pleasure, forms knowledge, produces discourse” (Foucault 1984: 63, 61).

INFLUENCE AND CRITIQUE

Foucault’s work has had a tremendous impact in many different disciplines across the humanities and social sciences. Scholars of history, geography, religion, political theory, communications, education, and literature have had to grapple with the implications of his claims, and respond to his challenges. His *History of Sexuality* volumes are considered founding texts in queer theory, and have helped to inaugurate the field of gender studies.

Foucault’s impact on sociology, then, simply cannot be overstated. Some see Foucault’s work as very much an extension of, and complement to, Weber’s analyses of social rationalization (O’Neill 1986; see also Owen 1996). Students of social control and deviance, particularly those influenced by labeling theory, cite *Discipline and Punish* as a revolution in the study of crime and criminality. Foucault’s institutional studies also have had implications for research on organizations (Cooper & Burrell 1988).

Foucault’s work has also been the subject of much debate across the social sciences. Some of the most energetic critiques have been directed at Foucault’s conceptions of power and agency. Foucault rejects what he calls an “economic” model of power, whereby power is something that some “have” and others do not. Instead, Foucault sees power as “something which circulates . . . never localized here or there, never in anybody’s hands, never appraised as a commodity or piece of wealth” (Foucault 1980: 98). For Foucault, power is a field in which we are all implicated. Sangren (1995) argues this conception of power reduces people and institutions to mere objects (rather than subjects) in Foucault’s analyses; power thus assumes the status of an explanatory telos (see also Habermas 1987: 274–5). For this reason, Foucault and theorists influenced by Foucault (such as Judith Butler) have been taken to task for either being too deterministic (and thus incapable of providing

an account of resistance to power) or not deterministic enough (e.g., Fox 1998).

A related critique also stems from Foucault’s account of power as something that is diffuse and dispersed, everywhere and nowhere at the same time. As a result, critics charge, Foucault does not adequately provide a way to differentiate between power and domination. Moreover, Foucault does not articulate a clear set of ethical standards by which to evaluate the morality of different arrangements of power. Indeed, Jürgen Habermas, one of Foucault’s most persistent critics, referred to this as Foucault’s cryptonormativity: his unwillingness to definitively make judgments about the justice or injustice of particular power relations. Foucault responds to this critique by rejecting what he referred to as “the blackmail of the Enlightenment,” the simplistic choice of “for or against” freedom, progress, and reason put to him by his detractors (Foucault 1984: 43).

The final critique of Foucault is really a question: Is social science, as such, even possible if we take Foucault’s work seriously? Foucault’s work challenges the very assumptions that make social science possible. For Foucault, the difficulty with the social sciences lies in the fact that modern “man” is both the subject and the object of disciplinary knowledge; he is a being defined by his ability to observe and be observed, count and be counted, evaluate and be evaluated, rank and be ranked. Man comes to know himself both as the empirical object and the transcendental subject of knowledge (Dreyfus & Rabinow 1983: 31). Foucault calls this peculiar epistemological configuration the “empirico transcendental doublet” that haunts the history of the human sciences, and it leads Foucault to make one of his most controversial claims: that the era of man is drawing to a close, and eventually man will disappear, “like a face drawn in sand at the edge of the sea” (Foucault 1972: 387).

If Foucault’s claims have any weight, then his own analyses must also be implicated in the conditions of their own production. Foucault acknowledges this, saying that genealogies “are therefore not positivistic returns to a more careful or exact form of science. They are precisely anti sciences” (Foucault 1980: 83). For this reason, Foucault’s greatest influence may be in felt in debates about the future of the

discipline itself. His supporters argue that his work helps pave the way for a post positivist social science.

In his biography of Foucault, Didier Eribon quotes at length Pierre Bourdieu's article in *Le Monde*, written at the time of Foucault's death:

"There is nothing more dangerous," wrote Bourdieu, "than to reduce a philosophy, especially one so subtle, complex, and perverse, to a textbook formula. Nonetheless, I would say that Foucault's work is a long exploration of transgression, of going beyond social limits, always inseparably linked to knowledge and power . . . I would have liked to have said this better — this thought that was so bent on conquering a self-mastery, that is, mastery of its history, the history of categories of thought, the history of the will and desires. And also this concern for rigor, this refusal of opportunism in knowledge as well as in practice, in the techniques of life as well as in the political choices that make Foucault an irreplaceable figure." (Eribon 1991: 328)

SEE ALSO: Deleuze, Gilles; Derrida Jacques; Disciplinary Society; Discourse; Femininities/Masculinities; Foucauldian Archeological Analyses; Postmodern Sexualities; Postmodernism; Poststructuralism; Power, Theories of; Prisons; Sartre, Jean Paul

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frame

David A. Snow

The concept of frame designates interpretive structures that render events and occurrences subjectively meaningful, and thereby function to organize experience and guide action. Within sociology, the concept is derived primarily from the work of Erving Goffman, which is beholden in part to the earlier work of Gregory Bateson. For these scholars, as well as others who use the concept analytically, frames provide answers to such questions as: What is going on here? What is being said? What does this mean? According to Goffman, frames essentially enable individuals "to locate, perceive, identify, and label a

seemingly infinite number of occurrences" within their immediate life situations or spaces.

Frames do this interpretive work by performing three core functions. First, like picture frames, they *focus attention* by punctuating or bracketing what in our sensual field is relevant and what is irrelevant, what is "in frame" and what is "out of frame," in relation to the object of orientation. Second, they function as *articulation mechanisms* in the sense of tying together the various punctuated elements of the scene so that one set of meanings rather than another is conveyed, or, in the language of narrativity, one story rather than another is told. Third, frames perform a *transformative function* by reconstituting the way in which some objects of attention are seen or understood as relating to one another or to the actor. Examples of this transformative function abound, as in the de eroticization of the sexual in the physician's office, the transformation or reconfiguration of aspects of one's biography, as commonly occurs in contexts of religious conversion, and in the transformation of routine grievances or misfortunes into injustices or mobilizing grievances in the context of social movements.

Given the focusing, articulation, and transformative functions of frames, it is arguable that they are fundamental to interpretation, so much so that few, if any, utterances, gestures, actions, or experiences could be meaningfully understood apart from the way they are framed. Indeed, one student of discourse and interaction, Deborah Tannen (1993), has claimed as much, noting that: "in order to interpret utterances in accordance with the way in which they are intended, a hearer must know what frame s/he is operating in, that is, whether the activity being engaged in is joking, imitating, chatting, lecturing, or performing a play."

In light of the relatively routine character of such activities, it is arguable that most frames are culturally embedded in the sense that they are not so much constructed or negotiated *de novo* as individuals go from one situation or activity to another, but exist, instead, as elements of the individual's or group's enveloping culture and thus contain within them situation relevant meanings. It is also the case, however, that one can easily glean from everyday social life numerous direct and indirect ambiguities and situations calling for a more interpretive

and contextual understanding of frames. Not only is some interpretive work required when reading a new situation or encounter and deciding, however instantaneously, what extant frame should be invoked or applied, but these primary frames are themselves also subject to transformation through, in Goffman's language, various "keyings" and "fabrications." In turn, these transformations can be fleeting or enduring, thus suggesting that frames are subject to change over time rather than static cultural and/or interactional entities. Additionally, there are moments and situations in social life in which the relevance or fit of extant cultural frames is likely to be ambiguous or open to question, and thus contestable, as is often the case in the contexts in which social movements arise. Hence, frames can be understood and analyzed from both culturalist and constructivist perspectives.

The concept of frame is one of a number of concepts that are invoked to capture the interpretive and constructed nature of much of what goes on in social life. Other kindred concepts include schemas, ideology, and narrative, but it is arguable that frames are conceptually and functionally distinctive. For example, schemas (knowledge structures consisting of learned expectations about objects of orientation) and frames interact during the course of interaction between two or more individuals, with frames providing an interpretive "footing" that aligns the divergent schemas that participants may sometimes hold. Ideologies can be thought of as broad, often loosely coupled sets of values and beliefs that function as a cultural resource for the construction of frames and which, in turn, can be modified by successfully implemented frames. So frames and kindred concepts like schemas and ideology can be thought of as existing in an interactive, almost dialogic relationship.

The analysis of frames and associated processes has been conducted in relation to various activities and social categories (e.g., advertising, face to face interaction, gender, talk) in a variety of domains of social life (e.g., culture, organizations, politics, public policy). To date, however, the most systematic application and development of frame analysis within sociology can be found in the substantive study of collective action and social movements.

SEE ALSO: Bateson, Gregory; Collective Action; Culture; Framing and Social Movements; Goffman, Erving; Ideology; Narrative

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framing and social movements

David A. Snow

Framing, within the context of social movements, refers to the signifying work or meaning construction engaged in by movement adherents (e.g., leaders, activists, and rank and file participants) and other actors (e.g., adversaries, institutional elites, media, countermovements) relevant to the interests of movements and the challenges they mount in pursuit of those interests. The concept of framing is borrowed from Erving Goffman's *Frame Analysis* (1974) and is rooted in the symbolic interactionist and constructionist principle that meanings do not naturally or automatically attach themselves to the objects, events, or experiences we encounter, but arise, instead, through interpretive processes mediated by culture. Applied to social

movements, the idea of framing problematizes the meanings associated with relevant events, activities, places, and actors, suggesting that those meanings are typically contestable and negotiable and thus open to debate and differential interpretation. From this vantage point, mobilizing grievances are seen neither as naturally occurring sentiments nor as arising automatically from specifiable material conditions, but as the result of interactively based interpretation or signifying work. The verb "framing" conceptualizes this signifying work, which is one of the activities that social movement leaders and participants, as well as their adversaries, do on a regular basis.

The link between framing and social movements was first noted in an experimental study of the conditions under which authority is defined as unjust and challenged (Gamson et al. 1982) and then developed more fully in a conceptualization and elaboration of "frame alignment processes" (Snow et al. 1986). Since then there has been an almost meteoric rise in research on framing and social movements, with much of the work congealing into what is now called the framing perspective on social movements (Benford & Snow 2000; Snow 2004). The analytic appeal and utility of this perspective is based largely on the conjunction of three factors. The first is the neglect of the relationship between meaning and mobilization, and the role of interpretive processes in mediating that relationship, by the dominant perspectives on social movements that emerged in the 1970s – namely, the resource mobilization and political process/opportunity perspectives; the second is the rediscovery of culture and the so called discursive turn that occurred during the 1980s; and the third is the development of a framing conceptual architecture or scaffolding which has facilitated more systematic theorization and empirical assessment of framing processes and effects.

Among the interconnected concepts and processes that have surfaced as the framing literature has expanded, there are at least six that can be thought of as cornerstone concepts and processes in that they provide a conceptual architecture that has stimulated much of the research exploring the relevance of framing to mobilization, both empirically and theoretically. These key concepts or processes

include: collective action frames, master frames, core framing tasks, frame alignment processes, frame resonance, and discursive processes and fields.

Collective action frames are the resultant products of framing activity within the social movement arena. They are relatively coherent sets of action oriented beliefs and meanings that legitimate and inspire social movement campaigns and activities. Like everyday interpretive frames, collective action frames focus attention by specifying what is "in" and "out of frame"; articulate and elaborate the punctuated elements within the frame so that a particular meaning or set of meanings is conveyed; and, as a result, often transform the meanings associated with the objects of attention, such that some situation, activity, or category of individuals is seen in a strikingly different way than before, as when everyday misfortunes are reframed as injustices or status groups like the homeless and cigarette smokers are framed as legitimate targets for social movement protest. But collective action frames differ from everyday interactional frames in terms of their primary mobilization functions: to mobilize or activate movement adherents so that they move, metaphorically, from the balcony to the barricades (action mobilization); to convert bystanders into adherents, thus broadening the movement's base (consensus mobilization); and to neutralize or demobilize adversaries (countermobilization). Much of the research on framing and social movements has focused on the empirical identification of collective action frames and specification of their functions with respect to the movements in question. In the case of the environmental movement, for example, numerous frames have been identified, such as an "environmental justice frame," a "runaway technology frame," a "conservation frame," and a "landscape frame."

Although most collective action frames are movement specific, sometimes those that emerge early in a cycle of protest come to function like master algorithms in the sense that they color and constrain the orientations and activities of other movements within the cycle, such that subsequent collective action frames within the cycle are derivative (Snow & Benford 1992). When the ideational and interpretive scope and influence of a collective

action frame expand in this way, it can be thought of as a *master frame*. Examples of master frames in recent history include the civil rights frame in relation to the resurgence of the women's movement and the flowering of movements accenting the rights of the aged, the disabled, American Indians, and other ethnic groups; the nuclear freeze frame in relation to the peace movement of the 1980s; and the environmental justice frame in relation to various environmental movements (Snow & Benford 1992; Benford & Snow 2000).

The relative success of collective action frames in performing their mobilization functions is partly contingent on the extent to which they attend to the three *core framing tasks* or challenges of "diagnostic framing," "prognostic framing," and "motivational framing" (Snow & Benford 1988). The former entails a diagnosis of some event or aspect of life as troublesome and in need of repair or change, and the attribution of blame or responsibility for the problematized state of affairs. Much research examining the substance of collective action frames suggests that diagnostic framing typically defines or redefines an event or situation as an "injustice" (Gamson 1992; Benford & Snow 2000: 615), but it is not clear that all collective action frames include an injustice component. Prognostic framing involves the articulation of a proposed solution to the problem, including a plan of attack and the frame-consistent tactics for carrying it out, and often a refutation of opponents' current or proposed solutions. Such framing, simply put, addresses the Leninist question of "what needs to be done." Research has shown that both diagnostic and prognostic framing can generate considerable debate resulting in "frame disputes" within movements (Benford 1993). The final core framing task, motivational framing, addresses the "free rider" problem by articulating a "call to arms" or rationale(s) for engaging in social movement activity. This has also been referred to as the "agency" component of collective action frames (Gamson 1992).

Frame alignment processes encompass the strategic efforts of social movement actors and organizations to link their interests and goals with those of prospective adherents and resource providers so that they will "buy in" and contribute in some fashion to movement campaigns

and activities. Four basic alignment processes have been identified. They include “frame bridging,” which involves the linkage of two or more ideologically congruent but structurally disconnected frames regarding a particular issue; “frame amplification,” which entails the embellishment, crystallization, and invigoration of existing values and beliefs; “frame extension,” which depicts movement interests and framings as extending beyond the movement’s initial constituency to include issues thought to be of relevance to bystander groups or potential adherents; and “frame transformation,” which involves changing prior understandings and perspectives, among individuals or collectivities, so that things are seen differently than before (Snow et al. 1986). Research on these alignment processes has been quite extensive and has firmly established their importance in relation to mobilization (Benford & Snow 2000; Snow 2004).

The ultimate measure of the effectiveness of proffered collective action frames and the corresponding alignment strategies is whether they resonate with targeted audiences. Those for which *frame resonance* is established facilitate mobilization; those that are non resonant fall on deaf ears, thus failing to inspire or influence the direction of social movement activity. Two sets of interacting factors have been postulated to account for variation in frame resonance. One is the “credibility” of the proffered frame, which is affected by the consistency between claims and actions, the relative empirical credibility of claims and events, and the credibility of the frame articulators, as determined by status and knowledge considerations. The second set of factors affecting frame resonance is the “salience” of the framing to the targets of mobilization, as determined by the centrality of the beliefs and claims to the lives of the targets of mobilization, the extent to which the framing is experientially commensurable with the past or present lives of the targets, and the extent to which the framings have narrative fidelity, such that they are resonant with cultural narrations and myths (Snow & Benford 1988; Benford & Snow 2000: 619–22). Affecting both sets of factors is the failure to attend to various framing problems that can result in the commission of framing errors or mistakes that undermine the prospect of resonance. Four such problems

that appear to confront movements of all kinds include the problem of “misalignment,” as when, in the case of injustice framing, attention is focused on establishing the responsible agents without first firmly establishing victimage; the problem of “scope,” as when framing claims are either too broad and general or too specific and narrow; the problem of “exhaustion,” as when a particular framing has been overused and perhaps taken for granted and is thus tired and spent; and the problem of “relevance,” as when the frame is contradicted by the flow of events and framing efforts are insufficiently attentive to establishing one or more of the conditions of salience (Snow & Corrigan Brown 2005). Such framing problems or vulnerabilities indicate that affecting resonance is a precarious enterprise and ongoing challenge.

The generation and modification of collective action frames occur primarily through the *discursive processes* of frame articulation and elaboration. Frame articulation involves the discursive connection and coordination of events, experiences, and strands of one or more ideologies so that they hang together in a relatively integrated and meaningful fashion. Frame elaboration involves accenting and highlighting some events, issues, and beliefs or ideas more than others, such that they become more salient in an array of movement relevant issues (Snow 2004). Historically renowned movement leaders, such as Gandhi and Martin Luther King, Jr., were masters at frame articulation and elaboration. Gandhi’s principles of *satyagraha* and *ahimsa* were based, in part, on his articulation of beliefs derived from Hinduism, Buddhism, and Christianity, and Martin Luther King’s potent civil rights frame derived, in part, from his articulation and elaboration of strands of Christianity, democratic theory, and Gandhi’s philosophy of non violence.

The processes of frame articulation and elaboration occur during the course of conversations, meetings, and written communications among movement leaders and members within broader enveloping cultural and structural contexts variously called *discursive fields* (Steinberg 1999) or discursive opportunity structures (Ferree et al. 2002). Discursive fields evolve during the course of debate about contested issues and events, and encompass cultural materials (e.g., beliefs, values, ideologies,

myths) of potential relevance and various sets of actors (e.g., targeted authorities, social control agents, countermovements, media) whose interests are aligned, albeit differently, with the contested issues or events, and who thus have a stake in what is done or not done about those events and issues. The discursive processes of frame articulation and elaboration draw selectively upon these cultural materials and are conducted in relation to the various sets of actors that constitute the discursive field. This suggests that the development of collective action frames is facilitated and/or constrained by the cultural and structural elements of the discursive field, further suggesting that collective action frames constitute innovative articulations and elaborations of existing ideologies or sets of beliefs and ideas, and thus function as extensions or antidotes of them. From this vantage point, social movements are viewed not as carriers of preconfigured, tightly coupled beliefs and meanings, traditionally conceptualized as ideologies, but as signifying agents actively engaged in the production and maintenance of meanings that are intended to mobilize adherents and constituents, garner bystander support, and demobilize antagonists.

Although the connection between framing and social movements has generated considerable theorization and empirical research, there are a number of issues that have not been adequately addressed. One cluster concerns issues specific to framing processes and their consequences. Much research has identified movement specific collective action frames, but comparatively little research has examined systematically the discursive processes through which frames evolve, develop, and change. The conceptual cluster of frame articulation and elaboration and the theorized discussion of the discursive fields in which these processes are embedded provide the conceptual edifice for research on frame discursive processes, but to date the actual occurrence of systematic research on framing processes (see Gamson 1992; Ferree et al. 2002; Snow 2004) has not kept pace with the calls for such research (Steinberg 1999; Johnston 2002; Snow 2004). A second cluster of issues that has not been sufficiently explored concerns the relationship between collective action frames and framing processes and relevant cultural and social psychological factors

such as narrative, ideology, collective identity, and emotion. Clearly, these are overlapping concepts that interact in ways not yet fully understood.

And last, our understanding of social movements will be advanced if more attention is devoted, both theoretically and empirically, to how framing intersects with the issues and processes examined via the theoretical lens of resource mobilization, political opportunity, and cultural perspectives. These perspectives should be seen not so much as competing but as shedding light on different aspects of the character and dynamics of social movements. The framing perspective emerged not as an alternative to other perspectives on social movements, but to investigate and illuminate what these other perspectives glossed over, namely, the matter of the production of mobilizing and countermobilizing meanings and ideas.

SEE ALSO: Consciousness Raising; Culture, Social Movements and; Goffman, Erving; Frame; Ideology; Political Opportunities; Resource Mobilization Theory; Social Movements

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franchise

David B. Bills

Franchising is a business arrangement in which a parent company contracts with one or more smaller firms to grant or sell to them the right to distribute its products, implement its processes, or use its trade name. The recent development of franchising in the US and elsewhere is characterized by steady to rapid growth in the number of franchised establishments, their increased levels of employment and sales, and their proliferation beyond the restaurant and retailing sectors in which they have been historically most prevalent into virtually all areas of post industrial economies.

The relationship between franchisors and franchisees is based on a contract that specifies the legal responsibilities and mutual expectations of each party to the contract. Still, the fact that the franchise relationship is so nearly an exclusive one means that the franchisors and franchisees share many common interests. Franchisors acquire a generally reliable means to expand their businesses, while franchisees acquire a measure of independence, sense of ownership, and reduced risk. Franchising permits the exploitation of efficiencies from scale economies. It allows the establishments of a parent company to share the overhead costs of such factors as marketing, advertising, and monitoring. These costs are often prohibitively expensive for a free standing establishment. About 80 percent of the time, the franchisee buys the business or a share of the business, but often the parent company retains ownership. This pattern varies a great deal across industries.

There are two principal types of franchising: product franchising and business format franchising. The US Department of Commerce defines product and trade name franchising as “an independent sales relationship between supplier and dealer in which the dealer acquired some of the identity of the supplier.” It defines business format franchising as “an ongoing business relationship between franchisor and franchisee that includes not only the product, service, and trademark, but the entire business concept itself – a marketing strategy and plan, operating manuals and standards, quality control, and a continuing process of assistance and guidance.” Product franchising (such as beverage bottling) is older and larger in sales value in the US than business format franchising, although the share of franchise sales in the product franchising sector is declining. Business format franchising, the most common kinds of which are quick service restaurants, lodging, retail food, and table/full service restaurants, is, however, more widespread than product distribution franchising, producing about four times as many establishments and jobs.

The roughly three quarters of a million franchised businesses in the US generated about \$1.5 trillion in sales in 2004. This figure represents about 10 percent of the national product of the US. Franchising’s share of total sales is

much higher in some industries. For example, franchises generate more than a third of retail sales. About 9 million Americans are directly employed in franchises, and about that many more work in jobs generated in some way by the franchise sector.

SEE ALSO: Branding and Organizational Identity; Brands and Branding; McDonaldization; Organizations and the Theory of the Firm

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Frazier, E. Franklin (1894–1962)

Mary Jo Deegan

Groundbreaking scholar on the African American family, social classes, youth, and community, Edward Franklin Frazier was born on September 24, 1894 in Baltimore, Maryland. He was the son of a former slave, Mary Clark, and James Edward Frazier. His father died when he was 10 years old, and his mother and three siblings worked together to survive this familial and financial loss.

Frazier graduated *cum laude* with an A.B. from Howard University (1916), and in 1920 he completed his master's degree in sociology from Clark University in Worcester, Massachusetts. After training at the New York School of Social Work (1920–1), he accepted a fellowship (1921–2) to study Danish folk high schools. He then taught sociology at Morehouse College in Atlanta, Georgia, and directed the Atlanta University School of Social Work. After Frazier published "The Pathology of Race Prejudice" (1927) in *Forum*, a controversy ensued and he was forced to leave Morehouse.

Frazier next received a fellowship from the University of Chicago where he earned his PhD under Ernest W. Burgess. The publication of his dissertation, *The Negro Family in Chicago* (1932), brought him to the forefront of scholarship on the black family. He taught at Fisk University from 1929 until 1934 under the supervision of Charles S. Johnson. Frazier and Johnson agreed neither politically nor personally and Frazier was relieved to move to Howard University, where he worked from 1934 to 1951. In 1948 he became the first African American elected as the president of the American Sociological Association.

In 1939, he published *The Negro Family in the United States*. It immediately generated fierce debate about the significance of illegitimate births, single parents, female headed households, neglected children, social disorganization, family pathology, and matriarchal and patriarchal issues in black families. The book was forgotten by the general public until Daniel Patrick Moynihan, in his 1965 policy paper *The Negro Family: The Case for National Action*, used it to assert that the black family was at the root of the "tangle of pathology" in African American urban communities. This highly criticized report brought Frazier's work into contemporary debates.

He published another provocative book, *Black Bourgeoisie*, in 1955. Here he criticized the color line within the black community and its leaders' failure to take more political and courageous stances on racial issues. Many African American leaders and Marxists debated its findings. Despite these criticisms, *Black Bourgeoisie* forced many black college students of the 1950s and 1960s to reexamine their upwardly mobile goals and responsibilities to the community. Frazier trained many black students at Howard University who became leaders and civil rights activists, including Stokely Carmichael (who later became Kwame Toure).

Frazier directed the Division of Applied Social Sciences UNESCO (1951–3), where he analyzed interactions between different races and the effect of these interactions on communities.

Frazier died on May 17, 1962 in Washington, DC as the modern Civil Rights Movement was beginning to fundamentally change American life and laws.

SEE ALSO: Chicago School; Color Line; Du Bois, W. E. B.; Park, Robert E. and Burgess, Ernest W.

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Freud, Sigmund (1856–1930)

Steve Dorné

Sigmund Freud's pioneering focus on unconscious motives arising from infant experiences offers a distinctive approach to understanding human motives. His focus on how the super ego internalizes societal demands offered a way of understanding how social norms affect individuals. His approach has had an enduring influence in sociology, shaping important research especially in gender, family, and religion.

Freud was born to a middle class Jewish family in Moravia. Freud, who had two half brothers from his father's previous marriage, was the favored first son of his mother, to whom he was strongly attracted. Freud recalled strong jealousies toward his younger brothers and contempt for his father, who was two decades older than his mother and whom Freud perceived to be intellectually weak and unable to confront anti-Semitism. Freud spent most of his life in Vienna, where his family moved when he was four. After studying medicine, philosophy, and science at university, he worked as a physician studying neurology. In the late nineteenth century he rejected the medical emphasis on chemical imbalances as the cause of hysteria, focusing instead on how mental processes cause physical problems. For the rest of his life, he used his psychoanalytic work with patients to develop a theory of the mind that is his lasting contribution.

Freud emphasized that the motives that impel action are unconscious. Behind every sociological theory rests some understanding of human motives. Symbolic interactionists focus on how meanings drive action; rational choice theorists focus on individuals' conscious weighing of costs and benefits; and ethnomethodologists see action as driven by habit and taken for granted knowledge. Freud insisted, based on his psychoanalytic work with his patients, that unconscious motives drive human action. He discovered the unconscious through his analysis of dreams, mental illness, jokes, and slips of the tongue. His psychoanalytic work suggested that unconscious desires arise from childhood relations with parents. For Freud, the self so represses infantile and childhood desires that they cannot enter the self's consciousness. Yet they nonetheless drive adults' actions.

Freud's account of psychic structure recognizes how cultural norms root themselves in the human psyche. For Freud, the "id" or "it" represents the unconscious drives that demand satisfaction. The psychic structure's "super ego" or "over I" represents the internalization of cultural norms espoused by parents. The super ego is an ego ideal in which part of the psyche (unconsciously) takes on the parents' admonishing role, punishing other parts of the self. For Freud, the "ego" is the "I" which mediates between the demands of id, super ego, and external reality. One of Freud's fundamental contributions to sociology is the recognition that the psyche itself internalizes social demands. The super ego, he says, is the "special agency" in which "parental influence is prolonged." (Freud 1969: 3).

Freud applied his psychoanalytic insights to understanding social phenomena. In considering religion, he argued that "in all believers . . . the motives impelling them to religious practices are unknown or are replaced in consciousness by others which are advanced in their stead" (Freud 1963: 22). For Freud, it is the "infant's helplessness and the longing for the father aroused by it" that is the ultimate source of "religious needs" (p. 19). This focus on unconscious motives that derive from childhood experience is Freud's fundamental contribution to sociology, which continues to have influence in fields as diverse as the sociology of

religion, the sociology of gender, and the sociology of family.

SEE ALSO: Family Theory; Marcuse, Herbert; Mental Disorder; Psychoanalysis; Religion, Sociology of

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friendship during the later years

Rebecca G. Adams

Gerontologists were responsible for much of the early scholarship on adult friendship and continue to focus more attention on it than other researchers do. This is probably due to their historical preoccupation with theoretical questions regarding older adults' social integration, engagement, and psychological well being. Friends are, however, important during later adulthood in many other ways as well, serving as sources of affection and social support and contributing to physical health and even to longevity.

Early studies of older adult friendship tended to focus on the effects of quantity of social contact, but more recent ones focus more on predictors of friendship patterns, including their dyadic and network processes and structural characteristics. Also in contrast to the early research on older adult friendship, more

recent research focuses on its negative aspects as well as on its positive aspects.

Many of the original studies of older adult friendship were either ethnographies or surveys of small samples of older adults. Contemporary researchers now commonly compare the friendships of adults of various ages and sometimes examine friendship patterns longitudinally. Knowledge of why friendship patterns change over time is still limited, however, because researchers often use the variable "age" as a proxy measure for stage of life course and developmental maturity without distinguishing between these two aspects of aging. Furthermore, researchers have not yet conducted large longitudinal studies of the friendship patterns of multiple cohorts.

For many years, gerontologists accepted the folk wisdom that as people age, their number of friends decreases. Recent research, however, suggests that friendship circles increase or decrease depending on the characteristics of the older adults and the contexts in which they live. In some cases, the role changes that people undergo can create further constraints, and in other cases, they can be liberating. For example, men tend to have more friends than women during midlife, but older women tend to have more friends than older men and this gap continues to increase as people age. Researchers have offered various explanations for this reversal in the gender difference in size of friendship network, including men's retirement from the labor force coupled with women's reduction in domestic responsibilities. Also compelling is the argument that because of differences in the types of activities that men and women engage in with friends (i.e., women talk and men participate in physical activities together), women are more likely than men to be able to continue to meet their obligations as friends.

As during other stages of the life course, older adults tend to have friendships with people who are similar to them in terms of sex and age. Older men's friendship networks tend to be less sex homogeneous than women's, a midlife gender difference that persists into old age and is also exacerbated by the differential survival rates of men and women. In other words, there are fewer older men available as friends due to men's shorter life spans. The studies of the age homogeneity of older adult friendships

are not conclusive, but suggest that if there are gender differences, women are more likely than men to continue to have friendship networks high in age homogeneity at older ages, possibly for the same reasons that women have more friends in old age and a higher proportion of same sex friends.

Although research on older adult friendships continues to be more common than research on the friendships of adults at earlier stages of life, even it is becoming less common than in the past. This may be in part because of changes in federal government funding priorities (i.e., less interest in social support) or because many of the original questions that inspired researchers seem to have been adequately answered. Nonetheless, theoretical challenges still remain for gerontologists interested in the friendships of older adults. For example, most of the studies of older adult friendship have been conducted on primarily middle class Caucasian populations residing in North America. Although a great deal is known about gender differences in older adult friendships, virtually nothing is known about class discrepancies or racial and ethnic variations, let alone about how less commonly studied variables such as sexual orientation affect social life in old age. Furthermore, due to the lack of studies conducted outside the US and Canada, little is known about how structural and cultural context affects older adult friendship patterns. Even more broadly, scholars need to consider the implications for older adult friendship patterns of characteristics of this period of history such as the culture of individualism, the privatization of social life, and the development of communications and transportation technologies.

SEE ALSO: Aging, Longitudinal Studies; Aging, Mental Health, and Well Being; Aging and Social Support; Aging, Sociology of; Friendship: Structure and Context; Gerontology: Key Thinkers (Hess, Beth); Leisure, Aging and

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friendship: interpersonal aspects

William K. Rawlins

Friendship refers to a broad category of positively disposed interpersonal relationships characterized by varying degrees of equality, mutual good will, affection and/or assistance. People employ the word *friend* to describe a recent acquaintance, a longtime co worker, a family member, a romantic partner, or an irreplaceable individual they have known for years. Friendship also complements, fuses with, competes with, or substitutes for other personal and social relationships. For example, friendship can complement the professional relationship of two co workers, but compete with the demands of a superior/subordinate relationship. Friendship can fuse so completely with spousal or sibling relationships that it is difficult to identify whether persons are acting as spouses or siblings or as friends. Finally, without close kin, friends may substitute for one's family. The range of uses of the word friendship in North American culture finds

summary definitions altered according to social circumstances. Across situations, however, friendship typically invokes benign connotations and social ideals of shared good will, pleasure, assistance, and moral comportment dating back to Aristotle's treatment of the topic.

Five characteristics defining dyadic friendship – voluntary, personal, equal, mutual, and affective – occur to differing degrees in particular relationships. First, friendship is *voluntary*. While social structural factors place people in the functional proximity necessary for friendships to develop, individual persons choose to treat each other as friends. The manner and degree to which they actually act as friends is both voluntary and negotiated. This voluntary attribute of friendship contrasts with blood ties to kin that persist regardless of personal choice. Similarly, marital bonds are sanctioned legally and religiously. Persons cannot simply drift away from a spouse, as occurs with friends; legal measures like divorce and sometimes religious procedures are necessary to end a marriage. Economic contracts and external obligations regulate work relationships and partnerships instead of the volition of the parties involved. In contrast to relationships continued primarily through their connections to the social structure, persons actively communicate in mutually expected ways to sustain their friendship.

Second, friendship is *personal*. Friends are regarded as particular individuals rather than occupants of roles or members of categories. Suttles (1970) referred to the “person qua person” orientation of friendship. Third, friendship is *equal*. Friendship functions as a leveler despite personal attributes and social statuses that create hierarchical relationships. Friends search for ways to speak and treat each other as equals. Fourth, friendship is *mutual*. Over time it requires fairly symmetrical inputs into the relationship and to each other's welfare. Fifth, friendship is *affective*. The affections of friendship range from a positive concern for the other's well being to a heartfelt liking and even love for friends. While friends may feel profound love for each other, the love of friendship is usually distinguished from sexual or romantic loving, with their overtones of possessiveness and exclusivity. Sexual or romantic

relationships, however, may also include or aspire to the attributes of friendship.

Through the late 1970s only scattered social scientific attention was devoted to friendship. Much work addressed friendship in the context of social attraction studies, emphasizing personality variables or residential propinquity. Friendship also appeared as a residual category of social participation in demographic and sociometric studies, contrasting friendships (often implied by the questionnaire choice, “other”) with family and work relationships. Two developments expanded these conceptions. First, scholars in a variety of disciplines began examining the unique character of friendship. Moreover, various thinkers voiced the need for a more developmental perspective on the emergence, maintenance, and decline of interpersonal relationships. This view assumes that what brings people together may not keep them together. Static conceptions of relationships say little about what makes friendships “work” or why their continued interaction holds mutual significance for them. Other scholars emphasized that the dyadic development of friendships interacted with constraints and opportunities of different periods in the life course. Overall, limited findings or integrated theory existed regarding the interpersonal communication involved in forming, maintaining, and dissolving friendships across life.

Subsequent work identified four interactional tensions that shape and reflect the interpersonal challenges facing friends throughout life. The tension between the freedom to be independent and the freedom to be dependent describes the patterns of availability and obligation characterizing the voluntaristic basis of friendships. Sustaining friendships requires reconciling the autonomy and interdependence of self and other within specific relationships, as well as the demands that friends make upon each other within embracing social configurations. The tension between affection and instrumentality describes the concerns arising between caring for a friend as an end in itself or as a means to an end. All friends rely on each other for a range of emotional and practical assistance. Different meanings of friendship are implied when persons feel befriended primarily for their utilitarian assistance than in relationships where those capabilities are

incidental or stem from a more fundamental mutual regard.

The tension between judgment and acceptance involves the recurring dilemmas in friendship between providing objective appraisals of a friend's activities versus unconditional support. People expect acceptance and encouragement from their friends, but also look to them for tough truths and wise counsel. A compassionately objective reaction combining evaluation and support is often viewed as constructive criticism. While reliance on a friend's opinions is a valued aspect of friendship, friends may tolerate detrimental tendencies or interpret vices as virtues. In doing so, friends may create private cultures that undermine the larger community or the common good. Criticizing or accepting friends constitutes a moral presence in social life.

Finally, the tension between expressiveness and protectiveness addresses the contrasting tendencies to speak candidly with a friend and relate private thoughts and feelings, and the simultaneous need to restrain one's disclosures to preserve privacy and avoid burdening one's friend. Throughout life people consider the ability to confide as a privilege distinguishing their closest friendships. Personal vulnerability arises from revealing sensitive information, and the responsibilities imposed on others not to misuse intimate knowledge of self make confidence and trust problematic achievements. Trust develops to the extent that friends manage the tension between expressiveness and protectiveness. Each person must limit his or her own vulnerability and strive to protect the friend's sensitivities while expressing personally crucial thoughts and feelings.

Although scholars disagree about the precise nature and extent of the differences, there are gender-linked patterns of friendship's benefits and tensions across the life course. Some argue that the emotionally involved and interdependent friendships modally associated with females are more fulfilling than the activity-based and independent ones modally associated with males. Others argue that these patterns describe qualitatively different forms of friendship that may result in equivalent satisfaction for the parties involved. Second, specific friendships involving members of either gender may

deviate considerably from the norms and modal patterns discussed here. Depending on their particular friendship practices and social circumstances, women's friendships may resemble the modal patterns associated with men and vice versa. Third, the contrasts lessen in women's and men's closer friendships as friendships of both genders approach the practices and ideals of the communal friendships modally associated with females. Fourth, these patterns are based on social scientific research primarily addressing white, North American, middle class participants. Until recently, Robert Brain's *Friends and Lovers* (1976) presented one of the few surveys of cross-cultural and ethnic variations of friendship.

Women friends tend to interweave their lives and value interdependence in confronting the tension between the freedoms to be independent and dependent. Men do not like to feel dependent upon their friends, expecting and enacting more independence in their friendships. Relatedly, women experience cross-pressures between affection and instrumentality in their friendships. Women describe themselves as more affectionate and report more emotional involvement with their friends than men do. Juggling multiple household, professional, and recreational activities, women place high demands on each other for instrumental help. The persistent requirements of caring and mutual reliance can be a source of strain in women's friendships. In contrast, men's friendships seem less emotionally charged in these areas. They do not demonstrate affection for each other in the ways and to the degree that women do. But they do offer and receive instrumental assistance with various projects, while striving to maintain their independence through reciprocity. Readiness to help without excessive sentiment is a feature of many men's friendships.

Women's friendships are energized by the potentially volatile interplay between judgment and acceptance. Because women care about and expect so much of their friends, they are more inclined to communicate their evaluations when friends disappoint them. By comparison, men seem less concerned about and more accepting of their friends' behaviors. Finally, women tend to be more expressive with their friends and to

discuss and trust each other with confidences. Seemingly less willing to make themselves vulnerable or burden their friends with personal concerns and doubts, men are more reserved and protective with their friends.

Other consistent findings complement this discussion of life course patterns, gender, and friendship. Females repeatedly rate their same sex friendships higher than their friendships with males. In contrast, males typically value their cross sex friendships more than their same sex friendships. Most married men report that their wife is their best friend. While many married women view their husbands as a good friend, they have a woman friend whom they consider as close or closer. Studies indicate that in later life women have more friends, a greater variety of friends, and closer friends than men. Finally, depending on their wives for close friendship in later life, many men retreat from wider participation or initiatives in making new friends.

People pursue varying degrees of closeness in their friendships. Some individuals prefer a limited number of exclusive relationships, carefully chosen, deeply validating, and precious. Others prefer easy going but superficial connections with many people, readily making and relinquishing such friends. Still other persons pursue a combination of these involvements with others. It is unclear whether a specific style of friendship better facilitates emotional well being. Later adults, for example, differ in their preference for multiple companions versus select, intimate friends. It may be that persons become accustomed to a style of friendship that best suits their emotional needs.

Several contemporary areas of inquiry about friendships are emerging. Returning to Aristotelian conceptions, scholars are examining the ways in which friendship facilitates moral growth and can lead persons astray during childhood and throughout life. What are friendships' contributions to the moral quality of our lives? The capacity of dyadic friendships to open outward and provide a basis for community development and meaningful political participation is being examined. How does communication function in initiating, sustaining, and ultimately leaving friendships? How voluntaristic are friendships versus their emergence

primarily as byproducts of social structure? There are increasing investigations of friendships spanning and enriched by differences of religion, ethnicity, socioeconomic status, race, age, gender, and sexual orientation. Scholars are probing the value and nature of friendship in educational and work settings, and the interplay among friendship, romantic relationships, and marriage. The comparative value of intimate friends versus companions for relieving loneliness and serving life satisfaction is an important concern for gerontologists. Finally, how do narratives of friendship shape our life expectations and experiences of self, relationships, and society?

SEE ALSO: Friendship During the Later Years; Friendship: Structure and Context; Interaction; Interpersonal Relationships

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friendship, social inequality, and social change

Graham Allan

While friendship evokes a good deal of interest in popular culture, there has until quite recently been little interest in it among social scientists. Sociologists in particular have failed to pay much heed to friendship, apparently accepting a conventional view that it represents an individual, and consequently idiosyncratic, relationship rather than one structured by social organization or having much social (as distinct from personal) consequence. Recently, though, this has begun to change, partly as a result of the rise of "the personal" in interpretations of the changes that are occurring in what has been termed late or postmodernity. In particular, changes in the demographic patterning of marriage and partnership, including the rising incidence of cohabitation, gay partnerships, and divorce, have led to sociologists showing increased interest in the ways informal ties of friendship are socially constructed and the part they play within contemporary social formations.

FRIENDSHIP AND INEQUALITY

Until the 1980s, a sociological concern with friendship was most evident in community studies. The focus of these studies on the character of local social relationships meant that often they paid heed to the extent and patterning of informal ties of sociability. While the information they contained was generally very limited, they served to highlight the social differentiations that were evident in the informal solidarities that developed. In particular, studies concerned with status divisions often drew on patterns of informal association to illustrate the boundaries constructed by and around different status groups. There was also evidence in this literature that the ways people organized their informal relationships varied depending on their material and social circumstances. This

was important because it indicated that friendships and other ties of informal sociability were not free floating, individually ordered relationships, despite the popular ideologies surrounding them. Instead, they were relationships which built upon other aspects of people's lifestyles and consequently reflected their social and economic identities.

Middle class friendships were found to be relatively free ranging, with friendships being enacted in different settings. Working class sociability, on the other hand, seemed to be more constrained, with non kin ties often restricted to particular social contexts and understood as consequent on interaction in those settings. Allan (1998) argued that this pattern of sociability was a way of sustaining balance in relationships in circumstances of poverty and economic shortage. Other researchers emphasized other social divisions, with gender differences in friendship in particular becoming a topic of significant debate within sociology (O'Connor 1992). Numerous studies suggested that men's friendships tended to be more instrumental than women's, with women's being more expressive. This was generally related to theories of gender socialization, as well as to the idea that women acted as relationship "experts" in many settings, including the home. The friendship experiences of older people were also a significant topic of sociological interest, partly driven by social concerns over the dangers of isolation in later life. In contrast to aging and gender, the relative absence of sociological studies of ethnicity and friendship is noticeable.

Cultural understandings of friendship are generally premised on the notion that it is a relationship of equality. This has a number of dimensions. First, the organization of friendship is one in which hierarchy, in terms of authority or power, is typically understood to play no part. Within the relationship itself, friends normally perceive each other as being of equal standing, even if there is difference recognized in personality and temperament. Second, friendship is normally understood to be equal in terms of the typical exchanges that take place. It is, in other words, a reciprocal relationship. While there may be short term imbalances, in the mid term efforts are generally made to ensure that neither friend can be

seen to be “taking advantage” of the other. Indeed, if there is an inappropriate lack of reciprocity, the friendship is liable to end, either through conflict or more gradual withdrawal. Third, friendship is generally equal in terms of the social and economic characteristics of those who are friends. While not inevitable, there is a marked tendency for friendships to be characterized by “status homophily.” In other words, those who are friends are usually of a similar age, have equivalent occupations, are in the same life course position, and share other similar structural characteristics with one another.

At one level the reasons for this are obvious. Not only are those who meet in sociable arenas likely to be broadly similar to one another, but also friendship is, by definition, a tie between people who share interests and feel a degree of liking and compatibility for each other. These factors alone are likely to result in friends occupying similar social locations to one another. However, the reciprocity characteristic of friendship is equally important in these processes. In particular, reciprocity is far easier to manage when the resources and commitments of the friends are broadly similar. For example, if one of the friends has more money or more time available for leisure activities than the other, keeping the friendship balanced is likely to become that much more difficult.

Friends are also important in consolidating our identities. They do this through shared activities and conversations and by acting as a resource for helping with whatever mundane or exceptional contingencies we face. Typically, we see such talk and activity with friends as expressions of our individuality; these interactions are based on our personal rather than our social characteristics. Yet much of our talk and many of the contingencies we face emanate from the social positions we hold (i.e., our structural location). In other words, friendship interactions confirm our individuality, yet that confirmation is generally built upon, rather than distanced from, the role positions we occupy (Jerome 1984). Consequently, through their content, friendships build on and confirm the significance of those very identities from which they appear to be independent. These processes of identity confirmation involved in friendship are themselves reciprocal. In other words, the friends each tend to confirm the

identity of the other through their interactions. Thus, the more similar the friends in terms of their social location, the more likely they are to share common experiences and the more readily they can appreciate the issues, dilemmas, and contingencies the other faces. Conversely, the further apart they are structurally, the more problematic such shared, taken for granted understandings become.

CHANGES IN FRIENDSHIP

If existing friends do come to occupy different social locations, this often results in their friendship waning. Despite ideologies of friendship that suggest that “real” or “true” friends are lifelong, the reality of most friendships is that they do change over time. At particular periods in life, some friendships will be more active, but, as circumstances change, they are liable to become less central. Other friendships will become more active, and in this sense take their place. In general, this is an unremarkable feature of the routine organization of friendship. However, it becomes more noticeable at times of significant change in people’s lives, in line with the arguments above about friendship “homophily.” When, for example, people divorce, there is often a shift in their friendship networks (Terhell et al. 2004). Typically, they begin to interact less with some of their previous friends, especially those who continue to be partnered, and instead gradually spend more with others who are also separated. A major reason for this is the difficulty of sustaining reciprocity within these previous friendships, given the material and social differences that now exist. Moreover, having faced the consequences of divorce themselves, the newer friends are better able to understand and facilitate the adjustments required to being newly “single.” In the process these friendships help to consolidate the new identity of “divorced” in the ways discussed above.

While individual friendships change, so too the ways in which friendships are patterned varies over time. In his important article, Silver (1990) argues that the possibility of friendship as it is now understood arose as a consequence of the development of commercial society in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. Unlike

previous societies, this generated a legislative and normative culture in which trust could develop outside of kin ties. Other researchers have shown how the social and economic circumstances which characterize a society – or a particular segment of that society – shape the forms of friendship which develop. Oliker (1998) provides a good example of this in her discussion of nineteenth century women's friendship patterns in the US. Recent socioeconomic changes have also had an impact on the general organization of friendship networks. In particular, the declining significance of locality in people's lives, new patterns of mobility, the growth of individualization, and shifts in the permanency of relational commitment have all fostered a greater diversity in personal networks.

This is an issue discussed at length by Pescosolido and Rubin (2000). They argue that in late modernity a "spoke" model of personal networks is tending to replace the more densely configured networks that were common previously. In other words, rather than networks in which many of those involved also know one another, now it is somewhat more common for networks to comprise relatively discrete, non overlapping clusters of others. This is very much in line with other theorizing about late modernity, in particular Giddens's (1991) arguments about the greater freedom people have to generate different lifestyles. This pattern of network configuration is likely to facilitate the types of process discussed above through which people establish new identities as their circumstances alter. In particular, it makes it easier for them to shift the extent to which different friendships are prioritized. Equally though, it makes it possible for individuals to emphasize different elements of the self in different contexts (Allan 2001). A classic illustration of this arises when gay/lesbian identities are revealed to some people in the personal networks, but not to others (Weeks et al. 2001).

Friendship has not been a topic that has been researched widely by sociologists, though, influenced by ideas of social capital, there is an increasing recognition of its importance in influencing people's well being. There is also a growing recognition that friendship as a form of relationship is becoming more central within social organization, partly as a consequence of contemporary changes in family solidarities and

household composition. This has led to an interest in the patterning of personal networks and the different contributions friends and kin make in people's lives. However, despite this increased interest, our knowledge of friendship remains quite limited. Specifically, there is a need for more studies of friendship involvement for those in midlife, including the ways couples manage joint and individual friendships. There are studies of friendship in childhood, youth, and old age, but fewer of intermediary periods. We also need to have more longitudinal studies. As noted above, we know that friendships change over time in both content and personnel, but there is a need for far more detailed information about the ways in which this happens. Finally, there is also a need for rather more detail of the ways in which friendships are drawn upon and used. This calls for a diversification of research methods. It would be particularly useful to have more qualitative and ethnographic studies of friendship that allowed researchers to understand better the dynamics of friendship.

SEE ALSO: Cross Sex Friendship; Friendship: Structure and Context; Friendships of Gay, Lesbian, and Bisexual People; Gender, Friendship and; Gerontology: Key Thinkers (Hess, Beth); Race/Ethnicity and Friendship

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friendship: structure and context

Rebecca G. Adams

Although since the days of Aristotle, Cicero, and Plato philosophers have been pondering the qualities of ideal friendship, proposing typologies of categories and functions of friendship, and analyzing the role of friendship in maintaining a stable society, very few sociologists conducted empirical research focused specifically on friendship before the late 1960s (for an exception, see Williams 1959). The friendship literature has thus developed during a scholarly period in which interdisciplinary collaboration has been more common than in the past. Nonetheless, cooperation on friendship research across disciplines has been rare, and while psychologists and communications scholars have mainly studied dyadic processes, sociologists and anthropologists have focused their research on network structure. Much of the early work in both of these traditions focused on individual variations in friendship patterns, but psychologists were concerned with how psychological disposition shaped what happened in friendship dyads, while sociologists were concerned with how social structural location affected friendship network structure. More recently there has been a general concern in the friendship literature about how context shapes relationships (Blieszner &

Adams 1992; Adams & Allan 1998). Sociologists, then, have contributed to the friendship literature by examining how friendships vary according to individuals' locations in the social structure, studying the structural characteristics of friendship networks, and theorizing about how friendships are affected by the contexts in which they are embedded.

EFFECTS OF SOCIAL STRUCTURAL LOCATION ON FRIENDSHIP

Gender is the most frequently studied antecedent of friendship patterns, though researchers do not often specify whether the effects they identify are the result of disposition or social structural location. The most robust finding reported in the literature on gender and friendship is that adult men's friendships tend to be activity based whereas women's friendships are more likely to involve self disclosure, reciprocity, social support, affect, and strong emotions (Adams & Ueno 2006). Given these findings, it is not surprising that compared to women, men tend to put more emphasis on having friends who are similar to themselves, and are therefore more likely to engage in the same activities with their friends and to view friendship as less important as a result of less intense involvement. Researchers have conducted very few studies comparing men's and women's friendships across the life course, so it is not clear how these gender differences change as adults age. It does appear, however, that as men age, they have less contact with their friends than women do, a finding that indicates a reversal of a midlife gender difference. During midlife men have more friends than women, but evidence suggesting that this difference also reverses in later life is not conclusive. Unlike women's friendship networks, the gender diversity of men's friendship networks increases with age and the age homogeneity of them decreases. In combination with men's emphasis on similarity and shared activities, these age shifts may explain why some researchers have reported that friendship becomes less meaningful to men as they age or at least as their health declines and constrains their types of involvement.

In contrast to the large literature on gender and friendship, very few studies focus on the

effects on friendship of race or ethnicity, socioeconomic status, or stage of life course (Ueno & Adams 2006). In surveys of general populations, samples include very small numbers of racial and ethnic minorities, and race or ethnicity is included as a control variable in analyses, if at all. Some studies focus on friendships within specific racial or ethnic groups or treat racial and ethnic homogeneity in friendships as an indicator of segregation. Oddly enough, given how well developed the literature is on class differences in neighboring, the literature on socioeconomic differences in friendship patterns remains undeveloped. Some studies suggest that friendship is more important to the middle class than to the working class and others show that people in different classes value different aspects of friendship (Allan 1989; Walker 1995), but there are many potential class differences in friendship patterns that remain entirely unstudied. Although studies of adult friendships within various age groups continue to be common, studies comparing friendships across stages of the life course remain rare. Even studies that do compare friendships across stages of the life course are usually cross sectional, and thus it is not possible to distinguish life course stage, period, and cohort effects. Furthermore, these studies tend to focus on changes in friendship patterns as people move through the dating, marriage, and parenting phases of the family life course (e.g., Kalmijn 2003), rather than on other life course changes such as in the occupational realm.

STRUCTURAL CHARACTERISTICS OF FRIENDSHIP NETWORKS

Sociologists have studied the structure of friendship networks much less exhaustively than psychologists have studied their internal processes, perhaps because interviewing respondents about their networks is time consuming and therefore expensive or because the network literature tends to focus on social networks in general, without distinguishing family, neighbors, co workers, and friends from each other and from other types of associates. Researchers have conducted fewer studies of friendship network structure during the past decade than during the previous one, though studies of

dyadic friendship processes have become more common during the same time period.

Early friendship researchers often asked respondents how many friends they had (i.e., the size of their friendship network) as one variable to be scaled with other measures of social integration or engagement, but now the focus is often more on the quality of relationships than on their quantity. Many of the studies in which friendship network size is reported are of subgroups of a general population. Even in studies of general populations that include measures of friendship network size, the researchers often fail to report an average or frequencies of responses in each category. It is therefore difficult to answer questions about whether the size of friendship networks varies across subgroups or has changed over time.

Studies of friendship network density (i.e., the percentage of all possible links among friends in a network that do in fact exist) are very rare and their foci vary according to what age group is studied. Research on college student friendship network density focuses on its relationship with conformity and commitment to the larger group. For example, researchers have found that networks of college students who participate in deviant activity are relatively denser than those of students who do not, and that college students in dense networks within larger groups are not as committed to the larger groups as the members of embedded networks which are lower in density. Perhaps the two best known studies of adult network density are Laumann's (1973) analysis of Detroit Area Study data and Fischer's (1982) report on the Northern California Study. Laumann, who only examined density among his respondents' three closest friends, found that 27 percent of them had networks that were completely interlocking (100 percent dense), 42 percent had partially interlocking networks, and the rest had radial networks (0 percent dense). Fischer reported that the average density of the network of associates was 44 percent and that the more kin and the fewer non kin in the network, the denser it was. This suggests that friendship network density, if he had reported it, would have been lower. Research on older adult friendship network density illustrates how age homogeneity of context and physical health can influence friendship network density; studies

demonstrate that nursing home residents have the highest friendship network density, residents of age segregated apartment buildings have the next highest, and residents still living in age integrated communities have the lowest.

Perhaps because philosophers have often defined friendship as a relationship between equals, researchers have almost completely ignored the hierarchical aspects of friend relations. Some recent studies, however, have shown that although the majority of friendships are perceived to be equal, not all of them are. For example, Neff and Harter (2003) reported that only 78 percent of college students' friendships were perceived to be equal. Similarly, Adams and Torr (1998) reported that the older adults they studied described only two thirds of their friendships as equal in terms of power and of status. In other studies, researchers have shown that perceived equality between friends is correlated with greater relational satisfaction, emotional closeness, liking, and self disclosure.

One of the most robust findings regarding friendship network structure is that they tend to be homogeneous (i.e., friends tend to occupy similar social structural positions). Depending on the age group studied, researchers have examined different aspects of homogeneity. They have shown for example that college students tend to have networks homogeneous in term of nationality and race, adults in terms of occupational status, ethnicity, age, marital status, social class, education, gender, and religion, and older adults in terms of gender, race, and marital status (for recent examples, see Walker 1995; Kalmijin 2003). Although sociologists generally posit a structural explanation for these findings (i.e., people have more opportunities to meet those who are similar to themselves than people who are different from them), preferences resulting from socialization may also contribute to the homogeneity of networks.

In most studies that include measures of friendship structure, the structural characteristics of friendship networks are used to predict outcome variables such as psychological well being, occupational success, or educational achievement. Some studies, however, include examinations of the interplay between the internal structure of friendship networks and dyads and the processes that are exchanged

among participants. For example, the commonly reported interaction among gender, gender homogeneity of friendships, and self disclosure illustrates the effect of the internal structure of friendship on its interactive processes. Gender homogeneity in women's friendships facilitates self disclosure and emotional closeness, whereas gender homogeneity in men's friendships constrains self disclosure. Similarly, it is well documented that equality, as a structural characteristic of friendship dyads, facilitates relational satisfaction across age groups (e.g., Neff & Harter 2003). Because equality is also associated with self disclosure, it is possible to argue that equality facilitates open communication. At the same time, however, friends in egalitarian relationships are likely to *expect* each other to share personal information. In this sense, equality may constrain the way friends communicate with each other (i.e., not being able to keep many secrets).

There are a smaller number of studies about how interactive processes in turn sustain and modify friendship structure. Many researchers seem to take for granted that ongoing friendships are sustained through regular contact, but this assumption is rarely demonstrated in empirical studies. Frequency of contact also has an impact on friendship structure beyond the dyadic level. Frequent contact with friends increases the chance that those friends know *each other*. This finding suggests that frequent contact increases the density of friendship networks over time. Similarly, studies of what interactive processes people use to sustain friendships or which ones predict friendship dissolution also illustrate ways in which friendship process affects friendship structure.

CONTEXTUAL EFFECTS ON FRIENDSHIP

During the last two decades or so, the amount of research placing friendship in context has increased. Researchers have studied friendships in a variety of specific contexts, ranging from immediate social environments to societies, and including historical and international settings. For example, Campbell's (1990) study of a 1939 neighborhood in Bloomington, Indiana, casts doubt on the presumption that past

neighborhood friendship networks were significantly more sociable than contemporary ones. Similarly, Adams and Plaut's (2003) study of friendship in Ghana suggested that friendship is not a universal form, but takes different forms in different cultural worlds. These case studies are important because they challenge assumptions and raise questions about whether findings can be generalized.

In spite of an increase in the number of studies of friendships in non North American contexts and of various subgroups within the US and other western countries, sociologists have not conducted many studies comparing friendships across cultures or across subcultures within a larger context. In lieu of such broad studies, researchers could compare findings across more narrowly focused studies and develop hypotheses about how context might affect friendship. This approach would be problematic, however, because survey researchers often neglect to include detailed discussions of contextual characteristics, and ethnographers and historians do not generally include information on individual participants in the settings they study. It is therefore important that future studies are designed to allow for comparisons of friendships across contexts (e.g., comparative international studies, historical trend analyses).

The lack of systematic evidence about how the broader social context affects friendships has not discouraged sociologists from theorizing about it. In the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, for example, German scholars such as Weber and Tönnies argued that the importance of friendship had declined with industrialization and urbanization. Social environments were increasingly diverse; therefore, because friendships are likely to form between people who are similar to each other, they were less conducive to friendship formation. Furthermore, because the newly developing bureaucracies hired people based on their qualifications for jobs rather than on their interpersonal connections, people relocated from their communities of origin to pursue careers, and impersonal economic incentives destroyed the love and trust that had previously existed among co workers.

In a series of articles in the 1960s, Litwak (1985) rejected the notion that close relationships and bureaucratic organizations are

incompatible and argued instead that they perform different, but complementary tasks. He pointed out that families, friends, and neighbors are better than bureaucratic employees at accomplishing simple and unpredictable tasks. Because of their personal commitment to each other, they require less supervision; because of their familiarity, they communicate more effectively. Furthermore, he argued that families are best at handling tasks that require long term commitment, neighbors are most useful when accomplishing tasks requiring immediate or face to face interaction, and friends are well suited to handle tasks where similar experiences and values are important, such as helping someone cope with bereavement or make critical decisions. Therefore, he concluded, friendship has not decreased in importance; its function has merely changed.

More recently, scholars have argued that in the process of industrialization and modernization, the more communal social life of the past has been replaced with a concern for the private world of home and family. Whereas in the past, social lives centered on relationships with co workers and neighbors, now improvements in transportation and communications technologies have reduced the importance of local ties. Some scholars have argued that this has led to increased isolation, but others have argued that people are now free to develop a wider variety of friendships (Wellman 2001).

Although sociologists have tended to study how context shapes friendships, a few have discussed how friendship affects society as well. For example, Oliner (1989) described how friendship upholds the institution of marriage. Similarly, O'Connor (1992) argued that friendship reinforces the class structure. In other words, friends teach people what is expected of them and because friends are similar to each other, the result of this process tends to be the preservation of the status quo, not changes to it. Although these authors, like the classic Greek philosophers, argue that friendship contributes to the stability of society, future research will surely also document ways in which friendship contributes to social change.

SEE ALSO: Cross Sex Friendship; Friendship During the Later Years; Friendship: Interpersonal Aspects; Friendship, Social Inequality,

and Social Change; Friendships of Adolescence; Friendships of Children; Friendships of Gay, Lesbian, and Bisexual People; Gender, Friendship and; Gerontology: Key Thinkers (Hess, Beth); Race/Ethnicity and Friendship

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friendships of adolescence

Robert Crosnoe

Friendships – intimate, ongoing relationships involving shared disclosure, sustained interaction, and strong feelings of connection – play a significant role in the human life course. The significance of these interpersonal relationships is heightened during adolescence, a period of life in which young people are particularly socially oriented and in which their self concepts are especially sensitive to the judgments of others. Consequently, friendships are a major component of adolescent life, in both positive and negative ways.

Within sociology, theory and research on adolescent friendships has traditionally had a distinctly negative tone. For the most part, it has focused on the role of friends and peers (similar others who may or may not be friends) in problem behavior and school disorder during adolescence. This tradition stands in stark contrast to the other discipline that has historically paid attention to adolescent friendships, developmental psychology, which has focused most often on the salient role of such friendships in normative social, emotional, and cognitive development during the early life course.

In fact, sociologists have virtually introduced the concept of “peer pressure,” named and known in various ways, to popular culture. This concept has certainly long been central to key theoretical traditions (e.g., Sutherland’s differential association theory) in criminological research on young people. In general, this criminological research has documented that association with deviant friendship groups is the strongest correlate of juvenile delinquency and substance use, through both selection and

socialization mechanisms, and a major explanation for social structural and demographic differences (e.g., race, gender) in both behaviors. Likewise, this power of friends to lead adolescents off conventional developmental and social pathways has also played a prominent role in educational research on secondary school contexts and achievement processes. Two of the more prominent examples in this vein are Coleman's famous study of anti adult peer crowds in American high schools and Ogbu's controversial oppositional culture thesis, which targeted negative anti school messages in minority friendship groups as the foundation of race/ethnic gaps in academic achievement during adolescence. These criminological and educational literatures, disparate but related, have both articulated in convincing fashion the crucial role of adolescent friendships in many of the major social problems that have long fascinated sociologists.

Over the last three decades or so, however, the ways in which sociologists have examined adolescent friendships have slowly evolved into a more multidimensional enterprise. While the peer pressure angle is certainly still an important part of sociology, it is now coupled with other perspectives on adolescent friendships. One perspective concerns the positive developmental significance of adolescent friendships, including how they assist in the meeting and mastering of developmental tasks, influence prosocial behavior, reinforce and strengthen the influences of parents, schools, and other adult groups, and serve as resources that can buffer against hardships in other areas of life. Such research has shown that the power adolescent friends have in each other's lives can be a positive force just as often, even more often, than it is a problematic one.

A good deal of empirical and theoretical attention is now also being paid to the contexts of adolescent friendships, including the important questions of how friendships and friendship groups form and what goes on within them. For example, a wealth of qualitative work by ethnographers like the Adlers and others has generated great insight into peer cultures in childhood and adolescence. Such sociocultural research has illuminated the ways in which young people come together to construct micro contexts of culture, often by reworking

inputs from adult society, and the mechanisms by which such micro contexts shape individual behavior in positive and negative ways. As another example, a good deal of educational research has revealed that one of the most significant influences that schools have on the developmental and behavioral outcomes of their students is their power to organize and shape the friendship associations to which young people are exposed. This phenomenon is clearly delineated in research by Hallinan and colleagues on the effects of tracking and curriculum on friendship formation as well as in investigations of the link between school racial composition and interracial friendships (see Joyner & Kao 2000; Moody 2001). Finally, the study of social networks has long been a major part of sociology and, in recent years, it has been leveraged to vastly improve our understanding of adolescent friendships with in depth investigations of the characteristics of adolescent peer networks, the connection between these network characteristics and larger social contexts (e.g., the school, community), and the developmental significance of location and position in different types of peer networks (see Frank 1998; Haynie 2001).

In these and other forms, the study of adolescent friendships is likely to be a "growth industry" in sociology; as the size of the adolescent population continues to grow, prominent developmental theories (e.g., human ecology) emphasize the connections of friendship groups with other contexts of youth development, nationally representative samples of adolescents (e.g., National Longitudinal Study of Adolescent Health) provide data to the public for investigation of adolescent issues, and adult research increasingly recognizes the importance of adolescent experiences as foundations for the adult life course. These trends will likely spur quantitative and qualitative research that locates adolescent friendships in life course processes – as contexts of adolescent development and experience that link adolescence with other stages of life.

SEE ALSO: Friendship: Interpersonal Aspects; Friendships of Children; Friendship: Structure and Context; Gender, Friendship and; Juvenile Delinquency; Networks; Race/Ethnicity and Friendship; School Climate; Youth/Adolescence

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friendships of children

Maureen T. Hallinan

A sociological perspective complements the conceptualization of children's friendships provided by other social science disciplines. Psychologists examine individual level traits that affect a child's friendliness and popularity. Researchers in human development consider the role children's friendships play in the transition from early childhood to adolescence. Anthropologists identify cultural factors that influence and give meaning to children's friendships. In contrast, sociologists examine how social organization and social structure affect children's friendships.

The literature on friendship identifies five bases of interpersonal attraction: proximity, similarity, complementarity, social status, and reciprocity. Characteristics of a child's environment affect the way these factors influence friendship formation and stability. Since children spend much of their time in a school setting, most of the sociological research on children's friendships examines how school characteristics affect children's interpersonal relations.

A major influence on students' friendship choices is the organization of students for instruction. Membership in the same grade and assignment to the same class or ability group create opportunities for students to interact. Proximity enables students to recognize similarities and differences while shared activities create new similarities and complementarities. In addition, working together fosters reciprocity. The level of the ability group to which a student is assigned confers academic status on the student, with higher status associated with higher group levels (Hallinan 1979). These factors promote friendship development within ability groups. Several studies show that students assigned to the same ability group are more likely to become friends than those assigned to different groups (Hallinan & Sorensen 1985).

Membership in co-curricular and extracurricular activities similarly influences student friendship choices. Participation in the same group allows students to interact, share interests, and work toward a common goal. These shared experiences foster friendship. Ethnographic studies show that there are more friendships within these groups than among students not belonging to the same groups. The studies also show that many of these friendships dissolve when students no longer participate in the same clubs and activities (Hallinan & Williams 1987; Adler et al. 1992).

Membership in the same group has a positive effect on interracial as well as same race friendships (Hallinan & Teixeira 1987). However, status differences complicate interpersonal attraction between students of different racial backgrounds. Research shows that when black and white students belong to the same ability group, white students are more likely than black students to make a cross race friendship

choice. While students in the same ability group have similar academic status, social status differences may act as a barrier to interracial friendship. Participation in non academic groups is more likely to foster interracial friendships since both black and white students tend to excel in these activities. Success enhances social status, making them attractive as friends.

Male–female friendships are rare among children (Adler et al. 1992). Researchers view friendships between boys and girls as a stage in a developmental process that progresses from indifference to hostility to interest and, finally, to friendship or romantic attraction. The same organizational factors that promote same sex and interracial friendships also influence cross gender friendships.

In addition to organizational factors, properties of networks influence the formation and duration of children's friendships. Sociologists have identified asymmetry and intransitivity as major determinants of friendship choice. Studies show that in a dyad, asymmetric friendship choices (A chooses B but B does not choose A) are unstable and tend either to be withdrawn over time or to be reciprocated. Dyads are embedded in triads. Intransitive triads (A chooses B, B chooses C, but A does not choose C) are unstable and members are likely to add or delete a friendship tie to restore balance. Thus asymmetry and intransitivity are sources of change in friendship networks (Hallinan & McFarland 1975). A change in a single relationship has implications for relationships in the larger group. When imbalance in a dyad or triad is removed by the deletion of a friendship tie, the larger social network becomes less cohesive. Adding a friendship choice to remove imbalance increases group cohesion. Since the evolution of a group toward greater cohesion requires a period of asymmetry and intransitivity, these structural forces are critical to the development of cohesive networks.

As children grow older, they form friendship cliques. Depending on the size of the student population, a school or a grade may have one or more cliques, and a student may belong to more than one clique. A map of the social structure of a high school typically shows well defined cliques, dyadic and triadic friendships, and social isolates. The network also may contain students who act as links or bridges

between cliques or between a clique and smaller social units. More linking relationships in a social network increases the cohesion of the network. Bridging relationships also facilitate the communication of information and the development and enforcement of social norms.

A clique forms a normative and comparative reference group for a student. Peers pressure clique members to conform to the group's norms and standards and exert autocratic control over their behavior and reputation. Peer pressure plays a significant role in shaping a student's values. Coleman (1961) referred to the set of norms and values that characterize a student friendship group as a subculture. An adolescent subculture can influence a student's academic achievement, educational aspirations, extra curricular activities, leisure time activities, attitudes toward authority, and career decisions. Lack of congruence between the norms and standards defined by school personnel and those that characterize a student subculture can serve as an obstacle to student academic achievement. Efforts by adults to penetrate the friendship cliques of older youth or to utilize them for academic purposes have had little success.

Recently, sociologists began relying on life course theory to provide a more comprehensive understanding of children's friendships (Crosnoe 2000). Life course theorists view an individual's life as a series of age related roles that a person enacts within a particular context and at a particular point in history. Children's friendships are embedded in a wider time frame than childhood. They are consequences of social, cultural, and historical factors and determinants of future relationships. By linking childhood friendships to adolescent and adult relationships, and by taking contextual and historical factors that influence friendships into account, this perspective highlights childhood friendships as the building blocks of an individual's maturation and adult social behavior.

SEE ALSO: Childhood; Cross Sex Friendship; Friendship During the Later Years; Friendship, Social Inequality, and Social Change; Friendship: Structure and Context; Friendships of Adolescence; Friendships of Gay, Lesbian, and Bisexual People; Gender, Friendship and; Race/Ethnicity and Friendship

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friendships of gay, lesbian, and bisexual people

Koji Ueno

Many gay, lesbian, and bisexual individuals first become aware of their orientations in adolescence and are forced to decide who should be told and who should not. Many people make their first disclosures to friends, instead of to parents or other family members (Herdt & Boxer 1993). In this sense, friendships play a critical role in the development of their sexual identities. Friends' reactions are mixed; some friendships dissolve while others increase in emotional intimacy (Herdt & Boxer 1993).

Therefore, coming out may create drastic changes in the composition of friendship networks as well as in the quality of friendship dyads.

In general, friendships tend to develop among people who share sociodemographic backgrounds (race, gender, and socioeconomic status), and this tendency already exists in adolescence. Previous studies, however, have produced mixed findings regarding whether adolescent friendships are homogeneous in terms of sexual orientation. Some studies have indicated that gay, lesbian, and bisexual adolescents are well connected with each other, but these studies tended to be based on adolescents who belong to community organizations that specifically serve the needs of these adolescents (e.g., Savin Williams 1990; Herdt & Boxer 1993). In contrast, in the analysis of school based data across the United States, Ueno (2005) found that a majority of gay, lesbian, and bisexual adolescents do not have school friends who share their sexual orientation and that they are no more likely than straight students to have such friends. Many gay, lesbian, and bisexual adolescents remain closeted to avoid violence and other forms of discrimination. Consequently, they are invisible to each other at school (Smith & Smith 1998). These factors may explain the sparse friendship networks among these adolescents at school.

Friendships among gay, lesbian, and bisexual people seem to be fairly common in adulthood (Ryan & Bradford 1993; Nardi & Sherrod 1994). These dense friendship networks may reflect these men's and women's desire to share unique interests and exchange support with each other, as well as their opportunities to meet each other at community organizations, bars, and social events. These existing friendship networks may also provide opportunities to meet other members of the gay, lesbian, and bisexual community.

Certain gay, lesbian, and bisexual adults are not well connected to these friendship networks, however. For example, Kirkey and Forsyth (2001) documented that gay men's friendship networks are sparse in suburban areas, where gay residents engage in social activities at home and are more integrated into the larger community than they are into the gay community. Also, gay men in prestigious

occupations tend to have fewer gay friends (Weinberg & Williams 1974). The gay, lesbian, and bisexual community is sometimes portrayed as one cohesive group, but there are some subgroups within the community in which members share specific attributes and interests (e.g., leather, ethnic groups) (Peacock et al. 2001). Structural patterns of friendships most likely reflect the presence of these subgroups and indicate clusters within the community.

Behavioral processes (e.g., shared activities and conversations), affective processes (e.g., relational satisfaction), and cognitive processes (e.g., knowledge about friends) are popular topics in the general friendship literature. Although a limited number of studies focus on these processes in friendships among gay, lesbian, and bisexual people, there is some indication that their friendships are characterized by frequent contact and social support exchange as well as high degrees of emotional intimacy (Ryan & Bradford 1993; Nardi & Sherrod 1994).

Sexual activity is an important topic in the literature on straight people's cross sex friendships. It is also a central issue for gay, lesbian, and bisexual people, whose potential pools of friends and romantic partners overlap considerably. Nardi and Sherrod (1994) documented that sexual activity is relevant to both gays and lesbians but in different ways. Gay men tend to engage in sex in the developing phase of friendships, but many discontinue sexual activities in order to create a boundary between friendships and romantic relations. On the other hand, sex with friends is not as common among lesbians, but they tend to maintain close friendships with their previous lovers.

Systematic investigations are necessary to identify unique characteristics of friendships among gay, lesbian, and bisexual people and directly compare their friendships to those of straight people. Previous studies have mostly focused on educated white gay men who are active in the gay community, but future research should include the remaining parts of this population. In addition, previous studies have focused on gay, lesbian, and bisexual people's friendships with each other, but friendships between them and straight people deserve more attention, as they are likely to be distinct from friendships within each group (Fee 2000).

SEE ALSO: Friendship: Structure and Context; Friendships of Adolescence; Gender, Friendship and; Homosexuality; Lesbianism

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Fromm, Erich (1900–80)

Neil McLaughlin

Although best known as a Freudian revisionist, global public intellectual, and social critic, German born scholar Erich Fromm made important and lasting contributions to twentieth century sociology. Fromm was trained in

sociology at Heidelberg University, receiving his PhD in 1922 under the direction of Alfred Weber, Max Weber's younger brother (Burston 1991). Fromm then joined the psychoanalytic profession, training and entering into therapeutic practice in Berlin and then Frankfurt. He became a core member of the early Frankfurt School network of "critical theorists" in the late 1920s and early 1930s, an influential network of neo Marxist social theorists formed under Max Horkheimer's direction. Moving to the United States in the wake of Nazism, Fromm worked with the critical theorists, as well as the sociological methodologist Paul Lazarsfeld, at Columbia University. The Frankfurt School scholars Max Horkheimer, Theodor Adorno, Herbert Marcuse, and Leo Lowenthal, in particular, created a range of influential ideas in their time in America; they found refuge from political events in Germany with the help of a large amount of money given them by a rich German benefactor and the sponsorship of Columbia University.

After his contentious break with Horkheimer and Adorno in the late 1930s over disagreements concerning issues of psychoanalytic theory, money, intellectual style, and radical politics, Fromm went on to write a number of influential sociological works from the early 1940s until his death in 1980. Although he is not often identified as a sociologist, three major contributions Fromm made to the discipline will be discussed: his analysis of Nazism, his role as an empirical critical theorist, and his contributions as a public sociologist.

THE SOCIOLOGY OF NAZISM

If Fromm had never written another word in his life, the publication of his classic *Escape from Freedom* (1941) would still have assured him a place in the history of sociology. Written before the United States had joined the war against Hitler, *Escape from Freedom* drew on Weberian and Marxist sociological theories in order to develop an explanation of the Nazi movement. Fromm's revision of psychoanalytic theory stressed existentialist insights into the passionate and often destructive search for meaning that motivates human beings. He rejected both a Marxist determinism that suggested Nazism

was a creation of authoritarian German capitalists and a psychological reductionism that put the emphasis on Hitler's psychology and the pathology of a seemingly "mad" political movement.

Fromm's sociological explanation of Nazism was provocative (McLaughlin 1996). The modern world had created both new freedoms and increased anxieties, and the stage had been set for Nazism by both the breakdown of the security provided by feudalism and the political crisis of the 1930s. In Germany, defeat in war and economic depression had destroyed the legitimacy of democratic institutions. Hitler's "evangelism of self annihilation had shown millions of Germans the way out of cultural and economic collapse" (Fromm 1969 [1941]: 259). The Nazi Party's racism, nationalism, militarism, and "spirit of blind obedience to a leader" were an "escape from freedom" (p. 235). The American sociological theorist Robert K. Merton introduced young scholars to *Escape from Freedom* in graduate seminars at Columbia University and the best selling book had wide spread influence throughout the social sciences.

Fromm's book was not without its flaws and limitations. The argument in *Escape from Freedom*, it is clear now, relied far too much on the questionable assumption that the Nazi movement was a lower middle class phenomenon. More generally, subsequent historical comparative research on genocide and far right wing movements has consigned *Escape from Freedom* to its status today as an inspirational if flawed early example of the sociological imagination.

The book, however, helped put the issue of totalitarianism on the scholarly agenda. *Escape from Freedom* had its origins in Fromm's research on the working class in Weimar Germany with the Frankfurt School network, work that was also instrumental in the creation of the theoretical foundation for Adorno et al.'s *The Authoritarian Personality* (1950) (Brunner 1994). This book, written by Fromm's former critical theory colleagues with the help of Berkeley social psychologists, was one of the most influential works of social psychology in the twentieth century. Developed out of an interest in explaining the psychological roots of anti democratic political behavior and anti-Semitism, the authoritarian personality tradition helped social scientists combine theories of the

psychological mechanism that explains the origins of scapegoats in political life with an empirical measure of authoritarianism called the “F” scale. Individuals whose answers to questionnaires score high on the scale developed in *The Authoritarian Personality* tend to express attitudes of reverence and blind obedience to those above them in the social hierarchy, while viewing those below them with contempt and irrational hatred. Fromm’s role in developing the famous if controversial “F” scale was not well known until the publication of the manuscript *The Working Class in Weimar Germany* (1984), a piece of empirical research from the 1920s and 1930s that Fromm had worked on with Paul Lazarsfeld as his assistant (Bonss 1984).

FROMM AS AN EMPIRICAL CRITICAL THEORIST

Although Fromm’s role as an early member of the Horkheimer critical theorists has often been forgotten in the “origin myths” created by the school’s contemporary proponents, Fromm was the most empirical and sociological of all the major “critical theorists” including Marcuse, Adorno, and even Habermas (Jay 1973; Wiggershaus 1986; McLaughlin 1999). Fromm’s *The Sane Society* (1955), in particular, laid out the basic critical theory critique of modern society and had an enormous influence on the new left generation before even Marcuse was widely known among North American activists and radical intellectuals (Bronner 1994). A key part of this story is a contentious debate between Marcuse and Fromm in the radical journal *Dissent* in 1955 and 1956 on the issue of Freudian theory and utopian possibilities within contemporary capitalism (Richert 1986). Marcuse argued that Fromm’s critique of orthodox Freudian theory created a “neo-Freudian” perspective that was intellectually conformist and insufficiently radical since it suggested that some kind of psychological adjustment was possible under what Marcuse saw as the “total alienation” of modern capitalist conditions. Those sympathetic to Fromm’s side of the exchange argue that Marcuse’s radicalism was unrealistic and would not lead to

positive social change. This debate helped make Marcuse’s name at the expense of Fromm on the eve of the publication of *Eros and Civilization* and nearly a decade before *One Dimensional Man* (1964) made Marcuse a guru for the new left generation of the 1960s.

The Fromm–Marcuse debate helps explain why Fromm is seldom linked to the critical theory sociological tradition in our disciplinary histories and theory textbooks despite the historical facts. The orthodoxy within the Frankfurt School tradition has tended to present Fromm as a “conformist” thinker, often uncritically taking Marcuse’s position on this contentious debate (Richert 1986; Bronner 1994). Fromm, however, was probably correct on the major issues at stake in his argument with Marcuse and Adorno regarding Freudian theory, as the recent work of Nancy Chodorow, Jessica Benjamin, and the larger schools of self psychology and object relations suggests. As sociologist Neil Smelser sums up the contemporary consensus, “many elements of Freud’s psychoanalytic theories have been discredited: eros and thanatos, universal dream language, the psychosexual stages of development, the primal horde.” The discredited aspects of Freud’s theory were, it is worth remembering, *precisely* the elements of psychoanalysis that Marcuse was defending and Fromm was criticizing based on his extensive revisionist Freudian training and writing (Roazen 1996). In addition, Fromm’s critical sociology was backed up by far more empirical sociological research than anything else undertaken by the major Frankfurt School scholars, particularly in *Social Character in a Mexican Village* (1970) and the interdisciplinary *The Anatomy of Human Destructiveness* (1973). Nonetheless, by the time the social protest movements of the 1960s were in full gear, Fromm had become settled in his new home of Mexico City and did not have the direct influence on North American political events and intellectual discussions that he had during the 1940s and 1950s. While he remained active in social movements such as the anti nuclear organization SANE (which was named after his book *The Sane Society*), the American socialist party, and American electoral politics, his association with critical theory was, over the years, lost to the collective memory of both the larger society and critical sociologists.

GLOBAL PUBLIC INTELLECTUALS AND PUBLIC SOCIOLOGIES

In addition to his scholarly contributions, Fromm was also an early example of a global public intellectual who did the kind of public sociology that former American Sociological Association president Michael Burawoy argued for in his influential address “For Public Sociology” (2004). Like the young C. Wright Mills whom he influenced through his popular new left oriented books written in the 1940s and 1950s, Fromm wrote clearly for a general audience without the jargon ridden prose that consigns far too much sociology to narrow professional discourse. Essential reading for young radicals for decades in North America as well as throughout Latin America and Western and Eastern Europe, Fromm was a global public intellectual who spread the sociological imagination far beyond traditional scholarly outlets. Although he had once published in the *American Sociological Review*, and a number of his books were reviewed in the leading sociology journals, Fromm was primarily a writer of commercial press books. Fromm’s flair for expressing complex ideas in compelling prose flourished in such books as *The Sane Society* (1955), *The Art of Loving* (1956), and *To Have or To Be* (1976).

Fromm’s influence on what we now call public sociology is also evident when one looks at the ideas and the career of American sociologist David Riesman. The author of *The Lonely Crowd* (1950), the best selling sociology book of all time, Riesman was first a lawyer and then a sociology teacher at the University of Chicago and Harvard University. Fromm had been Riesman’s analyst, and then mentor and friend; the influence of Fromm’s *Escape from Freedom and Man for Himself* (1947) can be seen directly in the analysis of “inner” and “other” directed social characters outlined in Riesman’s sociological classic (McLaughlin 2001).

Riesman himself is probably better remembered for his model as a public sociologist than for his professional sociology. But the Fromm–Riesman collaboration has many lessons to offer in thinking about how to combine Burawoy’s professional, policy, public, and critical sociologies in ways that move the discipline forward. If Fromm provides an example

of public sociology with a critical edge, along side C. Wright Mills, Alvin Gouldner, and France Fox Piven, Riesman provides a useful political balance and a scholarly style and liberal philosophical commitment that avoids some of the excessively prophetic tone of some of Fromm’s writings (Maccoby 1995). With this caveat in mind, Erich Fromm remains an important representative of twentieth century public sociology.

FROMM’S SOCIOLOGICAL IMAGINATION

Erich Fromm was not without his critics, of course. His Frankfurt School former colleagues saw him as a simplistic popularizer, and a conformist cultural conservative. Berkeley liberal political theorist John Schaar viewed Fromm as an unrealistic utopian proponent of an “escape from authority” (Schaar 1961). Fromm was also widely attacked by neoconservatives for his opposition to the Vietnam War, American led “modernization,” and the nuclear arms race, and for his radical democratic ideas on education. Allan Bloom’s best selling book *The Closing of the American Mind* (1987) famously made Fromm a key villain in the importation of European ideas that had led to the “Nietzscheanization of the American Left.” Contemporary empirical sociologists will find much in his research and theorizing that does not come up to the high standards the professionalized discipline had developed by the first decade of the twenty first century.

Erich Fromm’s place in the history of sociology, however, seems relatively secure on the creative margins of the discipline. *Escape from Freedom* is likely to be read as an exemplifier of the sociological imagination in the years to come by undergraduates and the general public alike. Critical theory also has a rich if contested future in sociology and Fromm remains an important part of the Frankfurt School tradition despite their nasty squabbles and intellectual differences. Fromm contributed to and shared the basic Frankfurt School critique of the cultural industries, the focus on alienation and subjectivity that the tradition pioneered, and the refusal to accept the normative limits of the instrumental rationality that dominates

purely professional and policy oriented social science. Erich Fromm wrote his works of the sociological imagination in accessible and clearly written prose, an example of the best kind of critical public sociology. Sociology does not “own” Erich Fromm, to be sure, given his important contributions to psychoanalysis and psychology, and his very clear interdisciplinary commitments. Nonetheless, Fromm was an important figure in the history of sociology, and his work continues to be of relevance to the discipline.

SEE ALSO: Adorno, Theodor W.; Authoritarianism; Authority and Conformity; Critical Theory/Frankfurt School; Horkheimer, Max; Lazarsfeld, Paul; Marcuse, Herbert; Mills, C. Wright; New Left; Psychoanalysis; Riesman, David; Totalitarianism

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function

Robin Stryker

Function has been an important idea within specific sociological paradigms and in sociology more generally. Analyzing the function(s) of social practices has been central ever since Émile Durkheim, in *Division of Labor in Society* (1893), defined function as consequence, and exhorted sociologists to distinguish functions of social phenomena from their causes while examining both. Arguing that the division of labor functions to create social solidarity, Durkheim likened the “organic solidarity” associated with a complex division of labor to functional interdependence among differently specialized organs in the human body.

Examining functions of social practices need not imply viewing society as an interdependent set of differentiated structures functioning together to promote societal maintenance and well being. However, these two ideas intertwined in the post World War II American structural functionalist paradigm. Like Durkheim, structural functionalists examined how social order is maintained and reproduced. More recently, a metatheoretical movement called neofunctionalism tried to retain structural functionalism’s core while extending it to address issues of social change and microfoundations (see Ritzer 1992).

Structural functionalism dominated American sociology in the period after World War II. Kingsley Davis, in his 1959 Presidential

address to the American Sociological Association, went so far as to argue that structural functionalism was neither a special theory nor a special method, but synonymous with *all* sociology. Today, Davis's essay remains helpful for understanding structural functionalism's roots in Durkheim, its debts to anthropological functionalists including Radcliffe Brown and Malinowski, and the intellectual and political institutional issues that concerned its proponents and critics.

Ritzer (1992) asserts that Talcott Parsons was the most important structural functionalist theorist and Robert Merton the paradigm's most important explicator. Both proponent and constructive critic, Merton (1968) characterized functionalism as interpreting data about social practices by establishing the consequences of those practices for the larger social structures in which the practices are incorporated. A social practice is any social phenomenon that is "patterned and repetitive," including social roles, norms, structures, and institutions (p. 104). For example, in a still admired analysis, Durkheim (1893) argued that crime has positive functions for society, not because punishment deters crime, but because punishment reaffirms societal norms, reinforcing both solidarity and boundaries of acceptable behavior. For Parsons, all systems, including biological, psychological, social, and cultural, must perform four functions to meet systemic needs. These functions are adaptation (adjusting to the environment), goal attainment (defining and achieving objectives), integration (coordinating and regulating interrelationships among parts), and pattern maintenance or latency (providing or maintaining motivation or cultural patterns sustaining motivation). In social systems, adaptation is primarily associated with the economy, goal attainment with the polity, integration with law and custom, and pattern maintenance with schools, families, and churches.

Although structural functionalists dealt with social change, they were limited to doing so in a particular way. Change is a process of increasingly adaptive evolution in which distinct societal institutions such as occupations, churches, schools, families, legislatures, police, prisons, and courts proliferate and become increasingly differentiated, but also integrated into an orderly whole through common norms.

Neofunctionalists tried to expand this characteristic treatment of social dynamics.

Like Durkheim, Merton reminded sociologists that function is not equivalent to cause, motivation, intent, or purpose. He criticized assumptions of functional unity, universality, and indispensability, made explicitly or implicitly by many structural functionalists. In place of society as a consensual, unified whole, Merton noted that social practices could be functional for some organizations and groups, and dysfunctional for others. Instead of presuming that a social practice with a particular function in one setting was universally associated with that function and thus indispensable, Merton argued that there could be functional alternatives. Even if some function were required for system survival, there likely would be alternative practices that could fulfill this function. Finally, Merton highlighted unintended consequences of social practices. Intended versus unintended consequence is one dimension of Merton's (1968) famous contrast between manifest and latent functions.

Assumptions that Merton criticized figure prominently in Davis and Moore's (1945) well known functional analysis of inequality in occupational rewards. Whereas this essay highlights pitfalls in functional analysis, Stinchcombe's (1985) functional analysis of contributory social insurance exemplifies possibilities of a functionalist approach. Notwithstanding the sensible caution against equating cause and function/consequence, Stinchcombe purposely makes the idea of function key to his causal analysis of how and why government welfare programs developed. Such a functional *causal* explanation is one in which a practice's consequences are essential elements of its cause. Key steps in considering whether it makes sense to hypothesize and test this form of explanation are: (1) finding a social practice with a consequence/function that is maintained in equilibrium notwithstanding specified tension(s) tending to upset the equilibrium; (2) finding that as these tensions rise, the social practice tends to be created or enhanced; and (3) specifying precisely *how* the function/consequence feeds back to create or enhance the social practice (Stinchcombe 1987).

Lewis Coser synthesized functionalism with conflict theory to specify the functions of social

conflict. Similarly, post war neo Marxists from Louis Althusser to Nicos Poulantzas to James O'Connor specified how democratic governments perform accumulation, legitimation, and class organization and disorganization functions that help maintain capitalism (see, e.g., Ritzer 1992). As Stinchcombe (1987) illustrates, Marx's theory can be recast in functional terms, with the key modification that functions and dysfunctions play out in the context of unequal power relations and conflicting interests among classes. In short, even many ardent critics of structural functionalism embrace the analytic utility of the concept of function, highlighting its centrality to sociology.

SEE ALSO: Conflict Theory; Davis, Kingsley; Durkheim, Émile; Functionalism/Neofunctionalism; Marx, Karl; Merton, Robert K.; Parsons, Talcott; Structural Functional Theory

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functionalism/ neofunctionalism

Donald A. Nielsen

Functionalism is a theoretical perspective in sociology, and the social sciences generally, which emphasizes the positive contributions made by any given social arrangement (e.g.,

institutions, cultural values, norms, rites, and so forth) to the current operation and continued reproduction of society and its cultural pattern. It has rested heavily as a theory on a broad analogy between societies and biological organisms, a tendency especially noted in the work of early functionalists such as Spencer and Durkheim. However, reliance on the organic analogy is already less evident in the work of social anthropologists such as Radcliffe Brown and Malinowski, who drew selectively on Durkheim's work, and has become muted in more recent forms of functionalism, which draw more frequently on general systems theory and not merely on the analogy with organisms. Functionalists also regularly couple the use of analogical reasoning with a claim to the objective analysis of society through the use of scientific methods and have linked their theorizing to one or another form of positivism in philosophy.

The work of Durkheim forms the most influential predecessor of most contemporary variants of functionalism. He used a functionalist method in a variety of his studies. For example, Durkheim (1964) analyzed the division of labor in modern society and found that it functioned under normal conditions to promote the formation of a new type of social solidarity, which he called organic solidarity. His discussion of the division of labor had a strong influence on the development of Radcliffe Brown's variant of structural functional analysis. In a similar vein, Durkheim analyzed the social functions of deviant behavior which, in his view, provided opportunities for the clarification and expression of the collective moral consciousness of society through the execution of rituals of punishment of deviant individuals. Finally, Durkheim (1995) argued that religion represented a system of beliefs and practices concerning the sacred and that its primary function was to integrate the members of society into a single moral community. This image of the integrative function of religion, and common values generally, was to have a strong influence on Parsons's functionalist theorizing.

These early functional perspectives were refined during the period after World War II and in the process often significantly modified by later thinkers such as Talcott Parsons and Robert K. Merton. Both figures created schools

of thought (Parsons at Harvard and Merton at Columbia) where each trained a new generation of sociologists. Each, in differing ways, emphasized one or another form of functionalism. As a result of their work and that of their students, functionalism became the dominant theoretical perspective in the post war period and, despite challenges from other theoretical perspectives, remained a leading trend of thought up through the mid 1960s. In such works as *The Social System* (1951), Parsons developed a grand systematic theory of society which focused on the four functional problems of all social systems: adaptation to their environment, goal attainment, integration, and cultural pattern maintenance. Parsons's systematic theory emphasized the exchanges of social performances which took place among institutions fulfilling these functions (e.g., the economy, government, law, education, religion, the family, and so forth) and the equilibrium established among them, while at the same time linking this outlook, if rather uncomfortably, to the theory of social action which he had begun to develop in his earlier work, *The Structure of Social Action* (1937). In his view, disequilibrium between and among the various institutions performing key social functions was a major way of explaining social change. Parsons also emphasized the relations between culture and society and the integrative role of common values in creating social consensus. These emphases led to a theory of social evolution which focused on increasing social differentiation and the historical development of more abstract and universalistic cultural values in modern societies. This brand of macro functionalism was adopted by Parsons's followers such as Marion Levy, Robert N. Bellah, and Neil Smelser and its analytical scheme was applied to the comparative study of societies and cultures such as China and Japan. Others, such as Kingsley Davis and Wilbert Moore, employed functionalism in the study of particular problems such as social stratification and argued that the functionalist method was largely identical with sociological analysis itself.

On the other hand, in his influential work, *Social Theory and Social Structure* (1949), Merton worked toward a more flexible "paradigm" of functional analysis with strong empirical applications. Merton argued strongly

against the idea of the universal functionality of particular social arrangements, such as religion or the family. Instead, he argued for the idea of functional equivalence, in which differing concrete social arrangements could satisfy any necessary social function. In this way, he was also more successful than Parsons in uncoupling functional analysis from its potentially conservative implications. Thus, no particular way of arranging for society's needs was privileged and new social arrangements were possible. In this same spirit, Merton also emphasized both the positive functions as well as negative dysfunctions of given social arrangements. Social institutions might have both positive and negative consequences for a society or some segment of it. He also emphasized the "latent" character of many social functions and dysfunctions, that is, their largely unrecognized and unintended quality, and linked this problem to his earlier interest in the unanticipated consequences attendant upon all purposive social action. Merton's brand of functionalism was linked to a strategy of theory and research which he entitled "middle range" analysis, one which avoided both Parsons's effort to create grand theoretical systems as well as the minutiae of empirical research devoid of any theoretical orientation. Merton's more flexible emphasis on latent functions and dysfunctions allowed him and his students to engage in theoretically driven research about such topics as bureaucracy, deviance, reference groups, public opinion, propaganda, and a host of others. As a result, Merton was a less central target for those who were increasingly critical of functionalist modes of analysis.

In addition to its importance as a source of influential schools of twentieth century social theory, especially in America, functionalism, particularly its Parsonian variety, has been a major reference point for widespread criticism by conflict theorists, symbolic interactionists, and others less persuaded by functionalists' claims. In the eyes of conflict theorists such as Ralf Dahrendorf, C. Wright Mills, Barrington Moore, and others, who often drew more heavily than Parsons on the Marxian theoretical legacy as well as Weber's theory of bureaucracy and political domination, Parsonian structural functionalism seemed to neglect the problems of power and political conflict, as well as other

forms of intergroup struggle (e.g., between social classes and racial and ethnic groups). In their view, functionalism was not only unable or unwilling to focus on or explain such persistent social realities, but also had decidedly conservative political implications. In the 1960s, movements of national liberation in the former colonies, intergenerational conflicts spearheaded by youth, the Civil Rights Movement, black nationalist currents among African Americans, the women's movement and, not least, the Vietnam War, put the problems of power, inequality, and conflict decisively back in public view. These changes made the functionalist emphases on the role of common values in integrating society and the use of the concept of disequilibrium to analyze change seem out of touch with currently explosive social realities. Parsons attempted to address anew the problems of political power from a functionalist, systems theory standpoint, by treating it (along with money) as one generalized medium of communication in society. In a related response to critiques and current changes, Neil Smelser, one of Parsons's followers, developed his *Theory of Collective Behavior* (1962), while Merton's student Lewis Coser, in his work on *The Functions of Social Conflict* (1956), had already taken up the analysis of conflict itself from a functionalist perspective by drawing on the ideas of Georg Simmel. Despite these and other efforts, after the 1960s, functionalist theorizing never fully recovered its place as the leading theoretical perspective in sociology.

Symbolic interactionists like Herbert Blumer had long been critical of functionalism for other reasons and his critique was increasingly supplemented by critical perspectives emerging from such authors as Erving Goffman, representing newer forms of analysis such as social dramaturgy and social constructionism. These microsociologists viewed the functionalist image of society, its functional problems, its emphasis on macrostructures and institutions, and its focus on common values and culture, more generally, as an egregious reification of what is essentially a complex process of social interaction among human actors whose mutually oriented actions create and sustain what the functionalists designate as "society" and "culture." Other critics of functionalism, working

from several different theoretical orientations, have generally agreed with the symbolic interactionists, even while they have also viewed the interactionist critique as insufficiently broad and systematic to meet the challenges posed by functionalist theory. For example, George Homans, in his 1964 Presidential Address to the American Sociological Association, made a plea for "bringing men back in" and in his book, *Social Behavior: Its Elementary Forms* (1961), developed an empirically based social theory rooted in a variant of social behaviorism, one which aimed at the creation of general propositions and even explanatory laws of social behavior by building the analysis of larger social structures on a foundation of individual behavioral psychology. Others, such as Peter Berger and Thomas Luckmann, sought to outflank Parsons's structural functionalism by offering, in *The Social Construction of Reality* (1966), an alternative systematic theory which combined macro and micro analyses of social action, interaction, and structures in a treatment of social reality as a socially constructed phenomenon. Their merger of ideas drawn from Marx, Durkheim, Weber, phenomenology, and symbolic interaction theory attacked functionalism on its own ground by offering what appeared to be a comprehensive theory of society and culture. In general, theorists who have emphasized the ongoing social construction of society have argued that functionalists omit any meaningful reference to the intentions of individuals and that all so called social functions can be best understood by reducing them to the combined actions and constructions of social actors.

In the last several decades new efforts have been made to revive functionalism by a new wave of "neofunctionalists" such as Jeffrey Alexander, Niklas Luhmann, Jürgen Habermas, and several others who have injected powerful doses of conflict theory, systems theory, an evolutionary emphasis on social change, and a greater emphasis on the role of political power in society into the moribund body of functional analysis. Alexander wedded his neofunctionalism to the broader agenda of developing a multidimensional theory of society, one which would find room for both conflict and consensus, yet also retain the earlier functionalist emphasis on major historical processes such as social differentiation. Luhmann moved

instead toward the merger of functionalism with systems theory and evolutionary perspectives and, in the process, emphasized the role of power as well as trust in society. While Habermas is not always grouped with the neofunctionalists, his dual emphasis on system functioning and lifeworld, as well as his evolutionary theory of social communication with its utopian intent of achieving unconstrained consensus in society, has much in common with Parsons. It represents an attempt to merge aspects of the Parsonian legacy with perspectives from linguistic analysis, phenomenological sociology, and political theory. It is of interest that all the above neofunctionalists draw on one or another element of Parsons's mature structural functional theory (e.g., social systems theory, evolutionary analysis, multidimensional grand theorizing, the role of power as generalized medium, the role of common values in society). It has provided them with decisive impetus, despite their considerable modification and supplementation of his ideas.

SEE ALSO: Conflict Theory; Durkheim, Émile; Function; Luhmann, Niklas; Merton, Robert K.; Parsons, Talcott; Spencer, Herbert; Structuralism; Symbolic Interaction; System Theories

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fundamentalism

Enzo Pace

Roughly speaking, fundamentalism is a label that refers to the modern tendency – a habit of the heart and mind (Marty & Appleby 1991, 1993a, 1993b, 1994, 1995) – to claim the unerring nature of a sacred text and to deduce from that a rational strategy for instrumental social action. The final goal is to achieve the utopia of a regime of the truth (Pace 1998), gain political power, and rebuild organic solidarity, in jeopardy because of relativism, secularism, and weakness due to the eclipse of religion's social function of integration. This tendency has arisen in various socioreligious contexts: in Protestantism and Catholicism, Islam and the Jewish communities (both in Diaspora and in Israel after the 1967 Six Day War), in contemporary Hinduism and Buddhism, and, to some extent, even in a particular faction of Sikhism (the Khalsa, the religious order of warriors, defenders of the truth and the sacred boundaries of the Punjab). Fundamentalism made its appearance in contemporary times with such manifestations as the first march of the Moral Majority in the United States and the Iranian revolution (1979); the intensification in Sri Lanka of the tension between the Sinhalese Buddhists and the Tamil Hindu from 1977 to 1983; the appearance in Israel of many nationalist religious movements whose aim was to regain and defend the biblical boundaries of the people of Israel (*Eretz Israel*) from 1977 to 1980; and, in the Punjab, from 1984 to 1988 there was an acute crisis in relations between the Sikhs and the Indian government, culminating in an attack by the Indian army on the

Golden Temple in Amritsar and the subsequent assassination of Mrs. Indira Gandhi by a Sikh.

In light of these events, many scholars hold the view that fundamentalism is a modern global phenomenon involving the historic religions, for the most part. One of the most impressive attempts at a comparative analysis was the "Fundamentalism Project," carried out by a team of researchers coordinated by Marty and Appleby and sponsored by the American Academy, which was published in five volumes. In summing up the authors' analysis, five common features characterizing fundamentalist movements can be identified.

First, fundamentalism is characterized by the type of social action dominated by the attitude of *fighting back*. This means, on the one hand, that the social actors claim to be restoring a mythical and sacred order of the past, but, on the other hand, they act with great innovative power of mobilization. The sacred becomes the means for gaining political power. Without this close relation between religious narrative and political rhetoric, with constant mutual contamination between the two, it is impossible to distinguish between the manner of fundamentalist movements and that of traditionalist or conservative ones. The former aim to assume the absolute and unerring truth of the sacred text to legitimate a new social order, the order of an immanent god (the law), pure and integral, to affirm and preserve a pure collective identity. Retracing its collective memory, fundamentalism comes up with a sacred language that inspires the discipline of the body and the mind; through this, it implants common habits in the hearts of the people, an image of solidarity. In contrast to the modern idea of "atomized" individuals in a fragmented society, this solidarity creates a mystical community of Brothers.

The second element highlighted by the authors of the "Fundamentalist Project" – *fighting for* – is implicit in the foregoing: the ultimate goal of the movement is political, despite the furious and intense religious motivations. For instance, at the beginning of the changes in Iran in 1977–8, Islam was perceived as a set of instruments promoting liberation from dictatorship and the modernization of the country run by the Pahlavi dynasty. There was an Islamic liberation theology that later

became, when the Ayatollah Khomeini gained power, a political project to create an integral Islamic state, a process which moved away from the centralized power of the state, shifting the traditional role of the Shiite clerical institution. Up to the time of the revolution, the Shiites were the interpreters of the sacred text without any claim to impose a single model of society or political order. Yet, after coming to power, the ayatollah began to offer a sort of state hermeneutics of the sacred text. In spite of the traditional pluralism within the Shia in the matter of interpretation of canon law, the Khomeini regime imposed a uniform, and unbearable, straitjacket on a society with some degree of social differentiation, accustomed to perceiving the difference between religion and politics.

The third feature – *fight with* – refers to a specific repository of symbolic resources of use in the crusade for restoring identity and gaining political power. As a rule, fundamentalists move toward a mythical past contained in a sacred text, the shrine of the secret of the social order. Thus, they distill – drop by drop – the functional language of social action, the sociologos of the society in question. In this sense, the fundamentalist approach to both the sacred text and social action is selective: fundamentalists actually interpret the text, whilst pretending to claim its inerrancy, its ahistoricity, and generally its structural refractoriness to any rational (historical and critical) hermeneutics.

The fourth element is the *fight against*. If fundamentalism were a label that could be applied to any kind of (religious) politics of identity (in which case, for instance, the former President Milosevic of Serbia acted as a fundamentalist when he tried to combine nationalist rhetoric with a discourse on the Orthodox origins of the Serbian nation), it would be very easy to demonstrate the link between the fundamentalist mentality and the need for an enemy. Being a fundamentalist assumes the idea and feeling of being threatened by an enemy (real or imagined) as regards one's identity, territory, and survival. When he assassinated Israeli President Rabin in 1995, Yigal Amir believed he was doing what was best, since Rabin, by making peace with Arafat, was yielding to the Palestinians territories that, according to extremist movements, belonged to the promised land given by God to his people.

Finally, the fifth feature of fundamentalism – *fight under God* – represents a simple corollary of the previous assumptions. It refers to the intensity of the militants' conviction that they are "on the right path." They are certain they are called directly by a god to carry on with radical determination the struggle against the enemy. Thus, symbolic and physical violence are legitimized. Sacred violence becomes a logical consequence of the missionary function the fundamentalist feels he has received from God. The fundamentalist believes he carries out the function of defender of the rights of God and executor of his will on earth.

The term fundamentalism has given rise to heated controversy among scholars, the most significant objection being that it has been used to classify different phenomena present in very diverse socioreligious contexts. In other words, we should guard against reducing every radical conservative religious viewpoint to a manifestation of fundamentalism. Other scholars point out the difficulty of comparing different religions under the same label, fundamentalism: religions which are monotheistic with those of a non theistic or polytheistic nature, or religions entailing the crucial importance of a sacred text (the Bible, Koran, Adi Granth) with others that do not.

Apart from these objections, those social scientists who accept the concept and assume a comparative and global approach to studying fundamentalism are divided on another issue: whether the phenomenon should be interpreted as an expression (or the quintessence) of modernity or as a simple reaction to modernity. The contrast refers to a broader debate within social theory about the classic dichotomy between tradition and modernity, postmodernity, and globalization.

To sum up, four main points of view emerge. In the first approach, fundamentalism is a clear reaction to modernity, a defensive protection against the individualization of belief and socio-religious identity (Meyer 1989). The second orientation is well represented, among others, by both Lawrence (1989) and Eisenstadt (1999); they hold that fundamentalism is a modern phenomenon, a direct consequence of modernity, characterized by the rejection of modernism. Using the advantages of modernity (the techniques of propaganda, the logic of social

mobilization, lobbying in the public and political arena, and so on), fundamentalism, according to Eisenstadt, is urged on by a modern Jacobin utopia in antithesis with modernity. Lawrence believes, on the other hand, that the disjunction between modernity and modernism enables fundamentalism to become a transnational movement claiming to give a new and absolute basis for social action and human knowledge, to the social order and the source of political power. The third approach stresses the relationship between fundamentalism and secularization (Kepel 1991), fundamentalism being a countertendency to the gradual eclipse of the sacred many scholars had predicted two decades ago.

The last point of view underlines the importance of the political objectives of the fundamentalist movements' social and religious action (Greilsammer 1991; Van der Veer 2000): their struggle tends to focus all religious energy on the public arena and consequently on political action, according to the crucial hypothesis that only through political power will it be possible to reestablish the divine law and safeguard one's identity (Hindu, Muslim, Christian, Buddhist, Sikh, Jewish, and so on). The way the fundamentalist mentality bridges the gap between religion and politics is characterized by a double abstraction used in the hermeneutics of the sacred text, as pointed out by Bhikku Parekh (1992): by abstracting from the tradition (sometimes in contrast to the traditional authority or a consolidated school of juridical thought and theological doctrine) and inventing a set of religious narratives and a political rhetoric of identity abstracted from a literal interpretation of the text itself. In this sense, fundamentalism is able to invent a tradition by reifying a sacred text and drawing from it paradigms of social action, sometimes without any substantial relation to the historical and theological context in which the sacred text was written. Even when a religious tradition does not refer to a single revealed sacred text – such as Buddhism or Hinduism – one of the most striking phenomena we have seen is the selection of one, among many other sacred texts, and the consequent construction of a sociological and cognitive map; the idea being that in the text we find the roots of our collective memory and identity, the sacred boundaries of

the territory we inhabit, and the source of political authority. When such a discourse is produced by an elite of Buddhist monks in Sri Lanka during the process of nation building (which has been going on since 1955), or by a network of neo Hindu groups and political parties (in India since 1979), which has gradually managed to gain power (with the Bharata Janata Party), there is no doubt that the habits of the heart and the attitudes of the mind are fundamentalist oriented.

SEE ALSO: Identity Politics/Relational Politics; Islam; Judaism; Protestantism; Religion; Religion, Sociology of; Sanskritization; Secularization; Social Movements

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G

gambling as a social problem

Lucia Schmidt

Gambling refers to wagering money or other belongings on chance activities or events with random or uncertain outcomes (Devereux 1979). Gambling opportunities are now widely available throughout the world and playing with and for money is socially accepted as a source of entertainment and recreation. However, a growing tendency to highlight problematic aspects is also to be noticed.

By its very nature, gambling involves a voluntary, deliberate assumption of risk, often with a negative expectable value. Traditionally, heavy gamblers who sustained repeated losses and other adverse consequences were considered derelict, immoral, or criminal. For much of the twentieth century, the prevailing view of excessive gambling continued to define that behavior as morally and legally reprehensible. Only a few decades ago, a new perspective on the problem came up in which the behavior in question is seen as a pathological one – as a form of addictive behavior in need of therapeutic treatment. The disease concept (at least partly) replaced former deviance definitions as a kind of willful norm violation, and excessive gambling increasingly is considered to be an expression of a mental disorder resembling the substance related addictions. This change in perception has been strongly stimulated by – and reflected in – the evolving clinical classification and description of pathological gambling in the various editions (between 1980 and 2000) of the *Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders* (DSM) published by the American Psychiatric Association.

The medicalization process was initiated in the US by a self help group named Gamblers Anonymous (founded in 1957). Soon, GA formed alliances with medical experts. A small circle of problem gamblers and professional claims makers started to bring public attention to the problem. The National Council on Compulsive Gambling (founded in 1972 and renamed the National Council on Problem Gambling in 1989) served as a model for similar organizations in other countries, all of which have become influential actors in the social construction of the new disease.

The medical conception was developed with strong references to the already established disease model of alcoholism and it highlights loss of control as a basic origin of excessive gambling. The psychiatrist Robert L. Custer was the first expert on pathological gambling who participated in one of the specialized DSM advisory committees. For the 1980 edition of DSM III, where the disease was codified for the first time, he was the *only* one. As Custer puts it in one of his classic works, “compulsive gambling is an addictive illness in which the subject is driven by an overwhelming, uncontrollable impulse to gamble. Accordingly, the afflicted gambler is controlled by his devastating disease. Rhetorical devices like this build up the image of persons as helpless, hapless victims” (Conrad & Schneider 1980).

There are remarkable regional differences in gambling opportunities that are supposed to be inherently problematic (e.g., to bear an increased addictive potential). For example, the discussion about “gambling addiction” in Germany was for years almost entirely restricted to a special kind of slot machine, while classical forms like casino games, lotteries, and sports betting were highly uncommon. Yet this type of slot machine was once described by Robert Custer as a harmless, not very exciting toy.

According to the National Research Council, much of the available research on all aspects of pathological gambling is of limited scientific value and reliable estimates for the national and regional prevalence of pathological gambling are hard to find (NRC 1999). However, the Research Council estimates that approximately 0.9 percent of adults in the US meet specific criteria as pathological gamblers on the basis of their gambling activities in the past year and that the current prevalence rate for pathological gambling among adolescents is considerably higher (NRC 1999: 98ff). The American Psychiatric Association states there are 1–6 percent of young people in the US and Canada who may satisfy diagnostic criteria for pathological gambling, with the rate of gambling problems rising among young people. From a sociological point of view, assertions about the extent of the problem serve as the rhetorical basis on which the discussion proceeds. Within the last few years, youth gambling has become a newly favored topic of research and political discussion. As illustrated by the title of an interdisciplinary reader on this subject – *Futures at Stake: Youth, Gambling and Society* (Shaffer et al. 2003) – rhetorical devices and drama make up an essential part of the ongoing problem discourse on gambling.

SEE ALSO: Addiction and Dependency; Deviance; Deviance, Constructionist Perspectives; Deviance, Medicalization of; Gambling and Sport; Labeling; Labeling Theory; Medical Sociology; Mental Disorder; Social Problems, Concept and Perspectives

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gambling and sport

Ellis Cashmore

There are two likely sources for the word gambling: the Old Saxon *gamene*, which became abbreviated to the contemporary "game"; or the Italian *gambetto*, source of "gambit," a practice of sacrificing something minor in order to secure a larger advantage. Gambling now refers to playing games of luck or skill, using a stake, usually a sum of money, in anticipation of winning a larger sum.

While gambling on sports is obviously a product of the growth of organized sports from the mid nineteenth century, playing games of chance for money or staking wagers on the outcome of events probably dates back to antiquity.

Modern forms of gambling emerged in connection with changing ideas about time and nature. As pre Enlightenment thinkers advanced the notion that reason and rationality lay behind all earthly affairs, the roles of chance, happenstance or pure randomness were seen as increasingly problematic. In an ordered universe, ignorance of affairs was merely imperfect knowledge because everything was potentially knowable. August Comte's positivism was perhaps the epitome of this, recognizing only observable phenomena and rejecting metaphysics, theism, and anything else that lay beyond human perception. The emerging emphasis on science led to the conclusion that given greater knowledge, the seeming vagaries of nature could be comprehended and subordinated to the rational, calculating mind.

Gambling is guided by such reasoning: admittedly, the conscious thought that lies behind rolling dice or drawing lots is hardly likely to resemble any kind of calculation; these are games of chance, played with the intention of winning money. But the motive behind gambling on sports is influenced by a more rational

style of thinking: that it is possible to predict the outcome of an event by the employment of a calculus of probability. No one wagers money on a sporting event without at least the suspicion that they are privy to a special knowledge about a competitive outcome. A hunch, a taste, a fancy, a “feel” – all these add to the calculus at work in the mind of even the most casual gambler when he or she stakes money on a competition.

Orientations of gamblers differ widely: some always feel a frisson whether it is in watching a horse romp home or some dice roll; others observe from a position of detachment, their interest resting on only the result. The sports gambler bets with head as well as heart; the reward is both in the winnings and in the satisfaction that he or she has divined a correct result from the unmanageable flux of a competitive event.

In his *Luck: The Brilliant Randomness of Everyday Life* (1995), Nicholas Rescher identifies a surge in popularity in wagering on contests of skill and chance during the English Civil War (1641–5) and the Thirty Years’ War in continental Europe (1618–48). Starved of entertainment, soldiers and sailors killed time by wagering on virtually any activity. Returning to civilian society, the militia brought with them their habits, and the enthusiasm for gambling spread, aligning itself with the games of skill that were growing in popularity in England.

The 1665 Gaming Act was the first piece of legislation designed to outlaw gambling, principally to restrict the debts that were being incurred as a result of the growing stakes. Some activities had attracted gambling for decades, perhaps centuries. Swordplay, for example, was a pursuit that was viscerally thrilling to watch and stimulated the human passion for prediction. As the military use of swords declined, so the contests continued simply for recreation and entertainment. Dueling was perfect for gamblers. Engaging in competitive contests simply for the satisfaction they afforded the competitor and observer was exactly the kind of wasteful and sinful behavior despised by the party of English Protestants and Puritans.

Blood sports were popular in nineteenth century England and North America. Their attraction, in part, was due to their amenability

to betting. Even as the civilizing process altered the threshold of repugnance and made such grim and cruel pursuits less tolerable, cock fighting, bear baiting and other blood sports remained, principally because of gambling. Pugilism was another combat sport that attracted what was known as a “fancy” or following of ardent spectators who would pit their forecasting skills against each other. Sponsors of pugilists were often extravagant backers of their charges. The influence of gambling on prize fighting became injurious and corruption was rife.

Boxing and gambling have gone hand in hand ever since, though there were other less probable sports that attracted bettors. Cricket, for example, in the early nineteenth century, had its hardcore spectators who were prone not only to gambling but also to drinking and rowdiness. Gambling regulations remained in the laws of the game until the 1880s and betting was still very much part of the sport until at least mid century. Lords, the home stadium of cricket’s governing federation, banned gambling in the 1820s and, according to Dennis Brailsford, in his *British Sport: A Social History* “one player was banned for allegedly throwing a match.”

Brailsford estimates that the money staked on boxing was rivaled “and sometimes exceeded” by that involved in pedestrianism, the period’s equivalent of track. Pedestrianism defined a variety of races and events, sometimes head to head, or against the clock, often involving both men and women. There were wheelbarrow races and hopping contests, as well as such unusual challenges as picking up potatoes. The appeal of pedestrianism was that it was possible to wager on practically anything. Opposition to working class gambling on sports bore fruit in the form of two pieces of legislation in 1853 and 1906, which were ostensibly framed to forbid off course betting.

In the US, where gambling was – and still is in many states – illegal, baseball nevertheless attracted gamblers. Perhaps the best known instance of corruption had its source in gambling. The Black Sox Scandal of 1919 involved several Chicago White Sox players who were bribed by a gambling syndicate to throw a World Series against underdogs Cincinnati Reds. Money was at the root of this instance

of corruption, which was chronicled by John Sayles in his movie *Eight Men Out*. The players were poorly paid and exploited by Major League Baseball long before the advent of free agency. The film and the Elliot Asinof book (of the same title) on which it is based depicts the players sympathetically, in some senses cheated by their employers.

Animal racing, from its outset, was fair game for gaming. In their modern forms, horse racing and dog racing proved the most attractive to gamblers. Dog racing has its origins in eighteenth century coursing, and involved highly bred and trained dogs, which chased and usually killed a fleeing hare. One of the attractions of meetings was the opportunity to wager and drink convivially. Hoteliers and publicans would promote coursing meets. It became an organized sport, complete with its own organization in 1858, when a National Coursing Club was established.

As opposition to what was obviously one of a number of blood sports prevalent at the time, coursing dispensed with living hares and substituted a mechanical equivalent. The first electric hare was used in 1919 and came into popular use at the end of the 1920s. In the US, the betting norm became *pari mutuel*, from the French, meaning mutual stake. (This type of betting was introduced in New Zealand as far back as 1880.) In the 1930s, this also took off in on course British horse racing (known as the totalizer).

A new form of gambling on soccer posed threats to both greyhound and horse racing. Known as the pools, it came to life in the early 1930s and captured the British public's imagination almost immediately. Newspapers had been publishing their own versions of pools for many years, but the practice was declared illegal in 1928. Brailsford notes how the £20 million staked in the 1934/35 season doubled within two years. The outlay was usually no more than a few pence and the bets were typically collected from one's home. The aim of pools was to select a requisite number of drawn games, so it was not classified as a game of chance, but one of skill, thus escaping the regulation of gaming legislation. By the outbreak of war, there were 10 million gamblers on the pools. The popularity the pools enjoyed with working class bettors stayed intact until the

introduction of the national lottery (modeled on the US state lotteries) in the early 1990s.

In the 1990s, betting on the spread became one of the most popular gambling forms. The bettor could wager not only on the result of a contest but on any facet of it. Spread betting was popularized in the US, then became the norm in Britain, especially in soccer.

Sports betting, while nominally illegal in most parts of the US, remains popular because gamblers typically have access to a Las Vegas bookmaker. The Internet has facilitated online betting, which effectively circumvents legal restrictions on gambling. A valid credit card and Internet access is all that is needed to gamble on practically any sports event, any where in the world.

Sociological research on gambling in sports has been rare because it is difficult to collect valid and reliable data. Therefore, we are left with case histories of gamblers and the athletes and teams that altered competitive outcomes or shaved points from their scores to enable gamblers, sometimes themselves, to win bets (Ginsburg 2003). Basketball presents a prime example. As Alan Wykes (1964) points out: "American basketball has been more notorious than football for its fixing scandals of the 1950s when college stars or whole teams were being bribed to throw games." Like any other competitive sport, basketball is a natural, if unwitting, ally to gambling. And history suggests that, where gambling is present, corruption is rarely far away.

Former Arizona State star Stevin Hedake Smith admitted helping a gambling ring by shaving points during his senior year as a way of relieving his own gambling debts. In one 1994 game, the Sun Devils were favored by a 14 point lead, so Smith and his accomplices had to make sure their team won by six points because the bookie wanted a cushion. Late in the game Arizona State led 40-27, but Smith began to allow more space to the shooters he was meant to be guarding and the score narrowed to finish 88-82. Smith revealed to *Sports Illustrated* (Yaeger 1998) how he could adjust his game to accommodate the various spreads, usually by easing off. By holding a victory margin to a certain number of points, players could earn \$20,000. Players sometimes bet on their own games.

Gambling's association with sports continues. Some sports' enduring popularity is directly attributable to betting. In both Europe and the US, horse and dog racing thrive on a betting levy (a fixed proportion of bookmakers' revenues). Interest in jai alai revolves around betting. The movement of major boxing contests to Las Vegas is no accident: boxing's historical connection with gambling is a sturdy one and gamblers flock to Las Vegas as much to bet as to enjoy the bouts.

Any activity, whether shopping, eating chocolate or watching television, has the potential to induce dependency. Gambling also, though "compulsive gamblers" are typically drawn to games of chance rather than gambling on sports events, where elements of choice, discretion, judgment and prescience are allied to luck.

SEE ALSO: Deviance, Sport and; Gambling as a Social Problem; Media and Sport; Sport; Sport as Spectacle

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game stage

D. Angus Vail

The game stage is one of three central components of George Herbert Mead's seminal discussion of the social foundation and development of the self. According to Mead, the self has a social genesis which becomes evident if one examines the ways that people develop a sense of their own being as something separate from, but also interdependent with, other people. In essence, the self is situated in the

individual's capacity to take account of themselves. By examining children's styles of play, followed by the games they play, one can see how they develop a capacity to take into account not just the role of a singular other person, but also eventually the roles of many people simultaneously. It is only once a person has reached this stage of development that she or he is said to have developed a complete self. Mead (1962: 151–4) called the second stage the game stage.

The fundamental difference between the game stage and its antecedent play stage lies in the child's ability to take the roles of multiple people at the same time. In order successfully to play an organized game or sport, the child has to be able to take account not only of his or her own actions, but also, and simultaneously, the actions of every other player involved in the game. Little league soccer makes a fine example of the distinction. At a certain age, children playing soccer stop playing swarm ball where every child on the field swarms around the ball, and they develop the capacity to play positions that require taking account of themselves, where the ball is, what their team mates are doing, and what their opponents are doing. Thus, they learn how to play the game of soccer rather than playing at being a soccer player.

If a person is to achieve success in a game she or he has to understand the rules that govern that game. Rules organize both the players' responses to each other and the attitudes that their actions are likely to induce in others who are also playing the game. Thus, while children in the play stage will swarm around a soccer ball, children in the game stage are capable of understanding the rules that govern zone offense or defense where the team acts together.

Of course, the game is a metaphor for the ways that children and adults take account of the diverse, malleable, and emergent roles that other people play, often simultaneously, in social settings. Thus, once a person enters the game stage of development, she or he demonstrates a capacity to take account of others' actions, her or his own actions, and the often quite informal rules (collectively known as the generalized other) that govern the social situation in which they all find themselves together. Mead contends that this capacity is the true mark of development of a complete self.

SEE ALSO: Generalized Other; Mead, George Herbert; Play Stage; Preparatory Stage; Role; Self; Symbolic Interaction

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game theory

Michael W. Macy and Arnout van de Rijt

Game theory is a powerful mathematical tool for modeling conflict and cooperation that originated with von Neumann and Morgenstern's (1944) seminal work. A game consists of two or more *players*, each with a set of *strategies* and a *utility function* that assigns an individual *payoff* to each combination of strategies, such that payoffs for a given strategy depend in part on the strategies of other players. This *strategic interdependence* can be represented in several ways: as a payoff matrix (the "normal form," where players act simultaneously), a decision tree (the "extensive form" for sequential moves), or as a production function (for *n* person games). Strategic interdependence allows two types of games. In *zero sum games*, a gain for one player is always a loss for the other, which precludes the possibility of cooperation for mutual gain. In *positive sum games*, everyone can gain through *Pareto efficient* cooperation, where some are better off and none are worse off, compared to other outcomes.

If cooperation is Pareto efficient and both players are rational, why would cooperation ever fail? There are two reasons: the fear of being "suckered" by the partner and the temptation to cheat. These failures can be avoided through enforceable contracts that preclude "cheating" ("cooperative games") or through collusion (in "non cooperative games").

In cooperative games, non cooperation is contractually precluded. The problem is to negotiate the distribution of resources among a coalition of players. Sociologists use cooperative game theory to study the effects of network structure on power inequality in social exchange (Willer 1999).

Non cooperative games have no enforceable contract. These games are generally more interesting to sociologists because they can be used to model *social dilemmas* which arise when players attempting to maximize their individual well being arrive at a socially undesirable outcome. More precisely, a social dilemma is a game in which there is at least one Pareto deficient Nash equilibrium (NE). An NE obtains when every strategy is a "best reply" to the other strategies played; hence, no player has an incentive to unilaterally change strategy. The equilibrium is Pareto deficient when the outcome is preferred by no one while one or more individuals prefer some other outcome.

The simplest version of a social dilemma confronts two players with a binary choice: whether to "cooperate" or "defect." These two choices intersect at four possible outcomes, each with an associated payoff: *R* rewards mutual cooperation, *S* is the sucker payoff for unilateral cooperation, *P* punishes mutual defection and *T* is the temptation to unilaterally defect. In a social dilemma, mutual cooperation is Pareto efficient yet may be undermined by the temptation to cheat (if $T > R$) or by the fear of being cheated (if $P > S$) or by both. In the game of "Stag Hunt" the problem is "fear" but not "greed" ($R > T > P > S$), and in the game of "Chicken" the problem is "greed" but not "fear" ($T > R > S > P$). The problem is most challenging when both fear and greed are present, that is, when $T > R$ and $P > S$. Given the assumption that $R > P$, there is only one way this can happen, if $T > R > P > S$, the celebrated game of "Prisoner's Dilemma" (PD). In this game, defection is the dominant strategy, that

is, it makes no difference whether a player knows what the partner has chosen. In other social dilemmas, the second mover should do the same as the partner (e.g., Stag Hunt) or the opposite (e.g., Chicken).

An interesting variant is called the “trust game.” The first mover chooses whether to invest resources in a “trustee” and if so, the second mover chooses whether to betray or reward trust. More complex variations allow for N players and continuous choices, whether to “give some” or to “take some” from other players. These games are used to study the *free rider* problem in *collective action*.

Although the games vary widely, the Nash equilibrium is a solution concept that can be universally applied. John Nash (1950) showed that every game contains at least one NE. NE predicts mutual defection in PD, unilateral defection in Chicken, and either mutual cooperation or mutual defection in Stag Hunt. NE also identifies a Pareto deficient mixed strategy equilibrium in Chicken and Stag Hunt. (A mixed strategy cooperates with a positive probability that is less than one.)

NE in non cooperative games is self enforcing – no contract is necessary to guarantee compliance. This allows for the possibility that social order can self organize, even in the absence of a Leviathan. Although this result is clearly of enormous significance across all the social sciences, there are important limitations that have spurred the search for more powerful theoretical extensions. Nash equilibrium analysis tells us if there are any strategic configurations that are stable, and if so, how they are characterized. Knowing that a configuration is an NE means that if this state should obtain, the system will remain there forever, even in the absence of an enforceable contract. However, even when there is a unique NE, this does not tell us whether this state will ever be reached, or with what probability, or what will happen if the equilibrium should be perturbed. Nor does NE explain social stability among interacting agents who are changing strategies individually, yet the population distribution remains constant, as in a homeostatic equilibrium. Put differently, NE explains social stability as the absence of individual change, not as a dynamic balance in a self correcting distribution of evanescent individual strategies,

each of which influences others in response to the influence that it receives.

Moreover, in most games, NE cannot identify a unique solution. Both Chicken and Stag Hunt have three equilibria (including mixed strategy). Worse yet, if these games are repeated by players who care about future pay offs in an ongoing relation, the number of NE becomes indefinitely large (even in PD, which has a unique equilibrium in one shot play). When games have multiple equilibria, NE can not tell us which will obtain or with what relative probability. Nor can it tell us much about the dynamics by which a population of players can move from one equilibrium to another.

Game theorists have responded to the problem of equilibrium selection by proposing procedures that can winnow the set of possible solutions. These include identifying equilibria that are risk dominant (every player follows a conservative strategy that earns the best payoff she can guarantee for herself), payoff dominant (no other equilibrium has a higher aggregate payoff over all players), Pareto dominant (every other equilibrium is less preferred by at least one player), and subgame perfect (all nodes along the equilibrium path can be reached in the extensive form). However, these equilibrium selection methods are theoretically arbitrary (e.g., there is no a priori basis for payoff dominant or risk dominant behavior) and they often disagree about which equilibrium should be selected (e.g., in Stag Hunt, payoff dominance and subgame perfection identify mutual cooperation while risk dominance points to mutual defection).

Another limitation is the analytical simplification that players have unlimited cognitive capacity with which to calculate the best response to any potential combination of strategies by other players. This allows equilibria to be identified by finding the minima of a function that describes the expected utility for any member of a homogeneous population. However, laboratory research on human behavior in experimental games reveals widespread and consistent deviations from equilibrium predictions (Kagel & Alvin 1995).

These limitations, including concerns about the cognitive demands of forward looking rationality, have led game theorists to explore

backward looking alternatives based on evolution and learning. This development has revolutionized game theory by relaxing what had heretofore been regarded as a canonical assumption – the cognitive capacity of rational actors to accurately predict the payoffs for alternative choices. *Rational expectations* were regarded as essential for game theory because of the *consequentialist* logic by which strategic choices are explained by the associated payoffs. Consequentialist explanations defy temporal ordering by attributing the causes of past events to their future outcomes. In *analytical* game theory the calculus of rational expectations provides the necessary link to the future.

Evolution and learning provide a radically different mechanism for consequentialist explanation. Repeated experience, not rational expectations, is the link to the future. In *evolutionary* game theory, prior exposure to a recurrent decision allows strategic outcomes to explain the choices that produce them through a process of iterative search. Thus, the outcomes that matter are those that have already occurred, not those that an analytical actor might expect to obtain in the future. This relaxes the highly restrictive cognitive assumptions in analytical game theory and allows for the possibility that players rely on cognitive shortcuts such as imitation, heuristic decision, stochastic learning, Bayesian updating, best reply with finite memory, and local optimization, thereby extending applications to games played by highly routinized players, such as bureaucratic organizations or boundedly rational individuals whose behavior is based on heuristics, habits, or norms.

Evolutionary game theory models the ability of conditionally cooperative strategies to survive and reproduce in competition with predators (Maynard Smith 1982). Biological models have also been extended to military and economic games in which losers are physically eliminated or bankrupted and to cultural games in which winners are more likely to be imitated (Axelrod 1984).

Critics charge that genetic learning may be a misleading template for models of adaptation at the cognitive level. The need for a cognitive alternative to evolutionary game theory is reflected in a growing number of formal learning theoretic models of cooperative behavior.

In learning, positive outcomes increase the probability that the associated behavior will be repeated, while negative outcomes reduce it. The process closely parallels evolutionary selection, in which positive outcomes increase a strategy's chances for survival and reproduction, while negative outcomes reduce it. However, this isomorphism need not imply that adaptive actors will learn the strategies favored by evolutionary selection pressures. In evolution, strategies compete *between* the individuals that carry them, not *within*. That is, evolutionary models explore changes in the global frequency distribution of strategies across a population, while learning operates on the local probability distribution of strategies within the repertoire of each individual member.

Sociology has lagged behind other social sciences in embracing game theory, in part because of skepticism about the heroic behavioral assumptions in the analytical approach. However, these backward looking alternatives show that the key assumption in game theory is not rationality; it is instead what ought to be most compelling to sociology, the *interdependence of the actors*. The game paradigm obtains its theoretical leverage by modeling the social fabric as a matrix of interconnected agents guided by outcomes of their interaction with others, where the actions of each depend on, as well as shape, the behavior of those with whom they are linked. Viewed with that lens, game theory appears most relevant to the social science that has been most reluctant to embrace it.

SEE ALSO: Coleman, James; Collective Action; Evolution; Exchange Network Theory; Norm of Reciprocity; Prosocial Behavior; Rational Choice Theories; Social Dilemmas; Social Learning Theory; Strategic Decisions

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gangs, delinquent

Rod K. Brunson

Discussions of gangs in the twenty first century stereotypically conjure up images of young minority males, outfitted in hip hop clothing, hanging out on street corners in impoverished urban communities, and engaging in unlawful acts. Using shorthand to identify gang members may seem logical to citizens, police officers, the media, and social service workers. It fails to recognize, however, the variation that exists among gangs and gang members. This begs the question whether the focus should be on gang members or on examining the conditions and processes involved in gang formation. Both approaches require their own orientation and have specific policy implications for addressing gang membership. At the center of these issues is the lack of consistency regarding how gangs are defined.

DEFINITIONAL ISSUES

One of the most difficult tasks for social scientists interested in the study of gangs is establishing the parameters of their area of interest: in other words, what constitutes a gang. Scholars have been interested in gang definition issues for decades. One key issue is whether delinquency should be regarded as an intrinsic feature of gang involvement. Thrasher (1927) and Klein's (1971) definitions characterize two sides of the debate and have been without question among the most influential. Thrasher emphasizes the spontaneous nature of gang formation, with delinquent activities of gang members regarded as a potential outcome to be examined independently. Klein, on the other

hand, maintains that the delinquent orientation of the group is a central feature of any definition of gang.

Scholars are polarized concerning whether or not delinquency should be considered an inherent trait of gang involvement. Definitions that omit delinquency are sometimes criticized or rejected because they would cause some social groups (e.g., Greek letter organizations, athletic teams, fraternal lodges) to be designated as gangs. Bursik and Grasmick (1993) urge caution, however, regarding the inclusion of the delinquent activities component because they fear it results in a tautology. Specifically, delinquency simultaneously serves as a possible outcome of gang involvement and a key component of the definition. On the other hand, several gang studies have excluded various groups *despite* their involvement in delinquency (i.e., hate groups, motorcycle clubs, prison gangs, and adolescent peer groups). These observations extend the focus beyond delinquency status and draw attention to the possible relevance of additional variables that may increase the odds of groups being labeled gangs (e.g., forms/seriousness of delinquency, characteristics of group members, and contexts where groups function).

Hagedorn (1988) has been particularly critical of gang scholars' acceptance of delinquency based definitions and maintains that the focus on delinquency has caused much contemporary gang research to focus primarily on trying to understand gang member delinquency and its consequences, rather than examining the context in which gangs develop and how they operate within their communities. The latter approach permits analyses of the function, for formation, and disbanding of gangs and thereby recognizes the fluidity of gang involvement. Hagedorn's criticism may be misplaced in that researchers who have accepted the delinquent component of gang definition have documented that gang membership is not a stable phenomenon. Specifically, youths transition in and out of gangs quite readily. Longitudinal studies have found that the typical gang member is in the gang for less than a year. Other literature does not preclude this either and acknowledges that playgroups may at times evolve into gangs and gangs may devolve into non gang like structures.

The lack of a standard definition regarding what constitutes a gang is problematic and yet holds promise for future research in this area. Bursik and Grasmick (1993) observe that, absent such, it is not possible to put forth definitive statements about the current state of gang involvement or make inferences about purported changes that have taken place over time. Horowitz (1990) notes, nonetheless, that consensus is unlikely and discord concerning definitions may in fact serve as a catalyst for future research in previously unexamined areas. This is an important opportunity for expanding gang research to gang like groups that might otherwise be excluded from study, or might inadvertently be classified as gangs.

GROUP STRUCTURES AND GANG TYPOLOGIES

The importance of group structure has generated interest among researchers concerned with distinguishing between particular gang types. Specifically, Maxson and Klein (1995) identified five classifications of gangs (traditional, neotraditional, compressed, collective, and specialty) characterized by age range, duration, size, the claiming of territory, the existence of subgroups, and whether offending patterns were specialized or varied. Such typologies are important beyond being extensions of gang definitions, as they clearly demonstrate the diversity of gangs. Recent scholarship on gangs demonstrates the relevance of this issue and recognizes that there is also variation among individual gang members.

Though scholars agree that gang involvement exists on a continuum rather than as an either/or status, most research on gang youth continues to sort these youths into gang versus non gang categories. Curry et al. (2002) point out that such an approach may fail to acknowledge that there are appreciable differences regarding levels of gang involvement. For instance, scholars have found that most youth, even those who reside in distressed communities with gangs, do not report gang membership. Curry et al. (2002: 283) note that many of these youths, however, acknowledge having "some level of gang involvement," suggesting an intermediary gang status. Because of difficulties

such as this, gang scholars have recently begun to use different methods to determine whether research subjects belonged to gangs.

The variation in approaches to studying gangs has made the pursuit of a unified definition for gang membership less likely. For example, some studies rely upon self nomination and others utilize official data to determine gang membership. This has important implications for the ability to understand the nature and extent of gang involvement as well as the characteristics of gang members, their behaviors, and where they are more likely to be geographically located.

FEMALE GANG INVOLVEMENT

For much of the history of gang research, gang involvement in most major metropolitan areas was considered a male phenomenon. In fact, scholars have been studying male involvement in gangs since the early 1900s. As recently as a decade ago, however, we had little more than cursory information about females' gang involvement, with few studies offering conclusions that were based on information from young women themselves. Historically, researchers have either stereotyped or simply dismissed as inconsequential young women's involvement in gangs. This is not the case today. The recent expanded focus concerning women's gang involvement brings to light that they are more involved in gangs than was previously thought and that their experiences within the gang are, in fact, rather varied.

Within the past two decades there has been unprecedented interest in the purported growth in the number of gangs across the nation. There has likewise been considerable attention paid to the role of females in that increase. Anne Campbell's (1984) innovative book on New York gang members, *The Girls in the Gang*, along with Joan Moore's (1991) study of Los Angeles gangs, *Going Down to the Barrio*, continue to influence gang scholars' examinations of the lives of gang involved young women. Contemporary research has also advanced our understanding of young women's lives in the context of their gang membership. It is no mystery that gang involved youth have garnered the attention of many criminologists

who have found that these youths engage in more delinquency than their non gang peers. In fact, research has demonstrated that gang involved female youth have higher rates of delinquency than their non gang peers of either gender.

FUTURE DIRECTIONS IN GANG RESEARCH

Gang members are responsible for a disproportionate amount of crime. Violent and other serious offenses, however, are more likely to come to the attention of the public and result in the misperception that these events are common in the context of gang membership. Involvement in crime accounts for a small portion of gang members' activities. In fact, the majority of their time is spent engaged in activities usually associated with adolescents (i.e., hanging out with friends, playing sports, watching television, and shopping).

It is important for social scientists to expand studies of delinquent youth groups beyond that of the standard gang/non gang dichotomy, especially since gangs (depending upon how they are defined) account for only a small percentage of delinquent groups. Specifically, there are other delinquent peer groups that are not gangs but also have relevance even in neighborhoods with gangs. These groups also impact adolescent development and should therefore be examined as well.

It is unrealistic to expect that youth in particular types of communities will not have gang involved family members, neighbors, or peers who they interact with at least minimally. The difficulty of discerning membership in gangs or other delinquent peer groups has implications for those who seek to intervene in the lives of youth. This is particularly important if membership in other groups is a precursor to more serious forms of delinquency or gang membership. If it is difficult for parents, school officials, and even other youth to distinguish between various peer groups and gangs, it must also be troublesome for law enforcement personnel. In fact, young people in certain neighborhood contexts comment frequently regarding their being mistaken by police as gang members.

The responses of law enforcement agents, however, have particular implications for young people. For example, external threats to non gang peer groups by law enforcement may serve to increase cohesion among members as it has been found to do among gangs. This is important given that suppression efforts have been problematic in addressing gangs that have loose organizational structures. It is likely that this approach would also be troublesome given that other delinquent peer groups are generally less organized than gangs.

Incorrectly responding to non gang groups of youths as though they were gangs might cause members to be increasingly socially isolated from conventional institutions that could be otherwise beneficial to them. The role of gang membership in the alienation of gang involved youths from prosocial groups has been observed in the literature. On the other hand, simply ignoring delinquent peer groups who are not gangs is also a strategy fraught with problems.

SEE ALSO: Crime, Organized; Criminology: Research Methods; Ethnography; Feminist Criminology; Gender, Deviance and; Groups; Juvenile Delinquency; Labeling; Popular Culture; Survey Research

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gay bashing

Michael Smyth and Valerie Jenness

Often subsumed under the contemporary rubric of "hate crime," "gay bashing" denotes the perpetration of violence aimed at people identified as, or assumed to be, homosexual, including gay men, lesbians, bisexuals, and transgendered individuals. Although examples of this type of bias motivated behavior range from acts of symbolic and rhetorical violence to physical assaults and homicide, selection of the victim based on his or her perceived non normative sexuality is common to gay bashing in all of its manifestations. The targeting of victims based on perceived sexuality may be seen as a function of perpetrators' hatred for individuals thought to be members of a despised sexual minority. Indeed, gay bashing constitutes a form of victimization and intimidation aimed not only at a primary target, but at the entire group to which that individual is thought to belong.

Violence against people presumed to be homosexual has been documented for as long as the lives of gay men and lesbians have been documented. Boswell (1980), for example, documented violence against gay men and lesbians in Western Europe from the beginning of the Christian era to the fourteenth century. In *Gay American History*, which covers a period of over 400 years, Jack Katz (1976) documented a history of violence directed at individuals because of their sexual orientation, identity, or same sex behavior. Although recent research indicates that young, otherwise relatively

powerless white males, acting most often in pairs or groups, are the most common perpetrators of physical violence against individuals thought to be homosexual, a variety of individuals, groups, and institutions, ranging from victims' intimates (Island & Lettellier 1991; Renzetti 1992), to strangers (Herek & Berrill 1992), to the state (Fout 1990), religion (Boswell 1980), education (Fone 2000), and medicine (Katz 1976), have been implicated in the perpetration of gay bashing.

In the twenty first century the incidence of various types of violence against homosexuals occurs globally, across regional and national boundaries, and across cultures and ethnicities. In many countries around the world, particularly in Africa, the Middle East, and Asia, non normative sexuality is outlawed and those suspected of not being entirely heterosexual are often arrested, imprisoned, and subjected to torture. In addition, many "homosexual" people are beaten, banished, and/or killed by non official individuals or groups in their own communities, often by their own families or kin. Traditional Islamic law, for example, calls for those committing homosexual acts to be stoned to death or, alternatively, they may be killed by their families as a matter of honor. Commonly, even in countries where the government does not actively participate in, or openly condone, violence against "homosexuals," a climate of homophobia pervades the culture to the extent that, when incidents of gay bashing occur, police and other officials look the other way.

Due in large part to their extreme brutality and ultimately fatal consequences, certain incidents of gay bashing have received widespread public attention. The murder of Matthew Shepard in 1998, for example, garnered unprecedented media coverage in the US after the 21 year old gay college student was pistol whipped, tied to a fence, and left to die. His two confessed killers were convicted of murder with aggravating circumstances after separate prosecutors successfully argued that the killing had been motivated by homophobia. Six months later, in 1999, a nail bomb exploded outside the Admiral Duncan, a gay pub in central London. Three pub patrons were killed outright and approximately 80 others injured, some suffering traumatic loss of limbs. Two separate, right wing splinter groups called the

BBC, claiming responsibility for the attack. Also in 1999, the press reported how the body of Billy Jack Gaither, a 39 year old textile worker in the US, was burned atop two old tires doused with kerosene after he was beaten to death by two men, who alleged that the openly gay victim had made an unwanted sexual advance toward them. Two years after Gaither's killing, the press began extensive coverage of the events surrounding the murder of Eddie "Gwen" Araujo, a transgender California teenager. After the victim's biological gender was revealed to them, Araujo was initially strangled and subsequently beaten to death by a trio of young men, with whom she/he previously had sexual relations. Ironically, in April 2004, David Morley, former manager of the Admiral Duncan pub, who survived the nail bomb attack in 1999, was beaten to death in London by a group of four teenagers in the fourth fatal incident of gay bashing in that city in as many months.

Notwithstanding their notoriety, fatal examples such as these are not characteristic of the majority of gay bashings. More commonly, victims of gay bashing report being the object of verbal assaults or having objects thrown at them, as well as being chased, kicked, punched, and beaten. A number of self report studies suggest that the perpetration of these types of non fatal gay bashing are widespread – a majority of gay men and lesbians indicating that they have experienced either actual or threatened violence because of their sexuality – and that these types of incidents are on the rise (National Gay and Lesbian Task Force 1991; von Schulthess 1992). In addition, the entire population of gay men and lesbians has experienced the sting of rhetorical violence perpetrated by anti homosexual politicians, religious conservatives, and others voicing a message of intolerance for sexual diversity.

In one of the first government sponsored efforts to assess the scope of anti "homosexual" violence perpetrated by individuals or groups (as opposed to institutional or state endorsed violence), the US Department of Justice commissioned a report on bias motivated violence in 1987. That report found that "homosexuals are probably the most frequent victims" of bias motivated violence (cited in Vaid 1995: 11). Shortly after the release of this groundbreaking report, the Federal Bureau of Investigation

(FBI) began to collect data on crimes committed because of bias against homosexuals as part of its larger effort to track bias crime in the US. Beginning in the early 1990s, the Uniform Crime Report (UCR) documents a consistent pattern of violence directed toward both male and female homosexuals. According to the UCR, although race based violence is the most frequently reported type of bias crime in the US, violence based on sexual orientation is a close second. Finally, according to the UCR, reported violence against gay men is more common than violence directed toward lesbians. More recently, analyses of these official data reveal that if one adjusts for population size, homosexuals are the most frequent victims of bias crime in the US.

In light of its historically ubiquitous and socially pervasive nature, recent research suggests that the portrayal of violence against "homosexuals" solely as a byproduct of hatred may discount the complexity of the phenomenon. Tomsen (2002), for example, found that many perpetrators view anti homosexual violence not simply as an expression of hatred, but as a means of policing the boundaries of acceptable male sexuality and attaining heightened male status for themselves. In his study of the motives underlying anti homosexual violence, Tomsen advances the notion that, if we are to accept homophobia as the motive for gay bashing, then our definition of the term must be more broadly conceived "to advance an understanding of the links that such acts of violence . . . have to commonplace forms of male identity" as they are construed within an overwhelmingly heteronormative society. In short, to understand gay bashing requires understanding the complexities of a larger sex/gender system in which they are inspired and manifest.

SEE ALSO: Hate Crimes; Homophobia; Homophobia and Heterosexism; Homosexuality; Race (Racism); Sexuality, Masculinity and; Violence

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gay gene

Edward Stein

The idea that a gene or set of genes makes some people sexually attracted to people of the same sex has become widely accepted over the past few decades. However, scientific evidence supporting the existence of a gay gene is inconclusive and the political and legal rationale some scientists have for the "search for the gay gene" (Hamer & Copeland 1994) is dubious.

Early in the twentieth century, geneticist Richard Goldschmidt (1916) suggested that the bodies of homosexuals did not "match" their sex chromosomes. According to this hypothesis, which was accepted by many people, gay men have female typical sex chromosomes and lesbians have male typical sex chromosomes.

This hypothesis was shown to be false about 40 years after Goldschmidt proposed it (Pare 1956) and it is not accepted even by those who believe in the existence of a gay gene.

Today, some scientists continue to look for genes that account for differences in sexual orientations. The search for the gay gene is at least initially plausible for various reasons, in particular, in light of several recent scientific studies that purport to show that sexual orientations are biologically based and that this biological basis is inborn or determined at an early age (LeVay 1996; Stein 1999: ch. 5). The most prominent study in the search for the gay gene was done by Hamer and colleagues (1993) and it is supposed to support the conclusion that a region of the X chromosome codes for male homosexuality.

Inside of each person's cells is an elaborate chain of DNA that is like a recipe for how to make that person's body. Isolating the role that a portion of genetic material plays in the development of a human is complicated, although the Human Genome Project has recently succeeded in doing just that. Identifying the specific genetic material that leads to complex psychological traits like a person's sexual dispositions is, however, much more difficult. There are, however, less direct ways to get evidence concerning the genetic basis of a trait besides isolating specific genetic material. One way to determine whether a trait is genetic is to study different types of twins. Identical twins have the exact same genes. Fraternal twins, though like identical twins in that they are born at the same time, are only as closely related as two non twin biological siblings are. Because identical twins are genetically identical, differences in characteristics between them must be due to differences in their pre- or post-natal environment, *not* their genes. This inference does not work in the other direction. If identical twins have the same trait, one cannot infer that this trait is genetic. If identical twins share a trait, it might be because they were raised in the same environment. For example, if both members of most pairs of identical twins know the Ten Commandments, this does not show that knowing the Ten Commandments is genetic. Applying these observations to sexual orientation, several studies suggest that sexual orientation runs in families (Pillard & Weinrich

1986; Pillard 1990). These studies indicate, for example, that the brother of a gay man is more likely to be gay than the brother of a straight man. These studies do not, however, establish that sexual orientation is genetic because most siblings, in addition to sharing about 50 percent of their genes, typically share many environmental variables.

To quantify the extent to which a trait is inherited, scientists have developed the concept of heritability, which represents the extent to which a trait was caused by genetic factors. Heritability is the ratio of genetically caused variation to the total variation among individuals with the trait. Heritability concerns the extent to which differences among people regarding a characteristic are caused by genetic differences. The heritability of a trait is importantly different from whether a trait is genetically determined; it captures some, but not all, aspects of our intuitive sense of genetic causation.

Consider one example. Having 10 fingers is a paradigmatic example of a trait that is genetically determined. The heritability of number of fingers is, however, quite low because having fewer than 10 fingers is typically due to environmental factors not correlated with genetic factors. Most cases of not having 10 fingers (though not all) are due to problems in fetal development (e.g., caused by the sleeping pill thalidomide) or to accidents (e.g., caused while cutting a bagel). The heritability of having fewer than 10 fingers is calculated by dividing the number of people who have fewer than 10 fingers due to genetic factors by the total number of people with fewer than 10 fingers. Since far more people have fewer than 10 fingers because of non genetic causes, the heritability of this trait will be low, despite the fact that having 10 fingers seems like a paradigmatic example of a trait that is genetically determined. The heritability of a trait is contingent on features of the environment. In an environment in which no one took thalidomide or cut off a finger accidentally, the heritability of having less than 10 fingers would be much higher. This highlights the difference between showing that a trait is heritable and showing that a trait is genetically determined (Stein 1999: 140–4).

Sophisticated heritability studies have been done to assess sexual orientation in same sex identical twins, same sex fraternal twins,

same sex non twin biological siblings, and similarly aged unrelated adopted siblings (Bailey & Pillard 1991; Bailey et al. 1993). The idea behind these studies is that if sexual orientation is genetic, then identical twins should have the same sexual orientation and the rate of homosexuality among the adopted siblings should be equal to the rate of homosexuality in the general population. If, on the other hand, identical twins are as likely to have the same sexual orientation as adopted siblings, then genetic factors make very little contribution to sexual orientation. In these studies, subjects were recruited through ads placed in gay publications that asked for gay or bisexual volunteers with twin or adoptive siblings of the same sex. Subjects were asked to rate their own sexual orientation, the sexual orientation of their relatives, and for permission to contact their siblings. In both heritability studies the concordance rates for identical twins were substantially higher than for fraternal twins. For example, 48 percent of the identical twins of lesbians were themselves lesbians, as were 16 percent of the fraternal twins, 14 percent of the non twin biological sisters, and 6 percent of the adoptive sisters (Bailey et al. 1993).

While these results are consistent with a genetic effect, there are various problems with these studies (Byne & Parson 1993; Stein 1999: 148–53), including biases in the sample populations. For, example the twin studies would lose their significance if gay men with gay identical twins are more likely to volunteer for such studies than are gay men with gay fraternal twins (Stein 1999: 191–5).

Building on the twin studies, Hamer and colleagues (1993) endeavored to isolate the portion of the human genome responsible for sexual orientation. Starting with the idea that homosexuality runs in families and is heritable, he recruited gay men using the same methods as the twin studies. Hamer's survey of this population pointed to a distinctive distribution of male homosexuality in his subjects' families: men on the mother's side of gay men's families were more likely to also be gay than men on the father's side. This pattern among gay men's families suggested to Hamer that male homosexuality, like, for example, color blindness, is inherited from one's mother in virtue of being carried on the X chromosome.

To test the hypothesis that there is a gene for homosexuality on the X chromosome, Hamer created a pool of subjects apparently enriched for the gene he was looking for and obtained DNA samples from two gay brothers in each of these families. These samples were then analyzed using linkage analysis to determine how frequently the brothers had matching genetic material in the X chromosome. Linkage analysis is a technique for narrowing the location of a gene using DNA "markers," which act like signposts scattered throughout the human genome. This technique enables scientists to determine the likelihood that two people share genetic material in a stretch of DNA. Hamer found a higher than expected percentage of the pairs of gay brothers had matching genetic sequences in a portion of the q28 region of the X chromosome (82 percent rather than 50 percent). While Hamer did not identify a particular genetic sequence associated with homosexuality, he did find that many of the pairs of homosexual brothers had matching genetic sequences in a region of the X chromosome.

There are several problems with Hamer's study. First, two independent research teams have failed to replicate his results (Bailey et al. 1993; Rice et al. 1999). The only replication was by Hamer's own group (Hu et al. 1995). Second, Hamer's study suffers from the same sort of sampling problems as the twin studies. Third, several commentators have expressed concerns about the most significant result of Hamer's research, namely, the increased rate of homosexuality on the mother's side of the gay men's families. Some have said that the different rate of homosexuality among maternal and paternal relatives is not statistically significant (Risch et al. 1993; McGuire 1995). Further, geneticist Neil Risch has suggested that the increased rate of homosexuality on the maternal side of gay men's families could be due to the fact that gay men are less likely to have offspring than men who are not gay. To see this, suppose that there is a gene that, in certain environments, tends to cause men to be gay and suppose that it is *not* carried on the X chromosome. Even so, in such environments, people would be less likely to inherit such a gene from their fathers because the gene, by hypothesis, tends to cause men to be gay, and gay men are less likely to have offspring than

other men. Thus, a gene linked to male homosexuality would appear maternally linked even if such a gene was not on the X chromosome.

More generally, linkage analysis is best suited for discovering the genetic basis of traits controlled in a genetically simple manner rather than traits that are controlled by several genes working in concert. This technique has mistakenly indicated that a specific genetic sequence plays a role in the development of a particular trait (Bailey 1995). Such mistakes are especially likely in the case of genetically complex traits, cognitively mediated psychological/behavioral traits, or those strongly affected by environmental factors. For these general reasons linkage analysis does not seem a promising technique for the study of sexual orientation.

These concerns aside, Hamer's study simply does not justify talk about gay genes. Genes in themselves cannot directly cause a behavior or a psychological phenomenon. Genes direct RNA synthesis that in turn leads to the production of a protein that in turn may influence the development of psychological dispositions and particular behaviors. There are many intervening pathways between a gene and a behavior or a behavioral disposition, and even more intervening variables between a gene and a cognitively mediated behavior. The concept "gay gene" has no meaning unless one proposes that a particular gene, perhaps through a hormonal mechanism, organizes the brain specifically to support the desire to have sex with people of the same sex (Byne 1996). No one has presented evidence in support of such a simple and direct link between genes and sexual orientation (Allen 1997; Byne 1996; Stein 1999: ch. 7).

In light of this, why are so many people interested in finding the gay gene? For many, including some scientists, the motivation is the legal/ethical/political intuition that proof of a gay gene would establish the wrongness of discrimination against lesbians, gay men, and bisexuals and the wrongness of withholding from them legal and social benefits that heterosexuals take for granted (LeVay 1996). There are several problems with this intuition (Hamer & Copeland 1994: ch. 13; Allen 1997; Stein 1999: chs. 10–12). First, even if there is a gay gene, a person's public identity, sexual activities, romantic relationships, and involvement in childrearing are all not determined by

genes even according to those who believe in a gay gene. Even if there is a gay gene, society could enforce extreme legal and social sanctions against lesbians, gay men, and bisexuals for their behaviors, identifications, and public expressions. Many human characteristics believed to be genetic – like dispositions toward disease, mental illness, or alcoholism – are highly stigmatized and people go to great lengths to avoid them. Even if there was a gay gene, homosexuality might still be deemed a disease or a socially undesirable characteristic, which might result in pressure to “cure” or prevent the birth of homosexuals. The search for the gay gene is thus not only scientifically unproven, but the legal and political motivations for this research are questionable and the social implications of this research are uncertain.

SEE ALSO: Essentialism and Constructionism; Homosexuality; Medical Sociology and Genetics; Sexuality Research: History; Sexuality Research: Methods

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gay and lesbian movement

Stephen Valocchi

The gay and lesbian movement refers to the manifold collective efforts to benefit people with same sex desire. Although an organized movement first appeared in Germany in the late nineteenth century, this effort was

shortlived. The first sustained activities, organizations, and network building for the positive recognition of lesbians and gays and the improvement of their social and political conditions appeared in the United States in the 1940s and 1950s with the establishment of three organizations: the Mattachine Society, an organization for men which devoted itself mainly to social support in a climate of profound public hostility; the Daughters of Bilitis, an organization that concerned itself with the unique challenges of women with same sex desire at a time when women were supposed to be dependent on men for economic and social support; and *One Inc.*, which existed only as a monthly magazine and promoted the view that gay people, rather than psychiatrists or lawyers, are the most qualified to speak for themselves. With the exception of *One Inc.*, these organizations stressed respectability and the desire to be accepted into mainstream society.

In the 1960s, the gay and lesbian movement entered a new phase as social movements created a more militant climate for disenfranchised groups in the United States and forced the movement to shift its focus, strategy, and goals. Following the Stonewall Riots of 1969 sparked by a routine police raid on a gay bar in Greenwich Village in New York City, the movement devoted itself to two somewhat conflicting goals: the pursuit of a variety of civil rights reforms, from the passage of anti discrimination legislation to the elimination of sodomy laws, and the pursuit of fundamental social change aimed at eradicating homophobia, heterosexism, and sexual repression. The Gay Activists Alliance was most closely associated with the former pursuit, the Gay Liberation Front with the latter. By the end of the 1970s, the liberationist impulse had dissipated but the rights based approach proved somewhat successful. At both the local and state levels, people joined organizations and promoted initiatives to combat discrimination against gays and lesbians. The strategy of "coming out of the closet," making public one's identity as gay or lesbian, contributed to this rights based focus since it helped build a group identity, thus giving gays and lesbians access to similar language of pride and positive strategies used by other minoritized groups.

The development of the movement during this time cannot be told without reference to the tensions between men and women in the movement and to their subsequently different trajectories of community building. Post Stonewall collaboration between men and women was sporadic as women experienced homophobia in women's liberation groups and sexism in men led gay groups. Nonetheless, the profound influence of the women's movement led many women to build lesbian feminist organizations identified more by women's resistance to patriarchy than by women's sexual desire for other women. This tendency led in the 1980s to the development of women identified institutions, from bookstores and cafés to sexual assault and rape crisis centers. During this same time gay men were building their own networks of community institutions, but these were of a more commercialized nature in the form of bars, nightclubs, neighborhoods, and sex clubs.

Given the association of gay men with a liberalized sexual culture and lesbians with feminism, it is not surprising that the visibility of the gay and lesbian movement in the late 1970s and 1980s led to the rise of a significant countermovement in the form of the religious right. Their many campaigns directed at state and local gay civil rights ordinances were successful not only in reversing some of these gains, but also, perhaps more importantly, in reviving the rhetoric of immorality from the earlier pre Stonewall era. This countermovement and the election of a conservative Republican administration in 1980 left the movement vulnerable and the community without political support when AIDS started killing thousands of gay men.

The AIDS epidemic had several consequences for the movement. First, issues of treatment, care, and funding came to dominate the agenda of the movement in the 1980s and early 1990s. Second, it led to the establishment of a dense network of AIDS service, advocacy, and treatment organizations that emerged fairly rapidly due to the already established community and health based resources of the gay and lesbian community. Third, its widespread impact brought many more people into the movement and propelled the movement into a period of heightened mobilization. Fourth, because of the involvement of many lesbians in

this new mobilization and in those care giving organizations, it led to a closer association between men and women in movement initiatives than had been the case since the 1970s.

The epidemic was also partly responsible for a brief but notable shift in focus for some segments of the movement in the 1990s. Dissatisfied with its narrowly rights focused, assimilation based goals, a new militancy invigorated the movement, first in the form of ACTUP (AIDS Coalition to Unleash Power), then with organizations such as Queer Nation and the Lesbian Avengers. These organizations rejected the standard definitions of gay, claimed the more non normative moniker of "queer," and embraced direct action strategies that were directed both at social institutions like the government and the medical establishment and at the general culture, seen by these activists as homophobic, sexist, and anti pleasure.

Various internal challenges also characterized the movement at this time, all of which signaled a loosening of the dominant identity categories of gay and lesbian. Women and men of color, bisexuals, and transgendered activists challenged the white middle class nature of the movement and its notion of a fixed salient identity defined by sex of object choice and insisted the movement take their concerns seriously. Many women in the 1990s also rebelled against the rigid definitions of lesbian feminism by rejecting the androgynous styles and sex negative attitudes of some segments of this community, embracing leather and sadomasochist sexual repertoires and reviving and re eroticizing butch-femme modes of style and embodiment.

The most recent developments in the lesbian and gay movement can be understood against the backdrop of the somewhat more favorable political climate of the 1990s, the heightened cultural visibility of gays and lesbians in the media, and the growth of centralized advocacy organizations. Taken together, these developments led the movement to pursue several top down policy initiatives with more resources and with a wider set of strategies than ever before. The issue of gays in the military consumed much of the movement's attention throughout this period: first in organizing to push President Clinton to make good on his

campaign promise to end discrimination against gays and lesbians; then in trying to undo the damage done by Clinton's "don't ask, don't tell" policy, which had the effect of expelling from the military men and women who expressed any statement of same sex desire. Most recently, the movement and the nation have been captivated by the push to legalize same sex marriages in the United States. Partly in response to court challenges in Hawaii and Massachusetts, the movement has marshaled tremendous resources to support these lawsuits, to prevent anti same sex marriage bills from being introduced into state legislatures and in Congress, and to push for civil unions, domestic partnerships, and bona fide marriage. Both of these policy initiatives – gays in the military and same sex marriage – signal a decided return to a rights based, assimilation focused orientation to the gay and lesbian movement.

As is the case with any number of social movements, the gay and lesbian movement presents sociologists with opportunities to study the dynamics of collective action: the conditions that led to its emergence, the internal development of resources, community, and consciousness, the framing strategies the movement uses, the relationship between the collective identity and the goals the movement seeks, and the factors affecting success and failure.

Until the late 1980s, with a couple of exceptions (Adam 1978; Altman 1971), the gay and lesbian movement was not systematically studied by sociologists. Until that time homosexuality was mainly studied in the context of deviance, subcultural formations, and the formation of a homosexual identity via symbolic interaction. It was mainly the impact of the social movements of the 1960s that transformed sociology's understanding of homosexuality from a deviance perspective to the study of a minority group. It was also due to the development of theoretical frameworks that viewed collective action not as a consequence of collective alienation but as politics by other means. Resource mobilization and political process approaches called attention to the structure of opportunities in the political environment and the quantity and quality of resources of the constituency which in turn affect the emergence and success of social movements directed mainly

at the state. New social movement approaches emphasize a wide array of post scarcity movements, sometimes organized on the basis of social identities and directed not primarily to the state but to challenge “stigmatizing public discourses and representations” (Seidman 1993: 108) of different social groups. Both frameworks informed sociologists’ study of the gay and lesbian movement.

Since the 1980s sociologists who have studied the movement have focused on five sets of issues. The first set involves research on the structural conditions that led to the emergence of an organized movement. This research has stressed the importance of the rise of industrial capitalism, changes in the nature of the family accompanying capitalism, the impact of bureaucracy on intimacy among men, and the rise of medical science. These factors taken together had contradictory consequences: on the one hand, they created the contexts whereby individuals with same sex eroticism could turn that practice into an identity and find others in urban areas who did the same. On the other hand, these same factors named the identity as pathological, established a medical and regulatory apparatus to police the identity, and created the (homo)phobia regarding expressions of same sex emotional intimacy or sexual expression. These conditions generated the political opportunities, resources, and grievances that led to mobilization on the basis of a sexual identity defined by sex of object choice.

A second set of issues involves research on the goals of the movement. The initial impulse of the movement had been the desire to change the way the culture views homosexuality: the movement emerged in a society that saw homosexuality as sin, sickness, or crime. Later, the movement shifted to working for civil rights through the state and other social institutions. This dual emphasis of the movement on changing culture and changing laws and policies makes it an interesting case study for sociologists since it allows them to engage issues of reform versus structural change, assimilation versus transformation. Work on this issue has focused on specifying the historically variable conditions that influence whether movement actors will focus on politics, culture, or some combination of the two. This research strategy brings together the concerns of political process

and resource mobilization approaches with political climate, resources, and networks and the concerns of new social movements’ perspectives on changing norms and belief systems and with building a collective identity.

The third set of research issues involves the ways that the movement constructs and reconstructs collective identity. Collective identity refers to the shared definition of a group that derives from members’ common interests, experiences, and solidarity. Another unique feature of the gay and lesbian movement derived from the socially constructed nature of sexuality is its concern with defining the constituency: who is the “we” that the movement represents? This feature has proven more pressing as conflicts between men and women, and battles over the inclusion of bisexual, transgendered, and intersexed persons have taken place. These battles are about the collective identity of the movement. Research on this issue seeks to explain how the boundaries are established and who gets to police them. It focuses on the material, organizational, and symbolic factors such as the class interests supporting the collective identity, the organizational structure that prevents other competing definitions from taking shape, and the symbolic messages embedded in the collective identity about “respectability” that is then communicated to the larger culture.

Related to this set of issues is a fourth focus on framing. Framing refers to “an interpretive schemata” (Snow & Benford 1992: 137) that distills the message or messages of the movement for several purposes: to recruit a constituency, create a collective identity, craft strategy, and gain outside support. Framing is fraught with dilemmas for all social movements since frames try to satisfy a number of potentially conflicting agendas. For the gay and lesbian movement, this is particularly significant given its framing as both a political and a cultural movement, the fractious nature of the collective identity, and the strength of the countermovement. Research on this issue has typically demonstrated the tensions occurring between a civil rights framing strategy – a dominant frame of many social movements – and other strategies derived from the varied nature of the movement. Frames such as sexual liberation or institutional heterosexism have competed with the civil rights frame, and these competing

frames rise and fall in tandem with internal struggles around collective identity and the external opportunity structure.

A fifth focus is the impact of queer theory and politics on the study of the gay and lesbian movement. Queer theory has called attention to the instability of sex and gender categories and stresses the performative nature of identities thought to be rooted in anatomy or culture. Queer politics extends this deconstructive analysis and critiques the gay and lesbian movement for its essentialist definition of sexual identity, its construction of exclusionary boundaries, and its stabilization of the identities of gay and lesbian. According to this critique, identity based strategies for social change deny the fluidity inherent in sexuality and invalidate the experiences of others with non normative sexuality who may not easily fit the class and race or western inflected definition of the identity. In addition, identity based strategies reinforce the boundaries between gay and straight, man and woman, and thus reproduce the hierarchical relationship between the dominant and the subordinate terms of the sex/gender system. This challenge to the essentialist model of sexual identity of the traditional gay and lesbian movement was first made by ACTUP with its boundary crossing and label disrupting tactics and by bisexual and transgendered people who exemplify the kind of boundary crossing embraced by queer politics.

Research on the movement that has used queer insights has focused on the internal and external pressures that affect when identity stabilizing and identity deconstructing frames and strategies will be used, noting both the concrete gains made through interest group politics and the cultural challenges made through identity blurring queer politics. A queer inflected understanding of social movements has also broadened the repertoire of collective action to include strategies such as political theater, performance art, and drag. This broadening dovetails with the cultural concerns of the movement as well as with the deconstruction of sexual and gender identities that now informs some segments of the contemporary movement. The challenge for sociologists in our future work is to extend, refocus, or alter our theoretical models of emergence, development, and impact to explain collective

action repertoires as diverse as the sit down strikes of the 1930s and the drag shows of the twenty first century.

SEE ALSO: Collective Identity; Culture, Social Movements and; Framing and Social Movements; Homophobia; Homophobia and Heterosexism; Lesbian Feminism; New Social Movement Theory; Political Process Theory; Queer Theory; Resource Mobilization Theory; Social Movements

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Gellner, Ernst (1925–95)

Rodanthi Tzanelli

Perhaps one of the most prolific scholars of the twentieth century, Ernst Gellner remains a highly influential figure across many disciplines (sociology, history, anthropology, and philosophy). He was born in Paris, but was of Czech Jewish parentage and he grew up in Czechoslovakia. In 1939, with the resurgence of anti-Semitism in Central Europe, he moved to England, where he spent most of his life. During World War II he served in the Czechoslovakian Armored Brigade (1944–5), and later

he returned to Oxford, where he received a degree in politics, philosophy, and economics. From 1949 until 1984 he was in the department of sociology at the London School of Economics (LSE), where he completed his doctorate in social anthropology (1961) and became professor of philosophy (1962–84). He was, among other things, Visiting Fellow at Harvard (1952–3), the University of California, Berkeley (1968), and the Centre de Recherches et d'Études sur les Sociétés Méditerranéennes (1978–9), member of the Social Science Research Council (1980–6), and Chairman of the International Activities Committee (1982–4). Between 1993 and 1995 he was Director of the Centre for the Study of Nationalism at the Central European University in Prague, where he died in 1995.

Gellner's initial philosophical inquiry involved a critique of linguistic philosophy as conservative, parochial, and restrictive. His *Words and Things* (1959) suggested a sociohistorical approach to theory, which contextualizes schools of thought and questions the ideological subtext of their theses. His critical approach to intellectual production and its sociopolitical origins, which was exemplified in his critique of Oxford philosophical parochialism, earned him many friends and enemies in the social sciences. The same critical spirit guided him later, when he reconsidered other hegemonic systems of thought, such as Islamism, psychoanalysis, relativism, and hermeneutics. An early application of this formula can be seen in *Thought and Change* (1964), where Gellner suggested that nationalism legitimates social order, especially in countries in which modernization led to social fragmentation. This Marxist conception of nationalism as a hegemonic product was reconsidered and modified by Gellner himself in his later work, but was never wholly abandoned.

Gellner's anthropological explorations began with *The Saints of Atlas* (1969), a study of Moroccan Berbers and their system of thought. In this study, Gellner defended the value of Berber conceptual frameworks of the world that contest institutional structures derived from the centralized Moroccan state model but enable an organization of social life based on indigenous beliefs. The same themes of local knowledge and hegemonic thought, particularity and

fabricated universality occupied Gellner in *Patrons and Clients* (1977) and *Muslim Society* (1981). Likewise, he developed an interest in Soviet anthropology and its theoretical subtleties that were depreciated by western Marxists. His edited volume *Soviet and Western Anthropology* (1980) marks an attempt to bring together different ways of implementing Marxism in the social sciences. His interest in Soviet politics and society found renewed expression in *Conditions of Liberty: Civil Society and its Rivals* (1994), in which he offered a brilliant reassessment of Marxism through an investigation of the conditions of modernity. *Conditions of Liberty* is deemed to be one of the most scholarly contributions in the study of civil society and its future in a post communist Russia overtaken by market values.

Gellner had a longstanding interest in the phenomenon of nationalism and its different manifestations in Western, Central, Southern European and other, non European, societies. In *Nations and Nationalism* (1983) and *Nationalism* (1997) he examined the rise of nationalism as an ideal that advocates the dominance of a uniform culture. Revising or revisiting some of the ideas he introduced in the 1950s, he argued that nations emerge when local cultures are replaced by the culture of the “nation,” which assimilates or eradicates deviating ways of living. Often, but not always, identifying the nation with the nation state, Gellner located the emergence of national culture in the modern conditions that prevailed with the extinction of close knit, agrarian communities and the advance of industrialization that resulted in social mobility and alienation. In this context, citizenship became the primary loyalty of the nation’s participants. A homogeneous educational system that promotes common traditions, beliefs, and language is sustained by the ruling elites, so that the nation’s members, equally educated, can move flexibly between places and roles without compromising the nation’s solidarity. At times Gellner replaces the industrialization model with the advent of Enlightenment rationality; a modernist at heart, he located the emergence of national identity in the post Enlightenment era. Gellner’s theory was criticized by Anthony Smith, one of his students and a defender of the ethnic, historical origins of nations (an argument encapsulated in

Smith’s concept of *ethnie*). In October 1995 an open debate was held at the University of Warwick between Gellner and Smith, in which Gellner defended the civic model of nationalism in opposition to Smith’s ethnic model. The Gellner–Smith dialogue was published in *Nations and Nationalism* (1996), the journal of the Association for the Study of Ethnicity and Nationalism based at the LSE and chaired by Smith, in 1996. Gellner was invited to continue this debate at the LSE, but he died a few months before the event.

For some, Gellner’s research trajectory appears to be fragmented and lacking a coherent agenda. This is partially because his interests spanned many disciplines and subject areas. Often, Gellner changed his views on phenomena he analyzed, or developed ideas that initially appeared in the form of essays, rather than extensive monographs. His work, however, has been influential in sociology and social anthropology, and still informs the study of culture, nationalism, and modern identity.

SEE ALSO: Ethnicity; Marxism and Sociology; Modernization; Nation State; Nationalism

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gender, aging and

Tomi Calasanti

Interest and research in gender and aging have progressed through a variety of different phases, each spurred by developments in both feminist scholarship and aging studies. While each stage has emerged from the previous, all can be found in contemporary theory and research.

The first stage, which can be further subdivided into two approaches, involved a focus on women. Spurred by the 1970s women's movement, in the early 1980s some scholars of aging began to question the lack of explicit attention paid to aging women. This was obvious in such topic areas as retirement, where women were routinely excluded from research. Even national, large scale data sets, such as the longitudinal retirement study undertaken by the Social Security Administration in the 1970s, only included women as primary respondents after their husbands had died. The presumed split between private and public spheres fostered a belief that paid labor was central only to men's identities and that, for women, retirement was either irrelevant or unimportant.

Two attempts to address the neglect of women in aging research ensued, each representing a somewhat different approach. The first simply added women to research. Similar to what had occurred in other areas of sociology, scholars began to include women in studies or investigate them on their own. However, this "add women and stir" tactic simply placed women into models and theories that derived from men's experiences. Conceptually, gender remained an individual attribute, a demographic characteristic with no structural properties. For example, noting differences between men and women's labor force participation histories led to the conclusion that women's intermittent work histories result in lower retirement benefits. Why and how women's work histories

differed, or why policies such as Social Security or defined benefit plans rewarded stable labor force participation were neither questioned nor explored. Similarly, the equation of workforce participation with adequate retirement finances assumed a gender neutral workplace in which women and men reap similar rewards.

As important as this movement toward inclusion was, using men as the explicit or implicit reference group ultimately rendered women deviant. Results and subsequent theorizing viewed women in terms of how closely they did or did not approximate male models, but revealed little about women themselves. In addition, the ways in which subsequent "differences" could be interpreted and used were problematic. Gibson (1996) pointed to the bias in the ways scholars typically discuss gender differences in old age, noting that men are used as the implicit standard and women are described as deviating from it. This has critical implications for future theory, research, and policies.

The realization that simply adding women into preexisting studies and theories rendered them as the "other" spawned a movement to examine women on their own terms. Spurred by developments in feminist scholarship, scholars undertook a second response to the neglect of women, that of centering on women's experiences from their own standpoint. More common in the 1990s, research that has centered on women has allowed for a reformulation of methods and theories that incorporate women's experiences as well as men's.

For example, in contrast to the model intended to discern if women were more or less satisfied with retirement than men, research beginning with women's experiences revealed that, for most women, leaving the labor force meant leaving only one job, a paid job. For the most part, women retained their domestic labor responsibilities. This does not necessarily diminish their satisfaction with retirement, but certainly shapes their experiences of this time of life in a different way from men's. Indeed, the notion of being "free" in retirement does not mean the cessation of work for women, but instead a reduced work load (for which they may well be grateful). The heightened focus on unpaid labor that resulted from centering on retired women also refocused attention on the productive activities of old people, both

men and women. While unpaid, the varieties of domestic and volunteer activities (to use just two examples) in which old people engage are vital to the economy. In particular, their unpaid labor is called upon to compensate for the increasing retraction of the state from social reproduction, and the formation of policies that continue to leave such activities as caregiving, for young and old, to "families" (i.e., women). The lack of state help and inadequate policies mean that, for instance, grandparents (particularly grandmothers) play an increasingly important role in child rearing, not only in a custodial role but also as day care providers for children who work. Without this important labor, state coffers would be strained and the economic activities of younger generations would be constrained. Thus, the focus on women in this instance has led to transformations in concepts about work, productivity, and retirement.

Continued evolution of the feminist approach in sociology and in aging studies has led to a movement away from a focus on women and aging to the second stage, with its focus on gender and aging. This implies not so much a movement away from examining women as a refinement of the theoretical lens. Centering on women's experiences leads to more explicit theories regarding power in gender relations. Further, it recognizes explicitly that both women and men have gender: "gender and aging" refers to everyone, and not just to women. From this standpoint, gender is taken to be characteristic of both social organizations and identities, embedded in social relationships at all levels, from individual interactions to institutional processes. Men and women gain identities and power in relation to one another with important ramifications for life chances (Hess 1992). As a power relation, gender describes a hierarchical system wherein men's privileges are intimately tied to women's disadvantages. This relational quality means that the situation of one gender cannot be understood without at least implicit reference to the position of the other. As a social organizing principle, then, gender shapes individual interactions as well as policy formation.

The theoretical shift toward viewing gender relations can be seen in many areas of aging research. Depicting both work and family as playing roles in both men's and women's lives

in old age is but one example. To push our example of retirement further still, a focus on gender relations over the life course sees women's and men's experiences of retirement as an outcome of the ways in which each is advantaged or disadvantaged in relation to one another in paid labor, unpaid (domestic) labor, and retirement. The presence and absence of family ties, or domestic labor, paid labor, and the like, are expressions of gender relations. It is not simply that women are constrained by families when they work for pay, or that this domestic labor shapes their retirement by lowering pensions and maintaining their burdens of housework. Both domestic and paid labor realms also influence men's *higher* retirement finances and relative freedom. That is, husbands' abilities to have successful careers rest on the unpaid work of their wives just as surely as this domestic responsibility constrains women's paid labor. Similarly, women's continued responsibility for domestic labor in later life underlies (some) men's ability to be "free" in retirement.

A newer, more sophisticated reformulation of theory results from the greater emphasis on gender relations. Attending to women and men in relation to one another also stimulates greater research interest in masculinity and men. Understanding the processes by which disadvantage occurs necessitates a similar comprehension of privileging processes and struggles. Implicit when we acknowledge that men's freedom in retirement links to women's unpaid labor, this becomes explicit in the next step when we explore the processes that privilege men in the workplace and home. Similarly, we would also investigate the relationship between privilege and widowers' risk for institutionalization or loneliness in later life. In this instance, husbands' more dominant household position also means that women are generally the ones to do the work of daily life and maintain networks. Viewing gender relations in relation to aging thus requires seeing privilege (just as we would disadvantage) as a dynamic, one that must be constantly reasserted and that this in itself has consequences for aging as well. Similarly, some of the same aspects of gender relations that are part and parcel of women's disadvantage may also emerge as sources of strength in later life.

The focus on power relations, and greater recognition of the dynamics of oppression and privilege, have led many to an emerging third stage, which emphasizes intersections of inequalities. Just as gender shapes aging, so other social hierarchies, such as those based on race, ethnicity, class, and sexuality, influence both gender and aging. From this vantage point, to speak of “gender and aging” becomes less apt. Old men and women do not exist outside their racial, sexual, and class based locations. For example, when we look only at old men and women, we see a much higher incidence of poverty among the latter. But when we look at race, for example, we find that, as a group, black men have lower Social Security incomes than do white women. Similarly, black women who live alone have a much higher incidence of poverty than their male or white counterparts despite longer labor force histories. How then can we discuss gender and poverty in old age? As a result, scholars working in this nuanced area increasingly focus on diversity and intersecting hierarchies, and not simply on gender.

As the example of retirement shows, the focus on gender and aging – in all three phases – has led to many insights that have advanced, and often redirected, scholarship. One of the first insights was the existence of a “double standard of aging” that not only devalues women at an earlier age than men, but also leads to age discrimination in the workforce earlier in women’s lives. Since then, scholars of gender and aging have continued transforming a wide array of research areas. In relation to health, for instance, researchers go beyond noting gender differences in life expectancies and health conditions to ask *why* these variations prevail, and how they relate to power relations. They point to such things as how men’s attempts to achieve dominant ideals of masculinity lead them to take physical risks that women do not take; they also seek out and follow doctors’ advice less frequently, actions that will adversely influence their health in later life. Similarly, scholars seek to understand how women’s social location makes them more vulnerable to particular health conditions and forms a context in which such ailments will play out in old age. Thus, among other issues, analysts might point to the gender bias in Medicare that provides coverage for acute illnesses, to which men are more

prone, rather than chronic conditions, which more frequently plague women, and the ramifications this might have for such things as nursing home utilization. Going further still, the diversity approach explores racial and ethnic disparities in health over the life course as this relates to occupational conditions, access to health care, and a greater reliance on Medicaid to fund nursing home placement.

Looking at other areas of research, we see that the kinds of grandparenting roles undertaken are closely related to race, ethnicity, class, and gender; those with full time care of grandchildren are more likely to be black or Hispanic women with lower incomes. We cannot simply speak of the ways that aging influences sexuality in later life, or even women’s relationships with their bodies, as it appears that old black women, for instance, are far more accepting of diverse body types and also more likely to see themselves in sexual terms than are their white counterparts. Finally, the particular historical and economic conditions under which many contemporary, working class black men have labored means that along with dissolution of first marriages, earlier family ties often become strained as well. As a result, they are especially vulnerable to isolation and institutionalization should they become widowed or divorced in later life. The importance of these and similar findings lies in terms of the recognition that practice and policy interventions, for example, must take into account the differences among the concerns and issues of various old people.

The gender and aging scholarship has advanced tremendously, especially in recent years. However, it is still a one way relationship, with gender scholars often influencing aging research but not vice versa. Still to come, then, is gender scholars’ recognition of age relations and the ways in which they intersect and influence gender. The limited discussion of how gender might change over the life course among some aging scholars is not the same as viewing age itself as a power relation that shapes people’s interactions, resources, and life chances. Recognition of age relations suggests an array of promising directions for future studies. We should ask how men, even those with the most privilege, lose status with age and struggle with younger men for power, and how this might shape their aging. Greater attention to age

inequality will, in turn, allow researchers and practitioners more fully to view people in a life course context. Recognizing that ageism permeates the lives of all old people, regardless of their level of privilege in earlier life, also has tremendous emancipatory potential. The realization that ageism is the one oppression all will face could provide a bridge across many groups defined by power relations, and spur those with greater privilege to think about and understand disadvantage.

SEE ALSO: Aging, Demography of; Aging and Social Support; Cultural Diversity and Aging: Ethnicity, Minorities, and Subcultures; Gender, Health, and Mortality; Gerontology: Key Thinkers (Hess Beth); Intersectionality

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gender bias

Jennifer Rothchild

Gender bias is behavior that shows favoritism toward one gender over another. Most often, gender bias is the act of favoring men and/or boys over women and/or girls. However, this is not always the case. In order to define gender bias completely, we first must make a distinction between the terms gender and sex. When we use the term *gender*, we mean socially constructed expectations and roles for women and men, for girls and boys. Specifically, girls and women are expected to demonstrate feminine behavior, and boys and men are expected to act masculine. By *sex*, we mean biological differences assigned to females and males in order to distinguish between the two. The biological characteristics assigned to females and males often consist of primary or secondary sex characteristics.

The term gender bias is often (wrongly) used interchangeably with the term sexism. *Sexism* is typically defined as the subordination of one sex, usually female, based on the assumed superiority of the other sex (Kendall 2005) or an ideology that defines females as different from and inferior to males (Andersen & Taylor 2005). Sex is the basis for the prejudice and presumed inferiority implicit in the term sexism. The term *gender bias* is more inclusive than the term sexism, as it includes both prejudice (attitudes) and discrimination (behavior) in its definition. Studies of gender bias also focus on gender, rather than on sex. Further more, the term gender bias could include instances of bias against boys and men in addition to bias against girls and women. This raises an important question: Are boys and men harmed by gender bias? While individual boys and men may suffer at the hands of gender bias, boys and men as groups benefit from gender bias embedded in our social institutions. The narrow benefits of gender bias for some are outweighed by much broader losses for all (Neubeck & Glasberg 2005). And if gender roles and expectations constrain both girls and boys and both women and men, it can be said that gender bias limits the overall development of contemporary societies.

GENDER BIAS: PERVASIVE INFLUENCE

Gender bias is part of almost every aspect of life. The most common areas of gender bias are found in the social institutions of families, education, the economy, and health.

Within the Household

At the household level, there is documented evidence of gender bias in the allocation of resources. Patriarchal households are maintained through power and control in the hands of men, particularly fathers, as the heads of households. Specifically, gendered roles assigned as “breadwinner husband” and “homemaker wife” lead to unequal distributions of power within the household. However, the numbers of dual income families and female headed households are growing rapidly in the US. Consequently, women’s and men’s attitudes towards sharing work in the household have changed over the years. Both women and men often face conflict between work and family. The juggling of work and family is complicated by the power differences between women and men in families, and these power differences often confirm gender roles, with women typically desiring more change than men (Andersen 2003). Along these lines of power differentials, gender bias within families can come in the form of violence as well. While it is certainly not the case in every family, women are significantly more likely than men to be physically abused and injured by their intimate partners (Renzetti & Curran 2003).

In Education

Gender bias is embedded in education from pre kindergarten through graduate school. Teachers provide important messages about gender through both the formal content of their instruction and materials utilized, as well as informal interactions with students (which is commonly referred to as the hidden curriculum). Gender related messages from teachers and other students often reinforce gender roles first taught at home (Kendall 2005).

Researchers have consistently found that teachers give more time, effort, and attention to

boys than to girls (Sadker & Sadker 1994). Gender bias exists in textbooks and instructional materials as well. Women are often under represented in course materials and/or are presented in stereotypical roles. Over time, gender bias in education undermines girls’ and women’s self esteem and discourages them from taking courses such as math, science, and engineering (Raffalli 1994).

In the Economy

While it is estimated that 60 percent of all women work in the paid labor force (US Bureau of Labor Statistics 2003), women, on average, make up a weaker position in the labor market than men. Specifically, they are more likely to be unemployed, employed in temporary jobs, or employed part time. Because of gender bias embedded in the labor market, women in the US are paid, on average, 76 cents to every dollar in wages that men are paid. Rates for women of color are even lower: 66 cents for African American women and 54 cents for Latinas. More than one million women work in jobs that pay less than the federal minimum wage (Neubeck & Glasberg 2005). Sociologists have argued that this is not a reflection of educational differences between women and men; rather, it is a product of gender bias in employment, promotion, and pay. The gender biased economic system encourages women to go into traditional “women’s jobs,” and this serves employers well: they are able to pay women lower salaries for traditional “women’s jobs” than for traditional “men’s jobs.”

In Health

The US health care system has long been dominated by men – from doctors to researchers to administrators. While more and more women are entering medical school and medical related fields, gender bias is still embedded in the system. As discussed above, women, on average, make up a weaker position in the labor market than men. Thus, they are less likely to occupy positions that offer adequate health care insurance, even when they work full time (Neubeck & Glasberg 2005). Female headed households are affected by this most strongly,

as they are more likely to be poor than male headed or dual headed households.

Biases and shortcomings in the health care system's treatment of women contribute to the problems women face in getting adequate medical care (Ratcliff 2002). Specifically, gender bias embedded in the US health care system contributes to very little research done on health problems pertaining to women. For example, women have been largely excluded as research subjects in studies sponsored by the federal National Institutes of Health (NIH).

CONCLUSION

In addition to the social institutions reviewed here, gender bias is embedded in the media, sports, the state/government, and other social institutions. Gender is so pervasive in contemporary society that we often do not notice gender bias in our everyday lives. However, gender itself is not a variable that stands alone. Our race, ethnicity, social class, sexual orientation, and other social positions affect our everyday gendered experiences. Therefore, gender bias regularly intersects with other forms of bias such as ethnocentrism, racism, classism, and homophobia.

While it may appear gender bias disadvantages girls and women the most, gender bias, as well as other forms of bias, shortchanges all of us.

SEE ALSO: Gender Ideology and Gender Role Ideology; Gender Mainstreaming; Gender Oppression; Gendered Organizations/Institutions; Intersectionality; Sex and Gender

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gender, the body and

Cynthia Fabrizio Pelak

Feminist thinkers have long focused on the body as an expression of power and a site of social control. As early as 1792, Mary Wollstonecraft proclaimed that "genteel women are slaves to their bodies" and that "beauty is woman's scepter" (Wollstonecraft 1988). Sixty years later, Sojourner Truth drew attention to how bodies are not only gendered but also racialized in her *Ain't I a Woman* speech of 1851. And, since the emergence of the second wave of women's movements in the US, feminists have been transforming our thinking on gender and bodies through their writings on rape, sexual assault, domestic violence, reproductive rights, beauty contests, eating disorders, sports, disabilities, cosmetic surgery, and more. Despite the recurrent focus on gender and the body, scholars have asked diverse sets of questions from various disciplinary and theoretical perspectives that have changed over time. This entry reviews some of the major questions that have been raised about gender and the body and discusses the shifting theoretical approaches that have developed in the literature.

A constant thread in contemporary feminist theory is questioning the source of sex differences. Are sex differences "naturally" produced or are they a result of social cultural production (i.e., nurture)? If sex differences are "natural," it is thought that they cannot be altered. However, if they are socially constructed, then sex differences could be altered and possibly eliminated. The emergence of the "nature versus

nurture” question within feminist theory is directly linked to dominant gender ideologies that posit gender differences as biologically determined and women’s subordination and men’s dominance as natural. Such gender ideologies have a long history in western societies and affect virtual every aspect of women’s and men’s lives in contemporary society. As discussed below, recent feminist scholarship on gender and the body critiques the terms of the nature versus nurture debate and offers a new paradigm that recognizes the inherent interaction of biological and social systems.

Perceptions and experiences of gender and the body in western societies have been grounded in dualistic thinking (Bordo 1993; Fausto Sterling 2000). According to influential male philosophers and theologians within Greco-Christian traditions, two opposing entities constitute human existence: the mind and the body. Within this framework, the mind is understood as being superior to the body, and the body, which is associated with wanton desires, is seen as something to be overcome and controlled. Western discourses on the mind/body split developed along with other dualisms such as male/female and culture/nature. On one axis, the mind, culture, and the masculine have been located and on an opposing axis the body, nature, and the feminine are positioned. Moreover, the male body has been assumed to be the standard and the female body an inadequate deviation from the norm.

Sexist ideas about women’s bodies advanced by philosophers and theologians were strengthened by medical and scientific discourses of the industrial and post industrial eras. With the professionalization of medicine, male medical doctors became “experts” on women’s bodies. Based more on ideology than empirical evidence, physicians espoused sexist beliefs about women’s embodied physical fragility, intellectual inferiority, and emotional instability. In her book *The Eternally Wounded Woman* (1990), Patricia Vertinsky shows how the dominant medical discourse of the nineteenth century led to the notion that physical exercise was dangerous to women’s reproductive function. Not surprisingly, the “misinformation” was meant for privileged women who were pushing for more access to the public arena and not poor, immigrant, and enslaved women who

regularly performed physically demanding labor and supposedly reproduced too much.

Since the mid twentieth century, psychologists, sexologists, biologists, and other researchers have battled over theories of the origins of sex differences, gender identities, and gender roles (Fausto Sterling 2000). Corresponding with the development of new technologies, the basis of “scientific” theories about bodily and behavioral differences between females and males moved from genitals to gonads to chromosomes to hormones to brains. As societal views around gender started shifting during the 1970s, feminist theories, which highlighted the importance of gender socialization and other environmental “nurture” factors, entered the debate. The infamous case of the male child who was “successfully” socialized as a girl after his penis was mutilated during a circumcision procedure was offered as proof for the social construction of gender. This evidence, however, was weakened when the socialized girl became a teenager and wanted to become a boy.

Feminist biologist Anne Fausto Sterling (2000) argues much of this debate is deeply limited by dualistic thinking and a devotion to the notion that there are two, and only two, mutually exclusive sexes. Fausto Sterling’s work suggests that sex is more of a continuum and that the body is changeable over the life course rather than fixed at birth. She rejects the framework that views the body and the circumstances in which it reproduces as separable. Instead, she and other scholars theorize an interactive biosocial model in which internal reproductive structures and external social, historical, and environmental factors are inseparable – interacting over time and circumstance. Grosz (1994) uses the metaphor of a Möbius strip to illustrate how social meanings external to the body are incorporated into its physiological expression, as well as unconscious and conscious behavior.

Nowhere are the politics of the debate about sex and gender differences clearer than in the debates over bodies that exhibit sexual ambiguity (Kessler 1998). Although intersexuality is a fairly common phenomenon, intersexuals disappear from our view because doctors quickly “correct” them with surgery. Kessler shows how the medical management of intersexuality (repeated surgeries and hormone treatments)

contributes to the construction of dichotomized, idealized genitals and normalizing beliefs about gender and sexuality. She argues that acceptance of genital and gender variability will mean the subversion of the equation that genitals equal gender.

As mentioned above, the emergence of the second wave women's movement sparked a wealth of new research on gender and the body. Much of the earlier work focused on how women's bodies were regulated, controlled, or violated. The body at this stage was viewed as a site through which masculine power operated rather than as an object of study in and of itself. The desire to counter theories of biological determinism and promote theories of social constructionism led feminists to sidestep theorizing the body. Likewise, the conceptual distinction between sex and gender, which posits sex as the biological/physiological and gender as the social/cultural, may have falsely constructed disciplinary boundaries that led feminist scholars to focus on the social (i.e., gender) and ignore the biological (i.e., sex).

The recent "discursive turn" in feminist theory and the development of poststructural challenges to binary constructs and dualistic thinking have encouraged new theorizing on gender and the body (Conboy et al. 1997). Drawing on the work of Michel Foucault, some feminist scholars are viewing bodies as texts which can be read as a statement of gender relations. Working within this framework, Judith Butler (1992) has tried to build a non-dualistic account of the body and reclaim the material body for feminist thought. Butler conceptualizes the body as a system that simultaneously produces and is produced by social meaning and shows how transgressive body politics can challenge the discursive limits of "sex."

While drawing on poststructuralist thought and insights from recent scholarship on gender and the body, Bordo (1993) cautions feminist scholars not to overemphasize women's embodied resistance at the expense of examining how domination is enacted upon and through female bodies. In her analyses of eating disorders, plastic surgery, media images, and the slender body, Bordo acknowledges the possibility of women's resistance, but also draws attention to the overwhelming power of

disciplinary and normalizing processes surrounding women's bodies in our postmodern world. The emergent field of feminist disability studies also interrogates normalizing discourses and practices of gendered bodies, but draws attention to bodies that are culturally identified as sick, impaired, ugly, deformed, or malfunctioning (Thomson 2002). Feminist disability scholars critique research on bodies, embodiment, and gender that ignores how the hierarchical ability/disability system intersects with other systems of power in shaping gendered experiences of women and men.

One of the most symbolically important social institutions for the naturalization of gender differences in contemporary societies is that of competitive sports. The sociology of sport, in particular, has contributed greatly to our collective understanding of gender and the body by examining the relationships between the symbolic representations of the body and embodied experiences within concrete sociohistorical contexts. The literature on gender and sport, which includes the theoretical tensions and turns outlined above, has contributed valuable insights on femininities, masculinities, and the body (Hall 1996; McKay et al. 2000). The scholarship of Jennifer Hargreaves (1994, 2000) is exemplary in its examination of women's historical exclusion in competitive sport and the seemingly irreconcilable tension between femininity and athleticism. Her work illuminates how competitive sport, throughout history and around the world, has been a site for both maintaining and challenging dominant notions of gendered bodies.

In addressing questions about gender and the body, the history of sex testing or gender verification within the Olympic Games movement provides an ideal case study of the shifting discourses and "science" around gendered/sexed bodies. Sparked by the growing political anxieties of the Cold War, in 1968 the International Olympic Committee instituted sex testing of female athletes, first through visual examinations and then by "scientific" chromosomal testing. Over the years, it was shown that fitting bodies into two mutually exclusive categories of female and male is not so simple. The suspension of gender testing in 2000 serves as an acknowledgment of the complexities of a body's sex and a recognition, at least at some level, that

labeling someone a woman or a man is a social decision (Fausto Sterling 2000).

Recent feminist theorizing on the body and embodiment has encouraged social movement scholars to focus attention on the role of the body in collective social action. Using the body as a site of resistance has long been a strategy of collective protest against gender oppression. Suffragists in the US and England at the turn of the twentieth century adopted the tactic of hunger strikes to draw attention to their cause. Parkins (2000) argues that the daring acts of protest by suffragists challenged dominant ideas about women's bodily comportment and physical capabilities, as well as embodied notions of citizenship. The more recent history of silent vigils of the Women in Black movement, which first emerged in Jerusalem in 1988 to protest the Israeli occupation of Palestine, illustrates how the body still serves as an agent of social and political change (Sasson Levy & Rapoport 2003). The recent theorizing in the social movements literature on the role of emotions and passion in political struggle has also led to new insights on gender and the body (see Goodwin & Jasper 2004). As the diverse and lengthy history of embodied social protest suggests and the various theoretical frameworks and empirical research on gender and the body illustrate, the body has been and seems will remain a central nexus to our understanding of gendered experiences, ideologies, and practices.

SEE ALSO: Body and Sexuality; Body and Society; Disability Sport; Female Genital Mutilation; Femininities/Masculinities; Feminist Disability Studies; Rape Culture; Sex and Gender; Sport and the Body

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gender, consumption and

Christine Williams and Laura Saucedo

The history of consumerism has been shaped by gender inequality. During the colonial period, when families produced most of what they consumed, a gender division of labor prevailed in which men supplied the raw materials (e.g., wheat, flax, animals) and women transformed them into commodities for consumption (e.g., bread, cloth, meals). During industrialization,

the period characterized by historians as bringing about the "separation of spheres," productive activity moved outside the household and eventually became seen as an appropriately masculine endeavor. Consumption became privatized, a range of activities under the purview of women consigned to the domestic arena. Although the separation of spheres was more cultural ideal than historical practice for many marginalized social groups (African Americans, the poor, immigrants), the association of women with consumption, and men with production, prevails today and shapes research and theory on consumerism.

Four major themes characterize research on gender and consumption. The first theme analyzes women's consumer practices as an extension of their primary domestic responsibilities. Sometimes referred to in the literature as "housework" or more recently "carework," this consumer activity centers on shopping as a means to acquire the goods to sustain members of a household (e.g., to cook meals, clean the house, organize family get togethers and other social events, and care for children and elderly parents). Marjorie DeVault's book, *Feeding the Family* (1991), was one of the first to carefully document the extensive effort involved in women's consumer activity on behalf of their families. Feminists argue that this work lacks pay and social recognition, yet it is essential for sustaining the quality of family life.

As many women have joined the paid labor force in the past decades, women's involvement in consumption has changed and in many ways increased. A current thread of research focuses on employed women who subcontract services to perform the domestic labor still expected of them as wives and mothers. Thus, we have witnessed the rise of domestic cleaning services, the proliferation of fast food restaurants, and the increase in private childcare centers. These industries cater to women forced to juggle the demands of paid work and family care. Referred to by Arlie Hochschild (2003) as the "commercialization of intimate life," these service industries are replacing the work that in previous generations women performed in their private homes without pay. The work involved in subcontracting and managing domestic labor is still mostly done by women, a vestige of the separate spheres ideology that remains deeply

embedded in current gender arrangements. The subcontracted work is also performed mostly by women, typically by non white and immigrant workers.

A second major theme in the literature on gender and consumption examines how the advertising industry has shaped cultural ideals of masculinity and femininity. Advertisers exploited the cult of domesticity in the first half of the twentieth century by encouraging women to associate the purchase of certain household products with being a good wife and mother. Although this trend continues through the twenty first century, the focus of advertising has become more personal, centered on how commodities can enable the individual to achieve prevailing gender ideals. In other words, consumption of certain products is presented as central to femininity and masculinity.

Feminist scholars first picked up on this trend in the 1970s. Early critiques emphasized the ideological content of advertisements directed to women that seemed to undermine self esteem while simultaneously promising relief through the purchase of their products. These products were not limited to beauty and fashion accessories, but included a full range of goods, from kitchen appliances to cars to food products, all promising to transform the body and the self to achieve ideal femininity. Early feminist studies of advertising urged resistance through consumer refusal. Thus, when *Ms. Magazine* debuted in 1972, it was free of advertisements, reflecting the feminist critique of the industry's deleterious impact on women's self image, and its central role in perpetuating stereotypical roles for women.

In the mid twentieth century, advertisements also began targeting men with the promise that products could enhance their masculinity. Although early ads were less focused on appearance than those targeting women, they suggested that heterosexual attractiveness could be enhanced with the purchase of expensive cars, stereo equipment, and vacations. *Playboy* magazine, which debuted in the late 1950s, is often credited with establishing the link between masculinity and consumerism, and thus challenging the conventional association of shopping with women (Ehrenreich, *Hearts of Men*, 1983). Unlike the feminist movement, political opposition from men's groups did not materialize,

except from the health community, which challenged ads that equated the consumption of especially unhealthy commodities, such as alcohol and cigarettes, to expressions of masculinity.

Gender scholars have developed increasingly sophisticated understandings of how advertisements shape social ideals of masculinity and femininity. Jean Kilbourne produced an influential series of videos on gender advertisements (*Killing Us Softly*) which have been shown to generations of students in college classes all over the country. These videos demonstrate that ads on television and in magazines represent an exceptionally narrow range of acceptable appearance standards for men and women. Wealth, whiteness, and heterosexuality are taken for granted in most advertisements, suggesting that men and women who are poor, non white, or GLBT have little chance to achieve social approval. Philosopher Susan Bordo (1993) draws on theories of post modernism to understand the allure of advertisements that promote unrealistic weight loss and body sculpting regimens. Women are drawn to these images, however damaging and irrational, because of an internalized sense of inadequacy promoted by a sexist culture that devalues femininity. Although her scholarship recognizes the problematic depiction of both men and women, the emphasis remains on how women are especially dehumanized by their portrayal by the advertising industry and vulnerable to its messages.

Analysis of both conformity and resistance represents a third main theme in the gender and consumption scholarship. In what she calls the fashion beauty complex, feminist scholar Sandra Bartky (1990) suggests that production, marketing, retail, and information companies work together to regulate feminine identity. Thus, pressure to conform to gender ideals goes beyond just advertisements. Department stores, for example, are spatially segregated by gender, clearly defining for customers which items should be purchased for men and for women. Genres in novels, television, and film have been gendered such that romantic stories (or so called "chick flicks") are pitched to women while action plots are geared toward a primarily male audience.

According to Bartky, lifestyle magazines targeting teen and adult women play a critical role

in the fashion beauty complex. Teen magazines claim a significant readership among teenage girls, and these publications prime their audience to continue consuming fashion and lifestyle magazines well into adulthood. Young women are highly invested in popular culture, and research demonstrates that their peer groups tend to encourage conformity to the feminine ideal that pervades these texts. The financial success of the beauty industry suggests that women do in fact support the fashion beauty complex. Cosmetics, dieting, and cosmetic surgery bring in billions of dollars a year, and the majority of these consumers are women. Because conformity is such big business, the industry has little impetus to diversify or alter its constructions of femininity in any way.

Despite this evidence of conformity in women's consumerism, the more micro level question of meaning must also be considered. Cultural theorist Stuart Hall argues that dominant cultural messages may be accepted, negotiated, or even subverted. Feminist scholars, for instance, have noted that shopping represents a relatively safe and socially acceptable way for girls and women to participate in the public sphere, an experience they may find liberating. Ethnographies and interview projects have shown that women often read magazines and romance novels or watch soap operas for personal pleasure, and as a means of escape from mundane domestic responsibilities. Many take pleasure in critiquing these media, which are often considered predictable and even ridiculous in content.

An ongoing debate within feminism questions whether or not women's conformity to beauty ideals can be considered resistant. Some argue that women can use their appearance as a form of bodily capital, in a Bourdieuan sense, to exploit male weakness and gain access to resources. Others point out that such practice fails to challenge dominant expectations of idealized femininity, doing little to improve conditions for women in general. Considering the high rates of eating disorders and the dangers of cosmetic surgery, this strategy may even be harmful to women.

Sociologist Lynn Chancer emphasizes that in everyday life, oppression and resistance often occur together. In order to resolve this debate, feminists must challenge the institutional and

cultural oppression of women without placing restrictions on or passing judgment about individual women's actions.

The fourth major theme of the gender and consumption literature considers the interactive dimensions of race and class. Consumer practices vary widely depending on social location. The economic realities of social class and cultural beliefs about race and gender place restrictions on what and how people consume. Education and occupation determine the amount of disposable income one possesses. Poor neighborhoods attract fewer businesses, thereby limiting the purchasing options of these areas' residents. Customers are treated differently based on employees' perceptions about one's race and/or class status.

The intersection of race, class, and gender results in a social hierarchy that privileges some while putting others at a disadvantage. The predominantly white upper class exhibits what Thorstein Veblen calls "conspicuous consumption," which is to say they purchase goods and services that overtly demonstrate their wealth and social status. In buying expensive and/or rare items, they set themselves apart from those without access to such luxuries. In this way, their consumer patterns help create and maintain class divisions.

Racial/ethnic minorities and the working class experience consumption quite differently. African American women, for example, have historically been relegated to lower socioeconomic status, in which consumption revolves around the provision of daily necessities. In the early twentieth century when beliefs about black inferiority prevailed, investing in beauty products such as hair straighteners and skin lightening creams represented a form of resistance. These items allowed black women to more closely adhere to the dominant feminine ideal, thereby undermining negative stereotypes. These black women viewed conformity as a way to make themselves and their race more respectable to dominant society. The investment in the cosmetics industry also resulted in a significant entrepreneurial opportunity for black women, who began producing and selling products specifically for African American consumers.

Race, class, and gender shape how different groups read and interpret cultural texts as well.

African American teenage girls tend to read teen magazines with a more critical eye than their white counterparts. These girls are less likely to identify with dominant beauty standards embodied by the exceptionally thin white women who are the typical models in advertisements. As a result, they read around much of the content focused on appearance, looking instead for articles they think will give them insight into their lived experiences. Life chances associated with social class guide the consumption of cultural texts in a similar way. Privileged groups of girls are highly invested in conforming to idealized femininity, particularly in terms of appearance and behavior. In contrast, working class racial/ethnic minority girls take interest in content addressing dating, marriage, and motherhood. Due to limited educational and career opportunities, these girls anticipate becoming wives and/or mothers earlier in life than the middle and upper class girls. In short, these cases suggest that social location plays a significant role in determining which products, images, and messages women find relevant to their lives. Intersecting forms of privilege and oppression create different needs and interests, which translate into different consumer practices.

Topics for future research on gender and consumption include: (1) analyses of how new shopping media, such as the Internet, promote and/or undermine conventional gender ideals and practices; (2) the gender socialization of ever younger girls and boys through targeted advertisements on television; (3) the gendered features of anti consumerist social movements; and (4) the impact of niche marketing on cultural constructions of gender, including marketing to members of GLBT communities.

SEE ALSO: Consumption and the Body; Consumption, Girls' Culture and; Consumption, Masculinities and; Sex and Gender; Sexualities and Consumption; Women's Empowerment

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gender, development and

Christine E. Bose

Over the last half century there have been different theoretical frameworks used to understand how women are located in global economic processes, and each has had a concomitant strategy to enhance women's position. In the middle of the twentieth century modernization approaches were common, but dependency theorists critiqued these strategies. By the 1970s these male focused arguments were largely supplanted by women in development (WID) ones, and more recently by gender and development (GAD) approaches.

Development refers to changes in a country that are frequently measured using a country's gross domestic product (GDP), as well as its degree of industrialization, urbanization, technological sophistication, export capability, and consumer orientation. Concerns about development are most likely to be expressed by representatives of advanced capitalist core countries of the "global North" or by international agencies when they create initiatives or generate responses to a whole range of critical problems faced by what they categorize as "developing" nations or the peripheral and semi peripheral countries of the "global South."

On the other hand, countries of the global South tend to see development as addressing survival issues like hunger and malnutrition, refugee displacement and homelessness, unemployment and underemployment, health services and disease, the destruction of the environment, and political repression and violence. Since numerous countries in the global South are former colonies of those in the global North, many survival problems result from the cumulative effects of unequal and dependent relationships that were established centuries ago and are recreated in the present using new mechanisms, especially structural adjustment programs and other economic globalization strategies promulgated by international agencies like the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Bank. Indeed, it is frequently argued that development projects, promoted by core countries, have better served their own interests, in the long run, than those of their recipients.

The condition of women in developing/global South countries is integrally tied to gendered power and economic structures that were established in the colonial era. In addition, although early development programs ignored their needs, usage of women's unpaid or underpaid labor has been crucial to many development programs and policies.

Post World War II modernization approaches assumed that developing nations needed to industrialize rapidly in order to gain economic strength, and that political democracy, gender equity, and national prosperity would follow from industrialization – consequences that were assumed to have occurred in core nations when they industrialized slowly over the course of the nineteenth century. Nonetheless, development agencies measured success only by increases in per capita income, literacy rates, life expectancy, and fertility rates, rather than by the disappearance of authoritarian regimes. Indeed, the prevalence of dictatorships in many Latin American and Caribbean countries that had achieved some degree of economic development helped to discredit the assumed connection between development and democracy. And the fact that some global South countries have greater women's political and professional participation than in the global North helps to

discredit the connection between development and gender equity (Burn 2005).

The industrialization and modernization programs created by international development agencies, and formulated from the perspectives of “western” nations, relied on foreign investment and manufacturing for export rather than for local consumption and did not encourage self sufficiency in the global South (Sen & Grown 1987). Frequently, developing nations depended on single commodity export trade, leaving them vulnerable to the fluctuations and perils of world markets. Many developing economies were “denationalized” because foreign industrial capital often interfered with or restricted the autonomy of local governments, as well as the capacity of national industries to compete in the world market (Acosta Belén & Bose 1995).

In the 1960s and 1970s, dependency theorists such as Gunder Frank (1969) argued that discussions of the need for “modernization” hid the fact that industrial nations were exploiting developing ones. Indeed, developing nations usually were former colonial possessions of present day industrialized nations, and had therefore always been integrated into the capitalist system. They also noted that the modernization model was applied across the board, with little attention to specific national needs. At about the same time, other scholars underscored the problem that modernization approaches paid little attention to women’s particular needs and assumed they would benefit in a “trickle down” fashion as economies improved.

In 1975 the United Nations proclaimed the first International Women’s Year and the decade 1975–85 was known as the Decade for Women. The UN’s focus was intended to acknowledge that women had been active participants in the development process from the beginning, and the call to integrate women into development was more of a denunciation of the male oriented biases in development policies and the invisibility to which development agencies had relegated women’s participation:

Indeed, the pervasive idea that men were the primary earners often led to the formulation of development policies that excluded or diminished women’s productive roles and thus their status; added extra hours to their double burden when they had to replace men (now

engaged in wage labor) in the subsistence activities that were performed collectively before; and often did not even account properly for women’s actual participation and contributions. (Acosta-Belén & Bose 1995: 20)

Prior to Boserup’s (1970) key publication, most of the development literature ignored women’s economic role and contributions. Assuming women were passive dependents, researchers and practitioners relegated them to reproductive rather than productive roles, confining them to an undervalued domestic sphere isolated from the rest of the social structure. Little attention was paid to variations in women and men’s economic roles in different global South nations or to women’s activities in the informal economy.

One of Boserup’s major contributions was to empirically establish the vital role of women in agricultural economies and to recognize that economic development, with its tendency to encourage labor specialization, was actually depriving women of their original productive functions and on the whole deteriorating their status. Acknowledged by many as a path breaker in the field of women and development (Benería 1982; Bolles 1988; Sen & Grown 1987), Boserup is credited with documenting the existence of a gendered division of labor across nations and showing that women’s labor had not been reported in official records. (Acosta-Belén & Bose 1995: 22)

Nonetheless, there were shortcomings in Boserup’s important work due to her adherence to the then prevalent modernization approach. She paid insufficient attention to women’s household labor as a basis for subordination, and to the differential outcomes of capital growth on various groups of women within colonial or former colonial settings (Benería & Sen 1981; Bolles 1988).

In spite of these problems, Boserup’s research fostered an understanding of how development policies ideologically denigrate women’s economic contributions, while simultaneously relying upon and exploiting women’s labor. Since her initial work, numerous studies have documented the impact of development on women at the local, national, and international levels and confirmed that women’s segregated labor generates their low wages and status. One result of the conceptual shift from

modernization theory to the study of women in development was the increased attention paid by feminist researchers to previously ignored sectors of working women who are (or were) essential to third world economies, including African enslaved women, domestic workers, tourist sector workers, women traders and street sellers, craft producers, and sex workers, as well as to non husband/wife household formations, especially families headed by women, who are often landless.

With increased globalization, “development” comes in a new form, as core countries make use of “offshore production” or the transfer of assembly plants, primarily in electronics, apparel, and textiles, to global South countries. Many of the hidden aspects of offshore production occur in export processing zones (EPZs), where young women migrate from rural areas to work in their national segment of the “global assembly line” and married women take on factory “outwork,” doing piecework at home. Women’s transnational migration for work also has increased, and women from developing countries migrate to more developed ones, often to work (legally or undocumented) as domestics or doing other forms of carework.

Burn (2005) notes that development projects based on a WID perspective fall into three categories. The first, and most common in the 1980s, were income generating projects, which tended to focus on traditional women’s skills such as sewing and handicrafts. Burn suggests that these projects rarely were successful because of the low marketability and profit in these areas, and because women were not always included in the design of the projects. The second, but less common, type of project was to introduce labor saving devices for women’s traditional tasks – unfortunately focusing on a limited range of tools. The third approach, that has grown in international popularity since the 1980s, is to give women access to development resources, especially in the form of small loans for women micro entrepreneurs. These quick revolving loans with reasonable interest rates and low collateral requirements have helped finance many women’s small businesses, and are believed to increase women’s autonomy and improve the health status of the women’s children, as more discretionary income becomes available to women (Blumberg 1995). Such

outcomes show that women are not passive victims of globalization and development processes, but see creative ways to resist subordination and become empowered.

Many development projects fomented under the WID philosophy helped women economically. However, few if any of these projects were intended to change the power relationships between women and men. In response to these limitations, a new approach, Gender and Development (GAD), was discussed by feminists and in women focused NGOs during the 1980s, with the goal of improving women’s rights and increasing gender equity. Many have called GAD an “empowerment” approach (Burn 2005; Moser 1989) because its goal is to create development projects based on the needs expressed by grassroots women and not only to provide services, but to challenge women’s subordination in households and in societies. One way GAD does this is by recognizing the multiple connections between women’s economic roles outside of the home and those inside the family; a second way is by encouraging women’s and feminist activism.

Among the urban strategies used in the global South are organizing collective meals, health cooperatives, or neighborhood water rights groups. Rather than privatizing their survival problems, women collectivize them and often place demands on the state for rights related to family survival. Mohanty (1991) suggests that challenging the state is not merely different, but “a crucial context” for global South women’s struggles precisely because it is the state that has created laws with gender and race limitations implicit in them.

Urban organizing is not the only form of empowerment. Indigenous and peasant women in rural areas create projects around agricultural issues such as land tenure or plantation working conditions, issues that link community and labor, as well as cultural issues related to ethnic identity and survival of indigenous peoples.

Other GAD related feminist organizing links self determined women’s development with the issues of nationality, race, class, and gender. Among examples in the Commonwealth Caribbean are the Women and Development Unit (WAND), which promotes women’s activities especially through income generating projects, local technical assistance, and government

advisement; Development Alternatives with Women for a New Era (DAWN), which is a network of activist researchers and policy makers; and the Caribbean Association for Feminist Research and Action (CAFRA), whose projects have included monitoring the Caribbean Basin Initiative effects, exposing worker conditions in Jamaica's export processing zones, and aiding rural women through the Women in Caribbean Agriculture Project (Bolles 1993). A more occupationally focused group is Trinidad and Tobago's National Union of Domestic Employees (NUDE), which utilizes actions taken at UN women's conferences and other international events to mobilize for change at home (Karides 2002).

By the 1990s international development agencies had begun to adopt GAD rhetoric in their mission statements, but GAD was used more as an analytic framework than as a development strategy – possibly because it is easier to discuss empowerment than to implement it (Burn 2005). Indeed, even in supportive circumstances, when women's equality is considered an important goal of the state, as in the revolutionary experiences of Cuba or China, the changes tend to be token reforms rather than major transformations. In the case of international development agencies, they have tended to adopt the European model called "gender mainstreaming," which "requires a gender analysis to make sure that gender equality concerns are taken into account in all development activities" (Burn 2005: 151). As a result, women are actively engaged in the development process, but women's activism for gender equality is not promoted, as GAD suggests it should be.

Nonetheless, many grassroots groups are actively developing transnational linkages that promote a GAD perspective (Naples & Desai 2002) and international feminist conferences are helping to create a transnational feminism that has many commonalities across nations while retaining local forms. This combination of local creativity and the transnational sharing of ideas may well push GAD ideas forward into future tangible gender equity development programs, and/or toward creating a newer women, culture, and development (WCD) perspective of which Bhavnani et al. (2003) are proponents.

SEE ALSO: Division of Labor; Global Economy; International Gender Division of Labor; Political Economy; Women, Economy and

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gender, deviance and

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Missing from traditional and most contemporary discussions of deviance and crime is the notion of gender. A rather accessible definition of gender can be found in most introductory sociology textbooks. For the purposes of this entry, gender is defined as the social positions, attitudes, traits, and behaviors that a society assigns to females and males (Macionis 2004). A close examination of theories of deviance reveals an androcentric or male oriented perspective. Early theorists and researchers in particular extrapolated from studies of boys and men when attempting to explain female deviant behavior. So, barring examinations of a few deviant behaviors, most notably shoplifting, violations of sexual norms (e.g., promiscuity, teen pregnancy, prostitution), status offenses (e.g., runaways), and infanticide, there were, and still are, few serious considerations of female deviant behavior.

Feminists, or members of society advocating equality between the sexes, have made a few strides with respect to introducing notions of gender into theories of deviance and crime. While a single comprehensive theory addressing gender and deviance is still missing from the literature, there appear to be four main

schools of thought: (1) the chivalry perspective, (2) patriarchal considerations, (3) the women's liberation hypothesis, and (4) the theory of victimization.

The chivalry perspective attempts to explain why girls and women are not seen as deviants. Why do most people think of boys and men when considering deviant and criminal behavior, specifically violent deviant and criminal behavior? This theory proposes that members of society are socialized not to see girls and women as deviants. Chesney Lind and Sheldon (1998) suggest that almost all members of society talk about delinquency, by which they generally mean male delinquency. More specifically, this argument theorizes that powerful male members of society (e.g., police officers, judges, the male dominated media) "protect" or "save" girls/women from the label of deviance (Felson 2002). Humphries (1999) specifically postulates a chivalry approach with respect to women and cocaine use in the 1980s and 1990s. She determined that in the early media coverage of cocaine use, white middle class women who used cocaine were presented as promiscuous and as "bad" mothers. Still, television networks showed a remarkable degree of tolerance toward these women. And with respect to domestic violence, Girschick (2002) notes that current understandings of rape and battering suggest that women are not perpetrators. More specifically, according to present day social norms and values, women do not rape and women do not batter.

This perspective posits that members of the male dominated criminal justice system will ignore, dismiss, and/or explain away female deviance and crime. For example, some theorists have attempted to explain away girls' accountability for their deviance by stating girls' deviant behavior commonly relates to an abusive home life, whereas boys' deviant behavior reflects their involvement in a delinquent lifestyle (Dembo et al. 1995). Girls and women, therefore, are not seen as deviant because male members of society protect them from the label. Male police officers, prosecutors, and judges have a traditionally chivalrous attitude toward women and treat them with more leniency than men. Regrettably, this theory, regardless of its potential accuracy,

perpetuates the cycle of male centered perspectives, attempting to explain female behavior by examining male attitudes and behaviors.

Patriarchal explanations posit that male dominated social institutions, especially the family, are designed to prevent girls and women from engaging in deviance and crime. Socialization processes within the family control girls more than boys, teaching boys to be risk takers while teaching girls to avoid risk (Hagan 1989). According to Akers (2000), in patriarchal families the father's occupation places him in the "command" position (e.g., manager, supervisor, CEO) and the mother either stays at home or works in a job where she occupies the "obey" position (i.e., taking orders from supervisors). In these families, according to the theory, the behaviors of girls and women are more closely monitored and controlled (Thorne 1994). Girls are expected to adhere to stricter moral standards and face a stronger sense of guilt and disapproval when they break the rules (Chesney Lind & Sheldon 1998).

Unfortunately, much like the previous theory, this is a male oriented perspective. This line of reasoning argues that males control girls and women and, therefore, control female deviance and crime. These androcentric theories do not attempt to understand female deviance in and of itself, explaining female behavior by way of male behavior (Chesney Lind & Pasko 2004). They are flawed and have been, for the most part, discredited.

The remaining two perspectives, the women's liberation hypothesis and the theory of victimization, attempt to explain the deviant behavior of girls and women apart from the attitudes/behavior of males. The women's liberation hypothesis proposes that as the gap between women's and men's social equality decreases, the gap between women's and men's deviant behavior decreases as well. This theoretical explanation suggests that the women's movement has brought about changes in traditional gender roles, greater equality for women, and an increase in the female labor force. An unintended consequence of this "liberation" for women is a greater involvement in deviance and crime. According to Adler (1975), the movement for gender equality has a darker side. Some women are insisting on equal opportunity in

fields of legitimate endeavor while other women are demanding access to the world of crime.

The "liberation" hypothesis, however, has not received much empirical support. Though increasingly represented in the labor force, women continue to be concentrated in traditional "pink collar" work – teaching, clerical and retail sales work, nursing, and other subordinate roles – that reflects a persistence of traditional gender roles (Zaplin 1998). In contrast, contemporary gender differences in quality and quantity of crime continue to parallel closely those of the thirteenth century. Additionally, Chesney Lind and Pasko (2004) state there is no evidence to suggest that as women's labor force participation has increased, girls' deviant behavior has also increased.

Therefore, it has not yet been compellingly demonstrated that female crime rates are significantly correlated with increasing gender equality. In fact, patterns of female deviance have remained relatively consistent over time.

One of the most persuasive theories regarding girls' and women's deviance is predicated on the reality girls and women face as victims. The theory of victimization proposes that women are deviants in part because of their status as victims of male abuse and/or violence. Chesney Lind and Pasko (2004) recognize that girls are much more likely to be the victims of child sexual abuse than are boys. Additionally, girls are much more likely than boys to be assaulted by a family member (often a step father) and women offenders frequently report abuse in their life histories. About half of the women in jail (48 percent) and 57 percent of women in state prisons report experiences of sexual and/or physical abuse in their lives. Chesney Lind and Pasko note that all of the girls in gangs interviewed hail from a more troubled background than boys in gangs. And with respect to spousal homicide, Zaplin (1998) revealed that wives are far more likely to have been victims of domestic violence and turn to murder only when in mortal fear. Husbands who murder wives, however, have rarely been in fear for their lives.

Empirical research does suggest that exposure to abuse and violence, too often a reality girls and women face, could compel girls/women to engage in various types of deviance (e.g.,

running away, truancy) and ultimately crime (e.g., theft, drug abuse, prostitution) (Flowers 2001). In fact, some theorists have highlighted the fact that a potential survival mechanism, running away from home, continues to be the most prevalent offense for female juvenile delinquents (Chesney Lind & Pasko 2004). This theory, although it addresses girls' and women's relationships with boys and men, serves as a building block for theories that consider the unique status of girls and women in society and its contribution to deviant behavior.

In conclusion, contemporary research continually reflects a need to take female deviance and crime much more seriously. While there are currently four major schools of thought, two have been discredited and one has little empirical support. It is evident that studies of women and deviance are lacking, even now. There is an increasing body of research examining girls and women engaged in deviance and crime (e.g., female gang members), but most of the contemporary research continues to examine girls and women engaged in traditional deviant and criminal behaviors (e.g., status offenses, prostitution) and/or limits discussions of women and deviance to women's status as victims.

A partial explanation for this continuing trend hails from Akers (2000), who has suggested that there is little empirically to sustain the criticism that current theories are falsified or inadequate when applied to the criminal behavior of women, or to uphold the conclusion that girl/women specific theories are needed to account for gender ratios in crime and deviance. And yet there are clear indications of differences in female and male deviant and criminal behaviors, arrest rates, and incarceration rates. What can explain these differences if no additional theoretical considerations are needed? Sociologists need to spend more time considering the unique aspects of the lives of girls and women with respect to deviance. Additionally, demographic considerations must be taken into account more systematically. Race, class, age, and many other social characteristics that are commonplace in male oriented research on deviance and crime must be folded into theories examining girls and women. "We've

come a long way baby," but we still have a long way to go.

SEE ALSO: Crime; Deviance, Crime and; Deviance, Theories of; Domestic Violence; Feminism; Feminism, First, Second, and Third Waves; Patriarchy; Rape/Sexual Assault as Crime; Sexism; Victimization; Women's Movements

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gender, education and

Jennifer Pearson and Catherine Riegle Crumb

Social scientists and educational researchers paid relatively little attention to issues of gender in education until the 1970s, when questions emerged concerning equity in girls' and women's access to education across the world. Researchers documented a link between increasing rates of female education in developing countries and a subsequent decline in fertility rates (e.g., Boserup 1970). In the context of an emerging global economy, increasing female representation in primary and secondary education was cited as an important factor in promoting national economic development, and therefore seen as a vehicle for social change.

As the feminist movement increased awareness of widespread gender inequality within US society, researchers began to focus on the educational system as a site of and explanation for women's subordinated status. Feminist scholars documented sex discrimination in educational experiences and outcomes, and this early work led to the passage of Title IX in 1972, legislation that prohibited discrimination on the basis of sex in federally funded educational programs.

During the 1970s and 1980s, women gained access to higher education and their share of college degrees climbed steadily. Women now comprise the majority of US college students and have achieved parity with men in number of undergraduate and graduate degrees, though men are over represented in the most prestigious colleges and universities and obtain a greater number of doctoral degrees than women (Jacobs 1996). Despite this greater equality in educational access, women remain significantly behind men in economic and social status. There remains a significant gender gap in pay, while women are also concentrated in low status, sex stereotyped occupations and continue to bear primary responsibility for domestic tasks despite their increased labor force participation. This paradox has led researchers to shift their focus from women's educational access to their academic experiences and outcomes.

While education is seen as an important mechanism of upward mobility in US society,

many sociologists of education have described the educational system as an institution of social and cultural reproduction. Existing patterns of inequality, including those related to gender, are reproduced within schools through formal and informal processes. Knowledge of how the educational system contributes to the status of women requires a look at the institution itself and the processes that occur within schools.

While women's access to education has improved, sex segregation within the educational system persists. Research following Title IX documented a wide gender gap in course taking during high school that led to different educational and occupational paths for men and women. For example, the American Association of University Women revealed in a 1992 report titled *Shortchanging Girls, Shortchanging America* that girls took fewer advanced math and science courses during high school, and these course taking patterns left them unprepared to pursue these fields in higher education. This contrasts with the primary school years, where girls receive better grades in math and are often over represented in high ability math courses, while boys are over represented in low ability courses. Additionally, average math test scores for boys and girls are similar, although there is more variation among boys, leaving them with the highest, but also with the lowest, scores. Girls' attitudes toward and interest in math and science begin to decline during the middle school years (fourth through eighth grade), and gender differences in test scores in these subjects are apparent by high school.

Recent research suggests that the gaps in high school course taking are closing, and girls and boys now take similar numbers of math and science courses. This may be the result of increased educational requirements and fewer choices in course enrollment, as girls continue to score lower on standardized tests and express less interest in these subjects. In addition, girls are now taking advanced courses such as calculus at comparable rates to boys, with the exception of physics. Furthermore, technology and computer courses remain highly gendered: though both boys and girls take computer courses, boys are more likely to take high skills classes, such as those that focus on computer

programming, while girls are over represented in courses featuring word processing and data entry, skills associated with secretarial work (AAUW 1999). Conversely, girls are more highly concentrated in the language arts, including literature, composition, and foreign language courses, and they tend to score higher than boys on verbal skills on standardized tests. This gender gap in favor of girls does not appear to be closing, but it is given relatively little attention in discussions of gender and education.

These high school course taking patterns foreshadow gender differences in higher education, where a high degree of sex segregation remains in terms of degrees and specializations. In the United States, women are concentrated in education, English, nursing, and some social sciences, and they are less likely than men to pursue degrees in science, math, engineering, and technology. As these male dominated fields are highly valued and highly salaried, women's absence from them accounts for a great deal of the gender gap in pay.

Sex typing in education appears to be a worldwide phenomenon, though it varies somewhat in degree and scope between countries. In countries where educational access is limited and reserved for members of the elite, women are often as likely as men to have access to all parts of the curriculum (Bradley 2000; Hanson 1996). However, in countries with more extensive educational systems, women have lower rates of participation in science and technology (Hanson 1996), fields greatly valued because of their link to development and modernity.

Some have used a rational choice approach in explaining the persistence of educational segregation, particularly that of higher education. These scholars suggest that women choose female dominated fields despite their lower status and pay because they will suffer smaller penalties for an absence from the workforce for child rearing; however, women in male dominated fields not only receive higher pay but are also offered more flexibility and autonomy. Others suggest that while individual choices are at play in perpetuating sex segregation, these choices are constrained by cultural beliefs that limit what women (and men) see as possible or appropriate options (Correll 2004). Math, science, and technology are regarded as masculine subjects, especially given their

emphasis on objective knowledge and rational action, and women are seen as ill equipped for these fields. Conversely, subjects such as language arts and nursing are perceived as feminine subjects, and men are largely under represented in these fields. In contrast to the push to include women in male dominated fields, however, the under representation of men in these subject areas goes largely unacknowledged and is often not regarded as problematic, probably due to the low status and low paid jobs associated with these fields.

These beliefs about appropriate interests and talents for men and women are part of a "hidden curriculum" that involves interactions and covert lessons that reinforce relations of gender, as well as those of race and social class, by teaching and preparing students for their appropriate adult roles. Several scholars have examined this hidden curriculum within schools, pointing to ways in which classroom interactions with teachers and between students impart these lessons. Observational studies by Sadker and Sadker (1994) suggest that in the same schools and in the same classes, boys receive more attention than girls. Teachers ask them more questions and offer them more feedback and constructive criticism, all of which are essential to learning. Boys monopolize classroom discussion beginning in the early school years, and girls become quieter over time, participating little in college classrooms. These classroom dynamics reinforce notions of femininity, teaching girls that they should be quiet, passive, and defer to boys, characteristics that disadvantage girls in competitive fields of math and science. Furthermore, an emphasis on social and romantic success can distract young women from their studies and make academic pursuits tangential.

Several feminist scholars have advocated single sex schooling in order to avoid these negative consequences. They argue that girls in all girls' schools have greater achievement, higher educational and career aspirations, attend more selective colleges, take more math courses and express a greater interest in math, and hold less stereotyped notions of female roles. These benefits allegedly result from smaller classes, higher teacher quality and attention, and freedom from social pressures of romance. However, other scholars argue that single sex education itself

does not ensure any particular outcomes because these schools vary greatly in the inspirations, desired outcomes, and sociocultural environments they embody. Indeed, recent research on single sex schools is often inconsistent, and their advantages in comparison to coeducational schools may have decreased after public schools began addressing issues of gender bias. More research is needed on school characteristics that are associated with improved outcomes for girls.

Some educational researchers suggest that concern for girls' education overshadows boys' disadvantages in education, advocating a shift in focus to boys. They argue that though the gender gap in math and science is closing, boys remain behind in language arts course taking and verbal skills. Further, boys are over represented in remedial and special education classes, and they are more likely to fail a course or drop out of school. Others contend that these disadvantages are short term costs of maintaining long term privilege: subjects in which girls outperform boys are devalued, so boys focus their energy elsewhere, such as in sports or math and science, which hold more prestige and will earn greater status and pay in the long run. Moreover, negative outcomes tend to be concentrated among working class boys and boys of color, suggesting that these problems may reflect race and class inequality rather than disadvantages affecting all boys. Regardless, considering boys only as a contrast group to the experiences of girls, rather than examining their position within and experiences of the educational system, will not provide a complete understanding of issues of gender in education. Future research focused on the experiences and behaviors of boys in schools is needed to further this knowledge.

Research on how race and class shape gendered educational experiences and outcomes has been relatively scarce, and only in the past ten years have race and class become focal points in research on gender in education. The advantages granted boys in schools are not equal among all boys: working class boys and boys of color do not demonstrate the same academic success as white, middle class boys. Further, among some groups, girls surpass their male counterparts in math and science course taking and achievement. Ferguson (2000) examines how the hidden curriculum

affects black boys, noting that many school practices disadvantage black boys, leading them to seek achievement and masculinity in ways that are detrimental to their future success. Similarly, perceived cultural differences can penalize girls who do not meet white, middle class standards of femininity: working class girls and girls of color are sometimes seen as troublemakers for being outspoken or assertive. Research on how the intersection of race, class, and gender shapes educational experiences and outcomes is an important direction for the future of the sociology of education.

SEE ALSO: Femininities/Masculinities; Gender, Development and; Gender Ideology and Gender Role Ideology; Hidden Curriculum; Inequality/Stratification, Gender; Math, Science, and Technology Education; Racialized Gender; Schools, Single Sex; Standardized Educational Tests; Teaching and Gender

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gender, friendship and

Stacey Oliker

The subject of gender and friendship links two fields of sociological scholarship. Gender was rarely a salient theme in pioneering studies of friendship, communities, and social networks that emerged in anthropology and sociology in the 1960s. By the 1980s, though, burgeoning gender scholarship in the social sciences ignited interest in gender and friendship. For the most part, the sociology of gender and friendship has explored how differences in the meanings, expectations, experiences, and identities that are culturally associated with biological sex create patterns of difference in the friendships of men and women. A second perspective, examining friendship patterns as a force in the constitution of gender difference and inequality, is less prominent in the literature, but it is promising.

Sociologists trace the modern forms of both gender and friendship to the emergence of a market economy, the separation of work and family life, and the cultural changes that cultivated modern individualism. In the nineteenth century public sphere that men entered as workers and citizens, men developed forms of individualism and masculine identity that emphasized autonomy, competitiveness, and the emotional toughness to suppress personal concerns that could contaminate their public roles. In the newly defined private sphere of family that became women's proper domain, women elaborated new private themes of individualism, emphasizing emotional introspection and expressiveness, which supported the new maternal role of attentive and responsive nurturer and moral exemplar. From these gender polarities in culture and experience, men and women developed distinctive versions of the warmer, more individualized friendship patterns of modern society (Oliker 1989).

In the institutions of private life, middle class women forged new patterns of intimate friendship, while masculine intimacy developed more ambivalently – in conflict with public sphere expectations and ideals of masculinity, and in the less private sites of male camaraderie in the streets, clubs, and taverns. Contemporary

patterns of gender and friendship originated in this era, where modern meanings of masculinity and femininity formed, and where institutions of work and family were reconstituted in sturdy forms that carried nineteenth century gender ideas into the present (Oliker 1989; Oliker in Adams and Allan 1998; Walker 1994; Wellman 1992).

Since the 1980s, studies have explored gender differences in communication between friends, friendship over the life course, and network size and composition. The most frequently identified gender difference is in intimacy, that is, the exchange of self disclosure, private experience, and emotional expression. Women talk more about themselves and show their feelings more to friends than men do. Women often bond by intimate talk, men by shared activity over time. Scholars disagree about what gender differences in intimacy mean for understanding friendship and for understanding gender. A “different but equal” position holds that we have misleadingly “feminized” our concept of intimacy: narrowly associating intimacy with expressive, self-disclosive exchange and ignoring the bonds created in the familiarities of joint activity and the exchange of instrumental help distorts our understanding of male intimacy in friendship (Wright 1998).

Those who maintain that the concept of self-disclosive intimacy is meaningful argue that conceptualizing intimacy in introspective and emotional terms illuminates the personal and social meanings of close friendship. When asked, men and women define intimacy similarly, in terms of self disclosure and emotional warmth, and both sexes assert that this kind of intimacy is the central characteristic of close relationships. Studies of the effects of disclosive intimacy suggest that both men and women feel better off and happier in relationships when this kind of intimacy is present (Reis 1998). Though shared activities may promote emotional intimacy, the settings and tasks of shared activity may discourage the attentiveness and candor required to achieve the bonds both men and women associate with close friendship.

Intimacy, affection, trust, and commitment to friends are not the same qualities, though the literature often elides them. Plausibly, each has different meanings for and influences on individuals, relationships, and even larger institutions,

such as marriage and the family. For example, through self-disclosive intimacy with best friends, women appear to actively reinforce each other's commitments to marriage and evolve strategies of marital bargaining and accommodation. Those who do not talk to close friends about problems in their marriages are unlikely to receive as much communal reinforcement of social norms of marital commitment, tailored to their particular perceptions, and do the kind of collective "marriage work" that stabilizes marriage. Gender differences in self-disclosive intimacy with friends may position men and women differently in the process of sustaining marriage commitments and stable families (Oliker 1989).

Sociologists have used depth psychology (primarily psychoanalysis), role theory, varieties of structural explanation (prominently, network concepts), and interactional approaches to explain how gender shapes friendship. With the exception of psycho-dispositional frameworks, all are deployable for an alternative approach to gender and friendship, which examines how friendship patterns shape gender. For example, studies of social networks and of foci of activity suggest how gendered divisions of labor result in men's looser knit and more work-focused networks that give men better access to information and contacts that advance their careers, while women's denser networks (denser in kin and neighborhood ties) offer women more resources for childrearing but fewer resources for career advancement (Smith-Lovin & McPherson 1993). In these studies, structures of friendship mediate the construction of gender inequality. Interactional frameworks that examine how gender behaviors and identities are produced in friends' interactions can explain persistent gender patterns even among individuals who may not be primed by dispositions, prompted by roles, or prodded by structural constraints. Evidence that men in cross-sex friendships are more disclosive than men in same-sex friendship and that women in cross-sex friendship are less disclosive suggests an analytical move in which gender identities and inequalities emerge in friendship dynamics (Reis 1998).

Enriching the study of gender and friendship will likely involve both analytical and methodological changes. The debate about gender

differences in intimacy shows the advantages of greater conceptual precision. Such precision would also make contradictory research findings easier to sort out. Two decades of qualitative research, most often studying either men or women, posits distinctive gender differences, while quantitative research finds few gender differences and small ones. Though such contradictions are entrenched, to some extent, in contrasting methods, more comparative qualitative studies and more interpretive strategies in quantitative work are likely to produce less discordant knowledge. Conceptual precision might also inspire scholarship on gender and the social, cultural, and psychological capital gains from less intimate "weak ties" of sociability and friendly acquaintance and co-participation. Finally, by shifting the analytical frame held up to gender and friendship, research exploring how friendship shapes gender could enrich the separate areas of friendship and gender, and the subject of relations between them.

SEE ALSO: Cross Sex Friendship; Friendship During the Later Years; Friendship: Interpersonal Aspects; Friendship, Social Inequality, and Social Change; Friendship: Structure and Context; Friendships of Adolescence; Friendships of Children; Friendships of Gay, Lesbian, and Bisexual People; Intimacy

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gender, health, and mortality

Ulla Larsen

Although life expectancy at birth of women in western societies is significantly longer than that of men (e.g., 80 versus 74 years in the United States), women experience more sickness and non-fatal health problems than men (e.g., higher morbidity). Specific biological and behavioral explanations for these gender differences are largely unknown. It remains unclear whether these gender differences in health and mortality are found throughout the world. Here, the term "gender" refers to the way biological differences are socially and culturally constructed and expressed in actions and thoughts, whereas the term "sex" is used to define a biological category based on anatomical and physiological differences between males and females. "Health" is a state of complete physical, mental, and social well-being and not merely the absence of disease or infirmity, according to the World Health Organization (WHO). "Mortality" is the rate of death in a population in a specified time period.

In the year 2000, the overall life expectancy at birth ranged from a high of 81.1 years in Japan (84.7 for women and 77.5 for men) to a low of 37.5 years in Malawi (37.8 for women and 37.1 for men), as measured from the 191 Member States of the WHO. At the beginning of the twentieth century female life expectancy exceeded male life expectancy by only 2-3

years in Europe, North America, and Australia, whereas at the beginning of the twenty-first century this gender-related difference in life expectancy was more than 10 years in some countries. Fewer deaths in childbirth help women today to live longer, accounting in part for the increase in the gap between male and female longevity. Worldwide analysis reveals a few exceptions: male life expectancy is higher than that of women (by less than a year) in a few countries (including Botswana, Namibia, and Nepal). These mortality sex differences prevail at all ages, races, and social conditions.

In 2002, worldwide, the four leading causes of disease burden (premature death and disability) over age 15 included HIV/AIDS, coronary heart disease, cerebrovascular disease, and unipolar depressive disorders. More specifically, HIV/AIDS was the leading disease burden for males and the second leading one for females (7.4 percent and 7.2 percent). The number one disease burden in females was unipolar depressive disorders (8.4 percent), whereas this disease ranked fourth for males (4.8 percent). Thus, of the four major causes of disease burden, unipolar depressive disorders have the greatest gender-specific difference. Coronary heart disease and cerebrovascular disease were the second and third most common cause for males (6.8 percent and 5.0 percent), and the third and fourth most common cause for females (5.3 percent and 5.2 percent). In conclusion, unipolar depressive disorders affected women relatively more than men, while coronary heart disease was somewhat more prevalent among men.

Women experience more poor health during their lives than do men. This gender difference in overall health is assessed by determining the number of days confined to bed, the frequency of sick leave from work, rates of yearly doctor and hospital visits, and the number of self-reported disease symptoms. For example, in the 1991 US National Health Interview Survey, the total proportion disabled (reporting difficulty with one or more activities of daily living) was nearly twice as high for women as men. However, the finding that women experience more health problems than men is being challenged with recent research documenting a more nuanced picture of gender differences in health, at least within developed western societies. For example, one study found no

consistent gender differences in reported health symptoms for young people in England. An other study, based on men and women working full time for an English bank, found difference by sex in symptoms of malaise (e.g., difficulty sleeping, nerves, and always feeling tired), but not in physical symptoms (e.g., hay fever, constipation, and a bad back) or in minor psychiatric morbidity (a 12 item general health questionnaire). The hypothesis that women are more willing to acknowledge and report poor health has also not been supported consistently in recent studies.

More research is needed to better understand the prevalence and causes of these general health differences between men and women. Future research will benefit from the use of health indices that have been evaluated for their validity and reliability in different research settings in order to ensure that findings between countries and across time are comparable and generalizable. In addition, the accuracy and completeness of health and mortality statistics are crucial in determining sex or gender differences. For example, measured differences might be the result of incomplete coverage of national death statistics, interviewer bias in health survey data, or because hospital and clinical data on disease include only the population attending these institutions, although women and men may be differentially admitted and treated.

Differing life span and quality of health can be due to biological factors, but medical research has not always accounted for sex differences. In 1977, in response to the adverse events following use of thalidomide and diethylstilbestrol in pregnant women, the US Food and Drug Administration (FDA) issued guidelines recommending that women in their childbearing years be excluded from phase I clinical trials (safety evaluations of new drugs based on healthy subjects). On scientific grounds it was justified to exclude women as clinical research participants because it was believed that men and women did not differ significantly in response to treatment in most situations, and the inclusion of women would introduce additional noise (from the hormonal variations caused by the menstrual cycle) and increase the heterogeneity of the study population. These faulty assumptions led to a period in which women were under represented

in research subject populations, a trend that may have reduced the effectiveness of new therapeutics for female patients. Thus, in 1985, the US Public Health Service Task Force on Women's Health Issues concluded that health care for women and the quality of health information available to women had been compromised by the historical lack of research on women's health. In 1993, with the National Institutes of Health Revitalization Act, the guidelines for inclusion of women became law and the FDA lifted the 1977 restrictions. In 1998 the FDA issued a rule allowing the agency to refuse new drug applications that did not appropriately analyze safety and efficacy data by sex.

In 2001 the Institute of Medicine formed a Committee on Understanding the Biology of Sex and Gender Differences, which found evidence suggesting that published research frequently did not present findings by sex, even though the data were available. It was noted that research on women's health and the inclusion of women in clinical trials would have limited value unless the actual differences between males and females were systematically studied and reported in published research. This committee noted that a number of sex based differences in health are attributable to sexual genotype (XX in the female and XY in the male on the 23rd chromosome pair) and hormonal or genetic differences between the two sexes. Also, men and women have dissimilar exposures (e.g., work and leisure activities), susceptibilities, and responses to initiating agents. Finally, sex differences in energy storage and metabolism result in variable responses to pharmacological drugs and the development of diseases such as obesity, autoimmune disorders, and coronary heart disease.

Examining the different experience of men and women with a particular disease, such as coronary heart disease, illustrates the complex effects of sex and gender on health, as well as the need for more research. Coronary heart disease begins *in utero*, evolves through childhood and young adulthood, and becomes a serious and often fatal health problem in middle and old age. Plaques of cholesterol and other cellular materials are deposited in the coronary arteries of the heart and over time compromise the flow of blood, causing cell and organ death (myocardial infarction). In general,

men manifest symptoms 10–20 years earlier than women, have higher prevalence of primary risk factors, and die at earlier ages, although women who have had a myocardial infarction are much more likely to die within a year compared to men. Female sex hormones (estrogen) reduce women's risk of coronary heart disease, in part by mitigating negative effects of serum lipids (fats in the bloodstream), while men's higher testosterone levels have unfavorable effects on serum lipids. In many non industrial societies, sex differences in cholesterol levels are minor or absent, largely an effect of diets low in saturated fats. It might also be that sex differences in serum lipid levels are linked to body composition, men having more abdominal fat, whereas women have more hip and thigh fat.

Several longitudinal studies, such as the Framingham Heart Study (US), the Tromso Heart Study (Norway), and the National Health and Nutrition Examination Survey (US), documented that genetics, age, and environmental and lifestyle factors are associated with onset of coronary heart disease. For example, environmental agents such as smoking, diet high in calories and saturated fat, obesity, a sedentary lifestyle, and psychosocial stress are linked to high blood pressure, high cholesterol, and diabetes. These factors are risk factors for coronary heart disease in both males and females, although susceptibilities and responses vary by sex. However, these studies did not explain why such sex differences exist. Smoking is a strong risk factor for coronary heart disease and the increase in smoking among women relative to men has contributed to narrowing the gap between men and women in mortality from coronary heart disease. There is evidence suggesting that medical care reduces coronary heart disease mortality more for men than for women, at least in the US. Women's complaints about chest pains tend to get cursory attention and women are less likely to get diagnostic evaluations. The data indicate that women get treatment at more advanced disease stages and more often have emergency surgery. Finally, heart conditions often present different symptoms in men and women, but more is known about this disease in men, in part because women often were excluded from clinical trials and epidemiological studies. Results

from research on men have simply been extended and applied to women, although it is now acknowledged that men and women have different exposures to risk factors and respond differently to some of the same risk factors. This underscores the importance of designing studies that address heart disease risk factors, treatment, and prevention in women.

Men and women respond differently to stress (the perception of excessive demands with which an individual is unable to cope), which is a risk factor for coronary heart disease. Lack of control induces stress and evidence suggests that women experience less control than men. In general, women experience more stress from their work because they have relatively lower status jobs with less control, less security, and less financial reward. In addition, women usually take on a greater burden of household chores, including childcare. Women do report more stress than men, but it has been argued that women simply express their distress more than men. Recent research showed that women are not socialized to complain more than men (express more stress), although it is possible that women and men feel differently about expressing emotional problems. Thus, there is accumulating evidence from western societies that women encounter more stress than men in their daily lives. Hence, stress might be a more important risk factor for coronary heart disease for women than men, although the higher levels of estrogen somewhat protect women from the negative effects of stress.

The question is whether the effect of stress on cardiovascular health is different for women and men. Laboratory studies showed that men express greater adrenaline response to stress than women, and it is hypothesized that women are protected against elevation of adrenaline because of higher levels of circulating estrogen. Elevated levels of circulating adrenaline may be bad for cardiovascular health because adrenaline stimulates the release of metabolites that contribute to raising levels of serum cholesterol. In addition, adrenaline is involved with the regulation of blood pressure, and repeated high blood pressure may lead to sustained hypertension. Studies of men and women in a number of non manual occupations showed significantly higher adrenaline levels in men on working days than on weekends, but no

such difference for women. Furthermore, self reported stress experienced on rest and work days was significantly associated with adrenaline response in men, but not in women. This difference in adrenaline response was seen, even though women and men reported (by questionnaire) similar levels of stress on workdays and the weekend and both sexes reported higher stress on workdays. Men and women also reported similar mood states, with the exception that men's anxiety dropped after work, while women's did not change. Thus, differences in subjective experience could not explain differences in adrenaline response to work between men and women, suggesting the influence of biological mechanisms. In summary, sex differences in coronary heart disease and mortality appear to be due to the interaction of multiple biological and behavioral factors.

Despite the importance of understanding why women live as much as 10 years longer than men and why women experience poorer health throughout their lives, so far no behavioral or biological explanation adequately explains this paradox. It is unlikely that biological and acquired risk differences fully explain why women experience poorer health, but live longer, for psychosocial aspects of symptoms and health care seeking (illness behavior) might play an important role.

SEE ALSO: Differential Treatment of Children by Sex; Gender, Aging and; Infant, Child, and Maternal Health and Mortality; Population and Gender; Sex and Gender; Women's Health

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gender ideology and gender role ideology

Amy Kroska

Both gender ideology and gender role ideology refer to attitudes regarding the appropriate roles, rights, and responsibilities of women and men in society. The concept can reflect these attitudes generally or in a specific domain, such as an economic, familial, legal, political, and/or social domain. Most gender ideology constructs are unidimensional and range from traditional, conservative, or anti feminist to egalitarian, liberal, or feminist. Traditional gender ideologies emphasize the value of distinctive roles for women and men. According to a traditional gender ideology about the family, for example, men fulfill their family roles through instrumental, breadwinning activities and women fulfill their roles through nurturant, homemaker, and parenting activities. Egalitarian ideologies regarding the family, by contrast, endorse and value men's and women's equal and shared breadwinning and nurturant family roles.

Gender ideology also sometimes refers to widespread societal beliefs that legitimate gender inequality. For example, Lorber (1994: 30) defines gender ideology as "the justification of gender statuses, particularly, their differential evaluation. The dominant ideology tends to suppress criticism by making these evaluations seem natural." Used in this way, gender ideology is not a variable that ranges from

conservative to liberal; instead, it refers to specific types of beliefs – those that support gender stratification. Gender ideology in the remainder of this summary refers to the first sense of the concept: attitudes that vary from conservative to liberal.

Sociologists' interest in measuring gender ideology can be traced at least as far back as the 1930s, with the development of instruments such as Kirkpatrick's 1936 Attitudes Toward Feminism scale. Interest continues today, and currently most major national surveys in the US, such as the General Social Survey (GSS) and the National Survey of Families and Households, include gender ideology scales. Two volumes by Carole Beere (1979, 1990) summarize the psychometric properties and past uses of most gender ideology instruments developed through 1988.

The most common technique for measuring gender ideology is a summated rating scale in which respondents are presented with a statement and given three to seven response options that vary from strong agreement to strong disagreement. The following statement from the GSS is illustrative: "It is much better for everyone involved if the man is the achiever outside the home and the woman takes care of the home and family." Other measurement techniques include Guttman scales, Thurstone measures, identity vignettes in which respondents rate their similarity to fictional characters, and intensive, open ended interviews.

Researchers have examined the correlates, causes, and consequences of individuals' gender ideology. Within the US the documented antecedents include gender and birth cohort, with males and earlier cohorts reporting more conservative attitudes than females and later cohorts. Among women, labor force participation and educational attainment decrease conservatism. More generally, conservative gender ideologies are positively related to church attendance, fundamentalism, and literal interpretations of the Bible, and negatively related to education, family income, parents' gender liberalism, and women's labor force participation (whether self, spouse, or mother).

Other correlates and consequences of gender ideological positions have also been studied. Liberalism is positively related to married men's housework and childcare contributions

and negatively related to women's housework contributions. Yet gender ideology is unrelated to the affective meanings (goodness, power, activity) associated with most social roles (e.g., a husband, a wife) and self meanings (e.g., my self as a husband) among individuals of the same sex, suggesting that gender ideology does not affect perceptions of most social roles or self meanings within those roles.

Researchers have also investigated the way that gender ideology shapes spouses' perceptions of their marriage. Liberalism reduces women's perceived marital quality but increases men's. Women's gender ideology also moderates the relationship between housework divisions and perceptions of fairness in housework divisions: as women's gender ideology becomes more liberal, the negative relationship between housework inequities and perceptions of housework fairness becomes stronger. Women's liberalism also increases the positive relationship between perceived fairness in housework and marital stability.

Researchers have recently begun to examine discrepancies between gender ideological positions and self identification with feminism. Schmittker, Freese, and Powell (2003) show a cohort effect in the US such that self identification with feminism is most strongly related to liberal gender ideologies for males and females who were young adults during the second wave of feminism. In addition, Klute et al. (2002) have applied Melvin Kohn's ideas to gender ideology. They found that self direction at work is positively related to values emphasizing self direction rather than conformity, and that spouses who value self direction are also more likely to hold egalitarian attitudes about marital roles. Thus, workplace experiences may have an indirect effect on gender ideologies through the values that they foster.

Cross national research has also shown that gender ideology is also related to women's political representation. Using the *World Values Survey*, which includes individual level information on gender attitudes in 46 countries in 1995, Paxton and Kunovich (2003) showed that a conservative gender ideology is negatively related to the percentage of female members in the national legislature of a country even when controlling for political and social structural factors.

SEE ALSO: Divisions of Household Labor; Doing Gender; Gender, Work, and Family; Ideology; Marital Quality; Role; Role Theory

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gender mainstreaming

Silke Roth

Gender mainstreaming is a strategy for achieving gender equality. The approach seeks to reorganize and restructure policies, institutions, and social programs by taking women's and men's perspectives, experiences, and needs into

consideration. Gender mainstreaming does not replace, but supplements, specific targeted interventions to address gender inequality such as affirmative action.

Gender mainstreaming was first introduced when UNIFEM (the women's division of the United Nations) was restructured. At the Third UN World Women's Conference in Nairobi in 1985, gender mainstreaming and empowerment were adopted in development policies due to the persistent marginalization of women with respect to access to resources, information, and decision making, replacing the earlier "women in development" (WID) approach. The goal of gender mainstreaming is to support women and to ensure their involvement in decision making processes and agenda setting. UNIFEM conceives gender mainstreaming as a double strategy: gender differentiation and taking into consideration the different living conditions and interests of men and women in all developmental programs and project interventions at the macro economic and macro political level, as well as women specific measures in those instances where gender analyses revealed inequalities with respect to resources.

Ten years later, the systematic incorporation of gender as a factor in policymaking was formally adopted at the Fourth World Conference of Women in Beijing in 1995. Due to extensive lobbying of the European women's lobby, gender mainstreaming was included in the Amsterdam Treaty of the European Union (EU), which was signed in 1997 and ratified in 1999 (Mazey 2001). The treaty declares gender mainstreaming as a core task of the EU and thus requests that member states (and those countries which seek to join the EU) mainstream gender into policies developed in their countries. Thus, the new member states which joined the European Union in May 2004 were required to adopt gender mainstreaming. The EU enlargement process thus provided important policy instruments for increasing equality between men and women. The implementation of gender mainstreamed regulations is monitored by the EU, but has to be carried out by the national governments.

Gender mainstreaming involves analytic tasks, taking into account inequalities in political power within households and in the domestic and unpaid sector, differences in legal status

and entitlements, the gender division of labor in the economy, violence against women, and discriminatory practices. Furthermore, it encompasses policy analysis and policy development: the formulation of the policy outcome to be addressed, the definition of the information needed to assess policy options, the assessment of the implication of different options by gender, the determination of who will be consulted and how, and the formulation of recommendations for policy choices. It is based on research and informs data collection, analysis, and dissemination. Gender mainstreaming in technical assistance draws on national commitments to women's rights and gender equality, ensures that the expert team includes members with gender analysis experience, and includes the consultation of local experts on gender equality (United Nations 2002).

In addition to development, gender mainstreaming was also introduced in other institutional arenas, for example international peacekeeping, education, and medicine. In October 2000 the UN Security Council adopted Resolution 1325, recognizing the urgent need to mainstream gender perspectives into peacekeeping operations, the importance of specialized gender training, and the need to understand the impact of armed conflict on women and girls. This includes the acknowledgment of sexual violence. In local societies, in which women constitute the majority of the population, it is especially beneficial to include a significant number of women in peacekeeping since female peacekeepers more easily establish dialogue with local civilians than their male partners because women may be perceived as less threatening and cultural norms might prohibit women to interact with men who are not family members. Security procedures such as body searches of women are easier if they are carried out by female peacekeepers (Olson & Torunn 2001). Gender mainstreaming of the education sector is based on the assessment of the educational status of girls and women, boys and men and involves the review of policies, laws, regulations, plans, and programs from a gender perspective, the analysis of the impact of educational policies and programs, and recommendations for more effective mainstreaming. Gender mainstreaming in the health sector guarantees that the different needs of men and

women are addressed, rather than extrapolating from male specific findings to women. Strategies include taking full account of diseases and disabilities from which women suffer because of their sex, which are more prevalent in women, which affect women more severely than men, which have more adverse effects on women during pregnancy, and against which women are less able to protect themselves. Men have a higher death rate from acute medical conditions such as cardiovascular or cerebrovascular episodes. Furthermore, men's workplace conditions, as well as gender stereotyping that discourages men from articulating their problems and emotions, need to be taken into consideration.

Gender mainstreaming represents a paradigm shift with respect to equality policies in as far as it declares all policy fields as relevant for women, in contrast to earlier gender policies which focused on women and developed political units (e.g., gender desks or women's ministries). This means that instead of helping women to adapt to structures which benefit men, the goal is to change the gendered structures in order to become more women friendly. Gender mainstreaming is future oriented in that it tries to anticipate gender processes in the planning and decision making stage, while earlier strategies to achieve gender equality retroactively sought to remedy past decisions and social inequalities.

SEE ALSO: Gender and Development; Gender Inequality/Stratification; Gendered Organizations/Institutions; Transnational and Global Feminisms

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gender oppression

Vrushali Patil

Gender oppression is defined as oppression associated with the gender norms, relations, and stratification of a given society. Modern norms of gender in western societies consist of the dichotomous, mutually exclusive categories of masculinity and femininity. Developing in tandem with industrial capitalism and the nation state, they had particular consequences for women and men. While masculinity was to consist of rationality, autonomy, activity, aggression, and competitiveness (all qualities that made men the ideal participants in the emerging public sphere of economy and polity), femininity was defined in contrast as emotionality, dependency, passivity and nurturance – all qualities that deemed women’s “place” in the private sphere. These naturalized views of gender categories were embedded in burgeoning disciplines such as biology and sociology. However, not only were they premised on a dichotomous conception of sex and gender, they were also premised on heterosexuality, middle class status, and European ethnic origin. As such, the gender oppression embedded therein is associated not only with the category with less power in the binary (femininity), but also with subjects that somehow deviate from either category.

Mainstream sociology initially ignored gender as well as gender oppression, marginalizing feminist sociologists in the early years. The subsequent period of structural functionalism excused and even supported dichotomous gender norms and their oppression, arguing that gender roles and identities served some functions in society. Sociological recognition and theorization of gender oppression thus required the denaturalization of the concept of gender itself within the discipline. A first step occurred in the 1970s, with debates regarding the extent to which “differences between the sexes” were biological. While this exchange enabled a limited discussion of gender oppression, the next set of debates allowed a greater role for the “social” – moving from sex differences to sex roles and socialization (Ferree et al. 2000). This shift was particularly useful for elaborating the gender oppression of those who “fit” or who

were able to comply with gender norms. One of the most important insights gleaned from this perspective was the relationship between the aforementioned gendering of public and private spheres and the fundamental gendering of personhood: that is, the gendering of the two spheres meant that women’s primary access to personhood within society was through the uptake and performance of their roles as wives and mothers within the private sphere, while men’s access to personhood was through participation in various worker and citizen roles in the public sphere (as well as through the status of head of household in the private sphere).

Studies of gender relations in societies around the world have demonstrated that almost everywhere in the modern era, though in culturally specific ways, femininity is associated with a domestic sphere while masculinity is associated with a public sphere. At the macro level, dichotomous and naturalized views of gender are evident in the gendering of economic, political, and other institutions, where especially elite men dominate every major institution in most societies around the world (see Peterson & Runyan 1999). Ultimately, this gendering shapes the experiences of different groups of women globally and is expressed in higher levels of poverty; lower levels of formal political power; trivialization and sexual objectification in media; gender specific health issues such as eating disorders, greater risk of AIDS, inadequate food/health care, and ongoing challenges to reproductive autonomy; greater levels of fear; and greater risk of interpersonal violence, to name a few.

Presently, the sociological approach to gender is even more “socialized,” and gender is now recognized as a thoroughly social entity as well as a central organizing principle in all social systems, including work, politics, family, science, etc. (Ferree et al. 2000). As such, understanding of its complexity and scope has increased as well. Hence, a central area of interest in recent years has been the intersection of gender with other dimensions of experience and oppression, including race, class, culture, sex, and sexuality. Otherwise stated, while the above perspective elaborated the gender oppression of those who “fit” the dichotomous gender categories of masculinity and femininity, this lens is particularly useful for understanding the gender oppression of those who “do not or cannot fit”

these categories. For example, the static and mutually exclusive norms of sex and gender that emerged in modernity denied the existence or personhood of the intersexed and the transgendered. Premised on heterosexuality, they denied the personhood of gays, lesbians, and bisexuals. Further premised on a masculine public sphere, working class women who necessarily transgressed this space have also been made deviant. Moreover, these norms are fundamentally racialized in that they emerged in the context of the conflict ridden contact between different peoples from the sixteenth century onwards. As European travelers in this period especially encountered racial and cultural “others,” with their varying gender practices, European gender norms became a symbol of civilization, the deviation from which became a sign of racial and cultural inferiority. In this fashion, gender became a central vehicle for constructing racial and cultural hierarchy (Enloe 1990; McClintock 1995).

Additional emerging areas of interest in the field include gender oppression associated with varying masculinities, gender experiences and oppression in a transnational framework, and gender symbolism that may perpetuate inequalities beyond the bodies of men and women (i.e., the denigration of “feminine qualities,” which denigrates not just women but any feminized entity).

SEE ALSO: Feminism; Gender Bias; Inequality/Stratification, Gender; Intersectionality; Patriarchy; Racialized Gender

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gender, social movements and

Nancy Whittier

Social movements are shaped by gender systems and they also are a source of social change in gender. Some social movements directly attempt to change gender relations; these movements, particularly women’s movements, have been the focus of considerable scholarship. Increasingly, scholars also recognize the gendered nature of other social movements and the impact of systemic inequalities of gender on the opportunities, constraints, and forms of social movements in general.

Research on gender and social movements has proceeded through several stages. Initial works focused on documenting women’s movements, including feminist and non feminist movements, and explaining their emergence and development. A second phase of work began to analyze gender in social movements more broadly, including masculinity, and to analyze the intersections between gender, race, class, and nationality in social movements. Most recently, numerous scholars have begun to examine the ways that movements are gendered in their origins, collective identities, frames and discourses, organizational structures, tactics, and political and cultural opportunities. In doing so, they contribute to a rethinking of the basic concepts of the field of social movements. These phases are similar to those for scholarship on gender more

broadly, which initially focused on documenting women's experiences and remedying male bias, next on gender as an institution and the intersections between gender and other major forms of social inequality, and lastly on reformulating basic sociological knowledge and theory based on a perspective that makes gender central. Sociological work on gender and social movements thus reflects the influence of the feminist movement on the academy.

Many social movements have targeted the social structures, culture, and interactional norms around gender. These include feminist movements, which in many countries focused first on gaining basic political rights such as the vote and the right to own property, and then progressed in later waves to addressing other forms of inequality between women and men ranging from responsibility for child raising and household labor, discrimination in paid employment, sexuality, reproductive rights, health care, stereotyping in the arts and popular culture, election to public office, and so on. Parallel to these movements are anti feminist movements, which tend to emerge in response to feminist movements and also target gender directly in an attempt to forestall or roll back changes.

Other movements have been organized around gender, without taking gender as a central or explicit target. For example, women's temperance and social reform movements in the late 1800s and early 1900s in the United States organized women based on their social responsibilities for morality, childrearing, and the promulgation of religious values. Women have organized in "mothers' movements" to challenge governmental killings and disappearances of their children (such as the *Madres de la Plaza de Mayo* in Argentina), or to fight against environmental degradation or for better public education. Such "maternalist politics" can uphold traditional definitions of women's place while simultaneously expanding those definitions, bringing women into the public sphere and often changing activists' own family relations and identities. Men's movements, such as the mythopoetic movement, also organize men around some traditional definitions of masculinity while simultaneously stretching those definitions by, for example, encouraging men to express emotions more freely (Schwalbe 1996).

Further, movements do not have to be oriented around gender to be shaped by it. Because gender is a central feature of social structure, culture, and daily life, all movements are gendered. The major elements of social movements are their emergence and recruitment, collective identities, frames or discourses, organizations, tactics or actions, and external contexts or political opportunities. Each of these elements is gendered.

First, movements' emergence and processes of recruitment are gendered because the status of women and men shapes their differential ability and willingness to organize on their own behalf. Gendered factors such as family structures and responsibilities, access to higher education, paid employment, and fertility rate all affect recruitment and participation in activism. These factors all vary according to race, class, and nationality as well as gender, and also change over time; such variations account for some of the differences in the level and form of women's mobilization cross culturally and historically. Further, social movements emerge along gendered lines because they emerge from gendered preexisting organizations and networks (Taylor 1999). For example, feminist organizing during the late 1960s in the US emerged partially from the Civil Rights Movement, in which women gained organizing experience and an ideology opposing inequality, but also faced gender barriers to full participation. However, grievances and networks based on race and class cross cut those based on gender. For African American and Latina women during the same era, their connections to mixed sex movements around race mitigated their interest in a mixed race movement around gender. Instead, they advocated for women's interests within mixed sex movements (Roth 2004). Similarly, international women's conferences sponsored by the United Nations have illustrated how women in third world countries define their interests quite differently from those in the highly industrialized global North.

Second, movements' collective identities, or group definitions, are gendered. Some social movements directly try to change the definition associated with their group, as feminist movements, for example, try to change what it means to be a woman. Beyond this, movement participants bring with them a gender consciousness

that affects the collective identities they construct, and they draw on ideas about gender from both dominant and oppositional cultures. For example, environmental or peace activists may define themselves as mothers concerned about the well being of children and future generations, and participants in anti globalization protests may draw on masculinity to define themselves as warriors standing up to the police, or they may draw on feminist and queer politics to define themselves as rejecting the dominant gender order along with capitalism.

Third, social movements construct interpretive frames to explain their grievances and issues, addressing their causes and calling for action. In doing so, they draw on mainstream discourses and also challenge and extend those discourses. Mainstream frames and discourses are built around particular definitions of the nature, roles, and responsibilities of women and men, and social movements include elements of these mainstream frames and discourses and construct alternatives. Often they may do both, as in the case of maternalist movements that draw on women's special place as mothers to argue for a greater influence by women on national affairs.

Fourth, social movements' organizational structures are gendered. For example, the American Civil Rights Movement assigned formal leadership to men while assigning women to more informal leadership roles (Robnett 1997). Recognizing these differences entails not only recognizing discrimination within the movement and bringing to light the previously unacknowledged role of women, but also redefining theories of leadership to include the ways that women exercise influence outside of official leadership positions. Beyond leadership, women and men may take on different tasks within movement organizations, with women taking more responsibility for activities such as providing food for events or monitoring the emotional climate at meetings, and men undertaking more public speaking, drafting of position papers, or providing "peacekeeping" at public demonstrations. Gendered divisions of labor within movements vary considerably across time, space, and among movements, of course. In movements that explicitly challenge the gendered status quo, such differences may be much less marked or even at times inverted;

while in movements that seek to restore traditional gender roles, they may be exaggerated.

Fifth, tactics and strategies are affected by gender. Women and men may draw on established social activities in order to work for change, as in men's use of violent intimidation compared with women's reliance on boycotts and vicious gossip in the US racist movement of the 1920s (Blee 1991). Here, too, incorporating tactics grounded in traditionally feminine activities into social movement theory suggests a broader definition of tactics and strategies that includes actions previously not seen as part of social movements.

Sixth, gendered external social structures and mainstream culture delimit the opportunities and constraints for social movements. Political opportunities are affected by gender because women and men have differential access to the state, both as elected officials and as outside activists. On a more subtle level, the state and other major social institutions operate through gendered structures, procedures, and discourses (sometimes termed gender regimes). When activists target or enter institutions, therefore, they face particular opportunities or barriers depending both on their actual gender and on the way their movement engages with or challenges existing notions of gender. For example, in working to change discourses about gender in the Catholic Church, women were able to draw on the institutional base of female religious orders but were limited by their structural subordination. As a result, they focused on *discursive* rather than structural change (Katzenstein 1998). Mainstream culture affects how movements' claims are received, as well, with activists who challenge accepted notions of gender being more likely to be marginalized. Men who openly display affection toward each other and lobby for an expansion in the definition of masculinity, for example, are the subject of considerable ridicule (Schwalbe 1996), while women who lobbied for restrictions on hunting were viewed as hysterical females treading into waters where they did not belong (Einwohner 1999).

In addition to being shaped by gender, social movements are an important force in changing gender systems. Feminist movements in the US and Western Europe have produced considerable change in cultural beliefs, the

structure of paid employment, women's access to higher education, and basic rights such as the vote, credit, and property ownership. In many countries, women's activism has produced constitutional guarantees for women's minimum representation in elected office. Further, social movements have contributed to changes in the cultural codes and interactional norms that define gender. At the same time, these changes have been contested by anti feminist movements.

Several lines of research are promising. First, more analyses of the gendered dimensions of men's and mixed sex movements will augment the extensive work on women's movements. Second, work on cases outside the US and Western Europe is examining the gender dimensions of a variety of movements. Because gender systems vary comparatively, this work promises to expand theorizing on the topic. Third, efforts to reconceptualize social movement theory based on this work have begun, and promise to produce a richer and more inclusive theoretical model.

SEE ALSO: Black Feminist Thought; Collective Identity; Culture, Gender and; Culture, Social Movements and; Emotions and Social Movements; Feminism; Feminism, First, Second, and Third Waves; Feminist Activism in Latin America; Framing and Social Movements; Gendered Organizations/Institutions; Political Opportunities; Sex and Gender; Social Movements; Women's Empowerment; Women's Movements

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gender, sport and

Louise Mansfield

Gender refers to the socially constructed differences between women and men, while the term "sex" is a reference to the biological and physical differences between males and females. Gender draws attention to the socially unequal distinction between femininity and masculinity. Femininity is used to describe characteristic behaviors and emotions of females and masculinity refers to the distinctive actions and feelings of the male sex. In studies of gender and sport, the concept of gender is analytically distinguished from that of sex even though the two are often used synonymously in everyday language and thought. Not all the differences between females and males are biological. But historically, ideas about the implications of biological differences between women and men have served to justify the exclusion or limited inclusion of women in sports. Such views reflect an ideology of biological determinism, where it is claimed that men, and not women, are inherently strong, aggressive, and competitive and, therefore, better suited to sports.

Since the 1970s, gender has become an important category of analysis in the sociology of sport. Research has clearly demonstrated that sports are gendered activities as well as social contexts in which boys and men are more

actively and enthusiastically encouraged to participate, compared with girls and women. Evidence also shows that more males than females participate in organized competitive sports, and that male dominance characterizes the administration and coaching of sports. Sports, it is theorized, operate as a site for the inculcation, perpetuation, and celebration of a type of (heterosexual) masculine identity based on physical dominance, aggression, and competitiveness. Associated with such masculine imagery, sports serve to legitimize a perceived natural superiority of men and reinforce the inferiority of females who are defined with reference to relative weakness, passivity, and grace – the characteristics of femininity. Therefore, sports are often described as a “male preserve.”

Social changes reflecting the condition of women in society have influenced the status of knowledge about the relationships between and within groups of women and men in sports. Starting in the 1970s, a consequence of the feminist movement was to raise public awareness about the need for increased opportunities for girls and women in sports. Since then there has been growing political and public recognition of the importance of health and fitness. Furthermore, emerging knowledge about the health benefits of physical activity provided a foundation for the promotion of physical activity for girls and women. Opportunities for girls and women in sports have improved and participation rates among females have increased. Scholars studying gender and sports indicate that these developments have resulted in ongoing challenges to gender stereotyping, resistance and negotiation of established gender ideology, and the initiation of important legal and political change regarding sex discrimination in sports and society. For example, Title IX of the Education Amendments of the Civil Rights Act (1972) in the US, and the Sex Discrimination Act (1975) in Great Britain were intended to counter public discrimination against women. Such legislation has been used to prevent and remove many barriers to female participation in sports.

There is now over 35 years of scholarship that theorizes gender and sport. One of the most sustained attempts at conceptualizing and theorizing about gender in the sociology of sport is found in feminist scholarship.

The first attempts to analyze women's place in sport were made in the 1960s by physical educators. The result was a corpus of largely atheoretical work on “women in sport” founded upon a liberal feminist consciousness about sport as a “male preserve” characterized by gender inequities. Between 1970 and 1980 psychological models were mainly used to explain female attitudes and motivations in sports. In the 1980s, emerging theoretical diversity and sophistication in feminist approaches led to the development of a clear sociology of women in sport. As political and theoretical feminisms have changed, so too has the focus of feminist research.

Depending on the theoretical and methodological position of the researcher, different questions about and accounts of gender and sport prevail. Debates surrounding the gendered character of sporting practices have changed with increasing awareness of feminist theories and a more sophisticated use of these theories. For example, much of the initial work on gender and sport highlighted inequities but did not explicitly deal with how the prevailing organization of sports privileged the physical experiences of boys and men. Subsequent critical analyses revealed that research focused on differences between males and females generally supported traditional claims about the biological inferiority of females and the legitimacy of efforts to control women's sports participation. Such research, it was argued, did not deal with the underlying structural and cultural sources of gender inequality. More recent scholarship has attempted to resolve the shortcomings of early research and theory by considering difference and diversity between and within groups of women, and by theoretical and methodological approaches that consider women as active agents in the construction and reconstruction of their sporting experiences.

There is no single feminist movement or theory that has informed current scholarly work on gender and sport. Liberal feminist accounts of sport are based on claims that women should have equal rights to those of men in terms of access to resources, opportunities to participate, and decision making positions. Radical feminists are critical of the patriarchal power relations that operate to maintain the dominance of heterosexuality and

construct homophobic attitudes and practices in sport. Socialist feminists have examined the connections between gender, social class, and race and ethnicity under conditions of patriarchy, capitalism, and neocolonialism. Significant theoretical influences in understanding gender and sport have also emerged in cultural studies and in work guided by the writings of Norbert Elias, Pierre Bourdieu, and poststructuralist theorists. Contemporary work in the field reflects the move toward critical analyses of the complex relationships between and within groups of women and men in sport. Current scholarship examines the ways in which gender relations are produced, reproduced, challenged, and transformed in and through sporting practices.

Three key themes have driven debates about gender and sport since the 1970s. First, leading scholars in the sociology of sport have highlighted that throughout history, sporting practices inculcated behaviors and values defined as male, manly, and masculine. Second, issues surrounding the body, physicality, and sexuality have been brought to the fore in understanding gender relations in sport. Third, it is emphasized that both women and men reinforce and challenge dominant gender ideology in sport in various ways. In this regard scholars have eschewed ideas about women and men as homogeneous categories, and have recognized and examined difference and diversity in people's gendered sporting experiences at the level of the subject and in terms of institutional politics and practice. Recent research includes work that examines the production and reproduction of gender in sport in terms of the sporting experiences of women and men from various sociocultural backgrounds.

HISTORICAL DEVELOPMENTS AND THE GENDERING OF SPORT

Sociologists of sport have illustrated that the historical development of modern sports laid the foundations for the gendered character of sporting practices. Over time, sports have been constructed and reconstructed around the assumptions, values, and ideologies of males, maleness, and masculinity. The roots of contemporary sports lie in the Victorian period in

Britain, when sports began to be characterized by organized structures and standardized rules. In terms of gender, late nineteenth century British developments in sports largely centered on the beliefs and values of white middle class males. The prestige, status, and superiority afforded to men in society became marked at this time. In institutions such as public schools, universities, churches, and private clubs, sports came to represent a Victorian version of masculinity based on physical superiority, competitiveness, mental acumen, and a sense of fair play. Established ideals of femininity such as passivity, frailty, emotionality, gentleness, and dependence were in stark opposition to the strenuous task of playing sports. The belief that male and female traits were innate, biological, and somehow fixed prevailed. Women's participation in sports was therefore a subject of debate regarding what type and how much physical activity was appropriate for them. The marginalization of women and the dominance of men in sports is a legacy of Victorian images of female frailty that is also reflected in the making of modern sports in the US.

In both Britain and the US, changes in social life during the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries impacted on gender relations in sport. British and American society at this time was characterized by social relations that were becoming less violent, there was a decreasing reliance on physical strength in the workplace, and home and educational environments were becoming ones in which young males spent increasing amounts of time with females. Eric Dunning (1999) and Michael Messner (1990) refer to these social transformations as the "feminization" of society. One consequence of these processes was the reconstruction of sporting opportunities and social enclaves (such as the Boy Scouts and the YMCA) for boys and men to reclaim and reassert their masculinity. While opportunities for women in sports also increased in the early part of the twentieth century, participation rates for females remained considerably smaller compared to males. Some sports were acceptable for women so long as they were not as strenuous or competitive as the male version. Women's sports were still the subject of intense debate reflecting and maintaining the Victorian myth of women's physical ineptitude.

SPORT, GENDER, POWER, AND PHYSICALITY

Many scholars have advanced an understanding about gender and sport by recognizing and examining the connections between physicality, power, and the production of gender. It is emphasized that in sport, physicality is predominantly defined in terms of bodily strength, muscularity, and athletic prowess. Connell (1995) explains such characteristics as a “culturally idealized” form of masculinity. Much has been written about the ways that contemporary sports reinforce a male model of (heterosexual) physical superiority and, at the same time, operate to oppress women through the trivialization and objectification of their physicality and sexuality. Several scholars assert that the acquisition of muscular strength and athletic skill is less empowering for women than it is for men. There is a commonsense assumption that muscularity is unfeminine, and that strong and powerful females are not “real” women. An increasing amount of work illustrates that such beliefs are reflected in the proliferation of media images emphasizing female heterosexuality at the expense of athletic prowess. The sexualization of female athletes through media representation is one way in which images of idealized female physicality are reproduced and perpetuated.

There are other mechanisms of control over female physicality in sport. Some writers explain that aerobics and bodybuilding operate to reproduce established gender ideology by feminizing the corporeal practices, rituals, and techniques in which women are involved, as well as objectifying and sexualizing women’s bodies. Some consider that sexual harassment and vilification of women by male athletes provides evidence that the use of violence, aggression, and force is a defining feature of masculine identity that is constructed and legitimated in sporting contexts. There is also some scholarship that focuses on the way in which sports perpetuate the denigration of lesbians and gay men. It is argued that sports maintain a culture of homophobia in which homosexuality is feared and deemed to be unacceptable. Lesbians and gay men are discouraged from expressing their sexual identities through threatening homophobic sentiments

and actions. Sports reinforce a culture of heterosexuality and effectively silence homosexual identities.

A central argument in contemporary work on gender, sport, and physicality is the idea that the empowering experience of sport for heterosexual males is not universal, fixed, or unchallenged. Robert Connell illustrates the inherent contradictions in hegemonic masculinity. Strength, power, skill, and mental and physical toughness are not the only defining characteristics of masculinity. Not all sports privilege the values of aggression and physical domination associated with culturally established ideals of masculinity. It is also the case that the dominant image of masculinity, most often represented in sport, is one that can be limiting and restrictive for some men as well as most women. There are fewer opportunities for boys and men to participate, without prejudice, in sports that are not based on strength, power, and domination. There is work that shows that boys and men who are not good at sport, or who do not participate, have their heterosexual masculinity called into question. The sports experience is a negative and disappointing one for such males.

SPORT, GENDER, AND CONTESTED IDEOLOGY

It is increasingly emphasized in studies of sport and gender that dominant ideals of masculinity and femininity exist at the same time as emergent and residual ones. Such work is concerned with the relational character of gender. Michael Messner explains that in terms of gender, sport is a “contested terrain.” This means that at any moment in history and in specific sporting contexts, there are competing masculinities and femininities. There are many scholars who now recognize that in sport, as well as in other social settings, some women are more powerful and influential than other women and men, and some women are empowered at the expense of other women and men.

Scholars in the sociology of sport have illustrated that many people are empowered by being involved in sport in spite of traditional gender ideology. Examples show how sport is a

site where established values about gender have been resisted, negotiated, and sometimes transformed. The assumption that homosexuality does not exist in sport is challenged in research about the many gay men competing in sports at recreational and elite levels. There are events such as the Gay Games that allow athletes to compete in a relatively unprejudiced environment where they have less to fear about derogatory and violent responses to their publicized sexual orientation. Several scholars question the assumption that sport is a site for the oppression of women by exploring the ways in which women gain from their sporting achievements. Such research shows that it is possible for women to experience feelings of independence, confidence, and increased self esteem from their involvement in a variety of sporting practices. Female participation in physical activity can also contribute to broadening and alternative definitions of physicality that are not simply based on traditional ideals about feminine appearance. In the case of professional sports, some women are able to gain considerable financial wealth and worldwide recognition from their sporting achievements.

The extent to which sports are oppressive and liberating for women and men is culturally specific and related to the political and economic conditions in which they live their lives. There is increasing interest in the relationships between sport, gender, race, and ethnicity, and work on this topic emphasizes that questions of femininity and masculinity are inseparable from questions of race and ethnicity. In the main, research on sport, race, and ethnicity has examined issues connected with black sports men. Recent research takes a closer look at the complex relationships between masculinity, blackness, and sport. Critical examinations of the historical development of sport emphasize that sports were constructed in the image of particular ideals about white masculinity. Analyses of the racial significance of sport illustrate that sporting practices can provide black males with (symbolic) opportunities for resistance to racism through the assertion of manly qualities such as athleticism, aggression, and toughness. These writings also illustrate that sport reflects the historically constructed (subordinate) place of black males in (Western) societies. Dominant images of black male athleticism tend to

reinforce stereotypes of black men as powerful, aggressive, and hypersexual.

Scholars concerned with the relationship between sport, ethnicity, and femininity emphasize that sportswomen are not a homogeneous group. Increasingly, there is literature that presents a challenge to dominant universalistic conceptions of women in sport that serve to construct white, western, middle class, able bodied women's experiences as representative of all sportswomen. Sociologists of sport have argued that the dominant assumption about female sports operates to marginalize or even silence the sporting triumphs and struggles of women who live outside the West and those who represent minority groups of females. A central feature of scholarship in this area is the recognition of difference between and within groups of women in relation to ethnicity, religious affiliation, social class, age, and physical (dis)ability. Jennifer Hargreaves (2000) explains that a sense of difference is characterized by power relations operating simultaneously at the personal and institutional level. In many ways, sport can be empowering for black women, Muslim women, Aboriginal women, lesbians, and disabled women. At the same time, these women are incorporated into the wider social networks of power in which they live out their lives.

SEE ALSO: Body and Cultural Sociology; Gender, the Body and; Identity, Sport and; Ideology; Leisure; Media and Sport; Race/Ethnicity, Health, and Mortality; Sexuality and Sport; Sport

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gender, work, and family

Elizabeth Thorn

Gender, work, and family is the study of the intersection of work and family, with a focus on how those intersections vary by gender. This research is motivated in large part by the tremendous growth in labor force participation among women in their childbearing years during the second half of the twentieth century. This influx of wives and mothers into the workforce has raised questions about the division of labor in the family and whether state and corporate policies are sufficient to support new family types. Researchers also examine the causes of the divergent outcomes men and women experience in the workplace, as well as the effects labor force participation has on family formation, dissolution, and carework. These questions are most frequently researched quantitatively, but qualitative and theoretical work also contributes to the understanding of gender, work, and family.

THE MYTH OF SEPARATE WORLDS

Rosabeth Moss Kanter's pivotal book *Work and Family in the United States* (1977) laid much of the groundwork for the study of gender, work, and family. Kanter made the case that changing family structures and increasing labor force

participation among women were creating a new and complex set of interactions that were not being sufficiently studied in the traditional domains of the sociology of the family and the sociology of the labor force. Social scientists, Kanter claimed, subscribed to the "myth of separate worlds," a belief that work and family are separate and non overlapping spheres, each of which operates free from the influence of the other and can be studied independently. She locates the origins of this myth in anti nepotism policies and employer claims on worker loyalty, in the increasing geographical separation of home and work, and in American individualism.

Kanter's counterargument is that the structures of work are actually quite crucial in shaping personal lives. Occupations have different levels of absorptiveness; some occupations may require little of the worker outside of the work place, but workers in other occupations, such as foreign service and military officers, clergy, and high level executives, must behave in certain ways even when officially off duty. The time and timing of work is another important consideration. Time that workers spend at work and commuting is time they do not spend with their families, and business travel and non standard work schedules may make spending time with family difficult even when the number of hours in itself is not onerous. Work is associated with rewards and resources, meaning that different workers have very different levels of compensation available to share with their families. Occupational cultures may become part of workers' worldview, shaping their values and especially the way they raise their children. Finally, the emotional climate of the workplace can produce feelings of self confidence or tension in the worker, affecting relationships within the family.

Similarly, family can influence workers' behavior in the workplace. Cultural traditions held by the family may shape workers' decisions about work. Family firms may offer employment to family members, and family connections may open doors to job opportunities. Families of workers in highly absorptive occupations have an impact on the worker's performance in that role; an executive, for example, might be hampered in his career mobility without the expected "corporate wife."

Finally, the emotional climate of the home may affect family members in their roles as workers.

The myth of separate worlds was so strongly gendered that the ways in which men's and women's work and family roles were studied were quite different prior to Kanter's book. Research often lumped all working women together without acknowledgment of the specificities of their work. At the beginning of the twenty first century, societal norms are still such that gender is an important consideration in the study of work and family.

TIME USE

One of the intersections of work and family Kanter identified is the time and timing of work, an area which has been extensively studied by subsequent scholars. Work and family responsibilities are both quite time consuming. As more and more women joined the labor force, researchers became increasingly curious about how families manage to find the time for paid employment, unpaid work in the home, and leisure. Most research has found striking and persistent differences in time allocation by gender.

Arlie Hochschild's (Hochschild with Machung 2003) ethnographic study of dual earner households with children living at home found that mothers were working what amounted to a "second shift" of housework and childcare when they got home from their paid jobs. Their husbands, by comparison, shouldered a much lighter load. There were some variations in the division of labor associated with different gender ideologies, with couples who shared an egalitarian ideology sharing the work of the second shift most equally, but the effects of those ideologies were mediated by the constraints of employment and actual feelings about work and family responsibilities. Hochschild attributed the uneven workload of the second shift to a stalled revolution, in which women had begun participating in the traditionally male domain of the labor force to a much greater extent than men had begun participating in the traditionally female activities of childcare and housework.

Other researchers have found that the imbalance might not be as extreme as the second

shift suggests (Bianchi et al. forthcoming). Time diaries show that across broader samples of American adults, there is less difference in the amount of work – both paid and unpaid – that men and women do. Although women as a group do more of the unpaid work in the home, they also tend to work fewer hours for pay than do men. Historical trends indicate that as women increased their hours in the labor force, they decreased the amount of time they spent on housework. Men have decreased the amount of time they spend in the labor force to some extent, generally by entering at later ages and by retiring earlier, and have increased the amount of housework they do, but not by as much as women have decreased their hours of housework.

An important related question is how much time fathers and mothers spend with their children, and how that has changed since more mothers began participating in the labor force. After all, it is one thing to spend less time on housework than was done in the 1960s and another to spend less time with one's children. However, in the United States, mothers' time with children has remained remarkably constant between 1965 and 1998, and if anything has grown slightly. Married fathers spend much more time with their children than did their counterparts in 1965, and this time is not just in playing with and teaching their children, but also in childcare activities such as dressing, bathing, and putting children to bed.

Another approach is to look at the time use of families, rather than that of men and women as individuals. Family structures have changed considerably since the middle of the twentieth century. Whereas most families with children in the 1950s and 1960s had a dedicated homemaker, today's families are much more likely to have two employed parents or be single parent families. It is in these families in which all adults are employed that work-family conflict – in this case a "time crunch" – is most likely to be felt (Jacobs & Gerson 2004). Dual earner families with children find it particularly difficult to balance the requirements of work and family. At the same time, however, there are also many families whose members are not able to find enough hours of paid work.

In addition to looking at the numbers of hours worked by men and women and different

family types, it is also important to consider *when* those hours are worked (Presser 2003). It is often assumed that paid employment takes place from nine to five, Monday through Friday. However, as of 1997, in a quarter of dual earner married couples, at least one spouse worked something other than that standard schedule. Looking only at married dual earner couples with children, that fraction increases to a third. Those non standard schedules have a number of consequences for the family. Non standard schedules are associated with lower marital quality and marital instability, especially when there are children in the home. Non standard work schedules make childcare arrangements more complex and difficult to manage, particularly in families with young children. One interesting consequence of non standard work schedules is greater participation by men in what are generally considered female household tasks and childcare.

FAMILY ROLES AND THE LABOR FORCE

Family roles and statuses are associated with different outcomes in the labor market. Some roles are linked to increased productivity and income, while others are related to decreased wages. Gender, work, and family researchers examine the relationships between various family positions and labor market outcomes and try to establish the causes of differences. Different positions within the family may actually cause different labor market outcomes through the family's effect on productivity. Alternatively, employers may discriminate based on family roles. A third possibility is one of selection; perhaps the same sort of person is likely to be found in both certain family roles and in certain labor market positions. Conversely, labor force positions may affect family functions, such as propensity towards marriage or divorce.

Much research has demonstrated that married or cohabiting men earn more than their single counterparts. Data from longitudinal studies (Korenman & Neumark 1991) suggest that this is not merely a selection effect – that is, it is not just that men who are likely to do well in the labor force are also likely to get

married. Rather, wage growth is faster for married men than single men, and married men receive higher performance ratings. This lends support to the idea that married men are either more productive or are more desirable to employers than are single men. Men may become more productive in the labor market because their new partner takes on more of the responsibilities in the home, which allows men to develop those skills that are most marketable. Research indicates that although men's earnings go up when they form an intimate union, their overall financial position may not change much, largely because their spouse's labor market activity may be reduced, causing a reduction in family income. For women, on the other hand, marriage does not seem to be associated with significant changes in wages.

Like union formation, the transition to parenthood is another large shift in family roles, and the labor market outcomes associated with becoming a parent vary by gender. Fathers are more likely to be employed and to work more hours than childless men, but the opposite is true for women. Wages are affected as well. Budig and England (2001) found a motherhood wage penalty of 7 percent per child. That is, each child a woman has is associated with an additional 7 percent decrease in wage rate. This wage penalty may be explained in part by new mothers exiting the labor force or reducing their hours, but even after controlling for work experience, Budig and England still find a penalty of 5 percent per child. They attribute this penalty to either a reduction in productivity or discrimination on the part of employers.

Lundberg and Rose (2000) also found that motherhood is associated with reduction in wages – 5 percent in their calculations. Fatherhood, in contrast, is associated with a 9 percent increase in wages. However, they attribute much of this difference to increased specialization on the part of the new parents; mothers' salaries decrease because their new roles divert their attentions and energies from the labor force, which lowers their productivity. When the analysis is restricted to couples in which the new mother is continuously employed, a different pattern emerges. These mothers work fewer hours, but at the same wage. The new fathers, on the other hand, work slightly fewer hours, but at a *higher* wage rate. Women may avoid a

wage penalty if they remain continuously employed upon the transition to parenthood, but men generally see a boost in wages upon becoming fathers, whether they reduce or expand their work time.

Family roles influence labor force outcomes. The reverse is also true: labor force positions can influence family roles. To take one example, the historical changes in women's labor force participation are associated with the increasing importance of women's earnings for marriage formation. Among younger cohorts, women with higher earnings are more likely to marry than women who earn less. Women now contribute significantly to their families' incomes, so women with high incomes are more desirable marriage partners. Men's earnings have long been associated with their chances of marrying. Labor force position can influence union dissolution as well as formation. Because women's labor force participation increased at the same time as divorce rates, it has often been supposed that women's employment leads to divorce. However, as indicators of marital dissatisfaction are much more accurate predictors of divorce than a wife's employment, it is more likely that employment allows women to leave bad marriages than women's employment causes marital disharmony. Occupation may also influence the likelihood of a woman remaining childless. Highly educated women in high level positions in the labor force are much more likely than other women to not have children, either because they always planned to pursue only a career, or because the tradeoffs associated with child rearing were too great.

PUBLIC POLICY AND GENDER, WORK, AND FAMILY

Public policy in the United States and Europe has historically assumed that most families fit the breadwinner/homemaker model. However, as fewer and fewer families match the breadwinner/homemaker model and gender roles in work and family change, policymakers have had to adapt many policies. Examples of changing policy include family leave, welfare reform, and dependent care policy. In some cases, these

new policies play a role in shaping gender norms in work and family.

One of the most striking examples of policy change is in the growth of family leave. In the US, family leave was first enacted at the federal level in 1993 as the Family and Medical Leave Act (FMLA). The FMLA provides certain workers with 12 weeks of job protected, unpaid leave to care for a new child or a sick family member, or in the case of the worker's own serious illness. The implementation of this right displays a recognition that workers are often also responsible for care taking in the home and cannot rely upon the efforts of a non-employed family member. However, use of FMLA leave is gendered along traditional lines; women are more likely to use it than men, and they are more likely than men to use it to care for others. While leave is unpaid under the federal law, in 2004 the state of California began offering leave takers a wage replacement rate of 55 percent, up to a maximum of \$728 per week.

European countries typically offer longer leave, plus wage replacement. Norway and Sweden, exceptional even in Europe, offer new parents a choice between 42 weeks of leave at 100 percent of pay and 52 weeks of leave at 80 percent of pay. The time can be split between the parents as they decide, but a minimum of four weeks is reserved for the father. The "father quota" was established in these countries in the hopes that it would both improve father-child relationships and balance gender roles within the family. There is some evidence that this policy does affect gender roles; men report that the father quota makes it easier to approach employers about taking leave, and researchers have found that new fathers who take leave are more likely to share in housework and childcare tasks. At a minimum, the policy has encouraged more men to use parental leave. Before it was established, only 4 percent of fathers took any leave in Norway, but in 1996, after the father quota went into effect, 80 percent of eligible fathers took leave (Boje & Leira 2000).

The availability of family leave does not necessarily support new gender norms and roles. Some countries in Europe, such as France, Germany, and Finland, have long leaves of two or three years. Leave of this length has a deleterious effect on experience,

training, and opportunity for promotion, and is overwhelmingly used by women, weakening women's labor force attachment. As a result, women's labor force participation rates decline, and the traditional breadwinner/homemaker family model becomes more common again.

Welfare reform in the United States is another example of policy changing to reflect new gender norms in work and family. Aid to Families with Dependent Children (AFDC), the original welfare program, was established to provide for the rare family that lost its breadwinner – usually through death or abandonment – and assumed that women with young children would not be in the labor force. This became increasingly untenable politically as single parent families were more frequently formed through non marital childbirth and as it became normative for married mothers to be employed. State level reforms were initiated during the first half of the 1990s, and on the federal level, AFDC was replaced in 1996 by Temporary Aid for Needy Families (TANF). TANF revised welfare policy by creating work requirements for aid recipients and by imposing lifetime limits on receipt of aid. These measures are in line with new gender norms that support women's participation in breadwinning. It is not only accepted but also expected that single women will provide economic support for their families.

Welfare reform has apparently had an impact. The 1990s saw a dramatic increase in the employment rates of single mothers, and welfare caseloads shrank dramatically. However, welfare reform also had other objectives, including encouraging marriage and discouraging non marital fertility. The most prominent provision to address these concerns was the broadening of eligibility to include two parent families. Theoretically, this would remove the disincentive to marriage that existed under AFDC. Researchers have found that welfare reform has instead led to fewer new marriages, but also fewer new divorces (Bitler et al. 2004). Nor has welfare reform led to reduced rates of single mother families (Fitzgerald & Ribar 2004). It is hypothesized that the economic independence fostered by TANF weakens the attractiveness of marriage.

Child and elder care policy in the United States has yet to catch up with new gender

norms in work and family, perhaps reflecting ambivalence about these changes, particularly when young children are involved. While the US has a patchwork of relevant policies – tax deductions for a portion of dependent care expenses, dependent care savings accounts, Head Start and Early Head Start, and childcare assistance to families receiving benefits through TANF – child and elder care costs are high and quality is highly variable. Childcare remains gendered in the family, with mothers reducing paid employment to care for children to a much greater extent than fathers. Similarly, women are much more likely to provide elder care than men. Childcare policy will continue to be an important issue, and with the aging of the population, elder care will become increasingly important.

SEE ALSO: Divisions of Household Labor; Doing Gender; Earner–Carer Model; Family, Men's Involvement in; Family Structure and Poverty; Feminization of Poverty; Fertility and Public Policy

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gendered aspects of war and international violence

Shahin Gerami and Melodye Lehnerer

Research has shown that gender is an integral element of violence (Tiger & Fox 1971; Elshtain & Tobias 1987; Goldstein 2001). Most cases of violence are committed by men against men. While women can be combatants in armed conflicts (Enloe 2000; Goldstein 2001), they are more likely to be victims than organizers and perpetrators of international violence. The intersection of social categories of gender, class, and nationality informs the effects of international violence for groups and individuals. Working class and peasant women pay higher prices, both directly and indirectly, for international violence. In violence between states, women of the South are victimized more often, more harshly, and pay higher costs during and after wartime. In fact, the benefits of peace reach them later and in smaller amounts.

International violence is collectively planned and systematically implemented by a group against another for political and economic goal(s). Four types of international violence are identified here. First, there are empire building,

multinational wars. Second, there are bilateral wars between two nation states most often over territorial disputes. A third type of international violence results from liberation movements when the colonized fight the colonizers for their sovereignty. Revolutions against a tyrannical government fall under this category because they frequently involve foreign players and interests. Lastly, there are civil wars that occur within a nation state. International forces often influence civil wars.

With regard to international violence, World War I marks a point in military history in which systematic and deliberate attacks on civilians became a pronounced strategy of war (Barstow 2000). Moving from the trench campaigns of World War I to the massive aerial bombings of World War II to more contemporary international conflicts of varying sizes, the ratio of combatant to civilian casualties has changed from 8:1 to 1:1 to 1:8 (Barstow 2000: 3). The great majority of these civilian casualties are women and those whom they care for – children and the elderly. This time period is also significant because, beginning with World War I, the “home front and the war front became intimately connected” (Goldstein 2001: 9).

The reach of new technology allowed targeting goals beyond the front line. Large scale street battles in urban areas became possible and a strategy of the war itself, not just for control of cities after the conquest. Unlike earlier periods, in which mass killing of civilians was more a consequence of the war, the reach of new technology allowed civilian targets to be integrated into war planning. Most importantly, the social distinction of public and private that had kept women away from the battlefield and its effects was obscured. Women, children, and the elderly, along with able bodied men, were constructed as the enemy and subject to annihilation. The violent consequences of this change for women were twofold: bodily injury and social role disruption.

VIOLENT ASSAULT: BODILY INJURY AND SOCIAL ROLE DISRUPTION

“Mass rape has long been a deliberate strategy of military leaders. By marking the raped women

as ‘polluted,’ mass rapes destroy families and weaken communal life” (Barstow 2000: 45). The violence of bodily assault includes physical injury from a weapon, torture, malnourishment, disease, and, most noteworthy, sexual assault. Sexual assaults on women can be an offensive or a defensive strategy. Sexual assaults as offensive strategy are planned and executed to destroy the enemy, his house, and his future offspring. Mass rape as a defensive tactic is carried out with the hope of increasing the invaders’ descendants. Murder and maiming of women destroys the home base, demolishes the soldiers’ morale, and often cripples the backbone of the war machinery.

When the Germans invaded Belgium in August of 1914, and as they marched through, reports of rape are documented along with villages burned and civilians bayoneted (Brownmiller 1975: 41). A clear cut pattern emerged: rape of women in war is not for sexual pleasure but for control and therefore has propaganda purposes to humiliate and demoralize the enemy. Similarly, the victimized community may exaggerate the atrocities to mobilize the combatants to avenge the dishonoring of women.

What did not get public attention was the huge price that women paid indirectly through social role disruption. It is well documented that French and Belgian families – men, women, and children – lost homes and lives in the first three months of the war. Less well documented are the experiences of Russian women. The Russian women served at the front in Women’s Death Battalions, worked the field, served as caretakers at the back of the lines, and lived in destitute conditions during the war, the 1917 Revolution, and the aftermath of these events (Clements et al. 1991). It is this aspect of international violence, disruption of women’s roles, which contributes to communal disruption.

Socially, disruption of women’s roles as caregivers and network organizers destroys the social fabric of the enemy’s home base. Planned scarcity, economic blockades, and disruption of basic services harm women physically and mentally, making their tasks harder to perform. Shortage of basic medicine or water sanitation means sick and starving children for distraught women to mind. The social disruption of women’s roles has far reaching consequences

for women’s and girls’ lives. Not only is the impact in the moment, it is also for generations to come.

SEXUAL AND PHYSICAL ASSAULT: THE PRIMARY CONSEQUENCE OF INTERNATIONAL VIOLENCE

In 1993, the UN Commission on Human Rights recognized the systematic rape, forced slavery, forced pregnancy, and forced prostitution of women as war crimes (Barstow 2000: 237). In 1996, this recognition led to the indictment of eight Bosnian Serb military and police officers solely on the charges of raping Bosnian Muslim women (Enloe 2000: 135). Over time, five patterns of sexual assault have been identified, regardless of the ethnicity of the perpetrators or the victims. These patterns were officially identified in the Final Report of the UN Commission of Experts on Serbia (1994). Nevertheless, they hold true for any time period and any type of international conflict. Not all patterns of sexual violence may be used in any one conflict, but often a combination of patterns does apply.

In the first pattern, looting and intimidation accompany sexual assault prior to widespread fighting. Assaults take place in women’s homes and in front of family members. In addition, rape may occur in public. The intent is to terrorize local residents in hopes they will flee or passively submit (Final Report 1994). The second pattern of sexual violence occurs during fighting. Once attacking forces have secured a town or village, those men, women, and children who remain are rounded up and then divided by sex and age. Women and girls are raped in their homes or in public. Those who survive are transported to detention facilities. The intent of this practice is to traumatize those detained as well as those who escape. Victims and witnesses are unlikely to return to the scene of such events (Final Report 1994). The third pattern of sexual violence occurs in detention facilities or other sites where refugees are kept. Again, the detainees in these “collection centers” are divided by sex and age. Men of fighting age are tortured, executed, or sent to work camps. The women who remain are raped or sexually assaulted by soldiers,

camp guards, paramilitaries, and civilians. There are two variations to this pattern of assault dependent upon location and visibility. In the first scenario, women are selected and raped at a separate location from the “camp” in which they are housed. Sometimes they are returned; other times they are killed. Alternately, women are raped at the location where they are detained in front of other detainees. On occasion, detainees, both women and men, are forced to assault each other. The obvious goals are multiple: humiliation, demoralization, and/or ultimately death.

A fourth pattern of sexual assault occurs in camps that are specifically identified as rape/death camps. These camps are set up for the purpose of punishing women through sexual assault and other forms of torture (Salzman 2000). In the case of Serbia, these camps were specifically set up to impregnate women with the “conqueror’s seed” (Salzman 2000). The intent of this practice is to achieve ethnic cleansing through women’s reproductive capabilities. The fifth and last pattern of sexual assault is the establishment of camps as sites of prostitution. Women are held in these camps to “service” soldiers returning from the front lines. In most instances, the women in these camps are eventually killed (Final Report 1994). This is a common practice wherever there are military bases in occupied territories.

SOCIAL ROLE DISRUPTION: A SECONDARY CONSEQUENCE OF INTERNATIONAL VIOLENCE

While the sexual abuse of women by the enemy has received some attention by international tribunals and can possibly be compensated for, the many other categories of harm that are more widespread, more intense, and have more long term effects are rarely documented, defined as war crimes, or accounted for in war reparations. International violence impoverishes masses, and among these masses women carry greater responsibilities and receive fewer opportunities. Such practices as the bombing of residential areas, home invasions, and economic blockades prevent women from carrying out their roles as wives and mothers. When homes are destroyed to disperse men, women’s domain

is destroyed and families displaced. When economic blockades lead to planned scarcity of food, water, medicine, or population movements, women refugees, as caregivers, face more hardships than male combatants whose task it is to fight and to survive.

Women’s injuries in the war from bombing, landmine explosion, street combat, unexploded ordinance (ammunition), and chemical exposure are of lower priority in the scarcity of health care and rehabilitation of the wounded. The secondary physical and psychological sufferings due to stress and scarcity of the war are not considered in war casualties, while men’s shell shocks are documented. As in any period of stress, a side effect of post war trauma is domestic abuse (Amnesty International 2005). Women are told, and they believe, that their suffering is part of their role, and complaining makes them selfish at best and traitors at worst.

CONCLUSION

While the focus here has been on immediate and long term physical and social harms of international violence for women, international violence goes beyond harms to women. Men are forced to fight and, when they refuse, are drafted, kidnapped, and killed more frequently than women. Furthermore, the duality of soldier prostitute, soldier wife, or soldier mother overlooks the multifaceted roles that women perform in international violence. For example, Cynthia Enloe discusses “militarized women” in her book *Maneuvers* (2000). These militarized women include prostitutes, rape victims, mothers, and wives of military personnel, nurses, women in the military, and feminist activists. Simplistic dualities also overlook women’s agency as individuals or collectivities (Gerami & Lehnerer 2001). Women suffer, but also gain in international violence in terms of economic independence, individual freedom of actions and mobility, and feminist consciousness. International violence puts social mores in a flux, allowing women to engage in activities not permitted before, expand their public role, and acquire greater responsibility and, with it, greater decision making ability and empowerment.

This deconstruction of the binary mode of gender and international violence also applies to any analytical evaluation of gender and peace. Gender narratives of men/soldiers and women/peacemakers on the one hand ignores the role of men in peace movements, and on the other hand implies gender determinism of violence and peace. As Ruddick (1989) reminds us, even anti militaristic feminism can fall prey to this binary interpretation of war and peace.

SEE ALSO: Gender, Development and; Gender Ideology and Gender Role Ideology; Gender Oppression; International Gender Division of Labor; Rape Culture; Third World and Postcolonial Feminisms/Subaltern; Traffic in Women; War

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gendered enterprise

Gill Kirton

What do we mean when we say that enterprise or organization is gendered? As Acker (2003) argues, "to say that an organization, or any other analytic unit, is gendered means that advantage and disadvantage, exploitation and control, action and emotion, meaning and identity, are patterned through and in terms of a distinction between male and female, masculine and feminine." However, the traditional approach to organizational analysis is criticized by a number of contemporary authors, including Acker, for its neglect, up until the 1980s at least, of women and gender. This neglect occurred firstly because organizational research often focused on senior levels of the hierarchy where men predominate. Secondly, men dominated the academic research process and generally showed little interest in female employees or gender as a unit of analysis. Critics argued that within traditional organizational analysis men's experiences and interpretations of organizational life were taken as universal, producing gender neutral knowledge, which failed to recognize gender as a significant dynamic of organizations and rendered women invisible. Although some of the criticisms remain valid in regard to mainstream organization and management studies, there is now a significant and growing body of gender and organization literature, largely produced by women and often with women as the analytic focus, which sees organizations as important sites in which gendered meanings, identities, practices, and power relations are produced, enacted, and reproduced.

Much of the gender and organization literature is influenced by liberal, socialist, and post modernist/poststructuralist feminist theories. Generally, the literature can be characterized according to one main feminist orientation, while perhaps reflecting insights from others. To summarize, liberal feminism conceives of people as autonomous individuals aspiring to fulfil themselves through a system of individual rights. Women's inequality is rooted in attitudes, customs, and legal constraints standing in the way of their entry to and success in

public life. Socialist feminism conceives of women as an oppressed social group facing a common struggle against male domination and exploitation. Women's inequality is rooted in the capitalist and patriarchal systems of production and reproduction. Postmodernist/poststructuralist feminism conceives of gender as a discursive practice through which femininities and masculinities are produced, sustained, and reproduced. There is less a concern with women's material inequality than with demonstrating the ambiguous, unstable, complex nature of social categories and the subjectivity of identity. Influenced by feminist theories, the gender and organization literature has over time taken various turns producing a number of strands, although the themes and foci often overlap. However, no precise chronology of the emergence of the strands can be proffered, and indeed different strands continue to coexist in the contemporary literature.

One dominant strand of this literature, most strongly influenced by liberal feminism, focuses on women managers and vertical gender segregation. Here it is assumed that individuals aspire to climb the organizational hierarchy and that the fair organization will allow both men and women to realize their capabilities within a merit system. The research concerns include gender differences in leadership, work commitment, motivation and satisfaction, sex stereotypes, and gender biases in recruitment and selection. The conclusion often drawn is that if women became or behaved more like men (i.e., if gender difference were eliminated) then they would defy sex stereotypes and succeed in organizations. Therefore, there is a focus on women's "deficiencies" rather than on any in-built unfairness within organizations, with policy recommendations such as assertiveness training courses, or "dressing for success" with the general aim for the fair organization conceived as needing to "fix the women" (Kolb et al. 2003). More recently the perceived existence of gender difference is seen less as something in need of correcting than as a potential organizational resource to be celebrated. Critical authors generally regard this strand of the literature as an inadequate and one-dimensional way of analyzing gender and organizations.

Kanter's *Men and Women of the Corporation* (1977) is an example of an important turn in the literature in that it set out to show that gender differences in organizational behavior are due to structure rather than to the characteristics of men and women as individuals. Hence, from this perspective, it is organizations that need to change, rather than women, in order to encourage more women to join the race to the top. This perspective remains influential and policy-oriented studies examining the gender structure of organizations continue to investigate the ways organizations might accommodate gender difference. For example, the contemporary "women in management" literature explores the problem of the invisible barriers to women's advancement (often referred to as the glass ceiling). These include the lack of senior female role models in organizations, the culture of presenteeism, and the evaluation of individuals according to their ability to separate home and work. Policy recommendations, which are compensatory in nature, are postulated, including the establishment of mentoring for women, women's business/professional networks, and schemes to enable women to reconcile work and family. However, the literature influenced by liberal feminism is uncritical of organizations fundamentally, for example the gendered processes of organizational decision making (e.g., why is it necessary to work excessively long hours?) or the dominant ideal of meritocracy (e.g., how is merit measured and judged?) are rarely questioned.

Another strand of the gender and organization literature is influenced more strongly by socialist feminist theory. This posits that paid work cannot be the sole unit of analysis and that the intersection between the public and private spheres (or work and the home) must be explored in order to understand women's position in the labor market. Analytically, research is often concerned with the macro level of the labor market and the temporally and spatially persistent pattern of vertical *and horizontal* gender segregation, which is seen to disadvantage women. However, empirical studies are often situated at micro level, although seeking to raise questions and offer arguments and illustrations that are applicable to the wider labor market. Research tries to uncover the social processes and relations involved in

sustaining and reproducing women's inequality and calls for transformation of organization structures and cultures. Generally, organization researchers influenced by this theoretical orientation favor qualitative case study methods that make visible informal gendered processes, relations, and practices.

For example, Collinson et al. (1990), through their detailed case studies of recruitment practices in the banking, mail order, insurance, hi tech, and food manufacturing industries, show that gender divisions of labor at home and in employment are both a routine condition and consequence of organizational recruitment and a common means of legitimizing sex discriminatory practices. Collinson et al. also show how sex discrimination is reproduced in recruitment practices through the agency of management, labor, men, and women to highlight how the perpetuation of job segregation is characterized by a self fulfilling vicious circle incorporating three key recruitment practices of reproduction, rationalization, and resistance. They argue that taken for granted beliefs about the male "breadwinner" and female "homemaker" inform the preference for either men or women in particular jobs so that preconceptions about the domestic responsibilities of both sexes are often perceived to be of central relevance to selection decision making.

The themes of reproduction, rationalization, and resistance are also evident in Cockburn's (1991) case study research situated in retail, local, and central government and trade unions. For example, Cockburn explores the way that powerful men in organizations use cultural means to deter women from aspiring to senior jobs by striving to retain women's loyalty to men and to the status quo. This then discourages women who are successful from identifying with women at the bottom of the organization. Cockburn is also concerned with horizontal segregation, what she calls the "ghetto walls," which keep the majority of women, especially mothers and other women with domestic ties, in low paid, part time work. To bring down the ghetto walls, she argues, it is necessary to institute structural change in organizations by redesigning jobs or retraining staff; reevaluating occupations and restructuring grade systems to reduce differentials

between people at the bottom and people at the top. Cockburn's work is important in that it integrates class analysis with the study of gender in organizations, shifting the focus simply from managerial and professional women to consider the majority of women in low level employment.

Similarly, Bradley's *Gender and Power in the Workplace* (1999) argues for a theoretical integration of gender and class in order to understand change and continuity in the gendered nature of organizations. She also draws attention to the polarization between younger and older women, whereby younger women are grasping the opportunities provided by the feminization of work and organizations and by "woman friendly" policy developments. However, Bradley finds marked patterns of gender segregation in her case study organizations, which are maintained in part, she argues, by a powerful set of gendered images about masculine and feminine attributes and their association with particular jobs and forms of employment. For example, as Cockburn (1991) and Collinson et al. (1990) assert, the jobs of trade union official and insurance sales person are permeated with masculine meaning, while the lower status, less well paid jobs of retail sales assistant and clerical support worker are permeated with feminine meaning. This powerful gender symbolism means that individual women or men who transcend traditional gendered occupational boundaries (e.g., women fire fighters, male nurses) often find themselves in a precarious and isolated position such that both sexes more typically keep to "gender appropriate" jobs. An interest in the gendered rhetorical devices, discourses, and imagery that sustain gender segregation is now a prominent theme in the gender and organization literature.

Arguably, this interest is influenced by post modernist ideas within the social sciences, although authors take these ideas in different directions. For example, Bradley retains an interest in "real" differences "out there" between men and women and their experiences of organizations, while perceiving discursive constructs as significant in constituting the gendered social relations that contribute to producing the differential "real" experiences. Other authors influenced by postmodernism

have less of an interest in material gender inequalities or setting out policy implications and more in the “performance” and “accomplishment” of gender by individual men and women in organizational contexts.

Another research focus in the strand of gender and organization literature influenced by postmodernist/poststructuralist feminist theories is on “femininities” and “masculinities.” These terms point beyond categorized, biological sex differences, treating them more as forms of subjectivities and using them to describe cultural beliefs without any close connection to men and women. In terms of what this means for the study of gender and organization, it is argued that men and masculinity remain taken for granted, hidden, and unexamined in much of the literature, which more typically equates gender with women. In contrast, studying masculinities is regarded as central to understanding the process and structuring of gender relations and discriminatory experiences. In this vein Collinson and Hearn (1994) call for men to be “named as men” in order to expose men’s power, discourses, and practices which underpin the asymmetrical gender relations found in organizations. They identify five discourses and practices of masculinity that remain pervasive and dominant in organizations: authoritarianism, paternalism, entrepreneurialism, informalism, and careerism. The consequence of their reproduction is a perpetuation of women’s inequality arrived at through the exercise and development, particularly by managers, of coercive power, protective practices, competitive approaches to business and performance, informal relationships between men, and aggressive concern with hierarchical advancement.

Some authors note the class differences in masculinities, arguing that although paid work as a source of masculine identity and power transcends class boundaries, class is a variable in terms of how masculinities are practiced in organizations. For example, a number of studies show how male manual workers seek to maintain masculine identities through discourses and practices of identification and differentiation, including heterosexualized humor and sexual harassment. Sexual humor, it is argued, constructs an image of men as assertive,

independent, and powerful and one of women as passive and dependent.

Having evolved over time, the gender and organization literature is now at a crossroads, with some authors arguing for the integration of gender into mainstream organization analysis and others foreseeing dangers in integration, namely the neglect of gender as a unit of analysis once again. It is clear, though, that studying gender will no longer mean studying just women.

SEE ALSO: Femininities/Masculinities; Feminist Methodology; Gender Ideology and Gender Role Ideology; Gender Mainstreaming; Gendered Organizations/Institutions

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gendered organizations/ institutions

Lauren Rauscher

CONCEPTUAL BEGINNINGS

Understanding organizational practices and processes is central to explaining gender inequality. While women remain clustered in secondary labor markets marked by lower wages, uncertainty, short career ladders, and few if any benefits, most men find employment in primary labor markets characterized by greater economic rewards. Occupational and job segregation continue to be an enduring feature within most firms. Additionally, gender differences in income, power, authority, autonomy, and status translate into men, particularly white men, enjoying systematic advantages over women. Despite changing social and economic conditions and legislation prohibiting sex discrimination, these inequalities persist and subsequently inform an impressive body of labor market and workplace analyses.

The study of “gendered organizations” as a distinct area of scholarly inquiry has developed over the last 15 years in an effort to explain such inequality. The concept, coined by Joan Acker, means that “advantage and disadvantage, exploitation and control, action and emotion, meaning and identity, are patterned through and in terms of a distinction between male and female, masculine and feminine” (Acker 1990: 146). Although relatively new, this field has roots in second wave and radical feminist scholarship dating back at least to the 1960s. Scholars began merging gender studies with organizational literature in an effort to render visible women’s experiences, place men’s experiences in a gendered context (rather than a universal experience shared by all), and identify the ways in which gender inequality is (re)created and maintained over time.

Early work by Heidi Hartmann, Rosabeth Moss Kanter, Catharine MacKinnon, and Kathy Ferguson revealed organizational dynamics that produce gender specific outcomes, which

disadvantage women and advantage men. For example, Kanter’s classic study, *Men and Women of the Corporation* (1977), demonstrates how one’s structural position within a firm (e.g., the job one holds in the hierarchy) determines one’s “success,” defined in terms of career mobility, authority, and power. One’s job also affects one’s personality, behavior, and aspirations, such as women acting timid. Thus, women’s disadvantaged location stems from being disproportionately concentrated and “stuck” in positions with limited power and short to non-existent career ladders. One of the primary strengths of Kanter’s work lies in the shift from individual level behavior of men and women to a structural explanation of gender inequality. Although Kanter provides mechanisms for how, once in place, gender inequality is maintained through occupational sex segregation, she neglects to explain the *origins* of segregation that leads to an array of unequal work rewards.

Turning to Marxist feminist scholars such as Heidi Hartmann helps find an explication of the origins of gender segregation and its consequences. According to Hartmann, capitalism and patriarchy are separate but interlocking systems that work in concert to structure social organization. (Hartmann defines patriarchy as a set of social relations with a material base, where hierarchical relations between men and solidarity among them enable men to control women.) Specifically, she contends that capitalism and patriarchy operate to subordinate women as individuals and as a collective group through various modes of production, the gendered division of labor, and subsequent sex segregation. Therefore, according to this perspective, patriarchy proceeds yet interacts with capitalism so that women enter the wage labor market at a disadvantage, and men’s actions maintain women’s subordinate position while protecting their own privileges. Hartmann’s theory acknowledges the interconnections between gender and other institutions. She also shows that men’s actions matter in maintaining gender inequality in addition to men and women’s structural positions, thereby making the link between structure and agency explicit. Since Hartmann’s account, feminist scholars have demonstrated the ways in which gender infuses

our lives through all institutions. Because institutions are intertwined and interdependent, we can use gender as a lens through which to describe and understand people's experiences within them.

Joan Acker argues that despite such advances in gender theorizing, conceptions of institutions (other than "the family") remain gender free or gender neutral, when, in fact, gender permeates their ideologies, practices, and symbols. Indeed, many argue that gender constitutes an institution in and of itself, in addition to shaping other forms of social organization. That is, gender is not only an individual attribute but also a major organizing system that structures patterns of interactions and expectations across other major social institutions (Lorber 1994). Thus, gender fundamentally structures family and kinship, the economy, language, education, culture, interpersonal relationships, sexuality, ideology, and personality. Conceiving institutions as genderless, separate entities is problematic because this obscures the fundamental processes of creating and maintaining power inequities between men and women.

According to Acker, the gendering of institutions and organizations occurs through the following processes. First, there is the division of men and women into distinctly different realms, in terms of the type of labor performed, physical work locations, and acceptable behaviors and emotions. Second, symbols and images, such as language and culture, are constructed that reinforce these divisions. Third, gendering processes occur in interpersonal interactions between and among women and men. Individual identities also promote and reinforce gendered outcomes to the extent that people enact and internalize gender specific scripts for behavior. Fourth, gender constitutes one of the fundamental organizing elements of creating organizational structures.

In a pathbreaking article, Acker (1990) uses complex, bureaucratic organizations as an example to detail how organizations reflect specific gendered expectations and relations. More specifically, she shows that jobs, work rules, contracts, evaluation systems, and firm cultures (e.g., organizational logics) are not gender neutral. Rather, she draws on feminists such as Dorothy Smith, Joan Scott, and Sandra

Hardin, who advocate that gender constitutes a meaningful analytic category to argue that a gendered substructure undergirds the entire bureaucratic organizational system. Notably, this substructure is gendered masculine, with the interests of men at its center. Therefore, gender inequality stems from the very organization of bureaucracies rather than being produced solely by the actions of particular gendered individuals enacting gendered scripts for behavior within them.

To illustrate, in organizational terms "jobs" constitute an abstract category, filled by an abstract worker, one with no gender. In this conception, the successful performance of a job requires a worker to focus on a set of tasks commensurate with a certain level of skills, credentials, and remuneration. Also, we expect a worker to be unencumbered by competing obligations that would interfere with job demands. Acker makes clear, however, that real people fill jobs; that is, jobs are embodied. And by examining jobs this way, we can see that the abstraction best reflects men's lives, since men stereotypically assume the majority work in the public sphere while having few competing demands in the private sphere. Instead, women perform reproductive, childrearing, domestic, and care work in the private sphere, which enables men to work outside the home. Thus, Acker shows that a gendered division of labor provides the foundation for the conception of a job.

Procreation, childrearing, and stereotypically feminine emotions upset the successful functioning of jobs within bureaucratic organizations, again making clear that jobs are based on men's lives, men's bodies, and masculinity, while relegating women to the margins. Thus, despite the inroads women have made into traditionally male dominated occupations and the greater number who have entered the ranks of management, gender inequalities between men and women remain remarkably stable. Although Kanter's theory would have predicted more equality as more women changed structural positions within organizations, Acker suggests that such mobility offers a futile attempt at disrupting gender differentials due to the gendered substructure privileging men that operates as a fundamental structuring element of the organization itself.

EMPIRICAL EVIDENCE

Empirical projects examining Acker's theoretical claims can be found in a burgeoning literature bridging multiple academic disciplines. For instance, significant work is devoted to the ways in which *occupations and jobs* are gendered. In her book *Gender Trials* (1995), Jennifer Pierce demonstrates how norms and expectations for lawyers and paralegals in corporate law firms are culturally constructed, symbolized, and reinforced through masculinity and femininity, respectively. For instance, successful lawyers are characterized by their "Rambo" litigating techniques where they obliterate their enemies in fierce competition. Token women lawyers (tokens because they represent a numerical minority in the occupation) must also conform to these ultra masculine behaviors in order to achieve success and not be considered weak and incompetent (or impotent). In contrast, women paralegals must nurture and mother their bosses or suffer consequences of criticism from them. Yet men paralegals do not experience the same set of constraints and experiences.

This work is similar to Williams's (1992) account of how men as librarians, elementary school teachers, and nurses face different experiences than women in the same occupations. Although these occupations are gendered feminine, men are promoted at exceptional speeds, "riding the glass escalator" rather than facing barriers to advancement. Such scholarship varies significantly from Kanter's findings of how women experience tokenism as having little power, needing to prove themselves, and exclusionary. These findings illustrate how a masculine gendered substructure operates to benefit men even where men constitute the numerical minority of workers in a given occupation or firm.

Other scholars have studied *gendered organizational practices and policies* across a broad spectrum of settings ranging from restaurants and prisons to an Anglican parish, Malawi NGOs, and a Latino health organization in Los Angeles. For example, Britton (1997) shows how training materials and examples for prison officers are presented as generic, but in actuality are constructed as though all of the trainees are men. The material neglects

issues and information germane to women's prisons (only men's), and completely ignores sexual harassment of officers from inmates.

The journal *Gender, Work and Organization* was created to advance interdisciplinary theoretical and empirical work on the process and outcomes of gendered organizational structures. Additionally, one can now find scholarship in this area in business journals, which historically have neither published extensively on women's experiences nor analyzed men's positions as gendered beings. *Gender and Society* also devotes considerable space to analyses on gendered processes and outcomes across a variety of institutions and organizations. Although challenges to integrating literature on gender, work, and organizations remain along theoretical, gender, and geographic lines, there is excitement about both the possibilities of "striking out" into new territories and problematizing current work in an effort to enrich this field.

FUTURE DIRECTIONS

Several scholars have responded to Acker's original treatment of gendered organizations, including Acker herself. Consensus exists on at least two of the future directions for work in this field.

First, scholars must seriously consider the specific context in which gendering processes occur to avoid criticisms that arguments of a gender substructure are essentialist and ahistorical. That is, instead of conceiving organizations as stable and rigid structures, Acker and others emphasize the process oriented and contextual nature of gendering. For instance, in "The Epistemology of the Gendered Organization" (2000) Dana Britton notes that one of the major themes in this field claims that bureaucratic organizations are *inherently* gendered masculine. Britton argues that turning a testable proposition into an underlying assumption stifles potential for changing the ways that workplaces (re)produce gender inequality, short of eradicating complex bureaucracies and replacing them with collectivist organizations. Moreover, such a static conceptualization does not account for the ways in which some formal bureaucratic practices benefit women (see Cook

& Waters 1998) and protect women from sexual harassment.

Additionally, Britton cautions scholars examining the ways in which occupations and jobs are gendered, most of whom rely on the extent to which occupations are male or female dominated. According to Britton, this approach presents the tendency to conflate sex with gender while simultaneously neglecting the complex historical process that leads to occupations being gender typed as feminine or masculine.

Context also remains important as organizational boundaries and contemporary work configurations change, partially fueled by globalization. Patricia Yancey Martin and others call for more systematic analyses of how contemporary practices, such as flattened hierarchies, team based approaches, telecommuting, and e-commerce, affect gendered occupations and practices and subsequent inequalities.

Second, a substantial body of literature demonstrates that inequality is patterned along gender, race, and class lines. Moreover, the intersections of these stratification systems translate into white men enjoying systematic advantages over other men as well as all women. In some instances, white women experience privileges that men and women of color do not, depending on the context. Thus, patterns of inequality are far more complex than simply noting gender inequities between all men and all women.

In response, scholars argue to move beyond solely examining the gendering of organizations to account for other axes of inequality, namely race. In *What a Woman Should Be and Do* (1996) Stephanie Shaw provides an exemplary study of how teaching as an occupation is both gendered and raced. Moreover, Collins (2000) draws on work by Barbara Omolade to argue that organizations maintain (white, masculine) power by having professional black women in supervisory positions who “serve white superiors while quieting the natives” (e.g., other women of color).

In addition to her suggestions noted above, Britton calls for greater theoretical clarification and refinement in an effort to create meaningful strategies for social change. Patricia Yancy Martin, Jeffrey Hearn, and colleagues contest

this call for synthesis, finding strength in the “ambiguity, contradiction, paradox, and multiplicity” that accompanies the diverse literature in this field (Martin & Collinson 2002).

SEE ALSO: Femininities/Masculinities; Gender Mainstreaming; Gendered Enterprises; Hegemonic Masculinity; Institution; Occupational Segregation; Patriarchy; Women, Economy and

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genealogy

Steve Fuller

The appeal to genealogy as a general historical method is usually attributed to Michel Foucault, who contrasted it with both teleology and his own preferred “archeology,” which suspends the search for causation altogether in favor of treating socio epistemic structures (or *epistèmes*) as superimposed space time strata, each of roughly coexistent events. (The palimpsest was thus Foucault’s model for historiography.) Foucault’s foil was Friedrich Nietzsche, whose *Genealogy of Morals* resurrected worries of legitimate lineage that had dominated the reproduction of social life prior to the constitution of the modern nation state. Replacing traditional legal concerns that political succession might be based on fraudulent documents, Nietzsche argued that contemporary morality might rest on forgotten etymologies, whereby “obligations” turn out to be strategies for the weak to inflict a sense of guilt on the strong, simply for being stronger. Here Nietzsche was explicitly siding with the survivalist ethic of Social Darwinists against socialists who argued that the rich “owed” their success to the collaboration of the poor.

A natural question to ask is what led Nietzsche to think that a defunct method for establishing right to rule should provide the basis for a deep understanding of society. Here the appeal to biology is crucial. Ernst Haeckel, Darwin’s staunchest German defender, famously declared “Ontogeny recapitulates phylogeny,” by which he meant the biological development of the individual organism (i.e., the gestation period) repeats the stages undergone in the evolution of all organisms. Nietzsche cleverly reworded Haeckel’s slogan for his own purposes: “Ontology recapitulates philology.” Nietzsche, a prodigy in the study of classical languages, unsurprisingly found Haeckel’s slogan appealing.

Darwin had depicted – and Haeckel popularized – evolution as a “tree of life” founded on a principle of common ancestry of morphologically similar species, ultimately deriving from a unitary “origin of life.” The imagery

remains powerful today as both a principle of biological taxonomy and an account of migration patterns within species or closely related species (e.g., the idea that all humans emerged out of Africa). Both uses are indebted to Darwin’s own inspiration, the comparative linguist August Schleicher, who drew the first “tree of life” (or “cladogram”) to show the interrelatedness of Indo European languages, which together implicated an ultimate ancestor, a pure “Aryan” language probably spoken in Western India. Many of Schleicher’s fellow philologists were inclined to think of this inferred source as the medium in which the biblical deity originally communicated with Adam. However, Darwin and Nietzsche were prepared to take at least one aspect of the tree of life metaphor literally, namely, that language – and life – began arbitrarily at a particular place and time.

The contingency of origins is crucial for the genealogical method. To see this point, consider that history may be considered from two general perspectives: from the past looking forward into the future, and from the present looking back at the past. The former standpoint focuses on “turning points” when the future is open to multiple alternate futures, with the decisions taken at those times generating what economists call “path dependent” outcomes. In contrast to such “underdeterminism,” the latter standpoint tends to presume “overdeterminism,” whereby when and where the origin actually occurs is irrelevant because eventually the outcome will turn out the same. Overdeterminism produces teleology, underdeterminism genealogy. In the latter, the perceived sense of “necessity” in current ways of knowing and being merely reflects the reinforcement of an original moment of decision.

It is worth observing that Nietzsche wrote at a time – the final quarter of the nineteenth century – when the inexorability of human progress was a default position among intellectuals. Thus, the shock value of the genealogical method was stronger then than now, when, under the influence of postmodernism, relatively few intellectuals take seriously Nietzsche’s teleological foil. In Nietzsche’s day, genealogy’s potential to scandalize was perhaps best presented in Henrik Ibsen’s “bourgeois dramas,” whereby some apparently ordinary situation

turns out to betray the traces of a sordid past that persists, albeit in some hidden form that veers between sanctification and mystification. The moral dilemma that repeatedly arises in Ibsen's plays is whether knowledge of that past should be allowed to influence contemporary judgments.

Darwin, Nietzsche, and Ibsen all lived before the incorporation of Mendelian genetics into modern evolutionary theory, which occurred in earnest only in the 1930s. Thus, they operated with a semi coherent sense of hereditary transmission, in which an older Lamarckian view of the inheritance of acquired traits was grafted onto a much less teleological view of offspring simply manifesting a blended version of their parents' family traits. Yet, despite its semi coherence, it was precisely this view that fueled the imagination of Freud, who saw his psychoanalytic practice as a micro application of Nietzsche's genealogical method. Freud replaced the rogue ancestor, whose identity is revealed in the course of the bourgeois drama, with the rogue incident in the patient's past – say, the source of the Oedipus or Electra Complex – that anchored his or her subsequent conduct.

In terms of earlier theories of genealogy and inheritance, Mendelian genetics constitutes a turn toward essentialism that undermines the need for extensive historical investigation. According to Mendel, the traits expressed in an individual's life (i.e., its phenotype) reflect a limited range of possibilities circumscribed by its genetic program (i.e., its genotype). In other words, an individual's inheritance can be ascertained simply through an intensive examination of that individual. A case in point is the increasing use of genetic profile, whereby "susceptibility" to, say, crime or disease is determined by genetic sequences that an individual shares with others who bear no obvious family relation. In this context, Gilles Deleuze's views about the "virtualization" of identity have considerable purchase.

SEE ALSO: Biosociological Theories; Deleuze, Gilles; Foucauldian Archeological Analyses; Foucault, Michel; Historical and Comparative Methods; Nietzsche, Friedrich; Social Darwinism

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general linear model

Xitao Fan

The social science researcher's repertoire of statistical tools ranges from simple techniques (e.g., *t* test) to sophisticated multivariate analytic techniques (e.g., structural equation modeling). Many of these statistical techniques appear to be different analytic systems designed for different research situations. The distinctions, however, are often superficial. Fundamentally, many techniques are related to each other to such a degree that they can be considered as variations of a more general statistical model. For quantitative researchers in social sciences, understanding the relationship among the seemingly different analytic techniques is important, because such understanding helps researchers make judicious choices of analytic techniques in research.

In the social and behavioral sciences, traditionally, techniques involving categorical independent variables (e.g., *t* test, ANOVA) and those involving continuous variables (e.g., correlation, regression) used to be treated as distinctly different data analysis systems "intended for types of research that differed fundamentally in design, goals, and types of variables" (Cohen et al. 2003: xxv). Despite the superficial differences, these and many other statistical

techniques share one thing in common: they are designed to analyze linear relationships among variables. Cohen (1968) demonstrated that ANOVA type techniques and regression type techniques were statistically equivalent. Because of this, many techniques can be conceptualized as belonging to a general statistical model called the general linear model (GLM).

The GLM underlies most of the statistical techniques used in social science research. In the conventional (and narrower) sense, GLM may be conceptualized as a regression based model. In regression analysis, the independent variable is assumed to be a continuous variable. In ANOVA type methods, the independent variable is a categorical variable representing group membership (either naturally occurring groups such as gender or ethnic groups, or groups based on manipulated variables such as treatment vs. control groups in an experimental design). However, it is easy to extend the regression technique to subsume ANOVA type methods (e.g., *t* test, ANOVA, ANCOVA, MANOVA) by converting the group membership categories to some form of “pseudo” quantitative coding. “Dummy coding” and “effect coding” are the two most popular coding schemes for this purpose, and both are illustrated in a typical regression analysis textbook (e.g., Cohen et al. 2003). This conceptualization of GLM is currently implemented in the major statistical software packages (e.g., SPSS, SAS).

Broadly speaking, the concept of GLM goes beyond the regression model. As discussed more than 30 years ago (Kshirsagar 1972: 281), “most of the practical problems arising in statistics can be translated, in some form or the other, as the problem of measurement of association between two vector variates x and y .” (Here, x and y are vectors each containing multiple variables.) This extension allows for linear combinations of *multiple* dependent variables, thus extending the GLM concept to such multivariate techniques as discriminant function analysis and canonical correlation analysis (Thompson 1991; Fan 1996). The more recent development of the structural equation modeling (SEM) technique further suggests that SEM should be conceptualized as the most general of the general linear models, because it is the most general analytic technique for analyzing linear relationships among variables,

and it subsumes most parametric analytic techniques widely used in social and behavioral sciences (Bagozzi et al. 1981; Bentler 1992; Fan 1996; Jöreskog & Sörbom 2001). So GLM should not only be understood as an analytic model, such as that implemented in statistical software packages like SPSS and SAS, but more importantly, GLM should be viewed as a conceptual framework that subsumes a variety of analytic techniques as its variations or special cases.

The concept of GLM has some important implications for social science researchers. First, the concept of GLM makes it clear that the choice of an analytical technique does not contribute to the validity of any causal inferences that a researcher may make. Some researchers often have the misconception that ANOVA type methods are closely related to experimental design, thus are more suitable for research studies intended for making causal inferences. Even some textbooks on research methods (e.g., Gall et al. 1996) unintentionally contribute to this misconception by linking analysis techniques to research designs (e.g., ANOVA type methods for experimental designs, and correlation/regression for correlation/observation research designs). The GLM concept informs us that the choice of statistical technique has no bearing on the validity of causal inference, and only the research design does.

Another issue is related to the often observed research practice of categorizing an independent continuous variable (e.g., categorizing family income originally measured in dollars into three income levels: high, medium, and low) so that ANOVA type methods can be applied. This is often done because a researcher wants to know if families at different income levels (high, medium, low) differ on the outcome variable of interest. This research practice is ill advised because analytic precision is reduced in the categorization process, and the same question can be more precisely answered by preserving the original measurement scale and applying correlation/regression type analysis.

SEE ALSO: ANOVA (Analysis of Variance); Multivariate Analysis; Regression and Regression Analysis; Statistics; Structural Equation Modeling

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generalized other

D. Angus Vail

The generalized other is one of George Herbert Mead's central concepts in his seminal discussion of the social genesis of the self. According to Mead, the self resides in the individual's ability to take account of himself or herself as a social being. It thus requires the individual to take the role of the other as well as taking account of how his or her actions might affect the group. *Generalized other* is Mead's (1962: 154-8) term for the collection of roles and attitudes that people use as a reference point for figuring out how to behave in a given situation.

This term is often used in discussions of the play and game stages of development.

According to Mead, selves develop in social contexts as people learn to take the roles of their consociates such that they can with a fair degree of accuracy predict how one set of actions is likely to generate fairly predictable responses. People develop these capacities in the process of interacting with one another, sharing meaningful symbols, and developing and using language to create, refine, and assign meanings to social objects (including themselves). In order for complex social processes such as these to work, people have to develop a sense for the rules, norms, roles, understandings, and so on that make responses predictable. While they learn these sets of rules from concrete others, their aggregate constitutes a generalized other.

Since different social settings are governed by different sets of rules, competent social actors have to be able to take account of different sets of rules as they move from one social setting to another. Each setting, then, is governed by its own generalized other. If one were to invoke Mead's preferred sports metaphor, the athlete has to be able to take account of different sets of rules as she or he moves from sport to sport.

As people develop more complete selves, then, they learn to internalize and recognize a greater diversity of perspectives operating among different communities. As they move among settings and/or communities, they have to take into account the aggregate expectations of the people they are likely to encounter in that setting, the culture that is likely to make that aggregate make sense, and the reasons that aggregate is different from other aggregates. Thus, while children in the play stage take the role of a single other, and children in the game stage learn to take the roles of several others, a person who has developed a sense of a *generalized other* can take the role of abstract sets of attitudes, beliefs, and norms she or he expects *concrete* others to embody.

In a sense, then, the generalized other is the process through which the individual internalizes and takes account of society's expectations. As society is processual, emergent, and contextual, so must be the person's ability to take account of different generalized others that

are likely to govern people's behaviors from setting to setting.

SEE ALSO: Game Stage; Mead, George Herbert; Play Stage; Preparatory Stage; Role; Self

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generational change

Martin Kohli

In its most obvious sense, generational change means change occurring along succeeding generations, showing up in differences between them. In a more fundamental sense, it expresses the idea that social change needs to be understood in terms of the sequence of generations, and is to a considerable extent driven by their dynamics.

The concept of generation can be defined with regard to society or to family – two levels which are usually analyzed separately but should be treated in a unified framework (Kohli & Szydlik 2000). At the level of the family, generation refers to position in the lineage. At the societal level, it refers to the aggregate of persons born in a limited period (i.e., a birth cohort according to demographic parlance) who therefore experience historical events at similar ages and move up through the life course in unison.

At both levels, the concept of generation is a key to the analysis of movement across time. In the sequence of generations, families and societies create continuity and change with regard to parents and children, economic resources, political power, and cultural hegemony. In all of these spheres generations are a basic unit of social reproduction *and* social change – in other words, of stability over time as well as renewal (or sometimes revolution).

SOCIAL AND INTELLECTUAL CONTEXT

In some “simple” traditional societies without centralized political power and class based social stratification, age and gender are the basic criteria for social organization. The most obvious type are the societies – to be found mostly in East Africa – based on formal age classes (or age sets, as they are sometimes called). A subtype of particular relevance are those societies in which the basis is not age but generation – that is, position in the family line age. Here, the sequence of generations in the family directly conditions the position of the individual in the economic, political, and cultural sphere. Family filiation is linked with material security, power, and social status.

In modern societies these features of social organization have been differentiated and are now institutionalized in separate spheres. But they need to be linked at least conceptually, so that shifts in the relative importance of these spheres may be detected. There are indications, for instance, that in the West the main arena of intergenerational conflict has shifted from the political and cultural to the economic sphere. The political and cultural cleavage between generations, so highly visible and outspoken in the “silent revolution” of the 1960s and 1970s (Inglehart 1977), has turned into a distributive cleavage played out around the institutions of the labor market and the welfare state.

Generational dynamics have always been a major engine of social change. In structural as well as symbolic terms, generations define themselves (or are defined) against each other; new generations come into being by setting themselves apart from and competing with existing older ones (Attias Donfut 1988).

Under conditions of modernity, this has taken on a special twist. Each new generation – both at the level of society and of family – is socially expected to come into its own and acquire some measure of autonomy. Adolescence and youth have thus become a period of particular unrest.

This was the situation faced by Mannheim (1928) when he put the problem of generations on the agenda of modern sociology. Mannheim did not invent the concept as such; when he wrote his seminal paper he identified two distinct traditions of thought on the subject that he labeled the French and the German:

The first, born of the spirit of positivism (Auguste Comte), was the search for an objective (external) historical rhythm and thus for a general law of social change. Comte and his followers thought that they had found this rhythm in the regular sequence of human generations.

The second, born of the spirit of hermeneutics (Wilhelm Dilthey), was the search for the inner totality (*Gestalt*) of an historical epoch and thus for what sets it apart from all others. Dilthey and his followers believed that this totality could be found in the specific historical experience of a generation. (Mannheim 1928)

Mannheim took up the “German” tradition, but gave it a sociological turn by combining it with some of the formal analysis characteristic of the “French” one. The problem that Mannheim defined was how experiential generations (as in the hermeneutic tradition) became political generations that created social dynamics (as in the positivist tradition).

Following Comte, Mannheim proposed a simple thought experiment: What would happen to a society if its members lived on indefinitely and no new members were born? In his view the likely consequence would be that change would be stifled. Social innovation – for Comte and Mannheim – is brought about by the onset of new generations. The young are the natural carriers of the new. On the other hand, people have to die in order to allow social renewal to take place. Generations must make room for the next ones at regular intervals. “Creative destruction” – to use Schumpeter’s famous term – depends on the disappearance of the old. It follows that – all things being equal – societies with shorter lives are more dynamic. We should note that modern societies have

institutionalized a functional equivalent for physical death: retirement.

This conception is based on a very strong presupposition: that people acquire their basic worldview and dispositions early in life and then more or less stick (or are stuck) with them. For Mannheim, the formative experiences are those of adolescence when the mind awakens to a reflexive conscience of itself. This argument is in line with his sociology of knowledge (later elaborated upon by phenomenological sociology). The first worldview or structure of knowledge that an individual acquires colors all later additions and corrections, positively or negatively.

A great deal of work has been devoted to assessing the validity of this presupposition; that is, whether there is stability of basic orientations and dispositions over the life course, and as a corollary, whether the elderly are less able and willing to innovate than the young. In developmental psychology there is broad evidence for learning and development throughout the life course; the potential for change thus remains until late in life, but in many dimensions the prevailing empirical pattern is one of continuity, with a possible trend towards less controlling and more accommodating action styles. The evidence in terms of political psychology is discussed by Braungart and Braungart (1993). From a sociological perspective, it can be argued that personal continuity may be less a product of “innate” tendencies or developmental path dependency than of the institutional commitment to stability (or the lack of institutional incentives for change) during adulthood. But as with other “big questions,” the overall answers have so far been rather unsatisfactory in terms of elegance and simplicity. At the most general level what can be asserted on the basis of this large body of research is that stability (or lack of innovation) is the general rule in *some* domains, under *some* conditions, and in *some* periods. In recent years, research activity seems to have slackened even though the basic issues have not really been resolved.

The three basic domains are those of political, economic, and family generations. There have also been studies on cultural generations, such as those in the world of art or of science, but given the close links between, for example, literary and political intellectuals (Wohl 1979),

this will now be discussed as part of the political field.

POLITICAL GENERATIONS

There are additional reasons why generational cleavages have deepened over the course of modernization. The first is the increasing age grading of social organization brought about by the institutionalization of the life course (Kohli 1986). The second is that other cleavages which organized early industrial societies have lost some of their salience, especially those of class.

In the history of most western welfare states, the key “social question” to be solved was the integration of the industrial workers – in other words, the pacification of the class conflict. This was achieved by giving workers some assurance of a stable life course, including retirement as a normal life phase funded to a large extent through public pay as you go contribution systems or general taxes. In the twenty first century, class conflict seems to be defunct and its place taken over by the generational conflict. The new prominence of the latter is due both to the evolved patterns of social security, predicated upon the institutionalized tri partition of the life course (which has turned the elderly into the main clients of the welfare state), and to the demographic challenge of low fertility and increasing longevity. Demographic discontinuity creates unequal life chances among generations (Easterlin 1980).

It remains essential, however, to assess the extent of generational cleavages per se and the extent to which they mask the continued existence of the received cleavages between rich and poor (or capitalists and workers); in other words, the extent to which new *intergenerational* conflicts have really crowded out traditional *intragenerational* ones. There are moreover other intragenerational cleavages that are usually categorized as “new” dimensions of inequality (in distinction to the “old” ones of class), such as those of gender and ethnicity.

There is thus a problem of internal differentiation. An individual does not live in a specific generational space only, but also belongs to a specific class, gender, ethnic group, and so on. By assuming the homogeneity of all those living together in the same stratum of historical time,

and neglecting the dimensions of conflict within this generation, the concept can even become ideologically tainted.

In political survey research, there has been a series of attempts to identify political generations as aggregates with specific orientations and dispositions. The broadest and best known comparative research program in this respect is that of Inglehart, who has made a strong case for a basic generational shift starting in the 1960s from materialism to post materialism. Smith (2005) analyzes the extent of the “generation gap” – the difference between the young and the old – in a wide range of attitudes, values, and behaviors and its change over the 25 years from 1973 to 1997 based on the US General Social Survey. He finds a wide generation gap at the beginning of this period with a narrowing thereafter, in line with the notion that the main cultural transformation occurred in the 1960s and that people who grew up during or after this time can be expected to have more in common with each other than those who were raised before. We may expect that in Eastern Europe the early 1990s would again be a transition with the potential of widening the generation gap.

But this is only the first level in the formation of a political generation. What is at issue here can be expressed analytically as a progression from (1) a common social location and experience to (2) consciousness of this shared reality to (3) getting organized together to form a unified political actor. This framework has obvious parallels to Marx’s distinction between *Klasse an sich* and *Klasse fur sich*, which has been put to good use in studies of the historical formation of labor movements and labor organizations, and is now also being applied to gender and ethnicity. Studies of political generations can be set up in similar ways – Mannheim developed his framework as an explicit analogy to Marx’s terms – but appear to face a more difficult task.

In fact, the formation of a generation as a unified political actor seems rather unlikely because it is not based on a membership characteristic that is clearly visible in social life and so cannot be easily shed (such as gender or ethnicity), or refers to well defined resource positions and ways of life (such as class).

Many authors have concluded that, while there may be groups that share certain social

locations, experiences, and dispositions, there are no generations in the sense of population groups that are conscious of sharing them, and even act on this consciousness. Against this skepticism, historical reality has time and again tended to reaffirm the existence of such political generations, and to put forth phenomena which can be understood only within a generational framework. These phenomena have manifested themselves as (often revolutionary) movements at various points in the course of modernization (Roseman 1995). They are often youth movements, and they often occur at major historical watersheds, such as 1914, 1945, 1968, and 1989. They may be focused on literary and intellectual groups (Wohl 1979) or on political groups and elites as such. There may be competing movements within a generation – “generational units” in Mannheim’s terms – such as left wing and right wing ones. An example of the latter was the German National Socialist takeover in 1933 which brought to power a large group of young adults, including a number of top level political functionaries who were about as old as the century – that is, in their early thirties – and after the demise of the Thousand Year Reich, in their mid forties. That social movements tend to be generational in spite of the presumed unlikelihood of generation based mobilization may again be explained by the age graded structure of the modern life course (Kohli 1986). People are typically processed by the institutions of schooling, army, labor market, and welfare in groups of age peers. Such groups have the opportunities to organize as well as the moral resources – because they know each other, they more easily develop the necessary closeness and trust.

ECONOMIC GENERATIONS

In the study of political generations economic opportunities have traditionally entered the picture as a key component of social location, although interest has always focused on their consequences in terms of political action. This is now changing. As mentioned above, the main arena of conflict in western societies has shifted from the political to the economic sphere. The issues of politics (power, hegemony) have given way to the issues of welfare (economic security,

resource allocation). The political conflict between generations has turned into a (potential) distributional conflict.

These issues are often framed as a conflict between young and old, or younger and older generations, and discussed under the label of “generational equity” (Kohli 2005). It refers to the argument that the elderly have got more than their fair share of public resources, and that this comes at the expense of the non aged population, especially children. In generational terms, this means that today’s older generations have profited from the expansion of public old age security without having had to pay full contributions, while the younger generations who now have to bear an increasing contribution load will not get the corresponding benefits any more. The growth of this argument into a full blown political discourse can be dated to the mid 1980s. From the US the discourse has been imported to the UK and to the European continent, where institutionalization has been slower but with more current weight (Attias Donfut & Arber 2000).

The discourse of generational equity has clearly been one of the more effective ones in shaping the public agenda of welfare retrenchment over the last two decades, even though its impact in changing popular attitudes and beliefs has so far been less impressive. The political consequences drawn by the proponents of generational equity go in the direction of reducing public spending for the elderly (e.g., by privatizing parts of old age security, reducing benefits, and increasing the retirement age). Other demands include age based rationing for some types of medical care, and age tests for a range of issues such as driving or even voting. In Europe, the demands are often grouped under the term *sustainability*, which links the long term survival of social security schemes to issues in the domain of ecology.

Against these claims it has been pointed out that the expansion of old age security should be seen as a success that – far from unduly privileging the elderly – has only given them their due share by finally bringing them up to par with the active population. Moreover, improving their well being does not necessarily come at the expense of other population groups; the distribution of resources between young and old is not a zero sum game.

One line of research examines the input side: welfare state spending targeted to different population groups (among them, the young and the old) and how it is brought about by welfare state institutions. This concerns not only the large redistributive programs such as old age income security or health insurance, but also arrangements only partially organized or subsidized by the state, such as long term care. An important extension is that of generational accounting which includes contributions as well as spending, and tries to establish full life time balances of contributions and benefits for each successive cohort.

The result is usually that the older generations, through the expansion of pension and health care programs over the past decades, benefit at the cost of the young and future generations. A direct comparison between spending on the elderly and on children and youth is misleading, however. In modern welfare states, incomes and services for the elderly are to a large extent publicly financed, while those for the young are still mostly borne by their families. The one exception is the educational system, but even this is often not fully accounted for. As Bommier et al. (2005) show, the usual intergenerational picture is turned upside down when public education is included in generational accounts along with pensions and health care. They estimate that in terms of benefits received minus taxes paid, all US generations born 1950 to 2050 will be net gainers, while many of today's old people are net losers. Windfall gains for early generations when Social Security and Medicare started up only partially offset windfall losses through the expansion of public education.

The more straightforward way of validating the claims of the generational equity discourse is to assess the output side: the outcome of market distribution and state redistribution in terms of the economic well being of the young and the old (Kohli 2005). Comparative OECD data show that from the mid 1980s to the mid 1990s children have indeed lost ground, and that their income position is considerably below that of the active population. The income position of the elderly has improved in most countries, but also remains below that of the active population, particularly so in the UK with its "residual" welfare state. Moreover, the position

of those above age 75 is clearly less favorable than that of the "young old." It is obvious from these results that in terms of generational equity families with young children should indeed be the target of supplementary welfare efforts. But the results give no reason to strip the elderly of (part of) their current benefits.

Thus, the potential for distributional conflicts among generations certainly exists and is fueled by the current challenges of public finances and demography. However, the discourse of generational equity overstates the extent and inevitability of such conflicts, and sharpens them at the expense of conflicts along the more traditional cleavages of class. Survey data regularly show that the public generational contract still enjoys high legitimacy among all ages and segments of the population. There are some age and generation effects, but they are much less pronounced than the public discourse would lead us to believe. A critical factor is the institutions – such as parties or unions – that mediate generational conflicts by favoring or disfavoring age integration in the political arena.

FAMILY GENERATIONS

The family is the institution where the concept of generation has its most basic meaning: the creation of offspring. While the generational process within a specific family lineage is highly discontinuous, at the population level it is continuous: births occur more or less regularly. There is thus no immediately available "translation" of family generations into political or economic generations. But there is a link relating the generational succession in the family to that in the polity. It is the claim that political innovation or rebellion is favored by generational conflict between parents and children. This claim has already been put forth as an attempt at explaining the movements of 1968. The shift away from authoritarian towards more egalitarian socialization styles in western families would then be another reason for the weakening of the generational conflict in the political arena.

Another link pertains to the reasons why age and generation effects in attitudes towards redistribution through the welfare state even

today are so relatively modest. For the young, the institutionalization of income maintaining retirement pensions means that they are freed from any expectation of income support towards their parents. They can moreover count on services such as grandparenting, and in many cases they can also expect material support. The public resource flow to the elderly has enabled the latter to transfer resources to their offspring in turn (Kohli 1999).

Recent research on *inter vivos* family transfers demonstrates that such transfers are considerable, that they occur mostly in the generational lineage, and that they flow mostly downwards, from the older to the younger generations. There may be expectations of reciprocity, or other strings attached, but by and large parents are motivated by altruism or feelings of unconditional obligation, and direct their gifts to situations of need. For Germany, our survey in 1996 showed that 32 percent of those above age 60 made a transfer to their children or grandchildren during the 12 months prior to the interview, with a mean net value of about 3,700 euros. Thus, part of the public transfers from the active population to the elderly was handed back by the latter to their family descendants. The aggregate net *inter vivos* transfers by the elderly population amounted to about 9 percent of the total yearly public pension sum. This link needs to be qualified, but the overall pattern is clear: the public generational contract is partly balanced by a private one in the opposite direction. These family transfers function to some extent as an informal insurance system for periods of special needs. Even more important in monetary terms are bequests. They are more frequent and much higher in the upper economic strata, but now also increasingly extend into the middle and lower ranks.

A similar picture emerges for other forms of support among adult family generations, as well as for their geographical proximity and emotional closeness. In all of these domains, the widespread idea of the nuclearization of the modern family and the corresponding structural isolation of the older generations – made popular not least by sociological theories of modernization such as those by Durkheim and Parsons – has proven to be highly exaggerated. Conflicts or isolation between family generations do exist to some extent, but not nearly

as pervasively as the conventional story of modernization has made us believe.

THE FUTURE OF GENERATIONAL CONFLICTS

There are still many issues where our current knowledge is severely limited. Due in part to the difficulties mentioned above, the generational framework has not yet been put to full use in accounting for political mobilization and cultural and economic innovation. The links between political, economic, and family generations need to be drawn out more clearly. The limitations are also partly due to the lack of appropriate data. Most studies so far have been limited to cross sectional evidence, or repeated cross sections at best. For a field in such rapid evolution this is especially regrettable.

Given these limitations, what can we say about the likely future? Much will depend on the opportunities and constraints created by institutions. The age grading of the life course, and thus the age based structure of benefits and obligations, may be expected to weaken somewhat, but it will not wither away. The discontinuities produced by the demography and the economy may even deepen, so that the potential for generational conflicts over issues of (re)distribution will remain strong. The bonds between the generations in the family and in the polity have so far been effective in defusing this potential, but whether this will remain so depends on whether there will be enough welfare state support for the family, and age integrating organizations in the political arena.

A crucial issue will be that of innovation. For aging societies, it is critical that the capacity to innovate should extend beyond adolescence and early adulthood into the later life phases. To some extent this would also lower the potential for generational conflict. Whether this will be the case obviously depends on the institutional incentives for continuing education and social participation.

SEE ALSO: Age, Period, and Cohort Effects; Aging and the Life Course, Theories of; Family Structure; Intergenerational Conflict; Intergenerational Relationships and Exchanges;

Life Course Perspective; Mannheim, Karl;
Socialization, Adult; Welfare State

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genetic engineering as a social problem

Gabriele Abels

Genetic engineering (GE) is the technique and science of intervention into the genetic mechanisms of an organism, whether it be microorganism, plant, animal, or human. GE is one of the most socially contested of technologies. In the public debate, the terms GE and biotechnology are often used synonymously; yet, in a narrower sense, GE is only one important technique in the field of biotechnology.

The first successful gene splicing experiment integrating genes from a different species into an organism was undertaken in 1973. Immediately a debate started – and is still going on today – about whether or not GE should be regulated, and in what way. Different regulatory approaches were developed (e.g., product versus process regulation), and (legal) regulations on GE and its various applications were adopted. Based on environmental, safety, and health concerns, GE was perceived as a risk technology from the beginning (Krimsky 1982). Sociologists of risk often refer to GE; for example, for Ulrich Beck, GE is a paradigmatic case for the risk society.

There are two main fields of application of GE: agriculture and food production and medical genetics. Both fields are socially contested, yet the latter is more complex with regard to the social problems involved. The medical field has been revolutionized by the Human Genome Project. Started in 1990 and led by US scientists, it was an outstanding international and multidisciplinary endeavor to map and sequence the human genome (Kevles & Hood 1992). The project was completed in 2004 and is now followed by a functional analysis of the genome (genomics, proteomics, and pharmacogenomics). The project led to an immense growth in knowledge on human genetics, contributing to the development of diagnostics and (pharmaceutical and genetic) therapies as well as population genetics. The project also fostered a trend toward “geneticization”: genetics is increasingly referred to as an explanation not only for

medical conditions, but also for social behavior (e.g., homosexuality, criminality, alcoholism). This shift is reflected in everyday culture where the gene has become a "cultural icon." The study of ethical, legal, and social impacts (ELSI) became an integral part of the Human Genome Project and numerous sociological studies were conducted on issues such as changing patient-physician relationships, the concept of autonomy, or the impact of the media on public perception.

For some time, GE has increasingly been combined with infertility treatment and embryo research ("reprogenetics"). Artificial reproductive technologies such as different techniques for prenatal testing (e.g., amniocentesis or chorionic villi biopsy), artificial insemination, and in vitro fertilization, first developed in the 1970s and today routine procedures, employ GE (e.g., pre implantation genetic diagnosis).

GE gives rise to a number of questions that relate to issues of social (in)equality, especially with regard to human genetics. Any kind of biological – including genetic – information can be socially powerful and used to stigmatize social and ethnic groups as well as individuals and to discriminate against them (Wilkie 1993; Nelkin & Tancredi 1994). There is ongoing debate about the specific status of genetic information: unlike other medical data, genetic information is permanent, cannot be altered, and has a prognostic power. It affects not only the individual, but also his or her relatives. Proponents of "genetic exceptionalism" argue for special legal regulation of genetic information, for example with regard to its use in the insurance sector or by employers. Others claim that a similar condition applies for a lot of non genetic biological information (e.g., use of blood samples in medical employment tests) and that there is no need for special regulation, but instead existing rules should be extended to genetic information and strengthened in order to protect individuals as well as the interests of third parties. Both positions share the concern that genetic information may create a new social cleavage between "genetically affected persons" and those deemed healthy, this cleavage potentially leading to genetic discrimination. The question of an individual's (or even a group's) control over the use of his or her

genetic data and access to this information by third parties thus becomes a prominent social and legal issue, that of genetic privacy.

Cultural perceptions about health, sickness, and disability are a further issue. Especially with regard to the use of GE in reproductive medicine, cultural meaning and social effects of disability are under debate. Radical disability rights activists raise the question of whether the (although until today imperfect) technical option to prevent babies being born with disabilities, so far usually by late term abortion, might lead to a negative cultural perception of disability as being avoidable and to discrimination against people with disability. Others object that only a few disabilities can be detected early on and most are acquired during one's lifetime, and, second, they emphasize the burden on parents and their reproductive rights. In this way, GE revives the old debate about reproductive rights and adds some new topics. Because of women's and men's different share in the reproductive process, GE affects women and men differently.

A third dimension of discrimination concerns race and ethnicity. Many genetic conditions are related to racial and ethnic origin, for example beta thalassemia is most common in the Mediterranean, African, and Southeast Asian populations, sickle cell anemia in the African population, or aggressive forms of breast cancer among African American women. This could give rise to a specific combination of racial/ethnic and genetic discrimination, above all if economically disadvantaged groups are affected.

Besides discrimination, GE in the human field has fostered safety, ethical, and philosophical debates about the future of humankind with regard to techniques such as different forms of gene therapy, enhancement, and human cloning. Gene therapy can be conducted on affected cells (somatic cell GE); the objective is to correct defective genes in individuals by inserting non defective ones. Conducted for the first time in 1990, it is still an experimental therapy and safety concerns dominate the debate. A more fundamental gene therapy would directly alter the genetic structure of the germ line, and thereby also change the genetic structure of future generations. This

could be done for therapeutic reasons in order to ultimately correct defective genes. However, germ line therapy also opens the way for enhancement of human beings for non medical reasons. This technical option is socially highly contested (cf. Bernard 2001; Fukuyama 2002; Habermas 2003). Critics argue that any form of enhancement is eugenics and leads to a slippery slope; they often recount Nazi “racial hygiene” as the historically most extreme case of eugenics. The major philosophical basis is Kant’s reasoning that a human should not be instrumentalized by anybody for personal interests but has a value of his or her own. Proponents argue that there is no strong theoretical argument against enhancement. The selective choice of a fetus in order to later use the baby, for example as a bone marrow donor for an affected sibling, as well as human cloning have become contested issues for much the same ethical reasons as germ line therapy and enhancement.

The early debate over GE was dominated by a risk discourse. Increasingly, ethics has gained prominence and often even takes center stage in scholarly as well as political debates, especially with regard to the medical field. Yet, ethics is today also more prominent with regard to the agricultural and food sector. Along with this change in the framing of the debate went a shift from the narrow issue of legal regulation of GE to the broader one of social regulation. Legal regulation in the medical field pertains to issues of research (e.g., informed consent, use of embryos or stem cells) to application in (medical) practice (e.g., informed consent, access to data, safety standards) as well as to commercialization (e.g., coverage by health insurance providers). Most legal regulation is in the form of national laws or self regulation by professional groups such as physicians. In the last decade, there has been a growing trend for more international legal regulation of some issues, such as research and cloning, by organizations such as the United Nations, the Council of Europe, or the European Union.

Social regulation pertains to broader questions of science (genetics) and society including who should participate in decision making and policy deliberation on these contested issues, and what counts as relevant knowledge. This

is reflected in institutional change in policy deliberation. Since the 1990s, special bodies have been set up in many countries in order to advise policymakers on ethical, social, and legal policy issues concerning GE and its application to humans (e.g., national ethics committees). Along with this professionalization of the debate has been democratization, insofar as many social experiments with enhanced citizen participation in science policy have been conducted (e.g., consensus conferences or citizens’ juries).

GE is a prominent topic in interdisciplinary social studies of science and technology (STS). A first strand in sociological research focuses on the social history of GE and conflicts within science as well as between science, politics, and the public. One strand of research addresses issues of public risk perception and media representation as well as different cultures of risk regulation, including the precautionary principle. Yet most of this research deals with regulation in the field of agricultural biotechnology, while the application to humans still requires scholarly attention. A third strand is concerned with social changes, for example geneticization effects on reproductive choice, disability rights, or the general topic of the social reinvention of nature, often including a gender perspective. While early research sometimes argued along the lines of technological determinism, today research is taking into account the complexity of how GE and society shape each other. Social justice and equality or, more specifically, Foucault’s concepts of biopolitics and governmentality are prominent theoretical approaches.

The ongoing social conflicts over GE have recently been analyzed from a perspective of the changing relation between science and society and build on changes in political culture and “civic epistemologies” (Jasanoff 2005). “Science governance” is a keyword. This concept criticizes the older approach of “public understanding of science” as insufficient. It identifies public ignorance as the key factor in conflicts over technologies and holds that technology assessment is best conducted by experts. According to the science governance perspective, new methods for technology assessment have to be developed that include a variety of social actors. New “participatory” or democratic

models criticize the epistemological deficiencies of expert oriented policy deliberation and attend to the decreasing authority of scientific knowledge (expert dilemma). Proponents of participatory models argue for the need to integrate a plurality of knowledges and aim to democratize expertise. This governance perspective allows us to link conflicts over GE to broader social transformations. It requires above all a theoretical embedding of technology assessment as well as the broader concept of science governance in social theory. This is one of the major tasks for future research.

SEE ALSO: Cloning; (Constructive) Technology Assessment; Eugenics; Expertise, "Scientification," and the Authority of Science; Gay Gene; Human Genome and the Science of Life; Medical Sociology and Genetics; Risk, Risk Society, Risk Behavior, and Social Problems; Science and the Precautionary Principle; Science and Public Participation: The Democratization of Science

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genocide

Susanne Karstedt

Genocide has been termed the crime of the twentieth century and in many ways it epitomizes this "age of extremes" (Hobsbawm 1994). It was in this century that the word genocide was first coined, and it was legally defined and criminalized. The international community committed itself to the protection of threatened populations and to the prosecution and punishment of those who were responsible for mass killings, and was successful in a number of high and low ranking cases; at the end of the century, international intervention in cases of genocide started. Most importantly, it was the century of the archetypical example of genocide in modern times, the Nazi Holocaust of the European Jews and other groups, the most horrible single crime in human history. On most accounts, it is the century if not with the highest numbers of incidents, then the highest numbers of victims of genocide in the known history of humankind.

The word genocide was coined by Raphael Lemkin, a lawyer of Polish Jewish origin, in 1944. It was legally defined in the United Nations Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide in 1948, preceded by a resolution of the General Assembly proclaiming that "genocide was the deprivation of the right to existence of a group in the same fashion that homicide was the denial of the right to exist of an individual" (Rubinstein 2004: 308). The UN Convention's definition was drafted in response to the Nazis' extermination of the Jews, and was based on the experience of the Nuremberg Trials 1945–6, which became a landmark in the legal prosecution of perpetrators of genocide. However, it did not start to play a role in international law and politics until the 1970s, and in particular after the end of the Cold War, when the mass killings in Cambodia, and later in Latin America, the former Yugoslavia, and in Rwanda alerted the international community to the continuous and global threat of genocidal practices.

The Convention states that "genocide means ... acts committed with intent to destroy, in whole or in part, a national, ethnic, racial or

religious group.” Such acts as detailed in the Convention include: killing members of the group; causing serious bodily or mental harm to them; deliberately inflicting conditions of life calculated to bring about their physical destruction in whole or in part; imposing measures intended to prevent births within a group; and forcibly transferring children of the group to another one. The Convention’s definition is remarkable in two respects. First, it did not imply that genocide is the total destruction of a whole group; second, it included a range of acts besides mass killings, and thus took into account the *process character* of genocide. However, the definition limited genocide to these groups, and specific actions, and excluded groups defined by class and political affiliation. As such, the Convention’s definition was untenable in the light of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights adopted in the same year. In fact, the mass killings of peasants in the Soviet Union under Stalin, or the genocide of its own people by the Khmer Rouge in Cambodia, are currently counted as genocide by most authors.

The Convention’s limitations started an ongoing debate about the definition of genocide, and currently, the terms “mass killings” (Valentino 2004), “mass atrocities” (Osiel 1997), “democide” or “deaths by government” (Rummel 1994, 1998), and “murderous ethnic cleansing” (Mann 2005) are all in use. Most of these extend the scope of genocide beyond the groups to which the Convention still gives a special status. Though genocide is clearly set apart from war, in particular by its illegitimacy, which is enshrined in the Convention, national criminal laws, and evidenced by the secrecy and complicity in the conduct of genocide (Shaw 2003), a number of authors include specific types of acts of war as genocide (e.g., Kuper 1981; Rubinstein 2004). The scope of the definition is decisive in two respects: first for the estimates of victims and perpetrators, and second for the history of genocide.

Estimates for the victims of genocide and mass killings as distinguished from war deaths range from 60–150 million for the twentieth century alone (Valentino 2004), with most estimates at about 80 million, and some considerably higher (Rummel 1998). For the second half of the twentieth century since 1945, estimates range from 9–20 million in more than

40 episodes of genocide (Valentino 2004; Gurr 1993). These horrifying figures testify to the “discriminate targeting” of groups in mass killings and their finally “indiscriminate” victimization (Shaw 2003). The perpetrators in contrast are comparably small in numbers. A very conservative estimate gives the figure of Germans who directly participated in mass slaughters of Jews as 100,000, to which a considerable number of members of police and other forces should be added. An estimate of immediate involvement in the Rwandan genocide suggests 200,000 direct participants; however, the regular and irregular military forces who did most of the killing number about 10,000. A similar estimate is given for the perpetrators in former Yugoslavia (Osiel 2005). Genocide is the crime in which victims massively outnumber perpetrators, but the group of perpetrators is large enough to include a considerable proportion of the population. Bystanders, those who tacitly or openly approve of or witness all measures leading up to the killings and finally the mass killings themselves, can comprise large parts of the population, depending on the type of action taken against the targeted group. Historical accounts and counts of episodes of genocide put the twentieth century into perspective, depending on the scope of the definition used. Both Rummel (1998) and Rubinstein (2004) estimate high numbers of victims of genocidal practices before the twentieth century. Rubinstein (2004) identifies five distinct types and periods in the history of genocide: in pre literate societies, in the age of empires and religions (from 500 BCE to 1492), colonial genocides from 1492–1914, in the age of totalitarianism (1914–79), and contemporary ethnic cleansing and genocide since 1945. He concludes that pre literal societies were probably more murderous than modern ones, thus contesting the assumed link between modernity and genocide.

Genocide involves three distinct elements, which provide the basis for all attempts to explain why and how genocides happen, and why apparently “ordinary men” (Browning 1992) – and very rarely women – engage in the indiscriminate killing of men, women, and children, who might have been their neighbors. These elements are (1) the “identification of a social group as an enemy . . . against which it is justified to use physical violence in a systematic

way”; (2) “the intention to destroy the real or imputed power” of this group; and (3) “the actual deployment of violence . . . through killing . . . and other measures” (Shaw 2003: 37). Genocides are more often than not related to wars, mounting social crises, and threatening social change, including the total breakdown of social order (Staub 1989). Though genocide and mass killings at least in the twentieth century take place in comparably short time periods, and most of the victims are killed within a few months (Valentino 2004), the development of the three decisive elements and the process character of genocide can be clearly identified.

Three explanatory approaches have been most influential: genocide as the product of *modernity*, with Bauman (1989) as the most prominent proponent; the *structural and psychosocial perspective*, which focuses on broad social, cultural, and political factors; and finally the *strategic perspective*, according to which specific goals and strategies of high political and military leaders are decisive for the precipitation of genocide (Valentino 2004), and which links genocide to “degenerate wars” (Shaw 2003). The link between modernity and genocide is established by modernity’s defining features, such as new technologies of warfare, new administrative techniques that enhance the power of state surveillance, and new and “excluding” ideologies that categorize people. It is the development of the power of the modern state that finally facilitates genocide and makes it a defining characteristic of modernity. In contrast, the structural and psychosocial approach focuses on a number of preexisting structural and cultural factors, which are however neither sufficient nor universally necessary causes of genocide. Among these factors the most important are deep cleavages between social and ethnic groups, with a clear structure of domination and “superimposition of inequalities” (Kuper 1981). These are exacerbated in social crises and in difficult living conditions, which increase the competition between groups for power and economic gains. Even if genocide generally involves “irrational and fantastical beliefs” (Shaw 2003), it is also a “rational” strategy for the perpetrators to enrich themselves and firmly establish power. Cultural factors include dehumanizing attitudes towards

targeted groups, scape goating in times of social crises, justifications of violence and exclusion, moral disengagement such as the erosion of norms of social responsibility and solidarity, and a cultural pattern of authoritarian and obedient attitudes. The concentration of unchecked power in undemocratic and authoritarian regimes has been identified as a causal factor by a number of authors (e.g., Rummel 1998). The twentieth century provides ample evidence for the role of dictatorships and authoritarian states in conducting mass killings; however, the role of democracies as bystanders and facilitators should not be underrated. Mann (2005) makes the failure of democracy and democratization responsible for murderous ethnic cleansing and explains it as the “dark side of democracy.”

The strategic perspective (Valentino 2004) differs from both the above approaches in its focus on situational and process factors, as well as political ideological conditions. From this perspective genocide is a powerful political and military tool for leaders, elites, and their imminent followers to achieve strategic goals. Valentino argues that the impetus usually originates from a relatively small group of political and military leaders, for whom mass killings are part of an instrumental policy, and strong incentives exist to instigate these as a “final solution” to real or imputed threats. He identifies six types of mass killings which can be grouped into two general categories. “Dispossession” mass killing results from policies that strip large groups of the population of their possessions, their homes, their way of life, and finally their lives. Collectivization and political terror, ethnic cleansing, colonial enlargement, and expansionist wars are in this category. “Coercive mass killings” occur in major armed conflicts, when political and military leaders use massive violence to coerce large numbers of civilians and their leaders into submission, and when this escalates into genocide. Counter guerrilla, terrorist, and imperialist mass killings are in this category.

While the structural perspective identifies long term social and *collective* processes that contribute to the ultimate precipitation of genocide, the strategic perspective focuses on the short term *strategic* process of genocide, which involves only a small elite group and their

followers. Both provide widely differing explanations for the *individual* processes that turn mostly ordinary men into mass murderers. From the structural perspective, social and cultural preconditions create a large pool of potential perpetrators, so that finally everyone can become actively involved in mass killings should the situation arise. The Milgram experiments were mostly designed to confirm this assumption. In contrast, the strategic perspective (Valentino 2004: 6) implies that the “preferential selection of sadistic or ideologically fanatic individuals and the influence of situational and group pressures and elite manipulation,” including incentives for perpetrators, explains the behavior of most rank and file perpetrators of mass killings. Historical evidence and case studies do not give unequivocal support to either of these perspectives, but it is obvious that perpetrators go through a process of stepwise preparations and different stages of moral disengagement and justification of their actions, during which group pressures and incentives, as well as imputed threats, play an important role (Browning 1992; Waller 2002; Mann 2005).

The UN Convention obliges the international community to prevent genocide, which includes intervention into ongoing mass killings. Both require the observation of critical situations and the identification of warning signs. Prevention and intervention include international military intervention, economic sanctions, the deployment of international peace forces and the disarmament of groups involved, and the provision of humanitarian assistance. From the structural perspective of “root causes,” long term measures are preferable. These include the promotion of minority rights, democratic values that protect individuals, the rule of law, and democratic regimes. Democratization, however, appears to be a double edged sword, since genocide episodes often followed on the heels of failed democratization efforts (Valentino 2004; Mann 2005). With its focus on small groups, situational and precipitating factors, on the shorter time frame of the actual road to genocide, and the identification of steps towards the “final solution,” the strategic approach appears to be more suitable to design and implement interventions and preventive

measures, and to identify premonitions of potential genocides (Osiel 2005).

The UN Convention committed the international community to the prosecution and punishment of perpetrators, and made individuals accountable under international law. The acts punishable under the Convention comprise conspiracy, public incitement, and complicity, and thus allow for the indictment of “constitutionally responsible rulers, public officials or private individuals” (Article IV), for which the International Military Tribunal at Nuremberg had been a promising start. In addition, the Convention committed the ratifying nations to prosecuting perpetrators in their own territory. It was not until the last decade of the twentieth century that the international community developed the requisite institutional framework, first with the International Tribunals for the Former Yugoslavia (Hagan 2003) and Rwanda, and finally with the adoption of the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court in 1998, and its establishment in 2002 (Schabas 2004). The tribunals and the court are confronted with numerous legal and procedural problems in the prosecution and punishment of mass atrocities. The sheer numbers of perpetrators and victims in particular pose problems to less developed systems of criminal justice as in Rwanda, or might exacerbate group conflicts in a situation of political and social crisis. Truth commissions, truth and reconciliation commissions, the combination of legal procedures with amnesties, or other frameworks of restorative justice are currently seen as promising solutions to the problems of making perpetrators accountable and doing justice to the victims of genocide.

SEE ALSO: Arendt, Hannah; Authoritarian Personality; Burundi and Rwanda (Hutu, Tutsi); Ethnic Cleansing; Ethnonationalism; Fascism; Holocaust; Milgram, Stanley (Experiments); Truth and Reconciliation Commissions; Violence; War

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genre

Roger Horrocks

A genre is any group of texts identified as sharing a cluster of characteristics (such as structure, theme, style, mood, spatial or temporal setting, or function). The term may imply a precise list of characteristics or be used more flexibly as a way of exploring “family resemblances” (in Wittgenstein’s sense of that phrase). New genres

are constantly being identified, but use value determines whether a proposed grouping gains long term acceptance. The most useful tend to be highly specific groupings of examples which are closely related in space and time as well as form, regarded as “subgenres” of traditional genres. The idea of genre is not only a conceptual tool of scholars, but is also employed constantly in everyday life in the production, distribution, and reception of media products. In that sense it calls for investigation as an important social and industrial (as well as creative) phenomenon. Indeed, it has been studied for so many centuries that sophisticated traditions of theory and criticism have developed around it, reflecting changing conceptions of the text and its relationship with social contexts. Those traditions have sometimes remained specialized and separate (within the arts, linguistics, and media industries), but in recent years there has been an increased emphasis on interdisciplinary approaches that seek to articulate the semiotic with the social.

The identification of a genre is the beginning rather than the end of analysis. Because of the breadth of the term it is important to specify the particular methods of construction or analysis linked with it, but basic to all is the activity of sorting or classification. Like “generalization” and “gender,” the English word “genre” looks back to *genus*, the Latin word for type or kind. The organization of textual study by genre is analogous to the biological classification of living organisms in terms of species and genus; and historical research on the development of genres may be likened to the study of evolution. Since genre analysis sees value in a researcher’s knowledge of many examples, it has potentially a quantitative as well as qualitative dimension. This aspect became increasingly important as the mass production of media products and their availability expanded. At the same time the term genre came to be associated with debates about the vulgarity of “mass culture” and the ideological conformity it was seen as promoting. Most scholars today would insist on a value free use of the term genre, but until recently genre criticism has tended to combine formal analysis with aesthetic or moral value judgments.

The idea of distinguishing genres and subgenres was already present (under various terms)

in the work of ancient thinkers such as Aristotle, who wrote in his *Poetics*: “Our subject being Poetry, I propose to speak not only of the art in general but also of its species and their respective capacities.” Such criticism became a common activity in all the arts. It was often based on the aesthetic appreciation of ideal rather than typical examples, and social aspects such as the relationship with audiences tended to be analyzed by a process of deduction. In relation to artistic production and distribution, the idea functioned in very complex ways, since it not only described what had already been made, but reinforced the natural tendency for artists to learn and borrow from one another. Genres developed distinctive traditions and strict conventions, with specialist producers and connoisseurs. This tendency also assisted marketing. Shakespeare parodied its uncritical use in Polonius’s remarks to Hamlet about a troupe of actors he regarded as the best in the world for all the main theatrical genres – “tragedy, comedy, history, pastoral, pastoral comical, historical pastoral, tragical historical, tragical comical historical pastoral . . . [etc.]”

In European art criticism, lists of genres (such as the list established by the *Académie Française*) tended to carry hierarchical implications. In the twentieth century a new approach to status was proposed by social theorists such as the Frankfurt School, who associated “genre” with the commercial products of mass culture, contrasting them with individualized examples of art that were too complex to be adequately discussed in generic terms. This tradition of genre analysis focused on standardization and gave rise to many Marxist studies of the ideology said to be embedded in particular genres. As an adjective, the term genre came to be widely used as a critical shortcut, with “genre films” (for example) contrasted with “art films.” Later researchers have tended to reject the value assumptions implied by this tradition and its neglect of some of the complexities of reception. (They also see no reason why “art films” should not be analyzed in generic terms.) Nevertheless, the Frankfurt tradition retains relevance for any critique focusing on cultural mass production and the centralized control of media industries.

Less polemical forms of genre analysis developed in linguistics. Bakhtin’s (1986) essay proposed a taxonomy of types of “utterance”

associated with various social activities. Literary readings or scientific lectures might be more complex than speeches of greeting or farewell, but all were part of the same spectrum of human communication, involving “relatively stable and normative forms.” Artistic (or “secondary”) speech genres such as the play or the novel drew upon everyday (“primary”) speech genres and transformed them for their own purposes. Applied to both written and spoken communication, this type of generic analysis has come to be used not only in linguistics but also in general education, with students acquiring both social and linguistic competence as they develop a repertoire of “text types.” In some respects this tradition looks back to the Renaissance study of rhetoric in its emphasis on generic conventions and social effectiveness. Many forms of social analysis – including organizational and business studies – have found it important to acknowledge the generic aspects of human communication. Each change in media technology has provided the linguist with new types of text to classify, such as Internet communication with its expanding genres of email, website, chatroom, and blog.

There have also been cognitive studies of the process of genre recognition at work in all forms of sorting, from Internet searching to library classification. Many American libraries use a standard system of generic classification known as GSAFD (Guidelines on Subject Access to Individual Works of Fiction, Drama, Etc.). Generic approaches compete or are combined with alphabetical, chronological, and geographical systems of ordering. Classification systems have become an important object of study in themselves, with changes in genre categories cited as historical evidence. Skeptical writers have sought to question the adequacy and social influence of all such systems. Jorge Luis Borges, once Director of the National Library of Argentina, created a witty cautionary tale in his story “The Analytical Language of John Wilkins,” which imagined an encyclopedia based on a taxonomy that defied all conventional logic.

The concept of genre, in both judgmental and non judgmental forms, continues to pervade daily life. Faced with a proliferation of media products, consumers struggle to locate texts of the types that interest them. Advertising

and packaging for books and recordings, films and television programs (or channels) make use of generic terms as a marketing shorthand. Stores are divided generically to assist both the customer and the store assistant to locate a particular item or group of related items. Categories vary from country to country and from one retailer to another, but customers adapt quickly because they are familiar with the process. The discovery of a genre and evidence of public interest in it imply the existence of a particular audience or market niche, thus encouraging the creation of similar products to satisfy a known taste. This is important for expensive, high risk media such as film and television. As a genre attains stability, specialist producers emerge (publishers, film companies, writers, technicians, record labels, etc.), along with distribution and exhibition networks (such as specialized stores, film distributors, radio stations, television channels, cinemas, etc.).

There have been a number of studies in recent years of reading communities associated with particular genres of popular culture, seeking (in a non judgmental way) to analyze the uses and gratifications involved. Janet Radway's *Reading the Romance* (1984) was an influential study of women reading "romance" novels, combining textual analysis of the genre with an ethnographic study of reception. Such studies have made us more aware of the complex nature of the transaction with formulaic material. The genre enthusiast derives convenience and pleasure from the mix of old and new ingredients, developing a comfortable sense of familiarity and insider knowledge as well as the opportunity to attempt to predict and to be surprised. Recent reception and industrial studies have revealed an unexpected complexity in popular culture and popular genres, despite the calculated simplicity of their surface features.

Popular music offers some particularly striking examples both of these cultural phenomena and of the scholarly work that analyzes them. The increased size, energy, and diversity of popular music have undercut sweeping criticisms of its mass produced nature. Change is extremely rapid, with each genre generating a rapid succession of subgenres, reflected in the changing organization of any large music store. (The genre of Electronic Dance Music, for example, rapidly diversified as House, Jungle,

Drum and Bass, Techno, Gabber, Trance, Acid House, Trip Hop, Ambient, Breakbeat, and a myriad of other subgenres, sometimes mating with larger genres such as Hip-hop, Reggae, or Heavy Metal.) These changes have been particularly interesting for those involved in cultural studies because forms of popular music are often associated with distinctive subcultures (an area of study developed by Dick Hebdige). Such a subculture involves particular kinds of venue, slang, styles of dance, types of dress, iconic heroes, etc. These social and cultural conjunctions have been the subject of recent studies by Simon Frith, Steve Redhead, and Nabeel Zuberi.

Various forms of industrial analysis have been applied to the commercial contexts of genre. Many studies of the media have focused on texts and their production, or in recent years on reception. Distribution and retailing remain relatively neglected topics, despite the importance of those activities in limiting access to cultural products. Artists are highly aware of them because of the difficulty of gaining distribution or visibility for work that cannot be marketed in terms of current categories. Some academics have expressed a similar suspicion of the conservative functioning of genre in the marketplace. This is one area in which the concerns of Frankfurt School critics such as Adorno are still compelling. At the same time, there are many complexities to be taken into account, for the idea of genre has many stakeholders – including fans, production companies, distributors, retailers, censors, and critics, as well as creative people. While some groups are able to exercise greater power, each group has its own perspective and priorities, and all are to some extent interdependent.

In contrast to early genre criticism which tended to focus on a few ideal, permanent, uncontested types, the modern approach tends to be empirical and inductive, aware of diversity and rapid change, and fascinated by social context. But how to interpret the links between a genre and its audience? Psychoanalytical approaches have often been applied to genres such as the horror film. There are strong connections with the social sciences in the industrial, ideological, subcultural, and ethnographic methods of analysis discussed above. How a genre develops in textual terms can sometimes be linked to technological changes – for

example, the evolution of film musicals as sound equipment became more flexible, or the new wave of films based on fantasy and comic book characters made possible by computer special effects. Yet single factor explanations are seldom adequate in this complex field and researchers need to consider audience responses and commercial trends as well as production possibilities. Major social changes can have an obvious impact on established genres, for example in the more prominent roles played by women in western popular culture since the 1960s, or the more explicit treatment of sexuality. Such changes have had an impact on many genres, from the thriller to the romance novel. Yet cultural and media studies writers remind us that such trends within a stylized genre still involve a sophisticated process of mediation, for example by fulfilling escapist desires.

The subject of film studies has provided a particularly important site for the analysis of genre. The concept of the auteur (or director with a unique style and vision) has sometimes been opposed to the concept of genre, but French critics such as André Bazin valued the genre as a context in which auteurs could display their individuality – as John Ford reshaped the western and Alfred Hitchcock experimented with the thriller. Both auteur and genre forms of criticism are based on groupings of related texts. Artists in all fields have been attracted to genres, as rich concentrations of cultural activity and as useful frameworks. Some innovators, such as composer Igor Stravinsky, have found their very constraints creatively stimulating.

From the 1960s, however, structuralist criticism shifted attention from auteurs to the collective structures of language and culture. It also helped to move criticism away from value judgments, including its tendency to privilege realism. It applied Saussure's relational approach to language to the relationship between texts, and its genre studies drew upon Propp's analysis of folktales and Lévi Strauss's studies of myths – their variant versions, their "bricolage" (or recombination of existing elements), and their problem solving functions. Structuralist critics saw genres as mechanisms for mediating fundamental tensions – for example, oppositions in the western between law and disorder, civilization and wilderness, nature and culture, male and female, East and West, etc. But structuralism

tended to move beyond genre to a broader understanding of discourse. Gerard Genette saw genre as only one of a range of types of "transtextuality." Poststructuralism went still further in announcing the "death of the author" and rejecting any notion of the unitary text – or genre – as an illusion. Although the concept of genre was discussed by Barthes, Kristeva, and Derrida, their basic aim was to destabilize it. Though coming from a different angle, ethnographic studies of reception have also tended to shift attention away from genres as patterns of regularity towards the freedom and diversity of reading practices.

Despite these challenges to traditional criticism, the basic concept of genre has survived strongly – in everyday life, as a linguistic tool, and as a subject of industrial and cultural analysis. It has emerged from the debates of the last thirty years in a more flexible form, shedding any residual tendency to essentialism, reification, or moralism. It is expected today that any one doing genre criticism will at least consider the complexities of reception and production (though other industrial aspects such as distribution may still be skimmed over). While continuing to value skills of textual analysis, genre criticism has moved to a complex awareness of social contexts – such as readers, subcultures, institutions, and commercial networks – combined with an interest in historical change. This eclectic and sometimes provocative approach provides new perspectives on texts of every kind, regardless of their milieu or status. Genre building has itself been studied as a form of social construction and this has encouraged the activity to become more self-critical and reflexive. The conventions, styles, and social contexts of text production associated with any academic field – such as genre criticism, or sociology – can be usefully subjected to genre analysis.

Such articulation of the semiotic with the social has so far mainly benefited the fields of cultural and media studies, but some sociologists have taken an interest. As an example of this fruitful exchange, Thomas Luckmann, one of the authors (with Peter Berger) of *The Social Construction of Reality*, has contributed to the study of communicative genres. Many aspects of sociological investigation can benefit from a more than perfunctory appreciation of their

linguistic, semiotic, or rhetorical aspects, and genre analysis offers a valuable set of tools.

SEE ALSO: Discourse; Film; Hegemony and the Media; Mass Culture and Mass Society; Media; Media and Consumer Culture; Popular Culture Forms (Soap Operas); Television

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gentrification

Jason Patch and Neil Brenner

Gentrification entails the reinvestment of real estate capital into declining, inner city neighborhoods to create a new residential infrastructure for middle and high income inhabitants. In coining the term “gentrification” in 1964, Ruth Glass emphasized that class relations lie at the core of the process, which has generally involved

the displacement of working class residents from inner city zones and the gradual influx of a new “gentry” of well off professionals.

Equally relevant, but often less noted, is the role of gentrification in accelerating the displacement of blue collar jobs from the urban core. Since the 1960s and 1970s, most manufacturing cities in the United States, Great Britain, and continental Europe have seen a steady decline in industrial production. As capitalists relocated manufacturing activities from the inner cities to the suburbs and abroad, disinvested property remained, and was often left in a derelict, decaying condition. Subsequently, as of the 1980s, information based financial and producer services industries gradually superseded the traditional manufacturing based urban economies of the Fordist epoch. Within the new, post Fordist configuration of urban development, professionals and white collar workers generated a new demand for upscale housing in closer proximity to revitalizing downtowns. Under these conditions, devalued inner city property was increasingly seen by large real estate capital as a basis for reinvestment and profiteering. As Neil Smith indicates, one crucial precondition for the process of gentrification is the existence of a “rent gap” enabling real estate capitalists to exploit the difference between the potential value of a property under some future “highest and best use” and its actual value under the inherited land use regime. While considerable debate persists among urban scholars regarding the degree to which the existence of rent gaps can effectively explain the timing and location of gentrification, there is today widespread agreement that this process has been facilitated in crucial ways through the speculative inner city investments of real estate capitalists.

As gentrification proceeds apace, inner city neighborhoods and other marginalized urban enclaves undergo significant sociospatial changes. Most significantly, there is a transformation of the built environment. New buildings are constructed; extant buildings are converted into luxury housing; industrial space is converted to mixed live work or residential space; and new commercial establishments (such as upscale restaurants, coffee shops, boutiques, art galleries, and high end clothing shops) are introduced. The New York City neighborhoods of SoHo in the 1960s and 1970s and Williamsburg,

Brooklyn in the 1990s represent classic instances in which the shift from small scale manufacturing factories to artist lofts, gallery spaces, and new retail activities has occurred. In addition, there is also a significant rearticulation of the social fabric. Established class based and ethnic milieus are destabilized or dissolved as new economic and cultural elites – often, but not always, composed of whites – move into the area. Philadelphia's Society Hill, with its predominantly African American community, was an early site of this wholesale change in a neighborhood's class and racial composition.

The first signs of gentrification became evident, albeit in highly localized forms, during the 1960s in the older inner cities of North America, Western Europe, and Australia. During this early phase, gentrification was guided by national and local governments concerned to counteract economic decline in inner city neighborhoods by encouraging private investment. Processes of gentrification became far more widespread throughout the older industrialized world following the global economic recession of the 1970s, as capitalists sought new opportunities for profitable investment in the real estate sector. Thus, between the late 1970s and the early 1990s, a second phase of gentrification unfolded. During this period, inner city reinvestment articulated with deeply rooted economic changes such as deindustrialization, the globalization of urban production systems, the enhanced urban concentration of corporate command and control capacities, and the rise of the so called FIRE (finance, insurance, and real estate) industrial cluster as an important engine of urban economic growth. During this period, moreover, the spatial frontiers of gentrification were expanded significantly as formerly marginalized neighborhoods, such as New York City's Lower East Side, were now targeted for extensive, high end real estate development. In the early 1990s, with the recession in the United States, some scholars predicted an "end to gentrification" as investor capital evaporated. Instead, following the recession of the early 1990s, a third wave of gentrification has begun to crystallize, as additional neighborhoods, located ever further from the city core, have experienced significant capital led redevelopment. In the US context, according to Smith & Hackworth (2001), this third wave of

gentrification has been supported, and in many cases directly financed, by local and national government agencies.

One major geographic consequence of gentrification in the US has been to unsettle the socioeconomic geographies that were inherited from earlier rounds of capitalist development, generating an urban sociospatial configuration that appears to be gradually inverting Ernest Burgess's famous concentric circle model. In the new model, the wealthy and middle classes have come to dominate the central zones of the city, whereas the working class and ethnic minorities are increasingly relegated to distant commuter zones. However, even as the process of gentrification spirals outwards from inner city zones to colonize new neighborhoods, it must also be viewed as a cyclical phenomenon in which individual neighborhoods often experience multiple rounds of reinvestment.

In addition to these structural, political economic, and geographical aspects, urbanists have also devoted detailed attention, on a microsociological level, to the *agents* of gentrification processes. In the earliest stages of gentrification, marginalized social groups – such as artists, gays, and middle class blacks – have played key roles. These "early" gentrifiers renovated dilapidated housing using their own sweat equity. These new residents have helped restore buildings, thus increasing their property value. Artists have often converted warehouses into mixed live work space; and they have aided in transforming formerly industrial areas into residential areas. City governments and local landlords have generally favored such small scale conversions, which are viewed as a means to increase property taxes and rents. In deference to these new residential patterns, city governments have often retroactively rezoned industrial areas to permit mixed uses. Ultimately, however, these gentrifying segments of the middle class have tended to colonize working class or ethnic minority neighborhoods and to price out long term and low income tenants. Furthermore, many early gentrifiers eventually become the victims of their own renewal efforts. By improving local property and lobbying for more city services, early gentrifiers increase property values and rental prices, thus creating the conditions for later, intensive rounds of gentrification and their own displacement.

As a subject for study, gentrification has generated multidisciplinary attention, especially among urban geographers and urban sociologists. While gentrification always unfolds in place specific forms, urbanists have debated extensively regarding its overarching features and consequences. In particular, Smith's rent gap theory, mentioned above, has provoked considerable debate. Smith's work emphasizes the essential role of real estate capital in animating the process of gentrification. In this manner, Smith's influential writings supersede earlier explanations that attributed neighborhood reinvestment to the renewed desire of middle class populations to live in the inner city. Concurrent with and subsequent to Smith's supply side analysis, however, other scholars have reexplored the demand side aspects of gentrification through a materialist lens. David Ley (1996), for instance, suggests that the new middle classes created a broad aesthetic appreciation for urban life in conjunction with the countercultural movements of the 1960s and 1970s and the subsequent round of urban restructuring. Similarly, Damaris Rose (1984) and Liz Bondi (1994) emphasized the distinctive gender patterns related to gentrification, in part due to the changing life conditions of middle class women. Indeed, the question of how to reconcile the demand side and supply side elements of gentrification remains an enduring, but productive, intellectual tension in this research field. Loretta Lees (2000), among others, has sought to pinpoint lacunae in gentrification research, and on this basis, to direct attention towards cross national comparisons and ethnographic forms of spatial analysis. Additionally, art historians have taken an interest in gentrified neighborhoods as venues for new forms of art production, as sites for artistic creativity, and as a source of political conflict within the art world itself. And finally, city planners and architects have approached gentrification less as a theoretical issue than as an opportunity to rethink key aspects of urban design and urban development strategy.

Multiple ethnographic and demographic case studies examine particular types of gentrifiers, such as artists, gays, college graduates, single women, and young professionals. Such studies create typologies between "early" or "marginal" gentrifiers (low income newcomers who

invest sweat equity into their residences) and "late", "super," or "yuppie" gentrifiers (those with the financial resources to purchase property outright). Gentrification may thus enable members of socially marginalized groups to secure their own property as well as community resources. Gays and lesbians, for instance, are often key players in the gentrification process as they seek to avoid areas of overt discrimination and to find locations in which they can be "out" in their own commercial enterprises and public social activities. Similarly, artists looking for large open studio spaces frequently agglomerate in former industrial zones and engage in extensive renovations of space. Zukin's (1989) study of SoHo in New York City discusses the archetypical case of artists appropriating manufacturing warehouses, with city government and landlord encouragement, leading in turn to subsequent waves of high end gentrification.

Many scholars use the case of gentrification as a basis for conceptualizing both the hopes and the horrors of urban living. In contrast to most of mainstream urban sociology, many writers on gentrification are influenced by radical or Marxist scholarly traditions, and thus tend to view middle class forms of urban reinvestment as expressions of growth machine politics and narrowly private accumulation strategies. Indeed, the struggle over neighborhood space, aesthetics, and resources is often thought to exemplify contemporary class and racial tensions within major metropolitan regions. However, many case studies show a more complicated picture. Often, the most fervent resisters to gentrification are themselves early gentrifiers who fear being priced out of neighborhoods to which they have grown attached. Many long term residents are able to partake in new services, and those who own property are often able to realize profits on long undervalued holdings. Also, the key concern about gentrification, the displacement of low income residents, is complicated by countervailing policy initiatives that sustain the location of minority residents in neighborhoods that are undergoing intense redevelopment. Still, many landlords, especially absentee and corporate ones, aggressively seek to remove low income tenants in order to realize higher rents. In this sense, as Neil Smith (1996) has argued in an influential intervention, gentrification can be viewed as a medium and expression

of the new forms of urban exclusion and “revanchism” that have been consolidated during the last two decades.

In the past decade gentrification studies have moved well beyond their original geographic homes in New York and London. Gentrification is now found throughout North America, Australia, Eastern Europe, and also in rural, industrial towns on the outskirts of major cities in the US and the UK. Its expansion may be expected to continue for the foreseeable future, and so too may scholarly attempts to decipher its origins, dynamics, and consequences.

Several other forms of urban restructuring – such as mass suburbanization – continue to surpass gentrification in terms of the number of people involved, the amount of capital invested, and political significance. However, gentrification’s prominence in contemporary urban scholarship rests in some measure upon its role as a metaphor for the urban condition under modern capitalism. As in previous rounds of urban restructuring, city life is still perceived as being precariously balanced between the worst manifestations of capitalism – the breakdown of traditional family, social, and cultural structures, alienation, and intensifying racial and class polarization – and initiatives oriented towards urban renewal, preservation, creativity, and the “right to the city.”

SEE ALSO: Built Environment; Growth Machine; Invasion Succession; Public Housing; Uneven Development; Urban Community Studies; Urban Political Economy; Urban Renewal and Redevelopment; Urban Space

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Germani, Gino (1911–79)

Arturo Grunstein and Louise Barner

Gino Germani legitimately stands as one of the founding fathers of academic sociology in Latin America. From the start of his academic career, Germani affirmed the need to overcome the two “anti-positivist” dominant traditions in Latin American social analysis: abstract philosophical speculation and conceptually poor empiricism.

To many scholars, Germani was the pioneer and leading representative of structural functionalism and modernization theory in the region. Nevertheless, scholars have often missed the complexity of Germani’s work, particularly its rich theoretical eclecticism (including, among other influences, those of Max Weber, Durkheim, Parsons, Merton, Freud, Mannheim, and José Medina Echavarría) as well as its innovative empirical studies and comparative historical

sociological analyses of Latin American development. In the context of an ideologically polarized Argentina of the 1960s and 1970s, many of his contemporaries, particularly a younger generation of critical Marxian and *dependentista* scholars, singled him out as a stalwart defender of the capitalist status quo and a reactionary sociologist. However, from an early twenty first century post Cold War perspective, Germani emerges as an advocate of liberal democratic development.

Throughout most of his personal and professional life, Germani struggled against what he conceived as the retrograde forces of tradition and irrationalism including religious dogma, totalitarian fascism, authoritarian peronism, and left wing revolutionary extremism. He firmly believed that the promotion of a scientific study of society was part and parcel of the advancement of liberal democratic modernization, which he closely associated with the twin processes of secularization and rationalization.

Born in Rome in 1911, as a young man Germani participated in the opposition against Mussolini. As a result, he was jailed for almost a year. The experience of repression and incarceration was critical in the formation of his political and sociological ideas. One of his central concerns became the changing meaning of freedom in complex societies.

Shortly after being released from prison, Germani began taking classes at the University of Rome, studying economics and accounting. In addition to enrolling in courses, he read many of the great classic and then contemporary authors including Kant, Hegel, Marx, Pareto, Spencer, and Durkheim.

In 1934 Germani and his mother migrated to Argentina. While working as a mid level federal bureaucrat, he registered for classes at the University of Buenos Aires (UBA). In 1943, he concluded undergraduate studies in philosophy. By that time, he was already a researcher at the UBA's Institute of Sociology. However, his professional career was temporarily derailed with the rise to power of Juan Domingo Perón in 1946. Once established, the peronista fascist inspired regime embarked upon the persecution of opposition politicians and intellectuals. As part of this repressive campaign, Germani, along with other liberal

and antiperonista professors, was purged from the UBA. In response, Germani joined a group of other opposition scholars in establishing a private independent college, Colegio Libre de Estudios Superiores.

In 1955, Germani published his first book, *Estructura social de la Argentina*. This work constituted a landmark and a model of empirical research in Argentina and the rest of Latin America. In researching and writing *Estructura social*, Germani mainly utilized the national census of 1947. Arguing that the book could threaten "national security," peronista censors impeded its publication. Shortly after a coup d'état overthrew Perón, Germani returned to the University of Buenos Aires. In 1957, the Institute was complemented with the foundation of a sociology department. The late 1950s were a truly golden age for Germani as he became the nation's leading sociologist. With the sympathetic support of the Frondizi government and various US foundations, Germani garnered financial resources that enabled the Institute and department to recruit professors, train students, and bring prestigious guest lecturers from Europe and the US. He was also able to travel and enjoy short academic residences at Harvard, the University of Chicago, and the University of California at Berkeley, where he met and established solid links with several leading US sociologists, including Robert Merton, Seymour Martin Lipset, and Reinhard Bendix.

By the early 1960s, Germani's department and Institute came under heavy criticism from both the right and the left. The Catholic Right charged that sociology would undermine traditional beliefs about God, nation, and the family; the extreme left wing attacked Germani for accepting grants from "imperialistic" US foundations and adopting a "reactionary" structural functionalist perspective.

This irrational ideological polarization convinced Germani of the fragility of liberal democracy in Argentina and the inevitability of another military coup. He was quite prescient about his adopted country's debacle. Shortly after his arrival in the United States, another military coup ousted the constitutional government in June 1966. Germani spent most of the last years teaching at Harvard University. He died in his native Italy in 1979.

UNDERSTANDING THE
“TRANSITION”: THE
MODERNIZATION PROCESS
IN LATIN AMERICA

A review of Germani's publications immediately reveals that he held multiple sociological interests and had a diverse research agenda. Nonetheless, it also clearly evinces a central intellectual concern: Latin America's modernization process. He was particularly interested in identifying the social, political, cultural, and psychological factors intervening in the transition from “traditional” to “industrial” society. Thus, in his principal studies, Germani consistently pursued two fundamental and closely interrelated objectives: (1) the elaboration of a general or ideal typical model of the transition process from traditional to modern society and (2) the historical sociological and empirical analysis of this process in Latin America, paying central attention to the case of Argentina.

Germani's definition of *social structure* is akin to Parsons's: “a conjunction of different interrelated parts in which people act and interact in accordance with shared sociocultural codes and environmental conditions.” From the outset, Germani acknowledged the diversity of traditional and industrial societies and, more importantly, the existence of “various forms of transition from the former to the latter.” Still, he singled out three basic types of social change: (1) changes in the normative structure that regulate social action and their corresponding psychosocial or “internalized” attitudes; more specifically, he refers here to the dwindling of prescriptive forms of action and the gradual rise, extension, and prevalence of elective action; (2) increasing specialization of values and institutions; and (3) the institutionalization of change. Thus, Germani explained that modern industrial society is characterized by the secularization of knowledge, an increasingly complex division of labor based on efficiency criteria, and the transformation of family from extended to isolated nuclear units.

Nevertheless these changes take place in an *asynchronous* fashion. In other works there are lags and disequilibria between sectors and spheres. In his analysis of Latin American political development, Germani underlined one fundamental form of asynchronism – the

imbalance between social mobilization and integration. These two sociopolitical notions, mobilization and integration, are essential to understanding the transition and particularly the dynamics of intergroup conflict in the context of long term processes of social change.

Germani defined an integrated society as one in which reciprocal congruence prevails in the normative, psychosocial, and environmental spheres. In an integrated society the system and subsystems of norms, statuses, and roles correspond sufficiently to allow a relatively stable functioning of society. Individuals have also adequately internalized compatible sets of values, roles, and attitudes. Finally, the environmental context (including material and non material conditions) is well matched with actions based on predictions and expectations stemming from the dominant normative and psychosocial structures. Conversely, social “disintegration” takes place when norms, values, their internalization, and the context in which actions evolve lack adjustment.

In some cases this lack of adjustment produces a state of anomie, affecting group behavior and the functioning of formally established legal spheres. According to Germani, under conditions of unsuccessful integration, anomie may lead to irrational social action on behalf of both elite and popular groups. Anomic tendencies initially emerge only in limited spheres of the social structure but frequently spread to others in a domino effect. Therefore, anomic forces commonly threaten the stability of systems and subsystems and impede or delay the modernization of normative spheres and adequate civic behavior. Specifically regarding the political system, a state of anomie can be catastrophic, as social discontent may result in unmanageable conflicts and the rise of opportunistic authoritarian leaders.

For Germani “integrated society” was only an ideal type. Virtually all societies manifest varying degrees of “disintegration.” Since social change is almost always asynchronous it entails a certain measure of disintegration, or the loss of adjustment within and/or between the three – normative, psychosocial, and environmental – spheres.

Germani then focused on participation as one particular, albeit fundamental, aspect of social integration. In traditional societies participation is spatially limited to small areas,

economic activities take place in isolation, most community members do not partake in political decision making, and a majority are excluded from enjoying the material and non material fruits of general culture. In contrast, in industrial society, mass participation is found in most or all of these social activities.

Subsequently, Germani further distinguished between “integrated participation,” that is, under conditions of normative, psychosocial, and environmental congruence, and “disintegrated participation,” that is, without correspondence to what is normatively and psychosocially expected and what is possible, given the existing environmental context.

Disintegration in one of the three basic dimensions mentioned leads to what Germani denominated “disposability,” indicating that “the groups affected must notice the change and perceive it as an alteration which makes former prescriptions inapplicable.”

Based on these concepts, Germani elaborated a transition model for Latin America. The following discussion focuses on the sphere of political development, which Germani privileged in his analysis. In specific reference to sociopolitical changes, he identified several fundamental stages:

- Wars of liberation.
- Civil wars, *caudillismo*, anarchy.
- Unifying autocracy.
- Representative democracies of limited participation.
- Representative democracies of extended participation.
- Representative democracies of full participation.
- National popular revolutions (as an alternative to the three previous stages).

Germani was perfectly aware of the important limitations inherent in such a scheme. First and foremost, considerable national and even regional or subnational variations could be found. He explained, however, that his scheme was merely a starting ground that would necessarily undergo corrections and modifications on the evidence of individual cases. The three phenomena – mobilization, integration, and disposability – are central in his sociohistorical analysis.

The first generation of creole political elites attempted to build modern democratic nation states disregarding their societies’ deep seated traditional structures. The Latin American bourgeoisie were in an embryonic phase and the remaining groups and classes – a large majority of the population – were deeply enmeshed in traditional normative and psychological structures. In addition, the power vacuum following the collapse of the colonial authorities led to severe cultural and territorial isolation of most of the population.

Consequently, independence was followed by a second phase of territorial disarticulation, political anarchy, and civil wars between *caudillo* led factions. As charismatic authorities, *caudillos* enjoyed broad popular support, but they seldom altered the existing traditional social structures. In many nations, this period of chaos and violence concluded when one *caudillo* was able to defeat his rivals and emerge as a dominant political figure nationwide.

During the third stage, “unifying autocracy,” the basic sociocultural traditional structures persisted, but some dictators forcefully promoted economic modernization by opening up their nations to international markets as producers of primary goods, foreign capital investments especially for infrastructural development such as railroads and ports, and, in some countries, the influx of massive immigration.

During the fourth stage, democracy with limited participation, personal dictatorship was replaced with oligarchic rule. Even though only a minority of the population were allowed to participate, the rules of the political game were being gradually institutionalized. Economic modernization led to a dual structure: the rapid growth of modern infrastructure and export enterprises in central zones accelerated urbanization and the emergence of new middle and working classes. Meanwhile, most of the nation’s inhabitants remained trapped in traditional patterns characterized by subsistence agriculture, small isolated communities, and local authoritarian forms of domination. In most instances, these social sectors remained politically passive. This was partly as a result of oligarchic authoritarian exclusion, but, as Germani pointed out, it was mainly due to enduring traditional psychosocial factors. In some nations, the process of mobilization, especially of the urban middle sectors,

gradually led to an awakening of some sectors and the widening of the sphere of political participation.

The next stage, which Germani termed “extended participation,” dawned with the formation of an alliance between the strengthened middle classes and recently mobilized segments of the mostly urban working class, also undergoing rising expectations regarding their incorporation into the national political arena. In the most advanced countries of the region, these previously marginal groups were successfully integrated and their participation was institutionalized. While intergroup conflicts frequently erupted, these new legitimate popular members of the national polity increasingly accepted the existing rules of the game. Still, during this phase, broad sectors of the population, particularly those living in rural areas, remained excluded.

“Total participation,” the sixth and final phase, takes place when these residual groups are finally integrated. Germani devoted considerable attention to this last period. By the mid twentieth century, no Latin American country had successfully institutionalized mass political participation. Most nations, including the most developed ones, experienced knotty transition processes marked by unrelenting cycles of progressive democratization and authoritarian regression. Not even Argentina, which had moved dynamically from extended to total participation, had managed to build stable integrative mechanisms.

Why had Latin America been unable to complete the transition to fully participatory modern democracy? Why couldn’t Latin America match the transition patterns and eventually catch up with advanced western nations? Based on his theoretical and historical sociological scheme, Germani identified three principal causes.

The first factor was that significant structural differences – in norms, values, etc. – were found between Latin America and western societies. In effect, one could refer to the existence of both traditional and modern aspects in general, ideal typical terms. Still distinctive, deep seated historical specificities led to a “relative inapplicability (of a higher or lower degree depending on individual cases) of the western model” to analyze the transition in Latin America.

Although asynchronisms were, indeed, present in every transition process, they were more acute and widespread in late modernizing societies such as Latin America’s. The fact that modernization was late and often triggered by external forces generated intense demonstration and fusion effects. Consequently, the pattern of social change diverged significantly from the western experience. Not only were the rhythm and speed different, but also the sequence of the transition was altered. Thus, for instance, social mobilization leading to popular consumption demands and unionization often exceeded the development of the national economy’s productive capacity and a fluent internalization of socio structural change. In many western nations, the equilibrium of the social system at different stages “was assured by the fact that the population not yet included does not exert pressure (or, at least, not a dangerous degree of pressure) because it remains passive, and the sequence is such that when it later becomes active there should be existing mechanisms capable of channeling participation without catastrophic disturbances for the system (although obviously not without relatively sharp conflicts).” In contrast to the European experience, the extension of political rights in Latin America was taking place in a swift if not explosive fashion, giving almost no leeway to building effective institutional channels of participation and the internalizing of adequate civic values and attitudes by mobilized groups.

Compared to the US and most of Europe, the historical ideological “climate” was overall adverse to the assumption of liberal democratic institutions as mechanisms for mass integration. In most Latin American nations, extensive mobilization took off in the age of the “welfare state.” In advanced nations, the “welfare state” was the culmination of a protracted developmental process, including the evolution from proprietary to corporate capitalism. However, by the mid twentieth century, the ideal of social citizenship was universalized. Consequently, mobilized popular groups in economically and politically laggard nations, among those many Latin American nations, demanded the extension of social rights within a compressed point in time. Just as this occurred, World War I led to a prolonged crisis of liberal democracy and it was challenged by both right and left wing

authoritarian and totalitarian alternatives, offering new forms of sociopolitical integration. Although fascism was defeated in World War II, during the Cold War soviet communism became an increasingly powerful modernization model for many late developing countries, including Latin America's. Thus, "ideologies of industrialization" in Latin America often assumed a mix of authoritarian conservative nationalism and socialism. These movements and regimes, which Germani classified as national popular, were difficult to classify on conventional right-left criteria.

Germani emphasized that the appearance of national popular movements is what made Latin America's transition to extended and total participation distinct from the classical western liberal democratic path. Elites usually elaborated these doctrinal hybrids in order to manipulate and contain the pressures stemming from mass popular mobilization. These elites allowed lower strata participation only to the extent that it did not effectively threaten existing social structures. In the process of social integration, nationalist symbols, a powerful means to integrate widely diverse mobilized popular groups, replaced liberal democratic values and institutions. The traumatic process of transition from traditional to industrial society in most of Latin America explained, according to Germani, the tendency of certain popular sectors to support authoritarian (both left and right wing) movements and regimes. However, sooner or later, participation for broad sectors of the population revealed itself as "ersatz" or illusory, and not as a genuine process of politically institutionalized integration. Such was the case of peronism, which, for obvious reasons, Germani studied at great length.

From its origins, peronism had a close ideological affinity with fascism. However, in sociological terms, the peronista version differed markedly from its European counterpart. In Argentina's sociopolitical context, Perón could not find and recruit large scale support from a mobilized petty bourgeois sector seeking to shut off proletarian participation. Instead, Perón maneuvered to build a strong popular basis of support for himself, consisting mostly of the recently mobilized working classes that migrated to Buenos Aires and other large urban centers from the interior provinces. These previously

marginalized groups had experienced radical and sudden social changes within the span of approximately a decade. While General Perón ostensibly opened up the gates of the national public arena for these social groups, once incorporated he rigorously conditioned and limited their participation. Unionization was encouraged, important wage increases were granted, and working conditions improved. Labor enhanced its bargaining position vis à vis employers. Still, the authoritarian regime managed to keep a tight lid on popular organizations and their political activities and demands. In other words, Perón conceded to the workers, so long as it could be done without compromising his regime's statist authoritarian project. Most importantly, reforms were never geared toward real long term structural changes such as the establishment of steady channels of participation. On the contrary, they were often aimed at preventing them. Under Perón, the working masses had been partially integrated but not on the basis of modern, liberal democratic institutions.

Why, then, did the masses stubbornly support peronism? Herein lies what Germani referred to as the "irrationalism" of Argentinean popular political behavior.

A central factor was the swiftness of the transition, including the spatial movement from relatively stagnant rural zones to rapidly modernizing urban centers. Mobilized groups surpassed the capacity of available integration mechanisms, thus becoming "disposable." Moreover, these mobilized and disposable masses had only partially internalized modern values, norms, and attitudes. About 57 percent of these migrants arrived in Buenos Aires after 1938, and by 1947 a majority had come from the most backward provinces, measured in terms of literacy, employment, and poverty levels. Partially stuck to traditional normative and psychosocial structures and lacking a sophisticated political culture, they were susceptible to Perón's charismatic leadership and national popular blandishments.

Germani acknowledged that the new working classes certainly had important reasons to back Perón. It was undeniable that they had enjoyed both the material and psychic benefits of "peronista freedoms" (to organize in unions, to gain public recognition and even respect as

laborers, to improve their working conditions and consumption levels). Nevertheless, the historic costs of these concessions were high and consequential: in exchange for short term gains, the workers lost political and organizational independence, thus blocking the possibility of attaining durable channels of effective participation.

As events following Perón's downfall revealed, Argentina persistently faced insurmountable difficulties in attaining adequate integration of the mobilized masses. Consequently, conflicts often culminated in extensive violence. Building and maintaining a stable participatory political and social structure based on liberal democratic institutions became virtually hopeless.

It would be erroneous to underestimate Germani's scholarship. Despite serious adversities, he was the principal force behind the foundation of academic sociology in Argentina. His theses concerning the asynchronic mode of late modernization, the dynamics of social mobilization and structural change, and the sociological meaning of different manifestations of authoritarianism are now considered as fundamental points of analytical departure in Latin American studies.

His principal works should also have inspired a more ambitious research agenda in macro comparative Latin American historical sociology. Thus, for instance, Germani's critics often overlook his comments on our lack of sufficient empirical and historical knowledge regarding working class ideologies and political culture, and his enthusiastic calls for such investigations. Only then, he contended, will we be able to elaborate firmer arguments on changing popular attitudes toward authoritarian and populist leaders, movements, and regimes. Using one of Germani's own concepts, the "historical climate" of his times may have been unfavorable not only for liberal democratic modernization, but also for a more balanced and productive evaluation of his theoretical and empirical findings. As the twenty first century dawns, his intellectual and political concerns have gained tremendous pertinence for contemporary debates on the region's future. This is particularly so regarding the structural obstacles to liberal democracy in Latin America based on both morally and intellectually compelling questions about the societal underpinnings of freedom and oppression.

SEE ALSO: Authoritarianism; *Caudillismo*; Fascism; Fromm, Erich; Mannheim, Karl; Merton, Robert K.; Nation State and Nationalism; Parsons, Talcott; Populism; Structural Functional Theory

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gerontology

Jason L. Powell

Gerontology can be defined as the scientific and social analysis of aging. The discipline of gerontology is concerned with understanding age and aging from a variety of perspectives and integrating information from different social science and human science disciplines such as psychology and sociology. The concern of gerontology is in the definition and theorization of age. In western societies a person's age is counted on a chronological or numerical foundation, beginning from birth to

the current point of age, or when an individual has died. Chronological aging is a habit we all engage in: birthdays and wedding anniversaries, for example. Counting age is a social construction because it is a practice underpinned by the development of industrial capitalism.

Age has three main focal points of interest to gerontology. First, the aging of an individual takes place within a particular period of time and space. By virtue of this, individual experiences of age are enabled or constrained by their location in time, space, and cultural uniformity. Second, society has a number of culturally and socially defined expectations of how individuals of certain ages are supposed to behave and how aging impacts upon how they are compartmentalized into the "stages of life." Historically, the stages of life were presented as a religious discourse which formed the basis for the cultural expectations about behavior and appearance. The life stage model is still used in taken for granted popular usage in society, which impinges on how our lives are structured. Third, age and aging have a biological and physiological dimension, so that over time and space the appearance of physical bodies changes. This latter definition has been illustrated by "biomedical gerontology," advocating scientific explanations of aging.

Gerontology as a *scientific discipline* has been dominated with a preoccupation with biomedical sciences and its constituent elements of "decline" models of biology and psychology. Gerontology based on *social* explanatory models sees aging as a socially constructed category with differential epistemological prisms (e.g., functionalism and feminist gerontology). However, while both definitions are fundamental to the complexities of aging in the social world, the theoretical interpretations of aging are in their infancy when compared to the analysis and attention afforded to class, "race," and gender in sociological theorizing.

If we take the scientific and social dimensions of gerontology, we can illuminate both the relevance and importance they have for understanding constructions of aging. We can suggest that gerontology has two focal points in its broad conceptualization.

Psychological aging processes include changes in personality and mental functioning. According to Kunkel and Morgan (1999: 5), "changes

are considered a 'normal' part of adult development, some are the result of physiological changes in the way the brain functions." What is meant by "normal" development? The "decline" aspect of aging is something which was picked up by the historical rise of scientific discourse and Enlightenment discourses of truth and rationality. Indeed, age and aging have a biological and physiological dimension, so that over time and space the appearance of physical bodies changes. Physical aging, for the biomedical gerontology, is related to changing characteristics on the body: the graying of hair, wrinkling of the skin, decrease in reproductive capacity and cardiovascular functioning, etc. An interesting question is whether these physical changes are inevitable, "natural" consequences of aging.

Biological aging is related to changes of growth and decline within the human body. For example, Bytheway (1995) suggests that the notion of "growth" is a central scientific discourse relating to the true changes associated with human aging to the biological body. Growth is seen as a positive development by biologists in that a "baby" grows into a "child" who grows into an "adult," but then instead of growing into "old age" the person declines. This scientifically sanctioned perception is that growth "slows" when a person reaches "old age" and is subsequently interpreted as "decline" rather than as "change" that is taken for granted with earlier life course transitions.

The effects of the decline analogy can be seen in the dominance of biomedical arguments about the physiological "problems" of the "aging body." The "master narrative" of biological decline hides the location of a complex web of intersections of social ideas comprising an aging culture. Indeed, a distinctive contribution of sociology as a discipline has been to highlight how individual lives and behavior which were thought to be determined solely by biology (Powell 2005) are, in fact, heavily influenced by social environments in which people live and hence are heavily *socially constructed*.

The broad pedigree of sociological perspectives of aging can be located to the early post war years with the concern about the consequences of demographic change and the potential shortage of "younger" workers in the US and UK. Social gerontology emerged as a field of study which attempted to respond

to the social policy implications of demographic change (Phillipson 1982). Such disciplines were shaped by significant external forces: first, by state intervention to achieve specific outcomes in health and social policy; second, by a political and economic environment which viewed an aging population as creating a “social problem” for society.

This impinged mainly upon the creation of functionalist accounts of age and aging primarily in US academies. Functionalist sociology dominated the sociological landscape in the US from the 1930s up until the 1960s. Talcott Parsons was a key exponent of general functionalist thought and argued that society needed certain functions in order to maintain its well being: the stability of the family; circulation of elites in education drawing from a “pool of talent” (Powell 2005). Society was seen as akin to a biological organism: all the parts (education/family/religion/government) in the system working together in order for society to function with equilibrium.

A key point to note is that theories often mirror the norms and values of their creators and their social times, reflecting culturally dominant views of what should be the appropriate way to analyze social phenomena. The two functionalist theories contrasted here follow this normative pattern; *disengagement* and *activity* theories suggest not only how individual behavior changes with aging, but also imply *how* it should change. Disengagement theory is associated with Cumming and Henry (1961), who propose that gradual withdrawal of older people from work roles and social relationships is both an inevitable and natural process: “withdrawal may be accompanied from the outset by an increased preoccupation with himself: certain institutions may make it easy for him” (p. 14). Such withdrawal prepares society, the individual older person, and those with whom they had personal relationships for the ultimate disengagement: death. For this variant of functionalism, this process benefits society, since it means that the death of individual society members does not prevent the ongoing functioning of the social system. Cumming and Henry further propose that the process of disengagement as an inevitable, rewarding, and universal process of mutual withdrawal of the individual and society from each other with advancing age was normal and

to be expected. This theory argued that it was beneficial for both the aging individual and society that such disengagement takes place, in order to minimize the social disruption caused at an aging person’s eventual death.

Retirement is a good illustration of the disengagement process, enabling the aging person to be freed of the responsibilities of an occupation and to pursue other roles not necessarily aligned to full pay economic generation. Through disengagement, Cumming and Henry argued, society anticipated the loss of aging people through death and brought “new blood” into full participation within the social world.

A number of critiques exist: first, this theory condones indifference toward “old age” and social problems. Second, disengagement theory underplays the role cultural and economic structures have in creating, with intentional consequences, withdrawal. In order to legitimize its generalizations, disengagement theory accepted the objective and value free rigor of research methods: survey and questionnaire methods of gerontological inquiry. In a sense, arguing for “disengagement” from work roles under the guise of objectivity is a very powerful argument for governments to legitimize boundaries of who can work and who cannot based on age.

The second functionalist perspective in gerontology is called activity theory and is a counterpoint to disengagement theory, since it claims a successful “old age” can be achieved by maintaining roles and relationships. Activity theory actually predates disengagement theory and suggests that aging can be a lively and creative experience. Any loss of roles, activities, or relationships within old age should be replaced by new roles or activities to ensure happiness, value consensus, and well being. For activity theorists, disengagement is not a natural process as advocated by Cumming and Henry. For activity theorists, disengagement theory is inherently agist and does not promote in any shape or form “positive aging.” Thus, “activity” was seen as an ethical and academic response to the disengagement thesis and recast retirement as joyous and mobile.

Despite this, activity theory neglects issues of power, inequality, and conflict between age groups. An apparent “value consensus” may reflect the interests of powerful and dominant groups within society who find it advantageous to have age power relations organized in such a

way (Powell 2005). Such functionalist schools in gerontology are important in shaping social theory responses to them; such functionalist theories "impose" a sense of causality on aging by implying you will either disengage or will be active.

Marxist gerontology or the *political economy of old age* was coined as a critical response to the theoretical dominance of functionalism. This critical branch of Marxist gerontology grew as a direct response to the hegemonic dominance of structural functionalism in the form of disengagement theory, the biomedical paradigm, and world economic crises of the 1970s. As Phillipson (1982) pointed out in the UK, huge forms of social expenditure were allocated to older people. Consequently, not only were older people viewed by governments in medical terms, but also in resource terms. This brought a new perception to attitudes to age and aging. For example, in the US, political economy theory was pioneered via the work of Estes (1979). Similarly, in the UK, the work of Phillipson (1982) added a critical sociological dimension to understanding age and aging in advanced capitalist societies. For Estes (1979) in the US, the class structure is targeted as the key determinant of the position of older people in capitalist society. Estes's political economy challenges the ideology of older people as belonging to a homogeneous group unaffected by dominant structures in society.

A critical evaluation of the political economy of old age is that it over concentrates analysis on the treatment of older people in terms of class relations within capitalist societies and neglects differences between capitalist societies in the treatment of older people. The approach homogenizes and reifies older age by discounting potential for improvements in the social situation of older people. Hence, the complexity of social life is more of a continuous, never ending project with variable outcomes than the political economy theory allows.

Another emerging perspective is *feminist gerontology*. In recent years there has been a small but growing body of evidence that in mainstream sociological theory the interconnection of age and gender has been under theorized and overlooked. "Mainstream" refers to dominant theories in the gerontological field such as functionalist and Marxist theory that could be accused of being "gender blind." In their

pioneering work, Arber and Ginn (1995) point out there exists a tiny handful of feminist writers who take the topic of age seriously in understanding gender. They suggest that the general failure to incorporate women into mainstream theoretical perspectives on aging is a reflection of our resistance to incorporate women into society and hence into sociological and psychological research. They further suggest that because older women tend to occupy a position of lower class status (especially economic status) than men of all ages and younger women, they are given less theoretical attention.

In all known societies the relations of distribution and production are influenced by gender and thus take on a gendered meaning. Gender relations of distribution in capitalist society are historically rooted and are transformed as the means of production change. Similarly, age relations are linked to the capitalist mode of production and relations of distribution. "Wages" take on a specific meaning depending on age. For example, teenagers work for less money than adults, who in turn work for less money than middle aged adults. Further, young children rely on personal relations with family figures such as parents. Many older people rely on resources distributed by the state.

There is a "double standard of aging," with age in women having particularly strong negative connotations. Older women are viewed as unworthy of respect or consideration (Arber & Ginn 1995). The double standard is seen as arising from the sets of conventional expectations as to age pertinent attitudes and roles for each sex which apply in patriarchal society. These roles are defined as a male and a female "chronology," socially defined and sanctioned so that the experience of prescribed functions is sanctioned by disapproval. For example, male chronology hinges on employment, but a woman's age status is defined in terms of events in the reproductive cycle.

Unfortunately, feminist theories that focus upon the social problems of older people may have promoted the agism that many are arguing against. Old age as a term can no longer be used to describe and homogenize the experiences of people spanning an age range of 30 to 40 years. The pace of cohort differentiation has speeded up, with different age groups reflecting cohort differences in life chances that are created by

period specific conditions, policies, and economic transformations. Hence, there is differentiation of *subjective* experiences of aging in the lifestyles of older people.

As a reaction against macro theories of gerontology such as functionalism, political economy of old age, and feminist theorizing, postmodern gerontology has emerged as a school of thought. The work of Featherstone and Hepworth (1993) and Featherstone and Wernick (1995) is important in this respect, and has fed into wider debates on postmodernism in Canada and the US. They expose and deconstruct both the scientific gerontology and macro stances about old age, particularly claims of objectivity and truth about bodies. Featherstone and Hepworth (1993) maintain that old age is a mask that conceals the essential identity of the person beneath. That is, while the external appearance is changing with age, the essential identity is not, so that one may be surprised that one looks different than the unchanging image in one's head. Furthermore, Gilleard and Higgs (2001) claim that life course models that propose universal stages of life are fundamentally flawed. To exemplify the fluid and blurred nature of aging identity, Featherstone and Hepworth (1993) argue that in western society "children" are becoming more like adults and adults more childlike. There is an increasing similarity in modes of presentation of self – gestures and postures, fashions and leisure time pursuits – adopted by both parents and children. If correct, this can be seen as a move towards a uni age style. The "private sphere" of family life is becoming less private, as children are granted access to adult media such as television where previously concealed aspects of adult life (such as sex, death, money, and problems besetting adults who are anxious about the roles and selves they present to children) are no longer so easy to keep secret. A uni age behavioral style is also influenced by the advent of media imagery that, as a powerful form of communication, bypasses the controls that adults had previously established over the kinds of information believed to be suitable for children. Coupled with this, Katz (1996) and Powell (2005) have developed *Foucauldian* gerontology in analyzing power relations, surveillance, and governmentality in their applicability to understanding aging.

As a critique of postmodern gerontology and its emphasis on deconstructing universal narratives of aging, Phillipson (1998) suggests that in a restructuring of social gerontology we should acknowledge how the "global" and the "local" articulate and recognize that globalization is unevenly distributed and is also a western phenomenon indicative of the unequal power relations between the "west and the rest." Phillipson suggests that occidental globalization impinges on the poverty status of older people universally.

Gerontology is then multidisciplinary and is the principal instrument of orthodox theorizing about human aging. It provides a space for the search for meaning about what it is to be "old" in modern society, not for issuing prescriptions but for alternative interpretations about aging.

SEE ALSO: Aging and the Life Course, Theories of Aging and Social Policy; Aging, Sociology of; Childhood; Demography of Aging; Gender; Gerontology: Key Thinkers; Marxism and Sociology; Postmodernism

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gerontology: key thinkers

All subfields in sociology have their own key figures beyond the more generally influential people discussed throughout this Encyclopedia. In this entry, several of the key figures (Beth Hess, Donald Kent, Mathilda White Riley, Ethel Shanas, and Donald Spence) in the history of the study of issues relating to gerontology are discussed. – GR

Hess, Beth (1928 2003)

Elizabeth W. Markson

The many scholarly contributions of Beth (Bowman) Hess to the field of sociology include those to the subfields of aging and the life course, gender studies, and friendship and its relationship to age cohort. Hess brought to her work intellectual curiosity, breadth of knowledge, analytic powers, impeccable editing and writing ability, and lack of pretentiousness.

The only child of upper middle class parents, Hess attended private elementary and high schools in Buffalo, New York and received her BA degree in 1950 from Radcliffe College *magna cum laude*, where she majored in government. After a brief interlude as a file clerk in a New York City advertising agency, she and her new husband, Dick Hess, moved to Paris. Returning in the mid 1950s to New Jersey where she lived for the rest of her life, she became, as she later described it (Hess 1995), temporarily enveloped in the *zeitgeist* of suburban motherhood. When her younger child entered kindergarten in 1962, Hess entered the graduate sociology program at Rutgers University. While a doctoral candidate working with Matilda White Riley, she began research on the sociology of aging, age stratification, and friendship, compiling the massive inventory of research findings in the first volume (1968) and editing each chapter of all three volumes of *Aging and Society*.

Her doctoral dissertation (1971) laid the basis for her seminal article, "Friendship" (1972). Hess examines how age influences friendship types developing between friends at various ages, whom one has as a friend, conditions in which friendships form, dissolve, or persist, and how friendships contribute both directly and indirectly to socialization throughout the life course. Age, a cohort attribute as well as indicator of life stage, signifies a common history that adds to friendship homophily as members of a friendship pair age

together, sharing the same sequence of life stages and historical events.

When Hess published her formulations on friendship, little research attention had been given to the topic and it was regarded more as a residual category rather than a major role. Indeed, Hess herself initially contrasted friendship with "major" social roles, and wrote her last full explication on friendship studies in 1979. Her work, however, prepared the way for a spate of interest on the import of social support, especially in later life. Subsequently, gerontologists have examined size of social networks, structure and process of friendships, and relationship to well being. The importance of gender for friendship roles—a theme highlighted by Hess in her later work both on aging and gender—has also become salient.

In 1969 Hess joined the full time faculty of the County College of Morris, where she was a professor until her retirement in 1997. Her decision to accept a position in a community college, largely governed by compatibility with family obligations and geographical convenience, could have been the entry into safe obscurity had she not had a strong commitment to advancement of the discipline. Drawing attention to race, class, gender, and social inequities before it was sociologically fashionable to do so, her contributions include textbooks such as *Aging and Old Age* (Hess & Markson 1980), the five editions of *Sociology* (Hess et al. 1996), and *The Essential Sociologist* (Hess et al. 2001). The first two editions of her reader *Growing Old in America* (1976, 1980) were published when courses in social gerontology were relatively new in college and university curricula and, like later editions (1985, 1991), carefully examined the current state of knowledge about later life. As a social gerontologist, Hess urged readers, whether colleagues or students, toward the essence of the sociological imagination: connections between personal problems and public issues and the interplay of race, class, and gender with the life course.

With a firm grounding in theory encompassing both often forgotten early feminist sociologists such as Harriet Martineau and Charlotte Stetson Perkins Gilman and the more usual male pantheon of Durkheim, Marx, Simmel, Weber, and others Hess was remarkably up to date on the latest findings and events. Whether scholarly books or journal articles, popular news articles, the most recent census data, or other government reports, she had not only read them, but also synthesized complex and often contradictory materials into a meaningful, sophisticated sociological argument, expressed with semantic precision. As a feminist scholar, she emphasized how gender organizes social arrangements, personality, and cognition. *Controversy and Coalition: Three Decades of the Feminist Movement* (three editions, Ferree & Hess 2000), *Analyzing Gender* (Hess & Ferree 1987), and *Revisioning Gender* (1998) illuminate the many ways in which feminist scholarship has transformed the social sciences.

Central to the governance and organization of many scholarly associations, Hess was executive officer of the Eastern Sociological Society, president of the Association for Humanist Sociology, Sociologists for Women in Society, the Eastern Sociological Society, and the Society for the Study of Social Problems (1994-5), secretary of the American Sociological Association (1989-92), and chair of the Behavioral and Social Science Section of the Gerontological Society of America. Listed in *Who's Who of American Women*, her scholarly contributions were recognized by the Lee Founders Award presented by the Society for the Study of Social Problems and as a Fellow of the Gerontological Society of America.

The many honors she received and offices held in sociological organizations are but a small token of her readiness to give her time and energy to advance the field. Amid her ability to balance the mastery of material, to write rapidly, coherently, and eloquently, to be active in the profession, and to mentor others, was her passion for integrity and justice reaching beyond the academy. As a feminist, she was dedicated not only to equality for women, but also a political activist and fierce defender of *all* human rights. Above all, Beth Hess was a passionate sociologist—passionate about clear and elegant writing, passionate about intellectual integrity, and passionate about the human condition. Her work, cross cutting many

venues from general sociology to the sociology of aging and feminist theory, reflects these passions.

SEE ALSO: Aging and Social Support; Gender, Aging and; Gender, Friendship and

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Kent, Donald P. (1916-72)

Jon Hendricks

Donald P. Kent, a key figure in social gerontology, was both a sociologist and government official who helped ensure passage of the Older Americans Act and was instrumental in establishing the Administration on Aging. Born in Philadelphia, Kent received degrees from Pennsylvania State

University (1940) and Temple (1945), and his PhD from the University of Pennsylvania (1950). Following his undergraduate degree, Kent taught high school and declared himself a conscientious objector during World War II. While working on his dissertation, published as *The Refugee Intellectual* (1953), Kent served as an instructor at Penn and subsequently joined the sociology faculty (1950-7) at the University of Connecticut before becoming director of its Gerontology Center (1957-61).

While in the latter role Kent also chaired the Connecticut Commission on Services for Older Persons and in that capacity was not only a vocal advocate but also acceded to high profile involvements in the federal government's emerging concern with aging issues. Kent was instrumental in planning the first White House Conference on Aging (1961) and led the Connecticut delegation. Nominated by Senator Abraham Ribicoff, patron and sponsor, to become director of what was to become the Administration on Aging, Kent ran into a maelstrom over his status as a conscientious objector. Subjected to ringing personal derision, Kent was on the verge of withdrawing until Ribicoff convinced him to stay the course. In 1961 he became special assistant to the US Secretary of Health, Education, and Welfare and vice chairman of President John F. Kennedy's Council on Aging. As director of the US Office on Aging (1961-5), later renamed Administration on Aging, Kent worked tirelessly behind the scenes and on the hill to ensure passage of the Older Americans Act. Present at the Rose Garden signing of the OAA by President Lyndon Johnson, Kent's direct involvement in pressing the federal government's aging agenda was also drawing to a close. As he had previously, he continued to provide briefings for federal, state, and local governments on aging issues, and remained involved in study sections for NICHHD, but longed to return to academia. In 1965 he was named chair, department of sociology and anthropology, at Pennsylvania State University, a position he occupied until his death. Kent's verve, statesmanship, and craft were invaluable during the arduous process leading to the implementation of the Older Americans Act and were characteristics that served him well throughout his governmental and academic service.

A firm believer in what would later be termed "action research," Kent was intent on bridging the gulf between social research and policy

formulation. He personified Cicero's admonition that "virtue without action is meaningless" and in research project after research project his agenda was to train and utilize indigenous staff, use them as a kind of "kitchen cabinet," and set them up for further employment. As part of a major study of inner city minority elderly in Philadelphia, Kent and colleagues implemented a volunteer referral service suggested by field staff not content to walk away from interviewees once unmet needs had been identified. Without cost to the funding agency an intervention network was implemented, as disembodied research was an anathema. Kent, Kastenbaum, and Sherwood's *Research, Planning and Action for the Elderly: The Power and Potential of Social Science* (1972) provides a comprehensive summary and prescription for action research on behalf of older persons and stands as a how to guide for generations of gerontologists.

Once back in academia Kent assumed editorship of the *Gerontologist* (1967-70) and took as his personal missions the mentoring of would be authors and the premise that outcomes of social research need to include practical and pragmatic implications. He utilized the occasion of his last publication to digest recommendations of the 1971 White House Conference on Aging in terms of whether they would directly benefit older persons or simply fuel the bureaucracy. He also stressed the need for robust and appropriate research methodologies to buttress policy recommendations and cautioned researchers about looking at real world experiences through a lens ground to their own specifications.

In recognition of Kent's many contributions, the Gerontological Society of America implemented the prestigious Donald P. Kent Award to recognize gerontologists embodying the highest standards of the field through teaching, service, and interpretation of gerontology to the larger society. The Kent Award remains one of the most prestigious recognitions a gerontologist may receive.

SEE ALSO: Action Research; Gerontology

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Riley, Matilda White (1911-2004)

Anne Foner

In her long and productive career Matilda White Riley devoted much of her scholarly work to setting forth and elaborating a sociology of age. This work followed her achievement as an innovative methodologist and her research on mass communications (with her husband, John Riley, Jr.), adolescent values, and family relations. The methodological sophistication and the interconnections between methods and theory that characterized this early work served to underpin her study of age as a social phenomenon. Her analysis of aging and society gave new understandings to a "taken for granted" phenomenon and helped establish the sociology of age as a key substantive field in the discipline.

Riley embarked on an academic career in sociology at New York University and Rutgers in 1950. Before that she had had a top position in market research, where she honed her skills in all aspects of survey research. When she started teaching research methods to sociology students she went beyond a narrow conception of methodology to demonstrate the interplay of theory and research and to explore the full range of quantitative and qualitative methods. This broad approach was elaborated in her 2 volume *Sociological Research* (1963), which examined how the conceptual framework of key classical studies was translated into empirical operations. In the process, she gave students a sweeping overview of some of the most significant sociology then available.

Riley turned her attention to the study of aging and society in the 1960s when she was commissioned to codify social science knowledge about the middle and later years. The project resulted in the monumental 3 volume *Aging and Society* (1968-72). It provided a synthesis of the considerable body of relevant research and in the process

identified methodological fallacies that had contributed to myths about old age and aging. In volume 3 it set forth an overarching analytical framework for understanding age as an element in the social structure and aging over the life course as influenced by and in turn influencing changes in the society.

In Riley's view human aging is a lifelong, complex, mutable process, shaped by social, psychological, and biological interdependencies. People in successive cohorts grow up and grow older in different ways as societies and their social structures undergo change. While the aging of individuals over the life course and historical changes in society are intertwined, these two dynamic processes have different rhythms, leading to pressures for structural changes, including changes in age criteria for filling roles, for access to social goods, and for social relationships.

These fundamental ideas of the *Aging and Society* paradigm became widely influential as Riley developed them in numerous publications and lectureships, in her roles as university professor, as president of the American Sociological Association and the Eastern Sociological Society, and as first associate director for Behavioral Sciences Research at the National Institute on Aging, where she initiated funded research on social and behavioral aspects of the aging process. As an exemplar and mentor she helped launch new scholars in the study of age and aging. Her contributions to the biosocial sciences have been recognized by many awards, including honorary degrees from Radcliffe, Rutgers, and the State University of New York, and election to the National Academy of Sciences. She continued to make contributions to and receive accolades from the discipline in her ninth decade.

SEE ALSO: Aging, Demography of; Aging and the Life Course, Theories of; Aging, Sociology of; Life Course Perspective

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Shanas, Ethel (b. 1914)

Gloria D. Heinemann

Born in Chicago, Ethel Shanas received her education from the University of Chicago. After receiving her doctorate in sociology, she remained at the University of Chicago as Research Associate/Instructor, Committee on Human Development (1947-52) and as Senior Study Director, National Opinion Research Center and Research Associate, Department of Sociology (1956-61). From 1965 to 1982, when she retired, she was Professor, Department of Sociology, University of Illinois at Chicago (UIC) and, beginning in 1973, Professor, School of Public Health, UIC Medical Center. Throughout her career, Shanas, who was a wife and mother, successfully combined a meaningful career and family life during a period when women had few supports for career development and advancement.

The courses Shanas taught at UIC exemplify her major areas of interest and contribution to sociology: medical sociology and sociology of aging, which included considerable material about aging, health, and long term care. She used the social survey to inquire about older persons, their families and intergenerational relationships, family help patterns, living arrangements, health status and incapacity, financial status, and work and retirement. These studies provided baseline data that debunked myths about and presented accurate portrayals of older persons living in the community. One of the major contributions from her research was the development of the Index of Incapacity.

Shanas also was a consultant to numerous international, governmental, and local university and community agencies and committees. Major

contributions resulted from her consultations, such as the Long Term Care Minimum Data Set and the National Institute on Aging. Other major contributions of Shanas include her service to professional organizations and her service on the editorial boards of professional journals. Much of her work was multidisciplinary and multicultural. This collaborative effort is evident in the research project and resulting book, *Old People in Three Industrial Societies* (Shanas et al. 1968) and in the two editions of the *Handbook of Aging and the Social Sciences* (Binstock & Shanas 1976, 1985), which presents perspectives from a broad array of social sciences.

Shanas was elected a Fellow of the American Sociological Association and the Gerontological Society of America. She was the Keston Memorial Lecturer at the University of Southern California (1972) and received GSA's Kleemeier Award (1977), the National Council on Family Relations' Burgess Award (1978), the GSA's Brookdale Award (1981), the American Sociological Association, Section on Aging's Distinguished Scholar Award (1987), and an honorary doctor of letters degree from Hunter College (1985). In 1979 she was elected to membership in the Institute of Medicine, National Academy of Sciences.

SEE ALSO: Aging, Sociology of; Aging and Health Policy; Aging and Social Policy; Aging and Social Support; Elder Care; Family Theory; Intergenerational Relationships and Exchanges; Kinship; Medical Sociology; Survey Research

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Spence, Donald L. (1930–89)

Victor W. Marshall

Donald L. Spence stands as a major influence in the sociology of aging and in the area of gerontology education. His 1965 doctoral dissertation at the University of Oregon, under Robert Dubin, was on retirement, and aging remained his lifelong passion. A member of the American Sociological Association continuously from 1959 and of the Society for the Study of Symbolic Interaction from 1977 until his death, he contributed effectively to an interdisciplinary field while maintaining a strong theoretical position as a sociologist and influencing many sociologists in the aging field.

Spence had a lasting impact on many sociologists working in the substantive area of aging. This was more as a mentor and role model than through his specific substantive research. He brought intellectual rigor and a commitment to theory to his own research, most of which was quite applied in nature, but mostly he is remembered for his commitment to theory and his mentorship of young investigators.

While “ABD,” Spence began teaching in 1962 in a new sociology department at the University of Alberta, Calgary, but he returned to his native California in 1965 to conduct aging research at the Langley Porter Neuropsychiatric Institute. There, he directed the Human Development Training Program in the department of psychiatry at the University of California, San Francisco. In 1973 he moved to the University of Rhode Island as associate professor, department of child development and family relations and coordinator of that university’s Program in Gerontology. He became director of the Program in Gerontology at the University of Rhode Island in 1976, professor of gerontology in 1982, and professor emeritus in 1989. During his period at URI he was also adjunct associate professor in community health at Brown University, where he served as founder and first director of the Southeastern New England Long Term Care Gerontology Center.

Spence left a multifaceted legacy. He was a dedicated and enthusiastic teacher, with a passionate and rigorous commitment to sociological theory. Initially, he could be characterized as a functionalist, and he also took pains to ensure that his students were well grounded in the philosophy of the social sciences. While at University of

California San Francisco he became a close friend of Anselm Strauss and formed a strong commitment to symbolic interactionism. His shift in perspective led to vigorous theoretical disagreements and his departure from the “Four Stages of Life” project, on which he was a project coordinator for several years. His commitment to theory inspired a small, informal grouping of sociologists who wanted to see a more theorized approach to gerontology and led to an increased appreciation of theory among gerontologists.

Spence’s later publications and papers focused on interdisciplinary health care teams and other aspects of care of the elderly, as well as on gerontological education. He was a founding member of the Association for Gerontology in Higher Education in 1974, served on every committee of that association and was its president (1982–3). He thus played an important role in the shaping of gerontology education during its major era of expansion. He was also a Fellow of the Gerontological Society of America.

SEE ALSO: Aging, Sociology of; Aging and the Life Course, Theories of; Symbolic Interaction

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ghetto

Joanna Michlic

The term ghetto is a concept with many meanings. It is frequently used to describe any dense areas of Jewish residence, even if no compulsory policies of residential segregation were imposed. It is also employed as a description of the geographical and social isolation of minorities other than Jews; for example, it is applied to African Americans and other ethnic communities in the US and to minorities in Japan such as ethnic Koreans. Scholars recognize that the term has assumed a life of its own

since its first application and have called for systematic examination of the history of its changing meaning from the time it was first used in connection with Jews until the present (Ravid 1992).

Originally, the term referred to the establishment of a compulsory segregated Jewish quarter, ghetto or *ghetti* in pre Enlightenment Europe. Although compulsory, segregated, and enclosed Jewish quarters had existed prior to 1516 in a few cities in Europe such as Frankfurt, the first involuntarily segregated quarter called a ghetto was established in Venice in that year. The Venetian government, motivated by utilitarian economic considerations of *raison d'état*, granted Jews charters, which allowed them to live in Venice. However, it required that as infidels Jews be kept in their place, both to demonstrate their inferiority for Christian theological reasons, and more practically, to restrict as much as possible social contacts, including sexual interaction, between them and the local Christian population. To ensure the complete segregation of Jews, the area allocated for their residence was walled up and the Christian owners of the dwellings within it were required by the Venetian government to evict their local Christian tenants. This was the first instance of a segregated compulsory quarter for Jews in a walled up form. The Venice ghetto existed for the next 281 years and was abolished in the early summer of 1797 in the aftermath of the dissolution of the Venetian government.

The term ghetto derives from the Italian word *gettare* (to pour or cast metal). The word was originally used to describe the old ghetto (*Ghetto vecchio*) and the new ghetto (*Ghetto nuovo*) for Jews in Venice. Both these quarters were located in the area where the municipal copper foundry was previously based. Subsequently, the term has been used loosely and imprecisely in Jewish history and sociology. The varied usages in different senses have created a certain blurring of the historical reality, especially when the term is used in phrases such as “age of the ghetto,” “out of the ghetto,” and “ghetto mentality,” which are often applied to the Jewish experience in Central and Eastern Europe in the seventeenth, eighteenth, and nineteenth centuries (Ravid 1992). The term in the original Italian sense of a compulsory, segregated, and walled up Jewish quarter cannot be

used to describe the Jewish experience in Eastern Europe because the history of Jewish residence there lacks the main characteristic of the Italian ghetto. If the word ghetto is to be applied in its original literal sense in connection with Eastern Europe, then it must be asserted that the ghetto arrived there only during the German occupation of the region in World War II. However, unlike those Italian ghettos of the Counter Reformation era, which were designed to provide Jews with a clearly defined, permanent position in Christian society, the ghettos established in German occupied Eastern Europe constituted a stage in the Nazi anti Jewish policies, which culminated in the genocide of European Jewry.

The concept of the ghetto as a closed premodern environment that isolated Jews from the rest of society also had a major impact on early scholarly attempts to understand the forces that held together ethnic neighborhoods of European immigrants in American society in the early twentieth century. In 1928 the Chicago sociologist Louis Wirth published *The Ghetto*, in which he compared the Chicago ghetto – the voluntarily established Jewish immigrant neighborhood on Chicago’s Westside – to the medieval Frankfurt Jewish quarter. Wirth assumed that Jewish immigrants in Chicago moved into a certain ethnocultural space because the centuries of separate settlement in Europe had imprinted the “ghetto experience” on the Jewish mind. Drawing on his mentor Robert Park, Wirth saw a correlation between the assimilation of immigrants and their residential mobility. For him, the Chicago ghetto was a passageway in time and space from premodern European ghettos into mainstream American society. Jeffrey Gurock (1979) dismisses Wirth’s thesis about the ghetto like pattern of settlement of Jewish immigrants in the US.

The idea of the ghetto has also often been applied to describe the African American experience in different geographical localities of the US between 1900 and the 1960s. The African American ghetto is a creation of the early twentieth century and its historical origins are linked to the large scale black migration to cities such as Chicago and Detroit. The African American ghetto is the result of the forces of racial segregation. Although the US Supreme Court banned explicit zoning by race in 1917,

by 1920 the color line in Northeastern cities had been fully established. The reinforcement of ethnic and racial barriers was not limited only to anti black initiatives in Northern US cities. The South had created its vast array of Jim Crow laws at the end of the nineteenth century. In the West, whites also used restrictive covenants against Asians. African American segregation in ghettos – inner city communities such as Harlem in New York – continued to rise until it reached its peak in the 1960s. The abolition of legal restrictions in the 1960s meant that barriers that were needed to keep areas white were gone. However, this process has not resulted in the end of the African American ghetto. African American ghettos have not become any less black. The persistence of subtle forms of barriers and economic factors are cited in scholarly and public discussions about the persistence of the African American ghettos in contemporary North American cities (Glasser 1997).

In recent scholarly literature the concept of the ghetto has been linked to the ideal of multiculturalism. Kymlicka (2001), for example, argues that the ideal of multiculturalism in Canada encouraged the idea that immigrants should form “self contained ghettos” alienated from the mainstream. He calls this process ghettoization, which may mark the latest manifestation of the concept in the social sciences.

SEE ALSO: Diaspora; Genocide; Holocaust; Multiculturalism; Urban Community Studies; Urbanism, Subcultural Theory of

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gift

Rodanthi Tzanelli

The concept of the gift has been explored by anthropologists, philosophers, sociologists, and social theorists, who recognized in it a heuristic tool for the study of kinship relations, exchange and reciprocity, and interconnections of power, economics, and morality. In all these cases the gift can assume the form of tangibles (material items such as artifacts or human beings) and intangibles (ideas, religious rituals, or titles).

Marcel Mauss's *The Gift* (1954) is considered the seminal work in this area, both because of its theoretical coherence and its plethora of ethnographic material. Mauss identified the practice of gift exchange as a universal phenomenon that exemplifies the pervasiveness of a sense of obligation in all societies, archaic and modern. He claimed that the nature of gift exchange is reciprocal; such exchange involves both individuals and groups (clans, families) that establish social relations and reproduce themselves through the act of giving and receiving. Controversially, Mauss claimed that the gift itself compels and ensures reciprocation, simply because the gift owner and the gift cannot be separated: the object received as a gift binds the giver and the recipient with a moral force. Therefore, to reciprocate becomes for the recipient obligatory insofar as the violation of reciprocation can lead to magical repercussions. The obligation of giving gifts and reciprocating them forms the basis of the archaic “system of total services” that aims to establish alliances (e.g., marrying one's daughter into another clan to secure friendly relations, offering military titles to an ally) or to seal rival relations. The latter is encapsulated in the potlatch (meaning “to consume”) tradition of Nootka Indians, in which competitors for social titles organize festivities and waste or distribute possessions to claim superiority. For Mauss, therefore, the practice of gift giving

has an inherently ambiguous nature that encompasses both self interest and selflessness, calculation and moral obligation.

These two types of gift giving have been reconceptualized by Marshal Sahlins and Karl Polanyi as reciprocity (gift giving for alliance) and redistribution (potlatch). Following Mauss's idea of "total services," they purported that reciprocal and redistributive exchange relations between two groups are continuous rather than separate in societies characterized by social differentiation. Whereas reciprocity regulates exchange between parties with different interests, redistribution is applied to the collective as a whole, as it is regulated by a central authority (e.g., the chief of a tribe) (Sahlins 1972). This argument presents redistribution as a more advanced, politicized form of gift giving that ensures social bonding in centralized communities, whereas reciprocity is viewed as a rationalized system of exchange that functionalizes gift giving. Bataille (1988) criticizes this dominant economic assumption as much as he rejects the idea that humans have a natural inclination to produce and save. His starting point is that human nature is inherently greedy and favors destruction and consumption. Social solidarity is thus secured through rituals that celebrate waste and go against the logic of social differentiation through wealth. To consolidate his thesis Bataille used as an example Aztec sacrificial offers and the potlatch ceremonies of American Indians, which are characterized by excessive waste of resources that could, according to the economic logic, be appropriated. For Bataille, this uncontrolled expenditure secures the situational power of the giver, which can, in turn, be challenged by reciprocal expenditure by the initial recipient. Generosity here is not inseparable from strategic calculation, but they form a continuum inherent in the "general economy" of giving (as opposed to the "restricted economy" of saving).

An empirically grounded approach to the gift in contemporary welfare provision was pioneered by Titmuss. Titmuss (1970) conducted a comparative study of the British and the American blood supply system, attempting to answer a fundamentally moral question: How is it possible for people to donate blood to strangers? Highlighting the difference between the British system, in which donation

is a voluntary act, and the American system, in which giving blood is formally remunerated, he argued for the superiority of morally bound forms of giving that stem from altruism, as opposed to those subjected to the laws of the market. Although situated in social and administration studies, Titmuss's research did not deviate from former anthropological studies that examined gift giving as a moral obligation. In a similar vein, Zelizer (1978) explored changing perceptions of life insurance in the American context. The initial commercialization of this service, and its presentation in monetary terms ("buying" life insurance for someone, subjecting life to the laws of economic transaction), was not welcomed by Americans. It was only when life insurance was presented as a way in which one can express care for one's family or spouse (by continuing to provide for the loved ones even after one's death) that hostile American attitudes towards this service subsided. According to Zelizer, the shift was enabled by the dissociation of life insurance from market exchange, and its presentation as a gift, a sacred offer that cannot be reciprocated by the living ones.

A thorough exploration of the gift's potential to restore collective bonding was offered by Berking (1999). Berking reconsidered the meaning of the gift and the messages of power, duty, and status that it communicates through an extensive excursus in anthropological and sociological theory. By exploring historical conceptions of the sacrifice, sharing, and giving as the basic institutions on which archaic societies were based, he attempts to reconcile modern self interest with the archaic ideal of communal good. Operating within the confines of the longstanding Durkheimian tradition, Berking argues for a moral economy that surpasses the market rationale and promotes the altruistic ideal.

SEE ALSO: Bataille, Georges; Durkheim, Émile; Gift Relations; Kinship; Moral Economy; Recognition

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gift relations

Craig D. Lair

Though the study of gift relations spans a range of intellectual disciplines (e.g., anthropology, ethnology, and sociology), one general theme has tended to unite the diverse works in these areas: more than being simply matters of economic transactions, gifts and gift giving are fundamentally *social* activities. That is, gifts are not exchanges of mere material objects, but rather objects and actions imbued with social meanings. Thus, to engage in a gift relationship is to engage in a *social relationship*.

The social nature of gift relations is a central theme found in the work that is often considered as being seminal in the study of gifts and gift exchange: Marcel Mauss's *The Gift* (2000). Mauss, drawing upon ethnographic data from Oceanic and Native American societies, as well as "ancient" legal and economic systems (e.g., Roman law), sees gift exchanges as a force that both engenders and sustains social solidarity. As Mary Douglas says in her introduction to *The Gift*: "A gift that does nothing to enhance solidarity is a contradiction" (p. vii). In part this is because, though gift giving appears as a voluntary action, it is in fact socially obligatory and socially regulated. In the study of gift exchanges in "archaic" societies, Mauss finds three obligations inherent in the gift giving process: to give gifts, to receive gifts, and to

reciprocate gifts given, often with "interest" (i.e., to give more than one has received). To refuse to engage in this process (i.e., to not give or receive) is "tantamount to declaring war" because gift exchanges are not simple economic transactions between individuals, but rather a "total service" – an activity that is a mixture of moral, juridical, economic, spiritual, religious, and social structural elements that is collectively carried out. To not engage in gift giving activities is to reject the whole of a society – its thoughts, beliefs, and entire worldview. However, to participate in this cycle of gifts and counter gifts, a cycle that once established is seemingly self-perpetuating, and thus one that acts to bind social groupings together over time, is to be engaged with, and intertwined in, the whole of a society. As such, the obligatory nature of gift giving acts to bind individuals and groups together in social relationships that are sustained over time and in this way they are mechanisms of social solidarity.

The social nature of gift exchanges has been a theme that has been picked up by most of those who have studied gift relations after Mauss. For Bataille (1989), gift exchange, in the form of the potlatch or competitive gift giving, was a means to obtain honor. That is, it was a means by which one could secure *social* status. Baudrillard (1993), before making his postmodern turn, saw in "symbolic exchanges" a non-acquisitive cycle of gifts and counter gifts, a radical alternative to both capitalism and socialism (both, in Baudrillard's mind, rested upon the same logic of production and utility, the only difference being how the fruits of this labor were distributed). Thus, for a time, Baudrillard saw in the gift relations of past and non-western societies a means by which modern *social* relations could be reordered in a fundamentally different manner. Helmut Berking, in his *Sociology of Giving* (1999), argues that modern individualism encourages not only self-centered views but also, and paradoxically so, altruistic values. Thus, for Berking, a "solidarity of individualism" is not incompatible with notions of charity and giving. Rather, individualism is a means by which these values can be given greater prevalence in social life.

From the early studies by Mauss, to more contemporary works exploring gift giving in modern times, one general theme has remained

the same: gifts, above and beyond any economic value they may have, are elements of a social exchange. Thus, to engage in a gift relationship is, at the same time, to engage in a social one as well.

SEE ALSO: Bataille, Georges; Gift

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Gilman, Charlotte Perkins (1860–1935)

Michael R. Hill

Charlotte Perkins Gilman was an influential and sometimes controversial contributor to early American sociology. Her *Women and Economics* (1898) launched a searching feminist sociological critique of the economic position of women in patriarchal societies. The primary site for Gilman's continuing sociological work was the *Forerunner* (1909–16), a monthly journal that Gilman wrote and self published. The socially problematic issues that Gilman explored in her works echo theoretical proposals of Lester F. Ward (1841–1913), a founding American sociologist who admired Gilman and vice versa. Ward's concept of gynocentric (i.e., woman centered) social theory reinforced Gilman's strong belief in the fundamental rationality of women's values and social contributions. Gilman developed this perspective at length in her non fiction works. Gilman was an early

member of the American Sociological Society, published in the *American Journal of Sociology*, was respected by contemporary sociologists, and was widely known by lay readers in the public generally.

Gilman shared the feminist pragmatist tenet, that women's values make for better societies, in common with American sociologist Jane Addams (1860–1935). Antecedent to Gilman's sprightly *Herland* saga is Addams's witty and biting essay, "If Men Were Seeking the Franchise" (1913). Addams, a friend and colleague of Gilman, described a hypothetical society of men and women in which women dominate the populace and have the political power to deny men the right to vote. Addams whimsically concluded that men cannot be allowed to share in government until they abandon their selfish and destructive ideas.

Gilman's *Herland* (1915), set in a fictional utopia populated only by women, is the first half of an accessible sociological critique of American life. *Ourland* (1916) continues and completes the *Herland* saga. In *Ourland*, Ellador (a native of Herland) and Vandyke Jennings (an American sociologist who discovered the remote Herland and subsequently married Ellador) leave the all woman paradise so that Ellador can tour and see the "real world" for herself. Suffice it to say, Ellador is appalled and aghast at the waste, wars, and patriarchal injustices that men have perpetrated around the globe.

In addition to *Woman and Economics*, Gilman's major non fiction sociological treatises, some serially published in the *Forerunner*, include: *Concerning Children* (1900), *Human Work* (1904), *The Dress of Women* (1915), and *Social Ethics* (1916), among others. In sum, wrote Gilman in *Social Ethics*, we have failed to teach even "a simple, child convincing ethics based on social interactions, because we have not understood sociology."

SEE ALSO: Addams, Jane; American Sociological Association; Ward, Lester Frank

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Gini coefficient

Ivan Y. Sun

The Gini coefficient is the most commonly used measure of inequality. The coefficient is named after the Italian statistician and demographer Corrado Gini (1884–1965), who invented the measure in 1912. While the Gini

coefficient is often used to measure income and wealth inequality, it is also widely employed to indicate uneven distribution in other social issues, such as industrial location and development, health care, and racial segregation. The coefficient ranges from 0 to 1, with 0 representing perfect equality (i.e., everyone has the same income) and 1 perfect inequality (i.e., a single person has all the income). An extension of the Gini coefficient is the Gini index, which equals the Gini coefficient multiplied by 100.

The Gini coefficient is calculated based on the Lorenz curve (Lorenz 1905) of income distribution. The graphical depiction of the Gini coefficient is shown in Figure 1. The Lorenz curve is plotted showing the relationship between the cumulative percentage of population and the cumulative percentage of income. The diagonal or 45 degree line indicates a perfect distribution of population and income (e.g., 30 percent of the population earns 30 percent of the income and 80 percent of the population earns 80 percent of the income).

The Gini coefficient is the ratio of the area between the Lorenz curve of income distribution and the diagonal line of perfect equality (the shaded area or area A in Fig. 1) to the total




Figure 1 Graphical depiction of the Gini coefficient ($A/A + B$).

area underneath the line of perfect equality. Putting it into an equation: the Gini coefficient = area A/(area A + area B). The further the Lorenz curve is below the line of perfect equality, the greater the inequality in the distribution of income.

Countries with Gini coefficients between 0.2 and 0.35 are generally viewed as having equitable distribution of income, whereas countries with Gini coefficients from 0.5 to 0.7 are considered to have high inequality in income distribution. Most European countries and Canada have Gini coefficients varying from 0.2 to 0.36, while many African and Latin American countries have high values of Gini coefficients exceeding 0.45. Most Asian nations have Gini coefficients between 0.25 and 0.45 (United Nations 2005). Income inequality in the United States showed an upward trend over the past three decades, increasing from a Gini of 0.39 in 1970 to 0.46 in 2000.

One needs to be cautious about the national measures of Gini coefficients for they may obscure great variations in income inequality across sectors of the population within a country. In the United States, for example, minorities (African Americans and Latinos) have higher levels of income inequality than non Hispanic whites (US Census Bureau 2005). The Gini coefficient is also useful in understanding the impact of economic development. For example, a nation may experience rapid economic growth and an increasing Gini coefficient simultaneously, indicating that income becomes less evenly distributed and thus inequality and poverty are not necessarily improving.

SEE ALSO: Income Inequality, Global; Income Inequality and Income Mobility; Inequality and the City; Inequality, Wealth

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global economy

Leslie Sklair

While they are often used interchangeably, the idea of the *global* economy should be clearly distinguished from the idea of the *international* economy. The international economy refers to the sum of all the relations between the national economies of all the countries in the world, particularly binational and multinational exchanges, whereas the global economy refers to the sum of all the relations between economic agents whether they are state or private or of other mixed forms. In practice, this distinction boils down to the analytic choice between a state centrist analysis of economic relations and regulation, and a transnational analysis of economic actors, practices, and institutions. This distinctive concept of the global economy comes from globalization theorists and researchers who have identified globalizing corporations and their local affiliates, those who own and control them, and those in influential positions who serve their interests as the dominant economic forces in the world today (Dicken 1998; Sklair 2001).

Theory and research on the global economy has focused on several interrelated phenomena, increasingly significant since the 1960s. The transnational corporations (TNCs) have attracted an unprecedented level of attention in this period, not only from academic researchers but also from activists in the fields of human rights in general and child labor, sweatshops, and environmental justice in particular. The ways in which and the consequences of how transnational corporations have facilitated the globalization of capital and the production of goods and services, the rise of new global forms of organization of the capitalist class based on ownership and control of TNCs, and transformations in the global scope of the corporations

that own and control the mass media, are no longer the sole province of international economists and trade specialists, but are now commonplace in many textbooks in the social sciences (Sklair 2002) and bestsellers read by students and concerned citizens alike (Klein 2000). In this respect, at least, the global economy has become popularized.

Interest in the connections between an increasingly globalizing capitalism and the rise of a global economy dominated by transnational corporations grew perceptibly from the 1960s. The context of theoretical and empirical interest in competing national capitalisms in the international economy was (and for many still is) the history of colonialism and imperialism. This is overlaid with several versions of the theory that capitalist states could more or less successfully plan their own economic futures. As direct imperialism and colonialism came to an end and as more and more very large TNCs began to emerge in the 1960s, attention began to shift decisively from the international to the global economy.

This manifested itself at first in the sociology of development, where the dependency approach to development and underdevelopment of Gunder Frank and the related world systems approach of Wallerstein, highlighted the systemic nature of capitalism as a worldwide phenomenon over several centuries. While both of these theoretical innovations can be said to have prepared the ground for it, neither entirely succeeded in establishing a coherent concept of the global economy. Wallerstein's analysis of core, semi periphery, and periphery in the world systems approach is based on national economies (Wallerstein 1979), though to some extent the theoretically more ambitious concept of commodity chains has been elaborated in more globalizing terms (Gereffi & Korzeniewicz 1994).

The novelty of theories of the global economy, in the sense used here, originates in the proposition that capitalism entered a new, global phase in the second half of the twentieth century. By the new millennium, the largest TNCs had assets and annual sales far in excess of the gross national products of most of the countries in the world. The *World Development Report* (published annually by the World Bank) for 2000 shows that only about 70 countries had

GNPs of more than US\$10 billion. By contrast, the 2000 *Fortune* Global 500 list of the biggest corporations by turnover reported that about 450 of them had annual sales greater than US\$10 billion. This comparison, however, underestimates the economic scale of major corporations compared with sovereign states, as TNC revenues are usually counted as part of GNP.

The global scope of TNCs has also expanded dramatically. Many major corporations earn more than half of their revenues outside the countries in which they are legally domiciled. This is true for TNCs from countries with relatively small domestic markets (for example, Switzerland, Sweden, Canada, Australia), as well as for those legally domiciled in the USA and Japan. Most of the biggest corporations are still headquartered in the First World, though several dozen companies originating in what is conventionally called the Third World – mainly the newly industrializing countries (NICs) – have been numbered in the *Fortune* Global 500. This group has included the state owned oil companies of Brazil, India, Mexico, Taiwan, and Venezuela (owned by the state, but increasingly run like private corporations), banks in Brazil and China, and Korean manufacturing and trading conglomerates like Hyundai and Samsung (Sklair & Robbins 2002).

Some scholars argue that the global economy is a myth because most major TNCs are legally domiciled in the US, Japan, and Europe, and because they trade and invest mainly between themselves. Against this conclusion, proponents of the global economy argue that an increasing number of corporations operating outside their countries of origin see themselves as developing global strategies of various types, as is obvious from the contents of their annual reports and other corporate publications (Sklair 2001). While all parts of all economies are clearly not globalizing equally, an increasing volume of empirical research indicates that the production and marketing processes of most major industries are being deterritorialized from their countries of origin and that these processes are being driven by the TNCs (Dicken 1998). The central issue for debates around the global economy is the extent to which TNCs domiciled in the US, Japan, and European and other countries can be more fruitfully conceptualized as expressing the

national interests of their countries of origin (sometimes termed the *global skeptic argument*) or what can be conceptualized as the private interests of those who own and control them. Even if historical patterns of TNC development have differed from country to country and region to region, it does not logically follow that TNCs and those who own and control them express any type of national interest or national character.

The formal ownership of capital and the corporations has been transformed since the 1960s. The ownership of share capital has increased throughout the world by means of greater participation (though still a tiny minority in most communities) of the general population in stock markets and the indirect investments that hundreds of millions of people, mainly in rich countries, have through their pension funds and other forms of savings. However, formal ownership rarely means effective control over the capital, resources, and decisions of TNCs.

The globalization of cross border finance and trading can be fruitfully analyzed in terms of the progressive weakening of the nation state and the growing recognition that major institutions in the global economy, notably transnational financial and trading organizations, are setting the agenda for these weakened nation states. Theory and research on this issue has, not surprisingly, led to an increased interest in the politics of the global economy.

The politics of the global economy is debated intensely inside and outside the social sciences. Since the disintegration of the Soviet empire from the late 1980s, the struggle between capitalism and communism has been largely replaced by the struggle between the advocates of capitalist triumphalism and the opponents of capitalist globalization. Many theorists have discussed these issues within the triadic framework of states, TNCs, and international economic institutions. From this perspective, the global economy is dominated by the relations between the major states and state systems (US, EU, and Japan), the major corporations, and the international financial institutions (World Bank, IMF, WTO, supplemented in some versions by other international bodies, major regional institutions, and so on). Such considerations draw attention to the management of the global economy as an ideological political project, closely

related to the rise of neoliberalism in the 1980s associated with the policies and practices of the Thatcher government in Britain and the Reagan administration in the US. This was theorized by some as the so called *Washington Consensus*, which sought to bring together a new orthodoxy of economic theory, a new theory of minimizing government intervention in the economy, and new strategies for development by the major international financial institutions. While controversy still rages over the effectiveness of neoliberalism (the *Washington Consensus* has not been much discussed since the 1990s), many policies promoted by their proponents have been adopted by governments all over the world. This has stimulated interest in who runs the global economy.

One explicit approach to this large question focuses on the concept of the transnational capitalist class (TCC). The TCC may be analytically divided into four main fractions: (1) TNC executives and their local affiliates; (2) globalizing politicians and bureaucrats; (3) globalizing professionals; (4) consumerist elites of merchants, media, and advertising (Sklair 2001). It is transnational in several senses: its members have outward oriented global rather than inward oriented national perspectives on a variety of issues (e.g., support for free trade and neoliberal economic and social policies); they are people from many countries, more and more of whom begin to consider themselves as citizens of the world as well as of their places of birth and residence (these might differ); and they share similar lifestyles, particularly patterns of higher education (in cosmopolitan universities and business schools) and consumption of luxury goods and services. The sociological analysis of the economic base, the political structure, and the culture ideology of the transnational capitalist class provides a fruitful research program for understanding the global economy and explaining its dynamics.

The dominant culture ideology of the global economy is widely agreed to revolve around consumerism, and many researchers argue that a globalizing effect due to the mass media is taking place all over the world. Ownership and control of television, including satellite and cable systems, and associated media like newspaper, magazine, and book publishing, films, video, records/tapes/compact discs, and a wide variety

of other marketing media (notably, the Internet), are concentrated in relatively few very large TNCs. The predominance of corporations from the US is being challenged by corporations from Japan and Europe in the global arena, and even by media empires from elsewhere (Herman & McChesney 1997).

While Marxist and Marx inspired theories of the inevitability of a fatal economic crisis of the capitalist global economy appear to have lost most of their adherents, at least two related but logically distinct crises have been identified. The first is the simultaneous creation of increasing poverty and increasing wealth within and between societies (the class polarization crisis), not to be confused with Marx's emiseration thesis, which failed to predict significant increases in wealth for rapidly expanding minorities all over the world. The second is the unsustainability of the global economy as it is presently organized (the ecological crisis). In most communities around the world the absolute numbers of people who are becoming global consumers have been increasing rapidly over recent decades. At the same time, in some communities the absolute numbers of the destitute and near destitute are also increasing, often alongside the new rich consumers. The best available empirical evidence (for which see the United Nations Development Program *Human Development Report*, published annually since 1990) suggests that the gaps between rich and poor have widened since the 1980s in many parts of the world. The very poor cannot usually buy the goods and services that the global economy offers in such abundance. While there is a long way to go before consumer demand inside the rich first world is satisfied, the gap between the rich and the poor all over the world is not welcome news for TNCs. In addition to the profits lost when poor people who want to buy goods and services do not have the money or even the credit to do so, the increasing visibility of the new rich and the new poor in an age of constant global media exposure directly challenges capitalist claims that everyone eventually benefits from the global economy.

The ecological crisis is also directly connected with consumerism, illustrated in the struggles over the concept of sustainable development. In recent decades most major TNCs

have formulated policies in response to the challenges of environmental harm and declining stocks of resources essential for the maintenance of the global economy. However, the persistence of problems of pollution, health risks, environmental degradation, and waste management intrinsic to the system suggests that ecological crisis will be difficult to avoid. In this context, the attempt by transnational corporations and their supporters in governments, international bureaucracies, and the professions (globalizing politicians, bureaucrats, and professionals) and the mass media to capture the idea of sustainable development and to reconcile it with the progress of the global economy is worth further study.

SEE ALSO: Capitalism; Global Justice as a Social Movement; Globalization; Globalization, Consumption and; Globalization and Global Justice; Globalization, Values and; Globalization; Globalization

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global justice as a social movement

Matthew Williams

The global justice movement is a transnational social movement, rooted in the confluence of the human rights, labor, environmental, indigenous, peasant, and feminist movements' shared opposition to neoliberal globalization and vision of a more democratic, equitable, ecologically sustainable world. Neoliberal globalization refers to those structural changes in the global economy being carried out under a discourse of free markets that weaken or eliminate policies that favor grassroots social actors, such as labor unionists, environmental activists, and indigenous peoples, while creating a regulatory apparatus that favors transnational corporations (TNCs). The global justice movement is truly global in scope, with strong constituent movements in western countries, Latin America, South and Southeast Asia, and parts of Africa; it is weakest in the Middle East, East Asia, and the former Soviet bloc. Constituent organizations range from traditional non profits and volunteer groups in the global North (first world), to large grassroots labor, peasant, and indigenous organizations in the global South (third world). The global justice movement is a relatively young movement, coalescing in the 1990s and only becoming highly visible with the massive 1999 protests against the World Trade Organization (WTO) in Seattle, Washington.

Given the movement's newness, sociologists have only recently begun to study it. Most research has focused on case studies of particular campaigns, coalitions, or social movement organizations using a combination of ethnography and in depth interviews, although surveys of global justice activists at various protests and conferences have been done as well. Some researchers have taken advantage of the heavy use of the Internet to communicate by global justice activists, mining online archives of email lists and websites as an additional source of data. It is as yet unclear how well traditional theories of social movements, which were developed based on analyses of movements in western

democracies, apply to the global justice movement, given its global scope and strong Southern character. Indeed, most research remains focused either on transnational coalitions or on the movement in the North, with relatively little work done by sociologists looking at constituent movements in Southern countries.

Often referred to, somewhat inaccurately, as the anti globalization movement, global justice activists oppose only the current form of economic globalization – neoliberalism – and favor what they sometimes call globalization from below. They critique neoliberalism for taking critical economic decisions out of the democratic, public sphere and placing them in the hands of either TNCs or intergovernmental organizations with little democratic accountability, particularly the International Monetary Fund (IMF), World Bank, and WTO. Critics charge that, under neoliberalism, decisions are made primarily on the basis of short term profit maximization, resulting in growing poverty and ecological degradation.

Global justice activists generally believe that democratic, public oversight of corporations and markets is needed to ensure an equitable, ecologically sustainable economy. In the more radical wing of the movement, this suspicion of markets takes the form of full blown anti capitalism. Global justice activists also stress the importance of political democracy; their vision of democracy is a participatory and deliberative one, moving beyond notions of democracy that are limited to elections and lobbying. Although most global justice activists would agree with the principle of subsidiarity – that decisions should be made at the most local level possible – there is much disagreement about what this would mean in practice, with some emphasizing the importance of a global regulatory apparatus, others stressing the empowerment of local communities. Although many global justice activists seek to strengthen nation states' capacity to regulate markets, many others are as suspicious of states as they are of markets. In its moderate form, this manifests as an emphasis on the need for a vigorous, global civil society to serve as a watchdog on both business and government. Among radicals, this often takes the form of emphasizing the need to create democratic spaces, autonomous from both markets and states. In the North, this

radicalism primarily takes the form of anarchism; while a minority in numbers, anarchists have been influential, playing an important role in organizing many major protests, thereby disseminating ideas about participatory democratic organization and the tactics of direct action. In the South, this radicalism is increasingly embraced by many large grassroots organizations of peasants, indigenous peoples, and the urban poor; these Southern groups generally do not share Northern anarchists' absolute rejection of nation states, but there is nonetheless an emphasis on fundamentally reshaping political relations to empower grassroots social actors over political and economic elites.

The global justice movement emerged as a response to the neoliberal transformations of the global economy that began in the 1970s. These changes resulted in social movements facing a new, more complex system of political opportunities and constraints, operating at multiple levels, both national and transnational, which led to the formation of transnational coalitions and changes in movements' tactical repertoires.

As Southern governments, in debt to and under pressure from the IMF and World Bank, began to reform their economies along neoliberal lines in the 1970s, they increasingly faced large anti-austerity protests. Although these governments would often reverse the reforms to quell the protests, they would later reimplement them in a piecemeal fashion that did not arouse public opposition but satisfied the IMF and World Bank. But just as neoliberalism closed many political opportunities at the national level, it created new, powerful targets at the transnational level, albeit targets that are far more difficult to pressure effectively. A number of campaigns evolved in the 1980s to challenge these organizations. Activists targeted the World Bank using traditional advocacy methods such as lobbying by environmental and indigenous rights activists, who charged that many of the development projects funded by the Bank, such as large dams and oil pipelines, were environmentally destructive and displaced indigenous people without adequate compensation. As TNCs increasingly moved production (and therefore jobs) between countries in an effort to cut labor costs, labor unions began to create transnational organizing campaigns targeting particular TNCs. In addition

to these adaptations of traditional tactics, activists developed a new, innovative repertoire of consumerist tactics such as economic boycotts to pressure TNCs guilty of particularly egregious actions into changing their environmental, labor, and other policies. Many of these campaigns depended on the ability of Northern allies to use their political or economic clout to pressure the World Bank or TNCs on behalf of Southern constituencies, who in turn provided the testimonies to legitimize the Northern activists' campaigns. Campaigns at this point in time focused primarily on changing individual TNC and World Bank policies, not the fundamental structures of the global economy.

The late 1990s and early twenty-first century saw a dramatic expansion of activists' tactical repertoires – alongside advocacy, labor organizing, and consumerist repertoires, global justice activists began to employ mass-based direct action. In the North, this has primarily taken the form of protests, starting with those against the WTO in Seattle, in which activists attempt to shut down or disrupt high-level meetings of international political and business leaders, such as the annual conferences of the IMF and World Bank and negotiations to create free trade agreements. These protests mark a dramatic shift away from the highly routinized, contained legal protests of the 1970s and 1980s. Police have, however, grown relatively adept at containing these protests through a number of counter-tactics, including mass, preemptive arrests. There has also been a wave of direct action in the South as well, particularly Latin America, where mass protests, road blockades, and other such actions have forced governments to reverse neoliberal initiatives and driven presidents from office. This also marks a noteworthy tactical shift, away from the armed struggles of the 1960s, 1970s, and 1980s. Even the indigenous Zapatista guerrilla army of Chiapas, Mexico has focused more on mass protest and creating a parallel system of participatory democratic government than on armed struggle. Paralleling this shift to direct action, activists have expanded their demands from individual policy changes to dismantling the entire neoliberal system.

The results of this can be seen in the outcomes of the WTO talks in Cancun, Mexico and in the Free Trade Area of the Americas

(FTAA) talks in Miami, Florida, both in 2003. Although the protests outside these summits were relatively small, the WTO talks collapsed when Southern delegates walked out and the US was forced to compromise with Southern delegates in the FTAA talks to avoid a similar walkout. In part, this was the result of increasing discontent on the part of Southern elites, who often wish for more autonomy than neoliberalism grants them; but it was also in part a reaction to the growing unrest they face in their home countries. While some political opportunities closed as economic policymaking was moved from the national and public forums to transnational and closed ones, other opportunities opened at both the national and transnational level, in part because of the actions of social movements themselves.

The organizational networks of the global justice movement began to take shape during the initial campaigns of the 1980s, which usually involved partnerships between grassroots groups in the South and large development or environmental non profits in the North. As these networks thickened in the 1990s, the scope of the groups involved grew to include smaller, more confrontational and radical groups in the North. Many have stressed the importance of the Internet and other advances in telecommunications in the formation of the movement; more important, however, have been face to face meetings among activists, allowing people from very different backgrounds to build ties of trust between them, ties that were then maintained through the Internet. While in the 1980s, activists met primarily to work on specific campaigns, in the 1990s and early twenty first century, regular international conferences focusing on confronting neoliberalism as a whole began to take place, including the Zapatista *encuentros* (encounters) and the World Social Forum. Those activists who formed relationships at such meetings then served as brokers between their respective constituencies. They were able to bridge their differences and work together, forming a "movement of movements," by framing their particular issues in shared terms of global justice and opposition to neoliberalism. The 1990s also saw the development of several permanent transnational coalitions with broader goals, including Fifty Years is Enough, dedicated to either dramatically reforming or

abolishing the IMF and World Bank; Jubilee 2000, a network founded to abolish third world debt; and People's Global Action, an explicitly anti capitalist alliance of small Northern radical groups and some of the large Southern grassroots organizations.

The networks that have evolved, at both the national and international levels, have striven for democratic relationships between groups working together. The global justice movement has developed a flexible, inclusive collective identity, with most activists being willing to put aside ideological and other differences to work on concrete projects, emphasizing dialogue over conformity.

There are, however, also a number of tensions around issues of organization and democracy in practice. The participatory democratic character of the new wave of global justice activists does not mesh well with the bureaucratic organization of the older advocacy oriented non profits and labor unions, both North and South, leading to difficulties in working across these divides. Differences in power, resulting from both access to resources and location in the world system, have also produced tensions. Many Southern grassroots groups are dependent on Northern non profits for part of their funding; these tensions also exist between non profits and grassroots groups within Northern countries. In some cases, these power differences have resulted in Northern activists launching campaigns without consulting their Southern "beneficiaries," sometimes producing results Southerners find not in their best interests. There have also been issues because of Northerners conveying a different message than their Southern allies would like to TNCs, the IMF, and World Bank, to which the former have more access than the latter. Over time, activists have grown more conscious of the need to take into account these power differences. While they cannot be erased short of a radical transformation of the world economy, more dialogue between Northern and Southern groups has gone some way to addressing these problems, though tensions certainly remain.

It should be noted that despite the growing importance of transnational networks and campaigns, most groups remain locally rooted. They may address domestic issues, framing them in terms of global justice, or they may

address international issues by pressuring their national governments to either change their policies or press for reforms in intergovernmental organizations of which they are a part.

SEE ALSO: Anarchism; Direct Action; Environmental Movements; Global Economy; Globalization and Global Justice; Indigenous Movements; Labor Movement; Neoliberalism; Political Opportunities; Social Movements, Participatory Democracy in; Transnational Movements

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global politics

Lloyd Cox

Global politics refers to patterns of political relations and activities that stretch across state borders, and whose consequences are, potentially and/or actually, worldwide in scope. As such, global politics includes but is not limited to interstate relations, and is not explicable in terms of those approaches conventionally deployed by realist scholars of international relations (IR). The latter have routinely assumed the primacy of sovereign, bounded territorial states, which act in their own national interest in a sharply demarcated “external” political environment defined by zero sum power equations. Many theorists argue that such views do not accurately reflect the new realities of what some have

referred to as a post Westphalian or post international world. In this world, states allegedly have had their capacities eroded, the boundaries separating domestic and foreign policy are increasingly blurred, and the sources of political authority, legitimacy, and governance have multiplied beyond the territorial state. This has created a “democratic deficit” between the nominal sites of political participation (national states) and more remote global sources of political power and decision making, in turn raising questions about contemporary forms of political community and citizenship. These shifting realities have been prompted by a number of developments encompassed by the term globalization.

While the definition of globalization has been fiercely contested, it can be reasonably understood as the sum of those processes involved in the growth of worldwide interconnectedness and interdependence, where social relations are stretched across existing boundaries and time and space are compressed to an extent that the whole planet becomes an object of human consciousness and action. Although “globe talk” only really takes off in the 1980s, it is traceable by numerous intellectual threads to earlier intimations of a global political awareness. In 1774, Herder rhetorically asked: “When has the entire earth ever been so closely joined together . . .? Who has ever had more power and more machines, such that with a single impulse, with a single movement of a finger, entire nations are shaken?” (cited in Hopkins 2002: 12). Similarly, in the nineteenth century, Marx argued that capitalism is predisposed to expand beyond its geographical point of origin, to “nestle everywhere, settle everywhere, establish connexions everywhere” across the entire planet. For Marx, such globalizing processes are inherently political, and would be further elaborated by the next generation of Marxists in various theories of imperialism (Hilferding, Bukharin; Lenin, Kautsky, and Luxemburg), and later still by dependency and world systems theorists (Frank, Amin, Wallerstein).

In non Marxist social science, theories of globalization and global politics were antipated from the 1960s in both sociology and political science. In a seminal article, Moore (1966) advocated the development of a “global sociology,” while Roland Robertson and his various co authors raised the specter of a global

comparative sociology of different paths to and through modernity (Nettle & Robertson 1968). In political science and IR there were similar trends among scholars dissatisfied with the dominant realist paradigm. Modelski's (1972) treatise on world politics was particularly significant in this respect, as it was one of the first works in the social sciences actually to deploy the concept of globalization. This was followed by Falk's (1975) appeal for mainstream political science and IR to take a more "global approach," and Keohane and Nye's (1977) important contribution on "complex interdependence." These and associated analyses were premised on the view that world politics could no longer (if indeed it ever could) be understood exclusively with reference to the interests of competing states within a largely anarchic interstate order, the central claim of realism. This resonated in subsequent analyses of "global governance," "transnational politics," "international regimes," and "global interdependence," which grew in stature in the 1980s and 1990s.

The periodization of political globalization has also been widely debated. Globalization has been variously described as being coterminous with European global expansion from the late fifteenth century, with European imperialism in the late nineteenth century, and with US led globally integrating economic and technological developments in the post World War II era. Regardless, most would agree that globalization has accelerated since the early 1970s. The breakdown of the Bretton Woods system of international financial regulation, the global resurgence of economic liberalism, the revolution in communications, the later emergence of global terrorism, and the collapse of the Eastern Bloc and its (and China's) incorporation into the circuits of global capitalism, are all viewed as important manifestations and constituents of globalization. These are trends that have frequently been analyzed through the lens of economic, technological, and cultural convergence, but they also clearly have important political dimensions that lend some substance to the notion of global politics.

One key element of global politics is the growth of "international regimes." An international regime can be defined as "implicit or explicit principles, norms, rules, and decision making procedures around which actor

expectations converge in a given issue area of international relations" (Krasner 1983: 2). Such regimes find an institutional embodiment in the proliferation of international non governmental organizations (INGOs) and intergovernmental organizations (IGOs) over the past century. The former increased from around 200 in 1900 to over 5,000 in 1996, while the latter increased from 27 to 260 over the same period (Held et al. 1999: 53). In both cases the largest absolute increases have occurred after 1960, in response to economic, technological, environmental, and security challenges that transcend the capacities of individual states, thus demanding new forms of transnational regulation and cooperation.

These increases have been paralleled by the consolidation and extension of military and trading blocs and other supranational institutions that are widely viewed as being more than the sum of their national parts. The European Union (EU), for example, is now much more than just a trading bloc of member states, but also encompasses a number of suprastate political functions and institutions to which member states agree to cede some hitherto taken for granted prerogatives and capacities. While the EU is a "regional" rather than a "global" institution, many would view it as an aspect of the broader globalization of politics, which has the potential to become a bulwark against US global dominance and which also portends similar suprastate arrangements in other parts of the world.

For many globalization theorists these developments signify the extent to which states have become more deeply enmeshed in webs of global political connections and multi layered governance, based on structures of overlapping authority. This implies a degree of "governance without government." Many of the functions of political coordination and regulation once the preserve of formal governments are now accomplished through more informal mechanisms, and with the participation of NGOs, IGOs (e.g., the IMF and WTO), transnational corporations (TNCs), and global media, which are allegedly beyond the jurisdiction of individual governments. If this is true, it clearly places serious limits on the exercise of democracy, which is still largely organized within the limited horizons of individual national states whose governments are increasingly beholden

to informal governance emanating from beyond their borders. This in no way entails the emergence of “world government” – a concept that suggests something far more unitary and directed than the realities of multi layered governance – though it has had implications for the United Nations (UN) system. In particular, since the early 1990s the UN has played a more interventionist role in policing a liberal democratic model of democracy on the one hand, and asserting a human rights discourse and practice on the other; albeit one that has been very unevenly applied. The former has been accomplished through the UN’s involvement in and monitoring of electoral processes in countries as diverse as Nicaragua and Angola, South Africa and Ukraine. The latter has been manifested in a multiplication of UN humanitarian interventions and peacekeeping missions across Africa, Asia, and the Balkans.

The idea of universal human rights that trump the sovereign rights of states to non interference by other states, and the realization of this idea in practices of humanitarian intervention, is a relatively recent one. Although universal human rights have been encoded in various covenants and protocols of international law since the late 1940s (including the UN Charter and Universal Declaration of Human Rights in 1948, the Convention against Genocide in 1948, the Covenant on Civil and Political Rights in 1966, and the Covenant on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights in 1966), it has only been since the end of the Cold War that states and coalitions of states have been actively prepared to enforce these principles. Enforcement through armed intervention has only been applied, however, in faltering steps and in very selective cases, with geopolitical calculation and domestic political considerations still being very important in determining when human rights do and do not get defended. This has led many scholars to question the assumption that humanitarian intervention represents the opening up of a post Westphalian global political order where states are answerable to powers and principles beyond their borders. This draws into sharp relief what is perhaps the key debate surrounding global politics; namely, whether or not states are still the central actors of global politics and, therefore, whether or not a

post Westphalian, post international political universe has in fact emerged.

Scholars who argue that such a new global political universe now exists typically emphasize four related points: (1) that state capacities and *de facto* sovereignty have been compromised in various ways by the globalization of economic, political, and cultural processes; (2) that national borders are increasingly porous with respect to the movement of information, commodities, and people, which contributes to point (1) above and problematizes the clear demarcation of domestic and foreign politics; (3) that politics has been partially “deterritorialized” as a result of points (1) and (2); and (4) that taken together, (1), (2), and (3) represent a qualitative break from the state centric, international world order that is assumed to have characterized world politics for the 300 or so years following the Peace of Westphalia (1648). The latter concluded the Thirty Years War in Europe and is often taken to have initiated the modern era of state sovereignty, with its presumptions of absolute and indivisible territorial authority, and rights to non interference by external actors. Mutual recognition of these sovereignty rights is said to have regulated conduct between states and been the central ordering principle of the Westphalian system, which has now been transcended by the globalization of politics.

Many critics dispute these claims, and reject the whole idea of a post international, global political environment. They point out that so called Westphalian sovereignty was always more of a normative ideal than it was a political reality, with states throughout the “Westphalian period” frequently having their claims to absolute authority constrained and subverted by other states and non state actors. Furthermore, the suggestion that state capacities have been uniformly eroded neglects the massive power discrepancies between different states, and glosses over the strengthening of some state capacities (the policing of immigration) even as others are eroded (the capacity to determine some aspects of economic policy autonomously). The US’s recent shift to political unilateralism is held up as proof of the fundamental era of deprecating state powers. Finally, the idea that there has been a deterritorialization of

politics is said to be out of step with both the past (where clearly not all political phenomena could be explained with reference to relations between territorial states) and with the present (where politics still has a demonstrable territorial dimension, as reflected in the continued salience of territorialized nationalist conflicts). In this view, global politics is, and will always remain, filtered through the prism of national institutions.

More recently, synthetic contributions to the globalization debate have emerged that try to transcend the stark dichotomies outlined above. These scholars focus on the contradictions inherent in global politics, between simultaneous tendencies towards integration and fragmentation, universalism and particularism, which exhibit both continuities and discontinuities with the past. In this view, states and interstate politics remain crucial, but are now overdetermined by other global actors and processes.

SEE ALSO: Citizenship; Empire; Globalization; Nation State and Nationalism; Political Sociology; Politics; Postnationalism; Sovereignty

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global/world cities

Jamie Paquin

“Global city” discourse posits and investigates the emergence of a small number of cities occupying commanding roles in a globalizing economic system. The emergence of global cities signals the shift in the organization of capital accumulation and economic production since the late 1970s and a corresponding shift in the nodal functions of some cities away from local, regional, or national contexts to more varied and uneven connections to other cities and regions in the world. Specifically, the designation “global city” is applied to those urban areas consisting of a disproportionate number of major economic headquarters and services, including corporate management, banking, finance, legal services, accounting, technical consulting, telecommunications, computing, international transportation, research, and higher education (Friedmann & Wolff 1982: 320). To the extent to which the hypotheses of this literature withstand scrutiny, numerous questions arise regarding the social implications of a greater disjuncture between proximity and connectedness in urban life.

Though the concept of world cities in the recent and distant past is not entirely new (Geddes 1924; Hall 1966), it was Friedmann (1986; see also Friedmann & Wolff 1982) who first made a direct link between contemporary “global forces” and “urban processes” in his “world city hypothesis” essay. Elsewhere, Sassen (1994, 2001) provides key empirical data corroborating some of the assertions made about an emergent system of global cities as sites of concentrated global economic activity. This conceptualization of a global city problematic is essentially economic, as the designation of “world” or “global” city is applied to those cities which become central to the accumulation, control, and deployment of international

capital and whose morphologies are transformed by the needs of global capital. Yet, as we can see, this perspective leads to the view that despite their “command and control” functions, global cities are not really “in control” as they are themselves shaped and produced in relation to the interests and demands of external economic forces.

The result of the emergent urban order is then greater difference not only between cities but within them as well, meaning that a world of global cities is both hierarchical and polarized, for even within the “truly” global cities there is a growing divergence in incomes and rights to the city (Friedmann 1986; Knox & Taylor 1995; Marcuse & van Kempen 2001; Sassen 1994, 2001). This polarization stems directly from their articulating role in the global economy, for by serving as the base for global industries and institutions, an “elite” professional class who are “well educated, socially mobile, footloose and cosmopolitan in origin and outlook” (Clark 1996: 139) become a key driving force in the formation of a corresponding economy of low waged and low skilled employment. Sassen’s work (1994, 1996, 2001; see also Mellenkopf & Castells 1991) investigates in great depth this polarization, finding that in the cases of London, Tokyo, and New York the growth in elite professions and services creates the need “for a vast army of low skilled workers” (Sassen 1996), embodied by legal and non legal immigration flows and those displaced by the decline of manufacturing employment resulting from global restructuring.

Novel forms of concentration and dispersal also bring forth new uses and functions of urban space. For those cities capable of attracting the premier command and control functions, high tech business districts, convention centers, international airports, and other transportation linkages become crucial components of their infrastructures, while for lower tier cities – places hollowed out by the migration of manufacturing with little chance of becoming preeminent global cities – the strategy of economic survival is often to cultivate spaces and economies geared toward “culture” and consumption. Some cities like Manchester have been relatively successful in their efforts to rebound from the loss of traditional industries through such initiatives, while other large scale

revitalization schemes have failed to attract the desired capital, consumers, and jobs. Moreover, with the shift toward consumption activities, which often occur in older urban areas, already marginalized populations have sometimes been negatively affected, either because they are pushed from “revitalized” areas through gentrification, or more directly because they become subject to increased surveillance and policing aimed at making these spaces “safe” and desirable. Thus, to the extent to which spaces such as business and trade centers, airports, high tech zones, and even revitalized historical districts of contemporary cities exist as the result of responses to changes in the relationship between proximity and connectedness in an age of globalization, they signal a novel development in the history of urban spaces and the meaning of place.

The global cities literature enriches the globalization debates by perusing and interpreting its spatial causes, manifestations, and requirements. In placing emphasis on urban dynamics and spaces as both the bearers and generators of economic globalization it also brings important scrutiny to the longstanding state centrism of social science, which typically assumes and constitutes national entities with little consideration to the greater specificity of cultural, economic, and political activities and connections. Finally, the global cities literature raises crucial questions regarding the implications of these transformations both between and within cities, drawing attention to the potential for increased social and economic polarization and eroded political capacities associated with transnational economic restructuring. Such changes leave observers such as Sassen (1996) rightly asking, “whose city is it?”

However, global cities discourse and research suffers from significant evidentiary and conceptual limitations. Many critics have called attention to the empirical weakness – or what Short et al. (1999) call the “dirty little secret” of world cities research, since both the criteria for assessment and measurement are inconsistent and questionable (Taylor 2004). Additionally, some studies have found that for some cities, polarization is not necessarily accompanying globalization, and even where it has occurred, local and national policies may be as significant as global forces in intensifying

income and other inequalities. The biggest weakness of this literature, however, is the economic reductionism and determinism underlying the conceptualization and investigation of the global city. Finding certain cities to be disproportionately central in the articulation of global economic activity may provide important insight into some global processes and their implications, but given that concentration is not that new – think of London, Paris, or New York as colonial centers – what stands to be gained by this approach to investigating the relationship between globalization and the city? Secondly, what contribution can such a literature make to the broader sociological problematic of the life world of cities in an age of globalization?

One way to address these shortcomings is to expand inquiry into the global city beyond economic questions through more culturally attuned research which investigates the multiple ways in which global flows are affecting the composition and texture of everyday urban life and subjectivity (cf. Appadurai 1996). Smith's (2001) reconceptualization of the global city problematic as a matter of transnational urbanism is an important contribution in this regard, as it highlights the fact that the designation of global (with its connotation of homogeneity) is less accurate than a language of transnationality or translocality when dealing with the extra local forces shaping contemporary urban life. In transnational urbanism we have then a more particular yet expanded conceptualization of the city in a context of globalization which emphasizes the numerous and diverse networks and flows of people, objects, information, capital, remittances, and media which are major dimensions of place and cultural formation of a global character, regardless of their status in the world cities hierarchy. From this approach, then, many cities will appear uniquely and deeply "global(izing)" despite their peripheral significance to the articulation of global capital. For example, despite Tokyo's global economic preeminence, it lacks the ethnic diversity of a city like Toronto, which although much lower in the "world city" hierarchy, is one of the most demographically diverse cities in world history, and a place where the collective cultural imaginary is heavily attuned to this diversity as a part of living in a global age. Cities like

Toronto are thus places where "globalized" cultural forms are being worked out, and as such, they can be viewed as thoroughly "worldly," if not "global" – a designation just as sociologically significant as the emergence of a small number of "global" cities responsible for the command and control of global economic activity. By adopting an expanded conceptual framework then, we will discover that cities globalize in a variety of ways related to the particular forms of linkages and flows they are both constituted by and generate.

Despite the conceptual and empirical limits of global cities research, the attention it brings to the spatial dimensions of globalization constitutes a fundamental contribution to the study of both globalization and contemporary urbanism, as it enables the apprehension of actual global processes as they operate through and produce spaces and places in conjunction with actual social actors and institutions. And by expanding the conceptualization of the global city to include cultural and political questions in the context of everyday urban life, the global cities perspective can become an especially powerful approach to the study and delineation of globalization as a complex, variable, and spatially manifest phenomenon.

SEE ALSO: Chicago School; Ethnic Enclaves; Inequality and the City; Mumford, Lewis; Primate Cities; Spatial Relationships; Transnationalism; Urban; Urban Space; Urbanism/Urban Culture

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globalization

Larry Ray

Globalization has become one of the central but contested concepts of contemporary social science. The term has further entered everyday commentary and analysis and features in many political, cultural, and economic debates. The globalized world order originates in the international organizations and regulatory systems set up after World War II – including the United Nations, General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (now the World Trade Organization), the International Monetary Fund, and the World Bank. However, the end of the Cold War was the prelude to the maturity of the concept of globalization, since after 1989, it was possible at least to imagine a “borderless” world in which people, goods, ideas, and images would flow with relative ease and the major global division between East and West had gone. A world divided by competing ideologies of capitalism and state socialism gave way to a more uncertain world in which capitalism became the dominant economic and social system. Coinciding with these changes, a major

impetus to globalization was the development and availability of digital communication technologies from the late 1980s with dramatic consequences for the way economic and personal behavior were conducted. The collapse of communism and growth of digital technologies further coincided with a global restructuring of the state, finance, production, and consumption associated with neoliberalism.

There are many views on the nature and impact of globalization, which is not a single process. Economic globalization refers to such things as the global dominance of transnational corporations, global finance, flexible production and assembly, and the rise of information and service economies. Political globalization can be understood in terms of the growth of international organizations, subnational regional autonomy, the spread of post welfare public policies, and global social movements. Further, globalization possibly weakens the effectiveness and cohesion of the nation state as its traditional functions are “hollowed out” – transferred “upwards” to international organizations and “downwards” to regional bodies. Again globalization is a cultural process, indicated by the growth of global consumption cultures, tourism, media and information flows, and transnational migration and identities. The latter half of the twentieth century saw the growth of global brands and media that carry both cultural and economic significance. A globalized world is one of increasing instantaneity, where events are experienced instantly even by people in spatially distant locations through access to digital communicative technologies. This creates a complex range of social interconnections governed by the speed of communications, thereby creating a partial collapse of boundaries within national, cultural, and political space. However, the meaning and significance of globalization remains far from clear. Some are optimistic (e.g., Friedman 2000), but some are more pessimistic and critical about globalization’s consequences (e.g., Falk 1999). Urry (2003) and Giddens (1999) regard globalization as an emergent process with effects in its own right, although this view is rejected by Rosenberg (2000), for whom it is the *effect* of a complex combination of social, economic, cultural, and political changes such as internationalization, imperialism, the “weightless economy,”

post Fordism, and neoliberalism. It might appear as though global western media create a homogeneous world culture dominated by global brands and TV networks. But at the same time they create increased heterogeneity between globalization winners and losers, global cities and surrounding locales, and eclectic hybrids of local and global cultures.

Globalization is a spatial process that has facilitated the emergence of a new kind of global city based on highly specialized service economies that serve specific, particularized functions in the global economic system at the expense of former logics of organization tied to manufacturing based economies. To enable global markets to function effectively, they need to be underpinned by specialized managerial work that is concentrated in cities. Further, privatization and deregulation during the 1980s and 1990s shifted various governance functions to the corporate world, again centralizing these activities in urban centers. In post industrial cities there is a concentration of command functions that serve as production sites for finance and the other leading industries, and provide marketplaces where firms and governments can buy financial instruments and services. Global cities become strategic sites for the acceleration of capital and information flows, and at the same time spaces of increasing socioeconomic polarization. One effect of this has been that such cities have gained in importance and power relative to nation states. There have emerged new "corridors" and zones around nodal cities with increasingly relative independence from surrounding areas. Networks of global cities densely connected by air have also emerged (Sassen 1996).

There is a wide range of social theories of globalization. Robertson was one of the first sociologists to theorize globalization and central to his approach is the concept of "global consciousness," which refers to "the compression of the world and the intensification of consciousness of the world as a whole" (1992: 8). Through thought and action, global consciousness makes the world a single place. What it means to live in this place, and how it must be ordered, become universal questions. These questions receive different answers from individuals and societies that define their position in relation to both a system of societies and the

shared properties of humankind from very different perspectives. This confrontation of worldviews means that globalization involves "comparative interaction of different forms of life" (1992: 27). Unlike theorists who identify globalization with late (capitalist) modernity, Robertson sees global interdependence and consciousness preceding the advent of capitalist modernity. However, European expansion and state formation have boosted globalization since the seventeenth century and the contemporary shape of the world owes most to the "takeoff" decades after about 1875, when international communications, transportation, and conflict dramatically intensified relationships across societal boundaries. In that period, the main reference points of fully globalized order took shape: nation state, individual self, world system, societies, and one humanity. These elements of the global situation became "relativized" since national societies and individuals, in particular, must interpret their very existence as parts of a larger whole. To some extent, a common framework has guided that interpretive work; for example, states can appeal to a universal doctrine of nationalism to legitimate their particularizing claims to sovereignty and cultural distinction. But such limited common principles do not provide a basis for world order.

By the end of the twentieth century, if not before, globalization had transformed the way people saw themselves in the world. Everyone must now reflexively respond to the common predicament of living in one world. This provokes the formulation of contending world views. For example, some portray the world as an assembly of distinct communities, highlighting the virtues of particularism, while others view it as developing toward a single overarching organization, representing the presumed interests of humanity as a whole. In a compressed world, the comparison and confrontation of worldviews are bound to produce new cultural conflict. In such conflict, religious traditions play a special role, since they can be mobilized to provide an ultimate justification for one's view of the world – a case in point being the resurgence of "fundamentalist" groups that combine traditionalism with a global agenda. A globalized world is thus integrated but not harmonious, a single place but

also diverse, a construct of shared consciousness but prone to fragmentation.

For Anthony Giddens the concept of time space distanciation is central. This is a process in which locales are shaped by events far away and vice versa, while social relations are disembedded, or “lifted out” from locales. For example, peasant households in traditional societies largely produced their own means of subsistence, a tithe was often paid in kind (goods, animals, or labor), money was of limited value, and economic exchange was local and particularistic. Modernization replaced local exchange with universal exchange of money, which simplifies otherwise impossibly complex transitions and enables the circulation of highly complex forms of information and value in increasingly abstract and symbolic forms. The exchange of money establishes social relations across time and space, which under globalization is speeded up. Similarly, expert cultures arise as a result of the scientific revolutions, which bring an increase in technical knowledge and specialization. Specialists claim “universal” and scientific forms of knowledge, which enable the establishment of social relations across vast expanses of time and space. Social distance is created between professionals and their clients as in the modern medical model, which is based upon the universal claims of science. As expert knowledge dominates across the globe, local perspectives become devalued and modern societies are reliant on expert systems. Trust is increasingly the key to the relationship between the individual and expert systems and is the “glue” that holds modern societies together. But where trust is undermined, individuals experience ontological insecurity and a sense of insecurity with regard to their social reality.

Ohmae’s (2005) concept of a “borderless world” epitomizes enthusiasm and the belief that globalization brings improvement in human conditions. Ohmae describes an “invisible continent” – a moving, unbounded world in which the primary linkages are now less between nations than between regions that are able to operate effectively in a global economy without being closely networked with host regions. The invisible continent can be dated to 1985 when Microsoft released Windows 1.0, CNN was launched, Cisco Systems began, the

first Gateway 2000 computers were shipped, and companies like Sun Microsystems and Dell were in their infancies. Back then, the economic outlook was gloomy and few saw this embryonic continent forming. Now, of course, it affects virtually every business. Transnational corporations increasingly do not treat countries as single entities and region states make effective points of entry into the global economy. For example, when Nestlé moved into Japan, it chose the Kansai region round Osaka and Kobe rather than Tokyo as a regional doorway. This fluidity of capital is creating a borderless world in which capital moves around, chasing the best products and the highest investment returns regardless of national origin. The cyberworld has changed not only the way business works but also the way we interact on a personal level – from buying and selling online to planning for retirement, managing investment and bank accounts. Decisions made on the invisible continent (the “platforms” that are created by businesses rather than governments) determine how money moves around the globe.

Giddens (1999) is less unambiguously enthusiastic about globalization than Ohmae and describes it as a “runaway world” which “is not – at least at the moment – a global order driven by collective human will. Instead, it is emerging in an anarchic, haphazard fashion, carried along by a mixture of economic, technological and cultural imperatives.” The global order is the result of an intersection of four processes – capitalism (economic logic), the interstate system (world order), militarism (world security and threats), and industrialism (the division of labor and lifestyles). However, Giddens does not say what the weight of each of these factors is and whether they change historically.

Similarly, David Harvey emphasizes the ways in which globalization revolutionizes the qualities of space and time. As space appears to shrink to a “global village” of telecommunications and ecological interdependencies and as time horizons shorten to the point where the present is all there is, so we have to learn how to cope with an overwhelming sense of *compression* of our spatial and temporal worlds (1990: 240–2). Time space compression that “annihilates” space and creates “timeless time”

is driven by flexible accumulation and new technologies, the production of signs and images, just in time delivery, reduced turnover times and speeding up, and both de- and reskilling. Harvey points for support to the ephemerality of fashions, products, production techniques, speedup and vertical disintegration, financial markets and computerized trading, instantaneity and disposability, regional competitiveness. For Harvey, flexibilized computer-based production in Silicon Valley or the "Third Italy" epitomizes these changes.

John Urry argues that the changes associated with globalization are so far reaching that we should now talk of a "sociology beyond societies." This position is informed by the alleged decline of the nation state in a globalized world, which has led to wider questioning of the idea of "society" as a territorially bounded entity. This in turn prepares the ground for claims to the effect that since "society" was a core sociological concept, the very foundations of the discipline have likewise been undermined. The central concepts of the new socialities are space (social topologies), regions (interregional competition), networks (new social morphology), and fluids (global enterprises). Mobility is central to this thesis since globalization is the complex movement of people, images, goods, finances, and so on that constitutes a process across regions in faster and unpredictable shapes, all with no clear point of arrival or departure.

Despite the contrasting theoretical understandings of globalization, there is some measure of agreement that it creates new opportunities or threats. For example, globalization offers new forms of cosmopolitanism and economic growth but also new threats and global risks such as ecological crisis, global pandemics, and international crime and terrorism. Globalization may be seen as encroachment and colonization as global corporations and technologies erode local customs and ways of life, which in turn engenders new forms of protest and assertion of local cultural identity. Enthusiasts argue that the effects are positive and that integration into the global economy increases economic activity and raises living standards. Legrain, for example, claims that in 2000 the per capita income of citizens was four times greater than that in 1950. Between 1870

and 1979, production per worker became 26 times greater in Japan and 22 times greater in Sweden. In the whole world in 2000 it was double what it was in 1962. Even more significantly, he argues that those countries isolated from the global capitalist economy have done less well than those that have engaged with it. Poor countries that are open to international trade grew over six times faster in the 1970s and 1980s than those that shut themselves off from it: 4.5 percent a year, rather than 0.7 percent. He claims that cross national data indicate how openness to international trade helps the poor by a magnitude roughly equal to each percentage increase in GDP (Legrain 2002: 49–52). By contrast, it can be argued that global patterns of inequality have become increasingly polarized. According to UN data, the richest 20 percent in the world "own" 80 percent of the wealth; the second 20 percent own 10 percent; the third 20 percent own 6 percent; the fourth 20 percent own 3 percent; and the poorest 20 percent own only 1 percent. Throughout the world, 2.7 billion people live on less than \$2 per day. These global inequalities predate globalization, of course, but there are global processes that are maintaining a highly unequal social system (Akyuz et al. 2002).

Contradictions in the global economy are illustrated in other ways too. Liberalization and globalization of capital may not have driven costs down in developed countries where few workers are prepared to tolerate the conditions this new model creates. Flexible global ordering systems need not just produce flexible labor, but flexible labor in excess, because to manage the supply of labor it is necessary to have a surplus. Migrants, many of whom are drawn into the North by collapsing agricultural prices at home, have met this need. But in the wake of hostility manifest in many developed countries, especially following threats of terrorist attack, migrants face tightening border controls and deportation of those who are not in areas where there is a shortage of skills.

Globalization has been the focus of extensive social movement activism and resistance, especially to neoliberal globalism represented by bodies such as the WTO. Glasius et al. (2002) identify the emergence of a "global civil society" in, for example, the growth of "parallel

summits” such as the 2001 Porto Alegre meeting in Brazil attended by 11,000 people to protest against the Davos (Switzerland) World Economic Forum. These are organized through multiple networks of social actors and NGOs operating on local and international levels. There may appear to be an irony that many of the internationally organized or linked movements use globalized forms of communication (notably the Internet) and operate transnationally, mobilizing a global consciousness and solidarities. However, many activists are not necessarily opposed to globalization as such but to economic neoliberal globalization and a corporatist agenda that is intent on constricting individual freedom and local lifestyles in the name of profit. Some further claim that globalization is a new form of imperialism imposing western (especially US) political and economic dominance over the rest of the world. For anti-globalization critics, international bodies such as the World Bank and IMF are not accountable to the populations on whom their actions have most effects – for example, when loans are made conditional on structural adjustment and privatization of public facilities such as health, water, and education. Activists also point out that globalization creates a “borderless” world for capital and finance but not for labor, since strict and increasingly severe immigration controls exist in most developed countries while labor lacks basic rights in many developing countries. The movement (if something so diverse can be called a “movement”) is very broad, including church groups, nationalist parties, leftist parties, environmentalists, peasant unions, anti-racism groups, anarchists, some charities, and others. If we take a broad view of globalization, though, these movements are themselves part of the process by which global solidarities (albeit rather weak and transitory ones) come to be formed.

SEE ALSO: Global Economy; Global Justice as a Social Movement; Global Politics; Global/World Cities; Globalization, Consumption and; Globalization, Culture and; Globalization, Education and; Globalization and Global Justice; Globalization, Religion and; Globalization, Sexuality and; Globalization, Sport and; Globalization; Globalization; Neoliberalism

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globalization, consumption and

Beryl Langer

The terms globalization and consumption combine with reference to the emergence of a global consumer culture: the same products, services, and entertainment sold in the same kinds of retail and leisure spaces (malls, plazas, theme parks, cineplexes) to consumers around the world. From luxury cars and designer clothes to jeans, t-shirts, toys, snack food, and bottled water, markets are global rather than national. The same electronic equipment, cosmetics, children’s toys, and grocery lines are consumed in cities as remote from each other as Sydney

and Stockholm, Bahrain and Birmingham. Product availability is less tied to specific places, first because the same global brands are on sale at the same time throughout the world and second because traders catering to deterritorialized immigrants recreate the retail environment of their homeland by importing familiar products. Starbucks, McDonald's, Pizza Hut, and Kentucky Fried Chicken are everywhere – as are family run restaurants selling “ethnic” food to customers in search of either the taste of “home” or the exotic. It is no longer necessary to go to Paris and Milan to buy Dior and Armani, the US to get a baseball cap, India to get a sari, or the Middle East and Southeast Asia for hijabs and burkas. All are on sale in cities around the world, although the different circumstances of their circulation serve to remind us that globalization is not one process, but many.

Globalization and consumption emerged as key concepts in social theory in the last decades of the twentieth century. Developments in electronics and information communication technology took what the geographer David Harvey calls “time space compression” to new levels, accelerating the flow of information, money, people, and goods across national borders to create a world market with a global division of labor and global consumers. Relocation of production in “newly industrializing countries” where labor was cheaper and less regulated turned subsistence farmers into urban workers (a process begun in England 200 years earlier), bringing new cohorts of consumers into the market and the global cultural economy. Human societies no longer can be understood in terms of bounded cultures within nation states. Social identities are increasingly defined and expressed through consumption and life style rather than work and class position.

Both terms are subject to conceptual, substantive, and evaluative debate. Globalization has been problematized in relation to its history, the extent to which its processes are separable from the activities of nation states, and whether its consequences are positive or negative. Debate on consumption has centered on a number of key issues: the continuing relevance of class as a basis for understanding social relations, whether consumer capitalism as a social

form represents an advance in freedom or a shift in the locus of exploitation, and whether the collective rights and responsibilities of citizenship have been replaced by diminished notions of consumer sovereignty based on individual choice and capacity to pay. At the intersection of these contested areas, questions focus on the implications of the global cultural economy for the survival of local cultures and national identities, the political economy of the global division of labor involved in its production, and its social and environmental consequences.

The question of what, if anything, distinguishes “global consumption” from the consumption of goods and culture distributed across borders by traders and invaders through out human history is part of a broader debate about the status of globalization as a concept. Critics like Hirst and Thompson (1996) argue that neither the flows of trade, capital investment, and labor migration, nor the impact of new technology between 1950 and 2000, are remarkable when compared to the period between 1850 and 1914. On the other hand, proponents of the globalization thesis such as Castells (1994), Giddens (1999), and Held (1999) argue that the intensification of patterns of interconnectedness mediated by new information technology justifies the conceptualization of the contemporary global system as distinctive – a “global economy” that “works as a unit in real time on a planetary scale” (Castells 1994: 21).

From a Marxist perspective, the globalization of consumption is part of the systemic logic of capitalism, which can only sustain profits through continuous growth. While Marx's predictions of intensifying class struggle did not anticipate the capacity of capitalist mass production to offer workers consumer durables instead of “immiseration,” his observation that “the need of a constantly expanding market for its products chases the bourgeoisie over the whole surface of the globe” proved remarkably prescient. Marx's view that the globalization of consumer markets was a logical outcome of capitalism finds contemporary expression in the work of Immanuel Wallerstein and his followers in “world systems theory,” who argue that the processes to which the term globalization refers are not new, but have existed for the

500 year “life cycle of the capitalist world economy” (Wallerstein 1974).

From the “figurational perspective” of Norbert Elias and his followers, globalization and consumption are understood in terms of an even longer trajectory of human development involving population growth and geographic expansion from the earliest “survival units” of human society. According to this view, the economic processes of production and consumption theorized by Marx tell only one half of the story, in that the movement of goods and people across geographical space is also dependent on physical security – protection from pirates and brigands. Expansion of networks linking producers to consumers therefore required both faster transport and the monopolization of violence by states to secure trade routes. Norbert Elias’s early work on “the civilizing process” in Western Europe is thus seen as documenting “the middle part of the long term story of globalization and its antecedents in one region of the world” (Mennell 1990: 360), and his later work as extending this story back to the role of “survival units” in human prehistory and forwards to the dynamics of nuclear power between global superpowers in the second half of the twentieth century. The interdependence of global consumption and the monopolization of the means of violence can be demonstrated in relation to both “legal” and “illegal” commodities. Global consumption, whether of oil or heroin, depends on securing the sites of production and networks of distribution through the exercise of violence, whether by states or drug cartels.

Globalization of consumption is often equated with Americanization, an argument reinforced by the number of prominent global brands with corporate headquarters in the US, including Coca Cola, Disney, Levi’s, McDonald’s, Nike, Microsoft, and Starbucks. Coca Cola is in that sense iconic, with the term “Coca Colanization” used to signify economic and cultural domination by the US (Wagnleitner 1994). So, too, McDonald’s, its golden arches metonyms of American culture and its restaurants regular targets for anti American protest (Ritzer 2004a). From this perspective, “global culture” is in fact “American culture” and its consumers are “Coca colonials.” Critics of this view point out

that the sources of global culture are not all American, arguing that Ikea furniture, Indian (“Bollywood”) movies and food, Japanese animation, electronics, and sushi – not to mention the global audience for soccer, a sport in which the US is an inconsequential player – all point to more complex processes of global cultural flow.

Equating the globalization of consumption with Americanization is a variant of the claim that globalization of consumption eliminates cultural diversity, leading inexorably to a homogeneous world in which everyone everywhere is the same. Against this, however, are two kinds of arguments. The first focuses on the culturally specific ways in which global products are consumed, and the different meanings attached to global products in different cultural contexts. Ethnographic studies of McDonald’s restaurants in East Asia, for example, suggest that while the popularity of McDonald’s has had an impact on local eating habits, particularly among the young, local customs have equally affected McDonald’s by rejecting the “fast food” ethos and using McDonald’s restaurants as places to “hang out,” effectively turning them into leisure centers and youth clubs (Watson 1997).

The fact that people consume global products does not tell us what this consumption means to them. For example, Daniel Miller’s account of what drinking Coca Cola means in Trinidad suggests that the global product is appropriated into local culture and meaning, becoming “Trinidadian” rather than American – hence the title of his essay, “Coca Cola: A Black Sweet Drink from Trinidad” (Miller 1998). According to Hannerz (1996; Hannerz & Lofgren 1994), global culture is always consumed locally, resulting not in homogenization but in what he calls a “global ecumene” produced through the intersection of global and local in four social and organizational settings: the state, the market, social movements, and the form of life. What is available for consumption in the market is just one factor in a complex cultural process involving the appropriation of global products into different “habitats of meaning” – as, for example, when anti American activists drink Coca Cola or wear Levi’s while expressing hostility towards “US imperialism.”

The assumption that globalization of consumption leads to homogenization is also called into question by Arjun Appadurai's (1990) conceptualization of the global cultural economy as a "complex, overlapping, disjunctive order" that can no longer be understood in terms of center-periphery models. Globalization is not one process but many, not just the circulation of global products and media but of people who recreate "deterritorialized" versions of diverse homeland cultures in countries of immigration. "Global consumption" is as much a matter of buying a sari from an Indian shop in Chicago or Birmingham as of buying Levi's in Mumbai or Delhi, watching "Filipino television" in Los Angeles as watching Disney Asia in Manila.

Globalization has contradictory implications for consumption. On the one hand, the global flow of commodities undermines the viability of "local" products and contributes to the sense that cultural difference is being submerged beneath a global uniform of jeans, t-shirts, sneakers, and baseball caps, a nutritional regime of American fast food, and a cultural diet of CNN, MTV, and Disney. On the other hand, the global flow of people circulates cultural difference; diasporic groups create deterritorialized versions of "homeland" culture in restaurants and stores that serve two markets – one hungering for the familiar, the other for the exotic. Global tourism is similarly contradictory – packaged holidays and hotel chains that insulate travelers from different cultures, Lonely Planet Guides for those in search of authentic alterity. Global consumption is the spread of McDonald's and Disney to Asia, but it is also the availability of Thai curry paste and Hong Kong action movies in Sydney and Seattle. Such examples suggest *interplay* between the world market and cultural identity, between consumption and cultural strategies, rather than a one way process of cultural homogenization, which inevitably and inexorably renders us all the same (Appadurai 1990; Friedman 1990, 1995; Kahn 1995).

The idea that consuming global products involves interplay between global and local rather than cultural homogenization gives rise to the terms "glocal" and "glocalization" (Robertson 1995) to describe what happens

when consumers incorporate global culture into local practice and meaning to produce culture that is neither fully global nor strictly local. By implication, globalization of consumption increases cultural diversity, adding "glocal" hybrids to the existing pool of local cultures. A less optimistic view would see "glocal" cultures as replacing rather than coexisting with "local" cultures, with the balance between global and local shifting inexorably in favor of the global as what's left of the local in "glocal" decreases over time. Ritzer (2004b) has coined the term "grobalization" for this process – an interplay between "grobial" and "glocal" which leaches hybrid forms of locally specific content ("something") and offers global consumers an ever expanding universe of centrally conceived and controlled products that lack distinctive content or character ("nothing").

Global consumption raises questions of social justice and environmental sustainability that might be seen as more important than those of cultural diversity, although the three are inextricably linked. "Consumer culture" is not just hamburgers and Hollywood, but what Raymond Williams called "a whole way of life." To what extent is this way of life sustainable, and what are the consequences of extending its consumption patterns and expectations to all corners of the globe? Can the desire of people in newly industrializing countries for the comforts and conveniences taken for granted in the North – cars, air conditioners, refrigerators, and washing machines – be met without rendering the planet even less habitable? Writing in 1905, in *The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism*, Max Weber observed that the "tremendous cosmos of the modern economic order" in which material goods had "inexorable power" over people's lives had an inescapable logic, which would continue to determine the lives of all within it "until the last ton of fossilized coal" was burnt. A hundred years later, the "iron cage" of this logic circles the globe.

SEE ALSO: Consumption, Green/Sustainable; Consumption, Mass Consumption, and Consumer Culture; Consumption, Tourism and; Globalization; Grobalization; McDonaldization; Media and Consumer Culture

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globalization, culture and

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As the debate about globalization has rapidly expanded and become more, rather than less, contentious, there has emerged what might be called a “negative consensus” concerning the idea of global culture. While there is most definitely no widespread agreement, either “globally” or “locally,” about what we might mean by the term global culture(s), there is – for many, a seemingly reluctant – confirmation of the proposition that the issue of global culture is of paramount significance.

In this regard we are witnesses of and participants in the continuation of an older debate as to whether national societies function primarily within the parameters of a societal culture, variously called the dominant ideology, the hegemonic discourse, the central value system, the common culture, or whatever. The key point here is that social scientists and students of culture have at least converged on the thesis that the question of which particular modes of contested cultural expression and discourse are predominant at any given time and/or place is a matter of importance. This much has been conceded by even the most committed of those of a materialistic persuasion. Indeed, there are few serious analysts of the global human condition who would now claim that ideational perspectives and commitments are mechanical products of autonomous material processes.

The conventional treatment of culture in mainstream sociology, greatly influenced by social and cultural anthropology, was for long that of a binding agent, a phenomenon that provided ideational cohesion and normative guidelines to the members of a society. Over

time this perspective has undergone increasingly strong challenges and in this regard the recognition that societies are not insulated monads has played a crucial role. And it might well be said that it is strange to consider now that until recently in the social sciences – with the problematic exception of international relations – analysis hinged upon such a viewpoint.

Consideration of culture in global or at least transnational terms has led to much rethinking of the concept of culture and its part in social life, not least because practitioners of the meta-discipline of cultural studies have made major interventions in the discussion of globalization, globality, transnationality, global modernities, and so on. Thus, the oft called cultural turn has had a major part in elevating culture to a position of significance in the globalization debate (Robertson 1992: 32–48; Inglis 2005: 110–36). This is not to say, however, that the cultural factor is totally accepted as central to the thinking of those working on matters global.

Almost certainly, the most controversial question in the general, non-reductionist discussion of globalization concerns whether the world as a whole is being swept by homogenizing cultural forces, at one extreme, or whether the world is, on the other hand, becoming increasingly marked by variety and difference. The middle ground position between total homogeneity and total heterogeneity of global culture as involving sameness within difference (or, perhaps, difference within sameness) is somewhat analogous to Durkheim's ideas of a century or more ago concerning national societies. Durkheim argued that at the societal level the form of social solidarity had shifted over evolutionary time from a condition of mechanical solidarity, involving sameness, to one of organic solidarity, involving the "coordination" of difference. (While Durkheim saw this issue mainly in relational terms, the concern here is with the problem in cultural terms.) Total homogeneity entails such a lack of vitality in human life that there would be a very strong entropic tendency across the world as a whole, while total heterogeneity suggests a world so completely marked by difference that there would be little or no sharing of worldviews or lifestyles, no solidarity at all. Thus, put in these hypothetical but actually realistically impossible terms, the two extreme positions are really

descriptions of, or recipes for, the collapse of the global human condition. This is actually an interesting, if apocalyptic, line of deliberation, one worth pursuing, particularly in light of the global trauma of recent years, but which cannot be taken up here.

Insofar as the globalization equals homogenization thesis has been so much in evidence in recent years, often in tandem with the conceptually unacceptable claim that Americanization is the same as globalization (Beck et al. 2003), the emphasis here is more on heterogeneity than homogeneity. Nonetheless, the motif of sameness is not relegated to the background. For the relationship between universal (or universals) and the particulars is a crucial, indeed *the* pivotal issue in the study of globalization, considered as a long term, multidimensional process. Globalization – conceived, of necessity, as *glocalization* (Robertson 1992: 173–4; 1995) – is a self-limiting process. In the light of the idea of glocality, globalization can only take hold unless globalizing forces can find or produce a niche in relation to the local and the particular. This is to be seen in the maxim that it is the particular which makes the universal work.

Put simply, globalization is defined as involving a move in the direction of unicity or oneness, with (1) a deepening and extending of reflexive global consciousness and (2) an increase in global connectivity and density. Both those phenomena are intimately related (Tomlinson 1999). One major manifestation of this relationship may be clearly seen in the current intimacy of economy and culture. They are complicitous in the specific sense that the worldwide production, promotion, distribution, and sale of goods and services has led to an increasing sensitivity to actual or constructed/cultural difference. In fact, cultural difference is a major selling point, in that the exotic alterity of a product is much used as a suggested rationale for consumption. On the other hand, the commodification of culture – in the form of cultural goods (Cowan 2002; Brown 2003) – makes them increasingly open to economic considerations and analysis.

PERSPECTIVES ON GLOBAL CULTURE

The idea of reflexive global consciousness is a critical aspect of any intervention in the debate

about global culture. It can usefully be approached via Marx's distinction between a class in itself and a class for itself. Clearly, global humanity has existed for millennia, but without possessing anything like the degree of widespread, but contested, sense of the fate of the concrete world as a whole in which we are participants in these early years of the twenty-first century. In other words, the *problem* of the world for itself is increasingly constitutive of the Durkheimian conscience collective of our time. This can be seen in various manifestations, most notably since the near global trauma of September 11, 2001. For in this very recent – and still ongoing – case, many, many people around the globe have been drawn in one way or another to consider the future and nature of our planet and its inhabitants, although increasingly in recent decades a way was prepared for this in millennialistic movies and books.

Notwithstanding the significance of access to the oil of the southern republics of the former Soviet Union, as well as the issues of Realpolitik, there can be no denying that the September 2001 attacks on the World Trade Center and the Pentagon, and the airplane that crashed near Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania, have brought cultural issues to the forefront of the global arena. This is to be seen in the way in which the theme of civilized versus uncivilized and the clash between different values and beliefs has been a conspicuous aspect of the post September 11 world situation (Barkawi 2006). In addition, the theme of anti Americanism is clearly a cultural phenomenon, even though much of the anti Americanism refers to the exercise of the economic and political strength of the US.

But the significance of September 11, 2001 should not be exaggerated. Or, conversely, there have been many events and circumstances recently, as well as in past centuries, that have extended and intensified the sense of a world for itself. One crucial factor in this respect is the extent to which consciousness of such events and circumstances is widespread and no longer confined to relatively small and/or isolated elites. Leaving any truly careful consideration of the latter reservation largely on one side, in relatively modern times the voyages of “discovery” of the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries; the Napoleonic wars; rapid improvements in means of travel and communication

during the nineteenth century; plus a large number of global events; natural catastrophes; and the inauguration of supranational or global institutions during the twentieth century (Robertson 1992) – all of these have heightened the sense of globality, as experienced now. On the other hand, much has been done of late to show that the sense of oneness of the world has been closed to modern scholarship. Only relatively recently have we come to recognize that consciousness of globality is much, much older than we have been led to believe, this being due in large part to the blinkering effect of disciplinary.

Quotations from two recently published books can illustrate these themes. In their study of the Renaissance entitled *Global Interests: Renaissance Art between East and West*, Jardine and Brotton (2000: 8) write of their recognition that “for purposes of artistic and other material transaction, the boundaries between . . . East and West were thoroughly permeable in the Renaissance.” They go on to say that along with recognizing cross fertilization and a two way traffic in influence “comes the inevitable recognition that cultural histories kept utterly distinct and kept traditionally separate, are ripe to be written as shared East/West undertakings.” Accentuating the elitist nature of global consciousness more fully, Wills (2001: 3) writes in his *1688: A Global History* that “even today, with all our opportunities for world travel and our instantaneous communications, the number of people who have a steady sense of the world as one world or even among several major parts of it is not as great as we would like to think.” Wills adds that “in 1688 a full sense of the variety of the world's places and peoples, of their separations and their connections, was confined to a few Europeans,” such as philosophers, Jesuit missionaries, travelers, and literate urbanites, although elite Chinese, for example, “were aware of the Europeans as a new element on the far margins of their ‘All under Heaven,’ but hardly at all of Africa and the Americas.”

Now, of course, we live at a time when via numerous world events and worldwide trauma – not to speak of worldwide ecological problems and pandemics, as well as space travel – our global consciousness continues to grow in reflexivity in both senses of the latter term. On the one hand, we think and act in unreflective

reaction to global events. On the other hand, we are also constrained to think and act reflectively in relation to these, this being the most important conception of reflexivity involved here.

Although not unconnected with the theme of global consciousness, the issue of a global culture raises rather different considerations. The study of culture in global terms is not merely somewhat different from the study of culture in societal terms, but that the concern with globalization has led to a rethinking of the study of societal cultures. However, without relinquishing this thesis, it must be said that this argument can be taken too far. Whether there is a global culture can be considered by invoking the work of Boli and Thomas (1999:17): "Culture lies at the heart of world development. Technical progress, bureaucratization, capitalist organization, states, and markets are embedded in cultural models, often not explicitly recognized as such, that specify 'the nature of things' and the 'purposes of action.' These cultural conceptions do more than orient action; they also constitute actors." The same authors go on to argue that it is worldwide "cultural principles" that define actors in certain ways – as having needs, emotions, and capacities and by providing templates for identities, roles, and selves. In the same way, cultural models also "define" collective identities and interests of such entities as firms, states, and nations. Moreover, actors do not act so much as they *enact* (Jepperson 1991). Boli and Thomas (1999: 18) go further and maintain that "the enactment of cultural models ... thus represents broad homologies, with actors everywhere defining themselves in similar ways and pursuing similar purposes by similar means, *but specific actions in specific contexts vary almost without limit*" (emphasis added). The end of this sentence is highlighted because it draws attention to *glocal* issues and also because it inhibits any temptation to consider the propositions of Boli and Thomas as presenting a classical dominant culture model. Nonetheless, these writers do clearly insist on there being a definite world or global culture. And in this regard they are posing an extremely important question: Why do we find so much similarity with respect to "actors" and institutions across more or less the entire world? This query is discussed with much sophistication by Lechner and Boli (2005).

While Boli, Thomas, and Lechner are keen to recognize that individual and collective actors "actively draw on, select from, and modify shared cultural models, principles, and identities" (Swidler 1986), they show much more interest in world cultural models than processes of selection and rejection of such. Moreover, such processes appear in their work as more or less confined to selection from (or rejection of) *world cultural* models rather than models presented by other actors. These authors (Boli and Thomas in particular) might well respond that since *all* "actors" are subject to the constraints of world cultural models, then ostensible emulation of other societies means that such emulation is in effect still enactment of such models.

In any case, the key consideration is that we find here a persuasive argument for the idea of a single global culture, one which derives in large part from the perception that there is a remarkable similarity in general terms among institutions across the world, as well as in the cognitive construction of "definitions, principles, and purposes" (Boli & Thomas 1999: 19). Thus, in a sense, the existence of a single global culture is largely derived from the observation of such homologies and isomorphisms. This is very different from Wallerstein's "metaphysical presuppositions" that are sometimes invoked as a way of accounting for the continuity of his world capitalistic system. In fact, indirectly, the stance of Boli and Thomas derives its significance partly from a cogent rejection of Wallerstein's general approach (Robertson 1992: 65–8).

The contested nature of world cultural models is by no means denied in the Boli–Thomas perspective, but nonetheless they maintain that conflicting models and discourse "share fundamental conceptions regarding actors, agency, technique, societal purposes, and much more" (Boli & Thomas 1999: 19). Moreover, universal cultural principles may in themselves produce conflict in that, if actors have identical goals, they are likely to compete for the same resources. However, this concession – if such it may be called – concerning competing cultural models tends to underestimate discontinuities, discontinuities that can and do lead to conflict and contestation. This is clearly the case with respect to the current "war on terror." That having been said, the program of Boli and

Thomas, as well as other members of the so called Stanford School who have been much influenced by John Meyer (Boli & Thomas 1999: v), has been undeservedly neglected.

In summary, it can be said that the approach to global or world culture of Meyer, Boli, and Thomas et al. is in a number of respects very cogent. For, working mainly from the observation of homologies and isomorphic connections, it comes to the almost inevitable conclusion that there must be “something” upon which these are based. On the other hand, there is a kind of disconcerting neatness about this overall argument, leading to a neglect of what might be called the messiness of world culture. Indeed, this is precisely why there is a need to present *other* ways of considering the latter. (It is worth stating here that the work of Lechner with Robertson has led to an important convergence with respect to the discussion of world or global culture.)

Perhaps the most neglected of all the ingredients of global culture is that which is involved in interactions – better, interpenetrations and comparisons – between nation states, indeed of international blocs and of entire civilizations. To put this somewhat abstractly, we can envisage the contemporary world as being made up of a large series of dyadic relations between nation states. Thus – to take a few salient cases – we could consider the following as exemplars: France–Germany; the US–UK; China–Japan; Greece–Turkey; France–US; Argentina–the UK; Israel–the US; Russia–China, and so on and so forth. Each of these cultures of nation state interaction has unique features although, of course, no dyad stands alone. Each is embedded in a vast complex of networks. Probably the most crucial point that should be made here, without going into the specifics of any particular dyadic case, is that to some large extent national identities are formed with respect to the interpenetration of sociocultural features of each society, or one nation state internalizes the image that the other nation is perceived to hold of “self.” A very interesting case of national identity interpenetration is provided by the Japan–US relationship in historical perspectives.

Quite closely related to this is the way in which externally generated characterizations of

a nation state become central to a nation state’s identity. The classic example is how de Tocqueville’s *Democracy in America* – written over 150 years ago – has been continuously reproduced in order to declare the central tenets of US American identity within the American context. Parallel examples abound of other societies’ reliance on the interpretations of external observers. And it should be said that the general – not to say highly problematic – notion of national “identity” illustrates the sameness/difference question very well. For while the very mention of identity summons up ideas concerning uniqueness and difference, the fact is that there is something like a global recipe or template for the production and presentation of national identities, this having much to do with models of and for the well worn theme of the invention of tradition that blossomed globally at the beginning of the twentieth century (Robertson 1992: 146–63).

Westney (1987) has well described the growth of selective emulation (in tandem with national identity formation) in Meiji Japan. In so doing she has emphasized that Meiji emulation of selected features of western nation states was greatly facilitated by the fact that it was also occurring among European nation states themselves. This late nineteenth century scenario may usefully be generalized to relations among all nation states in more recent times. In this regard there has been institutionalized, at the international level, an ongoing series of processes of comparison, with the academic observer becoming increasingly interested in what could be called the comparison of comparison. As has already been implied, this has much bearing on the issue of homologous and isomorphic relationships between and among the “appearance” of similar phenomena in a variety of societies. This emulation, as well as the rejection, process, provides a dynamic addition to the Meyer–Boli–Thomas position described previously.

At the same time, the circulation of practices, ideas, and institutional forms around the world is a central aspect of global culture. This has in the past often been indicated by the term cultural diffusion. But the latter term in itself lacks explicit sensitivity to the globalizing character of the circulation of sociocultural

phenomena. The same is true of what are frequently cast as flows from one context to others. In recent times non governmental organizations (NGOs) have played a big part in this as they have in the promotion and sustaining of diasporic relations with the “homeland.” In this case the multiplication of loyalties via population movements has become a crucial element of global culture. In particular, the assimilation of immigrants in the fully fledged sense is rapidly declining, so much so that the vast question of national societal membership and citizenship is a central and increasingly controversial problem of our time, particularly since 9/11 and, in the UK, 7/7. Thus, the increasing significance of transnational communities with their own cultures (Portes 2000), the prominence of these being greatly facilitated by the new and still expanding forms of electronic communication, the relative cheapness of air travel, and the growth of the illicit traffic in human beings.

The culture of images of the constitution of the world as a whole is a perspective on culture that pivots upon the different forms in terms of which the world as a whole is envisaged (Robertson 1992: 61–84). In addition, however, there is a need to indicate the ways in which what have been called global futures also constitute a significant element of contemporary global culture. While there have been for many centuries both utopian and dystopian prognoses of the future of the world, the current concern with the processes of globalization (however defined) has led increasingly to speculation about and programs for its future. What were for the most part conceived as “anti globalization” movements have become transformed inexorably into movements advocating alternatives to the currently perceived views of the state of the world.

These two aspects of images of the world – rather simplistically divided into normatively diagnostic and normatively prognostic – are closely linked. The “global futures” trend has meant that serious theoretical and empirical typifications of “really existing” images of the world have been neglected, to the detriment of the “realism” of projected utopias. For example, the much flourished phrase “globalization from below” entails virtually no attention as to how the structure of the world in its most general contours is or can be envisaged.

So we must turn to “really existing” images of the world. In the present frame of reference images of how the world is constituted may be cast in terms of four fundamental components of the world arena: nation states; individual selves; international relations (or the system of modern societies); and humankind. Images of the world, whether upheld by individuals or by small or large collectivities, revolve around these tendencies. In one sense, this is a purely hypothetical perspective. On the other hand, it reflects closely the form that globalization has taken in recent centuries (Robertson 1992: 25–31, 58–9, 75–83). Holton (1998) sketches four main images of world order: (1) a single worldwide community with strong bonds; (2) a world of bounded communities with weaker bonds at the global level; (3) a world government in federal form, with relatively strong bonds; and (4) a world composed of bounded nation states that are not strongly bonded but are relatively open and guided primarily by conceptions of national interest. As Holton (1998: 41) remarks, this kind of work on world images “assists in opening up excessively economic or political accounts of globalization to wider issues of cultural representation and evaluation.” He goes on to say that in this perspective globalization is as much about ideals and values as economic development, about ideals of what the world should be as well as what it currently is or is thought to be. This nicely captures the significance of images of world order, thinking that is as much empirically rooted as it is about ideals for the future.

Nonetheless, the advocacy of globalization from below, to repeat, must surely entail a realistic form of utopianism. Otherwise globalization from below simply becomes a kind of culture of resistance, something which is true of much of so called postcolonial and subaltern theory.

CONCLUSION

Four major, non exclusive aspects of the theme of global culture have been explored in the foregoing. The conclusion may be drawn that the inexhaustive list of themes that have been indicated shows that what can be reasonably

included under the rubric of global culture is considerable. In fact it would be perfectly plausible to insist that global culture is much richer and “thicker” than the culture of any given nation state. It is indeed more than a pity that so much intellectual energy has been expended in debating the homogenization cum Americanization thesis, as well as in arguing about the degree to which global (or any other) culture should, if at all, be considered epiphenomenally, when there is so much to address with respect to the diversity of global culture or cultures.

A return to the events of September 11, 2001 and their aftermath is more than appropriate. Presciently, Bamyeh (2000: 84–5) suggested well before that day that Huntington’s (1996) prognosis of a “clash of civilizations” could in fact become a self fulfilling prophecy; although Bamyeh surely errs in attributing “the shift to the cultural” as “the victory of capitalism,” for while capitalism has indeed been a major vehicle in recent times for the resurrection of the cultural factor (Robotham 2005), the latter’s significance had been hidden previously by capitalism itself. We should not be tempted by or pushed into averting our attention to the cultural factor simply because Huntington “wrote the script” for September 11. For surely on that very day culture sprang back, perversely, into its rightful place in the analysis of processes of globalization. All the millions of words that have been uttered about it so far, as well as visual representations of it and its aftermath are, it should be heavily emphasized, *cultural* by definition.

SEE ALSO: Civilizations; Culture; Discourse; Diversity; Durkheim, Émile; Globalization; Glocalization; Grobalization; Ideological Hegemony; Ideology; McDonaldization; Nation State and Nationalism; NGO/INGO; Religion

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globalization, education and

Keiko Inoue and Francisco O. Ramirez

The globalization of education refers to the expansion and increased interconnectedness of education related activity throughout the world. Much of the sociological research on this broad subject has focused on the following dimensions of the globalization of education: expansion of educational enrollments at all levels, nationalization of schooling, standardization of education, and the rise of an international educational sector. These studies are guided by functionalist, conflict, and institutional theories of education.

EXPANSION

Access to education has become a primary concern for states, societies, and transnational organizations. Education as human capital and education as a human right are widely held principles that fuel this concern. Earlier fears of the “overeducated” or “diploma diseases” have given way to efforts to identify and correct enrollment deficiencies. The achievement of universal primary education by 2015 is a United Nations Millennium Development Goal that commands great consensus. And indeed, primary, secondary, and tertiary enrollments relative to the appropriate age cohorts have sharply increased since World War II. The world primary enrollment ratio increased from about 80 percent in 1970 to nearly universal (99 percent) in 2000. Similar expansionary trends are found for both secondary and tertiary enrollment ratios. The corresponding change for secondary schooling is also impressive, with the secondary enrollment ratio more than doubling, from 32 percent in 1970 to 75 percent in 2000. Yet the most striking growth is found at the level of tertiary education, which more than quadruples in this period, from 7 percent in the earlier period to nearly 30 percent by the end of the century. While secondary and tertiary enrollments were concentrated in developed countries in the earlier periods, much of the current observable growth is due to

expansionary trends in less developed countries. What started as a “world educational crisis” (Coombs 1968) in primary schooling has now dramatically transformed education worldwide, with more optimistic world education agendas prevailing (Meyer et al. 1992).

To explain this phenomenon functionalists tout the role of education in development, often using human capital theory to argue that investments in education produce a well trained labor force spurring economic growth (Schultz 1961). Increased exposure to schooling, and especially to quality schooling (Hanushek & Kimko 2000), enhances individual productivity, and subsequently, economic growth. Modernization theories emphasize broader skills and capacities, but they too suggest that education grows because it contributes to the well being of individuals and of society (Inkeles & Smith 1974). These arguments are often restricted to lower levels of schooling, since the link of higher education to economic growth is more questionable. The crucial assumption underlying these theories is that education is primarily a process of socialization.

Conflict theories view educational expansion as the outcome of competition between different social classes and ethnic groups seeking to monopolize or to acquire certification advantages (Collins 1979). Within this perspective education is primarily a process of allocation to differentially valued positions within society. To the degree that allocation via education rules triumph worldwide, one should expect to find worldwide educational expansion. In a world of unequal economic and political relations, the preference for education allocation rules in core states should result in their adoption in peripheral ones, leading to educational growth but also undercutting local educational autonomy (Altbach 1977).

Institutional theories share some of the skepticism of conflict theories regarding the functions of education. These theories emphasize the widespread belief in education as the driving source of economic growth and social progress. This belief in turn reflects the degree to which education is a process of legitimation, defining what constitutes proper knowledge and reasonable personnel in society (Meyer 1977). From this perspective the worldwide growth of education is shaped by world models




Figure 1 Mean educational enrollment ratio by level, 1970–2000.

Source: All data are from the *World Development Indicators 2004* database (available online at www.worldbank.org/data/wdi2004/index.htm).

of progress and justice and the degree to which an increasing number of countries are linked to these models.

Whether driven by processes of socialization, allocation, or legitimation, or a combination of these processes, the phenomenal expansion of education is the first and perhaps most significant manifestation of the globalization of education.

NATIONALIZATION

There are several indicators of the degree to which education has been nationalized over time. One measure is the extent to which a national compulsory rule has been adopted. Earlier debates about the reasonableness of such a rule or the right of the state to compel schooling (see Mangan 1994) have disappeared. The proportion of countries which adopted such a rule increased to over 80 percent by the late 1980s (Ramirez & Ventresca 1992). Failure to fully comply with this law is widely regarded as a problem, as evidenced by current debates about attendance rates in some countries. A similar measure of nationalization involves the establishment of national ministries of education, that is, state agencies with direct or indirect authority over schooling. For instance, data from the *Stateman's Year Book* series from 1814 to 2003 show that the founding of ministries of education has been fairly constant over the past two centuries. Almost a third of the national ministries of education

were established during the nineteenth century, mostly in Western Europe but also in Latin America as well as in Japan and Ethiopia. With decolonization after World War II, many more countries nationalized their expanding school systems.

From a functionalist perspective, states take over schooling because states assume managerial controls over all societal activities deemed important. Conflict theories have emphasized the degree to which the nationalization of schooling is a reaction to multi ethnic conflicts (Collins 1979) or class based contestations (Spring 1972). Instead of social fragmentation, national integration is maintained via state controls over education. Lastly, from an institutional perspective the issue is one of identity. The proper nation state commits itself to schooling and to a school system linked to transnationally validated national goals and purposes. In other words, the nationalization of education is driven by the need to affirm proper nation state identity. There is little evidence that nationalization is more likely to occur under the conditions of expanded education or increased conflict imagined by functionalist and conflict theories (Ramirez & Rubinson 1979). However, recent developments in the direction of educational decentralization, privatization, and marketization were unanticipated within the institutional perspective. Addressing these new developments, functionalists assume that considerations of efficiencies constitute the underlying dynamic, while conflict theorists contend that transnational capitalist elites are




Figure 2 Cumulative number of education ministries by founding year (1814–1993).
Source: Data are from the *Statesman's Year Book*, 1814–2003.

undermining national states, and thus, the nationalization of education.

Further studies are needed to ascertain which features of the nationalization of education are withering and which continue to thrive. National goals and purposes may continue to be affirmed, even as schooling increasingly relies on subnational sources of funding. These studies need to take into account the multidimensional character of the nationalization of education, as well as the multiple and at times inconsistent sources of influence that impinge on national educational decision-making bodies.

STANDARDIZATION

Broad and common principles of education as human capital and education as a human right inform national educational goals, structure, curricula, and reform discourse. National education goals are remarkably similar, with economic growth and social progress at the top of the list. Human development, of course, is the key to both economic growth and social progress. Additionally, human development is to unfold within classrooms, within schools. Deschooling society proposals linger but are weak, while informal education is almost always coopted and becomes part of formal schooling. In practice, education has become schooling and the structure of schooling has become standardized.

Curricular content has also become more similar across countries (Meyer et al. 1992). What is to be taught and how much of it commands overall curricular time varies less than one would expect if national school curricula were truly distinctive. History and geography subjects, for example, tend to be bundled around a more child-centric social studies curriculum (Wong 1991). Even the study of science undergoes change to become more socially and personally relevant (McEneaney & Meyer 2000). Standardization is more evident with respect to primary and secondary schooling, but increasingly more and more universities converge on the principle that universities should be more broadly accessible, socially useful, and organizationally flexible. In Europe the driving force is the Bologna Declaration, but elsewhere standardization is conditioned by more associational processes reflecting the influence of educational professionals and organizations worldwide.

Does standardization take place because there are optimal forms of structure and curricula that trump everywhere? Do within-nation and between-nation conflicts lead to common compromises in the form of common educational structures and curricula? What is it about some structural forms and curricular emphases that make them more likely to be associated with a more legitimate nation-state identity? These are the research questions that the different theoretical perspectives need to tackle in the face of growing educational standardization. More

broadly, a robust sociological inquiry into the globalization of education needs to engage educational reform discourse to make more explicit its taken for granted assumptions. Does not the search for “best practices” in education presuppose a high degree of transnational portability? And does not this assumption fly in the face of calls for a nationally distinctive and relevant curriculum? Is “lifelong learning” an extraordinarily optimistic assessment of human malleability and capacity? Or does the retreat of the state and welfare safety nets give rise to the lifelong learning mantra? Similar sociological probes need to be undertaken with respect to “teaching for understanding” and “developing higher order skills.”

INTERNATIONALIZATION

The globalization of education has also involved the formation of an international educational sector. The latter consists of the organizations and professionals that articulate educational standards, setting forth appropriate educational goals and targets that foster the expansion and standardization of education discussed earlier. The school systems and universities of the more developed or more dominant countries have influenced educational developments throughout the world for over a century (Epstein 1994). This influence may be due to the greater attractiveness of the educational system of economically or politically successful countries. Alternatively, coercive processes reflecting power dependency ties between countries may shape educational outcomes in the more dependent ones (Altbach 1977).

In addition to mimetic and coercive mechanism, normative ones stemming from professional influence may also be at work. With the founding of the United Nations Educational, Scientific, and Cultural Organization (Unesco) in 1946, a series of international educational conferences have been the sites for much educational standard setting and international cooperation in education discourse (Chabbot 2003; Mundy 1998). These conferences have given greater visibility to shared or privileged educational goals and to portable school and university curricula, pedagogy, and structures. They have thus fostered globalization of

education via internationalization and international influences as well as globalized international interrelated educational activities.

To illustrate internationalization, consider the case of the Education For All (EFA) initiative, with world conferences held in Jomtien in 1990 and Dakar in 2000. The EFA movement created a space for governments of developed and developing countries, as well as their non-governmental counterparts, to embrace the task of achieving universal primary education by 2015. The movement is orchestrated by Unesco, the World Bank, the United Nations Children’s Fund (Unicef), and the United Nations Development Program (UNDP), but non-governmental organizations have become increasingly active in the promotion of universal primary education. Global Campaign for Education, for instance, has brought together NGOs and teachers’ unions in over 150 countries, creating a transnational web of organizations behind the EFA movement. Such networks of international organizations in turn act as “teachers of norms” (Finnemore 1996), resulting in increased standardization in goals and structures of educational systems around the world.

Addressing inequalities of access to schooling by gender and other social characteristics has also been a special focus of EFA and related international initiatives. For instance, the United Nations Girls’ Education Initiative addresses the gender gap in primary education enrollment. Though gender disparities are evident, the worldwide trend has been in the direction of greater equality at all educational levels. In fact, the growth rate for women’s share of educational enrollment was greater than the increase in overall rate of educational expansion between 1970 and 2000. With respect to higher education, for instance, women’s share of higher education has increased from 5 percent in 1970 to 32 percent in 2000. Even in fields traditionally regarded as male dominated, such as science and engineering, women’s enrollment has increased (Ramirez & Wotipka 2001).

In light of this discussion, the argument commonly held by conflict theorists involving the hegemonic influence of powerful donor countries or multilateral organizations is worth revisiting. The active participation of southern NGOs at the World Education Forum in Dakar in 2000 is a testament to the extensive




Figure 3 Mean female share of educational enrollment by level, 1970–2000.

Source: All data are from the *World Development Indicators 2004* database (available online at www.worldbank.org/data/wdi2004/index.htm).

grassroots engagement fueling the movement. In fact, non governmental contribution produced the *NGO Declaration on Education for All* in Dakar, reflecting civil society's long term commitment to the movement. NGOs have also been crucial to the formation of other education related initiatives, including active promotion of the United Nations Decade for Human Rights Education (1995–2004).

Why have governmental and non governmental organizations unvaryingly embraced the global initiative to promote education, particularly universal primary schooling? A closer examination of EFA and other education related initiatives highlights the great faith placed on education in eradicating obstacles to development and overcoming other social ills. The proclamation in the Millennium Development Goals is straightforward in linking EFA with economic growth: education is development. The Global Campaign for Education not only correlates EFA with poverty alleviation, but it also bases its work on the belief that education is a universal human right that can produce “sustainable human development.” Education is a means to national economic growth and stability, as well as a source of individual empowerment. The penetration of the EFA movement at the global and local levels demonstrates the extent to which education has become the most legitimate mechanism for pursuing common goals of economic productivity, political democracy, and social justice.

SYNTHESIS

To better understand the nature of educational globalization, further research should focus on three areas. First, given the interconnected relationship between the global and the local, a multilevel analysis that takes into account international activity and its link to grassroots work is pertinent. Currently, researchers tend to focus solely on broad trends at the global level or the impact of globalization in a particular context at the local level. Second, researchers should take advantage of newly available education related variables and further explore the persistent gender, income level, and regional gaps. Third, more research is needed to problematize the assumed link between education and economic productivity and individual empowerment. The commonly held belief that education is the key ingredient to progress and justice should also be questioned and revisited.

More direct tests of the implications of alternative theories of the globalization of education would further our understanding of this worldwide dynamic with multiple repercussions. The possible coercive and hegemonic nature of educational expansion also needs to be reconsidered. And finally, a further examination of the taken for granted character of educational globalization would allow for a broader understanding of the political and cultural dimensions of the massification of education. Functionalist, conflict, and institutional theories continue to

frame sociological research questions about the mechanisms underlying the globalization of education.

SEE ALSO: Colleges and Universities; Conflict Theory; Education; Globalization; Schooling and Economic Success; Stratification and Inequality, Theories of; Structural Functional Theory

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globalization and global justice

Dieter Rucht

Global justice movements (GJMs) are a loose alliance of contemporary leftist movements whose common denominator is their resistance to globalizing neoliberalism that promotes free trade, deregulation, and privatization as keys to universal progress. In the eyes of its critics, neoliberalism serves the interests of economic and political elites at the cost of the large majority of the population within, but especially beyond, the most developed countries (Rucht 2003). GJMs identify the driving force of neoliberalism in relentless profit seeking that causes a plethora of evils, such as violation of human and civil rights, destruction of

indigenous cultures, growing unemployment and increasingly precarious jobs, environmental degradation, and the widening gap between the affluent and the poor.

According to most mass media, the birth of what they dub the “anti globalization movement” was marked by the protests of a broad transnational coalition, ranging from left wing radicals to trade unionists to Catholic associations, against the 1999 summit of the World Trade Organization (WTO) in Seattle. While many groups initially accepted their designation as the anti globalization movement, they now widely reject it. Rather, they refer to themselves as global justice movements (or global solidarity movements) because, first, they deliberately create transnational networks and organize transnational, if not global, campaigns; and second, they oppose only some forms and aspects of (economic) globalization while promoting globalization of democracy, justice, and solidarity. Hence, they are anti global in some respects and pro global in others.

Contrary to common perception, GJMs had already emerged before the Seattle protests. The creation of loose alliances relating different issues and mobilizing transnationally to some degree can be traced to the nineteenth century (Boli & Thomas 1999). Also, challenging official summits is not a new tactic. As early as 1972, a counter summit took place at the UN Conference on the Human Environment in Stockholm. In 1985 dozens of groups protested against the G7 summit in Cologne and in Bonn (though most of these groups came from the summit’s host country). The Berlin meeting of the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund in 1988 was accompanied by a “week of action” that culminated in a protest rally attended by some 80,000 people (Gerhards & Rucht 1992). More recent protests, such as the one against the G8 meeting in Genoa in 2001, attracted more than 200,000 participants. Some of these protests were marked by severe clashes between a minority of mostly young demonstrators and police.

Most GJMs can be seen as an outgrowth or second generation of the so called “new social movements” that have flourished since the 1960s, focusing on issues such as human and citizen rights, participatory democracy, peace and disarmament, environmental protection,

urban renewal, and third world problems. Compared to this older family of “new” movements, GJMs focus more on transnational and even global issues, they target international governmental bodies and multinational corporations, and they create transnational movement infrastructures (della Porta & Tarrow 2005; Tarrow 2005). Because they identify the globalizing market economy as a source of a number of acute problems, many trade unions that tended to keep the new social movements at arm’s length have also become allies or even integral parts of the GJMs.

Groups associated with the contemporary GJMs differ widely regarding their social, cultural, and organizational background. Among them are well known scientists, impoverished farmers, professional trade union organizers, and unemployed, gray haired activists from the Old Left, in addition to politically inexperienced students, delegates from Northern religious congregations, and representatives of Southern indigenous people. The organizational forms include local and informal grassroots groups, firmly structured national and transnational non governmental organizations (NGOs), scientifically oriented think tanks, loose alliances and campaigns, leftist parties and sects, trade unions, farmer associations, student bodies, etc.

Unlike many earlier left movements that were often preoccupied with internal cleavages (if not bitter fights), the GJMs, in general, tend to exhibit a more tolerant attitude in terms of internal differences. This has caused many GJM groups to praise their overarching unity and identity as a new “movement of movements.” However, some observers rather stress the differences and cleavages among and within these movements. Apart from anti neoliberalism as the negative common denominator of almost all GJMs, numerous gaps exist that make it difficult to speak of one unified movement. Some currents pursue a reformist course aimed at mitigating the negative side effects of economic globalization, while other groups promote a strictly anti capitalist course and maintain the need for a revolutionary change. Accordingly, there is disunity about the questions of whether to cooperate with or instead fight against national and international governmental bodies, whether a free market has to be applied in a restricted manner or whether it should be rejected

altogether, and whether disruptive actions or even violence on the part of the movements is a legitimate means of pursuing the movements' goals. These differences are not only verbally expressed, but sometimes also have led to the physical separation of different ideological currents. This separation can be observed in the various parallel protest marches that occasionally take place at one single event, as well as at various Social Forums that have been split into a mainstream component and a – normally smaller – radical counterpart.

Thus far, the GJMs have been visible to the larger public mainly through three kinds of activities. First, they have organized counter summits and protests at official meetings of the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund, the WTO, G8, and EU summits, thematically oriented UN conferences, and the like (Pianta 2001). Second, they have launched several major campaigns on issues such as land mines, the Multilateral Agreement on Investments, the trading of toxic waste, debt relief (or debt cancellation) for the poorest countries, and precarious working conditions in Europe, etc. Some of the more regionally focused movements, such as those addressing the struggles of the Mexican Zapatistas, landless farmers in Brazil, and the people against the Narmada dam system in India, received worldwide attention and support. Third, GJMs have created their own infrastructures. Some of the most significant examples are the Social Forums, which today exist from the local to the global level. A starting point was the World Social Forum (WSF) in Porto Alegre (Brazil) in 2001. This WSF, with some 20,000 participants, was conceived as a critical counterpart to the elitist World Economic Forum that has been held in the Swiss mountain resort of Davos annually since 1970. In the past few years the WSF has become a major event in its own right (Sen et al. 2004). The fifth WSF in 2005, again taking place in Porto Alegre, was attended by 155,000 participants from 135 countries. In the past few years, continental and national forums have also been held in Asia, Africa, Latin America, and Europe. The European Social Forums that took place in Florence, Paris, and London were each attended by tens of thousands of participants. Yet the forum idea spread very disproportionately. For example, social forums are marginal

in the USA – a country that otherwise has an active community of global justice groups. In Germany the forum idea only gained momentum in 2003. By the end of 2005 around 60 local forums had come into existence. In Italy, where the concept of forums emerged in the wake of the protests against the G8 summit in Genoa in 2001, perhaps as many as 150 local forums already exist.

Thus far, the social forums at the continental and global levels have mainly been a marketplace of ideas for how to expose domestic and cross national problems, exchange experiences, make contacts, and create new networks. The WSF, in particular, has been defined as an open platform for a heterogeneous mix of groups which excludes only leftist guerrilla fighters, right wing extremists, and political parties. The platform concept, however, does not remain unchallenged. Some leftist groups have criticized the forum as being a kind of “talk shop,” unwilling and unable to engage in political activity that has any visible impact. These radicals would like to turn the WSF into a more unified actor that takes binding decisions and engages in joint action. While these radical groups have occasionally organized separate marches or camps within the WSF framework in previous years (most notably in Mumbai in 2004), it seems that fewer of these groups participated in the 2005 event, which was not marked by an identifiable split. Another point of internal criticism against the WSF is the somewhat opaque recruitment procedure for the International Council, which decides the location and structure of the WSF.

An additional significant infrastructural component are those groups and networks that are not coalitions of preexisting groups focusing on women's rights, climate change, rainforests, etc., but which have been genuinely created to promote the overarching ideas of the GJMs. One example of these new creations is “Fifty Years is Enough,” a group that was established to deliberately challenge the uncritical celebration of the 50th anniversary of the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank in 1994. Another such group is Attac, which was first established in France in early 1998 and then spread to dozens of other countries. Although initially created to promote a tax designed to reduce the cross border flow of speculative

capital (the Tobin Tax), Attac soon broadened its agenda, becoming a multi issue group that incorporated the majority of relevant themes and claims of the GJMs. Attac exerts a strong influence on the WSF process. Even though the group is nonexistent in several large countries such as the US, Attac has become a central player of the GJMs in many other countries. In Germany, media tend to equate Attac with the movements at large. Attac Germany was successful in building an alliance with major trade unions; one of these, representing approximately 2.5 million members, has even joined the much smaller Attac group (16,000 individual members).

A third significant infrastructural component is the creation of Indymedia, a network of alternative media groups that basically utilize the Internet for their purposes. The first local group was set up during the Seattle protests in late 1999. In its mission statement, which clearly mirrors the essential creed of the GJMs as a whole, the group defined itself as "a grass roots organization committed to using media production and distribution as a tool for promoting social and economic justice . . . We seek to generate alternatives to the biases inherent in the corporate media controlled by profit and to identify and create positive models for a sustainable and equitable society." By summer 2005 the Indymedia network was comprised of 153 groups, most of which are located in the US and Europe.

In sum, these growing infrastructures contribute to creating a backbone of the GJMs, which otherwise would hardly be more than a conglomerate of disparate groups who occasionally join forces.

Within a relatively short time period GJMs have become known to a worldwide public. They can no longer be ignored as a critic of established (international) politics. Not surprisingly, media, political and economic elites, movement activists, and even scientific observers differ widely in their evaluations of these movements. While conservative media and established elites tend to view the movements' positions and claims as unfounded, naïve, or even dangerous, liberal and left media react in a more differentiated, if not supportive, way. Even some representatives of international and national governmental bodies, without embracing the GJMs per se,

perceive these as legitimate political actors who point to undeniable problems and, for the most part, ask the right questions. Some proposals of these movements, such as the Tobin tax, have been seriously considered by both political leaders like French President Jacques Chirac and by economic experts. The moderate wing of the movements, and knowledge based NGOs in particular, are accepted as discussion partners and occasionally become part of official delegations. These developments are met with suspicion by more radical groups, who fear that parts of the GJMs are in the process of being coopted and thus compromised.

GJMs were successful both in building an agenda and in undermining the neoliberal creed (often dubbed the "Washington Consensus"), which had previously largely gone unchallenged. Their critique has triggered self reflection and moderate procedural as well as institutional changes in some international governmental bodies, but it has not been able to influence the overall direction of these institutions thus far. Only in some areas and regarding some issues can a substantial impact be observed. The Multilateral Agreement on Investment, for example, was cancelled, landmines have largely been banned, and a partial debt relief of the poorest countries has been announced.

SEE ALSO: Civil Society; Collective Action; Global Justice as a Social Movement; Globalization; Neoliberalism; New Social Movement Theory; Social Movements; Transnational Movements

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globalization, religion and

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Globalization describes the historical process by which all the world's people come to live in a single social unit. Religion constitutes an important dimension of globalization through its worldwide institutional presence, its importance in structuring individual and collective cultural difference, and as an effective resource for local and global social mobilization for various goals. Religion is a highly contested, occasionally powerful, and often conflictual domain of some consequence in the global social system.

GLOBALIZATION AND RELIGION AS CONTESTED CATEGORIES

Various scholars in the social sciences started using the neologism “globalization” in the 1980s. The first sociologist to do so consistently was Roland Robertson. Since that time, it has become a highly charged and popular word with diverse meanings. The most widespread of these refers primarily to recent or modern developments in global capitalism, through which this world economic system comes to have a determinative influence in all people's lives, for good or for ill.

Other, often connected, meanings emphasize the international political system of states, the recent intensification of the worldwide network of communications and mass media, or

other transnational structures and phenomena ranging from non governmental organizations and crime syndicates, to global migration, tourism, and sport. Some observers, in subsuming the latter, argue for the existence of a transnational civil society that parallels economy and the state system. Many of these perspectives also understand globalization in terms of a sometimes contradictory, sometimes complementary relation between local and global forces. The world is not just becoming a more homogeneous place; resistance to these processes or their heterogeneous particularization in diverse regions is as constitutive of globalization as capitalism and international relations. In comparatively little of the vast literature on globalization, however, has there thus far been much discussion of the role of religion, the only real exception being analyses of Islamicist and other religious militancy under such headings as fundamentalism. That situation may be changing.

Although there is currently no general agreement on what religion means and what should count under this heading, a limited set of institutionalized religions is accorded broad legitimacy in virtually every corner of the globe, most consistently Christianity, Islam, Buddhism, and Hinduism. To these, different people and different regions add a variable list of other religions, such as Judaism, Sikhism, Daoism, Shinto, Candomblé, and African Traditional Religion (ATR), as well as other less institutional phenomena ranging from morality and fundamental worldviews to ecstatic experiences and anything that is deemed to offer access to transcendence of the everyday. Moreover, like globalization, religion is often a highly contested category, especially with respect to what does or does not belong to a particular religion and what role religion should play in social life. If nothing else, such conflict over religion shows that it maintains its importance as a field of human endeavor and understanding under conditions of globalization.

RELIGION AS GLOBAL INSTITUTION

Sociological discussion about the relation of religion and globalization has for the most part focused on institutional religion, although

certain perspectives argue that highly individualistic and non institutional forms under headings like spirituality are becoming increasingly dominant. Three aspects of the institutional variety have received the most attention: the importance of religion in the context of transnational migration, the global extension of a great variety of religious organizations and movements, and the role of religion in social and political movements that respond specifically to the globalized context.

Literature on human migration, whether from rural to urban areas, into neighboring countries, or to other parts of the world, often focuses on the various problems migrants face when adapting to a new environment. These problems include issues of integration into the host society, questions of personal and cultural identity, differences among first generation migrants and their locally born children, relations between migrant communities and the countries of origin, and links among diverse diaspora locations of the same cultural group. Although the majority of studies in this area pay scant attention to religion in these matters, a substantial and growing number center specifically on the role of religious institutions. Churches, temples, or mosques are frequently the first collective institutions that migrant communities will found. These are established for centrally religious purposes, but they most often also serve a host of other functions including as places of cultural familiarity, social service providers, educational and recreational centers, and resources for community and political mobilization. At least as critical, these religious institutions facilitate important transnational links with the countries of origin and other diaspora communities, thus contributing to the communicative networks and flows across the world that are such an important feature of the globalized context. Although much of the literature on such subjects focuses on migrants that have come from non western to western countries, a sizable portion of it looks at different situations, such as Japanese communities in Latin America and Southeast Asians in Middle Eastern countries.

The religious establishments founded by migrant communities are far from the only way that religious institutions have created a worldwide presence. In fact, the spread of

religious ideologies, institutions, and specialists has been a major factor in the historical establishment of the contemporary globalized situation, as well as in the creation of different sub global but still vast civilizations of the past. The part that the Christian church played in medieval European civilization after the fall of the Roman Empire is one instance; but even more impressive is the role of Islam in the creation of empires from North Africa to Central and South Asia after the sixth century. At its height, Islamic civilization extended from Southeast Asia to Central Africa, structuring the most global of all social systems before the modern era. The trading links created by Muslim merchants, the networks of Sufi brotherhoods, the system of Islamic centers of learning, Muslim pilgrimage, and Islamic political empires informed by Islamic legal systems, were all vital social structures in this regard.

In the development of modern globalization, however, Christian missionary movements have played a critical role up until at least the middle of the twentieth century, with the result that Christian churches, including but by no means limited to the Roman Catholic Church, today make up a complex and worldwide network of non governmental organizations and transnational social movements. The linkages that these institutions establish have long since ceased to be unidirectional, from the dominant western core to the rest of the world. Christian Pentecostalism during the twentieth century grew in a highly multi centered way to become the second largest Christian identification in the world, with hundreds of millions of adherents distributed across virtually every region of the globe. Its highly diverse and localized forms maintain a wide variety of links with one another through publications, conferences, electronic media, and travel. Like many of the more tightly organized denominations such as the Anglican and Seventh day Adventist churches, Pentecostalism's demographic center of gravity is not in western countries but rather in Africa, Latin America, and parts of Asia. In deed, one of the general peculiarities of global religious organizations and movements in comparison with other institutional domains is that the bulk of religious action occurs away from the economic, political, media, and scientific core of the global social system. While this

fact is perhaps more obvious in the case of religions such as Hinduism, Islam, and Buddhism, it is only somewhat less the case for Christianity. This different distribution manifests itself in a variety of ways. Missionary activity, for example, such a critical element in the initial global expansion of western influence, now takes a number of different directions, with South Korean and Latin American Christian missionaries in Africa, and African Christians seeking to "return the favor" by reevangelizing Western Europe and North America.

Buddhist and Muslim movements, organizations, and leaders have likewise established and expanded their presence in various global regions beyond their historical heartlands, such as, for instance, the Chinese Buddhist Fo Guang Shan, the Japanese Buddhist Soka Gakkai, the West African Murid Sufi order, or the South Asian Islamic Tablighi Jamaat. To these selected examples one could add the international organizations and movements that represent a great many other religions, from Rastafarianism and Judaism to Baha'i and Sikhism.

Although these explicitly religious institutions are the foundation of religion's global social presence, it is the implication of religion in other social, but especially political, movements that has thus far received the most attention in social scientific literature. It is no mere coincidence that the political impact of religion in developments ranging from the Islamic revolution in Iran and the New Christian Right in the United States to the Hindu nationalism of the Bharatiya Janata Party in India and the religiously defined cleavages of Orthodox, Catholic, and Muslim in the former Yugoslavia, appeared on the global scene at roughly the same time as the notion of globalization. The often invidious term fundamentalism has gained a corresponding popularity, referring to religious movements like these, ones that advocate the public enforcement of religious precepts or the exclusive religious identification of state collectivities. Characteristic of such movements is that they seek to enforce highly particular and frequently absolutist visions of the world in their countries, but with explicit reference to the globalizing context which they deem to be the prime threat under such epithets as "global arrogance" (Iran) or "one worldism" (US). The religious visions that inform them are the

basis for this combination of a claim to universal validity with being centered in a particular part of the world among a particular people. Thus does religion serve as a globally present way of making cultural difference a prime structural feature of a globalized world that also relativizes all such differences by incorporating everyone in a single social system.

RELIGION AND RELIGIONS AS GLOBAL SYSTEM

A further approach to the relation of religion and globalization focuses on the degree to which both modern institutional forms and modern understandings of religion are themselves outcomes of globalization. During the long historical development of today's global society, religion came to inform a global religious system consisting primarily of mutually identified and broadly recognized religions, especially the ones indicated above. These religions, as noted, have an institutional presence and broad legitimacy in virtually every region of the globe. While the idea that religion manifests itself through a series of distinct religions may seem self evident, that notion is historically of quite recent provenance. In Europe, where this understanding first gained purchase, it dates back to the earliest to the seventeenth century. Elsewhere, such as in most regions of Asia, one must wait until at least the nineteenth century. The development and spread of this understanding of religion is entirely coterminous with the period most theories identify as the prime centuries of globalization.

The emergence of this religious system is not only recent. It is also quite selective; not every possible religion, not everything possibly religious, counts. Symptomatic of both aspects are ongoing and recent debates among scholars of religion concerning the meaning of the concept and its supposed Eurocentrism. One perspective insists that religion is at best an abstract term, but not something "real" that is actually out there in the world. A prime argument in support of this position is how the ideas of religion as a separate domain of life and of the distinct religions are so demonstrably products of relatively recent history and so clearly implicated in the concomitant spread of Christian

and European influence around the world. Another is that “the religions” is empirically too narrow, that what is meant by them does not cover enough of what is manifestly religious using slightly different notions of religion. These criticisms, however, do not exclude the conclusion that a peculiar way of understanding religion and institutionally embodying religion has nonetheless developed in conjunction with and as an expression of the process of globalization. Similar to global capitalism and the global system of sovereign states, the institutionalization of this idea excludes as well as includes. It also involves power and imposition, as do all human institutions. And just as anti-globalization movements are themselves important manifestations of that which they oppose, so too is controversy around the idea of religion and the religions symptomatic of the social and cultural reality which it contests.

FUTURE DIRECTIONS FOR RESEARCH

The explicit study of religion in the context of globalization is only in its beginnings. The sociological neglect of this topic may be due to the fact that religions usually ground themselves in tradition as opposed to contemporary developments, to the close relation between religion and local and regional culture, and perhaps to the lingering effect of secularization perspectives which have led many social scientists to expect religion to be irrelevant in the modern world. Be that as it may, a now rapidly growing literature that sees religion as an important player in today’s global context heralds a much needed new direction in this regard.

SEE ALSO: Buddhism; Christianity; Fundamentalism; Globalization, Culture and; Islam; Migration: International; Multiculturalism; Religion; Religion, Sociology of; System Theories

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globalization, sexuality and

Jon Binnie

The globalization of sexuality refers to the sexualized and embodied nature of processes associated with the movement of people, capital,

and goods across national boundaries. It also refers to how the consciousness of the world as a single place is sexualized. The globalization of sexuality is manifest in a range of processes and phenomena that are often couched and approached in highly emotive terms (e.g., the trafficking of women into prostitution, mail order brides, the development of the sex industry and sex tourism). It is also characterized by the AIDS pandemic, mass international tourism, and the development of cyberspace. Each of these has in turn intensified consciousness of the status of sexual minorities and the unevenness of their treatment across the globe. Key to our understandings of the globalization of sexuality is the relationship between sexuality and economics. While debates on the globalization of gay identity have been marked by an ambivalence over the development of gay identities and politicized communities outside of the West, work on the globalization of sexuality more generally has tended to have been marked by concerns with the worse excesses of what Smith (1997) has termed the "satanic geographies of globalization." Here we are concerned with the trafficking of women forced into prostitution. Contemporary moral panics on the scale and extent of the trafficking of women for prostitution across national borders mask the extent to which sex work has been intimately connected to the development of the global capitalist system. The transnational migration of sex workers has taken place for centuries. However, there is a perception we are seeing an acceleration in the scale of the phenomenon resulting from increased mobility across national borders – as witnessed by the increasing numbers from Eastern Europe working in the sex industry in Western Europe.

One dominant discourse on the global sex trade within western feminism is that third world women working in prostitution need rescuing from their plight and need to receive moral guidance, as they are incapable of making decisions about their sexual practice. They are passive victims who are uneducated and have no choice but to be forced into prostitution. Kempadoo and Doezema (1998) argue that this way of conceptualizing the global sex trade is redolent of neocolonialism, as it takes no account of the agency of women involved in sex work. The conditions of work for sex workers

in developing areas may be poor, but so it is argued are conditions for other workers. It is claimed that some anti trafficking campaigns may also cause harm to the very women they are designed to assist. For instance, Murray (1998) argues that in Australia anti trafficking campaigns targeting Asian sex workers may cause harm in reinforcing racist stereotypes of Asian women as weak victims, which may mark them out as easier targets for abuse. She argues that feminists who seek the abolition of prostitution speak for all women and do not listen to working class women who work in the sex industry. Murray suggests that there is complicity between feminists involved in groups such as the Global Alliance Against Traffic in Women (GAATW) and homophobic right wing religious fundamentalists who seek to control and regulate all forms of non procreative sexual practices.

Buss and Herman (2003) argue that academic discussions of transnational social movements tend to stress their progress, radical nature, and agency in contrast to conservative global organizations such as the World Bank. In their discussion of the transnational organization of the Christian Right they note a forging of alliances across religious boundaries on the basis of a common moral agenda around the protection of the sanctity of the family. These alliances lobby the United Nations to promote anti abortion agendas. Buss and Herman note that Christian Right groups are increasingly targeting homosexuality despite the fact that lesbian and gay rights activist groups have had little success at the global level – reflected in the failure of the International Lesbian and Gay Association to regain its consultative NGO status at the UN since this status was withdrawn in 1994.

One of the main vectors of the globalization of sexuality is the global AIDS pandemic. Indeed, AIDS has often been seen as a metaphor for globalization itself, as it has brought into sharp relief how lives on the planet are interconnected with the impotence of nation states to control flows of people with HIV across national borders. While helping to shape our consciousness of the world as a single place, the AIDS pandemic has impacted disproportionately on specific localities – the impact of the pandemic is experienced unevenly. Policy

responses to the AIDS pandemic have been held responsible for the promotion of modern western models of gay identity as opposed to indigenous or folk models of sexual identity in developing countries. The globalization of sexuality is often assumed to mean the export of a western model of sexuality (Wright 2000). However, can we simply see the West as the original starting point from which other models of sexuality are considered or studied? Folk or indigenous models of sexuality are often set in opposition to western models of sexuality; however, to what extent can we generalize about an egalitarian model of same sex relationships within the West? For instance, men who have sex with men in western countries may not identify with a gay identity or community.

A considerable body of work has been produced on the globalization of gay identity (Altman 1996, 2001; Philips 2000; Stychin 2003). We have witnessed the growth of a global gay consciousness and an associated activism and politics. For instance, the International Lesbian and Gay Association founded in 1978 now represents 370 organizations in 90 countries. The Internet is also playing a major role in facilitating the intensification of transnational activism around the rights of sexual dissidents. At the same time, global gay tourism has become visible through the development of global mega events such as the Gay Games and pride events such as Sydney's Mardi Gras.

Debates on the globalization of gay identity have focused on whether the export of a western model of gay identity reflects the imposition of cultural imperialism, or whether the development of a global gay consciousness is a positive and empowering example of a cosmopolitan cultural politics which is forging transnational solidarities against homophobic policies and regimes. At the same time, it should be noted that groups and organizations such as the Christian Right that are hostile towards sexual dissidents also operate on a global scale. Post colonial writers have challenged the ethnocentricity of the notion of a global gay identity and the ethnocentricity of lesbian and gay studies more generally (e.g., Puar's (2002) study of gay tourism in the Caribbean). Research on the globalization of sexuality is now drawing critical attention to the sexualized nature of the politics of nationalism, as this has often been overlooked

in debates on sex tourism and the politics of global gay identity.

Technological change is driving the acceleration of the globalization of sexuality. The development of the Internet in particular is significant in facilitating globalizing processes at a mundane level – for instance in aiding men's search for mail order brides, but also enabling those involved in campaigning against the trafficking in women to maintain and develop transnational activist networks. However, the Internet also plays a powerful role in shaping sexualized identities and desires in late capitalism. The Internet therefore encourages the development of what Schein (1999) terms an "imagined cosmopolitanism" – the commodification of desires for worldliness reflected in global media and advertising. This is the desire for foreign products that reflect a sophistication and yearning to transgress the boundaries of the nation state through, for instance, window shopping and gazing on displays of imported foreign consumer goods. Schein's work on cosmopolitan commodity culture in contemporary China is an example of work on the more mundane ways in which global capital and desire intersect.

Future work on the globalization of sexuality will need to examine critically the everyday ways in which economic, political, and cultural components of globalization are sexualized and resist the moralizing tendencies of those who would seek to police sexual practices and sexual dissident communities.

SEE ALSO: Gendered Aspects of War and International Violence; HIV/AIDS and Population; Sex Tourism; Sexual Citizenship; Sexual Cultures in Africa; Sexual Cultures in Asia; Sexual Cultures in Latin America; Sexual Cultures in Russia; Sexual Cultures in Scandinavia; Third World and Postcolonial Feminisms/Subaltern; Traffic in Women; Transnational and Global Feminisms

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globalization, sport and

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Modern sport is bound up in a global network of interdependency chains that are marked by uneven power relations. Consider the consumption of sports events and leisure clothing. People across the globe regularly view satellite broadcasts of English Premier League and European Champions League matches. In these games the best players drawn from Europe, South America, and Africa perform. The

players use equipment – boots, balls, clothing, etc. – that are designed in the West, financed by multinational corporations such as Adidas and Nike and hand stitched, in the case of soccer balls, in Asia using, in part, child labor. This equipment is then sold, at significant profit, to a mass market in North America and Europe. Several transnational corporations are involved in the production and consumption phases of global soccer – some of whom own the media companies and have, as in the case of Sky TV, shareholdings in the soccer clubs they screen as part of what sociologists term the “global media sport complex.”

The sport/leisure wear industry is an example of how people's consumption of cultural goods is bound up with global processes. As a fashion item, the wearing of sports footwear has become an integral feature of urban lifestyles and consumer culture. One premier brand is Nike. The purchase and display of Nike footwear by soccer players are but the final stages in a “dynamic network” involving designers, producers, suppliers, distributors, and the parent or broker company. Though Nike's headquarters are located in Oregon, US, the range of subcontractors involved straddles the globe. Its suppliers and production companies are located in a host of Southeast Asian countries, including Thailand, Singapore, Korea, and China. Its designers provide soccer boots with a worldwide demand that will also appeal to local tastes. Local franchise operations ensure appropriate distribution backed by global marketing strategies. Here again, Nike uses the media sport production complex by endorsing sports stars such as the Brazilian soccer player Ronaldo and/or sports-leisure festivals such as soccer's World Cup. In addition, Nike uses advertising within the television schedules that carry these sports and other consumer targeted programs. In the 2000–1 Premier League season it was reported that Nike was to become the official sponsor of Manchester United with a deal brokered at some £300 million over 15 years. In brief, elite sport now occurs on a worldwide scale and is patterned in connection with “global flows” of capital, culture, and people.

Global flows involve several dimensions: the international movement of people such as tourists, migrants, exiles, and guest workers; the

technology dimension is created by the flow between countries of the machinery and equipment produced by corporations and government agencies; the economic dimension centers on the rapid flow of money and its equivalents around the world; the media dimension entails the flow of images and information between countries that is produced and distributed by newspapers, magazines, radio, film, television, video, satellite, cable, and the worldwide web; and finally, the ideological dimension is linked to the flow of values centrally associated with state or counter-state ideologies and movements. All five dimensions can be detected in late twentieth century sports development. Thus the global migration of sports personnel has been a pronounced feature of recent decades. This appears likely to continue. The flow across the globe of goods, equipment, and "landscapes" such as sports complexes and golf courses has developed into a multi billion dollar business in recent years and represents a transnational development in the sports sphere. In economic terms, the flow of finance in the global sports arena has come to center not only on the international trade in personnel, prize money, and endorsements, but also on the marketing of sport along specific lines. The transformation of sports such as American football, basketball, golf, and soccer into global sports is part of this process.

Closely connected to these flows have been media led developments. The media sport production complex projects images of individual sports labor migrants, leisure forms, and specific cultural messages to large global audiences. Consider the worldwide audience for the 2004 Olympic Games: over 300 television channels provided 35,000 hours of Olympic coverage delivering images of Athens 2004 to an unduplicated audience of 3.9 billion in 200 countries and territories. The power of this media sport complex has forced a range of sports to align themselves to this global model that emphasizes spectacle, personality, and excitement. At the level of ideology, global sports festivals such as the Olympics have come to serve as vehicles for the expression of ideologies that are transnational in character. Note, for example, how the opening and closing ceremonies of the Athens Games were designed to project traditional images and "modern" messages about Greece to both its own people and to a global audience.

Three additional points need to be grasped in linking sport and globalization. First, studies of sport that are not studies of the societies in which sports are located are studies out of context. Here, emphasis is being placed on the need to examine the interconnected political, economic, cultural, and social patterns that contour and shape modern sport. Attention has also to be given to how these patterns contain both enabling and constraining dimensions on people's actions – there are "winners" and "losers" in this global game. Societies are no longer and (except in very rare cases) were never sealed off from other societies. Ties of trade, warfare, migration, and culture have existed through human history. Witness, for instance, the connections made throughout Renaissance Europe. More recent globalization processes have unleashed new sets of "interdependency chains," the networks that have (inter) connected people from distant parts of the globe. It is in this context of global power networks that the practice and consumption of elite modern sport is best understood. Secondly, in order to trace, describe, and analyze the global sports process it is wise to adopt a long term perspective. A historical and comparative approach enables us to explain how the present pattern of global sport has emerged out of the past and is connected with a range of what Maguire (1999, 2005) has termed "civilizational struggles."

The third point of significance concerns the concept of globalization itself. What does the concept refer to? This is a matter subject to intense debate. Here is not the place to examine the merits of these arguments. It is sufficient to note that the concept refers to the growing network of interdependencies – political, economic, cultural, and social – which bind human beings together, for better and for worse. Globalization processes are not of recent origin, nor do they occur evenly across all areas of the globe. These processes involve an increasing intensification of global interconnectedness, are long term in nature, and gathered momentum during the twentieth century. Despite the "unevenness" of these processes, it is more difficult to understand local or national experiences without reference to these global flows. In fact, our living conditions, beliefs, knowledge, and actions are intertwined with unfolding globalization processes. These processes include

the emergence of a global economy, a transnational cosmopolitan culture, and a range of international social movements. A multitude of transnational or global economic and technological exchanges, communication networks, and migratory patterns characterize this interconnected world pattern. As a result, people experience spatial and temporal dimensions differently. There is a "speeding up" of time and a "shrinking" of space. Modern technologies enable people, images, ideas, and money to cross the globe with great rapidity. These processes lead to a greater degree of interdependence, and to an increased awareness of a sense of the world as a whole. People become more attuned to the notion that their lives and place of living are part of a single social space: the globe.

Globalization processes, then, involve multidirectional movements of people, practices, customs, and ideas that involve a series of power balances, yet have neither the hidden hand of progress nor some all pervasive, overarching conspiracy guiding them. Although the globe can be understood as an interdependent whole, in different areas of social life there is a constant vying for dominant positions among established (core) and outsider (peripheral) groups and nation states. Given this growth in the multiplicity of linkages and networks that transcend nation states, it is not surprising that we may be at the earliest stages of the development of a "transnational culture" or "global culture," of which sport is a part. This process entails a shift from ethnic or national cultures to "supranational" forms based upon either the culture of a "superpower" or of "cosmopolitan" communication and migrant networks. In this connection there is considerable debate as to whether global sport is leading to a form of homogenized body culture – specifically, along western or American lines. There is some evidence to support this. Yet global flows are simultaneously increasing the varieties of body cultures and identities available to people in local cultures. Global sport, then, seems to be leading to the reduction in contrasts between societies, but also to the emergence of new varieties of body cultures and identities.

In making connections between globalization and modern sport several findings stand out. Globalization processes have no "zero starting

point." It is clear that they gathered momentum between the fifteenth and eighteenth centuries. These processes have continued apace since the turn of the nineteenth century. Research has identified several recent features of these processes, including an increase in the number of international agencies, the growth of global forms of communication, the development of global competitions and prizes, and the development of standard notions of "rights" and citizenship that are increasingly standardized internationally. The emergence and diffusion of sport in the nineteenth century is clearly interwoven with this overall process. The development of national and international sports organizations, the growth of competition between national teams, the worldwide acceptance of rules governing specific (that is, "western") "sport" forms, and the establishment of global competitions such as the Olympic Games and the men's and women's soccer World Cups, are all indicative of the occurrence of globalization in the sports world.

It would also appear that global sport processes are not solely the direct outcome of nation state activities (e.g., the International Olympic Committee (IOC) operates independently of any specific nation state). Rather, these processes need to be accounted for in relation to how they operate relatively independently of conventionally designated societal and sociocultural processes. In addition, while the globalization of sport is connected to the intended ideological practices of specific groups of people from particular countries, its pattern and development cannot be reduced solely to these ideological practices. Although elite sports migrants, officials, and consumers are caught up in globalization processes, they do have the capacity to reinterpret cultural products and experiences into something distinct, as the local acts back on the global. Furthermore, the receptivity of national popular cultures to non-indigenous cultural products can be active and heterogeneous; that is, local lives make sense of global events. That is not to overlook, however, that there is a political economy at work in the production and consumption of global sport products. Globalization then is best understood as a balance and blend between diminishing contrasts and increasing varieties, a commingling

of cultures and attempts by more established groups to control and regulate access to global flows.

The emergence and diffusion of modern sport is therefore bound up in complex networks and interdependency chains marked by unequal power relations. Political, economic, cultural, and social processes contoured and shaped the development of sport over the past three centuries. This global development has undoubtedly led to a degree of homogenization – in common with broader globalization processes. In addition, the spread of British/European/western sports has had elements of cultural imperialism infused with it. Further, while there was no “master plan” in the early phases of this process, more recently transnational corporations have sought to strategically market their products to consumers across the globe. Westerners have been the global winners at their own games both on and off the field. The male members of “western” societies were acting as a form of established group on a world level. Their tastes and conduct, including their sports, were part of this, and these practices had similar effects to those of elite cultural activities within “western” societies themselves. They acted and act as signs of distinction, prestige, and power. Yet, this is not the whole story.

The rise of the “West” was contested and its “triumph” was not inevitable. Furthermore, “western” culture had long been permeated by non western cultural forms, people, technologies, and knowledge. In sum, these cultural interchanges stretch back to long before the “west” momentarily achieved relative dominance in cultural interchange. It also needs to be recognized that both the intended and unintended aspects of global sport development need inspection. That is, while the intended acts of representatives of transnational agencies or the transnational capitalist class are potentially more significant in the short term, over the longer term unintended, relatively autonomous transnational practices predominate. These practices “structure” the subsequent plans and actions of the personnel of transnational agencies and the transnational capitalist class.

In addition, global sport has not led to complete homogenization: the consumption of non indigenous cultural wares by different national

groups is both active and heterogeneous. Resistance to global sportization processes has also been evident. Yet there is a political economy at work in the production and consumption of global sport/leisure products that can lead to the relative ascendancy of a narrow selection of capitalist and western sport cultures. Global sport processes can therefore be understood in terms of the attempts by more established white, male groups to control and regulate access to global flows and also in terms of how indigenous peoples both resist these processes and recycle their own cultural products. We are currently witnessing the homogenization of specific body cultures – through achievement sports, the Olympic movement, and sports science programs – and simultaneously the increase in the diversity of “sports”/body cultures.

It is possible, however, to overstate the extent to which the West has triumphed in terms of global sports structures, organizations, ideologies, and performances. Non western cultures resist and reinterpret western sports and maintain, foster, and promote, on a global scale, their own indigenous recreational pursuits (e.g., Kabbadi, a traditional game/sport reputedly developed in India and now played in many parts of South Asia). Clearly, the speed, scale, and volume of sports development is interwoven with the broader global flows of people, technology, finance, images, and ideologies that are controlled by the West, and by western men. In the longer term, however, it is possible to detect signs that the disjunctures and non isomorphic patterns that characterize global processes are also leading to the diminution of western power in a variety of contexts. Sport may be no exception. Sport may become increasingly contested, with different civilizational blocs challenging both nineteenth and twentieth century hegemonic masculine notions regarding the content, meaning, control, organization, and ideology of sport. By adopting a multi causal, multi directional analysis that examines the production of both homogeneity and heterogeneity, we are better placed to probe the global cultural commingling that is taking place.

SEE ALSO: *Figurational Sociology and the Sociology of Sport; Postcolonialism and Sport; Sport and Culture; Sportization*

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globalization, values and

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Global values refer to the moral and normative conceptions shared by individuals and social actors (such as international governmental and non governmental organizations, transnational corporations, and global institutions) across national boundaries and that pertain to the future cultural shape of globalizing society. Global values have to be understood in the larger framework of cultural globalization and the globalization of culture. Far from being the product of a harmonious consensus, the delineation of global values is a contentious work in progress that reflects the complexities and ambiguities of the whole globalization process.

As defined by Roland Robertson (1992), globalization refers “both to the compression of the world and the intensification of consciousness of the world as a whole . . . both concrete global interdependence and consciousness of the global whole.” As a process of social change, globalization involves deterritorialization – the lifting off of social relations from territorial boundaries as well as the transformation of local relations. And as Robertson’s definition indicates, globalization is also a reflexive process that involves a greater awareness of the

impact of global phenomena on people’s lives as well as of the potential impact of local matters at the global level. Globalization is therefore a process marked by unevenness (it produces winners and losers and integrates different regions at variable speeds and intensity), complexity (different global processes, economic, political, cultural, are not synchronized), and contention.

Cultural globalization refers to the global expansion of cultural flows – transmission of symbols, ideas, artistic and consumption products – on a global scale. Technologies of transportation and communication have facilitated such cultural diffusion and the corresponding emergent global consciousness. Arjun Appadurai (1996) delineates these flows (or “scapes”) as part of the process of cultural globalization. They comprise mediascapes (flow of information through the mass media, television, the Internet), finanscapes (flow of capital through the global financial system), technoscapes (flow of technology or flows made easier thanks to technology), ethnocscapes (flow of people, immigration, refugees, tourists), and ideoscapes (flow of ideas such as consumerism, market, democracy or human rights). The arena of cultural globalization is where the future moral contours of global society and conflicting value systems are debated.

The globalization of culture refers to the ways in which different cultures are shaped by, and respond to, culturally globalizing flows. It points to the emergence of a global culture, or, as Frank Lechner and John Boli (2005) conceptualize it, a world culture. World culture is the “culture of world society, comprising norms and knowledge shared across state boundaries, rooted in nineteenth century western culture but since globalized, promoted by non governmental organizations as well as for profit corporations, intimately tied to the rationalization of institutions, enacted on particular occasions that generate global awareness, carried by the infrastructure of world society, spurred by market forces, riven by tension and contradiction, and expressed in the multiple ways particular groups relate to universal ideals.” As this definition shows, if people and social actors share a global consciousness, they do not share consistent views of what the global order should look like. These different

imagined global futures display contrasting value systems and are promoted by different groups.

Jan Nederveen Pieterse (2004) delineates three major global value systems: cultural differentialism, cultural convergence, and hybridization. The cultural differentialist paradigm postulates the preeminence of the local. If there is to be a global culture, it is a global mosaic, composed of discrete territorial, cultural entities anchored in different regions of the world. This is the view popularized as “clash of civilizations” or the “West vs. the Rest”: different regional blocs have radically different values that can only generate conflicts between civilizational blocs. As Samuel Huntington postulates, the value system of a global society should be based on the universalization of western values, founded on the Enlightenment, democracy, and free markets. Whereas Huntington argues for the universalization of a particular value system (the West), other cultural differentialists argue for a strong version of cultural relativism. A global culture should be based on the preeminence of local values, free from outside interferences necessarily perceived as threat of cultural destruction. Such a view is popular among the anti globalization movements, especially in groups focused on the preservation of indigenous societies and the assertion of their cultural rights. In such a view, the core global value is preservation of cultural diversity. Both the clash of civilizations and cultural relativism views are based on an essentialist view of culture based on territory and boundaries. They reify cultural systems and promote open air museums in the guise of local empowerment. They ignore historical traditions of cultural exchanges as well as contemporary global flows and global deterritorialization.

The main fear articulated by cultural relativists is the fear of cultural convergence or cultural synchronization: the spread of American or western values, especially values related to the sphere of consumption, akin to cultural imperialism. In this view, the spread of global capitalism and western imperialism creates a world society based on a consumerist universalism. Borders and locales no longer matter as individuals all become part of a homogeneous world culture guided by principles of McDonaldization (Ritzer 2004) and Disneyization

(Bryman 2004) whereby most social relationships become commodified, including locales, in the case of international tourism. Mass consumption becomes the one and only significant universal value at the expense of all the local value systems that constitute the human mosaic. This dystopic view of world culture is also endorsed by world system analysts who view it as the ideology of the world capitalist system generated in order to sustain it. The homogeneity created within nations, at the expense of local culture and particularist values, produces a form of hegemony: global culture is the culture of capitalism. The universalist values it promotes are those of individualism and satisfaction through material comfort alongside the predominance of rationalized modes of production (McDonaldization) and consumption (Disneyization). In this view, a global ideology is being created that is spread worldwide through the western controlled mass media to sustain the consuming needs of the world economy. However, there is a utopian side to the view of the global spread of western capitalism, popularized as “creative destruction.” In this view, global mass consumption expands the menu of choice offered to individuals no matter what particular society they live in. There may be more cultural homogeneity between societies, but the expansion of the market provides more consuming diversity within societies as more objects of consumption become globally available. Cultural convergence produces greater individual choice irrespective of territorial base. In the utopian version of this view, the spread of western values can only be conducive to more democracy and choice where individuals are liberated from the tyranny of place – a view convincingly debunked by Amy Chua’s analysis of the rise of market dominant minorities in the face of politically dominant majorities. Chua shows that globalization as the double process of democratization (popular access to political institutions) and increased wealth concentrated in the hands of a few minority groups (such as Chinese in the Philippines) creates the conditions not for utopian combination of democracy and mass consumption but rather for brutal ethnically based conflict.

Such a cultural imperialist view is simplistic as it assumes that globalization is unilateral, from the core to the periphery: wherever

western values and institutions spread, they automatically become dominant and the cultural forms they encounter cannot resist. In other words, both cultural differentialist and cultural convergence analyses assume that global cultural processes flow one way, with no obstacles in their path: from imperialist core areas (western consumption patterns) to a passive recipient periphery powerless to stop such flows.

Both the cultural differentialist and the cultural convergence views assume that global values are part of a process of universalization of the particular (Robertson 1992), that is, the universal application of values specific to certain cultural systems. The reality of global culture and values is more complex, contentious (as the previous two paradigms indicate), and multidirectional. As much as there is determination of local circumstances through global structures, this does not eliminate the possibility of local impact in global processes, such as the Zapatistas' rebellion in Mexico in reaction to NAFTA. What does get threatened is the functionalist emphasis on coherence and boundaries that create social integration as transcultural flows shape both the local and the global. Global values may involve universalization of the particular, but they also involve the reverse process of particularization of the universal. This process has been variously called hybridization (Nederveen Pieterse 2004), creolization (Tomlinson 1999), or glocalization (Robertson 1992). All these designations involve the complex dynamics through which global processes and values are integrated into local contexts to produce cultural hybrid practices, such as world music.

In this context, western values may not so much be imperialistically delivered to peripheral areas as much as they are glocalized. Western values such as individual freedom, democracy, human rights, gender equality, and sexual autonomy as well as scientific and technological rationality are undeniably spreading globally, supported by the development of global movements, institutions, and infrastructures. However, how these values are integrated into local contexts, that is, glocalized, involves a complex interplay of local and global factors. For instance, feminist social movements are different in Japan than in western countries as

they adapt the general concept to their local circumstances.

At the same time, cultural and institutional globalization has seen the emergence of global values that have originated not in western countries but either in peripheral areas or in global institutions. For instance, cultural diversity and sustainable development, as global moral imperatives, have generated resistance both in core and peripheral areas. In core areas, cultural diversity is perceived as a threat to rather homogeneous populations and long established nations. For instance, the veil controversy in France illustrates how any encroachment on secular institutions can generate nationalist reactions in the face of multiculturalist demands. Similarly, sustainable development demands serious economic and moral reconsideration of western consumption practices that are perceived as impediments to the "freedom to consume," so to speak. On the other hand, peripheral countries have sometimes perceived intimations to sustainable development as normative impositions that impede sovereignty and development choices. Similarly, Muslim countries have consistently insisted on opt out options regarding human and women's rights out of respect for local traditions. It is precisely in the process of glocalization that areas of contention emerge regarding how global values are to be integrated or assimilated into local contexts.

As Lechner and Boli (2005) show, although world culture is riddled with conflict regarding what value system should prevail and shape the future of world society, the different United Nations world conferences on global topics (such as population, environment, or women's rights) reveal a global consensus on certain basic premises (the value of global negotiation and a common definition of global problems to be addressed in a global forum where all voices can be heard, even if confrontation arises), processes, and structures. In spite of such contentious debates, global responsibility is a value whose legitimacy is implicitly agreed upon although who/what is responsible for whom/what is precisely what is vigorously debated. Similarly, global responsibility becomes a moral imperative that displaces the perceived outdated morality of proximity (Tomlinson 1999)

where one is only responsible for one's own limited and localized circle of territorial relationships. Instead, the appeals to the global community are multiplied to intervene to stop genocides, provide relief against famines and natural disasters, and unite against the threat of global terrorism. Conversely, the intimation to "think global, act local" injects global responsibilities into personal actions.

Similarly, the anti globalization movement does not stand outside of globalization but asserts a value system with global claims, another instance of universalization of the particular in the constantly contentious debate regarding the value foundation of global society. In this case, anti globalization activists assert the global relevance of their value system even if what they demand is de globalization, that is, a return to the local. The claim may be for the preeminence of the particular, but it is asserted globally as having global relevance and legitimacy. In this sense, as much as they advocate for a return to the local and traditional values and social organizations, such groups as religious fundamentalists and indigenous populations' rights activists are promoting their own version of global society based on local values understood as the only source of legitimacy.

Indigenous populations present an interesting case of how global cultural values, far from being a reflection of western imperialism, promote emancipation. The visible struggle for respect for indigenous traditions and rights obscures that the cultural and political form most responsible for the silencing of minority voices has historically been the nation state. As Anderson (1983) has shown, the creation of nations as imaginary communities involved a deep imperialist process of nationalization, that is, elimination (cultural or physical) of marginal populations and their cultural practices, traditions, and values. The very possibility for indigenous populations to have their struggle recognized as legitimate on the global stage and their rights included in global documents, such as the Earth Charter, reflects a value shift in favor of cultural diversity and multiculturalism as opposed to national homogeneity. When the Zapatistas appeal to the global community to support their struggle, they recognize the legitimacy of the global stage as proper institutional context. They also

promote an ethical glocalization: the integration of the global when liberating (global networks of support), but its rejection when oppressive (World Trade Organization).

There is no set of neatly defined global values. Rather, because global society is connected and integrated (through flows) but neither unified nor centralized or harmonious, the sources of value systems are multiple, contradictory, and contentious. Such value conflicts reflect the often underestimated cultural nature of globalization and its complexity as traditional or popular explanations, clash of civilizations or cultural imperialism, fail to account for the hybrid nature of globalizing culture and values.

SEE ALSO: Consumption; Creolization; Cultural Imperialism; Culture; Dependency and World Systems Theories; Disneyization; Disarticulation and Disembedding; Global Justice as a Social Movement; Globalization; Globalization, Consumption and; Globalization, Culture and; Globalization and Global Justice; Glocalization; Globalization; Hybridity; Indigenous Movements; McDonaldization; Values; Values: Global

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glocalization

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The neologism “glocalization” has emerged in recent years in economic, sociological, and cultural theories in response to the proliferation of writings about globalization and its local implications. It might best be described as the relationship between global and local processes, which are increasingly viewed as two sides to the same coin rather than being diametrically opposed (e.g., Robertson, 1992). The age of global mobility has created more fluid and seamless relationships. For example, the work of Castells (1996) on the network society and Appadurai’s (2001) discussion of flows gives some indication of how global mobility has affected local environments and their inhabitants.

Giddens (1998) suggests that globalization was originally a political and economic term. It could be argued that glocalization, on the other hand, represents the intersection of political economics and sociocultural concerns, with its emphasis on the local and community impacts of global structures and processes. Ritzer (2004: 73) defines glocalization as “the integration of the global and the local resulting in unique outcomes in different geographic areas.” Glocalization can thus represent the consequences (both tangible and intangible) of globalization, e.g., the creation of heterogeneous or hybridized cultures, communities, and identities. In business terms, it might represent the local orientation of global product marketing, taking into consideration local social and cultural characteristics and traditions. In postmodern architecture, it may include “organic” approaches to the construction of new buildings (i.e., taking into account local environmental and historic features). In the context of global tourism, international visitors are brought into contact with local environments and their communities, thus influencing cross cultural exchange. Tourism can also sometimes help to strengthen the importance of retaining place identities and local character.

Nevertheless, glocalization could also be viewed somewhat negatively. For example, Bauman (1998) suggests that the term glocalization is best thought of as a restratification of

society based on the free mobility of some and the place bound existence of others. Tourist flows, for example, are mainly unidirectional (e.g., West to East, or developed to less developed countries). For this reason, tourism has sometimes been described as a new form of imperialism, which causes acculturation and radical social change rather than hybridization (the inevitable consequence of sustained foreign influence over time). Similarly, global economic and business developments are often deemed “imperialistic,” even where they have a local orientation.

Ritzer (2004) suggests that this dominance of capitalist nations and organizations might be termed “grobalization” rather than “glocalization.” He argues, like Robertson (1994), that the key characteristics of glocalization are sensitivity to differences, the embracing of cosmopolitanism, and respect for the autonomy and creativity of individuals and groups. The notion that the local is largely passive in the face of globalization is therefore a misrepresentation. For example, Barber (1995) sees “Jihad” as being the local response to the homogenizing influence of “McWorld.” Friedman (1999) sees “healthy glocalization” as a process by which local communities incorporate aspects of foreign cultures that enrich them, but reject others that would negatively affect their traditions or identity. The accessibility of new communications and technology also allows many societies to propagate local cultures globally.

Overall, therefore, glocalization could be seen as a positive interpretation of the local impacts of globalization, that is, a process by which communities represent and assert their unique cultures globally, often through new media.

SEE ALSO: Cultural Imperialism; Globalization; Globalization, Culture and; Grobalization

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Goffman, Erving (1922–82)

Gregory W. H. Smith

The work of Erving Goffman centered on explicating the structures and processes of the “interaction order,” the domain of social life brought about and facilitated by the physical co presence of persons. In a series of extraordinary writings published from the early 1950s through the early 1980s, Goffman developed an utterly singular vision of social life, expressed in a highly distinctive language that reflected his extraordinary observational acuity and his unmatched sociological grasp of metaphor and irony.

Born in Mannville, Alberta, Canada to Jewish migrants from the Ukraine, Erving Manual Goffman was educated at the universities of Manitoba (1939–42), Toronto (BA 1945) and Chicago (MA 1949; PhD 1953). His doctoral studies included a spell at Edinburgh University’s department of social anthropology, which sponsored and funded 12 months of fieldwork on the remote Shetland island of Unst. Following research posts at Chicago and with the National Institute of Mental Health (where he conducted fieldwork at St. Elizabeth’s Hospital, Washington, DC for *Asylums*), he was appointed to the faculty of the University of California, Berkeley’s sociology department in 1958, becoming a full professor in 1962. While teaching at Berkeley he influenced a number of

graduate students, including John Lofland, Dorothy Smith, David Sudnow, and Harvey Sacks. He also used his proximity to Nevada to undertake participant observation of casino life, first as a gambler, then as a croupier. Goffman relocated to the University of Pennsylvania in 1968, where his work became increasingly sensitized to sociolinguistic and gender issues. He remained there until his death in 1982 from stomach cancer.

Goffman’s primary contribution to sociology was to show how social interaction was fundamentally organized in social terms and amenable to close sociological investigation. He demonstrated how the building blocks of social encounters – the talk, gestures, expressions, and postures that humans constantly produce and readily recognize – were responsive not to individual psychology or social structural constraints but to the locally specific demands of the face to face social situation. This central analytic aim was pursued through a score of papers and eleven widely read books, including *The Presentation of Self in Everyday Life* (1959), *Asylums* (1961), *Stigma* (1963), and *Frame Analysis* (1974). In opening the interaction order as a distinct sub area of sociology Goffman brought a novel analytic attitude, a spirit of inquiry, and a persistent skepticism that connected narrow disciplinary concerns to wider social currents.

INTELLECTUAL AND SOCIAL CONTEXTS

While Goffman’s sociological project was unprecedented, his development of the sociology of the interaction order bore the imprint of the early social and intellectual contexts he encountered. Often characterized as a leading exponent of symbolic interactionism, Goffman brought a modulated determinism and critical edge to this perspective that owed something to the cultural influence of his Canadianism. At Toronto important influences were anthropologist C. W. M Hart, who introduced students to then untranslated portions of Durkheim, and the founder of kinesics, Ray Birdwhistell, whose class exercises involved close observation of ordinary behavior in natural settings.

These initial interests were firmed up after 1945 when Goffman moved south to join the talented cohort of students and faculty some times referred to as the second Chicago School of Sociology. Chicago proved to be the crucible in which a number of critical influences were condensed into the distinctive approach now immediately identifiable as “Goffman’s sociology.” Social psychological, sociological, anthropological, and literary lines of influence shaped the emergent Goffman. First, there was the legacy of G. H. Mead’s social psychology, codified as “symbolic interactionism” by Mead’s student Herbert Blumer in 1937. While Goffman absorbed Mead’s teachings about the formation of self through social interaction, he did so critically, acknowledging that in complex contemporary societies where the sources of moral consensus were increasingly differentiated, role taking was often more problematic than Mead envisaged. Cooley and Dewey were also major influences. A leading sociological influence was Simmel’s formal sociology, mediated via the Chicago School’s founding figure, Robert E. Park, who attended Simmel’s lectures at Berlin. One of Park’s students, Everett C. Hughes (whom Goffman considered his most important teacher at Chicago), passed the Simmel torch to the postwar generation. Simmel’s pioneering “sociational” conception of society that prioritized interactions between persons over large scale structures and institutions was congenial to Goffman, as was his proposal that sociology’s core method was to extract the “formal” features of sociation. As a formal sociologist, Goffman sought to elucidate and analyze a variety of forms of the interaction order, such as the basic kinds of face work, the forms of alienation from interaction, the arts of impression management, or the stages of remedial interchange. The anthropological influence on Goffman’s thought derives from the late “symbolic” Durkheim of *The Elementary Forms of the Religious Life*. This line of influence passed from Durkheim to British social anthropologist A. R. Radcliffe Brown – whom Goffman almost met in 1950 – through to W. Lloyd Warner (another significant Chicago teacher, and adviser for the research element of Goffman’s two graduate degrees). The literary influence was represented by Kenneth Burke’s writings, especially from *Permanence and Change*

(1935), from which Goffman extracted Burke’s method of perspective by incongruity, evident in the many irreverent comparisons and unexpected contrasts that became a Goffman trade mark. Burke himself apparently approved of *Presentation of Self* as a sociological application of his own dramatic approach.

These lineage lines contextualize the formation of Goffman’s sociology, but do not explain its unique shape and preoccupations. Goffman grew exasperated by critics who sought to label – and thus assimilate – his ideas to sociology’s major paradigms. In his view, sociological traditions were there to be creatively applied and modified, not slavishly followed. Throughout his career Goffman showed a remarkable facility to respond to and incorporate into his analyses ideas drawn from other theoretical approaches (game theory, ethology, phenomenology, feminism, conversation and discourse analysis). While his writings displayed clear systematic intent, the drive to build a single system was absent. Goffman was much more at home with the essay mode, never providing a final cumulative statement of his sociology. His judgment was that interaction analysis was too undeveloped to aspire to anything more than some robust conceptual distinctions. More than many significant twentieth century sociologists, Goffman’s oeuvre demands to be reconstructed by the reader; Goffman did not provide any obvious interpretive key to his work.

MAJOR SUBSTANTIVE CONTRIBUTIONS

Goffman burst onto the scene with the 1959 US publication of *The Presentation of Self in Everyday Life*, a book that breathed new life into the ancient “all the world’s a stage” metaphor. Embarking from a psychobiology that emphasized the immediate symbolic functions of the expressions humans constantly “give” (through the content of their talk) and “give off” or exude (through tone, posture, gesture, facial expression, and the like) when in the presence of others, Goffman brilliantly analyzed the “dramaturgical” aspects of this conduct. Using a wide range of illustrative materials – ranging from respectable treatises, ethnographies, and social histories through memoirs,

popular journalism, and novelistic accounts to his own acute observations of human conduct – Goffman showed how interactional details could be cogently understood in sociological terms as “performances” fostered by an “audience” requiring cooperative “teamwork” among performers to bring off a desired definition of the situation. Performances may be presented in “front” regions (such as workplaces or formal ceremonial settings) that are usually differentiated by “barriers to perception” from “back regions,” the back stage areas (bath rooms, restaurant kitchens, private offices) where performers prepare themselves. Goffman went on to examine how “discrepant roles” and “communication out of character” can threaten the fostered reality. A recurrent theme in his writings was that successful interaction needs not Parsonsian role players enacting the institutionalized obligations and expectations of a status, but rather “interactants” skilled in “the arts of impression management.”

In Goffman’s subsequent writings a range of figures – notably game, ritual, and ethnological metaphors – were used as methodological devices to highlight otherwise taken for granted features of social encounters. Face to face interaction was a species of social order, which he named “the interaction order” (a term coined in his 1953 PhD dissertation, then seemingly forgotten, and only revived for his posthumously published, valedictory American Sociological Association Presidential Address; see Goffman 1983). Confining his analytical attention to this face to face realm of embodied expression, Goffman produced both systematic examinations of the general forms of the interaction order (including *Behavior in Public Places*, 1963; *Relations in Public*, 1971; and *Forms of Talk*, 1981) and dissections of certain of its problematic aspects (notably *Asylums*, 1961; *Stigma*, 1963; and *Gender Advertisements*, 1979). Though Goffman always sought to maintain his own distinct position, his later work was increasingly preoccupied with issues that ethno methodology had brought to the fore of sociological analysis, and his longest book, *Frame Analysis* (1974), can be read as a sustained response to Garfinkel’s *Studies in Ethnomethodology* (1967). One major point of difference was the social self, which was for Goffman an abiding sociological referent.

Most generally, Goffman’s interaction analysis acknowledged the centrality of informational (or “communicative” or “system”) and ritual demands on interaction. The former concerned the communication and control of information given and exuded by the interactant (mood, intention, competence, trustworthiness, etc.) and was ultimately constrained by the physical limits of the human body’s vision, voice, hearing capacities, and so forth. Goffman mobilized dramaturgy and game theory to analyze the levels of mutual awareness that can emerge in inference making in ordinary encounters. It was these emphases that yielded complaints about Goffman’s “cynical” or “Machiavellian” view of human nature. The ritual model offered very different imagery. Ritual elements concern the expression and control of the interactant’s feelings towards both self and others. Here Goffman creatively adapted Durkheim’s theory of religion, applying it to the secular world of social encounters. In his work on face work, deference and demeanor, and supportive and remedial interchanges, Goffman showed how greetings and farewells, apologies and avoidance practices illustrated the need for persons to monitor their interactional conduct when in the presence of that sacred deity, the self of the other. From first to last, Goffman was a Durkheim revisionist.

Goffman’s analyses constantly distinguish out of awareness features of encounters that, once identified, become instantly recognizable. His pivotal distinction between focused and unfocused interaction is a case in point. Focused interaction, with its single joint focus of attention (e.g., a card game, a conversation, a physical task jointly carried out), is straightforward enough to grasp. But unfocused interaction, when persons orient their conduct simply by virtue of the co presence of others (e.g., walking down a busy street), opens up for sociology hitherto unenvisioned sources of social orderliness. A rule of “civil inattention” constrains the conduct of unacquainted others on the street, persons walking past each other silently being likened to passing cars dipping their lights. Civil inattention is one of a special class of social rules that regulate interaction known as “situational proprieties,” departures from which Goffman found especially instructive. Situational *improprieties* were less a

matter of psychopathology as they were an expression of alienation from the community, social establishments, social relationships, and encounters.

Goffman arrived at this conclusion after his monumental study of the plight of mental patients in *Asylums*, and his psychologically astute analysis of the identity implications of departures from normality in *Stigma*. Like his dissertation, in *Asylums* Goffman strove to overcome the limitations of his case study by generating an analytic ethnography that pursued selected conceptual themes. The mental hospital was seen as part of the larger class of “total institutions” that also included prisons, concentration camps, and monasteries. Social processes of “mortification” were common to them all. Mental patients underwent shared changes in self conception – a shared “moral career” that was at once cause and consequence of their current predicament as they were sucked into a “betrayal funnel.” Patients developed an underlife, rich in “secondary adjustments,” which created space for conceptions of self at odds with officially prescribed conceptions. The practice of psychiatry was described as a form of service work, a “tinkering trade” that offered precious little real service to the mental patient. *Asylums*, however, was not simply an influential critique of mental hospitals that brought Goffman to the attention of non sociological audiences: it remains a vivid exploration of resistance to authority and the social sources of selfhood under extreme conditions.

Stigma also drew acclaim from outside academic sociology. It provided a careful analysis of normality and those temporarily or more extensively excluded from full social acceptance. Although Goffman defined a stigma as a “deeply discrediting attribute” and was much concerned with the situation of groups such as the disfigured, the differently abled, and ethnic minorities, his emphasis was once again on acts and relationships, not personal attributes. *Stigma* also anticipated identity politics. Later, and in part in response to his feminist oriented students, Goffman presented an “institutional reflexivity” theory that saw gender difference as a thoroughly social construction. He illustrated his approach to gender difference through an analysis of some 500 advertising

images in *Gender Advertisements*, a book that still stands as an unrivalled piece of visual sociology. While Goffman’s thinking on gender difference did not attract the acclaim of his earlier ideas, it anticipated many of the key points of Judith Butler’s celebrated performative theory by more than a decade, and showed Goffman’s continuing sensitivity to social currents beyond the academy.

Goffman deepened his perspective with his longest book, *Frame Analysis*, which provided a modulated phenomenological dimension to his sociology. Frames are perceptual principles that order events, sustained in both mind and activity. For Goffman, frames were constantly shifting features of situational social life, analyzable into primary frameworks and two kinds of transformed frame, the keying and the fabrication. We can make sense of two persons quarreling in terms of a primary framework, a “domestic argument,” but can also come to see it as keyed if the couple are rehearsing a scene in a play, or as fabricated if one party is being set up for a reality TV program. Frames structure events, but our understandings can also be altered if participants seek to shift from a literal frame to a joking one. Goffman emphasized both the determinative characteristic of frames and the capacity of interactants to change the currently prevailing frame. This theme is refined in his last book, *Forms of Talk* – concept of “footing” is designed to capture the shifting alignments of persons to their own and others’ talk. Goffman’s later work focuses more consistently on the syntactical relations between the acts of co present persons, but the self does not disappear from view. Goffman’s earlier two selves viewpoint (where an unsocialized self seems to lie behind the presented self, directing it) gives way to a more sociologically consistent view of the self as a “changeable formula” with no more depth than is encoded in interactional conduct.

RELEVANCE TO HISTORY OF CONTEMPORARY SOCIOLOGY

One of the more readable (and certainly one of the most quotable) of twentieth century sociologists, Goffman’s deceptively accessible writings can be understood at many levels and in a

range of different ways. This is evident in the proliferation of a range of readings of his ideas: interactionist, structuralist, existentialist, ethogenic, modernist, and postmodernist. His sociology has attracted extremes of assessment from extravagant commendation to outright dismissal – the latter evaluations tending to originate from within sociology. The core of these objections concerns his cavalier approach to questions of method. Goffman was master of his own craft and did not have a method in the conventional sense of a set of procedures that can be taught to graduate students. His principled indifference stemmed from a conviction that actual research practice was always going to be at variance with proclaimed methodological procedures. Alternative valuations have concentrated on Goffman's artful use of a range of rhetorical devices. Goffman's texts adopt a distinct format made up of several components: the essay mode; conceptual framework development as a preferred discursive structure; pressing the deployment of metaphor to the point of exhaustion; and use of a range of sociological tropes, including perspective by incongruity, parataxis, irony, and humor. But the deconstruction of Goffman's texts in this way does not explain the ongoing fertility of his ideas. The brilliance and idiosyncrasy of his writings have so far proved a tough act to follow.

In the image originally applied to Simmel, Goffman left a cash legacy to be spent as successors consider fit. The primarily conceptual character of Goffman's legacy has proved to be adaptable to a variety of analytic enterprises. Theoretically, Goffman's ideas play an important role in the grand syntheses of Giddens and Habermas. Practically, *Asylums* impacted the deinstitutionalization movements of the 1960s and 1970s. *Stigma* remains a pivotal text for groups advancing the interests of the differently abled. In empirical terms, researchers have developed more fully explanatory theory from Goffman's initial conceptions. Examples include theories of politeness, interaction ritual chains, the centrality of frame analysis to social movements theory, and social psychological versions of impression management theory. Ethnographers of various hues have been equipped with an extensive and powerful analytic vocabulary. As might be expected from the cash legacy notion, the influence of Goffman's

sociology, both direct and diffuse, continues to be far reaching.

SEE ALSO: Blumer, Herbert George; Dramaturgy; Facework; Frame; Interaction; Interaction Order; Public Realm; Self; Simmel, Georg; Stigma; Symbolic Interaction

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Gökalp, Ziya (1876–1924)

Serif Mardin

Turkish sociologist Ziya Gökalp was the first to use western sociological theory as a foundation of his thought. He is known as the originator of a systematic theory of Turkish nationalism. This theory was elaborated in the confluence of three problematic issues in the Ottoman Empire at the end of the nineteenth century.

One was the policy of “Ottomanism,” an attempt by the reformist Ottoman bureaucracy to modernize the empire. Ottomanism attempted to present Ottoman reform to the Concert of Europe (composed of Russia, Prussia, Austria, and Great Britain) as having modernized the structure of the empire and granted a new status to non-Muslim communities. It was hoped this would make Turkey worthy of acceptance in the Concert. This strategy was successful (1856), but met with much criticism from various groups inside the empire. The second Ottoman problem was the question of the viability of a union of all Muslims under Ottoman leadership. This issue was known as Islamism or *İslamcılık*. The third issue was an option increasingly discussed among Ottoman intellectuals in the 1890s, i.e., the ideology of rallying all Ottomans around “Turkishness.”

In Cairo in 1904, an article appeared in the Young Turk periodical *Türk* entitled “Three Types of Policies” that weighed all three alternatives, condemning Ottomanism and “pan Islamism” but expressing a hope for the promotion of a Turkish national culture. The author was Yusuf Akçura, a Turkic émigré from Russia. Exactly the same issue was later to be discussed in a set of articles by Gokalp with the title “Underscoring One’s Turkishness, Islamicness and Modernity” (*Türkleşmek, İslamlaşmak, Muasırlaşmak*), with *modernity* as an added option in the list of alternatives.

Gokalp’s birthplace, Diyarbakır, was a provincial center distant from the Ottoman capital. However, it had profited from more of an input of the western oriented reform movement, the *Tanzimat*, than might be imagined. Diyarbakır had an official gazette published by Gokalp’s father, and it had a lycée (*idadi i mulki*), a product of reform that Ziya attended. Ziya came from a prominent local family and his father’s house had a large library, presumably containing nineteenth century geographical atlases and other reference works.

There was a sufficient number of secular intellectuals around to alert Gokalp to the ideas of materialism that came out of the West. He appears to have been introduced in his youth to Dr. Abdullah Cevdet, an intellectual who was to become a key representative of nineteenth century western secular materialism in Turkey. One of Gokalp’s mentors, a Greek physician

who was his teacher of biology in school, had a permanent influence on his intellectual development. His uncle, Hasip Efendi, introduced him to Islamic mysticism. These cross currents resulted in a depression that led to an attempted suicide (1895).

Gokalp was involved in a number of subversive activities encouraged by the Young Turk presence in Diyarbakır for which he was imprisoned in 1898. He thereafter went to Istanbul to study at the Veterinary School, from which he graduated. In 1903–7 Gokalp occupied a bureaucratic position in Diyarbakır. In 1907, leading a group of protestors, he occupied the Diyarbakır telegraphic office and sent a collective telegram to the sultan asking him to stop the depredation of a local tribal sheikh who was taking advantage of his position as a quasi gendarme to fleece the local population. Following the Young Turk Revolution and their accession to power on July 23, 1908, Gokalp was once again in Diyarbakır filling the position his father had occupied as the editor of the province’s official journal.

Gokalp was a local delegate to the Young Turk Congress of Salonika in 1909 and impressed the leaders of the party. Traveling back and forth between Salonika and Diyarbakır, he found time to increase his knowledge of western philosophy and sociology in Salonika where he read books ordered from Europe. He also taught sociology in the Salonika lycée in 1910 and established relations with a literary group and its publication, *Genç Kalemler*. *Genç Kalemler* paid special attention to linguistic issues and the elaboration of a literature expressed in the vernacular Turkish.

In the election of 1912 to the reestablished Ottoman parliament, Gokalp was elected as representative from Ergani. During World War I he took up the role of ideological mouthpiece for the Young Turks, following in his writings their various shifts of interest from Pan Turkism to Islam. He may be considered to have adumbrated some of their emerging secularism in articles he wrote before the war.

In 1911 Akçura had started a new review, *Türk Yurdu* (*The Turkish Hearth*). It was here that Gokalp published his article “Underscoring One’s Turkishness, Islamicness and Modernity” in 1912. According to Akçura, *Türk Yurdu* itself was a continuation of the

Tercuman, edited by Gaspiralı İsmail (Ismail Gasprinski) in the Caucasus since 1883. Akçura therefore underlined the much earlier interest of the Turkic population of Russia in the questions he reviewed in “Three Types of Policies.” This emphasis on the greater experience and sophistication of the Tatar as compared to the Ottomans was to remain a sticking point between the two men and led to a break in their relation after 1912. At the time, Ziya Gökalp was immersed in a much wider intellectual Ottoman debate about the three options detailed by Akçura. In this debate figured Süleyman Nazif (1869–1927), an “Ottomanist,” Ahmet Ağaoğlu (1869–1934), a “Turkish nationalist,” Babanzâde Ahmet Naim (1872–1934), an “Islamist,” Ali Kemal (1867–1922), an “Ottomanist,” and Yusuf Akçura, a “Turkist.”

During World War I, Ziya Gökalp was increasingly enmeshed in the ideological themes promoted by the Young Turks. With the financial help of the Party of Union and Progress, he founded in 1914 the bi monthly *İslam Mecmuası*, which continued publication until 1917. The review went along with a new interest of the Young Turks for the reform of the Ottoman Islamic institutions. This interest concentrated on the ways in which religion could be integrated with the state the Young Turks were constructing. Gökalp wrote a report for the 1916 Convention of the Union and Progress Party where he explored the same issue.

Following the defeat of the Ottoman Empire, the Young Turks abolished the Party of Union and Progress on November 5, 1918. On December 21, the Young Turk leaders fled, the Ottoman parliament was dissolved, and Gökalp was interrogated over his involvement in the Armenian deportations. On January 30, 1919, allied occupational forces landed in Istanbul, picked up a number of prominent Young Turks, and sent them into exile or prison in Malta. As a member of the Central Committee of the Young Turks, Gökalp was among their number. After returning from Malta in 1921, he went to Ankara where the new (later republican) regime was being organized. His return to Diyarbakır in 1922 probably reveals the suspicion Ankara still felt toward a former Young Turk responsible for the ruin of the empire.

In Diyarbakır Gökalp published a new review, *Kuşuk Mecmua*. This phase of his life

shows he was somewhat insensitive to the acceleration of the new regime’s secularist policies. On November 1, 1922, the sultanate was abolished and on November 18 an Ottoman prince was nominated as caliph without the title of sultan. Following the abolition of the sultanate, Gökalp discussed the issue of the caliphate, maintaining that it was a religious institution that should only be concerned with matters of faith (see Gökalp 1959: 223–7). Unfortunately, this view, which tacitly accepted the role of a purely religious caliph in Turkey, was diametrically opposed to the position taken by the minister of justice Seyyid Bey in the Turkish parliament on March 3, 1924. Seyyid Bey argued that the caliphate was a purely political position and therefore had no role to play in a republic that did not allow devolution of power. Seyyid Bey’s speech led to the abolition of the caliphate on the same day. The coolness that developed at the time between Gökalp and Ankara is therefore understandable. However, this difference seems to have been patched up when Gökalp was asked to direct the bureau in charge of publication and translation. He there after applied himself to promoting the ideology of the government in a brochure *Doğru Yol (The Right Way)*.

GÖKALP’S INNOVATIONS

Gökalp’s key concepts of the *umma*, the nation, and the international community show an evolutionist view of society. Although he outlined the stages of the process, it was difficult for him to specify the specific stage at which the Ottoman Empire found itself in the early twentieth century. Many of his statements should therefore be seen as part of a general program to be implemented in relation to “social facts” and their change over time.

Up to the time of Gökalp’s writings, the critique of the policies implemented in the empire was focused on their capability and efficacy in confronting western ideologies promoting “progress” and “civilization.” Gökalp turned the defensive attitude around. He stated that one should build a response to these pressures by observing social facts as components of Ottoman society. In his view, these had been approached by the *Tanzimat* with a somewhat

superficial understanding of the processes involved both in western influences and in the internal social changes the empire was under going. For instance, a structuring element of modernity the reformers had not taken into account was the division of labor that produced a general differentiation in social, economic, and political functions of society. A more general process could be observed that furnished the dynamic element of modernization and stood behind the division of labor, namely “new life . . . an ideal which is in the process of emerging from the [*sic*] social consciousness. Today this ideal has to remain somewhat ambiguous. This ambiguity will be cleared by time and by the guidance of social convention” (Gökalp 1959: 315)

The central point of departure for Gökalp’s sociology was the *umma*, the Islamic community at large. The *umma* could not be kept intact in the changing social structure of the Ottoman Empire, but, nevertheless, it had to remain in a modified form as a receptacle of faith. The remaining element of the *umma* was to be given a new foundation by retaining the Arab alphabet (a common feature of Muslim culture), by working on a common terminology for all Muslims, by promoting *umma* wide congresses taking up common educational policies to establish communication links between Muslims of all nations, and by keeping the crescent as a common symbol.

Even in the Ottoman Empire the social division of labor had expanded and had given rise to a society of occupational groups. Consequently, the collective consciousness of Muslim and Christian communities had begun to weaken. The ground was thus set for the emergence of a new type of society, the nation. This process was propelled by three types of forward motion: first, the social density that would create the effervescence necessary for change (something that Gökalp probably picked up from Durkheim’s view on religion). This effervescence, in turn, brought to the surface of society the component of its specific “ethos.” The integration of the component of the ethos produced a “culture” (*hars*) and its expression in a language. People of the same language tended to embrace the same faith. This somewhat confusing aspect of Gökalp’s ideas has had a prolongation in contemporary Turkish

nationalism, and can only be fully understood in the following quotation from Gökalp: “As language plays a part in decoding religious affiliation, so religion plays a part in determining membership in a nationality. The Protestant French became Germanized when they were expelled from France and settled in Germany. The Turkish aristocracy of the old Bulgars became Slavized following their conversion to Christianity” (1959: 81).

The society to emerge from this process was the nation. The forces that propelled the nation ahead, however, were not simply those of a social structure. They also depended on changes in communication patterns that accompanied the division of labor. According to Gökalp, Gabriel Tarde discerned two levels in this innovation. The first was the newspaper. The newspaper, using the vernacular version of a language, created a sense of shared identity among its readers, uniting them into a public. The second element was the book, which worked to promote a further associational bond in the sense that it addressed itself to persons who shared abstract ideas, e.g., the scholar and the scientist. This was the foundation of the international community, the next stage of social evolution with which the Ottomans had to integrate.

The nation is thus seen by Gökalp “as that ethnic group which, as it emerges after a long period of fusion in an empire, strives to regain and revive its identity.” The emergence and maintenance of this identity, however, can only be understood in relation to Gökalp’s belief in a “social mind” of a transcendental character in relation to organic social phenomena.

Although many of Gökalp’s speculations on Turkism show the use of the concept of race (1959: 75), in 1917 he was clear in preferring the new use by the French geographer Vacher de Lapouge of the concept of *ethnie*. He stated his preference for the term “ethnic family” instead of race when speaking of groups of smaller units, *kavm*, a group of individuals who have a common language and usage (Gökalp 1959: 127).

The name Turk was both a repository of *mores* and the name of a vernacular folk language that had been overlaid by a hybrid court culture. The nation, having once emerged, would be supported by systematic research concerned with retrieving Turkic folk motifs,

symbols, and usages. The emergence of the nation did not mean that the function of the *umma* disappeared. What had to happen was the creation of an “up to date Turkism” (1959: 76). The Turks would still consider themselves to be of the *umma* of Islam, the Qur’an to be their sacred book, and Muhammad their sacred prophet. However, many of the items that the *ulema* saw as part of the *şeriat*, such as the approval of polygamy, had no relation whatsoever to religious commands.

For Gokalp, the map of a future Turkey was Turkism, which included the search for authentic culture still buried in the culture of the people, doing away with the Ottoman written language and reforming language to fit the vernacular of folk literature. Like many of his contemporaries, Gokalp promoted populism and probably received these ideas from Turkic Russian émigrés. He contributed to a periodical entitled *Towards the People*, in which the Russian populist ideology was echoed. His populism, however, shows the element of authoritarianism that appears in many of his ideas.

Gokalp’s idea of solidarity rests on Durkheimian foundations and on Durkheim’s use of solidarity. However, Gokalp’s solidarity is to be distinguished from French solidarism. It had an authoritarian content that is evident in his views on property: “Individual ownership is legitimate only insofar as it serves social solidarity. The attempts of the socialist and communist to abolish private property are not justified. However, private wealth which does not serve social solidarity cannot be regarded as legitimate” (1959: 312).

Influences on Gokalp included Durkheim’s concepts of the division of labor as well as the social bond of solidarity. The contrast of *Gemeinschaft* and *Gesellschaft* appears without a clear reference to Tönnies, and Fichte is mentioned in relation to the “Germanic ideal.” The ideas of Gabriel Tarde and Fouille’s *idées force* are part of Gokalp’s theoretical foundations. He thought Bergson the most original thinker of his time. Gokalp took from him the idea of an *élan vital* and that of creative evolution. But even in their cumulation, these vitalist foundations can only be understood in relation to Gokalp’s less often expressed view of an active social mind that was transcendental in

character. He may have been predisposed to this view by his conviction of the profundity of Islamic Sufism.

Conscience collective and collective representation were both concepts Gokalp received from Durkheim, but he used them somewhat differently. In Durkheim, collective conscience is the source of control of moral transgressions. In Gokalp, it is the cement of nationality. This is an illegitimate extension of the term that may have links with his admiration of Ibn Arabi and Arabi’s theory of eternal essences. Gokalp’s use of “collective representations” as mental patterns common to members of a society expressed through symbolism as part of the culture of that society is closer to the Durkheimian use.

Ziya Gokalp’s *Turkleşmek, İslamlaşmak, Muasırlaşmak*, later transformed into his *The Principles of Turkism (Turkçülüğün Esasları)* (1921), was used as an ideological frame for nationalists of the republican era. Intransigent Kemalists nevertheless neglected the central role that Gokalp still gave to Islam. It appears that this role had already disappeared in his *Principles of Turkism*. The extreme nationalist right has also found a source of inspiration in his ideas. The poem *Turan*, with its references to a Central Asian Turkic “hearth” as an ideal to be followed by all Turks, has kept its force as an inspiration for Turkish nationalists. Although Gokalp had investigated the status of Kurdish tribes in his birthplace and published the result of his investigation, there is no mention of Kurds in the *Principles of Turkism*.

SEE ALSO: Collective Consciousness; Culture; Developmental Stages; Durkheim, Émile; Ethnic Groups; Ideology; Islam; Mass Media and Socialization; Modernization; Nationalism; Popular Culture; Positivism; Progress, Idea of; Science and Culture; Solidarity; Tönnies, Ferdinand

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Goldman, Emma (1869–1940)

Melissa Sandefur and Vicky M. MacLean

Emma Goldman was a social and political writer, revolutionary activist, and one of the most accomplished speakers in American history. Goldman was a proponent of individualistic anarchism, which she described as the philosophy and theory that government and man made laws are intrinsically coercive and harmful to individual liberty (Goldman 1969). Her commitment to anarchism and to the ideal of freedom led her to champion the causes of labor, anti militarism, freedom of religion, prison reform, and sexual and reproductive freedom. Her most important contributions to political and social thought include the incorporation of sexual politics into anarchism and her many essays on contemporary issues such as education, birth control, women's emancipation, modern drama, national chauvinism, and crime. A passionate feminist, Goldman believed that a

purely political solution was not the answer to inequality between the sexes, but that equality would come only from a massive transformation of values and from women themselves.

Emma Goldman was born on June 27, 1869 in the Jewish quarter of Kovno, Russia (now Lithuania) to innkeeper parents Taube Bienowitch Goldman and Abraham Goldman. Goldman spent a harsh and sometimes violent childhood (at the hand of her father) in Kovno, Popelan, and Königsberg. In 1881 when Emma was 13, the Goldman family moved to St. Petersburg, just after Tsar Alexander II's assassination. It was there that she was influenced by the radical student circle of St. Petersburg (Wexler 1984). Goldman attended school for 6 months, but because of family economic hardships she dropped out to work in a glove factory. Goldman's father attempted to arrange a marriage, but Emma, then only 15, refused with threats of suicide. She escaped the harsh conditions of Russia by moving to the US with her half sister Helena; they joined another sister, Lena, in Rochester, New York. Her 2 volume, 56 chapter autobiography *Living My Life* (1931) begins with her arrival in the US. Goldman worked at a clothing factory where working conditions were hazardous and where she was subjected to anti-Semitism, low pay, and 15 hour workdays. Goldman discovered that for a Jewish/Eastern European immigrant, America was not the Promised Land. These early experiences and her readings on communist anarchism, socialism, and Marxism influenced Goldman's belief that many problems of individual freedom stemmed from the social conditions resulting from capitalism.

Goldman was first drawn to anarchism following the Haymarket Square Strike and the subsequent Riot of 1886 in Chicago. This tragedy began as a confrontation between police attempting to disperse marchers protesting police violence, and striking workers in Haymarket Square. A riot ensued when an unidentified person threw a bomb, triggering a gun battle. Eight anarchists were arrested, charged, and tried for crimes and deaths associated with the riot; seven were found guilty, sentenced to death, and eventually four were hanged. Goldman followed the events intensely and on the day of the hangings resolved to become a revolutionary. As an anarchist Goldman

adopted syndicalist leanings, rejecting private property ownership and promoting free worker cooperatives in place of capitalism (Wexler 1984).

In 1887 Goldman married fellow factory worker Jacob A. Kersner, thus gaining US citizenship. Ten months later, she divorced Kersner and moved to New Haven, Connecticut, where she worked at a factory and met other Russian socialists and anarchists (Wexler 1984). Goldman then relocated to New York City, where she met her mentor, German anarchist Johann Most, editor of *Die Freiheit*, and her closest friend and lifelong comrade, Alexander Berkman. As a writer and prominent orator, Most encouraged Goldman to become a public speaker and deepened her interest in anarchist philosophy. Goldman's initial lectures were delivered in Yiddish or German, but in time she gained confidence and considerable skill as a speaker in English. Most also stimulated her interest in the social revolutionary potential of the arts. However, Goldman became dissatisfied with Most's attitude toward her as a woman, believing that he viewed her as his subordinate and mistress more than an equal comrade. She gravitated toward Berkman, who became her lover and closest comrade in the anarchist movement. Of the many men in her life, Goldman felt that only Berkman treated her as an equal, never pressuring her to fill the traditional roles of wife and mother (Solomon 1987).

Early in her anarchist career, Goldman advocated violence as an acceptable means to an end. She helped Berkman plot to assassinate industrialist Henry Clay Frick in 1892 after Frick used force to suppress strikers, leaving 9 dead. Goldman and Berkman hoped that the assassination of Frick would ignite a revolution. The assassination attempt was a failure, however, as Frick was only slightly injured, and the workers were not incited to revolt. Berkman received a 22 year prison sentence for the attempted assassination, but Goldman's involvement was never proven (Wexler 1984). In her autobiography, Goldman unburdened herself of her clandestine involvement with Berkman in the Frick debacle. She wrote: "my connection with Berkman's act and our relationship is the leitmotif of my 40 years of life" (Falk 2003: 3). As her thinking evolved, Goldman rejected violence in favor of political organizing. For

the next 30 years she lectured, studied nursing, edited and wrote for the radical anarchist magazine *Mother Earth*, and mobilized political protests advocating anarchism, free speech, and civil liberties.

Though Goldman did not support the women's suffrage cause, she criticized the social and economic subordination of women and was an early advocate of the right of women to practice birth control. She was arrested several times for violating the 1873 Comstock Law prohibiting the distribution of birth control literature. She saw birth control as a social issue and argued that the choice to have sexual relations without fear of unwanted pregnancy was critical to the human spirit and liberty as well as necessary to the empowerment of women (Wexler 1984). In her writings on women, Goldman argued that pursuing the vote would not bring women true emancipation. Instead, she advocated for institutional changes, particularly related to women's sexual freedom, economic independence, and marriage. Goldman discussed marriage as an impediment to love and to the ideal relationship between the sexes. Because of her belief in absolute freedom and her own disappointing experience of marriage, Goldman believed individuals should enter into and leave personal relationships without restriction. "If I ever love a man again," she said in 1889, "I will give myself to him without being bound by the rabbi or the law, and when that love dies, I will leave without permission" (Goldman 1931: 36). Marriage, in her opinion, was a legalized form of prostitution, in which women traded sex for economic and social standing (Solomon 1987). Building on her critique of women's suffrage, Goldman claimed that no political solution would free women from the internal constraints of public oppression. Goldman argued that if women are to be emancipated they must stand on their own ground and insist on unrestricted freedom (Goldman 1969).

During the depression of 1893, Goldman was arrested in New York's Union Square and convicted for "inciting to riot" (Wexler 1984). She was sentenced to a year at Blackwell's Island Penitentiary where she served as a nurse to the inmates, studied, and read freely. She became more fluent in English while working with prisoners and resolved to address

English speaking audiences in promoting “real social changes” (Goldman 1931: 155). Her experience with prison, both from her own internment and from the writings of Berkman, led her to address the deplorable conditions of prisons and the failure of the criminal justice system. Her 1917 publication *Anarchism and Other Essays* included an essay on “Prison: A Social Crime and Failure.” Pointing out that the methods used by society to deter crime were unsuccessful, Goldman promoted understanding of the social conditions leading to criminal behavior and called for a radical restructuring of political and economic institutions. She further advocated for the importance of providing prisoners with meaningful work and adequate pay as the primary mode of rehabilitation (Solomon 1987). “My Year in Stripes,” published in the *New York World* the day after Goldman’s release, told the story of her arrest and of the humiliating living conditions in prison. Goldman later declared before a crowd of supporters that if the representatives of government intended to prosecute women for talking, they would have to “begin with their own mothers, wives, sisters and sweethearts” (Falk 2003).

On September 6, 1901, self proclaimed anarchist Leon Czolgosz shot President William McKinley in Buffalo, New York, at the Pan American Exposition and later stated that a lecture by Goldman motivated his attack. Authorities arrested and interrogated Goldman but found no evidence linking her to the assassination (Wexler 1984). Goldman continued her public tours and gained much public favor among the middle class and liberal organizations that supported progressive causes and opposed 1903 legislation banning anarchists from entering the country (Solomon 1987). Goldman also began a new series of lectures on the Russian Revolution as tensions in Tsarist Russia mounted. In 1903 the Jewish community suffered a wave of pogroms: planned campaigns of persecution or extermination sanctioned by the government. Hundreds of Jews were killed in Kishinev and the final blow came in 1905 during “Bloody Sunday” when political dissidents demonstrating at the Winter Palace were slaughtered by Russian troops. For 2 years, Goldman toured and drummed up support for the Russian Revolution (Wexler 1984).

In the years between 1908 and 1916, Goldman’s lecture tours throughout the US and Canada took on a new level of intensity after she met and became the lover of Dr. Ben L. Reitman, a gynecologist who began to manage her engagements. Her prominence as a speaker is evident in the expansiveness of her audience. According to Solomon (1987: 26), in a 6 month tour in 1910 Goldman spoke in 25 states to an audience of 40,000 and she sold 10,000 articles of literature. Another boost to Goldman’s popularity came in 1906 when Berkman was freed from prison after serving out 14 years of his 22 year sentence. Together, Goldman and Berkman resumed their advocacy for political education. Berkman wanted to achieve anarchism through the labor movement, while Goldman’s ideology cut across class lines and attracted followers from the middle class. They founded *Mother Earth*, a radical periodical edited by Goldman until it was censored by the US government in 1917 (Wexler 1984). Many of Goldman’s lectures and writings were devoted to drama, a venue that allowed her to promote radical ideas through the arts. *Anarchism and Other Essays* contained writings on anarchism, social criticism, women’s emancipation, prison reform, and modern drama; it received wide spread publicity and reviews. In 1914 Goldman published a series of lectures (*The Social Significance of the Modern Drama*) critiquing social morality as represented by modern playwrights. Goldman addressed plays such as *A Doll’s House*, a critique of women’s roles and marriage, Shaw’s *Major Barbara*, and Ibsen’s *Ghosts*. Through her use of drama Goldman brought her social critique to a new audience (Solomon 1987).

“Red Emma,” a prime target of the US government, was arrested 16 times and jailed on several occasions. In 1917 Goldman and Berkman were imprisoned for protesting military conscription. Then in 1919, during the post World War I anti Bolshevik fervor, the government revoked Goldman’s citizenship and both Goldman and Berkman were deported to Russia (Wexler 1984). After 2 years Goldman fled the new Soviet Union, profoundly disillusioned with the authoritarian state and its disregard for civil liberties. Goldman subsequently wrote *My Disillusionment in Russia* (1923) and attempted to discredit Bolshevism and to

defend her own revolutionary principles. She wrote of her experiences in Soviet Russia from 1920 to 1921 and what she saw as the Bolsheviks' betrayal of the Revolution. Goldman argued true communism was never present in the Soviet Union, as the class system there was never abolished – just reformatted. In addition, Goldman noted that the Bolsheviks wielded even more power than the tsars they overthrew, and party officers spent most of their time seeking greater influence and prestige.

Emma Goldman spent the last two decades of her life traveling between France, England, and Canada, still actively promoting her humanist brand of anarchism. In June 1925, still exiled from the US, Goldman married a British friend and anarchist, James Colton, in order to secure British citizenship. She then moved to a small cottage, purchased by friends, near St. Tropez, France, where she wrote her autobiography with Berkman's editorial assistance. Goldman maintained her friendship with Berkman, who lived in exile in Nice, and helped to support him financially. However, as Berkman's health and financial situation deteriorated he became depressed and in June 1936 he shot himself, leaving Goldman feeling devastated and hopeless. Goldman was reenergized, however, when she was invited by Augustine Souchy, head of a Spanish anarchist syndicalist group, to support the Spanish workers' rebellion. While fundraising for the Spanish revolutionaries in Canada, Goldman suffered a paralyzing stroke and died 3 months later, on May 14, 1940. At the request of friends, she was buried at Waldheim Cemetery in Chicago, near the graves of the Haymarket strikers (Solomon 1987).

Emma Goldman's contributions to sociology are most evident in her political critiques of major social institutions: the family and marriage, religion, industrial capital, education, and most importantly, the state. Mentored by the most prominent anarchists of her time, she incorporated various strains of anarchy into a social movement reflective of a historical period of American radicalism often lost to historians. Rather than simply advocating anarchism as an intellectual exercise, she tested and expressed her theory through public speaking and her published works in the tradition of sociological "praxis." Goldman was concerned both with

educating the public about anarchism as well as providing a critique of social problems that stemmed from society as it was structured. Although Goldman was interested in political and social issues, she gave theoretical primacy to the individual and to the principle of self-determination. Despite what was sometimes an absence of logic in her oratorical rhetoric, Goldman's emphasis on freedom was always at the center of her activism and of her revolutionary thinking. Goldman's lasting influence on American history is evident in the fact that many of her historical proclamations continue to ring true today.

SEE ALSO: Anarchism; Communism; Family Conflict; Gender, Work, and Family; Inequality/Stratification, Gender; Radical Feminism; Sex and Gender

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governmentality and control

Susanne Krasmann

In his lectures at the Collège de France at the end of the 1970s, the French philosopher Michel Foucault developed a new analytics of power, making the concept of governmentality the focus of his interest. This concept first of all refers to the historical emergence of an “art of government”: governing becomes an object of problematizing the best possible mode of exercising power. “Art,” therefore, alludes to an artificiality of government, something fabricated by humans and implying certain techniques and forms of knowledge, and to a capacity of producing effectiveness. The rationality of government, then, does not consist in a substantial reason, as what seems to be rational results from a relation between the object operated on, the objective pursued, the application of suitable means, techniques, and so forth. In short, rationality is itself a reflection of the conditions of government. It is by no means timelessly valid; rather, the historical context and the perspectives of a society or a local culture give the structure that facilitates its emergence, and here especially the knowledge itself that comes into use. *Governmentality studies* examines rationalities of government that form the techniques, procedures and ways of action, and the economy of power that these technologies create.

In this sense, the concept also refers to a type of power that, according to Foucault, has become preeminent throughout the West: the art of “governing people,” which makes the individual become an active subject of its own government. Accordingly, the notion of government does not just refer to state and politics in its common use sense today, but also means the education of children, the organization of household and family, management strategies, the government of communities, and the control of social problems. The term already implies this wide range of meanings in modernity, and Foucault reconstructs the genealogy of the art of government as a history of problematizations. These in the first place concentrate on the inquiry into the reason of state: what is the

convenient way to go about fostering and defending the power of the state independently of the person of the ruler? Later on, the population will be discovered as an object of government in itself. Demographic developments and problems, like diseases and poverty arising from the growing industrial work and developing urban structures, were being made operational – and thus controllable – using statistical methods. Finally, the economy is becoming an independent science, posing the question of how the functioning of the economy can be reconciled with social welfare. Consequently, the economy, the social, and the political came out of these kinds of rationalizations as objects of knowledge and government. Their separation in different spheres therefore is on no account timeless, but the product of historical processes.

The exploration of governmentalities departed in the 1990s from the Anglo Saxon reception of Foucault’s lectures (cf. Burchell et al. 1991). Studies on the history and the effects of contemporary technologies of government made the most diverse social fields objects of investigation, ranging from genetics via philosophies of management to crime control. Yet, it is no accident that the “history of the present” was first written in the Anglo Saxon countries, in particular in Great Britain under Thatcherism (cf. Barry et al. 1996), as the concept is especially suitable for critically dealing with the political rationality of neoliberalism. Liberalism in this perspective is conceived of not as a theory or a philosophy defending freedom as a civil right only, but as an art of government recognizing liberty as an indispensable element for effective government. Freedom therefore is not a naturally preexisting entity, not something we own. Rather, it is presupposed artificially and thus becomes a resource of government, the use of which at the same time has to be organized.

Historically, liberalism initially expressed itself as a critique of too much interference and dissociated itself from the police science of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries that was constantly concerned with the social order and its regulation. Nevertheless, Foucault above all regards a liberal government as a specific type of power which has to be dissolved from this historically specific constellation, a mode of governing people operating on the

basis of possibilities that are being created, structured, and restricted. According to liberal reason, in order to conduct the behavior of people it is not necessarily indispensable to exercise force; rather, it is more effective to grant and structure the practice of freedom. Thus, freedom might take the effect of a promise mobilizing the capacities of individuals. They will learn to conceive of themselves as free subjects, as entrepreneurs that invest, citizens claiming their rights, creative persons on their way to self realization – and thus governing themselves. To be governed and to govern oneself is, according to Foucault (1993), inextricably linked together.

But liberalism also threatens the liberty that it itself founded, and this too can be deciphered as a kind of strategy: the free play of the market forces that it presupposes, the freedom of personal development, or the safety of the citizens it claims to guarantee, all these rights have to be secured. Insecurity, then, is a complement of liberty taking the effect of a negative promise – the threat of dangers, risks, and insecurities demands the implementation of security mechanisms that themselves constrain freedom. Security and liberty represent not only two main cornerstones of the liberal constitutional state, but also basic elements of technologies of government. By playing them off against each other and at the same time interweaving them, individuals are being convinced that they have had to subordinate their personal concerns in favor of the safety of all, or that in their own interests they have had to undertake endeavors to secure their own existence. Also insecurity is a precondition that allows for regulating the proper use of freedom politically (cf. Hindess 1996; Lemke 1997).

There are at least four aspects under which the concept of governmentality is opening up a new perspective for the analysis of power and domination, whereas the term “government” has to be posed in between these two poles. It refers neither to a spontaneous, ephemeral form of exercising power restricted to situations nor to conditions of domination already consolidated. Focusing on an intermediate level of rationalities and technologies of government, the concept firstly allows for scrutinizing the manners in which political tactics and strategies mold the subjectivities of people, how political

programs first of all produce imaginations, necessities, and endeavors and thus indirectly steer the behavior of people and their lifestyles. Forms of subjectivation are the effect of technologies of power but at the same time their vanishing point: we cannot presume a subject capable of creating itself in an act of free will any more than that this is determined socially. Rather, it can be deciphered as a point of resistance, making the forms of exercising power visible at the same time as they are being bent, refracted, varied. Therefore, a category like that of homosexuality might equally reflect a social strategy of stigmatization and an emancipating countermovement. Differently from the term “social control,” the concept of governmentality does not focus on individuals as mere objects of control ambitions but is interested in scrutinizing how the exercise of power on the one hand results in producing subjects and the activation of people, and how on the other hand it brings about counterpower, which is what the term of the subject implies.

Secondly, government is a practice, and the knowledge it requires is always also a practical knowledge, a *knowhow*. Technologies of government therefore cannot merely be deciphered as systems of meaning or ideology but as techniques and procedures that themselves are capable of bringing really new objects and subjects of government into being. Technological inventions thus made it possible to gather, copy, and retrieve data according to respective requirements, seemingly resulting in more efficient procedures of administration and control. Persons, therefore, find themselves sorted according to the most different criteria into a variety of risk groups. Computer programs may identify them as recipients of social benefits or, depending on their habitual drug consumption, as prospective patients or, as a result of a drag net investigation, as suspects. Each time, the control technology focuses only on certain aspects of a person recorded into technically codified samples of data. The individual thus becomes a “dividual” (Gilles Deleuze).

Being concerned with the analysis of how historical forms of knowledge tie together with practices of government and how political rationalities form the view of people, of society and its problems, governmentality studies thirdly focuses on the power of political programs to

produce reality. Programs, in stating problems and aspiring to appropriate strategies of dealing with them, not only describe reality but also shape it. They create the preconditions of their own acceptance, singling out certain aspects of reality and problematizing them according to their own rules. They not only indicate the direction of the change to be performed, but also offer the criteria for the evaluation that seems proper according to the respective rationality. They fabricate reality, telling what one could and should do, and at the same time presuming what kind of person one is and could be. They prescribe while seeming to describe. Sure enough, this does not predicate the conditions under which problematizations will prevail. But this is precisely the question to which governmentality studies applies. It does not refer to a general theory of society, but rather maps out society along the lines of its practices. It examines how these practices are being implemented and rationalized, whether they come up against resistance or acceptance, and thus shape society.

Fourthly, rather than conceiving the state as a singular actor, pursuing its own interests, the state has to be analyzed as an effect of heterogeneous technologies of government. This means not searching for functional logics and ultimately postulating the state as a historically continuous figure. This normative perspective finds itself too easily approved, attesting, for instance, to a loss of sovereignty in the face of dominating interests of the economy or of processes of transnationalization. The examination of technologies of government, in contrast, allows processes of constant readjustment to be traced: spheres deemed to pertain to the state and to be subjected to its competence vary historically, as does the meaning of “public” and “private.” Foucault in this sense alludes to a “governmentalization of the state”: it is less instructive to apply the analysis to the state, understood as a unifying principle of power, in order to trace the *étatisation* of society in history than to the technologies of government shaping state and society (cf. Foucault 2004).

Governmentality studies has repeatedly been accused of playing down the power of the state or the economy, and of fancying liberalism, putting freedom at the center of its analysis. Indeed, it has concentrated particularly on making visible forms of “governing through

freedom” that guide the conduct of people through incentives and options rather than through enforcement or direct interventions. Moreover, in this perspective the neoliberal restructuring of the state and society, noticeable in the West since the 1970s, does not appear as an “unleashing of capitalism” rolling back the state, and in the face of which politics feels itself powerless and at its mercy; finally, nor do the most recent ambitions of providing security appear as a reemergence of a surveillance state.

Government studies, in contrast, has been able to stress that relations of power cannot adequately be described by dichotomies such as consensus or violence, manipulation or free will; rather, power is effective just at that point at which individuals display their own subjectivity. It has also stressed that forms of political participation and civil commitment originate beyond common divisions such as public versus private, state versus citizen. Thus “the retreat of the state” appears not as a political necessity but as a strategy rearranging social realms and privatizing, for example, fields of responsibility once genuinely run by the state: security is commercially provided, community crime prevention programs demand civil commitment.

Analyzing political rationalities allows for conceiving an orientation on the market not only as a particularity of “the economy” but also as a mode of thinking that might prevail in society and that also affects politics itself, enhancing the “economization of the social” (cf. Bröckling et al. 2000). This might result in measuring the success of social work, for example, less in terms of quality and outcome than in terms of quantity and output, not according to the intensity of the support of “clients” but according to the number of “customers” showing up; this might result in the (neo)liberal ideal of economic government taking shape in strategies of crime control that no longer aim at changing, medicating, or amending people but shift to preventing crime by design, by architectural arrangements, and at the same time locking up the incorrigible for life. This might also finally result in a rearrangement of the relation between the state and citizen itself, so that, for instance, social benefits can no longer be claimed as a social right but derive from contractually defined accomplishments. The activity of those receiving benefits becomes a social duty, while responsibility for

their conditions of life will be delegated to themselves.

In view of new security laws and strategies, a new formation of a state of surveillance and security is currently being discussed. However, this is misleading insofar as security has not to be taken as the singular concern of a unilateral power of the state but involves both the participation and the provision of commercial security. To conceive of the state as a varying entity means to grasp that the designation of public or private, and of state concern and legitimate interference, is not only a question of jurisdiction but also changes with the techniques of government.

Liberal modes of government are not limited to liberalism; even despotic regimes rely on cooperation. Conversely, liberal modes must not be equated either with more freedom or with soft forms of control; rather, they are about *powers of freedom* (Rose 1999) that are inextricably linked to other forms of exercising power: to violence, force, and exclusion.

If governmentality studies has recently centered on “insecurity” as a systematic component of technologies of government and programs of mobilization (cf. O’Malley 2000), this also demonstrates the challenge the Foucauldian concept poses to our present: forms of violence and of threat are not extrinsic to technologies of freedom but are generated systematically by them (cf. Dean 2002).

The combat against social insecurities (unemployment, the precariousness of a safe existence) or against threats to one’s physical integrity (from disease, crime, or war) is carried out as a combat against external threats and in the name of freedom, while not refraining from violence and force, and with the result that the freedom of the individual is restricted.

SEE ALSO: Disciplinary Society; Discourse; Foucault, Michel; Knowledge; Social Control

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graduate study

Baranda J. Fermin

Graduate study, including the master’s degree but more specifically the pursuit of a PhD, is an extremely focused educational experience that is designed to produce a professional trained in the research, creation, and critique of knowledge within a given field. Graduate study is an essential part of the modern knowledge economy. The processes of graduate study create scholars, research, and academic criticism through an increasingly technological, yet staunchly traditional study, apprenticeship, and sponsorship model.

The nineteenth century ideal of uniting advanced study and research training with the work of individual scholars engaged in scientific research was heavily based on the German model popular at that time. Over time and across national systems graduate education has shifted away from this model. Today, the form and content of graduate education are heavily

influenced by the US model of prescribed curriculum, coupled with more formalized research training, culminating in a largely independent research project and the thesis or dissertation that demonstrates an original empirical or theoretical contribution to one's field. Due to the particular constraints of national systems and cultures, the extent to which this model is observed in its purest form varies considerably from country to country.

The idea and development of the research university first began in Germany with what is known as the Humboldtian model of study. Central to this model was the pursuit of new knowledge through academic research. In the nineteenth century, research, teaching, and study were brought together in academic settings where skilled veteran professors worked closely with students to focus on the creation and development of particular areas of knowledge. As the nineteenth century was drawing toward an end, German universities were by far considered the most advanced in the world and attracted students and scholars from many other countries. However, as a result of political and social tension, within the first four decades of the twentieth century this shifted. Thus, after World War II, the US emerged as the preeminent force in graduate education.

Graduate education in the US is historically a rather young endeavor. The first formal graduate program was at Yale University, where in 1861 three doctoral degrees were awarded to students of its Scientific School. Previous attempts to establish graduate education in the US had failed, despite outspoken proponents from among social and political leaders. When the Association of American Universities (AAU) was first organized in 1900, a central concern was the opinion of US graduate programs by institutions overseas. Today, this opinion can be measured not only by the quantity and quality of social networks and collaborations between US institutions and those abroad, but also by the high volume of doctorate degrees granted to students from other countries by US graduate programs.

In general, across national models, master's programs are larger and more diverse, and doctoral programs are smaller and more concentrated. However, prominent in the organization

and practice of graduate education is the structural requirement for a sequence of prescribed courses and for research training experiences. A master's degree (Master of Philosophy, Master of Education, Master of Arts, Master of Science) typically involves a combination of comprehensive coursework and a culminating project or examination. The project may be a thesis, a lengthy theoretical or empirical research project, or some other capstone activity showcasing the skills gained through study. The completion of a master's program for a student enrolled in full time study is typically anywhere from one to two academic years.

Even within the same national system, master's programs are tremendously varied in terms of their type, purpose, and expectations. The primary function of many programs is the preparation for doctoral study. Others function solely to advance the student's stock of knowledge in a particular field. Still others provide the student with a marketable skill or vocational qualification. This variation in part contributes to the fact that there is more debate surrounding the consistency of standards of master's degrees than either the baccalaureate or doctorate.

When students begin doctoral studies, coursework and research tasks are often similar to those involved in the master's degree. Earning a doctorate, however, involves the completion of a dissertation: an in depth, extensive, independent, and original research and writing project. The undertaking of independent and original research for the dissertation is the culminating experience of doctoral study. A graduate committee, advisor, and/or chair provide guidance and approval of the coursework and research activities of a PhD student. The primary advisor or chair closely guides, advises, and supports the student through the arduous process, including aspects of professional development and professionalism in the academy in addition to academic and research expectations.

Although the financing of graduate education is costly across all national systems, the US has the most diverse base of funding for graduate study. Unstable as it is, the organizational arrangement for the finance of graduate education in the US is the least tenuous in comparison to Japan, Germany, the UK, and

France. Institutions in the US and the students who pursue graduate study at these institutions must tenaciously seek funds from a variety of sources. This is an arduous but feasible task, as institutional endowments, philanthropic foundations, and (since World War II) the national government are major sources of loans, grants, and fellowships to defer, totally or in part, the costs of graduate education.

In the other countries the source of funding is also unstable, but concomitantly more focused, as the French, Japanese, German, and British national ministries of education are responsible for managing the financing of graduate education in their respective national systems. In these countries the central location of funding constraints illuminates two primordial problems within the systems. The first is the extreme dependence of higher education institutions on their respective national governments. The second is the increasingly lucrative and organized research units that exist outside academia. As an extension of these two issues a paramount concern, especially in the UK, is the quality of graduate education.

Due to the particular constraints of national systems and cultures, the extent to which the model present in the US is observed in its purest form varies considerably. The US model is by far the largest and most complex system for graduate level training. The German, British, French, and Japanese systems have smaller enrollments, more homogeneous institutions, and less elaborate structural arrangements for student progression through their graduate programs in comparison with the US model.

The systems of both the UK and Japan have struggled with an insufficient critical mass. The highly selective nature of the systems results in relatively small populations of advanced graduate students and the nature of research study and training results in even smaller numbers of earned doctoral degrees. Intense fiscal constraints on the advanced educational sector, particularly in comparison to industry research development and training, exacerbates the problem.

The German and French systems have had difficulty providing opportunities for hands on research training to the advanced students in their systems. Particularly in the case of

Germany, there has been, since the closing of the twentieth century, an issue with preserving the unity of research, teaching, and study. Segments of the national system have abandoned this Humboldtian ideal, while others struggle to maintain it. At the center of this struggle is finding the organizational and funding patterns that will keep the commitments of this model intact.

In the UK, although there has been increased enrollment in graduate programs, on the whole, graduate studies remain a small and marginalized sector of education within the nation's system. In the Japanese system, large enrollment numbers in the overall university sector mask the challenges the graduate sector faces regarding size. Although 60 percent of Japanese universities have graduate programs, only 7 percent of university graduates advance to master's programs and the total graduate student population – including doctoral students – accounts for a mere 4 percent of the total university population (United States Library of Congress 1995). The German system suffers from unevenness across fields in its graduate sector. Although overall enrollment may appear sufficient and stable, the disproportionate distribution of enrollments across sectors in graduate education is problematic for the entire system of advanced study in Germany due to the effects this has on faculty and fiscal capacity.

Due to its social and historical context, the US has virtually eluded contemporary issues concerning sufficient size and critical mass. However, in part due to huge demand and in part as a result of historical structural discrimination, the noteworthy issues facing the US graduate education sector have centered on educational equity in relation to race and gender. Over the last 20 years the number of US racial-ethnic minority doctorate recipients has grown as a result of the social movements impacting higher education access during the 1960s and 1970s. Overall, the gains in doctorates awarded to Asian Americans and Latinos have been far greater than the gains experienced for Native Americans and African Americans. In the last 25 years the number of women doctorate recipients has increased in the social sciences, humanities, physical sciences, and life

sciences. Women were the recipients of 45 per cent of all the doctorates granted in 2003; 25 years previously they represented only 27 per cent of the doctorate recipients in the US (Hoffer et al. 2004).

Despite advances in technology in engineering, physics, and medicine, and the advent of new methods of data analysis in the social sciences, the process of earning graduate degrees mirrors a quaint form of apprenticeship and sponsorship in most national systems. This is true despite differing social, political, and fiscal contexts. The significance placed on the various aspects of graduate education – research, study, and teaching – varies across contexts. Differences across systems are strongly influenced by the diffusion or centrality of fiscal contributors to the nation’s education sector. As all systems experience fiscal constraints, the research arena in Germany, Japan, France, the UK, and the US is becoming increasingly segmented as private and industry sector actors involve themselves in research more intensely.

SEE ALSO: Colleges and Universities; Education, Adult; Professions; Professors

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Gramsci, Antonio (1891–1937)

Alastair Davidson

Antonio Gramsci was born in Ales, Sardinia, on January 22, 1891, and died in Rome on April 27, 1937. Gramsci’s father was a petty bourgeois notable employed in the Land Registry and his mother was from a local landowning family. At 4 years old Antonio was left a hunchback after a fall. His father was imprisoned for malpractice in 1898 and the family lived in straitened economic circumstances. Antonio took a job. Then sent by his mother to middle and high school, in 1912 he won a scholarship to Turin University to study arts. Quickly involved in socialist politics, he discontinued his study and renounced a future career in linguistics. In 1913–16 he was a journalist for the socialist press. In 1917 he started to formulate his novel views in the single number of *La Città futura* and became a firm supporter of the Russian Revolution, which he typified as a “revolution against Marx,” understanding it to have reversed all determinist understandings of Marxism as a messianic creed by refocusing socialist attention on the force of willful mass proletarian action to change the world. Together with Palmiro Togliatti, Angelo Tasca, and Umberto Terracini, in 1919 he established the newspaper *Ordine Nuovo* whose object was to promote an Italian version of “soviets” or workers’ councils in the factories of Turin. The *ordinovisti* established close links with the workers’ organizations in 1919–20, becoming their voice during a mass occupation of factories in Northern Italy. This action was endorsed by Lenin. Gramsci became a founder of the Italian Communist Party in 1921 when it split from the Socialist Party, which was blamed for “missing out” on the Revolution. He went to work in the Communist International in Moscow.

The rise to power of the Fascists in Italy in 1922 put both the communists and socialists on the defensive. Internal disputes over reunification led to Gramsci returning to Italy and emerging as party leader in 1924. He was elected to parliament and created the newspaper *l’Unità*.

In 1926 the Communist Party was made illegal by the Fascist regime and in 1928 Gramsci, with much of the leadership, was imprisoned, in his case for over 20 years. His incarceration started as Stalinism imposed itself. Gramsci's relations with the CPSU and Communist International, already tense because of his opposition to the cult of the leader, took on harsher forms. The Party almost disappeared under Fascist oppression until his death.

While in prison he made the notes for a contribution *fur ewig* on the nature of the “popular creative mind” and how it was produced. By 1937 he had filled 29 notebooks on that subject and supporting themes. They constitute a major contribution to Marxist theory, whose “red thread” is the concept of hegemony (in 2003 the subject of 650 titles). Today, his work is the most translated of any Italian. While fragmentary, as he never wrote a synthesis of his work and died of prison exacerbated illnesses, it is in these works that we find his main reflections on sociology.

GRAMSCI AND THE MASTERS OF SOCIOLOGY

The social Darwinism of Cesare Lombroso and Alfredo Niceforo and the determinism of Achille Loria dominated Italian social sciences in Gramsci's childhood and youth. The first two applied a social determinism (using even phrenology) to show that Southern Italians like Gramsci were naturally primitive. Gramsci detested both authors and their widely shared belief in deterministic social laws. His first published article was on Achille Loria, professor of sociology in Turin – who influenced Weber. Gramsci wrote, scathingly, that Loria had established that the most perfect human type, the ideal of eugenics, was the university professor. To their elitism and determinism he preferred the liberal idealism of Benedetto Croce, with its emphasis on individual endeavor in creating freedom.

Gramsci was at Turin University when Robert Michels (Weber's protégé) and Gaetano Mosca were professors there. Vilfredo Pareto also maintained links with the university. There is no evidence that any of these people influenced him at the time, but their elitist political

sociology and (in the case of Michels and Pareto) early institutional links with Fascism could have predisposed him to further associate sociology with anti humanism and elitism.

After 1917, his growing knowledge of Marxism and Leninism and their view that sociology was expressly anti Marxist meant that there was little reference in his writings to the great masters of social science. His first real interest was provoked by Nicolai Bukharin's *Historical Materialism: A Popular Textbook of Marxist Sociology* (1921). This book stated that historical materialism was a sociology. It thus departed from the Marxist and Leninist orthodoxy that sociology was simply a bourgeois science and it relied heavily on the sociological masters, particularly on the equilibrium theory in Pareto's *Trattato di sociologia generale*. Gramsci made a critique of this book and the converse views of Henri de Man a central theme of his Prison Notebooks. In it he develops his understanding of sociology and its limits, denies that historical materialism is a sociology and yet intimates that it might contain a sociology.

GRAMSCI'S THEORY OF SOCIOLOGY

Gramsci (2001: 1432–3) asks “What is sociology?” and replies: “Is it not an attempt at a so called exact science [that is, positivist] of social facts . . . that is philosophy in embryo.” He proceeds to state that it had been an attempt to create a scientific method based on evolutionary positivism for explaining history and politics. As a “philosophy of non philosophers” it tried to classify historical facts systematically using the natural sciences as a method. Its object was thus to establish laws of evolution of society so that it could foresee the future with “the same certainty as an acorn grows into an oak.” It could not therefore grasp any social transformation that was qualitative. He thus identifies as its limits (1) that it applies natural scientific laws to social facts and (2) it sees causes in what is merely nominal classification. “One describes a series . . . of facts by the mechanical process of abstract generalization and derives a statement of similarities; this is called a law and assumed to have a causal function” (p. 1433).

It followed that he had great reservations about the “laws of large numbers” and statistical series. This did not mean he dismissed them outright, admitting that when social groups and structures were relatively unchanging and “passive,” statistical inquiry might have some limited validity. On the other hand, its application could have disastrous consequences if used to guide political action. It encouraged laziness and superficiality in a domain where the object was action, which destroyed the validity of statistical laws.

Objective historico social reality was merely the “historically subjective.” Reality, including the “laws” of natural science themselves, was no more than historically valid. Historical facts had to be studied scientifically and non scientifically. The propositions made in the first realm had no force until taken up by great masses and made “practical.” This meant that any foresight was made true only because great masses of humans acted as if it were (Gramsci 2001: 1403–5). He regarded technological determinism as nonsense. Necessity was linked to “regularity” as revealed by series only when there was a premise to which human beings had been driven which could be formulated along the lines of the Ricardian “given that . . .” So to the calculable material presence there had to be added that complex of passions and imperious sentiment that led to action (p. 1480).

It was the essential “premise” of “popular belief” that Gramsci wished to study and this brought him closest to the traditional concerns of some Italian and European sociology. It bore resemblance to Pareto’s concern with residues and to Mosca’s theory of sentiments and to de Man’s desire to establish how groups felt and thought. Gramsci’s theory of common sense might be described as a study of the “passive” group. But what concerned him as a believer in the *Theses on Feuerbach* was how such common sense could become “good sense.” He therefore regarded de Man as inferior to both Proudhon and Sorel (Gramsci 2001: 1501). For him, de Man took the position of a determinist scientist, a zoologist studying a world of insects, who studied popular feelings, and did not feel *with* them to guide and lead them to catharsis. He argued that de Man’s book *Il superamento di Marx* stimulated us to inform ourselves about

the real feelings of groups and individuals and not the feelings that sociological laws suggest exist. So de Man raised an empirical criterion to a scientific principle without knowing how to limit the criterion sufficiently. He thus ended up creating a new statistical law and (unconsciously) a new method of social mathematics and external classification, a new abstract sociology (Gramsci 2001: 1430–1). To accept what was thought by the mass as eternal would be the worst form of fatalism (pp. 1501, 1506). De Man’s work resulted in a commonplace based on the error that theory and practice can be separate and not act on each other constantly. For Gramsci, the only way to understand was to work “with.”

There are few secondary comments on Gramsci and sociology. They started at the Gramsci studies conferences in 1958 and 1967. Subject to limitations, they confirm the above account. Where the implicit relation with later Parsonian and “social action” theory has been touched on, the commentary adds nothing to challenge the overall thesis advanced above (Calello 1986: 209ff.). There has been an interesting attempt to suggest a Gramscian sociology or post sociological method (Misurata et al. 1977: 485–505).

SEE ALSO: Communism; Fascism; Ideological Hegemony; Lombroso, Cesare; Marx, Karl; Marxism and Sociology; Michels, Robert; Par eto, Vilfredo

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grandparenthood

Maximiliane E. Szinovacz

Grandparenthood can be considered at three distinct levels: the societal level (referring to societal norms, functions, and esteem of grandparents), the family level (referring to interactions and supports among grandparents, parents, and grandchildren), and the individual level (referring to the meaning and significance of grandparenthood to the grandparents). The meaning and significance of grandparenthood often derive from societal and familial contexts that are beyond grandparents' own control. On the societal level, the prevalence and duration of grandparenthood as well as the normative underpinnings of the grandparent role reflect cultural and demographic change. On the familial level, grandparents' functions within the family context are often shaped by special needs of the children or grandchildren rather than by grandparents' own aspirations. On the personal level, individuals experience the transition to grandparenthood as a countertransition, contingent on the fertility decisions of their children, and access to grandchildren is often mediated by the parent generation.

GRANDPARENTHOOD IN SOCIETAL CONTEXT

Grandparents' Status and Esteem

At the societal level, grandparenthood reflects norms about kinship and kin responsibilities. The definition of grandparenthood itself depends on kinship norms. Some societies may acknowledge grandparents only on the paternal or maternal side, while bilateral kinship rules in modern western societies assign grandparent status equally to paternal and maternal grandparents. However, increases in the divorce rate, adoptions, and artificial fertility methods can render assignment of grandparenthood status problematic in western societies. Grandparents of adopted grandchildren or of stepgrandchildren sometimes express ambiguity about their grandparent status.

Societal contexts further influence grandparents' functions and their interactions with

grandchildren. Recent anthropological research suggests that increases in longevity during the Upper Paleolithic (about 30,000 years ago) provided the foundation for grandparents' functions as childcareers and culture transmitters, both functions contributing to population expansion and increased creativity. In more recent times, the drug and AIDS epidemics have been partially responsible for the growing number of grandparents raising grandchildren, while the high divorce rates since the latter part of the twentieth century promoted the development of legal statutes regulating grandparents' visitation with their grandchildren. Grandparents also play a significant economic role, both as consumers (e.g., of children's toys) and as service providers (e.g., care of grandchildren by grandparents can enable mothers to remain in the labor force).

Grandparents' social esteem and image are often tied to the status of elders in societies. Although modernization sometimes undermines elders' status and implicitly that of grandparents by reducing their economic control and their importance as transmitters of knowledge, it can also enhance their status through elders' access to old age security entitlements. Furthermore, lack of familial authority on the grandparents' part may promote more congenial grandparent–grandchild relationships. In the US, Grandparents' Day or the proclamation of 1995 as Year of the Grandparent speak to the social significance of grandparenthood. The image of grandparents in the media has tended to lag behind times, providing stereotyped images that depict grandparents as old, passive, and powerless, although more recent research suggests a shift toward positive grandparent portrayals in children's books.

Demographics of Grandparenthood

In contrast to many other family transitions, the demographics of grandparenthood are defined by events in two generations, that of the grandparent and that of the grandchild's parent (referred to as the "middle generation" below). To become a grandparent requires that both oneself and one's children bear children. Contingent on medical advancements both in the treatment of infertility and in birth control

as well as on economic conditions, rates of childlessness varied considerably during the twentieth century. Childlessness peaked during the Depression era, then declined sharply until the last quarter of the twentieth century, and is now again on the rise (Uhlenberg & Kirby 1998).

Similarly, grandparents experienced a significant decline in the number of grandchildren born during the last century – from an average of over 12 to about 5–6 currently (Uhlenberg & Kirby 1998) – although the relatively high prevalence of early deaths among children at the beginning of the twentieth century curtailed the supply of older grandchildren. This trend is likely to continue well into the twenty first century. Between 1976 and 2002 the average number of children born to US women declined from 3.09 to 1.93 (Downs 2003), and even more dramatic declines in fertility are evident in many European countries. Within the US, this trend applies across racial and ethnic groups, but fertility remains somewhat higher for African Americans and especially Hispanics. Thus, by the middle of the twenty first century, many grandparents will have only 3 or 4 grandchildren. Both trends imply a significant decline in the supply of grandchildren well into the twenty first century.

In contrast, trends in longevity have altered the significance of grandparents in grandchildren's lives. Uhlenberg and Kirby (1998) estimate that in 1900 fewer than a quarter of grandchildren had all four grandparents alive at the time of birth, and fewer than 1 percent had all four grandparents alive at age 20, compared to 68 percent and 10 percent, respectively, in 2000. However, survival of grandparents is also contingent on the timing of births. Early childbearing especially during the baby boom period meant a relatively early transition to and a long duration of grandparenthood at the end of the twentieth century. Delays in childbearing since this time period will reverse this trend. Because increases in the delay of childbearing will probably be more pronounced than in creases in longevity, the supply of grandparents to grandchildren (both in terms of number of living grandparents and duration of grandparenthood) may well have peaked at the end of the twentieth century. By the middle of the twenty first century, exposure to grandparents'

deaths will again occur at earlier ages of the grandchildren, the transition to grandparenthood will be moved to later ages, and fewer grandchildren will be able to enjoy contacts with grandparents into their adulthood. Once again this trend will vary considerably by race and ethnicity. Delayed childbearing predominates among non Hispanic whites and Asians and Pacific Islanders and is less common among Hispanics and African Americans (Downs 2003). Thus, by the mid twenty first century we can expect considerable racial and ethnic variations in the supply of grandparents to grandchildren and in grandparents' roles and relationships with their grandchildren.

GRANDPARENTS IN FAMILY SYSTEMS

Grandparents' interactions with their grandchildren and grandparents' roles are intricately linked to dynamics of the family system as a whole and especially to circumstances surrounding the children's parents. These linkages are most evident in research referring to parents' mediation of grandparent–grandchild contacts and to grandparents' roles as caregivers and care recipients.

The mediation of grandparent–grandchild relationships through the middle generation is both direct and indirect. Indirectly, asymmetry in maternal and paternal kinship ties leads to a matrilineal advantage that furthers stronger bonds to maternal grandparents in general and maternal grandmothers in particular. Because proximity exerts a strong influence on grandparent–grandchild relations, grandparent–grandchild contacts are also affected by mobility decisions of the parents at least as long as grandchildren are young or reside with their parents. More direct mediation is evident from the strong associations between closeness between grandparents and the middle generation and closeness of grandparent–grandchild ties, although it is not clear whether grandparents' attachment to their own children or to their children in law is more significant.

Grandparents are often described as family stabilizers or family watchdogs, signifying that their role is augmented during times of family crisis. Research has focused on two such crises, namely, parents' divorce and parental inability

to raise their children. Divorce in the middle generation can both enhance and undermine grandparent–grandchild relationships. On the one hand, grandparents often step in to help their divorced children through supports that include grandchild care or help grandchildren in adjusting to the parents’ divorce. On the other hand, tensions among divorcing parents are often transferred to the grandparent generation, leading to disruption of grandparent–grandchild ties, especially for non custodial parents. In extreme cases, grandparents have attempted to overcome such barriers through court ordered visitation rights.

During the past two decades, grandparents’ role as surrogate parents has been the dominant research theme in grandparent research in the US. The number of grandchildren raised in grandparent headed households increased dramatically during the last decades of the twentieth century, from 2.2 million or 3.2 percent of children under 18 in 1970, to 3.9 million or 5.5 percent in 1997, but has since leveled off (3.8 million or 5.2 percent) in 2003 (US Bureau of the Census 2003). Among children in grandparent headed households, over one third lived in skip generation households (neither parent in the household) and close to one half with single parents and grandparents. According to the 2000 Census, 5.8 million grandparents co resided with grandchildren. However, a sizable number of grandparents who co reside with their adult children and grandchildren either play a secondary caregiver role or are themselves dependent on their adult children (Simmons & Dye 2003). Surrogate parenting can put considerable strain on grandparents. They not only have to deal with the adverse circumstances resulting in the surrogate parenting arrangement (e.g., children’s drug addiction, AIDS, incarceration) and the demands of grandchild care, but also complain about problems with custody, finances, and grandchildren’s behaviors, as well as conflicts with the grandchildren’s parents. Such problems manifest themselves in lowered well being of the grandparents themselves, such as increased depressive symptoms (Minkler et al. 1997; Hayslip & Goldberg Glen 2000).

Less attention has been paid to situations where grandparents are physically or economically dependent on adult children, and

grandchildren participate in grandparents’ care. Grandchildren in this situation lament lacking attention by their parents, reduction in leisure due to the demands of “grandma” sitting, and household upheaval caused by demented grandparents.

GRANDPARENT ROLE: SIGNIFICANCE AND FUNCTIONS

Despite concerns that grandparents have “opted out” of the grandparent role (Kornhaber 1996), research in the US and other western countries indicates that most grandparents maintain close contacts with grandchildren on a regular basis, fulfill various functions in their grandchildren’s lives, and derive satisfaction from the grandparent role (Attias Donfut & Segalen 1998). For example, a nationally representative US study of grandparents conducted in 1997/98 revealed that over one half of grandparents had contacts with grandchildren on a weekly basis and only 16 percent had fewer than monthly contacts. Furthermore, over three quarters of these grandparents reported talking with their grandchildren about personal concerns or sharing activities with them, and 80 percent attributed extremely high salience to the grandparent role (Silverstein & Marengo 2001). The frequency of grandparents’ contacts with grandchildren depends on multiple factors, including geographical proximity, urban versus rural background, kin relationship (matrilineal advantage), age and number of grandchildren, family structure, and closeness to the grandchildren’s parents.

The occurrence and relative prevalence of specific functions and activities in a grandparent’s role repertory has led to diverse typologies of grandparents’ roles. Such classifications refer to such dimensions as comfort, significance, style, role meaning and salience, frequency of contacts, instrumental assistance, relationship quality, type of activities with grandchildren, or influence of grandparents in their grandchildren’s lives. The major functions performed by grandparents are socializing, support, and information. Grandparents’ engagement in social activities with grandchildren has led to labels such as funseekers, buddies, or companions. Grandparents also provide various supports

either to the grandchild's parents in the form of babysitting and childcare or to the grandchildren themselves through emotional comfort, gifts, or help with transportation and school work. In addition, grandparents function as socialization agents, as transmitters of values and culture, and as family historians. However, grandparents' role as socialization agents remains ambiguous and is constrained by norms of noninterference into the parents' domain, although this norm seems weaker among African American families. Native American grandparents have been instrumental in the transmittal of tribal traditions, while Hispanic and Asian grandparents serve as cultural conservators.

FUTURE RESEARCH

Grandparent research has bloomed during the past two decades. This research demonstrated that grandparenthood remains a significant role in modern societies, and that grandparents fulfill important support functions, especially in times of family crisis.

Despite the multitude of recent studies devoted to grandparenthood, most research was limited to a few themes (extent and predictors of involvement, grandparents as caregivers, satisfaction with the grandparent role). Given ongoing and expected demographic changes, other themes may deserve more attention in the future. Declines in fertility and thus in the supply of grandchildren may increase competition between paternal and maternal grandparents, while delays in childbearing will increase relatively young grandchildren's exposure to frail grandparents and to grandparents' deaths. There is also a need for expansion of old themes. We need to know more about grandparents' roles in cases of parental divorce and about the long term influences of grandparents' care on the grandchildren. Diversity among grandparents from different racial/ethnic, rural/urban, and socioeconomic backgrounds also deserves increased attention in future research.

SEE ALSO: Aging, Demography of; Elder Care; Family Structure; Gender, Aging and; Intergenerational Conflict; Kinship; Life Course and Family

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Great Depression

A. Allan Schmid

On "Black Thursday," October 24, 1929, the New York stock market dropped precipitously and then recovered. On Monday, it dropped again but did not recover. Tuesday was the

most devastating day in the history of the exchange as everyone wanted to sell, but there were no buyers. After nearly a decade of extraordinary growth, business leaders insisted business was still sound. Yet, a year later factories were shuttered, production fell, and upwards of 30 percent of the workforce were to be unemployed. The depression lasted for 10 years and spread around the world. Industry did not suddenly rust and become inoperative. Resources and knowledge did not evaporate. This was an institutional failure, not a technological one. It was a function of cognition, human organization, and relationships, not one of physics. Years of rising expectations, greed, and a sense that it was possible to be rich without working turned into hopelessness and despair.

The spectacular rise in stock prices between 1922 and 1928 was built on borrowed money, innovations such as investment trusts and holding companies, and deliberate manipulation. Speculators could borrow as much as 90 percent of the cost of a stock from their brokers, who in turn borrowed from the banks, who in turn borrowed from Federal Reserve Banks. All is well until prices drop and margin calls occur. Investment trusts were early versions of today's mutual funds allowing even small investors to diversify. People speculated in the stock of the trust, and supertrusts borrowed money to buy other trusts. Pyramid schemes and Ponzi finance using new investors' money to give dividends to previous investors were common. There were no conflict of interest laws to prevent banks organizing a trust to buy its own stock. Pools of large investors aggressively bought a block of stock, driving up its price, spread rumors of some mysterious factor that would further increase its value, and then sold out to the unsuspecting general public.

Investment in plant and equipment or in financial instruments is a function of expectations. Expectations are a social artifact – reinforced and spread similar to a social movement. Shared expectations are learned images of what might be as much as civil rights or feminist movements. The investment of others increases the chance of success of the ideas of an entrepreneur or speculator. In a climate of optimism, banks are eager to make loans. The rising expectations are self fulfilling prophecies, but eventually the returns to investment do not

meet expectations and investors withdraw. The lowered expectations and investment reduce aggregate demand and actual profits. Firms cut employment to remain solvent. This makes sense for the individual firm, but as many firms follow suit the layoffs reduce incomes and aggregate demand falls again. Again the firm has excess inventory and again reduces the number of employees (circular and cumulative causation). This new equilibrium at less than full employment lasts until investors are convinced there is no way but up or until governments use fiscal policy to stimulate aggregate demand. In the case of the Great Depression, the US government became the employer of last resort and hired the unemployed to build public infrastructure. Still, massive unemployment lasted until the outbreak of World War II when government military procurement put people back to work.

Economists are divided on the causes of the Great Depression. Friedman blamed it on too little money supply, while others said it was too much. Kindleberger blamed it on the decline in foreign trade. The US had loaned large sums to Western Europe to finance their imports of American goods after World War I that could not be repaid when faltering banks called loans. Galbraith (1979: 169) argued that “Far more important than rate of interest and the supply of credit is the mood.” Since no definitive experiment is possible, it remains a matter of what one finds persuasive. If you like numbers and assume the underlying rationality of market participants, then you prefer explanations in terms of money, gold, and mistaken public policy. There are no comparable data series on mood and attitude. Still, some are persuaded by the written expressions of participants.

The popular, and even academic, literature on crashes often uses language suggestive of sin to describe booms and busts. After the fact, an unsupported runup in investment and stock prices is regarded as excessive greed, or in the words of Alan Greenspan, Federal Reserve chief, “irrational exuberance.” Keynes referred to the phenomenon as “animal spirits.” Nevertheless, while many know all bubbles burst, it is hard to resist the sirens and find a Ulyssian solution. For example, a trust manager who goes liquid too soon and misses a big runup will have no customers long before the crash

proves itself. Even those responsible for the health of the financial system, such as the Federal Reserve bankers, found it hard to act to burst the bubble, even though some recognized that an earlier bursting would wreak less havoc than later. No one wanted to be recognized as the one who had destroyed the promise of ever-growing riches that many began to believe was their birthright. Whether president or banker, it is better to let the system destroy itself and blame it on impersonal forces than to be seen as the one who “sabotaged prosperity.”

Bubbles and their bursting are not new phenomena. Tulip Mania, the South Sea Company, John Laws’s Banque Générale, and the Mississippi Bubble have entered into folklore. The only economic system to avoid booms and crashes was that of the Soviet Union, but the price was rather constant doldrums.

In the context of the global economy it is becoming even harder for a nation to insulate itself from other faltering economies. For example, South Korea’s collapse in 1997 caused financial organizations to call loans all around the world. The chain reaction threatened the solvency of international banks, which was only contained by extraordinary coordination led by the US central bank. The latest cycle of boom and bust was the information technology referred to as the dot.com business. In the 1990s, few proposals went without enthusiastic backers. Then when profits were not realized, investors wanted out and the stock of the new (and old) IT firms collapsed. In contrast, after a period of rapid growth, Japan suffered a prolonged recession throughout the 1990s. History has not yet written the conclusion on these episodes.

SEE ALSO: Capitalism; Culture, Economy and; Emotions and Economy; Global Economy; Self Fulfilling Prophecy; Unemployment

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globalization

J. Michael Ryan

Globalization is a term coined by sociologist George Ritzer (2004) in his book *The Globalization of Nothing*. It is meant to serve as a companion to the widely employed concept of glocalization. While glocalization represents the unique combinations resulting from the interpenetration of the global and the local, globalization represents “the imperialistic ambitions of nations, corporations, organizations, and the like and their desire, indeed need, to impose themselves on various geographic areas” (p. 73). Thus, glocalization would be most closely associated with postmodern, pluralistic ideas of heterogeneity, whereas globalization represents a more modern, imperialistic, and homogenizing perspective.

It is important to note that no value judgments are intended for either glocalization or globalization. Many things which are glocal (as well as local) can be “bad” (e.g., discrimination) while many things which are global can be “good” (e.g., the spread of medical technology).

Globalization theorists would generally argue that the world is becoming increasingly less diverse as transnational economic, cultural, political, and social entities seek to impose their influence throughout the world. The agent in this perspective has relatively little power to maneuver within, between, or around structures. Their ability to construct their own identity and world is seriously impinged on by the growing forces of global powers, particularly commodities and the media. Social processes are deterministic and overwhelm the local, limiting its ability to interact with, much less act back against, the global.

Although globalization encompasses a number of subprocesses, the main three are Americanization, McDonaldization, and capitalism (Ritzer & Ryan 2003). The quest for profits under capitalism, the most powerful of the subprocesses, has led corporations to seek ever-expanding global markets. The process of McDonaldization has facilitated the expansion of corporate entities and cultural patterns. Americanization can be closely tied to the dominant influence of the US in the world today. Taken together, these three subprocesses constitute some of the main drivers of globalization.

SEE ALSO: Globalization; Globalization, consumption of; Globalization; McDonaldization

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grounded theory

Kathy Charmaz

The term grounded theory refers to a set of methods for conducting the research process and the product of this process, the resulting theoretical analysis of an empirical problem. The name grounded theory mirrors its fundamental premise that researchers can and should develop theory from rigorous analyses of empirical data. As a specific methodological approach, grounded theory refers to a set of systematic guidelines for data gathering, coding, synthesizing, categorizing, and integrating concepts to generate middle range theory. Grounded theory methods are distinctive in that

data collection and analysis proceed simultaneously and each informs the other. From the beginning of the research process, the researcher analyzes the data and identifies analytic leads and tentative categories to develop through further data collection. A grounded theory of a studied topic starts with concrete data and ends with rendering them in an explanatory theory.

Barney G. Glaser and Anselm L. Strauss developed grounded theory methods when they studied the social organization of dying in hospitals. They articulated their methodological strategies in their cutting edge book, *The Discovery of Grounded Theory* (1967). Prior to its publication, field researchers had learned qualitative methods through an oral tradition combined with lengthy immersions in field work. Glaser and Strauss revitalized qualitative research in sociology and brought new impetus to pursuing it through explicating systematic methods for analyzing qualitative data. They called for reestablishing the qualitative tradition in sociology at a time when quantification had achieved disciplinary dominance. Quantitative researchers had embraced a logico-deductive model and derived hypotheses from grand macrosociological theories. A sharp division of labor between theorists and methodologists had deepened, while the gap between grand theories and empirical realities had widened. Glaser and Strauss argued that qualitative research could generate theory and qualitative methodologists could close the gap between theory and the empirical world. Thus, they proposed that (1) qualitative inquiry could make significant theoretical and empirical contributions in its own right, rather than merely serve as a precursor to quantitative research; (2) qualitative analysis could be codified in analogous ways as quantitative analysis had been; (3) inductive methods could be used to develop middle range theory; and (4) the divide between theory and methods was artificial.

Glaser and Strauss introduced grounded theory as a comparative method for analyzing basic social and social psychological processes. Glaser built on his quantitative training at Columbia University and aimed to codify qualitative methods as his mentor Paul Lazarsfeld had successfully codified quantitative methods. Glaser developed the language of grounded theory from his quantitative background and imported

certain positivist objectives and assumptions into the method. Hence, the logic of grounded theory relied on discovery, externality, neutrality, and parsimony. Strauss brought Chicago School traditions of ethnographic fieldwork, pragmatist philosophy, and symbolic interactionism to grounded theory. Thus, he emphasized first hand data, assumed an agentic actor, viewed social life as emergent and open ended, and acknowledged the crucial role of language, symbols, and culture in shaping individual and collective meanings and actions.

These early grounded theorists searched for discoveries in an external empirical world – and in theory construction. For Glaser and Strauss, and particularly Glaser (1978, 1992, 1998, 2001), theory construction was and is an emergent process accomplished through systematic engagement with data. They advocated that grounded theorists delay the literature review to avoid relying on extant ideas.

Glaser and Strauss and a number of their followers adopted roles as neutral scientists who subjected data to dispassionate, systematic analysis. Although grounded theory methods inform the entire research process, both Glaser (1978, 1992, 1998) and Strauss (1987) emphasized the analytic phases. They assumed that thorough analyses remedied researchers' possible biases and made grounded theory a self-correcting method.

The originators of grounded theory shared commitments to analyzing social processes, using comparative methods, accepting a provisional view of truth, fostering the emergence of new ideas, and providing tools for constructing substantive and formal middle range theories. Glaser's (1978) emphasis on the fit, relevance, modifiability, and usefulness of a grounded theory remained congruent with Strauss's pragmatist conceptions of inquiry and truth. Nonetheless, the marriage of positivism and pragmatism in grounded theory produces tensions in the method. Glaser (1978, 1998) stresses objectivist analyses based on variables, a concept indicator approach, and context free theoretical statements. Strauss emphasizes rich contextual analyses of meaning and action and the development of substantive and formal theories of action.

Since its publication, *The Discovery of Grounded Theory* has struck a resonant chord

among aspiring qualitative researchers, many of whom have cited it to legitimize their studies. However, many researchers still misunderstand grounded theory and relatively few adopt all of its guidelines. Divisions between Glaser and Strauss, their separate revisions of grounded theory, and new variants of it complicate these misunderstandings. Now what grounded theory is, which and whose innovations and revisions are acceptable, and which version should hold sway are contested issues.

Despite epistemological and practice differences, grounded theorists of various persuasions assume that (1) theory construction is a major objective of grounded theory, (2) the logic of grounded theory differs from quantitative research, and (3) the grounded theory emerges from rigorous data analysis, not from adopting preconceived theories. What stands as preception, however, differs among grounded theorists. Glaser (1998) remains adamant about delaying the literature review to avoid forcing data into preconceived categories. He implies that researchers can come to their studies without prior influences shaping their views. In contrast, Dey (1999), Charmaz (2000, 2006), Bryant (2002), and Clarke (2003, 2005) contend that researchers' interpretive frameworks, situations, and interests influence what they see and how they render it. Charmaz emphasizes using sensitizing concepts to open the research process. Henwood and Pidgeon (2003) enter the fray with the sound advice that grounded theorists adopt the critical stance of "theoretical agnosticism."

When involved in conducting their studies, diverse grounded theorists do agree on the following strategies: (1) collecting and analyzing data simultaneously; (2) using comparative methods during each analytic stage; (3) devising analytic categories early in the research process; (4) engaging in analytic writing throughout; and (5) sampling for the purpose of developing ideas. How researchers interpret and enact these strategies may reveal sharp differences. Yet researchers' rigorous analytic scrutiny of data can inform their further data collection and spur developing successively more abstract interpretations that explicate what is happening in the field setting.

Currently, most qualitative researchers engage in early analytic work, but it seldom

takes the systematic form of the grounded theory method. Coding in grounded theory is at least a two-phased process: *initial* and *focused*. During initial coding, researchers ask: “What category does this incident indicate? What is actually happening in the data?” (Glaser 1978: 57). Grounded theorists attempt to be open to all possible answers. Then they define what is happening by assigning brief categories to each line or incident in the data. Coding for actions furthers the grounded theory goal of studying process. As grounded theorists do initial coding, they compare lines of data or incidents to define the properties of what is happening, learn how it developed, and what it means. Even during this early phase of analysis, grounded theorists move beyond concrete description and take their data apart. Close examination of data combined with comparisons between data prompts researchers to see their data in new ways. Initial coding also alerts the researcher to potential *in vivo* codes given in the setting or participants’ direct statements.

Focused coding increases a researcher’s analytic control and precision. As researchers engage in comparing and coding data, certain codes assume greater analytic power than others and often appear more frequently. They select these codes as focused codes to sift large batches of data. Through focused coding, researchers can reassess tacit meanings and actions in earlier data and generate preliminary categories for the emerging theory. This coding also provides the grist to interrogate the data and to contemplate what’s missing in it.

Memo writing is the pivotal intermediate strategy that bridges coding and report writing. Memos are analytic notes covering all the researcher’s ideas and questions about the codes that occur at the moment. From the beginning of the research, grounded theorists see through the lens of their codes. Memos commit to writing what they see. Such writing helps to avoid meandering data collection and losing flashes of insight. Early memos record and discuss hunches and begin taking the data apart to explore meanings and actions. Rather than follow recipes for writing memos, researchers draw on their analytic sensibilities and follow the analytic leads they define in their memos. In early memos, grounded theorists raise certain codes to preliminary categories and then explore them.

In later memos, they develop specific categories through making more incisive comparisons and begin to integrate their categories. Hence, they compare category with category, as well as compare data with the relevant category.

After establishing analytic categories, researchers typically find gaps in their data, if not gaping holes. They seek more data through theoretical sampling, a selective, systematic, and strategic way of gathering specific additional data to develop the emerging theory. Theoretical sampling has been poorly understood and applied. Many researchers mistake theoretical sampling with purposive or representative sampling. In contrast, grounded theorists use theoretical sampling to elaborate the properties of a category, to make the category more precise, and to discover variation in it or between theoretical categories and make them more precise. Theoretical sampling may lead to returning to earlier research participants and settings. It often means seeking new research participants and settings that answer researchers’ *analytic* questions – and reveal the relative generality of their theoretical categories. Hence, grounded theorists may move between types of people and across settings to conduct theoretical sampling. Although many researchers stop short of theoretical sampling, it can increase the definitiveness, generality, and usefulness of their work.

The first major division among grounded theorists occurred after Strauss and Corbin published *Basics of Qualitative Research* (1990). They introduced new techniques, treated grounded theory as a set of procedures, and advocated verification. The flexible guidelines and comparative methods of earlier texts are less apparent, although Strauss and Corbin show how to study contextual relationships and to specify causes, conditions, and consequences of social processes. Glaser (1992) rejected Strauss and Corbin’s innovations because he saw them as preconceived procedures that forced data into categories. For Glaser, their approach resulted in conceptual descriptions, not grounded theories.

Charmaz (2000, 2006) articulated the second major division by distinguishing between constructivist and objectivist grounded theory. Constructivist grounded theory (1) places priority on the studied phenomenon rather

than techniques of studying it; (2) takes reflexivity and research relationships into account; (3) assumes that both data and analyses are social constructions; (4) studies how participants create meanings and actions; (5) seeks an insider's view to the extent possible; and (6) acknowledges that analyses are contextually situated in time, place, culture, and situation. In this view, researchers and their participants *produce* data through interaction and therefore construct the meanings, actions, and situations that researchers observe and define. Constructivists realize that grounded theorists can import preconceived ideas into their work when they remain unaware of their starting assumptions. Thus, constructivism fosters researchers' reflexivity about *their* interpretations as well as those of their research participants. In short, constructivism moves grounded theory further into interpretive social science.

In contrast, objectivist grounded theory (1) seeks discoveries in an external, knowable world; (2) assumes a neutral, passive observer but active analyst; (3) studies the phenomenon from the outside as an objective external authority; (4) treats representation of research participants as unproblematic; (5) distinguishes between facts and values; and (6) regards completed analyses as objective reports. Objectivist grounded theorists learn the parameters of the worlds they study and analyze processes within them, but they do not become immersed in these worlds. They often aim for thoroughness and accuracy, although Glaser (1998) takes a *laissez faire* stance toward data collection and rejects quests for accuracy and detail as derailing the analytic process. Despite some differences, the objectivist approach contains inherent positivist assumptions and practices.

Although Charmaz (2006) states that most grounded theory works contain elements of both constructivism and objectivism, Charmaz (2000) views both Glaser's and Strauss and Corbin's methodological statements as different forms of objectivist grounded theory. Corbin and Strauss's (1988) empirical work, however, assumes an interpretive approach and demonstrates its constructivist antecedents.

Glaser (1992, 1998, 2001) remains in the objectivist camp. Nonetheless, he has somewhat altered his earlier grounded theory guidelines

sufficiently to constitute a third revision of the method. Although his revision leaves the pragmatist underpinnings behind, Glaser claims his version represents classic grounded theory. Glaser still argues for a direct and often narrow empiricism consistent with mid century positivism, but he has grown more insistent about opposing a quest for accurate data. He aims to develop emergent theoretical categories and advocates using comparative methods and constructing abstract theoretical analyses, all of which have fundamentally defined the grounded theory method. In a major departure from earlier statements, however, Glaser (1998) has abandoned the objective of studying a basic social process because he views it as forcing inquiry. Instead, he favors analyzing a core category, although criteria for such a category remain vague. For him, the goal of grounded theory should be a theoretical analysis of how people resolve a major concern. Glaser has also revised his earlier endorsement of line by coding because he now views it as generating a hodge podge of unintegrated codes that clutter and encumber the analytic process.

Charmaz (2000, 2006), Bryant (2002), and Clarke (2003, 2005) aim to use grounded theory methods without allegiance to its positivistic presuppositions. They acknowledge the contextual positioning of data and theory and encourage a reflexive stance on the research process. Moreover, they each see building on symbolic interactionism as a way to undermine what Bryant (2002) views as "any inclination toward object centered, mechanistic, and technicist thinking." Clarke (2005) and Charmaz (2006) call for extending the direction of grounded theory inquiry to include theorizing difference, controversy, and injustice. Clarke (2003, 2005) argues that grounded theory has always contained properties now attributed to postmodernism, such as the provisional, multiple views grounded theorists routinely take toward their data. She explicitly aims to integrate post modern concerns into grounded theory and to go beyond them to reposition grounded theory in a reflexive pragmatism that addresses all kinds of differences explicitly and maps them in fluid, abstract forms of theorizing. In short, releasing grounded theory from positivism and reconstructing it from pragmatism holds

enormous potential for revitalizing the practice of theorizing.

SEE ALSO: Induction and Observation in Science; Methods, Mixed; Naturalistic Inquiry; Qualitative Computing

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group processes

Jeffrey W. Lucas

Sociology's group processes perspective is one of the three "faces" of sociological social psychology (Smith Lovin & Molm 2000). The perspective is characterized by theoretical development and basic research on fundamental social processes that occur in group contexts. Work in the group processes tradition dates to scholars who were interested in the interactions of individuals in small groups. As the perspective has developed, its focus has largely evolved to an interest in the processes that occur in group contexts rather than in groups themselves.

Much of the work in sociology's group processes tradition has its roots in the work of Bales and colleagues in the 1950s (see, e.g., Bales 1950). Bales developed a procedure called interaction process analysis (IPA) to code interactions in groups. The procedure treated each behavior in a group as an "act" and involved classifying acts into various categories. Bales's approach allowed investigators to objectively study interactions in groups and spurred researchers to develop new ways to classify group behavior.

A focus on group processes, of course, implies an interest in two things – groups and processes. As the group processes perspective has developed, the focus of the area has shifted to a greater interest in processes than in the groups in which the processes occur. In large part because of the perspective's roots in the classification of behavior in small groups, however, sociologists not in the group processes perspective will frequently treat studying "small groups" and studying "group processes" as interchangeable.

What interests those in the group processes perspective is how various social processes operate in groups. The groups in which the processes operate need not be small. Two of the processes that dominate work in the perspective are power and status. These processes occur in groups both large and small, and they provide examples of the perspective's major focus on processes that occur in groups rather than on the groups in which processes occur.

Power, in simple terms, is the ability to control resources that people value. Your boss, for example, has the ability to fire you from your job. If you value your job, this ability gives your boss power. Early treatments of power generally focused on the characteristics of powerful people that made them powerful. This research was limited by the fact that almost anyone put in the right position can be powerful. In other words, nothing about your boss herself gives her power over you. Your boss's power comes not from individual traits but instead from a position in a structure. Group processes scholars focus their efforts on discovering the conditions of groups rather than of people that give rise to power differences (see Markovsky et al. 1988 for an excellent example). Note that the groups in which these conditions arise need not be small. The president of a university, for example, has power (the ability to control resources) over a group (the university's employees and students) because of her structural position.

Status is a position in a group based on esteem or respect. Perhaps the most well developed group processes theory is a theory of status named *status characteristics theory* (Berger et al. 1977). Status, like power, is relative; in other words, people do not have status or power in and of themselves, but instead only in relation to other people. It is meaningless to say that medical doctors are high in status, for example, except in the context of other, lower status occupations.

Status characteristics theory specifies the processes that lead some people to have more status in groups than others. According to the theory, status orders in groups develop out of the characteristics held by group members. Examples of status characteristics include gender, age, appearance, race, and education. Status characteristics theory proposes that individuals act as though they develop performance expectations consistent with larger cultural beliefs about the characteristics held by themselves and other group members. Members with characteristics accorded higher expectations have higher status positions in the group and are likely to be evaluated more highly than others and to have more influence.

A few of the other processes studied in the group processes perspective are justice, legitimacy, identity, and bargaining. Although they

do not necessarily follow from an interest in group processes, most work in sociology's group processes tradition shares two additional features: formal theoretical procedures and experimental investigations.

Investigators adopting formal theoretical procedures construct theories with explicitly defined concepts, general propositions that logically follow from theoretical assumptions, and well specified scope conditions that lay out the domains of their theories. Tests of the theories then operationalize theoretical concepts in empirical settings and formulate hypotheses that provide tests of the theory's propositions (see Cohen 1989 for a discussion of formal theoretical procedures).

In experiments, investigators test hypotheses in carefully controlled environments in which different groups of participants are randomly assigned to different experiences. In that experiments usually involve the study of small groups of participants, the fact that most group processes research is carried out in experimental laboratories might seem to contradict the assertion that group processes scholars are not typically interested in small groups. The use of experimental methodology in group processes studies, however, follows not from an interest in small groups but rather from an interest in testing formal theories of basic social processes. The use of experiments, in fact, results from an interest in social processes. Group processes scholars attempt to understand the fundamental nature of the processes they study, independent of any particular group context. Experiments have the advantage of allowing researchers to simplify natural environments, eliminating aspects of the environments not germane to an understanding of the basic process under study.

Although experimental investigations in the group processes tradition follow from an interest in understanding the fundamental nature of basic social processes, their use nevertheless contributes to the misconception that the concepts "group processes" and "small groups" can be used interchangeably. The group processes perspective is young, however, and as knowledge from the area is applied to ever larger and more diverse groups it will likely shed its association with small groups, with a greater recognition of the primary emphasis on the "processes" in "group processes."

SEE ALSO: Exchange Network Theory; Experiment; Groups; Power; Social Psychology; Status

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groups

William Bezdek

The term “group” refers to at least two distinct forms of social cooperation. On the one hand, it refers to small groups where local patterns of order emerge from the abilities, needs, and interests of the members. On the other hand, it refers to formal organizations where order is imposed by formal rules and sanctions imposed by appointed authorities. Groups structured according to attributes of the group members are generally informal, face to face groups. Groups structured by rules and authorities are generally large scale business, service, and governmental organizations.

Associations are a type of organization in which a small core of specialists performs all the work of the association on behalf of a large membership. Associations do not structure the daily work life of their members; associations advise their members, act as advocates for them, and plan activities for them. As Alexis de Tocqueville noted in the 1830s, Americans

were distinguished from their European ancestors by forming an enormous number of associations to promote a varied assortment of special interests. Today, the number of special interest groups in the US ranges from the Association of American Alumni Associations to the American Zoological Association, from the Pagan Web Crafters’ Association to the Association for the Freedom of Association.

In addition to small groups and large scale organizations and associations, there is another category of groups referred to as aggregates or collectivities. Membership in a collectivity is defined by a common attribute (such as race, gender, or age) or a common interest (such as hunting or farming). Members of collectivities are generally dispersed, unknown to one another, and have no intrinsic form of organization. Collectivities, however, provide a constant source for the development of small groups, associations, and organizations, particularly as selected members of a collectivity organize to publicly advocate for, serve the interests of, or protest the treatment of an entire collectivity. Members of dispersed collectivities share no obligatory social relations with one another, still their natural affinities enable them to mobilize for social action. Collectivities have an increasing effect in the modern world because modern technologies of mass communication make possible the mobilization of collectivity members into virtual associations that can coordinate the actions of dispersed and anonymous individuals who share the same interest or attribute. Many small groups working for the benefit of the same collectivity can unite in a social movement. The many phases of the women’s movement provide an example of the ebb and flow of social movements that depend on grassroots support from small groups that promote the interests of a collectivity.

Crowds are a special type of collectivity distinguished by their being together in the same general location at the same time. Crowds can share a focus of attention such as a football game or a military parade, focal points that provide the crowd with a shared experience that creates a temporary sense of social solidarity that can be mobilized for collective action under certain circumstances. Not all crowds, however, share a central focus of attention. Workers, shoppers, and tourists who overflow

the sidewalks at closing time in the downtown areas of large cities constitute a crowd whose members display a rudimentary form of social organization in which individuals will generally keep both bodily and eye contact to a respectful minimum as they maneuver along crowded sidewalks. This minimal social orientation creates orderly patterns of movement in the crowd. When individuals in a crowd shove, push and trample on others during life threatening catastrophes such as a fire, the social order of a crowd degenerates into a social disorder.

All individuals are assumed to have two personal attributes critical for the study of all types of group life. First, it is assumed that all individuals have the capacity to act as self directed agents who optimize their self interest. Second, it is assumed that all individuals have the capacity to engage in symbolic communication. Taken together, these characteristics form a foundation for all life in human groups. G. H. Mead proposed that symbolic interaction provides the ability to “take the role of the other” during any interaction, thus making it possible for individuals to anticipate the reaction of others at the same time as they plan their own actions. This ability, according to Mead, provides the foundation for the development of both self and society. Jürgen Habermas emphasizes communicative action as the backbone of all human social formations. Because those with a vested interest in a particular issue tend to distort their persuasive communications, he was forced to construct an ideal pattern of communication to demonstrate that departures from it were in fact distortions in communication that impeded the development of effective communication. An ideal pattern of communication requires truthfulness, normative sensitivity, and personal authenticity, orientations that he took to be necessary prerequisites for the rational formation of a just society. Symbolic communication plays a secondary role for rational choice theorists, who are more likely to begin their study of group life by examining how individuals adapt their self interest to the self interest of others in order to develop the cooperation required for many forms of human group formation.

Because groups can be studied as the intersection between individuals and society, and because they constitute a readily accessible site

for gathering information, they have served different research and theoretical agendas in different eras of sociology’s history. During the first two decades of the twentieth century, sociologists were preoccupied with defining the subject matter and the methods appropriate to their field. Georg Simmel (1858–1918), an influential German theorist who began publishing articles in American sociology journals in the 1890s, called attention to the unsuspected significance between a group comprised of two persons, and a group comprised of three (or more) persons. In a group of two persons, if one person leaves, the group ceases to exist; in a three person group, one person may leave, and the group can continue to exist. In principle, a three person group can last indefinitely if the following condition is met: when one current member leaves, she or he is replaced with one new member. This potential for a group to persist, even with a total change in membership, has been used to investigate the way group norms and practices maintain themselves or change over time. The ability of groups to replace their membership, with minor changes in the group’s goals, practices, and organization, highlights the concept of a group as a relatively enduring set of relationships and social practices as distinct from the specific individuals that constitute a group at any given time. Because any group can be recognized as the “same group” in spite of changes in its membership, they have been, and will continue to be, a prime site for studying social development, social control, and social change.

Georg Simmel, among others, was also important in distinguishing two major types of groups: those in which personal attributes dominate the relationship (as in friendship and family groups) and those in which an individual’s official position or role dominates the relationship (Simmel gives the example of the way in which the official role of a Catholic priest dominates his relationship with his parishioners). This distinction between groups constituted by personal relationships and groups constituted by impersonal duties toward one another is now known mainly as the difference between primary group functions (more typical of small groups) and secondary group functions (more typical of organizations and associations). Emphasizing primary and secondary functions

instead of primary and secondary groups suggests that individuals in all groups will have some relationships that are more personal and some that are more impersonal, although it is still possible to distinguish primary groups from secondary groups in terms of the dominant mode by which individuals relate to one another within the group. Ferdinand Tönnies (1855–1936), perhaps the original sociological source for the primary/secondary group distinction, used the German terms *Gemeinschaft* (roughly corresponding to primary groups) and *Gesellschaft* (roughly corresponding to the forms of association found in impersonal groups, but more specifically he sought to identify the principles of social formation in modern, urban societies as opposed to social formation in pre-modern societies). In the 1920s, Robert Park (1864–1944) insisted “all social problems turn out upon analysis to be problems of the social group.” In differentiating sociology from psychology, he emphasized that collective action precedes individual action: since all individuals are born into preexisting group cultures, they must learn the ways of the groups before they can take part in the group’s activities and through these activities find ways to give social expression to their individual interests. John Searle (1995) gives collective interests equal philosophical footing with an individual’s self interest. Collective interest, as analytically distinct from self interest and symbolic communication, provides a third dimension for theorizing group formation and maintenance, adding to self interest and communicative action to form the foundations of group life.

In the 1930s and 1940s there were several innovations in the study of groups. Lewin, Lippitt, and White, for instance, invigorated the field of social psychology in an experimental study with obvious references to the threat posed by Hitler to democratic regimes. The importance of this study lies as much in its methodology, a sophisticated experimental design, as in its findings that group members in the long run, though not in the short run, are more productive and more satisfied with democratic leaders than with authoritarian leaders. At the same time, W. W. Whyte (1914–2000) published his pathbreaking study of a small, street corner gang exposing the gang’s internal structure as it was related to the larger

community. The success of Whyte’s book *Street Corner Society* (1943) succeeded in spreading participant observation methods in sociology as an alternative to both experimental methods and detached observational methods. In this same period, J. L. Moreno asked members of small groups simple questions, such as “Who are the persons in this group who are your three best friends and who are your three favored co workers?” He plotted the results in a sociogram, where each individual was represented by a dot on a piece of paper, and lines connecting the dots displayed a visual pattern of friendship and work relations within the group. This technique was the predecessor of network analysis, one of the major tools for mathematical modeling of subjective preferences that exist between individuals in groups. Subjective preferences (such as friendship and work preferences) help social investigators understand the stability or instability of a group, and network analysis, which depends on the individual’s subjective preferences, has become a major empirical method for sociologists who favor rational choice and self interest as the preferred foundation for the study of group life.

Beginning in the second half of the twentieth century, the major thrust of sociological theory and research in small groups was possibly the work of R. F. Bales, particularly in his collaboration with the dominant American theorist of the time, Talcott Parsons. Using a sophisticated observation technique, Interaction Process Analysis (IPA), Bales developed instructions for a detailed analysis of group conversations. Sitting behind one way windows, research assistants observed groups of five or six individuals, often assembled together for the first time, as they tried to reach agreement on a hypothetical problem presented by an academic investigator. Each group’s conversation was recorded and the words divided into small units, which were then coded into one of 12 preestablished categories. Studies using this method demonstrated the relation between task oriented phases of group problem solving and socio emotional phases in group problem solving, a finding that constituted an empirical demonstration of Parsons’s theoretical analysis of societies as organized around the division of task functions (i.e., the functions generally associated with secondary groups) and socio emotional functions

(i.e., the functions generally associated with primary groups). Some have criticized these findings as a tautological restatement of the 12 categories used to code the behavior of the group members. George Homans provided a major alternative to Parson Bales's structural functional orientation when he explained the interpersonal dynamics of a professional work group in terms of "social behavior as exchange." Homans observed that the less competent workers in the group continually asked for help from a more accomplished co worker. To help them, the more competent member was forced to reduce the time spent on his own work. In return, he received expressions of respect from his colleagues. The tradeoff was peer deference in exchange for expert help and advice. This study enlarged the theoretical boundaries of economic exchanges to encompass theoretical accounts of social exchanges.

George Herbert Mead (1863–1931) shifted the emphasis from groups as foundational social units to the process of interaction that leads to the formation of groups. For Mead, it is the communicative action between individuals that establishes the social reality of groups. Later, in the 1960s, theorists would embrace the perspective of "interaction" and "communication," without paying particular attention to the structure of the concrete groups in which interactions take place. Near the end of the 1950s, for instance, Erving Goffman began his series of publications on what he was later to call the "interaction order." Initially inspired by Emile Durkheim (1858–1917), who had theorized the importance of sacred rituals in the maintenance of social order, and following the lead of the philosopher John Locke (1632–1704), who had substituted the term "self" for Descartes's sacred "soul," Goffman made the leap from sacred rituals to rituals in everyday life. Individuals in everyday interactions, he concluded, would consider the self as possessing some of the mystery and authority associated with the soul, and would thus feel a deep impulse to show respect for the sacred like expressions of self displayed by their companions. When individuals are denied the respect they believe is their due as persons possessing a sacred self, Goffman saw the simple rituals of everyday life as a means to restore an

individual's lost self respect, drawing attention away from the emotional disturbances caused by threats to the self, and restoring the group's attention to the predominant functions of the group. More recently, Randall Collins (2004) has expanded the rituals of everyday life to examine a wide variety of social relationships.

Emmanuel Schegloff, a student of Goffman, collaborated with Harvey Sacks and others to develop Conversation Analysis (CA) as a method for recording and analyzing face to face interactions. Schegloff and Sacks conceptualize social interactions by examining written transcripts of conversations recorded during everyday interactions. The transcripts are enhanced by a notational system for capturing many of the verbal intonations, pauses, and overlapping speech patterns that are important for mutual understanding in face to face interactions. As with the previous attempt by Bales in constructing Interaction Process Analysis, CA analysts also exclude interior, private experience (such as the experience of the self as directing one's actions). CA differs radically from Bales's analysis, however, in that it rejects the idea of using preestablished categories to code social meanings in conversation. Instead, CA relies on a close examination of the structure of the conversation to construct its meanings. This method of sociological analysis even challenges what seems to be a necessary and reasonable assumption in sociology – that all symbolic communication is built around shared, intersubjective meanings. Schegloff's (1992) criticism of intersubjectivity as the basis for social formation presents a serious alternative to the concept of norms as shared, intersubjective understandings as the underpinning of orderliness in everyday social life.

CA was one way to address Howard Garfinkel's program of ethnomethodology, an ontological position in sociology opposed to the dominance of grand theorizing, as exemplified in the work of Talcott Parsons. Garfinkel, a student and admirer of Parsons, proposed that social organization does not exist independent of everyday social practices. For Garfinkel, social order is recreated in the living, ongoing achievements of everyday life. He believed that abstract conceptual and cognitive approaches to human relations only get in the way of the

proper study of sociology, and that CA provides a way to demonstrate this. In his famous phrase, individuals in everyday life “are not cultural dopes.” Feminist sociologist Dorothy Smith finds ethnomethodology congenial to the problems faced by women who live in a world of concepts developed by men who had conceptually marginalized women in everyday life, relegating them to care of children and home. She sees ethnomethodology and allied viewpoints as counteracting the one sided view of society that comes from male dominated conceptualizations and by logical extension from abstract conceptualizations in general. More recently, Garfinkel’s emphasis on everyday social practices has influenced organizational studies as well as small group studies.

At the beginning of the twenty first century, the study of communicative interaction (read communication in groups) was spread among several disciplines. In addition to sociology and anthropology, communicative interaction is studied in linguistics, social psychology, hermeneutics, cognitivist psychology, communication theory, computational neuroscience, and computer mediated interaction studies (see Grant 2003). The linguistic turn in both the humanities and the social sciences has emphasized the study of social interaction as social communication, and the techniques of CA have become its preeminent methodology. The shift from the study of groups to the study of the communicative interaction within groups makes it possible, in principle, to track styles of discourse and persuasion as they travel back and forth between the centers of social power and the interactions of everyday life. This project, if rigorously pursued, could form an important bridge between the particularities of social interaction and the abstractions that allow us to conceptualize groups and total societies.

One may clarify the relations between groups and interaction as the relation between a social process and a social outcome: social interaction is the process; the group is the outcome. Both the concept of group and the concept of interaction are at least one step removed from the everyday practices of social life. Theorists like Howard Garfinkel and Dorothy Smith have suggested ways to balance the simplifications inherent in the use of conceptual terms in the study of human associations.

SEE ALSO: Dyad/Triad; Ethnomethodology; Group Processes; In Groups and Out Groups; Interaction; Interaction Order; Mediated Interaction; Mesostructure; Networks; Public Realm

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growth machine

Andrew E. G. Jonas

The growth machine concept first appeared in 1976 in an article published in the *American Journal of Sociology* (Molotch 1976). It describes how in America city politics is generally a politics of growth. Although the concept in fact explains the systemic properties of cities, it has also been interpreted as referring to the presence in almost every American city of property dependent business interests actively engaged in local politics and civic affairs. This is so much so that the city itself can be seen, in its very essence, to be an instrument of profit for land based interests. Moreover, those involved frequently form coalitions with other players like wise dependent on local development, and mobilize to shape the policies and institutions of local government in a fashion such that future urban growth patterns and land use policies profit all participants; in this way, the city

building process operates like a growth machine. Growth machine actors promulgate an ideology of growth, which often proves a potent force to such an extent that all other interests either become incorporated within the essential logic of the machine or face defeat.

The growth machine thesis arose as a critical reaction against the sterility of extant social science approaches to the city: social ecology, the rank size rule, community power, and the like. Conventional social science was preoccupied with matters of urban social, spatial, and political form. In comparison, the growth machine concept gets to the substance of urban economic power, the structures and agents of urban development, and those day to day actions of urban growth dependent economic elites, which are so decisive in shaping land use and the distribution of resources and jobs within localities and through the urban system (Molotch 1999). The concept materialized during a time of growing skepticism about the role of government, increased public awareness of the limits to growth, and the brute materiality of the urban fiscal crisis, notably New York City's in 1975. Already in the 1970s, there were signs that the American growth machine system was facing new challenges and an emergent counter coalition appeared to be redirecting the focus of local government away from growth and towards stronger environmental regulation (Molotch 1976). Although the US federal government had not yet abandoned urban policy, the New Federalism and anti tax revolts pointed to the neo conservative, anti urban, and devolutionary trend that was to follow. The growth machine focused attention on how powerful economic interests tied to particular places (such as developers) depend on the power, resources, and authority of local and state government in order to create conditions conducive to their profit making activities.

The growth machine concept injected fresh ideas into a corpus of empirical urban research generally lacking in concepts linking urban form to broader political and economic trends. If community power studies had taught social scientists about who wields influence in the city, the growth machine thesis demonstrates what they do with their power. It makes an argument about how cities, suburbs, and metropolitan

areas are constructed, who constructs them, their role in the national political economy, and what the fiscal, social, and environmental consequences of untrammled growth are likely to be for people who live in these urban places (i.e., the majority of the national population).

After teaming up with John Logan, Molotch coined the term "rentiers" to describe collectively the growth machine players and their various auxiliaries, such as the media, universities, utilities, professional sports franchises, chambers of commerce, and the like (Logan & Molotch 1987). More than a case of instrumental manipulation of local government, rentiers strive to ensure that the local citizenry are receptive to growth by engineering a sense of community around which locals can unite. Here the growth machine toils to connect the social standing of a place, village, township, city, or urban region to its economic fortunes. However, the growth promotion activities of rentiers are shot through with conflict, actual and latent. The main source of conflict around growth is that of the use of land versus its exchange. Use values are rooted in the neighborhood or community as a living place inhabited by residents with deep psychological attachments to their homes and communities, or as a place to trade or produce goods. Threats to such attachments might arise from land use and demographic changes which satisfy the objective interests of growth machine players in maximizing exchange value, but represent serious disruptions to the livelihoods and personal psyche of residents. Conflicts result when factions compete to harness the legislative, fiscal, and legitimating powers of local government. Local government is not a value free interest in this process because, dominated by growth profiteers, it strives to influence land use outcomes and the distribution of resources within and between cities, often rationalizing desired outcomes as a source of fiscal betterment. It, too, is a participant in the growth machine system (Logan & Molotch 1987).

Unlike urban regime theory (Stone 1989), growth machine analysis is not primarily concerned with the detailed division of labor between state and market actors in urban politics and institutions. Nevertheless, the state – its organization and geography – is important

because neighborhoods, cities, metropolitan regions, and states form a hierarchy of territories possessing different powers and resources potentially of use to the growth coalition. Growth oriented coalitions will tend to coalesce around that level of government seen as having capacity to bestow the relevant fiscal and infrastructural capacities (Molotch 1976). Interest groups sometimes in competition for federal, state, or local resources within a city or region may well collude for the growth of the city region as a whole. In this way, the formation and activities of growth machines are scalar dependent and their organizational scope is contingent upon how they access the geography of the state apparatus.

Economic globalization has contributed to a rethinking of the spatial context in which economic growth oriented urban regimes exist and operate (Horan 1991). Localities, cities, and regions are inserted into a global economic development system. In some cases, international capital works in partnership with local property interests to circumvent local resistance to inward investment (Molotch & Logan 1984). By the same token, land development interests and activities are much more globalized. This implies a weaker link between local property dependence and a propensity to be involved in local growth coalitions (Cox & Mair 1989). Yet the growth machine concept remains durable in part because of the extent to which in many countries land use planning and the urban land market have been deregulated. Moreover, the state continues to be important if perhaps for different reasons than an earlier emphasis on local government manipulation by growth coalitions. National states have sought to activate local business–local state partnerships along the lines of the public private redevelopment partnerships found in many US cities. In this way, the growth machine may have been retooled in a neoliberal age remarkable for its fiscal austerity and hyper mobile capital (Jessop, Peck, & Tickell 1999).

Close engagement with the growth machine concept has prompted critique and further elaboration of the theory. Research has tried to prove empirically the presence or absence of a growth coalition and of the distributional and land use effects of its activities. In a

comprehensive survey, Logan, Whaley, & Crowder (1997) demonstrate the concept's resilience, but conclude that the changing nature of regional economic development and matters of social distribution pose questions for empirical research. Others have questioned its theoretical assumptions. A lack of understanding of the causal properties of geographically immobile versus mobile businesses, workers, residents, and local states in a capitalist mode of production is viewed by some to be a particular weakness in the thesis; the overriding emphasis on land use dynamics overlooks a variety of alternative forms of, and participants in, local and regional development (Cox & Mair 1989). Further research is required into the activities and interests of the poor, working women, racialized groups, unions, non profits, and so forth as these engage with development agendas and interests in cities. Additionally, business elites, chambers of commerce, and booster clubs have cultural and organizational logics, which can defy a straightforward political economy interpretation. Extensions of the growth machine concept emphasize at least three general issues: the generative and receptive contexts for discourses and ideologies of growth; the role of incentives, participants, and wider policy networks in growth machine like economic development coalitions; and the internationalization of the growth machine concept (Jonas & Wilson 1999).

First, the growth machine thesis is essentially all about local boosterism: the conscious attempt to (re)present a city or region in a positive light to a wider constituency such that it becomes more attractive to inward investment, outside visitors, government expenditures, etc. The growth machine thrives, not only by creating the material preconditions for urban development, but also by convincing people of the importance of growth to their well being. The emphasis on ideologies of community in the original thesis arguably fails to delve more deeply into the metaphorical power of "other" discourses (e.g., those of "race" or class) often associated with, for instance, the redevelopment and gentrification of central city neighborhoods (Wilson 1996). Growth coalitions are especially adept at shaping public values about the necessity for growth and

identifying the locality's potential civic and moral saviors, the local heroes whose influence transcends the local yet somehow captures the essential moral virtues of the place (Cox & Mair 1988). As Molotch himself recognized, this takes politics into realms far beyond the formal conventions of programs, policies, and regulations, which nonetheless continue to preoccupy urban political theorists.

The second concern sees the growth machine thesis as a place based model of urban governance, yet these days more of a process oriented and global approach is required. This is not an argument for studying the city *qua* the local as determined by global trends; globalization is itself a deeply misunderstood process. Not only is there an uplink from the growth machine to wider state structures and the global economy (Gotham 2000), but there are also cross links between all sorts of urban places connected by growth networks and entrepreneurial modes of governance (Molotch 1999). Moreover, urbanists now realize that cities and regions are locked into international flows of commodities, which serve to undermine the essential causal integrity of the urban, the fundamental spatial field of play for the growth machine. Yet, in its defense, the growth machine thesis is not so much an argument for an urban scale theory as laying out a general approach to the political economy of place. For example, cities, it seems, are making a comeback as sites of creativity, innovation, and drivers of national economic recovery. A growth machine perspective on the idea of the "resurgent city" would perhaps attempt to identify a necessary condition for resurgency in a collective place dependent agency, a redistribution of government resources, interventions in land development, and/or a class of property interests.

Third, the jury is still out regarding the transferability of the growth machine thesis outside the US. Comparative growth machine analysis has enabled us to identify the range of conditions essential to rentier like activities, emphasizing the diverse ways in which urban land is commodified and regulated, how inward investment is managed, and the scope of state intervention in urban development in different national settings (Molotch 1990; Molotch & Vicari 1988). Given differences between states in terms of functions and geography, it is

difficult to determine *a priori* whether the growth machine exists or operates the same way in other countries, especially those that have very different institutions, ideologies, and cultural traditions governing land use, urban development, or territorial integration than the US (Kirby & Abu Rass 1999). Extra territoriality is a significant factor in understanding the geography of urban growth networks at the international scale (Leitner & Sheppard 2002). Claims about the hollowing out of the nation state and the changing geography of economic development indicate the value of looking at cross national and interregional differences in the organization of growth coalitions and attendant activities.

The attraction of the growth machine thesis is its ability to articulate an essential feature of the political economy of place development in capitalism: the political role of various locality dependent economic interests and their capacity to shape institutional structures and spatial patterns of land development in ways that can be socially and environmentally detrimental for the vast number of people who live in cities and their immediate surrounding regions.

SEE ALSO: Black Urban Regime; Gentrification; Uneven Development; Urban Renewal and Redevelopment

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Guattari, Félix (1930–92)

Gary Genosko

French activist intellectual Pierre Félix Guattari was inspired by Jean Paul Sartre’s political sociology and trained as a psychoanalyst by Jacques Lacan. Guattari was internationally recognized for his collaborations with Gilles Deleuze on the capitalism and schizophrenia volumes *Anti Oedipus* (1977), *A Thousand Plateaus* (1987), and *What is Philosophy?* (1994).

In *Transversality and Psychoanalysis* (1972), Guattari developed his key concept of transversality that became the cornerstone of a new kind of analytic practice he called schizoanalysis. Beginning in 1953, Guattari and his colleague Jean Oury organized the Clinique de la Borde (his workplace for almost 40 years) around a complex, rotating system of tasks and responsibilities that scrambled power relations among staff and patients by having them change roles and take on unfamiliar duties. Called “the grid,” this made possible detailed analyses of relations of power by providing a context in which the institution itself could be exposed, and if necessary modified in a way that encouraged patients to accept new responsibilities and answer new demands within innovative universes of reference.

Guattari developed a Sartrean inflected theory of groups by distinguishing non absolutely between subject groups that actively explored self defined projects and subjugated groups that passively received directions; each affected in divergent ways the relations of its members to social processes and potential for maintaining an irreducibly polyphonic subjectivity.

Guattari described schizoanalysis as a non neutral, politically progressive, and provisional transformation of situational power relations in a little known book, *The Machinic Unconscious* (1979). Eschewing neutrality, the schizoanalyst’s micropolitical task is to discern among expressive assemblages of components those with mutational potential, explore the textures of their matters, and produce and extract singularities from them for the sake of the subject’s self invention.

Guattari rejected sociological definitions of groups. Rather, subjectivity is a group phenomenon, but defined as an assemblage of heterogeneous types of components with varying existential consistencies undergoing certain kinds of transformations in self-generated fields with describable semiotic features and observable pragmatic consequences. Guattari introduced the machinic as a principle of productive connectivity irreducible to specific technologies; machines form assemblages of component parts whose molecular becomings the schizoanalyst then helps to facilitate.

In *Schizoanalytic Cartographies* (1989) and *Chaosmosis* (1995), Guattari elaborated four ontological functions of the unconscious – material Fluxes, existential Territories, machinic Phyla, and incorporeal Universes – and explained how the schizoanalyst tries to bridge virtuality and actuality by discerning how virtual universes become real by gaining existential consistency, balancing manifestation and surplus potentiality as subjectivity emerges and pursues dissident vectors of singularization sitting astride abstract Phyla and material Fluxes.

As a political testament, Guattari called for ethico-aesthetic responsibility of subject formation that resists Integrated World Capitalism (globalization) at the intersection of art and ecology in *The Three Ecologies* (2000).

SEE ALSO: Deleuze, Gilles; Lacan, Jacques; Sartre, Jean Paul

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Gumpłowicz, Ludwig (1838–1909)

Bernd Weiler

Around 1900, Ludwig Gumpłowicz was internationally regarded as one of the most influential sociological theorists and, together with his fellow countryman Gustav Ratzenhofer (1842–1904), as the leading representative of the so-called Austrian Struggle or Conflict School. Born into an assimilated Jewish family in the quarter of Kazimierz in the Free State of Cracow, which was incorporated into the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy in 1846, the young Gumpłowicz strongly identified with Polish culture and fervently supported the movement for greater autonomy of Galicia. After graduating in law from the Jagiellonian University in 1861, Gumpłowicz joined the liberal democratic and positivist circles of his deeply conservative hometown and, as a lawyer, journalist, political activist, and chief editor of the progressive newspaper *Kraj* (“The Country”), took an active part in the educational, social, and political affairs of Cracow. Disappointed at his failure to bring about the desired reforms, he left Cracow in 1875 and moved to Graz, where he became a lecturer and in 1893 a full professor of law. Throughout his life, however, he maintained a strong interest in the politics of his native Galicia. Apart from numerous works on Austrian administrative and constitutional law, the prolific writer Gumpłowicz dedicated his scientific work to the newly emerging discipline of sociology. After the publication of his booklet *Rasse und Staat: Eine Untersuchung über das Gesetz der Staatenbildung* (1875), in which he first sketched his sociological principles, Gumpłowicz wrote *Der Rassenkampf: Sociologische Untersuchungen* (1883),

followed shortly thereafter by his most famous work, *Grundriss der Sociologie* (1885), *Die sociologische Staatsidee* (1892), *Sociologie und Politik* (1892), and the posthumously published *Social philosophie im Umriss* (1910). Already during his lifetime his main sociological works were translated into several languages, including English, French, Italian, Spanish, Polish, Russian, and Japanese. His theories were especially influential in Italy and the US. In 1909, two years after his retirement, Gumplowicz, who suffered from an incurable cancer of the tongue, and his half blind wife committed suicide.

Impressed by the rise of the natural sciences in the second half of the nineteenth century and entrenched in the tradition of positivism, Gumplowicz forcefully argued that it was sociology's prime function to prove that social phenomena were governed by universal laws. Several years before, Émile Durkheim, the Polish born scholar, who sought to establish the autonomy of sociology, claimed that the laws of social life were not reducible to biological, psychological, or environmental factors, but constituted a field of investigation *sui generis*. As Gumplowicz is often classified as a social Darwinist, it is worth mentioning that he was highly critical of the applicability of Darwinian principles to social life and that he developed his sociological theories in explicit reaction to biologicistic understandings of society.

Differing from most of his predecessors, Gumplowicz rejected not only the organicist holistic conception of society as a biological organism (Comte, Spencer, Schäffle, etc.), but also the atomistic viewpoint according to which social phenomena had to be explained in terms of the purposeful actions of independent individuals (Smith, etc.). Gumplowicz claimed that sociology was essentially the study of groups (hordes, tribes, races, social elements, etc.) and their interrelations. Society was nothing but an aggregate of groups which, in turn, completely determined the individual's thoughts, actions, and emotions.

Gumplowicz saw no need to undertake empirical investigations as he believed that sufficient data had already been collected in order to deduce the laws governing social life and to establish a grand and final sociological system. Drawing primarily upon ethnographic and prehistoric material but also upon his personal

observations of the national struggles in the Habsburg Empire, he argued for the polygenetic origin of humanity, the presence of diverse groups in all societies, the high degree of intragroup solidarity – “syngenism” in Gumplowicz's terminology – and the inherently hostile nature of intergroup relationships. Whereas this emphasis on the inherently hostile character of intergroup relations led him to deny the optimistic view, held for example by L. F. Ward and many of his contemporaries, that humanity was steadily moving upward, his emphasis on the inevitability of the laws governing social life and of the impotence of the individual to influence those laws in turn led him to criticize reformist attempts to interfere with the course of society and history. On the practical side, sociology could prove the futility of any human intervention.

In Gumplowicz's sweeping, conjectural, and at times contradictory interpretation of the history of humanity, the time of the formation of the state assumed particular importance. In prestate societies the encounters of ethnically different groups had usually ended with one group exterminating the other. States came into existence when one group conquered and subjugated another group, thereby institutionalizing slavery or other forms of economic exploitation. In this so called “conquest hypothesis,” it was always the minority that ruled over the majority. Over time new groups might emerge by differentiation, “amalgamation,” or further subjugation. Rejecting the ideas of the inalienability of human rights and of the impartiality of law in general, Gumplowicz argued that the legal system at all times reflected the actual power relations between the various groups within the state. Despite its more complex structure, modern political life was still characterized by the incessant struggle of groups. Similar to the elite theorists Mosca and Michels, who were both well acquainted with his work, Gumplowicz argued that the essential character of social life had remained unchanged throughout history. Because of this emphasis on social constants, he also saw no need, in contrast to Weber, Simmel, or Durkheim, to develop a sociological theory of modernity. Despite the fact that he offered no analysis of modernity, and despite the conjectural and highly deductive nature of many of his historical interpretations, his radical

anti individualism, and his nineteenth century positivist outlook, Gumpłowicz's almost obsessive focus on the differential power relations within society and his thorough attempt to replace the study of society at large by the study of intergroup relations still deserve attention.

SEE ALSO: Comte, Auguste; Conflict (Racial/Ethnic); Conflict Theory; Durkheim, Émile; Positivism; Ratzenhofer, Gustav; Simmel, Georg; Small, Albion W.; Social Darwinism; Spencer, Herbert; State; Ward, Lester Frank

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Gurvitch, Georges: social change

Phillip Bosserman

On June 22, 1962, Georges Gurvitch and his wife Dolly were victims of a terrorist attack aimed at assassinating this deeply dedicated Sorbonne professor of sociology. He had enormous intellectual gifts and possessed a dazzling

legal mind with a wonderfully creative sociological imagination. The distinguished social historian Fernand Braudel proclaimed him the brightest person he had ever known.

Gurvitch found himself opposed to French groups such as the OAS (Organisation de l'Armée Secrète) seeking to keep Algeria a French colony. Students poured into Gurvitch's sociology classes from North and Sub-Saharan Africa longing for independence from their French occupiers. Freedom was in the air and Gurvitch favored decolonization. In all likelihood, then, it was OAS terrorists armed with plastic bombs who destroyed the Gurvitchs' Paris apartment on that summer night in 1962, bringing paralyzing fear into their lives. They took refuge in the home of the celebrated painter Marc Chagall.

The moral facts, those principles upon which Gurvitch acted, were centered in a commitment to liberate Algeria from French colonialism. Gurvitch headed an academic activist group at the University of Paris that viewed the brutal and bloody Algerian war as unjust. His leadership tells much about the sociology he taught and lived. The roots of this spontaneous act of creative freedom came from living through the turbulent revolutionary years in Russia, experiencing the vast cataclysmic social changes that reverberated throughout his native land.

Georges Gurvitch was born October 20, 1894, in the Black Sea port of Novorossisk, Russia. About 1910, the family moved to Dorpat, Estonia, where the young Gurvitch's intellectual journey began. The first years of his university training (1912–14) were divided between summer sessions in Germany and winter classes in Russia. During these years he visited scholars in Germany and Central Europe who awakened in him a growing interest in the rising popularity of phenomenology as taught by Scheler and Husserl. Through them, Gurvitch gained a fundamental appreciation of the emotional, intuitive, and affective side of social reality. He absorbed the writings of Bergson and Fichte, who expanded on these approaches. Frederic Rauh provided Gurvitch with the basis for his sociology of moral life.

Just prior to the outbreak of World War I, Gurvitch studied with Emil Lask, who introduced him to Max Weber's thought. Later Gurvitch would make Weber's typological

approach a prominent feature of his social change theory. Lask's rigorous dialectic, mostly indebted to Fichte, eventually led Gurvitch to see *we ness* as ontologically prior to the individual, thus making the social real.

The defining experience that deeply affected Gurvitch's whole being was the Russian Revolution that erupted during February and March 1917. He joined a group of students on the margins of that chaotic political storm. Gurvitch saw creative freedom break forth spontaneously "in the faults or interstices of the determinisms [then in place]" (Choi 1978: i; see also pp. xiii–xiv). His group of students would ask a withering barrage of questions about the changes being made by Lenin's Bolshevik party.

Gurvitch became increasingly displeased with what he was seeing and experiencing. In the spring of 1920, after a memorable walk and talk with his wife Dolly along the banks of the Karpovka River in St. Petersburg, they agreed to leave Russia for Czechoslovakia. Gurvitch taught in the Russian Institute of the University of Prague for four years before moving to Paris. During World War II he accepted an invitation from the New School of Social Research in New York City, returning to France in 1945, eventually occupying Durkheim's chair at the Sorbonne.

Gurvitch's lived experiences of societies in crises and revolution led him to ponder the causes of social change. Mirroring the current challenging work of Michael Burawoy, Gurvitch in the 1950s and 1960s called for sociology to be a *vocation*, not a job, a calling that would make a positive contribution to the group or global society of which sociologists are a part. Gurvitch personally felt motivated to do something about the colonial wars in Algeria and elsewhere. As described above, his actions invited the 1962 terrorist attack against his home.

Central to Gurvitch's sociological thought on social change is the freedom or liberty to act. He went so far as to say sociology's underlying principle is this freedom to question the status quo, to dissent, to go against and change what is. Such freedom gives every human being the possibility of creative, positive activity. Gurvitch identified six degrees or stages of freedom:

1 *Arbitrary liberty* relies on subjective preferences which are driven by unconscious,

repetitious patterns similar to the movements of a mobile; such liberty takes precedence over needs or desires; contingency remains strongly present; it is a lazy kind of liberty.

2 *Innovative freedom* rests on a stronger, more determined will resulting in a more concrete application of rules and directives that constitute a moderated, patient, and attentive choice of action.

3 *Liberty choice* employs a more intense, clairvoyant will to guide actors in overcoming closed minds and total negativism by choosing the multiplying alternatives.

4 *Innovative liberty* is a means by which to escape those alternatives that are too cumbersome, present, and too menacing by inventing some possibilities for reorienting the will. Inventive freedom is an invitation to consider new strategies and new maneuvers for overcoming obstacles staring one in the face. This inventive liberty can rely on cunning, or can discover new models, signs, symbols, values, ideas, and the like.

5 *Decisive liberty* intends to overturn the present order, break down, destroy, and eliminate every obstacle that voluntary actions find in their path (Gurvitch 1963: 101). It seeks to confront the purest obstacle, i.e., a committed heroic role, prepared to risk everything.

6 *Creative liberty* is the profoundest level of human freedom. From this degree of human freedom change agents emerge who consciously strive to produce art, religion, and knowledge. They possess god like skills whose creative impulses are renewed by the other degrees of freedom (Balandier 1974: 17).

The vast capacity of all the degrees of liberty is often called *agency*; the collective acts of agents create social change. Individual and collective efforts to change the status quo are nearly always vigorously opposed by other actors who do not want any tinkering with what is. For Gurvitch, all of these actions make history.

Freedom plays off of determinism. Human actors function within groups, and groups possess a dynamic oneness resulting from the constant motion within what Gurvitch and Mauss called the *total social phenomenon*. Constantly in

motion, these total social phenomena are evidenced in ever present structuration and destructuration.

Gurvitch's discussion of sociability, what he calls microsociology, contrasts mass, community, and communion in terms of the intensity of *we ness*. What becomes apparent is that change is as critical to Gurvitch's sociological program as freedom or liberty. By employing radical (hyper)empiricism, he can observe the dialectical dance of freedom (free will) and determinism (the centripetal forces of each group's unity).

Gurvitch saw the struggle for change as a primary characteristic of human social life. The human actor, both individual and collective, possesses the freedom to act. "[This] liberty attempts not only to modify obstacles external to the action, but also to modify its own agents . . . [This freedom] aims to consider all the data, all the fluctuations of collective experience, *and* to take . . . account of the fact that in perceiving them it modifies them" (Balandier 1974: 17). Gurvitch's hyperempiricism requires fidelity in examining every type of experience, whatever it takes.

The dialectic illuminates social change. Gurvitch saw three primary aspects to its character. First, it is a concrete, constant movement to find unity (totality) while struggling with instability. Second, the dialectic is a method for grasping and understanding this real, changing human totality. Third, all the while this dialectical character underlines the engaged aspect of the human being who is wholly involved (Gurvitch 1962: 36–7).

In short, the dialectic rejects the pat answer, the hardened system, the simple explanation. Social reality's nature is a fluid, dynamic, ever changing, explosive, paradoxical, affective domain, the opposite of stable, static, and rigidly functional. Gurvitch proposed five dialectical processes:

- 1 *Complementarity*: No social whole is reducible to any one factor.
- 2 *Mutual implication*: What seems to be heterogeneous such as psychological and sociological phenomena overlap and combine, each implying the other.
- 3 *Ambiguity*: Thanks to Freud, social wholes are moving toward a tentative equilibrium

or go in the opposite direction of destruction.

- 4 *Polarization*: Conflict, extreme tension, the tearing apart of the structures and subjacent levels are good examples.
- 5 *Reciprocity of perspectives*: The opposite of polarization in which the immanence or presence of the other is nearly total.

These operative processes immensely help one grasp Marcel Mauss's ingenious admonition "to reconstruct the whole." Gurvitch agreed with Mauss that social scientists have divided and abstracted social phenomena too severely. In fact, he would make Mauss's conception of the total social phenomenon (TSP) his own. Furthermore, the TSP is horizontally arranged on a continuum of varied social frameworks from simple social bonds to friendship circles, family groups, neighborhoods, sports teams, social classes, and full blown global societies. The TSP is also vertically anchored, occupying different levels varying in terms of accessibility. The surface level of ecology is easiest to view and describe. Gurvitch identified ten levels but always left the exact number open. As one plunges into the depth levels of social organization, roles, creative collective behavior, and to the collective mind itself, the task of discovering how each contributes to the whole of social reality becomes increasingly difficult to discern. Dialectical analysis becomes indispensable. These intersecting relationships are dynamic and moving. "All of these depth levels interpenetrate; more than this, they are in perpetual conflict, tension, and threatened by estrangement or antinomy. The degree of their discontinuity and continuity, their mutual implication, or their polarization is a question of fact, and fact only" (Gurvitch 1963: 103).

Dialectics particularly aid in developing social change theory as it relates to the types of global, historical societies. Gurvitch called them Promethean for they possess "the elements of collective and individual consciousness concerning the capacity of human liberty to be an active and effective intervention in social life" (Gurvitch 1963: 221). Gurvitch rejects Weber's ideal types. These contemporary historical societies are *real*, and committed (engaged) sociologists will be using the dialectical processes to study them.

Because their field of labor is human social reality, sociologists cannot be enclosed in an ivory tower or a laboratory. There is no escaping the human condition. Moreover, if it is human, it is social. Again, *we ness* is ontologically prior to the *I*. Those whom sociologists examine are thinking, willing, conscious persons – they are also a part of the same global humanity.

As noted above, a striking contemporary voice to Gurvitch's view of practicing sociology is that of Michael Burawoy, president of the American Sociological Association (2004). "A critical, engaged sociology ought to be a sociology about the public, for the public," as Burawoy puts it. "The vocation of science can not survive without the vocation of politics." Burawoy sees four types: professional politics, the politics surrounding policy issues, the politics stimulating public discussion, and the engagement with the students we teach, calling for critical deliberation. In short, sociologists are *engagés*. There is no alternative.

Gurvitch's dialectic allows the sociologist to acknowledge the implicit relationship between values and method, between the subject and object, the observer and the observed. Social reality is dialectical by nature, requiring each program of research to be dialectical as well. A researcher or teacher cannot avoid taking a position based on certain values. Howard Zinn asserts this in the title of his autobiography, *You Can't Be Neutral On a Moving Train* (2002). He explains why by asking this question: "Does not the very fact of concealment (failure to reveal to your students who you are and where you come from) teach something terrible – that you can separate the study of literature, history, philosophy, politics, and the arts, from your own life, your deepest convictions about right and wrong?" (2002: 7). Gurvitch would have approved of Zinn's stance. Indeed, Gurvitch made it clear which type of global society he favored by self-disclosing his preferences. He was deeply committed to realizing a society that rests on democratic

principles of justice and fair play, where all citizens are participants, and decisions move from local grassroots councils upward so the rights of all are kept in balance. Ownership is federalized, i.e., property is jointly owned by individuals embedded in community. To this end, while still in New York, Gurvitch wrote an ambitious blueprint entitled *La Déclaration des droits sociaux* (1944) for post World War II France that could guide those who had oversight of the vast job of reconstruction. The project was an example of planned social change.

SEE ALSO: Braudel, Fernand; Collective Action; Colonialism (Neocolonialism); Decolonization; Phenomenology; Revolutions; Social Change; Weber, Max

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H

habitus/field

Anne F. Eisenberg

European sociology serves as an interesting contrast to American sociology in terms of theory and theoretical development, as exemplified by Pierre Bourdieu's writings and particularly with his ideas of habitus and field. On the one hand, most typical of theoretical development in American sociology is to build on an existing body of theoretical work rather than seeking to create something novel, and secondly to attempt to find ways to link theory to empirical research by operationalizing the theory. Examples of such programs include theories addressing justice, balance, and identity (micro level theories) as well as institutionalism, social change, and revolutions (macro level theories). European, particularly continental, sociology has tended to take a somewhat different approach by focusing on integrating key theoretical ideas across different perspectives, as well as creating new language with which to express such integrative ideas. Additionally, another key distinction between American and European sociology is that American sociology highlights what some writers consider to be false distinctions and dichotomies in a range of areas – such as theory versus research methods, objective versus subjective, qualitative or interpretive methods versus quantitative or positivistic methods, macro versus micro, and structure versus agency. European sociologists argue against creating and maintaining such arbitrary boundaries in describing and explaining the social world. Bourdieu's ideas of habitus and field provide a new way of explaining key aspects of the social world that integrates key ideas from different sociological perspectives.

In the first chapter of *Outline of a Theory of Practice* (1977) Bourdieu explicitly addresses the problems inherent in limiting our understanding of human society to the false distinctions that represent typical sociological explanations – particularly, the distinctions between objective versus subjective and structure versus agency. He argues that the structure of society (as represented by social institutions and macro structures) is far more dynamic than as normally portrayed, and that human agency has far more input in shaping social structures and social institutions than is normally discussed by sociologists. This discussion provides a natural segue to his discussion of habitus in the second chapter. Habitus epitomizes Bourdieu's interest in linking phenomenological and symbolic interactionist perspectives (sometimes equated with the subjectivist view) with the more structuralist approach (sometimes equated with the objectivist view) of American and some European sociologists. Additionally, habitus also illustrates the intimate connection between structure and agency as represented in the social actor, where the social actor can be an individual, a group, or any large collectivity.

Bourdieu defines habitus as the way in which actors calculate and determine future actions based on existing norms, rules, and values representing existing conditions. It is important to understand key aspects of habitus. One key element of this definition is that Bourdieu argues that existing norms, rules, and values have been mentally and cognitively integrated into the actor's frame of reference, and that they represent general social standards as well as specific situational and personal experiences. This illustrates his way of integrating the macro elements of a structured social world that imposes its will on actors with the dynamic agency that enables actors to engage in individually determined actions. Additionally, this

illustrates the integration of an objective reality created by existing structural elements in society with the subjective reality of the social actor. A second key element of habitus is that “future” actions refer to a range of possible actions, from what you do immediately upon reading this entry to what you might plan to do on your next vacation. Bourdieu states that social actors engage in a continuously dynamic interaction with their environment and other actors such that they are aware of negotiating from a range of possible actions to take. A third key element associated with his definition of habitus is that, in identifying actors’ agency in calculating actions, Bourdieu explains that this process is rational in that it takes into account potential outcomes for any specific action as well as something other than rational in that it also takes into account subjective motivations. In other words, habitus reflects actors’ emotional and spontaneous reactions to particular situations and the other actors involved. The final key element of the idea of habitus is that it represents a fluid set of guiding principles for the social actor. While actors in similar positions in society may share similar habitus, as their environment and the other actors in the environment change, so does the habitus. It is consistent across actors, which allows us to understand particular settings and cultures as well as what is unique to each individual.

Bourdieu’s idea of field also serves to demonstrate the intimate connection between objective and subjective realities as well as between structure and agency. His discussion of fields also integrates a Marxist focus on conflictual relations with a Weberian focus on formal hierarchies. Fields represent the network of relations between and among positions actors hold within particular structural or organizational systems. For example, Bourdieu examines artistic or literary fields and he describes them in terms of the positions actors hold relative to one another. Additionally, he argues that there are several hierarchies of fields as well as hierarchies within each field. The specific positions held by actors linked in terms of similar structural or organizational systems are embedded in fields of power, which are then embedded in fields of class relations. The connection to Marxist and Weberian ideas is immediately evident when you view the

field as a set of interconnecting positions that occur on several different levels – similar to 3 D chess, where the players must be aware of not only the first board, but also how the chess pieces on two other levels of boards are interacting with, and affecting, the primary or first board. There are several ways that Bourdieu’s idea of fields overcomes the dichotomies of American sociology. First, in his discussion of the network of relations among positions, Bourdieu allows the actors to be individuals as well as corporate actors. Along with the interlocking levels of fields, he bridges the perceived gap between micro and macro levels of social phenomena. Second, Bourdieu argues that while the positions reflect objective reality through their organizational or structural existence, they also reflect the subjective reality of individual actors who occupy such positions. Third, in the tradition of the early French anthropologists, Marx, Weber, and Durkheim, Bourdieu uses empirical research to develop this theoretical concept.

SEE ALSO: Agency (and Intention); Bourdieu, Pierre; Networks; Phenomenology; Structure and Agency; Structuralism; Symbolic Interaction

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Halbwachs, Maurice (1877–1945)

Suzanne Vromen

The French sociologist Maurice Halbwachs was a prominent representative of Durkheimian sociology during the interwar years, and an important contributor to the *Annales sociologiques*. He was also a statistician, a demographer, an expert at analyzing working class budgets, and an urban sociologist. His pathbreaking contribution to sociology, however, consists in the way he conceptualized how memory is socially constructed.

Maurice Halbwachs was born in Reims, France, in a Catholic family of Alsatian origin that opted to remain French when Alsace was annexed by Germany in 1871. Liberal in political ideas, the family moved to Paris in 1879. Influenced by Henri Bergson, his teacher at the Lycée Henri IV, Halbwachs studied philosophy at the Ecole Normale Supérieure, the elite school where most great French teachers are educated, and in 1901 he obtained his *agrégation*, the competitive diploma required to teach in the French secondary system.

Halbwachs soon became attracted to the social sciences, acquired two doctorates and sharpened his mathematical skills. He joined the Durkheim group, and from 1905 he contributed extensively to the *Année sociologique*. Bergson's influence on him, however, remained undeniable. Halbwachs's central program, the analysis of memory, was a lifelong attempt to reconcile some Bergsonian insights into consciousness, time, and remembering with Durkheimian perspectives.

With the end of World War I, higher education opened up for Halbwachs. From 1919 to 1935 he taught at the University of Strasbourg, first as professor of sociology and pedagogy, and from 1922 as France's first professor of sociology. Thanks to his reputation and the university's interdisciplinary climate, Halbwachs was invited to serve on the editorial committee of the *Annales d'histoire économique et sociale* launched by his historian colleagues Lucien Febvre and Marc Bloch, and he became a valued contributor. During the Strasbourg

years he produced major works, among them *Les Cadres sociaux de la mémoire* (*The Social Frameworks of Memory*) (1925), *Les Causes du suicide* (*The Causes of Suicide*) (1930), and *L'Évolution des besoins dans les classes ouvrières* (*The Evolution of Needs in the Working Classes*) (1933).

In 1935 he moved to the Sorbonne, where he occupied positions in the history of social economics (1935–7), the methodology and logic of the sciences (1937–9), and sociology (1939–44). At the same time, official honors were showered upon him, including membership of the Academy of Moral and Political Sciences (1932) and in the International Institute of Statistics (1935), and presidency of the French Institute of Sociology (1938).

In May 1944 he was appointed to the Chair of Collective Psychology at the Collège de France. But in July, detained by the Gestapo following his son's arrest for resistance activities, father and son were deported together to Buchenwald, where Halbwachs died in March 1945.

In the interwar years Halbwachs was a major promoter of Durkheimian sociology in France, broadening its development in dialogue with other disciplines such as psychology and history. A prolific worker and sophisticated statistician, with an expansive intellectual curiosity, he engaged critically with Durkheim's theories of suicide and of social morphology (*Morphologie sociale/Social Morphology*, 1938), and he also analyzed empirically aspects of urban and working class life in contemporary societies, subjects neglected by other Durkheimians.

With his theory of collective memory Halbwachs opened for sociological analysis a subject formerly left to literature and psychology. He intended to sociologize consciousness and to bring out the dependence on the social context of faculties traditionally considered uniquely and totally individual. For him, individual memory was shaped by the very fact of social existence. He postulated temporality and spatiality as intrinsic parts of consciousness, and considered memory as the convergence of multiple solidarities and as the ordering of experience. To remember, one needed others. He redefined time from a homogeneous and uniform category to coordinator of social experiences. By pointing the way to an analysis of the

concrete situations of everyday life in their temporality and spatiality with the meanings attached to them, Halbwachs adopted a phenomenological position. On the collective level, his analysis of memory was functional: group memories ensured cohesion and social continuity. They were didactic and effective because they included both concrete and abstract elements, images, and concepts. Space was to be understood in terms of a group's attitudes and intentions toward it, and localizations served as means of legitimation. Besides *Les Cadres sociaux de la mémoire*, Halbwachs developed his theory of collective memory in *La Topographie légendaire des Évangiles en Terre Sainte* (*Legendary Topography of the Gospels in the Holy Land*) (1941) and in *La Mémoire collective* (*The Collective Memory*) (1950), a collection consisting of an article on the collective memory of musicians and of extensive notes found in his papers after his untimely death, indicative of his intention to write another book on the subject of memory. The volume on the legendary topography of the Holy Land illustrates his concern with empirical data through a detailed and systematic examination of the localizations of holy places. Revered by Christians in Palestine, these holy places shifted according to historically significant doctrinal and political changes, thus the spatial framework of memory was continually reshaped by the varying concerns of the living people who did the remembering. Here Halbwachs offered a concrete reinterpretation of the sociology of knowledge, and questioned what images and concepts in a group's past best fulfilled didactic or legitimation purposes. A large collection of Halbwachs's notes and personal letters have recently been archived, and French sociologists are mining them to acquire a more complete sense of his work so tragically interrupted.

Halbwachs's constant focus on concrete facts of everyday life is apparent in his examination of family budgets, of expropriations, of working class budgets, and of memory. This emphasis on the concrete and the familiar differentiates him fundamentally from Durkheim, for he had no general evolutionary social philosophy.

For our postmodern age, Halbwachs's sociological theory of memory with its redefinition of time offers original lines of inquiry and feeds

into modern analyses of ideological forgetting and remembering, while his insights into how values are embodied in material forms provide contributions both to urban sociology and to the sociology of knowledge.

SEE ALSO: Annales School; Collective Memory; Durkheim, Émile; Knowledge, Sociology of

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hate crimes

Jack Levin

The term hate crimes has been employed since the mid 1980s to identify criminal acts motivated either entirely or in part by the fact or perception that a victim is different from the perpetrator. The term first appeared in newspaper accounts of a 1986 racial incident in the Howard Beach section of New York City, in which a black man was killed while attempting to flee a violent mob of white teenagers, shouting racial slurs. By the early 1990s the hate crime designation was being applied not only to attacks based on race and religion, but also on sexual orientation, national origin, disability status, and gender.

In legal terms, the groups protected by hate crime laws differ from state to state. By 2003,

45 states had some form of hate crime statute that covered individuals targeted because of race, religion, or ethnicity; 30 also included disability status or sexual orientation; only 27 protected gender (Anti Defamation League 2003).

In some states a separate statute exists which prohibits hate crime behavior, while in other states the hate crime statute is a "penalty enhancement." This means that if an existing crime is committed and it is motivated by bias, the penalty on the existing crime may be increased. Finally, a federal hate crimes statute exists, allowing federal prosecution of crimes based on race, color, religion, or national origin for certain constitutionally protected activities such as voting.

In a sense, the term hate crimes is somewhat misleading in its emphasis on hate as a defining basis for choosing and attacking a particular victim. The level of brutality in certain hate attacks suggests the presence of intense hostility or anger (i.e., hatred) in the motivation of the assailants. In the more typical hate crime, however, perpetrators may be motivated more by a desire for belonging or profit than by hatred for a particular victim. In addition, extreme dislike toward the victim may be present in many hate crimes, even if the primary motivation for the offense turns out to be something other than bias; such crimes can confound efforts to apply a consistent definition of hate crimes.

In terms of offender motivation, hate crimes can be categorized as four major types: thrill, defensive, retaliatory, and mission (Levin & McDevitt 2001). The majority seem to be thrill hate crimes: recreational offenses committed by youngsters – usually males operating in groups – who seek excitement at someone else's expense. Such young offenders get from their attack on a victim "bragging rights" with their friends. Though many of the hate crimes directed against property – acts of desecration and vandalism – can be included in the thrill seeking category, there are also numerous thrill hate offenses that involve intimidations, threats, and brutal assaults.

A second type of hate crime is defensive. That is, the attack is designed to protect an individual's neighborhood, workplace, school, or women from those who are considered to

be outsiders. Defensive hate crimes have often occurred when a family from a different racial group – especially black or Asian – moves into a previously all white neighborhood. Wherever it occurs, a defensive attack is often an act of domestic terrorism because it is designed to send a message to every member of the victim's group.

Retaliatory hate crimes are motivated by an individual's need for revenge as a result of a hate attack directed against his or her own group members. The targets of a retaliatory crime are not necessarily the particular individuals who had perpetrated the initial offense. More than any other type of hate crimes, a series of retaliatory offenses may contain the basis for escalating from individual criminal acts into large scale group conflict.

A final type of hate crime is a mission offense, usually committed by the members of an organized hate group. Actually, no more than 5 percent of all hate crimes nationally are committed by the members of organizations like the Ku Klux Klan or the White Aryan Resistance. Yet organized hate groups continue behind the scenes to support much larger numbers of violent offenses committed by non members who may be unsophisticated with respect to the ideology of hate – racist skinheads, alienated teenagers, or hate filled young men.

Organized hate groups are found not only in our communities, but in our penitentiaries. Established in many states around the country, for example, the Aryan Brotherhood introduces inmates to the theology of the Identity Church, according to which Jews are the children of Satan and blacks are sub human "mud people."

Like other aspects of the Uniform Crime Reports (FBI 2003), hate crime incidents, offenders, and victims are voluntarily reported by local jurisdictions to the FBI. Some 86 percent of the population of the US is now covered in nationally reported hate crime statistics. Of course, there is still reason to believe that hate crimes are vastly underestimated. Whether from ignorance, fear of retaliation, or distrust of the police, many victims of hate attacks simply do not report their victimization to the police.

In 2002 there were only 17 hate motivated murders reported to the FBI. On the other

hand, there were 8,832 hate crimes reported, 68 percent of which were directed against persons. The location of hate crime incidents varied, but they seemed to be concentrated in homes, on the streets, and in schools and colleges. Race was the most common basis for committing a hate offense, with anti black attacks most likely to occur and anti white attacks in second place. Anti gay, anti Jewish, anti Latino, and anti Muslim offenses were also quite prevalent. A wide range of groups were represented among the victims of hate crimes, including people with physical and mental disabilities, Asians, Protestants, Catholics, and American Indians.

SEE ALSO: Gangs, Delinquent; Gay Bashing; Homicide; Violent Crime

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Hawthorne Effect

William H. Swatos, Jr.

The Hawthorne Effect is the name that has been given to the possibility that a subject in a research project may change his or her behavior in a positive manner simply as a result of being aware of being studied. This concept takes its name from research studies conducted from 1924 to 1933 at the Western Electric Company's Hawthorne plant near Chicago, Illinois, that ultimately came under the direction of Elton Mayo of Harvard University. The specific research associated with the Hawthorne Effect was the first step among several and was conducted by engineers at the plant from 1924

to 1927, prior to Mayo's entry. This experiment involved increasing the lighting within a work area, using both experimental and control groups. Measuring worker output before and after the change in lighting showed an increase in productivity in *both* the experimental and control groups. Additional experiments with results along these lines led the researchers to conclude that the increased worker output occurred simply because of the increased attention directed toward the workers. It was at this point that Mayo entered the research, and the focus moved from simple variation in illumination to a variety of alterations in actual worker activity. As a whole, the research provided the initial grounding for Mayo to create the human relations movement, particularly in complex organizations.

With respect to research strategies themselves, later research has raised considerable doubts about whether the conclusions drawn across the studies as a whole are supported from the data. Subsequent studies show that the Hawthorne Effect has a variety of limits and may also have been influenced by its novelty at the time. Limits include the relative reasonableness of the alterations, the conduct of the researchers, and the nature of the work and workplace. At the same time, however, the implications associated with the Hawthorne Effect have been extended beyond classical experimental designs, which are relatively rare in sociology, to issues within survey research. Persons who are told that their opinions are valuable may quickly form opinions on topics about which they know very little, or they may modify their actual opinions in ways that they believe will be socially acceptable – either to the interviewer or to members of a group in a group interview setting. These various possibilities underscore the unique character of humans as subjects of research: the ability of humans to construct meaning within research contexts independent of the intentions of the researchers.

At the level of applied sociology in management, however, the Hawthorne studies have been incorporated into consultative approaches to labor management and productivity. That is, designing approaches to output that involve management–labor contact and worker opinion in the manufacturing process can be used as a strategy to improve productivity regardless of

the process itself. Although this tactic is subject to the same limits as occur with respect to research subjects, it nevertheless has become a fairly standard component of worker friendly management styles.

SEE ALSO: Experimental Design; Management Theory; Work, Sociology of

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health behavior

William C. Cockerham

Health behavior is defined as the activity undertaken by people for the purpose of maintaining or enhancing their health, preventing health problems, or achieving a positive body image (Cockerham 2000: 159). This definition goes beyond the one provided by Kasel and Cobb (1966), who depicted health behavior solely as the activity of healthy people to prevent illness. This latter definition is too limiting because health behavior does not just consist of healthy people trying to stay that way. While the health behavior of many people is intended to prevent sickness and injury, or to prolong their lives, other people may have other objectives. People with chronic diseases like heart disease and diabetes, for example, also engage in health behavior when they seek to control their disease through diet, exercise, and other forms of health related activity. Some people who are primarily motivated to enhance their bodily appearance and physical fitness through health promoting activities like diet and exercise likewise are engaging in health behavior even if the desire to look and feel good is more important to them than being healthy.

For most people, health behavior consists of actions to maintain, restore, or improve their

health, prevent health problems, increase their life span, or achieve a healthy appearance. These actions include a wide range of activities, including eating healthy foods, not smoking, exercising, brushing one's teeth, taking medication to control blood pressure or reduce cholesterol, getting 7 to 8 hours of sleep a night, and so on. What has brought health behavior to the attention of sociologists is that considerations of health outcomes are increasingly important influences on the daily routines of social life. In past historical periods, a person was either healthy or unhealthy and tended to take this situation more or less for granted. Today, however, this view has changed. In developed societies, good health has become a condition to be achieved and maintained through personal effort. In order to be healthy, people are expected to "work" at it, and believed to risk disease and premature death if they do not. This circumstance has its origins in the public's recognition that medicine cannot cure chronic diseases and the close association of such diseases with unhealthy lifestyles (Crawford 1984). The realization that responsibility for one's own health ultimately falls on one's self, not the medical profession, is viewed as a major reason for the renewed interest in health behavior that originated in the physical fitness movements (e.g., jogging, aerobic exercise) of the 1960s.

One of the first major accounts of health behavior in sociology was provided by the French sociologist Claudine Herzlich (1973; Herzlich & Pierret 1987). Health was described by people in her study as a necessity for both the individual and society, and the means by which a person achieves self realization. Herzlich identified a shift in thinking in French society away from taking health for granted toward a norm of a "duty to be healthy." This norm was strongest in the middle class, but appeared to be spreading, as many lower class people expressed the same orientation. "The right to health," stated Herzlich and Pierret (1987: 231), "implies that every individual must be made responsible for his or her health and must adopt rational behavior in dealing with the pathogenic effects of modern life."

The standard approach to the study of health behavior in public health views such behavior as largely a matter of individual choice and targets the individual to change his or her

harmful health practices largely through education (Gochman 1997). The theoretical models used in such research, like the Health Belief Model and the Stages of Change Model, are typically based on individual psychology. While this research is useful in certain contexts, it neglects the social situations and conditions that may ultimately be responsible for causing the health problem. A sociological perspective allows the researcher to analyze health behavior as a social phenomenon that goes beyond the psychology of the individual. The source of the behavior may be located in the norms, practices, and values of groups, social classes, and society at large that influence the individual. A sociological approach also helps the researcher address macro level conditions like poverty, the stress of economic recessions, and environmental pollution, over which the individual has little or no control but must cope with because of his or her social circumstances. These conditions not only cause unhealthy living situations, but also promote unhealthy behavior when heavy alcohol use, smoking, inattention to diet, and the like are the response.

The focus of research in sociology is not on the health behavior of the individual; rather, it is on the transformation of this behavior into its aggregate or collective form: health life styles. Health lifestyles are collective patterns of health related behavior based on choices from options available to people according to their life chances (Cockerham 2000: 160). Invariably, the better a person's life chances, as typically indicated by his or her class position, the healthier the lifestyle and, conversely, the worse the person's chances in life, the less healthy the person's lifestyle and the higher the probability for a shorter life.

SEE ALSO: Health and Culture; Health Life styles; Health Locus of Control; Health and Medicine; Health Risk Behavior; Health, Self Rated; Health and Social Class; Illness Behavior; Life Chances and Resources

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health care delivery systems

Fred Stevens and Jouke van der Zee

A health care delivery system is the organized response of a society to the health problems of its inhabitants. Societies choose from alternative health care delivery models and, in doing so, they organize and set goals and priorities in such a way that the actions of different actors are effective, meaningful, and socially accepted. From a sociological point of view, the analysis of health care delivery systems implies recognition of their distinct history over time, their specific values and value patterns that go beyond technological requirements, and their commitment to a set of normative standards (Parsons 1951; Selznick 1957). The term "system" is used here in a sociological sense (Parsons 1951; Philipsen 1980). Typical system features are functional specificity (operational goals), structural differentiation (the division of labor), goal setting (including effectiveness, efficiency), coordination (of activities, occupations, and facilities by mutual agreement, standards, or hierarchy), and boundary maintaining autonomy (in relation to political, economic, or normative structures). Some health care delivery systems comply more with these system characteristics than others. Where health care delivery systems vary, it is mainly due to long term cultural and structural developments.

Consequently, a health care delivery system is typified by its structure, its relationships between actors and organizations, and its specific pattern of underlying norms, values, and value orientations.

Three factors are significant in understanding the origins of modern health care delivery systems: (1) the socioeconomic level of development of a society, (2) its demographic situation, and (3) the epidemiological state of affairs. As shown in Table 1, modern societies developed from agricultural economies through industrialization to service economies in a *societal transition*. They initially focused on survival and self sustenance of the small landholder and his or her (extended) family, but evolved toward economies creating surpluses (wealth) and added value to products that could be traded. Surpluses were commonly used to institute new roles and occupations that were important but not necessarily productive, such as priests, soldiers, tax collectors, and healers. Surpluses accumulated during long periods, in which stages of prosperity alternated with times of recession, due to war, famine, and

pandemics. As societies further developed and modernized, more structures and institutions came into existence that reduced the risks of daily life.

Table 1 shows that widespread kinship based arrangements to cope with these risks were gradually supplemented and replaced by collective arrangements. This culminated in a *demographic transition* consisting of the reduction of a population's fertility. In modern societies it was no longer imperative to have many children as a provision against old age poverty. At the end of the nineteenth century, at first in Germany, social security systems against loss of income due to accidents and disabilities came into existence. These further developed to include public pension schemes several decades later. In addition to these collective arrangements, financial surpluses were the foundation of economic growth, by extending educational facilities, also creating more services and typical professions, like teachers, health care providers, lawyers, and engineers. In Europe, taxes or fee collection were the primary mechanisms and financial resources for these

Table 1 Societal transitions and the development of health care delivery systems.

<i>Societal transition</i>	AGRICULTURE (rural)	→	INDUSTRY (urban)	→	SERVICES (suburban)
	Multi-generation family		Nuclear family		Individual households
Social tensions, revolutions, war →					
Main health issues	Demographic transition				
	Infectious diseases	→	Declining fertility	→	Chronic diseases, diseases of civilization
	Declining mortality		Epidemiological transition		
Focus of care	Hygiene, public health, informal care	→	Emerging curative care, social security, welfare state	→	High tech care, professional home care

collective arrangements. In the course of this modernization process, the *epidemiological transition* took place that reflected a gradual shift from the sheer necessity to overcome infectious diseases (mainly affecting infants) toward dealing with chronic diseases (primarily affecting the late middle aged and elderly). Nowadays, health care delivery systems in modern societies are largely focused on the changing needs and demands of an aging population.

Health care organizations usually lag behind changing patterns of population needs. The reason is that modern, more sophisticated health care delivery systems, characterized by an advanced division of labor, high levels of complexity, and structural means for coordination and planning, require extensive financial resources. Yet only advanced economies are able to put aside sufficient resources for health care. Consequently, the extent to which resources can be generated for health care signifies a nation's stage of economic development. Evidently, on both micro (individual) as well on macro (societal) levels, there is a strong association between health and wealth.

Several conclusions can be drawn. First, the wealth of a society is a major determinant of health. Second, it is more difficult to improve health in affluent societies than in poor ones. Third, in countries with low levels of income (usually typified as developing societies), hygiene, sanitation, vaccination, nutrition, and immunization are the important objectives for health care. Modern societies, with higher average levels of income, largely have to cope with rising costs due to the increasing demand for chronic care, as a consequence of an aging population.

TYPES OF HEALTH CARE DELIVERY SYSTEMS

A simple, traditional market structure consists of bilateral relations between buyers and suppliers. The health care sector differs essentially from such a market structure, as interactions between actors are not organized in bidirectional relations of pairs of producers and consumers and the price of a health care procedure is not the balancing mechanism. Instead, health care delivery systems consist

of five principal actors. These are the consumers (patients), first line providers (usually general practitioners), second line providers (hospitals, institutional facilities), the state, and insurers (Evans 1981). They are organized multidirectionally, as an interacting system. Dependent on organization and system features, consumers (1) have direct access to hospital services; (2) may need a referral from a GP; (3) get their health care expenses reimbursed from an insurer; (4) have total or partial health care insurance coverage and pay taxes or insurance premiums for that reason; or (5) have to pay their bill directly to the provider (like the simple market structure).

Yet in typifying a nation's health system the role of the state in funding is decisive (Evans 1981; Hurst 1992; Marrée & Groenewegen 1997). Ideal typical ways of state funding involvement are:

- *Largely absent*: the state propagates non interventionism, leaving room primarily for private insurance to fill this role. The organization and provision of health care in the US and Switzerland are typical examples.
- *In between*: the state harmonizes the arrangements that developed between groups of citizens (e.g., employers, employees). This is the case in many European countries.
- *Central*: the state controls funding, *with* or *without* the provision of health care. The former is/was typical of Eastern Europe and Russia; the latter is typical for the National Health Services (NHS) model as found in the UK.

The *free market* model applies when the state conducts a policy of non interventionism and restricts its interference in health care matters to the bare essentials, leaving all other expenses to private funding and corporate provision (HMOs). This is the typical situation in the US, except for Medicaid (indigent) and Medicare (elderly) state interventions. Private insurance fills the gap to some degree, however, leaving about 16 percent of the US population uninsured for health care costs or loss of income due to illness and disability.

The second model is the *social insurance system*, founded in the late nineteenth century in

Germany. Typical for the social insurance system is that patients pay an insurance premium to a sickness fund which has a contract with first line (GP) and second line (hospital and specialist) providers. The role of the state is limited and confined to setting the overall terms of contracts between patients, providers, and insurers. The social insurance system is funded by premiums paid and controlled by employers and labor unions. These, however, have little control over the provision of services. This is left to the professions, specifically to the medical profession and to professionalized care organizations (e.g., home nursing, home help). For people with lower and middle class salaried incomes, collective arrangements are available (sick funds). Founded in Germany, the social security model was almost immediately adopted by Czechoslovakia during Austrian Hungarian rule, Austria, Hungary, and Poland. During World War II it was imposed on the Netherlands (1941) and later adopted by Belgium and France. The social insurance system survived two world wars and National Socialism, and in essence still exists in Germany, the Netherlands, Belgium, France, Austria, Switzerland, Luxembourg, and Japan (Saltman & Figueras 1997).

The third model, typically found in the UK, is the taxed based *National Health Services (NHS) model*. It was first introduced in 1948, is also centralized and is funded by means of taxation, while the state is responsible for the provision of institution based care (hospitals). The medical profession has a rather independent position. Self employed GPs are the gatekeepers in primary health care. Before visiting a hospital or a medical specialist one needs a referral from a GP. The NHS model leaves some room for private medicine. Through processes of diffusion and adaptation, the NHS model was first adopted in Sweden, and then by the other Nordic countries: Denmark, Norway, and Finland. At present, the NHS model applies to the United Kingdom, Ireland, Denmark, Norway, Sweden, Finland, Iceland, and outside Europe by Australia and New Zealand. Four Southern European countries have adopted, or are in the process of adopting, this tax based model. These are Spain, Italy, Portugal, and Greece (Saltman & Figueras 1997).

The fourth, most centralized health care delivery systems model, the *Soviet model*, dates

from 1920. It is characterized by a strong position of the state, guaranteeing full and free access to health care for everyone. This is realized by state ownership of health care facilities, by funding from the state budget (taxes), and by geographical distribution and provision of services throughout the country. Health services are fully hierarchically organized. They are provided by state employees, planned by hierarchical provision, and organized as a hierarchy of hospitals, with outpatient clinics (polyclinics) as lowest levels of entrance. Among the nations that, until recently, had a health care system based on the Soviet model were Russia, Belarus, the Central Asian republics of the former USSR, and some countries in Central and Eastern Europe. Many former Soviet Republics, however, are in a process of transition toward a social insurance based system.

The four models make up a continuum in terms of their "system" character, with state interventionism and centralized health care at one end, and non interventionism at the other. Centralized systems provide best mechanisms for cost control, while absence of state intervention does not appear to be fruitful, as soaring costs in the US evidently show. The four health delivery systems models are to be seen as pure types which can be found in many combinations and varieties. They also reflect stages and outcomes of a historical process. Consequently, system models that came into existence in highly developed economies in the first half of the twentieth century can now still provide useful options to choose from in developing countries or transitional economies like in Eastern European societies.

HEALTH CARE DELIVERY SYSTEMS REFORM

While the models presented reflect the major types that can be found in industrialized countries in Europe, the US, and Asia, none of these countries fully complies with the characteristics of one particular model. In a Weberian sense, they should be seen as ideal types. Through processes of adaptation and diffusion, national health care delivery systems deviate from these models. For example, social insurance based health care delivery systems and the

entrepreneurial system of the US were faced with problems of rising costs in the 1960s and 1970s. The NHS delivery systems and Soviet like delivery systems of Eastern Europe had problems of neglect, underfunding, and extensive bureaucracy in the 1970 and 1980s. In some countries, specifically those with social security based health care systems, this has led to more state regulation to curb the costs of health care. In other countries it resulted in less state intervention, and in the introduction of different forms of managed competition. For example, in Eastern Europe, after the fall of the Berlin Wall, we see the demise of state funding and state provision due to economic deficits. In the countries that have adopted the social insurance model we see more state regulation in order to introduce more planning and to curb the rising costs of health care. One of the consequences has been a stronger position of hospitals. In the UK we have seen a movement towards more decentralization, which was realized by a separation between purchasers (the government) and providers (Saltman & Figueras 1997; Tuohy 1999).

CULTURAL ROOTS AND VALUE ORIENTATIONS

Health care organization is also influenced by cultural circumstances. For example, nations with collective arrangements have more state intervention, a small private sector, a preference for tax rather than insurance funding, and comprehensive coverage with universal entitlement based on the notion of common rights. In contrast, societies steeped in individualism prefer private enterprise and insurance funding with selective coverage and high responsiveness to consumer demand. In societies which have equity as an important root we see explicit attempts to avoid discrimination and to facilitate public participation. In other words, values and value orientations play a role in the structuring of health care delivery systems.

Anthropologists have argued that differences between health care delivery systems are embedded in the values and social structure of the societies involved (Helman 1996). Based on specific histories, traditions, customs, and so on, differences in health care organization reflect the way in which societies define and deal with issues

of health and illness. Health and health care are embedded in value systems which give explanations why and how in specific cultures health problems are dealt with. For example, in some societies health care is considered a collective good for the benefit of all citizens. In other ones, health care is seen more as a "commodity" that can be bought or sold on a free market, or as an individual investment in human capital. As Gallagher (1988) notes: "The concept of health care as a calculable resource is an essential feature in its role as a carrier of modernity." The notion of health care as a commodity, however, has not been accepted everywhere. It seems to be more established in the essentially market oriented organization of health care in the US than it is in Europe or Asia. Nowhere in Europe has it become part of health policy objectives. This is notwithstanding a wide range of health care reforms in recent years introducing market oriented approaches with incentives to introduce more competition between providers and to use resources more economically (Saltman & Figueras 1997). Health care as a collective good for the benefit of all prevails in European health policy and in systems typified as national, social insurance, and so on. Health care as a commodity dominates in the US, although several European countries are moving in a similar direction.

Cultures or nations can vary in value orientations to a considerable degree. For example, values of equity, solidarity, and autonomy may have different health care implications in different societies (Hofstede 1984). Emphasis on hospital care versus home care or care for the elderly, on individual responsibilities versus solidarity between people, reflect a society's general value orientations that have an impact on its health delivery systems model (Stevens & Diederiks 1995; Saltman & Figueras 1997; Philipsen 1980; Hofstede 1984). Or to put this differently, the free market, insurance, and tax based health care delivery models to be found in the US, Germany, and the UK, respectively, are to a certain degree reflections of central values in their societies.

CONVERGENCE AND DIVERGENCE

There is ample evidence that contingencies like increasing health care costs, an aging

population, changing disease patterns, technological developments, growing public demand, and so forth impose a common logic in terms of institutional performance and the structuring of modern health care. In the literature a wide range of convergencies in health policy and health care organization have been listed (Field 1989; Mechanic and Rochefort 1996; Raffel 1997; Saltman & Figueras 1997). These include (1) the concern of governments to control health care costs while at the same time improving the effectiveness and efficiency of the system; (2) the increasing attention for health promotion and healthy lifestyles such as abstinence from substance use (alcohol, smoking, drugs), and healthy behavior; (3) reduction of health care inequalities and differences in access; (4) the stimulation of primary health care while cutting back extensive medical specialization; (5) the promotion of patient involvement in care and treatment and improving patient satisfaction; and (6) the reduction of fragmentation of services and the promotion of continuity of care.

Yet the convergence of modern health care delivery systems is not undisputed. Even if societies are faced with similar contingencies, their societal structures have to be consonant with culturally derived expectations (Lammers & Hickson 1979). Consequently, while there is substantial evidence that modern societies are evolving into the same direction with efficiency equity and utilitarian individualism as core value orientations, differences exist in degree and similarity of these developments. Modern societies still vary considerably in their dealing with issues of health and illness (Anderson et al. 1995). Moreover, while nations may have similar goals, alternative options are available to reach these. National health delivery systems are the outcome of a dialectical tension between universal aspects of technology and medicine on the one hand, and particularistic cultural characteristics of each nation on the other (Field 1989). These particularistic cultural characteristics refer to the historical foundations of health care delivery systems, to the societal and national context, and to specific values and value orientations of societies and health care delivery systems under consideration. Health care institutions are still largely country specific (Pomey & Poullier 1997). Such country specific elements would include social,

economic, institutional, and ideological structures, the dominant belief system, the role of the state versus the market, patterns of health care coverage, and centralization or decentralization of political authority (Saltman & Figueras 1997, 1998).

SEE ALSO: Health and Culture; Health Maintenance Organization; Health Professions and Occupations; Health and Social Class; Hospitals; Socialist Medicine; Socialized Medicine

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health and culture

Stella Quah

The cumulative knowledge from nearly a century's worth of studies confirms that the sociological analysis of health and illness would be grossly incomplete without the consideration of culture. Culture is both the context and an important determinant of the behavior, beliefs, and norms of individuals affected by illness and who are making decisions on help seeking, as well as of people and organizations whose role it is to help and to heal.

Many definitions of culture have been offered by scholars over the past century. Those definitions range from Parsons's "patterned system of symbols" to one or more characteristics of a group's or community's way of life, such as philosophical, linguistic, and artistic expressions; their collective norms of behavior; and their ethnic and/or religious customs and beliefs, among other features. Of these components of culture, the most commonly included in sociological studies of health and health related behavior are ethnicity and religion. As Stanley King aptly summarized it in 1962, ethnicity is understood as the combination of a common "language, customs, beliefs, habits and traditions," "racial stock or country of origin," and "a consciousness of kind" in Weber's sense. A group's religion or cosmology – that is, its interpretation of life, birth, and death, of right and wrong – gives shape to a consistent body of health beliefs and practices that are endorsed and implemented by individuals, typically with the tacit or active support and scrutiny of their social networks.

The intellectual context of the study of health and culture has been characterized by multidisciplinary and the presence of a wide range of conceptual frameworks. The early anthropological studies of primitive cultures in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries paved the way for the analysis of ethnic differences in illness and health related behavior by sociologists already schooled in the seminal ideas of Durkheim, Weber, Simmel, and Parsons. Parsons himself was influenced by anthropological and psychoanalytical perspectives. By the mid twentieth century, sociologists, social psychologists, and psychologists began collaborating in the analysis of the influence of beliefs and personality upon health related attitudes and behavior. The Health Belief Model was one of the first among several conceptual frameworks generated out of such collaboration. The incorporation of cultural variables in medical sociology research until then was modest and did not follow directly these conceptual developments.

Nearly all theoretical perspectives in sociology concur that ethnicity is socially constructed, is negotiable, and thus has permeable boundaries. However, medical sociology studies (predominantly research on traditional healing

beliefs and practices) confirm Kevin Avruch's crucial reminder (in Stone and Dennis 2003: 72) that while ethnicity is permeable from the perspective of the sociologist observer, from the subjects' perspective their culture is immutable because it "stretches back in an unbroken chain to some primordial antiquity." Indeed, studies of traditional healing systems indicate that people typically cite the perceived ancient authority of their culture as prescribing and sanctioning their traditional healing beliefs and practices (Quah 2003).

Different conceptual perspectives in sociology consider health generally as a state of well being (physical and/or psychological), but theories differ in their interpretation of the social meaning of illness. Some examples will suffice (Gerhardt 1989). Structural functionalism regards illness as "loss of role capacity" and assigns responsibility for one's health to the individual. The symbolic interactionist perspective sees illness in terms of stigmatization and proposes that societal and cultural influences impinge upon individuals' perception of health, self determination, and ability to negotiate their situation. Phenomenology sees the situation as "trouble trust dialectics" (following Garfinkel's approach to trust), where illness as "physical, psychological and role incompetence and incapacities" that break everyday life "trouble trust cycles" may be remedied by "reestablishing trust" in the form of medical treatment. Conflict theory addresses the questions of power and domination and associates illness with a surfacing of the everyday conflict that results from social, "political, and economic inequity" (Gerhardt 1989), an argument also pursued by Marxist and neo Marxist approaches. Of these theoretical frameworks, symbolic interactionism incorporates culture most directly, mainly in the form of socially constructed and subjectively perceived meanings of illness, definitions of illness severity, and labeling.

The two main perspectives that Gerhardt identified in 1989 as representing the major theoretical contention in medical sociology were the illness as deviance perspective and the power domination perspective. These two perspectives have been in confrontation throughout most of the past six decades. Against this backdrop, it is worth pointing out that the inclusion of culture (subjects' values, beliefs, and

customs) in research designs based on either of these main perspectives helps to elucidate their explanatory power. The incorporation of culture in a research design means addressing important questions such as how culture impinges upon people's subjective perception of health, illness, power, and stigma; upon the meaning they attach to illness and health; upon their sense of trust, normality, and deviance; and upon their health behavior. In fact, in the large and rapidly expanding body of biomedical and social science research on health and illness, the serious analysis of culture is a distinguishing feature of medical sociology and medical anthropology.

Increased interest in the cultural dimension of health has been prompted over the past six decades by major sociohistorical events and global upheavals, such as World War II, that motivated the examination of the idea of a sick society (Gerhardt 1989: 353); major movements of populations as the result of forced and free migration (leading to higher rates of ethnic minorities in Europe, North America, Australia, and New Zealand); and epidemics affecting a multitude of culturally diverse communities. The growing attention to the cultural or ethnic dimension of health and illness and the necessity to elucidate the complex web of attitudes, perceptions, and decisions on health risks and health options leading to the spread of epidemics such as HIV/AIDS and outbreaks of infectious diseases like SARS (severe acute respiratory syndrome) have led to a wealth of cross cultural and comparative research involving ethnic communities within countries and across different countries. This research trend has also been propelled by some slow pace but substantial changes in people's lifestyle (e.g., diet, rate of physical activity, leisure activities, long distance travel, exposure to environmental hazards, and high stress levels) and demographic trends, particularly longer life expectancy and the resultant increase in the proportion of older age cohorts and in the incidence of chronic diseases (e.g., cardiovascular diseases).

The wealth of studies of culture and health may be roughly classified into two main dimensions based on the principal unit of inquiry: some studies focus on the subjects affected by illness, while others concentrate on the expected or actual sources of healing. Research on individuals, small groups, and communities

affected by illness includes the sources of illness as well as people's health related behavior, attitudes, and beliefs at all the three main stages of the health-illness trajectory: preventive health behavior, illness behavior, and sick role behavior. Studies dealing with the expected and actual sources of help and healing concentrate on individuals as healers as well as on groups, networks, and organizations whose main objective is healing, or helping the sick, or safeguarding the health of others.

Concerning changes over time, one of the most important developments in the past two decades has been the noticeable increase in cross national and comparative research on cultural determinants of health related behavior involving different ethnic and religious communities. Illustrations of this type of research are studies on attitudes and behavior regarding prevention of and response to HIV/AIDS (e.g., condom use, sexual habits, and stigmatization) and other infectious diseases; and smoking, alcohol drinking, and dietary patterns in connection with cancer and cardiovascular diseases.

Some main trends may be identified in the wide array of current studies on health and culture. As indicated earlier, a continuing feature of medical sociology research on culture and health since the mid twentieth century is the concurrent advancement of theorizing and empirical research. Some critics have argued that theorizing has not moved significantly beyond middle range theories. Although this is true, the slow progress in grand theorizing and the presence of contending conceptual perspectives are common trends across sociology subfields of inquiry and general sociology. Another current trend is the continued interest in the study of the body, especially within the phenomenological, feminist, and postmodern perspectives. A third trend is that health behavior studies guided by one or more social psychology theories (such as the health belief model, protection motivation theory, self efficacy theory, and the theory of reasoned action) are now paying more attention to cultural variables. The fourth and perhaps one of the most robust and faster growing research areas with the potential to highlight the relevance of culture is the study of the impact of social networks and modes of help seeking on health behavior (Thoits 1995; Levy & Pescosolido 2002). The link between

health and illness and people's ethnic identity, their sense of belonging to a family, network of friends, and community, and the concomitant trust people place in their care and advice in times of distress and illness, are all social phenomena that can be analyzed fruitfully by research on social networks and help seeking.

The methodological challenges confronting medical sociology are found in all other subfields of the discipline. One of the most difficult challenges in studies of health and culture is the refining of methods to ascertain sociocultural and illness related phenomena. For example, while Weber's idea of "a consciousness of kind" has been elegantly discussed as part of the concept "ethnicity," it is difficult to devise a valid method to ascertain a person's consciousness of kind through observation, interaction, or interviews. The same challenge is posed by many other concepts, such as the permeability of a group's culture, stress levels, trust in others, meaning of social support, and a social network's level of cohesiveness and reliability as help provider. The second main challenge is establishing causality. The study of culture and health confront us with the problem of ascertaining causality in many aspects, such as the link between everyday stress and illness. But the question of causality is particularly difficult when trying to establish whether culture is part of the social structure (i.e., the context of agency) within which health attitudes and behavior evolve, or a determinant of health attitudes and behavior, or both.

Future advances in research, theory, and methodology of studies on health and culture need to give serious consideration to three aspects. First, the emphasis on the construction, verification, and improvement of conceptual frameworks is a very valuable feature of this field and must continue to mark the development of medical sociology research on health and culture. Second, the impact of culture as norms shaping attitudes toward health illness and guiding health behavior is an area that requires active consideration by sociologists engaged in social networks and social support research; social networks and help seeking have become very productive research areas in the past decade and will continue to expand. Third, the dearth of authentic cross cultural research needs to be resolved. The bulk of research on health and culture up to the end of the 1990s was

addressed to the majority versus minority contrast (or immigrant versus non immigrant comparisons) within the same country, mostly in the US and in some European countries. This serious limitation needs to be overcome by comparative or cross national studies. Comparative research can provide the basis for more effective understanding of the relative permeability or resilience of cultural boundaries and its effect on health; of the permanent or temporary transformation in belief systems; and of the way cultural beliefs and norms influence accounts of disease incidence and prevalence across communities and countries.

SEE ALSO: Conflict Theory; Ethnicity; Health Behavior; Health Lifestyles; Health and Medicine; Health, Neighborhood Disadvantage; Health and Race; Health and Social Class; Phenomenology; Structural Functional Theory; Symbolic Interaction

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health lifestyles

William C. Cockerham

Health lifestyles are collective patterns of health related behavior based on choices from options available to people according to their life chances (Cockerham 2000). The behaviors that are generated from these choices can have either positive or negative consequences for a person's health status, but nonetheless form an overall pattern of health practices that constitute a health oriented lifestyle. Health lifestyles are becoming an increasingly common form of social behavior given the limits of medicine in treating chronic illnesses like heart disease, cancer, and diabetes and the association of such diseases with unhealthy lifestyles. The recognition that the individual is ultimately responsible for his or her own health often promotes a healthy lifestyle.

The most common health lifestyle practices investigated by researchers are alcohol use, smoking, dietary habits, and exercise. Other practices include drug abuse, personal hygiene, rest and relaxation, automobile seatbelt use, and similar behaviors related to health. Health lifestyle practices also include contact with the medical profession for preventive care and routine checkups, but the majority of activities take place outside the health care delivery system.

Sociological theorizing about health lifestyles generally begins with Max Weber (1978). Weber did not address health practices, but focused on the relationship between lifestyles in general and social status. He found that status groups originate through a sharing of similar lifestyles. The lifestyles of status groups are based not so much on what they and the people within them produce, but on what they consume. This is because the consumption of goods and services conveys a social meaning that displays the status and social identity of the consumer. Weber's work helps us understand that health lifestyles are also a form of consumption in that the health produced is used for something, such as a longer life, work, or enhanced enjoyment of one's physical being (Cockerham 2000). Health lifestyles are also supported by an extensive consumer products industry of goods and services (e.g., running shoes, sports clothing,

diet plans, health foods, club and spa memberships) promoting consumption as an inherent feature of participation.

Weber shows that lifestyles have two major components: life choices (self direction) and life chances (the structural probabilities of realizing one's choices). Weber does not consider life chances to be a matter of pure chance; rather, they are the chances people have in life because of their social circumstances. His overall thesis is that chance is socially determined and social structures are an arrangement of chances. Therefore, lifestyles are not random behaviors unrelated to structure, but typically are deliberate choices influenced by life chances.

Weber's most important contribution to conceptualizing lifestyles is identification of the dialectical interplay of choice and chance in lifestyle determination (Cockerham et al. 1997). Choices and the constraints of life chances work off one another to determine a distinctive lifestyle for individuals and groups. It can be said that individuals have a range of freedom, yet not complete freedom, in choosing a lifestyle; that is, they have the freedom to choose within the social constraints that apply to their situation in life. As Zygmunt Bauman (1999) points out, individual choices in all circumstances are confined by two sets of constraints: (1) choosing from among what is available and (2) social rules or codes telling the individual the rank order and appropriateness of preferences.

Two other theorists, Anthony Giddens and Pierre Bourdieu, are also important in conceptualizing health lifestyles. Through his notion of the duality of structure, Giddens (1991) helps us understand that social structural resources in lifestyle selection can empower choices, not just constrain them. Furthermore, he observes that social situations tend to push people into choosing a particular lifestyle that connects to an orderly pattern of behavior shared with other people. His basic message is that lifestyles not only fulfill utilitarian needs, but also provide a material form to a person's self identity.

Bourdieu (1984) introduces the concept of habitus to lifestyle research that can be described as an individual's organized repertoire of perceptions that guide and evaluate behavioral choices and options. It is a mindset that produces a relatively enduring framework

of dispositions to act in particular ways and originates through socialization and experience consistent with the reality of the person's class circumstances. These dispositions generate stable and consistent lifestyle practices that typically reflect the normative structure of the prevailing social order and/or some group or class in which the individual has been socialized. The habitus produces enduring dispositions toward a lifestyle that becomes routine and when acted out regularly over time, reproduces itself. This suggests that health lifestyle practices are usually habitual modes of behavior strongly influenced by class and other social structural variables, such as age and gender.

The research literature on health lifestyles in sociology began to develop only in the 1980s. The focus in most studies is on determining differences between social classes in health lifestyle participation. Among the earliest and most influential lifestyle studies considering health practices is that of Bourdieu (1984). He constructed a model of stratified lifestyles based on differing cultural tastes in food, art, music, dress, and the like. He found that distinct class differences existed in relation to food and sports preferences and detailed how a class oriented habitus shaped these health lifestyle practices. Another early study was that of William Cockerham and his colleagues (1988), who examined similarities in health lifestyles in the US and Germany and determined how such lifestyles could spread in varying degrees across class boundaries. In Great Britain, however, Mildred Blaxter (1990) found that important differences in health lifestyles persisted between social classes and that living conditions played an important role in determining health practices. A universal finding is that people in the upper and upper middle classes tend to take better care of their health than those in the working class and lower class. Females invariably live healthier lifestyles than males. More recent research in Russia and other former socialist countries in Europe shows that unhealthy lifestyle practices (heavy drinking and smoking, high fat diets, and little or no exercise) are the primary social determinant of the significant increase in male heart disease mortality in the region (Cockerham 1999; Cockerham et al. 2002).

SEE ALSO: Bourdieu, Pierre; Health Behavior; Health Risk Behavior; Health and Social Class; Health, Self Rated; Health and Sport; Life Chances and Resources; Lifestyle; Life style Consumption; Weber, Max

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health locus of control

Brian P. Hinote

Health locus of control refers to the degree of control that people believe they possess over their personal health. More generally, locus of control measures indicate the degree of control (internal or external) an individual has over a particular life situation. People reflecting an internal locus of control believe that they can exert control over their environment to bring

about desirable consequences. Consequently, those possessing an internal health locus of control believe that their personal health related outcomes are for the most part determined by their own choices and behaviors. Conversely, people with an external locus of control believe that larger social forces, powerful persons or groups, or plain luck will determine their fate. Those displaying an external health locus of control consider their personal health related outcomes largely a matter of influences extending beyond their own control (Cockerham & Ritchey 1997; McGuigan 1999).

While interest in the notion of health locus of control is seen in medical sociology, the concept was initially derived from Julian Rotter's (1996) social learning theory in psychology. Most early studies investigating this topic used the scale developed by Rotter, the internal external (I E) scale, to assess locus of control, but researchers have more recently utilized instruments like the Health Locus of Control (HLC) scale, which distinguishes between an internal or external health locus of control. However, behavioral scientists have employed a large number of locus of control scales in research spanning over the past 40–50 years (Wallston & Wallston 1978; Lefcourt 1982; Seeman & Seeman 1983; Cockerham & Ritchey 1997).

Early studies suggesting a significant correlation between locus of control and health first appeared about 40 years ago. More attention, and thus more studies, followed, and over the years investigators uncovered a number of characteristics, behaviors, and outcomes exhibiting correlations with the health locus of control measure. These findings have helped underscore the fact that the widely accepted medical model may not adequately consider the role that one's personal sense of control plays in health and illness behaviors (Seeman & Evans 1962; Seeman & Seeman 1983).

For example, social class often shows a significant correlation with this variable, with persons in lower socioeconomic strata exhibiting the strongest external health locus of control. On the other hand, individuals occupying relatively higher socioeconomic positions tend to show more signs of internal health locus of control. Indeed, such differences in health locus of control manifest themselves in the perception of illness symptoms and the use of physicians, with

the least advantaged seeing physicians more regularly for illness symptoms and the more affluent exercising more control over health and illness (Cockerham et al. 1986). In addition, persons showing higher degrees of internal control tend to express increased mastery of information in their immediate social environment, so much so that patients characterized as "internals" more actively seek out relevant information to learn more about their particular disease or diagnosis (Seeman & Evans 1962).

With regard to mental health, depression is associated with feeling as if outcomes (good, bad, or both) are beyond one's control (external locus of control), and one's sense of control, whether internal or external, reflects the circumstances of a person's social and economic status (Mirowsky & Ross 1990). More destructive health behaviors like smoking also exhibit correlations with this concept. Research suggests that young people who display characteristics consistent with an external health locus of control represent those at greatest risk to start smoking and to become chronic, long term smokers (Clarke et al. 1982). In addition, studies show that demographic characteristics like age can also correlate with health locus of control. Research indicates that between the ages of 18–50 individuals generally tend to show overall high, stable levels of perceived control, but within increasingly older age groups control appears to gradually decrease (Mirowsky 1995).

While findings may show some degree of inconsistency at times, perhaps due to differences in measurement and to interaction effects, the significance of health locus of control within medical sociology appears well established. However, this measure represents only one in a potentially complex constellation of sociological factors influencing health behavior, illness behavior, and outcomes. Regardless, the concept likely possesses a number of implications for both researchers and policymakers. For example, health locus of control measures may be utilized in evaluating health promotion campaigns. That is, developing and fostering attributes of internal control could help such programs become increasingly successful. Perhaps programs aimed at behavioral deterrence should specifically target personality characteristics consistent with externality in order to increase their overall efficacy in real world

applications (Wallston & Wallston 1978; Clarke et al. 1982).

SEE ALSO: Aging, Mental Health, and Well Being; Health Behavior; Health Lifestyles; Health Risk Behavior; Health and Social Class; Illness Behavior; Medical Sociology; Mental Disorder; Social Learning Theory; Smoking

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health maintenance organization

Douglas R. Wholey and Lawton R. Burns

A health maintenance organization (HMO) is a managed care organization that integrates health insurance and delivery functions in an effort to contain costs and maximize quality. HMOs differ from indemnity health insurance, where the insurer compensates the consumer for the cost of specified services. On the continuum between indemnity health insurance and HMOs lie organizations such as preferred provider organizations (PPOs) that manage care delivery more than indemnity health insurance yet do not integrate health insurance and services.

There are five HMO types: independent practice associations (IPAs), network, group, staff, and mixed. IPAs contract with physicians in solo or small single specialty group practice. Network and group HMOs are based on physicians in multi specialty group practice: a network HMO contracts with several multi specialty groups, while a group HMO contracts with a primary multi specialty group. Staff HMOs contract with physicians as salaried employees in a multi specialty group. Mixed HMOs include physicians in both solo and multi specialty group practices. In contrast to IPAs, physicians in HMOs based on multi specialty organizations are more integrated, communicate more regularly with medical directors, and are more likely to have a joint governance structure for personnel and practice decisions (Wholey & Burns 1993).

HMOs initially developed in the 1910s and 1920s as prepaid group practices (PGPs) to provide health care services to lumber mill owners and rural farmers' cooperatives in exchange for a monthly premium. Early PGPs encountered active opposition from organized medicine, particularly the AMA. The late 1930s and 1940s saw the formation of HMOs by construction firms (e.g., Kaiser) and consumer cooperatives (Group Health Care) who sought to provide access to care for their members. HMO development at the national level began to accelerate with the passage of the HMO Act of 1973 (amended 1976) which overrode restrictive state

laws that blocked HMOs, provided some funding for start up HMOs, and allowed HMOs to require employers to offer federally qualified HMOs. The late 1980s saw rapid growth of HMOs, with growth continuing at a slower rate through the mid 1990s, and a slight contraction and industry consolidation in the late 1990s. HMO census data show 68 HMOs with 4.5 million enrollees in 1973 (Schlenker et al. 1974), 393 and 18.9 million in 1985, 582 and 53.9 million in 1995, and 424 and 70 million in 2003 (Inter Study 2004). The industry structure also changed, moving from a dominance of non profit network, group and staff HMOs to for profit IPAs.

Two factors driving the growth in HMOs were health care costs and small area variations. Escalating costs, due in part to the Medicare program, led to strong federal interest in cost containment using HMOs. Small area variations (i.e., the large variation in utilization rates between geographic regions) appeared to be due to provider practice style (Wennberg & Gittelsohn 1973). If medicine is indeed evidence based, the magnitude of these variations suggested that health care could be improved while reducing costs.

HMOs manage care by managing either enrollee or physician behavior. Enrollee behavior is managed through panel closure, benefit design, and demand management. Panel closure requires that HMO enrollees obtain services only from physicians contracting with the HMO. By channeling patients to contracted physicians, HMOs increase the dependence of the physician on the HMO, which supports the use of provider management tools. Some HMOs do offer an open ended option (typically for a higher premium and co payment) that allows enrollees to see specialists outside the HMO panel. Benefit design refers to premiums, co payments, deductibles, and covered health services (e.g., medically necessary services covered, experimental services not covered). A key point about benefit design is that the employers purchasing the HMO product, and not the HMO, typically determine what services are covered. Demand management includes activities such as consumer education to promote healthier lifestyles. In the earlier phases of their development, HMOs provided greater coverage than indemnity for well care visits, such as

physicals and immunizations, which enhance preventive care.

Physician behavior is managed in three broad ways: staffing, incentives, and health care management. Staffing refers to the decision on which providers to include on the HMOs panel. HMOs can manage costs and quality by selecting and retaining only providers who meet particular cost and quality standards. Incentives are the methods for compensating providers for providing care. Indemnity insurance pays providers on a fee for service (FFS) basis. HMOs modify this by paying a discounted FFS. Staff HMOs pay physicians on a salary basis. Capitation, perhaps the most controversial method of compensating providers, pays physicians a fixed payment per unit of time to provide a set of services (e.g., all primary care, all primary and specialty care, all primary, specialty, and hospital care) to an enrollee. Capitation shifts risk of utilization to the provider, but allows the provider to substitute nurses or physician assistants for physicians. There is inconclusive evidence whether capitation causes providers to skimp on health care provision to maximize their income.

Health care management refers to tools such as utilization review, profiling, case management, disease management, and education. Utilization review includes prospective review, such as pre-certifying hospital admissions, concurrent review, such as monitoring the progress and length of stay of patients in the hospital, and retrospective review, where patterns of health care use are monitored and profiled. Case management uses a care coordinator for patients with severe, expensive conditions. Disease management identifies patients with a particular condition, such as diabetes or congestive heart failure, and integrates services for that patient based on the evidence based guidelines. A typical goal is to reduce the use of costly services such as hospital admissions by using aggressive preventive care and patient education. Provider education is a key component of profiling and disease management.

Because HMOs seek to contain costs and improve the quality and management of care, they have the potential for adversely affecting health care delivery. A series of reviews show that HMOs and FFS do not differ significantly in quality of care and that HMOs reduce costs

by reducing use of hospitals and expensive resources (Hellinger 1998; Miller & Luft 1994, 2002) and by obtaining discounts from providers (Cutler et al. 2000). Competition among HMOs results in these savings being passed along to consumers as lower premiums (Wholey et al. 1995). However, consumer satisfaction surveys show that HMO enrollees are less satisfied than those not in HMOs with provider access and care delivery processes. Finally, although there is some research that suggests that individuals with chronic conditions may not do worse in HMOs than in other settings, the research results are heterogeneous and inconclusive.

SEE ALSO: Health Care Delivery Systems; Health and Medicine; Hospitals; Managed Care; Patient-Physician Relationship; Professional Dominance in Medicine

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health and medicine

Jeffrey Michael Clair and Jason Wasserman

Medical sociologists embrace a range of sociological concerns indigenous to the human condition – cultural, symbolic, personal, social, ecological, and biological. Medical sociology research can help us develop meaningful ways of thinking about the linkages between health and medicine, which involve a multitude of social factors. Health, medicine, and personhood dynamically interact through patient care. But despite this common insight, there is still much we do not know about the personal health and medicine relationship.

HISTORICAL RELATIONSHIP OF SOCIOLOGY TO HEALTH AND MEDICINE

The seed thoughts for a sociology applicable to health and medicine developed in Europe. The origins can be traced back to German physician Rudolf Virchow, who maintained that medicine was a social science and should be used to improve social conditions (Warbasse 1909, 1935; Walsh 1915; Rosen 1947, 1949, 1962, 1979; Ackerknecht 1953; Hyman 1967). Sixty years ago, medical historian Henry Sigerist (1946: 130) advocated the incorporation of a social science perspective into medical school curricula, arguing that “Social medicine is not so much a technique as rather an attitude and approach to the problems of medicine, one which I have no doubt will some day permeate the entire curriculum. This, however, will require a new type of clinical teacher and new textbooks.” While sociologists have remained underrepresented in this new type of clinical role, sociological insights could increasingly benefit medical practice.

While there is a growing awareness that few, if any, patient care decisions are purely medical, the coming together of social and medical perspectives remains elusive (Kleinman et al. 1978; Eisenberg & Kleinman 1981). Often there seems to be little correspondence between the flow of new social knowledge and its application, despite the fact that social insights and

data clearly can inform the medical clinician’s view of the problem. However, applicable findings tend to remain on the periphery of medical practice with much sociological evidence thought to be too abstract and uncertain to be helpful (Mechanic & Aiken 1986; Clair & Allman 1993).

Straus’s (1957) dichotomy of sociological work “in” and “of” medicine characterizes two approaches to medical sociology. Some sociologists have tended to be critical toward applied sociology “in” medicine work. Research design and data collection structured more to serve medical interests have sometimes not been regarded as true sociological work. As a result, training has focused on sociology “of” medicine and health, where, while still focused on the medical/health arena as a source of data, the overall aim remained committed to contribute to the development of sociological theory.

HEALTH CARE UTILIZATION: HOW PATIENTS APPROACH MEDICINE

Although we know much about the volume and cost of medical care utilization, we still have difficulty explaining cause and variation in health care utilization rates. It is unclear whether service use is based on need or other factors (Cockerham 2005). The relationship between patients’ health and their use of medical services is not necessarily direct, but related to class, race, and all sorts of social variables. Little is known about the decision making process of patients across various social contexts and the ways in which they define a set of health symptoms as requiring medical treatment.

Previous work includes only “users” of health care services when testing health care seeking patterns. This common approach can be seen as inherently problematic because it reduces relevant data and introduces severe sampling bias. It is a fair assumption that those studies focusing on only users of health services are really measuring *frequency of use* rather than the more generic issue of who is using and *not* using health services.

The vast majority of somaticized illnesses are managed almost exclusively outside institutionalized biomedical clinics (Kleinman et al. 1978). It is important to understand why large

segments of the population are seeking alternative forms of health services. We now know that Americans are embracing complementary and alternative medicine (CAM) more than ever before. Sixty eight percent of the adult population will use CAM at some point in their life (Eisenberg et al. 2001). Other studies consistently find that between 40 and 45 million American adults have used CAM within the previous 12 months (Astin 1998; Harris & Rees 2000). In 1997, Americans spent \$27 billion out of pocket on CAM visits, a total dollar amount greater than that spent on conventional care that year (Eisenberg et al. 1998).

This is a phenomenon not limited to the United States. About half the citizens of other industrialized countries also use CAM (Bodeker & Kronenberg 2002). CAM visits are an estimated 49 percent for the French (Fisher & Ward 1994), 48 percent of the Australian population (MacLennan et al. 1996), and the World Health Organization (2003) estimates traditional herbal cures account for 30 to 50 percent of all medicinal consumption in China. If the term alternative medicine is expanded to include traditional (i.e., indigenous) medicine (T/CAM), the figure rises to almost 80 percent in Africa (Bodeker & Kronenberg 2002). Clearly, alternative medicine appears to be a sizable current in the medical stream.

We can see, then, that the decision to go to a doctor with an illness is the result of an interactive process, taking place within the structural parameters of the distribution of available medical services. Factors other than need may be important in health care utilization. To routinely exclude non users (or T/CAM users) from health services utilization analyses is severely problematic.

Explanations of individual determinants of health care utilization are classified into the three major factors of predisposing, enabling, and need (illness) characteristics (Andersen 1968; Andersen & Newman 1973). The model assumes that predisposing, enabling, and illness need characteristics determine the use of health services. The predisposing variables represent individuals' inclinations to seek medical care. Predisposing characteristics exist prior to the incidence of an illness episode, and include subsets of demographic and social structural variables. An important assumption

of this model is that we should observe different patterns of health care utilization among individuals with different demographic and social structural characteristics.

The enabling characteristics reflect persons' access to social and institutional resources. The two levels of means are distinguished as family and community resources. When sufficient family and community resources exist, such as income and access to available medical care, then individuals needing health services are more likely to seek them out.

The illness need characteristics of health care utilization are the third component in the behavioral model. Even when one is predisposed and able to access medical care services, there must be some perceived (individually assessed) or functional (physician assessed) condition serving as an impetus for health care utilization to occur.

Health care utilization is the outcome component of the behavioral model, and can be classified on a continuum between discretionary and non discretionary use (Andersen 1968). At the discretionary end would be medical care use such as a dental visit. Although oral health care is vital to health and longevity, especially among older adults, dental services still tend to be an individual choice, even among those enabled to use them. The non discretionary end of the continuum represents hospitalization, based on decisions made by physicians. In the middle of the continuum would be physician visits, ranging from initial perceived need directed health care visits to more evaluative, physician directed follow up visits (see Andersen 1968; Andersen & Newman 1973; Wolinsky 1990).

Health and illness behaviors are ultimately influenced by how people think about their health. Individuals who place greater value on health potentially have different utilization patterns than those who attach less value. Indeed, individuals who have a greater confidence in their own ability to influence their health and those who are somewhat skeptical of the ability or trustworthiness of medical science are less likely to consult professionals.

There are over 40 million Americans with no health insurance. When we look at utilization research on this segment of the population, a variety of explanations are manifest. First, some

research found a pattern of underusage by the uninsured, prior to the enactment of Medicare/Medicaid programs. Explanation for this pattern suggests that the poor are skeptical of the motives of professional practitioners, lack awareness and knowledge about their symptoms, do not practice preventive care, and tend to delay seeking medical care until symptoms are quite serious. These patterns place the poor at greater risk and result in higher health care costs. This traditional pattern finds the poor underutilizing medical services despite greater need, and attributes underutilization to financial problems, a culture of poverty, and/or systems barriers, both bureaucratic and interpersonal (Clair & Allman 1993).

The alternative pattern of health care seeking behavior by uninsured patients finds that this population tends to utilize professional health services to a much greater extent than insured groups. Research by Cockerham (2005) and colleagues in a series of studies in Illinois, Germany, and the Netherlands shows that less educated, low income patients tend not to discriminate between symptoms on the basis of severity, are more likely to place responsibility for their health on physicians rather than themselves, and are relatively passive recipients of care. When ill, these poor tended to automatically visit physicians, while the more affluent were more likely to engage in self treatment or to recognize minor ailments as self limiting – likely to resolve without treatment. Earlier research in Illinois showed that blacks and the less educated had very positive attitudes about the health care system and believed that visiting doctors was the desirable course of action whenever any symptoms were present.

These two patterns of behavior are clearly influenced by the temporal context of the data. The traditional pattern of non use has tended to be eroded among the poorest poor, those who qualify for Medicaid. Public policy has increased health care access for these groups and research suggests that they now tend to overuse medical care. But the working poor, who do not qualify for Medicaid, but also cannot afford private insurance, may still practice avoidance, thereby underusing medical care. Regardless, a planned intervention could substantially correct for the hypothesized extremes in the care seeking behavior of the lower income

population. The most efficacious provision of health care services must be based on communicating successfully with both those patients who delay too long before seeking help and those who arrive too early.

BIOMEDICAL CAREGIVING: HOW MEDICINE APPROACHES PATIENTS

Knowledge and practice of medicine, and the experience of illness, reveal key aspects of how social systems of meaning and identity are structured. The study of biomedical caregiving is important because a person's health is intimately related to social behavior and has pervasive effects on the performance of social roles and matrices of interpersonal relationships.

Evidence on the effect of social support in alleviating life stress is conceptualized largely in terms of informal support from family and friends. However, the effects of formal social support, such as effective physician communication and guidance, also are important. Examining social support at both informal and formal levels provides insight on how the formal social support network affects the ability of the patient and his or her informal care network to deal with the stressful physiological and psychosocial circumstances of an illness. From this perspective, physicians, representing the health care system, can be seen as providing formal support counseling when caring for patients and their network of caregivers.

The life stress paradigm assumes that external stressors such as life events, role strains, and daily hassles, if unchecked, disrupt an individual's psychosocial equilibrium, induce physiological or psychological responses in the form of distress, and overall, challenge social resources. The premise is that psychosocial resources both alleviate existing distress and prevent or mitigate its occurrence. In addition to directly reducing distress, psychosocial resources play a primary role in mediating the detrimental effects of physiological and social stressors on the distress of both patients and caregivers (Lin et al. 1986; Clair et al. 1995). The concept of psychosocial resources should include not only personal coping and informal family and friendship support but also the *formal* support of professional health care providers.

Research on the mediation effect between life stressors, psychosocial resources, and distress is important. Such a focus can be expressed by the following propositions: (1) the frequency of undesirable life events and the daily pressures for individuals and caregivers are inversely related to social supports and psychological resources; (2) the extent and quality of an individual's informal and formal social supports and psychological resources are related inversely and directly to the extent of burden; and (3) the extent and quality of an individual's informal and formal social supports and psychological resources mediate the effects of undesirable life events and the daily pressures on burden.

Satisfaction with physician services, and the facilitation of services that extend beyond the medical mission of the clinic, are mutable conditions. Actions can be taken to improve physician-patient communication, and to expand a medical facility's domain so that a broader vision of illness and care can reduce burden on patients, family members, and/or primary caregivers.

CURRENT ISSUES AND FUTURE DIRECTIONS

Given a preponderance of health research based on self reported health measures, it would seem advisable for researchers to gain close up, first hand knowledge of issues related to health service utilization by varied subcultural groupings in society, in an effort to determine the extent to which actual health behavior correlates with these self reports. Such studies would then form the basis for generating research questions that are relevant and salient for the populations being studied.

As evidenced by informal health care behavior (e.g., T/CAM), those who utilize formal medical care are not necessarily sicker than those who do not. In fact, these two groups are indistinguishable when one compares the number and type of their symptoms. It would appear, then, that *symbolic* and *cultural* definitions of health are quite salient here. Those who manage their illnesses independent of traditional medicine may do so for a variety of reasons, one of which may entail negative experiences with, and reactions to, the idea of seeking traditional

medical care. Given the growing rate of both uninsured and underinsured persons, it is not hard to envision access to health care services becoming one of the major policy challenges of this century. Addressing issues of health care behavior and use as related to both access and differing symbolic and cultural meanings of health and illness is among the foremost future challenges for sociology.

How health information is being communicated to patients is another important social issue. Information must be presented in a way that takes into account patients' knowledge and values. Ignoring patients' broader social contexts may pose a barrier to adequate health care by creating misunderstandings about recommended treatment and prevention strategies. More importantly, patients may further aggravate their health by failing to adhere to such advice. A fuller understanding of uninsured patients' health values and beliefs, as well as health care seeking behaviors, could yield appropriate intervention data.

Further, we may expect to see increasing use of home health care services as the "baby boomer" generation ages. Efforts should be made to integrate the care regimen across formal and informal structures. For example, home care should be carefully coordinated with clinic and hospital care through centralizing patient records, with a formal health care provider taking responsibility for closely documenting what treatments and services are provided at both loci. Formal-informal service coordination is especially important for caregivers of functionally impaired patients. Home based formal support services may be the critical link to reducing burden, but such services should also enhance informal support services. Formal care providers may have to take responsibilities for what goes on outside the clinic by interjecting themselves into family support systems. For example, a care coordinator from the clinic could call a family meeting to institute a care sharing system among family members. This would reduce burden on the patient, family, and primary caregivers. Current drives for universal health care are based on the premise that traditional biocentric medicine must expand its domain to include health promotion and prevention to be effective. Similarly, the scope of services can be broadened to include meaningful assistance

to caregivers, because the patient's welfare and that of his or her caregivers go hand in hand.

Worldwide increases in the proportion of frail elderly raises a number of important questions regarding the motivations, satisfaction, and coping abilities of caregivers. Studying caregiver social networks and the appropriate responses to their needs is highly important and locating caregiving theoretically and empirically in a matrix of other roles and experiences adds substantially to our understanding of this critically important activity.

Caregivers are an especially important class of social actors in a society with an aging population, expanding health costs, and growing federal debt. Undoubtedly, individuals will be called on to do more caregiving, rather than less, in the near future. Under such circumstances, it is essential that we understand the caregiver distress process. To accomplish this difficult task, greater effort must be made to ground our knowledge of caregiving in more general psychosocial models of distress and to recognize the substantial impact of informal caregiving networks on patient care. Until this is accomplished, we cannot hope to design successful intervention programs for these critical health care providers. Instead we will remain puzzled as to why such programs have borne little fruit.

Proponents of alternative orientations toward the practice of medicine (and medical sociology) would like to see the emergence of new approaches and broadening conceptualizations of health and medicine, based on both traditional scientific methodology and new ways of knowing. To be sure, "any evaluation of sociology ought to focus not only on the way sociology is produced, but also on how it is consumed" (Merton & Wolfe 1995: 15). Sociology can be at the center of an integrative network of health and illness. However, by failing to make findings more accessible, sociologists enable health care providers to continue to view social factors as being outside their professional concern. Indeed, disciplinary jargons continue to be major obstacles (Freeman & Levine 1989). It will fall on sociologists to find ways of dealing with differences in our conceptual languages in order to infiltrate medicine and other physical and mental health settings, since invitations are not abundantly forthcoming.

SEE ALSO: Aging and Health Policy; Caregiving; Complementary and Alternative Medicine; Health Care Delivery Systems; Health and Culture; Health Locus of Control; Health and Race; Help Seeking; Medical Sociology; Medicine, Sociology of; Social Support; Sociology in Medicine

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health, neighborhood disadvantage

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Although health is often seen as a product of individual or micro level determinants, researchers are increasingly recognizing the role of neighborhood context in influencing a broad range of health outcomes. The concept of "neighborhood" typically refers to a geographically contained residential space the boundaries of which may be defined ecologically (e.g., major streets or railroad tracks), administratively (e.g., census tracts), socially (e.g., with respect to neighbor networks), or symbolically (e.g., shared identification with a local space). Extant research offers evidence of a link between economic disadvantage at the neighborhood level and outcomes such as mortality, morbidity, and functional status. A number of perspectives on the mechanisms linking neighborhood structural characteristics to health have emerged. These approaches emphasize social capital, subcultural orientations, stress, and access to care and other health enhancing resources.

Neighborhood social capital and health. Social capital has been defined as aspects of social structure used by actors to facilitate the achievement of goals (Coleman 1990). We focus here on the role of social network ties and collective efficacy in promoting health at the

community level. First, the increasingly vast literature on the role of informal social network supports in fostering health at the individual or egocentric network level has generated interest in the effects of community level social network characteristics on health. Structurally disadvantaged neighborhoods may be less capable of sustaining viable social networks and may suffer from deficits in local social support and sociability. Berkman (2000) suggests, for example, that networks at the community level influence egocentric connectedness and health enhancing processes such as social support, positive influence, and sociability. Evidence of the positive effects of social support on health is overwhelming and consistent, suggesting that the prevalence of social support activity and social engagement at the neighborhood level may also be relevant for health outcomes.

An additional social capital approach highlights the capacity for action on behalf of community goals as the critical intervening mechanism linking neighborhood structure with health. Robert Sampson and his colleagues (1997) have encapsulated this process in the concept of collective efficacy, which emphasizes mutual trust and solidarity (social cohesion) and shared expectations for prosocial action (informal social control). While acknowledging that local social ties may contribute to these dimensions of community social organization, the collective efficacy approach must be seen as distinct from the neighborhood social support and sociability perspective to the extent that it emphasizes the sense of attachment to community and the willingness of community residents to intervene on each other's behalf regardless of preexisting social ties.

The pathways through which neighborhood collective efficacy may influence health include the social control of health risk behavior, access to services and amenities, the management of neighborhood physical hazards, and psychosocial processes (Browning & Cagney 2003). First, Sampson et al. (1997) have demonstrated the powerful effects of collective efficacy on rates of violence, suggesting that health may be influenced by high levels of collective efficacy through limiting the health damaging consequences of violent victimization. Other forms of problem behavior including illicit substance use, alcohol abuse, child and elder neglect/

abuse, and reckless behavior may also be held in check by high levels of collective social control. Second, collective efficacy may enhance the capacity of communities to attract and maintain high quality health services and amenities such as community health clinics and safe recreational space. Third, collective efficacy may aid in correcting or avoiding the accumulation of neighborhood physical hazards such as decaying infrastructure and housing stock. Communities with the capacity to solicit and secure external resources to correct potentially risky conditions and monitor vulnerable residents (e.g., the elderly) are likely to enhance health. Finally, the effect of widespread trust and neighborhood attachment on factors such as fear and self respect may improve the health and well being of residents – even if they do not benefit from direct network support.

Subcultural transmission and health. Subcultural perspectives on health emphasize the health consequences of emergent alternative or oppositional cultural orientations primarily in economically disadvantaged communities. Fitzpatrick and LaGory (2000) suggest that disadvantaged communities with limited access to extra local mainstream institutions may experience the emergence of “health related subcultures.” Two aspects of these subcultural orientations may have consequences for health: (1) tolerance for risky lifestyles and (2) anomie or detachment from conventional values. First, socially isolated communities are more likely to experience the cultural transmission of problematic behavioral strategies. Some of these behavioral orientations may be adaptive for survival (such as display of a “tough” or violent demeanor). However, modeling of violent and other risky behavior (such as smoking, drinking, risky sexual activity, and poor diet) in these contexts may have serious consequences for health.

Second, structural disadvantage, characterized by widespread poverty, lack of access to employment, and bleak economic prospects, may lead to anomic social conditions (Durkheim 1979 [1897]) in which neighborhood residents question basic normative orientations (e.g., the value of abiding by the law and of employing conventional means such as education and hard work to achieve success). Since the benefits of adherence to basic cultural values are perceived not to accrue to residents of some disadvantaged

neighborhoods, the force of value based prescriptions weakens in these contexts. Possible adaptations to these conditions include the emergence of largely short term, instrumental orientations toward goals marked by little concern for the future. As applied to health, this hypothesis would suggest that anomie induced, short term, “here and now” orientations emphasizing satisfaction of immediate needs will tend to be associated with health compromising behaviors.

Stress based approaches. An additional perspective focuses on the neighborhood context of exposure to stress inducing conditions. Chronic high levels of exposure to stress may tax key systems within the body (e.g., the autonomic nervous system) resulting in diminished health (a condition known as “allostatic load”). Visible signs of community decay may contribute to stress through increased fear of victimization and social withdrawal. Abandoned and boarded up buildings, vacant lots, graffiti, and other physical signs of deterioration combine with indicators of social decline such as public drinking, gang activity, and crime to convey the breakdown of social order and control, particularly among the elderly. Thompson and Krause (2000), for instance, found that neighborhood deterioration, as measured by the condition of neighborhood buildings, roads, and the respondent’s perceived level of safety from crime in the neighborhood, was positively associated with distrust and social isolation and negatively associated with physical health among older adults. Indeed, some elderly urban residents may experience such intense fear of victimization that they live in a state of “self imposed house arrest” (Dowd et al. 1981). Thus, in disadvantaged contexts, the health consequences of fear induced stress may be compounded by limited social support and physical mobility.

Access to care and other health enhancing resources. Finally, in addition to the informal aspects of neighborhood influence on health, the availability and quality of institutions that provide medical care and health relevant resources are likely to vary across the community. Access to medical care depends upon who people are and where they live (Andersen et al. 2002). Research at the interface of sociology and health services has tapped these two dimensions, namely, via research on the behavioral determinants of access to care and variation in

health outcomes across small areas. Variation at the community level may exist due to obvious differences in the number of physicians, clinics, or hospitals. It may also emerge from the community’s ability to attract and maintain health enhancing resources or from factors associated with the organization and training of physicians. For instance, physicians disproportionately practice very near their initial training site, creating “clusters” of clinical norms and practice patterns (Phelps 1992). Variation may also stem from the political level, given care for uninsured persons is driven largely by state and local policy (Cunningham & Kemper 1998). Access to care is critical for health and well being, but may have benefits beyond those to the individual – good hospitals, for instance, may enrich the community apart from the delivery of quality health care.

In summary, neighborhood structural characteristics, particularly economic advantage, may contribute to both formal and informal neighborhood level mechanisms that are consequential for health. To date, the research on the relative significance of these mechanisms – including networks, collective efficacy, social and physical disorder, and access to care – has been limited. However, data collection efforts designed to investigate these mechanisms are generating new insights into the potentially powerful role of neighborhood context in promoting, and diminishing, individual level health status.

SEE ALSO: Aging and Social Support; Disease, Social Causation; Health and Culture; Health and Social Class; Hospitals; Social Capital and Health; Social Support; Stress and Health

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health professions and occupations

Elianne Riska

A profession is a prestigious white collar occupation that is based on theoretical and practical knowledge and training in a particular field, such as medicine. The specialized knowledge and the restricted practice is regulated by a central body of the profession to ensure the quality and the ethical conduct of its members. These characteristics separate the profession from an occupation which is a specific type of work done in the market. For example, caring is work done both outside and inside the labor market. In the latter case it is a collective activity organized as various health occupations. Sociologists differ in their views concerning the power of the professions, the character of health occupations, and on the division of labor in medicine.

The theoretical heritage of the sociology of health professions and occupations derives

from a normative approach. Émile Durkheim saw professions as moral occupational communities in the new moral order and division of labor of the urban and industrial society. Based on this notion, Talcott Parsons (1951) defined professions in relation to a specific normative value system: the pattern variables. He viewed professions as occupational groups that had a special autonomy from the emerging bureaucracies of the modern society as depicted by Max Weber.

Special autonomy, knowledge and a service ideal towards clients were the three characteristics which defined the professions, not only as distinct from occupations, but also from the power of bureaucracies. Early research mapped the traits of occupational groups in order to identify to what extent they fitted the criteria of being a profession. This traits approach was considered too static, and a process and a power approach emerged in the 1970s.

Five major theoretical perspectives can be identified in the sociological debate about the character of health professions: the functionalist, the symbolic interactionist, the neo Marxist, the neo Weberian, and the social constructionist and poststructuralist perspectives. According to the functionalist perspective on professions, the physician's tasks are institutionalized as a social role, the function of which is the regulation of the kind of deviance interpreted as based on illness. The institutionalized roles of the physician and the sick person – the so called sick role – contain certain expectations as well as obligations concerning the behavior related to the role. The role of the physician is acquired through a period of professional socialization where both the technical knowledge and the norms guiding professional behavior are taught. The views about the character of this socialization process were covered in a classic text, *The Student Physician* (Merton et al. 1957), which was based on a normative perspective.

The symbolic interactionist perspective on medical work has its earliest representative in a study on the professional socialization of medical students by a group of sociologists at the University of Chicago (Becker et al. 1961) and in Everett Hughes's (1958) collection of essays. For Hughes, the focus of a study of any kind of occupation is the "social drama of work." In his view, most occupations bring

together people in definable roles and it is in their interaction that the content of work and occupational status are defined. An occupation is not *a priori* by means of its expertise and knowledge a profession, but a social status that is socially constructed and negotiated.

Everett Hughes's disciple Erving Goffman focused on the interaction between health professions and patients in a mental hospital and on the power and control function of the medical profession and the routine work of health care personnel. Like Hughes, Goffman (1961) perceived professions not as intrinsically distinct from occupations, but rather as a particular type of personal service occupation based on expertise. Goffman emphasizes the social role of health professions as the basis of their power and he adheres to a Durkheimian approach to deviance. Goffman's complex and often conflicting views on social roles and structure have been pointed out in recent reviews.

A third representative working within the interactionist approach is Eliot Freidson, whose monopolization thesis set the field of sociology of professions on a new path. In contrast to the consensus perspective of the dominant functionalist approach to the study of the medical profession, Freidson (1970) reviewed the pattern variables and their validity for understanding the power of physicians in the division of labor in medicine. Rather than normative consensus, Freidson suggested that, like Hughes's (1958) thesis on the license and mandate of the medical profession, a monopoly of medical knowledge underlay the power of physicians as a profession. A decade later, Freidson (1984) witnessed a change in the character of the American medical profession, but argued that the profession had accommodated to the ongoing corporatization and rationalization of medicine by means of a new internal division of labor. This is Freidson's "restratification" thesis, which states that the medical profession is divided into three groups – the academic elite, administrators, and practicing physicians – in order to maintain its order in the hierarchy of medical work. In more recent work, Freidson (2001) has returned to the issue of professionalism as a special form of occupational control and the character of the market, professions, and bureaucratic and organizational control of work.

Both Parsons's and Freidson's work were focused on the medical profession and had little to say about other health occupations and the larger division of labor in medicine. Other theoretical perspectives not only challenged the narrow focus on the medical profession, but also pointed to the need to look at the broader division of labor within medicine and its basis in the class and gender structure of the larger society.

The neo Marxist perspective relates the power of the profession to the larger underlying economic and political organization of society. According to the neo Marxist perspective on health professions and occupations, the capitalist society determines the superstructure, of which the social organization of health care, the professions, and medicine as a science are but parts (Navarro 1975). The argument here is that the same hierarchy is found in the health sector as in the rest of the capitalist economy.

All the perspectives above perceive the medical profession as united and powerful. The prophecy of a gradual loss of power of the medical profession is attributed to two other sociologists, Marie Haug and John McKinlay, who advanced the deprofessionalization and proletarianization thesis, respectively (see Freidson 1984). For Haug, the knowledge monopoly of the medical profession is challenged both by various female health professionals and clients who have increasing access to medical knowledge through the information industry. Haug's prophecy was that the prerogatives of the medical profession will wither away because professions are rapidly losing their control over their knowledge domain. McKinlay and his colleagues adopted a neo Marxist perspective: medicine is viewed as being taken over by capital intensive and large corporations, a development that will result in physicians working increasingly as salaried employees of such organizations. The "proletarianization" of physicians denotes a process that will gradually result in the loss of the traditional power of the profession. The assumption is that all physicians will lose professional power and autonomy, since the corporatization of medicine is perceived as an ongoing universal process.

According to the neo Weberian perspective, professions are occupational groups that operate in the marketplace and have been successful in demarcating the domain of their work as their

exclusionary right (Larson 1977). The neo Weberian approach to the professions emerged as a reaction to the functionalist and traits perspectives. In focus are the characteristics of medical work and the actions of the occupational group striving for a professional status and defending it through the strategy of closure. Witz (1992) has added a feminist perspective in her analysis of the power of the medical profession, nurses, and midwives in the UK and suggests that professions have always been gendered projects (i.e., the agents are either men or women).

The most recent theoretical perspective that combines the Freidsonian and the neo Weberian views on the power of professions is Andrew Abbott's (1988) systems approach to professions. Here the term "professional jurisdiction" serves as the analytical tool to explain the power of both occupations and professions in the division of labor in knowledge based work in the service sector.

The Foucauldian theory of the power of medicine (Foucault 1975) attracted in the 1990s those who wanted to understand changes taking place in the governance of health care. The conflict perspective on the medical profession presents the profession as a group exerting social control. While the social constructionist tradition viewed the medical profession as a self interested group and patients as passive, the poststructuralist position in the structure agency debate is more complex. The medicalization thesis suggests that the medical profession has crucial power in turning social phenomena into medical problems. The crude version harbors a victimization view of the patient, while the Foucauldian perspective contends that the medical discourse of the medical profession is merely one of many alternative discourses on health and medicine.

In more recent work on health professions, Foucault's notion of governmentality underlies the special role that scientific knowledge and professions have in regulating behavior. For example, a disciplinary regime of self management serves as a "technology of the self" and represents a new kind of professionalism. Self management is an internal normative mechanism whereby not only traditional professions but also new service occupations control their members.

The major theoretical perspectives on health professions have mainly focused on the medical profession. Two aspects have thereby been neglected. First, there is still little research on other health professions, such as nurses and midwives. The rise and struggle of these health professions to achieve professional status and a jurisdiction of their own have been the focus of recent studies (e.g., Witz 1992; De Vries et al. 2001). The theoretical frameworks used in these studies have been neo Weberian or Abbott's systems approach. Second, early works on health professions viewed professions as either gender neutral issues or male dominated groups. In recent research, the gender perspective has been emphasized as a way to reach a broader understanding of the character of nursing and the status of women physicians within the medical profession.

The methodological approaches in the sociology of professions have varied, but can be classified as largely qualitative methods. Aside from statistics on the number of members and their distribution within specialties and sectors in the labor market, mapping of the historical trends and the professionalization process have been based on documents (e.g., organizational records, professional journals, legislation) and interviews with informants recruited from the profession. Recent studies on the job satisfaction or workload of physicians and nurses have used survey research, although a large part of this research has been done within the disciplines of health psychology or public health rather than sociology.

SEE ALSO: Functionalism/Neofunctionalism; Hospitals; Medical Sociology; Merton, Robert K.; Occupations; Parsons, Talcott; Professional Dominance in Medicine; Professions; Professions, Organized; Work, Sociology of

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health and race

Leigh A. Willis

Race interacts with health just as it does with other life determining, sociodemographic factors like class, gender, and age. Race is best understood as a shared set of cultural and social experiences common to people of the same skin color. Research has shown that the notion of distinct biological races is misleading because often more genetic variation exists within a defined "race" than between them. Therefore, we all belong to the human race and thus race is a social construction rather than a "true" biological distinction. Even though race is socially constructed (American Sociological Association 2002), the manner in which it influences social relationships suggests that race is a valid construct with "real" repercussions.

Race, for example, is often associated with health, which the World Health Organization defines as a state of physical, mental, and social well being. The relationship is important. By knowing an individual's race, that person's health lifestyle and illness behavior can frequently be predicted. Race and health interact on several levels, as seen in the health effects of racism and discrimination, class differences in health status, access to health care, doctor-patient interaction, health culture, representation in medical professions, and the racial health disparities in the United States and abroad.

There are substantial differences in health status among people of color in America and worldwide. For example, the rate of Hepatitis B is higher among Asians. Hispanics have a higher incidence of certain cancers, such as cancer of the cervix and stomach. Native Americans have high rates of alcoholism and diabetes. African Americans have an average life expectancy that is 7 years less than that of whites. So clearly there are differences in the health status of whites and non whites.

One of the ways race influences health today is through racism and discrimination. All types of racism and discrimination contribute to this problem overtly, institutionally, and covertly. There are many overt ways in which racism affects health, such as through environmental racism, which is racial discrimination in environmental policy making, enforcement of laws, and regulations (Chavis 1993). This causes a disproportionately large number of health and environmental risks for people of color in the communities in which they live. These risks come in the form of housing placed near waste dumps, living in housing with lead based paint, exposure to pesticides, and neighborhoods located in areas with contaminated land, air, and water. Environmental racism has existed for generations like other forms of racism, and is maintained by redlining, zoning, and political decision making. Increased environmental exposure to pollutants in communities of color considerably elevates the risk of its inhabitants for a variety of diseases. Covert discrimination and racism in the medical system also influences health. Even when people of color have equal access and provision for health care services, they are less likely to be treated as aggressively as whites with procedures like chemotherapy

and surgery (Jones 2000). Such treatment decisions ultimately exacerbate the health status of people of color by causing excess and premature mortality.

In order to understand the effects of racism and discrimination on health and how they influence health today, we must take into account its historical antecedents, using the concept of total discrimination. Historically, the institution of medicine was used as a basis of legitimization and justification for the oppression and disenfranchisement that non white "races" have experienced. For instance, medicine was used to justify the enslavement and subjugation of many people of color. Non whites were viewed as subhuman animals, less intelligent, and biologically inferior to whites. More specifically, medical knowledge like virology has been applied to instances of genocide of native peoples. Native Americans receiving smallpox infected blankets from Europeans is an example of these practices. In the same way, enslaved African Americans were used as human guinea pigs for medical procedures and treatments like abortion, hysterectomies, and amputation. Similarly, governments have sanctioned medical experiments on its minority citizens such as the Tuskegee Experiment (African Americans) and the South Dakota Hepatitis A Vaccine Study (Native Americans). Both of these experiments ended relatively recently, in the 1970s and 1991, respectively.

The policies of the past have translated into a pervasive distrust of the medical establishment. This distrust has influenced three outcomes: (1) an underutilization of formal medicine, (2) the utilization of formal medicine in concert with traditional cultural specific alternative means of healing, or (3) lack of participation in clinical trials. Every racial and ethnic group has its own culture specific version of folk and faith healers; among Latinos, it is the *Cuaranderos*/*Cuarandersma*; for African Americans, its root workers; for Asians, its acupuncturists and herbalists; for Native Americans, bonesetters. These healers use rudimentary health practices combined with aspects of religion and mysticism. Folk and faith healers are more effective in improving the patient's mental and spiritual sense of well being than in improving physical health. Still, their contribution is not to be taken lightly given that mental well being is

directly related to immune response. Further more, these healers offer a holistic (treating the body and mind as integrated units) approach to healing that most formal healers lack.

In the same way, the use of faith and folk healers is also due in part to the under representation of people of color in health professions. The paucity of people of color among health care professions is partly due to non whites formerly being prohibited and later discouraged from entering the health professions. This is important because when patients and professionals are of different backgrounds (races) there is a greater potential for racial stereotypes, prejudice, and lack of cultural sensitivity, as well as language barriers affecting the quality of medical encounters. Therefore, some people may decide if they cannot visit a health care professional with a similar racial background, they may avoid contact with formal medicine all together. Simply, many people of color feel more comfortable with health care providers and researchers of similar backgrounds who have an understanding or appreciation of their culture.

The unwitting participation of minorities in medical experiments in which people died or were disabled severely hinders efforts to recruit and enroll people of color in present day clinical trials. Participation in clinical trials is critical to the development of cures, because clinical trials help determine if drugs are effective. Also, by participating in clinical trials participants receive new information about their disease. The under representation in clinical trials also limits the potential for drugs to be designed specifically for people of color.

Access to care is another important factor that must be considered in looking at race and health. People of color are disproportionately poor, unemployed, or employed in jobs that do not provide health insurance. Therefore, they are more likely to be without or have limited access to health care. The costs of office visits, medicines, and therapy are an onerous burden for impoverished people. Also, the location of health care facilities influences access to care when there is closure of hospitals that formerly served non white communities. Typically, non white neighborhoods often do not have adequate medical facilities located within a suitable distance and thus make health care inconvenient

for many. Also, many people of color obtain their health care through the public system of health care rather than the private system. The public system may feature long waiting periods, lack of adequate staff, and limited resources. Thus, it may not be able to provide the necessary treatment options that can impact the quality of care people of color receive. Due to the distrust of medicine, being on the receiving end of poor doctor–patient interaction, and the high cost associated with seeing a health professional, many people of color probably do not seek preventive care, such as routine physicals and screenings. Consequently, they may delay seeing a professional until their disease is in a critical or life threatening stage.

Racism also affects health on a more personal level. A term for experiencing racism is “personally mediated racism.” Personally mediated racism is defined as “prejudice and discrimination, where prejudice means differential assumptions about the abilities, motives, and intentions of others according to their race” (Jones 2000: 1214). Personally mediated racism manifests itself in day to day interactions through devaluation, suspicion, and dehumanization of people of color. Despite a greater utilization of a social support network, racism is a powerful stressor which takes a psychological and physiological toll over time. Psychologically, racism may lead to feelings of helplessness, anxiety, frustration, and nihilism (Clark et al. 1999). Physiologically, stressors like racism negatively impact cardiovascular, immune, and endocrine systems, thus leaving people of color particularly susceptible to a variety of ailments.

Besides racism, racial differences in health also result from patterns of health care utilization, genetics, and health culture. First, differences in health among races may be due to a greater reluctance of non whites to use formal medicine for the reasons specified earlier. Genetics apparently plays some role, in that certain racial groups are predisposed to certain conditions, such as sickle cell anemia among African Americans and significantly higher rates of diabetes among Native Americans.

Health culture among different “races” may also explain differences. As mentioned earlier, people of color are more likely to utilize folk and faith healers from their own culture in concert with traditional medicine. Also, they

are more likely to use a lay referral network, which is the process by which an individual consults lay people such as friends and family members to guide them in interpreting symptoms, deciding whether care is needed, and the type of care they should seek. This process may delay the seeking of professional help. In the same way, different racial groups have innate cultural means of promoting health. Some of these are the stress buffering properties of the extended family network (social support); diet (nutrition); alternative healing practices (e.g., acupuncture); and subcultural emphasis on physical and mental health (e.g., yoga). In contrast, there are aspects of culture that are detrimental to health, such as lack of oral hygiene, internalization of stressors, and lack of disclosure of health status of family, friends, and sometimes the patients themselves.

Recently, racial health disparities between races have begun to receive greater attention in the US and worldwide. In the US efforts are being made to better understand the causes of health disparities. Some areas being examined are access to care and the effects of racism, genetics, diet, and health culture. Internationally, the WHO has been examining many of these issues, such as diseases that disproportionately affect people of color, such as HIV, TB, cholera, substance abuse, and a host of chronic diseases like cardiovascular disease, cancer, and mental illness.

There are methodological issues to be considered when examining the relationship between race and health. First, since race is a social construct, it is not measured consistently across societies. For example, racial categories in health data in America are not standardized. Second, in some situations, “race is not an attribute, but a dynamic characteristic dependent on other social circumstances” (Zuberi 2000: 172). So race is a construct that is defined differently and varies by country. For instance, in Brazil “races” are organized not only by skin color, but by hair type and language. Third, there is the problem of categorizing races. For instance, in some parts of the US, health data are only divided into white and non white categories. This practice is problematic because researchers are unable to uncover key differences and report on the health of Hispanics, Asians, Native Americans, and African Americans. A standardization

of racial categories across the world is needed, though creating a racial taxonomy would be difficult and perhaps cause misunderstanding.

As citizens of the world immigrate and migrate we will see greater diversity in societies as non white populations increase. Thus, all developing and developed nations will have to grapple sooner or later with the issues raised here.

SEE ALSO: Ethnicity; Health and Culture; Health Lifestyles; Health Locus of Control; Health and Medicine; Health, Neighborhood Disadvantage; Health and Social Class; Mortality: Transitions and Measures; Race (Racism); Race/Ethnicity, Health, and Mortality; Stress and Health

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health and religion

Jeffrey Michael Clair

Concepts of health and illness in human society originated from traditional religious views about life and death. One of the first sociologists to study religion was Émile Durkheim, who found that distinctions between ideas

about the sacred and profane were connected to notions of health and illness. Religious views of the sacred body, for example, were equated with health. When someone became ill, it was not because of hygiene, but because of a breach of social norms separating the sacred from the profane. Within this type of belief system, notions of sickness and misfortune generated attempts to justify and explain morally why a particular person was suffering from disease: "Why me?" (Turner 2004).

Fundamental notions of religion and health are apparent in modern everyday life, but as scientific concepts of disease develop, traditional notions of the religious character of illness and disease continue to be challenged. Over time, the social status of biomedicine has increased and the status of traditional healers diminished. During this transformation, we see the introduction of the mind/body dualism. This dualistic focus is responsible for the emergence of mental as well as physical health concerns (Turner 2004).

Contemporary studies show that religion is positively associated with physical and mental health, as well as longevity and mortality (Hummer et al. 1999; Sherkat & Ellison 1999). Religious involvement, measured by attendance at services and feelings of religiosity, is positively associated with physical health, general happiness, and satisfaction, as well as being inversely related to undesirable social psychological states, such as depression. Ellison and Sherkat (1995: 1256) suggest that religious involvement promotes physical and mental health in four ways: (1) shaping health behaviors and lifestyles in ways that reduce unhealthy and risky behavior; (2) by contributing to the individual's social psychological resource support network; (3) by enhancing self-esteem; and (4) by helping produce cognitive coping mechanisms.

Religious institutions and beliefs have long been recognized as control agents that can regulate individual behavior. We see this influence when we talk of religious groups promoting the body as a temple and discouraging negative practices like smoking, alcohol and drug use, and unhealthy diets (Cockerham 2004). Being involved in religious communities also tends to reduce deviant behavior, making an individual accountable for his or her health lifestyles. Some religious values encourage strong marital

relationships, discouraging sexual experimentation. And religious beliefs often promote intergenerational relationships that promote shared meanings about life events and biographical histories (Ellison & Sherkat 1995).

Being involved in religious groups can also be seen as helping integrate individuals into caring social circles (Idler 1995) and therefore add to a person's psychosocial resources that mediate and/or moderate the health consequences associated with social stressors. Here, religious involvement can be seen as not only increasing the size of a person's support network, but also providing regular opportunities to cultivate support (Sherkat & Ellison 1999). Many congregations also provide formal programs for those in need, which enhances opportunities to receive needed information and social support. One result of such opportunities is that they increase an individual's confidence that friends and associates can be counted on to help in time of illness or injury. In general, being involved in such a community can promote aspects of self esteem and efficacy (Ellison & Sherkat 1995). Religion provides not only support, but also structure, stability, and intimacy in dealing with health concerns.

Religious understandings have become "common and effective coping strategies for many individuals dealing with an array of chronic and acute stressors, particularly bereavement and health problems, including physical disability" (Sherkat & Ellison 1999: 374). This is in contrast to the "muscular Christianity" that links good health with the vitality of a nation (Cockerham 2004). Those with disabilities can find religious participation helps them to refocus on aspects of the self "to which a painful, or nonfunctioning, or unattractive physical body is irrelevant" (Idler 1995: 700). Such a refocus allows the individual to find a healthy inner self and emphasize positive emotions such as contentment, love, hope, and optimism as they develop, integrate, and perpetuate their faith into everyday life. In this regard, even private religious activities (e.g., prayer, Bible reading and study) can produce an effect on health by providing meaning, which in turn reduces helplessness and increases optimism (Musick 1996). If religion is viewed as a source of comfort, the increase in individual hope provides a sense of control in a disadvantaged

world, whether that disadvantage is physical health, social, or economic (Ellison et al. 2001).

Many people from a broad spectrum of religious backgrounds hold health and well being as central spiritual concerns. Although there is evidence that spiritual, social psychological, and physical aspects of health are fundamentally interconnected, more research is needed. Post modern developments will continue to challenge the synthesis of health and spirituality. Not only has human action become functionally separated into specialized institutions, but also biomedicine has displayed a predisposition toward differentiation from other institutional spheres, such as religion and the family. And while the general population does not generally disregard the power of medicine's explanations of disease causation, many consider medical explanations to be insufficient, and find themselves embracing complementary and alternative medicine and spiritual healing movements (McGuire 1993).

Future research will need to emphasize religious factors. We know that there is at least some evidence of the physical and mental health benefits of religion among men and women, different age groups, various racial and ethnic groups, and different socioeconomic classes, as well as geographical locations (Ellison et al. 2001). However, there often exist crude measures of religious identification, involvement, and participation. Not only do we find too many single item indicators, but also mostly cross sectional data. For instance, difficult measurement issues include being able to decipher when religious value is collectively produced versus it being a private good with intrinsic value (Ellison et al. 2001). Other suggestions for future work include an analysis of "insider documents" (Ellison & Sherkat 1995: 1265) in order to determine how institutions produce, distribute, and prepare material for religious communities. Because of its multidimensionality, religious involvement displays multiple causal pathways for its effects on physical and mental health. Attention to multidimensional measurement and a commitment to longitudinal data collection are needed. Epidemiological studies of large populations with extensive baseline health assessments and longitudinal follow ups with measures of religious involvement are also required.

SEE ALSO: Health Behavior; Health and Culture; Health Lifestyles; Health Locus of Control; Religion; Social Support

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health risk behavior

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Health risk behavior involves actions and related attitudes and perceptions that contribute to people's propensity to engage in, or

avoid, activities that have been deemed by experts to be hazardous or dangerous to their health. Considerable research in public health and medicine has been devoted to identifying health risks and the behaviors associated with these risks in the attempt to assist people to avoid them.

The juxtaposition of the words "risk" and "behavior" often implies a psychological approach to understanding the processes by which people think about and react to risk. Cognitive science is a major approach within psychology that focuses on risk behaviors, including those related to states of health. From this perspective, people's behaviors are considered very much on an individual level. Research questions revolve around how people process information about risk and what they then do with this information. The "objective facts" of risk, as identified by scientists, medical researchers, and other experts, are considered the standard by which lay understandings are compared, and often found wanting. An individual's propensity to make inaccurate judgments about health risks is seen as based, for the most part, on ignorance, deficiency in self efficacy, or biases.

One example of this perspective is the influential health belief model. People are seen as undergoing a series of cognitive steps when processing the possible threat posed by a health risk, presenting a linear relationship between knowledge, attitudes, and eventual practice. According to this model, risk taking is an irrational and deviant act. Little attention is paid to the symbolic and emotional meanings that are associated with risk perception and risk taking. People are represented as atomized and autonomous, largely removed from the influences of society and culture.

Sociological researchers often take a rather different perspective on health risk behaviors and beliefs. They are interested in exploring the ways in which people recognize phenomena as "health risks," how people identify the relationship between risk and behavior, which kind of risks they consider most threatening, who they see as posing the risks (e.g., are the risks viewed as imposed by outsiders or are they regarded as a product of personal lifestyle choices?), how social and cultural factors such as age, gender, ethnicity, and socioeconomic

status influence health beliefs and behaviors, and what kinds of broader social and cultural meanings and beliefs are associated with health risk beliefs and understandings.

Various theoretical and methodological approaches have been taken by sociologists when researching health risk behavior and beliefs. Sociologists drawing on a critical approach based on Marxist or feminist writings focus their attention on the ways in which health risks are closely associated with social disadvantage and inequality. Rather than draw attention to an individual's personal responsibility for risks, therefore, such researchers emphasize that a person's social location is a major influence on their exposure to health risks and the opportunities they have to avoid them. People in disadvantaged areas both live in environments which are more conducive to health risk exposure, such as a subculture that supports cigarette smoking and a physical environment that is more polluted, and have less access to sources of knowledge and assistance in avoiding health risks than do those from more privileged backgrounds.

One influential sociologist, Ulrich Beck (1992), has written extensively on what he sees as the move to "risk society" in contemporary western societies. Risk society is characterized by a sensibility which is highly aware of, and concerned about, risks, including health risks. Beck is interested in the reasons why certain phenomena are singled out as "risks" and the political uses this serves. Many health risks, he argues, are seen as the result of human action, of modernizing processes that have gone too far: examples include pollution, chemical contamination of food, and epidemics of bacterial infections caused by the inappropriate use of antibiotics. Anthony Giddens's (1991) sociological writings on risk also emphasize these political aspects of risk. He particularly draws attention to lay people's growing loss of trust in experts, and the subsequent confusion they experience in knowing how best to deal with risks.

Researchers working from a social constructionist perspective are interested in the discourses, or organized ways of representing phenomena in language and practice, that surround health risks and give meaning to them. This perspective challenges the "objective facts" of risk themselves. Expert risk knowledge

is viewed as equally subject to the influence of social and cultural processes as lay knowledge. Taking this perspective is not necessarily to challenge the accuracy of expert knowledge, but rather to emphasize that it is constructed in a social and cultural environment that shapes the knowledge in various ways. What phenomena are identified as "health risks," and therefore as hazardous and important for people to avoid, is partly a function of particular social and cultural environments and associated "ways of seeing," for both lay people and experts. Thus, for example, it may be argued that the current emphasis on the risks associated with overweight and obesity in western countries is influenced by a growing anxiety in the last decades of the twentieth century and into the first years of the twenty first century about the shape and size of the body, not only in relation to health but also to physical attractiveness.

Sociologists are also interested in the ways that discourses about health risks serve to encourage people to view themselves and their bodies in certain ways. Thus, for example, the dominant popular and medical discourses surrounding health risks and cigarette smoking represent the smoker's body as vulnerable and open to serious illness, cigarette smoke itself as a contaminating substance, and smokers as ignorant or weak willed, not interested enough in their health to give up the practice. Discourses are mutable, subject to change over time. Compare the positive discourses around cigarette smoking that were evident in the mid twentieth century, which emphasized the glamor and health giving effects of cigarettes, with those described above.

For sociologists, therefore, health risk behavior is not simply an individual's autonomous response to expert advice. Health risk behavior and the beliefs that accompany it are complex products of socialization and acculturation into certain expectations, assumptions, and norms. Behavior and beliefs are intimately associated with people's place in society, and are both political and surrounded by cultural meaning.

SEE ALSO: Health Behavior; Health and Culture; Health Lifestyles; Health Locus of Control; Health, Neighborhood Disadvantage; Health and Social Class; Risk, Risk Society, Risk Behavior, and Social Problems; Smoking

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health, self-rated

M. Christine Sneed

Self-rated health, or self-reported health (SRH), is a measure of a respondent's subjective sense of health. The SRH is commonly used to capture a general sense of health from the perspective of the respondent, which is assessed by one simple global question about their overall health. There are many phrasings of this question, including "In general, would you say your health is . . .," "How would you rate your overall health . . .," and "How is your health, compared with others your age?" Response items for these questions are Likert-type scales with responses typically scored from 1–5 (excellent, good, fair, poor, very bad) or 1–3 (better, same, worse). Methodologically, the SRH has been found to be both a reliable and valid measure of a respondent's health status (Krause & Jay 1994; Lundberg & Manderbacka 1996; Miilunpalo et al. 1997).

The SRH question is purposely and ambiguously constructed to not specify what is meant by health. While most people tend to think of "health" as physical health, some respondents may use a frame of reference that includes emotional or mental well-being. Some researchers place the SRH question at the beginning of a questionnaire so that respondents will not be influenced by later questions. Other investigators, who favor a broad definition of health, deliberately place the SRH at the end of their questionnaire so that responses can be informed by earlier questions. The thinking behind the later placement of the SRH is that if earlier questionnaire items were related to physical, emotional, or social well-being, the respondent would utilize this perspective.

The SRH has for decades been used in numerous studies from around the world from many different disciplines. The popularity and wide use of the SRH are based on it being one of the most powerful predictors of health, clinical outcomes, morbidity, and mortality (Idler & Yael 1997; Fayers & Sprangers 2002; Goldman et al. 2004). Most people have an accurate idea of what their health status is and the SRH provides this measure. Therefore, the SRH question is commonly employed in health surveys. It is a common measure, for example, in large scale studies like the Canadian National Population Health Survey, the Danish National Cohort Study (DANCOS), and the US Bureau of the Census's National Health Interview Survey. It has been employed successfully in smaller studies as well (Cockerham et al. 2002; Williams & Umberson 2004).

While the SRH is a powerful and useful measurement, it is not without limitations. It is a "subjective" measure and because of this "subjectivity" there will be differences in interpretations by respondents. The extent and ramifications of differing interpretations of what is meant by health and how respondents answer the SRH are not fully understood. Different social groups may interpret health in different ways. Researchers are currently investigating such issues and there appears to be a growing body of related literature. Gender differences, for example, have been noted in several studies examining SRH as a predictor of mortality. Women tend to rate their health poorer than men, even though they have longer life expectancies (Idler 2003).

Researchers have also noted relationships between other socio-demographic characteristics, SRH, and outcomes like mortality trends (Franks et al. 2003), including educational differences (Martinez Sanchez & Regidor 2002) and socio-economic or income differences. Class differences in particular seem to have strong associations with SRH, but this finding has not been consistent in cross-national comparisons (Knesebeck et al. 2003). A variety of explanations have been used to describe such discrepancies, but there is no consensus as to why these discrepancies occur. There is, however, consensus that health is a multidimensional phenomenon that can be measured in a variety of ways, and that the SRH is a popular and widely used measure.

SEE ALSO: Aging, Mental Health, and Well Being; Health Behavior; Health Lifestyles; Health Locus of Control; Health Risk Behavior; Sociometry

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health and social class

Eero Lahelma

The Black Report on Inequalities in Health (Townsend & Davidson 1982) refers to social class as "segments of populations sharing broadly similar types and levels of resources, with broadly similar styles of living and (for some sociologists) some shared perception of their collective condition." Two main sociological traditions of social class attach people to social structures, emphasizing either their relationships to production, ownership, and material resources (Marx) or their relationships to markets, status, power, and lifestyle (Weber). While in the Marxist tradition class positions between the bourgeoisie and the proletariat tend to be opposite, in the Weberian tradition social classes rather follow a hierarchical stratification. However, these sociological traditions of social class share the idea of unequal distribution of resources and assets in society. Both traditions have influenced the basic medical sociological assumptions that social divisions shape morbidity and mortality, and that poor health is likely to emerge from poor living conditions (Blaxter 1997).

Sociological studies often measure classes by occupations, but education, income, and wealth equally play a part in determining people's social class, or in broader terms, socioeconomic status. Thus, the topic of social class and health encompasses hierarchical inequalities in morbidity and mortality between upper and lower socioeconomic statuses as indicated by occupations and other socioeconomic indicators.

When examining social class differences in morbidity and mortality, it has become habitual to speak about "health inequalities" (Townsend & Davidson 1982). The term inequalities indicates not only neutral health differences between segments of people, but also suggests that most social class inequalities in health are artificial, undesirable, and (in principle) avoidable. Thus, a moral and political dimension of social class and health emerges, suggesting that a large part of health inequalities in modern societies can be regarded as unjust.

INTELLECTUAL AND SOCIAL CONTEXT

The examination of health inequalities dates back to the work of British scholars from the mid seventeenth century, including John Graunt and William Petty, and later Edwin Chadwick and the German scholar Rudolf Virchow (Whitehead 1997). Within this tradition, hygienic as well as social and economic determinants of mortality and morbidity were emphasized. It is by now well known that social class inequalities in health are a universal issue, cutting across all western countries and probably equally developing countries. Health inequalities constitute a major scientific challenge for the sociological study of morbidity and mortality as well as a political challenge for public health.

The Black Report on Inequalities in Health, published in 1982, signaled a new wave of interest in social class inequalities in morbidity and mortality. In this report health inequalities were “re found,” since it had been believed that, with social and economic development, “in modern western countries the relationship between social class and the prevalence of illness is certainly decreasing and most probably no longer exists” (Kadushin 1964). Since the publication of the Black Report a large number of studies worldwide have reported on persistent health inequalities.

It is recognized within medical sociology that social class inequalities in health provide keys for understanding major social causes for morbidity and mortality. In addition, the study of health inequalities provides evidence for general sociology on the significance of class and other social structural divisions for people’s life chances and their well being. This is challenging evidence, since some sociologists have predicted the “death of class,” implying that class divisions would give way to new divisions in society, such as those based on consumption and identity (Lee & Turner 1996). Nevertheless, the study of health inequalities shows that social class divisions continue to shape morbidity and mortality among populations.

Large hierarchical differences in morbidity and mortality between social classes persist in all countries from which evidence is available. This means that the public health challenge posed by health inequalities equally persists.

However, only slowly and in few countries have inequalities in morbidity and mortality been included in the agenda of health and welfare policies (Mackenbach & Bakker 2002). Political and moral reasons for tackling health inequalities have been raised, but successful reduction of health inequalities would not only contribute to equality and justice in society, but also to the overall level of health and life expectancy. For example, in Finland in the early 2000s the difference in life expectancy between upper non manual employees and manual workers is 7 years for men and 3.5 years for women (Valkonen et al. 2000). There are very few equally large health divides as those for social class, and lengthening the life in lower classes provides a large potential to improve the overall public health in society.

MAJOR DIMENSIONS

Social class inequalities in morbidity and mortality exist for occupational class as well as other key socioeconomic indicators, such as educational attainment, individual and household income, and wealth (Lahelma et al. 2004). These inequalities typically follow a hierarchical pattern, called the health inequalities invariance: the lower the social class, the poorer the health. Although occupational class is a key socioeconomic indicator, each socioeconomic indicator reflects partly general and partly particular aspects of the comprehensive concept of social class. Accordingly, there is no a priori paramount social class indicator, and judging from the existing body of research we are unable to say whether social class inequalities in health by one indicator are universally larger than by another. In fact, people’s social class is crystallized over the life course: education being achieved first, that contributing to occupational class, and these two together contributing to income. Thus, multiple socioeconomic circumstances jointly shape the overall social class inequalities in health that people will experience.

Inequalities are also found for a broad range of health indicators, and the patterns and magnitude of inequalities may depend on the health indicator employed. Social class inequalities exist for all main causes of death, but deviations

are found, for example, for female and male cancers of the reproductive organs. For violent causes of death, inequalities among men tend to be particularly large (Valkonen et al. 2000). Social class inequalities equally exist for most domains of ill health, including subjective health and functional as well as medically confirmed conditions. For example, large and consistent inequalities are found for self-rated health and physical functioning as well as many diseases. Only inequalities in mental health tend to be mixed and even reversed (i.e., mental health being somewhat poorer among upper social classes than lower classes).

A number of factors, such as age, gender, and ethnicity, are likely to modify social class inequalities in health. Inequalities in morbidity and mortality persist over the adult life and relative inequalities tend to be largest among middle aged people. However, for morbidity, there is a period of relative equalization in youth. Whether this is an artifact, or whether a true pattern exists, is not fully clear. Inequalities in morbidity and total mortality tend to be greater among men than women, since men more often die from causes in which inequalities are particularly great, such as accidents and violence, as well as cardiovascular diseases. Gender differences in inequalities in morbidity vary by domains of health, and there is a need for more accurate measurement of women's socioeconomic position. Ethnic background, furthermore, shapes health inequalities and being in a minority position tends to aggravate these inequalities (Krieger et al. 1997).

The patterns and magnitude of social class inequalities in morbidity and mortality vary between countries. According to European comparative evidence, inequalities in morbidity and mortality exist in all countries. For mortality, relative inequalities in the Scandinavian welfare states have appeared among the largest in Western Europe (Mackenbach et al. 2003). This geographic pattern for inequalities in mortality can partly be attributed to the leading cause of death (cardiovascular diseases), for which the decline has been particularly fast in the uppermost social classes. In addition to western countries, very large inequalities in mortality and morbidity among men have been found in the post communist countries, including

Russia and a number of Eastern European countries (Cockerham 1997).

Widening inequalities over time are observed for both morbidity (Kunst et al. 2005) and mortality (Mackenbach et al. 2003), and several Western European countries show widening health inequalities, with no single country showing narrowing inequalities. For morbidity, there was some stabilization in the Nordic welfare states during the 1990s.

CAUSES

So far, much descriptive evidence on social class inequalities in morbidity and mortality has been produced. However, the main intellectual challenge is a better understanding of the causes of health inequalities. Although the Black Report introduced a framework for main types of explanation in the early 1980s, only a small number of subsequent studies have examined causes for inequalities in morbidity and mortality. The explanations have repeatedly been revisited in the aftermath of the Black Report, and the main types include selection and social mobility, early and adult living conditions, health behaviors, and health care (Bartley 2004).

Selection and Social Mobility

Through intergenerational or intragenerational social mobility health directly or indirectly can contribute to social class positions. The natural selection explanation predicts that people are recruited to social classes on the basis of their (inherited) health, and therefore inequalities in morbidity and mortality may not be preventable. The social selection explanation predicts that some social factors, such as parental social class, may contribute both to people's health and their own social class. Social selection may play a role in the production of health inequalities (e.g., as people with disabilities are discriminated against in the labor market and run the risk of drifting down the social ladder). However, explanations other than those related to selection and mobility are causal in nature and predict unequal distributions of the determinants producing health inequalities between social classes.

Early Life Conditions

Unequally distributed circumstances in childhood and early life may have long lasting consequences for later life inequalities in health, either directly or through adult circumstances. For example, material living conditions (e.g., poverty) and psychosocial living conditions (e.g., parental divorce in the childhood family) may contribute to adult health inequalities.

Adult Living Conditions

Equally, in adulthood, unequal distributions of life circumstances and resources are found. Material living conditions, including poor housing and working conditions, provide causes for health inequalities between social classes. Further potential causes include psychosocial living conditions, such as stress and lack of social contacts and support, comprehensively referred to as “social capital” (Szreter & Woolcock 2004).

Health Behaviors

Smoking, excessive drinking, sedentary behavior, and an unhealthy diet all tend to enhance excess health risks among the lower social classes, and thus cause health inequalities. Smoking, in particular, is worldwide a key health compromising behavior which is likely to account for large part of inequalities in morbidity and mortality.

Health Care

Many sociologists tend to hold that health care plays a negligible role in the production of health inequalities. Although little is known about the impacts of health care on health inequalities, there are examples of specific treatments that are unequally distributed among patients, and may thus contribute to health inequalities.

While descriptive mapping of inequalities in morbidity and mortality continues where evidence is still lacking, analytic approaches are increasingly pursued to clarify the causes for health inequalities. Summarizing the existing evidence suggests that the most important groups of factors causing social class inequalities in health include past and present material

and psychosocial living conditions, as well as unhealthy behaviors. Selection and social mobility are likely to provide only limited explanations for health inequalities. Although arguments have been presented for one or another group of factors constituting the key explanation, it is by now clear that the explanations are not mutually exclusive and there is no single “hard” explanation for health inequalities. It has been debated, for example, whether childhood or adulthood, health behaviors or living conditions, material or psychosocial factors, people’s own income or income inequality in society, macro level structural and political processes or individual characteristics, will provide the key explanation. However, inequalities in morbidity and mortality are complex phenomena, and “soft” explanations should be pursued, taking simultaneously into account key groups of explanatory factors. Thus, some studies have sought to find interrelationships and pathways between the key explanatory factors; for example, whether material disadvantage enhances unequal distributions of unhealthy behaviors and these together produce health inequalities, or whether material disadvantage and health behaviors independently produce health inequalities (Laaksonen et al. 2005).

CHANGES OVER TIME

There are a number of further challenges for a better understanding of social class inequalities in morbidity and mortality which future analyses of health inequalities need to take into account.

First, changes over time should be examined more often. While it is known that health inequalities tend to widen over time, the causes for such widening need to be searched for. Second, there is international variation in the magnitude of health inequalities and the factors producing such variation between countries should be examined. Third, there are variations in health inequalities by gender and stage of life course, but the causes for these remain largely unknown. Fourth, a broad range of health outcomes shows inequalities varying in magnitude and in some cases no inequalities are found. It is poorly understood why the magnitude of health inequalities varies from large to

negligible and even to reverse inequalities. Fifth, health inequalities vary by socioeconomic indicator, such as occupational social class, education, income, and wealth. The causes for such variation, too, remain largely unknown. Even more importantly, we know very little about the interrelationships between the various dimensions of socioeconomic status in the production of health inequalities.

The last mentioned complex of issues is a particular challenge for sociologists, since social class is a key structural concept in sociology. The challenges range from postmodernist tendencies to abandon social class, to methodological and measurement issues related to health inequalities. In any case, sociological theory and empirical research on health inequalities need closer links. On the one hand, within the sociology of social class, the medical sociological evidence on persisting social class inequalities in health has played a negligible role only. On the other hand, within medical sociology, the study of social class inequalities in health has been pursued with relatively little theoretical work. Nevertheless, there are examples of Marxist, Weberian, and combined strategies, which have made efforts to apply theoretically based social class schemes in medical sociological studies (Cockerham 1997).

Although a strong current trend within medical sociology, social class inequalities in health are by no means sociologists' property only. In fact, a number of neighboring disciplines are involved, such as psychology, economics, and social epidemiology. The importance of multidisciplinary examination is evident from the broad range of explanatory factors for inequalities in morbidity and mortality, covering economic, social structural, cultural, psychological, and biological factors. The study of health inequalities can be taken as an example of the advantages of multidisciplinary social research.

METHODOLOGICAL ISSUES

A key methodological issue includes the distinction between absolute and relative inequalities in health. Most studies on health inequalities rely on relative inequalities, indicating the proportion of people with ill health among, for example, manual workers as compared to their

non manual counterparts. Absolute inequalities, in turn, express the difference in the number of people with ill health between the manual class and the non manual class.

In the examination of causes for health inequalities, relative inequalities are preferred, while for efficient egalitarian health policies absolute inequalities are the prime target. It is important to pay more attention to this distinction in order to obtain a better understanding of the unequal patterning of morbidity and mortality. To take an example, among Swedish men, relative social class inequalities in mortality in the 1990s were at a similar level with their Irish counterparts. However, absolute inequalities in mortality between the manual class and non manual class are much smaller in Sweden, because the level of mortality among Swedish manual men is lower than that among Irish non manual men (Lundberg & Lahelma 2001).

TACKLING INEQUALITIES

Inequalities in morbidity and mortality constitute a major public health problem worldwide, and the health inequalities invariance – the lower the social class, the poorer the health – holds true even in the most advanced societies. Health has proven an area where there are no signs of universal social class hierarchies giving way to some other social divisions, and health provides a case showing continuity in social class inequalities. Therefore, health inequalities should have a high priority in the agenda of future medical sociological research, as well as national health and welfare policies.

Reducing social class inequalities in morbidity and mortality still remains largely an open question. As health inequalities are deep rooted, their prevention should start in early life. Promoting equality in society, such as equal opportunities for education, is likely to provide resources also for egalitarian health development. Specific egalitarian health and welfare policies, as well as interventions against health inequalities, have so far been scarce. Nevertheless, in the 1990s such policies and programs have been developed in several countries with the explicit aim of reducing future health inequalities (Mackenbach & Bakker 2002). While we lack compelling evidence showing

which measures would be the most efficient ones, research on the causes for health inequalities suggests a number of potential measures. These include promoting (particularly among the lower classes) better living and working conditions, as well as healthier behaviors, and avoiding discrimination against people with poor health and disabilities.

SEE ALSO: Class, Status, and Power; Disease, Social Causation; Health Behavior; Health Lifestyles; Health Locus of Control; Health, Neighborhood Disadvantage; Health and Race; Health Risk Behavior; Inequality, Wealth; Life Chances and Resources; Medical Sociology; Race/Ethnicity, Health, and Mortality; Social Epidemiology; Stratification and Inequality, Theories of; Women's Health

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health and sport

Ivan Waddington

There is widespread acceptance of the idea that "sport is good for health." The ideology linking sport and health has a long history and the promotion and maintenance of the health of schoolchildren has long been an area of concern to physical educators in Europe and America.

The links between physical activity and good health have been endorsed in many official health publications in Britain and North America. In Britain, the Health Education Authority

(1997: 2) suggested “the health benefits of an active lifestyle for adults are well established.” In the US, the Surgeon General’s report, *Physical Activity and Health* (US Department of Health and Human Services 1996: 10), argued “significant health benefits can be obtained by including a moderate amount of physical activity on most, if not all, days of the week.” In Canada, a discussion paper prepared for Health Canada and Active Living Canada (Donnelly & Harvey 1996) noted that a comprehensive examination of Canadian data had similarly identified several significant health benefits of physical activity. Can we conclude, then, that sport is good for one’s health? Let us begin by examining the health benefits associated with physical activity.

EXERCISE, SPORT, AND HEALTH

Numerous studies indicate that moderate, rhythmic, and regular exercise has a beneficial impact on health. In the United States, the 1996 report of the US Surgeon General brought together what had been learned about physical activity and health from decades of American research. It concluded that regular physical activity is associated with lower levels of overall mortality for younger and older adults; decreased risk of cardiovascular, and especially coronary, disease; prevention or delay of onset of high blood pressure; reduction of blood pressure in people with hypertension; decreased risk of colon cancer; reduced risk of developing certain forms of diabetes; maintenance of normal muscle strength and joint structure; reduced risk of falling in older adults; lower levels of obesity; and improved mental health.

Five years after the Surgeon General’s report, Britain’s Department of Health (2001:1) stated there was “compelling evidence that physical activity is important for health” and listed health benefits similar to those identified in the American report. Most recently, the National Center for Chronic Disease Prevention and Health Promotion (2004) pointed out that regular physical activity substantially reduces the risk of dying of coronary heart disease (the leading cause of death in the USA) and has reiterated all the health benefits identified in the earlier reports in the US and Britain.

At first glance, studies like these might seem to indicate that the health based arguments in favor of sport and exercise are overwhelming. Donnelly and Harvey (1996: 5) have noted, tongue in cheek, that the “numerous, almost miraculous claims for the benefits of physical activity lead one to wonder why it has not been patented by an innovative company”; more seriously, they go on to point out that the wide spread nature of these claims should serve as a warning against a too easy and uncritical acceptance, and that the context of the claims needs to be carefully examined. There are indeed some important provisos to be borne in mind when considering studies on the relationship between sport, exercise, and health. In particular, it is important to note that almost all the studies cited to support the idea that sport is good for health refer not to sport, but to physical activity or exercise. Physical activity and sport are not the same thing. Physical activity or exercise might involve lifestyle activities such as walking or cycling to work, dancing, gardening, or walking upstairs instead of taking the elevator. None of these are sport. There are important differences between physical activity and exercise, on the one hand, and sport on the other. Perhaps most importantly, whereas the competitive element is not central to most forms of physical activity, sport, in contrast, is inherently competitive and is becoming increasingly so (Waddington 2000). The increased competitiveness of modern sport, together with the increased emphasis which has come to be placed on winning, mean that, unlike most people who take part in non competitive physical activities, those who play sport are, particularly at the higher levels, frequently subject to strong constraints to “play hurt,” that is to continue playing while injured, “for the good of the team,” with the associated health risks this behavior entails (Young et al. 1994; Roderick et al. 2000).

It is also important to remember that many sports (not just combat sports) are mock battles in which aggression and the use of physical violence are, to a greater or lesser degree, central characteristics (Dunning 1986: 270). In this context, many sports have, in present day societies, become enclaves for the expression of physical violence, not in the form of unlicensed or uncontrolled violence, but in the form of socially sanctioned violence as expressed in violently

aggressive “body contact”; indeed, in the relatively highly pacified societies of the modern West, sport is probably the main – for many people, the only – activity in which they are regularly involved in aggressive physical contact with others. As Messner (1990: 203) has noted, in the more violent contact sports, “the human body is routinely turned into a weapon to be used against other bodies, resulting in pain, serious injury, and even death.”

The link between sport, aggression, and violence provides a key to understanding why sport is a major context for the inculcation and expression of gender identities and, in particular, for the expression of traditional forms of aggressive masculinity. As Young et al. (1994) have noted, these traditional concepts of masculinity involve the idea that “real” men play sport in an intensely confrontational manner; players are expected to give and to take hard knocks, to hurt and to be hurt and, when injured, to “take it like a man”; injury thus becomes a symbol of virility and courage and, for many players and fans alike, relatively violent sports, precisely because of their violent character, are arenas *par excellence* for young men to demonstrate their masculinity.

Young (1993: 373) has noted that professional sport is a violent and hazardous workplace which has its own unique forms of “industrial disease.” He adds: “No other single milieu, including the risky and labor intensive settings of miners, oil drillers, or construction site workers, can compare with the routine injuries of team sports such as football, ice hockey, soccer, rugby and the like.” In this context, one study of injuries in English soccer found that the overall risk of injury to professional footballers is 1,000 times greater than the risk of injury in other occupations normally considered high risk, such as construction and mining (Hawkins & Fuller 1999).

But risks are not confined to elite level sport. There are health costs associated with sports participation even at the mass level.

THE EPIDEMIOLOGY OF SPORTS INJURIES

A leading British research team has commented that there “is a reluctance to recognize that

increased participation in sports and exercise will also result in an increase in exercise related injuries” (Nichol et al. 1995: 232), while Hardman and Stensel (2003: 250) have noted that “the relationship between the benefits and risks associated with physical activity is not well described.”

Research indicates that sports injuries are extremely common and have to be taken into account in any attempt to assess the “health costs” and “benefits” of sport and exercise. Community studies in Europe suggest that every sixth unintentional injury is associated with leisure time physical activity, mainly sports, and that around 50 percent of people participating in team sports sustain one or more injuries over a season (Hardman & Stensel 2003: 226). At one university hospital in the Netherlands, sports injuries comprised about one fifth of all injuries treated over a 7 year period, making these the second highest cause of accidental injuries (Dekker et al. 2000). In the US, a prospective study of a physical activity intervention program (Hootman et al. 2002) found that a quarter of all participants reported at least one musculoskeletal injury, and such injuries were more likely to be reported by those participating in sports than those participating in other forms of physical activities.

Large scale, national studies of sports injuries are relatively rare, but a team from Sheffield University Medical School (Nichol et al. 1993, 1995) estimated that in England and Wales there are 19.3 million new injuries and a further 10.4 million recurrent injuries each year. The direct treatment costs of injuries were estimated at £422 million, with costs of lost production (11.5 million working days a year are lost due to sports injuries) estimated at £575 million (Nichol et al. 1993: 25, 31).

The Sheffield University researchers also sought to ascertain the direct economic costs and benefits of sports and exercise related injuries to the health care system. The health benefits of sport and exercise (e.g., avoidance of costs associated with the management of chronic illnesses) were weighed against the costs of treatment of exercise related injuries. It was found that, while there were economic benefits associated with exercise for adults aged 45 and over, for younger adults (15–44 years old), the costs avoided by the disease prevention effects

of exercise (less than £5 per person per year) were more than offset by the medical costs resulting from participation in sport and exercise (approximately £30 per person per year). Thus, for every 15–44 year old adult who regularly participates in sport, there is a net cost to the British taxpayer of £25 per year. The authors conclude “there are strong economic arguments in favour of exercise in adults aged 45 and over, but *not* in younger adults” (Nichol et al. 1993: 109; emphasis added). A Dutch study that produced similar findings to those of Nicholl et al. noted that this result “contrasts heavily with statements of people who use the supposed health effect of sport as an economic argument to promote sport” (cited in Nichol et al. 1993).

Although the data in these studies relate to injuries from both sport and exercise, the authors did note that injury risks vary markedly from one kind of physical activity to another; unsurprisingly, the highest risks are associated with contact sports and, in line with the analysis presented earlier, the Sheffield study found that the activities with the lowest risks of injury were the non contact, rhythmic (and largely non competitive) activities involved in “keep fit,” swimming, and diving.

CONCLUSION

The relationship between sport and health is by no means simple. Moderate and regular physical activity has a beneficial impact on health. However, as we move from non competitive activity to competitive sport, and from non contact to contact sports, the health costs, in the form of injuries, increase. Similarly, as we move from mass sport to elite sport, the constraints to train more intensively and to continue competing while injured also increase, with a concomitant increase in the health risks. The health related arguments in favor of regular and moderate physical activity are clear, but they are considerably less persuasive in relation to competitive, and especially contact, sport and very much less persuasive in relation to elite or professional sport.

The injury risks associated with competitive sport are increasingly being recognized by public health specialists. Significantly, almost all the examples of physical activity recommended in the 1996 Surgeon General’s report are either

lifestyle activities such as washing a car, gardening, or dancing, or non contact, rhythmic exercises such as water aerobics, jumping rope, or walking. The only competitive sports which figure in the list of recommended examples of moderate activity are playing basketball for 15–20 minutes and playing volleyball for 45 minutes; all the other major competitive sports in the US, with their associated injury risks, are conspicuous by their absence from this list of recommended healthy activities.

SEE ALSO: Disability Sport; Exercise and Fitness; Health Behavior; Health Lifestyles; Leisure; Sport and the Body; Sport as Work; Violence Among Athletes; Youth Sport

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healthy life expectancy

Mark D. Hayward

Declining old age mortality has motivated research on the interplay between mortality, chronic disease morbidity, and disability. Do declining mortality rates signal declining morbidity and disability rates? Are the substantial gains in *life expectancy* accompanied by an increase in the expected years in good health, i.e., healthy life expectancy? Investigations of healthy life expectancy are important for anticipating an aging population's demands on health care and evaluating the effects of interventions and policy changes on both the length and quality of life.

A CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK

Poor health is a complex concept denoting compromised well being stemming from disability

and disease, and mental, physical, and emotional problems. Health expectancy measures are typically based on the World Health Organization's (WHO) 1980 *International Classification of Impairments, Disabilities, and Handicaps* (ICIDH) and Lois Verbrugge's and Alan Jette's (1994) disablement framework. Disablement typically begins with the onset of a chronic disease that may have a cascading effect resulting in a loss of physical or mental function. Disability results if functional problems make it difficult to perform normal social activities. The pathway is neither unidirectional nor deterministic and death can occur at any point. Changes in the social and ecological environments can alter disablement.

Under the auspices of the WHO, a life table model was developed to integrate and summarize the life cycle morbidity, disability, and mortality experiences of a population. The model allows survivorship to be decomposed into the probability of surviving without morbidity or disability, and the probability of death (see Fig. 1). The vertical axis denotes the probability of surviving to a given age without one of the health problems. The areas under the curves refer to the probability of being in a particular health state at a given age. For example, the area beneath the morbidity curve (A) represents the probability of being free of chronic disease at each age. By definition, the areas describe the person years in a life table cohort spent in each health state. Area C, for example, represents disabled person years while areas of A and B represent disability free person years.

The life table model provides the means to calculate healthy life expectancy, i.e., the expected length of time that an average individual can expect to be healthy (or unhealthy) according to some morbidity or disability criterion. The measure captures the *life cycle* burden of a health condition – i.e., the health related quality of life in relation to the overall length of life. Healthy life expectancy has been used to assess whether declines in mortality lead to a compression of morbidity and/or disability during particular time periods and whether different groups have similar overall survival but differ in terms of life cycle morbidity and disability.

Demographers' use of the life table model has produced a class of specific health expectancy




Figure 1 Hypothetical model of population health.

measures summarizing the life cycle health of a population:

- *Disease free life expectancy*: The expected number of years the average person of a given age would expect to live free of disease (or a specific disease). Although this has not been a focus of demographers, researchers have calculated the number of years lived with heart disease, dementia, and lung cancer.
- *Disability free life expectancy*: The expected number of years free of disability for persons who survived to a given age. Disability free life expectancies have been calculated for a number of countries, for the United States over the past several decades, and for race/ethnic, educational, and gender groups. Socioeconomic differentials in healthy life expectancy typically exceed differentials in life expectancy.
- *Health adjusted life expectancy*: This measure adjusts life expectancy according to weights assigned to health states. The measure is intended to identify the gap between life in perfect health and ill health. The measure has become a policy tool in evaluating the effects of interventions and international differences in disabled years. WHO estimates that disabled life is higher in poorer countries than in developed countries due to injury, blindness, paralysis, and the functional consequences of tropical diseases affecting the younger population.

MEASUREMENT AND METHODOLOGICAL ISSUES

An issue poorly addressed is the meaning of disability change. Disability is the combination of dysfunction (organ system or bodily function) *and* environmental demands on functioning. Changes in disability reports reflect differences in social and environmental support as well as changes in functioning – or adaptation. For example, marital status changes or the addition of technology can result in changes in individuals' reports of getting less help with tasks without improvements in functioning.

This problem points to the need to differentiate functional changes from environmental changes in longitudinal designs to understand how changes in healthy life expectancy occur. For example, a decline in disabled life could be a consequence of reductions in disabling diseases (e.g., cardiovascular disease), the reduction of environmental challenges, and new technology and medications. In the latter case, a reduction in disabled years is not a reflection of changes in functional problems but rather improvements in coping with functional problems.

Assessment of trends and differences in healthy life is also affected by studies' differences in life table modeling approaches. Many studies rely on a prevalence based approach called the Sullivan (1966) method, which weights the person years in a hypothetical life table cohort according to the observed proportion of persons in the population who have a

health (morbidity or disability) problem at a point in time. Prevalence captures current health experience and experiences at younger ages that have stamped the surviving population. An advantage of the Sullivan method is its straightforward data requirements – observed prevalence rates of health conditions and mortality rates for the population. Mortality rates are typically obtained from a country's statistical agency. Prevalence rates are usually obtained from cross sectional health surveys. These surveys are increasingly common internationally, inexpensive to field compared to longitudinal surveys, and yield reliable prevalence estimates.

A potential problem using the Sullivan method for examining trends in healthy life is its insensitivity to dramatic swings in disability and mortality. During periods of rapidly improving survival, the method underestimates improvements in healthy life relative to gains in survivorship.

With the availability of longitudinal data, multistate life tables are being used to model the interactions of morbidity, disability, and mortality. This approach relies on incidence rates rather than prevalence rates to model health changes with age. Incidence rates identify the probability of a change in health status. Unlike prevalence rates, incidence rates document both the onset and recovery from health conditions as well as mortality from each health state. Incidence rates used in multistate models are typically calculated for a relatively short time period (e.g., two years) for a cross section of the population. Multistate models thus produce health expectancies that summarize the years of healthy and unhealthy life for a cohort if current incidence and mortality rates remained unchanged over time.

Health expectancies calculated by the Sullivan method and the multistate model are difficult to compare because of the models' assumptions and the fact that they use different sources of data (e.g., cross sectional surveys versus panel studies). An advantage of the multistate model is that it can be used to assess the causes of changes in healthy life expectancy and the prevalence of health conditions. For example, Eileen Crimmins, Mark Hayward, and Yasuhiko Saito (1994) demonstrated how healthy life expectancy and prevalence respond to changes in the incidence rates governing

declines and improvements in health, as well as changes in health specific mortality.

Although the multistate model has desirable properties, the lack of longitudinal data for lengthy historical periods has limited its use in examining trends. Even if such data were available, the reliability of the incidence rates of health change – the usual inputs for the model – are potentially problematic because of the sparse numbers of health events at certain ages and for some groups. The implications of sample attrition for the incidence rates are also poorly understood.

SOME IMPORTANT LESSONS

Healthy life expectancy research has shown that mortality, morbidity, and disability are related but not isomorphic concepts. An individual may contract a fatal condition but not die from that cause. For some fatal conditions, individuals may live with the disease many years before death. Disability is not necessarily permanent nor does it inevitably precede death. Death is not always the evolutionary outcome of a process wherein individuals contract a fatal condition, the condition induces functional problems and disability, and, when advanced, results in death.

This complexity carries over to understanding group differences in healthy life. For example, sex affects mortality and disability in opposite directions such that women live longer than men, but they also have more disabled years. Men are more likely to die regardless of disability, but men are more likely to recover. Women are also more likely to become disabled. Other studies have documented educational differences in healthy life, showing that poorly educated persons have a higher incidence of disability, as well as higher death rates among persons without disability. Once disability occurs, educational differences in mortality are small. The end result is that education is associated with an increase of both total life and disability free life, and a compression of disabled life.

Models of healthy life are thus important to identify health trajectories consisting of morbidity, disability, and mortality. These models also are important in evaluating group differences in

healthy life and how these differences are tied to differences in morbidity, disability, and mortality. The models, in turn, help the development of theoretical models that articulate with the reasons for the interplay between morbidity, disability, and mortality.

CONCLUSIONS

Concerns about whether longer life signals better health has led to health monitoring systems and an ever expanding body of research. Health expectancy research has clarified that different components of health – disease, disability, and self perceived health – need not move in the same direction at the same time. Some components may rise during periods of falling mortality, a natural part of the epidemiologic transition. Rising disability does not necessarily signal failure of public health policies.

Health expectancy research points to a shift in the United States toward less severe disability accompanying the decline in old age mortality in recent decades. Research has begun to clarify the reasons for subgroup differences in healthy life, and life table models' descriptions of how health problems unfold in groups are useful in refining theoretical arguments underlying health disparities. Within the scientific community, researchers are engaged in debates over health expectancy methods and measures, investigating how different facets of morbidity interact and change over time. These activities are frequently collaborative, involving teams of researchers from multiple disciplines and countries.

SEE ALSO: Aging, Demography of; Aging and Health Policy; Biodemography; Chronic Illness and Disability; Demographic Techniques: Life Table Methods

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Hegel, G. W. F. (1770–1831)

Rob Beamish

Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel rose from within the liberal milieu of Protestant refugees in Württemberg to become Prussia's foremost post-Kantian, idealist philosopher in Berlin (1818–31). Hegel's major philosophical achievements were the *Phenomenology of Spirit* (1804), *Science of Logic* (1812–16), the *Encyclopedia of Philosophy* (1817), and his philosophy of history. Sociologists' interest in Hegel began with the posthumous 1930s publications of Karl Marx's 1840s manuscripts, Alexander Kojève's late 1930s lectures, and Herbert Marcuse's, Karl Löwith's, and Georg Lukács's analyses of Hegel's work.

Hegel's major sociological contributions stem first from the *Phenomenology*. Responding to the Cartesian and Kantian subject/object separation, Hegel argued that through a historical, dialectical subject/object mediation, the apparently unknowable "thing in and of itself" was revealed. Confronting the phenomenal world, consciousness became self-consciousness as mind (*Geist*) dialectically discovered self-reflexivity in the subject/object relation. An increasingly comprehensive intellectual Spirit (*Geist*) followed as a more all-inclusive Reason grasped the complex totality of reality, culminating in an Absolute form of knowledge. Phenomenological sociologists drew upon Hegel's conception of the subjective creation of meaning while Marx replaced "mental labor" with real, material labor as history's prime motive force, to reconceptualize Hegel's emphasis on historical development through conscious human action.

The *Logic*, Hegel's systematic account of dialectical method, was the methodological inspiration for Marx's critique of political economy and remains essential to genuinely understanding his method and overall critique.

Hegel's *Philosophy of Right* addressed the question of social order – now seen under changing historical conditions (placing Hegel among the first modernist, political theorists). Contrary to Rousseau, Hegel did not believe civil society could produce a fusion of individual wills – only the constitutional state, based on the principles of absolute rationality, could create a stable, historically evolving social order. Legislation could create the conditions that would allow freedom to flourish. Inspired by Greek philosophy, the *polis*, and Plato's rather than Aristotle's image of humankind as *zoon politikon* (political animal), Hegel argued that an impartial, philosophically educated civil service would act in the universal interest. Due to its largely eighteenth century traditionalism, the *Philosophy of Right* contained many of the *Republic's* shortcomings.

Hegel's political writings were never totalitarian in orientation although they were elitist; his view of the state guiding civil society was rooted in traditional conceptions of hierarchy, and although the universal grasped the complex totality of reality more comprehensively than the general, Hegel's experiences suggested universal, Absolute Knowledge was only within the grasp of a minority rather than a majority. Democratic outcomes would come from the policies of an educated, impartial, knowledgeable elite, leaving more than Marx's "inversion" of Hegel's idealism separating the two thinkers.

SEE ALSO: Dialectic; Labor/Labor Power; Marx, Karl; Phenomenology; Species Being

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hegemonic masculinity

Donald P. Levy

Developed in the 1980s (Carrigan et al. 1985) to provide a relational and socially constructed conception of men and masculinities, the term hegemonic masculinity describes the hierarchical interaction between multiple masculinities and explains how some men make it appear normal and necessary that they dominate most women and other men (Connell 1987).

Hegemonic masculinity describes a position in the system of gender relations, the system itself, and the current ideology that serves to reproduce masculine domination. In presenting the term, Connell demonstrates the essentialistic, ahistorical, and normative liabilities in previous men's studies scholarship. In the concept of hegemonic masculinity Connell joins the constructivist view of "doing gender" (West & Zimmerman 1987) with insights drawn from feminist scholars who described the ways in which gender relations shape social structures (Hartsock 1983).

Connell seeks to explain how some men succeed in making it appear normal, natural, and necessary for them to enjoy power over other men and most women; why it is that so many men and women participate willingly in their own oppression; and how resistance to hegemonic masculinity can promote gender justice. Connell posits four types of masculinities, more as positions in relation to one another than as personality types: hegemonic, complicit, subordinated, and marginalized. The hegemonic position is the currently accepted male ideal within a particular culture at a particular time. As such, the hegemonic male is an ideal type (Weber 1946). Connell notes that this image changes over time and place, as well as being subject to contestation within a particular culture.

Most men fall within the second, category, complicit. These men accept and participate in the system of hegemonic masculinity so as to enjoy the material, physical, and symbolic benefits of the subordination of women and, through fantasy, experience the sense of hegemony and learn to take pleasure in it, and avoid subordination.

The relations among the four positions are hierarchical. A man in the subordinated position suffers that fate despite appearing to possess the physical attributes necessary to aspire to hegemony. Men run the risk of subordination when they do not practice gender consistent with the hegemonic system and ideology. The clearest examples are men who are openly gay. Gay men are defined in this system as not real men. They lack the legitimacy to aspire to hegemony. The many seemingly innocuous taunts of "Be a man" or "What are you, a fag?" are in reality active gender policing in which the fear of subordination, the loss of legitimacy, and the fall from complicity are actively enacted. Marginalized men are those who cannot even aspire to hegemony – most often, men of color and men with disabilities. Groups can contest marginalization when they seek authorization by making the claim: "I'm a man, too."

The second manner in which Connell uses hegemonic masculinity is to describe the current system of gender relations: current "configurations of practice" organize social relations and structures to the overall benefit of men in relation to women and of some men in relation to other men. Connell stresses that these configurations of practice take place across four dimensions: power, the division of labor, cathexis or emotional relations, and the symbolic. Connell's argument is that hegemonic masculinity as a system becomes built into social institutions so as to make it appear normal and natural for men's superordinate position to be maintained. For example, major societal institutions including government, the economy, and the family are structured so as to reinforce and reproduce male hegemony in ways ranging from structure, credentialing, and even cultural symbolic expressions. Additionally, the hierarchical relations of men with other men are expressed in both social structures as well as cultural expectations in examples such as resistance to gays in the military or the gendering of

occupations, including typically female jobs like librarian, elementary teacher, or nurse.

The third usage of hegemonic masculinity, as an ideology, provides the justification through which patriarchy is legitimated and maintained. As an ideology, hegemonic masculinity structures the manner in which all people experience and thereby know their world, although those experiences vary as both men and women are differentially situated by race, class, and sexuality. This ideology, referred to as hegemonic complicity, can be measured across four dimensions: ideal type masculinity, hierarchical ranking of self and others, subordination of women, and the subordination of woman like behavior (Levy 2005). The first dimension, ideal type masculinity, is the belief that there is a single type of masculinity that is appropriate. Different men or groups of men and women can posit a different ideal type, contesting the definition of that type, but the underlying belief in a single ideal type typifies this dimension.

Hierarchical ranking of oneself and others is perhaps the least studied component of hegemonic masculinity as an ideology. Previous scholars (Lewis 1978) spoke of competition as a restrictive component of masculinity or as a barrier to meaningful interaction. This conceptualization fails to capture the ever present intrapsychic dimension of active hierarchic assessment. Hierarchical ranking is a process in which men compare themselves and others actively and incessantly to their general or contextual ideal type.

Subordination of women and anyone or any trait perceived to be woman like includes overt and covert sexism and homophobia. Although some would argue that both overt sexism and homophobia have been in decline, the lingering or residual effects, often in the form of beliefs about men, women, and sexuality, are quite active.

The three dimensions of hegemonic masculinity as a position, a system, and an ideology can be theoretically separated while their interaction and interconnections are still recognized. Those who criticize the concept of hegemonic masculinity for confusion, reification, or elitism (Lorber 1998; Martin 1998; Whitehead 1999; Demetriou 2001) need to recognize its multiple usages and see that those allegations have merit

only if the critic refuses to consider simultaneously the three understandings of hegemonic masculinity – position, system, and ideology – or to appreciate Connell's continuing dedication to gender justice, a commitment he shares with some feminists often accused of essentialism. Connell calls for forming coalitions among those resisting the subtle but pervasive effects of hegemonic masculinity and feminists opposed to patriarchal and/or class and racial oppressions. Given the ubiquity of hegemonic masculinity as both a system of gender relations and as a justificatory ideology, resistance can be expressed politically or interactionally; that is, rather than contesting the hegemonic position, resistance seeks to alter the configuration of gender practice that reproduces the system of hegemonic masculinity.

SEE ALSO: Doing Gender; Femininities/Masculinities; Gendered Organizations/Institutions; Homophobic; Patriarchy; Sex and Gender

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hegemony and the media

Dave Harris

Before becoming applied to academic analysis of the media, the term “hegemony” referred more generally to indirect political control, which often replaced the need for constant and direct military or political domination, of the kind exercised by, for example, colonial states over rivals.

The concept takes on more specific implications from its use to explain forms of domination (e.g., by classes, ethnic groups, or genders) within a nation state. Mass media can be seen as having an important role in justifying the rule of dominant groups by supporting their claims to superiority, and in trying to persuade the dominated to consent to this justification. People who specialize in formulating and disseminating ideas (such as journalists, priests, public relations companies, politicians, advisers, and academics) are constantly engaged in interpreting current events and debates so as to fit dominant conceptions and categories (not always conspiratorially). As examples, a violent incident in Iraq is interpreted as further evidence of worldwide terrorist conspiracy; economic crises are blamed on outsiders or seen as inevitable; national sporting successes vindicate political systems.

Scholars associated with the Birmingham Centre for Contemporary Cultural Studies (CCCS) in the UK, and later the Open University Popular Culture Group in the UK, were particularly significant in developing the concept of hegemony as a research tool, although there are also prominent North American writers in the field, such as Giroux, Grossberg, Jhally, and Radway (see their contributions in Grossberg et al. 1992). One aspect of the project was to elaborate the work of Antonio Gramsci, an Italian Marxist working in the 1930s and 1940s. Gramsci had used the term “hegemony” to draw attention to the cultural and political dimensions of class struggle in Italy. Struggle was not only focused on industrial and parliamentary matters, but extended to regional, religious, and local issues as well. One implication he drew from this was that the working class had to unite with other oppressed factions, such as

the remaining peasantry, leading them in a cultural and political struggle with the dominant bourgeoisie, as well as using the usual tactics of industrial strikes and urban demonstrations. A successful socialist or communist revolution would impose the hegemony of the working classes on its rivals and subordinates so that the whole culture would become a socialist one.

Italian fascism combined direct force and cultural, political, and ideological argument and activity and gained mass support. It displayed an impressive flexibility and mobility, reacting quickly to emerging social, cultural, and political events and weaving them into its (underdeveloped) conceptual schemes. Gramsci's attempts to do the same for Marxist theory (but far more rigorously) led to a flexible and impressive set of concepts that departed quite significantly from previous Marxist positions and debates. In particular, the concept seemed to offer a helpful notion of "moving equilibrium" to describe how ideological dominance was continually achieved as part of a process.

A number of specific academic projects were pursued by British Gramscian writers, including analysis of political discourses such as Thatcherism, the local manifestation of the neoconservative turn in European and American politics in the 1980s. Briefly, Thatcherism had gained sufficient mass support at the ballot box thanks to its effective ideological work in knitting together various dissatisfactions, even when they were mutually exclusive – such as anxiety about social change and a promise to modernize British society (Hall & Jacques 1983). More specific analyses soon followed, in which the mass media were seen as a major player in the struggle for hegemony, doing the actual hegemonic work, and explaining emerging events and arguments in popular terms.

One such event was identified as emerging from spectacular youth subcultures in the 1970s and 1980s in Britain. British youth were wearing outlandish clothes, listening to aggressive music, choosing different sorts of recreational drugs, and developing their own distinctive set of tastes. Sometimes, this led them into open conflict, as when rival youth groups fought at seaside resorts. In general, the media (the analysis largely turned on newspapers in the early days) reacted to this challenge by attempting to demonize British youth, by

launching tirades against the "mindlessness" of the activity, or exaggerating its impact on law and order. Perhaps the most extensive analysis of this kind of activity occurs in Hall et al. (1978). Here, black youth are attacked by the press in the guise of a campaign of moral outrage about street crime: the black mugger came to symbolize all that seemed to threaten the stability of Britain in the 1970s – social change, urban unrest, youth unemployment, immigration, etc. Other writers had written about such "moral panics," but Hall et al. politicized their analysis. This particular moral panic took place at a time of a general shift towards an authoritarian solution to the unrest produced by industrial decline and social change: diverting attention towards a visible minority group would offer a popular way to justify the strengthening of the state.

Gramscian analyses of the media peaked with the publication of the Open University course on popular culture (Open University 1982), together with its series of influential textbooks and readers (see Harris 1992). They included attempts to show how current affairs programs on television were also offering a form of hegemonic discourse. Despite their apparent political neutrality, such programs were suggesting in effect that the only legitimate political conflicts took place between recognized political parties working within the dominant system of parliamentary politics. This discourse was often embodied in the physical layout of the studio discussion, with party spokespersons on either side of the set, and a neutral respected commentator in the middle, whose role it was to stress in a concluding summary the underlying virtues of democratic consensus.

Television coverage of the English FA Cup Final (soccer) sought to perform a resolution of national tensions. Particular football clubs symbolize important social divisions, typically those between northern and southern England, for example. They come together on a national occasion as sporting rivals. However, unifying national symbols are also on display in the television coverage: the entire crowd sings traditional hymns, while the commentary team does its best to remind its viewers that football as a whole is the winner, that the English are wonderfully sporting and generous towards losers, that at the end of the day fans of rival

clubs can unite in support of the national team, and so on.

Some more abstract theoretical work supported these specific examples. Hall (1977) discussed how the media produce an “ideology effect” in general. Borrowing from Poulantzas, he argued that social problems can only be described in terms of ideological categories, such as differences of age, region, “race,” and so on. Social class in the Marxist sense is never acknowledged, and is hidden by these apparently obvious alternatives. Ideological categories like these then permit the sort of magical resolution discussed above – conflicts can be forgotten as the nation celebrates Christmas, for example, or seen to be reformed away. The whole analysis clearly echoes Marx’s own work in exposing the inadequacies and ideological effects of the categories of liberal political economy.

These studies were also criticized. The work on black youth in particular proved controversial: it was not clear whether this work was actually justifying criminal activity as “political,” for example (Cohen 1979). Other criticisms turned on the precise relevance of high powered theoretical digressions in the texts: Hall et al. (1978) engage as much in theoretical struggle with Althusserians as they do with the concrete issue of hegemonic moral panics about black crime. Frith (1984) suggests that the theoretical and political interest in spectacular confrontational youth subcultures led to a serious omission: the study of “normal youth.”

Media professionals objected strongly to seeing their claims to neutrality questioned. They wanted to suggest that a good deal of creative work went into constructing a television program, and that it was not just a simple matter of using unconscious hegemonic categories. Some work undertaken from within the Open University Popular Culture Group itself expressed similar doubts. Bennett’s initial analysis of the James Bond movie (Open University 1982) saw it as structured around some basic hegemonic codes stressing British claims to world importance, the need to subordinate challenging women, and the need to structure and manage desire (in Freudian terms). However, a later ethnographic study of the actual work involved in producing a Bond movie (Bennett & Woollacott 1987) found much more going on as well: attempts to adapt or parody

existing filmic conventions, to make references to other films, to include visual sequences for entertainment, to respond to a global audience, and so on. The role of the active audience was also acknowledged.

The focus on social class in early versions of the analysis led to serious challenge from feminists or black activists, on both political and theoretical grounds. Perhaps the privileged terms of Gramscian analysis were simply not adequate to grasp how sexual or ethnic minorities were depicted on modern television, implying that other concepts from different traditions were also required. Important feminist work critiqued CCCS Marxism (Coward 1977) and developed alternatives, some of them based on the rival Althusserian notion of how the media “positioned” individual subjects as gendered subjects.

The debate indicates a wider theoretical discussion going on about Marxism, and new thinking in poststructuralism and postmodernism. The privileged or “foundational” status of Marxist concepts was much debated following a series of close critical readings of Marx’s key works. Perhaps the most devastating of these was delivered by Hindess and Hirst (see Crook 1991), who argued that Marxist concepts were incoherent, not consistently deployed, heavily contaminated with metaphorical reasoning, and usually applied dogmatically. In an allied attack, poststructuralists were tending to refer to Marxism as a discourse, one among many, and refusing to grant it any privileged status as offering unique access to some underlying social reality.

Gramscian notions and concepts, including the notion of hegemony, faced problems from this criticism. The notion of hegemony seemed especially vulnerable to the poststructuralist emphasis on discourse. In a nutshell, ideological conceptions were being analyzed as discourses already, but why was it necessary or desirable to add a particular Marxist political inflection to such analysis? Answers insisting on the necessary reality of underlying struggle seemed to deliver Gramscians back into facing charges of foundationalism. Gramscianism found itself in a very uncomfortable position, having to hold increasingly suspect Marxist conceptions to stave off the possibilities of rival politically undesirable theoretical systems.

Critics have identified a number of dubious maneuvers in the debates that followed. Gramscians sought salvation in incoherent terms such as “relative autonomy” (see the debate between Hirst and Hall in Hunt 1977) or oscillated tactically between the possibilities (Wood 1998). They failed to resolve perhaps the most fundamental problem of all: whether hegemonic struggle is a “real” one located in a concrete social formation, or a discursive one, located exclusively in discourses and their effects (Townshend 2004). The question remains: is the main effect of the media to construct discourses about reality (evidently true but rather trivial and obvious, since what else could they do?), or do they do so as a necessary part of a wider and real political struggle for social control (much more significant, but much less easy to establish)?

SEE ALSO: Audiences; Birmingham School; Cultural Studies; Encoding/Decoding; Gramsci, Antonio; Ideological Hegemony; Media; Media Monopoly

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help-seeking

Bernice A. Pescosolido

Help seeking refers to efforts or actions designed to assist individuals with physical, mental, or emotional behaviors or manifestations somehow noticed as out of the ordinary. Often, this term is used interchangeably with service utilization, health care decision making, or health/illness behavior. However, a number of factors differentiate the concept of help seeking from the others.

First, help seeking is broader than service utilization, which generally taps formal, scientific medical services. Individuals may seek out lay, scientific, or alternative sources of advice or assistance perceived as potentially useful. Further, help seeking can mean going to a provider of a medical system but, just as readily, can be applied to using the Internet for information, talking to neighbors about their experience with similar conditions, buying over the counter medications, praying, or joining a self help group.

Second, the term is narrower than health/illness behavior because, technically, it refers to an active search by the parties involved. Individuals may, indeed, seek out care; however, it is also likely that individuals will experience legal coercion into the formal medical care

system. The issues of involuntary treatment for mental illness symptoms, contact by public health authorities regarding possible HIV exposure, or employees forced to use physicians for an insurance check up before starting their job, all are likely to result in the use of formal services. Further, and perhaps most troubling to some existing theories attempting to explain illness behavior, individuals may "muddle through" an experience of illness, recounting a story of entry into the formal medical care system that can be described neither as a choice nor as resistance (Pescosolido, Gardner, & Lubell 1998).

Third, help seeking is broader than decision making for medical care, at least in its most usual usage. That is, decision making tends to evoke an image of a single person weighing the costs and benefits of seeking out any of a variety of possible preventive or curative services. However, as Freidson (1970) points out, no small part of the significance of society's influence on the use of services is involved in motivating (encouraging or discouraging) an individual's movement toward assistance and giving them a sense of appropriate cultural solutions. In perceiving symptoms or the risk of a medical problem (for preventive services), or in pushing individuals toward or away from scientific or complementary, alternative services, others around the individual are crucial.

In Talcott Parsons's early, influential theory, help seeking was a non issue since modern societies required acceptance of the sick role (a community based decision) and that an individual seek formal help as part of the obligations inherent in the status. In response, several theories were developed in the 1960s and 1970s that still dominate empirical evaluations at the present time (Pescosolido & Kronenfeld 1995). The only explicit theory of help seeking was developed by David Mechanic (1968). Noting that both the process of definition of illness and the ability to cope with it are socially determined, Mechanic laid out ten determinants of the response to illness. These are: (1) the visibility, recognizability, or perceived salience of symptoms; (2) their frequency, persistence, or recurrence; (3) the perceived severity of symptoms; (4) the individual's or others' tolerance of the symptoms; (5) other belief systems or circumstances that may explain away the

symptoms as "expected" or "normal"; (6) the extent of medical or other cultural knowledge surrounding the individual; (7) other emotions (e.g., fear) that may trigger responses to the symptoms; (8) the extent to which "normal" individual or family routines are disturbed by the symptoms, as well as (9) other role obligations that may facilitate or impede the ability to go to or be taken to services; and (10) issues of access, whether geographical, financial, or logistical.

These factors are reflected in three other models that currently dominate the study of individual or population use of formal services. The Health Belief Model (HBM), targeting health behavior or prevention, was conceived originally by psychologist Irwin Rosenstock and developed further by sociologist Marshall Becker (1974). This model emphasizes perceptions, beliefs, and other social psychological characteristics that influence whether individuals feel at risk for problems and position themselves to change health behaviors and to utilize health care services. The Socio Behavioral Model (SBM), targeting illness behavior and overall use of medical and health care, was developed by sociologist Ronald Andersen (1974) and emphasizes three types of contingencies: enabling characteristics (or access, whether perceived or actual, geographic or fiscal), need (hurt, bother, and worry associated with symptoms), and predisposing characteristics (social and other characteristics like age and gender consistently related to utilization). The Theory of Reasoned Action, developed in psychology by Martin Fishbein (1979), was designed to address behavior more generally, but has been applied to health, illness, and disability issues. Here, the focus is on the factors that influence behavioral intentions because individuals rationally assess information or beliefs about the planned behavior. It is a combination of the individual's own attitudes about the intended behavior as well as the individual's perceptions of social norms that shape the person's subjected probability of "performing" the "target" behavior (for a catalogue of these and another models, see Gochman 1997).

In opposition to these models, which tend to be static in nature, other sociologists and anthropologists have focused on tracing the process of help seeking, calling this approach

the “illness career” perspective. These sociologists, coming primarily from the qualitative tradition, offer a textured recounting of the events and emotions leading up to decisions to use formal services (for a review, see Pescosolido 1991). More recently, the Network Episode Model has been offered as an attempt to bridge the differences between these two approaches, capturing their essential insights and reflecting new realities that face individuals in contemporary societies (e.g., decreasing reliance on tertiary care). The NEM is focused on the “illness or disability career” which marks all of an individual’s attempts to cope with the onset of an episode of a health or physical impairment or associated acute illness. It requires charting what individuals do and when they do it through the concepts of patterns and pathways. Patterns of care describe the combination of advisers and/or practices used during the course of coping with a disability or illness episode. Pathways add the element of order; that is, the sequences of advisers and/or practices used to deal with a disability or confront an acute episode of health problems during the disability career.

In the NEM the underlying mechanism is interaction or social influence. The NEM starts with a basic idea: dealing with any health problem or physical disability is a social process that is managed through the contacts (or social networks) that individuals have in the community, the treatment system, and social service agencies (including support groups, churches, community recreation centers, etc.). The experience of illness is embedded in its social life and rhythms, constrained by social structure, and created in negotiation with others. While dominant models have not ignored networks, it is quite different to conceptualize social networks as yet another contingency of choice (e.g., part of normative influence in the HSM and TRA), or to conceptualize social networks as the engine of action in a dynamic model of utilization. Unlike the explicit or implicit rational man assumptions underlying the other dominant models, in the NEM individuals are seen as pragmatic, having commonsense knowledge and cultural routines that they draw from past experience, from proactively talking to others, and from reactively responding to the comments of others when impairments, or other health problems associated with them, occur.

It questions whether every action in coping with a behavior outside the ordinary is the result of the complicated, cost benefit calculus typical of many other models. This view allows for rational choice, forced choice, or even haplessness to explain how individuals try to deal with their problems. But, in general, people face disabilities in the course of their day to day lives by interacting with other people who may recognize (or deny) a problem; send them to (or provide) treatment; and support, cajole, or nag them about appointments, medications, or life style.

Whatever the patterns or pathways, illness careers are not assumed to occur in a vacuum in the NEM. They are embedded in personal lives and changing communities. These community based networks are referred to as “external” networks. Following Freidson (1970), the NEM sees the size of a network as calibrating the potential amount of influence that can be leveraged, and the beliefs and experiences of individuals in social networks guiding them in a particular direction (e.g., toward or away from scientific medical care services). Further, the NEM conceptualizes the medical system itself as a changing set of providers and organizations with which individuals may or may not have contact (“internal” or “inside” networks). Like the community and the disability career, formal treatment systems change over time in response to the problems people have, to the technology and medical knowledge, to health care policies, and to community preferences and demands. These structures determine resource and information flows across systems and organizations, and they influence the behavior of individuals who are connected to or operate within them. These two network systems meet at the interface of the treatment and community system and can work together and cooperate or work in opposition. By seeing interaction in social networks as the underlying mechanism at work, the NEM contextualizes the response to disabilities in everyday life.

Taking a dynamic approach, rooted in the community and its institutions of care, and incorporating ideas from other existing models, poses a number of challenges in understanding help seeking. Such investigations of help seeking require more theoretical, methodological, and analytic work. In addition to

integrating more of the insights of dominant social science models, sociological approaches will have to incorporate new ideas about cognition, biology, psychiatry, and geography, for example, into its models. Moving to a more dynamic approach should bring other concepts from recent developments in the understanding of the life course. Social science methodologists have only begun to consider and develop suitable dynamic tools in the last decade. Further, moving to a more integrated approach will require serious theorizing about linking process and structures. Again, we are only beginning to consider how to integrate results from how one set of social and dynamic processes influences others. However, faced with current failures to explain critical aspects of help seeking, the synthesizing approach of sociology has much to offer in addressing these challenges.

SEE ALSO: Health Behavior; Health Care Delivery Systems; Health and Culture; Health Lifestyles; Illness Behavior; Social Support

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hermeneutics

Wendy Hilton Morrow and Austin Harrington

Hermeneutics is a branch of sociology concerned with human understanding and interpretation. Originally applied solely to texts, sociologists have applied hermeneutics to social events by examining participants' understandings of the events from the standpoint of their specific historical and cultural context. Hermeneutics is opposed to the view that social phenomena can be grasped adequately by reference to invariant laws of cause and effect or statistical regularities, as with positivist and behaviorist approaches and some elements of functionalist theory. Hermeneutics is one among a range of approaches to meaning, symbolization, and representation in social life that includes semiotics, structuralism, deconstruction, and discourse analysis.

The term hermeneutics derives from the Greek verb *hermeneuein* ("to interpret"), thereby relating to the ancient Greek messenger of the gods, Hermes. His role was more complex than that of mere messenger because before Hermes could translate and communicate the words of the gods (which were unintelligible to humans), he first had to interpret and understand their meanings for himself. This complex process is key to theories of hermeneutics, in which texts are understood as intermediaries between writers and audiences. In particular, hermeneutics initially focused on interpreting the Bible in order to understand the word of God.

Among German Protestant writers of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, hermeneutics referred to the art of interpreting

scripture in the light of philological evidence. Writing during the early nineteenth century within the Romantic movement, theologian and philosopher Friedrich Schleiermacher favored broadening the focus of hermeneutics, seeking a theory of interpretation that extended beyond religious texts. His writings influenced future work in that he understood the author as creator and the text as an expression of the creative self. Earlier traditions of hermeneutics theorized that a reader would understand intended meanings of a text until encountering incongruous or illogical passages. However, Schleiermacher proposed a radically different position in which understanding was taken as a process in which readers understand the text's context, including the author's creative individuality, the text's particular genre, and its historical circumstances.

Schleiermacher's most lasting contribution to hermeneutics was the concept of the hermeneutic circle, which he understood to operate at every level of interpretation. According to the theory of the hermeneutic circle, a reader can only understand a part within its relation to the larger whole; however, the larger whole can only be understood through its contributing parts. Therefore, readers find themselves oscillating between the part and the whole within this inescapable process of interpretation. For example, readers cannot know the meaning of a word without framing it within the context of the larger sentence. Likewise, they cannot understand the significance of a sentence without the context of the entire work. However, an understanding of the work is based upon its accumulated parts, as well as a context of the author's life and the culture as a whole in which it was created. Therefore, circularity exists across and between all levels of interpretation.

As subsequent theorists applied Schleiermacher's work to other areas of study, hermeneutics flourished in German academia. In modern social thought the first thinker to develop a distinctively hermeneutic program was philosopher and cultural historian Wilhelm Dilthey. Writing in the 1880s, Dilthey extended Schleiermacher's theory of interpretation to the human sciences, which studied all human expressions in disciplines ranging from archeology and history to sociology and anthropology. In an attempt to differentiate between the

natural sciences and the "human sciences," or what he termed the *Geisteswissenschaften*, Dilthey claimed that whereas the natural sciences seek *erklären*, the explanation of phenomena according to laws of regular correspondence between cause and effect, the goal of the human sciences is *verstehen*, the understanding of human action based on intention and context. To interpret a historical event or social process in terms of meaningfully lived experience was itself to account adequately for its occurrence and did not require the support of law like naturalistic generalizations to gain scientific validity. For Weber, Dilthey's ideas underlined the importance of "empathic understanding" and "subjectively intended meanings" and the fallacy of attempts to model social action exclusively on behavioral or psychological laws, such as in the writings of Auguste Comte, J. S. Mill, Herbert Spencer, and the classical political economists.

A second key source for hermeneutics is twentieth century phenomenological and linguistic philosophy. In the 1920s and 1930s Edmund Husserl and Martin Heidegger argued that before human beings come to develop methodical scientific representations of the world, they possess a more primordial existential understanding of the world which they express in everyday life and ordinary communication. These ideas became important notably for Alfred Schütz, who restated Weber's interpretive sociology in the form of a phenomenology of the social world, based on the concepts of intersubjectivity and the lifeworld. Similarly, in the 1950s, drawing on Ludwig Wittgenstein's linguistic philosophy, Peter Winch (1958) argued that social science had the aim of studying social relations in terms of "forms of life" constructed in linguistic rules and "language games" shared between speakers. Conceived of as an attempt to understand the most appropriate way to study human life, hermeneutics became focused largely on method.

German philosopher Hans Georg Gadamer challenged the assumption that understanding was a methodological issue. Gadamer was greatly influenced by philosopher Martin Heidegger's ontological concerns, including his idea that readers bring presuppositions to their understandings of a text. Gadamer hoped to separate the human sciences from prior influences, like

Dilthey and Wittgenstein, that he believed failed to fully reject the scientific presuppositions of positivism. In his 1975 book *Truth and Knowledge* Gadamer proposed that knowledge could never be objective, and, therefore, social theorists were incapable of fully escaping their preexisting prejudices. They can however be brought to a state of reflective awareness by means of what Gadamer calls a “fusion of horizons” between the standpoint of the interpreter and the standpoint of the other culture.

In the 1960s and 1970s Gadamer’s philosophy was criticised by Jürgen Habermas on grounds of failure to address issues of power, ideology, and material conflict in social life. Habermas (1988) argued that hermeneutics raises a false claim to universality when it overlooks the imbrication of linguistic communication with relations of domination. He argued that Gadamer’s and other hermeneutic philosophies need to be emended to incorporate critical assessment of the rationality of social practices in a non relativistic framework. Habermas compared hermeneutics to Marxian ideology critique and Freudian psychoanalysis. He argued that as Marx showed how ideologies can disguise oppressive social class relations, so Freud showed how all psychological interpretation is necessarily guided toward emancipation of the patient from irrational repressions.

Writers such as Ricoeur (1981) and Taylor (1985) have criticized Habermas’s position for ignoring the sense in which both ideology critique and Freudian psychoanalysis are themselves situated in specifically western post Enlightenment contexts of thought and therefore reflect specific pre judgments of their own. In general, however, Habermas’s arguments point to some notable limits around the scope of hermeneutics in social theory. In a similar spirit, other critics such as Roy Bhaskar, Anthony Giddens, and Pierre Bourdieu have argued that hermeneutics is informative only when it does not collapse material, economic, and systemic factors in social life into purely “mental” or “subjective” elements. In this sense, hermeneutics does not obviate the requirements of realist epistemology in social science. It demonstrates that all ideas of social reality depend on interpretation, but it does not show that social reality is reducible to interpretation, or that all causal relations in social life

can be encompassed purely in terms of aspects of meaning or symbolization.

In addition to influencing current sociological thought, the hermeneutic tradition’s attention to textuality and interpretation informs related scholarship in a range of academic disciplines, including philosophy and rhetoric.

SEE ALSO: Behaviorism; Deconstruction; Functionalism/Neofunctionalism; Phenomenology; Positivism; Semiotics; Structuralism; *Verstehen*

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heterosexual imaginary

Chrys Ingraham

Culture installs meaning in our lives from the very first moment we enter the social world. Our sexual orientation or sexual identity is defined by the symbolic order of that world through the use of verbal as well as nonverbal language. How we come to understand what it means to be heterosexual is a product of a culture’s symbolic

order and its organizing practices. Heterosexuality as a *social* category is much more than the fact of one's sexual or affectional attractions. What we think of when we talk about heterosexuality or refer to ourselves as heterosexual is a product of a society's meaning making processes. In reality, heterosexuality operates as a highly organized social institution that varies across culture, history, region, religion, ethnicity, nationality, race, lifespan, social class, and ability.

The task of examining this highly pervasive and taken for granted social arrangement requires a conceptual framework capable of revealing how heterosexuality has become institutionalized, naturalized, and normalized. Any attempt to examine the institution of heterosexuality and its incumbent meanings requires a theory and methodology capable of inquiring into its naturalized operation and pervasive social practices (e.g., dating, proms, weddings, Valentine's Day, online dating services, etc.).

French psychoanalyst Jacques Lacan's concept of the imaginary is especially useful for this purpose. According to Lacan, the imaginary is the unmediated contact an infant has to its own image and its connection with its mother. Instead of facing a complicated, conflictual, and contradictory world, the infant experiences the illusion of tranquility, plenitude, and fullness. In other words, infants experience a sense of oneness with their primary caretaker. Louis Althusser, a French philosopher, borrowed Lacan's notion of the imaginary for his neo-Marxist theory of ideology, defining ideology as "the imaginary relationship of individuals to their real conditions of existence" (Althusser 1971: 52). The "imaginary" here does not mean "false" or "pretend" but, rather, an imagined or illusory relationship between an individual and their social world. Applied to a social theory of heterosexuality, the *heterosexual imaginary* is that way of thinking that relies on romantic and sacred notions of heterosexuality in order to create and maintain the illusion of well being and oneness. This romantic view prevents us from seeing how institutionalized heterosexuality actually works to organize gender while preserving racial, class, and sexual hierarchies. The effect of this illusory depiction of reality is that heterosexuality is taken for granted and

unquestioned while gender is understood as something people are socialized into or learn. The heterosexual imaginary naturalizes male to female social relations, rituals, and organized practices and conceals the operation of heterosexuality in structuring gender across race, class, and sexuality. This way of seeing closes off any critical analysis of heterosexuality as an organizing institution and the ends it serves (Ingraham 1994, 1999). By leaving heterosexuality unexamined as an institution we do not explore how it is learned, what it keeps in place, and the interests it serves in the way it is currently practiced. Through the use of the heterosexual imaginary, we hold up the institution of heterosexuality as timeless, devoid of historical variation, and as "just the way it is" while creating social practices that reinforce the illusion that as long as one complies with this prevailing and naturalized structure, all will be right in the world. This illusion is commonly known as romance. Romancing heterosexuality is creating an illusory heterosexuality.

The lived reality of institutionalized heterosexuality is, however, not typically tranquil or safe. The consequences the heterosexual imaginary produces include, for example, marital rape, domestic violence, pay inequities, racism, gay bashing, femicide, and sexual harassment. Institutionalized heterosexuality and its organizing ideology – the heterosexual imaginary – establishes those behaviors we ascribe to men and women – gender – while keeping in place or producing a history of contradictory and unequal social relations. The production of a division of labor that results in unpaid domestic work, inequalities of pay and opportunity, or the privileging of married couples in the dissemination of insurance benefits are examples of this.

Above all, the heterosexual imaginary naturalizes the regulation of sexuality through the institution of marriage and state domestic relations laws. These laws, among others, set the terms for taxation, health care, and housing benefits on the basis of marital status. Rarely challenged – except by nineteenth century marriage reformers and early second wave feminists – laws and public and private sector policies use marriage as the primary requirement for

social and economic benefits and access rather than distributing resources on some other basis, such as citizenship or ability to breathe, for example.

A related concept useful for the study of the heterosexual imaginary and of institutionalized heterosexuality is heteronormativity. This is the view that institutionalized heterosexuality constitutes the standard for legitimate and expected social and sexual relations. Heteronormativity represents one of the main premises underlying the heterosexual imaginary, again ensuring that the organization of heterosexuality in everything from gender to weddings to marital status is held up as both a model and as “normal.” Consider, for instance, the ways many surveys or intake questionnaires ask respondents to check off their marital status as either married, divorced, separated, widowed, single, or, in some cases, never married. Not only are these categories presented as significant indices of social identity, they are offered as the only options, implying that the organization of identity in relation to marriage is universal and not in need of explanation.

The sociological importance of the theory of heterosexual imaginary is in its usefulness in researching issues related to gender and sexuality. Integrating this concept into sociological study holds enormous promise for placing a check and balance on a researcher’s standpoint, thus ensuring a more objective outcome.

SEE ALSO: Compulsory Heterosexuality; Essentialism and Constructionism; Femininities/Masculinities; Heterosexuality; Homophobia and Heterosexism; Ideology

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heterosexuality

Stevi Jackson

Before we can even discuss heterosexuality, we need some terminology clarification. The words “sex” and “sexual” can be used to refer to the erotic (e.g., “having sex,” “sexual fantasies”) or to denote differences between men and women (as in “the two sexes” or “the sexual division of labor”). This semantic confusion reflects some of the taken for granted assumptions underpinning everyday understandings of sexuality: that to be born with a particular set of genitals (“sex organs”) defines one as a member of a particular “sex” (male or female) and as destined to be erotically (“sexually”) attracted to and to “have sex” with the other “sex.” The introduction of the concept of gender, which emphasized the social character of the division between women and men, and the emergence of social constructionist perspectives on sexuality have made it possible to demystify the relationship between genitals, gender, and heterosexuality. Some confusion, however, persists in that some theorists continue to use “sex” to denote what sociologists generally term “gender.” In what follows, unless otherwise stated, gender refers to all aspects of the division and distinction between women and men, while the words sex, sexual, and sexuality are reserved for erotic aspects of life.

The term heterosexuality, as it is used in everyday language, denotes sexual attraction to and relationships between differently gendered individuals. In this sense it is a mode of erotic interaction between women and men. From a sociological perspective, however, heterosexuality entails more than merely a sexual practice or preference: it is deeply embedded in wider social relations and practices, institutionalized as the “normal” form of human sexual relationship and as the basis of marriage, family, and kinship relationships. It is recognized by the state through laws and practices governing welfare, taxation, inheritance, and other spheres of governance affecting families. Heterosexuality is inextricably interrelated with gender: it is defined by and helps perpetuate the division of society into two gender categories. Many

aspects of gender division and inequality are associated with heterosexuality. For example, the domestic division of labor and the gap between wages earned by men and women are products of a social order where adults are expected to live in heterosexual couples in which men are the main breadwinners. One of the main foci of studies of heterosexuality, therefore, has been its relationship with gender. The other has been its normative and privileged status, which has marginalized those who do not conform and served to legitimate the stigmatization of gay men and lesbians – historically often with brutal effect.

Heterosexuality might seem to be a human universal, but it is also historically and culturally variable in form. Heterosexual unions can be polygamous or monogamous, based on personal choice or founded on arrangements between kin, and have coexisted at times with socially approved homoerotic and homosocial bonds. Heterosexuality cannot therefore be assumed to have the same meaning or the same place in all societies at all times. Moreover, heterosexuality itself has a history: the concept was coined in the nineteenth century, along with “homosexuality,” in order to differentiate what was deemed “normal” from what was deemed “perverse.”

The term heterosexuality is less often used in everyday language than “homosexuality,” largely because it is simply the taken for granted norm. It is thus an “unmarked” term, one privileged through remaining unsaid. Heterosexual people are generally not expected to identify themselves as such, are rarely called upon to justify or explain their sexuality. Until the last few decades of the twentieth century sociologists largely shared this commonsense view. Thus, while many aspects of heterosexual relations, such as marriage, families, and kinship, had become objects of sociological enquiry, heterosexuality itself was assumed rather than analyzed, taken as given rather than being subjected to critical scrutiny.

During the late 1960s and early 1970s, with changes within sociology and in the wider social and political climate, heterosexual relations began to be questioned. Social constructionism gained ground within sociology, making more critical perspectives on heterosexuality possible. In their classic text, *Sexual Conduct* (1973), John Gagnon and William Simon argued that human

sexuality, far from being ordained by nature, was the product of social scripts. Sociologists working on deviance redefined it as a product of the social rules that defined the boundaries of conventionality and the social processes whereby individuals were labeled deviant. The implications of these perspectives were that heterosexuality was no more natural than homosexuality, the boundary between them was a social construct rather than a natural given, and that heterosexuality was “normal” only by virtue of social definition. A new generation of sociologists, influenced by the rise of gay liberation and second wave feminism, began to draw on these and other radical perspectives to develop critiques of male dominated heterosexual institutions and practices. Gay scholars such as Mike Brake (1976) began to name the heterosexual family as a source of exclusion and oppression, while feminists defined these same family structures as central to women’s subordination. Feminists also began to question the assumption of “natural” differences between men and women and therefore the idea of a natural mutual attraction between “opposite sexes” destined to complement each other in conjugal unions.

From the early 1970s feminist scholars and researchers began documenting sources of women’s discontent within heterosexual relationships, although they did not always identify heterosexuality as the object of critique. Where specifically sexual practices were concerned, feminists challenged the denial of sexual pleasure and agency to women on the one hand and, on the other, sexual coercion and violence. In arguing for women’s sexual autonomy feminists not only attacked the double standard of morality, but also questioned the definition and ordering of “the sex act” itself. Following Anne Koedt’s widely cited article “The Myth of the Vaginal Orgasm” (1972), feminists argued that equating sex with penetrative vaginal intercourse (prioritizing male orgasm while relegating acts producing female orgasm to the status of “foreplay”) constituted a male defined view of sex – though only a few noted that it was equally heterosexually defined. Feminists also paid considerable attention to sexual coercion and violence, making connections between being pressured into unwanted sex, everyday sexual harassment, and rape. Rape was seen as

a reflection of everyday sexual mores, a product of the social construction of male sexuality as an unstoppable force expressed through pursuit and conquest of women. Moreover, fear of rape was identified as a form of social control, limiting women's freedom of movement and legitimating their appropriation by one man in order to protect them from others. Even here, though, heterosexuality *per se* remained unproblematic. For example, Brownmiller's (1975) classic and encyclopedic analysis of rape never wavered from the assumption of a universally heterosexual world.

At the same time, considerable attention was given to marriage, the linchpin of institutionalized heterosexuality. Through the 1970s and early 1980s a great deal of research accumulated on power and economic dependence within marriage and especially on housework and the domestic division of labor. From the mid 1970s some feminists began to make an explicit connection with heterosexuality. Charlotte Brunch, for example pointed out that "heterosexuality upholds the home, housework, the family as both a personal and economic unit." Most analyses of domestic labor in North America and the UK, however, were oriented to debates on its utility for capitalism, precluding a focus on the heterosexual contract within which this labor took place.

In France, however, a different approach was being elaborated by a group of radical materialist feminists organized around the journal *Questions féministes* who, in the first issue of their journal published in 1979, made explicit the connection between the social construction of the categories "men" and "women" and the divide between heterosexuality and homosexuality. This group included Christine Delphy, who analyzed marriage as a relationship founded on men's appropriation of women's labor, and Colette Guillaumin, who analyzed male domination in terms of the individual and collective appropriation of women's bodies and labor. Drawing on these ideas, Monique Wittig published a series of articles between 1976 and 1981 in which she elaborates on an analysis of the category of sex (the socially constructed division between women and men) as "the product of a heterosexual society in which men appropriate for themselves the reproduction and production of women and their physical persons by means

of . . . the marriage contract" (Wittig 1992: 6). She argues that women and men are defined by virtue of their location within the heterosexual contract and likens lesbians, as fugitives from this contract, to runaway slaves and contends that since "woman" has no meaning outside heterosexual systems of thought, lesbians "are not women" (p. 32).

Another founding text of this time was Adrienne Rich's "Compulsory Heterosexuality and Lesbian Existence" (1980). Like Wittig, Rich contested heterosexuality's privileged status as an unquestioned norm. She argued that rather than being natural it was imposed upon women through the erasure of lesbian existence from history and by a range of social practices that constrained women into personal subjection to men. Compulsory heterosexuality thus kept women *in*, within its confines, and kept them *down*, subordinate. Whereas Wittig had argued that lesbians are not women, Rich suggested that all women were potentially lesbians. Rather than emphasizing the differences between lesbian and heterosexual women, Rich argued that all forms of sociality and solidarity among women were part of a lesbian continuum.

Wittig and Rich were both writing at a time when radical or political lesbianism was becoming an increasingly vocal political tendency within feminism on both sides of the Atlantic. Groups such as the New York Radicalesbians and later, in the UK, the Leeds Revolutionary feminists saw lesbianism as a form of resistance to patriarchy and heterosexual feminism as holding back the cause of women's liberation. While Wittig's work was more in tune with this perspective, Rich's was seen as insufficiently radical in allowing heterosexual feminists to consider themselves part of a lesbian continuum while they continued to consort with men (Jeffreys 1990). The concept of compulsory heterosexuality, however, has stood the test of time and continues, alongside some of Wittig's insights, to inform contemporary debates.

During the 1980s feminist discussions of heterosexuality became more muted, as debates shifted to new terrain. Competing perspectives on heterosexuality, however, remained an undercurrent in the heated exchanges between libertarian and anti violence feminists. The former focused on the rigid morality of straight society and thus on heterosexuality's normative

status. Rubin (1984), for example, analyzed the climate of “sex negativity” that resulted in the penalization of all forms of sexuality that lay outside the “charmed circle” of heterosexual monogamy. The latter saw heterosexual relations as a locus of male domination. Thus, Catherine MacKinnon argued that gender was the product of men’s appropriation of women’s sexuality. Two quite separate lines of critique were emerging – of heteronormativity and of heterosexuality’s interrelationship with gender hierarchy – which were to inform the debates of the 1990s.

At the same time, new perspectives on sexuality were emerging following the English publication of the first volume of Michel Foucault’s *The History of Sexuality*. Foucault’s (1979) approach to power as primarily productive rather than repressive and his analytical focus on the discursive constitution of objects of knowledge facilitated a rethinking of the heterosexual/homosexual distinction. From a Foucauldian perspective these concepts did not come into being in order to name preexisting categories; rather, they brought those categories into being. Whereas in previous eras it was particular sexual conduct that was policed, with particular acts condemned or outlawed, in the late nineteenth century categories of sexual persons were created – it became possible, as Foucault said, to *be* a homosexual. A corollary of this is that heterosexuality does not define a pre-given norm, but creates it – that far from being a natural state, heterosexuality is a historical construct, an invention (Katz 1995). Foucault’s arguments were to inform a new perspective that emerged in the 1990s – queer theory – which was also influenced more generally by postmodern thinking and by such writers as Lacan and Derrida.

Queer theory is not easy to define and some contest the utility of the term, but it has become a convenient shorthand for approaches that seek in some way to trouble heterosexuality, to destabilize the boundaries between heterosexuality and homosexuality and to interrogate the binaries of gay/straight and man/woman. Queer theory’s critique of heterosexuality tends to focus on its normative status, but also questions its stability, revealing the ways in which it depends upon its excluded “other” in order to secure its boundaries. Here sexuality is

seen as fluid and contingent and neither heterosexual nor homosexual identities are assumed to be fixed or unitary (Seidman 1997). While queer theory developed from rather different preoccupations from feminism, there was considerable overlap with feminist critique. Both questioned the inevitability and naturalness of heterosexuality and both, to some extent at least, linked the binary divide of gender with that between heterosexuality and homosexuality. This is probably most evident in the early work of Judith Butler, which is often identified as both feminist and queer. The object of her critique is the heterosexual matrix, the regulatory fictions that link sex, gender, and heterosexuality together as a seemingly natural, compulsory order, producing gender as an effect of compulsory heterosexuality. Butler’s radical denaturalization of gender and of the heterosexual/homosexual binary owes much to Wittig’s analysis, but reinterpreted through postmodern theory with the emphasis on bringing gender and sexual identities into question rather than on gender as a form of social inequality. As a result of this emphasis, even feminist variants of queer theory tend to focus on heteronormativity, saying rather little about what goes on *within* heterosexual relations.

Other feminists, however, continued to be concerned with relationships within heterosexuality. The rise of queer theory in the 1990s coincided with a revival of feminist work on heterosexuality, developing and reformulating earlier analyses of its intersection with gender. Rather than treating heterosexuality as a monolithic entity, feminists began to analyze its different facets, considering heterosexuality as institution and identity and in terms of everyday experience and practice (Richardson 1996; Jackson 1999). In so doing they recovered earlier feminist insights, pointing out that heterosexuality was not simply a form of sexual desire and conduct, but of the wider social relations between women and men. In the domestic arena, therefore, heterosexuality was as much about who washed and ironed the sheets as what went on between them (Jackson 1999). Hence, attention was refocused on the gendered character of heterosexuality while, at the same time, making evident the heterosexual character of gender relations. In a key article, “The Heterosexual Imaginary,” Chrys Ingraham argued that

since gender concerns relations between men and women, it is fundamentally ordered by heterosexuality.

These new feminist analyses facilitated a separation of the critique of heterosexuality as an institution from heterosexual identity, experience, and practice. It is now possible to discuss the potential pleasures of heterosexual sex as well as its constraints and to analyze the ways in which heterosexuality is implicated in the perpetuation of a male dominated social order without being critical of individual women for *being* heterosexual. Heterosexual identity can then be analyzed as differing for women and men, but also as often being not an identity as such at all, but a means of validating other aspects of feminine and masculine identities – in asymmetrically gendered ways. For example, first heterosexual is often seen as “making a boy a man,” but not making a girl a woman (Holland et al. 1996). Focusing on actual everyday heterosexual experiences and practices enables sociologists to explore persistent inequalities in heterosexuality, while also taking account of its variability; to consider heterosexual sexuality, but to link it with wider aspects of gendered, heterosexual social relations. For example, recent empirical research has found that despite greater sexual freedom, aspirations towards gender equality, and women’s greater social and economic autonomy, heterosexual sex remains male dominated. Young women, in particular, find it difficult to achieve a sense of sexual agency (Tolman 2002). One group of researchers have suggested that heterosexual sex is not governed by the tensions between masculinity and femininity – it is *masculinity* that regulates the sexuality of both young men and young women (Holland et al. 1998). Such research suggests that, despite the late modern rhetoric of female sexual autonomy and pleasure, women still discipline themselves to conform to an idea of sexuality that prioritizes men’s desires. This parallels other aspects of heterosexual relationship where women continue to do the bulk of the emotional and physical work that maintains the heterosexual couple as a going concern.

The debates of the 1990s have given critical perspectives on heterosexuality a higher profile within social theory and social research. This is

most evident in approaches to sexuality, where studies of heterosexuality can no longer masquerade as studies of sexuality in general. Heterosexuality is routinely named as such, treated as only one form of sexuality, its normative status subject to scrutiny rather than taken as given. In studies of gender, too, heterosexuality is less often merely assumed. Sociologists working on family life are now more likely to be aware of diversity of sexual relations as one of many aspects of family diversity and therefore less likely to take heterosexuality as given. In the wider social and political arena heterosexuality’s privileged status is now more openly contested within debates on gay and lesbian rights, especially with respect to the issue of gay and lesbian marriage or civil partnerships. Yet, in everyday life, despite advances in the rights of lesbians and gays in many countries, heterosexuality’s normative status is rarely questioned.

SEE ALSO: Family Diversity; Feminism; Feminism, First, Second, and Third Waves; Gay and Lesbian Movement; Heterosexual Imaginary; Homosexuality; Inequality/Stratification, Gender; Lesbian Feminism; Lesbianism; Queer Theory; Sex and Gender

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hidden curriculum

Laura Hamilton and Brian Powell

The hidden curriculum refers to the unofficial rules, routines, and structures of schools through which students learn behaviors, values, beliefs, and attitudes. Elements of the hidden curriculum do not appear in schools' written goals, formal lesson plans, or learning objectives although they may reflect culturally dominant social values and ideas about what schools should teach. Of the three major approaches to the hidden curriculum, the functionalist orientation is most concerned with how hidden curricula reproduce unified societies, the conflict perspective focuses on the reproduction of stratified societies, and symbolic interactionism more fully incorporates interactional context to our understanding of the hidden curriculum.

Because of its focus on education as a tool in maintaining orderly societies and producing appropriately socialized individuals, functionalist works are often collected under the label of consensus theory. Consensus theory depicts schools as benign institutions that rationally sort and order individuals in order to fill high and low status positions, meeting society's need for both experts and low skilled workers. As a concept, the hidden curriculum has its roots in Émile Durkheim's *Education and Sociology* (1922) and *Moral Education* (1925). Durkheim concluded that society could not function without a high degree of homogeneity and that education, as a highly regulated institution, could provide this level of similarity. Drawing upon Durkheim's work, Philip Jackson in *Life in Classrooms* (1968) coined the term "hidden curriculum." Along with other consensualist theorists of that period, he noted that British and American schools teach children to sacrifice autonomy, control, and attention to those with more power, repress their own personal identity and desires, and accept the legitimacy of being treated as a category along with others.

Although the concept of the hidden curriculum originated in the functionalist works of Durkheim, conflict theorists further developed theoretical concepts of the hidden curriculum. In general, conflict theorists argue that education serves to preserve the social class structure. Early challenges to the functionalist approach came from Neo Marxist theorists who suggested that schooling serves the demands of more powerful social institutions and groups. In their influential work *Schooling in Capitalist America*, Samuel Bowles and Herbert Gintis (1976) contended that students are educated in ways that make them suitable for varying levels of ownership, autonomy, and control in the capitalist system. They learn skills, develop a consciousness, and internalize norms that suit their future work. This connection between the social relations of school life and the social relations of production was labeled the correspondence principle. Theories that rely on the correspondence principle are also known as reproduction theories, as they explain how education reproduces social inequalities.

Reproduction theories, however, faced criticism in the early 1980s as some conflict theorists pushed for a less deterministic view of

education's role in maintaining the class system. In *Learning to Labor*, Paul Willis (1981) introduced the concept of resistance to reproduction theories. He found that the working class English boys in his study resisted both the official and hidden curriculums of their secondary schools. Although resistance had the effect of channeling the boys into working class futures, the idea of resistance loosened the rigid theoretical approach to the hidden curriculum. The concept of resistance allowed conflict theorists to see the hidden curriculum as contestable and perhaps malleable.

Similar to the conflict approach, symbolic interactionists who address the hidden curriculum see education as sorting students by their ascribed characteristics into stratified social positions. However, the symbolic interactionist approach shifts the focal point to a micro level, looking at how face to face interactions in the classroom contribute to the creation and maintenance of inequalities. Symbolic interactionists are most concerned with how classroom dynamics create patterned advantages and disadvantages and how academic interactions mold students' personalities, skills, and behaviors.

Early work in the symbolic interactionist tradition noted that certain students are labeled as "good learners" while others are seen as "troublemakers" and that these labels often corresponded to a student's race, class, or gender. Regardless of their previous ability level, negatively labeled students are more likely to perform poorly while positively labeled students are more likely to perform well. The labeling process therefore creates what Merton called the self fulfilling prophecy; students internalize the labels assigned to them and learn to behave in ways that match their labels. More recent work in the symbolic interactionist tradition has extended the focus from labeling to examine other ways in which teachers mold students' bodies, behaviors, and attitudes. They also recognize the importance of peer interactions, the physical environment, and teachers' interactions with each other and the administration.

While the functionalist approach assumes a consensual relationship between schools and societies, both the conflict and symbolic interactionist approaches see educational processes as creating and perpetuating social inequalities. These two approaches illustrate how class, race,

and gender identities are produced and how these markers are used to privilege some students over others. Nevertheless, scholars disagree over the extent to which class, race, and gender differences are intensified as a result of the hidden curriculum. This dissensus is due in part to the variability of hidden curricula over time, place, location, and interaction context and in part to the difficulty of studying and measuring a curriculum that is not explicitly stated.

Some scholars posit that the hidden curricula carry powerful class – based and race – based messages. Pierre Bourdieu and Basil Bernstein, for example, suggest that schools also create social environments that better match with the class backgrounds of middle and upper class students. Through the hidden curriculum, students get the message that middle and upper class cultural values, norms, and attitudes are the standard by which all else is measured. Schools reward conformity to these cultural norms and certify certain methods of learning as the standard. These learning methods are likely to better match middle and upper class styles of interaction and penalize lower or working class students. Physical spaces can also be marked by class, making some students more at home than others. The marking of space is particularly salient at higher levels of schooling: the physical environments in institutions that produce elite members of society such as law or medical schools are often tailored to the cultural norms and tastes of the advantaged.

To the extent that the hidden, and formal, curriculum is geared to the white majority, it is possible that the hidden curriculum inadvertently encourages, in the words of John Ogbu, an "oppositional culture." He argued that racial minorities with a history of enslavement, conquest, or colonization come to see academic achievement and participation in the dominant culture as a threat to group identity and loyalty. Oppositional culture can be considered part of the hidden curriculum as involuntary minorities learn through school that academic success is "acting white." The theory of oppositional culture, however, has been challenged by Douglas Downey and James Ainsworth Darnell among others who find that minorities place just as much if not more value on academic success than do their white peers and that

oppositional culture is a class not race based phenomenon.

Some scholars contend that the hidden curriculum – again in tandem with the formal curriculum – creates and supports gender differentiation. Some scholars have noted that starting in kindergarten, teachers use gender dichotomies that mark and make gender difference salient, using gender groupings to address students, separate them, and create adversarial groups in competitions. There is also some evidence that teachers respond differently to girls and boys. For example, some studies indicate that since boys are often more disruptive than girls in elementary classroom, they are given greater positive and negative attention while girls are left to their own devices. Teacher practices also may affect how girls and boys learn to move in their bodies, teaching girls to take up less space, react passively to threats, regulate movements and speech at higher levels, and place greater value on body adornment than boys. Other scholars have suggested that teachers' beliefs regarding sex differences in math, science, and verbal aptitude may influence their teaching practices and in turn students' performance and interest in different topics. In addition, the content of textbooks and lesson plans in which males are more represented than are females arguably may shape boys and girls' views regarding their own abilities as well as their ambitions.

Research on gender and the hidden curriculum has indicated that peer culture is one of the most influential ways in which gendered behaviors are encouraged and perpetuated. Early on, children also segregate by gender, maintaining cross gender boundaries through romantic teasing. Studies indicate that boys achieve high status in middle and secondary schools on the basis of their athletic ability, coolness, toughness, social skills, and success in cross gender relationships while girls gain popularity because of their parents' socioeconomic status, their own physical appearance, and social skills. These values also may be transmitted through extracurricular activities, most notably the greater financial support typically given to male sports.

Social markers such as class, race, and gender are not only salient within the hidden curricula of education systems. They also reflect forms of hierarchy and differentiation that exist

in other societal institutions. In fact, what the orists now see as the hidden curriculum of social control in the United States was once part of the explicit mission of education. This curriculum only became "hidden" as discussion of education shifted to increasingly individualistic terms. Although scholarship of the past few decades has unearthed this hidden curriculum, we still know little about how hidden curricula enter, change, and move out of schools. Moreover, other institutions (e.g., family, medicine, religion, and economy) intersect and shape both the formal and informal curricula of schools. Studying how the hidden curriculum is embedded within these contexts could lead to more informative and potentially transforming scholarship.

SEE ALSO: Cultural Capital in Schools; Differential Treatment of Children by Sex; Educational Inequality; Extracurricular Activities; Gender, Education and; Race and Schools; Self Fulfilling Prophecy; Stratification: Functional and Conflict Theories; Teaching and Gender

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hierarchical linear models

J. Kyle Roberts

The history of hierarchical linear modeling (also called multilevel modeling) can be linked to the seminal work of Robinson (1950) in recognizing contextual effects. The theory that

Robinson illustrated is also sometimes referred to as the “frog/pond” theory and bears discussion here. Suppose that a biologist has two frogs lying on an examination table that both weigh 500 grams and are both 1 year old. Consider further that Frog A was drawn from Pond A where it was the largest 1 year old frog in the pond, and Frog B was drawn from Pond B where it was the smallest 1 year old frog in the pond. The possible disregard of the contextual effect of the frogs’ habitat could lead to some erroneous conclusions about frog development if the two frogs were considered outside of the pond from which they were drawn.

Placing this same contextual argument in educational terms, let us suppose that a researcher is interested in monitoring reading proficiency among students within New Mexico’s schools. In testing differences among the schools, the researcher might use an analysis of variance (or ANOVA) to test for differences between mean reading proficiency scores across schools. As was noted with the frog/pond illustration, doing so would neglect the fact that some of the schools closer to the border of Mexico might have a larger number of non English speaking students. Neglecting this structure might lead a researcher to assume that a school is doing poorly in reading education, when in fact that school might be doing a superb job given the make up of students that attend that school.

The strength of the hierarchical linear model (HLM) is that it capitalizes on these contextual effects and models data analysis such that the effect of grouping structures can be included as an integral component of the analysis. Since hierarchical linear modeling may be regarded as an extension of the general linear model (GLM), it subsumes most statistical techniques like ANOVA (see above), analysis of covariance (ANCOVA; comparing group means on a dependent variable after controlling for a covariate), multivariate analysis of variance (MANOVA; comparing group means on multiple dependent variables), regression, and canonical correlation. The advantage of HLM over simple regression or ANOVA is that it allows the researcher to look at hierarchically structured data and interpret results without ignoring these structures.

The structure of data within an HLM design is relatively straightforward. Sometimes referred

to as nesting, the structure of an HLM data set is defined when data at the lowest level of the hierarchy are organized inside higher levels that are considered to determine the context of the lower level responses. Consider the following examples of hierarchical data sets: students nested within classrooms, students nested within schools, students nested within classrooms nested within schools (3 levels), people nested within districts nested within states, measurement occasions nested within subjects (repeated measures), students cross classified by school and neighborhood, students having multiple membership within schools across time (longitudinal data), and children nested inside families. Each of these examples illustrates data that are considered hierarchical in structure. Data derived from such hierarchical designs may be correlated based on the context from which they are drawn, and any subsequent analysis must take this into account.

The structure of a hierarchical linear model looks surprisingly similar to a regression format. Let us suppose that we have a data set in which we are trying to predict the amount of delinquency in children based on student GPAs. If we were to consider this model in a normal regression setting, we would simply place all of our students in a single data set and then make generalities about the relative contribution of GPA in explaining child delinquency. As any good sociologist knows, this model could have surprisingly different outcomes based on the type of school in which the data are collected. Let us use the state of Texas as a test case. In rural west Texas, it would be surprising to find any relationship between GPA and delinquency. With graduating classes sometimes approaching the teens, generally all of the students of the same age in these small rural towns are involved in the same activities and would have similar levels of delinquency (if delinquency can even be measured in these areas). Contrast this school to an inner city low SES school in one of the four large metropolitan areas in Texas. In this school, it may well be that student GPA is a very good predictor of child delinquency. Although this is probably not the most robust of analyses, it does help prove a point: the ability of HLM to consider context could prove paramount in studies where social settings differ between samples.

So just how does HLM do this? Answering this question would take multiple volumes, and is not the point of this entry. However, a quick answer is merited. Conceptually, HLM honors the nesting structure of a data set by simultaneously performing multiple analyses based on the grouping variable. For example, suppose that the above example of GPA and delinquency was performed for 100 students housed in eight different schools. In the first step of HLM we would perform a regression for each school in which we used GPA to predict child delinquency. After this was done, we would have eight slopes and eight intercepts for each of the eight schools. Through maximum likelihood procedures we would then produce a weighted least squares average of the eight intercepts to produce a fixed intercept value (also called the grand estimate for the intercept). Through the same procedures, we would produce a weighted average fixed slope. These estimates can be thought of as the “average” intercept and slope for the combination of the eight schools. We can then use these fixed estimates to go back and reestimate the corrected slopes and intercepts for individual schools based on empirical Bayesian procedures. These are called the random estimates. What we now have are grand estimates that give us information about what is going on in all schools simultaneously, and the random estimates for each school. This can be very helpful, as in the case of delinquency, for examining which schools are performing at different levels from other schools. Furthermore, we have moved beyond asking “Are the schools different?” to “Why are the schools different?”

SEE ALSO: ANOVA (Analysis of Variance); General Linear Model; Multivariate Analysis

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high school sports

C. Roger Rees

High school sports, arguably the most popular extracurricular activity in American schools, have been inextricably linked to the ideology of modernity. Conventional wisdom has it that participants in interscholastic athletics learn educational skills necessary for success in higher education and positive cultural values upon which they can draw as they develop into productive and well balanced adults. In short, there is widespread public faith that participation in sports “builds character” in the broadest sense of the term. This faith has, for the most part, remained unshaken despite three decades of sociological research from diverse theoretical perspectives that has produced mixed findings about the effects of interscholastic athletic participation.

The belief that sport played a positive role in the character formation of students originated when organized sports were first developed in the private boarding schools of nineteenth century Britain. In these schools a cult of athleticism formed the basis of the muscular Christian movement through which the sons (but not the daughters) of the upper middle class learned “manly” characteristics of leadership, courage, fair play, and patriotism through competitive sports. This movement also developed in the elite boarding schools of New England, which adopted a similar athletic curriculum to their British counterparts, and the value of sports as a socializing agent became “democratized” by the Playground Movement, the Young Men’s Christian Association, and the Public School Athletic League. By the second decade of the twentieth century the belief that school sport could be used to “socialize” students into positive academic and social values was institutionalized.

Contemporary proponents of school sports suggest that athletics is a positive influence on the formal education of students. They claim that participation in sports develops skills such as drive and determination, a positive self concept, and self confidence that are useful in the workplace. Sport increases high school athletes' positive attitudes towards the school, their academic aspirations and achievement, and provides them with opportunities to further their education at college. For less academically inclined students, sport provides the motivation to stay in school and therefore reduces the school dropout rate. Critics of school sport see it as part of a Faustian bargain between teachers and students, particularly students who are not academically motivated, by which sport provides the excitement to compensate for boring and irrelevant classes. Ethnically diverse students from different social strata can find unity in the drive for athletic victory against a common enemy symbolized by other schools. Because of their prominence in this struggle, athletes become the school leaders glorifying masculine values of achievement and aggression, and modeling a simplistic social Darwinist philosophy stressing survival of the fittest (although critics would say survival of the most belligerent) that legitimizes the status quo. Sport helps the school to reproduce the existing status hierarchy in society instead of providing students the skills and motivation to challenge it.

True to historically positivist traditions, research on school sports has examined the success of sport in providing athletes with skills necessary for future success. The relationship between athletics and academic success has been a popular research theme in this endeavor. Believers in the educational value of high school athletics argue that athletes have to practice efficient time management skills because of the time constraints imposed by school athletics, and that the self esteem supposedly gained from sports can transfer to academics. To support such claims they can point to research showing that athletes have similar or higher grade point averages than non athletes, and to more recent results from longitudinal research showing that participation has a small positive effect on grades and on dropout rates. Skeptics suggest that this "athletic effect" is part of a larger selection

process, since athletes tend to come from socio economically advanced backgrounds typical of students with higher grades. Also, they could be graded more leniently than non athletes, could benefit from special tutoring, or take easy courses in order to remain academically eligible to play.

Disagreement over the positive and negative effects of sport has also characterized the research on the relationship between participation and "delinquent" behavior by high school athletes. Approaches based on functionalist theory depict involvement as having a deterrent or reform effect by providing a system of rules and a code of behavior that gives athletes a positive sense of direction and a legitimate means of achieving their goals. Critical perspectives highlight the power of "the sports ethic" to reinforcing "positive deviance" in which athletes attach so much importance to team victory that they will do whatever it takes to win, even if it means taking performance enhancing substances or injuring their opponents on purpose. Longitudinal research has also examined the relationship between participation and the recreational behavior of athletes outside sport, including "risky" behavior such as binge drinking and sexual activity. As before, the results have been mixed. For example, whereas female athletes reported lower rates of sexual experience and fewer partners than did non athletes, the opposite was true for male athletes.

Clearly, the nature of the relationship between academics, delinquency, and school sports remains controversial. Although the longitudinal research has improved on the early cross sectional research designs because it has been able to isolate athletic effects instead of just comparing athlete and non athlete groups, it has not challenged the positivist assumptions that sport can help "fix" social problems such as lack of educational achievement or delinquency. The results of these studies need to be considered in conjunction with research that describes the relative importance of athletics and education in the social and cultural milieu of school life, and which examines sport as part of the "lived experience" of students. These studies tend to highlight the importance of high school sport to the social life of students and to place it at the center of the "hidden curriculum," the unofficial values system that students learn

through informal interaction in extracurricular activities.

The issue of gender identity is a prominent theme here. Feminists have challenged the historically positivist assumptions behind the development of school sports through the assertion that sports have always been linked to the promotion of masculinity. The fear that males were becoming "feminized" led to the origination of school sports and to their contemporary popularity. Some sports are still seen as being suitable only for boys or for girls. For example, the defining characteristics of violence and aggression make football a "male" sport, whereas gymnastics with its emphasis on aesthetics is seen as a "feminine" sport. Such stereotyping supports an "oppositional" view of gender, and has negative repercussions for athletes who risk labels such as "fags" or "dikes" if they play sports that are not "appropriate" for their gender. The male "jock" identity is often constructed around dominant images of masculinity based on victory, physical power, and heterosexuality. The frequent location of male athletes at the top of the status hierarchy of the school and the characterization of them as "cool" by other groups means that boys from less "masculine" cliques sometimes include these macho characteristics in their own self identities. Homophobia is also a common theme in the way male athletes treat females and in the content of hazing rituals by which entry to the team is unofficially "celebrated." It is not clear what effect if any the great increase in girls' participation in high school sport over the past 20 years is having on issues of masculinity and femininity. Critical feminists have argued that this increase has the potential for females to reduce the hypermasculine characteristics of high school athletics, but also that female sports run the risk of being coopted by the "male" model.

Race issues in high school sport are also controversial. Popular mythology sees sports as an ideal avenue for black youth to use their "natural" physical advantage over whites to gain athletic scholarships that allow them access to higher education and the long term benefits of a college degree. However, most sociologists would reject the authenticity of a biological theory of race, and would consider this racial

ideology to be a trap. Excelling at sport in high school is not a "way out of the ghetto" for the vast majority of African American males. Besides reinforcing the stereotype that all African American males live in ghettos in the first place, it marginalizes their academic credentials and encourages them to chase unrealistic "hoop dreams." The myth of genetic black athletic superiority also affects the sporting choices of white males who feel they are at a disadvantage when they compete in sports popular with African Americans. Negative racial ideology is also institutionalized in the naming of many high school mascots. Using caricatures of Native Americans trivializes their cultural heritage. Although the relationship between sports participation and ethnic identity in high school is understudied, current research calls into question the melting pot theory of high school sports. Sport can be used to reinforce ethnic identities, and can also be seen as a form of Anglo hegemony. For example, Doug Foley's (1990) study of Mexicanos in Texas high school football showed that involvement in sport was rejected by some working class Mexicano males, and also that Mexicanos who did participate were generally marginalized. High school football perpetuated Anglo power and privilege in the community.

Given the powerful belief that "sport builds character," research will continue to address the question of whether or to what degree athletics experiences comprise a valuable investment for the future success of youth. However, there is no singular sports experience in American high schools, so research comparing the characteristics of "athletes" to non athletes, or football players to swimmers, is likely to yield conflicting results. The power of sports to influence the life of students can be mediated by factors such as community and school traditions, past success, coaching philosophy, and the existence of an athlete identity. Accepting this reality means that future research should focus on in depth studies of high school athletics interacting with the culture of the school and community and the identity dynamics associated with sport participation. This approach would provide insights into how students view their own racial and ethnic identity in relation to athletic participation and fill a gap in our knowledge, particularly

with regard to female African American students. At the same time, the challenge for applied researchers interested in high school sports still remains how to help sport become more of a compassionate force in the social climate of the school and less of a haven for a jock culture that reinforces athletic elitism, hazing, bullying, and risky health practices such as binge drinking, steroid use, and extreme dieting. However, the excitement and controversy surrounding school sports is also “consumed” by the students and the public. Conceptualizing high school sport as a commodity stripped of functionalist assumptions about positive character development will increase among sociologists as the economics of big time sports (e.g., televising tournaments, naming rights for football fields and gymnasiums, expensive summer camps for elite players) become more prominent in high schools.

SEE ALSO: Gender, Sport and; Socialization and Sport; Sport; Sport, College; Sport and Race

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highbrow/lowbrow

David Halle

The distinction between “high culture” and “popular culture,” or “highbrow” and “lowbrow,” has underpinned most of the important debates about culture over the last 50 years in the US, Britain, and France especially, but also elsewhere. Theories of culture have tended either to presuppose this distinction or to debate various aspects of it. However, the nature of the debate has changed over time, and in particular the extent to which researchers and commentators are willing to stand by this distinction.

Partly this reflects the spread of higher education. Just after World War II there was a clear gap between an educated elite and the rest (only about 7 percent of the US population had a college degree) and it seemed plausible to talk about an elite of “highbrows” versus the rest. As a college degree became increasingly normal (held by over 25 percent of the US population these days) this education gap has faded, and so has the plausibility of maintaining that there are two radically different cultures, one pitched to an educated elite and the other pitched to the rest of the population. (The term “culture” itself is susceptible to many definitions, broad and narrow. Here I mostly use it in a fairly narrow sense to refer to the arts, namely literature, journalism, film, television, art, architecture, music, dance, and so on; but sometimes in the discussion below “culture” takes on a broader sense to include political beliefs, social attitudes, and religious beliefs.)

Four overall stages can be distinguished in the debates over “high/highbrow” and “popular/mass culture.” In the first stage, which flourished in the 1940s, 1950s, and 1960s, it was held that “highbrow” or “high culture” was unambiguously superior to “lowbrow” or “popular

culture.” From this perspective, “highbrow” culture was aesthetically rich and vital while “popular/lowbrow” culture was at best of little merit and at worst was harmful. “Popular/lowbrow” was often depicted as the standardized and homogenized products of large corporations who sold their wares to the unsophisticated “mass public.” By contrast, “high/highbrow” culture was the product of the skilled artist or craftsman and was appreciated by an elite, cultured audience. For example, in 1939 Clement Greenberg stressed the superiority of avant garde art over what he dismissed as “kitsch infected” mass art. Theodore Adorno, in the tradition of the Frankfurt School of sociology, berated popular music such as jazz, writing that the culture industry rooted out all deviations and that jazz had achieved musical dictatorship “over the masses.” In similar fashion, for about two decades after World War II the movies of Hollywood were typically denigrated by film critics (who were often based in New York City) as the epitome of commercial, mass culture and as the opposite of art, modernism, and New York City which, by contrast, was said to nurture serious, independent, and non commercial filmmaking.

The second stage in the debates over “high” and “popular” culture began in the late 1950s and early 1960s when researchers, especially sociologists, undertook empirical studies of “popular/lowbrow” culture and of the associated audience. These studies often challenged, on empirical grounds, the earlier claims that the products of “popular/lowbrow” culture were of little or no aesthetic value and were experienced by the audience in an uncreative and unimaginative way. While not usually disputing the view that “high/highbrow” culture was aesthetically superior to “popular/lowbrow” culture, these studies typically argued that popular culture was not as bad as its critics had maintained. For example, Herbert Gans, in a classic 1967 account of Levittown, the large suburban housing development in New Jersey, chastised those who denigrated such new tract houses, and the suburban lifestyle of their working class and middle class inhabitants, as dull, homogenized, or lonely. Few of those who lived there experienced Levittown in that way, Gans insisted, although he added that he personally considered that urban life was aesthetically and culturally richer

than that of these suburbs. Seven years later in an influential comparative account of culture, Gans defended popular culture in general against its most dismissive critics.

The third stage of the debates overlapped in time with the research of stage two and took the debates in a more radical turn, upending earlier aesthetic evaluations and arguing that “popular/lowbrow” culture is, in some respects at least, aesthetically superior to “high/highbrow culture.” For example, in *Learning from Las Vegas* in 1968, the architects Robert Venturi and Denise Scott Brown insisted that architects could learn much from studying the buildings on the Las Vegas strip, a place that many “highbrow” critics would have dismissed as the epitome of popular, vulgar culture. Venturi and Scott Brown argued that popular Las Vegas architecture was doing exactly what the classical medieval cathedral, a paragon of high culture, did, namely revealing from the shape of the building the function and activities that went on inside. The casinos of Las Vegas were designed so that viewers could recognize, from a considerable distance, not only that the building was a casino but also the nature of the fantasy that customers could experience within. For example, the shimmering black glass pyramid of the Luxor showed that this was a casino decorated in a patina of classical Egypt. Venturi and Scott Brown argued that such architecture was engaging and refreshingly superior to the dreary glass and steel boxes that the “highbrow” School of International Architecture had been building for decades. These anonymous boxes, the design of which dominated the curriculum of elite architecture schools, gave the viewer no inkling of what went on within the building. A similarly radical claim about the merits of popular culture was made by the Pop Art movement of the 1960s and beyond, which celebrated the aesthetic qualities of mass produced modern objects. The success of Pop Art legitimized the status of these objects as art, underlined by the installation of many of its works in the citadels of high culture. Thus, Claes Oldenburg’s 10 foot high sculptural representations of a slice of blueberry pie on a scoop of ice cream (installed on the roof of the Museum of Modern Art) and his monumental lipstick sculpture (installed at Yale), and Andy Warhol’s depictions of such products as Campbell’s soup, forced those who would denigrate

mass culture not only to take a closer look, but to consider the possibility that the products of "mass culture" might in some ways be more interesting than those associated with "high culture."

Also part of this third stage's radical challenge to the established aesthetic hierarchies is the work of the French sociologist Pierre Bourdieu, who argued in his book *Distinction* in 1979 that the driving force of culture had less to do with aesthetics and more to do with struggles for power between social classes. For Bourdieu, the "dominant class" (or classes) use high culture, which is often difficult to understand for those lacking higher education or upbringing in a dominant class family, in order to exclude members of the dominated class(es) from positions of power and privilege. Individuals from the dominated classes, lacking a facility in high culture, which Bourdieu calls "cultural capital," are on that basis kept out of the dominant class cultural rituals of social solidarity (the opera, ballet, etc.) and by that method are kept out of the dominant class even if they have managed to acquire significant economic assets. By arguing that high culture is at base about struggles for power between social classes, Bourdieu undermines its claims to intrinsic aesthetic superiority.

The fourth stage in the debate over "high culture" versus "mass culture" is more radical still, for it questions whether the basic distinction between one category of items that can be assigned as "high/highbrow culture" and another category than can be classified as "popular/lowbrow" is justifiable on any major grounds, not just aesthetic, at least as a basis for social theories that seek to lay out the main contours of modern society. This fourth stage, in short, seeks to dissolve the key terms in the "high culture/mass culture" debate and in so doing to dissolve the debate itself. Beginning in the late 1980s, researchers such as Paul DiMaggio and David Halle point out that surveys reveal that almost everyone, highly educated or not, is involved with at least some of the activities and products often designated as "popular culture." It remains true that some activities associated with "high culture" (e.g., attending the ballet, opera, or classical music concerts) are confined to a smaller group of people, who tend to be very well educated, but these same people for the

most part engage in the popular activities too. Further, any exclusionary function that "high culture" performed in the past has been decreasing for some time, as the institutional world of culture is less and less willing to insist on sharp boundaries between social classes and cultural worlds. Thus, it is noteworthy that contemporary theorists such as George Ritzer, Sharon Zukin, and Terry Clark, who stress the importance of the "consumer/shopping society," the "commercialization of leisure," and the tendency of cities to become "entertainment machines," usually argue that almost everyone is caught up in these phenomena.

Although in the past the analysis of culture has thrived on some version of the distinction between "high/highbrow" and "popular/lowbrow" culture, it increasingly seems as though major cultural theorists will now have to look for their inspiration elsewhere than to this supposed divide. That is not to deny that aesthetic distinctions can be made (though they need to be justified with extreme care), that tastes vary somewhat with such factors as education, or that these distinctions may have more salience and staying power in some societies (e.g., France) than others (e.g., the US). But it is to question whether aesthetic distinctions and taste differences are sufficiently clear cut as to provide the basis on which can be constructed major sociopolitical theories of cultural difference and distinction.

SEE ALSO: Culture; Distinction; Elite Culture; Popular Culture; Taste, Sociology of

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high-speed transportation pollution

Koichi Hasegawa

High speed transportation pollution refers to a type of environmental pollution consisting of high levels of noise, vibration, and air pollution brought about by high speed transportation systems such as the airplane and airport, the “bullet” (super express) train, or the traffic expressway. These disturbances cause damage to daily life such as sleep deprivation or the disturbance of conversation at home, as well as stress related health issues like heart disease or gastrointestinal disease. Bullet trains, jet air planes, and high speed expressways are essential to highly industrialized modern urban life. They are basic conditions for developing efficient modern economies, greatly reducing the time and cost of moving goods and people over large distances. In most countries, high speed transportation pollution is serious along the train line, the expressway, or the area surrounding the airport. It is especially serious in metropolitan areas and in high population density countries like Japan.

In many ways, high speed transportation pollution is quite distinct from industrial pollution. At first glance, the impact on the environment for each flight, bullet train service, or individual

automobile on the expressway looks inconsequential. It comes and goes away very quickly, at most within a few minutes. But an airplane takes off every several minutes at a major airport, and in the case of Japan’s Tokaido line, a bullet train passes through every several minutes. They keep coming every day, including holidays, from early morning to the middle of the night (for the airport and bullet train) or all day and night (for the expressway). The cumulative effect is very great. In fact, as the number of flights and trains rapidly increased in response to growing demand, the pollution from bullet trains and jet planes became serious social problems.

For many years planners, engineers, suppliers, and administrators of the transportation system focused only on the “benefit sphere”: the speed, safety, convenience for passengers or drivers, economy of the system, and economic effect for the surrounding area. They overlooked the “negative” environmental effects for local residents neighboring the transportation system. Effective regulation of the environmental effects only came about with the starting of protest movements and the coming of serious social issues.

In some cases of industrial pollution or daily life pollution, determining cause and effect is not always simple. But in most cases of high speed transportation pollution, the cause is usually obvious: we feel the noise and vibration. Despite the obviousness, planners, suppliers, and passengers tend to miss the negative effects. The principles of remedy or countermeasure are very clear – making the polluter pay (the PPP or polluter pays principle) and fixing the problem at the point where it occurs. These are basic and relatively cheap principles. But in Japan, the government administration and the railway companies tended to reject these principles.

In Japan, during the years of rapid economic growth in the early 1970s, high speed transportation pollution, especially in the high density areas of large metropolises, became a central issue for local residents’ movements. This was because the national government tried to continue high economic growth by constructing many jet airports, bullet train lines, and expressways. This special social background at that time made high speed transportation pollution into a major nationwide social problem.

Representative examples of these protest movements include movements to rectify the Osaka Airport pollution problem; oppose the construction of Narita Airport; rectify the Nagoya bullet train pollution problem; oppose the construction of the Tohoku and Joetsu bullet train lines in Saitama Prefecture and northern Tokyo; and oppose the construction of the Yokohama cargo line. In all of these cases, large groups of residents rapidly and successfully organized a powerful local residents' movement that remained active for a long time.

Each of these cases had a significant impact on subsequent local residents' movements, transportation policy, and the judicial system. The Nagoya bullet train Pollution Response Alliance organized 2,000 households residing within about 7km of the train line. The anti bullet train movement in Urawa demanded that the line be built underground and at its peak could mobilize about 4,000 people to a mass rally (Funabashi et al. 1985, 1988). In other cases, groups of plaintiffs were organized from local residents' movements. For example, litigation over the pollution produced by Osaka Airport and the Nagoya bullet train line sought the suspension or prohibition of airplanes and trains to reduce the environmental damage.

Alongside the litigation over the four major industrial pollution cases, these cases helped to establish a kind of class action lawsuit as an effective strategy for local residents' and citizens' movements, but also exposed the limited capacity of the judicial system to provide relief.

Legal action by local residents' movements seeking redress against industrial pollution principally indicted the interest seeking behavior of private firms, accrediting responsibility to them. In contrast, in the airport and railway cases mentioned above, the movements targeted the Ministry of Transportation and the public bodies in charge of designing and running the national railroads and airports, criticizing them for their refusal to accept responsibility for the harm they were causing or to implement effective policies to prevent noise pollution, and for their continuing defense of their destructive behavior in the name of "the public."

Here, the government actors/perpetrators responded to the residents/victims with

attitudes and tactics that were chillingly similar to the corporations' responses to accusations of industrial pollution. The government and public agencies defined "the public good" according to the social benefit produced by public works and related projects. They used this benefit to justify the behavior of public authorities, to proceed with project construction, and to restrict private rights to reduce (or avoid) the resulting damage and harm.

Residents criticized the authoritarian and oppressive tone of this conceptualization of "the public." They argued that the public good ought to be defined through democratic processes, including a complete prohibition on any violation of fundamental human rights. They demanded, before any large projects proceeded, the informed consent of residents in surrounding areas through direct participation in the decision making processes.

High speed transportation pollution is just one example of the unintended but harmful pollution caused by transportation technology. As mass consumer society becomes increasingly technological, the environmental problems caused by the new technologies extend well beyond noise and vibration into new areas like destruction of the ozone layer by CFCs.

SEE ALSO: Daily Life Pollution; Local Residents' Movements; Pollution Zones, Linear and Planar

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Hinduism

T. N. Madan

Use of the English term “Hinduism” (and its equivalents in various European languages) to designate certain aspects of the cultural traditions of Hindus anywhere is commonplace, but it is relatively recent and not wholly unproblematic. The idea that the Hindus must have a “religion” comparable to Christianity and worthy of study originated with British administrators and scholars in India in the last quarter of the eighteenth century. These scholars, known as the Orientalists, devoted themselves to the study and translation of textual materials, mainly in Sanskrit, some of which they identified as religious and others as secular texts. By the time the British parliament allowed proselytization among the “natives” of India in 1813, the word Hinduism had come into use. Christian missionaries also devoted themselves to the study of religious texts and the observation of religious practices, but unlike the admiring Orientalists their primary aim was to expose the “wickedness” of polytheistic and idolatrous religions and to highlight the “perfection” of Christianity.

The problematic aspect of these studies, often laudable for their reliability and detail, was the basic assumption that the Hindus had a religion which, however, was curiously deficient in significant ways given the absence of most notably, a founder, a single revealed text, and a church-like organization. But that the Hindus were a community of faith, united by a common religion, Hinduism, was considered unquestionable. The widespread use of the Hindu term *dharma* (*dharma* literally means “moral law,” “that which sustains” the social order) in Indian languages, at least from medieval times onward, was deemed sufficient terminological evidence for the historical authenticity of Hinduism. When the first census of the peoples of India under British control was conducted in 1872, classification by religion was considered an obvious objective. The Hindus emerged as the numerically preponderant community. Towards the end of the nineteenth century, when a national movement for some measure of self governance under the British imperium began to take shape,

the notion of India wide religions, respectively claiming the allegiance of millions, was further strengthened, despite some initial skepticism among intellectuals well versed in the Hindu tradition on the ground that the religious–secular dichotomization of areas of life was alien to their way of thinking. Simultaneously with the emergence of the notion of monolithic Hindu and Muslim religious communities, officially enumerated and described, came the idea of mutually exclusive identities and religious nationalisms, that eventually led to the partition of the subcontinent in 1947.

At this point, it may be recalled that the term “Hindu,” like Hinduism, is a foreign coinage from around the middle of the first millennium before the Christian era. The Persians and the Greeks identified the peoples of the plains of northwestern India in the name of the river called Sindhu in Sanskrit. Sindhu became Hindu in Persian and Indos in Greek. The Arabs appeared as conquerors in this area in the eighth century CE and called it al Hind and the peoples thereof, al Hindi. In the course of time a distinction came to be made between the Hindi, an ethno geographical category and the Hindu, a religious category. By further elaboration Hindus were those Indians (and even peoples further east) who remained outside the Islamic fold. By medieval times “Hindu” was established as a term of self designation and Hindu *dharma* also came into use. And, as noted above, Hindu *dharma* became Hinduism in the early nineteenth century.

The roots of Hinduism as we know it now go back to the belief and ritual complex, marked by nature worship, of immigrant Aryan speaking peoples, who were the composers of the body of hymns and instructions on ritual performances collectively known as the *Veda* (“knowledge”). The earliest of these collections of “texts,” transmitted orally, are about 3,200 years old and have over the millennia acquired the status of revealed scriptures. Some elements of Hinduism have been traced further back in time to the Harrappan civilization of 5,000 years ago. As the carriers of the Vedic cults proceeded east and south, a widespread and longlasting process of give and take (called by anthropologists “parochialization” and “universalization”) between them and local communities of faith (“folk religions”) began, producing immense

regional varieties of belief and ritual and generating a vast body of post Vedic texts known as the *Purana* (“legends”) from around 300–600 CE. New gods and goddesses and the cults, cosmogonies, and mythologies associated with them proliferated. Mutually hostile sectarian divisions crystallized around some of the new deities (notably Shiva, Vishnu, and the female Devi). These immense diversities rule out any notions of a linear development of Hinduism or of a subcontinentally homogeneous religious community. It must be noted, however, that efforts have also been made for a long time to overcome these diversities. A daring young intellectual and renouncer of South India, Shankara (ca. 788–820), instituted a non sectarian form of domestic worship (*smarta puja*), combining devotion to Shiva, Vishnu, Devi, and other deities, and traveled to the far corners of India to stress the unity and sacredness of the land through pilgrimage and to propagate a monistic philosophy of the oneness of the divine or Absolute and the human in its true essence. This and other philosophies are known as *Vedanta*, the culmination of the Veda, or the ultimate true knowledge. The earliest of the Vedantic texts, concerned with metaphysical issues and known as the *Upanishad* (secret knowledge), are believed to have been composed about the same time as the birth of Buddhism and Jainism (around the middle of the first millennium BCE), which were the first major heresies, so judged by the Brahmans, the teachers and practitioners of the Vedic religion. These ritual specialists were the most privileged of the categories of people who constituted Vedic society.

SOCIAL ORGANIZATIONAL FRAMEWORK

One of the hymns in the *Rig Veda* mentions the birth of four major social categories of human beings, and indeed the whole cosmos, from the self sacrificial dismemberment of the divine “primeval man.” From his mouth came the Brahman, knower and teacher of sacred knowledge; the Rajanya (or Kshatriya), warriors, and protectors of the realm, were his arms; the Vaishya, working people, his thighs; and the Shudra, providers of services to the other categories, his feet. Besides the division of labor

that they embodied, the four *varnas*, so called, were ranked, the Brahman downward, in terms of ritual status and social privilege, but in a holistic framework. Over the long duration, the fourfold *varna* order became the caste (from the Dutch *casta*) order comprising numerous *jatis* through a variety of processes including inter *varna* marriages, incorporation of outsiders, and fusion or fission of existing groups. In principle, however, the caste system is based on hereditary membership within a *jati*, endogamy, and the inheritance of occupation and ritual status. Consequently, the caste system is, at least in theory, the most rigid social order conceivable. It is a mirror image, as it were, of the looseness (liberalism) of the belief and ritual complexes that characterize Hinduism in its regional and sectarian diversities. In view of this, some sociologists have suggested that the unity of Hindu society rests not in Hinduism but in its social organization.

Indologists (specialists of classical texts) have long described Hinduism as *varna ashrama dharma*, the morally grounded way of life appropriate to one’s *varna* or *jati* and one’s *ashrama*. The latter stands for stage of life, of which four are recognized: the preparatory stage of student ship, householdership, retirement, and finally renunciation of all worldly engagements. The renouncers (not all of them may have gone through all the earlier stages) turn their back on caste rules as well as family obligations. In textual Hinduism the three upper *varnas* (referred to as *dvija*, the twice born, in view of the rites of initiation through which everyone must ideally pass) are guided by a grammar of value orientations (*purushartha*). Hierarchically ranked, these values are *dharma* (grounding in moral law), *artha* (rational pursuit of economic and political goals), and *kama* (aesthetic enjoyment and physical pleasure). The fourth value orientation, *moksha* (liberation), is the alternative to the first three taken together. It should be clarified that in a householder’s life, being grounded in *dharma* acquires meaning through the pursuit of *artha* and *kama*; but *kama* must not violate the dictates of *artha* and *dharma*, and *artha*, of *dharma*. The renouncers who seek liberation from the web of kinship and other social obligations do not necessarily go out of society altogether: they may return awakened, as the Buddha did, and found new sects, some of which (most notably

Buddhism, Jainism, and Sikhism) blossom in the course of time into full religions. Social involvement and renunciation are not necessarily mutually exclusive: their relationship is dialectical and socially creative. The preoccupation of sociological literature with caste and renunciation, presumably because of their unique character, has led to the grievous neglect of the empirical presence and ideological vigor of the householder as a key bearer of the values and rituals of Hinduism.

The householder, man or woman, is ever engaged in *karma*. In its narrower connotation *karma* is ritual action, but broadly *karma* stands for the full range of legitimate purposive action. *Karma* is the enactment of the triple goals of *purushartha*. Every *karmic* act has consequences (*karma phala*), whether intended or (because of interferences or inadequacies) unintended. A chain of cause and effect is thus constructed; its most significant implication is the belief in reincarnation. *Samsara*, the web of worldly entanglements, is considered a bondage, and *moksha* is the release from it. In practical terms these beliefs do not mean withdrawal from all activity, but rather its pursuit according to *dharma*, so that the secular and the religious make up (at least in principle) one seamless whole, and in a spirit of detachment.

From conception to death and thereafter a Hindu's life is involved in a succession of rites of passage, including the rituals of birth, initiation, marriage, death, and post mortem offerings. These periodic household ceremonies, daily rituals for the well being of the family (steps in a process of moral maturation) and of adoration (*puja*) of one's chosen deities, are a major preoccupation of all households. Pilgrimages to holy places (for example in the high mountains, at the confluence of rivers, or on the seashore) carry Hindus away from home. The precise content of these ritual performances varies from region to region and caste to caste. But there is more commonality in this respect between the upper ("twice born") castes than among the lower, owing to a greater adherence to textual Hinduism in the case of the former and to folk traditions in the case of the latter. Sociological studies of "popular" Hinduism bear witness to its richness and viability; they have also recorded the process named Sanskritization by which lower castes tend to move away from their

folk moorings and attempt to raise their ritual and social status by taking over the religious and secular practices of the upper castes. While such efforts at status enhancement are group based, it is noteworthy that Hinduism is a non congregational religion: its principal agent is the individual and its primary locus is the home. Even in temples and places of pilgrimage, it is the individual or a family who offer worship.

Karma in its various expressions is, then, the way (*marga*) of religion among Hindus. But there are two other equally valid ways, those of *gyan* (knowledge) and *bhakti* (devotion to the chosen deity), and all three are recognized in the scriptural text *Bhagavad Gita* (first century CE), which has gradually emerged as the single most revered "revealed" book of Hinduism. Beginning with the ninth century commentary of Shankara, there has been an unending tradition of commentaries on this text, including in the twentieth century those by the firebrand politician Bal Gangadhar Tilak, the mystic Aurobindo Ghosh, and the pacifist Mahatma Gandhi, each emphasizing a particular mode of interpretation. For Gandhi, the *Bhagavad Gita* is a moral treatise of selfless action (*anasakti*) in the service of humanity, which brings out the futility of violence and the imperative of divine grace in human affairs.

MEDIEVAL SYNTHESIS AND MODERN HINDUISM

Hinduism is not a static tradition. As we have seen, it has grown through dialogic processes involving different levels of articulation from the local (tribal, folk) to the regional and finally the subcontinental, in an increasing order of eclectic complexity. Rightly perhaps, Hinduism has been described as a family of religions. Moreover, internal heterodoxies, some of which have grown into fully fledged independent religions, have also altered the character of the core tradition of Hinduism, one of the best known examples being the value placed upon vegetarianism following the great emphasis on non violence in Buddhism and Jainism.

The arrival of Islam as a proselytizing religion in the eighth century, accompanied by the establishment of pockets of Muslim rule, first of all in the northwest, that by the early seventeenth

century had grown into the subcontinental Mughal empire, opened new possibilities of religious syncretism, particularly at the folk level, but also temporarily and unsuccessfully in the imperial court. Elements of Sufi religiosity blended well with Hindu theistic devotionism (*bhakti*) that had originated in southern India, partly in reaction to the ritualism of Vedism and the atheism of Buddhism. New communities of faith with their distinctive cults, such as the medieval Kabir Panth, were born, providing a “home” to low caste Hindus as well as Muslims, bound together by their ecstatic love of a formless (*nirguna*) divine, unblemished by idolatry and mechanical ritualism. It was in such an ambience that Sikhism took shape as an independent religion in the sixteenth and early seventeenth centuries.

After Islam it was Christianity that provided the new challenge, drawing from the Hindu intelligentsia a variety of creative responses. Bengal was the stage on which these dramas were enacted before they spread elsewhere. Christianity arrived in India early in the Christian era, but it was only in the sixteenth century that, under the aegis of Portuguese and other colonial powers, which gained footholds on Indian shores, that conversions began. Since it was the British who emerged as empire builders in the late eighteenth century, Christianity became a subcontinental presence, particularly after the British parliament lifted restrictions on evangelical activities in 1813. An early response to the new challenge was the search for the best in the Christian gospels – for instance, their ethical precepts – that could be welcomed into Hinduism. Thus the Brahma Samaj (Society of God) sought to combine the best of Vedanta with the best of Unitarian Christianity, but fared no better than the great Mughal Emperor Akbar’s *Din i Ilahi* (Religion of God) in the late sixteenth century.

As the activities of missionaries (often excessively condemnatory of Hinduism) gathered force, a spirited Hindu response, combining reform and revivalism, virtually burst upon the Indian scene in the closing years of the eighteenth century. Its luminous torch bearer was the Bengali renouncer Vivekananda (1863–1902). Breaking with tradition, he traveled overseas to emerge at the World Parliament of Religions in Chicago in 1893 as one of its most charismatic

participants. Taking his stand on Vedanta, which he claimed contained all the great truths of all religions, he proclaimed that the essence of Vedantic Hinduism was the acknowledgment of religious pluralism. All paths of religious seeking were true, but the tradition that acknowledged this principle, as Vedanta did, was the paradigm of perfection. Lecturing in the US, the UK, and India, he called upon the West to look beyond its materialist riches to the spiritualist treasures of India. To the Indian youth his message was social uplift of the down trodden and the cultivation of rationalism at home and spiritual conquest abroad. Like Shankara, he died young at 39 years of age. Vivekananda was indisputably the founder of global Hinduism.

If Vivekananda’s pluralism was under the umbrella of Vedanta as the essence of true religion, the pluralism of Mohandas Gandhi (1869–1948), known to the world as Mahatma (Great Soul), a name bestowed upon him by the great poet Rabindranath Tagore, was radical and his pluralism was open to the sky. All religions spring from divine inspiration, he said, but are imperfectly articulated because of the limitations of human reason. Things that are only implicit in some religions are explicit in others. Humanity, therefore, needs all religions. In judging each of them, moral sensibility, which he considered innate and universal, provides the yardstick. Whatever is in conflict with it, including ancient texts, must be discarded: the search for truth is unending. The strength of Hinduism, in Gandhi’s view, lies in its inclusivism and willingness to listen and learn from other religious traditions. Indeed, he considered this the true Hindu perspective. That he should have died at the hands of Hindu bigots should therefore not cause any surprise.

Hinduism is today a global religion. By present estimates there are nearly 900 million Hindus spread over six continents. Asia is where most of them live: over 800 million in India, 18 million in Nepal, 14 million in Bangladesh, 3 million in Sri Lanka, and about a million in the US. Migrants and itinerant religious teachers are the principal agents of a globalized Hinduism. Some forms of Hinduism have grown in foreign settings in response to the internal crises of other cultural traditions. The best known case, perhaps, is that of the International Society of Krishna Consciousness (ISKCON) in the US.

In India Hinduism remains a personal spiritual engagement for millions; but those who look upon it as a resource for political mobilization in the pursuit of power are also quite numerous. Their Hinduism is exclusive and often degenerates into communal hate and violence. Gandhi's assassination in 1948 did not bring the conflict between the two Hinduisms to a close.

CONCLUSION

The study of Hinduism in modern times has proceeded along two tracks. On the one hand, there have been the textualists whose studies have presented us with the ideals and norms of Hinduism as a way of life. On the other hand, the contributions of social scientists (particularly social anthropologists) have contributed richly to our understanding of "lived Hinduism" in its immense variety. Methodologically, the truth of Hinduism lies at the confluence of the textual and contextual perspectives. In recent years, both perspectives have become theoretically more sophisticated: structuralism, phenomenology, hermeneutics, cultural analysis, etc. have all been drawn upon with much benefit. As befits an expanding religious tradition, its study also seeks new points of departure and new frameworks of interpretation.

SEE ALSO: Asceticism; Buddhism; Folk Hinduism; Islam; Religion; Religion, Sociology of; Secularization

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Hirschfeld, Magnus (1868–1935)

Ken Plummer

One of a cluster of early sexologists – like Krafft Ebing, Albert Moll, and Havelock Ellis – who came to prominence in the late nineteenth century, Magnus Hirschfeld was a German physician and sex researcher, as well as a homosexual and a pioneer of homosexual rights. In his early work, he endorsed the idea of Karl Ulrichs's "urning theory," whereby homosexuality was seen as less of a choice and more of a biological "developmental defect." In particular, he argued for a hormonal basis. Much of his work was concerned with "intermediate types." He believed that all human beings were intermediate between male and female – a varying mixture of both. He was also one of the first modern theorists of transgender/transsexualism. He invented the terminology in 1923 and came to be known as "the father of Modern Transsexualism." He produced the film *Anders als die Anden (Different from the Others)* (1919), probably the first documentary campaign film about the rights of the homosexual, banned in 1920. Amongst his key publications were *The Transvestites* (1910), *Homosexuality of Men and Women* (1914), *Sexual Pathology* (1917), and *Sexual Science* (the five volume magnum opus published between 1926 and 1930).

Writing initially in the time of the Oscar Wilde trial, Hirschfeld was a reformist and activist until the end of his life. He developed ideas around sexual liberation in general, and on transgenderism and homosexuality in particular. He founded the Scientific Humanitarian Committee (which petitioned the German Parliament for law change in favor of homosexuals, especially the repeal of paragraph 175 of the Penal Code) and the Institute for Sexual Science (in 1919) – seen as a "Child of the Revolution" – which housed major archives, a marriage guidance bureau, and a petition that advocated social change. His work was also very influential on the development of sexual "science" in the UK, leading to the formation of the British Sexological Society in the 1920s.

But his work was also seen as a scandal. Moralists saw much of this work as dangerous to the public, and thought that it should not fall into the hands of ordinary people. Radical feminists were also very critical of his work, both at the time and later. These are not celebrants of sexual diversity, in the ways that many early and subsequent sex researchers have been. In contrast, they suggested that much of early sex research had prioritized men and their power, and had not adequately considered the lack of a woman's right to control her own body and its access. Many contemporary feminists have argued that the situation has become increasingly worse, with the ever and upward rise of so called "sexual freedom" in the twenty first century. In addition, Hirschfeld was the victim of much personal abuse, both as a Jew and as a homosexual. He was forced to leave Germany in 1930, his Institute was burned down by the Nazis in 1933, and he died in France in 1935. The archives, library, and all records, as well as a bust of Hirschfeld, were destroyed. Other homosexuals were subsequently interned in concentration camps and killed.

SEE ALSO: Ellis, Havelock; Gay and Homo sexuality; Intersexuality; Krafft Ebing, Richard von; Sexuality Research: History; Sexuality Research: Methods; Transgender, Transvestism and Transsexualism

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historical and comparative methods

Ian Varcoe

Among the classical figures, Max Weber stands out from the others in his devotion to comparative historical sociology. His lifelong quest was

to find through the study of "rationalization processes" what sets the West off from the non western civilizations. Concretely, the concern was with modern, rational, or bourgeois capitalism, its origins and development. This series of studies is "macro" and it deals with changes over long stretches of time.

Weber tackles systematic comparative study, whereby, rather than creating data experimentally, the investigator bases comparative analysis on real or natural events, trajectories, and cases. One class of "natural case" is historical sequences in large scale comparative social contexts or units.

Weber is a leading inspiration of comparative historical sociology in the twentieth century. Chief exponents of this are Reinhard Bendix, S. N. Eisenstadt, Theda Skocpol, Charles Tilly, Barrington Moore, Michael Mann, and John A. Hall. Weber came closest among the classical writers to making major use of John Stuart Mill's method of (indirect) difference. Of Mill's two principal procedures, the method of difference is the one that usually features in explicitly comparative research; it is the most powerful of the "logics" he identified and studies usually try to approximate it as closely as possible.

Mill's method of agreement works as follows: (1) several cases are found to have the phenomenon to be explained (y); (2) they also share the hypothesized causal factors (x) (this is the crucial similarity); but (3) in other ways that might seem causally relevant according to alternative hypotheses, they vary (i.e., *overall* there are differences). Mill's method of difference, on the other hand, requires that the investigator take (positive) cases in which the phenomenon to be explained and the hypothesized causes are present ($x - y$); these are then to be contrasted to other (negative) cases in which the phenomenon and the causes are absent (not $x -$ not y). These negative cases are as similar as possible to the positive cases in other respects. Comparative historical sociologists, in particular, can supplement the method of agreement by introducing into their analyses the method of difference; in short, a research design that combines elements of both is possible. Or the method of agreement can be applied twice over so as to approximate the method of difference.

Max Weber did this in his comparative studies of civilizations. Essentially, he conducted two sets of studies, of European societies that developed capitalism and non western ones that did not. Weber thought he could see a number of factors linked to the former which the latter set of societies did not possess. But what if other factors he had not identified were operating? By comparing the two sets of societies, stressing as much as possible their likenesses, Weber was able to strengthen the presumption in favor of his selected factors as the cause of capitalism in the West, their absence as leading to its absence in China and India.

Weber's strategy was to extend an ideal type by developing a subtype effectively containing an implicit explanatory hypothesis concerning difference. Weber's approach to comparative studies was shaped in a fundamental way by his view of causation in the historical and cultural sphere; not general laws but unique constellations of multiple causal factors drew his attention.

In addition to being historical studies, most work by comparative historical sociologists studies one, two, or three cases. Why this tendency to a limited number? The argument for such a limitation is that the cases are intrinsically interesting (they may even exhaust the phenomenon in question) or that they are the most representative. Unraveling complex, compacted causes can only be attempted in a small number of cases treated as wholes. The nomothetic (or generalizing) type of inquiry was held in suspicion by Max Weber as more the province of the natural sciences: opponents of positivism and evolutionism in the social sciences have shared this preference for the idiographic. It is, however, a tendency only, shown in varying degrees by historical sociologists. Studies using a few cases can, and usually do, pose nomothetic or general questions. Both the idiographic and the nomothetic types of studies may seek to explain and the causal forces conceived theoretically may well be the same in both. The import of Weber's methodology for comparative studies is, however, open to interpretation. Being itself a synthesis of conflicting elements, it has proved open to being "read" in different ways – to support more causal analytic and more contrast oriented positions. Comparative historical sociologists draw

methodological inspiration from approaches such as that of Durkheim (and latterly structuralist Marxism).

An interpretation of Weber that sees him as underwriting a highly tentative approach to causal statements is that of Bendix, who offers a sophisticated critique of the traditions of Marxism and structural functionalism. They are, he says, effectively single factor, evolutionary theories confined to proposing a series of "stages." Bendix calls for the kind of comparative concepts that cover some but not all societies. They should allow significant comparison but be less than universal. He argues that these are to be found in the ideal type because such concepts (1) invite specification in historical or developmental terms and (2) provide benchmarks by which historical data can be ordered in a preliminary fashion. The aim of comparative research, for Bendix, is to isolate differences, or explore contrasts, so setting a limit on premature generalizations. Such generalizations are always vulnerable to hidden or unexamined third variables (which may have to be dealt with ad hoc) for which the overly ambitious investigator has not controlled. An ideal type's principal value is to rule out certain possible associations in history by placing limits on the field within which causal imputation is possible, although this does not rule out imputation at some later stage when knowledge is better than it is now, and to give access to complexity unsuspected by "grand" evolutionary theories.

Bendix's modest, self denying strictures against overly generalized research designs are aimed at combatting what he sees as the organic assumptions of classical theory deriving from Marx and Durkheim where societies tend to be seen as bounded entities, the forces for change lying within them. However, if change is exogenous the comparative sociologist needs a way of separating and then relating endogenous and exogenous sources of change. To tackle this question theoretically, Bendix has drawn attention to non bounded societies composed of "layers" of differing degrees of extension beyond permeable borders that predate the unified modern state, and to the phenomenon of what he calls "reference societies" through which influence flows from one society to

another, e.g., with respect to models of industrialization. Concepts such as this sensitize comparative sociologists to the different degrees to which societies are less than self contained units.

Mill's canons of inductive logic say nothing about where the data should come from. They do not stipulate, for example, that they should come from different times and places; nor from how many social systems or units, that is, from one or more than one. The logic of comparative analysis whereby an attempt is made to gain control over suspected causal factors is present in methods that do not necessarily involve a few large units (e.g., nation states, societies, and civilizations). "Deviant cases" may be picked out for study; non existent data randomized, i.e., rendered irrelevant for scientific purposes; and the "imaginary experiment" employed. The aspect of a situation suspected to be crucial in producing a given outcome is "thought away" in an effort to estimate the difference it would have made.

The dilemma of concept formation in comparative research generally is that concepts should be sufficiently abstract to cover the multiple cases such research requires, but not so abstract that it becomes difficult to devise rules for empirical specification of the concepts. Aside from this, the main methodological questions in research concern:

- 1 *Classification.* Placing in the same class means "rendering comparable," i.e., implicitly excluding as causal candidates the respects in which members of the class are alike. Once a definition has been created, a pattern of possible causal relations – of similarities and differences of characteristics – is engendered.
- 2 *Issues of measurement.* Every stage of comparative research – choice of variables, causal inference, the location of indicators and their choice, the selection of units (classification), these last three reflecting implicit causal theories – depends on theoretical ideas. Theory and methods form a seamless unity, although the components of this unity can be separated and analyzed.

In the 1970s a certain momentum was generated for a comparative historical sociology,

to renew the classical tradition of macrosocial inquiry into major transformations of the human condition. Partly this was in reaction to trends like ethnomethodology, and partly the inspiration came from sociologists wishing to continue developing the legacy of Max Weber. But Marxists and neofunctionalists were also drawn in. Major figures were Eisenstadt (neofunctionalism), Bendix (Weber), Perry Anderson (neo Marxism), and Barrington Moore (neo Marxism). Forerunners of this type of sociology were seen to be the French Annales School of Fernand Braudel, who inspired Immanuel Wallerstein's world systems theory, and the historian of the Middle Ages, Marc Bloch. Methodological analysis of the various studies of these scholars suggested that theory influenced research design in various ways. Only one of these was firmly in the camp of macrosocial explanation, using Mill's logical canons in combined ways. Perhaps the most outstanding example of such a study was Barrington Moore's *Social Origins of Dictatorship and Democracy: Lord and Peasant in the Making of the Modern World* (1966). It used eight cases to identify three "paths" to the modern world. It used many independent variables, but principally the nature of class relations – between lord and peasant – in the countryside, to explain the type of emergent polity following industrialization.

Moore was able to establish parallels between countries within his three pathways. But he also made comparisons and contrasts across them. As well as this, he introduced negative cases in his discussion of particular countries. By doing so he approximated the method of difference, shoring up the causal case that he was trying to make.

Comparative historical sociology as a candidate for a preeminent theoretical empirical orientation in sociology has receded since its heyday in the 1980s – it was arguably less a movement or school than a genre. Mainly this is because the agenda of key sociological issues has changed with the end of the Cold War. The coherence of nation states has declined somewhat and issues like industrialization, urbanization, democracy, and revolution have ceded place to others that have flowed from US hegemony, globalization, the resurgence of militant

Islam, human rights, and so forth. None of these seems resolvable in terms of the development of societies as nation states, or is fully understandable with reference to a distinction between a Western European pattern of development and the development of the rest of the world seen as taking place with reference to that pattern. The priority of the West still resonates. However, issues of development are now filtered through the global framework rather than through a direct confrontation with Western Europe and North America. There is no doubt, however, that social change over the very long term is still a vitally important topic. It is historical sociology, but perhaps not *comparative* historical sociology in the analytic sense, that will continue to be practiced and will continue to offer rewarding insights: for example, into “multiple modernities.”

SEE ALSO: Annales School; Braudel, Fernand; Dependency and World Systems Theories; Ideal Type; Methods; Mill, John Stuart; Multivariate Analysis; Social Change; Variables; Weber, Max

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HIV/AIDS and population

Mark VanLandingham and Dominique Meekers

The connections between human immunodeficiency virus (HIV) and population features are vast. While HIV has its largest impacts on population size and structure by increasing mortality among young adults, it also affects and interacts with the other key components of population makeup and change, namely, sexual behavior and fertility, and migration. Impacts on these key components in turn affect the well being of populations in profound ways.

INTELLECTUAL AND SOCIAL CONTEXT

HIV is believed to have infected nearly 60 million persons worldwide, killing more than 20 million of them through the various complications associated with acquired immune deficiency syndrome (AIDS), the disease caused by HIV. The toll has been especially heavy in the developing world, where infection rates are highest and where effective medications are the least available.

The introduction and spread of HIV across the globe is a recent phenomenon and caught public health, population, and other social scientists by surprise. Although it is now thought that the virus probably existed in Africa for a number of years before it emerged within gay male populations in America and Europe, it was not until the early 1980s that this new deadly and infectious disease caught the attention of a scientific community heretofore convinced that the age of epidemics was nearing completion. It is not just the epidemiological transition paradigm that was uprooted by the spread of this new virus and the host of health problems it causes, but also the demographic transition paradigm, which predicted a steady decline of mortality and fertility in the developing world, and a gradual shift from a very young age structure – in which as much as half of the population may be under age 15 – to an older population with a much more evenly distributed age structure.

Instead, we find ourselves almost halfway through a third decade of an epidemic that has reversed decades of progress in increasing life expectancy in several Sub Saharan countries, and has disrupted longstanding patterns of intergenerational relations and exchange, social institutions, and international relations in many others. In terms of numbers of deaths, the HIV/AIDS pandemic is certain to surpass all previously recorded epidemics, and in terms of the disruption it causes, will rival and perhaps even surpass the plagues that ravaged Europe up until the Industrial Revolution and the worldwide influenza epidemic of 90 years ago. Unlike earlier epidemics that spread their misfortune across the age distribution, AIDS affects primarily young adults, at the precise ages when child rearing and economic responsibilities are highest. Indeed, one of the most sinister aspects of AIDS is that in addition to killing those young adults it infects, it also harms in profound ways many in the age groups typically dependent upon those young adults who succumb to the disease.

But if the prevailing paradigms of demography and public health were ill suited for the advent of AIDS, demographers' toolkits for estimating the potential consequences of the epidemic on population structure have proven well suited for the task. Well honed techniques for conducting "what if" scenarios involving changes in age specific mortality rates, even while employing far from ideal data, have facilitated major contributions from population scientists. Even so, there have been new and difficult obstacles to modeling HIV impacts because of poor information regarding the rate of spread of infection (especially related to variability in rates of partner change and partner risk profiles; variability in degree of infectiousness during different stages of the illness; unanticipated changes in behavior, etc.) and variability in the period between infection and death. Changes in such assumptions have very large implications for the results of such models.

It has been much more challenging to investigate the substantive consequences of such impacts. The combination of such high rates of death and the concentration of deaths in the most productive age groups is unprecedented. Also, such deaths affect all other age groups traditionally dependent upon these working

age adults for support, as is society more generally. Sensitivities regarding AIDS and especially its primary modes of transmission make data collection on such topics challenging; and long latency periods and potential delays in the manifestation of consequences after death also make the measurement of long term psychological, social, and economic effects difficult.

DEMOGRAPHIC DIMENSIONS OF AIDS

Demographers have focused much of their attention on the effects of various levels and patterns of AIDS related mortality on the age sex structure and size of future populations. Botswana's population, for example, would most likely have doubled between 1990 and 2025 without AIDS; instead, with AIDS, its actual population will be substantially less than it was in 1990. Worse, the loss of working age adults relative to other age groups will strain traditional support mechanisms for the young and old.

Such projections have proven very useful for illustrating the implications of existing levels of infections for future populations, and also for showing how such dire consequences would be mitigated by lowering rates of new infections. Such efforts have played a major role in inspiring some governments and international organizations to action. Most of this modeling has focused on transmission and subsequent death rates among young adults, but in high prevalence countries where AZT and other drugs that lower mother to child transmission have not yet become widespread, the infection of large numbers of children also implies non trivial decreases in child survival and overall life expectancy.

Conversely, patterns and levels of AIDS related mortality can affect the future spread of the virus. One feature of this relationship that can be readily modeled is the loss of the most susceptible members of a population through early infection, which will, *ceteris paribus*, lead to lower rates of infection and death among those remaining. More difficult to predict and model are changes in sexual practices that occur as a result of increasing AIDS related mortality.

Prevalence of HIV also affects current and future levels of fertility, primarily by increasing

mortality among adults of childbearing age. This results in fewer children than would have been born had these adults lived through these years. Other effects of HIV on fertility are mediated through one or more of the classic proximate determinants of fertility. First, wide spread widowhood will leave many young adult survivors without child producing and child rearing partners. Second, HIV induced morbidity reduces sexual activity among the infected – in proximate determinants parlance, these first and second mechanisms decrease exposure to intercourse. Third, HIV may lead to shifts from contraceptives more effective in preventing pregnancy, such as the pill, to methods less effective in preventing pregnancy but offering new protection against HIV, such as the condom; this third mechanism would affect exposure to conception. Fourth, HIV appears to increase fetal loss among infected women, affecting gestation.

These major mechanisms of HIV on fertility described above are fairly straightforward to incorporate into a projection. But a more difficult mechanism to model is that HIV may change the fertility desires of those infected and/or left behind by widowhood. This could result in either increased fertility among persons living with HIV and AIDS (PHAs) who wish to leave a child behind; or decreased fertility among those who do not want to risk having an infected child and/or a child without his biological parent to raise him.

On the other hand, an increase in fertility – if caused by changes in the frequency or onset of unprotected intercourse for reasons unrelated to HIV – could in principle stimulate subsequent increases in the spread of HIV. However, it is the underlying patterns of sexual practices affecting both fertility and HIV transmission that will have the most important impacts on both.

Migration patterns, too, can be a cause or consequence of HIV transmission. Most attention to this topic in the population sciences has focused on the former. Population scientists studying migration have long speculated that patterns of migration could facilitate the transmission of HIV among migrants, and facilitate the spread of HIV from urban centers to rural communities from which many migrants come. The past few years have seen increasing empirical investigations of this hypothesis. The focus

is most frequently on rural to urban migration because it exposes young adults to new opportunities for sexual experimentation, provides them the discretionary income with which to do so, removes them from the oversight and control of extended kin, and may lead to extended periods of spousal separation among those who are married. Similarly, long distance truckers experience extended periods of spousal separation, which increases the likelihood that they visit sex workers or engage in other types of high risk sexual behavior. Hence, migrants and long distance truckers tend to have above average rates of HIV infection, and may transmit the virus to more permanent partners upon their return. Moreover, many migrants and truckers provide financial support for a large number of family members in their home communities. Consequently, AIDS related morbidity and mortality among migrants and truckers can have a devastating economic impact on their home communities.

Less studied but also important are patterns of migration that result from AIDS. Migration of PHAs who had previously moved to urban areas for work back home to their villages for care taking appears widespread. While the implications for population distribution of such return migrations may not be major, the implications of such widespread moves on intergenerational exchanges (both monetary and in kind) and the welfare of their parental caregivers are likely to be significant.

In addition to interacting with the three traditional components of population growth and structure (mortality, fertility, and migration), HIV also affects other key features of population well being. Mortality aside, the severe morbidity associated with HIV infection severely diminishes the productivity of those infected, and draws away scarce labor and financial resources that would have otherwise been available for family investment or consumption. In high prevalence societies, the loss of highly trained individuals such as teachers, nurses, and physicians to AIDS will affect critical social institutions such as education and health care. Clinics and hospitals may also become overwhelmed with AIDS patients seeking expensive and sophisticated treatments that the staff are ill positioned to provide. And traditional patterns of care for children and the elderly, both of

whom are dependent upon working age adults for their support, are also being disrupted. While the plight of children left behind has been well recognized, the many ways in which older parents have been affected have not. Increasing numbers of households headed by women may face special difficulties related to resource acquisition. Increasing numbers of households without adult women may face special difficulties related to truncated social networks and a short age of household services that adult women normally provide.

CHANGES OVER TIME IN THE TOPIC AND ITS TREATMENT

Much of the attention given to AIDS by demographers has focused on modeling the impacts of HIV related mortality on future population size and structure, as briefly described above. Impending expansion of antiretroviral drugs to prolong the lives of the infected will soon add a happy complication to modeling efforts aimed at predicting the number of infections and deaths, and their subsequent impacts on population size and structure. Demographers and statisticians have recently also turned their attention to forecasting other future consequences of the epidemic; for example, the number of older persons likely to experience the death of a child before their own deaths. Other models address how features and changes in sexual networks affect the spread of the virus. New sampling strategies, such as the PLACE method and Respondent Driven Sampling, have been developed to access difficult to reach populations, such as sex workers and intravenous drug users, that often play key roles in the spread of the virus throughout the more general populations. Other recent advances in computer assisted analysis of qualitative data have helped make more systematic the investigation of sensitive topics and subtle processes.

Substantive work by population scientists has broadened from a focus on sexual risk taking to analyses of how non infected relatives of PHAs, such as children and, more rarely, older parents, are affected by the epidemic; community reaction and stigma towards PHAs and their families; HIV related domestic violence; and how communities respond to the epidemic.

Population scientists have also played an important role in programmatic research, including developing methodologies to conduct systematic assessments of the relative effectiveness of various types of HIV prevention interventions.

FUTURE DIRECTIONS

As the use of antiretrovirals becomes more widespread in the countries that need them over the next decade, there will be increasing demands for research on access to care, quality of care, and quality of life of PHAs. For example, interactions between nutrition and the progression of the disease are likely to command increasing attention. Although stigma and discrimination appear to diminish over time in most communities, given the sensitivities associated with AIDS and the primary modes of transmission, these are likely to remain central to the research agenda for the foreseeable future.

SEE ALSO: AIDS, Sociology of; Demographic Techniques: Life Table Methods; Demographic Techniques: Population Projections and Estimates; Fertility: Transitions and Measures; Globalization, Sexuality and; Health Risk Behavior; Prostitution; Sex Tourism; Sexual Health; Sexuality Research: Methods; Stigma

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Hobhouse, L. T. (1864–1929)

Stephen K. Sanderson

Leonard Trelawney Hobhouse was born in 1864 in Cornwall, England. His father was rector of the local parish church, and his grandfather had been a distinguished barrister and public servant (Owen 1974). Educated at Corpus Christi College, Oxford, he became a tutor there in 1887. In 1907 he became the first person to hold the Martin White Chair of Sociology at the University of London. In addition to his academic career, Hobhouse spent time as a journalist, working for the *Manchester Guardian* between 1897 and 1902. Later he spent time as a journalist in London (Owen 1974).

Hobhouse is generally regarded as the first British sociologist. He wrote numerous books, the most important of which dealt with long term social evolution and its meaning for the present and the future. The most important of these books were *Mind in Evolution* (1901), *Morals in Evolution* (1951 [1906]), *The Material Culture and Social Institutions of the Simpler Peoples* (1965 [1915]), and *Development and Purpose* (1927 [1913]).

In *Morals in Evolution*, Hobhouse sketched out the evolution of systems of morality or ethics

as part of a larger process of mental evolution. In this regard, he identified a process of mental evolution that began with the rudimentary and impulse driven thought of early preliterate societies. The first real advance in mental evolution was the protoscience of ancient China, Babylonia, and Egypt. This was followed by a new stage of reflection between the eighth and fifth centuries BCE that was characterized by the rise of the earliest world religions of Judaism, Confucianism, Buddhism, and Hinduism. Then came the first truly critical and systematic secular philosophy of the Greeks, and then finally the rise of modern empirical modes of thinking in Europe beginning in the sixteenth century (Ginsberg 1951).

Hobhouse identified four stages in the evolution of morality. At the lowest stage, people feel obligations toward one another, but these are limited to human relations in very small groups, either the local community or the kin group. Life is regarded as important, but it is only protected through such mechanisms as blood feud, and there is no moral principle that life itself is something sacred. Right moral action means avenging a wrong done to a member of one's own group. A second stage of morality is reached when people conceptualize a duty not merely to avenge a wrong but to protect life and to guard property instead of just retaliating against thieves. Moral obligations have become broader, but they still apply only to the members of one's own group, and there are no general ethical principles. This second stage of morality roughly corresponds to the second stage of mental evolution, and thus makes its appearance for the first time in the earliest civilizations.

In the third stage of morality people formulate moral principles and ideals of character and conduct of a religious nature. Here we find morality and ethics as integral parts of the great world religions; this third moral stage corresponds roughly to the third mental stage. The fourth and highest moral stage is reached when an attempt is made to construct a rational ethical theory that prescribes rights and duties that apply universally. It was the ancient Greeks who first began to grope toward this sort of ethical universalism, which has been extended by philosophers and theologians in more modern times.

In *The Material Culture and Social Institutions of the Simpler Peoples*, written in collaboration with G. C. Wheeler and Morris Ginsberg, the authors classified societies according to their technological inventory. They produced a scheme of seven major “stages of economic culture”: (1) Lower Hunters; (2) Higher Hunters; (3) Incipient Agriculturalists; (4) Middle Agriculturalists; (5) Highest Agriculturalists; (6) Lower Pastoralists; and (7) Higher Pastoralists. There is a rough evolutionary sequence here, except that agriculture and pastoralism stand to each other as subsistence alternatives rather than in an evolutionary relationship.

The authors related these economic stages to other dimensions of social life, especially morality, religion, law, and overall social organization by assembling data on over 400 ethnographically known societies. They found that the higher the economic stage, the more developed and formalized the system of government. In terms of the administration of justice, there was a pronounced trend from private redress of wrongs to public redress by chiefs or tribal councils. The authors also looked at the relationship between their economic stages and various dimensions of marriage and family life. Here the correlations were not always as dramatic or striking. But in the final analyses, which involved variables bearing on social stratification and property ownership, the results were again dramatic. There was a very marked trend from communal to private forms of property ownership and toward greater social and economic inequalities.

Given the emphasis on economic stages as the starting point for the whole book, and the correlations between these stages and other dimensions of social life, one might get the impression that Hobhouse, Wheeler, and Ginsberg were materialists. But this is not the case. Hobhouse was in fact a strong theoretical idealist. This is clear from his *Morals in Evolution*, but even more so from his capstone work, *Development and Purpose*, in which he presents an overall philosophy of evolution. Hobhouse was highly critical of Spencer and the social Darwinists, and claimed that it was the human mind, not the struggle for existence, that was the engine of social evolution. He contended that it was the “slowly wrought out dominance of mind [that] is the

central fact of evolution” (Hobhouse 1951: 637). Even the stages of economic culture themselves are explained ideationally, as the results of the mind accumulating “stocks of knowledge” over the millennia.

Like many early evolutionists, Hobhouse was committed to a doctrine of social progress, even though he recognized that progress is not automatic and social evolution is by no means strictly unilinear. Human progress is erratic, with periods of retrogression interspersed with periods of progression. But on the whole, humankind has been improving itself, gradually moving toward a society based on harmony and a kind of ethical universalism in which all of humanity will eventually form a single social unit.

Hobhouse was a liberal humanitarian and social reformer who was a strong proponent of social harmony and internationalism. He spoke out against imperialism in all of its forms. His interest in practical affairs is clearly indicated by his journalistic activity and his work for many years on various trade boards, where he concerned himself with labor conditions. Several prominent British government officials came under Hobhouse’s influence, either directly or indirectly. These included Harold Laski, Clement Atlee, Hugh Dalton, and Hugh Gaitskell (Owen 1974).

SEE ALSO: Civilizations; Evolution; Peace and Reconciliation Processes; Primitive Religion; Property, Private; Spencer, Herbert

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Holocaust

Fred Emil Katz

The stark facts of the Holocaust can be summarized. When Adolf Hitler and his National Socialist Party came to power in Germany in 1933, they initiated measures against Germany's Jews. Before their rise to power the Nazis, under Hitler, had openly and vehemently blamed Jews for all of Germany's ills in the years following the country's loss of World War I (1914–18). After they gained power, the Nazi anti Jewish measures included use of the existing legal machinery of the German state to devise and implement increasingly restrictive measures against Germany's Jewish population. These measures incrementally but inexorably deprived Jews of more and more rights of citizenship and capacity of living their daily lives. The legal measures were augmented by sporadic brutal attacks by organized thugs who molested and terrorized individuals and communities of Jews. The most extreme of these occurred on the night of November 9, 1938, the *Kristallnacht*, where a nationwide attack on Jews took place. Yet all of these eventually turned out to be preliminaries to an active and focused program to actually exterminate all Jews who came within Germany's reach during World War II – the war of 1939 to 1945. During the early years of that war Germany had overrun and conquered most of continental Europe, a land mass that included millions of Jews who had been living in the various countries now under German control. The actual extermination of Jews relied, at first,

on the direct execution of individuals by individual German soldiers and paramilitary functionaries of the state – most notably the SS. Although this took place on a huge scale, the extermination plan was so grandiose that more elaborate systems of mass murder were devised, most notably a system of concentration camps that served as extermination factories, using lethal gas and the burning of bodies on a mass scale never before seen. The Auschwitz concentration camp, located in Poland, was the most notorious but not the only camp of this kind. Murdered at Auschwitz were some 2 million innocent persons, most of them Jews, but also others whom the Nazi ideologues regarded as unworthy of living in their utopian vision of the superstate dominated by pure Nordics. It is estimated that the Nazis managed to murder some 6 million Jews before their rampage was stopped by the victory of the Allies that ended the war. This genocide, this deliberate and systematic murder of 6 million humans beings, is doubtless the largest effort of its kind in all of human history.

Following a period of stunned silence, there has been a flood of responses. Within the academic community these have come from historians (e.g., Hilberg 1967; Bauer 1978), political scientists (e.g., Shirer 1960; Goldhagen 1996), and psychologists (e.g., Adorno et al. 1950; Milgram 1974) and social philosophers (e.g., Arendt 1964, 1968).

Apart from one conspicuous exception (Fein 1979), sociologists have been exceedingly silent in response to the Holocaust. In 1979, a Jewish sociologist said that “there is in essence no sociological literature on the Holocaust” (Dank), and in 1989 another sociologist said that the Holocaust work of sociologists “looks more like a collective exercise in forgetting and eye closing” (Bauman). Bauman's assessment still seems to hold today.

Despite this silence, it seems that sociology can contribute insights about the Holocaust that no other discipline can. And that, in turn, the Holocaust can help us sharpen some of the most venerable sociological insights derived from Max Weber and Émile Durkheim (Katz 1993, 2003, 2004). The first begins from what is perhaps sociology's underlying premise: the need to explain ordinary people's ordinary social lives.

Applied to the Holocaust, a great many ordinary people – not crazy people, not marginal people, not zealous Nazis, but ordinary folks – became active participants in mass horrors. When it comes to monstrous behavior, it is not monsters we need to worry about, but ordinary people; they were active participants and contributors to the terrors we know as the ultimate genocide. It is ordinary people's ordinariness that must provide us with the clues of how genocide is practiced. The Nazis recruited many into becoming mass murderers who did not start out with murderous intentions.

Rudolf Hoess, the commandant of Auschwitz, was the ultimate bureaucrat. From Weber, we learned how the bureaucrat is the functionary who tries to bring rational processes to whatever tasks come his way. Hoess did just that, except that his task was mass murder. He also shows how the distinctive mindset of the bureaucrat enabled him to segregate an ongoing, fairly warm, nurturing home life from deep immersion in a grisly work setting. Weber was resurrected, but applied to a setting of which he could not have dreamed.

Émile Durkheim found an ally in Helen Fein (1979) in her study showing that the degree of Jews' integration into a country influenced the likelihood of becoming victims of the murderous assault. Durkheim's focus on social cohesion – based on what we would now call a group or society's shared culture – is also the focus of the "local moral universe" (Katz 2003, 2004). We humans get our sense of identity and purpose from a moral context, to which we try to contribute. Under such a moral umbrella, we may totally exclude those whom we regard as being on the outside. The result is that, as the Nazis displayed, these people can be treated not only with contempt but also with actual annihilation, and this can be done under the myth of operating on the basis of a high moral purpose and justification. This, Durkheim did not envisage. But his perspective applies and clarifies such a phenomenon.

The distinctive contribution of sociology to clarifying how a genocide operates – using the Nazi Holocaust as a source of insight – is that it can show how ordinary people can be recruited to do the most horrific acts, and do so using our existing social psychological proclivities and

habits. It can show how bureaucratic administrative techniques, so central to modern life, can be hijacked in the service of evil. Furthermore, it can show how the moral umbrellas under which we are accustomed to living, and which serve as instruments for our most humane actions, can also become the instruments for our most inhumane actions. Sociologists can clarify just how these ordinary features of our social makeup actually work. From this knowledge we can not only demystify, but also actually find ways to counter, the evil we have come to call genocide.

SEE ALSO: Anti-Semitism (Religion); Anti-Semitism (Social Change); Ethnic Cleansing; Genocide; Ghetto; Pogroms; War

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Homans, George (1910–89)

Thomas J. Fararo

George Caspar Homans was a major theoretical sociologist whose lucid writings helped to shape numerous developments in basic sociological research. His ideas about theoretical principles in sociology were much debated and often rejected.

Homans entered Harvard College in 1928 with an area of concentration in English and American literature. Among his electives was a course with the philosopher Alfred North Whitehead. Thereafter, in the period from 1934 to 1939, as a Junior Fellow of the newly formed Society of Fellows at Harvard, he interacted with Whitehead and other Harvard luminaries while undertaking independent studies in a variety of subjects, including sociology, mathematics, psychology, and anthropology. He attended a special faculty student seminar on the newly translated general theoretical sociology of Vilfredo Pareto, which led in 1934 to his first published work in sociology, with Charles Curtis, *An Introduction to Pareto: His Sociology*. He also studied historical methods, and began doing original historical research that was published in 1941 as *English Villagers in the Thirteenth Century*. In 1939 he became a Harvard faculty member, a lifelong affiliation in which he taught both sociology and medieval history. By virtue of his later theoretical writings, by the 1960s he had become a major theorist and in 1964 was elected president of the American Sociological Association.

As a theorist, Homans's overall intellectual ambition was to create a more unified social science on a firm theoretical basis. He criticized his colleague Talcott Parsons, notable for a similar ambition, for creating only a conceptual scheme, but not a theory, defined as a deductively organized system of propositions that explain observable phenomena. His own approach to theory developed in two phases. In each phase, there is a presupposition concerning the nature of the subject matter and an associated mode of theorizing.

In his first phase, as presented in *The Human Group* (1950), there is an explicit process philosophical presupposition about reality and a system model for its analysis, reflecting the intellectual influence of Whitehead and Pareto, respectively (Fararo 2001: ch. 3). Echoing Whitehead's stress on events and process, Homans proposes that social reality should be described at three levels: social events, customs, and analytical hypotheses that describe the processes by which customs arise and are maintained or changed. Social relations (e.g., kinship ties) are instances of such customs, defined as recurrent patterns amid the flux of social events.

The conceptual scheme in this first phase consists of three elements of social behavior called interaction, sentiment, and activity, together with emergent norms. Each of these is associated with variables such as frequency of interaction, similarity of activities, intensity of sentiment, and conformity to norms. These behaviors comprise the social system of the group. The system model, reflecting Pareto's influence, employs analogies drawn from physical science, especially thermodynamics. He argues that, like actual thermodynamic systems, social systems vary substantially in their "externals" (apparent differences) but that as in thermodynamics, they possess an underlying similarity described by the hypotheses that interrelate a small number of analytical elements. A year after it was published, Homans's social system theory was formalized by Herbert A. Simon as a system of differential equations, one of the earliest and most influential contributions to mathematical sociology. At the same time, Homans's book set out examples of emergent social structures of groups that have been of continuing interest to social network analysts. The subfield of sociology called "small groups" owes much of its inspiration to Homans.

In this first phase, Homans makes some use of the psychological principle of reinforcement and analyzes social exchange in one particular group. However, he was more attuned to the work of social anthropologists of his time. Chapters that treat theories of ritual, social control, and authority are brilliant forays into the subjects that draw upon and surpass the literature of the day. For instance, in a chapter on kinship, he anticipates

the theory of structural balance in social psychology, as well as his later trenchant critique of functionalist theories of marriage in his 1955 book with David Schneider, *Marriage, Authority, and Final Causes*.

The second phase of Homans's theory program is based on the presupposition that satisfactory explanation in the social sciences must be based upon principles about individual behavior. His "Social Behavior as Exchange" (Homans 1958) proved to be seminal for what came to be known as exchange theory, an important paradigm in sociology. In this article he employed principles from behavioral psychology to explain and synthesize findings from experimental social psychology, and findings from earlier field studies. Social behavior as exchange means that a plurality of individuals form a system of interaction in which the activity of each provides part of the basis for an outcome that has sanction significance (reward or punishment) for each of them. Social approval is a fundamental reward actors can provide one another, functioning at an elementary level of interaction as money does in an advanced economy. He elaborated this approach in his treatise *Social Behavior: Its Elementary Forms*, which appeared first in 1961 and then in a revised edition in 1974, and set out his presuppositions about social science in his 1967 book, *The Nature of Social Science*.

One example of his more specific theoretical contributions concerns distributive justice. In the pioneering 1958 article, Homans had argued that distributive justice is one of the conditions required for "practical equilibrium" in a group. In the *Social Behavior* treatise, Homans elaborated on this theme and suggested the general principle that distributive justice holds in a group when, for any pair of members, the ratio of their rewards (e.g., wages) is equal to the ratio of their contributions or investments (e.g., job responsibilities). These ideas have stimulated a great deal of theoretical and empirical work on justice by social psychologists and sociologists.

In its mature form, Homans's general argument is that fundamental explanatory principles are to be true of individuals as members of the human species, not as members of particular groups or cultures. Furthermore, social psychological propositions (e.g., those pertaining to

interpersonal balance) should be derivable from these principles. Thus, a theory requires two sets of premises: principles of behavioral psychology, and statements applying them to a specific explanatory task. Disciplines differ as to their typical explanatory task. History tries to explain particular social events, economics tries to explain outcomes of one time interactions of individuals, and sociology aims to explain emergent features of recurrent interactions among the same individuals. Hence, sociology is concerned with customs and social structure, but its theoretical aim is to explain these recurrent features in terms of patterns of rewards and punishments that individuals experience through interaction. For instance, status orders and authority relations are two such emergent features of social interaction. Each has a time extended character rather than a transient character. The new presupposition, relative to the first stage, is the idea that a theory must have a deductive structure. Homans is a methodological individualist, but his focus is sociological in the sense that the aim is to explain how processes of interaction generate the generic types of social structural phenomena we observe: social structure as consequence rather than cause. Although structure and culture act back on individuals, they cannot alter the principles of behavior.

Homans's arguments apply to what he calls the subinstitutional level of social life: that which emerges spontaneously from interaction such as informal social ranking. The logical priority of this type of explanation is essential to Homans's research program. Institutions are like the macrolevel enduring objects of fundamental physics: their existence presupposes a level of interactions that accounts for them. In this sense, Homans adopts the reductionist stance inherent in the program of theoretical physics. In terms of the philosophy of social science, his approach is clearly in the tradition of methodological individualism, although in his case it might better be called methodological behaviorism.

Although others called his work exchange theory and treated it as one among a number of ever growing theoretical paradigms in social science, Homans strongly rejected both the label and the multi paradigmatic presupposition that came with it. For Homans, there is only one fundamental theory in social science. That theory is

given by a system of deductive arguments based on the principles of behavioral psychology. The specific task of theoretical sociology is to explain how enduring social relational structures arise out of the interaction of human behavioral organisms (Fararo 2001: ch. 10). A somewhat more general perspective of this sort would apply it also to the explanation of culture, as in *A Theory of Religion* (1987) by Rodney Stark and William Sims Bainbridge, a theoretical work that adopts both the deductive and the behavioral elements of Homans's approach.

Other theories have reflected the influence of Homans's ideas, but in a more critical mode. Some take issue with the behavioral foundation and the scope restriction to elementary processes. For instance, Peter Blau (1964) attempted to create a general theory that starts with face to face interaction but also incorporates explicit macrosocial assumptions. For example, approval of leaders in the small group is paralleled by the legitimation of power at the macrolevel. Although emphasizing exchange processes, Blau adopted neither the deductive nor the behavioral aspects of Homans's approach. In turn, Blau's theory was criticized on the grounds that it lacked a deductive linkage between the micro and macrolevels – a criticism that embodies methodological individualism but not necessarily the behaviorist version favored by Homans. Thus the way was open for a more explicit formulation of a micro macro deductive logic in social theory. Coleman (1990) set out such an approach. It departed from the behaviorist foundation in favor of an approach closer to that of neoclassical economics, grounded in a postulate of rational choice.

Richard Emerson's power dependence theory was closer to Homans's approach. It has led to an experimental research program that, in some versions, retains the behaviorist principles employed by Homans. Power dependence theory has been applied to patterns of exchange between actors in networks. In turn, this development led to a variety of competing research programs that differ in their theoretical assumptions, but that aim to predict outcomes in varying shapes and types of exchange networks defined under laboratory conditions.

Homans's work also remains relevant to various research efforts gaining momentum in the

early twenty first century. Through the use of computer simulation, a number of investigators are developing model building approaches grounded in the idea that the basic task of social theory is to show how the interaction of a set of actors gives rise to emergent social phenomena. These simulations treat actors as knowledgeable agents whose behavior is generated by ever changing knowledge shaped by perceptions of the behaviors of other agents and of the outcomes to which their joint efforts give rise. In this development, the strictly behavioral foundation favored by Homans has been replaced by a more cognitive approach. However, very much in the spirit of Homans, the general theoretical goal is the explanation of spontaneous social order.

SEE ALSO: Blau, Peter; Emerson, Richard M.; Power Dependence Theory; Social Exchange Theory; System Theories; Theory Construction

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homelessness

David A. Snow, Jill Leufgen, and Matthew Cardinale

The sociological conceptualization of homelessness has pivoted on two dimensions: social disaffiliation and residential impermanence. The disaffiliation dimension, associated primarily with research on Skid Row alcoholics of the 1950s, emphasizes the interpersonal and

institutional disconnection of the homeless. Although many homeless individuals lack the affiliative bonds that link most domiciled folks to various institutional structures, not all homeless are socially atomized. Many of them are connected interpersonally to other homeless, some maintain contact with relatives, and most are connected in various degrees to an array of street agencies and programs. Moreover, the majority of homeless individuals are not chronically homeless, as they cycle on and off the street and between street and mainstream agencies and institutions. Because there is considerable variation among the homeless along the atomization continuum, disaffiliation can be best regarded as a variable dimension of homelessness rather than the defining characteristic. Consequently, recent conceptualization emphasizes the residential dimension.

Defined in terms of residence, individuals or families without a permanent place of their own that meets the minimal standards of a residence in their respective cultures are generally thought of as homeless. This would include within the US and much of the developed world not only what Peter Rossi initially termed the “literal” homeless – that is, people living on the streets and/or in shelters – but also institutionalized individuals who have no place of residence upon their release, individuals and families who “double up” with others because they cannot afford a place of their own, and often even those who live in grossly substandard housing. Although this is a very broad conceptualization (referred to as “general” homelessness), it is thought to be too inclusive for research purposes because of the difficulty of reaching agreement, both nationally and cross nationally, as to what constitutes an acceptable level of doubling up and substandard housing. In many large cities throughout the world, for example, the residents of the numerous urban shantytowns, such as Brazil’s favelas, are not typically considered homeless; in the US, by contrast, residents of similar makeshift shelter arrangements (e.g., encampments) are typically counted among the homeless. Because of such complicated issues, most research on homelessness at the end of the past century is based on the “literal” conceptualization, encompassing individuals sleeping in shelters, accommodations paid for by agency vouchers, or in places not intended as dwellings,

such as the streets, abandoned buildings, auto mobiles, and parks.

HISTORICAL OVERVIEW

Whether viewing homelessness broadly (general homelessness) or more narrowly (literal homelessness), it has been a longstanding feature of the social landscape, particularly since the rise of cities. However, the size and character of homeless populations, and the extent to which they have been regarded as social problems, have varied over time. Homeless beggars and members of “floating populations” were characteristic features of the pre industrial city, wherein the streets were teeming with people because of the blurring of the boundaries between home, work, and leisure. With the exception of a few vilifying pamphlets, such as Martin Luther’s *The Book of Beggars*, the folk tradition of hospitality to beggars and itinerants, and the tendency to idealize poverty as a spiritual virtue, tended to mitigate the stigma of pre industrial homelessness. This changed, however, with the social dislocation caused by industrialization and the breakdown of European agrarian economies, which led to dramatic increases in the numbers of homeless, then referred to derogatorily as vagrants, and to the development of laws and policies to control or eliminate those so labeled, particularly in England and its colonies.

One such law, the Vagrancy Act of 1597, led to the transportation of some number of England’s homeless to its American colonies. These relocated folks, along with other transient poor who moved from community to community because they were denied settlement rights, constituted the first wave of homelessness in what eventually became the United States. A second wave occurred in the 1860s immediately following the Civil War, when large numbers of people were displaced but subsequently absorbed into the western frontier. The era of westward industrial expansion, from the late 1800s to the mid 1920s, called for a transient labor force that gave rise to a third wave of homelessness symbolized by “hoboes” – itinerant, seasonal workers – and the development of “hobohemias” in many large cities, both of which were immortalized in Nels

Anderson's classic sociological study, *The Hobo* (1923). The Great Depression resulted in a fourth surge in homelessness, which lasted until World War II, when many homeless were either absorbed into the expanding workforce or recruited into the armed forces.

The confluence of a number of factors in the wake of World War II – declining Skid Row populations in major US cities, post World War II veterans' programs, the rise of optimistic urban planning programs, and a changing economy – prompted some observers to predict the end of homelessness in First World cities. But the early 1980s ushered in a new wave of homelessness that has persisted into the current century, not only in US cities but also in major, global cities throughout the world, such as Berlin, London, Paris, São Paulo, and Tokyo.

RESEARCH ON THE “NEW WAVE” OF HOMELESSNESS

From the mid 1980s to the turn of the century, homelessness was regarded as one of the most pressing social problems within the US, generating widespread public concern and debate manifested in intense media coverage, Congressional hearings, homeless protests and locality based NIMBY movements seeking to control and contain the homeless, and literally volumes of social scientific research. Nearly all of this research can be classified into three basic genres. The first genre consists of either city specific or national survey based studies focusing on homeless individuals, and particularly on their numbers, demographics, disabilities, and transitions in and out of homelessness (Rossi 1989; Burt 1992; Burt et al. 2001); the second genre includes macrolevel, multivariate studies that assess the relationship among variation in rates of poverty, unemployment, housing affordability, and the like, and variation in rates of homelessness across cities (Ringheim 1990; Burt 1992; Shinn & Gillespie 1994); and the third genre consists of ethnographic field studies that focus primarily on the texture and dynamics of street life and on the adaptive, survival strategies of the homeless (Snow & Anderson 1993; Wright 1997; Duncier 1999).

Estimating the Number of Homeless

Due to the distinction between literal and general homelessness, and the difficulties in counting the “hidden” homeless (sleeping in abandoned buildings, parks, automobiles, etc.) and determining the ratio of street to shelter homeless, estimating the number of homeless city wide or nationally has been a contested enterprise, with agency and advocacy estimates generally being considerably higher (2–3 million) than most research based estimates. Research estimates are generally based on either “point prevalence” or “period prevalence” counts. The former encompasses counts of the number of people who are homeless at a single point in time, usually one day or night, and are typically based on shelter and street counts (Rossi 1989), shelter and soup kitchen counts (Burt 1992), or on counts of homeless in a range of assistance programs (Burt et al. 2001). Since there are no reliable national counts, those derived from a systematically selected sample of cities have been used as the basis for estimating the national homeless population. There have been two such widely cited estimates, both conducted by the Urban Institute and both contested, for the US: close to 700,000 in 1987 (Burt 1992) and around 850,000 for 1996 (Burt et al. 2001). Period prevalence estimates, in contrast, are based on counts of people who have been homeless for some period of time or indicate that they have been in response to a survey, and yield much larger estimates. For example, a 1990 nationwide survey of 1,507 domiciled US adults indicated 3.1 percent (5.7 million) experienced literal homelessness between 1985–90, and 4.6 percent (8.5 million) experienced general homelessness during the same period (Link et al. 1995).

Characteristics of the Homeless

Prior to the 1980s and the fifth wave of homelessness in the US, most homeless individuals were poor, unattached, alcoholic older men (Bahr & Caplow 1973). In the 1980s, as the homeless population grew, their characteristics began to change as well (Rossi 1989; Burt 1992; Burt et al. 2001). The majority of the “new”

homeless were still unattached (single, divorced, separated, or widowed) males, but there were more homeless families and children than in the preceding decades. They were also considerably younger, with a mean age in the late 30s rather than the 50s; they were disproportionately minorities, with black Americans being conspicuously over represented, particularly in large metropolitan areas; and a disproportionately large number were military veterans. As before, alcohol abuse was prevalent among the new homeless, but heavy drug use was more commonplace, spurred in part by the availability of cheap "crack" cocaine during the 1980s. In comparison to the general US population, a disproportionate number of the homeless also experienced a serious mental disability, with most research based estimates ranging from one quarter to one third. A final defining characteristic of the homeless, both the old and the new, is that they are predominantly urbanites. Clearly, the new homeless can be found in all kinds of communities, both rural and urban, but they are most prominent in metropolitan areas, particularly in selected neighborhoods in central cities (Lee & Price Spratlen 2004).

Causes of Homelessness

Historical fluctuations in the incidence of homelessness appear to be precipitated by the occurrence of two dislocating trends or events: large scale structural changes, as in the case of industrialization, and systemic shocks, as associated with wars and depressions. Such changes, particularly of the structural variety, have been identified as the major precipitants of the end of the century increase in homelessness as well. Especially noteworthy is a decline in affordable housing in the context of increasing economic hardship due to such factors as deindustrialization and declining wages. Indeed, the confluence of such trends suggests a general proposition regarding the structural roots of homelessness: it grows in the widening gap between subsistence needs, particularly housing, and the availability of economic resources to meet those needs among increasing numbers of individuals (Ringheim 1990; Shinn & Gillespie 1994; Koegel et al. 1996).

Structural factors alone, however, do not determine who becomes homeless. They designate which groups or classes of individuals are at risk of becoming homeless, but they do not specify which vulnerable individuals are most likely to fall onto the streets. In order to get a handle on this part of the causal equation, researchers have also examined the individual level, biographic correlates of homelessness, such as demographic factors (e.g., race/ethnicity), human capital factors (e.g., educational level), social capital factors (e.g., family attachments), and disabilities (e.g., substance abuse and mental illness). In general, research concludes that the occurrence of homelessness among some individuals rather than others can be best understood by considering the intersection of structural and biographical factors (Snow & Anderson 1993; Koegel et al. 1996).

Survival Strategies

The homeless face specific challenges to survival and must negotiate ways to satisfy their basic human needs. Such challenges include finding food and shelter, establishing social relationships, and even making some subjective sense of their situation. The homeless adopt certain survival strategies that facilitate the satisfaction of these material, interpersonal, and psychological challenges. The strategies employed by the homeless are not uniform, but vary according to the individuals' personal characteristics and length of time on the streets. These survival routines are also embedded in specific organizational, political, and ecological contexts that encourage some strategies while making others less likely (Snow & Anderson 1993; Wright 1997; Duneier 1999).

To satisfy material needs, the homeless often engage in a number of different activities exclusively or in combination. Some homeless individuals receive institutional assistance, some perform wage labor, and some engage in "shadow work," which includes a variety of unconventional work pursued in the shadow of regular work, such as begging and panhandling and collecting and peddling discarded books, magazines, and cans.

The homeless, in general, are not interpersonally atomized and incompetent as often portrayed. However, their interpersonal relationships are often paradoxical in that they can provide security in the form of a non-stigmatizing reference group and a source for sharing resources, but they are often fleeting and fragile due to the transient nature of street life.

Like all individuals, the homeless must also make sense of their situation and negotiate meaning in their lives. Research suggests they tend to do so in two main ways: via existential oriented meaning construction, which includes invoking causal accounts, such as "I'm down on my luck," to explain one's situation; and through various forms of identity talk, including distancing one self from negative associations, embracing a positive association, or telling fictive stories to embellish one's status (Snow & Anderson 1993).

Responses to Homelessness

The turn of the century wave of homelessness has elicited a variety of responses by different sets of actors across different geopolitical units, ranging from the local community to the states to the federal government. In terms of doing something about the "problem" of homelessness, the responses have generally been of four kinds. The most pervasive response can be described as "accommodative" in the sense of providing relief that aims to ameliorate the experience of homelessness by expanding, for example, the network of shelters and food providers. This has been the character of response by most governmental units, including the federal government's Stewart B. McKinney Homeless Act of 1987 and its subsequent amendments. Overlapping, yet distinctive, is the "restorative" response, which has sought primarily to repair or remedy chronically disabled homeless individuals through medical and/or religious intervention, as illustrated by the 43rd US president's chronic homeless initiative and faith based charity programs. A third line of response is "preventive" in that the objective is to attack the structural causes of homelessness, such as unaffordable housing, rather than its individual level symptoms. This response is illustrated by the

July 2003 Bring America Home Act (HR 2897) and is championed by most homeless advocacy groups and protest movements. A final general response encompasses various "anti homeless" efforts that seek to control and contain the homeless through sponsoring regulative ordinances and legislation that "criminalize" various subsistence strategies, such as panhandling and sleeping in public places.

Research on the various responses to homelessness has been relatively minuscule in comparison to the volume of research on the scope and causes of homelessness and on the characteristics of the homeless and their survival strategies. Nonetheless, there is increasing scholarly concern with relevant policy issues and with the efforts of advocacy groups and the homeless themselves to mobilize on behalf of homeless interests and rights (Wright 1997; Cress & Snow 2000).

SEE ALSO: Deindustrialization; Industrial Revolution; Inequality and the City; Metropolitan; Poverty; Poverty and Disrepute; Social Exclusion; Urban Poverty; Urbanization

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homicide

Leonard Beeghley

Unlike other western nations, thousands of people are murdered in the United States every year. Any large American city displays almost as many homicides as do many western nations (Beeghley 2003). A high rate of homicide – the intentional and illegal killing of another human being – makes the US anomalous.

Historically, homicide rates across Western Europe fell in a ragged but steady way from about 20–30 per 100,000 in the fourteenth century to around 1 per 100,000 in the nineteenth century. Although the data must be pieced together and the use of ranges (for example, 20–30) for past estimates suggests some uncertainty, the long term process is clear (Gurr 1989). The average homicide rate in England and Wales was less than 1 per 100,000 throughout the twentieth century (Beeghley 2003). Other Western European nations exhibit similar rates.

By comparison, the US has always displayed much more violence (Adler 2005). In the

twentieth century, the average US homicide rate was 7.6 per 100,000 (Beeghley 2003). Nationwide, about 16,000 persons were murdered in 2001 – a relatively low number, as homicide rates declined at the end of the century. The US rate in 2001, however, was 5.6 per 100,000, compared to only 1.6 in England and Wales. There were 648 murders in Chicago in 2002, 587 in New York, and 654 in Los Angeles – which were low compared to just a few years ago, and interpreted as showing that these cities are becoming safer places to live. By contrast, there were 858 homicides in all of England in 2002.

One way to understand homicide is to assess people's motives (Akers & Sellers 2004). One might posit, for example, that an individual's frustration and socialization to violence contributed to a homicide. Other factors could be involved as well, of course, but the point is to distinguish individual killers from non killers, to explain one homicide. Although social psychological explanations like these are necessary and valuable, they reveal nothing about the structural factors leading to a high (or low) rate of homicide.

Dealing with that issue requires shifting the level of analysis (Messner & Rosenfeld 2001). Research shows that five structural characteristics make the US unique and combine to produce an anomalous homicide rate: (1) the availability of guns, (2) drug markets, (3) racial discrimination, especially in housing, (4) exposure to violence in the media, at home, in neighborhoods, and from government action, and (5) economic inequality (Beeghley 2003). With one exception, the relationship between each of these factors and the homicide rate is clear and unequivocal. The exception involves guns. This literature has become politicized in the US (but not in other nations, where observers take the relationship as established), which means conclusions must reflect an assessment of the preponderance of the evidence.

The combined impact of these factors is especially important. Scholars writing in each area, however, usually do not refer to works in other areas, which makes it hard to see the interconnections. For example, when studies find a correlation between gun availability and the homicide rate, the authors generally do not

look at drug markets. Yet one reason drug markets are so violent in the US is the presence of so many guns. In addition, one reason economic inequality in the US is related to homicide is that so many people are exposed to so much violence. It is a sociological truism that the parts of society are not only connected, but also that their impact is often mutually reinforcing. No single cause exists in isolation.

We are not helpless. A half century ago, the fatality rate from automobile accidents in the US was much higher than today. Although some argued the problem was the “nut behind the wheel,” design changes in roads and cars reduced auto fatalities – even though “nuts” still drive. In a modern society, that which can be explained can often be changed.

The structural factors identified in the literature suggest some possible directions for policy change. Thus, while people have a right to own guns (at least in the US), under what conditions should this right be exercised? Just as public safety dictates some restrictions on the use of cars, perhaps similar policies ought to be applied to guns. Perhaps the way guns are designed and sold should be modified. Similarly, since zero tolerance policies have not reduced demand for illegal substances in the US, perhaps this tactic should be reconsidered and jail reserved for those we fear, rather than those who anger us. This might mean providing users with treatment to undercut the illegal market and violence it engenders. It might also be useful to consider how to attack housing discrimination, reduce the level of inequality, and limit exposure to violence in the US. In evaluating these possibilities, the trick is to think radically but proceed cautiously, looking out for unintended results (Rosenfeld 2004).

But caution need not be stasis. The experiences of other nations suggest clearly that Americans are not fated to live with so much lethal violence. The US is anomalous for specific reasons that are reflected in public policy. The impact condemns thousands of people to death each year. These policies are not set in stone; they are choices. Choices made can be unmade.

SEE ALSO: Crime; Drugs, Drug Abuse, and Drug Policy; Index Crime; Violence; Violent Crime

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homophobia

James J. Dean

Three important areas of research have emerged on homophobia over the last 30 years. Since Weinberg (1972) first popularized the term homophobia in his book *Society and the Healthy Homosexual*, where he defined it as “the dread of being in close quarters with homosexuals,” we have seen the emergence of sophisticated psychological instruments, a vast array of surveys, qualitative ethnographies, and interview studies that explore the attitudes, feelings, and social practices that constitute homophobia.

While scholars such as Sears and Williams (1997) now define homophobia more broadly as “prejudice, discrimination, harassment, or acts of violence against sexual minorities, including lesbians, gay men, bisexuals and transgendered persons,” psychological instruments have become more adept at detecting differences between homophobic attitudes and feelings. For example, MacDonald and Games’s 30 item instrument Modified Attitudes Toward Homosexuality and Hudson and Rickett’s Index of Homophobia, which uses a scale to measure

reactions to homosexual individuals and situations, have become standard ways to assess homophobic attitudes and feelings in experimental studies. Although these instruments are able to differentiate between attitudes as cognitive beliefs about homosexuals and homosexuality and feelings as deeply seated emotional responses, they are still not able to capture how attitudes and beliefs affect social behavior and practices.

The second and largest area of research on homophobia is the development of a huge variety of surveys on homophobic attitudes among adults. The general findings of these surveys show that the demographic characteristics of those who hold negative attitudes about homosexuals are that they are more likely to live in the Midwest, the South, or small towns and rural areas (Herek 1984; Britton 1990; Bruce et al. 1990). Moreover, negative attitudes are more likely to be held by men who are older and less well educated (Roese et al. 1992; Herek & Glunt 1993). These surveys also show that men have stronger homophobic attitudes or feelings than women, and that men evidence a stronger dislike for gay male homosexuality than lesbianism (Herek 1988; Gallup 1995).

Other recent research on the relationship between homophobia and the formation of gender and sexual identities has emerged among scholars such as Sanday (1990), Mac An Ghaill (1994), Nayak and Kehily (1997), and Epstein and Johnson (1998). For example, Nayak and Kehily (1997) show through interviews and ethnographic observation how young men in secondary schools use homophobic practices to establish masculine heterosexual identities, emphasizing that masculinities are the basis upon which young men's homophobic practices and heterosexual identities are constructed.

Nayak and Kehily argue that identities are always constructed, and gain their meanings, through cultural oppositions. Hence, masculine identities are constructed through their opposition to feminine ones, gaining their meaning through excluding feminine identities but at the same depending upon them for definition. This understanding, they argue, explains why young men are not necessarily against homosexuality itself, but rather its associations with femininity and the lack of a masculine self identity that it implies. They thus view

homophobia as a practice that establishes boundaries of purity and pollution between pure heterosexual masculine men and polluted non heterosexual feminine ones. They observed several patterns of homophobic practices among young men. For instance, they state that young men avoid intimate conversations with one another, fearing emotional homosocial bonding. That is, talking about feelings could elicit suspicions that an individual might possibly be homosexual. Further, boys avoid other boys who are suspected of being gay in order to maintain clear boundaries between a respected masculine heterosexual status and a denigrated gay one. Moreover, young males use homophobic practices to establish a heterosexual identity through a gendered sign system that categorizes feminine boys as polluted and potentially homosexual. For example, boys who are quiet, studious, well mannered, or do not participate in male bonding practices are often targets of derision, as well as boys who have high voices, a feminine walk, or a scrawny body. By making fun of other boys, deriding them as gay, or even using violence, young men establish a masculine heterosexual identity through excluding and sanctioning other boys.

An even more violent and aggressive heterosexual masculine identity, which depends on homophobia and homosexuality for its constitution, is analyzed by Sanday (1990) in her study of fraternity gang rape. Sanday shows that fraternity brothers promote compulsory heterosexuality in acts of gang rape by using homophobic social sanctions which deride those brothers who do not participate as homosexual or unmanly. At the same time, however, a sublimated homosexuality is expressed by the fact that the frat brothers are having sex with one another through the woman being gang raped. Homosexual desire is expunged out of the act of gang rape through homophobic and compulsory heterosexual discourses that construct masculine heterosexual brothers who "pull train," that is, gang rape a woman, as exclusively heterosexual.

In sum, homophobia has become an important topic in social science research. The growing sophistication of psychological instruments, the increasing number of surveys and qualitative studies analyzing homophobic attitudes, feelings, and practices have helped us to better

understand the phenomenon and its continuing conceptualization as a form of deviance. However, future research on homophobic behavior by both quantitative and qualitative scholars would help to fill in important empirical gaps in the literature, especially on men who consciously and behaviorally identify as heterosexual and commit the largest number of hate crimes against gays and lesbians (Jenness & Broad 1997). Similarly, more research on the most effective strategies for reducing homophobia would be a valuable component in mitigating the pernicious effects of this social problem.

SEE ALSO: Compulsory Heterosexuality; Fear; Gay Bashing; Gay and Lesbian Movement; Homophobia and Heterosexism; Homosexuality; Sexual Deviance; Sexual Politics

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homophobia and heterosexism

Barry D. Adam

Homophobia is perhaps the most widely understood term to refer to anti homosexual attitudes and practices, but comparison of such terms as homophobia, heterosexism, and heteronormativity reveals how these terms rely on different ideas of what homosexual means, and where opposition to same sex relations originates. Homophobia typically denotes, like other phobias, an irrational fear or a set of mistaken ideas held by prejudiced individuals; its alleviation therefore likely comes through therapy or education. Popularized through George Weinberg's 1973 book, *Society and the Healthy Homosexual*, homophobia is a concept with strong roots in psychology. Its use tends to focus attention on individuals, to locate its origins in childhood socialization, and to conceive of it as a prejudice directed against homosexual persons. Heterosexism tends to be used less widely, but it offers a more sociological notion of practices that are embedded in social structures and reinforced by ideology. Use of a term like heterosexism shifts analysis to the ways in which the social institutions of government, workplace, religion, family, and media are organized to exclude or disadvantage same sex relations. Resolving heterosexism implies reforming or reorganizing social institutions in ways that allow and support same sex relationships. Finally, heteronormativity is a term used most often in literary studies, which

see both homosexuality and anti homosexuality as effects of binary distinctions made in language. Textual deconstruction typically seeks to find how and why such distinctions as heterosexual–homosexual arise and are reproduced. If distinctions of this kind were not made at all, or least were of little significance, then presumably anti homosexuality could scarcely come about either. For queer theory, the issue is not one of appealing for tolerance or acceptance for a quasi ethnic, twenty first century urban community of lesbians and gay men, but of shaking up or transgressing the entire heterosexual–homosexual binary that fuels the distinction in the first place.

There are several leading theories that lend credence to each of these conceptions. Gayle Rubin's influential essay on "The Traffic in Women" built on Claude Lévi Strauss's work on kinship systems among hundreds of societies around the world that showed how kinship codes prescribe the exchange of women by male clans, thereby founding and organizing gender systems that order both same sex and cross sex relations. Heterosexuality is recreated each generation through a system of fraternal interest groups that exercise control over women's reproductive power in families. As a consequence, homosexuality among men and among women runs up against different but related difficulties. Homosexuality among men abstains from or transgresses the fundamental social "game plan" of the fraternal interest groups to acquire, control, and trade in the reproductive power of women. Homosexuality in men, according to this scenario, comes to be identified with the betrayal of masculinity and the inability to assert male domination over women. The sexuality of women in such a system is put at the disposal of men; their own sexual preferences are largely precluded. Lesbianism, as Monique Wittig argues in "The Straight Mind," violates the same social order by asserting will and subjectivity among the female gender, intended by patriarchal groups to be objects of exchange. Wittig calls female homosexuality a "revolt of the trade goods" in the "traffic in women." Adrienne Rich (1989) also characterizes lesbianism as an assertion of women's subjectivity and self determination, and a direct challenge to patriarchy. Anti lesbianism, then, for Rich is a variant of misogyny, a means of

enforcing "compulsory heterosexuality," and a system of keeping women subservient to male domination.

Still, it must be noted that anti homosexuality is not the inevitable consequence of kinship organization. In many societies around the world, same sex bonding is accepted and valued by becoming integrated into, and defined by, kinship codes. Same sex connections may take "berdache," "two spirited," or transgendered form in societies with weak fraternal interest groups where gender fluidity, gender mixing, or gender migration appear to be possible for some men and a few women. Where male sexual bonding appears in societies with strong fraternal interest groups, it typically takes the form of hierarchical, military, age graded, and mentor/acolyte relationships, where adult men who exercise control over women's bodies also assume sexual rights over younger, subordinate males.

Gender panic theory focuses particularly on homophobia as an effect of gender. Masculinity, this theory contends, is an achieved and insecure status. Defensiveness against losing male status and privilege generates homophobia. Psychological research shows how homophobia appears to be particularly strong among gender conservatives intent on upholding gender differences, and among adolescent males who feel insecure in their access to masculine status. The queer theory of Judith Butler and Eve Sedgwick relies on, and extends, gender panic theory, contending that heterosexual masculinity builds itself on the simultaneous exploitation and denial of homosexuality. Since heterosexual masculinity can never constitute itself as secure and unassailable, and homosexuality is a default subject location against which heterosexuality defines itself, then homosexual possibilities can never be fully repressed and indeed remain necessary for the masculine self. Through extensive analyses of such cultural artifacts as novels, movies, advertising, and sport, queer theorists reveal how they covertly appeal to (sometimes thinly veiled) homoeroticism at the same time as they overtly deny it. This repetitive denial of homoeroticism in order to shore up the social construct of heterosexual masculinity reproduces heteronormativity. Again, it is noteworthy from a cross cultural perspective that this cultural understanding of gender and masculinity is neither inherent in maleness nor universal.

While gender panic theory offers a strong explanation for homophobia in western and other patriarchal societies, it does not work for societies where same sex bonding is itself regarded as masculine, and makes up a part of the socialization process to masculinize youths.

Sociohistorical theories are particularly interested in the social factors that fuel, or diminish, homophobia. These theories focus on the variability of homophobia by investigating why campaigns of persecution against homosexual relations break out in certain places and times, and among particular social constituencies, while at other times and among other social groups there is acceptance or support of lesbian, gay, bisexual, and transgendered (LGBT) people. Homophobia in western societies is associated with the roles non heterosexual peoples have been assigned in history, meanings attributed to homosexuality by powerful social institutions, and the symbolic value of disenfranchised and “upstart” social groups to dominant forces. In nineteenth and twentieth century Europe and North America, the adherents of anti homosexual worldviews have typically come from a range of social groups disturbed or threatened by modernity – usually traditional elites fearful of change and declining social classes resentful of groups on the rise. Status defense theories note that people with (or threatened with) declining living standards are especially susceptible to a politics of resentment, and have a tendency to strike out against those they see as “undeserving.” Anti gay persecution has often run parallel to campaigns of persecution directed against other disenfranchised groups. Perhaps the most egregious example is fascism, which swept up a range of people symbolizing modernity into the Holocaust. Thus gay men came to share the fate of Jews, communists, Roma, and disabled and racialized peoples when Nazism moved to reestablish the dominance of traditionally privileged social groups. Smaller scale and less intense campaigns have mobilized similar constituencies in the United States, from McCarthyism in the 1950s to repeated referendum campaigns to repeal human rights legislation since the 1970s and subsequent electoral strategies on the part of the Republican Party. Sociohistorical theories, then, do not see homophobia as a “given” inherent in gender

and social institutions, but focus on the forces that exacerbate or alleviate it over time.

Despite important gains in human rights legislation protecting the equality rights of LGBT people in many countries, homophobic attitudes and practices remain widespread. High schools appear to be a particular source of anti gay harassment in the English language world. Human Rights Watch found, in a recent investigation of US schools, that LGBT youth frequently find themselves the objects of verbal and physical attacks and that school officials provide them little or no protection or redress. Organizations such as the International Lesbian and Gay Organization, the International Gay and Lesbian Human Rights Commission, and, to a lesser extent, Amnesty International now monitor violence directed against LGBT people around the world. In some countries, state violence flows from laws that continue to criminalize homosexuality, particularly in postcolonial governments of South Asia, Africa, and the Caribbean – many still preserving British laws now abandoned by the United Kingdom itself – and Islamic governments of the Arab world, Southwest Asia, and Malaysia. Some jurisdictions have begun to take steps to curb homophobic violence in the form of hate crimes legislation, as in the United States, or prohibitions against incitement to hatred, as in Northern Europe, Spain, Canada, and Australia, but in many places anti LGBT violence endures.

SEE ALSO: Compulsory Heterosexuality; Gay Bashing; Gay and Lesbian Movement; Hate Crimes; Homophobia; Queer Theory

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homosexuality

Gert Hekma

Homosexuality refers to sexual behaviors and desires between males or between females. *Gay* refers to self identification with such practices and desires. Gay and homosexual are both terms mostly used only for men. Lesbian is its female counterpart. Such definitions have run into major problems, and nowadays the concept *queer* is used to indicate the fluency of sexual practices and gender performances.

SOCIAL CONTEXT

Since the 1970s, homosexuality has become the topic of an interdisciplinary specialization variously called gay and lesbian, queer or LGBT studies (Lesbian, Gay, Bisexual, and Transgender, to which sometimes are added QQI: Queer, Questioning, and Intersexual). The field is far removed from traditional sexology that has its base in psychology, medicine, and biology, and is closely linked to what once were called minority (black and women's) studies and now gender studies. Most of the disciplines involved belong to the humanities and social sciences: language and literature, history, cultural and communication studies, sociology, anthropology and political sciences, philosophy. Sociology had a late start, although some of the key figures in the field were sociologists (Mary McIntosh, Ken Plummer, Jeffrey Weeks), but their work was seen as primarily historical. Michel Foucault made a major imprint with the first volume of

his *Histoire de la sexualité* (1976). Other major sociologists contributed to or supported the field, for example Pierre Bourdieu, Michel Maffesoli, and Steven Seidman (1997, 1998). Notwithstanding its important intellectual proponents, the field has a weak base in universities and departments of sociology, where few tenured staff have been nominated anywhere specifically for the field, not even for the sociology of sexuality. Most often, academics started to work on homosexual themes because of personal and social interests. Gay studies has kept a strong interdisciplinary quality, often with close cooperation between sociology, history, anthropology, and cultural studies.

HISTORY

The words homosexual and heterosexual were invented in 1868 and first used in print in 1869 by the Hungarian author Károly Mária Kertbeny (1824–82). In 1864 the German lawyer Karl Heinrich Ulrichs had come up with the words “uranism” and “uranian” to describe a similar social reality, while “philopedia” was created by the French psychiatrist C. F. Michéa in 1849. These words no longer referred to sexual acts that were sins and crimes and were called sodomy, unnatural intercourse, pederasty, and so forth, but to sexual identities and desires that were deeply embedded in persons. Ulrichs and Kertbeny were predecessors of the gay rights movement and wrote mainly against criminalization of sodomy. They spoke largely from personal experiences and historical examples. Most medical authors, who started to use the new terminologies, discussed mainly the causes of such identities and desires and the question whether they were pathological or normal. They set the standards for the search for a biological basis that continues to this day (“gay gene”). Most physicians started to believe that homosexuality is an innate condition (but not the Freudians) and took the position that it is a disease or abnormality that should be healed and prevented. The early research by psychiatrists was mainly based on case histories of what they called “perverts.” They began to discuss not only homosexuality, but other perversions as well that got new names, such as masochism,

sadism, fetishism, exhibitionism, necrophilia, zoophilia, and so forth. The centers of research were on the European continent: Berlin, Paris, Vienna.

The early medical research had several sociological angles. Ulrichs and Magnus Hirschfeld, the founder of the first homosexual rights movement in 1897, came up with the first statistics on the numbers of homosexuals that closely resemble the data of today. While Ulrichs thought his uranians were less than 1 percent of the population, an anonymous Dutch adept of his estimated the figure in 1870 at 2 percent, as Hirschfeld later did. The Dutch physician and homosexual rights activist Lucien von Römer worked with Hirschfeld on sexual statistics. In a survey of 308 Amsterdam students done in 1904, he counted not only the men who identified as homosexual (2 percent) and bisexual (4 percent), but also those who had gay sex during puberty (21 percent) or homosexual fantasies (6 percent). In the first Dutch gay novel that appeared this same year, the author Jacob Israël de Haan told how as a student he made fun of the questions as he answered them. He made clear how unreliable such data often are.

Hirschfeld also did the first urban geography, "Berlin's Third Gender" (1904), in which he described the city's gay subculture of bars and parks and the elaborate world of male prostitution. Mainly German books on the history of sexual morality (*Sittengeschichte*), which often included chapters on homosexuality, preceded and influenced the work of later sociologists and historians like Norbert Elias and Michel Foucault. The work of these psychiatrists who started to give names, definitions, and identities to disease, crime, and perversion made possible the work of sociologists creating stigma and labeling theory. In many ways, this early research paved the way for what would become the sociology of (homo)sexuality. The enormous body of work, available mainly thanks to early, prewar German sexology, was largely forgotten when the main location of sex research after World War II moved to another language, English, and to another country, the US.

Most of the scholarly work on homosexuality remained focused on psychiatry, both in Europe and the US. The major sociological breakthrough came from Alfred Kinsey (1894–1956).

He was a biologist specializing in wasps, but he is generally considered to be the founder of the sociology of (homo)sexuality by means of his two books *Sexual Behavior in the Human Male* (1948) and *Sexual Behavior in the Human Female* (1953). Although these studies have been criticized for methodological weaknesses and the reduction of sexuality to "outlets," this work has been pivotal in putting sexuality on the agenda of the social sciences. Kinsey was the first to come up with more or less reliable statistics on sexual behavior, and placed them in the larger contexts of biology and history. From his research stem ideas that 37 percent of US men have had homosexual experiences and 4 percent exclusively and lifelong. He was a man with a mission who did not hide his political agenda. He stressed time and again that the large majority of citizens would have to go to prison if US laws were applied rigorously, indicating that it was a better idea to change the laws. He did much to normalize taboo acts such as homosexuality, masturbation, premarital sex, adultery, and prostitution. His institute in Bloomington, Indiana, has become one of the world's most important archives and research centers on sexual behavior and culture.

Kinsey offered a sociological instead of a psychological perspective on the topic. In his footsteps and in the wake of the nascent homosexual rights movement in the US and the UK, Edward Sagarin and Michael Schofield began to write on homosexuality from a sociological perspective, using the pseudonyms Donald Webster Cory and Gordon Westwood. Cory's books gave an overview of what was known on the topic, while Westwood interviewed 127 homosexuals on their sexual life. Cory's work in particular had a wide readership among gay men. These works changed the focus from the aberrant homosexual who had gender identity problems or was abused as a boy, to the society that discriminated against homosexuals and largely contributed to their problems (for an overview of early sociological research in the US, see Minton 2001). The Dutch psychiatrist Tolsma, who earlier believed homosexuality was pathological and homosexuals recruited boys to their ranks, did research on its origins and discovered in 1957 that no gay man had become this way through seduction.

In the footsteps of Kinsey and Schofield, more surveys were done among gay men in

the 1970s, in Germany by Martin Dannecker and Reimut Reiche, in France by Michel Bon and Antoine d'Arc, and in the US by Joseph Harry and William De Vall and by Alan Bell and Martin Weinberg of the Kinsey Institute. These surveys provided good pictures of local or national homosexual cultures, but as they could not use representative samples their results are difficult to compare. Frederick Whitam and Robin Mathy surveyed *Male Homosexuality in Four Societies* (1986) and found effeminacy in gay men in all four locations, which suggested, for them, innateness. The homosexual behavior of many non homosexual men in these societies was explained as a secondary sexual outlet. Other de/constructivist perspectives would later change this line of thinking. Surveying quickly developed in the wake of AIDS.

Other centers of research and theorizing took over in the 1950s from the Kinsey Institute and independent gay researchers. The Chicago School of urban sociology started to include sexual variation in its agenda and to study urban gay subcultures. Maurice Leznoff and William A. Westley were the first to write on "The Homosexual Community" in 1956, discussing "a larger Canadian city." The topics range from cliques, their gossip and incest taboos, being secret or overt, and professions (many were hairdressers). The topics are still very close to those of psychiatry. Later work discusses the gay bar in more sophisticated ways. Manuel Castells wrote a landmark study on geographical distribution, community organizing, and political activity of San Francisco gays and lesbians. In 1979 the concept of "gay ghetto" was introduced in the article of the same title by Martin Levine. This was the first article on gay geography and included maps of several gay vicinities that had come into visible existence since the late 1960s. After the queer turn of the 1990s, several books on space and sexuality appeared that were more cultural studies, but still included sociological material, while the field of gay urban histories boomed with George Chauncey's landmark study *Gay New York* (1994) and David Higgs's collection *Queer Sites* (1999). In *Forging Gay Identities* (2002) Elizabeth Armstrong studied gay and lesbian movements in San Francisco that she divided into three stages: the more prudent

homophile movement before 1969, a short interlude of the radical gay movement that connected gay and left interests, and from the early 1970s the identity and one issue gay (and lesbian) movement. The date of the Stonewall rebellion in 1969, when fairies, butch lesbians, and drag queens resisted a police raid in the bar of the same name in New York, is nowadays globally commemorated.

The major concept of the 1970s was stigma. Symbolic interactionism was added to urban sociology. It fit well with the change from psychology to sociology, from pathology to activism. What homosexual men suffered from was not their innate abnormality or viciousness, but social rejection. At the time that activists asked for removal of homosexuality from psychiatric classifications such as DSM, and came out of the closets into the streets, sociologists started to discuss sexual stigma. In a landmark study, Gagnon and Simon (1973) developed the concept of sexual script(ing). Their script was what others later named narrative or story (Plummer 1995). Gagnon and Simon wanted to turn away from biological and Freudian perspectives to a sociological one that combined the social and the individual. Persons become sexual beings in an interaction between both. With many examples, they indicate how the social influences the sexual and vice versa. Theories that focus on instincts and impulses proved to be less helpful to explain erotic experience and variation. Other work engaged with the homosexual "coming out," in which the various stages of this process – sensitivation, resistance, acceptance, integration – were studied and demarcated (Troiden 1988). A budding field was the theme of gay and lesbian youth and their organizations and sexual education. An early and most controversial contribution in the symbolic interactionist tradition was *Tearoom Trade* (1970) by Laud Humphreys, which was about casual homosexual encounters in a public toilet. The debate was both on the topic and on the ethics of the research method. Humphreys had used the vehicle registration plates of the men visiting tearooms to discover additional information without their knowledge. So he came to know that the men often were married and highly conservative.

The major line of research from the late 1970s became historical sociological. In 1967 Mary

McIntosh wrote a promising article (“The Homosexual Role”) in this direction, suggesting that such a role had only come into existence in the eighteenth century. The major studies were Michel Foucault’s 3 volume *Histoire de la sexualité* (1976, 1984, 1984). The first volume – *La Volonté de savoir* – was the founding work of social constructionism, a term Foucault himself never used. In this work he remarks on the change from the legal concept of sodomy, an act, to the medical one of homosexuality, an identity, that will be insistently researched as part of the politics of the body. His work is a strong critique of the idea of sexual liberation, then prominent on the social agenda through the work of Wilhelm Reich and Herbert Marcuse. He showed how discourses of sexual liberation had been around since the eighteenth century and mainly contributed to normalization and stricter controls of sexuality. His theory of an omnipresent power that used such ideologies to get a firmer grip on sexual practices spurred a new generation to engage with sexual history, also because sexuality was reconceived as something that changed over time and may not in fact have existed as a special social reality before the rise of sexual sciences. Movements of resistance that were included in his theory of power played an ambivalent role, as they largely contributed to the innovation of body politics. Although the work of Foucault deals with sexual culture in general, his leading theme may well be said to have been homosexual pleasures. His studies extended the realm of Gagnon and Simon from the micro to the macro level and gave it a historical twist.

A sociologist who works in the same vein as Foucault is Jeffrey Weeks. He started in 1977 with a book on the development of the homosexual rights movement in England and continued with a general history of sexuality (Weeks 2000). His later work is about sexual ethics (Weeks 1995), while he recently took to researching “non heterosexual” intimate relations (Weeks et al. 2001). The Foucauldian approach came at the same time as the establishment of gay and lesbian studies and inspired the first international conferences. Most new work was based on the idea of *The Making of the Modern Homosexual*, the title of a collection by Ken Plummer. Social constructionism was

opposed to essentialism that sees sexual preferences as innate. Few people in gay and lesbian studies defend that position, while most of the biologists who research gay genes, brain parts, and hormonal systems are unaware of this critique. A main theme became the development of essentialist sexual sciences.

The rise of AIDS stimulated research on several aspects of gay life, especially on sexual and preventive practices. The main aim was to impede risky behaviors. The positive side was that it produced much information on gay sex and created greater openness. But too often the research neglected the social context, once more focusing strongly on sexual outlets of “men having sex with men” (MSM). Many countries saw major surveys on sexual behavior (for the US, see Laumann et al. 1994). The outcome of these surveys surprised the gay movement because the stated numbers of gay men were everywhere lower than those found by Kinsey in the 1940s. The higher numbers of gay men in cities cannot be explained fully by their migration to the more gay friendly towns, as was expected, as cities themselves produce more men identifying as homosexuals.

SPECIAL TOPICS

With the development of gay and lesbian, and later queer studies, the research specialized. Apart from gay bars and urban cultures, particular groups started to receive attention. An early popular issue was male prostitution. These studies discussed the pay and the sexual identity of the hustlers who are often straight, their age and sexual techniques, the locations where they work, their drug use, ethnicity, and class. It is a circuit where the ganymedes, sexually unsure and unprofessional, rob and murder their clients. Later, bisexuals, drag queens, transsexuals, transgenders, intersexuals and s/m ers emerged. A very controversial subject is pedophilia, which is often and unjustly seen as an exclusively gay issue. Anonymous sex on the streets and other places was studied. Other topics varied from gay men in ethnic groups, friendships, and suburban gay lives to violence, suicide, and aging. Masculinity became a topic, sometimes with a focus on the leather scene.

With the start of discussions on homosexuality and the army and same sex marriage these issues arrived on the sociological agenda. The discussion on intimate relations was started by Weston (1991). Later studies showed opposite results. While Weeks et al. (2001) underlined the transgressiveness of same sexual families that were more open to third parties and educated children in various social constellations, Carrington (1999) stated that the couples he researched largely imitated straight codes when it came to the gendered division of labor, household tasks, and financial arrangements. It is likely that these opposite results could be explained by different samples. Other scholars revived the culture of the 1970s, before the times of AIDS, when gay men developed a patchwork of sexual situations, passions, love relations, and friendships that bridged the gap between single and couple. They felt culpable for the epidemic, but with the knowledge of safe sex it is possible to recreate this culture "beyond shame."

With the breakdown of the difference between anthropology and sociology, themes of gay life in a non western and globalized world start to draw more attention. Nowadays a growing number of books discuss same sexual practices and cultures in a great variety of countries, as well as the interconnections between the various parts of the world through migration, tourism, media, the Internet, science, and politics. Globalization created "global gays" and multiethnic queer communities in the major capitals of the world, while global effects got local inflections, or were sometimes resisted by gay and anti gay people (Altman 2001).

METHODOLOGICAL ISSUES

The main question in gay research is the definition of what is the object of study. Most research is dependent on self identification of the interviewees, who may be unwilling to disclose their sexual interests. There are no objective criteria to define the homosexual. Kinsey therefore developed a homo heterosexual scale from 0–6 in which he integrated sexual practices and sexual fantasies. Other authors created layered scales that included more facets or developments

in time as individuals move between sexual identifications during their lives. AIDS research focused on sexual practices, while some opposed this narrow perspective because behaviors are dependent on personal identifications and social contexts.

The confluence of homosexuality with effeminacy and passivity in practice and prejudice offers another challenge. Most biological research is based on the equation of effeminacy and sexual passivity in males with homosexuality, but most modern gay men stress their masculinity and exchange sexual roles with partners. All of these terms can have very different meanings. Transgenders may flaunt their femininity, but can be strong and masculine when they face violent confrontations. Straight men visit male to female transgender prostitutes and often prefer passive roles. Some females in Namibia call themselves "lesbian men" and were intransigent when the local gay and lesbian movement tried to teach them they were really butches – for them, there was a world of difference between the two. The advice to the researcher should be to learn and use the terminologies the respondents themselves use and clarify those instead of attributing names and qualities to them.

Another major stumbling block in research is the absence of representative groups. Most research uses the snowball method. Gay men are invisible, so researchers depend in surveys on self disclosure. Several techniques have been developed to circumvent this problem, for example asking "how often did you have sex with men?" rather than "are you gay?" or embedding questions on sexual behavior in a series that deals with heterosexual experiences. The terminological changes pose another problem, every new generation creating a new word for its same sexual experiences, moving from uranian, homosexual, homophile, and gay to LGTBQQI and queer, while these vocabularies always give different meanings to some times similar, sometimes quite dissimilar practices and desires. Translations into other languages pose specific problems. The use of any concept creates exclusions. The most inclusive word – queer – that is close to non heterosexual is rejected by respectable gay men who consider the term insulting.

FUTURE DIRECTIONS

Some of the research is driven by social developments, so it can be expected that controversial issues such as same sex marriage, homosexuals in the army, violence against LGBT people, or discrimination in various situations such as in offices or sports will remain high on the agenda. The same will apply to sexual education and queer initiation. Specific groups such as elderly, ethnic minority, and questioning young gays will receive more attention. The turn from biology to sociology in gay research means that attention will shift from genes and identities to space and time as context for the development of gay identifications and queer cultures. Urban queer geography will expand, while this will create an interest in suburban and non urban environments of gay men.

The development of questioning sexual orientation to a next stage which might be queer has not been touched upon in most theories of coming out, which relied on people with stable homosexual identities, not on those who did not make such a transformation. Too little theorizing has taken place on changes in sexual identifications or object choices. Examples are those men who start with gay and move on to kinky interests, but the reverse rarely happens, from kinky to gay or queer. Many boys who start to have gay interests seek adult partners rather than those of their own age group, while others who begin with their own age group subsequently stay with it, go beyond it, or forget about gay sex. Such changes in identifications and sexual interests have rarely been explored in their social contexts and ramifications.

A major issue concerns the terrains in between homosexual and heterosexual and male and female identifications and their interconnections. Sociological research on self identified bisexuals and transgenders is on the rise, but not on those who identify less along those lines, such as unmasculine men, or those persons who show a preference for intermediate cases. They even lack concepts of identification and can only be circumscribed in descriptive terminologies such as lovers of bisexuals, drag queens, or male to female transgenders.

In most cultures and the western world until about 1900, sexual desire was based on the idea of social distinction: between male and female,

younger and older, higher and lower class. Gay men were effeminate mollies who desired "normal" (straight) men, while others looked over class lines or desired boys or young men. In the literature a classification of homosexualities has been proposed based on gender, age and, less often, class difference (Greenberg 1988). The ideal of sexual connections has become over the last century an absence of social differences. Gay and lesbian relations fit this ideal better than heterosexual ones that still have to deal with a gender difference. But in most cultures connections between same sexual partners continue to be based on gender and age difference. This is the case in most of Latin America, Africa, the Arab world, and Asia. Casual contacts between non homosexual identified males that remain common in those cultures will often express a power difference, or be accompanied by a financial transaction. Many non western urban centers may see the quick expansion of gay cultures where such differences are eliminated, but they are not standard, often even defined as "modern" or "western" in a negative sense. The actual situation with regard to gender and age is rarely researched, not even for the West, while this global and radical innovation from sexual desire based on equality instead of difference has attracted next to no attention. It parallels a similar change of a world that is divided along homosocial lines (separate worlds for men and women) to a heterosocial world in which men and women participate on a basis of equality. This major and remarkable change with its manifold consequences for homosexual desires and worlds has not been a topic of research.

Absent is research on sexual pleasure, both in its individual developments and social locations. Although gay and queer studies often have an implicit liberal or libertine agenda, the sociological aspects of pleasure and desire are rarely discussed or studied. Sex research in the context of AIDS prevention has been weak on this issue, while it has been otherwise largely neglected. Scripting theory would have been a good tool for such work, but has not been used. It could help to study relations between social context and the experience of pleasure or how sexual specialties develop. Important elements of gay culture such as the choreography of cruising and sexual practices have been

regrettably neglected (Bech 1997), or studied from a literary perspective. Sexual subcultures attracted little attention, and their sexual organization remained in obscurity.

The concept of intimate or sexual citizenship (Bell & Binnie 2000; Plummer 2003) has been introduced to highlight the social and political aspects of sexuality. Such aspects were hidden by the traditional relegation of sexuality to the natural and private. This terminology draws attention to the intimate or sexual side of citizenship, next to its economic, religious, cultural, or gendered sides. It is about the body politics of societies that are ruled by straight norms and defined by heteronormativity. These codes pervade all societal institutions, from families and schools to armies and prisons.

SEE ALSO: Gay and Lesbian Movement; Heterosexuality; Homophobia; Homophobia and Heterosexism; Lesbianism; Postmodern Sexualities; Queer Theory; Sexualities, Cities and; Sexuality, Masculinity and

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Horkheimer, Max (1895–1973)

Markus S. Schulz

Max Horkheimer is best known as the long time director of the Frankfurt School and co author of the *Dialectic of Enlightenment* (with Theodor W. Adorno). In the 1930s Horkheimer defined the Frankfurt School's agenda of interdisciplinary empirical research, guided the Institute through the years of exile, and succeeded in its reestablishment in Frankfurt after World War II.

There is a remarkable continuity in Horkheimer's thought, which some have characterized as a Schopenhauerian Marxism. Although Schopenhauer and Marx had a great impact on Horkheimer, he was also profoundly influenced by Kant, Hegel, Nietzsche, the French Enlightenment philosophers, and three of his contemporaries: lifelong friend and political economist Friedrich Pollock, his university mentor Hans Cornelius, a phenomenologist

philosopher with left Christian leanings, and Theodor W. Adorno, who became his close collaborator.

There were four major stages in Horkheimer's work: (1) formative years from World War I to the late 1920s, in which he sought the conceptual tools for understanding human suffering and exploitation; (2) a brief but ambitious period of setting the agenda for interdisciplinary research during the later years of the Weimar Republic; (3) the years in exile, initially in Switzerland, then in New York and California; and (4) the reestablishment of the Institute in Frankfurt after the Nazi defeat.

Max Horkheimer was born in Stuttgart Zuffenhausen as the only son of a prosperous German Jewish textile manufacturing family. He wrote his dissertation (1922) and *Habilitationsschrift* (1925) on Kant under the supervision of Hans Cornelius at the University of Frankfurt. In 1931, following the death of Carl Gruenberg, Horkheimer became the second director of the *Institut fuer Sozialforschung* (Institute for Social Research) – later known as the Frankfurt School – and professor at the University of Frankfurt. Horkheimer outlined his vision for the Institute's agenda in his inaugural lecture on "The Present Situation of Social Philosophy and the Tasks of an Institute for Social Research" (in Horkheimer 1993: 1–14). He rejected what he perceived as philosophy's engagement with irrelevant pseudo problems and called for a close collaboration between economics, legal studies, psychology, philosophy, and sociology. The kind of social research and philosophy he envisioned was meant to change social conditions. As director, Horkheimer recruited Erich Fromm, Leo Loewenthal, Herbert Marcuse, Franz Neumann, and Adorno to the Institute. Horkheimer also founded the Institute's *Zeitschrift fuer Sozialforschung* (Journal for Social Research), which published a wide array of scholarly studies. Among the Institute's early empirical projects was a survey on the political attitudes of workers in the Weimar Republic. Although it was never concluded, its informal findings revealed to the Institute members the widespread absence of emancipatory values.

The Nazi rise to power forced the Institute into exile. Horkheimer was dismissed from his post at the university, and the Institute

was closed and its belongings confiscated. Horkheimer had already opened Institute branches in London and Geneva, and so transferred the Institute's endowment to Switzerland. After a brief stay in Switzerland, he moved the Institute to New York, where Columbia University made a building available at Morningside Heights. Horkheimer continued to edit the *Zeitschrift* in German until 1939, when he established its English successor, *Social Studies in Philosophy and Social Science* (1940–2). Among other articles, Horkheimer contributed to the *Zeitschrift* his definitive essay "Traditional and Critical Theory" (in Horkheimer 1972), which set the Institute's stance vis à vis mainstream academic thought. Horkheimer's substantial focus shifted in this period from research on the failure of a liberating revolution to a theory of the misdevelopment of culture. He became chief research consultant for the American Jewish Committee and co organizer of a large scale research project on anti-Semitism, social prejudice, and authoritarianism, the results of which were published in several volumes (with Samuel H. Flowerman, 1949–50) under the series title *Studies in Prejudice*.

In 1940 Horkheimer moved to Pacific Palisades, California, where from 1941–4 he worked with Adorno on a manuscript first circulated in 1944, then published in 1947 as *Dialectics of Enlightenment*. It was a dark assessment of the history of western rationality, surely influenced by the experience of the Nazis' industrial scale barbarism and by deep fears about the mass culture industries in the US. Although collaborative, the title essay and the chapter on de Sade were mainly Horkheimer's. He developed his position further in his major book *Eclipse of Reason*, published in 1947 and based on a series of lectures he had given at Columbia University. The book's later German title *Zur Kritik der instrumentellen Vernunft* (On the Critique of Instrumental Reason) probably reflected better his intent to critique a historically perverted type of reason without giving up reason as such.

In 1949 Horkheimer returned to Germany upon his reappointment as professor at Frankfurt, though he kept his American citizenship and frequently returned to the US as a visiting professor at the University of Chicago (1954–9). He succeeded in reestablishing the *Institut fuer Sozialforschung*, which undertook

research on, among other issues, the political culture in post war Germany. Horkheimer was elected rector of the University of Frankfurt from 1951 to 1953. In the late 1950s he moved to Switzerland and handed over the Institute's directorship to Adorno. Although Horkheimer retired in 1961, he remained active and served increasingly as a public intellectual via the press and radio. He received numerous civic honors. The student movement of the latter 1960s was inspired by Horkheimer's writings, although some distance developed when he later declined to condemn the US involvement in Vietnam. Horkheimer's accommodation with post war Germany and his appreciation of the benefits of liberal democratic institutions seem to have made him uneasy about the extremity of some of his previous positions. Only after years of hesitation did he agree to the German publication of *Eclipse of Reason* (1967). Yet, his posthumously published *Notizen* (Notes) and statements made shortly before his death expressed a profound "yearning for the totally Other" in a "totally administered world." Horkheimer died in Nuremberg and was buried at the Jewish cemetery in Bern Wankdorf, Switzerland.

Horkheimer's relevance cannot be separated from the Frankfurt School. Although not as prolific in his academic publications as his close collaborator Adorno, his sensitivity and vision shaped the Institute's research agenda, and his organizational and leadership skills ensured its survival during the years of exile and beyond. Horkheimer's writings have recently attracted renewed attention not only in Germany but also in the US. Contemporary sociology's growing interests in culture and interdisciplinary studies as well as in public sociology are likely to further fuel debate about Horkheimer's legacy.

SEE ALSO: Adorno, Theodor W.; Critical Theory/Frankfurt School; Culture Industries; Metatheory; Rational Choice Theories; Theory

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hospitals

Sharyn J. Potter

Hospitals are institutions where people in need of medical care receive medical and surgical treatment from trained professionals. The discovery of antiseptics and medical technological advances transformed the American hospital from the death and poor houses of the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries to the cornerstone of today's medical care (Starr 1982). The twenty first century American hospital provides the sick, injured, and healthy with a myriad of diagnostic, medical, and surgical treatment options. The federal government helped solidify the modern hospital as a local institution when the 1945 Hill Burton Act provided federal money for every community to build or expand their existing hospital (Stevens 1989). Hospitals ranging in size from 10–1,000 beds now dot the American landscape. In urban areas hospitals resemble small cities, complete with gourmet restaurants and banking services.

The twentieth century hospital provided families with relief from the disruption of home care by providing medical care for the sick and injured in a manner that was less disruptive for

society as a whole. In recent years hospitals have changed from places of treatment and recuperation to places constrained to treatment. The major payers of hospital care – government and private insurance companies – limit hospital stays by only reimbursing hospitals for the medical or surgical treatment. These payers no longer reimburse hospitals for convalescence care, thereby giving the responsibility of caring for the sick or injured to family or friends. This change in the provision of hospital care can be partially attributed to the passage of the Medicare Prospective Payment System (PPS) legislation in 1983.

With the implementation of the PPS legislation the hospital industry was faced with cost containment legislation for the first time in its history. Previously, hospitals had used their own discretion in pricing hospital services. The PPS legislation eliminated such discretion by authorizing the government to establish uniform prices for all hospital services for Medicare patients. Therefore, hospitals were forced to incur costs lower than the reimbursement amount to make a profit. Many hospitals found that they were able to earn a profit or save money by discharging patients soon after their procedures were complete. “PPS was a fixed payment per case determined in advance ... this approach offered hospitals the rewards of a profit or the penalty of a loss” (Altman & Young 1993: 12). Although this legislation was passed to regulate Medicare spending, the private insurance and managed care companies adopted similar methods of cost containment and initiated similar strategies for reimbursing hospitals in the US.

Three distinct types of hospitals (not for profit, for profit, and public) play an integral role in the US health care industry. Not for profit hospitals comprise the largest hospital sector, accounting for approximately 60 percent of all short term general hospitals. Many not for profit hospitals were opened and operated by various immigrants and fraternal and religious groups as a means to promote group cohesiveness and ensure care for their members. Since 1913 the federal government has formally exempted private and religious not for profit organizations from most revenue and property taxes in exchange for providing some free or below cost medical services (Gray

1986; Roska 1989). This commitment was referred to as the “relief of poverty” requirement (Fox & Schaffer 1991; Stevens 1989). The tax exemption accorded to not for profit hospitals was viewed as an investment of public resources for charitable purposes. Care for millions of uninsured patients was exchanged for the forgiveness of billions of dollars in federal, state, and local taxes.

The “relief of poverty” requirement remained in effect until 1969, when the Internal Revenue Service (IRS) modified the language and replaced it with the more general requirement that such hospitals provide “community benefit” (Roska 1989; Fox & Schaffer 1991; Seay 1992). The language in the 1969 IRS ruling resulted in considerable confusion about the interpretation of community benefit and a transformation in how hospitals began to define it. Because the rhetoric in the ruling was ambiguous and community benefit was not explicitly defined, not for profit hospitals explored alternative ways to meet this newly named requirement (Fox & Schaffer 1991). While some not for profit hospitals continued to maintain their tax exempt status in the traditional manner by providing medical care for underserved populations (Seay & Sigmond 1989; Seay 1992; Fox & Schaffer 1991; Gamm 1996), other NFP hospitals established their exemption status through more creative and non traditional methods. Some NFP hospitals began to invest in high tech equipment and new hospital and office buildings for the sake of the community (Fox & Schaffer 1991). Other hospitals developed a myriad of wellness and community education programs, that some suggest would more appropriately be called patient recruitment tools (Buchmueller & Feldstein 1996). As a result, it has been argued that the change in IRS requirements has enabled hospitals to provide “outreach activities focusing on the special health problems of the underserved” (Gamm 1996: 80; Seay & Sigmond 1989) and not necessarily on meeting the greatest needs in the community.

This conflict between charity care and community benefit continues (Kane & Wubbenhorst 2000: 186), and some believe the 1969 IRS ruling has blurred the distinction between services for the underserved and services that increase hospital visibility and revenues (Tuckman & Chang 1991; Buchmueller & Feldstein 1996). In an

effort to ensure that NFP hospitals are earning their tax exemptions, some communities now require NFP hospitals to quantify and report the community benefit services they provide (Kane & Wubbenhorst 2000). Other communities are pursuing the revocation of their hospitals' tax exempt status, believing that the increased tax revenue will give them needed funds for other projects.

Not for profit hospitals can earn profits; they are prohibited from distributing these profits. Instead, profits must be reinvested in the hospital. The major distinction between not for profit and for profit hospitals involves the distribution of profits. For profit hospitals can distribute their profits to their owners or shareholders. Therefore, stockholders demand that for profit hospitals behave in a manner that results in healthy financial statements. Gray (1991) argues that profitability is the key indicator for evaluating the success of a for profit hospital and poor financial performance can cost managers their position.

In the early 1900s many for profit hospitals were operated by physicians in rural areas where other types of hospitals were non-existent. In urban areas, eminent surgeons opened for profit hospitals for patients who preferred not to seek treatment at not for profit hospitals. In 1910, for profit hospitals accounted for approximately 50 percent of all hospitals (Stevens 1989). Thereafter, the number of proprietary hospitals steadily decreased as "community hospitals opened their staffs to wider membership and doctors found that they were able to have the public provide the capital for hospitals and maximize their incomes through professional fees" (Starr 1982: 219). By 1928, according to Paul Starr, proprietary hospitals accounted for only 36 percent of all hospitals. The number of proprietary hospitals subsequently declined further to 27 percent and then 18 percent of all hospitals, in 1938 and 1946, respectively (Stevens 1989).

Today, for profit hospitals account for 13 percent of all short term general hospitals. For profit hospitals choose to locate in affluent areas, purposely avoiding the provision of expensive charitable care that detracts from potential hospital profits. These well defined profit goals are the most appropriate justification for policies that tend to exclude poor patients (Homer et al. 1984). Over the years some for profit hospital

stocks have earned record returns for their investors. Critics indicate, however, that these record returns are not always gains for their communities. Potential stockholders do not base their purchasing decisions on how well the hospitals are meeting community needs (Rushing 1976).

The presence of public hospitals in a community influences the strategies of the other hospitals, both for profit and private not for profit. Research indicates that public hospitals often care for patients that other hospitals consider undesirable. A disproportionate number of their patients are poor, uninsured, or Medicaid recipients (Brown 1983).

Since the 1700s, public hospitals have played a vivid role in the history of American hospitals. Many big city public hospitals began as almshouses, including Bellevue in New York City, Charity in New Orleans, and Cook County in Chicago. In 1902 public hospitals were described as grim and barracks like; they typically had wards for patients with syphilis, tuberculosis, and mental disorders, and for unmarried pregnant women (Stevens 1989). Policymakers predicted the closure of many government not for profit hospitals following passage of the 1965 Medicare and Medicaid legislation, which gave the poor the means to pay for hospital care (Fox & Schaffer 1991). In theory, all patients now were paying patients and were entitled to private care. This prediction did not come true, and a mass closing of government not for profit hospitals never occurred. Public hospitals currently account for 26 percent of all US acute care hospitals.

Some researchers question whether the care at public hospitals is comparable to care at their private not for profit and for profit counterparts. For example, researchers who recently compared the records of patients suffering from ischemic heart disease at the three types of hospitals found that patients at public hospitals received less extensive services than patients at for profit and private not for profit hospitals. Likewise, other researchers find that patients at public hospitals received fewer diagnostic tests, fewer surgeries, and fewer follow up visits.

Twenty first century hospitals face a number of challenges. As cost pressures and medical technology facilitate the movement of many procedures away from the hospital to physician offices and less expensive free standing

facilities, hospitals will have to develop strategies to meet these challenges. Furthermore, many smaller communities struggle to support their hospitals and mergers occur on a regular basis, removing hospital access from local communities.

SEE ALSO: Health Care Delivery Systems; Health and Medicine; Health Professions and Occupations

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households

Graham Allan

When people discuss family life there is often a confusion between family as kinship and family as household. The two ideas are so much part of commonsense understandings of "family" that they are elided together. Though less common in sociology, a similar lack of clarity over what aspect of "family" is being examined sometimes arises. In principle, the distinction is clear cut. Family as kin are all those people who are linked to you genealogically or who you otherwise define as kin (Schneider 1968; Silva & Smart 1999). Typically, they remain kin whether or not they live with you, though the boundaries of inclusion and exclusion drawn around "my family" may alter across the life course. Households, on the other hand, are essentially those people who share a home with you. In this sense "my family" are those with whom I live and with whom I participate in a domestic economy. The membership of an individual's household will certainly change over time, and may for significant periods include people who are clearly not regarded as family.

Defining who belongs to a household appears relatively straightforward and for many people it is. There is a clear cut group of individuals who

normally eat together, share a common house keeping, and sleep in the same dwelling. These are the essential criteria used for defining a household, criteria which in different combinations are utilized in official government practices, records, and statistics. However, both in the past and currently, these issues are not quite so simple for all. At times, for example, some people may eat many of their meals in one household but sleep in another. Thus, one or more children in large sibling sets may sleep at a grandparent's house where there is more room, but otherwise live with their parents. Or a daughter or son with an elderly, infirm parent may regularly sleep at the parent's house in order to provide care at night.

Contemporary demographic patterns are also making the boundaries of households more diffuse than they were. For example, increasing numbers of people are spending different times of the week in different houses, usually as a result of conflicts between employment and domestic demands. Thus, some people do weekly commutes to work, living in one household during the week – possibly a small apartment or shared house – while living in the “family home” at weekends. A growing number of couples are also now “living apart together,” sometimes through choice rather than employment demands. Here each partner maintains their own home, but they also regularly spend time together in one or other of their homes. Whether the individuals involved in these arrangements are defined as living in one or two households, or as having a multiple household, is a moot point, as in some cases may be the question of whether they are “family” to one another. The central issue though is that the living arrangements people construct are flexible and variable and consequently cannot always be characterized as fitting neatly into a single household.

Other demographic changes have also had an impact on the composition of households. The rise in divorce, for instance, has clearly contributed to the higher numbers of lone parent households there now are, as well as to the increased proportions of people living alone for periods in midlife. So too the rise in separation and divorce has resulted in an increasing number of children whose parents share care of them in separate households. In terms of

their own household experience, these children belong to more than one household, alternating between each parent's household for whatever periods of time have been agreed. Other demographic shifts that have affected household composition include changes in life expectancy resulting in longer periods spent without dependent children in the household and later marriage age. This latter has had consequences for both the number of single person households and for the rise of non familial shared households consisting of unrelated friends and others living together (Heath & Cleaver 2003).

Generally, these demographic shifts have contributed to a greater degree of household diversity and mobility. In the early phases of adulthood particularly, people's “household careers” are often less “ordered” than they were, with changes in living arrangements being quite common. As well as the growth of shared housing as a living arrangement, young people are also now more likely than previously to be involved in relatively temporary cohabiting relationships of different durations. Equally, at least in Britain and other European countries, there has been a marked tendency for the process of leaving the parental home to be less clear cut than it was for previous generations (Holdsworth & Morgan 2005). That is, not only are adult children living for longer periods in the parental home, but there is also a noticeable trend for them to return to the parental home as circumstances in their lives – changing employment, relationship breakup, financial pressures – alter.

As a result of these different trends, overall patterns of household composition have been changing quite significantly in most western countries over the last 30 years. Taking Britain as an example, household size has continued to reduce, from nearly 3 people per household in 1970 to 2.3 in 2002 (National Statistics 2005). Currently, only a fifth (21 percent) of households consist of what used to be conceptualized as the “standard” family households of two adults and dependent children, compared to 31 percent at the end of the 1970s. And of course this number now includes increasing numbers of cohabiting unions and stepfamilies, as well as first time marriages. Significantly, nearly a third of all households (31 percent) are single person households (compared with

21 percent in 1978), though the routes into these single person households and the length of time spent in them varies significantly. A further third of households (34 percent) now consists of couples living alone, either married or cohabiting; some have not had children and others have children who are no longer dependent. The remaining households generally comprise lone parent households (8 percent) and those where people are living with friends/unrelated others (4 percent). Importantly, as discussed above, just as household composition has been altering, so too there is even greater flux over time in the personnel involved in each category as people's domestic circumstances and partnership status alter.

While these figures are about Britain, broadly similar trends are found in other western countries as a result of shifting family demography under the global processes of late modernity (Buzan et al. 2005). As noted, the growth of cohabitation, divorce, and separation and the lack of clarity over the processes of children leaving home are having an impact throughout the developed world. Clearly, though, the extent to which they occur and the impact they have depend in part on the social, fiscal, and urban policies impacting on family and household organization in the different societies. One significant element within this is the operation of the housing market. The availability of different forms of housing to different sections of the population, the costs and quality of such housing, and the alternatives which are considered acceptable all have an impact on the choices people make and the pattern of households they construct. To take one example, at a macro level, increased separation and divorce are likely to generate provision of more single person housing, but in turn people's decisions about whether or not to remain in a particular partnership will be influenced to some degree by their perception of the housing that will be available to them. Similarly, decisions about leaving the parental home will be based on alternative housing options as well as ideas of appropriate independence.

SEE ALSO: Cohabitation; Couples Living Apart Together; Family Structure; Kinship; Second Demographic Transition

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Howard, George Elliott (1849–1928)

Michael R. Hill

George Elliott Howard, a distinguished social scientist trained initially in history, rose to the presidency of the American Sociological Society in 1917. Howard earned the A.B. in 1876 at the University of Nebraska. Following two years of advanced study in Germany, Howard joined the Nebraska faculty in 1879. Howard's most prominent Nebraska student from this period, Amos Griswold Warner, later wrote *American Charities* (1894) – a standard classic in the field. Howard was named to the prestigious “First Faculty” of Stanford University in 1891.

At Stanford, when sociologist Edward Alsworth Ross was summarily fired in 1900 by university president David Star Jordan, Howard immediately defended Ross's right to free speech. Jordan demanded Howard's apology – or his resignation. Howard resigned, as did other Stanford faculty members in sequence. Instantly, Ross was hired by chancellor E. Benjamin Andrews to teach sociology at the University of Nebraska. The so called “Ross

affair” at Stanford resulted ultimately in the founding of the American Association of University Professors and the establishment of academic tenure in American universities.

After a series of brief appointments, including the University of Chicago (1903–4), Howard returned in 1904 to the University of Nebraska, where his colleagues included Edward A. Ross and Roscoe Pound. In 1906, with Ross’s departure for the University of Wisconsin, Howard was named head of Nebraska’s newly reorganized Department of Political Science and Sociology. Howard was an egalitarian, activist, and humane sociologist who championed women’s suffrage, encouraged racial tolerance, and advocated prohibition. An exacting scholar, Howard’s elaborate published syllabi on *General Sociology* (1907), *Social Psychology* (1910), *Present Political Questions* (1913), *Marriage and Family* (1914), and other topics remain extraordinary models of rigorous instructional guidance. Howard’s later Nebraska protégée, Hattie Plum Williams, earned her PhD in 1915, and in 1923 – with Howard’s encouragement and endorsement – became, at Nebraska, the first woman in the world to chair a co educational doctoral degree granting department of sociology. Howard retired in 1924.

The author of scholarly books and dozens of professional articles, Howard is best known today for his massive *History of Matrimonial Institutions Chiefly in England and the United States* (University of Chicago Press, 1904). A quintessential study in the sociology of institutions (Howard claimed for himself the invention of “institutional history” as a category of study), *Matrimonial Institutions* merited critical appraisal from Émile Durkheim and provided the intellectual foundations for the 1906 National Congress on Uniform Divorce Laws.

SEE ALSO: American Sociological Association; Divorce; Marriage; Pound, Roscoe

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human genome and the science of life

Anne Kerr

Although the double helix structure of DNA was discovered in 1953 by James Watson, Francis Crick, Maurice Wilkins, and Rosalind Franklin, it was not until the 1980s that powerful sequencing and information technologies were developed that enabled scientists to identify particular genes associated with hereditary diseases and to begin to map all of the genes in human DNA: the so called human genome. The human genome project was a massive international mapping exercise which began in the 1990s and culminated in the publication of a draft sequence by the International Human Genome Sequencing Consortium of the entire human genome in 2001, which is freely available on the Internet.

In the same period a broader range of biomedical knowledge was also developing, particularly in the fields of assisted conception. More recently, research into stem cells and tissue engineering, alongside the so called “postgenomic sciences” of pharmacogenomics and proteomics, has also developed. This “science of life” involves detailed understanding of the basic cellular mechanisms involved in human

development, as well as a focus upon copying and ultimately manipulating these processes in the laboratory. This is linked to a number of biomedical developments in the diagnosis and treatment of disease, particularly the move towards more targeted individualized treatments tailored to individuals' particular genetic makeup, and perhaps, in the future, utilizing cells and tissues taken from people's own bodies to develop treatments for them.

The use of embryos is a particularly contentious aspect of the science of life and human genomics. The dangers of surveillance and discrimination against a "genetic underclass" have also been raised, as have concerns about "designer babies." More generally, the optimism about these new developments has been criticized for being a form of hype which sustains the pharmaceutical, bioscience, and infertility industries, but will do little to tackle the major causes of ill health that the majority of the world's citizens face: poverty. In the UK the government has responded to these public and professional concerns by establishing a number of oversight bodies, notably the Human Fertilization and Embryology Authority, which enforced strict limits on the type of research that can be conducted upon human embryos. Across the world there are a range of similar bodies and more or less restrictive laws, but in some countries the science of life is largely unregulated, notably China and North Korea, where stem cell research is developing apace. In the US regulation is uneven. Although assisted conception is largely unregulated, there are stringent controls on federally funded biomedical research to prevent the use of human embryos.

Sociological work on these developments covers a wide remit. The early days of the human genome project saw sociologists, in common with their colleagues in the ethical and legal disciplines, exploring the implications of greater knowledge about individuals' genetic makeup, particularly the dangers of eugenics and genetic determinism. Others focused upon the political economy of the project, especially patenting (notably, indigenous people's DNA) and access to genetic information by the state (primarily with respect to large scale genetic databases). As Waldby (2002) noted, this was part of a growing trend of "biovalue" in which bodily parts and processes were commodified. However, these

developments have not gone unchallenged. John Moore challenged the patenting of his own DNA by researchers at Johns Hopkins University. Although he lost his case, the ownership of DNA was politicized in the process. Indigenous peoples have also resisted so called bioprospecting, where researchers take DNA samples from them to patent in the West, and this has resulted in a number of international treaties and legal claims which reassert the rights of ownership of individuals and communities over indigenous natural resources.

The lay-expert divide is also being breached in other respects where genomics and the science of life are concerned. Many patients with hereditary diseases have considerable expertise about their condition, which can lead them to challenge costly treatments and research. A range of oppositional groups such as the disability rights movement have also challenged the biologization of illness and disability. An unlikely alliance of feminists and anti abortion groups has attacked the commodification of women's bodies in assisted conception in particular, challenging, for example, reproductive tourism where rich western women travel to eastern countries to purchase eggs from local women for their assisted conception treatment. These criticisms are often focused upon the political and economic aspects of biomedical research and treatment within the context of late capitalism, and unpack widespread cultural assumptions about the nature of disability and infertility. Yet they can also perpetuate conservative notions of reproduction, where the sanctity of life is paramount. Nor is medical authority necessarily challenged in the process. Patient support groups often share with clinicians a discourse of objectivity and support for medical progress. And many of the people who become active in such organizations have a medical or scientific background. There are clearly a range of complex and sometimes contradictory views being expressed by particular groups and individuals in this area, which means that simple categories of "patient," "clinician," or indeed "activist" are largely unhelpful.

From an ethnographic perspective scholars have also spent considerable time exploring the practices of gene sequencing in the laboratory and tracking their utilization in the clinic. As Rapp (1999) and Sarah Franklin have shown, as

the uncertainties of diagnosis are profound, clinicians' and clients' choices can be very difficult. Although foregrounded, the individual is not necessarily privileged as a result of these new insights into reproductive and genetic futures. Although some patients might welcome an insight into the human face of science which an ambivalent clinician might present, others struggle to find categorical meanings to match the categorical actions that they are ultimately obliged to take about reproduction, diagnosis, and treatment: you either act or you do not.

The complexity of molecular genetic and other new forms of biological information is often highlighted by Foucauldian scholars, particularly Nikolas Rose, who explicitly contrasts it with the crude genetics of the past, particularly in its eugenic guise. This fits with a wider theoretical emphasis upon complexity and messy systems in late modernity. Echoing the risk society thesis, the main argument here is that as biomedical science has evolved so too has its risks and uncertainties. The bureaucratic edifice of the twentieth century was unable to control and tame these risks by centralized rational means, and faith in expertise weakened to the extent that the authority of biomedicine itself came into question. At the same time, the individual became more important than the collective, and a cultural emphasis upon personal rights and choices emerged. Science has therefore evolved to develop more complex, decentred interpretations of life, where flexibility and contingency are key. Genomics and the science of life, alongside developments in information and computer technologies, are at the forefront of these complex sciences, particularly the trend towards individualization of treatment, and a move away from "one size fits all" drugs and procedures.

However, others argue that the transformative potential and complex underpinnings of contemporary biomedicine and genetics in particular have been overemphasized. As scholars such as Diane Paul (1998) have shown, the so called "old eugenics" had myriad links to established scholars of genetics, and their understandings of human disease were far from monological or crude. Other studies, such as Kerr's work on cystic fibrosis, have shown that genetics has a history of multifunctional complex paradigms, which have often coexisted alongside other more determinist understandings of disease. This

suggests that complexity is not unique to the contemporary science of life, nor is it primarily a *response* to risk. Instead, it is an enduring feature of biological science.

The extent to which genetic tests and other diagnostic and screening services give patients informed choice about whether or not to participate have also been queried in a wide range of psychosocial, ethical, and sociological empirical studies. Theresa Marteau and colleagues have comprehensively demonstrated that the context in which pregnant women make decisions about antenatal screening is often one where information and interactions are subtly cued towards compliance. On the other hand, studies of familial testing for diseases such as Huntington's disease show how relationships with close relatives, wider family, and the community as a whole, as well as the very fact that these disorders are often untreatable, shape people's decisions about presymptomatic testing in such a way that it is often declined. Individuals who come from affected families also have complex responses to antenatal testing. For many, this is also fraught with difficulties and contradictions, as the potential to avert the birth of an affected child is weighted against the implicit denigration of affected individuals. The danger of too much information about one's future health being generated by these tests has also been discussed at length.

This work is often mobilized in debates about the extent and meaning of "geneticization," a term coined by Abby Lippman to stress the pernicious reach of genetic explanations for disease and behavior. Yet evidence about the uptake of genetic diagnosis and its effects upon attitudes to disabled people and social misfits is mixed. There is no comprehensive genetic paradigm being enforced by the biomedical establishment, yet it is not possible to say that the more widespread emphasis upon biological reasons for disease of which genetics is a part has no effects upon how people account for citizens' rights and responsibilities for health care in particular.

In any case, Lippman's term was always meant to be focused upon a broader trend towards reductionist notions of the genetic determinants of identity, disease, and anti social behavior. Other critics such as Dorothy Nelkin have made similar arguments about the

simplicity of much of the popular presentation of genetics, as well as the limited analysis of burgeoning fields such as evolutionary biology. Although some sociologists have called for a deeper engagement with these sciences and an end to the nature versus nurture debate, many remain committed to challenging the reductionism and circularity of this new form of biological determinism. Others, such as Peter Conrad and Alan Petersen, have focused their attention upon the popular presentation of genetic determinism in media accounts in particular, but policy documentation can also be subjected to similar analysis to show the prevailing emphasis upon "genes for ..." stories alongside an underlying positive focus upon technological progress, individual choice, and personal responsibility. At the same time, new technologies of visualization have emerged to move our understanding of life from the now relatively humble ultrasound of the disembodied fetus to laser scanning of internal cellular dynamics, bringing with them discourses of mastery and control alongside those of complexity and uncertainty.

A considerable corpus of work has also been built up into the public understanding of genetics, exploring and unpacking people's understandings and ambivalent responses to genetic knowledge and its application. Media messages notwithstanding, this work shows that the public are far from ignorant about new developments. Although their technical proficiency is often wanting, their wider social intelligence about the institutional politics of science and their experiences of raising children and mixing with a range of social groups can generate sophisticated questioning of the hype around the science of life and profound concerns about commodification in particular. Just as with the analysis of the various interest groups involved in more public debates about these new technologies, the study of more general public discourse shows that it not possible to box people into particular categories of "right to life" or "patient advocate" when their arguments and experiences overlap in myriad ways. It is also clear from a range of studies of the ethics of genomics and the science of life that professionals share many of the so called public's concerns, but that their ambivalence is often suppressed in more public spaces.

A further feature of sociological inquiry into genomics and the science of life concerns the emergence of new forms of ethics, primarily located in new institutional forms such as the HFEA. The perception of increasing public anxiety and newfound uncertainties of the science itself, particularly its application in the clinic and beyond, has meant that ethicists have moved out of academia into policy communities at a national and international level. This has been intensified by the globalization of biomedical research, signaled most clearly by the worldwide efforts of the HGP, but continued in the more routine arrangements of trade in information and bodily commodities which sustain the research networks in this field. Ethics has also been institutionalized in local research ethics committees which vet research applications from scientists and sociologists alike. A particular issue here is informed consent. This is a reflection of the rights based culture in which we live, but also a response to a range of scandals about biomedical research where subjects' and/or their families' consent had not been obtained prior to the performance of dangerous and/or distressing procedures. This holds science to account in a more public way than ever before, but in a fairly limited and (some would argue) limiting way. In contrast, ethics writ large is often focused upon pushing the boundaries of appropriate practice in this area, and is dominated by a number of high profile libertarians such as John Harris and Julian Savulescu, who make compelling arguments in favor of everything from genetic enhancement to reproductive cloning.

Once again, it is not possible to interpret the rise of bioethics as uniformly supportive or restrictive towards the science of life. It would also be wrong to see it as a response to particular aspects of the science or the technology itself, as it flows from a range of complex sociopolitical developments which have happened alongside the scientific discoveries and developments. Although a greater range of voices is now included in ethical reflection and debate than perhaps was the case in the past, ethical reflection in the public sphere is not unique to the contemporary period, and ethical restrictions on medical and scientific practice have long operated at various levels of formality and informality as a matter of course. And although the new institutional forms have developed a complex

infrastructure of surveillance to control medical practice, it is still the case that in the clinical context where consent is sought for diagnosis, treatment, or donations to research, the complexities of consent forms and the interpersonal dynamics between provider and client can and often do engender consent, just like the paternalism of the past.

Other sociologists, such as Nik Brown, have tracked the evolution of the human genome into post genomic and related areas of the life sciences, exploring the public presentation and interpretation of these developments, and the construction of expectations in particular. This involves innovators in packaging particular disorders and technical interventions in a way that emphasizes their relevancy and social usefulness while also generating and attempting to sustain an optimistic politics of hope in the face of profound uncertainty about medical and biological futures. The ethics of such hype has been questioned by scientists as well as sociologists, yet its place in the pharmacological armory seems fundamental. Profit drives innovation so the emphasis upon the future consumer of biomedical enhancement becomes necessary to the success of the industry, although the everyday practices of health services on the ground suggest that the ultimate operationalization of the “science of life” is more mirage than reality.

SEE ALSO: Eugenics; Gay Gene; Genetic Engineering as a Social Problem; New Reproductive Technologies; Science and Public Participation: The Democratization of Science

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human–non-human interaction

Clinton R. Sanders

Human interaction with non human animals is a central feature of contemporary social life. The majority of households include at least one companion animal, more people visit zoos each year than attend professional sporting events, people are more likely to carry photographs of their pets than of their children, married women report that their pets are more important sources of affection than are their husbands or children, and more money is spent on pet food than on baby food (Arluke 2003). Despite the fact that human interactions with animals are so commonplace, they have, until fairly recently, been virtually ignored within

sociology. This prosaic disregard of human–animal exchanges is based on a variety of core assumptions. Sociology is conventionally seen as the study of *human* social structures and relationships. Sociologists also hold to the Cartesian liguacentric assumption that because animals lack the ability to employ spoken language they are consequently mindless and selfless. And, as Arluke (2003) has observed, sociologists who specialize in the investigation of inequality and oppression tend to be suspicious of the study of non human animals because it may be seen as trivializing their focal concerns.

Although anthropologists traditionally have attended to the cultural role of domestic animals in simple societies, sociologists have only fairly recently begun to systematically examine the relationships and interactions between people and the animals with whom they share their everyday lives. For example, sociologists working in such varied substantive areas as social movements, the sociology of the family, work and occupations, criminology and deviance, and sociological psychology have turned their attention to human–animal issues. In tandem with the growth of interest in human–animal relationships within sociology, a wide variety of social scientific disciplines (geography, history, feminist studies, political science, and consumer research, among others) have also begun examining the phenomenon. Evidence of the burgeoning interest in what is now commonly referred to as human–animal studies is seen in the publication of special issues of established journals and book series established by academic presses devoted to the topic. The disciplinary legitimacy of human–animal studies was affirmed in 2002 when the American Sociological Association officially recognized the Animals and Society section.

The few early discussions of people’s interactions with animals were relatively unsystematic and unempirical. For example, in 1865 Harriet Martineau (a pioneer in observational methods) wrote about the problems presented by feral dogs, while in an 1872 issue of the *Quarterly Review* Frances Power Cobbe speculated about the impact of dogs’ physical characteristics upon their consciousness. In a little known but significant paper entitled “The Culture of Canines,” Read Bain (1929) criticized the anthropocentrism of sociology and advocated the

development of “animal sociology.” In his discussion of the “culture of canines” Bain stated: “Just as animal intelligent and emotional behavior, anatomical and physiological structure and function, and group life, have their correlates in human behavior, so the dividing line between animal and human culture is likewise vague and arbitrary.”

Bain’s contemporary, George Herbert Mead, frequently discussed non human animals in his writing. He employed descriptions of the *behavior* of animals as the backdrop against which he juxtaposed his model of human *action*. Mead maintained that, while animals are social beings, their interactions involve only a primitive and instinctual “conversation of gestures” (the dog’s growl or the cat’s hiss, for example). From Mead’s perspective, animals lack the ability to employ significant symbols and are therefore unable to negotiate meaning and take the role of cointeractants. Their behavior is directed toward achieving simple goals such as acquiring food or defending territory but, unable to use language, their behavior is devoid of meaning. They are mindless, selfless, and emotionless. Mead’s perspective reflected the anthropocentric, rationalist views of Descartes; non human animals could not think, therefore they were not worthy of serious analytic attention. This orientation laid the groundwork for the conventional discounting of animals and lack of attention to their interactions with humans that dominated interactionist social psychology (and sociology in general) until the last quarter of the twentieth century.

A significant turning point occurred in 1979 when *Social Forces* published an article by Clifton Bryant in which he advocated the importance of sociologists attending to the “zoological connection” evident in so many areas of social life. Soon, a few pioneering sociologists were beginning to investigate settings in which human–animal interaction was a central feature and to overtly call into question the Cartesian orthodoxy that held sway within sociology.

The major focus of this early work was on occupational settings in which workers routinely interacted with non human animals. Some of the earliest sociological work on this topic was done by C. Eddie Palmer on animal control officers and game wardens, D. Lawrence Wieder (1980) on researchers working with

chimpanzees, and William Thompson on slaughterhouse workers.

Arnold Arluke later emerged as the major figure in this topical area when his 1988 article based on the ethnographic research he conducted in biomedical laboratories was published in the interdisciplinary journal *Anthrozoos* (the sole academic journal devoted to human–animal studies at that time). Arluke's paper, and the various other related works he produced, laid the groundwork for a theme that became central to the substantive field: the dichotomy between defining animals as “pets” or functional objects and the impact of this determination on how animals are treated. Arluke expanded on this theme in his later writings, emphasizing the job related ambivalence experienced by animal shelter workers, veterinary students, and researchers in primate labs (Arluke & Sanders 1996). The number of studies focused on animal related occupations grew: Carole Case studied race track workers, Clinton Sanders (1999) wrote about veterinarians and guide dog trainers, and Mary Phillips discussed laboratory workers' perceptions of animal pain and emphasized the importance of whether or not laboratory animals were given names.

Arguably, the richest focus of systematic attention within sociological human–animal studies has been on the everyday interactions between people and their companion animals. This work has been done primarily by scholars working within the perspective of symbolic interactionism and centers on a direct critique of Mead's anthropocentric discounting of animal abilities. Key recent examples are Sanders' (1999) research with dog owners, Gene Myers' (1998) study of the interactions between children and animals in a preschool program, and Janet and Steven Alger's (2003) book on a cat shelter. These writers examine the intersubjectivity that emerges when people routinely interact with animals; the process by which people construct an understanding of the individuality, mindedness, emotionality, and identity of animal others and, in turn, how association with animals shapes the identities of human actors. Leslie Irvine's (2004) book, centering on her participation in an animal shelter, builds upon and extends this intersubjective focus by presenting a case for animals possessing a self. Basing her analysis on the work of William

James and studies of prelingual infants, Irvine makes the case for the animal self as being constituted by a sense of agency (being the author of one's action), a sense of coherence (understanding one's physical self as the locus of agency), a sense of affectivity (experiencing feelings associated with the self), and a sense of self history (maintaining an understanding of continuity in the midst of change). Irvine concludes that the self is “a system of goals, which we pursue through relationships and experiences, which involves the ways in which we respond to and order the worlds around us . . . [A]nimals, like people, manifest evidence of selfhood . . . as they manifest agency, affectivity, history, and coherence, as well as the capacity for intersubjectivity” (pp. 172–3).

Three additional main foci in the extant sociological work on human–animal interactions deserve mention. Grounded primarily in the insights of Erving Goffman, some writers have explored the impact of how being with a companion animal in public facilitates and/or impedes human to human social interaction. Non human animals have also emerged as the focus of criminological discussion, most notably in the works of Piers Beirne and Gertrude Cazaux, both of whom attend to situations in which animals are cast as violators of the criminal law and the relationship of animal abuse to people's violence toward other humans. This latter relationship has become a major focus of attention, since it incorporates broader issues of social inequality and is seen by some as offering insights into elements of a person's movement into and through a violent career. It should be noted that the predictive value of abusing animals with regard to eventual involvement in human to human violence is an issue of considerable controversy.

The third major focus is based within the traditional literature on social movements. While some writers do not see their work as overtly situated in human–animal studies (e.g., James Jasper and Dorothy Nelkin), investigations of the animal rights movement do speak directly to how social definitions of animals are constructed and are employed to establish principles governing “appropriate” and “inappropriate” interaction with, or treatment of, non human animals. David Nibert (2002), a sociologist who overtly identifies with human–animal studies,

combines an orientation based on principles of the animal rights movement, sociological perspectives on inequality, and critical theory to make the case for the oppression of non human animals – like that of women, racial minorities, and other members of disvalued human groups – as being directly related to the political and economic structure of contemporary society.

Sociologists employ a variety of methods in their investigations of human–animal relationships and interactions. Some conduct surveys to ascertain people’s perceptions of both domestic and wild animals. Others use photographs of people with animals in order to explore the impact of being in the company of animals on social and personal identity. Content analysis of advertisements, films, greetings cards, and other graphic depictions of animals have also been used to assess cultural definitions of animals. However, the most common approaches employed within sociological human–animal studies are ethnography and its variant autoethnography (the systematic recording of the researcher’s personal experience). Ethnographic techniques have proven to be the source of the richest, most detailed, and theoretically sophisticated portrayals of human–animal interaction in both public and private social settings.

As a relatively new substantive area within sociology, the study of human–animal interaction offers a wide variety of alternatives for future research. Since most of the extant discussions are focused on people’s everyday relationships with cats and dogs (the animals most commonly incorporated into households), studies of relationships with “exotic” animals such as ferrets, potbelly pigs, reptiles, insects, and rabbits would be new and instructive. There are also a number of unexplored animal related occupations (e.g., the work of veterinary technicians, wildlife rehabilitators, zoo keepers, professional dog handlers, animal behavior consultants, circus personnel, and K 9 police) available for fruitful investigation. Finally, as Arluke (2003) has observed, sociologists have now amassed sufficient basic understanding of human–animal interaction to begin to apply this knowledge in an attempt to deal effectively with problems in urban human–animal relations, veterinary medicine, animal control activities, and other settings and exchanges that

constitute the “dark side” of this key form of social interaction.

SEE ALSO: Animal Rights Movements; Anthrozoology; Friendship: Interpersonal Aspects; Popular Culture Forms (Zoos)

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human resource management

John Hogan and Miguel Martínez Lucio

Human resource management (HRM) has various definitions, but in the main there are two general approaches. The first descriptive approach states that HRM is the managing of employees and human assets at work and within the organization in an integrated and coherent

manner. The second approach elaborates this further by stating that HRM is distinct to previous forms of personnel administration in being proactive and therefore strategic: it concerns itself with soliciting higher forms of employee commitment and motivation. It is therefore both a relationship with organizations and a dedicated field of academic enquiry that has developed under this heading since the early 1980s.

Intellectually, HRM draws from various academic disciplines and subdisciplines, which in turn vary according to its distinct national contexts. Firstly, HRM derives from both traditional personnel management and labor/industrial relations as an area concerned with the question of employee control, cooperation, and commitment. It has, however, managed to constitute itself as something distinct to these two dimensions, with key proponents arguing it is more individualistic, strategic, and performance driven in orientation and not “reactive” or collectively underpinned. Hence, the role of occupational psychology has dovetailed into discussions on HRM regarding leadership and motivation, for example, and even matters of occupational health. Secondly, there is an economics tradition within HRM studies which is very much drawn from labor economics and concerns itself with matters concerning the relation between HRM processes and outcomes, as well as the subject of changing (flexible) labor markets and their relation with the HRM strategies of firms. Thirdly, there is a sociological trajectory which concerns itself with employment matters and management–employee–trade union relations within the workplace, and the broader composition of the workforce.

HRM is therefore a multidisciplinary area of analysis in terms of its academic context. It is a highly “populated” subject in terms of academic researchers, in the main due to the prevalence of business schools within the academy during the past two decades. There has also been an increasing demand from a practitioner perspective for information and guidance. This demand has come from organizations seeking greater flexibility in their workplaces, greater employee commitment, and developments in the capabilities of employees (e.g., the move from technical skills to communication and social skills). These demands have been driven

by a range of changes in product markets, competitive strategies, the structure of the firm, the competitive challenge through the globalization of economies, social changes and employee demands, and the changing context of regulation.

The topic is based on a growing belief that competitive success increasingly depends on securing more from employees in terms of commitment and resources rather than passive compliance to managerial instruction. The topics that have emerged were best described by Walton (1985), who argued that future competitive success required the eliciting of commitment rather than the imposing of control. There were five “pillars” to this:

- 1 High commitment or high involvement management: hence the increasing interest in forms of involvement and participation at work of a direct nature through team briefings and not just intermediaries such as trade unions.
- 2 Employee development: the emergence of the human resource development field with its interest in new forms of skills such as communication and interactive skills – seen as essential for service delivery in a service economy.
- 3 An emphasis on the individual employee: this dovetails with the manner in which reward and performance management systems begin to constitute the employee more as an individual and less as part of a collective.
- 4 An emphasis on leadership both at the senior and workplace levels: the changing nature of leadership through the proliferation of coaching and communication skills.
- 5 An adoption of a more “strategic approach” to HRM, which can take two forms in terms of (1) “internal fit” (i.e., that there is a consistent link and planned approach to the way elements outlined above are tied together around a “vision”) and in terms of (2) “external fit” (which has this strategy linked to the needs and demands of the product market and external environment in a more responsive manner).

There emerged approaches that referenced such developments in terms such as “hard”

and “soft” HRM. Normally, these were equated with the work of such American schools of HRM as Michigan (“hard”) and Harvard (“soft”). The first approach is more drawn to questions of control and direction (e.g., the role of cultural imposition of values and surveillance) and the second to a more negotiated approach based on involving stakeholders in the elaboration of strategy. These approaches have been nourished by the development of total quality management, with its emphasis on performance management on the one hand and employee involvement in matters related to service quality on the other.

HRM has expanded as an area of study in part due to the manner in which it is seen as being less a department or management identity/profession, and more a feature of all managerial functions. It remains an integral feature of core management education at various levels, although it has not always been able to rival the strategic popularity of areas such “change management,” and especially marketing, within the confines of the business school tradition.

There are two schools of thought and practice. One sees HRM as a series of techniques and practices which are transferable across time: the much feted emergence of the Japanese model of HRM during the 1980s and early 1990s with its emphasis on teamworking, employee commitment, and performance management, has been integrated by an Anglo Saxon model which prioritizes employment flexibility, financial control, and greater customer awareness. Both these models were seen as being transferable to other contexts in their attempts to develop competitive economies through labor management policies. The second school of thought is increasingly concerned with context – both regulatory and, to a greater extent, cultural. Hence the idea of prescribing models and strategies is increasingly being confronted with an emergent interest in environmental/regulatory constraint and mediation. Thus, questions of convergence are being discussed in relation to questions of divergence/contingency/context.

This is being mirrored in the debate on organizational culture and the emergent interest in the historical narratives of the firm. Not only are external national, economic, and cultural perspectives a focus of analysis; internal cultural and organizational specificities and

identities have also emerged as a source of study and intrigue which mediate the nature and content of HRM.

There are traditions within the study of HRM in recent years that also draw attention to the way management strategies are constrained and even mediated by the question of employee rights. The issue of diversity has begun to impact on the HRM debate as the tradition of equal opportunities and legal intervention has been complemented by the organizational utilization of employees and their socially diverse characteristics in the form of the discourse of “managing diversity.” HRM debates have placed great store on the fact that such issues as gender and ethnicity rights can be enhanced for social and economic gain, leading to the building of a business case for a diverse workforce. This business case is also apparent in the question of partnership, and a renewed interest in a form of cooperation between management and unions/employees based on the mutual gains both “sides” can achieve through a dialogue which removes traditional forms of adversarialism of a class nature and replaces it with a common alliance and strategy. Such developments, in the terms of representation and rights within HRM, are hotly disputed due to their slow progress, the concern with real gains for employees, and the nature of employer motives regarding social and representational issues (Kochan & Osterman 1994; Martínez Lucio 2004).

Current work is broad and research is expanding rapidly in the area due to the sheer scale of researchers within business schools and the dominance of consultancy practices. There are very broad sets of developments: the main ones are as follows. Firstly, there is growing interest in taking the question of “fit” discussed above and modeling it and studying it through quantitative research methods. This is known as the “bundles” approach, which aims to establish the ingredients that ensure effective HRM strategies and which allow for a match between product market pressures and HRM “recipes.” This has its own political dynamics as a feature of HRM in that there are concerns about the extent to which employee involvement and trade unions are part of such recipes in leading edge firms. There are various firm specific approaches and national/geographical

studies aimed at substantiating such links. Hence, a more qualitative approach to this subject in the form of the mutual gains approach (Kochan & Ostermann 1994) attempts to establish the role of labor – collectively and individually – as a key factor in ensuring greater quality and contentment at work and in terms of production.

Another departure is the question of meaning (i.e., the meaning of HRM in terms of its rhetoric, its contingent qualities, and its tendency to be more of a cultural and political veil than a measurable reality in terms of increasing levels of skill formation and involvement). In this respect there are studies and overviews aimed at revealing the rhetorical and political qualities of HRM (Legge 2004), its tendency to be driven by an imperative for control as suggested by the increasing levels of surveillance at work (which has drawn interest from Marxist and postmodernist accounts), and, with regards to postmodernism, the way HRM strategies have attempted to construct employees ideologically in a variety of manipulative ways. In turn, studies are showing that such strategies often lead to new forms of contestation and resistance – and even misbehavior (Ackroyd & Thompson 2000). Hence, there is a growing preoccupation with issues of employee dignity and work–life balance due to the pressure brought by HRM strategies.

There are fundamental tensions in the study of change and HRM, especially in relation to research methodology. The first is the tension between prescriptive studies of HRM which are common in the managerialist and guru/fad literature, with its recommendations as to what managers and organizations should do with regards to issues such as commitment, and the more descriptive and explanatory literature (Huczynski 1993). This tension is played out in terms of the practitioner dimension of the discipline and the academic end, with the former tending to reproduce itself in business schools, especially when there is no critical dimension or tradition present among HRM staff. The second tension revolves around quantitative and qualitative approaches. Increasingly, the dominance of North American academic paradigms means that organizational change and the evolution of HRM is understood through a quantitative prism and the concern with strategic and

organizational factors regarding issues of “fit” – both internal and external. Whereas qualitative research has focused on the more contradictory and contingent nature of change; it has also drawn attention, increasingly, to the distinct meanings of management processes and practices. Moreover, there are severe disputes between the sociological and economic perspectives on the one hand, with their interest in social relations and regulation, and psychological perspectives on the other, with their emphasis on distinct methodological concerns and research questions based on the individual.

The comparative agenda is the main challenge to the future research on HRM. Models of analysis still default to cultural perspectives or regulatory traditions of analysis. Mapping varieties of HRM at the macro and micro level is a major development, in part driven by the concern with efficient and “better” models of people management and by a cartographic desire to see if there are common features emerging in the way people are managed.

This is paralleled by a broad diffusion of interest in the changing nature of the firm as a space within which HRM strategies are elaborated. Firstly, with regards to spatial boundaries, there is the increasing internationalization of the firm. The development of transnational corporations brings the question of “fit” and employee management across boundaries up against the question of national regulatory and cultural context. Secondly, the firm’s boundaries are changing in organizational terms: the impact of decentralization, subcontracting, and ICT means that the jurisdiction of management is mediated and influenced by a broader set of sub actors. This has led to a growing interest in the role of social and corporate networks in the study of the firm, and inevitably to questions of social capital, transaction costs, and organizational coordination. There is also a third feature to this boundary issue in terms of the relation between HRM and other areas such as marketing, with its interest in communication/branding/ethics, and information management, for example, calling on academics to appreciate the interactive nature of management processes in an age of IT and image.

Finally, regardless of the initial talk of a break from traditional stakeholders and forms of organization there is an ongoing concern

with (1) the sociological characteristics of management and employees (e.g., in terms of gender and ethnicity), (2) the challenge of cooperation and involvement, and (3) the ethical framework of the firm. The ethical dimension in terms of the role of corporate social responsibility within the firm is a major aspect of current concern.

SEE ALSO: Industrial Relations; Management; Management, Worker's Participation in; Unions

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human rights

Susanne Karstedt

"Human rights are those liberties, immunities, and benefits which, by accepted contemporary values, all human beings should be able to claim 'as of right' of the society in which they live" (*Encyclopedia of Public International Law* 1995: 886). Virtually all states embrace and support the idea of human rights, and they have indicated some general agreement as to their objectives and contents. This definition which casts human rights in legal terms barely mirrors the expectations that individuals,

groups, and peoples have attached to them. When on December 10, 1948 the United Nations General Assembly adopted the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR), the Declaration was hailed as "an international Magna Carta of all mankind" that could set up a common standard of achievement (Risse & Sikkink 1999: 1). Five decades later, human rights are seen as "offering a framework for debate over basic values and conceptions of a good society" (Charlesworth & Chinkin 2000: 210), and as social claims made by individuals and groups against organized power for the purpose of enhancing human dignity. Human rights are a powerful discourse on the *moral nature* of society and individuals that is simultaneously a *legal discourse* on rights, obligations, and accountability.

Human rights discourse provides a normative legal basis that is obligatory, not optional for states. Human rights are entry points for individuals and collectivities into the sphere of international law and international relations. They require active and effective remedies in the international arena, and accountability in national and domestic arenas. Perhaps more than ever they are a constant source of hope for empowerment, identity, and self-determination for individuals, groups, and peoples who are invisible and suffer from exclusion, discrimination, and human rights abuses (Charlesworth & Chinkin 2000).

After a slow start, human rights discourse gained momentum in particular during the last decades of the twentieth century. Roughly between 1970 and 1990 the international social structure of human rights norms and institutions was built, including transnational human rights NGOs and advocacy networks. During this period major covenants came into effect, new international institutions emerged, bilateral and multilateral human rights policies were developed, and regional institutional structures were established in Europe, Latin America, and Africa. Since then and concomitantly with the third wave of democratization that took hold first in Latin America and then Eastern Europe, a process of genuine international "norms cascade" began as the influence of human rights norms and discourse spread rapidly around the globe. This norms cascade has promoted the "internationalization" of human rights norms

in the international community and given them a taken for granted quality (Risse & Sikkink 1999). If its momentum can be sustained human rights will be increasingly accepted and embedded in national norms and justice systems. The extensive human rights discourse, however, also revealed basic controversies and paradoxes that are innate to the paradigm of human rights, to its institutions and history. Three of these are presently most widely debated: first, the paradox of “international accountability for the domestic practice of sovereign states” (An Na’Im 2004); second and related to this, the controversy about the claim for universality of human rights against cultural relativism; and third, the claim for social and economic rights, in particular for the right to development.

Human rights have historical roots that reach far back into history. In particular those human rights that guarantee due process or security can be traced to ancient societies, Roman civil law, and the common law of Anglo Saxon countries (Ishay 2004a). Tolerance was and is embedded in many religions throughout the world, and states entered into treaties which acknowledged tolerance for heterodox religious worship. Through many centuries communities existed where at least some of what are now considered fundamental human rights were well protected by bodies of law, institutions, and customary law. However, the modern paradigm of human rights emerged in and is part of the Enlightenment tradition in Europe and the US. It came out of the struggles against the modern state that was accumulating more power than ever before, the bitter religious wars that had haunted the continent for nearly two centuries, and the claim for independence made by a colonial people. The first of these were the Petition of Right in 1628 and the Bill of Rights in 1689 in Britain, followed by the more encompassing declarations of the American and French revolutionaries: the American Declaration of Independence (1776), the French Declaration of the Rights of Man and of the Citizen (1789), and the American Bill of Rights (1791).

They were designed to empower individuals as human beings and because of their moral identity, thus ensuring individuals as moral personalities. These early declarations of human rights also made the state responsible

for guaranteeing these rights. The legacy of Enlightenment philosophy was twofold in this respect: it introduced the notion of individual autonomy and liberty, and simultaneously the notion – based on contract theories – that the state existed to secure the universal rights of all its inhabitants. This legacy entailed a lasting paradox for the role of the state in human rights regimes, “as both the guardian of basic rights and as the behemoth against which one’s rights need to be defended” (Ishay 2004b), a paradox that has been meanwhile transported to the supranational level and international humanitarian intervention. In the course of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries bills of rights were adopted or otherwise incorporated into constitutions on the entire continent of Europe, and the movement spread to the Americas, Asia, and Africa. The declarations of human rights further inspired and entailed other bilateral and multilateral international agreements and treaties that later were incorporated into the present paradigm of human rights. A prohibition on slavery and slave trade became customary international law in the nineteenth century and was later codified in widely accepted treaties. Further, humanitarian international laws that prohibited particularly cruel weapons and protected prisoners of war and civilians during wars were developed before World War I.

It was only in the wake of World War II and the barbarous acts committed in its course that the members of the international community, the United Nations, finally pledged themselves in the UN Charter to “take joint and separate action” for the promotion “of universal respect for, and observance of, human rights and fundamental freedoms for all without distinction as to race, sex, language, or religion” (Article 55 of the UN Charter). This led to the successive development and adoption of what is today known as the International Bill of Rights, which comprises a declaration, covenants, and measures of implementation. The International Bill of Rights can be termed as a major achievement and breakthrough in international law as it established individuals and groups as subject and legitimate preoccupation of international law besides sovereign states. The four “instruments” of the International Bill of Rights are the Universal Declaration of Human Rights

(UDHR) of 1948, the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR), the Optional Protocol to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR OP), and the International Covenant on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights (ICESCR), all adopted in 1966. The International Bill of Rights is enshrined in regional conventions that specify human rights obligations and norms for the member states of supranational regional organizations. The European Convention on Human Rights that entered into force in 1953, and in particular the establishment of the European Court of Human Rights, have been a model for other regions and the development of legal institutions to monitor the observance of human rights. In 1986 the African Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights was adopted, and in 1993 the Managua Declaration of the Organization of American States stated explicitly the obligation of its member states to promote and safeguard human rights. Other instruments mainly in the form of conventions cover specific violations of human rights (e.g., racial discrimination, forced labor, genocide, and torture) or address and protect the rights of specific groups like children, women, and migrant workers. The continuous development of these instruments over the decades in fact demonstrates the norms cascade of human rights.

The International Bill of Rights and its four instruments comprise 39 rights (or freedoms) (Condé 1999). It differs however in two important respects from the predecessors on which it is based. While these focused on individual autonomy, the UDHR and the ensuing Covenants are based on the notion of the "inherent dignity" of human beings, thus acknowledging the social and cultural embeddedness of human nature. While it was important for the Declarations of the Enlightenment era to establish the right to private property, thus promoting a free market economy, the UDHR and both Covenants do not include this right and thus abstain from defining the economic order of member states. The rights are often, though controversially, described in terms of first, second, and third "generation" rights reflecting on their historical legacy. The UDHR invokes in its 30 articles all generations of universal rights, which are then detailed and supplemented

in the Covenants. The first generation rights consist of civil and political rights and liberties as they were conceptualized during the Enlightenment. They protect against arbitrary interference and deprivation of life, liberty, and security by the state, and make the state obey the principle of the rule of law. The first generation's major document is the ICCPR. The ICESCR details the second generation of human rights, such as those to health, housing, and education. In contrast to the first generation these require active intervention by the state to ensure their protection. Individuals and groups can claim from their governments to secure their subsistence which is necessary to lead a life in dignity. Both Covenants further include third generation rights comprising peoples' or collective rights. Most prominent among these is the right to self-determination that was absent in UDHR. Third generation rights further include the right to development and peace. Claims can be made against the international community and nation states, and benefits will flow to individuals and the respective group. Third generation rights are more often than not contained in the "soft" law instruments like UN General Assembly declarations and resolutions, with the African Charter of Human and Peoples' Rights a notable exception.

While there is agreement on the justiciability of first generation human rights laws, the implementation and enforcement of second and third generation social, economic, and cultural human rights have raised debates about the general accountability of states for securing these rights for their citizens, and the actions necessary to achieve this. The Declaration on the Right of Development adopted by the UN General Assembly in 1986 epitomizes these controversies, as it links human rights language with international economic issues in a highly ambiguous way. Notwithstanding its symbolic significance in the UN system, it has also contributed to the sense that first generation liberal values and rights have a permanence and solidity that second and third generation rights do not possess (Charlesworth & Chinkin 2000: 207). However, these also have come under intense criticism. First, the right of states to international humanitarian intervention, and the legitimacy of such interventions, is debated (An Na'im 2004). Second, the claim of human

rights to universality has recently emerged as a most contentious issue (Ishay 2004a, 2004b; An Na'Im 2004). This concerns the popular, social, and cultural acceptability of human rights norms within specific social and cultural contexts. Since human rights are without doubt the product of a specific culture but nonetheless claim universality, a given set of human rights norms (in particular those based on individual autonomy and liberal values) can be perceived as alien and unacceptable in other cultures (e.g., rights for women). Further, human rights norms might not only be alien in some cultural and social contexts, but endanger those who they are supposed to benefit, by unraveling the social fabric which supported these groups. While western countries support the claims for universal rights, but are more reluctant in their endorsement of collective rights, Islamic and Asian cultures prioritize collectivistic over individual rights. It is important to address these issues in the effective and practical implementation of human rights.

Human rights law is constantly challenged, and though most states formally accept human rights regimes they undermine such commitment by use of extensive reservations, thus widening the gap between human rights promises and practices; further, many states are responsible for numerous human rights violations. The process of democratization and the development of full liberal democracy reduce the gap between promise and practice and generally the level of human rights violations. The implementation of human rights further requires processes of socialization that incorporate human rights regimes into the political identity of citizens and nations. Risse and Ropp (1999) identify three processes on the international and national level: adaptation and bargaining, moral consciousness raising, "shaming," and persuasion, and institutionalization and habituation. The density and strength of international institutions and "advocacy coalitions" of NGOs on the international and national level both coalesce into the "world time" and norms cascade of human rights regimes. Their "spiral model" of five stages towards enduring change of human rights regimes reflects the importance of interaction between advocacy networks, national movements, and international support.

Notwithstanding the numerous problems of implementation and enforcement, human rights law has an expanding role in the international community as a statement "of the elements of humanity" (Galtung 1994). It is perhaps the most important development in international law during the last century, with its norms cascade reaching into and defining the twenty first century. It has destroyed the myth that the way in which states treat their citizens is not the concern of anyone else. In the era of globalization human rights abuses are becoming the concern of everyone else.

SEE ALSO: Democracy; Global Justice as a Social Movement; Globalization and Global Justice; Law, Sociology of; NGO/INGO; Tolerance; Transnational and Global Feminisms; Transnational Movements; War

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Humanism

Joseph Scimecca

Humanism, a philosophical movement that affirms the dignity of the human being, originated in Italy in the second half of the fourteenth century. While the twelfth and thirteenth centuries had been dominated by the philosophical school of Scholasticism (philosophy taught by the “schoolmen” of medieval universities who tried to reconcile the philosophy of the ancient classical philosophers with medieval Christian theology), by the fourteenth century, Scholasticism was more and more seen by thinkers outside the church and the universities as irrelevant to everyday life. This view of Scholasticism, along with the growth of cities and greater contact with the East and its differing views and customs, led thinkers such as Francesco Petrarch (1304–74) and Desiderius Erasmus (1466–1536) to view the world differently than had the Scholastics. Although, the early Humanists were still Christians who believed that God ruled the world, it was a world which they saw as in need of change, change that could be brought about by human reason. For the Humanists, human beings possessed free will and the ability to use their reasoning power to bring about a humane world.

Humanism spread throughout Europe over the next few centuries, finally culminating in the Enlightenment, and it was out of the Enlightenment that the fundamental underpinnings of the birth of social science and eventually sociology sprang forth. It was a group of Scottish and French Enlightenment philosophers (or *philosophes*, as they are collectively known) who laid the foundation of what Auguste Comte (1798–1857) would later call “sociology.” The *philosophes* – John Locke (1632–1704), Baron de Montesquieu (1689–1755), Jean Jacques Rousseau (1712–78), Adam Smith (1723–90) – called for a fusion of morals and science, for a social science that sought to liberate the human spirit and ensure the fullest development of the person. Whereas these traditions of moral philosophy and empiricism are now seen by modern sociologists as separate, they were for the Enlightenment *philosophes* intertwined. And it was this emphasis on both moral philosophy

and empiricism, as modified by German Idealism and more recently by the American philosophical tradition of pragmatism, that constitutes the foundations of Humanism in sociology today.

THE *PHILOSOPHES* AND SOCIOLOGICAL HUMANISM

Although the Enlightenment *philosophes* initiated the discipline of sociology through their call for the application of scientific principles to the study of human behavior (Rossides 1998), it should not be forgotten that the *philosophes* were first and foremost moral philosophers. Science and morality were to be fused, not separated; the “is” and the “ought” were to be merged into a moral science, a science to be used for the betterment of humankind. Rousseau, with his arguments against inequality and for the dignity of the person, can be seen as an exemplar of this moral science tradition. Rousseau (1985) started with the fundamental assumption that all people are created equal but “everywhere they are in chains.” Rousseau was wedded to the idea that individual liberty and freedom prospered only under conditions of minimal external constraint – that the “chains” had to be broken. For Rousseau and the *philosophes*, this could only be accomplished through a fusion of morals and science, by a social science that sought to liberate the human spirit and bring about the fullest development of the person.

This tradition of a “moral science” is overlooked by the majority of contemporary sociologists, who instead focus on the empiricism of the *philosophes*, which though it played a huge role in the rise of social science, is only one part of what the *philosophes* advocated (Goodwin & Scimecca 2005). By their dismissal of the “moral science” tradition and by almost unquestioningly embracing the positivism that Comte, Spencer, Durkheim, and the other early founders of sociology advocated, sociology as it began in France, England, and later in the US strayed from its humanist roots. Sociology, however, developed differently in Germany, and it is through German philosophy and social science that the tradition of Humanism in sociology was kept alive.

GERMAN IDEALISM

German social science (unlike its English, French, and later American counterparts) was much more influenced by idealism than by empiricism – an influence due to two giants of philosophy: Immanuel Kant (1724–1804) and Georg William Freidrich Hegel (1770–1831). Like the medieval Humanists, Kant (1965) was concerned with the basic question of how autonomy and free will were possible in a deterministic Newtonian universe. Kant's answer lay in moral philosophy and the basis of moral philosophy was to be found in the human mind; moral law was located a priori in the mind and could be deduced rationally.

Kant's explanation was that objects of scientific investigation were not simply discovered in the world, but were constituted and synthesized a priori in the human mind. The external world which human beings experience is not a copy of reality, but something that can only be experienced and understood in light of a priori forms and categories. According to Kant, these forms and categories determine the form but not the content of external reality. Morally right action, too, was located in the mind. Going back to Rousseau and before him to the medieval Humanists, Kant (1949) focused on the dignity of the human being, postulating the notion of the categorical imperative – that each person be treated as an end and never as a means. This solidified the importance of the person as the cornerstone of philosophical inquiry and of Humanism. Moral values come from human consciousness, but lacking a viable theory of consciousness Kant could only go so far. It would be Hegel who subsequently made further progress toward the development of a humanistic orientation in sociology.

Although Hegel (1967) held that Kant's epistemology was successful in explaining how scientific knowledge was possible, he differed with Kant by rejecting his belief that the categories were innate and therefore ahistorical. For Hegel, the human mind had to be understood in the context of human history. Human reason was the product of collective action and as such was constantly evolving toward an ultimate understanding of its own consciousness. Hegel is very close to modern sociology in numerous aspects of his thought and it is unfortunate that he is so

often dismissed because of his ultimate reliance on the metaphysical assumption that total understanding would only come with the realization of the absolute spirit in human history, along with his conservative political views which some have seen as justifying a totalitarian system. Such interpretations overlook that Hegel was the first modern theorist to develop an anti positivist, critical approach to society. Hegel rejected positivism because of its over reliance on empiricism. As was Kant's philosophy, Hegel's philosophy was Humanist at its core.

Given the times in which they lived, neither Kant nor Hegel had a fully blown conception of self in society. It would be up to the American pragmatists to provide an active view of the self, laying the groundwork for contemporary Humanist sociology.

PRAGMATISM AND HUMANISM

Pragmatism assumes an active epistemology which undergirds an active theory of the mind, one which challenges the positivistic behaviorism of the time made popular by the likes of John B. Watson. For the pragmatists, how the mind comes to know cannot be separated from how the mind actually develops.

Mead (1974) exemplifies the pragmatists' view concerning the development of mind. Consciousness and will arise from problems. Human beings are capable of reflexive behavior, that is, they can turn back and think about their experiences. The individual is not a passive agent who merely reacts to external constraints as positivism holds, but someone who actively chooses among alternative courses of action. Individuals interpret data furnished to them in social situations. Choices of potential solutions are only limited by the given facts of the individual's presence in the larger network of society. This ability to choose among alternatives makes individuals both determined and determiners (Meltzer et al. 1977).

The individual is engaged in an active confrontation with the world; mind and self develop in a social process. Mead and the pragmatists provided an epistemological justification for freedom (*the* basic tenet of Humanism). The mind develops in a social context and comes to know as it comes into being. Any restriction

on the freedom of the mind to inquire and know implies a restriction on the mind to fully develop.

Pragmatism, by joining epistemology and freedom via the social development of mind, also provided a solution for the seeming incompatibility between an instrumental and an intrinsic approach to values. The value of freedom is instrumental in that it is created in action (the action of the developing mind); but it is also intrinsic in that the mind cannot fully develop without the creation of an environment which ensures freedom (Scimecca 1995).

Pragmatism, however, did not go far enough in its assumption of freedom of choice. Choice among alternatives is always limited. It is in pointing out these limitations in the form of power relations and vested interests behind social structures that Humanist sociology built upon pragmatism and thereby confronted the basic sociological criticism of pragmatism – that it lacked a viable notion of social structure. Humanist sociology seeks to fashion a full blown vision of the free individual within a society based on the principle of human freedom.

HUMANIST SOCIOLOGY TODAY

Humanist sociology has moved beyond pragmatism with its attempt to spell out the social structural conditions for the maximization of freedom. Humanist sociology is explicitly based on moral precepts – the foremost of which is that of freedom, “the maximization of alternatives” (Scimecca 1995: 1). This is assumed to be the most desirable state for human beings – and the goal of sociology is to work toward the realization of conditions that can guarantee this freedom. Given its Meadian theory of self (an active theory of self that chooses between alternatives), Humanist sociology is concerned with what type of society best ensures that the freedom of the individual is not thwarted by the institutions of the society. For the Humanist sociologist, there is one basic purpose: to develop a society where the dignity, interests, and values of human beings are always given the highest priority (Goodwin & Scimecca 2005).

SEE ALSO: Hegel, G. W. F.; Pragmatism

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hybridity

Jan Nederveen Pieterse

Cut 'n' mix experiences in consumer behavior, lifestyles, and identities are common and every day, for example in food and menus. Hybridity refers to the mixture of phenomena that are held to be different, separate. Hybridization is defined as “the ways in which forms become separated from existing practices and recombine with new forms in new practices” (Rowe & Schelling 1991: 231).

The theme of hybridity matches a world of intensive intercultural communication, everyday multiculturalism, growing migration and diaspora lives, and the erosion of boundaries, at least in some spheres. Hence, hybridity has become a prominent theme in cultural studies. New hybrid forms are indicators of profound changes that are taking place as a consequence of mobility, migration, and multiculturalism. However, hybridity thinking also concerns existing or, so to speak, old hybridity, and thus involves different ways of looking at historical and existing cultural and institutional arrangements. This suggests not only that things are no

longer the way they used to be, but were never really the way they used to be, or used to be viewed.

Anthropologists studying the travel of customs and foodstuffs show that our foundations are profoundly mixed, and it could not be otherwise. Mixing is intrinsic to the evolution of the species. History is a collage. We can think of hybridity as *layered* in history, including precolonial, colonial, and postcolonial layers, each with distinct sets of hybridity, as a function of the boundaries that were prominent at the time and their pathos of difference. Superimposed upon the deep strata of mixing in evolutionary time are historical episodes of long distance cross cultural trade, conquest, and empire and episodes such as transatlantic slavery and the triangular trade. Within and across these episodes we can distinguish further hybrid configurations. Taking a political economy approach we can identify several general types of hybridity in history. Hybridity across modes of production gives rise to mixed social formations and combinations of hunting/gathering and cultivation or pastoralism, agriculture and industry, craft and industry, etc. Semi feudalism and feudal capitalism are other instances of mixed political economies; modes of production did not simply succeed one another but coexisted in time. Hybrid modes of economic regulation include the social market in Europe and Scandinavia and market socialism in China, which organize economies by combining diverse principles. The mixed economy and the social economy of cooperative and nonprofit organizations are hybrid economic formations. Social capital, civic entrepreneurship, and corporate citizenship – prominent themes of our times – are also hybrid in character.

Hybridization as a process is as old as history, but the pace of mixing accelerates and its scope widens in the wake of major structural changes, such as new technologies that enable new forms of intercultural contact. Contemporary accelerated globalization is such a new phase. However, if practices of mixing are as old as the hills, the thematization of mixing as a perspective is fairly new and dates from the 1980s. In a wider sense it includes the idea of *bricolage* in culture and art. Dada made mixing objects and perspectives its hallmark and inspired the collage. Surrealism moved further

along these lines and so do conceptual and installation art. Psychoanalysis brought together widely diverse phenomena – dreams, jokes, Freudian slips and symbols – under new headings relevant to psychological diagnosis.

While hybridity may be unremarkable in itself, the critical contribution of hybridity as a theme is that it questions boundaries that are taken for granted. Thus, hybridity is noteworthy from the point of view of boundaries that are considered essential or insurmountable. Hybridity is an important theme also in that it represents one of three major approaches to globalization and culture. One is the idea that global culture is becoming increasingly standardized and uniform (as in McDonaldization); second is the idea that globalization involves a “clash of civilizations”; and third is globalization as hybridization or the notion that globalization produces new combinations and mixtures. The hybridity view holds that cultural experiences past and present have not been simply moving in the direction of cultural synchronization. Cultural synchronization does take place, for instance in relation to technological change, but counter currents include the impact non western cultures have on the West and the influence non western cultures exercise on one another. The cultural convergence view ignores the local reception of western culture, the indigenization of western elements, and the significance of crossover culture and “third cultures” such as world music. It overrates the homogeneity of western culture and overlooks that many of the cultural traits exported by the West are themselves of culturally mixed character if we examine their lineages. Centuries of East–West cultural osmosis have resulted in intercontinental crossover culture, and European and western culture are part of this global *mélange*. For a long time Europe was on the receiving end of cultural influences from the Orient and the dominance of the West dates only from 1800 onward (Frank 1998).

The term hybridity originates in pastoralism, agriculture, and horticulture. Hybridization refers to developing new combinations by grafting one plant or fruit onto another. A further application is genetics. When belief in “race” played a dominant part, “race mixture” was a prominent notion. Now hybridity also refers

to cyborgs (cybernetic organisms): combinations of humans or animals with new technology (e.g., pets carrying chips for identification, biogenetic engineering).

Hybridity first entered social science via anthropology of religion and the theme of syncretism. Bastide (1970) defined syncretism as “uniting pieces of the mythical history of two different traditions in one that continued to be ordered by a single system.” Creole languages and creolization in linguistics was the next field to engage social science interest. Creolization came to describe the interplay of cultures and cultural forms (Hannerz 1992). In the Caribbean and North America creolization stands for the mixture of African and European elements (as in the Creole cuisine of New Orleans), while in Latin America *criollo* originally denotes those of European descent born in the continent. The appeal of creolization is that it goes against the grain of nineteenth century racism and the accompanying abhorrence of *métissage* as miscegenation, as in the view that race mixture leads to decadence and decay, for in every mixture the lower element would be bound to predominate. The cult of racial purity involves the fear of and disdain for the half caste. By foregrounding the *mestizo*, the mixed and in between, creolization highlights what has been hidden and values boundary crossing. The Latin American term *mestizaje* also refers to boundary crossing mixture. Since the early 1900s, however, this served as an élite ideology of “whitening” or Europeanization; through the gradual “whitening” of the population and culture Latin America was supposed to achieve modernity. In the US, crossover culture denotes the adoption of black cultural characteristics by European Americans and of white elements by African Americans. A limitation of these terms is that they are confined to the experience of the post sixteenth century Americas and typically focus on “racial” mixing. A different perspective is the “orientalization of the world” and easternization, in contrast to westernization. This concerns the influence of Japan and the rise of East Asia, China, and India and the twenty first century as an “Asian century.” Each of these terms – creolization, *mestizaje*, crossover, and orientalizing – opens a different window onto the global mélange and global intercultural osmosis.

Hybrid regions straddle geographic and cultural zones, such as the Sudanic belt in Africa. Southeast Asia combines Indo Chinese and Malay features. The Malay world, Indo China, Central and South Asia, Middle Eastern, North African, and Balkan societies are all ancient *mélange* cultures. Global cities and ethnic *mélange* neighborhoods within them (such as Jackson Heights in Queens, New York) are other hybrid spaces in the global landscape.

What hybridity means varies not only over time but also in different cultures. In Asia it carries a different ring than in Latin America. In Asia the general feeling has been upbeat, as in East–West fusion culture. Hybridity tends to be experienced as chosen, willed, although there are plenty of sites of conflict. In Latin America the feeling has long been one of fracture, and fragmentation and hybridity were experienced as a fateful condition that was inflicted rather than willed. The Latin American notion of mixed times (*tiempos mixtos*) refers to the coexistence and interspersion of premodernity, modernity, and postmodernity. In recent times Latin America’s hybrid legacies have been revalued as part of its cultural creativity.

The domains in which hybridity plays a part have been proliferating over time, as in the hybrid car (combining gas and electricity), hybridity in organizations, and diverse cultural influences in management. Interdisciplinarity in science gives rise to new hybrids such as ecological economics.

The prominence of hybridity has given rise to a debate in which hybridity is being criticized as an élite perspective (Friedman 1999). A brief account of arguments against and in favor of hybridity is as follows (see Nederveen Pieterse 2004). Critics argue that asserting that all cultures and languages are mixed is trivial; a rejoinder is that claims of purity have long been dominant. Critics hold that hybridity is meaningful only as a critique of essentialism; which is true, but there is lots of essentialism to go around. Some question whether colonial times were really so essentialist; a rejoinder is that they were essentialist enough for hybrids to be widely despised. Critics object that hybridity is a dependent notion; but so are boundaries. Some critics argue that hybridity matters only to the extent that people identify themselves as mixed; but the existing classification categories hinder

hybrid self identification. Critics claim that cultural mixing is mainly for élites; but arguably cross border knowledge is survival knowledge also or particularly for poor migrants. Critics hold that hybridity talk is for a new cultural class of cosmopolitans; but would this qualify an old cultural class policing boundaries? If critics ask what the point of hybridity is, a riposte is what is the significance of boundaries? Boundaries and borders can be matters of life or death and the failure to acknowledge hybridity is a political point whose ramifications can be measured in lives.

A next step is to unpack hybridity and to distinguish *patterns* of hybridity. The most conspicuous shortcoming of hybridity thinking is that it does not address questions of power and inequality: “hybridity is not parity” (Shohat & Stam 1994). This is undeniably true; but boundaries do not usually help either. In notions such as global *mélange* what is missing is acknowledgment of the actual unevenness, asymmetry, and inequality in global relations. What are not clarified are the *terms* under which cultural interplay and crossover take place. Relations of power and hegemony are reproduced *within* hybridity, for wherever we look closely enough we find the traces of asymmetry in culture, place, and descent. Hence, hybridity raises, rather than erases, the question of the terms and conditions of mixing. Meanwhile, it is also important to note the ways in which relations of power are not merely reproduced, but refigured in the process of hybridization.

Thus, according to the context and the relative power and status of elements in the mixture, hybridity can be asymmetric or symmetric. For instance, colonial society is asymmetric. We can think of types of hybridity along a continuum with, on one end, a hybridity that affirms the center of power, adopts the canon, and mimics hegemony and hegemonic styles, and, at the other end, mixtures that blur the lines of power, destabilize the canon, and subvert the center. The novels of V. S. Naipaul are an example of the former and Salman Rushdie’s novels often match the latter. Menus that mix cuisines and health care practices that combine diverse methods may offer examples of the symmetric end of the hybridity continuum, but completely free floating mixtures are rare, for even at a carnival the components carry different values.

SEE ALSO: Boundaries (Racial/Ethnic); Cultural Studies; Colonialism (Neocolonialism); Eurocentrism; Globalization; Globalization, Culture and; Glocalization; McDonaldization; Multiculturalism; Race

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hyperconsumption/ overconsumption

Jeremy Schulz

Social critics and social scientists, on observing the transformations of American and Western European societies throughout the twentieth century, have relied on terms such as “overconsumption,” “consumptionism,” “new consumerism,” and “hyperconsumption” to convey the increasingly central role played by the acquisition and consumption of goods and services in the lives of individuals, the shaping of cultural forms, and the dynamics of social organization.

This family of terms has a long history in the American context, where “consumptionism” entered the popular lexicon in a 1924 article by journalist Samuel Strauss. Like many other social critics of his time, Strauss sought to expose the ethical bankruptcy of a society in which a concern for the standard of living dominated all other aspects of national and individual welfare. Decades later, in *The Affluent Society* (1958), the economist John Kenneth Galbraith savaged the “overconsumption” fueled by the growth of mass markets and American merchandisers’ insatiable appetites for huge sales volumes.

The term “overconsumption” also figured prominently in the critiques of the American lifestyle formulated by social critics and social scientists during the 1970s and early 1980s. Moving beyond earlier critiques, these treatments took aim not only at the ethical consequences of overconsumption, but at the effects of consumption oriented lifestyles on physical health, psychological well being, and social functioning. Scitovsky (1976) and Wachtel (1989), for example, argue that ever increasing quantities of goods and services do not ensure gains in satisfaction at the individual or collective level. In such a society, individuals accustomed to more and more inevitably adapt their consumer expectations to their new circumstances. Consumers will constantly revise their consumption standards upwards, conceiving a whole new set of “must haves” as general consumption standards rise. Other writers from this period address the theme of overconsumption from a less psychological standpoint. Hirsch (1976) considers the perverse social consequences of American society’s extreme emphasis on private goods at the expense of public amenities. The profusion of private goods and services and the starvation of the public sector make it necessary for each consumer to meet their needs individually through market channels. In Hirsch’s view, when all goods and services are supplied and consumed in this way, social and individual well being suffers.

Combining the themes which preoccupied the critics of the 1970s with the concerns for status and emulation which inspired Veblen at the turn of the century, Frank (1999) focuses

on the competition over status and social position in the consumerist America of the 1990s. Frank relates the “upscaling” of expectations about what constitutes a desirable wristwatch, suit, or car during the 1990s to the desire American consumers have for “positional goods” (Hirsch 1976) which assist people in creating the “invidious distinctions” Veblen mentioned in his writings on conspicuous consumption (Veblen 1967). Because they represent membership in certain reference groups to which they aspire, today’s status seeking consumers treat socially sanctioned “high end” products, brand name clothes, cars, and “trophy homes” as necessities. For the status driven American consumer, a serviceable \$50 wristwatch suddenly becomes inadequate when \$1,000 wristwatches start appearing on the arms of well off neighbors, successful co workers, and even media celebrities. Frank’s concern with adaptation and status seeking surfaces in many journalistic accounts of overconsumption in the contemporary US. During the late 1990s, articles about expensive and oversized “trophy homes” and “McMansions” appeared frequently in the pages of the nation’s newspapers.

Several recent works on overconsumption have shifted the focus somewhat away from the proliferation of luxury goods and the upscaling of consumer norms among the affluent. The predicament of the middle class overconsumer who depends entirely on earned income and consumer credit to finance his acquisition of goods and services is now a central theme in writings about overconsumption. In her influential book *The Overspent American* (1998), the economist Juliet Schor examines the new wave of middle class consumerism supported by earned income and consumer credit. In Schor’s view, middle class purchasing of status goods and services has exploded because of the visibility and transparency of the lifestyles associated with middle class reference groups such as celebrities. The status insecurities of middle class Americans who fear sliding down the social ladder add to this emulationist pressure and stimulates even more consumerist behavior.

For the status conscious members of the middle class, the acquisition, ownership, and display of “socially visible” goods such as cars, houses,

and clothing have become essential means of proving to themselves and others that they belong in the “really made it” and “doing very well” groups which have come to play the reference group role for more and more Americans. Today’s middle class overconsumers live in a social world where one cannot validate and affirm one’s claims to membership in the “made it class” without owning and flaunting the cars, clothes, houses, and computers which are recognized as essential components of upper middle class living. Indeed, George Ritzer (2001) remarks it is the very inconspicuousness of contemporary brand name overconsumption which differentiates it from the kind of overconsumption characteristic of Veblen’s elites. Consumerist individuals who want to be seen driving certain cars and wearing certain clothes are at once proclaiming their conformity to a particular generalized type and their distinctiveness as “individuals” (Baudrillard 1998).

A new interest in the institutional and infrastructural conditions of overconsumption has surfaced in the works of sociologists studying consumerist practices at the beginning of the twenty first century. The American sociologist George Ritzer coined the term “hyperconsumption” (Ritzer 1999, 2001) to capture the vastly expanded scope and scale of mass consumption supported by the organizational and logistical innovations of the last quarter century. Ritzer has written extensively about the physical and virtual settings and contexts where the contemporary consumer interacts with producers and sellers of consumer goods. In his view, the emergent “cathedrals” and “landscapes” of hyperconsumption offer an irresistible combination of abundance, enchantment, and predictability. They lend ordinary acts of purchase a magical aura, while at the same time removing all obstacles and barriers to the pleasurable and efficient acquisition of goods and services.

Ritzer (1999) reminds us that American consumers encounter a more and more rationalized and “McDonaldized” set of organizations and practices on the supply side of today’s consumer oriented American economy, an economy where consumer spending now accounts, either directly or indirectly, for a constantly rising

proportion of US GDP (now around 70 percent) and some 60 percent of all domestic employment (Toossi 2002). At the same time, the demand side of the American economy has been increasingly reorganized to support ever growing levels of consumption. Equity based credit cards and other innovations in the “means of consumption” (Ritzer 1999, 2001) give ordinary American consumers the capacity to spend far beyond their current means.

It is possible to distinguish three strands in recent empirical research into contemporary trends in overconsumption and consumerism. British and American ethnographers tend to concentrate on the experiential dimensions of shopping, whether at luxury stores or the large volume discount stores so prevalent in the US (Zukin 2004). More theoretically and structurally oriented researchers have dealt with the markets and organizations which supply the means – such as consumer credit (Calder 1999) – and the opportunities (Ritzer 1999) for overconsumption.

Emergent lines of research include, at the behavioral level, studies of individuals’ use of and relationship with goods such as large homes and luxury cars and services, particularly leisure and entertainment services such as cruises, casinos, hotels, and restaurants. At the structural and institutional level, researchers are turning their attention to the orchestration of consumer credit services, the structuring of large scale discount retailing/small scale luxury retailing, and the diffusion of American models of retailing and credit provision in Europe, Asia, and other parts of the world. Finally, theoretically oriented researchers are rethinking the category of consumer. Zygmunt Bauman, for example, argues that in contemporary neoliberal societies the empowered consumer now wields a kind of agency inaccessible to the comparatively disempowered worker employee who must cope with an ever more rationalized workplace. For this reason, individuals and households who lack purchasing power because of their low incomes or status as unemployed members of society find themselves stripped of consumer sovereignty. The loss of consumer choice casts the poor and unemployed further into the social abyss and further into the ranks of the “repressed” (Bauman 1998).

SEE ALSO: Conspicuous Consumption; Consumption; Consumption, Cathedrals of; Consumption, Landscapes of; Consumption, Mass Consumption, and Consumer Culture; Life style; McDonaldization; Shopping Malls

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hyperreality

Michael T. Ryan

The capitalist mode of production has gone through some significant changes in the twentieth century (according to Henri Lefebvre, a mutation). A number of French social theorists inspired by Marx have attempted to grasp this process with new concepts and theories, especially in relation to new cultural forms and processes (e.g., media technologies) that are no longer treated as epiphenomenal superstructures that are reducible to the economic substructure of capitalism as orthodox Marxists have traditionally conceptualized this relation. Cultural phenomena have become critical forces in the moments of distribution, exchange, and consumption of commodities in late capitalism. The heroic age of the revolutionary bourgeoisie ended around 1910 with the decline of all of the referentials of classic capitalism: clock time, the vanishing point in art, the work ethic and productive values, history, proletarian revolution, etc. Class strategy has shifted from the organization of production to the bureaucratic organization of consumption and everyday life. The age of simulation begins with the liquidation of referentials, according to Jean Baudrillard. Signs and signifiers have become detached from their referents, from reality, and now only refer to each other. For example, according to Mark Gottdiener, Las Vegas casinos have a variety of themes and constitute a structure of differences that have nothing to do with the gambling and profit taking that goes on in them. What is the social and historical relation between a simulated

pyramid and the gambling, entertainment, and profit taking that takes place there? If fantasies connected to ancient Egypt do not do anything for the consumer, there are a number of other fantasies with which to play (e.g., tropical paradise, the Wild West, simulated urban environments, etc.). For Umberto Eco, in themed environments like wax museums “[absolute] unreality is offered as real presence . . . The sign aims to be the thing, to abolish the distinction of the reference.” For Baudrillard, hyperreality “is the generation by models of a real without origin or reality.” The production and reproduction of the real or the hyperreal is what material production is all about in our postmodern society. Simulations, signs, and codes now structure social relations and social practices rather than the capital/labor production relations of classical capitalism. Modern men and women have been set adrift in a sea of signifiers and simulations.

While commodification, industrialization, and market relations were seen as elements of an explosive process in early capitalism, Baudrillard, following Marshall McLuhan, sees an implosion of all binary distinctions and boundaries in late capitalism: high and low culture, past and present, good and evil, capital and labor, male and female, white and non white, developed and underdeveloped nations, appearance and reality, urban and rural representation and reality, true and false, etc. The poles of every opposition have been absorbed into one another and have become undecidable. Although he is not explicit about this, one could trace this process of implosion as Lefebvre does to the failure of the working class to become an agent of revolutionary transformation, an agent that was supposed to explode all of the contradictions that had accumulated in the capitalist mode of production and to transcend all of the premodern and bourgeois institutions to create a new socialist mode of production and urban society. While Lefebvre sees the implosion of this over organized society as a dystopic possibility, Baudrillard sees it as an accomplished fact and only offers us one alternative possibility: a return to symbolic exchange that structured tribal cultures and, along with the challenge (i.e., warfare as a mode of appropriating economic surpluses as well as martial sports, the

ancient Greek Olympics or medieval jousting matches that maintained warrior skills and discipline), structured agrarian societies as well. Simulation begins when the poles of all of these oppositions collapse. Indifference and neutralization of all of these formerly dialectical oppositions is the consequence. The media provide models for lived experience and interactions in everyday life (e.g., sex manuals, manuals for parenting, advice columns, radio and television call in shows, etc.).

Hyperreality is seen by most of these social theorists as a constituent element and a structural tendency in the development of the consumer society and late capitalism. While most of these theorists connect this process to the political economy of the capitalist mode of production, Baudrillard sees postmodern society as a fundamental break from modern capitalism. We move from a society organized around production to a society organized by semurgy. Capital is simply one sign among a multitude of signs that structure social experience and practices in everyday life. Many of Baudrillard’s readers have recognized the importance of his early critical work, see it as an enrichment of Marxist theory, and incorporate it in their critical analyses of late capitalism. But as Douglas Kellner sees it, Baudrillard abandons a social scientific perspective for a metaphysical philosophical perspective in his later works after *The Mirror of Production*.

While hyperreality is a useful concept to grasp the effects of the media in late capitalism, there are a number of problems with Baudrillard’s later works. First, unlike Lefebvre who situates linguistic phenomena and consumerism within the process of the reproduction of the capitalist relations of production, Baudrillard sees the hyperreal as taking on a life of its own disconnected from the capitalist mode of production. He has reduced our understanding of this society to a single form and process (i.e., formalism or technological reductionism). He has failed to lay out the mediations to political and economic forms and processes, and he has failed to situate this tendency in history and in the possibilities for social change.

Second, his analysis is abstracted from any notion of agency. Which agents have brought this situation into existence? Which agents can

take up the task of transcending this closed system that apparently can only break down in a catastrophic manner? The only resistance is the passivity of the silent majority, which are the objects of his contempt. This often happens to radicals who live through a period of social movements that contest the powers that be and then fail, as happened in the 1960s/1970s. With social change unlikely in his lifetime, he abandoned these social movements to embrace some very reactionary political positions.

Third, his analysis is abstracted from the content of everyday life, the lived experience of consumers who are even more alienated than the workers of Marx's era. Does this postmodern society integrate all of its elements? Does this consumer society take care of all of our needs, especially social needs and services? Will the earth sustain a global consumer society? Are we not in the process of committing *terricide* as Lefebvre suggests?

Fourth, while Baudrillard is long on theory, he has failed to put together a research agenda, and in Kellner's judgment he has even failed to fully develop his theory. His concept of code is never satisfactorily defined. His work is often metaphorical; the logic of the metaphor displaces the logic of social processes (i.e., his use of DNA as a master code). For hyperreality to become a more useful concept, the students of Baudrillard will have to answer his critics.

SEE ALSO: Consumption; Culture; Implosion; Simulacra and Simulation; Social Change; Theory

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hypersegregation

Nancy A. Denton

Hypersegregation occurs when a race/ethnic group is highly segregated in multiple ways, no matter how segregation is conceptualized or measured. It is an explicit recognition of the fact that residential segregation by race is a complex phenomenon that is multidimensional in nature. First used in 1989 in an article by Massey and Denton about patterns of black-white segregation in large US metropolitan areas in 1980, the term now occurs in both the academic and popular literature to describe the extremely high residential segregation experienced by African Americans in the US. Though residential segregation has generally declined in recent decades for African Americans, hypersegregation was still documented for African Americans in both 1990 and 2000. For the first time in 2000, Hispanics are hypersegregated in two places as well. No other group experiences hypersegregation in US metropolitan areas.

The complex, multidimensional nature of segregation reflects the historical causes of racial residential segregation, which include prejudice, discrimination, the behavior of realtors and mortgage and insurance agents, as well as the FHA and the development of the suburbs. Associated with the Chicago School, segregation is used to gauge the spatial assimilation of diverse groups into US society, beginning with comparisons of the residential patterns of European immigrant groups to native born whites and blacks. The theory was that as groups became more similar to native born Americans in terms of language, education, income, and occupations, they would also reside in similar areas. The study of segregation is also linked to the development of long term amortized mortgages for housing purchase. Though these enabled many people to own their own homes, the mortgages necessitated that the lender have some way of knowing that the home would still be valuable decades hence, and the future value was linked to characteristics of the neighborhoods where houses were located, including the race of the neighborhood residents. The tremendous post World War II housing boom, combined with the baby boom and suburban development, resulted

in urban landscapes that some described as “chocolate city, vanilla suburbs.” In recent decades, residential segregation of blacks has been linked to the development of underclass areas where the spatial concentration of poverty also concentrates other social ills such as crime, joblessness, single parenthood, low levels of educational attainment, etc. Even for the non poor, the linkage between housing appreciation and neighborhood and their exclusion from such neighborhoods, combined with denial of mortgages and higher rates of interest, has been estimated to have cost the current generation of blacks almost \$95 billion in lost assets (Oliver & Shapiro 1995). This brief history of residential segregation serves to illustrate the complexity of it. Throughout all of these studies the segregation of African Americans always stood out because it was so consistently high across cities and over time. The concept of hypersegregation was developed as a way of measuring and describing this uniqueness.

Conceptually, hypersegregation occurs when a group has high segregation scores on four or five different dimensions of segregation. The first dimension is evenness: the extent to which all the neighborhoods in a metropolitan area show the same distribution of groups as the total area. Thus, if an area is 20 percent black and 80 percent white, there would be no segregation if each neighborhood had that racial distribution as well. Evenness is measured by the Index of Dissimilarity (D), the most commonly used measure of segregation. The next dimension is isolation: the extent to which a group shares its neighborhoods with only members of its own group. While evenness looks at distributions *across* all neighborhoods in a city or metropolitan area, isolation provides the view from *within* neighborhoods. A group may live in only a subset of the neighborhoods in a city, but if those neighborhoods are relatively integrated the group has contacts outside their group and their segregation is not as severe as when their neighborhoods are occupied only by their own group. The third dimension, concentration, refers to the relative proportion of the total land area a group occupies, relative to the group's size. This dimension addresses the issues of crowding, population density, and the advantages associated with housing on spacious suburban lots. Centralization, the fourth

dimension, measures how close to the central business district a group resides. In the past, the central business district was not a desirable place to live because of the presence of factories, and in more recent years it reflects the disadvantage associated with not living in the suburbs, where many jobs are now located. The last dimension of segregation, clustering, looks at whether the neighborhoods where a group lives are themselves clustered into one large area or are scattered throughout the metropolitan area. It addresses the aspect of whether a group member, regardless of the composition of their neighborhood of residence, interacts with non group members if they leave their neighborhood. In hypersegregated metropolitan areas, black neighborhoods tend to form large contiguous ghettos.

The five dimensions used to measure hypersegregation were identified through a factor analysis of 20 different segregation indices, computed for blacks, Hispanics, and Asians in 60 metropolitan areas in 1980 (the 50 largest plus ten others with large Hispanic populations) (Massey & Denton 1988). After selecting a single index for each dimension, a group was defined as hypersegregated when their segregation was above a cutoff on four or five of the dimensions. The original criteria for defining hypersegregation were 0.6 for indices of evenness and clustering, 0.7 for isolation and concentration, and 0.8 for clustering (Massey & Denton 1988), though in later work (Massey & Denton 1993) the cutoff was simplified to 0.6 for all dimensions. The choice of a cutoff reflects the fact that in the literature segregation above 0.6 is usually considered high when indices range between 0 and 1. In a reanalysis of the dimensions of segregation for the same metropolitan areas using data from 1990, Massey, White, and Phua (1996) found that the clustering dimension was not as clearly defined in 1990. These researchers also analyzed all 318 metropolitan areas and found that the original five dimensions of segregation identified in 1980 were clearly observable in 1990, indicating that the structure of segregation had changed somewhat in the largest metropolitan areas, possibly because of the increased presence of Hispanics and Asians in these places, but that segregation could clearly be defined as comprising five dimensions in 1990 as in 1980. In terms

of which index best represented each dimension, however, the choice was not as clear for clustering and concentration.

In summary, to define hypersegregation requires three decisions: first, which index will be used to measure each of the five dimensions; second, what value of each index will be considered "high"; and third, on how many of the five dimensions must a group be highly segregated to be called hypersegregated. Choices on each of these are made based on both the extant literature and the judgment of the researchers: in short, there is no absolutely correct choice, and changes will yield different lists of hypersegregated places and groups. While this may at first seem to imply that hypersegregation is an arbitrary idea, what it really reflects is that segregation is a continuous variable. Furthermore, as will be seen when specific hypersegregated places are discussed below, varying these choices does not dramatically change the overall pattern of results.

Where does hypersegregation occur and does its location change over time? Using data from the 1980 US Census, ten metropolitan areas were originally identified as hypersegregated: Baltimore, Chicago, Cleveland, Detroit, Milwaukee, and Philadelphia on all five dimensions, and Gary, Los Angeles, Newark, and St. Louis on four dimensions (Massey & Denton 1989). As noted above, these were selected by examining the 50 largest metropolitan areas in 1980, as well as ten others with large Hispanic populations. In 1993 an additional six areas were added to the list as a result of modifying the criteria for defining hypersegregation to be 0.6 for all indices: Atlanta, Buffalo, Dallas, Indianapolis, Kansas City, and New York. Thus, in 1980 hypersegregation was most often found in larger, formerly industrial cities of the Northeast and Midwest that had large African American populations. A decade later, looking at the same 60 metropolitan areas originally used, Denton (1994) found that African Americans in all of these metropolitan areas remained hypersegregated except those in Atlanta and Dallas. In addition, examination of black segregation in the remaining metropolitan areas revealed hypersegregation of African Americans in an additional 15 metropolitan areas. While eight are smaller metropolitan areas located in the South (Albany, GA, Baton Rouge, LA,

Beaumont Port Arthur, TX, Monroe, LA, and Savannah GA) or Midwest (Benton Harbor, MI, Flint, MI, and Saginaw Bay City Midland, MI), the other seven are large metro areas, implying substantial black populations living in hypersegregated conditions: Birmingham, AL, Cincinnati, OH, Miami Hialeah, FL, New Orleans, LA, Oakland, CA, Trenton, NJ, Washington, DC.

Research using data from the 2000 census reveals the continuance of hypersegregation for African Americans, as well as the emergence of hypersegregation for Hispanics. Wilkes and Iceland (2004) identify 29 metropolitan areas with black-white hypersegregation in 2000: Chicago, Cleveland, Detroit, Milwaukee, Newark, and Philadelphia on all five dimensions, and Albany, GA, Atlanta, Baltimore, Baton Rouge, Beaumont Port Arthur, Birmingham, Buffalo Niagara Falls, Dayton Springfield, Flint, Gary, Houston, Jackson, Kankakee, IL, Los Angeles Long Beach, Miami, Memphis, Mobile, Monroe, LA, New Orleans, New York, Saginaw Bay City, MI, St. Louis, and Washington, DC on four dimensions. While most of these were also hypersegregated in 1990, Wilkes and Iceland used a different index to measure concentration than the one recommended by Massey and Denton. If a consistent set of indices is used across the three censuses, then nine metropolitan areas drop off the list of those hypersegregated in 2000 (Benton Harbor, Cincinnati, Indianapolis, Kansas City, Miami, New Orleans, Oakland, Savannah, and Trenton), though they remain highly segregated. However, three areas (Atlanta, Dayton, and Mobile) became hypersegregated in 2000. In addition, Hispanics in Los Angeles and New York are found to be hypersegregated in 2000.

Why is hypersegregation important? The multidimensional layers of segregation implied by hypersegregation mean that to the extent that blacks living in these places are denied access to the spatial resources in terms of schools, jobs, safety, and housing value appreciation that whites experience, then hypersegregation is a factor supporting the disadvantaged status of blacks in metropolitan America. It is of particular importance that Hispanics in New York and Los Angeles are now experiencing hypersegregation as well, for there is little reason to expect that it will not have similar effects

for them as it has had for African Americans. Future research on hypersegregation will have to confront the fact that, currently, hypersegregation is defined relative to non-Hispanic whites. While this group is the most socioeconomically privileged, controls the opportunity structure in most metropolitan areas, and is usually the largest group numerically, metropolitan areas are increasingly diverse. Future studies of hypersegregation will have to include more groups and use multiple group indices such as the Theil Index, which is just beginning to be used in segregation studies (Fischer 2003; Fischer et al. 2004). In addition, increasing heterogeneity within groups, in both income and suburban location, implies that future work may show that some members of a group live in hypersegregated conditions while others do not (Alba et al. 2000; Fischer 2003).

SEE ALSO: Ethnicity; Inequality and the City; Race; Race (Racism); Residential Segregation; Segregation

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hypotheses

Ivan Y. Sun

Hypotheses are predictions that specify the relationships among the variables. The role of hypotheses in scientific research is to provide explanations for certain phenomena and to guide the investigation of related others. The development of scientific knowledge hinges ultimately upon the results from hypothesis testing. Formalized hypotheses consist of two types of variables: the independent and dependent variables. The former is the cause and the latter is the outcome. A good and well worded hypothesis should (1) indicate the specific relationship between the dependent and independent variables to be examined; (2) suggest the nature of the relationship; and (3) imply the nature of the research design (Cone & Foster 1993).

Hypotheses, which are derived directly from a theory or theories, have to be testable. The hypothesis testing process generally involves three steps. The first step is to formulate two hypothesis statements: a null hypothesis (often symbolized as H_0) that predicts no relationship between the variables in the population (e.g., H_0 : Social class is unrelated to deviant behavior) and an alternative hypothesis (H_1) that predicts a relationship between the variables (e.g., H_1 : Social class is related to deviant behavior). The null hypothesis should be mutually exclusive of the alternative hypothesis, meaning that there is no overlap between the two hypotheses. They are also exhaustive, representing all possible outcomes in reality. If the null hypothesis is not correct or rejected, then the alternative hypothesis may be correct or accepted.

The second step is to select the level of significance. In order to decide whether to reject or

fail to reject the null hypothesis, researchers must select a significance level (i.e., the α level) for the null hypothesis, which is typically at .05 or .01. If the alternative hypothesis specifies a direction of the relationship between the variables (e.g., H_1 : Social class is negatively related to deviant behavior), then the test is called a one tailed or directional hypothesis test of significance, which looks for either the increase or decrease of the dependent variable. If the alternative hypothesis does not specify a direction of the relationship (H_1 : Social class is related to deviant behavior), then the test is called a two tailed or non directional hypothesis test of significance, which examines any change in the dependent variable.

A final step is to calculate the value of test statistic and compare the statistic to a critical value obtained from distribution tables (e.g., Distribution of t or Chi Square or F) based upon the α level. If the test statistic falls beyond the critical value, then the null hypothesis is rejected and the finding is significant (e.g., People with high and low social class differ significantly in their deviant behavior). If the test statistic does not exceed the critical

value, then the null hypothesis cannot be rejected and the finding is not significant (e.g., People with high and low social class do not differ significantly in their deviant behavior), meaning that the difference in deviant behavior between people with high and low social class only occurs by random chance.

SEE ALSO: Evaluation; Fact, Theory, and Hypothesis: Including the History of the Scientific Fact; Statistical Significance Testing; Theory; Theory Construction; Variables, Dependent; Variables, Independent

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ideal type

Stewart Clegg

The notion of an ideal type is best known to sociologists through the work of Max Weber, although it was a term in common usage in nineteenth century German historical social sciences. It was designed to solve the problem of comparison. A historical event cannot be described without reference to the persons involved and to the place and date of its occurrence. Thus, all historical events were unique and one could only tell specific local stories. Forcing these into some overall framework would usually prove, at worst, ideological and, at best, would do violence to the integrity of local detail.

What an ideal type captures is meaning: what counts for history is always the meaning of the people concerned in its production and interpretation. As Leopold von Mises (1976: 60) argued in his *Epistemological Problems of Economics*:

An ideal type cannot be defined: it must be characterized by an enumeration of those features whose presence by and large decides whether in a concrete instance we are or are not faced with a specimen belonging to the ideal type in question. It is peculiar to the ideal type that not all its characteristics need to be present in any one example. Whether or not the absence of some characteristics prevents the inclusion of a concrete specimen in the ideal type in question, depends on a relevance judgment by understanding. The ideal type itself is an outcome of an understanding of the motives, ideas, and aims of the acting individuals and of the means they apply.

As Weber conceived them, ideal types were hypothetical and a reference not to something that is normatively ideal but to an ideational

type, which serves as a mental model that can be widely shared and used because analysts agree that it captures some essential features of a phenomenon. The ideal type does not correspond to reality but seeks to condense essential features of it in the model so that one can better recognize its real characteristics when it is met. It is not an embodiment of one side or aspect but the synthetic ideational representation of complex phenomena from reality.

For instance, Weber's analysis took emergent terms and ideas that were current in actual bureaucracies at the time that he was writing and used them as the basis for theoretical construction of an ideal type of bureaucracy. They were a reconstruction of ordinary language in use into the ideal type. Now a certain normative slippage occurs in this process, because he is using ordinary language terms, as defined by members of organizations, to describe what it is that these members do. The members were those of the Prussian and German bureaucracies of the state and military. They were bounded by a ferociously strong sense of duty and conformance.

Schütz (1967) took issue with one aspect of Weber's approach to ideal types: were they a construct by the analysts, or were they the analysts' account of the constructs in use by the members of the research setting in question? For Schütz it was not clear whether Weber's ideal types, in their basis in social action, were a member's category or one that belonged to analysts. By this he meant that their construction out of the concepts of everyday life should ensure that they were grounded in the members' usage. However, once they were refined by an analyst, they become somewhat dissociated from everyday usage.

An example of how slippage could occur is evident in the history of the concept of bureaucracy. Weber's synthesis of its ideal type

meaning became the basis for a narrow focus on “bureaucracy,” which became, ultimately, much more compatible with an instrumental concern with “efficiency” overshadowing the cultural, historical, institutional, political, and economic analysis of the market which Weber (1978) pioneered. Bureaucracy had been identified with elite constructions of organization; these, in turn, were now taken to be the literal depiction of the phenomenon. Rationality in the empirical world became identified with top managerial prerogatives defining what the bureaucracy should be and irrationality became identified with deviations from it.

Some sociologists made a similar error: because the ideal type was a construct from a highly specific place and time, it would have been odd for later and different realities to correspond to it. When writers such as Gouldner (1954) investigated organizations, they compared the realities they found with the type that they had inherited. However, since the type was always an imaginary and synthetic construct from a specific place and time, this is not an immediately sensible activity. It ends up privileging the subjectivities of those members whose everyday usage first grounded the construct and neglects that in different circumstances other members might have constructed quite other usages, which should surely provide the material for constructions of other ideal types. What can happen, instead, is that the type becomes reified. It takes on a life of its own. The analysts’ casting of the ideal type sets it in concrete and it is employed long past its use by date. For example, once again this seems to be what happened with Weber’s famous ideal type of bureaucracy. It was widely used in the 1950s and 1960s as the basis for both case studies, such as Gouldner (1954), and for the development of what were heralded as taxonomic approaches to organizations (Pugh & Hickson 1976). The latter saw the ideal type elements abstracted by Weber with respect to nineteenth century German bureaucracy become the definitive features of a functionalist conception of organization structure as an essential form determined in its particular patterns by specific local contingencies, such as size or technology. Analysis then became caught in a historical cul de sac of ever diminishing returns as scholars sought to defend the essential structure against all comers (Donaldson 1996).

Meanwhile, the members of actual organizations were, in practice, using quite different everyday concepts to construct their realities (supply chains, outsourcing, virtual organizations, etc.), which could not be captured adequately in the abstractions of the reified form. As Martindale (1960: 383) suggested, we should “compare different empirical configurations, not empirical configurations and types,” as any specific type is always historically bounded and “destined to be scrapped.”

SEE ALSO: Bureaucratic Personality; Charisma, Routinization of; Culture, Organizations and; Democracy and Organizations; Labor Process; Organization Theory; Organizational Careers; Schütz, Alfred; Weber, Max

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identity control theory

Peter J. Burke

Identity control theory (ICT) focuses on the nature of persons’ identities (who they are) and the relationship between the persons’ identities and their behavior within the context of the social structure within which the identities are embedded. ICT grows out of identity

theory (Stryker 1994; Stryker & Burke 2000) and structural symbolic interaction theory more generally (Stryker 1980). Central to all of these theories, including the symbolic interaction perspective, is the idea that behavior is premised on a named and classified world and that people in society name each other and themselves in terms of the positions they occupy. Further, these positional labels or names and the expectations attached to them become internalized as the identities that make up the self. These self labels thus define persons in terms of positions in society and these positions carry the shared behavioral expectations. Further, these positions, conventionally labeled roles and groups, are relational in the sense that they tie individuals together. For example, with respect to roles, father is tied to son or daughter; with respect to groups, the in group is related to the out group and in group members are related to other in group members. This is reflective of William James's (1890) notion that people have as many selves as they have relationships to others. Thus, through their identities, people are intimately tied to the social structure.

The social structure, in this view, is not fixed or static. Fluidity of the structure of social relations is conceptually brought about by introducing Turner's (1962) concept of "role making," which takes place situationally as persons interact and negotiate common meanings that may reshape, reinterpret, and otherwise change the situation. However, this is variable. Some structures (open) are more open to role making, negotiation, and change than others (closed). In the more open structures, names and classes as well as possibilities for interaction may be modified through negotiation and interaction. In closed structures, such modifications are made only with difficulty.

MEANING

Central to ICT is the concept of meaning around which identities are formed. What does it *mean* to be "father," or "son"? What does it *mean* to be an "American"? An identity is a set of meanings applied to the self in a social role or as a member of a social group that define who one is (Burke & Tully 1977). Identity control theory takes the definition of meaning

from the work of Osgood et al. (1957), which in somewhat simplified terms is a response that a person has to a stimulus; meaning is a response. From Mead, a symbol is a stimulus to which people share a common response. Thinking about myself as a father (the stimulus) calls up in me a set of responses (set of meanings) similar to those called up in others. These responses define for a person what it means to be a father, e.g., being strong, being caring, or being the breadwinner. These common responses lead to common expectations and understandings about what a father is and what a father does, as well as shared understandings about the relation of father to son or daughter and the position of father in the family.

CONTROL OF PERCEPTIONS

Each identity is viewed as a control system with four components (Burke 1991). The set of meanings for a given identity is held in what identity control theory terms the *identity standard* – one of the components of an identity. In addition to the identity standard containing the self defining meanings, an identity contains *perceptions* of meanings in the situation that are relevant to our identity (most of which come from the feedback from others about how we are coming across in the situation), a *comparator* that functions to compare the perceived meanings with the meanings in the identity standard, and an output function of the comparison, sometimes called an *error* or *discrepancy* that represents the difference between perceptions and the identity standard. Finally, as a function of the error or discrepancy, there is meaningful behavior enacted in the situation that conveys meanings about our identity.

If, in an interactive setting, people perceive their identity relevant meanings to be congruent with the meanings in their identity standard, that is, the discrepancy is zero, people continue to do what they have been doing. If the discrepancy is not zero, people change their behavior in such a way as to counteract the disturbance and reduce the discrepancy back toward zero. By changing their behavior, people change meanings in the situation. These altered meanings are perceived and again compared to the meanings in the identity standard. Thus, each

identity is a control system that acts to control perceptions (of meanings relevant to their identity) by bringing them into congruency with the meanings in their identity standards, thus reducing toward zero any discrepancy or error caused by a disturbance.

This process of controlling perceptions of identity relevant meanings to make them congruent with the meanings in the identity standard is the process of identity verification. Thus, people act to verify or confirm their identities, and in so doing, they bring about a situation in which relevant (perceived) meanings are consistent with their identity standard. The meanings in the identity standard represent goals or the way the situation is "supposed to be." If the identity is a role identity, then the behavior that brings about the changes in the situational meanings to make them consistent with the identity standard is appropriate role behavior. If the identity is a group- or category-based identity, the behavior which verifies the identity is the behavior that maintains group boundaries and divisions in the social structure. Thus, by verifying identities, people create and maintain the social structure in which the identities are embedded.

Note that by controlling perceived situational meanings, role players and group members are bringing about and maintaining certain conditions or states of affairs by whatever behaviors accomplish that. They are not engaging in particular behaviors except insofar as those behaviors bring about the condition of meanings that are perceived to be the way things are "supposed to be." It is the outcome that is important; an outcome that is accomplished by various means in spite of various unpredictable disturbances. For this reason, the meanings in the identity standard may also be conceptualized as goals to be achieved or realized by having perceptions that match the outcomes indicated in the identity standard.

As discussed above, identities control perceived meanings to bring them into alignment with meanings held in the identity standard. Meanings, also discussed above, are responses to stimuli. Identity control theory distinguishes between two types of meanings: *symbolic* meanings and *sign* meanings (Lindesmith & Strauss 1956). Symbolic meanings are responses to stimuli that are shared with others. These stimuli

are symbols. The meaning of the symbol "pen" is understood and shared by persons in the same culture. When one person talks about a "pen," others understand. Signs, however, are stimuli whose meanings are not necessarily shared with others, but which help us manipulate resources in the situation (Freese & Burke 1994). Using a pen to take notes, a person feels how the pen fits into her hand, how it flows along the surface of a sheet of paper, and how it makes marks with ink that are controlled to form writing. The responses that she has to the pen in its use are sign meanings. Sign meanings allow us to control resources present in the situation.

RESOURCES

Resources within identity control theory are processes that sustain persons, groups, or interaction (Freese & Burke 1994). This is a functional definition in which resources are defined by what they do rather than what they are. Resources are of two types: *actual* and *potential* (Freese & Burke 1994). Actual resources are resources in the situation that are in use in the sense of currently sustaining persons, groups, and interaction (e.g., the pen that is writing, the chair that is supporting an individual, the idea that solves a problem). Potential resources are resources that are not being used, but have the potential for use at a future time (e.g., the pen or chair that is not in use, food in the pantry, oil in the pipeline). Sign meanings allow us to control actual resources. Symbolic meanings allow us to control potential resources through thinking, planning, and action. When an identity controls meanings relevant to the identity in the situation, it controls both sign and symbolic meanings, and through them it controls actual and potential resources.

As described at the beginning, identities are primarily defined in terms of the named categories and positions of the general social structure. Further, the identity's position in the social structure, i.e., in a group or network, governs its access to the actual and potential resources either directly or through network ties. In this way, the resources controlled by identities are those that sustain the social structure by sustaining the groups, the roles, the individuals, and the interaction that defines

these. To understand identity functioning in an empirical sense then, one must understand the location of the identity in the social structure.

THE BASES OF IDENTITY

ICT distinguishes between three bases of identities. These are *role identities*, what it means to be in a role such as father, *social identities*, what it means to be in a group or category such as American, and *person identities*, or what it means to be the unique biological being that one is. Identities based on each of the different bases operate in the same way, wherein people seek to verify the identity or make the relevant situational meanings (both signs and symbols) match the meanings held in the identity standard by counteracting any disturbances. Analytically, each of these bases differs in the resources that are controlled through the control of meanings. For a role identity, control of meanings results in control of resources that sustain the role and the group within which it operates. For a social identity, control is of the resources that help sustain the group and maintain its boundaries. For a person identity, control is of the resources that sustain the individual as a unique biological being. Analytically, these differences are clear, although in practice and empirically, it is often difficult to know which resources go with which since we are often all of these at once: a biological being who is a group member in a role.

People have many identities, one for each of the many persons they claim to be, roles they have, and groups and categories to which they belong. This complexity of the self with its many identities reflects the complexity of society (Stryker 1980). In ICT, the multiple identities are arranged into a hierarchy of control systems in which some identities are higher than others in the sense that the outputs of those identities at the higher level are the standards of those identities at a lower level (Tsushima & Burke 1999). Higher level identities have their own perceptions, standard, and comparator just as the lower level identities.

While the output of the comparator of the lower level identities leads to behavior that maintains (when there is no discrepancy) or alters (when there is a discrepancy) meanings in the situation, the output of the comparator

of the higher level identities acts to alter the standards (identity meanings) for lower level identities. In this way, higher level identities act as general principles that guide the programs of lower level identities. Higher level identities include such master statuses as one's gender, race, or class, and many person identities, the control systems of which are used across situations, roles, and groups. One may, for example, be not just a friend but a female friend; one may be not just an American but a black American; one may be not just a professor but a diligent professor. In each case, the master status of gender or race, or the person identity as diligent, acts to change the manner in which friend, American, or professor is played out.

IDENTITY CHANGE

The most obvious outcome of a discrepancy between the perceived identity relevant meanings and the meanings held in the identity standard is behavior that counteracts any disturbance to the perceived meanings and quickly brings them back into alignment with the identity standard. At the same time, however, ICT recognizes the less obvious outcome that identities change: i.e., the identity standard slowly changes in the direction of the situational meanings. Both outcomes occur simultaneously, but at much different speeds. If the disturbed situational meanings are restored quickly, any change to the identity standard may not be noticed. If the discrepancy persists, however, because the person cannot change the situational meanings for one reason or another, the slowly changing identity standard will continue to move toward agreement with the situational meanings and the person will come to see herself as consistent with the situational meanings. The discrepancy has been removed not by changing the situational meanings to be in agreement with the identity standard, but by changing the identity standard to be in agreement with the situational meanings, although this generally takes a long time and most people would leave the situation rather than endure such changes to who they are.

Nevertheless, in persons who have been prisoners of war, in persons who are brought into cults, and in persons who are abducted and kept for a long period of time with their abductors, we

see the changes in the identities that are brought about. In each case, these powerless persons are unable to verify their (former) identities by changing perceived meanings in the situation. These persons with their lack of power and status are unable to change their perceptions and their identity standards slowly change to match the perceptions. This result was shown in research that examined identity verification among status unequals (Cast et al. 1999). The identities of persons with less power or status came to be more in alignment with the perceptions of meanings provided by more powerful others. The reverse was not true. Of course, children have very little power and their identity standards are strongly set by their parents who have the power.

EMOTIONS

In ICT, the verification process of identities is tied to emotional outcomes that help guide the process (Burke 1991). When the discrepancy between identity relevant perceptions and the identity standard is small or decreasing, people feel good. When the discrepancy is large or increasing, people feel bad or distressed. These consequences have been shown in research by Burke and Harrod (2005), who found that persons become distressed, angry, and depressed when their spouse's view of them is different (better or worse) than their self view or identity standard. Current work in ICT examines the role of identity verification in the production of self worth, self efficacy, and feelings of authenticity (Cast & Burke 2002) and is developing predictions about the specific emotions that may be felt when identities are verified or not verified (Stets & Burke 2005).

FUTURE RESEARCH

Because ICT is part of a continuing research program, new developments and additions to the theory are always being made; the theory is not fixed. A few areas that new research is exploring include: (1) how identities change in response to external events and the other identities an individual holds; (2) how the multiple different identities an individual has relate to one another; (3) how the social context in

which identities are or are not verified influences the variety of emotions felt; (4) how identity verification is related to the health and well being of individuals; (5) how the identities of persons in interacting groups influence interaction and group processes; and (6) how ICT relates to other developing theories in social psychology such as justice theory, exchange theory, expectation states theory, and status characteristics theory. It is clear that much work remains for the future development of this theory (Stryker & Burke 2000; Burke 2004).

SEE ALSO: Identity: The Management of Meaning; Identity: Social Psychological Aspects; Identity Theory; Role Taking; Self; Social Psychology; Symbolic Interaction

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identity, deviant

Patricia A. Adler and Peter Adler

Identities refer to the way people think of themselves. This is important in the field of deviance because people's perceptions and interpretations of situations and themselves are likely to affect their behavior. If people conceive of themselves as deviant, they are more likely to engage in further deviant behavior than if they have a non deviant identity. The study of deviant identities has focused on how people develop and manage non normative self conceptions. This processual approach has been fostered by the special interest in deviant identity taken by symbolic interactionists, with their rich heritage from labeling theory to dramaturgy. Central themes in the study of deviant identities include the ways that they develop, factors that foster their development, and consequences of having them.

Some structuralist scholars consider definitions of deviance rooted in absolutist elements intrinsic to people's attitudes, behavior, conditions, or social statuses. This approach sees unchanging, universal sources such as God or nature as responsible for differentiating between the deviant and the normative. Structuralists would likely view certain acts as so inherently abhorrent that these would be banned by all societies. Relativist scholars, such as Howard Becker, however, view deviance as the product of people's reactions to events, which are situationally variable by the era in which they occur, the relative social power of the perpetrator and victim, and the consequences that arise from them. Relativists believe that the likelihood of

an act becoming defined as deviant (and the punishment that accompanies it) depends on who commits it, who suffers from it, and who knows about it. This partly explains the higher likelihood that individuals of color who commit crimes against white people (or lower class people who commit crimes against rich people) will be arrested, charged with a crime, and prosecuted, since such victims generally have high social power and the perpetrators' social power is relatively low. Relativists note that definitions of deviance have significantly evolved over time and continue to do so. Most conceptions of deviant identity follow this latter approach, recognizing that people are most likely to develop deviant identities when they experience situational factors where such self conceptions are pressed upon them. In fact, Becker (1963) suggested that many people go through a range of experiences as "secret deviants," violating norms but doing so inconspicuously. As long as no others are aware of their transgressions, he suggests that people are unlikely to think of themselves as seriously outside of the norm.

The process of acquiring a deviant identity unfolds processually as a "deviant" (Becker 1963) or "moral" (Goffman 1963) career, with people passing through stages that move them out of their innocent identities towards one labeled as "different" by society. "Deviant identity careers" develop through seven stages. The point of departure, as Becker (1963) suggested, is getting caught and publicly identified. People commit deviant acts, such as theft; if they are apprehended, news of this spreads. Second, others begin to think of them differently. In light of this new information, others may engage in what Kitsuse (1962) called "retrospective reinterpretation," reflecting back onto individuals' pasts to see if their current and earlier behavior can be recast. For instance, people may wonder how someone now caught for college cheating got such good grades without studying much, and decide that he or she was probably cheating all along. Third, as this news spreads, either informally or through official agencies of social control, individuals develop "spoiled identities" (Goffman 1963), where their reputations become tarnished. Erikson (1966) noted that news about deviance is of high interest in a community, commanding intense focus from a wide audience. Deviant labeling is hard to reverse, he

suggested, and once people's identities are spoiled they are hard to socially rehabilitate. He discussed "commitment ceremonies," such as trials or psychiatric hearings, where individuals are officially labeled as deviant. Few corresponding ceremonies exist, he remarked, to mark the cleansing of people's identities and welcome them back into the normative fold. Individuals may thus find it hard to recover from the lasting effect of such identity labeling, and despite their best efforts they often find that society expects them to commit further deviance. Merton (1968) referred to this as the "self fulfilling prophecy," where people tend to enact the labels placed upon them, despite possible intentions otherwise.

Fourth, Lemert (1951) noted that the dynamics of exclusion then set in, where certain groups of people, organizations, employers, and others may not want to associate with the newly labeled deviants, who become ostracized from participation and membership with them. They may be cast out of honors societies, professional associations, relationships, or jobs. Fifth, Lemert highlighted the corollary to this point, discussing the dynamics of inclusion, which make people labeled as deviant more attractive to others. Their very acts may lead fellow deviants or would be deviants interested or engaged in similar forms of deviance to seek them out. Thus, individuals may find that as they move down the pathway of their deviant careers that they shift friendship circles, being pushed away from the company of some, while being simultaneously welcomed into the company of others.

Sixth, others usually begin to treat those defined as deviant differently, indicating through their actions that their feelings and attitudes towards the newly deviant have shifted, often in a negative sense. They may not accord people the same level of credibility they previously had, and they may tighten the margin of social allowance they allot them. Seventh, and finally, people react to this treatment using what Charles Horton Cooley referred to as their "looking glass selves." In the culminating stage of the identity career, they internalize the deviant label and come to think of themselves differently. This is likely to affect their future behavior. Although not all people who get caught in deviance progress completely through this full set of stages, Becker (1963) described this process as the effects of labeling.

Degher and Hughes (1991) have suggested that along the way to identity change people may be nudged out of their normative self identities and into deviant ones by active and passive "status cues." Active status cues are communicated through interaction, such as when people make remarks that let their friends know that they appear different, or that they ought to reconsider something about themselves. Passive status cues derive from the environment, such as when people discover that they are no longer capable of doing something or appearing a certain way. While active status cues are direct, people may encounter passive status cues for a long time without recognizing them, and often require some sensitization to perceive and accept these as pointing towards themselves. These cues serve to press on individuals the realization that their conventional identity no longer fits, and to move them through the identity change process.

While we all juggle a range of identities and social selves, Hughes (1945) asserted that a known deviant identity often assumes the position of a "master status," taking precedence over all others. Many social statuses fade in and out of relevance as people move through various situations, but a master status accompanies people into all their contexts, forming the key identity through which others see them. Deviant attributes such as a minority race, heroin addiction, and homosexuality are prime examples of such master statuses. Others, then, may think of an actor, for example, as a Hispanic actor, a heroin addicted actor, or as a gay actor, with the individual's occupation coming as secondary to his or her deviant attribute. Hughes noted that master statuses are linked in society to auxiliary traits, the common social preconceptions that people associate with these. Self injurers, for example, may be widely assumed to be adolescent white women from either middle class backgrounds or disadvantaged youth whose lives are unhappy. They may be thought of as lacking impulse control, seeking attention, possibly abuse survivors, mentally unstable, or as people who seek to inject control into their lives. The relationship between master statuses and their auxiliary traits in society is reciprocal. When people learn that others have a certain deviant master status, they may impute the associated auxiliary

traits onto them. Inversely, when people begin to recognize a few traits that they can put together to form the pattern of auxiliary traits associated with a particular deviant master status, they are likely to attribute that master status to others. For example, if parents notice that their children are staying out late with their friends, wearing “alternative” clothing styles, growing dreadlocks in their hair, dropping out of after school activities, and hanging out with a “druggie” crowd of friends, they may suspect them of using drugs.

Lemert (1967) asserted another processual depiction of the deviant identity career with his concepts of primary and secondary deviance. Primary deviance refers to a stage when individuals commit deviant acts, but their deviance goes unrecognized. As a result, others do not cast the deviant label onto them, and they neither assume it nor perform a deviant role. Their self conceptions are free of this image. Some people remain at the primary deviance stage throughout their commission of deviance, never advancing further. Yet a percentage of them do progress to secondary deviance. The seven stages of the identity career, described above, move people from primary to secondary deviance; their infractions become discovered, others identify them as deviant, and the labeling process ensues, with all of its identity consequences. Others come to regard them as deviant, and they do as well. As they move into secondary deviance, individuals initially deny the label, but eventually come to accept it reluctantly as it becomes increasingly pressed upon them. They recognize their own deviance as they are forced to interact through this stigma with others. Sometimes this internalization comes as a justification or social defense to the problems associated with their deviant label, as individuals use it to take the offensive. At any rate, it becomes an identity that significantly affects their role performance. Some people may compartmentalize their deviant identity, but others exhibit “role engulfment” (Schur 1971), becoming totally caught up in this master status.

Most individuals who progress to secondary deviance advance no further, but a subset of them moves on to what Kitsuse (1980) called tertiary deviance. In contrast to primary deviants who engage in deviance denial, and secondary deviants who engage in deviance

acceptance, Kitsuse sees tertiary deviants as those who engage in role embracement. These are people who decide that their deviance is not a bad thing. They may adopt a relativist perspective and decide that their deviant label is socially constructed by society, not intrinsic to their behavior, such as individuals with learning differences who consider themselves more creative than “typical” people. Or they may hold to an essentialist perspective and embrace their deviant category as intrinsically real, such as gays who “discover” their underlying homosexuality and accept it as natural. They therefore strongly identify with their deviance and fight, usually with the organized help of like others, to combat the deviant label that is applied to them. They may engage in “identity politics” and speak publicly, protest, rally, pursue civil disobedience, educate, raise funds, lobby, and practice various other forms of political advocacy to change society’s view of their deviance. Examples of this include people who fight to destigmatize labels such as obesity, prostitution, and race/ethnicity.

All of these identity career concepts encompass a progression through several stages. They begin with the commission of the deviance and lead to individuals’ apprehension and public identification. They move through the changing expectations of others towards them, marked by shifting social acceptance or rejection by their friends and acquaintances. The breadth, seriousness, and longevity of the deviant identity label are significantly more profound when individuals undergo official labeling processes than when they are merely informally labeled. With their internalization of the deviant label, adoption of the self identity, and public interaction through it, they ultimately move into groups of differential deviant associates and commit further acts of deviance.

Exiting a deviant identity is considerably more problematic than assuming one in the first place. Our society has many types of what Erikson (1966) has called “commitment ceremonies,” where people are stripped of their respectable status and marked with a negative one. Such moral passages are more noteworthy than returns to the normative fold, and garner considerably more public attention. Institutions of social control thrive on processing deviants, and have vested interests in holding individuals within their domain. Members of society also

tend to reinforce people's continued deviance by their social expectations that they will not become rehabilitated. Finally, avenues of opportunity often close for those negatively marked, making normative movement difficult from a practical standpoint. The route out of deviance, then, is often more gradual than precipitous, more solitary than social, more ascetic than pleasurable. Individuals seeking to exit deviant identity careers often have to hit bottom before they are willing to make the sacrifices necessary to regain the mundane everyday status that they once disdained.

SEE ALSO: Accounts, Deviant; Attitudes and Behavior; Deviance; Deviance Processing Agencies; Deviant Careers; Friendship: Interpersonal Aspects; Gender, Deviance and; Identity: Social Psychological Aspects; Identity Theory; Looking Glass Self; Master Status; Passing; Resocialization; Role Taking; Self; Significant Others; Socialization, Primary; Symbolic Interaction

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identity: the management of meaning

Christine Coupland

This description is an attempt to provide an informed understanding of classical and contemporary approaches to identity. Studies of identities aim to understand the ways we socially constitute ourselves while considering the link between society and self identity. The term "identity" was relatively unheard of in sociology and social psychology prior to 1940. Since then it has become the focus of vast amounts of research. Its theoretical, cultural, and empirical development has continued as academics apply, dispute, and discuss the concept. Precursors to the concept of identity developed in the disciplines of sociology, anthropology, and psychology. Importance was given within these early developments to self, character, and personality.

Identity is a broad term incorporating notions of the individual in interaction with other individuals and with social structures. There is a long tradition of research on identity from within many diverse areas (e.g., anthropology, organizational theory, philosophy, psychology, and sociology), each bringing particular frames of philosophical inquiries and methodologies. The resulting heterogeneity of the field has been further developed over time due to movements across the social sciences which affect how the individual is considered to be constituted in social relationships and the implications this has for the study of identities. These movements have challenged the assumptions that characterize modernity which underpin dominant understandings of the modern world. Criticisms have been raised on many fronts, political (Hall & Jacques 1989), from feminist perspectives (Luke & Gore 1992), through conceptions of reality (Baudrillard 1989) and claims to truth and knowledge (Lyotard 1984; Rorty 1989).

During these movements, identity has been theorized in three different ways. First, that of a knowing and conscious subject, second as a product or outcome of social relationships, and finally as both outcome and resource in interaction between the self and others. Definitions of identity thus vary according to different

philosophical assumptions; from an essentialist, mainstream view there has been a tendency to represent the “self” as a unified construct, thus leading to definitions that suggest personal identity is defined as the distinct personality of an individual regarded as a persisting entity, or the individual characteristics by which a thing or person is recognized or known. From a social relationship perspective attention has tended to focus on societal or cultural influences on identities, and from a dialectic or discursive approach it is acknowledged that identity is a contentious concept, subject to ongoing dispute rather than one with ontological reality which can be easily seen and defined. This illustrates its socially constructed nature rather than an objectively defined one. Hence, more contemporary definitions of identity suggest that it is emergent, always in flux, and that it is a perception that each person develops about who he or she is in relation to others. This definition requires us to understand the concepts and resources on which social actors draw to structure their relationships and is concerned with issues surrounding power, conformity, deviance, and difference.

There may be many reasons for this shift in perspective on what identity is and how it may be examined, but one major reconceptualization of identity and views of the self surround a critique of a neutral representation of the person by instead highlighting identity claims and descriptions as doing important work in constructing and transforming individuals and the social world.

MAINSTREAM APPROACHES TO IDENTITY

The notion that an individual has an essential inner self, which is carried around and can behave appropriately, dominates the western concept of people in social situations. This view, as a historically bound notion, may be seen in the rise of individualism for which most would credit the Enlightenment as the birth place of our contemporary beliefs about the self. Although social theorists from different stand points have questioned the universality of the contemporary western concept of the person, this remains the dominant notion of the self. In support for this argument, studies of other

cultures have shown their people as depersonalized from a western point of view, which implies its cultural specificity.

Underlying traditional or mainstream approaches to understanding identity is the assumption that identity is something an individual or society has. From this perspective, the questions asked in traditional studies of identity include: What criteria distinguish identities from one another? Or, what part do identities play in society? One aim of the studies is to use identity as a predictive variable. Working from the assumption that identities (e.g., middle class) correspond to an existing social structure, and are not just externally attributed but internalized through socialization, attempts have been made to link individuals with the social structure through this process. Two of the traditional or mainstream theories that attend to the individual/social structure/socialization process are role identity theory (e.g., Goffman 1959) and social identity theory (Tajfel 1978).

Role Theory

Role theorists propose that society is made up of roles which are internalized as identities that people take on. Goffman (1959) equated social interaction with dramaturgical performance. His work suggested that identity is a performance and that the actor’s skills enable the management of impressions left on others, the audience. Although influential in terms of understanding work identities in particular, this theory has been criticized because it places the person in the position of “social dope” where the self comprises a “true” self and a “social” self. The view that individuals are actors performing roles provided by society has been further critiqued as a “calculating” and “intellectual” view of the self (Bruner 1990). Finally, other critics of role theory argue that the notion of a script from within this dramaturgical perspective implies that the words are already decided. This underestimates the creative potential of interaction for the construction of the self.

Social Identity Theory

Social identity theorists suggest that social identities have a reality in relation to social groups.

This approach developed from a concern within social psychology to include a relationship, theoretically and empirically, between individual psychological functioning and the wider social processes that both shape this functioning and are shaped by it (Tajfel 1978). Individuals become aware of group membership and their preference for particular groups. In this way, the structure of society is reflected in the structure of the self as category memberships are internalized.

Its close relation, self categorization theory (Tajfel & Turner 1979), although concerned with people's categorizations of themselves, assumed them to be psychological, subjective, mental processes. They proposed that social identity is based on individual need to enhance self esteem through social comparison processes and differentiation. These influential theories have been interpreted, modified, developed, challenged, and expanded in numerous studies since their inception, which is an indication of the author's contribution. However, one of the criticisms of the work was that language was simply not considered to be an issue. If discussed at all, it was in terms of a psychological process along with motivation. This reflected the orthodox view of the time embodied in psycholinguistics from within a structuralist framework.

These and other traditional or mainstream approaches to identity have theorized largely at the intra individual level, regarding categorization as a cognitive process. With reference to understanding group identity, the question being asked from the mainstream approach has focused around how people identify with groups and what the consequences are of such identification. Finally, traditional or mainstream approaches share a view that language is a transparent medium or conduit onto some hidden, internal process and therefore they ignore the constitutive nature of the interaction.

CONTEMPORARY APPROACHES TO IDENTITY

Contemporary perspectives on understanding identity have been largely connected to a discursive approach. However, there were earlier writers in the field who considered how identity was

a linguistic construction, for example Cooley (1902). More recent approaches focus on inter individual explanations where categories and groups are considered to be discursive resources. Perspectives from within this broad description share skepticism of many mainstream assumptions and explanations of the self and instead regard identity as a process, rather than a product, evolving subject to historical and cultural influences. Identity formation is both active and context relevant. From within the contemporary approaches to identity two major schools of thought differ in terms of how identity may be constructed. For simplicity's sake these are labeled the poststructuralist and the interpretive schools. There are some distinct differences between the poststructuralist and interpretive approaches which are outlined briefly here, but this represents an oversimplification as there are also several similarities. For example, there is a shared proposal for a move from considering the self as an entity to considering the self as a construct (Gergen 1985), specifically in order to consider how the self is talked about.

Poststructuralist Approaches to Identity

The term "poststructuralist" is applied to those writers who presume that discourse operates as an organizing factor through which identities are produced. From this approach subjects are "interpellated," or called to identity relevant positions. This version of positioning began with Althusser's (1971) argument that ideologies in institutions (e.g., church, school) mean that people are trained to recognize themselves in a particular way. The focus of the poststructuralist approaches' study of identity has largely been on the relationship between power and discourse in that we are all claiming and resisting identities from within prevailing discourses. Poststructuralist writers argue that living under prevailing ideologies creates the illusion that we have chosen our way of life. Poststructural theories emphasize the nature of discourses in terms of how they constrain and enable ways of being, identities, in the social world. One criticism, however, of the poststructuralist view of language is that it disregards language's constitution through argument, while focusing on how it operates to obliterate argument in the interests of domination (Billig 1996).

Interpretive Approaches to Identity

Writers who adopt an interpretive approach propose that identities are constructed “online,” are situated in ongoing interactions, and are constructed to perform accounting or explanatory work in talk. Many share an ethnomethodological concern with people’s own displays of understanding and pay attention to the micro detail of talk in order to explore the “online” construction of plausible, persuasive identities. Members of a work community, for example, draw on, deploy, and reconstruct resources, which are available in that context and the broader context in which the workplace is situated. In this way, identity is viewed as a situated self which is set within a wider system of possible identities. Interpretive scholars have been criticized for treating “discourses” as cultural or social resources, as if one could construct self at whim. This would also imply some leaning toward a “calculating” view of the self, if it were not for the “structures” of plausibility, authenticity, and reasonableness in the talk. To disregard these in interaction would be to risk being thought mad or at least being misunderstood. To attend to how these function in talk makes visible commonsense, hidden ideologies surrounding how we are able to talk about the self today. From this perspective, a salient identity is a local, occasioned matter where members construct categories and draw on their rights and obligations in talk.

FUTURE DIRECTIONS

It is clear that the widespread acceptance and use of the term identity does not suggest agreement upon or even a clear understanding of its many meanings. Furthermore, the emergent trends in theorizing about identity should not be regarded as enduring but rather as historically and culturally located concepts which are enmeshed with emergent trends in the social sciences more broadly. This is not to suggest that scholars are gradually refining their understanding of what identity is and how it should be examined; rather, the trends are indicative of, shaped by, and subsequently shape understandings and social practices surrounding identities. Theories abound regarding identity,

sharing a focus upon understanding the ways that we socially constitute ourselves while considering or exploring the link between society and self identity. Future approaches will need to become aware of and analyze the transformations in nature and meanings of identity under conditions of modernity, late modernity, and beyond.

SEE ALSO: Cooley, Charles Horton; Discourse; Goffman, Erving; Identity Control Theory; Identity, Deviant; Identity: Social Psychological Aspects; Identity Theory; Role Theory; Self Esteem, Theories of; Social Comparison Theory; Social Identity Theory; Socialization

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identity politics/ relational politics

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Human society is no stranger to exercises of interpersonal power and identity politics. The annals of political history are replete with descriptions of these exercises. Power is the ability to get what you want with or without the consent or cooperation of others. Effects of deployed power are observable at the structural and institutional levels of society, and in face to face interactions. A discussion of identity politics (sometimes also called relational politics) may focus on either the class or group level or the level of personal interactions. The subject of interpersonal politics rests within a set of related concepts, such as the distribution of social power, social location and status, and a stratified system in which these interpersonal resources may be valued and utilized for purposes of individual or group advantage over other individuals or groups.

Groups in a stratified system, that is, a social system with a ranked structure of positions, may contend for advantage among themselves. Each group may seek to utilize group level resources in addition to individual characteristics to secure a better or stronger position vis à vis the members of other groups in the social tapestry. This may not be a result of actual conspiracy: often, people acting in their own perceived self interest serve the mutual desires of others in a similar social position.

In the struggle for relative advantage, winning groups succeed in marketing the notion that their group has characteristics that mark them collectively as the legitimate holders of a higher social position than members of other social groups. One example from recent American history was the successful claim by

men that group characteristics associated with maleness and masculinity were more valuable to society and thereby more deserving of monetary compensation for paid labor than the group attributes of females in equivalent positions. This is represented today in the tendency for women to earn between 65–70 percent on average of the amount men earn for similar work.

Members of different ethnic or cultural groups may also work collectively to deploy their ethnic and cultural capital to best advantage. Examples of research on this phenomenon include Bayard de Volo (2001), who examines gender politics in Nicaragua between 1979 and 1999; Finlay (2005) on the use of altercasting a group identity with negative connotations as a strategy in political conflict; House (2002), whose study of cultural continuity and language among the Navajo posits language shift as an indicator of identity politics; and Howard (2006), on the construction of Irish identity in the British 2001 census.

Kiely et al. (2005) suggest that perhaps new conceptual tools are needed to effectively analyze identity politics from a civil/territorial perspective rather than a more traditional ethnic or cultural approach, since their research indicates that some contemporary identities are more complex as a result of transience or competing political considerations.

While some identity politics plays out at the level of the political order and public discourse, individuals also engage in identity politics in face to face encounters. Goffman (1959) notes: “an individual may find himself [*sic*] making a claim or an assumption which he knows the audience may well reject . . . when the unguarded request is refused to the individual’s face, he suffers what is called humiliation.” Later, Goffman (1963) calls the resulting damage to identity a “stigma” that is then managed well or poorly by the individual in succeeding interactions. Blumer (1986) describes how these patterned social interactions are real to their participants and result in mutual expectations for behavior in wider contexts.

Goffman (1970) also contributes the concept of strategic interaction. In strategic interaction, the individual manages self presentation and social resources to maximize personal advantage

in the situation vis à vis other participants. Using the Japanese concept of “face” or the social perception of the individual by others in the situation, Goffman is able to integrate ideas about impression management, saving and losing face, and the potential for emotional manipulation, which contribute to politics at the interpersonal level of interaction.

Scheff (1988) suggests an interactionist perspective rooted in emotion for the individual level of identity politics. For Scheff, individual self concept is influenced by basic emotions of pride or shame. Individuals are therefore subject to manipulation on the basis of these emotions, which results in the acknowledgment of status hierarchy among them and deference to others as a result of that hierarchy.

One set of themes in the academic literature regarding identity politics involves the practices of identity claiming on the one hand, and altercasting, on the other. In identity claiming, an individual seeks to portray herself or himself as a certain kind of person, which portrayal may or may not be met with agreement from others. Altercasting occurs when another or others attempt to impute an identity to an individual, which the individual may or may not embrace. These processes may also operate with groups.

A second theme in research and theory about identity politics is the ongoing debate between essentialist models of identity and social constructionism, also referred to as anti essentialist positions. This is particularly noticeable in the debates about gender and identity. Debating whether group level characteristics are innate (essential) or socially constructed obscures a basic misunderstanding about the difference between diversity and inequality. Over time, identity politics has shifted somewhat from demands for equality of opportunity toward demands for recognition of and structural access for persons and groups of diverse views and practices.

A third theme that may be observed in the literature on identity and relational politics is the relationship between individual experience, personal status, or social roles and political stance. For example, one might examine the expectation that part of being gay is being political, or that only members of oppressed minorities can legitimately “belong” in their movements for equality, such as an African American rights group that only accepts

European American members in “auxiliary” roles.

For recent summaries of these themes, one might consult Bernstein (2005) for an overview of the topic or Warnke (2005) for an examination of race, gender, and pluralistic or anti integrationist identity politics.

SEE ALSO: Blumer, Herbert George; Deference; Facework; Goffman, Erving; Power, Theories of; Status

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identity: social psychological aspects

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Sociological social psychologists conceive of identities as social constructs – culturally and interactionally defined meanings and expectations – and as aspects of self processes and structures that represent who or what a person or set of persons is believed to be. Identities define people in social terms; they depend upon shared meanings and situate their bearers within variously structured and enduring sets of social relations. If a person is believed to belong to particular categories of persons, the meanings and expectations attached to those categories are presumed to be relevant to the person. Identities affect self conceptions and other intrapsychic structures and processes of the person believed to embody the identity as well as their actions, and affect how others will interpret, feel, and act in relation to the identified individual. The meanings of an identity draw upon sociocultural constructs attached to an identity type and may relate to relatively enduring positions within social structures, but they are actively and creatively presented, interpreted, and modified across different social contexts and over time. Identities are both reflections of socially structured sets of relations and are emergent and negotiable by social actors. As such, they can recreate and reinforce existing sets of social relations as well as alter them.

While the notion of identity is often used without further specification, it is useful to differentiate between several forms of identity (Vryan et al. 2003). The focus on *social identities*, *role identities*, constitutes much of sociologists' empirical study and theorizing on identity. A social identity defines a person or set of persons in terms of the meanings and expectations associated with a socially constructed group or category of people, and locates a person within socially structured sets of relations. Social identities define persons as members of particular groups or sets of people and hence not others (e.g., a Jew may define herself as Jewish and as therefore different than Christians and Muslims). They lead to expectations about

how the identified person – whether self or other – is likely to think, feel, and act. At the same time, social identities represent how a person fits within various interactional, network level, and sociocultural structures. Social identities commonly studied include those related to sex/gender, family, race and ethnicity, nationality, religion, occupation, sexuality, age, and voluntary subcultural memberships, but social identities may be based on any distinction socially constructed or interactionally defined as significant. An individual may possess many social identities, but those identities will vary in their importance, centrality, or salience within different contexts, in turn affecting behavior differentially.

A *situational identity* is defined in terms of the emergent structure of a localized, shared definition of a particular interactional situation. While social identities tend to be enduring as long as a person's relations within webs of social relations endure and are often considered to be essential aspects of their bearers, situational identities are facets of particular interactional episodes and are not usually considered to be enduring or essential to those who enact them. In any interaction, participants must define the situation and the other participants in order to determine their own courses of action and to know how to interpret others' talk and other behaviors. While various social identities may also be defined as relevant to a situation by interactants and affect behaviors and interpretive activities, situational identity enactments and negotiations are specific to a given type of social situation. For example, the situational identities of "student/audience member" and "teacher/lecturer" are defined as essential to the structure of a classroom lecture, while "salesperson" and "customer" are defined as essential to the structure of the situation of shopping in a retail store. Were someone to ask a lecturer if returns require a receipt, or to ask a salesperson if the price was going to be on the next exam, the lack of appropriate self and other attributions of situational identities would significantly problematize the interactions. While the particular situational identities that are deemed appropriate and the content of those identities may be indicated in sociocultural constructs (e.g., general social definitions of classroom and shopping situations, including the identities considered relevant and

appropriate), they are actively interpreted, adapted, presented, and mutually negotiated during interaction. Much research on situational identities focuses on their emergence, creative presentation, and negotiation in interaction and how people manage potential and actual problematizations of them (e.g., Goffman 1963; Snow & Anderson 1987).

A *personal identity* is a set of meanings and expectations specific to a given individual. Personal identity is associated with a personal name, a body and appearance (e.g., a clothing style), a biography and personal history (e.g., within a particular family network), a unique constellation of social identities, and a set of personality characteristics and traits (Goffman 1963; Shibutani 1964). Of the three forms of identity discussed here, personal identity is considered the most enduring and essential representation of a person, although its content may be presented differently to different audiences and may be redefined over time. Whereas social and situational identities focus on people as members of categories of persons – as similar to other members – a personal identity identifies the individual as unique. No two people are likely to share the exact same set of social identities, much less the same personal history and personality. But as with other forms of identity, personal identity functions to situate individuals within socially structured worlds, such as by specifying the identified person's various social identities and embeddedness within a particular family. Personal identity has been much less studied and theorized than social and situational identity.

Sociological social psychological work on identity followed an early symbolic interactionist focus on the related concept of *self*. Early symbolic interactionists and those who influenced them (e.g., William James, George Herbert Mead, Charles Horton Cooley, W. I. Thomas, Herbert Blumer) did not explicitly theorize and study identity as much as the related notion of self, but their conceptualizations significantly shaped work that was to focus directly on identity. Identity emerged as a concept of growing interest to both psychological and sociological social psychologists in the wake of immigration and disrupted national and ethnic identities following World War II, developing alongside and influenced by subsequent social changes and identity movements of

the 1950s (e.g., the Civil Rights Movement), 1960s (countercultural rejection of traditional role identities), and 1970s (Women's Movement) in the US. The relevance and importance of identity in academic work paralleled a growing modernization characterized by geographic and cultural mobility, rapid social changes in social roles and the meanings and expectations attached to identities, and personal and cultural "identity crises."

Sociologists applied the interactionist emphasis on the importance of meaning and its emergence in interaction to their conceptualizations of identities – or meanings applied to people – as key aspects of any self and interaction and as important in understanding human behavior. As people's actions and interpretive activities both constitute society and are shaped by it in an iterative process, identities are seen as constituted by and within particular cultures and social situations that specify certain meanings, expectations, rights, and constraints for those who are seen to possess them, and also as actively created and managed by people.

Among the first to argue for the importance of identity to sociology, Nelson Foote (1951) explained that identity was vital to understanding motivation and hence behavior. Humans know and act toward objects – including themselves and others – in relation to the symbols (meanings, especially as represented in language) that they attribute to those social objects. Our identities inform us as to how to act and not act, producing motivations and social action. More broadly, Foote and other interactionists argued that identity is an important way to conceive of how individuals relate to each other and to society at large. Anselm Strauss (1959) was also quite influential in shaping treatments of identity. As did other interactionists, he challenged psychological models and viewed identity formations and transformations as lifelong, socially determined (rather than determined by essential and universal human developmental trajectories), and actively negotiated processes. Strauss emphasized the significance of language and meaning (as socially constructed and negotiated) – an emphasis pervading sociological treatments of identity. In a line of thinking receiving increasing attention presently, Strauss linked identity with self narratives; we construct and reconstruct our various selves and identities

by naming them, thus assigning meanings to them. Linking social structure to identity transformations, Strauss discussed “turning points” as signals to institutionalized identity transformations, such as those experienced when getting married, graduating school, or becoming a parent. As socially structured realities change, so do the identities of the people embedded within them. And as identities change, so do social structures. While Strauss’s primary focus was, at least initially, on identity processes in face to face interactions, he attended to the cultural, intergenerational, and historical realities that affect such situations (1995). Other recent work builds on these foci, infusing recent theoretical and methodological developments associated with a “cultural turn” in sociology (e.g., Holstein & Gubrium 2000).

Gregory P. Stone (1981) called attention to the significance of appearances in the process of identification. Initially, it is appearance (e.g., clothing, nonverbal behaviors such as gestures, location) that leads us to an identification of the other, which precedes taking the role of the other; we must identify a person before having the ability to conduct that fundamental social process. Our selves as well as our behaviors in interaction are shaped by our identifications of ourselves and others, whether those identifications confirm or challenge a given identity that is presented or attributed. When there is congruence between the presentation of an identity and attribution by others, then a socially meaningful identity emerges. Erving Goffman (1963) was the first to explicate the complexities and intricacies of how it is that people create and manage identities as they go about their everyday lives, calling attention to the many problems that can arise as people go about defining themselves, others, and their social worlds. He also explained how people work collectively and continuously to manage their own and others’ identities, engaging in teamwork that seeks to protect or restore the identities of participants. Identities are understood as social accomplishments rather than properties of individuals, and ongoing behavior – even if it has other purposes and goals as well – is seen as a collective enterprise of identity management. In studying identities considered to be deviant in *Stigma*, Goffman (1963) showed how problematic identity management

can be, and how creative and resourceful people are in accomplishing their self conceptions and social interactions.

In addition to the situationally focused work of those discussed above – sometimes referred to as Chicago School symbolic interactionism – some sociologists pursued approaches known as structural, Iowa School, and Indiana School interactionism. Their work focused less on the situational and interactional emergence of identity and its management, and more on its enduring and socially anchored qualities, infusing reference group and role theories into their versions of interactionism (Stryker 1980). They saw identity in terms of intrapsychic self structures and in more clear relation to larger and more enduring social structures, developing models intended to enable the prediction of self and behavioral outcomes and to be testable via quantitative data analysis techniques consistent with traditional positivistic scientific practices. Key figures working along these lines include Manford H. Kuhn (Kuhn & McPartland 1954), Sheldon Stryker (1980), George J. McCall (McCall & Simmons 1978), and Peter Burke (Burke & Reitzes 1981).

Structural interactionists conceived of identities in terms of self structures, with enduring social identities being most significant to individuals’ self conceptions. More important than situationally emerging and renegotiable identities, the social identities seen as key to self concept and behavior tie people to particular reference groups and social structural arrangements. Complex societies characterized by multiplicity and complexity are seen as resulting in a multiplicity and complexity of selves and identities; when people hold many different social statuses they possess many different identities. Self structures include multiple identities arranged according to their salience, or the likelihood of a given identity affecting behavior rather than another. Structural interactionists explain that social arrangements and statuses affect salience hierarchies and, in turn, salience affects behavior, such as is modeled in Stryker’s version of identity theory. Others home in on intrapsychic identity processes and structures that operate to affect behavior, as in Burke’s version of identity theory that applies a cybernetic control model (Stryker & Burke 2000).

Many lines of research and theoretical specifications have emerged from the theoretical approaches and methodological techniques sociologists have applied in their studies of identity. Those following the more situationalist approach explain with increasing depth how, and identify generic social processes according to which, identities are taken on as aspects of self and are presented and managed in interaction. They most often apply qualitative methods such as ethnography within localized, naturally occurring social contexts and in depth interviewing among people sharing a particular identity in order to discover how people collectively accomplish “identity work” in their everyday lives and how identities are constructed via self and group narratives. Structural interactionist research models how it is that social arrangements writ large affect individuals via identification with the meanings associated with categories of people that are defined by their social locations within those structures, seeking to explain and predict self structures as a function of social positions, and behavior as a function of identification in terms of those positions. They most often apply quantitative methods such as survey research and laboratory experimentation suited to their goals of theory testing, replicability, and prediction of intrapsychic self structures and resulting behavior. Lines of research not explicitly or directly symbolic interactionist – such as expectation states theory and various psychological approaches – also inform our understandings of identity, although sociological treatments of the topic nearly universally share the interactionist emphases on identities as sets of meanings emerging and made meaningful only within social contexts.

Some scholarship theorizes identity generally, such as self verification theories that posit that people will select interactions and relationships that confirm their self identifications regardless of what the identity is. Other research and theories focus on particular identities or types of identities. Most often, these are social identities based upon socially constructed and structured distinctions such as sex/gender, race, ethnicity, and minority status (e.g., Porter & Washington 1993), occupation (or other statuses within occupational and educational systems), deviance/normativity, age, and national or other

collective identities. Lines of research also pursue particular behaviors as functions of identification, such as social movement participation (Stryker et al. 2000). In addition to these lines of research that more deeply flesh out social realities related to particular identities, identity types, or contexts that shape identity structures and processes, there is increasing attention being paid in recent years to the multiplicities of identity, with theory and empirical research attending to the ways that multiple identities are organized and managed within self structures and interactional and sociocultural contexts, as well as how they intersect. This can be seen, for example, in recent emphases on multiracial identity and in a tendency to study the intersections of a greater number of distinct types of identities such as those based upon gender, class, race, and sexuality. Scholars are increasingly attending to the importance of emotions, the body, and embodiment in their work on identity, as well as mental and physical health (e.g., Charmaz 1995). In addition to continuing these recent emphases, future research on identity is likely to explore more thoroughly how identity is affected within mass and computer mediated contexts, as well as other new forms of social organization and interaction that relate to new ways of defining, presenting, and managing identities (e.g., Holstein & Gubrium 2000).

SEE ALSO: Affect Control Theory; Identity Control Theory; Identity, Deviant; Identity Theory; Identity: The Management of Meaning; Impression Formation; Role; Social Identity Theory; Stigma; Symbolic Interaction

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identity, sport and

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Identity is a rather loose concept which has various degrees of currency in a number of different disciplines. For example, Bosma et al. (1994) have argued that there is little consensus in the field of psychology about the phenomena to which the term identity might refer. They go on to suggest that, as a result, different definitions of identity not only have led to the development of different schools within psychology, each with its own theoretical and empirical traditions, but that scholars appear to know little about, or prefer to ignore, what is happening beyond the boundaries of their own school.

There is not quite the same situation within sociology, where considerable theoretical and methodological developments of the concept of identity have occurred primarily in the sociological tradition of symbolic interactionism, in both the Chicago and Iowa schools, and where, according to Weigert et al. (1986), the notion of identity has also had some limited currency in the sociological traditions of structural functionalism, critical theory, interpretive sociology, and the sociology of knowledge.

The sociological concept of identity is broadly understood to include notions of "social identity," "personal identity," and "ego identity." *Social identities* are those identities which tend to refer to the individual's position(s) in a social structure, understanding that various cultural and social factors influence the extent to which the individual is pressured into fitting into available identity "molds" (Côté & Levine 2002). They are identities which are either seen as providing some social value and are therefore claimed by the actor, or imputed or attributed to others in order to place or situate them as social objects. *Personal identities* are the self designations and self attributions which an individual brings into play or asserts during the course of interaction, and are essentially the meanings the individual attributes to the "self" (Snow & Anderson 1987). "Personal identity," then, is a concept which places the focus on the specific individualities that are peculiar to each of us, which arise as a result of the accommodations between the

definitions of our social identities and the uniqueness and peculiarities of our actual lived experience (Côté & Levine 2002). The term “ego identity” refers to the sense of sameness or continuity in the “self” (or personality) which individuals experience over long periods of their life. Bosma et al. (1994) use the illustration of a tree, which, although it experiences great changes over the seasons, still remains the same tree. Similarly, although a person experiences tremendous changes between the times of her conception and death, she remains the same, unique individual.

Two major interests have been apparent in sociology’s focus on identity: (1) the process(es) through which adult identity is formed and (2) the process(es) by which that identity is maintained once it is formed. Identity formation is a process through which, particularly in modern societies, individuals are able to choose from an array of potential self definitions and personal meanings, and then may work to develop those identities in interaction with others (e.g., see Goffman’s 1959 work on impression management). Modern societies, it is argued, provide many more models of social and personal identity and offer much more freedom to choose from among these models. The notion of identity maintenance picks up on the idea, associated with late modernity, of the increasingly transient and unstable nature of social identities, with the consequence that the sustained validation of such social identities by others constantly requires work (Côté & Levine 2002: 6). This approach to the management of identities suggests that, first, the individual is required to act in a manner that is appropriate to the identity/ies which he or she is claiming, and second, that the individual must gain a confirmation of the performed identity/ies from the responses and reactions of appropriate significant others.

These ideas about identity are clearly centered on such assumptions as: (1) individuals are able to choose their identities; that is, they have an array of potential identity options available to them; (2) they are active players in the interactions which lead to the creation, assumption or appropriation, and development of an individual identity; that is, individuals have agency; and (3) it is through the validations of others in social interaction with the individual that such identities are maintained; that is, one

must work at securing these validations and confirmations.

Various literatures within the field of sport sociology have focused on the role that “sport” (broadly understood to include the many forms of participation in a wide range of types of physical activity, considerations of the physical body in movement, and the many forms of secondary consumption of sporting activities) may play in the processes of identity formation generally, and of particular identities specifically, and in the processes through which individuals strive to sustain such identities. This work has examined the role of sport (1) in the formation of an identity as an “athlete”; (2) in the formation of identities specific to particular sports; and (3) in the formation of more generic identities, such as gender identity, racial/ethnic identity, or national identity. It has also examined the consequences of successfully claiming an athletic identity on the individual’s future options for seeking alternative identities and career paths.

The generic identity of “athlete” has considerable saliency in many social settings and in many of the countries of the world – although the specific characteristics associated with this identity vary from sport context to sport context and from country to country. Nevertheless, such an identity is clearly valued and may provide many social benefits to the individuals who are able to successfully claim it – whether this occurs at an elementary school age, at high school or college, as a member of a professional or national team, or even as a masters athlete in his nineties. The success of such identity claims rests on, first, the individual’s ability to satisfactorily or authentically present the main characteristics of this identity, and second, the validation of the identity claim provided by primarily non athlete, significant others – one’s peers, family, community, and so on.

There are also many, more specific, sporting identities that are available in a wide range of different sporting activities, and in these cases the sport sociology literature has focused on the processes of identity formation and maintenance of such identities. An excellent example of this focus is provided by the work of Donnelly and Young (1988), who show how identity claims are made in the context of existing sport groups, and that successfully claiming an

identity as an athlete in a particular sport is an interactive process that occurs in social and cultural contexts in which social definitions and meanings serve as influencing factors.

Using their ethnographic work on the sporting subcultures of rugby and rock climbing, Donnelly and Young illustrate the various ways in which neophytes to these two sporting activities deliberately strive to take on and claim – in Donnelly and Young’s words, “construct” – the social identity of “rugby player” or “rock climber.” They describe how, upon entering the social context, these neophytes often have a limited or even erroneous understanding of the behaviors, values, and attitudes typically associated with the sporting identities they are attempting to claim. If they are to be successful in these identity claims, therefore, the “rookies” need to realign their public presentations of these identities to meet the expectations of the subcultural insiders, the “veterans.” It is through an interactive process in which the rookies “try on” the potential identities and attempt to manage impressions that they become more “accurate” in and more comfortable with the presentations of these identities. More often than not, however, they make mistakes, misinterpreting the meanings and the significance of certain behaviors, expressions, and narratives from within the subculture. It is here that the role of subcultural insiders is critical in this interactive process, as Donnelly and Young demonstrate, as the insiders test the newcomers in order to validate the identity claims that they are making, particularly about the skills, abilities, and experiences they are claiming as part of the identity – such as having climbed certain routes which have an established level of difficulty, or about having played in certain positions in rugby or at certain levels of expertise in countries recognized as rugby powers. The result is that these insiders act to either support and confirm or refute the claimed identity.

The formation and maintenance of more societally generic identities through personal participation in sports as well as through watching sports has been another focus of the sport sociology literature. Sports are believed to be particularly efficacious in such identity processes because of their enormous popularity, the passion they can engender in both participant and spectator, and their potential to present

effective modeling of the different identities. For example, sociologists have explored the ways in which a wide variety of sports can be used to create and to reinforce gender identity, such as a “masculine” identity through participation in such sports as soccer, North American football, rugby, and ice hockey (e.g., see Burgess et al. 2003). Alternatively, scholars have also shown how participation in sport can be used to create and sustain gender identities which challenge traditional meanings and definitions – for example, gay athletes who challenge hegemonic definitions of masculinity (see Anderson 2002). Similarly, scholars have examined the role of sports in the construction of various racial and ethnic identities, such as baseball and the Latino identity, basketball, football, and athletics and the African American identity, and rugby and the Maori identity (e.g., see King 2004). And, of course, sociologists have investigated the role of soccer worldwide in the construction and reinforcement of various national identities, from Ireland and Scotland to Israel, Liberia, and Brazil (e.g., see Bairner 2003).

Finally, some literature in sport sociology has examined the consequences of successfully claiming and maintaining sporting identities on an individual’s future options for seeking alternative identities and career paths. This literature has looked at the ways in which such successfully claimed sporting identities, while on the one hand encouraging the deepening of the individual’s commitment and “embeddedness” in sporting involvements, may, on the other hand, also act to constrain the individual’s immediate and future life choices. For example, Stevenson’s (1990) examination of the careers of elite athletes illustrates how many of these individuals were often recognized early (but not always) in their lives as potentially excellent “rugby players” or “field hockey players” by a number of significant others (including their peers and their community, their parents and siblings, and such significant adults as teachers and coaches). The initial consequences of being attributed such desirable identities were generally very positive, in that these individuals received considerable attention and praise, and were held in high esteem by their immediate social group. Such consequences served to heighten the commitment of these individuals to these identities and to their sporting activities,

increasing the time, energy, and resources which they committed to them, while also simultaneously reducing the perceived value of pursuing alternative identities and other types of careers. So, as they enjoyed these benefits over their careers as athletes, they also found that their options to be “other than a rugby player” or “other than a field hockey player” became constrained. As the costs of their identities as successful athletes began to mount – injuries, the intrusion on other aspects of their lives, including their relationships with others, the constraints on their ability to create other career and identity possibilities outside of the sporting context – the resultant difficulties in maintaining their identities as athletes became increasingly acute, until their athletic careers came to an inevitable end or became transformed into associated identities, such as coach, administrator, or media commentator.

SEE ALSO: Gender, Sport and; Goffman, Erving; Identity Theory; Impression Formation; Nationalism and Sport; Sport; Sport Culture and Subcultures; Sport and Race; Sports Heroes and Celebrities

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identity theory

Michael J. Carter

Identity theory is a social psychological theory based on the tenets of structural symbolic interactionism (Stryker 1980). Similar to other work that has emerged within this type of symbolic interactionism, identity theory treats society as stable rather than erratic – the result of repeated, patterned behaviors of individuals. The theory examines how the self is created and how actors attach meanings to the multiple roles which they play; research within this theoretical framework addresses how identities emerge within social structures. Macro level structures are continually replicated through interactions between actors in a reflexive process; identity theory examines how micro level processes serve to create and maintain the meanings actors have for themselves as well as others, and how these meanings perpetuate themselves over time. This perspective sees the self as emergent from social interaction and portrayed to others through identities that are appropriate in specific situations.

The term “identity” is used in various ways in sociological literature, and usually concerns one of the following contexts (Stryker & Burke 2000). First, identity is sometimes used in reference to *culture*, where distinctions between identity and ethnicity are often blurred or disregarded altogether. Second, identity is also used to refer to common identification within *collectivities* or *social categories*. Identity here

focuses on how phenomena (such as social movements) serve to create a common unity among individuals. Third, and unique to those who work specifically within identity theory, identity is seen as a component of the self. Identities in this context provide meanings that actors apply to various roles which are played out through social interaction. This orientation is aligned with the work of G. H. Mead concerning the self and others, and the reflexive relationship between the two. As part of structural symbolic interactionism, identity theory examines the embeddedness of the actor in society and how the self is organized around identity structures and identity meanings.

Identity theory begins by addressing the ways in which the self is comprised of multiple identities. These identities determine how an actor behaves when alone, while engaged in a role, or when in a group. Thus, there are different types of identities for different social dynamics: *role identities*, *social identities*, and *person identities* (Burke 2004). Role identities (e.g., student, worker, father) are defined by the meanings an actor attributes to the self while performing roles. These meanings emerge from socialization and through culture, as well as by the unique, individual assessment of what the role means for the actor. Role identities are a combination of *shared* and *idiosyncratic* meanings which are negotiated by an actor during interactions (Stets 2006). Social identities describe how actors identify with groups or categories (e.g., Republican, Christian). Actors' social identities operate as an in group/out group dynamic, with others being categorized as either *similar* or *different*. Social identities allow actors to create a sense of unity with other in group members and share common bonds, and provide mutual reinforcement to act in various ways. Person identities refer to the self meanings that allow an actor to realize a sense of individuality. Person identities are self meanings such as being competitive or passive, moral or immoral. These identities are frequently activated because they are not generally unique to any specific circumstance; they rather apply across many situations. All three types of identities can operate simultaneously, and in many situations an actor can have multiple identities activated – including role, social, and personal identities.

Contemporary work within identity theory generally has two emphases. One emphasis examines how social structures influence identity and behavior, and how actors' many role identities are organized in a *salience hierarchy* (Stryker 1980). The other addresses the ways in which internal dynamics within the self influence how individuals behave (Burke & Cast 1997; Burke & Stets 1999). An additional area within identity theory specifically emphasizes role identities (McCall & Simmons 1978). While all three emphases add to the general understanding of identity within structural symbolic interactionism, most current research is aligned with the first two areas, following the work of Stryker and Burke.

SALIENCE AND COMMITMENT

Stryker's hierarchical approach to identity seeks to explain how a social actor will behave in a situation based on how often and strongly identities are invoked. Behavior is a function of how salient and committed identities are for actors as they interact with others in the social structure (Owens 2003). Identity salience refers to the probability that an identity will be invoked by the self or others in social situations; identity commitment refers to the degree to which actors' relationships to others depend on specific roles and identities. A salient identity is an identity that is likely to be activated frequently in various contexts. The more salient an identity, the more likely a person will perform roles that are consistent with role expectations associated with the identity, perceive a situation as an opportunity to enact an identity, and seek out situations that provide an opportunity to enact the identity (Stets 2006).

One's commitment identifies the number of actors that one has connection to through an identity and how strongly one is attached to others based on the identity. When an actor is more committed to an identity, the identity is seen as high in the salience hierarchy. The structural aspect to identity is important here: identities that have strong commitment are the identities that are invoked most often across situations. Research that addresses these aspects

of identity examines such themes as religion and how salient religious identities are for individuals. For example, studies have shown that actors committed to relationships based on religion have highly religious identities; these identities are a function of the amount of time people spend doing religious activities (Stryker & Serpe 1982). Stryker's work emphasizes how the salience hierarchy for identities is crucial in determining human behavior because one's identity level directly influences choice and action – the higher an identity in the hierarchy, the higher the probability the identity will be activated (Owens 2003).

INTERNAL DYNAMICS

Burke et al.'s work in identity theory addresses the internal dynamics within the self that influence behavior (Burke & Tully 1977; Burke & Reitzes 1991; Burke 2004). Early work within this emphasis focused on how identity and behavior are linked to common meanings – by identifying what meanings actors apply to identities, one can predict the meanings associated with individuals' actions. Recent research that examines how internal processes affect behavior reveals the connection between identity and behavior, showing that the internal process for invoked identities is a perpetual control system (Burke 1991). Here the internal dynamics of the self are highlighted and identities serve as standards that influence behavior; identities are sets of meanings attached to the self – these meanings provide references that guide behavior. The perpetual control system is a circular process and mechanism that explains how an actor's self defined identity meanings are reflexively attached to experiences in the social environment. Basically, when an identity is activated in a situation, a feedback loop emerges. As the feedback loop operates across situations, actors act to verify their identities and identify both who they believe they are and who others believe them to be. Work within this emphasis of identity theory furthers the idea that behavior is guided by situations or internal meanings by revealing that behavior results from the relationship between situations and self meanings.

ROLE IDENTITIES

The third emphasis examines role identities – an actor's subjective interpretation of him/her self as an occupant of a social position (McCall & Simmons 1978). Role identities have two dimensions: conventional and idiosyncratic. Conventional dimensions of role identities refer to expectations and self meanings actors internalize concerning social positions within the greater social structure. Idiosyncratic dimensions regard the unique interpretations actors have for their specific roles. McCall and Simmons (1978) understand identity similarly with Stryker in terms of identities being arranged hierarchically, but give more emphasis to a prominence hierarchy of identities. A prominence hierarchy reflects how individuals see themselves according to what ideals and desires the individual has, as well as what is considered important to the individual. An identity's location in the prominence hierarchy depends on three things: the degree of support an individual obtains from others for an identity, the degree of investment or commitment an individual has for an identity, and the rewards one receives by invoking an identity. The prominence hierarchy basically represents how actors' sense of priority affects their behavior in situations; it represents one's *ideal self*. McCall and Simmons also identify a salience hierarchy, as do Stryker and his colleagues. A salience hierarchy here reflects more the situational self rather than the ideal self. An identity's location in the salience hierarchy is a function of the identity's prominence, need for support, and actor's need for the kinds and amounts of intrinsic and extrinsic rewards achieved by the identity, and the perceived degree of opportunity for its profitable enactment in the situation (Stryker 1980; Stets 2006). Actors negotiate their identities by considering who they encounter and the context in which the interaction occurs – identities are in relation to counteridentities that exist in interactions with others. For example, the role of "doctor" is dependent on another's role of "patient"; the role of "employee" is dependent on the role of "boss." Actors have expectations for their roles as well as the roles of others; when interaction changes go smoothly (i.e., both actors act

within one another's expectations for each role), relationships are maintained and prominence hierarchies are supported.

RESEARCH METHODOLOGIES

Research within identity theory incorporates multiple methodologies, both quantitative and qualitative. Past research has used surveys and interviews to examine self definitions of identity, identity commitment and salience, and how identities provide meanings for actors in specific situations. For example, surveys created to measure identity salience and commitment have asked participants questions such as "how often do you see yourself as a student?" and "which people are you more likely to discuss a sensitive issue with?" Such methods allow researchers to measure how salient and committed identities are for participants by finding what importance a participant places on an identity and by identifying the amount and type of people a participant is connected to through an identity. Other methods have used survey instruments to examine what it means to *be* a specific identity by measuring how often a participant plays a particular role – for example, how often a person sees herself as a student or spouse. Recent methodologies within identity theory (specifically, identity control theory) have used a combination of surveys and laboratory experiments to measure identity processes and identity verification. Contemporary research designs also use surveys and laboratory experiments to measure undeveloped facets of identities, such as how individuals act in groups when they are not committed to a situational identity and how identities are invoked when actors are amidst unfamiliar others (Stets 2006).

Identity theory continues to be an influential subfield for the general study of self, identity, and symbolic interactionism. The theory continues to grow in terms of its theoretical development, methodological innovations, and research areas that address the dynamics of the self within greater society (Stets 2006). Scholars of identity theory attempt to reveal how individuals attach meanings to themselves and others, and continually strive to identify the mechanisms that explain how social structures affect and constrain individuals, as well as how individuals

create and maintain social structures. The prevalent emphases within identity theory differ in degree more than kind, and the corpus of work produced by scholars from all areas of the theory has furthered the understanding of both micro and macro level phenomena, within both sociological social psychology and sociology in general.

SEE ALSO: Identity Control Theory; Identity: The Management of Meaning; Identity: Social Psychological Aspects; Mead, George Herbert; Role Taking; Self; Social Psychology; Symbolic Interaction

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ideological hegemony

Matthew C. Mahutga and Judith Stepan Norris

Ideological hegemony theorizes the way in which relationships of domination and exploitation are embedded in the dominant ideas of society. To the extent that dominant ideas are internalized, they induce consent to these relationships on the part of the dominated and exploited. Consistent with the interconnected world in which we live, there are as many levels of ideological hegemony as there are levels of society.

The concept of ideological hegemony has deep historical and theoretical roots in the development of Marxist thought during the twentieth century. At the beginning of the twentieth century, Marxist theorists and parties were faced with the absence or failure of worldwide communist revolutions. The concept sought to explain why workers were not gaining control of their states.

One of the earliest theorists to develop these ideas and use the phraseology of bourgeois hegemony explicitly was Georg Lukács (1885–1971). Lukács was active in the Hungarian Communist Party after World War I. He remained loyal to the Communist Party throughout his lifetime, but became increasingly critical of it toward the end of his life. Lukács's most important contribution was arguably *History and Class Consciousness*, published in 1923. Though greatly influenced by the writing of V. I. Lenin, Lukács unequivocally claimed to have been producing an exposition of Marx's theory as "Marx understood it." In this work, Lukács drew a distinction between what he calls *objective* and *subjective* class consciousness. Objective class consciousness consists of the material interests facing the working class at any given historical moment. Subjective class consciousness, on the other hand, consists of the actual ideas and attitudes that the working class may have. Thus, "false consciousness" is the gap between the working class's objective class interests and their awareness of them.

Drawing the distinction between objective and subjective class consciousness moves away from the "pure economism" that dominated Marxist thought during this time, which suggested that communism was inevitable due

to the inherent contradictions in capitalism. In addition to the notion of false consciousness, Lukács suggested that social classes that were not "purely" proletarian (i.e., the petty bourgeois, peasantry, or semi wage earners) were unable to attain a revolutionary consciousness because their consciousness was limited by their objective interests within society, which were not driven toward the dissolution of capitalism. Thus, Lukács presents two mutually reinforcing explanations for why the working class failed to gain control of the state across Europe and the United States: either the working class's objective and subjective class consciousness failed to coincide, or the working class simply failed politically because they could not gain the allegiance of classes that were neither proletarian nor capitalist. Either way, the source of these failures was the "hegemony of the bourgeoisie," which not only dominated economically, politically, and militarily, but also naturalized capitalist social relations through the development of a theory of economics, politics, and society that dominated the intellectual milieu.

The most often cited author in connection with ideological hegemony is Antonio Gramsci (1891–1937). While in prison in Fascist Italy between 1927 and 1935, Antonio Gramsci developed the notion of ideological hegemony. His writings, in particular his conception of ideological hegemony in *The Prison Notebooks*, were directed at the Marxists of the Second International, who emphasized the primacy of science and materialist forces, and anticipated that working classes in advanced industrialized nations would vote out the representatives of the capitalist classes once they obtained the right to vote. Gramsci, in contrast, argued that perceptions and other mediations come between material forces and the meanings connected to them. The realm of ideas, or what Marx called the "superstructure" (religion, legal structures, the family, etc.), is affected by the interests of the ruling class such that they incorporate those interests without the appearance of doing so. Exploited people unwittingly adopt ideas and ways of life that are consistent with the continuation of their exploitation (Boggs 1978).

To get a grasp on how this process operates, Gramsci distinguished between different levels of the superstructure. "Civil society" represents all that we consider private, and

“political society” refers to the state. In civil society, the dominant group exercises hegemony, whereas it utilizes the state for direct domination.

According to Gramsci, ideological hegemony is a project that the ruling class must accomplish. Therefore, the level of ideological hegemony varies between societies. Where it is strong, capitalists need not rule mainly by physical coercion, but instead rely on popular consensus. Here, power relations are mystified. Where it is weak, that is, where traditional social and authority relations have been undermined, where bourgeois culture and lifestyles have lost their appeal, physical coercion becomes more necessary. In the latter case, workers’ revolutionary potential is higher. Still, workers need not only throw off the old, but must also develop counterhegemonies to successfully accomplish their revolutionary potential. The development of a counterhegemony is the main political task of the socialist movement (Boggs 1978).

Gramsci’s development of the notion of hegemony and counterhegemony goes beyond theorizing to the realm of politics. Gramsci distinguished between a “war of position” and a “war of maneuver” as necessary parts of the socialist/communist movement’s counterhegemonic project. The war of position entails a battle for the hearts and minds of individuals within civil society. The war of maneuver involves a violent “frontal attack” on the state with the purpose of total political victory. Gramsci brings the role of “organic intellectuals” to center stage, arguing that only this group of thinkers, who are intimately connected with the day to day lives of the working classes, can construct an alternative vision acceptable to civil society. According to Gramsci, the role of organic intellectuals flows from their position in civil society, which unifies their subjective and objective class consciousness through the philosophy of praxis. Through praxis – practical/critical activity – the working classes can win the allegiance of all workers as well as other classes. Finally, a victorious war of position makes a victorious war of maneuver possible.

Around the same period as both Lukács and Gramsci, the Institute of Social Research was founded at the University of Frankfurt. The

Institute became known as the Frankfurt School and continued the development of Marxist ideas. One of the most influential members of the Frankfurt School was Herbert Marcuse. By the 1960s, Marcuse was one of the most influential scholars of the New Left. This same period witnessed the popularization and proliferation of the writings of Antonio Gramsci, as the New Left became disillusioned with the Soviet Union and sought an explanation for the brutality of Stalinism. Though Marcuse never used the word hegemony explicitly, his ideas can be viewed as an extension and explication of ideological hegemony to the highly developed nature of advanced capitalism.

In *One Dimensional Man* (1964), Marcuse criticized both capitalist society and the Soviet Union. He moved his analysis of the failures of radical politics from the impediments of a revolutionary “class consciousness” to the impediments of an oppositional consciousness of any kind. To the modes of hegemony articulated by Gramsci, Marcuse added the advertising industry, industrial management, and the very act of consumption. The diffusion of mass consumption wedded the lower classes to an exploitative system through the act of consuming, which mitigates oppositional behavior and critical thinking. This analysis became the cornerstone of much of the New Left’s critique of capitalist society for the implication that it creates false needs in human beings, which reproduces, unnecessarily, relationships of exploitation and domination.

The legacy of Gramsci, Lukács, and the ideas subsumed under the notion of ideological hegemony can be clearly seen in current writings of critical theorists. Perhaps the most influential of these is Jürgen Habermas, the last of the Frankfurt School writers. Though Habermas’s range of subject matter is quite large, he is concerned with the very basic notion that a socialist society is possible, but that there are systemic impediments to its emergence. For Habermas, “advanced capitalism” has evolved past the pure wage labor/capital dichotomy outlined by Marx and has proved able to avert (at least temporarily) a terminal economic crisis. Advanced capitalism instead produces a series of distinct but connected crises leading ultimately to

a legitimation crisis (Habermas 1973), in which the system might cease to produce the motivation for the masses to consent. Though space considerations preclude a further discussion of the evolution of the notion of hegemony, suffice it to say that the whole field of critical theory owes an undying legacy to the development of Marxist theory in general, and ideological hegemony in particular.

The notion that hegemony must be achieved by convincing people to accept its terms in civil society implies that capitalists dominate the cultural sphere. When not achieved, hegemonic groups must exercise control through state violence. Thus, the maintenance of hegemony hinges on the ruling class's monopolization of cultural transmission in civil society. Cultural institutions, broadly defined to include the media, educational system, religious institutions, and so on, become the media through which "legitimate" discourse is defined. As evidence for the notion that elites have disproportionate access to media of cultural dissemination, many empirical studies have shown that the highest levels of corporate, political, and cultural arenas are occupied by interlocking directorates (Domhoff 2002). The empirical findings of dense and exclusive elite networks that unite the highest echelons of political, economic, and cultural institutions provide evidence that a dominant class has the ability to both construct and disseminate an ideology that legitimates their interests.

Many scholars who do research on or use the concept of hegemony focus on the mechanisms through which consent is achieved on different levels. Special attention is given to demonstrating the reproduction of hegemony through interpersonal interaction. For example, on the level of production processes, scholars have shown how submission to relationships of domination and exploitation on the shop floor is embedded in the act of work itself. Michael Burawoy (1979) has shown that piece rates induce a proclivity toward competition and manipulation between workers, and thereby solidify workers' commitment to the status quo on the shop floor.

Research in the area of media studies has focused on the means by which popular culture, as expressed on television or through the film

industry, projects consistent images of society that mitigate critical thinking. For example, the very format of television creates a reified view of reality impervious to radical change by proposing character themes that are fixed rather than developing in nature. Furthermore, the very act of consuming mainstream cultural transmission via television precludes public discourse and encourages passive absorption of dominant ideologies. Finally, critical media scholars also point to the profit logic driving media dissemination as creating a contradictory consciousness. Here the idea is that views toward profit create appetites for sensationalism in media, which at best distracts consumers from the redress of everyday problems.

The theory of ideological hegemony explicitly implies that there are real limits to hegemony. Because of the strong link between the economic/political structure of society and the ideology it produces, as well as the fact that the economic/political structure of society is constantly in a state of change, hegemonic ideology must always change in order to naturalize evolving social relations. Todd Gitlin has argued that television in the 1950s was able to exclude voices of dissent because of the relatively calm era of smooth economic expansion. By the 1970s, however, themes dealing with racism, sexism, and poverty were increasingly pushing their way into the mainstream. Thus, what emerged in mainstream television culture was an attempt to domesticate ideas of feminist and ethnic resistance by delegitimizing "radical" views in favor of those that were easily co-opted. One study of American labor during its height of effectiveness in the industrial heartland showed that the presence of a progressive union can not only mitigate hegemonic ideology in the workplace, but also initiate *counterhegemonic* orientations (Stepan Norris & Zeitlin 2003).

Because of the historical legacy of Marxist theory on the development of the concept of ideological hegemony, it oftentimes assumes a Marxist epistemology. Even when ideological hegemony is used in explicitly non-Marxist ways, it still relies on the distinction developed by Lukács between objective interests and subjective consciousness to imply that there is an objective reality of domination/exploitation that

people in power obfuscate. To the extent that whether or not social relationships are exploitative remains an empirical question, studies of hegemony run the risk of tautology. Consequently, sometimes studies of ideological hegemony lapse into a “reinterpretation” of a given phenomenon with the language of a critical perspective, rather than conducting empirical investigations into whether or not such a reality exists to be covered up. In the end, however, if relationships of exploitation/domination have been shown to exist, the concept of ideological hegemony always provides a language to decode them and explicate the mechanisms through which subordinate groups consent to both the relationships and their outcomes.

SEE ALSO: Civil Society; Class Consciousness; Conspicuous Consumption; Critical Theory/Frankfurt School; False Consciousness; Gramsci, Antonio; Hegemony and the Media; Ideology; Lukács, Georg; Marcuse, Herbert; Marx, Karl; Media Monopoly

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ideology

Christoph Henning

An ideology is a system of shared beliefs that is relevant for social action, integration, and social stability, though it is not necessarily true. Ideologies are very important for sociology: if there was no ideology, we would not need sociology. Because people's opinions of how society works differ from how society actually works, a science of society is necessary in the first place. It is not necessary for society to function that people have true beliefs about society. Rather, every social group holds its own beliefs to be true. If one group of people believes another group of people's set of beliefs to be false, they will call this belief system an ideology. Implicit in this denunciation is the claim of the first group to possess a more accurate theory of society. But such claims have become rare nowadays – at least, the term ideology is hardly used any more. After the cultural turn, this term lost its former prominence, for a simple reason: today, the claim to possess the one and only “true” theory of society is highly discredited. It was replaced by postmodernist pluralism. Here you can only investigate different discourses, without claiming that they are false. All of them are part of a certain culture, whether we like them or not. Nevertheless, in current public discourse there are many sentiments that could very well be called ideological from a sociological point of view.

The term ideology in its modern sense was first used in 1796 by Destutt de Tracy in the context of the French Revolution. He intended a descriptive *science des idées* in the tradition of the Enlightenment, but with an almost positivistic approach. The “ideologues” became an influential school of thought in early nineteenth century France. Yet the term was soon to be used much more polemically. Napoleon criticized the pure reason of the “ideologues” that abstracted from pragmatic political necessities and the “knowledge of the human heart,” meaning the human need for pleasant illusion. This was the birth of ideological criticism, which mainly contains an accusation of a detachment of theory from reality (abstractification). It was later taken up by Marx and Engels's use of the

term ideology, which they developed in their seminal, but long unpublished, book, *The German Ideology*.

The Marxian use of the term ideology has the following implications. First of all, like mythology, it refers to self conceptions of a whole society. But the societies Marx has in mind are modern societies. This means two things: first, they employ a social division of labor, resulting in a class society or, as later sociology would call it, a “functional differentiation.” Secondly, one of these classes dominates the others, mainly through control over the means of production. Resulting from the division of labor is a fundamental opacity of the way society functions (estrangement), which calls for easy explanations to reduce this complexity cognitively and symbolically. This leads to “false consciousness,” to false ideas and pictures about the way society functions. Here, ideologies develop and spread without anybody intending it. Resulting from the dominance of the ruling classes, on the other hand, is an imposition of their worldview on all members of society. “The ruling ideas are the ideas of the ruling classes” (Marx). This later process can include consciously intended actions in order to obtain such hegemony – not necessarily, but possibly. Later Marxist writers (e.g., Gramsci, Lukács, and Adorno) investigated how capitalism, or specific parts of the bourgeoisie, managed to uphold an ideology of “just” capitalism in spite of its partly and seemingly catastrophic consequences. One of these ideologies, Marxists would claim, was nationalism and fascism, another one was Keynesianism and the welfare state, and the most recent one is neoliberalism with its meritocratic master narrative.

Large parts of leftist twentieth century sociology were engaged in a criticism of ideology, most importantly Critical Theory. Yet even before the cultural turn there were two serious challenges. First, by the middle of the century Daniel Bell and others proclaimed an “end of ideology,” resulting from the weakened class conflict and increased sociological knowledge that allowed for more planning (technocracy). This was a rather old claim: ideologies never declare themselves openly, they always try to sell themselves as “truths.” And this was the case with Bell’s narrative, as well. After some decades, it has become obvious that ideology is still alive, as

writers like Žižek, Hall, and Bourdieu have shown. The “end of ideology” thesis was nothing less than yet another ideology. It depends on the social standpoint of the spectator whether something appears as ideology or as “truth.” This irony of Marx’s was in many cases missed by his critics.

Exactly this insight was the starting point for another challenge to the criticism of ideology. Some important Marxists like Gramsci and Lenin had called Marxism an ideology. In consequence, Marxists no longer had a privileged standpoint, but could only maintain one among many other perspectives on society. Karl Mannheim spelled out this paradox: the “hermeneutics of suspicion” (Paul Ricoeur) needs to be “totalized.” Every social theory is a potential ideology. Unfortunately, this totalization is self-defeating. In order to call something an ideology, you need to claim that your own standpoint is valid. If you call everything an ideology, by implication you cannot call anything an ideology, because that applies to your own theory, too. Thus, Mannheim transformed ideology criticism into a less polemical sociological approach. This approach was as much influenced by Nietzsche’s perspectivism and Dilthey’s hermeneutics as it was by Marx. For Mannheim, the way social classes perceive society is necessarily influenced by their position in society. In order to understand an ideology or worldview right – without claiming that it is “false,” because there is nothing like the one, true picture of society – we need to relate it to this position in society. This is Mannheim’s “relationism,” which was very important for the modern sociology of knowledge, which moved ideology criticism from politics to science.

SEE ALSO: Adorno, Theodor W.; Critical Theory/Frankfurt School; Discourse; Division of Labor; Gramsci, Antonio; Ideological Hegemony; Ideology, Economy and; Ideology, Sport and; Knowledge, Sociology of; Lukács, Georg; Mannheim, Karl; Modernity; Myth

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ideology, economy and

Edward G. Carmines and Michael W. Wagner

Two fundamental aspects of political life in advanced industrial democracies the world over are people's ideological preferences and their economic orientations. The interaction between these two factors helps organize citizens' value orientations and issue beliefs since there are several different ideological perspectives that people can have about the appropriate role for the involvement of government in managing a nation's economy. These distinctive ideological impulses range from extremely liberal (or "left") preferences favoring equality through more state control over the production, distribution, and pricing of a society's goods to extremely conservative (or "right") beliefs preferring individual freedom through allowing the market to control the production, distribution, and price decisions in a society.

The relationship between ideological preferences and economic orientations is important because they inform citizens' political choices and behavior. In order to understand how the dynamic and varying ways these concepts have been integrated in modern democracies, it is necessary to (1) define ideology and explain the general beliefs that make up important ideological perspectives; (2) define economy and describe various prominent economic systems; (3) illustrate the ways in which ideological preferences and economic orientations have commingled; (4) describe how issue preferences, other than economic, have further complicated

how citizens make political choices; and (5) compare the evolution of the interaction of ideology and economy in the United States to other advanced industrial democracies.

The sets of beliefs that people use to help organize their opinions on political issues are called ideologies. A great deal of research demonstrates that people often identify themselves as having some measure of either a liberal or conservative ideology. Generally speaking, liberals favor government intervention on political and economic problems, viewing change as progress, while conservatives often prefer the status quo over change and prefer a more limited government.

The differences between liberals and conservatives vary country by country. For example, in the United States, the public perceives only a modest difference between the Democratic Party and the Republican Party, with the Democrats generally representing American liberals and Republicans being the party of choice for most conservatives. On the other hand, French, British, and German people perceive sizable differences between the much larger numbers of political parties on each side of the ideological divide. Since the advanced industrial democracies of Europe have more political parties than the United States does, European parties vary widely on a liberal-conservative continuum, holding distinctly different, and sometimes more extreme, positions than the United States' two major parties.

Economics is the study of how a society produces and distributes its goods. There are various forms of economic systems, many of which are operating in contemporary political life. At the far right end of the economic spectrum is the pure capitalist system, where the market determines the pricing, production, and distribution of goods and services in a society while property is privately owned. This kind of capitalism is called "laissez faire" for the French term that loosely means "let the people do as they see fit." The government does not play any role in the economy in this kind of system, allowing the market to dictate a society's economic actions. There are no pure capitalist societies in the world.

At the other end of the ideological spectrum is the socialist system. A socialist economic system is one in which the means of production, distribution, property ownership, and price

controls are state run. Under a purely socialist system, it would be unjust for some people to own more property than others. Therefore, the government decides what a society needs, preventing individuals from having power over others.

In between these extremes lies the system of regulated capitalism that provides a capitalist economy generally protecting individuals from government encroachment and supporting private ownership while still allowing for government intervention designed to protect fair competition, individual rights, and other procedural guarantees. One prominent example of this economic middle ground began in the United States during the 1930s and was the inception of the New Deal.

The New Deal coalition is the classic case studied by scholars interested in how the interaction between ideological preferences and economic orientations influences political choices. What was remarkable about the American political landscape in the years following the first election of Franklin Delano Roosevelt to the presidency was that public opinion on nearly every issue that was salient to the American public revolved around people's answer to the question: "what is the proper role of government in providing for the general welfare of its citizenry?" At the New Deal's outset, the answer was largely class based.

In general, those of lower status and incomes, unskilled workers, northern blacks, Catholics, Jewish people, union members, urban residents, and southern whites became Democrats, favoring government support of progressive tax rates, the creation of a limited welfare state, and economic intervention. At the same time, the Republicans' coalition was a near mirror image of the Democrats' alliance. Upper and middle income earners, northern whites, non union families, non southerners, and rural residents preferred a more "laissez faire" attitude to government economic intervention. As such, the terms *liberal* and *conservative* became synonymous with one's position on the proper role of government in the economy.

This ideological alignment, based on citizens' preferences about the government's role in the economy, produced Democratic victories at the ballot box when elections were contested over New Deal economic and social welfare issues.

Of course, the debate over social welfare issues extended beyond the issue of government involvement in the economy, ranging over questions of whether or not the particular social goals of the New Deal were desirable for the United States.

The first hundred days of FDR's presidency brought swift changes to the way that the US government became involved in the American economy. During that time, the Securities and Exchange Commission reformed the banking system, the Civilian Conservation Corps, the Federal Emergency Relief Administration, and the Civil Works Administration provided relief to many of the 15 million Americans who were unemployed as a result of the Great Depression, and the Tennessee Valley Authority was created to address issues of flood control and public electric power. Later in Roosevelt's presidency, the Social Security Act was passed, providing the elderly with government financed income.

The political alignment of liberals favoring government intervention in the economy and conservatives favoring less government involvement dominated American politics for 30 years. However, as Edward G. Carmines and James A. Stimson (1989) argued in their book *Issue Evolution*, the introduction of racial issues transformed the American political system, adding a new dimension to the ideological divide. The 1964 presidential race between Democrat Lyndon Johnson and Republican Barry Goldwater introduced the idea of government involvement in issues of racial equality. While the major political parties had not taken consistent stands on racial issues during the New Deal's heyday, the 1964 election introduced Democrats as the party of racial liberalism and Republicans as the party of racial conservatism. While the conservative-liberal divide still existed, the coalitions that made them up began to change, complicating the clean economic ideological divide that existed before.

After becoming familiar with the parties' positions on racial issues, people began making political choices based on their ideological positions on race, in addition to the role of government in the economy. African Americans became, and continue to be, overwhelmingly Democratic, but southern whites gradually gravitated to the Republican Party. One long term result of this

shift is that the once powerful “Dixiecrat” wing of the Democratic Party has vanished from American politics. Racially liberal Republican members of Congress have similarly disappeared, even though many of them were central to passing civil rights legislation in the 1960s.

Further complicating matters in the United States, the introduction of the abortion issue to partisan politics in the 1970s and 1980s also began to influence ideological choices amongst elected officials and the electorate. Even though more Republicans than Democrats preferred abortion rights in the early 1970s, by the late 1980s Republicans had become the “pro life” conservative party on abortion while Democrats offered the more liberal “pro choice” position. The abortion issue is the most prominent of a new set of issues that are often referred to as “culture war” issues (such as women’s rights, gay rights, gun control, prayer in public school, and the death penalty). One of the most crucial distinctions between liberals and conservatives on the abortion issue and other cultural questions is people’s individual religiosity. The more evangelically religious an individual, the more likely he or she is to exhibit a conservative ideological perspective on cultural issues. Thus, the New Deal alignment of economic liberals and conservatives has been altered, but no similarly simple alignment has taken its place.

COMPARING EUROPEAN POSTMATERIALISM TO THE AMERICAN IDEOLOGICAL DIVIDE

The evolution in the United States from a purely economic divide to a more contemporary ideological landscape consisting of economic, racial, and cultural divisions seems unique when compared to the electorate’s ideological preferences in Europe’s advanced industrial democracies.

First, while the New Deal conflict provides a useful example regarding the impact of competing ideological orientations and economic preferences, many European nations have a much wider scope of conflict on the economic dimension of ideological conflict. For example, in his book *Citizen Politics*, Russell Dalton (2002) notes that in 1996, less than 40 percent of Americans believed that the government was

responsible for providing health care for the sick or a decent standard of living for the elderly, while more than 80 percent of the British and between 50 and 65 percent of Germans and the French supported such measures. Additionally, Europeans were much more likely to claim that the government should help reduce the income disparities between the rich and the poor. This more expansive scope of conflict is also treated differently in European nations than in the United States because of the significantly greater number of political parties European advanced industrial democracies have in comparison with the United States, which boasts only two major parties.

Second, and perhaps more importantly, Ronald Inglehart’s theory of postmaterialism, the leading account of cultural conflict in European advanced industrial democracies, provides a much different understanding of the role that economic preferences play in ideological orientations. The increasing affluence of the post war period, according to Inglehart, resulted in certain groups in the advanced industrial democracies of Europe focusing less of their attention on economic issues, or “material” goals, and more on non economic, value laden, or “postmaterial” matters. Thus, issues such as economic security and national defense, which tap into people’s underlying needs for safety and security, represent material goals. On the other hand, if a society is able to successfully meet material needs for a significant portion of its population, its citizens can shift their attention to higher order values such as personal freedom and participation; these represent postmaterial values.

Postmaterialism’s rise changes the nature of political conflict because it results in some parts of the working class shifting their political support to the right, while portions of the middle class move their political support to political parties on the left. In the end, according to Inglehart, the most meaningful basis of political conflict in western democracies (other than the United States) has come to be between materialists and postmaterialists, rather than between liberals and conservatives divided over economic issues.

Overall, the influence of material–postmaterial value priorities in American politics does not seem to help explain the growth of conflicts

over “culture war” issues during the past few decades. Still, the continuing passage of time and the occurrence of political change more generally require the further comparison of the evolution of the relationship between citizens’ ideological orientations and economic preferences for Americans, Europeans, and members of developing democracies across the globe.

SEE ALSO: Conservatism; Culture, Economy and; Economy (Sociological Approach); Ideology; Liberalism; Political Parties; Post Industrial Society; Public Opinion; Socialism

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ideology, sport and

Peter Millward

Sport and ideology refers to the way in which the former, as a distinct form of leisure activity, impacts upon the body of ideas which reflect the beliefs of a social group or political system. Indeed, the ideological capacity of sport can be considered so great that it may now be apt to rework Marx’s dictum, in that sport, rather than religion, might sensibly be considered to be the new opiate of the people. Unquestionably,

explicit links between sport and ideology have their roots in the work of the Frankfurt School thinker Theodor Adorno. In sum, Adorno argued that sport, like many other forms of popular culture, was a frivolous activity which reinforced the inequalities of the capitalist system and prohibited critical thought. At the heart of Adorno’s critique lay two defining principles: participant competition and the consumption of the sporting spectacle.

Addressing the first of these issues, Adorno argued that sport emitted dangerous social messages, which resonate with the sports playing proletariat. A given example is that sport is ultimately tied to “instrumental reason,” meaning that it serves a purpose of habituating those in subordinate social positions to the demands of material life. Therefore, Adorno’s indictment was specifically aimed at the means end rationality of bourgeois society, in that sport created the message that if the sports player worked/trained hard he or she would have more success. This was the ideological communication from the capitalist system. Building upon this, Adorno saw that the intrinsic value of sport was in permitting competition between members of the same social class, in that they risked physically damaging themselves and each other during participation. Adorno argued that this was a dystopian reality: members of the oppressed class should be galvanizing against the inherent power structures rather than indulging in masochism. Thus, in this sense, sport creates a false ideology in which instrumental reason is central, which carries a strong capitalist work ethic and hides the “real” bourgeois enemy.

However, the ideology which sport creates does not stop at sports competitors. Adorno saw that spectators offered remuneration for the privilege of watching competitive sport. Thus, Adorno and Horkheimer (1992) argued that sport, like much of popular culture, was part of the *culture industry*. They argued that sport, like the other institutions that create popular culture, was owned by members of the bourgeoisie but uncritically consumed by the proletariat masses. Taking the view that popular culture may numb the working class’s faculties of critical thought, Adorno and Horkheimer argued that the differences between the ideological propaganda of the Nazi party and key agents within popular culture

(including sport, music, cinema, and news print) were minimal. Indeed, popular cultural forms and Nazi propaganda were alike in lulling cultural consumers into a false sense of security and in the process limiting their ability to think critically. Essentially, the ideological message was that as long as the preoccupied proletariat had access to popular culture, they would not challenge the existing power structures.

Furthermore, the cultural industries have bourgeois owners who, for entry into sports events or access to the mediatized spectacle, charge fees for a unit of their product. Inevitably, like any profit making activity, this creates a surplus. Therefore, popular culture – including sport – pacifies the proletariat while producing a profit for the bourgeoisie. Indeed, Eco (1986) has voiced a similar opinion. Like Adorno and Horkheimer, he highlighted a belief that sport placates society by asking if it was “possible to have a revolution on a football Sunday?” With this, Eco suggested that sport – in this case football – negates the proletariat’s ability to think and act critically. Therefore, for Adorno, Horkheimer, and Eco, the only real sporting results are the continued oppression of those in subordinate positions and eventually an accommodation to monopolistic capitalism. What is more, these concerns were voiced long before the expansion of the global media, which has allowed the most popular sports events – such as English Premiership football and US NBA Championship basketball matches – to be broadcast worldwide, aiding the spread of global capitalism. In this sense, Adorno and Horkheimer’s condemnation was prophetic. Indeed, Adorno (1982) most succinctly summed up his concerns by arguing that “sport itself is not play but ritual in which the subjected celebrate their subjection,” and therefore clearly demonstrating the role sport plays in developing an ideology which favors existing power structures.

Thus, Adorno demonstrates the linkage between sport and the ideology of the capitalist system. However, Bero Rigauer (1981) points out that sport has also been utilized as an ideological tool by “state socialists”/“communists.” For instance, in the former USSR, the first socialist sports movement was organized by the state immediately after the revolution. Therefore, sport was used to create harmony

and practiced to promote the nation’s fitness during the Civil War (1917–20). This use of sport was markedly different from its uses in western capitalist systems, in that competitive sport was not featured. However, the practices were designed by Russian communist intellectuals in order to cultivate a social consciousness which could eliminate a range of social problems (such as alcoholism and illness). In this case, the ideological capacity of sport was utilized to manipulate the actions of the public, beyond capitalistic measures. Thus, using this form of ideology, sport can undeniably have a cohesive (as well as destructive) dimension that can (re)unite disparate societies.

However, the illustrated links between ideology and sport have been broadly one dimensional, relating to the way the economic or state power base conditions a public culture. Taking this route, Rigauer, Adorno, and Horkheimer do not look at subordination and empowerment beyond the macro political structures. Eco, on the other hand, pinpoints an additional criticism within the domain of sport participation. Eco argues that sport gives rise to a needless inequity, which separates those who demonstrate sporting aptitude from those who do not, deepening cultural inequality. Although Eco drenches his point with irony, it is clear that other forms of ideology exist beyond the parameters set by the named thinkers. Indeed, the late twentieth and early twenty first centuries have been characterized by the shift toward non class based new social movements. An agenda for future research which considers sport created ideology should be responsive to this, asking questions which relate to other forms of inequality in sport (and with links to the broader society). Such an agenda might, for example, specifically relate to issues of racism, xenophobia, gender, and sexuality, which pertain to both sporting and non sporting dimensions of contemporary society. Therefore, future scholarly research may focus on the various ideologies of inclusion and exclusion, building upon the impressive work of Back et al. (2001), Hargreaves (1994), and King (2003), among others.

SEE ALSO: Adorno, Theodor W.; Ideology; Political Economy and Sport; Social Theory and Sport; Sport and Culture

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idioculture

Tim Hallett

Idioculture is defined as “a system of knowledge, beliefs, behaviors, and customs shared by members of an interacting group to which members can refer and employ as the basis of further interaction” (Fine 1979: 734). Termed by Gary Alan Fine, idioculture respecifies the content of culture by focusing on the level of small groups and the social interactions therein. Developed before the sociology of culture gained popularity in the discipline and at a time in which macro, structural, political, and economic approaches were dominant and culture was seen as a vague, amorphous, fractured, “indescribable mist” (Fine 1979: 733), idioculture makes the culture concept useful by focusing on empirically observable group interactions as the locus of cultural creation. To regroup culture in group interactions, Fine draws from the symbolic interactionist tradition and research on group dynamics.

While the idioculture concept respecifies culture at the group level, it also identifies the process through which elements become a part of an idioculture. To become a part of an idioculture, an item must be Known, Useable, Functional, Appropriate, and Triggered (KUFAT). An item must be a part of a *known* pool of

background information. If the item is not known by at least two group members, it cannot become a stable basis of ongoing interaction. Though the focus of idioculture is local, the “known” criterion provides a link to broader social structural and cultural forces as they are experienced by group members. An item must also be *useable*, that is, it must be “mentionable in the context of group interaction,” (Fine 1979: 739). If the item violates the morals of a group or has taboo implications, it will not survive as a part of the idioculture. To become a part of idioculture, an item must also be *functional*: it must help the group to fulfill some need. Items that have no purpose in terms of group tasks or group emotions are unlikely to become a basis of ongoing interaction. An item must also be *appropriate*. An item is appropriate when it supports the status relations within the group. Items that are hostile to high status group members are censored, but items that are sponsored by high status members are likely to be incorporated into the idioculture. An item must also be *triggered*, it must “spark” group interactions, and triggers which are notable or unusual are most likely to become a part of the idioculture. The creation of idioculture through this five part process occurs via the interactions of group members.

The content of idioculture ranges from nick names and jokes to stories and rules of conduct. The concept was generated inductively from Fine’s (1979, 1987) ethnographic study of little league baseball teams, but features prominently in all of his works, from his study of fantasy gaming to his recent observations of weather forecasting. Among the many examples that Fine gives is an informal rule created by a little league team prohibiting the eating of ice cream in the dugout during a game (Fine 1979: 743–4). The rule was triggered by an unexpected loss, during which a younger, non playing member ate an ice cream cone. The rule was drawn from a known background – the players knew that it was abnormal for a player in the “big leagues” to eat ice cream during a game. Likewise, the rule was useable because it did not deal with any childhood taboos. It was functional because it provided an emotional outlet while focusing the attention of the younger members and creating solidarity, and it was appropriate because it was enacted by high status members against the actions of a low status member. Though this

feature of the idioculture was created through this interactive process, it sets the terms for ongoing actions: it effectively ended the eating of ice cream for the rest of the season.

This process of idiocultural creation emphasizes the non random and therefore thoroughly sociological nature of culture. Different configurations of the five features explain how idio culture varies between different groups and how different forms appear and remain in different groups. That the “no ice cream” rule did not present itself in the idiocultures of other teams can be explained by the notable triggering (during a loss as opposed to a victory) and the status dynamics of the particular group.

The term idioculture is routinely referenced in the sociological literature as a synonym for small group culture. However, it is rare for researchers to engage the full KUFAT apparatus, perhaps due to an implicit methodological implication. Because idioculture is local in nature, it must be studied at the group level, and though the process of idiocultural creation is empirically observable, it requires detailed microsociological data collection and analysis. Though fieldwork is increasingly viewed as a legitimate method, many sociologists do not have the interest or inclination to engage in this labor.

While the term is used more frequently than the full concept, a number of studies capture the “spirit” of idioculture by emphasizing the connection between groups and culture. In his research on “creative genius,” Farrell (2001) debunks the image of solitary inspiration to show how groups such as the French Impressionists used friendship networks to form a “collaborative circle” that spawned creativity. Farrell presents a stage model of group creativity (formation, rebellion, quiet, creative work, collective action, separation, reunion) that is not unlike the KUFAT process. In their ethnographic studies of voluntary associations, Eliasoph and Lichterman (2003) propose a model of culture in which “group style” filters macro level collective representations down to the micro level of interaction. Eliasoph and Lichterman stress how the group style (composed of boundaries, bonds, and speech norms) mediates broader cultural categories, codes, and vocabularies, to make them useable in the context of everyday group life.

SEE ALSO: Culture; Ethnography; Groups; Social Psychology; Symbolic Interaction

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ie

Takami Kuwayama

In Japanese, *ie* means “house,” but it is often applied to a group of people residing in the same house to make a living together. This semantic shift is evident in the definitions given in the authoritative dictionary *Kojien* (5th edition, 1998): (1) a structure for residence; (2) a collectivity of people living in the same house; and (3) a kinship group with common ancestors and property handed down from generation to generation. The sociological and anthropological discussion of the *ie* is inevitably concerned with the last two meanings. The *ie* is widely regarded as Japan’s traditional family. There has been much controversy, however, about what it really is, particularly over the question of how the *ie* should be distinguished from the supposedly universal institution of family or

kazoku. (*Kazoku* is written in two Chinese characters, the first of which is the same as the character for *ie*). Furthermore, the *ie* has been used as a structural principle of larger organizations, including the entire Japanese nation, and, as such, it is central to the debate on Japan's national identity.

Putting aside the enormous variation within Japan, it is safe to characterize the *ie* as a 4P institution: patrilineal (tracing descent on the father's side), patrilocal (the bride moving into the groom's house after marriage), primogenital (house property being inherited by the eldest son), and patriarchal. There is general agreement that the structural core of the *ie* is the line of succession between the head and his successor. Succession has two different aspects: (1) accession to the headship and (2) inheritance of property. The *ie* headship is ordinarily passed on from father to eldest son, but many alternative strategies exist to maintain the group. For example, when there is no biological son to succeed within the *ie*, a son may be adopted from outside. The Japanese *ie* is distinguished from its Chinese or Korean or even Okinawan counterpart in that there is no strong feeling that the adopted son should be related to the head by blood. This fact correlates with the absence of a clear cut distinction between kin and non kin in traditional Japanese society. It is also related to the loose use of kinship terms in addressing non kin. As for inheritance, *ie* property is passed on to one child, usually to the eldest son by the rule of primogeniture. In some regions, however, it is inherited by the eldest daughter if she is a first child. In this particular case, the headship is ordinarily assumed by her husband who has been adopted into the *ie*. Occasionally, ultimogeniture is practiced – a custom commonly related to the *inkyō* (retirement) system, in which the senior couple set up a separate residence after abandoning the headship. Generally speaking, non inheriting children, including daughters, receive economic support from their parents when marrying out. In the case of a merchant *ie*, which incorporates unrelated employees as its members, branch shops are often set up for them, and they maintain fictive kinship relationships with the *ie* head. This custom supports the argument, to be explained later, that the *ie* is a corporate group, rather than a family, which functions as a managing body.

Many of the features mentioned above were found in the family system codified in the Civil Code of 1898, known as the “*ie seido*” (*ie* system). Because this Code was abolished after Japan's defeat in World War II, having been replaced in 1947 with a democratic civil code during the occupation period (1945–52), there is a widespread tendency to regard the *ie* as feudalistic and legally defunct. This tendency should be corrected in the light of two facts. First, as a social organization, the *ie* has developed over the long course of Japanese history, with its origin probably dating back to the twelfth century. It is not identical with that codified in 1898. Thus, the abolition of the Civil Code of 1898 does not automatically mean the demise of the *ie*. Second, legal changes do not bring about immediate changes in people's attitudes. The so called “*ie ishiki*” (*ie* consciousness) is weakening, but it persists and unexpectedly reveals itself on ceremonial occasions, such as weddings and funerals, often to the surprise of the people involved.

Among the many controversies over the identity of *ie*, that between Kizaemon Aruga and Seiichi Kitano deserves the closest attention. Aruga (also called “Ariga”), best known for his study of the *dozoku* (a federation of *ie* groups organized hierarchically with the *honke* [main *ie*] governing its *bunke* [branch *ie*]), maintained that the *ie* is a *seikatsu shudan* (life group). According to him, the *ie* is not simply a family or a kinship group. Rather, it consists of people, both kin and non kin, who live and work together to sustain themselves and, ultimately, to perpetuate the collectivity's *keifu* (genealogy). He further contended that the status of *ie* members is determined by their functional roles in maintaining the group and that positions within the *ie* may be filled by any competent person recruited from outside. Aruga thus considered the *ie* a task oriented residential unit (Aruga 1954, 1972). Kitano (1976) took exception to Aruga's functional view. Drawing on the theory of *shokazoku* (small family) formulated by Teizo Toda, founder of the Japanese sociology of family, he emphasized the emotional bond among family members. He argued that the family consists of only a small group of kinship members, centered on husband, wife, and children, who are affectively connected with each other. He therefore excluded people like servants, and severely

criticized Aruga, saying that the *ie* or the Japanese family as conceptualized by Aruga is essentially a *jigyō dantai* (enterprise group).

Significantly, it is the analogy between *ie* and enterprise group that was later adopted in analyzing the Japanese company, especially its commitment to the welfare of employees as persons rather than workers contracted to provide labor in exchange for wages. Known as “corporate familism,” this feature of the Japanese company has widely been regarded as a secret of Japan’s post war economic development.

The scholarly importance attached to the *ie* has eventually developed into what may be called the “*ie* model of Japanese society.” It is a part of the well known “group model,” in which the Japanese emphasis on the group is contrasted with western individualism. The *ie* model contains two major approaches: sociological and psychological. In the sociological approach, the *ie* is defined as the basic unit in Japanese society, and other large groups, such as the *dozoku*, the company, and even the entire nation, are considered structural extensions of the *ie*. Examples include concepts like “corporate familism,” “*ie* society,” and the “family state” (see below). In the psychological approach, the group orientation of the Japanese is highlighted. Attention is focused on the submission of the individual to the family will and the resultant suppression of personal needs and desires for the sake of the *ie*.

Chie Nakane, author of *Japanese Society* (1970), represents the sociological approach. In this influential book, Nakane argued that the idea of *ba*, “frame” or “field,” is pivotal in organizing groups in Japan. In her mind, *ba* refers to “a locality, an institution or a particular relationship which binds a set of individuals into one group” (p. 1), and it takes precedence over a member’s *shikaku* or attributes. Thus, being a member of a particular company is considered in Japan more important than being, for example, the president or a secretary of that company. In this idea is underscored the importance of group membership, as contrasted with individual achievement. Nakane maintained that the *ie* is the archetype of *ba*. The psychological approach, on the other hand, has extensively been used by American scholars. A classic example is found in Ruth Benedict’s *The Chrysanthemum and the Sword* (1946), in which she wrote:

“The claims of the family come before the claims of the individual. . . . Submission to the will of the family is demanded in the name of a supreme value in which, however onerous its requirements, all of them have a stake” (p. 55). In the United States, the argument that self sacrifice is demanded of the Japanese for the common good has repeatedly been made to date (e.g., Kondo 1990).

Since the Restoration of Meiji in 1868, the *ie* has often been represented as Japan’s national symbol. This representation is inseparable from that of the house or family, but it has transcended the original meaning to produce a broad discursive sphere in which different aspects of Japan are understood as manifestations of a single entity – the *ie*. A most dramatic example is that of the *kazoku kokka* (family state), a political ideology created by the authorities at the end of the nineteenth century, which worked as the country’s spiritual foundation until the end of World War II. The family state likened the entire Japanese nation to a huge *ie*, in which the relationship between the emperor and his subjects was compared to that between father and children, on the one hand, and between main *ie* and branch *ie*, on the other. From the first comparison was derived the notion that *chu* (loyalty to the emperor) was identical with *ko* (filial piety). From the second comparison was derived the belief that the emperor’s ancestors were genealogically related to those of his subjects. A sense of national unity, however fictitious, was thus fostered among the Japanese people. Through the moral training called *shushin*, Japanese schoolchildren were taught to serve the emperor faithfully, if necessary through the ultimate sacrifice of their lives. In *shushin*, self sacrifice for the sake of the *ie*, on which the nation was believed to be based, was praised as a great virtue, which was then contrasted with the supposed “vice” of western individualism.

Japan’s defeat in World War II put an end to the official ideology of family state. The notion persists, however, that the *ie* is a time honored tradition of Japan and that it should be defended from foreign encroachments. The current debate on the Japanese government’s proposal to install a *fufu betsusei* (two surname family) system, which would allow husband and wife to assume their own surnames, clearly

attests to this point. Article 24 of the Constitution of 1946 stipulates that the individual should be respected in family life and that husband and wife hold equal rights. Article 750 of the Civil Code of 1947 allows a married couple to assume the surname of either husband or wife in accordance with the agreement made at the time of marriage. In reality, however, women are required to change their surnames to those of their husbands upon marriage. In order to cope with a widespread sense of inequality among the ever growing number of working women, and also to comply with the international Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women, in the mid 1990s the Japanese government proposed to legalize the two surname family. This proposal immediately met strong opposition from nationalists, who vehemently maintained that it would only enhance the already individualistic trend among the Japanese whose moral fiber has, in their judgment, been destroyed by western values. Surprised by this reaction, the Japanese government has withdrawn the proposal. The debate continues, however, and it is difficult to predict the final outcome. Whatever the outcome may be, these issues demonstrate the vulnerability of the *ie* to political manipulation.

SEE ALSO: *Ba*; Japanese Style Management; *Nihonjinron*; Suzuki, Eitaro

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illness behavior

Ronald Angel

While the phrase health behavior refers to behaviors that individuals engage in to maintain health, the phrase illness behavior has been used to refer to the responses that individuals engage in after they become ill, presumably in an effort to get well. Many classic theoretical attempts to understand this process focused on what was conceived of as the illness career or the sick role. These theories (and later approaches) attempted to understand how an individual's perceptions, experience, and expression of symptoms, as well as their decisions concerning the appropriate course of action, are influenced by and interact with professional models of illness, provided primarily by physicians, to determine how the illness career is structured. Indeed, one of the most intriguing and important aspects of illness behavior models has to do with understanding compliance and the identification of those individual, cultural, and social factors that lead individuals to ignore or to follow medical advice.

As the populations of the developed world age and as chronic diseases such as obesity and its complications become more common, effective control requires long term compliance with regimens that include dietary changes, increased exercise, and proper medication use. In order to make profound changes in behavior and life style, the individual must come to view him or herself as sick and accept the proposition that the lifestyle changes and medical interventions prescribed will substantially lower the risk of further illness and functional decline. Similarly for HIV/AIDS, cancer, mental illness, or any other malady: the patient's response to intervention is determined by their own assessment of the medical advice provided. Even in an age in which medical authority is high, individuals continue to consult chiropractors, massage therapists, the practitioners of oriental medicine, herbalists, and many other non traditional healers. The uncertainty and ambiguity that surrounds so much of illness and its treatment leave a great deal of room for personal interpretation and evaluation.

The classic conceptions of illness behavior were largely functional and identified categories

of variables or factors that potentially influence the illness career. In most of these models, the response to illness usually begins with the recognition of symptoms or with a medical diagnosis in the absence of symptoms. The theories of Talcott Parsons (1975), Edward Suchman (1965), David Mechanic (1972), and others focus on the factors associated with the symptomatic individual's recognition and assessment of the severity and meaning of symptoms, as well as on those factors that determine the actions an individual takes in order to get well. Certain of these theories also dealt with society's expectations of the sick individual and the structure of the social roles that the ill individual occupies.

Suchman, for example, developed a theoretical model of the relationship between social and medical factors and related those to demographic and social group structure, including cultural orientation, in their impact on medical care use. Suchman identified several stages in the process of recognition and response to illness. At each stage the symptomatic individual engages in a cognitive process that is influenced by demographic and social group factors that leads him or her to reject a medical definition of the problem and postpone the acceptance of treatment, or to accept a medical explanation and comply with the prescribed treatment regimen. If the patient seeks medical advice and accepts its legitimacy, he or she assumes the sick role, the ultimate objective of which is recovery of one's health and functioning. Suchman observed that the probability of acceptance of a medical explanation for what is wrong with one is influenced by one's level of education and sophistication. Parochial individuals who are scientifically uninformed and who hold a popular view of healing tend to procrastinate, deny symptoms, and delay seeking medical attention longer than more cosmopolitan individuals who more readily accept their need for medical treatment. Suchman saw this theory providing important insight into the degree of congruence between physicians' subculture and belief systems and those of groups that adhered to more or less scientific or popular conceptions of illness and its treatment.

In subsequent years other theorists and researchers extended this tradition to focus specifically on the cognitive structures and

processes involved in the sick individual's response to illness and their relation to culture and the process of acculturation. Much of this research focused on the phenomenon of "somatization" – a clinical syndrome in which emotional and even social distress is expressed somatically – or on specific culturally defined syndromes such as "nervios" or "nerves" among Latinos (Kleinman 1986; Guarnaccia & Farias 1988). This theoretical tradition was motivated by the observation that in subjective experience individuals do not differentiate between their emotional and physical selves, but rather experience distress holistically. Modern scientific medicine and psychiatry differentiate between the physical and the mental for practical reasons, but most of humanity does not, and given the ambiguous nature of illness and treatment, emotional distress directly influences and accompanies physical illness. A large body of research has for years demonstrated that depression exacerbates the symptoms of physical diseases and increases suffering (Wells et al. 1989). A casual perusal of the Internet or journals such as *Psychosomatic Medicine* reveals many articles that demonstrate an association between depression and coronary artery disease, arthritis, chronic pain, and much more.

By now a rather large body of theoretically informed research has demonstrated that illness behavior relates to a process that is cognitively and socially quite complex. Leventhal (1986) and colleagues have elaborated such a cognitive model in relation to a number of specific conditions and to the degree and nature of compliance with prescribed treatments. Most of the research into illness behavior is based on surveys and more in depth anthropological and clinical inquiry. Surveys such as the Health and Nutrition Examination Survey ask questions about mental and physical symptoms, medical care use, self medications, etc., and they clearly demonstrate group differences in the level and structure of depressive affect and symptom reporting (Angel & Guarnaccia 1989). Although such data provide useful information on broad group differences it is beset by methodological problems related to self reports. Surveys are highly structured and offer little opportunity for deep or extensive probing. Indeed, the problems of language and communication plague

all illness behavior research, both because researcher and patient often do not speak the same language, and because of the fact that they have very different worldviews, as Suchman noted.

For the physician and for the social scientific or behavioral researcher, symptoms form much of the basis of assessment. Unlike signs, or the observable and objective evidence of disease, self reported symptoms reflect privileged information. The individual who is suffering is the only one with access to his or her internal subjective realm. Those cognitive and social factors that influence the expression of symptoms and the language one uses to talk about the self must be better understood by epidemiologists and social policy researchers, as well as physicians (Angel & Williams 2000). In recent years much more concern about measurement issues related to health matters has appeared (Stone et al. 2000). By now it is clear that self reported and subjective information is influenced by multiple factors, including those related to culture, education, and one's previous experience with illness (either one's own or someone else's), and much more (Angel & Thoits 1987).

Perhaps the complexity of the processes involved in illness behavior accounts for one of the practical weaknesses of this particular theoretical and research tradition. Although the theories posit useful associations between the mind and the body and the research demonstrates a clear association between depression and physical illness, neither the theories nor the research provide specific prescriptive insights into just who will engage in specific behaviors or who will comply with prescribed medical regimens. Certainly, it is of practical use to know that depression, anxiety disorder, and substance abuse are common in primary care and that the response to them is often inadequate. It is also useful to know that depressive affect is correlated with physical complaints, but it has been difficult to determine which patients are at highest risk.

Perhaps screening of primary care patients or better training of physicians and other health care professionals would increase the recognition of these problems, but just how they would be treated is not clear. The problem is seriously

compounded when the patients are recent immigrants with low acculturation levels or when they do not speak English. We understand the general aspects of illness behavior, but those insights have not been translated into practical applications. Knowing, for example, that poorly educated individuals of Latin extraction are, as a group, more likely to somatize and to employ culture bound expressions of distress does not allow us to identify which individuals of that group will do so. Individuals who share similar demographic and cultural characteristics can differ significantly in their personal response to illness. Indeed, the illness behavior tradition suffers from the shortcomings and offers the promises that Thoits (1995) identified in the area of the health outcomes of stress and coping. We know that some individuals cope better with specific stresses than others, but it is not often clear what gives them that capacity. It is clear that we need a better sense of the intervening factors that lead one individual to engage in one set of behaviors and another to deny. "Parochial" versus "cosmopolitan" orientations or the realization that individuals with a culturally traditional orientation are more likely to somatize and to delay seeking medical care are only general observations. They do not lend themselves to prescriptive statements, which is what practitioners often request of their more social scientific and anthropologically oriented colleagues.

Clearly, though, understanding the complex processes that fall into the very general category of illness behavior is important. Much of modern medicine and certainly the control of chronic disease involves changing the patient's conception of his or her personal vulnerabilities in order to bring about the appropriate behavioral changes. Understanding how and why individuals decide how to respond to symptoms or how they interpret medical advice requires that we go beyond the traditional models and employ the new insights of the cognitive sciences to understand how individuals frame illness vocabularies (Pelto & Pelto 1997). In order to move the understanding of illness behavior forward it will be necessary to employ the insights and techniques of the cognitive sciences in combination with more refined qualitative interviewing techniques. Brain imaging may

even lead to the identification of specific structures or processes associated with specific behaviors. At the very least we need some better sense of how complex medical information, or fairly burdensome medical recommendations such as advising a middle aged Mexican American man to alter his diet drastically, are interpreted. We also need a better understanding of the impact of family and local social structural factors on illness behavior. The dietary changes required to control a father's diabetes mean that the routines of the entire family may have to be altered and that one is required to reject local dietary traditions.

It would be impossible, of course, to end even a short entry on illness behavior without mention of the non cognitive, non psychological factors affecting individual behavior. Most of the traditional theories placed the symptom attention, evaluation, response process within a larger social and economic context. Rarely, though, was that context elaborated in detail. Yet we know that if one has few economic resources and no income, one is less likely to seek professional medical care or to comply with treatment and more likely to suffer adverse health consequences (Institute of Medicine 2002). One suspects that much of the impact of culture is really a reflection of social class. Of the over 40 million uninsured Americans a disproportionate number are African American and Hispanic. Mexican Americans who are concentrated in Texas (the state with the lowest rates of health care coverage for adults and children in the nation) are the most uninsured group in the nation (Angel et al. 2001). It is possible to attribute to culture or to low levels of acculturation effects that are, in fact, a result of the lack of social or economic resources. The cognitive processes that individuals engage in to decide whether or not to seek help or comply with prescribed regimens may well be quite rational and reflect reality. Clearly, illness behavior is a complex process with multiple explanatory layers. Since humans are not passive recipients of medical care though, and since the public's health generally depends on the collection of individual actions, understanding illness behavior in context remains a vitally important research initiative.

SEE ALSO: Health Behavior; Health Care Delivery Systems; Health Lifestyles; Health and Culture; Health and Race; Health and Social Class; Illness Experience; Illness Narrative; Medical Sociology

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illness experience

Graham Scambler

The term illness experience refers to the ways in which people define and adjust to perceived interruptions to their health. It is conventional in medical sociology to distinguish between illness and disease. Illness refers to people's "lay" or subjective definitions of health problems, while disease refers to "professional" or objective definitions of health problems based on signs and symptoms. The value of this distinction is that it allows us to acknowledge that people can be ill without having a disease, and can have a disease without being ill (Freidson 1970).

For all its utility, the illness/disease dichotomy can also be misleading. First, it is evident that lay understandings of illness are typically informed by direct (e.g., communicated by doctors) or indirect (e.g., mediated by the Internet) representations of professional conceptions of disease. Less obviously, professional notions of disease do not emerge out of a cultural vacuum. Rather, they have their genesis in, often reflect, and must, if they are to retain their authority and legitimacy, continue to be seen to have their basis in the broader culture inhabited by prospective patients. Second, the dichotomy erroneously equates healing with allopathic medicine. There is strong evidence in North America, Europe, and elsewhere that people are turning increasingly to complementary or alternative practitioners to treat their health problems, and many of these healers reject the philosophy, theory, and practice of professional biomedicine. Arthur Kleinman's (1985) anthropological notion of the

"local health care system," comprising popular (self or lay care), folk, and professional sectors, neatly captures the complexity and subtlety of contemporary healing.

The research literature on the myriad but patterned ways in which people cope with the illness experience within their local health care systems can be broken down by theme. The first concerns how they come to see themselves as ill and their subsequent decision making regarding treatment and care. The second contextualizes these decisions in relation to the cultural norms that articulate morally appropriate and responsible behaviors around illness. The classical expression of these norms is Talcott Parsons's (1951) concept of the sick role, which establishes both rights and obligations attendant on illness in the US and kindred societies. The third theme focuses on the ongoing and negotiated relationships between ill people and their healers, typically, in the domain of research, doctors. The fourth concerns biomedical and other treatment regimes and, most conspicuously, those factors known to affect what has been variously called compliance, adherence, and, more recently, concordance. The fifth and final theme is the broadest: it covers how and with what results people accommodate to their illnesses. It is a theme usually identified as coping or adjustment/maladjustment, typically with chronic and disabling rather than acute conditions. The first two themes are dealt with in detail in other entries, so what follows concentrates on themes three, four, and five.

There is enormous variability in the manner in which illness intrudes on people. An illness with a dramatic impact may not indicate threatening disease. Similarly, life threatening disease can begin with uneventful symptomatology. A dizzy spell, faint, or blackout or two can either be rationalized away, as the product of fatigue or stress, or precipitate a consultation leading to a medical diagnosis of epilepsy. Medical labeling of this sort changes people: it "makes them into epileptics" (Scambler & Hopkins 1986). A diagnosis of multiple sclerosis typically occurs long after the individuals affected define themselves as ill, and often long after specialist doctors initiate testing. People are notoriously intolerant of uncertainty, particularly in the face of illness for which "lay

theories” seem inadequate. However, while people with epilepsy typically experience the biomedical termination of uncertainty as a set back (i.e., an unwanted stigmatizing identity has been foisted on them), those with multiple sclerosis, if not their kin, typically experience it as a relief (i.e., at last they can begin to make sense of what is happening).

Diagnoses of this type can lead to “biographical disruption” (Bury 1982), sometimes encompassing a “loss of self” (Charmaz 1983). Chronic symptoms like epilepsy or diseases like multiple sclerosis, diabetes, or rheumatoid arthritis require a rethinking or reordering of selves, goals, and priorities. Gareth Williams (1984) refers to such processes as “narrative reconstruction.” This may be self or other imposed. An individual with epilepsy, as it were incognito, may be affected more by “felt” than “enacted stigma”: he or she may suffer more from a sense of shame or fear of being stigmatized than from actual stigmatization or other forms of discrimination on the part of others (Scambler & Hopkins 1986; Scambler 2004). Someone with motor neuron disease, AIDS, or multiple sclerosis is more likely to be confronted with a stark and other imposed demand to reappraise his or her future.

The notion that people who are ill, acknowledge themselves as such, and seek professional help should recognize an obligation to comply with or adhere to appropriate medical counsel and regimens has been challenged, evidentially and in theory. It is known that compliance/adherence averages out at around 40 percent. The rationales people develop in relation to advice and medications bear testimony to the fact that they think for themselves and typically have multiple motivations and agendas. Freidson’s discernment of a “clash of perspectives” between doctors treating disease in their clinics and patients coping with illness in their day to day lives remains salient: the two parties can talk past each other.

Future research is likely to build on a topical concern with medical accountability and patient choice around illness. The concept of the “expert patient” has had a mixed reception, some heralding it as a device for co opting and limiting patient choice. In addition to continuing work on coping with illness, new challenges might be anticipated to the ubiquitous

presumption that all phenomena to which the label disease has been or might yet be attached, from diabetes to smoking to wrong body image, make either victims or irresponsible citizens of their bearers.

SEE ALSO: Chronic Illness and Disability; Complementary and Alternative Medicine; Illness Behavior; Illness Narrative; Patient–Physician Relationship; Sick Role

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illness narrative

Lars Christer Hydén

Illness narratives are mostly thought of as sick people’s narratives about their illnesses and the effect on their lives. Illness narratives can also include the narratives of relatives about the effects the illnesses have had on their relationships with the sick people and on their own

lives. They often occur as oral narratives in everyday conversations with family, friends, and colleagues. They can also appear as written and published biographical or autobiographical accounts of illnesses or pathographies (Hawkins 1993). Both oral and written illness narratives help to configure and articulate experiences and events that change one's life and its prerequisite sites as a result of illness.

Research on the forms and functions of illness narratives expanded rapidly during the last decades of the twentieth century (Bury 2001). The medical sociologist Arthur Frank (1995) suggests that this interest has to do with ill persons in late modernity wanting to have their own suffering recognized in its individual particularity. Patients' illness narratives capture the individual's suffering in an everyday context, in contrast to the medical narratives that reflect the needs of the medical professions and institutions.

The research on illness narratives is marked by diversity in the theoretical perspectives and methods that are brought to bear on a variety of problems. The field covers interview studies of patient narratives of illnesses, as well as studies of the way narratives are used in the interaction between medical staff and patients.

Medical sociologists and anthropologists (among others) have attempted to understand suffering and illness as they are experienced by ill persons and how their daily lives are affected by illness – this in opposition to describing the illness from the perspective of the medical profession and institution. This approach has been conceptualized by Mishler (1984) as a conflict and struggle between the “voice of the life world” and the “voice of medicine.” Several researchers have tried to examine the “voice of the life world” in more detail and in that context used narrative both as an analytic and theoretical concept.

In what follows, three main areas of research will be discussed: illness narratives and identity, illness narrative and medical knowledge, and the functions of illness narratives. The first area is concerned with the ways individuals narratively reconstruct their identities in face of chronic illness. All types of illnesses affect the experience of continuity and inner coherence as it is called into question, perhaps becoming invalid altogether. Illness can be

experienced as a more or less external event that has intruded upon an ongoing life process. At first, the illness may seem to lack all connection with earlier events, and thus it ruptures not only the sense of continuity but also identity (Bury 1982; Williams, 1984).

Narratives offer an opportunity to knit together the split ends of life, to construct a new context and plot that encompasses both the illness event and surrounding life events and recreates a state of interrelatedness. Depicting illness in the form of narratives is also a way of contextualizing illness events and illness symptoms by bringing them together within a biographical context. By weaving the threads of illness events into the fabric of our personal lives, physical symptoms are transformed into aspects of our lives, and diagnoses and prognoses attain meaning within the framework of personal biography. Narrativizing illness enables other people to comment on the narrative and to offer new interpretations and suggestions. Thus, narratives serve as arenas or forums for presenting, discussing, and negotiating illness and how we relate to illness.

In the second area of research, the narrative is primarily *about* the illness; that is, the narrative conveys knowledge and ideas about illness (Kleinman 1988; Hunter 1991; Charon 2001). Examples are situations in which doctors and other professional care staff talk *about* the patient's illness. Several researchers emphasize the importance of the illness narrative as a means by which doctors acquire a more detailed clinical picture of the patient. The medical practitioner must become versed in the patient's narratives, not only in order to make a correct diagnosis, but also in order to propose a treatment program that is acceptable to the patient. Becoming acquainted with the patient's illness narratives also plays an important role in determining how the communication between doctor and patient develops (Clark & Mishler 1992) and how the patient experiences the information conveyed by the doctor. Charon (2001) has argued for the development of a “narrative medicine.” It is necessary for the doctor to learn the process of close, attentive listening to the patient in order to hear the patient's narrative questions, and to recognize that there are often no clear answers to these questions. Through emphatic listening a relationship is created that allows the

physician to arrive at a diagnosis, interpret physical findings, and involve the patient in obtaining effective care.

A third area of research is concerned with the *functions* narratives have in various contexts. One example of this is how narratives can be used as means of transforming individual experience into collective experience. Traditionally, illness narratives concern the *individual's* experience of illness. Several chronic illnesses (e.g., HIV/AIDS) pose the question of whether the narrative is able to *collectivize* the illness experience and ask what the social implications of illness are. An analysis of men who have been diagnosed as HIV positive, for example, shows how homosexual men reconstruct their identities and incorporate the cultural experiences of homosexuality into their life histories (Carricaburu & Pierret 1995). The illness experience is removed from the private sphere and becomes a part of an all encompassing political and social narrative and context. Through the narrative, the illness experience becomes a collective experience.

The study of illness narratives is a research area that is still growing. Important new areas focus on the way illness narratives are represented in various media like photos and film, and also the bodily enactment and performance of illness narratives in contrast to verbally performed narratives.

SEE ALSO: Body and Society; Chronic Illness and Disability; Illness Experience; Medical Sociology; Medicine, Sociology of; Narrative

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imagined communities

Paul R. Jones

Imagined communities is a term coined by Benedict Anderson (1983) in an influential book on the emergence and persistence of the nation. Anderson addresses a number of central sociological issues associated with belonging and cultural communities. A paradox of the modern age is that although many feel that the nation is our natural community, we do not know the vast majority of the other people who constitute this group. Indeed, Anderson famously defines the nation as *imagined* "because the members of even the smallest nation will never know most of their fellow members, meet them, or even hear of them, yet in the minds of each lives the image of their communion" (p. 6). The nation is defined as a *community* because "regardless of the actual inequality and exploitation that may prevail in each, the nation is always conceived as a deep, horizontal comradeship" (p. 7). Therefore, the concept of imagined community assumes that nations, national identities, and nationalism are socially constructed; "imagined" in this context then does not mean false, but instead points to the socio cognitive element in the construction of the nation.

Like many others working in this tradition, Anderson argues that culture is crucial to these constructions, placing major emphasis on the chance, yet highly dynamic, coincidence of the emergence of print culture and the development of industrial capitalism in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. Advances in printing technology, accompanied by increased literacy, allowed the concept of the nation to be disseminated through the media and through literature. The mass production of print also led to communication increasingly taking place within national linguistic boundaries and markets, allowing the emergent bourgeoisie to “imagine” themselves and to form new solidarities not based on family structures or religion. Indeed, the nation performs many of the integrative functions carried out by premodern religious cultural associations.

For Anderson then, the promise of the nation as an “imagined community” is both as a mechanism for social integration among strangers – a key concern for modern states – and a coherent narrative of progress based upon a constructed remembering and, just as importantly, a forgetting. The impression, albeit an illusion, is of a united group moving together through history and into a common future. In questioning how such narratives are constructed and maintained through culture, the concept of imagined community has become central to much sociological research on nationalism, ethnicity, and identity.

SEE ALSO: Community; Culture; Modernity; Nationalism; State

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Imanishi, Kinji (1902–92)

Pamela J. Asquith

Kinji Imanishi was an ecologist, anthropologist, and founder of primatology in Japan. His basic view emphasized cooperation rather than competition in the natural world. This view held that “lifestyle partitioning” (*sumiwake*) among coexisting species explained the origin, or differentiation, of species. His concept of “species society” (*specia*) likewise focused on members of a species as a whole and their interactions with one another that maintain an equilibrium, rather than on the morphological differences and reproductive fitness of individual members of the species. He returned to these views many times in the course of his critiques of the predominance of natural selection theory to explain evolution.

Imanishi received a bachelor’s degree in 1928 from Kyoto University, specializing in entomology. He then turned to the relatively new discipline of ecology for graduate research, excited by the prospect of studying living organisms interacting with their natural environment. He received a Doctor of Science degree in 1940 from Kyoto University based on nearly 10 years of research on the ecology and taxonomy of mayfly larvae of various genera living in Japanese river torrents. In the next year he published his first and perhaps best known book, *Seibutsu no Sekai (The World of Living Things)*. This was a philosophical statement of his views on the origins and interactions of organisms with their environment and development of the biosphere. It was a pivotal book that related the views that had supported his biological work thus far, and out of which he developed most of his future ideas and projects. The book enjoyed several reprintings and was widely read by laypersons as well as scholars in Japan. English and German translations of the book were published in 2002 (Asquith et al. 2002; Wuthenow & Kurahara 2002).

As an undergraduate and graduate student he witnessed the considerable debate among western ecologists about the efficacy of natural selection theory to explain evolutionary

processes. He was to remain a lifelong “anti selectionist,” or critic of Darwinian and neo Darwinian evolution, though not of evolution itself.

His personal study notes and papers (dating from 1919 to 1980) reveal a probing, restless scholar with a huge capacity for synthesis and for fieldwork in several fields (Asquith 2004). From his student days he considered individual action upon the environment and recognition of the species society to be of paramount importance in understanding the life of living things. The idea of animals as active in selecting their own environments, rather than as passive organisms acted upon by chance, stemmed in part from migration studies among British ecologists. Charles Elton’s (1930) summary of factors likely to be important in evolution included, besides natural selection, sexual selection, “tradition” (or the transmission of learned behaviors between generations), the selection of the environment by individuals, and the spread of “indifferent” or non adaptive variations (that might be adaptive in another situation). A further reflection of the importance attached to sociality in determining biological outcomes was that social ecology in the 1920s and 1930s was considered to be a school within American sociology (Alihan 1938). Similarly, the well known *Animal Aggregations* (1931) by the University of Chicago’s W. C. Allee was subtitled *A Study in General Sociology*.

Part of what impelled Imanishi’s remarkably broad range of scientific interests was an accident of history. At every turn his research was cut off by world events, as he relates midway through his career (Imanishi 1966). He had planned a scientific expedition to Borneo to study orangutans during World War II, but conditions made that impossible. Instead, he went to Mongolia where he began field studies of the Mongol, a pastoral tribe. For this, he included study of the types of vegetation and its productivity on the Mongolian steppe as it formed the basis of the livelihood of the Mongol. In 1944 he became the first director of the Northwest Research Institute there. His studies in what would be called ecological anthropology found fruition many years later when one of his students founded the African Area Studies Research Institute at Kyoto University, which

conducts studies both of primates and of human ecology in Africa.

Imanishi left Mongolia in 1946 when the Institute was closed in the aftermath of the war. Shortly after his return to Japan he initiated various studies of naturalistic animal behavior, which soon became focused on Japanese macaques. Japanese primatology was founded through Imanishi and his students’ efforts in 1948. In 1950, at age 48, he became a lecturer in the Institute for Humanistic Studies at Kyoto University. In 1958 he traveled through Africa with his student Junichiro Itani to search for good field sites for studies of gorillas and chimpanzees. They also visited several pioneers of the developing primate studies centers in Europe and the United States. In 1959 he became Professor of Social Anthropology at Kyoto University. He also established the Laboratory of Physical Anthropology and in 1962 was appointed professor there too. After mandatory retirement from the Imperial University, he became Professor of Cultural Anthropology at Okayama University in 1965, and president of Gifu University in 1967, continuing actively to research and publish, particularly on evolution.

Imanishi’s extraordinarily broad and pioneering scholarly career was matched only by his mountaineering career and exploration (on which he also wrote prolifically). The latter was very much the basis for his inspirational example and popularity among the general public in Japan. He helped to found the still active Academic Alpine Club of Kyoto in 1931 and scaled over 2,000 peaks in Japan. During the early 1950s Imanishi led mountaineering expeditions to the Himalayas and his Japanese team was the first to ascend some of the peaks in the Annapurna range. His personal qualities and contributions were recognized twice by the Japanese government. In 1962 he was designated a “Person of Cultural Merit” and in 1979 he was named to the “Second Order of the Sacred Treasure.” Imanishi remained professionally active into his eighties. He died on June 15, 1992. Fifteen hundred people attended his funeral, including an envoy from the emperor.

Although Imanishi published comparatively few papers in English, the papers appear to mark turning points in the development of his ideas

and application to his researches. Very often he had published from one to several volumes in Japanese on major concepts that appeared in his English publications. Among these were papers on nomadism, development of the family, the evolution of personality, social behavior of primates, human and animal ecology, and, at the age of 82, a paper on his proposal for *shizengaku* (nature study) as a culmination of his efforts to dissolve disciplinary boundaries and mechanistic approaches to nature that he saw in the ever increasing specializations in science. Imanishi also found inspiration and a way to express his views in the writings of philosopher Kitarō Nishida (1870–1945). Nishida's view that every thing came from a single source and fit within a coherent whole was echoed in Imanishi's view of evolution and the current complexity of life. It is only up to us to find how the parts of the whole fit together. Imanishi set himself the task to try to understand the ecosystem shared by all organisms, living and non living.

Imanishi's influence extended far in the Japanese academy, even if it is sometimes only remembered by the most senior generations of scholars now. Those who accompanied him on his field researches and whom he sent on projects became professors, directors of institutes, and researchers in a great array of disciplines including anthropology, folklore studies, primatology, philosophy, ecology, and psychology. Imanishi referred to his human and animal studies as comparative sociological studies, and to his idea of the species society as a sociological concept. Critics of Imanishi's anti Darwinian views have suggested that these views were a reflection of his cultural and political viewpoint. However, his personal notes and papers reveal instead that he was in step with the debates surrounding natural selection theory – debates that only quieted after the modern evolutionary synthesis (bringing genetic bases to Darwin's theory) was formulated in the late 1930s. Imanishi was aware of all the advancements in genetic theory through the ensuing decades, but remained unconvinced by the priority of a single theory of evolution. The concept of species society is central to his views of the interconnectedness of things in nature. It is not just a conceptual construct, Imanishi noted, but it is an existent entity with an autonomous

nature, whose various individuals are continually contributing to the maintenance and perpetuation of the species society to which they belong. This shared life does not imply a conscious and active cooperation; rather, as the result of the interactive influences among individuals of the same species, a kind of continuous equilibrium results. The species society is a real entity in this world, or in other words, the world of species is a *social* phenomenon.

SEE ALSO: Ecological View of History; Evolution

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immigrant families

Karin Wall

Overall, the sociology of immigrant families represents a significant lacuna in the research on international migration. Although migratory flows have been interpreted as complex negotiations involving a diversity of actors including the individual, the family, social and kin networks, the market, and the state, other topics have polarized the attention of the social sciences. The political, demographic, and economic conditions of sending and receiving countries, on the one hand, and the patterns and corresponding consequences of migration movements for societies, in particular the survival or the elimination of ethnicity, on the other hand, have been the major concerns of classical migration research.

The neglect of the *immigrant family* is related to various factors. In the first place, sociologists underline the fact that immigrants were for a long time mostly workers and men. Women immigrants and children were few and only attracted attention when the intensity of family reunification, the settlement of families, and the integration problems of second generation migrants came to the forefront. Secondly, research shows that the feminization of migration and the diversification in women's patterns of migration have only recently become a noted trend. As Castles and Miller (1998) point out, women over the last decades became increasingly vital in all forms of migration in many regions and across the globe. Lastly, the linkages between sociology of the family and sociology of migration have been weak. The former has

focused on family change and organization in general rather than seeking to understand family trajectories and dynamics in the context of immigration. In contrast, gender studies have taken up the issue of migrant women and of women left behind more systematically, thus approaching the impact of immigration on family life from the perspective of women.

The invisibility of the family is, of course, relative. Indirectly, the immigrant family underpins many of the well known works on immigration, past and present. For example, Thomas and Znaniecki's *The Polish Peasant in Europe and America* (1918–20) analyzes the subjective experience and the integration of Polish immigrants – mostly young male workers but also married men who left families behind – by reference to the peasant family in Poland and to the maintenance of kinship ties, viewed as promoting adaptation, in the receiving country. The life stories also focus on the difficulties of the new nuclear families, labeled as *marriage groups* in order to distinguish them from traditional multigenerational families, in educating and controlling their children without the authority of the extended primary group. Changing family relationships and obligations, alongside the assertion of individualization in the host country, are thus a subtle but constant thread of interpretation woven into the analysis of the experiences of immigrant individuals.

In conceptual terms, immigrant families have been defined rather broadly as families that have one or more members who *moved from another country*: it may include only one member or both members of the couple (or a lone parent), and all, a few, or none of the children, as some may stay behind and others are born in the host country. A second approach is to define the immigrant family as one that relates to migration through a *variety of movements between countries*: some immigrate, some stay in the sending country, some come and go, others (children) go back temporarily. This type of *multilocal and multinational immigrant family* has become more frequent in a world of transnational mobility and communications. For labor immigrants, it is also stimulated by policies which are often restrictive in relation to family reunification and legalization. Members come or stay behind, remittances flow, and the family overarches two parts of the world, one rich, one poor. A third approach is to

define an immigrant family as one where every one in the family is an immigrant. This is the most restrictive definition and is probably less useful methodologically as fewer families meet this definition. Depending on the objectives of research, however, it is important to keep in mind the diversity in the criteria of definition as they are strongly related to the immigrant family's organization and identity.

The conceptual issue has not been high on the research agenda. Instead, research on migration and the family has traditionally worked along four main areas: the motivations of family migration; the forms of migration (how the family moves to another country); demographic trends; and the assimilation of immigrant families.

The decision to migrate is one of the oldest themes in migration research. Moving on from the simplistic idea of a push-pull model, research developed typologies which account for a variety of subjective and objective reasons, such as redundancy, poverty and hardship, aspirations based on the idea of searching for a better life, social rejection and political persecution, the wish to study or to specialize, starting a new life after divorce or single parenthood, the decision to marry or to obtain health care in another country, working for multinational firms or responding to offers for qualified labor in another country. All these reasons may apply to individuals or families, but immigrant families in mass migration have traditionally been linked to two motivational categories: hardship and the search for better life conditions.

Findings remind us, however, that family migration is a selective process and that the reasons leading up to the decision are frequently linked to other factors, such as close relatives who have already migrated – family networks stimulate and facilitate the migration process – or social contexts, such as the Caribbean or the Cape Verde islands, where, over the centuries, emigration has acquired the quality of an all pervasive norm perceived as the only way of “making a life” (as L. Akesson describes it in her 2004 book of that title). Moreover, rather than searching for isolated motivations, research has emphasized that family immigration is linked to an ongoing *project* involving various aspects of family life: saving up, finding stable jobs in order to be able to build or buy a family

house, having children and giving them a better education and opportunities, helping elderly relatives in the home country, returning to the sending country with better living conditions (which may involve setting up a family business, buying farmland, or building a house in view of future retirement). The concept of a migration *project* has the advantage of underlining not only initial motivations but also the meanings of family immigration over time. These change and develop, depending, among other factors, on living conditions in the host country and on marital and parent-child relationships. Women from rural settings usually hesitate in returning after experiencing more egalitarian marital relationships and holding down full time jobs in the receiving society, whereas children often feel they belong to the host society where they were born or educated. As a result, parents may decide to return without adolescent or adult children, thus initiating a new coming and going between the countries. In summary, to understand family immigration as a *process* it is essential to analyze the migration project in time as well as the tensions and differing meanings of immigration within the family.

The forms of family migration have been roughly mapped out but inadequately analyzed concerning their impact on families. Family immigration is commonly associated either with *joint family* migration or a *man first* migration in which the male breadwinner arrives first and the family comes later (often referred to as *chain migration*). In the latter case, however, there may be various pathways into family immigration: the male worker, who may be married or single, arrives first, finds work and a home; if married, then the wife, with or without the children, comes later; if single, the worker either marries in the host country or returns home to find a wife. The impacts of the various *man first* forms of migration on the immigrant family may be quite diverse: for example, coping with marital separation entails a great deal of strain, but living with enforced separation from young children is highly stressful and leads to emotional and cultural tensions between parents and children. Other pathways may be mentioned: the male worker may form a new family in the receiving society while maintaining bonds with the family in the country of origin. On the other hand, single women, lone mothers, and wives

now frequently immigrate alone. In highly skilled couples, it is frequent for the wife to find a job first and for the husband to come later. In poor countries, unskilled single and divorced mothers are among the first to emigrate alone, often illegally, to work as domestic employees and health workers in order to improve the living conditions of children left behind with a grandmother. Unskilled lone working mothers may become lone mothers again in the receiving country, a situation often linked to immigrant lone parent poverty.

The demography of immigrant families has privileged the analysis of fertility, a research topic which has currently gained ground due to the policy issues surrounding aging populations in the receiving societies. Immigrant worker families have a high birth rate compared to the population of the countries they are living in. The migrants are young, and in the age group most likely to have children. They also come from countries where birth rates are high, although immigrant women tend to have lower fertility rates than comparable age groups in their home countries and that decrease over time. Analysis of immigrant family households has also shown that immigration stimulates the formation of extended horizontal families (young couples who lodge and support young relatives) rather than vertically extended families.

The permanence of ethnic minorities and the noted existence of female immigration and participation in the labor market led, in particular from the 1970s onwards, to more research on the assimilation and differing ethnicity of families and the children of immigrants (usually referred to as *second generation* immigrants). Regarding the process of assimilation, most research thinks in terms of a partial blending of cultures, with significant differences, nevertheless, according to the stronger or weaker ethnic contrasts (social, cultural, familial, racial) of the immigrant families in relation to the majority population group. Other theories have sought to go beyond the theory of assimilation or mutual acculturation. For example, Portes's notion of *segmented assimilation* (Rumbaut & Portes 2001) suggests that the children of immigrants assimilate to particular sectors of American society, with some becoming integrated into the majority middle class and others remaining in the inner city underclass. Rather than a mix of old

and new, this research shows that second generation migrants follow diverse trajectories into the receiving society.

Research related to immigrant families has thus centered essentially on the theoretical question of their integration or marginalization in the receiving societies, even if some work is also emerging on family dynamics. A recent study on the *reconciliation of work and family* in immigrant families in Europe showed that the first generation ones lack kin networks to support childcare as well as information on childcare facilities. Class and ethnic status cut across reconciliation strategies: skilled immigrant families resort to paid informal or formal care whereas unskilled labor families with low resources may have to manage by leaving young children alone, with other children, or taking them to work (Wall & São José 2004). Research on the dynamics of *mixed couples* has also been a recent topic of interest. Differences in culture, religion, and attitudes to family and gender roles often exacerbate the internal difficulties of married life (Barbara 1993).

Future directions in research, theory, and methodology are linked to the above mentioned development in the sociology of immigrant families. In methodological terms, systematic treatment of the typologies concerning motivations and forms of family immigration is needed if their impact is to be adequately understood. More emphasis on comparative work, across countries and different national origin groups, such as the research by Rumbaut and Portes (2001), is also to be expected in the context of continued and intense movements of families across the globe. On the other hand, diversification in research topics and theoretical approaches, considering the emphasis laid over the last decades on the paradigm of assimilation, represents an important challenge. Understanding patterns of marital, family, and intergenerational dynamics through the migration process may be one direction; stimulating linkages between gender studies, family studies, and migration research may be another pathway toward diversification.

SEE ALSO: Ethnicity; Family Migration; Feminization of Labor Migration; Immigration; Immigration Policy; Migration: International; Znaniecki, Florian

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immigration

Hans van Amersfoort

People have always been on the move. Some times they migrated over great distances, some times only a few miles, sometimes in regular circular movements in rhythm with the seasons, sometimes never to return to their place of departure. The study of such a general phenomenon requires a perspective from which to select the characteristics that we want to analyze. In studies on the micro level, the focus is primarily on individuals: the migrant's decision

whether to leave or to stay, his or her process of adaptation to the new environment, and so on. Sociologists, however, tend to concentrate on migration and its causes and consequences as a social phenomenon. The unit of analysis is not the individual migrant but the migration flow, not immigrants as individuals but immigrant populations and their characteristics. The volume of the migration flow, its demographic structure (e.g., only young males, whole families, etc.), and the homogeneity or heterogeneity of the immigrant population (the mix and levels of educational attainment) are all relevant variables for the description of immigration as a social phenomenon that cannot be studied at the individual level.

A second decision to be taken concerns the societal context of our field of study. Because migration is such a ubiquitous phenomenon, it has occurred and still occurs under very different circumstances. The world counts to date millions of people who have migrated of their own free will or who have been compelled to move by ethnic cleansing, civil wars, or natural disasters. The receiving societies differ fundamentally in nature and stability of state formation, to mention only one important characteristic. (Documentation of present day world migration is available at www.migrationinformation.org/GlobalData/.) A most important historical development impinging on migration processes has been the rise of the modern state, at least in the western world. The American and French revolutions signaled the birth of a state wherein government was legitimized not by patrimonial rights but by the will of the people. Government by the people for the people implied a distinction, between citizens and non citizens, between those who are part of the nation and those who are not. The amalgamation between government and people gave rise to the twin concept of the nation state. This modern state eclipsed in the course of a few centuries other institutions (notably the church) and became by far the most important institution regulating societal life. Especially after World War I, there was an increasing influence of the state on the labor market, in the field of housing, and with regard to education and medical care. The modern state became a welfare state and although there are differences between the western welfare states, they belong clearly to one family. With the rise of

the state as the dominant social institution, state borders became critical impediments for migration flows. The distinction between internal and external migration became accepted as a fundamental one for the analysis and assessment of migration processes. Neither geographical distance nor cultural differences between populations but state borders are at present the most relevant divides regulating human movements. Immigrants became defined as people settling in a country of which they are not citizens. Whereas in the nineteenth century the most important attribute of a citizen was the right to vote and to be eligible for public office, in the present day situation the most important attribute is the undisputed right of abode.

All welfare states have developed a three step system of migration regulation controlling entry, residence, and work. The states of the European Union, for instance, use the following categories in order to regulate migration: (1) nationals; (2) European nationals who have an agreed reciprocal right of residence and work; (3) foreigners, including (a) visitors: people who are supposed to stay only a limited period, sometimes subject to visa regulations but generally allowed to stay for a maximum of 3 months; (b) foreigners with a personal residence title, often tied to a job or function; (c) foreigners with a dependent residence title, such as children of legal residents; (4) (a) refugees: persons who are recognized as falling under the Geneva Refugee Convention; (b) asylum seekers: persons who claim to fall under the Geneva Convention, but whose claim is still under consideration.

Other welfare states use similar classifications to decide who is allowed to enter, reside, and work in the country. In all states migration control has become a political issue, often a very sensitive one, and studies about the regulation of migration and the links to other aspects of social traditions, definitions, and interests show a kaleidoscope of situations even within the category of welfare states, let alone in very different states such as the emirates around the Gulf (Cornelius et al. 1994; Brochmann & Hammar 1999). The definitions that look so clear on paper, for instance who is a refugee, in practice prove to be open to debate. The control of all visitors to prevent them overstaying their term and becoming illegal residents is virtually

impossible, and many an employer is happy to work with undocumented workers.

There are two different principles that guide the practical application of migration rules, as is already visible in the categories mentioned above. All western states have signed the Geneva Convention (1951) on refugees, as amended in New York (1967) and, for the countries of the European Union, refined in Dublin (1990). Whatever the practical definitions, the basic idea is clear: the ground for the right to enter, reside, and work in the country of immigration is based on the human rights of the refugee. The needs of the refugee immigrant supersede the interests of the immigration country. The consequence of this principle is that it is an open ended regulation, leaving the receiving states without any control over the number of entrants. No government is in practice prepared to accept this outcome. Hence, governments continuously modify the definitions and rules in order to contain the flows of these kinds of immigrants, without directly rejecting the treaties.

Implementation of the migration control mechanisms with regard to general immigrants depends on an evaluation of the following four aspects: (1) numerical consequences (does the country need more people?); (2) economic consequences (do the immigrants contribute to the economy or at least to certain sections of it?); (3) social consequences (what are the implications for the educational system, the costs of health care, the social housing program?); (4) cultural consequences (are the immigrants potentially people with strange and objectionable customs, with regard to women, for instance?). Leaving aside the special cases of spies, criminals, or international terrorists, these points determine the political discussions and policy measures with regard to immigration control. A distinction is made between good immigrants, who are expected to contribute to society, and unwanted immigrants, who are expected to become a burden rather than a boon. The last three factors converge in the more general question of whether the immigrants will ultimately be integrated into society.

The relation between immigrants and the host society, considered under various dimensions – assimilation, integration, incorporation – has been the main theme in the sociology of migration, especially in the United States. The

countries of the “New World” (US, Canada, Australia, New Zealand) had few doubts about the numerical aspects of migration, unlike European countries, with the notable exception of France. But the question of the role of immigrant populations in the society has always been on the agenda. Several ideologies and paradigms have played a role. It was soon clear that the massive immigration of the nineteenth century would change American society and that the immigrants would not all become white Anglo-Saxon Protestants. The idea that a homogeneous American culture would emerge from the mixture of cultures – American society as a gigantic melting pot – also proved to be too simple. Reality was more complex. Immigrants on the one hand became Americanized, but, on the other hand, they changed American society by introducing new religions, customs, and life styles. The great fears many Americans had about the immigration of Catholic Poles and Italians, not to mention East European Jews, proved unfounded. They did not become the average American, but they did become part of American life in the course of a few generations.

This last aspect, the temporal nature of immigrant assimilation, is emphasized in many studies by American scholars. Stanley Lieberson (1980) documented how, over a period of a hundred years, various immigrant populations found their way into American society, how separation and participation in central institutions (labor market, educational system) developed in a circular causation. Precisely because it is a complex process of several interlinked elements, immigrant integration is difficult to steer by policy measures. The first generation of an immigrant group, particularly if it is made up of a homogeneous, poorly educated population, is generally concentrated in neighborhoods where housing, schools, and public services are of inferior quality. This is clearly a consequence of their low incomes, which in turn result from restricted opportunities in the labor market. This lack of participation in society can also lead to low levels of achievement of the second generation in school. Factors that are positive in the short run (closeness to family or fellow countrymen, which reduces psychological tensions) may be negative when viewed from a longer time perspective. Still, however complicated the processes and whatever the variations in time

scale, regional factors, and other variables among various groups, the general conclusion has been that the immigrants adapted to American society and American society to them. It is precisely this overall conclusion that has been questioned by recent studies with regard to the present immigration situation.

The development of modern means of transportation and the globalization of the economy have resulted in unprecedented flows of people all around the world. Never before have there been so many travelers and migrants. This mobility raises the question of whether it is the numbers alone that have changed, or whether the new means of transportation and communication are contributing to the formation of new types of immigrant communities. Instead of the “classical immigrants” gradually shifting their orientation from the home to the host country, modern immigrants are supposed to remain oriented to the home culture. They are described as frequently traveling home, using television and websites to communicate among themselves, and adapting only partially, if at all, to the receiving society. They are not immigrants but transnationals. Such a general claim is difficult to prove or disprove, because first generation immigrants often have remained oriented to their homelands in many ways; on the other hand, maintaining contacts over long distances has undoubtedly become much easier. The question whether modern immigration is indeed different in nature, and therefore must have different consequences for the countries of immigration, is the subject of a recent study by Alba and Nee (2003). They summarize the classical American studies and scrutinize the evidence with regard to the assimilation of modern immigrant communities. They point out that an important aspect of modern assimilation is to be found in the rapid change in the economy and labor market. The American mainstream now looks different from the mainstream in the industrial era, but this is not to say that there is no mainstream and that immigrants are not assimilating to it.

During the past decades, western European states have also become immigration countries. Their situation in that respect has become similar to that of the classical immigration societies. Only France had, since the nineteenth century, already welcomed immigration as contributing

to the demographic strengthening of the nation. But France had, at the same time, always been confident that immigrants would become true French men and women in at most two generations. The centralized and strongly assimilative educational system would result in French citizens, whatever their surname or color. It is only during recent decades, when it became clear that the Muslim immigrants from North Africa were not assimilating in that way and remained recognizable communities, that immigration in France also became a sensitive issue. Were immigrants not threatening the integrity of the French Republic and becoming a source of cultural, if not political, separatism? As in other countries, the rise of international Islamic fundamentalist terror organizations has dominated the public discourse and greatly impeded an assessment of the role of immigrants in society. European countries other than France had no (recent) immigration tradition and had, on the contrary, regarded themselves as countries of emigration in the years after World War II. The UK and the Netherlands, as a legacy of their colonial past, had received postcolonial immigrants but regarded this as a historical accident, which would have no remaining consequences. It was only in the last quarter of the twentieth century that Western Europe realized that immigration was a permanent feature of its demographic and social development. In order to manage the immigration pressure that results from a fertility rate below replacement level in Europe and excessively youthful populations in other parts of the world, all European countries devised measures that aimed to keep the “good” immigrants in and the unwanted ones out. With the growth and further institutionalization of the European Union, the states of Western Europe try to arrive at a unified policy with regard to immigration. But a concept comparable to the American mainstream has as yet not emerged among these states, with historically different ideas of citizenship and different traditions with regard to the relation between public and private life.

SEE ALSO: Assimilation; Diaspora; Diversity; Immigrant Families; Immigration and Language; Immigration Policy; Migration: International; Refugee Movements; Refugees; Transnational Movements; Transnationalism; Transnationals

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immigration and language

Gillian Stevens and Jennifer M. Ortman

Languages are a means of communication, and provide access to cultural and social resources. The use of specific languages can also signify speakers' national and racial heritages. Because all but the very youngest migrants learn to speak in their country of origin, their language skills at the time of migration may not overlap with the language skills demanded in their country of destination. Any disparity between migrants' language skills and those of the receiving society results in a complex and multifaceted response involving individuals, communities, and societies. Individual level responses include language learning and language shift. Societal level responses to immigrants' languages may be formalized in policies governing the use of languages in various social domains. In a few cases, the languages themselves change.

LINGUISTIC ADAPTATION AND INCORPORATION

The language repertoires of societies and of their residents can shift in several ways when

immigrants enter a country. The languages introduced by immigrants can displace the languages spoken by the indigenous residents, as happened in the colonial US and in much of Latin America. More commonly, the immigrants are required to learn and use one or more new languages. The anticipatable difficulties associated with learning an additional language pressure prospective migrants to choose destinations in which their current language skills are useable. Migration streams thus form between countries that share a language, such as France and Morocco or the US and Canada. In spite of this selectivity, many migrants arrive in the receiving society without being conversant or literate in its major languages of communication.

Migrants who lack skills in a nation's dominant or official language(s) face formidable difficulties in adapting to their new society because the languages used by individuals in a society are laden with communicative, political, and cultural import. Migrants can encounter numerous communicative obstacles in major social arenas, and as a result often face diminished labor force prospects and other negative life outcomes. For example, poor oral and literacy skills in the destination country's dominant language(s) strongly depress occupational status and earnings among immigrant adults. In countries such as Germany and New Zealand, immigrants cannot become citizens without demonstrating proficiency in the country's official language. Moreover, the negative outcomes can persist into the next generation. For example, studies in a variety of countries, such as the US, Israel, and the Netherlands, show that children of migrants often encounter language based difficulties in school.

These negative outcomes pressure migrants and their children to learn the appropriate language(s). The first stage in the linguistic adaptation of immigrants is thus learning the society's dominant or official language(s). However, the political and social considerations dictating which languages migrants and their children should learn can be very complex, especially in multilingual societies. In Barcelona, Spain, for example, children of immigrants are pressed to learn three languages: Spanish (the national language), Catalan (a regional language), and English (as an international language).

In spite of the pressures to learn the society's dominant language(s), not all immigrants are equally successful. Research has identified a wide variety of factors associated with successful language acquisition among immigrants, but the most important factors are time, age at immigration, and education. In general, immigrants who have been in the country longer, who migrated in childhood, and who are more educated are more likely to be successful in learning a second (or higher order) language.

Sociologists generally interpret the strong positive association between length of residence in the host country and second language acquisition as the result of length of exposure to the opportunities and incentives to learn the language. The relationship may also reflect selection processes associated with return migration because migrants who are less motivated or less adept at learning the receiving country's major language are more likely to return to their country of origin. Sociologists attribute the strong and negative association between age at migration and second language acquisition as reflecting the participation of children in school, usually an intensive language learning environment. Many (but not all) sociolinguists interpret this association as reflecting the operation of maturational constraints (or critical periods), which result in children being able to learn a second language more successfully than adults.

The positive association between educational attainment and second language skills among immigrants also has several explanations. The costs associated with a continued reliance on a minority language, and thus the impetus for investment in second language proficiency, rise with educational attainment. Higher educational attainment among migrants may indicate exposure to, or formal instruction in, the language before arrival in the receiving country. Individuals with less education may have less practice exercising the cognitive skills required in learning a second language. Moreover, among very poorly educated adults, illiteracy in a first language impedes second language learning. Finally, it is possible that the causality is reversed and that migrants with better linguistic skills are better able to achieve more schooling.

Intergenerational language shift (or "mother tongue shift"), the next stage in the linguistic adaptation of immigrants and their families,

occurs when children learn only the society's dominant language(s) and do not learn their parent(s)' mother tongue. There are two ways to assess the extent of intergenerational mother tongue shift. The first is to directly compare children's language repertoires with those of their parents – an analytic approach that limits investigations to children living in the same household as their parents at the time the data are collected. Studies using this approach often show high rates of mother tongue shift between the first and later generations in countries such as the US or Australia. A second approach focuses on communal shift: the gradual substitution over an extended period of time of a minority or immigrant language with the society's dominant language.

The rapidity or extent of mother tongue shift (or conversely minority language maintenance) depends on numerous factors. The attributes of individuals, especially the parents, within immigrant families are particularly important because mother tongue shift presumes parents have learned and use the society's dominant language(s) with their children. Rates of mother tongue shift thus tend to be higher, for example, if parents are highly educated and have lived longer in the receiving country. Other considerations include the community and societal contexts. Rates of mother tongue shift tend to be lower (and levels of minority language maintenance higher) when the immigrant language communities are culturally cohesive, spatially concentrated, and larger in size. Societal considerations include the degree of tolerance of additional languages and the legal and social resources devoted to immigrant minority language populations and to minority language maintenance.

RECEPTION AND RESPONSE

The linguistic differences that historically mark immigrants as newcomers to a society include an inability to speak the society's dominant language(s) and fluency in some other language(s). Immigrants' language skills (or lack thereof) are easily observed by others and can therefore play an important role in the formation of attitudes and implementation of policies within the receiving society.

Immigrants' lack of proficiency in the society's dominant language(s) can be read as a reluctance to learn the language and thus a disinclination to participate in the society's cultural and political life. In extreme situations, lack of fluency in a dominant language is deemed a barrier to the integration of immigrants. In the 1910s, for example, when the "Americanization" movement held sway in the US, immigrants were herded into English language classes because they purportedly could not understand the ideals of the nation if articulated in any language other than English.

Even if fluent in the dominant language, fluency in an immigrant language can signify an individual's race, national origins, and status as an immigrant. The links between language skills and race, national origins, and nativity can incite xenophobia or nativism among the society's citizens. The use of an immigrant language can be viewed as evidence of continued affiliation with a racial or national origin group and in extreme cases can be seen as portending potential treachery, as happened with the use of German in the US during World War I. On occasion, the links between language skills and race have been enshrined in immigration policy and used to deny entry to prospective immigrants of certain races. During the first part of the twentieth century, for example, Australian immigration officials had the power to exclude any person who failed to pass a 50 word dictation test in *any* European language.

These types of responses can encourage governments to enact policies supporting or favoring the use of specific languages within a society. The policies are sometimes a response to languages introduced by recent immigrant groups. However, they sometimes seek to counteract the dominance of colonial languages, which were introduced by immigrants a century or more ago, by reviving or solidifying indigenous languages. Ironically, in many countries, the population prefers the colonial language. Hong Kong residents, for example, have resisted the recent attempt of the Chinese government to implement the use of Chinese rather than English as the medium of instruction in schools. South Africans prefer the use of English and Afrikaans in their schools and therefore strongly oppose the attempt of their government to revitalize

indigenous languages through a multicultural national language policy.

The government policies directed at contemporary migrants can concern the lack of skills in the country's dominant language(s) among prospective immigrants. Some countries, such as Canada and New Zealand, explicitly favor the entry of prospective migrants who demonstrate facility in the country's official language(s). Recent shifts in France's immigration policy require immigrants to sign an "integration contract" in which they agree to participate in language training and instruction on the values of French society in order to receive a ten year (rather than a one year) residence permit.

Government policies may also implicitly dictate the use of official or dominant languages in important social arenas such as schools, the judicial system, the health care system, the political system, or in the provision of social services. These policies often disproportionately affect immigrants and their children. But policies can also support immigrant or minority languages in important social arenas. These policies are often among the most complex and often contested. For example, there is an ongoing debate in the US on the relative merits of immersion, transitional bilingual, and immigrant language maintenance programs in schools.

LINGUISTIC SHIFT

When languages are "in contact" because two or more language groups share the same social space, sociologists generally concentrate on changes in what languages are spoken by migrants (or residents) and their descendants. However, the languages also can change, and new languages can emerge. For example, if the need (or opportunity) to communicate across language groups is very narrowly focused on trade or migrant labor, pidgin languages, which are restricted in vocabulary, can emerge. If learned by children, the pidgin becomes more complex because it is used within additional social domains, and is then often referred to as a Creole.

If a sizable number of migrants settle permanently in a receiving society, they can establish immigrant language communities. Because these communities are embedded in the larger society, the immigrants' language often

"borrows" words, or more rarely, elements of other linguistic structures, from the socially dominant language. A dominant language can also change. American English, for example, borrowed *kindergarten* from its early German immigrants, *shick* from its early Yiddish immigrants, and *rodeo* and *macho* from its Mexican immigrants. Bilingual immigrants may also mix elements from the two languages in conversations, a phenomenon known as code switching.

Immigrants also often retain linguistic structures, especially phonological features, from their first language when speaking the society's dominant language. The result is often heard by linguistically naïve listeners as an accent. (Linguistic transference therefore aids the identification of immigrants as minority group members.) In some situations, a borrowed linguistic structure lingers into the linguistic repertoires of the immigrants' native born descendants. The result can be distinctive ethnic or geographically bounded dialectal communities sharing features such as the treatment of low back vowels among the Boston Irish and the /o/ fronting found among Philadelphians in the US.

SEE ALSO: Bilingual, Multicultural Education; Bilingualism; Immigration; Immigration Policy; Language; Migration, Ethnic Conflicts, and Racism; Migration: International

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immigration policy

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Immigration policy specifies the laws and practices that allow persons to move permanently to other countries and petition for citizenship or to enter and stay for delimited lengths of time without the right to apply for citizenship. In developed countries, such policies include not only voluntary work and occupation based and family based migration but also the admission of refugees and the acceptance of asylum seekers. In its most comprehensive form, immigration policy not only involves the admission of immigrants, but also endeavors to coordinate labor needs with the control of migrant flows, affect international policies that might alleviate the need for some migration, and integrate newcomers into the socioeconomic fabric of the destination society. Immigration policies also often cover non immigrants, such as those who cross borders to travel, conduct business, work temporarily, visit, or study. Such policies also extend to the treatment of unauthorized immigrants, or those who enter a country without a visa or who overstay a visa, although the presence of such persons in the country does not directly result from admissions policies.

Immigration policies vary across countries, although relatively few countries receive many international migrants and have formal migration policies in place. Traditional migrant receiving countries such as the United States or Canada have tended to try to control who enters their borders through visa systems. Continental countries, such as Germany, that had not considered themselves migrant destinations despite decades of immigration, have tended over the years to control migration through residence and work permits, the parameters of which might become more favorable the longer

migrants stayed. While such distinctions of policy emphasis have blurred in recent years, policy conceptions between the traditional immigrant receiving countries still perceive of policy differently from new immigrant destinations.

Until the late nineteenth century, none of the major immigrant receiving countries sought to adopt laws and practices to regulate migration, nor did they mount substantial efforts to control the magnitude of immigrant flows. To a considerable extent, this owed to the relative absence of political forces compelling such restriction. Nativism was a relatively small cultural current in early nineteenth century America; most Americans at the time – as well as Canadians and Australians – understood that they needed to populate and settle their countries. After decades of flows of settlers, however, anti immigrant activity began to arise in the United States in the mid nineteenth century, first against Catholics, particularly the Irish but also the Germans; then against Asians, starting with the Chinese and moving on to Japanese and Filipinos; and then against all immigrants, particularly as immigrant flows were increasing from southern and eastern Europe.

By the late nineteenth century, the major immigrant receiving countries were beginning to restrict migration in response to anti immigrant sentiment. In the United States, the Chinese Exclusion Act of 1882 initiated an escalating series of limitations that culminated in the national quotas set in the Immigration Act of 1924. In Canada, legislation in 1895 barred those whose incapacities rendered them likely to become public charges, those with moral flaws, and those considered “racially and culturally unassimilatable” (Lynch & Simon 2003). In 1923, Canada further prohibited most Chinese and other Asians. Meanwhile, Australia set up a dictation test in 1901, together with restrictions on public charges, the insane, prostitutes, and contract laborers. The dictation test – 50 words in any European language – effectively restricted immigration to Europeans.

THE GROWTH OF INTERNATIONAL MIGRATION

International migration (defined as legal movers from one country to another plus refugees and

asylees) grew in the latter part of the twentieth century. Although according to the United Nations it was only about 3 percent of the world's population in the year 2000, international migration has been rapidly increasing, with the global number of such migrants more than doubling in the latter third of the twentieth century. For example, the United Nations Population Division estimates a rise from 75 million to 175 million international migrants between 1965 and 2000. And the increase occurring over the last 15 years of this period (1985 to 2000) represents a rate of growth of more than 4 percent per year, more than two and a half times the 1.5 percent annual rate in overall population growth. Most of this in migration is concentrated in the developed countries, where international migrants make up almost 9 percent of the population overall. This proportion varies, from just over 1 percent in Japan to 21 percent in Australia to nearly 35 percent in Luxembourg as of 1997. Among the OECD countries, many of which have birth rates below replacement, immigrants account for about 65 percent of population growth.

Countries thus vary substantially in their concentrations of international migrants. Some nations, like the United States, have always been known as immigration countries (that is, as countries whose policies allow for substantial immigration). Others, like Japan and Spain, for example, have not. Still others, at least until recently, have not either seen themselves or been known as immigration countries even though they in fact have been or have become countries of immigration. Germany is a case in point. Like most developed countries in the world, Germany now receives migrants from elsewhere, either legally or "illegally." Most of the industrial countries of the world are now experiencing immigration, even though many have not yet come to view themselves as immigration countries. Certainly, the movement of peoples from country to country affects politics and economics both nationally and worldwide. Yet immigration policies often reflect these countries' ambivalence toward immigration. In 2004, Germany opted not to institute a point system to select immigrants with high levels of human capital but to maintain its recruitment ban (although with some limited exceptions for scientists, managers, and the self employed).

RECENT IMMIGRATION POLICY IN THE UNITED STATES

Because the United States receives by far the most immigrants of any country, US immigration policy deserves special mention. The immigration quotas of 1924, which curtailed immigration from Europe, were the culmination of 75 years of rising nativism. Four decades later, in the civil rights era, the Hart Cellar Act lifted those quotas and established family reunification as the preeminent criterion for admission. By abolishing race and ethnic origin as grounds for exclusion, the act set good relations with recently independent Asian countries, but it also inaugurated an era of unforeseen expansion in immigration. While Canada and Europe contributed relatively few immigrants, more and more came from Asia and Latin America.

The end of the Bracero program for temporary workers from Mexico in 1964 also led to a major increase in unauthorized migration. The use of Mexicans as a source of labor was institutionalized throughout the Southwest, and demand for such labor was rising even as population growth in Mexico generated many more people than Mexico could employ. As the US economy slowed dramatically in the 1970s, even as the stream of immigrants picked up, debate grew on how to deal with the migration of low skilled workers, particularly those who were unauthorized. In 1986, Congress passed the Immigration Reform and Control Act (IRCA), which made it illegal to hire workers lacking appropriate documents, though this provision of the act has not been heavily enforced (Fix & Hill 1990). IRCA further made longtime unauthorized aliens and agricultural workers eligible for legalized status. The act also authorized spending \$4 billion for states' costs in providing public assistance, health care, and education for the newly legalized population; required states to verify that non citizens were eligible for welfare benefits; and expanded enforcement of the border patrol and inspections. Though the act did not succeed in curbing unauthorized migration, through 1994 it helped about 2 million unauthorized migrants become legal.

In 1990, a new Immigrant Act capped overall immigration for the first time since 1924 at

700,000 until 1994, and 675,000 thereafter, with unlimited visas for immediate relatives of US citizens. But the term “cap” is misleading, in that the cap exceeded the existing levels of family admissions and could be pierced under certain circumstances. The law also increased the number of visas for workers and shifted the preference toward skilled and professional labor. Furthermore, the act set up “diversity” visas for citizens of countries less likely to send immigrants to the United States.

In the aftermath of a backlash against immigrants that began in California, the United States began to emphasize border control and tripled its spending on border enforcement between 1993 and 2004. The Illegal Immigrant Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996 further tightened US borders, particularly in the Southwest, and stiffened the penalties for smuggling, visa fraud, and illegal entry. The act, together with the welfare reform act of the same year, restricted the rights of non-citizens to obtain federal means tested benefits, such as food stamps or Supplemental Security Income.

Mexican Immigration and US Policy

Special mention should also be made of Mexican migration, because Mexico has sent more legal immigrants to the United States between 1964 and 2004 than any other country, as well as the largest number of unauthorized migrants. The high profile of Mexican migration for US policy is relatively new. Until recently, Mexican migration, compared to that from other nations, was not particularly large and, in practice if not always in law, relatively unrestricted, with exceptions such as the repatriation of large numbers of Mexican migrants in the 1930s and again in 1954. Compared to the massive immigrations from Europe in the last half of the nineteenth century and the first decades of the twentieth century, Mexican immigration contributed only a small part of US population growth until recently. Its pre World War II peak occurred in the 1920s when the economic disruptions of the Mexican Revolution (1910–20) and the civil wars that followed led many Mexicans to migrate to the United States in search of jobs. In the 1920s,

459,000 Mexicans were registered as immigrating to the United States, equivalent to 3.2 per cent of the total Mexican population in 1921. These numbers of Mexican immigrants were not to be surpassed until the 1970s, but they were not exceptional. Several European countries, Italy, Germany, and the United Kingdom, contributed similar numbers of immigrants, while twice that number of immigrants came from Canada in the 1920s. Even Ireland, long past the peak of its contribution to US population growth, sent a higher proportion of its population as immigrants to the United States than did Mexico in these years. Some 5.2 per cent of the Irish population immigrated to the United States in the 1920s, despite the attainment of Irish independence that removed one of the major ostensible causes of Irish emigration.

Not only was Mexican migration not particularly voluminous, much of it was temporary in nature. Partly as a result, Mexican immigrants have had one of the lowest naturalization rates of any immigrant group. Census figures also suggest substantial emigration out of the United States by Mexican immigrants. While 728,000 Mexicans are recorded as immigrating to the United States between 1901 and 1930, the numbers of the Mexican born population in the US in 1930 amounted to 641,000, and these would have included many who had not documented their immigration. By 1950, the Mexican born in the census had dropped to 452,000, reflecting not only mortality and the low level of immigration after 1930, but also the forced repatriations of Mexicans in the 1930s. There are no satisfactory estimates of Mexican return migration to Mexico, but it is clear the amount of return migration has been quite high in virtually all years.

Unauthorized Mexican Migration

Mexican migrants to the United States until the 1960s were predominantly employed in types of work that were temporary and seasonal in nature. The rapid expansion of Californian agriculture depended on a seasonal labor force. So long as unauthorized Mexican migrants wished to return to Mexico, the arrangement suited both sides. Until the 1970s, most Mexican migrants did in fact wish to return;

but in the last three decades of the twentieth century, Mexican migration not only increased in volume, it also more and more involved longer term migration. A major reason for this shift toward permanent immigration was and continues to be the gradual erosion of the economic viability of small scale agriculture in Mexico, a change that has at once promoted migration to large metropolitan areas within Mexico and discouraged Mexican US migrants from returning to and investing in small town and rural Mexican villages and enterprises.

Because so much of Mexican migration has been unauthorized (i.e., occurring outside the framework of legal immigrant visas), US immigration policy has often given special policy attention to this type of migration. This reflects in part the United States' longstanding ambivalence about unauthorized labor migrants, particularly unauthorized migrants from Mexico. A good example of this ambivalence can be found in the now eliminated policy contradictions embedded in the so called "Texas proviso," a quirk of US immigration law for nearly 30 years which – until 1986 – made it legal to hire unauthorized workers (e.g., to employ them to take care of your lawn) but illegal to harbor them (e.g., to invite them into your home for a drink of water). Such anomalies have exemplified US policy approaches to unauthorized Mexican migration for several decades, practices that have repeatedly consisted of sporadic and highly public efforts to intercept unauthorized Mexican migrants as they cross the border into the United States (i.e., to "control the border") while "turning a blind eye" to migrants who enter via other means. Although messy and unseemly, this awkward mixture of *de jure* and *de facto* strategies served the interests of conflicting constituencies reasonably well. Agricultural and other employers of low skilled workers who tend to favor the easy entry of unauthorized migrants continued to benefit from a rather steady flow of workers, whereas citizens who worry about the social, cultural, economic, and legal implications of such migration have been able to take solace in at least periodic efforts at border enforcement.

That such largely ad hoc arrangements have not been entirely satisfactory is evident in the numerous legislative efforts of one kind or another mounted during the post war era to

curb such migration, usually attempts taking place after periods of high unemployment. One of these occurred in 1986 when Congress adopted the Immigration Reform and Control Act introducing civil and criminal penalties for hiring unauthorized workers. Another occurred in 1994, when Congress ratified the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA), a treaty whose negotiation expressly avoided dealing with migration matters but whose political marketing widely promised that it would generate effective migration control through enhanced Mexican economic development. And in 1996, also following the economic recession of the early 1990s, Congress sought to reduce the attractiveness of migration by limiting immigrant access to social services.

Despite these legislative efforts, however, illegal migration to the United States has apparently not diminished, even though it has sometimes been temporarily reduced either by slowdowns in the economy or short term responses to legislative initiatives. This lack of abatement has caused many observers to argue that efforts at border control and enforcement are largely futile, that the pressures for entry into the countries of the world enjoying the strongest and most advanced economies are so great that border and migration control efforts inevitably fail (Cornelius et al. 2004). Others have argued that control policies, especially border enforcement emphases, are not merely ineffective but even counterproductive, at least in the case of Mexican unauthorized migration to the United States. Recent more strict enforcement policies have been argued to generate longer US stays on the part of circular migrants who might otherwise have remained in the country for shorter periods of time were it not for the fact that crossing the border had become more difficult. Whatever the case, the apparent persistence of migration under conditions of economic slowdowns and increased border enforcement raises new questions for future immigration policy research about the effectiveness of implicit and explicit policy efforts to control migration.

SEE ALSO: Immigrant Families; Immigration; Migration: International; Migration: Undocumented/Illegal; Refugee Movements; Transnationalism

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imperialism

Alberto Toscano

Imperialism designates the historical phenomenon whereby certain political entities have sought to exert control over and extract resources from others, whether through formal conquest, informal coercion, or a host of intermediate solutions (e.g., protectorates, alliances, occupations, and so on). It also denotes the multiple concepts or theories of imperialism, which continue to be the object of controversies that easily exceed the realm of academic debate, especially since “imperialist” still largely remains a term of reprobation. Initially coined to designate the existence and expansion of empires (from Ancient Rome to Napoleonic France), the notion of imperialism gained prominence in the late nineteenth century, when it came to identify the reality of European colonialism (from the British Raj to the “scramble for Africa”). The ensuing history of the concept registers a distinction between, on the one hand, purely political definitions of imperialism, which reduce it to an instance of power politics and foreground the issue of territorial gain, and,

on the other, socioeconomic analyses, which, while not discounting the significance of physical expansion, emphasize the underlying and often invisible causes of imperialist policies, thereby accounting for the influence of material factors on geopolitical decisions. The penchant for a given concept or theory of imperialism invariably determines which processes and events count as cases of imperialism, so that analytical definitions are here inseparable from historical judgments.

The acceleration in colonizing ventures during what Eric Hobsbawm has termed the “age of empire” gave rise to the first great debates on imperialism. At first, imperialism served to designate a policy of nationalist expansion and international competition. It was also marked by the sense of a European civilizing mission, the so called “white man’s burden.” The expansionist ideology was sustained by quasi-vitalist ideas of the need for certain nations to expand politically, economically, and culturally (as testified, for instance, by some of Weber’s writings on Germany). Liberal opposition to imperialism attacked what it regarded as a jingoistic manipulation of mass sentiment for irrational ends or petty interests. In Schumpeter’s analysis, this led to a focus on the use of irrational and “objectless” nationalist tendencies to condition the popular masses, and to promoting a democratic free market polity that could sap the drives towards monopolization and hyper-exploitation both at home and abroad. Where Schumpeter defined the causes of imperialism as primarily sociopolitical in character, Hobson’s *Imperialism* opened the way for its structural analysis as a necessary correlate of a particular socioeconomic order. While also highlighting the manufacture of expansionist consent against the very interests of the masses, Hobson contended that imperialism was driven by the needs of financial elites and monopolies which, failing to get sufficiently profitable returns on their investments in a saturated market constrained by the low purchasing power of workers, pushed for the forcible opening of overseas opportunities.

Hobson’s ideas were of great import for what is certainly the most read and influential tract on the subject, Lenin’s 1916 *Imperialism, the Highest Stage of Capitalism*. Compensating for the insufficient theorization of imperialism in

Marx’s own works, Lenin followed Hobson in seeing finance and monopoly capital as the key factor (a position also held by Hilferding and later by Baran, Sweezy, and Magdoff). In the midst of World War I, Lenin tried to understand that conflagration as an effect of the conflict between great capitalist powers, now held captive by increasingly parasitic financial oligarchies (this theory of imperialist conflict is juxtaposed with Kautsky’s theory of imperialist convergence, or “super imperialism”). This was, of course, a contradictory phenomenon, which saw both a seeming decay in the capitalist system as a whole, as well as an increase in the “socialization of production.” Importantly, Lenin also interpreted imperialism in a strategic political vein, and pushed for the formation of an anti-imperialist front and the reconsideration of nationalism as a weapon against capitalism. Rosa Luxemburg, in her 1913 *The Accumulation of Capital*, also attempted to integrate a political critique of the age of empire with an economic analysis – founded on the idea of underconsumption and capitalism’s constant need to expand to non-capitalist zones to create markets and realize surplus value. She also introduced the analysis of “militarism” both as an ideological tool and as a component (in the guise of the arms industry) of capital accumulation under conditions of imperialism, an analysis later expanded upon by Ernest Mandel in his *Late Capitalism*.

Marxist theories of imperialism – whose economic parameters have repeatedly come under attack by liberal economists and social theorists – grew in political significance and conceptual variety in the post-war period, as they came face to face with the Cold War (especially in Vietnam, but also in terms of the vexing question of “communist imperialism”) and decolonization (which spawned neo-Marxist theories of dependency and “modernization” *qua* products of imperialism). The ebb of theories of imperialism in the 1980s seemed terminal, especially as the analysis of the political economy of the world market came under the aegis of globalization theories. Even from the Left, namely in the theory of “Empire” as a new form of virtual, decentered capitalist sovereignty, the notion of imperialism appeared to be relegated to another era, when capitalism was still, to use Marx’s terms, in a phase of formal and not real

subsumption. Reaction to the work of Hardt and Negri paradoxically laid the ground for a renaissance in the theorization of imperialism, a renaissance that became all the more timely in the wake of the invasion and occupation of Iraq by the US and the UK in 2003. The justification of the war in terms of security and democracy, together with Iraq's massive oil resources, have inevitably spurred new attempts to link the economic and political aspects of imperialism. "Empire" is no longer used so much to designate a placeless system of power, and is frequently qualified as "American," leading to a renewal of the debate – prominent in the 1970s – over whether America's form of primarily non territorial economic power and influence should be defined as imperialism. David Harvey and Ellen M. Wood, two prominent Marxist theorists, have answered in the affirmative. The first, following Giovanni Arrighi, argues that the "new imperialism" must be understood in terms of two conjoined but irreducible logics: a territorial logic of political power and a molecular logic of capital accumulation. He thus regards the war as a means of securing American hegemony over energy resources and thus bolstering its increasingly labile standing in the world economy. Wood, in what is perhaps the boldest restatement yet of the theory of imperialism, defines capitalist imperialism – as opposed to previous empires of property (China, Rome) and empires of commerce (Arab Muslim, Venetian, Dutch) – in terms of the detachment of economic from political power. However, this economic power demands for its hegemony and expansion the presence of a system of multiple states, and the more globally integrated the system, the greater the tendency to the hegemony of one of these states (i.e., the American "empire") over the task of maintaining the capitalist system. Updating the methods of historical materialism, Wood thus returns to the key theme already broached by Luxemburg: the intimate correlation between capital accumulation, on the one hand, and expansionist or interventionist militarism, on the other. In historical terms, the study of imperialism has also been reinvigorated by an attention to its interaction with ecological factors, namely in Mike Davis's groundbreaking research on the murderous exacerbation of famines by imperial policies in his *Late Victorian Holocausts*.

SEE ALSO: Capitalism; Colonialism (Neocolonialism); Cultural Imperialism; Marxism and Sociology; Neo Marxism; Postcolonialism and Sport

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implosion

Karen Bettez Halnon

French postmodernist critic Jean Baudrillard's theory of implosion is one of social entropy, wherein he asserts that a consumer age of information, media, and mass media has ushered in an accelerated and coercive hyperproduction of meaning and information to the "irrational" and "terroristic" extent that all meaning, knowledge, and subjectivity, and the "social" itself, are neutralized and ultimately collapse. All that is left, he says, is an imploding "mass," described dramatically as "an in vacuo aggregation of individual particles, refuse of the social and of media impulses; an opaque nebula whose growing density absorbs all the surrounding energy and light rays, to collapse finally under its own weight" (Baudrillard 1983: 3–4). In other words, amid ubiquitous and proliferating media generated information in a consumer society of simulacra and simulation, information ceases to be productive, in the sense of transformation of it by human

subjects. It is destructive energy, producing even more implosive density, more mass. Best and Kellner (1991: 121) further summarize Baudrillard's theory of implosion, a basic point of reference for postmodern theory: "The social thus disappears and with it distinctions implode between classes, political ideologies, cultural forms, and between media semiurgy and the real itself . . . Baudrillard is not only describing a series of implosions (that is, between politics and entertainment, capital and labour, or high and low culture) but is claiming that the society in its entirety is implosive."

Baudrillard claims that the only "imaginary referent" remaining in a world of simulacra and semiurgy are the non subject, non object "silent majorities," or the purely "crystal ball" statistical morbid remains of status groupings. The "singular function" of the silent majorities is to absorb all meaning, but not refract it. Stated otherwise, having "become bored and resentful of their constant bombardment with messages and the constant attempts to solicit them to buy, consume, work, vote, register an opinion, or participate in social life," the "masses thus become a sullen silent majority in which all meaning, messages, and solicitations implode as if sucked into a black hole" (Best & Kellner 1991: 121).

Baudrillard claims there is a "fantastic irony" in the muteness of the masses and their "exasperating endless conformity" (Baudrillard 1983: 33). While "at no time are the masses politically or historically engaged in a conscious manner" (p. 38), they have only one practice: a "collective retaliation," a "refusal to participate" (p. 14). Baudrillard says, for the inert, indifferent, passive masses, the only non conscious "strategic resistance" to the present phase of the system is that of a "refusal of meaning . . . the hyperconformist simulation of the very mechanisms of the system, which is a form of refusal and non reception" (p. 108). Forestalling any interpretation of the defiantly apolitical, he says, "the denial of meaning has no meaning" (pp. 40-1).

Explicitly challenging both critical theory and psychoanalytic interpretations that claim mystification or alienation, or that develop schemas aimed at liberating oppressed or repressed subjects, Baudrillard says that implosion "is inevitable, and every effort to save the principles of

reality, of accumulation, of universality, the principles of evolution which extol expanding systems, is archaic, regressive or nostalgic" (p. 60). In particular, with the death of human subjectivity and the "social," Baudrillard's theory of implosion declares the end of sociology and sociological inquiry. However, if it is any consolation, the continuity of an intellectual elite that thinks, acts, and interprets (aimlessly) outside or above "silent majorities" is implicit in Baudrillard's theory of implosion.

SEE ALSO: Consumption; Consumption, Mass Consumption, and Consumer Culture; Consumption, Spectacles of; Hyperreality; Mass Culture and Mass Society; Postmodern Consumption; Postmodern Culture; Simulation and Virtuality

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impression formation

Christopher D. Moore

Impression formation is the process by which individuals perceive, organize, and ultimately integrate information to form unified and coherent situated impressions of others. Internalized expectations for situated events condition what information individuals deem is important and worthy of their attention. Further, these expectations condition how individuals interpret this information. In face to face interaction, social cues including others' physical appearance,

verbal and non verbal behavior, and the social setting in which the exchange takes place combine with information in perceivers' memories to influence the ways in which they initially form impressions of others and themselves. These initial impressions serve as the basis for subsequent attributions.

Key findings regarding impression formation come from a variety of theoretical literatures. Most notable are social cognition theories, expectation states theory, and affect control theory. Specifically, research in social cognition provides explanations of general information gathering and processing, expectation states theory offers additional insights with regard to information integration, while affect control theory highlights the importance of affective meanings to the process of impression formation and provides a testable mathematical calculus designed to predict its outcomes.

PERCEIVING SOCIAL INFORMATION

Once raw information about a social object is gathered, it is organized and integrated to form a coherent conceptual impression of the social object. Cognitive limitations in our capacity to both perceive and process information affect the impressions we form about others. Specifically, we are limited in what we can pay attention to in a social situation, and we also rely on cognitive shortcuts to quickly and efficiently manage the information that we do gather. In addition to cognitive limitations, our social experiences serve to form preexisting expectations for events that affect the nature of information we notice and how we then interpret it.

Most people believe that first impressions are very important. Research in social cognition and related subfields extends this view by highlighting how the temporal ordering influences the processing of social information. For example, a concept related to the importance of first impressions is the *primacy effect*. The primacy effect is said to have occurred when individuals weight information acquired early in an interaction more than later information.

While the process of impression formation begins with perception, it is important to also consider that individuals' preexisting internalized expectations for how they expect events to

unfold serve to sensitize them to specific features of situations over others. The relative degree of attention given by an individual to a specific social object is a measure of that object's *salience* to that person. An object's salience also stems from the relationship between it and the social context. Specifically, any characteristic about a social object/person that provides an observer with a basis to differentiate it from other similar objects or others (however categorized) may make that characteristic more salient, and thus more likely to be usable as a cue for defining said object/person. For example, the relative height of another is less salient if the observer is of approximately the same height as the other who is being observed, or if said other is in a room populated by similarly statured individuals.

Once individuals form preliminary impressions about others, the evaluation of new information is often subject to the *confirmation bias*. This bias is in operation when individuals seek out or disproportionately favor new information that confirms their existing views. As interactions continue, new pieces of information that "fit" within the initially evoked schema are readily used to elaborate and bolster it, while potentially disconfirming information is treated with suspicion. The outcome of this process, through which individuals form general attitudes toward others by weighting the salience of new information more favorably if it matches what they already "know," is called the *halo effect*.

Alternatively, information that is "old" or sparse (e.g., not bolstered by subsequent readily available confirming information for extended periods of time) may be supplanted by new challenging information. Specifically, the "newness" of information may be such that it makes it more likely for it to earn the attention of observers simply because it is part of the immediate local situation. Thus, not only can early information be disproportionately weighted in terms of an individual's impression formations, but the most recent items of information – those that are freshest in one's mind – may also carry more than their "fair share" of weight with respect to impression formation. When this occurs, it is called the *recency effect*. These effects are difficult to self monitor and consciously control and they may be related to a wide range of other

biases such as ethnocentrism, groupthink, and self serving bias.

An illustration of how individuals form impressions of others is found in a classic research study conducted by Solomon Asch (1946). In this study, a number of people were shown a series of seven adjectives describing an unidentified person's personality characteristics. All conditions contained the following six adjectives – intelligent, skillful, industrious, determined, practical, and cautious – but varied on whether the seventh characteristic was either warm, cold, polite, or blunt. These adjectives represented the first (and only) pieces of information that the participants were given about the unidentified other. The participants were then asked to describe the person to which the list pertained by selecting from a list of other descriptors: generous, wise, happy, good natured, reliable, and important. The goal of this study was to see if individuals form organized impressions of others based on a combination of what they perceive and what they then assume to be likely given that information. Asch found that the participants who were shown lists containing the trait “warm” were more likely to rate the unidentified person as generous, happy, and good natured; whereas the participants who were shown the list containing the trait “cold” most often rated the unidentified person as stingy, unpopular, and unhappy. Further, when participants were shown either lists containing the traits “polite” or “blunt,” their assessments of the unidentified person did not significantly differ. Asch concluded that hot and cold acted as *central organizing traits* with respect to how these individuals formulated their impressions of the unidentified person. These traits were especially important because they colored the participants' interpretation of other traits they also were shown such that the impressions they formed about the person the lists purportedly described were very different.

Individual traits are more than mere additive pieces of information; they are components that operate in relation to one another to form a gestalt picture of an individual. We do not perceive individuals as a collection of itemized traits, but rather these traits invoke images in their perceivers' minds of a complex assortment of meanings and expectations that then subsequently serves as the basis for further social

attributions. Asch referred to individuals' beliefs about how personality traits are related as *implicit personality theories*. These beliefs may also be thought of as trait schemas or personality stereotypes in that both of these terms also highlight the dynamic and abstract nature of these beliefs, as opposed to equating them only to a collection of specific traits.

ORGANIZING AND INTEGRATING SOCIAL INFORMATION

Expectation states theory provides a particularly useful and well supported explanation of how the social information is aggregated into organized subsets to form impressions of self and others (Berger et al. 1992). Specifically, to explain the effects of multiple and sometimes contradictory pieces of social information in situations, these researchers argue that all salient status information is combined for each actor to form an aggregated expectation state, with the difference between the focal actor's and others' aggregated expectation states representing the focal actor's expectation (dis)advantage. In other words, all salient information is organized into subsets analogous to person schemas, which then serve as the basis for the emergent status and influence arrangement of the group. Further, these researchers also demonstrate that an attenuation function operates with respect to additional pieces of supporting information such that at some point, for example, there is a diminishing independent effect for each additional piece of information favorable to group leaders' expected competence on their overall status in the group. Also, new information is likely to have a greater independent effect on status outcomes when presented in opposition to a field of contrary information than if it were presented alone.

Inconsistent information affects impressions in other ways. For example, changes in observers' evaluations of others may occur if they observe others behaving in ways that challenge their initial expectations for them. For example, if a presumably good and nice person behaves cruelly toward an also good but weaker other, an observer's evaluations of the first person in this case might be reassessed in light of this action unless the observer can somehow

otherwise justify the act. Such a justification may involve adjustments to the observer's definition of the action itself (e.g., it was not really that violent and hurtful after all), or perhaps to the observer's definition of the presumably "good but weaker other" (e.g., he actually deserved the treatment). Notice how each of these strategies involves the reassessment of some information, be it that which comes from the local situation or that which resides in the observer's memory. Also note that the schemas upon which the observer's expectations are based do not change; rather, adjustments are made with respect to "fit" between what she observes in the local situation and how she cognitively categorizes it.

Affect control theory (ACT) offers a mathematical formalization of the impression formation process that synthesizes elements of symbolic interactionism and role theory. Our understanding of the impression formation process owes much to ACT. According to ACT, individuals see themselves and the others around them as participating in situations by enacting social roles. Each person forms his or her definition of the situation by assigning an identity label to self and others after comparing the readily observable characteristics that each person possesses with internalized cultural expectations for what identities are appropriate given the setting they are in. ACT quantifies the affective definitions of these assigned labels on three dimensions: evaluation (goodness versus badness), potency (powerfulness versus powerlessness), and activity (liveliness versus passiveness). These dimensions have been shown to capture the culture specific sentiments that individual actors (A) form about self, behaviors (B), other social object/persons (O), and settings (S). The core ACT argument is that individual actors will try to create behaviors that maintain their symbolic meanings of A B O S situations. Once an individual has defined the setting and the actors/objects in it, cultural rules pertaining to these definitions provide the basis from which she can form expectations for the events (behaviors) that are likely to occur between herself and the others in the situation.

When the meanings of events interpreted from individuals' own localized experiences do not match those they anticipate, given their definition of the situation, ACT predicts they

will act to restore them. In particular, ACT researchers argue that social events create predictable changes in individual actors' feelings and impressions about the situation. The localized (transient) impressions individuals form in the context of situations are compared to their preexisting (fundamental) sentiments about the identities, behaviors, and setting that they are in. If events unfold such that individuals' experiences become out of line with their initial expectations for a situation, ACT predicts they will act to restore this balance. Importantly, ACT shows both how cognitive definitions of situations lead to impression formation, and how impressions from events can operate to maintain or change the definition of situations. Research in ACT has shown that this process applies to the meanings of the entire A B O S situation.

ACT researchers often utilize a computer program, INTERACT, that contains several culture specific dictionaries of sentiments and impression formation equations. This program automates the lengthy calculations involved in processing A B O S situations. Separate impression formation equations for the United States, Canada, and Japan are currently available. For investigations into other cultures for which sentiment dictionaries are available (such as Germany), the United States impression formation equations are generally used by default.

A number of assumptions are incorporated into the impression formation equations. One of these assumptions is that individuals' impressions tend to be stable. The *stability principle* states that once situational elements have been labeled and impressions about the evaluation, potency, and activity (EPA) of the A B O S elements have formed, those impressions tend to remain relatively stable and carry over into subsequent interactions. For example, the negative shift in the evaluation (E) dimension of an actor who does an evil deed, such as raping another, will be remembered by observers and cause them to continue to see the actor as bad after the event. When this principle is applied to the evaluation of actors' behavior, such as in the above example, it is called the *morality effect* (e.g., "good" or "bad" behaviors reflect evaluative "credits" or "demerits" toward actors' identities).

The *consistency principle* states that individuals tend to expect that the feelings they have about actors and their behaviors, or behaviors and targeted object persons, will be congruent. When events unfold that pair actors or object persons with inconsistently evaluated behaviors, observers tend to form corresponding negative impressions. For example, good actors are expected to perform good behaviors and good object persons are supposed to receive good treatment (and vice versa). Thus, if an actor behaves cruelly (bad) toward a nice (good) other, the actor violates the consistency principle and is then seen as less good (note that this negative evaluation is also reinforced by the morality effect). However, the consistency principle also yields some non intuitive predictions. For example, if a “bad” actor behaves generously toward a good and weak other, the actor may experience a marginally increased evaluation according to the morality effect, but the consistency principle suggests that the act may be seen as so out of character by observers that their subsequent suspicion of the actor may mitigate the otherwise positive evaluation from the behavior. In addition, actors who are seen as having much greater power over others are faced with a disincentive to actively use their power. Specifically, powerful actors who behave very powerfully toward weaker others appear as “bullies” and subsequently lose (possibly transfer) some of their perceived power. In other words, in order to maintain power, the consistency principle suggests that powerful actors should be sparing in their utilization of power. Further, if the evaluation (good versus bad) of a behavior is matched to the targeted object person, the consistency principle suggests that the actor, behavior, and object person will benefit from a slight increase in evaluation. On the other hand, when actors treat object persons in ways that are not consistent with their evaluation, the evaluation of the actor, behavior, and object person suffers a decrease. This effect seems to provide a global incentive for situated actors to “play by the normative rules” for the collective good (assuming that achieving a more positive evaluation operates as an incentive for most actors). Finally, a range of *congruency effects* further explains how specific pairs of different EPA dimensions combine to form impressions. For example, behaving nicely toward weaker others

will make actors seem merciful (more good), while behaving nicely toward more powerful others can make actors appear as flatterers (less good). Similarly, acting powerfully toward evil others will make actors seem righteous (more good), while acting “too” powerfully toward very nice others makes actors seem indecorous (less good).

The tendency of observers to accord more or less goodness to actors who behave in ways that result in an equilibrium state with respect to the evaluation and/or potency dimensions of all three core event elements (A B O) is called the *balance effect*. Using an equilibrium criterion consistent with cognitive balance theory, ACT posits that if the product of the combined valences (+/-) of an A B O structure is even (e.g., all three are + or any two are -), then the actor will be seen as more good. When applied to the evaluation (E) dimension of an A B O structure, this effect either reinforces or mitigates consistency effects based on evaluation (e.g., the effect enhances the consistency effect when object person is good and mitigates it when object person is bad). Also, when applied to the potency (P) dimension, the balance effect suggests that when powerful actors act potently toward powerful others, or when weak others act sheepishly toward similarly powerless others, they seem less nice. Interestingly, when powerful others direct potent acts toward weaker others, they and the targeted others seem more good (the latter reinforced by the consistency principle if the object person was not viewed as highly good beforehand) – but in doing so, powerful actors take the risk of losing some of their power (if the act is “too powerful”) according to the consistency principle.

SEE ALSO: Affect Control Theory; Attribution Theory; Cognitive Balance Theory (Heider); Cognitive Dissonance Theory (Festinger); Expectation States Theory; Facework; Identity: Social Psychological Aspects; Mead, George Herbert; Social Cognition

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income inequality, global

Glenn Firebaugh

Income inequality refers to the unequal distribution of income across units (usually individuals). *Global* income inequality refers to the unequal distribution of income across the world's citizens.

Global income inequality consists of income inequality across nations and income inequality within nations. Income inequality across nations, or *between nation income inequality*, refers to the unequal distribution of *average* income across nations. Income inequality within nations refers to the unequal distribution of income across individual units (individuals or households) within countries. Traditionally, sociologists have focused on within nation inequality: on why inequality is higher in some nations, on the consequences of high (and low) inequality, and on why inequality changes, where "change in income inequality" refers to change in the *ratios* of individuals' incomes. If everyone's income doubles, so an income of \$100 is boosted to \$200 and an income of \$1,000 is boosted

to \$2,000, inequality remains constant because the income ratio remains fixed at 10 to 1. Standard inequality measures, such as the Gini index, are based on the ratio concept of inequality (Allison 1978), and that is the concept of inequality used here.

Recently there has been a surge of interest in income inequality across nations, or between nation inequality. This new attention to between nation inequality reflects (1) a growing recognition that between nation inequality is the larger component of global income inequality; (2) more reliable data on national incomes; and (3) debate over whether between nation income inequality is now declining and, if so, whether the decline is steep enough to drive down global inequality as well.

First, with regard to between nation inequality as a component of global inequality, suppose we eliminated all inequality within countries by moving all incomes to the income mean within each country. How much global inequality would remain? The surprising answer is, "most of it." Because of huge income disparities between the world's richest and poorest regions, most global income inequality lies across countries, not within them (Goesling 2001).

The prominence of between nation inequality in today's world reflects profound spatial unevenness in income growth during the nineteenth century and first half of the twentieth century. During this period the world divided into three income camps as the industrializing West surged ahead economically and Asia and Africa lagged badly behind. Incomes in a middle group, consisting of most of Latin America and Eastern Europe (including the former Soviet Union), grew at roughly the world average. Because it was the richer regions that were growing faster, this unevenness in growth rates resulted in the massive inequality in income across regions and nations that we see today.

The legacy of the Industrial Revolution, then, is that of a world of much higher average income (Maddison 1995) much more unevenly distributed (Pritchett 1997). The growth in global inequality over this period was due entirely to growing inequality across countries since within nation income inequality declined over most of the period (Bourguignon & Morrisson 2002).

In recent decades, however, income inequality has declined across nations and increased in

the average nation, resulting in a “new geography” of global income inequality (Firebaugh 2003) where nationality is becoming less important in the determination of one’s income. There is little consensus on why inequality has increased recently in many nations (but not all nations); the reasons are complex and likely vary from country to country. By contrast, the major source of declining inequality across nations is clear (Firebaugh & Goesling 2004): faster than world average income growth in many of the world’s most populous poor nations in Asia. Although incomes continue to decline relatively (and in some instances absolutely) in many poor nations in Sub Saharan Africa, many more poor *individuals* live in poor nations where incomes are growing faster than the world average than in poor nations where incomes are growing slower than average. The result is declining income inequality across countries.

There is less consensus over the direction of the global trend since the global trend represents the net effect of two trends going in opposite directions. While some studies conclude that global inequality is declining because the decline across nations more than offsets the increase within nations (Firebaugh 2003: Table 11.1), others conclude that the global trend is indeterminate because some income series yield different results. The recent downward trend in between nation income inequality is steeper when one uses conventional national account (production) data than when one uses household survey data on consumption, and that can affect conclusions about the global trend. With regard to the within nation trend, estimates suffer from the lack of systematic data collection on income inequality for many nations, including some large nations. Aside from the problem of missing data, extant data are often inconsistent with regard to whether they are based on pre tax or post tax income, on whether the units are individuals or households, and on whether a probability sample was used.

The major challenge for future research on global inequality is data reliability. The measurement issues are pretty well settled: there is general consensus on how to measure income, and on how to measure and decompose income inequality. But our measurements and

decompositions are only as reliable as the data we input, and that is where much of the effort should be expended in future research on global income inequality.

SEE ALSO: Income Inequality and Income Mobility; Inequality, Wealth; Stratification and Inequality, Theories of

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income inequality and income mobility

Wout Ultee

Research on income inequality within the social sciences took off as a byproduct of income taxation. Lists were published showing how many tax paying units during a tax year had an income of a certain size. The distribution did not look like a bell shaped curve, but was skewed at the upper end. The description of the distribution by one parameter started with Vilfredo Pareto, and his results led to the hypothesis that this statistic was more or less the same for all times and places. Later results, using better measures like the Gini coefficient, found differences

between countries, leading to a hunt for explanations. Due to the efforts of the World Bank and the Luxemburg Income Study, quite comparable income inequality data for various countries are now available, so that hypotheses testing is possible.

Sociologists proposed basically two explanations for country level differences in income inequality. The first invokes economic factors, the second political ones. It has been held that in more economically developed countries income inequalities are smaller. Similarly, it has also been proposed that countries with a more peripheral (as opposed to central) place in the world economy have larger income inequalities. As to political factors, it has been maintained that in highly industrialized societies a long democratic history as well as a social democratic government, by way of various policies, have diminished income inequalities. Among these policies are progressive taxation, free secondary and tertiary education for all, and collective insurance against such matters as unemployment, work related disabilities, and old age.

By way of quite simple comparisons and more sophisticated statistical techniques, these hypotheses have generally proved their mettle. An important issue is exactly how income inequalities are measured and what hypotheses say about effects on this or that measure. According to some hypotheses, a democratic state is like Robin Hood: the state takes from the really rich and gives to the poorest of the poor. This hypothesis may be tested by using one measure of a country's income distribution, such as the Gini coefficient. Other theories take a closer look at what democracy is all about. If the members of a governing coalition wish to enrich themselves, they exclude the richest persons in a society from governing. So a redistribution from the rich to the rest will occur. But to exactly whom? Not only to the poorest of the poor, since the coalition governing a democratic state comprises at least 51 percent of the population, and the richest members of the coalition want a piece of the pie, too. Upon opposition from the poorest of the poor, the richest members of the coalition may threaten to blow up the coalition, leaving the poorest of the poor nothing at all. This is the theory of the strategic middle proposed by Gordon Tullock. If it is to be tested, an

overall measure for income inequality in a country (like the Gini coefficient) will not do. Data on the income share of, say, the poorest and the richest 10 percent and 20 percent of the population are also necessary. The Robin Hood hypothesis in its strongest form predicts that upon the introduction of democracy the income share of the two richest decile groups will go down, and the income share of the poorest deciles will go up, with the decrease of the former as large as the increase of the latter. The hypothesis of the strategic middle predicts a decrease for the richest deciles and an increase for the poorest deciles only if parties representing the interests of the poor are part of the governing coalition.

If some measure for the inequalities in income for all the households of a country does not change in the course of time, this of course does not mean that the income of all these households remained the same. It is not difficult to imagine that higher income inequality within a country goes together with more income mobility. Until recently, data on income mobility calculated over a longer time span were rare, but with the implementation of panel surveys by statistical agencies more data are becoming available. They mainly have been analyzed by economists.

Sociologists have studied data on intergenerational mobility along a scale of occupational status. Blau and Duncan (1967) examined data from the US and found a correlation between father and son's occupational status of 0.4 (with zero indicating no correlation and unity full correlation and the strongest possible determination of son's by father's occupational status). When reviewing Blau and Duncan's results, an economist suggested that occupational status as measured by sociologists is a reasonably good indicator of permanent income: not a person's income during one particular year, but a person's income calculated over a longer period. The interesting question is to what extent occupational correlations agree with data from long running income panels.

Earlier data from non representative samples in the US take single year earnings of fathers and sons, with father's earnings observed when the son was still in the parental home and son's earnings some decades after leaving it showing correlations below 0.2. Later studies used data from the Panel Study of Income

Dynamics, conducted annually since 1968 in the US. The data for father's earnings pertain to around 1970, with those for son's earnings around 1985. Age restrictions were applied so as to bypass the earnings of sons when they were under 30 years of age, when earnings supposedly are highly variable. This time the intergenerational correlation in single year earnings of fathers and sons was 0.3. Taking father's earnings not as a single year measure, but as the average of 5 years, increased the correlation to 0.4. Averaging son's earnings over 5 years too, the correlation approached 0.5. These findings on income mobility indicate that correlations between father and son's occupational status are not far off the mark and definitely not too high.

Apart from depicting the US as a much less mobile society than earlier income mobility data indicated, comparisons of US intergenerational income mobility data with those of other countries do not seem to show particularly low correlations for the US. Research on Finland and Sweden using 3 year annual average earnings for fathers and sons found correlations closer to 0.1 than to 0.2. Strict comparisons of a large number of countries remain a promise for the future, but it does seem that, for highly industrialized countries, low inequality in yearly income goes together with high income mobility.

SEE ALSO: Educational Attainment; Income Inequality, Global; Inequality, Wealth; Intergenerational Mobility: Core Model of Social Fluidity; Intergenerational Mobility: Methods of Analysis; Mobility: Intergenerational and Intragenerational; Occupational Mobility

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index crime

Robert F. Meier

Index crimes are a series of eight crimes – murder and nonnegligent homicide, forcible rape, aggravated assault, robbery, burglary, larceny theft, motor vehicle theft, and arson – about which police agencies report to the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI). They have been an important source of information about crime for more than three quarters of a century. They are also an important part of a larger crime reporting program called the Uniform Crime Reports (UCR).

The UCR began in 1930 when police chiefs in various cities began to experience difficulties in keeping up with crime on a national basis. With greater use of the automobile in the 1920s, criminals were able to commit crimes over a larger geographic area. Offenders could commit a major crime in, say, Chicago in the morning, in Des Moines in the afternoon, and in Omaha that evening. Clearly, effective police efforts required more information about crime in other communities than had existed up to this time. In the late 1920s, the International Association of Chiefs of Police requested the FBI to serve as a collection agency for crime statistics. The plan was for police departments to send their information to the FBI which, in turn, would collate the information and publish the figures annually.

The UCR publishes its annual report, *Crime in the United States*, each year. The report contains information about crime for the preceding calendar year. Among the statistical information contained in the report is information about crimes known to the police, characteristics of persons who are arrested for those crimes, and data about police officers. The crime statistics are broken down into major geographic areas and specific jurisdictions (cities and counties) within states. The annual report

is largely a compilation of tables containing this information.

The UCR crime statistics are the result of a voluntary reporting system. No police department is *required* to submit information, but the great majority of all departments – state police, sheriff’s offices, municipal police departments, federal police agencies, and even university and college campus police departments – do report their information for publication in the UCR. Police agencies covering about 94 percent of the population submit statistics on a monthly basis for the reporting system.

The FBI recognized that not all crimes could be included in the UCR, so they distinguished between two categories of offenses. The original Part I crimes were a list of seven offenses, all felonies that were thought to represent an “index” of crime in the US. For this reason, they are often referred to as the Index Crimes. The original index crimes were homicide, aggravated assault, forcible rape, robbery, burglary, larceny, and auto theft. In 1979 arson was added as an eighth index offense, although information in the UCR is still sketchy about this newest index crime, more than 20 years after it was added. The Part II offenses are a collection of about 27 offenses about which some but not all information is recorded. In terms of detailed information, the emphasis in the UCR is on the Part I or index crimes.

Murder and nonnegligent manslaughter is defined as the willful (nonnegligent) murder of one human being by another. As with the other index crimes, the determination of this crime is made by police investigation only, not other means (e.g., coroner, medical examiner).

Forcible rape, as defined by the UCR, is the carnal knowledge of a female forcibly and against her will. Neither assaults of male victims nor statutory rape cases are included.

Robbery is defined as taking or attempting to take anything of value from the care of another person through force or threat of force.

Aggravated assault is an unlawful attack by one person on another with the purpose of inflicting severe or aggravating injuries. Usually, such assaults involve a weapon. Also included in this crime are threats of severe injury.

Burglary is defined in the UCR as the unlawful entry into a structure for the purpose of committing a theft or felony. Actual theft is

not required and attempts are considered burglaries. Force is not required.

Larceny theft is defined as stealing property of another. There are many different kinds of thefts, such as shoplifting, purse snatching, and bicycle thefts. Specifically excluded from this crime category are embezzlement, confidence games, forgery, and worthless checks. Motor vehicle theft is also excluded since it is another index crime.

Motor vehicle theft is defined as the stealing of a motor vehicle or its parts. Included are thefts of cars, trucks, motorcycles, and buses. Specifically excluded are thefts of vehicles which do not intend to deprive owners of their vehicles permanently, such as joy riding.

Arson is defined as the willful burning of property with the intent to defraud. Arson is defined as the result of an investigation and those fires that are considered only suspicious are not included.

Surely, if one is interested only in characteristics of persons who are arrested, the UCR is the best single source for this information. Criminologists, however, are often more interested in the amount of real crime in the community, and in this regard the UCR is inadequate.

SEE ALSO: Age and Crime; Homicide; Measuring Crime; Property Crime; Race and Crime; Rape/Sexual Assault as Crime; Robbery; Sex and Crime; Violent Crime

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indigenous movements

David Anthony Tyeeme Clark

From the homelands of aboriginal peoples in Canada’s Northwest Territories to indigenous territories in four Andean countries – Peru,

Ecuador, Bolivia, and Colombia – indigenous peoples have demanded self governing political institutions, asserted their rights to a greater measure of cultural self determination, and reacquired legal control over their own territories and resources. While throughout the Americas certain indigenous peoples have reestablished land ownership, gained official recognition of indigenous forms of government and justice, got elected to public office, and, in some cases, established independent regions, at the same time, others are losing their fragile control over lands, waters, and other resources, as well as their access to sacred sites. Market driven global processes, supported by state sponsored efforts often led by the United States, are deepening environmental deterioration and increasing poverty among natives, seriously deterring the possibility of sustainable indigenous societies and nations well into the future.

In response, indigenous peoples are continuing old fights as well as mounting new forms of resistance and grassroots mobilization. Throughout the Americas, indigenous peoples are resisting state violence and subtle coercion. While often concerned with defending recently reacquired autonomy, the political and economic conjuncture brought on by market oriented globalization has forced indigenous peoples to engage in new fights for survival.

The efforts of Indians in Latin America, for instance, have gained momentum in the last decade as government policies based on assimilation and paternalism are replaced with new approaches founded on participation and consensus building and a respect for the aspirations of indigenous peoples. In less than a decade, indigenous movements in Latin American countries have toppled two presidents and left their distinctive mark on parliaments, ministries, municipal governments, and even a vice presidency. There are nearly 50 million indigenous individuals among a total Latin American population of 400 million.

In some cases, governments have responded to indigenous movements with broad based state sponsored violence, such as in Ecuador in 1992 and 1994 where indigenous peoples constitute 3.5 million – 25 percent – of the total population. In Mexico, with 10 million indigenous, the Ejército Zapatista de Liberación

Nacional took up arms against the Mexican government in 1994 to demand access to the institutions of democracy and justice. As a result of their armed resistance that, along with other factors, destabilized the political system dominated since 1929 by the Institutional Revolutionary Party (PRI), in 2000 Mexico for the first time in over 70 years swore in a non PRI government.

In many cases, grassroots efforts have achieved success without bloodshed. For instance, the Aymara leader Víctor Hugo Cárdenas was Bolivian vice president from 1993 to 1997. Cárdenas has called on his allies to “go beyond legal and institutional changes and transform the entire culture surrounding policies on indigenous people, including the attitudes of national elites and bureaucracies.” In Brazil, indigenous peoples have worked with government leaders to set aside lands not as reservations where the government attempts to “civilize” hunters and gatherers, but where the government serves to keep loggers, gold miners, and other intruders out of indigenous lands.

Contemporary indigenous movements, appearing in response to unevenly institutionalized reforms, pose a serious challenge to emerging democracies. These movements have sparked political debates and constitutional reforms over community rights, territorial autonomy, and multi ethnic citizenry. Throughout the Americas – from Canada to Latin America – indigenous peoples remain as concerned as ever with safeguarding indigenous forms of government and governing, wresting control of resources away from states and state protected corporations, protecting sacred sites, and revitalizing indigenous languages and cultures.

Indigenous governments and governing. In Bolivia, for instance, indigenous peoples who make up 55 percent of the total population control 35 percent of the country’s municipalities – 311 in total. Local leaders set their own priorities and administer local financial resources. In the Mexican state of Oaxaca, residents of 412 of the state’s 570 municipalities chose their leaders in open assemblies of elders, rather than by ballot. The communities also run their own criminal justice systems. In the northern border state of Sonora, 33,000 Yaquis are represented by their own governor and council of elders, enforce their own laws, and exercise jurisdictional rights over

a 1,880 square mile territory in the southeast portion of the state.

Control of resources. In the United States, the Native American Rights Fund (NARF) is a non profit organization that provides legal representation and technical assistance to tribes, organizations, and individuals nationwide. In recent years on the Pine Ridge Reservation in South Dakota, for instance, NARF has supported the Oglala struggle with unsafe drinking water, crumbling sewage systems operating without EPA permits, and widespread pollution of primary streams which are both unregulated and unmonitored. A 1994 survey of 149 tribes conducted by the National Tribal Environmental Council for NARF revealed that tribes face an array of environmental problems. More than 75 tribes reported polluted or insufficient drinking water.

Sacred sites. For decades, a growing number of American Indians have been alarmed by the desecration and destruction of sacred sites and have advocated for increased protection. Dozens of sacred sites, including Dzil Nchaa Si An in central Arizona and the home of the sacred deity Ma'l Oyattsik'i at Zuni Salt Lake in New Mexico, remain in 2005 the focus of ongoing struggles by indigenous activists and elders, as well as environmentalists and religious organizations concerned about protecting the spiritual welfare of indigenous peoples.

Indigenous languages and cultures. In the United States there is an "English Only" political movement that questions the value of teaching languages other than English, including indigenous languages. Identifying language loss among their greatest challenges, indigenous peoples have responded in a variety of ways. In Hawai'i, for instance, the 'Aha Punana Leo grew in 1983 from a pioneer group of language nest immersion preschools into a non profit Native Hawaiian family based 501(c)(3) tax exempt educational organization dedicated to reinstituting Hawaiian as a daily, living language.

Indigenous peoples of the Americas are not alone. Indigenous movements representing hope for the future are visible in Africa, Asia, and Europe, as well as among Pacific Island populations including those in Australia and New Zealand.

SEE ALSO: Colonialism (Neocolonialism); Culture, Social Movements and; Decolonization; Ethnic, Racial, and Nationalist Movements; Indigenous Peoples; Paternalism; Recognition

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indigenous peoples

Thomas D. Hall and Joane Nagel

Throughout most of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, scholars and policymakers predicted the disappearance of Native Americans and indigenous peoples in general (see Dippie 1982 for many examples). Global patterns of urbanization, industrialization, and resource extraction indeed have led to a reduction in the number of indigenous people living traditional lifestyles on ancestral lands. However, those who predicted the demise of indigenousness did not anticipate the global resurgence of indigenous consciousness, political mobilization, and cultural renewal of the past several decades (Wilmer 1993; Nagel 1996; Bodley 1994, 2003; Hall & Fenelon 2004). Indigenous groups in North and South America, Australia and New Zealand, Central Europe and Central Asia, Asia and Africa are making land claims,

petitioning for political rights, and demanding control of resources; many are doing so with remarkable success given their limited votes, money, or military capacity. To illustrate the resurgence in indigenous identities, communities, and cultures, after a brief discussion of terminology and the sociological significance of studying indigenous peoples, we focus here on contemporary demographic, economic, and political trends among Native Americans.

We use the term “indigenous” to refer to those peoples who either live or have lived within the past several centuries in nonstate societies, though virtually all indigenous communities are located within state societies. We note that the diversity of types of nonstate societies is far greater than the diversity of states. Attempts to organize this diversity have generated a plethora of terms: clans, bands, macro bands, tribelets, tribes, chiefdoms, segmentary lineages, etc. (see Chase Dunn & Hall 1997).

The term “tribe” is one of the most common designations for indigenous peoples, but it is also one of the most controversial because of its connotation of primitiveness and savagery. Despite its baggage, the term “tribe” has political utility for those peoples who inhabited North America before Europeans arrived, since the tribe–nation distinction often has been used politically to support or to deny autonomy or sovereignty for indigenous groups and because some indigenous communities informally and officially refer to themselves as tribes, though many have replaced “tribe” with “nation.” Even “Native American” can be problematic, since legally, anyone born in the United States is a “native” [born] American. We use “indigenous” peoples or communities throughout this discussion, and for peoples indigenous to North America, we alternate among Native Americans, American Indians, native, or Indian.

When referring to a specific indigenous community, we use the name of the group, but we note that official names are political and historical constructions that do not necessarily reflect some prior, pristine indigeneity. For instance, there are the historical accidents of naming and the vagaries of spelling that stemmed from colonial powers’ lack of clear understanding of indigenous languages. Sometimes a name derived from a derogatory term, while other changes mark indigenous peoples’ efforts to reclaim their

name in their own language, such as Diné for Navajo, Ho Chunk for Winnebago, or Tohono O’odham for Papago.

Changes and disputes over indigenous peoples’ names stem also from historical changes in group boundaries in response to internal processes or encounters with outsiders. In early contact periods with Europeans, North American native peoples often shared a broad sense of identity but were not ruled by any single social or political organization (Cornell 1988). The need for unified resistance to European, then American, encroachments led to the formation of socio political structures that encompassed new groupings of individuals and communities. Out of these alliances new names and identities emerged.

The modern organization of many historical indigenous cultures and communities has arisen, ironically, from efforts to destroy them, either by outright genocide, the devastations of disease, by assimilation into European societies, or by merger or amalgamation with other indigenous groups. At times these amalgamated communities were examples of “ethnogenesis,” i.e., the creation of new ethnic groups whose contemporary names may or may not reflect their historical origins. In fact, a great deal of ethnographic and ethnohistorical research shows that the symbolic, demographic, and social boundaries of nonstate groups are extremely permeable (Brooks 2002). This suggests that the presumption of fixed, clear, rigid boundaries or borders is an artifact of contact with European states – the expectations of outsiders about the timeless nature of indigeneity and the needs of European and later postcolonial negotiators to identify “leaders” of native societies for purposes of treaty making and land acquisition.

Indigenous peoples are of special interests to sociology and to sociologists for several reasons. First, in the United States, the Americas, and in many other countries, indigenous peoples comprised the earliest human settlements and interactions with indigenous peoples by immigrant or colonial populations were important in shaping contemporary legal, cultural, political, economic, and social organization. In many countries indigenous peoples are central to national images of past and present and components of ethnically diverse national populations. Thus, despite their relatively small

numbers, they should be included in any general discussion of race or ethnicity, particularly since the historical treatment and contemporary status of native peoples are central to national questions of group rights, nation formation, justice, group formation, group transformation, and social change.

The study of indigenous peoples represents an invaluable opportunity for theory building and evaluation since indigenous peoples represent a wide variety of social structures that are not found among immigrant or settler groups. In the United States, the varieties of indigenous languages, kinship structures, political organization, or cultural formations present unique opportunities for understanding human pasts and presents. Further, since the founding of the United States, Native Americans have had a unique political and social relationship with the US government. They are the only ethnic community with legal rights connected directly to the federal government, rights that bypass county, city, and state governmental authority. This “government to government” tribal–federal relationship generates many politically and sociologically interesting interactions and exceptions that have led to controversies about gaming, Indian hunting and fishing rights, or the right to sell gasoline or tobacco on reservations without charging state taxes (see Bays & Foubert 2002).

Finally, consideration of indigenous peoples is vital to understanding long term social change and social evolution. On the one hand, omitting such groups biases the sample. On the other hand, it is erroneous to assume indigenous people, even those who live “traditionally,” are models or “living artifacts” of earlier societies. Contemporary indigenous peoples have survived centuries, and in parts of Asia, millennia of contact and interaction with state societies. Their contemporary social structures have been shaped by their responses to those interactions. Ferguson and Whitehead (1992) caution against too much reliance on historical “first contact” accounts for information about change in indigenous societies. This is because intergroup contacts change both societies so profoundly that even the earliest first hand accounts must be approached with considerable skepticism. By the time a representative of a literate state society observes an indigenous group, typically

there already has been considerable prior contact and consequent social change. Thus, while first hand accounts can be useful, they cannot be presumed to be unbiased snapshots of the pre contact past. The rate of change resulting from intergroup contact in North America, for example, has led scholars to be cautious about assuming the accuracy of early nineteenth century depictions of western US tribes by Meriwether Lewis and William Clark (see Fenelon & Defender Wilson 2004).

CONTEMPORARY INDIGENOUS AMERICAN ISSUES AND TRENDS

The demography of indigenous peoples is another complex topic. First is the politics of numbers and their uses. Stiffarm and Lane (1992) argue that there is a tendency to underestimate the population of the Americas prior to European contact in order to minimize the decimation of the indigenous population. While estimates for the indigenous population of North American (US and Canada) range from 1 million to 30 million, Thornton (1987) argues for a figure in the neighborhood of 7 million, based on careful reconstruction of population densities, early population counts, and the effects of known epidemics. Native populations declined drastically, but not exclusively, from “old world” diseases. Native populations in the United States reached a nadir of about one quarter million around the turn of the twentieth century. Since then the Native American population has grown so that, at the beginning of the twenty first century, it is well over 2 million – between one third and one half of what it was in 1492. It is important to note that more than disease was involved in the depopulation of indigenous Americans; colonial and US land policies, population removals, and wars took on genocidal proportions and were major factors in the steep population decline.

Population recovery since World War II has been considerable: from 1960 to 1970 the number of Americans who reported their race to be “American Indian” in the US census grew 51 percent (from 523,591 to 792,730); from 1970 to 1980, the American Indian population grew faster, 72 percent (to 1,364,033); from 1980 to 1990, the American Indian population

increased 37 percent (to 1,878,285); and from 1990 to 2000, the American Indian population increased 26 percent (to 2,366,639). The increase is due to improved enumeration techniques, a decrease in death rates, and an increasing willingness of individuals to identify themselves as Native American. Native Americans intermarry with other groups more than any other ethnic group, giving rise to three different categories of "Indians": (1) "American Indians," persons who claim to be Indian racially and have a specific tribal identification; (2) "American Indians of multiple ancestry," persons who claim to be Indian racially, but who have significant non Indian ancestry; and (3) "Americans of Indian descent," who do *not* claim to be Indian racially, but who report an Indian component in their background (Snipp 1986). This gives rise to questions about membership in Indian tribes and definitions of who is and is not "Indian" by tribal governments, federal officials, and Indian communities and individuals. The financial successes of some native communities (e.g., due to gaming or natural resources) makes identity an economic issue as well.

Urbanization, intermarriage, education, and increased participation in the paid labor force since World War II have spurred the most politically active period in American Indian history: formation of activist organizations such as the American Indian Movement and Women of All Red Nations, legal defense organizations such as Native American Rights Fund and Native Action, and lobbying groups such as National Congress of American Indians and National Tribal Chairmen's Association. These organizations comprised a backdrop and, in some cases, the infrastructure for Indian rights movements in cities and on reservations that took root and blossomed in the fertile political soil of the civil rights era in the US. Beginning in the 1960s, American Indians staged a variety of protest events: "fish ins" in the Pacific Northwest in the mid 1960s, the 19 month occupation of Alcatraz Island beginning in 1969, the 71 day siege at Wounded Knee on the Pine Ridge Reservation in South Dakota in 1973, the occupation of Camp Yellow Thunder in the Black Hills in the 1980s, and protests against Indian athletic mascots since the 1980s. Out of such protests and the legal battles they gave rise to came a new "self determination"

era in federal Indian policy. This opened the way to increased tribal control of budgets and decision making, to the development of tribally owned natural resources, to the establishment of casinos and gaming on tribal land, and to opportunities for self rule and economic development by Indian communities. These changes, in turn, have raised questions about how Native Americans fit into United States society.

In the twentieth century, access to wealth from mineral resources, gaming, and tourism has helped economic development on reservations and in American Indian communities. Although Snipp (1988) has shown that the differences between energy resource Indian nations and those without such resources tend to be minimal, gaming has brought profits and change to many native communities (Jorgensen 1998; Napoli 2002). A key problem facing Native American nations has been how to participate in economic development without undermining traditional Indian values (Cornell & Kalt 1992, 2005). The tension between development and tradition also are central to debates in many indigenous communities globally (Wilmer 1993; Gedicks 2001).

Economic development and the practice and preservation of traditional cultures are enmeshed in two important contemporary issues facing American Indians: the internal and external consequences of gaming as a strategy of economic development in Indian communities and non native interest in American Indian spiritual practices. Because of their special relationship with the US federal government, reservation governments are able to sponsor gaming, to sell gasoline and cigarettes without paying local and state taxes, and to sell other typically locally or state interdicted or regulated products such as fireworks. The growth of Indian casinos and the desire of non Indian governments and businesses to compete with Indian enterprises, which they see as having unfair tax advantages, has spawned social movements that are nominally anti gaming, but are often thinly disguised anti Indian movements. In some cases they reflect conflicts of interest among local non Indians, Indians, and local and state governments. Similar non Indian opposition has resulted from renewed Indian land claims (such as by the Passamaquoddies in Maine in the 1980s and the Oneidas in New York in the 1990s).

These controversies have heightened identity politics both within Native groups and between Native groups and the general population.

While American Indian gaming might be viewed negatively by some non Indians, American Indian religions and traditions (real or imagined) have attracted many non Indians. Some religions welcome, and indeed, seek to convert others and expand their membership. This generally is not the case with Native American spiritual leaders and practitioners. Non Indian appropriation of Indian spiritual traditions often is perceived by native people as theft – one in a long series of “Indian giving” by non Indians. The presence of charlatans and hucksters (a few of whom are of native ancestry) involved in assorted “new age” appropriations of Indian cultural elements lifted from their indigenous context has heightened the controversy (Churchill 1996).

The spread of new age and “world music” that uses elements and occasionally performers from various indigenous populations has spawned analogous controversies at a global level (Feld 1991). Not the least of the subcontroversies is that it is non Indian performers and producers who are making the large profits from the use of indigenous instruments, themes, music, and performances. Such controversies will not disappear quickly. They have, however, generated a new interest in relations with indigenous peoples and new attempts to reexamine the long, and often tawdry, history of Indian/non Indian relations.

SEE ALSO: Decolonization; Ethnography; Indigenous Movements; Polyethnicity; Primitive Religion; Tribalism

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individualism

Jens Zinn

Individualism emphasizes the importance of the individual, for example the individual's freedom, interests, rights, needs, or beliefs against the predominance of other institutions in regulating the individual's behavior, such as the state or the church. A range of theories in different societal domains contributes to the dissemination of individualistic ideas in society. In particular, economic and political liberalism are vehicles of individualism.

The term individualism was introduced by de Tocqueville. Even though he distinguished individualism from egotism, his distinction is essentially one of degree, but individualism would in the long run lead to "downright egotism."

A strong impact on the development of individualistic thinking in Western Europe can be traced to religion. The Reformation and the development of Protestantism indicated a shift to more individualistic thinking. This can be linked to Luther's claim that a personal relationship with God cannot be mediated by the interpretation of the church.

Another important contribution to individualistic thinking was given in economics by Adam Smith's development of a system of economic liberalism. He assumed that a simple system of

natural liberty and exchange of goods and services in free and competitive markets, with as few interventions by the state as possible, would best support societal development and welfare.

A growing political individualism became most influential with the French Revolution and the emphasis on individual rights, referring to the idea of natural justice in contrast to the absolutist state. Several of these developments came together in the bourgeois Enlightenment in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries.

In Anglophone discourse there is a tendency to interpret individualism as egoistic and selfish behavior. For example, Bellah et al. (1985) prominently argued that the prevalence of individualistic behavior would destroy the moral integrity of American society, though this view was contested. More positively, individualism is interpreted in Beck's (1992) theorizing on the risk society. Here, *individualization* indicates liberation from traditional bonds. Thus, it opens up more options from which to choose, but at the same time forces people to choose.

Methodological individualism emphasizes that sociological phenomena can only be explained by the characteristics of individuals. It was developed in opposition to methodological collectivism or holism. For example, Durkheim justified a specific sociological contribution to the examination of the human being by claiming that social phenomena can only be explained socially, and thereby proposed a holistic approach.

Today, this fundamental contradiction is rather outdated. Sociologists are much more concerned with questions of how sociocultural and sociostructural factors on the one hand and individuals, their actions or characteristics, on the other hand, are mutually linked or constitute each other. Instead of stating extreme positions, today's research is more often engaged with how both aspects combine in social reality.

SEE ALSO: Collectivism; Durkheim, Émile; Liberalism; Tocqueville, Alexis de

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induction and observation in science

Andrew Tudor

One of the most persistent commonsense accounts of science is that in which scientists are understood systematically to assemble observations and arrive at reliable generalizations based upon them. Sometimes, wrongly, this simple inductive empiricist view is laid at the door of Francis Bacon (1561–1626) and dubbed “Baconian inductivism.” In fact, Bacon’s views were considerably more complex than this, but the hare that he set running – inductive inference as the heart of scientific method – has subsequently been pursued by all manner of hounds. The Scottish Enlightenment philosopher David Hume (1711–76) was preeminent among the early pursuers, and to this day “Hume’s problem” continues to preoccupy philosophy of science. In the mid twentieth century, there was a period when the seemingly more powerful hypothetico deductive model of scientific inquiry appeared to have run inductivism and Hume’s problem to exhaustion. However, it rapidly became apparent that the issues surrounding inductive inference had a peculiar capacity to reemerge from the coverts of deductive certainty, not least where the nature of observation itself was questioned. Into the space thus created have hastened newer, more relativistic epistemologies and, in full cry, the sociology of science.

Although Bacon was by no means a naïve inductivist, he did insist on the necessity of ridding the mind of certain kinds of preconceptions when examining the facts, so as to better discover the true workings of natural phenomena. In effect, then, the inferential process

moved from neutral observation to generalization unencumbered by misleading beliefs likely to obstruct proper knowledge. In its period this was a bold formulation, and one crucial to the subsequent development of natural philosophy into modern science. But it immediately raised difficulties for those eager to underwrite the legitimacy of scientific method in inductive terms. For while deductive reasoning had a lengthy logical pedigree, inductive inference was to prove far more slippery.

It was David Hume who presented the central problem of inductivism in its most influential form. In essence, the argument is simple: that however many instances we may find of a specific phenomenon, this gives us no reason in logic to expect that observed pattern to continue in the future. In other words, we have no justification for making any reliable inference from past evidence. Nor, of course, can we lay claim to probabilistic justification in as much as at the heart of the problem is the very unpredictability of the future in relation to past experience. The future will hold surprises. And against those who suggest, more pragmatically, that our past successes with this kind of inductive inference should lead us to expect success in the future, Hume levels the charge of circularity: attempting to justify inductive inference by inductively inferring future success from past instances of inductive inference itself.

Unsurprisingly, then, the difficulties consequent upon accepting inductive inference as *the* distinguishing feature of scientific method gave way by the mid twentieth century to more deductively inclined models of science. Rather than seeing science as founded on generalizations from data, these approaches afforded greater emphasis to the relative autonomy of theory. So, for example, variants of the hypothetico deductive model were little concerned with the grounds on which we actually arrived at our theories and generalizations. Their interest lay, rather, with deducing predictive hypotheses from theory which could then be subjected to (experimental) test. In strict versions – for example, Popperian falsificationism – the test could only falsify and not confirm (Hume’s problem again). But this, too, presented problems. Science clearly did not proceed on the basis of rigid, deductive tenets (let alone falsificationist ones), and at the heart of any process of

testing lay “observation” – which apparently relied upon some form of inductive inference from experience to the observation statements describing that experience. Since this would raise a variation of Hume’s problem, deductivism was forced to recognize the unavoidably theory laden and conventional character of observation. The traditional logical positivist reliance on the distinction between theory language and observation language simply would not do. The language of observation was no less theoretical than the language of theory.

None of this, of course, dissolves the problem of inductive inference, if problem it is, for even if induction is not the defining element in so called scientific method it remains an important feature of actual scientific practice. Scientists make inductive inferences, albeit within a context of inquiry which also involves deduction, intuition, competition, and even sheer bloody mindedness. Accordingly, philosophers of science have continued to examine induction with a view to somehow resolving or bypassing the Humean difficulties. Within the pragmatist tradition, for example, Rescher (1980) has sought to reconceive inductive inference as essentially a kind of cognitive method, while others, such as Howson (2000), who retain more formal concerns, have leaned toward Bayesian probability theory as providing grounds for resolving at least some of Hume’s problem(s). Such approaches are often illuminating about what kinds of presuppositions are involved in inductive practice, although their apparent goal of providing “justification” seems far less significant in a period which has come more fully to recognize the importance of sociological and psychological factors in scientific inquiry. Here, Collins’s (1985: 145) “sociological resolution of the problem of induction” is interesting. By empirical examination of what he calls the “experimenters’ regress,” he seeks to show that the nature of experiments as “skillful practice” means that an attempted replication always leads to the necessity for yet further experimental tests to confirm the quality of each experiment in the chain. This regress can only be halted by contingent, collective decision. Observing, experimenting, and constituting “facts,” then, are socially constructed achievements of human agents; they cannot, without loss, be rendered

as logically justified processes under the grand rubric of Inductive Scientific Method.

SEE ALSO: Controversy Studies; Experiment; Fact, Theory, and Hypothesis: Including the History of the Scientific Fact; Falsification; Laboratory Studies and the World of the Scientific Lab; Positivism; Realism and Relativism: Truth and Objectivity

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industrial relations

John Hogan and Peter Nolan

The material origins of industrial relations, both in practice and in research, can be traced to the movement from early to advanced capitalism. The rise of capitalism, centering on the purchase and sale of labor power, ushered in a new structure of relations between the direct producers and their controllers. Workers were brought together in centralized work stations and subjected to an authority relationship and hierarchical division of labor. The bosses had the right to hire and fire their charges, set their wages, and dictate the hours and intensity of

work. The detailed division of labor was entrenched and reinforced in the factories, thus rendering worker solidarity and collective organization difficult. But the unbridled authority of bosses eventually came to be challenged. Workers formed embryonic unions and relations between workers and their masters became increasingly fraught.

The study of industrial relations took its lead from these material developments in the workplace. It is no accident that the field of inquiry has been shaped by scholars operating from within the economies that have dominated the history of global capitalist development. The study of industrial relations is a predominantly Anglo Saxon discourse. Initially, scholars focused on processes of rule making and the elaboration of institutional arrangements to contain conflict. The formation, structure, and influence of unions dominated the early key texts, but researchers found that the character of workplace relations, employer practices, and the position of unions were strongly conditioned by the wider political economy and state interventions. Scholars in the United States took the lead.

In the 1920s and early 1930s, American unions suffered heavy membership losses and were marginalized by company sponsored unions. Yet, they proved to be successful in expanding their membership in the runup to and beyond World War II. While much of the success followed on from bitterly fought battles to build organization, notably in Minneapolis for the Teamsters and in Michigan amongst car workers, the position of US unions was bolstered by legislation introduced under Roosevelt's New Deal, in particular the Wagner Act, which legalized workers' rights of association, and the Social Security Act, which underpinned the emerging welfare state. But the changing balance of forces between employers, employees, and the unions proved difficult to capture in theory. By the late 1950s the dominant framework was the "systems" model, which treated industrial relations as a relatively autonomous subset of relations influenced by politics, the state, technology, and the economy (see Dunlop 1958; Kerr et al. 1960). Viewed as independent exogenous forces, these wider systematic variables were set apart conceptually from the processes and outcomes of the politics of

production. The possibility, for example, that the pace and impacts of technological advances may be conditioned by the division of labor and power struggles in the workplace was never considered. The approach thus attracted a vast critical literature that, *inter alia*, highlighted its intrinsic determinism and failure to unravel the complex, non linear connections and contradictions between the industrial relations "sub system" and broader political, economic, and technological forces.

Though initially influential in the UK, the systems approach was modified and adapted to take account of the particular patterns of workplace bargaining and the limited role of the state in directly shaping the pattern of industrial relations. The politics of pluralism dominated the mainstream literature that was primarily focused on institution building at workplace level. Like their American counterparts, the mainstream largely failed to unravel the complex connections between production politics and the particular historical trajectory of the UK economy, which by the early 1960s exhibited an entrenched pattern of low wages and low productivity. Criticized for overreliance on description, and for assuming that historical continuities would prevail over the forces of change, the mainstream, according to one critic (Crossley 1968), inclined toward a historicist method that blinded it to the contradictions and fragility of Britain's workplace institutions, including collective bargaining.

The late 1970s recoded the high tide of industrial relations in the Anglo Saxon countries. In the UK union membership peaked at over 13 million employees. But during the 1980s and 1990s successive Conservative governments promoted the view that industrial relations had become an irrelevant public policy area. Strikes were in decline, and major unions suffered heavy defeats in the face of a state sponsored employers' offensive. For many commentators, the defeat of the National Union of Mineworkers after a year long strike between 1984 and 1985 was the turning point in modern labor history. Rising levels of unemployment, which topped 3 million by the mid 1980s, and a series of draconian anti union laws sapped the capacity of unions to fight back and resist the degradation of working conditions that was legion across UK firms and industries.

In the United States, a new discourse – human resource management – focusing on the individual rather than collective employment relations captured the research agenda and led practitioners in the field of personnel and industrial relations to reinvent themselves. The administration led by Ronald Reagan was deeply hostile to the labor movement that had already been weakened by broader economic forces. Taking an unusually high profile in breaking the 1981 air traffic controllers' strike, Reagan was determined to promote a sea change in management practices, emphasize the primacy of the individual in the workplace, and denigrate established collective bargaining relations. Union membership and influence plummeted and have yet to recover, a malaise that brought forth a highly significant split in the peak trade union federation AFL CIO during 2005.

In continental Europe collective bargaining and the solidarity of trade unions across service and industrial sectors proved more enduring. Tensions were apparent, in the systems that evolved after 1945, but large employers accepted (sometimes reluctantly) their duties under the laws to negotiate and consult with the trade unions that represented their employees. Union membership levels remained high by comparison with the UK and the US, and the coverage of collective bargaining often approached levels in excess of 80 percent of the workforce. Despite the claims on behalf of the Anglo Saxon deregulated labor markets, the evidence revealed that the more regulated economies of Germany, Scandinavia, and Italy continued to thrive at the expense of the UK and US economies (Nolan 1994, 2004).

Employment patterns in continental Europe, it should be stressed, are not homogeneous. The panoply of institutional arrangements, both voluntary and statutory, that regulate the employment relationship vary considerably. Yet until quite recently many scholars counterpoised the industrial relations systems of the Anglo Saxon countries to a stylized model of highly regulated and highly unionized labor markets that embedded productivity inhibiting working practices. To be sure, in line with the traditions of social democracy that became embedded in many (but by no means all) European countries, institutional structures did evolve to protect the rights of workers in ways

that far exceeded the rights of British and American employees.

Yet it is crucial to be aware of the nuances of the employment systems in different European countries. In France, for example, a relatively small and divided union movement has kept alive a tradition of militancy, one capable of mobilizing beyond its immediate ranks, that has brought discipline to the practices of management. The principle of management prerogative has never been successfully embedded. In Germany union density rates are high, and workers retain considerable leverage over their terms and conditions of employment. A highly regulated system, to be sure, but it has succeeded in economic terms in delivering high levels of productivity and economic efficiency. It remains unique among the advanced economies in retaining a strong manufacturing sector. Further contrasts are provided by Spain, where unionism only took root after the death of Franco, and where a substantial proportion of the workforce is engaged in part time work, while in the former Soviet bloc, systems of industrial regulation and union formation are evidently in a state of flux.

The key conclusion is that countries within the European zone should be studied in their own terms and not be grouped under facile descriptions of a rigid and inefficient block of sclerotic economies burdened with high unemployment and low productivity growth rates.

The early evidence base for the study of industrial relations was forged in the last decades of the nineteenth century. Seminal contributions from the Webbs (1894, 1920) brought a new focus to the examination of the nature of employment, authority relations, and the position of wage labor that had not been attempted since Engels's study 50 years earlier, of the nature of employment in Halifax, Leeds, London, and Manchester (Engels 1993).

Writing in a period of growing tensions in major industries – railways, textiles, chemicals, and coal – and in the buildup to the General Strike of 1926, Sidney and Beatrice Webb laid the foundations for the modern study of industrial relations. Leading practitioners such as Montague Burton – who developed in Leeds the largest clothing factory in the world – commissioned independent research into the conditions of industrial peace. He funded three

Chairs at the Universities of Cambridge, Leeds, and Cardiff in the late 1920s to address the concerns of key businesses about achieving a degree of consensus on the shop floor. The incumbents of these Chairs brought pragmatic guidance to the key policymakers involved in employment relations, the practitioners in the expanding industries, and the growing trade union movement. The concept of partnership – a current public policy issue in the UK and continental Europe – had been anticipated by progressive employers and trade unions eager to establish negotiating rights in the factories in the third decade of the twentieth century. The situation in the US was far less hospitable and was not placed on a more constructive footing for at least two decades.

Industrial relations became an established source of public policy concern in the US and the UK in the 1960s. In the US the research led by economists (Lloyd Reynolds, Clark Kerr, and John Dunlop) took as a point of theoretical departure traditional neoclassical economics. But they invested their studies with an acute understanding of power relations in the workplace and the pluralism of interactions between trade unions, government, and employers. Their research engaged with the orthodox notion that the anonymous forces of supply and demand dictated employment levels, rates of pay, and the position of different segments of the workforce within organizational hierarchies. Detailed studies of firms' internal labor markets (e.g., Ozanne 1968) revealed how imprecise a guide to the world of work the traditional economic axioms were (and still are). A beacon of light at a time of growing policy and theoretical conservatism, their work provided much of the impetus for the development of the academic study of industrial relations in Britain.

The research that ensued in Britain was driven by immediate policy questions focusing on rising strike levels, productivity deficits, and complex wage systems that were allegedly bringing manufacturing companies to a standstill. The challenge for researchers was to get behind the political rhetoric of the day. The lead was taken by a group of historians and social scientists committed to interdisciplinary policy research, collectively known as the "Oxford School." Led by Hugh Clegg, the group included academic practitioners (notably Alan

Flanders and Clegg) and historians of the labor movement (Alan Fox). Such was their political influence at this time, Clegg was asked by the then prime minister, Harold Wilson, to lead the 1965 Royal Commission on Industrial Relations. Notwithstanding the often inflated (sometimes inflammatory) claims of many writers who claimed to have detected a direct causal link between the UK's industrial relations and economic underperformance, no clear evidence was produced (see Nolan 1996 for an exposition of the debates).

Anecdotes were used by economists to support their accounts of the underlying institutional causes of productivity deficits with the ever more successful economies of continental Europe, but the economists rarely entered the factories and offices about which they had so much to say. Studies failed to demonstrate a clear causal link between the UK's economic underperformance and the pattern of industrial relations in firms and industries. Many commentators gave voice to the government's position that the established voluntary system of industrial relations in the UK had proved deleterious to economic performance, and that a regime change, involving restrictive legislation against the activities of trade unions, was required. As indicated below, there followed a sea change in the character of industrial relations.

The government was disturbed by the increasing incidence of strikes that were both unconstitutional (out of procedure) and unofficial (unauthorized by the leaders of the relevant unions). Sometimes referred to as "wildcat" strikes, because of their spontaneous character on the shop floor, these actions were particularly common in the ailing UK engineering industries. Coventry, Birmingham, and Liverpool were notable hotspots. In Leeds textiles and clothing featured prominently in the disputes stakes. Some commentators linked the strikes and the wage drift associated with the increasingly tight labor markets in the 1960s to loss of market share in international manufacturing markets.

Hugh Clegg commented thus:

Under employment of labour is one of the major scandals of the British economy. There may be few workers outside the newspaper

industry who are paid to do nothing at all, but throughout British industry there must be hundreds of thousands of workers who are paid to do nothing for a considerable part of their time ... Then there are the machines and changes in technology many of them in use in other countries which would be introduced here but for the limits placed by workers on their output. (Clegg 1964)

On the face of it this statement by Clegg represented a severe attack on the disruptive powers of the organized trade union movement in the UK, but he was also careful to include in his prescriptions the failures of management to do their jobs properly and efficiently. The Oxford School were ambivalent. Always committed to mutual disputes resolution in the workplace and to the limited role of legislators, Clegg and his colleagues espoused a program of reform that would engage all key parties: employers, workers, and their representatives to collective bargaining and the elaboration of new workplace procedures to minimize the damage that ensued from unbridled conflict.

The underlying philosophy was pluralism, the central idea that there were multiple stake holders in the workplace. The evidence that the Royal Commission assembled revealed that conflict was endemic in the workplace and that institution building was the best way of raising productivity and reducing strikes, absenteeism, and conflict. Their prognosis – most clearly registered in the Royal Commission Report – was that power should be shared through the elaboration of collective bargaining arrangements, that the emerging numbers of unpaid shop stewards in private and public sector organizations should be provided with facilities (office space, time off work for meetings) in order to resolve differences with management to avoid strikes and productivity damaging acts by both employers and employees.

Throughout this period in which academics worked hand in glove with policymakers in the UK and US, there were powerful dissenting voices. The most prominent scholar in the UK was Professor Vic Allen, a self proclaimed Marxist. The Oxford School ignored his contributions but failed to minimize their impact on successive generations of students of industrial relations that found in his work a refreshing challenge to the pluralist orthodoxy (Allen

1971). The argument, backed by careful empirical research, that workers and their employers had often differences that could not be reconciled by institution building as proposed by the 1968 Royal Commission was borne out by the severe conflicts of the 1970s.

The election of Mrs. Thatcher in the UK in 1979 signaled a major upheaval in the practice, perception, and study of industrial relations. The situation in the US was bleaker, with union membership plummeting and employers introducing tough measures to retard workers' "voice" (Freeman & Medoff 1984). The attack by the Thatcher government, through numerous legislative measures, effectively prevented unions from taking collective action at the work place. Set piece strikes in the steel, railway, and coal industries halted the threat of mass mobilization policies by workers as the government sought new legal powers to stem the tide of resistance to draconian closure and mass redundancy programs. No sector was protected.

The academic study of industrial relations suffered in line with the prevailing material conditions. The new advocates of human resource management seized upon the evidence of declining collective relations in the workplace and proclaimed a new regime change in which business would work with individuals to secure business success. Performance related pay, regular performance appraisals, teamworking, empowerment, and skill development programs were the new watchwords in a managerial vocabulary deployed to win the commitment of employees. Industrial relations researchers remained skeptical, arguing, somewhat complacently, that this was a fashion that would not endure.

The declining status of academic industrial relations was also a result of the failure of the mainstream to engage with other social science disciplines, notably economics. It ceded the terrain of debate – arguably the most politically charged debate in Europe, the US, and the UK – to economists who made bold claims with their blunt tools about the complex causal relations between conduct in the workplace and the performance of companies, industries, and national economies. They claimed that the terrain that had been occupied by students of the labor market, collective bargaining, and dispute resolution could be scrutinized with new techniques and data that would yield more

knowledge than the older tradition of micro empirical inquiry and ethnographic research.

The orientation in the new business schools that mushroomed in the US and UK, and to a lesser degree in continental Europe, promoted new vocabularies centered on leadership, self help, and unbridled individualism in pursuit of personal advancement in the organization. Collective solidarity among workers was consigned to history. Academics in the US developed a new institutional economics that broke with the public policy tradition of the "old" institutionalists (e.g., Kerr, Dunlop, and Reynolds) by elevating transaction costs, for example the costs of managing the employment relationship through an authority relationship as opposed to spot market hire and fire policies. Established research centers were closed or starved of resources. Indeed, in the UK, leading academics were accused of academic bias in favor of collective bargaining at a time when the government of the day was seeking to impose highly restrictive measures on the trade unions.

Did the state offensive against unionism produce new patterns of working and new management practices that redefined the landscape of industrial relations? The evidence for the UK suggests that the new hardline approach against collective bargaining and worker voice was counterproductive. It encouraged sloppy management systems and removed the incentive for employers to invest in new technologies and the up skilling of their employees. UK businesses pursued a longstanding tradition of competing in international markets with a low wage, poorly trained workforce. At the turn of the twentieth century, productivity levels in the UK remained significantly lower than in other European countries and the United States.

Industrial relations have become a major issue for public policy debate. The UK government has retreated from the draconian policies designed to marginalize collective relations in the workplace, in favor of a renewed attempt to generate the condition of industrial peace through institutional arrangements to generate partnership in the workplace. Current developments would have pleased Montague Burton. The attempt by policymakers and researchers to supplant the traditional issues that had for nearly 100 years formed the agenda for the practice and subject of industrial relations by

the rather vague and empirically ungrounded field of human resource management has failed (Nolan & O'Donnell 2003). Unions have begun to rebuild their activities in the UK with membership gains, and employers are increasingly keen to harness their influence in the workplace to bring forward much needed changes to secure productivity and innovation changes. Slowly and unevenly there is a creeping shift toward a more European model of employment relations and a retreat from the harsher climate of industrial relations that has characterized work experiences in the United States. There is an evolving agenda that will inevitably be shaped by the impacts of new information and communication technologies (ICT), global market shifts, and developments in the shape of organizations and production politics at workplace level.

The capacity of industrial relations researchers to engage with these unfolding transformations is demonstrated with explorations into the meaning and potential of the "information age." The analysis of the implications of ICTs, in particular the Internet, for the politics and processes of labor has generated a substantial literature. Debate has been driven by concern with finding ways of building more effective forms in the face of the widespread and global "crises" of trade unionism, while taking inspiration from the innovative countercoordination of workers who have already demonstrated the potentialities of new ICTs. In South Korea, for example, the Internet has been identified as central to the strategy of the Korean Confederation of Trade Unions to break free from clandestine status, while in the 1995-8 unofficial Liverpool dockers' dispute the Internet was used to generate the most widespread international simultaneous solidarity action the labor movement has ever witnessed (Carter et al. 2003).

Developments in union presence on the Internet, the routine use of electronic communications, and the sponsorship of practitioner and academic reflection upon the opportunities and "perils" provide clear indication of future possibilities (Hogan & Grieco 2000). There is now a widespread availability of communication technologies that can be utilized at relatively low and distributed cost and accessed in transit and from the home, with processing and storage capacities that are growing exponentially and which can be readily deployed for the receipt,

storage, auditing, manipulation, and broadcast of information globally. Through intervention into these communicative spaces visibility is greatly enhanced, allowing for the auditing of the performance of individuals and institutions (Hogan & Greene 2002). The retention of memories and traditions that hitherto had so easily been broken or lost is also placed within grasp as never before. This drive to innovation can challenge established power relations within trade unions but can also be internalized within labor institutions by the adoption of servicing and organizing facilities which specifically address the need to operate outside of the disciplinary constraints of hostile workplaces and which recognize that the captured market of the occupationally concentrated community is no more (Hogan & Nolan 2005).

SEE ALSO: Democracy and Organizations; Human Resource Management; Institutional Theory, New; Internet; Labor/Labor Power; Labor Movement; Labor Process; Laborism; Unions

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industrial revolution

François Nielsen

The Industrial Revolution (IR) is the rapid increase in the use of machines powered by inanimate forms of energy (such as waterfalls, steam engines powered by coal, or electricity) that began in England in the later part of the eighteenth century. There are two perspectives on the scope of the subject. The IR may be viewed both as (1) a well defined historical episode, delimited in time and space, or (2) a much broader phase of sociocultural evolution that is

continuing to this day. In the first approach there is much agreement about the place (England) and time (the late 1700s). The year 1750 can be taken as a reasonable nominal date for the beginning of the IR (Nolan & Lenski 2004), although it might be considered early by some historians. The second approach is more encompassing, as it views the economic and social transformations of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries as all part of the unfolding of the IR.

A broad approach to the causes of the IR is to say that it is the result of the accumulation of technological information in agrarian societies of western Europe in the centuries that preceded the revolution (Nolan & Lenski 2004). Among these were innovations in shipbuilding and navigation that made possible transoceanic travel and the discovery of the New World. This event would contribute to increase trade activity, especially in the North Atlantic area, and infuse the European economy with large quantities of gold and silver. The resulting inflation favored the ascent of commercial classes relative to the landed aristocracy, and motivated the latter to try improving productivity of their land, spurring great progress in agricultural production. Another specific technological innovation was the mid fifteenth century invention of the printing press, which favored the spread of literacy and information in general and perhaps the rise of the rationalism associated with the Enlightenment. The printing press also facilitated the success of the Protestant Reformation, which was premised on direct access to sacred texts by believers. Much has been made of Max Weber's argument in *The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism* that the Protestant ethic of frugality and hard work facilitated the IR, but a major role of religion in the IR is unlikely in view of the fact that the earliest industrialized areas on the continent tended to be Catholic rather than Protestant (Delacroix & Nielsen 2001).

SHORT TERM CONSEQUENCES

Short term consequences of the IR are taken to be those that were already in evidence by, say, 1850.

Successive technological innovations in the late 1700s, especially in the textile industry,

led to the design of increasingly complex machines that became too heavy to be operated by muscle power alone. The factory system arose because of the need to organize work activities near machines connected to a central source of power, such as a water mill or later a steam engine. Factory based production had the additional advantages of permitting a more elaborate division of labor and closer supervision of the workers. Eventually there would be a corresponding decline in home based manufacturing production (the "putting out" or "cottage industry" system), although this consequence was not immediate.

Labor demand associated with the rise of factories exacerbated the influx of rural population to towns and cities. In the mid 1700s only 15 percent of the population of England lived in towns of 10,000 or more; this proportion increased to a quarter by 1800 and one half by 1840 (Weightman 2003: 77). Immediate consequences of rapid urbanization were crowding, pollution, disease, poverty, crime, and other social ills. Contributing to social disorganization was the uprooting of industrial workers and their families from kin based and traditional support networks in the countryside. Local town officials were overwhelmed and unable to cope with social problems on such an unprecedented scale (Nolan & Lenski 2004).

Although the issue of the short term impact of the IR on living standards is still controversial (Evans 2001), it is known that the first half of the nineteenth century was characterized by much economic instability and that many families were barely able to survive on low factory salaries, even with all members of the household employed (including children as young as 6) and despite long hours of work in often deplorable conditions. The obvious hardship of workers' lives made entirely reasonable Karl Marx's belief, shared by many contemporaries, that the development of capitalism would entail the progressive impoverishment of the proletariat, a prediction that turned out to be false in the long run.

LONG TERM DEVELOPMENTS

The entire way of life characteristic of modern industrial societies has its roots in the IR, and

thus can be viewed as a consequence of this historical episode. Some of the specific causal threads linking modern life to the IR can be distinguished.

Economy and Labor Force

Industrialization has transformed the predominant types of economic activity carried out by the population of industrial societies. The proportion of the labor force employed in the primary sector (extractive activities such as agriculture and mining) dwindled in most industrial societies from an overwhelming majority in 1750 to less than 5 percent by the close of the twentieth century. The secondary sector (manufacturing industries) rose to approximately a third of the labor force, reaching a maximum early in the second half of the twentieth century before declining in later decades. It is employment in the tertiary sector (services, or the production of intangible goods) that rose steadily throughout the course of industrialization, up to some three quarters of the labor force in many industrial societies today. These trends in the nature of work activities have radically changed the daily life and worldviews of members of industrial societies.

Industrialization began changing the nature of firms around 1850 with the spread of corporations based on the bureaucratic mode of organization, with a parallel decline in individually or family owned firms. One major advantage of the corporate form of organization, in which the firm is collectively owned by shareholders in the form of stock, was the principle of limited liability, a genuine legal innovation of the industrial era. Limited liability means that investors are risking only the amount invested in shares, rather than their entire assets, in the corporate venture. This allowed the spreading of risk and the consolidation of vast amounts of capital. Corporations were run on bureaucratic principles, including the assignment of positions on the basis of competence acquired through education and training. This development coincided with the increasingly systematic application of science to industrial production. The resulting demand for skills, from the elementary (literacy) to the most sophisticated (such as

engineering or legal), must have contributed to the spread of education, although other factors such as national rivalries may have been at work. Most industrial societies had extensive systems of primary education by the late 1800s, often with compulsory attendance laws. Systems of mass secondary and tertiary (college level) education involving large proportions of the corresponding age cohorts did not develop until the second half of the twentieth century, however.

An inherent feature of capitalism is the tendency to growth in the average size of firms and industrial concentration, resulting in the domination of an industrial sector by one firm (a situation of *monopoly*) or a few (*oligopoly*). The mechanism of industrial concentration is based on economies of scale, which imply that a firm producing more units can reduce production costs by further subdividing fixed costs (such as costs of machinery, product development, and advertising). An initial market share advantage thus permits reducing production costs, and capturing an even larger market share. This autocatalytic process ("snowball effect") inevitably leads to increase in the size of firms and industrial concentration, a trend that was already evident in the late 1800s. As corporations grew in size and complexity they became increasingly controlled by the appointed executives (who had the expertise needed to run the organization) as opposed to the stockholders.

Demography, Family, and the Role of Women

Industrializing societies (with some exceptions such as France) experienced the *demographic transition* which is marked by a decline in the death rate followed by a delayed decline in the birth rate. The decline in deaths was due to improved food distribution facilitated by better transportation networks in the form of canals and railroads, better sanitation such as sewers and water treatment systems, and other public health measures such as vaccination. The decline in birth rate was due to a decline in the desire for large families more than improvements in birth control technology; the phenomenon is still somewhat mysterious. During the demographic transition, as the decline in births lagged behind the decline in deaths,

industrializing societies experienced a phase of rapid population growth.

Rising productivity of labor combined with tapering population growth at the conclusion of the demographic transition eventually produced a remarkable rise in living standards for a majority of the population of industrial societies, refuting the trend of impoverishment prophesied by Marx.

Declining birth rates entailed much smaller families. The trend was dramatic: of British couples married around 1860, 63 percent had five children or more; of those married around 1925, only 12 percent did (Nolan & Lenski 2004: 281). Smaller family size reduced demands on women in the household, facilitated employment of women outside the home, and contributed to make women (and individuals in general) increasingly independent from the family.

With the decline in family farms and home based industry the household ceased to be the principal unit of production. In a parallel trend the family lost a number of its traditional functions, including caring for the sick and the elderly, part of the socialization of children, and even food preparation; these activities were taken over by specialized organizations such as hospitals, retirement homes, schools, and makers of frozen dinners. Raising children, their early socialization, and the provision of emotional support for members have remained important functions of the family in industrial societies. The development of labor saving machines for household tasks during the twentieth century further freed women for outside employment.

Greater independence from the family due to employment opportunities for women and the economic safety net provided in some measure by most industrial societies cannot be unrelated to the secular increase in divorce rate (a trend also marked by major upward and downward swings) that affected most industrial societies.

Ideology and Politics

In the ideological realm industrialization witnessed the emergence of new secular ideologies, including free market capitalism (Smith 1976 [1776]), and socialism in two principal flavors:

democratic and revolutionary. The polity was transformed by the remarkably steady progression of *democratic republicanism* or *mass democracy*, i.e., a system of government where political decisions are made by representatives elected by the entire citizenry. Using franchise or electoral turnout as an indicator, it appears that democracy has increased steadily from the early 1800s, only temporarily interrupted by the fascist takeovers of the 1920s and 1930s (Flora 1983; Nolan & Lenski 2004). The democratic trend can also be seen in the passage of successive legislative milestones such as universal male voting, women suffrage, or Jewish emancipation (Davies 1998).

Another political trend was growing support for democratic socialism in many industrial countries, often with the support of working class organizations such as trade unions. Social democratic parties have achieved many of the goals of socialism, collectively referred to as the welfare state. These goals include social security, state pension systems, unemployment compensation, national health care, free education at all levels, family allowances, subsidized childcare, and so on. The extent to which the welfare state has been achieved varies considerably among modern industrial nations, being less developed in the US than in most European countries (Esping Andersen 1990).

The development of the welfare state and other government activities has produced massive increases in the size of government in all industrial societies, whether size is measured as number of employees or as government share of gross domestic product. "Big government" is strongly correlated with the development of the welfare state (e.g., Nolan & Lenski 2004: 233).

Fewer people in industrial societies today attend religious services or believe in God. The decline in traditional religious beliefs has been less marked in the US, a particularity attributed variously to the historical salience of religion in the country's origins, the variety of denominations and resulting competition for members (resulting in a more "efficient" recruitment of believers), or the relative failure of socialist ideologies in the US (Lipset & Marks 2000). It is possible that the trend of religious skepticism is partly independent of

industrialization per se, having deeper and independent roots in the Enlightenment.

The World System

In the international context the rapid increase in production beginning with the IR in industrializing areas of Europe (and later the US and Japan) initiated an unprecedented rise in overall world inequality, as the income gap kept widening between industrial and non industrial nations for more than two centuries (Firebaugh 2003). The resulting development gap, and the associated imbalance in military technology and power, may well have provided the conditions for the phase of territorial expansion of industrial nations from about 1860 to the eve of World War I that has been called *imperialism* or *colonialism* (Chirot 1986). This historical episode set the stage for the current phase of globalization (increasing trade and interactions of all kinds) affecting societies within the world system.

INDUSTRIAL OR POST INDUSTRIAL SOCIETY

Some authors argue that the transformations taking place at the turn of the twenty first century are so profound that societies affected by them deserve the new name of *post industrial* societies. The post industrial type of society is deemed different from the industrial one in that it is based on the production of services rather than manufactured goods, the processing of information rather than material objects (Bell 1976). Others, such as Nolan and Lenski (2004), prefer to view these recent trends as part of a later phase of the IR. In that view, advanced industrial societies today are experiencing the continuation of the IR rather than moving toward a radically different post industrial stage. Both views certainly have merits; analyzing today's social trajectories does not require choosing any particular terminology.

SEE ALSO: Capitalism; Demographic Transition Theory; Demography: Historical; Family, History of; Industrialization; Labor/Labor Power; Management History; Post Industrial Society; Socialism; Urbanization

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industrialization

Michael Indergaard

Industrialization is the process by which an economy shifts from an agricultural to a manufacturing base during a period of sustained change and growth, eventually creating a higher standard of living. Sociology's founders were keenly interested in the causes, correlates, and consequences of industrialization, which they considered a major development in the broader social transformation producing modern society.

For much of the twentieth century, however, broad analyses by classical sociologists such as Marx and Weber were overshadowed by narrow accounts featuring technology or efficiency. Sociologists often deferred to economic historians, accepting determinist narratives of a singular path of industrialization marked by a flurry of new gadgets, energy sources, and processes unleashed by *laissez faire* policies. Sociologists drew on miscellaneous concepts and observations to compile profiles of industrial society featuring traits such as a division of labor, rationalization, the systematic application of science, urbanization, increased life expectancy, literacy, higher standards of living, and democracy. More recently, the humbling of western industry by newly industrialized countries (NICs) has led sociologists to examine how interactions of political, cultural, and economic factors in different contexts produce multiple paths of industrialization.

A key influence on discussion of industrialization was Adam Smith's notion that more specialization in the division of labor, though it had negative effects on workers, is more efficient and inevitably increases a nation's wealth if the state adopts a *laissez faire* stance. Another was provided by French writers in the early 1800s who spoke of an Industrial Revolution, citing parallels between technological changes in manufacturing and the French Revolution. Engels drew on various romantic currents in exposing the conditions that the Industrial Revolution imposed on the English working class. In *Capital* (1867), Marx placed the Industrial Revolution in the historical development of the capitalist mode of production, arguing that the detailed division of labor abetted the introduction of machinery which subordinated and replaced workers. Social progress, he asserted, awaited an overthrow of capitalist class relations and the detailed division of labor. Victorian reformers, alarmed by the revolutionary critiques and growing urban poverty, embraced Toynbee's romantic denouncement of the Industrial Revolution which, ironically, echoed Engels: it established the idea among economic historians that industrialization occurred through rapid technological change causing social catastrophe (Coleman 1992).

Most sociologists rejected Marx's radicalism, preferring interpretations of industrialization

compatible with reformist positions. They were attracted to Durkheim's argument that the division of labor had temporarily made social solidarity problematic and to Weber's early work on the Protestant ethic, touted as the culturalist answer to Marx's materialism. Discussions of industrialization largely ignored Marx's dialectical conception of history and the comprehensive analysis that Weber later developed of how cultural, political, and economic factors interacted to produce rational capitalism.

The reform inclination in the early twentieth century was particularly evident among American sociologists who, having agreed to stay out of turf claimed by economists, focused on social aspects of industrial society. The Chicago School organized around the study of social problems and forms of organization in industrial cities, while a broad subspecialty – industrial sociology – drew on institutional economics and human relations theories to explore relations and groups in industrial organizations and workplaces. Over time, industry sociology expanded to examine additional issues such as development, occupations, stratification, organizations, and labor markets before such topics were hived off by a host of emerging subspecialties in the discipline.

A new movement in economic history injected optimism into discussions of industrialization during the twentieth century, celebrating the Industrial Revolution's technological achievements (e.g., use of coal, the steam engine, the spinning jenny); it reinforced the idea that the British case defined a general path of industrialization. The Great Depression, fascism, and the Soviet Union's industrialization temporarily raised doubts about the one path thesis. Free market accounts of industrialization also were challenged by Polanyi's argument that ideology and state interventions set the ground for industrialization and for unregulated markets themselves. However, the World War II triumph restored confidence in the US that industrializing countries would converge around a common path. Some economists advised that multiple paths were possible, but many sociologists embraced Rostow's modernization thesis that all developing societies would have to pass through five stages of development, with industrialization representing the takeoff stage. Similarly, industrial sociologists

endorsed a convergence thesis proposing that functional imperatives of industrialization required societies to develop certain traits – e.g., an extended division of labor, separation of family and enterprise, and rational forms of calculation and investments. They added that industrialization would encourage secularization, social mobility, and democracy.

In the 1960s and 1970s, a new wave in economic history attacked the Industrial Revolution metaphor, using macroeconomic trends (e.g., growth in national income, growth and sectoral composition of the labor force) to argue that industrialization had been a gradual process. Achievement partisans, however, depicted the Industrial Revolution in ever more heroic terms, comparing it to the development of agriculture, monotheism, and even language. They bolstered their position, drawing on Schumpeter's claim that each long wave of growth was propelled by a distinctive set of innovations (Coleman 1992). Dominant accounts of industrialization also came under fire from the left. Neo Marxians revisited western industrialization, arguing that its capitalist nature accounted for the calamities it inflicted on working people. Labor process studies showed how social control agendas drove efforts in factories to subdivide work and deskill workers. Dependency and world systems theorists proposed that the development of poor nations was distorted or constrained by unequal relations with advanced nations.

In the 1970s and 1980s, the rise of state guided industrial powers in East Asia, crisis in western industry, and promotion of free markets by Anglo American neoliberals brought a sea change in studies of industrialization. Debates about flexible industrial systems and new global divisions of labor produced evidence that industrialization had taken multiple paths in the past as well as the present. Seeking an alternative to technology/efficiency explanations, a new economic sociology spearheaded a return to broad examinations of industrialization. Piore and Sabel's (1984) study of the triumph of mass production over craft production inspired a large body of work. They argued that political conflicts and competing visions influenced the path that industrialization takes in different nations and the respective capacities that result

(e.g., the flexibility of Japanese manufacturing). Institutionalists also cited political and cultural factors in challenging Alfred Chandler's argument that the industrial corporation gained the form that it did (modeled on railroad administration) because it was the most efficient way to coordinate a large number of geographically dispersed workers.

A second debate concerned the rise of Japan and the East Asian NICs (South Korea, Taiwan, Hong Kong, Singapore). Economists attributed their international competitiveness to free trade policies which gave them access to foreign capital and technology while exposing them to market discipline. In contrast, proponents of the developmental state model argued that a distinctive set of policies gave East Asian NICs an advantage in overcoming the internal obstacles that late industrializers face. As was the case with Japan earlier, an initial lack of capacity for innovation in products and processes forced late industrializers (e.g., Brazil, Turkey, India, Mexico, South Korea, Taiwan) to enter the global economy through emulation of foreign technology and reliance on cheap labor and tariffs. Developmental states allowed East Asian NICs to complete and develop beyond this initial stage much more quickly than other NICs. The developmental state devises national strategies, encourages the formation of business groups, and guides capital into targeted sectors. It also exercises discipline over business (e.g., performance standards) as a condition for subsidies, encouraging firms to excel in making incremental improvements and enabling entire segments to move into higher value sectors (Amsden 1989). A second explanation (Gereffi 1994) for varying paths of industrialization among NICs stresses the different positions that their chief industries hold in new global divisions of labor. State strategies still matter, but are constrained by the dynamics of product cycles and by the structures of different kinds of international commodity chains dominated by multinational corporations. A third model stresses the hybrid nature of post socialist development, a notion that is especially relevant for the case of China – an avowed practitioner of market socialism that is often considered an avatar of global market forces but also resembles a developmental state.

The post industrial society thesis deems the recent decline in manufacturing in western nations to reflect a transition to a knowledge based service economy. However, the credibility of the term post industrial depends on how industrialization is defined. If one considers industrialization to be the rationalization of economic activities, as does Ritzer's McDonaldization thesis, then the standardization of work routines and the homogenization of products and consumption that one sees in a fast food restaurant imply that industrialization continues in the service sector. Other work suggests that the development of information technology represents the industrialization of information. Mokyr (2002) proposes that sustained growth in both the First and Second Industrial Revolutions was due to the broadening of the knowledge base. He raises the possibility that the increasing accessibility of scientific knowledge due to computers may have initiated a Third Industrial Revolution. Synthesizing the literature on industrialization in the past and present, Castells (2000) advises that we are undergoing an Information Technology Revolution based on the application of knowledge and information back to the very process of generating knowledge and information.

The term industrialization seems more the product of mythmaking and list making than a coherent theoretical program. In the reductionist manner in which economics addresses the term, industrialization means so little; in sociology it has come to mean so much. After nearly two centuries of use, basic definitional and methodological issues remain unsettled. When can a nation be deemed to be industrialized? At what point does the process begin? Can industrialization be distinguished from a stage of capitalism or the process of rationalization? What social structures, institutions, and processes are as essential for industrialization as technology and how should we understand their interplay? Should the unit of study be the nation state or some global segment?

Given industrialization's correlation with basic indicators of well being, it is important to determine what can still be expected in cases where industrialization has stalled or never really started. That problem is becoming more complex and daunting as the industrialization

of developing nations is increasingly structured by their links to global networks of production and information technology.

SEE ALSO: Capitalism; Division of Labor; Industrial Revolution; Information Technology; McDonaldization; Marx, Karl; Post Industrial Society; Weber, Max

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inequalities in marriage

Constance Shehan and Susan Cody

Women and men typically experience different rights and responsibilities in marriage, in spite of widespread beliefs in marital equality. These differences led sociologist Jesse Bernard (1972) to coin the phrase “his and her marriages.” Gender based patterns of marital inequality have existed historically in the US and other western nations, though they have declined somewhat in recent decades, and they persist in other parts of the globe, as well. For various reasons, which will be outlined below, there are systematic gender differences in the amount and type of domestic labor and family care performed by spouses, in power and authority in marital decision making, in access to and control over household resources, and likelihood of experiencing severe injury as a result of spousal violence. Gender based inequalities continue after divorce, characterizing property settlements and custody arrangements as well as the relative economic circumstances of former spouses.

INEQUALITIES IN THE DIVISION OF HOUSEHOLD LABOR

Studies of the division of household labor conducted over the past 40 years have shown that women allocate considerably more time each week than men to various household tasks and family care even when they are employed outside their homes. Today, women typically devote about 19 hours, and men about 10 hours, to housework each week (Bianchi et al. 2000). The types of household tasks performed by women and men also differ. Men tend to do those that are more flexibly scheduled and at least somewhat discretionary, whereas women perform routine and repetitive labor that must be performed on a regular basis (Hochschild 1989).

In terms of childcare, fathers are more likely to spend time with children in recreational activities while mothers allocate considerable time to basic “maintenance” chores. The gender based patterns of family care are even more pronounced when it comes to elderly relatives. Nearly all the work that is done for ill or dependent elderly

people in private homes is done by women. British researchers estimate that the ratio of time women and men spend in elder care approaches 19 to 1 (Abel 1986). Even in households where time allocated to household tasks and family care by spouses is similar, wives perform an “executive” function, monitoring family needs and ensuring that they are met in a timely and effective fashion. This may mean hiring and supervising outside help, in which case wives are likely to use their own salaries to pay for the costs of the auxiliary help. As a result, women spend more of their time in various types of labor and have less time for leisure and sleep. Among married couples with infants, women work an extra day, or 24 hours more per week than their husbands (Rexroat & Shehan 1987).

INEQUALITIES IN POWER AND DECISION MAKING

Marital power can be defined as one spouse’s ability to impose his or her will on another, which can mean forcing the other spouse to act in certain ways or accept a specific “definition of reality” as one’s own (Aulette 2002). Alternative explanations for the balance of marital power emphasize individual traits or abilities such as one partner’s greater size or strength, greater knowledge or expertise, control over socioeconomic resources, or superior communication skills. Thus, the balance of power swings to the stronger spouse or the one who contributes more money and status. When decisions are contested, the partner with the greater interest in or knowledge about the issue may have greater say in the final outcome. Or, in some cases, the more persuasive partner may win out. These bases of marital power often favor husbands insofar as men, on average, are larger and stronger and earn higher wages than their wives. Gender differences in communication styles in which men tend to control the course of conversations by talking more, interrupting more, and vetoing topics, may also swing decision making power to husbands. One of the most important bases of power in marriage is patriarchal authority: legitimate authority bestowed on men to act as the heads of their families and/or households. Patriarchy is institutionalized in religious customs and governmental policies.

In many cultures, women's secondary status is linked to social systems which connect kinship and patriarchy. In such societies, social relations, including those within families, are influenced by traditional views of women and men. Kin groups are built around male headship. Traditions of patrilinealism and patrilocality have restricted women's choices inside and outside the home (Lerner 1987). In recent years, however, extended families have become less common around the globe. While this change has been bemoaned by some as a loss of tradition and family ties, it is also linked to greater freedom for women.

Today, in most western societies, patriarchal authority in families and households does not have the same influence it once had, but it still exists and in certain segments of American society it continues to be strongly supported. Evangelical Christians, for instance, often adhere to patriarchal authority, as do other religious subcultures such as the Hasidic Jews, the Old Order Amish, and to a lesser extent, the Mormons. Some ethnic and nationality groups in the US also adhere fairly closely to a patriarchal ideology. These include people who have recently emigrated from the traditionally patriarchal cultures of the Middle East, Africa, Latin America, and Asia. African American and Latino populations have cultural elements that support patriarchy, although other aspects of their lives (such as the need for women to be employed) may counterbalance the traditional view of male dominance.

Patriarchy is also built into civil laws. In a very real sense, American state and federal governments create a hidden marriage contract through laws, administrative rulings, and court decisions. This contract defines the rights, responsibilities, and obligations of married persons and is based on traditional assumptions about the roles of husbands and wives which grew out of English common law. Any person who marries is agreeing to conform to any and all conditions of the hidden contract (Stetson 1991). Primary among these assumptions are the following: husbands are the heads of their households; husbands are responsible for the economic support of their wives and children; and wives are responsible for domestic services and childcare. Under the common law tradition, husbands had the right to decide where they and

their families would live. They were also given control of the family's economic resources, including the wife's property and possessions at the time of their marriage. When a wife was employed under these conditions, her husband was entitled to her wages.

INEQUALITIES IN THE LIKELIHOOD OF INTIMATE PARTNER VIOLENCE

While men are more likely than women to be victims of reported violence in our society, they are considerably less likely to be victims of intimate partner violence. If women are violently assaulted, their assailant is most likely a husband or boyfriend. When women are assaulted, they are more likely to be injured if they have an intimate relationship with the perpetrator. Bureau of Justice statistics reveal the extent of the gender difference: roughly 7.5 women and 1.4 men in every 1,000 are victims of crimes with intimate perpetrators. Feminist scholars argue that gender inequality and the oppression of women are the central features of violence in families. Historically, there have been norms and laws that condone violence against women. In the nineteenth century, for example, many states had laws specifically approving of wife beating. Battering is a reflection of the inequality between women and men and is a conscious strategy used by men to control women and to maintain the system of gender inequality.

In 1993 the United Nations adopted the Declaration on the Elimination of Violence Against Women. UNIFEM, the branch of the United Nations which deals with women's issues, has focused its attention on the global epidemic of violence against women and girls, especially violence that occurs within families (Sev'er & Yurdakul 2006). Because of the strong preference for sons, girls face a high risk of violence beginning at or before birth. Parents may use practices such as sex selective abortion or infanticide to increase their chances for a son (Ravindran 1986). Worldwide, millions of girls have been victimized by a practice known as female genital mutilation (FGM). This cultural practice involves some combination of procedures ranging from partial to total removal of the clitoris and/or sewing together the external genitalia, often under very harsh and unhygienic conditions. It is used to ensure the virginity of

girls, thereby increasing their opportunities for marriage (World Health Organization 1995).

Cross cultural studies indicate that wife beating is the most common form of family violence (World Health Organization 1995). Estimates of the incidence of wife abuse are conservative, due to shame and guilt on the part of victims, lack of legal recourse, and fear of partner retaliation. In recent years, extreme forms of violence against wives have been exposed. In India, for example, wives are expected to express deep gratitude for selection into marriage and to show deference to husbands and other family members. Bride burnings may result from a wife's alleged infidelity or a family's inability to pay the dowry in full to the husband.

In recent years, honor killings have been publicized in such nations as Pakistan, Egypt, and Turkey (Sev'er and Yurdakul 2006). Such countries have a strong tradition of family based patriarchy and may customarily mandate complete control over women's social, reproductive, and economic lives. In Turkey, for example, wives have virtually no rights to property, and their sexual behavior continues to be controlled even after a legal separation has been granted. Wives are not protected against marital rape unless they sustain a serious and obvious physical injury. Furthermore, law enforcement officials continue to hold very traditional ideas about sexual assault, believing that women provoke such crimes in most cases.

EQUALITARIAN MARRIAGES

Despite the prevalence of traditional or patriarchal marriages, it does appear that some couples today are attempting to create and maintain what has been described as egalitarian or "peer marriages." Greater awareness of gender inequalities, changing gender roles, as well as the need for two wage earners, has prompted some couples to consider a more equitable type of intimate relating. Clearly, the inequalities associated with marriage have been a major source of marital dissatisfaction in the past. Couples who maintain or who perceive that they maintain equity in their relationships express higher levels of marital satisfaction. Sociologists have coined the term peer marriage to refer to relationships that are built on *equity* (i.e., each

partner gives to the relationship in the same proportion that she or he receives) and *equality* (i.e., each partner has equal status and is equally responsible for emotional, economic, and household duties). Peer marriages are difficult to achieve and maintain, however, due to the overwhelming acceptance and established traditions of patriarchal marriage. Couples who strive for egalitarianism are viewed with suspicion, disbelief, or hostility (Blumstein & Schwartz 1983). Not surprisingly, women are often the first to initiate or express a preference for peer marriage (Schwartz 1994), although feminist ideology is not often cited as the reason. More often, wives cite the desire for more shared parenting as their primary motivation. Peer marriages remain quite rare (Risman 1998).

Peer marriages have four important characteristics: a nearly equal division of household labor and childcare; equal influence over important decisions; equal control over the family money; and equal consideration given to both partners' work in family decision making.

SEE ALSO: Child Custody and Child Support; Childcare; Divisions of Household Labor; Divorce; Domestic Violence; Feminization of Poverty; Gender, Work, and Family; Marital Power/Resource Theory; Marital Quality; Marriage; Patriarchy

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inequality and the city

James R. Elliott and Timothy J. Haney

Urban sociology emerged from the fertile ground of US cities during the early 1900s as a means of understanding social problems and the processes that produce them. Central to the field's conceptualization and analysis of these social problems was, and remains, the idea of inequality, defined loosely as the uneven distribution of social resources and actors relative to one another. As such, the term "inequality and the city" is best understood as a conceptual umbrella that spans a broad range of subtopics and research traditions within urban sociology, rather than as a single subfield in its own right. For heuristic purposes, we can organize this material into two subject matters: inequality among cities and inequality within cities.

INEQUALITY AMONG CITIES

Research on inequality among cities focuses on how cities emerge and develop through interaction with other places, that is, as connected

nodes within a more expansive trade and settlement system. Early attempts to understand the nature of this system emphasized the hierarchical, or unequal, distribution of cities by size and economic function within national regions, attempting to explain why, for example, Chicago became a more dominant city than Dubuque.

This research tradition traces to the 1930s, when German geographer Walter Christaller (1966 [1933]) advanced two theoretical propositions: first, a positive correlation exists between the importance of a city's economic functions and its population size; second, cities tend to "space" themselves such that those of similar size and economic importance do not cut into each other's market area. From these two propositions, Christaller developed a theory of urban hierarchy in which a few "super" cities generate market control over a larger number of middle order cities, which in turn generate market control over an even larger number of lower order cities, which themselves generate market control over surrounding rural hinterlands. The result is an even, orderly, and unequal system of cities, with those at the top gaining demographically and economically from those beneath them.

Subsequent research has challenged the assumptions and deductive logic of Christaller's theory, but it has not displaced the idea of urban hierarchy. Most recently this idea has resurfaced prominently in the "global city" literature, which investigates how new processes of global trade are redefining the roles that major cities play in the world system. This line of investigation can be traced to the early 1900s, when Robert McKenzie (1927), an original member of the Chicago School of Sociology, advanced a global perspective on urban structure and change in which he argued that social development brings with it increasing specialization of parts and greater centralization of "coordination and control" functions over time. It follows, McKenzie reasoned, that similar processes would bring growing inequality among places around the world, with most settlements becoming increasingly specialized and subordinate to a few cities where these "coordination and control" functions would concentrate.

Today's literature on "global cities" advances a similar theme but also contends that today's

world economy has changed radically over recent decades as multinational corporations have seized the reins of increasingly far flung financial and production operations. These developments have reduced the systemic importance of cities that serve merely as political capitals and increased the systemic importance of cities that act as strategic command posts for global business. According to Saskia Sassen (1991), these developments have produced a new breed of global city, which functions in four ways that distinguish it from the past: (1) as a highly concentrated and influential node in the organization of the world economy; (2) as a strategic site for the location of sophisticated business services, which have replaced manufacturing as the leading engine of economic development; (3) as a production and innovation site for this new sector; and (4) as a place where corporations go to buy and sell these sophisticated business services – accounting, advertising, legal counsel, information management, and the like. Sassen's central point is that global control is not an inevitable byproduct of economic globalization; rather, it must be produced, and this production occurs in global cities.

According to many observers, these developments have changed not only the urban hierarchy but also the social structure of cities at its top (e.g., New York, Los Angeles, Tokyo, London). This line of research contends that the growth and development of today's "command and control" functions in global cities polarize job opportunities in the local labor market. The result is a large sector of highly skilled, well paid, corporate professionals and a large sector of less skilled, poorly paid, non professionals that serve the new elite as maids, janitors, dry cleaners, nannies, private security, restaurant help, and the like. This polarization tends to push working class natives out of global cities, attract low skill immigrant labor, and reproduce, locally, forms of extreme inequality that these cities help to maintain on a global scale.

INEQUALITY WITHIN CITIES

These issues move us from viewing cities as nodes in a larger system to viewing the city as a system itself. This tradition traces to the early

years of the Chicago School (1910s–1920s), when US cities were booming and flush with European immigrants from all regions. Prejudice and discrimination against Poles, Italians, and Irish were high and often bitter during this period, followed later by the great migration of Southern, rural African Americans to the same urban centers, generating new ethnic divisions. From this turbulent context emerged a rich tradition of research on ethnic, racial, and class inequalities in the city.

Anchoring this tradition is the ecological premise that social and spatial distance correlate positively in the city, such that groups with higher status will seek to remove themselves spatially, as well as socially, from those with lower status. This premise identifies segregation, especially residential segregation, as the chief mechanism behind durable inequality in the city. Early research within this tradition produced rich cultural studies of ethnic urban neighborhoods created by this segregation, capped intellectually by Louis Wirth's (1928) classic study of Jews in *The Ghetto*. By mid century, however, with immigration restrictions in place and European assimilation on course, scholars began steadily shifting their attention from the vibrant lives of ethnic villages to the dramatic segregation of whites and blacks across metropolitan space. This issue erupted onto the front pages in the late 1960s, when racial unrest from Watts to Detroit to Newark shook US cities and white consciousness.

Efforts to understand this unrest pointed squarely to racial segregation of whites and blacks in big cities and the disadvantages and frustrations that this segregation created for African Americans. Central to this literature was John Kain's (1968) "spatial mismatch" hypothesis, which continues to inspire research to this day. Stripped to the bone, the spatial mismatch hypothesis advances two claims: first, proximity to jobs increases odds of employment and reduces commuting costs; second, African Americans tend to live farther than whites from available jobs as a result of residential segregation and emergent patterns of suburbanization. As a result, African Americans as a group tend to have higher employment costs and lower job prospects than otherwise equal whites, leading to higher rates of joblessness and underemployment. In his study of data from the 1950s, Kain

estimated that residential segregation cost African American workers as many as 9,000 jobs in Detroit and 24,000 jobs in Chicago.

A decade later William Julius Wilson (1978) tweaked this idea in his influential book, *The Declining Significance of Race*, when he argued that US society was entering a new era during the 1970s in which class, more than race, now determined the life chances of African Americans. Wilson rooted this claim in the growth of college educated blacks in professional occupations beginning in the late 1960s. For them, and their white counterparts, Wilson claimed, class position, not race, would define their place in the stratification system. The fate of less educated blacks, however, would differ radically. Wilson later argued in *The Truly Disadvantaged* (1987) that as the black middle class grew, it would exercise its new racial freedom and move from established inner city neighborhoods, leaving behind an impoverished "urban underclass" that lacked the skills, job opportunities, and social resources needed to succeed in today's urban economy. The result, Wilson claimed, was not only poor people but also disorganized communities that suffered from their eroding class, not racial, status.

This line of argument generated a great deal of debate in urban studies, with perhaps the most prominent critique coming from Douglas Massey and Nancy Denton (1993) in their book *American Apartheid*. In this and subsequent work, the authors argue that recent shifts in the urban economy away from manufacturing toward professional services have been uniquely detrimental to African Americans because they have joined with racial segregation to produce extreme concentrations of poverty that expose poor blacks to remarkably harsh and disadvantaged neighborhood environments. At stake in the ensuing debate with Wilson was whether race and class could ever truly be viewed as separate causes of urban inequality and what the answer implied for policy efforts to redress this inequality. For Wilson, class specific actions that avoided the stigma of racial politics were best – higher educational standards, better teacher development, more school funding, public child care and parental leave, universal health care, school to work programs, job centers, public employment programs, and the like. For Massey, these laudable efforts would have to be

accompanied by race specific remedies to reduce discrimination and expand opportunities for African Americans specifically, who remain by far the most segregated group in US cities.

By the late 1990s, immigration began to push the intellectual pendulum back from concerns over black/white segregation to concerns over immigrant adjustment and its role in reshaping racial, ethnic, and class inequalities in cities. Central to this literature is the question of how millions of less educated immigrants can enter the same urban environments that failed less educated African Americans and succeed, growing in number. The current answer, while still evolving, seems to run roughly as follows. Less educated immigrants are willing to take jobs that less educated natives will not due to the stigma that these jobs carry in US society. Immigrants who accept these stigmatized jobs, in turn, help friends and relatives move to the area to take similar jobs. The result is an ethnically organized economy for less educated workers, wherein racial and ethnic groups not only tend to live apart from one another but also work apart in labor markets regulated as much by ethnic networks as by market forces. Whether these developments constitute "success" for less educated immigrants is open to question, but scholars have already begun to talk of a new "immigrant underclass" that, despite its steady employment and dense job networks, finds itself living and working in substandard conditions that appear difficult to escape.

A related concern in this area is whether immigration and its urban concentration have increased the difficulties facing less educated African Americans. Sometimes referred to as the "immigrant competition" hypothesis, this question has generated much debate but mixed results. On the one hand, economists and social demographers, who generally expect immigration to harm the wages and employment opportunities of blacks due to open markets, have found little evidence to this effect. On the other hand, sociologists working from a "new economic sociology" framework, who generally assume that immigrant networks minimize competition with blacks, have found evidence of a negative effect of immigration on African Americans' job prospects. The argument here is that urban blacks have trouble finding decent jobs not because they lack the necessary education

and experience but because immigration has divided urban labor markets along ethnic lines, reducing job opportunities for natives, especially less skilled African Americans. Where these and related intellectual traditions on inequality and the city lead next remains for future researchers to decide.

SEE ALSO: City; Global/World Cities; Hypersegregation; Social Exclusion; Uneven Development; Urban Ecology; Urban Political Economy; Urban Poverty; Urban Renewal and Redevelopment

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inequality/stratification, gender

Michele Adams

Gender stratification refers to the level of inequality in society based on gender, the social characteristics associated with sex. Specifically, gender stratification refers to the differential ability of men and women to access society's

resources and to receive its privileges. As gender stratification increases, so does the level of gender inequality, reflecting greater differences between men's and women's access to power. Because historically men have garnered greater social power, gender inequality has systematically disadvantaged women. Gender inequality is complicated, moreover, by the intersection of gender with race/ethnicity, social class, age, and sexuality. That is, every individual, categorized as either male or female, also falls somewhere within a matrix of domination that includes these other dimensions (Collins 1991).

Original applications of the terms sex and gender tended to confuse the two, which were often used interchangeably. More recently, most sociologists have begun to distinguish between them, agreeing that the terms should apply to different, but related, concepts. While sex is defined in terms of biology and the reproductive organs one is born with, gender is typically seen in more social terms, as society's idea of how people should be, based on their biological sex. Gender, that is, is socially constructed to reflect society's expectations about how men and women should act, dress, move, and comport themselves in the context of everyday social interaction.

Under what conditions did gender inequality originate and under what conditions has it been maintained? Early answers to this question drew on biological differences between men and women and their associated reproductive functions to posit a "natural" division of labor between the two. Accordingly, men were seen as having evolved from hunters to family bread winners and providers, with women as child bearing, childrearing, and domestic experts. More sophisticated study of premodern societies, however, has discredited many of these assumptions, pointing to more diversity and fluidity in men's and women's roles than a natural division of labor could explain.

As more nuanced information emerged from research on early societies, perspectives on the origin of gender inequality became more complex. Two main explanatory approaches surfaced from these later analyses, one economic and the other political. One early economic perspective came from Friedrich Engels's book, *The Origins of the Family, Private Property and the State* (1884). Although some of his assumptions

are now recognized as incorrect, he was accurate in suggesting that early societies were more gender egalitarian than later ones, based on the latter's accumulation of material surplus. Social theorists (Blumberg 1978; Huber & Spitze 1983; Chafetz 1990) have proposed varying economic perspectives on the origin of gender inequality, taking account of labor conditions, the kinship system, and larger social politics. Generally, economic perspectives on gender stratification suggest that a high demand for women's labor, combined with kinship systems that promote inheritance through the maternal line and residence with female kin, promotes women's economic power and reduces gender inequality. Increased gender equality is evidenced in women's greater control over their fertility, choice of marriage partners, sexuality, and greater authority in the home and local politics.

Political perspectives on the origins of gender stratification examine how military situations and the organization of the state affect the relative power of men and women. One political theory of gender stratification evaluates ways by which control of weaponry, overall military situation, and social stratification and economic surplus affect inequality (Collins 1975). This perspective suggests that gender stratification increases as fighting and weapons are increasingly monopolized by men, and economic surplus and class stratification are high. Under these conditions, women are controlled as sexual property.

The industrial revolution reduced the importance of sex differences in maintaining the gendered division of labor. Machines replaced muscle power, and men's brawn became less significant as a source of energy. By the beginning of the twentieth century, bottle sterilization techniques freed women from the necessity of breastfeeding with its associated time and schedule demands. Over the course of the twentieth century, the invention of the birth control pill and other reliable contraceptive methods allowed women greater control over their reproduction, giving them relative freedom to move into the paid workforce in increasing numbers. According to the *Statistical Abstract of the United States, 2004–2005*, by the end of the century, nearly 60 percent of women aged 25 or older, many mothers of young children, worked in the paid labor force. This is a trend, moreover, that

shows little sign of abating. The sheer volume of women now doing paid work has, to a significant degree, lowered the level of gender inequality in the workplace.

The women's movement has been instrumental in reducing gender inequality. In the US, the first wave of the movement emerged in the mid nineteenth century as a reaction to women's lack of power in both the public and private spheres. Elizabeth Cady Stanton and Susan B. Anthony are well known as initiators of the movement, which ultimately turned its sights toward women's suffrage. After gaining the vote in 1920, the women's movement in the US became relatively inactive for the next 50 years, only to reemerge in the 1970s. This second wave of feminism reinvigorated the quest for women's empowerment in marriage and family and sought to equalize women's involvement and opportunity in institutions such as the labor force, education, law, and politics. While the struggle for women's equality is far from over, second wave feminism was able to mobilize many women (and men) on behalf of women's rights, overturning a number of institutionalized inequities embedded in law and promoting women's involvement in professional occupations and politics at the highest levels.

Nevertheless, both in the US and globally, women continue to be negatively affected by gender stratification. Although inroads have been made, gender persists as a core organizing structure around which inequality is arranged. In the workplace, occupations remain gender segregated overall, with "women's work" providing lower pay, fewer benefits, and less security than "men's work," even if comparable in form or content. At home, women continue to shoulder the lion's share of household labor, childcare, and domestic responsibility, even when employed in the paid labor force. These trends, moreover, extend globally, such that while women now constitute over a third of the world's labor force, they also, according to the Population Crisis Committee (1988), constitute 70 percent of the world's poor.

In the US, education is one area in which women have made substantial gains. In 1970, women comprised roughly 42 percent of undergraduate college enrolment; by 2001, that figure had risen to approximately 56 percent, a trend that is projected to continue (Peter & Horn

2005). Similarly, women today are awarded the majority of bachelors degrees (57 percent). Less change has occurred in the areas in which men and women earn their degrees and the earnings realized from them. In 2001, men predominated in business and engineering programs, as they did in 1980, while women have continued to earn more degrees than men in education, the health professions, and psychology. Moreover, the gender wage gap for bachelors degree recipients employed full time one year after graduation actually increased between 1994 and 2001. In 1994, these women earned 84 percent of what these men earned; in 2001, women's earnings had dropped to 83 percent of men's earnings (Peter & Horn 2005).

Women have made less educational progress elsewhere in the world. A gender gap in education persists in much of the developing world, where women's enrolment lags behind men's enrolment at all educational levels. Nevertheless, research continues to demonstrate the importance of women's education, which is positively related to beneficial national outcomes such as economic growth, greater life expectancy, and improved functioning of political processes (Hill & King 1995).

Where women are denied education and other rights, their health tends to suffer. For instance, lack of access to information on preventing HIV/AIDS has contributed to women's increased susceptibility to this devastating disease. According to the UNAIDS report "Women, Girls, HIV and AIDS" (2004), of those infected with HIV worldwide, 47 percent are women; in Sub Saharan Africa, that figure has risen to 57 percent. Besides lack of education, the spread of HIV/AIDS among women has been linked to their restricted access to employment, property ownership, and other rights, as well as their vulnerability to violence.

Violence against women continues to be a major problem, reflecting the extent of gender inequality worldwide. Domestic violence perpetrated against women by their intimate partners has become an issue of international concern, occurring in all countries and across all social, economic, religious, and cultural groups. Stranger rape has become a weapon of war, and women in war zones are habitually subject to sexual assault by their captors both during and after conflict. In some countries such as in Africa,

women ranging in age from infancy to maturity are subjected by custom to genital mutilation. This practice, condemned by international groups, reflects the second class citizenship of women and related attempts to regulate their sexuality. By the same token, constraints on women's ability to control their own sexuality and reproduction have historically been a hall mark of societies with high levels of gender stratification. Lack of access to safe methods of birth control and information regarding family planning and other reproductive options continues to plague women in a number of developing countries (Pillai & Wang 1999).

The following theoretical perspectives are among those invoked to explain the persistence of gender inequality. Sociobiological explanations suggest that the gendered division of labor is based on biological differences between men and women. The greater physical power of men, these theories suggest, leads to economic and political power. Women's reproductive functions, on the other hand, leave them vulnerable, dependent on men for protection and support, and without social power. Sociobiological explanations have been criticized for ignoring relevant cultural and social factors that affect the balance of power between men and women.

Structural functionalism peaked in the US in the 1950s with the theorizing of Talcott Parsons. Reflecting the powerful pro family sentiment that characterized this era, structural functionalists promoted the complementarity of gendered roles for men and women, particularly in the context of the family. Men were instrumental, rational, goal oriented, and unemotional, and their associated role involved acting as family breadwinner. Women were expressive, emotional, and nurturing, and, as a result, were expected to stay home, tend the hearth, and raise the children. Because of the economic aspect of the breadwinner role, men were valued more highly than women, whose family role involved no monetary benefit. Adherence to the structural functionalist notion of gender roles thus institutionalized gender stratification and inequality as a functional imperative of family life. Today, structural functionalism receives little academic support, as it, too, omits questions of power.

Conflict theory is another perspective that may be used to explain gender stratification.

In this account, issues of power do come into play, with gender inequality explained as resulting from the unequal distribution of resources and power between men and women. Men's institutionalized and superior access to resources keeps them in control, while women, who have less access to valued resources, are obliged to submit.

Feminist theory is a version of conflict theory, suggesting that the unequal distribution of resources, control, and power is intentionally (if subconsciously) exercised by men to dominate women. Women are at the center of feminist theory and patriarchy is represented as the social system that supports men's domination of women. The goal of feminist theory is to move beyond theory to actively reduce gender inequality in society and in women's everyday lives.

In some arenas, gender stratification appears to be declining; in others, it does not. Evidence of the former comes in the form of men's increasing participation in household labor and childcare, once thought to be exclusively women's work. Evidence of the latter can be seen in the intractability of the gender wage gap and the glass ceiling that women bump up against in the paid labor force. Moreover, while men are, in fact, sharing more labor in the home, most of the increase can be explained by women who do less rather than by men who do substantially more. Nevertheless, as women continue to press for equality and men recognize the benefits that shared parenting and involved partnering have for them, gender equality is more likely than not to become the norm rather than the exception.

SEE ALSO: Feminist Activism in Latin America; Gender, Development and; Gender Ideology and Gender Role Ideology; Inequalities in Marriage; International Gender Division of Labor; Matrix of Domination; Patriarchy; Stratification, Gender and; Women's Movements

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inequality, wealth

Nico Wilterdink

In all human societies beyond a certain minimum size, material possessions (such as land, animals, houses, tools, and consumption goods) are distributed unequally among individuals and groups. Insofar as these possessions have a monetary or exchange value, this unequal distribution can be described as inequality of wealth. Besides, and related to, income inequality, wealth inequality is an aspect of economic inequality which in turn is a dimension of social

inequality in the wide sense. *Wealth* can be defined as the monetary value of the sum total of assets or goods belonging to a certain unit. This unit may vary from a national society (national wealth) to an individual person (individual wealth). *Personal wealth* is the wealth owned by an individual person or a consumption unit consisting of more than one person (a household or family). *Wealth inequality* is usually understood as the unequal distribution of personal wealth in a society.

Wealth gives the owner certain advantages; in other words, it has functions for the owner. These functions vary with the relative amount of wealth, its composition (the specific goods that make up the wealth), and its institutional context (including laws of property). In general terms, three economic or material functions can be distinguished: wealth is a source of (1) income (profits, interest, rent, dividend as well as capital gains), (2) material comfort and consumption (the ownership of a house and various durable consumption goods), and (3) material security. This latter function is particularly important when collective arrangements that guarantee some minimum income (pension rights, life insurances, social insurance, welfare payments) are lacking. Personal wealth can also have wider functions for its owners: it is a basis of (4) relative freedom and autonomy, (5) status, and (6) power. It contributes to individual freedom to the extent that it widens the scope of alternatives in consumption and leisure, and gives the possibility to postpone work, or not to work at all. In most stratified societies in the past, the very wealthy were a leisure class that distinguished itself by its freedom from physical labor. Wealth is also a source of status. Large wealth holders may impress others by showing their possessions (a big house, a large piece of land, expensive jewelry, etc.) or obliging others by their generosity and material help. This may also contribute to power. More directly, wealth is a basis of power when it enables the owner to make other people work for him (as employees, servants, or even slaves). And it may be helpful in acquiring wider political power, for example, as a basis for financing an election campaign. Finally, personal wealth is (7) an important vehicle for keeping privileges within the family as it is

transferred to the next generation through inheritance. On all these accounts, wealth inequality is at the basis of, and connected to, various dimensions of social inequality.

In the course of human history, wealth inequality tended to increase with the growing size and complexity of societies. In larger agrarian societies, most arable land was typically owned by only a tiny fraction of the population. This landed aristocracy not only derived the bulk of its income from the land, but also had political rights and privileges with respect to those who tilled the land, the dependent peasantry. With commercialization and monetarization and the advance of capitalism, starting in Western Europe in the late Middle Ages, these “feudal” relations gradually disappeared, and property became more sharply differentiated from political power. It is only under these modern conditions that wealth inequality can be assessed with some degree of accuracy.

Several empirical studies have attempted to assess the degree of wealth inequality in a given society and trends over time on the basis of tax data. Most studies have been undertaken by economists and economic historians. Lindert (2000: 181) calculated on the basis of estate duty data that the wealthiest 1 percent of households in England and Wales in 1670 held 48.9 percent of total personal wealth; in 1700 this share had declined to 39.3 percent, but since then it rose to 43.6 percent in 1740, 54.9 percent in 1810, and 61.1 percent in 1870. These figures thus indicate a high and, for the period 1700–1875, rising inequality. A high concentration of wealth was also found in the city of Amsterdam, Holland, in the seventeenth century, where the richest 1 percent of families held 41 percent of total taxable wealth in 1631 and 45 percent in 1674 (Soltow & van Zanden 1998: 38). Less inequality has been found for the US in the nineteenth century, although here too wealth inequality tended to increase, the share of the top 1 percent of households rising, according to one estimate, from 21 percent in 1810 to 31 percent in 1900 (Schneider 2004: 29, Table 3.10).

For the twentieth century and beyond, more data and estimates are available. Table 1 summarizes findings on trends in three countries: the UK, the US, and Sweden.

Table 1 Share of top 1%/5% of wealth-holders in total personal wealth in the UK, the US, and Sweden, 1911–2000

<i>Year</i>	<i>UK</i>	<i>US</i>	<i>Sweden</i>
1911–13	69/87		
1920–2		37/	50/77
1929–30	58/79	44/	47/74
1935			42/70
1938–9	55/77	36/	
1949–51	47/74	27/	33/60
1960	34/60		
1969–70	30/54	31/	23/46
1975			17/38
1979–80	20/43	21/	
1983			21
1990–2	18/35	34/	
2000	22/42		

Several conclusions can be drawn from the figures in this table as well as the outcomes of studies on other countries:

- 1 The degree of inequality in the distribution of personal wealth is much higher than that of income. The shares of the top 1 percent or 5 percent in total personal wealth are normally more than twice the shares of the top 1 percent or 5 percent in total disposable income.
- 2 During the first three quarters of the twentieth century, wealth inequality in western countries tended to diminish, though this tendency was much less clear and outspoken for the US than for the UK and Sweden. The same trend has been observed for several other western countries as well, such as France, Belgium, (West) Germany, Canada, and the Netherlands.
- 3 Since the last 15–25 years of the twentieth century, this trend stopped or even reversed: wealth inequality increased in many western societies.

These developments more or less correspond, and are related, to trends in income inequality. In order to assess their sociological significance, one has to connect them to other social developments: the long run growth of national wealth; the increasing significance of collective wealth, such as pension funds and government owned assets; and the development of welfare

state arrangements that give a certain degree of material security and are, in this respect, a functional alternative to personal wealth. The tendency of decreasing personal wealth inequality, particularly in the period from about 1930 to 1975, went hand in hand with equalizing tendencies in other respects: decreasing income inequalities and the development and expansion of collective arrangements for material security, including pension rights and state guaranteed social insurances. The inclusion of pension rights in the distribution of wealth among individuals or households results in a lower degree of wealth inequality. The ongoing expansion of pension funds alleviates to some extent the tendency of growing personal wealth inequality since the last few decades of the twentieth century. On the other hand, this tendency is reinforced by other trends in the direction of more inequality: growing income differences and declining levels of state regulated transfer incomes.

Economic explanations of wealth distribution usually start with individuals. Basic determinants of individual wealth are: earned (non property) income, the savings rate, age, returns on wealth (property income and capital gains), and inheritance. The larger the differences in these respects, the larger the resulting wealth inequality. Several factors explain why wealth inequality is much higher than income inequality. First, there is a strong positive correlation between income and savings rate. High income groups save more not only in absolute terms, but also proportionally. Low income groups often spend more than they get, and as a consequence their wealth amounts to zero or is even negative. Whereas households cannot survive for long with a zero or negative income (unless they are very wealthy!), they can do without wealth (apart from some basic consumption goods). Secondly, the accumulation of wealth on the basis of savings on current income takes time; therefore, older age groups are on average wealthier than younger ones, and the differences within the older age groups are larger. A third factor is the cumulative interaction between income and wealth which is particularly important in the creation of new fortunes. In a capitalist market, one or a few entrepreneurs get a competitive advantage in new expanding branches; high profits are made

that can be reinvested and lead to a strong upward appreciation of the invested capital.

In the course of the twentieth century, labor incomes (wages and salaries) in western societies increased in absolute terms and relative to capital incomes: this explains, to some extent, why wealth inequality tended to diminish. Through savings on wages, small wealth was created that brought some redistribution in favor of formerly “propertyless” wage earners. A more specific factor, related to this, was the spread of home ownership. The introduction of new or higher taxes on wealth and income from wealth and/or wealth transfers (particularly inheritances) may also have contributed to some leveling in the distribution of wealth. Short term changes in wealth inequality are connected to differential capital gains, especially fluctuations on the stock market: since shares and bonds are highly concentrated among large wealth holders, a booming stock market leads to increasing wealth inequality, a recession on the other hand to decreasing inequality. This partly explains why wealth inequality increased in many western countries from the 1980s when stock prices started to rise more strongly and steadily than in previous years. A more general explanation is that returns on capital increased relative to average wages and wage incomes became more unequal. Moreover, in several countries tax reforms were initiated that were particularly advantageous for the well to do.

These explanations can be given a more sociological twist by relating factors of production to social groups or classes and conceiving the relations between these groups in terms of power and interdependence. The growth of wage income relative to capital income resulting in decreasing wealth inequality can be regarded as the manifestation of a shift in the power relation between (large) capital owners and workers (manual and non manual, on different levels) in favor of the latter, which was in turn connected to processes of industrialization, urbanization, and democratization. In the last decades of the twentieth century, on the other hand, processes of deindustrialization and globalization contributed to the weakening power position of organized labor in relation to corporations and their shareholders, which may help to explain the growth of income and wealth inequality.

SEE ALSO: Capital: Economic, Cultural, and Social; Class, Perceptions of; Class, Status, and Power; Income Inequality and Income Mobility; Poverty; Stratification and Inequality, Theories of

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infant, child, and maternal health and mortality

Michelle J. Hindin and Britta Mullany

According to the World Health Organization (WHO), health is a state of “complete physical, mental, and social well being and not merely the absence of disease or infirmity.” The health status of a population, including that of infants, children, and mothers, has traditionally been summarized via mortality. An infant death is defined as a death under the age of 1; the standard indicator used to measure infant death is the “infant mortality rate,” equal to the number of infant deaths under the age of 1 per 1,000 live births in a given year. A child death is a death of a child under the age of 5; the “under 5 mortality rate” refers to the number of deaths of children under age 5 per 1,000 live births in a given year. Given the multiple periods of risk related to a pregnancy, the definition of maternal mortality is more complex. A maternal death is one which occurs while “pregnant or within 42 days of the termination of pregnancy, irrespective of the duration and the site of the pregnancy, from any cause related to or aggravated by the pregnancy or its management but

not from accidental or incidental causes” (WHO 1948). The “maternal mortality ratio” is the most frequently used indicator to measure maternal deaths and is defined as the number of women who die as a result of complications of pregnancy or childbearing in a given year per 100,000 live births in that year.

INEQUALITIES IN INFANT, CHILD, AND MATERNAL HEALTH AND MORTALITY

The death of an infant or child is considerably more likely in a developing country as compared to more developed settings. According to data from 2003–4, almost 11 million child deaths occur annually – approximately 8 million of these deaths occur in the first year of life. The first 28 days of life (also known as the neonatal period) represent the period of greatest risk with approximately 4 million deaths worldwide occurring during this time. With average under 5 mortality rates of 89/1,000 live births for the developing world and 120/1,000 for the world’s poorest countries, and 8/1,000 for high income countries, a child’s risk of dying before his or her fifth birthday is at least 11 times higher in developing countries than in developed countries. The majority of child deaths around the world occur in Sub Saharan Africa and South Asia. High child mortality is strongly linked to high fertility rates, which in turn increases risks of maternal, infant, and child death; this cycle, known as the replacement effect, suggests that a decline in infant and child death rates is a necessary precursor for a decline in fertility.

In the scope of public health, maternal mortality is the health risk for which the largest divide exists between the developed and the developing world. Approximately 515,000 maternal deaths occur worldwide each year, 99 percent of which are in developing countries; consequently, a woman’s risk of dying from pregnancy related complications is 45 times higher in the developing versus the developed world. While the maternal mortality ratio (MMR) in the developed world is 12/100,000 live births, the MMR in the developing world is 440/100,000, with the highest risks being found in Sub Saharan Africa and South Asia. For each

woman who dies due to complications of pregnancy or childbearing, an estimated 30 women are afflicted with chronic disease, disability, or physical injury resulting from pregnancy related complications. The death of a mother can have dire ramifications on a family, particularly in the developing country context. In addition to the loss of the primary caregiver and of a productive worker, the risk of death for her children under the age of 5 is doubled (in some cases, even tripled).

THE CAUSES OF INFANT, CHILD, AND MATERNAL HEALTH AND MORTALITY

The causes of infant and child mortality vary substantially in developed versus developing countries. The major causes of infant and child death in the developing world include neonatal causes (including birth asphyxia and low birth weight), diarrhea, pneumonia, malaria, measles, and AIDS. As societies become more advanced, the leading causes of infant and child death shift toward congenital anomalies, preterm related disorders, sudden infant death syndrome, and others.

The direct causes of maternal death are unpredictable and often occur within hours or days after delivery. Globally, hemorrhage, sepsis/infection, and pregnancy induced hypertension are the leading causes of maternal mortality. Other prominent causes of maternal death, particularly in developing countries, include obstructed labor and complications of unsafe abortion. Ectopic pregnancies result in a small proportion of maternal deaths in more industrialized countries as well.

The vast inequities in risk between higher income and lower income countries are one of the most striking elements about infant, child, and maternal survival. Similar gaps in infant, child, and maternal mortality are increasingly being seen between wealthy and poor communities within most countries of the world. While the direct medical causes of maternal, child, or infant death can be roughly outlined as above, it is exceedingly difficult to divide the direct cause of a death from the individual, social, economic, and cultural factors that precede and impact that medical condition and its management.

As related to child survival, for example, recent research has indicated that the predominant underlying cause of the majority of global child deaths, including deaths attributed to diarrhea, pneumonia, malaria, and measles, is malnutrition, which itself is the consequence of numerous factors.

In an effort to simplify these complexities, Figure 1 presents a conceptual framework of infant, child, and maternal mortality. The framework depicts some of the pathways through which distal determinants, such as socioeconomic conditions and cultural factors, can influence more intermediate health determinants, such as hygiene and sanitation practices and in turn contamination of water or food, which subsequently impact infant, child, and maternal survival via proximate mechanisms (or actual causes of death), such as undernutrition or infectious disease.

The socioeconomic, cultural, and political context of a population is crucial in understanding patterns of health in that setting. These background factors set the stage for individual, household, and community wide factors that ultimately influence health outcomes by acting through maternal and/or environmental pathways. Poverty, for example, is perhaps the most common underlying factor that both "increases exposure and reduces resistance to disease, a synergy that contributes to the wide inequities" in infant and child health, as well as maternal health (Victora et al. 2003). In addition, risks to health are frequently compounded by the reduced utilization of and access to health services often found in poorer communities. The WHO and UNICEF have, for example, described maternal mortality as "a litmus test of the status of women, their access to health care and the adequacy of the health care system in responding to their needs" (WHO/UNICEF 1996).

Individual, household/familial, and community factors can play an important role in influencing the utilization of health care, which can ultimately impact health outcomes. A woman who wishes to seek health care for a condition but who has no decision making power in her household may, for instance, suffer the repercussions of being denied access to household finances to seek care by her husband or other family member. Other social factors acting at the household level, such as domestic violence

toward pregnant women, can also have serious repercussions both on a woman's health and on the health of her child(ren). Worldwide, as many as 25 percent of women are physically or sexually abused during pregnancy, usually by an intimate partner. Women who have experienced violence are more likely to delay seeking antenatal care; more likely to experience sexually transmitted infections, bleeding during pregnancy, and unwanted or mistimed pregnancies; less likely to gain sufficient weight; and more likely to experience a miscarriage, abortion, premature labor, fetal distress, and low birth weight infant.

Factors influenced by distal determinants but ultimately specific to the mother impact the survival of both her and her children. For instance, short intervals between pregnancies increase the risk of pregnancy complications, with children born three to five years after a previous birth having a greater chance of survival compared to children born less than two years after a previous birth.

Background factors, such as household sanitation, can also impact exposure risks to disease through contaminated air, water, or food, and increased insect and parasite vector transmission. As a result of distal determinants operating via these intermediate environmental factors, children in poor settings are more likely to experience malnourishment and have lower resistance to infectious diseases. Similarly, women in such settings are more likely to experience poor maternal nutrition and infections during pregnancy, which in turn increases their risk of giving birth to a low birth weight baby, who is susceptible to undernutrition and disease.

Each of these points along the pathways, as illustrated in Figure 1, represents potential points for health promotion interventions, in the form of both prevention activities (e.g., improved access to water and sanitation, immunizations for pregnant women and children) and curative activities (e.g., improved access to health facilities, oral rehydration treatment for diarrhea). The reduction of infant, child, and maternal mortality must thus be achieved through a multitiered approach that addresses underlying factors (e.g., poverty, education, sociocultural aspects), intermediate causes (e.g., environmental contamination, short birth intervals), proximate causes (e.g., malnutrition, disease), and the population equitable introduction




Figure 1 Conceptual framework of infant, child, and maternal health and mortality.

and monitoring of health promotion/disease prevention interventions (e.g., skilled attendance at birth, basic neonatal care, immunizations).

POLICY

The last two decades of the twentieth century witnessed an increased recognition of the important health needs and risks of women

and children globally. Figure 2 depicts an outline of the significant events impacting infant, child, and maternal health from the late 1970s to the present.

Numerous programs have been launched over recent years aimed at promoting infant and child health. In 1982, UNICEF, in collaboration with several other large international institutions, launched the Child Survival Revolution. In this initiative, reducing infant and child mortality

1976–1985	United Nations Decade for Women
1979	United Nations adopted the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women (CEDAW)
1982	UNICEF launched the Child Survival Revolution
1987	Safe Motherhood Initiative launched, Nairobi
1989	The convention on the rights of the child was adopted by the UN
1990	World Summit for Children and the Declaration on the Survival, Protection, and Development of Children
1992	Integrated Management of Childhood Illness (IMCI) Strategy by WHO and UNICEF began
1994	International Conference on Population and Development, Cairo
1995	The Fourth World Conference on Women: Action for Equality, Development, and Peace (including rights of girl-child), Beijing
1996	Generic guidelines for IMCI completed
2000	UN Millennium Goals launched through the United Nations Millennium Declaration
2000	Special Session of the UN General Assembly Women 2000: Gender Equality, Development, and Peace for the twenty-first century
2002	UN General Assembly Special Session on Children
2004	WHO strategy on Reproductive Health and Resolution on the Family

Source: www.un.org/esa/coordination/ecosoc/puc.htm (accessed August 5, 2004).

Figure 2 Timeline of recent significant events in maternal, child, and infant health.

was highlighted as an instrumental step along the journey of a country’s development, and four low cost interventions were singled out in an effort to reduce infant and child mortality. The acronym GOBI was used to summarize these four interventions (growth monitoring, oral rehydration therapy, breastfeeding, and immunization). Approximately a decade later, UNICEF and WHO introduced a new strategy named the Integrated Management of Childhood Illness (IMCI). Also aimed at reducing early childhood morbidity and death, the IMCI emphasized management of childhood illnesses with proper nutrition and immunization and improvement of service delivery at the household, community, and referral levels.

The launch of the Safe Motherhood Initiative (SMI) in 1987 represented an important commitment to maternal health, in the form of a partnership between WHO, the United Nations, the World Bank, and numerous governments and institutions. The primary aim of the SMI is to reduce maternal morbidity and mortality by encouraging the adoption of a number of maternal health promotion strategies (including family planning, post abortion care, antenatal care, skilled assistance during child birth, essential obstetric care, and adolescent reproductive health care).

An important perspective that has been gaining strength in maternal and child health movements has been an emphasis on human rights. The WHO estimates that 88–98 percent of maternal deaths are avoidable, and several international human rights committees consider the failure to address preventable causes of maternal death as being a violation of human rights. The Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination Against Women was one of the leading groups to clearly state this in its recommendations. Similar stances have been taken in relation to children; a shift toward viewing children as complete individuals has been crucial in framing their health rights as human rights, particularly in cases such as protection from sex trafficking of female children.

METHODOLOGICAL ISSUES

There are several methodological issues that arise for measuring infant, child, and maternal mortality. In the majority of settings where mortality risks run the highest, vital statistics registration systems are weak, and access to and utilization of health services are too low to provide accurate population estimates. Poor vital registration systems found in many settings lead

to less than a full account of all births and deaths. Household surveys are often used; however, the relatively rare occurrence of death (particularly for maternal mortality) necessitates unusually large sample sizes, and consequently requires substantial financial and logistical inputs.

The calculation of infant, child, and maternal death rates can fall prey to seasonal effects; since many risk factors (e.g., malnutrition) and diseases (e.g., malaria) can change considerably throughout the seasons of a given year, caution must be exercised in surmising rates from data collected only in certain segments of a calendar year. Similarly, rapid shifts in fertility trends can result in misleading conclusions regarding maternal, infant, and child death rates.

There are specific issues that arise when measuring infant and child mortality, with data quality issues being the most prevalent. Members of a population most at risk for having a child death (e.g., individuals without a home or living in extreme poverty, migrant or conflict affected communities) are also the most likely to be underrepresented in a vital events registration system; this problem is particularly problematic in developing country settings. Issues of underreporting and misclassification of mortality can be found for all ages of infant and child death, but are especially problematic for newborns. Beginning at the time of delivery, for instance, the correct identification of a live birth versus a stillbirth can be difficult. Though live births are used in the denominator for measuring rates of infant and child mortality, newborn infants who are born alive but die shortly (e.g., 1 minute) after birth may not be counted as live births, thereby underestimating the infant mortality rate. The timing of a death, or age at which a child dies, can be susceptible to both numerical rounding biases (i.e., respondents round up or down to the nearest age) and recall biases (i.e., respondents miscalculate the timing of the event). Retrospective recall difficulties can also result in misclassification of cause of infant or child death. In addition, child deaths are often the cause of sequential or concurrent illnesses, a factor that is important in ascertaining cause specific risks to infant and child health. Greater efforts must therefore be made in correctly classifying a single cause of

death, or multiple causes of death, allowing for the possibilities of co occurrence of diseases or synergy in causes of death.

Assessing the levels of maternal mortality is also difficult since there are issues of measurement, misclassification, and underreporting. Despite being the most frequently cited indicator for measuring maternal mortality, the MMR has a number of weaknesses. The MMR uses live births in the denominator, although a sizable proportion of women each year experience (and survive) pregnancies that do not result in live births. Therefore, the MMR actually inflates the risk of maternal death. In addition, women die from pregnancy related complications in the absence of a live birth, particularly women who experience unsafe abortions.

There are a number of alternatives to the MMR. Since most women become pregnant more than once in their lives, a more accurate measurement of maternal risk would take into account the lifetime risk of maternal death as a cumulative measure inclusive of fertility rates and the risk of dying from pregnancy related causes. For instance, maternal mortality risk could be calculated per 100,000 pregnancies, rather than 100,000 live births; however, the near impossibility of counting the number of pregnancies makes this calculation unrealistic. The maternal mortality rate (number of maternal deaths in a given time period, usually one year, per 100,000 women of reproductive age) may better capture the risks introduced by exposure through fertility. The indirect sisterhood method of estimating maternal mortality relies on reports from the respondents of household surveys about pregnancy related deaths among their sisters. This method, however, is costly since maternal mortality is relatively rare and therefore requires a very large sample size to obtain accurate population estimates. The WHO, UNICEF, and UNFPA have developed adjusted estimates of MMR that attempt to correct for underreporting and misclassification of maternal deaths.

Regardless of which estimation method is used to calculate maternal mortality, all methods are prone to misclassification bias and underreporting. Some examples of this include: the pregnancy status of a woman may be unknown at the time of her death; there may be fear or stigma preventing the report of an

abortion related, miscarriage related, or other maternal death; or the medical cause of death may be unknown. Given these difficulties, proxy process indicators are used as monitoring tools. The “benchmark” proxy indicator promoted by UNICEF, WHO, and UNFPA is the percentage of all births attended by skilled health workers, including doctors, nurses, or midwives. These figures are often highly correlated with maternal mortality, are cost effective, and easier to measure.

Data availability and quality are dependent on adequate funding. Several maternal health issues in particular are more sensitive to political shifts in resource allocation; data availability and quality are subsequently affected. Specifically, contraception, abortion, and comprehensive sex education, all of which influence women’s reproductive health status, are particularly prone to political tides; the controversial aspects of these issues often manifest themselves in restrictions, terms, and/or conditions from funders of maternal health services. A paradoxical cycle of inadequate funding, followed by reduced availability of reliable data, is created; the less reliable data collected on these sensitive issues, the less funding that will be devoted to their improvement. There is a need for increased and improved event surveillance systems, as well as additional and stronger data concerning the identification of risk factors and the pathways between those risk factors and health outcomes, that will ultimately lead to more effective, affordable, and appropriate interventions for infant, child, and maternal health.

The sustained improvement of infant, child, and maternal health has faced major setbacks, and will inevitably continue to do so. Populations in crisis, such as those being persecuted, or those living or fleeing from war torn or natural disaster stricken areas, face greatly magnified health risks. The international community must learn to better address the health needs of these populations, including their amplified health risks as well as the often accompanying reduction or destruction of health infrastructure in such communities.

Perhaps the most prominent setback on the global stage has been the HIV/AIDS epidemic. Women account for almost half of the 40 million people living with HIV worldwide.

In the hardest hit regions, most notably Sub Saharan Africa, women make up the majority of people living with HIV, and maternal to child transmission of the virus is a major problem. Approximately 6 million children worldwide have been infected with HIV since the start of the pandemic, and access to the means of preventing vertical transmission from mother to child remains severely limited in many countries. In a 2004 call to action, several United Nations branches stated that in order to slow the spread of the epidemic and mitigate its consequences, the “triple threats” of gender inequality, poverty, and HIV/AIDS must be addressed.

FUTURE DIRECTIONS

A new set of benchmarks and policies may improve the global situation for infant, child, and maternal health. There is a growing focus on the significance of educating and empowering women, both for the sake of women themselves and for the overall health of their families. In 2000, the United Nations implemented a series of Millennium Development Goals, pledged to be met by all 191 United Nations member states. The third goal highlights the recognition of the importance of women’s education by pledging to “eliminate gender disparity in primary and secondary education preferably by 2005, and at all levels by 2015.” As more educated women enter the labor force, new infant, child, and maternal health issues will arise, creating the need for improved policies for women workers and workers with families. The International Labor Organization has played an active role in creating minimum standards for maternity leave, workers who are breastfeeding, and the needs of working families.

To improve infant, child, and maternal health, researchers, policymakers, and public health practitioners must go beyond the direct causes of death. The framework presented here attempts to capture social and contextual inputs that have traditionally been excluded or deemphasized in many health models and frameworks. Models need to consider a range of factors from the sociopolitical context to the power dynamics between couples to better understand the causes of infant, child, and maternal health and mortality. In addition, there is a critical need

for research on improving strategies of health delivery systems and coverage of public health campaigns. Exploring multiple levels of influence on individual outcomes is required for increased understanding and prevention of mortality. In addition, a fundamental priority must be the improvement of surveillance and monitoring systems. The lack of high quality population representative data presents a major barrier to the development and implementation of more appropriate health promotion policies, particularly in developing country settings.

SEE ALSO: Family Demography; Family Planning, Abortion, and Reproductive Health; Gender, Health, and Mortality; Health Care Delivery Systems; Mortality: Transitions and Measures; Population and Development; Population and Gender; Socioeconomic Status, Health, and Mortality; Women's Empowerment; Women's Health

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infertility

Arthur L. Greil

Infertility is a term used by medical professionals to refer to the physical inability to conceive a child or to successfully carry a child to term. Demographers typically employ the word "sub fecundity" to describe this inability to have desired children. Some demographers use "infertility" to mean childlessness, regardless of childbearing intentions or contraception practices, but others utilize the term more narrowly and in conformity with popular and general sociological usage to refer to a woman's inability to give birth in the absence of contraception.

Although infertility must necessarily manifest itself in the female partner, the man or the woman or both may have the reproductive impairment. A specific male factor is identified in from 20 percent to 40 percent of those cases where a cause can be found. Since a major cause of infertility is female tubal factors related to reproductive tract infections (RTIs) spread through heterosexual intercourse, it is likely that men contribute to infertility in more than half of all infertile couples. It is thus ironic that, in many parts of the world, infertility is considered to be a "woman's problem."

Medical practitioners generally differentiate between "primary infertility," a situation in which an infertile woman has not had any pregnancies, and "secondary infertility," in which infertility has been preceded by at least one pregnancy. Demographers, epidemiologists, and other sociologists more often use these terms to refer to live births rather than pregnancies, using the term "primary infertility" to mean involuntary childlessness and the term "secondary infertility" to denote infertility experienced by couples who already have at least one biological child.

Most medical professionals consider a couple to be infertile if they have failed to conceive after 12 months of unprotected intercourse, reasoning that 90 percent of non-contracepting women will conceive within a year. This definition has been used by the National Survey of Family Growth (NSFG) in the United States and by researchers in the Netherlands, Norway,

and other industrialized societies (Schmidt & Münster 1995). The World Health Organization (WHO) considers a couple to be infertile if they have experienced two years of unprotected intercourse (after which time 95 percent of non contracepting women will have conceived), and some demographers have used longer intervals of either five or seven years (Larsen 2000). When self reports are used to measure infertility, individuals are considered to be infertile if they state that it would be difficult or impossible for them to conceive a child. NSFG's definition of "impaired fecundity" combines medical considerations with self reports (Chandra & Stephen 1998). Most studies of the social and psychological consequences of infertility utilize clinic samples, implicitly defining the infertile as those who are concerned enough about their fecundity to present themselves for treatment.

INCIDENCE

Various problems of methodology and data availability make it impossible to determine the incidence of infertility throughout the world with precision. The lack of consistent operational definitions of infertility makes it difficult to determine the numerator in an infertility rate with any confidence. But there is also uncertainty about the denominator, as no agreement exists with regard to who should be considered "at risk" for infertility. There are no agreed upon upper and lower age limits for fertility; nor is there agreement about how to deal with women who have not "tested" their infertility by attempting to have children. Not all countries conduct population surveys based on random samples, and those that do employ various methodologies. Finally, many factors influence the accuracy of reporting, and there is no reason to assume that these factors will be consistent from one survey to another (Schmidt & Münster 1995).

Somewhere between 8 and 12 percent of couples or between 50 and 80 million people worldwide are affected by infertility (Inhorn 2002). Lifetime prevalence rates are probably considerably higher; it is likely that 20 to 40 percent of couples in any given society have been affected by infertility at some point in their lives (Schmidt & Münster 1995). There are wide

variations in the incidence of infertility from society to society and from region to region and ethnic group to ethnic group within societies. Infertility is particularly prevalent in Sub Saharan Africa, to the extent that demographers often refer to a "Central African Infertility Belt." This higher rate is probably due to the higher incidence of RTIs. Secondary infertility appears to account for somewhat more than half of all cases of infertility in the industrialized world and is even more common in Sub Saharan Africa.

SOCIAL AND CULTURAL CONTEXT

While infertility is clearly of interest to demographers, the study of infertility also has interest for sociologists interested in gender, help seeking behavior, health care institutions, self identity, and subjective well being. Infertility is a health problem which can have far reaching effects on life satisfaction, well being, and psychological adjustment, especially for women. In societies throughout the world, parenthood is seen as an integral part of the transition to adult status. Because of the great importance attached to the childbearing and parenting roles, women often experience infertility as a catastrophic role failure, which can come to permeate every aspect of life (Sandelowski 1993).

Most research on the social and emotional impact of infertility has been marred by a reliance on clinic based samples of treatment seekers. Because many infertile couples do not seek treatment, this makes it difficult to generalize findings to all infertile couples and confounds the consequences of fertility status, treatment seeking, and treatment itself. Descriptive and ethnographic studies have generally concluded infertility is a stressful experience that leads to psychological distress, feelings of social isolation, perceived stigma, and stressed relationships. The findings of quantitative studies using control groups have been more equivocal. In a review of the literature, Greil (1997) concludes that most well designed studies find that the infertile are more distressed than the non infertile, but not in a clinically significant way. McQuillan et al. (2003) conclude that infertility distress is found primarily among infertile

women who remain childless. Most of the large body of research on the relationship between infertility and gender has found that women and men experience infertility differently, with women generally reporting greater distress.

Recently published ethnographic work (Inhorn & van Balen 2002) suggests that stigma and suffering of infertility may be more pronounced in developing societies, where parenting is culturally mandatory and where alternative roles for women may be less available. Infertility is both more common and more stigmatizing in many of the societies where fertility rates are highest and population pressures are greatest. Marcia Inhorn describes a "fertility–infertility dialectic," in which fear of infertility results in behaviors that lead both to high fertility rates and a high incidence of infertility. While infertility is seldom considered to be an important public health problem in societies where overpopulation is deemed to be the more serious problem, it may well be that controlling fertility rates will depend on dealing with women's concerns about *infertility*.

TREATMENT

From 30 to 70 percent of infertile women in industrialized societies report that they have been to a physician or a clinic to seek treatment (Schmidt & Münster 1995). Treatment seeking rates among industrialized countries appear to vary with access to health care, with treatment rates higher in societies with universal or near-universal health care coverage. Women with primary infertility are approximately twice as likely as those with secondary infertility to seek treatment. While reproductive impairments are actually more common among minority groups and those with lower incomes, whites and those with higher incomes are most likely to seek treatment. Many American women who are infertile according to the medical definition do not self-identify as infertile and therefore do not pursue treatment.

Increased media coverage in recent years has given the impression that the incidence of infertility has been rising dramatically in industrialized societies. In fact, this is not the case. It is, however, true that the number of *childless* infertile couples has been increasing in the

industrialized societies. Since female fertility declines with increasing age, the current trend in industrialized societies toward delayed child bearing means that a larger percentage of infertile couples than before are childless when they discover their infertility.

While the proportion of infertile women in industrialized societies has remained stable, the proportion of infertile women who have decided to seek medical treatment has increased dramatically in recent years in industrialized societies. Office visits for men have remained at virtually the same level as before. The trend toward delayed childbearing has meant that many women now discover their infertility at an older age when less time remains on the "biological clock." The advent of birth control technology may have given the infertile a stronger sense that conception is something that can be conquered via technology. Increased demand for medical services may also be related to the decreasing availability of non medical solutions to the problem of involuntary childlessness, such as adoption.

Advances in medical treatment, including but not limited to such advanced reproductive technologies (ARTs) as *in vitro* fertilization (IVF) and intra cytoplasmic sperm injection (ICSI), and the media attention that have surrounded them have contributed to a strengthening of the sense in developing societies that infertility is something that can be brought under control and that seeking medical treatment is the most appropriate response. A decline in the fertility rate has resulted in a drop in demand for obstetrical services in industrialized societies; when the supply of obstetricians exceeds the demand, gynecologists may be inclined to pay more attention to other kinds of services. Physicians may also have been encouraged to devote increased attention to infertility by the increased prestige that has come to infertility as a specialty as a result of publicity surrounding ARTs.

Treatment of infertility is often expensive, time consuming, and invasive. The infertile often find that treatment regimens assume a central importance in their lives. The fact that reproductive technology has made the hope for a child more realistic can make infertility even harder to accept and can lead the infertile, especially infertile women, to become very

treatment oriented. A group of scholars influenced by feminist concerns has argued that overreliance on ARTs reinforces the notion of mandatory motherhood and reinforces traditional gender roles and patriarchal ideologies. Increasing reliance on ARTs has resulted in a dramatic rise in multiple births.

Demand for infertility treatment from both biomedical and traditional healers is quite strong in developing societies. For example, infertility is said to be the leading reason for gynecological visits in Nigeria. Clinics that offer IVF and other ARTs exist throughout the world, but access to them is typically limited to the wealthy. It is in the developing world, where demand for infertility services is greatest, that access to infertility treatment in general is most limited.

Areas where further research is needed include patterns of sociocultural variations in the experience of infertility; lay conceptions of infertility; help seeking behavior; long term consequences of infertility; and the socioeconomic context of infertility treatment.

SEE ALSO: Fertility: Low; Fertility: Transitions and Measures; Marriage; Medical Sociology; New Reproductive Technologies; Stigma

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infidelity and marital affairs

Kaeren Harrison

Infidelity is about being emotionally or sexually unfaithful. It is closely equated with non monogamy, and as such is usually examined in the context of marriage. However, as constructions of marriage have changed since the middle of the twentieth century, the meanings attached to infidelity (or unfaithfulness, betrayal, or disloyalty) are no longer associated so exclusively with marriage. Awareness – and direct experience – of the fragility of marriage is high, ensuring that marriage is no longer uncritically perceived as a monogamous lifelong relationship. This is reflected in the popularity of prenuptial contracts, civil ceremonies, and the sharing of “relationship aspirations” rather than traditional marriage vows.

In his analysis of *The Transformation of Intimacy* (1992), Anthony Giddens provides a theoretical reappraisal of the nature of contemporary marital and partner commitment which is particularly interesting in the context of examining infidelity. In it, he describes the emergence of “confluent love,” a form of intimacy based on mutual self disclosure. The essence of confluent love lies in its contingency; couples construct a relationship of mutual trust and commitment alongside the knowledge that their relationship might not last for ever. The relationship will only last for as long as each member finds it emotionally and sexually

fulfilling. Moreover, within confluent love, sexual exclusivity may or may not be significant, depending on the understandings negotiated by the couple.

Such views about transformations in the character of commitment in marriage and marriage like relationships carry implications for understandings of infidelity. Of itself, a movement towards confluent love does not necessarily indicate that infidelity within partnerships is more acceptable than it once was. Indeed, it can be argued that monogamy (albeit serial rather than lifelong) remains a highly salient marker of commitment and stability in relationships because of the additional emphasis now placed on personal compatibility and long term satisfaction (Allan & Harrison 2002). Nevertheless, the recognition that individuals have a right, and perhaps a responsibility, to seek fulfilment within their personal relationships, creates a cultural climate in which the exploration and development of new relationships is socially more acceptable than it once was.

Popular discourses around infidelity reflect these complexities. The terms “having an affair” or “becoming involved (or intimate) with some one else” carry different meanings and emotional overtones from “committing adultery” or “engaging in extramarital sex.” The first two expressions convey greater tolerance and therefore a more ambiguous and muted moral message; the second two expressions retain a strong sense of social disapproval. In other words, responses to infidelity are shaped by the current understandings of marriage in the society and the social circle in question. Expressing this point slightly differently, the “rules” against infidelity are applied more readily to some people, and some groups, at some times, than others. An obvious example of this is the degree to which husbands’ and wives’ extramarital affairs have been understood very differently, with men’s infidelity being condoned more readily than women’s.

Attention must also be paid to the social or cultural variables that influence an individual’s behavior. In agricultural societies, for example, marriage and kinship – with their associated land rights – represent the key structures around which social and economic organization is built. Under these conditions, it is likely that infidelity would be seen as a threat to the social

order as well as to the marital relationship, and would be condemned through a range of religious, moral, and social sanctions. Even today, there are some fundamentalist Muslim countries where infidelity may be punished by death. Cross culturally, infidelity is the most frequently cited reason for divorce, and actual – or suspected – infidelity (usually on the part of the woman) is a primary cause of domestic violence and spousal homicide. These last two points, of course, indicate that for some women engaging in an affair carries very different risks and repercussions than it does for men, and therefore we should be cautious of an analysis of infidelity that is gender free.

However, recent research in Britain (Lawson 1988; Reibstein & Richards 1992; Wellings et al. 1994) has suggested that the incidence of affairs is increasing, and that behavior by men and women is converging. There is some evidence that many (or even most) men and women admit to having at least one affair in their first marriages (Lake & Hills 1979), indicating a move away from stereotypically gendered understandings of affairs based on “double standards,” and suggesting a more complex understanding of sexuality, fidelity, and commitment where women’s and men’s needs are not highly differentiated. And yet both men and women in social attitude surveys in Britain and the US demonstrate continued disapproval of extramarital sexual relationships, with the percentage of people saying that such relationships were “always” or “mostly” wrong consistently being over 80 percent (Scott 1998). This would suggest that there is significant dissonance between what individuals feel their relationship practices should be like, and what they actually are like, making it increasingly difficult for people to make sense of affairs within the context of shifting normative frameworks.

Nevertheless, affairs – whether within heterosexual marriages or other forms of exclusive partnerships – are clearly important life events for those who have them. Unfortunately, despite the significance of affairs, there has been very little empirical research undertaken. This is a curious omission, given that sexual matters are now discussed far more openly and when there is greater ambiguity around the moral status of affairs. The recent resurgence of interest in family diversity and family practices has

generated a lot of research on or about divorce, family dissolution and reordering, remarriage and, more recently, stepfamilies. However, little attention has been paid to the part that affairs might play in the process of marital breakdown and the character of new domestic arrangements. In other words, there would seem to be some disparity between the predominance of affairs on the one hand and the extent to which they have been studied academically on the other.

Among the reasons for the lack of sociological research into infidelity and marital affairs are the methodological issues and problems associated with the topic. Conducting research on issues of sex and secrecy raises serious ethical considerations, while the sheer variety of affairs makes any generalization difficult. This is a point that has been made by a number of authors who have investigated the broad nature of affairs and their consequences (Duncombe et al. 2004). Passion, transgression, secrecy and lies, betrayal, power, emotion work, identity construction, and gossip as a means of social control are common themes in Duncombe et al.'s edited collection, demonstrating the complex set of issues that face people who engage in affairs. There are few clues, however, as to why individuals might engage in affairs in the first place. Research is still in its early stages, but affairs tend to occur at different stages of marriage, possibly for different reasons. Early on, where partners have already engaged in premarital sex with others; after childbirth, when marital satisfaction dwindles; in early middle age, when individuals seek reassurance that they remain attractive; and in later years, when an affair may end an otherwise "empty" marriage. Men's affairs tend to cut across class, age, and marital status, whereas married women have markedly fewer relationships with young single men – a reflection, perhaps, of older men's greater resources and freedom, compared with women's "social depreciation" with age.

While the individuals involved (directly and indirectly) in affairs are important, it should also be remembered that these relationships develop, endure, and sometimes end within a wider complex of interacting forces. In other words, the patterns and pathways of affairs are framed within a societal context. The form affairs take, their importance in people's lives,

the extent to which they are "allowed" to continue, and whether they are condemned or condoned, are all shaped by broader social and economic influences. The sociological study of how affairs are constructed at different historical points in time, among different social groups, would certainly contribute to an increased understanding of institutions and practices such as marriage, sexuality, morality, and gender relations.

SEE ALSO: Divorce; Intimacy; Marriage; Plastic Sexuality; Sexual Identities; Sexual Practices

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information and resource processing paradigm

Koichi Hasegawa

Tamito Yoshida's notion of the information and resource processing paradigm was influenced by information theory, particularly Norbert Wiener's *Cybernetics* (1948). At first,

Wiener was reluctant to relate his idea of cybernetic control to the social sciences, but he later came to apply the negative feedback process – the most basic principle of the cybernetic control mechanism – to organic bodies, human beings, and human society. The basic idea of Yoshida's (1990) general systems theory evolved from Wiener's work through the generalizing of his logic. His central hypothesis comprises the following.

The natural world is divided into “non controlled nature,” “inorganic nature” such as the universe, and “controlled nature.” Controlled nature is composed of “organic nature” controlled by “genetic information” and “human nature” controlled by “cultural information.” From Yoshida's “evolutionist” perspective, any natural system, including that of plants, animals, human beings, and any level of society, has the common basic structure of an “information and resource processing system.” This means that any controlled system is “the system of resources and resource processing” controlled by “information and information processing.” In this context, “information” and “resources” are defined in very broad and abstract terms. For instance, cherry blossoms only bloom when the temperature is higher than 20 degrees, hence they are controlled by temperature, by information. Similarly, human action involves a highly complicated process of information and resource processing. Human actions are controlled by a wide variety of cultural and social information such as language, signs, symbols, norms, and values. When we drive a car and come to a red signal, we press on the brake pedal. In this case, our behavior is controlled by the red signal, traffic rules, orders from cranial nerves and so on.

The structure of such systems is always configured by elements and patterns of information processing and resource processing. This structure is also controlled by information and information processing, such as norms and values. In family life, we can observe a pattern of action among family members (e.g., the sharing of housework, talking, the communal eating of meals, and so on). Social system is a “social information and resource processing system among two and more actors, including individuals and collectivities. Social resources are divided into material, informational, human,

and relational resources. Material resources include energy and energy resources. Money, influence, political power, love, and prestige are examples of relational resources.

Yoshida's ideas led to the development of his theory of the self organizing system. An organic “information and resource processing system” is also a self organizing system, with a built in mechanism for structural change, so that when the performance of the system falls below a socially accepted level it has the potential to structurally change so as to increase its performance level. In cases where the system is performing adequately, it then remains stable and is able to maintain that performance level.

SEE ALSO: Social Change; System Theories

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information society

Hugh Mackay

The information society is a key way in which contemporary social transformation is conceived. Used commonly by policymakers, journalists, and futurists as well as sociologists, the notion encompasses a diversity of arguments which have in common that they see information, and information technology (IT), as at the heart of the burgeoning social order. Greater volumes of data are being communicated by a fast growing range of technologies, with profound social consequences for nearly every aspect of social life. On the basis of the growth of information flows and technologies, information society theorists argue that the changes underway represent not just quantitative but qualitative social change – transforming almost

every realm of social life, including households, communities, education, health, work, surveillance, democracy, and identities. Together, these changes are seen as constituting a new form of society, comparable to the shift from an agrarian to an industrial society. Rather than tightly defined, the scope of information society debates ranges widely and overlaps with other approaches to understanding contemporary social change. Other terms (“post industrial society,” “knowledge society,” and “network society”) carry similar and often overlapping meanings; while for some social theorists, different labels (“late modernity,” “postmodernity,” or “globalization”) better characterize contemporary social transformations. Even those who focus on the “information society” use the term to refer to different social processes.

Information society theorists can be broadly categorized in terms of those who see technology as the driving force behind the change, versus those who see social factors as shaping technology and history. This debate, technological determinism versus “the social shaping of technology,” lies at the heart of the sociology of technology. While sociologists have been concerned to refute technological determinism, countering the common, everyday way of conceiving of the relationship of technology to society, much work on the information society remains at least implicitly technologically determinist, while in the sociology of technology there is a growing interest in the constraining capacity of technology. Another key issue in the debate is whether and when quantitative changes (e.g., increasing flows of information, a larger information sector of the economy, or growing levels of ownership of IT devices) constitute qualitative change (the emergence of a new form of society, even an “IT revolution”). In other words, there is a debate about whether the situation is radically different from the past, or merely the continuation of long running phenomena or tendencies. A further distinction is between optimists and pessimists, on which count the debate is remarkably polarized: for some (notably Daniel Bell), the information society is a progressive development, characterized by greater freedom and fulfillment, whereas others (Herbert Schiller, Jürgen Habermas, Nicholas Garnham, Frank Webster) point to the continuation or exacerbation of long running

inequalities and patterns of control. Some contributors to the debate, and not just those in fiction and futurism, are normative in their writing, slipping into a mode of endorsing the changes that they identify as underway. Different theorists focus on different strands of the debate, notably the growth of technology, the transformation of the economy, the changing nature of work, new patterns of connection across time and space, and the coming to the fore of mediated culture. Contributors to the debate include economists (e.g., Fritz Machlup), geographers (e.g., David Harvey), planners (e.g., Manuel Castells), and cultural theorists (e.g., Mark Poster) as well as sociologists (e.g., Daniel Bell). The debate can be reviewed by considering the work of two key contributors to the field, Bell (who comes to the information society by identifying an information economy) and Castells (who provides a broad ranging recent account of the information society).

The information society debate has its origins in the work of Daniel Bell, who has provided one of its most detailed accounts. Generally, he wrote about “post industrial society,” but in some of his later work he refers to the “information society,” and the distinction matters little to him. Bell argued that western economies had deindustrialized, by which he meant that they had a declining percentage of the workforce working in the manufacturing sector and growing employment in the service and information sectors. Figure 1 shows clearly the transformation which lies at the heart of his thesis.

Bell describes a “march through the sectors,” from agrarian through industrial to post industrial, or information, society. The shift of manufacturing to China and the growth of call center employment are obvious contemporary manifestations of the changes to which he is referring. For Bell, pre industrial society is characterized by muscle power, industrial society by machinery, and post industrial society by information. The post industrial society is about not only the transition to a service economy, but also the growth of scientific knowledge, which now drives history as never before.

Bell’s thesis is rooted in, and draws heavily on, the empirical work of two economists, Fritz Machlup and Marc Porat. Machlup found that the knowledge industries between 1947 and

1958 expanded at a compound growth rate of 10.6 percent per annum, and thus established the high degree to which the US economy was dependent on its knowledge workforce. Machlup's definition of knowledge was his own subjective interpretation, Alistair Duff refers to this work as "riddled with errors," and Bell acknowledges that Machlup's data were "somewhat unsatisfactory." Nonetheless, there has been a dramatic growth in the use of codified knowledge which is transmitted systematically to others, and production and organization have become increasingly dependent on such knowledge. For Bell, knowledge has replaced labor as the source of added value, supplanting capital and labor as the central variable of society. Whether knowledge has *replaced* labor, or merely transformed it – perhaps increasing the skills required of the workforce – is debatable. Bell also used Porat's examination of the proportion of economic activity that can be attributed to information activities. Porat concluded that nearly 50 percent of the GNP and more than 50 percent of wages and salaries in the US in 1967 derived from the production, processing, and distribution of information goods and services.

Thus, Bell's analysis depends on definitions of "knowledge" and "service sector" and on the relationship between these and other sectors and occupations. There is considerable

debate about such categorizations, and about how the processes are (or are not) related. Cleaning, transport, and accountancy, for example, might be classified as "services" if they are bought in, but "manufacturing" if they are undertaken in house. In other words, divisions into service and manufacturing can be unreliable or even meaningless. In his work there is some confusion about, and sometimes conflation of, knowledge and service work. Like futurists, but rather unusually for a sociologist, Bell is happy to play the role of social forecaster, presenting his vision of the future: his work moves readily from analysis to prognostication and even to prescription. He is remarkably optimistic, seeing the post industrial society as one in which everyone will enjoy access to the world's traditions of art, music, and literature. Post industrial society means the rise of professional work, professionals are oriented towards their clients, and society becomes transformed into a more caring, communal society. Education, care, public interest, and the environment, he wrote in the 1970s, become more important than restricted concerns to maximize the return on capital.

Finally, while Bell's analysis fuses data and argument about the economy, employment, and knowledge, underlying his work is a clear technological determinism. He epitomizes the information society literature by according to




Figure 1 Four-sector aggregation of the US workforce, 1860–1980. *Source:* Bureau of Labor Statistics, cited by Bell (1980: 521).

technology a central role in social change: technological innovation is seen as resulting in social change. By contrast, sociologists of technology reject the notion that technology is somehow outside society and that technological change causes social change. Rather, they have been concerned to explore how particular social formations *give rise to* (or shape) the development of specific technologies (MacKenzie & Wajcman 1999).

Castells's work on the "network society" provides a more recent account, again at a macro level, of contemporary, global, social transformation. His concern is to provide a cross-cultural theory of economy and society in the information age, specifically in relation to an emerging new social structure. While Castells uses a different term, his work resonates with the tenor of information society debates. Like Bell, Castells documents the demise of traditional, labor intensive forms of industry and their replacement by flexible production. His account fuses the transformation of capitalism (notably, the growth of globalization) with changing patterns and forms of identity. He argues that, with the rise of the informational mode of development, we are witnessing the emergence of a new socioeconomic paradigm, one with information processing at its core. For Castells, the issue is not information as such, but the "informational society" – the "specific form of social organization in which information generation, processing, and transmission become the fundamental sources of productivity and power, because of the technological conditions" (Castells 1996: 21).

In other words, the issue is not simply that information is central to production, but that it permeates society. In the informational economy, networks are the new social morphology. Organizations are transforming from bureaucracies to network enterprises, responding to information flows, with economic activity organized by means of fluid project teams. Economic activity becomes spatially dispersed but globally integrated, reducing the strategic significance of place, but enhancing the strategic role of major cities. Networks are composed of interconnected nodes – places where information does not merely flow, but is collated, analyzed, and acted on. Thus, New York, Paris, Tokyo, and London are inhabited by a

managerial class with a cosmopolitan lifestyle, extensive networks around the world, frequent air travel, and using exotic restaurants. In contrast with earlier time space arrangements, there is in terms of flows no distance between nodes on the same network. In other words, geographical distance is irrelevant to connection and communication. So there are fundamental changes to the nature of time and space, with time compressed and almost annihilated; and space shifting to the space of flows: places continue to be the focus of everyday life, rooting culture and transmitting history, but they are overlaid by flows. The network of flows is crucial to domination and change in society: interconnected, global, capitalist networks organize economic activity using IT and are the main sources of power in society. The power of flows in the networks prevails over the flow of power – which might be read as some kind of "flow determinism." The Internet and computer mediated communication are seen as transforming the fabric of society – though Castells explicitly rejects technological determinism.

The other main strands of Castells's argument are about identity and culture. The transformation of economies has been accompanied by the decline of traditional, class based forms of association, particularly the labor movement. At the same time, state power has been eroded and new forms of collective resistance have emerged, notably feminism and environmentalism. The explosion of electronic media, specifically the development and growth of segmented audiences and interactivity, means the growth of "customized cottages" (as opposed to a global village) and a culture of "real virtuality." Although he acknowledges growing inequality, social exclusion, and polarization, Castells, rather like Bell, sees at least the possibility of a positive future, of new forms of communication and the network society offering democratizing possibilities.

While Bell focuses his analysis very much on the economy, and Castells provides a remarkably wide ranging account, the work of these two key analysts of the information society addresses what can be seen as the four core themes of the information society, or of information society debates. First is the new patterning of work and inequality. This includes debates informed by Bell regarding the decline

of manufacturing in western economies, and the growth of information and service sectors; the deskilling debate and the restructuring of work; and the growth of e commerce. It also includes debates about the growing gulf between the rich and the poor, and social exclusion – the “digital divide.” There is debate about the extent to which lack of access to information is a cause, rather than merely a reflection, of social exclusion.

Second is time space reconfiguration, compression, or convergence – different authors use different terms. The shrinking of time and space, examined by Castells, is facilitated by instantaneous electronic communication. Globalization and digital information networks lie at the heart of information society debates. Some invoke McLuhan’s notion of the global village and develop this in relation to the Internet, and a large and growing body of literature examines Internet communities, for example those of national diasporas. Multi channel television and global television flows are key components of global cultural communication. The erosions of boundaries between home and work and public and private are other aspects of time space reconfiguration.

Third is the huge growth of cultural activities, institutions, and practices. Culture has become increasingly significant in contemporary society, and with new ICTs the means to produce, circulate, and exchange culture has expanded enormously. The media and communications industries have a huge economic significance today, paralleling that of physical plant in the industrial era. Far from simply a matter of business and flow, culture connects closely with the constitution of subjectivity, with identity.

Fourth, there is a set of issues about the transformation of state power and democracy – with the growth of technologies of surveillance. Behavior in public space is routinely observed and recorded on video, while computer systems map personal movements, conversations, email traffic, consumption patterns, networks, and social activities. At the same time, democracy is facilitated by the capacity for many to many communication (as opposed to the broadcasting model of one to many) and the increasing accessibility of growing amounts of information, with the development of the Internet. New patterns of communication across time and space

enhance communication possibilities, and state control of the media is challenged by new technologies – satellite but especially the Internet – that easily cross national borders.

The notion of the information society has been highly influential in policy studies, notably in Japan, the EU, and the UN. From the end of the 1980s the EU identified the information society as a policy objective. It was seen that information and communication technology (ICT) could be harnessed to generate economic growth and to promote social cohesion. EU information society policies have their origins in economic policies to maintain competitive advantage, policies that followed the deregulation of state telecommunications in the 1980s. The Delors Report (1993) proposed a Task Force on European Information Infrastructures, which led to the Bangemann Report (1994) *Europe and the Global Information Infrastructure*. This referred to the spread of ICTs as a “new industrial revolution,” and advocated financing the revolution through public private partnerships. The Bangemann Report led to the Action Plan (1994), which has been revised subsequently but which remains the basis of the EU’s information society policies. These have focused very much on IT infrastructure, encouraging businesses to get online and governments to deliver services electronically. At the same time as focusing on neoliberal economic development, there is a concern with social cohesion – in that policies focus, too, on the digital divide. The tenor of the EU information society discourse is both technologically determinist and highly positive, with reports routinely extolling the benefits of IT – at home and work, and in education and leisure.

There are important UN policies, which have focused on social exclusion and the digital divide. The World Summit on the Information Society, with its second phase in Tunis in 2005, was convened to set the global agenda, to build consensus between stakeholder groups (governments, civil society groups, NGOs, and corporations), and to develop an action plan (with target goals for 2015). The UN sees ICTs and access to information and knowledge as central to achieving development goals, and of value in resolving conflicts and attaining world peace.

The information society remains a term very much in vogue three decades after its

formulation. In part because of its breadth, it is a malleable concept or debate. It continues to resonate because of the growing plethora of ICTs and their considerable significance in everyday social life. In turn, this has led to take up by policymakers, making the information society an important area in which sociological debate connects with public policy. Research councils have responded to this connection with publicly funded research programs. In methodological terms, the field has been characterized by heterogeneity, with a prominent strand – that shows no sign of abating – that focuses on quantifying the information society.

SEE ALSO: Consumption and the Internet; Cyberculture; Globalization, Culture and; Information Technology; Internet; McLuhan, Marshall; Media and Diaspora; Technology, Science, and Culture

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information technology

David Lyon

Information technology (IT) is generally taken to be a technical system for storing, transmitting, or processing information. As such it could refer to the paper documents and files of a bureaucratic organization, or even to hieroglyphs on rocks in the ancient world. While such broad meanings remind us of the larger context of human interaction with information, in the twenty first century IT usually refers to electronically based systems that draw upon a combination of computing power and telecommunications. Indeed, IT is now central to many systems that are increasingly integrated, producing a fusion of what was once referred to separately as electronic media and information and communication technologies.

INTELLECTUAL AND SOCIAL CONTEXT

IT may be thought of by some computer scientists as a merely technical matter, but in fact a very good case can be made that such are relatively trivial. In the real world IT is the product of economic, political, social, and cultural contexts and choices, as well as technical knowledge, that shape its development and use. In these contexts the shaping and consequences of IT are far from trivial.

The changes that occurred in IT production and use between the start and the close of the twentieth century are nothing short of astonishing. While paper based bureaucracies dominated the means of organizational practice at the start of the century, digital ones dominated them by the end, even though the “paperless office” never materialized as promised. But not only this – the ways in which production, education, administration, entertainment, travel, and other activities were done were transformed in large part through their interactions with and increasing dependence on IT. Today, for the vast majority in the global North, everyday life is unimaginable without a range of IT based systems, tools, and gadgets, some of which – like call centers or smart refrigerators – were almost unheard of in the 1980s.

One crucial change was the convergence of telecommunications with computing power. Joining telecommunications with computing enabled many aspects of the taken for granted world that many in the global North now inhabit – of instant remote interactions with computers, credit and debit cards, computer controlled machine tools, cell phones, and iPods.

By the end of the twentieth century, IT was integrated with all aspects of modern life, such that many started to speak of an information age based on new forms of work and employment, a new global economy, a spatial division of labor, and a general sense of contracting space and accelerating time – as opposed to the industrial age ushered in by the Victorians a century before. And IT also ceased to be thought of as an “external” factor. It had become embedded in countless processes, practices, systems, and devices.

MAJOR SOCIAL DIMENSIONS

At the largest scale, IT must be seen as one dimension of modernity. IT is now a major contributor to the distinctive character of contemporary modernity and, in social science, to the debate over how modernity is transforming itself in the twenty first century. If in early modern times a strong motif was reliance on science and technology as a vital determinant

of “progress,” one could argue that the emphasis shifted decisively from “science” to “technology” during the twentieth century. While dependence on science is still demonstrably constitutive of today’s modernity, it has in some ways been folded into technology, such that terms like technological society have far more popular resonance than scientific society. The term technoscience captures some of this folding.

More specifically, IT is implicated in a number of social, cultural, and political economic changes that are referred to variously as late modernity or postmodernity, or are considered under the rubric of globalization. Alongside the shift towards consumption and consumer capitalism (Slater 1997), reliance on communication and IT has helped to reconfigure some of the central institutions of social life and to change the contours of modernity (Lyon 1999) in the global North and to a lesser extent and some times in different ways in parts of the global South. The very notion of global mobility of information, persons, goods, images, services, wastes, and entertainment – basic to any globalization thesis – is fundamentally enabled by IT. And equally the shift towards more fluid social relations (Bauman 2000) associated with the postmodern can only be understood in terms of remote connections and instant communication based on IT.

IT affects many aspects of social, political, economic, and cultural life, though not always in ways foreseen by the pundits and marketers. This is why serious sociological analysis is so vital for grasping the realities of change. Whether in military, workplace, domestic, or entertainment spheres, IT is increasingly a *sine qua non* (Webster 2004) of organization and practice, so it is worth exploring as a major theme of contemporary social analysis. This may involve examining ways that IT extends human capacities, but also looking at how IT may be implicated in actual alterations in social life (Gane 2004). And none of this may be adequately considered without seeing how IT is implicated in regimes of power, whether within labor processes, bureaucratic organization, or policing and state control. IT is intrinsically bound up with contemporary regimes of governance (Rose 1999).

SOCIAL RESEARCH ON IT

IT is an enabling technology that experienced – and is still experiencing – exponential growth just because it is basic to so many major processes of production and consumption. It started with a focus on microelectronics and now has to be considered in relation to the wholesale convergence and integration of many different media. The growth may be jerky at times, but the overall pattern is of steady expansion. IT is now a major economic player with huge ramifications in every area. IT is also a crucial enabler for globalization (whatever it means) and thus implicated in current developments.

The treatment of IT in the social sciences began as a fairly minor subfield, but it is now seen as one of the major areas for social science research. Four phases may be distinguished in its development. The first was what might be termed popular IT, and this first appeared under the rubric of the microelectronics revolution or the information technology revolution. These studies were very focused on the amazing capabilities and potential of these technologies to bring about “social transformations” of various kinds. While such studies rightly recognized the epochal character of IT, far too much stress was placed on what the technologies themselves would achieve and equally too much optimism was expressed about their benign character. However, such studies also stimulated serious critique (Webster & Robins 1986; Mosco 1996), which served to move the debate forward.

A second phase might be called IT studies in which workplace organization, government administration, and other areas such as “virtual communities” were examined in terms of the mediation of relationships by IT. This empirical contribution has produced a number of treatments of lasting value. A third phase, inspired largely by French theory, could be called post structuralist IT studies, and these make much of the diverse contributions by Baudrillard and Lyotard. Later on, studies in the Foucauldian tradition and from authors such as Deleuze also became significant. Lastly, what might be called critical IT studies constitutes a fourth phase (and of course these “phases” overlap considerably with each other – they are neither historically nor conceptually independent). Such critical studies began by attacking the

technological determinism of early popular accounts of “IT and society,” but also made solid contributions of their own by stressing the political economy and the gendered and racialized developments of IT.

From the 1980s onward research councils in North America and Europe began to recognize the importance of IT and this was reflected in funding for studies of the social dimensions of electronically mediated relationships of all kinds. After the advent of the World Wide Web in the early 1990s, for example, the UK Economic and Social Research Council set up a multi million pound initiative under the title “Virtual Society?” Similar work has been pursued in the US and Canada. Such developments tend to encourage empirical research and, with the late twentieth century trend towards radical economic restructuring, they also tend to be tied more tightly to the competitiveness of the country in question (hence the Canadian Social Sciences and Research Council funding for work on “Knowledge Based Economies” and then the “Initiative on the New Economy”).

CURRENT EMPHASES

Classic work in social scientific treatments of IT was done by precursors in the field such as Canadians Harold Adams Innis and his student Marshall McLuhan, along with the philosopher George Grant (Kroker 1984). These and several others were also influenced by earlier and more general work on technology by Jacques Ellul and Martin Heidegger. One could say that Innis’s work was the most doggedly empirical, even though he was to originate the important “bias of communication” perspective (Innis 1962). McLuhan’s was less tied to political economy and attuned more to the cultural changes associated with new media in general, while Grant provided a deeper critique based in relational and ethical perspectives. These could be compared and contrasted with Ellul’s searing attack on mere “technique” (that loses sight of what he argued are more significant goals of human activity, such as peace and justice) or Heidegger’s argument that technology is not correctly understood as a “tool” or “means,” but as a way of interacting with reality (and is not necessarily entirely under human control).

The most significant early sociological treatment of IT came from Daniel Bell, whose work still stands as a milestone in our comprehension of the social dimensions of what he called post industrial society (Bell 1974). By examining carefully the occupational structure, Bell's "social forecast" proposed that "industrial society" – which it should be recalled was the standard sociological description of contemporary social relations for several decades in the twentieth century – was slowly but surely being replaced by something else. And among other things, a new kind of reliance upon organized technical knowledge was at the heart of this putative shift. In Bell's own work, and then in the work of others, the negative descriptor was soon exchanged for the more commonplace term "information society," a concept that retains its salience in the early twenty first century.

More recently, however, the large scale comparative studies of Manuel Castells (2000) under the general title of the *Information Age* have become the standard and the foil for analysis of the social aspects of IT. Castells's work is similar to Bell's in that he seeks some structural explanations for what he takes to be epochal shifts in economy, polity, and society, but different in several respects, too. Unlike Bell, Castells does not imagine that the US provides the model for "information society" or, as he calls it, "network society." Castells provides some comparative analyses of IT development in different societies, beginning with alterations in urban infrastructure – his interest was in "global cities" – but also examining new social and political movements whose existence and activities depend on the availability of IT, and new forms of criminality and social exclusion appearing in information societies (see also Stalder 2005).

During the last part of the twentieth century and into the present century IT studies proliferated into a number of constituent sub fields. In addition to the macro level studies of the information society, other distinct areas emerged. Internet studies became important in its own right (e.g., Jones 1999; Wellman & Haythornthwaite 2002), although this field is likely to change shape somewhat as other kinds of media (such as wireless cell phones) are integrated with Internet access. Science, technology,

and society (STS) perspectives are also important in this field and combined with "information science" approaches have produced important studies such as Brown and Duguid's (2000) work on the "social life of information." This in turn relates to work done in organization studies and management information systems.

As noted above, IT is also studied in relation to globalization studies and in terms of divisions of access (digital divides) that may be socioeconomic but also associated with race and ethnicity and with gender (Wajcman 1991). IT studies are also implicated in surveillance studies and in the analysis of contemporary governance. Most strikingly, since the attacks of 9/11 and subsequent attacks in Madrid and London, IT companies have been competing for contracts with governments to upgrade security arrangements, especially at borders and within policing and intelligence services. The ideals of "convergence" and "integration" of systems and departments have never been as prominent as in the current quests for interoperability and for networked anti terror techniques.

ANALYSIS AND CRITIQUE

The social analysis of IT does not of course take place in a philosophical or ethical vacuum. As with all social theory, explanations of processes, systems, and change inevitably refer to some kinds of valuing, to normative critique or at the most basic level, to views of the "good society" or its opposite. Rather than attempt the impossible, to purge theory of such features, it makes more sense to acknowledge the particular kinds of arguments being made and to debate the consequences of taking a specific stance. With regard to macro level theories of the information society this is particularly evident, not least because some early studies seemed intent on optimistic forecasts of general human benefit in the wake of the new technologies. But it is also, though less obviously, true of STS, organization studies, and of studies of IT and social divisions.

A sociological understanding of IT cannot but notice the role of cultural factors in IT development. The ideas of information society or cyberspace are replete with mythical or even

“sublime” characteristics (Mosco 2004). They relate to the supposedly beneficent effects of IT in their capacity to make life easier, more peaceful, or even to transcend the limitations of the body. Unfortunately, while there are of course labor saving devices associated with IT, and while some quests for social justice are indeed facilitated by IT and some IT based innovations (e.g., word processing) may be useful “prosthetic” extensions to the human body, IT in the real world is as caught up in the contradictions and struggles of social life as anything else.

But there is a further problem here. Those accounts of IT that gloss unavoidable aspects of the “real world” also distract attention from the questions of ethics and politics that responsible treatments of IT will always raise (even though these in themselves go beyond the purview of sociology; see Robins 1995, or, for another perspective, Lash 2001). Thus, while it is the case, for example, that globalization in all its manifestations is facilitated by IT, all the debates over globalization – who benefits, how distance “dies,” where sweatshops and waste dumps are located, how superpower hegemony is maintained – thus also implicate IT. And as IT applications do not simply “appear” but are sought and developed for particular purposes, the argument that IT is a “neutral” technology and it is “how it is used” that matters is shown to be not only unsociological and hollow but also dangerous.

IT is today wrapped with the packaging of global consumerism, although it is also basic to the military systems that ultimately back up what appears to be a world of “free choices.” That efficiency and productivity may be enhanced using IT is not questioned, but what might be worth questioning is whether these represent primary goals of social, economic, and political life. As Weber observed a century ago, the “demands of the day” make a significant call on sociology “as a vocation” (Gerth & Mills 1946). He argued strenuously against turning sociology into a vocation for “demagogues,” but he also bemoaned the demise of seeing sociological work in the light of larger purposes and of politics and ethics. This is as true of the sociology of IT as the studies of bureaucracy or of comparative religion that Weber undertook.

FUTURE DIRECTIONS

The sociological analysis of IT is likely to continue for a long time to come, even though the discrete term IT may disappear as the technologies are increasingly embedded in systems and products. At a basic economic level, knowledge based work, which accounts for a growing proportion of GDP in many countries around the world (including now, significantly, China and India), is highly dependent on IT. In every productive sector, IT makes an important difference and understanding this is in part a sociological issue. But IT is also involved in the ways that services, travel, education, and entertainment are organized, not to mention life in the domestic sphere. It is hard to think of an area of social life studies by sociologists in which IT has no impact.

IT is also implicated in several very significant current trends, especially those towards the safety state and the security economy. As concerns about terrorism have been added to the already existing issues of the so called risk society (Ericson & Haggerty 1997), security and surveillance will continue to play a prominent role in social, economic, and political life. The security economy is now a sector in its own right and commands massive markets, especially in the global North. These markets are frequently involved in dedicated surveillance technologies of various kinds and also in redeploying technologies developed in one area (consumer marketing in particular) for security purposes. Intelligence services, for example, in the quest for identifying potential terrorists, now use data mining tools invented for profiling consumers (Lyon 2003).

Social theories of IT are proliferating, but some key threads are likely to stand the test of time. Firstly, political economy perspectives that locate IT developments in the power relations of capitalist countries serve as a reminder that whatever the micro level changes and how ever genuine improvements are made in human welfare, there is a constant tendency that IT will be developed in ways that benefit some groups at the expense of others. Secondly, technology studies look at the ways in which artifacts themselves are produced and how they interact with systems and users. This reminds us of the contingency of IT developments. Thirdly, the

kinds of theory associated with particular aspects of IT development – in relation to race and ethnicity, gender, age, ability, access, and region – will continue to be important for the social understanding of IT. Fourthly, postmodern and poststructural theories (e.g., from Bau drillard, Foucault, and Deleuze) are likely to continue to stimulate new ways of thinking about IT as simulation, as discourse, or as assemblage.

Information technology has in some ways become as basic to social life as industrial organization was in the twentieth century. It thus warrants a commensurate degree of sociological attention that is clear, careful, and ethically critical.

SEE ALSO: Digital; Globalization; Globalization, Culture and; Information Society; Internet; Knowledge Societies; Surveillance; Technological Determinism; Technological Innovation; Technology, Science, and Culture; Women, Information Technology and (Asia)

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infotainment

Lauren Langman

The twentieth century, with its new forms of mass production and mass media, gave rise to what has been called consumer society, a world largely concerned with personal gratifications and desirable selfhood gained through consuming goods and experiences. An essential part of this new “amusement society” has been a focus

on entertainment from watching television sit coms to attending sport events, various rock concerts, or the symphony. As mass mediated entertainment became a growing industry, there was a proliferation of cable programming and cable news outlets, greater fragmentation of audiences, and a growing concentration of ownership. Thus the gathering of “hard news,” reports of breaking events of war and peace, prosperity and poverty, leadership, public affairs, or investigations of crimes became highly expensive, producing little revenue and ever less audience share. These various factors led to the erosion of barriers between reporting “hard news” and the production of “soft news” combining information and entertainment to produce “infotainment,” pleasantries about people, places, or events which provide the viewer with an agreeable form of entertainment “that is unrelated to public affairs or policy, and is typically more sensational, more personality or celebrity oriented, less time bound (meaning that the traditional journalistic norm of “timeliness” does not apply), and more incident based than hard news” (Patterson 2001).

Thus we have seen that whether in print, radio, or television, almost half of the “news” now concerns such things as celebrity revelations – often conducted by celebrity journalists, in which the private thoughts of a Britney Spears on sex, diets, and clothes are far more entertaining than how changing tax codes more directly impact people. Various human interest stories, sensationalist tabloid journalism, life style, personal finances, or the paranormal, what has been called “eye candy,” pleasurable to view, have now become one of the main sources of information about the “world,” or rather the world that many citizens inhabit, a world without war, hunger, poverty, or pollution, but filled with information about the loves and marriage of celebrities, their affairs and divorces, and how they decorate their homes. Clinton’s *affaire* Monica, from first revelation to published memoirs, garnered far more interest than his record on jobs, taxes, or the former Yugoslavia. While “infotainment” seems an aspect of television, it has also impacted much of print journalism, as for example *USA Today* reducing the vast complexities of events to a

paragraph or so. To maintain or increase readership, many respectable newspapers have included more tabloid “infotainment” and have moved closer to *National Enquirer* like reports on aliens in the government and monsters feeding on pollution.

It should also be noted that a great deal of talk radio and television that purports to be news and news commentary, generally presented by strong, charismatic “personalities,” has become a channel for conservative viewpoints. While people like Rush Limbaugh, Don Imus, or Bill O’Reilly may very well be witty and entertaining, much of what they report is not just biased or distorted but blatantly wrong, and viewers/listeners are unlikely to have access to more accurate reportage. “Infotainment,” whether celebrities’ lives, UFOs, wonder diets, or most political talk shows, is however more than simply amusing; it is part of a much larger set of processes that have encouraged personal gratifications at the cost of public concerns and thus serves to erode democratic governance. This becomes most evident when celebrities become politicians and political news is entertainment, whether it involves Cicciolina the Italian porn star, Ronald Reagan, or Arnold Schwarzenegger. As the Frankfurt scholars suggested, the “culture industries” serve an important conservative ideological function by reproducing the status quo and hiding its inequalities, injustices, and costs in human suffering.

SEE ALSO: Celebrity and Celetoid; Celebrity Culture; Culture Industries; Media and Consumer Culture; Popular Culture Forms; Popular Culture Icons

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in-groups and out-groups

Michael J. McCallion

An in group is a social unit an individual belongs to, interacts with, and shares a sense of “we ness” with. An out group, on the other hand, is a social unit or group of people that an individual neither belongs to nor identifies with. The construction and maintenance of boundaries (physical or symbolic) are the primary ways by which groups establish what it means to be “in” and, by contrast, what it means to be “out.” The basis of in group identity, then, is socially constructed through symbolic markers (boundaries) such as narratives, creeds, rituals, and social practices. Moreover, sociologists view such boundaries along a continuum of permeability (open) and impermeability (closed), which influences group member entrance and exit processes. In group identity, in other words, is always an ongoing achievement in which group boundaries are collectively generated, affirmed, maintained, and employed to mark differences between insiders and outsiders (Hadden & Lester 1978).

In his classic study of folkways, William Graham Sumner (1906) articulated the enduring notions of in groups and out groups and the dialectical relation between them. Sumner stressed the negative reciprocity between in groups and out groups, especially in the context of conflict over scarce resources. In an environment of scarcity, Sumner argued, individuals need to band together to compete with other groups for survival. Without such conflict and scarcity, neither strong in group attachment nor out group hostility would occur, as Sherif and Sherif (1953) have confirmed in their work on intergroup behavior.

Indeed, Muzafer Sherif and his associates (1961) conducted various intergroup studies, in particular their classic field group study of 11 and 12 year old boys. In stage one of their study, the researchers took a group of boys to summer camp and divided them into two groups, each group residing in its own cabin. Eventually two cohesive groups formed, with one group calling itself the Rattlers and the

other the Eagles. In stage two, the groups engaged in competitive sporting activities, which soon gave way to name calling, accusations, fighting, and raiding of cabins, involving some structural damage. At this point the researchers discovered that negative stereotyping had developed toward the out group, while in group solidarity increased. Moreover, it was concluded that the social variable increasing each group’s cohesiveness was threats toward the out group. In stage three, the researchers attempted to unite the groups through various common social events, but the intergroup conflict continued. It was not until the two groups had to work together to accomplish common goals (all pushing their broken down truck up a hill) that conflict decreased and cooperation ensued, leading to Sherif’s hypothesis that conflict arose from mutually incompatible goals and cooperation from pursuing common goals.

In recent decades, much social research has confirmed Sumner’s basic principle that conflict between groups often tends not to weaken, but rather to strengthen, groups internally. In other words, in group favoritism and out group negativity are strongly related, with some research (Tajfel 1982) finding that the mere categorization of people into groups can lead to increased attraction of in group members and devaluation of out group members. Ralph Dahrendorf (1964: 58) argues even more strongly that “it appears to be a general law that human groups react to external pressure by increased internal coherence.” Even before Dahrendorf, however, Lewis Coser published a classic book, *The Functions of Social Conflict* (1956), which argued that intergroup conflict clarifies boundaries, strengthens in group identity, increases unity and participation, and strengthens ideological solidarity within conflicted groups. Social scientists continue to observe these principles at work in a variety of settings, from ethnic relations (Gerard 1985) to military organizations (Elliot 1986). In particular, many studies in social psychology have confirmed the theory that out group conflict builds in group solidarity (e.g., Fisher 1993). Also, many studies in anthropology, psychology, and political science support these findings, with Stein (1976), in reviewing this literature, concluding: “In sum, then, there is a clear convergence in the literature in both

the specific studies and in the various disciplines, that suggests that external conflict does increase internal cohesion.”

Although research continues to confirm the findings that external conflict increases in group solidarity, other research has found that mere categorization (Karp et al. 1993) or conflict (Allport 1954) are not key or absolutely necessary for the creation or maintenance of in group solidarity and cohesion. Kollock (1998), reviewing this literature, writes that “it is the belief in future reciprocal exchanges between members . . . that moderates the temptation to defect and encourages cooperation. The expectation of in group reciprocity seems to serve as a very deep heuristic that shapes our strategic decisions.” Allport (1954) also found that attachment to one’s in group does not require conflict or hostility toward out groups, which stands in contrast to the inherited wisdom of Sumner’s work. Allport postulated, for instance, that in groups are psychologically primary, in the sense that familiarity, attachment, and preference for one’s in group comes prior to development of attitudes toward specific out groups. Moreover, he notes, in group love can be compatible with a range of attitudes toward corresponding out groups, including mild positivity and indifference or intense disdain and hatred. The bonds of in group solidarity, in other words, are not necessarily based on conflict/hostility toward outsiders or born of altruism via categorization of individuals into out groups and in groups, but rather, in many instances, in group solidarity arises from the practices and beliefs in the interdependencies of group members and expectations of reciprocity among the members.

SEE ALSO: Groups; Idioculture; Networks; Social Worlds; Sumner, William Graham

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insecurity and fear of crime

Philippe Robert

Insecurity and fear of crime are expressions designating the apprehension elicited by crime and, by extension, the field of research devoted to studying it.

In the United States, research on fear of crime took off following a study by a presidential commission on crime in the mid 1960s (President’s Commission 1967), which tackled the problem of measuring crime from a new perspective. Growing doubts about the adequacy of

police statistics at the time encouraged a search for non institutional tools based on general population surveys. This led Joseph Bidermann, Philip Ennis, and Al Reiss, Jr. to invent the victimization survey. However, when people in a sample were questioned about their fear in addition to any victimizations they had suffered, the two measures turned out not to coincide that well: some victims were not very frightened, some non victims were nonetheless fearful. Fear of crime thus gradually came to be singled out as an object of research. Even before this American tradition had taken hold in Europe, British sociologists had approached this research field from another angle: they had termed "moral panic" the excessive alarm elicited either by fights between youth gangs in holiday resorts (Cohen 1973) or by muggings (Hall et al. 1981). Elsewhere, sociologists or political scientists interested in local occurrences had studied rumors, such as reports that girls had been abducted by shopkeepers in one French city, or local signs of insecurity, the explanation for which was sought in the living conditions and social relations of insecure groups. The gradual reception of the American research tradition on fear of crime finally unified these different European strands to some extent.

Some subtle differences do exist, however, as evidenced in the terms used. North Americans tend to speak of fear of crime, whereas in Europe insecurity is increasingly becoming the accepted term, not only in German (*Unsicherheit*) and French (*insécurité* or *sentiment d'insécurité*), but also in European English. The two expressions are not exactly equivalent: recourse to one or the other may indicate, at least implicitly, differing conceptions.

Be that as it may, irrespective of whether we speak of fear of crime or insecurity, these expressions have become a part of the language of sociology because of the realization that apprehension is not a simple reflection of the risk incurred or of previous experience of victimization. Insecurity or fear of crime has become an object of research because it is felt to be *excessive*; attempts are made to dispel or to explain this apparent enigma. At the same time, these expressions continue to be used in public debate, and belong primarily to the language of the mass media and politics. Their conceptual coherence is faulty and sociologists may

consider whether research would not do better to replace them with more homogeneous objects of study.

The two main trends in research on insecurity and fear of crime may now be described. First, explaining why apprehension exceeds actual risk or experience has led to work exploring three themes. It may be claimed that insecurity is not so much caused by the intensity of the threat of crime to which one is exposed, or by one's experience as victim, but rather, that it results from media messages that unduly magnify crime. One may also wonder whether insecurity is not fed by disorder rather than by crime per se. Finally, the extent of apprehension may be adjusted by considering differences in exposure to risk or the greater vulnerability of some individuals.

Since apprehension of crime seems disproportionate in comparison with offenses actually committed, it seems common sense to accuse media coverage. The media everywhere devote a great deal of time and space to crime generally, as is readily observed, and most importantly, they mainly publicize the most spectacular and most frightening crimes, especially violent crime. The media, then, offer a dramatized image of criminality. Quite naturally, the media are deemed responsible for the gap between crime and the fear it elicits. Offending is good for filling up news columns, it is spectacular, in short, it helps to sell the media. Moreover, it is in the interests of certain other actors to feed the press, radio, and television with dramatic, fear inducing information about crime: politicians play on fear as a vote getting device or as a way of diverting public attention from more complex social problems such as unemployment; the police use it as an argument to support their demands for greater resources and to point up the importance of their work, sometimes even to silence criticism about their poor relationship with the public; lastly, some moral entrepreneurs find arguments to back their demands for greater repression, while pressure groups try to discredit some minorities by putting the blame for crime on them. As a sales gimmick, insecurity may serve a number of causes (Warr 2000).

However true all this may be, empirical research yields only lukewarm support for this commonsense argument. As usual, the message

delivered by the mass media is easy to observe, but its impact is much more difficult to determine. It is very tempting to assume that what is delivered is received. On further reflection, however, this assumption is not very solid: it leads to the postulate that the target of media messages is like putty, passively molded by it. A handful of studies do come to the conclusion that media messages on crime are instrumental in producing insecurity. However, some have been subjected to serious methodological criticism that sheds doubt on their conclusions, whereas many other studies are unable to establish any definite causal relationship.

As a rule, the available research tends rather to reject the media's ability to create fear of crime out of nothing. It indicates that a media message suggesting a threat to security is only received as such if it corroborates some personal experience felt as security threatening, or if it encounters a preexisting concern with security. If it falls on such fertile ground it may nourish insecurity, especially when people are subjected to constant media hype, particularly since people who are most sensitive to insecurity also tend to revel most in such alarmist messages. This may create a sort of vicious circle: people who are sensitive to insecurity problems welcome any corroboration provided by the authoritative media. Not only does the message then feed insecurity, it also legitimates it: this is not some personal whim, it is invested with the authority of the TV news program. But perhaps the influence of the media on insecurity stems mostly from the ability of mass communications to provide cognitive patterns, to give a definite shape to feelings of insecurity, its causes (*parental abdication* or *an overliberal justice system*), and the proper remedies (*zero tolerance*), thus furnishing ready made frames of reference.

Whereas the mass media's responsibility in creating feelings of insecurity must be qualified, conversely, their enormous influence on political personnel should not be underestimated. It may be that political leaders' experience of their own sensitivity leads them to point an accusing finger at the media at regular intervals.

The discrepancy between the risk of crime and the fear it elicits has propelled research in a second direction, which ascribes feelings of

insecurity to incivility rather than to crime, on the basis of Wilson and Kelling's (1982) article on broken windows. When signs of social disorder (e.g., drunkenness, youth gangs, harassment on the streets, drug dealing) and of physical disorder (e.g., vandalism, abandoned buildings, buildup of garbage and refuse) are allowed to accumulate in an area, the mechanisms of informal control are undermined, the housing market collapses, families who are able to leave move away to avoid being stigmatized by a neighborhood that is pulled into a downward spiral of disintegration, and feelings of insecurity prosper. The overview conducted by Skogan (1990) for the US conclusively marked the development of this type of research. The fact remains, however, that the underlying explanatory model may not be the same for those who think that incivility encourages crime, those for whom it primarily increases perception of crime (as is the case for LaGrange et al. 1992), and those who feel that it produces insecurity directly (e.g., Hale et al. 1994), the other possibility being that incivility affects both crime and fear simultaneously.

Another avenue of research has tried to correct the poor correlation between the extent of crime and the fear it elicits. In 1979, Balkin drew attention to the effect of exposure to risk: retirees and housewives who express great apprehension are less irrational than it would seem. Their risk of victimization should be correlated with their exposure, much less frequent than, for instance, a young man who goes out every evening; it is therefore greater than at first apparent. Stafford and Galle (1984) were the first to do empirical work in this direction. However, the Balkin effect can only work for street crime, not for housebreaking, burglary, or violence between intimates, which often have enormous repercussions. Many other factors operate in the same direction – differences in vulnerability, for instance. The prospect of being jostled is much more serious for an elderly man than for a youth of 20: any broken bone will heal rapidly in the latter's case, whereas the former risks permanent invalidity. The same is true of what Ferraro (1995) calls the *shadow effect* of fear of rape on women's fear of crime: behind any threatening situation lurks the far more terrifying risk of sexual violence.

However rich the three research currents outlined here, the fact remains that none has succeeded in completely dispelling the enigma of insecurity, and this legitimates the other broad area of research on insecurity and fear of crime. Are we dealing with a coherent social object, or do these labels, used in public debate, conceal more complex phenomena?

Many writers have attempted to break down the categories of fear of crime and insecurity in order to reach more consistent ones. Young Rifai, for example: as early as 1979 she made distinctions between general concern, at either a national or a local level, evaluation of actual risk in one's own neighborhood, and assessment of the probability of personally being a victim of a specific offense. The distinction between *fear* and *concern*, suggested by Furstenberg in 1971 (and adopted since in various forms – such as *concrete fear* and *formless fear* in the 1980 Figgie Report, and by a great many researchers) has finally prevailed. It is one thing to fear crime for oneself or one's loved ones, and quite another to view it as a serious societal problem. One may of course be both fearful and concerned, but the number of cases in which this is not true is sufficient to demonstrate the analytic cogency of this distinction. Although they may merge in some people, fear and concern are not driven by the same mechanism.

Fear for oneself and one's loved ones seems to be a kind of anticipation of a risk, hence its good correlation with local indicators of crime, be they police statistics or victimization rates, or with experience of victimization. To produce fear, however, the perception of danger combines with subjective feelings of vulnerability. The latter may depend either on physical causes, such as age or sex, or on living conditions. To take one example, some French studies show that people who are financially unable to leave their derelict urban area are particularly prone to fear crime, which they could only escape by moving out (Peretti Watel 2000). Concern seems to be less concrete, less tied to a personal situation. It views insecurity as a social problem rather than a personal risk, and therefore seems to be relatively insensitive to variations in actual risk or personal victimization. It is apparently linked less to vulnerability with respect to crime than to apprehensiveness

about societal transformations, which makes people relatively intolerant of crime, viewed as a sign of disorder.

These distinctions help us to understand why the link between insecurity and the risk of crime or personal experience of victimization seems to vary with the form – concrete or abstract – of the question posed. Another point is that it is easier to apply a single indicator to the measurement of concern than to fear, which is both local and fragmented: in the same population, during the same investigation, scores and profiles may differ considerably depending on whether the question has to do with fear at night on the streets, at home, in different kinds of public transportation, or for one's children. Conversely, concern does not seem to be a black or white variable: there is a whole range of types, from people for whom security is an obsession to the relatively unconcerned, and including the strongly concerned.

Although the distinction was first made in the US, many observers have pointed out that North American research seems to deal increasingly with fear, whereas European research, although encompassing fewer studies, is directed at both facets of insecurity. The difference in vocabulary on either side of the Atlantic definitely reflects diverging scholarly orientations.

Be that as it may, scholarly interest in insecurity or fear of crime is part of a deep seated change in ways of thinking about crime. Traditionally, interest focused on the extent of crime and its control, and even more specifically on offenders and what should be done with them. The main question then was: what should be done with that fringe of hardened repeat offenders who seem impervious to dissuasion by the law and the criminal justice system? Should they be rehabilitated when possible, and eliminated when not? The emphasis on insecurity places us within a conception in which crime is perceived as a mass risk, the harmful effects of which must be controlled while limiting the costs of public policies. The central variable is no longer the criminal as much as feelings about or experience of crime.

This change of emphasis seems to go along with the firm belief – carefully hidden but deeply rooted – among political leaders that public policies pertaining to security are mainly played

out on the symbolic register, through statements of intention and the impact of calculated announcements. Perhaps this should be interpreted as reflecting a degree of powerlessness. Certainly, one of the bases of the nation state is its claim to protect the security of people and their property. But concrete fears must be handled by local arrangements involving a number of protagonists, and these are difficult for national level officials to comprehend. (Conversely, local governments are increasingly using security as an argument to attract people to their city or region.) As for concern with security, it may well turn out to be a bottomless pit: a government can prove its inclination for law and order, but have greater difficulty making the future less uncertain.

This juncture is stimulating for the development of research, for which the strong demand for knowledge is beneficial. But it also puts a tremendous onus on it, as is always the case when a subject of sociological research develops out of a controversial area of public debate, in which the very terms used are, in themselves, one element of the debate. Research on insecurity and fear of crime will continue to accumulate at a rapid pace; its fruitfulness, however, will depend on the ability of sociologists to call into question the obvious, immediate nature of the very formulations suggested by those who sponsor their work.

SEE ALSO: Crime, Broken Windows Theory of; Criminology; Dangerousness; Deviance, Criminalization of; Hate Crimes; Media and the Public Sphere; Social Disorganization Theory; Victimization; Violence

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institution

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An institution is the fixing of stereotyped social interactions in the form of rules. In most cases these rules are made explicit and there are sanctioning mechanisms behind them. Yet sometimes these characteristics are absent, for example when people adhere to such rules simply because they feel urged to act in this way. An institution does not need to be a large organization. The largest institutions known are states or multinational organizations like the United Nations, yet there are also much smaller institutions, as for example marriage or monthly meetings of a group at a certain pub. Therefore, institutionalization is not a matter of size.

The term institution has become quite popular in the neo-institutional economics of Oliver Williamson and D. C. North. Their use of the term has recently spread back into sociology, in spite of the fact that it refers only to “constraints” on individual utility maximizing behavior due to the fact that there are always others trying to do the same thing. It categorizes institutions in terms of the transaction costs people save if they agree to cooperate with others. In this individualistic perspective, the essentially social character of institutions is omitted from the start. That does not matter much for economics, but this conception is of little use for sociology. Sociological concepts of institutions, institutionalization, and institutional change have in fact influenced economics in the first place. An institution can determine what appears to the individual as a “utility” or an obligation. So if one starts from institutions, one can explain individual behavior, rather than the other way round. This is what the sociological concept of institution is aiming at.

The first sociologist to use the term was Herbert Spencer. He described society as an organism. Accordingly, for him institutions were society’s “organs.” He distinguished six different types of social institutions: those related to the family, politics, religion, the economy, ceremonies, and professions. Another naturalistic approach was developed by Bronislaw Malinowski, who started with the needs of the individual. The function of a social institution is to fulfill basic needs of a group. On this basis, higher or second order needs may develop which also call for satisfaction. This leads to a distinction between primary institutions, which can be legitimated with reference to nature, and secondary institutions, which must be legitimated with reference to culture. Here, institutions appear as the “concrete isolates of organized behavior” in which groups of people satisfy their needs together.

There is another tradition in social theory that starts not with nature but with ideas. Sometimes institutions enact power over the behavior of individuals even where it is against their interests. This cannot be explained by need alone, and there must be other sources of institutional credibility. For Émile Durkheim, who described sociology as the “science of institutions,” these sources were the collective patterns of thought. They are as solid as physical objects for the socialized individual. But where does this normative and symbolic surplus come from? Following Maurice Hauriou (1865–1929), institutions are centered around a leading idea (*idée directrice*). This idea is shared by every member of a group and therefore constitutes institutions like law or the state. In order to provide continuity, this idea needs to be incorporated and personalized. Talcott Parsons further developed this approach: for him, too, society is based on norms and values. Yet in the Parsonian tradition, the term institution almost disappeared behind the more fundamental concept of the social “system.”

A third way of dealing with institutions tries to combine the natural and the symbolic factors. For the German anthropologist Arnold Gehlen (1904–76), institutions are necessary in order to give directions to human beings. Compared to lower animals, human instincts are reduced. Yet social life without directions

would lead to a Hobbesian war of all against all. Institutions therefore reduce complexity: they limit the possibilities to act. In so doing they not only fulfill the basic needs in a certain culturally fixed way, they also supply cultural meaning to all things, providing a “meaning of life.” On the basis of this “background satisfaction,” new possibilities appear which constitute the second order freedom of cultivated man. This philosophical approach was taken up by the seminal work of Berger and Luckmann, *The Social Construction of Reality* (1966). Their work integrates different approaches into a general theory of institutionalization. Following them, social interaction becomes institutionalized when typified behavioral patterns crystallize into role models that are known to all or most members of society. Such models can last for generations. Therefore, their internalization (the counterpart of institutionalization) requires certain narratives in order to legitimize these institutions. Institutions do not necessarily need to become “total,” as Goffman described in examples like prisons. The dimension of legitimation allows for an institutional adaptation to new challenges. For this reason, institutional analysis is not confined to finding formal organizational structures and necessities. It also needs to investigate the culture of an institution, which includes the legitimizing narratives as well as the informal narratives that allow for institutional continuity and institutional change.

Institutional economics has stressed the importance of institutional settings as restrictions on individual economic action. Economic sociology has reacted to this recent trend by showing that much more is at stake. Institutions matter even more than institutional economics admits. Economic action is always embedded in broader cultural and political settings. The market itself is an institution that needs regulation. This starts with a central bank that physically provides money, interest rates, loans, exchange rates, and so on; and it has cultural implications, as, for example, the issue of which “goods” should be allowed to be traded at all. Should there be markets for human organs and genetic codes? This is a question that is dealt with in ethical, political, and juridical institutions. The main object of economic analysis is the market. But there are

social institutions at work long before a market evolves. Therefore, the sociology of institutions is more relevant today than ever.

SEE ALSO: Culture, Nature and; Markets; Narrative; Organizations; Role; Social Change; Social Embeddedness of Economic Action; Socialization

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institutional review boards and sociological research

Zoe Blumberg Corwin and William G. Tierney

Institutional review boards (IRBs) are charged with ensuring the rights of volunteers who participate in research conducted through a university. Originally conceived after World War II to deter possible abuses in biomedical research, human subject review has expanded to research in the social sciences. The role of IRBs in research is not without controversy, especially as it pertains to sociological studies. Tension between IRBs and researchers centers on how the two parties interpret what constitutes

research and the effects of IRB regulation on research in general.

ORIGINS AND HISTORY

During the Nuremberg War Crime Trials after World War II, news of abusive biomedical experiments conducted by the Nazis drew attention to the importance of establishing ethical parameters for conducting research. The Nuremberg Code (1947) expanded on earlier directives issued by the Prussian government to protect the welfare of research subjects, including obtaining consent from participants in medical experiments. The much publicized Code outlined a broad protocol for judging the ethics and actions of scientists who performed biomedical research on human subjects, was intended for the international community, and served as the prototype for subsequent IRB regulations in the US.

The first major effort to establish IRBs at universities across the country and to articulate IRB guidelines occurred in 1974 when the US government created the National Commission for the Protection of Human Subjects of Biomedical and Behavioral Research. The commission was charged to determine the various distinctions between biomedical and behavioral research, establish a way to assess the risks and benefits of conducting research, outline the guidelines for subject selection, and define the boundaries of informed consent. The Commission's central policy document, the Belmont Report (1979), outlined guidelines for the Commission at the federal level and for individual IRBs at the institutional level. The report clarified distinctions between research and practice, identified three ethical principles intended to guide the protection of human subjects, and discussed the application of the three principles. The authors of the report intentionally utilized generalized language, thus leaving room for interpretations of details up to individual IRBs at each institution, a point with implications discussed below.

By 1991, oversight for human subjects policy in the US had been transferred to the Department of Health and Human Services which, in conjunction with 16 other federal departments, drafted what is commonly referred to as the

Common Rule (45 CFR 46.111). The Common Rule expanded on earlier regulations and required that universities create IRBs if their researchers desire to access government funding for investigations. Many universities, however, have expanded IRB jurisdiction to cover all research activities with human subjects regard less of funding sources. The expanded IRB role is most likely due to increasing university concerns of being sued over improper research protocols and methods.

In 2001 the American Association of University Professors wrote a critical response to the Common Rule outlining concerns of social scientists over governmental regulations on research, questioning the constraints that IRBs potentially place on academic freedom, and studying the applications of governmental regulations on social science research. In particular, the document offered suggestions for improving how IRBs address qualitative research which comprises approximately 25 percent of all research reviewed by IRBs. The AAUP document underscored the challenge of interpreting IRB guidelines given the broad definitions articulated in the Belmont Report (AAUP 2001).

IRBs are not exclusive to the US. US IRBs provide protections for subjects participating in foreign research conducted by US researchers and many countries employ their own system of human subject protections within their universities. International IRBs are structured around similar issues to IRBs in the US, yet the details of implementation vary in nuanced ways. For example, in the Netherlands, social scientists are exempt from undergoing IRB review unless their research poses clear physical or psychological duress on subjects (Bosk & DeVries 2004), and Canadian IRBs differ slightly in how they define "minimal risk" and "human subjects" (Center for Advanced Study 2005). Debates entertained by IRBs and researchers in the international community are reflective of those that occur in the US.

JURISDICTION

IRBs are responsible for translating federal, state, and local regulations into institutional practice. As such, IRBs are mandated to

approve, require modifications, or disprove of research activities related to human subjects and funded by federal resources. As noted, numerous universities now require all research, irrespective of funding source or researcher, to receive IRB approval. For example, any graduate student who writes a master's thesis or a dissertation must receive IRB approval. A recent study by the NIH found that few proposed studies were rejected by IRBs, but that approximately 80 percent required changes (AAUP 2001). The authority of IRBs is governed by principles outlined in the Belmont Report, but also is determined by the composition of IRBs, interpretation of exemptions and regulations, and treatment of informed consent. Most large institutions host separate medical and social behavioral IRBs. According to the Common Rule, IRBs must have at least five members, ideally from diverse backgrounds with respect to race, class, and gender, but also from various academic disciplines. Because the majority of IRB members come from biomedical fields, it is especially important for sociological researchers that IRBs are comprised of individuals who understand the nuances of social scientific work. If an IRB is faced with evaluating a proposal where no one is familiar with the research, experts are allowed to be consulted and participate in the review.

IRBs are guided by the three ethical principles outlined in the Belmont Report: (1) respect for persons, (2) beneficence, and (3) justice. Respect for persons emphasizes that individuals should be recognized as autonomous and treated with dignity and that persons with diminished autonomy (e.g., persons with certain types of mental illness, persons with restricted liberty such as prisoners) deserve special protections. The implications of this principle pertain to supplying participants with adequate information about the research project and ensuring voluntary participation. Beneficence requires researchers to do no harm and to maximize the possibility for benefits and minimize possible risks to subjects. The application of beneficence involves weighing the risks and benefits of each particular project. The third principle, justice, obliges researchers to distribute the benefits and burdens of research equitably. This principle relates to fair sample selection for the subject individually, but also

as a member of a social, racial, sexual, or ethnic group. The Tuskegee syphilis study of 1940, where rural African American men were used as research subjects and deprived of effective treatment, even though the disease affected a much wider population, is an example of how a specific population can be unfairly burdened through a selective sample.

Especially important to sociological researchers are the six concepts of exemption pertaining to social science research. They are (1) research in education settings on instructional techniques, curricula, or classroom management methods; (2) research involving the use of educational tests, survey procedures, interview procedures, or observation of public behavior, unless the subject can be identified and disclosure of the subject's responses could put the individual at risk of criminal or civil liability or could damage the subject's financial standing, employability, or reputation; (3) research involving elected or appointed officials or candidates for public office; (4) studies using existing data, documents, or records, as long as these resources are publicly available or the human subject cannot be identified; (5) studies of public benefit or service programs; and (6) research focusing on consumer consumption of food and the taste and quality of food (AAUP 2001). These categories are exempt because they are believed to exhibit minimal risk. However, what qualifies as exempt is also open for interpretation by university specific IRBs.

The majority of IRBs require written proof of informed consent to participate in research. Consent forms outline the study parameters, possible risks, and benefits of participating in the project, and require a signature from the research subject. Requiring written consent can pose problems for qualitative researchers in particular and at times must be negotiated with the institution's IRB. For example, the American Anthropological Association (2004) has argued that in some cases having research subjects sign a consent form can be alienating and even deter an individual from participating in a study. Examples of this include research with vulnerable populations such as individuals with stigmatizing illnesses (e.g., HIV/AIDS), or individuals who perform illegal activities (e.g., sex work, garment workers without immigration documents), or individuals who do not

believe in signing government documents (e.g., *curanderos* – medicinal healers – from rural Mexico). Other issues arise, particularly in the field of education, if non research activities, such as course evaluations, are conflated with exempt research. The Internet poses new challenges for obtaining informed consent, as researchers increasingly use email and chat rooms as sites for data collection. Still, researchers contend that obtaining consent should be a meaningful activity because it reflects the essence of individual autonomy (Brody 2001).

MAJOR DEBATES

Given the original purposes of IRBs, how well does institutional review fare with regard to sociological research? Despite the value they place on ethical conduct in research, sociological researchers are often at odds with the IRB process. On the one hand, IRBs have the potential to share resources and expertise with scholars, as well as highlight the importance of reflexivity in research. Yet researchers also complain that vague definitions and varying interpretations of research pose unique challenges to sociological work, that applying a biomedical model to social science research is ineffective, and that the implementation of IRB review inhibits academic freedom and restricts productivity. Further, many scholars perceive IRBs as increasingly more concerned with the protection of the university from lawsuits than with the protection of human subjects.

The amorphous character of definitions presented in the Belmont Report is particularly problematic for sociological researchers. For example, the report defines research as an activity designed to “test hypotheses, permit conclusions to be drawn, and thereby to develop or contribute to generalizable knowledge (expressed, for example, in theories, principles and statements of relationships).” This definition has perplexed social scientists who do not purport to test hypotheses or produce generalizable findings, but still are required to submit their proposed studies to their IRB for review. Also troubling for sociological researchers is the definition of the human subject as “a living individual about whom an investigator (whether professional or student) conducting research obtains (1) data

through intervention or interaction with the individual, or (2) identifiable private information.” The terms “intervention,” “interaction,” and “private information” can be interpreted in different ways. Even measuring the costs and benefits of a research project is subject to interpretation. IRBs, for example, can determine that while the benefits of a research study are reasonable in relation to the risks imposed on subjects, the benefits with respect to new knowledge are not substantial and thereby deny approval or request modifications to the study. Here the interpretation of what constitutes knowledge is open for interpretation and strongly influenced by the composition of IRB members. As discussed below, how an IRB interprets the Belmont Report’s definitions has significant ramifications for various types of sociological research.

In principle and in practicality, many researchers from the field of sociology voice concerns over the fact that IRB regulations derive from a biomedical model. Since the goals of sociological research as well as the methods often vary from biomedical research, this paradox poses problems for sociological researchers, especially for those who conduct qualitative studies. The examples of oral histories, ethnographies, and case studies illustrate the complexity of the inconsistency.

In 2003, after discussion with the American Historical Society, the federal government determined that oral histories do not constitute research and consequently are not subject to IRB review. Historians had voiced concern over how IRBs had been interpreting regulations intended for biomedical researchers which were “unsuited” to historical methods (Brainard 2003). The association argued that oral histories do not attempt to add to “generalizable knowledge” and that historians aim to describe a specific past and therefore do not need to undergo IRB review (Ritchie & Shopes 2003). At the core of this ruling was the interpretation of what it means to do research. While historians applauded the decision, they are now faced with the mixed message that what they do is not considered research. Consequently, a side effect of the loose interpretation of research is that it created a larger chasm between academic disciplines.

Unlike with oral histories, the American Anthropological Association (AAA) determined

that ethnographies qualify as research, but should be evaluated on a case by case manner due to their often complex nature. In many cases, ethnographers are unable to articulate hypotheses and procedures formally prior to beginning data collection due to the dynamic nature of the method. In a 2004 statement on IRBs and ethnography, the AAA (2004) pointed out that, due to the fact that ethnographic research is based on cultivating trusting relationships over time, IRBs need to recognize that consent is a changing and ongoing process. The AAA stressed the need to evaluate the socio-cultural environment of each research project in order to adequately assess risk. It is likely that most ethnographies will be classified as low risk since it is fairly simple to withdraw participation. A major area of contention for the AAA with regards to IRBs is the documentation of consent as discussed above, but also considering the intrusion that research paraphernalia (consent forms, tape recorders, writing pads, pencils, and pens) can have on securing trust with an interviewee.

The position of case studies is less clear. Some scholars argue that case studies aim to contribute to generalizable knowledge, can cause risk to participants, and thus are subject to IRB review; others argue that case studies do not rely on "systematic investigation" and generally invoke little risk and therefore should not be classified as research. How the IRB interprets research determines how case studies should be treated.

A practical result of this confusion is a logjam with regard to the approval process. The interpretation of IRB "rules" varies from campus to campus, and with different committees on the same campus. What was approved last year, or even last semester, may not gain approval this year. Graduate students, in particular, have faced delays in conducting research in large part because no one is certain how to proceed, so that everything needs to be reviewed by a committee. Even if the process were optimal, the result can be remarkably inefficient.

For many institutions, IRB review extends not just to research but into the classroom. Sociological scholars have emphasized the risk that increased surveillance, more rigid regulations, and emphasis on the institution over the individual place on academic freedom. Again, efforts to translate biomedical approaches to sociological research fuel the complexity of

ensuring academic freedom. Increased attention to human subjects as a result of biomedical failures, scrutiny of classroom teaching, and questions about what constitutes "evidence and scientific inquiry serve as fodder for limits on academic freedom" (Lincoln & Tierney 2004). It is suggested that this is partly because IRBs focus on research *plans* instead of potential publications, a method that works for biomedical research but has a complicated application to sociological work, since researchers often do not know what they will publish until the research is complete.

Debates in journal articles, conference papers, and online discussions suggest that IRBs have the potential to stifle innovations in research by discouraging research with populations who might appear to pose high risks to IRBs, slowing down the research process, and assuming a "one size fits all" model for nuanced types of sociological studies (AAUP 2001). Delays in IRB approval adversely affect the actual production of scholarship, as well as the perceptions about how to design future research. Lincoln and Tierney (2004) point out that a growing reluctance to approve research with children as well as restrictions on reflexive research contribute to self censorship on the part of researchers.

Concern has been expressed over burdening researchers with too much regulation and paperwork, a situation complicated by IRBs who are sometimes ignorant about sociological research methods (Pritchard 2002). At the same time, attention has turned to resisting "mission creep," or the inability of IRBs to cope with increased workloads caused by a misplaced focus on procedure over ethical issues (Center for Advanced Study 2005). Negative perceptions and experiences with IRBs have also been shown to demoralize faculty and students (Pritchard 2002). Graduate students witness the frustration experienced by their professors and opt to do research that they perceive will receive expedited or exempt review.

FUTURE

One solution to promoting understanding of sociological research is to ensure that members of sociology departments are represented on IRBs and that biomedical members are educated

as to the nuances of sociological research. More in depth understandings of the types of risks involved in sociological research can expand the potential for exempt review as well as lessen the number of required changes to research design. Other recommendations include sending research proposals to an IRB representative in home departments before submitting the document for review, thus decreasing the potential for an IRB member to misinterpret study goals or methods.

Kahn and Mastroianni (2002) pose an important question: How do we move from a culture of compliance to a culture of conscience? There are a host of innovative approaches to educating researchers about the IRB process. Universities now offer online certification for individuals conducting federal research, specialized journals highlight the continually changing issues facing IRBs, and online chat rooms provide a forum for discussing issues pertinent to IRB review (see www.irbforum.com). National conferences have also created venues for discussing the parameters of IRBs (American Sociological Association in 2005; Center for Advanced Study at the University of Illinois in 2003; Social and Behavioral Sciences Working Group in Human Research Protections in 2003). Graduate research seminars can incorporate sections on IRB review.

Given the public attention afforded to instances of university neglect of research volunteers and increasing concern of universities to protect themselves from lawsuits, it is unlikely that IRB regulations will relax in the future. In fact, trends in the last ten years indicate that IRBs have become more rigid. Consequently, it is critical that researchers continue to express vigilance over infringements on academic freedom and the adverse effects of IRB review on innovation in research. This can partially be facilitated through supporting sociological studies on how IRBs function (DeVries 2005). Continued dialogue and debate is productive not only at the institutional level, but in national forums as well.

SEE ALSO: Ethics, Fieldwork; Ethics, Research; Ethnography; Interviewing, Structured, Unstructured, and Postmodern; Methods, Case Study; Survey Research

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institutional theory, new

Chris Carter and Stewart Clegg

Emerging from the sociology of education in the 1970s, new institutional theory (NIT) has become one of the foremost positions within the mainstream of American management studies. It seeks to explain the ways in which institutions are created, sustained, and diffused. NIT's antecedents lay in the institutional theorizing of writers such as Philip Selznick a generation before. Adherents of NIT are keen to draw a distinction between "new" and "old" institutionalism. While old institutionalism emphasized politics and the role of conflict, NIT took legitimacy as its master concept. The old institutionalism focused on the existence of a negotiated order between different interest groups, while in its place NIT sought to understand the way in which the quest for legitimacy is a driving force behind the isomorphism of organizations. NIT is interested in understanding the means through which the socially constructed external environment enters the organization by "creating the lens through which actors view the world and the very categories of structure, action, and thought" (Powell & DiMaggio 1991).

Works by Meyer and Rowan (1977) and DiMaggio and Powell (1983) are generally held up as foundational or seminal statements of NIT. Constituting the two branches of NIT, they remain widely cited to this day. Meyer and Rowan examined why particular phenomena became institutionalized; that is, why certain forms were repeatedly enacted over time. Exploring the use of budgeting in the loosely institutionalized setting of a university, they argued that it came to play a more important

role because of the increasing need for university authorities to portray their actions to external agencies as following some form of "rationality." Their analysis highlights that such rationality is often a mere rhetorical veneer – an image existing only in a ceremonial and symbolic form – which might well be decoupled from what actually happens in the organization. Building on these insights, Suchman argues that this leaves three strategies open to organizational actors: (1) they ignore the actual performance of an initiative and choose to concentrate on celebrating the ceremonial aspects of the initiative; (2) they criticize and display cynicism towards the initiative, acknowledging that its results are problematic; (3) they champion reform of the initiative, thereby drawing a distinction between the troubled present and a more successful future.

The DiMaggio and Powell branch of NIT seeks to understand why it is that organizations are increasingly coming to resemble each other. They argue that this process of isomorphism is driven by the necessity of being seen to be legitimate in the eyes of important stakeholders, which, following Berger and Luckman, they see as an intersubjective process of social construction. DiMaggio and Powell identify coercive, normative, and mimetic dimensions of isomorphism. Coercive isomorphism, as the name suggests, occurs where an organization is compelled to institutionalize a particular policy, such as adopt an employment law or a tax standard. Coercive isomorphism is often found in global supply chains, where one powerful buyer coerces other parts of the supply chain to adopt a particular initiative or technology. Normative isomorphism refers to institutions adopting similar initiatives because they are regarded as constituting professional "best practice." The MBA qualification can be construed as a transmission mechanism for notions of best practice in management. The drive for legitimacy on these three dimensions increasingly leads organizations to resemble each other, at least superficially.

In management studies, contrary to their intentions, DiMaggio and Powell's concept of mimetic isomorphism has become by far the most widely used and tested of the three types of institutional isomorphism (Mizruchi & Fein 1999). It is this concept that underpins much of

the burgeoning research in management fashion. According to this perspective, management fashions are ephemeral and are adopted by organizations seeking to demonstrate that they are in symphony with the spirit of the zeitgeist. In the adoption of an initiative, some organizations are regarded as being fashion leaders, on the catwalk at the leading shows, as it were, amidst a blaze of positive publicity, while others follow more slowly, less as *fashionistas* and more as diffusionists, as fashion gradually trickles and distills down to the high street (Mazza & Alvarez 2000). After a few years, a fashion becomes *démodé*, leaving the organizational scene without an institutional trace. There is little empirical doubt that management fashion has become a feature of the organizational world. Some researchers (Mizruchi & Fein 1999) have suggested this is not the sole reason for the popularity of mimetic isomorphism. Its uncontroversial content – dealing with mimicry instead of power and conflict – make it perfect for making contributions to conservative American management journals. Thus, NIT has undergone a series of translations as it has entered the canon of management. These translations have taken it far from the initial work of DiMaggio and Powell and Meyer and Rowan.

NIT has been criticized for its weakness in being able to explain organizational change. As a social theory it has difficulty in explaining how change occurs. NIT's departure from old institutionalism marked a downplaying of power and politics, which means that, as a theory, it has little to say about conflict or hegemony. Similarly, NIT falls silent on agency. There have been recent calls to reintroduce agency into institutional analysis, a challenge that is being addressed by the emerging institutional entrepreneurship community.

Despite its limitations, NIT remains a popular position and it has the capacity to help understand aspects of the intersubjective relationship between an organization and its field (Powell & DiMaggio 1991). It can help us understand the adoption of innovations (Mazza & Alvarez 2000), long term shifts in organization fields (Fligstein 1991), and variation among nation states, an issue that is also addressed by the closely related societal effects school (Maurice et al. 1980). Indeed, with the latter we may say that a separate European New

Institutional School, more attuned to the classical sociological concerns of power, has been established. However, lacking the citational impact of the leading US journals, because of its European provenance, its impact has been less influential. Indeed, in an ironical way, this serves as a final example of institutional theory at work: those theories that become most easily institutionalized are those that are seen to have been published in what are regarded, by a hegemonic system dominated by US scholarship, in the most legitimate journals. Needless to say, these are those sourced in the US rather than elsewhere.

SEE ALSO: Institution; Institutionalism; Management; Management Fashion

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institutionalism

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There are many definitions of institution in sociology. Most of them are subsumed in the following: institutions are persistent social facts that regulate social behavior. "Persistent" indicates the role of institutions in stabilizing social life. "Social facts" capture the idea that institutions are the product of interaction and association and that they exist externally to individuals. "Regulate social behavior" represents that institutions sanction certain forms of social behavior and discourage others.

According to this definition, most targets of sociological study qualify as institutions. At a minimum, organizations, the state, social norms, laws, cultural values, and socially constructed knowledge are, or are enlivened by, institutions, and each of these has been the focus of one or more variants of institutional argument. Indeed, Durkheim (1982: 59) defined sociology as "the science of institutions, their genesis and their functioning." There is really no question among sociologists that institutions matter for social life. Instead, sociological institutionalism is directed at questions of which institutions matter most, how they impact individual behavior, and how they emerge and change.

INSTITUTIONAL FORMS AND FORMS OF INSTITUTIONALISM

There are a number of variants of institutionalism based on different emphases on these three issues. One way to organize these is along two dimensions that identify the social structures with which the institutions are most closely associated. A public/private dimension identifies the subjects of the institution. Public institutions apply to all members of a nation, culture, or general sphere of interaction such as an industry, whereas private institutions apply to recognized members of an exclusive social structure, such as a group or an organization. A centralized/decentralized dimension refers to the source of institutional authority. Centralized institutions are those created and enforced by some designated agent, whereas

decentralized institutions are emergent, and responsibility for their enforcement is diffuse. Archetypes of the four major forms of institutions identified by these two dimensions are laws (public-centralized), cultural values (public-decentralized), organizational rules (private-centralized), and social norms (private-decentralized). The social structures that house these institutional forms are, respectively, states, civil society, organizations, and networks.

Public-Decentralized: Culture, Values, and Civil Society

The public-decentralized quadrant is currently the most active in sociology, represented by the "new institutional" school that emerged in the late 1970s and closely associated with Stanford University (it is sometimes labeled the "Stanford School"). The seminal article was Meyer and Rowan (1977), which argued that many formal organizations implement structures that are consistent with widespread societal beliefs about legitimate approaches to organizing, and not necessarily a response to the task demands the organization faces. Organizing in this way can bring the organization resources, which are often dependent on legitimate action. However, it is not the conscious pursuit of the rewards of legitimacy that motivates action in this form of institutionalism. Rather, action here is more preconscious than calculative, based on the actor's socially constructed cognitions about their role and the expectations it entails (Berger & Luckmann 1967). This cognitive approach is a defining feature of this form of institutionalism.

The role of legitimacy as a mechanism for the new institutional school leads naturally to the question, "where does legitimacy come from?" The most common argument is that legitimacy is a function of frequency of occurrence, with a practice or structure becoming more cognitively familiar, and therefore more legitimate as it becomes more common, to the point where it may be sufficiently endemic as to be "taken for granted." The most compelling empirical evidence of this process comes from organizational ecology's theory of density dependence, which argues that an organizational form becomes more legitimate as a function of the number of organizations that employ it. The results of

dozens of analyses of organizational founding and failure are seen as supporting that theory (e.g., Carroll & Hannan 1999).

Legitimacy based institutionalism often examines the impact of institutional influence on organizations. The ultimate source of institutional influence from this perspective, however, is the concept of propriety inherent in civil society. Organizations are seen not generally as the source of institutional influence, but rather as a manifestation of it. Organizations stabilize the institutional environment by giving ideas a structural representation, which in turn reinforces them and facilitates their transition to taken-for-granted status. Although organizations are most often the target of institutional influence, an appealing element of this theory is that other social actors may be similarly affected. Some of the most exciting empirical applications of this form of institutionalism have examined states as the unit of analysis, identifying how they are subject to internationally embedded sentiments as to what types of activities are appropriate for a state (Meyer et al. 1997).

Within countries, pressure from institutions is not equal in all sectors of society. The relative importance of the legitimacy of organizational practices, as opposed to their direct implications for the organization's ability to achieve its goals, is greater in sectors that are more public. Consequently, studies on the structures of educational and health care organizations, and government offices, are among the most prominent in this literature. The literature is least compelling when it seeks to explain organizational features such as the marketing strategies of for-profit enterprises that cannot be clearly linked to ideas of propriety. This is not to say that this literature has nothing to say about the strategies and structures of for-profit organizations, however. There are a number of important studies on the processes by which organizational structures that represent societal values, particularly regarding labor relations and the role of women and minorities within organizations, become institutionalized among for-profit firms. A particularly interesting example in this line is Dobbin and Sutton (1998), which argues that the US federal government relied on its influence over the process of legitimation to affect a shift in employment rights that it did not

have the administrative capacity to force on organizations.

Private–Decentralized: Interorganizational Ties and Group Norms

An influential paper by DiMaggio and Powell (1991) forges a bridge between public–decentralized and private–decentralized institutions, and between the legitimacy based new institutionalism and its more realist ancestors. DiMaggio and Powell examine the tendency for organizations within a field of interaction to employ the same structures, practices, and procedures. Partly, they complement legitimacy based institutional arguments by more precisely specifying the mechanisms by which ideals enter organizations, for example, through the influence of the professions. They also recognize more direct mechanisms of interorganizational influence, particularly the possibility that a powerful organization may coerce others that are dependent on it. Whereas the Stanford School sees institutions mainly as preconscious influences on cognition, the concept of coercive isomorphism is consistent with the idea that organizations may promote or adopt certain practices due to more conscious calculations regarding their costs and benefits to the organization's goals and to important interorganizational relationships. This idea connects firmly to what is called the "old institutionalism" in organizational sociology, represented famously by Selznick's (1949) classic study of the Tennessee Valley Authority (TVA). Selznick shows how, in its attempt to maintain control and sustain itself, the TVA became infused with the values of powerful constituents in its environment, coming to represent and pursue their values and interests at the cost of the TVA's original goals. As with the new institutionalism, the old institutionalism characterizes organizations as laden with external ideals, even when they are not needed or even helpful for achieving the organization's operational goals. The difference is the logic of action, which for the old institutionalists derives ultimately from utilitarian pursuits of organizations and their participants. Norms may be internalized in this view, but their origins are in the interests and values of the participants of a social system, and

they are associated with regulatory rewards and punishments which are an important part of their influence (Parsons 1990).

Selznick and other old institutionalists are categorized as examining private institutions because organizations are not unavoidably subject to the influence of their interaction partners in the way that they are to the law or to public perceptions of legitimacy. At the same time, these institutions are decentralized because there is nothing official about the authority for influence among interdependent organizations. No bank is designated, for example, to encourage cooperative organizations to adopt capitalist organizing principles (a common empirical example of an ideal that leads to interorganizational coercion). Based on the behavioral constraints that emerge from voluntary association, the old institutionalism of organizational theory can be seen as comparable, at a higher level of social aggregation, to the norms of social groups. Indeed, the literature on social norms represents most of the sociology relevant to private-decentralized institutions.

Much of what sociologists know about normative control derives from social exchange theory. A fundamental work here is Homans (1950), which presents a number of insightful cases that show the micro processes through which the benefits that members derive from groups become the basis for the group's control over them. More recently, researchers have used more formal models to show that norms can align individual and group interests by encouraging individuals to contribute to collective goods (e.g., Coleman 1990). Norms are of obvious sociological interest in their own right, but they are also important for understanding the operation of the most significant social structures. In particular, research on private-decentralized institutions is being used in economic sociology to better specify just how social networks that connect individuals, organizations, and states affect the behavior of those actors.

Private-Centralized: Bureaucracy and Organizational Rules

The third category of institutions, private-centralized, is based on the role played by organizations and organizational rules as the *source* (as

opposed to the target) of institutional influence. The targets of private-centralized institutions are the participants in the organization, which may be individuals or other organizations in the case of a supra organization such as a trade association. Attention to organizational policies and bureaucracy as determinants of individual behavior is the foundation of organizational theory. The foundational argument here is Weber's (1947) illustration of how authority may derive from the rules of bureaucracy. Merton (1957) contributed a potent essay on the micro mechanisms by which bureaucratic rules grip participants, even to the point where they may sometimes inhibit the pursuit of the organization's goals. Subsequently, contingency theorists built theories that indicate which combinations of formal organizing principles are best to encourage particular behaviors from participants. Currently, the attention to private-centralized institutions from sociologists is low. Part of the reason is the success of new institutional arguments which have alerted analysts to the symbolic implications of formal organizational structures, rather than their direct influence on behavior. Private-centralized institutions are, however, the subject of a vibrant literature in organizational economics, one that borrows from and influences sociology. Williamson (1985) and others operating under the banner of "transaction cost economics" argue that formal organization and other institutional forms, notably the market, may be more or less effective for governance depending on characteristics of the transactions in question.

Public-Centralized: The State

The fourth category, public-centralized institutions, represents the state and the laws and policies it implements. Institutional arguments regarding the state's impact on the economy can be categorized into four broad types. First, the state is a fundamental source of the institutions that smooth exchange by helping citizens to make credible commitments (Campbell & Lindberg 1990; North 1990). This role of the state is particularly prominent in recent accounts of the transition from state socialism, where the costly absence of property rights, contract law, and the regulation of financial

markets becomes starkly apparent. Second, the pattern of economic behavior within a state depends on whether the state can commit to not “bailing out” subjects when they struggle. If not, subjects may be diverted from productive activity toward efforts to “hold up” the state for subsidies. Third, subjects’ willingness to invest in long term projects will depend on whether the state has the checks and safeguards to resist appropriating subjects’ wealth. Fourth, the state may affect the distribution of power and wealth, between rich and poor, between suppliers and consumers, or between rival organizational forms. Dobbin’s (1994) comparison of the development of anti trust institutions in France, the UK, and the US is an important example of the state’s distributional influence. Beyond these direct effects of the state on the economy, institutionalists such as Skocpol (1985) have also theorized as to the source of the state’s strength. Following Weber, they highlight bureaucracy as a key source of the state’s capacity to implement policy, but they also consider the state’s autonomy from other actors in society.

FUTURE DIRECTIONS FOR THEORY

The various institutionalisms all struggle with two questions: “how are different types of institutions interdependent?” and “how do institutions change?” The first question has become a pressing problem partly because of the pattern of development of institutionalism as a field of inquiry. Different schools of institutionalism have tended to focus on one kind of institution, typically arguing for its supremacy as an influence on behavior and slighting the relevance of other institutional forms. Nevertheless, some of the most exciting institutional arguments highlight the fact that the functioning of one institutional form, such as state regulation, depends on other institutions, such as norms derived from social cohesion. Indeed, Durkheim makes this claim in the preface to the second edition of *The Division of Labor in Society* (1984: liv), where he calls a modern state that governs unorganized individuals “a veritable sociological monstrosity” and claims “[a] nation cannot be maintained unless, between the state and individuals, a whole range of secondary

groups are interposed.” The dependence of the state on other institutional forms makes for an even larger place for sociology among disciplinary approaches to institutionalism.

Kindred interdependencies exist between other institutional forms. As Homans’s (1950) reanalysis of the bank wiring room indicates, organizational rules may be frustrated by opposition norms among the participants. In part interdependence between institutional forms occurs because actors are almost always subject to various institutions – an individual in the US is subject to the law, the policies of an employing organization, the norms of friendship groups, and the values of culture. More than merely acting simultaneously on the same targets, however, different institutions may interact with and enable each other. For example, Fligstein (2001) presents an economic sociological account of markets that emphasizes that a range of different institutions, including property rights, rules of exchange, governance structures, and conceptions of control, are jointly necessary to make a market.

The second and most pressing challenge for all forms of institutionalism is to explain the origin and change of institutions. As institutions stabilize social structure and constrain behavior, it is perhaps unsurprising that theories say more about the persistence of institutions than their change. Furthermore, the arguments about institutional change that do exist emphasize incremental change processes in which the past weighs heavily. For the Stanford School, the key mechanism is diffusion, whereby a practice moves from actor to actor, gaining the momentum of legitimacy on the way (DiMaggio & Powell 1991). Other institutional schools highlight path dependence as a mechanism of institutional change (e.g., North 1990). Neither of these approaches accounts for the discontinuities in institutional trajectories which are perhaps the key moments of institutionalized life, or which institutions will be created in the first place. A promising development that targets such discontinuities is the combination of institutionalism with social movement theories. This approach sees institutional entrepreneurs playing a key role of motivating and organizing others to affect institutional change. To do so, they may broker between social sites and institutional ideas and frame potential institutions

in ways that appeal to preexisting institutions. Furthermore, elements of the institutional framework may be reconstructed into new institutions in a form of bricolage. This approach therefore combines most extant institutional theories, recognizing that institutions affect individual interest but require collective consent, and that institutional change depends on preexisting institutions but may sometimes involve a turning point that shifts the institutional trajectory.

SEE ALSO: Capitalism, Social Institutions of; Durkheim, Émile; Economy (Sociological Approach); Institutional Theory, New; Institutionalism; Law, Economy and; Legitimacy; Organization Theory; Social Movements; State; Weber, Max

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intellectual property

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Any form of literature, science, music, film, or computer program can be protected by copyright to prevent third parties from making copies without written permission. Copyright is the law of authorship and dates back to the Statute of Anne (1709) passed in England to protect the rights of authors and publishers from piracy. The law has been progressively elaborated in Europe and North America to grant copyright for a fixed term to the estate of deceased authors and protect authors from the violation of their rights through new technologies of reproduction and exchange. However, the balance between the rights of authors and freedom of information is a delicate one and is regularly subject to legal challenge. In the US the First Amendment, which guarantees free speech and a free press, has been used by litigants as the basis to contest the reach of copyright.

The issue has escalated in legal and popular culture as new electronic technologies of reproduction and file sharing, such as the photocopier, home audiotape, videotape machines, and computers, have become available. The First Amendment raises the issue of “fair use” through private educational and leisure practices, news reporting, comment, and criticism. The exchange of information and opinions in education and the press would be violated by an over zealous application of copyright principles. In 1994 the US Supreme Court ruled that “transformative use,” which alters the original to create a new work, through interpretation and parody, is acceptable. The ruling had wide spread ramifications for hip hop, rap, and other forms of new music which employ sampling technology. The landmark case on this issue is *Acuff Rose Music v. 2 Live Crew* (1991). In 1965 Acuff Rose Music acquired the rights to the song *Oh Pretty Woman* from its writers, the pop star Roy Orbison and William Dees. In 1990 the controversial rap group 2 Live Crew recorded its own version of the song without seeking copyright clearance. Acuff Rose sued for infringement of its copyright. The Trial Court ruled that while 2 Live Crew had indeed infringed copyright, their version of the song constituted parody rather than imitation. It upheld the right of 2 Live Crew to engage in parody without legal constraint. However, the question of when “fair use” becomes “literary larceny” is extremely thorny and is obviously open to conflicting aesthetic judgments.

The Internet vastly increases the flow of data exchange and creates unprecedented challenges for policing and the application of copyright. Without a commercially viable system of monitoring file exchange, the integrity of copyright relies on the probity of Internet users. In the late 1990s the development of peer to peer (P2P) file exchange systems such as *Napster* seriously eroded the market share of record companies. This provoked a protracted and as yet unresolved series of legal disputes between P2P providers and copyright holders. The development of legal, fee based download systems such as the *Apple Music Store* has been a partial solution to the problem. But it has not eliminated illegal file exchange. Broadband technology will exacerbate the problem by allowing more information to be downloaded

at faster speeds, making the downloading of full length feature films and computer programs as quick and easy as downloading a 3 minute pop single.

SEE ALSO: Consumption; Internet; Modernity; Popular Culture; Popular Culture Forms (P2P)

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intelligence tests

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Intelligence is a concept whose meaning has been fashioned by the discipline of psychology. Psychologists view intelligence as a set of mental abilities that are inferred from an individual's performance on an intelligence test. In defining intelligence as one or more abilities, psychologists seek to demarcate it from the accumulation of specific knowledge to which only some individuals are exposed. In this view, intelligence is a broad cognitive capacity that, though often correlated with the acquisition of specific knowledge, is conceptually distinct from it.

In emphasizing intelligence as a quality of individual cognition, psychologists differentiate it from other individual qualities, such as personality, character, social skills, and physical abilities. Such qualities may be highly valued by a society, and those who possess them may have different life chances than those who do

not; but because they are not cognitive skills, they are not acknowledged by most scholars as forms of intelligence. The prevailing view of intelligence as an attribute of the individual also does not admit the more social view of cognition that sees human cognition as distributed across a group of individuals in a particular social setting, who use tools and artifacts to represent knowledge (Hutchins 1995).

Intelligence can be characterized as a hierarchical set of cognitive abilities, with Carroll's (1993) representation of three levels of mental abilities the most widely cited. At the lowest level are highly specific skills represented by performance on specific tests. One well known intelligence test, the WAIS III (1997), has 14 specific tests, ranging from digit span (in which the examinee repeats an orally presented sequence of numbers either forwards or backwards) to picture completion (in which an examinee must identify what is missing from a color picture of a common object or setting). These specific tests are distinct in the sense that performance on one does not perfectly predict performance on another. But individuals may perform better on some clusters of these specific tests than on others, and the correlations among scores on such tests can be accounted for by a smaller number of factors than the original number of tests. Carroll (1993), in an exhaustive study of the correlations among mental test scores, concluded that there are eight factors that can adequately represent the clusters: broad visual perception, broad auditory perception, broad retrieval ability, broad cognitive speediness, processing speed, general memory and learning, crystallized intelligence, and fluid intelligence.

As was true for performance on specific tests, performance on one of these factors does not perfectly predict performance on another, indicating that the factors are distinct. But individuals who score highly on one factor are more likely to score highly on others, with the average intercorrelation among factors about .70 (Deary 2001). Carroll (1993) concluded that most of the variation among individuals on these eight factors could be accounted for by one general factor, which has historically been referred to as *g*, or general intelligence. Because *g* is abstracted from performance on a great many tests, it is often described as a context free measure of

general reasoning or problem solving ability, and as the ability to comprehend and respond to complexity in one's environment.

Modern intelligence tests typically are constructed to have an overall mean of 100 and a standard deviation of about 15, and the distribution of scores within many populations assumes the shape of a bell curve, with about two thirds of the scores clustered between 85 and 115, and fewer than 5 percent of the scores either below 70 or above 130. In the US, individuals identified as African American have historically scored on average about 15 points below those identified as white, an average group difference that parallels the gap observed on a variety of tests of educational achievement. The average black-white difference in IQ test scores cannot be explained by a simple form of cultural bias, as the differences are observed on tasks that appear to require little knowledge of white middle class culture as well as those that are "culturally loaded" (Jencks 1998). Nor can the black-white test score difference be easily attributed to the lower socioeconomic status of blacks, as substantial differences are observed even when blacks and whites are matched on measurable social and economic characteristics (Phillips et al. 1998). Unmeasured social differences between blacks and whites may be important, but they are not yet an adequate explanation for the black-white difference in IQ test scores.

There is little question that performance on intelligence tests is a function of both genes and environment. Heritability, an attribute of a population of individuals at a particular historical moment, refers to the extent to which variation in individual intelligence scores is due to differences among individuals in their genes and environments. A heritability estimate of zero indicates that all of the variation among individual test scores is due to differences in those individuals' environments. A heritability estimate of one indicates that all of the variation among individual test scores is due to differences in those individuals' genes. Although scientists are not yet able to identify the specific genes associated with particular cognitive abilities, the shared genetic heritage of monozygotic ("identical") and dizygotic ("fraternal") twins provides some purchase on the relative influence of genes and environment. Within middle class white populations in western

societies, heritability estimates typically range from .50 to .70 (Cianciolo & Sternberg 2004).

Heritability estimates tell us little about the origins of a particular individual's cognitive abilities. In part this is because heritability is defined in relation to a population, not to an individual. But it would be difficult to summarize the mix of genetic and environmental influences in a single number, as individuals experience remarkably different social environments, due to both their social locations in society (Gottfredson 2000) and the unique experiences of individuals within the same general social location or the same family (Gottfredson 1997; Deary 2001). Moreover, individuals have the capacity both to select themselves into new environments and to modify the environments in which they are situated, and these adaptations may be more easily negotiated by individuals with greater cognitive ability.

Some scholars have succumbed to the temptation to link the average black–white difference in IQ scores to the high heritability of intelligence within the middle class white population, suggesting that the origins of the black–white gap in intelligence scores are genetic (Herrnstein & Murray 1994). There is to date little empirical support for this view (Neisser et al. 1996). The existing evidence on black–white differences does not rely on a biological or genetic basis for racial classification, but rather a social basis, individuals' self reports. Hence, the observed score difference represents a mixture of social and biological influences (Gottfredson 1997). Moreover, it is widely recognized that the magnitude of the heritability of a trait within a population, such as US blacks, does not imply a similar magnitude of its heritability between populations.

Individuals who score higher on intelligence tests have differing profiles of adult social and economic success than do those who score lower. Intelligence test scores are correlated with educational attainment, job performance, and income, and with the likelihood of delinquent behavior and incarceration. A functional interpretation of these associations is that they reflect the complexity of the modern world, in which only those with advanced cognitive skills can successfully navigate their environments over sustained periods of the life course. It is a logical fallacy, however, to conclude that the

advantages enjoyed by people with high IQ test scores are a necessary, and hence natural, feature of modern society. The impact of individual differences in IQ test scores on adult success is expressed within a system of structured social inequality, in which social origins either open or close the doors to opportunity (Fischer et al. 1996). Differences among individuals are real, but their impact can be magnified or muted by the political choices a society makes. Under the current institutional arrangements, individual differences in measured cognitive ability do matter, and perhaps increasingly so.

SEE ALSO: *Bell Curve, The* (Herrnstein and Murray); Educational Inequality; Meritocracy; Scientific Racism; Standardized Educational Tests

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interaction

Dirk vom Lehn

“Interaction” describes particular kinds of social relationship that are different from, but constitutive of, groups, organizations, and networks. Interaction occurs when two or more participants are in each other’s perceptual range and orient to each other through their action and activity. It ends when the participants dissolve their mutual orientation and leave the social situation.

Sociological research only gradually recognized the significance of social interaction. It initially focused on groups and organized relationships before progressively finding that temporary bound social relationships are critical to understanding the emergence and organization of more persistent forms of relationship. Georg Simmel was one of the first sociologists to mark the difference between relatively persistent social relationships such as groups and fleeting social encounters such as the mutual exchange of glances. He differentiates various “forms of interaction” and demonstrates their significance for social life. Simmel’s work has been of great importance for the development of sociological approaches to understanding interaction, in particular symbolic interactionism and conversation analysis.

George Herbert Mead argues that the emergence of interaction is grounded in the fact that people’s actions function as social stimuli that affect a reaction of the other. He differentiates interaction mediated by gestures and symbolic interaction. The former, a “conversation of gestures,” is relatively primitive and unreliable. Mead famously compares it to a “dog fight.” Symbolic interaction uses “significant symbols” like language that stimulate the same reaction in the actor and the other. It provides the basis for

people’s ability “to take the role of the other” and align each other’s actions. Mead’s work provides the intellectual basis for the emergence of symbolic interactionism (Mead 1934).

In light of these theories, early twentieth century sociology began to take seriously interaction as a “social fact.” *Functionalist approaches* investigate interaction as social system integrated by a common set of cultural symbols and norms that ensure people orient to situations in the same way (Parsons 1951). In recent years, Talcott Parsons’s approach has been updated by Niklas Luhmann, who opposes social theories based on a consensus about meanings and values. He views social systems as *communication systems* that have developed specific mechanisms to organize their communication processes. Society’s subsystems, such as politics or economy, organize their communication processes by virtue of generalized media such as power or money; they are autonomous from the co presence of participants. Contrarily, the emergence of interaction systems relies on the co presence of multiple participants who orient to each other’s actions (Luhmann 1995). Systems theory remains relatively underdeveloped with regard to the social organization of interaction systems.

Exchange theory focuses on the individual and the “rationale” for his or her decision to engage in interaction. George Caspar Homans argues that interaction emerges because the actor who is a rational decision maker anticipates to maximize his or her rewards by virtue of the exchange. He begins to develop psychological principles and rules that support the actor’s decision to engage in exchanges (Homans 1961). Peter Blau has further developed exchange theory by linking it to contemporary theories concerned with social structure. He explores the relation between rational actions and the emergence of social structures (Blau 1964). In a related way, Richard Emerson investigates the origin of *exchange networks* by focusing on the exchange of valuable resources between parties (Emerson 1974).

Although there had been a growing sociological concern with interaction since the 1940s, relatively little research was undertaken to explore the process of interaction. Robert Bales’s *Interaction Process Analysis* (1976) addresses this gap in research. IPA focuses on

group activities that are undertaken to achieve a goal shared between group members. It provides quantitative methods through which people's actions are recorded and analyzed. The analysis reveals the phases of the activity a group is involved in and the different roles of the group members in the activity. In recent years, IPA has been further developed as a tool (Symlog) for people to enhance their effectiveness in group activities. IPA has been very influential in particular for small group research.

Symbolic interactionism was developed in opposition to functionalist approaches. In drawing on Mead's work, Herbert Blumer, who coined the term symbolic interactionism, considers "society as symbolic interaction" (Blumer 1969). He argues that society and its norms and values do not predefine how people act and interact. However, people act in situations according to the meaning these situations have for them. The "definition of the situation" is produced in interaction with others. Hence, symbolic interactionist research is particularly interested in the interpretive processes by virtue of which participants negotiate the definition of the situation.

Blumer's theoretical work has initiated the emergence of the Chicago School, which produced a large body of ethnographic studies tackling topics such as social problems, race relations, and industrial relations (Everett C. Hughes, Howard S. Becker). In recent years, sociologists like Mitchell Duneier have taken up the Chicago School's work and produced intriguing ethnographies of race relations (*Slim's Table*, 1992) or street vendors (*Sidewalk*, ethnographies are not the only way in which symbolic interactionism developed. The Iowa School evolved a very different approach to further Mead and Blumer's concepts. Its work was initially interested in developing "scientific methods" to explore the structure of the self (Manford Kuhn). From the mid 1960s, Carl Couch and his colleagues introduced experimental methods to develop "a set of universal social principles" explaining how social units such as dyads and triads coordinate their activities (Couch & Hintz 1975). There also is a large body of research related to symbolic interactionism that explores how phenomena that are often viewed to be cognitive or material rather than social feature in interaction. For example,

investigations have been undertaken concerned with emotion and affect (Norman Denzin), the human body (Kathy Charmaz), or with the role of non human objects in interaction (Joseph Cohen; Susan Leigh Star and Geoffrey Bowker).

Erving Goffman's famous work on *The Presentation of Self in Everyday Life* (1959) is often discussed in the context of debates in symbolic interactionism. Yet, it forms part of a research tradition that uses the "theater metaphor" for the inquiry of social life. His essay refers to Kenneth Burke's "dramatism," which explores the relationships between the act, the agent, the scene, agency, and the purpose of action ("dramatic pentad"). Goffman's "dramaturgical approach" explores how these relationships play out in social interaction and investigates the techniques participants employ to manage the impression others have of them. It has been very influential in sociological research and occasioned a wide range of ethnographic research concerned, for example, with the presentation of self of politicians and management gurus.

Goffman's investigations also draw on developments in human anthropology and cognate disciplines. Whilst sociology was still debating the significance of social interaction as a phenomenon, human anthropologists and ethologists (Heini Hediger; Irenaeus Eibl Eibesfeldt) were long engaged in exploring the social production of culture. Gregory Bateson used film recordings to reveal the social organization of action and interaction. In light of Bateson's observations and related developments in other disciplines, a new communication theory emerged that conceived communication to be a "multichannel system." Researchers began to dissect the different communication channels to reveal the organization of their elements. Investigations have been undertaken that uncover the elements of language (Edward Sapir), the ways in which the meaning of utterances is influenced by the tone of voice, pitch, volume, and other paralinguistic cues, and bodily communication such as gestures and facial expressions (Michael Argyle, Paul Ekman, Adam Kendon; see Scherer et al. 1982).

These developments have initiated investigations that explore other aspects of human interaction and communication. Ray Birdwhistell (1970) uses film recordings to dissect the

elements of body movement in concerted activities. Edward Hall (1966) investigates people's spatial behavior and experience of space. He conceives spatial behavior as a "language" by virtue of which people structure the social space in which they act and interact ("proxemics"). Hall's work provides the basis for inquiries into the spatial organization in conversations (Robert Sommer) or the use of personal space in public places. In the 1960s and early 1970s, Albert E. Scheflen (1972) explored how communicative systems such as psychotherapeutic encounters are structured and generate meaning by virtue of neatly organized verbal and bodily actions ("context analysis").

Goffman and later Adam Kendon (1990) drew on the observations made by the aforementioned investigations. They explored how through spatial and bodily behavior participants organize "relations in public" (Goffman 1971) and "focused" and "unfocused interaction" (Goffman 1963). These inquiries in the social organization of actions and activities reveal how participants bodily orient to each other and how they can shift the focus of an activity by virtue of changes in their bodily positions, postures, and gestures (Juergen Streeck). They reveal how people organize and structure their activities in social situations by virtue of body movements. Studies of people's spatial and bodily conduct in interaction have made important contributions to our understanding of interaction. However, they neglect how participants' talk is coordinated with their bodily conduct in interaction.

The development of *ethnomethodology* by Harold Garfinkel has been the beginning of a program of research that led to new developments in exploring how social interaction emerges from participants' actions and activities. Ethnomethodology aims to reveal the practices and reasoning that underlie people's action and interaction. Garfinkel investigates the *in situ* "indexical" character of interaction. The indexicality of people's practices and reasoning leads to the insight that the context of action is not predefined and stable, as symbolic interactionists may argue, but that action is "doubly contextual in being both context shaped and context renewing" (Heritage 1984).

In light of Garfinkel's *Studies in Ethnomethodology* (1967), Harvey Sacks and colleagues

developed *conversation analysis* as a methodological framework to explore how language is used in practice. Conversation analysis employs audio recordings as principal data to investigate in detail the organization of brief fragments of talk. The original work by Harvey Sacks, Emanuel Schegloff, Gail Jefferson, and others has principally been concerned with talk as an institution in its own right. This work reveals how participants attend to each other's utterances moment by moment and begin to unpack the *sequential* organization of talk in interaction. They show how interactional encounters are opened and closed as well as how participants deal with interactional problems that arise in conversations. Key to the understanding of the organization of talk are "social mechanisms," such as adjacency pairs, repairs, and the like, that participants draw on in interaction. These mechanisms are independent from participants' cognitive disposition and motivation, institutional arrangements, and material constraints (Sacks 1974, 1992). In recent years, a body of research has emerged that expands the conversation analytic perspective. It explores how talk and its analysis are embedded in culture (Michael Moerman), how institutional arrangements influence the organization of "talk at work" (Paul Drew and John Heritage), and how participants orient to institutional settings and situations.

Various researchers have recently begun to augment the disembodied concept of interaction that pervades conversation analysis by exploring how the body and aspects of the material environment feature in interaction. They draw on Simmel and Goffman's work and use the analytic and methodological framework provided by ethnomethodology and conversation analysis to investigate how participants socially organize their talk and bodily conduct in social situations. The principal data of these investigations are audio/video recordings of naturally occurring social interaction. They employ the analytic and methodological framework of ethnomethodology and conversation analysis to explore the interactional and sequential production of talk and bodily conduct. They reveal how minute bodily movements such as a shift in gaze direction or the turn of a head can influence the way in which an interactional sequence develops. They demonstrate that speaking and hearing

are closely intertwined activities. In speaking, the bodily actions of the hearer play a significant part in the way in which the talk is produced (Goodwin 1981). The observations and findings of these video based studies of interaction provide the basis for a growing body of research concerned with the ways in which participants socially and sequentially organize their actions and activities in a variety of workplaces. The emerging field of *workplace studies* (Luff et al. 2000) reveals the social and sequential organization of work that involves the use of highly complex technologies in control rooms of urban transport systems, air traffic control, operating theaters, and news production. Workplace studies explore how participants orient to and embed objects and artifacts, such as paper documents, computer screens, or large displays, in the interactional production of work. They examine how participants produce a “reciprocity of perspectives” (Alfred Schutz) with regard to objects and artifacts, tools and technologies (Suchman 1987; Heath & Luff 2000). They also investigate the ways in which the human body becomes the focus of interaction. For example, in medical encounters, anesthesia, or surgical procedures, participants produce the status of the body as acting and feeling subject or inanimate object in and through social interaction. In recent years, related work has been undertaken in museums and galleries exploring how participants orient to and make sense of exhibits and exhibitions in interaction (Heath & vom Lehn 2004).

The development of video based field studies that explore social interaction in material environments reflects a growing sociological interest in “materiality.” Bruno Latour, Michel Callon, John Law, and others who have recently developed actor network theory (ANT) have put the object and materiality firmly on the agenda of sociological debate. They argue for a fundamental rethink of the relationship between the social and the material. They ascribe objects the status of “actants” and explore how they participate in social situations. The body of research in ANT has been very influential in social studies of science (Latour 1987; Law 1991).

Recent technological developments challenge a fundamental principle of social interaction, namely, the physical co presence of

participants in social situations. Novel computer technologies seem to provide participants with sufficient resources to organize their action and activities “just like” in situations of co presence. A large body of research has emerged in disciplines cognate to sociology, such as computer supported cooperative work (CSCW), which explore interaction across distributed locations. They illuminate the difficulties of designers who try to create situations of “virtual presence” and of participants who attempt to organize their actions with others who are “in range” but not bodily present in a social situation. The exploration of distributed work has helped to reinvigorate the interest of sociologists in undertaking research on the social organization of interaction. However, it also has brought to the fore the tension between concepts of “interaction” used in the information and computer sciences and those developed in sociology, the former relying on a separation of “sender” and “receiver,” the latter maintaining the particular social characteristics of interaction. The coming years will show whether sociology will be able to further develop its theories and methods to grasp the new forms of interaction emerging in light of the current technological revolution.

SEE ALSO: Actor Network Theory; Bateson, Gregory; Blau, Peter; Blumer, Herbert George; Chicago School: Social Change; Conversation Analysis; Dyad/Triad; Emerson, Richard M.; Ethnomethodology; Friendship: Interpersonal Aspects; Goffman, Erving; Homans, George; Human–Non Human Interaction; Interaction Order; Interpersonal Relationships; Language; Luhmann, Niklas; Mead, George Herbert; Mediated Interaction; Networks; Parsons, Talcott; Symbolic Interaction

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interaction order

Mark D. Jacobs

The interaction order, as conceived by Erving Goffman, is constructed around systems of enabling conventions that – without recourse to social contract or social consensus, as often assumed – provide a basis of social order. The interaction order, Goffman insists, is a substantive domain in its own right, engendered by social situations, interactions in which at least two actors are co bodily present. That is, against the claims of either micro or macrosociological reductionism, Goffman insists on the analytical distinctness of the interaction order from both the underlying language games and conversational protocols of ethnomethodologists and the various overarching systems of macrostructuralists. For his part, Goffman dismisses the claim that macrostructural properties are epiphenomenal to the interaction order. The influence of Goffman's formulation extends even to theorists who reject the primacy of his analytic focus, as well as to those who embrace different characterizations of interactional dynamics.

As Goffman (1983) explains in his summative statement about the interaction order, enabling conventions arise as techniques of social management of the personal risks – both bodily and self expressive – inherent in interpersonal interaction. These conventions "can be viewed . . . in the sense of the ground rules of a game" (p. 5); they are the shared base of cognitive and moral presuppositions that make interaction possible. Not merely tact but tact about tact (Goffman 1959) is one such convention; deference is another. By instructive contrast with the macrosociologist Edward Shils (under whose tutelage Goffman first studied

deference), who declared: “Deference . . . is a way of expressing an assessment of the self and others with respect to ‘macrosocial’ properties” (1975: 277), Goffman analyzes deference “as a means through which this self is established . . . Deference and demeanor practices must be institutionalized so that the individual will be able to project a viable, sacred self and stay in the game on a proper ritual basis” (1967: 91).

As a theoretical construct, the interaction order is a Simmelian Durkheimian hybrid. Goffman recapitulates Simmel’s “The Problem of Sociology” (which famously declares: “Society exists where a number of individuals enter into interaction”) (Simmel 1959a: 314), not only in its basic conception, but also in its methodological prescription: “The trick, of course, is to differently conceptualize these effects, great or small, so that what they share can be extracted and analyzed, and so that the forms of social life they derive from can be pieced out and cataloged sociologically, allowing what is intrinsic to interactional life to be exposed thereby” (Goffman 1983: 3).

He echoes Simmel’s “How is Society Possible” (1959b) in declaring: “at the very center of interaction life is the cognitive relation we have with those present before us, without which relationship our activity, behavioral and verbal, could not be meaningfully organized” (Goffman 1983: 4). He explicitly draws on Durkheim in his assertion that enabling conventions are essentially symbolic and ritual. And he hearkens to Durkheim’s analysis of the *corroboree* in *The Elementary Forms of the Religious Life* (1995) in his discussion of those intense ceremonials in the interaction order that have consequences for macrostructures.

In its relatively short career, the concept of the interaction order has already spawned a rich and variegated tradition. The concept animates such classic monographs as Schwartz’s *Queuing and Waiting* (1975), which focuses on a paradigmatic form of the interaction order, and Fine’s *With the Boys* (1987), which traces the emergence of “idiocultures” in primary groups involved in Little League Baseball. This tradition even encompasses theories that challenge the analytic distinctness of the interaction order: the macrosociological theories of Giddens (1984), for example, in which the interaction order cements the “duality of structure,” as well

as the microsociological theories of Collins (2004), in which structural transformations derive their energies from interaction rituals.

SEE ALSO: Durkheim, Émile; Goffman, Erving; Idioculture; Interaction; Simmel, Georg

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intergenerational conflict

Merril Silverstein

Intergenerational conflict refers to the collective tension, strain, and antagonism between older and younger generations over what constitutes the fair distribution of public resources

across age groups. Intergenerational conflict is most often invoked in the context of the generational equity debate, an ongoing public dialogue about the cost and fairness of entitlement programs for the older population. One of the opening salvos in the debate over generational equity was the observation that the well being of older and younger Americans diverged over the third quarter of the twentieth century as a result of public policies that favored older adults and lifted them out of poverty (Preston 1984). The popular press concluded from this that older adults had gained at the expense of younger adults, and it was not uncommon in the 1980s and 1990s for the elderly to be portrayed as a leisure class of affluent retirees unfairly benefiting from the taxes paid by a struggling working age population.

Anxiety about the future viability of public programs for the aged has been on the rise, particularly among younger generations, driven by fears of population aging and consequent growth in the dependency ratio – a measure of the size of the working age population relative to the retired population. Trends in population aging converged with national and international pressures to shrink government spending, raising fundamental questions about the nature of society's collective obligation to the elderly and the rights of older citizens to public benefits.

Economists, in particular, framed the issue of generational equity as a competition for limited resources in a zero sum game between the young and the old. Using an approach known now as “generational accounting,” they discussed how the financing of entitlement programs for the aged (Social Security, Medicare, and other government programs that use age to determine eligibility) was unfair to the younger generation that would ultimately pay the bill (Longman 1987). The public and scholarly debates that ensued opened the door to questioning the deservingness of older people as an entitled group, the inviolability of the contract between generations that began with the New Deal, and the wisdom of sustaining entitlement programs in their current form when the baby boom generation reaches old age. The “sacred cow” of the Social Security program was sacred no more, as conservative politicians began using the older population as a scapegoat to further

their political agenda of shrinking the size of government (Binstock 1983).

The central tenet of generational accounting – that there are winners and losers in the competition between generations – was met with swift resistance by many social scientists. There was little evidence suggesting that generations were in conflict. Not only was public support for Social Security and Medicare programs very strong across all age groups, some research found that support for these programs was stronger among younger adults than it was among the elderly (Logan & Spitze 1995). In addition, when public opinion about various government programs was charted over time, entitlement programs serving older adults were the ones least likely to lose support. Thus, the slight declines observed in support for Social Security tended more to be the product of strengthening overall preferences for fiscal restraint and smaller government than of generational conflict. Scholars advocated for decoupling the fortunes of the young and the old, attributing them to unique historical processes. Where older people benefited from public programs initiated through the second half of the twentieth century, children were disadvantaged over this same period by family and economic change, such as the increase in single parent families and the decline in real wages due to economic restructuring.

Social scientists discovered that the public's attitudes toward entitlement programs were more complex than could be measured on a single metric. Several orthogonal dimensions were identified: (1) perceptions about the legitimacy and social value of entitlement programs for the elderly; and (2) concerns over the cost of such programs. Thus, it is possible to support programs for the elderly while at the same time expressing concern over their costs. What explains the public's support for entitlement programs is the norm of reciprocity – the notion that older people previously contributed into the system and now deserve to be supported as an earned right. This argument has been extended to include the older population's earlier contribution to post war economic expansion.

The principle of *generational justice* was brought into the scholarly debate to represent the moral dimension of public policy that emphasizes responsibility for older citizens as

a collective duty. If reciprocity were relied upon as the sole underlying principle guiding intergenerational transfers, then older generations that presided over a particularly weak economy for most of their working lives would produce a moral hazard. This makes public programs all the more important, for they compel even the most reluctant contributors to make state mediated transfers to the older generation.

One of the most compelling arguments against the existence of widespread intergenerational conflict is that younger and older adults are interdependent with each other within family lineages – what is known as the *interdependence of generations perspective*. Thus, individuals simultaneously occupy several types of generational positions: welfare generation as represented by age group or birth cohort at the macro level, and family generation as represented by position in the family lineage at the micro level (Attias Donfut & Arber 1999). Resources that flow upward from later to earlier born cohorts through government transfer programs are then balanced against the sizable downward flow of resources from older parents to adult children in the form of inter vivo transfers, bequests, and childcare. This circular flow of support builds solidarity across generations and suggests that obligations between welfare generations and family generations are not competing but complementary with each other. Whether intergenerational conflict continues to be minimal will hinge on how changes in public policies and family commitments alter the integrity of this implicit contract across generations.

SEE ALSO: Aging, Sociology of; Aging and Social Support; Intergenerational Relationships and Exchanges; Life Course; Life Course and Family

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intergenerational mobility: core model of social fluidity

Richard Breen

The analysis of intergenerational social mobility is usually carried out using log linear or log multiplicative statistical models applied to a contingency table which cross classifies individuals' current class (usually called "class destination") with the class in which they were brought up ("class origin"). An important distinction is between absolute and relative mobility (sometimes called "social fluidity"). Absolute mobility refers to the distribution of cases in the mobility table. Social fluidity refers to the inequality between individuals from different classes in their chances of coming to occupy one rather than another destination class. It is captured by odds ratios which are measured as the proportion of cases that originate in class A and are found in destination class X rather than class Y, divided by the proportion of cases from origin class B which are found in destination X rather than Y. An odds ratio of one indicates

that the chances of being in destination class X rather than in Y are the same for those originating in both A and B, while an odds ratio greater than one shows that those born in A are more likely than those born in B to be in X rather than Y, and conversely for an odds ratio less than one. An important feature of odds ratios is that they are unaffected by any scalar multiplication of one or more rows and/or columns of a table: thus, inequalities in access to particular class destinations can be compared across mobility tables, despite the fact that they differ in their distributions of origins and destinations.

One of the most widely reported findings of mobility research is that differences between mobility tables (when these tables represent, for example, sexes or ethnic groups in a given country, different time points within the same country, different countries, and so on) in the distribution of cases in the mobility table (i.e., absolute mobility) are overwhelmingly shaped by differences in the marginal distributions of origins and destinations rather than differences in social fluidity (Erikson & Goldthorpe 1992: 213–14). Despite this, by far the greater amount of research has been devoted to social fluidity – possibly because fluidity captures, in a very obvious way, inequality in the competition for more, rather than less, desirable destination class positions.

SOCIAL FLUIDITY IN LOG LINEAR AND LOG MULTIPLICATIVE MODELS

Assume that the mobility table has I rows (origin classes) and J columns (destination classes), indexed by $I = 1, \dots, I$ and $j = 1, \dots, J$ respectively. Because mobility tables are usually square, $I = J$. F_{ij} is the logarithm of the expected (under the model) frequency in the ij^{th} cell of the table and this is a function of a constant term, λ ; an effect associated with being in the i^{th} row (i.e., coming from the i^{th} origin class), λ_i^O ; an effect associated with being in the j^{th} column (destination class), λ_j^D ; and the effect, on the ij^{th} cell, of the association between origins and destinations, λ_{ij}^{OD} . That is:

$$F_{ij} = \lambda + \lambda_i^O + \lambda_j^D + \lambda_{ij}^{OD}, \text{ for all } i = 1, \dots, I; \quad j = 1, \dots, J$$

The association between origins and destinations is captured in the λ_{ij}^{OD} terms which are functions of the logarithm of the odds ratios (the log odds ratios) in the table. A maximum of $(I - 1) \times (J - 1)$ such terms can be estimated (because this is the number of independent odds ratios in a table), and doing this would yield a model that exactly fitted the data. However, rather than fit all the association parameters we would like to reduce this to a few interpretable parameters which represent some underlying social processes that structure the pattern of fluidity. Such a set of parameters we will call a model of fluidity. How well a particular model reproduces the data (its “goodness of fit”) is assessed by comparing the frequencies expected under the model with the observed data and several measures based on this comparison are widely used. A large number of models of social fluidity have been proposed: examples include Hout’s (1984) “status, autonomy, and training” (SAT) model; Breen and Whelan’s (1992) “agriculture, hierarchy, and property” (AHP) model; and the model developed by Jonsson and Mills in 1993. But Erikson and Goldthorpe’s (1992) “core model” of social fluidity is the most widely used such model.

When we make comparisons of social fluidity between two or more mobility tables we are interested in whether the pattern of fluidity (or, equivalently, the odds ratios) differs significantly across the tables. In other words, is there more or less inequality in some tables compared with others? When comparing fluidity across tables, we must specify the manner in which the parameters of the chosen model of fluidity differ between them. In this way, we hope to gain insight into exactly where and how the fluidity regime varies.

CORE MODEL OF SOCIAL FLUIDITY

In 1975, Featherman, Jones, and Hauser put forward the FJH hypothesis: “the genotypical pattern of mobility (circulation mobility [i.e., social fluidity]) in industrial societies with a market economy and a nuclear family system is basically the same” (Featherman et al. 1975: 340). Since then many publications have been devoted to testing this hypothesis, the majority of which have found support for it (most

notably, Erikson & Goldthorpe 1992), though with some influential exceptions (Ganzeboom et al. 1989; Breen 2004).

The FJH hypothesis refers to a “genotypical pattern” of fluidity, and Erikson and Goldthorpe (1987a, 1987b, 1992) developed the “core model of social fluidity” as an attempt to characterize this genotypical pattern. Having done this, they could test whether the purported pattern was indeed the same in industrial societies with a market economy and nuclear family system. The data that they used comprise mobility tables having seven classes of both origin and destination, defined according to the Goldthorpe or “EGP” (Erikson, Goldthorpe, and Portocarero) class schema (for details, see Erikson & Goldthorpe 1992: ch. 2). The seven classes are denoted by Roman numerals as follows:

- 1 Classes I+II: professionals, administrators and officials; managers
- 2 Class III: routine non manual employees
- 3 Class IVab: small proprietors and artisans
- 4 Class IVc: farmers
- 5 Classes V+VI: technicians, supervisors, and skilled manual workers
- 6 Class VIIa: semi and unskilled workers not in agriculture
- 7 Class VIIb: semi and unskilled workers in agriculture

Erikson and Goldthorpe developed the core model as a theoretically informed account of the fluidity patterns of England and France (which were taken as the two nations whose fluidity patterns most closely corresponded to some putative common pattern). The model consists of eight components, usually expressed through a set of eight matrices, in each of which the cells of the table are assigned to one of two categories. These rows and columns of the matrices are ordered according to the ordering of origin and destination classes as they are listed above.

The first element of social fluidity in the core model concerns hierarchical movement; and in the first dimension of this (called HI1) the value 2 indicates movement between three ordered (from most to least desirable) groups of classes: (a) class I+II; (b) classes III, IVab and c, and V+VI; and (c) VIIa and b. (Erikson and Goldthorpe (1992: 46, 124) treat class IVc

(farmers) as lying at the lowest hierarchical level (c) in class origins, but at the second level (b) in destinations.) In other words, the value 2 is assigned to cells of the mobility table which indicate an origin in one group but a destination in another. The value 1 is applied to cells in the same group in both origins and destinations:

1	2	2	2	2	2	2
2	1	1	1	1	2	2
2	1	1	1	1	2	2
2	2	2	2	2	1	1
2	1	1	1	1	2	2
2	2	2	2	2	1	1
2	2	2	2	2	1	1

Another matrix, called HI2, is defined distinguishing movement across two levels:

1	1	1	1	1	2	2
1	1	1	1	1	1	1
1	1	1	1	1	1	1
2	1	1	1	1	1	1
1	1	1	1	1	1	1
2	1	1	1	1	1	1
2	1	1	1	1	1	1

Here the value 2 is applied to cells with an origin in a class in group (a) and a destination in a class in group (c), and vice versa. This element of the model thus distinguishes “long range” mobility (as opposed to the short range mobility captured by HI1).

The second component concerns the inheritance of class position; that is, the tendency for men to enter the same class as their father – a tendency which is more marked in some classes than in others. The first inheritance matrix, IN1, distinguishes cells in which origin and destination are in the same class:

2	1	1	1	1	1	1
1	2	1	1	1	1	1
1	1	2	1	1	1	1
1	1	1	2	1	1	1
1	1	1	1	2	1	1
1	1	1	1	1	2	1
1	1	1	1	1	1	2

The second inheritance matrix, IN2, distinguishes three classes in which inheritance is more pronounced than elsewhere: these are classes I+II, IVab, and IVc:

2 1 1 1 1 1 1
 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
 1 1 2 1 1 1 1
 1 1 1 2 1 1 1
 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
 1 1 1 1 1 1 1

1 2 2 1 1 1 1
 2 1 1 1 1 1 1
 2 1 1 2 1 1 1
 1 1 2 1 1 2 1
 1 1 1 1 1 2 1
 1 1 1 1 2 1 1
 1 1 1 1 1 2 1

The final inheritance matrix, IN3, reserves a single distinction for farmers (IVc), among whom class inheritance is particularly strong:

1 1 1 1 1 1 1
 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
 1 1 1 2 1 1 1
 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
 1 1 1 1 1 1 1

The third aspect of the core model is a single matrix, SE, that defines barriers to movement between the agricultural and non agricultural sectors. Thus, all cells with agricultural origins (classes IVc and VIIb) and non agricultural destinations, and vice versa, are assigned the value 2:

1 1 1 2 1 1 2
 1 1 1 2 1 1 2
 1 1 1 2 1 1 2
 2 2 2 1 2 2 1
 1 1 1 2 1 1 2
 1 1 1 2 1 1 2
 2 2 2 1 2 2 1

The final component of the model is two affinity matrices. The first, AF1, identifies movement between classes I+II and VIIb and assigns the value 2 to these cells:

1 1 1 1 1 1 2
 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
 2 1 1 1 1 1 1

while AF2 identifies reciprocal movement between I+II and III; between IVab and IVc; and between V+VI and VIIa; and non reciprocal movement from IVc to VIIa and from VIIb to VIIa:

In the case of AF1, movement between I+II and VIIb is thought to be particularly unlikely (even over and above the hierarchy, inheritance, and sectoral effects already included), whereas the movements captured in AF2 are thought to be especially likely.

The model is derived from a number of propositions about the factors shaping inequality in mobility chances (for a full explanation, see Erikson & Goldthorpe 1987a). Because hierarchical movements are assumed to be more difficult than non hierarchical ones, both HI1 and HI2 should have negative values. The inheritance effects, by contrast, should all be positive, while the sector effect, since it captures the difficulty of moving between the two sectors, should be negative. Of the affinity effects, AF1 should be negative (it captures a “disaffinity”) and AF2 positive. Some of the parameters of the core model are to be interpreted incrementally. For instance, the relative likelihood of long distance mobility is captured by the sum of the coefficients for HI1 and HI2, rather than by HI2 alone. HI2, in fact, tells us the degree to which long range mobility is more difficult than short range. In the same way, the propensity to inheritance of class IVc is given by IN1 plus IN2 plus IN3. So IN3 itself measures the “extra” inheritance observed among farmers compared with classes I+II and IVab.

Erikson and Goldthorpe (1992: 173) argue that the FJH thesis requires, as the first criterion for its support, that a model of fluidity (in this case the “core model” of fluidity) should provide a reasonable fit to the data. But they find that the core model with the same parameter values for all countries in their sample does not provide an adequate fit to the data: in other words, there is statistically significant variation between countries in the parameters of the model. Allowing such variation, the model fits the data much better, and Erikson and Goldthorpe take the success of this as supporting the FJH hypothesis:

“We can at least maintain that . . . the . . . effects that our model comprises do tend to operate cross nationally in the way anticipated, even if with differing strengths” (Erikson and Goldthorpe 1992: 174). Nevertheless, even allowing the parameters of the core model to differ between countries, they still find that everywhere except England and France, some adjustments have to be made to the core model itself in order successfully to capture national variations in fluidity. These are sometimes called the national variants of the core model. The adjustments are of two kinds. In some cases the existing matrices are redefined: so, for example, when applied to the West German data, IN2 assigns immobility in class I+II to level 1, rather than 2. That is, there is no tendency for class inheritance to be higher here than in any other class. In other cases, additional affinity matrices were included. So, in Hungary, an additional matrix, called AFX, captures the tendency for movement from the class of farmers, IVc, to the class of agricultural workers, VIIb.

CONCLUSIONS

The core model is nowadays very widely used (see, for example, the essays in Breen 2004) and its fit to empirical has often been adequate, and in some cases, good. The main reason for this is that it succeeds in capturing the features evident in most mobility tables, namely the tendency for clustering on some cells of the main diagonal of the table (inheritance effects), and the inequality that derives from a hierarchical ordering of the classes. But these features are common to almost all models of fluidity: indeed, given a number of mobility tables, it is usually quite difficult to decide which of a set of models is to be preferred because none provides an unequivocal best fit to all the tables. If there can be said to be any core features of fluidity it is the tendency for clustering on the diagonal and the hierarchical component. The latter can be modeled in various ways, and, indeed, Erikson and Goldthorpe’s approach here is idiosyncratic, with most analysts preferring a simple scaling of the origins and destinations according to the mean prestige or mean income of the occupations that make up each class. Nevertheless, a model which only fits inheritance and hierarchical effects is unlikely

to fit any mobility table. The claims of the core model then rest on having found other processes (instantiated in the *se* and *af* terms) that are common to all fluidity regimes. Unfortunately, the need to introduce national variants of the model, which mainly modify the *se* and *af* terms, somewhat undermines that claim. As Sorenson (1992: 309) remarks: “*any* mobility regime can be represented as *some* core model with national variants.”

The major weakness of the core model is that the effects hypothesized to shape fluidity are all operationalized as binary contrasts or “dummy variables” (on the other hand, this may also help to account for the model’s popularity, since one requires no more than the mobility table itself in order to employ it). The alternative is to express log odds ratios as proportional to differences in scores on measured variables, and several other models of fluidity adopt this approach (e.g., Hout 1984; Breen & Whelan 1992; see also Breen & Whelan 1994). To illustrate: we might express the log odds ratios capturing hierarchical inequality as proportional to the difference in the mean earnings of the origin and destination classes involved in the comparison. Clearly, the choice of explanatory variables should follow from some hypothesized mechanisms rooted in individual action and interaction, and, in fact, the use of explanatory variables inevitably pushes mobility research away from a concentration on tabular data and towards analyses using data on individuals (Logan 1983; Breen 1994) which test hypotheses about the processes that shape individual mobility trajectories and account for the variation among them. A move in this direction would do much to advance the study of social fluidity both theoretically and empirically.

SEE ALSO: Class, Status, and Power; Intergenerational Mobility: Methods of Analysis; Log Linear Models; Mobility, Horizontal and Vertical; Mobility, Intergenerational and Intra-generational

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intergenerational mobility: methods of analysis

Ruud Luijckx

This entry comprises an analysis of intergenerational mobility, and in particular mobility tables, in which parents' and children's positions are cross classified. These positions

can refer to the level of educational achievement, earnings, occupational position, religious denomination, social class, and so on. Intergenerational class mobility (social mobility) involves the class of the family in which respondents lived when young (the *origin* class), and their current class position (the *destination* class).

The analysis of social mobility has a long tradition within sociology and largely evolved within the context of the International Sociological Association's Research Committee 28 on Social Stratification and Mobility. Elaborate overviews of the results of the different "generations" of social mobility research have been published (Ganzeboom et al. 1991; Treiman & Ganzeboom 2000; Breen & Jonsson 2005).

DISTINGUISHING SOCIAL CLASSES

Usually, the origin class in an intergenerational mobility table is related to the occupational position fathers held when respondents were between 12 and 16 years of age, and the destination class is related to the *current* occupational position of respondents, although sometimes destination refers to the first occupation held. A typical age selection for respondents is between 25 and 64 years of age. How many categories do the origin and destination class have? Looking at the history of social mobility analysis, a whole range of social class variables has been used. Very crude classifications that only distinguished farm, manual, and non manual occupations were used in early analyses (see, e.g., Lipset & Zetterberg 1959). Sometimes, for manual and non manual occupations, a further distinction was made into an upper and a lower category. This five category classification used to be standard in the United States and has been used as the basis for further refinements, leading to a seventeenfold categorization (Blau & Duncan 1967; Featherman & Hauser 1978). Another, now dominant, categorization is the Goldthorpe or EG(P) (Erikson, Goldthorpe, and Portocarero) class schema (Erikson & Goldthorpe 1992). To construct these more refined class schemes, detailed occupational information and information on the self employment and supervising status of people holding the occupational positions is essential (Ganzeboom & Treiman 1996).

The criteria used to aggregate occupations into social classes are in many cases more pragmatic than theoretical, but classifications can be evaluated in terms of both homogeneity and structure. *Homogeneity* refers to the extent that, within an aggregate of occupations (social class), there are no barriers between any origin occupation and any destination occupation. *Structure* refers to pattern and strength of the barriers between origin and destination classes. These barriers should be similar for the occupations constituting the classes. When disaggregated information is available, the assumption that class boundaries (barriers) are in agreement with the requirements of homogeneity and structure is testable.

The following list makes use of the seven class version of the Goldthorpe class schema:

- 1 Classes I + II: professionals, administrators and officials, managers.
- 2 Class III: routine non manual employees.
- 3 Class IVab: small proprietors and artisans.
- 4 Class IVc: farmers.
- 5 Class V + VI: technicians, supervisors, and skilled manual workers.
- 6 Class VIIa: semi and unskilled workers not in agriculture.
- 7 Class VIIb: semi and unskilled workers in agriculture.

Table 1 presents an intergenerational mobility table based on data used by Breen and Luijckx (2004). The table is an "average" table based on 89 mobility tables for men from France, Germany, Great Britain, Hungary,

Ireland, the Netherlands, Poland, and Sweden between 1970 and 2000. The number of cases in the table is rescaled for reasons of exposition from more than 250,000 to 1,000.

We distinguish origin O with subscript i and destination D with subscript j . Let $\{f_{ij}\}$ ($i = 1, \dots, I; j = 1, \dots, J$) be the observed frequencies for each cell (i, j) in the $I \times J$ mobility table of origin by destination (in this case $I = J = 7$); f_{ij} is the observed number of people with origin i and destination j . The observed row totals are designated by f_{i+} , the observed column totals by f_{+j} , and the grand total by f_{++} or N .

MEASURING ABSOLUTE MOBILITY

Using the data in Table 1, we can compute measures of absolute mobility. We observe that 340 out of 1,000 men are in the same class as their fathers. In other words, 34.0 percent of the men are immobile and thus the mobility rate in the table is 66.0 percent. The mobility rate (or gross change) depends on the number of classes being distinguished, as can be seen from Table 2. In Table 2, we combine the seven classes into three: (1) I + II, (2) III, IVab, IVc, and V + VI, and (3) VIIa and VIIb. Based on these data, we now conclude that 50.8 percent ($9.5 + 33.3 + 8.0$) of the people are immobile and that the mobility rate is 49.2 percent. Within the mobile, we can distinguish those who are upwardly mobile, going from (3) to (1) or (2) and from (2) to (1) – in total 31.2 percent; and those who are downwardly mobile, going from (1) to (2) or (3) and from

Table 1 A mobility table

<i>O</i> (origin)	<i>D</i> (estimation)							<i>Total</i>
	<i>I + II</i>	<i>III</i>	<i>IVab</i>	<i>IVc</i>	<i>V + VI</i>	<i>VIIa</i>	<i>VIIb</i>	
I + II	95	14	9	1	24	11	1	155
III	26	9	4	1	16	8	1	65
IVab	28	9	18	1	21	13	1	91
IVc	25	9	10	55	40	40	11	190
V + VI	67	21	16	1	102	44	2	253
VIIa	38	16	11	2	70	53	3	193
VIIb	5	3	2	2	17	16	8	53
Total	284	81	70	63	290	185	27	1,000

a farmers' background, whereas only 33.5 per cent of the people in class I + II are recruited from that class. However, when we look at Table 3a, we see that 29.0 percent of the people with a farmers' background become farmers themselves, but that 61.3 percent of the people with an origin in class I + II end up in that same class. An explanation for this can be derived from the column and row totals in Tables 3a and 3b, respectively: Class I + II expanded from 15.5 percent in the origin distribution to 28.4 percent in the destination distribution, while the relative size of the farmer class declined from 19.0 to 6.3 percent. This brings us to the dissimilarity index.

Dissimilarity Index

If we look upon the class distribution of destinations as an opportunity structure, we can say that economic and demographic changes in society contribute to the dissimilarity between the contemporary opportunity structure, i.e., the destinations, and the class origins of current workers. Looking at Table 1, it is evident that the decline in agricultural jobs is balanced by an increase in non manual positions. A summary measure of these countervailing changes is the index of dissimilarity between the distribution of origins and the distribution of destinations:

$$\Delta = \sum_{i=1}^I \frac{|f_{i+} - f_{+i}|}{2N}$$

Δ is a measure of net change. It does not take into account the actual gross flows in the mobility table, only the net outcome of all flows. can be interpreted as the minimal proportion of people who have to be reclassified to make the origin and destination distributions identical (for Table 1 this is 0.182). Above we saw that the gross change (mobility rate) was 0.660. A high mobility rate results if the destination distribution differs substantially from the origin distribution or if origins and destinations are statistically independent, that is, if the conditional distributions of destinations are the same for all origins. A low mobility rate results if there is a similarity of origin and destination distribution *and* if the association between

origin and destination is strong. In the analysis of mobility, these two elements have to be separated: mobility due to dissimilar marginal distributions of origins and destinations (known as structural mobility) and mobility due to association between origins and destinations.

MEASURING RELATIVE MOBILITY

Mobility can also be described in terms of odds ratios. It is possible to compute many odds ratios from an $I \times J$ table, but the association in the complete table can be fully described by the odds ratios of a basic set of subtables: the 2×2 subtables formed from adjacent rows and adjacent columns. There are $(I - 1) \times (J - 1)$ basic subtables. The formula for the (adjacent) odds ratios is:

$$\theta_{ij} = \frac{f_{ij}/f_{i(j+1)}}{f_{(i+1)j}/f_{(i+1)(j+1)}}$$

In Table 4 this basic set is presented for the data from Table 1.

Goldthorpe (1980: 77) described odds ratios as indicating how unequal the outcomes are of competitions between persons of different origins to achieve or avoid certain jobs. For example, in Table 1, 95 men with origin I + II go to class I + II and 14 go to class III. The odds of going to class I + II instead of class III from origin I + II is $95/14 = 6.79$. For people from class III background, this figure is $26/9 = 2.89$. Although men from both origins are more likely to end up in class I + II instead of class III, the odds are 2.35 ($6.79/2.89$) times greater for men from origin I + II than for men from origin III. Were the odds for both origins equal, the odds ratio would have equaled one.

If all the odds ratios in the table are equal to one, we can speak of perfect mobility, i.e., destinations do not depend on origins. It is clear from the pattern in Table 4 that the odds ratios in the diagonal cells are much higher than the other ones, indicating that the propensity for men to stay in their own class is much higher than moving to another class.

An important feature of the odds ratio is that it is not dependent on the marginals: when all frequencies in a certain row or column are

multiplied by a constant, the odds ratios remain the same. This property is useful in the case of stratified samples: the odds ratios are not sensitive to an over or underrepresentation of a certain category. Even more important is the fact that it makes comparison of the origin–destination association possible between tables with different marginal distributions. This origin–destination association or relative mobility is also known as social fluidity.

Log Linear Models to Constrain the Odds Ratio Patterns

The full set of contiguous odds ratios (Table 4) constitutes a complete account of the association pattern, the so called saturated model or unconstrained association model. Log linear models are used to constrain the odds ratios in the saturated model to a more parsimonious set in order to find a sociologically more meaningful and statistically more powerful account of the data. We define the following log linear model:

$$\ln F_{ij} = \lambda + \lambda_i^O + \lambda_j^D + \lambda_{ij}^{OD}, \quad \text{for all } i = 1, \dots, I; j = 1, \dots, J$$

where F_{ij} is the (under the model) expected frequency in the ij th cell of the table; λ is the grand mean; λ_i^O and λ_j^D are the one variable effects pertaining to the origin and destination; and λ_{ij}^{OD} is the origin–destination association. Identifying restrictions on the parameters have to be defined. As fit measures, the conventional log likelihood ratio χ^2 statistic (L^2), and the BIC statistic (Raftery 1986) are mostly used.

Which patterns of social fluidity can be modeled using log linear analysis? The simplest

pattern would be the one with no origin–destination association, the already presented perfect mobility model (in that case all $\lambda_{ij}^{OD} = 0$). But such a model does not fit our data well ($L^2 = 336.9$; $df = 36$). A next model is that of quasi perfect mobility. It assumes that people have a higher propensity to stay in their own class than moving to other classes (and that this propensity is different for each class), but that for people who are mobile, there is perfect mobility. We display this model as a matrix showing which association parameters of the model affect which cell of the table:

2	1	1	1	1	1	1
1	3	1	1	1	1	1
1	1	4	1	1	1	1
1	1	1	5	1	1	1
1	1	1	1	6	1	1
1	1	1	1	1	7	1
1	1	1	1	1	1	8

This model fits the data much better, but is still not statistically significant ($L^2 = 65.4$; $df = 29$). The highest immobility parameter belongs to class IVc (farmers), followed by VIIb (agricultural workers) and IVab (self employed). Another pattern that improves the fit of the model further is the core model of social fluidity.

Scaled Association Models

Scaled association models have turned out to be very useful for summarizing relative mobility

Table 4 Odds ratios for the mobility table

Origin	Destination					
	(I + II):III	III:IVab	IVab:IVc	IVc:(V + VI)	(V + VI):VIIa	VIIa:VIIb
(I + II):III	2.35	0.69	2.25	0.67	1.09	1.38
III:IVab	0.93	4.50	0.22	1.31	1.24	0.62
IVab:IVc	1.12	0.56	99.00	0.03	1.62	3.58
IVc:(V + VI)	0.87	0.69	0.01	140.25	0.43	0.17
(V + VI):VIIa	1.34	0.90	2.91	0.34	1.76	1.25
VIIa:VIIb	1.43	0.97	5.50	0.24	1.24	8.83

(Goodman 1979). The “starting” point is the very restricted uniform association model that assumes all contiguous associations in a table to be identical: $\ln \theta_{ij} = \varphi$. This model uses one parameter to characterize all odds ratios in a table, which is parsimonious but also often too restrictive (in these data, $L^2 = 224.7$; $df = 35$). The stringent assumption can be meaningfully relaxed in three ways:

- 1 By including diagonal density parameters that represent within class immobility over and above the association.
- 2 By scaling the distances between the row (μ_i) and column (ν_j) categories: $\ln \theta_{ij} = \varphi(\mu_{i+1} - \mu_i)(\nu_{j+1} - \nu_j)$; the category scalings μ_i and ν_j can be interpreted as measures of distance between or similarity among social categories with respect to the mobility chances. If categories are identically scaled ($\mu_1 = \mu_2$), this suggests that they can be regarded as a single social class. If the scalings are very different, this implies not only that mobility between the classes is extremely difficult, but also that they have very different mobility exchanges with other classes.
- 3 As a useful special restriction in this model we can introduce equal scalings for origins and destinations: $\mu_i = \nu_i$.

This model is known as the Goodman–Hauser model after its principal inventors (Goodman 1979; Hauser 1984). This model yields a very good fit to the data ($L^2 = 12.0$; $df = 23$). In Table 5 we present the scaling and immobility parameters.

Although not equidistant, we see from the scaling measures that the distance between the classes is ordered except for the farmers (IVc), who are better placed between unskilled manual workers (VIIa) and agricultural workers (VIIb). The immobility data show that inheritance is strong not only for farmers (IVc) and

the self employed (IVab), but also for the ser vice class (I + II).

In the Goodman–Hauser model the distance between the classes is estimated. An attractive alternative is the measured variable approach in which known characteristics are used as scal ings for the classes. In Hout’s (1984) SAT model, he scales origins and destinations using socioeconomic status (S), on the job autonomy (A), and specialized training (T). Breen and Whelan’s (1994) AHP model scales origins and destinations with origin and destination specific measures for agriculture (A), hierarchy (H), and property (P).

COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS

The measures presented here for absolute mobility can also be used to compare the level of absolute mobility between countries and per iods. An important prerequisite is that tables are comparable (of same dimension and using similar class categories). Dissimilarity indices can be computed to compare origin and desti nation distributions between tables, and in this way divergence or convergence between coun tries and periods can be assessed (see, e.g., Breen & Luijkx 2004).

For the comparative analysis of relative mobility, log linear models are extremely well suited. To compare tables, we need to extend the log linear model defined earlier:

$$\ln F_{ijk} = \lambda + \lambda_i^O + \lambda_j^D + \lambda_k^T + \lambda_{ik}^{OT} + \lambda_{jk}^{DT} + \lambda_{ij}^{OD} + \lambda_{ijk}^{ODT},$$

for all $i = 1, \dots, I$; $j = 1, \dots, J$; $k = 1, \dots, K$

We now have an additional one variable effect (λ_k^T) pertaining to the table totals, two additional two variable effects ($\lambda_{ik}^{OT}, \lambda_{jk}^{DT}$) pertaining to the origin and destination distributions for the

Table 5 Parameters for the Goodman Hauser model

<i>Class</i>	<i>I + II</i>	<i>III</i>	<i>IVab</i>	<i>IVc</i>	<i>V + VI</i>	<i>VIIa</i>	<i>VIIb</i>
Scaling	0.48	0.35	0.23	0.38	0.08	0.11	0.66
Immobility	0.69	0.21	1.13	2.82	0.41	0.21	0.20

distinct tables, and an additional three variable effect (λ_{ijk}^{ODT}) pertaining to the variation in origin–destination association in the different tables.

Let us think of T as a number of tables from different periods within one country, although it could also be tables from different countries or a combination of periods and countries (the model can also be further extended to take period and country into account as distinct variables). A first model is the constant social fluidity (CnSF) model that assumes no variation in the odds ratios OD across the tables (all $\lambda_{ijk}^{ODT} = 0$). Erikson and Goldthorpe (1992) and Xie (1992) have proposed an elaboration of the CnSF model to test for trends, the UniDiff (uniform difference) or log multiplicative layer effect model. UniDiff takes an intermediate position between CnSF (same pattern and strength of association in all tables) and the saturated model (different pattern and different strength of association for all tables) by using as a constraint that the set of odds ratios in one table differs from the set of odds ratios in the next table only by a log multiplicative scaling factor: $\ln \theta_{ijk} = \beta_k * \ln \theta_{ij}$, where $\beta_1 = 1$ by convention. In this case $\ln \theta_{ij}$ refers to the set of log odds ratios in the first table.

The UniDiff model does not model the pattern of mobility in the tables, but simple extensions to do so can be made by elaborating on the scaled association model presented earlier: $\ln \theta_{ijk} = \varphi_k(\mu_{i+1} - \mu_i)(\nu_{j+1} - \nu_j)$. In this model, scalings μ_i and ν_j are assumed to be equal across tables and the association φ_k is allowed to differ (in a similar way as β_k in the UniDiff model). Both β_k and φ_k can be constrained linearly or curvilinearly.

General statistical programs like SPSS, SAS, and STATA can be used to estimate most of the models presented here. To estimate the log multiplicative scaled association and UniDiff models, specialized programs such as LEM (Vermunt 1997) are more appropriate.

Although published more than 20 years ago, Hout's *Mobility Tables* (1983) is still one of the more comprehensive introductions to the log linear analysis of mobility tables. A more recent work in which both substantive and methodological aspects of mobility analysis are presented is the collection of country papers in

Breen (2004), which also includes a comparative analysis of eight nations over three decades.

SEE ALSO: Educational and Occupational Attainment; Income Inequality and Income Mobility; Intergenerational Mobility: Core Model of Social Fluidity; Mobility, Horizontal and Vertical; Mobility, Intergenerational and Intragenerational; Mobility, Measuring the Effects of; Occupational Mobility; Occupational Segregation; Transition from School to Work

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intergenerational relationships and exchanges

Timothy J. Biblarz, Vern L. Bengtson, and Merrill Silverstein

The study of intergenerational relationships and exchange is about the structure and process of sharing that occurs in the linked lives of grandparents, parents, and children (and some times extended kin) as they move along the life course. Like the discipline of sociology, this subfield emerged in the wake of rapid industrialization, urbanization, and expansion of the state's role in families (e.g., the education of children and caring for the elderly), and is concerned with how these major social changes altered extended family ties, the role of grandparents, and parent–child relationships. Midtown researchers in the 1920s, for example,

observed challenges to parental control as children's individualistic aspirations began to compete with family obligations. In the US, parents' relationships with children have since shifted from an emphasis on obedience and strict conformity to developing children's autonomy and independence. In Japan, South Korea, and other countries, the significance of filial piety seems to be diminishing, raising new questions about who should care for the old and young.

The study of intergenerational relationships and exchange has been guided by two questions. The first involves intergenerational transmission: what do families transmit from one generation to the next, how do processes of intergenerational transmission occur, and why? Sizable correlations have been found, for example, between the social class position of parents and that eventually held by children (the intergenerational reproduction of inequality), and between parents' and children's religious and political values, occupations, family behavior (e.g., propensity to divorce), health related behavior (e.g., smoking), and other statuses, values, and behaviors. The family environment (as against genetic) component of intergenerational inheritance has been variously explained by patterns of parental investment in children (economic theory), children modeling their parents (learning theory), and levels of affect in the parent–child relationship (attachment theory). Research is just beginning to explore transmission across multiple generations, as in the case of grandparental influence on grandchildren, prompted in part by positive trends in the health, longevity, and socioeconomic status of older generations.

The second question involves how intergenerational relationships and exchange contribute to (or detract from) the well being of individual family members. Under what circumstances do relationships and exchange provide members psychological and material well being, a haven in a heartless world, or leave them in the cold? The concern most often has been with the well being of society's two dependent populations, elders and children, although the well being of the “sandwiched” generation has also received attention. A key feature is the study of caregiving, and of the timing and spacing of transfers up and down the intergenerational ladder

over the life course. The core resources given altruistically or exchanged reciprocally that are most frequently studied include time and involvement, money, assets and goods, and love, affection, and intimacy, in part because these have proven essential to individual well being.

Trends from the 1960s to the present – most notably, increases in divorce, maternal employment, nonmarital childbearing, and cohabitation – have stirred volumes of new research on consequences for parent–child relationships, child development and well being, and intergenerational exchange. New research shows that the quality of early parent–child relationships is consequential years later, when aging parents may need help from adult children, or vice versa. Some studies show that fathers who divorce while their children are young, for example, get less from their children in old age. The role of grandparents in contributing to the well being of grandchildren, particularly in the context of divorce and other stressors, is becoming an important focus of research.

While intergenerational relationships and exchange are studied in a variety of social science disciplines, the sociological approach has at least three key features. First, it pays attention to how patterns of intergenerational relationships and exchange are affected by the social contexts (neighborhoods, employment sites, economic conditions, and so on) in which families, and family members, are embedded. For example, a number of studies have shown that bad jobs make good parenting more difficult to achieve. The experiences and lessons learned in extra family environments get brought into families, influencing family relationships and exchange.

Second, the life course perspective is often used as a framework for studying intergenerational relationships. It draws attention to the unique alignment of age or life stage (e.g., the nature of exchanges between parents and children will vary depending on whether children are in infancy, childhood, adolescence, or adulthood) and history (e.g., relationships will be colored both by the period under which family members came of age and the current climate), with an eye toward how individual development and primary relationships at the micro level

are affected by local, regional, national, and even global events. The life course approach is inherently longitudinal, viewing intergenerational relationships as beginning at birth and moving through old age, and sequential, where earlier intergenerational events and transitions along the life course will have essential implications for later ones.

Third, rooted in the expansion of the division of labor and population heterogeneity that accompanied modernization, sociology has become markedly attentive to the consequences of social inequalities – hierarchies based on the intersecting dimensions of education, occupation, economic status, age, race, ethnicity, nativity and immigration status, gender, sexual orientation, and family background. This “race, class, gender” approach has become an important component of studies of intergenerational relationships. Do class, race, and ethnicity, for example, shape the way parents raise children and adult children care for aging parents? Some evidence suggests that, controlling for resources, African American and Latino adults in the US are more likely to provide assistance to their parents, and that race, class, and gender shape the way parents raise their children.

Since its origin was in the disruptions of major social changes, this subfield traditionally has been concerned with family decline – the possibility that intergenerational relationships have weakened and exchanges have diminished. To date, the fear of intergenerational decline has been stronger than the empirical evidence. Even at the height of the apparent generation gap in the US – the 1960s – relatively high levels of shared values and bonds between family members were observed, and the vast majority of caregiving today continues to be provided by family members. Recent work has also shown that employment has not led to significant decline in the amount of time mothers spend with children. To be sure, at the beginning of the twenty first century, intergenerational relationships and exchanges are more diverse and complicated than ever before, but remain crucially important to the well being of individuals and society.

SEE ALSO: Aging, Sociology of; Family, Sociology of; Intergenerational Conflict; Life Course; Life Course and Family; Socialization

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international gender division of labor

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World systems theorists were among the first to use the concept of an international division of labor by illustrating how the production of goods and services for "core" or more developed countries relied on the material resources of "peripheral" or developing nations (Wallerstein 1974). Their work describes the changing

political and economic relationships among nations over the last six centuries, beginning with the period of colonization when Western European nations took possession of other countries in order to gain access to their raw materials such as sugar, coffee, gold, silver, or labor sold into slavery. By the middle of the twentieth century most of those colonies had gained their political freedom and titular control over their own resources, but were never able to break away from their economic dependence on highly industrialized countries.

In the twentieth century a new process called global or economic restructuring created a new form of international division of labor between the developed countries (now labeled the global North, a term replacing the old Cold War label "First World") and the developing nations (now called the global South, which replaced the concept of a "Third World"). Beginning in the 1970s, in order to lessen production costs and enabled by improvements in information and production technologies, US, Japanese, and Western European corporations began to "off shore" some of their production processes to the global South, often moving to export processing zones (EPZs) within these countries, which are defined as industrial zones that provide manufacturing infrastructure, tax reductions, low labor costs, lax environmental regulations, and other incentives. As a result of this worldwide economic restructuring, much basic manufacturing and heavy industrial production were relocated to developing nations, while corporate headquarters, service work, and final product finishing stayed in developed nations. This process was initially referred to as the growth of the global assembly line or the global factory (Kamel 1990). Instead of taking raw material resources from their former colonies, transnational corporations (TNCs) based in the global North rely on residents of the global South to provide inexpensive labor for factories now located in developing countries.

In addition, international development or funding agencies such as the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank influence global South economies when they loan money to poor and developing nations, because loans are tied to required austerity measures known as structural adjustment programs (SAPs). SAPs require the debtor countries to reduce

government expenditures on social services and increase production for export, rather than supporting independent local businesses that produce for local consumption, in order to earn more foreign currency to pay back these loans. An important byproduct of these two factors – TNCs relocating production overseas and structural adjustment programs – is that developing economies are indirectly controlled by transnational corporations and/or funding agencies located in developed nations, thus reinforcing a new international division of labor.

This international division of labor is profoundly gendered in many ways. Mies et al. (1988) observed there has been an international trend towards the “housewifization” of all labor – an interesting term that incorporates several aspects of the relationship between paid work and women’s unpaid work at home. First, paid work is becoming increasingly feminized, with new jobs in the service sector drawing more on women’s than men’s labor. Indeed, some of women’s traditional white and pink collar jobs, such as data entry or telephone call in work, are now being sent to workers in developing countries, especially to English speaking, former British colony nations (Freeman 2000).

Second, paid work is increasingly organized like women’s housework, with jobs that require flexible schedules and are occupationally segregated. Such “flexibilization” of the world economy refers to the growth of part time, temporary, or seasonal employment. In developed countries, this process is most visible in the growth of the service sector. In developing economies flexibilization usually refers to the need for families to have multiple income sources based on subsistence farming, vending, or other forms of self employment, and perhaps some formal paid work.

Third, many of these jobs, like market trading, factory outwork, or off the books childcare, are found in the informal sector of the global economy that is rapidly expanding but, like housework, is not regulated by national labor laws. Therefore, increasing “informalization” of work often accompanies flexibilization.

Fifth, since women’s traditional tasks are stereotyped as unskilled (although they are not), companies or individual employers can more easily pay less and provide less job security.

In other words, economic restructuring and the international division of paid labor created new jobs that have many of the characteristics of women’s paid work and unpaid carework and housework, which is not surprising since women are the source of new labor in most countries worldwide.

Recent scholarship by Parreñas (2000), Hondagneu Sotello and Avila (1997), and others illustrates that there also is an international division of reproductive or carework labor. This occurs when women from developing countries migrate internationally to more developed ones to perform paid carework for other women, then use their earnings to hire someone back home (often a rural to urban migrant or another family member) to take care of their own families. Parreñas (2000) argues that this labor chain, transferring white women’s domestic and reproductive labor to women of color from developing nations, creates an international system of racial stratification in reproductive work and makes temporary overseas “contract workers” into a new export commodity for some developing countries.

While the international division of labor continues to change forms, one of the constant features is its gendered and raced nature.

SEE ALSO: Development: Political Economy; Division of Labor; Divisions of Household Labor; Feminization of Labor Migration; Global Economy; Women, Economy and

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Internet

James Slevin

The Internet is a global network of interconnected computer hardware and software systems, making possible the storage, retrieval, circulation, and processing of information and communication across time and space. From a sociological perspective, the Internet is not synonymous with a global information machine as it is in some popular accounts. A sociological account encompasses the constituent Internet technologies and attends to these as social phenomena. It also includes the information and other content which is produced, transmitted, and received by individuals and organizations using the Internet. Finally, a sociological account of the Internet includes the socially and historically structured contexts and processes in which the production, transmission, and reception of information and communication are embedded.

Consider the simple act of writing and sending an email over the Internet. What can we say from a sociological perspective about communicating in this way? We could start by pointing out that communicating by email is not just an alternative way of producing and distributing information. It involves us in a complexity of new forms of action and interaction that stretch across the world. In order to send an email, we need to have access to technologies that allow us to store, process, and send information over the Internet. The resources we are able to muster in respect of communicating and in respect of accessing and distributing information over the Internet are not uniformly spread. Moreover, using these technologies is a skilled performance demanding particular capabilities, for example, knowing how to work a computer, knowing how to address an email, and knowing how to attach other items like photographs, if we so wish.

Sending an email is also embedded in various kinds of interlocking institutional arrangements. Sending email from a private Internet connection at home is different from sending an email from an office or from an Internet café. At home, we might need to negotiate time spent on the computer with others in our household who might also wish to use it. In an office, we might be restricted in sending private emails which are not strictly related to our work. In an Internet café, we might be paying for Internet access by the minute, feel uncomfortable because other people can read our screens, and leave as soon as we have finished our coffee. The circumstances of the recipient of our email may also be relevant to the process of sending it. It's no good sending an email and expecting a direct response if the recipient is away on holiday or is normally asleep at that time of day. The situated social contexts of both the sender and recipient also interlock with institutional arrangements that are instantiated in what happens online. Sending an email from an Internet café, for example, may involve us using the online services of a distant Internet provider. Such arrangements also enable and restrict communication and the accessing and distributing of information.

Finally, the content of an email also involves us in new forms of action and interaction and is constructed and organized differently from communication by letter, phone, or in face to face exchange. The content of email messages mostly does not display the same formalities that letters do. In such a situation where we want to communicate a complicated message which could easily be misunderstood, we might prefer to use a phone or meet face to face rather than communicate by email. Moreover, the choice to send a message by email rather than using a different means of communication is already an act that may be considered socially meaningful by a recipient. Sending highly consequential information via email, for example, may seem insensitive to a recipient's feelings and interests.

Email is only one of a baffling variety of available Internet applications. The World Wide Web, newsgroups, instant messenger systems, Virtual Learning Environments, to name but a few others, can all be approached from a similar sociological perspective.

The Internet deserves the attention of sociologists for three major reasons. First, the Internet facilitates a reorganization of information and social relationships across time and space. As such, its development and use have intended and unintended consequences for human social life, groups, and societies that need to be studied and understood. Second, in investigating and understanding the complex subject matter of sociology, the Internet is an important tool for collecting data and for accessing information relevant to such an endeavor. Third, the Internet deserves the attention of sociologists because it expands the opportunities for circulating research findings and for supporting critical reflection, learning, and debate. However, in staking out the relevance of the Internet for sociology, we need to be aware that as a social phenomenon, it is an expression of the radical interconnection of people, organizations, different sectors of society, and the problems that we take up for study. In this way, studying the Internet involves shifts and linkages to perspectives that might traditionally have been considered to lie beyond the disciplinary boundaries of sociology. A comprehensive understanding of the Internet can only be developed jointly, from a multidisciplinary approach.

Fundamental to a sociological account of the Internet is that its development and use are not accidental to a set of complex and contradictory changes that are taking place in our world today. As such, the Internet is in the midst of some of our most severe and exciting challenges. The world we live in is becoming increasingly globalized. As a global communication network, the Internet is transforming the complex relationships between local activities and interaction across distance. The world we live in confronts us with new opportunities and dilemmas as the certainties afforded by tradition, authority, and nature no longer direct our lives in the way that they once did. The Internet radicalizes this process by placing "horizontal" forms of communications center stage, by allowing the questioning and blurring over of authority, and by allowing the reordering and expansion of the built environment. The world we live in is increasingly reflexive and saturated with information. As a technology of communication, the Internet transforms our information environments by facilitating global attentiveness,

visibility, and questioning. Moreover, as a technology of communication, the Internet does not simply impact on this set of complex and contradictory changes; it contributes to the construction, mediation, and disclosure of what these transformations are.

Globalization, detraditionalization, and the intensification of social reflexivity force themselves as major themes into all sorts of Internet topics addressed by sociological research. In connecting these themes to the topics they study, sociologists are concerned with a range of questions that follow from the challenges we face. First, to what extent is the Internet facilitating an advance in intelligent relationships between individuals, groups, and organizations arranged through dialogue rather than domination and violence? Second, how might the Internet empower individuals, groups, and organizations to make things happen rather than to have things happen to them in the context of overall goals and interests? Third, in what way does the Internet offer a new basis for solidarity and strategic alliances, bringing together in association individuals, groups, and organizations who were previously socially and geographically far apart? Fourth, in what way might the Internet open up new opportunities for limiting damage and conflict as new communication networks allow individuals, groups, and organizations to cross paths with others whose views differ from their own? In dealing with these questions, sociologists may opt to emphasize the communicational, political, economic, and normative aspects of the Internet and its use, or a combination of these.

In spite of all the excitement generated by the Internet over recent years, we would not be far off the mark if we were to conclude that it remains only poorly understood. Many debates about the social impact of the Internet have involved opposing sides taking almost completely contradictory views about its significance in modern life. On the one hand, we find the Internet radicals who claim that we are at the dawn of a new era of opportunity in which we can live our lives on the screen. On the other, we find the Internet skeptics, who warn of the onset of a terrible nightmare in which many people will find themselves disconnected and irrelevant to the important things that go on in their world. Sometimes optimistic and pessimistic views are raised by one and the same person.

While we might rejoice at the idea that people hold different opinions, this kind of understanding of an important communication medium is not at all satisfactory given the severity of the challenges that we face, both on the level of world society and institutions and on the level of our personal lives. Why is our understanding of the Internet so poor? More importantly, what can sociologists do about it?

Some commentators point to a lack of adequate research into the Internet and yet others to the sheer pace of social and technical change which they claim has overtaken us. The problem, however, also goes deeper than this. We urgently need to find concepts and frameworks that can be placed in the service of developing a more critical understanding of the Internet and we must continue to remain critical of what we may find.

A great deal of early knowledge of the Internet had an anecdotal and descriptive quality about it. As the sophistication of Internet studies advanced, research began to slot into an already growing interest in communication via the computer. Studies of computer mediated communication and "cyberculture" developed from this and were taken up by researchers from diverse disciplinary backgrounds. This resulted in the research area becoming highly fragmented with different disciplines declaring different parts of it to be their own. While narrowly defined disciplinary approaches still exist today, Internet research has become increasingly multidisciplinary.

Another problem with early research is related to the use of the term "new media" to refer to technologies like the Internet. This was conveniently taken by some to mean that they could begin their understanding of the Internet with a fresh start without critically referring to existing theories and to existing media. Some commentators even claimed that media convergence would result in the new media swallowing up or replacing the old. Today, we are far more sensitized to the way in which the Internet reconfigures different media and the contrasting ways in which it reconfigures our information and communication environment.

The biggest shift in the treatment of the Internet, however, is that early research tended to focus on what was happening on the Net. Internet culture was understood to be an online

phenomenon quite divorced from the social contexts within which, and by virtue of which, it was produced and received. There is now a growing realization that the Internet is not incidental to our lives but fundamental to the way we live now. This has resulted in far more comprehensive studies looking at the way in which the Internet enmeshes with the cultural transformations associated with the rise of modern societies and a far greater awareness of the situated and cultural contexts of its use.

With the Internet so centrally involved in the shakeup of our institutions, organizations, and our individual lives, the research topics addressed by sociologists are bounded only by the limits of their imagination. While the following list does not exhaust all possibilities, it contains some of the topics that sociological research has addressed.

- 1 The history of Internet related technologies. The history of the Internet is only beginning to be written. Many early accounts hardly progress beyond the construction of time lines setting out important events without explaining why these came about or what they mean. More advanced approaches show the Internet not to be a sudden invention, governed solely by conditions internal to its own technological development. Instead, they argue that all Internet related innovations are fundamentally social and their meaning, together with their meaningful use, is grounded in social contexts. The Internet is the result of tensionful, contradictory technical and social conditions and the consequences of its use are no less so.
- 2 Self identity and everyday life. Globalization and detraditionalization mean that individuals face more opportunities in constructing their own lives than once was the case. Who we are, what we do, and how we do things together is increasingly mediated and fed by information and communication technologies. Sociological studies attempt to unravel the involvement of the Internet in transforming the nature of the self, experience, and communication in everyday life. Sociologists are sensitive to ways in which the Internet is furthering individual autonomy but also to ways in which the Internet might adversely affect individuals

- by excluding them from its use or by involving them in problems of compulsion, addiction, and self harm.
- 3 Networking and community. The turmoil of our modern world has resulted in the breakdown of traditional strategies for organizing solidarity. Critical awareness of this social disintegration is accompanied by a renewed interest in community. Online communication opens up vast opportunities for human interaction and association across time and space. Communities facilitated by the Internet often consist of individuals related to each other in terms of practice rather than proximity. There are worries, however, that new forms of human association using the Internet are undermining solidarity still further with individuals becoming increasingly disengaged from meaningful face to face relationships.
 - 4 Organizations, business, and institutions. Modern organizations exist by virtue of the informed practices of their members. Internet technology has permeated all forms of organization in the form of intranets for their internal communication, extranets for their communication with other organizations, and the Internet for their external communication. Using these networks, some organizations have become more open and informed resulting from a decentralization of organizational authority, a shift toward supportive and facilitative leadership, a focus on knowledge sharing, horizontal communication, teamwork and empowerment, and a blurring of traditional organizational boundaries, for example, where individuals work from home and on the move. However, using these networks, organizations can also become highly centralized, hierarchical, inaccessible, exclusive, and fundamentalist rather than cosmopolitan in their outlook.
 - 5 Publicness and democracy. The Internet is creating new opportunities and burdens as regards mediating visibility and making information available to others. Sociologists are interested in how the Internet is impacting on the public sphere, redefining freedom of expression and discussion. The new global information environment is a powerful democratizing force. Democratic institutions are being transformed under pressure of highly reflexive citizenries who are increasingly organizing themselves internationally.
 - 6 Social movements and civil society. The rise of various social movements oriented toward challenges traditional democratic institutions have failed to cope with has snapped together with the new opportunities offered by the Internet. The civil rights movements, the feminist movements, the ecological and anti nuclear movements, and the gay and lesbian movements, to name but a few, are all reinvigorating civil society, empowered by the Internet. For sociologists, their struggle for visibility, campaigns, and use of information technology have become important topics of study.
 - 7 Globalization and the digital divide. Globalization is an inherent feature of our modern world and raises many questions and difficulties. We increasingly live in one world where globalized communication is relevant to all our lives. Yet the consequences of globalized communication are highly contradictory and most of the world's population is excluded from using it.
 - 8 Regulation. New forms of policy and regulation are being researched, developed, and implemented affecting Internet access and content, stimulating economic development, promoting diversity, pluralism, and the deconcentration of power, and regulating the connections with other media.
 - 9 Research and social theory. Sociologists have also attended to questions regarding Internet research and whether this demands new theoretical frameworks and research methodologies.
- Sociological projects in these areas are set to continue and new projects will arise. Some will acquire new significance and urgency. None the more so than in the area of e learning. Successful intervention in our world today is increasingly governed by decisions made on the basis of knowledge and competence which is revisable or can be rendered outdated in an instant. The Internet is set to play a key role in facilitating the building and rebuilding of knowledge and skills, at any time and in any place, and is already contributing to the

refashioning of education, its institutions, and the way we learn.

As the radical interconnectedness afforded by the Internet propels its users into an increasingly challenging reality of cultural differences, people and organizations will increasingly cross paths with others whose views and interests may differ from their own. How people and organizations can best negotiate such a complexity of experiences will demand significant attention from sociologists.

There is also a growing awareness of the environmental impact of global communication systems. The Internet already consumes a vast amount of energy and produces a vast amount of waste. In this respect, as with other global technological systems of our times, the Internet only works because most of the world's population is excluded from using it. This poses tremendous challenges for finding ways of dealing with the digital divide.

New technological developments also call for new developments in sociological perspectives and imagination. Not only people but also technological systems, even ones we do not normally associate with communication and the Internet, will increasingly become interconnected. Our lives and the contexts in which we work and live will become ever more saturated with information which will create new demands for processing information and archiving it. Social problems and problems specifically related to the Internet will become more interconnected and complex. In meeting these challenges, sociologists will increasingly find themselves working with others across disciplines in a world acutely aware of the limitations of their expertise. In all of this, it is the sociologist's responsibility to contribute to understanding the ways in which technologies like the Internet are being used, to reflect critically on our complex world, to gain a better understanding of it, and to intervene in it the best we can.

SEE ALSO: Community and Media; Cyber crime; Cyberculture; Cybersexualities and Virtual Sexuality; Digital; Globalization, Education and; Information Society; Information Technology; Internet Medicine; Knowledge, Sociology of; Media and Globalization; Media Monopoly; Media, Network(s) and; Media and the Public Sphere; Mediated Interaction;

Multimedia; Politics and Media; Scientific Networks and Invisible Colleges; Social Movements, Participatory Democracy in; Surveillance; Technology, Science, and Culture

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Internet medicine

Michael Hardey

The engagement of medicine with information and communications technologies (ICTs) can be traced to the early part of the twentieth century when attempts were made to send X-ray images through the phone lines. By the 1970s, the desire to overcome the constraints distance imposed on contact between clinicians had produced a new specialist area of practice labeled "telemedicine." Since the emergence of

the Internet, telemedicine has come to denote medical practices that use, for example, email, teleconferencing, and remote diagnosis. As Giddens (1991) notes, scientific disciplines in advanced modernity generate ever more subdisciplines. Consequently, specializations have emerged organized around telepsychiatry, tele-neurology, teleorthopedics, medical informatics, and so forth. Despite this differentiation, a useful distinction can now be made between telemedicine and what is known as e health. This recognizes the Internet as a key driver in the new "information age" where the "electronic" flows of information and capital form the "new economy" of the twenty first century (Castells 2001). The prefix "e" has since become attached to activities that use the Internet to make interactive links between producers and consumers, so that together with e commerce the category e health has quickly become established. It can be defined sociologically as involving theoretically grounded and empirically informed attempts to understand the dynamic, emergent, and pluralistic nature of knowledge about health and illness that is mediated by the Internet. From this, four key themes that continue to frame research and debates within e health are evident.

The first theme involves what might be termed the "quality debate," which has been significant since the initial use of the Internet to provide consumers with health information. It reflects the open, dynamic, global, and potentially anonymous nature of the media where the status of the providers of information and the veracity of material that is published may not be clear. To put it simply, the key issue in medical circles is whether information published on the Internet puts consumers at risk. Consequently, a range of organizations has emerged to provide "kite marks" which are awarded to Internet sites that only display reliable biomedical information. Such systems necessarily dismiss complementary and alternative (CAM) approaches to health that are not open to clear scientific verification.

The second theme is concerned with how individuals perceive and use information published on the Internet. Drawing on work by Anthony Giddens and others, it has been argued that people make sense of the choices that confront them in the information age through a

reflexive engagement with diverse forms and sources of information. This involves the careful and rational discovery and assessment of information about health that offers to improve or shape aspects of individual lives. This highlights concerns about how medical treatments including drugs can be purchased or treatments entered into through the Internet in a way that escapes national regulations. For example, spam email advertising Viagra is widespread but there is no guarantee that the drugs purchased through ICTs will resemble those available through medical prescriptions. Similarly, how do consumers know that a doctor who offers email consultation is really what he or she purports to be? Trust is, as Parsons's (1991 [1951]) model of the sick role noted, central to the doctor-patient relationship. The third theme is therefore concerned with the way well informed patients may transform this relationship (Hardey 1999). Reflecting broader aspects of the consumer society, the doctor-patient relationship is becoming democratized and one that is often better regarded as a partnership than an unequal encounter between expert and passive consumer.

Finally, the interactive nature of the Internet enables people to become producers as well as consumers of information. Research into news groups and similar peer to peer spaces have revealed how they are used to share information and experiences about illnesses. Whether the topic is "fatness," asthma, or any other health related issue, it is possible to find newsgroups where individuals can post questions and offer advice to others. What has been called "wired self help" has in effect opened up a global network of people with whom experiences can be shared that in the past was limited by sociability within geographically bound communities and families (Burrows & Nettleton 2002). There are also many web pages and blogs constructed by those who have experienced sometimes rare conditions and who want to share information in a global forum. Chronic illness may therefore not be such an isolating experience as it was in the past and people may come together to advocate new forms of treatment or call for more medical resources (Hardey 2004). Furthermore, those with "sick" bodies may leave them behind and interact on an equal basis with others in the disembodied digital domain of the Internet.

The Internet represents a challenge to established social research. Research has to capture the dynamic nature of the medium and often needs to embrace the local and global aspect of both users and the information that is published. This may involve the use of ICTs to generate data from, for example, email based questionnaires or interactive interviews. Furthermore, the analysis of Internet resources may involve text, images, and languages other than English despite its domination of the Internet. Much work needs to be done on how CAM is represented and consumed through ICTs. The “digital divide” remains an important policy and research concern as unequal access to ICTs may further disadvantage the poor, who suffer disproportionately from chronic illness. Finally, we are only beginning to recognize how the Internet may be used to address the inequalities in health between people who live in the first and third worlds.

SEE ALSO: Complementary and Alternative Medicine; Cyberculture; Health and Culture; Health Lifestyles; Illness Behavior; Illness Experience; Illness Narrative; Internet; Medicine, Sociology of; Patient–Physician Relationship; Sick Role; Socialist Medicine

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interpersonal relationships

Terri L. Orbuch

In any relationship, two participants are interdependent, where the behavior of each affects the outcomes of the other. Additionally, the individuals interact with each other in a series of interactions that are interrelated and affect each other. Individuals form many different kinds of relationships with other people, some of which are intimate and close (e.g., parent–child, spouse–spouse, friendships) and others which are not intimate and close (e.g., neighbor, teacher–student). Most of the research on interpersonal relationships has focused on those relationships that are close, intimate, and have high interdependence. In an influential book, Kelley and colleagues (1983) define a close relationship as one that is strong, frequent, and with diverse interdependence that lasts over a considerable period of time. In sociology, although the classic distinction between primary and secondary relationships has been expanded in the public realm (fleeting, routinized, quasi-primary, and intimate secondary relationships), these close relationships (as described above) also can be categorized as primary groups, which provide support and nurture and socialize individuals to the norms of society.

The concept of relationship historically has had a central and significant place in sociology. Some of the founding sociologists, such as Simmel and Marx, were concerned with attraction and interpersonal relationship issues. Even particular types of relationships and relationship processes – such as courtship, marriage, and parent–child relationships – have always been important to how and what sociologists study. For example, sociologists have been particularly interested in research on marriage and the family, specifically the structural and

demographic correlates of these relations (e.g., Bernard 1972).

HISTORICAL CONTEXT

In the 1960s the initial focus of interpersonal relationship research was on the interpersonal attraction process, primarily between strangers meeting for the first time, rather than on the relationships themselves that might develop as a result of attraction. This research developed primarily out of mate selection studies first begun by family sociologists in the 1930s and 1940s (Burgess & Cottrell 1939). Attraction typically is conceptualized as an attitude toward another consisting of feelings, cognitions, and behaviors and can be negative and/or positive in nature. Most of the early research on the interpersonal attraction process relied on self report measures to assess the factors that lead a person (P) to be attracted to another person (O). For example, the bogus stranger paradigm (Byrne 1971) asked respondents (typically, young college students) to rate how much they were attracted to another person after being presented with minimal information about this other person. In these paradigms, respondents were actually participating in an experiment, where the information presented to respondents was manipulated, and the other persons were typically hypothetical others. Walster, Berscheid, and their colleagues (e.g., Walster et al. 1966) also conducted numerous "get acquainted interaction" studies in which real respondents were matched with each other and given the opportunity to interact, after which they self reported their attraction to each other.

In the 1980s researchers turned their attention to the more intense sentiments and phenomena that occur within actual interpersonal relationships, and to the social context of various kinds of specific relationships. Although attraction was important, maybe even necessary for P (person) and O (other) to begin an interpersonal relationship, the majority of research started to focus on the "pulse" or quality of these interpersonal relationships and its link to processes inside (e.g., cognitions, depression, physical health) and outside (e.g., work satisfaction, financial strain, family cohesiveness) the individual. In addition, researchers began to examine the influence of factors in P (person)

(e.g., depression) and O (other) (e.g., physical attractiveness), along with the combination of those factors (P and O) (e.g., conflict, similarity) on the likelihood that P and O will stay in the relationship and are happy with it.

NEW DIRECTIONS IN RESEARCH

Even more recently, relationships have received considerable attention in sociology and the other social sciences. An examination of the research since 1980 illuminates several themes. First, an expanding and significant body of literature demonstrates that interpersonal relationships are vital and important to the physical and mental health of individuals. Studies show (House et al. 2003) that individuals are likely to suffer from depression, anxiety, ill health, and other physical problems if they lack interpersonal relationships of high quantity and quality. The interesting finding here is that quality and quantity of relationships are critical for individuals' overall health and well being.

Second, the current research emphasizes specific relational processes that are relevant at various stages of the life course of a relationship. This literature tends to be organized according to relationship type and focuses on factors that are important to the development of a relationship (attraction, similarity, background factors), the maintenance of a relationship (communication, conflict, family interference and support), and the dissolution of a relationship (legal factors, effects on children, adjustment). There also is strong evidence to suggest that what factors predict divorce or dissolution of a relationship differ depending on the life course stage of the *relationship*. The age or life course stage of the *individual* also has been found to be relevant to what relational processes are important to individuals' evaluations of the relationship (relationship quality). Further, the recent emphasis on the life course of both relationship and individual has focused scholarly attention on the importance of making conceptual distinctions between (1) the intent to maintain a relationship (e.g., commitment) (see Johnson 1991), (2) personal evaluations within a relationship as perceived by individuals (relationship quality), and (3) the status of the relationship (relationship stability) (Veroff et al. 1997).

A third new direction in relationship research has been to concentrate on making the dyad the unit of analysis rather than the individual (Couch 1992). This change is both methodological and conceptual and has become an important contribution to the literature on relationships. Relationship scholars now find it important to collect information from both members of the dyad, rather than only one member, and assess how these reports may differentially affect the well being and stability of the relationship (Duck 1990).

Fourth, given the prominence of symbolic interactionism in sociology (e.g., Mead 1934), another new direction of relationship research has been to apply symbolic interactionist concepts to the study of relationship well being and stability (Burke & Cast 1997). The self is created out of the interactions and feedback from others, and the relational context is even more salient for how individuals view themselves. Further, to understand how adults define and describe themselves to others, relationship scholars turn directly to the context and status of their relationships.

The fifth new direction in relationship research has been to examine the construction of meaning within relationships for relationship quality and stability (Orbuch et al. 1993). In these studies, there is an acknowledgment that individuals may construct meanings of their relationship, based on the social context of that relationship and individual, which in turn has significant influence on individuals' evaluations and status of those relationships. Many relationship scholars now ask couples/dyads (separately or jointly) to use a narrative or account as stories technique to gain a better understanding of individuals' meanings of their relationship and relational processes over time (for a review, see Orbuch 1997). This technique allows individuals to have a "voice" in their reports about their relationships and permits variations in reports as a result of the "sociocultural ecology" within which the relationship is embedded. This approach also recognizes that these stories formulate, control, predict, and shape individuals' relational experiences over time.

Sixth, the larger environment and structural conditions that can be harmful or beneficial for a couple's well being have been examined. Relationship scholars have begun to link these

"sociocultural ecologies," or what sociologists term the norms, cultural meanings, settings, circumstances, or people outside the relationship, to relationship quality and stability. One specific contextual factor that has received a great deal of attention lately is social networks, or the link between the relationship and people outside the dyad. Specifically, relationship scholars have been interested in the influence of social networks of family and friends on the stability and quality of relationships (for a review, see Felmler & Sprecher 2000). The majority of this research looks at how social networks can be a potential source of support or reduction of stress for couples, but this direct link has been challenged and revised by many (Kessler et al. 1995). The general notion that social networks are linked to the internal pulse of the relationship was first examined by Bott (1971).

Another important contextual factor that has received attention recently is the context of race/ethnicity for interpersonal relationships (McLoyd et al. 2000). Relationship scholars have begun to highlight the similarities and differences between and within various racial/ethnic groups. Recent studies find that both cultural and structural factors may affect relational processes differentially among various ethnic groups (Orbuch et al. 2002).

CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE DIRECTIONS

The field of interpersonal relationships has a strong history and vibrant theoretical foundation in the discipline of sociology. Critical to sociological ideas and theories is the notion that individuals interact with others and that these interactions are interrelated and affect each other. Further, the topic of interpersonal relationships is the perfect arena to understand and illuminate many underlying sociological processes and concepts (e.g., development of self, culture, social networks, commitment, and emotions) that are critical to the discipline.

The study of interpersonal relationships is not yet the focus of an organized subspecialty in sociology, as it is in psychology and communication studies. Yet the research questions that have been asked about interpersonal relationships,

whether in the past or present, are not inherently more psychological than sociological. It is imperative that sociologists continue to expand research on the topic of interpersonal relationships (Felmlee & Sprecher 2000). For sociologists, the list of questions is still very expansive and the research possibilities are endless.

SEE ALSO: Accounts; Divorce; Dyad/Triad; Family and Community; Friendship: Interpersonal Aspects; Interaction; Marriage

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interracial unions

Alison Roberts

Interracial unions refer to romantic relationships between people of different racial categories. Generally, the term indicates married (and hence, heterosexual) status, as it is more feasible to identify and carry out social research on this population than non married, non cohabiting, and/or same sex interracial couples. Sociological inquiry of racial intermarriage stems from the study of assimilation and understanding the social evolution of societies with significant immigration. Researchers employ both qualitative and quantitative methods to study interracial unions: a macro level perspective involves examining demographic data to identify cultural patterns, and a micro level approach focuses on the cultural meaning – derived from social interaction – of an interracial relationship to the couple and to their family, friends, and community. In recent years

more attention has been devoted to the study of the identity of the offspring of interracial unions, but the study of interracial marriage remains sociologically relevant – the rate of interracial marriages can be an indicator of levels of proximity or distance across racial lines, tolerance or prejudice of different groups, and the malleability of the boundaries of racial categories. Interracial unions are studied by sociologists with an interest in racial and ethnic relations as well as those interested in the family.

Sociologists use the metaphor of the “marriage market” to analyze how people select their spouses: individuals will look for the most desirable partner they can attract given the resources available to them. This model explains why many married couples share similar characteristics such as educational background and socioeconomic status. However, individuals may compensate for any “mismatching” by providing each other with resources that the other does not possess. This status exchange hypothesis explains that members of higher status groups could be inclined to marry members of lower status groups if the individuals with the lower status could offer a resource to offset that lower status. In his 1941 article “Intermarriage and the Social Structure: Fact and Theory,” Merton argued that racial minorities could compensate for their lower racial status with a higher socioeconomic position. Much of the research conducted on interracial marriages has focused on an exchange of racial status for socioeconomic status.

Sociologists who study racial and ethnic relations use assimilation theories to address immigrants’ ability to adapt to the new environment and to integrate with other racial and ethnic groups. Milton Gordon established several stages of assimilation that explained what outcomes we can expect if immigrants adapt to and become part of their new culture. One such outcome would be marital assimilation, indicated by significant intermarriage between ethnic and racial groups. Over time, intermarriage among white, European American ethnic groups became quite commonplace, but that trend has not been replicated in the rate of interracial unions. Historical conditions such as colonialism and slavery are determinants of how interracial marriages are perceived within a society. Indeed, many states and nations legislated and

enforced sanctions against interracial unions. In South Africa, interracial marriages were not entirely uncommon until the Prohibition of Mixed Marriages Act of 1949 and the Immorality Act of 1950 effectively outlawed interracial unions. Today interracial marriages remain rare occurrences even with the repeal of apartheid-induced racial laws in the late 1980s. In the United States, some states forbade interracial marriage up until 1967, when the Supreme Court overturned the last anti-miscegenation laws in the case of *Loving v. Virginia*.

A few trends characterize interracial marriages in the United States. Since 1967 the rate of interracial marriages has increased exponentially, and demographic trends and cultural patterns indicate that this rate will continue to increase in the same direction. However, the growing number of interracial unions does not bear out proportionately among racial groups. The amount of research on interracial marriages between blacks and whites belies the fact that these unions make up a very small percentage of interracial marriages overall. Interracial marriages among blacks remain relatively uncommon, especially when compared with the rates of interracial marriage among Asians, Latinos, and American Indians. Younger generations find interracial unions more acceptable: researchers find that interracial marriages are more common among newer immigrant groups from Asian and Latin American countries, particularly among the young, native born population.

Qualitative analyses indicate that interracial couples face an array of challenges as a consequence of their decision to “cross the color line” in their selection of a spouse. Public opinion of interracial unions is much more favorable than it has ever been, but many people tend to be less accepting when an immediate family member chooses to date or marry interracially. Interracial couples may deal with strained relations with their families and perhaps even estrangement. They must also contend with a worldview that posits race as an essential quality, not a socially constructed element of a person’s identity. They may find themselves defending their relationship in ways other couples are never called on to do. Finally, their own ideas about race may be tested – they may witness privilege and/or racism in new ways.

Research on interracial unions would be well served if the literature based on both demographic and qualitative approaches was synthesized. As new immigration patterns take shape, the world becomes more diverse, and racial boundaries continue to shift, it will be important for those studying interracial unions to employ innovative perspectives. In an increasingly global society, the field would benefit from a cross cultural and cross national examination of interracial unions.

SEE ALSO: Biracialism; Boundaries (Racial/Ethnic); Color Line; Endogamy; Marriage; One Drop Rule; Race

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intersectionality

Cynthia Fabrizio Pelak

Most gender scholars agree that to understand historical and contemporary gender relations one must be attentive to how race, class, and

other systems of power intersect with gender. The general consensus around intersectionality has emerged from an evolving interdisciplinary body of theory and practice that emphasizes the simultaneity of oppressions, the interlocking systems of inequalities, and the multiplicity of gendered social locations. Legal scholar Kimberlé Crenshaw (1989, 1991) was one of the first to use the term intersectionality to draw attention to the marginalization of black women's experiences within single axis frameworks of anti discrimination laws, feminist theories, and anti racist politics. Sociologist Patricia Hill Collins (2000: 18) defines intersectionality as "particular forms of intersecting oppressions, for example, intersections of race and gender, or of sexuality and nation." She goes on to say: "intersectional paradigms remind us that oppression cannot be reduced to one fundamental type, and that oppressions work together in producing injustice." Intersectionality has its roots in numerous intellectual traditions, such as socialist feminism, race and ethnic studies, and postcolonial feminisms. The various identifiers of the projects in which intersectionality is central – black feminism, womanism, multiracial feminism, third world feminism, postcolonial feminism, indigenous feminism, and multicultural feminism – suggest divergent origins and analytical foci. In this entry, the term intersectionality is used to refer broadly to scholarship that uses theoretical approaches that foreground interlocking systems of inequality. Special attention is given to the contributions of scholars who were instrumental in developing the intersectionality perspective, namely black women intellectuals from North America and women of color scholars from the "third world."

An intersectionality framework is attentive to multiple levels of analyses: individual, interactional, institutional, cultural, and structural. Individuals are seen as occupying multiple and often contradictory status positions as well as being embedded in institutional, cultural, or structural contexts that are multidimensional and fluid. By focusing on how systems of inequality are cross cutting rather than operating in isolation from one another, intersectionality draws attention to differences among women (or among men) rather than simply differences between women and men. Beyond recognizing differences, this tradition understands systems of

oppression as grounded in relational power differentials. Men's domination is thus related to (and dependent upon) women's subordination and the status of poor women of color is related to (and dependent upon) the status of affluent white women. Using a multi lens approach or a race/gender/class approach allows researchers to understand consequential power differentials among women as well as those between women and men. Hence, this framework can help explain why women's common structural location as women is not sufficient for mobilization against gender inequalities.

Theorizing around intersectionality is directly rooted in the practical concerns of building diverse grassroots coalitions of women (and men) to fight against gender and other oppressions. Like feminist studies, the work on intersectionality did not develop in the rarefied atmosphere of academia, but among collectivities of people who sought to understand and change the systems of oppression called racism, patriarchy, and class exploitation (Collins 2000). To elucidate this framework, five basic assertions common to intersectionality approaches are identified (Baca Zinn & Thornton Dill 1996). They include the conceptualization of gender and race as structures and not simply individual traits, the rejection of an a priori assumption that women constitute a unified category, the existence of interlocking systems of inequality and oppression, the recognition of the interplay of social structure and human agency, and the necessity for historically specific, local analyses to understand interlocking inequalities.

CONCEPTUALIZATION OF GENDER AND RACE

Within intersectionality paradigms, gender and race are not simply conceptualized as a social characteristic of an individual, but are understood as structures, discourses, or sets of enduring relations that operate at multiple levels in connection with other structures, such as class, sexuality, and nationality. There is general agreement among social theorists that gender and race are social constructions rather than predetermined, transhistorical, biological or natural phenomena. The changing meanings of

gender and racial categories across time and place substantiate the fluid, social character of gender and race. Omi and Winant (1994) conceptualize race as an ever changing complex of meanings that signifies and symbolizes sociopolitical conflicts and interests rather than a fixed, concrete, objective, or natural attribute. Likewise, scholars drawing on an intersectionality approach reject essentialist notions of gender and argue that sexed bodies do not exist outside of the social (Ferber 1998). Harding (1991: 79) explicates such a conceptualization within an intersectionality framework by claiming "there are no gender relations per se, but only gender relations as constructed by and between classes, races, and cultures."

ANALYTICAL CATEGORY OF WOMEN

Another basic assertion of gender scholars working within this framework is that the category of "women" is not assumed to be a homogeneous, unified group of individuals who experience a common oppression. The analytical category of "women" is not assumed prior to an investigation. As Mohanty et al. (1991: 58) argue, "sisterhood cannot be assumed on the basis of gender; it must be forged in concrete historical and political practice and analysis." Within an intersectionality framework, women's shared structural location as women is not sufficient for understanding their experiences of inequality.

INTERLOCKING SYSTEMS OF INEQUALITIES

A central component of intersectionality is the linkages of individual experiences with social structures. An intersectionality perspective assumes that individuals' lives are embedded within and affected by interlocking systems of inequalities, such as those based on race, gender, class, and sexuality. Individuals occupy multiple and often contradictory status positions that simultaneously advantage and disadvantage their lives. Collins (2000) identifies the interlocking systems of inequalities as a "matrix of domination," which is a model of interlocking rather than additive connections between inequalities and statuses. The notion of a matrix

of domination is a criticism of the construction of binary oppositions of oppressed/oppressor or black/white; it rejects the “either/or” dichotomy while embracing a “both/and” position. Individuals can be simultaneously privileged and disadvantaged.

The notion of interlocking inequalities operates at two distinct analytical levels. At a macro level the concept refers to the connections between institutional and organizational structures of race, class, and gender. For example, the paid labor market is structured such that women of different racial and class backgrounds are differentially situated in the hierarchy of jobs. The labor market is thus simultaneously structured upon gender, race, and class hierarchies. The notion of interlocking oppressions at the micro level refers to how interactions between individuals and groups are shaped simultaneously by race, gender, and class structures. For example, the interactions between a female domestic worker and her employer are often shaped by unequal race and class statuses. At both levels of analysis, gender relations and inequalities cross cut other systems of power rather than operating in isolation. A woman’s gendered experiences are always framed in the context of her racial and class locations. Therefore, gender relations and gender inequalities are best examined simultaneously through lenses of race, class, and other systems of inequality. Using this multi lens approach or the notion of the matrix of domination allows researchers to (1) ground scholarship on gender in the histories of racism, classism, imperialism, and nationalism; (2) highlight how status positions are relational such that positions of privilege and disadvantage are connected; and (3) understand consequential differences among women (or among men) rather than simply differences between women and men.

HUMAN AGENCY

Intersectionality also highlights the interplay between social structures and human agency. The importance of recognizing the interplay of social structures and human agency is that it allows for the possibility of social change. Scholars employing an intersectionality approach critique scholarship that overemphasizes the

powerlessness of women and only represents women as victims, exploited, and dependent on men. Mohanty et al. (1991: 56), for example, criticize the research produced by western scholars that represent “third world” women as ignorant, poor, uneducated, tradition bound, domestic, or family oriented, rather than agents of their own identity.

Intersectionality theorists tend to focus on the strategies of creative resistance that women employ to survive and thrive in oppressive situations. Social science scholarship typically focuses on overt, public political activity, while scholars drawing on intersectionality foreground the less visible politicized activities that are taken up by subordinated groups. For example, Berger’s (2004) study of women of color with HIV/AIDS highlights how multiply stigmatized women develop a public voice and facilitate their political participation by drawing on resources rarely associated with political participation. Berger’s work demonstrates that political resistance need not be formal or institutionalized. Collins (2000) recognizes two interdependent forms of black women’s social activism: the subtle undermining of institutions through the creation of female spheres of influence within existing structures of oppression when direct confrontation is neither possible nor preferred, and the institutional transformation consisting of direct challenges in the form of trade unions, boycotts, sit ins, marches, etc. By shifting our understanding of power relations based on a hierarchical, vertical model to a more fluid model of interrelatedness, intersectionality theorists argue that we can begin to analyze the dynamics of domination and resistance in new ways.

HISTORICALLY SPECIFIC AND LOCAL ANALYSES

The basic assumptions of intersectionality necessitate the need for historically specific, local analyses that allow for the specification of the complexities of particular modes of structured power relations. It is through such analyses that theoretical categories can be generated from within the context being analyzed. Intersectionality scholars reject universalizing and ahistorical approaches that try to explain,

for example, patriarchal organization for all places at all times. The call for historically specific, local analyses also demands that researchers not impose a specific ideological or universal theoretical formula to interpret their findings. Postcolonial feminists, for example, offer a strong critique of the tendency of western feminists to interpret and judge “third world” women’s activism through a western feminist or “first world” framework rather than indigenous understandings and definitions of feminist activism (Mama 1995). What is transgressive in one sociopolitical context may take on an entirely different meaning in another sociopolitical context.

Two early works that were influential in the development of an intersectionality approach are Angela Davis’s book *Women, Race, and Class This Bridge Called My Back* (1983) edited by Moraga and Anzaldúa. Both of these texts center on the experiences of women of color to theorize differences among women and encourage alliances across racial, ethnic, class, sexual, and national boundaries. Davis (1981) addresses topics ranging from womanhood and the legacy of slavery, race and class dynamics of the early nineteenth century women’s movement in the US, rape and sexual assault, reproductive rights, and the politics of housework. Moraga and Anzaldúa (1983) grapple with the complexities of race, class, culture, homophobia, revolutionary politics, immigration, and motherhood through the voices of Chicana, black, Asian, Native, and third world women.

Another more recent exemplar of an intersectionality approach is Abby Ferber’s book *White Man Falling* (1998). Ferber employs an intersectionality perspective to understand how the white supremacy movement articulates white male identity. Her analysis demonstrates that to fully appreciate the complexities of white supremacist identity one must explicate how race, gender, class, sexuality, family, religion, and nation intersect within the white supremacy movement.

The body of scholarship that builds upon insights of intersectionality is vast, diverse, and goes well beyond gender studies. Although there may be significant theoretical, methodological, and epistemological differences within this evolving interdisciplinary body of theory and practice, the thread that ties them together

is the appreciation for the simultaneity of oppressions, the interlocking systems of inequalities, and the multiplicity of social locations. Even when intersectionality is not named or pioneering intersectionality scholars are not given credit for their ideas, the impact of this perspective has been deep and lasting.

SEE ALSO: Black Feminist Thought; Matrix of Domination; Multiracial Feminism; Racialized Gender; Third World and Postcolonial Feminisms/Subaltern; Womanism

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intersexuality

Laura M. Moore

Intersex refers to a variety of inborn conditions whereby an individual's sexual or reproductive anatomy varies from social expectations about "normal" male or female anatomy. Because the standards are arbitrary, "intersex" is not a discrete category – what counts as intersex depends upon who's counting. That said, about 1/2,000 babies is born with obvious enough differences to come to medical attention. This biological variation creates direct challenges to binary constructs of sex and gender and to the cultural institutional systems designed around assumptions that discrete sex categories naturally yield complementary gender roles and heterosexuality.

The medical treatment of intersexual infants in contemporary western cultures was first highlighted in Suzanne Kessler's (1990) publication, "The Medical Construction of Gender: Case Management of Intersexed Infants." This psychosocial theory presumes intersexuals must be normalized into one of two possible categories, male or female, so they can develop appropriate gender identities and meet society's gender role expectations. Hence, biological sex is forced to conform to socially constructed gender. Deconstruction analysis has revealed several sexist and heterosexist gender stereotypes embedded in the standard medical protocol, which prioritizes males' ability to penetrate and females' ability to procreate (Dreger 1998; Fausto Sterling 1999). Among some gender theorists and scholars, intersexuality has become intertwined in nature versus nurture debates as well as identity politics arguments regarding the existence of an essential versus a socially constructed self (Turner 1999).

The most common surgeries performed on children with intersex conditions are removal of clitoral tissue and enlargement of the vagina. Though medical management of intersex drew the attention of media and the academy at the same time as African genital cutting, these parties have been largely unable to equate female genital cutting in Africa with clitoral surgeries in contemporary western culture (Chase 2002).

Individuals with intersex conditions entered the arena of gender and sexual identity politics with the formation of the Intersex Society of North America (ISNA) in 1993. Building on strategies employed by gender and sexual minority rights movements of the late twentieth century, ISNA members have demanded an end to cosmetic genital surgery on infants, noting the absence of empirical evidence supporting the practice and ethical, medical, and human rights concerns (Chase 2003; see also the ISNA website, www.isna.org). Sex assignment at birth has critical legal and social implications including marital rights, certain constitutional protections, military service, athletic program participation, and leadership opportunities in religious organizations. People with intersex argue the existing medical treatment protocol must be changed to reduce the shame and secrecy around their condition and to allow people with "ambiguous genitalia" the right to make their own decisions about plastic surgeries.

SEE ALSO: Gay and Lesbian Movement; Identity Politics/Relational Politics; Queer Theory; Transgender, Transvestism, and Transsexualism

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intersubjectivity

Paul T. Munroe

Intersubjectivity refers to a shared perception of reality between or among two or more individuals. The term has been important in many aspects of sociology, from positivist and post-positivist research methods to studies of the lived experiences of individuals by ethno-methodologists and feminist scholars.

The term presupposes that we, as human beings, cannot know reality except through our own senses: sight, hearing, smell, taste, or tactile feeling. Accordingly, each individual's reality is necessarily subjective. We may extend and refine those senses through measuring devices such as telescopes, scales, cameras, and myriad other technologies, but ultimately each person's understanding of reality is individually subjective. One cannot see "blue" except through one's own senses. With social reality, we have even less certainty. It is easier to know that the sky is blue than it is to know that "James likes me."

However, most individuals also understand that we cannot change reality simply by thinking. Reality has an "obdurate" character (Turner & Boynes 2002). If one were to wake up and decide that "blue" is "yellow," it would be clear that one could not effect this change and make it real for many others. This is a duality of truths that presents a problem for people interested in studying how people live their lives; neither objectivity nor subjectivity is sufficient to explain the life experiences of the individual. Intersubjectivity is an intermediate position that sociologists use to solve this problem. We propose that the best people can, and often do, achieve is a common understanding of what is going on.

A related line of theorizing is work on the duality of agency and structure. As Giddens

(1984) and Sewell (1992) argue convincingly, "actions," willed behaviors of free individuals, often follow and reproduce a given "structure," rules and patterns set in the external environment, even though actors have a choice to not do these acts. Part of what happens is that people perceive certain behaviors as normal, and if not compulsory, at least expected. Structure is thus enacted in everyday behavior. This enactment of structure could not happen without intersubjectivity.

INTERSUBJECTIVE TESTABILITY

Philosophers of science (Feigl 1953; Popper 1959) and social scientists (Cohen 1989) have used intersubjectivity, or often intersubjective testability, to discuss the day-to-day operations of a relatively successful science of human behavior. There is no way to know objectively the meaning of a particular behavior. Nor is there a way deterministically (with certainty) to predict that one process follows another every time, without fail. However, regularities do occur. Patterns of social behavior are often repeated; they can be observed to happen in similar ways in many instances, and these observations can be documented.

Since this is true, social science should be able to explain and predict, with better than chance results, the outcomes of certain situations based on some initial information and a theory of how things work. The concept of intersubjective testability is one answer to the question "how?" People in a particular field of study come to agree first on the rules of evidence. They obtain specialized training in order to be able to conduct tests of "knowledge claims" (Feigl 1953; Cohen 1989) about the regularities of patterns of behavior. Understanding is facilitated by clear definitions and precision in the theory, and by transparency in the research methods. Since the rules of evidence are agreed upon, different scientists looking at the same information can agree on its meaning. Social scientists obtain intersubjectivity on the results of a particular piece of research.

It is a value judgment on the part of people who share this view of social science that this intersubjectively tested knowledge, though short of perfectly certain or objective knowledge, is

far better than many of its alternatives, such as intuition, tradition, "common sense," or guessing. Specialists trained in a certain field of science thus are and should be treated as authorities on how to evaluate knowledge claims in the field they dedicate their lives to studying. The knowledge that is generated through this rigorous process will be better and more reliable than knowledge produced through less systematic methods.

INTERSUBJECTIVITY IN EVERYDAY LIFE

In a quite different vein, phenomenologists (e.g., Schütz 1967) and ethnomethodologists (e.g., Garfinkel 1967) have used the term intersubjectivity to refer to the understandings people come to share in their everyday lives. Once again, the term presupposes that objectivity is not possible in human understanding. Here an emphasis is placed on the malleability of meaning, especially social meaning, and it is stressed that differences of subjective views are ubiquitous. Intersubjectivity in this context refers to the shared perspectives people sometimes actually achieve, and often assume they have achieved. People take for granted that reality is in fact obdurate. They may realize at times that there is no way objectively to know what is "real." But for day to day activity, this is treated as unimportant. People operate as if reality is knowable, as if people similar to themselves see things the same way, and that if reasonable people discuss matters, they will probably come to the same conclusions.

This assumption of intersubjectivity can become problematic when the reality of differences between people's expectations and interpretations becomes apparent. Garfinkel (1967) has pointed out that intersubjectivity is most visible, and its importance is highlighted, when it is violated. When taken for granted behaviors do not occur, or unexpected behaviors do occur, they call into question assumptions about reality. The resulting breakdown in intersubjectivity can be most unsettling. This line of work has led to an often repeated phrase among social constructionists that "reality is negotiated."

FEMINIST CONTRIBUTIONS TO INTERSUBJECTIVITY

Feminist scholars (see Lengermann & Niebrugge 1995) have pointed out that there are important aspects of power that are involved with intersubjectivity in interaction. Low power actors are often required to share the perspectives of high power actors, coming to an intersubjective agreement on "what you want, what you think, what you do." High power actors are often afforded the right to concern themselves with "what I want, think, and need."

One kind of relation of power that qualitative researchers engage in is the interview setting. If researchers are more interested in what they want to know from their interviewees, they may miss the opportunity to learn what the interviewees want them to know. As a value statement, some qualitative researchers who wish to study human behavior from a feminist perspective claim that they should attempt to achieve an intersubjective view with their interviewees.

INTERSUBJECTIVITY IN THERAPEUTIC INTERACTIONS

Mitchell (2000) identifies four levels or modes of interaction which can be studied in a therapeutic situation: behavioral, in which relatively smooth interactions are facilitated by patterned, habitual repertoires of activities; primitive emotional, in which people's affect states transfer from one person to another – one person's anger invokes another's fear, one person's sadness makes another sad; self oriented, in which the other person is thought of as a characteristic other in relation to the self (how does this person see me, what kind of person is this, and what is my role in this situation); and finally at the most useful and highest functioning level, intersubjectivity, in which two people are reacting in a genuine fashion to each other's conscious, willful, meaningful interactions. These modes of interaction hold much promise for the future study of interpersonal behavior in many other circumstances.

SEE ALSO: Ethnomethodology; Everyday Life; Interaction; Phenomenology; Schütz, Alfred; Structure and Agency

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intertextuality

Matt Hills

The concept of intertextuality has been significant within a range of theoretical debates (Orr 2003). Though often assumed to be a matter of one text directly citing or quoting material from another, intertextuality has also been theorized as underpinning the general condition of textuality itself. As French structuralist Julia

Kristeva (1969) argues: “Every text takes shape as a mosaic of citations.” This has become a crucial concept in structuralist attacks on the authority of the author (Barthes 1977; Allen 2000). It is argued that language and textuality, as structuring systems, should form the proper objects of analysis, and not authorial agency.

Intertextuality’s importance has not been restricted to structuralist debates, for it has also played a key role in definitions of the postmodern condition (Jameson 1985; Allen 2000). In Fredric Jameson’s influential account, a specific type of intertextuality – thought of as a form of imitation – characterizes postmodernism: “Pastiche is . . . the imitation of a peculiar or unique style . . . but it is a neutral practice of such mimicry . . . Pastiche is blank parody” (Jameson 1985: 114). Here, intertextuality becomes an endemic social and cultural condition in postmodernism: signs, codes, and texts are subject to constant repetition, without any sense of “parody” as a critical or reflexive discourse. Instead, styles and texts are seemingly reiterated and re-represented, cut adrift from their original contexts and endlessly recombined as “pastiche.”

However, this criticism lacks sociological context itself. Writers such as Collins (1989) and Lash (1990) have engaged more precisely with the sociology of “postmodern” intertextuality. Collins (1989) analyses how “intertextual arenas” operate in genre fiction, suggesting that authors and texts can position themselves in relation to their generic predecessors. Thus, texts such as detective fictions may bid for “literary” value by linking themselves to literary discourse, while others may seek deliberately to “mix” discourses, combining “High Art” and pop cultural intertextualities so as to destabilize the cultural authority of the former, rather than simply deploying its cultural and social prestige. Moving this debate on, Lash (1990) argues that the wide ranging intertextuality of postmodern culture may simply reflect the distinctive “cultural capital” of new middle class groups of consumers – those who are able to spot many popular and elite cultural references. Indeed, we could go so far as to suggest that types of intertextuality carry “intertextual cultural capital” (Hills 2005): they specifically target educated, specialized, and highly media literate audiences.

SEE ALSO: Barthes, Roland; Bourdieu, Pierre; Cultural Capital; Genre; Postmodern Culture; Postmodernism; Structuralism; Structure and Agency

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intervention studies

Robert F. Boruch

Intervention studies address one or more of the following five kinds of questions:

- 1 What is the nature and severity of problems to which an intervention is directed or may be directed, and what is the evidence of the problem?
- 2 How and how well is the intervention deployed, and what is the evidence for this?
- 3 Does the intervention work? Which intervention works better? And what is the evidence?
- 4 What are the cost-effect relationships among interventions, and what is the evidence?
- 5 What interventions work, or not, based on what cumulative evidence from repeated studies?

The phrase intervention studies is commonly used in epidemiology and medical research to refer to questions of the third kind (i.e., studies

of the effects of health related interventions). The phrase has also become common in prevention research, work on learning disabilities and behavioral disorders, and in other areas. Variations on the phrase are frequently in the context of studies of effects of interventions *other* than health related ones. For instance, intervention studies “covers questions, posed in different academic disciplines and government agencies, that are also addressed under the rubrics of ‘evaluation,’ ‘prevention research,’ and ‘randomized controlled trials’” (social experiments) (Rossi et al. 2004; see also Boruch 1997).

Questions of the third kind, on intervention effects, receive most attention then in what follows. The others are handled as precursors to or successors of this basic class of question. The interventions at issue vary with the problem’s character and context. Across the social sciences, these can include *practices*, such as providing conventional welfare, police, or health services. They may include *programs* designed to provide better or more specialized services to individuals, organizations, or geopolitical jurisdictions. And at the broadest level, interventions may be construed as macro level *policy* in welfare, environment, education, and other arenas.

In addressing the first question, on nature and severity of the problem, evidence may be generated by probability sample surveys of those people or organizations at risk, administrative records of service organizations, and ethnographic (street level) research. Each method, for instance, has been exploited to estimate the size of homeless populations in various cities, and the number and kinds of victims of crime. In health oriented sociology and epidemiology, such studies include work to estimate incidence and prevalence of events such as injuries and survival rates. Good understanding of needs is usually a precursor to developing an intervention that could address the need, and is a precursor to testing the intervention’s effects.

Theory drives the choice of what variables ought to be measured. In considering teenage pregnancy, for instance, one might focus on girls, or boys, or both, depending on one’s theory about the problem or one’s theoretical construal of the phenomenon in different cultures and countries.

At least for studies based on sample surveys, government statistical agencies and professional

organizations have developed standards for judging the quality of the studies and their results. See, for instance, the standards enunciated by the US Census Bureau, as well as those for the UK, China, Sweden, Canada, and others.

The second question, on deployment of the intervention, falls under the rubrics of implementation studies, process research, and program monitoring, depending on the academic discipline and agency responsible for generating an evidential answer. Sociological theory might inform one's choices about what to measure and how (e.g., measuring social capital in the context of education interventions such as private versus public schools). Typically, the evidence to answer the question stems from performance indicators that permit one to judge progress of relevant agencies or the adequacy of the intervention services. Less often, the evidence may be generated through periodic surveys of clients' or customers' satisfaction with the intervention service, for instance. Anthropological studies may also be used to generate hypotheses and ideas about the character of service and delivery from the points of view of service recipients or other stakeholders in the process.

In health care, for example, studies that address the second question often aim to learn whether government or other professional guidelines for health care of the elderly (say) are operationalized in hospital or other care settings. Finding that fewer than half the guidelines are implemented well is important. Understanding whether, how, and how well particular interventions can be deployed in different settings is no easy matter. The need to understand has led to the production of systematic reviews of evidence on the topic, such as Fixsen et al. (2005), and to new peer reviewed journals such as www.implementationsciences.com that cover new empirical work on how to deploy or not. For a new intervention, deeper questions hinge on whether it has been implemented with fidelity in a trial and how need for fidelity and need for flexibility in adaption can be balanced in larger scale trials and in eventual deployment of the intervention beyond the trials.

The third question, on relative effects of interventions, invites attention to randomized

controlled trials that produce the least equivocal evidence possible about whether one intervention is better than another or better than the ambient service or system (Boruch 1997). In these trials, individuals, organizations, or geopolitical jurisdictions are randomly assigned to each different intervention, including a control (ambient conditions). Well run randomized trials generate a statistically unbiased effect of the interventions' relative effects and a legitimate statistical statement of one's confidence in the results. Put in other words, a trial's product is a fair comparison that takes into account chance variation in individual and institutional behavior.

In the US, for instance, randomized trials have been conducted to test the effect of programs that move poor people from high to low poverty areas. These Moving to Opportunity trials (Gibson Davis & Duncan 2005) include anthropological work on processes and people. Mexico's Progresa randomized trial was preceded by statistical work on severity of the school dropout problem in rural areas and informed by anthropological research on its nature and the intervention process. Villages were randomly assigned to an income support program or to control conditions to learn whether the program was effective in reducing a chronically high rate of school dropout (Parker & Teruel 2005).

Large scale studies in which entire organizations or entities are randomly allocated to different interventions are often called cluster randomized trials, or group randomized trials, or place randomized trials, depending on the disciplinary context. Prevention researchers further distinguish between efficacy trials and effectiveness trials (Flay et al. 2005). Efficacy trials are well controlled and depend on experts and their collaborators to deploy an intervention in contexts that are well understood, with measures of outcome whose reliability is controlled, and so on. The effectiveness trials are mounted later, in environments that are real world in the sense that the interventions may not be delivered as they ought to be, the measures of outcome are not as reliable, and so on. The interest in generating better evidence on effectiveness through such trials has led to the creation of specialized peer reviewed journals in which trial results and issues can be reported. These

include the *Journal of Experimental Criminology* and www.trialsjournal.com.

When randomized trials are not ethical or feasible, evidence on what intervention works may be generated through quasi experiments or through statistical model based approaches. These are common in sociology and other social sciences. Quasi experiments and observational studies produce more equivocal (i.e., potentially biased) estimates of effect than randomized trials.

Generally, these approaches try to approximate a randomized trial by using statistical methods to equate groups or to construct groups that are similar apart from the intervention. The methods and the independent variables used vary depending on the domain. The statistical approaches in the model based approaches include propensity scores, selection models, structural models, instrumental variables, and other techniques that try to approximate the results of randomized trials.

Comparing the results of randomized controlled trials against quasi experiments or observational studies on the same intervention is important for several reasons. Randomized trials ensure unbiased estimates of effect, but they are often more difficult to carry out than a quasi experiment. The quasi experiment may be easier to carry out, but does not provide the same level of assurance of unbiased estimates and instead relies on more assumptions. If the results of using each approach are similar, or lead to the same policy decisions, one might then opt for quasi experiments. Empirical comparisons of the results of each suggest, however, that results often do differ and neither the magnitude nor the direction differences are predictable. The discrepancies have been explored through reviews of intervention studies in health (Deeks et al. 2003), employment and training (Glazerman et al. 2003), education and economic development (Rawlings 2005), and other areas. Identifying specific domains in which the nonrandomized intervention studies are dependable is crucial for science and for building better evidence based policy.

Some professional societies and government organizations have developed standards for reporting based on studies of the effects of interventions. The standards have been constructed

to ensure that the relevant evidence is presented completely and uniformly. In health care, for instance, the international CONSORT statement has been a model for reports on randomized controlled trials (Mohrer et al. 2001; Campbell et al. 2004). Analogous efforts have been made to ensure uniform reporting on quasi experimental (nonrandomized) trials, notably TREND.

Standards for judging the trustworthiness of evidence from studies on the effects of interventions have also been developed. The international Society for Prevention Research, for instance, issued guidelines that distinguish between evidence on efficacy trials and effectiveness trials and also handles evidence on whether effective programs can be disseminated (Flay et al. 2005).

In education, substance abuse, and mental health, government agencies have developed systems for screening evidence from studies of the effects of the interventions. In the US, the Institute for Education Sciences put high priority on randomized trials, and put only certain quasi experimental designs in second place. It eliminated many other study designs as a basis for dependable evidence. The Substance Abuse and Mental Health Administration (SAMSHA) sponsors the National Register of Exemplary Programs and Practices (NREPP) to assist people in identifying model programs that have been identified on the basis of quality of evidence, including randomized trials (www.modelprograms.samsha.gov). In crime and delinquency, Blueprints screens evidence and identifies model programs.

Addressing the fourth question, involving cost effectiveness of different interventions, usually presumes evidence for answers to the first three questions. Few peer reviewed journals that report on trustworthy studies of the effects of interventions also report on the intervention costs, however. Accountants, finance people, and economists can then add value beyond the first three questions addressed in intervention studies. Guidelines on the conduct of cost effectiveness analyses of interventions have been developed for various substantive areas of study (National Institute of Drug Abuse 1999; on prevention and treatment, Levin & McEwan 2001; in education, Rossi et al. 2004).

The cumulation of results of studies of an intervention's effects and the analysis of this assembly of studies are important to science, of course. Systematic reviews of intervention studies of effect have developed remarkably since the 1990s. The scientific rubrics for development in this area include meta analysis and systematic reviews, each of which emphasizes the quality of the evidence. The QUOROM Group in health research standards reports on meta analyses of randomized trials (Moher et al. 1999). As yet, analogous guidelines have not yet been developed for the educational, social welfare, and criminological areas.

Beginning in 1993 the international Cochrane Collaboration (www.cochrane.org) in health has led the way in generating uniform, systematic, high quality reviews of assemblies of studies on effectiveness of interventions. The international Campbell Collaboration (www.campbellcollaboration.org), Cochrane's younger sibling, focuses on social welfare, crime and justice, and education. The Cochrane Collaboration has produced over 1,500 systematic reviews since 1993. The topics range from effectiveness of psychosocial development interventions such as multi systemic therapy, to summarizing efforts to manage colitis, heart disease, and other illness. Both the Cochrane Collaboration and the Campbell Collaboration have developed world wide accessible registers of randomized trials. In this respect, the organizations compile information that addresses a variation on questions of the third kind in the context of intervention studies – What works? Or works better? – based on fair evidence.

SEE ALSO: Effect Sizes; Evaluation; Experiment; Experimental Methods; Prevention, Intervention; Structural Equation Modeling; Survey Research; Theory; Variables, Independent

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interviewing, structured, unstructured, and postmodern

Andrea Fontana

Interviewing is a methodology based on asking questions in order to gain information from the respondent. The interview may be structured, unstructured, and postmodern. Structured interview seeks information with an emphasis on measurement, unstructured interview stresses understanding the world of the respondent, and postmodern interview focuses on the negotiated interaction between interviewer and respondent.

DEVELOPMENT

Interviewing first became popular in clinical diagnosing and in counseling; later, it was used in psychological testing. Charles Booth (1902–3) is credited with introducing interviewing to sociology, by embarking on a survey of social and economic conditions in London. Others followed, both in England and the US. Among the most notable early interview projects were Du Bois's (1899) study of Philadelphia and the Lynds' (1929, 1937) studies of Middletown.

During World War II the impetus of interviewing was magnified by large scale interviews of American military personnel, some of which were directed by Samuel Stouffer and titled *The American Soldier*. In the 1950s, interviewing in the form of quantitative research moved into academia and dominated it for the next three decades. Some of the most notable proponents of this methodology were Paul Lazarsfeld and Robert K. Merton at the Bureau of Applied Social Research at Columbia University, Harry Field at the National Opinion Research Center in Denver and later in Chicago, and Rensis Likert with the Survey Research Center at the University of Michigan.

There were other developments in interviewing. Opinion polling was popularized by George Gallup; the documentary method focused on respondents' attitudes, and was initially used

by W. I. Thomas and Florian Znaniecki; unstructured interviewing, often coupled with ethnographic research, was originally used by researchers at the Chicago School of sociology. Focus group interviewing moved from marketing to sociology and was employed both in quantitative and qualitative research. Oral history and creative interviewing were based on multiple, very lengthy interview sessions with the respondent. More recently, postmodern approaches have brought heightened attention to the negotiated collaboration in interviews between interviewer and respondents and the dynamics of gendered interviewing.

STRUCTURED INTERVIEWING

Telephone interviews, face to face interviews, and interviews associated with survey research are included in this category. Structured interviews make an effort to standardize both the instrument (the interview questions) and the interviewer. The questions posed are generally preestablished, provide a limited number of possible responses, and leave little room for variations. This approach makes it possible to numerically code each response a priori. The interviewer attempts to remain as neutral as possible and to treat each interview in exactly the same manner. The same questions are read in the same sequence to all respondents; explanations to be given to the respondents are prepared in advance by the supervisor and the interviewer should not deviate from them or try to interpret the meaning of any question. The interviewer must ensure that no one interrupts the interview or tries to answer for the respondent. The interviewer should not attempt to influence any answer or show agreement or disagreement in regard to any answers. The interviewer must never deviate from the preestablished questions and their exact wording. These efforts aim at minimizing errors and leaving little room for chance.

However, three types of problems arise in structured interviewing. Firstly, the task itself: the close ended nature of the questions limits the breadth of the answers. Secondly, the interviewers: they do not in fact remain neutral but are influenced by the nature of the context and the variations among respondents. Additionally,

the interviewers have been found to change the wording of questions. Thirdly, the respondents: there is an assumption that respondents will answer truthfully and rationally and will not let emotions or any personal agenda affect their answers.

FOCUS GROUP INTERVIEWING

Focus group interviews are basically a qualitative method; an interviewer/moderator assembles a small group of respondents in a conference room or similar setting in order to gather their collective opinions of the subject under study. The moderator directs the interaction among respondents and his or her approach can vary from very structured to completely unstructured, depending on the purpose of the interview.

Focus group interviewing originated in market research in order to collect consumers' opinions of various products. Sociologists use focus group interviewing for different purposes. Most common is to use the interview as an exploratory tool to fine tune research topics or to pretest survey research structured questions. The interview can also be used for triangulation purposes to support and validate another method, either quantitative or qualitative. Finally, focus group interviews can be used as the sole basis of data gathering, often to elicit the respondents' recall of an event they all witnessed, such as a disaster or a celebration.

Focus group interviewers must possess skills similar to those of individual interviewers. Addressing a group, however, presents additional problems. The interviewer must ensure that all respondents are participating in the process and no one is dominating the interaction; also, the interviewer should be aware of the possibility of "group think." Focus groups are popular since they provide an alternative or addition to both qualitative and quantitative research methods and are relatively easy to assemble and fairly inexpensive.

UNSTRUCTURED INTERVIEWING

Unstructured interviewing, also called in depth interviewing, is an open ended methodological

technique. The interviewer has a general idea about the topics of research but does not use any structured questions or formal approach to interviewing. There is no effort to ask the same questions of all respondents or to quantify the responses. The focus of this type of interviewing is to *understand* the way of life of the respondents and the meaning they themselves attribute to the events. We present three types of unstructured interviewing: traditional, oral history, and creative interviewing.

Traditional Interviewing

Traditional unstructured interviewing is often used in conjunction with ethnographic field work and follows the same techniques. The interviewer has to *access the setting* of the group being studied, whether that be a welfare office or a massage parlor. Sometimes the study focuses on no group per se, as when studying homeless persons on the streets, and *entrée* must be negotiated anew with every individual. Next, the interviewer must make efforts to *understand the language and culture* of the respondents. Cultural anthropologists at times had to rely on interpreters, with perhaps disastrous misunderstanding of the cultural mores (Freeman 1983). Sociologists studying a subculture, such as physicians, also need to gain understanding of the language used. In addition, they must familiarize themselves with the cultural nuances of the group, such as not to ride a British bike while studying the Hell's Angels (Thompson 1985). *Locating an informant* is the next move. It is valuable to befriend a marginal member of the group under study with whom the interviewer can check the veracity of information being received by the others. *Gaining trust* and *establishing rapport* are next; the respondents must feel at ease and trust the interviewer or they will freeze them out, withhold information, or lie. Trust and rapport take time to achieve and are easy to lose, just by a wrong decision. Finally, the interviewer must find an inconspicuous way to collect information, ranging from debriefing oneself every night into a tape recorder to surreptitiously writing fieldnotes on toilet paper in a rest room.

This type of unstructured interviewing is still somewhat formal in its step by step

approach and its attempt to find checks and balances in an effort to “scientize” the study. Interpreting the information received is also problematic. Since there is no close ended questionnaire, the researcher finds there is a great deal of what often seems disconnected information and has to decide what to use and what not to use. There is also a tendency, as in structured interviewing, to view the interviewer as “invisible” while in fact who is doing the interviewing has a great influence on the interaction and results.

Oral History

Oral history is a very old approach to interviewing. It is based on lengthy, often multiple interviews with members of a specific group, such as a Native American tribe or elderly people in a chronic care facility. Its goal is to capture the daily forms of life of the group under study through the recollection of its members. Oral histories are not always published, but transcripts can be found in libraries – memories of a past waiting for someone to bring them back to life.

Creative Interviewing

Oral history straddles anthropology and sociology, while creative interviewing is more germane to sociology. Douglas (1985) coined this approach and it shares with oral history a technique based on multiple, lengthy, unstructured interviews with single respondents. Douglas’s approach is more skeptical, raising doubts about the veracity of the respondents and suggesting techniques to help pry the “truth” from them. The interviewer should become close to the respondents and share with them facets of their own life in a sort of confidential *quid pro quo*.

POSTMODERN INTERVIEWING

Postmodern informed researchers in both anthropology and sociology (Marcus & Fischer 1986) moved away from scientific claims about fieldwork and unstructured interviewing.

Instead, they are reflexive about the role and influence of the interviewer in their interaction with respondents. They suggest ways to minimize if not eliminate this influence, by increasing quotations from the actual, untouched statements of the respondents. Also, postmodern interviewers use a *polyphonic* approach, using multiple voices of respondents with minimal intrusion by the interviewer. The interviewer became visible, actively drawn out in the reporting, to help inform the readers about the possible biases and gendered, social, and contextual distortions created by whom ever, wherever, and whenever the interview occurred.

We present two types of postmodern informed interviewing: gendered interview and active interview.

Gendered Interviewing

There has been a pervasive tendency in traditional interviewing, whether structured or unstructured, to be paternalistic. It was not uncommon (in cultural anthropology) to give women researchers “temporary male status” to allow them to access settings and to talk to people with whom women would not otherwise be allowed to interact. The influence of gender in interviewing has been traditionally overlooked. Postmodern interviewers accuse traditional interviewers of ignoring gender differences in order to maintain the pretension of value free and neutral research. Yet, as Denzin (1997) and other postmodern sociologists hold, interviews take place in a culturally paternalistic society where gender differences do matter.

In gendered interviews the interviewer must share herself with the respondent to gain her intimacy. Gendered interviewing is committed to maintaining the integrity of the phenomena studied and presenting the viewpoint of respondents. Yet this is not a ruse, as in creative interviewing, to get more information. Instead, the interviewer throws asunder pretenses of value neutrality and becomes an advocate for the women (or other oppressed individuals, such as African Americans or gay groups) being studied. It is reminiscent of C. W. Mills’s ameliorative sociology.

Some have pointed out that there may be times when the researcher does not see things eye to eye with the group studied and advocacy becomes very problematic. Others have confessed that the “sharedness” between interviewer and respondent is artificial, since it is still the researcher who has the power of producing a text from the interview. Edwards and Mauthern (2002) feel that rather than pretend that differences between interviewer and respondents have been overcome, they should be pointed out, as they cannot be eliminated.

Active Interviewing

Holstein and Gubrium (1995) coined the term active interviewing to refer to the fact that interviews are actively negotiated accomplishments between the interviewer and the respondent. The two (or more) individuals actively collaborate in creating a text in a unique situation and a specific setting. According to Holstein and Gubrium, traditional interviews of all types stress too much the data gathered in the interview, regardless of how they were collected. The interviewer should also pay much closer attention to the latter, the ways in which data were collected – by whom, where, how, in what circumstances, and any other element that may have influenced the data. This approach is a very reflexive one, which rejects the notion that we merely gather data in interviews and use refined techniques to improve the quality of those data. Here the interview is a cooperative, negotiated text, created in the interaction and dependent upon it and the individuals involved.

Reporting Interviews

Postmodern interviewers are also experimenting with new modes of reporting their findings. Rather than mimicking the sparse language of science as do traditional sociologists, postmodern reports at times take the form of performances, plays, introspective recounting, and even poetry. The intent is to provide a more immediate and colorful picture for the readers, who can hopefully be more attracted to sociology and gain a better empathetic understanding

through the immediacy of the new reporting techniques.

Limits of Postmodern Interviewing

Postmodern interviewers have met with criticism from traditional interviewers. The question “but is it sociology?” has been repeatedly asked and not satisfactorily answered. Also, assuming that it is sociology, how does postmodern interviewing submit to the standard criteria of sociology, such as verifiability and replicability? Furthermore, how do sociologists judge the merits of the poetry or performance? Were these arbiters to judge them by literary standards they would fall very short; no other standards have thus far been suggested.

ELECTRONIC INTERVIEWING

A new development in interviewing is through electronic outlets, especially the Internet. Given the tremendous expansion of home computers this means of interviewing allows access to a huge population. The technique costs little and can have a very speedy response. Of course, there is no face to face or even voice to voice contact, so we are faced with a “virtual interviewing” with almost no checks and balances of who the respondent really is and the veracity of their statements. Currently, electronic interviewing tends to rely on questionnaires, but some are already exploring the world of chat rooms (Markham 1998) and delving into the fabricated realities and online lifestyles of virtual online selves.

ETHICAL ISSUES

Since the objects of inquiry in interviewing are human beings, there must be ethical considerations in their regards. All interviewers would agree to grant the respondents rights to informed consent, anonymity, and protection from harm. Much of structured and unstructured interviewing research has no stake per se in the world of the respondents, albeit at times social policy may arise from the findings of some studies. Postmodern interviewers aim for

advocacy for oppressed and underserved individuals and groups whom they study, thus moving away from the traditional sociological goal of value neutrality and objectivity.

Another important ethical consideration is the relation and degree of involvement between researcher and respondents. Whyte (1943) has recently been accused (by Boelen 1992) of misrepresenting and exploiting his respondents, especially his closest informant, Doc. Having casual sexual relations with some of the respondents (as admitted by Goode 2002) certainly goes beyond the ethical involvement between interviewer and respondent.

Interviewing is a very varied methodology, but it ought to be, since human beings are very complex and find themselves in a myriad of different vicissitudes. Each and every subtype of interviewing should be able to get to some kind of answer, to reach some life description from the respondents. This is the goal: not just asking questions, but being able to get answers – meaningful answers.

SEE ALSO: Ethics, Fieldwork; Ethnography; Key Informant; Methods; Postmodernism; Quantitative Methods

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intimacy

Lynn Jamieson

What is imagined by “intimacy” as a quality of relationships is often associated with particular ways of behaving (Davis 1973). Intimacy is sometimes defined narrowly to mean the familiarity resulting from close association. In this sense, domestic life across much of the life course in all societies is intimate. Living arrangements that involve sharing domestic space, a “hearth and home,” the caring activities associated with bearing and raising children, and other forms of routinely giving or receiving physical care necessarily provide familiarity and privileged knowledge. Sometimes the term “intimacy” is also used even more narrowly to refer to sexual familiarity with another person. In everyday current usage, intimacy is often presumed to involve more than close association and familiarity, for example, also involving strong emotional attachments such as love. However, in both popular and academic commentaries, intimacy is increasingly understood as representing a very particular form of “closeness” and being “special” to another person founded on self disclosure. This self disclosing or self expressing intimacy is characterized by knowledge and understanding of inner selves.

Privileged knowledge gained through close physical association is not a sufficient condition to ensure this type of intimacy. People living side by side can feel trapped together as strangers who know nothing of each other's inner worlds.

Studying how people generate and sustain intimacy leaves open the issue of what types of intimate relationships (sexual relationships, couple, kin, specific family relationships, friendship) are significant to people in different times and places. Popular and academic commentators of trends in affluent "western" societies make a range of claims and counterclaims about the nature of intimacy, its meaning and significance in everyday lives, and patterns of social change. These include claims that a focus on private intimacy has helped displace civic and community engagement, that individualized forms of intimacy have undermined conventional "family values," and counterclaims of heightened equality and democracy spreading from personal life to other domains.

"Self disclosing intimacy" as an element of "good" couple, family, and, ultimately, friendship relationships has had widespread endorsement among the growing ranks of relationship experts, psychologists, psychiatrists, psychotherapists, and sexual counselors. This view point was increasingly marketed and advertised in the late twentieth century through a range of cultural products advocating talking and listening, sharing your thoughts, showing your feelings to achieve and maintain a "good relationship," often privileging self expression over more practical forms of "love and care." Advocates of "self disclosing intimacy" claim participants in conversations of mutual self revelation create a quality of relationship more intense than the knowing and understanding that can be gathered without such dialogue. Sexual intimacy may play a part, but for some advocates of this type of intimacy it is neither a necessary nor a sufficient condition, as an intimacy of inner selves is conceived as possible without an intimacy of bodies. However, if, as some theorists have argued, sexuality has come to be seen in western cultures as expressive of the very essence of the self, then sexual familiarity inevitably enhances the intimacy generated by verbal self disclosures.

Academics across a range of disciplines have provided metacommentary on this cultural turn

to "self disclosing intimacy," generating both pessimistic and optimistic analysis of changes in intimate relationships. An influential optimistic analysis was produced by British sociologist Anthony Giddens in *The Transformation of Intimacy* (1992). Giddens argued that a qualitative shift in intimacy began to occur in the late twentieth century. In this period, the faster pace of social change and heightened awareness of risk and uncertainty meant that conventional ways of doing things, including "being a family" and constructing gender and sexual identities, were increasingly open to reworking, as people became more self conscious of being makers of their own "narrative of the self." In this climate, Giddens argued, people increasingly sought "self disclosing intimacy" to anchor themselves in one or more particularly intense personal relationships. Relationships became more fragile, only lasting as long as they provided mutual satisfaction, but they were also potentially more satisfactory, equal, and democratic. Sex was no longer harnessed to set scripts; instead couples negotiated their own rules of sexual conduct on a "what we enjoy" basis. Although people continued to choose long term intimate relationships, including marriage like relationships and parenting relationships, diversity in styles of personal life inevitably also blossomed.

There has been continued discussion of whether and why women's relationships appear to involve more "self disclosing intimacy" than men's (Duncombe & Marsden 1995). Some psychological and psychoanalytic accounts map this to the function of mothering and mother-child relationships. Historically produced gendered cultural discourses, together with inequalities in social constraints and opportunities, are also widely cited in the literature. Similarly, there are discussions of differences by social class, ethnicity, age, and life course stage in patterns of intimacy. Giddens suggested that women, and particularly lesbians and young women, were at the vanguard of his alleged transformation of intimacy: women because previous conventions and social conditions have made them more skilled at "doing intimacy"; women in same sex relationships because they are less constrained by any prior script that suggests a particular division of labor; and young women because they have the most to gain in more equal

and democratic relationships. The work of some feminist commentators has suggested that Giddens has underestimated the persistence of gender inequality (Jamieson 1999) and the ideological strength of a conventional heterosexual culture (Berlant 1997). Berlant argued in her analysis of US culture that the ideologies and institutions of heterosexual intimacy have provided support to a reactionary status quo by encouraging citizens to take refuge from the confusions of capitalism and politics. However, Giddens's argument also finds support among those who believe they are identifying a growing number of instances of people constructing intimate relationships outside of the "heteronorm" (Roseneil & Budgeon 2004).

Whereas Giddens's account suggested that cultural emphasis on "disclosing intimacy" is matched by positive social change in the everyday lives of men and women, there are many more pessimistic visions of what is happening to intimacy in this period of "postmodernity." According to a number of academic commentators, either intimacy has become attenuated (rather than more intense) or its intensity is of little social worth. Unrestrained market forces and mass consumer cultures are accused of promoting a self-obsessive, self-isolating, or competitive individualism which renders people incapable of sustaining meaningful intimate relationships. As one commentator puts it, concern to be sincere and responsible is replaced with worry about being true to one's self (Miztal 2000). Social scientists from a range of contexts have developed variations of this argument, sometimes in tandem with debate about "social capital" and concern that private intimacy supplants or undermines "community." Well-known examples include Bauman (2003) and Sennett (1998). This is also a longstanding subtheme in the work of Hochschild (2003; see also Bellah et al. 1985).

High rates of relationship breakdown, the associated disruption of wider social networks, and concerns, particularly in Europe and North America, about juggling family and work clearly do indicate strains in intimate life. However, detailed research on how people conduct specific intimate relationships commonly identifies strenuous efforts to create "good relationships" and to put children and "family" first, although generally it is women who continue to play the

larger part in sustaining these intimate relationships. Much of the empirical research demonstrates neither self-obsession nor the primacy of "self-disclosing intimacy." In a review of research on couple relationships, sexual relationships, parent-child relationships, and friendship relationships, Jamieson (1998) concluded that the evidence demonstrated a wider repertoire of intimacy than "disclosing intimacy." The relationships people described as "good" relationships were often neither equal nor democratic. Moreover, equal relationships were sustained by more than "disclosing intimacy." For example, couples who had worked hard to have fair divisions of labor typically negotiated mutual practical care that did more to sustain their sense of intimacy than self-disclosure. As Vogler asserts, perhaps "not all intimacies are affairs of the self" (2000: 48; see also Holland et al. 2003). This is not, however, to deny the significance of "self-disclosing intimacy" in popular culture, or its discursive power to influence everyday perceptions of how to do intimacy.

SEE ALSO: Couples Living Apart Together; Heterosexuality; Inequalities in Marriage; Intimate Union Formation and Dissolution; Lesbian and Gay Families; Love and Commitment; Marriage

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intimate union formation and dissolution

Judith A. Seltzer

Ten years ago studies of couple relationships emphasized marriage formation and dissolution (both separation and divorce). Marriage is still the dominant heterosexual couple relationship, but increases in rates of nonmarital cohabitation, the growing recognition of couple relationships between individuals who do not live together, sometimes called LAT (Living Apart Together) couples, and same sex unions have broadened the area of inquiry to include these other unions as well. A benefit of the broader perspective is that it allows for comparisons between marriage and less institutionalized relationships, such as cohabitation, to assess effects of social context and laws on couples' well being.

Research on unions often distinguishes between unions as private, intimate relationships and unions as public phenomena that are a result of laws, policies, and social norms about the rights and obligations of members of the couple. Examples of the latter are tax policies and inheritance laws that treat married couples

differently than unmarried couples who live together. The public nature of unions is also evident in attitude surveys that show general agreement about a gendered division of labor within marriage. The distinction between private and public unions is less useful than might appear at first. Private aspects of couples' relationships are, at least in part, a function of the laws, policies, norms, and economic organization of the public world. For instance, the relative wages of men and women may affect the timing of marriage and the kind of person someone marries. Social norms affect how husbands and wives divide household labor and childcare. Policies that change how difficult it is to divorce may also alter the quality of relationships within marriage. When divorce is less costly, spouses invest less in their relationship and pursue more of their own interests than when divorce is more difficult.

TRENDS

The US has seen an increase in the age at which couples marry. In 2003, half of US men were married by the time they reached age 27.1, an increase since 1970 of nearly 4 years. For women, the increase in median age at marriage to 25.3 was even greater, 4.4 years (US Bureau of the Census 2004). During this period, sex outside of marriage became more acceptable, rates of marital separation and divorce rose and then stabilized at high rates, and nonmarital cohabitation became much more common before and after marriage. By the late 1990s about half of first marriages ended in separation or divorce (some who end marriages do not formally divorce); and over half of first marriages were preceded by cohabitation. The probability of marital dissolution has been relatively stable for the past 20 years, although crude divorce rates have stabilized and even declined slightly for some subgroups. Late marriage and high divorce rates do not mean that individuals have stopped pairing off. Individuals still form couples and live together outside of marriage. Although rates of cohabitation have continued to rise, the increase in cohabitation has not compensated for the rise in age at marriage. That is, rates of union formation, where unions include marriage and nonmarital cohabitation,

are still lower today despite the increase in cohabitation.

Within the US there are substantial class and race/ethnic differences in rates of union formation and dissolution. Men and women who have more secure economic prospects are more likely to marry than those who are economically disadvantaged. African Americans are much less likely to marry than are whites. This race difference cannot be explained fully by racial differences in economic characteristics. Marital dissolution is also more common among those with less education and among African Americans, as compared to whites. These disparities in separation and divorce appear to be widening over time.

Trends in union formation and dissolution in Western European countries are similar in several ways to those in the US. Age at marriage has risen and nonmarital unions, sometimes called consensual unions, have become increasingly common since the 1970s. Rates of divorce have also increased in most European countries. The combination of delayed or nonmarriage, increasing consensual unions, and high rates of marital instability support the claim that marriage has become less attractive compared to alternative arrangements.

ECONOMIC AND CULTURAL EXPLANATIONS

There are two broad categories of explanations for these trends and differentials: cultural change and changes in economic opportunities. Cultural explanations argue that changes in unions occurred because of a broad shift toward individualistic and egalitarian values. Some trace this ideological shift to the Protestant Reformation, while others identify a qualitative change toward the middle of the twentieth century, sometimes called the Second Demographic Transition. The rise in individualism fostered investment in personal goals which sometimes conflicted with marital goals, and resulted in delayed marriage and increases in marital dissolution. At the same time, a growing concern with equality between women and men fostered increases in women's education and labor force participation, contributing to declines in the number of children couples have. Without the

responsibility for children, individual spouses have less investment in their marriage and find divorce less costly. The driving force in these explanations, however, is changes in values.

Economic explanations for changes in marriage emphasize the rise in opportunities for wage labor, expansion of educational opportunities, and the relative wages of women and men. These theories argue that marriage and other unions are the result of cost benefit calculations about whether the benefits of being married (or divorced) are greater than alternatives, such as being single or cohabiting. Delayed marriage and higher rates of marital dissolution occur because women have greater economic independence outside of marriage than they had earlier in the twentieth century. This interpretation derives from the "new home economics" theory advanced by Gary Becker and is consistent with Talcott Parsons's view of the family in which there are gains to specialization in marriage. In these theories, both husband and wife are better off when one (typically the husband), who has higher earning potential, specializes in market work and the other (typically the wife) specializes in housework and childcare. When women's earning potential increases, the gains to marriage are relatively smaller, and divorce rates rise.

Empirical evidence for the theories emphasizing women's economic opportunities is mixed. Several patterns suggest this explanation cannot on its own account for trends and differentials in union formation and dissolution. For example, US women with higher education and earnings are more likely to marry than women with lower earning potential. Education also reduces women's chances of divorce in the US. There is also some evidence that the education disparity in rates of marital dissolution has increased recently.

A second variant of economic interpretations focuses on men's economic prospects and security. According to this view, marriage in western societies has long been an economic arrangement, a prerequisite for which was that the couple must have sufficient economic resources to live independently from their parents. Even today, men's economic resources and potential earnings are an important predictor of marriage. In this view, marriage is delayed or foregone when men have difficulty establishing

themselves in the labor market and earning a family wage, that is, among those who are less educated and minority group members. New research in this area, however, suggests that for recent cohorts both women's and men's earning potentials affect who marries and the kind of person they marry.

Although cultural and economic explanations for changes in unions are often posited as competing interpretations, efforts to compare them typically demonstrate that neither is sufficient on its own to explain either temporal or cross sectional variation in union patterns. It is more likely that both ideological and economic factors contributed to changes in the formation and dissolution of marriage.

PRIVATE RELATIONSHIPS AND THE MARRIAGE MARKET

In the US the popular notion of finding a spouse is that two people fall in love and then marry. That marriage depends on more than love is evident from data on assortative mating, or the extent to which spouses resemble each other on social and demographic characteristics. Husbands and wives are very likely to have the same racial identification. They are also likely to be similar in the amount of schooling they have completed. In addition, spouses are likely to come from similar religious backgrounds, but religious intermarriage has been increasing in the US. Couples who are cohabiting are somewhat less homogamous or similar than married couples. This is probably in part because cohabitation is a period when individuals are evaluating whether or not they are a good match for each other, and in part because the social norms about what constitutes an appropriate marriage partner are different from those governing other unions. Members of cohabiting couples who are more similar have a greater likelihood of marrying. Marriages between more similar spouses are also more stable and less likely to end in divorce.

Similarities between spouses' or partners' characteristics are the result of a matching process in which each person seeks the best partner who will also have him or her. Social scientists sometimes describe the process of spouse selection as a marriage market. This analogy assumes that spouses find each other through an

exchange process. The actors in marriage markets differ across cultures. Although in the US the potential spouses themselves are the primary actors, in some cultures matches are formed by kin groups seeking alliances with each other for political reasons or to protect property, and in other settings parents themselves or a third party matchmaker bring a couple together.

Marriage markets also differ in the characteristics considered desirable in a potential spouse. For instance, in a secular society in which technical skills are highly valued, finding a highly educated spouse may be more important than marrying someone who is of the same religion. In the US, religious homogamy has declined at the same time educational homogamy has increased. There may also be gender differences in the characteristics desired in a spouse. If the roles of husband and wife differ, as in the Parsonian breadwinner-homemaker model of middle class marriage, then the marital division of labor dictates that men with higher earning potential and women who are attractive and emotionally supportive would be highly sought after on the marriage market. Men's attractiveness and women's earning potential would be relatively less important compared to the characteristics that help fulfill the gendered role requirements of marriage.

Finally, marriage markets are also constrained by formal rules about who is an appropriate marriage partner (e.g., whether or not first cousins are allowed to marry; and whether racial intermarriage was permitted under previous US state laws governing marriage). Informal aspects of social organization also affect marriage market outcomes. Daily interaction between persons of the same race or education level in neighborhoods, schools, and work settings increases the likelihood of homogamous unions. By choosing where to live or where to send their children to school, families indirectly affect children's later decisions about whom to marry.

DELAY IN MARRIAGE AS AN EXTENDED SEARCH FOR A SPOUSE

Finding a spouse takes longer when it is unclear whether or not potential spouses have the desired characteristics. Physical appearance is easy to observe at a young age, but signs that

someone will have a successful career or earn a lot of money are not apparent until individuals are older and have finished school and started working. That age is correlated with characteristics that matter on the marriage market is an insight that can be used to interpret the trend in age at marriage for US women and men. In the mid twentieth century both women and men married at younger ages than they do today, in part because men completed schooling earlier and entered paid work at younger ages, thus revealing their potential as a breadwinner at younger ages. With the growth in demand for more highly educated workers, determining whether a potential husband would be a good economic provider takes longer as men (and women) stay in school longer and delay the age at which they marry. At the same time, the women's movement and improvements in women's economic opportunities increased the value to potential husbands of wives' earning potential. Uncertainty about women's economic potential when they are young also contributes to the rise in age at marriage, and probably accounts for the even greater rate of increase in women's age at marriage than men's. Much, but not all, of the delay in marriage in the US is compensated for by the increase in cohabitation before marriage. Living together before marriage is one way that couples learn more about whether a potential partner would be an appropriate spouse, even if couples do not consciously decide to cohabit as a step on the way to marriage.

Even with late marriage, there is still uncertainty about whether a potential spouse is a good match. Individuals change after marriage, sometimes in ways that make them more compatible and sometimes in ways that are unexpected. When individuals change in ways that are not anticipated (e.g., if a person is wrong about what kind of person their spouse will become or if one of the partners loses a job) these unexpected disruptions may increase the chance that the marriage will dissolve. The rise in US divorce rates in the 1960s and 1970s might be explained by unanticipated changes in spouses' expectations about each other's gender role obligations in marriage associated with the women's movement and women's greater labor market opportunities and by decreasing costs of dissolving unsatisfactory matches.

FUTURE RESEARCH

Many theories about the formation and dissolution of intimate unions claim that unions depend on individuals' assessments of the relative benefits of being in the relationship as compared to an alternative. When cohabitation is rare, it is likely that the alternative to marriage is being single. When cohabitation is more widely accepted, there may be two alternatives to marriage: being single or cohabiting. New research should investigate the conditions that affect the alternatives individuals weigh in deciding whether, when, and with whom to form (or dissolve) a union.

Another productive area for new research is how individuals form expectations about potential partners' future characteristics (e.g., whether they will be good economic providers or good parents). It is especially important to learn more about the role of uncertainty in making decisions about unions and the degree to which individuals actually think of themselves as making a decision.

The challenge of designing studies that fully take into account the range of potential partners who might form a union, that is, the full marriage market, is a longstanding problem in studies of union formation and dissolution. Research that considers only unions or matches that have already been formed excludes important information about the alternatives or failed matches.

Finally, research on unions typically assumes that the partners or spouses co reside, and that when the union dissolves, the partners no longer live together. Co residence is important, but it is not the only dimension of intimacy and enduring ties that matters for couple relationships. Couples who are deeply committed to each other and their relationship may live apart (LAT relationships), and those who live together may not think of themselves as being in an enduring or satisfying relationship. Learning more about the continuum of relationships and the conditions under which they involve co residence will shed new light on the meaning and effects of contemporary unions.

SEE ALSO: Cohabitation; Couples Living Apart Together; Divorce; Family Demography;

Marriage; Same Sex Marriage/Civil Unions;
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invasion–succession

Barrett A. Lee

Invasion succession (hereafter IS) has enjoyed considerable popularity among social scientists as a framework for understanding community change. In its simplest form, IS refers to the replacement of one population group or land use by another within a particular geographical environment. Due to mounting awareness of the complexities surrounding the process of change, however, the IS model no longer occupies the status of conventional wisdom that it did throughout much of the last century.

The historical roots of IS can be traced to the work of sociologists at the University of Chicago in the 1920s and 1930s. Borrowing ideas from plant and animal ecology, Park (1952), McKenzie (1968), and their colleagues stressed unfettered competition for valued resources (such as a desirable location or housing) as the driving force behind IS. Competition was believed to spur a natural, orderly, and irreversible transition from an equilibrium stage dominated by the incumbent group to a new equilibrium dominated by the “invading” group. According to the Chicago sociologists, the notion of passage through a sequence of stages could be helpful for depicting social change along multiple dimensions – demographic, cultural, economic – and across settings ranging from the local to the global.

Despite the Chicago School's broad view, the scope of IS has narrowed substantially over subsequent decades of empirical usage. Well before

World War II, IS research had already begun to focus on residential phenomena, including the settlement patterns of ethnic immigrants and shifts in community socioeconomic status. The meaning of IS became even more restricted after 1950. Studies by the Duncans (1957) and the Taeubers (1969) applied the term to a specific type of change in neighborhood racial composition: from white to African American occupancy. These studies defined additional stages (e.g., penetration, consolidation) in the IS process and spelled out the population dynamics that could produce an increase in the percentage of black residents. They also identified the conditions under which IS was likely to occur.

Many investigations conducted from the 1950s through the 1970s emphasized the pace and inevitability of white to black transition. Racial change was thought to proceed at a gradual rate until the representation of African Americans in an area reached some vague “tipping point.” Once the area tipped, whites were deemed more likely to move out, leaving vacancies to be filled by black home seekers eager for better housing and neighborhoods. The result of such “white flight” was accelerated change and, ultimately, resegregation. Put differently, this common version of the IS model precludes stable integration, black to white change, or other racial residential outcomes.

Recent scholarship has challenged the model on several fronts. One weakness is its overly descriptive character: IS predicts what should happen to a community over time but fails to explain why. In response to this weakness, students of racial change have devoted increased attention to decision making – by both households and institutional actors – as an important explanatory mechanism (Hartmann 1993). Shifting racial composition can be seen as the cumulation of numerous household level decisions to move out of, stay put in, or move into a given neighborhood. These decisions involve more than the ability to compete successfully for residential position, as implied by the IS model. Household members may take into account their own racial preferences, how they think residents from other racial groups will respond to them, perceived correlates of a neighborhood’s racial mix (safety, school quality,

property values, etc.), and what kind of future they anticipate for the neighborhood.

Household decision making is further influenced by a wide range of institutions ignored in IS research. Those institutional actors participating directly in the housing market tend to be key. Real estate agents, for example, have used “blockbusting” tactics to encourage panic selling on the part of white homeowners, speeding white to black change (Gotham 2002). Current evidence indicates that African Americans continue to receive less information and assistance from agents at all stages of the home seeking process and are “steered” to certain types of areas (Yinger 1995). Lenders and insurers have also been shown to engage in discriminatory behavior. Similarly, local government policies and the efforts of residents’ associations can constrain or facilitate household mobility decisions and thus modify the process of racial transition.

Beyond its explanatory deficiencies, the IS model seems out of step with certain kinds of community change. Gentrification, occasionally labeled “reverse” succession, offers a case in point. Since the 1970s, middle class renovation of older housing in inner city areas has typically been accompanied by an increasing (rather than decreasing) percentage of white residents and upward (rather than downward) socioeconomic movement. Another trend, the rise of multi ethnic neighborhoods, defies the two group logic of IS. With Latino and Asian populations growing rapidly across the metropolitan US, new trajectories of change are pushing more neighborhoods in the direction of greater diversity while reducing the number of all white and all black areas (Fasensfest et al. 2004). The IS prediction that African Americans will completely replace whites once they enter a neighborhood is less accurate now than in the past.

Multi ethnic patterns of change highlight the significance of the larger context in which neighborhoods are embedded. Immigration policies and flows at the national level fuel these patterns, disproportionately affecting neighborhoods in “gateway” metropolises such as Los Angeles and New York. Variation across metropolitan settings in housing construction activity can have consequences for neighborhood change

as well. When new housing units are occupied, the older vacated units become available, stimulating moves by members of different groups into and out of established residential areas in domino like fashion.

The IS model appears to have worked best when a distinctive set of forces – notably, pervasive discrimination against an expanding African American population – made selected neighborhoods in Midwestern and Northeastern cities vulnerable to dramatic white to black transitions. In hindsight, the historical and place specific nature of the model is apparent. So are more fundamental shortcomings. To fully comprehend how communities evolve, one must be able to explain differences in the direction, pace, and magnitude of change on several dimensions, including but not limited to racial ethnic composition. An adequate explanation must also incorporate causal factors operating at the social psychological, household, institutional, and contextual levels. In its most common form, IS fails to satisfy these criteria.

SEE ALSO: Blockbusting; Chicago School; Gentrification; Park, Robert E. and Burgess, Ernest W.; Redlining; Restrictive Covenants; Steering, Racial Real Estate; Urban Ecology

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investigative poetics

Stephen Hartnett

In his Beat inflected manifesto, *Investigative Poetry*, Edward Sanders (1976) argued that “the essence of investigative poetry” is to create “lines of lyric beauty [that] descend from data clusters,” hence both seducing and empowering readers with “a melodic blizzard of data fragments.” As illustrated in *America*, his epic collection of data fragment strewn poems, Sanders (2000) hoped to merge poetry with the pedagogical imperative to teach his readers their national history and the political goal of empowering them to re-enliven the great traditions of activism and artistry celebrated in his poems. By interweaving the emotional power of poetry with the pedagogical power of historical scholarship and the political power of fighting for social justice, Sanders’s *America* embodies the theory explored in his *Investigative Poetry*, thus providing a model for writing layered, historically dense, yet beautiful, political poems (Bernstein 1990; Monroe 1996; Hartnett & Engels 2005).

While Sanders’s version of investigative poetry is focused on US national history, other practitioners of the art have sought to write in a comparative, international mode. For example, Carolyn Forché’s *The Country Between Us* (1981) shuttles between the US and El Salvador, where she was both witness to and participant in the nasty wars launched by presidents Reagan and Carter against supposed leftists. Peter Dale Scott’s *Coming to Jakarta: A Poem about Terror* (1988) fulfills a similar role, oscillating back and forth between US political intrigue and the CIA sponsored coup that brought Suharto to power in Indonesia and that led in 1965 and 1966 to the killing of half a million alleged communists (Blum 1995). For both Forché and Scott, witnesses propelled to chronicle terrible

acts of violence while still honoring the aesthetic joys of poetry, investigative poetry can say what cannot otherwise be said, it can cut through stultifying genre expectations to interlace personal horror and historical fact, first hand reports and philosophical flights of fancy.

Investigative poetry is more than just the expression of front line reporting in poetic forms, however, for the works cited above by Sanders, Forché, and Scott also offer compelling meditations on the role of poetry as a survival mechanism in an age of mass produced terror (Hartnett 1999; Kaplan 2006). As argued by Terrence Des Pres (1986) in a roundtable discussion on the possibilities of political poetry, “we turn where we can for sustenance, and some of us take poetry seriously in exactly this way,” as a daily practice of making meaning. From this perspective, investigative poetry offers not only a creative vehicle for offering political criticism, but also a heuristic model of *how to live*, of how to take a critical stance against what Des Pres calls “empires in endless conflict” while not giving in to despair or quietude, all the while maintaining a daily commitment to producing art (see Hartnett 2003).

For example, after chronicling the horrors of the US aided genocide in Indonesia, the closing section of Scott’s *Coming to Jakarta* advises readers to cherish the small moments that make each day precious:

As for those of us
 who are lucky enough
 not to sit hypnotized
 our hands on the steering wheel
 which seems to have detached itself
 from the speeding vehicle
 it is our job to say
relax trust
 spend more time with your children
 things can only go
 a little better
 if you do not hang on so hard.

For Scott, investigative poetry includes ventures not only into international intrigue and bloody political crises, but also into the micro logical mechanics of daily life. This inward turn is framed, of course, as part of a political response to empire, as an experiment in living an ethical life in the shadow of so much plenty

earned largely through the mass produced pain of so many others (Scott 1992, 2000; Hartnett 2006).

Whereas Sanders’s work concerns US history, and whereas Forché’s and Scott’s contributions explore international political intrigue, a third major strand of investigative poetry includes work clumped loosely around a notion of ethnographic or anthropological poetry. Of the early practitioners of this genre, Jerome Rothenberg and Gary Snyder are perhaps the best known. The term *ethnopoetics* was coined in 1967 by Jerome Rothenberg and Dennis Tedlock and gained prominence via the work of *Alcheringa*, a magazine Rothenberg and Tedlock founded in 1970 (Statement of Intention 1970). Merging a fascination with premodern and developing cultures with a stinging rebuke of western modernity, ethnopoetics offered ecologically sensitive, culturally comparative poems full of both wonder and anger (Rothenberg & Rothenberg 1983; Pratt 1985; Rothenberg 1990).

For example, Snyder’s *Turtle Island* (1974) moves from a celebration of the Anasazi, a Native American tribe living in the sun drenched Southwest, to “The Call of the Wild,” a bitter poem attacking “All these Americans up in special cities in the sky / Dumping poisons and explosives.” Published amid the war in Vietnam, this clear reference to the saturation bombings sanctioned by President Nixon invites readers to think about the deep historical connections among Indian genocide, environmental destruction, and the butchery under way in the name of defeating communism. By thinking in this multi temporal manner, by holding the Anasazi and the Vietnamese in one’s mind at the same time, Snyder gains historical and political leverage for his claim in “Tomorrow’s Song” that “The USA slowly lost its mandate / in the middle and later twentieth century / it never gave the mountains and rivers, / trees and animals, / a vote. / all the people turned away from it.” Reading these lines in light of another set of US triggered wars in Afghanistan and Iraq, one is struck by the commonsensical argument that there is an intimate relation between the violence used to demolish nature and the violence used to murder our fellow humans. Indeed, in the face of the well oiled machinery of death that slaughtered the Indians, that

murdered millions of Vietnamese, that leveled Afghanistan and Iraq, and that has left a world wide trail of ecological destruction in its path, one is struck by how relevant and powerful this poem feels 32 years after its first publication.

A fourth strain of investigative poetry builds upon the early work of ethnopoetics, yet infuses it with a stronger sense of anthropological depth. For example, consider Ivan Brady's masterful *The Time at Darwin's Reef* (2003). Whereas the ethnopoets mentioned above dabbled in studies of ancient and other non western cultures – sometimes veering close to what could be called nostalgia or naïve Orientalism – Brady is an accomplished anthropologist who has studied Pacific Island cultures for over 25 years, meaning Brady's poems bristle with a lifetime of research and personal experience. As evidence of the book's remarkably broad sense of time and place, *Darwin's Reef* closes with an alphabetical "Place List" and a chronological "Date List," both of which include information relevant to the other. For example, the Place List begins with "Abaiang Island, February 14, 1840," closes with "USMCRD, San Diego, California, August 27, 1958," and includes 60 other place/time entries sandwiched in between. Readers recognize from glancing through the Place List and Date List that *Darwin's Reef* addresses the long history of naval conquest, beginning for the purposes of this book in the South Pacific during the 1840s, culminating in the world's largest floating arms depot, San Diego, during the late 1950s, and wreaking havoc on all the places in between. The Place List and Date List thus function as semiotic machines of imaginative yet historically grounded suggestions, producing juxtapositions, layerings, and clues meant to lead the reader on geographic and temporal journeys through the wreckage of colonialism (see Brady 2000).

As in Snyder's *Turtle Island*, "Time" at Darwin's Reef is less linear than in traditional historical writings and more like the twisting, reverberating, ecological, and even spiritual forms it often takes in folklore. For example, in the poem that names the book, "The Time at Darwin's Reef" – located with the place and date listings that preface each poem as "Playa de la Muerte, South Pacific, July 4, 1969" – Brady conveys time as "High Time, 1:05 p.m.,

Fiji time" (local clock time), as "Time to Get Down" (from the Cessna flying overhead), as "Island Time" (the deep ecological time of natural change), as "Copy Time in the coral" (the movements of coral reproduction as seen in "ejaculating rocks"), as "Magic Time," and so on, in a dizzying multiplication of possible times, most of them rooted not in western notions of clocks, but rather in the natural temporal forms of tides, seasons, and life cycles. Taken together, these layered "times" indicate a spiritual sense of completeness, of multiplicities woven into an organic whole, of ecological centeredness.

Lest readers assume that Brady's gorgeous experiments in temporal confusions lapse into political complacency, "Proem for the Queen of Spain" layers such temporal dislocations against spatial and political fragments, hence creating a sense of bitter poetic judgment. The bulk of the piece is a letter (fictional but true to its historical moment) from Fernando Junipero Dominguez, written in "New Spain" (Mexico) in 1539, in which the writer thanks the queen for bringing to his people "the Embrace of the Mission and the Love of God, Amen." The letter demonstrates how colonized peoples internalized oppression, in this case in the form of bowing to a foreign god brought to the New World by a foreign empire. The endmatter following the poem provides multiple historical references on the history of Dominguez, so the poem fulfills the pedagogical function of both seducing readers to think historically and then leading them to the necessary information to pursue their own further readings. Tucked within the letter, however, Brady offers expletive laced commands from US troops who shout at Vietnamese peasants: "Nam fuckin' xuong dat! Lie the fuck down! Or y'all gonna fuckin' die!" Much like Snyder's juxtaposing of the Anasazi against Nixon's saturation bombing of Vietnamese peasants, Brady's insertion of dialogue from US soldiers within a 1539 letter to the queen of Spain illustrates a sense of continuity linking the Spanish invasion of Mexico to the US invasion of Vietnam. Against the deeply satisfying ecological times of "Time at Darwin's Reef," then, "Proem for the Queen of Spain" offers a chilling sense of *imperial time*, of the looping repetitive horrors of conquest.

Although attempts to define a genre are doomed to failure and inevitably invite a cascade of counter arguments, refutations, and modifications, readings of Sanders, Forché, Scott, Rothenberg, Snyder, and Brady suggest that investigative poetry exhibits these characteristics:

- An attempt to supplement poetic imagery with evidence won through scholarly research, with the hope that merging art and archive makes our poetry more worldly and our politics more personal.
- An attempt to use reference matter not only to support political arguments but also as a tool to provide readers with additional information and empowerment.
- An attempt to problematize the self by studying the complex interactions among individuals and their political contexts, hence witnessing both the fracturing of the self and the deep implication of the author in the cultural and political systems that he or she examines.
- An attempt to problematize politics by witnessing the ways social structures are embodied as lived experience, hence adding to political criticism ethnographic, phenomenological, and existential components.
- An attempt to situate these questions about self and society within larger historical narratives, thereby offering poems that function as genealogical critiques of power.
- An attempt to produce poems that take a multi-perspectival approach, not by celebrating or criticizing one or two voices but by building a constellation of multiple voices in conversation.
- A deep faith in the power of commitment, meaning that to write an investigative poetry of witness the poet must put himself or herself in harm's way and function not only as an observer of political crises but also as a participant in them.

SEE ALSO: Anti War and Peace Movements; Autoethnography; Buddhism; Capitalism; Class, Perceptions of; Class, Status, and Power; Collective Trauma; Colonialism (Neo colonialism); Crime, Corporate; Ethnography; Personal is Political; Poetics, Social Science; Time

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Islam

Khaled Fouad Allam

The birth of Islam coincided with radical change in the anthropological and sociocultural situation of Arab populations which, in about the seventh century CE, had already been affected by strong social tensions and by a number of important religious upheavals. If pre-Islamic societies are generally to be considered as polytheistic, the presence, since the beginnings of Islam, of important Christian and Hebrew communities must not be understated and from which elements of the Koran are taken. This “new” religion, Islam – whose etymology means “peace” but also “submission” in the sense of humankind’s devotion to God’s word – not only changed the extant religious language, but also deeply modified the social and anthropological structures of the peoples of the Arab peninsula. In analyzing the structures of Islamic societies it is clear how such an event resulted from the demand for change in a social universe – the tribal and clan world – which claimed to be structured differently from the extant one, and which was crossed by deep tensions and crises.

According to Islamic tradition, God chose a man, Mohammad, who through the angel Gabriel’s revelation (or *tanzil*, which means Word descent) would become God’s messenger and prophet. The God of Abraham reveals definitively in the Word, the recitation of which corresponds to the term *Qur’an* in Arabic, the language that, according to the Koran, God chose because of its “clarity.” This point represents an essential element in the definition of Islamic identity: the new religious conscience of Islam involves a linguistic and semantic

specificity represented by the Arab language. In this way, signs and symbols define the whole religious universe of Islam and they are the foundations of Islamic dogma, the *I’gaz al Qur’an* (the inimitability of the Koran): “If all the humans and all the Jinns banded together in order to produce a Qur’an like this, they could never produce anything like it, no matter how much assistance they lent one another” (Koran, Surah XVII, verse 88).

The notion of inimitability refers to the notions of fascination and amazement: the divine language interrogates man, as the creator asks him to witness the eternity of his mystery (*gaib*) and the mystery of creation. An essential element of Islamic theology is the mystery behind the revelation of God, who does not allow man to attain such knowledge. Divine revelation in Islam is inseparable from “God’s messenger” or *rasul*, Mohammad’s path, which is divided into two phases, each corresponding to a collection of Surahs (chapters) of the Koran. The first phase, from the beginning of the revelation until 622, is called the Meccan period: it reflects the image of a solitary man, marginalized from Meccan society because of the revelation. The Meccan Surahs of this first period deal with a deeply spiritual, eschatological Islam – an Islam which could be referred to as being an interior Islam. In the second period, from 622 to 632, a change in the function of the Koran’s message occurs: Islam appears and develops in Medina, where the first Muslim community is born and where individual religious identity becomes collective. The cycle of the revelation continues in Medina and the Prophet Mohammad dies in 632, leaving a society in the making.

The Koran’s text, composed of 114 Surahs, is present in the memory of the Prophet’s companions (the first four caliphs) and in the community’s memory, but it is not yet structured, given that their culture is based on oral traditions and not the written word. This explains the reason for the great disagreements behind the authenticity of some verses and forms of transliteration. In fact, any passage which passes from oral to written form creates a filter that has consequences for an orally revealed religion.

The present text of the Koran, comprising 114 chapters, was codified during the age of caliph Utman (d. 656). His decision to arrive

at a definitive version of the text intended to stop the violent polemics which the two different approaches to text created, due to the diverging views on Islam and its social structure. Sources for the contention were founded on issues of Arabic grammar. Two schools arose: the Bassora school and the Baghdad school. This implied two different ways to expound the revealed Word: one more closed, the other more open. Utman, to avoid disputes, opted for the more conservative system.

In the Koran, the order of chapters does not follow the chronological sequence of their revelation. Except for the first Surah, *Al Fatiha* ("the opening") that is Meccan, all the initial Surahs are from the Medina period, in that they essentially define the social organization of Islam and its ethical and juridical principles. Some scholars affirm that the historical sequence of the Surahs is inverted because they have been ordered beginning with the longer ones and ending with the shorter ones. Others affirm that this has to be interpreted as an accent on the Medina Surahs – those that refer to a specificity of Islam, the primacy of the community over the individual, a primacy that is historically defined in Medina and becomes the social archetype of the Muslim world.

In effect, Islamic identity is founded not only on the historically defined experience of the Medina community, but also, and essentially, on the prophetic function. The Prophet Muhammad embodies two roles in Islam. He is the messenger of God, whose Word he receives to transmit to the community, and he also represents the image of the perfect man (*insan kamil*), symbol of charismatic authority that is expressed through history, and therefore in a social construction consequent to the sacred experience of revelation. He is the archetype, the model which should inspire every Muslim community.

The first historical experience of Islam is that of Medina: it represents the collective memory for the entire Muslim world. In this way history becomes tradition (*Sunna*) and creates an individual and collective model for the whole community. From the outset, this passage in history involves a structural crux: if an initial historical experience is to be reproduced perpetually, Islam can no longer be empowered by history. Therefore, with the death of its

Prophet, profound disagreements arose regarding Islam's developments throughout history; the controversy between Sunnis and Shiites has its roots in the function of the Prophet. For the Sunnis, the cycle of prophecy concludes definitively with Muhammad's death. To subscribe to a historical perspective means to reproduce the founding elements of Islam, the categories and the interpretive patterns elaborated by the Prophet, since they are considered sufficient to preserve the social and religious elements of a community.

For the Shiites, on the contrary, the cycle of prophecy does not end, but continues throughout history. Islam has to be experienced permanently, in order to preserve a vital link between the sacred and the historical experience of its community. In the Shiite tradition, such continuity is made possible by prophetic descent, by the genealogical filiations which have their beginnings with Ali, cousin and son in law of the Prophet: in fact, the Shiite *faith witness* mentions Muhammad alongside Ali.

These deep differences in the interpretive grid configure the Islamic universe into different dimensions and into contrasting anthropological and juridical patterns. In Islam, two perceptions of the connection between society and religious identity have developed. They correspond to different ways of interpreting the concept of authority. For the Shiites, the collective memory of Islam is kept alive, since the prophetic descent ensures the continuity of interpretation. The caliph is the principal figure of authority because it is he who maintains the interpretation of the Koran; the prophetic tradition does not conclude with the death of Muhammad, but it is continually enriched through the succession of the *imams*, interpreters of Islam in its historical development. For the Sunnis, on the contrary, the historical cycle of interpretation concludes with the death of the Prophet in 632; Muslim society disposes of a definitively fixed pattern that can and must only repeat itself in following cycles of history.

Such deep disagreements produced a political and a theological divorce, since – according to the Shiite perspective – the caliphate had been usurped by the Sunnis. While Sunni Islamic theology is based upon a series of dogmas, Shiite Islamic theology is founded on the combination of the spiritual dimension and its

achievement in history. While for the Shiites there is an uninterrupted investment in history with the sacred, for the Sunnis these two areas are distinct from one another and are always susceptible to conflict. For example, radical Islamism springs from the refusal of a historical investment in the interpretation of the Koran.

Sociologically, Sunni Islamism adapted to the cultural and cognitive contexts of the different peoples it encountered within its history, through the formulation of a legal system and not of a theology. Up to the present there are four schools of juridical interpretation: the Malikite, the Hanbalite, the Hanafite, and the Shafiite. Each of them extends over a wide area of the Muslim world. For example, the Malikite school is present in the Maghreb region and the Hanbalite school extends over the Middle West area (Mashreq), whereas the Hanbalite and Shafiite schools are in the areas of the so called peripheral Islam (Central Asia, the Balkans, the Indian subcontinent, etc). Not only do these schools differ from each other in their juridical characteristics, but each of them also defines a specific approach to the Koran's exegetics, since each adopts a particular speculative methodology about the juridical corpus, varying from maximalist to minimalist interpretations.

There are four methods of reasoning in the formulation of the law in Sunni Islamism: *igma* (consent); *qiyas* (analogy); *ray* (personal opinion); and *igthad* (interpretation), which provides an essentially closed praxis. The identity of a Sunni Muslim is not only founded upon the Koran and the prophetic tradition, but also upon his belonging to a certain juridical school which conditions his whole existence, from birth to death, through rites and religious praxis.

From the late Middle Ages, the European approach to Islam has been functional to the relation between religious identity and territory. The expansion of Islam in the Mediterranean basin has been interpreted in terms of competition between two patterns of medieval intelligibility, that is to say in terms of the different conceptions of truth, connected to revelation in the two sacred texts (the Koran and the Christian gospels). Intellectual and theological debates attempted to ascertain which of them held the truth.

Until the beginning of the twentieth century the interpreting grid of the Islamic phenomenon was based upon the more relevant historical events or changes. The birth of a wide Islamic empire in the heart of the Mediterranean has been the object of various interpretations, in particular the thesis of two prominent historians, the medievalist Henri Pirenne and the founder of the *Annales* school, Fernand Braudel. Pirenne affirmed that what distinguishes Islam from Christianity – and what corresponds to Islam's strategy of conquering new territories – is that Islam never integrates into other cultures, but always remains unchanged. Studying the texts of the Councils in Muslim Spain, Pirenne points out that the church had to translate its Latin texts into Arabic because Arabic was so widespread. His explanation is that the Muslim conquest implied an extension of its religious and sociocultural pattern. Pirenne places this specificity of Islam in opposition with the conquest of the Germans who, on the contrary, integrated and embraced the linguistic, cultural, and religious patterns of the people they conquered and who converted therefore to Christianity. Pirenne considers the fact that Islam never integrates a specificity of the religion, because he maintains that Muslim identity has a territorial character: Islam exists anywhere Muslims live.

The *Annales* school reflects a more complex position, in which religious matters are defined on the basis of material relations. From this point of view, the expansion of Middle Age empires has to be interpreted in relation to the exchange of goods and the control of maritime routes, which determines the logic of power and rule. If this logic is maintained until a certain date, then this is a consequence of the material, that is, economic characteristics of the period. In effect, the decline of the Muslim world historically coincides with the loss of control of the new trade routes. This happened in the sixteenth century, when trade moved from the Mediterranean to the Atlantic. In this case religious identity just seals the means of production and the consequent power relations of the period.

The nineteenth century and the first half of the twentieth saw the development of orientalism. This doctrine is considered as constitutive

of a phenomenology of Islamic elements, such as the corpus of founding texts, the production of Muslim jurisprudence, the Arab language and its idioms, and the literature and the history of great dynasties. But orientalism certainly lacked the material history of the Muslim world, providing for it a series of interpreting grids, in the same way that the historical method did in the development of the western world. In fact, in Islam's historiography, the lack of a history of peoples is evident, since a history of dynasties and power has prevailed.

The conceptual frame of orientalism that provided a comprehensive and organic picture of Islam gradually crumbled in the face of the felt necessity to decodify those societies into a structural approach. A new approach to these societies was shaped in the field of social and cultural anthropology, where in fact more relevant methodological changes appeared. In the 1950s scholars like Jacques Berque, Jean Paul Charnay, Germaine Tillon, and Clifford Geertz opened a new approach to Islam through structuralist research. They analyzed the kinship system and local economies; they conducted sociolinguistic studies of dialects; they began to analyze production in the Muslim world and its relations with territory. In this way they got over the issues that blocked these societies into rigid and decontextualized frames.

During the last few decades the consequences of decolonization together with the phenomenon of acculturation in Muslim countries have amplified the crisis and the re-Islamization of society, through the forming of religious parties and of a symbolic universe reintroducing religious order in socialization processes (veils for women, beards for men, etc.). Political science and sociology have analyzed all these changes. The phenomenon of Islamic terrorism, the geopolitical changes consequent to the Afghan crisis and the two Gulf wars, together with the question of the development of an Islamic Diaspora, both in the USA and in Europe, have raised the question of a public space for Islam in democratic western societies.

The role of sociologists and political analysts has therefore become relevant in providing a comprehensive frame for the great changes in Islam's progress. For example, scholars underline the deep fracture (*fitna*) afflicting contemporary Islam, dividing those who embrace a

close relation between Islam and political order, and those who embrace a change of Islam in private life. The works of Gilles Kepel, Olivier Roy, and Jocelyne Cesari tend to demonstrate the complexity of the changes and conflicts in progress in Islam and in its relations with the West.

A multi disciplinary approach to Islam in the social sciences gives an account of the present complexities and of the phenomena still in progress within Muslim societies. Such an approach is shared by many Muslim scholars, such as the anthropologist Abdellah Hamoudi, the philosopher Mohammed Arkoun, the political analyst Ghassan Salamé, the sociologist Leila Babès, and the historians Abdessalam Cheddadi and Abdellah Laroui. In all these studies the traits of contemporary Muslim societies are evident in the relationship between reality and change. Scholars have to face the difficulty of formulating appropriate interpreting grids to describe an ever changing reality. In studying and analyzing reality there is always a risk of using analytical frames which are surpassed by the constant transformation of reality, and of not having a conceptual frame that can account for reality and change.

The doctrine of orientalism has undergone a crisis because it fixed a method of study of those societies which did not take into consideration their transformation. Today, in the social sciences, the risk persists of fixing an immutable frame for Muslim societies by affirming that "Islam is . . ." The wording should probably be changed from Islam to Muslims, that is to say, those who live Islam.

The prospects for research on Islam and Muslim societies involve more than a shift towards field analyses, starting by singling out groups and segments of society, since collective identity tends today to shift toward individual identity. All this is related to the new forms of organization and structure of Muslim societies. What needs to be defined today is the Islamic Diaspora and Islamic nationalism, and what are the political procedures structuring Islam into political patterns like those of Morocco or Turkey. What should be analyzed is the crisis that is political Islam, as in Algeria. Finally, the crisis of contemporary Islam should be evaluated, in which the central questions troubling the Muslim world are the construction of a

democratic space and the acknowledgment of human rights – the rights of the individual and religious freedom. Studying these questions society by society and country by country, the social sciences could provide a new framework that emphasizes the magnitude of the crisis, but also the significance of the changes that Islamic societies are already undergoing.

SEE ALSO: *'Asabiyya*; Fundamentalism; Islamic Sexual Culture; Khaldun, Ibn; Orientalism; Religion

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Islamic sexual culture

Hammed Shahidian

Delineating criteria for “Islamic sexuality” appears impossible because there exist no uniform codes for sexual behavior or relations. There are in fact many Islamic *sexualities*. Even so, one may deduce certain (relative) constants in sexual ideology. Islam considers sexual desire a natural aspect of human relationship and dissociates sexuality from guilt. In the Qur'an, just as plants and animals are created “in pairs, two and two” (13:3), humans are created with a mate. Several Qur'anic verses (2:183–7; 4:1; 53:45) refer to mating as a divine design for making a harmonious family, a microcosm of the society wherein people can lead a peaceful life. Thus, sexuality in Islam is in nature heterosexual, with women being men's “tilth”; men are instructed to enter their “fields” as they please (2:223). Islamic sexuality reflects gender power hierarchy. Men are active and on top; women, boys, slaves, servants, and maids passive and at the bottom.

Having recognized the legitimacy of sexual desire, and having limited the legitimate outlet for sexual satisfaction to the marital bed, Islam promotes marriage (*nikâh*) at the earliest possible time. Yet in reality early marriage is not

always possible. Marriage elevates intercourse from an act of lust to a sacred task and marks the boundaries of legitimate and illegitimate sexual liaisons. Marriage is an obligation of all believers. The restriction of sex to the marital bed – at least in theory – creates strict sexual and moral codes: *he* ought to display his manliness and *she*, her chastity. Any deviation is tantamount to anarchy and a revolt against God.

Islamic sexuality is ultimately procreational. The objective of lovemaking is not satisfying bodily desire but performing a divine mission (56:59). A quest for family “harmony” and raising healthy and virtuous children brings a couple together. Even when not resulting in procreation, marital intercourse performs its sacred mission by functioning as an antidote against the temptation of fornication.

Though these ideological “constants” are routinely negotiated and redefined in social practice, they are nonetheless significant in defining “normal” sexuality and how individuals must manage their sexual desires. Sexuality is intimately linked to religion, family law, and politics. The most blatant example is the Shari’ah based notion of *tamkin*, according to which being financially provided for by her husband obligates a woman to live where he chooses and to serve him – including sexually – as he desires (unless his demands contradict the Shari’ah). States often regulate private erotic expressions to accord with the religiously defined “appropriate” sexuality and conservative moral standards. Deviation from sexual norms can be easily attributed to conspiracy with foreign powers to undermine religion and state.

Unequal power within the family severely compromises women’s rights to consent and inextricably ties sexuality to violence. Passage to manhood involves rituals of violence (e.g., circumcision and conscription) that entail subordination of women. Circumcision or military training abuses inflict pain upon young men, yet this pain is celebrated and revered as a precondition to manhood. Crimes of honor, punishment for adultery (death by stoning), and female genital mutilation – neither of the latter prescribed by the Qur’an – are other manifestations of violence and sexuality.

Nationalist and modernization projects have drawn middle and upper class women into the public sphere, but they have also reemphasized

women’s maternal responsibility and have valorized them as symbols of nation and tradition, leading to new measures of control over female sexuality. In Turkey, for instance, women’s chastity (*iffet*) was a component of the Kemalist reconstruction of Turkish identity. In many Middle Eastern countries, a female student’s chastity is a prerequisite for entitlement to formal education. Often, even married women cannot attend day classes in high school; they are required to enroll in evening classes with older students if they wish to continue their education.

According to Islamist ideologues, women stand at the vanguard of foreign intervention. Women are also the most significant bastion against external powers. Capitalizing on the perceived western threat to Islam and the Middle East, Islamist movements have promoted restrictive definitions of female gender roles and sexuality by assigning to women the task of preserving “authentic” culture. Traditions have been revived and invented. *Hejâb* (the Islamic dress code) has been referred to as the “flag” of Islam. Weakened customs such as *mut’a* (temporary marriage) have been reinforced (e.g., in Iran), and in some cases (e.g., Pakistan under President Zia) rape has been redefined as a form of *zinâ* (adultery).

Despite conservative tides, sexual ideologies and practices have undergone some changes. Emerging voices have addressed sexuality, especially restrictions on female sexuality, as a human rights issue. Feminists have attempted to move sexuality away from the sphere of metaphysical rules and place them in the context of social relationships. Progressive political movements are moving away from the belief that sexuality (and women’s rights) concerns only the bourgeoisie. Evidence from a number of Islamic societies suggests that many youths are experiencing premarital sex. Though most women in Islamic countries marry, postponing marriage, even never marrying, is gaining gradual acceptance. Homosexuals are also slowly asserting their identities as gays and lesbians.

Studies of sexuality in Islamic cultures have been rather limited. There is a need for investigating the actual sexual behavior of the population, changes in attitude toward sex, and emerging sexualities. It is also pivotal to closely scrutinize classical and contemporary treatises

on sexuality, paying attention not just to the text's overall message, but also to its underlying images, vocabularies, and assumptions.

SEE ALSO: Gender Ideology and Gender Role Ideology; Islam; Nationalism; Sexuality, Religion and

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J

James, William (1842–1910)

Frank J. Page

William James was the son of a theologian and brother of the novelist Henry James. He taught psychology and philosophy at Harvard University. His *Principles of Psychology* (1890) is the foundation of modern psychology. An annotated version, *On Psychology: Briefer Course*, was published in 1892. Other major works include *The Will to Believe* (1897), *Human Immortality* (1898), *The Varieties of Religious Experience* (1902), *Pragmatism* (1907), and *The Meaning of Truth* (1909). Along with Charles S. Peirce, Charles H. Cooley, and John Dewey, he was instrumental in establishing American pragmatism. This intellectual tradition has been an influential framework for symbolic interactionism, US educational practices, and many epistemological issues. James's conceptions of psychology, consciousness, cognition, self, self-esteem, stream of consciousness, and habit have a profound relevance for many sociological assumptions regarding the nature of society and its influence on human conduct.

As defined by James, psychology deals with consciousness, cognition, emotion, motivation, and conduct, all of which must be understood within the context of nature and evolution. His psychology rejects dualism, an ancient and prevalent assumption that asserts that mind (cognition and soul) and body are distinct and separate entities. James replaces dualism with parallelism, which posits that mind and body are linked through the central nervous system, and that there is a uniform correlation between thought and underlying physiological processes. In effect, cognition is made possible by

the brain and central nervous system, an axiom central to modern psychology.

In harmony with his parallelism and modern evolutionary theory, James's psychology is predicated upon psychological functionalism, which asserts that the mind, consciousness, memory, and cognition are evolved traits that exist because they promote human survival. According to this paradigm, consciousness and the self awareness it facilitates are made possible by the central nervous system and exist because of their adaptive value.

James describes the central nervous system as a biological machine that receives sense impressions and discharges reactions that promote survival of the organism. The biological principle that drives this process is homeostasis, the tendency of organisms to seek stability and respond in ways that will promote survival. In accord with this principle, humans are directed by sensations registered in the central nervous system. Accordingly, human behavior will tend toward those activities that are pleasurable and avoid those that are painful, because they promote survival. However, according to James, humans are not merely reactive organisms directed by biological instincts and drives. In humans, responses and interactions between the individual and the environment are mediated by consciousness.

According to James's concept of consciousness, early in childhood and forever after, many of the sense impressions that guide human conduct are mediated by and attached to signs and symbols that, as categories of thought, can be stored in memory and called to the forefront of consciousness. Through learning, people acquire these categories from society. In cognition, through the processes of association and disassociation, these categories facilitate discrimination, whereby people can categorize and differentiate between different objects and

actions, and use this information to make decisions and choices. People think, perceive, and act on the basis of these categories, and it is not only the ability to discriminate that is made possible by categories, but also the sensations associated with categories that direct human thought and conduct.

In his analysis of consciousness, James describes the link between signs and sensations as “apperception.” This physiological connection between signs and sensations is the mechanism by which signs and symbols direct human conduct. The sensory images that direct human conduct are “anticipatory images.” These images and categories of thought enable people to anticipate the probable sensations associated with certain acts and objects, and thereby direct human conduct in ways that are generally beneficial to the individual and the species.

The concept of apperception is a core concept in James’s model of consciousness. Several functions and implications are connected to this concept. First, apperception allows the cognitive processes of association and discrimination to be directed by sensations, however subtle, that occur when an individual thinks and interacts with the environment. Second, apperception is an incipient conception of sentiment, a key concept in Cooley’s later conceptions of self and society. Third, apperception is intrinsic to James’s principle of “ideo motivation,” which asserts that sensations associated with signs and symbols stored in the mind influence cognition in ways that direct and motivate conduct. Finally, apperception is a crucial component of James’s concept of a “figured reality,” which, like Peirce’s concept of symbolic realism, posits that people can store signs and symbols that represent reality in their minds and use them for thinking, anticipating, and generally directing their conduct. This principle is central to later studies of cognition and symbolic interactionism.

James’s principle of a figured reality is a central tenet in his functionalist model of consciousness. As such, it is also an important element in the American pragmatist conception of instrumental knowledge wherein knowledge is defined as information that guides human actions in a way that is useful and instrumental to well being and survival. As conceptualized

by James, all knowledge is composed of signs and symbols that are necessarily associated with sensations; this conception of knowledge also has implications for theories of meaning. Most importantly, if categories of thought are associated with sensation, meaning is not simply a matter of ascertaining what words refer to, but also a question regarding how acts and different ideas and things make people feel. Following this principle, acts and things that are meaningful are generally associated with certain pleasant and positive feelings, while those that are deemed meaningless are associated with bad and unpleasant feelings or no feelings at all. This principle, wherein knowledge is associated with a feeling state, underlies James’s analysis of depression and the “sick soul.”

A major tenet in James’s conception of consciousness is the proposition that consciousness should always be conceptualized as something that is constantly changing, yet continuous, “a stream of consciousness.” The validity of this concept is supported by the fact that, in accordance with James’s principles, people do have the capacity for memory, cognition, learning, forgetting, habit, and the use of language to represent self and reality, all of which make consciousness and self awareness a stable yet fluid experience. In *Principles of Psychology*, James carefully delineates these many capacities, their complex interrelationships, and the human qualities they facilitate. His analysis culminates with his depiction of the adaptive nature of habit which functions to simplify movements, conserve energy, limit fatigue, and allow people to multitask and become habituated to social norms. Accordingly, habit is not only personally empowering but also the “great flywheel of society,” a notion that has considerable relevance for sociological conceptions of social control and order.

James’s complex model of consciousness and human nature postulates that humans are evolved, sentient, cognitive, self aware beings prone to habit and capable of learning, discrimination, and willful activity. However, the capstone of his psychology is his definition of self, and the related conceptions of the soul, will, motivation, and mental illness. As defined by James, self is composed of the “I and the Me.” The I is the knower, thinker, and therefore the subject. The Me is that which empirically

can be known by the knower about the knower as object. Basically, the knower is the consciousness and the changeable memory made possible by the central nervous system, whereas the Me is that which comes to be known about the knower through consciousness and awareness.

For analytical purposes, James divides the Me (that which can be known) into the Material Me, the Social Me, and the Spiritual Me. Each Me is important because, as known by the I, through the process of self appreciation (evaluation), it may arouse instincts, feelings, and emotions that motivate and direct conduct. More specifically, if self appraisal indicates that the self, be it the material, social, or spiritual aspect of self, is successful and secure, a person will experience self complacency, and keep doing what he or she has been doing, or not doing. On the other hand, if self appraisal leads to the conclusion that some aspect of the self is deficient or threatened, it will arouse instincts, emotions, and feelings that will generate self seeking and self preserving actions that attempt to remedy the problem by changing the self or the situation. Finally, if self appraisal leads to a sense of hopelessness, the individual may experience lethargy, angst, depression, denial, and suicidal tendencies.

Because they are crucial aspects of the self that guide behavior, James carefully conceptualizes each aspect of the Me. The Material Me or self is not only the physical bodily self, but also anything that a person can identify with. This may include family, friends, pets, lovers, houses, cars, a career, an art form, or a particular locality. However, in that the human body necessarily has the most direct connection with self, it is the innermost if not most important aspect of the material self. When threatened, as a matter of self striving and self preservation, strong instincts and emotions such as rage and anger will be automatically elicited.

In conceptualizing the Social Me, James delineates that part of the self that is aware of and responds to the expectations, influence, importance, and dependency on other people and groups. In many ways, his analysis of the Social Me adumbrates the conception of the "Me" that was developed by George Herbert Mead and later incorporated into symbolic

interactionism. It also foreshadows what sociologists now describe as the social self, role playing, situated identities, role conflict, and what Goffman later described as "impression management." That James saw the Social Me and social motivation as powerful is evident in his description of the American worship of success as a "Bitch Goddess" that creates workaholics.

James defines the Spiritual Me as that part of the self that, in being aware of itself as a thinking, feeling, acting creature, can ultimately deem life itself to be good, bad, meaningful, or meaningless. As a matter of self striving, it is the spiritual self that directs conduct in terms of acquired intellectual, moral, religious, and philosophical beliefs and aspirations. However, while the spiritual self is an important and often dominant aspect of self, decisions are not always made by the spiritual self, but rather by that aspect of self that at a particular moment is the most engaged or threatened. When physical survival is at stake, the material self may predominate and overrule the social and spiritual self, a proposition that indirectly underscores the dangers of severe social disorganization and the moral importance of social order.

The Me(s) in James's model of self is an important organizing concept, because, in harmony with his functionalism and parallelism, as a matter of self striving (self protection), it responds when threatened. Consequently, when faced with a threat of injury or death, the Material Me, through instinct and emotion, strives for physical survival. When social rank is threatened, the Social Me, knowing of its dependence upon other people, strives for recognition as a means of security. When confronted with threats to cherished beliefs and values, the Spiritual Me attempts to direct conduct in terms of ideals and morals. Conceptually, each Me is an abstraction representing different aspects of the self as known by the I (the knower) that function as sources of motivation and direction.

James augments his analysis of the self and the motivation that springs from self awareness with his mathematical formula for self esteem (Self esteem = Success/Pretenses to Success). According to this formula, a person's self esteem level and the motivation that follows from it will be a function of the ratio of that person's actual success divided by his or her

aspirations to success. When formulated in this ratio, self esteem is low when a person has many aspirations to success and few actual successes, and high when a person has many successes and few aspirations. As a result, self esteem can be heightened by success or by lowering aspirations for success. Charles Cooley and many modern theorists elaborated this concept.

A related and important, but often overlooked, principle regarding consciousness, motivation, and conduct developed by James that bespeaks his principle of ideomotority asserts that people will act on the basis of that image or idea that comes to the forefront of consciousness. According to this principle, whether or not a particular idea comes to the forefront of consciousness and thereby becomes a matter for thought and discrimination and a means of directing conduct will be a function of the intensity of the sensations associated with that particular idea or image. Due to apperception, all are accompanied by sensations, and James divides the ideas and images that compose consciousness into two types, those associated with instincts and drives, and those drawn from society. The values and beliefs drawn from society are “emotion laden ideas.” Paralleling Freud’s discussion of the superego, James underscores how as part of the spiritual self these ideas direct conduct in prosocial ways. However, he notes that because instincts are associated with survival, they are also associated with strong sensations, and that when survival is at stake, an idea associated with an instinct, be it hunger, thirst, sex, or fear, may dominate consciousness and cognition and preempt the Social and Spiritual Me, and lead to conduct that is asocial and amoral.

According to James, consciousness is composed of ideas about the world and the self. Whether or not a particular idea or image will dominate consciousness and become the basis of cognition, perception, and motivation will be influenced by the strength of the sensations associated with it, the relative influence of instinct, society, the proper functioning of the central nervous system and the self, and the situation at hand. Consciousness, cognition, and the self are influenced by a variety of factors, but people think, make decisions, and act on the basis of intention and will. For

James, “will” or “will power,” rather than being an amorphous metaphysical concept, is simply the individual’s conscious attempt to keep certain ideas at the forefront of consciousness and thereby control her or his conduct. As to the issue of “free will,” James’s parallelism and functionalism, along with his conception of the self, implicitly imply that will is constrained by the functioning or dysfunctioning of the central nervous system and the nature, development, and health of the self.

While it does not often get the attention that the I, the Me, and self esteem receive, James’s concept of Soul is crucially important because it is the Soul that facilitates the interaction of the I and the Me. As defined by James, the Soul is that part of the I (the knower and thinker) that, as part of the stream of consciousness, functions as an ongoing, combining medium that allows for change and growth while maintaining continuity and a consistent sense of identity and self. While this concept is somewhat vague, it necessarily refers to the capacity of the individual to feel, know, learn, develop, and change. This ability to change yet maintain a continuous sense of identity is made possible by memory, learning, cognition, sensation, and, most importantly, the human use of language, all of which allow people to acquire new understandings of themselves and the world they live in, and selectively discard and forget older, inappropriate views. In terms of James’s parallelism and functionalism, this is made possible by the central nervous system and the self awareness that consciousness affords. However, as emphasized by James, the central nervous system, the Me(s), the Soul, and consciousness are subject to illness and aberrations that may lead to mental illness and human suffering.

In *Principles of Psychology*, James analyzes abnormal behavior in terms of mutations and multiplications of the self. These aberrations may be caused by alterations of memory brought about by changes, defects, or damage to the central nervous system or alterations in the material, social, and spiritual aspects of self. As conceptualized, a malady, be it a psychological problem that arises from a physiological deficit or a purely psychological problem associated with a damaged, threatened, or overreactive self,

may lead to depression, insane delusions, alternating selves, mediumships or possessions, and false memories.

In *Varieties of Religious Experience*, James describes pathologies associated with the “sick soul” and the “divided self.” These illnesses are driven by conditions where, in some individuals, the I’s knowledge of the world gives rise to an awareness of inevitable suffering and the demise of self. This knowledge challenges and undermines the religious and philosophical ideas held by the spiritual self that give meaning and purpose to existence. As a result, the Soul, perceiving its own suffering and demise, is pained and sick. In addition, the self is divided and conflicted because the Spiritual Me is at a loss to provide direction to the Social Me and the Material Me which, without direction, may conflict with one another. In response, people may suffer neurosis, hopelessness, depression, and sadness, and some will search other religions and philosophies for more comforting beliefs that, in some cases, may relieve their anguish and give them a sense of being “reborn.”

SEE ALSO: Cooley, Charles Horton; Goffman, Erving; Mead, George Herbert; Pragmatism; Self; Self Esteem, Theories of; Social Psychology; Symbolic Interaction

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Japanese-style management

Ross Mouer

Japanese style management (JSM) (*nihonteki kei ei*) is a loosely defined term used to indicate the way employees are managed in firms and other organizations in Japan. Accordingly, its meaning changes as micro economic realities change. At the same time, the term is used to distinguish from management practices in Japan more generally (*nihon no kei ei* or *nihon ni okeru kei ei*) to those employment practices that are alleged to be uniquely Japanese (*nihonteki*) and to have a peculiarly Japanese cultural imprint. Using the term to indicate the packaged set of practices which are described below, many acknowledge that what they refer to exists mainly in Japan’s large firms. In this context, JSM was popularly used in the 1970s to delineate a number of interrelated practices demarcating the way work was organized in Japan (or at least in Japan’s largest firms) from how it was conceived elsewhere.

The practices initially receiving attention were lifetime employment, seniority wages, and enterprise unionism. These came to be known as the three pillars, the three sacred treasures, or the three sacred emblems of industrial relations in Japan. Although the cultural uniqueness of each has been challenged, some have argued that it is the overall mix as an integrated system that has been unique. The belief that these practices were unique to Japan was bolstered by references to other phenomena alleged to be outcomes of the unique features: Japan’s low levels of industrial disputes (reflecting a high value placed on social consensus), long hours worked in Japan (as part of a special culturally ordained work ethic), the provision of certain types of company welfare such as employee housing (emanating from familial and paternalistic orientations found in Japan’s traditional agricultural communities), and lower labor turnover (reflecting an innate sense of loyalty to the company as a primary group; i.e., a surrogate family). In its second report on industrial relations in Japan in 1977, an OECD

study team indicated that the three pillars were “kept in place” by a fourth: Japan’s cultural values. Underpinning the three structures were a traditionally Japanese predilection for verticality in human relationships (e.g., seniority), for being part of a group (e.g., long term employment), and for consensual relationships (e.g., enterprise unionism). By the 1970s these cultural features had come to be codified in academic accounts of nearly every aspect of Japanese society – a paradigmatic approach or viewpoint which came to be known as *nihonjinron*. This kind of cultural essentialism view came to dominate much of the Learn from Japan boom of the late 1970s and the 1980s.

The structures mentioned above were initially seen as part of an overall system of industrial relations that produced few strikes, wage restraint, and high levels of motivation as major factors facilitating Japan’s rapid growth in the 1960s and 1970s. However, the literature about JSM shifted attention downward from the societal level and macroeconomic outcomes to the microeconomic concerns associated with employment relations in the firm. To some extent this shift reflected a general change in interest in the field internationally from the way tripartite frameworks for labor–management relations came to be institutionalized to a much more multi dimensional mapping of employment relations and human resource management. Despite this shift, many in the field continued to assume that the industrial relations system in Japan was largely the sum of the HRM practices found in each Japanese firm. At this level the model was developed further to highlight “uniquely Japanese” approaches such as widespread bottom up consultation (e.g., *nemawashi*, the memo system known as *ringi seido*), spontaneous and voluntary quality control circles, internal labor markets, joint labor–management consultations, the absence of a strong militant class orientation in ritualized conflicts such as the Spring Wage Offensive (the annual round of 6–8 weeks each spring when unions put forth their wage demands and settlements are negotiated between labor and management), and the highly integrated production systems which utilized large numbers of firms linked together to form enterprise groupings known as *keiretsukigyo*.

In the 1970s numerous scholars sought to codify the linkages between *nihonjinron* and *nihonteki kei ei* (Ogishima 1984). In the late 1950s the anthropologist Abegglen coined the term “lifetime employment” to describe what he perceived to be a peculiar feature of management practices at the firms he studied in Japan. In the next decade Hazama (1963) began the codification by which he and others sought to link aspects of JSM to cultural underpinnings. However, it was in the 1970s that those foundations came to be seen as uniquely Japanese (and not just remnants from a tradition associated with all pre industrial societies). As a kind of postmodern outcome, the Japanese firm was seen as being able to maintain a delicate balance between the push for greater social justice (as seen in the demands of left wing unions) and the efforts of management (with the cooperation of business unions) to obtain greater efficiency. Nakayama (1974) wrote about a system generating true efficiency (*honrai no noritsu*) by combining an emphasis on economic rationality (*noritsu*) with an emphasis on fairness (*kosei*). For Tsuda (1977), the terms were cooperative community (*kyodo seikatsutai*), rationality (*gorisei*), and consensus (*goi*); for Hazama (1971), group oriented labor–management relations (*shudanteki roshi kankei*), profit seeking (*eiri no tsuikyu*), and continuity of the company (*kaisha no eizoku*); for Iwata (1977), the formative principles of Japanese management (*nihonteki kei ei no hensei genri*), organizational demands (*soshiki no yokyuu*), and the demands of individual employees (*kojin no yokyuu*). In hindsight an increased awareness of how the institutions associated with JSM were born out of the immediate post war years, the shift in the balance of power first to unions and then back to management, and the ongoing ideological battle between Cold War camps has helped those interested in JSM to see how it was produced out of a peculiar historical milieu in which the tensions between capitalist and socialist views worked themselves out in the context of successful economic resurgence and the efforts to reestablish positive assertions of national identity.

In the 1980s debate revolved around the exportability of JSM, with many questions raised about the exportability of the cultural

proclivities commonly associated with work organization in Japan. In the process the culturalist view was undermined by a growing acknowledgment that JSM practices were found primarily in Japan's large firms. Nevertheless, although firms with over 500 employees accounted for only 12 percent of the labor force in 1975 (and only 8.9 percent in 1999) (Mouer & Kawanishi 2004: 119), it was asserted by many that the model's significance was less in its prevalence as an actual reality and more in its role as an ideal to which many in the Japanese workforce aspired. Myth or not, the fact remains that notions of *nihonteki kei ei* and the entire set of *emic* terms used to describe components of JSM have become important as a Japanese vocabulary for talking about work organization in Japan.

In the 1980s western managers, unionists, and academics made a concerted effort to find out more about JSM. Managers motivated by the desire to acquire a new kind of competitive advantage traveled to Japan to discover the secrets of JSM and to find "quick fix" solutions. Unionists, however, came to feel the pressure of certain anti union tactics which were seen as being characteristic of some Japanese investment in their own countries. Some of these views were captured in North America in the film *Gung ho*. The efforts of these practitioners tended to shift attention back from the alleged essence of Japanese culture to the more easily observed concrete structures that could more easily be implemented in their own societies. By the early 1990s the literature had come to provide a more comprehensive view highlighting a number of structural features central to the functioning of JSM. Outside Japan a debate developed between those who saw JSM primarily in cultural terms as a post Fordist phenomenon and those who saw it more in structural terms as an ultra Fordist approach.

The structuralists paid attention to the very complex system of delayed wage payments and the importance of performance linked criteria which markedly differentiated the age wage (seniority) trajectories on which individual employees found themselves. Just in time systems (which had been contrasted with more costly just in case systems) were introduced without the full realization that the costs saved by the final assembling plants with reduced

stocks of parts had not been removed from the overall production process, but had rather been simply shifted further down through the production process, a situation reflected in continuing firm size differentials in working conditions. Other ways in which internal and external labor markets were segmented – especially in terms of employment status and the distinction between regular employees and a huge range of non regular employees – also came to be seen as integral to how the "Japanese system" of integrated production actually functioned. The use of excessive regulation and an opaque performance management system have also been mentioned as factors goading workers to work long hours and to accept assignments which physically removed them from being involved in their family on a day to day basis. These facets came to be documented by Kumazawa (1994, 1997) and by many others from the late 1980s onwards. Further to these correctives were studies showing that many Japanese firms governed by JSM were actually not very efficiently run; privatized public enterprises (from the Japan National Railways in the early 1980s to national universities at the end of the 1990s), retailers, and many financial institutions provide ready examples.

Mouer and Kawanishi (2004) argue that JSM needs to be understood in a broader social context in which choices at work have been fairly limited for many Japanese employees, including those in large firms. The absence of adequate safety nets for unemployment and the segmented approach to providing health insurance and pensions require all employees to think very carefully about choices which increase the risk that they might experience some form of downward intragenerational mobility as they are shifted out of Japan's more privileged labor markets and into its less attractive ones. Since the turn of the century a good deal has been written about widening income differentials and the difficulty of achieving intra and intergenerational upward mobility (e.g., Sato 2000). Changes in the power relationship between peak organizations representing labor and management markedly affect the likelihood of progressive legislation being introduced to affect social welfare.

In recent years, however, Japan's affluence and a relatively high standard of living have altered the relationship between labor and management in the labor market. Fewer Japanese

are willing to labor in jobs characterized by the 3 Ds (i.e., that are dirty, demanding, and dangerous) – or the 3 Ks in Japanese) (*kitanai*, *kitsui*, and *kiken*). Parasite singles (young persons in their late twenties and in their thirties who have not left home and continue to enjoy free accommodation at their parents' expense while working for good wages, as described in Yamada 1999) are less prone to seek "privileged employment" at all costs, and the number of *furitaa* (freelance casuals) has increased significantly over the 1990s. Widespread questioning of gender derived segmentation has opened up the work place to greater competition. These changes only add to doubts about the uniqueness of JSM (*nihonteki kei ei*), and in this sense JSM (*nihon ni okeru kei ei*) will continue to be characterized by change and be difficult to capture in its entirety as managers use Japanese structural elements to respond to the spread of global standards. While the workers will continue to be guided by a strong sense of self interest, the spread of multicultural thinking is likely to encourage variety in those responses. Over time new vocabularies for describing JSM are bound to emerge as perceptions and realities change, and as different conditions of possibility come to shape the environment in which work is performed in Japan.

SEE ALSO: Enterprise Unions; Labor–Management Relations; Management; *Nenko Chin gin*; *Nihonjinron*; *Shushin Koyo*

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Jehovah's Witnesses

Massimo Introvigne

Rodney Stark and Laurence Iannaccone (1997) noted that, despite their millions of members, until recently Jehovah's Witnesses failed to attract the attention of most sociologists of religion (Beckford 1975 is one of the rare book length studies). The difficult access to their international archives was a factor, together with a general undervaluation of non mainline Christian groups by certain sociologists. In the 1990s and 2000s, however, the situation changed. Sociologists became interested in testing on such a large group hypotheses about the relative success of different religious movements, cognitive dissonance, routinization of charisma, and mainstreaming of once marginal religions, while a new Witnesses leadership was ready to cooperate.

The Jehovah's Witnesses are the largest among a group of several religious movements that claim the heritage of Pastor Charles Taze Russell (1852–1916). Born in Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania, Russell became involved in theological

controversies within the American Adventist movement, which had predicted the end of the world for the year 1844 based on numerical speculations drawn from the Bible. After 1844, Adventists divided into several competing groups. Those who renounced any further date setting eventually became the Seventh Day Adventists, a large international denomination. Some of those who would still calculate prophetic dates focused their hopes on the year 1874, and constituted a loosely organized movement. After the new disappointment, the young Russell emerged as one of the leaders of those who had placed their hopes in 1874. Russell both predicted the end of the world as we know it for the year 1914 and shifted his focus on teachings other than prophetic date setting.

In 1878, Russell separated himself from other factions of the movement and started editing a magazine, *Zion's Watch Tower and Herald of Christ's Presence*, which is still published today as *The Watchtower*. Russell's followers were known simply as Bible Students, but in 1884 the preacher formally established an organization known as the Zion's Watch Tower Society, later the Watch Tower Bible and Tract Society. Russell's ideas involved the denial of Trinity (Jesus Christ was regarded as God's first creature). He also preached conditionalism, a rejection of the traditional view of the immortality of the soul. These doctrines would later seem highly heterodox to mainline Christians. In the late nineteenth century, however, they were shared by quite a few preachers. Russell's notable success (almost all his books sold millions of copies) did not come so much from the alleged revolutionary character of his teachings as from the fact that they were perceived as being in continuity with, if not part of, mainline Christianity. This confirmed to later social science that new religious movements, in order to gain a large following, should exhibit only a moderate discontinuity with respect to mainline religion.

The prophetic failure of 1914 did not stop the movement's progress. The Bible Students, however, were radical Christian pacifists, who adamantly refused to be drafted and to fight in war. In several countries they were arrested in significant numbers. In this climate, the election as president of the Watch Tower Society of Joseph Franklin Rutherford (1869–1942) was

not welcome by everybody, and several schismatic groups separated from the mainline movement, although all these splinter organizations remained quite small.

Not only did Rutherford promote speculations about a new date for the end of the world, 1925, he also transformed the loose network of Russell's times into a strongly centralized organization, changing its name in 1931 into the current one of Jehovah's Witnesses. With a peculiar and abrasive populist rhetoric, Rutherford consistently attacked organized religion, politics, and big business as "rackets" and corrupt monopolies up to no good. Although Rutherford would be later criticized for his early and, in retrospect, naive attempt in 1933 to contact the Nazi regime and present a positive image of the German Jehovah's Witnesses, such contacts quickly failed and the Witnesses were severely persecuted in Nazi Germany, as in Fascist Italy and Communist Russia. Several hundred died in Nazi concentration camps.

Nathan Homer Knorr (1905–77) succeeded Rutherford in 1942. Again, the transition from one president to the next took place during a world war. The 115,000 active Witnesses, still committed to radical pacifism, were again experiencing difficult times in most countries of the world. Presiding over the Witnesses in an era that was now suspicious of charismatic leadership, Knorr struggled to depersonalize the movement's hierarchy and almost consciously organized a sustained routinization of charisma within the group. Articles in the Witnesses' magazines and books were now published anonymously, concluding a process initiated during the Rutherford era. Although still emphasizing the Witnesses as the only authorized organization representing the Lord's true church in the world, the style became less abrasive than it had been during the Rutherford administration. Missionary endeavors, now much more systematically organized, became the top priority.

At Knorr's death in 1977, the movement had grown to more than 2 million "publishers" (i.e., Witnesses engaged in the active "field service" of proselytization, mostly conducted by systematically visiting all homes in a given neighborhood) and more than 5 million participants to the memorial of the Lord's Supper, the only yearly "liturgy" of the movement. This difference emphasizes the problem in assessing the

number of Jehovah's Witnesses statistically. While the Witnesses themselves would count only the "publishers" as members in full standing, adherents of other denominations are not counted by taking into account only those active in missionary enterprises. Participants in the yearly memorial offer a statistical assessment closer to how members of other religious organizations are normally counted, although it is true that the yearly memorial is occasionally attended also by friends and sympathizers. On the other hand, it is also true that the traditional Christian slogan "every member is a missionary" is taken much more literally by the Witnesses than by most other Christian denominations, and everybody is encouraged to devote a substantial amount of time to missionary endeavors. Although the effectiveness of the systematic door to door strategy has been called into question, sociologists have noted that the internal effects of the effort in reinforcing the members' identity and commitment are almost as important as its external success (see Beckford 1975).

A new prophetic enthusiasm seized the movement before 1975, a date regarded by many Witnesses as a likely end of this world. The disappointment many Witnesses experienced created several difficulties and energized an oppositional movement which received considerable media attention but in fact involved only a limited, if vocal, number of former members. The fact that the Witnesses survived prophetic failures in 1914, 1925, and 1975 has been regarded by some sociologists as a confirmation of the theory of cognitive dissonance as applied by Festinger et al. (1956) to instances "when prophecy fails." In order to avoid admitting their previous gullibility, members reinforce their missionary efforts and, by persuading others, re persuade themselves. The theory would predict that, counterintuitively, movements can grow rather than enter into a crisis after a prophetic failure. More recently, however, others have argued that cognitive dissonance has very little to do with Witnesses' reactions to prophetic disconfirmation. First of all, in the immediate aftermath of failed date setting, Witnesses *lost* members, and started growing again only after years of painful reorganization (Singelenberg 1989). On the other hand, prophecy in fact only fails for the

outsiders; from the point of view of the movement itself, prophecy does not fail but is regarded as having come true at other levels: perhaps *a* world, rather than *the* world, has ended, or the prophecy needs to be understood differently (Melton 1985).

In 1995 *The Watchtower* announced a "new point of view" on prophetic date setting, still regarding the end of the world as we know it as quite near, but discouraging members from calculating precise dates. This evolution, as it did for Seventh Day Adventists one century earlier, had the gradual effect of reducing the "otherworldliness" of the Witnesses, facilitating their further evolution toward the religious mainline. International expansion resumed (with more than 15 million participants at the yearly memorial in 2004), and the bureaucratization process continued. In 1976 the Witnesses started adopting a rotating presidency among the members of the governing body, the spiritual presiding body of the organization, thus further deemphasizing the presidency's charisma which had been so crucial in the Russell and Rutherford eras. In October 2000, after Milton Henschel (1920–2003) had succeeded Frederick Franz (1893–1992) as president of the Watch Tower Society, all members of the governing body voluntarily stepped aside from the board of directors of that Society, thus separating the spiritual from the administrative governance of the Witnesses.

In the late 1990s, renewed discrimination in countries such as Russia and France (where the Witnesses were involved in campaigns against so called "cults" and "sects") led to what Pauline Côté and James Richardson (2001: 14) called a "deformation" or "reconfiguration" of the group's relationships with the external world. The two sociologists believe that external pressure, including persecution and legal harassment, may cause important changes in religious organizations. In other words, even when groups successfully resist pressure, how exactly they resisted may involve significant internal changes. In the cases of the Jehovah's Witnesses, Côté and Richardson report a first phase of "disciplined litigation" during and immediately after the Rutherford era. In the face of sustained legal discrimination, prominent Witnesses leader and lawyer Hayden Cooper Covington (1911–79) both reacted through any

available legal means, and counseled the Witnesses to avoid the most abrasive slogans against “big business,” politics, and other religions, which would not have fared well in courts of law. The introduction of “theocratic tact” showed how legal strategy contributed to mainstreaming the Witnesses after World War II (Zygmunt 1977).

However, after they had scored important victories before the US Supreme Court and other jurisdictions, the Witnesses did not continue with the “disciplined litigation” strategy and even appeared concerned not to lose their distinctiveness. Similar processes of backing off from what may be perceived as a too rapid integration into the religious mainstream have been described by Mauss (1994) with respect to the Mormons, and defined as “retrenchment.” These retrenchment strategies may be very successful in terms of church growth because, as Stark and Iannaccone (1997: 152–3) have argued precisely with reference to Jehovah’s Witnesses, keeping the “strict” features of the group may both reduce the number of free riders and make a movement more attractive to the large conservative niche of the religious market.

In the case of the Witnesses, a certain retrenchment in the 1960s involved the closing in 1963 of the movement’s in house legal office, which had served as an important tool for contacts with religious liberty advocates and other religious groups, although limited to legal issues rather than involving ecumenical dialogue. However, renewed attacks led to the reopening of the legal office in 1981 and the emergence in the 1990s of a new strategy that Côté and Richardson (2001: 11) have defined as “vigilant litigation.” Court cases are now used to prove to opponents, the media, and the members themselves that the Witnesses’ lifestyle should no longer be regarded as marginal or controversial but is part of the mainline, although their theology remains unique. Law and the courts have thus been consciously used as a vehicle for moving toward the mainstream, although the results in countries like Russia or France remain quite uncertain.

SEE ALSO: Charisma; Charisma, Routinization of; Denomination; Fundamentalism; Globalization, Religion and; Millenarianism; New Religious Movements; Sect

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Jevons, William (1835–82)

Milan Zafirovski

William Stanley Jevons is best known as an early influential British neoclassical and utilitarian economist mostly influenced by and developing Benthamite utilitarianism (Schumpeter 1991). More precisely, he is renowned among economists as one of the founders (alongside Carl Menger and Leon Walras) of marginalism or marginal utility theory (during the 1870s) as what economist sociologist Schumpeter (1954) describes as a Copernican Revolution in economics (for more on Jevons as an economist, see Mosselmans & White 2000). Overall, his sociologically minded disciple Philip Wicksteed (1905) describes Jevons as “one of the most

powerful, bold, and original thinkers” in economics. While virtually unknown or neglected among sociologists, curiously enough, Jevons can probably be credited (Swedberg 2003) with inventing the term economic sociology (in the second 1879 edition of his main work, the *Theory of Political Economy*), though not the idea or concept. The idea of economic sociology is already contained or germane in Comte, especially his notion of social economy, as a branch of sociology distinguished from orthodox economics, and of the “economy of real society” subject to “sociological research.”

Specifically, Jevons (1965) suggests “it is only by subdivision, by recognizing a branch of Economic Sociology, together possibly with two or three other branches of statistical, jural, or social science, that we can rescue our [economic] science from its confused state.” He adds that economics (also called political economy) is in such a “chaotic state” owing to the need of subdividing a “too extensive sphere of knowledge,” with economic sociology being one of the results of this subdivision. Hence, Jevons considers economic sociology not only a field of sociology, but also a branch of economics, alongside, for example, the mathematical theory of economics, systematic and descriptive economics, fiscal science, and others, as do similarly some later economists (e.g., Schumpeter 1954). In turn, he treats economics as a “branch of the social sciences,” by implication of sociology understood as such a general science. Thus, Jevons (1965) states that the so called new historical branch of social science, and implicitly economics, “is doubtless a portion of what Herbert Spencer calls Sociology.” At this juncture, he adopts an apparent Spencerian or evolutionary definition of sociology as the “Science of the Evolution of Social Relations.” Notably, Jevons defines economics by analogy to the Spencerian definition of sociology or in evolutionary terms, as “a science of the development of economic forms and relations.” Further, he implies that economics as defined is “one branch of Mr. Spencer’s Sociology,” an implication also suggested by his followers Wicksteed and Edgeworth. Wicksteed (1933), noting that Jevons followed Comte “to erect a hierarchy of science,” places economic science among the “branches of sociological study” and even urges

that “economics must be the handmaid of sociology.” Similarly, Edgeworth (1967) describes Jevons’s marginal utility economics as the “most sublime branch” of sociology in Comte’s sense.

The Jevonian definitions of economics and sociology also yield an implicit Spencerian or evolutionary definition of Jevons’s economic sociology as the study of the “development of economic forms and relations” in interrelation to and within the general “evolution of social relations.” Thus understood, Jevons’s economic sociology is a neoclassical economist’s attempt at integration of economics and sociology, thus anticipating similar efforts by some sociologists (e.g., Parsons & Smelser 1956). Another implicit definition of economic sociology is found in Jevons’s (1866) alternative, utilitarian hedonistic specification of the “field of inquiry” of economics, deemed a “hedonic science,” as consisting only of the “relations of ordinary pleasures and pains,” or a “calculus of pleasure and pain” (Schumpeter 1991), and not of “all human motives.” Viewing this field as “wide enough,” he states “there are motives nearly always present with us, arising from conscience, compassion, or from some moral or religious source, which [economics] cannot and does not pretend to treat. These will remain to us as outstanding and disturbing forces; they must be treated, if at all, by other appropriate branches of knowledge” (Jevons 1866). By implication, one of these latter appropriate branches of knowledge is, as Jevons himself suggests in his later writings, economic sociology, thereby implicitly defined as the study of the relations of utilitarian hedonistic motivation to other human motives as “disturbing forces” or, in Weber’s words, material and ideal values/interests alike. Negatively, Jevons’s statement, by denying that economics deals with “all human motives” and excluding non economic factors from its field as “disturbing forces,” does not suggest what has come to be known as the economic approach to “all human behavior” or rational choice theory. Positively, the statement in essence adopts and elaborates on Mill’s earlier view that most “disturbing causes” do not belong to the domain of economics but to “some other science,” specifically what he proposes as the “science of social economy” as an anticipation or equivalent of

Jevons's economic sociology (a proposal that also implies no rational choice theory).

The main part of Jevons's economic sociology is the sociology of the market, just as the (marginalist) theory of markets, value, and prices is the key element of his pure economics. One implied element of Jevons's sociology of the market is the observed impact of non economic factors such as bargaining power and asymmetrical knowledge or information on market transactions. This is what he essentially suggests by observing that often market transactions "must be settled upon other than strictly economic grounds [supply and demand]" (Jevons 1965), specifically on bargaining and by implication power relations (an observation approvingly cited by his prominent marginalist disciple, Francis Edgeworth). In turn, Jevons predicts that the outcome of bargaining will "greatly depend on the comparative amount of knowledge of each other's position and needs which either bargainer may possess or manage to obtain in the course of the transaction" (i.e., simply, asymmetrical or private information as a particular ("soft") facet or source of differential power and domination). He therefore implies that the bargaining outcome such as the market price will be ultimately determined by what Weber calls power constellations, specifically economic domination "by virtue of a constellation of interests," and contemporary sociologists term differential positional power. Consequently, Jevons (1965) suggests "indeterminate bargains of this kind are best arranged by an arbitrator or third party," including political and other extraneous parties like government.

This indicates a second, related element of Jevons's sociology of the market: the role of political factors in markets. For illustration, he observes that the so called political intelligence of the moment often affects "prospective" supply or demand (i.e., speculation) and its bearing on market equilibrium (Jevons 1965). A third element of Jevons's sociology of the market and economic sociology overall involves the influence of institutions on markets and the economy. For example, he notes the "hedonic bearing of our social institutions" (Jevons 1881), and thus suggests institutional influences

on market economic behavior, including pursuit of pleasure or maximizing utility. Notably, he recognizes that non economic institutions have such a hedonic economic impact in virtue of their contribution to human wants or material (and other) well being which he considers (like Adam Smith) the "sole object of all industry" (Jevons 1965).

In sum, while mostly unknown and overlooked among sociologists, Jevons is potentially interesting and intriguing for them on account of his proposal of economic sociology, thus formally contributing to the adoption and development, even within economics, of a classical sociological idea and field.

SEE ALSO: Comte, Auguste; Durkheim, Émile; Economic Sociology: Neoclassical Economic Perspective; Markets; Mill, John Stuart; Schumpeter, Joseph A.; Spencer, Herbert; Weber, Max

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Johnson, Charles Spurgeon (1893–1956)

Mary Jo Deegan

African American race relations authority and academic administrator Charles Spurgeon Johnson was born in Bristol, Virginia on July 24, 1893. The grandson of a slave and the son of a Baptist minister, Johnson was inspired by religious ideals and a commitment to end social inequality. He graduated from Wayland Academy and studied at Virginia Union University, both in Richmond, Virginia. He completed a BA in sociology from the University of Chicago in 1917. After America entered World War I, he enlisted in the army. He returned to the university in 1919 and began his graduate studies with Robert Ezra Park.

In the summer of 1919 a major race riot occurred in Chicago, and the Chicago Commission on Race Relations, under the auspices of the Chicago Urban League, began to investigate the conditions leading up to it. Johnson directed this research from 1919 to 1921. In 1922 the commission published *The Negro in Chicago*, wherein Johnson made significant contributions.

In 1921 he moved to New York to direct research for the National Urban League. From 1923 to 1928 he edited their magazine, *Opportunity*, an important publishing outlet during the Harlem Renaissance. It influenced the careers of many artists including Langston Hughes, Zora Neale Hurston, and Arnaud Bontemps.

In 1929 Johnson moved to Nashville, Tennessee, where he chaired the social sciences department at Fisk University. He hired colleagues formerly associated with the Chicago School of Sociology, including Horace Cayton, E. Franklin Frazier, and Park after the latter's retirement from the University of Chicago.

Johnson's books *The Negro in American Civilization* (1930), *Shadow of the Plantation* (1934), and *The Negro College Graduate* (1936) emphasized the importance of scientific, objective goals to collect and interpret empirical data. Education was a major source for social change to obtain social equality. Johnson documented institutionalized discrimination in these books

but rarely commented upon it or supported explicit reforms.

During World War II, Johnson shifted his conservative politics by openly attacking segregation. He published *The Monthly Summary*, which provided information on race relations throughout the country. In 1943 his work on segregation influenced Gunnar Myrdal's *An American Dilemma* (1944). In 1944, Johnson began annual Race Relations Institutes (RRI), attended by national leaders. Johnson became the first black president of Fisk University in 1946, a position he held until 1956.

National Association for the Advancement of Colored People (NAACP) attorney Thurgood Marshall often addressed the RRI in the 1950s and Johnson provided him with sociological data and interpretations that Marshall used in his legal briefs for *Brown v. Board of Education* (1954). This landmark decision eliminated the legal justification for "separate but equal" public facilities and set in motion many public protests in the later Civil Rights Movement.

By the late 1940s Johnson was appointed to several powerful positions: as a United States delegate to UNESCO (1946–7), a member of the Fulbright Board of Foreign Scholarships (1947–54), and a delegate to the Assembly of the World Council of Churches (1948). His balance between "objective" social science and a more critical, change oriented stance helped Johnson obtain philanthropic funds, create a Southern center for studying racial injustice, and develop a global network supporting black artists.

On October 27, 1956, Johnson died suddenly in Louisville, Kentucky of a heart attack. He was mourned by educational, sociological, and political leaders who recognized his contributions to all these fields.

SEE ALSO: *American Dilemma, An* (Gunnar Myrdal); *Brown v. Board of Education*; Chicago School; Civil Rights Movement; Frazier, E. Franklin; Park, Robert E. and Burgess, Ernest W.

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jōmin

Takami Kuwayama

Jōmin is a central concept in Kunio Yanagita's research into Japanese folklore. Yanagita (1875–1962), founder of Japanese folklore studies or folkloristics, invented this term by combining two characters – *jo* (also pronounced *tsune*), used either as a noun or a modifier, meaning “usual,” “ordinary,” “average,” or “conventional,” and *min*, a noun meaning “people.” *Jōmin* thus means “common people” as distinguished from both elites in the ruling class and people placed at the bottom of society, including outcasts. No proper equivalent is found in European languages, but its meaning is close to that of the German *Volk* or the English “folk.”

The importance attached to the study of *jōmin* in Yanagita's research may be explained in terms of his theory of history. Defining folkloristics as a historical science, Yanagita contended that orthodox historiography, using almost exclusively written documents as data, merely recorded the lives of great individuals and dramatic events. Commoners, who made up the majority of the population, were described as the anonymous masses without emotion and character, if described at all. Dissatisfied with this practice, Yanagita placed *jōmin* at the center of historical inquiry. He also proposed new methods for studying history. Instead of doing archival research, he conducted fieldwork. Yanagita reasoned that, since Japan modernized relatively late, premodern manners and customs were still practiced among the commoners. Even if they were no longer practiced, they could be reconstructed, Yanagita thought, from the memory of living people. Thus, he extensively used interviews, in addition to the observations of actual behavior, as a tool of investigation into the past. In Yanagita's mind, history did not refer to past events, but rather the past within the present. In today's terminology, he wrote the “social history” of the Japanese people at large, using the ethnographic methods that were developed in the early twentieth century.

There is agreement among Japanese folklorists that *jōmin* embody Japan's folk culture. Put another way, ordinary people are understood as active agents of historical development, not as

passive subjects, who, with their own will, observe and pass on tradition from generation to generation. There is, however, some ambiguity as to the exact meaning of *jōmin* because Yanagita neither defined it precisely nor used it consistently, as was often the case with other concepts he proposed. Despite his admiration for science, Yanagita was essentially a man of letters, whose influence derived more from his literary talent than from his scientific achievement. Among later generations of scholars, therefore, there has been much debate about the meaning and the significance of *jōmin* for folklore research. Even today, it continues to be debated, with new interpretations presented from various fields.

One of the best interpretations has been presented by Ajiō Fukuta, Japan's leading folklorist. Fukuta examined the frequencies of Yanagita's use of “*jōmin*,” as well as its meanings, in his voluminous works. Having found that Yanagita's usages had changed over time, Fukuta classified them into three periods: (1) from the 1910s to the 1920s; (2) around the mid 1930s; and (3) after the 1940s. In the first period, when Yanagita first made his name as a governmental bureaucrat and later, after his resignation, as a pioneer in folkloristics, *jōmin* was used to mean peasants who had settled in a particular community located on flat land, as contrasted with non peasants, such as hunters, wood turners, and some sorts of religious practitioners, who moved from community to community in the mountains. In the second period, when Yanagita's scholarship fully developed, *jōmin* meant not simply peasants but “ordinary peasants,” excluding the hereditary upper class peasants who owned massive land and thus dominated local politics. Fukuta's interpretation is based on Yanagita's classic statement, made in his 1935 book *Kyōdo Seikatsu no Kenkyūho* (*Methods in the Study of Local Community Life*), that *jōmin* were found in between the upper and the lower classes of people in a farming community, the former pointing to the hereditary ruling class, and the latter pointing to people engaged in specialized occupations, such as smiths, coopers, and itinerant priests. These people refused to settle in one community. In the last period, when Yanagita's research interest shifted from the study of local customs to that of Japan's national culture, *jōmin*'s meaning

was extended to include the entire Japanese population, even the emperor. In Yanagita's observation, some aspects of ordinary people's life, rituals in particular, closely resembled those of the imperial family – hence the unity of the Japanese nation.

After Yanagita's death in 1962, much of the debate on *jōmin* focused on the extended usage just mentioned. Central to the debate was the question of whether *jōmin* constituted a specific category of people who really existed at a particular time and place or, by contrast, an abstract category comprising the entire Japanese people across time and space. Fukuta supported the former position, regarding *jōmin* mainly as *honhyakusho* (independent peasants), who, in the Tokugawa period, possessed their own land and house, as well as their descendants, who were believed to embody their ancestors' traditions in modern times. He thus objected to Yanagita's attempt to make *jōmin* an all-embracing category. Many folklorists supported Yanagita, however, and interpreted *jōmin* as meaning not only the Japanese people, but also the totality of their way of life. In their hands, *jōmin* became almost synonymous with Japanese culture – a view that later came to be called “*jōmin* as a cultural concept.”

This identification of *jōmin* with Japanese culture aroused much controversy among historians. Historians directed their criticisms toward the folklorists' indifference to the time frame, which, according to the former, was derived from the latter's supposition of the “supertemporal nature” of *jōmin*. This concept was so named after the folklorists' assertion that *jōmin* was a transgenerational category. Indeed, the aforementioned “*jōmin* as a cultural concept” was divorced from a specific time frame, hence unable to indicate when particular customs were practiced – a criticism similar to that of “essentialism” in today's scholarship. Another criticism made by historians, especially those in the Marxist camp, was concerned with the folklorists' indifference to class, which derived from the supposed “superclass nature” of *jōmin*. Given Yanagita's view that *jōmin* included the emperor, this was only expected. All in all, the idea of *jōmin* has the same weaknesses as the anthropological notion of culture: both tend to be essentialist and gloss over internal differences and conflict.

Fukuta's approach, by contrast, is free from such ambiguities. It represents what has come to be called “*jōmin* as a substantial concept.” This concept, however, has a different set of problems. For one thing, the proportion of the people Fukuta identified as *jōmin* (i.e., independent peasants in Tokugawa times and their descendants) has significantly diminished in post-war Japan as a result of urbanization and industrialization. Since *jōmin* is a pivotal concept in Japanese folkloristics, this demographic change implies the loss of the discipline's *raison d'être*. At least, the dramatic social change that has occurred since the end of World War II has made it necessary to reconsider the folklorists' customary emphasis on peasant culture. Some scholars, most notably Noboru Miyata, have tried to solve this problem by developing new fields, such as “urban folkloristics.” For another, the attempt to restrict the meaning of *jōmin* to a narrowly defined group of people will eventually direct the researchers' attention away from the folk customs practiced outside that category. Accordingly, the scope of research will be considerably diminished, and folkloristics may lose its popularity among readers at large.

Despite his familiarity with western scholarship, Yanagita seldom mentioned the literature he had consulted in producing his voluminous works. This omission was probably intentional. Yanagita was convinced that folkloristics would only prosper in a country like Japan, where the old and the new coexisted, and that western scholars would sooner or later be forced to reexamine their findings in light of the Japanese research. Yanagita wanted to be the leader, if not the founder, of the world community of folklorists. Considering the passive role Japanese academics conventionally played in the international community, his ambition was exceptional. However, Yanagita's failure to properly acknowledge his intellectual debt has brought about unfortunate results among his followers – the difficulty of assessing his achievement in the global context and the subsequent isolation of Japanese folkloristics from western scholarship, which occupies a central place in the “academic world system” (Kuwayama 2004). Thus, it is unclear if Yanagita's concept of *jōmin*, around which his scholarship developed, has any connection with, for example, the Annales School of French social history, which

developed at about the same time. The task of clarifying the “western roots” of Yanagita still remains to be done.

SEE ALSO: Annales School; *Minzoku*; *Nihon jinron*; Yanagita, Kunio

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journaling, reflexive

Valerie J. Janesick

Journal writing as a reflexive research activity has been called reflexive journaling by many sociologists and researchers in training. It has been most used by qualitative researchers in the social sciences and other fields since these professionals are seeking to describe a given social setting or a person's life history in its entirety. Qualitative research has a long history of its own which includes discussion of the techniques of the qualitative researcher. Reflexive journaling has been one of the most described and often used techniques (Janesick 2004). It has proven to be an effective tool for understanding the processes of qualitative research more fully, as well as the experiences,

mindsets, biases, and emotional states of the researcher.

Many researchers advocate the use of a reflexive journal at various points in the research project timeline. To begin with, a journal is a remarkable tool for any researcher to use to reflect upon the methods of a given work in progress, including how and when certain techniques are used in the study. Likewise, it is a good idea to track the thinking processes of the researcher and participants in a study. In fact, writing a reflexive journal on the role of the researcher in any given qualitative project is an effective means to describe and explain research thought processes. Often qualitative researchers are criticized for not explaining exactly how they conducted a study. The reflexive journal writing of a researcher is one device that assists in developing a record of how a study was designed, why certain techniques were selected, and subsequent ethical issues that evolved in the study. A researcher may track in a journal the daily workings of the study. For example, did the participants change an interview appointment? How did this subsequently affect the flow of the study? Did a serious ethical issue emerge from the conduct of the study? If so, how was this described, explained, and resolved? These and other such questions are a few examples of the types of prompts for the writer. In addition this emphasizes the importance of keeping a reflexive journal throughout the entire qualitative research project.

If one checks recent dissertations completed and catalogued on Dissertation Abstracts International, it is easy to see that many recent dissertations include the use of a reflexive journal. The inclusion of the use of the reflexive journal as part of the data collection procedure indicates, to some extent, the credibility of this technique. But, conversely, does it not also act as a source of credibility and validity for the overall project? As a research technique, the reflexive journal is user friendly and often instills a sense of confidence in beginning researchers and a sense of accomplishment in experienced researchers. Many researchers verify that the use of a reflexive journal makes the challenge of interviewing, observations, and taking fieldnotes much more fluid. Researchers who use the reflexive journal often become more reflective persons and better writers. Writing

in a journal every day instills a habit of mind which can only help in the writing of the final research report.

In beginning the reflexive journal, regardless of the project, it is always useful to supply all the basic descriptive data in each entry. Information such as the date, time, place, participants, and any other descriptive information should be registered in order to provide accuracy in reporting later in the study. Especially in long term qualitative projects, the specific evidence which locates members and activities of the project can become most useful in the final analysis and interpretation of the research findings. Now let us turn to the history of the reflexive journal and the creation of a reflexive journal, which are also critical aspects of the journaling process.

Journal writing began from a need to tell a story. Famous journal writers throughout history have provided us with eminent examples and various categories of journals (Progoff 1992). Some types of journal writing can be viewed from the perspective of chronicler, traveler, creator, apologist, confessor, or prisoner, as Mallon (1995) describes. No matter what orientation taken by the reflexive journal writer, it is generally agreed that reflexive journal writing is utilized for providing clarity, organizing one's thoughts and feelings, and for achieving understanding. Thus the social science researcher has a valuable tool in reflexive journal writing.

While journal writing has its seeds in psychology, sociology, and history, one can rely on understanding the use of the journal from social psychology and the symbolic interactionists. In addition, what Denzin (1989) calls "interpretive interactionism" is a useful tool for understanding the reflexive journal. Symbolic interactionists have historically argued that we all give meaning to the symbols we encounter in interacting with one another. Interpretive interactionists go a step further in that the act of interpretation is a communication act with one or more interactors. For the journal writer, one is interacting with one's self in a sense.

Basically, the art of journal writing and subsequent interpretations of journal writing produce meaning and understanding which are shaped by genre, the narrative form used, and personal cultural and paradigmatic conventions

of the writer, who is either the researcher, participant, and/or co researcher. As Progoff (1992) notes, journal writing is ultimately a way of getting feedback from ourselves. In so doing, it enables us to experience in a full and open ended way the movement of our lives as a whole and the meaning that follows from reflecting on that movement.

One might ask, why should one invest the time in journal writing? Journal writing allows one to reflect, to dig deeper into the heart of the words, beliefs, and behaviors we describe in our journals. The act of writing down one's thoughts will allow for stepping into one's inner mind and reaching further for clarity and interpretations of the behaviors, beliefs, and words we write. Journal writing also allows for training the writer as a researcher in writing about a research project in progress. The journal becomes a tool for training the research instrument, the person. Since qualitative social science relies heavily on the researcher as research instrument, journal writing can only assist researchers in reaching their goals in any given project.

SEE ALSO: Biography; Culture; Education; Life History; Methods

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Judaism

Abraham D. Lavender

Judaism is one of the world's oldest religions, characterized by a belief in one God (monotheism), a belief that the Torah is the source of divine knowledge and law, and that the Jews,

because the Torah was given to them after other peoples turned it down, have an obligation to be a light unto the world. The Torah is also referred to as the holy scriptures. It is the first five books (Genesis, Exodus, Leviticus, Numbers, and Deuteronomy) of what Christians refer to as the Old Testament. In Hebrew, the word *Torah* means “teaching.” In a larger sense the Torah consists not only of the five books, but includes all of Jewish tradition. The belief in monotheism is affirmed in the Shema, the first line and essence of which comes from Deuteronomy 6:4, and is translated as “Hear, O Israel, the Lord our God, the Lord is One.” Judaism does not claim to be the only true religion, but rather teaches that there are different ways of reaching God.

Some sources define Judaism as the religion of the Jews, but this then raises the question of how to define Jews. The definition has changed throughout history, and continues to change even until today. This situation exists largely because Jews also have been considered a race, an ethnic group, a culture, a civilization, or a nation. Today, a person born of a Jewish mother is considered Jewish even if he or she does not practice Judaism, unless there is a deliberate rejection of Judaism. Reform and Reconstructionist Judaism accept a child born of either a Jewish mother or father if the child is raised to accept Judaism. But until about 2,000 years ago the religion followed the father instead of the mother. In Israel today the issue of who is a Jew continues to be a hotly debated topic which changes according to the internal political situation and influences from the Diaspora.

Abraham (ca. 1600 BCE) is considered the first patriarch and the founder of Judaism. He was born and raised in Ur (present day Iraq), and after rejecting the idols of his culture and accepting the belief in monotheism, he migrated to Canaan. As with much of ancient history, researchers today question whether this is legend or fact, or a mixture of both, but Abraham is viewed as the founder of Judaism.

The initials used above, BCE, refer to Before the Common Era, and CE refers to the Common Era. They frequently are used by Jews instead of BC and AD, which are based on the birth and death of Jesus, and hence are viewed by some as Christian markers. However, the years are the same as in the Christian (Gregorian) calendar,

so that one could, for example, say 2007 CE, which would be the same as AD 2007. However, within the Jewish community, and with Jewish calendars, the years differ, and one does not use any initials after the year. Because Judaism, like Islam, the Chinese culture, and others, uses a lunar calendar instead of a fixed calendar, the Jewish year does not begin on January 1, but on the Jewish holiday, Rosh Hashanah (“the head of the year”), which usually occurs in September or early October. The Jewish calendar adds 3,761 years to the Christian calendar, so that, for example, the Christian year of 2000–2001 was the Jewish year of 5760–5761. Judaism uses this system to date the beginning of the world with Adam and Eve. Abraham, and the beginning of Judaism, go back only about 3,600 or 3,700 years, but the Jewish calendar goes back 1,946 years before Abraham. The number of years is based on the 19 generations listed inclusively from Adam to Abraham (Abram) in Genesis 5:3–32 and Genesis 11:10–26. The Jewish day begins at sundown instead of at midnight.

While all of the Torah is very important to Judaism, the Ten Commandments (Exodus 20:1–17), revealed to Moses at Mount Sinai in the thirteenth century BCE, are viewed in Judaism as the basis of all legislation. About two centuries after Moses, King David (1010–970 BCE) made Jerusalem the center of the government and of Judaism. David’s son Solomon built the first Temple, making Jerusalem the physical center of worship for Jews. But the strengthening of Jerusalem strained relations with the tribes outside of Jerusalem, leading to major effects on the future of Judaism.

Like most religions, Judaism has changed over time and has developed divisions with different definitions, degrees of traditionalism, and practices. The first major division was in 721 BCE when the ten northern tribes, known as Israel, were conquered by the Assyrians and sent into exile (becoming known as the Lost Tribes), while the two southern tribes, known as Judah and centered in Jerusalem, continued. In 2 Kings 17:7 it is said that Israel fell because “the people of Israel had sinned against the Lord their God.” But in 586 BCE Judah also fell, victim of the large Babylonian Empire to the east. Solomon’s Temple was destroyed and much of the population, especially much of the religious leadership, was deported to Babylonia.

Large numbers also went to Egypt. But only a few decades later, in 538 BCE, under new Babylonian leadership, Jews were allowed to return to Jerusalem. Some stayed in Babylonia and some returned. The exile was interpreted as punishment for sins, and the return was interpreted as God's forgiveness for the sins.

The Temple was rebuilt in Jerusalem (completed in 516 BCE) and referred to as the Second Temple. Rebuilding a Jewish life was not easy, but eventually Judah was reestablished with Judaism at its center and the Temple playing a major role. The Greek empire was the next threat to Judaism, partly by ruling over Judah, but also by presenting other perspectives and "hedonistic" philosophies. After 198 BCE the Seleucids ruled Jerusalem, banned the practice of Judaism, and raised an altar to Zeus in the Temple. In 165 BCE the Maccabees, a Jewish group, won independence for Judah and reestablished Judaism. Two groups arose during this period: the Pharisees, who maintained the Torah and the Oral Law and tried to adapt Judaism to new conditions, and the Sadducees, an aristocratic group who rejected the Oral Law and interpreted the Pentateuch (Genesis, Exodus, Leviticus, Numbers, and Deuteronomy) literally. Although they were frequently dominant in Temple worship, they disappeared as a group with the destruction of the Second Temple in 70 CE. Oral Law is the authoritative interpretation of the Written Law (the Pentateuch), and traditionally is considered as being given to Moses at Mount Sinai along with the Written Law.

The destruction of the Second Temple resulted from Roman rule. Religious conflict was dominant in Israel, partly leading to a weakened condition, and by 47 BCE Israel was ruled by the Roman Empire. This defeat brought great soul searching, many individuals claimed to be the promised Messiah who would bring peace (Jesus, a rabbi, appeared in this context), and conflicts between religious groups were frequent. There were Jewish revolts against the Romans, and as a result in 70 CE the Second Temple was destroyed. In 135 CE a second revolt was crushed and most Jews were exiled from Israel.

Even by the end of the first century of the Common Era, shortly after the life of Jesus, the

world Jewish population was about 7 million, with about 2.5 million in Israel and almost two thirds in the Diaspora, especially in Egypt, Syria, Greece, Rome, and Babylonia. With a Temple no longer existing as the major center of Judaism, and with nearly all Jews expelled from Israel in 135 CE, the worship of Judaism would undergo major changes. Over a million Jews had been killed during the revolts in Israel, including rabbis and other scholars, and many yeshivot (Jewish academies) had been destroyed. A religious need existed. Rabbinic Judaism, which emphasized interpretations by rabbis, would become dominant. The synagogue increased in importance, becoming the focus of Jewish communal life. Because nearly all Jews were now in Diaspora, living in many countries, many interpretations of how to believe in and practice Judaism developed. The Babylonian Talmud was developed between the early third and late fifth centuries CE. It consists of Jewish history and customs, and interpretations of Jewish law. The less accepted Jerusalem Talmud was completed around the fifth century CE. Halakhah refers to the legal part of the Talmudic and later Jewish literature, including Oral Law, and is the traditionally accepted interpretation of the Written Law.

From a cultural perspective, Jews today are classified as Sephardic or Ashkenazic. Sephardic comes from the Hebrew word referring to Spain, and Sephardic Jews in a restricted sense are those Jews from Spain or Portugal. However, the term frequently is used also to refer to Jews from the Near East, the Middle East, North Africa, and a few other locations. A more correct terminology is to refer to Jews from the Eastern world as Mizrahim, *mizrahi* meaning "eastern" in Hebrew. Ashkenazi comes from the Hebrew word for Germany, but like Sephardi, has been extended to cover a much larger area. It includes all of Europe except a few areas such as Spain and Portugal, and in a larger sense, generally refers to those Jews who have lived in Christian lands. Jews lived in many of these areas long before the areas became Christian. By contrast, most Sephardim have lived in Islamic or Muslim lands since the advent of Islam in the seventh century, although most of these areas, such as Iran,

Iraq, the Middle East, and North Africa, had sizable Sephardic populations long before the areas became Islamic.

Sephardim, living mostly in Islamic lands, were not treated as equals but generally were not treated as badly as the Ashkenazim (*im* is the masculine plural, and *ot* the feminine, in Hebrew). Sephardim were more likely to interact with the non Jewish populations, whereas Ashkenazim, facing more oppression, were less likely to interact with non Jews. Ashkenazim generally maintained Yiddish, that is, Hebrew mixed with German or other European languages, as their major language. Sephardim from Spain maintained Ladino, Hebrew mixed with Spanish, to a limited degree, and in some other areas maintained Hebrew mixed with the local language, such as Judeo Persian. But Sephardim or Mizrahim largely spoke the language of the country. In all Arab countries Arabic remained the vernacular of the Jews to the present time, and a voluminous literature in Arabic was produced by Jews. Largely because of the interaction, or lack thereof, with non Jewish neighbors, Sephardim and Ashkenazim developed different responses to discrimination and persecution. Ashkenazim have been more likely to approach persecution from a martyr perspective, whereas Sephardim have been more likely to temporarily adjust themselves to the demands of the oppressive society (some times converting to the dominant religion, with a secret maintenance of Judaism) with the expectation of being able to return to Judaism at a later date. Maimonides (1135–1204), a very famous rabbi, philosopher, and physician who was born in Spain, fled to Morocco to escape persecution, and spent most of his life in Egypt, taught this perspective. Some indications are that his family followed this perspective.

In 1170 there were 1,400,000 Sephardim in the world, and only 100,000 Ashkenazim, Sephardim comprising 93.3 percent of world Jewry. World trade patterns shifted, some countries underwent difficult times, and by 1700 there were 2 million Jews in the world, evenly divided between Ashkenazim and Sephardim. In the next 200 years the Ashkenazim, largely in Eastern Europe, continued an explosive growth while the Sephardim declined. In 1900 there were 9,550,000 Ashkenazim and

only 950,000 Sephardim, Ashkenazim comprising 90.5 percent of world Jewry.

Largely because of different experiences of Jews living in diverse areas, as well as the influences of modernization, Judaism historically has had religious divisions and movements. In the Common Era, the Karaites appeared in the Middle East in the early eighth century, and rejected the Talmudic and Rabbinic traditions. Kabbalah, emphasizing Jewish mysticism, became more important around the twelfth century. By the sixteenth century, Jerusalem, Safed, Tiberias, and Hebron were centers of Jewish mysticism in Israel. Shabbetai Zevi came out of Turkey in the seventeenth century, claimed to be the Messiah, and got a large following, but eventually converted to Islam under pressure. Hasidism arose in Eastern Europe in the eighteenth century as a pietist religious and social movement, emphasizing devotion of the masses rather than Talmudic learning for a few. The Haskalah, a modernization and Enlightenment approach to Judaism, arose in Germany, Italy, and Western Europe in general in the 1770s.

Today, there are several major branches of Judaism, which differ in their beliefs and practices. In most Ashkenazi areas the two main divisions are Orthodox, or Traditional, Judaism, and Liberal, or Progressive, Judaism. Orthodox Judaism accepts the totality of Judaism as based on the Torah, Oral Laws, and commentary, and requires a strong degree of traditional belief and daily observance. It is divided into Modern Orthodox and Traditional Orthodox. Liberal Judaism has made more adjustments with modern societies and is less demanding in both beliefs and practices.

The US, whose Jewish population is over 90 percent Ashkenazi, developed a threefold division of Orthodox, Conservative, and Reform Judaism, largely because of migration patterns which were not experienced in other countries. Although Sephardic Jews founded the US Jewish community in 1654 and remained the cultural elite until the 1700s, the first sizable Jewish population was established in the early and middle 1800s by German Jews. They usually had been influenced by Haskalah before migrating. Reform Judaism had begun in Germany and was brought to the US. In the 1880s large numbers of Jews began migrating to

the US from Eastern Europe, which mostly had not yet experienced the Haskalah. Hence, they usually brought Orthodoxy with them. Many felt that Orthodoxy was too traditional for the US, which was much different from Eastern Europe, but many also felt that Reform Judaism had given up too much tradition. So a middle ground, Conservative Judaism, developed. Conservatism agrees with Orthodoxy in many beliefs, but is closer to Reform in practices. A fourth branch of Judaism in the US, Reconstructionism, views Judaism as an evolving religious civilization and follows some modern practices, such as ordination of women. Sephardic Jews did not follow this migration pattern to the US, and hence did not divide into either Reform or Conservative Judaism. Sephardic Judaism is Orthodox, but because it represents all Sephardim with various degrees of traditionalism and modernization, it tends to be more flexible than Ashkenazi Orthodoxy.

In contemporary Israel, because of political alignments within the Knesset (Israel's parliament), Orthodoxy (mostly of the Ashkenazi perspective) has been the arbiter of religious and cultural disagreements. This includes the question of who is a Jew, and has led to major conflicts between traditional and non traditional Jews. A large number of Israeli Jews are secular rather than religious. Reform and Conservative Judaism have made some progress in Israel, but progress has been limited because of insufficient political power. The Masorti movement, founded in 1979, is the umbrella for Conservative Jews in Israel.

Judaism has several major holidays and a number of minor holidays. Most important are Rosh Hashanah, Jewish new year, and Yom Kippur, the Day of Atonement. Rosh Hashanah begins a 10 day period of repentance that ends with Yom Kippur, the holiest day of the Jewish year. As noted, both occur in September or October. Other major Jewish holidays are a reflection of Judaism's long religious and cultural history, including persecutions and victories. Purim (February–March) is a joyful holiday that celebrates the victory of the Jews over a plot to destroy them in ancient Persia. Pesach, or Passover (March–April) is a celebration of the Jewish escape from slavery in ancient Egypt in the thirteenth century BCE. Sukkot (September–October) is a joyful festival

symbolized by booths (*sukkot*) which represent the huts which Jews lived in during the years in the wilderness during their return from Egyptian slavery. Sukkot is celebrated for 7 days and nights and concludes with Simchat Torah, a joyful holiday which celebrates the completion of the annual reading of the Torah and the beginning of a new cycle. Hanukkah (usually December) lasts for 8 days and celebrates the victory of the Maccabees over the Seleucid oppression in 165 BCE. Historically, Hanukkah was a relatively minor holiday, but it has become more important in Christian countries partly to offset Christmas so that Jewish children do not feel left out.

Judaism has several life cycle events beginning with circumcision (*brit milah*) for a male Jewish child on the eighth day after birth. This is to renew the covenant between Abraham and God (Genesis 17:9–13). When a child is 13 years of age, a rite of passage into adulthood is celebrated: bar mitzvah for the male and bat mitzvah for the female. In the US and some other places in recent decades, these ceremonies have become expensive celebrations for some youths. Bat mitzvahs, traditionally not celebrated as much as bar mitzvahs, have increased in importance in recent decades to lessen the gender gap. Marriage and death, as in most religions, also have special religious ceremonies.

Intermarriage of Jews with non Jews has become very common in a number of places, including the US, in the last few decades. This reflects the extent to which Jews have been accepted in larger societies, but it also is a numerical threat to the Jewish community because of the tendency of children of intermarried couples to merge into the larger society. Assimilating often is easier than maintaining a separate identity. Some non Jews who marry Jews convert to Judaism, but overall intermarriage is a numerical loss to the Jewish community.

At the same time that Judaism is losing people to intermarriage, there are two groups of people who are returning to Judaism. In the Americas, thousands of descendants of Jews who left Judaism during the Spanish Inquisition (especially 1391 to 1492) are returning to a Jewish identity. This is found especially in the Southwestern US, but is evident in most areas with large numbers of Hispanics, such as

California, Miami, Florida, and New York City. Some descendants of the Lost Tribes of Israel, exiled by the Assyrians in 721 BCE, also are returning to Judaism. Some, especially from India, have returned to Israel to live. Black Jews from Ethiopia also have returned to Israel in large numbers, undergoing conversion once in Israel. Among all these returnee groups, there is a desire, so far unfulfilled, for a return ceremony rather than a conversion ceremony.

The belief that Jews are a race has been held by most non Jews and some Jews until recent decades, and historically has been used as an excuse for major anti Semitic actions. The Crusades, the Inquisition in Spain and Portugal, the pogroms (mob attacks on Jews, often for fun) in Eastern Europe, and the Holocaust all have had various degrees of racial, religious, and social reasons for anti Semitism. The racial dimension has often been the most severe, especially during the Holocaust. It was the pogroms in Russia which gave impetus to the First Aliyah in 1881–2 and began the large scale return of Jews to Israel as part of the Zionist movement. In recent decades the concept of race has decreased in importance and more attention has been put on genetic (DNA) clusters. There is a Middle Eastern genetic base shared by about two thirds of Jews in the world, and the closest genetic relatives of Jews as a group are other Middle Eastern groups such as Palestinians, Syrians, and Lebanese.

Recent studies conclude that there are about 13 million (12,950,000) Jews in the world today, with 60.7 percent (7,856,000) in the Diaspora and 39.3 percent (5,094,000) in Israel. The Americas account for 46.9 percent (6,071,100) of world Jewry, with the US alone accounting for 40.9 percent (5,300,000). This has decreased in the last few decades, largely because of intermarriage and loss of children to Judaism. In the Americas, other than the US, the largest populations are in Canada (370,500), Argentina (187,000), Brazil (97,000), and Mexico (40,000).

Hashoah (the Holocaust) killed about 6,000,000 Jews – 37 percent of all world Jewry – mostly in Europe. Until then, 60 percent of world Jewry lived in Europe. Now, Europe has only 12.0 percent (1,550,800) of world Jewry. The three largest populations are found in France (498,000), of whom many are post 1948

exiles from Morocco, Algeria, and other North African countries, the United Kingdom (300,000), and Germany (108,000), most of whom are immigrants from Eastern Europe. Next in size in Europe are Russia (252,000), Ukraine (95,000), Hungary (50,000), Belgium (31,400), the Netherlands (30,000), Italy (29,000), and Belarus (23,000). In the 1990s about 900,000 Jews left the former Soviet Union and moved to Israel. Iran, Iraq, and North African countries historically had large Jewish populations, but most of these Jews (about 870,000) left in the 15 years after 1948 because of hostility against them after Israel's independence in 1948 and the rise of Islamic based nationalism in North Africa. About 600,000 moved to Israel, and today about half of the population of Israel is Sephardi or Mizrahi.

The above figures, given annually in the American Jewish Year Book, are estimates and include people who identify as Jewish, whether or not they are active followers of, or even believers in, Judaism. Once again, the definition of who is a Jew includes a mixture of religious and cultural identities, and, for countries where anti Semitism persists, racial components.

SEE ALSO: Anthropology, Cultural and Social: Early History; Anti Semitism (Religion); Anti Semitism (Social Change); Assimilation; Ethnicity; Holocaust; Orthodoxy; Religion, Sociology of; Women, Religion and

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juvenile delinquency

Jeff Maahs

Juvenile delinquency refers to behaviors of children and adolescents that violate the legal code. Some jurisdictions further distinguish “delinquent offenses,” those that violate criminal law, from “status offenses” (e.g., curfew violation, truancy) that apply only to minors. The legal status of “juvenile delinquent” is relatively new. The concept of delinquency is rooted, however, in an ancient debate over when children can form criminal intent and bear criminal responsibility for their actions, and whether/how they should be officially sanctioned. Some of the earliest written legal codes make distinctions in the punishments available for children and adult offenders. By the seventeenth century, English common law adopted a classification system where children under 8 years of age were immune from criminal prosecution. For youth aged 8 to 13 years, the state had the burden of proving that the youth possessed criminal intent (Butts & Mitchell 2000). In the United States, Progressive era reformers went a step further and created an entirely new system to respond to juvenile offenders. The first juvenile court, created in Cook County, Illinois in 1899 and modeled thereafter by other states, was markedly different from criminal courts. The new court was quasi civil and informal in nature, and under the doctrine of *parens patriae* (the state as parent), aspired to act in the best

interests of the child. The new philosophy and procedures required a new language. Thus, rather than finding juveniles guilty of a criminal offense and sentencing them to a sanction, youths were “adjudicated delinquent” and received a suitable “disposition.”

The issues of criminal responsibility and age appropriate responses to juvenile offending remain unresolved, as evidenced by wide variation in statutes defining juvenile delinquency across the United States. For example, the upper age limit for juvenile court jurisdictions ranges from 15 to 18 years. Additionally, many states have statutes that allow, for various reasons (e.g., seriousness of offense, prior juvenile offenses), youth to be waived to criminal court.

Aside from legal considerations and the formal response to juvenile misconduct, juvenile delinquency occupies a central position in the study of criminal behavior. This position is well justified for a number of reasons, chief among them the prevalence of juvenile offending. In the United States, juveniles aged 13–17 years make up only 6 percent of the population, yet account for roughly 30 percent of all arrests for Uniform Crime Reporting (UCR) index offenses. A plot of arrest rates versus age yields an “age–crime curve” that indicates offending rates peak during adolescence (around age 16 for property offenses, and age 18 for violent offenses) and diminish soon thereafter.

Unsurprisingly therefore, the major theoretical paradigms explaining crime, including social control theory (Hirschi 1969), social learning theory (Sutherland 1947), strain theory (Merton 1938), and labeling theory (Becker 1963), are derived from theories of juvenile delinquency. In the 1960s, several “subculture” theories evolved solely to explain the existence and nature of delinquent gangs (see, e.g., Cohen 1955). Although some of these theories extend to account for adult offending, most focus explicitly on concepts (school experience, peer groups, parenting) that are germane to adolescence. More recently, juvenile delinquency interests criminologists for another reason – its ability to predict future criminal behavior.

Studies (using both self report and official data) of cohorts of children indicate that a small minority of children (roughly 6 percent) account for a large portion (over 50 percent) of the delinquency in that cohort. Further,

delinquency, and even non delinquent behavior problems (e.g., severe, age inappropriate temper tantrums, conduct disorder), are robust predictors of future criminal behavior. A major goal of developmental or life course criminology is to explain why antisocial behavior is stable over time. Some theorists argue that stability is due to a trait (impulsivity, low self control) that is stable from early childhood onward. Others contend that delinquency itself has effects on the environment (school performance, peer and parent relationships) that mortgage the child's future prospects and narrow options for change. While this debate remains unsettled, there is some agreement with regards to other correlates of juvenile delinquency.

Gender is among the most agreed upon correlate of crime. Regardless of how delinquency is measured (e.g., arrest data, self report, victimization data), males are much more likely to engage in most forms of delinquency than females. The data are more ambiguous for social class and race. In the United States, official data (and some victimization data) indicate moderate to strong relationships between delinquency, class, and race, whereas self report data often indicate weak or nonexistent associations. This may be due to police or court bias, or to differences in the nature of offenses measured by self report and official data. Aside from gender, the most empirically supported individual level correlates include socialization markers (parental supervision and discipline, parent-child bond), and the influence of delinquent peers. At the macro level, social disorganization theorists focus on neighborhood characteristics (high

poverty, high residential mobility) conducive to delinquency. Sampson and Groves (1989), using data from the British Crime Survey, found that delinquency is more likely in neighborhoods where these ecological characteristics impede a neighborhood's ability to informally supervise and control youth.

SEE ALSO: Age and Crime; Crime, Life Course Theory of; Crime, Schools and; Crime, Social Control Theory of; Crime, Social Learning Theory of; Gangs, Delinquent; Index Crime; Measuring Crime; Race and Crime; Self Control Theory; Social Disorganization Theory; Strain Theories

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K

key informant

Jon H. Rieger

The term key informant is generally associated, though not exclusively, with qualitative research in which a researcher employs interviewing of knowledgeable participants as an important part of the method of investigation. During the often extended period of fieldwork that such research requires, a particular subject may become an especially useful source of information, be repeatedly interviewed, and thus earn designation as a key informant. It is not unusual in field research that at any particular time an investigator might have several informants who could be identified as performing in that role. Key informants can extend the investigator's reach in situations where he or she has not been, or cannot be a direct observer, and they can illuminate the meanings of behavior that the researcher does not understand. They can also serve as a check on the information obtained from other informants.

Varying circumstances may determine who actually ends up serving as a key informant. Sometimes a person becomes a key informant by merit of playing an important role in the social setting being studied. If the researcher is studying an organization, for example, a key informant might turn out to be that person who occupies a central structural position or who may be situated strategically in the communication network within the organization. An individual in such a position is likely to be unusually knowledgeable about the organization and its internal dynamics and may function as a gatekeeper. This circumstance can make his or her cooperation critically important to the success of the research. Properly cultivated, that person may serve not only as a key

informant, but may also function as a potential sponsor and guide.

Another kind of subject who might become a key informant would be an individual who has long experience with the phenomenon being studied: veteran participants are likely to be rich repositories of information. Long term participants in a particular setting potentially provide not only a wealth of useful information but can also bring perspective to their accounts. Researchers tend to be acutely sensitive to those circumstances which may indicate that a particular subject has special or extensive knowledge and may therefore make special recruitment efforts to secure his or her service in that role. Classic studies by Whyte (1955) and Liebow (1967) demonstrate the successful utilization of key informants by social researchers in field settings.

Who will be a key informant is not always predictable, for as often as not, the person who fulfills that role emerges as the research is ongoing. While the researcher may have good reasons to surmise that certain individuals will become key informants, this is not always the way things turn out in field situations. A person who may be desirable as a potential informant may be, for various reasons, insufficiently accessible to the researcher. Issues of trust can interfere with development of the researcher–informant relationship, or there may arise simple conflicts of personality or temperament. Moreover, key informants may shift as the research is ongoing: different phases or aspects of the research may call forth different individuals who can serve as key informants.

The researcher must exercise some care in the choice and employment of informants and in reliance on any of them as key sources. For example, experienced field researchers are generally wary of subjects who present themselves early and enthusiastically to outsiders. Such

individuals may actually be marginal or isolated within their own group. Uncritical use of these subjects may yield information of little value and interfere with gaining access to more reliable sources. The value of a key informant may also be adversely affected by his or her limitations as an observer, or lack of reportorial articulateness or sensitivity. To combat such problems some field researchers have even suggested that key informants be given training for their roles (Pelto & Pelto 1978).

Other perils accompany reliance on key informants. They may harbor unacknowledged biases or be driven by their own private agendas. Alternatively, key informants may distort, embellish, or exaggerate their accounts in an attempt to provide what they believe the researcher wants to hear. On the other hand, informants may willfully falsify or invent information. Chagnon (1977), for example, spent most of his initial field time being systematically lied to by supposed key informants among the Yanomamo Indians in South America, and it took 5 months of effort before he was able to connect with even a single source in the tribe that he could trust, and nearly a year to find a second informant to confirm the accounts of the first.

The value of informants in social research was well recognized at a fairly early stage in the evolution of contemporary research methodology and a substantial literature began to develop on the topic, especially in the 1950s. By the late 1960s virtually every aspect of the potentials and limitations of informant interviews had been pretty thoroughly explored. The basic insights into the use of informants generally, and key informants in particular, date to this classic literature. The value of this approach as a component of a robust social research methodology has thus been well established for several generations, and it has become a fairly standardized part of contemporary methods training (e.g., Warren & Karner 2005). In recent decades, the use of key informants has become a very common procedure in evaluation research, so much so that in some venues it has acquired more formal recognition as the “key informant method.”

SEE ALSO: Ethics, Fieldwork; Ethnography; Evaluation; Grounded Theory; Interviewing,

Structured, Unstructured, and Postmodern; Observation, Participant and Non Participant; Rapport

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Khaldun, Ibn (732–808 AH/1332–1406)

Syed Farid Alatas

Walī al Dīn 'Abd al Rahman ibn Muhammad ibn Khaldun al Tunisi al Hadhrami was born in Tunis on 1 Ramadhan of the Muslim year into an Arab family which originated from the Hadhramaut, Yemen and subsequently settled in Seville at the beginning of the Arab conquest of Spain. His ancestors left Spain for North Africa after the Reconquista and settled in Tunis in the seventh/thirteenth century. Ibn Khaldun was a scholar, teacher, and judge but is best known from the nineteenth century as

the founder of historiography and sociology. Ibn Khaldun received a customary education in the traditional sciences, after which he held posts in various courts in North Africa and Spain. After a number of unsuccessful stints in office he withdrew into seclusion to write his *Muqaddimah*, a prolegomenon to the study of history that was completed in 1378 and which introduces what he believed to be a new science he called *'ilm al 'umran al bashari* (science of civilization) or *'ilm al ijtimā' al insani* (science of human society). Ibn Khaldun's chief works are the *Kitab al 'Ibar wa Dīwan al Muḥtadā' wa al Khabar fi Ayyam al 'Arab wa al 'Ajam wa al Barbar wa man Asar ahum min Dhāmī al Sultan al Akbar* (*Book of Examples and the Collection of Origins of the History of the Arabs and Berbers*); *Muqaddimah* (*Prolegomenon*); *Lubab al Muḥassal fi usul al dīn* (*The Resumé of the Compendium in the Fundamentals of Religion*), being his summary of Fakhr al Dīn al Rāzī's *Compendium of the Sciences of the Ancients and Moderns*; and his autobiography, *Al Ta'rīf bi Ibn Khaldun wa Rihlatuhu Gharban wa Sharqan* (*Biography of Ibn Khaldun and His Travels East and West*).

Ibn Khaldun lived during the period of the political fragmentation and cultural decline of the Arab Muslim world. The picture of chaos and disintegration that Ibn Khaldun grew up with must have influenced the development of his thought. His central concern was the explanation of the rise and decline of states and societies and he believed that he had discovered an original method for this purpose. In fact, his own classification of the major known fields of knowledge cultivated up to his time shows that his science of human society was unknown. The first category, that of the traditional sciences (*al 'ulum al naqliyya*), refers to sciences associated with revealed knowledge, while the second category, that of the rational sciences (*al 'ulum al 'aqliyya*), refers to sciences which arise from the human capacity for reason, sense perception, and observation (ibn Khaldun 1981 [1378]: 435–7, 478). Neither ibn Khaldun's nor earlier classifications of the sciences include *'ilm al 'umran al bashari* or *'ilm al ijtimā' al insani*.

Ibn Khaldun's *Muqaddimah* is a prolegomenon to his larger historical work on the Arabs and Berbers, the *Kitab al 'Ibar*. He begins the

Muqaddimah by problematizing the study of history, suggesting that the only way to distinguish true from false reports and to ascertain the probability and possibility of events is the investigation of human society (ibn Khaldun 1981 [1378]: 38 [1967: I.77]). It is this investigation that he refers to as *'ilm al 'umran al bashari* (science of civilization) or *'ilm al ijtimā' al insani* (science of human society), which may also be translated as sociology. Ibn Khaldun made the distinction between the outer forms (*zahir*) and the inner meaning (*batin*) of history (ibn Khaldun 1981 [1378]: 1 [1967: I.6]). The outer forms consist of facts and reports while the inner meaning refers to explanations of cause and effect. The new science, therefore, is presented by ibn Khaldun as a tool for the study of history and is directed to uncovering the inner meaning of history. The new field of inquiry consists of the following areas: (1) society (*'umran*) in general and its divisions; (2) Bedouin society (*al 'umran al badawa*), tribal societies (*qabail*), and primitive peoples (*al wahshiyah*); (3) the state (*al dawlah*), royal (*mulk*) and caliphate (*khi lafah*) authority; (4) sedentary society (*al 'umran al hadharah*), cities; and (5) the crafts, ways of making a living, occupations. These areas roughly approximate, in the language of the modern social sciences, human or social ecology, rural sociology, political sociology, urban sociology, and the sociology of work. The brief introduction to Ibn Khaldun's sociology that follows looks at the empirical and theoretical aspects of his work.

Empirically, ibn Khaldun's interest was in the study of the rise and fall of the various North African states. This begins with theorizing the differences in social organization between nomadic (*al 'umran al badawa*) and sedentary societies (*'umran hadharah*). Fundamental to his theory is the concept of *'asabiyyah* society with a strong *'asabiyyah* could establish domination over one with a weak *'asabiyyah* (ibn Khaldun 1981 [1378]: 139, 154 [1967: I.284, 313]). In this context, *'asabiyyah* refers to the feeling of solidarity among the members of a group that is derived from the knowledge that they share a common descent. Because of superior *'asabiyyah* among the Bedouin, they could defeat sedentary people in urban areas and establish their own dynasties. Having done so, they became set in the urban ways of life

and experienced great diminution in their *'asabiyyah*. With this went their military strength and their ability to rule.

There are at least two general ways in which *'asabiyyah* declines. One is where the second generation of tribesmen who founded the dynasty experience a change “from the desert attitude to sedentary culture, from privation to luxury, from a state in which everybody shared in the glory to one in which one man claims all the glory for himself while the others are too lazy to strive for (glory), and from proud superiority to humble subservience. Thus, the vigour of group feeling is broken to some extent.” By the third generation *'asabiyyah* disappears completely (ibn Khaldun 1981 [1378]: 171 [1967: I.352]). This left them vulnerable to attack by fresh supplies of pre urban Bedouins with stronger *'asabiyyah* who replaced the weaker urbanized ones. And so the cycle repeats itself.

Another distinct way in which *'asabiyyah* declines is when the “ruler gains complete control over his people, claims royal authority all for himself, excluding them; and prevents them from trying to have a share in it” (ibn Khaldun 1981 [1378]: 175 [1967: I.353]). In other words, when a tribal group establishes a dynasty and its authority becomes legitimate, the ruler can dispense with *'asabiyyah*. The ascendant ruler then rules with the help not of his own people, but of those other tribal groups who have become his clients.

The social cohesion expressed by the concept of *'asabiyyah* is only partly derived from agnatic ties in tribal social organizations. While all tribal groups have stronger or weaker *'asabiyyahs* based on kinship, religion can also bring about such social cohesion, as was the case with the Arabs who needed Islam in order to subordinate themselves and unite as a social organization. But beyond this social psychological aspect of *'asabiyyah*, there are its material manifestations. *'Asabiyyah* refers to the authority that is wielded by the leader that derives, in addition, from his material standing as a result of profits from trade and appropriation from raiding activities. For ibn Khaldun, then, *'asabiyyah* referred to (1) kinship ties, (2) a socially cohesive religion such as Islam that provided a shared idiom legitimizing the leader's aspirations for power and authority, and

(3) the strength of the leader derived from trade, booty, pillage, and conquest.

Ibn Khaldun resigned himself to the eternal repetition of the cycle. He did not foresee developments that would lead to the elimination of the cycle. This happened with the Ottomans, the Qajar dynasty in Iran, and the state in the Yemen. The cycle ceased to be in operation when the basis of state power was no longer tribal. In Ibn Khaldun's world, ordinary folk were caught between the oppressive policies and conduct of a royal authority on one hand, and the other the prospects of conquest by bloodthirsty tribesmen led by a religious leader bent on destruction of the existing order.

Underlying the above substantive concerns is ibn Khaldun's interest in elaborating a new science of society. An understanding of the relationships among the state and society, group feeling or solidarity, and the question of the end of society requires an application of Aristotle's four types of causes, the formal, material, efficient, and final cause (Mahdi 1957: ch. 5). Understanding the inner meaning of history is to know the nature of society, which in turn requires the study of its causes. The causes are what gives society its constitution (material cause), its definition (formal cause), the motive forces of society (efficient cause), and society's end (final cause) (Mahdi 1957: 233–4, 253, 270). The material cause or the “substratum” of society is identified by ibn Khaldun as the constituent elements of society such as economic life and urban institutions (Mahdi 1957: 234). What gives definition to society, the formal cause, is the organizing ability of the state (Mahdi 1957: 235). But the material and formal causes are united by an efficient cause, solidarity or group feeling (*'asabiyyah*), which is the primary factor effecting societal change (Mahdi 1957: 253–4, 261). As society has a goal or end, the final cause also enters into the analysis. The end is the common good, for the sake of which the society, state, and solidarity (the material, formal, and efficient causes) exercise their causality (Mahdi 1957: 270). The above can be said to be the elements of ibn Khaldun's general sociology, applicable to all types of societies, nomadic or sedentary, feudal or prebendal, Muslim or non Muslim.

There are numerous works on ibn Khaldun's life and thought, including an autobiography. There are not many modern biographies of ibn Khaldun, but a well known one was authored by an early Egyptian sociologist, Muhammad Abdullah Enan, and is available in both the Arabic original and English translation (1941, 1953). Ibn Khaldun has been widely written on in the Arab and Muslim world as a precursor of modern sociology. Well known examples are 'Abd al 'Aziz 'Izzat's thesis in 1932 entitled *Ibn Khaldun et sa science sociale* supervised by Fauconnier and Maunier in France (Roussillon 1992: 56 n48) and another work comparing ibn Khaldun and Émile Durkheim ('Izzat 1952). Ali Abd al Wahid Wafi undertook a comparative study of ibn Khaldun and Auguste Comte (1951) and wrote a much cited work on ibn Khaldun as the founder of sociology (1962).

Ibn Khaldun has been recognized as a founder of sociology by earlier generations of sociologists (Kremer 1879; Flint 1893: 158ff.; Gumpłowicz 1928 [1899]: 90–114; Maunier 1913; Oppenheimer 1922–35: II.173ff., IV.251ff.; Ortega y Gasset 1976–8 [1934]). Becker and Barnes in their *Social Thought from Lore to Science*, first published in 1938, devote many pages to a discussion of the ideas of ibn Khaldun, recognizing that he was the first to apply modern like ideas in historical sociology.

However, this degree of recognition has not been accorded to ibn Khaldun in contemporary teaching and the writing of the history of sociology. A neo Khaldunian sociology has yet to be developed. There has always been little interest in developing his ideas, combining them with concepts derived from modern sociology, and applying theoretical frameworks derived from his thought to historical and empirical realities.

There have been few works which have gone beyond the mere comparison of some ideas and concepts in ibn Khaldun with those of modern western scholars toward the theoretical integration of his theory into a framework that employs some of the tools of modern social science (Gellner 1981; Lacoste 1984; Carre 1988; Alatas 1993).

SEE ALSO: 'Asabiyyah; Gökalp, Ziya; Islam; Sociology; Theory

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kindergarten

Valerie E. Lee and David T. Burkam

The idea of a kindergarten originated in 1840, after the German educationalist Friedrich Froebel opened a Play and Activity Institute for children between the ages of 3 and 7 to develop their mental, social, and emotional faculties. The term is now used in many parts of the world for the initial stages of a child's classroom schooling. In some countries kindergarten is part of the formal school system, but in others it usually refers to preschool or day care programs. In France and Germany such programs are separate from the schools and are often run by churches and local community groups. In India, Mexico, and the US kindergarten programs are available through both public and private schools.

Many aspects of children's education in kindergarten are important in a sociological context. However, the discussion here is restricted to a few important issues about kindergarten in the US: (1) differences in children's social and cognitive status as they begin their formal schooling in kindergarten; (2) how these social and cognitive differences map onto the quality of the schools where they experience kindergarten; and (3) how differences in children's cognitive growth in kindergarten are associated with whether their experiences are in full day or half day programs.

When US children should begin their formal schooling, and what the nature of that schooling should be, has been debated for almost two

centuries (Ramey & Campbell 1991; Pianta & Cox 1999). Although the availability of publicly funded preschool education (including Head Start) is far from universal and is typically restricted to low income children, virtually all US children now attend kindergarten. Despite its universality, the nature of the optimal kindergarten experience is widely debated among educators, early childhood specialists, parents, and researchers (Vecchiotti 2001). Since the 1960s, experts have called for more than "self directed play." Among early childhood experts, "early intervention" typically refers to activities that include both play and academics.

Children neither begin nor end their education on an equal footing. Although kindergarten is where virtually all US children begin their formal schooling, many have early and informal schooling experiences in preschool, Head Start, or childcare (Olsen & Zigler 1989). Although all children enter kindergarten at close to the same age (typically, 5 years old), there is great variation in their cognitive and social skills as they start school (Alexander & Entwisle 1988; Ramey & Campbell 1991; Duncan et al. 1998; Pianta & Cox 1999). Moreover, cognitive and social status are typically associated with family background and race/ethnicity (Jencks & Phillips 1998). Using data from the current and nationally representative US Department of Education's Early Childhood Longitudinal Study, Kindergarten Cohort (ECLS K), Lee and Burkam (2002) reported substantial differences in young children's test scores in literacy and mathematics by race, ethnicity, and socioeconomic status (SES) as they begin kindergarten.

Such substantial cognitive and social differences among children as they begin school present a serious conundrum. On the one hand, school is seen by the broader society as the location where social inequalities should be reduced. Advantages and disadvantages that children experience at home should not determine what happens to them in school. Rather, school is a place where children should have equal chances to make the most of their potential. On the other hand, schools often tailor children's educational activities to their perceived potential (or cognitive status), which would increase rather than equalize social

differences. Kindergarten is where this conundrum about the proper role of schooling in either equalizing or magnifying cognitive and social differences begins.

Researchers and policymakers agree that social background factors are associated with school success. Moreover, research findings are consistent that social stratification in educational outcomes increases as children move through school. However, there is less agreement about the causes of increasingly stratified outcomes. One explanation for growing inequality is that children's educational experiences are differentiated as early as kindergarten – through reading groups, special education placement, and retention (Alexander & Entwisle 1988). Many educators see such differential experiences as appropriate responses to the cognitive and behavioral differences children bring to kindergarten. Such differentiation extends through elementary school through ability grouping, special education, and gifted and talented programs. They are well recognized by high school, through tracking, advanced placement, and the like.

Another explanation for increases in socially based cognitive differences relates to the schools children attend, although this link has typically been assumed rather than subjected to empirical scrutiny. The association between background and school quality means that disadvantages derived from the lack of home resources that might stimulate cognitive growth are frequently reinforced by a lack of school resources (both financial and human). The low resource base of such schools constrains their ability to compensate for poor children's weak preparation.

Lee and Burkam (2002) used ECLS K to explore the link between young children's social background, defined by race/ethnicity and socioeconomic status (particularly poverty or economic need) and the quality of the schools where they attend kindergarten. School quality was broadly defined with a wide array of measures. Although background factors were not equally strongly associated with all measures of school quality, the patterns of association were strikingly consistent. Black, Hispanic, and lower SES children begin school at kindergarten in systematically lower quality elementary schools than their more advantaged and white counterparts. Whether defined by less favorable

social contexts, larger kindergarten classes, less outreach to smooth the transition to first grade, less well prepared and experienced teachers, less positive attitudes among teachers, fewer school resources, or poor neighborhood and school conditions, the least advantaged US children were shown to begin their formal schooling in consistently lower quality schools.

The consistency of these findings across aspects of school quality very different from one another was both striking and troubling. The least advantaged children in the US, who also begin their formal schooling at a substantial cognitive disadvantage, are systematically mapped into the nation's worst schools. Moreover, there is a strong association between the type of communities where schools are located (large or medium city, suburbs, small town, or rural area) and the quality of their public schools. The lowest quality schools are in large cities; the highest quality schools are located in the suburbs, where the most affluent citizens reside. Those findings translate into a sobering conclusion: children who need the best schooling actually start their education in the nation's worst public schools.

As kindergarten attendance has moved toward universality, pressure has mounted among policymakers to increase the cognitive demands made on kindergarten students. One way to accomplish this is to keep children in school longer. Several demographic and socio-cultural factors explain the growing implementation of full day kindergarten. The proportion of working mothers with children under 6 is increasing; over 60 percent of these mothers are now in the workforce. Moreover, for growing numbers of children, rather than their first school experience, kindergarten fits into a continuum routinely beginning with childcare and/or a pre kindergarten or preschool experience and moves through elementary school (Olsen & Zigler 1989). Since the mid 1970s more and more children under 5 have attended preschool programs: private or public preschools, Head Start, or childcare. Proponents of full day kindergarten believe that, as a result of their childcare and preschool experiences, children are ready for more demanding and cognitively oriented educational programs. Recent scientific, technological, and economic developments

have thrust the importance of academic success, especially in literacy and numeracy, into the forefront of social discourse. Public and political forces collectively impose enormous pressures on schools to focus on children's academic achievement, and this focus begins earlier and earlier.

Full day kindergarten advocates suggest that a longer school day provides educational support that ensures a productive beginning school experience and increases the chances of future school success, particularly for poor children. The growing diversity among kindergarten children's racial, ethnic, cultural, social, economic, and linguistic backgrounds challenges educators to serve children well in increasingly complex classrooms. Full day advocates suggest numerous advantages of a longer kindergarten day: (1) it allows teachers more opportunity to assess children's educational needs and individualize instruction; (2) it makes small group learning experiences more feasible; (3) it engages children in a broader range of learning experiences; (4) it provides opportunities for in depth exploration of a curriculum; (5) it provides opportunities for closer teacher-parent relationships; and (6) it benefits working parents.

Not all educators, researchers, and parents favor full day kindergarten. Detractors argue that children in full day programs risk stress and fatigue due to the long day. However, research reveals that children attending full day kindergarten demonstrate less frustration than children in half day programs and do not show evidence of fatigue (Elicker & Mathur 1997). Others argue that full day kindergarten increases the chance that children will be expected to achieve and perform beyond their developmental capabilities (Olsen & Zigler 1989).

Full day programs in public schools enroll less advantaged children (those whose families are lower SES and/or minority). Full day programs are more common in public schools located in large US cities, which enroll less affluent and more minority children (Lee & Burkam 2002). A logical explanation for these trends focuses on public efforts to induce social equity. Despite the higher cost of operating full day kindergarten programs, their implementation may have a compensatory purpose. Schools with disadvantaged populations are able to offer

such programs because Title 1 funds (US federal money that assists schools with high numbers or percentages of poor children to ensure that all children meet academic achievement standards) could cover the added costs.

Although the relative impact of full day and half day kindergarten programs has been subjected to considerable empirical scrutiny, the quality of this research base is not strong. Many such studies are quite dated; many have weak research designs. Although some studies explore affective outcomes, most focus on cognitive performance. In general, research findings favor full day (or extended day) kindergarten over half day programs for academic performance. Further, some studies suggest that full day kindergarten is especially effective for socially and educationally disadvantaged children (Elicker & Mathur 1997). Whereas some studies document long term benefits of full day kindergarten, others report no long term effects. No study demonstrates academic advantages for children in half day kindergarten.

A recent study improved on the extant research based on this topic in several ways (Lee et al. 2001). First, it used current and representative samples from ECLS K. Second, it made use of more appropriate multilevel analysis methods. Third, its conclusions were located within policies that consider costs and benefits of full day programs. Although kindergarten is now close to universal in the US, only about half (55 percent) of schools offer kindergarten exclusively in a full day format. Full day programs are more common both in private schools and as compensatory programs (i.e., in inner city schools enrolling high proportions of low income and minority children).

Findings of the study strongly favored full day programs, with between school advantages of almost one standard deviation on gains over the kindergarten year in both literacy and mathematics achievement. This translated into over a month's learning advantage in both subjects. Although the time spent in school was twice as long in full day than half day kindergartens, the time spent on academic instruction was not double. Asking whether the benefits are worth the cost, the authors concluded that they are. Although costs for moving to full day programs include doubling the numbers of kindergarten teachers and increasing classroom space,

the benefits in academic terms are substantial, with potential long term benefits of less remediation or retention. Evaluations of educational interventions, particularly at the national level, have seldom reported cognitive advantages this large.

Although offering kindergarten to all in the educational landscape of the US is no longer contested, there is considerably less agreement about the nature of the optimal kindergarten experience. Further research is needed to determine the ideal length of the kindergarten day, and how much of children's kindergarten experiences should focus on academics and how much should be devoted to play and socialization. In addition, numerous equity issues need to be addressed through careful investigations into whether children's academic experiences in kindergarten should be tailored to their cognitive status at entry, and whether full day kindergarten should be an aspect of compensatory education, so that only low income and/or low performing children have access to such programs at public expense. As the first formal educational setting that virtually all US children experience, ongoing research needs to provide an understanding of how children's academic and social experiences in kindergarten lay the groundwork for their educational trajectories.

SEE ALSO: Childhood; Early Childhood; Educational Inequality; Ethnic Groups; Family Poverty; Poverty; Race and Schools; School Transitions; Urban Education; Urban Poverty

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King, Martin Luther (1929–68)

John H. Stanfield

Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr., was not only an internationally renowned civil rights leader, but was also a public sociologist par excellence. King was born into a family and local community of socially involved ministers, deeply dedicated to issues of racial justice, in Atlanta, Georgia. His father was the pastor of Ebenezer Baptist Church, located in the now famous Auburn Avenue black community in Atlanta, who along with peers such as the Rev. William Borders, pastor of the Wheat Street Baptist Church, and John Dobbs, informally called the Mayor of Sweet Auburn, created a community culture that was highly critical of the racial status quo. It was in the Auburn Avenue community that King developed his lifelong commitment to social justice that would become refined as he was educated and went through the experiences of being a leader of a powerful social movement. This is important to keep in

mind since often, while analyzing the contributions of King, it has been common to forget, or to undervalue, the influences of his community of origin. It was here that he was exposed, at an early age, to highly educated black men who took bold public stances against the racial oppression of their day.

His time at Morehouse College as an undergraduate (1944–8) coincided with the most influential years of Benjamin E. Mays, the institution's president, who was a practical theologian and public sociologist who published what was considered to be, for many years, the seminal text on the sociology of the black church. Mays, who was appointed as Morehouse president in the early 1940s, transformed this remarkable liberal arts college for black men into a sociological learning community teaching social justice and egalitarian values which permeated the culture of the campus and were reinforced by Mays's mandatory Tuesday Chapel talks to Morehouse men. Besides the leadership of Mays, the ideas and insights of Walter Chivers, the longtime chair of the Morehouse department of sociology in which he majored, had a profound influence on King. Chivers was the chief black community researcher for Arthur Raper's (1933) *The Tragedy of Lynching*, 1 of public sociological activist research in the South. From the 1940s until the late 1960s, when he retired, Chivers directed the Morehouse Family Institute, which sponsored annual conferences designed to translate academic knowledge about family issues for black community members who would be invited to these campus events. Chivers's approach would have a profound influence on how King subsequently valued the capacity of sociology as a discipline to bring about social transformation.

King would learn as well the importance of careful empirical sociological research from spending a summer working as a research assistant for the Afro Caribbean Quaker sociologist Ira de A. Reid, who was on the Atlanta University Center faculty for a brief time. It should be mentioned that the reflective sociological reasoning typical of the culture of Morehouse College also involved the department of religion, which included professors such as S. M. Williams, who encouraged Morehouse students not only to study religious ideas, but also to be active in addressing questions of social

inequality in a Jim Crow society. King's profound ethical and sociological critiques of race in American society, such as *The Letter from Birmingham Jail* and his "I Have a Dream" speech, were shaped by an older Morehouse professor, Howard Thurman, who was a theologian with a strong sociological imagination, as best seen in his book *Jesus and the Disinherited* (1949). (While Thurman was dean of Boston University's Marsh Chapel, he would introduce King, then a doctoral student, to the ideas of Gandhi.)

Thus, wherever King turned in the Morehouse curriculum there was the emphasis on thinking sociologically to promote the public good of racial justice. Surviving papers from King's Morehouse and Crozier Seminary days reveal a young man with a keen sociological approach to theology and community justice issues. This pattern would continue in his sermons, which also tended to have a deep reflective sociological focus. That King identified himself as a sociologist can be seen in his willingness to write prefaces to sociological texts such as Daniel Thompson's (1963) classical study of the black leadership class. He also wrote at least one essay on the use of the behavioral sciences in efforts to transform communities and societies. King's first book, *Stride Towards Freedom* (1958), was a personal ethnographic account of the origins and development of the 1955 Montgomery Bus Boycott, which is still a seminal handbook on how to organize a local social movement. It also includes one of the first sociological discussions about non violence as a means to achieve what would be eventually called restorative justice. Lastly, when King went to Stockholm in 1964, one of the people he most wanted to see was Gunnar Myrdal, the Swedish economist whose monumental *An American Dilemma* (1944) had greatly influenced his views on race as a social and moral problem in the US.

King's leadership of the Southern Christian Leadership Conference during the 1960s, like his command over the Montgomery Bus Boycott during the mid 1950s, demonstrated his skills as an applied public sociologist. His capacity to manage men and women with strong personalities and his extraordinary ability to delegate authority as a self effacing leader were amazing. He was also a master of the media

during an age in which television was beginning to become the dominant force in mass communications. If it were not for King's skill at dealing with the media, as well as his political acumen, his movement would not have been nearly as effective as it was. When King was assassinated in Memphis in 1968, he was being increasingly criticized, as his movement began to falter outside the South and due to his opposition to the Vietnam War. Also, as indicated in his 1964 Nobel Peace Prize lecture, he was beginning to turn, at least since the early 1960s, to economic questions, which made many traditional supporters of his movement, including those in the media, increasingly uncomfortable. That is to say, he began to inch closer to the perspectives of emerging Black Power leaders who were advocating black economic empowerment.

King's ability to take academically challenging theological and sociological ideas and translate them effectively for mass appeal made him a most unusual example of what a public sociologist does, and for whom. Nevertheless, the most distinctive dimension of King's sociology was his integration of spiritual and interfaith concerns into his social analysis of racial problems and other important issues during his time, such as poverty and war. His sermons, lectures, and books have fascinating illustrations of how his spiritual values are intertwined with his astute sociological analyses. In doing this, King's approach provides a model for those sociologists interested in the ethical and spiritual dimensions of human experiences, and an example for those theologians wishing to understand the sociological context for religious studies.

SEE ALSO: *American Dilemma, An* (Gunnar Myrdal); Civil Rights Movement; Leadership; Race and Ethnic Politics; Social Movements, Non Violent

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Kinsey, Alfred (1892–1956)

Ken Plummer

Alfred Kinsey was not by training a sociologist, but a biologist (specializing in the taxonomy of gall wasps) at Indiana University, Bloomington. Believing there was a need for a course about marriage and sexual behavior, in 1938 he was concerned to find little data on which to base such study. According to one small study at that time, some 96 percent of young Americans did not know the word masturbation and many thought it was a form of insanity. In general there was widespread ignorance, and he decided to conduct his own study of the sexual behavior of the American female and male during the 1930s to 1950s – most prominently as *The Sexual Behavior of the Human Male* (1948) and *The Sexual Behavior of the Human Female* (1953), and after his death, less well known studies such as *Sex Offenders* (1965). Ultimately providing some 18,000 life stories of individuals (many of whom he interviewed himself), it was largely taxonomic – a “social book keeping” exercise showing who does what with whom, where, when, and how often. Using the interviews, he and his colleagues asked around 300 questions. When published, his work was a large statistical and scientific study, but curiously it became a national bestseller and played a prominent role in shaping US cultural life in the later part of the twentieth century (Reumann 2005).

His work was largely atheoretical, but his data showed dramatically how sexual behavior was related to social forces. (The theoretical

implications were later drawn out by John Gagnon and William Simon, especially in their theory of social scripting.)

For Kinsey, matters such as social class, age, marriage, urban living, and religion seriously shaped social patterns of sexual behavior. His work documented significant differences between men and women, noting that “the range of variation in the female far exceeds the range of variation in the male” (Kinsey et al. 1953: 537–8; see tables in vol. 2), as well as across social classes. He also showed a wide range of variant sexual behavior; for example, finding very high rates of extramarital and premarital sex, high rates of masturbation, curiously high rates of zoophilia, and most famously of all very high rates of homosexual behavior. He found much higher rates of participation in homosexual acts than previously thought, and invented the heterosexual–homosexual continuum with a point scale ranging from “exclusively homosexual” (Kinsey 6) through to “exclusively heterosexual” (Kinsey 0) (Kinsey et al. 1953: 470).

Among his other major contributions was the refinement of interview research tools – a major appendix on research strategy is included in the first volume and it became required reading for many students of sociology during the 1950s and 1960s. His interviews required great sensitivity in eliciting material, and his sample depended upon volunteers. It remains one of the most detailed large sample studies to date, though it depended upon volunteers and did not use random sampling.

Kinsey’s work has been much criticized. Apart from many moralists who condemned his work as obscene, there were others (such as Lionel Trilling) who argued that the focus on sexual behavior – of measuring who does what to whom, where, and when – managed to reduce sex to orgasm counting while robbing it of meaningful humanity. The importance of love was minimized (but Kinsey argued that this was not measurable and this was his concern). Radical (or anti libertarian) feminists came to criticize it for its tacit celebration of male power, for its emphasis on pleasure while ignoring the danger of sexuality, and for the violence often perpetrated upon women. (Although many also argued that it made women’s hitherto neglected and denied sexuality much more active and visible.) Sociologists were later very critical of

its methodology: it did not employ a random probability sample but depended on volunteers, and hence, although large, the sample was seen as very biased. Further, the sample was not representative, and the interviews were not very accurate.

But others have seen it as a trailblazing study. For its time, the study was actually a remarkable methodological achievement, not least due to Kinsey’s pioneering, single minded efforts. In time, not only did it come to inspire many subsequent empirical works on human sexual behavior, but sociologists eventually became part of a team of researchers and helped the research take both a more theoretical (sexual scripting) and therapeutic turn. Robinson (1976) suggested that the key contribution of Kinsey’s work was its impact on society: it rendered sexuality more democratic and generated an “ideology of tolerance” around sexuality that has now permeated culture. This, in turn, was built “on Kinsey’s discovery of the remarkable variety of human experience.” Kinsey also established the Kinsey Institute (formally known as the Kinsey Institute for Research in Sex, Gender, and Reproduction), which exists to this day in Bloomington, Indiana. Part of its work became therapeutic training for practitioners, and as such it played a prominent role in the development of sex therapy and sexology, though it has often been under continuing critiques.

Kinsey’s own life has been the subject of both biography (Jones 1970; Gathorne Hardy 1998) and film. He may have looked the picture of conservative America (complete with his bow tie): he was “happily married” and his work took on the mantle of objectivity and respectability. But as recent writing has shown, Kinsey and his colleagues were in fact “sexual enthusiasts,” very accepting of a wide range of sexual diversities, and implicitly very critical of the moralism that dominated US sexual mores. He was ultimately attacked as a communist out to destroy the family and he became depressed – dying in ignominy of a heart attack at the age of 62. He was never to know his profound influence in making people aware of sexual issues, and in trailblazing the field of sexology and sex research. His work has played a major role in the development both of the study of sexuality as a serious area and in creating a very different sexual culture.

SEE ALSO: Homosexuality; Sexuality Research: Ethics; Sexuality Research: History; Scripting Theories; Sexuality; Sexuality Research: Methods

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kinship

Graham Allan

The study of kinship tends to be associated more closely with social anthropology than with sociology. In large part, this is a consequence of anthropologists frequently studying societies in which social and economic organization was premised to a great extent on the obligations and responsibilities that kin had towards one another. Consequently, understanding the kinship system operating in such a society provided the anthropologist with a means of revealing the society's dominant structural characteristics. In contrast, sociologists focused more on industrial societies in which family and kinship solidarities, while of consequence, were far less central to the overall organization of social and economic life. Indeed, often, family relationships were understood to be of declining significance

within western societies. Like the collapse of community, the decline of kinship solidarities was understood as a necessary consequence of the economic specialization and bureaucratic rationalization associated with modernity and industrial development.

In focusing on kinship systems anthropologists are concerned with specifying the principles which underlie the dominant forms of kinship behavior, commitments, and solidarities occurring within the society they are studying. They examine such issues as who is recognized as kin; what the boundaries of kinship are; what the social and economic consequences of particular kinship positions are; whether some categories of kin (e.g., patrilineal or matrilineal kin) are privileged over others; how kinship groups operate to protect their economic interests; and the like. Such questions about the kinship system as a system can also be asked of western societies, even while recognizing that kinship is structurally of less importance in these societies. Indeed, in many ways, the long history of moral panics and polemical debates concerning the state of contemporary family life can be recognized as essentially debates about the character of the contemporary kinship system in the society in question.

Historically, the sociologist who has been most influential in analyses of western kinship systems is Talcott Parsons (1949, 1955). His argument, building on the work of earlier European social theorists, was that the family and kinship system emergent in developed industrial societies could best be characterized as a *nuclear family* system. This form of kinship system, according to Parsons, was best suited (i.e., functionally most compatible) to meet the economic requirements of industrial societies. The essence of the nuclear family system is that each individual's primary obligations are defined as being to his or her nuclear family of spouse/partner and dependent children. Parsons argues that the absence of extensive kinship obligations outside the nuclear family facilitates mobility among the labor force and limits the extent to which kinship obligations potentially undermine dominant organizational requirements for fair and equal treatment. Other sociologists, in particular W. J. Goode in his book *World Revolution and Family Patterns* (1964), developed Parsons's ideas further by attempting to demonstrate that a wide range of

contemporary societies were merging towards a common nuclear family system.

In evaluating Parsons's views of kinship, it is important to recognize that his concept of structural isolation does not equate with either social isolation or an absence of all obligations. What it does assert is that responsibilities to nuclear family members are prioritized over obligations to other kin. In other words, the argument is that within the dominant kinship system a relatively strong boundary is drawn between nuclear family members and other kin. Other writers have queried how strong this boundary really is. Litwak and his associates in particular emphasized the important role that other family members outside the nuclear family household play in sustaining social life (see Harris 1983). Certainly, there is now ample evidence that in industrial societies primary kin – mothers, fathers, sons, daughters, siblings – generally remain significant throughout a person's life, and not just when they reside together as a nuclear family. Typically, though not invariably, these kin act as resources for one another, being part of an individual's personal support network for coping with different contingencies.

Thus, while a person's primary responsibilities are usually to their spouse/partner and dependent children, there remains a continuing solidarity with other kin. In particular, a parent's concern for children does not end when the child becomes adult, and few adult children have no sense of commitment to their parents. Yet importantly, this solidarity is *permissive* rather than *obligatory* (Allan 1979). That is, within most western societies, the "rules" of kinship are not tightly framed. Typically, neither the law nor custom specifies how relationships with non nuclear kin should be ordered. Instead, there is a relative freedom for individuals to work out or "negotiate" how their kinship relationships should be patterned. Within this, of course, some groups or subcultures have stronger social regulation of kinship relations than others. For example, many migrant minority groups, especially those with a specific religious commitment, draw on kinship as a means of coping in a foreign and sometimes hostile environment, of advancing their economic interests, and of protecting and celebrating their culture.

The extent to which forms of negotiation occur between kin has been highlighted in

Finch and Mason's (1993) research in Britain. They were concerned with the nature of kinship obligation in general, but more specifically with how families determine who provides support to elderly parents as they become more infirm. Their argument is that kinship obligations and responsibilities are not culturally specified – they do not follow "a preordained set of social rules." Rather, in any particular instance, a process of "negotiation" occurs through which decisions come to be made. Importantly, such negotiation does not occur in isolation, but is framed by the biographical development of the relationships in question. In other words, previous kinship behavior, as well as knowledge of the personalities and commitments of those involved, form part of the context in which the negotiation occurs. Moreover, Finch and Mason (1993) highlight three different modes of negotiation that can occur. These are: *open discussions*, *clear intentions*, and *non decisions*. As the name implies, the first is where two or more kin openly discuss and negotiate potential responses to the issue in question. The second is where a particular individual decides on a course of action and conveys this to other kin involved without really allowing any wider discussion. The final category, non decisions, arises where, because of the circumstances of those involved, a particular course of action emerges as "obvious" to all without any explicit decision taking ever occurring.

The importance of Finch and Mason's analysis is that it highlights the role of agency as well as structure in kin behavior. While there are clear patterns in the ways kin behave toward one another (e.g., in the greater likelihood of daughters rather than sons providing parents with personal care in later old age) there is also a great deal of variation. As an illustration, there is solidarity between siblings, but the ways in which that solidarity is expressed vary depending on the circumstances of the siblings, their other commitments, and the history of their relationship. So too there can be diversity in who is regarded as kin, which kinship ties are honored, and what activities and topics of conversation are seen as relevant within different kin relationships. Furthermore, all these matters are liable to change over time as people's circumstances alter. Thus, within contemporary western society, kinship position does not

of itself determine how people behave towards their kin or the responsibilities they feel.

The variation there is in people's attitudes and behavior towards kin has been compounded over the last 30 years by significant changes in patterns of family formation and dissolution. Most obviously, there has been the substantial growth in divorce and remarriage. Of themselves, these raise questions about the categorization and meaning of kinship. For example, are ex spouses categorized as kin? Under what circumstances? When, if at all, are their kin categorized as kin? Similarly, to what degree and under what circumstances does a stepparent or a stepchild become kin? Are they likely to be so regarded without co residence? Equally, what are the kinship consequences of cohabitation, a pattern of partnership which is becoming increasingly common? When do cohabitantes come to be regarded as kin, either by their partner or by their partner's other kin? Such questions do not have clear cut answers; there is a relative absence of kinship "rules" governing these matters. Instead, the nature of the relationships which develop and the extent to which they are understood as operating within a kinship frame are emergent, and in this sense "negotiated" in line with Finch and Mason's (1993) arguments.

One other important property of kinship is worth noting. As implied above, kinship is not just about individual relationships. The collective element of kinship is central to understanding kinship behavior. That is, kinship is a network of relationships in which each tie is influenced by, and in turn influences, the others. The effective boundaries of the network vary for different people, over time and for different contents. But typically news, information, and gossip flow readily through the network, with some individuals acting as "kin keepers." For example, mothers often play a key role in passing news on to their children and facilitating contact at times of family ceremonial. In part it is because kinship operates as a network that a focus on negotiation is so useful for understanding kinship processes. Similarly, the issues raised above concerning when new partners come to be regarded as kin or whether stepparents are kin are not solely individual issues. In part, what matters is whether others in the kinship network regard

them as "family," too. In many ways it is the network properties of kinship that distinguish it most clearly from other personal ties and which encourage the "diffuse, enduring solidarity" which Schneider (1968) defines as characteristic of American kinship – and by implication other western kinship.

SEE ALSO: Family Diversity; Family, Sociology of; Grandparenthood; Lesbian and Gay Families; Marriage; Parsons, Talcott; Sibling Ties; Stepfamilies

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Kitsuse, John I. (1923–2003)

Axel Groenemeyer

John I. Kitsuse was one of the premier and most influential contributors to the social constructionist movement from the 1960s, which changed the way sociologists approached the

study of social problems, normality, deviance, and control. Born a second generation Japanese American in California, Kitsuse was imprisoned in an internment camp for one year during World War II. He earned his bachelor's degree from Boston University and his master's and PhD from UCLA before he became professor of sociology at Northwestern University in 1958. From 1974 until 1991 he was professor of sociology at University of California San Diego. He served as president of the Society for the Study of Social Problems from 1978 to 1979. He died in California.

Kitsuse started his academic career with contributions on migration and social integration, especially of Japanese migrants in the US (Broom & Kitsuse 1955, 1956), and with research on education and the school system in the US (Chandler et al. 1962; Cicourel & Kitsuse 1963). However, he is primarily known as one of the founding fathers of the labeling approach to deviant behavior in the 1960s and for his contributions to the perspective of constructivism on social problems from the 1970s on.

The basic methodological and epistemological perspective of Kitsuse could best be described with a story, written at the beginning of his book *Constructing the Social* (Sarbin & Kitsuse 1994). Three referees are involved in a discussion. The first one, a self confident realist, argued that he would punish every foul according to the rules of the game. The second one, more cautious and influenced by the perspective of symbolic interaction, answered: "I only punish the fouls as and how I see them." After that, the third one, a convinced constructivist, stated: "There will only be a foul when I punish it." There is no doubt that Kitsuse, at least after the early 1960s, followed the perspective of the third referee. Even if the basic ideas of the then so called labeling approach had been developed long before by Tannenbaum (1938) and Lemert (1951), this radical subjectivism and relativism had not become convincing before the 1960s, with its political and intellectual climate of political mobilization for civil rights and other social movements, and the criminalizing reactions of the state. The reactions of agencies of social control and their consequences in the construction of deviant labels and careers, the scrutinizing of basic and commonly held categories of deviance and

conformity, and the opening of sociology to the perspectives of "underdogs" became the main interests of a whole generation of sociologists and constituted the base for a fundamental criticism of the supremacy of structural functionalism in sociology and of positivist criminology, which had always been interested only in the individual pathologies of offenders.

Among the "fathers" of this new approach of the sociology of deviance – sometimes called the New Chicago School from California (David Matza, Sheldon L. Messinger, Howard B. Becker, Aaron V. Cicourel, Erving Goffman, Edwin M. Lemert, Harold Garfinkel) – Kitsuse was one of the first to formulate this research program in a radical way (Kitsuse 1962, 1964; Kitsuse & Cicourel 1963). Whereas this new perspective had been popularized by the work of Howard Becker (1963), who had been influenced more by Everett C. Hughes and Edwin H. Sutherland and the theory of learning, and by Erving Goffman's (1963) analysis of stigma and identity development, Kitsuse had already use a constructivist perspective (even if it had not been so named at this time).

Although the labeling approach very often has been linked to symbolic interaction, ethno methodology, or phenomenology, it never developed a consistent theory. This has not only been a major criticism of the perspective from outside its ranks, but also by Kitsuse (1975) himself. However, against its critics (e.g., Gove 1975), he insisted on the methodological position that the process of labeling could not be reduced to another cause of deviance among others. In this, he followed the line of argumentation developed in the classic text of Kitsuse and Cicourel (1963). The objective of this analysis was not the dismantling of measurement problems of official statistics on crime, but to show that these statistics are basically *not* statistics of crime. Instead, they have to be seen as a representation of the activities of the agencies of social control. In this formulation there are no measurement problems of crime in official statistics because they do not measure criminal activities. Unlike Becker (1963) and Lemert (1951), Kitsuse insists there will only be a criminal offense if and when this label is successfully applied. From this perspective the idea of undetected crime does not make any sense. As a consequence the only interesting issue in

the sociology of deviance and crime has to be the processes by which deviant labels are constructed and applied to certain categories of behavior and people. Deviant behavior cannot be explained by existing social norms, but must be analyzed as the activities of social control.

Even if the labeling perspective of Kitsuse had not been named constructivist, its central arguments certainly followed this idea and laid the groundwork for the more theoretical formulations that – since the publication of *Constructing Social Problems* (Spector & Kitsuse 1977) – dominated the sociology of social problems, at least in the US. This book, which was an elaboration of ideas published previously (Kitsuse & Spector 1973, 1975; Spector & Kitsuse 1973), defined the field of social problems from a new perspective. Social problems were no longer rooted in social structures and social change as in theories of social disorganization, anomie, and social pathology, but had to be analyzed as “activities of individuals or groups making assertions of grievances and claims with respect to some putative conditions” (Spector & Kitsuse 1977: 75). “Claims making activities” now constitute the basic research question, and very often the perspective of reconstructing the establishment of specific issues as problematic in public discourses is seen as the only legitimate and characteristic research question in the sociology of social problems.

Criticisms about inconsistencies in his argumentation (for not having followed the methodological perspective of constructivism consistently) (Woolgar & Pawluch 1985) led Kitsuse to reformulate this perspective in a more linguistic form of discourse analysis (Ibarra & Kitsuse 1993). Whereas in *Constructing Social Problems* the main focus of analysis was on activities and collective actors that define issues as social problems on the public agenda, now social problems should be analyzed as cognitive structures – “vernacular constituents” – of texts and narratives. With this “linguistic turn” any reference to the real world of social conditions and actors was dismissed from the sociology of social problems: they are just a special game of rhetoric and counter rhetoric. The role of sociological knowledge is reduced to that of developing convincing narratives that could offer some new perspectives. The central criterion for the validity of these narratives

is not a somehow constructed correspondence with some social reality, but its coherence and dramatic structure (Sarbin and Kitsuse 1994). In principle, sociologists become storytellers like any other collective actor in society, perhaps with the difference that sociologists tell stories about the stories of other storytellers. As a consequence, one could ask whether this should still be called sociology, but in the perspective of his radical constructivism Kitsuse left this question open.

SEE ALSO: Constructionism; Crime; Deviance; Labeling; Social Problems, Concept and Perspectives

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knowledge

Steve Fuller

Knowledge is relevant to sociology as the principle that social relations can be organized in terms of the differential access that members have to a common reality.

Until the late eighteenth century, Plato's *Republic* epitomized the role of knowledge as a static principle of social stratification. However, the Enlightenment introduced a more dynamic conception, whereby different forms of knowledge could be ordered according to the degree of freedom permitted to their possessors. An individual or a society might then pass through these stages in a process of development. Thus, thinkers as otherwise diverse as Hegel, Comte, and Mill came to associate progress with the extension of knowledge to more people.

However, this dynamic conception of knowledge produced a paradox: the distribution of knowledge and the production of power seem to trade off against each other. The more we know, the less it matters. Knowledge only

seems to beget power if relatively few people enjoy it. The distinctly sociological response to this paradox was to jettison Plato's original idea that a single vision of reality needs to be the basis for knowledge. This response, popularly associated with philosophical relativism, asserts simply that different forms of knowledge are appropriate to the needs and wants of their possessors.

The history of the sociology of knowledge is a tale of two traditions, French and German. Both came to fruition in the period 1890–1930. They are based on the proximity of knowers in space and time, respectively. Thus, the French tradition focused on how people of different origins who are concentrated in one space over time acquire a common mindset, whereas the German tradition focused on how people dispersed over a wide space retain a common mindset by virtue of having been born at roughly the same time.

The French tradition, exemplified by Lucien Lévy Bruhl and Émile Durkheim, regarded sustained interpersonal contact as the means by which a “collective consciousness” is forged and maintained. Both took tribal rituals as the paradigmatic site for the formation of this sort of consciousness, whereby emotional energy is translated into such cognitively significant artifacts as sacred texts and canonical procedures.

In contrast, the German tradition, exemplified by Wilhelm Dilthey and Karl Mannheim, was influenced more by history – indeed, historicism – than anthropology. Instead of looking at how the physical environment, including artifacts, constrains cognitive development, the German tradition focused on the overall world view exhibited by an array of texts produced by people who marched through time together, a “generational cohort.”

Common to both the French and German traditions was the assumption that knowledge is constituted as acts of collective resistance to the environment. The exact nature of the resistance is explainable by the spatiotemporal arrangement of the people concerned. Thus, a Durkheimian might show how religious rituals enable the faithful to escape the limitations of their material conditions and stand up to potential oppressors, while a Mannheimian might show how a persistent ideology enables the

experience of a particular generation to define the parameters of policy for the entire society. In both cases, the sociology of knowledge is meant to complement, not replace, the psychology of normal thought processes through which individuals adapt to a world that is largely not of their own making. Berger and Luckmann's *The Social Construction of Reality* (1967) eclectically mixes French and German traditions.

The addition of scientific knowledge as a potential object of inquiry complicated matters. Among the classical sociologists, Vilfredo Pareto was very clear about the "non logical" status of the forms of knowledge eligible for sociological scrutiny. He declared that rationality is self explanatory as the path of least resistance between ends and means, while sociology is needed to explain the friction of bias and error that usually gets in the way. The "rational choice" paradigm in the social sciences retains this perspective today. It was also how positivistic philosophers divided the intellectual labor between the epistemology and the sociology of knowledge. They presumed that science would always fall on the rational side of the divide, and hence not require special sociological treatment. Mannheim himself justified the presumption on reflexive grounds: sociology could not be trusted to study knowledge scientifically unless it was systematically immune to the kinds of frictions Pareto identified.

This general line of reasoning was overturned in the late 1970s by the self styled sociology of scientific knowledge (Bloor 1976). It posed an empirical and a conceptual challenge to Mannheim's strictures. The empirical challenge lay in the irony that sociology seemed to have a mystified understanding of the form of knowledge it aspired to be. For example, Robert Merton's famous account of the normative structure of science had been based largely on the methodological pronouncements of distinguished scientists and philosophers. This was like constructing a sociology of religion solely out of the writings of theologians and priests. Consequently, the last quarter century has witnessed an efflorescence of studies applying some German but mainly French approaches to the sociology of knowledge to the understanding of science. As had been the case with religion, much of this work on science has been

"demystifying" and hence a source of discomfort to professional scientists and philosophers of science.

The conceptual challenge pertained to the definition of science used to infer that it is necessarily a rational activity. Might not a religion or a political party also appear "rational," especially if evaluated in terms of its own goals? Conversely, were scientists judged in terms of all the consequences of their activities, both intended and unintended, might they not appear as "irrational" as priests and politicians? How, then, should the socially and ecologically transformative, sometimes even destructive, character of science be taken into any overall assessment of its "rationality." This challenge has been taken up most directly by "social epistemology" (Fuller 1988), which attempts to reconstruct a normative order for science in light of this socially expanded sense of consequences.

Perhaps the biggest challenge facing the sociology of knowledge today is science's tendency to become embedded in the technological structure of society as "technoscience" (Latour 1987). Under the circumstances, science's character as a form of knowledge is reduced to its sheer capacity to increase the possessor's sphere of action. Such a reduction characterizes the definition of "knowledge" used by sociologists who argue that we live in "knowledge societies" (Stehr 1994). For them, knowledge is a commodity traded in many markets by many producers. In this emerging political economy, institutions traditionally dedicated to the pursuit of knowledge (e.g., universities) no longer enjoy any special advantage.

SEE ALSO: Knowledge Management; Knowledge Societies; Knowledge, Sociology of; Mannheim, Karl; Merton, Robert K.; Scientific Knowledge, Sociology of

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knowledge management

John Sillince

Knowledge management seeks to increase organizational capability to use knowledge as a source of competitive advantage. The field has risen to prominence along with the “knowledge worker,” who is someone who does work which involves knowledge which is socially complex, causally ambiguous, and tacit. Relevant theories include social capital theory and the resource based view of the firm. Practitioner approaches to knowledge management emphasize ways of creating, diffusing, using, and evaluating knowledge.

Strategy researchers attempt to create statements about the link between industry structure and firm performance in order to deliver guidance to leaders of firms. This guidance advocates either selection of an appropriate formula for changing industry structure, or diversification into more profitable industries. However, the value of such guidance is undermined by its key assumption of interfirm homogeneity – all firms can implement such strategies. An emerging theory of the resource based view (RBV) of the firm and of sustainable competitive advantage implies that such strategies are not able to protect the firm against imitation or substitution. This has led to the rise in importance of theories of business strategy which privilege resources such as knowledge which are socially complex, tacit, and causally ambiguous.

Socially complex resources are routines and skills which, because of their relational nature, are difficult to imitate or substitute. Knowledge is a socially complex resource because its creation and use depend on networks of relationships and because it is collectively owned. Much

work in organizations is done in interaction with others, where the knowledge is created and used collaboratively rather than in isolation, and for this reason where it is difficult to disentangle what each person knows individually from the collectively generated knowledge. Other work is done in networks of friends and contacts who inform each other of opportunities, send warnings, and answer questions. The value of knowledge within social networks often depends on its surprise value. Such knowledge tends to come from “weak ties” – distant rather than near relationships. Networks also can act as passage ways for accessing information. Through “weak ties” and “friends of friends” network members can gain privileged access to information and opportunities. In order to explicate such properties of networks and communities a theory of social capital has developed. Social capital theory argues that there are intangible goods such as knowledge, trust, goodwill, and reputation which animate social networks, constitute social structure, and facilitate the actions of individuals. It has been argued that organizations have advantages over markets for the development and use of social capital. This is because organizations are able to protect secrets and to create a trustful working environment better than markets. Such a view places knowledge as a central element within the organizational community, which concerns itself with the creation of new knowledge by means of combination and exchange of previous knowledge.

Causally ambiguous resources are ones which cannot be easily identified as inputs to performance improvements and so do not help competitors who wish to learn why a firm is so successful. However, the assumption is that organization members are sufficiently able to identify the value of those resources. Knowledge is a causally ambiguous resource because how firms do things is not just a question of procedures, policies, and routines. There are also experience, degree of care and heedfulness, cooperativeness and collective confidence which also facilitate the use to which knowledge is put and which help to improve business performance.

Tacit resources are implicit and therefore uncodifiable and so are again difficult to copy. Knowledge is a tacit resource because it is used and exchanged in language and interaction,

where context cues and conversational sequence provide implicit information about the meaning of what is said. Even when written down, there is meaning to be gained by reading “between the lines.”

Recent times have seen theoretical developments in how organization members are seen and how they see themselves in terms of a greater emphasis on knowledge. More educational qualifications and training, more reliance on an empowered, flexible workforce which is able to take the initiative, together with a shift from manufacturing into services, have all led to a greater emphasis on the intellectual content of work. These forces have all been behind the rise of the term “knowledge worker.”

The simplest definition of knowledge worker is someone who does work which involves knowledge which is socially complex, causally ambiguous, and tacit. Many attempts have been made to measure “intellectual capital,” which is defined as the knowledge dimension of social capital. Simple methods include a focus on observable and tangible assets such as patents and routines. However, this misses out many intangibles and any serious attempt to measure intellectual capital would need to take account of these. Intellectual capital is structurally embedded in the organization because the individual’s knowledge is enriched and applied in a specific context created by the organization. That context includes routines, equipment, and people. Intellectual capital is relationally embedded in the organization because the individual’s knowledge is enriched and applied in relationships with others. Knowledge is therefore partly a function of who one knows and what relationships one has with them. However, those relationships are only partly influenced by the organization – they may span across organizational boundaries. Intellectual capital is also influenced by cultural and cognitive factors such as inertia, cognitive bias, curiosity, and motivation.

Many employees now have responsibilities which are difficult to track and control and therefore employees are increasingly difficult to motivate. Employees with complex responsibilities are valuable because the tasks they perform would take some time to teach to a replacement, who may not be as good anyway. Employees are increasingly disloyal to their

company, despite attempts by companies to develop “strong cultures.” They are therefore free to leave and join other organizations. Old fashioned, heavy handed control methods may backfire in such cases, as the knowledge held by such workers “walks out the door.”

The slimming down of workforces as a quick and simple method of economic stabilization in times of market difficulties has led to gaps in knowledge, or to gaps in organizational methods for handling knowledge. These gaps have added to the perceived importance of knowledge. If knowledge workers make up the organizational brain, removing whole levels of the hierarchy is analogous to small parts of the brain dying in a stroke, with its effect on dislocation of the organizational memory. Just as in the case of stroke in an individual, organizational memory may recover over time if there are suitable recovery practices.

The search for non imitable organizational capabilities in line with resource based theory of the firm has increased the importance of organizational identity. Organizational identity is “who we are as an organization.” It increases one’s sense of belonging, commitment, and identification. To conceive of knowledge as an individual competence misses the potential for linking individual knowledge to organizational identification. Instead, conceiving of organizational identity as the collective meaning of knowledge creation ensures that individual members feel part of a common activity, and discourages them from individualistic, alienated, and opportunistic means of gaining compensation. This is all to say that such management messages avoid drawing attention to individual competencies and instead draw attention to organization level capabilities.

The view of knowledge in relation to organizational processes which has been most influential with practitioners has been the mechanistic view that there are different, separable processes. These are creation, diffusion, use, and evaluation of knowledge.

The realization that the creation of explicit knowledge can be measured whereas the creation of tacit knowledge cannot, and that the tacitness of knowledge prevents free transfer between a firm’s workers, has led to at least two very different responses. One approach, of great appeal to practitioners, and influenced by a

mechanistic view of knowledge, has been to suggest that tacit knowledge should be transformed into explicit knowledge rather like changing base metal into gold. This approach centers upon the transformations possible between tacit and explicit knowledge. These transformations are explicit to explicit (socialization), tacit to explicit (externalization), tacit to tacit (combination), and explicit to tacit (internalization). This classification has been linked to steps of learning. However, few empirical tests have been carried out of these ideas, perhaps because of the intractability of tacit knowledge.

The other approach to the creation of knowledge more favored by academic researchers has been to investigate tacit knowledge as a sociological phenomenon. For example, language is a rich field of investigation because much of the information contained in interactions is situated and context dependent. Another example is social networks in which knowledge is understood and evaluated as part of social relationships – the intellectual content of a piece of information may be less influential in its being believed compared to whether the source is liked or trusted. Another example is activity theory, which argues that knowledge is embedded in – and therefore inextricable from – tasks or, more precisely, interdependencies between tasks, “tools,” and people.

The desire to measure and therefore control knowledge may be a misguided objective. The crucial question here is whether the control of knowledge leads to over standardization. Individuals have their own “craft” ways of doing things, whereas organizational interest is furthered by standardization. Knowledge is continuously created by economic activity, and attempts to standardize too much may eradicate any novelties that eventually become sources of a firm’s uniqueness. Over standardization may also lead to the creation of routines which can be imitated by competitors.

The diffusion of knowledge has been investigated intensively for some years. Starting from the simple electricity analogy that knowledge starts from a source and eventually, despite resistance, reaches a destination or target, the field has changed considerably. The transfer of knowledge depends upon the target’s ability to handle or understand it: its “absorptive capacity.” Thus, a new industrial process will more

likely be taken up by another company if it has scientists and technologists who understand it, and if it has industrial processes which can turn it into valuable products. The barrier may not only be in terms of understanding the content of the knowledge to be transferred. It may also be a question of the cultural gulf which exists between the sending and receiving organization – a difficulty experienced by many multinationals. The idea of absorptive capacity has been generalized to say that the target must be treated carefully by the source in order to facilitate diffusion. For example, Edison bought up a gas company and designed electric lamps of similar dimness to gas lamps in order first to overcome the resistance of monopoly gas suppliers, and secondly to adapt to consumers’ expectations of dimness. Only later did electric lights increase in brightness when the idea of the electric light had been accepted. This is an example of the value of institutional theory in understanding knowledge diffusion.

Institutional theory states that much organizational action is caused not by instrumental or rational objectives, but instead takes on the values or prescriptions contained in institutional rules. Organizations adopt many rational seeming procedures and techniques not because they make members more knowledgeable about what they are doing, but just in order to be seen to be following methods accepted by other organizations. It may be that a lot of the value of knowledge, and of knowledge workers, may be of this institutional kind. That is, knowledge may often be valued because it provides the organization with legitimacy rather than because it makes things work better or faster.

When looked at in this way, knowledge becomes a political good, which adds to an organization’s reputation and which is useful to specific professional groups in their attempts to increase their status and power. Historical studies have been undertaken of companies which have shown that the status and power of professional groups have changed markedly. In the early twentieth century, manufacturing and production engineering were the most powerful professionals. Since then there has been a rise in both the finance and the marketing functions, as companies have come to realize that scarce resources in their environment, first of finance and then of consumer demand,

give precedence to people who have knowledge about such scarce resources.

One dimension of knowledge management of interest to practitioners is the extent to which the creation, diffusion, use, and evaluation of knowledge can be facilitated by information and communication technology, and how much it is facilitated by human resource management by creating a cultural environment which encourages information sharing and knowledge creation. Technology offers several tools, but requires cultural support to be fully effective. Intranets enable organizations to share background information such as procedures and policies and to make this information available on an as needed basis. But intranets depend upon individuals adding information for others to read. Databases which contain organization members' area of specialization enable members to contact the most suitable person to help them solve their problem. But members may refuse to give the time requested to solve a problem, especially if the organization rewards individuals narrowly according to specific targets. Or members may refuse to share their knowledge because they do not wish to lose their indispensability and the power associated with it. Project diaries which chronicle surprises and problems surmounted are valuable sources of advice for the project teams that follow. But often project teams are too busy to fill in the diary, or members wish to hide mistakes. Multinationals spawn huge numbers of projects in each unit and subsidiary. These projects often duplicate each other in different regions or departments. Databases of projects and their main features enable members to avoid such duplication. But such databases also threaten team budgets and so often teams refuse to add their own project's details. Such databases also cross regional boundaries and so threaten the independence of regional units.

Where such methods have been systematized they therefore require a centralized system directing their use. An example is the use of Rapid Action for Process Improvement Deployment (RAPID) at all Ford's car factories as a method of publicizing new process improvements between plants. However, it is important that local subsidiaries have sufficient freedom to develop their own solutions to problems if they wish, because markets and regulations may vary

considerably between subsidiaries. Finding the right balance is partly judging the product as global (oil), nearly global (cars), or national (insurance). It is also a matter of giving regions the choice of getting the diffused and reused idea cheaply or the local solution at full cost.

These examples show the importance of the human factors involved in technology use with regard to knowledge management. Knowledge management is therefore as much an area of concern for human resource management as it is for information technology. The main aim of such policies is to encourage information sharing. One approach is to create a "strong culture," that is, a strong identification with the organization, a positive organizational identity. This is not just a job for a communications department, because what members consider their organization to be will affect, for example, how they train new recruits, how they deal with customers, and how they check quality. Another approach is to use rewards of both money and recognition. Most consultancy firms, in which knowledge sharing is vital, give their consultants high basic salaries so that doing "good citizen" activities such as sharing information with others does not lead to loss of the consultant's income. Consultancy firms which do not do this have problems motivating their staff to cooperate enough to share information. Directly rewarding specific actions such as how much an individual writes is difficult because it may be quality rather than quantity that counts. The best situation is when reputation as an expert is its own reward.

Behind all questions of effective knowledge management is the existence or nonexistence of trust in working relationships. After all, this is the advantage of organizations rather than markets as methods of creating economic value. Some organizations have trust and some do not. Inside most companies there exist departmental feuds, scapegoating, blame shifting, and ruthless competition for promotion. Trust takes time to build up. Trust exists between identifiable individuals. It is based on perceived goodwill to be likely to promise something and also on competence to do what the person promises to do. But there is also such a thing as institutional trust, where being from a certain company or department or region or nationality gives a person a guaranteed trustworthiness

even when we do not know that person. Because of the growing importance of knowledge and therefore of information sharing, trust is also growing in importance. It is one of the fundamental qualitative features of organizational climate. Because it is impossible to acquire imitatively it is a potent source of competitive advantage.

Several routines have gained prominence as methods of facilitating knowledge sharing. One is the Peer Assist scheme at BP. When a difficult decision arises (e.g., when a new oil rig has to be started involving risky investment) the person who is responsible calls for experts to come to a meeting to give their views. This is resourced by the sending units on the argument that the visiting experts gain by picking up new experience and new credits on their CVs. Although conflicts between strangers might develop, it seems that the need of experts to get invited to such meetings leads them to control their level of criticism. Another routine is the Asset Consulting Team approach at Chevron, where if you have a problem, you go and visit a specialized internal consulting unit.

Most practitioners recognize knowledge management as talking about and spreading “best practice.” One problem is that this year’s best practice becomes last year’s bad practice. Spreading best practice may also result in sharing ignorance. These problems occur when knowledge management becomes concerned merely with diffusion and not with creation of new knowledge.

SEE ALSO: Knowledge; Knowledge Societies; Knowledge, Sociology of; Management Theory; Scientific Knowledge, Sociology of

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knowledge societies

Nico Stehr

The transformation of modern societies into knowledge societies continues to be based, as was the case for industrial society, on changes in the structure of the economies of advanced societies. Economic capital – or, more precisely, the source of economic growth and value adding activities – increasingly relies on knowledge. The transformation of the structures of the modern economy by knowledge as a productive force constitutes the “material” basis and justification for designating advanced modern society as a knowledge society. The significance of knowledge grows in all spheres of life and in all social institutions of modern society. The historical emergence of knowledge societies represents not a revolutionary development, but rather a gradual process during which the defining characteristics of society change and new traits emerge. Until recently, modern society was conceived primarily in terms of property and labor. While the traditional attributes of labor and property certainly have not disappeared entirely, a new principle, “knowledge,” has been added which, to an extent, challenges as well as transforms property and labor as the constitutive mechanisms of society.

Knowledge may be defined as a *capacity for action*. This definition indicates that implementation of knowledge is open, that it is dependent on or is embedded within the context of

specific social, economic, and intellectual conditions. Knowledge is a peculiar entity with properties unlike those of commodities or of secrets, for example. Knowledge exists in objectified and embodied forms. If sold, it enters other domains – and yet it remains within the domain of its producer. Unlike money, property rights, and symbolic attributes such as titles, knowledge cannot be transmitted instantaneously. Its acquisition takes time and often is based on intermediary cognitive capacities and skills. Despite its reputation, knowledge is virtually never uncontested. Scientific and technical knowledge is uniquely important in modern social systems because it produces incremental capacities for social and economic action that may be “privately appropriated,” at least temporarily. Knowledge has of course always had a major function in social life. Social groups, social situations, social interaction, and social roles all depend on, and are mediated by, knowledge. Power, too, has frequently been based on knowledge advantages, not merely on physical strength.

The emergence of knowledge societies signals first and foremost a radical transformation in the structure of the economy. What changes are the dynamics of the supply and demand for primary products or raw materials; the dependence of employment on production; the importance of the manufacturing sector that processes primary products; the role of manual labor and the social organization of work; the role of international trade in manufactured goods and services; the function of time and place in production and of the nature of the limits to economic growth. The common denominator of the changing economic structure is a shift away from an economy driven and governed by *material* inputs into the productive process and its organization, toward an economy in which the transformations of productive and distributive processes are increasingly determined by symbolic or knowledge based inputs.

The transformation of modern societies into knowledge has profound consequences aside from those that pertain to its economic structure. One of the more remarkable consequences is the extent to which modern societies become fragile societies. Modern societies tend to be fragile from the viewpoint of those large and once dominant social institutions that find it

increasingly difficult to impose their will on all of society. From the perspective of small groups and social movements more uncoupled from the influence of the traditional large scale social institutions, however, modern societies are not more fragile, in the first instance. For such groups and social movements, the social transformations underway mean a distinct gain in their relative influence and participation, even if typically mainly in their ability to resist, delay, and alter the objectives of the larger institutions.

Knowledge societies (to adopt a phrase from Adam Ferguson) are the results of human action, but often not of deliberate human design. They emerge as adaptations to persistent but evolving needs and changing circumstances of human conduct.

Modern societies are also increasingly vulnerable entities. More specifically, the economy, the communication and traffic systems are vulnerable to malfunctions of self imposed practices typically designed to avoid breakdowns. Modern infrastructures and technological regimes are subject to accidents, including large scale disasters as the result of fortuitous, unanticipated human action, to non marginal or extreme natural events that may dramatically undermine the taken for granted routines of everyday life in modern societies, and to deliberate sabotage.

Present day social systems may be seen to be fragile and vulnerable entities in yet another sense. Such fragility results from the conduct as well as the deployment of artifacts designed to stabilize, routinize, and delimit social action (e.g., the so called “computer trap” or, more generally, the unintended outcomes of intentional social action). In the process of evermore deeply embedding computers into the social fabric of society, that is, redesigning and reengineering large scale social and socio technical systems in order to manage the complexities of modern society, novel risks and vulnerabilities are created.

The fragility of modern societies is a unique condition. Societies are fragile because individuals are capable, within certain established rules, of asserting their own interests by opposing or resisting the (not too long ago) almost unassailable monopoly of truth of major societal institutions. That is to say, legitimate cultural

practices based on the enlargement and diffusion of knowledge enable a much larger segment of society effectively to oppose power configurations that turned out or are apprehended to be tenuous and brittle.

Among the major but widely invisible social innovations in modern society is the immense growth of the "civil society" sector. This sector provides an organized basis through which citizens can exercise individual initiative in the private pursuit of public purposes. One is therefore able to interpret the considerable enlargement of the informal economy, but also corruption and the growth of wealth in modern society, as well as increasing but typically unsuccessful efforts to police these spheres, as evidence of the diverse as well as expanded capacity of individuals, households, and small groups to take advantage of and benefit from contexts in which the degree of social control exercised by larger (legitimate) social institutions has diminished considerably.

The future of modern society no longer mimics the past to the extent to which this has been the case. History will increasingly be full of unanticipated incertitudes, peculiar reversals, and proliferating surprises, and we will have to cope with the ever greater speed of significantly compressed events. The changing agendas of social, political, and economic life as the result of our growing capacity to make history will also place inordinate demands on our mental capacities and social resources.

SEE ALSO: Economy, Networks and; Information Society; Knowledge; Knowledge Management; Knowledge, Sociology of; Network Society; Scientific Knowledge, Sociology of

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knowledge, sociology of

E. Doyle McCarthy

The sociology of knowledge examines the social and group origin of ideas, arguing that the entire "ideational realm" ("knowledges," ideas, ideologies, mentalities) develops within the context of a society's groups and institutions. Its ideas address broad sociological questions about the extent and limits of social and group influence through an examination of the social and cultural foundations of cognition and perception. Despite significant changes over time, classical and contemporary studies in the sociology of knowledge share a common theme: the social foundations of thought. Ideas, concepts, and belief systems share an intrinsic sociality explained by the contexts in which they emerge.

From its origins in German sociology in the 1920s, sociology of knowledge has assumed that ideas (knowledge) emerge out of and are determined by the social contexts and positions (structural locations) of their proponents. Its major premise is that the entire ideational realm is functionally related to sociohistorical reality. According to its framers, *Wissenssoziologie* was developed as an empirical and historical method for resolving the conflicts of ideologies in Weimar Germany that followed the political and social revolutions of the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, conflicts grounded in competing worldviews and directed by intellectual and political elites. Outlined in early statements by Max Scheler and Karl Mannheim, the new discipline reflected the intellectual needs of an era, to bring both rationality and objectivity to bear on the problems of intellectual and ideological confusion. It was in this sense that the sociology of knowledge has been described as a discipline that reflected a new way of understanding "knowledge" within a modern and ideologically pluralistic setting. The approach defines a new "situation" (Mannheim 1936), summarily described as "modernity," a world where "knowledge" and "truth" have many faces. What we believe that we *know* varies with the cognitive operations of human minds and these vary by community, class, culture, nation, generation, and so forth.

Contemporary sociology of knowledge addresses a related but different set of concerns than those posed by its founders, and its subject matter extends beyond the problem of relativism and the social location of ideas and ideologies. Prominent among its current themes are the “local” features of knowledges and the study of their functions in everyday life. This redirection of the field from the study of conflicting ideologies to the study of the tacit and taken for granted understandings of everyday life can be characterized as a shift from concerns with the truth status of ideas and ideologies to the concerns of a cultural “sociology of meaning.” These changes also represent a movement away from a study of the ideological functions of elites and intellectuals to conceptions of knowledges as discursive (cultural) forms and as part of the entire range of symbolic and signifying systems operating in a society.

The term sociology of knowledge (*Wissenssoziologie*) was first used in 1924 and 1925 by Scheler (1980) and Mannheim (1952). From its inception, it described a field of inquiry closely linked to problems of European philosophy and historicism, particularly the nineteenth century German philosophical interest in problems surrounding relativism that were linked to the legacies of Karl Marx, Friedrich Nietzsche, and the historicists, whose cultural philosophy of worldviews (*Weltanschauungsphilosophie*) was influential in German social science from the 1890s to the 1930s.

For Scheler (1980), who offered the first systematic outline of the discipline, the *forms* of mental acts, through which knowledge is gained, are always conditioned by the structure of society. For this reason, sociology of knowledge is foundational to all specialized studies of culture and to metaphysics. While Scheler’s original essays provoked commentary and debate, it was Mannheim’s formulation of the discipline in *Ideology and Utopia* that defined the subject matter of the field for years to come. Those who offered their own sociologies of knowledge, including Talcott Parsons (1961) and Robert K. Merton (1957), defined their positions relative to Mannheim’s arguments concerning ideology, utopia, and relationism.

Mannheim’s treatise begins with a review and critique of Marxism and proceeds toward a

theory of ideology in the broader sense: the mental structure in its totality as it appears in different currents of thought and across different social groups. This “total conception of ideology” examines thought on the structural level, allowing the same object to take on different (group) aspects. This understanding of ideology refers to a person’s, group’s, or society’s way of conceiving things situated within particular historical and social settings. Like ideologies, “utopias” arise out of particular social and political conditions, but are distinguished by their opposition to the prevailing order. Utopias are the embodiment of “wish images” in collective actions that shatter and transform social worlds. Both concepts form part of Mannheim’s broad design for a critical but nonevaluative treatment of “ideology,” one that supersedes the sociohistorical determinism and relativism of Marxism while moving toward a “relationist” notion of truth. From an analysis of the various and competing social positions of ideologists and utopians, a kind of “truth” emerges that is grounded in the conditions of intellectual objectivity and detachment from the social conditions that more directly determine ideas. *Ideology and Utopia* established the criteria for a valid knowledge, albeit a *relational* knowledge, of sociohistorical processes. More important, it raised the problems surrounding the historicity of thought and did this within the newly emerging academic discourse of sociology. In the process, it gave legitimacy to a new set of methodological issues involving the problems of objectivity and truth for the sciences and the humanities.

Despite the many criticisms of *Ideology and Utopia*, the work received wide attention and appreciation inside and outside the social sciences where the problems posed by relativism continued to attract the attention of those working in the sciences and the humanities. While reviews of the work focused on its failure to overcome relativism and Mannheim’s excessive reliance on the Marxist conception of ideology, Mannheim’s book provoked discussion and commentary in the decades after its publication.

Werner Stark’s *The Sociology of Knowledge* (1991) prompted a major advancement and redirection of the field. It argued for the

embedding of sociology of knowledge within the larger field of cultural sociology. Stark's book clarified the principal themes of earlier writers, especially sociologists, who had addressed the problem of the social element in thinking. He also intended it to serve as an introduction to the field that would prepare the way for a detailed and comprehensive history of the sociology of knowledge and its most significant ideas: theories of ideology of Marx and Mannheim; philosophical speculations of the neo-Kantians Heinrich Rickert and Max Weber; views of the German phenomenological school of the 1920s, especially Scheler. Stark's strongest affinity was with Scheler's struggle to reconcile the antithetical claims of idealism and materialism, and his view of the sociology of knowledge as the foundation for a knowledge of "eternal values." The sociology of knowledge is concerned with the "social determination of knowledge," not with the problem of ideology. This distinction is an indispensable precondition of the sociology of knowledge. It directs attention to the study of mental life as grounded in social and historical conditions, granting to "social determination" a depth that the theory of ideology does not accomplish. While the theory of ideology will always play a vital role in sociology and the history of ideas, it remains outside the principal concerns of the sociology of knowledge.

Berger and Luckmann's *The Social Construction of Reality* (1966) advanced a sociology of knowledge that was compatible with the view of sociology as a humanistic discipline and the notion that "human reality" is a "socially constructed reality." The work moved the field further away from theoretical knowledge or ideas and toward the (pre theoretical) knowledge that social actors draw from in everyday life. Their treatise also redirected the traditional theory of social determination of ideas by social realities: social reality itself is a *construct*. It integrated the perspectives of classical European social thought (Marx, Durkheim, Weber) with the social psychology of the American pragmatist philosopher George Herbert Mead, thereby advancing Meadian social psychology as a theoretical complement to European sociology of knowledge (see Curtis & Petras 1970; Remmling 1973). What the authors proposed was that knowledge and social reality exist in a

reciprocal or dialectical relationship of mutual constitution. This work placed the sociology of knowledge on a new footing whose focus was the broad range of signifying systems that form and communicate the realm of social realities. Since its introduction, the idea of a "constructed reality" has summarized a number of concerns of writers in the sciences and humanities that may be described as the *problem of meaning* and the use of philosophical, literary, and historical approaches to study its social construction. Berger and Luckmann's treatise subsumed knowledges within a framework of interpretation, a *hermeneutics* that was decidedly cultural and semiotic, concerned with the symbolic and signifying operations of knowledges.

More recently, the "new sociology of knowledge" (Swidler & Arditì 1994; McCarthy 1996) can be seen as part of this larger movement in the social sciences, distinguished by a turn away from materialism and social structure toward semiotic theories that focus on the ways in which a society's meanings are communicated and reproduced. Swidler and Arditì (1994) focus on how social organizations (e.g., the media) order knowledges, rather than examining social locations and group interests. In light of new theories of social power and practice (Michel Foucault and Pierre Bourdieu), they also examine how knowledges maintain social hierarchies and how techniques of power are simultaneously and historically linked to knowledges. They join others in pointing out that newer theories of power, gender, and knowledge depart from the economic, class, and institutional focus of the classical sociology of knowledge.

Proponents of the new sociology of knowledge do not claim that the subfield has been entirely superseded by newer work in sociology and cultural studies. However, they note that the new sociology of knowledge is not a unified field, an argument also advanced by earlier writers who treated the sociology of knowledge as a "frame of reference" rather than a body of theory in its own right (Curtis & Petras 1970: 1; cf. Remmling 1973).

Two overriding factors can account for the persistence of a broad approach to knowledges. First, the propositions of Scheler, Mannheim, and other early writers in this field (e.g., in the US, works by Florian Znaniecki, C. Wright Mills, and Edward Shils) today serve as working

propositions for a range of social scientists as well as for specialists in other disciplines, including the subfields of the history of ideas, social psychology, social studies of science, feminist theories, and cultural studies. For this reason, a sociology of knowledge perspective – concerning group life and mind – has been incorporated into the many subfields of sociology as well as sister disciplines from anthropology to history. Furthermore, as long as knowledges are understood as preeminently cultural phenomena, the more likely it is that the sociology of knowledge will be seen as a broadly inclusive set of theories and studies rather than a subfield with a distinct subject matter. Knowledges are no longer confined to the domain of “superstructure.” They operate across the full extent of society, from the realm of everyday affairs to the institutions of law, politics, art, and religion, to the various sites and fields where knowledges are produced. The new sociology of knowledge examines the observable properties of knowledges in texts, modes of communication, and forms of speech within specific institutional settings.

SEE ALSO: Collective Memory; Constructionism; Ideology; Knowledge; Knowledge Management; Knowledge Societies; Mannheim, Karl; Scientific Knowledge, Sociology of

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Komarovsky, Mirra (1905–99)

Vicky M. MacLean

Mirra Komarovsky's research, teaching, and advocacy on behalf of women mark her as a pioneer in the sociology of gender and feminist scholarship. She was the second woman to serve as president of the American Sociological Association, thus furthering opportunities for women in the profession of sociology. Major contributions to sociology include her critique of the Parsonian functionalist perspective on gender roles, research on women's education and changing feminine identities, and the study of men and masculinity. Komarovsky's research focused on the nature of conflict and strains in gender roles during periods of uneven social change. Her 1953 book *Women in the Modern World: Their Education and Their Dilemma* anticipated Betty Freidan's *The Feminine Mystique* by more than a decade. Methodological contributions include refining the use of the qualitative case study method using in depth interviewing and synthesizing sociological schedules and surveys with psychological tests of personality and gender.

Born to a Jewish family in Russia in 1905, Komarovsky migrated with her family from Baku to the United States in 1921, fleeing anti-Semitism and Bolshevik attempts to eradicate the middle class. Her childhood education in Russia was primarily from private tutors. In the United States Mirra's family initially

settled in Wichita, Kansas where she graduated from Wichita High School. Then in 1922 her father moved the family to Brooklyn, New York to provide greater educational and career opportunities for Mirra. She took her bachelor's degree at Barnard College, majoring in economics and sociology. Komarovsky received the Caroline Durer Fellowship for graduate studies, taught as an instructor at Skidmore College, and then pursued her master's degree at Columbia University, writing her thesis under the direction of William Ogburn. Upon accepting a research associate position at the International Institute for Social Research, Komarovsky began graduate work for her doctorate under the direction of Paul Lazarsfeld, and returned to Barnard to teach (Reinharz 1989, 1991; Rieder 1999). Her dissertation, *The Unemployed Man and His Family* (1940), was a continuation of Max Horkheimer's *Studien über Autorität und Familie* (1936). Using the case study method, Komarovsky studied 59 skilled worker families receiving government relief during the Depression. The study revealed that unemployment led to a deterioration of men's personalities, undermined their household authority, and affected marital satisfaction. A man's loss of status was experienced more in relation to his wife than his young children, but his status and authority over adolescent children suffered most.

Central to Komarovsky's scholarship were the objectives of identifying the functional significance of sex roles, their cultural contradictions, and prospects for social change. Whereas the dominant functionalist perspective emphasized the integrating functions of a sexual division of labor in maintaining a system's equilibrium, Komarovsky emphasized role strains and conflicts. Focusing on these dysfunctional aspects of sex roles, she emphasized the important relationship between men's changing roles (particularly in sharing domestic responsibilities) and women's emancipation. "Cultural Contradictions and Sex Roles," published in the *American Journal of Sociology* in 1946, launched four decades of research on the changing gender role attitudes of women entering an elite women's college and the dilemmas college women faced due to competing gender role expectations. This research culminated in *Women in College: Shaping New Feminine*

Identities (1985). Prominent influences on Komarovsky's work were Ogburn's cultural lag theory and Merton's role theory. She conceptualized role conflicts and strains as emerging from the discontinuities created by differential rates of change in norms, attitudes, and institutional arrangements. *Women in the Modern World* (1953) addressed post World War II anti feminist charges that colleges neglected the special functions of women in society. Critiquing biological and psychological theories of gender differences, Komarovsky offered a sociological explanation of the dilemmas faced by women. The foremost contradiction was in the competing expectations of the "traditional" feminine role and the "modern" role, the latter emphasizing women's intellectual and professional development. Whether a woman chose homemaking or to combine domestic and paid work, she was likely to experience internal conflicts and dissatisfactions. Komarovsky argued for social changes allowing men and women to reach their full potentials, advocating for women's employment in non traditional fields, men's sharing in family responsibilities, and wider availability of quality childcare.

Women in the Modern World emphasized strategies employed by college educated women in the 1940s to address gender role strains; for example, "think smart and act dumb" was an adaptive strategy used to protect male egos. In contrast, *Women in College* (1985) emphasized the growing complexities of shifting gender roles and competing expectations from family, institutional, and peer influences in the 1980s. Based on a longitudinal study of 240 Barnard freshman women, the study traced the school's influences on changes in gender role attitudes, career aspirations, and lifestyle preferences for marriage and motherhood. Over time, women were found to gain an increasing commitment to combining careers and family, became more certain in their career choices, and an increasing proportion were committed to sustaining uninterrupted full time careers. In *Women in College* Komarovsky also examined outside factors that shaped women's career orientations, including the quality of their parents' marital relationships, mothers' satisfactions with the homemaker role, and mother-daughter relationships.

Blue Collar Marriage (1962) is Komarovsky's study of stable working class marriages based

on in depth interviews with 58 couples living in “Glenton,” a mill town located in a major metropolitan area. Working class, native born white Protestant couples, under the age of 40, with no more than a high school education and at least one child, were interviewed. Marital satisfaction based on discrepancies between ideals and reality was examined. Certain discrepancies in marriage were found to be easily tolerated by couples while others led to dissatisfaction. High conformity between values and behaviors sometimes led to strains and stresses as opposed to greater satisfaction in marriage. The cultural lag between modern conceptions of companionate marriage and the means for achieving personal intimacy was the basis of dissatisfaction in marriage, particularly for high school educated women who had high expectations for personal intimacy. Although working class couples experienced a minimal level of work–family role conflicts, they lacked intimate communication and self disclosure. Ironically, a consensus of values about sex roles among traditional couples led to frustrations in the form of social isolation and emotional disengagement, particularly for the men. Komarovsky concluded that traditional values were problematic for couples in a society that could no longer accommodate a rigid sexual division of labor. The absence of economic and social rewards generally increased social isolation, creating a drab and narrowly circumscribed life for blue collar families.

Not only did Komarovsky study female gender roles, but a number of her studies addressed men and masculinity, paving the way for contemporary work on hegemonic, alternative, and intersecting masculinities. In *Dilemmas of Masculinity: A Study of College Youth* (1976), Komarovsky found that men are not unlike women in the dilemmas they face in meeting role expectations, and in balancing cultural contradictions and role ambiguities. Using a sample of 62 senior males from Columbia University, Komarovsky examined masculine role strains resulting primarily from incongruity between the ideals of egalitarian relationships on the one hand, and men’s personal preferences for masculine privileges in relationships on the other. The cultural revolution of the 1960s resulted in changes in male attitudes; for example, men expected their

wives to work, but retained traditional views that work should not interfere with the primary roles of mother and wife. Role strains, defined as the perceived or latent difficulty in fulfilling role expectations, and/or the low rewards for role conformity, were analyzed in several spheres of men’s lives. Stresses in the sexual sphere included anxieties surrounding virginal status, sexual performance, and guilt associated with sex outside of marriage (e.g., potential pregnancy, sexual exploitation, and infidelity). Strains and stresses related to future work roles were prominent, particularly those surrounding choosing and achieving career goals. Similarly, men’s desires for emotional independence from parents created stresses in their family relationships due to their economic dependence. Unsatisfactory father–son relationships were more common than mother–son relationships and had consequences for men’s abilities to handle role strains and to disclose their emotions in heterosexual relationships. In relations with women (apart from sex), power and emotional disclosure were the primary sources of role strain. Of particular importance were men’s feelings of inadequacy in obtaining ideal masculine leadership or dominance, assertiveness, and, to a lesser degree, intellectual superiority. Komarovsky developed a theoretical typology of role strain: ambiguity in role expectations; incongruity between individual and society in role conformity; insufficiency of resources to fulfill role expectations; low rewards for role conformity; latent and manifest conflicts in role conformity; and overload of role obligations.

In her American Sociological Association “Presidential Address: Some Problems in Role Analysis” (1973), published in the *American Sociological Review*, Komarovsky addressed the most common criticisms of social structural role analysis by using illustrations from her own and other’s research. To the criticism that role analysis obscures and neglects individuality, presenting as it were an “oversocialized” view of humans lacking in spontaneity or self agency, Komarovsky highlighted the importance of integrating psychological variables into sociological research. In particular, she promoted understanding the social situational origins of psychological ambivalence as these become embedded in the structure of social statuses and roles. To the criticism that role

analysis places too much emphasis on role conformity and stability, Komarovsky illustrated from her own analyses of *Blue Collar Marriage Dilemmas of Masculinity* the ways in which role conformity can become problematic in times of social change, creating conflict and disorganization. In “The Concept of Social Role Revisited” (1992), Komarovsky specifically took up the criticisms of some feminists that the concept of social role is too limited in the sociological study of gender. Critics have argued, for instance, that the concept of sex role is too closely linked to biology and neglects the social construction of gender (p. 301). The use of the concept of “gender” or “gender roles,” argued Komarovsky, is preferred to “sex roles” but this preferred language and clarification of definition does not undermine the utility of social role or gender role analyses. Others, such as Barrie Thorne, have stated that the language of roles is deeply embedded in functionalism with its emphases on “consensus, stability, and continuity” (p. 303). Komarovsky (1992) responded that although Parsonian sociology placed emphasis on the functional integration of differentiated instrumental (male) and expressive (female) roles in the family, for others interested in women’s problems the concept of social role locates “disensus, discontinuity, and change” (p. 303). Komarovsky concluded that while new conceptualizations of gender are important for illuminating selected aspects of gender, the new approaches are not all inclusive, and complement rather than undermine social role analysis.

“Some Reflections on the Feminist Scholarship in Sociology,” published in the *Annual Review* in 1991, provides a retrospective look at the important contributions of feminist scholarship to sociology and is an indication of Komarovsky’s continued involvement in the discipline. The article addresses how the women’s movement of the 1960s influenced the feminist critique of sociology and the important contributions of feminist precursors (writing between the 1930s and 1960) to the “new feminist scholarship.” The feminist critique, she argued, identified lacunae in knowledge, revealed distortions embedded in the traditional theoretical interpretations, and raised new questions for research. The new scholarship was particularly important in revealing the malleability of

personality and its responsiveness to social structural opportunity, the strong sex typing of occupations and resistance to women’s work integration, and the importance of reconceptualizing work to include both paid and unpaid activities. While this early work took a “minimalist” approach to gender differences in personality traits that too often were used to legitimize women’s subordination, later work attempted to revalue women’s traditional activities and feminine traits, thus challenging the bias in the value system of the dominant group.

Komarovsky’s affiliation with Barnard College spanned three quarters of a century from her undergraduate years through her retirement. In personal interviews Komarovsky indicated that she experienced both personal and professional obstacles to fulfilling her potential as a sociologist, not receiving interpersonal or institutional support for her work until later in her career (Reinharz 1989, 1991). As a student she was discouraged from becoming a professional sociologist, instructed by her mentor, Ogburn, that her desire to teach was unrealistic for a woman, a foreigner, and a Jew. On the Barnard faculty, from 1935 to 1946, she did not advance beyond the level of assistant professor. An administrative change in the late 1940s, however, brought her promotions and the support needed to advance professionally. She served as chair of the Barnard Department of Sociology for 17 years and returned to teach and to serve as the director of Women’s Studies after her retirement in 1970. For her years of service and accomplishments at Barnard, Komarovsky received the Emily Gregory Award for teaching excellence and the Distinguished Alumnae Award, Medal of Distinction. Her accomplishments in the profession included serving as: vice president (1949) and president (1955) of the Eastern Sociological Association, a member of the Council of the American Sociological Association (1966–9), associate editor of the *American Sociological Review*, and president of the American Sociological Association (1972–3) (Reinharz 1989, 1991; Rieder 1999).

SEE ALSO: Culture, Gender and; Family Conflict; Family, Men’s Involvement in; Gender Ideology and Gender Role Ideology; Gender, Work, and Family; Hegemonic Masculinity; Inequality/Stratification, Gender;

Liberal Feminism; Marital Quality; Sex and Gender; Structural Functional Theory

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Kondratieff cycles

Immanuel Wallerstein

It is an elementary truism that no phenomena are absolutely stable. Whatever we measure in the real world shows fluctuations, whether we are speaking of basic economic phenomena (such as prices, production, employment, or investment), politico military phenomena (such as wars, free trade policies, or geopolitical arrangements), or cultural phenomena (such as puritanical mores or family patterns). The question is always whether we can ascertain the existence of any kind of rules or systemic pressures that govern the ups and downs of phenomena, including the explanation of the fluctuations and their timing and frequency.

The most readily observed fluctuations are those that affect the income levels of a population. We refer popularly to such ups and downs as prosperity and bad times. It is therefore no surprise that social scientists have been trying to explain such cyclical happenings for at least two centuries. As long as a large proportion of the population was engaged in agricultural production, the distinction between good harvest years and bad ones was of great importance to almost everyone, since the fluctuations promptly affected the prices and distribution of the products and therefore the ability of ordinary people to survive.

When industrial production became a larger percentage of total production, it became clear that there were fluctuations in the rates of profit of entrepreneurs, and therefore of production and employment, and this had immediate implications for public policy. Some scholars were beginning to measure such fluctuations at the beginning of the nineteenth century. Cyclical phenomena of varying lengths began to be observed, recorded, and eventually predicted. It was towards the middle of the nineteenth century that analysts began to talk of waves (A + B phases) that were 50–60 years in length. It is waves of this length that we now refer to as Kondratieff cycles.

Kondratieff cycles are named after Nikolai Kondratieff, a Russian economist whose classic work on such cycles was published in 1925. Kondratieff was not the first person to write about such waves, but his name became attached to them. Kondratieff observed price cycles in some major industrial countries, beginning in the late eighteenth century. His choice of starting date was no accident since, by the time he was writing, the late eighteenth century was also commonly given as the date of *the* industrial revolution.

Economists speak of a number of other shorter economic cycles named after their original analysts: the Kitchin cycle (40 months), the Juglar cycle (8–10 years), and the Kuznets cycle (15–20 years). They are explained variously. More economists are willing to accept the existence of these shorter cycles than are willing to give credence to the existence of Kondratieff cycles. Nonetheless, Kondratieff cycles have a wide, distinguished, and intellectually very varied set of proponents. Among

economists the most prominent was no doubt Joseph Schumpeter in his book *Business Cycles*, who is primarily responsible for labeling these cycles with Kondratieff's name. The concept found strong supporters among Marxist economists (Helphand, van Gelderen, de Wolff, Trotsky, Mandel) but just as strong opponents (probably a larger group). It also found strong support among non and anti Marxist economists (Dupriez, Hansen, Rostow, Forrester, Mensch) but just as strong opponents (probably again a larger group).

If one turns to economic historians, one finds a very large group (e.g., Simiand, Braudel) who describe Kondratieff waves without using that name for earlier periods – the sixteenth to eighteenth centuries, and for some beginning much earlier. And then there is a group of political scientists and sociologists who find such cycles in the political and cultural arenas (again, often without using that name). Some see these cycles as linked to wars, some as linked to the rise and fall of hegemonic powers. Some find even longer economic cycles, to which Cameron (1973) gave the name of “logistics” because of their S shape.

The critics of Kondratieff cycles point to inconsistencies among proponents concerning the dating and argue that the statistical evidence is inadequate, and often conclude with name calling (“science fiction,” according to Paul Samuelson). The debates among the proponents are more substantive and have to do with the underlying explanation of the cyclical patterns and a secondary debate about how, once in the B phase, the system ever renews an expansionary phase.

If one looks at Kondratieff's classic work one notices immediately that all the data are about a very few countries (England, France, the US, and Germany). Only one graph and chart are comparative; all the rest are about either England or France. The earliest data are for 1780. The data deal with prices, wages, foreign trade turnover, and production of raw materials. Kondratieff does note, however, that the rising phase seems to have more social upheavals (revolutions, wars). His basic explanation of the start of a cycle is the possibility of profitable investment in “new basic productive forces” (Kondratieff 1984: 104). It is Schumpeter who took what was no more than empirical data in Kondratieff and

turned it into a theory. Schumpeter made two basic additions to the description Kondratieff had made. First, he argued that the three described forms of waves – the Kitchin, the Juglar, and the Kondratieff – fitted within each other: “It is possible to count off, historically as well as statistically, six Juglars to a Kondratieff and three Kitchens to a Juglar – not as an average but in every individual case” (Schumpeter 1939 I: 174–5).

The second change was to shift from a two stage model of a long wave (prosperity and recession, or A and B) to a four stage model, which he named prosperity, recession, depression, and revival. The four stages were bracketed at each end by equilibrium. This allowed Schumpeter to locate temporally the process of innovation (something for him quite distinct from invention), which he defined as “the setting up of a new production function” (p. 87). He called it “the outstanding fact in the economic history of capitalist society” (p. 86). It is spurred by the third phase (depression) and bears fruit in the fourth phase (revival) and accounts for the return to equilibrium and prosperity.

The Schumpeterian emphasis on innovation as the explanation of the long waves and the reason why they are a fundamental feature of a capitalist world has given rise to one entire school of Kondratieff theorizing, which was revived when the world system entered a Kondratieff B phase in the 1970s. Whereas the innovation school tends to emphasize the self regenerating capacities of capitalist entrepreneurs (they innovate when they can no longer make profits on the basis of previous products), the class conflict school of Kondratieff theorists insists that regeneration is a political process. Renewal of capital accumulation requires capitalists to “increase the rate of surplus value and to foster deterioration of general working conditions for the working class” (Mandel 1980: 46). Their capacity to do this depends on the latter's “capacity to mount resistance and counterattack” (p. 47). Hence, the upswing depends on a dialectic between objective and subjective factors, “in which the subjective factors are characterized by relative autonomy” (p. 49).

In a sense, both the innovation school and the class conflict school see a decline in the rate of profit inherent in the capitalist process as accounting for the downturns. For Schumpeter,

it is the inevitable speculative overreach, when there is prosperity and profits are high, which leads to excessive credit to producers who are not sufficiently efficient. For Mandel, it is essentially the expansion of production beyond the possibilities of buyers in the market. For both the innovation and the class conflict schools the downturns are inevitable, and the question really is what permits the upturns. Suter (1992) adds evidence that national debt cycles are linked to the downturn phase.

There are of course some analysts, such as Rostow (1978), who see the downturns as the result of the fact that "investment decisions tend to be determined by current indicators of profitability rather than by rational long range assessments" (p. 307). There is here the implicit suggestion that these decisions are irrational "mistakes," mistakes that might be corrected by greater wisdom. And indeed, it is clear that, in the last 50 years, central banks and world financial institutions have frequently undertaken measures in order to dampen cyclical behavior, which has no doubt affected the process somewhat.

While the innovation school looks primarily at the economic arena (indeed, primarily at the level of entrepreneurial activity), the class conflict school tries to effectuate a "dialectic" between the economic (objective) processes and the political or class conflict (subjective) processes. However, there are analysts who wish to turn our attention primarily to the political arena, and indeed to the geopolitical arena of the relations between states and the existence of "hegemonic powers" or "leadership cycles." These analysts tend to speak of "long cycles" rather than of "Kondratieff cycles" and these cycles turn out in general to be longer than those of Kondratieff.

Wars – to be more exact, world wars – play a central role in these analyses of grand political long cycles. Modelski (1987) traced over five centuries of such cycles, seeing them as having four phases: global war (ending with a victor or leader), world power (or world peace led by the victor), delegitimation (or decline of the leader), and deconcentration (lack of order and presence of a strong challenger to the leader). He suggested that in these conflicts the "continental" powers lose out to the "oceanic" powers. He saw this as "the major rhythm of the modern

world" (p. 34), in which the result of the global war is the key decision.

The political long cycle group shares one characteristic with the economic historians who speak of A and B phases. They agree that the processes they are describing go back at least to the sixteenth century, and are not a product merely of the so called industrial revolution, often dated as beginning in the last decades of the eighteenth century (and which was the temporal foundation of Kondratieff's original discussion). So, be it noted, does Schumpeter.

There have been attempts to blend the discussion about Kondratieff cycles and political long cycles, using the longer time frame. Goldstein (1988) sought to "integrate" virtually all the emphases into a complex theoretical model which includes six "basic two way causality relationships . . . portrayed as negative feedback loops with time delays [whose] primary relationship is between production and war" (p. 277). Wallerstein (1983) saw two separate cycles in the workings of the modern world system. One is the cycle of hegemony, in which the achievement of temporary hegemony is rooted in the ability of one state to command simultaneous primacy in production, trade, and finance. The other is the Kondratieff cycle which relates to the achievement of temporary quasi monopolies in leading industries (Wallerstein 2004: 30–2). In both cases, the maximal positions (hegemony, quasi monopoly with its concomitant maximal capital accumulation) are self liquidating, which takes the form of long cycles with four phases.

It has been remarked that the popularity of theorizing about Kondratieffs is correlated with whether the world system is in an A or a B phase. People living in A phases seem to dislike long wave theorizing because it suggests that the A phase is not eternal, whereas people living in B phases seem to like such theorizing, since it suggests that the B phase will come to an end.

The literature on Kondratieff cycles and on "long cycles" is extensive. It has always been controversial. Indeed, few hypotheses about the modern world or about capitalism as a system seem to arouse as much negative passion among its opponents. One has to ask the question why. There seem to be several major

arguments against the existence of Kondratieff cycles. One is a debate about the quality of the data put forward in its favor. This is of course a perfectly legitimate debate. But it is doubtful that the quality of the data is significantly weaker than that for any other hypothesis that deals with macrophenomena over long historical time.

The second is that the hypothesis is mechanistic, in that it suggests exact time parameters for the presumed phases of the cycles. But this is simply unfair, since all proponents explicitly state that the timing is only approximate and has varied from cycle to cycle. Indeed, proponents of the Kondratieff cycles argue among themselves constantly about the dating one wishes to assign to various cycles.

The heart of the debate involves two issues. One is whether there are any general rules governing large scale social phenomena. The school of social scientists whose emphases are exclusively idiographic of course reject this. But so do social scientists whose epistemology is reductionist, emphasizing microphenomena and rejecting the idea of emergent properties. The second issue is among those who are willing to accept the existence of large scale generalizations, but are quite unhappy about the policy implications of Kondratieff cycles. For some, they suggest that a Whig interpretation of history is unsustainable since the structures of the modern world provide constantly for “downturns.” For others, it is the opposite. They see Kondratieffs as minimizing the element of agency and the possibilities of basic transformation of the existing system.

It is clear that the debate about Kondratieffs hides other, more important debates about the understanding of large scale social processes and the historical development of the modern world. These questions will never be resolved at the level of the existence or non existence of Kondratieff cycles, but must be tackled directly. In the meantime, there is a significant group of historical social scientists who are trying to add evidence and clarify theoretically their observations about macro fluctuations in the real world.

SEE ALSO: Braudel, Fernand; Dependency and World Systems Theories; Schumpeter, Joseph A.

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Krafft-Ebing, Richard von (1840–1902)

Ken Plummer

Richard von Krafft Ebing was an influential Viennese psychiatrist who invented a massive taxonomy of non procreative sexual classifications in his influential text, *Psychopathia Sexualis with specific reference to the Antipathy Sexual Instinct: A Medico Forensic Study* (1886). Never a sociologist, he gathered some 1,500 “clinical” case studies, developing a simplified version of life stories/autobiography as a tool for gathering unique subjective worlds of sexuality which could then be placed in the public domain (Plummer 1995). Many were

introduced – in a fairly random way – as newly discovered medical perversions and disorders such as masochism, fetishism, necrophilia, sadism, inversion, and even heterosexuality – combining, for example, a wide range of case studies from men who were attracted to handkerchiefs with detailed case studies of necrophiliac murders. It was the first book of its kind and played a very significant social role in bringing to recognition an array of diverse sexualities. Much of this is discussed very critically in Foucault's key work, *The History of Sexuality* (1978), where Krafft Ebing is implicitly seen as a key figure in creating the sexual confessional, the medical construction of sexual perversion, and the contemporary organization of sexual discourses. For Foucault's influential work, Krafft Ebing was a theorist of the Victorian "repressive hypotheses."

Initially, Krafft Ebing theorized homosexuality as a degenerate inherited trait (although it can be caused by masturbation or debauchery), and his work was very significant in establishing the ideas that homosexuals were specific kinds of people, that their state was a sickness, and that cure may well be possible. As such, it could seem that Krafft Ebing was a conservative regulator of sexuality. In fact, he was a sympathetic liberal doctor who was concerned with the ways in which many sexual deviations had become criminalized, seeing them as unjust. He was influential on both Havelock Ellis and Sigmund Freud, even though they both rejected his theory. Putting his work in context, his study must be seen as one strand of late nineteenth century thinking in which sexuality was becoming separated out from its procreative function. The sexual impulse was no longer seen as dominated by the reproductive instinct, and could indeed be linked to pleasure and personal fulfillment. Many of the so called perversions were part of this wider pleasure and desire (Oosterhuis 2000).

Psychopathia Sexualis was first published in 1886 and went through 12 editions. It was published in English in 1892, although much of the sexual language was left in a medicalized scientific form – "written in Latin" – to prevent the titillation of non medical readers, who were largely excluded from reading it. By the final edition he was much more critical of his own ideas

of morbidity and degeneracy, but he did not live to see his own critique published. In the end, his work offered a humanistic account of wide spread human sexual differences.

SEE ALSO: Ellis, Havelock; Foucault, Michel; Hirschfeld, Magnus; Homosexuality; Repressive Hypothesis; Sexuality Research: History

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Kuhn, Thomas and scientific paradigms

Ron Stanfield and Mary Wrenn

Thomas S. Kuhn (1922–96) was born in Cincinnati, Ohio, and attended Harvard University. After graduating with a bachelor's degree in physics, Kuhn worked for the US government during World War II, then returned to Harvard for graduate study in physics. Having entertained an interest in philosophy since his undergraduate days, Kuhn agreed to teach a newly developed history of science class as part of his graduate work. As a result, in the last stages of his doctoral program, he decided to change his field to the history of science, a change which allowed him an entrée into the study of philosophy by focusing on the philosophical implications of change within a discipline. Kuhn continued down this intellectual pathway,

dedicating much of his professional academic career to the study of the history of science, and was especially intrigued by the shifting of gestalts within a discipline through time.

Although Kuhn's work focused almost exclusively on change within the natural sciences, it is perhaps in the social sciences that Kuhn's work made the deepest impact and where it continues to resonate today. Kuhn's emphasis on the social construction of a body of scientific knowledge appealed to social scientists who had long suffered in comparison to formal precision and elegance of the natural sciences. By seeming to emphasize consensus over rigor, Kuhn supported the scientific claim of social studies. He also opened the door to the study of the sociology of science through his work on the influence of cognitive values upon what is considered acceptable science, what Kuhn refers to as *normal science*, within any particular discipline.

Kuhn's most recognized and enduring work is *The Structure of Scientific Revolutions*. In *Structure*, Kuhn describes a process of a discipline's articulation or extension of a given developmental path up to the point at which that path no longer is able to furnish or resolve interesting problems. This crisis of normal science provokes extraordinary science and the possibility of scientific revolution in which the basic paradigm of a discipline is changed. A paradigm is a worldview, a set of implicit and explicit guides or examples defining the world and the questions and methods for analyzing the world.

The basic stages of Kuhn's scientific revolution or history of science paradigm are the following: pre paradigm; normal science; crisis and, possibly, extraordinary science; and normal science again after the crisis is resolved. The pre paradigm stage is characterized by the existence of several competing schools of thought, each offering a potential paradigm, none of which is persuasive enough to gain the (near) universal acceptance associated with normal science. There is a lack of direction as to what research should be done and as to the appropriate methods for doing it. Each competing group tends to seize upon a set of problems, facts, and methods. Published works take the form of extensive treatises that define and justify the scope and method of the research.

When one or a synthesis of the competing schools begins to attract ever larger shares of

practitioners, the transition to normal or mature science begins. Paradigms gain this acceptance by being considered more capable of solving a set of problems that have come to be accepted as the most important. The transition to normal science is marked by a withering away of competing schools, caused by conversion of old adherents, lack of recruits from a new generation, or simply defining out of the science the diehards who refuse to convert.

The discipline also is given a narrower, more rigid definition. This more rigid definition changes the nature of scientific publications, as general books (except textbooks) are replaced by shorter articles or research reports that assume prior knowledge of the paradigm on the part of the reader. The textbook tradition also arises. Textbooks generally include only that past scientific work relevant to the current paradigm. This creates the accumulated knowledge illusion of a science, since past scientists are seen as sharing the same worldview, that is, as studying the same puzzles, data, and phenomena as current scientists, albeit somewhat less adroitly. Students learn from texts, not by using original sources. The discipline grows more insular, with its own standards and communications system increasingly separated from the lay public. Indeed, scientific revolutions tend to become invisible because of the textbook tradition.

Normal science is achieved when the discipline more or less universally accepts the dominant paradigm, which then directs the practitioner as to the key questions and appropriate methods of normal research. Normal science encompasses a period of paradigm articulation involving the manipulation of fact and theory to expand the scope and precision and to resolve the ambiguities of the paradigm. Significantly, normal science is characterized by a lack of intent to uncover phenomenal or theoretical novelties. The accepted paradigm defines the appropriate problems to pursue and the procedures to be used for this pursuit, and it guarantees that solutions to the problems can be found by using these procedures. Normal science involves puzzle solving. When an experiment fails to produce the anticipated result, the puzzle solver, not the puzzle (paradigm), is considered inadequate. This point is important because scientific revolutions are rejections of paradigms that do not make good their guarantees. Normal science

is thus characterized by a period of relative quiescence, but this should not be interpreted as an equilibrium or static period. Normal science features calm and orderly cumulative change; it is not an equilibrium situation to be disturbed only by exogenous happenstance. As an articulation or day to day working out of the directions given by a paradigmatic axial structure, normal science itself sows the seeds for a period of storm, crisis, and redirection.

A situation of crisis occurs with the interruption of the normal science pattern. The existence of one or several anomalies marks the first stage of such a crisis. An anomaly is a violation of expectation or failure of a set of paradigm puzzles to come out right. As such, an anomaly may be associated with conflicting experimental or empirical discoveries or with an insistent theoretical ambiguity that defies resolution by paradigm articulation. An anomaly may not lead to crisis; it may exist and be recognized but be considered peripheral. Or the paradigm may be adjusted to resolve the anomaly. To evoke a crisis, an anomaly must question explicit, fundamental generalizations of the paradigm; be important to the solution of a pressing practical problem; or involve a long history of persistently defying resolution within the paradigm. When, for these or other reasons, an anomaly becomes recognized as more than merely a difficult problem, the transition to crisis and extraordinary science has begun. More attention is afforded the anomaly, and it may come to be recognized as the subject matter of the discipline.

The period of extraordinary science is similar in many ways to the pre paradigm state. There occurs a relaxation of the rules of normal science, which results in more speculative, random research. Increasingly divergent articulations occur, which may involve the formation of schools of thought. This pattern often leads to an increase in discoveries and a shift to philosophical analyses or explicit methodological debates on the rules of the paradigm. In essence, then, a state of flux exists in which the discipline searches for a new departure by reconsidering data, questioning structural institutions, evaluating received doctrine, and the like. The state of flux which occurs during extraordinary science is necessary but not sufficient to invoke a battle of paradigms. The period of

extraordinary science ends in one of three ways. The anomaly may be resolved finally by normal science; the anomaly may resist all offered approaches, in which case the discipline accepts it as insoluble given the state of the art; or a new paradigm may emerge and a battle for its acceptance ensues. In the last case, the ascension to dominance of a new paradigm is, of course, the consummation of a scientific revolution.

The paradigm battle occurs when dissenting opinion is molded into a synthetic paradigm that can be used to challenge the extant conventional wisdom. The challenge to conventional opinion is weakened by the existence of several dissenting schools, each insisting on its own doctrinal integrity and expending vital energy to do so. The true testing in a science occurs within the paradigm battle. Normal science does not involve testing the paradigm with fact. It is a process of matching fact and theory with the burden of failure resting upon the tool user, not the tool. Testing occurs in the paradigm battle when competing paradigms are tested for their ability to gain the allegiance of the discipline. This testing cannot be done precisely by proof either of the falsifiability criterion or of the probability of accurate prediction types, since competing paradigms are incommensurate. That is, holding different worldviews, standards, delineations of the science, and connotations of terminology, practitioners with different paradigms cannot agree on an objective operational test of the paradigms. The testing and conversion process is one of persuasion. Frequently members of the old generation remain unpersuaded and either are defined out of the discipline or manage to stave off conversion of the discipline until their deaths.

There are three principal persuasive arguments for a new paradigm: that it is capable of resolving the crisis producing anomaly; that it permits the admission of new phenomena inadmissible under the old paradigm; and that it is aesthetically more pleasing, neater, more suitable, or simpler than the old paradigm. More generally, Kuhn notes that to gain acceptance the new paradigm must be seen as preserving most or all of the problem solving capacity of the old paradigm while offering additional capacity of its own. Of course its chances for success increase with the amount of importance that can be attached to this additional capacity. Although

the new paradigm retains the problem solving capacity of the old, the new paradigm is not simply a cumulative process of attaching a new layer to the old foundation. Rather, it is the social construction of a new foundation involving new fundamental laws, generalizations, and behavioral functions; often new methods and applications; and a redefinition of the character and standards of the science. It is because of this marked deviation from the previously established paradigm that the new paradigm arises in the minds of one or a few individuals whose research is usually concentrated in the anomaly area, and who generally are young or new to the discipline and therefore have less invested in the propagation of the old paradigm. Indeed, the new paradigm is a change in worldview to such an extent that the world itself is changed. The perception and cognition of data and even the data to be collected are redefined.

Kuhn's work indicates the importance of social structure in any discussion of a scientific community. For example, a clear picture of socialization or acculturation emerges from the discussion of the intergenerational process of recruitment and accreditation. Paradigm discipline to sustain an integral core of fundamental problems and methods is a social process. The most visible aspect of this process is the structure and function of a penalty–reward and status system in the discipline's hierarchy of journals, departments, and associational offices of function and sinecure. There is also the tacit knowledge aspect in that the members of a science have internalized shared commitments, values, and research guides that remain tacit in a period of normality. Their existence, however, can be recognized consciously and their content deliberately scrutinized in periods of crisis and extraordinary science. The hierarchy of departments, journals, and associations may also be subject to critical scrutiny in such times.

In discussing normal science as a puzzle solving activity, Kuhn notes that the paradigm, and not society, defines the scope and method of a science, but this is not to say that paradigm shifts within a science occur in complete autonomy and that the wider society or social structure bears no influence upon paradigmatic change. Given the subjective character of paradigm acceptance, any social forces that play upon an investigator's sense of self and

sense of collegiality may play a role. Kuhn cites nationality as an example of an external criterion that could influence the rate of change within a discipline. Darwinism, Kuhn notes, ascended to normal science before its adaptation in other countries. As well, an individual scientist's values and norms influence the disciplinary choices made. As such, both shared and personal criteria figure into the decision making process and work to determine the openness with which paradigm changes might be greeted and the type and degree of change which the individual practitioner will tolerate. The degree of influence by these external values is directly correlated with the degree of upheaval generated by the paradigm battle internal to the discipline. Subjective values thus rise to guide the individual and fill the lacuna left by the conflation or absence of objective rule criteria. In the interest of maintaining "objective science," the part played by an individual's values and norms is generally unacknowledged in the evolution of a science. Moreover, Kuhn points out that in understanding the ascension to dominance of a new paradigm, reference must be made not only to the shared criteria of the scientists who chose the new paradigm, but also to those points on which they differ.

Kuhn's work has had enormous influence not only in the history and philosophy of science but also in the language of everyday life. His emphasis on the social construction of science is part of a general movement, dating at least to Marx, toward a sociology of knowing. If a unification of scientific knowledge is in the offing near term, it will likely build upon this growing concern with the process of human cognition.

SEE ALSO: Evolution; Fact, Theory, and Hypothesis: Including the History of the Scientific Fact; Falsification; Paradigms; Science, Social Construction of; Scientific Knowledge, Sociology of; Scientific Revolution

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Kurauchi, Kazuta (1896–1988)

Kenji Kosaka

Kazuta Kurauchi was born in Okayama Prefecture in Japan. His father was the head teacher of Chinese classics at Kojokan, which was a local private school specializing in Chinese literature studies. From his early days, Kurauchi was greatly influenced by both Keiken Sakata, the famous scholar who owned and managed the school he attended, and his father.

Kurauchi graduated from the Faculty of Letters at the then Tokyo Imperial University – now Tokyo University – where he studied sociology under Tongo Takebe, who was a follower and proponent of Comtean sociology. As sociology was not yet a well developed academic discipline in Japan, Kurauchi also studied history, literature, and philosophy, all of which combined to give a much broader perspective to his sociological work. Thus, although a sociologist, he was also well versed in classical Chinese and western (particularly German and French, but also English and Italian) and Japanese literature studies, both classical and contemporary. This wide intellectual background informed his sociological studies, and distinguished him from other Japanese

sociologists, both those who were his contemporaries and those who came after him.

After graduation, Kurauchi was employed by the Ministry of Education to research educational matters in Japan, but continued his sociological studies with colleagues at the Tokyo Society of Sociological Study. He also taught at various universities as a part time instructor at this time. Eventually he moved into teaching as full time academic work, becoming a faculty member at Kyushu University (1933–46), Osaka University (1948–60), Kwansai Gakuin University (1960–7), and Otomon University (1967–74). He was granted a doctoral degree in sociology for his book *Bunka Shakaigaku (Sociology of Culture)*, written in 1943.

Among his other major works are the books *Bunka to Kyoiku (Culture and Education)*, (1948), *Shakaigakubu Gairon (Outline of Sociology)*, (1953), and *Shakaigaku – Zohoban (Sociology, Enlarged Edition)*, (1966), which, with his many academic papers, are all included in his *Collected Papers* (1976–84). Kurauchi served as president of the Kansai Sociological Association (1956–60), and was a member of the Science Council of Japan from 1960 to 1963. He died at his home in Osaka Municipal Prefecture on July 6, 1988, having actively written about and explored new sociological research areas of study until the very end of his life.

Kurauchi was a creative scholar who lived in the Meiji era and who attempted to integrate western and Japanese philosophy, having first studied and learned Comtean sociology from Takebe, but later becoming inclined toward the sociological thinking of Tarde and Georg Simmel. His graduation thesis was “Considerations on the Causes of the Decline of Societies.” He was later also influenced by the strong currents in German sociology, particularly by phenomenology and the sociologies of culture and knowledge. The research interest which sustained his work was in the “social” dimension of society and sociology as an academic discipline.

In 1922, a new movement emerged at Tokyo Imperial University among the younger sociologists. This movement sought to absorb the new waves of European sociology that had developed while Japanese scholars had been isolated due to World War I. *Tokyo Shakaigaku Kenkyukai* (Tokyo Society of Sociological

Study) was formed in 1924 by Hisatoshi Tanabe (a committed French sociologist being a follower of both Durkheim and Tarde), Kurauchi, and Takashi Akiba (well known for his studies of ethnic groups in Korea and in China) in order to promote this new movement. Although Kurauchi was committed to phenomenological sociology, Japanese sociology as a whole became more diverse and more independent in the years following the formation of the Tokyo Society of Sociological Study.

Kurauchi's principal influences were Simmel, Kracauer, Husserl, Vierkandt, Tönnies, Scheler, Litt, Geiger, and Mannheim, all of whom are considered phenomenological sociologists. Following study and research methods developed by this prominent group of sociologists, Kurauchi attempted to have a clearer understanding of the essence of "society" in the lived experiences of the self as an individual. Theodor Litt was perhaps the most influential phenomenological sociologist on Kurauchi's sociology. It was Litt's insights into lived space and the conceptualization of the essence of society in terms of the reciprocity of perspectives that most affected Kurauchi's sociological thinking. Kurauchi applied Litt's insights to both the spatial and temporal perspectives. Other prominent sociologists greatly influenced Kurauchi, such as Durkheim, Tarde, Gurvitch, and other French sociologists. No multiplication of names of people who influenced Kurauchi's intellectual odyssey, however, would be sufficient.

Kurauchi is known as a pioneer in three areas of sociological study and research in Japan: the sociology of education, cultural sociology, and theoretical sociology. Among his major contributions was the development of unique and creative theories and concepts of sociological thought from a phenomenological perspective. His creativity and innovativeness can be seen in the sociological analytical framework and in the uniquely coined sociological concepts and terms he developed. He considered society to be a whole that contains many subjects. This whole is experienced by each individual subject, rather than by the whole subjectivity. The contemplation of society must be considered from three points: the wholeness of society, individuals, and the many varied relations that hold between and among individuals.

The experience of society is always defined in terms of time and place, where three group types can be distinguished according to the lived experience of individuals: preceding group (*Vorgruppe*), present group (*Jetztgruppe*), and subsequent or succeeding group (*Nachgruppe*). Preceding group is defined as a social group which exists prior to a given nation state, and which is involved in the transformation process of that nation state from within, with the collective energy of a social group being retained. An example is tribal groups, on whose allegiance a given nation state is based, these groups existing prior to the creation or construction of the state system, and maintaining their group allegiances after the system is formed. Such groups are often agitating elements in the state system, and there is always the possibility that these groups may withdraw from that system.

Present groups are those necessary for the construction or creation of the nation state system. Bureaucratic groups and military groups are prime examples of this group type in that they play important roles – as far as formal roles are concerned – in sustaining the state as such. However, as concerns their informal roles, these groups can easily deviate from normative standards set by the state. Since such groups are deeply connected to the state system, having been instrumental in the creation of the state system, they can also have great effects on social changes (e.g., in a coup d'état). Succeeding groups emerge after the creation or construction of the state system has been initiated, and are created or recreated by the system itself. These groups may become discontented with the state system, in which case they may also become agents of revolutionary change through their resistance to the system.

These notions of society were quite original to Kurauchi, although he got the idea from the work of early Chinese and Japanese historians such as Su Dongpo (1036–1101) and Rai Sanyo (1780–1832). Kurauchi combined the three group type model with a fourfold schema to fully develop his own theory of societal change – which he called *ri ho say may* – by integrating various sociological insights, both eastern and western. Society in its totality and societal change can be analyzed, he claimed, by reference to *ri* (law), *ho* (norm), *say* (current), and *may* (destiny), as shown in Figure 1.

	Universal	Particular
Ultra-societal	law (<i>ri</i> ; <i>Gesetz</i>)	destiny (<i>may</i> ; <i>Geschick</i>)
Societal	norm (<i>ho</i> ; <i>Norm</i>)	current (<i>say</i> ; <i>Strom</i>)

Figure 1 Societal change.

In the conceptual schema in Figure 1, *ri* refers to “external” general laws that serve to regulate societies and events and manage the thinking, actions, and behavior of humans. Our individual lives are also determined by *may* in that we cannot choose when, where, or with what socio-economic status we are born. *Ho* refers to societies’ “internal” laws and institutions, whereas *say* represents more transient entities such as social currents, fads, mobs, and public opinion. In Kurauchi’s theoretical thinking, *ri* and *ho* are much more stable than *may* and *say*. All these terms originated in eastern or Oriental literature, but are readily translatable into terms clearly understood in western philosophy.

Kurauchi uses this fourfold typological schema to explain various social phenomena; even the architecture of a house, seen from Kurauchi’s sociological perspective, can be interpreted using the four concepts. A house in Kurauchi’s conceptual schema is a representation of material culture, it being a creation and adaptation of humans in the midst of their natural surroundings (*ri*). The house embodies human values (*ho*), and is a reflection of a variety of manners that show social currents (*say*). The house, consisting of three major components – roof, wall, and floor – is also a place where someone happens to live (*may*). The natural environment coupled with the human need to protect oneself from possible violent assault by outsiders, for example, together determine different housing styles, which reflect different cultures and ways of thinking and behaving (e.g., eastern/Oriental and western/Occidental, modern and premodern, etc.).

Kurauchi uses this same explanatory schema to illustrate, for example, how elements of Confucianism have affected modernization and the development of democracy in Japanese society, how the history of a society is to be analyzed in general terms, and how religion is formed and transformed during historical processes. Thus, Kurauchi’s fourfold schema provides a

powerful interpretive framework in sociology. Kurauchi’s culture and his original social analyses reminded him of early literature, both eastern and western. At the same time, the opposite occurred: he was provided with useful clues or hints to formulating sociological concepts and theories by recalling early literature. For Kurauchi, even the past can be classified into three types. First there is the “age of direct contemporaries,” secondly “the age of direct transmission of tradition,” and lastly “the age of indirect records and literature.” This further utilization of Kurauchi’s conceptual and theoretical framework was suggested to him by Chun Gin, a Chinese scholar of the Gong Yang school at the end of the Qing dynasty. This typology was also easily linked to the concepts of *Vorwelt* (world of predecessors), *Umwelt* (fellow men in direct experiences), *Mitwelt* (world of contemporaries), and *Folgemelt* (world of successors), which were developed by Alfred Schütz.

Kurauchi applied his unique phenomenological perspective to the interpretation of numerous historical events as well as cultural and artistic works. The *I Ching*, for example, remained one of his longstanding academic interests. *Doroumi koki*, which was an orally constructed legend in Japan of the creation of humans, describes the philosophy of Miki Nakayama (1798–1887), the founder of the Shinto sect named *Tenri kyo*. Kurauchi reinterpreted *Doroumi koki* as an elaborate philosophy for ordinary people based on both the *I Ching* and his own sociological perspectives.

The legend known as *Doroumi koki* begins by describing how humans were created. Gods of (the) sun and (the) moon looked down upon *doroumi* (muddy sea), only to find loaches. The gods soon grew tired of looking at this monotonous scenery and decided to create humans. Kurauchi interprets this as an embodiment of *K’un* (ground), represented as loaches in *doroumi* and gods in *Ch’ien* (heaven), a combination of

the two trigrams of *ying* and *yang* which, he says, imply the production or creation of some thing – in this case, humans.

Other phenomena can be interpreted in terms of a combination of two out of eight trigrams. A seemingly ridiculous legend, involving a variety of fish and reptiles, such as tortoises, eels, glo befish, plaice, flatfish, black snakes, and killer whales, is now codified as representing three layers of humans, animals, and vegetables. Furthermore, in the process of that codification the legend acquires a deep sociological interpretation. This analysis thus recalls Aristotelian anthropology and Lévi Straussian structuralism as well as Chinese and Japanese philosophy. No other sociologist, Japanese or otherwise, can compete with Kurauchi's analysis explaining the entire discourse of *Doroumi koki*.

Kurauchi's sociology may very well be characterized as an attempt to integrate sociology with its western origins into the social thought and literature of the eastern/Oriental and Asian experiences. In 1974 Kurauchi stated,

[I am] dissatisfied with the situation where Japanese sociologists view sociology as an imported science subservient to the authority of Western scholars, while lessons from Chinese and Japanese classical and contemporary works are ignored. It is unnaturally dogmatic that we do not investigate that literature and continue to treat it as irrelevant. This is a cultural tragedy. ("Sociology and I," in *Collected Papers*, V.456)

Kurauchi never once mentioned or spoke of "globalization" in the sense in which the term

was used at about the end of the twentieth century. The three group model discussed above may well reflect the world system in the 1960s as Kurauchi viewed it. However, Kurauchi's ideas and theories will never become outdated since they are concerned deeply with the fundamental structures and processes of the lived experiences of humans, and with society. Kurauchi's ideas, concepts, and theoretical explanations, analyses, and interpretations are readily applicable to any society at any level of discussion or analysis, and at any time. The many newly emerging difficult tasks, and the turmoil which gives rise to an urgency of confronting those tasks in the twenty first century, can be readily addressed by carefully looking at and applying Kurauchi's general theoretical schema.

SEE ALSO: Confucianism; Culture; Durkheim, Émile; Knowledge, Sociology of; Phenomenology; Religion; Schütz, Alfred; Shintoism; Simmel, Georg; Takata, Yasuma; Theory

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L

labeling

Thomas Calhoun and Mark Konty

In the sociology of deviance the concept of labeling is used in two interrelated ways. One involves the labeling of people as *deviants*. When people are so labeled, they are judged to be deviant by some standard and the label has important sociological and psychological consequences. The other is the labeling of actions as *deviance*. When actions are labeled as such, there tends to be an actual or assumed non normative behavior, and that reaction reflects the feeling and attitude of a person or group toward that behavior.

Although functionalism and conflict theory contributed to the labeling concept, it is most firmly rooted in symbolic interactionism. As suggested by symbolic interactionism, people and their behavior are labeled deviant via social interaction with others, and the feedback we receive from those interactions structures our view of ourselves. In effect, labeling behavior as deviant constitutes and defines its deviant status, and, as a result, the person so labeled experiences the consequences of being labeled deviant.

LABELING PEOPLE AS DEVIANTS

Deviant labels are *negative*. Frank Tannenbaum (1938) was the first sociologist to argue that society creates criminals by “dramatizing the evil” of the offender. The person is “defined,” “identified,” “segregated,” and made “conscious and self conscious” of his or her failings. The label identifies the negative character of the offender.

Deviant labeling produces negative *reactions*. Edwin Lemert (1951) made a conceptual distinction between primary and secondary deviance. Primary deviance is norm violating behavior that goes undetected by others and consequently escapes being labeled deviant. This type of deviation does not affect the individual’s social relationships or self concept. Secondary deviance, however, is known to others and provokes negative “societal response.” Lemert was not concerned with what prompted people to commit the deviant act in the first place, but was interested in how the negative responses to deviance shaped future behavior. A person may commit rule breaking acts, but with no response from others the individual simply carries on as before. A person, then, is not a deviant unless others respond in a negative way to the person’s behavior.

Deviant labeling depends upon *social relationships*. All labels emerge from social relationships. These negative reactions ascribe negative characteristics to the individual. These reactions, however, are not the same for all kinds of people. Instead, as Howard Becker (1963) observed, some individuals are more likely to be labeled deviant than others, even when the same rule is broken. The likelihood of being labeled deviant, however, depends on the relationship between one person and others. Generally, the greater the difference in power and status between the two parties, the more likely one is labeled deviant by the other. Also, the more distant the relationship, the more likely labeling is to occur. Thus, labeling is more likely to occur among strangers than among friends and family members.

Deviant labels are *noxious*, an “undesired differentness” (Goffman 1963: 5). They tend to threaten or destroy the labeled person’s career, social position, and relationship with friends, acquaintances, and others. As a result,

people generally try to avoid deviant labels and they use various strategies to manage the situation to avoid the label. Erving Goffman (1963) draws a distinction between people who are “discredited” (already stigmatized) and “discreditable” (may be stigmatized at any time) and suggests some of the ways that each manages the situation to avoid the noxious effects of the deviant label.

Deviant labels make *social interaction difficult*. Generally, people prefer to interact with others who are more like them. The deviant label lets us know that the deviant is not like us, seems to oppose our values, or has different tastes and preferences. We consequently feel uncomfortable interacting with the deviant person. Moreover, interacting with deviants carries the risk of guilt by association or what Goffman (1963) called “courtesy stigma,” whereby conventional people are labeled deviant simply because they associate with a deviant. As a consequence, conventional people tend to steer clear of the deviant.

Another effect on social interaction occurs when the rule breakers are shamed for their behavior. According to John Braithwaite (1989), shaming takes one of two forms, each with different consequences. In “disintegrative” shaming the rule breaker is stigmatized and rejected by the group, resulting in the likelihood of further deviance. “Reintegrative” shaming, on the other hand, involves showing compassion and understanding for the rule breaker while simultaneously making him feel shame for his behavior. The result is the likelihood that deviance will desist. The effect of labeling on social interaction thus depends upon the type of shaming practiced by the group.

Deviant labels tend to produce *deviant self concepts*. In symbolic interactionism, the self is a product of social interaction. If the interaction involves a person being labeled as a deviant, that person is likely to develop a deviant self concept. The altered self concept in turn affects future outcomes. This can occur even if the individual has done nothing wrong.

William Chambliss (1973) demonstrated that not only does social status affect who gets labeled, but that this difference also affects the self concepts accordingly. The “Roughnecks” came from the community’s lower social strata. They engaged in some petty larceny and

occasionally fought with each other. The community labeled them as the town troublemakers. The “Saints” were members of the community’s upper social strata. They were actually more deviant than the Roughnecks, not only because they committed more deviant acts but also because their deviant acts were more serious and harmful. These boys were nonetheless considered upstanding members of the community, and when they were caught breaking rules, the behavior was excused as “boys being boys.” Following high school graduation the Saints did better than the Roughnecks. The Saints became the respectable citizens they were projected to be, while the Roughnecks continued a life of petty crime and low paying jobs. The only exception was two Roughneck boys who went away to college on athletic scholarships. Free from the negative feedback of the deviant label, they developed positive, successful self concepts. They returned to their home community and occupied the same positions as the Saints. This reveals a situation where two groups of youth, both engaged in delinquency, had very different outcomes because their social statuses determined how their behavior was reacted to, and those reactions shaped the boys’ futures in different ways.

LABELING BEHAVIOR AS DEVIANCE

Becker (1963) observed, “deviant behavior is behavior that people so label.” This seems to be stating the obvious, but this subjective, or reactive, definition of deviance opened the door for new analytical and theoretical insights in the study of deviance. Analytically, this definition of deviance allows researchers to set aside their own judgments of right and wrong and instead focus on the judgments and consequent reactions of the society being observed. Theoretically, this definition calls attention to the role of power in defining behavior as deviant.

How can we know what is regarded as deviant in a society? Becker analyzed several approaches and found each wanting. One approach is to calculate some statistical mean and use that as a standard of what is “normal,” but this may or may not actually fit what the society considers desirable or deviant. Some typical behaviors (e.g., lying) are quite common

but still considered deviant. Some atypical behaviors (e.g., eating pancakes for lunch) are not considered deviant at all. Another approach is to determine if a behavior is harmful to the individual or society, but there is often little consensus as to what is harmful or not. The approach with the most intuitive appeal is to simply ask what the rules are or look for some absolute moral code (e.g., the Bible) which the group references. In complex societies, however, people reference many different groups, each under different rules, and figuring out which rules apply at what time and in which setting makes analysis difficult, if at all possible. On top of all this is the fact that some formal rules are rarely enforced while other informal rules carry more weight. How could the observer know what is deviant and what is not? The answer, Becker contended, is that the observer can know deviance by how people react to an individual's behavior. If they react negatively, he reasoned, then the act must be deviant.

Some critics question the moral validity of this approach. They argue deviants are unusual, deviance is harmful, and the moral code is absolute rather than relative. Deviance is an objective phenomenon, they conclude, not a product of social construction. Unfortunately, this approach is analytically useless and doesn't reflect empirical reality. To the researcher, it doesn't matter what *should* be deviant, but rather what *is* regarded as deviant in a particular society. Simply observing the world around us tells us that definitions of deviance do vary across groups, time, and space.

The labeling, reactive definition provides a parsimonious solution to the problem of defining a phenomenon with so much variance. People don't react negatively if they believe a behavior is positive, so if there is a negative reaction, there must have been a negative behavior in the eye of the observer. Of course, this definition also includes people who may have actually done nothing wrong, but are still labeled deviant, what Becker called the "falsely accused." There is a problem, though, with this reactive definition. It may include the subjective view of deviance as *positive*, which runs counter to most sociologists' assumption that deviance is always negative (Heckert & Heckert 2002).

A key utility of the reactive definition of deviance is that it allows sociologists to examine the role of power in defining deviant and normative behavior. A normative definition of deviance, which regards deviance as a norm violation, says nothing about where the norms came from or why the norm violation does not have the same consequences for different categories of people. The more power and resources a social category commands, the greater is its capacity to resist being labeled as deviant and the more impact its definitions of deviance have. More powerful social sectors of the society are more likely than less powerful sectors to have their definitions of deviance valorized and institutionalized. Taken collectively, the more influence a social category has, the more likely its views on right and wrong will have influence on the educational curriculum, the content of the media, political discourse, and the actions and policies of the criminal justice system.

AN ASSESSMENT OF LABELING THEORY

The labeling *process* is distinct from labeling *theory*. The process of labeling, a process that takes place in all societies and all times, has manifestations and consequences that are distinct from any theoretical claims made by labeling theorists. Labeling theory can be critiqued independent of the phenomena observed during the labeling process. As a theory, labeling can be both dependent and independent variable. Labeling theorists have attempted to explain why certain people are more likely to be labeled than others, taking labels as result dependent upon other factors. Substantial evidence indicates that factors like power and status differences, resources, social distance, and visibility affect the likelihood that a label will be applied. Labeling theorists also posit that labels have their own independent effects on social interaction, self concepts, and behavior.

Over the years a number of criticisms have been leveled at labeling as an independent variable. The most common is the charge that the labeling perspective does not explain initial acts of deviance, as it only explains deviance after the behavior has been detected and the label

applied. But supporters of the labeling theory counter that the theory is not intended to explain initial deviance but instead secondary, continued, or repeated deviance as a result of the societal responses to initial deviance. However, research has yielded mixed results on the presumed validity of the theory. Labeling by friends, family, and other informal social agents has strong effects on self concepts (Matsueda 1992), while labels from the criminal justice system and other formal social control agencies seem to have weak or no effects on individual's self concepts (Akers & Sellers 2004).

SEE ALSO: Crime; Deviance; Deviance, Crime and; Deviance, Criminalization of; Deviance, Explanatory Theories of; Deviance, Theories of; Goffman, Erving; Identity, Deviant; Labeling Theory; Lemert, Edwin M.; Stigma; Symbolic Interaction

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labeling theory

Ross Matsueda

Unlike most theories of crime and deviance, which emphasize the causes of deviant behavior, labeling theories focus on society's reaction to crime and deviance. Labeling theorists argue that society's reaction to deviance is fundamental for three reasons. First, individuals who are labeled as deviant by society often become stigmatized and isolated from society, leading them into a deviant lifestyle. Second, the very definition of deviance lies not in the objective behavior of "deviants," but in powerful groups' ability to define and label the behavior of the powerless as deviant or criminal. Thus, deviance is socially constructed. Third, society's reaction to deviance provides positive functions for society by defining the boundary between deviant and conventional behavior and by reaffirming social solidarity.

LABELING, STIGMA, AND DEVIANCE AMPLIFICATION

Labeling theory argues that initial acts of child misbehavior are harmless acts of primary deviance; if left alone, children would mature out of misbehavior. While the children define such acts as "play" or "mischief," the adult community defines them as "bad" or "evil." The community, which includes parents, teachers, and juvenile justice officials, labels the acts as "delinquent," and the child as "bad" or "evil," in need of treatment or reform. The label, in turn, affects the self image of the child, who comes to internalize the label, which produces more deviance, and more labeling. This escalating process of labeling can even tuate in the youth caught up in the legal system, stigmatized by society, isolated from conventional groups, and left with a deviant self image. The result can be a self fulfilling prophecy, as an otherwise conforming child fulfills the prophecy of the initial labeling of harmless acts, through deviance amplification (Matsueda 1992).

Lemert (1951) used the term primary deviance to refer to harmless initial acts of deviance, and secondary deviance to refer to deviance resulting from the negative effects of labeling. Labeling theorists have identified many examples of secondary deviance. For example, because of the stigma of their arrest records, ex prisoners have difficulty getting jobs, finding affordable housing in good neighborhoods, and finding non criminal companions, all of which impedes reentry into conventional society. Mental patients institutionalized in mental hospitals are stripped of their identities and forced to adapt to a custodial environment, which can hamper their attempts to recover. The poor are sometimes labeled as lazy and slothful, which can undermine their self esteem and attempts to secure and maintain jobs.

These propositions of labeling theory led to policy changes in the 1970s. In juvenile justice, non intervention policies were introduced to remove youth from the tangle of juvenile corrections and community treatment. In mental health, deinstitutionalization and mainstreaming were adopted to move non chronic mental patients into the community. Such policies resulted in some successes, but also unanticipated consequences, such as widening the net of community controls of juveniles and increasing the ranks of mentally ill in the homeless population. Thus, the policies were no panacea for the complex problems addressed.

SOCIAL CONSTRUCTION, POLITICAL POWER, AND THE DEFINITION OF DEVIANCE

Perhaps more than any other theory of deviance, labeling theory takes seriously a social constructionist view. Rather than assuming that deviance and crime are objective behaviors "out there" to be discovered, labeling theorists argue that deviance is socially constructed through an institutional process involving politics and the legal system, and an interactional process involving the powerful applying of labels to the powerless. As a social construction, then, deviance is relative to a given society and

historical period. Out of the nearly limitless variety of human acts, societies settle on a small range of acts to label as deviant; most entail harm to others, but some entail little harm. The relativity of deviance is underscored by labeling theorists' definition of deviance.

In contrast to the usual definitions of deviance (or crime) as behavior violating social norms (or criminal laws), most labeling theorists adopt a "labeling definition of deviance," in which deviance is a label or status conferred by a social audience. Deviance, then, is not a behavior but a label: "The deviant is one to whom that label has successfully been applied; deviant behavior is behavior that people so label" (Becker 1963). When introduced, this definition created confusion, as critics argued that, taken literally, the definition excludes the possibility of actual deviant behavior, independent of whether or not it is labeled. Becker (1973) responded by saying the entire process of creating rules, violating rules, and labeling violators constitutes labeling: "Social groups create deviance by making the rules whose infraction constitutes deviance, and by applying those rules to outsiders." Such a definition spawned studies of the entire process, beginning with rule creation.

A hallmark of labeling theory is the observation that labels are not distributed equally in society, but rather are disproportionately applied to the powerless, the disadvantaged, and the poor. This begins with the creation of rules that define deviance. Labeling theorists argued that generally the powerful succeed in creating rules and laws outlawing behavior that violates their self interests. Thus, rule creation is a result of group conflict in society, in which the powerful have a distinct advantage. Becker (1963) showed how moral entrepreneurs, typically drawn from the ranks of the middle and upper classes, create moral crusades by mobilizing disparate interest groups to outlaw behaviors that violate their common interest. Classic examples include the Marihuana Tax Act, prohibition, sexual psychopath laws, and the creation of the juvenile court.

Labeling theorists also maintain that once laws are passed they tend to be enforced by the justice system in unfair ways, again more likely to single out the less powerful for the same behavior.

At the extreme, some theorists claimed that everyone commits crimes, but only a select few – including minorities, the poor, and the powerless – are arrested and incarcerated. Finally, an offshoot of labeling theory, termed the medicalization of deviance perspective, showed how the powerful medical profession increasingly succeeds in defining deviance as a medical problem or illness requiring treatment by licensed medical professionals. Once the deviant act is medicalized, other approaches to explaining, treating, and policymaking are ignored.

POSITIVE FUNCTIONS OF DEVIANCE

Building on the works of Durkheim and Mead, Erikson (1962, 1966) examined the positive functions of labeling for society. Durkheim (1964) argued that punishment of criminals served two functions. First, by punishing criminals with outrage and passion, society reaffirms the moral order – including the values, beliefs, and morals that bind society together – threatened by criminals' transgressions. Second, by punishing criminals, society draws a line between moral and immoral conduct, which is necessary because what constitutes crime and deviance is relative to a given society. Durkheim argued that in a "society of saints," trivial deviations – which we would consider merely "bad taste" – would be punished to reaffirm the moral order. Mead (1918) maintained that punishment allows members of society to express impulses of hostility and outrage, which creates a strong emotional identification with conventional society and feelings of anger at the criminal.

Erikson notes that labeling, such as imprisonment or hospitalization, does not reform or cure the deviant (the manifest function), but instead stigmatizes and segregates the deviant, resulting in a self-fulfilling prophecy in which deviants return to their deviant ways. Erikson concludes that labeling serves the latent function of maintaining a pool of deviants for defining moral boundaries and reaffirming social solidarity. He studied the Salem witch trials and showed how Puritans expressed their emotional hysteria by condemning witches and labeling them sinners and agents of the devil,

which reduced tensions and factions among Puritans, Quakers, and other sects.

CRITICISMS AND PROMISING NEW DIRECTIONS

In the 1970s labeling theory achieved prominence as a major theory of deviance; through the 1980s it was subjected to several major critiques; by the 1990s, new theoretical developments emerged. Critiques came from disparate sources. Conflict and Marxist criminologists argued that labeling theory's analysis of rule creation and enforcement was rudimentary and ignored the contradictions of capitalism, which are revealed by a Marxist critique of capitalist social relations. Positivist criminologists, who advocate using scientific principles to study crime, argued that actual deviance did exist, the concept of secondary deviance was bankrupt, and labels were not disproportionately applied in society, when controlling for actual behavior.

Three recent developments in labeling theory have addressed the positivist critique by responding to Becker's (1973) call for an interactionist theory of all aspects of deviance, including primary deviance, labeling, and secondary deviance. Link and his colleagues (1989) have developed a modified labeling theory of mental illness in which a community's tolerance of mental illness colors how mental patients cope with the stigma of official labeling by treatment agencies. Depending on whether the community discriminates and devalues mental patients, the patient either minimizes the stigma by enlightening others, hides the treatment history, or withdraws from prejudicial groups.

Braithwaite (1989) developed a theory of shame and reintegration, in which he argues that labeling can have both positive and negative effects on future behavior. When offenders are severely punished, they are stigmatized as an outcast, cut off from conventional groups, and are likely to turn to subcultures, which ensnarls them in a web of criminality. In contrast, when offenders are publicly shamed by the community expressing disapproval, but then reintegrated into society, the stigmatizing effects of labeling will not lead to secondary deviance. Reintegrative shaming is most effective in communitarian societies like Japan, in which members are

intertwined in each other's lives, making shaming and reintegration likely and successful.

Matsueda (1992) and his colleagues (Heimer & Matsueda 1994) used Mead's theory of role taking and social cognition to develop a theory of both primary and secondary deviance, termed differential social control. In problematic situations in which habitual behavior is blocked, individuals take the role of others, form a self as an object from the standpoint of others, and consider alternate solutions to problems from the standpoint of others. This cognitive process links the self and social groups to behavioral decisions: the self is a reflection of appraisals made by significant others, including reference groups. They find support for a causal chain, in which labeling by others influences future delinquency by altering reflected appraisals.

In sum, labeling theory has shaped how we view deviance and crime in society by underscoring the importance of society's reactions to deviance, analyzing political power and deviant labels, and showing how labeling can amplify deviance. Left for dead in the 1980s by some researchers, labeling theory is enjoying a revival by researchers responding to Becker's (1973) call for an interactionist theory of all aspects of deviance, including primary deviance, labeling, and secondary deviance.

SEE ALSO: Crime; Deviance; Deviance, Crime and; Deviance, Criminalization of; Deviance, Theories of; Interaction; Labeling; Lemert, Edwin M.; Social Problems, Concept and Perspectives; Social Psychology; Theory

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labor/labor power

Rob Beamish

While establishing their materialist position, Marx and Engels argued that one may distinguish humankind from other biological entities by consciousness, religion, or whatever else one chose, but humankind fundamentally distinguished itself from animals and other living organisms when it began to produce its means of life. Labor, they argued, is an eternal, naturally imposed condition of human life, common to all forms of society. Finally, Marx and Engels noted, while producing its means of life, humankind indirectly produces the material conditions for its ongoing existence.

Two decades later, Marx again stressed labor's ontological nature and importance. In *Capital*, Marx distinguished labor "in general" from labor involved in "the valorization process." The latter is a particular sociohistorical form of labor that produces commodities that are sold in the market and functions as the source of surplus value. Labor in general is the general form of labor through which materials from the natural world are appropriated and converted to products that directly or indirectly meet human needs and wants. Labor in general actualizes the fundamental interchange between humankind and nature through which humankind engages with nature, changes

its understanding of nature, and influences its own character. More than 130 years of scholarship in the physical, biological, and social sciences have refined, but not fundamentally altered, Marx's position on labor's ontological character.

Humankind is directly part of the material order of nature and inescapably bound to its laws (e.g., gravity, mitosis and meiosis, aging). As living creatures, there are specific material needs which we must meet (e.g., we must metabolize oxygen, water, protein, and caloric energy to live), but they are not all met immediately and directly. Through time and the evolutionary processes of the material order, the human order became dirempted or alienated from the material order. Whereas the material order of nature is direct, concrete, and thingly, the human order is concurrently immediate and mediate, concrete and abstract, and objective and subjective. Labor in general is the activity through which humankind indirectly or mediately engages with the material order and draws upon the concrete and abstract aspects of its being to create and recreate its existence.

It was Marx's 1844 critique of Hegel's *Phenomenology* that led to his deepest and most perceptive analyses of labor as the material, ontological basis to human life. Read through Marx's emerging materialist position, Hegel's conception correctly emphasized the creative aspects of labor, but limited it to the self-conscious mind. For Marx, human self-development stemmed from labor that was simultaneously concrete and abstract. Through labor, a material object is created which is separate from the producer as he or she externalizes an idea in a material form. This object stands "opposite" and outside the producer, but it simultaneously remains a part of him or her insofar as it represents the culmination of his or her creative activity. Subject to the laws of the material order – including humankind's material being – labor is an activity that is simultaneously objective and subjective because in producing an object – in the creation and externalization of an idea – the producer also gains subjective knowledge that did not exist before production began. Ontologically, labor is a concrete process that is inescapably creative. The mediate relation of humankind to the material order interposes,

through the labor process, a grid of culture between humankind and the natural order.

If labor is the eternal, naturally imposed condition of human life, labor power is the eternal, active, mediating capacity and force between humankind and the material order. Living labor, Marx argued in *Capital*, is the fire that infuses energy into raw materials, tools, and machinery, and turns them from moribund objects into newly formed products that can meet human needs and wants through consumption.

The notion of labor power originates in Adam Smith's *Wealth of Nations*, where he attributed the "productive powers" of labor to the division of labor. Noting the conception of "productive faculties" in one of his 1844 study notebooks, Marx refocused the term when wrestling with the question of what a worker actually brings to the production process. Marx argued that labor was brought to the marketplace as a potential. The living worker represented and carried an ability (or abilities) and the capacity to engage in labor – the product that was of ultimate interest to the capitalist purchaser. While Marx used several terms in his early work, he tended to use labor power in his later works to describe the capacity or commodity that the worker brought to the valorization process, but labor power always represented a complex conception of potential, ability, power, and force which brought life to the material order in the concurrently concrete and abstract, objective and subjective, immediate and mediate process of labor.

In class societies, labor power is the sole source of value creation. Because labor power is a capacity, the purchaser pays only as much as is required for the worker – the bearer of this potential – to meet his or her socially determined needs to reproduce him or herself and return to work day after day. The expenditure of labor power produces more value than the replacement value of labor power, giving rise to surplus value. As a result, labor power is the unique source of surplus value. The identification of labor power as the source of surplus in societies of social labor, in general and capitalist society in particular, was among Marx's most significant discoveries.

SEE ALSO: Alienation; Engels, Friedrich; Hegel, G.W.F.; Marx, Karl; Smith, Adam; Value

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labor–management relations

Casten von Otter

The study of labor–management relations (LMR) refers to the rules and policies which govern and organize employment, how these are established and implemented, and how they affect the needs and interests of employees and employers. LMR has implications for the organization of work as well as economic policy. Focus gradually has broadened from the formation and operation of national and local institutions and collective bargaining to strategic human resource policies. Most recently a multi level agenda has formed, following new needs for regulation in world trade, in the extended European Union, and in former communist and newly industrialized countries.

The freedom of collective bargaining is an important instrument of citizenship in a democracy, as expressed by the UN Declaration of Human Rights and the International Labor Organization's statement of core labor standards. Based on a norm of accommodation of interests, LMR eases the burden placed on parliamentary institutions. Respect for the freedom of association for all workers is generally seen as a prerequisite for a sustainable system of free trade.

To sociology, LMR is a momentous arena in which a political order intersects with the market system, which affects social differentiation, the distribution of social and economic welfare, and numerous other social dimensions in which sociologists take great interest. The field is important, as well, to many other disciplines – economics (labor economics), management science, political science, labor law, and social history. Industrial (or labor) relations was established as an academic discipline in the US in the early twentieth century. LMR is unusually rich in interdisciplinary theories, as well as international comparative studies. Its academic history is marked by strong ideological and normative commitments and the evident inputs to theorizing from political ideologies as well as the social sciences.

Two analytical paradigms have dominated the field. The traditional industrial relations systems perspective as laid out by John Dunlop is focused on the governance of work. Conflicts of interest between employees and management are seen as legitimate and often structural in origin. The favored vehicle for conflict resolution is collective bargaining (ultimately backed by the right to strike and lock out) and regulated procedures for arbitration. Legislation is a useful instrument to be applied, however, mostly when self determination by the parties has failed. While this theoretical perspective does not preclude accommodation of interests at the individual level, it maintains the importance of a collective regulatory framework that establishes a countervailing force against unfettered market forces and unilateral decisions of the employer. The industrial relations perspective has been criticized for being too top down, for disregarding workplace practices, and (initially) lacking in agency theory.

The other perspective is personnel or human resource management (HRM) and is underpinned by application of behavioral science (human relations theory) to organizational design. Corporate culture is important in integrating the employees with the aims and long term objectives of the firm. Thus, wage systems and benefit schemes should be molded, not only to fulfill a contractual obligation, but also as proactive instruments to promote skills and beneficial attitudes and actions. New human resource policies are related to the increased

pressure to compete in terms of speed, innovation, customization, etc. Conflicts and power relations are played down, as both parties supposedly have a strong interest in maintaining a consentient culture. HRM schemes have been controversial for their alleged use to foster complacent attitudes and to shift focus from trade union relations to personnel policy. More recently, the two fields are becoming integrated, as policies associated with HRM are introduced into collective agreements in Europe and the US.

HISTORY

Labor relations as a theme evolved out of the social problems that became evident during the industrial revolution. In all countries a period of social struggle preceded the resolution of labor conflict in institutional forms, bearing witness to the strong adversarial potential of unregulated LMR. In the words of Marx, workers were treated like commodities and should organize to overthrow the capitalist system. Sidney and Beatrice Webb inspired the reformist labor movement, favoring the improvement of LMR through legislated labor standards and collective bargaining, which ultimately could lead to industrial democracy. The basic idea – then and to this day – is to take wages, benefits, safety, and security standards out of economic competition. Germany under Bismarck pioneered legislation in health and safety, unemployment and workers' compensation insurance, retirement benefits, etc. Social model institutions for LMR or utopian communities such as those established by Robert Owen or Henry Ford served to demonstrate the viability of more human policies, but failed for different reasons in the long run.

J. R. Commons laid the foundation of the academic theory of industrial relations and the vocational practice in the US. The New Deal took his ideas further and established a national industrial relations framework with the National Labor Relations Act and the Fair Labor Standards Act, etc., which set an example to many countries. Since then the formal structure has expanded in scope, detail, and complexity.

During the politically radical 1970s attention was drawn to industrial democracy and new

less alienating models of work. The thinking owed inspiration both to the Webbs and to Japanese management, and to experiments with work organization by the Tavistock Institute (sociotechnical theory), especially in Norway and Sweden, which tackled issues such as employee participation in cross functional learning, innovation, and quality. After a century of progressive evolution of workers' rights through collective bargaining and legislation, the trajectory for these approaches to LMR seemed to decline in the 1980s.

INSTITUTIONS OF LMR

There are three main processes of employment regulation: legal enactment, collective bargaining, and unilateral regulation confirmed by the individual when accepting his or her employment contract. LMR regimes involve a mix of substantive and procedural matters, but beneath them all are two parties in asymmetric positions, trying to make the most of their relative positions. Notions of interests, fairness, and effectiveness are profoundly important, within the action frame of reference. There is across nations a wide variety of arrangements, a mix of public and private, firm specific, state and tripartite forms, reflecting particular national experiences, attitudes, and key political relationships, etc.

National clusters of LMR regimes have been identified as the European model, which is the more encompassing, and the Anglo American, which is more minimalist. Some argue that there is more than one path to competitive advantage, and speak of the former as "coordinated" and the latter as "liberal market economies." Defining characteristics of the coordinated model are a combination of multi employer bargaining, legal enforceability, and the practice of extension (of collective agreements), as well as provisions for information and consultation.

Few dispute the need for some government legislation in defining rules for collective bargaining and labor conflicts and establishing core standards (e.g., prohibiting forced and child labor, and more recently discrimination, sexual harassment, etc.). Issues regulated variably by law or contract or in combination include minimum wages, working hours, holidays, sick

leave, dismissals, and redundancy and supplementary benefit schemes. Health plans, severance pay, unemployment insurance, pension plans, etc. are in some countries general entitlements, in others mediated through collective agreements or not at all. Issues of worker participation can similarly be regulated to give the workers – either as employees or through a trade union – representation on corporate boards, in work councils, or similar entities. An active labor market policy, assisting in the relocation and training of workers, is in most countries an integral part of the industrial relations system, seen as instrumental in obtaining compliance with structural economic change from the unions.

Over the years the general tendency has been for bargaining to become less differentiated between the private and public sectors, salaried and waged workers, etc. A prominent feature when comparing Europe, the US, and the leading Asian economies is the persistent high degree of interest in organization among workers and employers in Western Europe. In the US union membership is considerably lower than in most of Europe, and the peak level organizations command little authority. Employers' organizations are strong in Europe, barely feature in the US, and are weak in Japan.

The effectiveness of a union as negotiator and political lobbyist depends on its ability to command the loyalty of its members in mobilizing for action and respect for collective agreements. This makes internal governance and strategic leadership of unions of basic interest. Unions hold different views on how far they should allow themselves to be involved with government and management. Positions taken vis à vis employee stock ownership plans, quality circles, and productivity programs reflect varying deliberations and political inclinations (e.g., communist, social democratic, or catholic).

Union membership as percent of the active labor force was at its peak in most western countries in the 1970s. Only in a few mainly Northern European countries is a majority of the workforce engaged in trade unions. In countries such as the US, the UK, Australia, France, and Italy membership has declined by two thirds or more. Countries with stable density have legislation that favors membership.

In the last few decades US managers have been actively anti union, while in Europe the focus has been on new arrangements rather than derecognition of unions. Non union representation does not exclude workers' consultation. Many multinational corporations which are non union have developed systems for employee regulation and representation as part of their personnel policy. The rules are then determined unilaterally and can be altered at management's discretion.

ENCOMPASSING REGIMES

Fundamental to the role of collective bargaining as theorized by the economist Mancur Olson is the degree of coordination in encompassing units. Where there is peak level bargaining and trade unions have a near total coverage of the community, they need to take into account wage, price, and employment effects, which induce restraint and concern for inflation. While under disintegrated bargaining, where the beneficial results are concentrated in the members and the negative impact is dispersed, the union will disregard inflationary and other external effects.

This line of reasoning is the rationale for neo corporatist arrangements, such as a government led incomes policy. Most such schemes were eliminated in the neoliberal ascendancy of the 1980s. However, there has been an unexpected revival of "social pacts" as instruments for preparing for global competitiveness and the EMU (the European currency). In these, reform of LMR and wage moderation, labor market flexibility, and revised welfare provisions hold a key role.

European integration has prompted a multi level system of governance, introducing a supranational level and encouraging resort to decentralization within national systems. The effects of harmonizing social standards in the Euro zone need to take into account the vast regional economic differences in the expanded community. Compared to the US, labor market mobility remains much lower in Europe, for obvious cultural and traditional reasons.

All of the Western European countries, except the UK, are characterized by an inclusive structure of multi employer bargaining.

The impact of collective bargaining only vaguely reflects the density of union membership. Most countries hold statutory extension provisions by which the terms of the collective agreement are extended throughout a sector or country. A consequence is that there is little correlation in Europe between trade union membership (on average below 50 percent) and coverage by collective agreement (around 80 percent). In the UK and Ireland by contrast, collective agreements are voluntary and enforceable by law only if the parties are agreed. Collective bargaining in the US never covered more than about a third of the labor market, but collective agreements are intensively developed to cover a wide range of issues. Some agreements have ramifications outside their constituency as a benchmark for non union firms. This might explain why many Americans (between 40–50 percent) think favorably of unions, although fewer than 10 percent are members.

A NEW PARADIGM?

Over the last few decades momentous events have transformed the field of LMR practice and research. Inflexible markets were blamed for the stalled growth of the old industrialized countries in the 1970s, in comparison to rapidly developing economies in Asia. New global product markets created strong competitive pressures. In response, employers and a new range of neoclassical economists called for the deconstruction of LMR to reassert management authority and enhance flexibility.

Deregulation of the economy has left both parties with less room for contingent accommodation. Workers' bargaining power has suffered threefold because of the new international mobility of capital, technology driven vertical disintegration into global production networks, and monetary policy upholding an equilibrium level of unemployment (two or three times the previous full employment level). International dispersion of work enables employers to evade existing labor regulation and makes a unified workers' front more difficult.

With the macroeconomic policy shift in the 1980s from demand to supply side economics, industrial relations' effects took center stage in the economic policy discourse. The neoliberal

transformation process began in the US and the UK, and was followed by many other countries, including New Zealand, Australia, and many of the East European countries. Most of the emerging market economies in Asia and Latin America have a liberal market model, when LMR is not coercively regulated by the state.

The Reagan and Thatcher governments set out fundamentally to reform the industrial relations system and curb militant unionism and a mounting number of strikes, irregularities inside unions, and fierce labor-management disputes, plus inflationary pressure from wages. The Anglo American axis was formed around a shift in policy towards more pro individualism, private ordering, and free markets, and against collectivism and regulation of markets. Union immunities were reduced, strikes restricted, etc. The protection of workers in the UK was replaced by a legislative approach (traditionally condemned by the unions) to discrimination, unfair dismissal, and the like. The procedure continued under the subsequent Labour government, which introduced the first ever minimum wage law.

The blow to the unions also affected industrial relations research to the degree that it was symbiotic with the bipartisan structure. The situation eventually led to invigorated interest in workplace practices and HRM. Several facets of the scheme, such as flattened organizational hierarchy, gain sharing, and extensive communication, could be incorporated into and controlled under the participative management doctrine. In Scandinavia, where new laws on codetermination had been enacted in the mid 1970s, the basic principles had entered collective agreements, with clauses that gave the local union a say in their implementation.

MANAGEMENT PRACTICES

Alternative ways of thinking about LMR have long existed along lines parallel to the collective bargaining framework. Japanese (and to a degree Northern European) unions have for more than a generation acted on the presumption that there is a close link between high productivity, employment, and wages. The human relations theory associated with Elton Mayo is part of the legacy in these countries, as well as in American

business schools. The focus in the 1990s on competitive advantage and industrial reengineering was evoked by globalization and deregulation, and brought emphasis to a strategic approach to employment management. The classic works of sociologists and psychologists like Argyris, Herzberg, McGregor, and Whyte guided the link to integration of LMR with business strategy.

In the deregulated market firms typically pay lower or more differentiated wages and they utilize work systems and employment contracts that are more flexible. Some exploit nonstandard employment arrangements that shift economic risks onto the workforce. However, work and employment are not changing as fast as may have been expected, and are unlikely to do so. Work is not disappearing. Surveys indicate that labor force participation and hours of work have remained stable in the OECD area. People are highly committed to work. The evidence on workforce changes (e.g., with regard to tenure, training, and wage inequality) is mainly with in occupations, indicating that there is an increasing diversity in workforce and individualized remuneration. Organizations are using a variety of skills in cross functional teams, and there has been a drastic reduction in management and supervisory jobs. Managers become coaches and workers are expected to act more on their own commitment. Voluntary quits have declined, so have perceptions of job security. Dual career patterns make work and family decisions highly interdependent. Union membership continues its long term decline, even though significant innovations are made in union–management relations. Taken together, the changes have exerted a profound effect on explicit and implicit employment contracts and conditions of employment.

The bulk of surveys indicate strong pressure in all countries for numerical and functional flexibility, but also that environmental factors impinge in systematic ways on how work structures evolve – though they are not deterministic. A study by the ILO (Auer & Cazes 2003) suggests that stable employment relationships are in fact quite resilient. Arguments in favor of unconditional flexibility miss the fact that with high turnover human and organizational capital may be eroded. In Japan, policies are still geared towards employment maintenance and

thus social protection is low, while in Denmark the opposite is the case. When social protection outside the firm is kept at a high standard even though job security is low, workers perceive a lower degree of insecurity compared to the opposite situation.

FUTURE DIRECTIONS

The study of LMR, although relevant to innumerable disciplines, is held together by the existence of a politically urgent real life problematic. Where the field has lost its central policy relevance, so has the demand for a multidisciplinary research community, as analyzed by Kaufman (2004). The need for systematic theories of LMR, however, has not disappeared, resulting in claims to new interesting research combinations.

Labor–management relations are deeply embedded in sociopolitical traditions and narratives, pointing to their relevance for the discourses of cross national institution building and “varieties of capitalism.” Human resource management has emerged intellectually stronger by infusing some industrial relations thinking. Monitoring of welfare effects under deregulation has become increasingly rewarding for sociological analysis. Finally, globalizing trade and production defines a distinctly international and challenging research agenda, where the basic assumption upon which organized labor has acted for well over 150 years – “to take wages out competition” – has met with some challenging complications. The western bias, which has prevailed throughout history in this field, might be approaching the end.

SEE ALSO: Collective Action; Labor Markets; Labor Movement; Management, Workers’ Participation in; Stratification, Gender and; Unions; Welfare Regimes

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labor markets

Anne Fearfull

In principle a labor market is the primary method of allocating people to paid work, of whatever nature, within capitalist economies/societies. Within capitalism, the separation of the producer of a good or service from the means of its production has rendered a situation where labor power (that is, the capacity of a person to work) has become a commodity to be bought and sold. In theory both buyers and sellers of labor power are free to choose from or to whom they would like to buy or sell. Thus, the “market” can be represented as an efficient, voluntary mechanism of exchange wherein the economic rules of efficiency, perfect competition, and supply and demand apply, and equilibrium will be achieved. From such a perspective market imperfections (or disequilibria) when they occur do so because interest groups within a market are, for example, able to strengthen their position, restrict entry to their group, or force pay changes. Actions or events such as these are regarded essentially as “glitches” and, over time, theory suggests, equilibrium will be reached.

From a general picture of labor markets within the context provided, we can hone our examination by considering the notion of both external and internal labor markets. The model of the dual labor market developed by Doeringer and Piore (1971) introduced the idea of the primary and secondary sectors. The primary sector represents core skill areas for which employers were prepared to pay higher levels of wages and provide better employment terms and conditions as a means of ensuring as far as possible a secure, committed, and competitive labor force. By contrast, workers in the secondary sector would not expect to have so secure a position. Indeed, it is this sector which facilitates flexibility for employers, as workers within this context would tend to have contracts based on, for example, seasonal requirements or part time availability of or for work. Within this sector would be subcontracted workers or even businesses, and significant levels of labor turnover would be both expected and tolerated. This pattern of duality has been further popularized through the model of the flexible firm proposed by Atkinson (1984). This model proposed a range of flexibilities for operationalization by employers, including numerical, functional, and financial. The basis of this proposal was the employment of distinct core and secondary workforces, the latter, in extreme cases, attracting so called “zero hour” contracts. The agreement for people working under such a contractual term would be that they had no fixed hours or times of work, but would be called upon as and when the employer required their services.

From a sociological perspective, focus is placed upon the relationship between those groups within the labor market and within individual workplaces and occupations. Broadly speaking there is a rejection of the economists’ notion of market efficiency. The basis of this alternative position is the inequitable nature of the employment relationship. The root of such inequity is firmly planted in the nature of capitalism and the dispossession of workers from the means of production, of either goods or services, including their lack of ownership of raw materials, tools, and places of production.

Attempts have been made by labor to manage the ensuing competition within labor markets. Some of these attempts have driven

wedges between the different sectors within the labor force. Trades unions and other employee associations engage in collective bargaining to influence pay and conditions for their constituencies. Social closure has been one method used by trades unions to limit competition by restricting access to particular jobs to their members alone. While this is no longer an option for trades unions following the outlawing of closed shops, it remains a means by which professional bodies establish and maintain their power within their sectors. This is achieved by their ability to devise and establish systems of practice and codes of ethics within their fields of work and to have these formally recognized through the gaining of chartered status. Similarly, buyers of labor power (i.e., employers) have effected their own methods of managing labor markets and some of these have been addressed above in the outline of the dual market and its associated models.

The points suggested so far suggest that, while we might be able to form a neat definition of the term labor markets, and indeed we frequently see variations on such definitions in dictionaries and textbooks, the practice of and experience within them are far from neat. There are a number of reasons for this, some of which have already been outlined. By expanding upon those outlines we can appreciate the complexity of labor markets and the extent to which competition within them is anything but “perfect.” If we take Littler’s (1985: 3) position that “differences in labor market status help to create (or reinforce) different orientations to work,” then we begin to gain greater insight into the nature of variations and experiences of labor within the labor market in general, and within specific labor markets in particular. Although not an exhaustive list, status markers include, being:

- Professionally qualified
- Trade qualified
- Skilled
- Unskilled
- Male
- Female
- A full time employee
- A part time employee
- Experienced
- Relatively inexperienced
- A school leaver

- From an ethnic minority group
- Already employed
- Unemployed

To explore the sociology of labor markets further we can use examples from the above. Beginning with young people entering the labor market we can consider the notions of structure and agency and the important interplay between these factors in that context. The socialization of individuals plays an enormous role in mediating our perception of agency since it heightens our awareness of the choices which can or cannot be made, as the case might be or might be perceived. It is clear that agency is affected by structures in place which might limit choice, and also by the extent to which individuals (in this case young people) are aware of the opportunities available to them and the contexts in which they might exercise their agency. Giddens’s (1984) theory of structuration recognizes the inextricable link between structure and agency. However, while critically we can appreciate the boundaries placed upon people and their choices as a result of structures at the levels of both society and organization, we might also appreciate how structures enable opportunities to be formed and a context in which choices can be made.

The issue of class and class consciousness is particularly relevant when considering structuration and labor markets. This is especially so within the context of young people newly entering the labor market. The extent to which they are conscious of their “place” or “level” within the structure of society, and the degree to which they see this as determining the occupational choices they are able to make, may lead to lack of development and/or realization of their aspirations. Family support is also central to the developing aspirations of young people entering or preparing to enter the labor market.

If we consider the unemployed and their relation to labor markets we can see other levels of complexity. Attempting to re enter a labor market from a position of unemployment, the unemployed are often met with difficult and sometimes insurmountable barriers. To some extent this is due to our often implicit understanding of the latent functions of work (Jahoda 1982). These functions are the socio-psychological factors rendered as a result of

being employed; for example, having an imposed time structure to one's day; having social relationships beyond those formed within the family unit; having a sense of purpose; and the development of identity. For those people becoming unemployed, these positive, essentially unintended consequences of work can fade quickly as one begins to doubt oneself and one's contribution to both society and family. Long term unemployment, or a situation where one has never been employed, can have more extensive and significant implications, as such a situation can be regarded as rendering a person work incapacitated. Such incapacitation is with regard to skill levels and changes in skill requirements due to technological advancements, but just as importantly, with regard to the sociopsychological implications of unemployment.

Gershuny (1994) demonstrated the severity of the sociological and psychological implications of unemployment. So severe are they, in fact, that they might render people's potential participation in any labor market extremely difficult; due to the traditionally tighter tie between men and work, this can be particularly debilitating for men, as their sense of identity diminishes. Thus, the notion of a reserve army of unemployed people ready, willing, and able to be called back into the labor market when required might be regarded as nonsensical. Amid severely high levels of unemployment in the UK in the 1980s, an alternative perspective emerged whereby the notion of the Protestant work ethic, central to the functioning of western labor markets, was questioned as appropriate and proposals made to replace or amend it with the "usefulness ethic." This view is typified by Robertson (1985), who proposed an "ownwork agenda," the basis of which would move us away from employment where our working time is controlled through labor markets, to a system in which people would take control of the use of their own time. As we know, this proposal did not come into being. And yet we have seen an increasing interest in alternative lifestyles as people seek to effect improved work-life balance.

Using another example from our labor market groups above, we can examine the dynamic between women and labor markets. The dual role of women within society as both

economically active and having primary responsibility for social reproduction renders their role or potential role within labor markets as problematic, both for themselves and for potential employers. The ensuing gender stereotyping and female subordination in the sexual division of labor prevails even today and in spite of legislation designed and introduced to outlaw inequities in access, opportunity, and pay. Women's particular place within, or displacement from, labor markets was discussed by Lewis (1988) when outlining past law which "denied women access to property and political rights." From a radical feminist perspective, the dominance of men in both legal and political environments and the fact that education was withheld from women until the late nineteenth century provides insight into the roles taken up by women, or aspired to by them, within the labor market in general. In this regard, we can reiterate Littler's suggestion, cited above, about the creation or reinforcement of orientations to work in the light of the nature of the gender relationship within both labor markets and society in general.

Over the past two decades feminist writers have extended the debate about the opportunities available to women and the degree to which they have been seriously curtailed by the patriarchal nature of western society. Cockburn (1987), for example, considered the level of discrimination apparent in training opportunities. The gendered nature of both occupational and job segregation has been considered by a range of authors (Crompton & Sanderson 1990; Reskin & Roos 1990; Cockburn 1991; Boterro 1992). These writers argue that such segregation is a result of practices within both employing organizations and the nature of societal organization, each of which is considered as being patriarchal. Extending this type of argument, Reskin and Roos (1990) illustrated the advantaged position with regard to job and occupational opportunities, as well as pay, enjoyed by white men, in general, over men of color and all women. Using an American focus, they provided a historical context for the inequitable distribution of workplace participation for men and women on the basis of gendering, race, and ethnicity. Again, the importance of the domestic sphere is emphasized as a means of shaping job and pay equity through raising the

issues of aspirations and orientations of people entering the labor market and even targeting particular labor markets.

Extending the notion of inequalities for people within labor markets, we can draw further on the questions of race and ethnicity. The issues faced by ethnic minority people in the labor market are more complex than for indigenous populations. As Jenkins (1986) has shown, ethnic minority people in general face discriminatory processes due to potential employers' sensitivity around the extent to which people from such groups would "fit in" within an existing workforce. This notion of "acceptability" therefore extends requirements beyond those of a person's technical "suitability" for a post, which is a determinant for most people's employment. Thus, in spite of legislation introduced both nationally and internationally over the past three decades or so, we can consider notions of institutional racism (Macpherson 1999) as being a considerable threat to multi ethnic workforces within organizations and the equitable treatment of ethnic minority groups within more widely defined labor markets. For ethnic minority women, any such circumstances are exacerbated further. Facing multiple roles in excess of those faced by many women in general in both internal and external labor and primary and secondary markets, ethnic minority women find their career aspirations challenged by stereotyping in relation to their sociocultural and religious affiliations, as well as those in relation to perceptions of their roles within family and community life (Kamenou 2002).

Although we have not considered each one of the labor market status markers listed above, we have developed an ongoing theme which challenges the dominant economic perspective on labor markets, including the notion that buyers and sellers of labor power are free to choose to whom they would like to buy from or sell to. From the perspective taken here, we can see that the concept of the efficient market, perfect competition, and the achievement of equilibrium is highly questionable. A more realistic position recognizes market imperfections, or disequilibrium, and that they emerge because of the varying strengths of the numerous interest groups.

SEE ALSO: Class Consciousness; Ethnic and Racial Division of Labor; Gender Ideology and

Gender Role Ideology; Labor/Labor Power; Labor-Management Relations; Labor Movement; Labor Process; Structure and Agency; Unemployment; Work, Sociology of

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labor movement

Rick Fantasia and Kim Voss

The labor movement is a broad, multidimensional social formation that is generated from the social structures of work and industry in a society. It may comprise both legally recognized and formally sanctioned institutions (like trade unions, political parties, and works councils) as well as less formal groupings of workers and their allies (industrial actions, organizations of strike supporters, dissident movements within unions, cultural forms, etc.). Labor movements operate at the intersection of economic practice, civil society, and the state. They are more or less firmly institutionalized in any given society in any given historical period, and can be partly characterized by the extent to which extra institutional practices are permitted and have been incorporated into the routine operations of industrial and labor relations. The social and organizational composition of a labor movement as well as the degree to which its practices have been institutionalized are thus two important analytical axes through which the social logic of a labor movement can be discerned.

Having been born in and by the industrial order, the labor movements of the most developed capitalist societies generally took on their characteristic appearance over the course of the nineteenth century, with political parties and trade unions being the most prevalent organizational forms. Contrary to conventional wisdom, in its formative decades the US labor movement was not a particularly exceptional case relative to other industrial societies, although the arc of its trajectory would become increasingly distinctive later on. Thus, just as in England and France, two countries whose socioeconomic development was roughly comparable to the

United States, for much of the nineteenth century the American labor movement was composed of skilled craft workers whose cultures and practices had been constructed to protect traditional skills and craft prerogatives in the face of machine technologies and standardized work practices that employers had specifically designed and implemented to erode. By the last quarter of the nineteenth century, however, the character of the American labor movement began to take an “exceptional” form, although not at all in the manner in which conventional wisdom has often held. The labor movement in the US was becoming militant and class conscious in ways similar to those Karl Marx had envisaged in his analyses of the development of capitalist society, most notably expressed in the explosive growth of the Knights of Labor. The Knights was a remarkably egalitarian organization of workers and artisans that, by its height in 1886, had mobilized almost 10 percent of the US working class across skill level, nationality, race, and gender into militant local assemblies spread out across the entire country.

In contrast to perspectives in sociology and historical studies that have viewed the US labor movement as intrinsically and exceptionally weak, or conservative, or lacking in collective solidarity (variously attributed to affluence, or the possibilities for upward social mobility, or the spatial expansiveness of the American frontier, or early universal male suffrage, among other factors), the existence of the Knights of Labor in the late nineteenth century suggests the need for an alternative interpretation. A consideration of the dynamics of both their rise and their fall provide us with the lessons for such a reinterpretation. Ironically, it was the rapid and widespread mobilization of workers into the Knights that provoked a powerful mobilization of employers to counter them, with the ferocity of the reaction leading to their equally rapid downfall, as well as to a general weakening of the US labor movement for at least another generation. Unlike in England and France where the state often intervened to encourage or demand employer concessions in labor disputes, the US government at the time did little to constrain the actions of employers, allowing them free reign to destroy the Knights of Labor. Considered altogether, this suggests that (1) the

US labor movement was not intrinsically weak and, if anything, at one time was perhaps *more* militant and class conscious than its counterparts; and (2) the reaction by employers to the militancy of the Knights reshaped the legal, political, and social terrain in ways that made militant worker organizations much more difficult to mobilize and sustain, thus demonstrating the “exceptional” power enjoyed by *employers* in the US context. One outgrowth of the defeat of the militant Knights was the ascendancy of a more pragmatic, conservative, craft based unionism embodied by the American Federation of Labor (AFL), which became the overwhelmingly dominant institutional force within the US labor movement well into the twentieth century.

What this brief example illustrates is that labor movements can never be properly understood without considering them in their mutually constituting relationship to the corporate employers of labor (capital). Moreover, the nature of this relationship will strongly affect the role of the state in the society. In the case of the US, the state has not been as strong a force for regulation as it has been in other societies and this has meant that large corporations have been relatively free to operate. With such freedom, large corporations have become firmly ensconced as the dominant institutional player in US society, thus ensuring a relatively weak labor movement. In most other capitalist societies the state has tended to foster more balance in this relationship, by limiting (or regulating) the power of large corporations. It is important to recognize at the same time, however, that because the society is not a static one, the power and position of the labor movement in US society have not always been as weak as they have at other times.

Moreover, the labor movement has never been monolithic and has always combined various competing tendencies. For example, by the turn of the twentieth century, a massive increase in European immigration was underway, with millions of relatively unskilled workers pouring into the United States, attracted to the huge factory complexes where assembly lines and other mass production techniques were fast becoming the bases for most forms of manufacture. A craft based capitalism was giving way to highly industrialized forms, thereby paving the way for a new form of unionism.

The AFL, which had openly rejected the militant social unionism of the Knights of Labor, was made up of organizations largely shaped by the prerogatives of their own members, native born skilled craftsmen concerned with protecting their own relatively privileged status within the working class more than with opening their ranks to the unskilled immigrants whom they often looked upon with contempt.

Not until the 1930s was a widespread effort undertaken to organize the unskilled workers from the mass production industries into industry wide unions. It meant bringing into the same organizations men and women of all races and ethnic backgrounds, regardless of skill level, and these industrial unions formed together under the overall banner of the Congress of Industrial Organizations (CIO). The attempts to form the CIO unions were met by ferocious resistance by the large corporations, often including organized violence and thereby necessitating a more militant stance and a more combative political framework on the part of the new unions. Openly encouraged in the early stages of the New Deal by laws such as the Wagner Act of 1935 and by the administration of President Franklin Delano Roosevelt, who saw unionism as a strategy for overcoming the effects of the Great Depression, the CIO unions were often organized by socialists, communists, and other left wing radicals who set the terms for a more broadly based social vision than had been held by the AFL unions. It was an outlook that both reflected and corresponded to ideologies that were familiar to and respected in the European immigrant communities that tended to make up the membership of the new unions.

Through the first half of the twentieth century, the US labor movement showed two faces, partly reflected in the divisions between the AFL unions and their craft base, and the CIO unions with their industrial base. While the former was more pragmatic and politically moderate, the latter tended toward militancy and political radicalism, and was much closer in tone to the version of unionism represented in most other capitalist societies. By the close of World War II, however, after more than a decade of CIO mobilization, the large corporations quickly moved to reassert and consolidate their power within US society by seeking to curtail the militancy and radicalism of the CIO.

This was accomplished by the powerful pressures they brought to bear on Congress to pass the Taft Hartley Act, a broad set of statutes drafted by corporate lawyers to essentially repeal the Wagner Act that had earlier encouraged industrial unionism. The Taft Hartley Act achieved a number of longstanding goals of American corporate employers, including weakening union security in a variety of ways; for bidding the most effective forms of industrial action; imposing a stifling regime of bureaucratic governance over labor relations practice, as well as on the practices of union leaders; and purging communists and radicals from the ranks of the union leadership, thereby removing the clearest and strongest voices for social change from positions of authority in the unions.

Whereas the labor movement in the United States had once shown two distinctive faces, by the mid 1950s the AFL and the CIO had merged together, while largely adopting the political visage of the AFL. It was a period characterized by rapid post war economic growth, rising American military intervention throughout the less developed world, and a profound ideological conformity imposed under the name of McCarthyism. The corporate imposed domestication of the US labor movement that was noted above was often misinterpreted by social scientists as a kind of “natural” outgrowth of institutional maturation that was thought to characterize labor relations in all developed societies. A related version of the same theme saw the “end of ideology” as the inevitable accompaniment to modern socioeconomic development, whereby societies would simply discard any need for radical criticism or ideological debate with regard to the future. However, underneath such obvious signs of approval that were stamped on the social order by conservative social scientists or the bureaucratic practices that had been imposed on labor relations in the process of domesticating it, there were important countertendencies apparent to the few who took notice. These took the form of dissident movements of workers, often radicalized by their experiences in the largest unions, who fought against the sorts of things that the Taft Hartley Act had imposed (i.e., they struggled to replace union leaders who were insufficiently militant, overly bureaucratic, or undemocratic, and to wield militant forms of

protest and collective action, such as wildcat strikes). In other words, the actions of employers to constrain the labor movement had generated new forms of organization and new forms of action from deep within the labor movement itself.

By the beginning of the 1970s, facing strong competitive pressures from European and Japanese firms, US manufacturing corporations began to squeeze more from their domestic operations by forcing down wages and by mounting a formidable and wide ranging assault on union organization in the United States. Drawing upon a legal arsenal that had been earlier put in place by the Taft Hartley Act, they were also assisted by a burgeoning industry of management consultants specializing in both union avoidance (slowing the creation of new unions in those sectors of the economy where unions had not had traditional roots, like health care and much of the services) and in breaking unions in the traditional sectors of labor strength (food processing, meat packing, newspapers, airlines, etc.). While the assault against unionism reached its peak during the decade of the 1980s, it continued through the 1990s and up to the present, with union density rates falling from a high point of 35 percent in the mid 1950s to approximately 13 percent and falling in 2005 (where in the private sector it is only 9 percent).

In the mid 1990s, faced with the demise of its institutions and its position in the society, the leadership of the US labor movement began to forge a process of internal change in an attempt to reverse its fortunes. The change began with a “palace coup” within the top ranks of the AFL CIO, which replaced a conservative, bureaucratic leadership with a reform leadership group drawn from some of the more militant and dynamic unions. Once in place, the new leadership group began a campaign to encourage, cajole, and coerce the leadership of the approximately 60 unions in the Federation to turn more of their efforts and budgets toward organizing new members, rather than servicing the needs of existing union members. They have encouraged new, more militant union organizing tactics, including circumventing the bureaucratic system of union representation elections in favor of collective action and disruption; developing “corporate campaigns” to pressure

institutional shareholders to protest corporate anti unionism; and have sought to envelop labor struggles within a wider circle of community solidarity, narrowing the distinction between the labor movement and other social movements. With their own elections dependent upon the votes of existing members, there has been a considerable amount of resistance from many labor leaders, but the use of new tactics, in certain economic sectors and regions of the country, has also been able to show some positive results. The future of the labor movement in the US is still quite uncertain.

The labor movements in the most advanced economies of Western Europe have traditionally been stronger politically, and more firmly rooted institutionally, than US unions. Indeed, the practice of “social partnership” has, for decades, characterized the relationship between large corporations and the labor movement in much of Western Europe, and is still intact. What this has generally meant is a more consultative and less openly combative relationship than in the US, represented by the active existence of works councils in many of the largest enterprises and trade associations that afford labor a voice in corporate planning. However, the deregulation of global markets and the imposition of many neoliberal reforms across Europe (often pioneered in the US, where labor has not been able to offer firm resistance) have shown that societies are now faced with some very similar competitive pressures (to privatize public services, to deregulate markets, to treat short term shareholder value as a guide in economic policy, etc.). The tendency to cheapen the cost of labor is therefore increasingly an international effort, so that there is a drive to eliminate the differences between national labor movements by weakening them all. Ironically, then, faced with the competitive pressures from US corporations in many world markets (ironic given the reverse impetus for wage cuts and union busing in the 1970s within the US), European societies have seen corporate intransigence increase and union power decline in recent years, expressed most explicitly in the erosion of a host of state social welfare policies across Europe in recent years. Across Europe a debate rages between the labor movement and allied social forces who would uphold a European model of social solidarity, and those who

would subordinate social and labor policies to the exigencies of the market alone.

SEE ALSO: Capitalism; Class; Collective Action; Labor–Management Relations; Laborism; Neoliberalism; Political Economy; Social Movements; Socialism; Unions

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labor process

Alan McKinlay

Braverman's *Labor and Monopoly Capitalism* (1974) was a craftsman's roar of indignation against the relentless deskilling of modern work. His starting point was explicitly Marxist:

the distinction between labor power and labor. That is, all forms of management are not neutral forms of coordination and mobilization, but necessarily involve the transformation of the *potential* productivity latent in labor power into *actual* work and output. Exploitation is not an unfortunate lapse but inherent in the employment relationship in capitalist societies. From the industrial revolution onwards, management had skirted around the stubborn opposition of skilled labor by indirect means, such as the use of ramshackle incentive systems or craft supervisors to navigate between craft norms and managerial demands. Braverman argues that modern management, a management that did not accept craft methods as a given, was inaugurated by F. W. Taylor. Taylorism, for Braverman, consisted of three essential principles. First, that management must accumulate and then codify all the knowledge of tools, tasks, and techniques held by skilled labor. This both redressed the imbalance of working knowledge that was the historic weakness of management and allowed them to experiment systematically with alternative, more efficient production methods. Second, the separation of conception from execution, the first step in the rigorous fragmentation and recombination of *all* tasks. Refractory, wayward workers were to be orchestrated for maximum discipline, efficiency, and predictability. "Scientific management" offered not just efficiency and control, but also reduced labor to something entirely interchangeable, an activity with no purpose other than to complete the working day and which offered no intrinsic satisfaction. Such was the ideological appeal of this objective "science," Taylor argued, that the worker would willingly accept her or his complete subjugation at the factory gates, and surrender all agency and knowledge to become a "mere appendage to the machine." *This* was the hallmark of modern "scientific management." Third, once management had wrested the necessary knowledge from skilled labor, tasks would be defined in advance and labor would now work according to the tempo set by management planning rather than craft norms. In part, Taylorism represented the accumulation, codification, and reordering of the craftsman's traditional knowledge in order to raise overall productive efficiency. No less important,

however, Taylorism offered a powerful critique of early twentieth century American management, which had allowed the productive potential of major technological changes to be blunted by craft resistance. For Taylor, management had tacitly accepted its relative ignorance and was complicit with craft labor in maintaining inefficient working practices. The modern manager was to derive his authority not from the maintaining of output using established practices, but from his mastery of the theory and practice of Taylor's new science of work.

Taylorism and deskilling had a political importance that stretched far beyond the workplace. Braverman offered a new philosopher's stone, a way of understanding the long run dynamics of class and political change. This was the political promise of labor process theory: as deskilling and the degradation of work became more extensive and profound, so it would erode, if not obliterate, distinctions inside the working class. As automation spread ever further, not just particular skills but entire occupational categories would disappear. The result would be degraded work, under employment and the creation of an ever expanding reserve army of labor that placed ever greater downward pressure on wages and working conditions of an increasingly homogenized working class. This vicious cycle of automation, degradation, and immiseration held enormous promise for revolutionary political change.

BEYOND BRAVERMAN

"First wave" labor process theory offered important correctives to Braverman's deskilling thesis, but endorsed its underlying analytical and political principles (Thompson & McHugh 2002). Certain criticisms quickly became routine – above all, that Braverman neglected not just union bargaining power but also informal worker resistance to technical and organisational change. In social history Braverman's focus on skill echoed the "history from below" that sought to recapture the lived experience of working people. Although this shift towards the grassroots inevitably flirted with a romanticization of working class life, studies of construction, cotton, engineering, printing, and

shipbuilding all pointed to the tenacious survival or, more accurately, the resilience of skilled labor and its ability to blunt or absorb much of the deskilling potential of new technologies. Nor does compliance with routinized work regimes necessarily imply a complete loss of agency. Michael Burawoy's pathbreaking studies show how workers turn production targets into games in which they negotiate the rules, which means that they can retain and display agency in even the most hostile environments (Burawoy 1985). A second criticism was that Braverman – like Taylor – ignored the often hidden or unrecognized skills of routine “unskilled” workers. Such tacit skills ensure safety, efficiency, and equity in the workplace and are important parts of even the most unsophisticated types of job. Braverman (1974) offered little guidance on how to measure changing skill levels over time, between occupations, sectors, or national economies. A third criticism was that Braverman underestimated the range of strategies deployed by employers. Management would cede control to skilled labor when confronted with major technical or market uncertainties or decide not to impose Taylorist principles where groups of workers had erected substantial defenses.

But however significant the qualifications to Braverman's original thesis, the implicit position was that – *ceteris paribus* – management would pursue a deskilling strategy. Other things were, however, seldom equal. Even at the height of its popularity in 1920s America, very few employers deployed the full range of techniques defined by Taylor as essential characteristics of scientific management (Nelson 1975; Edwards 1979). Similarly, faced with smaller, more fragmented product markets, and the significant fixed costs of developing the organizational infrastructure necessary to sustain some form of Taylorism over the long run, British and European employers, for example, consistently shunned full blown scientific management (Littler 1982). Maintaining productive flexibility was a vital strategic consideration, far more important than any long run gains that might result from a protracted and hugely risky transition to mass production (Zeitlin & Sabel 1997). Until the 1970s, the decentralized organizational structures of British corporations together with the disdain for “professional” management proved

major barriers to anything more systematic than ad hoc bursts of Taylorism. The range of caveats, qualifications, and special pleading whittled away the coherence of Braverman's original position until Taylorism had assumed an almost metaphysical quality: the search for control, much more than profitability, was something that was assumed to be implicit in *all* managerial maneuvers. Braverman's original deskilling thesis was being asked to bear an impossible analytical burden.

NEW THEORETICAL DIRECTIONS

The last two decades have witnessed a waning of Braverman's influence. There have been two broad reasons for this. On the one hand, the emergence of teamworking as the dominant organizational form in manufacturing and clerical and service work over the last two decades has placed a question mark over the continued relevance of scientific management as the key driver of labor process change. Indeed, depicting the shift to teamworking as a revolt against Taylorism and managerial bureaucracy has been a prime source of legitimacy for corporate change programs. Just as the rhetoric of Taylorism was more important than its practice, so the dominant ideology of radical managerialism belies its more restricted practice.

The dynamics of routine service work *can* be accommodated within the original labor process perspective, but only by an increasingly strained use of the assembly line as a metaphor rather than an organizational reality. Analytically, Braverman has been pushed aside as the cornerstone of radical interpretations of work in favor of eclectic borrowings from post modernism. Above all, Foucault has moved to the fore as the theorist that offers insights into the power of electronic and peer surveillance in the contemporary workplace, the ambiguous play of discipline on individual identity (McKinlay & Starkey 1998; Sewell 1998). Too often, this “linguistic turn” has assumed the coherence and durability of corporate cultural projects and the malleability of workers bewildered by managerial ideology and with scant alternative sources of meaning. The result has been an

analytical readiness to read workers as cultural dopes, analogous to the deskilled automata of Taylor's fantasy and Braverman's nightmare. On the other hand, Taylorism has little appeal to managers of high value added "knowledge work" in which innovation and creativity are valued more highly than efficiency. For knowledge intensive firms – in advertising, design, pharmaceuticals – competitive advantage derives from management's ability to assemble project teams to maximize their creativity far more than their ability to codify, simplify, and deskill work. That is not to say that there are not significant competitive and managerial pressures to accelerate knowledge labor processes or to introduce project management tools, but that is a far cry from Taylorized work. Understanding the dynamics of control, knowledge, and creativity is fast becoming the focus of much mainstream and radical research into the dynamics of contemporary competitiveness and organization.

For all the claims to greater theoretical sophistication, the gradual retreat of the labor process perspective has involved a real loss of any sense of connection between shifts in the nature of capitalist economies and work organization or how that intersects with trade unionism or popular politics. The labor process debate sparked by Braverman initiated an enormous range of historical and contemporary research into the interplay of skill and technology, the long run recomposition of labor markets, and management ideologies and practices. The turn to the study of work as a form of discourse which is shaped almost exclusively by management has resulted in the neglect of material issues of wages and working conditions, tools and tasks, and of conflict as something more than a clash of signs and symbols. The rejection of the very *possibility* of grand narratives has dissolved work as a key moment in political economy, a term that has become deeply suspect. A return to the ambitious historical sweep of Braverman's original focus on the political and economic centrality of the workplace is now overdue.

SEE ALSO: Capitalism, Social Institutions of; Labor/Labor Power; Labor-Management Relations; Labor Markets; Laborism; Organizational Careers

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laboratory studies and the world of the scientific lab

Daniel Lee Kleinman

The most prominent laboratory studies – produced in the late 1970s and early 1980s – continued a trend in the sociology of science and technology away from attention to the institutional character of science and toward a sociological understanding of the process of knowledge production itself and the "technical core" of science. To comprehend the process through which knowledge is *constructed*, these studies undertook ethnographic investigations of the work that goes on in scientific laboratories. Among the central findings of this body

of scholarship are: (1) contrary to standard images of science, which suggest that the methods, practices, and outcomes of science are universal (or trans contextual), knowledge production occurs at a local level and is subject to local variation; (2) instead of the characterization of science as fundamentally logical and rational, science is the product of contingent factors; (3) scientific work does not merely read its results from nature, but instead nature is transformed in the laboratory; (4) if the view of science as “reading off nature” amounts to an understanding of science as a descriptive practice, the early laboratory studies show, by contrast, that scientific results are the product of construction.

Initially published in 1979, Latour and Woolgar’s *Laboratory Life* (1986) is probably the most prominent laboratory study. This book traces the struggle to define the structure of an important human hormone. The authors show that the scientists they study are centrally engaged in efforts to persuade colleagues of the validity of their findings. To do this, these researchers begin with “inscription devices” – pieces of equipment that transform a material substance into a figure or a diagram. Unlike standard images of science as linear processes that lead inevitably to “findings,” the movement from experimental work to inscription, as witnessed by Latour, was instead messy and uneven. In the end, however, the process was forgotten or taken for granted and scientific discussion focused on figures and diagrams. As a result, scientists came to see their inscriptions as direct indicators of the substance being studied, rather than as contingent and constructed outcomes.

With an inscription, scientists work to persuade colleagues to drop qualifications in any statements they make about the inscription. The researchers aim to move their competitors from statements like “Smith’s work appears to suggest that x plays a crucial role in the onset of lung cancer” to “x plays a crucial role in the onset of lung cancer.” This is all part of the process of knowledge construction. A fact only exists when qualification is gone and it is taken for granted and is drawn on as part of an accepted body of knowledge.

Another canonical laboratory study is Knorr Cetina’s *The Manufacture of Knowledge* (1981),

which studied the work of plant protein researchers. Knorr Cetina stresses the contingent and local character of knowledge production, showing that how an experiment proceeds depends as much on what equipment happens to be available, what money has been allocated for, and how resource use needs to be justified as on widely accepted procedures. In addition, Knorr Cetina suggests that scientists are not linear reasoners, but reason analogically. Knorr Cetina shows that the messy and contingent process of knowledge production is masked by scientific papers which suggest an orderly and linear movement from introduction, to methods, to data and analysis and conclusions.

Another especially prominent laboratory study is Lynch’s *Art and Artifact in Laboratory Science* (1985). Coming from the ethnomethodological tradition and drawing on data collected in a university brain sciences laboratory, this book, like Knorr Cetina’s work, points to the disjunction between scientific writing and what actually happens in the laboratory. Even more than Knorr Cetina, Lynch stresses the local character of scientific work, suggesting that, for example, what counts as an artifact in experimental work is determined in the local laboratory context through discussion of the local situation and not measured against an external standard. Lynch focuses on talk among laboratory workers and shows that standards for matters like experimental competence are settled for practical purposes.

A final canonical text, Traweek’s *Beamtimes and Lifetimes* (1988), offers a quite different perspective. Based on a comparative analysis of high energy physics research in the US and Japan, Traweek focuses more on the culture of laboratory practice than on the epistemological concerns that drive the other prominent laboratory studies. Looking especially at the large and expensive equipment at the center of high energy physics, Traweek shows how the different cultures of the two countries affect the construction and use of these crucial tools. Most prominently, Traweek describes how equipment is proposed by researchers in the Japanese case and then built outside the laboratory environment and not subject to subsequent modification. In the US, particle detectors, while initially developed based on scientific

specifications, are also altered on the basis of everyday use. This difference in orientation to equipment construction affects the way in which research is undertaken and the outcomes produced.

Broadly speaking, the classic laboratory ethnographies treat the laboratories studied in isolation from a larger social world in which we might view them as embedded. Kleinman (2003) moves laboratory ethnography in a new direction. Situating the plant pathology laboratory he studies within a broader political economy, Kleinman shows the multiple subtle and indirect ways in which university laboratory practices can be affected by the world of commerce.

SEE ALSO: Actor Network Theory; Knowledge Societies; Merton, Robert K.; Political Economy of Science; Scientific Knowledge, Sociology of

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laborism

Peter Beilharz

Laborism refers to the theory and practice of the labor movement, articulated as its own kind of socialism or social protection. Laborism is best understood as the project which seeks to defend and extend the interests of workers and their families under capitalism. Laborism is peculiar to Anglo imperial cultures, such as Britain, Australia, and New Zealand. Its intellectual advocates are often associated with the ideological trend of reformism called Fabianism in these countries, or progressivism in the United States. The peculiarity of laborism as an Anglo phenomenon is that it results from the shift a hundred years ago of the labor movement into politics. Laborism, or labor socialism, as the defensive cliché indicates, is what labor parties do.

Laborism, then, indicates a distinct path of development in contrast to European socialism, or social democracy. Classical social democratic parties on the European continent were based on the German model, which was not only socialist but also explicitly Marxist. Laborism is less doctrinal than this, often seeking as a maximum program universal health care provision and free schooling or decent public housing. This is not to say that laborism is always meek in its reformism. Certainly the British, Australian, and New Zealand labor parties were home to various radicals and Marxists, though the rise of organized communism after 1917 took such activists elsewhere. If the labor parties often then argued for socialization after World War I, their greatest moment came with World War II, when the Savage government pioneered the welfare state “cradle to the grave” in New Zealand from 1935, the Attlee government introduced the National Health Service (NHS) in Britain over the period of its reign, 1945–51, and the Curtin and Chifley governments presided over the program of post war reconstruction in Australia.

Laborism was then transformed into managerialism in the post war boom, and then washed away by the new wave of globalization into the 1980s. As the greatest organized social movement of the twentieth century, the labor

movement lost its national reforming impact in the face of the rise of neoliberalism. Having dropped their socialist claims in the managerial atmosphere of the 1950s, labor parties now spearheaded neoliberal innovation, first in the Antipodes, then most illustriously in the shape of Blair's New Labour in Britain. The transformation of the post war world – Keynesian, based on high growth, full male employment, and the nuclear family as the unit of consumption – dissolved the basis of this kind of left labor politics. The theory and practice of laborism were transformed sociologically from below.

SEE ALSO: Labor Movement; Management, Workers' Participation in; Political Sociology; Social Movements; Socialism; Solidarity; Unions; Welfare State; Welfare State, Retrenchment of

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Lacan, Jacques (1901–81)

Christine A. Monnier

Jacques Marie Émile Lacan received his medical degree in psychiatry in 1932 based on a doctoral dissertation analyzing a famous case of paranoid psychosis. This work marked the beginning of a clinical and theoretical career in psychoanalysis that would span over 50 years and make him one of the major, and most controversial, figures of the post World War II French intellectual milieu. Lacan defined his approach as a “return to Freud.” By this,

he did not simply mean the establishment of a literal Freudian orthodoxy, but the rediscovery of Freud's most controversial and subversive insights. He also succeeded in underlining the importance of Freud, beyond the field of psychoanalysis, to other human and social sciences. It is therefore not surprising that his conceptual developments integrated insights from the arts (Surrealism), philosophy (Spinoza, Hegel, Heidegger, Merleau Ponty), linguistics (Saussure, Jakobson), anthropology (especially in the structuralist anthropology initiated by Lévi Strauss), and mathematics. Such a wide range points to two major difficulties in studying Lacan: first, he constantly redefined his concepts to integrate insights from other fields; second, this integration made Lacan notorious for his deliberately “unreadable” style.

One of the major controversial insights that Lacan retrieved from Freud is the radical deconstruction of the classical Cartesian view of the *subject*. Through his famous formulation *cogito ergo sum* Descartes posited a unified subject, able to know himself through conscious thinking. This conception of the status of the subject was a pillar of western thought. By introducing the concept of the unconscious, Freud and Lacan showed that complete knowledge and unity of the subject is impossible. In addition, Lacan demonstrated that human life (mental and sexual) is not governed by biological processes and instinct (as biologism sees it), but by linguistic processes that create meaning; in other words, the source of human behavior is to be found in social rather than biological reality. Although it is impossible to review all of Lacan's conceptual developments, it is important to examine those that are relevant for the social sciences.

The first of these is known as the *mirror stage*. Infants reach the mirror stage between the ages of 6 and 18 months. At this stage, they become able to identify themselves in a mirror, as complete individuals, in spite of their lack of motor and coordination skills. According to Lacan, the mirror stage involves a dialectic process: the child, as it recognizes itself in the mirror, also identifies the image as its *reflection*, some thing separate from itself, an *other*; this stage marks the emergence of the ability to distinguish between self and other. Where the child experiences itself as fragmented, uncoordinated,

and disorganized, it experiences the image as complete, thus providing for what Lacan calls the ego ideal, the perfect, complete image of the ego that the subject tries to achieve through identifications. If the mirror stage is essential to the development of the ego, it also involves a fundamental alienation – a split – as the subject will always rely on an *other*, a mirror, for his identity.

Coinciding with the mirror stage is the development of language, the child's entry into the Symbolic order according to the Lacanian version of the Oedipus complex. The acquisition of language corresponds to the child's separation from the world of the mother and movement into the social world (the Big Other, in Lacanian terms), the patriarchal world, the world of the father (a symbolic, rather than biological entity). Lacan calls the former the "real," marked by complete enjoyment or *jouissance*, and the latter the "symbolic," marked by the loss of this *jouissance*, which gives rise to sexual desire in the subject. For Lacan, the fear of castration involved in the Oedipus complex is a symbolic more than real notion; it reflects the anguish associated with the irremediable loss of the real, the world of the mother where the subject is complete, and the entry into the symbolic, the social world, governed by language, where the subject is split. The mirror stage and the symbolic domain are at the root of the subject's identity in society, albeit an incomplete one.

The *Symbolic* and the *Real* are two components in the tripartite order that defines the human subject. The other is the *Imaginary*, the domain of appearances and images. Lacan represented the relation between these three orders in the image of the Borromean knot (for an illustration, see Evans 1997).

For many feminists, Lacan merely reproduced Freud's misogyny. However, for others, the infamous statement that "the Woman does not exist" can be interpreted as a description, rather than endorsement, of the fact that there is no feminine essence or nature but that such nature is only the product of men's desires and cultural determinations in the symbolic domain, that is, patriarchal reality. Moreover, Lacan also uses the symbolic concept of phallus (as opposed to the biological penis) as a limitation on men's libido. Indeed, Lacan showed that if men are limited to phallic pleasure,

women have access to a surplus of *jouissance* or sexual enjoyment.

The result of the split of the subject is the never ending search for complete identity through identifications in the sociopolitical reality. But since this split is the result of the loss of the real, a full identity can never be achieved – although different ethnically based political movements (identity politics) may promise such fullness. Much nationalistic and exclusionary thinking is based on the idea that "others" (immigrants, minorities, homosexuals, etc.) have access to *jouissance* at the expense of the subject's "natural right" to such. In addition, most political utopian projects (Nazism, communism, communitarianism) are based on the idea of creating such fullness at the social level. Such projects offer an imaginary vision of a harmonious society, as if the real had been recuperated (Stavrakis 1999). However, since social reality is riddled with conflicts and other problems, such utopian projects always need a scapegoat to blame for delays in achieving the imaginary society, and therefore to be exterminated. For Stavrakis, this explains the failure of such utopian projects as well as the double threat to democracy: the threat of totalitarianism (the utopia of completeness) and the threat of particularism (the utopia of irreconcilable difference as source of complete identity). Democracy is the only viable Lacanian political project because it is based on the acceptance and institutionalization of conflict. Democracy is the only system that does not try to fill the lack that is constitutive of human existence, but integrates this lack and turns it into sociopolitical institutions.

SEE ALSO: Freud, Sigmund; Postmodernism; Poststructuralism; Psychoanalysis

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laicism

Jean Baubérot

The French Constitution defines France as a “*République laïque*,” a lay republic, and the French generally consider laicism to be a “French exception.” This aspect of singularity was recently reinforced with the passing of a law in March 2004 banning ostentatious religious signs in public schools. But it is impossible to simplify laicism in terms of this particular law. Laicism is also a possible means for relationships between the state, religion, society, and every human being. Such relationships can function only if there is flexibility and adaptability to all situations present in society.

Classically, sociologists dealt with the notion of secularization as being the decline of the influence of religion on modern society. For example, according to Peter Berger, secularization is “the process by which the sectors of society and culture are freed from the authority of religious institutions and symbols.” Nowadays, not only is it obvious that the decline is incomplete (for Berger, the turning point of the twentieth and twenty first centuries was “furiously religious”), but also such a notion of secularization can be criticized as being too broad. For a better understanding, a distinction can be made between two long term sociohistoric processes, a cultural process of secularization and a political process of laicization.

When the cultural process of secularization is predominant compared with the political process of laicization, the relative decline of a religion’s influence takes place in the form of cultural mutations, with no major tensions between religious and political or other social forces. Certainly, religious changes, as well as economic and political changes, may produce

internal tensions. But triumphant forces participate in the same cultural and social dynamic. Therefore, there is no important clash between the changes within the religious sphere and other social changes. This is the reason that Scandinavian countries are seen as exemplary of a secular state. The switch to Lutheran Protestantism, particularly linked to the Bible’s translation, has favored the development of a national culture. Theological arguments have prevented the autonomy of the nation state toward religion from provoking important conflicts. Moreover, a joint and progressive democratization of state and church has taken place.

In Scandinavian countries, and in other countries like the United Kingdom, religion contributed in various ways to secularization and particularly to the development of democratic sociability. In certain cases, the development of secularization that occurred in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries is described by the paradoxical term “religious secularization.” It is feasible, then, that a national church can continue to be the symbol of the identity of nations that have been culturally secularized.

Laicization is a process in which there is a double movement at the end of a political “theocracy,” a movement of institutional differentiation between the political and the religious sphere, a movement of emancipation of the nation state and the institutions toward religion. When the political process of laicization is predominant compared with the cultural process of secularization, the tensions between various social forces generally take on the aspect of an open conflict where religion becomes a politico cultural stake. For example, the symbolization of the national culture is controversial. Either the state imposes religion on society (clericalism) or refuses that religion should continue to be the symbol of national identity (laicization). The French case is the main example of such a process.

In 1789, religion pervaded French society. From the Revocation of the Edict of Nantes (1685), the monolithic Roman Catholic faith was made compulsory for the French. Communion at Easter and confession were imposed on the people. The clergy was the first of the three “orders” of the kingdom. The monarchy possessed religious justification, given the theory of the divine right of kings. The king possessed

politico religious power, and one of his basic duties was to defend Catholicism. Gradually, the monarchy also established widespread autonomous political and administrative power. A Gallican movement emerged, which developed the idea of a French Catholic Church that would be autonomous from the pope and protected, as well as partly controlled, by the monarchy. An anticlerical dimension appeared in the French philosophy of the Enlightenment that had permeated a part of the nobility and bourgeoisie. This spirit differed from the English Enlightenment or the German *Aufklärung*. The latter appeared as a confrontation within a diversified Protestantism wanting “enlightened religion,” the former directly attacked the Roman Catholic Church.

The French Revolution removed the privileges of the clergy and confiscated the church’s large property holdings. Revolutionaries worked to “emancipate” civil and political society from the influence of the church, particularly in social matters relating to marriage, divorce, and education. The Declaration of Human Rights of 1789 proclaimed the principle of religious freedom. In 1791, the Constitution divested the monarchy of its religious features, and it was implemented the following year. The republic was established, although rather conflictually. However, it was not clear that the founding of the republic was considered as the first day of the new era (as is the birth of Christ for the Gregorian calendar). In 1793, the institutions of revolutionary cults (“Eternal Reason,” “Saint Liberty,” or the more conciliatory “Cult of the Supreme Being”) struggled violently against all revealed religions. The significance of the new forms of religion was represented by ritualized gatherings of the community around common values that were socially fundamental and regarded as sacred (cf. Émile Durkheim). It was a conflictual and, eventually, impossible laicization.

Napoleon Bonaparte inherited a chaotic situation. In 1801 he signed a concordat with the pope: the Roman Catholic Church was proclaimed the “religion of the great majority of the French,” but without the status of a state religion. In 1802, the plurality of religions became official: Lutheran and Reformed churches and, later, Judaism were recognized.

In 1804, the Civil Code made no reference to religion.

It is possible to evaluate the situation using the abstract notion of the first threshold of laicization (constructed on the basis of Weber’s ideal type). It is marked by three characteristics:

- 1 *Institutional fragmentation*: Roman Catholicism was no longer an inclusive institution. The clergy had to confine itself to its religious activities, which were clearly distinguished from profane activities. Educational and health needs assumed gradual autonomy, related to religious needs, and were provided for by specific institutions that underwent progressive development.
- 2 *Recognition of legitimacy*: The French Revolution did not destroy religious needs, which continued to exist objectively and within the general society. Religion was a public service and the state paid ministers of recognized religions. Religions were politically recognized as a foundation of social morality.
- 3 *Religious pluralism*: The state recognized several but not all religions; it protected and controlled them since they could satisfy the religious needs of their followers and develop moral values. Other religions were more or less tolerated. Relative freedom was even granted to those who decided to do without the “help of religion.”

This profile delineates a logic that dominated for a century. But the situation was not static or rigid. This was due especially to the fact that, for a long period, a number of aspects of the first threshold of laicization were not entirely evident; other institutions were not sufficiently developed to become totally autonomous. Then there was growing conflict between those who regarded France mainly as a Roman Catholic nation and partisans of the liberal values of 1789. Similar conflicts also rose during the nineteenth century in other countries where Catholicism continues to predominate today, among them Belgium, Spain, Italy, and Mexico, whilst in the 1870s a few countries, such as Germany with the *Kulturkampf* movement, held firm against Catholicism. But, at present, there is

not necessarily any conflict between church and state in predominantly Catholic countries. Catholicism can represent a national sentiment (as, for example, in Ireland under British rule, or in Poland).

Conflict grew in the nineteenth century between “clericalism,” that is, a religion’s political dominion over a country, and “anticlericalism,” which actively fought this claim. Rooted in scientific ideology, radical forms of anticlericalism perceived religion as an outdated explanation of the world that offered only a backwards orientation, irrelevant to the context of modern democracies.

In France, the founding of laicism was rooted in the political victory of the anticlerical movement. The impression prevailed that the republic (established again in 1870) was threatened by clericalism. A 1901 law excluded religious congregations from the right to free association. A new law passed in 1904 (and in effect until 1914) prohibited members of religious orders from teaching. But, essentially, the combative anticlerical movement gave birth to a progressive pacifist form of laicism. It is as if a revolutionary socialist party, assuming power by democratic process, ultimately gave birth to a social democratic system.

During the 1880s, the republicans introduced a religiously neutral educational system, which included a “laic morality.” This morality borrows elements from a number of origins: classical antiquity, Christianity, the Enlightenment (from Voltaire to Kant), and, occasionally, from Confucius. Different traditions are interpreted according to two notions: dignity of the human person (which creates rights and duties) and social solidarity. Further, the republicans hoped that the structure of the lay school would engender morality. As a place for learning tolerance, it enabled all French children, irrespective of social class or religion, to come to know and accept one another. Through school, the republic itself was the bearer of values. This moral was a compromise, and, because of the conflict, a significant anticlerical section asserted that religion was dangerous for the republic and its ideals.

In 1904–5, after the crisis that arose out of the Dreyfus affair, the separation of church and state became inevitable in a climate of confrontation.

Two models were possible. One was combative, as represented by the bill of Prime Minister Émile Combes. However, it was rejected, especially by the celebrated socialist leader Jean Jaurès, who hoped to achieve a law that would bring peace and make it possible to combat social inequalities. A liberal model prevailed ensuring freedom of conscience, guaranteeing the freedom to exercise religion, and respecting the self organization of each religion (art. 1 and 4), even though it neither “recognized” nor subsidized any religion (art. 2).

Even in liberal dominance, this model of separation completed a religiously neutral educational system and found a new logic. This can be seen as the second threshold of laicization. As for the first, there are three characteristics:

- 1 *Institutional dissociation*: Religion was entirely optional because it was no longer considered an institutional structure of society but rather as a mode of free association.
- 2 *Social neutrality regarding religious legitimacy*: Religious needs became a private matter. The question as to the usefulness of religion for society was no longer publicly relevant. But, within the framework of freedom of expression and association, religions could participate in public debates on social questions and the meaning of life.
- 3 *Freedom of religion and conviction*: Various religious societies belonged to the public sphere. The state guaranteed each citizen freedom of conscience and allowed citizens to meet within religious societies or associations.

A twofold aspect marked a separation in 1905: the victory of the lay camp in the conflict of a divided France, and an implicit covenant with opponents whose ultimate aim was to attain peace rather than achieve victory in the short term. The conflict vanished progressively because religion ceased to be a political problem, except in the field of education. So, by 1945, the bishops held that there could be a positive meaning to the term laicism and the following year laicism was officially proclaimed and recognized by the Constitution.

Other countries also underwent a process of laicization. Belgium was not situated in a similar

logic to the second threshold of French laicization but integrated laicism in its system of recognized religions: non confessional morality in school, lay advisers in hospitals or prisons, and so on. The Spanish and Italian systems tend to resemble a laicism that corresponds a little more to the first threshold of laicization, with more liberty and more pluralism.

The American situation is characterized by the separation between church and state (the 1st Amendment of the Constitution, 1791) and this is linked to the central function of religion. Stephen Warner indicates the main differences:

- Religion is constitutive for some American subcultures.
- Religion in America has historically promoted the formation of associations among mobile people.
- Religion in America serves as a refuge of free association and autonomous identity – a “free social space.”
- The second generation of immigrants often transmutes ethnicity into religion because it allows immigrants to assimilate and conserve their identity.

The American situation is heavily influenced by civil religion. There is an ambivalence between civil religion and laicization. Civil religion historically favors dissociation between social links and the hegemony of a religion, but civil religion renders the political values of the collectivity sacred.

Is the French situation the most laic? The answer is no, since, for example, the separation between state and church in Mexico from 1917 to 1992 created a time of austerity for religion. The 1917 Mexican Constitution forbade monastic orders, ensuring that religious ceremonies could only take place in churches, which were permanently under the authorities' supervision, and according to the Constitution religious ministers of all cults were denied the right to vote. Since the 1990s, though, there has been more flexibility and such rigidity is not as common. Turkish laicism is also historically harsher than French laicism. It expanded after World War I, questioning the logic of Islam, which was considered to be the principal cause of social decline. This position explains the reason for the armed forces' important role in religion.

A moderate Islamic movement tried to make it more liberal. The international situation does not favor such a development because a new form of conflict that might be characterized by a new anticlericalism has arisen between fundamentalist religious groups and laicized and/or secularized societies. Examples are evident in several Islamic countries, in Israel (orthodox Jews), and in the United States (fundamentalist Christians). Whether or not headscarves may be worn, a passionate issue for many French people, is a typical example of these new tensions. Several problems are interwoven, concerning not only how best to deal with fundamentalism, but also the most appropriate strategy to prevent social exclusion, the various conceptions of school, and the different notions of plurality compatible with national identity.

However, the idea of the universal has changed within the last 50 years. Today, the universal is no longer considered as the imposition of the nation state's values upon the civil society, no more than it is the imposition of western values on the rest of the world. It is the result of the building up of positive comparisons between values provided by different cultures, religions, philosophies, and civilizations. We are in the age of globalization. This represents a considerable change for laicism, which is linked with the development of the nation state.

Another issue worthy of attention is that, historically, laicization and secularization were two different processes of modernization. Now, changing from a process to a movement, modernization is a hegemonic but disillusioned reality. In the nineteenth century, morality was based on science. Now, science and morality tend to be dissociated in the context of many problems. Science was increasingly seen as technoscience, the functional efficiency of which was undeniable but which, far from helping to resolve moral questions, created new ones that were more difficult to resolve because of their intrinsic power. Is all possible progress also desirable? This is now an important topical question, not just in the biomedical field but in other areas as well: consider everything that contributes to environmental degradation. This new disillusionment changes the relationship to temporality. Ephemeral effects thus are becoming more important than investments in long term projects. Mass communication favors

sensationalism over analysis in the news, emphasizing its entertainment value. This entertainment broadcasts heroism, intrigue, sex, and wealth in large doses. It can lead to resentment because of the sizable gap between the imaginary notions conveyed and the nature of daily life, with all its banality, difficulty, and routine. In addition, it is necessary to be self-sufficient, each person has to assume responsibility. Such disillusionment leads to problems and various identity constructions are available that help individuals move toward the necessities of self-realization. Once again, the new cultural and religious demands have to be understood within this context. Indirect discrimination and reasonable accommodation are becoming new important problems.

SEE ALSO: Civil Religion; Globalization; Globalization, Religion and; Modernization; Religion; Secularization

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language

J. I. (Hans) Bakker

Language is a very important topic in its own right (Crystal 1987) and in terms of philosophical debates in the social sciences (Rorty 1967; Calhoone 2003), yet, surprisingly, many sociologists pay scant attention to language and find communication entirely unproblematic. For some, for example, it is mainly a question of tracing the history and etymology of specific words (Stevenson 1983). Many classical sociologists did not pay specific attention to language as a phenomenon, but recently there has been a reexamination of the work of outstanding linguists and logicians. The important debates between those who identify with Enlightenment modernism (Chomsky 1998) and those who adhere to postmodernism (Jameson 1991) have forced many social scientists to reexamine long held assumptions.

However, there were important precursors among the moderns, including Johann Gottlieb Fichte, a dialectical thinker who defined language in 1794 as the “expression of our thoughts by means of arbitrary signs” (Surber 1996: 32). Critical approaches to the study of gender, race, and class have often involved a rethinking of basic linguistic categories by scholars such as Foucault, Baudrillard, Derrida, Bauman, and many others. For example, Foucault (1985: 91) has a very ingenious way of defining “aphrodisia” as “acts intended by nature.” Hence, in a sense, the study of language is a window to all of the social sciences, especially as cutting edge theory is shaping up in the early twenty first century. For many, there has been a philosophical shift from Cartesian “subject centered reason” and rational action, to Fichtean “communicative social action” (Habermas 1989) and symbolic interaction. Nevertheless, many theorists resist that change in worldview. The battleground where many issues are fought out is the study of language and communication generally.

Both as a subject matter (i.e., an “object” of study) and as a key aspect of theorizing (e.g., in terms of epistemology), language is a highly contentious topic (Crystal 1987). The ways in which languages have been studied have

changed. There is still interest in such topics as the emergence of alphabets and writing. Much in the way of traditional linguistics is still carried out. But there have been many changes over the last few decades. Comparative philology has given way, for the most part, to various forms of linguistics and semiotics. Many writers have discussed the “linguistic turn” in contemporary thought, a paradigm shift that may have started with “ordinary language philosophy” and other trends in the 1960s, or even earlier (Rorty 1967). Modernist, structuralist epistemologies stressing the Cartesian subject–object dichotomy have been confronted by postmodernist, post-structuralist epistemologies which stress the “habitus” (Bourdieu 1977) and the “lifeworld” (Habermas 1989). Often, the study of language is seen as part and parcel of all aspects of human (and even non human) communication. Since no one can speak a language that is entirely idiosyncratic and still be understood, all languages tend to be social. A critique of the meaning and function of language in general (or perhaps a particular jargon) is often implicit in efforts to reform a disciplinary paradigm. Philosophers who emphasize linguistic questions (e.g., the later Wittgenstein) sometimes argue as if all that is necessary to dissolve certain intellectual problems is simply a reform of the language, thereby eliminating what are often called merely “semantic arguments.” Yet it is not altogether clear that certain questions can be considered mere “pseudo problems.” It is also not clear that “ideal language philosophy” is a realizable possibility (Rorty 1967).

Languages come in an amazing variety of forms, including dialects and *lingua francas* (Wardhaugh 1986). We rely on “euphemism” and “jargon” (Goshgarian 1998). There are many distinctive national, vernacular languages in the world. Of the approximately 5,500 currently still viable languages the most commonly spoken are Mandarin Chinese, English, Arabic, Spanish, and Hindi. Several ancient languages (“dead languages”) are nevertheless still in use, including Medieval Latin and Sanskrit. Other languages have died out and either can or cannot be reconstructed. (The Ancient Greek used by those who wrote in Linear B in Minoan civilization has been reconstructed, but Linear A – as well as the writing on the Phaistos Disc, also found in Crete – is still undeciphered.)

There are many definitions of the term language. Commonsense views of language stress the grammar and vocabulary of a specific natural language, like Swahili, Russian, Frisian, Mandarin, or English. Many people think of English, for example, as one and only one language. Crystal (2004) has stressed, however, that the history of English involves not just one consistent narrative (centered on English as spoken by the upper classes in England), but many different “stories” (including many versions of English historically and regionally). It is not just a matter of a “standard language” with many different offshoots. Since there are many legitimate forms of English spoken around the world, there is not just “one English language” today. This leads Crystal to look at English as a “global language.” His encyclopedic coverage of English as a language is matched by a similar range of coverage on languages in general (Crystal 1987).

Linguistics, the study of language and languages, can be viewed as sets of answers to a host of different intellectual questions or problems. For example, a group of linguists may be concerned with (1) *philosophical problems* (e.g., rationalist vs. empiricist aspects of philology as clues to deeper epistemological truths); (2) *social science questions* (e.g., the study of language acquisition by children, speech communities, and dialect patterns); and (3) *challenges in the humanities and arts* (e.g., the study of rhetoric and literatures). Some authors, of course, develop complex theoretical ideas concerning all three areas of inquiry. Thus, for example, Roman Jakobson, a member of the Prague Circle of the 1920s, wrote on questions of literary theory but also got involved in questions related to grammar. His “Quest for the Essence of Language” (Jakobson 1987: 413–27) is an aspect of his “semiotic” theory. Moreover, some authors argue strongly in favor of one viewpoint but later find that their theoretical ideas concerning language may have implications for a range of questions on which they themselves had not previously focused. A good example is the work of Edward Said on “Orientalism,” a very broad critique that has many implications for textual criticism and cultural criticism (Said, 1983). Habermas (1989) has attempted to steer clear of certain excesses in postmodernism while nevertheless incorporating many of the discoveries which have attended the linguistic turn.

The simplest form of language study is taxonomic and descriptive. However, for some, the term taxonomic linguistics is pejorative, since such classification systems tend to rely on “finite states” versus phases or transformations. There are different branches of linguistics. Historical linguistics looks at language change (diachronic, comparative philology), while general linguistics examines the characteristics of human language as a structured phenomenon (synchronic, contrastive structural linguistics). Language families have been analyzed by comparative linguists working in both diachronic and synchronic modes of investigation. Language usage is sometimes viewed as the most important aspect of what it means to be human. That could make linguistics a kind of queen of the social sciences, with interdisciplinary contacts with many other disciplines outside of the social sciences.

For many, the study of psychological linguistics is a subset of linguistics. For others, like Chomsky, the study of language is merely an aspect of the general discipline of psychology. That is because the key to language usage is considered to be a “generative grammar” that is part of our cognitive makeup. Chomsky argues that little children do not get enough experience with linguistic examples for them to be able to speak a language simply through memorization of clearly demonstrated patterns. Instead, human beings are “hard wired” with neurolinguistic abilities. Since those are universal it is possible to have a scientific approach to language acquisition and hence to language structure. In early work Chomsky views “transformational grammars” as heuristic, but more recently the standard “transformational generative” theory of the 1960s has been questioned and further refined.

An examination of the anthropological and sociological aspects of language includes the study of such topics as the creation of artificial languages with simplified grammars (e.g., Esperanto). Language affects social structures and social structures, in turn, affect language. In general, it is a truism to point out that human beings interact with one another through the use of languages. But while that is well known, what interests the social scientist are the complex patterns that emerge from the human use of language. This leads to ethnolinguistics and

anthropological linguistics. In sociology the focus is on sociolinguistics.

The sociological use of the philosophical term *Verstehen* evokes for many an image of language in which the isolated individual speaker or writer in his or her personal “singularity” is able to have a fairly clear inner knowledge of the motivations and intentions of other speakers or writers, living or dead. Thus, Dilthey (1996) sometimes tended to write as if it is a matter of the scholar personally “reliving” (*Nacherleben*, *Nachbildung*) the mindset of a previous thinker (e.g., Marx attempting to interpret Hegel). Weber utilizes Dilthey’s concept of *Verstehen* but modifies it to make it more sociological rather than psychological. (Dilthey himself was heading toward a broader conceptualization of *Verstehen* at the end of his life.) But various poststructuralist scholars have indicated that such a Dilthey Weber use of *Verstehen* – and “romantic hermeneutics” in general – may still be too individualistic and may neglect the importance of the sociolinguistic “field,” the conscious and unconscious coordination of a group due to its shared language (Bourdieu 1977). Hence, we move from the individual scholar to the social actor and then to the “bundle of habits.”

In the discipline of linguistics the field of “pragmatics” concerns the ways in which language usage is linked to contextual background features. This has a recognized overlap with sociological ethnomethodology. How do people “accomplish talk”? Knowledge of the sociocultural context and the social psychological situation can help us, for example, to distinguish between angry and joking behavior. We might want to examine the specific details of how a group of people are able to believe that their words are understood. Thus, for example, speech act theory concerns the ways in which linguistic utterances are meant to accomplish specific goals (e.g., to apologize, to threaten). Conversation analysis examines the structure of human dialogues.

The study of “symbolic interaction” by sociologists who call themselves symbolic interactionists is based in part on George Herbert Mead’s insight that in order for two or more people to interact they need to have “significant symbols” in common. A significant symbol is a symbol that all participants to the interaction

understand fairly clearly in terms of its practical consequences. For most Americans a Ugandan flag is not a significant symbol, but an American flag is. Similarly, when two specialists use their own jargon they use words that are significant symbols in that one specialized context (e.g., motorcycle mechanics discussing the “fork” on a “hog” or astrologers debating the “sidereal” versus the “tropical” star chart). All human interaction relies on the ability of members of a collectivity to share certain significant symbols. This is partially a matter of customary norms.

Bourdieu (1977) has made it clear that one’s habituated ways of doing and saying things (one’s *habitus*) involves indicators such as language usage that can be correlated with social class. Those from upper class households will be accustomed to speaking in a more formal and literary version of the language. Their language usage is “distinctive.” Moreover, public recognition of a change of linguistic usage can evoke a crisis because the new expressions involve “objective signs of recognition” that were previously only privately held. Bourdieu worked with poststructuralist thinkers like Derrida. Bourdieu’s *habitus* can be regarded as a sociological version of the idea of a semiotic system of meanings. Just like the air we breathe, the semiotic symbols we use are part and parcel of our very being. We are like fish swimming in a linguistic sea. Take away the language context upon which we rely and we are no longer cognitive beings.

Some authors, following clues found in Saussure and Peirce, have argued that there should be a shift from linguistics to a much more generalized approach that is sometimes called semiotics (Hall 2002). Semiotics can take the form of a separate discipline, albeit one with very general implications (like mathematics or philosophy). However, semiotics is also often associated with interdisciplinary approaches. For example, both the psychologist and the sociologist might be interested in studying advertising in terms of the process of signification (“semiosis”).

Reflexivity about language usage has led not only to specific questions about language and languages, but also to broader philosophical questions about how we know anything with any certainty (epistemology) and whether or not we ever really know “obdurate reality”

(other than perhaps concrete material things) in any direct sense (ontology). The use of careful distinctions in philosophical discourse is often disparaged by labels like “casuistry” or “Scholasticism.” Nevertheless, there is a need to be precise and to articulate subtle but important distinctions that may not be easily conveyed by the use of natural languages. An example is the distinction often made between something being “real versus not real” and the separate analytical question of whether or not something “exists versus not.” It has been argued that “God exists but is not real.”

In philosophy some stress that in principle natural languages cannot be precise (e.g., the later Wittgenstein), while others attempt to develop an artificial, logical symbolic language that is precise, like mathematics (e.g., the early Russell). Of course, not all vague languages are naturally occurring languages. In computer science there have been a number of artificial program languages which are based on mathematical logic, but that does not always make computer algorithms crystal clear. The field of symbolic logic in philosophy also uses artificial signs. This is much like mathematics and statistics in general. But Gödel’s proof that it is impossible to be both consistent and complete in mathematics had a significant impact on linguistics. Ever since Gödel’s ingenious theory it has been argued that an entirely non circular, non tautological verbal language is also not logically possible.

One philosophical approach, associated with Peirce, is that languages of all kinds can be broadly conceived of as systems of “signs” which constitute a “code” or semiotic system (Sebeok 2001; Hall 2002). Such codes can affect our ways of seeing other human beings and classifying them as “others” in terms of their sex gender, race ethnicity, and class status. Peirce (1923) argues that the aspect of reality that is being signified is something “represented” by an interpretive community and not by an isolated individual. The interpretive community always signifies “the representant” through the use of a system of signs. Hence, language is a semiotic system that allows for human *and* animal communication.

For some, it is not possible to study anthropological linguistics, ethnolinguistics, sociolinguistics, or psycholinguistics without evoking

all aspects of human communication (anthropo-semiotics). The argument is also frequently extended to include communication among other animals. Thus, the study of “the language of bees” is a study in animal communication (zoo semiotics). The underlying premise is that there is a high degree of continuity between other animals and the human animal in the way in which we communicate.

The linguist Ferdinand de Saussure also constructed a view of language that stresses the importance of how “the signifier” (the form) represents “the signified” (the concept). When we use language, he argues, we make differentiations. For example, we can differentiate between the signs “mother” and “father.” When signs can be interpreted in a meaningful way we have a language that is meaningful. Hence, the sign system and its usage constitute a social construction of reality. Our cultural codes are linguistic systems which we use in various ways and constantly modify as we apply them. Hence, language is constantly changing and always somewhat imprecise. Saussure introduced the distinction between the structure of a language (*langue*) and the way in which that language is commonly spoken (*parole*). The formal patterns are reinvented and simultaneously subverted every time we speak. No language can remain “pure” for long. Most languages are amalgams of many components.

There are many kinds of signs that are important to human languages (Sebeok 2001), but perhaps the most important are “symbols” such as words and phrases (Jakobson 1987). A set of such symbols, perhaps supplemented by iconic or indexical signs, can constitute a “text” (Dilthey 1996). Any piece of recorded symbolic communication is a kind of text, but when we think of language we think primarily in terms of written language and the formal “ground” of such a language, what Saussure refers to as *la langue*.

It is often argued that language has an important impact on how we think. The stronger form of the Sapir Whorf hypothesis is rejected today, but it is widely recognized that a weaker form of that theory is valid. Edward Sapir and his student Benjamin Lee Whorf were struck by how subtle distinctions found in one language might be difficult to convey into another language. Moreover, the structure

of a language largely determines commonsense notions of time, space, and causation. In standard European languages there is, for example, a notion of events as discrete and countable, while in Native American languages that may not be the case (Wardhaugh 1986).

The study of symbolic interaction involves ethnographic use of language through such research techniques as the interview. Ethno-methodologists and conversation analysts have paid special attention to nuances in the construction of semiotic systems. Garfinkel (2002) attempts to examine the “haecceity” (immediacy) of accomplishments and Sacks and colleagues (1974) examine topics like turn taking in conversations and the comprehension of puns. Others study membership categorization. Goffman (1981) studies forms of talk. Various kinds of discourse have been examined in many ways.

Langer (1979) argues that “true language” is always discursive. Hence, she rejects such metaphorical constructs as a “language of musical tones” or a “language of colors.” For Langer, a discursive language can be broken down into analytical units and those units can be conceptualized as having a syntax. Without a true syntax to create composite structures, she argues, it is difficult to conceive of a true language. In human languages the basic unit may be the “word” as an elementary aspect of meaning. At the same time, it is also possible to have logical categories that are derived from immediate bodily experience which are “presentational.” That is, we are “presented” with feelings and emotions which cannot be expressed in any language. This is similar to Foucault’s (1985) discussion of language and sexuality.

Complex hypothetical and deductive linguistic theories have been postulated by many thinkers, including those who have emphasized the importance of “semiotics” (Deely et al. 1986). Writers such as A. J. Greimas have utilized insights from thinkers like Saussure, Merleau Ponty, Lévi Strauss, Dumezil, Barthes, Lacan, Propp, and Jakobson (1987) to develop arguments concerning the relationship between language and communicative symbols in general. Such “structural” views tend to postulate the existence of a narrated universe of “deep semantic structures” that are reflected in the underlying grammar of all human languages. The surface “narrative”

is viewed as “syntagmatic.” That is, the syntactical rules, such as “linear succession,” tend to determine the fundamental semantic structures. This can be seen as a further refinement of Saussure’s distinction between *parole* (the spoken language) and *langue* (the underlying structure), which utilizes ideas from Propp and others to give a more complete account of the way in which such semantic structures exist in human emotions, dreams, and passions, as well as in the rigor of scientific reason and the precision of technological design. One’s epistemology shapes one’s view of language and vice versa (Bourdieu 1977). The study of language and communications is central to philosophical aspects of social science theory and methodology (Calhoone 2003).

SEE ALSO: Bilingualism; Cultural Studies; Epistemology; Habitus/Field; Hermeneutics; *Langue and Parole*; Media; Postmodernism; Representation; Saussure, Ferdinand de; Semiotics; Sociolinguistics; Structuralism; Symbolic Interaction

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langue and parole

J. I. (Hans) Bakker

Ferdinand de Saussure distinguishes between a “language” (*langue*) in its structural form and the spoken word (*parole*). Linguistics studies patterns of communication using an auditory mode, but vocalized sounds in one language are structurally related to sounds in other languages, particularly languages of the same language family. Chomsky makes a similar distinction between “competence” and “performance.” When a native speaker speaks a language, he or she “performs” the *parole* but

is not necessarily aware of the linguistic structure of that language as a generalized “competence” in the linguistics of that *langue*. It is possible to speak a *langue* in a grammatically correct manner without any knowledge of the discipline of linguistics in general, or even the application of linguistic rules to that specific language. The distinction is similar to the anthropological terms “etic” and “emic,” which are taken by analogy from phonetics and phonemics. In anthropology an “etic” approach to ethnographic fieldwork data is the outsider’s academic perspective concerning patterns and structures, while the “emic” aspect is the indigenous knowledge of the culture in practice in daily life. An anthropological fieldworker attempts to learn the implicit rules and must become as adept at the local dialect as a native speaker. But the researcher then takes the data and makes broader generalizations than most indigenous speakers are likely to be concerned with in their everyday use of subtle distinctions. In linguistics, phonemics studies the phonemes, which are a class of phonetically similar “phones” or speech sounds (from the Greek word for voice), while phonetics is also concerned with patterns of sound changes in a language or group of languages. Grimm’s law is a law of phonetics. Something similar is meant by Saussure’s distinction, but it is not entirely clear whether he thought of *langue* as an ontologically real structure or merely an epistemologically ideal device. Saussure’s distinction is synchronic rather than diachronic; the actual utterance by a person is a product of that speaker’s having been socialized into a language which is relatively fixed during his or her lifetime. There is some indication that Saussure may not have been entirely settled on the methodological importance of the distinction for general linguistics; however, many structuralist theorists have utilized it. Hence, the structuralist tradition in anthropology that is associated with Claude Lévi Strauss uses Saussure’s distinction, which may be part of the reason why it was eventually transformed into the etic/emic distinction. A structuralist approach to *langue* is compatible with “semiology,” “signology,” or – as it is usually called now, semiotics (Seung 1982). The implications of Saussure’s distinction have been debated by philosophers influenced by the “linguistic turn.” The linguistic

turn is often associated with “ordinary language philosophy” and with Wittgenstein’s later philosophy, which stresses the ordinary use of words in “natural language” (Rorty 1967). Walter Benjamin was opposed to Saussure’s ontological assumptions concerning the arbitrariness of the signifier.

SEE ALSO: Benjamin, Walter; Emic/Etic; Language; Saussure, Ferdinand de; Semiotics; Sociolinguistics

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late-life sexuality

Judith A. Levy

Considerable ambiguity surrounds both scientific and popular attempts to define the term “late life sexuality.” Agreement as to when “late life” begins increasingly has moved upward over the last century with the lengthening of the average life course in most industrial societies. Meanwhile, the term “sexuality” has come to connote a wide variety of human sociobiological responses that range from varying levels of social attraction or physiological arousal to intimate body contact that may or may not include physical penetration. The failure of research scientists to define what they mean by “sexuality,” “sexual behavior,” or “late life” when designing studies or publishing their results complicates attempts to compare research findings within older age groups and across societies and sociocultural environments. Still, at least five themes emerge as constant premises in the literature concerning sexual desire and activity in later life as defined by some form of mental and/or physical sexual response at age 50 or older.

First, scientific evidence widely documents that sexual norms and behaviors differ by societies and culture, historical time, generational influences, group characteristics, and individual beliefs and preferences. In this regard, the sexual attitudes and behaviors of today's oldest Americans are believed to have been shaped by their having come of sexual age during an era when intimate relations were less openly discussed and less acceptably variable. Thus older people now in their late sixties and older generally are perceived to be more sexually conservative, less comfortable discussing sexual topics, and more prone to hiding sexual behavior defined as deviant than their younger US counterparts. Such judgments also are applied frequently to anyone seen as advancing toward middle or older age.

Second, the "sexual revolution" of the 1960s that redefined sexual mores for youth and young adults in western societies appears largely to have bypassed popular beliefs and stereotypes about sexuality in later life. Today's older adults, many of whom as youth in the 1960s helped to push the boundaries of acceptable sexual behavior, now find themselves part of a generation commonly believed to be disinterested in and/or incapable of sex. This view is reinforced by popular culture that often portrays sexuality in old age as humorous, fraught with frustration, and aesthetically distasteful to others.

Third, despite stereotypes to the contrary, general agreement exists among researchers and clinicians that sex and sexuality are a normal and valued part of human existence among adults at any age and that many older persons remain sexually active until they die. Some times compared in the literature to riding a bicycle, sex is seen as something that once learned is never forgotten and always remains potentially enjoyable. Scientific findings support this view through statistics drawn from studies documenting a wide range of sexual interest and activity occurring in later life. As with many aspects of human behavior, sexuality appears to follow lifelong patterns, with those individuals who were the more active in youth being the most active in old age.

Fourth, although desire for sexual gratification appears to continue typically throughout life, opportunity may not. Lack of a sexual

partner is the most commonly cited reason given for late life celibacy. Because they outnumber men demographically at age 65 and older, heterosexual women are more likely than their male counterparts to be without a partner (Deacon et al. 1995). Meanwhile, age norms that define mature adults as becoming less attractive and sexually desirable as they age tend to produce an ever shrinking pool of younger candidates as sex partners for older persons, irrespective of their sexual preference. Lack of a social and/or physical environment conducive for sex also affects both sexual partnering and self pleasuring opportunities. For example, older persons who live with their offspring or others may lack the private space needed for intimate behavior. For those living in a nursing home, staff attitudes and organizational policies often reflect negative judgments that hinder the expression of sexuality among residents.

Fifth, despite its potential for offering continued enjoyment, considerable evidence indicates that sexual behavior of all types occurs less frequently and differs physiologically with age from that of adolescence and earlier adulthood (Zeiss & Kasl Godley 2001). Among peri and post menopausal women, natural changes due to aging commonly include general atrophy and loss in elasticity of vaginal tissue, decreases in rate and amount of vaginal lubrication, lesser labial and clitoral engorgement during sexual arousal, decrease in estrogen levels with a corresponding shrinkage in the size of the cervix, uterus, and ovaries, and more dependence on androgens for sexual response. Common changes among aging men include a slower rate of sexual arousal, the need for greater genital stimulation to reach full erection, less firm tumescence, lengthening of the refractory period prior to a new erection, and less semen and urgency in ejaculation due to loss of prostate elasticity. None of these biological changes, however, necessarily reduces sexual enjoyment for either sex (Lauman et al. 2005). Challenges and barriers to sexual fulfillment in later life are far more likely to be linked to the person's earlier sexual history, general health, the possible effects of medication that reduce desire or inhibit sexual function, and psychosocial factors that support or discourage sexual thoughts and actions.

NEW OPPORTUNITIES AND PERILS FOR SEX IN LATER LIFE

The development and popularization within the last decade of the chemical compound known as "Viagra" (sildenafil) may well mark the start of a sexual revolution, rivaling that of the contraceptive "pill" of the 1960s, with enormous opportunities and consequences for late life sex (Loe 2004). With public figures appearing in the mass media extolling the benefits of the drug in treating male erectile dysfunction, sex among older adults has become more publicly visible and possibly better accepted by Americans of all ages. Both older women and men have become the focus of scientific, marketing, and media attempts to gauge how they view, use, and physiologically respond to its effects. Such scrutiny clearly documents Viagra's pharmacological success in treating erectile dysfunction, allowing an unknown number of men who otherwise experience difficulties to attain and maintain a penile erection sufficient for satisfactory sexual performance.

This biological achievement is not without social consequences. To assure maximal effects, sexual performance achieved through pharmaceuticals also requires advanced decision making and precalculations in timing that militate against sexual spontaneity. The use of Viagra and similar compounds (verdenafil, tadalafil) also has generated a plethora of comic monologues and media humor featuring the sex lives of older persons as the butt of the joke. Also, not all sexual partners of men experiencing renewed sexual capacity report welcoming this change. An unknown number of women and possibly men who are the sexual partners of aging males appear satisfied with or prefer reduced sexual activity as they or their partners age. In addition, the use and abuse of sexually enhancing pharmaceuticals has crossed generational borders as an increasing number of younger men avail themselves of their effects to facilitate or prolong sexual intercourse or to enhance orgasms. The promise of "better sex through chemistry," using pharmaceutical enhancements obtained through medical prescription, the Internet, or illicit sources, has called into question previous assumptions about what is sexually "normal" at any age.

While Viagra, Cialis, and other similar substances have enhanced or restored the sexual

lives of many aging males, older women have had less pharmaceutical success in treating age related female sexual dysfunction. Clinicians commonly use variations of the term "hypoactive sexual desire disorder" to define persistent reduction or loss of sexual fantasies, a condition often associated with lower hormonal levels of androgens and estrogen with age. In addition to affecting libido, estrogen decline can reduce vaginal lubrication during sexual arousal and result in painful intercourse when vaginal walls become excessively thin. Hormone replacement therapy (HRT), even when begun after age 60, can retard or reverse such vaginal changes to some extent, but not without health risk. While testosterone replacement can increase libido in aging women, little is known of proper dosage and potential adverse side effects include masculinization with acne and excess body hair, scalp hair loss, deepening of the voice, and enlargement of the clitoris. Meanwhile, the search for a female Viagra has proved elusive despite considerable efforts by pharmaceutical companies to develop and test a range of clitoral therapy devices, vasoactive agents, and steroids. Their quest has added fuel to feminist and others' concerns that the framing of women's sexuality has become medicalized to the exclusion of other key social and cognitive factors (Kaschak & Tiefer 2001).

The Internet has emerged over the last two decades as a second technological innovation with enormous potential for transforming the sex lives of many older adults. As with their younger counterparts, an increasing number of individuals over age 50 seek friendship, romance, and opportunities for sexual interaction through websites and personal advertisements posted on the Internet (Adams et al. 2003). A global network of users offers opportunities for courtship and sexual partnering that transcend local geographical boundaries and the limits of personal social networks. Unlike face to face introductions, older adults can initiate online relationships without age related physical declines being immediately apparent. Meanwhile, the Internet also supplies older adults with ready access to erotica, pornography, and online purchases of sex toys and adult rated books without having to risk potentially embarrassing live encounters with sales clerks and other customers.

Increase in dating opportunities among older adults is not without worries. Although considered clinically safe for older males when used under physician supervision, some men experience undesirable side effects with Viagra or Cialis that force a choice between safeguarding health or enjoying better sex. Similarly, while HRT can ease menopausal changes that can inhibit sexual drive and activity among older women, increasing evidence suggests that its use heightens women's risk for breast and endometrial cancer. Meanwhile, as is true of all adults, people over age 50 who engage in sexual behavior outside of a monogamous relationship increasingly confront the dangers of acquiring sexually transmitted diseases including HIV/AIDS. CDC statistics reported by Karin Mack and Marcia Ory in a special issue of *J AIDS* devoted to AIDS and aging reveal that adults over age 50 account for about 10 percent of newly diagnosed cases of AIDS annually in the US. Over the next decade, the number of older persons living with HIV/AIDS is expected to rise substantially as treatment success of highly active antiretroviral therapy (HAART) prolongs the lives of people of all ages living with HIV. Increased prevalence of the virus among people over age 50 undoubtedly in some way will affect how this population views the use of condoms, sexual partnering, and sexual behavior in general.

SEE ALSO: Aging, Sociology of; Body and Sexuality; Cybersexualities and Virtual Sexuality; Sexual Health; Sexuality; Viagra; Women, Sexuality and

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latent growth curve models

Oliver Christ and Elmar Schlueter

Longitudinal methods permit the systematic study of stability and change over time and thus are a powerful tool for examining processes underlying social phenomena and the causal relation between different constructs. There are many different statistical methods to analyze longitudinal data (for an overview, see Crowder & Hand 1996; Menard 2002). Most of these techniques are related to applications of the general linear model to continuously distributed repeated measures (e.g., repeated *t* tests, ANOVA, multiple regressions, autoregressive models). A major shortcoming of these methods is that they are fixed effects models assuming that there are no interindividual differences in change. One prominent and powerful method to overcome this shortcoming are latent growth curve models (LGMs; synonymous terms used in literature are "latent curve models" or "latent trajectory models") as one variant of structural equation modeling (Bollen & Curran 2006). With LGM it is possible to analyze individual trajectories and related processes of change over

time. Meredith and Tisak (1990) first proposed LGM based on the seminal work of Tucker and Rao in 1958. LGMs are based on the assumption that a set of observed repeated measures taken on a given individual over time can be used to estimate an unobserved underlying trajectory. This assumption can be formally expressed as

$$y_{it} = \alpha_i + \lambda_{i2}\beta_i + \varepsilon_{it}.$$

y_{it} are the measured variables of time t which are explained by two latent factors (α_i and β_i) in the measurement model. α_i models the initial level in the measured variable (intercept factor), whereas β_i expresses the linear growth rate (slope factor). ε_{it} is the random error. The subscript i indicates that both the latent intercept and the latent slope factor are allowed to vary across individuals. These individual intercept and slope components of growth can be expressed by the following function specifying group and individual influences:

$$\alpha_i = \mu_\alpha + \zeta_{\alpha i}.$$

$$\beta_i = \mu_\beta + \zeta_{\beta i}.$$

Both latent factors, α_i and β_i , are defined by their means (μ_α and μ_β) and their residuals ($\zeta_{\alpha i}$ and $\zeta_{\beta i}$) in the structural equations. Since there are no exogenous variables specified, $\zeta_{\alpha i}$ and $\zeta_{\beta i}$ can be interpreted as the deviations from the group mean of the intercept and the slope

factor. A prerequisite of LGM is that the measurement model is constant over time, otherwise growth cannot be meaningfully modeled by LGM.

In Figure 1 a simple unconditional LGM is presented with three repeated measures assessed at equal intervals. “Unconditional” means that both latent factors are not affected by other variables (see below). Factor loadings on the intercept factor are set to 1 and the three factor loadings on the slope factor equal $\lambda_i = t - 1$, where t is 1, 2, 3. Thereby, the slope factor is constrained to a linear growth. In this example, the intercept reflects the model implied value of the outcome measure at the initial period of measurement because factor loading on the slope factor for the first measure was set to zero and factor loadings on the intercept factor are constrained to one. It is also possible to use alternative codings of time to define other meanings of the intercept term. In the case of an unconditional LGM with three measures, eight parameters have to be estimated from the data. The model is just over identified ($df = 1$), since the empirical covariance matrix has six and the mean vector has three elements.

In LGM, besides linear growth, nonlinear trajectories can also be modeled. In linear LGM, change over time is constant over all points in time. That means a one unit change in time is associated with a μ_β unit change in the outcome. This relation is constant for all equally spaced assessments, but can vary in the




Figure 1 Unconditional linear latent growth curve model for three repeated measures.

nonlinear case. In some cases it is theoretically plausible to assume nonlinear growth instead of linear changes. One possibility to test such relations is to use a quadratic function. Whereas the linear LGM has only one intercept and one slope factor, the quadratic LGM includes a third latent factor to capture any curvature that might be present in the individual trajectories. The quadratic model implies differential change in the measured variable between equally spaced time assessments. For example, change in a construct can be large at the beginning, but constantly becomes smaller in the further course of time. Alternatives to quadratic trajectories are exponential trajectories which are not time bound and as such are often more plausible for describing change in constructs. Du Toit and Cudeck developed techniques to implement exponential functions into the LGM framework. All trajectories, presented so far define a specific growth function that relates the repeated measures to the passage of time. Sometimes such assumptions are too restrictive and do not cover the pattern of change in an optimal way. An alternative is the free estimation of a part of the factor loadings of the repeated measures on the slope factor (Meredith & Tisak 1990). For example, in the case of three repeated measures, the loading of the last measure on the slope factor can be freely estimated to get a better adjustment of the trajectory on the observed data.

Besides the question of the functional form of the trajectory, it is often of interest to identify variables which affect the development of constructs. The LGM can be easily extended by including exogenous predictor variables (Willett & Sayer 1994). In these models it is examined in such a way that the intercept and the slope of a repeated measure are affected by time invariant predictors.

A further extension of the LGM is the inclusion of time variant repeated measures. Such multivariate LGMs take into account the change of several repeated measures simultaneously. Besides the consideration of several time variant repeated measures it is also of interest to consider time specific relations of the repeated measures within or between constructs. The autoregressive latent trajectory model (ALT) developed by Bollen and Curran (2004) connects LGM with autoregressive

models and allows, in addition to the analysis of random trajectories, the examination of autoregressive relations within constructs, as well as cross lagged relations between constructs.

Further possibilities to extend LGM include the examination of moderational and mediational hypotheses, as well as the use of multiple indicator latent factors. Mediation is indicated when the effect of a predictor on the intercept or slope of a time variant repeated measure is explained by a further time invariant predictor. In the case of two time invariant predictors as described before, normal methods to test mediation can be used. If predictors and mediators are also time variant, mediational analysis is much more complex (see Bollen & Curran 2006). In many cases it is of interest to proof moderating effects of variables in the change of a construct. There are two general types of analysis techniques to examine such moderational effects. In one case, the interaction term of two exogenous predictors can be included in an LGM analysis. A moderational effect is indicated by a significant effect of the interaction term on the two latent growth factors. Alternatively, multigroup analysis can be used to test for moderation. Here, specific parameters can be compared between two or more subgroups of a sample. Significant differences in parameters of the LGM indicate moderational effects of the moderating variable which was chosen to divide the sample into subgroups (e.g., age, sex). By using multiple indicator latent factors it is possible to control for measurement error. In the case of LGMs with multiple indicator latent factors, the growth in the latent factors is estimated, not in the measured variables.

As with all applications of structural equation modeling, LGM allows us to analyze missing data using powerful methods to impute missing data like multiple imputation or full information maximum likelihood (FIML). In addition, it is also possible to calculate LGM even when the normal distribution assumption is violated, which is often the case in social science (Bollen & Curran 2006).

Figure 2 illustrates a conditional growth curve model for anomia – defined as a state of mind expressed by individuals living under societal conditions of anomie – over a three year period ($N = 825$) based on data from an




Figure 2 Conditional latent growth curve model for anomia over a three-year period with education as an exogenous predictor variable.

Notes: Anomia t1 Anomia at wave 1; Anomia t2 anomia at wave 2; Anomia t3 Anomia at wave 3; ** $p < .001$.

ongoing panel survey of the German general population. In this example, education is used as a time invariant predictor variable.

For the latent intercept indicating respondents' initial level of anomia, a significant mean value of 3.23 ($p < .001$) is estimated. The significant variance of the mean value equals .56 ($p < .001$), suggesting that there is substantial variability in respondents' average levels of anomia at time one.

For the latent slope, the data reveal a significant mean value of = .18 ($p < .001$). According to this finding, respondents' level of anomia increases on average .18 units for every measurement one year apart. Further, the data reveal a significant parameter estimate for the variance of the latent slope (.09, $p < .001$). Therefore, it can be concluded that there is considerable variability in the respondents' latent trajectories for anomia over the period under study.

The significant negative correlation of $r = -.40$ ($p < .001$) between the latent intercept and slope factors indicates that the higher respondents' initial level of anomia, the lower the change over time.

Next, we examine possible effects of education on the latent intercept and latent slope of anomia. For the latent intercept, the significant parameter estimate of education is $\beta = -.35$ ($p < .001$). Substantially, this suggests that individuals with higher education show significantly lower initial levels of anomia. However, according to the results, education exerts no significant effect on the latent slope of anomia ($\beta = -.06$, *ns*). That means change in anomia is independent from respondents' level of education.

LGM is a powerful method for longitudinal analyses. It allows social science researchers to examine many different theoretical questions of change. LGMs can easily be extended by using multiple indicator latent factors to model measurement error, integrating predictors of change as well as mediators and testing moderating influences of measures. But there are of course a number of limitations of latent growth curve modeling. A minimum of three repeated measures is needed. Still problematic is the handling of missing data and deviations from normal distributions, although there are powerful techniques to take these problems

into account, such as FIML in the case of missing data and robust maximum likelihood in the case of deviances from normal distribution (for more details, see Bollen & Curran 2006). But the most critical factor for LGM and all other statistical methods is the underlying theory which guides the statistical analyses.

SEE ALSO: Aging, Longitudinal Studies; Correlation; Hierarchical Linear Models; Quantitative Methods; Structural Equation Modeling

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later-life marriage

Liat Kulik

With the aging of the population and increased life expectancy in western societies, there has been growing research interest in the period of late adulthood, which can span several decades. That life stage is characterized by three major events that can affect the individual as well as the marital unit: decline in health, retirement

from work, and entry into the role of grandparent or sometimes even great grandparent. The following main aspects of the dyadic unit are emphasized here in light of their relevance to late adulthood: caregiving, satisfaction with marriage and quality of marital life, power relations, and the division of household tasks.

CAREGIVING

In late adulthood, caregiving involves a considerable investment of time and energy by spouses, who are usually the main caregivers. Some couples report that the caregiving role increases their sense of commitment, closeness, and love. Husbands usually approach caregiving as a project and are comfortable delegating tasks, whereas caregiving wives usually give more direct assistance in the form of ADLs (activities of daily living) and IADLs (instrumental activities of daily living) (Miller 1990). Caregiving wives usually look for activities that will involve their spouses, and are concerned with providing for their spouses' needs, whereas caregiving husbands usually prefer to do things on their own. In addition, wives are more negatively affected than their husbands by caregiving. For example, Miller (1990) found that caregiving wives have less access to social support, although they do not differ from their husbands with regard to emotional strain. Other researchers indicate that caregiving wives feel burnout, because the responsibilities of providing care may cause them to feel trapped at a time when they should be free. By contrast, caregiving husbands may feel less burnout because they are more likely to supplement the care for their wives with formal services. It has also been argued that husbands are better able than wives to cope with problems in the marital relationship and maintain an emotional distance (for a review, see Walker 1999).

SATISFACTION WITH MARRIAGE AND QUALITY OF MARITAL LIFE

In general, researchers have found that most older people report happy marriages, and attribute this perception to the selective examination of couples whose marriage did not end in divorce (for a review, see Huyck 1995).

Cross sectional studies of older people have revealed that, compared with younger populations, older couples report fewer marital problems, although there is a decline in positive interaction compared with earlier stages of marriage. As for gender differences, husbands typically report higher marital satisfaction than do wives (Walker 1999). In this connection, qualitative studies suggest that husbands tend to idealize the situation and deny existing tensions, whereas wives tend to recognize problems and initiate changes as the children start leaving home. Wives who have been married for 20 years indicate that resolving disagreements becomes more difficult (Vaillant & Vaillant 1993), and tend to report lower marital adjustment over time, whereas husbands tend to report a greater decline in sexual satisfaction. Among elderly couples, wives are more likely to consider separating than husbands. Elderly wives are also less likely than their husbands to name their spouse as their main confidant, although both elderly partners consider their spouse as a companion. Kulik (2001) found fluctuations in marital satisfaction at different stages of the retirement process. In the remote pre retirement stage (about seven years before retirement), couples express more emotions (tension and marital enjoyment) than in the near pre retirement and post retirement stages. Kulik also found that levels of burnout, i.e., feeling tired of the marriage or feeling trapped in late adulthood, are much lower than in earlier stages of marriage, and that when marital relations are egalitarian, both spouses feel less burnout in marital life.

POWER RELATIONS

Few studies have focused on marital power relations, and even fewer have dealt with the topic in late adulthood. In their well known study *Husbands and Wives* (1960), Blood and Wolfe found that a husband's power increases from the time the first child is born until the youngest child enters school. Afterwards there is a steady decline in the husband's power, which reaches a particularly low point when the oldest child leaves home. The husband's power continues to decline after retirement, when he loses some of the resources that he had while he was working.

Recently, Kulik found that throughout the retirement process (remote pre retirement, near pre retirement, and after retirement), men show a greater tendency than women to report an advantage in the areas of major decisions (e.g., budget). With respect to domestic power (decisions about household matters), women have reported an advantage, although no gender based differences were found regarding decisions about such issues as time use. Moreover, attempts have been made to analyze power relations in late adulthood as a function of occupational status and timing of retirement among couples. For example, a comparative study of synchronous couples (both spouses retired or employed) and asynchronous couples (one spouse retired and the other employed) revealed that all types of couples tend to have relatively egalitarian power relations, as expressed in decision making in all areas of life (Kulik 2001).

DIVISION OF HOUSEHOLD TASKS

According to family development perspectives, role differentiation declines in the late stage of family life, when work obligations and the demands of childrearing diminish. However, findings are inconclusive and inconsistent. Some studies have found that after retirement most couples continue the traditional patterns, which are characterized by a clear differentiation between gender roles. According to this perspective, men continue to perform typically masculine tasks such as household repairs and gardening, and even increase their involvement in those activities (Vinick & Ekerdt 1991), whereas women maintain traditional feminine roles such as cooking, cleaning, and laundry. In a similar vein, researchers have found that retired men with employed wives do not seek to increase their involvement in household tasks, and that certain women even increase their involvement in household tasks after retirement (Szinovacz & Harpster 1994). In contrast to these findings, which indicate that traditional gender roles persist after retirement, other studies have revealed that gender role differences diminish (for a review, see Atchley 1992). Additionally, some studies have found that the husband's participation in typically feminine household tasks increases after retirement. Kulik

(2001) found that the division of feminine tasks such as cooking, cleaning, and ironing, as well as general tasks such as paying bills and purchasing household commodities, is usually more egalitarian among synchronous retired couples than among synchronous pre retired couples. The division of feminine tasks was relatively egalitarian among asynchronous couples (retired husbands/employed wives). However, no differences were found between different types of couples with respect to masculine tasks such as household repairs, which are almost always carried out by men.

As for future research, with the increase in life expectancy in western societies and the growing population of elderly couples over the age of 80, it would be worthwhile to focus studies on that age group. Additionally, because most studies on later life marriage are cross sectional, longitudinal studies that follow the development of marital relations in late adulthood among the same group of couples would be very useful.

SEE ALSO: Divisions of Household Labor; Emotion Work; Gender, Aging and; Inequalities in Marriage; Marital Power/Resource Theory; Marital Quality; Marriage; Retirement

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Latinidad and consumer culture

Lisa Peñaloza

Latinidad, most literally, is the identity of Latinos/as. More figuratively, it is a sensibility and way of being in the world that expresses who one is and what one's culture is about. This quality emanates from a community of very diverse people and is used by them to relate to one another, drawing from their similarities, even as they contest it based on their differences. Born at the multiple intersections of Native American peoples, Europeans, and blacks, it connotes an amalgam of ritual traditions and values – *amor, familia, respeto, compromisos, pasión*; that is, love, family, respect, accomplishment, and a passion for living – at once very real, yet imagined, dynamic and organic. The geographical coordinates of its diaspora are no less complex, in pertaining to those of Latin American ancestry in the US and in Central and South American nations, the Caribbean, Spain, and, to a lesser degree, southern Italy and France. Like other social phenomena, it is individually and collectively engineered and reproduced; internally by Latinos/as, and externally, as attributed to us by non Latinos/as. When linked to consumer culture, the body of work

has sparse but long roots, and has gained in abundance and currency with the rapid growth of the people.

Terminology continues to be a challenge, for Latinos/as in identifying ourselves and distinguishing among our various subgroups, and for non Latinos/as in referring to us. Issues of race, geography, nationality, social class, generation, politicization, language, and colloquial usage context complicate its meaning and use, as does variation in the strength of affiliation of members to the group as a whole and to the various subgroups, and dramatic sociodemographic shifts, particularly geographical mobility and the increased incidence of mixed ethnic background. A major distinction lies between those from the US, where Latinos/as are a minority, and those from the many other nations where Latinos/as constitute the main stream. In the US, subgroups of different historical trajectories and sociocultural characteristics impact Latinidad. Here, traces of regional concentrations remain such that Mexicans and Mexican Americans live predominantly in the US Southwest; Cubans and Cuban Americans in Florida; and Puerto Ricans in New York. However, the cultural character of each of the regions has changed dramatically since the 1980s due to interstate migration and immigration from other Central and South American countries and the Caribbean.

As with other groups of people and fields of ideas examined within the sociology of science, studies of Latinidad and consumer culture have changed as each generation of scholars grapples with the issues of its time. Socially, gains made by Latinos/as in the US in the 1970s and 1980s in political representation, legislation for equal rights, census inclusion, and more accurate counting were followed by affirmative action programs in government and in business, academic studies programs in universities, and attention as a consumer market through the early 1990s to the present. Buoyed by increased numbers and buying power, Latinos/as in the US have come to enjoy a much heralded popularity in media representation, political canvassing, job recruitment, and market targeting. Yet while those comprising the middle class experienced dramatic gains in income in the 1990s, the majority continues to lag socioeconomically, with overall indicators remaining well below

those of their white counterparts. In contrast, the social context of Latinidad in Latin American and Caribbean nations is marked by the challenges of socioeconomic development, post colonial relations, alliances with other Latin American and Caribbean nations and nations in Europe and Asia, internal political differences, and the struggles of indigenous peoples.

Academic studies in the US have come a long way since the early demands for Chicano and Puerto Rican studies programs in universities as part of El Movimiento, the Civil Rights Movements in the 1960s and 1970s. Early work such as Ernesto Galarza's *Merchants of Labor* (1964) and Rodolfo Acuña's *Occupied America* (1988) display a mix of academic and social activist research, as scholars worked to educate and remedy the violence, exclusions, and discrimination of postcolonization. The early, androcentric work of Latino scholars was soon joined by their Latina counterparts, as exemplified by Gloria Anzaldúa and Cherrie Moraga's classic edited volume, *This Bridge Called My Back: Writings by Radical Women of Color* (1981). This book, and many that would follow (e.g., Carla Trujillo's *Living Chicana Theory*, 1998; Richard Delgado and Jean Stefanić's *Critical White Studies*, 1997), are not pegged to Latinos/as alone, and have stimulated and challenged Latino/a and non Latino/a scholars alike to incorporate and attempt to better understand the simultaneous social impacts of ethnicity, race, gender, sexuality, class, and the market on social phenomena, and the differential effects experienced by various subgroups.

A mix of activism, literature, and research characterizes the history of Latino/a consumer culture. Activists have operated on the terrain of consumer culture in the US for decades; an early example is their challenge to the racial stereotyping of the cartoon character, the Frito Bandito, in Frito Lay advertisements in the 1960s. They protested against the marketing of cigarettes and alcohol in Latino/a neighborhoods in the 1980s. Priests called for spending curbs on lavish *quinceañera* celebrations (young 15 year old women's coming of age parties), and actors and community activists fought for more Latino/a roles and more Latinos/as playing Latino/a characters in film and on TV through the 1990s. More recently, Internet blogs were used successfully to stop offensive

insinuations of Latina sexuality in Tecate Beer promotions in 2004. In Latin America, consumer culture peppers the literature, from indictments of US imperialism and multinational capitalism in the poems of José Martí and Pablo Neruda; the pedagogical essays of Ariel Dorfman articulating a critical approach to such pop cultural characters as Donald Duck and Babar the elephant; to the intricate literary and political analyses of Carlos Fuentes.

Academically, theoretical and empirical studies of Latino/a consumer culture have flourished since the 1980s on such topics as postcolonial identity and cultural adaptation, physical and mental health care, community development, media representations and ownership, and globalization. Critical literary studies are arguably the most prevalent, with early scholars such as Américo Paredes, Ana Castillo, and Rina Ben mayor, joined more recently by Norma Alarcón and Ramon Saldivar in directing attention to the contributions of Latino/a authors, poets, and musicians, both historical and contemporary, and challenging theoretical conventions by which such work is evaluated.

Dimensions of *Latinidad* and consumer culture reflect the multiple disciplines comprising its study and the diversity of the people. Geographical considerations, national and subcultural background, language, socioeconomic class, political orientation, generation, disciplinary structure, and theoretical perspective are discernable across a wide array of topics. Areas of study include border studies, colonialization and post colonialism, labor organization and exploitation, immigration patterns, family life and socialization, language acquisition, bilingual education, and political representation. The work has changed dramatically over time, even as it is marked by continuities. Initially oriented by the cultural background and disciplinary training of its major scholars, the body of work has expanded toward the full realm of the social sciences and humanities. Scholars such as David Montejano, Henry Triandis, Amado Padilla, Rodney Hero, José Limón, Fernando Peñalosa, Alfredo Mirandé, Vickie Ruiz, Enrique Trueba, Doug Foley, Elizabeth Fox, Anghy Valdivia, and Lisa Peñaloza, to name a few, have focused on replacing pejorative accounts of Latinos/as based on naïve comparisons with the Anglo mainstream,

in books and the journals of their disciplines – history, psychology, political science, anthropology, sociology, education, communication, and marketing. Economics is the most recent addition to the fold. Works by George Borges and Marta Tienda, Silvia Pedraza Baily, and Bárbara Robles investigate cultural patterns affecting community economic development in the US, while Hernando De Soto examines such issues in Latin America.

Current emphases of this body of work stem from the many paradoxes and contradictions of consumer culture, together with unique qualities related to particular mainstream/margin cultural dynamics. First, agency in reproducing one's identity and one's culture is a key concern. It is important to consider the power dynamics in who is consuming whose culture, as signs and values drawn from the ritual holidays and everyday life of Latinos/as are packed into consumer objects and activities associated with Latino/a culture for consumption by Latinos/as and non Latinos/as. The general availability and widespread use of the piñata for children's birthday parties is one example. Consumer culture is empowering, in that Latinos/as support a big part of their consumer culture in buying the accouterments, products, and services they employ in being Latino/a. However, in a key displacement of power, a formative influence stems from the ways Latino/a consumer culture is subject to the whims of non Latino/a consumers in cultural crossovers and tourism.

Second is the paradox of market legitimization. That is, being a market brings a type of social legitimacy, yet it is not without its limitations. Simply put, it is easier to be Latino/a now than ever before. Yet this legitimacy comes at a price, for not all aspects and dimensions of this diverse identity and culture are recognized, reproduced, and thus valued in the market. This is a major concern among Latinos/as and community organizations, for it requires much work to redirect attention to qualities more vital to the community, but much less marketable. In a second key displacement of power, marketers play an important role in reproducing Latino/a culture in the marketplace, for consumption by Latinos/as and non Latinos/as. What often follows is that the most different and threatening among Latino/a elements are elevated in

cultural stereotypes, even as marketers emphasize the most assimilated and the less threatening qualities in their efforts to target Latinos/as.

Third, in addition to examining non Latino/a–Latino/a dynamics, it is crucial to examine relations of power among Latinos/as. That is, an important part of the development of Latino/a consumer culture occurs as cultural members with knowledge of Latino/a culture educate Latino/a and non Latino/a owned consumer products companies, as Dávila notes in *Latinos, Inc.* (2001). Of importance here is examining the ways Latinos/as work to reproduce Latino/a identity in such consumer cultural institutions as the media and advertising (Peñaloza, *Media Studies Journal*, 1995).

In short, basic to Latinidad and consumer culture is a conflation of region, nationality, class, and political leanings that are not easily sorted out, and from which stem important methodological implications. A key concern in this body of work is incorporating fundamental precepts of social justice into our disciplines, as Sandoval, San Juan, Jr., and Pérez encourage, in examining the ways such ideals as democratic representation, opportunity, and community development are compromised in capitalist socioeconomic systems in the US and Latin American nations. These works employ self reflexivity and social engagement, while attending to a diversity of positions and perspectives. As such, additional challenges relate to the complexities of agency and subjectivity, for both researchers and those whom they study. Identity dynamics remain a challenge in attending to relations of power between many levels of mainstream and marginal subgroups, while retaining a critical perspective in attending to the full range of their intragroup impacts. Other methodological challenges relate to scope and scale, as important inroads are being made in attending to the dynamics of globalization, while not losing sight of the contours of localized struggles.

Regarding future directions in research and scholarship, while the work is likely to continue to examine persistent traditions and change in the competing pulls of family, culture, and society, it shows tendencies of moving beyond who we are as a people and how we are represented in the market, toward exploring fundamental contradictions between democracy and capitalism. Important inroads are to be made in

linking across the various groups in the US and in other nations, and not getting derailed by the many differences, while acknowledging their substance and significance. Further advances are to be made by globalizing our studies, and comparing the experiences of Latinos/as in the US to those in Latin America and other nations of the Latino/a diaspora. Ultimately, much work is to be done to better understand dimensions of race, class, and gender as they impact cultural inclusion and exclusion, of identity and community development, and institutional and government treatment as played out in the terrain of consumer culture.

SEE ALSO: Capitalism; Community and Economy; Consumption, Mass Consumption, and Consumer Culture; Culture; Globalization, Consumption and

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law, civil

Stephen E. Brown

Civil law entails two distinct categories of meaning. It is used to reference Romano Germanic law, one of four broad forms of legal systems that presently are most practiced throughout the world. In this context, civil law is best understood in juxtaposition to common (Anglo Saxon), religious (e.g., Islamic), and socialist law. Civil law systems are most widespread in the world. Their most central feature is the codification of law, an approach historically linked to the Justinian Code of ancient Rome, and that became characteristic of continental Europe.

The second fundamental connotation of civil law relates to the division of some legal systems into segments that address what are construed as distinct types or categories of legal problems. Such division is not universal, but reflects a larger philosophy of law, the authority underlying it, and the goals of social control. Islamic law, for example, does not distinguish civil matters from criminal. Instead, all behaviors are morally assessed from the framework of the Koran and the *Sharia*, identifying the word of God regarding how humans are to behave. Under this system the view is that law comes from God and cannot be compromised. Both Romano Germanic and common law traditions, however, view the state as having a vested interest in and authority over public issues such as crimes (which are offenses against the state or community at large), but not in regard to private disputes. The latter fall in the realm of civil law. In this vein, then, civil law refers to the segment of legal systems that addresses grievances between individual citizens, as opposed to conflicts that are theoretically between the state and individual citizens.

All law serves as a form of social control in the sense that it manages social conflict. All forms of law are also shaped by social forces. These points probably are most widely appreciated in the context of criminal law, but apply equally to civil law. Moreover, the way that laws control and are shaped have greater bearing on the civil realm because these cases impact far more people. Civil law governs social obligations across a vast array of human activity. It governs the nature and parameters of family relations such as marriage, divorce, child custody, adoption, provision of medical treatment to family members, and innumerable other domestic issues. Civil law governs privileges such as licensure to operate vehicles, to engage in certain occupations, to participate in sporting activities, the pursuit of education, eligibility for many financial benefits, ownership of property, and all other realms of human endeavor. It also provides the framework for determining which individuals have been wronged and how the damages are to be rectified. In short, civil law provides the rules and procedures for resolving conflicts between individuals over any and all matters within a society.

Civil or private law, as opposed to public law, is structured differently because it is presumed that public law is pitting individuals against a more powerful state. Within civil law the defendant is not accorded nearly as much protection because it is presumed that there is not such a dramatic power imbalance between the two sides to the conflict. Moreover, the state is empowered to take life or liberty, sanctions unavailable in private disputes. A single event, however, may have the potential to be jointly addressed by civil law (a plaintiff sues for civil damages) and criminal law (the state pursues criminal charges). Nevertheless, because it is so far reaching, civil law dramatically shapes the nature and quality of social life.

SEE ALSO: Crime, White Collar; Law, Criminal; Law, Sociology of; Legal Profession

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law, criminal

Victoria Time

Criminal law is a body of law that defines and grades crimes, and indicates corresponding punishments. These definitions and punishments are found in statutes and in criminal codes within each state, and within each country. Due to the dual system of government that obtains in the US, the federal government has its own criminal code different from that of the various states.

Besides defining and stipulating sanctions, criminal law also explains constitutional limits on the power of government in enforcing criminal laws. It explains general principles of criminal liability and discusses parties to a crime, as well as defenses to criminal responsibility.

In the US, criminal law differs from civil law in that the latter (also referred to as private law) regulates private rights and remedies. Further, while a higher burden is required to prove guilt in criminal cases (beyond a reasonable doubt), liability in civil cases is proven based on a preponderance of the evidence. The penalties for criminal violations range from jail time and any intermediate sanction to death, while those in civil cases are limited to damages and injunctions. Some crimes, such as assault and battery, may be prosecuted in both a criminal court and a civil court. The prosecutor, on behalf of the state or the federal government, brings charges against defendants in criminal cases, while the victim or friends and family as plaintiffs file charges against defendants in civil cases.

OBJECTIVES AND CHARACTERISTICS OF CRIMINAL LAW

The primary purpose of criminal law is to regulate people's behavior in efforts to curb crime.

In this regard, delineating behavior which is criminal is necessary, and punishing wrong doers is vital. In compliance with the rule of law, also known as the principle of legality, one can be punished only if there is a law that expressly defines conduct as criminal, and prescribes a fitting punishment for that conduct. Hence, if there is no crime, there can be no punishment. Criminal law attempts to achieve several goals, including deterrence, retribution, incapacitation, rehabilitation, and restitution. The following are characteristics of criminal law:

- It states behavior that people must comply with and those from which people must refrain.
- These stipulations are put into law by appropriate authorities.
- Violations of these stipulations result in punishments.
- Everyone in that jurisdiction is subject to the law.
- Not only the victim is affected by a crime; the community at large becomes a symbolic victim.
- Punishments against perpetrators signify a collective will of the people.

SOURCES OF CRIMINAL LAW

The following provide the various sources of law in the US.

US Constitution

Even though the US Constitution focuses on procedural law in the Bill of Rights, it touches on criminal law in that it defines the crime of treason in Article 3.III.

US Criminal Code

The US code embodies federal crimes defined by Congress. These crimes, which include illegal possession of drugs and weapons, as well as crimes perpetrated against the US, its employees, and property, are prosecuted in federal courts.

State Constitutions

As the most dominant source of law in a state, state constitutions embody laws that define the parameters of the powers of the various agents that work within the criminal justice system. Further, it incorporates precepts of criminal law.

State Criminal Codes

State defined crimes are largely a heritage of common law. However, where necessary, each state has modified common law definitions of crimes as well as punishments in ways that reflect changing times, as well as the unique circumstances of the state.

Common Law of England

Initially, common law of England comprised unwritten customs and regulations which were interpreted and enforced differently throughout England. In efforts to create some uniformity in the interpretation and enforcement of the law, William the Conqueror requested that the various customs and regulations be codified, and applied in similar fashion throughout England. These written customs and regulations became known as common law. In order to maintain some semblance in the ways cases with similar facts were decided, judges felt compelled to follow precedent. The principle of *stare decisis* which mandated judges to follow precedent was developed.

When the founding fathers migrated to the US they brought many of these English laws and practices and incorporated them into the legal systems. Today, some common law definitions of crimes, as well as practices, still exist, while others have been modified or stricken out.

Judicial Decisions

Appellate court judges (the US Supreme Court Justices are the highest) make law through judicial rulings. Usually, they follow precedent when cases have similar facts. When there are substantive differences, judges distinguish the

cases and provide a rationale for their new decision.

Local and Municipal Ordinances

It is not uncommon to find ordinances that are endemic to a particular municipality. Based on their unique economic and social factors, each jurisdiction defines crimes and infractions, and stipulates punishments for behavior that contravenes aspects of those factors.

Administrative Law

Although administrative laws mostly generate civil litigation, violation of some may sometimes give rise to criminal litigation. For example, the administrative agency for Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms requires that firearms be registered. Possession of an unregistered firearm may lead to criminal prosecution.

CLASSIFICATION OF CRIMES

Offenses are classified in various ways in order to determine an appropriate punishment. Worthy of note is the fact that classifications based on the type of punishment are not uniform among the states, since each state legislature draws limits on sentences.

Classification Based on Severity of Offense

A more popular way of classifying offenses is based on the degree of seriousness of the offense. Crimes are divided into three categories: felonies, misdemeanors, and infractions. Felonies are the most serious crimes, for which the punishment ranges from one year in prison to death. Death sentences are usually reserved for capital offenses such as treason and aggravated murder. In non death penalty states, a capital offense carries a punishment of life.

Misdemeanors are less serious offenses than felonies and their punishments are usually less than a year in jail. Some states differentiate gross misdemeanors from petty misdemeanors. Gross misdemeanors carry sanctions ranging from six months to one year. Infractions or violations such as traffic violations are the least

serious offenses, whose punishments are usually fines.

Felonies are tried in courts of general jurisdiction, while misdemeanors and infractions are tried in courts of limited jurisdiction.

Classification Based on Moral Turpitude

Offenses that are egregious (such as murder) are deemed *mala in se* or inherently wrong. Others (such as polygamy) are *mala prohibita* or acts made illegal by laws of a state or country.

Crimes can also be classified based on the subject matter. For instance, battery may be classified as a crime against a person, while treason and sedition may be classified as crimes against the state.

ELEMENTS OF A CRIME

In order to convict a defendant, a prosecutor has to prove the elements of a crime. Some times, it may not be necessary to prove all the elements. The elements are (1) the guilty or evil act (*actus reus*), (2) the guilty mind (*mens rea*) or the evil intent, (3) concurrence of the guilty act and mind, (4) attendant circumstances, or “facts surrounding an event” (Black 1990: 127), (5) causation, which may relate to cause in fact, that is, the act that creates the harmful result. Courts look at two types of causation in determining who should be held responsible for cause of death: (1) “but for” or *sine qua non* causation, and (2) legal causation, which relates to the proximate cause of a result when some intervening factor affected the chain of events from when an initial act was perpetrated until when death occurred.

PARTIES TO CRIMES

Criminal liability may attach for those who commit crimes, as well as those who aid and abet, assist, entice, or encourage criminal acts. The doctrine of complicity explains circumstances under which accomplices assume criminal responsibility based on the extent of their participation in a criminal venture. Common law grouped parties to a crime in four categories: accessories before the fact, principals in the

first, principals in the second, and accessories after the fact. Changes have been made over time to this classification. Participants to crimes are classified in modern statutes as (1) principals (those who carry out the crime), (2) accomplices (those who act before and during the commission of the crime, as for instance those who act as look outs) and (3) accessories after the fact (individuals who, knowing fully well that principals and accomplices have committed a crime, willingly provide them a safe haven, or provide them with any type of assistance in order to impede their arrest or prosecution). Accomplices and accessories can be punished even when the principal is still at large.

Culpability may also attach vicariously based on the relationship of the offender and a third party. For example, an employer may be held responsible for the crimes of an employee that fall within the scope of employment. A person may also be held liable under the doctrine of strict liability, even when the person did not have the requisite guilty mind, as long as some harm ensued from the person’s act.

TYPES OF CRIME

Some offenses are classified as anticipatory/inchoate or incomplete crimes. These offenses, in order of their seriousness, are attempt, conspiracy, and solicitation. Attempt is distinguished from mere preparation, in that attempt requires that “substantial steps” are taken towards the commission of a crime. Conspiracy requires an agreement between two or more persons to engage in illegal activities. Solicitation is a request or an inducement to someone to commit a crime.

With regard to other types of crimes, the list is lengthy. Some of the more common are (1) crimes against a person, which include murder, man slaughter, rape, assault, battery, and kidnaping; (2) property offenses, which include larceny, burglary, embezzlement, forgery, etc.; (3) crimes against public order and morality, which may include but are not limited to vagrancy, disorderly conduct, aggressive panhandling, and prostitution; (4) crimes against the administration of government, which include treason, perjury, obstruction of justice, etc.; and (5) crimes against a person as well as property, for example, robbery.

DEFENSES TO CRIMINAL LIABILITY

There are three broad categories of defenses to criminal liability: (1) alibi, which is raised by defendants who contend that they were some where else when the crime was committed; (2) defenses of justification, such as self defense, defense of home and property, defense of others, consent, necessity/choice of evils, and execution of public duty, which may be raised by defendants who accept responsibility for the crime but argue that based on the circumstances, their actions were justified; and (3) defenses of excuse, such as insanity, entrapment, intoxication, age, mistake, syndromes, etc., which may be raised by those who shift blame to something that to them precipitated the commission of the crime. Some of the syndromes that defendants have raised are Vietnam/Gulf War syndrome, premenstrual syndrome, and spousal abuse syndrome. When a syndrome defense is raised, the defendant contends that some abnormality brought about by unpleasant experiences triggered anti social behavior.

LIMITATIONS ON CRIMINAL LAW

Even though many legislative and judicial rulings affect criminal procedure, some of them set limitations on how criminal law can be enforced. Some limitations are (1) void for vagueness and overbreadth: laws that are not precise or those that are so broad as to encompass constitutionally protected rights cannot be enforced; (2) *ex post facto* laws: retroactive laws cannot be enforced if they punish acts which were committed before the laws were passed; neither can they increase the punishment nor the gravity of an offense; (3) cruel and unusual punishments such as those that are barbaric or those that are disproportionate to the crimes are forbidden; (4) free speech, which includes expressive conduct, may not be "abridged" except they constitute obscenity, profanity, fighting words, slander, libel, and expressions that may give rise to "clear and present danger"; and (5) due process and equal protection of the laws may not be denied anyone. Without a valid state interest that has to be articulated, courts will not enforce laws that are discriminatory.

SOME CHANGES IN CRIMINAL LAW OVER TIME

Changes over time are quite evident in the sanctions, definitions, and types of crimes. Most felonies at common law carried a death penalty sanction; today, the death penalty is mostly reserved for capital offenses and treason. The penalties for other felonies in recent times typically carry terms of incarceration, while punishments for misdemeanors range from fines to a year in jail in most states. Flogging, which is outlawed, and punishments which are disproportional to the crimes are considered cruel and unusual in contemporary times.

Besides changes in sanctions, definitions of offenses have also changed over time. Two examples are burglary and rape. The definition of burglary used to comprise the breaking and entering of a dwelling during the night with the intent to commit a felony. The current definition of burglary entails breaking, entering, and remaining in any structure at any time of day with the intent to commit a crime. Rape, which was considered to be an unwanted sexual offense by a man to a woman other than his wife, today in many states has a gender neutral definition. The elements of the crime of rape, particularly that of force, have in modern times been revised to include both intrinsic force (normal force) and extrinsic force (more force than normal). While non consent at common law required resistance by the victim, today, simply saying "no" suffices for non consent.

SEE ALSO: Age and Crime; Alcohol and Crime; Capital Punishment; Corrections; Courts; Crime; Criminal Justice System; Death Penalty as a Social Problem; Deviance; Deviance, Crime and; Hate Crimes; Law, Civil; Law, Sociology of; Legal Profession; Prisons; Property Crime; Violent Crime

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law, economy and

Robin Stryker

The law–economy relationship has been an important object of inquiry for sociologists. Classical theorists Durkheim and Weber promoted sociology as a discipline by offering the ories of this relationship. Today, sociological research on law and the economy provides ideas and empirical evidence to help answer such key questions as: Where do firms and markets come from? How and why do they operate and evolve as they do? How do legislatures and courts shape inequalities of income and wealth? How do legislatures and courts affect the participation in paid labor markets, jobs, and earnings of people of different races, ethnic groups, religions, and genders?

Among classical theorists, Marx assumed “bourgeois” law would reflect and reinforce capitalist relations of production. At most law was an object of class conflict among factory owners and workers, but it was not a major causal force in its own right. Durkheim focused much attention on the law–economy relationship, making it central to his analyses of economic modernization. For Durkheim, shifts in law from punitive to restitutive legal principles and sanctions indicated changes in social bases of solidarity. Societies moved from solidarity rooted in similarity to that rooted in difference and complementarity, as a consequence of increased economic division of labor. In contrast to Durkheim and Marx, who viewed the nature of legal ideas, behavior, and institutions as consequence rather than cause of economic ideas, behavior, and institutions, Weber emphasized the conjoint, mutually reinforcing rise of a formal rational legal system and of capitalism in Western Europe. Weber’s ideas

have been especially influential in economic sociology and for contemporary perspectives on law and economy (Trevino 1996; Swedberg 2000; Stryker 2003; Edelman & Stryker 2004).

According to Weber, formal rational law provided legal rights and guarantees to parties in exchange, enhancing predictability and certainty in contractual relations. This increased the probability that promises were kept, promoting market exchange, which in turn promoted further changes in business and contract law. Though full blown capitalist economies were unlikely without legal enforcement of contracts, economic exchange and markets could exist without such enforcement. One among many sources of legal rationalization itself was separation of sacred and secular law going back to republican Rome’s practice of refusing to let priests interfere in daily life (Trevino 1996).

Similarly, legal concepts and tools of negotiability, agency, and the juristic or legal person probably were necessary for developing economic action and institutions with very high degrees of systematization, calculability, and predictability. Banknotes, checks, and bills of exchange are signed legal documents including unconditional promises to pay. As Trevino (1996) points out, because such negotiable instruments were not promoted until the seventh century, markets but not full blown capitalism could develop in ancient Rome. Finally, by making business organizations bearers of universal rights and duties, entitled to formal equal treatment under the law, the legal personhood concept provided a bridge between developing ideas of rule of law and rule oriented legality in the polity, and development and reproduction of capitalist ideologies, firms, and markets.

Contemporary treatments follow Weber in presuming that law operates both as an independent and dependent variable with respect to the economy (Edelman & Stryker 2004). With respect to centrality of law in the social construction of firms and markets, for example, Roy (1990) showed that anti trust policy contributed to a massive merger wage in the US at the turn of the twentieth century. Focusing on an 1897 Supreme Court decision that unexpectedly declared key provisions of the Interstate Commerce and Sherman Acts to be constitutional, Dobbin and Dowd (2000) showed how this decision triggered a chain of events leading

the railroad industry away from cartel forms of business organization to oligopoly enhancing friendly mergers. Not only did firm and market structures change, so too did business models of appropriate and efficient profit oriented behavior.

Business activity shapes the nature of law, as well as vice versa. For example, Fligstein and Stone Sweet (2002) showed that increased cross border trade within the European Community promoted more litigation of EC law, that the two together promoted more EC legislation, and that all three of these together promoted the founding of new EC oriented lobbying groups in Brussels. Here, firm economic behavior and concomitant legal and political behavior are transforming legal ideas, action, and institutions, creating a new EC level regulatory system and transforming a treaty based common market into a constitution based transnational legal system.

With respect to economic inequality, research shows how economic and social regulations, including legislation governing collective bargaining, health and safety, pensions, and equal employment opportunity, have reshaped the nature of the American workplace, transforming workplace governance, business hiring, firing and promotion procedures, and impacting labor market outcomes for women and minorities (Stryker 2003). As well, redistributive tax and social welfare legislation at the core of the welfare state ideal led to measurable reductions in income inequality in advanced industrial democracies, though these reductions were not of the magnitude that many anticipated (Lempert & Sanders 1986).

Conversely, Edelman et al. (1999) showed that courts take into account managers' business concepts and routines, including their business adapted interpretations of equal employment opportunity and affirmative action laws, when making formal adjudicative rulings on whether or not firms have violated equal employment laws. Thus, more "covert" day to day managerial interpretations diffusing across firms and economic sectors, as well as more "overt" business attempts to influence legal rules through litigation, often have dramatic effects on law enforcement, such that the impact of equality promoting legislation is minimal or even the converse of that intended (Yeager 1990; Stryker

2003; Edelman & Stryker 2004). Law and society scholars highlight such differences by contrasting "law on the books" with "law in action" (Trevino 1996; Stryker 2003; Edelman & Stryker 2004). The legal profession itself – in addition to advancing members' interests in creating and monopolizing markets for their services – also shapes the content of legal rules and the structure of legal institutions (Lempert & Sanders 1986; Dezalay & Garth 1996).

Consistent with many recent studies and findings, current sociological ideas about the law–economy relationship emphasize co evolution (Stryker 2003). Legal ideas, actions, and institutions reciprocally shape and are shaped by economic ideas, action, and institutions in intersecting institutional fields. An excellent example is provided by Dezalay and Garth (1996) in their study of the emergence of a transnational legal order of commercial business arbitration. This new legal field, which transforms international and national business disputing, emerges and itself becomes transformed through interconnected power struggles over business, markets, and the state within and among lawyers and businesspersons operating in and across local, national, and transnational organizations and institutions.

Social mechanisms through which law–economy co evolution occurs are a topic of lively debate. Some scholars emphasize how law reshapes actors' cost benefit calculations and interests. Others emphasize how legal and economic concepts and institutions are mutually constitutive, with law's power in and for economic life rooted in taken for granted meanings, norms, and values. Where scholars emphasizing rational calculation tend to conceptualize law as a set of state promulgated formal rules, scholars emphasizing how law helps to construct cognitive frameworks for economic behavior tend to emphasize a broader concept of law as legality (Stryker 2003; Edelman & Stryker 2004). Legality encompasses codified rules as well as symbolic and ritual elements of law and social behaviors mobilizing and enacting both state made formal laws and law like principles and processes outside the formal legal system.

Stryker (2003) suggests that both formal legal rules and broader notions of legality affect the economy through multi dimensional resource mobilization processes involving instrumental

calculations by economic and legal actors, and also these actors' cognitive interpretive frames and their normative evaluations (see also Dezalay & Garth 1996; Kelly 2003). Reviewing extant research, Edelman and Stryker (2004) suggest that political mechanisms involving resource mobilization and counter mobilization and institutional mechanisms involving hegemony and diffusion of taken for granted meanings and practices combine to account for the mutual endogeneity of legal and economic ideas, actors, and institutions. They show how a "sociological" approach to law and the economy, emphasizing that ideas of economic efficiency and rationality are socially constructed, is different from a "law and economics" approach. The latter relies on a priori concepts of rationality and efficiency as assumptions for its theories about business behavior and as a normative standard to evaluate legal rules and institutions. Finally, law plays facilitative, constitutive, and/or regulatory roles with respect to economic ideas, actors, and institutions. Sometimes it plays all three at once. For example, corporation law constitutes corporations as bona fide economic actors and legal persons while it also facilitates and regulates capital accumulation (Edelman & Stryker 2004).

Diverse quantitative and qualitative methods are used productively to study law and the economy. Both quantitative modeling and case oriented comparative techniques have been used to investigate the impact of statutes, directives, executive orders, and court rulings on, for example, business behavior, unionization, strikes, economic growth, employment, unemployment, international trade, and transformation of market structures, as well as on the labor market participation, jobs, and wages of minorities, women, and members of diverse ethnic and religious groups (Donahue & Heckman 1991; Fligstein & Stone Sweet 2002; Edelman & Stryker 2004). Quantitative methods likewise have proved useful for assessing diffusion of new business structures and practices in response to changing regulatory laws and for investigating distinct periods in law and economy dynamics. Case oriented comparative historical methods have been especially helpful in examining key events or turning points in mutually constitutive legal and economic processes (Stryker 2003). Precisely because the

over time role of law in constructing currently taken for granted economic concepts, actors, behaviors, and institutions tends to become invisible from contemporary vantage points, research investigating short and long term law–economy dynamics is important for understanding current economic phenomena, as well as for appreciating the possibilities and probabilities of future economic transformations.

SEE ALSO: Capitalism; Culture, Economy and; Economic Development; Economic Sociology: Classical Political Economic Perspectives; Economy (Sociological Approach); Enterprise; Global Economy; Institutionalism; Law, Sociology of; Markets; Modernization; Occupations; State and Economy; Unions; Weber, Max; Women, Economy and

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law, sociology of

Robert Dingwall

The sociology of law is one of the oldest specialty fields in the discipline, reflecting the influence of nineteenth century jurists like Sir Henry Maine (1861) on writers of the founding generation like Tönnies, Weber, and Durkheim. Although it has been a less significant area over the last half century, it is currently undergoing a revival, mainly through its contribution to interdisciplinary studies in law and society alongside law, history, political science, anthropology, and social psychology.

The sociology of law can be distinguished from criminology in two ways. First, it has a broader attention to the scope of law's impact on society. Where criminology focuses particularly

on the coercive effect of law, the sociology of law is also interested in its regulatory and facilitative aspects in relation to civil society, commerce, and domestic life. Second, it has a less applied orientation. Although there are significant critical currents in criminology, which are often closely linked to the sociology of law, much criminological work is essentially a form of problem solving for the criminal justice system, where prior definitions of crime and institutional solutions have been laid down by research sponsors. It is important not to overstate this because there are also empiricist elements in law and society studies that are equally sponsor driven (Campbell & Wiles 1976).

Early sociologists had a central interest in explaining the transition to modernity that they believed they were witnessing, in their own lifetime and that of their immediate predecessors. Changes in the nature of law were thought to be part of this transition, creating the conditions for the development of a capitalist economy. Maine described this as the movement from a society based on *status* to one based on *contract*, a distinction reformulated by Tönnies as *Gemeinschaft* to *Gesellschaft* and by Durkheim as *mechanical* to *organic* solidarity (Nisbet 1966). To the extent that law could be said to exist in traditional societies, it was an expression of sovereign or collective will, designed to impose order through repressive sanctions and sustain relations between individuals that reflected inherited or ascribed positions within the community. Modern law was a resource that individuals could use to structure episodic relationships between themselves, particularly within the economic sphere, by means of contracts that provided a basis for stability and predictability in their interactions by codifying promises and penalizing breaches. Contemporary anthropologists of law are highly critical of this representation of traditional societies, which their research has shown to be more strongly marked by informal sanctions and an emphasis on restitution and peace making than on coercion. Nevertheless, the model was important in stimulating reflection and empirical work on the relationship between law and the rise of capitalism.

The division of analysts over the extent to which law is an integrative element in society, facilitating action in a broadly neutral fashion,

or an expression of the coercive power of a dominant class persists to the present day. Durkheim (1984) saw law as one of the solutions to the problem of social and moral fragmentation that arose from the division of labor. The creation and articulation of enforceable contracts provided for the specification and definition of a wide range of social relationships – from the economic sphere of consumption, employment, or property to the domestic sphere of marriage and intimate relationships. However, in contrast to many of his contemporaries writing from more narrowly legal or economic backgrounds, Durkheim underlined the importance of the institutional embeddedness of law: contracts depended on a non contractual basis of values, which could only be imperfectly sustained by legal means. For Durkheim, though, the division of labor was a spontaneous process: its unilateral imposition on workers by the owners of capital was a pathological form, the *forced* division of labor, that he sought to oppose. Marx, in contrast, saw this imposition, in pursuit of greater profit, as the essential driver of the process, so that law was primarily an ideological tool of the capitalist, supplying legitimacy to the power imbalance between owner and laborer (Cain & Hunt 1979). The apparent neutrality of law as an arbiter between interests cloaks the “hard power” of the capitalist state’s monopoly of violence. In practice, laws are written by one class to serve their goals of expropriation from, and domination over, another. The courts are no more open to all than the Ritz Hotel.

Weber (1978) took over Marx’s recognition of the role of law in legitimizing state power, although he argued that the control of the state and the nature of struggles between different groups of citizens were more complex phenomena than Marx had allowed. Law was not a simple servant of the interests of a capitalist class because such a single, homogeneous social grouping could not be identified as easily as Marx thought. Weber put more emphasis on the role of law in the spread of rationalization in modern societies. It was one of the impersonal metrics that both ordered social and economic relations and, ultimately, undermined their spontaneity and creativity. If the modern world was being experienced as an inhumane place, law was part of that inhumanity, while,

at the same time, being one of the conditions that made possible the advance of Enlightenment values and of material prosperity. This tradition remains important in, for instance, the work of Teubner (1993).

The straightforward model of Marx’s original writing proved unsustainable under the conditions of the twentieth century’s experiments with communism. Marx had seemed to suggest that the overthrow of the capitalist order would lead to the creation of a self organizing society in which law would be redundant. In practice, communist societies found it hard to dispense with law. The Soviet Russian theorist Pashukanis, writing in the 1920s and 1930s, noted the continuing use of contracts to define relationships between state owned or controlled enterprises, for example. He distinguished the repressive character of law under capitalism from the facilitative character of law under communism (Beirne & Sharlet 1980). Even the self styled “workers’ states” found it hard to dispense with a framework of law to regulate economic and social relationships or to supply legitimacy to coercive acts in defense of the revolutionary order.

The contemporary sociology of law focuses on a research agenda that can conveniently be summarized in the terms of one of its classic papers: naming, blaming, and claiming (Felstiner et al. 1980–1). Naming refers to the recognition by a social actor that a problem is potentially a legal problem, that is to say a grievance or a dispute to which the law may offer a useful response. This generates a set of questions about what kinds of problems people encounter in their daily lives, whether as family members, workers, consumers, tenants, borrowers, employers, landlords, lenders, or whatever. How do some of these come to be selected into the legal system? What happens to the others? These questions generate studies of legal consciousness, what the prospective users of law think that the law can offer them, and when it is appropriate to make use of it. Legal consciousness is in turn linked to studies of culture, of the images of law presented in different forms of mass media, and of the outreach activities of professional legal actors seeking to recruit problems for resolution by the system from which they derive their living. Blaming involves the identification of a second party who is

responsible for the problem and against whom the law's resources may be mobilized. The law is a means to compel the wrongdoer to make some redress for the wrong. In this sense, at least, it is an alternative to the peer pressures of a community or the unregulated use of private violence. The law may ultimately rest on coercion to deliver redress, but this response is the measured employment of the modern state's monopoly of legitimate force, sanctioned by a judicial decision. Claiming describes the processes of mobilization, considering the social and economic influences on access to the law, the relative role of formal and informal legal institutions, the role of the legal professions and regulatory agencies in managing claims or grievances, and the role of court processes in constructing outcomes.

In general, scholars draw attention to the "iceberg" of potential legal business: potential causes for litigation are endemic in everyday life, but are rarely named as such and mobilized as claims (Greenhouse et al. 1994). While there is a widespread contemporary belief in the recent growth of a "compensation culture," where both citizens and corporations, stimulated by entrepreneurial lawyers, are making increasing use of formal legal means to make claims and resolve disputes, there is no substantial empirical evidence to support this (Daniels & Martin 1995). Even in an area like medical malpractice, where claim rates have attracted much discussion, the best evidence suggests that only a relatively small proportion of physician errors lead to claims, most of which are settled without trial. Compensation tends to reflect the real losses sustained by plaintiffs, even in countries like the US where, at least in the first instance, juries decide awards (Vidmar 1995). The perception of a compensation culture is in part the product of a popular imagery of law, derived from novels, TV, and film, that massively overstates the role of trials in modern legal systems. Whether in relation to criminal or civil issues, most legal outcomes are negotiated.

A good deal of recent scholarship, then, concentrates on the factors that tend to divert cases from the legal system. Is the diversion of problems structured in ways that exclude certain social groups and favor others? Some of the barriers are cultural. Ewick and Silbey (1998),

for example, identify three ways in which ordinary people understand the law: one is based on an idea of the law as magisterial and remote, not for "people like us"; a second views the law as a game with rules that can be manipulated, and where some people are always advantaged; a third sees the law as an arbitrary power to be resisted in favor of local and traditional ways of dealing with problems. However, even business actors tend to avoid referring their disputes to the legal system wherever practicable (Macaulay 1963). Individual litigants and small businesses are indeed structurally disadvantaged by their limited resources and unfamiliarity with the nature of the game. Galanter's (1974) analysis of the imbalances between "one shotters" and repeat players has had a wide influence and continues to be sustained in current work (Kritzer & Silbey 2003). Research on court procedures has examined the extent to which legal language excludes or disadvantages certain social groups, although there is some disagreement about the degree to which these features either arise from the functional logic of a truth seeking process or are more or less self-conscious devices for protecting the interests of the powerful (Dingwall 2000). The legal profession itself has become increasingly organized in larger units focused on serving the repeat players, with a growing distinction between those firms and lawyers serving corporate and individual interests (Heinz & Lauman 1982; Galanter 1994; Heinz et al. 2005). This has not necessarily compromised the profession's ethical standards: large firms may have greater economic and cultural resources for resisting pressure to engage in deviant behavior (Carlin 1962; Shapiro 2002). However, it is argued that the law contributes increasingly to the social and economic integration of an elite, supplying predictability in their corporate relationships and providing for the settlement of their disputes, mainly by negotiation between their lawyers and only occasionally by the maverick process of trial.

Those who are not well served by this closure have been offered two other institutional developments: the rise of alternative dispute resolution (ADR) and of regulation as an alternative to litigation. ADR is an uneasy coalition of two very different interests. One dimension

is inherited from experimental social programs in the 1960s and 1970s intended to strengthen the capacity of poor neighborhoods to resolve their own disputes by supporting the mobilization of community resources. It is intended to overcome the perceptions of remoteness and arbitrariness attaching to the formal legal system. Problems will be solved by the intervention of a third party, who may either facilitate direct negotiation between disputants, seek to communicate between the parties to bring about a compromise, or, more rarely, to make a decision that will bind the parties. It should be noted that none of these are exclusive to the settlement of the grievances of the poor: the powerful also prefer to avoid courts and have long used similar means to resolve disputes among themselves. However, this community oriented concept has been increasingly transformed by the sponsorship of governmental actors seeking to reduce public expenditure on the legal system by diverting low value cases from the courts, which have relatively high fixed costs. ADR reduces the resources offered by the state to poor people while telling them that it is morally better for them to solve their own disputes among themselves (Nader 2002).

The twentieth century saw the wholesale growth of regulation as an alternative to relying on victims to mobilize the law in search of redress. Regulation is based on the proactive screening of various areas of social and economic activity by a formal bureaucracy empowered to administer legal penalties or to refer cases to the courts for sanction. It has been particularly evident in areas where harms are diffuse (environment, obscenity), where there are great economic inequalities between parties (health and safety, discrimination), or where there are great informational inequalities (consumer protection, finance and investment, professional licensing). However, the results have been mixed. Sociologists have pointed to the way in which regulatory agencies tend to become "captured" by those who they seek to regulate, forming alliances inimical to the public interest that they are supposed to represent. As with so much of the law, compliance is negotiated rather than imposed. In part, this often reflects state ambivalence about their use of enforcement powers and willingness to resource

agencies accordingly. The revival of neoliberal social theories has produced calls to roll back the regulatory state in favor of action by robust individuals. As with ADR, private enforcement by individual litigants is held to be morally preferable to collective action on their behalf by a "nanny state."

The resurgence of the sociology of law is in part attributable to the resurgence in the role of law in society. The discipline's founders observed a world of "small states," with limited spheres of action, and sought to develop replacements for the ineffectiveness of traditional legal forms as a basis for the new forms of social and economic organization that were emerging. A modern world required a modern form of law, forming part of a much wider system of governmentality. The perceived crisis of that system has allowed its critics to roll back many of its state based elements, returning individual acts of legal mobilization to a position that they have not occupied for some generations.

SEE ALSO: Criminology; Durkheim, Émile; Law, Civil; Law, Criminal; Law, Economy and; Legal Profession; Marx, Karl; Social Control; Tönnies, Ferdinand; Weber, Max

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Lazarsfeld, Paul (1901–76)

Brian Starks

Paul Lazarsfeld, founder of the Bureau for Applied Social Research at Columbia University, was a pioneering empirical sociologist. Trained as a mathematician and initially self-identifying as a psychologist, he only later came to recognize himself as a sociologist.

Lazarsfeld was born to a Jewish family in Vienna and first came to the US as a Rockefeller Fellow in 1933. As an active socialist at the time, Lazarsfeld chose to remain in the US after his fellowship ended in 1935 rather than return home to persecution (a ban against social democrats had just been enacted in Austria, and Hitler had begun his rise to power in Germany). This experience of being a heavily accented foreigner and a Jew transplanted into the US left an enduring impact on Lazarsfeld's self image. Throughout most of his life he saw himself as a marginalized individual despite his vast accomplishments and recognition among peers, which included being chosen as president of the American Association for Public Opinion Research (1949–50) and the American Sociological Association (1961–2).

While many of Lazarsfeld's concepts remain foundational in the field of mass communication, he may be best remembered for his sociological approach to voting (focusing on social location) and his theory of the two step flow of communication, which highlights the importance of "opinion leaders" and personal influence in the process of decision making, especially voting. Lazarsfeld's work is recognized as exceptional not just for the wealth of concepts he left behind but also for its methodological innovation. From his early work on unemployment (in the Marienthal project), to later work on mass communication and voting and finally in his research on higher education, Lazarsfeld developed ingenious ways of measuring and analyzing concepts. Cornerstones of modern social science such as survey analysis, focus groups, and panel studies, while not invented by him, were pioneered by him through his creative

application of them to practical, empirical puzzles. Additionally, his development of “latent structure analysis” and use of contingency tables helped to build a secure foundation for the use of contingency tables and loglinear models in later research (e.g., in studies of class mobility).

Lazarsfeld was also dedicated to collaboration and institution building. He founded several research institutes over the course of his career. The first was the Research Center for Business Psychology in Vienna, but his most famous was the Bureau for Applied Social Research at Columbia. Finally, in a partnership with Robert Merton that lasted more than three decades, Lazarsfeld advised hundreds of graduate students at “the Bureau” and helped to shape a generation of empirically oriented sociologists.

SEE ALSO: American Sociological Association; Mathematical Sociology; Merton, Robert K.; Survey Research

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leadership

Tyrone S. Pitts

There are several definitions of leadership available; however, it can be broadly defined as the process of inspiring, directing, coordinating, motivating, and mentoring individuals, groups of individuals, organizations, societies, and/or nations. While the origins of leadership can be

traced back to ancient times in Africa, Asia, and Europe, it is only relatively recently that systematic attempts have been made to understand, operationalize, and conceptualize leadership. In sociology, Weber (1947) conceptualized leadership as legitimated by virtue of subordinates’ understanding of bureaucratic authority, rules, and legitimacy. Weber identified three general typologies of leadership in bureaucracy: charismatic, traditional, and legal. Charismatic leaders were attributed powerful qualities by those who follow them; traditional leaders were powerful by virtue of hereditary wealth or peerage; legal leadership draws its power from professional knowledge and technical expertise, and formal authority was legitimized through roles or position in the bureaucratic hierarchy. As such, formal authority is legitimated by subordinates’ understanding and respecting rules and authority (Clegg et al. 2005). In contrast to Weber’s approach, more recent sociological approaches to leadership have been more concerned with notions of power rather than leadership per se. As such, the study of leadership is less about the individual and more about how power structures allow domination and control over others.

At a broader level, and in contrast to sociology, the origin of leadership research and theory is embedded in psychological trait theories of personality. Trait based approaches to leadership distinguish leaders from non leaders by attempting to identify specific biological and genetic personality traits, such as honesty, integrity, intelligence, strength of character, and confidence. Research results, however, have been quite mixed, and so critics sought to develop newer ways of understanding leadership. The issue for the trait approach was that leaders proved no more likely to possess special traits than did “non leaders.” As a result the behavioral school gained strength, especially in the US, because it argued that what distinguished leaders from non leaders was not so much their traits but rather their observable behaviors. A leader, therefore, is what he or she does. Such notions of leadership dominated until the 1970s, when arguments emerged stating that effective leadership was contingent upon certain situational factors. If leadership was about how one acts, then one would have to act the same way all the time. Situational

leadership theory moved away from individual difference psychology back to the social psychological and sociological notions of leadership. For some, there was a return to Weber's idea that leadership is a function of the willingness of subordinates to be led. For others, there was an attempt to define leadership as a function of a number of situational contingencies. Newer versions of contingency theories see leaders' ability to influence performance as a function of their cognitive capacity to deal with situational stressors and organizational environment (Fiedler 1995).

Over the last two decades the study of charismatic, transformational, and transactional leadership has dominated the leadership landscape and, to a certain extent, reflects Weber's three typologies of leadership. The charismatic leader, as the name suggests, exhibits character that followers are attracted to, and has the ability to inspire and build dreams and sell vision. The transactional leader attends to all the necessary functional aspects of management, such as coordination, control, and budgeting. The emphasis on the transformational leader emerged out of the sociological work of Burns (1978) on political leaders. The transformational leader sets examples through inspirational performance, inspired change and innovation, and deals in abstract concepts, such as vision and mission (Bass 1985; Avolio & Bass 1988). While there is a certain degree of overlap between transformational and charismatic leadership, charismatic leaders tend not to transform followers into future leaders. Adolf Hitler, for example, was a charismatic leader in that he inspired followership, but he also protected his rule and authority over all others. A transformational leader would also mentor his or her followers so that they might become future leaders.

Most recently a number of newer – or recycled older – approaches to leadership have emerged, most notably from a positive psychological perspective, but also from postmodernist conceptions. Positive psychology has its roots in William James and the humanist approaches of Gordon Allport, Carl Rogers, and Abraham Maslow. Interest in positive psychology has been reinvigorated more recently by Seligman (1999) and has recently entered organizational behavior and organization theory – not without its critics. The positive psychology of leadership

draws upon Bass and Avolio's notions of transformational leadership, with some additions. Current work on positive leadership has a sociological dimension: it concentrates on a person's ability to create social as well as psychological capital (Luthans & Youssef 2004). Other approaches to leadership present leadership less as pious behavior and more as a problematic endeavor typified by tension, challenges, and mistakes. What characterizes a "good" leader, then, is the ability and commitment to build strong communities through principles of economic, social, and environmental sustainability (Dunphy & Pitsis 2005).

Another interesting area of leadership theory and research with sociological underpinnings is that of leadership substitutes and dispersed leadership theories. Leadership substitutes are those things that replace or make a leader obsolete. For example, the empowerment of teams and the use of self managing work teams are believed to make the requirement for individual leaders obsolete. Dispersed leadership, however, returns to the analysis of leadership as power and addresses how leadership power is transferred to structure, rules, procedures, and technologies. Such notions may draw upon Foucault's (1979) analysis of Jeremy Bentham's Panopticon as a form of managerial surveillance and control. That is, while the leader may not be physically there, she or he is always watching you – say via time cards, surveillance cameras, email, etc. More interestingly, some go as far as to argue that even leadership substitutes such as empowerment are advanced and ingeniously designed forms of power. Sewell (1988), for example, argues that the use of teams produces stronger forms of control and surveillance than could any individual leader. What better way to control people than to have them monitored by their peers?

In a postmodern sense leaders do not exist to lead but to be servants – they are servants to the frontline people who are servants to customers. In other words, consumers and consumerism are king and we are all servants to consumption. In essence postmodern leaders provide running commentary on how the organization is doing, and how people fit within it; they construct the stories and rituals around life in organizations, where the organization will go and can go, and how one can become a better servant of the

consumer (Boje & Dennehey 1999; Greenleaf 2002). Of course, leadership might also be a social construction of our collective imagination. In this sense what makes a leader a leader is how observers construct their understanding around a person's specific behavior who is labeled a leader, and so the role and performance of leadership is overstated (Meindl 1995; Parry & Meindl 2002).

SEE ALSO: Political Leadership; Power, Theories of; Social Movements, Leadership in; Weber, Max

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learned helplessness

Bridget Conlon and Christabel L. Rogalin

Learned helplessness is the group of motivational, cognitive, and emotional deficits that can result from repeated exposure to events if they are perceived to be uncontrollable. The phenomenon was discovered serendipitously in the laboratory of Richard Solomon by his students including Seligman, Maier, Leaf, and Overmier (Overmier & Seligman 1967; Seligman & Maier 1967). During experiments in which dogs in Pavlovian hammocks (harnesses used to restrict movement) were exposed to a tone (conditioned stimulus) paired with an electric shock (unconditioned stimulus), researchers realized that the dogs were unable to learn to escape shocks in a later controllable situation.

In order to examine the hypothesis that deficits were due to exposure to non contingent (uncontrollable by the dogs) events, researchers designed "triadic design" experiments where animals were first exposed to one of three training phases: (1) no training; (2) training with outcomes that were not controllable by the animals; and (3) training with controllable outcomes. In the control condition, dogs were not exposed to any shock. In the second condition, experimenters shocked the dogs for 5 seconds 64 times. The dogs were able to cut the shocks short by pressing panels on either side of their heads. Dogs in the third condition were "yoked" to dogs in the second condition. Yoked means that the dogs were shocked simultaneously for identical lengths, yet the dogs in the second condition controlled the shocks while the dogs in the third condition were not able to control the frequency or length of shocks.

During the second (test) phase of the experiments, animals performed a task related to the task in the training phase and their performance was measured. The goal was to test whether performance during the test phase was affected by the condition in the training phase. Researchers found that the animals that were exposed to controllable shocks during the training phase were able to learn to escape shocks during the test phase. Animals exposed to uncontrollable shocks in the training phase were unable to learn to escape shocks during the test phase. In essence, the animals learned that they were unable to control outcomes and generalized that knowledge to a similar situation when they actually had control of outcomes. The *expectation* of uncontrollability is a key to learned helplessness.

LEARNED HELPLESSNESS IN HUMANS

Martin Seligman is considered a major contributor in extending the original observations to studies of learned helplessness in humans. Seligman suggested that the symptoms dogs exhibited were similar to symptoms of depression in humans. He proposed a learned helplessness model of human depression. Depressed people often exhibit similar motivational difficulties, believing that their behaviors are futile. They also often show cognitive deficiencies such as the inability to learn when their responses can affect outcomes. Finally, depressed people experience frequent sadness and anhedonia that may appear similar to the helpless whimpering of dogs exposed to non contingent shocks. Anhedonia refers to the inability to experience pleasure from things that one would normally find pleasurable. The translation of the concept from animals to humans required some reworking of the original theory. Specifically, researchers studying humans found that when exposed to uncontrollable stimuli, such as inescapable noise or unsolvable puzzles, some individuals showed signs of learned helplessness while others exhibited increased activity that facilitated their performances.

The reworking of the learned helplessness model to fit humans included increased emphasis on attributions. Abramson et al. (1978) suggested that individual people have a stable

(trait like) explanatory style when they encounter unpleasant events. Explanatory style has three dimensions: internal–external, stable–unstable, and global–specific. In practice, these dimensions are measured using Likert scales from one to seven. The internal–external dimension refers to the extent to which an individual feels a specific event is caused entirely by one’s self versus entirely by others. The stable–unstable dimension refers to the extent to which an individual believes that the cause of an event will never again be present versus always being present. The global–specific dimension refers to the extent to which an individual believes an event is caused by something that only influences the particular situation versus influencing all situations in one’s life. The distinction between stability and globality is a fine one. Stability refers to causes repeating over time, while globality refers to causes that repeat across different types of situations. Many theorists argue that explanatory (or attribution) style is a trait like characteristic that develops during childhood. The reformulated theory posits that when faced with negative events, people who tend to attribute the events to external, unstable, specific causes (referred to as pessimistic explanatory style) are less likely to experience depression than people who attribute the events to internal, stable, and global causes (referred to as optimistic explanatory style). Thus, in the reformulated theory, learned helplessness only occurs when an event is perceived to be beyond an individual’s control and that individual has a more pessimistic rather than optimistic explanatory style.

MEASURING ATTRIBUTIONS

Because of the increased emphasis on attributions in the reformulated model of learned helplessness, researchers developed two standard procedures for measuring attributions: Attributional Style Questionnaire (ASQ; Peterson et al. 1982) and the Content Analysis of Verbatim Explanations (CAVE; Peterson et al. 1983). For the ASQ, respondents imagine that an event has happened to them. They are asked to give a cause for the event and then give ratings of internality, stability, and globality for each cause for each event. A more recent (and slightly

more reliable) version of ASQ includes only negative events rather than both positive and negative (Peterson & Villanova 1988). There is also a children's version of the questionnaire (CASQ; Seligman et al. 1984).

Whereas the researcher gives respondents hypothetical situations to explain in the ASQ, researchers using the CAVE approach read documents such as autobiographies, interviews, or therapy transcripts to measure how respondents explain events in their lives. Events and attributions are extracted and scored by independent judges on the dimensions of internality, stability, and globality.

OTHER APPLICATIONS OF LEARNED HELPLESSNESS

Researchers have found that learned helplessness affects organisms' immune system function. In addition, learned helplessness has been used as an explanation for why some but not all people who experience traumatic events develop post traumatic stress disorder (PTSD). After exposure to a traumatic event, the attribution an individual makes about the internality, stability, and globality of the cause of the event affects whether he or she develops PTSD.

Learned helplessness can also be applied in an educational setting. Students could perceive repeated failures to indicate that they lack control over their academic success and cause them to develop signs of learned helplessness. Sedek and Kofta (1990) focus on a specific aspect of learned helplessness. Specifically, they argue that cognitive exhaustion is the reason previous exposure to uncontrollable events results in reduced performance. They argue that poorer performance is not due to helpless feelings or believing one cannot control the situation. Rather, the uncontrollable event decreases the individual's ability to process information and develop conclusions. Note that these researchers, along with many others, suggest different mechanisms through which learned helplessness occurs than the original theory suggested.

A somewhat controversial application of learned helplessness is the battered woman syndrome. Walker (1984) suggested that repeated exposure to domestic violence causes women to develop learned helplessness so that they

are unable to protect themselves or escape the relationship. Research evaluating this hypothesis has found at best mixed results. Many researchers see attributional style as a trait like characteristic that is probably developed during childhood. A recent article suggests that pessimistic attribution style contributed to whether battered women developed symptoms of depression or PTSD. Yet the researchers found that battered women were no more likely to exhibit learned helplessness than women in a comparison group from the community. This suggests that experiencing domestic violence does not lead to learned helplessness, but that if a person tends to have a pessimistic attribution style, he or she is more likely to experience depression or PTSD due to the experience than if he or she had an optimistic attribution style (Palker Corell & Marcus 2004).

CURRENT AND FUTURE DIRECTIONS IN LEARNED HELPLESSNESS RESEARCH

As mentioned above, researchers in this area often argue that explanatory style is a characteristic that develops during childhood. Few investigators have explored the conditions in which children develop this trait. Some argue that experiencing trauma at a young age leads to development of learned helplessness. Others believe that exposure to crowded or inadequate living conditions causes children to develop feelings of helplessness. Recent research also suggests that interpersonal relationships, particularly parent-child relationships, can affect the type of explanatory style individuals develop. Specifically, children can learn explanatory styles watching how their parents explain events in their own lives and their children's lives.

Maier's research has continued to focus on learned helplessness. His research evaluates the physiological and neurological aspects of learned helplessness. In particular, he explores the relationship between the brain and the immune system to understand cognitive difficulties, stress, and pain perception.

Seligman has turned his attention to positive psychology and learned optimism. He currently directs the Positive Psychology Center at the University of Pennsylvania. Positive psychology

suggests that people have varying levels of 24 strengths such as leadership, humor, industriousness, and love of learning that they categorize into six cross culturally valued virtues: wisdom and knowledge, courage, humanity, justice, temperance, and transcendence. Further happiness can be cultivated by focusing on one's strengths rather than one's weaknesses and frequently using one's strengths in day to day life.

SEE ALSO: Attribution Theory; Behaviorism; Experimental Methods; Self Fulfilling Expectations

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leaving home in the transition to adulthood

Frances Goldscheider and Berna Torr

Full adulthood normally involves attaining the stable adult roles of worker, partner, and parent. Childhood, in contrast, is normally associated with net dependency on one's own parents. The transition to adulthood, then, comprises two steps: (1) ending childhood dependency and (2) making progress on the central responsible roles of adulthood. In the study of the transition to adulthood, these processes are bound together in complex ways.

Given this complexity, it is not surprising that the transition to adulthood, which might be viewed as a near uniform, biological progress to physical maturity, actually varies greatly across societies and over time. Dramatic changes in both work and family have increased this complexity. The time needed to attain stable adult work roles has lengthened. This reflects both the increased need for higher education and greater job turnover in early adulthood. Related in part to these changes in work roles, the establishment of stable family roles has also been delayed throughout the industrialized world, postponing full adulthood for most young adults. This has created an ambiguous life course stage between the ages of 18 and 25 marked by "semi adulthood," when living arrangements such as (1) living in the parental home, (2) residing alone or with roommates (non family living), or (3) entering into uncommitted partnerships (cohabitation) are common and become alternatives to the more traditional route of forming one's own family through marriage. Frank Furstenberg and colleagues (2004) have argued that we have a new stage in life in the US and many other developed economies, a

stage of “early adulthood” that is no longer adolescence but is also not full adulthood either.

TIES TO THE PARENTAL HOME

Parents are the major source of the many transfers of resources needed by the next generation. In most industrialized countries, the generation of later middle aged adults is wealthier than any in history, and has relatively small families, so parents can afford to provide reasonable space for their children and financial support for an extended number of years. Parents use their income to retard very early departures (e.g., before high school is completed), which are linked with the most negative outcomes, but use their income to facilitate leaving home at older ages.

As a result of the rural–urban transformation that unfolded over the twentieth century, parents are now more likely to be living in areas where there are more economic opportunities for young adults and where young adults often do not have to leave home to attend school or find jobs. However, families once provided their children with jobs. Inheritance of the family farm or business was an important factor structuring many young people’s economic opportunities and their relationships with their parents. Nepotism has not totally vanished from modern economies; many parents can “pick up the phone” and procure opportunities for their children in the businesses of friends and associates. Nevertheless, most parents who want to help their children must now find other ways to do so. Financing their children’s college education, which often delays complete financial and residential independence of those children, is one way parents achieve this end.

An important resource is money. Not all parents are willing to provide monetary support to their children once they enter adulthood and financial help appears to be contingent on what young adults are doing. A 1980 study of mothers found that although most (88 percent) expect to provide at least some help with the expenses of college for their unmarried children, many fewer would help with college costs if the child were married, and fewer still would help out a child struggling with job or relationship difficulties. Further, there appeared to be

substantial variation among mothers in their support priorities. Some would be more likely to help a married child while others would be more likely to help an unmarried one. Some would be more likely to provide support to a child living away from home while others would only help a child living at home.

LEAVING AND RETURNING TO THE PARENTAL HOME

Leaving the parental home, and particularly the routes young people take out of the home, play key roles in the transition to adulthood. In most industrialized countries, the cohort of the *parents* of today’s young adults not only is relatively wealthy, but also left home younger than any cohort before or since. They appear to expect their children to follow in their footsteps, despite the much later ages at marriage and the more fragile economic situation confronting their children than they faced growing up. Parents often express dismay at the recent increase in the proportions of young adults remaining in or returning to the parental home, an increase that has accompanied the later age at marriage and greater instability in the job market. A frequently invoked norm of adulthood requires residential independence from an early age, in most cases long before marriage. This rhetoric suggests that young adults are refusing to grow up and may not deserve their parents’ financial and residential support. However, pressures on young adults to leave home early can be problematic, given the negative effects of early, non college nest leaving on educational attainment.

The increase in marital disruption among parents also affects family support for the young adults and the timing of residential independence. Young people leave home faster from disrupted families than from two biological parent families. The differences are particularly large when leaving home to attend college is separated from other routes, as young adults from non traditional families are significantly less likely than young adults from stable, two parent families to leave home for college. In addition, young adults of divorced parents are more likely to report leaving home because of friction. Young adults from non traditional

families are also much less likely to return home, suggesting that the home and its resources are less available to them.

There are also longstanding gender and race/ethnic differentials in nest leaving by young adults. Girls tend to leave home earlier than boys, in part because they are likely to marry or otherwise form families earlier. Non Hispanic whites also tend to leave home earlier than African Americans, Asians, or Hispanics. Hispanics and Asians are more likely than non Hispanic whites to leave home for marriage, while blacks are more likely to leave home single because of later ages at marriage. There was a crossover, however, in age at leaving home for blacks and whites in 1960. Prior to 1960, blacks left home earlier than whites, while in the post 1960 period blacks left home later, reflecting the differential impact many trends affecting leaving the parental home have on population subgroups.

The transition out of the parental home is not always a permanent one. Another form of support that parents provide is a home to return to. Those who leave home for marriage are less likely to return home than those who leave home for other reasons. Thus, the likelihood of returning home has increased as young adults have become more likely to leave home for reasons other than marriage. However, the older young adults are when they leave, the less likely they are to return. The availability of jobs and the cost of housing are also important: stable employment both facilitates residential independence and lowers the risk of returning home. Finally, state policies also affect when young adults leave the parental home and whether they return. When the state facilitates human capital growth, such as through access to affordable higher education, parental resources become less important; when it does not, the parental home and parental resources increase in importance for young adults' educational attainment and progress in taking on adult work and family roles.

NON FAMILY LIVING

Non family living is an increasingly important pathway out of the parental home. Although unmarried adolescents have often lived away

from their parents, they normally lived with other families, in family based lodgings, or in colleges considered to be *in loco parentis*. Extensive non family living in separate households, however, is quite recent (mid twentieth century), beginning among the elderly with the expansion of state support for pensioners. It spread to young adults as delayed marriage and parenthood, divorce, and cohabitation became more common. In the transition to adulthood, non family living provides a "quasi adult" alternative to committed family roles, in that living independently reduces the power of parental authority and increases individual autonomy for young people (and their parents). An increasingly common non family living arrangement, cohabitation, shares with the other living arrangements (and jobs) in early adulthood the flexibility/impermanence that so often marks this life course segment. The majority of cohabitations are fairly short lived. On the economic side, there is evidence that cohabitation may serve as an adaptive strategy for young couples facing uncertainty about their careers.

A HISTORICAL EXAMPLE FOR THE UNITED STATES

A full analysis of trends in young adults' living arrangements did not emerge until the 1990s. This reflected a lack of both data and interest in the subject in the early years of the development of family demography, but it also reflected the difficulty of conceptualizing it. When Paul Glick and his colleagues (1965) defined the family life cycle and outlined how its contours had been changing in the United States, they were forced by lack of data to assume that young people leave home when they marry. During the period in which Glick wrote – the baby boom – this was a more nearly tenable assumption than either before or after, since marriage ages then were so young that few young adults had the time to leave home in other ways.

Trends in young adult living arrangements in the United States are illustrated with an examination of the period from 1900 to 2000. The solid line in Figure 1 shows the proportions of all 18 to 24 year olds who were living with their parents; that is, those who were




Figure 1 Percent living with parents and percent living with parents among those not “married household heads” (aged 18–24).

Source: Computed by the authors from the Integrated Public Use Sample (Ruggles & Sobek, University of Minnesota, 2003).

reported in the census as “child of head.” In 1940, just over half of young adults were living at home at this age, a level that had changed only slightly in the previous 40 years, increasing from 49 percent to 55 percent. This slight increase likely reflected a combination of three factors. First, declining adult mortality increased the availability of parents for young adults to live with. Second, the ongoing rural–urban transformation meant that an increasing proportion of young adults were living in cities and therefore able to live at home while working. And third, the Great Depression of the 1930s delayed young adults’ achievement of stable jobs and family formation, and kept home many of those who were employed in order to help their impoverished parents.

Between 1940 and 1960 there was a substantial decline in the proportion of all 18 to

24 year olds living with their parents, decreasing more than 20 percentage points to 34 percent. Much of this decline was the result of the rapid decline in age at marriage, with the growth in early marriage that accompanied the post World War II baby boom in the United States. However, some of this decline in the proportion of young adults living in the parental home during this 20 year period resulted from the increase in non family living.

This increase in non family living is illustrated by the dotted line in Figure 1, which shows a substantial decrease in the proportion of *unmarried* young adults living with their parents. This measure removes all married young adults from the ratio, and represents the proportion of *unmarried* young adults who are living in the parental home (and thus not living in a non family situation). The proportion of

unmarried young adults living in the parental home increased during the 1900 to 1940 period to near universal (80.5 percent), and then declined to slightly over 60 percent by 1960. Hence, the decline between 1940 and 1960 in the proportion of all young adults aged 18–24 living with parents reflected two trends: the decrease in age at marriage and the decline in living with parents among unmarried young adults.

Things became much more complicated, however, in the post 1960 period. The marriage boom ended abruptly, with the result that the share of young adults aged 18–24 living in new families they had formed through marriage dropped precipitously, and continued to decline through 2000. This decline in new families formed by marriage resulted in a greater proportion of all young adults remaining in (or returning to) their parental home. The child of head category increased from 34 percent in 1960 to nearly 45 percent in 1990. However, despite the continued increase in age at marriage between 1990 and 2000, during that decade the proportions of all young adults aged 18–24 living with parents declined.

Does this 1990–2000 dip indicate a reversal in nest leaving patterns? Not really, because as the dotted line in Figure 1 shows, the proportions of the unmarried living with parents declined throughout the 1940 to 2000 period. By 2000, about half (51 percent) of young unmarried adults aged 18–24 lived with their parents. Thus, while fluctuations in age at marriage affect the process of leaving the parental home, the influence of marriage age on leaving home has decreased. Those who left home in the latter part of the twentieth century were much less likely to do so via marriage.

This illustration demonstrates that even at the level of the living arrangements of the unmarried, the transitions in young adulthood are complex. Adding in trends in educational transitions (including dropping out and stepping out and returning to school), in early job transitions, and, of course, in union formation and dissolution, would require extensive research, little of which has been done in an integrated manner. For exceptions, see Billari et al. (2001) and Corijn and Klijzing (2001) for Europe, and Brien et al. (1999) for the United States. Most other studies rarely link leaving home

consistently with partnership formation, or with transitions in work and study. As a result, the light they cast on “semi adulthood” is partial, at best. To understand transitions in young adulthood, research is needed that relates changes in young adult living arrangements to changes in patterns of work and school attendance as well as to changes in marriage and cohabitation.

SEE ALSO: Family Demography; Family Structure and Child Outcomes; Intergenerational Relationships and Exchanges; Life Course and Family; Life Course Perspective; Occupational Mobility; Second Demographic Transition; Urban–Rural Population Movements

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Lechner, Norbert (1939–2004)

Miriam Alfie Cohen

Born in Germany in 1939, Norbert Lechner was granted honorary citizenship by the Senate of the Republic of Chile in 2003. He earned a bachelor's degree in law and obtained a doctorate in political science from the University of Freiberg in 1969. He visited Chile as a doctoral student and came to live there. From 1974 he was a professor and researcher in the Latin American Faculty of Social Sciences in Chile (FLACSO). He was its director from 1988 to 1994.

One of the central concerns throughout Norbert Lechner's theoretical analytical work was the creation of a theory of the state in Latin America. Texts such as *La crisis del Estado en América Latina* (1977), *La conflictiva y nunca acabada construcción del orden deseado* (1986), *State and Politics in Latin America* (1981), and *Los patios interiores de la democracia* (1990) speak of the urgent need in Latin American countries

for political reflection as a guide to theoretical analysis, as well as a project to be constructed. Lechner takes on the analysis of the state as an object of research in order to account for the problems posed by social reality.

From this perspective, the existing order is analyzed in order to carry out a critique, a negation of the prevailing situation with the goal of unraveling the logic of the system, transcending it, and creating a theoretical and practical reflection upon social change and the construction of the new order. Thus, politics, order, and utopia are the linked categories that become the core of the exposition in the author's works.

His first writings show a concern for the Chilean social reality of the so called "legal road to socialism" that brought Salvador Allende to power. This peculiar political situation led Norbert Lechner to question the limited experience of Popular Unity in the study of the state. Although Allende and his team established an economic program for the period of transition to socialism, the lack of a political theory to explain the change was evident. From Lechner's point of view, in Popular Unity's lack of a concrete analysis of politics a determination of the economic order was provoked which considered the state realm to be a mere corollary of the economic realm, the state appearing as an entity at the disposal of one class or another.

With the military coup and the rise of Augusto Pinochet's regime (1977), Lechner came to study the state intensely, emphasizing that the state is neither on the margin of the social process nor an actor above the social process. Chilean authoritarianism pushed Lechner to find common traits in the Latin American region. Guided by Marxist thinking, particularly the currents represented by Antonio Gramsci, Rosa Luxemburg, Ernest Bloch, and the Frankfurt School, he sought out the leitmotif of the Latin American political situation. From his point of view, the distinction between state and state apparatus is fundamental. The central question for Lechner is the nature of the state, the state as a form. The idea is to discover the specific nature of the bourgeois state, in a way analogous to the type of commodities that appear as goods through the lens of Marxist theory. Thus, the state would seem to be the type of generality that atomized social relations assume in the process of production.

The state is necessary because it organizes and guarantees relationships of domination and inequality. Economic coercion (exploitation of the added value) breaks down into objectified political coercion in the state apparatus. The state is an autonomous power that intervenes in the economic sphere and fails to appear as a co-constitutive moment in capitalist production relations. Here it is worth highlighting the Gramscian vision of politics as an autonomous entity that is not determined by the economic realm.

However, for Lechner the serious problem in Latin America is understanding how the state is converted into a social relationship that becomes independent of its producers, becomes distanced from the social praxis that created it, and appears as a real abstraction endowed with a life unto itself. Unraveling the nature of the state in Latin America became a fundamental concern of the author's political analysis. His analytical objective is divided in two facets: first, to carry out a theoretical conceptual reflection regarding the capitalist state *per se* based on critique of political economy; secondly, to carry out a historical concrete study regarding the development of a particular state (Chile, Peru, Mexico, amongst others). The common thread is authoritarianism in different Latin American societies.

Lechner returns to the theoretical assumptions of dependency theory, led by the writings of Fernando Henrique Cardoso and Enzo Faletto (1969), and emphasizes how capitalist dependency is the result of structural heterogeneity, the juxtaposition or overlapping of different relations of production that give rise to the fragmentation of society. In the majority of Latin American countries, the nation does not exist as a mechanism of collective identity, forcing a certain level of social cohesion to be built through authoritarian means. To Lechner, the nonexistence of the "national state" in Latin America is substituted by the state apparatus. Thus, domination becomes more visible when there is little collective identity and the active presence of physical coercion substitutes the lack of social internalization of power in a "consensus of order."

Living under authoritarian conditions tends to lead to overvaluation of the coercive momentum; the state becomes a synonym for physical

coercion. Through various subtle forms of social control it expands and intensifies a new rationality, a new culture, and that "one dimensional man" (Herbert Marcuse) that incarnates in actual authoritarianism begins to appear.

The authoritarian state is a new Leviathan, a representation of the rationalization of domination: reason that becomes domination. The Latin American state is established as a relationship of internal domination and external hegemony. Therefore there is no capitalization of Latin American society to generate the material basis for a general interest. Because of this, it is difficult to construct a "popular national will." Thus there is a hegemonic crisis, as no social group is able to consider, based on its own individual interests, the whole of society. The task is then the construction of a real and effective solidarity around common interests. Politics is conflict regarding people's sense of order.

For Lechner the construction of utopia is proposed as the abolition of domination with in human order, an essential possibility for reality, the good order. Utopia is linked to an anti authoritarian interest, whose motto consists of never falling for any type of servitude. Lechner emphasizes the struggle for democracy as the battle for popular sovereignty, a struggle against all forms of domination. The anti authoritarian interest refers to an order of freedom. Freedom is not an idea without a cause, it is the content of a kingdom to be built and its construction anticipates the new society.

Politics is a struggle for the determination of the sense of order and the order that should be, while utopia is a moment of politics. Rationality leads to a good order; it is the critique of the capitalist order in light of an alternative order. Thus, the possibility of a rational order makes the present order irrational. Utopia, then, will be the cleverness of reason that allows society to reflect upon itself.

A third moment in Lechner's work is marked by the fall of the dictatorship and the transition to democracy. The majority of the ideas promoted during this period had transcendence for the rest of Latin America as, along with authors such as O'Donnell and Schmitter, a period of theoretical political reflection regarding societies in transition begins.

If the concern for order was briefly seen in Lechner's early writings, these gain relevance

for him as a central analysis of politics and the transition to democracy. The order tends to be sought out and imposed by either the state or the market. From Lechner's point of view, the debate regarding state and market tends to be polemical because it puts at stake the idea that we are created by the social order. In order to avoid the fetishization of one or another element, the convenience of situating the relationship within their respective historical contexts is proposed.

According to Lechner, the market is a special category; the operation of the market is found to be determined by its insertion into political institutions, social structures, and cultural processes. It is worth mentioning that the market by itself neither generates nor sustains a social order; on the contrary, it presupposes a "politics of order." This implies two integration processes – integration into the global system and social integration – that require the market dynamic as well as, above all, a redefinition of the state. In Latin America, a dual transition process takes place: transition toward democracy and the transition toward a market economy. Thus, the classic question emerges regarding the relationship between democracy and economic development.

Lechner establishes that modern society, along with deploying the differentiation between economics and politics, always proposed (in an affirmative or critical manner) a certain harmony between both spheres. When the countries of Latin America proposed harmonizing political democracy with economic growth and social equality, a novel challenge was posed. On one hand, economic development and, concretely, the market could not be considered a "prerequisite" for democracy. On the other hand, democratic politics did not guarantee economic development either. Thus, the profound question for all of Latin America continues to be how to make democracy and development compatible.

From this perspective, it becomes clear that the determination of the social order is definitively at stake. For Lechner, the debate regarding state and market has traditionally been a point of polarization in Latin America. Ideological discussion led to choosing a priori one or another principle as the exclusive and excluding rationality of social organization. In order to

avoid the fetishization of the state or the market under a form of higher rationality, it became convenient to carry out a historical analysis that allows one to visualize not only the continued existence of the two logics, but also the changing combination of the two. The priority given to one or the other would mark policy.

For Lechner, the field of politics opens a field of conflict, of power and the opportunity to establish a new conception that develops into a critique of the established conceptual models. This critical theory of politics cannot be reduced into any particular political strategy. They are distinct levels, where strategy is the result of deliberation and collective decision, while theory contributes the arguments for convincing others, without supplanting collective creation. There is a perception, in this stage of Lechner's work, of a distancing from Marxist thinking and from a particular conception of the so called "desired order."

It could be said that as Lechner's interest moves from the study of the state to the analysis of politics, he arrives at the conclusion that social interest does not have to overcome social differences, but rather develops them. To him, it is not about proposing unity regarding the resolution of the plurality of man, but rather examining that plurality as the construction of a collective order. It is a conflictive and never ending order in which the content varies from one period to another.

Because of this, one cannot think about politics and order without referring to utopia, construction projects that allude to the transformation of the world. Utopia thus functions as a horizon concept that allows us to conceive of society projected into plenitude. It is an ideal through which to understand historical projects. Just by considering what is desirable, the possible is constructed. Utopia forms a part of the social imaginary that all societies externalize as a horizon for judgments. From there, it is necessary to preserve and develop the utopias of good order, because only as related to this image of the perfect, but impossible, society are we able to discover the possible society.

Lechner rejects social revolutions as mechanisms for the construction of a social order and establishes the possibility of consensus as being necessary to the new forms of political processes. Negotiated ruptures are social reforms

based on agreements that give rise to political self determination. The greatest challenge in Latin American transitions is the construction of an order that can combine the possibility to establish consensus regarding central themes that lead to democracy. From this perspective there are no longer predetermined subjects, nor armed revolutions. Qualitative changes are proclaimed based on political ruptures and conception between what is possible and what is desirable. Facing war and consensus as two limiting ideas, negotiated rupture points toward the construction of collective will, toward politics as the deliberate creation of the future.

Lechner's main contribution is in highlighting the construction of order as a political task. The search for society's diversity is a transformation undertaken as the construction of order, where negotiated ruptures are the constructive elements of a new order shaped according to the idea of what is desirable. Feasible democracy is constituted by a plurality of subjects that arises through reciprocal recognition; even though one has to confront the "Other," it is no longer to annihilate him but rather to confront the differences. Democratization therefore demands the development of plurality and collective responsibility. The construction of order becomes a collective task. Politics is everyone's activity, a citizen activity. There are reciprocity agreements, where trust, loyalty, or respect are real norms through which reciprocal expectations are structured. Thus, it is the linking of economic transformation and political self determination as emancipatory practices that leads to democracy.

The last part of Norbert Lechner's work is dedicated to the difficult task of constructing Latin American democracy. Democracy needs to be placed in the public light in order to develop, but at the same time it hides skeletons in the closet, some sordid and others simply forgotten. Lechner will delve into the recognition of these nooks and crannies – the cognitive affective substratum of democracy – in order to obtain a different substratum of politics.

Thus, in the debate regarding democratic alternatives, Lechner says that two moments stand out that pave the way for a transformation of Latin American political thinking. On one hand, there is a reassessment of politics, which rejects the logic of war and substitutes

for the political logic; this points not to the annihilation of the adversary but rather to the reciprocal recognition of subjects amongst themselves. The need for difference and plurality is emphasized as a condition for political life itself, and a reconceptualization of utopia is proposed that defines it as an image of impossible plenitude that is nonetheless indispensable in order to discover the possible. On the other hand, there emerges a reassessment of civil society that highlights the interest of intellectuals in establishing democratization in the concrete problems of ordinary people, along with concern for the reconstruction of the social fabric that has been devastated by military dictatorships as well as neoliberal regimes.

For Norbert Lechner, the actual reevaluation of the formal procedures and institutions of democracy in Latin America cannot rest on old habits and norms that are recognized by everyone. It is not about restoring regulative norms, but rather the creation of those norms that are essential to political activity; the beginning of the democratic game and agreement regarding the rules of the game are two simultaneous facets of the same process. Today, the central task in the democratization of Latin America is a change in political culture. The possibilities and tendencies for democratization are conditioned by criteria of normalcy and naturalness, developed by normal people in their daily lives. It is in this sphere that projects of solidarity and social change can be built. Delving into political culture opens a wide expanse of possibilities that range from the mundane to the political.

The lack of a democratic political culture in Latin America is due, according to Lechner, to the growing distance between political institutions and citizens. As more social activities are submitted to political legal regulation, the man on the street loses more control over his social context, producing a deterioration of political practice upon failing to be able to produce and reproduce the sense of order to which men and women refer in order to contextualize the different aspects of their lives. To the extent that political organizations, which are increasingly specialized and separated from the daily tasks of "people like us," no longer create or guarantee collective identities, these identities tend to recreate themselves on the margins or even in opposition to the institutions.

Because of this, the study of everyday life becomes a fundamental concern for Lechner. He returns to important authors such as Gouldner, Habermas, Touraine, and Heller and proposes that everyday life is a crystallization of the social conditions that allow us to explore the relationship between macro and microsocial processes. It is the field for the analysis of the contexts in which different individual experiences come to be recognized as collective identities. Democratic construction goes side by side with political culture, with that privileged space in daily life that implies a change of values, perceptions, and images and comes to establish itself. It begins with common visions, the possibility to create collective identities, and democratic consolidation.

However, the construction of a democratic order confronts two great problems: the lack of time and unpredictability. In terms of time, Lechner points out how events suddenly happen and multiply and, on occasions, nothing happens and time languishes, stagnates. In both cases, one bets on the realist's conjecture, to take one's time in order not to be overwhelmed by the urgency of events nor limit the time in order to be able to crystallize emotional energies within a symbolically significant time frame. In terms of unpredictability, he returns to Luhmann and proposes reducing the uncertainty and insecurity of politics. It is not a forecast, it is a bet: it is the commitment to a particular result, which is not foreseeable.

One of the fundamental elements for resolving the distance between the present and the future and increasing the level of acceptable uncertainty is trust. The term implies a commitment to certain future conduct without knowing whether the other will respond to the commitment. It is a voluntary offer, but once the other responds to the trust given, he or she is committed. To trust is to reflect upon uncertainty. Trust in the order is a central element of the stability of a democratic system. Trust involves the citizenry's identification with the political system as well as the system's credibility before public opinion.

As can be seen, Lechner's work shows a substantial change from his proposals of the 1970s. In this final period, concern for political culture, trust, and the construction of a democratic order are the most important points of

reference in his work. The transformation of Norbert Lechner's theoretical as well as critical apparatus is a clear sign of political ideological developments in Latin America, a region of the world that continues to face the consolidation of democratic societies.

SEE ALSO: Authoritarianism; Democracy; Democracy and Organizations; Gramsci, Antonio; Marx, Karl; Marxism and Sociology; State; Utopia

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Lefebvre, Henri (1901–91)

Michael T. Ryan

Henri Lefebvre had the good fortune to live a long, intellectually productive life in a century of political disasters that drove most intellectuals on the left to despair or worse. Lefebvre was one of the most original Marxist theorists to think with Marx beyond Marx about the changes taking place in capitalism since Marx's death in 1882. He appropriated in a critical manner the concepts of some of the most important social theorists. Lefebvre also developed concepts of his own: everyday life, the production of social space, difference, modernity, and reproduction of the relations of production. He completed his *Diplôme d'Études Supérieures* at the Sorbonne in 1924 and his dissertation in 1954. Lefebvre considered himself a philosopher/sociologist, and this led him to emphasize conceptual analysis on sociological issues. He became a member of the French Communist Party (PCF) in 1928 and was excluded from it in 1958 for participating in too many oppositional groups to the PCF. He was appointed to a research position in 1948 in the Center of Sociological Studies (CES) at the Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique (CNRS). In 1960 he established the Research Group on Everyday Life at the CES. In 1965 he was appointed to the sociology chair as well as to the directorship of the Institute of Urban Sociology at the University of Paris at Nanterre. Henri Lefebvre was one of the most important influences, along with Guy Debord and the Situationist International, on the student movements and May events in France in 1968 that

raised questions about the bureaucratization of private life in the "bureaucratic society of controlled consumption." His most important publications are: *Critique of Everyday Life*, Vols. 1–4 (1947, 1961, 1981, 1992); *The Production of Space* (1974); *The Urban Revolution* (1970); and *The Survival of Capitalism* (1976).

Henri Lefebvre came of age during the events and aftermath of the Russian Revolution which occurred in the conjuncture of the capitalist crisis and World War I. Lefebvre discovered Marx's concept of alienated labor and extended it to the analysis of private life. It is at this moment that the consumer society emerges in response to the failed proletarian revolution, with the "technocracy" bringing its bureaucratic forms of organization to the reproduction of the capitalist relations of production. The Great Depression and World War II provided a second crisis and moment for Lefebvre's development. He brought Nietzsche's thought together with Marx's in the first volume of his *Critique of Everyday Life*. The process of self development and public life were as alienated as the working day in Marx's analysis. Lefebvre also confronted a number of other important intellectual currents: institutional Marxism, existentialism, information theory, structuralism, and American sociology. The crisis of the late 1960s provided a third moment in Lefebvre's development when anti colonial wars were proving to be much more risky to the metropolitan centers than the "colonization of everyday life," as Debord put it. Differential groups – racial and ethnic groups, students, youth, women, homosexuals – were contesting bureaucratic authorities across the globe in their struggles to realize the *right to be different*, one of Lefebvre's rights to the city. Lefebvre also had critical encounters with structural Marxists, Heidegger, and postmodern theorists.

Lefebvre first discussed dialectical method in an article on rural sociology written in 1953. He further elaborated on his method in volume 2 of the *Critique of Everyday Life*. Lefebvre's method of analysis takes sociology beyond mere description of society as it exists to an analysis of society in terms of its possibilities for change. His method of conceptual analysis starts by going back to the emergence of a concept, e.g., everyday life emerges in the writings of novelists such as James Joyce in *Ulysses*. Everyday life is a

residuum, a moment of history, what is left over after working activities are extracted, humble actions that are repeated daily and taken for granted, the positive moment and power of daily life. This is the “regressive” moment in his dialectical method. Then he links the concept to its place in the current social totality. Everyday life is also the product of modernity, of bureaucratic organization and the programming of private life, “everydayness” as an alienated moment. Everyday life is a contradictory amalgam of these positive and negative moments. In the “progressive” moment he begins in the present to analyze the possible movements of the concept and the totality, from the programmed everyday to lived experience, self development and generalized self management, i.e., the revolution in everyday life. For Lefebvre everyday life is *the* social structure of modernity, a mediator between particulars and the social totality, a *level* of the social totality. Everyday life is another instance of uneven development, an impoverished sector that has yet to be developed with the available wealth and technologies to the same extent as other sectors such as capital goods and the military. As long as people can live their everyday lives, modernity will continue to be reproduced in its present forms and structure. When people can no longer live their everyday lives, the possibilities for change in social relations become open.

In *The Production of Space*, Lefebvre distinguishes social space as it is *conceived* in abstract geometric terms, as it is *perceived* concretely in the works of artists like Cézanne, and as it is *lived* in everyday life by different social strata and actors. Social space is organized in ways to facilitate the movement of products and people, reflecting the logic of the technical division of labor; it has also been commoditized and colonized and creates another sector for investment and capital formation. It is an abstract space that develops without regard to the needs and desires of human beings; it enhances the domination of the technocrats and contributes to the reproduction of the capitalist relations of production. It sets in motion a conflict between the producers of this abstract space and the users who want to appropriate space as “lived space.”

Difference is another critical concept that Lefebvre linked to the processes of urbanization and urban revolution. Industrialization has a

homogenizing logic, reducing everything to commodities. Urbanization has a differential logic. Like Robert E. Park, Lefebvre argues that differences are one of the most unique qualities of cities. While most sociologists analyzed these differences in terms of subcultures, Lefebvre used this concept to emphasize relations of domination and subordination. The differences originate in nature as particularities – race, ethnicity, gender, and age – but they become social differences when the members of these groups struggle for the right to be different. Their struggles take place in an urban context in which they: affirm their difference against the process of homogenization; assert their right to the center against fragmentation and marginalization; and claim their right to equality in difference against the process of hierarchization. Lefebvre uses this concept to explain the new social movements that have developed since World War II. They are at the heart of the urban revolution, although the working class, because of its position in the process of production, still has a role to play.

According to Lefebvre, capitalism has undergone a mutation from its classical nineteenth century form. When the working class failed to become a revolutionary agent of change, the technocrats brought stability and cohesion to a society that lacked both through their deployment of bureaucratic forms of organization and the ideology of technological modernism, the introduction of trivial technological changes on the surface of this society while the capitalist relations of production remained fundamentally unchanged beneath the surface. Social relations do not have a life of their own; they do not persist due to inertia; they need to be reproduced in everyday life. Marx had demonstrated the social quality of the production, distribution, and exchange moments in the process of production. He did not take his analysis into the moment of consumption, nor did he link this process to social space. In their consumption the members of each social class reproduce themselves as capitalists, workers, and land owners. When workers pay for their material and immaterial needs in everyday life, they recreate their dependence on capital and land and are constrained to return to the labor market. The capitalists take their profits, pay for their own consumption, and reinvest their

wealth in whatever economic sector that promises to expand their wealth. This reproduces their dependence on workers whose living labor creates the wealth. Further, capitalists invest their wealth increasingly in space: industrial, commercial, agricultural, and residential and leisure spaces. This allows capital to accumulate beyond the crisis tendency in the industrial sector, although this sector is also subject to crises of falling profits, overproduction, and depreciation. We move from the production of *things* in space in the nineteenth century to the production of *space* and things in space in the twentieth century.

With the creation of modernity, many of the historical tasks of the working class revolution have been accomplished. Yet, Lefebvre did not see it as a closed system in the way that Baudrillard saw it, and that is why he does not see our society as a postmodern one. He argues that while modernity is efficient at taking care of individual needs, there are social and individual needs that are poorly recognized and met: health care, education, care for the elderly, public spaces, community, love and self actualization. Social goods are different from individual goods; they are not used up in the same way as a commodity is used up in an act of consumption. Millions of citizens have made use of Central Park in New York City, but they have yet to use it up. There is also a fundamental struggle between consumers and producers over the intended uses and meanings that are attached by the advertising form to goods and acts of consumption. Consumers often use goods in their own ways, attaching their own meanings to commodities. Further, programmed consumption entails incredible destruction of natural resources and the environment, especially when planned obsolescence accelerates the depreciation of commodities through the fashion cycle and the low quality of materials used. The destruction of the earth is a real possibility. Lefebvre proposes a different path for social revolution: revolution in everyday life and urban revolution will complement and extend the proletarian revolution toward generalized self management and emancipation from bureaucratic domination and class exploitation at work, in public life, and in private life. This process will lead to the creation of an urban society, although it is likely to be a long process

since changes in everyday life are slow. This process will require a reduction in time devoted to work.

Modernity is an incredibly complex social formation, and there is a tendency for sociologists to reduce this complexity to single forms (norms), structures (culture), or functions (socialization). Lefebvre argues that we must situate and mediate all of these social forms, functions, and structures within the political, economic, and cultural processes that produce and reproduce modernity. Further, we must be historically specific in our analysis and give up our quest for universals.

SEE ALSO: Built Environment; Capital, Secondary Circuit of; Debord, Guy; New Urbanism; Space; Uneven Development; Urban Movements; Urban Space; Urbanization

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legal profession

Mathieu Deflem

The legal profession refers to all the occupational roles purposely oriented towards the administration and maintenance of the legal system. Encompassing lawyers, judges, counselors, and experts of legal education and scholarship, the legal profession has been the subject of considerable reflection in the sociology of law. This sociological interest parallels the enormous attention devoted to the legal profession in various strands of sociolegal studies, including also other social sciences besides sociology as well as legal scholarship, which in turn is the result of the successful monopolization of the execution of legal functions and the resulting social standing and closure of the legal profession. The fact that the legal profession is among the most researched aspects of the institution of law is thus a direct function of the professionalization of the legal role itself. Yet, although most scholarly research on the legal profession comes from within legal scholarship and from law and society perspectives that are firmly nestled in legal education, there also exists a distinctively sociological tradition that examines societal aspects of the legal profession from the viewpoint of a multitude of theoretical orientations.

The aspiration to maintain occupational autonomy is one of the legal profession's most critical and sociologically challenging characteristics. This professional independence is a concrete expression of the autonomy of law as a whole. Rooted in Montesquieu's famous doctrine of the separation of powers, the ideal of legal autonomy finds primary expression in the establishment of an independent judiciary. Further manifestations of the autonomy of law are provided in the workings of the courts and, most importantly, the professionalization of the legal occupation. The autonomy of legal practice is primarily reflected in legal education and legal practice, as the legal profession has been successful in controlling admission to and the organization of law schools and legal work.

Theoretical differences exist on how the place and role of the legal profession are to be

conceived from a sociological viewpoint. Most studies in the sociology of the professions are indebted to the focus on the professionalization of legal work in modern societies that was first systematically addressed by Weber and which was subsequently taken up by Parsons with respect to the role of the professions in the legal system's integrative function.

Weber defined law intimately in relation to the legal profession by specifying law as a normative order that is externally guaranteed by a specialized staff, including police, prosecutors, and judges. Under conditions of modern societies, Weber maintained that law rationalized in a formal sense on the basis of procedures that are applied equally to all. Legal professionals take on a special role in this context because they are involved in the adjudication of law on the basis of acquired legal expertise. The institutionalization of expertise in matters of law secures the specialized status of the legal professional on the basis of the state formally granting such monopoly.

In modern sociology, Parsons gave special consideration to the legal profession's role in securing integration through the legal system. This conception harmonizes with the functionalist attention towards law as a mechanism of social control and also betrays the broader Parsonsian attention to the role of the professions in modern societies. The successful acquisition of expertise in a particular occupational role is the profession's most outstanding characteristic. The legal professional is primarily someone who is learned in the law and who can provide specialized services on the basis of this expertise. The legal professional thus mediates between the polity as legislator, on the one hand, and the public as clients of the law, on the other.

In more recent decades, sociological perspectives have offered more varied, sometimes radically alternative viewpoints on the role and status of the legal profession and its autonomy. Theoretical perspectives have been introduced that transcend the functionalist obsession with integration to contemplate the law's role in terms of power and inequality. Most distinctly focusing on the legal profession have been representatives of the so called Critical Legal Studies movement who have pondered the behavior of judges and lawyers irrespective of,

and often contrary to, law's self proclaimed ideals of justice and equity. Arguing that legal reasoning is affected by dozens of personal biases depending on the legal professionals' sociostructural backgrounds, these perspectives have in their most radical form critiqued the very basis of the legal professional's aspiration to autonomy and expert neutrality.

While not necessarily overly critical in orientation, most recent sociological studies of the legal profession have pointed towards greater diversity in the legal profession than a simple model of professionalization can account for. Sociologists have specifically contemplated the more complex behavior of the legal profession once it has been successfully monopolized, when it also seeks to influence the state and its legislative potential. Among the more enduring sociological puzzles, also, is the increasing diversity of the legal profession since the latter half of the twentieth century. Unlike the cohesive group of old, legal professionals nowadays comprise a wide variety of practitioners, educated in a multitude of legal programs, and are more broadly representative of contemporary society with respect to gender, age, and ethnicity. The increasing diversity of the legal profession, however, has not always been accompanied by increasing equality, as many disparities have been observed to persist, such as earnings gaps among male and female lawyers and differences in cultural and economic capital between solo practitioners and employees in large law firms. The high degree of stratification in the legal profession may thus have brought about a lack of professional unity.

SEE ALSO: Law, Civil; Law, Criminal; Law, Sociology of; Occupations; Parsons, Talcott; Professions; Weber, Max; Work, Sociology of

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legitimacy

Lisa Troyer

Legitimacy is defined as a state of appropriateness ascribed to an actor, object, system, structure, process, or action resulting from its integration with institutionalized norms, values, and beliefs. It is a topic of longstanding interest across the spectrum of sociological phenomena and levels of analysis. Legitimacy is a multilevel concept, as implied by the term "actor," which may refer to individuals, groups, organizations, nation states, and world systems. It appears as a core concept in diverse areas of sociological inquiry including (but not limited to) social psychology, stratification, deviance, collective action, organizations, political systems, law, and science.

At its core, legitimacy involves a sense of appropriateness that is accorded to an entity. That is, a legitimate entity is one that we view as suited to its social environment and, as a result, deserving of support by other entities in the environment. The sense that an entity is suited to its environment arises from its perceived consistency with the institutionalized norms, values, and beliefs in which the entity is embedded. The institutionalized character of norms, values, and beliefs is a critical element of legitimacy. Institutionalized criteria are beyond the discretion of single actors. Because no single actor is perceived as dictating the norms, values, and beliefs that guide a social system (although they are socially constructed), they represent superordinate standards, uncontaminated by individual motives and preferences. Their superordinate status lends institutionalized

norms, values, and beliefs a taken for grantedness and the sense that, irrespective of privately held views, they will be upheld by others in the social system. Consequently, an entity that is perceived as integrated with institutionalized norms, values, and beliefs is one that we believe is appropriate and thus deserving of support. That support may take the form of social approval, the investment of social capital, or material/financial rewards.

Theoretical treatments of legitimacy emphasize the importance of collective support. This is a common thread across classic sociological theory, hearkening back to the work of Marx, Mead, and Weber. It is interesting that while Marx proposed that class consciousness – a sense of shared ideology – is critical to the elimination of inequality, Della Fave (1980) argued that the shared ideology of *equity* legitimates stratification. An equity ideology, represented in the generalized other (i.e., the perception of the shared norms, values, and beliefs to which society prescribes that is held by individual actors), affects individuals' self evaluations and, thereby, their sense of deservingness of rewards. These self evaluations, in turn, serve as the basis for rationalizing an unequal distribution of resources in society, engendering a sense of appropriateness regarding inequality. As a result, social inequality gains legitimacy and is perpetuated.

Weber's highly influential work on authority systems likewise emphasized the importance of the perception of collective support in generating legitimacy. He proposed that legitimate authority systems are those in which authority reflects rule based action, where the rules are collectively upheld (as opposed to action directed at maximizing one's personal outcomes and exercised at personal discretion). Thus, Weber highlights the importance of validity – the perception that others support and will act in accord with the rules governing a system – in legitimating an authority system. Subsequent theorists explicitly distinguished validity from propriety (i.e., privately held beliefs about the appropriateness or desirability of an entity), and demonstrated that validity generates legitimacy, independent of propriety. Insights on the importance of validity to legitimacy have been applied not only to authority systems, but also

to status structures, patterns of distributive justice, and identity processes.

Also, across time and different treatments of the concept, legitimacy is consistently viewed as a source of stability in social systems. As Weber noted, legitimate authority persists and provides an important foundation for bureaucracy, itself a persistent organizational form. Scholars of organizations and world systems have pointed to the isomorphic tendencies of legitimate structures and processes to diffuse across social systems. Group processes researchers have also suggested that legitimacy produces resilience in status structures and distributive justice processes, even when those structures and processes disadvantage the majority of actors in the system. Stability is a function of the ongoing ability of actors within the system to mobilize resources to perpetuate a legitimate system.

As this discussion has suggested, sociological theories involving legitimacy have drawn heavily on Weber's classic work. His insights on the legitimacy of particular organizational structures and processes (e.g., legal rational authority and bureaucracy) begged the question of how these particular forms gained legitimacy. Meyer and Rowan (1977) addressed this question with an influential essay on the process through which social structures and processes become aligned with the collectively supported (i.e., institutionalized) norms, values, and beliefs that are socially constructed and transmitted through the environment. Recently, sociologists have turned their attention to the process of alignment itself. How do the structures and processes of social entities become aligned with collectively supported norms, values, and beliefs?

Three strategies have emerged to address this question. First from the new institutional perspective in sociology, theorists have argued that alignment with institutionalized norms, values, and beliefs (and hence, legitimacy) results from certain environmental pressures (e.g., Powell & DiMaggio 1991). These factors lead social systems to adopt structures and processes that embody institutionalized norms, beliefs, and values. The pressures arise from normative and coercive processes that reward conforming systems with legitimacy and punish deviant ones with its withdrawal. Alternatively, in the absence of coercive and normative

pressures, when the norms, values, and beliefs that would dictate the desirable form are uncertain, systems are likely to mimic the form of other already successful systems.

Second, a related argument from the population ecology perspective (e.g., Hannan & Freeman 1992) proposes that the environment determines which organizational forms survive, and which languish. Within this perspective, the form (i.e., structures and processes) a system assumes at its outset is relatively stable and resistant to change. To the extent that institutionalized norms, values, and beliefs characterizing the environment are embodied in the system from the start, its legitimacy increases and, therefore, so do its odds of surviving. This is because legitimacy is critical to securing other key resources needed for survival. As this implies, the environment, rather than the strategic behavior of actors, determines the legitimacy of a system.

A third perspective on how entities align themselves with institutionalized norms, values, and beliefs to secure legitimacy is also emerging (e.g., Friedland & Alford 1991). This perspective incorporates both a strategic view of social actors and elements of social constructionism. It recognizes the diversity of sets of shared norms, values, and beliefs that characterize social environments and are closely tied to established social institutions, like the economy, political systems, and the family. These sets of norms, values, and beliefs, referred to as "institutionalized logics," may vary depending on the institutions with which they are associated. For example, a norm of equality may comprise a logic related to democracy; a norm of equity may be part of an institutionalized logic corresponding to a capitalist economic system; a norm of need based resource distribution may be a component of the institutionalized logic governing the family. Moreover, all of these institutions (with competing logics) may coexist in the same broader social system. Emerging theory drawing on these ideas suggests that legitimacy arises when an entity is able to mobilize support for the logic it embodies through appeals to the relevant social institutions supporting that logic. Thus from this perspective, legitimation is a process through which actors successfully construct the validity of the norms,

values, and beliefs characterizing their own systems through appeals to particular institutions within the broader social system.

As these developments indicate, theory related to the sources and consequences of legitimacy is growing in part through integration and diffusion across perspectives and topics, as well as competing arguments on the mechanisms of legitimacy. New institutional theory, which has catalyzed many of the contemporary developments in the study of legitimacy, emerged in the context of the sociology of organizations, but has become increasingly influential in such diverse areas as political sociology, group processes, sociology of culture, and sociology of law. At the same time, Weber's classic statements on validity and authority remain influential. Furthermore, on the one hand, social constructionist accounts have gained renewed attention with attempts such as those described above to explain strategic efforts of actors to secure legitimacy. On the other hand, recognition of inertial forces beyond the control of actors also retains significance in explaining the dynamics of legitimacy.

In contrast to the vast research on the sources and consequences of legitimacy, however, there has been less emphasis on delegitimation. Theory and research on unstable political systems are valuable examples of the importance of investigating such processes. Given the importance of validity and institutionalized norms, values, and beliefs to legitimacy, it is not surprising that this line of theorizing points to conditions that increase the salience of conflict over shared norms, values, and beliefs as a catalyst for undermining the validation of political systems. Once invalidated, legitimacy crumbles, and established political regimes are vulnerable to replacement. Researchers investigating political change have posited that political actors are carriers of endorsement or disapproval across social groups, and once disapproval becomes salient across a critical mass of groups, then legitimacy is jeopardized (e.g., Habermas 1975). Extensions of these ideas may hold promise for the theories of delegitimation, and thus social change as it characterizes other structures and systems, e.g., organizational change, economic change, changes in legal systems, changes in status and distribution systems.

Despite the long history of research related to legitimacy, it has been hindered by methodological difficulties. Researchers have had difficulty operationalizing legitimacy independent of the variables to which it is theoretically related (e.g., validity, stability, commonality, mobilization of support). For example, within organizations research, the legitimacy of an organizational structure or process is often operationalized in terms of its prevalence, the extent to which organizational actors believe that other actors endorse it, and/or the success of organizations in extracting resources from their environments. Similarly, political sociologists have also conflated legitimacy with endorsement and the stability of political systems. Within microsociological traditions, the conflation of legitimacy with its causes and consequences is less common. Instead, researchers in these traditions, like Berger et al. (1998), tend to treat legitimacy as an unmeasured theoretical construct, and focus on its constituent processes and outcomes, e.g., the relation between validity, resource mobilization, and stability. This strategy has the advantage of retaining the logical integrity of theories involving legitimacy, while still testing the social processes and outcomes that legitimacy is assumed to engender.

In summary, legitimacy continues to represent an important theoretical concept for sociology. Yet, there are a number of challenges to be addressed, such as articulating the relative effects of strategic behavior versus inertial forces in legitimacy processes, developing and testing theories of illegitimacy, and refining the operationalization of legitimacy. Because of the centrality of this concept to the understanding of social life at different levels of analysis and across different topics, legitimacy is likely to continue to play a key role in sociological theory. Indeed, Comte's vision of sociology as a science that can explain both the social order and social dynamics may be realized through theories of legitimacy that are able to specify both the legitimation processes that give rise to stability, and the delegitimation processes that give rise to social change.

SEE ALSO: Dependency and World Systems Theories; Expectation States Theory; Institutional Theory, New; Organization

Theory; Political Sociology; Social Psychology; Weber, Max

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leisure

Sheila Scraton

Leisure is a notoriously difficult concept to define. The study of leisure has early origins stretching back to the 1920s and Veblen's *The Theory of the Leisure Class* (1925). However, it was in the 1960s and 1970s that the foundations of leisure studies as an academic area were laid. Early writers such as Dumazedier in *Towards a Society of Leisure* (1967) defined leisure as activity that is set apart from other obligations such as work and family and provides individuals with the opportunity for relaxation, the broadening of knowledge, and social participation. Dumazedier's definition highlights the notion that leisure involves pleasure and freedom of choice and that this sets it apart from paid work and everyday commitments. Leisure could be seen as *compensation*, a means of escape from the routines of daily labor, or as *residual time*, time left over when other commitments have taken place.

The definition of leisure as in opposition to work and other obligations has been very significant within the sociology of leisure. In the UK, Parker (1971) was a major contribution that explored in greater detail this relationship between work and leisure and argued that leisure is an important aspect of social life that demands rigorous sociological analysis alongside the more conventional areas of work, family, education, youth, and so on. He argued that it was with industrialization that leisure became viewed as a separate sphere of life as work became more clearly demarcated in terms of time and space. Therefore, leisure cannot be understood in isolation from work. Parker identified three aspects of the work–leisure relationship: extension, opposition, and neutrality. He viewed the *extension* pattern as showing little demarcation between work and leisure activities, giving the examples of social workers, teachers, and doctors as typical of those that experience work and leisure in this way. *Opposition*, as the name suggests, relies on an intentional dissimilarity between work and leisure and Parker highlighted people with tough physical jobs such as miners or oil rig workers as typical within this category. His third pattern of

neutrality is defined by an “average” demarcation of spheres. Workers whose jobs are neither fulfilling nor oppressive and who tend to be passive and uninvolved in both their work and leisure activities are defined by this pattern.

There were several criticisms of Parker's early typology of the work–leisure relationship that highlighted the limitations of this analysis for those outside of the paid workforce. The unemployed, the retired, students, and women working in the home as carers and undertaking domestic work were all identified as outside this work–leisure model as paid work is not central in their lives. However, the recognition of the importance of situating leisure within a social context, not as a separate, totally autonomous sphere of individual free choice, was an important contribution to the developing sociology of leisure. As leisure became analyzed within a social context, emerging definitions reflected the different emphases of competing theoretical perspectives within leisure studies.

THEORIZING LEISURE

A feature of leisure studies throughout the 1970s and 1980s was the development of competing paradigms which sought to understand and explain leisure from different sociological perspectives. In the UK the three major traditions in leisure studies developed from pluralism, critical Marxism, and feminism, whereas in North America a more social psychological approach underpinned much of the leisure research and writing.

Roberts (1978) argued that a pluralist model of society provides the most coherent approach to understanding contemporary leisure in the 1970s. His contributions to the field of leisure studies have remained consistent within this paradigm. This “conventional wisdom” suggests that there is a plurality of tastes and interests generated by different circumstances. Both commercial and public providers of leisure supply experiences from which individuals seek to fashion their varying lifestyles. Leisure is both a “freedom from” and a “freedom to” and is primarily concerned with relatively self-determined behavior. The pluralist model does not assume that leisure is free from all influences but argues that age, gender, socioeconomic

status, and other “variables” operate in a multitude of configurations (Roberts 1999).

In contrast to the pluralist model, Marxist theorists sought to understand leisure as an integral part of the structure of capitalist society. Clarke and Critcher (1985) argued that leisure’s domination by the market and the state, the persistence of leisure inequalities, and the drift to post industrialism all demonstrate how leisure is part of capitalist society. Capitalism shapes leisure through hegemonic processes of both constraint and coercion. Their work provided a powerful critique of the “conventional wisdom” of leisure studies and emphasized the importance of history and the significance of *social* processes such as work, the family, the life cycle, and the market. Leisure is about people’s choices but these choices are made within structures of constraint. Leisure needs to be understood within the dialectical relationships of structure and agency, control and choice, continuity and change. A neo Marxist approach to understanding leisure draws on the “sociological imagination” of C. Wright Mills, grasping the relationship between history and biography. Leisure as “freedom” and “constraint” is seen as socially constructed around time and space, institutional forms, and social identities. This approach to explaining and understanding leisure was derived from cultural studies and views leisure as potentially an arena for cultural contestation between dominant and subordinate groups in society.

Further criticisms of the “conventional wisdom” of leisure studies came from the developing feminist perspectives within sociology during the 1980s. Feminists began by identifying the male dominated approach that had characterized much of sociology, including the study of leisure. Leisure understood as free time or freedom of choice was identified as being problematic and irrelevant to many women’s lives. Women’s lives were recognized as not being neatly compartmentalized into periods of work and periods of leisure, as most women have domestic work responsibilities as well as paid work and often childcare or other caring responsibilities. For many women, family leisure is a time when they are supporting others’ free time, such as transporting children to activities, preparing meals for entertaining friends, or planning and organizing family holidays. Thus their

leisure often involves a *relative freedom* rather than clearly demarcated time. Feminist work identified the need to examine leisure in the context of women’s lives as a whole and not as a separate sphere divorced from all other areas of their lives. Consequently, the existing definitions and theories of leisure were viewed as androcentric, having meaning only in relation to men. Research by Green et al. (1990) provided the world’s largest study of women’s leisure. Based in Sheffield, UK, between 1984 and 1987, the research focused on the cultural significance of leisure in women’s lives and leisure as a potential site for conflict and inequality. They found that the concept *leisure* is extraordinarily resistant to being confined to a single, neat, definitional category. For the women in their study, leisure was a highly personal and subjective mix of experiences and was linked to, and a part of, other areas of life.

Research in the 1980s, which shifted the focus to women and leisure, also recognized that gender relations were crucially a part of leisure experiences and leisure institutions. This work identified that women occupy a subordinate position within a patriarchal society. Thus, their material position, as well as constructions of femininity and masculinity, have a determining effect on women’s lives, including their leisure lives. The research and theoretical understandings of women’s leisure highlighted issues relating to sexuality, respectability, and social control which paralleled work more broadly in feminist sociology. Women’s leisure was shown to be constrained by constructions of femininity and gender appropriate behavior and controlled, both directly and indirectly, by men, either individually or collectively. Although much of the work during this period focused on structural constraints of gender, there was some acknowledgment of the interlinking of gender relations with those of class and race.

Both the feminist and neo Marxist analyses throughout the 1980s in the UK shared a predominantly materialist or structuralist approach to the sociology of leisure. In North America, however, the approach to understanding leisure has been more individualistic and located within a social psychology or social interactionist paradigm. Within these approaches the emphasis is on how leisure is *experienced* by individuals. Rather than concentrating on constraints, the

focus shifts to how individuals use leisure to create roles and identities. Leisure can thus provide an important space for individuals as a *freedom to be*, self determining and fulfilling. The work of the North American social psychologist Csikszentmihalyi has been utilized within this approach to understanding leisure; in particular the concept of *flow* has been applied. This notion of flow is associated with what Csikszentmihalyi argues is *optimal experience*, when highly skilled individuals are stretched to their limit and become totally absorbed in their activity. It is through leisure activities that many people seek to achieve this optimal experience. Focusing on leisure as experience directs attention toward motivations and satisfactions and emphasizes inner feelings and experiences rather than external contexts and constraints.

Since the 1990s, sociological approaches to understanding leisure have drawn on postmodern developments in social theory. Rojek (1993, 1995, 2000) has been the most prolific writer who has criticized the former traditions of leisure theory, which he characterizes as social formalism, the influence of critical Marxism, and cultural studies and feminism. In his writings he not only debates and challenges the paradigmatic traditions within leisure studies but also develops and engages with postmodernist perspectives on leisure. Rojek has developed theoretical debates within sociology and sought to understand and interpret postmodern cultures and their relevance for leisure and leisure studies. In doing this he has presented a challenge to the existing theories, which he argues offer universal accounts that rely on dualisms and fail to adequately theorize culture, difference, and agency. Rojek argues for a phenomenology of leisure, with experience at the center of analysis. Within postmodernity, the weakening and destabilizing of former structures and the blurring of social divisions such as class, race, and gender have led to leisure and leisure lifestyles gaining increasing significance in the construction of individual and social identities. The development of new technologies and the shifts in cultural practice to hyperreality, a loss of authenticity, a dissolution of cultural boundaries, depthlessness and superficiality, fragmentation, parody and pastiche, are all seen to find expression within postmodern leisure.

No longer are leisure places and experiences seen to be fixed as travel and tourism become virtual, theme parks, such as Disneyland, challenge the distinctions between real, imitation, and fiction, and leisure becomes more individualized with pleasure, risk, and excitement center stage. The connections between leisure lifestyles and consumption are of increasing significance, with leisure playing an important role in the reflexive project of identity construction and definition.

Although postmodernism and postmodernity have impacted on the ways in which leisure is understood and theorized, there remain many theorists who argue that such a shift is by no means total or complete. Although many accept that uncertainty, fragmentation, hyperreality, and superficiality are evident in our cultural world and leisure reflects these cultural shifts, others have argued for theoretical positions that recognize and analyze cultural differences and the complexities of multiple social identities whilst adhering to a theoretical stance that continues to consider broader structural relations of power and the persistence of material inequalities in many people's lives (Wearing 1998; Aitchison 2003).

RESEARCHING LEISURE

Information about people's leisure has been, and continues to be, routinely collected via large participation surveys such as the General Household Survey in the UK, which is conducted annually and gathers information from a nationally representative sample of households. Questions in the survey that are related to leisure provide knowledge of participation rates for different sections of the population, including the number and type of people taking part in sporting activities, visits to the countryside, and visits to museums and other leisure related provision. Since the academic study of leisure began, information such as this has been used to evidence trends in participation over time and identify which groups in society are under or over represented in various activities. Other large scale surveys provide information on consumer spending on leisure, and together, large scale national surveys help identify the

main leisure activities for different populations. Roberts (1999) identifies that the big three leisure activities are eating and drinking, tourism and holidays, and home entertainment, including the television and other audiovisual media. He argues that out of home food and drink are leading leisure items, and that participation in these activities and spending on them exceed the figures for sport participation and spectating, cinema attendance, or participation in other leisure forms. Tourism and holidays rate very highly in terms of expenditure, with people increasingly taking more holidays and traveling further. The media are a significant aspect of people's leisure and it is home entertainment that is a major leisure activity for many people.

Large scale national surveys together with time budget studies and expenditure surveys have been used since the 1970s to categorize and measure the "facts" of leisure and, in turn, to influence and direct policy initiatives. This tradition of positive empiricist research underpinned the "conventional wisdom" of leisure studies as quantitative data provided knowledge about leisure participation. Empirical research utilizing quantitative data also contributed to knowledge about leisure through the life course as participation rates at different ages were identified. However, an influential piece of early work on leisure through the life course, *Leisure and the Life Cycle*, was conducted in 1975 by Rhona and Robert Rapoport. They used extended interviews in families to explore the balance of leisure, family, and work in people's lives and identified how individuals have different preoccupations throughout their lives, identifying four main stages within the family life cycle. Although there have been many criticisms of the Rapoports' approach to understanding leisure and the family, methodologically their research moved away from a rigid quantitative approach to one that sought to delve more deeply into meaning and identity.

As the questions in leisure studies turned from the *functions* of leisure to a concern to explore and identify structural inequalities, both in and through leisure opportunities and experiences, so the means of conducting such research have shifted. Increasingly, researchers have turned to in depth, qualitative, and interactive

methods to explore the realities, meanings, and experiences of leisure. There has been a move to recognize the significance of subjective knowledge, which is largely absent or marginalized from quantitative large scale studies. Feminist researchers in particular have argued for the importance of small scale, qualitative, or interactive approaches that can give voice to the personal, experiential, and emotional aspects of leisure. This shift to more micro, individualized accounts of leisure, away from more macro institutional concerns, mirrors the theoretical shifts over the past few decades in the sociology of leisure. However, although there are now far more studies that use interviews, life histories, and a qualitative approach, there is still a reliance on large data sets of survey material to inform policy. Leisure research remains closely applied to policy and practice in many cases.

CURRENT RESEARCH AND FUTURE DIRECTIONS

Leisure contexts and activities are extremely broad and include sport, physical activity, tourism, media, the arts, countryside recreation, and new technologies, amongst others. Leisure continues to provide an important site through which sociological questions can be explored. Work-leisure-family balance remains crucial to achieving quality of life and is of increasing significance as paid work intensifies, becomes more flexible, and working life becomes extended. The place of leisure in achieving work-life balance remains an important sociological question, as do questions relating to retirement, "serious leisure," and volunteerism. However, the early emphasis on the work-leisure relationship is being replaced, at least to a certain extent, by questions relating to the depth and spread of consumer culture.

The growth of consumption and commercial provision, together with the theoretical concerns of postmodernism and poststructuralism, have shifted the focus of some leisure scholars away from former concerns around material inequalities to questions of representation, embodiment, and identities. Drawing on social and cultural geography, research has begun to

explore the consumption of spaces and places within a leisure context. Whilst this remains underdeveloped, there is already exciting work around areas such as gay and lesbian city space, cultural tourism, and shopping.

Gender relations have been central to the study of leisure since the 1980s, including work focusing on androcentric definitions of leisure, the different meanings and motivations for women participating in leisure, leisure spaces, women's oppression in and through leisure, and, more recently, leisure as an important site for agency, negotiation, and transformation. Increasingly, research on gender is recognizing the importance of acknowledging and understanding difference and diversity between women. Studies on the experiences of different women across ethnicity, age, sexuality, and class have extended our qualitative understandings of women's leisure. Further work will be important in exploring the intersectionality of gender, race, ethnicity, sexuality, and class in the leisure lives of diverse groups of people. There remains limited work on masculinities and leisure and much of the current research is within the context of sport. There needs to be more research into shifting gender relations, new masculinities, and men's changing relationships within work, the family, and leisure.

A major gap in the literature within leisure studies is work that centers on race and ethnicity. Although there is some critical engagement with race, racism, and sport, this needs to be extended and developed into other areas of leisure. An exploration of the concept of whiteness is beginning within sport and leisure studies, although as yet this remains underdeveloped.

Leisure research is a broad and multidisciplinary arena. The theoretical shifts within the sociology of leisure are reflected in the changing focus of research away from questions of leisure choice and material and structural inequalities to more rigorous analyses of leisure forms and practices as sites for cultural production, empowerment, social inclusion, and social transformation.

SEE ALSO: Culture; Gender, Sport and; Leisure, Aging and; Leisure Class; Leisure, Popular Culture and; Media; Media and Sport; Popular Culture; Sport; Sport as Work; Work, Sociology of

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leisure, aging and

Jon Hendricks

Leisure and well being are closely entwined throughout life. Whether defined as free time or volitional activity, the significance of leisure is that it provides opportunities wherein the quest for meaning is self absorbing and yields

subjectively salutary results. Given changes in the character of work, certainty of careers, timing of retirement, and improvements in health, it is reasonable to assert that leisure will occupy an important place in the aging process.

Rather than consider free time, leisure, and aging as domains separate from the rest of life, adopting a life course perspective may provide greater insight. Leisure is grounded in societal conditions as well as the subjective and individualized world of participants. Leisure does not stand free of broader societal based values, gendered distinctions, life course issues, family stage, work, retirement, or other sociodemographic or marketplace influences. Yet leisure is symbolically significant to individuals, helping to create meaning and sense of self. Leisure structures time, space, and social relationships. If normative prescriptions or reinforcements from other realms become unclear for any reason, leisure interests may assume greater prominence. As far as individuals are concerned, leisure facilitates self enhancement, expression, and identity formation through intrinsic rewards, opportunities to exercise agency, and relationships rooted in the social worlds of leisure participation. Leisure serves as a context, a frame within which actors can author their own development – creating and collaborating interpretation by taking part (Hendricks & Cutler 2003; Stebbins 2004).

During the course of adulthood, leisure is fashioned by family life cycle, work roles, career stage, and demographic, socioeconomic, and other master status characteristics such as gender or ethnicity. Though leisure interest may evolve over time, its symbolic relevance in terms of identity, integration, and bonding may remain constant. During retirement leisure likely reflects role substitution, the search for meaningful modes of engagement, and is a mechanism to maintain vigor, interests, and relations.

Among adults, an average of 40 hours a week may be devoted to leisure (Becker 2002). TV watching can account for up to 28 hours a week, but travel, reading, socializing, gardening, and other discretionary activities occupy from 1.5 hours to nearly 9 hours weekly. According to the *Statistical Abstract of the United States: 2001*, during the previous year 48 percent of adults had partaken of an arts event and half had dined out or entertained

friends or family at home as a form of leisure. Available evidence suggests European elderly follow comparable patterns.

Physical activity, vigorous hobbies, exercise, and sports are somewhat more common among people age 65–74 and older than among their younger adult counterparts. Estimates are that a third to 40 percent of older men, compared to one quarter or less of younger adult males, engage in medium to high levels of leisure time physical activity (Barnes & Schoenborn 2003). Gendered patterns are historically grounded, with women marginally less physically active, but the age related slope is comparable. As the federal government's *Older Americans 2000* pointed out, approximately a third of persons aged 65 or older may be leading what can be described as inactive lifestyles. There is a direct relationship between education, income, and socioeconomic status and levels of physical activity. Despite the lore, attendance at sporting events is not overwhelmingly popular, with less than half of adults attending in the last year. For example, only about 16 percent of US adults have been to a baseball game in the past year (Becker 2002).

Such statistics do not tell the whole story, nor do they reflect variation in time devoted to particular forms of leisure depending on age, gender, socioeconomic status, and other socially relevant factors. Neither do they include volitional educational involvements or volunteerism as forms of leisure. In analyses of time spent in leisure pursuits, both education and volunteering occupy up to 10 percent of available leisure time. According to a 2003 report from the American Association of Retired Persons, volunteerism is an important source of satisfaction, sociability, and self validation and therefore retained by larger proportions of older people than previously thought. There is yet another aspect of leisure that must be broached. Certain types of deviance may constitute leisure for those who are engaged in them and there may be “good” and “bad” categories of leisure, with the latter often overlooked (Rojek 2000).

Education level, income, health status, gender, and ethnicity, plus a host of other compositional characteristics reflecting period and cohort effects, as well as age, shape traditional forms of leisure. As these change, leisure

patterns and activities will be affected. In many respects, leisure is a microcosm where such issues as gender and ethnicity play out. Participation patterns, spaces and places, enjoyment, and even definitions relate to gendered and ethnic concerns as an aspect of broader social and cultural relations and perceptions of aging.

Before drawing inferences about age related shifts in leisure involvements the prospect of selective optimization must be considered. It is possible that as they age, people seek to get the most out of their involvements in ways that maximize subjectively meaningful returns on investments. Older persons may choose to cut back on certain forms of engagement or interaction while expanding others. A case in point can be seen in the example of volunteerism: less meaningful engagements diminish, while time and energy spent in selected others is sustained (Hendricks & Cutler 2004). The same is likely true of leisure: peripheral pursuits fall by the wayside in favor of those with more meaningful returns.

The symbolic import of leisure lies in its association with various facets of well being. There is ample evidence that leisure lifestyles protect against physical and health declines or cognitive impairment, and provide forums for conservation of social integration, interpersonal bonding, morale, life satisfaction, and subjective sense of control (Guinn 1999; Musick et al. 1999; Schooler & Mulatu 2001; Silverstein & Parker 2002). Above all, leisure is an expressive domain wherein personal meaning is created and continued and the effects accrue in many aspects of the aging experience.

The money involved in the leisure market provides some indication of leisure's appeal. From early in the twentieth century the commercialization of leisure has grown and is evidence of returns derived from speaking to demands for leisure lifestyles. Estimates are that at the dawn of the twenty first century personal expenditures for entertainment, leisure, and other discretionary diversions were in the range of \$568 billion to \$1 trillion annually – in excess of 10 percent of total household expenditures. That does not include the \$21 billion devoted to parks and recreation by local, state, and federal governments or a number of other categories, but these figures do indicate the dimensions of the leisure marketplace (Becker 2002).

SEE ALSO: Age Identity; Consumption of Sport; Identity Theory; Leisure; Leisure Class; Leisure, Popular Culture; Sport and Culture

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leisure class

Matthias Zick Varul

The concept of the leisure class was introduced by Thorstein Veblen in his *Theory of the Leisure Class* (1899). Leisure classes here consist of those people who, due to their social position, can afford to abstain from productive work and live on other people's labor. They confine themselves to non industrial occupations like "government, warfare, religious observances, and sports." Their income is sourced from

exploitation of industrial classes that are subdued by the leisure class's superior "pecuniary prowess." In order to assert their position they have to be *visibly* idle. Their leisure practices do not only demonstrate momentary inactivity, but often display skills that serve as evidence of past abstention from work – higher learning and accomplishment in gentlemanly sports, for example, count as evidence for habitual non productivity. Positional claims are further asserted by wasteful "conspicuous consumption" of high status goods and by vicarious leisure of family members, guests, minions, and footmen. Conspicuous consumption of high priced goods is a form of "vicarious leisure" in which other people's labor time is taken up for the production of goods of ostensibly no practical use. Leisure class fashion, too, expresses contempt for productive activity (e.g., by deliberately limiting the movements of the wearer).

Apart from obstructing industrial progress by the wasteful use of social resources, Veblen sees the main effect of the modern leisure class in the exertion of a cultural dominance, setting socially accepted standards of taste. Aspiring classes emulate leisure class patterns of behavior and especially consumption, while the emulated leisure class in turn is constantly developing its "pecuniary canons of taste" in order to spoil the emulative efforts. The leisure class thus functions as a consumerist avant garde. This claim has been criticized as highly overstated and ignoring reverse emulation of popular culture by the upper classes (Bourdieu 1979).

While historically the leisure class was formed by a ruling aristocracy, industrial capitalism is ruled by businessmen who share leisure class values of pecuniary prowess but are no leisure class themselves; to the contrary, Veblen asserts that they work long and hard. Veblen thus anticipates a common argument against his theory (Rojek 2000): the rich of today normally continue investing most of their time in business life, forming a rather "harried leisure class" (Linder 1970). Veblen, however, sees the abstention from household labor in the upper class wife and the pretension of leisure in the upper middle class wife as compensating vicarious leisure acting out the husband's leisure entitlement.

The term leisure class is rarely used in recent sociology, but it still is informative in

approaching contemporary social phenomena. The group fitting Veblen's description best are "celebrities" who can be said, at least in terms of connubiality and commensality, to form a contemporary leisure class. Their artistic, medial, or sportive activities are, in the public perception, set apart from the social process of production. Like the Veblenian leisure class, celebrities act as commodity culture innovators and serve as role models whose consumption, style, and behavior are emulated. The difference of course is that here leisure itself and the readiness of a wider audience to aspire and emulate has become the basis of the high income, which for Veblen's leisure class was what their leisure expressed. Their leisure behavior, in turn, does not simply *dictate* social taste but also has to anticipate changes in public preferences. In Veblenian terms, celebrities as directly or indirectly financed by their audiences act out vicarious leisure for the onlooking society. Given the very mixed social background of the members of this new leisure class, "trickle up" effects here are at least as important as "trickle down" effects.

Another contemporary "leisure class" is the unemployed. Here leisure is involuntary and problematic. While voluntary leisure in the Veblenian case is a means to assert social recognition, socially unlegitimized forced leisure has the reverse effect on social and self esteem. The social expectation here is that of a quasi work orientation toward reemployment.

Elements of leisure class behavior have been generalized in a move from leisure class to *leisure society* (Seabrook 1988), but they are also spatially and/or temporarily compartmentalized and contained within a work society. Within the lifecycle, old age has been discussed as a "new leisure class" (Michelon 1954). Unlike with the unemployed, leisure in old age is usually legitimated by reference to contributions in a long working life. Old age leisure is "deserved" or "earned," but it is also seen as problematic, requiring reinterpretations of leisure as meaningful or even an education for leisure.

Within the year cycle, tourism has been characterized as requiring "a new theory of the leisure class" (MacCannell 1976). While lacking the defining characteristics of a class, tourists do appear as a leisure class vis à vis the local population of tourist destinations. With one of the roots of modern tourism being the

middle class emulation of the aristocratic Grand Tour, it can be argued that tourism is in part a remainder of trickled down leisure class patterns. However, like old age retirement, tourism refers both negatively and positively to work. It is defined as the opposite of work and the closest most people come to a leisure class existence – but it also refers back to work as paid out of income and functioning as recreation for work.

SEE ALSO: Celebrity and Celestoid; Celebrity Culture; Conspicuous Consumption; Consumption; Consumption, Fashion and; Consumption, Mass Consumption, and Consumer Culture; Consumption, Tourism and; Leisure; Leisure, Aging and; Unemployment; Veblen, Thorstein

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leisure, popular culture and

Robert A. Stebbins

Mukerji and Schudson (1991: 3) define popular culture as a widely shared set of beliefs and practices that people use to organize certain

objects, these objects also being part of that culture. This intentionally general definition (formulated to avoid terminological haggling) encompasses folk beliefs, practices, and objects generated in political and commercial centers. It also includes the handful of elite cultural forms that have, by curious quirk of fate, managed to become popular.

Popular culture includes, in broadest scope, any cultural item that has achieved popularity, or that has developed a mass public. Given this definition, one might be tempted to say that leisure and popular culture are close to being identical, if not, in fact, identical. Yet numerous popular artifacts and practices exist that are decidedly not leisurely, among them petrol, toothpaste, queuing, and paying income tax. Meanwhile, some activities people do for leisure are hardly popular, including collecting rare paintings, climbing Mount Everest, raising snakes, and playing string quartets. The limited interest in bungee jumping and sadomasochistic pornography shows that even hedonic leisure occasionally fails to win mass appeal. And, finally, some popular culture is disagreeable enough for many people to be anything but leisure for them. That happens when, for example, they are unable to escape obnoxious advertising or the repulsive habits of others (e.g., smoking, for many non smokers; boom box music, for the unappreciative; outlandish dress and bodily decoration, for those not given to in group fashion).

THE LEISURE FRAMEWORK

Leisure is uncoerced activity undertaken during free time. Uncoerced activity is something people evidently want to do and, at a personally satisfying level using their own abilities and resources, succeed in doing. Further, as Kaplan (1960: 22–5) noted, leisure is the antithesis of work and encompasses a range of activity running from inconsequence and insignificance to weightiness and importance.

This observation about the range of leisure activity suggests that leisure is by no means cut entirely from the same cloth, a condition that any exploration of the relationship between leisure and popular culture should never lose sight of. For instance, as will become evident, the vast majority of popular leisure activities can be

qualified as casual rather than serious leisure. Nonetheless, we look first at serious leisure.

SERIOUS LEISURE

Serious leisure is systematic pursuit of an amateur, hobbyist, or volunteer activity that participants find so substantial, interesting, and fulfilling that, in the typical case, they launch themselves on a (leisure) career centered on acquiring and expressing its special skills, knowledge, and experience (Stebbins 1992: 3). The term was coined years ago (Stebbins 1982) following the way in which the people Stebbins had been interviewing and observing since the early 1970s defined the importance of these three kinds of activity in their everyday lives. The adjective "serious" (a word his respondents often used) embodies such qualities as earnestness, sincerity, importance, and carefulness, rather than gravity, solemnity, joylessness, distress, and anxiety. Although the second set of terms occasionally describes serious leisure events, the terms are uncharacteristic of them and fail to nullify, or, in many cases, even dilute, the overall deep fulfillment gained by the participants. The idea of "career" in this definition follows sociological tradition, where careers are seen as available in all substantial, complex roles, including those in leisure. Finally, serious leisure, as will be made clear shortly, is distinct from casual leisure.

Amateurs are found in art, science, sport, and entertainment, where they are invariably linked in a variety of ways with professional counterparts. The two can be distinguished descriptively, in that the activity in question constitutes a livelihood for professionals but not amateurs. Furthermore, professionals work full time at the activity whereas amateurs pursue it part time. Hobbyists lack this professional alter ego, suggesting that, historically, all amateurs were hobbyists before their fields professionalized. Both types are drawn to their leisure pursuits significantly more by self interest than by altruism, whereas volunteers engage in activities requiring a more or less equal blend of these two motives. That is, volunteering is uncoerced help offered either formally or informally with no or, at most, token pay and done for the

benefit of both other people and the volunteer (Stebbins 2001a: ch. 4).

Hobbyists are classified according to five categories: collectors, makers and tinkerers, activity participants (in non competitive, rule based pursuits such as fishing and barbershop singing), players of sports and games (in competitive, rule based activities with no professional counterparts like long distance running and competitive swimming), and enthusiasts of the liberal arts hobbies. The rules guiding non competitive, rule based pursuits are, for the most part, either subcultural (informal) or regulatory (formal). Thus, seasoned hikers in Canada's Rocky Mountains know they should, for example, stay on established trails, pack out all garbage, be prepared for changes in weather, and make noise to scare off bears. Liberal arts hobbyists are enamored of the systematic acquisition of knowledge for its own sake. Many accomplish this by reading voraciously in, for example, a field of art, sport, cuisine, language, culture, history, science, philosophy, politics, or literature (Stebbins 1994).

Serious leisure is further defined by a set of distinctive qualities, qualities uniformly found among its amateurs, hobbyists, and volunteers (Stebbins 1992: 6–8). One is the occasional need to *persevere* at the core activity to continue experiencing there the same level of fulfillment. Another is the opportunity to follow a *career* (in a leisure role) in the endeavor, a career shaped by its own special contingencies, turning points, and stages of achievement and involvement. Third, serious leisure is further distinguished by the requirement that its enthusiasts make significant *personal effort* based on specially acquired knowledge, training, or skill and, indeed at times, all three.

The fourth quality is the numerous *durable benefits* or tangible, salutary outcomes such activity has for its participants. They include self fulfillment, self enrichment, self expression, regeneration or renewal of self, feelings of accomplishment, enhancement of self image, social interaction and sense of belonging, and lasting physical products of the activity (e.g., a painting, scientific paper, piece of furniture). A further benefit – self gratification, or pure fun, which is by far the most evanescent benefit in this list – is also enjoyed by casual leisure participants. The possibility of realizing such

benefits becomes a powerful goal in serious leisure.

Fifth, serious leisure is distinguished by a *unique ethos* that emerges in association with each expression of it. At the core of this ethos is the special social world that begins to take shape when enthusiasts in a particular field pursue substantial shared interests over many years. According to Unruh (1980), every social world has its characteristic groups, events, routines, practices, and organizations. Diffuse and amorphous, it is held together, to an important degree, by semiformal, or mediated, communication. The sixth quality – *distinctive identity* – springs from the fact of the other five distinctive qualities. Participants in serious leisure tend to identify strongly with their chosen pursuits.

Relatively few people – by the author's admittedly impressionistic estimate, no more than 20 percent of the adult population in the typical western society – take up a form of serious leisure. Its requirements of effort, commitment, perseverance, deferred gratification, and so on are too overwhelming and offputting for most people in the modern age. Casual leisure is easier to partake of, and therefore much more susceptible to becoming popular.

CASUAL LEISURE

Casual leisure is immediately intrinsically rewarding, relatively short lived pleasurable activity requiring little or no special training to enjoy it. It is fundamentally hedonic, engaged in for the significant level of pure enjoyment, or pleasure, found there. Stebbins coined the term in the same conceptual statement about serious leisure (Stebbins 1982), his object at the time being to further define serious leisure by showing what it is not. So continuing in that vein, he noted that casual leisure is considerably less substantial and offers no career of the sort found in serious leisure. Yet, subsequently, it became evident that casual leisure needed a conceptual statement of its own (see Stebbins 1997, 2001b).

Eight types of casual leisure have so far been identified, seven of which are also common items of western popular culture. They include *play* (e.g., dabbling at the guitar); *relaxation* (e.g., napping, strolling, people watching); *passive entertainment* (e.g., watching commercial

TV, reading trade books, listening to popular music); *active entertainment* (e.g., playing popular games of chance, card games, party games); *sociable conversation* (e.g., held over coffee, drinks); and *sensory stimulation* (e.g., sightseeing, dining at restaurants, drinking at pubs/bars). The seventh type – *pleasurable aerobic activity* (Stebbins 2004b) – finds its most popular expression in personal exercise aerobics, as pursued collectively in formal classes or individually following a television program or video taped routine as a guide. *Casual volunteering* (a parallel to career volunteering) has yet to generate a popular form, and may never do so.

Furthermore, it is likely that people go in for the different types of casual leisure in combinations of two and three at least as often as they do them separately. For instance, every type can be relaxing, producing in this fashion play–relaxation, passive entertainment–relaxation, and so on. Various combinations of play and sensory stimulation are also possible, as in experimenting with drug use, sexual activity, and thrill seeking in movement. Additionally, sociable conversation accompanies some sessions of sensory stimulation (e.g., drug use, curiosity seeking, display of beauty) as well as some sessions of relaxation and active and passive entertainment, although such conversation normally tends to be rather truncated in the latter two.

Notwithstanding its hedonic nature, casual leisure is by no means wholly frivolous, given that some clear costs and benefits accrue from pursuing it. Moreover, unlike the evanescent hedonism of casual leisure itself, these costs and benefits are enduring. The benefits include serendipitous creativity and discovery in play, regeneration from earlier intense activity, and development and maintenance of interpersonal relationships (Stebbins 2001b). Some of its costs root in excessive casual leisure or lack of variety as manifested in boredom or lack of time for leisure activities that contribute to self through acquisition of skills, knowledge, and experience (i.e., serious leisure). Moreover, casual leisure is alone unlikely to produce a distinctive leisure identity.

Some casual leisure is deviant, even if most of the time the community tolerates such activity (Stebbins 1996b: 3–4; Rojek 1999). Tolerable deviance undertaken for pleasure – as casual leisure – encompasses a range of deviant sexual

activities including cross dressing, homosexuality, watching sex (e.g., striptease, pornographic films), and swinging and group sex. Heavy drinking and gambling, but not their more seriously regarded cousins alcoholism and compulsive gambling, are also tolerably deviant and hence forms of casual leisure, as are the use of cannabis and the illicit, pleasurable use of certain prescription drugs. Social nudism has also been analyzed according to the tolerable deviance perspective (see Stebbins 1996b: chs. 3–7, 9). Yet the very definition of these forms as deviant prevents them from being conceived of as popular culture, while pointing to yet another area where leisure and popular culture cannot be considered identical phenomena.

POPULAR CULTURE: CONSUMPTION/ PRODUCTION

Discussion so far suggests that much of casual leisure can be further understood as *consumption* of particular kinds of popular culture. Indeed, the relationship between leisure and popular culture is much more complicated than acknowledged to this point, in that some people also pursue certain forms of serious leisure (and, we shall see, remunerative work) precisely because they want to *produce* such culture. Table 1 describes this new, more complicated relationship, as expressed along two dimensions: work/leisure and consumption/production.

Both modern common sense and conventional academic wisdom tend to treat work and leisure as though they were two separate worlds, which, however, sometimes fails to jibe with the facts (Stebbins 2004a). Cell 1 of Table 1 directly confronts this misconception by introducing the idea of “occupational devotion.” Occupational devotion is a strong, positive attachment to a

form of self enhancing work. Here, where there is high sense of achievement and intense attraction to the core activity (set of tasks), the line between such work and leisure is virtually erased (Stebbins 2004a: 2–6). “Occupational devotees” express this devotion through their “devotee work.” In terms of the present discussion, popular culture workers meeting the criteria of occupational devotion can be said to be both consumers and producers of their popular culture. Examples include pop music stars who find deep fulfillment while simultaneously making and listening to their music, and commercial painters, writers, and filmmakers who, as they produce their works, enjoy the same kind of aesthetic experience.

The professional work considered in cell 2 is, to be sure, devotee work, but emphasis in this cell is on how popular culture is produced rather than on how it is consumed. Here the reigning conceptual separation of work and leisure is both evident and legitimate. As for cell 3, it needs no additional explanation beyond what was said about casual leisure in the preceding section.

Cell 4 in Table 1 shows that some serious leisure is, in fact, significantly related to popular culture, albeit through production rather than consumption of such culture. Amateur sport and entertainment are two main arenas where this occurs, as seen, for example, in entertainment magic (Stebbins 1993), stand up comedy (Stebbins 1990), collegiate football (Gibson et al. 2002), and mass media covered marathon running (Wilson 1995). Popular displays of hobbyist activities include model rail road exhibitions, barbershop shows (Stebbins 1996a), quilt fairs (King 2001), and the manifold competitions in sport that attract large numbers of spectators (e.g., alpine skiing, speed skating, auto racing, bicycle racing). One

Table 1 Relationship of leisure and popular culture.

<i>Popular culture</i>	<i>Consumption of popular culture</i>	<i>Production of popular culture</i>
As work	(1) Devotee work in sport and entertainment	(2) Professional work (full- and part-time) in sport and entertainment
As leisure	(3) Casual leisure (7 types)	(4) Amateur sport and entertainment, hobbies (displayable forms)

important condition that any serious leisure activity must meet if it is to be consumed as popular culture is its capacity for public display. The liberal arts hobbies as well as some of the collecting hobbies and some of the sports and games (e.g., bridge, chess, marathon running, mountain climbing) lack this capacity and hence cannot, at least in their present form, enter the realm of popular culture.

Volunteering occupies an indeterminate position in all this. Of the three types of serious leisure, it quite possibly draws the largest number of participants (no quantitative comparative data are available). It is also much talked about these days for its key role in creating and maintaining civil society and for its capacity to fill the gap left by business and government through their ongoing failure to deliver needed community services. Yet, apart from volunteering to help organize and run certain popular sports and arts events (e.g., Olympic Games, major arts festivals) – classifiable as an indirect contribution to producing these events – volunteering would appear to be yet another area where leisure and popular culture must be regarded as separate phenomena.

SEE ALSO: Consumption, Fashion and; Culture Industries; Culture, Production of; Deviance; Film; Health Lifestyles; Infotainment; Leisure; Leisure, Aging and; Lifestyle; Lifestyle Consumption; Music; Music and Media; Popular Culture; Popular Culture Forms; Pornography and Erotica; Sport, Amateur

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Lemert, Edwin M. (1912–96)

Robert A. Stebbins

Edwin M. Lemert was born in Cincinnati, Ohio. He received his BA in sociology from Miami University (1934) and his doctorate from Ohio State University (1939), specializing

in sociology and anthropology. He taught briefly at Kent State and Western Michigan Universities. In 1943 he moved to the University of California at Los Angeles, and in 1953 to the University of California at Davis, from which, in 1980, he retired as Professor Emeritus. After formal retirement Lemert worked almost daily in his university office, writing scholarly material until his death in 1996.

Lemert is widely recognized for his pioneering work on labeling theory in the study of deviant behavior, which he called societal reaction theory. He preferred this title because the social or community reaction to deviance in its midst formed a central feature of his perspective. His classic statement of this approach appeared in *Social Pathology: A Systematic Approach to the Theory of Sociopathic Behavior* (1951). His other prominent books were *Social Action and Legal Change* (1970); *Instead of Court: Diversion in Juvenile Justice* (1971); and *Human Deviance, Social Problems, and Social Control* (1972). The latter comprised a collection of his most significant papers to that time. It showcased his extraordinary breadth of interests, running from alcoholism through mental disorder to folklore, speech defects, and check forgery.

Lemert's theory of sociopathic behavior, set out in *Social Pathology*, rests on three central processes. The first is *differentiation*, which refers to the fact that people differ, sometimes deviate, from average characteristics of the population in which they are found and in which they interact with other people. The second process is the *societal reaction* toward the deviance observed, a reaction that includes expressive feelings as well as action directed toward its control. The third process is *individuation*, or the manifestation of the causes of deviance in individuals, which includes how they come to terms with the deviance. This latter process has become the core of modern labeling theory. More particularly, individuation is best understood by looking at the course of events and processes associated with *primary deviation* (deviant behavior that is normalized by the person) and *secondary deviation* (behavior enacted in response to problems caused by the societal reaction). The two types of deviation and their interrelationship foreshadowed the concept of deviant career, formally introduced 12 years later by Becker (1963). Lemert was

also the first to examine the role of stigma in the life of deviants – a precondition of secondary deviation and one later explored in detail by Goffman (1963).

SEE ALSO: Crime; Deviance; Deviance, Theories of; Deviant Careers; Goffman, Erving; Labeling; Labeling Theory; Social Control

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lesbian feminism

Eve Shapiro

Lesbian feminism is a political and philosophical strand of feminism that emerged in the US, Canada, and Britain in the 1970s. It holds as central tenets that heterosexuality is the seat of patriarchal power; lesbianism is a political choice and not an essential identity; and lesbians occupy a unique and empowered position vis à vis sexism and patriarchy because they do not rely on men for emotional, financial, or sexual attention and support. Lesbian feminist ideas, writings, and activism informed and guided both feminist and lesbian movements throughout the 1970s and into the 1980s, and have continued to shape academic theorizing and political organizing to this day. As lesbian feminism evolved, several ideological variations emerged including cultural feminism and separatist feminism.

THE WOMAN IDENTIFIED WOMAN

As Echols (1989) examined in *Daring To Be Bad*, lesbian feminism developed out of radical

feminism in reaction to sexism within gay liberation movements and homophobia within feminist movements of the 1960s. Sparked by Betty Friedan's 1970 characterization of lesbians as the "lavender menace" and an impediment to the National Organization for Women's mission and to the credibility of the feminist movement, lesbians began to theorize and advocate inclusion and recognition from feminist movements. Out of the ensuing debates, groups like the New York based "Radicalesbians," originally known as "Lavender Menace," and the Washington, DC based "Furies" formed. These early lesbian feminist groups quickly articulated a lesbian centered critique of society, sexism, and feminism.

In "The Woman Identified Woman" (1970), the first political statement of the lesbian feminist movement, the Radicalesbians laid out an argument about the construction of sexual identity categories like lesbian and their links to heteronormativity and patriarchy. Radicalesbians argued that "lesbian" as an identity was not just a sexual object choice, but rather a chosen identity that was comprised of a continuum of "women identified women." Defining lesbian feminism as central to feminism, "The Woman Identified Woman" and other early writings established sexuality as a key vector of oppression and integrated these critiques into broader feminist political ideology and burgeoning feminist academic theorizing. One common lesbian feminist slogan of the time, attributed to Ti Grace Atkinson and drawn from Jill Johnston's (1973) theorizing in *Lesbian Nation*, was "feminism is the theory and lesbianism is the practice." The implication of this statement was that feminist theorizing demanded a woman centered focus and that this woman identified approach was what constituted a "lesbian." Also implied is the notion that identifying as a lesbian was at the least a political choice, if not a political responsibility, for feminists. Contrary to other feminist ideological approaches that ignored sexuality, silenced lesbians, and argued that lesbian inclusion threatened the viability of the whole movement, lesbian feminism positioned lesbians at the center of a feminist liberation movement.

THE LESBIAN CONTINUUM

Approaching lesbian as a political identity required a radical redefinition of lesbian. In "Compulsory Heterosexuality and Lesbian Existence," one of the most important texts of lesbian feminist theorizing, Adrienne Rich (1980) theorized the connections between heterosexuality and patriarchy, argued for the reclamation of an erased lesbian history across cultures and times, and discussed in detail the concept of the "lesbian continuum." What Rich articulated, and what lesbian feminism organized around, was the idea that because sexuality was a socially constructed tool of patriarchy, all women had the power to reclaim the term lesbian in an effort to resist patriarchal dominance. Expanding lesbian beyond a self identified marker of sexuality to include women who identified themselves sexually, spiritually, emotionally, *or* politically with other women, Rich argued that there was a lesbian continuum that opened up space for *all* women to be lesbians. Lesbian feminist ideology held that this was the cornerstone of dismantling patriarchy and gaining gender equity.

Elaborating her argument, Rich positioned the erasure of lesbian history as the erasure of a history of resistance to male domination and compulsory heterosexuality, and argued this erasure was necessary for the maintenance of patriarchal power. Other writers further theorized and supported the broadening of "lesbian" in their own work. Lillian Faderman's book *Surpassing the Love of Men: Romantic Friendship and Love Between Women from the Renaissance to the Present* (1991) was a critical text in reclaiming a lost history of women identified women. Building on Rich's argument that woman identification had been erased in an effort to subordinate women, Faderman argued the long history of lesbian existence, supported by evidence of both emotional and physical intimacy between women across cultures and time periods.

Ideologically, the "lesbian continuum" fostered a belief for many white lesbian feminists that a shared woman identification united all women regardless of race, class, nation, or sexuality. In other words, gender became the

primary axis of both oppression and resistance. Extension of this argument can be seen in many academic and movement texts. For example, writer and theologian Mary Daly has argued over the past 25 years for a woman centric analytical approach, and theoretical traditions like standpoint epistemology draw on a belief in a shared “women’s standpoint.”

Alongside theoretical developments, lesbian feminist ideology promoted critiques of existing institutions and alternative women centered institutions. Two related but distinct branches emerged within lesbian feminism in the 1970s. One branch often referred to as cultural feminism focused on developing and fostering woman centered institutions. The other – lesbian separatism – took this a step further and argued for a complete withdrawal from men and male dominated institutions.

CULTURAL FEMINISM

Out of critiques of patriarchal society and calls for a woman identified life, lesbian feminists began advocating for and developing woman identified counterinstitutions. They founded feminist bookstores in most cities, and publishing houses and presses like Naiad Press and Spinsters Ink, auto shops, health collectives, and other institutions. In addition, lesbian feminist communities developed alternative cultural products like goddess focused spiritualities, music labels like Olivia, and a genre of women’s music with lesbian feminist artists like Ferron and Cris Williamson, Tret Fure, and Holly Near. Extending a critique of masculinist language lesbian feminism developed alternative language like womyn, wimmin, and womb moon, and invented non patrnomial naming traditions, renaming themselves with woman focused names like Dykewomon. Lesbian feminist activists developed new repertoires including zaps, which were symbolic protests aimed at cultural/ideological change as much as at political reform. Like radical feminism, lesbian feminists argued for a refocusing on women’s sexuality independent from heterosexual intercourse and/or the male gaze. Part of being a woman identified woman meant rejecting dominant beauty and fashion norms as patriarchal, and adopting an androgynous,

makeup free appearance. This style, characterized by flannel, jeans, sandals, and short hair, was often referred to as “the uniform” and was the dominant lesbian feminist aesthetic through the 1970s and 1980s.

This new ideological focus on gendered beauty standards and sexuality led to a critique of both the existing butch/femme lesbian culture and the emerging sex radical lesbian communities. Lesbian feminism characterized butch/femme culture as an oppressive mimicry of sexist and misogynist heterosexual gender relations. Similarly, the increasingly visible sex radical community, which included an emergent women’s sadomasochism community and sex worker community, was characterized as replicating, enacting, and perpetuating violence against women. These debates, referred to as the lesbian sex wars, came to a head at the 1982 “The Scholar and the Feminist IX: Towards a Politics of Sexuality,” where lesbian feminists battled each other throughout the conference over the meaning and politics of sexuality (Vance 1984).

Radical feminists both in feminist communities and in academic theorizing critiqued lesbian feminist cultural development as escapism and dubbed this “cultural feminism” counterproductive to struggles for political change. Based on field studies of 14 lesbian feminist communities Taylor and Whittier (1992) challenged this depiction and argued that the development of women’s culture within lesbian feminism was critical in sustaining feminist activism during the increasing conservatism of the 1980s and 1990s. Exploring the lesbian feminist focus on personal and cultural change as well as political change, Taylor and Whittier conclude that “cultural feminism,” or, as they prefer, lesbian feminist community, signaled the development of new social movement forms and tactics. The cultural products, institutions, and norms that emerged in the 1970s within lesbian feminist communities sustained and enabled these movements and movement organizations over the past 30 years.

LESBIAN SEPARATISM

Charlotte Bunch, a writer and member of the “Furies,” a lesbian feminist collective of writers

and activists, argued in 1972 that lesbianism is not just a political choice, but that women *must* be both lesbian and feminist to fight patriarchy and end sexism. The Furies was a short lived Washington, DC collective (1971–2) that was profoundly influential and included writers like Charlotte Bunch and Rita Mae Brown, and activists like Ginny Berson, who went on to found Olivia Records. Unlike cultural lesbian feminist groups, however, separatist groups believed that lesbians needed to remove themselves from male dominated society in order to effect significant social change. Like cultural feminism, separatism advocated the creation of alternative woman oriented institutions, but went further to argue that lesbians needed to separate themselves from both men *and* heterosexual women. Many separatists argued that heterosexual women were “sleeping with the enemy” and therefore were part of the problem, not the solution. This separatist ideology encouraged the creation of women only spaces like the Michigan Women’s Music Festival as well as more permanent women’s communities in rural areas. Women’s communes and communities were founded across the United States, Australia, and England and many, like Womanshare in Oregon and Camp Sister Spirit in rural Mississippi, continue to exist today.

SCHOLARSHIP

Two bodies of research have emerged in relation to lesbian feminism. Sociological research about lesbian feminist movements, culture, and communities has developed in the fields of gender studies, sexuality studies, and social movements. Additionally, for many academics lesbian feminist ideologies and beliefs were incorporated into their work, and lesbian feminist commitments guided research topics and approaches.

Many scholars like Adrienne Rich, Gayle Rubin, Charlotte Bunch, and Lillian Faderman merged academic theorizing and lesbian feminist ideology in the late 1970s and early 1980s, allowing one to inform the other. Lesbian feminist gendered critiques and theorizing around heterosexuality, patriarchy, and feminism were a catalyst for and informed theoretical developments in nascent gender and sexuality

studies. Simultaneously, the woman identification associated with lesbian feminism encouraged research on and by women and about women’s lives across disciplines including history, literary studies, and the social sciences. For women of color academics like Barbara Smith and Audre Lorde, the lack of theorizing around race in both academic and activist communities led to a simultaneous and interconnected critique that was central in sparking further research and writing by women of color within lesbian feminist movements, and in the incorporation of race in lesbian feminist analysis and scholarship.

Alongside scholarship informed by lesbian feminist movements was the emergence of research about lesbian feminist movements. Contrary to earlier research on “deviant” sexuality which took an individualist and pathological approach, many sociologists began in the 1980s and 1990s to examine lesbian communities in general, and lesbian feminism more specifically, through cultural studies, gender studies, and social movements lenses. Two of the first texts to reexamine lesbian feminist movements were Taylor and Rupp (1993) and Nancy Whittier’s *Feminist Generations* (1995). These studies examined the role of political ideology and collective identity within lesbian feminist communities and argued that lesbian identity needed to be examined as socially constructed within the context of social and political communities. Taylor and Rupp challenged the dismissal of culture and cultural products and argued that culture was not only central to the success and sustenance of lesbian feminist movements, but that it also plays an important role in social movements more broadly. Based on an in depth case study of lesbian feminist communities in Columbus, Ohio, Whittier found that the meaning of feminism and the collective identity among lesbian feminists changed over time for participants. Arlene Stein (1997) extended this analysis and argued that lesbian feminism was a product of the Cold War and 1960s liberation movements. Lesbian feminism, in turn, produced new discourses about lesbian identity, feminism, and community. These new lesbian feminist discourses, according to Stein, have played crucial roles in shaping contemporary feminist and lesbian movements. Scholars like Suzanne Staggenborg

have furthered these analyses and approached lesbian feminism from a social movements perspective.

CRITIQUES

There have been three main critiques of lesbian feminist movements and theorizing since the 1970s. Perhaps the most significant critique emerged alongside lesbian feminism in the 1970s from women of color and poor women. Lesbian feminist ideology relies on an essential shared womanhood that transcends other differences and situates gender as the primary vector of oppression in society. For women of color and poor women who experienced gender, class, and race as interconnected identities and oppressions, this ideology erased and invalidated their experiences. In *This Bridge Called My Back* (Anzaldúa & Moraga 1981), women of color spoke about exclusion within lesbian feminist communities and advocated for new, integrative activist and academic approaches. More recently, notions of essential womanhood (and exclusion based on this) have also been challenged by transgender communities. Transgender women continue to argue for a place within lesbian feminist and separatist spaces like Michigan Women's Music Festival, most of which maintain "woman born woman" policies.

Alongside critiques of essentialist arguments at the root of lesbian feminist ideology, sex radical communities have continued to challenge the rigid sexual politics within lesbian feminist communities. This rift between "pro sex" and "anti sex" feminists has remained volatile and has been played out in academic circles as well as in lesbian feminist communities through boycotts and protests of sex positive writers and activists like Patrick (formerly Pat) Califia, and legislative battles over anti pornography legislation spearheaded by Andrea Dworkin and Catherine MacKinnon.

Finally, the emergence of queer theory in the 1990s has challenged lesbian feminist theoretical and analytical approaches to gender, sexuality, and inequality. The focus in queer theory on decentering identity and focusing on sexual power broadly instead of on patriarchy or heterosexism has led to a dismissal of much of

lesbian feminist research and critique of lesbian feminist ideology as outdated. As many feminists have argued, however, identity politics have been and continue to be central to lesbian and feminist organizing and community building. Despite these criticisms, lesbian feminism continues to influence contemporary feminist and lesbian movements and many of the institutions founded in the 1970s and 1980s by lesbian feminist communities continue to thrive.

SEE ALSO: Cultural Feminism; Feminism; Feminism, First, Second, and Third Waves; Feminist Activism in Latin America; Gay and Lesbian Movement; Lesbianism; Radical Feminism; Sexualities and Culture Wars; Social Movements; Women's Movements

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lesbian and gay families

Brian Heaphy

In the narrowest sense, the term "lesbian and gay family" refers to lesbian and gay individuals or same sex couples and their children. The term is sometimes used to refer to same sex partnerships or cohabiting relationships. In the broadest sense, the term can denote social networks that include lesbian or gay individuals and/or couples where some or all of the members self define as "family." These latter arrangements have also been described as "surrogate," "friendship," or "chosen" families.

Lesbian and gay families have become high profile social and political issues since the 1980s. They touch on a broad range of sociological themes to do with family life and social change, family diversity, and alternative family practices. The topics of lesbian and gay families and families of choice have played an important part in debates on the demise of traditional conceptions of family, the legitimacy of new family forms, and contemporary reconfigurations of family obligations, responsibilities, and care. Existing sociological work on the topics includes theorizing and research into the historical, social, and political forces that have facilitated the emergence of lesbian and gay families

and families of choice; theoretical discussions of their social and political significance; and studies of the meanings, structures, and social practices associated with them at local levels.

Prior to the 1960s, homosexual relationships were subject to legal and social sanctions in societies and were culturally invisible. European and North American research on lesbian and gay families in the pre 1960s era suggests that they are best conceptualized as "surrogate" family forms, made up of adults who provided mutual comfort and support in the face of hostile social environments. During the 1960s and 1970s, the politics of sexual liberation opened up distinctive possibilities for the formation of lesbian and gay identities that challenged heterosexual ideologies. Research suggests that while surrogate families continued to be important for some lesbians and gay men, other arrangements began to emerge, including self consciously alternative family forms. While surrogate and alternative arrangements provided emotional and practical supports to their adult members, the latter more frequently included children from previous heterosexual relationships, and were more likely to be influenced by feminist and other political critiques of the role of the family in the reproduction of gendered and sexual inequalities.

Several theorists have argued that the emergence of AIDS in the 1980s and political responses to it were key factors in shaping the current emphasis in lesbian and gay politics on family issues in Europe and North America. Initially, Moral Right responses to AIDS reinforced the historical construction of lesbians and gay men as a threat to the family. In the United Kingdom, for example, legislation was introduced in the late 1980s (commonly known as Section 28) that explicitly sought to ban the promotion by local authorities of homosexuality "as a pretended family relationship." Such interventions, however, had the reverse effect of mobilizing a lesbian and gay family oriented politics. Some theorists have further argued that community based caring responses to AIDS were ultimately to underscore the importance of family type relationships for lesbians and gay men. This view has been criticized on the basis that it undermines the existence of non heterosexual caring relationships that pre existed AIDS.

It is more generally accepted that lesbian and gay community responses to AIDS facilitated the institution building and increased cultural and political confidence that were essential in making possible greater social tolerance, if not acceptance, of lesbian and gay families. This increased confidence has also been argued to be crucial in opening up a new family vision amongst lesbians and gay men. This, some argue, is clearly visible in the sharp rise in lesbian and gay individuals and couples who are choosing to become parents *as* lesbians and gay men. It is also evident in the ways in which lesbian and gay politics has become organized around family issues such as the rights to parent, adopt, and marry. It is further evident in ways in which lesbians and gay men are now days likely to include accepting members of family of origin in their chosen families.

While lesbian and gay families have long been of interest to scholars of sexualities, they have more recently come to the attention of sociologists of family life. This new interest is partly due to the current concern with family diversity and changing patterns of relating. Lesbian and gay families are now being explored for the insights they provide into the challenges and possibilities presented by detraditionalized family life. From this perspective, these family forms are studied for how they are structured and operate outside institutionalized norms and supports that have traditionally shaped "the" family. Because of the lack of gender based differences in same sex relationships, lesbian and gay families are also examined for the possibilities of organizing family without clearly defined gendered roles. A number of theorists have argued that because of the lack of gendered assumptions, lesbian and gay families are more likely to adopt a friendship model for relating, and operate according to an egalitarian ideal. Empirical studies that have set out to explore the meanings, structure, and practices of lesbian and gay families and families of choice suggest a complex picture.

Existing research indicates various traditions of the usage of the family terminology in non heterosexual cultures, and the complex and fluid meanings that family has for individuals. North American research has indicated that parental terminology of "mother" and "father" has been used by younger lesbians and gay men

to refer to older, non heterosexual friends and mentors in historically and contextually specific ways. The terms "brothers" and "sisters" have long been used by some lesbians and gay men to denote the affective and/or political significance of non heterosexual friendship. The refrain of "we are family" has also been used in lesbian and gay political life to refer to the affective political bonds that are perceived to underpin non heterosexual communities. Despite these traditions, the research indicates that while many lesbians and gay men embrace the terminology of family to talk about partners and friends, others see it as only applicable to relationships based on caring for children. Others still view the terminology of the family with hostility, and are critical of the normalizing potential of its employment in relation to lesbian and gay life.

Studies indicate some considerable diversity in how lesbian and gay families are structured and constituted. However, lesbians and gay men generally appear to distinguish between the families they grew up with and the relationships they "choose" as adults. Family, when used to describe the latter, can include partners, ex partners, children where they exist, friends, and certain members of family of origin. The inclusion of "given" kin is not automatic, and is usually dependent on the quality of the commitment and emotional bond. The research does suggest, however, that lesbians and gay men are increasingly likely to maintain committed relationships with at least some members of their family of origin. This is especially the case amongst lesbians and gay parents who wish to develop generational links between their children and the families/parents they grew up with.

A number of studies have explored the place, roles, and experience of children in lesbian and gay families. Until recently, such studies tended to be concerned with the implications of growing up in these family forms. Most of this research suggests that this experience is unlikely to have any discernible long term impact on children's sense of well being, social connectedness, or family or personal security. Because of the changing historical circumstances in which lesbians and gay men have become parents, most existing studies are of lesbian and gay families with children who were conceived

through a parent's previous heterosexual relationship. Recent studies have, however, begun to focus on the experience of families with children, where same sex couples, individuals, or friends have chosen to take advantage of recent opportunities to become parents through self or assisted insemination, surrogacy, adoption, and fostering. Many of these studies have moved beyond the focus on children's experience to also explore the blurring of the boundaries between biological and social parenting and the negotiated nature of same sex parenting.

The theme of negotiation has also emerged as an important one in research that has studied how lesbian and gay couples challenge or reproduce the norms and values traditionally associated with family life. Studies indicate that same sex couples value core beliefs about emotional commitment and mutual care and support. However, they can also structure and "do" their relationships in ways that are self consciously opposed to assumptions and norms in heterosexual couple life. One fairly consistent finding concerns the extent to which lesbian and gay couples tend to be more reflexive and democratic than their heterosexual counterparts. This appears especially to be the case in relation to the organization and negotiation of domestic duties. Studies suggest that because same sex couples cannot assume domestic or partnership roles based on gender, there is more scope for the negotiation of couple practices. A number of studies have argued that this is indicative of an egalitarian ideal that is common amongst same sex partners. This, in turn, has been argued to be rooted in the friendship ethos that underpins same sex relationships, and is seen to open up creative possibilities for mutually satisfying relationships. Same sex couple negotiations and creativity have also been studied in relation to the negotiability of monogamy as a marker for couple commitment. While monogamy tends to be assumed in heterosexual couples, same sex couples tend to negotiate whether the relationship will be monogamous or not. Same sex couples often have explicit ground rules to guide the operation of non monogamous sexual relationships and to protect the primacy of the couple's emotional commitment. Sexual exclusivity is not, however, viewed as necessary or desirable for couple commitments or stability.

Friendship families have been regarded as the most creative form of lesbian and gay relationships and research has explored these as sources of emotional, economic, and social support. Most studies confirm the significance of these for emotional sustenance and various forms of material and social support. Some studies do suggest, however, that friendship families mostly provide a context for care in relation to "everyday" problems, and tend not to be relied upon in terms of long term physical care. While research has documented the crucial role of friendship families in caring for people with AIDS in the 1980s and 1990s, and some small qualitative studies suggest they are important sources of practical support in times of other health crises, it appears that the friendship ethos underpinning these families can inform a strong sense of what constitutes appropriate levels of physical care. The friendship ethos, it is argued, emphasizes reciprocity and co independence. This implies that an expectation of long term physical care from friends can be viewed as inappropriate and undesirable. Long term couple partners, on the other hand, are most often identified in research as the first choice as providers of care should it be needed. Some studies indicate that ex partners can also have agreements to provide mutual care. A number of studies have, however, pointed out the difficulties partners and ex partners can face in juggling work and other commitments with long term caring commitments. This is especially the case where the caring role is not supported or recognized as legitimate by state agencies or employers.

The issue of care in lesbian and gay families raises a number of topics that could be fruitfully explored in future research, such as: the resilience or otherwise of lesbian and gay families as sources for care and support across the life course; the significance of children, friendship, and chosen families for supporting lesbians and gay men in later life; and the range of social and political factors that limit and enable the possibilities that lesbian and gay families have been said in theory to offer. Theory and research could also explore the implications for lesbian and gay families of their marginalization and/or normalization in different national, geographical, and social contexts, and the ways in which

the challenges they face are common or other wise to other “new” family forms.

SEE ALSO: AIDS, Sociology of; Cohabitation; Family Diversity; Gay and Lesbian Movement; Homosexuality; Intimacy; Same Sex Marriage/ Civil Unions

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lesbianism

Tamsin Wilton

Although it is generally accepted that “lesbianism” refers to sexual contact between women, this is by no means an adequate definition. Indeed, it is not possible to provide such a definition. The complexities of the political economy of sexuality mean that the word is subject to continual contestation among many diverse interest groups, to the extent that there is not even agreement that sexual contact – or even desire – is necessarily definitional.

Lesbianism is equally subject to theoretical contestation, in particular between essentialists and constructionists. It is, therefore, something of an exemplary topic for demonstrating the political and theoretical processes at work within the social sciences more broadly, as well as being the commonly accepted descriptor for a group of women marginalized and subject to varying degrees of stigma and sanction because they prefer other women as their sexual partners.

There are two main strands of debate concerning the nature of lesbianism, the theoretical and the political. Both have their origins in the social processes which gave rise to the concept of lesbianism in the first place, so it is helpful to begin with a brief historical overview.

Etymologically, the word “lesbian” is of late nineteenth century origin and refers to the island of Lesbos/Lesbos in the Greek archipelago where, in the classical period, the poet Sappho lived. Revered in her own time – Plato referred to her as “the tenth Muse” – examples of her poetry which have survived include fervent expressions of her passionate feelings for women. Love between women, therefore, became popularly known as Lesbian or Sapphic love, in the same allusive way that love between men was referred to as “Greek love.”

The early sexologists employed “lesbianism” to mean “female homosexuality.” This linguistic shift from using “Lesbian” as an adjective, a term which was allusive and euphemistic, to using “lesbianism” as a noun with pretensions to scientific accuracy exemplifies the theoretical and political shift toward the construct of homosexuality *as an innate condition*. It is this shift which Michel Foucault identified, in the first volume of *The History of Sexuality*, as marking the transition from ecclesiastical juridical to medical constructions of sexuality. “The nineteenth century homosexual,” he concludes, “became a personage, a past, a case history, and a childhood, in addition to being a type of life, a life form and a morphology, with an indiscreet anatomy and possibly a mysterious physiology” (1979: 43).

Lesbianism was initially approached by social scientists, in the 1950s and 1960s, as one of many forms of deviant behavior, and lesbians and gay men in most of the industrialized English speaking West were studied in the context

of a necessarily secretive underground subculture. As such, they tended to be presented as exemplary of Goffman's theories of stigma, and of primary and secondary deviance.

In Britain, this situation slowly changed following the 1957 publication of the Wolfenden Report, recommending the decriminalization of homosexuality. In 1968 the first key paper to offer an early social constructionist approach to sexuality, "The Homosexual Role," was published by British sociologist Mary McIntosh. McIntosh found biomedical claims for essentialism to be weak, and concluded that to ask whether homosexuality is innate or acquired is to ask the wrong question. She went on to argue that "the conception of homosexuality as a condition is, in itself, an object of study" (1981 [1968]: 31). It is arguable that her paper laid the foundations not only for the social constructionist model of sexuality but also for what later became known as queer theory, since her conclusion implies the need to problematize the taken for grantedness of heterosexuality.

Once the social constructionist standpoint is accepted, then, rather than ask questions such as "what is the incidence of lesbianism in the female population?" or "how have different cultures responded to their lesbian members?" we have to ask, "in whose interests is it to reproduce the idea of lesbianism, and what social and political functions does it perform?" This has meant that the social constructionist position has been of particular utility to feminist theorists, for whom the social control of female sexuality has been a key concern.

The essentialist/constructionist debates, between those who regarded same sex behaviors as willfully chosen and those who believed they were symptomatic of an innate condition, became closely associated with two key opposing strands in lesbian and gay civil rights activism. Thus, within both essentialism and constructionism, there exist positively and negatively valued accounts of lesbianism. Within the essentialist position may be found medical scientists seeking an etiology, a definitive symptomatology, and (at least by implication) a cure, alongside lesbian and gay liberationists whose claims for human and civil rights are based on the notion that it is unethical to discriminate against a minority group on the basis of something over which they have no control.

Within the constructionist position there is radically polarized political disagreement between those for whom lesbian behaviors represent a threat to the social order and must be eradicated, and those who claim that it is an empowering and positive choice for women seeking to escape the emotional and political consequences of patriarchy.

Social constructionism has tended to be far less rigorously founded in empirical research than has essentialism, largely because it developed as a theoretical offshoot of poststructuralism and postmodernism. However, it is evidence based, insofar as it draws upon historical texts and anthropological evidence, and McIntosh's paper is exemplary of this.

Of key importance to the sociology of sexuality in general, and of lesbianism in particular, has been the recognition that the relationship between sexual behaviors, desires, and identities is complex and may be contradictory. Here, most of the evidence comes from research done with gay men, including Laud Humphries's *Tearoom Trade* (1974), a ground breaking study of men who have casual sex with other men, and later research carried out in the interests of HIV/AIDS prevention by groups such as Project Sigma. This body of research demonstrates that a heterosexual identity does not necessarily preclude same sex activity, nor does a gay identity prevent men from engaging in heterosexual.

Researchers have been less interested in lesbian identities and sexual behaviors, partly because sex between women carries very little risk of HIV transmission. There is also the complicating factor of lesbian feminism and, in particular, a radical lesbian feminist politics of the erotic. The renaissance of the women's movement in the 1960s and 1970s had profound consequences for lesbian theory and practice, two elements of which are of particular interest to sociologists. The first is the desexualization of lesbianism by a small group of revolutionary lesbian feminists – together with the vigorous contestation of that position by self defined "sex radical" lesbians such as Pat (later Patrick) Califia, Joan Nestle, and Dorothy Allison – and the second is the observation that a number of women did, indeed, make a conscious political choice to become lesbians. Some eventually returned to heterosexuality and others identified as celibate lesbian feminists. Others, however,

entered into sexually active partnerships, thus changing their "sexual orientation" by an act of will, something which biomedical theories are unable to take account of.

Later research into lesbian lives and experiences demonstrates that many women "come out" as lesbian relatively late in life, after a significant period of heterosexual activity. Such findings do not, of course, automatically overturn essentialist claims, since the policing of female sexuality makes it likely that women who are "innately" lesbian might be effectively socialized into heteronormativity by, for example, strong social pressures to marry and have children, and may thus not "discover" their "true nature" until something happens to make them question their assumptions. In addition, female sexuality is discursively constructed as emotional rather than pleasure driven, and the hegemonic discourse of heterosexual sex represents men as sexually inept and women as difficult to arouse. This suggests that a woman who gains little pleasure from heterosexual activity is likely to regard this as normal, and this, too, may delay recognition of innate lesbianism.

However, detailed qualitative research using semi structured interviews and focus groups has found that women may enter into lesbian relationships and take on a lesbian identity after many years of *successful* heterosexual relationships. Whilst some women report sexual and/or emotional unhappiness in their earlier heterosexual relationships, others report that they found heterosexuality to be physically and emotionally satisfying but that they prefer, for a variety of reasons, lesbian relationships. This body of research is relatively new, but seems likely to provide data which will make it increasingly difficult to maintain essentialist claims for female sexuality.

The development of feminist social science in the 1980s and 1990s incorporated research that paid attention to lesbian lives. Areas of interest were largely driven by the need to justify civil rights claims and to resist a particularly homophobic era in political life, represented in the UK by the government of Margaret Thatcher and in the US by the Christian Right and Reaganism. Researchers therefore looked at lesbian parenting, kinship and family formation, and the impact of homophobia on well being. Such research played a significant part in, for

example, the family courts, where it was increasingly accepted that lesbianism should not automatically result in women losing custody of their children.

The more theoretical research agenda included a specifically lesbian strand of critical and "high" theory. Lesbian academics began to produce theory from a position self consciously marginal to the mainstream of what was (and largely continues to be) an unreflexively heteronormative social science. In the United States, lesbian authored accounts of lesbian lives, experiences, and identities were often produced by women working outside formal academic institutions. In Britain, on the other hand, most lesbians undertaking such research did so within universities. Annabel Faraday's 1981 paper "Liberating Lesbian Research" critiqued the androcentricity of existing research, and set the tone for the next decade of British lesbian sociology. Lesbian psychologists Celia Kitzinger and Sue Wilkinson provoked an extremely defensive response when they challenged heterosexual feminist scholars to problematize their sexualities and reflect on the impact which their heterosexuality had on their feminist praxis. The resulting collection, *Heterosexuality: A Feminism and Psychology Reader* (1993), remains the only published work by heterosexual feminists critiquing their own sexuality. Shortly afterwards, Diane Richardson published *Theorizing Heterosexuality* (1996), a collection of papers by both lesbian and non lesbian sociologists, and the "new" lesbian sociology was established.

Lesbian social science grew out of feminist theory, so it is not surprising that it followed a similar developmental trajectory. From early papers such as Faraday's, which wrote lesbians into existing research, developed work such as Tamsin Wilton's *Lesbian Studies: Setting an Agenda* (1995), which explored the intellectual and disciplinary lacunae resulting from lesbian invisibility in the academy, working from the assumption that "lesbian" was a theoretical position which might productively be adopted by any scholar, regardless of sexual preference. In her enormously influential book *Gender Trouble* (1999), Judith Butler drew upon the artifice of the drag queen to demonstrate that gender, and the sexual stereotypes with which it is associated, is performative rather than natural. *Gender Trouble* is generally regarded as the

Ur text of queer theory, a theoretical position which problematizes all genders and all sexualities rather than simply non normative variants.

With the (important) exception of Michel Foucault, the key queer theorists – Butler, Eve Sedgwick, Elizabeth Grosz, and others – have been lesbians who identify as feminist theorists. Since queer theory is primarily concerned with the gendering of sexualities (and vice versa), this is perhaps not surprising. Queer theory takes a social constructionist position as given. However, outside the rarefied atmosphere of universities, essentialist explanations for sexuality continue to dominate popular understandings of the subject.

The debate between essentialism and constructionism is more than merely academic. To this day, lesbianism is regarded by many as immoral or criminal, and punishment for engaging in lesbian behaviors – particularly, but not exclusively, in Islamic theocracies – may be severe. Imprisonment is not uncommon, and the death penalty is still enforced in several countries. In this context it is not surprising that activists have traditionally drawn upon essentialism, insisting that it is both irrational and unjust to penalize individuals for being who they are. It was for precisely such reasons that the early sexologists argued that lesbianism and male homosexuality were innate. English writer John Addington Symonds, summing up these debates for a British audience, argued that: “To deal with [homosexuals] according to your [legal] code is no less monstrous than if you were to punish the colour blind, or the deaf and dumb, or albinos, or crooked back cripples” (1984 [1928]: 180). There is a mainstream in lesbian and gay political activism which adopts this position. Many lesbian feminists, however, take the opposite position and have argued that lesbianism represents the best kind of intimate relationship available to a woman, allowing her effectively to sidestep the psychological, cultural, and material restrictions imposed on women under male supremacy. From this political perspective, lesbianism is a choice open to all women, and it is rare to find an essentialist lesbian feminist.

One notable exception to this argument is offered by Monique Wittig who, in her 1981 paper “One Is Not Born a Woman,” argues that lesbians are not women at all, since the word

“woman” refers to membership of a class which stands in a specific relation to the class “man.” Wittig’s position might be thought of as a “strong” version of social constructionism, since she exempts lesbians from the social construct “woman” by reason of their lack of fit with the cultural and material processes which are implied by that construct.

The two extremes, essentialism and social constructionism, demarcate the political contestations which have continued to develop around “lesbianism” and which are, inevitably, key components in the ongoing social and cultural construction of female sexuality, whether lesbian or not.

The essentialist position, from which “lesbianism” is a condition of the same kind as – for example – autism, depends upon biomedical science for its evidence. Its research methods include twin studies, measurement of body parts, and microscopic analysis of brain tissue taken from cadavers. All such studies are predicated upon the assumption that for an individual to feel sexual desire and love for members of her own sex constitutes an error of gender. Thus, scientists working within the essentialist paradigm aim to identify masculine elements in the physiology of the “lesbian body.” Genitals, inner ear structure, fingerprints, relative finger length, the interstitial nuclei of a part of the brain known as the anterior hypothalamus, and secondary sex characteristics such as nipples and body hair have all been claimed by different researchers as demonstrating “wrong sex” characteristics in individuals identified (albeit some times after death) as lesbian or gay.

Feminists have criticized biomedical research for its traditional strong bias toward androgyny. That is, the physiology of the male body is accepted as the ideal or typical physiology of humankind whilst that of the female body is either ignored or regarded as an extraordinary case. It is therefore not surprising to find that lesbians have been far less often the subjects of biomedical research into “homosexuality” than have men.

Another problem is that biomedicine is the product of the industrial nations of the West, and unreflexively reproduces as a generalizable norm the gender roles regarded as proper in those nations. Those gender roles themselves are intimately implicated in the social construction of

heteronormativity, inasmuch as the behavior of women and of men is assumed to be largely shaped by their presumptive role in the reproduction of the species. Within the heteronormative paradigm, female sexuality is constructed as reproductively driven, in contrast to that of men, which is assumed to be pleasure driven and instrumental. Female sexual desire, therefore, becomes something of an oxymoron, and lesbian sex, which cannot be reproductive, is not only unfeminine or masculine, it is not “really” sex at all.

The heteronormative construct of lesbian sex as non sex, identified by lesbian theorists Diane Richardson and Anna Marie Smith, and of female sexuality as trivial other than when associated with the reproductive imperative, compounds the existing tendency of biomedicine to ignore women altogether.

Many have suggested that it is only by ignoring lesbianism that biomedical researchers can continue to make claims for homosexuality as an innate or acquired condition, since women’s sexual lives are both more complex and more fluid than are men’s. As Edward Stein notes in his book *The Mismeasure of Desire* (1999), “If women’s sexual desires were put at the centre of our theorizing about the origins of sexual orientation, the case for multiple origins would be readily apparent.”

There are two major obstacles to conducting social scientific research into “lesbianism.” The first is that the stigma which attaches to lesbianism makes this a hidden and “hard to reach” group of people, and that researchers have great difficulty in accessing lesbian research participants other than that small group of women confident and assertive enough to be publicly “out.”

The second is that “lesbianism” is, in many ways, a term of little use to researchers. It is all but impossible to define the term in a way which allows for adequately rigorous research – as becomes evident from a critical scrutiny of most biomedical research into “lesbianism.”

From a social scientific perspective, essentialist claims appear somewhat naïve, since they depend on ignoring the social and historical contingency of human sexuality. It is not even possible to claim that, always and everywhere, there have been women who demonstrate a strong sexual preference for members of their

own sex. Historical documentation does exist for the existence of women whose sexual and emotional preference for other women led them to take the risk of “passing” as men and living as such with female partners. Such documentation largely takes the form of court records relating to the trial of women whose deception was uncovered. Emma Donoghue provides evidence going back to the seventeenth century in Europe, and there is some evidence that some precolonial indigenous cultures in the African, American, and Indian subcontinents had developed accepted roles for women who wanted to take on a male role in life, including “marriages” with other women. However, historical evidence about women’s lives is far less detailed and robust than is the case for men’s, and it is often difficult to know how useful contemporary notions of lesbianism are when interpreting historical or anthropological data.

The gendered power relations of patriarchally structured societies impact strongly upon female sexuality and upon the evidence available to historians and social scientists. It is generally the case that women’s sexuality is policed by, and in the interests of, men. Patriarchal institutions, including the established religions, medicine, and the law, have also tended to exert particularly rigorous control over women’s sexual and emotional lives, whilst the economic and social power of men and the relegation of women to the domestic and private sphere means that women have very little autonomy. Whilst the industrialized nations of the developed world have recently undergone a certain degree of transformation of gender relations in response to the demands of feminist political campaigns, such changes are historically recent and far from universal.

It is, therefore, very difficult to assess the likelihood of women entering into sexual relationships with each other, or even engaging in fleeting sexual contact with each other, at different historical periods or in different cultures. Whereas the historical records contain substantial evidence of sexual contact between men, this is not the case for women. Given that the material, political, and cultural circumstances required for women to achieve any degree of autonomy have been relatively rare until the twentieth century, and given that the policing of women’s sexuality has been both

geopolitically widespread and ideologically driven, it seems unlikely that many of the world's women have been able to develop much of a sense of themselves as sexual beings at all, much less experience and act on desire for each other.

It is, therefore, not possible to claim that something called "lesbianism" exists as any kind of universal human experience, or that it represents – as some evolutionary psychologists have claimed – a naturally existing variation with identifiable evolutionary benefits. Human sexuality is so culturally and historically specific that any universalizing claims must be treated with suspicion, and it seems likely that social constructionist accounts of both gender and sexuality will continue to dominate lesbian sociology and the sociology of lesbianism.

SEE ALSO: Essentialism and Constructionism; Female Masculinity; Femininities/Masculinities; Gay and Lesbian Movement; Homophobia and Heterosexism; Homosexuality; Lesbian Feminism; Queer Theory; Stigma

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Levittown

Jessica W. Pardee

As the single largest housing development ever undertaken in US history, Levittown is the standard model for American suburban housing. Using assembly line production techniques, Abraham Levitt and sons revolutionized the housing industry. While the Levitts built housing across the nation prior to World War II, Levittown, NY took mass production to a new level. Built on 4,000 acres of potato fields, the site included 17,400 single family homes, as well as several swimming pools, baseball diamonds, playgrounds, and green spaces. Additionally, the Levitts were able to produce houses for almost \$1,000 less than their competitors, while securing a \$1,500 profit on each home. It is this transformation of the housing production process that makes Levittown so sociologically important.

One of the key mechanisms the Levitts employed to promote production was an absolute Taylorization of the home building process. By identifying specific, detailed tasks, the construction labor was divided and reduced to 26 individual steps. To keep prices low, each step was then subcontracted, with all materials and equipment provided by Levitt. This allowed Levitt absolute control of the entire process, as well as the employment of non union labor. Likewise, Levitt personally oversaw construction along with company employed site managers to assure construction was of an acceptable standard.

Financially, the Levitt and Sons construction company and its subsidiaries were organized vertically, with all materials bought and sold through companies owned by the Levitts. The result was the consolidation of all profits, from lumber to unit sales, within the family. In total, this system resulted in extreme efficiency, a consolidation of profit flows to the Levitts, and an outsourcing system that demanded contractor services be on time and under budget. Quantified in houses, the system produced approximately 26 houses each day, at costs lower than those of competitors and at a higher profit to Levitt and Sons.

Across the country there are three Levittowns: Levittown, NY, Levittown, PA, and Levittown, NJ. Hebert Gans studied Levittown, NJ, later renamed Willingboro by the residents, between 1958 and 1962. In *The Levittowners*, Gans (1967) explores the social and democratic systems emerging in the new suburban community. As a participant observer and community resident, Gans focused his research on the emergence of a new community, the quality of suburban life, the effect of that life on resident behavior, and the quality of politics and decision making. In contrast to suburban myths, Gans found the Levittowners to be a reasonably heterogeneous group, whose community developed out of contentions between residents, not a homogeneous view of how a suburban community should be.

Decades later, researchers Baxandall and Ewen returned to the New York Levittown to examine what the 1940s community looks like now. In *Picture Windows* (2000), they find a stark contrast to the homogeneous spatial design and ethnic demographic of the original residential development. Modern Levittown reflects a diverse environment of home designs – the result of additions and remodeling, racial and ethnic diversification of the once whites only development, and inclusion of multigenerational and single mother families with boarders. Thus, 50 years later, Levittown, NY reflects much of the diversity that is predominant in most inner cities.

SEE ALSO: City Planning/Urban Design; Metropolis; New Urbanism; Suburbs; Urbanization

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Lewin, Kurt (1890–1947)

Reef Youngreen

Kurt Lewin is recognized by many as the founder of modern social psychology because of his foundational contributions in making connections between psychology, sociology, anthropology, and economics. By adapting and applying the gestalt perspective to personality theory and social dynamics and translating these ideas into social experience involving people, Lewin's field theory powerfully translated these ideas to new domains.

Born in 1890 in Molgino, Prussia into a middle class Jewish family in which he was one of four sons, Lewin and his family moved to Berlin when he was 15. At 19 and showing an interest in studying medicine, he attended the University of Freiberg. Shortly thereafter, he transferred to the University of Munich to study biology. During his time in Munich, Lewin became interested and involved in the socialist movement, aiming to combat anti-Semitism and help improve women's social positions. It was here that he and similar others organized and taught adult education programs for working class people. His later studies at the University of Berlin fostered his interest in the philosophy of science and exposed him to gestalt psychology, both of which are premises on which much of Lewin's legacy is grounded.

Lewin completed his doctoral work at the outset of World War I in 1914 and was awarded his degree in 1916 while serving in the German army. After joining the Psychological Institute of the University of Berlin in 1921 and becoming a popular lecturer in both philosophy and psychology, he was invited to spend six months as a visiting professor at Stanford University in 1930. The political situation in Germany at this time was deteriorating for many, particularly

Jews. As a result, Lewin and his wife and daughter relocated to the US in 1933, and in 1940 Lewin became an American citizen. He began his work in the US at the Cornell School of Home Economics. In 1935, the first year in which an English collection of Lewin's work was published (*A Dynamic Theory of Personality*), Lewin moved to the University of Iowa. For nearly a decade in the Midwestern US, he perpetuated his interests in group processes and involved himself in applied research initiatives linked to the war (e.g., troop morale, warfare psychology). His commitment to applying research techniques and findings to social problems led to the development of the MIT Research Center for Group Dynamics. Concurrently, Lewin's model of action research – research oriented to solving social problems – resulted in a number of significant studies on religious and racial prejudice for the Commission of Community Interrelations for the American Jewish Congress in New York. It is from this and similar work with other community group leaders that Lewin's "T" groups emerged. Receiving funding from the Office of Naval Research in 1947, he and a few of his contemporaries established the National Training Laboratories (NTL) in Bethel, Maine. Unfortunately, Lewin was never able to personally realize the important outcomes of the NTL because he died suddenly of a heart attack on February 11, 1947.

Perhaps one of Lewin's most recognized contributions to social psychology is his field theory, a system of ideas that highlights his gestalt psychology influences. A gestalt may be thought of as a coherent whole possessing its own laws as constructs of individual minds rather than an objective reality. From Lewin's perspective, behavior motivations were determined not by individual drives, but by all of the elements of a situation. In observing individual behaviors and group dynamics, one must give precedence to the field. In *Field Theory in Social Science: Selected Theoretical Papers*, Lewin defined the field as "the totality of coexisting facts which are conceived of as mutually interdependent." From field theory, Lewin constructed a symbolic representation of behavior expressed as $B = f(P, E)$, or behavior is a function of the person and the environment. The entire psychological field comprises the *lifespace*, or all of the

physical locations, social identities and associated roles, and psychological realities available to an individual. To understand the meanings and motivations associated with behaviors, Lewin believed that the researcher must understand the lifespaces within which people acted. Importantly, Lewin's belief that analyzing a situation required the focus on the situation's entirety – differentiated from the component parts of the situation – illustrates the prominence he granted to the gestalt view.

Lewin's ideas about why members of a group come together do not invoke familiar or common reasons (e.g., homophily). Instead, Lewin reasons that groups form in a psychological sense not necessarily because of members' similarity, but because group formation depends on individuals' realizations that their own fate depends on the fate of the entire group. To support this contention, Lewin cited the common struggle of Jews in the late 1930s as an example of this feeling of interdependent fate. Brown (1988) cites experimental support for this idea that groups require even the most basic form of interdependence. Lewin also argued for the importance of task interdependence in group formation. Fate interdependence is a weaker form of interdependence than task interdependence. The overlap of the group members' goals forms a more solid foundation on which a more powerful group dynamic may be built.

Lewin, along with other research colleagues, is credited with the development of "T" groups (an abbreviation for "basic skills training" groups). These groups, the foundation of the encounter groups of the 1960s, emerged as Lewin and his colleagues realized that the leadership and group dynamics training sessions they conducted for the Connecticut State Interracial Commission in 1964 were most effective when a tension is created between immediate experiences of group members and trainers' theoretical models. Inputs from each perspective enhanced the experiences of the other, resulting in marked increases in expected group vitality and creativity. This innovation in training practice became the basis of funding to establish the NTL.

Lewin's emphasis on the necessity of feedback to produce optimal outcomes, as illustrated by the dialectical nature of "T" groups, is also

the foundation of action research, or research for social management or social engineering. He came to believe that for many sorts of experimental research, it was necessary to have a very intimate relationship between skilled social practitioners with an interest in research and skilled researchers who understood the necessity of social action (Lippitt 1947).

Lewin's action research consists of a series of spiraling steps, each step consisting of planning, action, and collecting data about the results of the action. The first step in action research is to examine an idea very carefully, from all available perspectives. This step usually requires collecting more information than is already present. From this step emerges a plan of how to reach an objective and a choice about what the first step in the plan entails. At this point, the plan to reach the goal has likely already modified the original idea. The next step consists of ongoing circles of plans, executions, and a collection of data indicating the outcome of the initial execution. Evaluations of the data representing the outcomes of initial action inform the plans for the next step or may require a modification of the entire plan. The experiential learning associated with this plan of research is specifically oriented to problem solving in both social and organizational settings. As such, Lewin's action research spiral has been adopted by organizations as a method for self improvement. There is a danger in interpreting action research as a simple procedure for addressing and overcoming social problems. Action research is not a method, but rather a progression of commitments to observe and frame through action a set of principles for social inquiry (McTaggart 1996). Because of its association with radical political activism, action research suffered a decline in popularity. More recently, action research has found favor among community based movements as a participatory mechanism for inciting change. As a method to improve educational experiences, the tools of action research have experienced a renaissance.

Another of Lewin's established areas of inquiry concerned the relationship between leadership types and group structure. Lewin believed that democracy was among the most difficult group structures to develop and maintain. Successful democracies result from a knowledge of and abidance by the laws of human

nature in the group setting. Each new generation under a democratic structure has to learn these rules, which is one of the reasons democracy is difficult to develop and maintain. Lewin believed that democracy, unlike autocracy, could not be imposed on people. Lewin and Ronald Lippitt, one of Lewin's contemporaries, examined democratic, autocratic, and *laissez faire* leadership models and found democratic groups embodying more originality, group mindedness, and friendliness than other models. These researchers examined groups of children under both democratic and autocratic structures and found the friendly, open, cooperative group under a democratic structure quickly diminished with the imposition of an autocratic structure. Further, the change in children's behaviors from under an autocracy to a democracy took much longer than from democracy to autocracy. Lewin and Lippitt concluded that behavior under each of the leadership models was not entirely the result of individual differences, but rather an outcome of group structure.

Lewin's legacy in social psychological and personality research is evidenced by the quantity and array of research based on his foundational ideas. According to the Social Science Citation Index, Lewin's research was cited by published research over 150 times in 2004, 57 years after his death. The research citing his work is found in an array of publications including the *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology*, the *Journal of Retailing*, and *Theory into Practice*. The title of the final journal listed above captures the undercurrent of Lewin's life work: the integration of theory and practice. This emphasis is captured in Lewin's most notable quotation: "There is nothing so practical as good theory."

SEE ALSO: Action Research; Democracy and Organizations; Experimental Methods; Psychological Social Psychology; Social Psychology

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liberal feminism

Kristina Wolff

Liberal feminism is one of the earliest forms of feminism, stating that women's secondary status in society is based on unequal opportunities and segregation from men. Emerging out of the abolitionist and women's movement in the US, this body of feminism focuses on eliminating gender inequality. The basic beliefs are grounded in liberalist philosophical traditions, as well as French and British feminist theory. Society consists of individuals who are equals and therefore all people must have equal rights. There is a clear division between the role of the state (public) and individual freedom (private). Liberal feminists create change by working within existing social structures and changing people's attitudes.

The anti slavery movement emerged in the early 1800s. These groups engaged in public forums and speeches, boycotted churches and businesses that supported slavery, lobbied for changes in laws, and practiced other forms of non violent activism. These tactics reemerged during the modern black Civil Rights Movement starting in the mid to late 1950s. Many of the early founders of the suffrage movement or first wave of feminism were strong abolitionists and began organizing for women's rights while members of these anti slavery organizations. Many activists such as Angelina and Sarah Grimke spoke publicly about the need for equal education and an end to women's servitude. The first public call for women's right to vote was made when Lucretia Mott and

Elizabeth Cady Stanton were refused recognition as delegates to the 1840 World Anti Slavery Convention. After this event, Mott, Stanton, and Mary Ann McClintock began organizing for women's right to vote.

In 1848 during the Seneca Falls Convention, the *Declaration of Sentiments* was presented by Stanton. This statement mirrored the writing of Thomas Jefferson, calling for voting rights for women, which would enable them to work to eliminate sexist laws, thereby seeking an end to the second class status of women. During this time, women were legally the property of their fathers or husbands and had few rights of their own. After the Civil War, many abolitionists focused on voting rights for blacks, and women were expected to help with this effort and abandon their fight for the women's vote. This was a catalyst for Susan B. Anthony to leave the Equal Rights Association and form the National Woman's Suffrage Association with Elizabeth Cady Stanton. The new focus, along with other activists such as Alice Paul, was on the creation of a constitutional amendment for women's right to vote along with actively working on other issues such as changing inheritance and divorce laws and women's economic inequality. The 19th amendment to the US Constitution granting women the right to vote was finally ratified in 1920.

The theoretical foundation for these early feminists was a combination of their religious beliefs and the writings of John Locke, John Stuart Mill and Harriet Taylor Mill, Mary Wollstonecraft and later, Jane Addams and Harriet Martineau. Main themes in their work focused on personal independence, economic and educational opportunity, and equality for all humans. Societal change happens through individual efforts and working within existing social structures. Through the efforts of suffragists, women also won greater access to education as well as improved individual rights and autonomy. After women won the right to vote, the movement lost some momentum, but work on issues of equal rights and the end of gender inequality continued through the efforts of women like Addams, Paul, and Emma Goldman.

The 1950s saw a renewed cultural push for men and women to fulfill traditional gender roles. During this time, the modern black Civil Rights Movement was beginning to increase in

scope and momentum. By the early 1960s, numerous groups – including anti war activists and women as well as gays and lesbians – were also pushing for social reforms. In 1963 Betty Friedan published *The Feminine Mystique*. In her text, Friedan details the lives of the average American suburban housewife; she described women as being “dissatisfied” with their lives, each one “yearning” for something more. Ultimately, she concluded that women across America were suffering from “the problem that had no name.” This phrase soon came to represent the contemporary Women’s Liberation Movement which gave rise to modern liberal feminism. Once again, women marched in the streets, gave speeches, lobbied politicians, and worked for reform in the areas of education, employment, health care, and politics, as well as for the end of inequality based on gender.

Sexism was viewed as improper behavior by men and women, who were conditioned by society’s “bad” ideas about gender roles. Social change would come from working within the system to eliminate structural barriers and change cultural expectations of women’s roles as wives and mothers, as well as to establish equality between genders so women would have the same opportunities as men. The National Organization for Women (NOW) was formed by Friedan and others in October 1966. During their first national convention in 1967, they adopted a “Bill of Rights” which demanded such things as maternity leave, government sponsored childcare centers, equal opportunities for education and job training, reproductive rights, and the establishment of the Equal Rights Amendment to eliminate discrimination based on sex. Motivated by the phrase “the personal is political,” women organized across the nation, fighting for equal rights and access to traditionally male only organizations, jobs, and educational institutions, and for change in the image of women in the media. One result of these actions was the establishment of a women’s studies curriculum and departments in colleges and universities, as well as the recognition of feminist sociologists and the formal development of feminist sociology. By adopting an assimilationist approach, liberal feminism appealed to a wide array of people, as it is complementary to American ideals of individualism and success through hard work and determination.

Not surprisingly, early areas of research by feminist scholars center on the institutions of marriage, motherhood, and family, as well as work, education, and reproductive rights. Included in this scholarship is the development of feminist theories and methodologies. Research focusing on marriage and family not only illustrates the experiences of women as wives and mothers, but also challenges the expectations of gender roles. In the 1970s, women still lost their autonomy upon marriage. They were legally the property of their husband, they could not have credit without their husband’s permission, many were denied jobs or admission to college due to their gender, and the dominant cultural belief was that all women would marry and therefore did not need to have a job or advanced education. Feminists successfully lobbied against these legal limitations imposed on women and also challenged the belief that the nuclear family was the “natural” family structure, thus bringing to question women and men’s roles as wives and husbands as well as mothers and fathers.

By placing women at the center of analysis, sociologists have expanded understandings of marriage and family, illustrating the central role these play in perpetuating ideologies of gender roles and expectations in society. Often, the traditional nuclear family structure has been used to support the division of labor in society, where women are expected to be at home in order to care for children; therefore, men are forced to work outside of the home to support the family, thus limiting options and choices for both men and women; for example, few companies offer parental leave to men to care for their newborn child. Feminists also challenge this division due to the unequal balance of work placed on women who must care for children, operate the household, and provide support for husbands (including help to advance their careers). Additionally, for women who work for pay outside of the home, as housework is unpaid labor, researchers have found that their responsibilities at home rarely change. Husbands seldom increase their role in the household to assist women working outside of it, so when a woman returns home from her job, she has to continue to work in the household to keep it functioning. Hochschild (Hochschild & Machung 1989) labeled this phenomenon the

“second shift.” A liberal feminist solution to this situation is to call for changes in family law, such as providing more support through parental leave policies as well as to educate men and women about restructuring their relationship to be more balanced and equal. Additionally, liberal feminists have called for increased support for childcare, welfare reform, and laws to challenge these traditional concepts of family, as well as extend support to single parents and lower income families.

In addition to the family structure being viewed as a means to keep women in a subordinate position in society, research on the social worlds of work and education has also demonstrated how women’s secondary status has benefited men. In the 1960s, women experienced few choices in education and employment. Jobs were advertised in newspapers according to race and gender and were largely limited to lower skilled positions. Women were expected to go into pink collar occupations such as nursing, teaching, secretarial positions, or as maids. These positions paid low wages and offered little to no opportunities for advancement. After it became illegal to hire according to race or gender characteristics, high school counselors, teachers, and parents continued to encourage women to enter these fields, rather than pursue careers in business, mathematics, or any of the sciences.

Through socializing women to continue working in pink collar professions, men have less competition in areas of employment as well as entry into colleges and universities. By encouraging men to enter into areas of employment that provide higher pay and benefits than the low paying occupations women are directed into, society’s gender roles are reinforced and a large gap is permanently created between the earning potential of women and men, thus further limiting women’s options and opportunities.

As women gained greater access to education and began to enter into traditional male jobs, the image of the “superwoman” or “supermom” emerged in the 1980s. These women were depicted as having successful careers and marriages and happily fulfilled their primary role as mothers. This glorified image of women balancing all of these roles represented a cultural shift

in accepting women’s broader entry into the working world, but it also reifies traditional gender roles women are expected to adhere to as wives and mothers. While great advances have been made in areas of education and employment, women continue to earn approximately 72 cents per every dollar a man makes, with few actually gaining positions of stature such as CEOs of large corporations or presidents of universities. The number of women holding elected office proportionately remains quite low in comparison to men.

One of the foundational tenets of liberal feminism is also its most controversial. This is the belief that all women have the right to privacy, which includes complete control over their bodies. This ideology becomes complicated when discussing issues related to sexuality, health care, and reproduction, largely because of women’s biological role in procreation. Historically, conceptions of marriage have been based on people’s desire to procreate, to create a family. It is only within modern history that western (specifically, US) culture has embraced the belief that marriage is based on love and fulfilling relationships. One of the main areas of focus for change with the rise of the Women’s Liberation Movement was increased autonomy for women to make their own medical decisions, particularly concerning their choices connected to birth control, which includes the right to have a safe abortion. This right was gained with the 1973 US Supreme Court decision in *Roe v. Wade* and *Dole v. Bolton*. Women were granted the legal right to have access to safe abortions, but the role of the state in terms of providing funding or the actual service has been highly contestable, as is the right to abortion itself. This issue remains central to women’s activism and scholarship.

Since the *Roe* decision, laws have been adopted that limit women’s access to abortion, including parental notification laws for minors, time periods established between when a woman seeks an abortion and can receive one, and the elimination of all federal funding for this service. One of the consequences of this has been a decrease in available reproductive health care services for all women. Often, arguments against providing services connected to birth control and abortion follow conservative

ideologies reinforcing traditional gender roles for women as mothers, with the expectation that all women want to have children and that they have made a choice to become pregnant. These beliefs have been challenged by liberal feminists and researchers who have documented women's lack of reproductive options, including their ability to choose whether or not to conceive a child. Certainly, while liberal feminism strongly advocates a pro choice ideology and therefore supports abortion, there is much debate surrounding this issue.

One of the main critiques of liberal feminism is the amount of attention that has been paid to women's right to an abortion and who exactly benefits from this right. Historically, women of color and poor women have had very different experiences to those portrayed in liberal feminism. The US has a long history of forced pregnancy of slaves and medical experimentation and forced sterilization of African American, Puerto Rican, and Native American women. These women have been legally required to and/or pressured to have abortions and hysterectomies and to utilize long term birth control such as Norplant, which has dangerous side effects. Many of these women have also been lower income, which provides another barrier to adequate health care. While liberal feminists and scholars present their efforts as representing all women, it has had great difficulty uniting a wide range of women. When discussing the racism and classism of liberal feminism, Angela Davis (1981: 202) writes: "rarely have the movement's leaders popularized the genuine concerns of working class women." Liberal feminism has responded to these critiques. Larger national groups – including NOW and NARAL – have widened their efforts at working for reproductive health care options, but abortion remains the primary focus within this work.

From the beginning of the women's movement, there has been strong criticism as to the elite nature of liberal feminism. The vast majority of positions of power and authority have been held by white women with privilege. This is evident in Friedan's work, which called for women to get out of the trappings of housework but ignored the issue of who their maids were: they were usually black women who had to work to support their families. Additionally, the

family is viewed as an essential part of their lives, not a burden but the foundation for strength, happiness, and community. Women activists (particularly black women from the abolitionist movement) have contributed greatly to the elimination of gender inequality, but also have largely remained invisible due to their race/ethnicity and/or class status. This is evident in Sojourner Truth's outburst during one of the early conventions, when she shouted "Ain't I a Woman?" and demanded recognition for her contributions and desire for equality based on race and gender. Her words may be famous, but they made little impact in terms of changing the role of blacks in the movement. Truth, Ida B. Wells, Anna Julia Cooper, and contemporary activists and scholars such as Ella Baker, Frances Beale, and Shirley Chisholm remain on the margins of history despite their contributions to feminism.

Liberal feminism has also been criticized for its lack of systematic analysis of the social structures that maintain gender inequality. There is no critique of existing social systems because it seeks entry into these institutions rather than changing them. This caused many fissures within the Women's Liberation Movement. Radical feminism was formed with the belief that social systems and structures need to change in order to eliminate oppression of women overall. Socialist and Marxist feminism emerged from radical feminism, focusing on capitalism as the main source of women's oppression. Other feminisms soon followed which expanded analysis into an array of areas, including analyzing what gender actually is, issues related to sexuality and age, and a host of other topics. Black Feminist Thought and Women of Color feminism emerged through the creation of their own organizations, which moved beyond focusing on a single issue as the cause of inequality, to examining oppression and domination through intersectional lenses. This moved feminism and feminist thought into broader realms, into questioning and challenging systems of oppression and domination throughout the US.

As with any social movement and body of scholarship, liberal feminism has evolved as society and culture has changed. Many of the basic goals of individual rights and freedoms, as well as an end to gender inequality, remain

central to liberal feminism. Liberal feminists successfully brought the issue of equal rights into mainstream America and created significant legal and cultural changes that improved the lives of women and men in the nation. Many of the tactics they created or adopted from the black Civil Rights Movement have been utilized by other movements and organizations, including other women's groups around the world.

SEE ALSO: Addams, Jane; Black Feminist Thought; Cultural Feminism; Martineau, Harriet; Radical Feminism; Social Movements; Women's Empowerment; Women's Movements

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liberalism

Andrew Gamble

Liberalism is the leading ideology of the modern era. The term first began to be used to denote the supporters of liberty and the opponents of arbitrary authority in Spain during the Napoleonic Wars. During the nineteenth century it came to signify adherence to the principles of individualism, liberty, limited government, progress, and equality. As such it has always been an extremely broad doctrine, espoused by thinkers as diverse as John Stuart Mill, Constant, Bentham, Tocqueville, Hobbes, and Hayek. Many of its key ideas can be traced to earlier thinkers such as Locke, Kant, and the French and Scottish Enlightenment. At its core is a particular conception of society and human nature, based on beliefs in the moral primacy of the individual as the starting point for thinking about politics and society; the equal moral worth of every individual, regardless of class, nation, gender, or race; and the possibility of improving social conditions and reforming political institutions. Individuals are conceived as the bearers of rights which exist independently of government and for which government is brought into existence in order to protect. The legitimacy of any system of government depends therefore on how well it protects the liberty of its citizens.

Liberalism was decisively shaped by the American and French Revolutions. These two major political events marked the beginning of the modern era and the age of ideologies because they involved a decisive break with the old order and a vision of the new, the overthrow of established political authority, and the assertion of new principles of government – life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness in the American version, and liberty, equality, and fraternity in the French. Both these revolutions

proclaimed in different ways that sovereignty should be popular sovereignty, that government should be based on the will of the people, and that for this purpose all members of a political community should be regarded as equal and able to participate in their self government. These ideals were much contradicted in practice; in America the rights of man which formed the basis of the new Constitution were not extended to slaves or women, while in France the attempt to construct representative institutions gave way to terror and dictatorship. But despite their failings the political revolutions in France and America did produce a decisive rupture in the system of monarchical absolutism, giving birth to a new kind of political imagination and political possibility.

The political revolutions were also part of much broader social and economic changes involving the rise of new technologies, new forms of organization, and new forms of knowledge, which together shaped the conception of modernity. Liberalism came to stand for progress and opposition to all forms of obscurantism, tradition, privilege, and prejudice, and therefore became identified with capitalism, rationalism, science, secularism, and more generally with modernity and the rise of the modern state. Although liberals held many different views on aspects of the new society that was emerging, they tended to be optimistic rather than pessimistic about the prospects for human progress because of their faith in reason, which came from the Enlightenment, their universalism, and their confidence in rational, scientific methods to discover the causes of things and propose improvements.

As a political doctrine liberalism emphasizes the framework of institutions and laws through which the liberty of citizens can be protected from arbitrary government. The aim is to establish a government of laws rather than of men. A well designed constitution ensures a balance of power between the different arms of government – executive, legislature, and judiciary – so that no one arm of government can dominate. Liberals have generally sought to disperse power and to limit government, and to set obstacles to any return to tyranny and dictatorship. They have been ambivalent about democracy, divided over whether it is a new form of

unlimited government which threatens liberty and the rule of law, or whether it is the best means to promote representation, accountability, and self government.

As an economic doctrine liberalism developed a distinctive strand of political economy, committed to free trade, sound money, and *laissez faire*. These ideas were important in breaking down obstacles to the spread of markets and capitalism and promoting flows of capital, goods, and people around the world, based on the argument that if government stands back and allows the natural energies of the people full rein, countries will become stronger and richer. Governments are necessary evils, but still evils, so have to be limited in their powers as much as possible. Liberals, however, have always accepted that some powers must be exercised by the state, even if this is only the minimal state providing external defense, internal order, and the rule of law as the basis for a market order. A central tension within liberal political economy and within liberalism more generally is the proper relation between liberty and coercion. All liberals want to minimize coercion as much as possible; the question is always how much and for what purposes. In contrast, libertarians reject all coercive authority as an infringement on liberty, and therefore reject the state itself, so moving outside the bounds of liberalism.

As a cultural doctrine liberalism has been associated with tolerance, diversity, rationality, and neutrality towards other beliefs. Individuals should be free to live as they choose and define the good in their own way without intervention or direction from the state or the community, so long as their choices do not harm others. Application of this principle has allowed a substantial enlargement of the realm of personal freedom, and the shrinking of intervention by the state in areas such as sexual behavior. But some critics of liberalism have argued that this self image of liberalism is a sham because liberalism is a highly moral doctrine and as intolerant as any other moral doctrine of claims which challenge its core beliefs, such as the idea of neutrality itself or the claim that education should be secular, inculcating the values of a common citizenship.

Liberalism has developed many different strands and has undergone substantial change

as the tensions inherent in its core ideas have been explored. There have been important intellectual traditions such as classical liberalism, utilitarianism, new liberalism, and neoliberalism, as well as many distinct national traditions of liberalism, such as those in Germany, Britain, Italy, and the US. Ideological disagreement among liberals themselves over the role of the state and the role of reason have divided the liberal tradition into “true” and “false” liberalism, or “skeptical” and “rational” liberalism. The divide is over whether there are strict limits to the potential of human reason to reorganize the world and what these limits are. The skeptics believe human reason can only be used to discover the constraints within which human life must be lived, while the rationalists believe human reason can and should be used to overcome those constraints.

This argument about the limits of reason is closely associated with ideas about the limits of government, and the potential of government for utilizing rational knowledge to transform society for the better. The lure of scientific knowledge and the apparently limitless possibilities it opened for understanding both physical nature and human nature seemed to provide societies with the tools for limitless improvement. The skeptics argued that progress could only be maintained if the powers of the state were kept strictly limited, so as to maximize the energy, knowledge, and enterprise of the myriad of individual actors. Rationalists, such as the utilitarians, believed public policy should be so conducted as to ensure the greatest happiness of the greatest number.

This divide also became expressed as a divide between the state and the market, and the question of how far the market needed to be protected from the depredations of the state. In the early phases of liberalism the emphasis was upon removing restrictions to enterprise and trade, challenging traditions and customs, and embracing change and new knowledge to change society. Once liberalism in the shape of liberal political economy became the orthodoxy, however, the widening of the gap between rich and poor and the relentless nature of a competitive commercial society created powerful conservative and socialist counter movements against liberalism. Many liberals became convinced that

the achievement of their ideals required more positive action by the state to create the conditions under which all individuals could develop the capacity to exercise freedom. Such attitudes were characteristic of “new liberalism” in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries and moved the goal of liberalism from being about liberty to being about human flourishing and self realization. This required the state to intervene to remedy disadvantage and to equip all its citizens with the opportunities and resources for self realization. A long and expanding list of interventions by the state became sanctioned.

This conflict within liberalism was later formalized by Isaiah Berlin as the contrast between negative liberty and positive liberty. A liberalism that is concerned primarily with negative liberty leaves individuals free to do whatever they like so long as they do not harm others and accepts that individuals will always disagree about what constitutes a good life. A liberalism that is concerned more with positive liberty targets those conditions such as disease, ignorance, and poverty which prevent many individuals from realizing their potential for self development. Both sets of liberals set great store on liberty as the supreme value, but disagree strongly as to how it is best secured. New liberals gravitated towards social democracy in Europe and programs like the New Deal in the US, while laissez faire liberals after a long period of retreat in the face of collectivism finally reemerged strongly in the second half of the twentieth century in the guise of neoliberalism.

In the 1930s it became fashionable to believe that liberalism was an outmoded doctrine, no longer suited to an industrial society which was increasingly organized, managerial, and collectivist in its consciousness and ethos. The rise of collectivist ideologies and totalitarian regimes made many liberals believe that some form of collectivist organization of society and the state had become necessary for the survival of industrial society. The strong revival of liberalism after 1945 in the west was largely unexpected. It was accompanied by the development of the idea of a liberal democracy, based on constitutional safeguards for representative and limited government, a free market economy, and an active state to promote the well being of its

citizens. In the first few decades after 1945 liberalism became quite strongly associated with interventionist economic and social policies programs inspired by two English liberals, J. M. Keynes and W. H. Beveridge, as well as with permissive social policies on a range of issues from abortion and homosexuality to divorce and capital punishment. One consequence of this was that the term liberal in the US became permanently linked to a left liberal agenda, and the revival of laissez faire liberalism or classical liberalism in the 1970s was associated more with conservatism than with liberalism, even though it was dubbed neoliberalism by its opponents.

The collapse of the Soviet Union brought an end to the most serious twentieth century political and ideological challenge to liberalism, and suggested to some that all the most important ideological conflicts were now within liberalism rather than between liberalism and other ideologies, and that liberalism had now established itself as the quintessential doctrine of modernity. Others regarded the triumph of liberalism as largely a mirage, reflecting the remarkable degree of dominance established by the US at the end of the twentieth century rather than any broad acceptance of liberal ideas throughout the world. Many liberals continued to be ambivalent about democracy and about the role of the state in promoting the conditions for a liberal society, while others argued that liberalism had to develop further if it was to live up to its founding principles. The restless and iconoclastic character of liberalism – with its emphasis upon the individual and upon reason – continue to define it, even if some of the conclusions that liberals draw from these principles remain diametrically opposed.

SEE ALSO: Conservatism; Democracy; Individualism; Mill, John Stuart; Neoliberalism

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Liebow, Elliot (1925–94)

Levon Chorbajian

Elliot Liebow was born in Washington, DC. He served in World War II and received his high school equivalency diploma while in the Marine Corps. After the war, Liebow received his bachelor's degree in English literature from George Washington University. He studied ancient history at the University of Maryland and received his PhD in anthropology from Catholic University. Liebow was employed by the National Institute of Mental Health (NIMH) for 25 years and rose to the position of chief of the Center for the Study of Work and Mental Health. In his last years of retirement from NIMH, Liebow held the endowed chair as Patrick Cardinal O'Boyle professor at the National Catholic School of Social Work at Catholic University.

Liebow's reputation is heavily based on the publication of a single book, *Tally's Corner: A Study of Negro Streetcorner Men* (1967). It had been his doctoral dissertation. The book has sold in excess of 800,000 copies, and it continues to be in print. Liebow was the son of Eastern European Jewish immigrants and had grown up in a poor African American neighborhood in Washington. This experience proved to be an asset for Liebow in establishing rapport with the subjects of *Tally's Corner*. In the early 1960s Liebow spent 18 months in the company of two dozen poor African American men who regularly congregated at a particular neighborhood street corner in the District. He spent hundreds of hours with these men and accompanied them to hospitals, parties, workplaces, and courtrooms. Liebow's interpretation of the world of these men became *Tally's Corner*. The book's popularity is partly accounted for by the coincidence of its publication with urban uprisings, the rise of the Civil Rights and Black

Power movements, and the federal anti poverty programs of the late 1960s, all of which generated an interest in urban African American communities.

Liebow's second book was published two and a half decades after *Tally's Corner*, shortly before his death. *Tell Them Who I Am: The Lives of Homeless Women* (1993) evolved out of Liebow's volunteer work in public and private homeless shelters for women in the Washington area. As in *Tally's Corner*, Liebow was interested in how people at the lower rungs of the class structure establish identity and maintain dignity in the face of great odds.

Liebow made important contributions to the breadth and diversity of sociology as a discipline. *Tally's Corner* helped to resurrect ethnography as a method at a time when Parsonian structural functionalism was still sociology's dominant theoretical paradigm and survey research its reigning methodology. Among Liebow's many awards are two from the Society for the Study of Social Problems, the C. Wright Mills Award for *Tally's Corner* and the Lee Founders Award for career achievement in sociology.

SEE ALSO: Deindustrialization; Ethnography; Ghetto; Homelessness; Inequality and the City; Observation, Participant and Non Participant; Poverty; Race; Race (Racism); Urban Poverty

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life chances and resources

Wout Ultee

Around the mid 1980s in the field of societal stratification, the research program of "Class, Status, and Power" had evolved into the more

powerful program of "Life Chances and Resources." At that time, theoretical and empirical efforts undertaken by sociologists in various countries of the world began to converge.

An early formulation and application of the new program was given by Lenski in 1966. This study did not so much apply concepts like class, status, and power to describe concrete societies as it presented propositions to answer questions that went beyond earlier interrogations. As Lenski put it, he had taken the liberty of reformulating the once paramount question in the field of stratification about the number and nature of strata in various human societies into the question of causes and consequences of distributive processes, or more attractively, the question of who gets what and why. Lenski's theory in answer to this problem aimed to synthesize existing theories, and the book elucidating and testing his ideas carried the catchy title *Power and Privilege*. Perhaps a less categorical title, like "Resources and Advantages," would have expressed better the most general statement of the program Lenski unfolded: the members of societies who command the most resources for that reason lead a privileged existence and have the best chances in life.

Lenski's two prime derivations from the perhaps obvious proposition that power makes for privilege were the technology hypothesis and the ideology hypothesis. Whereas the idea that resources make for advantages is pitched at the individual level, these two hypotheses referred to developments within societies and differences between them. The technology hypothesis held that if a society has a higher level of technological development, stratification within this society is stronger. Culling data from monographs by anthropologists, historians, and sociologists on phenomena such as hunting skills, ownership of gardens and fields, wealth according to tax records, number of wives, size of houses, differences in diet, and the ease with which various people in a society lived, it appeared that this thesis held up remarkably well in the early stages of technological evolution, but failed with the shift from agriculture to industry.

Lenski attributed this refutation not to flaws in the auxiliary assumption that advances in technology amount to the invention of new resources, but to the other auxiliary assumption that forms of power tend to be pyramidal.

Technological progress, Lenski now proposed, does not always make for an accumulation of new and old economic resources. Industrial societies use so many different vocational skills that education becomes an economic resource independent of the ownership of factories and machines. Also, because industrial societies no longer restrict the right to vote for political offices to the wealthy but have introduced universal suffrage, the balance of political power becomes more equal. Lenski's second derivation therefore invoked the ideologies of ruling industrial societies: to the extent that these societies are governed by parties seeking redistribution from the rich to the poor, the impact of class upon the life of their inhabitants is mitigated. The testing of this ideology hypothesis was presented as a matter for future research.

The first reviews of Lenski's book centered on the matter of whether the synthesis of existing theories was a happy one. In later research, the "multilayered" nature of Lenski's theory was noticed. If power makes for privilege, then the introduction of universal suffrage in industrial societies levels the distribution of political resources, and to the extent that redistributive parties ascend to government and award the inhabitants of a country social rights, differences between a society's members in income decrease too. This was measured by using official statistics on the income shares of the upper quintile or decile (Hewitt 1977). Some time later, hypotheses concerning the effects of government by left wing parties on father-son mobility were tested (Heath 1981).

Whereas the program of class, status, and power focused on three aggregate phenomena within a society, the program of life chances and resources took its starting point from individual resources. Sometimes resources similar to the aggregate power phenomena were postulated. An example is Runciman (1989), who held that there are three kinds of power in every society, succinctly called means of production, means of persuasion, and means of coercion. Earlier, Collins (1975) added to the proposition that forms of property like slaves, landholding, and industrial capital are upheld by the means of violence of the state, the idea being that the means of mental production and of emotional production are resources too. Bourdieu (1984), leaning on Marx, used the

term capital and distinguished three forms, but in the end came up with social resources as a new type: people differ in the extent they command economic, cultural, and social capital.

The counterpart of resources (or assets) is handicaps (or liabilities). By focusing on these, questions of age, ethnicity, and gender may be brought into the program of life chances and resources. To answer the question of why males in most human societies dominate females, Collins (1975) pointed out that women on the average are less tall and muscular than men, with women being physically vulnerable too by bearing and caring for children. As other handicaps for females accounting for male dominance, Collins listed property and ideology. Collins attempted to deal with the dynamics of age stratification by indicating resources of young persons and of adults.

Several subprograms of the program on life chances and resources concentrate on one type of capital. One investigates the thesis that in advanced agrarian societies the shift from weapon bearing and army commanding feudal lords to the monopolization of the means of violence by an absolute ruler raised the criteria of civilized conduct by which the old feudal lords sought to distinguish themselves from other, particularly ascending, strata. This subprogram was initiated by Elias in 1939 and had been dormant before a German reprint appeared in 1969 and an English translation in 1978. It was carried forward by De Swaan (1988) with respect to the elimination by industrial states of the negative externalities of vagrancy, contagious diseases, illiteracy, and infirmities in old age. Another subprogram is that of social capital (Lin 2001). It sings to the tune of "I get by with a little help from my friends." The results, however, seem to amount to the line "Going to try with a little help from my friends." According to some studies, people who find a job through a friend rather than through answering an advertisement wind up in a worse job. However, it was shown that if the status of the helping friend was higher, the job found was higher too.

The Elias hypothesis refers to situations in which the declining returns of one resource (weapons) in agrarian societies are offset to some extent by a greater importance of another resource (good manners). Bourdieu (1984) presented several hypotheses about how the

propertied classes in industrial societies try to maintain their position at the top of the social scale by compensatory strategies. An example is the statement that upon the introduction of wealth taxes and inheritance taxes, parents invest more in the education of their children. The conversion of resources may be taken as another topic for a subprogram of the program of life chances and resources.

The notion that classes, status groups, and parties are phenomena of the power relationships within a society almost naturally directed attention to political stability and change. In contrast, the notion of various kinds of individual resources steers us toward the question of how scarce consumption goods are distributed within a society, and the question of whether, apart from economic resources, political and symbolic resources also make life easier and more fulfilling. Thus, in a review of the results in the field of stratification in Great Britain between 1946 and 1976, Goldthorpe and Bevan (1977) went beyond pure description and set themselves the aim of integration. It was to be attained by taking classes, status groups, and parties as phenomena of the power relationships within a society and introducing the notion of advantage as complementary to that of power. After stating that power brings advantage, Goldthorpe and Bevan pointed out that the idea of advantage may fulfill a role in the field of societal stratification at the "distributional" level, analogous to that of power at the "relational" level. When detailing life chances, they pointed toward class differentials in infant as well as in adult mortality, class differences in the use of health services (which in Britain at that time were available to all and at very low cost or entirely free), and class differentials in access to different types and levels of education and in educational attainment.

The word life chances had been used by Weber in an almost casual way. Which concrete phenomena, treated as instances of advantages in research monographs, may be taken as part of the program of life chances and resources? Wright (1979) focused on income in the US and found that, when taking class, education, and occupational status as resources for individual income, class has a significant impact on income independent of occupational status, and that, net of education, the impact of class on

income is greater than that of status on income. Income returns to education differed within classes too, with the smallest returns for workers, and the largest for employers. This sums up Wright's answer to the question of whether not only more economic resources but also more symbolic resources lead to a more privileged life, as indicated by income.

Earlier, the *embourgeoisement* thesis held that affluent workers would lose their distinct position in the class structure. Findings for Britain in the early 1960s (Goldthorpe et al. 1968) spoke largely against it: the Labour Party continued to be regarded as the party for the working class, support for labor unions was still strong, and the orientation of affluent workers toward their job, rather than becoming a source of intrinsic satisfaction, remained instrumental. Also, as regards leisure, manual couples were more likely to spend spare time with kin and neighbors, and white collar couples with colleagues and others. However, members of the manual and the non manual classes did not differ much in the aspirations they held with respect to the education of their children.

Bourdieu (1984) took the next big step in this line of research on other chances in life than income. His most concrete and interesting question perhaps may be phrased as: with jobs becoming physically less exhausting, do people come to cultivate their aesthetic capacities? Bourdieu empirically investigated such matters as the food people eat, the furniture that fills their houses, the sports they practice, and, as far as aesthetic matters go, the paintings and music they esteem beautiful, as well as the films they have seen. He also established the relation between these phenomena and the occupation of persons. By way of factor analysis of surveys undertaken in France around 1970, Bourdieu sought to establish the existence of a multidimensional social space. This did not simply consist of dots for closely related occupations and leisure activities, but comprised in various statistical exercises several axes, particularly for the volume of capital commanded and the composition of that capital. Here Bourdieu came to three categories: people who command neither economic nor cultural capital, people who command primarily economic capital, such as persons with leading positions in industry and finance, and people who primarily command

cultural capital, such as secondary school teachers and lawyers. Apparently, the number of persons in a society with both economic and cultural capital turned out to be very limited. In discussing his findings, Bourdieu counted not only diplomas but also the command of high culture, supposedly part of the implicit curriculum of schools, as cultural capital. The differences in leisure activities between the three groups were assumed to go beyond those necessitated by income differences. They would indicate a leisure preference in line with the nature of people's jobs, and a tendency for the persons with certain occupations to distinguish themselves from persons with other occupations.

Weber had maintained that status groups claim a particular lifestyle, but shied away from circumscribing those styles. He simply noted that status groups are indicated by who marries whom and who shares meals with whom. Elias (1978 [1939]) studied one aspect of the lifestyle turning people into a status group, the criteria for civilized conduct in agrarian societies by which their top groups keep the lower strata of society at a distance. According to Bourdieu, Weber's thesis that status groups have distinctive lifestyles was not simply about life styles but about distinction. Arguing along the lines set out by Bourdieu, lifestyles may also be taken as combinations of life chances. Questions about the lifestyle within the working classes of industrial societies began to draw more attention after World War II. It then turned out that in industrial societies with private ownership of the means of production, mass unemployment did not always occur, and wages did not sink to the subsistence level. With the rising standard of living of the working classes, questions about how income was being spent became a topic of empirical research. Also, with the shortening of the number of hours worked each day, the contraction of the working week from six to five days, and the introduction of paid vacation weeks, questions on leisure became important. However, the idea of a hierarchy of human needs, with subsistence at its lower levels, rest and recreation a bit higher, and the appreciation of beauty on top, and other things somewhere in between, has remained until now implicit in the program of life chances and resources.

The program of class, status, and power had been plagued by the difficulty that parties and

status groups are always more than mere aggregates, whereas classes are not always groups. By shifting from aggregate phenomena like classes, status groups, and parties to various individual resources, the program of life chances and resources did away with this difficulty. Ultee also offered a fresh start with respect to the conditions under which persons who have similar market positions (such as manual workers) form groups, in this case political parties and labor unions pressing their interests. The idea of false consciousness prominent in theories taking class as the fundamental dimension of stratification in all times and at all places was dropped. It now was posited that collective action was but one strategy open to the members of a society's lower strata, and individual mobility another (Boudon 1973). It was held too that rational actors face the dilemma of collective action. After all, if only a few persons participate in a class organization, the movement will not attain its goals, and if a lot of people participate, a person may withdraw since without that one person the goals will in any case be reached. The economist Olson (1965) pointed out this dilemma, first studied as the prisoner's dilemma, and the sociologist Oberschall (1973) indicated that the dilemma of collective action may be overcome not only in small groups, as Olson stated, but also in homogeneous large groups concentrated in particular localities.

Of late, a shift is taking place within the field of social stratification as regards the "outside" theories being applied. Blau and Duncan (1967) estimated statistical models of status attainment processes in the US in the mid twentieth century, and sought to provide evidence that a general functionalist theory obtained: attainment would be governed less and less by principles of ascription such as race and social background, and more and more by principles of achievement such as education and work experience. It is easy to interpret their finding of a shift from ascription to achievement within the framework of individual resources: the effect of parental characteristics for a person's level of education and job status declined, and the return to education in terms of job status increased. Indeed, stock markets discovered that the profits of a company are not always served by making the children of founders

directors, and states lowered the financial costs of schooling for children of parents who are not well to do.

Sociologists like Elias and Bourdieu, however, have been pointing toward the effects of competition between persons if the inequalities between them in some resources decrease. These effects may be characterized as spiralling processes: criteria for civilized conduct become more strict; if income does not distinguish as it used to do between classes, the way people spend their money and time becomes important. If primary school becomes compulsory in industrial societies, for parents who already send their children to primary school, secondary education becomes important for their children. And if the age of compulsory schooling is raised to, say, 16 years, higher education is the means to keep ahead. Blau and Duncan's results hint at spiralling processes too: a person's education influenced not only a person's first job directly, but also a person's present job, and, net of education, a higher first job made for a higher present job.

Spiralling processes differ from the equilibrium processes on competitive markets studied by neoclassical economics. However, formal models for rational persons making sequences of decisions rather than one shot choices (Boudon 1973; Mare 1981) might have more to offer, as well as theories on market behavior in a social environment (Becker & Murphy 2000). It should be pointed out too that Goldthorpe (2000), when explaining persistent class inequalities in education attainment, tries to do away with the general assumption of rational choice theories that people go for the highest. Instead they would avoid a situation for their children that is worse than their own one, being satisfied with that situation or a better one.

SEE ALSO: Class, Status, and Power; Distinction; Stratification and Inequality, Theories of; Stratification: Technology and Ideology

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life course

Jens Zinn

The term life course refers to the idea that the course of one's life is not just determined by a natural process of aging but is mainly shaped by social institutions and sociocultural values as

well as by decisions and unexpected events. Thus the life course consists of life stages (e.g., childhood, youth, adulthood), status passages or transitions (e.g., from youth to adulthood, from student to professional), and life events (e.g., marriage, job loss, illness). Formal institutions such as the law and the welfare state ascribe rights and duties by age and formal status, and when, for example, to start a family and how to divide labor within the household are also structured by sociocultural norms and habits.

The term life course increasingly supplants the earlier concept of the life cycle, which implies a connection to early developmental concepts in psychology. These concepts state that life is structured by a specific order of events where one built on the previous event, and that they represent a "natural" order.

The modern notion of the life course differs from concepts in small "primitive" societies as described in ethnographic research, where transitions are understood as determined by natural processes (such as first menses to indicate that girls can be married) or "rites of passage" (Gennep 1981 [1909]).

The modern notion of the life course also differs from its ancestors. During the Middle Ages in Western Europe, the understanding of life was captured in religious and magical thinking. Life seemed to be determined mainly by external powers, such as God or fate. The different stages of life were understood as an expression of an externally given order. The course of one's life could always be interrupted by unforeseeable events and often ended prematurely by death. With modernization, ongoing sociocultural and sociostructural changes shift the meaning of the life course (Kohli 1986).

The institutionalization of education and a social security system as well as the formal regulation of rights and duties by age create a new framework and understanding of the life course as something to be shaped individually. Models of normative expectations about how men and women should shape their life were institutionalized, and societal institutions orient themselves to such models of a "normal" life. Additionally, the increase in medical knowledge and standards of hygiene supports a significant change in mortality, which was moved to and concentrated on old age. A predictable life

course became a normal experience for an increasing part of the population.

Life course research is interested in specific sociostructural patterns as well as the individual's sense making of his or her life. Some times the whole life is examined, but many studies focus on specific transitions, for example from youth to adulthood, from single to husband or wife and to father or mother, from unemployed to employed, or from a lower to a higher position.

How people manage their life systematically differs by sociostructural indicators such as gender, ethnicity, health/disability, or generation. It is expected, for example, that women marry younger than men and that they bear children before 30, while it is accepted that men father children in older age as well. It is also accepted that younger women marry older men, but the reverse is perceived as unusual or even deviant. Such norms are reflected in different life plans and expectations regarding the future, for example that women often expect to have a career break in order to have children whereas men often assume that children will not significantly influence their occupational career.

Early research on the life course was often influenced by sociopsychological approaches combining contextual factors (such as historical change or illness) with individual coping strategies. For example, the early study by Glen Elder, *Children of the Great Depression* (1974), showed how families mediated the individual's management of the hardships of economic slowdown. Another classic study by Barney Glaser and Anselm Strauss (1968) on status passages during the life course showed how people cope with dying. Another stream in the tradition of sociostructural analysis focuses on formal factors influencing the life course (e.g., class, educational attainment, gender, marital status, age).

In newer research the orthodoxy of sociostructural determination of individuals' sense making of social positioning and the life course was questioned by the thesis of growing individualization, which would weaken the individual's embeddedness in traditional institutions. Growing individualization would set free new generations from traditional bonds and would open an increasing space of new opportunities and decisions, for example for youth (Furlong & Cartmel 1997). More critical examinations

show that although the semantics of life course decisions have changed, the idea of growing self responsibility does not go along with a significant change in vertical social mobility or increasing individual control of life (Vickerstaff 2006).

The life course encompasses an objective course of life and the individual's sense making of his or her life. This is mainly analyzed by a combination of quantitative and qualitative methods that investigate the sense making of transitions, action orientations, and coping strategies. Additionally, two streams of research have developed which concentrate on specific aspects of the life course. At the center of biographical research is the individual's sense making of his or her life. Sociostructural researchers, on the other hand, focus on the life course patterns that are expressed in durations of working and employment status or marital status or divorce, and which factors could be linked to such patterns. While the biographical approach mainly works with qualitative methods and narrative interviewing techniques to explain current activities by the cumulated sense making of one's former life (Rosenthal 2004), the sociostructural approach uses event history modeling (Blossfeld & Rohwer 2002) or optimal pattern matching techniques (Abbott & Tsay 2000) to examine and compare life course patterns and events.

SEE ALSO: Aging and the Life Course, Theories of; Biography; Crime, Life Course Theory of; Individualism; Life Course and Family; Life Course Perspective; Life History; Rite of Passage

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life course and family

Chris Phillipson

The concept of the life course refers to the social processes shaping individuals' journey through life, in particular their interaction with major institutions associated with the family, work, education, and leisure. The life course perspective distinguishes between *trajectories* on the one side and *transitions* on the other. The former refer to the sequence of roles experienced over the life span; the latter to the changes consequent upon events such as divorce, children leaving home, and the birth of grandchildren.

Life course approaches emphasize the way in which individual trajectories and transitions are linked to the lives of significant others, with the interdependency of generations being one such example. The idea of families having "interlocking trajectories" was first explored in the work of the American sociologist Glenn Elder, most notably in his *Children of the Great Depression* (1974). This study illustrated how delays in the parents' timing of work and family careers as a result of the economic depression of the 1930s affected the subsequent timing of their children's own life transitions. Another example of the "linked lives" phenomenon has been illustrated in research on grandparenting that examines situations where grandparents take

responsibility for raising grandchildren. Silverstein et al. (2003) view this as an example of “mutual interdependency” within the family, with grandparents adopting new parental roles and parents excused from the main responsibilities associated with parenting. In this way, the researchers suggest, the family can be seen as a group of interlocking individuals who continually adapt both to their own needs and to those of others within the family system.

The idea of *time* is a central element in the concept of the life course. Hareven (1982) identifies three different levels of “time” running through the life course of any individual: familial, individual, and historical. *Family time* refers to the timing of events such as marriage which involve the individual moving into new family based roles such as spouse or parent. *Individual time* is closely linked with family time, given the links between individual transitions and collective family based transitions. *Historical time* refers to more general institutional changes in society, including demographic, economic, and socio legal. Hareven argues that an understanding of the synchronization of these different levels of time is essential to the investigation of the relationship between individual lives and wider processes of social change.

The life course is itself now stretched over a longer period of time, given substantial improvements in life expectancy in most western countries. Associated with this have been significant changes in family life over the past century. For example, current cohorts of older people experience a far longer period of “post parental” life than was the case with earlier cohorts. In 1900, women were likely to be in their mid fifties/sixties when their last child married. Consequently, given lower life expectancy at this time, many women could expect to be widowed before their last child left home. With increased life expectancy, smaller family size associated with low fertility rates, and closer spacing of children, the average couple can now expect to live for 25 years or more after their last child has moved out. However, this post parental phase may still be associated with extensive care responsibilities associated with grandparenting and other types of informal care.

The life course approach has been highly influential in research on the family life of older people, with the idea of linked lives

demonstrating how expectations about giving and receiving support are part of a continuing interaction among parents, children, and other kin over their lives as they move through time (Hareven 2001). Although the growth of individualism may have loosened kinship ties to a degree (Beck & Beck Gernsheim 2004), relationships between generations continue to be important in the family life of older people (Phillipson et al. 2001). The work of Attias Donfut and Wolff (2000) in France has highlighted the role of the “pivot” (middle age) generation in providing economic support to young people on the threshold of adulthood, as well as providing flexible forms of care for the older generation as need arises. Generations have also been shown to provide emotional support for one another at different points of the life course. Research in the US has tracked feelings of emotional closeness and support across generations and found that emotional closeness stayed stable over a period of nearly two decades, with the maintenance of strong levels of affectual solidarity across generations, with adult children both providing and receiving help from mothers and fathers.

Life course research has also underlined the variability of expectations and patterns of support, with patterns of generational assistance shaped by values and experiences that evolve throughout life. Hareven and Adams (1996) demonstrate this point from research in the US examining how the premigration history of different ethnic groups influences expectations of support in later life. They demonstrate how older cohorts tend to emphasize support from family members; younger cohorts, in contrast, tend to stress help from social and welfare programs. They further note the way in which the earlier life course experiences of each cohort, as shaped by historical events, also affect the availability of economic and educational resources and support networks.

Given greater longevity, multi generational ties have assumed much greater importance for securing well being and support for individuals over the life course. At the same time, the diversity of family ties must also be acknowledged. Generational relationships remain important in anchoring people at different points of the life course; however, not everyone is involved to the same degree in such relationships. The role of

family relationships within the life course is likely to undergo further modification with the experiences of new cohorts influenced by wider social and historical change. The key point to acknowledge here is the dynamic process involved with different age groups both influencing the shape of the life course, while themselves being affected by changes operating at an institutional level. Families with their connecting intergenerational bonds will remain at the center of this process, and are themselves likely to contribute to what will be a major area of social change in the years ahead.

SEE ALSO: Aging and the Life Course, Theories of; Family Diversity; Grandparenthood; Life Course; Life Course Perspective

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life course perspective

Glen H. Elder, Jr.

Developments after World War II called for new ways of thinking about lives, society, and their relationship. The social discontinuities of economic depression, a world war, and prosperity raised questions about the course these adults followed into the middle years. The changing age composition of society also gave more visibility to the adult life course. Problems of old age directed inquiry to earlier trajectories and to the processes by which lives are influenced by a changing society. In combination, these developments placed lives in context and focused attention on their social pathways. From this background the life course perspective was conceived as both a concept and a theoretical orientation for the study of individual lives and age cohorts.

ELEMENTARY DISTINCTIONS

As a concept, the life course refers to an age graded sequence of events and social roles that is embedded in social structures and history. These structures vary from family relations at the micro level to age graded educational organizations and state policies at the macro level. The life course also represents a theoretical orientation, a type of theory that guides research in terms of problem identification and formulation, rationales of design, variable selection, and explanatory analysis.

The life course evolves over an extended period of time, as in a trajectory of marriage or work; and it also takes form within a short time span, as a transition between statuses, such as leaving school and entering a full time job. Social transitions of this kind vary in timing, whether relatively early or late, and are always

embedded in trajectories which give them a distinctive form and meaning. Indeed, life trajectories in specific domains (such as work) link states, the duration of each state, and transitions between states across successive years. For example, each work trajectory is patterned by a sequence of jobs of varying duration and transitions between jobs, along with occasional episodes of unemployment. A single work transition may entail little or no change or produce a turning point – a redirection of the life course through changes in situation, meaning, and/or behavior. Marriage and stable employment have served as transitions out of crime and as turning points for young men who grew up in poverty.

Each concept – trajectory, transition, and turning point – applies to levels of the life course, from macro to micro: (1) institutionalized pathways may be defined on the macro level by social policies of the state or firm; (2) within these pathways, the individual works out his or her life course through choices and lines of action; and (3) the individual's own course of development and aging, which may be expressed in terms of self confidence or intellectual competence. These multiple levels are illustrated by an examination of worklife. A "career line" refers to pathways that are defined by the aggregated work histories of employees. They are structured by industry sectors and the labor market. An individual's worklife varies by the career requirements of the marketplace and firm. It also may vary by the worker's family life, an integral dimension of his or her life course. On the developmental level, both negative and positive changes in work have psychological consequences, as in feelings of self efficacy. Each level of the life course represents a field of study, though contemporary work is more likely to extend across levels.

The life course is frequently used interchangeably with other concepts, such as life span, life history, and life cycle. These concepts have an important application in studies of the life course, but they are not synonymous with its meaning. For example, life span, as in life span psychology or sociology, describes the temporal scope of inquiry and specialization that includes a substantial portion of life, especially one that links behavior in two or more life stages. The temporal frame moves well beyond age specific studies of childhood or adolescence. Life

history, on the other hand, generally refers to the chronology of events and activities across the life course (e.g., residence, household composition, marriage and childbearing). It is frequently assembled from retrospective life calendars, which record the year and month at which a transition occurs in each domain. This life record depicts an unfolding life course in ways uniquely suited to event history analyses. Lastly, the life cycle has been used to describe a sequence of social roles or events, especially the reproductive process from one generation to the next. All populations have a reproductive life cycle, but only some of the people bear children.

PARADIGMATIC PRINCIPLES OF LIFE COURSE THEORY

Over many decades, the life span was carved up into life stages which became distinct fields of study. Now we recognize that developmental and aging processes can only be understood by taking a long term perspective. This whole life course perspective reflects the cumulation of research that documents the relevance of early learning and experience for later life. Behaviors at mid life are influenced not only by current circumstances or by anticipation of the future, but also by the experiences of childhood. Also relevant are the developmental trajectories and the biomarkers of pre disease pathways that extend back to the early years. Long term studies are increasingly documenting the relationship between patterns of late life adaptation and the formative years of life course development. By studying lives over substantial periods of time, we can also observe the potential interplay of social change with individual development. Accordingly, the principle of life span development states that: *human development and aging are lifelong processes.*

Pioneering longitudinal studies in California became lifelong enterprises without an initial vision of the life course. Larger studies have recently adopted this perspective, such as the national longitudinal studies of birth cohorts in Great Britain, marked by birth dates of 1946, 1958, 1970, and 2000. They are all scheduled to be followed into the later years of life. Studies across the life course are demonstrating that life outcomes can be modified even for those who

experienced adversity in childhood. They are also changing our understanding of poverty, work, and achievement across the life course while identifying pathways of resilience and increasing vulnerability.

Individual lives are not merely shaped by social institutions or the larger environment. They are also constructed through the choices and plans people make. In the severely limited world of the inner city, families struggle with poverty and crime, but many parents manage their children's lives effectively by entering them in youth organizations and activities, including the local church. John Clausen (1993) has made the case for planful competence as a component of human agency. Adolescents who possess self confidence, an intellectual investment, and dependability – the elements of planful competence – can more effectively prepare themselves for the future. The principle of human agency states that: *individuals construct their own life course through the choices and actions they take within the opportunities and constraints of history and social circumstance.*

Making decisions or choices plays an important role in the timing and timetables of life. Some people come to marriage early in life, while others do so much later on. These differences in timing have consequences, since early marriage may come before education is completed and late marriage severely restricts the pool of available mates. Mortimer (2003) finds that very early transitions to adulthood, such as leaving home at a very young age, have detrimental effects on mental health. Since life experiences often cumulate over time, low income and limited wealth are likely to have more potent effects on emotional and physical health in later life. Unequal groups become more unequal across the years. With these points in mind, the principle of timing states that: *the developmental antecedents and consequences of life transitions, events, and behavioral patterns vary according to their timing in a person's life.*

Both timing and individual choices occur in specific historical times and places, as expressed in the principle of time and place: *the life course of individuals is embedded in and shaped by the historical times and places they experience over their lifetime.* Consider the Chinese Cultural Revolution, which lasted from 1966 to 1976.

Thousands of urban Chinese youth had their lives drastically altered by this revolution through Mao's decision to "send them down" to the countryside, separating them from their families and communities, exposing them to hard manual labor, and limiting their education. These young people postponed marital decisions in the hope of returning to their coastal city. In this manner, the sent down cohort was set apart from adjacent birth cohorts and those of similar age who were not sent down.

The same historical event or change may vary in substance and meaning across different places, regions, or nations. In World War II, the post war era brought great prosperity to Americans as they returned from the war, but Germans faced widespread great poverty and hunger at the same time. With retrospective life history methods, Mayer (1988) found that German men who were born between 1915 and 1925 were almost universally involved in the armed forces. These men lost as much as nine years of their occupational careers in the war and many of the survivors could not find employment afterward. The younger cohort of 1931 also suffered widespread hardship in the war which could not be countered by the economic boom of the 1950s.

In the Great Depression, children were influenced by their father's income loss and by their mother's employment. This observation is expressed by the principle of linked lives: *lives are lived interdependently and sociohistorical influences are expressed through this network of shared relationships.* A more contemporary example comes from the US rural crisis of the 1980s and 1990s when economic indicators such as housing starts and retail sales declined by 40 percent or more. Economic hardship adversely affected the nurturance of parents because it increased their depressed feelings. At the same time, hardship made joint activities and shared responsibilities more important. These experiences had developmental value in the lives of rural youth.

In combination, these principles foster awareness of larger historical forces and the timing of events. They enhance the recognition that lives cannot be understood when they are not connected to relationships with significant others. Most importantly, when they inform inquiry they promote a holistic understanding of lives

over time and across changing contexts. The ideas underlying these principles have emerged over recent decades. The first principle on human development and aging as lifelong processes represents a definitional premise of the theoretical orientation's scope – the temporal span of study extends from birth to death. The other principles first appeared in a Cooley Mead award lecture by Glen Elder (1994) that surveyed studies of the life course and some key premises. Within the time frame of life histories, the principle of human agency depicts the individual as an active force in constructing his or her life course through choices and action. The multiple meanings of age brought temporality and timing to life course thinking, especially during the 1960s – the meanings of social age and historical time. The principle of linked lives refers to the interdependence of lives and has its origins in role theoretical accounts of life histories that date back to *The Polish Peasant* (Thomas & Znaniecki 1918–20). The fifth principle on historical time and place derives much of its richness from the emergence of social history.

THE EMERGENCE OF LIFE COURSE THEORY

Research traditions and concepts relevant to the life course began to coalesce in a theoretical orientation during the 1960s and 1970s. One of the crystallizing forces came from the pioneering longitudinal studies that followed children through the Great Depression and into adulthood – e.g., the Oakland and Berkeley Growth Studies, and the Guidance Study at the University of California, Berkeley. With study members in adulthood, the investigators had to move beyond child based, growth oriented accounts of development. They faced three major challenges: (1) to formulate concepts of development and aging that apply across the life course; (2) to develop ways of thinking about how lives are organized and change over time; and (3) to relate lives to an ever changing society.

The first challenge required the formulation of life span concepts of development and aging in both sociology and developmental psychology. For sociologists, life transitions and turning

points entail changes in relationships, social identity, and self evaluation. Concepts of inter personal and correlated constraints offer insights concerning the dynamics of behavioral continuity. Within birth cohorts, differentiating and cumulating experiences across the life course tend to generate complementary processes, greater heterogeneity or inequality between individuals over time, through the cumulation of advantages and disadvantages, and enhanced behavioral continuity within individuals. In psychology, the distinctive principles of life span development feature the relative plasticity and agency of the organism, the multidirectionality of life span development, and the lifelong interaction of person and social context.

The other challenges were prompted by the relative neglect of context in studies of the person and life span development. These studies did not take role sequences into account in concepts of careers and the life cycle, or age grading. However, a view of life patterns as role sequences dates back to the nineteenth century. Changes in social roles marked changes in social stages across the life cycle, as from marriage to parenthood. W. I. Thomas was an early proponent of this life cycle perspective. With Florian Znaniecki, he used life record data to study the emigration of Polish peasants to European and American cities around the turn of the century (1918–20). Over the years, life cycle theory has focused on stages of parenthood and the generations. By doing so, it has brought some measure of context to lives by stressing their interdependence and providing a way of thinking about socialization. Within the life cycle of each generation, unexpected and involuntary events occur. Thus, a 30 year old woman becomes a grandmother when her adolescent daughter has a first child. Family members lose their status as grandchildren when their grandparents die. Changing connections to family members are a defining feature of life cycle processes.

But the life cycle's emphasis on reproduction and parenting severely limited its application. It did not apply to the never married or to the multiply divorced in a world in which marriage and parenting have become uncoupled to a large extent. And its focus on one career, that of reproduction, ignored the contemporary realities

of multiple roles (e.g., work and family). Equally important, the life cycle, as a role concept, was not sensitive to temporality, apart from the notion of order. It does not specify the duration of time in role or the timing of life transitions, distinctions that are now an essential part of an age graded view of the life course. A sequence of parental roles, for example, could occur in a woman's twenties or thirties. Likewise social role categories, such as generational membership, failed to locate people in historical time with precision. Membership in a kinship generation may span 30 years.

Until the 1960s, the relationship perspective of the life cycle offered a popular way of thinking about the patterning of lives and their interdependence, despite the aforementioned limitations. However, these limitations soon led to a convergence with newly developing understandings of age in a sociological perspective on the life course. This perspective drew upon the key virtues of each tradition, the distinction of linked lives in the life cycle approach and of the relation between age and time that provided an age graded model of the life course embedded in a specific historical context. More than before, human development and aging were viewed now as interacting with a changing life course and its historical context.

These new understandings of age are based on three advances: greater knowledge of the sociocultural meanings of age across the life span, more awareness of the variability among people of the same age in the pace and sequencing of life transitions (e.g., people of the same age do not move across their lives in concert), and the historical meanings of age defined cohorts by birth year or entry into society. Age distinctions may be expressed in terms of social and normative expectations about the timing of life transitions. These expectations can be thought of as timetables – as appropriate times for entering primary school and leaving school, for marriage and the attainment of a managerial role. The existence of such expectations and informal sanctions, as well as peer pressures, makes the appropriate timing of certain transitions especially consequential, such as marriage in a traditional society. Among people born in the same year, some will come to marriage relatively early, or on time, or relatively late, and

some will never marry. Such differences in timing may reflect specific historical circumstances, such as hard times in an economic depression or rapid economic growth. Birth year locates people in specific age cohorts and thus according to particular social changes.

The three dimensions of the life course as a theoretical orientation (e.g., life span concepts, social relationships and the life cycle, and age based concepts) came together in a study of California children who were born in the 1920s, grew up in the Great Depression, and then entered service roles in World War II (Elder 1999 [1974]). The central question concerned the effects of the Great Depression on the lives and development of two birth cohorts, the Oakland children who were born in 1920–1, and the Berkeley children, with birth years of 1928–9. The Depression's effects centered on variation in economic loss for both cohorts. Two deprivational groups within the middle and working classes of 1929 were identified by income loss (1929–33) relative to the decline in cost of living (about 25 percent over this period). Deprived families were defined by a loss of more than 35 percent of their 1929 income, a figure that applies well to both age cohorts. At first an intergenerational approach seemed appropriate and adequate for addressing the above question, with emphasis on the process by which Depression hardship made a difference among children by changing family processes and socialization. But the profound change in life experiences from the 1920s into the late 1930s raised questions that could not be investigated by this perspective. For example, the effect of change depended on many circumstances, including the children's exposure to the change at different ages, as well as the differential age of parents when the economy collapsed. Birth years at opposite ends of the 1920s identified birth cohorts that experienced family income losses at different life stages. Family responses to such losses became a set of linkages between the economic collapse of the 1930s and the developmental experience of children. Dynamic notions of the family economy and its multiple actors became a way of relating the economic crisis to the lives of each cohort of children.

To understand the consequences of growing up in the Great Depression, we drew upon

knowledge of life paths to adulthood, such as education, marriage, worklife advancement, and military duty. A number of young people might escape hardship through early work and military service, whereas others might do so through higher education and marriage. However, some outcomes seemed to have more to do with their timing than with their mere occurrence, such as marriage. Hardship favored early marriage by diminishing the chances of higher education and by making life in the parental home less appealing. Moreover, developmental theory suggests that the early work experience of adolescents would prompt early thinking about work and the timing of their entry into adult work roles. These and other issues made theoretical distinctions concerning the age graded life course especially relevant to the study.

Most adults from hard pressed families managed to rise above this disadvantage as they moved into adulthood. This resilience had much to do with entry into college and the military, along with the support of a partner, family, and friends. However, notable adverse effects of the Great Depression appear among the younger Berkeley males. They experienced the Depression crisis when they were more dependent on family nurturance and hence more vulnerable to family instability, emotional strain, and family conflict. Girls of the same age were more protected by the support of their mothers. Compared to age mates and the older Oakland cohort, the Berkeley boys were less likely to be hopeful, self directed, and confident about their future than were youth who were spared such hardship. However, between adolescence and mid life, postgraduate education, a supportive wife, and the developmental benefits of military service enabled many deprived Berkeley men to achieve notable gains in self confidence and social competence. Recovery and resilience are common themes in the lives of Depression children from the two birth cohorts.

By the end of the twentieth century, across the discipline of sociology and the social sciences, the life course had become a general theoretical framework for the study of lives, human development, and aging. Symptomatic of this development is the publication of a handbook on the life course (Mortimer & Shanahan 2003), as well as the dramatic growth of longitudinal

studies and the emergence of new methods for the collection and analysis of life history data.

SEE ALSO: Aging and the Life Course, Theories of; Aging, Longitudinal Studies; Aging, Sociology of; Crime, Life Course Theory of; Healthy Life Expectancy; Life Course; Life Course and Family; Socialization; Status Attainment; Transition from School to Work

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life environmentalism

Hiroyuki Torigoe and Yukiko Kada

Life environmentalism is a model that aims to resolve environmental problems from a perspective that considers conserving the community life and practices of the people who inhabit the affected area. The life environmentalism model was developed in the 1980s by Japanese environmental sociologists who were concerned with the environmental destruction wrought by industrialization. At the time, the field of environmental policy was divided into two schools of thought embracing mutually opposed ideas about the best approach to environmental policy. The first, which we call "nature environmentalism," advocated the preservation (or restoration) of the pristine natural environment, following the ideals of the natural conservation movement and ecological theory. The other, which we call "modern technicism," emphasized the development of modern technology to rehabilitate the affected environment. This was the position typically embraced by government officials who had civil engineering credentials and the power to allocate the public budget.

However, when sociologists made in depth field research, it was discovered that the local people, as well as some government agents and nature conservationists who worked closely with the local people, were drawing on local knowledge to resolve local issues. Life environmentalism thus developed as a theory that utilizes local knowledge (and associated practices) to resolve environmental problems, recognizing that local communities depend upon the local/natural environment and have therefore developed practices that sustain it. These three points are illustrated using the case study of Lake Biwa, the largest lake in Japan.

Carried to their extreme, the principles of natural environmentalism aim to exclude humans from living close to and exploiting for ests, lakes, and rivers as much as possible. It therefore strongly supports schemes such as the National Parks in the United States. The Lake Biwa conservation movement was strongly supported by people who live in large cities and tend to embrace the principles of nature environmentalism, which thus provided the basic

framework for criticizing government policies. However, this approach could not generate effective measures, as more than 1 million people live around Lake Biwa, and it was practically impossible to relocate them.

Modern technicism, in contrast, advocated reclaiming land from the lake to build a sewage treatment plant to improve the water quality and to use concrete on the sides and bottoms of the feeding rivers and streams to prevent flooding. Needless to say, these proposed measures were staunchly opposed by the proponents of the nature environmentalist model. Both approaches, ecology and modern technology, are important for environmental conservation. However, it is clear that applying the principles of nature environmentalism was unrealistic while modern technicism would contribute to further destruction of the natural environment.

One case study focuses on one village, which is located next to a river that feeds into Lake Biwa. Until the 1950s, the people of this village took their drinking water from a stream running through the village. Children played in the water and adults washed their dishes and vegetables, and chilled watermelons, in the stream. The stream had symbolic importance as well; the people sent ceremonial grass ships down stream, to help the souls of their ancestors on their journey. The fish that were caught in the stream were an important part of the village's diet. In order to maintain the cleanliness of the drinking water, there were strict community rules, which, for example, forbade dumping waste into the river. In the late 1950s a modern waterworks was built in the village, a symbol of modernization. As a consequence, the waste water ran into the river and the water quality declined. To address this declining water quality, a sewage system was eventually introduced but this did little to rectify the situation. However, even after the introduction of a waterworks and sewage system, people remained loyal to the flowing river.

The government proposed concreting the sides and bottom of the river for flood control in the 1970s. The locals were reluctant to oppose the government, not wanting to anger the local administration, which they viewed as a benefactor; but their desire to maintain their customary relationship with the running water was so strong that they eventually voiced their

opposition to the proposal. After discussion in the community, the village people decided to leave the bottom of the river as (its natural) sand and opted for permeable masonry retaining walls that would allow the river water to continue to soak into the banks. This compromise ensured that the environment remained attractive for the village people's favorite aquatic insects, like fireflies, and that fish continued to live and animate the river.

The modern technicism model maintained that building stone or concrete riverbanks would prevent flooding and associated disasters, but the local people, based on their direct experience, did not believe it. Thus even after the river reconstruction, the people continue to take social responsibility for flood prevention: for example, they patrol the river during heavy rains and when the need arises, the people in the community work together to make temporary river banks with sandbags. With these processes local people have maintained their own self government.

The underlying principle of life environmentalism is that people live in and use the environment; humans will tamper with nature and thus the environment will not be "purely natural." We must accept this as the way it is. At the same time, the life environmentalism model supports the idea of using local knowledge and local practices to both sustain the natural environment and ensure local stewardship of the environment.

Life environmentalism utilizes modern technology but also values nature. In other words, it employs "hard" technology like civil engineering construction technology, but is not determined by it, being guided always by the "soft" knowledge of everyday life experiences like community social capital of stewardship. Life environmentalism is especially appropriate in areas like the Asian regions, where population density is high, but the basic ideas of enhancing the social capital of local people will be appropriate in other areas like Africa and Latin America.

SEE ALSO: Ecological Problems; Ecological View of History; Ecology; Environment, Sociology of the; Ethnography; Knowledge; Life History; Lifeworld; Reflexivity; Social Change, Southeast Asia; Tradition; Values; Yanagita, Kunio

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life history

M. Carolyn Clark

Life history is somewhat of a stealth term – on the outside it looks harmlessly simple, but inside it is cloaked with ambiguity and its meaning is both slippery and elusive. The simple part derives from its point of origin: a researcher interviews a particular individual and elicits a richly detailed account of her or his life. It is in how that account is understood, and what is done with it, that the uncertainty and messiness begin. Nothing is straightforward. The life history interview, while privileging the informant in that that person decides what to share about his or her life and how to structure the telling, is nonetheless a co construction between the researcher and the informant, both of whom are situated within a discursive context that shapes the definition of story as well as its telling. The product of the research, the life history itself, is the interpretive work of the researcher. That person has framed the research from the beginning around particular interests, which may or may not be significant to the informant; working from the narrative generated by the informant, it is the researcher who through the life history makes knowledge claims about the larger issue under study.

Cole and Knowles (2001) define life history as "illuminating the intersection of human experience and social context" and it is that intersection that makes all the difference. People live within particular social, cultural, and historical

contexts and their life stories are shaped and defined by those contexts in complex ways. A life history, then, is a means by which we can see how that person makes sense of their experience within those contexts, as well as what impact social structures have on a person's life. Measor and Sikes (1992) think of it as biography read through a sociological lens. Unlike biography, however, life history explores the lives of ordinary rather than famous people. Tierney (1998), invoking Walt Whitman, argues life history makes it possible to say "No one is alien to me" without erasing the differences that will always continue to exist between people.

Life history can be considered an umbrella term for various genres of personal research, including such things as biography, autobiography, autoethnography, and oral history, or it can be identified as a genre in and of itself. These categories, however, are somewhat contested and they tend to blur into one another, but the common ground is that all explore personal experience. Life history has its roots in anthropology and sociology in the early 1900s, peaked in the 1930s and 1940s, then fell out of favor in the social sciences because of its lack of representativeness and its high level of subjectivity. With the interpretive turn in the 1960s, and with the growing influence of postmodern theory, those weaknesses came to be viewed as strengths, and life history again became popular in sociology and anthropology, as well as in psychology, history, education, gender and cultural studies, and linguistics (Goodson & Sikes 2001).

In life history interviews informants choose how to craft their account, selecting some events, omitting others, in order to accomplish something (e.g., create a particular identity, establish causality, or develop thematic coherence across the life span), which is to say that the stories themselves have work to do. Likewise from the perspective of the researcher the life history itself exists to accomplish something. Peacock and Holland (1988) suggest two broad conceptualizations of the purpose of life history: as portal and as process. When understood as a portal, the life history is used to illuminate a reality that stands outside the story and which the life history presumably mirrors. This could generate objective data about the person's life,

for example, in order to understand a particular historical period, or subjective data, where the focus is on the inner life of a person, whereby the researcher could understand how, for example, a particular culture shapes self understanding. Life history conceptualized as process has a very different focus. Attention here is addressed to the narrative itself; the generated text and its interpretation is central. Geertz (1983) argues it is impossible to really understand what it's like to be a member of another culture; what is possible is to understand the symbolic and discursive categories of that culture. He likens this to how a reader understands a poem or makes sense of a proverb: it is a complex act of interpretation that is only possible by collecting a great deal of data (the notion of thick description which Geertz adopted from Gilbert Ryle) and contextualizing it. The analytic tools focus on language and other symbol systems, as well as on overarching themes.

Given the highly personal, even intimate, nature of life history research, a number of methodological and ethical issues are embedded and intertwined within it that are more salient here than in other types of qualitative research. The underlying questions being addressed are how informants make sense of their lives and how they narrate that understanding. But there is also an autobiographical dimension to this work, as there is in all research: we choose topics of personal interest to us, and those interests also shape the interpretations we render. In studying the lives of others it is particularly important that we are aware of how our life story intersects with theirs, how our personal and professional interests are being served through this work, and how our multiple positionings shape our thinking; and these personal factors need to be made visible in the life history itself. Plummer (2001) stresses that to understand any life story we must know how both the researcher and the informant are positioned, the nature of their relationship (he thinks of this in terms of the level of involvement by the researcher: stranger, acquaintance, friend, lover), and how all are positioned in the broader social context. The central responsibility of the researcher is to the informant, and that relationship must be marked by empathy, sensitivity, and respect. Cole and Knowles (2001) speak of this as a

highly principled process. It is essential that the researcher work collaboratively with the informant at all stages of the process – never an easy thing to achieve, in part because both parties have different interests in engaging in this work and because unequal power relationships are challenging to overcome – but Chase (1995) argues persuasively that the researcher must do everything to enable the informant to take responsibility for the narrative if the outcome is truly to be an intersubjective construction of meaning.

Measor and Sikes (1992) lay out many of the thornier ethical issues implicit in life history research: the careful building of trust and rapport with the informant in order to elicit intimate information can have elements of voyeurism; the ambiguity of a project in which we seek intimate information of others to serve our own professional and disciplinary purposes is difficult to balance with what the informant needs or wants from participation in the study; and being aware of and sensitive to the impact on the informant of the telling of the life story itself, as well as the potential impact that reading what we write about them might have. There is also the concern that the published report not serve to other the informant. As is true with all ethical issues, there are no ready answers to these dilemmas. Plummer (2001) suggests five principles to guide researchers in dealing with these and other ethical dilemmas: respect for persons and their differences; an ethic of care; the promotion of equity and fairness in working with informants; an increase in autonomy and free choice for participants; and a commitment to minimize harm. In a postmodern era such universals may be at variance with the fragmented and ambiguous realities of life, but the need remains to honor our relationship with our informants and to continually seek their good, making judgments about that good that are highly situated, often ambivalent, but done in good faith.

What do we have when we write a life history? We certainly cannot claim that we have the life itself; no life can be captured and reduced to text. In addressing this question Denzin (1989) begins with Derrida's "metaphysics of presence": people live meaningful lives and these meanings are real and present to them, yet there

is no way to access the inner life of another because it always must be done through language which itself is unstable and fluid. Denzin concludes that both the lives as told and the life histories as written are literary productions – they are, in fact, fiction: "As we write about lives, we bring the world of others into our texts. We create differences, oppositions, and presences which allow us to maintain the illusion that we have captured the 'real' experiences of 'real' people. In fact, we create the persons we write about, just as they create themselves when they engage in storytelling practices" (p. 82). This notion of our work as fiction is an important caveat for life history research. All meaning is fluid and shifting. In the telling of a story, in the transcription of that telling, in the analysis of that text, and in the reading of that text by others, meaning shifts and reforms, morphing constantly. As Riessman (1993) notes, "all texts stand on moving ground." It is essential that we recognize that what we write is fiction and that our truth claims are limited, but it is also important to know that these fictions are meant to serve larger ends, the illumination of the human condition.

Postmodernism presents other challenges to life history research. The self is also contested; no longer unitary and stable, it is now understood as nonunitary, fragmented, and unstable, which has profound implications, both in representing a life and in interpreting it. All knowledge claims must be tentative, open to multiple interpretations and reinterpretations. Tierney (1999) identifies five concerns that these issues raise: textual authority, which requires that the author be understood as the co creator of the work; fragmentation, the multiple identities of researcher, informant, and reader that need to be made visible in the text; representation, the creation of an evocative and flexible narrative; purpose, that these are multiple and situated within the needs of the researcher, the informant, and the audience; and judgment, the need for new standards of quality for postmodern texts. Tierney's concerns themselves constitute quality standards. In addition to those, Cole and Knowles (2001) propose a principled methodological process, the use of accessible language, authenticity and internal consistency within the text, aesthetic form of the life history itself, and

the theoretical and transformative potential inherent in doing this research.

The future of life history is filled with both challenge and promise. Life history has enormous emancipatory potential as a tool for exposing and confronting social structures that oppress and silence, but it will be important to do so without reifying power inequities and without providing insights that could be used by the powerful as tools to enforce their dominance over others. The direction of this research also needs to change, from studying down to studying up, that is to say by examining and illuminating the workings of power by those who wield it. The challenges involved in doing all of this are significant, but the benefits to be gained make the attempt more than worth the effort.

SEE ALSO: Autoethnography; Biography; Narrative

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lifestyle

Tally Katz Gerro

Lifestyle involves the typical features of every day life of an individual or a group. These features pertain to interests, opinions, behaviors, and behavioral orientations. For example, lifestyle relates to choice and allocation of leisure time; preferences in clothes and food; tastes in music, reading, art, and television programs; and choice of consumer goods and services.

At the individual level, lifestyle denotes self expression, personal taste, and identity (Featherstone 1991). At the group level, the concept refers to shared preferences and tastes that are reflected primarily in consumption patterns and in the possession of goods (Weber 1946). Lifestyles give members of a group a sense of solidarity, and mirror the differentiation between groups in society. The distinctive lifestyles of specific groups may be hierarchically ordered to different degrees, depending on the extent to which a clear system of prestige exists that attaches value to lifestyles (Weber 1946; Sobel 1981). Arguably, it is the range and diversity of different lifestyles practiced in a given society that is of most interest, rather than the profile and makeup of a specific lifestyle. A comprehensive lifestyle analysis will emphasize the way in which arrays of lifestyles evolve over time, the degree to which different lifestyles (associated with class, race, sexuality, etc.) are legitimized, and the way lifestyles are linked to changes in social and economic structures (Zablocki & Kanter 1976).

Max Weber (1946) provided the major sociological definition of the concept, which emphasizes lifestyle as a means of social differentiation that could be used to acquire or to maintain a certain social status. Individuals and groups adopt lifestyles to express and sustain their identity at a particular time and place. In the Weberian framework, lifestyle is the expression

of status groups that can be differentiated from class. Weber defines classes as groupings that are economically determined, while status groups are communities that are determined by a specific social estimation of honor. Status honor is normally expressed by a specific style of life, in as much as the consumption patterns of a status group involve the prestige or honor that is attached to those patterns. Because a status group expects that its members share a particular lifestyle, this becomes the descriptive manifestation through which affiliation, hence status, can be perceived.

Veblen (1970 [1899]) applied this framework in his study of what he termed "the new leisure class" at the turn of the twentieth century in the United States. Veblen portrayed a lifestyle that emphasizes conspicuous consumption as a strategy that individuals employ to display status. Although the possession of wealth becomes the primary evidence for successful activity, and hence the dominant basis of esteem, the translation of wealth into appropriate observable symbols is imperative. This is accomplished through the display of conspicuous leisure and conspicuous consumption.

Building on Weber's work, a body of research has developed which adopted the view that lifestyle is a major form of social stratification that can be used to characterize contemporary society. Although lifestyle segmentation reflects structural inequalities within society, lifestyle is to be distinguished from social class. The concept of class usually refers to dimensions such as education, occupation, and income in as much as they specify one's position and resources in the market. At the same time, the concept of lifestyle usually refers to dimensions such as cultural preferences and tastes, which facilitate symbolic communication of status as an order distinct from that of economic standing. Lifestyles are constructed by symbolic boundaries that mark differences between groups. Symbolic boundaries are expressed through distinctive consumption patterns that tend to be associated, in a particular social context, with shared symbolic codes that bear specific meanings.

The significant relationship between classes and status groups and its expression in material and cultural lifestyle further reverberates in Pierre Bourdieu's (1984) two dimensional approach to stratification. Bourdieu distinguishes

between economic and cultural capital. Class fractions, defined by similar positions with respect to education, income, and occupation, are united by a habitus or by cultural dispositions that are derived from similar life experiences. The habitus determines taste, which is the material and symbolic capacity to appropriate cultural objects and practices. Tastes constitute lifestyle, which is a unitary set of distinctive preferences that classify the classifiers, the upper class. A lifestyle that is associated with the upper classes is naturalized as good and noble and serves distinction. Therefore, lifestyles serve as an effective exclusionary resource and serve to reproduce existing social inequalities as long as they vary systematically with social position.

Bourdieu emphasizes that it is not only the amount of goods and services consumed that is typical of a group, it is also the characteristic mix of goods and services. Lifestyle elements, in terms of specific cultural preferences, can be studied one at a time or as stylistic unities. Stylistic unity is an internal cultural consistency in the elements comprising a lifestyle and in symbolic properties of those elements. It rests on shared perceptions that lifestyle elements are patterned in a manner that makes some sort of aesthetic or other sense. Depending on social, historical, and cultural context, stylistic unity becomes more or less elusive and difficult to identify. Stylistic unity can range from a tight system of expectations for particular tastes and preferences, all adhering to a clear set of cultural imperatives, to a system of blurred, eclectic components, loosely connected by symbolic meanings. For example, a body of research has been trying to identify snobbish unity or omnivorous unity in cultural preferences of elites in contemporary western societies (Peterson & Kern 1996).

Research on the determinants of lifestyle differentiation has predominantly concentrated on those factors that Weber (class), Veblen (income), and Bourdieu (education, parental background) emphasized in their theoretical accounts of the contours of lifestyles. Indeed, a significant body of research has shown that tastes and consumption patterns are influenced by individuals' education, financial resources, occupational characteristics, parental education, and parental lifestyle. In addition, other factors have been shown to matter, such as gender, age, and race. At the same time, there is evidence that in

contemporary society lifestyle is becoming more volatile and less hierarchical so that the correlation with social divisions is no longer conclusive (Featherstone 1991). This is explained by social conditions that are becoming increasingly fragmented, partly because of the proliferation of information and cultural repertoires. Since collective affiliations are multiple, fragmented, and often conflicted, the lifestyles associated with these affiliations are more fluid, unsettled, and cross cutting.

Research on the consequences of lifestyle has looked at its effect on individuals' life chances. This line of work attempts to establish the extent to which the deployment of tastes in everyday life helps to reproduce social class boundaries. Such research has shown how cultural preferences influence individuals' educational aspirations, school grades, and educational attainment; their occupational attainment; and their marital selection (DiMaggio 1994).

SEE ALSO: Conspicuous Consumption; Consumption, Mass Consumption, and Consumer Culture; Cultural Capital; Distinction; Health Lifestyles; Lifestyle Consumption; Status; Taste, Sociology of

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lifestyle consumption

Sam Binkley

Lifestyles are symbolically embellished ways of living. Sociologically, they serve two important functions: they classify or categorize the practitioner within a broader social matrix, and in so doing offer practitioners a unique sense of self and identity. Thus, lifestyles combine material and symbolic processes: they are practical ways of providing for basic needs and requirements such as food, clothing, and shelter, but also aesthetic and symbolic expressions of one's sense of self and of one's membership among certain social groups. As such, lifestyles occur at the intersection of individual agency and social structure. They project a unity that is both subjectively meaningful to practitioners themselves, and objectively legible to those defining the social context in which they are performed. For these reasons, lifestyle has sustained as a key sociological concept, capable of bridging the divide between macro level concerns with large scale social structures and social groupings, and micro level concerns with the subjective dimensions of agency, meaning, and identity.

The study of lifestyle also has a more current relevance. Lifestyles have attracted the interest of many contemporary sociologists for their usefulness in the analysis of processes of social change, and particularly for the perspective they offer on the unique social and cultural conditions characteristic of late capitalist or postmodern societies. Indeed, as Chaney (1996) and others have argued, the very concept of lifestyle is an inextricably historical category of analysis, bound up with social instabilities linked to patterns of modern social change. These changes include the decline of social classes (organized around production) and the emergence of personal identities (based on consumption); the rise of urban centers and the increase of social anonymity in big cities; the increasing influence of mass culture and the "bourgeoisification" of the proletariat; the increasing saturation of culture with visual technologies of communication; and the ever more pervasive commodification of everyday life. In this regard, sociological uses of the concept of lifestyle can be divided into

two general areas: (1) studies of social differentiation and stratification through the use of symbols, and (2) studies of the constitution of personal identity in the context of dynamic social change.

LIFESTYLE AS STATUS EMULATION

A sociological interest in lifestyle assumes, as do many sociological narratives, a fundamental rupture between traditional and modern societies: traditional orders of social hierarchy rooted in ascribed status give way to more flexible and mobile status systems defined by achieved status, opening the way for the advancement and upward mobility of a range of social groups previously excluded from the elite strata. With the increasing mobility of social groups brought on by the extension of a money economy unfettered by the controls of the old feudal order, more people gain access to goods and luxuries through the expanding open market, increasingly available to the swelling ranks of the emerging mercantile class, or bourgeoisie. With the gradual crowding out of small, close knit communities characterized by face to face interactions by the bustling traffic and anonymous crowds of the cities, social identity becomes uprooted, less constrained by longstanding tradition, more available for manipulation and affect.

Lifestyles, then, appear under these conditions as means of conferring legitimacy on one's location on a social ladder, not through the holding of resources, titles, or offices in the mode of the old aristocracy, but through the affect of specific ways of living meant to display one's wealth and cultivation – a circumstance that leaves ascendant or would be ascendant groups open to charges of abuse, fraudulence, and falsification. With the demise of a social universe defined by a metaphysically sanctioned hierarchy, the profane, secular world of everyday practices and things emerges as a field of symbolic contest and status competition. This predicament is exacerbated by the influx of a newly monied middle class, or *nouveau riche*: possessors of economic capital who lack the legitimacy and status conferred by the established order. These newly ascendant classes seek to locate themselves through sometimes verbose and clumsy acts of

emulation. They parrot, however clumsily, the styles of the older aristocratic classes in a pattern of distinction that expresses a lifestyle in the full sociological sense – an effort to classify oneself through habits of living which are at once material and symbolic.

Most notable here are the contributions of Alexis deTocqueville, whose studies of American society in the early nineteenth century reveal the strained efforts of the American gentry and their emulators to distinguish themselves through ostentatious practices of living in a society where formal hierarchies have been effectively leveled (Tocqueville 1969). Similarly, Thorstein Veblen, writing against the opulence of the Gilded Age and the materialistic excesses of the *fin de siècle* industrialists, outlined a genealogy of modern leisure, tracing contemporary modes of conspicuous consumption to their barbaric origins in the symbolism of social power (Veblen 1924). His view of leisure or style of life as competitive display is reflected in much mid century American sociology, as illustrated in Lloyd Warner's studies of trickle down status imitation in an American suburb, Robert and Helen Lynd's studies of "Middletown," an American town under the grip of the new consumer culture of the 1930s, and in Vance Packard's popular critique of postwar American consumption patterns, *The Status Seekers*.

CULTURE AND STRATIFICATION

Underscoring much sociological interest in lifestyle as a form of stratification mediated by symbols is a desire to supplement the objective categories of economic class with the subjective outlooks and meanings possessed by actual social actors themselves – a theme first introduced with Weber's (1946) analysis of the types of social power. Weber made the distinction between elite groups stratified by the varying criteria of class, status, and party, with status emerging as a claim to social esteem determined by a "social estimation of honor." Status groups, for Weber, posed an alternative grouping of social power based not on the possession of capital and valued property alone, but on recognizable characteristics shared by a community which assume the quality of honorific value.

The stratification of social groups, Weber argued, was not reducible to competition for scarce (economic) resources, but extended to struggles for (symbolic) recognition and honor between competing groups, manifested in the mundane dimensions of consumption and everyday life. This distinction would prove significant in the analysis of the cultural forms and processes of social change that would begin to take root in the latter part of the twentieth century.

Weber's influence is apparent in the sociology of Bourdieu, perhaps the most influential contemporary voice in the sociology of lifestyle, and an author who took to task the challenge of a truly cultural approach to stratification. The value of Bourdieu's sociology comes with his insistence on avoiding economic reductionism by linking the symbolic productions of everyday lifestyles to practical efforts of groups and individuals to distinguish themselves within a stratified system of cultural preferences. His expansive study of the French class system, *Distinction* (1984), documents the efforts of middle class and working class people to effectively classify themselves on a stratified cultural scale through the exercise of taste in clothing, art, music, and food. The expression of taste represents, for Bourdieu, a practical intervention in a classificatory scheme wherein certain tastes naturally accrue to the higher or to the lower end of an economic scale. Like Veblen, Weber, and Tocqueville, Bourdieu sees the social world as a highly conflictual arena in which lifestyle plays as a set of tactics employed by various groups to secure honorific distinction denied by others, yet unlike these figures Bourdieu pays careful attention to ways in which these strategies are enacted in unreflective, mundane choices, naturalized within the taken-for-granted disposition – or habitus – of members of these groups. In marked contrast to economic models, which conceive of actors as intentional and rational, Bourdieu's theory of the habitus considers the lifestyles of actors as a site of creative classification in the practical moments of everyday life.

Importantly for Bourdieu's sociology, the habitus's of various social groups conform to their own distinct logics, which are themselves established in a dialectical tension between dominant and subordinate classes. These two

dispositions meet in what Bourdieu terms a game of "refusal and counter refusal." The aesthetic dispositions that structure the middle class habitus, for example, express a distain for the brutishness, obviousness, and directness contained in working class arts, sports, foods, fashion, and films, expressing instead a preference for the indirect, thoughtful, and cultivated. At the same time, members of the working class dismiss the loftiness and rumination implicit in middle class refinement and cultivation, preferring the straightforward, the practical, the direct, and the immediate. These logics illustrate the contrasting dispositions of these groups in which a "taste of the necessary" expressed by the subordinate groups is distinguished from an "aesthetic distancing" expressed by dominant groups.

DETERMINISM AND AGENCY

Other sociological uses of lifestyle as an alternative category of stratification to those offered in more economic accounts developed specifically from dialogues within the Marxist tradition. An old maxim of Marxist thought, "base determines superstructure," provides a deterministic explanation of the cultural and aesthetic realms, to which Bourdieu's theory of the habitus is in part a reaction. The stamp of this determinism is evident in several branches of Marxism, most notably in the work of Frankfurt School theorists Adorno and Horkheimer, who in *The Dialectic of Enlightenment* (1982) examined mid century forms of popular or "mass culture" as instruments of ideological control. Lifestyle practitioners are, from this perspective, cultural dopes, passive objects of control and manipulation.

But for other twentieth century Marxists more engaged with the problem of culture (a roster that includes Italian communist Antonio Gramsci, the British historians E. P. Thompson and Eric Hobsbawm, French structuralists Roland Barthes and Louis Althusser, and later members of the British Birmingham School of Cultural Studies), investigations of the everyday lives of subaltern groups countered the parochialism and determinism of the base-superstructure model by uncovering a terrain of symbolic struggle in which opposition originated, not in

the categories of economic class, but in the mundane categories of everyday lifestyle. A version of this thesis was advanced by Richard Hoggart in his influential *Uses of Literacy* (1957), which depicts the “feminization” of the British working class through a process of Americanization, or its saturation in the affects of consumer lifestyles. Hoggart’s work informed the writings of leading figures of the Birmingham tradition (Stuart Hall, Dick Hebdige), who variously proposed studies of the lifestyles of subordinate groups (usually male, working class youth cultures) as explorations of the everyday symbolic realms wherein counter hegemonic struggles were fought out on the level of style. Notable in this tradition is Hebdige’s *Subculture* (1979), a study of London punks, which set the agenda for the emerging field of cultural studies – an interdisciplinary field broadly concerned with lifestyle as a subversive practice.

MODERNITY AND LIFESTYLE

A sociology of lifestyle that stretches from Veblen to Bourdieu has, in many varied ways, related the practice of lifestyle to the conditions of social democratization. Therein, lifestyle is read in terms of strategies employed by opportunistic social groups in their effort to confirm social identities in the absence of more stable, traditionally grounded status criteria. Yet, in place of these stable traditional structures, these approaches tend to assume that there exists an equally stable symbolic matrix wherein the symbolism of lifestyle practices can be universally registered and accepted. To assume, for example, that the *nouveau riche* emulate their aristocratic superiors is to assume the existence of a stable and universally accepted framework for reading lifestyles as symbolic interventions in a fixed status hierarchy. What this line of analysis does not take into account is the ambiguity and instability inherent within these codes at every stage of modern development, and particularly the eroded state of such codes under the accelerated conditions of contemporary culture. The various effects identified with postmodern culture (saturation of culture with visual representations, the commodification of all social meanings, the breakup of traditional class groupings, the increasing mobility and globalization of

communities, the malleability of personal identities) have rendered status emulation through lifestyle an outmoded concept. In this regard, an analysis of lifestyle as a symbolic practice in the contemporary context demands an accounting of the conditions of ambivalence and ambiguity that define the daily conditions of personal and social life in the contemporary context.

A sociology of lifestyle as a response to conditions of ambiguity can be traced to Simmel’s (1971) analysis of urban life in his landmark essay “The Metropolis and Mental Life.” Here, Simmel contextualizes lifestyle as a developing subjective response to the changes and pressures foisted upon ordinary people by the accelerated social and cultural conditions of modern social life, where a collision of codes and symbols, an uprooting of communities, and the increasing mobility of classes and groups undermines the semiotic frameworks wherein lifestyles might have served the function of social classification.

Though Simmel discussed the crowded and disjointed conditions of urban life at the turn of the century, his observations resonate with recent sociological inquiries into the breakup of the symbolic codes underpinning status differentials in late capitalist societies. Harvey (1989) has described a shift from Fordist (production based) to post Fordist (consumption and culture based) economies, in which a process of cultural acceleration and saturation has resulted in a time space compression. In line with this argument is Lash and Urry’s (1987) case that organized capitalism has effectively given way to new patterns of investment and growth, which have uprooted the old social groupings of class upon which lifestyles depended. New emphasis on product differentiation and market segmentation has eclipsed class solidarities and pushed lifestyles to the fore, yet at the same time it has undercut the indexical function of lifestyles as indicators of membership in larger social groups. In the new, information and service oriented capitalism, where the exchange of knowledge and the manipulation of symbols has risen to replace the manufacture of commodities (and the class fractions that follow), lifestyles have become, not indexical, but reflexive: lifestyles do not refer to real social memberships but are self referential, referring only to the fashioning practices of the individuals who bear or enact them. Indeed, adaptations of

Bourdieu's thesis on the cultural dispositions of the middle classes have pointed to important schisms within this class between the old and new fractions, more adept to the cultural and semiotic conditions of consumer capitalism. Mike Featherstone, drawing on Bourdieu, has described the rise of a class of "new cultural intermediaries," mediators of the realms of production and consumption, skilled workers at the shaping, not of things, but of meanings.

IDENTITY AND THE SELF

While sociologists generally agree on a trend toward individualization and the aestheticization of identity, less agreement is shared on the ultimate personal and social implications of this trend. Typically dour notes are sounded by the likes of Daniel Bell (1976), who has described the disjuncture between cultural and economic spheres, resulting in a hedonistic embrace of lifestyle by the minions of the middle class, and Christopher Lasch (1978), who has criticized the "culture of narcissism" that developed from the counterculture of the 1960s. For these authors, lifestyle, unmoored from concrete social structures, is drained of political meaning and moral focus.

But this model of the new lifestyle practitioner as limp and lacking in resolve is countered by postmodernists who find vibrancy and new political potentials in the fragmentation, diversity, and multiplicity made possible by the mobility of lifestyle. Often cited in this respect is the work of Walter Benjamin, who recounted the stance of the *flâneur* as one who negotiates the discordant, disorderly world of the modern marketplace, savoring the possibilities for self presentation and aesthetic self styling that are presented by the crowds of anonymous spectators populating the bustling centers of the urban metropolis (Benjamin 1973). In this light, sociologists of consumer culture have recovered the emancipatory dimensions of lifestyle, asserted the implicitly imaginary dimensions of shopping and other forms of consumption as vehicles of an imaginary hedonism, with powerful potentials for rethinking personal identity as a lifestyle practice (Shields 1992).

However, others have pointed to the anxiety and instability underlying this process. For

Giddens (1991), the "reflexive modernity" thesis provides a general model understanding lifestyle in terms of the existential predicament of the modern individual: amid the patterns of rapid and seemingly haphazard social change that characterize modern historical trajectories, the reassurance and sense of what Giddens terms "ontological security" once furnished by traditional moralities are replaced with a highly individualized lifestyle identities. Against the backdrop of the uncertainties and ambiguities that characterize secular modernity, individuals are compelled to make choices and to realize themselves in these choices. "We have no choice but to choose," Giddens writes.

SEE ALSO: Bourdieu, Pierre; Commodities, Commodity Fetishism, and Commodification; Consumption, Fashion and; Consumption, Mass Consumption, and Consumer Culture; Lifestyle; Postmodern Consumption; Simmel, Georg; Status; Taste, Sociology of

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lifeworld

Warren Fincher

Lifeworld refers to the commonsense interpretive frames and logics by which individuals prereflectively conceptually organize their perceptions of everyday life. The concept of the lifeworld is central to two theoretical traditions – phenomenology and the critical theory tradition as articulated by Habermas – but the lifeworld is also an important concept in the sociological investigations into the construction of knowledge and the social body.

Edmund Husserl, a nineteenth century German philosopher, theorizes the importance of the lifeworld in how individuals come to understand the world around them. The primary focus of his work theorized the nature of logical thought, particularly the origins of knowledge. Husserl developed a philosophy of what he later termed the lifeworld. Two positions were prominent within the philosophical debates of the late nineteenth century. The first stressed formal systems of logic and methods of knowledge construction. The second tradition stressed the importance of lived experiences in the development of an intuitive reflection and subsequent construction. Husserl's early work attempted to bridge these two traditions. In doing so, he argued that the logic involved when thinking does not simply utilize ideal forms, but must incorporate the context of what is specifically

being thought about. Thought, for Husserl, is an interplay between pure logic and the store of knowledge accumulated from lived experiences. By examining the relationship between a phenomenon as it occurs and how individuals subsequently conceptualize and make sense of that experience, Husserl attempts to find those logical frames that transcend the ongoing stream of experiences.

In elaborating on this work, Husserl recognizes that knowledge transcends the boundaries of individual perception and reflection, and he finds the need to theorize the role of others in the construction of meaning. In attending to these issues, Husserl employs the concept of the lifeworld, which for him comes to mean that set of knowledge that is shared intersubjectively. This intersubjective knowledge is about common experiences, but emerges from the common logical forms that people hold. In Husserl's lifeworld we find perhaps the most presocial iteration of the lifeworld, as Husserl links the concept to the idea that all people have a "natural attitude" or innate set of logics that predates learned modes of inquiry and that individuals all hold as a common feature of their cognitive processes.

The concept of the lifeworld enters into sociological inquiry through the work of Alfred Schütz, who incorporated the works of Husserl, Weber, and Bergson to develop his own contributions to the fledgling phenomenology of the early twentieth century. Because Schütz was particularly interested in how people both construct their own senses of reality and also must cope with others' senses of reality, his work elaborates on the intersubjective functions of the lifeworld that Husserl develops by examining the lifeworld as a product of both collective life and also individual experiences. As such, the lifeworld is external to the individual, predating his or her birth and serving to place constraints on the constructions of reality that people create, but the lifeworld is also an individualized part of our ability to make sense of the world, as it is the product of our individual ongoing experience of daily life.

Schütz enumerates a number of key characteristics of the lifeworld. Among these, it is important to note that the lifeworld requires "wide awakeness" from individuals in that they must maintain a level of consciousness of the world around them in order to live life.

The construction and management of meaning is an active event, although not perceived to be thought, but rather taken for granted knowledge. Much of how we employ the lifeworld in making sense of the world around us is through typification, specifically what Schütz calls “first order” typification that rests on the stock of knowledge found in the lifeworld, as opposed to second order typification, which utilizes complex information beyond the scope of the lifeworld. Another important characteristic for Schütz’s lifeworld is that people accept it as reality without question, until something compels them to think otherwise. When problems do occur, people then turn to various more overt logical processes to reinstate normalcy. Given this, Schütz’s legacy can be seen to include the later work of Harold Garfinkel and the ethnomethodological tradition.

The philosopher Merleau Ponty also utilized Husserl’s work on the lifeworld and applied the concept to the body. The body serves as the link between phenomena and the social organization of those phenomena, and the lifeworld serves to bridge the communication between the physical world, the individual’s body, and others. The lifeworld, according to Merleau Ponty, also incorporates knowledge about the body, as evidenced by the “phantom limb syndrome” in which the individual continues to perceive a limb that no longer exists.

The next notable development in the theory of the lifeworld occurs in the work of Habermas, perhaps the most widely known scholar of the critical theory tradition. Habermas utilizes “lifeworld” to mean two related concepts. First, building on Husserl and Schütz, Habermas refers to lifeworld as the set of background assumptions and convictions that people hold. However, what sets apart Habermas’s work on the lifeworld from previous theories is his focus on the function of the lifeworld in modern societies. As such, Habermas also uses the term lifeworld to denote a particular kind of integration that arises from the sharing of background assumptions among people. Because of this interest in integration, Habermas moves away from a strictly phenomenological use of lifeworld that Husserl and Schütz demonstrated.

Habermas maintains an interest in the communicative processes surrounding social integration. A key dynamic in social integration,

for Habermas, is the interplay between the lifeworld and the system, two different perspectives found in modern societies. From the perspective of the lifeworld, one sees the self embedded within the social world, but from the perspective of the system, one sees the world necessarily through a macrosocial lens, distanced and seemingly only indirectly involved through mechanisms of market exchange and the dissemination of organizational power. The form of integration that the system and the lifeworld each proffers is dissimilar and analogously extends Husserl’s distinction between formalized knowledge and the lived experiences of everyday life. The system is that set of formal mechanisms in a society’s superstructure that functions to maintain consequences of social action. The lifeworld, on the other hand, is the perspective from the standpoint of the actors, not the structure. The lifeworld serves to transmit interpretive patterns among individuals, which facilitates key functions in modern society. The lifeworld facilitates the construction of both individual personalities and group identities. It socializes members of society toward communicative processes and the ability to manage interpersonal actions. And through its transmission, it allows for the preservation and selective modification of the stock of background knowledge common to the community’s lifeworld.

Habermas is concerned with the “colonization of the lifeworld,” a pathological phenomenon which occurs when the instrumental rationality common to the operations in the system is utilized in the private sphere in lieu of communicative rationality. Socialization becomes reoriented around values appropriate to the marketplace, but not ones that have been consensually negotiated through the discourses endemic to a healthy lifeworld. The processes of identity formation and value education that are key functions of the lifeworld are then organized around bureaucratic and economic values. In order to guard against the colonization of the lifeworld, Habermas advocates that societies foster a greater reliance on open communicative action that freely engages the value structures of economic and political spheres. However, this conceptualization of communicative action in the lifeworld as intrinsically harmonious has been repeatedly criticized as too idealistic

and not representative of the pathologies that exist in lifeworld discourse, such as patriarchal dynamics, regardless of colonization by instrumental rationality.

The current work involving the lifeworld spans the diversity of contexts that utilize this term. Conversation analysis is one subfield in which the lifeworld remains a salient concept, both as a subject of study and a methodological issue. How people make sense of talk is a key point of inquiry for scholars working in this area, which attends not to how symbols are given meaning but rather how meaning is conveyed in the form that talk takes. As a methodological issue, conversation analysts must confront the problem that they must utilize their own lifeworlds in order to interpret the collaboration of their subjects. In making assessments about how participants carry on interaction through talk, the lifeworld lens of the researcher may be divergent from the lifeworld being preserved and modified within the participants' interaction. As well, ethnomethodological studies are interested in the sense making mechanisms people employ to maintain seamless interactions with others.

The lifeworld remains a useful conceptual tool in other areas of investigation, particularly in the extension of Habermas's work. Studies continue to focus on the lifeworld of women, people of color, urban settings, etc. Much of this work takes Fraser's (1997) critique of Habermas's ideal speech community as a point of departure. Many of the studies that use the lifeworld concept also maintain a focus on the institutional or organizational context. Elizabeth Gill's work on the role of the lifeworld in managing death analyzes the hospice setting for the negotiation of lifeworld and system perspectives, and focuses on the role of the hospice worker in negotiating the interactions between the medical staff and the family. And recent work has also directed attention to the role of the lifeworld in a setting marked with broad scale social change, particularly with social change related to international development and adaptations to working in large scale organizations.

SEE ALSO: Conversation Analysis; Critical Theory/Frankfurt School; Ethnomethodology; Intersubjectivity; Phenomenology; Public Sphere; Schütz, Alfred

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literacy/illiteracy

George Farkas

Traditionally, literacy has meant the ability to read and write. As the cognitive skill requirements of work and daily life have increased, the definition has expanded. In the National Literacy Act of 1991, the US Congress defined literacy as "an individual's ability to read, write, and speak in English and compute and solve problems at levels of proficiency necessary to function on the job and in society, to achieve one's goals, and to develop one's knowledge and potential." Consistent with this, the National Assessments of Adult Literacy, conducted by the National Center for Education Statistics, have measured literacy along three dimensions: prose literacy, document literacy, and quantitative literacy. Each was measured on a scale defined by the skills needed to succeed at daily and work tasks ordered from simple to complex.

Over time and across nations, higher literacy rates have been associated with higher levels of economic development. This is a

well documented pattern, which has been most thoroughly analyzed by economists under the topic of “investment and returns to human capital” (for a review of these studies, see Hanushek & Welch 2005). Indeed, increasing the spread of literacy is one of the key strategies advocated by the World Bank in its efforts to reduce poverty worldwide (Bruns et al. 2003).

Further, at any one place and time, an individual's level of literacy has been associated with her or his place within the social class structure. Typically, the higher the parents' social class status, the more years of schooling are given to their children. Thus, education is the most common mechanism by which parental social class status is transmitted to children. Schooling is also the most common mechanism for upward mobility. Both of these patterns have become stronger as economic development has proceeded, and the cognitive skills demanded of workers have increased.

An increasing number of studies have examined years of schooling completed and individual placement within the social class structure, and found that these are strongly related within all modern societies. Indeed, researchers have now developed research and testing instruments that have been used to systematically collect similar data across a wide variety of nations (Porter & Gamoran 2002), and have discovered very similar relationships between schooling and socioeconomic attainment within all nations. Further, studies have shown that the institutional arrangements for the delivery of schooling bear strong similarities across nations (Baker & LeTendre 2005).

For the US, these patterns are illustrated by the over time trend in the illiteracy rate – defined as the percent of individuals who can neither read nor write. Among whites, this rate declined from 20 percent in 1870 to below 1 percent in 1979. As a consequence of slavery, the illiteracy rate among African Americans in 1870 was 80 percent. By 1979 it had declined to 1.6 percent. However, as noted above, more than the bare minimum of reading and writing skills is required to succeed in twenty first century labor markets. Thus, gaps in more advanced literacy skills, between, on the one hand, lower income, African American, and Hispanic students, and, on the other, middle and higher income or white and Asian students, have emerged as

among the US's greatest concerns. This has led to empirical studies on the determinants and consequences of these achievement gaps, and to the consideration of a variety of policies and programs designed to reduce them.

The importance of this focus on differentials in cognitive skill across class and race/ethnicity groups is emphasized by a variety of studies that show that, at the beginning of the twenty first century, such skill has increasingly become *the* social stratifying variable in American society. These studies have yielded the following findings. First, the years of schooling an individual completes is the primary determinant of her or his placement within the social class system, and also the primary mechanism by which parents transfer their social class status to their children. Second, during the period 1980–2000, as the economy became more knowledge based and globalized, and as union strength declined, the economic returns to schooling and cognitive skill increased dramatically. That is, adjusted for inflation, the earnings of workers with no more than a high school education were stagnant, while the earnings differential between college educated and high school educated workers increased dramatically. Third, and also during this time period, the black–white test score gap, which had narrowed between 1960 and 1980, stopped closing and remained unchanged. Fourth, the earnings differential between African American and white workers was shown to be largely explained by the cognitive skills differential between these groups.

What explains individual and group differentials in literacy, as measured by tests of cognitive skill and self reports of educational attainment (number of years of schooling completed)? Both qualitative and quantitative studies point to parent–child interaction and children's oral language development during the preschool period as crucial for the creation of differentials in school readiness that strongly predict performance in early elementary school. Thus, the child's early literacy skill – oral vocabulary, grammatical usage, letter knowledge, and phonemic awareness (the ability to hear and manipulate the separate sounds in spoken language) – are among the principal predictors of success in first grade reading. Since scores on these variables tend to be lower for children from lower social class, African American, and

Latino backgrounds, lower preschool literacy among these students predicts lower first grade reading attainment.

How do middle class children come to have more extensive vocabularies and standard speech patterns than lower class children? The phenomenon in question has been publicly discussed at least since the story of Eliza Doolittle in *My Fair Lady*, whose distinctively working class vocabulary and dialect are remade by Professor Higgins. During the 1960s, 1970s, and 1980s, sociologist Basil Bernstein and anthropologist Shirley Brice Heath reported on the more restricted speech code within lower class families, and the more elaborated code within middle class families, and argued that the latter better prepares middle class children for school success. More recently, developmental psychologists Betty Hart and Todd Risley (1995, 1999) had graduate students audiotape, one evening each month, the speech utterances occurring between parents and children as the children aged from 12 to 36 months of age. They found that the middle class parents addressed many more words to their children than did the lower class parents, and also used many more different vocabulary words in these conversations than did the lower class parents. Hart and Risley report that by 36 months, the children were full participants in their family's conversational culture. Not surprisingly, just like their parents, the middle class children knew and used far more different words than the lower class children. Other researchers have corroborated and extended these findings. Thus, preschool oral language literacy translates directly into elementary school reading literacy.

School readiness and acquisition also have a behavioral dimension. Perhaps most damaging to their success in school is the immaturity that many low income children bring to first grade. They often come to school unready to sit still, pay attention to the teacher and the lesson, and do their own work. Parental assistance with homework, and monitoring of the child's school success, is often absent. By comparison, middle class parents often make raising, instructing, and assuring the school success of their children one of their principal daily activities, a pattern that Lareau (2003) refers to as "concerted cultivation." As a result of differential cognitive and behavioral school readiness,

differential parental involvement in the school performance of their children, and resulting differential early school success, lower income and middle income children typically show very different achievement trajectories as they progress through the school grades.

The divergence of these trajectories is not surprising. Children who are engaged and successful at school typically receive positive feedback from teachers, and enjoy schoolwork, which causes them to maintain or even increase their efforts. They are typically placed in higher level "ability groups," where other students are engaged and motivated and more material is covered at a faster pace. They are assigned and complete more homework, and do more reading in their free time. On the other hand, children who are less engaged and successful in early elementary school typically receive less positive feedback from teachers, and get less pleasure from schoolwork, which causes them to become disengaged. They are often placed in lower level "ability groups," where the other students are also less engaged, and more elementary material is covered at a slower pace. They are assigned little or no homework, and do little reading in their free time. When differential patterns such as these begin in early elementary school, and continue through later elementary, middle, and high school, the "low" and "high" trajectory groups emerge at the end of 12th grade with very different literacy levels as measured by academic skills and motivations.

Nor does the process of differential literacy development end at this point. Lower performing children have a higher rate of school dropout, and those who graduate from high school often go straight into the labor market. There they may encounter employers who consider their literacy and mathematics skills to be inadequate for the requirements of the jobs available. By contrast, higher performing students typically undertake four more years of academic skill development in college, often followed by graduate level or professional training. Then, when these individuals enter the labor market, they take jobs which themselves have a strong component of continued learning and literacy development. The result is a society composed of adults who, at least when we compare the top and bottom of the occupational hierarchy, are strongly differentiated on the basis of their

cognitive skills, which are in turn correlated with their earnings.

These effects have been magnified by the strong upward trend in female employment during the second half of the twentieth century, and the accompanying increase in female representation in highly paid, knowledge based professional employment. At the same time, income inequality across worker education and skill levels has been increasing. With assortative mating by educational level at a high level, there has been significant growth in families where both parents hold highly paid jobs requiring advanced cognitive skills. Meanwhile, at the lower educational levels, wages are stagnant, and many children are raised in single parent households. Children raised in families having these very different levels of cognitive, social, and monetary resources, typically in neighborhoods and schools segregated by income and race, can expect very different cognitive development trajectories. Thus, in US society today, social class and race/ethnicity are correlated with literacy, broadly defined as reading, writing, and mathematics skills. This correlation is a primary cause of continuing social inequality.

SEE ALSO: Educational Attainment; Educational Inequality; Educational and Occupational Attainment; Globalization, Education and; Schooling and Economic Success; Status Attainment; Stratification: Functional and Conflict Theories; Stratification and Inequality, Theories of; Urban Education

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local residents' movements

Koichi Hasegawa

Local residents' movements expanded greatly in Japan after the mid 1950s. Their names – such as “students’ movements” and “women’s movements” – designate types of participants. The term “residents” indicates the local inclusiveness of the movement: anyone who lives in the area, if they are interested in a local issue,

can participate. No other qualification is required. People of any age beyond high school, including senior citizens, male or female, people of any political affiliation or ideology, are welcome to participate. The boundary of the local area depends on the issues. In many cases it corresponds closely to a geographical area like a local school district, city, town, or village. But when pollution comes from a large scale project like the bullet train or an airport, the movement can even extend beyond prefectural boundaries.

In the Japanese context, local residents' movements are completely distinct from existing labor union movements and political movements led by political parties, such as the "progressive party," the Japan Socialist Party (now the Social Democratic Party), or the Japan Communist Party. Major characteristics of local residents' movements include being (1) single issue or issue limited, (2) spontaneous, (3) non partisan, and (4) stressing democratic values like participation, self autonomy, freedom, and transparency. In this meaning the term "self limited radicalism," used by Cohen (1985) to describe new social movements, is also appropriate to local residents' movements.

The size of residents' movement membership, from several people to 10,000 and more, depends on the issues. Typically, the issues are of two types: (1) a protection type – opposing or stopping some harmful plan or facilities; and (2) an achievement type – improving local amenities or living conditions, such as requests to build public libraries or public parks. The organizing form or management style of the movement organization can vary from a self generated loose network to a formal organizational structure with articles of incorporation, representatives, and an annual budget.

The concept of citizens' movements resembles that of residents' movements. These two terms are commonly used without distinction, almost interchangeably. However, there are subtle nuances of difference between the terms "local residents" and "citizens." Local residents are people with loyalties bound to particular local communities. Citizens, however, in the context of Japanese social movements, are thought of as autonomous individuals pursuing generalized civic goals. Contrasting local residents' movements with citizens' movements from this perspective reveals important differences in their

character and organizing principles. In general, residents' movements are commonly organized around existing local groups such as neighborhood associations, and are strongly characterized by their focus on issues of concern to a specific local area. Typically, their membership is largely composed of the people who reside in this limited range. In contrast, citizens' movements are thought to consist of autonomous individual citizens brought together by shared ideals and objectives. They are strongly characterized by their focus on much broader issues: issues of concern to entire prefectures, the whole nation, and sometimes to the world or all of humanity (e.g., the peace movement and women's movement).

The social status of participants in local residents' movements can vary greatly, but the primary actors are often people who find it relatively easy to devote time to the movement. Such people include those involved in agriculture or fishing (during the slack season), the self employed, public sector employees (i.e., public officials and teachers), women, and the elderly. In contrast, the people involved in citizens' movements are typically professionals and the better educated who have access to information resources. For instance, if a group to protect the natural environment of "Mt. X" was organized by people living in the immediate vicinity of the mountain, this group would be a local residents' movement; its central objective would be to protect the interests of the local people. In contrast, instead of or beyond local residents, if the group was created by the general citizenry of surrounding urban areas, lovers of nature, and specialists such as scientists, teachers, and lawyers, it would be a citizens' movement; its activities would be much more idealistic, driven by a commitment to universal values rather than direct interests.

The well known farmers' protest during the Meiji era in the 1890s and 1900s against pollution from the Ashio copper mine provides a classic example of an early form of local residents' movement. But in that era, the prewar Great Japan Imperial Constitution substantially limited civil liberties such as freedom of speech and assembly. These restrictions made local residents' movements infrequent, sporadic, and highly localized. Only after 1955, with democratization and liberalization in place, did

pollution from the rapid development of heavy industry lead to local residents' movements across the entire nation.

The increasing rates of air, water, and soil pollution by industrial waste – exemplified by the “four major cases” of Minamata mercury poisoning, Niigata mercury poisoning, Ouchouch cadmium poisoning, and Yikkaichi asthma, all of which appeared in the 1950s and were publicly denied by the companies and the authorities – stimulated action and protest by local residents' groups across the country. During this period, local residents' movements usually sought relief and improvement after the pollution had occurred. In these movements farmers and fishers concerned about the destruction of their means of livelihood made appeals, petitions, and demands supported by protest actions.

In the mid 1960s, residents' movements changed their strategy from reactive to proactive. They fought to prevent the construction of planned large scale industrial development projects before they could cause pollution. The first major successful case of this type in Japan was the 1964 movement against the construction of petrochemical complexes in Numazu, Mishima, and Shimizu in Shizuoka prefecture. The organizing processes, strategies, and tactics of these movements became a model for subsequent movements. The participants in these movements came from across the whole social strata. The 1964 example provides a good illustration: in a relatively short period of time, housewives joined with teachers, researchers, and other professionals, plus a broad spectrum of local residents including laborers, farmers, and fishermen, standing shoulder to shoulder to defend their local environment.

It is worth noting that these movements were not simply responses to the actions of individual corporations (although individual corporations were often the immediate focus of protest, criticism, and litigation). Rather, they were reactions against government policies. This period of high economic growth was marked by the introduction and (attempted) implementation of several nationwide development plans. The First Comprehensive National Development Plan (1962) aimed to develop and disperse industrial activity across the nation, in part by designating and funding new industrial cities. The Second Comprehensive National Development Plan (1969)

attempted to stimulate development across the nation through the construction of enormous industrial complexes and interconnecting transport networks of bullet train lines and high speed freeways.

By this time, awareness of the four major pollution cases, the pollution problems evident in other industrial areas, and the widely reported success of protest movements against industrial complexes in Numazu and elsewhere had spread to the general public. Under these circumstances, the actual and impending pollution from the large scale development plans stimulated the further growth of local residents' movements all over Japan. Powerful residents' movements stopped plans for new large scale petrochemical complexes in the Second Comprehensive National Development Plan in such areas as Tomakomai City in Hokkaido, Rokkasho Village in Aomori (Funabashi et al. 1998), and the Shibushi Bay area in Kagoshima. The opposition was so fierce that in the aftermath of the 1973 oil crisis, as governments around the world reassessed their energy supply options and associated economic policies, the Japanese government abandoned its plans altogether for further petrochemical industrial complexes.

The political effectiveness of residents exercising their right to protest received great attention from the media and general public. The Japanese public embraced protesting as a tool for resisting government policies that valued economic growth above all else and lacked any mechanisms for effectively regulating pollution or preventing environmental destruction.

From the mid 1960s these movements broadened and became more active in demanding improvements to the living environment. Urban dwellers who had developed a citizens' conscientiousness began to organize in defense of the environment, to create new communities, and to revitalize towns. In the process, the foci and forms of the local residents' movements became much more diverse, and the differences with citizens' movements became far more ambiguous. Especially in and around large metropolitan areas such as Tokyo, Osaka, and Nagoya, the provision of social infrastructure had not kept up with the population explosion of the high economic growth years. Failures in water supply, sewage, road construction, employment and

educational opportunities, public health, and maintaining parks and other public facilities brought about a nationwide boom in local residents' movements, especially between the late 1960s and mid 1970s.

From the mid 1970s the model of local residents' movements spread to South Korea, Taiwan, and other East Asian countries, where it helped inspire anti pollution movements.

SEE ALSO: Benefit and Victimized Zones; Daily Life Pollution; Environmental Movements; High Speed Transportation Pollution; New Social Movement Theory; Social Structure of Victims

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log-linear models

Janet C. Rice

Log linear modeling is a data analysis technique used to explore relationships among categorical variables. Log linear models express the

logarithms of the expected cell frequencies from a multiway contingency table as a linear combination of the variables and their interactions. The simplest models yield a test equivalent to the chi square test of independence, but the technique allows exploration of relationships among more than two variables. Since log linear models are additive with respect to the logarithm of the cell frequencies, they easily generate estimates of odds ratios.

Although statisticians such as Pearson and Yule addressed the association between two categorical variables early in the twentieth century, development of techniques similar to the analysis of variance and linear regression for continuous outcome variables was slow. Birch (1963) proposed the log linear model. Goodman and others made log linear modeling popular in the 1960s and 1970s (Goodman 1970; Bishop et al. 1975). Goodman and his colleagues made a computer program available in the 1970s.

A log linear model assuming that two cross classified categorical variables, A and B, are associated is denoted AB and has the form

$$\ln(e_{ij}) = 1 + I_i^A + I_j^B + I_{ij}^{AB}$$

where $i=1$ to I indicates the level of variable A, $j=1$ to J indicates the level of variable B, e_{ij} is the expected frequency for the ij th cell of the table, and the I s are parameters to be estimated. A model that assumes the two variables are independent is denoted A,B. If an interaction term is included in a model, the main effects that are involved in it are necessarily included in the model.

Parameters are most often estimated using the method of maximum likelihood. Grizzle et al. (1969) developed a weighted least squares approach that they applied to repeated measures data. Exact methods for small samples are also now available.

There are two major types of log linear models, logit and symmetric. Logit models assign the role of predictor to some variables and the role of outcome to others. Symmetric models place all variables on an equal footing.

Logit models are members of the general linear model. They are analogous to linear and logistic regression models. In fact, for a single binary outcome and a set of categorical

predictors, log linear models yield the same results as logistic regression models. Outcomes can also be polytomous, and the models can contain more than one outcome variable.

All logit models must include the most complex interaction among the predictors and the most complex interaction among the outcomes as controlling terms. Additional components must involve relationships between predictors and outcomes.

Symmetric models allow researchers to address problems that fall outside the context of the general linear model. Researchers have applied them to problems in many disciplines including sociology, psychometrics, and epidemiology. Since there are fewer mandatory controlling terms in symmetric models, the number of models that can be considered is larger than in the logit case.

One of the earliest applications of symmetric models was in the area of social mobility. Data are in the form of a square table relating the status of one generation to that of the next. The cells on the main diagonal represent no change in status. Interaction terms in these models often require a large number of parameters. The variables are often ordinal. Modeling strategies attempt to reduce the number of needed parameters. An example of a simplifying hypothesis is that the relationship between one or more of the variables and the logarithm of the frequencies is linear.

Assessment of rater agreement also generates a square table. Observations that fall on the main diagonal represent agreement. The log linear model allows the inclusion of covariates and the comparison of more than two raters.

Another type of symmetric model concerns the identification of latent classes. Latent class models assume that all associations among the manifest variables can be explained by their association with the unobserved latent variable(s). If X is a latent variable and A and B are manifest variables, the model is AX, BX . Clogg developed a program to fit latent class models.

Latent class models also allow tests of the hypothesis that a set of categorical items form a Guttman scale (Clogg & Sawyer 1981). These models are used in developmental research and studies of progression of drug use.

Epidemiologists use capture recapture models to estimate the size of a population by

drawing two or more samples from it. The variables are presence or absence in each sample. An important feature of data from capture recapture studies is that the cell observed frequency indicating that an observation is absent in all samples must be estimated by the model. This technique was used to estimate the extent of undercount in the census.

Future developments in log linear modeling are likely to be in the areas of correlated data and random effects modeling. Problems in genetics will stimulate development of techniques for many dimensions.

SEE ALSO: Correlation; General Linear Model; Multivariate Analysis; Regression and Regression Analysis; Reliability; Statistics

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logocentrism

Warren Fincher

Coined by Jacques Derrida in his *Of Grammatology*, logocentrism refers to the tendency in western civilization to privilege the linguistic

signifier (a spoken or written word) over the signified (the thing to which the word refers). The importance of the term resides in Derrida's critique of the philosophical tendency in western civilization to be logocentric. Derrida asserts that western discourses generally tend to impose hierarchies of power by defining certain concepts against necessarily subordinated alter natives. Extending this critique to logocentrism, Derrida notes the tendency in western philosophy and semiotics to value the signifier as opposed to the thing it signifies in what he calls a "metaphysics of presence."

In *Of Grammatology*, Derrida systematically problematizes much of Ferdinand de Saussure's work in semiotics. On many points, Derrida employs Saussure's work as a point of departure. For example, Saussure maintains that the signified does not inherently indicate the nature of the signifier – for example, there is nothing about the nature of a table that requires it to be called such – but rather that signifiers create a linguistic system of signs that reference each other. Likewise, Derrida agrees that linguistic systems encode certain value systems. However, Derrida rejects the dyadic model of signs that Saussure develops, wherein Saussure focuses attention on the relationship between the signifier and signified; the relationship is arbitrary but nonetheless provides insight into the form of the linguistic system. Derrida rejects the distinction between signified and signifier, between some external and objective object and its linguistic sign. Rather, he sees the two interpenetrating. Also, Derrida rejects Saussure's tenet that the relationship between signifier and signified, while arbitrary, is also static. Derrida recognizes that a gap exists between the idea and the thing it references and, through this gap, play occurs. To focus on the signifier as clearly and always indicative of the same signified object is to allow the sign more preeminence than is due and falsely implicates a centrality of the signifier over the signified.

In "Plato's Pharmacy," Derrida examines Plato's *Phaedrus*, in which Plato denounces writing as a lesser form to oration, claiming that writing is a derivative of the spoken word. This praises the spoken word as the closest manifestation to the mental experience of an idea, and writing as secondary to that. In making this argument, Plato values the presence of the

speaker in oration – and its proximity to the mental experience of thought – and rebukes the absence of the author in the written form. The value system found in this "phonocentrism" may also be found more generally in the western tradition of privileging the signifier – at the moment of being read, the text is present – over the signified, which is not present. Hence, because logocentric thought reifies a division of the signifier from the signified and because logocentric philosophical orientations specifically value the present, logocentrism embodies a "metaphysics of presence."

Current sociological work in logocentrism is scant and remains mostly within the forum of philosophical debates over the nature of language. Clive Stroud Drinkwater's (2001) defense of logocentrism critiques Derrida's approach to deconstruction, concluding that it rests on incorrect generalization of metaphysics and otherwise follows the tenets of classical logic. Beyond debates over semiotics, the concept of logocentrism has been applied to the sociology of science (Fox 2003). The idealized setting of the laboratory is contrasted with the arena of practical application. A "scientific logocentrism" emerges from the privileging of data produced from the ideal conditions of the lab and subsequently framed as a representation of reality. Deviations from that representation when applied to practical settings are then discounted as invalid because of the uncontrolled elements of the setting. The laboratory is given centrality as the articulation of a scientific reality, even though the conditions that give rise to that reality are not found in nature.

SEE ALSO: Deconstruction; Derrida, Jacques; Poststructuralism; Saussure, Ferdinand de; Semiotics

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Lombroso, Cesare (1835–1909)

Frank P. Williams III and Marilyn D. McShane

Cesare Lombroso is considered one of the fathers of positivist criminology. His work on the traits and characteristics of offenders typifies the scientific analysis of the individual criminal in an attempt to determine the causes of crime. Although there is little support for his assumptions today, his work is valued not only as a precursor to criminal anthropology but also as an early demonstration of the use of scientific measures in theory building.

Lombroso, born in Verona, Italy, received a medical degree in 1858 and a surgical specialty in 1859. He married in 1869 and had two daughters, Paola and Gina. He served as a physician in the Italian army and also worked with the mentally ill in several hospitals. Fascinated by comparative anatomy, he hoped to establish some relationship between the form and features of individuals and their behavioral tendencies.

There is evidence of two major influences in Lombroso's work. First, he was affected by German materialism of the time that valued objective scientism over naturalistic philosophy. Second, his writings exhibit an appreciation of evolution, particularly the writings of Charles Darwin on biological evolution and of Herbert Spencer and others who proposed theories of social evolution.

True to positivist methods, Lombroso conducted painstakingly careful research, documenting the facial and body measurements of hundreds of criminals and non criminals, using populations of soldiers, prisoners, the insane, persons with epilepsy (a disease which was

misunderstood at the time), and the general population. He attempted to explain physical and mental differences as anomalies indicating a primitive or subhuman nature he referred to as atavism. He rejected the classical concept of free will and argued that criminals were cast their fate by their degenerative features. To him, criminals were evolutionary throwbacks whose defective traits were evident in the shape of their skull and bone structure, certain physical quirks, and tendencies toward slang, tattoos, and vice. All of these characteristics and features were said to be symptoms of a criminal personality, which for Lombroso was a more innate, biological concept than the way the term personality is used today.

Lombroso classified offenders into two primary groups: born criminals or hardened recidivists, and occasional criminals. The first group, which exhibited most of the traits mentioned above, is the one he emphasized and for which he is best known. The latter group occupied much of his writings because they were exceptions to his "born criminal" theory. This group was composed of three categories. First, Lombroso identified pseudocriminals who were not necessarily atavistic, but more victims of circumstance – such as a person who commits a crime in self defense. His second type of occasional criminal was the criminaloid, who he claimed had only a touch of degeneracy. Finally, there was the habitual offender who was also not degenerative or atavistic but caught up in a pattern of bad associations and continued contact with born criminals.

His theory of the born criminal, particularly in its biological aspects, was severely criticized. In response, Lombroso incorporated the criticisms into his theory and, at the time of his death, had added social, economic, and political causes of crime. He also had increased the number of criminal types to encompass other biological features, such as an epileptoid. However, to the very end he maintained that biological factors were the dominant causes of crime.

Later in life, Lombroso worked closely with his daughter Gina and other young scholars with whom he published several articles and books. At the University of Turin he was professor of legal medicine and public hygiene, professor of psychiatry and clinical psychiatry, and professor of criminal anthropology.

Lombroso was also one of the first criminologists to study and write about the female offender. His efforts in this area demonstrate his consideration of a wider range of factors in criminality, including gender, age, poverty, and occupation. In his book *The Female Offender*, he decided that women were far more ferocious than men.

The essence of Lombroso's work was carried on by a student, Enrico Ferri, and a fellow criminologist, Raffaele Garofalo, who assisted him in establishing the *Archives of Psychiatry and Criminal Anthropology*. Both also went on to achieve acclaim in the area of criminology, although they moved away from Lombroso's emphasis on physical traits.

Criticisms of Lombroso's work center primarily on the generalizations he made about crime proneness based on ethnic characteristics. For example, he spoke of the Gypsies as a criminal race: "They are vain, like all delinquents, but they have no fear of shame. Everything they earn they spend for drink and ornaments . . . They are given to orgies, love noise, and make a great outcry in the markets. They murder in cold blood in order to rob, and were formerly suspected of cannibalism. The women are very clever at stealing, and teach it to their children."

Nonetheless, some of his arguments are still popular today, such as the role of alcohol in crime, and the existence of a criminal personality. We also credit the theoretical work of the "Italian Triumvirate," Lombroso, Garofalo, and Ferri, for laying the foundation for the study of criminal offenders, particularly in their emphasis on the use of scientific methodology for the classification and prediction of behavior.

SEE ALSO: Crime; Criminology; Evolution; Positivism

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lone-parent families

Karen Rowlingson

The growth of lone parenthood is a trend common to many advanced industrial countries. In 1990 Britain had one of the highest rates of lone parenthood in Europe (with 19 percent of families with children being lone parent families) along with Sweden (19 percent), Norway (19 percent), and Denmark (18 percent). The European countries with some of the lowest levels included Greece (5 percent), Ireland (9 percent), Italy (7 percent), Portugal (6 percent), and Spain (5 percent). This division suggests some combination of North/South, rich/poor, Protestant/Catholic factors at work. Countries that are generally rich, Protestant, and North European have much higher rates of lone parenthood than those that are mainly poor, Southern, and Catholic, though Britain cuts across this division as it has comparatively high rates of poverty but is Northern and Protestant. Culture and religion therefore seem important factors when seeking to explain variations in rates of lone parenthood. If we look outside of Europe but remain within the developed world, Japan had a very low rate of lone parenthood (4 percent) in the early 1990s, Australia had a slightly lower rate than Britain (15 percent), and the US had by far the highest rate (25 percent).

The percentage of births outside marriage also varies substantially by country. This figure cannot be taken as a direct indicator of lone parenthood as these births are often to cohabiting parents, but there does appear to be some correlation, as the highest rates of births outside marriage were in Denmark, Norway, and Sweden in the early 1990s. The lowest rates were in Greece and Italy. The United Kingdom

and the US fell somewhere in between these two extremes. Divorce rates are also associated with lone parenthood. The highest rates in the early 1990s were in Denmark, the UK, and Sweden, with the lowest rates in Greece, Ireland, Italy, Portugal, and Spain. The US had by far the highest rate.

Another interesting point of comparison is the family marital status of lone parents within each country. For example, the proportion of lone parents who are never married varied dramatically, from more than half in Norway and Sweden to about a third in the US and UK. Never married lone parents were virtually non-existent in Greece, Portugal, and Japan in the early 1990s.

WELFARE REGIMES

Some researchers have tried to categorize countries into groups in terms of how women and lone parents fare, especially in relation to employment and social policies. This general approach of categorizing “welfare regimes” is most heavily associated with Esping Andersen, who categorized welfare regimes in terms of the policy logics that revolved around a paid worker’s dependence or independence from the labor market.

Another way of classifying countries is in terms of whether they focus on lone parents as mothers (the “caregiving” model) or workers (the “parent/worker” model). The Netherlands is a prime example of the former, where sufficient support is given to lone parents to remain in the home to look after their children. The state therefore provides support for women as mothers. Lone parents are able to establish autonomous households without suffering poverty and deprivation and they can do so without having to engage with the labor market. Sweden, however, is an example of the parent/worker model. Lone parents here are also able to establish autonomous households without suffering poverty and deprivation, but they tend to do so through engaging with the labor market. The state provides support in terms of child care, wages are relatively generous, and there are reasonable benefit payments to those out of work.

The ability of lone parents to establish autonomous households without suffering poverty and deprivation might be seen as a benchmark with which to measure gender (and class) equality in different countries. We have seen that there are different ways of doing this: we can support lone parents to stay at home and care for their children (by having generous benefits) or we can support lone parents to take up paid work (by having affordable childcare and keeping wage rates high). Perhaps there is also a middle way in terms of supporting lone parents to combine roles by means of packaging their income – some income from part time work, some from benefits, some from maintenance. This is more the approach taken in the UK, where in work benefits such as Working Tax Credit (formerly Family Credit) enable lone parents to put together such a package. But in the UK, wage and benefit levels have generally been too low to avoid poverty for all but a minority of lone parents.

EFFECTS OF SOCIAL SECURITY POLICY

It is common for those on the political right to argue that lone parenthood has risen because women have access to relatively high rates of benefit. There is some evidence that appears to support this view; Greece and Portugal, for example, have low levels of social security support for lone parents and also low levels of lone parenthood. At the other end of the spectrum, Norway, Denmark, and Australia have higher levels of both social assistance and lone parenthood. But we must be careful not to draw conclusions about causation from these associations. It is possible that the high rates of benefit in some countries were the *result* of a growth in lone parenthood (due to a growing lobby group and increasing recognition of the need for higher benefits) rather than the *cause* of the growth. Also, the US provides an important exception to any correlation between levels of lone parenthood and levels of benefit. As we have seen, the US has the highest level of lone parenthood in the western world, but its level of social assistance is among the lowest (lower even than that available in Ireland and Spain).

So it seems that there is only a weak association between high rates of benefits for lone parents and high rates of lone parenthood.

Social security policy may have only weak effects on the *rate* of lone parenthood, but it may nevertheless affect the *employment participation* rates of lone parents. Here again, however, the evidence is inconclusive. For example, Sweden had the largest proportion of lone parents in paid work in the early 1990s, but the benefit replacement rate was also the highest. This means that Swedish lone parents, compared with lone parents in other countries, would not be much better off financially in work than on benefit. We might therefore expect them to have low employment rates, but they do not. This therefore contradicts a narrow rational economic model of behavior that assumes people weigh up the financial costs and benefits of a particular course of action and then act accordingly. France and Germany, on the other hand, had relatively high proportions of lone parents in work along with relatively low benefit replacement rates (thus supporting the rational economic model). Denmark and France had similar proportions of lone parents in the labor force, but Denmark was relatively generous to lone parents on benefit whereas France was relatively mean.

EMPLOYMENT PATTERNS AND POLICIES

As we have seen, there is also a great deal of variation in the employment patterns of lone parents across different countries. In the early 1990s the Netherlands, the UK, and Ireland had the lowest rates of full time paid work for lone parents: fewer than one in five lone parents in these countries had a paid job. The highest rates were found in Portugal, France, Japan, Italy, Sweden, and Denmark, where over half of all lone parents worked full time. Overall, however, lone mothers in all countries apart from the UK are either more likely to be working full time than all mothers or the level of full time employment is about the same. And generally, lone mothers are less likely to work part time than all mothers are. So what explains these variations in employment rates?

Some of the variation in lone mothers' employment rates across different countries mirrors variation in the employment rates of mothers in couples. This supports a gendered approach to lone parenthood and also questions the appropriateness of singling out lone mothers as a group. If the experience of lone mothers is just an extreme version of that for all mothers, then perhaps policies should be aimed at improving the opportunities of all mothers rather than just focusing on lone mothers in particular. Or perhaps policies could be aimed at those (both women and men) with poorer educational and employment prospects.

Most advanced industrial countries are increasingly encouraging (if not compelling) lone parents to enter the labor market. But the ways in which they do this vary. Some, like the US, aim to achieve this largely by restricting access to benefits. Others, like the UK, attempt to "make work pay" principally through in work benefits. And others, like Norway, provide cheap childcare. These policies have been most successful where they fit with lone parents' own aspirations about employment. In the Netherlands, for example, a new policy to encourage lone parents into employment has largely failed because lone parents themselves, their employment advisers, and society more generally did not think it appropriate to push lone parents (back) into the labor market. Social and cultural norms about mothers as carers or workers have a major impact on employment patterns.

Many countries are now emphasizing paid work rather than care as the route to autonomy for lone parents. But paid work is no guarantee against poverty, as is evident in Japan and the US. The success of some countries, like Sweden, in combining high employment rates with low poverty rates is due to a number of factors, such as:

- Lone parents working full time rather than part time.
- Childcare provision paid for by the state.
- Long parental leave schemes.
- Paid leave to be with sick children.
- Strong social transfers (benefit payments) for those out of work.
- State advanced maintenance schemes.

We cannot therefore simply move lone parents into paid work and expect poverty to be eradicated. Other policies, such as those relating to childcare and employment rights, also need to be put in place.

The strategy of moving lone parents into paid work places little value on the unpaid work in the home that most lone parents spend much of their time doing. Much of this unpaid work revolves around caring for children. In the past, "mothering" work was valued in as much as it attracted considerable status for women. Many states reinforced this by exempting lone parents on benefit from seeking work, as were the partners of unemployed men. From one point of view, such an approach is a positive one towards women as it enables them to carry out the "mothering" work that they wish to do. From another point of view, it reinforces patriarchal assumptions that women's role is in the home. Not only does it lack any expectation that women might want to get paid work, it also fails to provide them with any support, advice, or training should they decide they do wish to get paid jobs. Men gain access to the wages from paid work and women remain dependent either on men (if they are in couples) or on the state (if they are lone parents).

The move towards encouraging lone parents to take paid work can therefore be seen from either of these perspectives. It can be seen as lowering the status of the unpaid "mothering" work that women do or it could be seen as challenging women's confinement to the domestic sphere.

DIFFERENCE, DIVERSITY, AND IDENTITY

Lone parent families have received a great deal of attention from the media, politicians, policy makers, and academics. But should we focus on them as a particular group? This depends on the answer to two further questions. First, are lone parents a homogeneous group with distinctive characteristics that unite them? Second, are lone parents sufficiently distinct from other parents or other groups to warrant separate consideration?

The answer to the first question is that lone parents do have some distinctive characteristics

which unite them as a particular group. They have challenged prevailing norms of the two parent family, based on the idea of a breadwinning man and a housewife. The lone parent, to some extent, takes on both these roles and since the vast majority of lone parents are women they are also united by their gender. However, it is also widely assumed that lone parents are united in poverty, but although poverty is widespread among lone parents, it is not universal. Some lone parents are much better off than others and the social class background of lone parents can make a considerable difference to the experience of living in a lone parent family.

Another source of difference between lone parents is how they became lone parents (and this is often linked to economic difference, too). Younger women who have babies while single are generally from very poor backgrounds, while women who separate from husbands sometimes come from better off backgrounds and experience lone parenthood in different ways. Yet another source of difference is ethnicity. Most lone parents in western countries are white, but some ethnic minorities are over represented in lone parent families (such as Afro Caribbean women in the UK and African American women in the US) and some are under represented (such as Asian women).

There are many other potential sources of difference between lone parent families. Some lone parents are sick or disabled and others have sick or disabled children. Sexuality and culture also vary among lone parents and all these factors can affect the experience of lone parenthood as well as the identity of the lone parent. Perhaps a lesbian lone mother will feel she has more in common with a lesbian mother in a couple than with a heterosexual lone mother?

This brings us to the second question about whether some lone parents have more in common with other parents, or other groups, than they do with other lone parents. For example, a young never married lone mother living in poor housing may feel she has (and may actually have) more in common with the married mother living next door than she does to a divorced lone mother living in a large house in an affluent area. Of course, all lone parents face similar issues when it comes to raising children without a partner, but even in couples, one parent (usually the mother) tends to take on more of the parental

responsibility and associated work than the other partner. So perhaps the difference between lone mothers and mothers in couples is not so great.

A final reason why lone parenthood should not be seen as a monolithic state is that it is not, usually, for life. Couple families turn into lone parent families, which then turn again into couple families and so on. So to make very large distinctions between lone parent families on the one hand and couple families on the other must be questioned. In the UK, research has found that half of all lone parents leave lone parenthood within 6 years of becoming a lone parent.

FUTURE DIRECTIONS

As already mentioned, issues around difference, diversity, and identity are complex and fluid. More research needs to be carried out to explore the homogeneity or heterogeneity of lone parenthood both on an objective level (e.g., comparing levels of income, work, disability, etc. with other groups) and on a more subjective level in terms of identity.

It is also important to consider the role of other actors rather than simply focus on the lone parent. Concern about non resident parents has mostly revolved around issues of financial support for children, but the role of fathers more generally in relation to care work is a very important issue. And children's perspectives on family life are starting to receive more attention – deservedly so. The role of grandparents, steprelatives, broader family, and friends also needs to be considered.

Families change over time and more research needs to be carried out on the dynamics of family life. There is already some quantitative longitudinal work in this area, but very little qualitative longitudinal work. Qualitative panel studies are unusual and raise various methodological issues, but these should be explored to provide an important and currently largely lacking perspective on lone parenthood.

Finally, there is an urgent need for more up to date, comparative data on lone parenthood. Much of the data referred to in this entry relates to the early 1990s and yet it is highly likely that the picture has changed since then. Such research will need to consider carefully different definitions of lone parenthood in

different countries so that meaningful comparisons can be made.

SEE ALSO: Child Custody and Child Support; Children and Divorce; Family Diversity; Family Poverty; Family Structure and Child Outcomes; Family Structure and Poverty; Non Resident Parents

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longevity, social aspects (the oldest old)

Miriam Bernard

Longevity is defined as the maximum life span attainable by the species and is measured by the age of the oldest living individual. Although there is evidence that people have lived well into late old age for many hundreds of years, a Frenchwoman, Madame Jeanne Calment, made history when she died at the age of 122 in August 1997. Other definitions of longevity refer to it as “uncommonly long duration of life,” but what was once uncommon is now increasingly common. Today the World Health Organization calculates that there are approximately 600 million people aged 60 and over around the world. By 2025 this total is expected to double and, by 2050, there will be 2 billion people of this age. Historically, these changes are very recent and are a product of the twentieth century. As a result, many countries are now experiencing “rectangularization” as declining fertility and mortality (notably infant mortality) rates change their population structures from a pyramidal shape (many children at the bottom and fewer old people at the top) to a more even distribution across age groups. By the middle of the twenty first century, demographers predict that there will be more people aged 60 years and older than children under the age of 15 years.

Although commentators agree that maximum life span has probably not extended a great deal over the centuries, what has improved markedly is life expectancy for both women and men. The rapidity of these changes can be illustrated with reference to Britain where, in 1901, life expectation at birth was only 48 years for men and 51.6 years for women. What is remarkable is that these figures had not altered since medieval times. Now however, women can expect to live to about 80 years of age and men to about 76 years of age. Despite continuing improvements in life expectancy, the gap between the sexes is closing as lifestyle factors, which researchers believe to account for about 70 percent of a person’s chances of achieving longevity, begin to have an impact.

A further important feature illustrative of increased longevity is the aging of the older population itself as higher and higher proportions of people survive to age 60 and beyond. Worldwide, the fastest growing group is the “oldest old,” variously defined as those aged 80 or 85 years or more. Perhaps the clearest indication of this trend is the rapid increase in the numbers of people surviving to the age of 100 years, particularly in developed countries. In 2000, the United Nations estimated that there were 180,000 centenarians around the world. By 2050, this number is projected to be 3.2 million: an eighteenfold increase. Moreover, in many countries, old age in general, and extreme old age in particular, is predominantly a female experience. In 1999 in Britain, there were 8,000 centenarians of whom 7,000 (87.5 percent) were women and 1,000 (12.5 percent) were men. Of the 50,000 centenarians in the United States, 85 percent are women and 15 percent are men. This has been termed the “feminization of later life” (Arber & Ginn 1991) and is often further reflected in other social aspects such as marital status and living arrangements. Widowhood, solo living, and reduced financial circumstances are now expectations for many older women, especially the “oldest old,” while changing family forms contingent upon changing work patterns, changing attitudes to sexuality, growing numbers of minority ethnic older people, rising divorce rates, and, for some, remarriage will lead to even greater diversity of family and social situations across the life course and into old age.

Increased longevity presents us with many profound challenges. Among the persistent social issues facing all societies are how our oldest and most vulnerable members will be accommodated, given care, and supported; how we might finance old age; and how family and social networks may change. Contrary to popular opinion, the body of research evidence shows that older people have never been abandoned wholesale by their families. Rather, family and family support – albeit in different forms – will continue to remain crucial in our lives. Alongside this, prospects for many of improved health and well being together with the blurring of the boundaries between education, work, leisure, and retirement may well open up new social opportunities and help challenge some of the

age old taboos and agist attitudes. This will include the possibility of developing different lifestyles and leisure activities in old age; having greater choice about where, how, and with whom one lives; continuing participation and involvement in local communities and in political and national life; and prospects for more rewarding and mutually beneficial intergenerational relationships.

Rapid though these changes have been in westernized nations, it is important to recognize that aging is now happening at a much faster rate in the developing world than in the developed world. For example, France's older population doubled from 7 percent to 14 percent over a period of 115 years, while the World Health Organization (2004) predicts that it will take China just 27 years to achieve the same increase. Today, 60 percent of people aged 60 and over live in the developing world, a figure that is expected to rise to 75 percent by 2025 and 85 percent by 2050. Moreover, it must be remembered that the rapidity of population aging in many developing countries is expected to outpace social and economic development, with the result that adjusting to these trends is likely to prove even more challenging than it has been to countries who became rich while they grew old.

These dramatic changes to our populations are neither temporary nor a statistical artifact: they are permanent and progressive. As the late Margot Jefferys (1988) eloquently argued, they should be seen as a triumph for public health and a cause for celebration, rather than a reason to further problematize and pathologize old people and old age.

SEE ALSO: Age Prejudice and Discrimination; Aging, Demography of; Aging and Health Policy; Aging and the Life Course, Theories of; Aging, Mental Health, and Well Being; Aging and Social Policy; Aging and Social Support; Health Lifestyles; Healthy Life Expectancy; Leisure, Aging and; Social Support

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looking-glass self

Jennifer Dunn

The looking glass self is the most well known dimension of Charles Horton Cooley's early, seminal conceptualization of what he called the social self. Cooley used the image of a mirror as a metaphor for the way in which people's self concepts are influenced by their imputations of how they are perceived by others. Cooley distinguished three "principal elements" of the looking glass self: "the imagination of our appearance to the other person; the imagination of his [*sic*] judgment of that appearance; and some sort of self feeling, such as pride or mortification." Much of the time, Cooley thought, our experience of self is an emotional response to the supposed evaluations of others, especially significant others. Children learn the meaning of "I" and "me" and "mine" through the appropriation of objects they desire and claim as their own, in contrast to the things they cannot control. Importantly, among the objects they seek to control and appropriate as their own are their parents and others in the primary group. As infants and toddlers discover they can influence others by their actions, they simultaneously discover and realize reflections of themselves in these others.

Cooley based his self theory on observations of his own children, confirming his initial

hypotheses with a systematic study of his third child from shortly after birth to the thirty third month, in order to determine how the word "I" is learned and its meaning. Children begin appropriative processes with attempts to control the things closest to them, including their own bodies, and then move outward to the people in their vicinity, even as infants "exerting [their] social power" to attract attention. They lay claim to their parents in much the same way they assert as their own their noses and their rattles. In order to learn the meaning of personal pronouns, which refer to different objects when used by different people, children must imagine themselves from the perspective of others. After coming to understand what others mean when they refer to themselves, that is, that "I" refers to self feeling, children "sympathize" with these others and this empathetic process gives meaning to their own incipient self feelings. "I" is social because when it is used it is always addressed to an audience (for Cooley, usually the child's mother), and its use thus indicates children's newly acquired ability to take the role of their audience. Once they begin to do this, they can also perform different selves for different audiences. Indeed, Cooley argued that even young children are capable of manipulating their audiences, care more about the opinions of some people than others, and selectively "own" those with whom they are the closest and over whom they have the most influence (e.g., "*my* mama"). Adults are not that much different; their imaginations are merely more complex and specific and their manipulations of others more subtle.

The self, then, emerges in interaction, becomes meaningful only in contrast to that which is not of self (society), and is, therefore, inextricable from society. Cooley described the looking glass self in his first major work, *Human Nature and the Social Order*, published in 1902. His analysis of self was influenced by his early reading of idealist and transcendentalist literature, including Thoreau, Goethe, and Emerson, as well as the pragmatism of Dewey, also at Ann Arbor at the time. The social self draws upon the work of the psychologist and philosopher William James and the social psychologist James Mark Baldwin and was articulated within the populist, progressive intellectual milieu

of the Midwestern scholarship of Cooley's era and the sheltered academic environs of the University of Michigan, which granted him the leeway to develop his reflective notion of self based on his observations of his own children and introspection. As Cooley was also a painfully shy and reclusive man who wrote in his journals of his obsession with gaining the approbation of others, his theorization of a self that depends on a reflexive, emotion laden response to imagined evaluations is distinctly autobiographical. Cooley's methodological approach follows directly from his conception of the self: human action must be understood in terms of the subjective meanings actors impute to situations. In his conjoining of the social self with society as the communicative imaginations of multiple selves, his looking glass self is a culturally and historically specific product of his social location and his conceptual and political idealism.

Cooley's looking glass self was elaborated by George Herbert Mead in the latter's development of the notion of taking the role of the other, especially the generalized other, as the mechanism through which a unified self emerges in interaction. Cooley also influenced Goffman's dramaturgical analysis of the self as a situated performance. There is a significant body of research on what is now commonly referred to as "reflected self appraisal" and its role in the development of self concepts, and with those of Mead and Goffman, Cooley's ideas about the self have become a constitutive and foundational core of theories of self in sociological social psychology and symbolic interactionism, and because of his emphasis on the emotional aspects of identity, have influenced the sociology of emotions. Cooley has been critiqued: Mead thought his work was too "mentalistic" and others have suggested that the looking glass self, if accurate, suggests an oversocialized human, passive and overly dependent on the opinions of others. Cooley himself answered both of these concerns, claiming in the introduction to *Social Organization* in 1907 that imagination was not all of society, but only his particular focus. His discussion of the looking glass self, moreover, is only one dimension of the social self conceptualization, in which he points not only to the importance of reflection, but also to the ways in which humans

selectively and actively interpret and appropriate these reflections.

SEE ALSO: Cooley, Charles Horton; Generalized Other; Goffman, Erving; Identity: Social Psychological Aspects; Mead, George Herbert; Primary Groups; Self; Significant Others

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love and commitment

Irene Hanson Frieze

Love is one of the most basic human emotions. Many have written about love experiences, both in popular writing and in more scholarly publications, especially as they apply to romantic relationships. As these writings indicate, there are many ways of thinking about love. Some of the types of love identified by researchers are reviewed below. Research about how people fall in love and why they choose one person over another to date or to marry also provides information about love. Much of the research on love and partner choice focuses on dating and the initial stages of relationships.

Love and feelings about the partner are only one of many determinants of commitment to that partner. Factors predicting commitment

are also reviewed below. Much of the research on relationship commitment examines marital partners.

DEFINITIONS OF LOVE

One of the first modern scientific analyses of types of love was proposed by Lee (1977). Different types of love were derived from a concept analysis of fictional writing in Europe and the US since ancient Roman times. The forms of love that were identified were given names that related them to ancient Greek conceptions of love.

The first type of love identified was called *Eros*. *Eros* is an erotic, passionate love. The physical appearance of the beloved is an important part of *eros*. *Eros* love can be love at first sight. Having feelings of *eros* toward someone is a very enjoyable feeling. But *eros* love can also end suddenly, leaving the person wondering what they saw in their former beloved. Others may wonder what the attraction is toward the beloved, since the relationship does not appear to have a rational basis.

Another form of passionate (and apparently irrational) love is called *Mania*. While *eros* love is a positive, happy state, *mania* love is the dark side of passionate love. *Mania* involves obsession with the beloved person. Constant thoughts of the beloved can involve high levels of jealousy and upset about what the beloved is feeling about oneself. This type of love may be associated with stalking of the beloved.

Storge is a friendship based love. *Storge* is a quiet, affectionate love that develops gradually over time. Even if the love relationship ends, the strong friendship associated with *storge* often means one continues to be friends with the former beloved. Highly related to relationship satisfaction, this type of love can lack strong feelings of passion.

Agape is an altruistic love. *Agape* love is associated with the desire to give to the beloved without asking anything in return.

Pragma love is a practical love that involves loving something about the person, such as being a good parent, being respected in the community, or being wealthy. This type of love is associated with arranged marriages.

Ludus love is not typically classified as “love” in western society today, although these feelings were found by Lee to be labeled as love in some cultures. *Ludus* is love for the moment. It is assumed that *ludus* love feelings will not last long. They may be only for an evening. *Ludus* is associated with flirtation and the desire to seduce someone for a sexual encounter. *Ludus* feelings are associated with low relationship satisfaction, shorter relationships, and not feeling “love” for the partner.

Love styles are assessed at one point in time. One’s feelings can change over time. Thus, a relationship that starts out with primarily *eros* feelings could develop into a *storge* or *agape* type of love feeling. Love styles are also specific to the relationship. One can have *eros* feelings for one partner and *mania* feelings for another partner.

Another way of classifying love is to divide it into two basic types: passionate love and companionate love. The passionate love would include Lee’s *Eros* and *Mania*. Passionate love is also called *limerence*. Passionate love is of much interest to psychologists since it appears to be irrational. Characteristics of passionate love include strong feelings of sexual arousal. There is also fantasy and idealization of the beloved. This type of love comes on suddenly. It is sometimes defined as a “state of intense longing for union with another.” When one is feeling passionate love for another, being together brings fulfillment and ecstasy, while separation brings anxiety and despair. This type of love often does not last long, especially if reality is allowed to interfere with the fantasies one has of the beloved.

Several theories have been proposed to explain the origins of passionate love. The first of these was suggested by the psychiatrist Karl Jung and his colleague Esther Harding, who spoke of unconscious attraction as the basis of passionate love. Jung felt that people have both a conscious part and an unconscious part of their personality. Generally, one’s unconscious self is of the other gender than the conscious self. A goal of Jungian therapy is to integrate the unconscious aspect of the personality into conscious awareness. Within this framework it was proposed that when one feels a sudden, passionate attraction toward someone, one is really falling in love with an unconscious aspect

of the self that has the opposite gender to the conscious self. This unconscious, opposite gender self is often derived from one’s opposite sex parent. For some reason, perhaps a resemblance to the opposite sex parent, there is a sense of knowing the beloved person and of strong attraction. Fantasy is used to maintain the image that the beloved person has the same characteristics as the unconscious self. This theory is not directly testable, but informal observations of people attracted to those who resemble their other sex parent provide some support for it. Passionate love does not appear to have a rational basis.

John Money, known primarily for his work with children with abnormal genitals, suggested a theory of pair bonding, a concept very similar to passionate love. Money (1980) feels that passionate, somewhat irrational feelings of love are analogous to an imprinting process that is set off by the physical appearance of the loved one. Although Money does not specify what the biological basis of pair bonding is, one possibility is that this is related to pheromones. Fantasy about the beloved is used to explain to the person why the strong attraction exists. High levels of passion are maintained for about two to three years (long enough for a pregnancy to occur). Once a woman becomes pregnant, her pheromones change and the basis of the pair bonding may be lost (explaining why so many passionate relationships end during pregnancy). After the pregnancy, if the relationship continues to exist, it must be maintained by parent–child bonds in both partners.

Another theory of love proposed by Berscheid and Walster (1969) is based on social psychological research on attribution theory. This theory builds on Zillman’s work on motivation and the finding that arousal from sexual feelings, fear, physical exercise, or aggression all lead to similar forms of physiological arousal in the body. People use cues in the environment to label this physiological arousal, and if cues are ambiguous, people can mislabel the source of their arousal. Arousal from one source can be transferred to another source. Thus, when men are angry, they rate pictures of attractive women more positively than they do if not previously angered. Berscheid and Walster apply these ideas to human passionate love. Their theory argues that

when one is aroused (by any source), if an appropriate love object is present, the physiological arousal may be (mis)labeled as passionate love. This theory has been extensively empirically tested and data from many studies do show support for the idea that physiological arousal can increase feelings of attraction or love of a desirable partner. When one encounters an unattractive individual under a state of physiological arousal, the reaction is more likely to be anger.

Companionate love is similar to Lee's concept of *storge*. This type of love is affection or deep friendship felt for those with whom our lives are deeply intertwined. Companionate love tends to develop gradually and strengthens over time (at least in theory). This type of love generally occurs among those with similar backgrounds and shared interests. It appears to be based on mutual reinforcement.

DETERMINANTS OF PARTNER CHOICE

Another way of analyzing love is to study how people select their marital or dating partners. Many studies have attempted to do this, using a variety of methodologies. Conclusions depend on the methodology used. Studies that simply ask people about what they are looking for in a partner do not yield valid findings, since it appears that people either do not know what they seek or they are unwilling to say. When asked, people often report wanting "boy scout" traits. They say they want a partner who is loyal, dependable, and honest. But these traits do not appear to explain why people select the partners that they do. When people are asked to rate how important various traits are in making partner choices, although people do continue to rate traits such as loyalty high, it is also possible to see differences in the ratings of men and women. Such studies show that men value the appearance of their partner more than women. Women rate the earning ability of their partners higher than men do. Ratings are different for short term partners, as compared to what one wants in a marriage or long term partner.

Another technique for studying partner choice is to analyze personal ads where people seek a partner. Since the first of them in the 1970s, these studies have consistently shown that

men seek an attractive partner, more than women do, although both sexes care about the appearance of their partner. Women mention their own appearance in their ads more than men, while men are more likely than women to mention their financial situation, or the fact that they seek a committed relationship. Men tend to respond to more ads than women, and there is less correspondence between men's own self-described characteristics and the characteristics of the women whose ads they respond to. Women tend to be more selective, responding only to ads of selected men.

Other studies analyze the people who do marry to see what variables appear to predict partner choice and breakup. When existing couples are examined, it is very difficult to show that any measure of personality compatibility consistently matters across groups of couples. In studies using photos of real couples, when the level of attractiveness of the man and the woman are similar, the couples matched on attractiveness are more stable and satisfied in relationship.

Overall, data suggest that although men value the attractiveness of their partners more than women, physical appearance is important to both sexes. People have many positive beliefs about attractive individuals, and have negative associations with unattractive individuals. The greater importance of partner appearance for men than women is seen in heterosexual as well as homosexual couples.

COMMITMENT TO A RELATIONSHIP

As noted above, many of the types of love, especially passionate love, tend to be unstable and can end very quickly. Thus, commitment to a partner involves quite different dimensions than feelings of (passionate) love. One component of commitment is the positivity of feelings about the partner and the relationship. Generally, relationship satisfaction is higher for companionate love or *storge* relationships than for passionate love, especially *mania*. Several theories of commitment are discussed below. Many of these theories focus on marriages.

Rusbult has proposed that commitment is related to relationship satisfaction, as well as to the level of investment in the relationship and to

the availability of alternative attractive relationships. This model has received some empirical support. Investment is generally operationalized as the amount of time spent in developing the relationship and resources such as a shared social network and children that have become associated with the relationship. Rusbult further suggests that when a person is more committed to the relationship, they are more willing to accommodate to the partner's requests, sacrifice for the partner, feel a sense of interdependence, avoid seeking alternative relationships, and have positive beliefs about the relationship.

Levinger provides another perspective on relationship commitment. He suggests that commitment is a function of the level of positive as compared to negative feelings about the relationship and the level of barriers or restraining forces that prevent breakup of the relationship. If there are strong social pressures to maintain a marriage, for example, people would be more committed to their spouses than if divorce is relatively easy. The level of attraction to the relationship is dependent on the rewards associated with the relationship compared to the costs of being with the partner. Once people make a public commitment to their relationship, through announcing an engagement or a marriage, the external barriers to breaking up the relationship increase. Barriers are relatively low today in the US as compared to earlier historical periods and to other societies in the world.

Johnson has argued that there are three different types of commitment to a relationship. First is the personal commitment or desire to continue the relationship. This is similar to what others have labeled as relationship satisfaction or attraction to the partner. A second type of commitment is the feeling of moral obligation to remain with the partner. Such moral feelings can relate to religious beliefs about the permanence of marriage. They can also come from believing that one has to remain with the marital partner for the sake of the children. Some people may feel that breaking up a relationship is a form of failure. Such feelings may also take on the characteristic of remaining in a relationship because of feelings of obligation. In addition to these factors within the person, Johnson also considers that social pressure exerted for people to remain in relationships functions as a third predictor of relationship commitment.

Another body of research looks at personality factors in the individual, known as attachment styles, as they relate to commitment. There are three basic forms of attachment: secure, avoidant, and anxious. These are believed to develop during infancy and come from the types of interactions that occur between the infant and his or her major caretakers. Securely attached infants become upset when the caretaker is absent, but are happy when the caretaker is present, and feel free to explore their environment. Avoidant infants do not appear to be upset about the caretaker being absent and show little positive affect in the presence of the caretaker. Anxious infants appear to be overly clinging when their caretakers are present and become quite upset when they are absent. Such behaviors are believed to continue into adulthood and become manifested in romantic relationships. Work by Shaver and others has indicated that those with secure attachments are more committed to their romantic partners and feel more satisfaction about these relationships. Their relationships tend to last longer than for other groups. Those with an avoidant pattern are less committed to their romantic partners and report less relationship satisfaction. The anxious adults often form relationships very quickly, but they do not appear to have long term commitments. Qualitative data suggest that they may be experiencing mania types of love.

SEE ALSO: Attraction; Attribution Theory; Divorce; Emotion; Cultural Aspects, Emotion, Social Psychological Aspects; Intimacy; Intimate Union Formation and Dissolution; Marital Quality; Social Psychology; Stalking

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Luhmann, Niklas (1927–98)

Ralf Rogowski

Niklas Luhmann saw it as his task to revolutionize the sociological theory of society. His theory of social systems claims nothing less than to offer sociology a new “universal theory for the discipline” (Luhmann 1995). One of the major concerns guiding his approximately 700 publications was to counter the trends, as he perceived them, of abandoning general sociological theory, confining sociological theory to exegeses of the classics, and dispersion of sociological research and thinking into subdisciplines. In countering these trends he devoted his energy to introducing a new general sociological theory that is able to provide an adequate understanding of the real challenges to modern society. He called his alternative approach autopoietic social systems theory. It borrows insights from general sciences, in particular general systems theory, epistemological constructivism, mathematical logic, and the theory of communication.

Luhmann’s approach developed in three stages. In his early work he formed his ideas in discussion with the systems theoretical approach as expounded by Talcott Parsons, whom he encountered in the 1960s during a 1 year study visit at Harvard University. He criticized Parsons for operating with a one dimensional concept of functionalism that is preoccupied with system maintenance and proposed to replace causal relationships between structure and function with a notion of functional equivalence of structural solutions adopted by social systems. He elaborated this approach in numerous studies, including pathbreaking analyses of formal organizations and administrations. In the second phase Luhmann advanced his theoretical base by integrating the theory of autopoiesis into the study of social systems. The major publication of this period was his *Social Systems* (1995, German original 1984). The theoretical focus shifted from concerns with functions and structure to an analysis of self reproduction of elements. The structure and the unity of a developed social system are seen as directly linked to operationally closed

self reproductive processes. In his late work Luhmann used autopoietic systems theory to create a general theory of the modern society and its major function systems. He presented this theory in 9 voluminous monographs (Luhmann 2002), including 2 general studies of society (*Soziale Systeme* of 1984 and *Gesellschaft der Gesellschaft* of 1997) and 7 studies of its major function systems covering the economy, science, law, art, politics, religion, and education, of which 4 were published between 1989 and 1995 and 3 posthumously.

Five theoretical aspects can be highlighted in characterizing Luhmann’s theoretical approach. First, Luhmann combines the concepts function, differentiation, and evolution in order to analyze the development and dynamics of modern society. Luhmann distinguishes between three levels of analysis of autopoietic systems: general systems theory, the theory of social systems (as opposed to psychic systems, organisms, and machines), and the level of concrete analysis of social systems. Similar to Parsons, Luhmann considers the development of social systems as a process of differentiation and evolution. However, in Luhmann’s concept the Parsonian ordering of society with just four primary subsystems is replaced by a polycentric view of society. Modern society replaces vertical stratification with horizontal functional differentiation as primary mode of social organization and thereby loses its center.

In Luhmann’s theory of modern society there exists neither a fixed number of functionally differentiated social systems nor a firm ranking of functions. For analytical purposes Luhmann distinguishes between society and function systems. He considers society as a first order social system, whereas function systems like the economic and the legal system are viewed as second order social systems or societal subsystems. Society as a first order social system differs from second order social systems insofar as it has no other social system as an environment; society’s environment consists only of natural and psychic systems (human beings).

In Luhmann’s theory, functions are not derived from a fixed set of pattern variables (like in Parsons’s approach), but are ultimately defined by the social systems themselves. Functions are represented by binary codes specific to each functional subsystem of society. Binary

codes are achievements of evolution and necessary requirements of a function system in order to define the boundary and to select its elements. In applying the binary code, the functional subsystems can distinguish between societal communications that belong to the system or the environment of the system. Examples of binary codes are true/false in the case of the science system, legal/illegal in the case of the legal system, and payment/non payment in the case of the economic system. However, these codes do not guide the behavior of the participants directly. They require programs (like methods, statutes, or invoices) that translate them into behavioral directives.

The second feature of Luhmann's theory concerns his understanding of elements and structures as key components of a system. The system derives its complexity from its elements and their innumerable relations. In abstract terms, system complexity is defined as the relationship between the set of all possible relations between elements (contingency) and the selectivity achieved by the self constituted structure of a system. This definition combines selectivity, contingency, and self constitution of the system through specific selections.

Autopoietic systems theory develops a new understanding of structure and its relation to elements. Luhmann insists that it is not sufficient to define structure as relations of elements. In the general autopoietic conception of systems, structures result from the fact that only certain relations of elements are selected and held constant over time. Structure is thus defined as limitation of possible combinations of elements within the system. The function of structures is not to translate environmental needs into the system, but to secure the autonomy of the system's self reproduction, which is conceived as an operationally closed process. Structures of the system emerge both from self reproduction of the elements and from selection of relationships. The system acquires properties in the evolutionary process that cannot be explained by the properties of its elements. The system instrumentalizes the self reproduction of the elements for its own self reproduction, upon which in turn the self reproduction of the elements becomes dependent. The structure of the system evolves in this process as a product of both

the self reproduction of the elements and the system itself.

A third characteristic of Luhmann's approach refers to the processes of communication, self reference, and autopoiesis that constitute social systems. Probably the most radical departure from the Parsonian theory of the social system and, indeed, from conventional sociology, is Luhmann's assumption that the ultimate, non decomposable elements of an autopoietic social system are communications and not human beings. For Luhmann, human beings constitute part of the environment of the social system and he views the individuality of human beings and their consciousness as separate, highly complex psychic systems. Furthermore, in Luhmann's theory, communications replace actions or interactions as the main elements of a social system. Communication consists of three components: information, utterance, and understanding. Each component is described as a selection, and communication is accordingly characterized as the coordination of three selections. The important feature of communications is that they are related in self referential processes. Thus, without linkage to other communications, no communication can happen.

Luhmann's theory of communication incorporates logical and mathematical approaches. In this respect it has recently been elaborated by Baecker (2005) into a general systems theory of communication. Baecker, in accordance with Luhmann, emphasizes that communications as such cannot be observed but require specific forms in which they can appear. This is crucial for a social system because survival depends on its ability to observe and describe itself, which is a precondition for self reference and autopoiesis. This requirement to become observable both for external observers and for self observation is the main reason why, according to Luhmann and Baecker, a communication system generally ascribes itself as an action system.

Luhmann has demonstrated such ascription in his analysis of the emergence of structures in interaction systems. Structures reduce uncertainty and create trust relations (Luhmann 1979, 1993). In face to face interactions the mutuality of expectations binds the actors through double contingency and thus becomes a self referential circle. Luhmann merges the

theory of self reference and double contingency and thereby arrives at a concept of action and interaction without subject.

Interaction conceived as a self referential circle is unstable and can cease to exist from one moment to the next. In order to survive it needs the system which treats the self referential circle as a basic element of its self reproduction. Self reference of the system means, in this respect, that the system produces and delimits the operative unity of its elements through the operation of its elements. It is precisely this process that Luhmann calls the autopoietic process, which lends its own unity to the system (Luhmann 1995: ch. 1).

Pre autopoietic systems theory defined systems as open systems which are characterized by their exchange relations with the environment. Autopoietic systems theory conceives systems instead as closed systems which reproduce themselves not by variation of structure but by constant recombination of their elements. Recursive closure of the system, with respect to its elements, guarantees self reproduction or autopoiesis. Luhmann constructs a theory of an operationally closed social system which is not dependent on other social systems or its environment for its core activity (i.e., autopoiesis). Only if autopoiesis is guaranteed can the system be open and relate to the innumerable events and conditions in its environment.

Fourth, a particularly pertinent problem for a theory of autopoietic social systems is the conceptualization of the relationship of the system with its environment and with itself. A social system can logically develop three kinds of relationships. It can relate to society, it can relate to another social system or societal subsystem, and it can relate to itself. Luhmann (1990a) calls the relationship to society *function*, to another social system *performance*, and to itself *reflexion*.

In debates within systems theory a number of concepts are used for the analysis of intersystemic relationships. Originally, Parsons adopted the notion of interpenetration as the main concept in studying exchange relations between systems. However, Luhmann uses this concept only in a limited sense and reserves interpenetration for an analysis of the relationship of social systems and psychic systems. In Luhmann's theory the central concept that explains relations

between social systems is structural coupling. Luhmann adopted this concept from general systems theory and biological theory of living systems. Prominent examples of mechanisms of structural coupling are for Luhmann the semantic concepts of constitution, contract, and property. The constitution couples the political and the legal system, contract and property couple the economic and the legal system. Coupled systems increase the chances of structural variation of systems. However, they cannot determine structural changes. Structural coupling might lead to reciprocal irritation or perturbation of the coupled systems, to which each system can only respond with internal means that are limited by the autopoietic needs of the system.

A further concept of intersystemic linkage has been proposed by Teubner (1993). His notion of interference tries to capture the special nature of communication, which is always at the same time general societal and special communications in the functional system. The elements of functional systems consist of the same substance as in society at large. Indeed, the same communication is linked to the communication process or circle of society and of the functional system. Teubner calls this societal context of communication the "life world context."

A particular case of intersystemic relations constitute efforts of one system to regulate affairs in another system. In an autopoietic social world, systems can only observe each other, and cannot regulate each other's self reproduction. Any regulatory effort has to be compatible with the autopoietic requirements of the regulated system. External regulation of self reproduction can ultimately only be successful if it corresponds with self regulation.

A fifth feature of Luhmann's theory relates to the fact that society becomes global as an "unavoidable consequence of functional differentiation" ("The World Society as a Social System," in Luhmann 1990b). The concept of the world society that dominates Luhmann's late work was already conceptually developed in his early work. Function systems that have a high degree of autonomy "detonate" societal boundaries. Most advanced in this respect are the economy, technology, and science. In particular science is said to have adopted universal intersubjectivity as its own structuring principle and criterion of

performance. In contrast law and politics remain backward by clinging to territorial boundaries.

The globalization of function systems results from their very nature as systems of communications. It is difficult to prevent communications from flowing across territorial boundaries. It is this that makes it almost impossible to isolate function systems from world processes. All function systems are exposed to the pressure of globalization that results from worldwide communications. Furthermore, worldwide communications produce new structures at the world level. In a systems theoretical perspective the world society can be conceived as a system characterized by specific emergent properties. New structures that transcend “internationalism” occur in the form of world law, world politics, and world religions (Stichweh 2001).

Luhmann reveals nevertheless a certain pessimism in predicting the future of the world society. It is increasingly becoming itself the source for manifold regional, economic, cultural, climatic, and ecological differences that create new conditions for the function systems (on ecological communication, see Luhmann 1989; on the role of the mass media, Luhmann 2000; on modernity in general, Luhmann 1998). In particular the legal system is confronted in the world society with specific challenges. Its performances for other social systems change, in the first place due to the changing role of the political system that is no longer organized by a state at the global level.

For Luhmann, the role of law and politics as risk bearers of societal evolution decreases in the world society (Luhmann 2004: ch. 12). However, this does not mean that law is withering away, but that we can expect a change of the legal form. In one respect Luhmann is optimistic. As the result of an increase in cognitive expectations, the economy, science, and technology have begun to orientate themselves towards the future rather than the past. This cognitive transformation is gradually becoming true for all function systems and also for the world society at large.

SEE ALSO: Autopoiesis; Evolution; Function; Functionalism/Neofunctionalism; Parsons, Talcott; Reflexivity; Social System; Society; Structural Functional Theory; System Theories; Theory Construction

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Lukács, Georg (1885–1971)

Stanley Aronowitz

Born in Budapest of a prominent banking family, Georg Lukács was among the most influential, if not always the most beloved, Marxist philosophers and social theorists of the twentieth century. His book of essays *History and Class Consciousness* (1971: HCC) ranks as a major contribution to Marxism, albeit of a distinctly unorthodox kind. And, adopting some of Weber's key concepts, especially the notion of the ideal type, he made huge contributions to the sociology of literature. An outstanding scholar of Kant, Hegel, and Marx, as well as the nineteenth and twentieth century realist novels

of Balzac, Scott, Dickens, Mann, and Solzhenitsyn, he was, at the same time, one of the twentieth century's outstanding public intellectuals. He served as a minister of culture and education in two different Hungarian communist governments – that of the short lived revolutionary regime of 1919 and the reform government of Imre Nagy in 1956. He was a leading figure in German and Hungarian intellectual life after the publication of his first book, *Soul and Form* (1974) when he was 26 years old, and his widely read *Theory of the Novel* (1973), which earned him a European wide reputation in the years prior to World War I.

In 1912 Lukács became a member of Max Weber's Sunday Circle in Heidelberg. The circle included the historian Karl Polanyi and, important for Lukács's future development, Georg Simmel, whose influence can be seen in the famous chapter in *HCC*, "Reification and the Consciousness of the Proletariat." Simmel first introduced the concept of reification in his magnum opus, *The Philosophy of Money* (1978), a book he described as follows: "The attempt is made to construct a new storey beneath historical materialism such that the explanatory value of the incorporation of economic life into the causes of intellectual culture is preserved, while the economic forms themselves are recognized as the result of more profound valuations and currents of psychological or even metaphysical preconditions" (p. 56). While adopting a Marxist rather than Simmel's Kantian framework, Lukács retained Simmel's fundamental idea of the ineluctable link between culture and the economy. This innovation was to remain a benchmark of Lukács's explication of historical materialism for almost a half century.

Every essay in *HCC* was written from Vienna in the context of Lukács's work as a leader of the illegal Hungarian Communist Party. Many readers of *HCC*, which was reissued in German in 1967 and appeared in English 4 years later, are inevitably drawn to two essays: "What is Orthodox Marxism?" in which Lukács defends the materialist dialectic, especially the concept of the totality and its corollary, the relation of the subject and object as constitutive of the totality; and the magisterial "Reification and the Consciousness of the Proletariat" – actually an elaboration of the same themes, with particular emphases on the underpinning of the

subject/object split in everyday life, and the objective basis of this split in the universalization of the commodity form in capitalist society. Lukács's conception of reification, derived from his reading of the section in chapter I of Marx's *Capital* on the fetishism of commodities, and mediated by Simmel, is that in the capitalist system, dominated by commodity production, and exchange, relations between people take on the appearance of relations between things. That is, subjectivity is subsumed under reified objects and becomes opaque to itself. Read in the context of the debates over political organization rather than exclusively a work of sociological reflection, Lukács provides a "scientific" and philosophical basis for Lenin's claim that revolutionary class consciousness cannot arise directly from the workers' struggle. For Lukács, that struggle is always conditioned by (1) rationalization in which every aspect of human activity can be calculated and classified into "specialized systems"; (2) "the fragmentation of human production necessarily entails fragmentation of the subject" (Lukács 1971: 142); (3) by the division of labor, as well as by (4) the hierarchies produced by the occupational structure of the labor market.

Consciousness, therefore, is not lodged in perception or individual understanding, but instead is determined by the logic of capital. Taken in isolation, the Reification chapter might be interpreted as an argument for either voluntarism (the doctrine according to which even adverse objective circumstances can be overcome by revolutionary will) or fatalism (the idea that the capitalist crisis will, under its own weight, lead to the system's self destruction).

In "Toward a Methodology of Political Organization" (Lukács 1971: 295–342), the last chapter of *HCC*, which combines philosophy with social theory, Lukács sees the root of contemporary conceptions of the subject/object split in Kantian ethics. He addresses Kant, not only because Kant's three *Critiques* dominated German and French philosophy for almost a century after Hegel's death in 1831, but also because Kantian ideas had penetrated some of the leading figures of international socialism, notably Eduard Bernstein (German), Max Adler (the leader of Austrian Social Democracy), and some Russians as well. In his view, unless a sound philosophical basis is established for the

objective possibility of revolutionary class consciousness, efforts to make changes are likely to founder on the twin fallacies of objectivism (the inevitability of revolution) and voluntarism (the idea that human agency can overcome under almost all circumstances the limitations of social and political conditions). The task, according to Lukács, is to provide a structural basis for explaining the reproduction of bourgeois consciousness within the proletariat in the wake of crises and war, and for the objective possibility of class consciousness.

Condemning what he calls the “contemplative attitude” towards social reality, in which the “thing in itself” is not available to consciousness, he argues that praxis (political practice that is informed by reflection) – by linking form and content – can overcome the Kantian view that objective reality is, in principle, unknowable. However, he argues: “In so far as the principle of praxis is the prescription for changing reality, it must be tailored to the concrete material substratum of action if it is to impinge upon it to any effect” (Lukács 1971: 125–6). Here, Lukács advances a bold definition: “organization is at once the form of mediation between theory and practice” (p. 299) and, more generally, “the concrete mediation between man and history – this is the decisive characteristic of the organization now being born” (p. 318). In these passages he stresses the fallacies of the inherent hierarchy present in many workers’ parties which overestimate the importance of the individual, that is the leader and his activity, and the “fatalistic” complementary passivity and subordination of the masses. Both tendencies lead to bureaucratization of the party and thwart the development of a movement that promotes the “real active participation” of members in every event, in the full scope of party life.

The idea of organization as the “concrete mediation between man and history” is closely linked to the problems of fragmentation and rationalization raised in the “Reification” essay. Every struggle is necessarily partial. According to Lukács, the party is in the first place the mediation between these struggles and the fight against capital. Second, the party indicates the principles for a better life that are inherent in these struggles and why this aspiration is frustrated by the priorities of various embodiments of the ruling class: employer, landlord,

developer, and government official. Third, the party exposes the role of the state in these struggles and raises the questions: Whose side is the state on? What are the necessary tasks regarding legislation? What are the costs of legal solutions versus direct action?

HCC was roundly condemned by the leaders of the Communist International and some of Lukács’s comrades in the Hungarian party. In order to stay in the party’s good graces he was forced to repudiate the book, although he wrote a spirited defense three years later called *Tailism and the Dialectic*, which remained unpublished during his lifetime. Later, as a result of his losing struggle for leadership of the exiled Hungarian Communist Party, Lukács took up residence in Moscow in 1930, where he worked in the Marx Lenin Institute until 1945, when he returned to Hungary to take an academic appointment in Budapest University. During this period most of his work was devoted to literary theory and literary history. Among his many books, *The Historical Novel* (1983), *Studies in European Realism* (1972), and *The Young Hegel* (1975) may be considered his major works of this period. His writings on literature argued for a canon of nineteenth and twentieth century European novels consisting of works that adopted the standpoint of “critical realism” regardless of their own subjective political position.

Returning to Hungary, Lukács resumed his literary studies, producing a major book on Goethe (Lukács 1965), revising *The Young Hegel*, and writing *The Destruction of Reason* (1977), a blistering attack against existentialism and phenomenology. In this controversial work Lukács identifies Heidegger, Husserl, and Jaspers, among other modern thinkers, as reactionaries whose philosophy articulates with the irrationality that marked fascism and other tendencies of the modern Right. In the context of the Cold War and the simultaneous rehabilitation of Heidegger in western philosophical and literary circles, Lukács’s refusal to separate philosophy from politics was, at the time, dismissed as a shrill Stalinist rant. Despite occasional evidence of Stalinist rhetoric, the analysis and conclusions of the work bear a striking resemblance to Bourdieu’s (1996) condemnations where, like Lukács, he links the philosopher’s works to his politics.

Lukács briefly reentered politics when he supported the 1956 popular Hungarian uprising against the Rakosi communist regime and became the education minister under the reform administration of Imre Nagy, soon to be overthrown by Soviet tanks. He was taken into custody by Soviet armed forces and exiled, this time to Romania, but soon was permitted to return to Hungary where he resumed his teaching and writing. His last major project was an unfinished 8 volume *Ontology of Social Being*, which may be considered a vast recapitulation of many of the themes he developed throughout his career. He died at age 86.

SEE ALSO: Culture, Economy and; Hegel, G. W. F.; Marx, Karl; Marxism and Sociology; Polanyi, Karl; Simmel, Georg; Weber, Max

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lust balance

Cas Wouters

The concept of the lust balance refers to the social organization and accompanying social codes (ideals and practices) regarding the relationship between the longing for sexual gratification and the longing for enduring relational intimacy. It thus draws attention to the balance between emotive charges in the desires for sex and love, and to changes in this lust balance. For although the two types of longing for sexual gratification and for an intimate relationship are clearly interconnected, these connections change in both the biographies of individuals and the histories of peoples. Nor is the interconnectedness unproblematic. Today, some people (mostly men) even view the two longings as contradictory. Moreover, the attempt to find a satisfying balance between the longing for sex and the longing for love may be complicated by many other longings; for instance, by the longing for children or by the longing to raise one's social power and rank. Therefore, the "balance" in the relationship between sex and love is a polymorphous and multidimensional tension balance. Yet it offers a wider theoretical framework that opens the possibility to integrate many different threads of long term developments, as is demonstrated by Wouters (2004), in a study pioneering lust balance as a central concept.

Other studies of the connections and the tensions between sex and love are rare, and historical studies of this area are even harder to find. Besides the problem of distinguishing between changes in the lust balance as a dominant ideal and as a practice, there is an additional complication: studies of sexuality usually do not pay much attention, if any, to the kind of relationship in which it occurs; and studies of loving relationships usually do not take a systematic interest in sex. Both kinds of research are even reported as attracting different kinds of respondents.

However, it is well documented (common) knowledge that the nineteenth century's main stream of social change went in the direction of a romanticization and idealization of love, which implied a lust dominated sexuality for men and

a complementary (romantic) love or relationship dominated sexuality for women. Statements such as “the more spiritual love of a woman will refine and temper the more sensual love of a man” typify a Victorian ideal of love that was as passionate as it was exalted and desexualized (Stearns 1994), with a rather depersonalized sexuality as a drawback and outlet for the man’s “raging hormones” and “wild” sensuality behind the scenes of social life. This ideal of love as feeling mirrored the Victorian attempt “to control the place of sex in marriage . . . by urging the desexualization of love and the desensualization of sex” (Seidman 1991: 7). It also implied that sexual intercourse was increasingly defined as *his* “right” and *her* “marital duty.”

The Victorian ideal of a highly elevated marital happiness was an ideal of the bourgeoisie. The rise of business helps in particular to explain this idealization and also why “ladies first” became a characteristic of all the commercializing nation states: deference to superiors was no longer the main ruling principle in nineteenth century manners because business demanded, not deference, but trust and respect. In contrast to the aristocracy, the social existence of the bourgeoisie heavily depended upon contracts, which in turn depended upon a reputation for being financially solvent and morally solid. Moral solidity included the sexual sphere, and it seemed inconceivable how any bourgeois man could possibly create the solid impression of being able to live up to his contracts if he could not even keep his wife under control and his family in order. Therefore, in comparison with the aristocracy, the bourgeois control of the dangers of sexuality rested more strongly on the wife’s obedience to her husband, and on (other kinds of) external social control such as chaperonage.

From the 1890s onwards, the processes of the desexualization of love and the desensualization of sex seemed to go into reverse gear: there occurred instead a sexualization of love and an eroticization of sex. Throughout the twentieth century – with accelerations in the 1920s, 1960s, and 1970s – the Victorian examples of how to integrate the longing for sexual gratification and the longing for relational intimacy faded, but it

was not before the spurt of informalization in the 1960s and 1970s that they disappeared. At that time, old “marriage manuals” became suspect or hopelessly obsolete, mainly because they hardly acknowledged the sensual love and carnal desires of women, if they acknowledged them at all.

Only since the sexual revolution have women themselves actively taken part in public discussions about their carnal desires and the achievement of a more satisfactory lust balance. From then on, increasingly large groups of people have been experimenting between the extremes of desexualized love (sexual longing subordinated to the continuation of a relationship) and depersonalized sexual contact, provoking new and more varied answers to what might be called the lust balance question: when or within what kinds of relationship(s) are (what kinds of) eroticism and sexuality allowed *and* desired?

This question is first raised in puberty or adolescence when bodily and erotic impulses and emotions that were banned from interaction from early childhood onwards (except in cases of incest) are again explored and experimented with. The original need for bodily contact of small children and their subsequent frank and spontaneous explorations seem to be stopped and become restricted when and where adults begin to experience them as sexual. Sexuality *and* corporality are thus separated from other forms of contact. In puberty and adolescence, the taboo on touching and bodily contact has to be gradually dismantled, which for most people is a process of trial and error. In the twentieth century, especially since the 1960s, a similar process of trial and error has been going on collectively.

Around the turn of the twentieth century, young people started to “date,” that is, to go out together, both with and without a chaperone. From then on, in most western countries, changes in courting regimes and in the related relationships between children and parents, and women and men, have triggered many similar questions and discussions. The question concerning in what places young women and men could acceptably meet (private dances, clubs, skating rinks) and where not (a bachelor’s apartment) more or less faded when acceptability came to include the street. Discussions

about the necessity to be (properly) introduced ended with the acceptance of people simply introducing themselves. Questions regarding appropriate ways of meeting changed from focusing on how to ward off unwelcome advances to a broader focus including questions such as how to invite and respond to welcome advances. Increasingly open access to the opposite sex and easier, more comradely contacts between the sexes coincided with discussions and lamentations about the decline of courtesy towards women and the decline of poetry or romance in courting relationships, about the practice of kissing thoughtlessly and promiscuously, about girls as daredevils for whom running risks is a trump and ideal, about the public display of nudity and sex appeal in clothing, and about the trend to disclose the “secrets” or “facts of life,” a trend in which women were thought to lose their innocence and purity.

A major difference between European countries and the US emerged in the early 1920s with the rise of a dating regime in the US. From the 1920s onward, advice on dating, necking and petting, the “line,” the stag line, cutting in, and getting stuck appears in American manners books only. This dating regime signified the escape of young people from under parental wings and the formation of a relatively autonomous courting regime of their own, leading to a head start in the emancipation of sexuality and to the rise of the first western youth culture – an international innovation restricted to the US in contrast to the second youth culture, that of the 1960s, which was a western international one. This emancipation of young people in the US also implied an emancipation of young women; it made young women less dependent upon their parents and chaperones. But in regard to their relationship to young men, the dating regime kept women rather dependent upon men and their “treats.” Just as the competitive attitude was institutionalized in the dating regime and expressed in the words “dating and rating,” the uneven balance of power between the sexes was institutionalized in an attitude that linked “petting and paying.” The younger generation had a common interest in breaking the taboo of the older generation, the no sex at all taboo, thus creating for themselves a lust balance with

more sex. In the process of defining what sex, and on what conditions, boys and young men were clearly dominant.

In part, dating, necking, and petting became a competitive “quest of thrill” (Waller 1937), pushing all participants towards further exploration of the path of lust. Yet sexual exploration was to remain without sexual consummation. In that sense, the youth culture dating code was oriented toward sex *and* love (marriage), maintaining the adult code of abstinence of sex before and outside marriage. The responsibility for sufficiently restrained sexual emotion management was put in the hands of women. This double standard demanded that women developed increasing subtlety in the art of being both naughty and nice, of steering between yielding and rigidity, prudery and coquetry: a highly controlled indulgence of sexual impulses and emotions.

In the 1920s, liberation from the regime of older generations in the US was not followed by a feminist movement attacking the uneven balance of power between the sexes. Thus, male dominance was formalized in the dating system and subsequently more or less fossilized as part of American culture. This may help to explain why the female emancipation movements that followed the international youth culture and its sexual revolution met with tougher resistance in the US than in many European countries.

In Europe, until the sexual revolution, the emancipation of the younger generations and their sexuality was relatively limited. It consisted of the development of a type of courtship relationship that was to some extent similar to “going steady,” a kind of “trial” relationship that could transform into an “engagement to be engaged.” In both, some sexual experimenting came to be increasingly accepted. After World War II, young people in the US and in Europe started to “go steady” and to go steady was to play marriage. The powerful longing of women for more equal and trusting relationships allowing for a lust balance with more sex, more playful sex, and more equal play and pleasure seems to have been a major driving force of these changes.

In the 1960s, as the international western youth culture and its sexual revolution surfaced and was soon followed by a strong wave of

female emancipation, sex for the sake of sex came to be discussed in all western countries. As a result, the *whole* lust balance appeared on the public agenda. Moreover, both sexes came to participate in public discussions of lust balance questions. Now, much stronger than in the first (US) youth culture, changes in lust balance definitions and practices resulted from changes in the balance of power between both the generations *and* the sexes.

The accepted code regarding the pace of getting closer and expressing further interest accelerated from a three times meeting before suggesting a "spot of dinner," via a three times meeting before kissing and a three date "score," to the instant intimacy of a one night stand. Masturbation was mentioned positively. These changes coincided with rising tensions between the two types of longing. Topics and practices such as premarital sex, sexual variations, unmarried cohabitation, fornication, extramarital affairs, jealousy, homosexuality, pornography, teenage sex, abortion, exchange of partners, pedophilia, incest, and so on – all part of a wider process of informalization – implied repeated uprooting confrontations with the traditional lust balance. Since the 1980s the choir of voices expressing ideals of a lust balance with more sex lost fervor, while those defending a more traditional lust balance and attacking "excessive permissiveness" became somewhat louder again. On the whole, however, these repeated confrontations accompanied and reinforced the trend towards a collective emancipation of sexuality, that is, a collective diminution in the fear of sexuality and its expression within increasingly less rigidly curtailed relationships. Sexual impulses and emotions were allowed (once again) into the center of the personality – consciousness – and thus taken into account, whether acted upon or not. And the process of female emancipation was expressed in increasing acknowledgment of the principles of mutual attraction as well as mutual consent in courting. Surveying the twentieth century development, women have come to feel like having sex more often, to allow more sexual incentives more easily, and they have learned to discuss these matters more freely, whereas men have been learning to connect relational satisfaction and sexual gratification.

Discussions of issues like sexual harassment, pornography, rape in marriage, and date rape can be understood as a common search for ways of becoming intimate and of keeping at a distance that are acceptable to both women and men. Precisely because of the sensitivity and caution needed to proceed in such a way, erotic and sexual consciousness and tensions have expanded and intensified, stimulating a further sexualization of love and eroticization of sex. This quest for an exciting and satisfying lust balance, avoiding the extremes of emotional wildness and emotional numbness, has also stimulated the emotional tug of war to a higher tension level. That is so if only because the increased demands on emotion management will have intensified both the fantasies and the longing for (romantic) relationships characterized by greater intimacy, as well as the longing for easier (sexual) relationships in which the pressure of these demands is absent or negligible, as in one night stands. This ambivalence, together with an increasingly more conscious (reflexive) and calculating (flexible) emotion management as a source of power, respect, and self respect, is characteristic of the processes of decreasing segregation and increasing integration of the classes and the sexes. And as long as such integration processes continue, these ambivalent emotions may be expected to accumulate and intensify, including both longings that make up the lust balance.

SEE ALSO: Civilizing Process; Elias, Norbert; Intimacy; Love and Commitment; Sexuality Research: History; Women, Sexuality and

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Luxemburg, Rosa (1871–1919)

Kevin B. Anderson

Rosa Luxemburg, one of the greatest theorists in the Marxian tradition, was part of the generation after Marx. She was also a political leader, a common situation in the Marxist movement of the early twentieth century. Others who held such positions were the more reformist Karl Kautsky and Eduard Bernstein in Germany, as well as the more radical minded Russians V. I. Lenin and Leon Trotsky. However, Luxemburg was the only woman to attain such a position in this period. Her most sustained teaching position was at the German Social Democratic Party's Central Party School in Berlin, where she taught political economy and social history from 1907 to 1914.

Born into a middle class Jewish family in Russian ruled Poland, Luxemburg joined the socialist movement as a teenager. After coming to the attention of the Tsarist police, she left to attend the University of Zurich, where she wrote a dissertation entitled *The Industrial Development of Poland* (1898). Luxemburg lived most of her adult life in Germany, where she and her longtime companion (until 1907) Leo Jogiches led the underground Social Democracy of the Kingdom of Poland and Lithuania, which formed part of the larger Russian Social Democratic Party. This put her in continuous contact with Russian Marxists, but unlike most other political exiles from the Russian Empire, she took an active part in the political and intellectual life of Western Europe. She became a prominent leader of the German Social Democratic Party, until 1914 the world's most important Marxist

organization. During World War I, Luxemburg was jailed by the German government for her outspoken opposition to war and militarism. She now became a leading figure in the internationalist (later communist) wing of social democracy, together with the German socialist Karl Liebknecht, and the then still lesser known Russians Lenin and Trotsky. Unlike most of the reformist socialists, the internationalists opposed the war. Freed from prison during the November 1918 uprising that brought down the Prussian monarchy, Luxemburg helped to found the German Communist Party and endorsed the notion of direct democracy through workers' councils, termed "soviets" in revolutionary Russia. In January 1919, she and Liebknecht were kidnapped and beaten to death by proto fascist officers. This occurred during the repression of a socialist uprising in Berlin that she had helped to lead, a repression that was supported by reformist social democrats. The murder of Luxemburg and Liebknecht hardened the break between social democrats and communists. However, the publication in 1922 of Luxemburg's critique of the Russian Revolution, in which she attacked the establishment of a single party state as inherently undemocratic, showed that she was no orthodox communist. While Lenin had called for the publication of her collected works, under Stalin, her writings were suppressed and discussion of them discouraged. During the 1920s, however, unorthodox Marxists, most notably Georg Lukács, expressed great admiration for Luxemburg. After 1933, the Nazis destroyed the writings of this Polish Jewish Marxist, whose anti war stance was a prime example of what they called the "stab in the back" that had led to Germany's defeat in World War I.

Published while she was still in her twenties, Luxemburg's *Social Reform or Revolution?* (1899) earned her wide recognition as a theorist. In this work, she responded to Bernstein's elaboration of a gradualist, evolutionary road to socialism, which had been termed "revisionist" by his Marxist critics. In her critique of this prominent figure, whom none other than Friedrich Engels had named as his literary executor, Luxemburg argued that where Bernstein saw increased stability, there were in fact deepening social contradictions. She gave considerable

attention to the danger of world war, which she theorized as an outgrowth of the battle among capitalist states for global hegemony. In this sense, Luxemburg was something of an exception within a generation where even left wing critics tended to view the future as one of peace and progress.

A second strand of her theoretical work fell in the area of political economy, the subject of her lectures to worker activists at the party school. Luxemburg made original contributions to the theory of imperialism, in writings that included sympathetic accounts of pre capitalist social forms in a variety of non western societies. In her most important theoretical work, *The Accumulation of Capital* (1913), she argued that the rise of modern western capitalism was intimately tied to the exploitation of Africa, Asia, and Latin America. Moreover, Luxemburg held that the system's continued survival also depended on maintaining an imperialist system. In this book, she also critiqued some of the assumptions in volume 2 of *Capital*, which led to a series of attacks, most notably one by the Russian theorist Nikolai Bukharin in the 1920s. In *The Accumulation of Capital*, Luxemburg discussed how modern imperialism had destroyed premodern economic and social institutions in China, Algeria, India, and South Africa. She also detailed the tremendous human cost of this process, whether in the Orissa famine in British ruled India or the mass deaths during the French conquest of Algeria. However, unlike Lenin, Luxemburg did not lend her support to anti imperialist nationalist movements in the colonies. Instead, she viewed all forms of nationalism, including the struggle of her native Poland to reestablish its independence, as inherently reactionary and illusory in an era of imperialism and capitalist centralization. Luxemburg's *Accumulation* stands today as a classic analysis of imperialism, alongside J. A. Hobson's *Imperialism* (1902) and Lenin's *Imperialism: The Highest Stage of Capitalism* (1916). She pursued similar themes in the unfinished and posthumously published *Introduction to Political Economy*. This work is notable for its exploration of communal social forms across a wide variety of pre capitalist societies, from the ancient Germans and the Inca Empire to nineteenth century India, East Africa, and Russia. Luxemburg viewed each of these

societies as similarly structured by communal property. While far from uncritical of these communal social forms, she pointed to their relative egalitarianism, their flexibility, and their longevity. As the twentieth century began, international capital and imperialism were dealing the final blows to these ancient and once widespread forms of human social organization. Other Luxemburg texts in this vein, such as "Slavery," written during the same period but hidden away until the 1990s in the archives of the former Soviet Union, show that her studies of pre capitalist social formations took account of the latest German scholarship on the Greco Roman world, from Theodor Mommsen to Max Weber. Her last major work in political economy was *The Accumulation of Capital – An Anti Critique*, an answer to her Marxist critics, also published posthumously.

In a third and closely related strand of her theoretical work, Luxemburg theorized war and militarism. Although she had argued for the centrality of militarism to modern capitalist society as early as *Social Reform or Revolution?*, the outbreak of World War I gave added impetus to these efforts. From her prison cell, as part of an attempt to lead socialist opposition to the war, she penned a major theoretical critique of modern militarism, *The Crisis of Social Democracy* (better known as *The Junius Pamphlet*), which was smuggled out and published under the pseudonym Junius in 1916. Luxemburg held that the war, which she termed a retrogression to barbarism, was an outgrowth of capital's quest for surplus value. She also connected the brutality of this war in the heart of Europe to the barbaric violence visited upon Africa and Asia by western imperialist powers in the decades preceding it. Finally, on the basis of the war, she questioned the notion that capitalism was inherently progressive. She wrote that another world war would lead not to socialism but to barbarism.

A fourth strand of Luxemburg's theorizing, not recognized as such until after her death, was a concept of revolution that differed from both reformist social democracy and Leninism. In the best known of these texts, *The Russian Revolution* (1918), also written from a German prison cell and published posthumously, Luxemburg indicated her overall support for the Russian Revolution, especially its break with

the logic of war and imperialism and its early attempt to establish soviet democracy. However, she strongly criticized Lenin and Trotsky for having established a single party state and defended the need for democracy after the revolution. In an earlier article, published in 1904, she had responded to Lenin on the vanguard party. A third major text critical of Lenin, the “Credo” (1911), also hidden away in the Soviet archives until the 1990s, continued her earlier critique of Lenin as an organizational “ultra centralist,” while making an even sharper one of other Russian Marxists, including Georgi Plekhanov and Trotsky.

A fifth strand of Luxemburg’s work centered on the role of spontaneity in working class movements and social revolutions. The distinctiveness of her concept of spontaneity was not widely recognized until after her death, when it began to be linked to her critiques of Lenin. In her 1906 pamphlet, *The Mass Strike, the Political Party, and the Trade Unions*, Luxemburg argued that truly revolutionary upheavals contained an important element of spontaneity. They were characterized by a radicalization from below that went beyond the perspectives of established political and trade union organizations that ostensibly represented the masses. This pamphlet focused on the experiences of the Russian Revolution of 1905–6. In it and in a later work, *Theory and Practice* (1910), she held that this upheaval in technologically backward Russia and Poland was not a repeat of the liberal revolutions of the nineteenth century, but the harbinger of a period of socialist upheaval that would draw in Western Europe as well.

A sixth strand within Luxemburg’s life and work concerned gender. While many studies of Luxemburg have denied any relationship to feminism because she did not write or speak very often on women’s issues, some of the recent ones have explored this question anew. Luxemburg firmly supported women’s suffrage and also wrote that the participation of women might shake up the routinization of the socialist movement. Elsewhere, she singled out women’s special oppression under slavery and imperialism. In addition to these occasional writings on women, Luxemburg’s close friendship with Clara Zetkin, the longtime leader of the international socialist women’s movement, enabled her to influence it from behind the scenes.

It has also been noted that her gender made her place within the leadership of German social democracy a very contested one. While male leaders like Kautsky resorted to openly sexist innuendo against Luxemburg in their private correspondence, the party as a whole seemed nonetheless to support this Polish Jewish woman as one of its key leaders.

Luxemburg’s work on political economy, war, and imperialism, all of it recognized within her own lifetime, as well as the interest stirred up later on by her critiques of Lenin over democracy and revolution, her theory of spontaneity, and the gendered dimensions of her life and work, have led to the continued discussion of Luxemburg, especially among those critical of both globalized capitalism and authoritarian forms of socialism.

SEE ALSO: Anarchism; Capitalism; Class Consciousness; Colonialism (Neocolonialism); Communism; Economy (Sociological Approach); Gender, Social Movements and; Global Economy; Marxism and Sociology; Political Economy; Revolutions; Revolutions, Sociology of; Socialism; War

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M

McDonaldization

Todd Stillman

McDonaldization is the process by which principles of the fast food restaurant are coming to dominate more and more spheres of US society and the rest of the world. Coined by the sociologist George Ritzer, the term invokes the famous fast food chain founded by Ray Kroc in 1955 as a metaphor for a widespread change in the delivery of goods and services toward more instrumentally efficient means of distribution. In a series of books and articles, Ritzer describes the competitive advantages of the McDonald's service system and catalogs the many ways in which it has shaped the expanding consumer marketplace.

McDonaldization can be understood as a specific instance of the process of rationalization: the development of instrumentally efficient means to achieve a given end. Weber first described the process of rationalization in reference to the development of administrative bureaucracies in modern Europe. Bureaucracies attain a high degree of efficiency by being organized into functionally differentiated, hierarchical systems based on written rules. After World War II the same principles of efficiency began to be applied on a widespread basis to sectors outside the bureaucracy (and factory), most notably in the fast food restaurant and other spaces of consumption. Streamlining meant that newly minted consumers had more access to a greater variety of goods than ever before. It also meant that they could expect more consistency, lower costs, and in some cases a higher level of quality from their purchases.

The McDonald's service system can be thought of as a paradigm of contemporary rationalization. Ritzer derives five principles of

McDonaldization from Weber's writings on rationalization. These are efficiency, calculability, predictability, control through the substitution of non human for human technology, and the irrationality of rationality.

Efficiency refers to the optimal means for achieving a given end. Efficiency is often achieved by the functional differentiation of tasks and the development of discrete routines that are engineered to save time and labor. Calculability places an emphasis on the quantifiable aspects of a product or process. Calculability is achieved by an emphasis on the quantity of units sold, the speed at which units can be produced, the size of portions, or relatively low cost. Control is exerted to a high degree over workers in a McDonaldized system. Workers are trained to relate to customers using scripts, rather than their own words. They are also trained to prepare orders following scripted routines. Codified routines make it easy to train new employees and keep labor costs low. They have also contributed to a firm's ability to supply a standardized product over time and across many outlets. Predictability means that the settings, procedure, and production in a McDonaldized system are much the same from one time or place to another.

Control may be exercised through the substitution of non human for human technology, with workers being replaced by machines. Machines save both labor and time spent on production. Kroc himself sold five spindle milk shake mixers before he founded McDonald's. Automation is also used to prompt workers to perform their specified routines, typically using a system of timers and blinking lights to orchestrate when a particular procedure will be performed. Control may also be exercised over customers to save labor and time. The enlistment of customers as active participants, from the process of preparing their own beverages at

the beginning of the dining experience through to the process of bussing their own tables at the end of it, contributes to the overall efficiency of the operation.

The irrationality of rationality refers to the negative consequences of McDonaldized systems. The crux of the matter might be termed the “subjectivity of efficiency.” Operators and their efficiency engineers weigh the costs and benefits of each step in the delivery process with an eye on profitability. As a result, irrationalities that do not affect the profits of a firm accrue. For example, McDonaldization has adverse effects on the environment because of the amount of disposable material it generates as a matter of course. It has had a negative effect on public health as the emphasis on quantity over quality has been identified as a contributor to a marked increase in obesity among Americans.

Ritzer has particularly pointed criticism of the alienation consumers experience in McDonaldized settings. He suggests that McDonaldized systems do a disservice to consumers by forcing them to submit to the dehumanizing controls of a rationalized environment. Operators are at pains to make their rational system more attractive settings for consumers by using themes and spectacles, but they remain a systematic threat to genuine human sociality and diminish the possibility of deriving meaning from consumer activities.

The principles of McDonaldization have diffused primarily in two ways: first, through the competitive expansion of the franchise (now 30,000 outlets worldwide); second, by the emulative actions of competitors. Simplified products, low labor costs, and no frills service are elements of a dominant paradigm that has spread to many sectors of the economy. Others have described the McDonaldization of non-commercial institutions, including higher education, the church, and the justice system.

Ritzer is critical of the homogenizing effects of McDonaldization on consumer culture. He worries that the success of McDonaldization has contributed to the decline of local and regional forms of consumer culture by subjecting less efficient forms of production and service delivery to intensive competition.

The theory of McDonaldization has been subject to a variety of critiques. In a volume edited by Barry Smart (1999) contributors

question the effects of McDonaldization, asking whether customers are truly alienated by what they consume. The moral objection of groups such as vegetarians is evidence of resistance to the paradigm of McDonaldization. They also question the scope of McDonaldization. It is suggested that McDonaldization is an issue only for a relatively wealthy fraction of the world’s population. Finally, counter examples point to the limits of McDonaldization: for example, the diversity found in art markets suggests that streamlining is not incommensurate with creative and personal products.

The McDonaldization of Society (Ritzer 2004) is a model for how to produce socially relevant sociological theory. The concept of McDonaldization captures in an evocative way the pervasive effects of rationalization on consumption and beyond. It has contributed both to the debates over the consequences of consumerism and to the effects of globalization on cultural diversity.

SEE ALSO: Consumption; Disneyization; Globalization; Globalization; Rationalization

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McLuhan, Marshall (1911–80)

Gary Genosko

Herbert Marshall McLuhan was born in Edmonton, Alberta, Canada in 1911. He spent his formative years up to his undergraduate and

master's level studies in English literature at the University of Manitoba (1929–34) in the prairie city of Winnipeg. McLuhan earned his doctorate in English literature from Cambridge in 1942, writing a dissertation on Thomas Nashe. He taught briefly at the University of Wisconsin (1936–7) and for a longer stint at the University of St. Louis (1937–44) before returning to Canada to teach at Assumption College in Windsor, Ontario (1944–6). He joined St. Michael's College in the University of Toronto in 1946 and spent his entire career there, with the exception of one year as the Schweitzer Chair in the Humanities at Fordham University in New York (1967–8). He died at home in Toronto on New Year's Eve, 1980.

McLuhan's first book, *The Mechanical Bride* (1951), is his most sociological. It appeared during a decade rich in international examples of cultural studies, including, in France, Roland Barthes's *Mythologies* (1957); in the UK, Richard Hoggart's *The Uses of Literacy* (1957); and in the US, Reuel Denny's *The Astonished Muse* (1957). All of these books critically analyze the consequences of the emergence of a massified popular culture. Eventually, McLuhan turned his back on the critical insights of his first book into how media aid political mythology, eschewing what he considered moralizing for a poetic approach and a more flexible, less committed taking of position. McLuhan abandoned any promise of a critical sociological perspective at the outset of his career; henceforth, description would precede evaluation, satire took the place of social semiotics, and exploration superseded explanation. McLuhan forged a remarkable collection of rhetorical devices (tropes and aperçus, puns and probes) for discovering the active and largely invisible technological environments that shape human experience.

McLuhan's galactic reconfiguration of history in *The Gutenberg Galaxy* (1962) around how media alter the human sensorium was built on tropes of primitivism and technologically driven change. In McLuhan's periodization, technology is determinative for the social and this is a recipe for a kind of passivity. Instead of opposing, one copes, reacts, or contemplates, discovers but never modifies.

The pre Gutenbergian world of traditional, pre literate, oral and aural, intimate sociality

gave way to typographic culture of the printed book with its linearity, uniformity, and status as a commodity (showing the way toward industrialization and massification). Eye displaced ear. Sound became vision. The general thesis that vision has been denigrated owes much to McLuhan. His innovation was to recode visual media like television as a tactile image machine and ultimately as a synesthetically tactual experience. But the expansion and explosion Johannes Gutenberg detonated with his press (hotter than the existing hotness of phonetic writing) was met by the implosion of electric (and eventually electronic) media of communication in a new global village of simultaneity, non linearity, and integrated cosmic consciousness. Television usurps the book. Electronic media recreate the conditions of pre literate sociality. Cool, low definition, and involving audio tactility returns after a hot, high definition, mechanical and well defined interlude. McLuhan found social evidence in the 1960s and 1970s of this neotribalism in youth counterculture, happenings, television, liberal politicians, and the nascent computer culture. His descriptions were often incorrectly conflated with his personal promotion of countercultural values.

McLuhan's galaxies fit neatly into the rather grand phaseal models of history that have been proffered by Marxist historians (waning of use value and the generalization of exchange value) and postmodern theorists (rise of simulacra, reification, semiurgy). Such models have a certain vagueness about them. This quality makes them graftable onto numerous social issues such as intergenerational strife (mature individualism versus youthful collectivism), development and modernization (non western underdevelopment is valorized as implosive, cool, and contemporary). The definition of phases (civilizations, empires) in terms of media of communication was adopted by McLuhan from his fellow countryman Harold Adams Innis, while shifting his emphasis from its implications for social structure onto sensory organization.

Understanding Media (1964) is perhaps McLuhan's best known book. It contains mature versions of his key conceptual binarisms: the hot (radio and book) and cool (television) distinction is applied awkwardly to various media on the basis of how much material needs

to be brought to them by receivers; and the shift from explosion (mechanical, fragmenting) to implosion (inward, integrating, space and time annihilating, speedy) is a metaphysical principle christened as reversibility or flip from one system to another at a saturation point. This “over heating” explains galactic shifts. Implosion was particularly influential in postmodern theory, yet in a nihilistic version, especially in the work of Jean Baudrillard. McLuhan is considered a pre postmodernist. His meditations on automation and speed are consonant with the theses on the democratic revolution advanced by Paul Virilio.

The extensions of man thesis is fully elaborated toward a global embrace as the central nervous system is outered into the network of a world rapidly becoming wired. This Catholic humanist promise of salvation is McLuhan’s technocratic media theology. It is built upon Greek myth (Narcissus) translated into technological extensions of the body (autoamputations) that in turn intensify (irritate) functions and actions. Humans are servomechanisms of these extensions, a relation to which McLuhan gave a sexual coloration. In order to bear this new intensity, perception is protectively numbed. The consequence of the outering of the central nervous system is not suicide but insight into the existential predicament of post individual shared experience in the electric age in which “we wear all mankind as our skin.”

McLuhan’s famous buzzphrase “the medium is the message” reorients the study of media and communication toward the interplay of form (figure) and content (ground), but not symmetrically. Medium takes precedence over overt content (aboutness, programming) because for McLuhan content is either another medium (the content of writing is speech) or provided by the user. The implications of this shift are profound. Media massage or condition perception and produce new sense ratios. In this way media introduce new patterns into socialization. Socially, the medium is the message. Technically, media forms rise to prominence under the conditions of the information age in which speed and simultaneity of communication configure a kind of total, gestalt awareness and allegedly break down social barriers and blur identities. McLuhan’s idea of a “global village” is based on the sharing of information

in dynamic interrelationships in a radically decentralized and dedifferentiated social process. Unfortunately, a focus on media characteristics does not reach into the political and economic forces shaping communication technologies; neither does it lend itself to detailed content analyses favored by social scientists.

McLuhan’s formalism suggests an affinity with Georg Simmel’s sociology of forms, based on dynamic relations between categories of form and content emphasizing the relative isolation of a grammar of pure forms from material and historical contents. Formal sociology is plagued by the conceptual difficulties created by the form/content distinction.

McLuhan’s anti dialectical and playfully Joycean style, with a minimum of explicit direction given for parsing hierarchies of value among heterogeneous fragments, has the feel of sociological fiction. Fictive social criticism deploys a variety of devices to slyly evoke social relations and problems. It is marked both by the inability to imagine production and by the precedence of the imaginary over the economic and semiotic over the evidential. The prime example is Georges Perec’s novel *Things* filled with wish of abundance in leisure society. Similarly, McLuhan imagined post Gutenbergian salvation as a techno Pentecost of post semiotic and perfect global communication.

The fictive effect of McLuhan’s writings owes much to his method. His “mosaic” method first announced in *The Gutenberg Galaxy* featured interacting and mutually transforming fragments. McLuhan juxtaposed texts and images in a series of kaleidoscopic print assemblages in conjunction with graphic designers. His book objects produced with Quentin Fiore and Jerome Agel – *The Medium is the Message* (1967) and *War and Peace in the Global Village* (1968) – as well as the Harley Parker realizations of *Through the Vanishing Point* (1968) and *Counterblast* (1969), among a host of similar “non books,” underlined that their form communicated about consumer society in the manner of consumer society, but with the onus for critical anchoring placed firmly on the shoulders of readers.

The refractory quality of McLuhan’s ideas and literary productions throughout the decades of the 1950s, 1960s, and 1970s made them difficult to integrate into the disciplinary

categories of academic institutions. His formidable public presence as media star, which peaked in 1967, and valorization in diverse professional and cultural communities outside of the academy, generated intractable problems around the authentic sources of his legitimation. This strained relations at McLuhan's home university and called into question institutional support for his famous coach house where he directed the Center for Culture and Technology from 1963 until his death.

From the period of *Understanding Media* onwards, McLuhan sought to respond to critics of his work by refining his method. The posthumous publication of *Laws of Media* (1988), brought to press by his son Eric, presents a fourfold classification of questions that may be posed of any artifact. Although formulated in response to criticisms that his work lacked scientificity, it is not evident that these questions hold the possibility of scientific knowledge. The tetradic model is a stable heuristic device that gives systematic expression to McLuhan's investigations of the paradoxical effects of media technologies. It is a study of effects rather than a search for causes. Four fundamental questions are posed about innovative media: Which faculties or senses do they Enhance? Which abilities or practices do they displace or Obsolesce? Which previously sidelined capacities or practices do they regain or Retrieve? At which critical points do they flip or Reverse into their opposites? Unlike logical or semiotic squares, McLuhan's tetrads are unencumbered by internal constraints and are thus best seen as tools for generating interpretations whose evaluation remains subject to further rhetorical justifications. McLuhan's tetrads are being tried out in diverse arenas such as the critical discourse on geographical information systems and in management theory.

Currently, McLuhan's work fits best within cultural sociology and has been taken up by cybercultural theorists and promoters of information technologies for its uncanny ability to anticipate contemporary technocultural developments.

SEE ALSO: Barthes, Roland; Cultural Studies; Media; Media and Consumer Culture; Simmel, Georg

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madness

Raymond M. Weinstein

Madness is a layman's term for what psychiatrists and medical professionals call mental illness or psychiatric disorder. A mad person is characterized by psychopathology of one kind or another: a disordered mind, irrational or

unintelligible behavior, extreme mood swings, disturbed emotions, bouts of anxiety, or a dysfunctional personality. Madness and mental illness are terms that are both distinct from "insanity," which is a legal concept. If a mentally disturbed individual comes before a court of law, the concern is whether he or she is insane (i.e., knew right from wrong, poses a danger to self or others, and/or is responsible for his or her actions).

Madness has been recognized throughout history in every known society. Primitive cultures turn to witch doctors or shamans to apply magic, herbal mixtures, or folk medicine to rid deranged persons of evil spirits or bizarre behavior. In ancient Israel it was widely believed that mental or emotional disturbances were caused by supernatural forces or an angry God as a punishment for sin or failure to follow the commandments. The Old Testament contains numerous references to kings and commoners smitten with some form of madness. The Jewish prophets were thought to be psychologically abnormal because they acted in strange ways, departed markedly from the norm in appearance, and foretold of future events that few understood. The Greeks replaced concepts of the supernatural with a secular view, insisting that afflictions of the mind were no different than diseases of the body. They saw mental as well as physical illness as due to natural causes, an imbalance in bodily humors. Hippocrates frequently wrote that an excess of black bile resulted in irrational thinking and behavior. The Romans made further contributions to psychiatry, especially contemporary practice. They put forth the idea that strong emotions could lead to bodily ailments, the basis of today's theory of psychosomatic illness. The Romans also embraced the notion of humane treatment for the mentally ill and codified into law the principle of insanity as a mitigation of responsibility for a criminal act.

The Middle Ages witnessed the end of the progressive ideas of the Greeks and Romans. With the overriding influence of the Catholic Church there was a return to the belief that supernatural forces, the Devil and witches, were causing troubled mental states in people. Many disturbed persons exhibited delusions and hallucinations of a religious nature and

exorcism was commonly practiced by clerics. This Christian connection between the Devil and madness lasted for well over a thousand years. In late medieval Europe, mentally deranged people were burned at the stake, put aboard "ships of fools" for deposit on a distant shore, and placed in custodial centers for religious cures. During the Renaissance, with the rise of monarchies and state responsibility for the poor and disabled, there was a growing tendency to house mad men and women in special institutions. By the eighteenth century there was the Great Confinement, a network of asylums and hospitals all across Western Europe. Unable to work or to participate in community life, those deemed mad or insane were locked away from society, crowded into unheated cells and chained to walls or beds. At century's end, the abuses and sufferings of the mentally ill led to public outrage and a period of reform. A program of "moral treatment" was begun – institutional care based on kindness, sympathy, guidance, work, and recreation – the reeducation of patients to behave normally. In the early nineteenth century this humane pattern of care spread to the New World. Change occurred again in the mid nineteenth century on both sides of the Atlantic. There was the decline of moral treatment and the emergence of the "medical model," the perspective that stresses mental illness is caused by biological factors and is incurable.

The twentieth century is noted for the ascendancy of a variety of different concepts and treatments in psychiatry. The idea of community involvement to prevent mental illness was bandied about in the first and second decades. In the 1920s the theories of Sigmund Freud on childhood psychosexual development and the unconscious mind profoundly affected psychiatric thinking and practice. The 1930s saw the introduction of electroconvulsive therapy, insulin treatment, and lobotomies. In the 1940s the war years uncovered a new disorder, "battle fatigue," while the post war period, with the creation of the National Institute of Mental Health in the US, saw the beginning of the federal government's commitment to helping the mentally ill. In 1950s America the populations of state hospitals, growing for over a century, peaked and began a long period of

decline. By the 1960s a “psychiatric revolution” was underway. Freud’s psychoanalytic method – expensive, time consuming, and ineffective for curing seriously disturbed patients – lost favor. A new medical model emerged, with an emphasis on recently developed psychoactive drugs to maintain patients both in and out of the hospital. Deinstitutionalization was public policy and became a social movement, complete with ideology and political action. Federally funded community mental health centers were established to treat former patients and those not previously hospitalized. At the end of the twentieth century the trend in institutionalization reversed again. Many former mental patients were returned to an expanding state hospital system, as they could not be treated effectively in the community, were rejected by their families, or ended up on the streets of every major city, homeless and often in need of medical attention.

The second half of the twentieth century was marked with intense debate as to what madness is and whether hospital treatment is appropriate. Psychiatrists generally assume the presence of an abnormal condition in the individual which is manifested in specific symptomatology, but Thomas Szasz broke ranks and led the anti psychiatry movement in the 1960s by arguing that mental illness is a myth, nothing more than “problems of living.” Sociologists, on the other hand, tend to view mental illness as a label attached to persons who engage in certain types of deviant activities. Thomas Scheff, chief among them, argued that the symptoms and disturbed behavior typical of the mentally ill are more the conformity to a set of role expectations, products of situations, than the result of some personal predisposition or specific psychopathology. Walter Gove, however, severely criticized the labeling approach to mental illness advanced by his colleagues. From a psychiatric point of view hospitalization is thought of positively, as a site to both treat patients and shield them from the environment that is causing or contributing to their madness. The sociological position, articulated best by Erving Goffman, casts the mental hospital in a negative light, as a “total institution” that stigmatizes the patient and reinforces the very behavior it is supposed to correct.

The coming of the twenty first century has not seen the end of the centuries old controversies surrounding madness in people and its consequences for society. The causes of mental illness are still largely unknown. Whether disorders of the mind are due to organic, genetic, and biological factors or the result of developmental and environmental influences is part of the larger longstanding battle between “nature” and “nurture” among medical and social scientists. Psychiatrists have revised their *Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders* many times, changing the definitions and categorizations of symptoms and diseases. Advocacy groups for the mentally ill and their families demand greater public funding for treatment programs, parity in insurance coverage with medical disorders, the right of hospitalized patients to refuse treatment, greater tolerance for former patients in the community, and expanded services for relatives. Politicians focus on the potential cost savings of halfway houses and the privatization of mental health care, while patient advocates argue for society to be motivated more by a humane concern for the mentally ill and protection of their legal rights than per capita treatment expenditures. Public opinion polls suggest that community residents favor the transfer of patients from large institutional settings to smaller neighborhood facilities, but when hypothetical situations become backyard reality they often vigorously oppose any mad person from living next door to them or across the street.

Today’s problematic mental health system, changing treatment priorities, and controversial public policies may be different in substance, but are not so variant in form from the ancient and medieval debates over the nature of madness and what to do with those so afflicted.

SEE ALSO: Aging, Mental Health, and Well Being; Dangerousness; Deinstitutionalization; Freud, Sigmund; Goffman, Erving; Labeling Theory; Mental Disorder; Psychoanalysis; Stigma; Stressful Life Events

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magic

Tomasino Pinna

Magic is complex and difficult to define. Generally, it refers to ritual activity – usually without institutional supports – the execution of which, through words and actions considered powerful, intends to automatically induce changes of various types. There are good (white magic) or bad (black magic) aims relating to various human and natural events (health, sex life, reproductive activity, climatic events, knowledge of the future, social relationships, etc.) according to the desires of those who use it (magicians or their clients) and those who believe (magic also presupposes a system of beliefs, apart from rituals), so that the practitioner is able to bend to his or her will the powers on which the various aspects of reality depend.

The concept of magic arose and developed in western civilization and has served to define, polemically, internal mythical ritual expressions (as do most marginalized practices) considered in opposition to religion, science, and reason. This concept was then extended and applied to people other than those of the West, assuming the value of a category which both defines and devalues cultural alterity (religions of higher ancient civilizations – Egypt, Vedic India, etc. – of primitive or colonized peoples).

The expression *mageía*, from which “magic” derives, has its origin in the name of Persian priests, *mágoi*, who belonged to the Zoroastrian priesthood (Herodotus). Thus, it originally defined an official and prestigious role. But in classical Greek and Roman culture, and later in Christianity and western culture in general, there was a radical change in the meaning of this expression, which acquired a negative and controversial character.

Greek civilization called *mágoi* marginal people. They were surrounded by scorn and considered charlatans. The expression *mágos* was used to define the foreigner, the *bárbaros*. The *magus* had the same value in Latin culture, and *magia* was viewed with distrust and as an instrument which threatened the normal order of individual, family, and social life. Magic was evaluated and repressed as a crime beginning with the Law of the Twelve Tables until the Codex of Theodosius and Justinian. Enemies were accused of magic: pagan intellectuals accused Christians of magic and later Christians accused pagans of the same.

It is often ancient and overthrown religions that are accused by the victorious religion of magic and superstition (an idea closely related to that of magic). This happened in the case of the victory of Christianity over the ancient polytheism of the Roman Empire. Christianity added a demonic character to the concept of magic, thus reducing the ancient divinities to the level of demons. This also had far reaching consequences in the long run, such as in the witch hunts of the modern period (fifteenth to seventeenth centuries) where the devil became the cornerstone of the ideology of the witch, and even the most simple act of popular magic was considered as inspired by the devil. In the same way, magic and superstition were associated by European colonizers, in a Christian centered view, with the myths and rituals of the peoples conquered in various continents. Within complex and industrialized societies the practices and beliefs of subordinate social classes, popular religions, and rural communities have been placed by those who hold the reins of cultural and religious power within the devaluing category of magic.

Nevertheless, apart from magic as an expression belonging to dominant groups, there exists

also a learned tradition. This is the case of the *magia naturalis* (natural magic) of Humanism (with precedents in the field of occult medieval sciences, and even earlier within Neoplatonism). This is understood as esoteric knowledge of the elect few, able to penetrate into the secret mechanism of the world in order to act upon it and change it. There one finds Neoplatonic formulations and conceptions of the universe as a complex organism of empathy and consonance, in which man by his intelligence is able to intervene to foresee the future and to change it, dominating it with his knowledge and the actions inspired by it: the reality of man and Nature. Magic appears here to be a type of knowledge of the laws of the universe, as a science not yet divulged. In this sense, the Renaissance *magia naturalis* of Giambattista Della Porta, Marsilio Ficino, Pico della Mirandola, Paracelso, Tommaso Campanella, Giordano Bruno, and Cornelio Agrippa (seen as esoteric knowledge) scorned and condemned ceremonial as base, vile magic and demonic magic. In this case – in which we see a reevaluation of magic – we can also notice how there still exists the characteristic anti magic controversy of the West. The conception of New Science was founded on the acquisition of knowledge based on experiment and – as opposed to the secrecy of knowledge – hoped for the spread of data for the benefit of everyone and refused every kind of magic, including natural magic. The Enlightenment and later positivism considered magic on a par with an irrational and unjustifiable superstition and the fruit of ignorance (Rossi 2004; de Martino 1976). On this basis, the concept of magic – as the fruit of a controversial history – is characterized as the negative half of a binomial whose opposite expression is religion, science, and rationality. Above all, this western category was applied to other civilizations (e.g., primitive peoples) who had not experienced Western alternatives.

Today, the use of magic is widespread: the fruit of urban uneasiness which looks for the short cut of a magical miracle via unconventional operators, but also as the mystifying ability of power (Burdeau et al. 1989). The concept of magic has been the object of many studies, giving life to different interpretive theories, which consider magic from different points of view: as science in embryo, as an inferior

religion, as a social function, and as a universal structure.

Anthropological evolutionism, whose major representatives are Tylor (1832–1917) and Frazer (1854–1941), studied magic according to an intellectualistic perspective, as a mode of knowledge, of organization, and of the manipulation of reality. It is considered to be a deceptive cognitive system, typical of the more primitive stages of evolution and still present, as a survival and the result of ignorance, among the lower social strata of civilized Europe, ethnocentrically assumed to be the evolutionary apex and parameter with which to measure the level of other civilizations. Frazer claims that in the evolution of humanity it is possible to identify three principal stages: magic, religion, and science. He places magic in the first and most primitive stage, when it is thought possible to intervene directly in nature through words, deeds, and signs. When one becomes aware of the ineffectiveness of magical actions and the inability to influence nature at will, then one believes it is governed by potent forces, on which man also depends, and towards which one takes an attitude of propitiation and conciliation which is manifested in prayer and sacrifice. Thus, religion is born. Science, the last stage of evolution, allows us to act directly on nature through a correct knowledge of its laws, without the intervention of superior beings. Frazer argues that magic is based on two fundamental principles: (1) the law of similarity, which produces homeopathic magic, according to which similar produces similar, and it is believed possible to produce any effect by simply imitating it (damage or kill an enemy by destroying an image of him; make it rain by pouring water; making pustules drop off by rubbing them while a falling star crosses the sky; seeding a field by a fertile woman in order to fertilize the vegetation, etc.); (2) the law of contact, on which contagious magic is based, founded on the idea that things which were once in contact will always be so, and so it is possible to influence a person even at a distance, by acting on the object with which he had been in contact (his nails or his hair, his clothes, his footprints; one can heal a wound by acting on the arrow which caused it, greasing the weapon, or, in Melanesia, putting it among fresh leaves to cure the inflammation, etc.).

According to Frazer, the magic system is substantially the same, in principle and in practice, at all times and in all places (among the ignorant and superstitious classes of modern Europe, in ancient Egypt, and among aboriginal Australians . . .), as he tries to demonstrate with a rich illustrative list which refers to indiscriminate and decontextualized comparativism. Frazer distinguishes clearly between magic and religion, and assimilates magic to science, as both are based on cognitive principles of an associative nature. Except that magic, unlike science, applies these principles, which are correct, in the wrong way, believing that things which seem alike are the same and that things which were once in contact continue to be so forever. Thus, he defines magic as “the bastard sister of science.”

Frazer created, for the study of magic, a truly pioneering point of reference: many theories, even current ones, identify it as a reference or continue some of his points of view, correcting a certain evolutionistic rigidity (e.g., the neo intellectualism of Robin Horton and John Skorupski, who emphasize the points of contact between magical thought and scientific thought), or disputing Frazer’s statement, as in the symbolist approaches of John H. M. Beattie, Victor Turner, Stanley Jeyaraja Tambiah, and Clifford Geertz, who consider magic not as a cognitive instrument to be evaluated in terms of truth/falsity of a scientific type, but as a symbolic system which expresses, also at a subconscious level, collective values, social conflicts, and existential problems (Cunningham 1999).

Freud’s psychoanalytic theory is influenced by evolutionism. Assimilating individual evolution (ontogenesis) and evolution of the species (phylogenesis), magic – which mixes ideal connections and real connections to satisfy the desires which derive from the pleasure principle – would constitute the first stage of the thought of human evolution, corresponding to the narcissistic phase and of omnipotence of thought of individual evolution. Religion corresponds to the stage of attachment to parents. Science would be the stage of maturity and of adapting to reality. The magic rituality of the neurotic, as a form of narcissistic regression, is for Freud assimilated to the primitive man’s and child’s magic forms and to those of folklore

and of occultism. He does not distinguish ritual as an individual pathology (which isolates) from ritual as a cultural fact (which socializes) (de Martino 1976).

Differing from the evolutionistic approach, Wilhelm Schmidt considers magic not as an initial moment of human evolution, but as a later and degenerative moment in comparison with an original monotheism of humanity. Research, the result of religious aims, attempts to give a scientific foundation to biblical stories, and is based on data shown as erroneous by Raffaele Pettazzoni.

Beginning with Rudolf Otto (*The Idea of the Holy*, 1917) and in general within the phenomenological current (Gerardus van der Leeuw, Mircea Eliade), magic has been considered as being connected to religion, since both represent an existential experience of the relationship with the Holy (which Otto calls “numinous,” *mysterium fascinans et tremendum*). But magic is also defined as the “vestibule of religion” because it is considered as a primordial moment of the highest forms of religious life.

A notable change with regard to evolutionism is to be found in the functionalist theory of Malinowski. For him, magic, religion, and science do not represent in any way a progressive sequence. They coexist in the same social environment and each provides its own specific contribution (function) toward satisfying individual and social needs. Malinowski abandons the intellectual approach to magic as a logical error of evolutionism. Magic, for him, does not belong to the realm of science, but to that of religion, even though there are differences between them. Magic is used to solve concrete, specific problems. Religion, which is much more complex, is used to give answers to general problems and to those of meaning. However, both intervene beyond the point in which man can control reality, and have their origins in moments of anxiety and emotional tension, which are in that way confronted. Malinowski cites the ideas of Lévy Bruhl, who contrasts the rational and scientific worldview of the modern West to the mentality of primitive peoples, which he considers as prelogical. Lévy Bruhl thinks that primitives live within a magical dimension indifferent to the principles of identity and of non contradiction. They are seen as obeying a law of mystical participation, which

puts in contact the different orders of reality (which for us are distinct) and creates continuous interferences between the visible world and invisible powers, between sleeping and being awake, between the dead and the living. Malinowski, on the other hand, studying the natives of the Trobriand Islands, observed that they knew well how to use the tools of reason and could distinguish between technology and magic. Magic never intervenes when results are certain, but only to deal with anxiety deriving from situations that do not seem to be fully controllable. Magic, in specific contexts, is needed to reestablish psychological and social equilibrium disturbed by the uncertainty of outcome in different areas of human life (love, farming, fishing, etc.).

Durkheim and above all Marcel Mauss stress the character of magic as a social phenomenon. The magician and his magic are expressions of the social environment; they are born and they stand on social consensus, as do religion and the clergy. Like religion, magic is a system of beliefs and practices relative to the sacred (as opposed to the profane). Through its private, individual, secret, and mysterious character, and through its tendency toward the concrete and utilitarian (which links magic to science and technology), Mauss argued, medicine, metallurgy, pharmacology, botany, and astronomy would have arisen. Magic is distinguished from religion. Religion has a public character, tends toward the abstract and metaphysical, and, in Durkheim's opinion, creates a moral community, called "church," among those who belong to it. In contrast, there does not exist a magic church (even though the frontiers between the two realms of magic and religion are often imprecise).

A very close connection between social structure and magic was found by Radcliffe Brown (who also suggested giving up the unhelpful dichotomy between religion and magic, and subsuming both under the category of ritual) and by Evans Pritchard. The latter identifies in the Azande of the Sudan a coherent system of mystical thought, which supplements empirical thought. Witchcraft explains misfortunes, while magic provides the means to defend oneself from it or to remedy any damage caused by attacks by witches, which are discovered through oracular techniques. Oracles and magic

are two different ways of overcoming witchcraft. This magic system works as an instrument of control of behavior and as a safeguard of social and normative equilibrium.

An analysis of the relationship between magic, society, and economy was undertaken by Weber. Examining the origins and developments of religion, he describes the earliest religious forms as essentially magic and characterized by coercive rituals and by material purposes. Later, religion takes on ethical values and provides a sense of individual and social life (even though magical elements remain in most religions). The overcoming of magic, or disenchantment with the world, which happens particularly through ascetic Protestantism, leads to the rationalization and moralization of religious practices and beliefs, and constitutes, with theological accentuation of the intraworldliness of the professions, an essential instrument for the birth of modern capitalistic economy and for the development of technology (magic being an obstacle to the rationalized organization of economic activity).

Similar ideas (the influence of ideological dimensions on the economic) are present in the work of Keith Thomas, according to whom the decline of magic that took place in England in the seventeenth century with the success of Protestantism, favored by technical progress and by improvement in the material conditions of life, was due also to decisive factors of an ideological type: to a change of mentality and attitude of confidence in the progress of science, which produced an intellectual atmosphere in which the use of magic was considerably reduced and lost its credibility. Thomas's work paints a picture of the beliefs and popular magic practices of divination and witchcraft, in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, with great attention to the relationships with the social environment in which they operated.

Jeanne Favret Saada undertook research into the contemporary French rural world, studying it in the region of Bocage from the point of view of witchcraft. He analyzed the functional mechanisms used to give symbolic form to misfortune and aggression within the community. According to Lévi Stauss's theory, magic (assimilated to myth and rite) and science represent two different strategies for approaching reality, directed toward its knowledge and

its order. Magic is based on perception and intuition in accordance with the criteria of global and integral determinism. Nevertheless, magic thought (or “savage thought”) is not to be considered as science in embryo, but as a different form of knowledge, in itself complete. Durkheim and Mauss had already stressed the cognitive functions of magical thought, conceiving magic as a primitive form of classification. According to Lévi Strauss it was, instead, a form not only belonging to primitive people, but universal and permanent in human intellect, and is an expression of its unconscious structure – savage thought is also present in modern domesticated man.

The Italian historian of religions Ernesto de Martino dedicated several works to the study of magic, from numerous points of view. He believed that magic was primitive man’s first attempt to move away from his natural condition and to become a “presence” (*presenza*), a cultural subject able to transcend nature. He studied magic also as an expression of subordinate Euromediterranean cultures and in particular of southern Italy, where conditions of misery favor the rise of magic (this interest led the way for other academics, including his follower Clara Gallini, who wrote about the evil eye in Sardinian traditions, in which she points out the close connection between the system of production and magical ideology). It also represents a traditional device for facing critical situations (an illness, an unreciprocated love, an uncertain future, social oppression, death, etc.) which cannot be realistically solved. The negative emergency is submitted to procedures of “de historicization” (*destorificazione*) which mythically shape the crisis and mythically produce its solution. It is believed that magic rites, by repeating the myth, resolve in the same way the historically given crisis. Above all, beyond real effectiveness (de Martino, like Lévi Strauss, Mauss, and others, dwelt on the reality and symbolic effectiveness of magic rites), it exercises the function of social reintegration by saving the individual from the risk of remaining entrapped in the traumatizing event without being able to act or to choose according to the codes of her social group. De Martino holds that magic is not different from religion except for the narrowness of values transmitted. Magic is to religion as the abacus is to the calculating machine:

they both serve the same purpose, but they differ in complexity. There occur continuous syncretic crossings, such that Angelo Brelich even hoped for the abolition of the expression “magic,” to leave only that of “religion,” noting the need to be fully aware of the conventionality of its use.

Against every liquidating attitude of a positivistic strain, magico religious symbolism has its internal logic and exercises positive functions. The need to understand the magic world requires that we do not surrender the hegemonic choices of the West (reason and history) and its integral humanism. Magic alterity must be understood, but without irrationally falling within its coils (as critics of Jung allege, for example), and this brings de Martino to that methodological solution which, far from absolute ethnocentrism and absolute relativism, represents an original middle position, called critical ethnocentrism.

SEE ALSO: Ethnocentrism; Malinowski, Bronislaw K.; Myth; Popular Religiosity; Primitive Religion; Religion; Rite/Ritual

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majorities

Shirley A. Jackson

Majorities is a term that refers to the dominant group in a society, and can be defined as members of a group who hold power in a society and have access to resources. They need not be the numerical majority. They differ from minorities in that minorities do not hold power, be it economic, political, or social. Additionally, majorities develop the laws which define the rights of majority and minority group members. South Africa during the apartheid era is an excellent example of majorities (the Dutch), who were much smaller in number, oppressing the numerical majority. Historically, men prevented women from voting or from being able to handle their legal affairs. Women still receive less pay than their male counterparts for the same job.

Majorities can also refer to the group whose members share both physical and cultural similarities different from those of minority groups. Majorities may oppress their subordinates, minorities, by stereotyping them, holding prejudiced beliefs, or engaging in acts of discrimination. Majorities may hold privileged positions in society due in large part to their group membership. It should be noted, however, that with all groups, not all majorities may benefit equally from their dominant group membership.

In the US, studies on race relations often refer to majorities by dominant group – white Anglo Saxons (WASPS) or Caucasians. Majorities is not as frequently utilized as minorities as a term in race relations. The use of the term majorities in the social sciences has returned due in large part to an interest in whiteness studies, an area which points to the need to discuss the existence of whiteness as a variable in the same way that non white races and ethnic groups have been represented in the literature. These studies also maintain that while minorities experience a sense of “oneness,” this type of identification, while not always asserted in large part by the majority group, still exists.

Race is defined as a social construction that groups people according to their inherited physical or biological traits. While race is considered a social construction because we give it meaning, it holds very real consequences for those who may be considered inferior or superior based on their group identification or the group into which others categorize them. Although there is no such thing as a pure race, a superior race, a smarter sex, or an inferior sex, society may continue to act as if they exist. Thus, some groups, even contrary to evidence presented, may consider individuals as belonging to a superior or inferior group and associate certain positive or negative behaviors with members of those groups.

Ethnicity is often erroneously referred to as race. More correctly, ethnicity refers to one's cultural characteristics. It includes language, food, music, dress, surnames, and family structure. Ethnicity may be seen as something that is externally shared, in that it is not biological or does not contribute to one's physical or phenotypical characteristics.

According to some theorists, responses to group differences such as gender, age, race, ethnicity, or class are learned. Society teaches its members to consider some attributes more desirable than others. In addition, alleged differences based on intelligence and mental attributes are presumed of members based on their group membership. The degree to which individuals learn how to think of themselves also influences how they think of and treat those who are different. Prejudice is an attitude or belief whereby one holds a prejudgment based on one's group membership. While a prejudice

can be either positive or negative, it is usually negative when lodged against members of groups other than one's own. Because majorities have the power to determine what qualities are positive or negative, they can assert negative prejudices that are harmful when aimed at minorities. It is because of the propensity towards discrimination that prejudices can be harmful. Discrimination is an action of usually unfair treatment. Majorities, once again, are in a position to discriminate against those who are minorities by withholding such benefits as equal employment opportunities, equal pay, or fair access to management positions.

The functionalist perspective does not consider the disparate treatment of minorities by majorities to be functional for society. Rather, functionalists assert that what is functional for one group is not always functional for the other. As such, minorities may find themselves the victims of ethnocentrism and stereotypes. These are dysfunctional for minorities, as they impact their life chances and ability to gain equal standing with those who are more powerful. For example, women who attempt to gain parity with men may find themselves the victims of sexism, receiving threats of or actual physical violence in the workplace. Members of a racial or religious minority may find themselves the victims of hate crimes. These acts are especially dysfunctional for those who are the targets, but may form the basis of group loyalty or group consciousness among those who are the perpetrators.

The conflict perspective approach to majority and minority relations attributes the power of majorities and the disfranchisement of minorities to the perceived lesser abilities of the latter. While not all members of the majority have power, their group membership, nonetheless, provides them with opportunities not afforded to minority group members. They assert that the dominant group's power gives them the ability to shape how society's members feel about themselves and others. The conflict perspective also asserts that the competition for scarce resources between minorities and majorities results in discrepancies of wealth, power, and prestige. Lacking these, minorities find themselves holding an unequal status. They do not have the ability to challenge the majority, and thus may find themselves the

subject of continued domination, hostility, and oppression.

Relations between majorities and minorities have long been of special interest to sociologists studying both longstanding and emerging conflicts between men and women, and varied racial, ethnic, and immigrant populations. There appears to be no end to these conflicts in the foreseeable future, which makes certain their continued significance for social scientists.

SEE ALSO: Ethnicity; Prejudice; Race; Race (Racism); Stereotyping and Stereotypes; Whiteness

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male rape

Philip N. S. Rumney

The phrase male rape denotes serious sexual assaults in which the victim is male. Male rape is defined in many legal codes as nonconsensual sexual intercourse, including acts of anal and oral sex, usually with another male, though it is also sometimes defined so as to include nonconsensual intercourse with a woman. There is evidence of the specific recognition of male rape within legal codes dating back to the eighteenth century. The historical evidence on the incidence of male sexual victimization is

limited, though there are some records of male sexual coercion in Europe and elsewhere since the time of the Roman Empire (Jones 2000).

Male rape has long been recognized as a problem that has existed within the prison system, as well as other institutions. There is a significant body of literature on rape within prisons, primarily from research conducted within the US. This work indicates that rape in some institutions is not uncommon and that prison authorities have often failed to address the problem properly. This literature also illustrates the difficulties of measuring the prevalence of sexual coercion. For example, it has been noted that the notion of consent within prisons is "extremely slippery" because "prisons and jails are inherently coercive environments" (Human Rights Watch 2001).

In the last two decades researchers have begun to examine the prevalence and impact of male rape and sexual assault outside of institutional settings. What this research shows is that men of all ages and backgrounds can become victims, though both homosexuality and incarceration appear to be particular risk factors associated with victimization. Coxell et al. (1999) found that men with a prior history of consensual sexual contact with another male were six times more likely to be a victim of rape or sexual assault than a male with no such previous experience (Mezey & King 2000). Qualitative research has also given us an understanding of the dynamics and impact of male rape on its victims (Myers 1989; Scarce 1997), and there is a small amount of evidence on the perpetrators of male rape and sexual assault (Groth & Burgess 1980).

The consequences of male rape have given rise to several questionable claims within the literature. It has been repeatedly suggested, for example, that male rape may involve more violence and resultant trauma than rape involving female victims. The literature, however, provides only limited support for this claim (McLean 2004; Rumney & Morgan Taylor 2004). In addition, it has also been suggested that male and female victims experience "sexual assault differently" (Novotny 2003). There is no support for this claim when the full range of emotional and psychological reactions is considered (Mezey & King 2000; Rumney & Morgan Taylor 2004).

While research on male rape and sexual assault has improved our understanding of its prevalence and dynamics, there continue to be areas where there is a need for further work. There is limited information on the prevalence of male rape and sexual assault, with only two epidemiological studies examining the subject (Coxell et al. 1999). In addition, there is currently little qualitative evidence on the experiences of male victims within the criminal justice process or among those who access health services. The limited evidence available suggests a lack of understanding of male rape among some criminal justice professionals (Rumney & Morgan Taylor 2004). Better understanding is required of the needs of male victims in the context of health services, as victims often access these services in order to address concerns regarding sexually transmitted diseases or to receive treatment for assault related injuries. Finally, there is a lack of evidence on the dynamics of male rape and sexual assault within homosexual relationships. Given that homosexuality is a particular risk factor in male rape, a better understanding of sexual coercion and violence within such relationships is pressing.

SEE ALSO: Homosexuality; Law, Criminal; Prisons; Rape/Sexual Assault as Crime; Sex and Crime; Sexual Violence and Rape; Violent Crime

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Malinowski, Bronislaw K. (1884–1942)

Bernd Weiler

Bronislaw K. Malinowski and Alfred R. Radcliffe Brown are generally regarded as the “founding fathers” of British social anthropology. Born in Cracow, then part of the Austrian province of Galicia, Malinowski studied natural sciences, mathematics, and later psychology and philosophy at the Jagiellonian University where his father had been an eminent professor of Slavonic philology and folklore. In his formative years the main intellectual influence on Malinowski, apart from his father’s linguistic and ethnographic interests, appears to have been a combination of the philosophical current of “second positivism” – in his doctoral dissertation Malinowski analyzed the idea of “the economy of thought” in the epistemological works of Mach and Avenarius – and the neo-romantic movement of Polish cultural modernism (Ellen et al. 1990; Young 2004: 3–127). After graduating in 1908, Malinowski went to Leipzig, where he studied with Wundt, the founder of the so called *Volkerpsychologie*, and with the economic historian Bücher. In 1910 he moved to England, enrolled at the London School of Economics (LSE), and immersed himself in anthropology. Apart from his teachers at LSE (Seligman and Westermarck), Malinowski developed his ideas in critical response to and through eclectic use of the

works of Frazer, Rivers, Durkheim, and Freud, among others. During World War I, despite being an enemy alien in Australia, Malinowski was allowed to carry out fieldwork in the Trobriand Islands, located northeast of New Guinea. The results of this research were published in the book *Argonauts of the Western Pacific* (1922), which contained a detailed analysis of the intertribal exchange system known as *Kula* and which established Malinowski’s international fame as an anthropologist. His ethnography of the Trobriand Islands was later complemented by *The Sexual Life of Savages in North Western Melanesia* (1929) and *Coral Gardens and Their Magic* (1935). Upon his return to England he became a reader and in 1927 a full professor of anthropology at LSE, also playing a major role in the International Institute of African Languages and Cultures. A charismatic personality and highly gifted in promoting and popularizing the cause of anthropology, Malinowski recruited a remarkable international body of talented young scientists for his famous seminars at LSE (e.g., Firth, Evans Pritchard, Mair, Richards, Fortes, Nadel, Hofstra, Powdermaker, Kuper), many of whom went on to hold important posts in and outside the British Commonwealth. Malinowski spent the last years of his life at Yale University, where he died in 1942.

Despite the “scandal” caused by the posthumous publication of his field diaries (which in some parts revealed a racist and abusive attitude toward the “natives”) and despite the criticism that he mistook the Trobriander for *anthropos* himself, Malinowski still ranks as a pioneer of anthropological fieldwork who contributed decisively to the replacement of the older method of extensive ethnographic surveying with the modern method of intensive participant observation. Emphasizing the goal of grasping “the native’s point of view” Malinowski, not least because of his considerable literary gifts, was able to convince the reader of his expertise as an empathetic “I witness” (Geertz 1988: 73–101) and to paint a captivating yet realistic picture of “native” life. In his ethnographic accounts he sought to bridge the chasm between the “civilized” and the “primitive” by showing that the latter did not lack the rationality and scientific attitude of the former. Furthermore, he drew attention not only to the orderliness of

“primitive culture,” but also to the fact that the “primitive,” like the “civilized,” sometimes manipulated and deviated from the norms and rules of his or her community.

Within the realm of theory Malinowski, together with Radcliffe Brown, is generally credited for having led the “synchronic and nomothetic revolution” in anthropology. Malinowski’s functionalism, the doctrine most often associated with him, implied a rejection of social evolutionism and diffusionism, the two most influential theories in anthropology around 1900. Arguing forcefully, especially in his analysis of myth, that the past was not an independent force but always manipulated by and in the present, Malinowski emphasized the irretrievability of the past for anthropological studies and, concomitantly, the futility of the evolutionist’s search for origins and historical stages. Criticizing the diffusionist concept of culture as an ever changing hodgepodge of disparate elements, Malinowski stressed the integrity, inertia, and organic wholeness of culture. Anthropology’s prime goal, as conceived by Malinowski, was to search for the fundamental laws governing human conduct. By arguing that culture was essentially “functional” and an instrument for the satisfaction of basic individual needs (e.g., nutrition, reproduction, safety), Malinowski sought to prove the underlying unity in cultural diversity. Some critics of Malinowski’s theoretical work, especially of the naivety, ambiguity, tautology, and the psycho physiological reductionism of his functional analysis, have argued that it was to anthropology’s benefit that in many of his writings Malinowski, like his Trobriander, did not adhere to the rules that he aimed to establish for his discipline.

SEE ALSO: Anthropology, Cultural and Social: Early History; Biosociological Theories; Culture; Function; Functionalism/Neofunctionalism

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Malthus, Thomas Robert (1766–1834)

John R. Weeks

Thomas Robert Malthus is unquestionably the most influential writer in history on the topic of population. This was generally unintentional on his part because he was trained in Jesus College at Cambridge University in England with the early ambition of becoming a clergyman, and he was ordained into the Church of England. After graduation from Cambridge he divided his time between his duties as curate in a small parish church in Albury, south of London near his family’s home, and Cambridge,

where he had been elected a fellow, and it was during this period that he wrote the first edition of the book that has immortalized him: *Essay on the Principle of Population as it affects the future improvement of society; With remarks on the speculations of Mr. Godwin, M. Condorcet, and other writers*. Malthus (who went by Robert, which is why his first and middle names are usually provided) was by nature a shy man and he had a perceptible speech impediment (which limited the scope of his ambitions in the Church of England), and he published the book anonymously in 1798. However, the book's success forced him to acknowledge authorship, and he subsequently revised and expanded the book through several published editions.

Malthus must be understood in the context of his time. He was the second son of a gentleman farmer with a strong intellectual bent. His father was personal friends with Jean Jacques Rousseau and David Hume, two of the more important Enlightenment writers. The eighteenth century Enlightenment was a time when the goodness of the common person was championed. The idea that the rights of individuals superseded the demands of a monarchy inspired the American and French revolutions and was generally very optimistic and utopian, characterized by a great deal of enthusiasm for life and a belief in the perfectibility of humans. In France, these ideas were well expressed by Marie Jean Antoine Nicolas de Caritat, marquis de Condorcet, a member of the French aristocracy who forsook a military career to pursue a life devoted to mathematics and philosophy. Condorcet's optimism was based on his belief that technological progress has no limits. He saw prosperity and population growth increasing hand in hand, and he felt that if the limits to growth were ever reached, the final solution would be birth control, which was rudimentary at the time, but still reasonably effective if a couple was highly motivated.

Similar ideas were being expressed in England by William Godwin, whose *Enquiry Concerning Political Justice and Its Influences on Morals and Happiness* appeared in its first edition in 1793, revealing his ideas that scientific progress would enable the food supply to grow far beyond the levels of his day, and that such prosperity would not lead to overpopulation

because people would deliberately limit their sexual expression and procreation. Furthermore, he believed that most of the problems of the poor were due not to overpopulation but to the inequities of the social institutions, especially greed and accumulation of property.

As Malthus read and contemplated the works of Godwin, Condorcet, and others who shared the utopian view of the perfectibility of human society, he wanted to be able to embrace such an openly optimistic philosophy of life, yet he felt that intellectually he had to reject it. In doing so, he unleashed a controversy about population growth and its consequences that is still with us. He introduced his 1798 essay by commenting that: "I have read some of the speculations on the perfectibility of man and society, with great pleasure. I have been warmed and delighted with the enchanting picture which they hold forth. I ardently wish for such happy improvements. But I see great, and, to my understanding, unconquerable difficulties in the way to them" (Malthus 1965 [1798]: 7).

These "difficulties," of course, are the problems posed by his now famous principle of population. He derived his theory as follows:

I think I may fairly make two postulata. First, that food is necessary to the existence of man. Secondly, that the passion between the sexes is necessary, and will remain nearly in its present state. . . . Assuming then, my postulata as granted, I say, that the power of population is indefinitely greater than the power in the earth to produce subsistence for man. Population, when unchecked, increases in a geometrical ratio. Subsistence increases only in an arithmetical ratio. . . . By the law of our nature which makes food necessary to the life of man, the effects of these two unequal powers must be kept equal. This implies a strong and constantly operating check on population from the difficulty of subsistence. This difficulty must fall somewhere; and must necessarily be severely felt by a large portion of mankind. . . . Consequently, if the premises are just, the argument is conclusive against the perfectibility of the mass of mankind. (Malthus 1965 [1798]: 11)

Malthus believed that human beings, like plants and non rational animals, are "impelled" to increase the population of the species by what he called a powerful "instinct," the urge

to reproduce. Further, if there were no checks on population growth, human beings would multiply to an “incalculable” number, filling “millions of worlds in a few thousand years” (Malthus 1971 [1872]). This does not happen, however, because of the checks to growth. According to Malthus, the ultimate check to growth is lack of food (or, more generally, the “means of subsistence”). In turn, the means of subsistence are limited by the amount of land available, the “arts” or technology that could be applied to the land, and “social organization” or land ownership patterns. A cornerstone of his argument is that populations tend to grow more rapidly than does the food supply since population has the potential for growing geometrically, whereas he believed that food production could be increased only arithmetically, by adding one acre at a time. He argued, then, that in the natural order, population growth will outstrip the food supply, and the lack of food will ultimately put a stop to the increase of people.

Malthus was aware that starvation rarely operates directly to kill people, since there were “positive checks” that killed them before they actually died of starvation. The positive checks were primarily those measures “whether of a moral or physical nature, which tend prematurely to weaken and destroy the human frame” (Malthus 1971 [1872]: 12), which today we would call the causes of mortality.

Malthus also recognized that there are preventive checks that limit population growth. In theory, the preventive checks would include all possible means of birth control, including abstinence, contraception, and abortion. However, to Malthus the only acceptable means of preventing a birth was to exercise what he called “moral restraint”; that is, to postpone marriage, remaining chaste in the meantime, until a man feels “secure that, should he have a large family, his utmost exertions can save them from rags and squalid poverty, and their consequent degradation in the community” (1971 [1872]: 13). Any other means of birth control, including contraception (either before or within marriage), abortion, infanticide, or any “improper means,” was viewed as a vice that would “lower, in a marked manner, the dignity of human nature.” Moral restraint was a very important point with Malthus, because he believed that if people were allowed to

prevent births by “improper means” (that is, prostitution, contraception, abortion, or sterilization), then they would expend their energies in ways that are, so to speak, not economically productive.

To Malthus, material success is a consequence of human ability to plan rationally – to be educated about future consequences of current behavior – and he was a man who practiced what he preached. He planned his family rationally, waiting to marry and have children until he was 39, at about the same time that he obtained a secure job in 1805 as a Professor of History and Political Economy at East India College in Haileybury, England (north of London). He and his wife, 11 years his junior, had three children.

An important part of the Malthusian perspective – which Karl Marx attacked vociferously – was his belief that a natural consequence of population growth was poverty. This is the logical end result of his arguments that people have a natural urge to reproduce, and that the increase in the supply of food cannot keep up with population growth. Malthus believed that the urge to reproduce always forces population pressure to precede the demand for labor. Thus, “overpopulation” (as measured by the level of unemployment) would force wages down to the point where people could not afford to marry and raise a family. At such low wages, with a surplus of labor and the need for each person to work harder just to earn a subsistence wage, cultivators could employ more labor, put more acres into production, and thus increase the means of subsistence. Malthus believed that this cycle of increased food resources leading to population growth leading to too many people for available resources leading then back to poverty was part of a natural law of population. Each increase in the food supply only meant that eventually more people could live in poverty.

Borrowing from John Locke, Malthus argued that “the endeavor to avoid pain rather than the pursuit of pleasure is the great stimulus to action in life” (1965 [1798]: 359). Pleasure will not stimulate activity until its absence is defined as being painful. Malthus suggested that the well educated, rational person would perceive in advance the pain of having hungry children or being in debt and would postpone marriage and sexual intercourse until he was sure that he

could avoid that pain. If that motivation existed and the preventive check was operating, then the miserable consequences of population growth could be avoided. Malthus objected to the use of birth control not so much on religious grounds as on more philosophical grounds: “To remove the difficulty in this way, will, surely in the opinion of most men, be to destroy that virtue, and purity of manners, which the advocates of equality, and of the perfectibility of man, profess to be the end and object of their views” (1965 [1798]: 154). The underlying concept was later adapted by Sigmund Freud in his discussion of sublimation. Sexual intercourse without the fear of pregnancy, Malthus believed, would destroy a man’s work ethic.

Malthus was opposed to the English Poor Laws (welfare benefits for the poor), because he felt they would actually serve to perpetuate misery. They permitted poor people to be supported by others and thus not feel that great pain, the avoidance of which might lead to birth prevention. Malthus argued that if every man had to provide for his own children, he would be more prudent about getting married and raising a family. In his own time, the number of people on welfare had been increasing and English parliamentarians were trying to decide what to do about the problem. Although the Poor Laws were not abolished, they were reformed largely because Malthus had given legitimacy to public criticism of the entire concept of welfare payments. Marx was adamantly opposed to this idea, because his view, like Godwin’s, was that poverty resulted from social injustice, not overpopulation. If capitalists (including large landowners) did not exploit the workers, then more people working ought to generate more economic productivity which would raise the standard of living, not lower it. The historical evidence does not, in fact, support Malthus’s view of the Poor Laws. Those English counties with more generous welfare benefits did not have a higher birth rate than those with less generous benefits.

The crucial part of Malthus’s ratio of population growth to food increase was that food (including both plants and non human animals) would not grow exponentially. Yet when Charles Darwin acknowledged that his *Origin of the Species* was inspired by Malthus’s essay,

it was because Darwin realized that all plants and animals, not just humans, had the capacity to grow exponentially. “Darwin described his own theory as ‘the doctrine of Malthus applied with manifold force to the whole animal and vegetable kingdoms; for in this case there can be no artificial increase of food, and no prudential restraint from marriage.’ Thus plants and animals, even more than men, would increase geometrically if unchecked” (Himmelfarb 1984: 128). The balance between humans and the resources that sustain human life was not the only battle going on in nature. Darwin understood that every living thing was competing for resources and that the result was a slow process of evolutionary change as each species worked to ensure its own survival.

Criticisms of Malthus do not, however, diminish the importance of his work. Although his writing often has a moralistic rather than a scientific tone, he laid out a very clear argument for why resources may not be sustainable in the face of continued population growth. He laid the groundwork for Darwin’s theory of evolution, and offered a very modern sounding view of the world in which humans must balance their numbers against the natural resources available on the planet.

SEE ALSO: Demographic Transition Theory; Demography; Marx, Karl; Population and Development; Population and the Environment

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managed care

Teresa L. Scheid

Managed care refers to processes or techniques used by, or on behalf of, purchasers of health care that seek to control or influence the quality, accessibility, utilization, and costs of health care. Managed care emerged in the United States in the 1960s as a response to rising health care costs, and consists of different types of organizational practices to make health care more efficient and effective. Most other industrial countries have also responded to rising health care costs by managing care. Managed care emphasizes cost containment, performance assessment, and measurable outcomes and subjects the treatment actions of health care providers to external review. Treatment decisions are evaluated in light of measurable client level outcomes; consequently, managed care has resulted in a greater emphasis on accountability. The issue is whether accountability is assessed in terms of cost savings (efficiency) or enhanced care (effectiveness). In the United States, managed care often involves a greater concern with cost savings than with enhanced quality or access.

There are numerous ways in which health care is managed, the most common being utilization review or pre certification (where services must be authorized before a client can receive them), purchaser contracts with groups of health care providers (such as health maintenance organizations or preferred provider organizations), and capitation (where a set amount is paid for a client for specified services). Many of these forms of managed care are used in conjunction with one another. By 1995, three fourths of American workers received some form of managed care through their private insurance plans, and with recent reforms to Medicaid and Medicare most Americans receive managed health care in one form or another.

Because of the diversity in approaches to managed care, as well as wide variation in the types of organizations which provide managed care, we do not know very much about the overall impact of managed care on health care.

While economists have focused on economic evaluations of the efficiency of managed care (i.e., reduced costs), sociologists have concentrated on the forces promoting managed care and how managed care has changed the traditional system of care.

Donald Light (1997) has argued that managed care is a revolutionary shift from a provider driven (health care professionals and providers) to a buyer driven system of care. Provider driven health care was based on a professional model where, by virtue of their professional expertise, health care providers had control over treatment decisions. The buyer based system of care is characterized by a distrust of professional authority and external monitoring of health care providers in order to enhance accountability. Scott et al. (2000) have provided an extensive analysis of the decline of professional dominance and the growth in a managerial/market based institutional logic in the San Francisco Bay area. With managed care there is an increased emphasis on standardization of clinical practices and reliance upon evidence based medicine. Because treatment is reimbursed when there is a valid medical diagnosis for which an efficacious treatment exists, managed care has resulted in a restricted view of care in terms of the medical model of care, which excludes many forms of support needed by individuals with chronic conditions. There is also an increased reliance on medications as the primary form of medical care.

Sociologists have examined managed care constraints on professional autonomy and conflict with bureaucratic control systems. Most of the existent research focuses on physicians. Sociologists have found that decisions about clinical care continue to rely upon medical expertise, and while physicians do conform to principles of cost containment, they maintain high levels of autonomy. That is, professional logics of care have incorporated the logic of cost containment. This may not be the case where health care providers lack the power of physicians, such as in the provision of mental health care (Scheid 2004). There needs to be more research on how managed care has affected the work of different groups of health care providers as well as patients. There is a large body of literature outside sociology that examines the

ethical dilemmas providers experience when faced with conflicting demands for cost containment and patient care. Since managed care so often operates at the organizational rather than the individual level, we need to develop better models of organizational ethics and link studies of health care to sociological theories of organizational behavior.

Unfortunately, assessments of managed care have largely been conducted by health services researchers and there has been a narrow focus on efficiency. Efficiency has been defined in the health policy literature in terms of lower costs and the use of fewer resources (Sullivan 2000). The quality of care involves assessment of the effectiveness of that care (Flood 1994; Campbell et al. 2000). However, a good bit of the existent research uses efficiency to assess the effectiveness (quality) of care. For example, managed care has reduced the length of inpatient hospital stays, which certainly saves money; it is less clear if quality of care is enhanced by shortened stays. Sociologists need to take a more active role in evaluations of managed care practices and how managed care has affected the type and quality of care patients receive. Sociologists also need to focus on ways in which managed care has changed access to health care for different populations. Managed care has the potential to widen access by distributing health care more equitably; it may also restrict access by limiting care to those with acute health care problems and hence neglecting the long term needs of patients with chronic problems. In terms of mental health, there is some evidence that managed care has in fact resulted in a democratization of care where everyone gets a similar level of services and those with chronic needs do not get the services they require (Mechanic & McAlpine 1999). We also do not know very much about the differential experience of minority groups within managed care (both as health care providers and patients). Sociologists studying health disparities rarely include organizational variables in their analysis. Consequently, we know little about how mechanisms to manage care may in fact widen access by allowing for a more equitable rationing of care, or which mechanisms ration care such as to enhance inequalities in care.

SEE ALSO: Chronic Illness and Disability; Health Care Delivery Systems; Health Locus of Control; Health Maintenance Organization

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management

Stewart Clegg and Chris Carter

On the eve of World War I, scientific management became the first big management fad, a source of innumerable new truths about work and its organization, all of which were oriented to the efficiency of the individual human body. At the same time a revolution in manufacturing also occurred when Henry Ford introduced the assembly line, modeled on the Chicago slaughterhouses (see Upton Sinclair's 1906 ethnographic novel, *The Jungle*). In the abattoirs each job was separated into a series of simple repetitive actions as the bodies moved down the line to be progressively dismembered; in Ford

the car was built on the same principles that the hog was butchered.

While management saw it as important to know how much time each element requires to be accomplished, other aspects of time study techniques were not appropriate for assembly line manufacturing. Individual incentives were not appropriate because every operator was tied to the speed of the line. What remained from the Taylor system was the elemental decomposition of jobs. Jobs were small, repetitive, and routine. In fact, routine became such a problem among Ford's workers that, in the first year of full assembly line operation, the company experienced about 900 percent turnover (Williams et al. 1992). The annual turnover rate settled at around 400 percent and daily absenteeism ran between 10 and 20 percent. It was for this reason that on January 5, 1914, the Ford Motor Company announced the \$5, 8 hour day for all production workers, irrespective of pieces produced (which was determined by the speed of the line, anyway, not individual effort). To ensure only deserving workers received the money, in 1914 Ford established the Sociological Department to administer the program and to investigate the home lives of workers (Marcus & Segal 1989: 236–8). It was a remarkable example of the institutionalization of a socially disciplinary apparatus in the front ranks of the emerging industrial economy of modernity and of an ultimately failed attempt to institute meta routines governing societal politics. The \$5 day was designed to include only those who were “‘worthy’ and who would not debauch the additional money.” The rules governing eligibility were demonstrating that, if one were a man, one lived a clean, sober, industrious, and thrifty life, while women had to be “deserving” and have some relatives solely dependent upon them. Investigators from the Sociological Department visited workers' homes and suggested ways to achieve the company's standards for “better morals,” sanitary living conditions, and “habits of thrift and saving.” Employees who lapsed were removed from the system and given a chance to redeem themselves. Long term failure to meet Ford Motor Company standards resulted in dismissal from the company.

Of course, there was a degree of racism at work here as well, paralleling Ford's well documented anti-Semitism (Lee 1980): after

the Civil War, black people had been leaving the sharecropper society of the Deep South in droves, fleeing a culture rooted in slavery. After hitting Highway 61, they headed for the burgeoning factories of the North, in Chicago and Detroit, in the latter of which Ford began hiring African Americans in large numbers in 1915, paying them the same wages as his white employees. The material basis of the jazz age for the many black people who headed North was working in the factories and assembly plants. By 1923, Ford employed 5,000 Detroit area black men, far more than other plants.

As Fordist modernity became characteristic of modernity in general, in workshops large and small, the state took over the functions that private capital had hitherto assumed. Small employers or those new to business could not develop their own sociological departments, but the state, as an ideal total moralist, supplemented the work of surveillance over those in whom the churches and associated temperance movements had not succeeded in instilling a governmental soul. Power shifted its focus from the individual to the collective. We should understand these innovations as extensions of a panoptical complex. They lacked the specificity of Taylor's targeting of the body and were more oriented to what Foucault (1977) referred to as biopower, power oriented to the collective body politic. In accord with Gramsci (1971) we can see these new managerial techniques of Taylorism and Fordism seeking to suppress “the ‘animality’ of man, training him,” as Turner (1984: 100) suggests, “for the regular disciplines of factory life,” in an anatomical politics. Even as the state supplemented “the private initiatives of the industrialist” in framing the political morality of work (in an era before random drug testing of employees had become widespread), newer, more specifically targeted practices were being shaped in opposition to Taylor's political economy of the body, private initiatives by industrialists, and the state's regulatory biopower.

EMERGENCE OF THE SOUL IN THE MACHINE

Not everyone contributing to the imagination of futures at work in management theorizing

shared the same dreams. There were signs that what for some augured a dream of efficiency for others foreshadowed a nightmare of isolated sociability, alienated being, and wasted humanity. Additionally, it became increasingly evident that it was an insufficient level of reform and innovation to be merely mechanically efficient in terms of the relation between the body and the immediate environment. Such reform, while necessary, could not be relied upon to create the desired results because the free will of the workers interceded.

Taylor's system of scientific management might have achieved efficiency, but at the cost of eroding civility. Mass production and large scale were made possible through efficiency in the division of labor, but this division had removed the social bonds that constrained individuals and now pitted them ruthlessly and relentlessly against each other in a highly competitive individualism. What was required, thought Mary Parker Follett (1918), was a reinstitution of civility, society, and fellowship in and through work and its organization if the corrosive effects of possessive individualism on the moral character of the American employee were to be halted. People needed to think not just of themselves and the individual benefit to be gained through competition at work, but how they fitted into an overall pattern of functions, responsibilities, and authoritative entitlements to command and to obey. Her views of Taylor's influence were evident in her assertion that individuality is represented best in the capacity for union between people, rather than in their non relation, which she defined as evil. In her view the potentialities of the individual remain potentialities until they are released by group life. Only through the group can men and women discover their true nature, and gain their true freedom. On this basis, she opposed the modern legal conception of the corporation as an individual fiction. She thought that corporations had the capability for "real personality" only when their members were able to interknit themselves into genuine relations, as a human group. Out of this vital union comes creative power. Or, more poetically, "We find the individual through the group, we use him always as the true individual – the undivided one – who, living link of living group, is yet never embedded in the meshes but is forever

free for every new possibility of a forever unfolding life" (Follett 1918: 295).

World War I was a fillip for the adoption of Taylorism, as jobs were deskilled for the influx of female workers as men fought in Europe. World War II saw the emergence of a trenchant critique of scientific management. Against excessive individuation Mayo (1975) pitted collaboration, his version of community. Individualism has served the nation well, he says, but only in one dimension, that of organizing for material efficiency. What it has not been able to do, even in wartime conditions, is "ensure spontaneity of cooperation" or "teamwork" (p. 9), that is, social efficiency based in the skills of individuals to cooperate with others. The ability to display a capacity for receiving "communication from others" and responding to the "attitudes and ideas of others in such a fashion as to promote congenial participation in a common task" (p. 12) has been lost because scientific management has destroyed it, creating anomie and shattering community, through "the skill required of a machine hand [having] drifted downwards; he has become more of a machine tender and less of a mechanic." All the organizing energy has been focused on developing technical skills in a more and more divided manner, while "no equivalent effort to develop social or collaborative skill has yet appeared to compensate or balance the technical development" (p. 13).

Mayo's theoretical background guided the selection of issues he was familiar with and the marginalization of the issues that did not match the theory he chose to promote. When Mayo (1933) looked at the findings from the Hawthorne Laboratory investigations he thought the results showed that employees had a strong need for shared cooperation and communication. Merely by asking for their cooperation in the test, Mayo believed the investigators had stimulated a new attitude among the employees. The assemblers considered themselves to be part of an important group whose help and advice were being sought by the company. He believed that if consultation between labor and management were instituted it would give workers a sense of belonging to a team. Here we can see the transformation produced in the modes of surveillance. A new strategy of government of the body/soul in the factory

was to be based on the construction of a sentiment of freedom (and responsibility) without any apparent surveillance (Mayo 1975: 75).

These studies changed the landscape of management from Taylor's engineering approach to the political economy of the body to a social sciences approach that focused on the interior life, the mental states, the consciousness and un-consciousness, which Follett termed the "soul" of the employees: "Coercive power is the curse of the universe; coactive power, the enrichment and advancement of every human soul" (Follett 1924: xii). Worker productivity would henceforth be interpreted predominantly in terms of patterns of culture, motivation, leadership, and human relations (Maslow 1978). The locus of expert power shifted from the engineering expert, designing the job, selecting and training the right worker, and rewarding performance, to the manager, responsible for leading, motivating, communicating, and counseling the individual employee as well as designing the social milieu in which work takes place. Human relations came to the fore, as did a concern with leadership and authority.

HUMAN RELATIONS, LEADERSHIP, AND AUTHORITY

Mayo developed what became known as the Human Relations School. The emphasis of this approach was on informal work group relations, the importance of these for sustaining the formal system, and the necessity of the formal system meshing with the informal system. In the informal system special attention was to be paid to the satisfaction of individual human needs, focusing on what motivates different people, in order to try and maximize their motivation and satisfaction. Mayo thought the manager had to be a social clinician, fostering the social skills of those with whom she or he worked. Workers who argued with their managers and supervisors were expressing deep seated neuroses lodged in their childhood history.

Chester Barnard (1938) joined forces with Mayo when he cited him to the effect that "authority depends upon a cooperative personal attitude of individuals on the one hand; and the system of communication in the organization on

the other" (p. 175). What managers should communicate are strong moral values, which it was management's duty to provide, said Barnard. Good management requires emotional work, and it is the task of the managerial elite to configure others as servants of responsible authority through guiding them, emotionally, thought Barnard, and Mayo (1975) seemed to agree with this diagnosis.

For Barnard, authority relations were not a given, but had to be worked at by managers. Authority only exists insofar as people are willing to accept it. The pervasiveness of authority can be expanded by gradually enlarging the "zone of indifference" within which compliance with orders will be perceived in neutral terms without any questioning of authority by employees. Managers should seek to extend the borders of this zone through material incentives, but more especially through providing others with status, prestige, and personal power. Communications, especially in the informal organization (which Mayo had "discovered" in his interpretation of the Hawthorne experiments), are absolutely central to decision making. Management's responsibility is to harness informal groupings and get them working for the organization, not against it. Everyone should know what the channels of communication are and should have access to formal channels of communications that should be as short and direct as possible. All of these new technologies of power should not replace the scientific management of work and organization design, but should supplement it, be added to it as new forms of persuasion. Where individuals worked with common values rather than common orders, they would work much more effectively.

In one of the most sophisticated accounts, Selznick (1957) explicitly divides the soul from the body. The organization is a corporate body, a tool or instrument rationally designed to direct human energies to a fixed goal, an expendable and limited apparatus. However, the body has a soul, something largely natural, living, and unplanned, a distinctive identity, something which Selznick identifies as an "institution." Organizational tools evolve into something infused with value and meaning, becoming soulful institutions. Or they will, if they are managed properly and there is

specificity about how to achieve such proper management. Management is the job of the elites. "Maintenance of social values depends on the autonomy of elites" (p. 8). These autonomous elites must produce that commitment and identification, that great soulful boundless leap, which makes the bodies of the employees more than a mere tool. The elites must make the individual components of the tool identify with and feel committed to the elites and their purposes. They will do this both by stimulating soulful feelings and controlling them "to produce the desired balance of forces" (p. 100).

MODERN MANAGEMENT THEORIES

In the post war era the informal organization of Mayo and his associates became fused with the stress on authority and leadership of Barnard and Selznick, and with Taylor's formal organization through the metaphor of the social system. Within this metaphor the epitome of modern rational management knowledge became the program institutionalized as contingency theory. Contingency theory developed a political edge when Child (1972) published his influential article on "strategic choice," in which he drew deeply on debates that Silverman (1970) had sparked in Britain among organization sociologists, drawing on influential sources such as Berger and Luckmann (1967) to rekindle an interpretive account of organizations. Silverman (1970) counterpoised an "action frame of reference" to the open systems contingency perspective that was by now dominant in organization analysis. His key point was that organizations were neither natural nor rational systems *per se*, but were socially constructed phenomena. Silverman was an important, but outside Britain, largely neglected early institutional theorist (Clegg 1994). The key point that Child and Silverman were making was that organizations were a result of choices, particularly by those whom Selznick (1957) had referred to as the "dominant coalition" (see Colignon 1997).

Institutional theory quickly lost its focus on power after Meyer and Rowan (1977) and DiMaggio and Powell (1983) initiated its renaissance by asking why there are so few types of organizations. Organizations, they suggested,

are not as they are for efficiency reasons (as contingency functionalist theorists had argued), but for reasons of social construction. Hence, it is the cultural stock of knowledge rather than functional necessity that determines how and why organizations are as they are. Strangely, given Weber's preeminent role as both a cultural theorist (Clegg 1995) and analyst of power and domination (Clegg 1975), these latter terms seemed somewhat underdone in the new institutionalism. As Mizruchi and Fein (1999) suggested, research programs applying DiMaggio and Powell concentrated on mimetic isomorphism while downplaying the coercive and normative. The European Aix School (Maurice et al. 1980), who had arrived at similar conclusions to those of the North American institutional scholars, conducted comparative cross national research in which they compared the organization structures of different countries, seeing the differences not only in terms of contingency factors but also as a "societal effect" (Sorge 1991): different relations of power were differently valued in different countries (Whitley 1994). The reason that different institutional structures were valued differently in different countries was because different national elites had formed around different constellations of values and interests, giving rise to quite distinct patterns of elite formation, recruitment, and reproduction. One such elite, of course, coalesces around those who produce management theories.

WHAT DO MANAGEMENT THEORIES DO?

As management theory became increasingly institutionalized, especially in business schools, it began to develop the traits that we would expect of any institutionalized body of knowledge. Rival camps with competing claims to territory emerged. Definitions of the field became contested. What was regarded as holy writ differed within each citation cartel, centered on different fulcra, whether journals, theories, or theorists. We can make a distinction between those objects theories construct through their concepts, methods, and models and the "naturally" occurring phenomena that these reflect. The latter would exist irrespective

of their theorization or non theorization as practices – what people do. Theory inhabits its own specialist realm and has its own terms. There is always a gap between theory and the practice it reflects on, which will be an effect of the social constructions, conventions, and grammars of analysis within which translation between them is made. Translations from practice to theory that achieve systematicity and institutionalization can become objects of analysis in their own right, creating their own truths. Theories of management are just these sorts of translations. The important question, however, is not so much to identify what it is that they construct as *true* (on this one should, properly, be agnostic rather than faithful), but to inquire what are the *functions* of the truths that they posit? What is important is to analyze the machinery of truth production. Truth claims that are granted and respected perform an essential function in ordering membership and normalcy in the social contexts in which they pertain, such as business schools and other organizations. They specify the conditions of existence for possibilities and impossibilities; they legitimate relations of domination and subordination. In this sense, what is (taken to be) true is a social fact, as Durkheim (1983: 67) puts it. Haugaard (1997: 69) suggests that those who benefit from extant machineries of truth production will be least keen to see its mechanisms exposed. Truth is typically taken to be that knowledge indubitably standing as provisional after exposure to robust skeptical procedures of conjecture and refutation (Popper 1965). Thus, the essence of science is to be protected from power at all costs. The most current accounts of management clearly serve dominant power interests and relations in ways that are only too self evidently reminiscent of the earlier concerns with the mind and soul.

CURRENT FADS

The last 25 years have witnessed an explosion of management initiatives. Replete with their careful styling and image intensity such initiatives are now widely characterized as management fashions. Examples of management fashion over the last decade or so include Total Quality Management, Downsizing, Business

Process Re Engineering, Enterprise Resource Planning, Knowledge Management, and Shareholder Value. These initiatives do not emerge from a vacuum. The genesis of the bulk of these ideas, as writers such as Abrahamson have pointed out, rests with the “management ideas industry.” A loose but very powerful actor network of large accounting firms, management consultancies, management gurus, information technology firms, self styled world class companies, and business schools drives the creation of new management fashion. Tightly coupled to the managers they seek as clients, management fashions are carefully market tested to gauge managerial anxiety. The resulting fashion, by anticipating and offering solutions to managerial problems, succeeds in capturing the corporate zeitgeist. If the management ideas industry captures the supply side of the industry, it is management who are the consumers. The literature is split between those that imply that managers following fashion are to be looked down upon (Abrahamson 1997; Scarbrough & Swan 2001), to others for whom adorning one’s organization with the latest fashion possesses more positive connotations (Czarniawska & Sevón 2006).

In current approaches the ordinary knowledge of ordinary people is regarded as a neglected resource that managers must access, use, and make routine. They will do this through the simple strategies of building social capital (brought into focus primarily through the work of Putnam 1993, 1995) and through the use of those coactive power strategies that Mary Parker Follett had recommended for building such capital all those years ago. Once social capital has been identified, then new routines can be constructed. Social capital takes care of the coactivity while knowledge management will structure the new routines. It is tempting to see the former as a continuation of the concern with the moral economy and the latter as a simple extension of scientific management – to incorporate the mind as well as the body and soul of the employee. We explore this proposition in what follows.

Social capital is defined as “the sum of actual and potential resources embedded within, available through, and derived from the network of relationships possessed by an individual or social unit” (Nahapiet & Ghoshal 1998). Firms are “understood as a social community

specializing in the speed and efficiency in the creation and transfer of knowledge” (Kogut & Zander 1996). Organizations, designed to bring people together for task completion, supervision, and coordination, result in frequent and dense levels of social contacts, creating coactive power in Follett’s terms. Social capital, as Follett realized, makes it possible for ends to be achieved that, in its absence, could otherwise only be achieved at additional cost.

The social capital concept privileges the worker as a “knowledge worker” with embrained rather than embodied knowledge (Blackler 1995). Such employees are potentially mobile and can go to another employer; thus, they must be kept loyal by avoidance of coercion (which, much as the use of tight contracts, destroys trust) and by use of soft power (on power and trust relations, see Fox 1974). Trust and control can be viewed as structures of interrelated situated practices that influence the development of different forms of expert power in particular organizational contexts. In this view, trust and control relations are generative mechanisms that play a role in the production, reproduction, and transformation of expert power. Trust is based on predictability of behavior, where some type of control or self control mechanism influences such predictability.

Trust and control are closely associated (Maguire et al. 2001; Reed 2001). Many organizations attempt to “manage” trust as a means of control (Knights et al. 2001). Maguire et al. (2001) have suggested several ways in which this happens, including actively manipulating the employee using rewards, acquiring information about the employee and thus rendering him or her more predictable and hence controllable, and active manipulation of the goodwill of the employee by increasing his or her identification with the organization. The rhetoric of “trust” often sits uncomfortably in the context of all the routines constituting a “low trust” workplace of design of technologies and of work by standardized procedures. Contemporary labor process studies carried out or reviewed by Thompson and Ackroyd (1995, 1999) and Thompson and Warhurst (1998) suggest that we need to untangle the managerial rhetoric and intention from the realities of the situation.

Knowledge management is another new idea with deep roots that go back to Taylor and

scientific management. Two aspects of knowledge management are relevant here. First, there is the treatment of knowledge as a commodity, through the mechanization and objectification of knowledge creation, diffusion, and storage. Treated this way it increases management’s sense of control. Second, there is soft domination of the knowledge worker by identification based control. The highest degree of trust is when the person completely identifies with the organization, in which case their self image is aligned with managerially determined objectives (Alvesson & Willmott 2002). What knowledge management seeks to do is to draw from the tacit knowledge of individuals and the social capital of the group to construct new and improved routines. The thrust of scientific management and the many subsequent clones spawned from its political economy, such as knowledge management, was that routines produce increased efficiency where the correspondence between relations of knowledge is closed, where the worker does exactly what the scientific manager prescribes. Taylor and his heirs sought to make workers functionaries of knowledge relations defined externally to the “being there” of the workers. Yet, paradoxically, as the Hawthorne studies first revealed, efficiency is determined by the extent to which individual knowledge and expertise is accessed and utilized (Grant 1996a).

In knowledge management efficiency is based on common knowledge as a prerequisite to the communication of direction and routine. Translating specialist information depends on the sophistication and level of common knowledge. Second, the frequency and variability of task performance changes the efficiency of knowledge integration (Nelson & Winter 1982). The efficiency of comprehending and responding appropriately among employees involved in tasks is a function of frequency of task performance. Third, organizational structure that reduces the extent and intensity of communication to achieve integration assists efficiency and to do this the employee has to be integrated into the enterprise as an obedient rather than resistant subject. Knowledge management grows out of the cross-pollination of scientific management and human relations theory to make obedient subjects creative.

Knowledge management is an instrument producing new routines that result from acquiring and distilling knowledge of tacit experiences and action that is embedded in social and institutional practice (Brown & Duguid 1991). Individual public performances draw on private parts of the self – the soul in Follett’s terms – in interactions (Nelson & Winter 1982). Thus, as recent theory has it, “the primary role of the firm is in integrating specialist knowledge resident in individuals into goods and services” (Grant 1996b). Knowledge management institutes what Garrick and Clegg (2000) referred to as an “organizational gothic” at the heart of organizational life, a capacity to suck the vitality from the individual body and soul in order to enhance the vitality of the corporate body for increased efficiency and reduced costs, through greater coercive power. The secret is in extracting creativity from the individual through the use of coercive power and instilling it into the body corporate, where the body corporate retains its vitality by sucking out the vitality of those members that compose it. The allusion to Dracula is intended; the practice seems as gothic as any Hammer horror movie.

Individuals share uniquely held knowledge on the basis of what is held in common among them. Common knowledge refers to the “common cognitive ground” among employees that facilitates knowledge transfer through promoting dialogue and communication (what Nonaka and Takeuchi (1995) term redundancy). Redundancy creates an intentional overlap of information held by employees that facilitates transferring and integrating explicit and tacit knowledge. Knowledge about elements not directly related to immediate operational requirements that arises from images in tacit knowledge can be shared through redundant information about business activities, management responsibilities, the company, products, and services. Competitive, individuated, relations of power make this knowledge difficult to surface. Coercive power leads to zero sum games, win/lose scenarios, power/resistance, and resource dependency, which creates power effects more akin to rape than seduction, as Stokes and Clegg (2002) argue. The rape and seduction analogy suggests that seduction would seek to elicit expert knowing representing a rich and anchored context, whereas rape absconds with the partial

acquisition of knowledge without context, and thus, lacking situated meaning, promotes only a wrenching of something unwillingly given. That is why the projects of knowledge management and social capital are seeking to become aligned. First, use coercive power to seduce knowledge that can become the basis for the new routines. Then, when the new routines are established they take on a coercive power of their own, as individuals can be held accountable to them.

CONCLUSION

In some respects, early management theorists were situated too close to its practice to reflect overly on its theory. These early texts were embedded, precisely, in the strategies for making sense of management that the pioneers forged and the managerial techniques they advocated. The political and moral economy of the body, and the emergence of a concern with the soul of the employee, did not enter greatly into subsequent accounts. Management became ever more abstracted and sophisticated in its use of metaphors drawn from contingency and system theory, yet it still struggled with the obdurate *matériel* of the human subject at its base. Overwhelmingly, its tendency has been to rationalize and routinize this obduracy through designing systems that reduce the capacity for human inventiveness, creativity, and innovation of those within the systems designed, as Ritzer’s (2005) work on McDonaldization suggests. It is through this prism that we should see the latest trends in management thinking, such as knowledge management. While the actors in the system are occasionally noted, their creativity is more often demoted, incorporated, or excluded. As Fairtlough (2006) has noted, tellingly, this is hardly the most effective way of getting many things done.

SEE ALSO: Industrial Relations; Knowledge Management; Labor Process; Management Consultants; Management Discourse; Management Education; Management Fashion; Management History; Management Improvisation; Management Innovation; Management Networks; Management Theory; Management, Workers’ Participation in; Top Management Teams

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management consultants

Robin Fincham

Interest in management consultants, in popular management media and academic study, has expanded enormously in the past decade, reflecting the growth of consultancy and increasing numbers of managers who experience working with consultants. The emergence of consulting as a growth industry has links with many modern conditions. Trends like the service economy, increasing “marketization” of sectors, and the development of new organizational and corporate structures have created huge demand for the expertise of “outsider” groups like consultants.

But as well as the economic significance of consulting, a range of cultural and symbolic factors has meant the management consultant has become a figure of special interest or even fascination. Consultants have been linked with sociological themes of “insidious power” that define modern corporate life. They are pictured as hidden persuaders and as possessing unaccountable influence (O’Shea & Madigan 1997; Pinault 2000). Consultants are also associated with the celebrity managers and “gurus” who shape current managerial thought and management “fashion” (Sahlin Andersson & Engwall 2002a).

Producing a clear definition of management consultants is not easy. Traditional professions tend to be defined in terms of the expert knowledge they possess. Identifying the body of knowledge effectively solves most problems of definition – we know who is a member of the profession (those who have acquired that knowledge) and what the professional does (dispenses knowledge to clients and customers).

However, management consultants have no such accepted expertise. That is not to say they have no useful knowledge. But the activity of “consulting” is not characterized by the kind of well defined, abstract knowledge that Abbott, for example, suggested lies at the heart of professional occupations.

Neither is consulting a discrete occupation or set of activities – it is a cluster of many occupations. A purist definition of management consulting might confine itself to that of the “advice giver,” in the sense that to “consult” an outside expert means seeking advice about a particular managerial problem. Early models of consulting developed a view of the consultant as “professional helper” (Schein 1969; Argyris 1970). However, the modern consultant supplies much more than merely business “advice.” Consultants offer a vast range of services in specialist areas like finance and information systems, as well as in core management areas such as strategy and decision making.

Many of these problems of definition reflect the links between management consultancy and patterns of *change*. While typical professional occupations are defined by a degree of stability and continuity in their knowledge base, consultancy is characterized by the exact opposite. The continually changing nature of consultancy more or less defies attempts to define its boundaries and some unique set of tasks. No sooner does one settle on some notion of what constitutes consultancy than a raft of new activities, ideas, and techniques emerge that transform our view. Indeed, much of the current interest in management consulting is bound up with the significance of “change” in organizations and the manner in which consultants trade on this. Traditionally, the managerial task was often defined in terms of the uncertainties lying at the heart of management. Yet in recent times uncertainty, insecurity, and change have become the driving concepts of organizational life. Change at the level required in many organizations has meant increased dependence on outside expertise, while “change management” has become almost a specialist skill delegated to the outside expert.

The origins of management consulting can be traced to the “efficiency movements” in the US and subsequently Britain and Europe. These followed the early impact of F. W. Taylor

and the more studied and “theorized” approach to management he introduced. (Taylor, who pioneered so much else in management studies, can also be seen as the father of management consulting.) For many years consultancy developed not exactly as a cottage industry, but certainly relatively slowly through sectoral mergers and organic growth. New activities of strategy consulting and organizational development were added to industrial engineering, and a group of founding firms grew in size, employing often several hundreds of professional staff and steadily expanding overseas.

However, the 1980s brought a sharp discontinuity in this pattern. The global accounting firms, such as PriceWaterhouse Cooper, Ernst & Young, and Deloitte, moved into management consulting while much larger scale activities such as systems implementation and change programs fed the new growth, and firms operated on an increasingly international scale. Now management consulting has to be seen as part of a powerful and dynamic business services industry that includes the global accounting and law firms and the IT/systems giants. In 1980, consulting revenues worldwide stood at around \$3 billion, which grew to as much as \$60 billion by 1999, reflecting the “double digit growth” the industry was famous for in these years. Explosive growth has stuttered since the millennium, in common with other business services, but has steadied and was estimated at just under \$125 billion in 2004 (Kennedy Information 2004).

In light of the above, Kipping (2002) argues that changes in the management consulting industry fit a series of “waves” of development. In each wave, new forms of competitive advantage emerge, while the preeminent consulting firms are those which capture the new areas of business. Thus, in the first scientific management wave, shopfloor efficiency and industrial engineering represented the central client interest. This gave way to a strategy and organization phase that focused on core decision making issues, and in which famous firms like McKinsey, Booz Allen, and the Boston Group emerged. Finally, in the current phase, IT networks and enterprise wide planning are the global standards of best practice, and huge systems firms like IBM and Capgemini have begun to dominate the consulting field.

This historical framework makes an important theoretical distinction: the shape of the consulting industry reflects its relationship to and dependence on the central problems and institutions of management, while the dynamics of the client–consultant relationship are the driving force behind change in global consulting.

In terms of approaches to the topic, a large consulting literature goes back certainly as far as the 1950s. Mostly concerned with defining effective consultant techniques, and often authored by consultants themselves, this has been seen as heavily prescriptive and lacking any independent view of consulting (Clark & Salaman 1995). More recently, an alternative literature has emerged with links to the wider field of critical studies of management knowledge. Rather than accept the functionalist assumption that clients must be receiving a valuable service (otherwise why would they pay huge fees to consultants, and why would the industry have grown so fast?), a number of more critical sociological themes have been explored. These have problematized the construction of management knowledge and how consultancy itself is achieved and legitimized.

Early seminal studies emphasized the uncertainties and ambiguity surrounding the consulting “service” and the room this gives the consultant to manage impressions. For example, Clark (1995) coupled this basic observation with a dramaturgical metaphor. The consultant was seen as a kind of performer who defines social reality for the client as audience; given the ambiguities of the consultant role, there is “scope to construct a reality which persuades clients that they have purchased a valuable and high quality service” (p. 18). Similarly, Starbuck (1992) argued that, because clients are unable to judge the quality of the advice or solution, they rely on “symbols of expertise” such as the consultant’s reputation and use of impressive techniques. And Alvesson (1993) likewise stressed the ambiguous nature of knowledge intensive work and consultancies as “systems of persuasion.”

In this vein, the symbolic nature of consultancy work and, in particular, the *rhetorical* aspects of its discourse have also been explored. The persuasive nature of the ideas employed and solutions proposed are seen as meeting

managerial needs for reassurance in an uncertain world. Themes of rationality and control, threats of failure allied with promises of success, and the achievement of transcendent managerial goals have all been detected in consultant discourse (e.g., Bloomfield & Danieli 1995; Kieser 1997; Jackson 1999).

However, the critical perspective is not without its own tensions, and others have argued that the emphasis on consultants’ persuasive powers almost assumes them to be omnipotent, and managers dupes. Sturdy (1997), for example, has emphasized instead the interactive nature of the client–consultant relation and consultancy itself as an “insecure business.” Also Fincham (1999) has suggested the client–consultant relation is a type of contingent market relation that depends on the corporate power and knowledge base of the client organization and consultancy.

A second broad theme of the critical approach involves the role of consultants in the dissemination of “fashionable” management ideas. In a sense, management consultants are a secondary element in this literature – the formation of new knowledge itself is the focus – but among the various agents of management fashion consultants are key figures. Notably, Abrahamson has stressed the role of “fashion setters” who “attempt to convince fashion followers that a management technique is both rational and at the forefront of managerial progress” (1996: 267). In this crowded marketplace, fashion setters compete in their efforts to convince managers and increase the potential of particular ideas to become mass fashions. Sahlin Andersson and Engwall (2002a) have also stressed new forms of transient knowledge as increasingly dominant forces in corporate life. In the model these researchers develop, the “carriers” of knowledge are the intermediaries who specialize in ideas generation (consultants, gurus, journalists, academics) as well as high profile managers. Any internal barriers in this “self sustaining and self enforcing system” (p. 7) blur into a central “field” of practice within which management knowledge is constructed and expanded.

In terms of methodological issues and future research directions, because the critical study of management consultants is not much more than

a decade old, advances in methods and what remains to be done stand out fairly clearly. Early studies tended to be either modest empirically (e.g., limited interviews with consultants, or attendance at consultant “events”) or they analyzed consultant ideas and rhetoric from documentary material (bestselling guru books were a favorite source). The reliance on relatively “easy” empirical sources reflected the difficulty of researching the client–consultant relationship and sensitivities about granting access to ongoing projects. In this sense, the current challenge for research is to focus on “live” relationships, as well as following through some of the themes mentioned above – defining the substantive nature of “consultant knowledge” and encapsulating the contingent and varied nature of consultancy work.

SEE ALSO: Change Management; Management; Management Education; Management Fashion; Management Theory; Professions, Organized

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management discourse

Carl Rhodes

Management discourse commonly refers to the institutionalized ways that the management and organization of work are understood through language. The term discourse suggests that the culturally embedded linguistic patterns that people use to speak and write about management

influence the possibilities for management action and decision making. Here words are not seen as being in opposition to action or practice, but rather it is through language that meaning is constructed and that the possibilities of practice emerge from that meaning. Studies of discourse examine how management knowledge develops in relation to the way that it is instantiated through particular uses of language in practice, and the way that such uses of language are informed by socially available and/or dominant ways of understanding.

While the explicit focus on management discourse emerged in the management and organization studies literature from the early 1990s, earlier attention to it can be traced back to ethnomethodological studies in the 1970s (e.g., Clegg 1975; Silverman & Jones 1976). Such studies sought to establish the relationship between the “language games” in organizations and the material conditions that were produced by the practices of management. The more recent growth of interest in management discourse can be attributed to two developments. The first is the economic and political changes associated with neoliberalism in the way that management is understood and practiced. The second is a more general shift in the social sciences through what is widely referred to as the “linguistic turn.”

The growth in popularity of discourse emerged in response to social, political, and economic changes since the 1980s. In particular, the turn toward neoliberal forms of governance that privilege the market as the main means of regulating economic affairs is said to have had a broad influence on management toward an entrepreneurial and post bureaucratic model. It has been argued that the forms of language used to talk about management have changed so as to privilege particular meanings, practices, and identities that are said to support contemporary capitalism. Management discourse is interested in understanding these changes. Key aspects of this discourse are said to be a focus on normative control, entrepreneurship, and the alignment of the interests of labor and capital as they are embodied in particular management practices such as human resource management, strategy, organizational culture management, and leadership. As Deetz (1992) suggests, management discourse turns attention to the manner in which

particular ways of understanding the world become naturalized such that their politics remains largely invisible. On this basis, management discourse is not just interested in what people say about management, but is focused on how those things that are said relate to the dominant ways of understanding and doing management.

With respect to the “linguistic turn,” an increasing number of researchers and theorists have examined how language is related to historically and socially contextualized ways of understanding the world and how this is in turn related to the situated existence of individual people (Deetz 2003). This broad shift in methodological and theoretical focus brought issues of language and discourse more to the center stage of the study of society in general, and the study of management in particular. While this included direct extensions of the earlier ethnomethodological work (e.g., Boden 1994), discourse now takes on a broader set of interests focused not just on talk that goes on in organizations, but on the way that organizations are socially constructed through discourse (Grant et al. 2004).

It is noteworthy that the methods and theories associated with the term management discourse are very broad and potentially incommensurable. Differences in focus can range from studies of conversation, dialogue, narrative, stories, rhetoric, and tropes and can employ methodologies such as conversation analysis, speech act theory, interaction analysis, pragmatics, sociolinguistics, social semiotics, critical discourse analysis, critical theory, and deconstructionism (Grant et al. 2004). Despite this breadth, the most common threads that unite the differences in management and organizational discourse are a concern with power and identity; power in the sense that discourse creates regularities in organizational practice that create inequities, and identity in the sense that it is created and negotiated in relation to discourse (Iedema 2003). Each of these is reviewed below.

Given that management discourse is socially contextualized, it is possible to identify dominant discourses as they relate to particular historical periods. Barley and Kunda (1992) have identified five major discourses that have emerged and become widely diffused since the late nineteenth century. These are industrial

betterment (1870–1900), scientific management (1900–23), welfare capitalism and human relations (1923–55), systems rationalism (1955–80), and organizational culture (1980–present). A key focus of studies in management discourse is on the most recent of these discourses as it relates to practices such as business process reengineering, organizational culture, and quality management. Commonly this is done as a means of developing a critique of management discourse as being beholden to contemporary market capitalism such that broader issues such as social responsibility, justice, and ethics are marginalized. This focus on management discourse problematizes the way that power is related to management as the established patterns of discourse are argued to influence what can and cannot be said about management and thus exert control about what is both included and excluded from managerial agendas. What is also highlighted, however, is that although particular discourses might be more dominant than others, in any organization there are a multiplicity of discourses at play and which vie for authority. Further, the practice of management can involve resistance to dominant discourses.

An important aspect of the growth of interest in contemporary management discourse is the way that it relates to the construction of what Gee et al. (1996) call a *new work order* – an ideal work culture characterized by collaboration, communication, trust, and openness as manifested in “visionary leadership” and “core values.” Such discourse attempts to construct a life world for people at work that influences more and more aspects of their lives (Casey 1995). In such organizations, managerial control can be coupled with a discourse associated with teamwork, quality consciousness, flexibility, quality circles, and learning organizations, in order to bring together the aspirations of individual employees and the commercial objectives of corporations (Chan 2000). In such discourse, the archetypes for the late modern organizations run by such managers are ones where loyalty, favoritism, informality, and non legality are emphasized over hierarchical compliance; technical training is replaced by loyalty, style, and organizational fit; fixed salaries are replaced by performance pay; and rules are replaced by discretionary behavior (Gephardt 1996).

The study of management discourse has also been concerned with the way that contemporary forms of organizational governance relate to the identity of workers. In this sense, discourse relates not just to talk about management, but also to the possibilities of what it means to be a particular type of person at work – be it a manager or worker. In this sense, discourse is taken to be the main way that people create their social reality at work and is studied in terms of how it frames their identity – it is both the expression and construction of what management and organization means (Mumby & Clair 1997). As du Gay (1994) points out, the range of management discourses that have held sway through the twentieth century – such as scientific management, human relations, and quality of working life – constructs the category of person known as the *manager* differently. In contemporary management discourse, du Gay (1996) argues that management privileges “enterprising selves” who should derive personal satisfaction and self fulfillment from work while undertaking activities that support organizationally sanctioned goals such as profitability and competitiveness. In such a way, management discourse conflates the notions of being a better worker with that of being a better person.

The focus in management discourse of relating the identity of the worker to the achievement of organizational goals has also been associated with the idea of corporate culture. It has been that corporate culture programs see people at work being pressured to incorporate managerial discourses into narratives of self identity (Alvesson & Willmott 2002: 622). In this sense identity is seen as an organizational and economic resource that can be manipulated in order to achieve organizationally sanctioned goals. Management discourse not only suggests what managers should do, but also contains exemplars of what types of people are most valued at work. Discourse thus enacts control by privileging and rewarding particular identity positions against which the conduct of real people can be judged (ten Bos & Rhodes 2003). By attending to these dominant identity positions, researchers can identify the identity pressures that people at work are subject to through discourse as well as examining the

extent to which people capitulate to them or are resistant to them.

Although approaches to studying management discourse are broad and can differ from one another significantly, a key contribution has been a detailed consideration of the relationship between management practice and the organization of language. Given that, in managerial work, any form of "action" largely involves language and communication, this has enabled organization theory to understand and theorize the relations between discourse and management with a particular focus on power and identity.

SEE ALSO: Conversation Analysis; Culture, Organizations and; Discourse; Management; Management Fashion; Management Theory; Neoliberalism; Organization Theory

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management education

Andrew Sturdy

Something like 25 percent of US university students currently major in business or management, and in the UK, 30 percent of undergraduates study some management. Elsewhere, business and management education is expanding its scope. A Chinese government minister is said to have recently called for a million MBA (Master of Business Administration) graduates to help fuel the national economy. Such penetration and expansion in higher education systems and other educational domains have prompted considerable comment and sociological research activity. The latter has often come from outside sociology departments, in schools of management and education, for example. While a number of concerns reflect more general educational issues such as pedagogy, vocationalism, and the social role of the university or academy, key areas of attention and debate are focused around core sociological issues: globalization, commodification, and professionalization.

Typically, management education is associated with the activities of business and

management schools, mostly within universities, and the hallmark qualification of the MBA and related executive education. Here, a whole range of topics is taught, mostly linked to management functions (e.g., personnel/human resource management; finance and accounting; marketing, strategy; production and operations), and often with their own relevant core disciplines (e.g., psychology, math, economics, engineering, and sociology). However, it is important to point out not only the management education of university students majoring in other subjects, but also the activities of other educational institutions, including semi professional associations and schools, where management is a comparatively recent subject on the formal curriculum. In addition, the mass media serves as a conduit for management being “self taught,” especially through books written by so called management gurus. Indeed, arguably, the latter are more influential than formal education, certainly in promoting particular approaches to managing people and organizations. Peters and Waterman’s *In Search of Excellence*, for example, sold millions of copies worldwide.

Considerable attention has been given to the history, development, and geographical spread of management education, notably through the work of Robert Locke. As management emerged as a separate activity, elite, and ideology, it was initially aligned with engineering/scientific management (and accounting/finance) and then, following the Hawthorne studies, with a more “sociological” approach, human relations, as large organizations with extensive supervisory hierarchies emerged in the US. The latter development in particular is associated with the expansion of the early US business schools (e.g., Wharton and Harvard, both formed pre World War I), although most expansion followed World War II. These schools were to fuel and symbolically represent an emerging cadre of formally educated managers and consultants, although numerically, most education was carried out in various colleges or trade schools and existing (e.g., accounting) and emerging (e.g., personnel) professional associations.

Formal management education in business schools remained largely concentrated in the US for some time, although US based practices (e.g., the assembly line) were promoted in other ways. For example, the post war economic

growth of Germany and Japan occurred in the absence of comparable educational approaches and qualifications. However, this period, often in parallel with the Marshall Aid program and more general influence of US based multinationals, saw the establishment of some US style business schools in Western Europe (e.g., INSEAD in France and Manchester and London Business Schools in the UK). While educational institutions remained, and continue to be, largely distinctive, university based management education and the MBA have both grown enormously outside the US in the last 20 years. In the UK, for example, there are over 100 business schools. Some of these, along with US and Australian schools especially, have actively recruited overseas students, especially from fast growing Asian economies, where they have also set up or partnered campuses and qualifications. This development continues, accelerated by distance learning and, in particular, “e learning,” although increasingly, it is only a minority of mostly US institutions whose MBA carries significant prestige.

This geographical expansion of management education and its particular approach/content have been subjected to sociological critique over Americanization or neo imperialism, if not globalization. Here, arguments vary between seeing the spread of the MBA and business schools as marking a standardization of management education or that cultural and institutional systems are more or less resilient to such developments, despite superficial appearances of increasing commonality. The latter position might point to examples of how management ideas, techniques, and educational media have been adapted to existing cultural practices and institutional conditions such as prevailing value systems or economic structures. At the same time, the nature of that standard as offering a largely positivist, managerialist, masculinist, and ethnocentric view of work and organizations has been critiqued from opposing positions.

The expansion of management education and its demand combined with a more neoliberal and managerial approach to education and its funding has also led to liberal and humanist critiques over the commodification of knowledge and qualifications. Here, at the extreme, education is seen as no longer for its own sake, or even to develop useful skills, but as

an income generator for student and university alike. The MBA has become probably the most widely recognized, if not always valued, qualification which can readily transcend national and sector boundaries. Although not restricted to management, this has seen the reconstitution of students into consumers, with shifts in student–teacher relations and mixed outcomes for those involved and excluded. For example, although assessment of students clearly exposes the lie of “sovereign” consumer power, reliance on fee income means that staff teaching evaluations and the provision of executive facilities combined with the maintenance of the institutional “brand” and league table positions become “educational” imperatives. This shift has also seen the increasing involvement of corporations in management education, not as sponsors of students or research but as producers, outsourcers, and consumers. In particular, some companies are setting up their own “corporate universities” while others are commissioning tailor made MBAs.

Such developments connect with longstanding debates over management education as an ideological or professional project and thence to issues of power/privilege, control, and exclusion. This is, of course, intimately connected to various perspectives on management knowledge. There are three main views. Firstly, management knowledge is a universally applicable and testable science where there is a “one best way” of managing which varies with circumstances or change, such as increasing complexity or organizational size. Secondly, management emerged as a way of appropriating workplace control from labor, most evidently through scientific management, in order to secure profit – managers as agents of capital. Management knowledge and education then continue to develop in order to counter the associated resistance to control. Thus, they serve an ideological purpose in justifying and explaining how work is managed and the fact that it is done so by a particular elite group. This relates to the third, institutional, view put forward by Shenav, who argues that it was neither efficiency nor control imperatives *alone* that account for the rise of management, but the activities of engineers, “a new class of salaried technocrats – wishing to carve out their own domain within industrial organizations” (1999: 9). This

observation points to the start of attempts to professionalize management and its functional specialisms through education which continues today.

As in other and sometimes related and competing fields such as accounting, a core element of professionalization is the establishment of a body of technical knowledge which is deemed as necessary and to which access is limited through the regulatory practices of an independent association such as examination. This is evident in the early activities of engineers to establish management as a scientific endeavor and to form various professional bodies. Likewise, human relations and subsequently, industrial psychology formed the basis of the “science” of people management and spawned associations such as the Institute of Personnel Management (now the Chartered Institute of Personnel and Development) in the UK. However, a core tension necessarily lies between the role and identities of managers as experts or employees/agents – cosmopolitans or locals. Overall, the power of employers has prevented the kind of professionalization which occurred in earlier eras in law and medicine, for example. Alongside this is the academic status of the knowledge and the role of universities and business schools. In the 1950s, for instance, the Ford and Carnegie Reports in the US called for business schools to become less like trade schools and more academic. This helped fuel the subsequent growth of mostly positivistic management research and journals, symbols of academic respectability, and a gradual, if still incomplete, acceptance of management within university departments. For example, it is only comparatively recently that the traditional academic institutions of Oxford and Cambridge universities in the UK have established mainstream business schools, although aspects of management have been part of engineering curricula for some time.

While it is probably only a minority of university management departments that aspire to an academic research based identity or are resourced to do so, recent debates focus on the extent to which this may be under threat. There are a number of developments, in the West at least, which relate to the more enduring themes of the purpose and beneficiaries of education, universities, and management education. Firstly

and following on from consumerist trends, there are calls from students, managerial commentators, employers, and government agencies for a more applied, practical, integrative, and less analytical, (sub)disciplinary and critical approach, what has come to be known as “mode 2” knowledge. The assumption here is that management education should simply provide techniques for managers to manage (i.e., management training), perhaps at the expense of more liberal and pluralistic concerns with reflection and inclusivity. However, some see the issue in terms of currently popular approaches to knowledge and learning as embedded in practice rather than in the classroom (e.g., Mintzberg’s recent book, *Managers Not MBAs*).

Indeed, more generally, knowledge and learning have become partially displaced from formal educational spaces and seen as central to governmental and corporate policy for improved competitiveness – the knowledge economy and learning organizations, for example. Moreover, given rhetorical claims made about the relative pace of organizational and social change, such knowledge is regarded as being in flux. In the context of management, emphasis is placed on increasingly dominant discourses of leadership, entrepreneurship, innovation, and continuous learning as opposed to learning a core and relatively stable body of knowledge, conceptual frameworks, and models. Indeed, and further challenging the traditional professional project of rendering knowledge specialist, abstract, and exclusive/excluding, management discourse is permeating different realms of people’s “private” lives such as personal health and relationships. This does not so much democratize management, in terms of access to positions of privilege, as normalize it as a largely rationalist and instrumental orientation to the world. Such insights emerge from another, contrasting, and less audible source of critique of contemporary management education, that of “critical management studies,” which draws on diverse critical social theories such as Marxism, feminism, postmodernism, postcolonialism, and queer theory. Together, although largely marginal(ized) from mainstream research, this points to the centrality of power, inequality, and exclusion within the practice and pedagogy of management education, its institutions and effects.

Management education research is not, of course, an exclusively sociological domain. In terms of everyday educational practice, it remains dominated by largely depoliticized (social) psychological concerns with learning. Both here and in more sociological studies, emphasis remains close to home, on the university, business school, and related institutions. Other educational spaces are largely lost within technicist concerns over training effectiveness or broader non management specific educational issues. While institutional approaches sometimes point to a variety of (e.g., national) structures and locations of management education and its elites, there is considerable scope for extending research to other domains and actors, not least because of the broad reach of management discourse and formal education. Here, traditional sociological concerns with school education and social structure might be reexplored as well as relatively new fields such as educational media corporations and industries. Finally, most management education research is written from the perspectives of western management academics. This might be usefully complemented by the voices of other (e.g., educational) sociologists and those from different geographical spaces and management traditions.

SEE ALSO: Democracy and Organizations; Education and Economy; Labor Process; Management; Management Consultants; Management Discourse; Management History

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management fashion

Chris Carter and Stewart Clegg

One of the striking features of the organizational world in the last 30 years has been the rise and fall of a dazzling array of management initiatives. Typically originating in the US, such ideas have spread across the industrialized world (Czarniawska & Sevón 1996). The raft of initiatives includes Total Quality Management (TQM), Business Process Re Engineering (BPR), Culture Change, the Learning Organization, Knowledge Management (KM), Shareholder Value (SHV), and Enterprise Resource Planning (ERP). Of course, at least since the advent of Taylorism there have been management initiatives that have been widely appropriated. A key difference between earlier diffusions and now is the emergence of a powerful actor network that actively packages and commodifies management initiatives as products based on a 3–5 year life cycle.

Wilson (1992) noted the emergence of a phenomenon he termed “programmed change initiatives,” which were management change initiatives that styled themselves as being portable across sectors and nations. In a sense it was a return to Taylorist notions of the “One Best Way,” as such initiatives were deemed by their promoters as constituting superior modes of organizing. Similarly, Pascale demonstrated there has been an exponential take off in management initiatives from the 1980s onwards and more recent analyses have highlighted that this has continued unabated (Kieser 1997; Swan & Scarborough 2001). This has given rise to a body of literature that seeks to understand such initiatives as management fashions, defined as “a relatively transitory collective belief, disseminated by management knowledge entrepreneurs, that a management technique leads to rational management progress” (Abrahamson & Eisenman, 2001).

Much of the literature on fashion owes a heavy debt to new institutional theory, the difference being that in most cases the fashions prove ephemeral rather than enduring. The key theorist of management fashion from a new institutional perspective is Abrahamson, who has penned a number of pathbreaking articles

(Abrahamson 1991, 1996; Abrahamson & Fairchild 1999). His chief contribution has been to theorize the management ideas industry and its role in producing fashion. His central argument is that a loose coalition of “world class companies,” management gurus, business schools, large consultancies, and IT firms constitutes the supply side of an industry that produces and commodifies fashions. Taken together, this amounts to an actor network that has successfully packaged and commoditized managerial initiatives. These models of “best practice” have been disseminated throughout the organizational world. We argue that this has been profoundly important in terms of creating blueprints of what organizations “should” look like. Collectively, the key players of the management ideas industry have helped produce management fashions.

Little is left to chance by this industry, with ideas being carefully market researched to find whether they resonant with managerial anxieties of the zeitgeist. A management fashion – new ideas or in some cases old ideas that have been rediscovered – contains both an aesthetic and a technical dimension. The aesthetic dimension makes a robust argument in an “attempt to convince fashion followers that a management technique is both rational and at the forefront of managerial progress” (Abrahamson 1996). The new technique will be backed up by war stories that confirm its effectiveness and statistics demonstrating its worth to the organization. The careful image intensive styling and well crafted success stories and plausible philosophical rationale for the adoption of such a technique constitute a rhetoric intensive manifesto of action for organizations. The technical dimension of a fashion includes a number of tools and techniques that can be used to perform a particular initiative. For TQM this included brainstorming, process mapping techniques, cause and effect diagrams, and so forth. The overarching characteristic of an initiative is that it is imperative for the success and indeed survival of the organization. A management fashion often exhibits considerable ambiguity. This lack of clarity makes it more portable across a range of different organizational contexts. For instance, for some organizations Total Quality Management came to be about developmental cultural change, while for others it was about

stringent statistical checks on a range of processes.

Abrahamson argues that a fashion is likely to exhibit a bell shaped demand curve. Such management initiatives have typically followed the life cycle of a fashion, moving from being “haute couture” and the preserve of exclusive pioneers through to being “pret a porter” (Mazza & Alvarez 2000) where the initiative has achieved mass market penetration before gradually disappearing. Abrahamson & Rosenkopf (1993) analyze “bandwagon effects,” which are diffusion processes whereby an adopter takes on an innovation simply because of the sheer number of adoptions that have already taken place. In a further development of fashion theory, Abrahamson & Fairchild (1999) propose an “evolutionary theory of institutions,” focused on the population level, which puts forward stages of variation, selection, and retention, or alternatively, rejection. Bandwagon effects can create self reinforcing loops in that legitimating effects are due to the *number* of adopters.

Abrahamsonesque style research identifies management fashion by conducting bibliometric analyses of trade journals and the like. The number of articles on an initiative is taken as a proxy for the supposed popularity of a management fashion. This research has an undoubted capacity to illuminate broad trends as to which management ideas are in vogue at any given time through their citation or non citation. Such an approach is, however, limited, especially through its inveterate capacity to suppress an account of the *actual means* through which managers actually consume such ideas. As Jackson (2001: 14) notes: “It is clear that a direct link cannot be made between the number of citations of a particular program and its take up by organizations and managers.”

The lack of analysis of the means through which managers consume fashion is a gap in the current literature. Much of the current research into management fashion is negative in its coverage, taking an ascetic view that fashion is trivial. Czarniawska (2006) notes “fashion has been portrayed as an irrational deviation from rational management behavior, as indicated by the frequent repetition of the alliteration ‘fads and fashions’.” If being at the vanguard of fashion is regarded positively in the world of fashion proper, what justifies a negative view

of managers following fashion? This is a point that Czarniawska & Sevon (2006) have made, arguing for a more positive interpretation of fashion: “Fashion is one of the ways of introducing order and uniformity into what might seem like an overwhelming variety of possibilities. In this sense, fashion helps to come to grips with the present.” Czarniawska suggests the concept of translation as an alternative to the dominant models of diffusion. This conceptualization emphasizes the mutually constitutive relationship between the “fashion” and the organization (i.e., the fashion may well change aspects of the organization, but in turn the organization changes the fashion).

Management is first and foremost a discourse. It is one that is, as ten Bos (2000) argues, oriented to the ideal that modern rationality can achieve the utopia that figures in management’s fallacies. Managerialist fashions have become commonplace in recent years. Given the powerful industry that has emerged to create and disseminate such ideas, this is likely to continue in the future. It is also likely that the management fashions will, in addition to the private sector, increasingly become a part of the government and NGO world. As an academic agenda, it is noteworthy that little use has been made of the rich resources of cultural studies to understand management fashion. Some management academics have called for a more interventionist approach through direct engagement in the management fashion making process.

Fashions are instances of “blackboxed” (Latour 1987) knowledge which, while usually American in origin, are footloose and sufficiently ambiguous that they can traverse sectors and nations. As part of their pressure for capital accumulation, actors within the management ideas industry are constantly seeking the next initiative that will sell well. The search for discontinuous innovation – necessary to maintain the portfolio of new products for a market that quickly tires of the same old recipes – involves careful market research into managerial anxieties and organizational issues. Thought leaders scan the management journals for ideas and potential gurus that can be translated into profitable business. Successful fashion innovators possess sufficient *habitus* to be able to construct managerial initiatives that capture the corporate zeitgeist.

SEE ALSO: Institutional Theory, New; Knowledge Management; Management; Management Consultants; Management History; Management Improvisation; Management Innovation; Management Theory

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management history

Charles Booth

Management history is a scholarly endeavor which concerns itself with the investigation of the development of management thought and of managerial practice. It therefore sits in sympathetic (in principle) but uneasy (in reality) relationship with contiguous and overlapping fields such as business history, economic history, accounting history, the history of economics, and marketing history, among others. There is no satisfactory or broadly accepted statement of these fields' domain boundaries, and any treatment is necessarily idiosyncratic.

In contrast to related fields in business and economic history (and so on), management history is relatively sparsely served by scholarly associations and publication outlets. The Academy of Management established a Division of Management History in 1971 (later and currently the Management History Division), but this remains one of the smallest groupings in that institution. No domain specific journals existed until 1994, with the establishment of the *Journal of Management History (JMH)*. This was merged with *Management Decision* in 2001 and became a subsection of that journal – itself not at all historical in orientation – with the title “Focus on Management History.” However, prospects for the field seem to be improving in this respect, with the demerger and relaunching of *JMH* currently planned, and a new journal, *Management and Organizational History*, scheduled for first publication in 2006.

Within the field, it has become commonplace to identify six different approaches to management history, some of which are in practice complementary. All offer strengths and weaknesses which are probably self explanatory. These approaches are: (1) a stages approach, whereby the historian focuses on a particular

historical era to investigate the evolution of management thought and practice within a specific temporal frame; (2) a schools approach, in which different historical approaches to management and managing are grouped and differentiated from one another, and their evolution traced; (3) an institutional approach, which analyzes the emergence and development of particular economic institutions (some commentators would see this as the specific domain of business history, however); (4) a biographical approach, which focuses on the contribution of individuals to the development of management thought and practice; (5) a revolutionary approach, in which researchers identify and investigate innovative ruptures and discontinuities in management practices; and (6) an evolutionary approach, which seeks instead to trace continuities and developments unfolding over time.

Unsurprisingly, the field has struggled to establish itself and prosper within the broader management research and teaching discipline. In part this has been due to the relentlessly universalist and presentist nature of a discipline which has been characterized as lacking a memory and a sense of its own history, or indeed of its own geography. Advantages claimed for a historical perspective in this context include a developed appreciation of current organizational practices, behaviors, and structures as culturally, spatially, and temporally specific. This appreciation, in principle, mitigates against the acceptance and perpetuation of deterministic theories of human and organizational behavior (and so on), as well as that of teleological accounts of theoretical and empirical “progress” in knowledge production.

Management history has, however, been characterized as suffering from methodological problems which may also have contributed to its relative stagnation as a scholarly field. While not particularly attracting the criticism of invertebrate empiricism leveled at business history, management history has not noticeably engaged to any extent (unlike the so called “new accounting history,” for example) with recent developments in historiography or in the philosophy of social science. Secondly, with its emphasis on the development of American (and to a lesser extent British) management thought and practice, management history shares with the discipline

of management studies itself an Anglocentric focus and attitude. Thirdly, possibly as a reaction to implied critiques of irrelevance by the mainstream, the field has in practice moved to reorient itself within a presentist metanarrative. When the Management History Division reviewed its domain statement in 2000, for example, much greater emphasis was placed on the pragmatic application of historical lessons for current theory and practice. Arguably, this move offered up to critics of the field a negation of the very advantages that a historical perspective was said to bring.

Ironically, the greatest legacy of a historical approach to management scholarship is arguably one in which management historians are no longer particularly involved. Harvard Business School, established in 1908, placed an early emphasis on economic and business history in its taught programs, and scholars associated with Harvard were instrumental in the establishment of various scholarly associations and publications in the US business history field, broadly conceived. The development of the historical case study, at Harvard and elsewhere, placed historical exemplars at the heart of business and management pedagogy. The continuing success of this pedagogical technology is attested to by its rapid extension into almost every area of the management curriculum, and the development of case publication into a multimillion dollar industry. However, although case studies remain a definitive educational technology within the management discipline, they are no longer particularly associated with a historical orientation toward management education and research, or with historical scholarship.

Management history faces different possible futures. The worst potential case is the sclerotic stagnation of the field, accompanied by continuing marginalization within the management and organization studies academy. More positively, the emergence of new publication outlets offers new possibilities for invigorating management history scholarship. The development of the new accounting history in the early 1990s, with its theoretical and methodological realignments, offers a possible exemplar. Closer connection to perspectives in organization studies which explore organizational processes through longitudinal perspectives, as well as

to potentially sympathetic developments in business history such as an emerging focus on culture, offer fruitful areas for development. The emergence of a potential “historical turn” in organization studies, remarked on by some commentators, provides further opportunities for reinvigoration of the field.

SEE ALSO: Culture, Organizations and; Management; Management Discourse; Management Education; Management Theory; Organization Theory

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management improvisation

Miguel Pina e Cunha

Management improvisation can be defined as the conception of action as it unfolds in an organizational context, drawing on the available material, cognitive, affective, and social resources. It is an individual practice which takes place in light of concrete circumstances. People improvise to solve practical problems which emerge as a result of specific and

unplanned circumstances. In this sense, improvisation can be neither managed nor controlled. To improvise or not to improvise is an individual prerogative, resulting from the interaction between the person and his or her circumstances. That is why organizations are not able to manage or to control improvisation. All they can do is to nurture or facilitate it.

Improvisation was a neglected concept until the 1990s, when it started to attract the regular attention of a group of scholars. The reasons for the initial neglect and the recent surge of interest can be attributed to the dominant management paradigms. Under the classical mechanistic approach, organizations were viewed as objects of planning and stable design. They were expected to work in a systematic and predictable manner. In this representation of the organizational world, there was no space for improvisation. Improvising in a machine-like organization is not only unnecessary but also dangerous: improvising individuals could damage the smooth functioning of the organization. In such a context, improvisation can be taken as a demonstration of a planning failure. The description of business environments as hypercompetitive, high speed, and fast changing, however, stimulated scholarly attention for processes that could lead to survival and advantage in markets that required more than mechanical routines and a focus on efficiency.

It was in this context of fast change and unpredictability that the interest in improvisation flourished. Several seminal texts prepared the ground for the study of the theme, but widespread attention resulted mainly from the almost simultaneous edition of a 1998 special issue of *Organization Science* on organizational improvisation, of Hatch’s (1999) paper on the jazz metaphor, Crossan et al.’s (1996) exploration of how planning meets improvisation, Brown and Eisenhardt’s (1998) discussion of improvisation in semi structured organizations, and last but not least, Weick’s work on the role of improvisation in the process of organizing (e.g., Weick 1993, 1998; Weick & Sutcliffe 2001). Karl E. Weick can be regarded as the author who most consistently fertilized the soil for the 1990s momentum. He discussed the aesthetics of imperfection in orchestras and organizations, pointed out the need to find a space for improvisation in mindful organizing,

used jazz as a mindset for organizing, and explored the role of minimal structuring as a source of both freedom and coordination/control. These efforts subsequently led to works of synthesis such as those of Cunha et al. (1999), who reviewed the literature on improvisation, and Kamoche et al. (2001), who compiled some of the central articles on the topic.

From a marginal and minor field, improvisation evolved to become a regular presence in the organizational vocabulary. Theories of practice, such as those developed by Giddens (1986), Bourdieu (1990), and Certeau (1988), have helped to reinforce the interest and legitimacy of improvisation not only as a topic of research but also as a framework for explaining social experience. Mentions of improvisation have appeared in discussions of a variety of topics such as planning, dynamic capabilities, strategizing, learning, and so forth. The evolution of research on the topic reflects this renewed and consequential interest. Theoretical explorations of the concept and its relevance, often at a metaphorical level and relating it with theater and jazz music, came to be complemented with empirical work in such processes as new product development, cross cultural virtual teams, medical teams, and crisis management, for example. This combination between the theoretical understanding of improvisation and its relationship with the arts and the development of empirical work possibly reflects the three major approaches to improvisation: (1) as an intriguing metaphor for organizing; (2) as a possibility for managing the unexpected and the exceptional; and (3) as a normal, everyday organizational practice. The first approach underpins the research exploring the jazz and theatrical metaphors. The second is found in papers dealing with improvisation as a complement or a substitute of planning, namely under crisis situations. The third appears in the research dealing with contexts where traditional planning is useless or undesirable (e.g., high speed) or where, due to historical and sociocultural reasons, people reveal an attraction for improvisational practice – something which seems to happen, for example, in the southern Latin European nations (Aram & Walochik 1996; Cunha 2005).

From the definition, one can easily devise the major dimensions of organizational improvisation. Improvisation has to do mainly with:

(1) impromptu action in an organizational context and (2) bricolage, or the ability to draw on the available material, cognitive, affective, and social resources in order to solve the problem at hand.

Regarding the first dimension, impromptu action, people improvise because they have no routine to tackle a certain issue and because action is required, not optional. In some circumstances, even when faced with a sudden problem, people may decide not to react. This absence of action may suit the situation but does not correspond to improvisation. There is no improvisation without action. If someone decides not to act in the face of a given problem, he or she is not improvising. Hence the description of improvisation as impromptu action. It is in this sense that, in improvisation, planning and execution converge in time (Moorman & Miner 1998). People build their plan of action while going along, in face of practical problems, not in anticipation to imagined opportunities or threats. This effort of tackling problems does not occur, however, in a void. Improvisers rely on a minimal structure comprised of such elements as goals, deadlines, and responsibilities. These elements provide the means for coordinating action without constraining it.

Due to its inseparability from the context where it originates, improvisation must be viewed as situated practice. This situatedness poses a series of relevant methodological as well as practical questions. The latter have to do with the impossibility of prescribing how people can improvise to cope with a given issue. Practice is inseparable from the context, which means that it is not reducible to a set of general and situation free principles and that it must instead be built by people embedded in a given situation.

Bricolage constitutes the second major dimension of improvisation. Due to the urgency of action in improvisational contexts, people need to act with the resources they have, not with those that would best fit their needs. Bricolage refers to the capacity to make do with the available materials. Confronted with the need to solve problems, people may have to use the available materials instead of triggering a process of resource allocation. Bricolage is facilitated by the ingenious use of intimately known materials. It is a key dimension of improvisation because impromptu action requires people to act fast, not to engage in a search for the best resources.

Bricoleurs use material, cognitive, affective, and social resources:

- They improvise with the material resources they have. A soft drink may be used to increase the stickiness of a *passerelle* during a fashion show.
- They use their present cognitive resources, including knowledge and memory. Cognitive styles, such as being an innovator instead of an adaptor, may facilitate creative uses of resources. Cognition involved in improvisation is also related to tacit knowledge and intuition: due to the practical, often non codified knowledge involved in improvisation, intuition is often presented as a defining aspect of improvisation.
- They use their affective resources. Bricolage and improvisation may produce feelings of competence and flow, thus enhancing the meaning of the work to those executing it. If goals are clear, feedback is immediate, and the level of challenge matches individual skills, people will deeply engage in improvisational action, with psychologically rewarding results. Other emotional processes are involved in the improvisational process. When people internalize the importance of the goals and deadlines making the minimal structure, these may not only be a contextual factor but also a source of emotional involvement with the task, facilitating the propensity to improvise by means of an intense emotional link with the job at hand.
- Finally, bricoleurs draw on the existing social resources. They rely on those people with whom they already have some kind of relationship, regardless of these interlocutors' skills to the task. Baker et al.'s (2003) research with entrepreneurs shows how these businesspeople were constrained by their existing social networks. In fact, they made use of their networks with purposes different from those initially expected – for example, recruiting students to managerial positions to which they were not suited, because they knew them.

Analysis of the improvisational process at the organizational level would stress the relevance of other dimensions, such as organizational culture and control, power, and routines. These

aspects are unequivocally important but they will not be addressed here, because they have more to do with the context where improvisation occurs than with improvisation itself.

Due to its practical, situated, and ephemeral nature, improvisation is not easy to study. It cannot be fully captured by inviting people to fill in a questionnaire asking them how much they have improvised or have relied on well defined plans or routines. It should not be approached *ex post facto*, because people will possibly engage in a process of retrospective justification, reducing surprises and giving an appearance of predictability to a process which may not have been as predictable. Hence, methodologically, improvisation confronts researchers with some pertinent issues: how can we study a process involving action rather than attitudes or cognitive evaluation; a process which is ephemeral and unpredictable? How can researchers study something they do not know where and when to look for in advance? Improvisation, therefore, confronts scholars with the limitations of traditional research methods in dealing with dynamic processes rather than with discrete variables. Despite the difficulties raised by the topic, researchers are using several methods and techniques, including observational methods, ethnographic approaches, grounded theorizing, interviewing, critical incidents, case studies, and the traditional quantitative surveys. Initial attempts to uncover the improvisational process in organizations have mainly adopted qualitative, non obtrusive research methods. Whether this preference is due to the nature of the subject itself, or whether it results from the stage of research on improvisation (leading to a preference for theory building rather than for theory testing) is something that only time will tell.

Being in its infancy as a scientific topic, the future of improvisation research is wide open. It may be further approached at the individual, group, and organizational levels. At the micro level, improvisation may be studied from a psychological perspective. Researchers may ask what individual characteristics (e.g., self efficacy, locus of control) facilitate the willingness to improvise. Or they may compare groups of people in terms of their predisposition and proficiency in improvising (e.g., is improvisation more likely in experts or novices?). At the group level, team dynamics and demography

may be influential. The same may be valid for leader behavior. Leaders favoring action orientation and autonomy may induce in members of their teams a pro improvisation bias. At the organizational level, organizational strategy, structure, and culture may be relevant influences. Not much is known about the influence of the organizational context on the practice of organizational improvisation. In bureaucratic organizations, one may hypothesize that people will rely on the hierarchy rather than on improvisation as a guide for action. It is admissible, however, that due precisely to the limitations imposed by the organization's structure, employees will act in an improvised fashion in order to counter structural inertia.

Despite the prevalence of the image of organizational change as resulting from planned efforts managed by top management, some authors are suggesting that organizations may change as the result of the accumulation of minor changes introduced throughout the organization by people lacking the option of strategic choice (Orlikowski 1996; Lanzara 1998). This line of research suggests that improvisation should be addressed both as an individual practice and as a systemic property of organizations. This double perspective suggests that, rather than being a negligible aspect of organizational life, improvisation can be equally relevant for individuals and their organizations.

SEE ALSO: Complexity and Emergence; Management Innovation; Management Theory; Organization Theory; Organizational Continuities

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management innovation

Peter Clark

Innovation refers to the processes of replacing past lifestyles, products, services, knowledge, and forms of managing by a variation which is different. The difference ranges from small and

incremental to radical and discontinuous. Typically, innovations have been equated with entities and artifacts which can be readily seen and touched. These innovations, however, are embodiments of vast investments in forms of knowledge and ways of organizing (Clark 2003). The role of management in the innovation process and of how the organization of management affects the pace and directions of innovation remained largely unexplored until about 50 years ago. Forms of managing and organizing are innovations which are so taken for granted that their significance might be overlooked. Organizations, especially large scale corporations, are the pivotal arena within which invention and innovation are orchestrated. The earlier focus upon artifacts has shifted to the examination of the roles that management do and can play in orchestrating innovation.

The analysis of management innovation is noted for its bold attempts at synthesis and for increasing critiques of the pro innovation bias (Clark 2003). Consequently, the reader is assailed by seductive narratives of how all managers can orchestrate innovations. However, published data routinely list failures in the public and private sectors. Equally, there has been a misleading focus upon the ease of transferring innovations which have been successful in one geographical context (e.g., Silicon Valley, US) to other nations. The many successful examples, especially of the transfer of services like fast food, exemplify extraordinary managerial achievements even when the consumable outcome is regarded as unwelcome. Typically, the transfer of innovations between nations results in hybrids (Clark 2003). Thus American football emerged in the 1870s from the playing of indigenous winter ball games and from the importing of two British sports: running and handling the ball (rugby) and kicking the ball (soccer). In a similar way, recent Japanese innovations have resulted in many hybrids following their transfer (Abo 1994). The core problem for management innovations is in improving our understanding of what is possible and how those possibilities can be actualized in specific contexts.

In the 1960s there was a modernist focus upon creating universal theories with a strong "can do" tendency. Consequently, important contextual details were minimized and then stripped out. Then, with the rise of Japanese

innovation led exports into America and Western Europe, there has been a strong growth of interest in how the domestic context might shape the degrees of freedom for management innovation. Even so, the strongest tendency is the creation of pro innovation recipes. This should be resisted.

THE PRO INNOVATION BIAS

There are very few published studies of failure, yet two thirds or more of all attempts at innovation fail (Clark 2003). The pro innovation bias is a discourse saying that innovations should be adopted as quickly as possible in the format recommended by their suppliers because innovations are essentially efficient (Rogers 1995 [1962]; Clark 2003). The adoption process often seems to contain easily recognized stages in a linear sequence. It is presumed that adoption will be successful and will improve the effectiveness of the firm. The pro innovation bias is so pervasive that even articles prefaced by its recognition are guilty of its promotion. It may be noted that in diffusion studies the analysis is micro level and ignores the multiplicity of levels in the embedding context. Therefore it is essential to recognize the political processes of innovation with their contested, confrontational features. The political context of network innovations has been conflated, eviscerated, and suppressed. Opposition to innovations is ordinary and extensively implicates management. The counterpoint to the pro innovation bias is that much if not most innovation occurs through alterations to the population of organizations through the exit of surviving firms and entrance of new firms. The inertial capacities of the existing capabilities of surviving firms are powerful constraints through time (DiMaggio & Powell 1991). Unpacking the politicality of organizations and their contexts represents an important way of advancing understanding. The suppliers distributing the innovation are not politically neutral and nor is the user passively awaiting implementation.

CORE RESEARCH PROGRAMS

For management there are three major areas of innovation: innovation design, commercialization

and diffusion, and the use and consumption of innovations. These form an iterative interactive sequence and their overall connections require the construction of a complex knowledge chain. Innovation design refers to the processes of conceiving and producing prototypes. This is the moment when the future market is most distant and least certain. Many firms lack the capacity to undertake the next cycle of innovation design because fast design and prototyping have to be articulated with a robust understanding of the consumer as user.

Management innovation was a largely unexamined, secret process until three seminal publications: Burns and Stalker (1995 [1961]) on management organization; Chandler (1962) on the emergence of the multidivisional form in large multiproduct American firms; and Rogers (1995 [1962]) on the diffusion of innovations. Each of these highlighted organizational innovations as being distinct from material artifacts. They demonstrated that the managing of the innovation process is a complex struggle in which human agency wrestles with preexisting flows and processes.

Burns and Stalker (1995 [1961]) began with the problem of whether a world center for the electronics market could be established in Scotland from its wartime experiences with electronics produced under government contracts. They researched a small sample of private British firms working in contexts of varying rates of innovation, from low to high. Remarkably, they found that the roles of management and their organization of the firm varied systematically along the high–low continuum. When the rates of technical and market change are low, the firm should adopt a mechanistic management system. This requires a high functional specialization, the codification of responsibilities, precise definitions of roles, and hierarchical authority. Knowledge and control will be centralized. Prestige will arise from understanding internal politics rather than external situations. In contrast, when the rate of change is high, the management system should be organic. Control, authority, and communication are in the form of networks containing highly committed role occupants who translate external events in order to develop flexible responses. Knowledge is highly diffused yet has to be

articulated and orchestrated through networks. The mechanistic/organic distinction in types of management system soon became widely known. The findings were contingent (rested upon) the rate of external change. Readers and commentators tended to race to the center of their lengthy book to extract the findings. Consequently, few readers read the second half of the book. There, the authors suggest that organic management systems could only be introduced under certain necessary conditions. These were conditions absent in Scotland. This necessary contextual feature was gradually ignored. Moreover, some commentators wrongly presumed that the switch between management systems was quick and easy: the pro innovation bias.

Chandler (1962) undertook in depth archival studies of four large, successful American firms to discover how their management systems altered, if at all, when the corporate strategy shifted from regional markets and single products into world markets with multiple products. The research revealed a tortuous struggle involving experiments and debates about ways of managing the apex of the firm. Each of the firms had started from a regional, single product market. They had each adopted centralized top management. As the firms' activities grew in complexity, so the centralized control was overwhelmed. Some executives sought to experiment with various alternatives. This was an episodic and emergent process in which organizational innovations and success were interwoven. Gradually, over a period of two decades, a specific solution was identified: the multidivisional form. Successful firms with multiple, unrelated products entering new geographical markets outside America tended to create specialized divisions and to use the top board only as an investment bank. Chandler then demonstrated that this tendency could be found in a large survey of American firms. We have to presume that American managements were very active in watching how other firms recognized and resolved the generic problems of management innovation (DiMaggio & Powell 1991). The problem of growth from local into international markets transfixed the attention of American management along with a growing community of consultants and

researchers. The universal relevance of Chandler's analysis is increasingly debated, but there is no dispute about his majestic contribution to the problematizing of management innovation.

Rogers (1995 [1962]) provided an exemplary account and framework synthesized from earlier research on diffusion and marketing to identify which processes and contextual factors affect the rates of adoption and rejection of innovations. This led into differentiating between early and late adopters. Those who opposed innovation were laggards and Luddites. The models covered the period from the commercialization of innovations to their purchase or rejection. Initially, the models did not explore what the users did with the innovations. The models promoted the center over the periphery and expressed a broadcast-receiver view of the supplier-user relationship. Rogers adopted the two step theory of communication which presumed that individuals were influenced by their peers and by certain features of the innovation. The first step should consist of the massive supply of documentary information infused with features designed to enroll the purchasers. This is mainly textual information and explicit advertising. The formal media are used to target the specific users. Second, the target community is analyzed by change agents who locate those members who are highly regarded and likely to be early adopters of the innovation. The change agents then engage directly with those targets to reinforce their decision and to persuade them to engage in trial adoptions. The exemplar for this is the role of change agents in promoting new drugs to the medical profession. Rogers suggests that the center should design their innovations to enroll the perceptions of the potential innovators. Five dimensions of perception are highlighted: offering relative advantage to the adopter, being compatible in values, minimizing complexity, dividing the adoption process into stages, and showing results that can be used to communicate performance. These five features indicate that the suppliers should black box the innovation to transform any fuzziness into perceived certainties and confidence about adoption.

These three research programs provide key cognitive and practical pillars. Their influence is evident today and continues to unfold.

EVOLUTIONARY PERSPECTIVES AND EFFICIENCY CRITERIA

Evolutionary perspectives take a non teleological approach to describing and analyzing managements' founding of firms and then their transformation or exit. Aldrich (1999) suggests that organizations are evolving as their managements struggle to resolve the three choices of producing variations, developing a retention system, and confronting the forces of selection in the external context. Variations are represented by the multidivisional form or organic management systems. New variations may arise from design, accidentally or as an unintended consequence of unintended human actions. It has been said that the British involvement with Formula One motor racing was a historical accident arising from the availability of wartime airfields as early low cost tracks conjoined to the desire of tobacco firms to advertise on British commercial television. The unintended is also illustrated by American football. Variations exist in a selection context and that context might be unfavorable, in which case the variation disappears. Americans discarded soccer, yet this became the world's number one male winter sport. These examples illustrate the context of struggle for management innovation. Variations that survive require institutionalization within some kind of retention system. McDonald's has developed a massive retention system, an internal university, to retain and develop knowing about meat, potatoes, and apples, as well as ways of incentivizing the franchisees.

There is huge debate over whether selected variations are efficient or are simply the outcomes of multidimensional lock ins that, once taken, then establish specific national trajectories. Is the multidivisional form an efficient universal solution, or simply an example of a genre of management innovation that arises in America? DiMaggio and Powell (1991) contend that selected variations are not necessarily efficient. If so, that might explain why certain forms of organizational innovation persist even when the competitiveness of a firm or nation is undermined. This is an uncomfortable conclusion for most economists. DiMaggio and Powell suggest that the evolution of innovations through a sector or nation may simply be a case of tendencies toward copying on the basis of

excitement and status rather than performativity. Evolutionary perspectives highlight the long term tendencies toward the destruction of formerly established practices. This suggests that the introduction of management innovations must be accompanied by the careful and focused removal of practices that hinder the new forms of organizing. Contemporary managements have gradually learned how to use greenfield sites to remove unwanted practices. This may involve transferring activities around the world.

The claim that management faces long term waves or cycles anchored in new generic innovations such as information technology is controversial. It has been argued that there are long waves of 50 or so years equally split between the swarming of a new generic innovation, its maturity, and then replacement. If these exist, then the implications for managements would be far reaching. Their strategies and processes would have to be aligned with the state of the wave. Equally, the policies of the state would be affected. So far long wave theory has tended to use strict calendrical units (e.g., 56 year cycles), but contemporary theories of temporality suggest that we should measure the wave by the events of process time.

The place of innovation in their sectoral life course models is important and complex. Managements tend to watch other firms in the same sector and to shape their knowledge and practices into sectoral genres of innovation. In a seminal study, Abernathy (1978) examined the archives on innovation for the Ford Motor Company and discovered that the most radical innovation occurred close to the founding of the sector. The design of the automobile gradually shifted from a high rate of radical innovation into more incremental innovation after two decades. The design of the factories followed this process. So, by the 1960s, innovation was incremental. Abernathy extrapolated this tendency into the distant future. By then Ford had established a very sophisticated combination of divisional organization (Chandler 1962) with mechanistic management systems (Burns & Stalker 1961). Abernathy's interpretation was similar to that of those who claimed that all cars would become alike and only a few enormous automobile firms would survive. However, the late 1960s was a period of increasingly radical

innovation in the design of the automobile and its means of assembly. There was a discontinuity. The increasing rate of technical and market change was coupled with the entrance of Japanese firms. According to academic theories, existing firms should be combining the switch to radical innovations with the creative removal of non performative practices. However, existing structures and processes tend to be very sticky. The experience of the automobile industry over the past four decades illustrates the requirement for firms to develop a repertoire of mechanistic and organic management systems which can be activated contingently according to circumstance. In practice, managements have partly resolved this problem by a combination of tightly regulated outsourcing of their supply chain and of switching production around the world at greenfield sites. This has been enabled by the evolution of information technologies.

INFORMATION TECHNOLOGY AND ACTOR NETWORKS

Management innovation involves many non human elements (Bijker et al. 1987) Climatic variations exemplify elements not designed by humans. Buildings, raw materials, equipment, and software are socially constructed technology systems. The swimming pool robot cleaner is inscribed with the designer's capacities to automate the collection and disposal of debris at times set by the user. These displace humans and are the social made durable.

Management innovation requires knowledge and knowing of how non humans engage in action. Actor network theory claims that extensive and depthful research has significantly clarified what can be done by management. Information technology and the electronic embrace provide a useful site to explain the theory. Computing has evolved through architectural (e.g., search engines) and incremental innovations (e.g., websites) from mathematical machines in the nineteenth century via Hollerith card processors into the instantaneous, open link systems of today. Management can assemble far more data than it is possible to categorize and interpret. This all exemplifies social activities translated into non human artifacts.

The artifacts are inscribed with particular human assumptions during their design. Tracing these inscriptions and following the biographies of artifacts shows that the networks of management now depend and partly shape extensive heterogeneous actor networks. However, the design intentions of the originators may be differently interpreted by the users. The users domesticate and appropriate artifacts. Artifacts possess a wider band of interpretive flexibility than is presumed. Software designed in the US and Germany for monitoring and managing the resources used by the enterprise may be used quite differently by the users in universities from retailers. Moreover, there are likely to be important, rather hidden, national predispositions. Particular software solutions have to operate as boundary objects.

Actor network theory suggests that innovations can be managed by establishing centers that become obligatory points of passage at which the decision processes are orchestrated (Clark 2003). For example, since the early 1990s Formula One automobile racing and its advertising laden television broadcasting has largely been controlled by a very small number of key actors who control a large, global configuration. Explaining their position and possible eclipse introduces the four step model: PIEM. To start, problematize (P) a situation by suggesting a particular solution. Then engage in enrolling (I) with potential collaborators, including non human elements like engines, tires, racing circuits, finance capital, and television screen. Next enroll (E) the key elements into a particular center that excludes rivals. Finally, continuously mobilize (M) the political support (e.g., legal protection) to promote survival. PIEM is supported by a lot of excellent case studies which are remarkably enjoyable and stimulating (e.g., Bijker et al. 1987). Yet, we must inquire about the conditions under which particular examples were undertaken and became successful. Could a luxury yacht industry be located in any nation?

NATIONAL SYSTEMS OF INNOVATION

The national context was very largely neglected until the success of Japanese innovations became apparent in the 1980s. The role of the

nation has an influence. In a brilliant analysis of national systems of innovation, Storper and Salais (1997) provide a suggestive framework. Their approach suggests that only some sectors are likely to prosper in particular national contexts. Each nation is likely to possess a typical variety. UK management succeeds with petrochemicals, pharmaceuticals, food, drink, and tobacco but fails with automobiles, white goods, and furniture.

There are many examples, especially with network technologies, that the nation of origin contains key enabling features absent in other contexts. America has been a key originator of organizational innovations, yet their importation by other nations has been very patchy. Japanese automobile firms and electrical firms are often able to transfer their management practices to other national contexts. When non Japanese firms attempt to import Japanese innovations, they often fail or most frequently create hybrids (Abo 1994; Clark 2003). The growth of international supply chains indicates that within firms from many different nations there is a remarkable understanding and experience of the transfer of innovations. It seems likely that our academic understanding of the processes of successful cross cultural transfer requires much more analytic attention to how the differences between contexts interact.

HYBRIDS AND DOMESTICATION

Management innovation involves dynamic configurations whose survival is contingent upon global selection contexts. Most innovations, organizational and material, are imported into an organization by particular sets of managers to resolve a problem. This importation process is highly demanding on managerial services. It is therefore highly likely that the imported innovation will be unbundled and its elements domesticated to the local situation. Therefore hybrids are highly likely. The problem is for management to articulate robust design strategies and to continually evolve the corporate languages that frame activity nets. Management innovation requires robust repertoires.

SEE ALSO: Actor Network Theory; Consumption, Landscapes of; Hybridity; Knowledge;

Management; Management Improvisation; Management Theory; Micro–Macro Links; Organization Theory; Technological Innovation

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management networks

Tyrone S. Pitsis

A network is a broad concept whose definition is generally a function of its disciplinary context. The interest in contemporary networks research and theory has had broad interdisciplinary appeal. Network theory and research has been conducted in sociology, communications, psychology, economics, biology and medicine, and organizational behavior. It has been applied to a broad range of natural and synthetic systems such as sociopolitical systems, neural networks, disease epidemiology, terrorism and anti terrorism, and transport. More recently, the term “network” has been popularized and most associated with information technology and the

Internet and taken to mean the connection of people and organizations through computer mediated communications technologies aimed at enabling and facilitating efficient and effective communications and transactions between them. Generally, however, the conception of networks is not far removed from its sociological roots, and a search through most sociological works will show that a network has a number of defining features. First, a network requires a group or system of individual people and/or agencies. Second, a network requires these groups or systems to be interconnected in some way. Third, the network must share common goals, interests, or values. Finally, there is an assumption that the individual and/or agencies maintain at least some level of autonomy.

There is a broad range of methodologies that can be used to study networks from a social scientific perspective. These can include traditional surveys, in depth interviews, quasi experiments, ethnographic research, network analysis, and network mapping. The growth of computer mediated communications and information technologies has also made the study of networks more innovative and more widespread. Some of the key attributes studied in networks from a sociological perspective are the strength of network ties and the relationship between actors involved in the network, and the nature of the nodal points in a network. These can include what are commonly termed “brokers” and also “hubs.” Brokers act as the nodal point or portal between members in a network who, for one reason or another, are unable to exchange information (Burt 1992). Hubs reflect more the power of one or more individuals in a network. Other areas of interest are distance, centrality, reciprocity, transitivity, density, and power.

Early interest in networks in sociology can be seen in the work on “tight knit networks” developed by Elizabeth Bott (1957), who sought to understand the intricate system of social relationships within which people were involved in their everyday family life. For Bott, tight knit networks were important because they provide social support while also acting to mobilize social control. As such, a network has a profound effect on controlling and influencing social behavior within those networked relationships. Later, Granovetter (1973, 1978,

1985) developed the notion of strong ties and loose ties. Strong ties reflect Bott's notion of tight knit networks and typically refer to a network of family and close friends bound together through trust based relationships which are of mutual benefit to all actors involved. Weak ties, however, are more superficial than strong or tight knit networks because they involve less emotional investment for actors. Consequently, many had theorized that weak ties are subject to higher levels of uncertainty, abuse, and exit than strong ties.

Certainly, sociological and social psychological research has shown that strong networks, such as those found in strong family and community ties, have been linked to greater psychological adjustment, better coping skills in traumatic or stressful conditions, and lower levels of deviance and criminal behavior (see, e.g., Baron et al. 2000). However Granovetter (1973, 1985) highlighted the "strength of weak ties" and, since Granovetter, weak ties have also been shown to be just as critical as strong ties to sustainable growth and development of communities. In weak ties certain individuals emerge who act as brokers of knowledge and relationships. Such individuals typically, but not always, have strong ties with the two parties exchanging information or resources, thus the two parties exchanging any information or resources do not need to be tightly knit. The argument is that people in "loosely coupled" or "weak" networks are provided with the opportunity to form strong networks with people or agencies they might not be able to otherwise access. Such weak tie networks have been very important in explaining how people of lower socioeconomic status can access and leverage from new opportunities opened to them. As such there is a strong argument for government policies that foster weak tie relationships in a range of social policy areas such as employment, mental health, indigenous health, and regional and rural business development. For example, in the US, UK, and Australia there are ongoing debates about implementing and funding youth mentoring programs to assist young people from disadvantaged backgrounds in accessing knowledge, resources, and opportunities through mentorship by business leaders. Such policies encourage collaboration

between business and the youth of any given community, thus providing people with opportunities.

While network theory and research might provide a greater understanding of how individuals might benefit from their networked relationships, both tight and weak, at a broader sociological level there is a growing body of research to suggest that the nature of network relationships can have a profound effect upon entire communities. Businesses increasingly adopt more efficient and cost effective operating strategies, such as new technologies, wide ranging downsizing programs, and outsourcing of non core operations. Simultaneously, they seek to reduce regulatory control and the cost of production by moving part or all of their business operations offshore. Such business practices have had substantial effects the world over, the results of which can be seen in many communities that have traditionally depended on that key industry for survival. In the UK, the US, and Australia, for example, there have been a number of communities previously dependent on highly specialized industry such as coal mining, steel manufacture, forestry, farming, and so on, where these industries had become a socially embedded part of the community. In such a situation, the strength of ties between the industry and the community was tight indeed. In such networks, when a critical component separates itself from the network, there are some harsh outcomes for the community, such as significant levels of unemployment and an increase in poverty, along with their associated effects, including crime, alcoholism, and so on. However, recent research suggests that in communities typified by weak ties, that is, where one industry is not so embedded within that community, its members and agencies can maintain loose relationships with several other businesses within and outside that community, such that when the dominant industry relocates or shuts down, these communities fare much better on almost all socioeconomic measures of success. Economically then, weak ties suggest that communities that are less insular fare better than ones that are tightly knit.

Another area in which the sociology of networks is making a major contribution is in

organization and management theory. Organizational and management scholars conceptualize the modern organizational environment as one defined by high levels of uncertainty, ambiguity, and risk. Many argue that current hierarchical and rigid structural organizational forms lack the flexibility to adequately survive under such conditions. As such a number of new organizational forms have emerged to help provide the flexibility, adaptability, and capabilities to survive. Alliances, for example, are a collection of organizations, usually two or more, who join together to complement or enhance one another's capabilities with the aim of delivering a service and/or product. More recently there has been a growing body of work on project based organizations (Clegg & Courpasson 2004; Pitsis et al. 2003), which involves the design of a separate entity made up of a complex arrangement of networked relationships of client organization, partner organizations, internal and external stakeholders, including the community and customers, and a supply chain. As with Bott's control over "tight knit networks," the project based organization works to coordinate and control behavior and social relations not through strict control and surveillance but through what Foucault terms "governmentality." In this sense, governmentality refers to the active and consensual subjugation of all actors involved in the project based network for the good of the project (Clegg et al. 2002). Such a concept has strong connotations of Granovetter's (2002) notions of social embeddedness in networks.

According to Granovetter (2002), the power of social relations embedded within networks should not be underestimated in coordinating, mobilizing, and motivating members of a network to act in ways that sustain and protect these social relations. Using project based arrangements, organizations, both public and private, build such social embeddedness within networks via new organizational forms such as alliances.

SEE ALSO: Actor Network Theory; Alliances; Economy, Networks and; Exchange Network Theory; Management Theory; Organization Theory; Scientific Networks and Invisible Colleges; Social Movements, Networks and; Social Network Analysis; Weak Ties (Strength of)

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management theory

Jean François Chanlat

From the beginning of the nineteenth century until today, the industrialized world has witnessed unparalleled socioeconomic development. At the same time, the phenomenon of historical capitalism has been the object of numerous publications. Writers as diverse as classical and neoclassical economists, Marx, and foundational thinkers in sociology were all obsessed by the socioeconomic dynamic related to this movement. In sociology an attempt to explain the emergence of capitalism was the

central core of Weber's intellectual work. If, according to Weber, capitalism is singularized by private firms in a market economy, another important characteristic is the appearance of management thinking and of a new social agent: the manager.

As shown by historians of business such as Alfred Chandler, the social figure of the manager emerged at the end of the nineteenth century when business firms grew inexorably in size in the US. Since then, management thinking has undergone great development. Management is a social field in Bourdieu's sense, in which different actors play a role in its construction and transformation. Theories of management are both the products of society (mainly people and social forces in a historical context) and its producers. The sociology of management has to take into account this theoretical elaboration in order to understand the principal discourses which contribute and shape both organizational forms and managerial practices.

Management is defined as a social process and a social figure. As a social process, it is defined by the process through which an organization is effective and efficient. Whereas effectiveness is related to the attainment of goals, efficiency is related to the optimization of resources in the pursuit of organizational goals. The resulting effectiveness–efficiency dilemma underpins much management thought, as the difference is not neutral on the construction of managerial practices. Management is not restricted to the social processes of achieving effectiveness and efficiency; it also describes the social group in charge of this process: executives and managers. Theories of management are instances of speculative or scientific ideas about organizational efficiency and effectiveness. Every theory has dealt with key issues for attaining these goals: organizing, controlling, motivating, planning, and leading.

Historically, management thinking has three main contributors: practitioners, consultants, and academics. The first group is the most numerous. It includes all managers, whatever their status and functions. The second includes all the people who give advice to managers. The third includes all the management researchers and professors working in universities or higher education institutes. When we look at management as an intellectual enterprise, we can easily

see that at the beginning of the last century the most popular and influential theories came from practitioners and consultants. After World War II the work of academics became increasingly influential, though there have been recent concerns about the extent to which the academic literature is read by academics rather than practitioners. While the theories of the first two groups are mostly normative and prescriptive, the theories of the third group are mostly analytical and comprehensive.

We can also notice that even if there is substantial production in other parts of the world (notably in Europe and Asia), the majority of the theories produced today come from North American practitioners, consultants, and academics, and their diffusion is ensured by all kind of media, notably those specializing in economics and management matters. Such theories are deeply embedded into the social and cultural fabric from which they emerge.

While some business historians trace managerial practices to past centuries, it is at the turning point of the twentieth century that we see the first attempts to systematize managerial thinking and the intensive use of the word itself in English. Theories of management have proved to be both numerous and very diverse. This variety is due in part to the type of producer (practitioner, consultant, academic), the disciplines mobilized (engineering, economics, management, sociology, psychology, anthropology, political sciences, etc.), the mental representation of what constitutes an organization (machine, living organism, social system, psychic and cognitive products, cultural set, etc.), the region, the country of production, and the social historical context (social issues, social movements, and social tensions).

We can periodize management thought as follows: (1) 1880–1945: the founding and classical thinkers; (2) 1945–75: the Cold War and the establishment of American hegemony in management thinking; (3) 1975–2000: a socioeconomic slow down, the historical victory of the western capitalist experience, and the hegemony of managerialism.

In the last quarter of the nineteenth century management thinking witnessed the first attempt to systematize efficiency at work. The central figure of this movement was Frederick Winslow Taylor. His career was not without

controversy (e.g., towards the end of his life he was questioned and censured by a Congress committee). Taylorism can be seen as a political economy of the workshop. It revolutionized production in the US and it proved popular in Europe, where it was largely adopted in France, Germany, and the UK. In the Soviet Union Lenin famously quipped that Taylorism was “a system to ameliorate the production and the material level of the Soviet people.” While Taylorism may now seem to belong to the past, some writers have pointed out that its principles are an enduring part of the way in which society is organized. For instance, Ritzer (2002) has drawn parallels between Taylorism and the work organization of McDonald’s restaurants, while others have insisted on new forms characterized as neo Taylorism, based on the use of technologies of information and a Taylorist division of work (e.g., as in a call center). Taylorism was not wholly original, but it did crystallize many influential ideas of the time. In particular, it was ineluctably scientist in its orientation. This presupposed that science was the main factor underpinning progress. Translated into the social domain these principles were a means of finding the “One best way” to efficiency, which in turn produced social harmony in the form of relatively high wages combined with high levels of productivity. For these reasons, reformers and revolutionaries alike saw Taylorism as emblematic of progressive thinking.

Contemporaneously to Taylor, the French engineer Henri Fayol was concerned with issues of management and organization. As a successful director of a French mining company, Fayol represents the rise of the manager described by Chandler (1977). Whereas Taylor’s analysis is concerned with his reflections from the workshop, Fayol placed emphasis on the firm as a whole. He presented 14 principles that aimed to improve organization efficiency and deliver organizational success. Fayol’s ideas were less popular among his compatriots than those of Taylor. At the same time, Fayol was largely unknown outside of the Francophone world. It was not until 1949 that his ideas were translated into English and started to become popular in the English speaking world. His main principles were adopted by the planning, organizing, leading, and controlling framework which has become a common part of American

management theory. Not surprisingly, Fayol’s ideas bear the imprint of his own social roots. His managerial experience was in a historical context characterized by many social conflicts and the growing influence of the socialist movement, which led his management philosophy to a form of paternalism that was sensitive to the social dimensions of the time.

Henry Ford’s influence extended beyond the creation of a production system to change society as a whole. Ford’s creation of the assembly line has led many to suggest that he was more innovative than Taylor. Others regard the difference between them as more a question of nuance than of substance. According to some scholars Fordism was an application of the Taylor system to mass production. Compared to Fordism, Taylorism can absorb new technologies and adapt itself to new organizational realities. The new production system had a tremendous effect on output. The doubling of workers’ salaries to the famous 5 dollars a day aimed to reduce the very high turnover rate. Ford had adopted one of Taylor’s principles: “Men will not do an extraordinary day’s work for an ordinary day’s pay.”

Fordism created a modern plant populated by thousands of workers. The assembly line created the unqualified worker: it was now possible for factories to employ an unskilled immigrant workforce. Unintended consequences of Fordism included the development of worker consciousness, increased social conflict, and the development of large trade unions. In response, the Ford company further developed its operations and methods offices and also developed industrial relations specialists. Henry Ford’s thinking bore the imprint of American culture, which emphasized that the US was a land of opportunities where everybody had the capacity to be successful so long as they worked hard and that production served the great majority of the people.

Mary Parker Follett was a well known management thinker in the early twentieth century. After her death in 1933 her ideas disappeared from popular management thought, but there has recently been a reawakening of interest in her main articles. A political scientist by training, Follett was concerned with issues of state and democracy. She was interested in managerial experiments which she regarded as acts of

creation. She understood that management needed to be congruent with the organizational culture and social system. Her law of situation emphasized organizational contingencies long before the advent of contingency theory *per se*. Her vision of organizations and management is a democratic one. The assumption was that cooperation and participation would help a business to be run more successfully. If her work was widely ignored following her death, it is perhaps attributable to her questioning of the philosophical foundations of business firms. Her theory asserts that the role of organization is to contribute to life itself. From this point of view, she can be regarded as an advocate of sustainable development long before the term became popularized.

Bureaucracy is a master concept within the classical canon of management thinking. According to Weber, bureaucratic thinking is an illustration of the process of rationalization of the modern human experience. Historically, the success of the bureaucratic theory stems from its efficiency. In Germany, for example, the bureaucratic model was taught at schools of commerce at the beginning of the twentieth century. Contrary to many popular discourses which represent bureaucracy as the stuff of organizational nightmare, bureaucracy was and remains an efficient means of organizing. In some areas (common goods) it can be more effective and efficient than market coordination.

The famous Hawthorne experiment marked the dawn of the human relations movement. Elton Mayo and his co researchers developed an explicit link between work performance and group dynamics. Highlighting the importance of social recognition by an organization and privileging an individual approach towards employees, Mayo provided the stimulus for further human behavior research into organizational settings. The promise of human relations was to provide a solution to social conflicts, which appealed to industrialists. Paradoxically, Mayo's thinking was critical of democracy, which he regarded as unrealistic and decivilizing. Mayo also viewed the industrial revolution as a cause of decivilization by the way in which it destroyed social bonds and produced alienation at work. Mayo saw the development of a managerial elite as a way to save western civilization. Trained in different techniques (e.g., listening,

counseling), these managers could respond to worker malaise, defend a rational conception of life against the emotions, and reduce the influence of trade unions. His work opened the way for human resources management and a psychological treatment of social problems.

Chester Barnard, the last great classical thinker, was a business manager who in 1938 wrote a hugely influential book which is considered as an important link between the classic theories and post World War II currents of thoughts. His contribution was to build a theory of management which placed cooperation at the center of organizations. Influenced by Follett and the human relations movement, he developed a conception of authority founded on the idea that the legitimacy of managerial agency is clearly linked to personal approval.

All the contributions discussed above belong to a period of great change and social crisis (social tensions both in plants and society, World War I, the Russian Revolution). The 1929 Crash was seen by many as an illustration of capitalist contradictions and the limits of *laissez faire* theory in economics. All the management theories developed in this period were created to provide answers to these social changes and crisis. Macrosocial responses varied internationally: democratic responses (e.g., the US New Deal, Keynesian policies in Scandinavian countries, the Popular Front in France) coincided with Fascism in Italy and Nazism in Germany. Peaking with the terrible experience of World War II, these historical events deeply influenced the evolution of management theory in the decades that followed.

The period from the end of World War II to the mid 1970s was characterized by extraordinary economic growth in the western world, decolonization, and a deep international division between two blocs: the West and the East. One has to understand the evolution of management thinking in this period in this sociohistorical context. The influence of American management thinking was dominant everywhere, especially in the western world. The Marshall Plan nourished Europe not only financially but also intellectually: many European missions went to the US to learn the secret of managerial success and efficiency. The rebuilding and modernizing process in the non communist world was viewed as the main defense against the influence of the

Soviet bloc. The Cold War shaped the whole sociopolitical agenda. In other words, the export of the American model included importing American management thinking into many parts of the world, notably Europe.

Within the field of management thinking itself the theories already developed constituted a ready reckoner for educated managers. The post World War II period was to be a theater of new ideas. One of the major developments came from life sciences, especially the development of the general theory of systems. From the closed vision of organization shared by both Taylorism and theorists of bureaucracy, the field of management theory welcomed system approaches and led to many theoretical currents, among them the socio technical system approaches developed by the London Tavistock Institute and by Scandinavian scholars which linked technology and organization; and contingency theory (developed both in the UK and US), which stressed the importance of the relationship between an organization and its own environment. The success of a business firm or an organization became closely linked to the coherence of the internal system with its environment. Unlike Taylor's vision, such reflections concluded that there was no one "best way" to organize. Applying the equifinality principle, supported by the general theory of systems, they did not conceptualize organization adaptation to their environment as following a unique organizational form.

In psychology and economics, Carnegie Mellon researchers critiqued the lack of realism in the universalistic abstractions of neoclassical economics and proposed another version of rationality: bounded rationality. Based on cognitive psychology and studies of concrete decision making, this conception strengthened the idea that decisions are also an embedded process. These authors were at the foundation of not only the new administrative sciences in which cognition played a central role, but also a new model of American business schools, founded on research. Management and managerial practices became objects of science, just as any other social practices. The administrative sciences would be at the core of management knowledge's scientification process.

Other developments came from sociology and psychosociology. In relationship with Weber's

work, some American sociologists made case studies to describe the dynamics of bureaucracies. They discovered what they called the dysfunctions or vicious circle produced by such a dynamic. Inspired by this and by the ideas of bounded rationality, a French sociologist, Michel Crozier, described the bureaucratic vicious circle: the will to reduce uncertainty and arbitrarily push an organization so that it would be governed by impersonal rules. However, in this will to power he saw the impossibility of abolishing uncertainty as the impetus that created arbitrary behavior, which pushed the worker to seek more rules for regulation, and so on. Crozier not only described the bureaucratic system, but also developed the foundations of the actors' strategic analysis which became one of the chief conceptual instruments of the French speaking school of sociology of organizations. His work and that of his main collaborators have been very influential in management education programs and some public and private administrative spheres.

The developing field of organizational behavior gradually replaced human relations at the end of the 1960s. The new field was pushed by critiques of managerial teaching that emerged in the 1950s that integrated all the new developments coming from industrial psychology, group dynamics, socioanalysis, sociometry, social psychology, and the sociology of work and organizations. They were to be at the base of theories of work satisfaction, work motivation, leadership, and group dynamics, and became very influential in many workplaces, notably in personnel management.

As we can see, this period is important in the reformulation of management thinking. First, there is a new scientification of management discourse, especially in American academic work, which had a great influence in many business schools all around the world. Second, many of these ideas were incorporated into management theories and management education systems. Third, American management thinking became the reference for many countries of the western bloc despite strong criticisms of American imperialism. The period was associated with a demographic explosion and increased socioeconomic growth, which saw collective and individual enrichment, a decline in economic inequalities, monetary stability, the

development of mass education, and the building of a more or less elaborated welfare state in all the industrialized countries. These remarkable results were clearly an element to contain Soviet influence and communist threat.

From the second half of the 1970s crucial decisions were made and events occurred that resulted in economic slow down and set a new socioeconomic agenda (e.g., President Nixon's decision to change the international monetary system; the Vietnam war; the reconstruction of Europe and Japan; the rise in petroleum prices; the challenge to Keynesian orthodoxy in economics by the Chicago monetary school; the emergence American conservative think tanks). The political victories of Margaret Thatcher and Ronald Reagan provided a strong political boost for a conservative political agenda. Tax cuts, privatization, and reduced public expenditure became the new mantra in the US and the UK, gradually spreading to much of the developed world. Growing competition from Asia and Japan forced a rethink of organization and management practices. Financial markets now had more influence: Anglo American political elites sought to develop a society of stock owners. This ambition was encouraged in 1989 by the fall of the Berlin Wall, a symbol of the historic victory of western democracies and their market economies.

The new economic model pushed for more workforce flexibility, state withdrawal from many areas in favor of marketization, a reduction of business and individual taxes, and an openness of national markets to competition – a globalization process in which every society had to be involved. Social scientists discovered that we are involved not only in a risk society, but also in a less protected social universe. Management thinking played a key role in this process. Thus, while previous ideas were produced in a relatively stable universe of increasing wealth, the ideas of the last two decades emerged in a different context. Key elements of the new social situation greatly influenced the managerial thinking of this period.

First, the reconstruction of Europe and growing competition from Asian countries (mainly Japan) led to reflection on business systems and the effects of different “national cultures”: it seemed that the American model was not the only way to produce efficiency and wealth.

Different combinations were possible between state, market, and civil society at a macro level, and managerial practices dealing with national or regional cultures at the level of the firm. Organizational systems are often different from country to country. If theories of management are embedded in space (a culture and a society) and time (history), we cannot have a unique model based on a universalistic abstract approach. There were perhaps more contingencies than just those that related strictly to business – there were also cultural and historic contingencies.

Second, international competition and competitiveness helped to develop strategic management thinking. Strategy theories flourish because of the turbulence caused by changes in the environment. Market openness, international commercial agreements, currency floats, industry deregulation, and privatization all helped to build new demand for strategic management. Some thinking focused on strategic differentiation (product, market, price policy and cost leadership, construction of entry and mobility barriers) and strategic planning, which emphasized the role of planners; others emphasized strategic design by studying strengths, weaknesses, opportunities, and threats. Still others developed an interest in strategic positioning, strongly influenced by Michael Porter's economic vision. Another popular strategy approach involves the use of scenario planning, which tries to establish environmental scanning of social dynamics and economic, technological, and political issues to build preemptive and appropriate business answers. Unlike traditional planning, scenario planning does not have a linear conception of time. It integrates uncertainty, chance, and complexity in order to challenge custom. The “emergence” strategy perspective is based on ideas which emphasize the real processes of making strategic decisions in a context. It shows strategy as a process of social construction deeply embedded in everyday organizational life.

Third, in the western world, this period was also characterized by great innovation and diffusion of communication and information technologies. The creation of networks of all kinds – notably the Internet – reconfigured international, regional, national, and local socioeconomic links, in some cases reshaping organizational forms. Management theories

incorporated these impulses in forging the words e management, e commerce, and virtual organizations.

Fourth, workforce mobilization greatly preoccupied management thinkers. During the 1970s many negative reactions (absenteeism, high turnover, reduced quality, alienation, and industrial conflict) were observed in workforces aspiring to more individual respect. Several strategies were proposed to deal with new working class attitudes, such as industrial democracy perspectives in the Scandinavian countries, Germany, and Austria. Negotiation between the state, unions, and employers' federations was institutionalized and in Germany and Austria co management (or co determination) was imposed on firms with 2,000 employees or more in an illustration of the social democratic compromise. A second strategy was to take a legal approach. In France, laws sought to organize social dialogue in the firm and give legal rights to worker expression in the workplace. This approach was clearly within the centralizing traditions of France, emerging from discussions organized by politicians with worker and employer representatives. There were also micro strategies at the firm or plant level. Some of these harked back to the socio technical approach, stressing semi autonomous work groups. These strategies were very popular in Scandinavian countries and received a certain recognition in other contexts. The movement for the quality of working life emerged from this approach, strongly shaping Swedish politics around work, in particular. These ideas were close to those of Follett. Another approach used the notion of culture. In effect, in front of the Japanese challenge, America tried to react by bringing corporate and organizational culture into debate. If Japanese economic success was because its culture was founded on solidarity and group cohesion, then American companies had to find their own culture to cope with the competition. A culture of excellence was the response. In the US these ideas (mainly produced by consultants with academic business school linkages) gave legitimacy to sociological and anthropological studies in some management spheres. Organizational culture became central to management theories and became a new topic for organizational behavior courses. In its quest for excellence, "quality" became a watchword inspired by the

Japanese techniques of production, themselves largely influenced by the American William Deming.

The feminization of the labor market and the rise of women managers led to great stress on women in organizations and the different management styles that they deployed. Existing mainstream management theories were seen as gender productions. The social inequalities observed between men and women in organizational settings inspired managerial practices designed to diminish them (affirmative action, salary equity, parity, mentorship, etc.), notably in Scandinavia, the UK, and the US. This movement was also related to a broader one concerning the situation of social minorities generally; in the US, the position of African Americans, Latinos, and Native Americans; more generally, visible minorities, a trend from which the idea of managing diversity emerged.

As well as collective strategies to tackle the difficulties arising from social mobilization and workforce diversity, there were also some more individual strategies. Numerous strands of psychology concerning individual satisfaction and motivation were mobilized in these individualistic strategies. They were also encouraged by the growing culture of narcissism and intimacy in the western world and elsewhere, sustained by socioeconomically dominant discourses on the role of individuals in the fabrication of social life. Annual competencies, employee evaluations, discourses on employability, salary individualization, stress management programs, and personal counseling and coaching become responses to these individualistic needs as a way of treating social issues.

None of these ideas were completely new, but the victory of capitalism and the market gave an important role to the private business firm and to managerial categories of thinking. In the last two decades, management as a system of thinking has become *the* intellectual frame that shapes the popular and political imagination, as well as ordinary people's minds. *Manage* and *management* are words now used everywhere. Categories for thought come more and more from managerial spheres. The key words – client, product, quality, reengineering, efficiency, effectiveness – come from market enterprises and are increasingly pervasive in many other organizational types: public administration,

non profit organizations, churches, schools, universities, cooperatives, cultural organizations – even politics, Weber's last redoubt against routinization.

The beginning of the twenty first century has shown the limits of some firms' behaviors. The explosion of the Internet financial bubble, numerous corporate scandals, and the rise of the corporate social responsibility movement have all questioned some basic assumptions of dominant managerial theories. Other issues, such as global warming, ecological threat, the growth of social inequalities, and the negative effects of globalization, have created a diversity of social movements and pushed many people to rethink their management conceptions.

At the same time, the internationalization of the economy and organizations has also provoked reflection on managing according to one's own culture. The appropriateness of the managerial techniques of the western world in general and the US in particular is discussed in different regions of the world. The issue of social cohesion is debated in a context of great migratory movements and gender and ethnicity issues in which people seek to move as freely as capital. Finally, the boom in communication and information technologies led to deep questioning about appropriate organizational models and management. How will all these trends affect the evolution of management theories in this new century? According to many observers, we are going to see three great turns: ethics, culture, and socioeconomics.

Given numerous corporate scandals and inequities, the movement toward ethics and ethical guidelines is going to feed more and more management thinking. All the discussions about corporate governance are related to this issue. More generally, the success of managerial thought associated with poor socioeconomic performance raises many questions about management educational systems and corporate governance. Ethics are also going to be fed by the issue of sustainability. In light of scientific data, many governments and pressure groups have set a new agenda. The creation of social notation agencies, the signing of international agreements, and the diffusion of the sustainable adjective among political institutions, business firms discourse, and society as a whole are illustrations of a growing awareness of societal

values. In a world which may face an environmental and social crisis, management theories have to develop new ideas and practices. Such issues are going to change elements of strategy, accounting, production, marketing, human resources, and research and development.

The second turn is socioeconomic. If the dominant values of managerial agency have to be based on acute environmental and social sensitivity, they are going to change some managerial practices about the workforce, technology, clients, suppliers, stockholders, and communities. The issues of equity, training, wealth sharing, quality, and innovation are going to influence managerial agency more deeply to develop a new agenda of more qualitative economics, in which growth will be associated with social effects and stockholders replaced by stakeholders.

The third turn is cultural. With internationalization and regionalization processes, not only business firms but also administrations, governments, and non profit organizations are discovering the peculiarities of some of their behaviors and social logics. These intercultural experiences are producing intercultural management thinking. Based largely on anthropology, ethnology, and history, this shows that we can not manage with the same methods in different settings. Culture as a symbolic universe is framing the management system of meaning. In so doing, culture is key to understanding work and managerial practices in particular social contexts. Theories of management will increasingly have to discuss cultural embeddedness and the limits of universalistic approaches – even as these seek to remake the world that they address. As management theories are at the heart of our capitalist and managerial society, those who produce them (practitioners, consultants, theoreticians) have a great responsibility. According to many scientists, time is running short. We must build not only on more relevant managerial practices, but also on the human wisdom rooted in historical experience.

SEE ALSO: Bureaucracy and Public Sector Governmentality; Hawthorne Effect; Human Resource Management; Knowledge Management; Management Discourse; Management Education; Management History; Organization Theory; Organizations and the Theory of the Firm; Strategic Management (Organizations)

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management, workers' participation in

George Strauss

Workers' participation in management (WPM), also known as organizational democracy, is a broad concept which covers a wide variety of

institutional arrangements. Definitions abound, many ideologically loaded. At the minimum it is a process which allows employees to exert some influence over their work and the conditions under which they work.

Over the years WPM has been advocated on a variety of grounds (Dachler & Wilpert 1978; Heller et al. 1998). One is *political*: left wingers see it as a means of power sharing, specifically of strengthening working class power at the expense of capitalist management (Couch & Pizzorno 1978). A second is *managerial*. Wide spread participation, it is argued, results in better decisions. Workers are more likely to carry out decisions they made themselves. Moreover, WPM improves communications, reduces the need for supervision, and overall motivates workers to work harder and more efficiently. The final arguments are *humanistic* or *psychological*. The claim is that by contributing to personal growth and satisfying non pecuniary needs (including those for autonomy, creativity, achievement, and social approval) WPM reduces alienation and enhances human dignity.

Power equalization arguments were common in the 1960s and 1970s, especially in Europe and among leftist student groups. With the decline of the left, these are made less commonly now, especially since experience has shown that while participation may have many advantages, it is unlikely to transform society. Managerial and humanistic arguments, by contrast, were most common in the US, particularly in the 1980s. For a while, WPM was almost a fad (Marchington et al. 1993). In Britain, on the other hand, it was widely seen as linked to the highly controversial "human resources" movement.

In practice, WPM comes in many forms. Some are informal. Kinds of formal participation may be classified according to a number of dimensions. One is the level at which participation occurs (e.g., the work group, department, plant, or company). Another classification is by degree of control workers exert: whether management merely listens to employees but retains final say, or whether there is joint control and both sides must agree before a decision is reached (as in collective bargaining), or whether the workers themselves have final say (as in true producers' cooperatives). Still another dimension relates to topics regarding which participation occurs (e.g., wages, production methods, or

investment decisions). A final dimension is ownership: do workers own all, some, or none of the company?

Most of the research has focused on three major types of WPM: direct participation, representative participation, and worker ownership and control.

Direct participation takes two forms, sometimes called offline (or "problem solving") and online (or semi autonomous work) teams. Quality circles (popular in the US during the 1970–1980s) are typical of offline groups (Applebaum & Batt 1994). They consist of a small group of workers from the same work area who meet together voluntarily on a regular basis, often with a specially trained chair. They often deal not just with quality, but also such problems as work flow, productivity, safety, and employee welfare generally. Total Quality Management (TQM) and Six Sigma groups are related programs.

Offline groups typically make recommendations to management. Online teams actually make decisions. Online participation occurs when an entire work group (or work team) is given wide autonomy to make decisions as to how it does its work and how it relates to other departments and management. The concept of work teams developed out of research conducted by the Tavistock Institute in Britain on "socio-technical systems" (Trist & Bamforth 1951) and later introduced extensively in Scandinavia. In time the practice spread to Japan and the US. Some of the most extensive use of autonomous work teams has occurred at NUMMI, the joint General Motors Toyota Fremont, California auto plant (Adler 1992), and at Saturn (Rubenstein & Kochan 2001).

Both online and offline teams spread rapidly in the US during the 1990s. Both forms have been fairly intensively studied, with the main measures of success being productivity and satisfaction. A major finding of the research is direct participation is unlikely to prosper or even survive unless it is accompanied by other appropriate human resources policies and conditions (Ichniowski et al. 2000). Among these are employment security, management and supervisory support (WPM may threaten supervisors' power, status, and even their jobs), work group cohesion, cooperative labor–management relations, and financial rewards for increased

productivity. Cultural factors may also be important.

Unfortunately, many instances of direct participation are short lived. Management engages in "pseudo participation" and gives workers little real autonomy, worker suggestions are not implemented, teams meet less often, and gradually the program atrophies. But in other situations direct participation (regardless of what it is called) has had significant payoffs for all concerned and the entire process has been routinized. Surveys suggest that in the US, at least, manufacturing workers on average enjoyed more autonomy by the mid 1990s than they did a quarter century earlier (Osterman 1994).

Representative participation takes many forms. Aside from unions, the best known and most studied are works councils, which exist in many European countries, with those in Germany receiving particular attention (Rogers & Streeck 1995). Quantitative research in this area has been difficult due to fuzziness in variables; nevertheless, German works councils have been credited with much of the responsibility for Germany's overall good union–management relations. One explanation is that adversarial zero sum gain negotiations on topics such as wages have been conducted by unions at the national level, while reserving for works councils issues more susceptible to cooperation such as discipline, training, and work schedules. Yet even in Germany works councils differ in effectiveness. In some situations they are powerless, in part because of worker uninterest. Efforts have been made to explain why works councils have been more successful in Germany than in, say, France or Spain. The answer seems to be related to history and culture.

The final major category is workers' ownership and control (WOC). Ownership without control (as is the case with most US Employee Stock Ownership Plans) typically involves little participation. Effective control without ownership is difficult. Examples of situations with ownership and considerable control include Israeli kibbutzim, pre 1985 Yugoslav industry, numerous small producers' cooperatives in many countries, professional partnerships among doctors, lawyers, and accountants, and Mondragon, a Spanish conglomerate with over

30,000 employees (Whyte & Whyte 1988). All have been studied.

Research suggests that WOC is most likely to succeed in small firms in which most jobs are the same or can be performed by all members, little capital is required, member motivation is at least partly ideological, the product market favors high quality over low cost products, and most employees enjoy full and equal voting rights (thus professional partnerships are imperfect examples of WOC because secretaries have no vote).

WOC is beset with problems (Uvalic 1991). If economically successful, WOC firms grow too large. In large firms management of necessity becomes a specialized function performed only by a few. Under these circumstances, rotation of top management jobs among members rarely works. Further, member discipline may be divisive. Arrangements for new members to buy in or for retiring members to sell their shares are difficult. As a consequence of these problems most cases of WOC eventually become transformed into traditional hierarchical companies, or they fail altogether.

To conclude, scholarly interest in WPM peaked around 1990. Much of it was motivated by belief that WPM would be a magic cure for industrial problems. But as WPM's limitations emerged, scholarly interest rapidly declined. Nevertheless, the evidence suggests that under appropriate, fairly limited circumstances WPM can enhance both employee job satisfaction and organizational efficiency (Heller et al. 1998: ch. 8).

SEE ALSO: Democracy and Organizations; Human Resource Management; Industrial Relations; Labor-Management Relations; Labor Movement; Labor Process; Teamwork; Work, Sociology of

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manifest destiny

Peter Chua

Manifest destiny refers to a belief and a sustained racial and imperialist project that the Christian God ordained United States settlers and land speculators to occupy the entire North American continent and claim territorial, political, and economic sovereignty over its people and resources. Articulations of this belief and project were prevalent yet widely contested in the nineteenth century; they persist into the twenty first century.

Many white settlers with Northwestern European heritage believed that it was their dutiful mission to remake the “New World” in their image and spread confidently US styled liberty and democracy. This remarkably masculinist mission as the “Great Redeemer” provided for the western expansion across the lands of North American indigenous people (such as the Seminoles, Cherokees, Siouxs, Comanches, Pawnees, Apaches, Poncas, Arapahos, and Cheyennes) into Mexico and toward the Pacific frontier, bringing industrial and national prosperity. Accordingly, this manifest destiny belief conveys the idea that expansion and possession were ordained by God, fulfilled by Christian settlers, and not established by rifles, soldiers, and atrocities.

While influential newspaper editor John O’Sullivan coined this term in 1839, Horsman’s *Race and Manifest Destiny* (1981) reminds us that the white supremacist narrative of manifest destiny had already justified earlier acts related to expansionism and explorations of US colonial settlements. Significant to US history and contemporary life, it is a nationalist ideology that combines distinct forms of racial and religious thoughts to produce particular state, economic, and cultural forms of genocide, assimilation, and other racial projects.

Manifest destiny is not discussed only in relation to continental expansion. It is also associated with US colonialism, military interventions, and economic imperialism in Mexico and Latin American countries. Moreover, it served as a major reason why the US sought to enter the Chinese market, coerced Japan to open its doors to US commerce and “friendship,” purchased Alaska from Russia, and forcibly acquired northern Mexico, Hawaii, Cuba, the Philippines, Puerto Rico, and other territories in the Caribbean and the Pacific. After World War II, the US continued to view as its ordained mission the promotion of US styled democracy and ways of life as it fought wars and occasionally provided peacekeepers in Korea, Vietnam, and other countries in Central America, Northern Africa, and the Middle East.

Sociological inquiries examine closely two major impacts of the manifest destiny belief and related narratives of “white men’s burden” and their “civilizing mission.” First, they predominantly explore conflicts over land tenure.

Neo Marxist sociology focuses on the class struggles and property conflicts entrenched in the earlier US economy. These economic, political, and racialized struggles transformed an early nineteenth century semi slavery and semi feudal society into a global capitalist super power after 1945. World historians and historical sociologists examine the social processes by which white settlers (such as in South Africa and the US), explorers, and soldiers annexed land, acquired property rights, and dispossessed indigenous and other non white communities. They delve into the cultural and economic relationships among frontier violence, shifts in rural land ownership, and subsequent growth of industrial capitalism. Theoretically, they provide new ways to understand power, imperialism, gendered nationalism, states and legal sovereignty, and colonial and postcolonial wars.

The second series of sociological inquiries follows from the first. Racial and ethnic studies and the sociology of racism explore the racialized making of economic, cultural, gender, and sexual subordination and the related demographic changes in racial composition as another direct impact of the manifest destiny belief and the conflicts over land and resources. This belief and set of conflicts shifted political and economic power among racial groups and altered racialized residential patterns (such as through extermination, forced removals, and relocation), territorial sovereignty, and everyday ways of life. These studies also delve into the new expressions of racial and cultural superiority proliferated as white settlers moved westward. These studies highlight earlier stereotypical accounts such as the “disappearing Indians,” “dirty Mexicans,” and “little brown brothers” (to refer to Filipinos). This is in contrast to a variety of racialized narratives of white settlers and immigrants that highlight their rugged individualism and persistence in overcoming the seemingly natural brutality and savagery of the frontier.

Newer inquiries focus on recent continuation and transformation of the manifest destiny narrative as associated with new racial projects, imperialist conquest, and institutional articulations of empire, exceptionalism, and ethnic nationalism. These newer studies place greater analytical importance on culture, religion, and human agency than before. Analytically, they

explore new patronizing relations (for instance, between the US and Iraq during the 2000s) as well as the associated moral sense of political, economic, cultural, and religious superiority (for instance, during the US–Vietnam War). Cultural analyses of these new projects and articulations highlight the nuanced relationships among particular Christian ideological repertoires, nationalist identities (of individuals, groups, and countries), state policies, and the practices of “occasional” interventions. Particularly noteworthy are the debates regarding cultural and gendered expressions of ethnoreligious identities and nationalist atrocities involving land and forced displacement of racial/ethnic groups. Researchers are scrutinizing elite forms of art and popular cultural forms in everyday life to understand how they reflect, mediate, generate, and resist new nationalist articulations in identities and practices of manifest destiny.

SEE ALSO: Colonialism (Neocolonialism); Indigenous Peoples; Migration, Ethnic Conflicts, and Racism; Nation State and Nationalism; Race; Race (Racism); Whiteness

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Mannheim, Karl (1893–1947)

Martin Ruef

Karl Mannheim was born in Budapest, Hungary, but developed his academic career in Germany (in Heidelberg and Frankfurt) and England (at the London School of Economics). He was the earliest proponent of the *sociology of knowledge*, a branch of theory concerned with the influence of social context on our way of perceiving, interpreting, and forming claims about the world. Although Mannheim began his career as a philosopher with an interest in epistemology, he became increasingly fascinated by the impact of society on thought processes, with particular emphasis on culture, intellectual competition, and intergenerational dynamics. In his most influential book, *Ideology and Utopia* (1936 [1929]), Mannheim distinguished between two forms of belief systems: *ideological* systems, which seek to ensure inertia in beliefs through an emphasis on the past; and *utopian* systems, which embrace change in beliefs through an emphasis on the future. After being forced from Germany in 1933, Mannheim's writings turned toward the contemporary crisis generated by fascism, examining the role of planning and the possibility of a democratic society.

Karl Mannheim spent his childhood in Hungary. Following several semesters at the University of Budapest, he moved to Germany to study philosophy at Freiburg and Heidelberg. During this early phase of his academic career, he was influenced by both Hungarian and German teachers, including Georg Lukács and Béla Zalai in the former camp, and Heinrich Rickert, Emil Lask, and Edmund Husserl in the latter. He was also influenced by Juliska Láng, a psychologist and fellow Hungarian student, whom he married shortly after graduation. In 1922, Mannheim published his doctoral dissertation on epistemology, under the title of *The Structural Analysis of Knowledge*.

Mannheim's interest in sociological theory developed in the early 1920s, through an intensive study of Max Weber, Alfred Weber, Max Scheler, and Karl Marx. These efforts came to

fruition in 1925 with the publication of an article on “The Problem of a Sociology of Knowledge,” which created a new subfield of the discipline. At the time, Mannheim accepted his first faculty position at the University of Heidelberg. His most widely read book, *Ideology and Utopia*, was published four years later and introduced the sociology of knowledge to a much broader audience. In the same year, Mannheim was offered a professorship at the University of Frankfurt, which he held until his dismissal by the Nazi regime in 1933.

Following his exile to England, Mannheim joined the London School of Economics and Political Science. In this third phase of his career, he became fascinated by the crisis of liberal democracy, as evidenced by the regime change in Germany. Mannheim expanded his existing scholarship on the role of the intelligentsia to address the problem of planning in a democratic society. This led to an interest in the sociology of education and an appointment to the chair in education at the University of London in 1945. In 1947, Mannheim was offered the job of directing the European division of UNESCO and appeared to have an opportunity to apply his theories on planning and education. Unfortunately, he died unexpectedly a few weeks later at the age of 53.

SOCIOLOGY OF KNOWLEDGE

Mannheim’s pioneering efforts in the sociology of knowledge anticipated a number of recent developments, including a rapprochement between cognitive science and the sociology of culture (DiMaggio 1997), as well as the development of cognitive sociology in its own right (Zerubavel 1997). At the same time, he echoed intellectual concerns that were especially pronounced in early twentieth century Europe, addressing the constraints imposed by conservatism and the question of whether humans can transcend irrational patterns of thought. Seen in this light, Mannheim’s sociology of knowledge can be seen as both building on, and critiquing, the work of predecessors such as Karl Marx and Max Weber.

In his earliest writings, Mannheim began with a central question in interpretive sociology: How can philosophers or sociologists

interpret the cognitive perspective of their subjects, especially if the life experiences and social context of the subjects are very different from those of the analyst? The problem is most acute when the analyst seeks to understand a world view (*Weltanschauung*) holistically, including the large number of attitudes and beliefs that are tacit (pre theoretical) and therefore resistant to scientific formalization (Mannheim 1993 [1921–2]). Mannheim identified three kinds of meaning that can be attached to a society’s *Weltanschauung*, including its intrinsic meaning, elicited without reference to individuals’ motives (*objective* meaning), its extrinsic or symbolic meaning, in light of individuals’ motives (*expressive* meaning), and its meaning as reflected in textual and third party perceptions (*documentary* meaning). From the standpoint of historical interpretation, documentary meaning is most amenable to systematic analysis, although it also tends to exclude pre theoretical intuitions.

In his sociology of knowledge, Mannheim (1993 [1925]) analyzed different approaches to interpretation more systematically. A sociology of knowledge begins with the assumption that the thought of any individual is tied to that individual’s social existence or *being*. How we specify the relationship between thought and being depends on our philosophical perspective. *Positivists* view this relationship as being relatively unproblematic, insofar as empirical evidence collected in an individual’s daily existence can be used to adjudicate between conflicting thoughts. *Formal apriorism* argues that thought precedes being and, as a consequence, we ought to take steps to ensure the logical integrity of thought. *Material apriorism*, also known as phenomenology, questions the utility of formal logic. Instead, it seeks to understand the intrinsic ways in which individuals perceive the world and how, in turn, this influences their social existence. Finally, *historicism* agrees with many of the precepts of phenomenology, but emphasizes that distinctive modes of cognition tend to be characteristic of different historical eras. Mannheim showed clear favoritism toward the latter two positions, especially given his interest in the concept of a *Weltanschauung*.

These themes are continued in Mannheim’s writings on specific types of worldviews, including conservatism, ideology, and utopianism. In analyzing these worldviews, Mannheim began

to turn away from an abstract conception of the cognitive subject and toward an emphasis on *thought communities* (see also Zerubavel 1997). He noted that it is not individuals in isolation who do the thinking, but people in groups who develop distinctive styles of thought (Mannheim 1936 [1929]: 3). One style of thought that Mannheim studied was *conservatism*, a reaction against Enlightenment efforts toward rationalization. Following Weber's discussion of formal rationality, Mannheim (1986 [1927]) defined rationalization as an effort to impose abstract, quantitative laws on nature and society. Conservatism emerged as an intellectual backlash in the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries, highlighting concrete, qualitative, and religious features of western European culture. In contrast to *traditionalists*, who simply engage in habitual efforts to maintain older customs and institutions, conservatives actively reconstruct those customs and institutions for a modern audience. As a detailed exemplar, Mannheim analyzed the conservative Romantic movement in nineteenth century Germany and its efforts to celebrate feudal institutions.

Mannheim's (1936 [1929]) *Ideology and Utopia* likewise can be seen as an effort to understand *Weltanschauungen* that diverge from modern rationalism. Ideological perspectives, which subsume conservatism, entail anti rational thinking intended to retard social change. Utopianism, on the other hand, seeks social transformation, but also relies on strong anti rational elements – in particular, an orientation toward goals which are not yet attainable in reality (p. 173). In advancing these conceptions, Mannheim sought to remove ideology from its then dominant Marxist connotation, especially as reflected in the critique of “false consciousness.” Mannheim suggested that all worldviews – including capitalism, socialism, and communism – might be classified as ideological or utopian thinking, depending on the context and interests with which they are advanced.

In pursuing his sociology of knowledge, Mannheim also attempted to clarify the impact of social structure on differences in *Weltanschauung*. One relevant structure in this respect involves *generations* – cohorts of individuals born around the same time. Mannheim stressed that generations, as demographic units, should be distinguished from “generations as

actuality,” which require that cohort members share a common culture. The second structural feature that interested Mannheim was *competition* among opposing worldviews. Extending basic economic terminology, Mannheim distinguished between prevailing worldviews achieved by virtue of consensus, by monopolistic interpretation, by atomistic competition, and by concentration among different thought communities. In many respects, he anticipated recent sociological developments concerning the competitive ecology of ideas (e.g., Barnett & Woywode 2004).

SOCIOLOGY OF INTELLECTUALS

In discussing his sociology of knowledge, Mannheim presented a distinctive perspective on intellectuals (Kurzman & Owens 2002). While other scholars of his day, such as the Italian communist Antonio Gramsci, characterized intellectuals as being tied to their social class of origin, Mannheim (1936 [1929]: 137) argued that the intelligentsia in modern society was a relatively autonomous and classless stratum. In the past, he suggested, intellectual activity had been monopolized by closed groups, such as the priesthood, defined along occupational or class lines. With the advent of the “modern bourgeoisie,” however, the intelligentsia became largely detached from social class and, as a consequence, their worldviews are constantly in a state of change (p. 139). Members of the intelligentsia can therefore freely align themselves with a variety of social classes or political parties.

DEMOCRATIZATION OF CULTURE

Following the rise of fascism, Mannheim's writings increasingly turned toward social policy concerns. Considering his exile from Germany, Mannheim's perspective was often surprisingly optimistic. He stressed that trends toward democracy – not just in political life, but in intellectual life as a whole – were the destiny of modern society (1993 [1933]: 447). Democracy, in this sense, relied on three cultural principles. The first was the ontological *equality* of all individual members of society. By

equality, Mannheim did not mean to imply a “mechanical leveling” of human beings, but simply that all members of society should pursue their goals with equal opportunity. The second principle was the *autonomy* (or “vital selfhood”) of individuals, coupled with social responsibility. A third principle addressed the potential paradox of elites in a democratic society and appropriate methods of *elite selection*. Mannheim noted that democratic elite selection can proceed through bureaucratic advancement, unrestricted competition, or party politics.

Mannheim also identified pathologies that tend to be associated with processes of democratization. As evidenced in fascism, mass democratic movements could lead to anti democratic outcomes. This was especially common when democracy became divorced from rationality and served as an instrument of emotional impulses and mob rule (1993 [1933]: 450). Mannheim’s solution was to suggest ways in which rational planning could be combined with a democratic culture. A key aspect of planning that captured Mannheim’s attention involved establishing a system of education that would prepare citizens for democracy. The discipline of sociology was viewed as an integral part of such educational reforms, particularly in helping average citizens understand the complex social institutions that can support a democratic civilization.

SEE ALSO: Ideology; Knowledge, Sociology of; Marx, Karl; Phenomenology; Rational Choice Theories; Utopia; Weber, Max

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Marcuse, Herbert (1898–1979)

Steven P. Dandaneau

Herbert Marcuse was a German philosopher and social theorist who immigrated to the US to escape Nazi persecution, becoming a naturalized US citizen in 1940. Marcuse is credited with having formulated a distinctive critical theory of society that combined a Hegelian reading of Marx with insights drawn from his masterful studies of modern and twentieth century philosophy and social theory. As the only member of the famed Frankfurt School’s inner circle at ease with partisanship, Marcuse’s highly visible participation in 1960s revolutionary activism led to his celebration as a New Left intellectual hero on a par with Jean Paul Sartre. His once considerable presence and notoriety worldwide notwithstanding, Marcuse’s scant influence on institutionalized sociology since is largely attributable to the fact that his lifelong commitment to dialectical forms of critical social analysis places his otherwise rich oeuvre at loggerheads with predominantly positivist sociology.

Marcuse’s intellectual life may be divided into five periods. While a spiritual connection with Hegel and Marx is evident even in his earliest days, the facts of Marcuse’s biography meant that he would be a material witness to

the rise of Nazism as well as to the existentialist and phenomenological philosophies of Martin Heidegger and Edmund Husserl, with whom he studied between 1927 and 1932. Their intensive tutelage on conditions of radical subjective existence, experience, and perception during Germany's bitter interwar years enriched Marcuse's critical analysis of an emergent fascist society, and provided the basis for his first major scholarly synthesis, construed, characteristically, as a timely political intervention.

Marcuse's *Reason and Revolution: Hegel and the Rise of Social Theory* (1941), regarded by Marxists and non Marxists alike as a classic study, sets out to rescue Hegelian philosophy from its Nazi propagated association with totalitarian ideology. But Marcuse also demonstrates the radical implications of Hegelian philosophy for would be ideologists of liberal capitalist society by showing that the genesis of the dominant western positivist philosophy and social science lies in a series of self conscious efforts to suppress the revolutionary implications of Hegel's dialectical method of sociohistorical analysis, the same method that Marx, of course, embraced rather than suppressed. Neither fodder for national socialism nor simply the long vanquished foe of positivism, Hegel's historicizing phenomenology is viewed as the ideal expression of Reason's development through acts of radical negation, the material manifestation of which, for Marcuse as previously for Marx, is revolutionary praxis. Marcuse's distinctive vision of praxis would eventually, however, attend to elements of subjective existential experience – as suggested, for example, by his later demand for “new sensibilities” – that exceed even those evident in Marx's *Economic and Philosophic Manuscripts of 1844*.

During and after World War II, Marcuse worked for various pre CIA US intelligence agencies in an effort to aid the defeat of the Nazi regime and its post war remnants. The second major period of his intellectual life thus does not become widely evident until the publication of his perhaps most visionary book, *Eros and Civilization: A Philosophical Inquiry into Freud* (1955).

With McCarthy still calling witnesses, Marcuse decamped in 1952 to Columbia and Harvard before landing at Brandeis University

in 1954, there joining Abraham Maslow and countless similarly luminous intellectuals in creating a veritable intellectual and cultural 1960s in the middle of the “Leave It to Beaver” 1950s. Much of Marcuse's study at this time was dedicated to demonstrating, as he had done for Hegel, the profoundly revolutionary character of Freud's psychoanalysis. Where in Freud there is analysis of repression, Marcuse, for example, distinguishes socially necessary forms of psychological repression from the “surplus repression” foisted upon the denizens of consumerist capitalist society. Freud's uncompromising emphases on sharply contradictory forces, such as elaborated in his famous *Civilization and Its Discontents*, is preferable, argued Marcuse, to the theoretical adjustments and inward looking palliatives made popular by the leading neo Freudians and ego psychologists of the day, among them Karen Horney, Erik Erikson, and Marcuse's former Frankfurt School colleague, Erich Fromm. Frankfurt School critical theory is often characterized as having proffered a novel Marx–Freud synthesis, the foremost expression of which was given by Marcuse.

Marcuse's most straightforwardly sociological studies are the mainstay of his third period of intellectual work. *Soviet Marxism* (1958) and *One Dimensional Man* (1964) advance highly critical analyses of what are depicted as essentially two competing forms of totalitarian society, the former evidently so and justified by the bastardization of a once radical theory, the latter less evidently so and all the more threatening as a result. For Marcuse, advanced capitalist industrial society systematically absorbs the sting of utopian criticism and papers over deep seated contradictions via the diffusion of its extraordinary wealth and power through the mechanisms of mass society and culture. With basic needs largely met by the technologies of the Welfare/Warfare State and Reason impoverished via the seductive hegemony of diffuse technocratic thinking, Marcuse depicts an unsettling Cold War dystopia where choice of ice cream and candidates among competing flavors measures the extent of possible happiness and freedom. *One Dimensional Man* tended to motivate, however, rather than discourage dissent, as it served as a surprising inspiration for radical social and cultural analysis as well as a call to redeem the

promise of Reason via revolutionary praxis for many who took up the mantle of protest in the 1960s.

Marcuse's involvement in what he advocated as a "Great Refusal" constitutes his fourth major period of social and philosophical analysis and coincides with his move to the University of California at San Diego in 1965. In 1969 Marcuse published *An Essay on Liberation*; in 1972, *Counterrevolution and Revolt*. In these works and others, Marcuse peers unflinchingly into the abyss of war, assassination, and political repression, searching in the hope of finding reason to hope as much as for just cause for revolutionary action or for specific positions and strategies in the massive worldwide struggles then ongoing. Given his visibility and increasing stridency, it is perhaps not surprising that Marcuse was harassed by government officials, including California governor Ronald Reagan.

The final period of Marcuse's life and work is aesthetic in form and content and is summarized in his final book, *The Aesthetic Dimension: Towards a Critique of Marxist Aesthetics* (1978). With the new social movements of the 1960s lost in their long march through the institutions, Marcuse returned to the fundamental philosophical basis of his lifetime of advocacy for the inherent bond between Reason and Revolution. This book also suggests rapprochement with the more consistently aesthetic critical theory of Horkheimer and Adorno. As was the case with Adorno, Marcuse's last major study sought to wrest from the grips of an oppressive historical reality the almost unspeakable hope for the realization of utopian possibilities. Marcuse died in 1979, the same year as Margaret Thatcher was elected prime minister.

As the generation of the 1960s fades into their golden years, it is ever more doubtful that Herbert Marcuse's intellectual legacy will again significantly influence sociological analysis. Major figures in social theory, from Anthony Giddens to critical theory's putative expositor, Jürgen Habermas, have defined their distance from Marcuse. Yet contemporary advanced capitalist society appears no less "one dimensional" than when Marcuse first dubbed it such, no less incapable of imagining qualitative self transformation. Nor do these societies appear

to thrive any less on what Marcuse called "repressive desublimation," the process whereby pseudo gratifications translate into pseudo freedoms, much as Prole Feed, Hate Week, and the up scale satisfactions symbolized by Victory Gin were just about enough to ensure happiness in Oceania. "Either there will be a catastrophe or things will get worse," Marcuse sometimes prophesized to his students. The jury remains out on which it will be.

SEE ALSO: Adorno, Theodor W.; Dialectic; Critical Theory/Frankfurt School; Freud, Sigmund; Fromm, Erich; Horkheimer, Max; Positivism

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marginal art

Yoshio Sugimoto

The term marginal art (*genkai geijutsu*) was coined by Shunsuke Tsurumi, an analyst of mass culture in Japan. Tsurumi classifies art forms into three analytical categories: pure, popular, and marginal. In what he terms pure art, both producers and their audience are art specialists, with the producers being professional artists and those who appreciate it being

equipped with a degree of expert knowledge. For instance, paintings, symphonies, operas, *noh*, and formal tea ceremonies executed or performed by professionals fall into this category. Popular art is produced by professional artists in collaboration with mass media organizations, but is consumed by non specialist masses and is therefore often regarded as vulgar art or pseudo art. Its specific forms include television programs, popular songs, posters, detective stories, animations, and comic strips.

Marginal art differs from both pure and popular art in that both its producers and its consumers are laypeople that lack professional expertise. Marginal art emerges in the domain where everyday life and artistic expression intersect and includes such concrete forms as graffiti, house decoration, children's building blocks, everyday gestures, song variations, festivals, funerals, family videos, family albums, political demonstrations, calls to enliven physical labor, nicknaming, tongue twisters, and even gravesite decorations. These activities and their products are primarily devised and developed by amateurs who neither make a living through professional artistic practice nor claim specialist artistic know how. Similarly, those who appreciate the work are also people untrained in artistic appreciation or do not possess specialist knowledge. To an extent, every person can be, and is, a marginal artist. By definition, marginal art lacks precision or rigor and contains ambiguities that constitute the seeds of more articulated forms of professionally produced art.

Tsurumi's perspective on art includes all kinds of symbols distilled from human aesthetic experiences. It also covers a wider range of human activities than is conventionally considered artistic and questions the narrow dichotomy between pure and popular art forms. He suggests that marginal art, as the most primordial art form, has existed since ancient times and thus preceded the other two forms of art. He contends that the development of the mass media and of modern economic and political institutions has removed marginal art from the sphere of legitimately recognized art.

According to Tsurumi, "playful activities" that go hand in hand with human labor constitute the core of marginal art. For example, most traditional, anonymously authored folk songs reflect agricultural work such as rice planting,

tea picking, and log carrying. Many artifacts of folk craft such as rice bowls, tea cups, and handcrafted furniture are produced by nameless craftspersons and are used every day by ordinary people who appreciate the beauty and utility of the object. Hence, central to the genre of marginal art is the "aesthetics of use," as opposed to the principle of art for art's sake, which operates in pure art, or art for commerce's sake, which animates popular art.

The various ways in which people and objects are named represents a verbal domain of marginal art. Riddles, anecdotes, funny little tales, and proverbs that have survived for centuries among the masses are the products of marginal art that have withstood the test of time. In the nonverbal sphere, the ways in which one smiles, cries, eats, and drinks often manifest themselves as marginal art. *Origami*, the Japanese marginal art of folding paper into figures and *bonsai*, the cultivation of dwarf trees in shallow pots, are now practiced internationally.

While large scale festivals for tourists are, by and large, commercially organized expressions of popular culture in which the performers are separated from the audience, small local festivals, in which little distinction is made between the two, contain the widest range of marginal art and represent its most comprehensive manifestation. Centering on folk religious memories, small scale, regional festivals bring together popular artistic skills, expressions, and products that have roots in community life. In the Japanese context, they may include portable shrines, summer Bon Festival songs and dances, goods sold at night stalls, and decorations in sacred places.

The notion of marginal art reflects and resonates with the perspectives of folklore studies. When studied collectively and systematically, marginal art provides a point of entry into the ways in which ordinary people have lived communally in various geographic locations and historical periods.

This perspective informed a variety of studies of Japan's grassroots culture that were conducted for a few decades after World War II by the *Shiso no kagaku* (Thought of Science) group, for which Tsurumi was the prime intellectual engine. Comprised of both academic researchers and non professional observers, this popular level, private research group had

a number of branches around the country. Through its analysis of the lifestyles, aesthetics, conceptions, beliefs, and philosophies of common people it put marginal art and those that create and use it on the map of public discourse and debate.

SEE ALSO: Art Worlds; *Seikatsu/Seikatsusha*; Yanagita, Kunio

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marginality

Rutledge M. Dennis

The concept of marginality was first introduced by Robert Park (1928) and explained, almost as a minor theme, in Park's analysis of the causes and consequences of human migrations. In his article, Park referred to a "new type of personality" which was emerging out of rapid human migratory patterns during the end of the nineteenth century and the beginning of the twentieth, and how they would affect present and future relations between groups. The most interesting feature of this essay was Park's discussion of this new personality, which would be a "cultural hybrid, a man living and sharing intimately in the cultural life and traditions of two distinct peoples . . . a man on the margin of two cultures and two societies, which never completely interpenetrated and fused." Edwin Stonequist (1937) probed the marginality concept more extensively than Park, but he highlighted the personality features of marginality and focused his critique into an assessment of the mental state of those marginalized. So closely allied are the views of the two that we can without distortion discuss their views as the Park–Stonequist model of marginality. It became the predominant model and a reference point for studies of marginality (Dennis 1991: 4) until Dickie Clark (1966) introduced the term "marginal situation"

and moved the discussion from the personality of the marginalized to a more pointedly sociological reference point. Dickie Clark concluded that the Park–Stonequist model, largely Stonequist's extension of Park's early model, subverted and distorted the sociology of marginality by creating an exclusive model of the marginal who became permanently stereotyped as "irrational, moody, and temperamental."

Dickie Clark's emphasis on the "marginal situation" is important in that he grounded the concept within sociology, not psychology, and made power and privilege precursors to its genesis. Likewise, the marginal situation evolved out of historical practices and policies which legitimized unequal status and opportunity structures. However, the heavy emphasis on demarcating marginal situations within largely unstructured temporary interactions and settings tended to deflate and underemphasize marginal situations within very structured institutional interactions (Dickie Clark 1966: 28). The importance of Dickie Clark's approach, however, gave credence to the argument that marginality was more nuanced, complex, and multidimensional than had been assumed.

The Park–Stonequist model of racial, ethnic, religious, or cultural groups caught between two contrasting worlds, neither of which accepted them, is no longer the model used today. The term has been expanded to include many groups that differ in a variety of ways from the dominant culture, who are viewed by that dominant society as the "other" and dwell on the fringes of their society. A current grouping of those who have made a case for themselves as being among the marginals would include women, the poor, homosexuals, and those with mental and physical illnesses. But central to the marginality query is the question of who wields power, who establishes policies, and the nature of the structural barriers created and the institutions most affected. The lack of access, however, does not translate into a non societal role, because imposed marginality (see below) is designed to create emotional and social barriers as well as structural ones as it imposes specific though limited roles and positions to be acted and played out by marginals. Thus, marginals are both "of" and "in" the society but with limited access and prescribed positions, and with special roles.

There are two types of marginality: imposed marginality and marginality by choice. Powerful groups using an array of legal, social, economic, and political measures push less powerful groups to the edges of the society and generally attempt to utilize them in the labor market, but in other ways render them invisible (Dennis 2005). This pattern may be seen in the United States as well as throughout Africa, Europe, Asia, and Latin America (Dennis 1994). Usually, the group marginalizing another is numerically larger, but South Africa under apartheid was an example of how a numerically smaller population can marginalize and render momentarily powerless a much larger population. The Park–Stonequist model is of little help in defining or explaining marginality within the context of intergroup relations in the twenty first century. Marginalization may often lead to anger and resentment, and to a situation in which the marginalized lay in wait for opportunities in anticipation of a time when scores might be settled. Contemporary battles and skirmishes in the Sudan, Spain, Kosovo, and Northern Ireland represent cases of formerly marginalized groups seeking redress for historical grievances. The histories of these cases depict situations in which an accommodation strategy had been the *modus operandi*, but quite often dominant groups assume that the accommodationist strategies used by powerless groups have been accepted by these groups as a way of life and as an acceptance of their marginal status. That is often far from true.

The second type of marginality is marginality by choice in which groups, usually for religious reasons or for artistic and scholarly reasons, desire to separate themselves and become marginal to the larger social, political, and economic community. Hasidic groups in New York City, the Amish, and the Nation of Islam during the 1950s, 1960s, and 1970s represent this focus. Unlike an imposed marginality in which the marginalized may desire more extensive political, cultural, or economic participation, groups which choose marginality are all too happy to be excluded and left alone, and only those among these groups who desire to leave the group might be said to experience this dual marginality as they seek to find a place in the formerly forbidden worlds beyond the group's enclaves. It is this dual marginality with its implied

ambivalences, uncertainties, and choices which represents our present era and generation.

The concept continues to be useful in sociology because it describes structural linkages and relations, and permits us to chart, document, and locate who is a marginal and why, as well as probe the consequences of marginality for the larger society. This will require that we mine more extensively examples of marginality, especially in the areas of social class, ethnicity, and race.

Dual marginality has been suggested as a multidimensional approach to the marginality dilemma and as an approach which might rescue marginality from a theoretical *cul de sac* (Dennis 1991, 2003). A similar point had been made earlier by Peter Worsley (1984). In Dennis's 1991 study the dual marginality theme focused on black youth and their position and role in a medium sized Midwestern city: they were caught between their role as youth under parental guidance and their role and position of soon to be independent young adults; caught between their role and position in a small and marginal black community and a larger, often hostile, white community; caught between their circumscribed role of black youth in a largely segregated city with its limited mobility and freedoms and the role of white youth and their greater freedom in the larger dominant community. The dualness of their marginality was described as the ambivalence of youth to their parents and the black community on the one hand, and their ambivalence toward both white youth and the white community on the other. What was clear in the definition of dual marginality was its structural framework and the fact that the youth were playing out specific roles and positions in segmented aspects of their dual marginal status: they had limited encounters with white youth in the white world, just as they had limited encounters with white adults in the dominant community. In each of these segmented worlds, black youth display both an acceptance and a rejection, mainly because their position is not clear to themselves and they believe that they are both accepted and rejected by parents, the black community, white youth, and the larger white community.

The youth are wedged between those segments presented above, but unlike the Park–Stonequist model, rather than the rejection

by both and the personality problems which ultimately emerge, there are degrees of acceptance and rejection from the segmented structures, as well as degrees of acceptance and rejection by youth. The dualness of the marginality is seen more in the fact that the youth, though rejected by the “other,” continue to seek an entrance into that world, but when opportunities arise which make possible their entrance or absorption into that world, they may well reject such opportunities. One might see parallel examples in an examination of racial and ethnic groups within large dominant group organizations. Individuals may reject aspects of the culture into which they were born, and may wish to experience and assimilate into another culture or group but may not be able or willing to shed many of the values and behavioral traits of that culture. The ambivalence centers around the tradeoffs seen as necessary to make the leap from one culture to another or from one group to another. So there is simultaneously a movement toward and away from the group to which entrance is sought, just as there is a movement toward and away from the group which has provided the primary socialization. In enlarging the scope of marginality beyond the Park–Stonequist model, it is apparent that today, individuals and groups must confront a world which reflects varying degrees of dual marginality (openness and closedness) as individuals and groups move in and out of group labels and identities and into a world of great certainties and uncertainties. It is this power and resource inequity and the blocked mobility experienced by those marginalized that warrant continued attention by both scholars and activist scholars.

SEE ALSO: Accommodation; Acculturation; Assimilation; Biracialism; Caste; Inequalities Past and Present; Conflict (Racial/Ethnic); Culture; Marginalization, Outsiders; Plural Society; Social Integration and Inclusion; Solidarity

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marginalization, outsiders

Hartley Dean

Marginalization is a metaphor that refers to processes by which individuals or groups are kept at or pushed beyond the edges of society. The term outsiders may be used to refer to those individuals or groups who are marginalized.

The expression marginalization appears to have originated with Robert Park’s (1928) concept of “marginal man,” a term he coined to characterize the lot of impoverished minority ethnic immigrants to a predominantly white Anglo Saxon Protestant United States. It later became popular, particularly in Latin America (e.g., Germani 1980), as a term that captured the supposed “backwardness,” not of immigrants in developed countries, but of people in developing countries who fail or are prevented from participating in the economic, political, and cultural transition to modernity. Modernity, it is argued, constitutes as anomalous the subordinate status and cultural differences of rural peoples and the urban poor who are not properly assimilated to the formal economy or the political or social mainstream. More recently, the term marginalization has been largely superseded by the term exclusion. Nonetheless, marginalization often appears as a synonym for extreme poverty or for social exclusion and it may sometimes be

difficult to distinguish between the concepts other than in terms of who is choosing to use them. People may be marginalized from economic production; from consumption (including the consumption of public services); from political participation; and/or from social or cultural interaction. This can apply as much in the developed as in the developing world (e.g., Burchardt et al. 2002).

The nature of the capitalist process of production is such that not everybody will be employed within it, and Marx in his classic analysis referred to those who are rendered outsiders as the “reserve army of labor,” who are pushed to the margins of the labor market. Those outside the formal economy may engage in marginalized forms of economic activity, for example in subsistence agriculture in the developing world, in informal or unregulated economic activity (e.g., Williams & Windebank 1998), or in street level activities, such as hustling or begging (e.g., Dean 1999). Equally important, especially in the context of a society characterized by consumerism (Bauman 1998), is that those who cannot afford to obtain access to goods or services may be marginalized: not only can they remain or become outsiders or strangers to the kinds of shops and leisure facilities that others use, but also they may inhabit marginalized neighborhoods that are poorly served by public services or which may, for example, have been “redlined” by credit providers (e.g., Power 1999). Ultimately, they may exist outside the parameters that define a customary lifestyle, as happens, for example, when people become homeless. Democratic systems may marginalize or ignore the interests of minority groups, and those who are for whatever reason stigmatized or reviled may be marginalized from social networks and community life.

It is not only what people may be marginalized from, but also why they are marginalized. The poor may become outsiders, but so too can the rich when they choose to live separately in gated communities. Disabled people may quite literally be outsiders if, because their needs are marginal to the interests of architects, builders, and planners, they cannot obtain access to public buildings or housing accommodation. Minority and/or itinerant ethnic groups may be marginalized because of racism and so form outsider communities.

The most extreme form of marginalization is associated with criminalization, which occurs when individuals or groups are labeled as deviant (Becker 1963). This can occur when popular or media inspired “moral panics” stigmatize particular kinds of behavior (which may or may not be technically criminal) and when the offenders assume a marginalized identity.

SEE ALSO: Deviance; Deviance, Criminalization of; Disability as a Social Problem; Ethnic/Informed Economy; Homelessness; Marginality; Marx, Karl; Poverty; Race; Race (Racism); Social Exclusion

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Marianne Weber on social change

Patricia Lengermann

Marianne Weber's work is being only slowly recovered and studied; her sociology in general and her analysis of social change in particular

are informed by and respond to the ideas of Marx (Weber 1900), of her husband Max, of their mutual friend Georg Simmel, and of feminist activists and theorists like Charlotte Perkins Gilman and Ellen Key. Of these, her debate with Max is arguably the most important. Like him, she embraced a historical comparative methodology. But her feminism led her to reject his stance in value neutrality, to offer a radically different interpretation of the significance of Protestantism and capitalism, and to use a three part model of social change, in which ideas are only an equal player with materiality and human agency.

Marianne Weber's sociology emerges today as an almost archetypal representative of the practice of feminist sociology: it has as its central problematic the fundamental feminist principle of describing and explaining society from the standpoint of women and using those descriptions and explanations to analyze how to change society in the direction of greater justice. Her theories of social change are interwoven with the ongoing feminist commitment, common to critical sociologists generally, that the purpose of sociology is not just to know the world but to change it, and the corollary principle that in order to know the world one must try to change it. Marianne Weber was both a social theorist and an activist who built a career as an important player in a number of German feminist organizations, culminating in the period 1919–20, when she became the first German woman representative elected to a state assembly (Baden) and was elected president of the Federation of German Women's Organizations. For her, as for many sociologists speaking for oppressed groups, the sociological project is profoundly liberationist.

Weber's analysis of social change focuses on the description and explanation of the condition of women, a condition she viewed as equally complex and important to study and understand as that of men. She described the changes in women's condition from prehistory to the present (Weber 1907) as an uneven movement toward greater autonomy, and explained both the movement and its unevenness in terms of the dynamic interaction among three fundamental elements in social life – ideas, materiality, and agency. She saw this dynamic working at both the microsocial and macrosocial level and

producing both planned outcomes and unintended consequences.

Weber invoked this model of change at the microsocial level in her response to Simmel's thesis about gender and modernity. Simmel argued that while the massing of objective culture in the world has overwhelmed modern men to the point where they are in danger of losing their capacity for subjective culture (or an interior life), women, unsuited to and excluded from full participation in objective culture, retain a spirituality that men have lost. Weber responded in part by playing off Simmel's dichotomies between objective and subjective culture, arguing that modern women are fully capable of engaging in objective culture and that men must take responsibility for their subjective culture. Then, and using her tripartite model, she stated that all women occupy a particular place in the creation of culture, a third realm of cultural production that she named "women's special cultural task . . . the shaping of immediate existence" (Weber 1998c [1918]: 225). She saw women, through acts of individual agency, taking the larger world of objective culture – both material and ideational – and translating it through work into the daily artifacts and atmosphere of the home. She argued that the human ability to create a meaningful subjective culture is largely determined by the efficacy and harmony of this middle ground in which people encounter – or miss or are denied – order, beauty, care, moral direction. Thus, the arrangements of the home – the aesthetic of its furnishings, the predictability of its routines, the tenor of its interactional style – lay the foundation in individual personality for the creation of the varieties of human relationships that bind individuals to each other; the very fabric of social life depends on women's cultural production in the home (Weber 1998c [1918]).

Where Simmel viewed cultural production being radically changed by modernity, Weber both accepted that claim and asserted a basic consistency in the role of women in this third realm of cultural production. She also held that new opportunities make it incumbent upon women – and especially women of the propertied classes who have more leisure – to acquire a deeper cultural content that they may actively shape the world of everyday life rather than

merely maintain its customary routines. And she recognized that as women seize new opportunities, they must, like men, guard against the dangers of distorting their personalities under the pressure of the specialization of modern professional life. While Weber herself argued for changes in the marriage relationship and recognized that women working outside the home would impact the home, she never questioned the centrality of this middle ground of cultural production, nor that it was women's role through individual action to translate ideas into material arrangements and material arrangements into expressions of meaning. Her argument about the need for a public valuation of housework rests in part on the importance she assigned to this central female task of shaping the immediate experience of the daily world.

At the macrosocial level, Weber posited that materiality is most represented by the economy, ideas most manifested in religion, education, and law, and agency as expressing itself in collective action through social movements. Historically, a dynamic interaction among these structures has progressively changed to what is for women the central institution: marriage and family. Using this model, she took up two of the themes most known to sociologists through Max Weber – the “Protestant ethic” and the “spirit of capitalism.” Marianne Weber argued that the significance of the Protestant ethic for women lies in the insistence in the most radical Protestant sects – most especially the Quakers – that every person, male or female, stands before God alone and accountable. Where Max found the seeds of capitalism, Marianne found the seeds of liberation: “Within the religious communities of the New World that were sustained by the Puritan spirit, the idea of the religious equality of woman first came to be taken seriously. . . . Freedom of conscience, the mother of all personal rights of the individual, stood, across the ocean, at the cradle of women's rights as well” (1998a [1912]: 217). But Marianne also noted the limits of the power of ideas to produce social change. She criticized the German idealist philosophers, like Kant and Fichte, who refused to extend to women the primary duty they assigned to men, the duty of achieving moral agency or, in Weber's phrase, “autonomy”; she labeled as “self serving” the patriarchal

argument that the married woman voluntarily gave over this right to the husband and argued instead that no one can yield that duty wholesale to another.

Indeed, within Weber's presentation, the idea systems of Protestantism and German idealism seem important chiefly in providing a legitimation for women's assertions of rights to autonomy; the rights themselves can only be won by a change in the material conditions which frame women's negotiations for agency. Specifically, women need access to and independent control of monetary resources in order to negotiate for autonomy within the structure of patriarchal marriage. While for Max Weber the growth of capitalism leads men into an iron cage of practical rationality, for Marianne Weber the growth of capitalism had liberated women from the strict confines of domestic life to which their gender had hitherto assigned them. Capitalism required women's participation in the paid workforce and thus gave women an independent economic base in the public sphere.

Marianne Weber perceived women – and men – in her time poised among at least three fundamentally conflicting assumptions: (1) the unintended but logical conclusion of Protestantism and German idealism that justifies woman as an independent moral agent; (2) the policies of the material world of the capitalist economy that require that women as workers and as consumers be able to act as independent contracting agents; and (3) the patriarchal ideas expressed in established religion, law, state, and philosophy that define woman, as wife, as dependent on and subservient to the husband.

It is at this historic moment of contradiction that women's agency in the form of mobilized feminist collective activism would become the force that would work to spell out the terms under which marriage would be reorganized and women's autonomy guaranteed. This reorganization would occur primarily by demanding that new laws, as the codification of collective ideas, be created to regulate the material relations of women's employment and status in marriage. Writing on the German women's movement, Marianne Weber stressed that while that movement represented a diversity of opinion, it was united in its understanding that women, in marriage and in the public

sphere, must be empowered to stand as fully autonomous human beings equal to men. In marriage, Marianne Weber saw this leading toward “companionate marriage” rather than the old patriarchal marriage hierarchy.

In her most policy oriented exploration of change, “On the Valuation of Housework” (1912), Weber focused on what she saw as one key piece in a total marriage reform – a method of compensating the housewife for the work she does in the home. She explored the possibility of writing a law that would guarantee women within marriage some right to personal income, recognizing both the worth of women’s work and their need for financial independence. In considering how women could gain financial independence, Weber made a critical point for the development of feminist sociology: the recognition of differences among women. While acknowledging that perhaps an important fraction of women, chiefly from the professional classes, could find independence – in the way outlined by Charlotte Perkins Gilman – through employment outside the home, Weber argued that for many women the possibility of employment that paid an individual living wage was unlikely. She offered a range of empirical data about women’s material condition, most especially their employment, to show that what Gilman dreamt of was not a possibility for the mass of women who had to work at low paid jobs. Presenting a statistical overview of the employment of women, Marianne Weber argued that the typical woman worker in the new industrial order was recruited from the propertyless classes and had to continue to juggle the dual demands of wage work and housework/motherhood. These women worked not out of some calling to a particular career nor with a hope of financial independence, but because they had to for the sake of survival. Weber, therefore, turned to the possibility that the economic value of housework could be calculated and that calculation codified into law.

In examining the possibility of wages for housework, Weber investigated the relationship between the macrosocial and microsocial in securing social change. She explored at some length whether compensation for housework should be paid by the government or by the individual husband, finally arguing for the latter, partly on the grounds of economic

practicality (as the total sum would be staggering for the country) and partly on the grounds of the most effective mechanism for social change. Where in her discussion of “Authority and Autonomy in Marriage” (1912) she focused primarily on the macrosocial institutions of law and religion, in looking at the issue of the valuation of housework Weber turned to the microsocial. Arguing that on the basis of past performance the government could be expected to be slow to move in this area, she reasoned that women had to work out in their individual marriages the kind of egalitarian relationship they wished to see enacted in law. Custom (everyday ideas about material relations) developed out of individual agency (actions by women and men defining individual marriages) would pave the way for legal change, the macrosocial codification of ideas of right relations between women and men.

SEE ALSO: Cultural Feminism; Feminism; Gender, Social Movements and; Gender, Work, and Family; Gilman, Charlotte Perkins; Simmel, Georg; Stratification, Gender and; Weber, Max

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marital power/resource theory

Graham Allan

Questions about inequalities in marriage and the distribution of power within the relationship have long been a concern within family sociology. In particular, ideas about historic shifts in the dominance of husbands/fathers within families have vied with feminist inspired views of the continuing significance of patriarchal control in both public and private spheres. The former perspective was captured well in Burgess's (Burgess & Locke 1945) influential idea of a shift from "marriage as an institution" to "marriage as a relationship," with some seeing the growth of "companionate" marriage as a sure indicator that marriage would increasingly become a relationship of equality (Clark 1991). (See Young & Willmott 1973 for a particularly optimistic analysis.) Others, however, argued that marriage continued to be a structurally unequal relationship as a consequence of both the differential opportunities open to men and women, especially in the workplace, and

the continuation of a highly gendered division of labor within the home (see, e.g., Delphy & Leonard 1992).

One of the earliest – and most cited – studies examining the distribution of power within marriage was conducted by Robert Blood and Donald Wolfe in *Husbands and Wives: The Dynamics of Married Living* (1960). In this, they report on a study in which over 900 wives were interviewed about the character of their marriage. More specifically, Blood and Wolfe were interested in finding out about who made decisions within the marriage, arguing that decision making was a clear indicator of the exercise of power and authority within any relationship. In the study, each respondent was asked questions about eight different decisions that couples and families typically made. These included such decisions as: what job a husband should take; whether or not to buy life insurance; and how much money the family can afford to spend each week on food. As a result of their findings, Blood and Wolfe concluded that decision making, and thus power, within marriage was based on the level of social and economic resource that each spouse brought to the marriage. Thus, the greater the differential in, for example, a spouse's earnings, education, and status, the greater power that spouse would have to make decisions over different aspects of family life.

Although highly influential, Blood and Wolfe's conclusions were questioned by many researchers concerned with marital power, on a combination of theoretical and methodological grounds. Overall though, the criticisms made of the study raised important questions about the nature of power in marriage and helped generate a far more sophisticated understanding of its exercise than had existed previously. Three levels of criticism were of particular moment. The first concerned the issues about which the respondents had been questioned. Seemingly simple, these criticisms of themselves raise important questions about what power is. As noted, Blood and Wolfe's strategy was to ask about different decisions that were made by the couple – some frequent, some rare, some highly significant, others less so. A key question raised by the study was whether each of these decisions was equally indicative of the exercise of power within the marriage. And if not, how

should it be weighted, and who should decide on this? For example, is the choice of food purchase as consequential as decisions about what apartment/house to buy or rent, or a spouse's employment? If not, what is the value of asking about the less consequential decisions? How revealing of power are routine, everyday decisions? Moreover, within this model, how are "non decisions" to be treated – that is, decisions over which there appears to be little disagreement or debate? As will be discussed below, this is a more theoretically significant question than it might at first appear to be.

The second criticism made of Blood and Wolfe's study concerned the constitution of the sample. The issue here was not its size or scope per se, but whether studies of marital power could ever be valid if only one party to the relationship was questioned. Implicit within Blood and Wolfe's methodology was the notion that decision making was an objective feature of marriage which would be reported on similarly by either husbands or wives. There was, in other words, limited recognition that there might be competing understandings and experiences of a marriage – a "his" and "her" marriage, in Bernard's (1973) famous terms. Yet if husbands and wives were to have different understandings of decision making within their marriage, which of these is "true"? Are either valid? And how is the researcher to decide between competing accounts? While, again, this seems like a methodological issue, it is actually more fundamental. It raises questions about the extent to which people's perceptions of decision making are themselves constituted through an exercise of power rather than being, as Blood and Wolfe's model implies, "independent" of that power.

The third criticism, more radical than either of the above, calls into question the value of examining who it is who makes decisions as a means of measuring power. Instead of focusing on decision making, it argues that the crucial question is who benefits most from the decisions that are made (Lukes 2005). Those with power are the ones who win out, irrespective of the process by which a decision is reached. There are a number of elements to this in the context of marital power. First, it recognizes the importance of social order, or, in the case of marriage, gender order. That is, conventional and normative agreements often disguise

the distribution of benefits between actors. Thus, routine ways of organizing domestic and familial life often hide the ways in which one party – typically husbands – benefits from this mode of organization at the expense of the other – typically wives. It matters little who decides on a particular issue if the decision that is reached sustains an already unequal status quo. Indeed, as Lukes (2005) argues, the most powerful are those who can rely on the less powerful to make decisions which consistently operate in favor of the more powerful. Delegation of these decisions, as well as a social order that makes some decisions so "obvious" as to be non contentious, can help legitimize the consequences of the decisions that are made.

In the light of this, analyzing who *makes* decisions in marriage is not of itself necessarily revealing of power. Moreover, open discussions and consultation are highly valued within contemporary ideologies of coupledom and partnership. Thus, as Edgell (1980) argued, joint, apparently democratic, participation within marital decision making can help legitimize the relational basis of the marriage, while still operating to secure a structurally embedded and (largely) taken for granted gender order which prioritizes men's interests. Moreover, many routine decisions can also be "delegated" to wives because in practice the decisions they reach are liable to be ones which further, or at least do not harm, the interests of their husbands. For example, decisions about family meals may be left to wives as part of their domestic responsibilities with the outcome that wives choose food they know their husbands prefer.

If these arguments are accepted, then it becomes questionable whether decision making can be used to reflect marital power in any simple fashion. Rather, what needs to be considered more is the distribution of material and non material resources between the couple. Questions about who has access to more leisure time, who has more money for personal expenditure, whose needs are prioritized within the family, become more central than decision making per se. One illustration of this alternative perspective on power can be found in the research literature on money management within families. What these studies repeatedly highlight is the extent to which wives and

mothers in poorer households routinely sacrifice their own needs in order to provide better for their husbands and children. Although decisions about balancing household income and expenditure are clearly theirs to make, this does not reflect the exercise of power in a conventional sense so much as the (delegated) responsibility of managing inadequate household budgets.

No matter what the context, power remains a highly contested and complex concept (Lukes 2005). Within the study of marriage, it is further complicated by dominant ideologies of personal commitment that imbue behavior with motives of love and altruism rather than power and self interest. So too, within contemporary constructions of “partnership,” divisions in domestic and paid labor tend to be viewed as negotiated familial and household organization rather than the operation of structural inequalities. The growth of cohabitation and what Cherlin (2004) refers to as the “deinstitutionalization of marriage” complicates further the interpretation of power within “marriage like” relationships. With hindsight, decision making approaches to the study of marital power are clearly subject to many questions and criticisms. Nonetheless, Blood and Wolfe’s study was seminal in opening up debate about the ways in which power is exercised within marriage and helping family sociologists understand its inherent complexities.

SEE ALSO: Decision Making; Divisions of Household Labor; Inequalities in Marriage; Marriage; Money Management in Families; Power, Theories of

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marital quality

Lindsay Custer

Marital quality is a dynamic concept, as the nature and quality of people’s relationships change over time. There have been two major approaches to conceptualizing and measuring marital quality: looking at the relationship itself (examining patterns of interaction, such as the amount and type of conflict) and looking at individual feelings of the people in the relationship (evaluative judgments of happiness or satisfaction). Marital quality and related concepts – adjustment, happiness, and satisfaction – are the most frequently studied variables in marital research. Despite the wealth of literature examining these constructs, there is a continuing lack of consensus among marital researchers on how to conceptualize and measure marital quality, as well as an absence of a unifying theoretical approach to studying this construct.

Some scholars view marital quality as an interpersonal characteristic. Proponents of this approach treat marital quality as a process, the outcome of which is determined by interaction patterns between spouses. Scholars who take this approach, which was dominant during the 1970s, favor the term “marital adjustment.” These scholars also view marital quality as a multidimensional construct. Multidimensional

measures of marital quality typically assess a number of specific types of interactions between spouses (e.g., spousal agreement about marital issues, time spent together/companionship, conflict, and communication). In addition to measuring reported behavioral characteristics of the dyad, some multidimensional measures also include global subjective evaluations of the relationship (such as happiness, satisfaction, or distress). The most frequently employed multidimensional measures of marital quality are: the Locke Wallace Short Marital Adjustment Test (LWMAT), the Dyadic Adjustment Scale (DAS), and the Marital Satisfaction Inventory (MSI).

During the 1980s the interpersonal approach to the study of marital quality, and the multidimensional measures utilized by those who adhered to this approach, came under severe attack. First, many multidimensional measures, such as the LWMAT and the DAS, were criticized for combining scales assessing objective reports of interaction with subjective evaluations of the relationship. This combines both the unit of analysis (dyad and individual) and the type of report (objective and subjective). Second, critics pointed out that by including both evaluative judgments about marital quality and reports of specific behaviors and general interaction patterns, multidimensional measures inflate associations between marital quality and self report measures of interpersonal processes in marriage. This is particularly problematic when dealing with cross sectional data. Finally, multidimensional measures were criticized because the components that are frequently included in multidimensional measures of marital quality may, in fact, be determinants of marital quality. These factors, such as communication or couple interaction, also could be considered as independent variables that might influence marital quality. The criticisms of multidimensional measures raised in the 1970s led many researchers to conclude that scales assessing different dimensions of marital quality should not be summed.

In response to the criticisms of the interpersonal and multidimensional approach to marital quality, scholars began to take an intrapersonal and unidimensional approach to marital quality in the 1980s. This approach was also prompted by the fact that many of the large nationally

representative data sets that were available in the 1980s contained only unidimensional measures of marital quality. According to the intrapersonal approach, marital quality should be conceived of as reflecting a person's evaluation of the marital relationship, not the interaction between two spouses. Scholars who take this approach frequently employ the terms "marital satisfaction" or "marital happiness." Evaluations of the marriage can be global (e.g., marital satisfaction) or specific (e.g., sexual satisfaction).

Scholars who take the intrapersonal approach to marital quality most often use unidimensional, global evaluative assessments of the relationship. Unidimensional measures take the individual (rather than the dyad) as the unit of analysis and are subjective reports of feelings (rather than objective reports of behaviors). The most frequently used unidimensional measures include: the Kansas Marital Satisfaction Scale (KMSS), the Marital Satisfaction Scale (MSS), and the Quality Marriage Index (QMI). Although unidimensional measures have not suffered the same degree of criticism as multidimensional measures of marital quality, two major shortcomings have been identified. Unidimensional measures may be subject to considerable social desirability response bias and global measures tend to be significantly skewed toward a positive evaluation.

During the 1990s the lack of consensus regarding how to conceptualize and measure marital quality persisted. In several studies, researchers included more than one assessment of marital quality (e.g., marital satisfaction and marital conflict), but treated them as separate measures. Other scholars have pointed out that marital quality may indeed contain more than one dimension, most likely a positive and negative dimension, but that these dimensions cannot necessarily be summed. Clearly, the debate regarding how to conceptualize and measure this important construct has not been resolved.

Disagreement regarding how to conceptualize and measure marital quality has contributed to the failure of marital researchers to develop a guiding theoretical perspective. Early theoretical attempts consisted primarily of drawing propositions from extant, general theories or of developing middle range theories, such as Lewis and Spanier's Exchange Theory of Marital Quality.

In the 1980s marital quality research tended to be atheoretical, as scholars struggled to resolve the controversies surrounding how to measure and conceptualize marital quality. More recently, new theoretical approaches have been developed. For example, Fincham, Beach, and colleagues offered a new theoretical perspective of marital quality based on a two dimensional structure of affect. It remains to be seen whether marital researchers will adopt this new theoretical approach.

The importance of understanding and measuring marital quality stems primarily from the assumption that it is a key determinant of marital stability. Early marital researchers assumed that marital quality and marital stability were directly correlated. However, it became clear that given a certain level of marital quality, some marriages would end in divorce and some would not. Spanier and Lewis identified four types of marriages: high quality/high stability, high quality/low stability, low quality/high stability, and low quality/low stability. A number of researchers have tried to identify factors that may moderate the relationship between marital quality and marital stability. External pressures and alternative attractions have been the focus of several studies.

Investigating the determinants of marital quality has occupied a central place in marital research. One topic that has received a great deal of attention is gender differences. Several studies have offered empirical support that gender shapes individual perceptions of many aspects of marriage. In general, men report slightly higher marital quality than women. Researchers have also investigated how race or ethnicity may shape marital quality. In general, African Americans report lower marital quality than whites, but few other groups have been studied.

Among the most intensely studied topics in marital quality research is the influence of family stage, presence of children, and duration of the marriage on marital quality. In their review of literature from the 1960s, Hicks and Platt (1970) reported that one of the most surprising findings of that decade was that children appear to detract from the marital quality of their parents. The transition to parenthood also was a popular topic of study during the 1970s. Several cross sectional studies identified a curvilinear relationship between family stage and

marital quality, whereby the average quality is higher in the preparental and postparental stages. The most common interpretation of this finding was that it reflected the addition of children to the family, their maturation, and their departure. However, more recent longitudinal studies have suggested that changes often attributed to the transition to parenthood are duration of marriage effects instead. Some of these studies suggested that rather than being curvilinear, marital quality declines sharply during the first few years of marriage and then tapers off more slowly.

The link between premarital cohabitation and marital quality also has been the subject of a great deal of investigation. A negative relationship between cohabitation and marital quality has been established, but it is unclear whether it is the fact of living together or the type of people who tend to live together before marriage that is responsible for this effect. Research on remarriage has also increased sharply in the past 20 years and much of it has focused on marital quality. This research indicates that average marital quality is slightly greater in first marriages than in remarriages after divorce. It also appears that the average quality in remarriages is somewhat higher for men than for women.

Wives' employment, spouses' gender role attitudes, and the division of household labor also have received some attention recently. It seems that congruency between spouses' attitudes toward gender roles, as well as congruency between attitudes and behaviors, are related to marital quality. A shared division of household labor and perceived fairness of the division of household labor also seem to enhance marital quality.

Marital quality is typically treated as a dependent variable. However, in the 1980s some studies used marital quality as an independent variable to predict the global well being of married people. This research illustrated a strong link between marital quality and general well being. The authors of these studies have suggested that marital quality influences well being. However, the causal direction between these two variables is still unclear.

Bradbury et al. (2000) organized their review of recent marital quality research around two themes: interpersonal processes and sociocultural contexts within which marriages operate.

These authors stated that research conducted during the 1980s and 1990s supported the conclusion that spouses' attributions are linked to marital satisfaction. The 1990s also saw a dramatic surge in research on the affective dimension of marital interaction. Although it is clear that affect is linked to marital quality, the exact nature of the relationship is not clear yet. Interaction patterns (especially the demand/withdraw pattern), physiology, social support, and violence were also identified as factors that are linked to marital satisfaction. In the latter half of their review, Bradbury and colleagues focus on contextual factors (both microcontext and macrocontext) that may contribute to interpersonal processes of couples as well as moderate the relationship between processes and marital satisfaction. The effects of children, spouses' family background, life stressors and transitions, as well as broader social conditions are discussed.

SEE ALSO: Divorce; Family Conflict; Intimacy; Intimate Union Formation and Dissolution; Love and Commitment; Marriage

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markets

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Markets are a fundamental category of economic science often described as "market economics" (Schumpeter 1954a: 12). Economists place the analysis of markets at the "heart of economics" (Mises 1960: 3; Wieser 1956: 3) and view the evolution of economic theory as the history of their attempt to explain the "workings of an economy based on market transactions" (Blaug 1985: 6). As sociologists also note, a "central problem area" of conventional economic theory is the "structure of markets" (Parsons & Smelser 1965: 143). This emphasis often reaches the point of what critics from economic science and sociology alike call "market fundamentalism" (Stiglitz 2002) or "absolutization" of markets (Barber 1995) within orthodox economics.

Markets are also an important subject of economic sociology of which one of the main subfields is the "economic sociology of the market" (Boulding 1970: 153). However, economics, especially its orthodox version, and economic sociology usually differ in approaching the subject in that the first treats markets as purely economic phenomena or mechanisms, and the second conceives them as complex social structures or institutions. For instance, prominent economists like Joseph Schumpeter (1954b: 9-22) distinguish pure or theoretical economics as the "study of economic mechanisms," notably "market mechanisms," from economic sociology as the "analysis of social institutions" as societal forces shaping the economy, or of "economically relevant institutions." Consequently, Schumpeter regards markets as

economic mechanisms from the stance of pure economics and as social institutions from that of economic sociology (or social economics). So do in their own ways other prominent economists sociologists like Vilfredo Pareto and Friedrich Wieser. Generally, pure economists and economic sociologists (or socioeconomists) conceptualize markets differently, i.e., as mechanisms and institutions, respectively.

ECONOMIC DIMENSIONS: MARKETS–MECHANISMS

Both classical and especially neoclassical economics (or marginalism) treat markets as economic mechanisms, as does most of its contemporary economics. For instance, the idea of markets as economic mechanisms is already implicit in Adam Smith's concept of an "invisible hand" of the market as an assumed impersonal mechanism converting private gains into the "public good." So is it in Smith's description of the market as an "obvious and simple system of natural liberty" establishing and regulating itself on its "own accord," insofar as a defining trait of an economic (or any) mechanism is this self establishment or self regulation (as neoclassical economists like Leon Walras, Francis Edgeworth, and Irving Fisher later suggest). Developing Smith's insights, Jean Baptiste Say provides a classical formulation or anticipation of the above idea by postulating what has come to be known as Say's "law of self regulating markets." In this respect, the idea of markets as economic mechanisms represents economics' original and persisting trait to be adopted, made explicit, and reinforced in its subsequent developments, notably marginalism under the strong influence of physics and mechanics (Mirowski 1989) and its contemporary extensions and ramifications.

The general concept of markets as economic mechanisms involves a number of specific and interrelated notions. These notions are markets as (1) mechanisms or systems of supply and demand; (2) self regulating and equilibrating mechanisms; (3) mechanisms (or realms) of free competition and economic freedom overall; (4) spontaneous mechanisms of economic coordination; (5) mechanisms of resource allocation; and (6) mechanisms of price determination.

First, conventional economics conceives markets as mechanisms, systems, and sets of relations and laws of supply and demand, or of economic exchange, which is probably the standard, best known, or most popular market conception. Moreover, some contemporary economists (e.g., Samuelson) suggest that the market mechanisms and laws of supply and demand are all that a (pure) economist needs to know. Within classical political economy, the above conception is implied in Smith's concept of the market as a "system of natural liberty," particularly Say's law of self regulating markets positing some pseudomechanical adjustment between supply and demand. Their contemporary Thomas Malthus explicitly defines markets in terms of the system, mechanism, or principle of supply and demand (and competition). Also, Malthus argues that the market performs the "best adaptation" of supply to consumers' demand ("actual tastes and wants"), an argument also entailed in Smith's invisible hand and especially Say's law of self regulating markets. Most neoclassical and contemporary economists adopt and further elaborate or reinforce this early argument for optimal market adaptation. For instance, Wieser (an Austrian marginalist economist) contends that markets perform an "ideal adaptation" of supply to demand, as does Lionel Robins (a contemporary economist influenced by Wieser and other Austrians), stating this adjustment in terms of relations of scarce resources or limited means to competing wants or multiple ends. Alfred Marshall also provides a definition of markets as systems, especially realms or sites of relations, of supply and demand by defining a (perfect) market as a geographical "district" that involves many economic agents with full knowledge of its conditions and features the same price for all (uniform) products. In retrospect, this represents or reflects the conventional definition (traced by Marshall and others to Augustine Cournot, an early French economist writing during the 1830s–1840s) of perfect or pure competition as a market form characterized by multiple economic units, uniform products and prices, full knowledge and foresight, free resource movements, and so on, in contrast to other forms like monopoly, oligopoly, and imperfect (or monopolistic) competition, having different or opposite properties. Also, Marshall's

definition comes most closely to the common sense understanding of markets as concrete sites of supply or selling and demand or buying, simply exchange or marketplaces, which most economists as well as sociologists find simplistic or superficial. Marshall's marginalist colleague Edgeworth injects a dose of mystery into markets, attributing to them what he calls the "mysteries of Supply and Demand" determining contracts (prices) in a "state of perfect competition," while another contemporary (Allyn Young) purports to define them in the "inclusive sense" as the "aggregate of productive activities, tied together by trade." Also, contemporary economists define markets as systems that tend to spontaneously "equate supply and demand" at an equilibrium price (Arrow 1994: 3), which evokes Say's law. A succinct contemporary formulation of the concept of markets as supply-demand or exchange systems is defining the market as the "system of multiple exchanges" (Hicks 1961: 73).

Second, traditional economics treats markets as economic mechanisms endowed with self regulation or automatism and an inherent tendency to reach an equilibrium and optimum. Say's law of self regulating markets contains an archetypical formulation or adumbration of this conception, stating that production "opens a demand for products" or "products created give rise to various degrees of demand" – i.e., simply, "supply creates its own demand" (reinforcing Smith's view that the "quantity of every commodity brought to the market naturally suits itself to the effectual demand"). Likely influenced by Say as well as physics (e.g., celestial mechanics), marginalist pioneer Leon Walras develops and reinforces this formulation, carrying it to its limiting consequences by equating or comparing markets with physical mechanisms, as do most other marginalists. Generally, Walras treats markets as primary economic mechanisms and the essence of "pure political economy" understood as a "theory of the determination of prices under a hypothetical regime of absolutely free competition." Notably, he describes a freely competitive market as a "self regulatory and automatic mechanism" – for a transformation of productive services like capital and labor into commodities – that is almost identical or comparable to those of physics, including celestial mechanics (as Walras's model for pure

mathematical economics). So does his marginalist follower Fisher, who also uses such terms as "self regulative," "market mechanism," and "industrial machinery" or "hydraulics" to describe the nature and operation of markets. Similarly, Edgeworth follows Walras (including his celestial mechanics model for pure economics) by defining markets as "market machine [s]" driven by the "law of motion" in physics and solving the "economical problem of exchange" made of "catallactic [exchanging] molecules" or the "maze" of contracting competing agents. In particular, Edgeworth emphasizes the "smooth machinery" of a free market or perfect competition. So does his marginalist contemporary Philip Wicksteed, who defines markets in terms of a "machinery" which resolves the excess of supply or demand through the "law" of market equilibrium presumed to implicate all economic laws. This law endows markets with the properties of quasi automatic equilibrating "machineries" tending to reach equilibrium and so optimum as an assumed equivalent according to the equivalence theorem (Allais 1997) of neoclassical economics. Market equilibrium is, as Pareto states, the outcome of an "opposition" between effective demand ("tastes") and available supply ("obstacles"), and when established, especially under free competition, economic actors "enjoy maximum satisfaction." The latter, positing equivalence between equilibrium and optimal states in markets, implies what is known as the Pareto optimum defined as the market position of maximum utility so that "every small departure" from it increases the welfare of some individuals and reduces that of others.

Some contemporary economists adopt or revive the mechanistic conception of markets from marginalist economics (thus, openly or tacitly, Walras–Edgeworth's mechanics model for economic science). For example, Frank Knight describes markets as unconscious, automatic, and gradual orders resistant to external regulation, direction, and planning, a description following or resembling that in Austrian marginalism (from Carl Menger to Friedrich Hayek) and setting the tone for those by the Chicago School of economics (e.g., Milton Friedman). Also, influenced by Walras, Schumpeter in his pure economics treats markets as forms of "economic mechanisms" or

simply “market mechanisms,” while using terms like the “economic machine” and the “capitalist machine” with its “inner logic” for describing the economy, capitalism in particular. So does Schumpeter’s student Paul Samuelson (1983: 203), who conceptualizes the market “simply as a mechanism” (yet with an “aesthetic content”), particularly an “equilibrium system,” and comes closer to adopting and implementing Walras’s mechanics model for pure economics by extolling the virtue of using simple concepts and methods from physics and mathematics over “literary” work in the analysis of markets. This holds true of some contemporary mathematical economists (Debreu 1969), who *à la* Walras describe the market as a self-sustaining economic system or mechanism that tends to reach a “valuation equilibrium” for a given “set of prices,” so the Pareto optimum. Similarly, others define the market as a “perfectly competitive mechanism,” with “optimality properties,” “incentive compatibility,” the high “scale of information efficiency” for the “narrow class of atomistic environments” (Hurwicz 1969), which apparently redefines in esoteric terms what Walras and Marshall call “absolutely free” or “perfect” competition. In turn, contemporary critical economists suggest that it is neither “perfectly competitive” nor completely efficient by pointing to “market failures – absent or imperfect markets” (Stiglitz 2002: 479).

Third, conventional economics regards markets as mechanisms, realms, or sources of free competition and economic freedom overall. A prototypical instance is Smith’s concept of the market as a “system of natural liberty” that establishes itself on its own “accord,” in particular a mechanism, domain, and source of universal “free and fair” competition. Most classical as well as neoclassical and contemporary economists adopt and elaborate on the concept of markets as mechanisms or systems of “natural liberty,” notably of free competition. Thus, David Ricardo attributes to markets “fair and free competition” which, he suggests, should operate “without restraint” and “never” be regulated by external intervention (e.g., “interference of the legislature”). So does Thomas Malthus, who argues that markets (e.g., profits) operate in accordance with the law or principle of competition (and supply and

demand), as well as William Senior suggesting that they function under “perfectly equal competition,” which intimates the notion of a perfect market. John S. Mill probably codifies or condenses the classical position by stating that markets are regulated by the “principle of competition,” particularly “perfectly free competition,” which also anticipates the concept of a perfect market.

That neoclassical economics embraces and even reinforces this classical position is exemplified by Walras’s conception of markets as mechanisms and domains of “absolutely free competition” and economic freedom (*laissez faire*) as a whole. Similarly, Wicksell describes universal “free and unrestricted” competition as the “special” law of markets that function as the impersonal catalysts of individual agents’ diverse attributes and orientations by generating a single equilibrium price. Also *à la* Walras, Edgeworth proposes that markets are mechanisms or fields that tend to reach the “perfect state of competition,” thus amplifying or formalizing Mill Senior’s ideas too, as does John B. Clark, stating that they are under the “perfect action of competitive law.” Marshall generally defines the (perfect) market as the “system of economic freedom,” apparently adopting and evoking Smith’s notion of markets as systems of “natural liberty.” Further, following Smith, Ricardo, and Mill, Marshall contends that this market system is the “best from both the moral and material point of view,” which perhaps epitomizes what critics denote as the “absolutization” of markets in orthodox economics. Also, contemporary economists adopt Smith’s idea of a “Simple System of Natural Liberty” to describe the character and operation of markets or the market economy (Buchanan 1991: 27).

Fourth, conventional economics defines markets as spontaneous and impersonal mechanisms or instruments for economic coordination, regulation, and control. The notion of markets as such coordinating mechanisms originates in Smith’s idea of an invisible hand assumed to spontaneously coordinate the economy by converting individual interests into the common interest. Thus, Smith and other classical economists compare the workings of markets with an invisible hand that achieves economic coordination out of the “autonomous decisions of many

separate units” (Lange 1946). In retrospect, Smith’s invisible hand reformulates and reinstates in economic terms Mandeville’s fable or paradox of “private vices, public virtues” and provides a classic *laissez faire* argument, for arguably if markets spontaneously and efficiently perform economic coordination they should not be interfered with by the state. Smith restates and mitigates Mandeville’s “shocking paradox” by replacing “vices” (“passions”) and “virtues” with economic terms like “gain,” “advantage,” or “interest,” notably by positing a “harmony of interests,” private and public, and consequently argues in favor of the “minimal state doctrine” (Hirschman 1977). The invisible hand of markets has become a venerable axiom of classical political economy as well as neoclassical and contemporary economics. Thus, contemporary economists proclaim “hail that Smithian Invisible Hand” of market competition as the “grand solution of the social maximum position” (Samuelson 2001: 1206), which implies that markets are optimal coordinating mechanisms, another way to state their supposed tendency to optimum. Within classical political economy, Say’s law of self regulating markets is a particular ramification of Smith’s invisible hand principle in postulating a spontaneous quasi automatic coordination or equilibrium of aggregate supply and demand, so a sort of harmony between private and public interests (e.g., producers and consumers). Another, more general ramification is Ricardo’s assertion that individual and community interests “are never at variance” in consequence of the impersonal operation and spontaneous coordination by market “free and fair competition” in the way of an “invisible hand,” which evidently assumes such a harmony. Similarly, Mill argues that originally the “contrivance” of markets functions as the spontaneous mechanism or instrument for coordination (periodic meetings) between sellers and buyers, “without any intermediate agency.” Also, most neoclassical economists, especially Austrian marginalists, emphasize the function of markets as mechanisms for spontaneous and efficient economic coordination. For instance, Menger invokes Smith’s invisible hand to address the supposedly “most significant problem” of social science – i.e., how institutions promoting the common good have been created “without a common will

directed toward establishing them” – arguing that this is due to the impersonal coordination or harmonizing of individual interests by markets as spontaneous phenomena, thus implicitly in favor of *laissez faire*. Menger’s followers in Austrian economics adopt and reinforce this argument: thus, Mises contends that markets (including prices) achieve control or regulation of the economy with more rigor, justice, and precision than any other mechanism, including the “supervision by the State,” which leads to an argument for *laissez faire*. So does Hayek, emphasizing the “hard discipline” of markets. Notably, these and other Austrian economists embrace and elaborate on Menger’s notion of markets as spontaneously coordinating mechanisms, as epitomized by Hayek’s concept of the market as a kind of impersonal “spontaneous order” and “anonymous group.” Also, Clark anticipates Hayek’s latter concept by describing the market as a “group system” or an “expression of the totality of individual wants.” Further, following Menger, Hayek claims that the unrestricted operation of markets, as spontaneous orders performing economic coordination via an invisible hand *à la* Smith (cited approvingly) or *laissez faire*, is the “central problem” of social science. The notion of markets as coordinating mechanisms is summarized by Friedman, characterizing the market as the “technique of achieving coordination” as its “central characteristic.”

Fifth, economics conventionally regards markets as mechanisms or instruments for objective, quasi automatic, efficient, or optimal resource allocation, a view implied in or part of their definition as spontaneous systems of economic coordination. Thus, this view is germane to Smith’s invisible hand principle as well as its ramifications in Say’s law of self regulating markets and Ricardo’s impersonal operation of free market competition. In particular, Smith implies that markets perform a function of resource allocation in stating that the division of labor is “limited by the extent of the market” (“effectual demand”). So does Mill, who proposes that the wide “extent” of actual or potential markets permits a “considerable” division of labor, thus implicitly a substantial investment of productive factors, production, and productivity, in large business enterprises, and conversely. Further, some contemporary economists

(Debreu 1991) define the “core” of markets (or the market economy) as a set of competitive or final (i.e., Pareto optimal) “allocations” of production factors and consumer goods. Overall, contemporary mainstream economics treats competitive markets as (decentralized) “allocative mechanisms” that attain a form of resource allocation as well as income distribution that is Pareto optimal (Rosen 1997).

A sixth aspect of the idea of markets as economic mechanisms is their notion as factors in price determination or simply determinants of prices. For instance, echoing Smith’s respective ideas, Ricardo proposes that all prices or contracts (including wages) must be governed by “fair and free” market competition and alternatively “never be controlled” by government interference. So does Mill, stating that (single or equilibrium) price represents the “natural effect of unimpeded competition” in markets. Neoclassical and contemporary economists elaborate on and reinforce the notion of markets as price determining mechanisms. Thus, Walras considers markets mechanisms or realms for exchanging products and productive services, and consequently for determining their exchange values or prices. Moreover, he argues that exchange value or price “comes into being naturally in the market under the influence of free and unlimited competition.” Adopting Walras’s argument, Knut Wicksell contends that no economic value is more real than that determined by markets, and even that market prices are the sole factual exchange values in a modern economy.

Some other aspects of the idea of market mechanisms in orthodox economics, more or less implicit in the preceding, include: markets as mechanisms for natural selection (“survival of the fittest”) in the economy, markets as mechanisms for optimal wealth and income distribution, markets as mechanisms or sources of economic growth, markets as factors of increased living standards or material welfare, and so on.

SOCIOLOGICAL DIMENSIONS: MARKETS—SOCIAL CONSTRUCTIONS

Markets are also a central concern for the “economic sociology of the market.” However, in

contrast to pure economics, economic sociology typically conceptualizes markets as social constructions, especially institutions, in contrast to their conceptualization as pseudo automatic mechanisms in conventional economics. Economist sociologist Schumpeter identifies and in a sense codifies this contrasting treatment by defining markets as institutions within the framework of economic sociology and as mechanisms in that of pure economics. In so doing, he seems influenced by Émile Durkheim (and Max Weber), who specifies, in contrast to orthodox economics, the subject matter of economic sociology as consisting of economic phenomena considered as institutional arrangements, including markets as “institutions relating to exchange.” Another economist sociologist, Talcott Parsons (1967: 4), remarks that orthodox economics has a “deep rooted belief” in the market as an “automatic, self regulating mechanism” presumably operating to transform the individual seeking of self interest or private ends into the “greatest possible satisfaction of the wants of all,” while economic sociology considers markets particular social systems or institutions. Contemporary economic sociologists object that mainstream economics empties markets from social relations and institutions or “elementary sociological concerns” like power, norms, and networks (Lie 1997: 342). Even some contemporary economists lament that orthodox economics (especially Austrian marginalism) lacks a “social concept” of markets described as an “obvious illustration of a social situation” (Arrow 1994: 2).

The social conception of markets conceptualizes them as (1) instances of social phenomena; (2) institutional arrangements; (3) social actions, relations, and networks; (4) social systems or structures; (5) power configurations and realms of conflict; and (6) cultural orders.

The most general, self defining, and perhaps redundant dimension of the social conception of markets, implying to some degree all the others, including their definition as institutions, is treating them as societal phenomena. This treatment is common to classical and contemporary economic sociology and originates or is implicit in Auguste Comte’s idea of the social economy whose functions, including that of exchange performed by markets, are “naturally implicated in relations of greater generality” or

society. Durkheim adopts, elaborates, and makes Comte's ideas explicit by placing markets into the examples of social facts whose source or substratum "cannot be other than society." Since Durkheim views institutions as fundamental forms of social facts, he regards markets as special institutional arrangements. In retrospect, he provides a classical formulation of the concept of markets as social phenomena in general and as institutions in particular. So does Georg Simmel by arguing – counter pure economics as well as Marxism – that market exchanges are not "simply" economic facts but can be considered social phenomena, given their "preconditions in non economic concepts and facts," including cultural and other institutions. Contemporary economic sociology fully embraces and further elaborates or specifies the classical social conception of markets as societal phenomena, including institutions.

The second dimension of the social conception of markets, entailed in their general idea as societal facts, is their definition as institutional arrangements or institutions. Like the general idea, the specific concept of markets as social institutions is germane to Comte's ideas of a social economy and is subsequently given an explicit classical formulation in Durkheim's economic sociology. Comte implies that society's "elementary" economy, including the market, has (like the family) the character or spirit of an institution in virtue of the principle or sentiment of cooperation being "preponderant." Also, he suggests that markets are influenced by political and other institutions by contending that government "shall intervene in the performance of all the various functions of the social economy, to keep up the idea of the whole, and the feeling of common interconnection." Building on and rendering Comte's rudimentary ideas methodical propositions, Durkheim provides an archetypical conception of markets as social institutions. First, Durkheim does so implicitly by placing markets or related economic categories (e.g., monetary or financial systems) in the examples of social facts and consequently institutions considered their essential (organized or crystallized) forms and defined as the "beliefs and modes of conduct instituted" by society. That Durkheim's "markets as social facts" idea specifically means "markets as institutions" is also suggested by his definition of sociology as

a science of the "genesis and functioning" of institutions, whose fundamental principle is the "objective reality" of social facts (which apparently equates "social facts" with "institutions"). Second, Durkheim explicitly conceives markets in institutional terms. Specifically, he defines markets as "institutions relating to exchange," which, alongside other classes of socioeconomic institutions – e.g., institutions related to the production and distribution of wealth – constitute the "subject matter of economic sociology." Durkheim therefore anticipates or leads to Schumpeter's alternative institutional definition of markets and his project of economic sociology as a branch of economics. Similarly, Durkheim considers markets, just as economic organizations, "public institutions" or instances of collective "beliefs and modes of conduct." Also, he suggests or hints at the institutional normative bases of markets, emphasizing the social, including conventional, moral, and legal, elements of market contracts. Durkheim memorably argues that a commercial contract "is not sufficient unto itself, but is possible only thanks to a regulation of the contract which is essentially social," especially institutional, which includes legal or conventional norms. Simply, saying that in market contracts "not everything is contractual," Durkheim says that not all in markets is economic and mechanical, but also institutional and otherwise social. Akin to Durkheim, Ferdinand Tönnies points to the social dimensions of market contracts or transactions by noting that society is "involved in every contract or exchange."

Another prominent classical sociologist, Weber, basically converges (as Parsons implies in *The Structure of Social Action*) with Durkheim on an institutional normative conception of markets as well as economy and society overall. Weber sociologically conceives markets as particular normative institutional orders, arguing that group formation through market exchanges ("use of money") represents the "exact counterpart" to social institutions or rule systems, i.e., to associations formed via "rationally agreed or imposed norms." Also, in his early, more economic oriented writings, Weber considers markets special cases of those social institutions – described as "purposive systems" – that are "not purposefully created by collective means, but which nevertheless function purposefully,"

apparently influenced by Menger's ideas of spontaneous market creation and evolution out of "individual interests." In particular, like Durkheim, Weber places markets among the "most advanced institutions" of (modern) capitalism, while suggesting that they historically predate this economic system. So does Thorstein Veblen, another early economic sociologist or social institutional economist whose institutionalist conception of markets seems particularly influenced (in part) by or similar to that of Durkheim. Veblen considers markets the "prevailing institutions" of modern capitalism or the "price system." In general, he describes and analyzes markets in terms such as "institutions" or the "institutional scheme" of the price system, the "institutional basis" (e.g., monetary accounting and property rights) of economic enterprise, and the like. Notably, he regards modern markets and other "institutions of the price system" as products of social cultural evolution, the "development of society" and the "growth of culture," thus subject to "developmental variation." The same can be said of such other early institutional economists as Commons and others who embrace and develop Veblen's (and indirectly Durkheim-Weber's) ideas. For illustration, Commons analyzes markets as social institutions by treating market transactions as institutional, including conventional and legal, relations.

Durkheim's and Weber's institutional conceptions of markets have not only proven influential and seminal in economic sociology, but also influenced some prominent neoclassical economists, alongside early economic institutionalists like Veblen and Commons. One (perhaps most) important case of such influences is Schumpeter, whose sociological concept of markets as social institutions is to a large measure inspired by or similar to those of Durkheim and Weber (Swedberg 1998). Schumpeter conceives markets as particular forms or effects of what he, apparently following Weber, denotes as "economically relevant institutions," a variation on or specification of the Weberian concept of "economically relevant phenomena." In particular, Schumpeter describes markets as essential institutions of the monetary, especially modern capitalist, economy, seemingly echoing Weber, and states (under the likely influence of Walras-Menger's *laissez faire* ideas) that no

social institution is "more democratic" than a market. Notably, Schumpeter furnishes an underlying sociological rationale for the institutional or holistic conception of markets by declaring *à la* Durkheim and Comte that the "social process is really one indivisible whole" from which the analyst "artificially extracts" economic phenomena. Another pertinent instance of Durkheim's and Weber's (plus Marx's) sociological influences, via an institutional conception of markets, on economists involves Polanyi, a heterodox economist and economic anthropologist. Evoking Durkheim, Polanyi notices that markets have an "institutional history" and are complex social institutions, not simply or purely economic ones. Polanyi therefore points to or hints at what has come to be known in modern economic sociology as the institutional, or generally social, embeddedness of markets, though he usually, as critics object (Granovetter & Swedberg 1992), suggests that market economies are "dis embedded" in this sense in contrast to their traditional non market forms as "embedded and enmeshed in a variety of institutions." Specifically, at least the fact of having an "institutional history" allows or intimates that markets are also "embedded and enmeshed" in various social institutions, which solves Polanyi's market "dis embeddedness" puzzle or weakens its criticism.

Within post war economic sociology, Parsons adopts and elaborates on what he sees as Durkheim's and Weber's convergent institutional normative conceptions of markets or market economies. Parsons and his collaborators analyze and emphasize the "institutional structure" of markets (Parsons & Smelser 1965: 143). In this view, the institutional structure of markets particularly involves or presupposes the "institutionalization of economic values" or an "institutionalized and internalized" value system of the economy, notably "institutionalized motivation" (e.g., the profit motive). Similarly, some heterodox economists (Myrdal 1953: 197) point to the "institutional factors" determining the structure of markets, even the entire economic system, thus adopting or echoing Durkheim-Weber's ideas.

Modern ("new") economic sociology has also embraced and further developed the classic Durkheimian Weberian conception of markets

as social institutions. Contemporary economic sociologists typically consider markets particular social institutions in deliberate contrast to their treatment as mechanisms in orthodox economics. In this view, markets constitute institutional arrangements in that they need social rules and structures, such as property rights, governance structures, rules of exchange, and conceptions of control (Fligstein 2001: 30–3), and are regulated by various formal and informal institutions (Carruthers & Babb 2000: 4). Also, the institutional conception of markets has received increasing acceptance or attention in some parts of modern economics, sometimes becoming a challenge or alternative to their orthodox and still prevailing concept as self-regulating economic mechanisms *à la* Walras. Moreover, the concept of markets as social institutions tends to become a major substantial point of convergence, affinity, or collaboration between contemporary, especially the new institutional, economics and economic sociology, just as it has been between their early or classic versions in Veblen et al. and Durkheim and Weber, respectively. Thus, some economists with otherwise different general theoretical positions redefine markets as “vigorous” social institutions with the “essential function” of registering consumer preferences (Robinson 1964), or as institutional arrangements for the “consummation” of exchange transactions (Stigler 1952). So do others by considering markets social institutions on which prices are “determined” (Arrow 1994: 118), as well as the “institutions of governance” or “governance structures” (Williamson 1998: 75–7). Particularly, some economists analyze labor markets as specific social institutions (Solow 1990). Others emphasize the operation of markets generally as institutional arrangements having “cultural consequences” for the “evolution of values, tastes, and personalities” (Bowles 1998). Other economists define markets as social institutions involving “practices, norms, rules” that contribute to economic and societal coordination, combined with “spontaneously organized complex phenomena” (Caldwell 1997: 1871). Notably, markets are admittedly embedded in (other) social institutions, including a legal political “institutional infrastructure” (Tornell & Lane 1999), specifically democratic rules and values (Caldwell 1997: 1871). This suggests

that economists increasingly recognize or pay attention to some kind or degree of institutional, including political, embeddedness of markets, thus adopting or evoking a central idea of classical and modern economic sociology.

The third dimension of the social conception of markets is their definition as sets of social actions and relations or of networks, also implicit in their general sociological idea. If the institutional conception of markets is a macro sociological specification of this idea, their definition as social actions, relations, or networks is the micro (Carruthers & Uzzi 2000). In classical economic sociology, Weber and Simmel furnish pertinent examples of the second treatment of markets. Weber treats the market as a “sociological category of economic action” and suggests that the study of markets as such categories constitutes “essentially” the subject of economic sociology (or social economics). Specifically, he defines markets as the “archetype” of rational social action or “consociation” via economic exchange, which exist when competition obtains “for opportunities of exchange among a plurality of potential parties.” Weber stresses that by defining markets in terms of a “coexistence and sequence” of social relations or consociations he uses a “sociological point of view,” as distinguished from the purely economic. In particular, he states that markets “constitute social action” to the effect that any market or money mediated exchanges are such actions “simply because money derives its value from its relation to the potential action of others.” Generally, what for Weber makes them sets or networks of social actions and relations is that in markets every action is directed by the “actions of all parties potentially interested in the exchange,” not by individual action in mutual isolation. Finally, he implies some degree of embeddedness (while not using the term) of markets and the economy overall in social relations and their networks. Thus, Weber suggests that markets and other “forms of economic organization” are influenced by the “autonomous structure of social action” within which they exist and so are “embedded.” In general, he posits what he famously describes as the “elective affinity” between “forms of economic organization,” including markets, and “structures of social action,” the best known case being that between the “spirit and structure” of modern capitalism

and the “ethic of ascetic Protestantism.” Weber’s contemporary Simmel provides another classical formulation of the notion of markets as sets or networks of social relations and interactions. Specifically, Simmel uses terms like an “incomparable sociological constellation,” “sociological process,” and “peculiarly interwoven form” of social interaction (e.g., conflict) to designate markets, especially market competition, thus hinting at their embeddedness in social relations and networks. Weber’s and Simmel’s contemporary Tönnies describes in particular the labor market as a “network of communication,” thus of social interactions and relations, located in the “periphery” of the system of markets, including also the market for commodities. In addition, apparently reflecting Marx’s view, Tönnies states that labor markets are not dependent on the “prior existence” of those for commodities (a statement contradicting neoclassical economics that argues the opposite by the principle of “derived demand” for labor and other production factors from that for products). Some leading contemporary economic sociologists essentially adopt and elaborate on Weber–Simmel’s ideas by treating markets as representing or, more precisely, being embedded in networks of social relations and interactions among individuals. Hence, this reformulates or reinstates the conception of social embeddedness of markets (originating in Polanyi and implicit in Weber and Durkheim), which has become paradigmatic for the “new” economic sociology since the 1980s (Swedberg 1998). In this view, social relations are “fundamental” – even more so than are institutions and cultural norms (“generalized morality”) downplayed as secondary – to markets in virtue of market behaviors and other economic actions being situated and embedded in micro networks of interpersonal (“weak”) ties (Granovetter 1985: 500).

The fourth dimension of the social conception of markets is defining them as social systems or structures, another definition derived from or part of their general sociological idea. The notion of markets and economies as social systems or structures can be deduced from Comte’s “static study of sociology” as an “investigation of the laws of action and reaction of different parts of the social system.” His sociological statics thus necessarily incorporates (as Durkheim also interprets it) markets and

economies, alongside governments and politics, into “different parts of the social system.” Notably, Comte suggests that the “scientific principle” of the relations between society and markets or economies (just as governments or politics) is a “spontaneous harmony between the whole and the parts of the social system.” Developing Comte’s insights, Durkheim defines markets in social system terms by stating that economies and other major social phenomena are “systems of values,” a proposition embraced and developed by Parsons (e.g., “institutionalized and internalized” value economic system) and other functionalist sociologists. Also, like Comte, Durkheim suggests that markets as defined constitute systemic elements (or subsystems) of a larger societal system or macrosocial structure, a suggestion found in Pareto as well and carried further by Parsons and contemporary systems theorists. Pareto considers markets social systems and proposes that they and other “states of the economic system” represent just “particular cases” of the general state of the “sociological system.” Further, *à la* Durkheim and Comte, he describes the social system (and so sociology) as “much more complicated” than the economic market system (thus pure economics), due to the fact that the first involves not only rational actions and interests, as does the second, but also (and mostly) non rational behaviors and sentiments (“residues”). Parsons and other contemporary systems theorists in sociology adopt and carry further Durkheim’s and Pareto’s ideas of markets as social systems. Thus, they suggest that in economic sociology the market and the economy overall be “considered as a social system” (Parsons & Smelser 1965: 174) or a “subsystem of the total society.” Specifically, they consider the market/the economy a functional social subsystem that is differentiated from other subsystems on the basis of fulfilling the “adaptive function” of a society (i.e., “maximizing utility”) within their AGIL (adaptation, goal attainment, integration, latent pattern maintenance) model. For example, they classify the market into labor markets, markets for consumer goods, capital markets, markets for entrepreneurship (“control of productivity”), all considered social subsystems. Building on Parsons, contemporary systems theorists in sociology define markets and economies as “self referential” social systems whose

operation “ultimately” refers to and depends on the larger societal environment (Luhmann 1995: 462). In this view, the “unavoidable coupling of self and other referential meaning references” in markets and economies presupposes and functions within “special” social structural conditions (Luhmann 1995: 462) or the “wider macrostructure” of society (Munch 1994: 276). Similarly, other contemporary sociologists (Habermas 1971: 163) define the market (and the economy) in terms of a “behavioral system of instrumental action.” Further, some prominent contemporary economists acknowledge that markets, just as economies overall, are part of the “social system in general” (Arrow 1994: 6), thus adopting or echoing Durkheim–Pareto–Parsons’s macrosociological ideas.

Within contemporary economic sociology, an influential and perhaps prevailing (micro or net work) variation on the (macro) theme of markets as systemic categories is their definition as social structures. In early formulations, contemporary economic sociologists define markets (especially their production or supply side) as “self reproducing” social structures involving “cliques of firms” in reciprocal actions and reactions (White 1981: 518). Specifically, production markets are characterized as “induced role structures” that involve a “structure of roles with a differentiated niche” for each producer. This view also attributes to markets a historical or evolutionary trajectory that makes a market a “historically shaped” structure of specific roles for a “stable set” of producers as social actors (White 1981: 526). Other contemporary economic sociologists also adopt a structural or network approach to markets by treating them as “social rather than exclusively economic structures” (Baker 1984: 776). In particular, some identify the “social structure” of market competition as a “key ingredient” in the structures and processes of business organizations (Burt 1988: 356). Others analyze and compare the social structure of historical or precapitalist markets and that of modern or capitalist markets, both treated as Weberian ideal types (Swedberg 1994: 274). Generally, contemporary economic sociology emphasizes the societal constitution and construction of markets in the sense of constituting or being shaped by social structures (Fligstein 2001: 8). In this definition, markets constitute or involve

“complex and stable” social structures – resting on “repeated interactions” between market actors and their status or reputation – “types of social orders” or “forms of social organization” (Fligstein 2001: 7–32). Even prominent contemporary economists (Becker 1976: 3–8) implicitly conceive markets in sociostructural terms, stating that the market fulfills “most, if not all, of the functions assigned to ‘structure’ in sociological theories” (though this statement may lead to reducing all social structures to “market”). Notably, they recognize and analyze the “importance” of social structure for markets (Becker & Murphy 2000: 3).

The fifth dimension of the social conception of markets is considering them power configurations and realms of conflict, a consideration also specifying their general sociological idea. Such a consideration is particularly characteristic for Weber, who suggests that markets represent, involve, or are influenced by “power constellations” and “conflicts of interests.” Thus, he holds that market prices are determined by “conflicts of interests and of compromises” and thus by “power constellations.” Generally, Weber depicts markets or the “price system” in terms of “a struggle of man against man,” with wealth as its “weapon” and prices as its “expressions.” Notably, he identifies a special source of power and domination in a “formally free interplay” between economic actors in competitive markets, due to the fact that these, just as economic organizations, represent or exhibit a “structure of dominance.” Some contemporary sociologists evoke Weber by observing that market economic exchanges are the “structural sources” of power and domination (Blau 1994: 166). So do some contemporary economists by describing markets as the “locus” of power (Bowles 1995) and as “populated by multiple powerful groups” (Tornell & Lane 1999). For Weber, the fact that dominance is often produced by free market relations is exemplified by what he calls domination “by virtue of a position of monopoly” or “monopolistic powers.” Further, he adds that “indeed, because of the very absence of rules, domination which originates in [markets] may be felt to be much more oppressive than an authority in which the duties of obedience are set out clearly and expressly,” an implicit counterargument to orthodox economics’ view of the market as the

supreme realm of freedom and democracy. Relatedly, Weber identifies and emphasizes what he denotes as the “non monetary significance of political bodies” for markets or the “economic order” to indicate that the modern state influences them in various ways, including through the “structure” of authority and political power, beyond the simply monetary function of a *laissez faire* government.

Akin to Weber, Simmel suggests that markets represent realms of power and social conflict by pointing to their “complete domination” by particular economic actors in the case of market monopolization or cartelization. So do some heterodox economists, who evoke Weber’s ideas by arguing that those social groups with “enough” political power can, if they will, alter the institutional conditions that “determine” the structure of markets, thus indicating that market (and non market) exchanges are “subject to the rules of those in power” (Myrdal 1953: 197). This is what contemporary economic sociologists also indicate by observing that markets show a history of the “repeated exercise of political power” in their operation as well as of establishing and defending property rights (Friedland & Robertson 1990: 6). Influenced by or reminiscent of Weber, other heterodox economists notice that historically political power “had precedence over profit” in the operation of “self regulating” markets within capitalism to the point “ultimately” of war setting the “law to business,” as during the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries witnessing two world wars (Polanyi 1944: 12). Further, leading contemporary sociologists almost reproduce Weber’s terms by describing contemporary markets as “factual constellations of power” (Habermas 1975: 68). In particular, this description is applied to labor markets diagnosed with a “quasi political wage structure” primarily determined by “relations of political power” (i.e., negotiations between management and workers) rather than just by the market itself. In modern economic sociology, this dimension of their social conception is codified or summarized in treating “markets as politics” in the sense that they are (re)created by the “politics of the creation of market institutions” (Fligstein 2001: 46). This reaffirms and reformulates Weber’s ideas, since treating “markets as politics” is another way to say that they

constitute power configurations and realms of conflict.

The sixth dimension of their social conception is defining markets as cultural orders or simply cultures, which, as another specification of their general sociological idea, is especially linked with their institutionalist normative notion. This approach originates in and is particularly prominent for classical sociologists like Simmel, Weber, and Durkheim, who at this point converge on a culturalist conception of markets. Thus, Simmel proposes a culturalist explanation of markets by observing that historically market exchanges and money are particular results or expressions of “general economic culture.” Moreover, he implicitly treats markets as a sort of climax in the evolution of culture by describing money and market exchange as the “pinnacle of a cultural historical series of developments” determining their emergence and direction. Some contemporary economic sociologists explicitly adopt, elaborate, and specify Simmel’s ideas, particularly stressing the cultural underpinnings of money and related market phenomena (Zelizer 1989). A culturalist explanation of markets and the economy overall is also present or implicit in Weber’s economic sociology, notably his concept of “economic cultures” exemplified by the work ethic of Protestantism and other world religions. In this sense, he implies that markets constitute instances of – or have an “ethical foundation” in – economic cultures that are mostly religiously based and consist of “constellations of norms, institutions, etc.,” which illustrates the close link between culturalist and institutionalist market explanations. In particular, Weber’s famous thesis of an “elective affinity” of the “spirit and structure” of modern capitalism with the work ethic of “ascetic Protestantism” entails an explanation of markets in terms of economic cultures (though he admonishes against a “one sided spiritualistic” or culturalist conception). Like Simmel and Weber, Durkheim posits a cultural explanation of markets, as suggested by his assertion that, like other social phenomena, economies or markets are “nothing than systems of values and hence ideals.” Consequently, he places markets and economies overall in the social “field of ideals” or cultural values. In a sense, Durkheim’s sociological conception of markets and economies can

Table 1 Economic and sociological dimensions and conceptions of markets.*Economic dimensions and conceptions of markets: mechanisms*

- 1 Mechanisms or systems of supply and demand (exchange).
- 2 Self-regulating and equilibrating mechanisms.
- 3 Mechanisms and realms of free competition and economic freedom.
- 4 Spontaneous mechanisms of economic coordination.
- 5 Mechanisms of resource allocation.
- 6 Mechanisms of price determination.

Sociological dimensions and conceptions of markets: social constructions

- 1 Instances of social phenomena.
- 2 Social institutions.
- 3 Social actions, relations, and networks.
- 4 Social systems or structures.
- 5 Power configurations and conflict fields.
- 6 Cultural orders.

be interpreted as, first and foremost, culturalist (or, relatedly, institutionalist), given that he essentially understands social facts as “immaterial” cultural phenomena (or institutions), with society described as a collective “moral entity.” Some contemporary economic sociologists adopt and develop these classical culturalist conceptions of markets by arguing that market economic processes possess an “irreducible cultural component” (DiMaggio 1994: 27). So do others by treating markets and their reproduction as culture projects or social constructions reflecting a unique normative cultural (and political) construction of economic organizations and national societies (Fligstein 2001: 70–97). This view is summarized in the proposition that markets involve or are embedded in “culture, or sets of meanings” (Carruthers & Babb 2000: 9), which suggests their cultural embeddedness. Lastly, even some contemporary economists (Becker & Murphy 2000: 3) acknowledge and explore the relevance of culture, including norms, for markets, thus subscribing or coming close to Simmel, Weber, and Durkheim’s culturalist market explanations.

The above economic and sociological dimensions and conceptions of markets are summarized in Table 1.

SEE ALSO: Capitalism; Comte, Auguste; Culture, Economy and; Development: Political Economy; Durkheim, Émile; Economic Sociology: Neoclassical Economic Perspective; Economy (Sociological Approach); Economy,

Culture and; Economy, Networks and; Mill, John Stuart; Parsons, Talcott; Polanyi, Karl; Rational Choice Theory (and Economic Sociology); Schumpeter, Joseph A.; Simmel, Georg; Smith, Adam; Social Embeddedness of Economic Action; Weber, Max

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marriage

David H. J. Morgan

Dictionary definitions of marriage usually begin with something like “the legal union of a man and a woman in order to live together and often to have children.” Even in such a simple and limited definition, some key elements and some potential complexities are highlighted. First, we are dealing with a definition referring to legal criteria. However, since legal definitions differ, we can reasonably expect practices and understandings of marriage to differ. This dictionary definition is consequently a highly ethnocentric one, shaped by the cultural and historical conditions under which it is produced. Next, marriage is a way of identifying some particular kinds of ties between two, or sometimes more, people such that marriage is always something more than the characteristics of the individuals who compose it. There is also a suggestion of functionality; marriage exists in order to achieve something else.

Marriage is important to the individuals concerned, the others to whom they are connected, and to the society within which the marriage is recognized. Marriage will not necessarily be important in the same way across different societies or to the different individuals within these societies. Recognizing this qualification, the list here outlines some of the key ways in which sociologists have described the importance of marriage:

- Marriage is seen as a key element within a wider set of family relationships. It establishes links between different families and over different generations.
- Marriage is seen as a key element in the life course. It is seen as an important transition in the lives of individuals and of those to whom they are connected.
- Marriage is seen as a key element in the social ordering of gender and sexuality. This is the most widespread understanding of marriage (one man, one woman) and reaffirms distinctions between men and women and the dominant importance of heterosexuality.
- Marriage is seen as a key element in the wider social structure. This is because the parties involved in a marriage are not just gendered and sexualized individuals but have class, ethnic, religious, and other differently based identities.
- Marriage is important as an element in the mobilization of patterns of care and social support.
- Marriage is important in the formation of personal and social identity.

These are in addition to the key function which links marriage and parenthood and which sees marriage in terms of the production, legitimizing, and social placement of children.

Research into marriage may be classified under two headings: the comparative and historical, and the study of its internal dynamics. The first considers how marriage differs between different societies or different historical periods and how it has changed over time. Earlier comparative research into marriage explored different marriage systems and the ways in which these were linked to wider aspects of social structure such as the division of societies into classes or castes, or the distribution of property. The emphasis was often a strongly functional one considering the part that a particular marriage system (polygyny, polyandry, arranged, and so on) played within the wider social structure. Comparative research might also be linked to a wider theory of social evolution, speculating on the ways in which marriage patterns and the wider social order together change over time.

More recently, interests have become more theoretically focused. Goode’s now classic study explored the ways in which, and the extent to which, family patterns throughout the world were converging into a single “conjugal” family model, one which focused on the unit created through marriage. This account, although influential at the time, suffered from being too closely tied to a functional mode of analysis and from smoothing over complexities and divergences. Other analyses have explored differences between premodern, modern, and postmodern patterns of marriage and family living, as well as the long term decline of “patriarchalism” within family relationships (Cheal 1991; Castells 1997). These more recent

accounts have been aware of differences in the pace of change between different parts of the globe and, increasingly, the possibilities of resistance to the forces of globalization. Thus, the reassertion of what might be described as “traditional” patterns of marriage might be seen as important in the construction of religious, ethnic, or national identities in the face of globalization and westernization.

More narrowly, attempts have been made to analyze changes in marriage in Britain, the United States, and other anglophone societies together with much of Western and Northern Europe. Sometimes this might be expressed simply as a “decline” of marriage, as increasing numbers of people do not go through a formal marriage ceremony, have children outside wedlock, or divorce. Further, with the partial recognition of cohabiting and non heterosexual partnerships, the privileged status of heterosexual marriage seems to be less secure.

Notions of the decline of marriage may be countered by showing that marriage continues to be an important, if frequently delayed, transition in the life course and pointing to the increasing demands for the recognition of gay and lesbian marriages. The issue here is one of change rather than decline, with researchers often accounting for these changes in terms of a broad historical process of “individualization.” The emphasis here is on the ways in which individuals are increasingly called upon to shape their own relational biographies with little reference to the expectations of others or previously established patterns of behavior. This may sometimes be seen as the extension of democratic ideals into intimate relationships.

Yet another formulation is in terms of a long term shift in marriage from institution to relationship. Marriage may be seen as moving from a social context where it was clearly embedded in a wider network of familial and kinship ties and obligations and where it constituted the major legitimate adult identity. As marriage becomes more of a relationship, there is greater emphasis on individual choice and the needs and satisfactions of the participants. Choice here includes the possibility of choosing not to get married.

There are difficulties with this formulation which, as with other accounts, glosses over

diversities in experiences and trends over time. A wholly “relationship marriage” would seem to be an oxymoron and it is probably better to think of different “mixes” of relational and institutional elements at different points of time and between individual marriages. Thus it can be argued that the very idea of “relationship” has itself developed some institutional features in that marital partners may be expected to share intimacies, enjoy sex, and monitor and evaluate the development of their marriages and, indeed, other less formally recognized relationships.

Turning to the more “internal” aspects of marriage, we can look at gender divisions and questions of identity. It is widely believed that marriages have become more equal in terms of gender; the very idea of a relationship suggests some degree of mutuality and equality between the partners. At the same time, there has been a considerable body of research exploring gendered inequalities and differences within marriage. These include unequal participation in household and parental tasks; differences in the management of money within the home; and differences in patterns of paid employment and leisure activities outside the home. The sources of these persisting differences include men’s and women’s differential labor market participation and earning power; the persistence of deeply held assumptions about the nature of men and women; and inequalities in power within the household, including physical power and the potential for violence. Some have argued that we should consider the different balances between “love” and “power” within marriage. There is a strong expectation that modern marriage should be based on love, but this expectation coexists with these continuing inequalities within this relationship (Dallos & Dallos 1997).

Evidence of change is uneven although generally pointing toward a greater degree of sharing. There has been an increasing acceptance of the idea of equality in marriage on the part of both men and women. Actual practices may fall behind ideals, although there is evidence of greater sharing, especially in childcare. Men and women still tend to do different kinds of tasks within the household and women are still more likely to take overall responsibility for

parental or domestic planning. There is considerable variation, however, depending on factors such as patterns of paid employment, education, ethnicity, and social class. Despite some clear shifts, gender remains an important division within the institutionalized relationship of marriage.

In terms of identity, it is still the case that marriage represents an important life course transition and remains a significant adult relationship. Partly for this reason, marriage can still provide an important source of stability and security in an individual's life. Further, it can be a basis for identity and a key element in the development of a relational self. However, this self also exists in a world shaped by the changing labor market, globalization, individualization, and changes in the gender order. Sometimes, therefore, there may be a tension between the apparent stability provided by marriage and the possibilities within a marriage for shaping identity and personal development, especially where different gendered expectations develop within marriage.

Sociological research continues to find marriage an important social institution and a major area where the gender order, and changes within it, are manifested. While it has been affected by forces such as globalization and individualization, it has not been overwhelmed by these processes. Nevertheless, within western societies at least, it is increasingly clear that the boundaries between marriage and other adult intimate relationships have become blurred. The exclusively heterosexual character of marriage is being challenged and the distinction between marriage and cohabitation has become more blurred in terms of law and actual practices.

It is likely that future research will explore the whole spectrum of intimate relationships and the position of marriage within it. It may serve as a reminder of the limits of individualization through exploring the multiple interdependences that can develop over a life course. With an aging population, the significance of these relationships in later life will receive increasing attention. It is also hoped that there will be more systematic comparative research in order to provide a more rigorous exploration of the notions of globalization and individualization.

SEE ALSO: Cohabitation; Divisions of Household Labor; Inequalities in Marriage; Infidelity and Marital Affairs; Interracial Unions; Intimacy; Intimate Union Formation and Dissolution; Marital Power/Resource Theory; Marital Power/Resource Theory; Marital Quality; Marriage, Sex, and Childbirth; Money Management in Families; Same Sex Marriage/Civil Unions

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marriage, sex, and childbirth

Graham Allan

As with ideas of community, public perceptions of family life highlight the extent to which change has been occurring. Usually the emphasis is on the "decline" of family values and family solidarities in comparison to some past, more stable and wholesome period. In most cases, these perceived changes are significantly exaggerated, with the past being idealized in a quite uncritical fashion. Under more rigorous examination, family relationships in the past can be recognized as somewhat less rosy than popular imagination usually supposes (Gillis 1997). However, there is one sphere of family life in which there has undoubtedly been real – and significant – change occurring. This concerns the patterning of partnership and household

formation and dissolution, and more specifically the relationships between marriage, sex, and childbirth. Importantly, these changes have been occurring, albeit at different speeds, across a wide range of economically advanced societies especially in Europe and North America.

The changes there have been in these patterns have been radical, certainly in comparison to the trends that were dominant for much of the twentieth century. Each country is different; each has its distinct social and cultural influences; each develops its own legislative principles and welfare traditions which influence the dominant organization of sexual, domestic, and familial relations within the society. Nonetheless, for much of the twentieth century there was a very clear relationship in different European and North American societies between marriage, sex, and childbirth. In effect, they formed a strong trilogy, certainly ideologically, but also behaviorally. In other words, for the first two thirds of the twentieth century, sex was only really considered legitimate within the relationship of marriage, as, both legally and socially, was childbirth.

Of course, sex occurred outside marriage, both before and during, and children were born outside wedlock. However, unmarried sex was typically furtive and covert, while illegitimate births brought shame and disapproval. Moreover, to live in a sexual relationship outside marriage was to “live in sin” – a powerful symbol of the moral significance of marriage. Indeed, marriage came to be seen as increasingly central within the individual’s life course. For women especially, it was often the reason for leaving the parental home and thus symbolized independence and adulthood. Over this period of the twentieth century marriage rates steadily increased, while marriage age typically dropped. For example, in Britain women’s rates of marriage by age 30 rose from 60 percent in 1900 to over 90 percent in 1970, while median age at first marriage fell for women from 25 in 1900 to 21 in 1970.

However, since the early 1970s the connections between marriage, sex, and childbirth have altered quite dramatically. The component elements are no longer linked as strongly as they were. Certainly there continues to be an overlap between the three, but they are not bound as tightly to each other in the ways they

were. Thus, counter to the trends dominant throughout most of the twentieth century, rates of marriage have fallen substantially, marriage age has increased, and many more people now cohabit outside marriage. Again drawing on Britain as an example, by 2002 fewer than 50 percent of women had married by age 30; median age at marriage for women had risen to 28, and nearly 30 percent of all non married women aged 18–49 were cohabiting. At the same time, separation and divorce increased so that lifelong partnership became a less realistic expectation. Instead there has been a normalization of varied transitions over the life course in an individual’s domestic and sexual arrangements. Indeed, especially where there are no young children involved, these issues are increasingly seen as matters of personal choice rather than ones requiring social sanction, control, or regulation.

This is evident in the rapid growth there has been in cohabitation over the last generation. From being a mode of partnership and domestic organization largely limited to those who were divorced, over the last 25 years it has become an entirely normal and acceptable practice throughout much of the western world. In the 1980s, cohabitation tended to occur for a period prior to marriage. It was, in other words, seen by many as a form of engagement through which the strength and suitability of the partnership could be tested. This trend has continued: cohabitation prior to marriage is increasingly normative. In addition, though, many couples cohabit without defining this as necessarily a prelude to marriage. Cohabitation has in this sense become simply another lifestyle option, through which couples come to choose how they pattern their sexual and domestic partnerships. There continue to be religious and ethnic differences in the social acceptability of cohabitation, but clearly the social and moral judgments made of this arrangement have changed significantly from the mid part of the twentieth century.

Not surprisingly given these other changes, the link between marriage and childbirth is also now nowhere near as strong as it was in previous generations. For most of the twentieth century, births outside marriage were highly stigmatized. When women became pregnant outside wedlock, the most appropriate “solution” socially was for them to marry the father of the child. Often where this did not happen, the mother

was sent away to give birth, with the child then being offered for adoption. Cultural reactions are quite different now, as the statistics on births in and out of marriage indicate. Once more drawing on Britain as an example, in the 1970s fewer than 10 percent of births were outside marriage, whereas by 2001, 40 percent were. Even more dramatically, the proportion of teen age births outside marriage rose to 90 percent by 2003 from less than 10 percent in 1976. Of course, changes in partnership behavior are also relevant here. Often births registered as outside marriage involve cohabitation – in Britain currently over 80 percent do. Not all of these will be “marriage like” in terms of partnership commitment, but many are. However, even where there is no committed partner, it is evident that moral disapproval of births outside wedlock is far more limited than it was. In general, and again allowing for ethnic and religious differences, it seems largely to be restricted to concern over young mothers who, despite experiencing poverty, are perceived by some to be abusing the welfare system.

Behind these changes lies a fundamental shift in the ways in which sexual expression and behavior are culturally understood. As discussed above, the cultural “blueprint” governing legitimate sexual activities has been transformed over the last 30 years in most western societies. The limits that were placed around full sexual activity in the early and mid twentieth century no longer carry weight with the majority of people. Instead, individuals now have far greater freedom to express their sexuality and engage in sexual relationships outside marriage than was the case in previous generations. Most noticeably, with the exception of some of those who hold strong religious beliefs, virginity is no longer something to be valued in the way it was. Instead, the cultural perception is that individuals – both male and female – should gain sexual experience prior to “settling down” in a marriage or a marriage like relationship. Similarly, while infidelity within a committed relationship is rarely condoned (Duncombe et al. 2004), there is no moral disapproval of sexual relationships among the non married, be they single, separated, divorced, or widowed. As above, these issues are seen as essentially a private matter of choice rather than a public issue requiring social sanction.

The reasons for this greater cultural acceptance of sexual activity outside marriage are numerous. Among the most important are cumulative changes in ideas of femininity and citizenship, and changes in the availability of effective contraception. Ideas about femininity and appropriate behavior for women have clearly altered since the 1970s. The rise of second wave feminism in particular marked the development of different understandings of womanhood and changed representations of “feminine.” Linked to this were changes in education and employment which enabled women to be less dependent on marriage and male patronage and thus less bound by domestic responsibility. These changes were also facilitated by developing ideas of citizenship. Over the last 30 years, women’s citizenship rights in all western societies have been redefined and protected through legislation which attempts to outlaw discrimination, in public arenas at least, on the grounds of gender, sexuality, or partnership status. And quite crucial to these changes has been the ability of women – married and unmarried – to control their fertility. Symbolized by the development of the birth control pill, the reduction of the risk of pregnancy meant that women felt able to engage far more freely than previously in full sexual relationships outside marriage. In turn, for many, concerns about protecting and controlling daughters’ sexuality became more muted as the moral climate changed.

These changes are in line with other transitions that social theorists have argued are having an impact on personal relationships in late modernity. In particular, the idea that sexual behavior and sexual identities are personal rather than public issues is clearly compatible with the growth of individualization in society as well as with changing expectations about the nature and permanency of committed relationships. The evidence of increasing divorce rates has played a symbolically important role in this. Not only were divorced couples at the forefront of changes in cohabitation, they also challenged traditional ideas about sexual abstinence outside marriage. Moreover, if marriage is no longer considered as necessarily a permanent union, then the idea of a single lifelong partner is undermined. If this is so, then so too the idea that individuals should “save” themselves sexually for that one partner also becomes

questionable. In this context, gaining sexual experience prior to marriage comes to be valued rather than condemned.

Overall, there can be no doubt that the relationship between marriage, sex, and childbirth has altered quite dramatically over the last 30 years across different western societies. These shifts are having a clear impact on the nature of “family” and on our understandings of family solidarities. Yet while the patterns are clear, more detailed information is needed on how different people are making decisions about these matters and what influences them in these. Of course, it is also unclear what the longer term implications of these trends are, especially with regard to parenting and the future of marriage as a regulatory institution. Already welfare systems are having to address the issue of non custodial parents’ responsibilities to children. In the coming years, governments will also have to consider more fully how issues of property division, including pensions, are resolved legally when the relationships in question are premised on informal rather than formal commitments.

SEE ALSO: Cohabitation; Divorce; Family Diversity; Feminism; Feminism, First, Second, and Third Waves; Intimacy; Lone Parent Families; Marriage; Motherhood

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Marshall, Thomas Humphrey (1893–1981)

Jack Barbalet

Born in London, Tom Marshall was the fourth of six children in a prosperous and cultured middle class family. His father was a successful architect, and his great grandfather made a fortune in industry. He was educated at Rugby and Cambridge, where he read history. In 1914 he went to Germany to learn German and spent the next four years as a civilian prisoner of war at Ruhleben, near Berlin. Marshall described his period of imprisonment as “the most powerful formative experience” of his life up to that time. It was his first contact with working men, as the Ruhleben camp’s inmates included merchant seamen and fishermen. Although Marshall’s profession of sociology was a decade away, he wrote that from this time there was “a growing sociological curiosity about what was happening in me and around me.”

On returning to England after the war, in 1919 Marshall won a six year fellowship in his tory at Trinity College, Cambridge. During this time he wrote on seventeenth century guilds, the life of James Watt, and revised and extended a popular textbook on English economic history. While a fellow at Trinity Marshall stood as a Labour candidate in the 1922 general election, through which his appreciation of working class life and the depredations of class inequality were extended. He concluded that temperamentally he was not suited to political campaigning, and that it was not in his nature to spend his “working life poring over original documents

to the extent demanded by reputable historical research.” In 1925 he took a post at the London School of Economics to tutor social work students. In 1929 he moved to the sociology department, where he remained until his retirement in 1956, with the exception of the five years 1944–9 when he was head of the social work department. He was promoted to a readership in sociology in 1930. He was appointed Professor of Social Institutions in 1944 and Martin White Professor of Sociology in 1954.

Marshall had a successful public career as well as an academic one. During World War II he was in the British Foreign Office monitoring the foreign press, and immediately after the war served with the Control Commission in Germany. His involvement with German affairs continued in 1947–8 when he toured West German universities on behalf of the Association of University Teachers and during 1949–50 when he was Educational Adviser to the British High Commissioner in Germany. From 1956 to 1960 Marshall was director of UNESCO’s Social Sciences Department, based in Paris. On his retirement Marshall returned to Cambridge, where he became involved in the introduction of sociology and taught part time in the university’s economics faculty. He continued to live in Cambridge and in his eighty eighth year died there, in 1981.

Marshall’s reputation as a sociologist rests on *Citizenship and Social Class*, first given as the Marshall Lectures in Cambridge in 1949, in commemoration of the economist Alfred Marshall (no relative), and published in 1950. His other contributions remain part of a significant sociological legacy. The essays brought together in *Sociology at the Crossroads and Other Essays* (1963), published in America as *Class, Citizenship, and Social Development* (1964), and *The Right to Welfare and Other Essays* (1981) develop not only the themes of his chief sociological interests, namely social class inequality and social policy, but also the conceptualization of power, for instance, and also transformations of capitalism in the mid to late twentieth century. Marshall also published a leading textbook, *Social Policy* (1965), that went through many revisions and editions.

Marshall’s work has exercised much influence in British sociology and also had an impact on American sociology. Reinhard Bendix’s

Nation Building and Citizenship (1964), for instance, owes much to Marshall and much of it reads like a commentary on Marshall’s own treatment of that theme. It would not be unfair to say that the intellectual core of Talcott Parsons’s discussion, “Full Citizenship for the Negro American?” (1965), draws enormously from Marshall. Marshall’s influence on Gerhard Lenski, *Power and Privilege* (1966), is not insignificant and not unacknowledged. But the translation to American idiom of this very British thinker was not always successful, as one particular example demonstrates.

In his inaugural lecture, “Sociology at the Crossroads” (1946), Marshall sets out a methodological program in which “sociology can choose units of study of a manageable size – not society, progress, morals, and civilization, but specific social structures in which the basic processes and functions have determined meanings.” He went on to describe these endeavors as “stepping stones in the middle distance.” Robert Merton, in his paper “On Sociological Theories of the Middle Range” (1968), refers to Marshall’s discussion to support his own position on middle range theorizing. What escaped Merton, and others who have referred to Merton’s use of Marshall, such as Lipset, is that while Merton’s approach arguably undermines the idea of a social system, as Alvin Gouldner’s “Reciprocity and Autonomy in Functional Theory” (1959) shows, Marshall’s presupposes it. Marshall had a very strong sense of the concrete historical reality of capitalism as a social system, and his “middle distance” theory of citizenship and social class was a historical comparative theory about the development of the capitalistic class system and its attendant institutions.

Marshall’s argument is that as capitalism develops as a social system and as the class structure develops within it, so modern citizenship changes from a system of rights that emerge out of and support market relations to one that bears an antagonistic relationship with the market system by placing rights in the political arena for electors without property and other market capacities, and also rights of access to social goods outside of market exchanges. This argument required Marshall to distinguish between elements or parts of citizenships, and to relate each interactively with a historically dynamic

class system. Unlike most theorists of class structure, Marshall recognized the possible impact of citizenship on aspects of class inequality, including class loyalty and class resentment, which affect the nature and incidence of class antagonism. Marshall was able to develop this understanding because he conceptualized citizenship beyond its legal and political dimensions. This analysis was extended by Marshall into the late capitalist mixed economy in his discussion of “Value Problems of Welfare Capitalism” (1972).

SEE ALSO: Capitalism; Citizenship; Class; Nation State; Welfare State

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Martineau, Harriet (1802–76)

Cynthia Siemsen

Harriet Martineau’s 25 volumes of short novels illustrating the principles of political economy outsold the works of her contemporary, Charles Dickens; Martineau’s travel chronicles of nineteenth century American society and its cultural beliefs are comparative historical accounts that have been likened to Tocqueville’s *Democracy in America*; she authored sociology’s first systematic treatment of methodology six decades before Durkheim’s *Rules of the Sociological Method*; and Martineau translated and

condensed Auguste Comte’s *Cours de philosophie positive*, and introduced his attempt to establish a sociological science within the English speaking world. However, the story of sociology’s emergence has been a history of men and their contributions to the formation of the discipline. Although Martineau achieved high intellectual success in applying scientific techniques borrowed from the natural sciences to theories of social observation, that status was limited to her lifetime alone (Harper 2001).

Martineau’s works are usually found in the English literature section in most university libraries rather than on sociology’s shelves (Hill 1991). Until the 1960s her pioneering sociological works appeared forgotten, suffering more than a century of neglect by the sociological community until “rediscovered” by Lipset (1962). Still, when her name appears in books dedicated to social theory, Martineau will at best be mentioned as “the first woman sociologist” (Rossi 1973), and will rarely be addressed in research methods texts. Most often, Martineau will remain in a last chapter devoted to the contributions of women to classical social theory, despite recent arguments that her work is on a par with the canonical masters (Terry 1983). As with those other original thinkers, Martineau’s work cannot be separated from her historical moment or lived history. However, in her case the task is facilitated by Martineau’s (1877) autobiography.

Martineau was born to a well to do textile manufacturer in Norwich, England, the sixth child in a family of eight. As was customary in the emerging middle class English homes of the early nineteenth century, Martineau was sent to the care of a wet nurse for her first years, which has often been interpreted as an early indicator of the loneliness, self doubt, and sense of abandonment she would experience throughout her youth. Martineau’s isolation was compounded by her lack of taste and smell, and spans of childhood illness that resulted in an almost complete loss of hearing at age 12. Her family, rather than recognizing her disability, “considered her dull, awkward, and difficult, and clearly she thought so too” (Pichanick 1980: 7). Martineau fantasized that suicide would release her from a fearful world, and, if not, a good education resulting in “independence of action” would be necessary.

While not particularly attentive to her psychological needs, Martineau's parents were progressive when it came to her education, even though it was uneven in comparison with her brothers'. As Unitarians, the elder Martineaus emphasized education and social awareness for all their children. Martineau was home schooled in writing, math, Latin, and French by her older siblings. And then for two "delectable" years she attended a coeducational Unitarian school, receiving the same instruction given her brothers. Though the school unexpectedly closed, disrupting Martineau's formal education, she received two further years of master's instruction in French and Latin, and dedicated herself to further study in order to attain her longed for independence.

Martineau's turn to scientific writing grew not only from a desire for self sufficiency, but also from economic necessity. By the 1820s England was thrown into an economic crisis resulting from industrialization, sparing few, let alone textile manufacturers the likes of Thomas Martineau, who believed in profit sharing for hard working employees. As the family fortune disappeared, Martineau became preoccupied with the emerging science of political economy. At a time when most middle class Victorian women would use marriage as a way out of economic insecurity, Martineau experienced the breakup of two engagements, the second of which brought her great relief. After her Unitarian minister fiancé experienced a complete physical and mental breakdown, pragmatic Martineau declined any hospital visits. Recognizing her inability to form anything but intimate intellectual relationships, Martineau immersed herself in the life of the mind and concluded: "If I had had a husband dependent on me for his happiness, the responsibility would have made me wretched . . . I am probably the happiest single woman in England . . . I rejoice not to have been involved in a [marriage] for which I was, or believed myself unfit" (Martineau 1877 I: 133–4).

Early articles, essays, and commentaries in the Unitarian journal *Monthly Repository*, plus a novel and book length religious history, helped establish Martineau's name for future publications (Lengermann & Niebrugge Brantley 1998). The year 1832 signaled Martineau's entrance to secular writing. The

first volumes of *Illustrations of Political Economy* became runaway bestsellers, explaining through fiction the new science of political economy as espoused by Adam Smith, David Ricardo, John Stuart Mill, and Thomas Malthus. Within two years she had published 25 volumes, out selling Charles Dickens at 10,000 copies per month. Though these volumes have been identified as an early example of the case method (Bosner 1929), their contents remain an untapped resource in sociology through literature (Hill 1991). Martineau's financial independence paralleled her entry into the intellectual circle of George Eliot, Florence Nightingale, Charles Dickens, Thomas Malthus, William Wordsworth, Charlotte Brontë, and Charles Darwin. With her name secure in London's literary society, Martineau turned her attention toward a science of society.

Martineau's initial move into what would become sociology began in 1834 with her two year travels to the US. With *Society in America* (1836–7) and *Retrospect of Western Travel* (1838b) Martineau transformed travel writing into social scientific inquiry. In these works Martineau implemented the theories outlined in her yet unpublished method's treatment, *How to Observe Morals and Manners* (1838a). She believed that any examination of society must take into account morals (i.e., cultural beliefs and values, and manners): social interaction. If a scientific observer of society seeks to understand the morals of a group, Martineau proposed that she examine the meanings of an activity for the social actor. Martineau did not propose value neutrality on the part of the observer; however, she did propose that the researcher's biases be acknowledged. According to Martineau, sympathy toward the actor was a skill that separated the scientific study of society from the natural sciences. (The methodological approach is similar to Weber's *verstehen*.) *How to Observe Morals and Manners* is more than a methodological treatise; it sets social theoretical precedents. Before Marx, Weber, and Durkheim, "Martineau sociologically examined social class, forms of religion, types of suicide, national character, domestic relations and the status of women, delinquency and criminology, and the intricate interrelations between repressive social institutions and the individual" (Hill 1991: 292).

Martineau's approach to the study of American society dealt with the problem of ethnocentrism in comparative works written for a European male audience. She highlighted the importance of women's issues as an essential component to the study of a society. Although she presumed her readers to be male, Martineau directed their attention to the study of the household and the domestic role of women in culture as necessary for a sociological study. And instead of merely comparing the US to England, she divided her work into three volumes: political structure, economy, and a category she called "civilization" that dealt with social mores and values. Martineau (1836–7) identified the moral principles that Americans claimed to hold dear, and then contrasted them to the everyday reality of life in the US to see "how far the people of the United States lived up to or fell below their own theory."

Like Tocqueville (1835), Martineau distinguished between structural reality and the dominant American values of democracy, equality, freedom, and justice. However, rather than identifying the American tendency toward political conformity and the status quo through the tyranny of the majority, Martineau "analyze[d] the effect of values on structure and change" (Lipset 1962). In her trek through 20 of the then 24 United States, Martineau observed American society to be in transition, somewhere between feudal morals represented by the interwoven nature of slavery and democratic ideals embraced by the abolitionists; all the while she tackled a fundamental problem of sociology, how to study society as a whole.

Martineau's search for a scientific approach to the study of society where the old order was disappearing and a new order was coming to take its place eventually led her to observe Middle Eastern life. Martineau's move from her Unitarian upbringing occurred during her study tour of the Middle East. Through her observations of *Eastern Life: Past and Present* (1848) she grew to believe that truth and wisdom were not present in the knowledge of her day but rested in future history (Pichanick 1980). Moving in the direction of a theory of history, Martineau (1848) concluded: "The world and human life are . . . obviously very young. Human existence is, as yet, truly infantine . . . It can hardly be but that, in its advance to maturity, new

departments of strength will be developed" (vol. 3, p. 332). Much like Durkheim would hope for 40 years later, Martineau wished for a scientific study of society that would attract those like herself who needed an intellectual replacement for traditional religion.

Martineau's acquaintance with Comtean thought was largely secondhand until 1852 (Pichanick 1980). As interest in Comte grew in England, Martineau felt the need to translate and condense his masterpiece; in its original French form, *Cours de philosophie positive* was a difficult, rambling, repetitive, six volume work taken on by only the most patient reader. She hoped to introduce Comte to those who would have been deterred from reading about his new scientific study of society because of the work's bulk. Martineau further hoped that this new science would be an ethical field that would move in the direction of social reform by pinpointing society's ills. Martineau accomplished more than translating Comte; through the clarification of his work she introduced sociology to the English speaking world. Comte was not only pleased with the translation; he believed Martineau clarified his ideas. He wrote to her: "Looking at it from the point of view of future generations, I feel sure that your name will be linked with mine, for you have executed the only one of those works that will survive amongst all those which my fundamental treatise has called forth" (Comte, in Harrison 1913: xvii–xviii). The names of Comte and Martineau are indeed linked; however, he is recognized as coining the term sociology, and she as his translator. Martineau may also be rightly called the Mother of Sociology.

SEE ALSO: Comte, Auguste; Durkheim, Émile; Malthus, Thomas Robert; Mill, John Stuart; Smith, Adam

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martyrdom

Enzo Pace

If we use Durkheim's classic division of suicides into egoistic, altruistic, and anomic (*Le Suicide*, 1897), martyrdom is an altruistic suicide. According to Durkheim, those who consciously sacrifice their lives for a supreme ideal (religious, political, or moral) demonstrate not

only a profound faith in the ideal, but also strong commitment to a group (be it micro or macro). In the martyr's hierarchy of values, the individual's life counts for less than the supreme and universal ideal he believes in (the Fatherland, the Nation, God, Religion). The *ego* places itself (i.e., the individual's whole life) under the *alter*, showing how far faith and trust enable the individual to transcend himself, to overcome the instinctive fear of violent death and to prove his supreme coherence with an ideal. Group solidarity pushes him to sacrifice his own life in an altered state of consciousness, a sort of mystical experience that allows him to go beyond human fears and anxieties. The heroic dimension of martyrdom means precisely the lucid awareness that, by acting in a particular way, death is a certainty. Martyrdom is a trial for the individual and for the group he belongs to. So the psychic system of a martyr tends to reduce the social complexity he lives in to a terrifyingly basic binary code, life/death (with the resulting give life/take life), which he believes is the fundamental moral code of every pure militant. After his death, he becomes the emblem of the group. This is why the martyr's body is so important in the social representation of the altruistic suicide: the members of the group are able to strengthen their conviction by exalting the blood of the martyr and worshipping his body. By commemorating his sacrifice, they transform the narrative of martyrdom into a narration of the cohesive strength of the group itself.

We can distinguish two types of martyrdom: passive and active. The former occurs when an individual is compelled to immolate his life to defend the ideal to which he adheres, because he refuses to repudiate his faith or the group's solidarity. This kind of martyrdom is frequent in both the religious and political fields. Every day language distinguishes the political or civil hero from the religious martyr, but the formal profile of the martyr appears to be the same. The case of the Christian martyrs under the Roman Empire is a good example of passive martyrdom, as important as the other stories of various religious minorities persecuted by a dominant religion. Another interesting example is represented by the stories of the Buddhist monks who burned themselves in protest against the communist regime.

Active martyrdom, on the other hand, is a suicide attack where the act of self destruction is designed to strike a perceived enemy. In passive martyrdom, the violence is suffered; in active martyrdom, it is used to kill both the martyr and the enemy. This second type of martyrdom has attracted much more attention in the social sciences because of its dramatic spread in contemporary society. The martyrdom of a suicide attack (Hassan 2004) has become a modern method of making war within a war context; in many cases, it covers both the religious and political aspects of modern conflicts (Iannaccone & Introvigne 2004; Pace 2004).

We should not forget the ancient roots of the present phenomenon. In the first century BCE, the Jewish Zealots directed a suicide attack against the Roman army occupying Judaea and Jerusalem, and tried to force the Jews to repudiate their faith. In the twelfth and thirteenth centuries, an extremist sect appeared in Islam – the Shiite Order of the Assassins (so called probably because they used to take hashish before attacking their enemies) – which came up with the practice of suicide attacks, seen as inner world asceticism, as a desperate method of fighting against a much better equipped and more numerous enemy. One of the best known cases of this kind of suicide is the Japanese kamikaze. The kamikaze (from *kami*, God, and *kaze*, wind – the name of the typhoon which saved Japan from the invasion of the Mongol hordes in 1216) was, in fact, a soldier (an aviator, to be precise) willing to carry out an act of war, in the lucid awareness that he would die in the process, and exalting in the fact that one man alone, with a single airplane, would be able to inflict heavy losses on the enemy. As is well known, such attacks were widely used by the Japanese against the United States Navy in World War II. Not by chance, those willing to carry out these acts formed part of a special fighting force, the *ko geki tai* (*divine storm special force units*) (Axell & Kase 2002). The story of the kamikaze illustrates the relationship between religion and politics, which was intensified by the war context; the more dramatic the political situation, the more the symbolic resources provided by religion to justify the resort to violent suicide attacks.

The issue disputed in the social sciences concerns the relations between the practice of

martyrdom in the form of suicide attacks and the core message of a religion. Many references to the high value assigned to martyrdom may be found in the religious tradition. In the preaching of Jesus of Nazareth, for example, there are frequent references to the figure of a witness who should fear nothing because the Holy Spirit sustains those who cling to their faith even up to the ultimate sacrifice, up to “death on the cross.” From the second century on, Christian martyrs are those who continue to publicly affirm, in the face of the power of the Roman Empire, their identity and membership of the Christian community even when it entails sacrificing their own lives. This idea of bloody martyrdom gradually tones down as Christianity becomes a majority religion; the figure of the martyr becomes more spiritual, apart from the modern throwback when Christians, and Catholics in particular, were persecuted by intolerant, totalitarian regimes (as occurred in many former eastern bloc countries, for example). Islam also exalts the figure of witness/martyr to the faith as he who, fighting on God’s path, perishes in battle; the reward which awaits him is immediate entry to heaven. Moreover, the minority Muslim Shiite sect (nowadays concentrated mainly in Iran and Iraq) remembers the first two chiefs (*imam*), Ali and Husayn (the latter was killed in 680 CE in the battle of Karbala), as martyrs of the faith.

The continuity between the original religious doctrines of martyrdom and its modern use, removed from its historical context, has been disputed. Robert Papp has demonstrated, for instance, that the relationship between religious fundamentalism and radical religious traditions in general, on the one hand, and suicide attacks, on the other, is very weak. In support of his view, Papp quotes the case of the Tamil Tigers in Sri Lanka, the extremist faction of the Tamil ethnic minority, which claims independence for the northern part of the island. The Tamil Tigers have frequently made suicide attacks on Sinhalese Buddhist political and religious targets, but they are not very sensitive toward religion despite their Hindu background. In this case, religion is simply a marker of ethnic identity, a symbolic resource among others to consolidate the collective identity. In contrast, the reference to a religious discourse is explicit in the case of the radical Palestinian movements

(Jihad, Martyrs of Al Aqsa, 'Iz al Din al Qasem Brigades), linked to the fundamentalist movement Hamas, because of the final goal of their strategy: first, to achieve independence for Palestine and, second, to build an Islamic republic. The same also applies to Lebanon and Kashmir (Martinez 2003). Analyzing all these cases, Papp argues that the martyrs follow a strategic logic for obtaining political and territorial concessions. In other words, the martyrdom/suicide attacks over the past two decades appear to be a means of shifting political power relations and gaining control of entire areas of the territory.

Some contemporary political scientists argue that martyrdom in a war context mobilizes people who are psychologically deprived, living in a permanent condition of social frustration, in poverty and ignorance. They argue that the socially marginalized are willing to be manipulated and indoctrinated by fanatical religious leaders. This explanation is contested by certain psychologists and sociologists who, having examined the evidence of the psychopathological origins of the phenomenon, found no empirical support for it. In particular, psychologist Scott Atran (2002) has pointed out that the active martyrdom/suicide attack is associated neither with mental or psychological ailments nor with the educational and economic deprivation of the individual who agrees to become a martyr killer. According to Atran, most of those who undertook martyrdom training and then committed suicide, killing innocent victims, were not affected by particular pathologies. The choice they made depended more on political and social factors.

As Riaz Hassan (2004) has noted, in the Middle East, for instance, it is far more important to take into account the "collective sense of historical injustice and social humiliation in which the majority of people are living." Therefore, individuals may become martyrs and martyr killers when, in their own consciousness and within that of the group to which they belong, martyrdom appears to be the sole means available for achieving several goals at the same time: empowerment versus powerlessness, salvation (in religious terms) versus damnation, and – very important in certain sociocultural contexts – honor versus a sense of humiliation (Hassan 1983, 1995). A United Nations relief worker in

Gaza, Nasra Hassan (2001), has reported the findings of a survey carried out in the Gaza strip, involving 250 interviews with aspirant martyrs. The most interesting evidence to emerge from this empirical investigation is that none of the young Palestinians was uneducated, desperately poor, or psychologically depressed. The only explanation Nasra Hassan found was the desperate social disorder caused by the permanent state of war against Israel, a war that throws everyday life into turmoil, creating a pervasive sense of precariousness and impotence.

The followers' interiorization of the martyrdom model is the result of a sort of intra world asceticism, a moral discipline (which only later becomes technical and military) based on the principle of sacrifice today for reward in heaven, as well as immediate benefits *on earth* (killing as many enemies as possible). It is, therefore, an act of symbolic violence on oneself to overcome the fear of death and of the horror of consciously putting to death the innocent and defenseless. However, the problem is to discover what religious suicide represents in an environment such as contemporary Islam. Khosrokhavar (2000) and Jürgensmeyer (2000) have shed light on this aspect. The body of the martyr becomes a sort of medium of communication to persuade other young boys and girls to lay down their lives for a supreme religious and political ideal. The contexts in which this occurs are those dominated by unresolved national issues (such as Palestine, Chechnya, Kashmir, and Iraq), others involving a crisis in a revolutionary project (such as Iran with Khomeini's regime in decline, at the time of the first Gulf War between Iraq and Iran, 1980–8), and lastly, the forms of transnational martyrdom used by the al Qaida network. From this viewpoint, al Qaida is a movement composed of defeated movements, veterans from groups that had lost their battles in their respective countries and who thus placed themselves at the service of an International of terror, in an international environment, that of the network of Bin Laden. By planning suicide actions, the leaders of al Qaida thus reduced, with extreme symbolic as well as physical violence, the internal complexity of a system of beliefs such as Islam.

Martyrdom, in this sense, may be seen as a symptom of cognitive dissonance. Paraphrasing Festinger's well known thesis outlined in

A Theory of Cognitive Dissonance (1957), people who perceive the collapse of the social and everyday life tend to come back to religion to compensate for the frustration arising from the acute crisis they are coping with.

SEE ALSO: Cognitive Dissonance Theory (Festinger); Durkheim, Émile; Fundamentalism; Sacrifice; Suicide; Violence

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Maruyama, Masao (1914–96)

Wolfgang Seifert

Masao Maruyama, historian of Japanese political thought and political scientist, was the son of the prominent political journalist Kanji Maruyama, who worked for the *Ôsaka Asahi* and *Ôsaka Mainichi* newspapers. After graduating from the First Higher School in Tokyo in 1934 he studied the history of western political

thought at the Law Faculty of Tokyo Imperial University. In 1937 he became a graduate assistant, and in 1940 assistant professor at the same faculty. In the meantime he was persuaded by his teacher Nanbara Shigeru to delve into the texts of the Japanese tradition. Before he was drafted into the army in 1944 and posted to Pyongyang and later to Hiroshima, he had written three treatises on the development of political thought in premodern Japan for the academic *Kokka gakkai zasshi* (Journal of the Society of State Science). Appointed professor in 1950, he held the Chair in History of Political Thought of East Asia at Tokyo University. Compiled from the treatises mentioned above, *Studies in the Intellectual History of Tokugawa Japan* was published in 1952. When his essay “Theory and Psychology of Ultra Nationalism” appeared in May 1946 in the opinion journal *Sekai*, it created a sensation. Maruyama decoded the emperor system (*tennôsei*) in an unprecedented way by focusing on the “magic power” its main ideas exerted on the thought and behavior of the Japanese. In 1956–7 he compiled this and several other scholarly works and essays on contemporary Japanese politics in *Thought and Behavior in Modern Japanese Politics*. In those years he frequently stated his opinions on major controversies of post war Japanese politics. His *Japanese Thought* became a bestseller in 1961 and serves as a point of reference for ongoing debates on the intellectual development of modern Japan to date. In 1961–2 Maruyama delivered lectures as a visiting professor at Harvard and Oxford universities. Shortly after the student movement had reached its climax, he had to abandon lecturing for health reasons some years prior to retirement. In 1972 his analysis in “Ancient Substrata of Japanese Historical Consciousness” attracted attention, since it seemed to be a “return to Japan.” In spring 1975 he once more left to lecture at Oxford and later at Princeton. He again immersed himself in the work of the Meiji enlightenment thinker Fukuzawa Yukichi (1834–1901) and published as his final major book a profound commentary of Fukuzawa’s *Outline of a Theory of Civilization*. Another major project, “Seitô to itan” (orthodoxy and heresy), remained unfinished. In addition to his specialized field, his profound knowledge of western political philosophy and music

(especially the operas of Richard Wagner) was well known. Maruyama was appointed a member of the Japan Academy. He died on 15 August 1996 in Tokyo.

Maruyama is one of the most outstanding and internationally best known scholars of Japan. Though not a sociologist himself, sociology in Japan and sometimes abroad (e.g., that of Robert N. Bellah) was stimulated over decades by his work, in particular in the field of the ethos and values of the individual. Averse to all “grand theory,” he can not be classed as belonging to a particular school, but was an original scholar. In recent years Maruyama has been paid attention to as a political philosopher as well, and it seems that debates about his works will continue. Shortly before his death, publication of his collected works began under the title *Maruyama Masao sh* (16 volumes): it was finished in 1997. Major works have been translated into western languages, as well as into Chinese, Korean, and Bahasa Indonesia.

Maruyama’s work was written over more than half a century (1940–96). According to his own words, his approach to history and social science was very much shaped by: German idealism, especially Kant and the neo Kantians, but by Hegel as well; Marxism, in particular the early works of Karl Marx; and later by “thinkers who take a middling position between German ‘historicism’ and English ‘empiricism,’ men like Max Weber, Hermann Heller, and Karl Mannheim.”

Following a recent proposal by M. Kobayashi, in terms of its respective social context one may discern three periods in Maruyama’s works corresponding to phases of political history and social change in Japan. However, in terms of his thought, there are no sharp turning points, and the different phases overlap in part. During the first period (1940–52) the main incentive for his work was the critique of ultra nationalism or – in a broader sense – of “Japanese fascism,” which he had experienced himself. Through what factors could ultra nationalism succeed “in spreading a many layered, though invisible, net over the Japanese people”? Closely connected to this issue was the question of the subject of democratic revolution after the collapse of the Empire of Greater Japan. Could democracy, conceived as the active participation of individual citizens in politics, take root in the

thought and behavior of the Japanese people, or would it simply be imported as a set of formal institutions under American occupation? Moreover, Maruyama’s concern was the threat to democracy by the effects of the Cold War. The “reverse course” adopted by the occupation authorities as early as 1947, the “Red Purge” directed at the left, including liberal critics of the old elites like himself, and the emergence of McCarthyism in the US (which eventually drove his friend, the historian and diplomat E. H. Norman, to suicide) gave Maruyama cause to warn against “fascism in the name of democracy” even in the contemporary West. In view of the mass society emerging in Japan from the middle of the 1950s, he raised the question of how political participation could be achieved in a society whose members came closer and closer to the type of the atomized individual.

While Maruyama wrote during the years of oppression of Marxist and liberal thought, his treatises implied a covert critique of the fabrication of national myths. In “The Sorai School: Its Role in the Disintegration of Tokugawa Confucianism and Its Impact on National Learning” (1940) and in “Nature and Invention in Tokugawa Political Thought: Contrasting Institutional Views” (1941) he investigates how rational thinking replaced step by step metaphysical assumptions of a natural cosmic order. In particular, the second treatise works out how – in the thinking of the political philosopher Ogy Sorai (1666–1728) – social and political institutions were no longer considered “given” or “natural,” but “invented.” In the unfinished “The Premodern Formation of Nationalism” (1944) he examines early forms of Japanese nationalism that had emerged before the opening of the country in 1853 and its subsequent building of a “modern nation state” after the Meiji restoration in 1868. These treatises became seminal for all later research on the political thought of the Tokugawa period (1603–1868).

With “Theory and Psychology of Ultra Nationalism” Maruyama offered an anatomy of the emperor system, which sharply differed from the Marxist approach toward the analysis of the class structure. He focused instead on the legal structure of the state and the power structure in terms of political thought and social psychology. This essay, along with further

works such as “The Ideology and Dynamics of Japanese Fascism” (1947), “Thought and Behavior Patterns of Japan’s Wartime Leaders” (1949), and “Fascism – Some Problems: A Consideration of its Political Dynamics” (1952), served as a base for comparative research on fascism in Japan. Maruyama plainly distinguishes between phases of a movement and regime and brings out the peculiarities of the ideology of Japanese fascists. He coined the term “fascism from above” and thereupon described and explained the differences to “fascism from below,” as he perceived National Socialist Germany and Fascist Italy. This terminology became established internationally in research on fascism.

During the second or “middle” period (1952 to the late 1960s) Maruyama applied the results of his research on the historical background of Japanese nationalism and its extreme form to contemporary Japanese and international politics. These were the years when he addressed a wide audience with essays and statements in newspapers, mass media, and on public assemblies, without ever being a member of a political party. Especially during the conflict on the renewal of the US–Japan Security Treaty (Anpo) in 1958–60 he acted as a “public intellectual.” However, his view of political developments was based on concrete experiences in Japan, and not on the adoption of imported western political concepts. As early as the late 1940s and prior to the outbreak of the Korean War, Maruyama argued – starting from his point of view, that war was “the worst evil of all” – against the “realists” in foreign policy. He supported a “general, comprehensive” peace treaty with all former enemies, including the communist countries. The public statements of the Peace Problems Symposium, a group of known intellectuals of different political views, were decisively influenced by him. In this middle period he published “Japanese Thought” (1957), “Loyalty and Rebellion” (1960), and “Patterns of Individuation and the Case of Japan: A Conceptual Scheme” (1965).

Maruyama argues in “Japanese Thought” that since no “axis” like tradition such as Christianity in the West or Confucianism in China existed in Japan, tradition appeared to be “unstructured.” In the political sphere, the founders of the Meiji state had to create a belief

system centered on the emperor, who at the same time had to function as a modern monarch. From this, various unsolved contradictions resulted. In “Loyalty and Rebellion” Maruyama examined, by analyzing various texts, the inner tensions on the level of the individual produced by the Meiji reform of 1867–8 and the subsequent fundamental changes. Maruyama argues that traditional (feudal) loyalty by no means meant mere passive conformity or subjection, but in principle contained a dynamic element of influence of a vassal or servant on his master. This element was manifest in the rebellion of many samurai against Tokugawa rule. Moreover, when the Popular Rights Movement attacked the growing authoritarian tendencies of the newly established Meiji administration, its members, too, acted not only as adherents of western ideas of political participation, but were in many cases motivated by that “feudal spirit.” These examples show that Maruyama did not consider the “progressives” to be the sole driving force of historical progress. Even less did he consider progress to develop linearly towards modernity in an affirmative sense or to consist in reaching it. In his treatise “Patterns of Individuation and the Case of Japan” Maruyama worked out the “disparity between what is expected of modern institutions – legal, political, and economic – and the interpersonal relations which in fact are at work.” According to him, the discrepancies stretch from the individual level to the group level, reaching an exceptional extent in Japan. In contrast to “modernization theory” predominant in the 1950s and 1960s, Maruyama wanted “to lead the problem of modernization into areas related to ‘ethos’ or ‘ideology’ questions.” Again, the compelling logic of his argument aroused sociological discussions.

After years of silence, Maruyama published in 1972 “Ancient Substrata of Historical Consciousness,” which marks a significant change. From then on we may discern a third or late period of his work. He had returned to research on the history of political thought in Japan, yet his view of history had changed. The Hegelian notion of history progressing by stages of development was replaced by the theory that historical change is strongly influenced by contact between the different cultures of Japan and the outside world. Maruyama now focused

more on continuities in political, historical, and ethical consciousness. Whereas he used to speak of “prototypes” of respective views, he replaced this term with “ancient substrata” or “deep structures,” and in his late works by the musicological term *basso ostinato*. The basic views of the Japanese on politics and society showed a particularism hardly capable of being overcome. It appears as if these obstacles to forming universalistic ways of thinking drove Maruyama to despair, but still one would be mistaken in viewing his findings as a kind of “theory of Japaneseness” (*Nihonjin ron*). Maruyama assumes that Japanese society is heterogeneous, and he is not offering comprehensive characteristics of Japanese society, nor applying a holistic approach. Instead, he kept searching for elements of ethical principles and for conditions of substantive democracy in the thought and behavior of the Japanese. In a way, he continued the task he had described as early as 1962: “to examine the nature of Japanese culture in a wider sense, and analyze the daily behavior of the Japanese people and the nature of their thought processes including not simply consciously held ideologies but more especially those unconscious assumptions and values which in a fragmentary way reveal themselves in the actions of daily life.”

From today’s perspective, Maruyama’s works, albeit disputed, are still inspiring sociology and social sciences, even if he was not a sociologist himself. Not only for contemporary history, but also for political sociology and research of political culture, his essays on Japanese fascism offer important stimuli to comparative research, even though the historical data he used are out of date. The same is true of a number of self-coined terms and metaphors, for example for types of political personality during the rule of the “emperor system”: the “portable shrine,” the “official” and the “outlaw,” represent respectively authority, power, and violence. With regard to the question of individual freedom and its relationship to society, Maruyama’s insights will challenge not only non-western societies and East European societies, which are transforming themselves into more democratic societies, but also – again – western societies. His idea of subjectivity and his “scientifically imagined democracy” (Barshay 1992) might function as an antidote

against adaptive tendencies of the social sciences in the contemporary world.

SEE ALSO: Democracy; Fascism; Historical and Comparative Methods; Modernity; Nation State and Nationalism; Politics

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Marx, Karl (1818–83)

Robert J. Antonio

Karl Marx’s critique of economic inequality and appeals for social justice have inspired left-wing political parties, labor movements, and insurgencies across the world. His ideas often have been fused with local political cultures and employed in diverse ways. Marx’s participation in the communist movement, call for worldwide revolution, and totemic status in communist

regimes have made him a very controversial thinker. In wealthy capitalist countries he has been more of an oppositional reference point than an inspirational figure. For much of the twentieth century, western sociologists viewed him as an ideologue, on the margin of their discipline. During the later 1960s and early 1970s, however, sociological interest in Marx increased, spurred by anti colonialist uprisings, student activism, and the New Left. In North American sociology, which previously had ignored or dismissed him, a new generation of theorists portrayed him as a founder of “conflict theory” or “critical sociology” and accorded him elevated status, along with Durkheim and Weber, as part of classical social theory’s and sociology’s founding troika. Later critics held that this canon was too narrow and Eurocentric and that the postmodern cultural shift and collapse of communism rendered Marx irrelevant. Others countered that globalization, deregulated capitalism, and increased economic inequality made him more relevant than ever. These divergent views aside, Marx’s materialist perspective and concept of class have influenced much sociological work, including that claiming to disprove his theories. In the early twenty first century, Marxist sociologists worked in many parts of the world, and they even had their own section of the American Sociological Association. Moreover, sociologists with diverse orientations have employed concepts and questions originating from Marx in well established research and theory programs. Marx has had an enduring impact on sociology’s development.

Marx built on ideas from Hegel, wider Enlightenment thought, and modern democratic ideology. Theorizing capitalist society as a whole, criticizing it historically, and calling for its fundamental transformation, Marx initiated the critical theory tradition of the broader practice of social theory. At least since Plato’s *Republic*, social theorists have posed theories of society that address “what is” in arguments about “what should be.” Arguably, Marx began modern social theory, which retains the normative thrust of the earlier tradition, but engages empirical historical material in a much more comprehensive, systematic, and sociological manner. Marx wrote his masterwork, *Capital*, after many years of research in the British Museum, studying intensely social and economic theory, history,

and data. He foreshadowed a generation of late nineteenth and early twentieth century social theorists who addressed social processes, structures, and ruptures, entwined with capitalist development. Expressing the era’s scientific aspirations, they called for creation of social science and helped bring it forth. Later sociologists fashioned a more strictly empirical, theoretical practice, sociological theory, which is supposed to focus entirely on “what is” and exclude value questions. Social theory became an interdisciplinary enterprise, largely independent from sociological theory. However, borders between the practices are somewhat ambiguous or fluid. Marx made a major contribution to social theory and sociological theory, and his thought sheds light on the connections and tensions between these different practices.

HISTORICISM, ALIENATION, AND CRITICAL THEORY: MARX’S ENGAGEMENT WITH HEGEL

Marx was born into a middle class household, the oldest male of six surviving children. His parents had Jewish origins, but converted to Protestantism in response to Prussian anti-Semitism. Marx was exposed to Enlightenment thought and socialist ideas in his teenage years. As a university student, he joined the Berlin Doctors Club, a group of left wing intellectuals who embraced Hegel’s philosophical vision of humanity, making itself historically through its own labor. They opposed right wing Hegelians, who stressed his theory of the state and justified the Prussian regime. Left Hegelians wanted to complete philosophy’s break with religion and fashion an approach that favored progressive change. Marx finished his doctoral dissertation in 1841, but did not complete the second thesis required to enter German academia. After left Hegelian Bruno Bauer lost his academic position for political reasons, Marx knew, especially given his Jewish roots, that this door was closed to him. He decided to try journalism.

In 1842 Marx wrote for the progressive *Rheinische Zeitung* and soon became its editor. Opposing laws that forbade peasants from gathering wood, he attacked the wealthy’s monopoly of property and called the poor “the

elemental class.” He criticized Hegel’s view of the state as a neutral arbiter and rational expression of the general will. By contrast, he held that bureaucratic officials cared little about the public, were grossly self interested, and slavishly obeyed aristocratic and bourgeois demands. Marx attacked the Prussian state’s press censorship and authoritarian approach to democratic civil society. He believed that average people were capable of grasping their own problems and self governing. His early views about bureaucracy, free speech, and active citizens anticipated aspects of Dewey’s and Habermas’s ideas of radical or communicative democracy. The *Rheinische Zeitung* flourished under Marx’s editorship, but, in 1843, Prussian officials shut it down because of its criticism of the monarchy and bureaucracy. That year Marx married Jenny von Westphalen and took an editorial position in Paris, where he would learn more about capitalism, the working class, and communism. A skilled journalist, he did part time newspaper writing throughout much of his life.

Marx’s “On the Jewish Question” (1843a) attacked Bruno Bauer’s plea to deny Jews political rights. Marx’s negative comments about Jews indicate that he had not come to terms with his own roots. However, he took a more radical position than before, decrying capitalism’s emphasis on egoistic pursuit of self interest. He argued that bourgeois “freedom” or “liberty” dissolved feudal ties and expanded legal rights, but it did not take account of the fact that most people in emergent capitalist societies were too poor to activate the new rights, especially given liberalism’s stress on the inviolability of property rights and opposition to redistribution. In Marx’s view, bourgeois “freedom” obscured capitalist unfreedom, undermined community, and precluded “human emancipation.” He saw genuine freedom entailing access to the means of participation, which requires substantive, social justice as well as formal, legal equality. In another work, Marx (1843b) attacked Hegel for portraying the oppressive Prussian monarchy as if it mirrored its democratic constitution, and for attributing to it a transcendent, “Rational” logic. He held that Hegel’s “idealist” idiom, stressing evolution of “spirit” or consciousness, easily mistakes normative justifications for sociopolitical realities.

Criticizing Hegel’s philosophical idea of “estrangement,” Marx’s “Economic and Philosophical Manuscripts of 1844” formulated a historically specific idea of “alienated labor” manifesting the split between capital and labor. He held that the humanitarian possibilities of capitalism’s unparalleled productive forces were undercut by its oppressive class hierarchy. Marx charged that Hegel failed to engage “corporeal” people in their social relations and to recognize that overcoming alienation and recovering human agency required a social transformation. Marx concurred with leading left Hegelian Ludwig Feuerbach’s “inversion” of Hegel, stressing historical, human subjectivity over transcendent spirit (e.g., humanity makes God) and holding that explanations of social life should start with material realities, rather than with ideas. However, Marx criticized Feuerbach for retaining too much Hegelian residue, over emphasizing religion, treating the material realm too inertly, and speaking too generally about “Man.”

Hegel still left a permanent, deep imprint on Marx. Hegel argued that we create our world and make ourselves in the process, but that our self creation is “estranged” because we fail to recognize our agency and thus treat human creations as alien objects (e.g., human good or evil is seen as the product of God or heredity). Hegel contended that humanity eventually will overcome estrangement through heightened self consciousness, struggle, and, especially, labor. His view of “lordship and bondage,” a metaphorical discourse on domination, was crucial for Marx. Hegel held that masters seek self recognition by dominating slaves, but languish in the contradiction that coerced recognition from unfree people is worthless. By contrast to the master’s falsity and inactivity, he contended, slaves grow wiser and stronger through their striving, and ultimately triumph over the master. By this striving, he held, humanity will some day achieve a higher stage of development based on recognition of the equality of selves. Hegel saw this move as a major step toward the discovery of human authorship of the world and toward a terminus to preexisting history, after which “Absolute Spirit” or total freedom and rationality will reign; then we will make our world and ourselves deliberately and in a way that each person’s particularity and worth is

recognized by all others. Following Hegel, Marx rejected transcendental explanations and saw self-constitutive labor as the source of all culture. Substituting capitalists and wage workers, alienated labor, and communism for Hegel's masters and slaves, estranged objectification, and Absolute Spirit, he forged a historically specific, sociological version of Hegelian historicism.

Embracing Hegel's dialectical idea of "determinate negation," Marx aimed to overcome capitalism's class attributes, preserve its progressive facets (especially its heightened capacity to produce for human needs), and create a freer, more just society. He rooted his critique in liberal democratic claims about freedom and rationality, which he turned against bourgeois inequality and exploitation. He aimed to create a critical standpoint based on historical grounds, rather than on dogmatic claims about religious or metaphysical "Truth." Marx fashioned his critical theory to engage historical conditions, which could be analyzed sociologically and, hopefully, would inform emancipatory political practices. He intended to anchor normative critique in sociological claims about historical ideals, contradictions, developmental tendencies, and existent or possible social movements. However, tensions between the sociological and political sides of Marx's critical theory plagued his thought and later approaches that followed in its tracks.

FRAMING MATERIALISM: MARX'S COLLABORATION WITH ENGELS

Marx developed his materialist framework in the middle and later 1840s. Although motivated by political upheavals, accelerating capitalist development became his chief focus. He was influenced by left Hegelians Moses Hess and Friedrich Engels's shift from philosophical criticism to a critique of political economy. Joining the communist movement, they criticized capitalist manufacture and its impoverished workers. Engels's (1845) study of the English working class was an especially important work. Becoming Marx's lifelong collaborator, Engels provided him constructive criticism, extensive editorial assistance, moral and intellectual comradeship, and even financial

support. Engels understated his role in the partnership, but he contributed to the analytical basis and substance of Marx's thought.

Marx made his decisive move toward his materialist position in a collaborative effort with Engels, *The German Ideology* (1845–6). Claiming to turn Hegel's position "right side up," they gave primacy to material needs and production over consciousness and ideas, and articulated a philosophical anthropology that portrayed language and symbolic culture as late arrivals in human development, shaped by productive practices. Marx and Engels established "mode of production" and "class" as their fundamental analytical categories. They argued that extractive social relationships between ruling classes and direct producers are the most decisive formative factors in a social formation and that they have variable historical forms, which must be analyzed on their own terms. Marx and Engels argued that capitalism had a unique "world historical" character; "large scale industry" was enlisting natural science into production, supplanting labor with machinery, and creating a new type of global order. They saw capitalist factories, markets, and class relations evaporating traditional societies, destroying local particularity and autonomy, and creating global homogeneity and interdependence. Their ideas about large firms, scientific production, and globalization anticipated core aspects of Marx's later masterwork, *Capital*.

Marx and Engels's political pamphlet, "The Communist Manifesto" (1848: 487–9), expressed eloquently capitalism's radical modernizing force – "all that is solid melts into air, all that is holy is profaned" – and then humanity finally will "face with sober senses" their real social conditions and relations. Writing as revolutionary struggles for liberal institutions and rights swept across Europe, they thought that the capitalist class would soon smash the remains of feudal aristocracy and monarchy, attain full political power, create liberal democracy and global capitalism, and thus forge the material basis for a higher stage of social development. Marx and Engels expressed their materialism lucidly and succinctly, applied it to capitalism, and located it vis à vis competing anti-capitalist positions. They held that capitalism's "colossal" productive forces, which were already greater than those of all previous

societies combined, were creating exceptionally extensive cooperative networks and “universal interdependence.” Claiming to be giving voice to intensifying crises and mounting opposition to capitalism, they argued that cutthroat economic competition drives capitalists constantly to revolutionize productive forces, transform radically and untiringly society and culture, and create a mass of impoverished industrial workers destined to overthrow capitalism. Initially the platform for the Communist League, the Manifesto was circulated worldwide by left intellectuals, communist parties, revolutionary insurgencies, and labor movements. It became the political catechism for twentieth century communism and the most widely read, politically important Marxist work. The Manifesto had a highly optimistic thrust: after the class war, a clear eyed communist leadership will employ their materialist perspective to plan centrally, build on capitalism’s progressive facets, reduce misery and, after their transitional dictatorship that eliminates reactionary opposition, create a participatory, democratic association of producers who will turn the state into a benign system of administration and facilitate “free development of all.”

THEORIZING THE DETERMINANTS OF CAPITALISM’S DISTORTED SURFACE: MARX’S ROAD TO *CAPITAL*

In 1848 Marx went to Germany to edit the radical newspaper *Neue Rheinische Zeitung*. After the right defeated the recently ascendant, liberal democratic forces there in 1849, he was expelled with a passport good only for Paris. The conservative French regime restricted him to Brittany. Marx fled to London, living the rest of his life in the bastion of liberal economic theory and liberal individualism, the first nation to develop large scale capitalism. Great Britain was experiencing sweeping changes that did not come to other parts of Europe and North America until the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. Marx participated in radical working class politics, leading the First International from 1864–72. However, when prospects for change dimmed, he reduced his political activity and gave fuller attention to his theoretical work. Although continuing journalism, he and his

family depended on Engels’s generous financial help. Marx fathered eight children, four of them dying before reaching adolescence. He and the family maid had a son who was given to foster parents and kept secret. Overall, however, Marx was an attentive father, supportive of his three daughters’ cultural and personal development. The Marx family apparently was closely knit and warm. First they lived in a poor neighborhood, then later moved to a middle class area. Marx suffered from recurrent, painful, and probably work related health problems. He was tormented by his inability to finish projects, especially *Capital*, and by his financial dependency and its impact on his family. In a letter to Engels he lamented that he was “still a pauper” at 50, recalling his mother’s earlier admonition that he should have “made capital” instead of simply writing about it (Marx 1868: 25).

Although reactionary forces regained power in Europe, at first Marx and Engels believed that the bourgeois revolution would soon succeed. But they turned pessimistic in the face of counter revolutionary paralysis and internecine class and subclass conflict. Marx’s *Eighteenth Brumaire* (1852a) addressed the rise of France’s second Napoleonic dictatorship. He reported how Louis Bonaparte attained total power, aided by the easily bribed Parisian underclass mob. In Marx’s view, the new regime paralleled earlier absolutism, but concentrated power more fully and effectively, pushing aside bourgeoisie and proletariat. His opening paragraphs are among the most beautifully written and circumspect in his corpus. Marx (1852a: 103–4, 106) declared that people “make their own history, but they do not make it just as they please.” Just when the old order appeared ready to be revolutionized, the state returned “to its oldest form,” based on “the shamelessly simple domination of the sabre and the cowl.” He lamented that “the tradition of dead generations weighs like a nightmare on the brain of the living.”

Anticipating Weber’s views, Marx held that the French parliamentary democracy’s highly rationalized bureaucracy provided effective means for a *coup d’état* and usurpation of total power. He contended that the bourgeoisie created the conditions of their own demise, their pursuit of short term, material interest paving the way for the total state. Marx held that the new regime appeared to be

“completely independent” of the material base and bourgeoisie, but that state power could not really be “suspended in mid air.” He contended that the dictatorship manifested the class interests of the smallholding peasantry – a very large group in rural France that voted heavily for Louis Napoleon. Marx considered them to be the most backward stratum, living in “stupefied seclusion” on “isolated” family plots, unaffected by capitalism’s extensive cooperative networks and interdependence, and alien to proletarian solidarity and revolutionary aims. He held that commodification of rural life and consequent proletarianization would eventually modernize the peasantry and undermine the dictatorship. Although clinging to class based revolutionary theory by a thread, the *Brumaire* scuttled the Manifesto’s optimistic vision of materially driven social progress and demonstrated dramatically that capitalist development might lead to unexpected reactionary fusions of modernity and tradition, rather than to freedom and rationality. The authoritarian regime blocked the type of capitalist development and class struggle that Marx promised would lead to proletarian revolution and communism. The *Brumaire* anticipated issues probed by the Frankfurt School, a major twentieth century carrier of the critical theory tradition. Many of these thinkers moved toward post Marxist positions while exploring Fascism, Nazism, and Stalinism, and capitalist democracies’ depoliticized working classes, uninterested in revolution and vulnerable to seduction by demagogic chants.

Engels (1851–2) argued that the bourgeoisie were defeated more decisively in Germany than in other parts of Europe. Restoration of aristocratic power and dissolution of the provincial and national assemblies destroyed liberal democracy. He argued that the 1848 revolutions created new configurations of aristocratic and capitalist power, which undermined formation of a class conscious, revolutionary proletariat. Moreover, Marx (1852b, 1852c) observed that Great Britain’s prosperity was creating “political indifference,” neutralizing the progressive possibilities of its liberal institutions and generating opposition to progressive democracy. The depoliticizing impact of affluence was a major factor in the decline of socialist and labor centered left politics in later twentieth century

European social democracies. Marx and Engels retained their materialist viewpoint, but abandoned the Manifesto’s optimistic view that modernization would make capitalism transparent and emancipation imminent. In the *Brumaire* Marx spoke about the Napoleonic regime’s “superficial appearance” as if it were a veil obscuring underlying capitalist realities. He raised the issue of ideological illusion in earlier work, but now he implied that one must dig much more deeply and theoretically to grasp the causal matrix of capitalism’s highly distorted sociocultural and economic surface. Marx (1859: 275) asserted later that the “semblance of simplicity disappears in more advanced relations of production.”

Marx started his intense study of capitalism in the early 1850s, but it was not until 1857 that he developed his theory (Marx 1857–8a; 1857–8b; 1859). He held that everyday experiences of the “economy” and “money” are profoundly “mystified.” Capitalist exchange appears to be an independent realm of “things,” rather than a “social relation.” In his view, monetary exchange “shrouds” capitalism’s contradictions, manifesting them in an indirect, distorted way. He claimed that dominant economic views ignore how capitalists attain the products of labor that they trade and from which they profit. Marx aimed to illuminate the hidden sociomaterial determinants of bourgeois political economy’s hypostatized, or reified, economic categories. In particular, he argued that the mainstream view of the wage labor relationship between capitalists and workers as a realm of “free” and “equal” individual exchange obscures its nature as an extractive class relation. In his view, this unequal exchange ultimately animates monetary circulation and accumulation.

In the *Brumaire* Marx suggested already that class structure and class conflict were becoming much more complicated than the linear scenario projected in the Manifesto. Modern industry’s greatly expanded production and surpluses opened the way for a proliferation of intermediate classes and complex class and sub class splits. In *Capital*, however, Marx held that the social relationship between the historically specific ruling class and the class of direct producers – capitalists and wage workers – is still the key to grasping capitalism as a whole. Seeing the extractive, wage labor process as the

secret of capitalist accumulation, he made the labor theory of value the work's integrative analytical frame. He contended that the value of "commodities" manifests their common "social substance," or the "socially necessary labor time" that it takes to find, mine, refine, fashion, assemble, or otherwise make them (which presumes average efficiency relative to existing productive forces). Although acknowledging that supply and demand, monopoly, entrepreneurship, and certain other social conditions cause "exchange values" to fluctuate, Marx argued that they gravitate toward an average price determined by the "crystallized social labor" or the "labor time" contained in commodities. He saw the same contingent business factors to be vital for the success or failure of individual capitalists, but he believed that variations cancel each other out over the entire capitalist system and thus cannot explain accumulation as a whole. Most importantly, Marx argued that the worker's wage pays only for subsistence or the cost of his or her reproduction, which is only a fraction of the labor time that he or she transfers to the product during a pay period. Capitalists keep the unpaid portion and realize the "surplus value" when they sell the items. Holding that "labor power" is the only commodity to produce regularly and systematically more value than it commands in exchange, Marx identified the unequal wage relationship as the ultimate source of profit and growth. He contended that, under capitalism, as in earlier modes of production, ruling classes appropriate direct producer surplus. Like slaves and serfs, he held, wage workers cannot ordinarily choose positions that would allow them to retain their surplus product or to live off that of others. By contrast to slavery or serfdom, however, Marx claimed that capitalism's formally "voluntary" labor contract creates the illusion of freedom and commensurate exchange.

Marx held that a capitalist makes huge profits when he or she is the first to develop technical innovations that produce a commodity substantially below its socially necessary labor time (e.g., Henry Ford's assembly line). However, he contended that, eventually, other producers adopt the same innovation and socially necessary labor time is adjusted downward. Thus, he argued, in the long run, mechanization and

automation, driven by capitalist competition, will reduce sharply the proportion of "living labor" (the only source of value) in the productive process, causing ever increasing unemployment and falling profits. He thought that monopoly pricing, global expansion of capitalist production into low wage countries, and other strategies would pump up profits and slow the decline, but could not avert an eventual, terminal capitalist crisis and rise of communism. Marx claimed that automated production, highly rationalized and centralized productive organization, and applied science and technology, decoupled from capitalism and class by communist planners, would provide means to develop productive forces much more systematically, reduce their destructive impacts on people and nature, generate more surplus, reduce unnecessary labor, and create an equitable distribution of work and goods. However, Marx's vision of this transition presumed the prior spread of very advanced, knowledge based capitalism and automated production to the entire globe, which at the millennium was still a far off dream. Even Marx and Engels had doubts about this scenario.

The first volume of *Capital* (1867) was published about a decade after Marx began his effort to theorize systematically capitalist political economy. He planned to complete six volumes of his magnum opus. Although writing thousands of pages and filling numerous notebooks, Marx never completed the work. After his death, Engels edited and assembled the two unfinished core volumes (Marx 1885, 1894). Karl Kautsky edited the three volumes of *Theories of Surplus Value* (1905–10), Marx's critical history of economic theory.

MARX'S CORE MODEL: HEURISTIC MATERIALISM OR DOGMATIC MATERIALISM?

Like many other modern social theorists, Marx held that people are born into ready made, hierarchical social worlds, which shape their ideas and actions in innumerable ways. However, he saw class to be the most pervasive source of systematic social constraint. It is an aggregate of people who share a common location in a mode of production and thus face similar

material limits and possibilities. Marx and Engels (1845–6: 77–9) stated that class has an “independent existence as against individuals” that fixes conditions under which people make themselves, regardless of their identity, will, or effort. For example, feudal peasants were tied by law to their plots and endless toil, while the lord ruled by military means and appropriated their “surplus product,” leaving them only the “necessary product” required for subsistence. This class relation shaped distinct types of superordinate and subordinate social beings, born into positions that were reproduced generation after generation. Marx was aware of individual divergences (e.g., some peasants fled to towns), but he thought that class position entails fundamental limits and opportunities and threats and possible costs for deviation from expected roles. Depending on historical circumstances, he argued, classes can be fragmented aggregates (i.e., composed of individuals, who are unaware of their common condition or who take a passive attitude toward it) or “class conscious” groups (i.e., in which individual and collective identities and actions are oriented to their shared position and common interests). In either case, Marx’s “structural” idea of class stresses pervasive sociomaterial conditioning of individual and group development.

Marx’s materialism holds that the historically specific way “in which unpaid surplus labor is pumped out of direct producers” is the “hidden basis of the entire social structure” (Marx 1894: 777–8). He argued that ruling classes and allied intermediate strata (e.g., priests, intellectuals, politicians) mystify this extraction, making it a reflection of God, nature, or reason and thus moral, inevitable, or legal. In his view, materialist analyses uncover systematically suppressed, “real bases” of society (e.g., social agents, structures, and processes). Marx argued that social formations are characterized by systematic interdependence and internal relations. He held that the mode of production, or base, is their primary, albeit nonexclusive, structuring factor. He saw it to be composed of an ensemble of “productive forces” (i.e., natural resources, tools, labor power, technology/science, modes of cooperation), or factors that contribute directly to creation of necessary and surplus product, and “property relations,” or class based social relationships that determine who

has effective control over productive forces and disposition of product and who must do productive labor. Although seeing this “material factor” to be the ultimate determinant, he conceived of it as a social construct with physical dimensions. Even simple productive forces, such as prehistoric stone tools, require rudimentary technical ideas, communication, and social cooperation. Stressing centrally class struggles over productive property, Marx usually focused more on social relationships oriented to material factors than on physical conditions *per se*.

Marx held that social formations also have a superstructure (i.e., “modes of intercourse” and “ideology”) that reproduces the mode of production. For example, he saw the state’s military, police, legal, and administrative arms to be primary means to perpetuate productive forces and property relations. He also argued that private associations and organizations (e.g., families or voluntary groups) control, socialize, or otherwise fashion people to fit the mode of production. Marx occasionally exaggerated the scope of such reproduction and other times left it vague, but he did not claim that all organizations, associations, and culture contribute equally to the process or necessarily do so at all. For example, he knew that, in liberal societies, labor organizations and political parties sometimes oppose capitalism, yet still participate in public life or operate at its borders. For Marx, ideology, or “ruling ideas,” meant facets of culture that either play a direct role in, or make an indirect but clearly identifiable and determinate contribution to, justifying the mode of production (e.g., capitalist ideas of the state, economy, or possessive individualism). He was aware that certain individuals reject these ideas, or he could not have hoped to demystify the capitalist wage relationship or raise proletarian consciousness. Certain later twentieth century, left leaning “cultural studies” scholars applied the concept of ideology much more sweepingly than Marx, referring to culture as a whole (or else declaring it irrelevant), holding that the media’s “floating signifiers” and “simulation” precluded distinguishing illusion from reality.

Marx spoke of relations of correspondence, which facilitate the reproduction of a mode of production, and relations of contradiction, which undermine the process. For example, feudal laws and customs, which bound serfs to

lords and journeymen to masters and forbade unrestricted sale of property and market competition, “corresponded” to and reproduced the productive forces and property relations of the manor and guild, but they “contradicted” or “fettered” the nascent capitalist forms of labor organization and technology that were arising in feudalism’s interstices. Increased capitalist development brought heightened contradictions and intensified class conflicts, which escalated sometimes into open political battles between the emergent bourgeoisie and the feudal aristocracy and guild masters. Capturing the state, victorious capitalists created administrative, legal, and sociocultural forms, which “corresponded” to and fostered development of the new productive forces and class structure. Marx saw class struggle to be the immediate “motor” of such transformations of modes of production and over all social formations, but he argued that fundamental shifts of productive forces are the ultimate causal agent. His view that epochal social transitions are rooted in qualitative transformations of production anticipated later, widely accepted arguments by non Marxist anthropologists and comparative historical sociologists (i.e., shifts between hunting and gathering, horticultural, agricultural, and industrial societies initiate fundamental sociocultural changes). However, Marx implied or asserted, at certain junctures, the normative claim that material progress leads to social progress. This “economism” has been expressed more emphatically and consistently by later “Orthodox Marxists” and has been attacked by “Critical Marxists” and non Marxists. Durkheim, Weber, and various “institutionalists” have contested a parallel economism in the thought of Adam Smith, Herbert Spencer, and other liberals and neoliberals, as well as the Marxist version.

The claim that the material factor has “primacy,” or is the ultimate determining force, has been an enduring, intense topic of Marxist debate and anti Marxist criticism. Marx did not argue that all substantial sociocultural change originates from shifts in productive forces. His view of the relation of culture and nature is complex, because he saw the “material” realm to be social as well as natural. For example, he considered science and modes of cooperation to be part of determining productive forces. These

sociocultural elements depend on and are embedded in a social formation’s overall culture. Thus, causality is a complicated matter for Marx. He often praised art and literature, and did not reduce them to a materialist reflux of class society. He did imply that entire social formations bear their mode of production’s imprint, but he saw their parts to be, at variable levels, “relatively autonomous.” Usually, Marx treated the mode of production as a social matrix that sets material limits and exerts variable, determinate influences on different parts of the social formation. This view implied heuristic materialism, a guide to historical sociological inquiry. By contrast, however, he expressed occasionally a dogmatic materialism that reduced politics and culture to epiphenomenal “reflections” of material forces or stressed the “inevitability” of certain tendencies or “iron laws” of capitalism. Critical Marxists have charged that this overblown determinism is a chief flaw of Orthodox Marxism. Other post Marxist, postmodernist, and anti Marxist critics, asserting politics’ or culture’s sweeping autonomy, often have rejected Marx’s ideas, branding him a dogmatic totalizer.

Regardless of the dogmatic passages, Marx stressed generally a complex, historically contingent, heuristic materialism, which is not reducible to “technological determinism” (i.e., social change arises only from technical change) or to “reflection theory” (i.e., ideas are mere emanations of physical reality). In substantive analyses he often pointed to diverse cultural and political conditions as well as to contingent material ones that heighten or deflect class struggles. He sometimes qualified theoretical arguments with the proviso that claims about analytical relationships must be grasped in light of different empirical circumstances, especially conditions under which they might not hold. Employed as a heuristic device, Marx’s materialism provides the basis for a Marxist sociology with characteristic foci, problems, and hypotheses, which other approaches leave unexplored or address in different ways. By contrast, his dogmatic moments, which likely were meant to reassure the working class, his other supporters, and perhaps even himself that “history was on their side,” suggest an absolutist ontology and irrefutable “Truths,” which are beyond inquiry and which discourage it. These polar tendencies

in Marx's thought have parallels in other types of social theory, manifesting tensions between their normative and empirical sides. Social theorists' effort to unify "theory and practice" has been a rocky road.

Even in the most complex premodern civilizations, productive forces usually have developed incrementally over many hundreds or even thousands of years, and major innovations have tended to diffuse very slowly between different regions, if at all. By contrast, as Marx argued, modern capitalism generated a greater variety of powerful productive forces than all preceding civilizations together. Bearing the marks of this peculiar historical moment, his materialism constituted an effort to come to terms with a new and unique capitalist world. The primacy that Marx gave to material factors arose from his experience of the radical changes wrought by an unparalleled socioeconomic revolution that altered everyday life profoundly across extremely extensive spaces in a few generations. By the late twentieth century, neoliberal capitalism made accumulation the measure of nearly everything, accelerated greatly the already intense pace and diversity of change, and fashioned a new global capitalism. Twenty-first century peoples still live in the wake of the world historical transformation that Marx analyzed; the capitalist mode of production is still ongoing. Thus, his materialism still provides heuristic tools, which pose penetrating sociological questions about social inequality, wealth, growth, ideology, and overall social development. Finally, his social theory's ethical thrust, stressing just distribution of the sociomaterial means of participation, challenges us to rethink socioeconomic justice after twentieth-century communism and social democracy and to entertain fresh alternatives to unrestricted economic liberalism and its characteristic inequalities. Marx's specter hangs over sociology still.

SEE ALSO: Alienation; Anomie; Birmingham School; Bourgeoisie and Proletariat; Braverman, Harry; Capital, Secondary Circuit of; Capitalism; Communism; Conflict Theory; Crime, Radical/Marxist Theories of; Critical Theory/Frankfurt School; Cultural Studies, British; Dependency and World Systems Theories; Dialectical Materialism; Exchange Value; False Consciousness; Hegel G.W.F.; Hegemony;

Ideology; Labor/Labor Power; Luxemburg, Rosa; Marxism and Sociology; Materialism; Materialist Feminisms; Neo Marxism; New Left; Political Economy; Revolutions; Social Justice, Theories of; Socialism; Stratification and Inequality, Theories of; Structuralism; Structure and Agency; Use Value

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Marxism and sociology

George Steinmetz

The twentieth century challenged some of Marxism's central theoretical concepts and empirical expectations. Contrary to the anticipation of capitalism's immanent downfall, capitalist societies reconfigured themselves repeatedly, overcoming economic and political crises and redirecting popular dissatisfaction toward less threatening aims. The links between people's social class locations and their political practices and subjectivities were weak or extremely variable across time and place (Burawoy & Wright 2000). During the 1930s and 1940s workers in some European countries were just as likely to support fascism as socialism. And finally, the self-designated socialist and communist societies turned out to be politically repressive and economically stagnant. Most of them collapsed under the weight of their internal weaknesses and oppositional movements. Although some Marxists continue to describe contemporary society as *late* capitalism (Fredric Jameson, Ernst Mandel), most agree with Theodor Adorno's early prognosis that capitalism's futures may not be socialist at all, nor even preferable to present day conditions.

Marxism has also faced intensive theoretical and conceptual questioning. Critique has been directed against its claims to explain all of social life omnihistorically in terms of a uniform cluster of explanatory mechanisms such as class

or capital accumulation. Adorno's "negative dialectics" already opposed this totalizing with an "antisystem" that moved beyond the Hegelian "category of unity" (Adorno 1990 [1966]: 10). Writing around the same time, Louis Althusser (1990 [1965]) argued against essentialist, "Hegelian" Marxism that derives all practices from a unitary, core contradiction (e.g., bourgeoisie versus proletariat). Marxist orthodoxy had seen *ideology* and *the state* as "super structures" that were derived from, and functionally reproductive of, the economic "base." In recent decades Marxists have acknowledged that culture is not simply derivative of the economic but is a determining force in its own right, and that modern states often pursue social order and other goals in ways that ignore or even run at odds with the needs of the capitalist economy (Steinmetz 1993). After a phase in which theorists proposed "dual systems theories" (e.g., gender and class, state and society), it gradually became evident that there is potentially an infinite number of different principles according to which social domination/exploitation can be socially organized. Laclau and Mouffe (1985) pushed this line of thinking to its logical conclusion, arguing that all social practices, including the economic ones that Marxism had long considered foundational, were the product of contingent discursive articulations. The unavoidable conclusion was that critical social science must accept the "rain forestlike profusion of different kinds of reality" (Collier 2005) – the complex variety of social structures and practices interacting in unexpected ways – that produce the flow of empirical events that we call history. Accepting the ontological pluralism of social structures does not negate the possibility that practices are *sometimes* the mechanisms intrinsic to Marxism.

Furthermore, traditional Marxism expected ideology and the state to wither away in post-capitalist societies. Against this, Althusser (1971) argued that ideology was an eternal feature of human existence. Cornelius Castoriadis, Claude Lefort, and other members of the group *Socialisme ou barbarie* (1949–65) argued that "actually existing" socialist societies had produced a hypertrophy rather than an evaporation of the state. Adorno criticized Marxists for elaborating particular, *affirmative* utopias and thereby reducing the "non identical" to the familiar.

Despite these empirical and conceptual challenges, Marxism has continued to evolve and even flourish as a vital research program. Marxist sociology falls into differing methodological camps. These include ethnography, geography, historical sociology, cultural analysis, and survey research. At a deeper theoretical and epistemological level one can discern differing responses on the part of different groups to the challenges discussed above. (1) A *poststructuralist* version has reframed Marxism as a theory of *discursive* constructions or articulations (e.g., Laclau & Mouffe 1985). (2) *Critical theory's* insistence that the substantive analysis of capitalism and the critique of (social) epistemology as inextricably linked has sparked renewed interest in the work of the Frankfurt School among sociologists of science. (3) *Regulation theory* focuses on the broadly "economic" social practices that were the main focus of Marx's own writing – on capitalism as a conflictual, crisis ridden, and contradictory set of social relations. This approach rejects functionalism and economic reductionism, however, construing Marxism as a *regional theory* of the economic that no longer claims to explain the entirety of social life. Regulatory modes like "Fordism" are analyzed as social inventions that are fortuitous from the standpoint of capital but not inevitable resolutions of capitalist crisis. (4) Rational choice Marxism has responded to the problem of functionalism and supposed empirical conundra such as "false consciousness" by reframing the entire tradition in terms of methodological individualism (Wright 1985). (5) Marxian analysis of globalization (Arrighi 1994), empire (Harvey 2003), and the capitalist world system (Wallerstein 2004) have continued to explain international dynamics in broadly economic terms while proposing various revisions of the inherited model of capitalism.

The question is, what ties all of this together as "Marxism"? It is still possible to identify a set of core Marxian assumptions underlying this work.

Capitalism is organized around social classes defined in terms of their unequal rights and powers over the means of production and capital and in terms of "unequal rights over the results" of using those resources (Burawoy & Wright 2000: 20). Class relations are relations of *exploitation*, meaning that the surplus created

by the producing classes (those with few or no rights and powers over capital and productive resources) is appropriated by the owning classes. Marx's category of alienation (*Entfremdung*) refers above all to this estrangement of the product from the producers. To qualify as exploitative, furthermore, the material welfare of the exploiters must depend *causally* "upon the material deprivations of the exploited" (p. 21). Starting from this concept of exploitation, Erik Olin Wright (1985) has elaborated class categories that more adequately map the complexities of contemporary social structure.

Capitalism is intrinsically volatile and unstable because the exploiters and the exploited are locked in an intimate relationship with opposing interests. Of course the resulting explosiveness need not be directed toward the socialist forms that Marxists prefer. Class unrest in the overdeveloped capitalist countries has increasingly been channeled in the direction of religious fundamentalism and narratives of national humiliation and racist resentment (Steinmetz 1997).

Profit rates decline cyclically, leading to disinvestment, unemployment, the "creative destruction" of old infrastructure and productive spaces, and sometimes to the rescaling of space in a "spatial fix" that promises to undergird new rounds of accumulation. Marxist research on spatial transformations has been vibrant in recent years (see Brenner 2004).

There is also an almost inevitable decline in the functionality of the institutions that "defend and reproduce" capitalism (Burawoy & Wright 2000: 25). The neo Marxist school known as "regulation theory" explores the stabilizing frameworks that are sometimes elaborated without assuming that one will be found. Regulationists insist that longer term crises of capitalist profitability and "muddling through" are also possible since there is no omniscient agent or structural mechanism guaranteeing that solutions will be found.

Theories of Fordism and post Fordism have proven extraordinarily useful in making sense of various empirical phenomena and historical transitions that had hitherto remained out of reach. The period between the late 1940s and 1973 now appears as a distinct formation in the advanced capitalist world, albeit with particular national emphases and different moments of

consolidation and dissolution. Post war social science can itself now be perceived as partly shaped by the spontaneous social epistemologies produced by the Fordist emphases on the mass consumption of standardized, uniform commodities (along with the imperatives of the Cold War and US empire; see Steinmetz 2005). Ironically, some critical theory and sociology from this period can also now be understood as mirroring the epistemic and substantive social premises that embedded within post war Atlantic Fordism. Adorno's conviction that administered capitalism was annihilating the individual projected Fordist conditions into the infinite future. More recently, post Fordist social forms seem to have stimulated a *heightened* emphasis on the individual and to have encouraged "promotional selfhood." At the core of the "post Fordist" mode of regulation thought to have emerged in recent years is flexibilized and "just in time production," decentralized industry, and a remapping of economic practices in ways that no longer correspond closely to the boundaries of the nation state. Individual and regional inequalities are exacerbated and the state becomes "hollowed out" (Jessop 1993). Even where the state is forced to take a leading role, as in foreign policy, the *form* of overseas military interventions increasingly mirrors the neoliberalism and privatization that dominate the "domestic" and economic sphere (Steinmetz 2003).

Marxists analyze capitalism as a system that is restlessly expansionist, constantly seeking to incorporate and encompass new external and internal regions and practices. Of course there are also moments of deliberate *decommodification*, in which specific zones are released into a non capitalist state of being. According to the orists of the "articulation of modes of production" and colonial "indirect rule" (Mamdani 1996), for example, modern European colonialism preserved or produced non capitalist zones in order to enhance political control and depress the costs of reproducing labor power. In the contemporary era US capitalism has found it preferable to abandon the urban populations that were central to mid twentieth century Fordist production, resulting in a partial reagrarianization and the emergence of a subsistence economy in the abandoned inner cities that is ever more distant from the central zones of

capitalist vitality (Chanan & Steinmetz 2005). This abandoned population has also been shunted off into a booming prison industrial complex.

Capitalism originated in Europe with the process that Marx called "primitive accumulation," consisting of concerted appropriations of land and property. David Harvey has proposed that primitive accumulation is not simply a chapter in the prehistory of capitalism but a practice that accompanies capitalism throughout its history, reappearing whenever there is a crisis of over accumulation, that is, a "lack of opportunities for profitable investment" (2003: 139). Whereas Rosa Luxemburg, John Maynard Keynes, and others focused on strategies for increasing aggregate demand, Harvey notes that "it is also possible to accumulate in the face of stagnant effective demand if the costs of inputs (land, raw materials, intermediate inputs, labour power) decline significantly." Harvey calls the procedures used to accomplish this "accumulation by dispossession," arguing that they have become the principal strategy for capitalist accumulation since 1973.

SEE ALSO: Adorno, Theodor W.; Bourgeoisie and Proletariat; Capitalism; Commodities, Commodity Fetishism, and Commodification; Critical Theory/Frankfurt School; Dependency and World Systems Theories; Fordism/Post Fordism; Gramsci, Antonio; Lukács, Georg; Marx, Karl; Neo Marxism; Regulation Theory

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masculinities, crime and

James W. Messerschmidt

Gender consistently has been advanced by sociologists as the strongest predictor of criminal involvement: it explains more variance in crime cross culturally than any other variable.

As an explanatory variable, then, gender would seem to be critical. Yet early theoretical works in the sociology of crime were gender blind. That is, although acknowledging that the vast majority of those who commit crime are men and boys, the gendered content of their legitimate and illegitimate behavior was virtually ignored (Messerschmidt 1993).

However, the rise of second wave feminism – originating in the 1960s – challenged this masculinist nature of criminology by illuminating the patterns of gendered power that had been all but ignored. As a result of feminism, not only is the importance of gender to understanding crime more broadly acknowledged, but it has also led to the critical study of masculinity and crime. The three major contemporary theoretical perspectives in this endeavor are Hagan's (1989) power control theory, Agnew's (1992, 2001) strain theory, and Messerschmidt's (2004) structured action theory.

Hagan (1989) argues that in industrialized societies an instrument–object relationship exists between parents and children. Parents are the instruments of control and their objects are children, and this relationship shapes the social reproduction of gender.

Hagan identifies two family structures based on women's participation in the paid labor market, "patriarchal" and "egalitarian." In patriarchal families, the husband/father works outside the home in an authority position and the wife/mother works at home. Patriarchal families, through sex role socialization, "reproduce daughters who focus their futures around domestic labor and consumption, as contrasted with sons who are prepared for participation in direct production" (p. 156). In egalitarian families, the husband/father and wife/mother both work in authority positions outside the home. These families "socially reproduce daughters who are prepared along with sons to join the production sphere" (p. 157).

In both types of families daughters are less criminal than sons because daughters are more controlled by their mothers. Hagan argues, however, that daughters in patriarchal families are more often taught by parents to avoid risk taking endeavors, whereas in egalitarian families, both daughters and sons are frequently taught to be more open to risk taking. It is this combination of the instrument–object

relationship and corresponding socialization of risk taking that affects delinquency. As a result, egalitarian families maintain smaller gender differences in delinquency: "Daughters become more like sons in their involvement in such forms of risk taking as delinquency" (p. 158). In this theory, sons are for the most part ignored and gender differences in crime are explained by a concentration on the characteristics of mothers and daughters.

Agnew (1992) identifies three forms of "strain" that may lead to delinquency: the failure to achieve positively valued goals (such as disjunctions between expectations and actual achievements), the removal of positively valued stimuli from the individual (such as a loss of a girlfriend/boyfriend or death of a parent), and the presence of negative stimuli (such as child abuse/neglect or negative relations with parents). In examining strain in relation to gender and crime, Agnew (2001) concentrates on the question: Why do males have a higher crime rate than females? Answer: This is *not* due to boys and men having higher levels of strain than girls and women. Instead, males experience different *types* of strain that are more likely to lead to crime. For example, Agnew argues that because of sex role socialization, "males are more concerned with material success and extrinsic achievements, while females are more concerned with the establishment and maintenance of close relationships and with meaning and purpose in life" (p. 168). The resulting differences in strain, Agnew argues, explain the greater rate of property crime among males. Moreover, there are important additional differences in social control and sex role socialization. For example, for females, forms of strain involve a restriction of criminal opportunities and excessive social control: "It is difficult to engage in serious violent and property crime when one spends little time in public, feels responsible for children and others, is burdened with the demands of others, and is under much pressure to avoid behaving in an aggressive manner" (p. 169). Because men are more likely to be in public, to experience conflict with others, and to suffer criminal victimization, they are more likely to be involved in violence. Thus, the different types of strain men and women experience result in higher rates of crime by the former.

Agnew does not stop there, however, but adds that males and females also differ in their emotional response to strain. Although both males and females may respond to strain with anger, they differ in their experience of anger: female anger is often accompanied by emotions like fear and depression, whereas male anger is often characterized by moral outrage. In explaining these differences, Agnew (p. 169), like Hagan, concentrates on sex role theory, arguing that by reason of differences in "the socialization process," women learn to blame themselves for negative treatment by others and view their anger as inappropriate and a failure of self control; men blame others for their negative treatment and view their anger "as an affirmation of their masculinity." Consequently, men are more likely to commit violent and property crimes, whereas women are more likely to resort to self destructive forms of deviance, such as drug use and eating disorders.

Power control and strain theories acknowledge gender inequality and conditionally focus on the social dimensions of behavior. In addition, the theoretical conceptualizations of power control and strain do present interesting insights on gender differences in crime, and these insights present an opportunity for a politics of reform.

By concentrating on gender *differences* in crime, however, power control and strain theories ignore gender *similarities* in crime between men and women and disregard the differences *among* men and boys as well as *among* women and girls. Thus, these theories construct an essentialist criminology by collapsing gender into sex. They create an artificial polarization, thereby distorting actual variability in gender constructions and reducing all masculinities and femininities to one normative standard case for each: the "male sex role" and the "female sex role." Not only are there differences cross culturally, but also within each particular society masculine and feminine practices by men and by women are constructed on the basis of class, race, age, sexuality, and particular social situation. These variations in the construction of masculinity and femininity are crucial to understanding the different types and amounts of crime. In addition, power control and strain theories require that we examine masculinity exclusively by men and boys and femininity by

women and girls, thus ignoring masculinities and femininities by people: the way individuals construct gender differently. Consequently, power control and strain theories miss what must be acknowledged: women and girls also construct masculine practices that are related to crime.

Because of the above problems with power control and strain theories, many sociologists of crime interested in masculinities have turned to structured action theory (Messerschmidt 1993, 1997, 2000, 2004). Following the work of feminist ethnomethodologists (West & Fenstermaker 1995), this perspective argues that gender is a situated social and interactional accomplishment that grows out of social practices in specific settings and serves to inform such practices in reciprocal relation: we coordinate our activities to “do” gender in situational ways. Crucial to this conceptualization of gender as situated accomplishment is West and Zimmerman’s (1987) notion of accountability. Because individuals realize that their behavior may be held accountable to others, they configure their actions in relation to how these might be interpreted by others in the particular social context in which they occur. Within social interaction, then, we facilitate the ongoing task of accountability by demonstrating we are male or female through concocted behaviors that may be interpreted accordingly. Consequently, we do gender (and thereby crime) differently, depending upon the social situation and the social circumstances we encounter. “Doing gender” renders social action accountable in terms of normative conceptions, attitudes, and activities appropriate to one’s sex in the specific social situation in which one acts (West & Zimmerman 1987).

“Doing gender” does not occur in a vacuum, but is influenced by the social structural constraints we experience. Social structures are regular and patterned forms of interaction over time that constrain and enable behavior in specific ways; therefore, social structures “exist as the reproduced conduct of situated actors” (Giddens 1976: 127). Following Connell (1987, 1995) and Giddens (1976), structured action theory argues these social structures are neither external to social actors nor simply and solely constraining; on the contrary, structure is realized only through social action, and social

action requires structure as its condition. Thus, as people “do” gender they reproduce and sometimes change social structures. Not only then are there many ways of “doing gender” – we must speak of masculinities and femininities – but also gender must be viewed as *structured action*, or what people do under specific social structural constraints.

In this way gender relations link each of us to others in a common relationship: we share structural space. Consequently, shared blocks of gendered knowledge evolve through interaction in which specific gender ideals and activities play a part. Through this interaction masculinity is institutionalized, permitting men (and sometimes women) to draw on such existing, but previously formed, masculine ways of thinking and acting to construct a masculinity for specific settings. The particular criteria of masculinity are embedded in the social situations and recurrent practices whereby social relations are structured (Giddens 1989).

Given that masculinities and femininities are not determined biologically, it makes sense to identify and examine possible masculinities by women and girls. Recent research has begun to move in this direction. For example, Jody Miller’s important book *One of the Guys* (2001) shows that certain gang girls identify with the boys in their gangs and describe such gangs as “masculinist enterprises.” Pointing out that unequal structured gender relations are rampant in the mixed gender gangs of which these girls were members, certain girls differentiated themselves from other girls by embracing a “masculine identity.” Similarly, recent life history interviews of girls involved in assaultive violence indicate that some of these girls “do” masculinity by in part displaying themselves in a masculine way, by engaging primarily in what they and others in their milieu consider to be authentically masculine behavior, and by outright rejection of most aspects of femininity (Messerschmidt 2004). Nevertheless, like the girls in Miller’s study, these girls found themselves embedded in unequal gender relations that disallowed them entrance into the same masculine place as the boys. Thus, their masculinity was constructed differently from, and subordinate to, that of the boys.

In short, structured action theory allows us to conceptualize masculinity and crime in new

ways – ways that enable sociologists of crime to explore how and in what respect masculinity is constituted in certain settings at certain times, and how that construct relates to crime by men, women, boys, and girls.

SEE ALSO: Crime; Deviance, Crime and; Deviant Careers; Ethnomethodology; Femininities/Masculinities; Feminist Criminology; Gender, Deviance and; Hegemonic Masculinity

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mass culture and mass society

Nick Perry

“Mass culture” typically refers to that culture which emerges from the centralized production processes of the mass media. It should be noted, however, that the status of the term is the subject of ongoing challenges – as in Swingewood’s (1977) identification of it as a myth. When it is linked to the notion of mass society, then it becomes a specific variant of a more general theme; namely, the relation between social meanings and the allocation of life chances and social resources. Considered as a repository of social meaning, mass culture is one of a group of terms that also includes high (or elite) culture, avant garde culture, folk culture, popular culture, and (subsequently) postmodern culture. The interpretation and boundaries of each of these categories are routinely the subject of debate and dispute. This becomes particularly evident in attempts at ostensive definition (i.e., the citation of examples of each term and the reasoning employed to justify their allocation to the category in question). In combination, these concepts constitute a system of differences, such that a change in the meaning of any one of its terms is explicable through, and by, its changing relation to the others. Those same terms frequently function as evaluative categories that – either tacitly or explicitly – incorporate judgments about the quality of that which they affect to describe.

In his introduction to Rosenberg and White’s *Mass Culture Revisited* (1971) Paul Lazarsfeld suggested that in the US, controversy and debate with respect to mass culture had most clearly flourished between 1935 and 1955. It was a time when recognition of the mass media as a significant cultural force in democratic societies coincided with the development of totalitarian forms of control, associated with the regimes and media policies of Hitler and Stalin. The perceived affinities between these developments prompted concern about how best to defend the institutions of civil society, culture in general, and high culture in particular against the threats that they faced. Such preoccupations helped

shape the pattern of the mass culture debate at that time. Certainly, what was evident among American social commentators and cultural critics was a widespread antipathy to mass culture that reached across the differences between conservative and critical thinkers. Even among the defenders of mass culture, the justifying tone was characteristically defensive and apologetic (Jacobs 1964).

For many of the critics, a typical strategy was to define mass culture negatively as high culture's "other" (Huyssen 1986). This convergence in defining and understanding mass culture as being everything that high culture is not, occurred under circumstances where the conception of high culture that was valorized might be either (1) generally conservative and traditional, or (2) specifically modernist and avant garde. For some conservatives, in a line of thought influenced by Ortega Y Gasset and T. S. Eliot, it took the form of an unabashed nostalgia for a more aristocratic and purportedly more orderly past. They therefore tended to see the threat posed by mass culture as generated from "below" (by "the masses" and their tastes). For critical theorists such as Theodor Adorno, mass culture served interests that derived from above (the owners of capital) and was an expression of the exploitative expansion of modes of rationality that had hitherto been associated with industrial organization. This critical group's understanding of the attributes of a high modernist culture is that it is – or rather aspires to be – autonomous, experimental, adversarial, highly reflexive with respect to the media through which it is produced, and the product of individual genius. The corresponding perspective on mass culture is that it is thoroughly commodified, employs conventional and formulaic aesthetic codes, is culturally and ideologically conformist, and is collectively produced but centrally controlled in accordance with the economic imperatives, organizational routines, and technological requirements of its media of transmission. The emergence of such a mass culture – a culture that is perforce made for the populace rather than made by them – serves both to close off the resistance associated with popular culture and folk art and that seriousness of purpose with which high culture is identified.

The debate around this opposition between the culture of high modernism and mass culture

was, for the most part, carried forward by scholars in the humanities. What proved to be a point of contact with social scientists was the latter's related concern as to whether the development of modernity (understood as a social process) was associated with the emergence of mass society. Insofar as the notion of such a society is grounded in the contrast between the (organized) few and the (disorganized) many, Giner (1976) suggests that its lengthy prehistory in social and political thought stretches back to classical Greece. In like fashion, Theodor Adorno had seen the foundation of mass culture as reaching as far back as Homer's account, in *The Odyssey*, of Odysseus's encounter with the Sirens and the latter's seductive, but deeply insidious, appeal.

A specifically sociological theory of mass society, however, with its antecedents in the writings of Alexis de Tocqueville, John Stuart Mill, and Karl Mannheim, is altogether more recent. As formulated by such writers as William Kornhauser and Arnold Rose that theory was concerned to highlight selected social tendencies rather than offering a totalizing conception of modern society. The theory does nevertheless advance a set of claims about the social consequences of modernity, claims that are typically conveyed by way of a stylized contrast with the purportedly orderly characteristics of "traditional" society or, less frequently, those forms of solidarity, collectivity, and organized struggles that exemplify "class" society. In brief, social relationships are interpreted as having been transformed by the growth of, and movement into, cities, by developments in both the means and the speed of transportation, the mechanization of production processes, the expansion of democracy, the rise of bureaucratic forms of organization, and the emergence of the mass media. It is argued that as a consequence of such changes there is a waning of the primordial ties of primary group membership, kinship, community, and locality. In the absence of effective secondary associations that might serve as agencies of pluralism and function as buffers between citizens and centralized power, what emerges are insecure and atomized individuals. They are seen as constituting, in an influential image of the time, what David Reisman and his associates called "the lonely crowd." The "other directed" conduct of such individuals is

neither sanctified by tradition nor the product of inner conviction, but rather is shaped by the mass media and contemporary social fashion.

In C. Wright Mills's (1956) version of the thesis the relevant (and media centered) contrast was not so much between past and present, as between an imagined possibility and an accelerating social tendency. The most significant difference was between the characteristics of a "mass" and those of a "public," with these two (ideal type) terms distinguished from one another by their dominant modes of communication. A "public" is consistent with the normative standards of classic democratic theory, in that (1) virtually as many people express opinions as receive them; (2) public communications are so organized that there is the opportunity promptly and effectively to answer back any expressed opinion; (3) opinion thus formed finds an outlet for effective action; and (4) authoritative institutions do not penetrate the public, which is thus more or less autonomous. In a "mass," (1) far fewer people express opinions than receive them; (2) communications are so organized that it is difficult to answer back quickly or effectively; (3) authorities organize and control the channels through which opinion may be realized into action; and (4) the mass has no autonomy from institutions.

As these images imply, and as Stuart Hall was subsequently to suggest, what lay behind the debate about mass culture was the (not so) hidden subject of "the masses." Yet this was a social category of whose very existence Raymond Williams had famously expressed doubts, wryly noting that it seemed invariably to consist of people *other* than ourselves. Such skepticism was shared by Daniel Bell (1962), an otherwise very different thinker from Williams. In critiquing the notion of America as a mass society, he indicated the often contradictory meanings and associations that had gathered around the word "mass." It might be made to mean a heterogeneous and undifferentiated audience; or judgment by the incompetent; or the mechanized society; or the bureaucratized society; or the mob – or any combination of these. The term was simply being asked to do far too much explanatory work.

Moreover, during the 1960s, such a hollowing out of the formal, cognitive basis of the mass culture concept was increasingly complemented

by altogether more direct empirical challenges. The emergence of a youth based counterculture, the Civil Rights Movement, opposition to the Vietnam War, the emergence of second wave feminism, and the contradictions and ambiguities of the media's role in at once documenting and contributing to these developments, all served to bring the mass society thesis into question. In addition, both the control of the popular music industry by a handful of major companies (Peterson & Berger 1975) and of film production by the major studios were the subject of serious challenges from independent cultural producers with their own distinctive priorities (Biskind 1998). The result (for a decade at least, until the eventual reassertion of corporate control) was an altogether more diversified media culture. And in what was perhaps explicable as part reaction, part provocation vis à vis an earlier orthodoxy, what also emerged were instances of populist style academic support for the very notion of mass culture – as, for example, in the *Journal of Popular Culture*. If this latter tendency sometimes displayed an unreflective enthusiasm for ephemera and a neglect of institutional analysis, it nevertheless presaged the more broadly based recognition of the diversity of mass culture that was evident during the 1970s (e.g., Gans 1974).

During the 1980s an emphasis on the cultural reception of popular cultural forms attracted innovative empirical work (Radway 1984; Morley 1986) at a time when the notion of the postmodern had become the subject of sustained critical attention. Postmodernism displayed none of high modernism's antagonism towards mass culture. On the contrary, as evidence of the blurring of cultural boundaries multiplied, practitioners of postmodernism either interrogated the very basis of such contrasts between "high" and "mass" and the hierarchical distinctions that sustained them (Huysen 1986) or (somewhat matter of factly) proceeded to ignore them. For example, work on television soap operas subverted the convention of critical disdain for such texts by directing attention towards such structural complexities as multiple plot lines, absence of narrative closure, the problematizing of textual boundaries, and the genre's engagement with the cultural circumstances of its audiences (Geraghty 1991).

In its “classic” forms the mass culture/mass society thesis has thus lost much of its power to persuade. Contemporary permutations of its claims are nevertheless discernible in, for example, the post Marxist writings of Guy Debord and Jean Baudrillard, and in the contention of the erudite conservative critic George Steiner that it is disingenuous to argue that it is possible to have both cultural quality and democracy. Steiner insists on the necessity of choice. It is, however, refinements to the closely related concept of “culture industry” which may prove to be the most enduring and most promising legacy of the thesis (Hesmondhalgh 2002). Culture industry had been identified by Adorno and his colleague Max Horkheimer as a more acceptable term than “mass culture,” both because it foregrounded the process of commodification and because it identified the locus of determinacy as corporate power rather than the populace as a whole. As originally conceived, it presented altogether too gloomy and too totalizing a conception of cultural control. An emphasis on the polysemy of media texts or on the resourcefulness of media audiences offered an important methodological corrective. But these approaches could also be overplayed, and the globalization of media production and a resurgence of institutional analysis and political economy among media scholars during the last decade have revived interest in the culture industry concept.

SEE ALSO: Adorno, Theodor W.; Audiences; Critical Theory/Frankfurt School; Culture Industries; Hegemony and the Media; Mannheim, Karl; Mass Media and Socialization; Popular Culture; Public Opinion

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mass media and socialization

Stephen L. Muzzatti

Socialization is a lifelong process through which people learn the patterns of their culture, including behavioral expectations, values, and “truths.” This process is facilitated by a host of groups and institutions such as the family unit, the educational system, peer groups, and the mass media. Debates in sociology and related social sciences over the relative importance and impact of these agents on individual behavior have raged for decades with little resolution. However, the mass media’s increasing ubiquity and ever divergent forms leave little question as to their pervasiveness. While they are a more recently developed agent of socialization, the mass media strongly influence public opinion and our worldview. By imparting both approved and fugitive knowledges, media narratives shape the way we see ourselves and the world around us.

THE MASS MEDIA

While the mass media are often lumped into one homogeneous category, particularly by critics decrying a negative influence upon, for example,

young people, it is important to recognize that there are many diverse media ranging from chart topping CDs, best selling novels, and Hollywood blockbusters through political affairs news magazines, amateur Internet pornography sites, and university textbooks. Hence, to suggest homogeneity of any sort is simplistic. While some media, such as newspapers, have been in existence for several centuries, most of the media we are daily exposed to have emerged much more recently. Advertisements, for example, undeniably the most ubiquitous of mass media's incarnations, only began to take on their current form in the 1920s, while television is largely a product of the post World War II boom. Similarly, music videos and video games emerged in the 1980s, while commercial and personal websites are little over a decade old.

FOUR MODELS OF MEDIA INFLUENCE

While the "sociology of the media" and aligned areas of study – such as popular culture, communications studies, and cultural studies – are relatively recent developments, sociologists have studied and postulated media impacts for much of the last century. Early researchers theorized that the mass media destroy the individual's capacity to act autonomously. However, subsequent scholars posited a more complex interaction between the mass media and society. Elevating the role of human agency in the socialization process, this later work contended that individuals actively evaluate and interpret mass media narratives. Theories about media influence have evolved over the last half century from those which emphasized direct and immediate influence (a "hypodermic needle" model) and those which suggested relatively little influence (a "minimal effects" model) through those that maintained a select influence (an "agenda setting" model) and long term effects (a "cultivation" model). Recognizing the dynamic tension between human agency and social structure, most contemporary media scholars address both the media as a process and the relationships among the myriad elements of this process.

Theorists from the German Frankfurt School (such as Theodor Adorno, Walter Benjamin, Max Horkheimer, and Herbert Marcuse)

provided some of the earliest and most systematic analyses of the mass media's influence, and best embody the "hypodermic needle" model. According to these scholars, the media, whether in the form of "news" or "entertainment," is a "culture industry" transmitting information to a passive audience. This model of a unified and powerful media further suggests that consumerist messages work together with political ideology to further the hegemonic designs of those in power. Absolutely docile, the general public hungrily consumes packaged media spectacles ranging from news magazines detailing the war on terrorism to primetime television dramas on the exploits of sex crazed, upper middle class, suburban housewives.

Considerably less deterministic in its approach is the "minimal effects" model. American sociologists affiliated with Columbia University such as Paul Lazarsfeld and Robert Merton, working in the late 1940s and 1950s, contended that the mass media's influence was far less direct than was previously suggested. Focusing their work more on the media's news production than on their entertainment endeavors, these scholars found that interpersonal relations served to mitigate media messages. Furthermore, they found that media messages acted more to reinforce existing beliefs, values, and behaviors than to change them. This, they theorized, was a result of a multistage process wherein opinion leaders, who themselves were drawn to the mass media, incorporated media messages they were amenable to, and then worked to promulgate them among family, friends, and acquaintances.

The radicalization of American sociology in the 1960s and 1970s heralded the emergence of the "agenda setting" model of the mass media. This model recognized the role of growing media monopolies to tell people not *what to think* but rather *what to think about*. According to this approach, the media organize public understanding in keeping with preferred social and cultural codes. By symbolically reflecting the structure of values and relationships of post industrial capitalism which lie beneath the surface of our everyday/night worlds, the corporately owned mass media impart cultural, political, social, and economic statements of "truth," by which individuals fashion their identities and relate to one another.

Emerging in the mid 1990s, George Gerbner and his colleagues' "cultivation" model addresses the long term cultural influence of the mass media on the people's beliefs and values. Focusing primarily on the impact of television, Gerbner et al. (1994) assert that lengthy exposure to messages from the corporately owned mass media have a mainstreaming or homogenizing effect on an otherwise heterogeneous population. Hence, rather than the direct causal effect posited by some, this model contends that continuous and sustained exposure will, over time, impact the audience's worldview. According to this model, the cultivation factor has moved the general population politically and ideologically to the right over the course of the last two decades. Not unlike the agenda setting model, this model is particularly attentive to a shrinking media cosmos which, while on the surface appearing to offer more choices (more television channels, newspapers, etc.), actually offers a narrower perspective because of increasingly oligopolistic ownership patterns and the concomitant horizontal and vertical integration across media.

THE PUBLIC OUTCRY OVER THE MASS MEDIA

Contrary to much of the evidence provided by contemporary scholars in this area, public concern over the media's influence (perhaps itself in part a product of media influence) tends to center around the alleged deleterious influence of certain forms of popular culture on youth and unquestioningly embraces an overly simplistic cause-effect model. Many moral entrepreneurs, politicians, and action groups have long held that popular media contribute directly to a host of social problems ranging from truancy, vandalism, and teen pregnancy through gang activity, suicide, and mass murder. In the early twentieth century, comic books and dime store novels were said to cause young readers to defy the authority of their teachers and the clergy, while jazz and, later, rock and roll were said to promote promiscuity and drug use among listeners. Today, many of these same arguments are directed against contemporary media forms. Over the past few years, some of the more high profile targets of politicians and moral

entrepreneurs have included video games from the Grand Theft Auto series, the music of artists such as Marilyn Manson, Eminem, and most recently, 50 Cent, and Hollywood films such as those in the Matrix series. Ironically, the mass media themselves, particularly the corporately owned news media, have been a driving force behind much of this clamor over alleged anti social media messages. Indeed, the news media are likely the single most influential actor in the orchestration and promulgation of moral panics involving young people, mass media, and popular culture. News coverage of certain kinds of popular media, particularly those catering to young people, is often quite sensationalistic and usually distorted. This coverage regularly couples mass media exposure to instances of youth crime, not only suggesting a direct causal link, but also inflating the seriousness of the incidents, making them appear more heinous and frequent than they truly are. Public anxiety is whipped up through the use of rhetorical journalistic devices. "Special cover story," "in depth exposé," or "investigative report" style coverage employs dramatic photos, video, and sound bites along with highly moralistic editorializing focusing on the corrupting influence of hip hop, gaming, and Internet chat sites among others.

CRITICAL SCHOLARSHIP AND MEDIA LITERACY

While many politicians, religious leaders, and laypeople demonize the mass media and the youthful audiences that consume much of it, most sociologists of the media and aligned scholars approach the issue of mass media and socialization somewhat differently. To be certain, this is not to suggest that these researchers turn a blind eye to problems such as hedonism, misogyny, intolerance, and the glorification of violence present in some media targeted toward young people; rather, they recognize the audience's agency and the ability of its members to employ resistant and/or oppositional readings of mass media texts. Furthermore, many of the leading media scholars like Sut Jhally, Elizabeth and Stewart Ewen, and Henry Giroux contend that some of these allegedly destructive media messages embedded in youth oriented media are

more social justice oriented than the mediated representations of them lead us to believe. According to these scholars, a far more prescient concern is the way in which the corporately owned mainstream (not the specialty or youth oriented) mass media undermine the democratic public sphere by disseminating an ideology which, while serving the hegemonic imperatives of post industrial capitalism, devalues human dignity, marginalizes difference, and reduces personal worth to commodity fetishism by pedaling unreflexive hyperconsumption and encouraging unquestioning deference to authority. For example, some like Barry Glassner (2000) and Mark Crispin Miller (2005) theorize that the American public's unrealistic fear of crime and terrorism is a result of a paucity of non corporate, non consumerist media messages. Similarly, some media scholars are more troubled by the destructive values of consumer capitalism and the rank dog eat dog individualism embedded in many "reality TV" programs such as *The Apprentice* or the latest incarnation of *Survivor*. Many too are concerned by the ubiquitous presentation of highly unrealistic female body types in all forms of visual media and the normalization of extreme body modification in programs such as *The Biggest Loser* and *The Swan*. As such, critical media scholars encourage all of us, as consumers of mass media, to engage in thoughtful and informed analyses of these texts in an effort to uncover and explore both the approved and oppositional meanings.

CONCLUSION

As indicated at the outset, the mass media are diverse, and clearly, so too is the range of opinion on the matter of their specific place in the broader process of socialization. As to the questions of how much, and in what direction, the media influence us, sociologists are still undecided. However, what is undeniable is that the mass media are vital sites of cultural and economic brokerage. Over the course of the last quarter century the mass media have expanded steadily, resulting in new forms of cultural pedagogy. As the mass media's omnipresence becomes more entrenched, traditional boundaries among news, entertainment, and advertising become increasingly fluid. Slick and

emotional, profound and poetic, rhythmic and insistent, and most of all, never fully shut out, mass media narratives serve as conduits through which society represents itself and ways by which social and personal identities are articulated and disseminated.

SEE ALSO: Audiences; Critical Theory/Frankfurt School; Fans and Fan Culture; Hegemony and the Media; Media and Consumer Culture; Socialization, Agents of; Socialization, Gender

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mass production

Dieter Bogenhold

Mass production was practiced in medieval times in places such as Venice, where pre-manufactured ships were produced along assembly lines. However, mass production is mostly

concerned and identified with the rise of modern capitalism starting after the Industrial Revolution. In a narrow understanding, mass production is an industrial technique to organize the production of large amounts of consumer goods on production lines. The most popular entrepreneur who introduced industrial mass production was Henry Ford with his famous Ford Model T in the early twentieth century. The idea of mass production is the realization of economies of scale. Very high rates of production permit very inexpensive products for large consumer markets.

Mass production is often described by the existence of assembly lines where hundreds of people each do one simple specific job and run routine procedures. The worker's job uses the same tool to perform identical operations on a stream of products being produced. Formalization, differentiation, and specialization are key principles of the labor process.

A theoretical foundation for such industrial practices was found in the writings of Fredrick Winslow Taylor, an American engineer who became a pioneer of a new generation of writers on management. Taylor's book *Principles of Scientific Management* (1911) is a summary and extension of his well known diverse presentations and working papers. Taylor combined existing pragmatically different ideas and concepts, and synthesized them for an audience of industrial managers who were open to new ideas and procedures to increase productivity. Terms such as labor studies, human resource management, or quality control did not exist prior to Taylor. Management conditions at the time of "scientific management" were (1) the development of a systematic science for each element of the industrial labor process, to overcome traditional procedures; (2) the controlled selection, training, and further education of employees in contrast to a practice in which everybody is doing and choosing his or her own task and job; (3) the establishment of an understanding of cooperation between blue collar workers and management; and (4) the installment of hierarchy and of a corresponding system of formal rules and a rational system of authority lines within a company. Combined, this provides Taylor's framework for an organization theory, which includes ideas of a strict scheme of authority and responsibility, the separation of

administrative and practical work elements, task specialization, and methods of motivation and gratification for blue collar workers.

Taylor's ideas of "scientific management" were designed for industrial mass production within the context of rapidly developing capitalist economies, but they received enthusiastic attention from socialist observers. For example, W. I. Lenin admired and studied the works by Taylor because he identified within them a key to strengthen productivity.

Taylor's principles to organize the industrial production process were regarded as having an impact on the societal regime of production. People argued that mass production within an industrial regime of assembly lines and large factories goes hand in hand with fundamental changes in society and economy. In the view of many of Taylor's contemporaries, mass production would lead to a revolution of general life styles and cultural modes because the speed of the new production and the related organization of work would impact all other forms of life organization. The term Taylorism was coined to represent not only the single organization of the labor process, but also the wider context of a society based on industrial mass production. Taylorism acted as the face of a rationalized economy in which the society is sensitive to the needs of large manufacturing plants.

Another term for the same matter was Fordism, which stood for a similar societal philosophy to organize industrial production and social life. For several decades the terms Taylorism and Fordism were interchangeable. However, detailed discussion of Henry Ford's and Frederick Winslow Taylor's results underlined differences between both concepts. Where Taylor's concepts appear to be more static, Ford's were more dynamic, flexible, and open. Taylor never mentioned Ford and Ford never spoke about Taylor (Gottl Ottilienfeld 1926: 12). Despite this, Taylorism and Fordism were used synonymously as a trend of capitalist development toward a regime of mass production and related large industries. Mass production was regarded as the fate of the masses. Cultural interpretations in sociological and economic literature were almost always negative and assumed that people's living conditions would become visibly similar. Among many others, the Italian philosopher Antonio Gramsci

(1975) argued workers were going to lose their sovereignty and become degraded to a small wheel within a large machinery. Monogamy and the absence of alcohol and other drugs were prerequisites for the establishment and further development of Fordism.

In retrospect, although the bleak future prophesied in social and cultural terms was sociologically extremely plausible, not all developments headed purposefully in one and the same direction. For example, debate on individualization and the plurality of lifestyles highlights that more than one “average existence” of human beings has emerged. And, of course, the twentieth century is also the century of the emergence of large enterprises, the so called global players, but one has also to acknowledge the persistence of an astonishingly high ratio of small and medium sized enterprises in advanced capitalist economies. Among others, even authors at the beginning of the twentieth century stressed that a capitalist economy is not a “one size firm” economy, as argued at that time by Gustav Schmoller and Werner Sombart. Sombart discussed very critical assumptions employed by theorems of Taylorism and Fordism (Bögenhold 2000). Much later, Piore and Sabel (1984) demonstrated the very high performance of small handicraft production for several economies after World War II. Changes in industries and markets are always more than just the automatic running for economies of scale (Fligstein 2001).

The (blue collar) workers’ movement and academic organization theory criticized concepts of Taylorism and Fordism for different reasons. Such criticism was explicit criticism of capitalism, but it was also a criticism of the perception of workers within the labor process. Ideas of mass production could not appropriately design work without referring to the needs and emotions of the human beings involved. For example, the beginning of the debate on human relations in the 1930s is not fully understandable without an appropriate awareness of the earlier rise of mass production and related academic reflection.

Nowadays, mass production must be regarded in combination with issues of globalization and social inequalities, and with the question of the development paths of modern economies and societies. While the beginning

of reflection on mass production was extremely focused on the industrial production process, current discussion should try to turn further attention to the connections between mass production and mass consumer markets. The “McDonaldization thesis” – as introduced by Ritzer (2004 [1996]) – provides important hints to understand mass production in combination with the emergence of global mass markets by consumer demands (credit cards, colas, burgers, movies, music hits, etc.). Further discussion has to specify different scales in order to arrive at a better understanding of the topic.

SEE ALSO: Fordism/Post Fordism; Industrial Revolution; Industrialization; Labor/Labor Power; Labor Movement; Labor Process; Laborism; McDonaldization; Mass Culture and Mass Society; Organization Theory; Taylorism

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massive resistance

Rutledge M. Dennis

American society has long resisted the idea of creating a truly egalitarian society. This was first noted in the early nineteenth century

in one of the earliest comprehensive studies of the United States when Alexis de Tocqueville wrote that America's ability and willingness to confront its racial and color divide would determine its very survival. Toqueville's study took on added meaning later in the century as North and South engaged in a bloody civil war, largely over slavery. Closely connected were issues related to the industrialism of the North versus the agrarian economy of the South, the belief that all powers should be centralized in Washington versus the idea that the US Constitution sanctioned a federal system which guaranteed specific rights to the states (states' rights), and the jockeying by both the North and South for political power and supremacy which had plagued the United States since its very inception.

If there were moments evoking an optimism leading toward greater equity and egalitarianism in the decades following the Civil War (the Reconstruction, the 13th, 14th, and 15th Amendments designed to free the slaves, grant them citizenship, then give them the right to vote), this optimism would soon be shattered by the 1896 *Plessy v. Ferguson* decision (Cruse 1987; Bell 1992) which sanctioned and legalized racial inequality and would be the judicial framework for a national and comprehensive "separate but equal" view which undergirded a policy of racial segregation and exclusion. *Plessy v. Ferguson* would prevail until challenged and delegitimized by the 1954 *Brown v. Board of Education* decision which denounced the dual school system and ordered the desegregation of formerly segregated public schools.

Most white Southerners and politicians reacted with horror to the Brown decision and vowed to follow a policy of non compliance. For this reason, between 1954 and 1965, 97.75 percent of black children continued to attend segregated all black schools (Black & Black 1987). While average citizens and politicians simply sulked, denounced the court decision, declared themselves advocates for states' rights, and were content to play a waiting game, Virginia's US Senator Harry F. Byrd, the leader of the infamous and politically powerful "Byrd Machine," stepped into the limelight and became the leading opponent of the Brown decision under the banner of "massive resistance."

Prior to the call for massively resisting the Brown decision, Virginia proposed numerous measures to circumvent it. One was the Gray Plan (Sartain & Dennis 1981), named after Senator Garland Gray and made public in November 1955. This plan pleased very few, including some of the massive resisters. Under this plan, (1) tuition grants were to be given to white children to attend private schools if their schools were ordered to desegregate; (2) a pupil placement plan would allow local school boards to assign students to specific schools, thus slowing the pace of desegregation; and (3) the Virginia Constitution would be amended to eliminate compulsory education, thus no child would be forced to attend a desegregated school.

Senator Byrd sounded the call to arms which initiated the Massive Resistance Movement on February 24, 1956 (Moeser & Dennis 1982) when he contended: "If we can organize the Southern States for massive resistance to this order [Brown decision] I think that in time the rest of the country will realize that racial integration is not going to be accepted in the South." That Byrd and Virginia would lead the fight against the Brown decision, and thus become deeply involved in racial matters, was unusual in that historically Virginia generally sought to distance itself from the more rabidly racist states of the Deep South such as South Carolina, Georgia, Mississippi, and Alabama, though like the white public and politicians throughout the South, Virginia was ideologically committed to the myth of white supremacy. But as Sartain and Dennis (1981: 211) asserted, "geographically there are many states further South, but ideologically none is farther South in culture and tradition than Virginia. Richmond is a major focal point for the spirit of the Old South. Here are located the Museum of the Confederacy and other reminders of the days of Richmond's greatest era of fame, such as the Robert E. Lee House and the headquarters of the United Daughters of the Confederacy."

The Virginia General Assembly met for a special session in August 1956. The session was designed to address two issues: to apply political, social, and economic pressure on the local chapter of the NAACP and its members and to enact measures to thwart the school desegregation order (Sartain & Dennis 1981).

Regarding the former, pressures were brought on black parents to refrain from soliciting to have their children attend white schools, attempts were made to seize the records and membership of the local and state NAACP chapters, and individual NAACP members were fired from their jobs if they applied to enroll their children in white schools. The legal underpinnings of massive resistance were established by the General Assembly in three areas: (1) a State Pupil Placement Board was established which would be responsible for all pupil assignments and transfers; (2) the governor was given a mandate to close any school ordered to desegregate and reopen such schools only on a segregated basis; if this failed, state funds would be withdrawn from all schools operating as desegregated schools; (3) state supported tuition grants would be awarded to white children whose schools were closed due to the desegregated order.

Though Harry F. Byrd had issued the "massive resistance" battle cry in February 1956, the legal battle for the movement began with the August 1956 special Virginia General Assembly session. The Assembly set the mood and tone for the opposition to the desegregation order, and even if many Southern politicians and white citizens sought to circumvent the decision, only Virginia would actually defiantly close its public schools in a show of massive resistance to desegregation. J. Harvie Wilkinson (1979: 83) indicts Senator Byrd for the social, educational, political, and economic pain inflicted upon Virginia and the South, and asserts that Byrd was determined, in his last years, to "reap the drama and glory of another Lost Cause." And it would be a lost cause (Wilkinson 1979: 83-101), though before the battle was over, Prince Edward County, a small rural and impoverished county, when ordered to desegregate, closed its schools from 1959 to 1964, deschooling more than 1,400 whites, the vast majority of whom were educated in churches, synagogues, homes, and other places. The 1,400 blacks were not so fortunate, and more than 800 would be denied any formal education. In Norfolk, Virginia six white high schools closed rather than desegregate, and more than 2,000 to 3,000 black students were without formal education. The legal rebellion came to a close in January 1959 (Sartain &

Dennis 1981), when a panel of federal judges declared Virginia's laws opposing desegregation to be illegal and unconstitutional. Two important movements and themes emerged out of the Massive Resistance Movement. One was the Committee to Save Public Schools, an interracial movement which would have an impact in the area of political alliances and coalitions for blacks and whites in the major cities in Virginia. The other was the creation, by young black professionals, of the Crusade for Voters, an organization designed to rally and develop black political power in urban areas. The Crusade (Dennis & Moeser 1982; Moeser & Dennis 1982: 34) would become the most important black political group in Richmond and the surrounding areas. It would change and reorder the political landscape in the city and state by "first increasing the political consciousness of blacks and then translating that consciousness into voting power."

SEE ALSO: *Brown v. Board of Education*; Civil Rights Movement; Discrimination; Hate Crimes; Human Rights; Integration; Majorities; Marginality; Paternalism; Race; Race and Ethnic Politics; Race (Racism); School Segregation, Desegregation; Slavery

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master status

Stephen Hunt

The term master status denotes a perceived social standing that has exceptional significance for individual identity, frequently shaping a person's entire social experience. The concept is at least implied within the theoretical framework of structural functionalism, especially the work of Talcott Parsons who was predisposed toward using the expression in a normative sense. Here, master status is attached to the prestige relating to the individual's primary social role (cf. Parsons 1951). However, in the disciplines of sociology and social psychology, master status is a concept used more specifically in the field of deviance.

The principal development of the notion of a master status is usually attributed to the theories of Howard Becker, especially through his work *Outsiders* (1963). For Becker, a master status usually implies a negative connotation. It is related to the potential effects upon an individual of being openly labeled as deviant. In Becker's analysis a deviant act only becomes deviant when social actors perceive and define it as such. It follows that deviants are those who are labeled as a result of these sociopsychological processes. A label is not neutral since it contains an evaluation of the person to whom it is attached. A major consequence of labeling is the formation of a master status surpassing and indeed contaminating all other statuses possessed by an individual. Other social actors subsequently appraise and respond to the labeled person in terms of the perceived attributes of the master status, thus assuming that he or she has the negative characteristics normally associated with such labels. Since individuals' self concepts are largely derived from the response of others, they are inclined to see themselves in terms of the label, perhaps engendering a self fulfilling prophecy whereby the deviant's identification with his or her master status becomes the controlling one.

The concept of master status has been further used in the area of deviance, including Jock Young's (1971) survey of the implications of labeling "hippie" marijuana users. However, it is probably in the seminal work of Erving

Goffman where the concept has been used most effectively. The consequences of being labeled with a master status are analyzed by Goffman in terms of the effects of stigma upon self conceptions. He focused, in particular, on the often vain struggle of the stigmatized to maintain self respect and reputable public image by various coping strategies (Goffman 1968a). This is taken further in his volume *Asylums* (1968b), which explores the role of total institutions in the application of a stigmatized master status.

SEE ALSO: Goffman, Erving; Identity: The Management of Meaning; Identity: Social Psychological Aspects; Labeling; Labeling Theory; Organizations as Total Institutions; Self Fulfilling Prophecy; Stigma

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masturbation

Benjamin Shepard

The history of masturbation – self pleasuring solitary sex – includes countless episodes of definition and redefinition. Intellectuals from Jean Jacques Rousseau to Ludwig Wittgenstein agonized over masturbation. American social purists called for prohibitions against it. Sigmund Freud and his disciples debated it. By the early 1990s, an American surgeon general

would be fired merely for suggesting that it was a worthy alternative to abstinence or unsafe sex.

From the thirteenth century until the mid twentieth century, masturbation was viewed as a moral flaw. St. Thomas Aquinas noted that masturbation signaled the beginning of a slippery slope leading to sodomy, adultery, and bestiality; thus, in *Summa Theologica*, he categorized it with other “luxuria,” signifying crimes against nature. Aquinas and others like him viewed masturbation as a gateway pleasure, much like marijuana is said to be a gateway to heroin: not very dangerous in and of itself, but capable of opening countless subversive possibilities. Like any sexual act other than reproductive missionary position intercourse, masturbation was assumed to be a sin of irrational gratification – suspect because it emphasized pleasure over procreation. Medieval and early modern church leaders feared that the impure act of masturbation could overwhelm the sexual body of the laity. Thus, studies of masturbation grapple with core questions about social control and hierarchy.

For most historians of sex, the origin of masturbation as a moral issue can be located in the publication of an anonymous tract some time between 1708 and 1716 entitled *Onania; or, The Heinous Sin of Self Pollution*. Onan was a character in the biblical book of Genesis. Rather than deposit his seed inside the wife of his deceased brother, as required by law, Onan spilled it on the ground. For this transgression, Onan was struck down by God. The author of the tract, a doctor, thus suggested that ejaculating alone was “willful self abuse,” and masturbation came to be known as “onanism.” *Onania* became a publishing sensation as generations of readers were drawn to the lurid tales of harm produced by “self abuse.” The publication of *Onania* provides a case study of the commodification of a social problem. The tract was sold in English public houses where people met socially. Not coincidentally, relief for the new malady – a form of herbal snake oil – was also sold to the public.

Throughout the eighteenth century, onanism was considered outside the bounds of “normal” heterosexuality, much like sodomy and prostitution. Social purity advocates suggested the practice led to an excessive sex drive. By the

nineteenth century, the first steps toward adultery were thought to begin with self pollution. The dilemma was how to stifle interest in this most available and democratic of sins. Talking about it stimulated further discussion of a brash new secular morality. Prohibitionist efforts backfired as discussions of sex led to the production of sexuality and the elaboration of fantasy where disciplinary regimes hoped to assert control.

Recognizing that masturbation offered a form of social and political transformation, reform minded anti vice crusaders Cotton Mather and Anthony Comstock sought to stop the practice. Well into the twentieth century, Alex Comfort notes masturbation was “encircled by a nearly unanimous form of vocal moralism.” The moralist view was supported by advertising, preaching, and counseling, resulting in ever increasing discourses propelling social anxiety. According to the nineteenth century doctor Emma Drake, for example, the dangers posed by masturbation included “epilepsy, idiocy, catalepsy, and insanity.” She explains: “It has been discovered that out of eight hundred and sixteen cases of insanity in New York State Insane Asylum, there were one hundred and six addicted to this practice.” Thus, Drake advised mothers, “from their babyhood be watchful of your children’s companions; allow no sensational books to be read” (Comfort 1967).

By the mid twentieth century, however, prohibitions surrounding solitary sex began to relax. In contrast to Dr. Drake’s advice, by 1953 a self help book recommended that solitary sex should be viewed as “a normal and healthy act for a person of any age,” rather than a practice in need of social control. “What happened?” Comfort (1967) ponders. “One is still at a loss for an explanation of the outburst – one of the most astonishing floods of psychologically damaging medical nonsense in history had somehow been unleashed.” Yet, by the mid twentieth century, this influence seemed to wane. Masturbation was redefined as a source of pleasure, joy, and social autonomy.

Kinsey’s numbers only confirmed the trend. In 1948, Kinsey published *Sexual Behavior in the Human Male*, followed by *Sexual Behavior in the Human Female* in 1953. Kinsey’s team found that 92 percent of males reported that they had masturbated. Among females, 62 percent

reported that they had masturbated, with 45 percent reporting that they could reach orgasm within 3 minutes. Solitary sex was found to be the most important sexual outlet for single females and a close second for married females. A large majority of women (84 percent) reported clitoral stimulation, while 20 percent reported using artificial objects for vaginal insertion. Additionally, 2 percent reported that they simply used fantasy to reach orgasm.

Kinsey's research revealed a striking shift in social mores. After all, for many years, women had been told that the only way to find sexual pleasure was through vaginal orgasm. Freud suggested that women should reject anything else. Yet as the 1960s turned into the 1970s, the women's movement pointed out that clitoral orgasm offered new forms of pleasure and autonomy from patriarchy. For some, this included the rejection of men, as the penis lost its exclusivity as a phallus. For women's liberationists, embracing masturbation was a way to discover a better, less sexist society.

The practice of solitary sex gained new importance with the advent of AIDS, as gay men created "jack off" (JO) clubs that functioned as safe alternatives to both disease and repressive heterosexual norms. Gay men across the US organized JO parties, where men could come together to build communities around pleasure. For many, masturbation offered nothing less than the realization of the essential human right to sexual happiness.

The cultural history of solitary sex is a story of the relation of the body to passion, desire, and selfhood. Masturbation is intimately bound up with the power to create, the process of self making, and cultural combat against authoritarian control. This struggle is reflected in the works of a number of twentieth century artists. For example, the work of Philip Roth, Egon Schiele, Vitto Acconci, and Lynda Benglis offer telling images of the relation between creativity, masturbation, selfhood, and the rejection of social control. Part of the reason for the ongoing debate surrounding masturbation is the insight that for many, the practice is a step toward self discovery, part of the making of the modern, secular self. The release from the shackles of prohibition around solitary sex opened up a new chapter in the history of sexuality. Yet the

struggle was not without its emotional price. Throughout the twentieth century, guilt and other psychological costs replaced the mechanisms of religious and social control that had governed the practice in ages past. While not as terrifying as madness and death, anxiety and stigma remain vexing.

Historical research on masturbation has addressed questions concerning its legitimacy as a form of sexual exploration and expression. Future research might include questions about the relationship between masturbation fantasies, sexual activity, use of technology, gender, and sexual orientation. What is the relationship between masturbation, technology, and personal identity in the age of the Internet and Viagra? Donna Haraway suggests that the question "Who am I?" must be answered within the context of such technology impacted environments. It is clear that technology has transformed the ways people practice, understand, and think about sexuality. The use of new technologies for sexual activity – including masturbation – must be reconciled with questions about the connections between real life, fantasy, and social identity (Waskul 2003).

SEE ALSO: Body and Sexuality; Cybersexualities and Virtual Sexuality; Freud, Sigmund; Kinsey, Alfred; Safer Sex; Sexual Practices; Sexuality Research: History

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material culture

Tim Dant

Material culture refers to the physical stuff that human beings surround themselves with and which has meaning for the members of a cultural group. Mostly this “stuff” is things that are made within a society, but sometimes it is gathered directly from the natural world or recovered from past or distant cultures. It can be contrasted with other cultural forms such as ideas, images, practices, beliefs, and language that can be treated as independent from any specific material substance. The clothes, tools, utensils, gadgets, ornaments, pictures, furniture, buildings, and equipment of a group of people are its material culture and for disciplines such as archeology and anthropology provide the raw data for understanding other societies. In recent years sociologists have begun to recognize that the ways that material things are incorporated into the culture shape the way that society works and communicates many of its features to individual members.

Jean Baudrillard's critique of Marx's analysis of production and exchange led him to explore how the “system of objects” circulates sign value within a society, articulating cultural distinctions and meanings. The uses of different materials such as wood or glass to create the atmosphere of interior spaces, the embedding of technology within “gadgets” and tools, how things extend the form and actions of the

human body, and the relations between objects that are unique and those that are parts of series are all systems which shape the culture. The recent literature on the sociology of consumption has frequently recognized that material things are not only useful in themselves but can also be signs of social status and cultural location. A motorcar is much more than a functional transportation device because it encapsulates a set of cultural messages about the aesthetics, wealth, and technological values of a culture as well as the status of the individual who drives it.

The consumption of material stuff may locate individual identities within a culture (Csikszentmihalyi & Rochberg Halton 1981), but it also threatens the environment and uses up scarce resources (Molotch 2003). The material stuff of a culture “co evolves” not only with other stuff but also with human practices and systems of action (Shove 2003). Material objects are involved in interactions between human beings, providing a topic as well as a resource for constructing meaning (Hindmarsh & Heath 2003). But the embodied “material interaction” directly between individual humans and the stuff around them also releases the cultural meanings and practices embedded in the materiality of that stuff (Dant 2005).

SEE ALSO: Consumption; Materialism; Technology, Science, and Culture

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materialism

Walda Katz Fishman, Ralph Gomes, and Jerome Scott

“It is not the consciousness of men [and women] that determines their being, but, on the contrary, their social being that determines their consciousness” (Marx & Engels 1986: 182).

Materialism is the philosophy that explains the nature of reality and the world – physical, social, cultural, etc. – in terms of matter. It asserts that reality and the universe are first and foremost material; they exist outside of human thought and ideas and are independent of the human mind. The human intellect can come to know the world of matter through experience and sense perception and can interact and shape the material world; but the world of material existence is primary. Philosophical materialism stands in opposition to the philosophy of idealism that states that ideas, thought, and mind are the essential nature of all reality and the world of matter is a reflection of mind, thought, and ideas.

Materialism, the philosophical outlook of science, has been an important philosophy in eras of scientific development in ancient times as early as the fourth century BCE among Greek philosophers (e.g., Epicurus and even Aristotle), and in modern times in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries in Isaac Newton’s scientific study of nature and the emerging social science of the Enlightenment *Philosophes*.

The economic, political, social, and intellectual ferment of the 1700s and 1800s gave rise to several streams of social thought informed by the materialist view of the world and the scientific method. The most important of these streams are the mechanical materialism of Feuerbach and especially the dialectical and historical materialism (i.e., historical materialism) of Marx and Engels. The empiricism and positivism of Saint Simon, Comte, and Durkheim presented itself as science based in materialist methodology, but was actually rooted in philosophical idealism.

Mechanical materialism analyzes social life and even idea systems such as religion in terms of material conditions, but is static in its overall worldview and offers no theory of human

agency or future beyond what was then emerging (i.e., industrial capitalism). Structures and processes of capitalism are examined – some times critically – and incremental quantitative changes of social reform may occur, but within mechanical materialist analysis qualitative transformation is not possible.

Historical materialism critically analyzes capitalism and its antecedents. But unlike other forms of materialism and social theory, it views the structures and processes of capitalism as a transient stage of human social development giving way to its negation through contradictions and antagonisms that give rise to socialism and communism. It embodies a dialectical image of the social world and a dialectical method in which theory and analysis are tested in experience and practice, including social and class struggle. Historical materialism contains a developed theory of political economy, the state, and ideology, as well as an analysis of agency and qualitative revolutionary social and historical transformation in which those classes, nations, peoples, and genders most oppressed and exploited organize themselves politically to reorganize society in their own interests through a process of consciousness, vision, and strategy.

Empiricism and positivism examine society and culture through the facts or data of sensory observation and perception. Only those data gathered through the senses exist as reality and as scientific truth. Belief in the existence of a material objective external world is suspended and the sense perceptions of that material reality in fact become the “reality.” This limits the outlook of empiricism and positivism to the sense observations of social life, to those data immediately perceivable in the present moment of rising market capitalism or perhaps perceived and recorded in the past. Structures and processes of development and transformation not directly observable do not exist in empiricist and positivist analysis. There is no analysis of social change and the future beyond what is incremental and quantitative.

While many early philosophers and social thinkers grounded their understanding of social life in materialist philosophy, the centrality of materialism in shaping modern social theory arose in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. This was the age of rationality, science, and social transformation that gave rise to machine

production, global markets, urban centers, and industrial capitalism, to Enlightenment thought and political revolutions overturning feudal monarchies and establishing constitutional, electoral, and representative political forms.

In this context, Enlightenment thinkers, who were challenging the pure rationality of Descartes and the hegemony of the Catholic Church in feudal society, rooted their scientific analysis, their theory and laws of social development in the materialist philosophy of the natural and physical sciences of the day – a mechanical materialism expressed in Newtonian laws of the natural universe. Montesquieu, Rousseau, and Wollstonecraft all presented their interpretation of past societies and the revolutionary process. This scientific and materialist understanding of the social world was quickly challenged by the romantic conservative reaction. It grounded its attack on science and the nascent social science of the day in the philosophical idealism of Hume, Kant, Burke, and Hegel, as well as the Catholic counter revolution of Louis de Bonald and Joseph de Maistre.

It was a group of intellectuals – the Young Hegelians, including Feuerbach, Marx, and Engels – who studied Hegel’s dialectical idealist philosophy of history and who broke with Hegel around the question of idealism versus materialism as the essential nature of reality and the driving force of social and historical development. Feuerbach offered an understanding of the social world in material terms, but with no dynamic process for social change. Marx and Engels embraced the dialectics of Hegel, but turned his analysis “on its head,” locating reality and the forces of social transformation in the material conditions of the production and reproduction of social life and class struggle.

Together, Hegelian dialectics, Feuerbach’s materialism, and the labor theory of value based on a critique of Adam Smith’s and David Ricardo’s understanding of labor, value, markets, and profit formed the basis of a new world view. Historical materialism, often referred to as Marxism, is dialectical materialism applied to society, history, and the long struggle for the liberation of humanity from all forms of class exploitation and political and cultural oppression and war. It answers the question of how societies and their people produce and distribute the necessities of life and reproduce themselves.

External material conditions are the primary forces of social life and history. The foundation of society are the forces of production (i.e., the tools and technology of production, communication, transport, etc.), the reproduction of human labor through various forms of kinship and family, and the relations of production – the emergence of private property, class relations, power relations and state forms, patriarchy, colonialism and imperialism, and white supremacy, etc. From this real foundation, the mode of production, the superstructure arises: ideas and culture, ideology, spiritual life, and various social institutions. Both the forces and relations of production are dynamic, with the forces being the most dynamic. Essential to historical materialism is human collective agency and struggle that creates the possibilities of quantitative change and qualitative or revolutionary transformation under certain objective and subjective conditions of technology, consciousness, and political organization.

From the time of Marx and Engels’s critique of Hegel and Feuerbach and their development of historical materialism as a revolutionary theory, method, and practice, both forms of materialist social analysis have continued, as have empiricist and positivist theory and methods.

Social theory and research in the mechanical materialist tradition remains an important tendency in sociology. It examines materially based social problems, especially various forms of social inequality and domination. It may situate them within capitalist political economy and ideology and call for legal reforms, but systemic change to resolve these problems is not considered. This examination also often employs empiricist and positivist methods of research, further distancing this form of materialist social analysis from historical materialism. Analytic (non Marxian) conflict theory focusing on gender, race, and class inequality is a key expression and includes, for example, Janet Chafetz’s work on gender, Charles Willie’s work on race, and Randall Collin’s work on stratification.

Historical materialism as a revolutionary theory and practice in the twentieth century has been located primarily in political struggles and building socialist states outside the academy. Examples of political leaders who have done this intellectual and practical work include V. I. Lenin in Russia, Mao Zedong in China,

Ho Chi Minh in Vietnam, and Ernesto “Che” Guevara and Fidel Castro in Cuba.

Throughout the twentieth century scholars and scholar activists have conducted materialist analysis and engaged in practice along the continuum from a critical but non revolutionary materialism to historical materialism. We know them in sociology as Marxists, neo Marxists, radical and critical sociologists, underdevelopment and world systems sociologists, materialist feminists, race class gender and intersectionality sociologists, globalization sociologists, and most recently public sociologists.

In the first half of the twentieth century some of the best known of these sociologists included W. E. B. Du Bois, Oliver Cox, and E. Franklin Frazier on race and class; Anna Julia Cooper, Jane Addams, the Grimke sisters, and Ida Wells Barnett on gender, race, and class; Clara Zetkin and Alexandra Kollontai on patriarchy and class; Antonio Gramsci and Georg Lukács on ideology and class consciousness; the Frankfurt School on the critique of capitalist society, culture, and science; and C. Wright Mills on the power elite.

By mid century, despite McCarthyism and anti communism in the US, the rising social movements (e.g., black freedom struggle and modern civil rights, anti Vietnam War, women’s rights and sexual equality, and anti colonial and national liberation struggles globally) created renewed interest in Marxism as theory and practice. In North America, graduate students and a few professor activists formed the sociology liberation movement in 1969 that gave birth to the Radical Caucus and publication of *The Insurgent Sociologist* that same year. In 1975 the American Sociological Association recognized and institutionalized radical and Marxist analysis with the formation of the Marxist Sociology Section; and in 1987 *The Insurgent* became *Critical Sociology*, suggesting a shift in ideology and practice.

During the next several decades many more scholars worked in the tradition along the critical materialist and historical materialist continuum. Among them were Louis Althusser, Nicos Poulantzas, Ralph Miliband, and William Domhoff on the state and the ruling class; Harry Braverman and Paul Baran and Paul Sweezy on the exploitation of service sector workers and monopoly capitalism; Frantz Fanon, Claude Ake, and Walter Rodney on colonialism,

imperialism, and liberation struggles; Albert Szymanski and Goran Thernborn on class struggle and the state.

Over the last few decades of the twentieth and early twenty first centuries, scholars and scholar activists have continued to work in the critical and historical materialist frameworks. They include Immanuel Wallerstein and Terence K. Hopkins on capitalist world systems; Erik Olin Wright and Edna Bonacich on labor and class analysis, especially empirical studies; Patricia Hill Collins on intersectionality of race gender class oppressions; Dorothy Smith, Maria Mies, Rose Brewer, and Martha Gimenez on a materialist analysis of race gender class; James Petras, Berch Berberoglu, and Samir Amin on imperialism and the state; Rod Bush on race and class struggles; Michael Burawoy on public sociology; and Anthony Giddens, Manuel Castells, Douglas Kellner, and William Robinson on technology, the information age, and twenty first century globalization.

In the early twenty first century materialist sociologists are especially looking at the new realities of globalization – capitalism in the age of electronics – and neoliberalism. This includes the technological revolution; deepening inequality, white supremacy, and sexism; growing polarization of wealth and poverty among classes, genders, peoples, races, and nations; the slashing of the social safety net for poor and oppressed peoples the world over; new forms of the state, ideology, social control, and militarism; ecological crises; emerging social movements for justice, equality, and popular democracy; and bottom up movement processes of consciousness, vision, and strategy.

In identifying and conducting materialist sociology, it is not what is being examined, but the explanatory theory and its philosophical principles that are key. Thus, ideology, culture, the state, etc. can be analyzed from a materialist perspective. What makes it materialist is linking these phenomena to the material conditions of society and the material class interests of various groups and classes in maintaining the status quo, reforming it, or qualitatively transforming the whole system. In its historical materialist expression it asks and seeks to answer the question where in their historical development are society and the political process of human liberation led by those most marginalized,

impoverished, and oppressed. Here human liberation means the abolition of all forms of private productive property, total reorganization of society, freedom from all forms of exploitation and oppression – class, gender, nationality, race, etc. – and building a cooperative, egalitarian, and peaceful global society.

Mechanical and critical to historical materialist forms of social analysis from analytic conflict sociology, Marxism, and neo Marxism, various race class gender and public sociologies, to studies of today's globalization and its bottom up anti capitalist revolutionary movements, will continue to be developed. Throughout history historical materialists have lifted up as their mantra in response to mechanical materialists Marx's famous eleventh thesis on Feuerbach: "The philosophers have only *interpreted* the world, in various ways; the point however is to *change* it" (Marx & Engels 1986: 30). What the twenty first century holds we will come to know through historical materialist analysis of and participation in the processes of political struggle and social transformation.

SEE ALSO: Globalization, Consumption and; Intersectionality; Marxism and Sociology; Materialist Feminisms

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materialist feminisms

Nilufer Isvan

A materialist feminist research program is one that places special emphasis on the material conditions underlying gender inequality. Scholars within this tradition may vary in their definition of the line of demarcation and conceptual relationships between material and ideological spheres, but most would agree that the organization of production is central to material reality. Although all feminist scholars acknowledge the importance of women's economic status, materialist feminist approaches are distinguished by the centrality and causal precedence ascribed to material forces over ideational ones in explaining women's oppression.

One consequence of this theoretical orientation is an emphasis on social class. The use of "women" and "men" as unified analytic categories is avoided, since individuals from different class backgrounds have differential access to power, autonomy, and other social resources. The specific mechanisms of gender oppression depend on women's class position, as do the conditions of their emancipation. Overlaps between the interests of some women and some oppressed men are acknowledged, resulting in political stances supportive of strategic alliances with some categories of men.

This brand of feminism is the outcome of engagements with the Marxist tradition. On one hand, it uses insights from feminist theory

to challenge the gender blind aspects of Marxist analysis. On the other, it uses Marxian methods to criticize liberal and radical feminisms for their lack of attention to differences among women and their failure to develop a systematic critique of capitalism. It is, in this sense, a doubly critical discourse.

Feminist scholarship that meets these criteria is characterized as “materialist,” “Marxist,” or “socialist,” often interchangeably. Scholars who regard themselves as working within the Marxist tradition while revising some of its features within a feminist agenda usually characterize their work as Marxist feminist. Those who consider their revisions to be so substantial as to alter the core elements of Marxism tend to shy away from this label. If they consider the critique of capitalism to be vital to their work or labor activism to be central to their political agenda, they may prefer the label socialist feminist. On the whole, there is no consensus among sociologists on choice of label; whether a feminist’s work is hyphenated as materialist, Marxist, or socialist is generally a function of personal or political preference rather than any formally definable theoretical criteria.

INTELLECTUAL ORIGINS

As noted by Hartmann (1981) and other contributors to the same volume, feminism’s encounter with Marxism has been at once productive and problematic. Marx’s analysis from the standpoint of the oppressed, his investigation of the mechanisms of exploitation, and his emancipatory political agenda provided fruitful models for feminists. Materialist feminisms are projects to reshape Marxist categories to better accommodate women’s realities. Women’s oppressed status, though acknowledged, appears in Marx’s schema as a direct consequence of the asymmetrical relations of production. Thus, the emancipation of women is assumed to follow automatically from the emancipation of the worker. In subsuming kinship, marriage, and, at a more general level, the social relations of reproduction under the logic of production, this framework poses problems for feminist scholarship, for it leaves under theorized precisely those areas of social reality that are the primary loci of women’s lives. Consequently, much of

materialist feminist scholarship is concerned with bringing the sphere of reproduction into theoretical focus and highlighting its (partial) autonomy, while retaining Marx’s insights into the vital role of production relations in shaping social reality.

Efforts to theorize reproduction within a materialist framework predate feminist interventions. During his later years, Marx himself grew increasingly dissatisfied with his theoretical neglect of family and kinship, as evidenced by his notes and marginalia on ethnographies such as Morgan’s *Ancient Society*. Though he never published this research, his notes on Morgan constitute the core of Engels’s *The Origin of the Family, Private Property and the State*, published in 1884 shortly after Marx’s death.

In *Origin*, Engels develops a historical materialist analysis linking production, reproduction, and governance, conceptualizing reproduction as a determining force equal in importance to production. Although many of his conclusions have been severely challenged on both anthropological and feminist grounds, his definition of historical materialism is still widely embraced by materialist feminists: “The determining factor in history is, in the final instance, the production and reproduction of immediate life. This, again, is of a twofold character: on the one side, the production of the means of existence . . . and the tools necessary for that production; on the other side, the production of human beings themselves, the propagation of the species.”

The production/reproduction link was further developed during the 1970s. In her classic work, *Women’s Role in Economic Development* (1970), Ester Boserup demonstrated a historical correlation between types of farming and systems of family/gender. The British anthropologist Jack Goody (1976) further developed the theoretical implications of her theory.

Revisions to Marxism proposed by European “articulationists” are also significant in this context. This body of work asserts that at any given historical moment several modes of production coexist through articulations with each other and with the dominant mode, and identifies reproduction as the site of this articulation (Wolpe 1980; Meillassoux 1981). These revisions, combined with the notion of a domestic (or kin based) mode of production developed by Marxist anthropologists, represent moves away

from Marx's historicism, reductionism, and economic determinism. They helped set the stage for historical materialist analyses that problematized the articulation of capitalism and patriarchy.

THEORETICAL CONTRIBUTIONS

Marxist critiques of liberal feminism date back to the turn of the twentieth century. Socialist feminists of the era attacked bourgeois suffragists for their collusion with established political institutions, their support of property restrictions on voting rights, and their lack of attention to the double oppression of working class women. Activists such as August Bebel and Clara Zetkin in Germany, Alexandra Kollontai and Nadezhda Krupskaya in Russia, Sylvia Pankhurst in England, and Emma Goldman and Margaret Sanger in the US, were leaders in both socialist and women's organizations. They are largely responsible for the inclusion of issues such as women's working conditions and labor organization, birth control, maternity insurance, and the socialization of childcare and domestic work in socialist platforms of this era. However, beliefs about the power of socialism to bring about the total emancipation of women were still widespread within these circles. Consequently, a feminist critique of Marxist doctrine did not emerge within the social movements of this era. In fact, most of the early socialist feminists were staunch anti revisionists.

The first concerted efforts to revise Marxist theory from a feminist standpoint came from European feminists of the New Left during the 1960s and 1970s, when materialist feminism emerged as a doubly critical discourse. Having witnessed Stalinism, socialists of this era were more open to doctrinal revisions than their earlier counterparts. Likewise, the feminists among them were no longer as hopeful that socialism alone could offer a solution to women's oppression. Furthermore, the left's preoccupation with class to the exclusion of gender as a dimension of oppression was a source of disillusionment for these feminists.

Thus, the initial contributions to materialist feminism, such as Juliet Mitchell's (1966) seminal *New Left Review* essay and Christine Delphy's *Close to Home* (1984), were received

with interest by feminists and Marxists alike. Mitchell's article attacked socialism for its failure to bring about women's emancipation, and argued that analyses of women's role in production were not sufficient for a truly materialist feminism. In addition, she maintained, Marxist feminists needed to problematize the psychosexual foundations of gender relations, which would require a fundamental revision of Marxist theory.

DOMESTIC LABOR

In an influential article, Benston (1979) proposed domestic production as the material base of women's oppression, initiating a debate about how best to insert housework and childcare into Marx's model of capitalism (for an overview of the debate, see Molyneux 1979). On the whole, these interventions are feminist corrections to Marx's schema using Marxist logic, without problematizing the psychosexual foundations of gender. Nonetheless, they made a major contribution to feminist and Marxist theories by bringing domestic labor under analytic scrutiny.

DUAL SYSTEMS

The dual systems approach is a product of efforts to integrate the psychosexual forces underlying gender relations and the cultural underpinnings of kinship into materialist analyses. Having its origins in Mitchell's *Psychoanalysis and Feminism* (1975), and best represented in the US by Zillah Eisenstein's (1979) early work, this line of theorizing regards women's oppression as a product of class (capitalism) and gender (patriarchy) simultaneously. Though patriarchy predates capitalism, it is argued, it has shaped capitalist development in important ways, reshaping itself in the process. Thus, women's emancipation requires two revolutions: an economic one to overthrow capitalism and a feminist one to end patriarchy. This approach has been criticized by some feminists for failing to specify sufficiently the mechanisms that link the two systems, and for treating patriarchy as a transhistorical entity.

The latter criticism is addressed by Rubin (1975). She defines a sex/gender system as the set of historically specific sociocultural

mechanisms that transform biological sex into gendered subjectivities, and argues that historical analyses of gender need to use this general concept instead of patriarchy, which is one specific sex/gender system rather than an analytic concept. Similarly, in their *Feminism and Materialism: Women and Modes of Production* (1978), Kuhn and Wolpe outline a mode of analysis that relates modes of production to “the historically specific form of organization of procreation and sexuality.”

Though the mechanisms that link capitalism and patriarchy have not been fully elaborated at the theoretical level, the dual systems approach inspired a number of valuable studies focusing on the interdependence between the two systems at specific empirical instances. Hartmann’s *Signs* article “Capitalism, Patriarchy, and Job Segregation by Sex” (1976) and Secombe’s study of the historical construction of the male breadwinner norm published in *Social History* in 1986 are notable examples.

CLASS, RACE, AND SEXUALITY

The feminist challenge made important contributions to Marxist class analysis. By demonstrating the role of gender and kinship in reproducing class structures and mediating class outcomes, it cast serious doubt on the validity of economic determinism in predicting or explaining sociopolitical outcomes. The literature on class-gender interactions addresses issues such as gendered reinterpretations of Marxist class categories (Eisenstein 1979), the implications for women of living in class societies, gendered aspects of class formation, women’s labor history, and class differences among women.

Especially in the US, where class discourse is intimately linked to race and ethnicity, it is by now customary to represent this interaction as a three way relationship. Best exemplified by black feminist thought (Collins 1990), this “intersectionist” approach insists on the irreducibility of race to other dimensions of oppression. One of the most influential formulations of intersectionism is the Combahee River Collective’s (2000) position statement, which included sexuality along with gender, class, and race as interacting sources of identity, power, and social status. This point was further developed by

queer materialists who combined insights from Marxism, materialist feminism, and queer theory to develop materially grounded analyses of heterosexism (D’Emilio 1983).

GLOBAL CAPITALISM

As first world deindustrialization and the consolidation of global capitalism accelerated during the 1980s, feminist scholarship focused on such phenomena as the relocation of manufacturing industries to the third world, the rise of free trade and export processing zones, and international labor migration. At the theoretical level, there were efforts to determine the impact of third world women’s work on global capital accumulation. Building on the work of articulationist Marxists and the domestic labor debates of the 1970s, these studies argued that third world wage labor was rendered “inexpensive” through women’s invisible and often unremunerated subsistence production. The value created by this domestic work, it was argued, met a large portion of wage workers’ subsistence needs, reducing third world workers’ need for cash income, and contributing to the profitability of manufacturing in the third world (Mies et al. 1988).

The 1980s also witnessed the publication of detailed empirical studies of the differential impact of global capitalism along the lines of class, race, gender, and world system location. *Women, Men, and the International Division of Labor* (1983) edited by Nash and Fernández Kelly and Ong’s *Spirits of Resistance and Capitalist Discipline: Factory Women in Malaysia* (1987) exemplify this literature.

THE POSTMODERN TURN

Materialist feminists responded along several lines to the rise to prominence of postmodern and poststructuralist approaches during the 1990s. First, there was a tendency to “take stock” of the entire materialist feminist project, resulting in several books, special journal issues, and anthologies critically reviewing past work and setting agendas for the future.

In line with the prevailing mistrust of determinist and totalizing explanations, there was a retreat from efforts to formulate a feminist

version of Marxist theory. Relatedly, and partially in response to the conservatism of academic circles, fewer feminists self-identified as Marxist or socialist during this era, preferring instead to define their work as materialist. There was a reevaluation of the definition of "material," resulting in the inclusion of culture, representation, and meaning production within this sphere. Though written a decade earlier, Michèle Barrett's (1980) work was influential in these reformulations.

The role of discourse as mediator between material reality and individual subjectivity became a central focus of feminist analysis (Hennessy 1993). Growing awareness of the situated nature of knowledge brought the production of knowledge, including feminist knowledge, under critical scrutiny. Haraway's *Simians, Cyborgs, and Women* (1991) and the collection of essays edited by Mohanty, Russo, and Torres, *Third World Women and the Politics of Feminism* (1991), are notable examples of this mode of analysis.

The retrenchment of welfare capitalism and the decline of social services during the 1980s and 1990s drew feminists' attention to the political economy of privatized dependent care and its increased importance to survival (Folbre 2001). The uneasy fit between this category of work and prevailing definitions of production led some theorists to question the usefulness of the "productionist" paradigm for understanding women's relationship to material reality, and to advocate its replacement with a model more representative of the intersubjectivity that characterizes much of women's caregiving work in contemporary societies (Benhabib & Cornell 1987).

Feminist cultural materialism is a relatively new area of investigation that constitutes a productive source of new research. The theoretical connections among different dimensions of oppression are not yet fully explored, and materialist feminist work along intersectionist lines is likely to continue into the future. New reproductive technologies and advances in genetics pose important problems for women (not the least of which is a real danger of neo-eugenics), and abortion, gay marriage, and elderly care will also remain on political agendas for the foreseeable future, especially in the US. Newly emerging dimensions of globalization and especially those

involving war, ethnic conflict, and terrorism are attracting increasing attention from feminist scholarship concerned with their gendered consequences. Establishing the material bases of these political struggles will challenge materialist feminists in the years to come.

SEE ALSO: Black Feminist Thought; Capitalism; Gender Oppression; Gender, Social Movements and; Marxism and Sociology; Materialism; Patriarchy

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materiality and scientific practice

Ragna Zeiss

Studies of scientific practice were the first to investigate scientific practice and science in the making empirically, something that had not been done by philosophers and historians of science. The outcomes of these studies opposed the standard view of science and instead showed how science and scientific knowledge are produced locally and scientists, instruments,

computers, and other heterogeneous elements have to work together in order to co construct science. They have stressed the importance of materiality in scientific practice and provided material for debate between different ways of studying materiality.

Science had long been considered as an activity that provides us with information about the world "out there." In other words, science tells us about how the world really is and delivers true explanations of inquiry independent phenomena. In the 1960s the view of science as a rational and universal process that provides us with the "truth" began to change. Kuhn (1996) argued that "facts" were the outcomes of negotiations between scientists. These negotiations took place within a "paradigm" in which agreement existed about the methods that should be followed and the kinds of knowledge that were scientific. Innovative knowledge that would not fit in the contemporary paradigm could only be accepted if scientists were persuasive enough to convince others of their findings. Partly building on the work of Kuhn, some sociologists (but also, for example, anthropologists and historians) started to regard science as deeply embedded in society. This allowed them to investigate science as a social process.

Examples of studies of scientific practice are "laboratory studies." These occurred in the late 1970s. By inserting themselves into a laboratory, scholars of sociology (and others) participated and observed the practices inside laboratories – the place where scientific knowledge is produced. By writing ethnographies of science, they showed that knowledge construction is not a purely rational process. Instead, scientific practice can be rather "messy." Knowledge production is a process in which nonsolid and uncertain ingredients, day to day, and contingent factors play a role. An experiment is carried out at a particular time in a particular setting. It is performed by people who have certain interests and ideas about which parameters and materials are important and which are not. What experiments and how experiments are carried out thus depend on these aspects in addition to issues like the availability and costs of particular equipment. This also means that the outcome of these experiments, science, is not universal from the start. Latour (1988) illustrates this by analyzing the "fact" that microbes can cause disease.

Louis Pasteur was able to isolate microbes and show visible colonies of them in his laboratory, something that would have been impossible outside a laboratory. With the help of the instruments in the laboratory he was able to define what he regarded as a microbe and what was not. By giving public demonstrations he tried to convince others that microbes indeed cause disease. The public demonstrations were, in a sense, extended laboratories, since the same conditions as in the laboratory had to apply in order to obtain the same results. It was only when Pasteur convinced other scientists, doctors, and other groups that the existence of the microbe and it being the cause of disease became taken for granted and a "fact." Apart from illustrating that scientific outcomes are made into universal facts through hard work, this example has also shown that science can be regarded as a process of construction rather than description. In this process of construction, materiality plays an important role.

This is illustrated by Zeiss (2004). When the quality of our drinking water is tested, it is not the water "out there" that is brought into the laboratory to be tested. The water that is taken "out there" is put into sample bottles of various materials and with various preservatives to prevent the specific parameters for which the water has to be tested from changing. A bottle for a bacteriological sample contains a preservative that neutralizes the chlorine in the water. If this preservative were absent, the chlorine would decrease or extinguish the bacteria population and the bacteria population could no longer be analyzed when the sample arrived at the laboratory. In this process, however, other parameters – for which this specific sample will *not* be tested – will change or be eliminated. The water that was taken from a tap has thus in a certain sense been purified in order to be suitable for testing in a laboratory. The laboratory therefore does not study the water as it is "out there," just as other laboratories do not study nature as it is "out there."

The knowledge that science produces, whether this is inside or outside laboratories, is always mediated by perceptions and instruments. Scientists, instruments, and natural objects have to adjust to each other and take each other into account for scientific knowledge to be produced. In other words, they are all

reconfigured in a specific practice to produce knowledge (e.g., water quality) together. The process of knowledge production is constitutive for what we know reality to be; scientists can therefore be said to construct rather than describe nature. This has (theoretical) consequences: it means that we cannot know nature as it is. However, this is not to say that scientific knowledge would therefore be less valuable. The specific knowledge about water quality that can be obtained through detailed analyses with technological instruments cannot be obtained in a different way. Scientists, the water, the sample bottles, and the measurement instruments together make knowledge production possible; they co-construct scientific knowledge.

Laboratory studies have been celebrated for being the first to explore scientific practice as it is and in real time. They did not focus on the context of scientific practice, but investigated how the content of scientific knowledge is produced. Constructivism and the widespread use of ethnographic studies in social studies of science and technology are important outcomes of laboratory studies. The stress on materiality in the production of scientific knowledge is another important result. How materiality can or should be analyzed theoretically has however been subject to debate. An example can clarify this.

It happens that experiments do not work, the scientist does not succeed in getting the material to work, the material does not do what it is supposed to do: the material resists. This has frequently been described in laboratory studies. Some would argue that it is not possible to grant material artifacts agency, since this would imply an essentialist – or technological determinist – assumption of a technological or material core in which the intrinsic properties of the material can be found. They do not deny that material (artifacts) can have constraining influences upon actors, but they contend that these constraints can be known as such: they are always subject to interpretation. In their eyes, materiality (and scientific practices) can only be studied through looking at accounts of these constraints and through exploring why some accounts are more convincing than others (for this approach to materiality, see Grint & Woolgar 1997). Scientists study purified and selected parts of nature or representations of

nature in the form of diagrams, images, and graphs. Ethnographers entering the laboratory are not able to distinguish the same characteristics of, or patterns in, the material as the scientists distinguish. Scientists have learned to read the material in specific ways – they distinguish between what is relevant to see and what is irrelevant. They cannot deal with materiality as it is and neither can social scientists. According to Grint and Woolgar (1997), material resistances have to be interpreted and once they have been interpreted, the social world has been entered in which one's disciplinary background and the thoughts of previous scientists become important.

Others have argued that reducing materiality to accounts does not do justice to the role of materiality. They see work in laboratories as a process of active interaction with materiality. Actor network theory (ANT) does not want to make a distinction between the technical and the social, since what counts as human and non human is in itself a construction. ANT studies often follow an actor (or actant) in a network of social and technical elements with which the actor can make alliances and which are constitutive of science (e.g., Louis Pasteur, above). The mangle of practice approach (Pickering 1995) proposes to take material agency seriously in a different way. Pickering argues that the contours of material agency are never decisively known in advance. Instead, scientists have a continuous job to try “tuning” into the material agency. Material agency can then be *temporally emergent* in practice. Whereas ANT sees humans and non humans as symmetric and interchangeable, Pickering argues that humans cannot be substituted for machines, especially since humans have intentions, goals, and plans that have to be taken into account. These intentions and possible futures are intertwined with existing ideas and scientific results and can also be changed by tuning. The process of tuning refers to a way of dealing with the resistance of the material by accommodating it and revising the goals, intentions, and/or material form of the machine. Terms similar to “tuning” are “tinkering” (Knorr Cetina 1981) and “bricolage” (Latour & Woolgar 1986), but these have less (explicit) connotations to theoretical ways of dealing with the issue of materiality.

SEE ALSO: Actor Network Theory; Actor Network Theory, Actants; Laboratory Studies and the World of the Scientific Lab; Realism and Relativism: Truth and Objectivity; Science, Ethnographic Studies of; Science, Social Construction of; Scientific Knowledge, Sociology of

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maternalism

Susan E. Chase

Maternalism has three meanings. First, it refers to social practices grounded in women's concern for children, especially when those practices extend beyond the home into community and/or political arenas. Maternalism has been used particularly to describe the activities of Progressive era social reformers who shaped the emerging welfare states' policies concerning mothers and children. It has also been used to describe the activities of many women's clubs,

associations, organizations, and social movements, from the nineteenth century to the present, that aim(ed) to improve the quality of children's lives. Second, maternalism refers to discourse that highlights women's connection to and responsibility for children and that emphasizes differences (which may be conceived either as biologically based or as socially conditioned) between men's and women's contributions to family and society. This discourse animates many of the social practices listed above, but it can also infuse institutions or systems, such as the welfare state itself. Maternal discourse often intersects with class, racial, national, or religious interests. Third, maternalism is sometimes used to describe feminist theory that critiques the cultural devaluation of mothering and that articulates the contributions of maternal practice to social and political life.

In the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, feminists, women reformers, and women club members generally took for granted that women's responsibilities included mothering and other domestic tasks. By contrast, feminists of the 1960s, 1970s, and 1980s treated motherhood as a socially and historically specific institution requiring critical analysis. By the 1990s, feminist historians and social scientists had produced a substantial body of research on the (mostly) middle class Progressive era women whose work laid the foundation for welfare states in North America and Europe. In the United States, these reforms included the establishment of mothers' pensions, child labor laws, juvenile courts, protective legislation for women workers, public health nursing for mothers and infants, and the Children's Bureau.

Whether or not they had children of their own, these Progressive era reformers viewed themselves as enacting maternal responsibilities in relation to and on behalf of other women and their children. Using maternalist discourse, they not only argued for reforms in other women's and children's interests, they also defended their incursion into occupational and political arenas from which women had been excluded. Before women won the right to vote, and thus the right to participate directly in the political process, maternalist discourse was a powerful tool for mobilizing women and a persuasive defense of women's political activity. The reformers' use of this discourse, however, sometimes embodied a

paradox. On the one hand, by defining (middle class) women's involvement in political arenas as municipal housekeeping, they challenged the ideological separation of private and public realms. On the other hand, the welfare policies they fought for tended to reinforce the ideology that mothers' primary responsibilities revolved around home and children. Although the intent was to help, the result was often intensified scrutiny of poor, working class, and immigrant mothers' practices and employment (Skocpol 1992; Koven & Michel 1993; Gordon 1994; Ladd Taylor 1994).

Historians and social scientists have paid particular attention to the ways in which maternalist reformers succeeded or failed in forging connections among women of different classes, races, and ethnicities. For example, white women's reform associations frequently (but not always) excluded African American women reformers or disregarded black communities' circumstances and needs. This treatment, along with government programs' racial discrimination, led African American women reformers to create private institutions in their communities, such as day nurseries, schools, and health clinics. Furthermore, while middle class white women reformers tended to discourage working class women's employment, middle class African American women reformers were more accepting of working class mothers' waged labor (Gordon 1994; Ladd Taylor 1994).

Scholars have also studied how maternal practice and discourse have functioned in a wide range of grassroots organizations and social movements across time and place. Women have fought against environmental hazards such as toxic waste dumps near schools, against the state's use of their sons and daughters to fight wars they do not support, and against state sponsored torture and disappearance of family members. They have fought for welfare reform, for decent, affordable health care, housing, childcare, and education, and for peaceful alliances across various borders. It is important to note, however, that maternal politics can pit mothers and children of different social groups against one another, that maternal activism can be found anywhere along the political spectrum from left to right, and that maternal discourse can be used not only to legitimate but also to disguise political aims (Jetter et al. 1997).

For instance, Tamara Neuman (2004) argues that, starting in the 1970s, Kiryat Arba women used maternal discourse to downplay the political nature of their efforts to expand Israeli settlement in Hebron. And Alexis Jetter et al.'s *The Politics of Motherhood* (1997) includes articles about how women have employed maternal rhetoric in the service of white supremacist and race hate movements in the United States and Europe. Yet, an important theme in the literature on maternal activism is that what begins as a concern for one's own or one's communities' children sometimes develops into a broader struggle on behalf of other children (Jetter et al. 1997).

In the 1980s and 1990s, feminist scholars also theorized mothering as a particular form of social practice that has been unjustly devalued, both culturally and scientifically. Sara Ruddick's 1980 article, "Maternal Thinking," as well as her subsequent work, has been central in feminist revisioning of mothering. She coined the term *maternal thinking* to describe three values or intellectual capacities that may arise from the everyday work of caring for children, whether it is performed by men or women. First, she argues that children's demand for preservation and protection can produce the value of "holding," of trying to keep the child safe while knowing one can not always control the environment. Second, she suggests that children's demand for physical, emotional, and intellectual nurturance may lead to the intellectual capacity to understand complex and unpredictable change, both in children and in oneself. Third, children's demand for moral and social training, so that they may be accepted as members of their community, requires that the mother cultivate openness to the child's potential, including the child's potential difference from herself and from others in her community. Ruddick acknowledges that maternal thinking can lead mothers to defend their own children at others' expense. Nonetheless, she argues that maternal thinking can be mobilized beyond one's own children into a broader politics of resistance, including global peace politics (Ruddick 1995).

Other feminist theorists have resisted universalizing maternal practice. Patricia Hill Collins (1994) has been especially influential in theorizing mothers' practices from specific

social historical locations. Starting from the perspective of poor and working class women of color in the United States, Collins argues that these mothers, unlike their more privileged counterparts, must fight for their children's survival, struggle to teach their children about their racial/ethnic identities in a racist society, and fight for empowerment in a society that has controlled their bodies and reproduction as well as their relationship to their children.

A major issue in both empirical and theoretical explorations of maternalism as practice and discourse is the link between maternalism and feminism. In cases where maternalism focuses on children's needs while excluding mothers' needs, extols a limited sphere of influence for women, and/or seeks the well being of some children while harming others, scholars have tended to view maternalism as non feminist, if not anti feminist. By contrast, when maternal practice, discourse, and activism include mothers' as well as children's needs, integrate women's rights and equality into the struggle, and build bridges across racial, ethnic, class, national, or other borders, scholars are more likely to define them as feminist (Gordon 1994; Ladd Taylor 1994; Ruddick 1995; Chase & Rogers 2001).

Nonetheless, given the vast historical and geographical diversity among instances of maternalism (and of feminism), most scholars resist generalizations; consequently, study of particular manifestations of maternal practice, discourse, and activism has been crucial. In part because of the conflict and/or uneasy alliance between maternal and feminist practices, discourse, and activism, some scholars have chosen different terms than maternalism to describe instances where mothering and political activity intersect. Nancy Naples (1998), for example, uses *activist mothering* to describe the work of women community workers employed in Community Action Programs during the War on Poverty in the 1960s and 1970s. She uses this term to highlight the women's view of political activism as integral to their mothering, to emphasize their membership in the communities on whose behalf they work, and to underscore the cross class, cross racial nature of their work.

Some contemporary scholars argue for moving beyond maternalism as a paradigm for understanding women's relation to the family,

the economy, and the state (Boris & Kleinberg 2003). In this context, some propose that a focus on *carework* offers a better analytical lens. Rather than highlighting women's connection to children, this term draws attention to women's caring as a form of *labor*, whether it is a labor of love or not, whether it is paid or not, whether it takes place in the home or in the workplace, and whether it is performed for children, adults, or one's own or others' family members. Research on carework explores how that work fits into the family-work nexus in workers' lives, attends to the ways that work is positioned in the economy and organized by the state, and investigates how that work embodies or resists gendered and racialized discourses. Teresa Swartz (2004) offers a good example of how these aspects of carework intersect. She explores the complexities of foster parenting as (minimally) paid care work, performed for and regulated by the state, and performed by mostly working class women who use a gendered discourse of mothering. Research on carework covers many of the same issues as research on maternalism, but the latter emphasizes women's connection to and responsibility for children and how that concern can lead to political engagement.

Another new concept that builds on the scholarship on maternalism is *familialism*. Haney and Pollard (2003) suggest that familialism is especially useful for understanding cases where there is no welfare state, such as colonial regimes and state socialist and communist regimes. They argue that various regimes and states, in different historical periods and geographical locations, regulate not only mothers' but also fathers' family responsibilities, and that these gendered forms of regulation have wide ranging consequences for family structures.

SEE ALSO: Carework; Ecofeminism; Ethic of Care; Feminism; Feminism, First, Second, and Third Waves; Gendered Organizations/Institutions; Motherhood; Women's Empowerment

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math, science, and technology education

Larry E. Suter

The study of educational practices in mathematics, science, and technology considers the social, psychological, economic, and political forces that affect career choice and cognitive understanding of those subject areas. The field

involves the development of theories and methods that explore how students learn complex topics in the sciences and engineering. Many products of research in technology apply the theories and methods of psychology, education, political science, engineering, and all sciences as well as of sociology. The subject areas of mathematics, science, and technology are considered priority areas for study because the knowledge can affect economic production and invention. Moreover, these subjects are the domain of school learning rather than home learning in all countries.

The study of mathematics, science, and technology education has become an established body of research leading to greater efficiencies in the teaching, learning, and public understanding of those topics (Kilpatrick 1992). Researchers apply theoretical and methodological foundations of sociology (as well as insights from other behavioral disciplines such as education, anthropology, and psychology) to understand student performance, teaching practices, adult understanding, and behavior of large organizations. The study of a single set of "content areas" such as mathematics and science is not a common frame of reference for researchers from social sciences because it requires a specific knowledge of the disciplines as well as knowledge of the social forces that affect behavior. Thus, persons trained in the physical and mathematical sciences at some point in their careers dominate the study of mathematics, science, and technology education.

Sociologists participate in research on the content areas of mathematics and science by examining student career paths, teacher careers, cognitive learning, student motivation, school curriculum, international comparisons, college enrollment, technological applications, and demographic characteristics of enrollment. Thus expertise of sociologists in such areas as demography, community systems, organizational behavior, race relations, social stratification, interpersonal behavior, and educational institutions in particular is found throughout studies of mathematics and science education.

American elementary, secondary, and college student participation in mathematics, science, and technology education has been a concern of national policy since World War II, when it appeared as though US scientists might not

be able to keep up with scientific developments in other parts of the world after the war. The launching of Sputnik in 1957 was especially troubling because it confirmed fears that the American educational system was behind the development of science and mathematics in other countries. It also spurred further Congressional funding of mathematics and science education.

Vannevar Bush (1945) urged Congress to establish the National Science Foundation in 1950 to increase domestic financial support for scientific research and scientific and technological education. Congressional committees have provided financial support for research in science, mathematics, and technology education through many federal agencies such as the National Science Foundation, the National Aeronautics and Space Administration, the National Institute for Standards in Technology, the Department of Energy, the Department of Defense, and the Department of Education (see National Science Board 2000). These agencies support basic research in the sciences as well as research and educational practices in science, mathematics, and technology (engineering).

The public (adult) understanding of science is also a matter of significant study and measurement (National Science Board 2000; Miller 2004). Studies of public understanding of scientific and mathematical principles have developed statistical surveys of popular understanding and have created theoretical frameworks for describing national and international trends in scientific understanding. These surveys have shown that the American public is not well informed about some areas of science. For example, only half of the US population correctly understood how long it takes for the earth to circle the sun.

The National Academy of Sciences (NAS) conducts many regular syntheses of research in many aspects of teaching and learning of science, mathematics, and technology through the National Research Council. Some recent major studies focus on how people learn, mathematics education, science education reform, children's health, and student motivation. The NAS conducts studies through a series of review committees of scholars in all fields that analyze the literature of a problem area. These analyses involve the work of sociologists who contribute background on the theory of social behavior as

well as methodological experience with data for large social systems as well as smaller classrooms.

The study of mathematics, science, and technology education is conducted in every country of the world because the scientific manpower is considered a necessary asset to productivity. Comparative studies of the performance of elementary and secondary students in mathematics and science are conducted regularly by two international organizations. The International Association for the Evaluation of Educational Achievement (IEA) has produced detailed studies of student performance since 1966 and its databases are available to others for research (see the IEA website, www.iea.nl/). The Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) regularly conducts studies of careers and student performance and publishes reports from its French office in Paris. Moreover, the UNESCO office in Paris regularly collects statistical summaries of the production of graduates for each field of study for secondary and tertiary institutions in all countries. These studies have identified differences in subject matter curriculum emphasis and aspects of teacher training as important factors in explaining large differences in student achievement in these subject areas across countries. The studies also have included analysis of basic student social conditions that accompany student performance such as time spent on entertainment, the use of computers and calculators, availability of books and supplies, the contribution of textbooks to learning, the educational level of parents, and income level.

International comparative studies of student achievement in mathematics, science, and technology have been conducted through surveys of students and teachers that include questions about student motivation, cognitive understanding, and social background. More recent methodological approaches have used video analysis of classroom behavior across a number of countries to establish classroom level descriptions of differences in teacher and student performance (Stigler & Hiebert 1999). These studies have shown that no single aspect of teaching, student behavior, or extended use of computers in classrooms is associated with high average country performance in mathematics, science, or reading. Studies of technology in classrooms have

shown that the United States is not always the leading country in applying technology to classroom instruction. The IEA study of information in education found that technology innovations have limited impact on classrooms or schools. In the schools where innovations have been both disseminated and continued, continuation depended on the energy and commitment of individual teachers, student support, the perceived value for the innovation, availability of teacher professional development opportunities, and administrative support.

The field of mathematics and science education is largely composed of research by educational psychologists and educational practitioners attempting to solve practical problems about classroom presentation, curriculum organization, and teacher preparation. Many researchers begin their careers in one of the physical or mathematical sciences and then become interested in conducting formal research on student and teacher behavior. Committees of the National Academy of Sciences and funding programs of the National Science Foundation encourage collaboration between researchers in physical and mathematical science disciplines and those from social sciences disciplines.

Sociological theories of social behavior such as social stratification, gender relations, race and ethnicity, organizational behavior, family participation, rural sociology, and sociology of education are all present in significant studies on the conditions of mathematics and science education. The methods employed by sociologists for demographic analysis, survey research, statistical analysis, case studies, and interviews are the basic techniques used by all researchers of school practices. The development of particular methods that suit the needs of research areas has also occurred, such as in the application of multilevel models of statistical analysis to understanding the learning of mathematics by students in schools or classrooms. The field of sociology has also contributed to the development of methods for displaying statistical indicators of significant educational activities (Porter & Gamoran 2000). It has also contributed to understanding of the study of career development in mathematics, science, and technology (Mortimer & Shanahan 2003).

Kilpatrick examined the history of research on mathematics education and has found

evidence that it has been a “disciplined inquiry” (Cronbach & Suppes 1969) that may not involve empirically tested hypotheses, but is scholarly, public, and open to critique and refutation. Mathematics education became a recognized area of study in the nineteenth century at Teachers College. More recent research efforts in mathematics education are likely to involve experimental designs about the uses of technology in the classroom.

Science educators have been concerned with the pipeline for science and engineering, arguing that the human resource pool is refined through a series of stages and that it is at a maximum level of popularity in the elementary grades. They noted that “leakage” of interest in science is especially visible in the middle school grades. They were also concerned with the cultural factors that condition the opportunity to learn science and the motivation to engage in doing science. The increase in the number of minorities who continued into higher classes of secondary school also needed special attention to continue engagement in science disciplines.

Since 1950, the US government has been concerned with appropriate production of scientists and engineers through the US educational system. Vannevar Bush’s “Report to the President” emphasized the bipartisan nature of federal funding for science and established the principle that federal support of research in universities is necessary for the production of knowledge, innovation, and trained personnel for the nation’s workforce.

The current emphasis area of research for funding agencies is to increase the integration of all sciences into the study of learning science and mathematics principles. The multidisciplinary study of educational practices includes researchers working together on the same projects from two or more different and diverse disciplines. Researchers may work together from neural sciences, cognitive science, computer science, engineering, behavioral psychology, social psychology, natural sciences, as well as sociology and anthropology.

New theories and research methods are needed that address the social construction of learning complex topics in mathematics and science. How do student interaction and cognitive knowledge of mathematics interact? Psychologists and psychometricians have

developed theoretical frameworks of the science content areas (see National Assessment of Educational Progress), cognitive tests of the areas, and statistical models of individual differences. But few of these indicators include aspects of student interaction with other students and teachers or information about the contexts in which students learn and remember science and mathematics.

Research currently is developing a more sophisticated understanding of how group membership and social networks interact, affecting student careers choice and retention of cognitive knowledge in mathematics and science. The analysis of international comparisons on student achievement provides insights into cultural differences, but few of these studies have provided entirely new frameworks for understanding student motivation and cognitive learning as might be required to ultimately explain individual differences in achievement. Current research areas also include the relationship between individuals, disciplinary knowledge, and machines (computers) to better explain how modern technology alters the nature of science and mathematics and thus instructional requirements. Studies are under way to examine whether virtual experience with science studies substitutes for laboratory experience.

The study of mathematics, science, and technology education requires the collection of data from students and teachers as they are in the process of teaching and learning. New techniques for capturing and analyzing in situation behavior, such as video analysis, are being developed and promise to provide new insights into student behavior and performance. Measures that capture the many dimensions of student achievement also need to be developed more fully. New statistical modeling and data collection techniques promise to provide many future opportunities for discovering new relationships between student and teacher behavior.

Measurement of student achievement in the United States has focused greatly on the development of paper and pencil tests of cognitive memory on mathematics and science topics. Cognitive learning, however, has social aspects that have yet to be captured in these models. Sociologists need to develop methods of capturing networks of interactions between students, families, peers, and teachers that help explain

when and why students are able to retain and use mathematics and science knowledge in some settings but not in others. This will require the application and development of new data collection techniques and mathematical models of interpersonal behavior.

SEE ALSO: Educational Attainment; Educational Inequality; School Climate; School Segregation, Desegregation; Schooling and Economic Success; Technological Determinism; Technological Innovation; Technology, Science, and Culture

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mathematical sociology

Thomas J. Fararo

After World War II, some sociologists began to employ mathematical models as part of a deepening and broadening of the interpenetration of mathematics and the social and behavioral sciences. These applications were quite different from traditional data analysis wherein statistical procedures are the main tools. The idea was to create more rigorous scientific theories than had hitherto existed in these fields. Traditionally, for instance, theories in fields such as psychology and sociology were strong in intuitive content, but weak from a formal point of view. That is, assumptions and definitions were not clearly stipulated and distinguished from factual descriptions and inferences. In particular, there was rarely a formal deduction of a conclusion from specified premises.

The phrase “constructing mathematical models” captured the new and preferred style. This means making explicit assumptions about some mathematical objects and providing an empirical interpretation for the ideas. It also means deducing properties of the model and comparing these with relevant empirical data. Mathematical sociology was part of this intellectual movement in the social and behavioral sciences.

INFLUENTIAL EARLY DEVELOPMENTS

The distinctive feature of sociology as a science is its focus on groups. But a group is not just a set of people. Rather, through processes of social interaction, a group is a set of people in

social relationships with one another. How can the pattern of such relationships – a social network – be characterized in mathematical terms?

Two early and influential innovations in the use of mathematics in sociology emerged as answers to this question. Both developments were initiated by thinking of a pattern of relationships as a set of points connected by lines. The points (or “nodes”) represent people or other actors and the lines (or “arcs”) represent relations among those actors. A body of mathematics called the theory of graphs had been developed to deal with circuits and other such networks, but it could not be directly applied to social networks. Abstract concepts had to be developed that mirrored the special properties of social networks.

With this objective in mind, graph theorist Frank Harary and social psychologist Dorwin Cartwright collaborated in a discrete mathematical approach to social networks. They employed extensions of the mathematical theory of graphs, large parts of which were being created by Harary and his collaborators as they worked on social science problems. For instance, since the 1930s, social psychologists had been analyzing patterns of friendship and animosity between people in groups, such as schoolchildren. Starting from a representation of sentiment relations among persons in terms of lines with positive or negative signs, Harary and Cartwright went on to prove the important and non obvious structure theorem (Cartwright & Harary 1956). The theorem says that if a structure of interrelated positive and negative ties is balanced – illustrated by the psychological consistency of “my friend’s enemy is my enemy” – then it consists of two substructures, with positive ties within and negative ties between them. (There is a special case where one of the two substructures is empty.) Of course, this is an idealization because in the real world there may be more than two cliques. In fact, later work generalized this theory of structural balance so as to accommodate this and other facts about the world.

Graph theoretical concepts and theorems are difficult to apply to the complicated pattern of links among nodes that typically emerges in a large population. Beginning in the late 1940s, the mathematical biologist Anatol Rapoport developed a probabilistic approach to the

characterization of large social networks. His insight was to start the analysis from a baseline model called a “random net,” one in which ties are generated at random. It turns out that one can prove interesting results about random networks characterized by a parameter called the contact density – the average number of outgoing links from a typical node. For instance, by the “weak connectivity” of a network, we mean the expected proportion of the nodes in the network that will be reached by tracing links from an arbitrary small starting set of nodes. It can be shown that the weak connectivity of a random net depends only upon the contact density. In particular, for contact density 2, 3, and 4, the weak connectivity is 0.59, 0.80, and 0.94, respectively. By contrast, in empirical studies of large friendship networks we find that these numbers are much lower. For instance, not 80 percent but less than half that fraction is on average reached in tracings of “best three friends.” How can we explain this departure from the derived predictions for a random net?

The model building strategy to address this question employs the methodological principle of introducing social parameters. When the social parameters are equal to zero, the random net predictions are obtained. Parameter values greater than zero correspond to departures from randomness, or *biases*, that may occur in different kinds of networks in natural settings. The result is a theory applicable either to random or biased nets. For instance, if A has two friends B and C, then there is a greater than chance probability that B and C will be acquainted. This non chance level probability can be taken as a “bias” parameter that helps to account for the reduced reachability that we observe in empirical studies. In this way, using a probabilistic structural model, one can derive formulas that show how the contact density and bias parameters account for the global network feature of weak connectivity, which in turn has implications for studies of information diffusion in large networks (Rapoport 1957).

Structural balance theory and the theory of random and biased nets each pertain to the analysis of structure, but they differ formally in that one is deterministic and the other is probabilistic or stochastic. Two other early influential developments in mathematical sociology

contrast in this way as well, but in the context of models of process.

Simon (1952) constructed a deterministic process model in his formalization of a theory set forth by George Homans in his book *The Human Group*, published in 1950. The classical mode of representation of dynamics employs a system of differential equations in which each equation combines certain mechanisms that contribute to the change of state of the system under analysis. Following Homans's lead of describing the group in terms of interaction, activity, and sentiment variables, Simon translated the hypotheses of Homans's theory into mechanisms that together generate the change of state of a group. The analysis of the system of differential equations obtained in this way leads to theorems pertaining to emergent equilibrium states as well as social change.

The other type of process model is probabilistic and involves the body of mathematics called stochastic processes. The influential early contribution here related to dynamic models of learning phenomena (Bush & Mosteller 1955). The typical application was to a single organism, human or not, adapting to a situation in which certain behaviors would lead to reward while alternative behaviors would not. In controlled experiments, analysts had recorded the proportion of organisms that respond in a particular way on each of a sequence of trials. Thus, for each trial there is a probability distribution over the possible responses and the complete set of data consists of a sequence of such trial dependent distributions. The mathematical problem is to postulate a behavioral process in such a way as to be able to derive and thereby predict the over time and equilibrium properties of such sequences. Thus, a stochastic model, which enables one to derive expected proportions over time, is a suitable form of model. The general probabilistic approach to behavior came to be known as stimulus sampling theory, in which human and other organisms are postulated to sample stimulus patterns and to connect these to responses as a function of situational contingencies, e.g., the relevance of particular responses to particular rewards. Later work in this program of research applied stimulus sampling theory to human social situations in which the outcome depends upon the acts of each of the actors, as in repeated game situations. In such

cases, each actor is represented as a "stimulus sampler" and the data are trial dependent distributions over the joint actions of the actors.

RESEARCH PROGRAMS AND MATHEMATICAL SOCIOLOGY

The four early developments sketched above have illustrated a pair of distinctions: models of structure versus models of process, and deterministic models versus stochastic models. This pair of distinctions was carried forward in subsequent work. To illustrate the sort of models and social phenomena studied, three important sociological research programs will be discussed.

The use of differential equations by Simon, as described earlier, raises a question: How can one connect a system of differential equations to the data of sociology? One clue is that empirical studies in sociology often report results in the form of proportions. This suggests the idea that the differential equations might refer to changes in proportions over time. In turn, this suggests a stochastic process model. Yet the proportion of people believing or doing something at a given time has to be correctly interpreted. Although each person in a population may hold a certain belief or be inclined to vote a certain way, the *processes* by which these individual orientations come about is socially mediated. Thus, we should understand the process by which states change over time as a social process in which persons influence one another to change their minds. This means that network ties loom large, and we have a linkage between social relations and social process.

These sorts of considerations animated the research program of James S. Coleman and led to his important book, *Introduction to Mathematical Sociology* (1964). The fundamental type of model discussed by Coleman is a continuous time discrete state stochastic process with "contagion" terms, i.e., terms that represent influence effects that emerge in social networks. With this type of model, a system of differential equations is derived and theoretical parameters of the postulated process can be estimated, leading to testable predictions about observable social phenomena (Fararo 1973: ch. 13). In later work, this sort of process analysis was linked to an approach to social theory that drew upon

mathematical ideas about rational action. The use of rational choice models became more common in sociology but also somewhat controversial in that it seemed to depart from the structural emphasis that many sociologists favor (Coleman & Fararo 1992).

This concern for structural analysis dominates another research program with a strong focus on mathematical model building. The structural balance theory discussed above applied best to small interpersonal networks. Could a mathematics of social structures be developed that would apply to complex patterns of relations such as anthropologists had found in describing kinship systems? Sociologist Harrison White answered this question in the affirmative when he initiated a long term research program on the mathematics of social structures that began with his 1963 monograph, *An Anatomy of Kinship*. This book illustrated how modern abstract algebraic ideas could be applied to the analysis of social structures. The immediate background was the analysis of kinship structures by anthropologists. White set out a set of axioms describing a certain type of prescribed marriage system where clans loom large in the structure. His analysis then consisted of a formal study of this class of systems using certain methods of abstract algebra. Subsequently, White embarked on an effort to generalize the algebraic approach by relaxing the axioms of mathematical group theory but preserving some of its methods. Most notably, the idea of homomorphism – a mapping that preserves structure while also simplifying it – was employed to map social relational data into simpler forms called block models. In turn, this work became part of an interdisciplinary social networks paradigm, home to a variety of research programs using both graph theory and algebraic methods coupled with statistical procedures for the analysis of social relational data (Wasserman & Faust 1994).

A third research program in which mathematical models became prominent originated in the collaborative work of three theoretical sociologists at Stanford University, Joseph Berger, Morris Zelditch, Jr., and Bernard P. Cohen. Classical sociological theorists had not made any important connections between theory and mathematics. The new developments that began to create such links called for work that would

elucidate the nature of the efforts. The Stanford program began with the question: How does using mathematics advance theory in the social and behavioral sciences?

Their collaborative monograph, *Types of Formalization in Small Group Research* (1962), formulated a typology of models and selected three examples of model building in the literature to illustrate each type. In their approach, the key idea is that types of models are best understood in terms of the goal of the model builder. One goal is to explicate an important concept in a theory, as in the Cartwright–Harary graph theoretic formalization of the concept of structural balance. A second goal is to represent a recurrent process, as in Coleman’s process model building. A third goal is the formalization of a theory of a broad class of phenomena, illustrated by stimulus sampling theory. This third type was called a “theoretical construct model” because the mathematical theory postulates some underlying entity and processes associated with it that enables the derivation of various empirical findings.

In building their own research program, Berger and his colleagues aimed to develop a theoretical construct model for the domain of interpersonal processes (Berger & Zelditch 2002: ch. 3). The key explanatory processes deal with expectation states of people in social interaction. These states are not directly observable to the sociological analyst or to the interactants but, according to the theory, they account for such phenomena as social influence and the allocation of prestige in social interaction situations. Thus the concept of expectation state and the processes associated with it, when expressed in formal terms, constitute a theoretical construct model. The program associated with this “expectation states theory” is now one among a number of other programs in which mathematical models play a significant role, examples of which may be found in Berger and Zelditch (2002).

INSTITUTIONALIZATION OF MATHEMATICAL SOCIOLOGY

The institutionalization of a field is indicated by the appearance of such entities as textbooks, bibliographic surveys, journals, and graduate

programs. Since 1971, the *Journal of Mathematical Sociology* has been open to papers covering a broad spectrum of topics employing a variety of types of mathematics, especially through frequent special issues. Three specialized publication outlets emerged for contributors to the three families of research programs originated out of the works reviewed above: *Rationality and Society*, *Social Networks*, and *Advances in Group Processes* (an annual publication). In addition, and this is important as an indicator of the penetration of mathematical model building into sociological research, the major comprehensive journals in sociology, especially the *American Journal of Sociology* and the *American Sociological Review*, regularly publish articles featuring mathematical formulations.

Thus, mathematical model building has become a recognized method in sociological theory and research. However, there are norms that are invoked in work with mathematics – such as idealization in constructing models, simplicity of framing assumptions, fertility of deductive consequences – that are often ignored or misunderstood by many sociologists despite efforts to communicate these standards to social scientists (see, for instance, Lave & March 1975). Thus, there is a continuing problem of absorbing the spirit and content of mathematical model building into general sociological theory.

SEE ALSO: Coleman, James; Expectation States Theory; Rational Choice Theory (and Economic Sociology); Theory Construction

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matriarchy

J. I. (Hans) Bakker

The term matriarchy has a commonsense meaning today. It refers to a situation where a female becomes an important figure in a nuclear or extended household. Thus, for example, Rose Kennedy was a matriarch of the Kennedy clan. That current meaning has deep roots. At one time many thinkers believed that women had always been secondary to men. Early ideas concerning what Carl Linnaeus called “*homo sapiens*” (wise man) were biased in favor of “men’s history.” It was not clear to social scientists until the early twentieth century that male and female gender roles are social constructs and that biology is not always destiny. Comparative data on anthropologically indigenous, non industrial societies makes it clear that the division of tasks in the household can be quite varied, with men often doing household tasks. Moreover, many cultures recognize a “third gender” in which biological men are treated in every outward respect as women.

Such micro level phenomena in relatively less technological communities are only one part of the picture. Another aspect of matriarchy is the notion that some societies have been politically dominated by women. This is sometimes called Amazonism, based on the mythical

Greek “reverse gender” accounts of Scythian or independent female warriors. Bachhofen, a Swiss amateur classicist and judge, argued on the basis of the iconography of Roman tombs that the earliest stage of human culture was characterized by general promiscuity. He called his hypothetical stage *hetaerism*. When people became aware of maternity, the core of family life was the link between a mother and her children. Such matriarchy was a progressive evolutionary advance over promiscuity.

The theory of matriarchical civilization, first articulated by Bachhofen in 1861 (1992, 2003), was once very popular and indirectly influenced Morgan, Engels, and others (Bamberger 1974). Most scholars believe that while there is a grain of truth in Bachhofen’s claims, he overgeneralized based on limited data. Some feminist writers took up the theme in the 1970s, which is ironic since Bachhofen also argued that the next evolutionary stage was patriarchy. But a number of semi popular books (e.g., Gimbutas 1991) argue that matriarchy not only preceded patriarchy but was superior to it. With the advent of patriarchy the role of women, it was argued, was devalued. Many feminists still use the term patriarchy to describe male dominance. But the idea of patriarchy succeeding matriarchy is largely discredited. While the matrilineal clans may have preceded the Roman patrilineal *gens* and *curia*, that does not indicate matrilineal curia or a general, societal matriarchical power system in Rome, much less a more universal progression from one to the other.

There are *matrilineal* societies and there have been influential women rulers (e.g., Tang China), but there is no evidence of any civilization having been ruled exclusively by women. The Canadian novelist De Mille (1991 [1888]) wrote about a matriarchical society in the 1870s; but his fictional account is a Hegelian “negation” of nineteenth century values. Gilman’s (1979 [1915]) *Herland* is extremely important as an early feminist statement of utopia. Indeed, the feminist concept of patriarchy hinges on a polarization of male versus female based institutionalized power. It is easier to conceptualize patriarchy if it replaced matriarchy, but it seems likely that that never took place (Sanday 1981). The literature contains studies of conflict between masculine and feminine gender identities in gathering and hunting societies.

Changes in kinship systems evoke rituals difficult to explain without reference to changes from matrilineal to patrilineal descent, as among the Iatmul of New Guinea (Bateson 1958 [1936]). Men from the female lineage (mother’s brothers, *mau*) dress in women’s clothes to signify their allegiance to older patterns of matrilineal descent, reinforcing the rights of the sister’s children (*laua*).

Max Weber (1968 [1920]: 231–6) discusses “primary patriarchy” as an elementary form of traditional “domination” or “legitimate authority” (*Herrschaft*). “Gerontocracy and patriarchy,” he states, “are frequently found side by side.” Obedience is owed to the individual male leader. The extension and expansion of patriarchal authority, according to Weber, leads to patrimonialism (e.g., sultanism). The only mention of patriarchy in Weber’s study of ancient civilizations is a brief reference to Deuteronomy, and Weber does not cite Bachhofen in his study of ancient Judaism.

SEE ALSO: Feminism; Kinship; Lesbianism; Myth; Patriarchy

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matrix of domination

Marjorie L. DeVault

The term matrix of domination is associated with the feminist thought of Patricia Hill Collins, who came to prominence in the academic movement that arose from women's activism in the 1960s and 1970s. Her project locates lived experiences of oppression within the social contexts that produce those experiences. Collins's term refers to the particular configurations of oppression and resistance (along varied lines of socially constructed difference) that shape life in specific communities and historical moments.

Collins indicates that her scholarship grew out of resistance to her experiences as a young African American student and then teacher, when she confronted a racist curriculum and schools that seemed to have no room for young people like her. Drawing from diverse texts produced by black women, she brought forward a body of subjugated knowledge in an influential article, "Learning from the Outsider Within" (1986), and then a book titled *Black Feminist Thought* (1991; revd. 2000). She emphasized the distinctiveness of black feminist thought in relation to undifferentiated feminist and race based analyses, and she became a leader in the academic movement that began to challenge unitary gender or race analyses that did not account for the cross cutting dynamics of these systems of oppression. Collins argued that these structures of inequality intersect, in any specific historical and community context,

in a matrix of domination that produces distinctive experiences of oppression and resistance. That idea has been taken up and extended, by Collins and others, under the rubrics of "intersectionality" (Collins 1998) and "race, class, and gender" (a phrase sometimes used as a shorthand meant to include other dimensions of difference related to sexuality, ability, etc.).

Collins (2000) locates a standpoint associated with the lived experiences and community lives of African American women. She deploys the idea of a matrix of domination as a heuristic device intended to stand for the various practices that constitute the particular pattern of domination and resistance that shapes these lives. Given a particular matrix, exploring the "standpoint" of this subjugated group allows her to sketch out their knowledge: a community based "wisdom" that includes, for example, practices of resistance to dominant body ideals, and of "other mothering" or community care for African American children. While the first edition of the book emphasizes race, class, and gender, Collins's (2000) revision incorporates into her conceptualization of the matrix the dimensions of sexual orientation and nation, drawing from emergent social justice movements and scholarship focused on sexuality, citizenship, and transnationalism (see Collins 2004).

SEE ALSO: Black Feminist Thought; Consciousness Raising; Feminism and Science, Feminist Epistemology; Feminist Methodology; Feminist Standpoint Theory

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Matthew effect

Yuri Jack Gómez Morales

When considering science as a social system, there is a continuous interplay between status and the class system which locates scientists at different positions within the opportunity structure of science. Social standing within science's opportunity structure is, then, a function of positive recognition by one's peers. All other extrinsic rewards, such as monetary income from science connected activities, advancement within the scientific hierarchy, and enhanced access to human and material scientific capital, derive from this basic form of recognition.

In this sharply stratified and elitist social system of science, rewards tend to be concentrated among a few scientists, a few laboratories, and a few institutions. This uneven distribution results from differences in scientists' performance, from the scarcity of rewards, and most importantly, from processes of *cumulative advantage*. Within the social system of science, *cumulative advantage* refers to processes through which various kinds of opportunities for scientific inquiry, as well as the subsequent symbolic and material rewards for the results of that inquiry, tend to accumulate for individual practitioners, as they do for organizations engaged in scientific work.

Putting aside the problem of how to assess equivalence in quality among scientists' contributions, the Matthew effect (so called by reference to St. Matthew's gospel) occurs when scientists receive differential recognition for particular scientific contributions depending on their location in the *stratification* system. Thus, if the accumulation of advantage shapes the distribution of rewards in science and leads to increasing disparities among scientists over the course of their careers, the Matthew effect refers to a special case in which cumulative advantage gets reinforced as a result of a complex pattern of credit misallocation for scientific performance. The social mechanism that leads to this misallocation operates through the accruing of large increments of peer recognition to scientists of considerable repute for their contributions, at the expense of less known scientists of comparable performance. The Matthew effect therefore

enlarges differences in reputation and rewards over and above those merely attributable to differences in quality of scientific performance and to processes of *accumulation of advantage*. Because the social mechanism at work is based on personal attributes of individuals rather than on assessment of their role performance, the Matthew effect introduces its own variety of *particularism* into the social system of science.

A functional analysis of the consequences of the Matthew effect, both for individuals and the social system, suggests that, as it involves misallocation of credit, it may become dysfunctional for the careers of some individuals who are penalized in the early stages of their development. In fact, deprived scientists see the Matthew effect in terms of a basic inequity in the reward system that affects their individual careers. On the other hand, this same misallocation is functional for science since evaluation and utilization of papers depend to an extent upon an author's reputation: discoveries made by eminent scientists or having eminent scientists as co authors are more likely to be quickly incorporated into the body of scientific knowledge. Thus, the Matthew effect may heighten the visibility of new contributions, speed their diffusion, and increase the probability of recognition for it. Indeed, having learned the value of attending to the work of certain investigators in the past, and faced with a literature of unmanageable proportions, scientists tend to notice the work of well known scientists, take it more seriously, and ultimately use it more intensively. Thus, contributions made by scientists of considerable standing are the most likely to enter promptly and widely into the communication networks of science accelerating its development. Looking at the Matthew effect from this perspective, it stands for the influence of all aspects of stratification on the reception of scientific ideas.

Empirical investigations on the Matthew effect – in which citations are taken as measurement of scientific quality – suggest that the Matthew effect has a greater influence on the extent of diffusion of a scientist's complete work than on any particular paper. Good papers have a high probability of being recognized regardless of who their authors are; but lesser papers written by high ranking scientists are more likely to be widely diffused earlier than lesser papers by

low ranking authors. The Matthew effect also serves to focus attention on the work of little known scientists who, by collaborating with high reputation scientists, might increase visibility for early contributions as he or she goes on to greater fame (Cole 1970).

Being an outcome of peer reviewing and communication processes in science, the effect was initially elaborated by looking at it in documented historical cases of multiple discovery and co authorship. Merton considered that if two scientists independently make the same discovery, the considerably more eminent one will get the greater or perhaps all the credit. Likewise, if scientists of greatly differing status collaborate, the one who is most eminent will get the lion's share of the credit for the joint effort. Further empirical and theoretical investigations have advanced Merton's originally sociohistorical formulation of the Matthew effect from generalization of the effect over the entire range of scientific productivity (Cole 1970) to its deduction – on individualistic rather than functional premises – as a generalized principle at work in society at large (Goldstone 1979), from studies on the operation of the effect applied to gender differences (Rossiter 1993) to its application to the structure of the formal communication system of science (Bonitz & Scharnhorst 2001).

SEE ALSO: Intellectual Property; Peer Review and Quality Control in Science; Science/Non Science and Boundary Work; Scientific Knowledge, Sociology of

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Mead, George Herbert (1863–1931)

Lonnie Athens

Despite being a philosopher, George H. Mead became a titan in sociology. He was reared in a white, Protestant, middle class family. Although not from a wealthy family, he did come from a culturally privileged background. His mother taught at prestigious New England preparatory schools and at Oberlin College. While later serving as president of Mount Holyoke, she oversaw its transition from a women's seminary to a general college. His father, a former pastor, held a special chair in Oberlin College's theological seminary for more than a decade. After graduating from Oberlin College in 1883 with an AB degree, Mead worked as a secondary school teacher, tutor, and surveyor. Unable to find satisfying work, Mead enrolled in 1887 at Harvard University, where he was most influenced by the romantic idealist Josiah Royce. After earning his MA in philosophy at Harvard in 1888, he went to Germany to obtain his PhD – enrolling first at the University of Leipzig and later at the University of Berlin. Although Mead never finished his doctorate, he did study with several famous German scholars: Wundt, Ebbinghaus, and Dilthey.

While still in Germany, Mead applied for a job at the University of Michigan. In 1891 he became an instructor in the philosophy department, where John Dewey was the chairperson. The two quickly became friends. When Dewey was appointed chairman of the University of Chicago's philosophy department in 1894, he insisted that Mead accompany him as an assistant professor. Dewey was without doubt the person who exercised the greatest influence on Mead's intellectual development. Although Dewey later left the University of Chicago for

Columbia University, Mead stayed at Chicago, where he remained the rest of his academic life (Cook 1993: 1–38; Joas 1985: 15–20).

On the one hand, Mead is not generally considered to be one of America's major twentieth century philosophers. His importance in philosophy is primarily limited to his contribution to the American philosophical school known as pragmatism. Most philosophers rate his contribution to the development of pragmatism as not only less than that of Dewey's, but also less than that of James and Pierce. Thus, Mead is considered to be a secondary rather than primary figure in this school. On the other hand, sociologists have come to appreciate his ideas far more than philosophers have. Today, he is recognized not only as one of the most important early sociological figures in America, but also in the entire world. In fact, most sociologists now place Mead on the same pedestal as Weber, Durkheim, and Marx.

Although all of Mead's major works were published before the outbreak of World War II, he did not enter the pantheon of classic figures in sociology until the last decade or two. Contrary to popular opinion, Mead achieved a significant record of publication. Despite publishing a hundred or so articles in academic journals, however, he never completed a single book. Whether considered individually or together, his journal articles do not provide a coherent statement of his mature philosophical thought. Although there are numerous books on which his name appears as the author, he never published any of them. In some cases, latter day scholars (Mead 1964, 1968, 2001) have merely strung together a series of his previously published or unpublished articles to produce a book. In other cases, former students have created books (Mead 1936, 1938, 1982) from notes taken in various courses that he taught at Chicago. In the case of the only book that Mead actually intended for publication, *Philosophy of the Present* (1932), he died before finishing it. Arthur Murray, a colleague, completed the book for Mead by adding two previously published articles by Mead to his completed rough drafts of only three chapters, together with four previously unpublished manuscripts.

It is difficult to gauge how not finishing this book impacted Mead's intellectual legacy. If Mead had lived long enough to complete his

apparent magnum opus, then he might have entered the pantheon of classic sociological figures much sooner, as well as significantly raised his standing in the school of pragmatism. Conversely, his failure to provide a well rounded, systematic statement of his mature ideas does have some unrecognized benefits. It has not only created a permanent aura of mystery about the precise form or shape that his finished thought might have taken, but has also wrapped his completed work with a protective coating. Potential critics can never be sure whether what Mead said in his completed work was "right" but misunderstood, or whether what he said was wrong and they understood him "correctly."

Mead analyzes three ideas of significance to sociologists: (1) the social act, (2) the self, and (3) society. The starting point for understanding Mead's mature sociological views is not the self, as many sociologists have mistakenly thought, but the social act. Without engaging in social acts, people could never have developed selves, and without selves, societies as we know them could have never arisen. Thus, to be consistent with Mead's thinking, his most famous book, *Mind Self & Society* (1934), which was published posthumously, could have been more accurately titled *The Social Act, Self, and Society*.

Mead defines a social act as any activity that requires at least one other person to complete. According to him, social acts comprise five basic components: (1) roles, (2) attitudes, (3) significant speech, (4) attitudinal assumption, and (5) social objects. For Mead, roles are the basic building blocks from which all social acts are assembled. More specifically, they are the individual acts that each participant must carry out to ensure a social act's completion. Roles operate hand in hand with attitudes. Mead defines attitudes as the preparation or readiness to perform our specific roles within a larger unfolding social act. Because attitudes originate from vague bodily impulses, they unite our corporal and social existences. Mead uses his term "significant speech" as a synonym for language. It refers to our use of vocal or written gestures that have a similar meaning to us as they have to the other participants in a social act. For Mead, attitudinal assumption, which significant speech makes possible, refers to our assuming the attitudes of others so that we can anticipate the

roles that they will perform in the social acts in which we are participants. Finally, according to Mead, a “social object” is the common attitude that participants assume toward the construction of a prospective social act. Thus, when participants form a social object of a social act, they simultaneously form what Mead called a “common plan of action” for its subsequent execution.

Mead speaks of the self, which for him inserts itself inside the social act, in two alternative ways. The most poetic way in which he speaks of it is as a conversation between an “I” and “me.” The “I” represents the impulse that excites our attitudes or preparation to perform our roles in a social act, as well as the later expression of that attitude in the actual performance of our role. Conversely, the “me” represents the attitudes of the other participants or society at large that we assume during the performance of our particular role in a social act. The “me” affects the expression of our “I” and thereby how we perform our roles in a social act, but not always in the same way. It can outright endorse, veto, or make major or minor alterations in our “I’s” expression. On rare occasions, the “I” can simply ignore the “me” altogether.

Mead also speaks of the self more mundanely as an attitudinal assumption process. People assume each other’s attitudes by telling each other what they plan to do and how and when they plan to do it. To have a self, he argues, we must not only assume the attitudes of the other participants in a social act. Our assumption of their attitudes must also affect our attitude and, thereby, how we actually perform our role in the social act. Whether viewed as a conversation between “I” and “me,” or as an “attitudinal assumption” process, Mead views the key ingredient of the self as “reflexivity” – the ability to adjust your attitude toward the performance of your role in a social act on the basis of your assumption of the other participants’ attitudes toward the performance of their roles in it. Thus, for Mead, reflexivity and, in turn, selfhood, require more than our merely being conscious or aware of others’ attitudes; it also requires that this awareness change, however slightly, our attitudes toward our roles and, thereby, the subsequent performance of them in a social act.

According to Mead, the self not only inserts itself into the social act but also, by its insertion,

it makes society possible. Mead sees society as a community organized on the basis of institutions. Mead views an institution as only a special form of social action. Institutionalized social acts are launched to satisfy recurrent socio-physiological impulses, such as communication, sex, parenting, bartering, benevolence, and mentoring. The recurrent impulses that launch institutional social acts stir in us attitudes to perform complementary roles in these acts, such as speaker and hearer, mother and father, seller and buyer, minister and congregation member, and mentor and protégé.

Mead believed that during institutionalized social acts we always draw on common maxims to help us form a common social object of the unfolding social act and, in turn, construct a congruent plan of action for carrying out our particular roles in it. However, we cannot draw on common maxims to help us construct a congruent plan of action for carrying out an institutionalized social act without assuming the attitude of our society. Before we can assume the attitude of society, however, we must have selves. Institutionalized social acts are necessarily repetitive. Although our successful execution of a plan of action for the completion of an institutional social act satisfies the socio-physiological impulse that launched it, we will later need to satisfy this same impulse over and over again in future institutional social acts. Finally, for Mead, our social institutions are not immutable. Once made, they can be reinvented through individual ingenuity. The “I” can sometimes jump over the “me.” We can invent new maxims to form novel social objects of our social acts and new congruent plans of action for their execution.

Without institutions, Mead believes that we would be still living in a disorganized mass. According to him, our institutions did not emerge simultaneously. Instead, they evolved at different times in society, depending on the level of “social participation” that they generated among the members of a community. By level of social participation, Mead only meant the width of the cross section of the community members who regularly engage in the social action. According to him, the institutions with the widest social participation evolved the earliest and those with the narrowest social participation evolved the latest in society.

Mead (1936, 1964) identified only six basic societal institutions, which he believed evolved in the following order: (1) language, (2) family, (3) economy, (4) religion, (5) polity, and (6) science. Although Mead believes that all six of these institutions are of great importance not only to the development of human society, but also for its ongoing operation, he believes that language is the single most important one. According to him, language makes possible what he calls “human sociality” which, in turn, greases the wheels for the creation and subsequent operation of all the other institutions in society (Athens 2005).

For Mead, sociality is not limited to human societies or even the organic world, but operates throughout the universe. In the special case of human societies, it refers to the principle whereby different human beings who are participating together in some joint activity mutually adjust their separate activities to each other to complete the larger enterprise to which they are all contributing. In Mead’s opinion, what distinguishes human sociality is the distinctive way that it operates. By consciously assuming each other’s attitudes, human beings mutually affect the performances of each other’s roles and the larger social acts in which these roles play parts. They can consciously assume each other’s attitudes by informing each other what they plan to do, and when and how they plan to do it. Thus, because language makes it possible for human beings to engage consciously in the process of attitudinal assumption, it lies at the very root of human sociality.

Mead became more famous after his death than during his life. Since his death more than a half century ago, the interest shown in his work has not waned, but steadily increased. In fact, today the promotion and development of his ideas have created a veritable cottage industry. Both sociologists and philosophers are publishing more and more articles and books about how he developed his ideas, what their implications and meanings are, and how they deviate from and conform to the ideas of other intellectual giants. In an attempt to move beyond merely explaining or comparing Mead’s ideas against the ideas of others, scholars are now embarking on their constructive criticism and improvement (Athens 1994). Shortly before Mead died, Columbia University invited him to join their faculty and offered double the

salary he was earning at Chicago (Cook 1993: 191; Wallace 1967: 408). If his death had not prevented him from going to Columbia, then he would undoubtedly have not only had the opportunity to finish *Philosophy of the Present*, but also to finish it while interacting face to face again with Dewey. Since their early days together at Michigan, Dewey remained Mead’s most important sounding board. Thus, as far as the development of Mead’s mature thought is concerned, his death could not have come at a worse possible time.

SEE ALSO: Blumer, Herbert George; Dewey, John; Game Stage; Generalized Other; Language; Play Stage; Pragmatism; Self; Symbolic Interaction

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Mead, Margaret (1901–78)

Joyce E. Williams

Margaret Mead was one of a very few academics to become known to the general public. Her discipline was anthropology but her contributions to knowledge were as critical to sociology and to psychology as to her own discipline. She pioneered fieldwork on women and children in various cultures; advanced ethnographic techniques; applied the social sciences to understanding everyday events and problems; and increased public awareness of culture as learned patterns of thought and behavior. Mead was ahead of her time as an anthropologist and as a woman when in 1925, at the age of 23, she went alone on her first field trip to study adolescents in Samoa.

Mead was born December 16, 1901 in Philadelphia, the first baby born at West Park Hospital and the first of four children born to parents Emily Fogg Mead and Edward Sherwood Mead. Thus began a life of firsts for America's best known anthropologist. She was born into an academic family. Her father was a university professor of business and economics but with interest in the applied aspects of the business world, including coal mining. At the time of Margaret's birth, her mother was working on her doctorate. Although her father spent most of his professional life at the University of Pennsylvania, the family moved frequently. Some of the moves were regular and seasonal while another allowed her mother to do research for her doctorate. Mead once proclaimed that "few things are needed to make a home." The many moves of her childhood are recorded, along with the significance of home, in her autobiography, *Blackberry Winter* (1972). The title is reminiscent of childhood seasons spent on a five acre "farm" in Hammonton, New Jersey. At the American Museum of Natural History in New York City, Mead identified her attic room, which grew in size and contents over the years, as "home" for all of her professional life. From 1928 until her death, she occupied the same space as Assistant Curator, Curator, and Curator Emeritus. It was the home to which she

returned from numerous field trips, visiting professorships, and lecture junkets and became the repository of artifacts and mementos collected from far flung corners of the globe. Only after Mead died at age 77 was the space cleared and the Mead collection removed to the Library of Congress.

Mead began her college work at her father's school, DePauw University, in Indiana. After one year she transferred to Barnard, where she majored in psychology but was introduced to anthropology in a class taught by Franz Boas. While she never lost her interest in psychology, and took her master's degree in that area, her doctorate was in anthropology, the field that became her life's work. Both of her graduate degrees were taken at Columbia. Although known as a university professor and educator as well as a researcher, Mead never held a full time academic appointment. She taught as a visiting professor at New York University, the New School for Social Research, Emory University, and Vassar, among other schools. However, her most enduring academic affiliation was with Columbia University where she taught for more than 20 years as an adjunct professor. The primary benefit of this arrangement was that she was provided with graduate research assistants and freedom for long periods of time away from her faculty post. Mead was the second woman president of the American Anthropological Association (her mentor and friend Ruth Benedict was the first) and the first female anthropologist to become president of the American Association for the Advancement of Science. She was awarded the Presidential Medal of Freedom posthumously in 1979 by President Jimmy Carter. Mead's writings include 39 books, some of them co authored, and more than a thousand articles and other writings spanning more than half a century (Howard 1984).

Any acknowledgment of contributions to the scientific and popular understanding of sex roles and male–female differences must include the work of Margaret Mead. Mead pioneered the ethnography of women and children. Prior to her fieldwork, most ethnographies were conducted by men and tended to focus on male roles. Not only did Mead focus on women and children in her studies of seven different South Sea Island groups, but she and husband Gregory Bateson also pioneered the use of still

photography in ethnography. The end result was a recording of the everyday lives of the people studied, not only in words but also in the pictures brought back from the field. No doubt because of her early interest and training, Mead made anthropology more psychological. Throughout her life she maintained an interest in psychology and in psychoanalysis and often, to the chagrin of friends, suggested that they might be helped by psychoanalysis, although she herself never entered analysis (Howard 1984).

Mead did not identify herself as a feminist or feminist anthropologist, and even at times put down feminists – or more specifically, feminist rhetoric. She nevertheless made an indelible contribution to contemporary feminist thought. Although cross cultural study and the preeminence of culture over biology are taken for granted in the study of gender roles today, this was not the case when Mead began her work. She documented female and male differences in diverse cultures, leaving little doubt that most of the differences attributed to sex in the United States were, in fact, culturally determined and learned through socialization rather than inherited with the male or female anatomy. Such knowledge contributed to moving women from the mentality of “I want to, but I’m a woman” to “I can do whatever I work at.” Mead disliked the feminist critique of patriarchal society because she saw it as portraying women as the oppressed. Mead could not identify with the victim role even though the fact that she was a woman had initially made it difficult for her to do what she wanted. Teacher mentor Edward Sapir objected to her field trip to Samoa based on her being a woman, and a very young one at that. Obviously, Mead did not allow Sapir’s ideas to deter her and this experience may have increased her determination to succeed in her first field trip.

Throughout her life, Mead held to something of an old fashioned idea of what it meant to be a “lady,” when to wear gloves, for example. Some of her beliefs were inconsistent with those of the more radical behaviors and rhetoric of the second wave feminists. She publicly disagreed with Betty Friedan’s *The Feminine Mystique* (1963); she thought Friedan was assuming a victim role. Friedan included Mead in a chapter title and labeled Mead’s *Male and*

Female (1949) as the “cornerstone of the feminine mystique.” Even though Mead and Friedan were opponents, some would even say “public enemies,” at Mead’s death, Friedan attended her New York memorial service, explaining that she just felt a need to pay her respects (Howard 1984). Mead’s life and work reflect contradictory views on feminism and women’s equality. For example, she made the decision to retain her own name when she married for the first time in 1923, but once turned down a university presidency because “women make poor administrators.” Yet in a 1975 conference she admonished women to stop pretending that they would live in a benevolent home where their husbands would never leave (Howard 1984).

Mead’s work must be understood in historical context. In the early part of the twentieth century, the nature versus nurture argument was one of the major intellectual and philosophical issues of the day. Professor and mentor Franz Boas no doubt influenced Mead’s work in his early rejection of the then dominant theory of racial superiority. Reconceptualized as heredity versus culture or learning, the argument was at the center in two of Mead’s earliest and best known works, *Coming of Age in Samoa* (1928) and *Growing Up in New Guinea* (1931). In the latter work she confronted the issue head on by posing the question in her Introduction: “How much of a child’s equipment does it bring with it at birth?” While acknowledging that biological characteristics make all learning possible, Mead nevertheless concluded that human nature is malleable and responds to varying cultural conditions, including learning to be “male” or “female.” Mead did recognize that restriction of either sex in exercising their abilities could leave them and the world the poorer, but argued that some restrictions are necessary to preserve a way of life. For example, in *Male and Female*, she questioned the value of bringing women into male defined fields if it results in intimidating the men, “unsexes the women,” and distorts the contributions each could otherwise make in their respective roles. As she saw it, the “cure” could be worse than the “disease.”

Mead introduced the public to culture as more than the popular notion of music, art, and literature. She made it known that culture is all learned behavior, that it is patterned, and passed on from generation to generation

through teaching and imitation but not by her edity. People in different places and at different times do things differently, including behaving as male or female. “We are our culture,” she often said. During World War II, Mead popularized a concept borrowed from Ruth Benedict, of “national character,” which she treated as the expression of American institutions and attitudes embodied to some degree in every American. Her book *And Keep Your Powder Dry* (1942) was published as a contribution to the war effort. She argued that the strengths and weaknesses of the American character were the psychological equipment with which the war could be won. Her work during World War II was indicative of her belief that science, anthropology specifically, should be useful. She spent time during the war in England and in Washington, DC, where she served as adviser to various governmental agencies and worked as a member of several wartime committees, most notably the Committee on Food and Nutrition and the Committee for National Morale.

Mead, unlike most intellectuals or academics, wrote for the public more often than for her colleagues. Mary Bateson (1984) described her mother’s writings as always taking into account what would be helpful for people to know. Her field studies as well as other works were consistently cross cultural; she compared unfamiliar customs with those of the everyday in the United States. It was unusual that an academic work such as *Coming of Age in Samoa* would become a bestseller, to be reissued in paperback, in several new editions and in several languages. Perhaps because of its popularity, Mead’s Samoan work was questioned and challenged by other anthropologists for years to come.

Prior to World War II, Mead’s career was defined by ethnographic fieldwork with seven different South Sea Island groups: the Samoans, the Manus of the Admiralty Islands, the Arapesh and the Tchambuli groups of New Guinea, the Mundugumor of the Yuat River, the Iatmul of the Great Sepik River, and the Balinese Islanders. During and after World War II, Mead became better known for her work on behalf of the war and her writings on domestic issues. These later works reflect both her interests in anthropology and in problems related to the family, communication, race, and the generation gap. Early in her career, Mead made a practice

of educating the public about what anthropology is and what anthropologists do. *Sex and Temperament* (1935), for example, contains a chapter explaining in very accessible language and illustrations what anthropologists do and how they do it. At the end of a Mead work, readers were never left with the “so what?” syndrome. From her fieldwork, she always drew comparisons and “lessons” for her American readers.

While Mead was often controversial, she was always interesting. In her last years, she became an elderly statesperson or, as Howard (1984) described her, a “citizen philosopher” more than an anthropologist. She enjoyed public recognition and worked to make herself instantly recognizable. Because of a weak ankle, at age 60 Mead began using a hand carved forked thumb stick which most people assumed to be the product of one of her field expeditions but which was, in fact, purchased from an umbrella shop in New York. She carried such a stick, which she called her pastoral rod, for the remainder of her life. She also took to wearing a long, flowing cape which she had made in several different colors, one being bright red. With her image, reputation, and identity buoyed by a monthly column in *Redbook* and by her frequent appearances on Johnny Carson’s *Tonight* show, Mead became a kind of wise mother figure who never hesitated to express opinions or to dispense advice. In 1969, *Time* magazine named her “Mother of the World.” Nor was Mead’s public reputation lessened by the fact that she loved the acclaim and recognition. She is quoted by Howard (1984) as having made frequent statements in her youth that she would be famous – and indeed she was.

SEE ALSO: Bateson, Gregory; Culture, Gender and; Ethnography; Femininities/Masculinities; Feminism, First, Second, and Third Waves; Gender Ideology and Gender Role Ideology; Gender Oppression; Role; Sex and Gender; Socialization; Socialization, Gender

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measures of centrality

Ernest T. Goetz

Measures of centrality (or central tendency) are statistical indices of the “typical” or “average” score. They constitute one of three key characteristics of a set of scores: *center*, *shape*, and *spread*. Three measures of centrality are used in social science: mode, median, and mean.

The simplest measure of centrality is the *mode*, or most frequently occurring score. Since the mode is identified simply by counting the number of occurrences of each score, it can be found even for the categorical data of nominal scales, the lowest level of measurement. Nominal measurement sorts things into different types or categories, such as Republican, Democrat, or Libertarian. If more voters were registered as Republicans than any other party, then Republican would be the modal value for party membership. Note that Republicans need not represent a majority of voters in order to be the mode.

The *median* is the score that occurs in the middle of the set of scores when they are ranked from smallest to largest. It is the score at the fiftieth percentile, for which half of the scores are smaller and half larger. If half of the households in a community had incomes of less than \$30,000, then that would constitute the median household income. Identification of the median requires at least ordinal data (i.e., data that can be ranked).

The most statistically sophisticated measure of centrality is the *mean*: the sum of the scores divided by the number of scores. Calculation of a mean is appropriate only for interval or ratio scales, which differ in whether they have an absolute zero (e.g., Fahrenheit or Celsius versus Kelvin temperatures, respectively). The mean is used to determine measures of variability such as the variance and standard deviation, and with them constitutes one of the key ingredients of all parametric statistics (e.g., analysis of variance (ANOVA), correlation, general linear modeling, hierarchical linear modeling, regression and regression analysis, structural equation modeling).

For interval and ratio data, the shape of the distribution of scores influences relationships among the three measures of centrality. For some distributions, such as the bell curve (i.e., normal distribution), the mean, median, and mode all have the same value. However, for skewed distributions, their values differ. For example, in positively skewed distributions, where the scores pile up at the lower end of the scale and tail off to the upper end, the mean will be largest, followed by the median and mode, respectively. In negatively skewed distributions, the order is reversed. Thus, for example, if most household incomes in a community were under \$30,000 but a few were \$100,000 or higher, the mean income would be highest, and the mode would be lowest.

Outliers, or scores that fall well outside the range of the rest of the distribution, also differentially affect measures of centrality. Since the mean is the only measure of centrality that reflects the exact value of every score, it is the only one affected by outliers. For example, it would not affect the modal or median income in a community if the highest income were \$300,000 or \$300,000,000, but it would affect the mean. The impact of outliers is greatest

when the number of scores in the distribution (e.g., households in the community) is small.

Thus, despite its utility in inferential statistics, the mean can be a misleading indicator of central tendency. For this reason, the median typically is used to depict the “average” of scores in skewed distributions such as personal income and cost of houses in descriptive statistics. In addition, outliers sometimes are excluded to avoid distortion of the mean. When this is done, the researcher should report that fact, providing information about the number of outliers discarded and the reasons and rules for exclusion.

SEE ALSO: ANOVA (Analysis of Variance); Bell Curve; Descriptive Statistics; General Linear Model; Hierarchical Linear Model; Outliers; Regression and Regression Analysis; Statistical Significance Testing; Statistics; Structural Equation Modeling; Variance

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measuring crime

Roland Chilton

All crime measures begin as attempts to count either incidents considered criminal or the people involved in such incidents. These basic counts may be combined, summarized, or modified in complex ways, but they are at the heart of all attempts to measure crime. Such counts can be generated by police departments or other public agencies or they can be created by anyone willing to design and use a questionnaire or interview schedule. Police measures include counts of offenses coming to their attention and counts of offenders based either

on statements of victims and witnesses or direct police observation. Some police measures are counts of arrests or counts of the types of persons arrested. Other official agency measures are counts of prosecutions, convictions, persons in prison, or those under some kind of supervision imposed as a result of conviction for criminal conduct.

The numbers produced by these efforts are usually converted to crime rates because there has been a persistent interest in comparing the levels or amounts of crime occurring in specific places and in trends in crime over time. Since the size of the population limits the number of possible offenders and victims, comparing crime counts for places having very small populations with those for places having very large populations will result in misleading and inaccurate conclusions. Crime rates are usually computed by dividing a crime count by a specific population estimate. The police based robbery offense rate for Chicago for 2003, for example, is the number of robberies coming to the attention of the Chicago police during 2003 divided by an estimate of Chicago's 2003 population. This fraction is usually multiplied by 100,000 and rounded to create the number of robberies per 100,000 residents (US Federal Bureau of Investigation 2004).

The major change in attempts to measure crime over the last 60 years was the development of survey approaches to produce victim counts and the use of a slightly different and less uniform set of surveys to produce offender counts for “self report” measures of crime. These “self report” surveys have been both national and local in scope. In such surveys, whether local or national, respondents are asked to report their own criminal activities over specified periods of time. They are usually asked if they have ever engaged in specific kinds of criminal or delinquent activity and sometimes how frequently they have done so.

This “self report” approach was developed in the late 1940s and the early 1950s by social researchers dissatisfied with the limitations of police reports as crime measures (Nye et al. 1958). These efforts were initiated in part to measure the amount of crime that might not be reported to the police and to get more information on the backgrounds of offenders. Early self reported crime studies usually asked

questions of young people in school settings. They were often local in focus and their designers made no attempt to select national samples of respondents. This changed in the 1960s and 1970s and many criminologists now routinely rely on data from national samples. Some individuals in these national samples are questioned annually for several years (Elliott et al. 1985). In 1966, the President's Commission on Law Enforcement and Administration of Justice used a different procedure to assess the amount of crime that does not come to police attention. They asked a group of researchers to conduct a national victim survey. In contrast to the attempts to count all of the offenses reported to the police or public health agencies, this approach creates estimates of the number of victims of crime by asking carefully selected sets of ordinary people if they have been victims of a small set of crimes that closely parallel the list used in the Uniform Crime Reports program. The results of the initial survey were so interesting that the Commission recommended an annual victim survey. By 1973, the National Criminal Justice Information and Statistics Service (NCJISS), later to become the Bureau of Justice Statistics (BJS), created the National Crime Survey.

This approach, now called the National Crime Victimization Survey (NCVS), differs from the "self report" surveys in its focus on victims rather than offenders. It was the most widely cited source of victim reports as measures of crime in the US for the last quarter of the twentieth century. Each year BJS has the Bureau of the Census carry out telephone interviews with adults in 40,000 randomly selected US households. Participants are asked a set of screening questions to see if they might have been victims of rape, robbery, assault, burglary, larceny, or vehicle theft. If the screening questions point to victimization, the participants are asked for more details. The counts made in this way are then "expanded" to estimate the number of offenses that occurred in the United States in the year under study. These surveys have had a consistent national focus and only provided victimization estimates for specific cities early in the program's history (NCJISS 1975; US Department of Justice and BJS 2003).

Historically, the earliest attempts to measure crime in the United States were efforts carried

out by individual states to count and report prosecutions and convictions in criminal courts. But a groundbreaking measure of crime was created in 1929 when the International Association of Chiefs of Police (IACP) and the US Bureau of Investigation started the Uniform Crime Reports (UCR) program. Its founders developed a set of uniform descriptions of a small set of crimes – murder, rape, assault, robbery, burglary, and vehicle theft – and asked local police departments to submit counts of these offenses to the national program (IACP 1929).

In the early stages of its development, the UCR program used records of arrest and prosecution in the FBI's fingerprint file to produce arrest counts. The fingerprint file was compiled using information and fingerprints sent by local police agencies with requests for identification and the arrest history of the person whose prints were sent. This approach to arrest counts was later abandoned and police agencies were asked to submit separate summary reports of arrests and to indicate the age, race, and sex of persons arrested. During the 1930s and 1940s, UCR counts and rates were virtually the only national measures of crime in the United States. At the time, there were efforts to collect information from juvenile courts on the number of court referrals and the National Prisoner statistics program reported the number of prisoners received and released each year. But these specialized reporting programs made no effort to measure crime in the United States.

The three basic efforts to measure crime – police reports, self reports, and victim reports – can be classified as attempts to estimate the extent of offending or the extent of victimization. Each of these approaches has specific strengths and weaknesses; each presents a different image of criminal activity and those involved in it. The basic strengths of police reports are their national scope and their provision of both national and local assessments of crime rates and crime trends. Another strength of police reports is the fact that they now provide information on far more than six types of crime. This has always been true for arrest counts but, in the new UCR program discussed below, it is also true for offense counts. The primary weakness of police reports is the fact that many crimes are never reported to the

police and never come to police attention. In addition, since the UCR program is voluntary, some agencies do not provide reports and police departments have sometimes doctored the numbers reported in response to a variety of local pressures (President's Commission 1967: 26).

The great strength of victimization surveys is their lack of reliance on the police as sources of information. By going directly to a subset of ordinary citizens, they collect reports of crimes that may never have been reported to the police. In addition, the survey approach permits the collection of more information on the characteristics of victims and their households. In general, the NCVS is the only program that asks those victimized about their family income. The most important weakness of the NCVS is that it provides no local measures of crime, only a national estimate. Moreover, because some forms of crime are rare, the set of people surveyed must be large. This makes the NCVS expensive and limits the number of crimes that can be used in the survey. Finally, the basic focus of the survey on victims precludes the collection of any information on non predatory or victimless crimes such as drug use.

Self report studies, in contrast with victim surveys, are able to ask about victimless offenses. But their great strength is their ability to collect more detailed information about offenders than police reports or victim reports. Like victim surveys, self report approaches do not rely on the police as a source of information. But the fact that the questions are asked anonymously limits the confidence we can have in the information collected. Most importantly, even though there have been several large scale national surveys, there has always been a lack of uniformity in content and approach. Different questions are asked about different offenses and responses are classified and counted in different ways. There is no national uniform self report program.

Although the Uniform Crime Reports and the National Crime Victimization Survey are very different in approach and have sometimes produced conflicting results, the two methods continue to provide widely accepted information on levels of offending and levels of victimization. All three approaches, police reports, self reports, and victim reports, continue to provide some information about trends in crime and

responses to it. And all three provide information used to make assertions about the characteristics of offenders. With the development of the new UCR NIBRS program, discussed below, victim information is now available in two of the three basic approaches. Only the self report surveys generally ignore victims.

Looking ahead, it appears that existing crime measures will be improved by a rapidly changing computer technology. Currently, the UCR program is being transformed from a summary statistics program to an incident based program. The summary reporting approach requires local police agencies to classify and code all offenses and then to put summary counts on special forms designed by the FBI's UCR Section. The new approach, now called the National Incident Based Reporting System (NIBRS), eliminates the need for local agencies to classify and summarize crimes coming to their attention every month. Instead, specially designed software collects information being keyed into computers as police officers report on the incidents to which they have been assigned. The primary purpose of the computer generated reports is administrative. They create permanent records and help in the operation of the department. However, the NIBRS components of the computer programs collect and organize the incident information in a uniform format that is ready for transmission to a state UCR program, from where they are sent to the national UCR program. In some cases the information may be sent to the national UCR program directly (US Federal Bureau of Investigation 1992).

In 2003, the conversion to incident based reporting was only partially complete. Police agencies representing about 20 percent of the US population were sending crime information in NIBRS format to the FBI. However, the percentage of the population represented by NIBRS agencies has increased every year since 1995. Unless there is a major policy change, this percentage will continue to increase until the UCR program has been completely converted from a summary statistics program to an incident based program. When NIBRS information is processed it provides incident counts, offense counts, victim counts, offender counts, arrest counts, and information on the property involved in property crimes. The system permits police agencies to report multiple offenses,

multiple victims, and multiple offenders in each incident. Since annual NIBRS data files are archived at the University of Michigan's Inter University Consortium for Political and Social Research (ICPSR), there will be widespread use of the counts and this use will probably encourage improvements in the ways the UCR program presents the information to the public.

Another development that will probably have great impact on attempts to measure crime is primarily an extension of the NIBRS program. It requires the inclusion of street addresses in the NIBRS records, so the NIBRS records can be used to create computerized maps showing the local geographical distribution of specific offenses, offenders, and victims. This convergence of an improved crime measure with computerized mapping technology will not produce a new crime measure, but it will provide an informative and useful way to organize and view the information.

However, other computer technology may provide an improved crime measure through the statistical use of computerized criminal history (CCH) files. None of the approaches described above links a current criminal charge brought against an individual to that person's prior arrests and prosecutions. However, increased use of automatic fingerprint techniques and automated records of arrests and prosecution will make it possible to examine patterns of prior contact with the system of justice. Such a program could provide measures of the type and frequency of earlier charges brought against suspects at different points in their lives. It would provide indications of the existence or absence of patterns of involvement in specific types of crime. It would indicate the extent to which offenders specialize or engage in a variety of types of crime. It would permit extensive indications of the extent to which individuals persist or desist in criminal activities over the life course. Privacy concerns might impede the development of such a program. But concealing the identity of those in the file should not be an insurmountable problem. The Bureau of the Census creates public use files without providing identifying information and the incident numbers of archived NIBRS incidents are replaced with random characters in a way that retains the incident number as a unique

identifier without providing a link to any specific incident.

Nevertheless, experience with programs designed to measure crime in the past suggests that all of these new approaches to measuring crime may encounter resistance for a variety of reasons. One common objection to new crime measures is created by uncertainty about the impact of the new measure on local crime rates. This kind of uncertainty may be slowing the conversion of some traditional UCR programs to NIBRS. Although thousands of police departments in small and medium sized cities have abandoned the summary statistics approach to crime reporting in favor of the new incident based approach, many large city departments have resisted the conversion. This may reflect a concern by many large city mayors that conversion to NIBRS will create an appearance of rising crime rates. If the history of the UCR program is an indication of how long it takes to develop dependable crime measures, existing measures will continue to be used well into the twenty first century.

SEE ALSO: Crime; Criminology: Research Methods; Index Crime

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media

Lyn Gorman

Discussions of media in a social context are generally concerned with mass media and, more recently, new media. Mass media are defined as communication systems by which centralized providers use industrialized technologies to reach large and geographically scattered audiences, distributing content broadly classified as information and entertainment. Media reaching mass populations emerged in the late nineteenth century – newspapers, magazines, the film industry – and expanded to include radio from the 1920s and television broadcasting from the 1950s. A range of “new media” developed from the 1980s, including video, cable and pay TV, CD ROMs, mobile/cellular phones, and the Internet. In twenty first century societies media are pervasive and integral to modern life. Even in less developed societies they are widespread, although disparities in access remain. Economic profitability is also seen as a defining feature of modern media, reflecting the importance of commercial considerations to media institutions.

DEVELOPMENT OF MASS MEDIA

The newspaper press was the first “mass medium.” In the late nineteenth century social and economic change (industrialization, growing urban populations, expanding education and rising literacy, changing patterns of work and leisure), technological developments (telegraph, telephone, printing technologies, the spread of railways), and policy changes such as the abolition of stamp duties that had restricted newspaper circulation, opened the way to development of newspapers attracting a mass readership. Changes in economic organization were crucial: the rise of

advertising made it possible to sustain a cheap popular press; and the development of newspaper (and magazine) chains achieved economies of scale. Powerful owners (“press barons”) such as Lord Northcliffe in Britain and William Randolph Hearst and Joseph Pulitzer in the US built large scale press enterprises and fostered journalistic styles that appealed to mass audiences, in turn attracting advertisers whose expenditure ensured profitability.

Throughout the twentieth century, wide circulation, mass produced newspapers (“quality” newspapers/broadsheets and popular tabloids) remained significant. Advertising revenue sustained newspaper enterprises. Concentration of ownership, already apparent by the 1920s (Northcliffe and his family owned numerous newspapers and magazines in Britain), has persisted (Murdoch’s global News Corporation is an outstanding contemporary example). Newspapers have overcome competition from emerging popular media (radio, television, the Internet), adapting to change. Some deplore the lowering of journalistic standards in the face of commercial pressures, but “quality” newspapers have survived (offering more sophisticated services via Internet websites); prestige dailies and tabloids continue to provide a cheap, easily distributed, and portable means of disseminating information and entertainment to a mass readership.

Film also emerged as a medium of mass entertainment in the late nineteenth century, drawing on inventions and technological developments in the US, Britain, France, and Germany (the application of electricity, developments in photography and celluloid film, invention of the motion picture camera, new projection techniques). Initially an urban, working class entertainment, in the early twentieth century film became “respectable,” appealing to middle class audiences as film’s potential to tell stories was exploited, permanent movie theaters were built, and more efficient distribution methods introduced. The luxurious picture palaces of the 1920s attracted growing audiences and increased film stars’ popular attention. The Hollywood studio system developed: the “big five” – Paramount Pictures, 20th Century Fox, Warner Brothers, Loew’s (Metro Goldwyn Mayer was its production subsidiary), and RKO (Radio Keith Orpheum) – dominated

the market, achieving vertical integration (controlling production, distribution, and exhibition), with Universal, Columbia, and United Artists also important. The appeal of cinema was enhanced when the introduction of sound ended the era of silent movies in 1927.

Hollywood enjoyed a golden age in the 1930s and 1940s: the film industry adjusted to changing circumstances (the Great Depression, another world war) and film was a major source of mass entertainment within the US and internationally. From the 1910s American companies came to dominate world cinema, due partly to their domestic success and ability to make substantial investment, partly to the diversity and high production values of American film. Success provoked criticism – of sex and violence on the screen, of depictions of national or racial groups, and of the use of cinema to promote consumer products and “Americanization.” The industry succeeded in avoiding external censorship or regulation, adopting a Production Code in 1930 which influenced content over several decades. The industry faced its greatest challenge in the 1950s with the advent of television. In the US this came at a time when the Hollywood studios were weakened by a 1948 Supreme Court decision compelling them to cease involvement in exhibition and when the industry was affected by Cold War anti communism that led to blacklisting of industry members after the investigations of the House Un American Activities Committee.

By the 1960s the Hollywood studios had been absorbed into large conglomerates (Paramount purchased by Gulf and Western, Warner Brothers by Kinney National Services, United Artists by Trans America), and in later decades they became part of transnational concerns (20th Century Fox part of Rupert Murdoch’s News Corporation in 1985, Columbia taken over by the Japanese electronics firm Sony and MCA Universal by Matsushita in 1990). Nonetheless, the film industry survived, developing mutually beneficial arrangements with television and increasingly involved in cross media content provision and promotion. It remains a major source of mass entertainment in the twenty first century. US cinema has remained dominant, even though film production has been internationalized (co productions aimed at international audiences, investment in foreign

films). Other national and regional cinemas have also achieved a measure of international success (including film industries in the Indian subcontinent – “Bollywood” – and South America).

Radio developed as a mass medium in the 1920s. The US Navy was an early user of wireless telegraphy; technological developments contributed to the development of radio broadcasting, as did the pioneering work of individuals (Guglielmo Marconi from Italy, Lee De Forest in the US) and enthusiastic experimentation by amateurs with crystal sets. Building on technical developments during World War I, radio rapidly gained popularity in the 1920s, bringing information and entertainment into the home at a time when there was increasing emphasis on the private sphere in industrialized societies, and when other changes such as the spread of electricity made it possible to use radio sets.

Two contrasting institutional forms of radio broadcasting emerged in the US and Britain: commercial and public service broadcasting. These provided models for the development of sound broadcasting systems elsewhere, as well as the framework for the establishment of television as a mass medium in later decades.

The US model reflected the needs of commercial interests, with radio broadcasting seen as a source of profit (the companies General Electric, Westinghouse, and American Telephone and Telegraph formed the Radio Corporation of America/RCA). Networks were established and became enduring features of American radio and, later, television broadcasting: the National Broadcasting Company/NBC in 1926, Columbia Broadcasting System/CBS in 1927, the American Broadcasting Company/ABC in 1943. There was limited regulation of radio (and telephone and later television) by the Federal Radio Commission (the Federal Communications Commission/FCC from 1934). Financially, the US networks relied on selling time to advertisers who made or sponsored programs. The development of mass media and the growth of mass advertising and of consumer culture in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries were integrally connected. Radio (and newspapers and television) reached mass audiences; the advertising industry grew rapidly, developing techniques to persuade potential customers to

acquire the expanding range of consumer products. Advertising has remained fundamental to commercial media. Its importance underlies the emphasis on entertainment programming appealing to mass audiences, and explains the importance of services such as audience ratings.

A different radio broadcasting model was adopted in Britain: a public service model, with the British Broadcasting Company licensed by the Post Office to begin transmissions in 1922. Rather than relying on advertising revenue, British radio relied on revenue from licence fees and royalties from the sale of wireless sets. In 1927 the Company became the British Broadcasting Corporation (BBC), established by royal charter as a national institution with a responsibility to “inform, educate, and entertain,” with guaranteed income from licences and editorial independence. The contrasts with the US situation were marked: in Britain the BBC had a monopoly; it did not rely on advertising or sponsorship, but received public funding; and its charter set out public service responsibilities. The public service ethos was confirmed by Sir John Reith, who led the Company and Corporation until 1938. He stressed the BBC’s educative role and importance as a leader of public taste and national culture.

The 1920s and 1930s are considered the golden years of radio, when a rich variety of program genres developed. Music was central to early radio, and this had an immense impact on the music industry. Broadcasters employed live bands and orchestras, then incorporated recorded music into programming as gramophone records became popular. A high level of dependence between radio and the music industry has continued, through technological change (tape recordings superseded records, which were superseded by compact discs) and changing patterns of audience consumption. In addition to music, other programs evolved: radio drama, comedy and variety shows, Westerns and detective programs, soap operas (soap manufacturing companies were major sponsors), and quiz shows. The broadcasting of sporting events became an important component of radio programming. Radio was also used for political purposes (President Franklin D. Roosevelt broadcast “fireside chats” to national radio audiences in the US, Adolph Hitler used radio

to deliver Nazi messages within and beyond German borders in the 1930s).

By the late 1930s radio had fundamentally changed home entertainment, offering mass audiences immediacy and a rich variety of programs. Arrangements for commercial broadcasting gave advertisers easy access to vast markets of listeners as consumers, a basis for expanding commercialism. Although radio declined as television gained in popular appeal, new forms were developed (portable transistors, car radios), and broadcasters successfully identified niche markets and particular “demographics” (continuing to attract relevant advertisers). By the late twentieth century radio, like other mass media, was subject to the effects of greater deregulation, economic concentration (with large corporations controlling many stations), and considerable emphasis on maximizing profits.

Limited television broadcasting began in the 1930s in Germany, Britain, and the US, but the outbreak of war in 1939 delayed its development, and it was not until the 1950s that television developed as a mass medium. It too drew on various developments (in electricity, telegraphy, photography, motion pictures, radio) and the work of inventors (including John Logie Baird in Britain and the Russian born Vladimir Zworykin in the US on scanning devices).

In the US growth was rapid, with the radio broadcasting model adopted for the new medium (privately owned companies dependent on advertising revenue, with limited government regulation by the FCC). The existing networks – NBC, CBS, and ABC – dominated television, as they did radio broadcasting. The medium quickly became popular with advertisers. After initial competition, a profitable collaboration was established with Hollywood, films became a staple of programming, and the studios produced popular television series. By the 1970s the American networks were very profitable, paying attention to audience ratings in their quest for substantial advertising revenues; a fourth network, Fox (part of the Murdoch media empire), was added in 1986. A Public Broadcasting Service was established in 1967, but its role in commercially dominated US television has been minor.

In Britain, too, the radio broadcasting model was used as television developed. The BBC initially enjoyed a national monopoly, with no

advertising and no direct government control, funded from the sale of radio and television licences. Programming conformed to public service values, emphasizing the cultural and educative role of television. In 1954 a commercial service was added, Independent Television (ITV), dependent on the sale of advertising spots but with higher levels of regulation and less scope for commercial pressure than in the US. With a second public service channel added in 1964 and the introduction of color in 1967, British television programming in the 1960s and 1970s was varied and of high quality. From 1982 Channel 4, a commercial channel regulated by the Independent Broadcasting Authority and catering to minority audiences, added diversity. By the turn of the century the BBC had survived as a significant public service broadcaster, despite two decades of deregulation and declining government support, alongside Britain's commercial but regulated channels.

Television development in other countries sometimes followed the US commercial model, sometimes adopted a hybrid of public service and commercial broadcasting, and in many cases was subject to high levels of state control. Television remains a powerful mass medium, although affected by changing contexts and patterns of ownership – the strength of free market ideologies, deregulation, and the quest for profits by the conglomerates that absorbed the networks. The influence of commercial interests has encouraged a blurring of the distinction between advertising and programs (product placement in entertainment programs is an example) and a proliferation of popular talk and “reality” shows with low production costs.

DEVELOPMENT OF NEW MEDIA

A range of new media developed from the 1980s. Again, technological innovation was essential, with the expansion of digital technologies allowing the convergence of previously separate media and more sophisticated links between traditional media and new information and communication technologies (ICTs). The expanding range of new media includes video recorders, home videotape players, pay TV delivered by cable and satellite, direct broadcasting by satellite, multimedia computers, CD ROMs,

digital video discs (DVDs), the Internet and World Wide Web, mobile/cellular phones, and various handheld devices (the latest “generation” of these technologies offers not only telephone and messaging services but also commercial and personal video, photographs, and graphical information services). These have revolutionized communication, introduced opportunities for convergence of media content, and expanded audience choice and opportunities for interactivity.

Global take up of the Internet is a noteworthy feature of new media development. Originating in US Cold War defense concerns to develop a distributed, indestructible communications system in the 1950s, the Internet was used by academic and research institutions in subsequent decades; commercial concerns became involved in the 1980s and 1990s through Internet service provision and growing use of the new medium for advertising and e-commerce; and development of the World Wide Web in the 1990s enabled use of the Internet as a public, global communications medium. Powerful corporations such as Bill Gates's Microsoft achieved prominence, and there was speculation, a rise and then fall in the profitability of “dotcom” ventures in the final years of the twentieth century. In the new millennium the Internet remains the most significant of new media, allowing for rapid information retrieval (through search engines such as Google) from ever-expanding resources, for interpersonal communication (through email) and for advertising and global commerce.

In a “media landscape” that has changed fundamentally through rapid global adoption of new media (as well as email, SMS and MMS, text and image messaging using mobile telephony, are proving immensely popular), traditional media have adapted to change. Newspapers, the film industry, radio, and television provide enhanced services and reach global audiences via websites. Commercial interests have been quick to exploit evolving media: the diversion of advertising business to the Internet is an example. For audiences, new media have provided greater choice and more control over how they receive information and entertainment. They have also introduced new problems such as piracy (the music industry has tried to curb free downloading of music via the Internet

through litigation) and greater invasion of privacy; concerns about the relationship between media content and public morals have focused on the volume of, and easy access to, pornographic content on the Internet.

THEORETICAL APPROACHES

There has been debate about the relationship between media and society, especially since mass media developed in the late nineteenth century. Various theoretical approaches have been employed, drawing on different disciplines and areas of study. Fundamental to media research has been an understanding of human communication, with basic questions about who, says what, using which “channel,” to whom, with what effect, underpinning different perspectives.

“Mass society” approaches have been influential in media studies. Early critics (T. S. Eliot, F. R. Leavis) deplored the effects of mass media, seeing “packaged” popular culture as inferior; their views reflected “critical anxiety” about the media, apprehension about mass society that grew as media industries developed. The Marxist Frankfurt School (Adorno, Horkheimer, Marcuse) saw the mass media as industries used to control the masses. The media contributed to the survival of capitalism by encouraging the working class to be passive recipients of the dominant ideology, allowing social control and maintenance of capitalist values. Other advocates of an “ideological control” approach (for example, Louis Althusser) saw media or their messages as supporting those in power (conveying a false view of reality, encouraging passivity and acceptance of the status quo). Theorists have pointed to the use of media in totalitarian societies to gain support for the ideology of those in power, and in democratic states to foster powerful consumer cultures. Mass society approaches became less influential in the late twentieth century as the concept of mass society lost ground and media institutions and patterns of ownership changed. Nonetheless, notions of media and the reproduction of ideology, linked to analysis of audience interpretations and reception of media messages, remained influential in late twentieth century cultural studies.

“Effects research” (reflecting sociological and psychological interests) shifted attention from the impact of media on mass society to audiences and their “uses” of, and responses to, mass media. Some research derived from negative assumptions and fears (moral panics) about the impact of media (the effects of on screen violence on children, or of sex and violence on public morals). There is growing consensus that it is difficult to reach firm conclusions about the effects of mass media. Such research has, however, introduced useful concepts. The idea of the “active audience,” selective rather than passive, draws attention to ways in which audiences make sense of media communication, stressing pluralism and responsiveness, “uses and gratifications” (rather than a “hypodermic syringe model” whereby the media simply “inject” messages). Effects research also encouraged recognition of the many factors affecting audience reactions to mass media over the long term, encouraging research on cumulative and generalized effects (of forms of stereotyping, of omnipresent consumer culture images and values).

Approaches that concentrate on media content/messages have been influenced by disciplines such as literary and textual analysis and semiotics, as well as cultural studies. Here the emphasis is on what the media produce, leading to detailed analysis of images and meanings to determine how media represent or stereotype, particularly with respect to class, gender/sexuality, and race/ethnicity, but also raising more general questions of power. Cultural and social cultural approaches (drawing on the 1970s work of the Centre for Contemporary Cultural Studies in Birmingham) paid attention to both messages and audiences, examining the role of popular culture for particular social groups.

Growing interest in the political economy of the media stimulated late twentieth century research that highlighted the importance of economics, institutional forms, and issues of ownership and power. This focus remains important in the context of globalization. Interest in the structure and dynamics of media organizations led to consideration of professional norms and expectations (of journalists and broadcasters) and their impact on media content (including “agenda setting” and “gatekeeping”). In a

broad sense, concern with the political economy of the mass media embraces issues such as media hegemony and cultural imperialism (building on 1970s concerns about media in the context of dependency approaches to third world development), the implications of highly concentrated ownership, the relative importance of market forces and public service values, and globalization and more standardized media products. Debates about media imperialism have gained new momentum with diffusion of the Internet and questions about its potential for local empowerment as opposed to globally homogenizing tendencies.

Specialized areas of study, such as various streams of feminism (liberal, radical, socialist, and postmodern), have used different theoretical perspectives to investigate aspects of media: effects research, content analysis, and political economy approaches to the impact of media representations on equality, the extent and power of gender stereotyping, the marginalization of women's activities such as sport, the role of media in creating a democratic public sphere in which women feel comfortable to participate, and so on.

There is growing appreciation of interdisciplinary perspectives that give due weight to the complexity of the issues relating to media, whether in modern nation states or at the global level. These complexities include varying economic, cultural, and social contexts, the varieties of audiences and their interpretations of media products, recognition of the pervasiveness of media systems in contemporary societies, and the effects of convergence.

CURRENT EMPHASES

Contemporary media studies has vast scope, and many examples illustrate interest in the ways media influence or reflect social or individual experiences. Examples include the relationship between media and politics; the relationship between media and military during war and (a related issue) the use of media as propaganda tools; and the impact of media on sport.

It is generally accepted that mass media have had a profound impact on politics. They provided new means of communicating with national audiences. They assumed a significant role in agenda setting by selecting and

interpreting information and helping to determine the issues that dominate public debate. Critics point out that television emphasizes image and "packaging" at the expense of issues and policies (the 1960 US presidential campaign television debate between John F. Kennedy and Richard Nixon was an early illustration of the importance of "image"). Contemporary media are seen as giving lower priority to traditional news values, with a decline in investigative journalism and "serious" current affairs programs; the lines between public affairs and entertainment have become blurred, with "infotainment" pervasive. Partly because of media involvement, political campaigns require enormous funds (the US is the prime example), thus limiting the range of political candidates. The advent of new media has provoked debate about their role in politics. On the one hand, new media afford greater access to information, with possibilities of enhancing individual empowerment, participatory democracy, and perhaps "civic reinvigoration." On the other hand, there is concern about high levels of image management (and "spin doctoring") across traditional and new media by governments, politicians, and public relations agencies; about the continuing "digital divide," with great disparities in media access in industrialized and developing countries; and about the "reality" in political terms of "virtual communities."

Another area in which the role of media has been controversial is war. Relationships between mass media, the military, and governments during war have a long history, from the growing importance of war correspondents in the late nineteenth century through the Great War of 1914–18 and World War II in 1939–45. The relationship attracted increasing attention during the 1960s/1970s Vietnam War, when the media (particularly television) were blamed for the US defeat. Although historians argued that factors apart from television were important, in conflicts in the 1980s (the Falklands War, US invasions of Grenada and Panama) the British and US military exerted greater control over media during military operations. In the 1990s technological and institutional change (satellite broadcasting, global news services such as CNN) enabled media to provide "saturation" coverage of war to global audiences. To forestall adverse effects on public

opinion, the military employed strategies of “media management.” The US used a “pool” system during the Gulf War of 1991 and “embedded” journalists with military units during the Iraq War of 2003. Technological change challenges the extent to which media can be “managed” during war – it is difficult to control individual journalists’ use of mobile and satellite communication and to regulate Internet communication. For western governments, the rise of new global broadcasters such as the Arabic television news channel al Jazeera has also meant that global audiences have access to different perspectives. While global and national media are considered vitally important during both war and peace, there is continuing debate about the extent to which they shape or mirror public opinion.

A related issue is use of media for propaganda purposes. During war, media have been used to bolster patriotic and nationalist sentiment, to sustain morale at home, and to wage psychological warfare against the enemy (sometimes using blatant “demonization”). Totalitarian states’ overt use of mass media for propaganda purposes is acknowledged (Hitler appointed Josef Goebbels as Minister for Public Enlightenment and Propaganda), although there is debate about the effectiveness of propaganda relative to methods of terror and repression. Democratic governments have also used media to persuade, “inform,” and “educate.” “Psychological warfare” using mass media has attempted to persuade populations to support particular causes. The Cold War (from the late 1940s to the 1980s) saw US and Soviet governments use media at home and abroad to disseminate their respective ideologies. In the US led “war against terror” that followed the events of “9/11” (September 11, 2001) media largely reflected nationalist and patriotic values, but coverage of the war against Iraq has demonstrated that not all media images are likely to provoke sympathy for western policies. The role of media in war and the relationship between war reporting, public opinion, and support for government policy remain controversial.

With respect to sport, there is an integral relationship between media and sport. Sporting events are vital “commodities” for media, which in turn provide huge national and international audiences. Sport has responded to media

requirements: it has become increasingly professionalized; there have been changes in game rules, sports attire, and the scheduling of events. The economics of sport has been transformed by mass media. The enormous amounts demanded by successful sportspersons, the sums paid for broadcasting rights to major international events such as the Olympic Games, and the relationships between international advertisers and sports personalities illustrate this point. Relationships of dependence link media organizations, sportspersons, sporting organizations, advertisers, and sponsors.

“Bigger questions” about media in the contemporary world also remain. They include the interrelationships of technological, cultural, economic, social, and political change. The technological determinist view was convincingly challenged by Raymond Williams in the 1970s, but debate continues on the extent to which economic conditions, social and cultural dynamics and preferences, and policy decisions affect the manner in which new media technologies are developed and adopted.

There is broad agreement that contemporary media give far greater weight to entertainment than to information and that traditional expectations have not stood the test of time. An example is the idea that media should fulfil a “watchdog” role in democratic societies, based on a perception of the newspaper press as the fourth estate. The development of giant media corporations in the late twentieth century (News Corporation, AOL Time Warner, Disney) confirmed that media were big businesses driven by profit imperatives for whom old notions (such as investigative journalism or role in the nation state) had little relevance.

Although media have expanded in type and reach, critics claim there has not been any corresponding expansion in media content or diversity – programming offers “more of the same,” increasingly dominated by cheap formats (such as reality TV). Linked to this is debate about the extent to which both traditional and new media globally disseminate images of western consumer culture and influence audiences’ attitudes, lifestyles, and values over the longer term. The history of traditional media in the twentieth century demonstrated the power of commercial interests, and the use of new media by advertisers in the twenty first

century indicates continuing commercialization. Linked with interest in the importance of consumer society values are perennial questions about cultural hegemony and forms of “imperialism” in new guises (“Americanization” or the influence of global corporations). Recent research has pointed to the limits of US domination and the importance of local or regional cultural and social contexts (as well as individual reactions to media content), but the longer term effects of control of media by profit driven global corporations remain to be seen.

A notable feature of media history has been the adaptability and resilience of media forms. In an increasingly rich and diversified media world, traditional media – newspapers, the film industry, radio, television – remain important purveyors of entertainment and information despite rapid changes. However, it is noteworthy that Google, the Internet search engine, has, in a relatively short period, become the most used information source in the world.

Future research on media will build on existing areas (including work on established media – newspapers, cinema, radio, television) and expand into new realms. On particular topics such as media and politics, the impact of new media on public affairs, virtual communities, and citizens’ participation is already attracting attention. Broader issues such as the relationship between media, consumption, and lifestyle continue to attract attention, now encompassing cyberspace and the multiple modes and means of delivery of advertisers’ messages. The role of media in “digital lifestyles” and the implications of mobile, individualized access to a wide range of media products are areas for further research – work on the sociology of the mobile phone is already applying theories of social capital, networking, social atomism, and virtual walled communities. Research on other aspects of media and globalization will include political economy, content, and sociocultural impact. Continuing convergence (of services, products, and content) invites research on the implications for individuals, communities, societies, and globally of linkages between the media sector, ICTs, and telecommunications companies.

SEE ALSO: Audiences; Community and Media; Cyberculture; Film; Hegemony and the Media; Information Technology; Internet; Mass

Culture and Mass Society; Mass Media and Socialization; Media and Consumer Culture; Media and Diaspora; Media and Globalization; Media Literacy; Media Monopoly; Media and Nationalism; Media, Network(s) and; Media and the Public Sphere; Media, Regulation of; Media and Sport; Multimedia; Music and Media; Photography; Politics and Media; Print Media; Propaganda; Public Broadcasting; Radio; Television

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media and consumer culture

Douglas Kellner and Clayton Pierce

“Media and consumer culture” is the transdisciplinary category used by theorists and social researchers to describe and understand the mediated experience of individuals and groups within consumer capitalist societies who are influenced and informed by a variety of different media, such as film, television, radio, newspaper, magazines, advertising, Internet, and other information and communication technologies. Implicit in the category of “media and consumer culture” is the connection drawn between the imperatives of capitalist consumer society and the harnessing of the methods of mass communication and culture that bolster the production/consumption paradigm.

By situating consumer society within the constellation of what is now being called a “media culture,” theorists have attempted to explain how the relationship between media and consumer culture has developed into a qualitatively new social formation. This change in the relation between media and consumption illustrates the strengthening effect and influence this relationship retains on the politics, values, and ideals in contemporary society. Thus, it can be said that forms of media culture like television, film, popular music, magazines, and advertising provide role and gender models, fashion hints, lifestyle images, and icons of personality. This view also suggests that the narratives of media culture offer patterns of proper and improper behavior, moral messages, and ideological conditioning, sugar coating social and political ideas with pleasurable and seductive forms of popular entertainment.

The expanding influence of media and consumer culture can be traced to its rise during the post World War II era and the emergence of theories that began to explore and examine the interconnectedness of advanced industrialized society and mass communication. After World War II, the consumer society emerged throughout the western world. Whereas the primary US corporations were developing systems of mass production and consumption in

the 1920s (which saw the rise of media industries like broadcasting, advertising, and mass publications to promote consumer goods), the 1930s Depression and then World War II slowed the introduction of the consumer society. The Frankfurt School, living in exile in the US, was among the first to theorize this new configuration of society and culture in its critique of the culture industry, the integrative role of mass consumer society, and the new values and personality structures being developed.

Key Frankfurt School theorists included Theodor Adorno, Max Horkheimer, Leo Lowenthal, Walter Benjamin, and Herbert Marcuse. Horkheimer and Adorno’s highly influential analysis of the culture industry published in their book *Dialectic of Enlightenment*, which first appeared in 1948 and was translated into English in 1972, provided a sharp critique of media and consumer culture. They argued that the system of cultural production dominated by film, radio broadcasting, newspapers, and magazines was controlled by advertising and commercial imperatives, and served to create subservience to the system of consumer capitalism. Horkheimer and Adorno combine analysis of the system of cultural production, distribution, and consumption with analysis of some of the sorts of texts of the culture industry and thus provide a model of a critical and multidimensional mode of cultural criticism.

Through the pioneering efforts of the Frankfurt School theorists, advanced industrialized society was shown to retain dynamic qualities that extended consumer culture through its domination of mass communications technologies into the sphere of private life. This view highlighted the fact that the advanced industrialized nations had increased the production paradigm to include the production of culture – deepening the understanding of the relationship between media and consumer culture to include theories on the transformations of subjectivities within the burgeoning media culture.

The Frankfurt School’s theorists were joined by others from different parts of the industrialized western world who provided new interpretations and focused on the quickly evolving “media and consumer culture” of the mid twentieth century. For example, in the US, marketing research for big corporations and advertising agencies took up broadcasting

research and out of this process a dominant model of “mass communication” studies emerged. Paul Lazarsfeld and his colleagues at the Princeton Radio Research Institute, which included Frankfurt School member T. W. Adorno, began researching which programs audiences regularly tuned into, studied audience taste, and accordingly advised corporations concerning consumer demand for broadcasting product and what sort of programming was most popular (Kellner 1989). Hence, mass communications research emerged as an offshoot of consumer research in the 1940s and 1950s, producing a tradition of empirical study of the established forms of culture and communications. Around the same time, new studies were beginning to take place in Europe that focused on another dimension of media and consumer culture. This expanded examination suggested that media and consumer culture’s increasingly homogenizing and global quality could be viewed as a site of potential resistance to the dominant norms and values of advanced industrialized society’s advancing consumer culture.

During the period between the early 1960s and the early 1980s, the University of Birmingham Centre for Contemporary Cultural Studies became one of the most important research centers for the study of society, culture, and media. The Birmingham group came to concentrate on the interplay of representations and ideologies of class, gender, race, ethnicity, and nationality in cultural texts, especially concentrating on media culture. They were among the first to study the effects on audiences of news papers, radio, television, film, and other popular cultural forms. They also explored how assorted audiences interpreted and deployed media culture in varied ways and contexts, analyzing the factors that made audiences respond in contrasting manners to media artifacts. Stuart Hall’s famous study “Encoding/decoding” (2002) highlighted the ability of audiences to produce their own readings and meanings, to decode texts in aberrant or oppositional ways, as well as the “preferred” ways in tune with the dominant ideology.

The Birmingham group offered new ways of understanding media and consumer culture, ones that looked to the proliferating hegemonic structure of media culture as a possible terrain for multiple readings and contestation. Indeed,

these innovative interpretations enlarged theorists’ and social researchers’ understandings of the increasingly complex dynamics of media and consumer culture as an active zone of engagement and social resistance. Congruently, it was during the same period in continental Europe and Canada that other interpretations of media and consumer culture were beginning to appear in French intellectual culture and North America.

Rapid modernization in France after World War II and the introduction of the consumer society in the 1950s provoked much debate and contributed to constructing a variety of discourses on the media and consumer society, inspiring Roland Barthes, Henri Lefebvre, Guy Debord, Jean Baudrillard, and their contemporaries to develop novel analyses of the emerging forms of society and culture. It was clear that the consumer society was multiplying images, spectacle, and new cultural forms and modes of everyday life. The leading French theorists of the period attempted to explain, make sense of, and in many cases criticize the novelties of the era.

Of these groundbreaking interpretations, Roland Barthes’s *Mythologies* (1983), which drew upon earlier work in semiology and structuralism, analyzed codes and meanings embedded in artifacts of popular culture ranging from wrestling to soap ads, while dissecting their social functions. Other theorists, like Marshall McLuhan (1994), the most famous North American media theorist of this period, began to articulate the profound changes that media culture was beginning to have on everyday life and western civilization as a whole. The proliferating media culture, McLuhan argued, produced more fragmentary, non rational, and aestheticized subjects, immersed in the sights, sounds, and spectacle of media such as film, radio, television, and advertising. It was in the sights and sounds of the emergent “global village” where McLuhan brought attention to the technological medium itself, claiming that in the new media age “the medium is the message.”

Paralleling McLuhan, Guy Debord, in his masterful work *Society of the Spectacle* (1975), described the proliferation of commodities and the “immense accumulation of spectacles” that characterized the escalating consumer society. Grocery, drug, and department stores were

exhibiting a dazzling profusion of commodities and things to purchase that in turn were celebrated in advertising campaigns that inscribed the novel consumer items with an aura of magic and divinity. Hence, the society of the spectacle refers to a media and consumer society, organized around the consumption of images, commodities, and spectacles.

Debord's society of the spectacle influenced Jean Baudrillard, another French theorist of the fetishization of media symbols and images in consumer culture. For Baudrillard, commodities form a system of hierarchically organized goods and services that serve as signs pointing to one's standing within the system. According to Baudrillard, consumers have a sense of the codes of consumption whereby certain cars, clothes, and other goods signify relative standing in the hierarchy of consumption. Thus luxury objects have more prestigious signification, are desired, and therefore provide seductive social gratifications. On this analysis, needs, use values, and consumer practices are all socially constructed and integrate individuals into consumer society. While Baudrillard's account lacks a critique of the political economy of media and consumer society, he nonetheless advances our understanding of the connection between media and consumer culture by stressing how uses, wants, needs, and sign values of commodities are all socially constructed, as part of a system of production and consumption.

These novel understandings of media and consumer culture also pointed to an emerging global character and the rapid movement of signs and cultural symbols through multinational corporate channels. Thus, in the post World War II conjuncture, the spectacle became globalized as corporations such as Coca Cola and Pepsi, sundry national automobile corporations, IBM and the nascent computer industry, and subsequently McDonald's, Nike, Microsoft, and a cornucopia of global products circulated throughout the world (Kellner 2003). With increasingly complex forms of media, a strikingly global quality was producing and disseminating the values, attitudes, and the rationality of consumer culture at unprecedented levels.

This globalizing quality of the consumption/production paradigm is captured by sociologist George Ritzer (2004) in his concept of "McDonaldization." Building on the work of German

sociologist Max Weber, Ritzer argues that the phenomenon of McDonald's fast food restaurants now embodies and retools the principles of industrial rationality: efficiency, calculability, prediction, and control "particularly through the substitution of nonhuman for human technology." For Ritzer, the McDonaldization model has extended the "iron cage" of industrial society's rationalization process, moving beyond Weber's theory of bureaucratization as well as other production models such as Fordism and Taylorism. Moreover, Ritzer's model of McDonaldization suggests advancement in the rationality process by providing a template for social institutions and places of consumption such as hospitals, schools, and theme parks to emulate. For Ritzer, this new model of production accelerates the influence of instrumental reason by streamlining the production/consumption model, enabling the rationalization process to encroach into more sectors of society both within the US as well as the rest of the world.

Ritzer does note that the McDonaldization process is not a uniform one because it varies in degree depending upon context and setting. In doing so, Ritzer is able to take into account variances among consumer behaviors and production patterns that require flexibility from the McDonaldization process. Thus, for Ritzer, sociocultural context and differing consumer habits in fact generate multiple trajectories of the McDonaldization process, reflecting the malleable character of McDonaldization as opposed to a monolithic one.

As Ritzer provides new ways of understanding the transfer of consumer and production habits and methods with his McDonaldization model, in *Enchanting a Disenchanted World* (2005) he provides probing sociological analysis of the new forms and settings of consumer culture, ranging from hyperreal Disney worlds and virtual realities to the local mall and stadium. Engaging new "Cathedrals of Consumptions," Ritzer deploys modern and postmodern perspectives to explore how new means of consumption are providing a "re-enchantment" of the world through the creation of spectacles via extravaganzas, simulation, and implosion of space and time in arenas such as malls and new modes of shopping, to Las Vegas and fantasy theme parks that implode shopping, travel, and entertainment. Although Ritzer recognizes

“media and their ever present advertisements” are crucial “facilitators of consumption [that] are clearly of great increasing importance (p. 34), he chooses to focus on the new means of consumption themselves (compare Kellner (2003), who focuses on the role of the media in the reproduction of media spectacle and the consumer society).

Exploring similar themes as Ritzer, Mark Gottdiener (2000), another sociologist from the US, offers critical analysis of the new places in which people consume commodities and create identities deploying neo Marxist, semiological, and other theoretical perspectives. Gottdiener has pointed to the strengthening influence of media and consumer culture and its effects on the formation of identity through “spaces of consumption,” including malls, airports, entertainment parks, and the Internet. For him, spaces of consumption make up a material realm that is a conjuncture of many cultural influences that inform the construction of identity in contemporary society. According to Gottdiener, these new spaces of consumption are characterized by (as with Ritzer) their themed appearance, as is the case with such stores as Nike Town, Hard Rock Café, and Planet Hollywood. Gathered together in a spectacle of consumer delight, the shopping mall typifies the novel sites of consumption because it provides the individual with a multiplicity of value laden commodities by which identities are influenced and formed.

Gottdiener’s research charts emerging arenas of the media and consumer culture landscape by illuminating not only the workplace as a formative influence on the construction of identity, but also by delineating new spaces of consumption that constitutes a common experience in contemporary society. Indeed, these spaces of consumption are not limited to the material realm, as media spectacle provides entertainment fantasies through which individuals may create new identities, as well as experiencing the social and political dramas of the present age (Kellner 2003). Moreover, novel exciting spaces have opened up through the advent of the Internet, adding to the milieu of consumption the phenomenon of the virtual self. Consequently, online shopping, surfing, and interacting now plays a defining role in the construction of self and consumer habits,

allowing people to sit comfortably at home and create one’s identity through cyber shopping experiences, consuming and commenting on media culture, interacting with others in virtual space, and dabbling in politics.

Recent social theorists and researchers have argued that media and consumer culture’s dialectic relationship offers potential for progressive and transformative meaning and identities while, at the same time, also acknowledging its assimilatory quality as a tool of the status quo. With the continued proliferation of media and information technologies coupled with the rise of the so called “information age,” the landscape of media and consumer culture has indeed entered a watershed era. The billions of dollars spent each year in the US on advertising and marketing indicate the amount of research and energy that goes into controlling the systems of mass communication by corporate interests. With massive government deregulations, the oligopoly of global media conglomerates, made up of multinational corporations such as AOL Time Warner, Disney, General Electric, News Corporation, Viacom, Vivendi, Sony, Bertelsman, AT&T, Liberty Media, Yahoo, and Google, signals an increasingly uniform and homogenized culture industry, one where politics, social values, information/disinformation, and images create a constellation of great complexity. Yet varying appropriations of these forms and active audiences and consumers are producing new hybrid forms of media and consumption, novel types of meanings and identities, and new modes of consumer technopolitics such as hacking, culture jamming, and organizing campaigns and boycotts against certain corporations like Nike or McDonald’s. Hence, the complexity and contradictions of contemporary media and consumer culture requires transdisciplinary approaches whereby theorists and social researchers employ multiperspectival approaches that incorporate different theories and analyses in order to interpret and understand this highly fluid field that has now come to play a defining role in the lives of so many.

SEE ALSO: Consumption, Cathedrals of; Consumption and the Internet; Consumption, Mass Consumption, and Consumer Culture; Globalization, Consumption and; McDonaldization; Postmodern Consumption

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media and diaspora

John Sinclair

Since the late 1980s, the concept of diaspora has become ever more widely used to describe the movement of people away from their land of origin, such as migrants, exiles, refugees, expatriates, and “guestworkers.” Literally, a diaspora is a dispersal of people from one country into many, such as the Jewish Diaspora of antiquity, or in modern times, the flow of

people out of China and India and into the rest of the world. Strictly speaking, a diaspora is distinct from ordinary migration in that members of a diaspora are linked not only back to their compatriots in their land of origin, but also laterally, with each other, across the borders of however many countries they have moved into. In practice, the term is more often used in a loose way to refer to population movements across borders and “transnational communities” in general, but especially where cultural barriers also have to be crossed, and people are living in marginal situations within a dominant culture.

It is not just the flows of people that are of interest here, but the flows of media services and content that go along with them, both of which are part of what we mean by “globalization.” Diasporic movement is both a cause and an effect of globalization, and this generates different classes of diasporic peoples. For example, while the expatriate capitalist groupings known as the “Overseas Chinese” and the “NRIs” (Non Resident Indians) control substantial global investments, many other ordinary Chinese and Indians work in foreign countries as laborers. Correspondingly, there is a wide range of diasporic media in use. At one level, there are international satellite television services which relatively wealthy subscribers can enjoy in comfort, while more down to earth CDs and videos can be carried by people in diasporic movement in their luggage, or rented from the local grocery store. The Internet enables families and friends in different countries to send each other their news and photos via email, while organized groups maintain websites.

In this way, diasporic media reinforce ethnic identities, possibly at the expense of national cultural identities. Of most interest here are studies of how diasporic peoples are engaged in a productive construction of new hybrid identities and cultures through processes of cultural maintenance and negotiation.

Hamid Naficy’s (1993) study of what he calls the “exilic” television produced by Iranians in Los Angeles in the 1980s is a model for how communication media can be used to negotiate the cultural politics of both “home” and “host.” Drawing on political economy as well as cultural studies, he theorizes the Iranians’

production and consumption of their own cable television as a dialectic between nostalgic longing for the lost homeland and an effort to achieve economic integration and develop a new sense of themselves.

Another classic study is Marie Gillespie's (1994) detailed ethnographic work with families of Punjabi origin in their homes in West London, which demonstrates the role of television watching, and family talk about television, in the construction of a British Asian identity among young people. Yet a darker side of diasporic media is revealed by Dana Kolar Panov in her *Video, War, and the Diasporic Imagination* (1997), which explores the role played by video "letters" amongst overseas citizens of the former Yugoslavia as their country was breaking up during the early 1990s. Just as there are websites which still foster memories of the Sino Japanese War decades ago, these "atrocity videos" played upon traditional ethnic divisions. Thus, the use of media in cultural maintenance and negotiation is not necessarily positive. Even nostalgia is not innocent if it locks émigrés into a time warp.

Taking communities of Chinese, Vietnamese, Indian, and Thai origin in Australia, Stuart Cunningham, John Sinclair, and colleagues (Cunningham & Sinclair 2001) studied the processes in which desires generated by diasporic experience, for example wanting to stay in touch with news and popular culture from the homeland, translate into demand for certain kinds of media services and products. This includes how diasporas, even when they are small and dispersed, can become formed as media markets through "global narrowcasting" technologies, notably international satellite television.

Most of these studies, as well as more recent work, have been brought together in *The Media of Diaspora* (2003), edited by Karim Karim. This covers not only case studies of the use of television and video amongst several deterritorialized peoples, but also the rise of computer mediated communication – websites, e magazines, chatlines – amongst diverse diasporas. Without downplaying the considerable capacity of diasporic groups to generate their own television and video content, the interactivity of the Internet can be seen to offer more inclusive, active, and accessible modes of communication than television and other "old" media.

As far as theory is concerned, the study of diasporas has tended to undermine the traditional concept of culture, that is, culture as a fixed, given essence, bounded by the territory of the nation state, in favor of more hybrid notions of culture. For example, in *The Location of Culture* (1994), Homi Bhabha sees a process of "cultural translation," in which the diasporic individual actively opens up a "third space." Diasporic culture in such a perspective is thus the product of the constantly configuring process which occurs when immigrant or otherwise displaced cultures selectively adapt to host cultures, intermingling and evolving to form a regenerative "new" culture, a culture related to, but yet distinct from, both the original home and host cultures. Diasporic media are both an influence upon and an expression of this process of creative and adaptive fusion.

SEE ALSO: Community and Media; Diaspora; Media and Globalization; Media and Nationalism

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media and globalization

John Sinclair

While in everyday language "globalization" usually refers to economic and political integration on a world scale, it also has a crucial cultural dimension in which the media have a central role. Indeed, in sociology and other disciplines that focus on the media, the concept

of globalization has had to be adopted so as to take account of a new reality in which global institutions, especially the media, impact upon the structures and processes of the nation state, including its national culture. In that sense, media globalization is about how most national media systems have become more internationalized, becoming more open to outside influences, both in their content and in their ownership and control. This is a cultural phenomenon, one with implications for our contemporary sense of identity, but it is closely linked also to the economic and political factors driving globalization, notably the deregulation of national markets and the liberalization of trade and investment, which in turn facilitate the inroads of global corporations.

THE MEDIA AND GLOBAL CORPORATIONS

The corporations which characterize global capitalism today are privately owned institutions with their origins in large nationally based companies that were the “transnational corporations” of the 1960s and 1970s, and which since have globalized themselves. That is, they have become more complexly interpenetrated with other companies, and more decentralized in their operations. Of most relevance to the media are the long established consumer goods companies whose products are made and marketed worldwide, such as Coca Cola and Ford. They are predominantly of US origin, but not exclusively so: there are major British, Dutch, and French global companies, and more recently, Asian ones. These are the global advertisers from whom the media corporations, several of which are themselves global in scale, derive their income, and whose quest for markets is the motive force behind media globalization.

There are some global media corporations, such as Sony, which began as communications hardware industries and then branched into content production, in Sony’s case, film and recordings. However, others have been built upon the basis of the media industries themselves. Their rapid growth over the closing decades of the twentieth century was due to the ideological and structural shift toward

privatization and economic liberalization of trade and investment which characterized this era, but also to a range of technological developments, particularly the trend to the convergence of media with telecommunications.

The new ideological climate greatly transformed the regulation of media industries. To take one significant example, widescale privatization of the television systems of most of the nations of Western Europe was brought about in the 1980s, including the advent of private ownership of international television satellites. News Corporation, under the chairmanship of Rupert Murdoch, can be regarded as an archetypical model of how the new regulatory mood and technological developments of the era became business opportunities that could be exploited, such as with its acquisition of BSkyB in Britain.

In a classification of global media corporations devised by Herman and McChesney (1997) toward the end of the 1990s, News Corporation ranked fifth amongst the companies that made up the first of the two tiers in their list. Even before its merger with America On Line, Time Warner was at the top, followed by Disney, and the largest European based media corporation, Bertelsmann. Notable others in the first tier were companies which had taken advantage of technological convergence, General Electric and Liberty Media. The second tier consisted mainly of US newspaper and information service companies, plus several European media groups, and the major media conglomerates that have developed in Latin America and Asia. However, the very largest media corporations are nearly all American, and this continues to be a major issue in media globalization.

As well as the horizontal integration of “new” media, such as Internet service provision and satellite television, with “old” media, such as the press and broadcast television, these corporations are characterized by vertical integration. This means that sequential layers of business activity are incorporated under the same conglomerate umbrella: for example, a corporation engaged in film production will have related companies to distribute the films, and the videos and DVDs made from them. It is worth noting that audiovisual media have proven to be more able to cross national frontiers than print.

FROM "CULTURAL IMPERIALISM" TO "GLOBALIZATION"

Much of the theoretical and critical debate over recent decades can be seen as a response to the rise of these various types of corporation, their influence upon national governments, and their social and cultural effects on populations. In particular, the whole discourse about "cultural imperialism" in the 1970s and 1980s now can be seen as the protest of nation states as they adjusted to the globalization of the media and consumer industry corporations in an era in which international relations was dominated on one hand by the inequalities between the "West" and the "third world," and on the other by the pressures of the Cold War. Indeed, it was only since the collapse of the eastern bloc that the discourse of globalization began to supersede that of cultural imperialism.

The age of globalization has nevertheless adopted a number of notions from the past, the most persistent being that greater economic and political integration in the world also necessarily brings about a "global culture." This view assumes a decline in the power of the nation state in the face of global forces, such that new forms of cultural identity, beyond the national, are seen to have growing significance, while national cultures are eclipsed by a universal popular culture of media and consumption. The cultural authority of the nation state is believed to be under challenge in at least two ways. Firstly, globalization causes a massive increase in the movement of people across borders, resulting in much more culturally and linguistically diverse populations in each nation state. That is, nation states are much less culturally homogeneous than they believed themselves to be in the past, and furthermore, thanks to modern media, their diverse populations can maintain strong ties to the culture and language of their original homeland. This trend has important theoretical implications for the traditional sociological concept of culture itself, rooted as it has been in terms of the "organic" way of life of a certain people fixed in a certain place.

Secondly, the national cultures which cultural imperialism discourse once sought to defend against outside influence now stand revealed as ideological constructions through

which the dominant social groups in each nation state legitimize and perpetuate their domination, whether in terms of gender, ethnicity, or class. Thus, along with universal social movements based on gender and sexual preference, global migration has brought to the fore social differences which formerly were concealed by notions of national culture, so that nation states are losing their cultural authority at the same time as their sovereignty is threatened by economic and political globalization.

THEORISTS OF GLOBALIZATION

The globalization of the media has enabled vast sections of humanity to gain access as never before to the enormous output of information and entertainment which flows around the world. On occasion, they also can become spectators to global media events, ranging from regularly scheduled ones such as the Olympics, to unique and totally unexpected ones like those of September 11, 2001 in the United States (Dayan & Katz 1992). Yet it is important to appreciate that contemporary globalization theorists do not necessarily fear global culture as an irresistible force of homogenization, as their predecessors did.

One of the most influential theorists has been Arjun Appadurai (1990), who identifies a series of "flows" – of people, media, technology, capital, and ideas – which constitute globalization. These flows are "disjunctive," that is, they operate independently of one another, unlike in theories derived from Marx which see cultural phenomena as being conditioned by economic processes. Marxist theories have emphasized what they see as a trend to cultural "homogenization," that is, the similarities in media content found throughout the world, particularly in the form of "Americanization." Appadurai acknowledges this trend but argues that it exists in tension with a countertrend to "heterogenization," which is the hybrid cultural differences that occur when global influences become absorbed and adapted in various local settings. Heterogenization happens now that people are presented by global media with a *mélange* of cultural and consumption choices that they never had when their cultural imagining was defined by a dominant national culture.

As well as the theoretical debate around cultural sameness and difference, there is another which is more concerned with “deterritorialization,” or the social and cultural effects of media that can vanquish space as well as time. Media such as international satellite television and the Internet allow individuals to be free of the constraints of place, and instead act within a global context, regardless of where they are. Anthony Giddens (1990) believes that such “time space distancing” is one of the modes through which the institutional mechanisms of modernity have become global. Manuel Castells (1997) has drawn attention to the “space of flows” which underlies the global “network society.” Location still matters, says Castells, but only in terms of its relation to other locations in the patterns of global flow (whether of capital, goods, people, information, and so on).

John Tomlinson, in his *Globalization and Culture* (1999), sees interconnectedness as the principal fact about globalization, calling it “complex connectivity,” but also argues that complexity is a defining characteristic in itself. All these theorists agree that the control of space and time is the defining abstract principle behind globalization. The media are central to this control, not just because they transcend both space and time, but also because of their inherent interconnectedness, especially in their capacity to give individuals access to global networks, regardless of their location.

The idea that people can have more than one cultural identity at the same time, or rather, cultural affiliations existing at different levels, is the general contribution of postmodernist theory to understanding cultural globalization. Equally, there is the insight that the process of globalization is mediated by regionalization, and that the “regions” involved exist at both macro and micro levels, that is, both above and below the nation state. Jan Nederveen Pieterse (1995) has shown how a number of criss crossing levels of social organization can be seen to correspond to cultural identifications: transnational (or “global”), international, macroregional, national, microregional, municipal, and local.

Thinking of the production, circulation, and consumption of media and other cultural products as occurring at such an interlocking series of levels, with cultural identities corresponding

to each level, puts the concept of global culture into a comprehensible perspective. Rather than a universal force for homogenization, global culture can be seen as just one more level at which particular kinds of cultural forms can circulate around the planet. For example, Oliver Boyd Barrett (1997) refers to the “global popular,” meaning a globally marketed cultural product of a certain kind, such as a Hollywood blockbuster movie. Such products receive maximum publicity and marketing support on a global scale, and are distributed through complex hierarchies of channels. Yet although this material might assert its own level of cultural influence, there is no reason to believe that it thereby drives out other media and consumption choices, and the identities they express, especially those based on ethnicity and religion.

GEOLINGUISTIC REGIONS AND THE CASE OF TELEVISION

Different media exhibit different patterns of globalization. The Hollywood blockbuster movie would most closely fit the notion in literal terms, being released and exhibited more or less simultaneously in the various national markets of the world, dubbed or subtitled as required. Television, arguably the most widely diffused and most influential of all the popular media, is different. In the 1960s and even the 1970s, the critics of cultural imperialism were alarmed to discover high levels of foreign content, mainly from the US, on the television screens of the world. However, as television markets have matured and developed the capacity for their own production, they have moved away from this initial dependence. The evidence now indicates that audiences prefer television programming from their own country, and in their own language, when that is available, or if not, from other countries which are culturally and linguistically similar (Straubhaar 1997).

Language is a fundamental factor in the globalization of media markets, and the main way in which the process is mediated by regional factors beyond the nation state. The regions in this case can be thought of as “geolinguistic” in the sense that they are defined more by commonalities of culture and language than by

geographical proximity. Historically, they have been formed by colonization and the world languages propagated in that process, notably English, Spanish, Portuguese, and French. As it is easily taken for granted in the English speaking world, or what some now call the “Anglosphere,” it is instructive to see how significant language is in other world regions. Thus, just as the huge size of the domestic market enables the US to hold sway over program exports in English, the major television corporations of Mexico and Brazil dominate the program export trade in the Spanish and Portuguese geolinguistic regions, since their home markets are the largest in those respective regions (Sinclair 1999).

Actually the world’s largest geolinguistic region is “Greater China,” in which programs are traded between the People’s Republic of China (Mainland) and Republic of China (Taiwan) in spite of their political differences, while Hong Kong remains a major center for all kinds of audiovisual production and distribution. India provides a quite different case, where the liberalization of television has meant a boost for “local” languages. These are languages with tens of millions of speakers, such as Tamil and Bengali, forming commercially sustainable geolinguistic regions. Despite cries of “cultural invasion” that greeted the advent of STAR TV and CNN satellite to cable services at the beginning of the 1990s, by the end of the decade it was Indian channels that had won over the allegiance of audiences, most strikingly those broadcasting in the local languages. Also most significant in the Indian case is the fact that these channels undermine the traditional “nation building” role of television in India, particularly the efforts of the nation state to establish Hindi as a national language, and raise the question of just how much cultural and linguistic pluralism a large nation state can bear.

In the age of transnational satellite television, geolinguistic regions have come to include users of particular languages dispersed on a global scale, however remote and isolated. This is most often where there have been great diasporic population flows out of their original countries, of which the Chinese and the Indian are classic cases. Just as English speakers can watch CNN or BBC World wherever they are, so too are their services distributed globally in

other major world languages, and indeed, in a number of minor ones. In this way, far from eroding local cultural identities, as theorists of homogenization fear, global television contributes to their maintenance.

GLOBALIZATION, FREE TRADE, AND CULTURAL DIVERSITY

In 1995, the World Trade Organization (WTO) was set up, the culmination of years of international negotiations under the auspices of the United Nations General Agreement on Trade and Tariffs (GATT). The many nation states that signed have thus committed themselves to the eventual removal of trade barriers across all sectors, which includes the media. Long before the establishment of the WTO, the United States had been putting direct pressure on the many nations of the world that have various policies – subsidies, screen quotas, import levies, and the like – aimed at bolstering their national cultural industries against market dominance by high quality but low cost media products and services from countries with comparative advantages in the media trade. In practice, this means the United States, since producers there can export films, television programs, and recorded music at low prices, because they have already recovered their costs and gone into profit in the large domestic market.

Thus, a global free trade regime in the media industries favors the United States, which refuses to accept that other countries might have their cultural trade policies as a means of protecting their forms of national cultural identity and expression. Such arguments are rejected as merely an excuse to maintain economic protection for uncompetitive national cultural industries. However, just as the United Nations Educational, Scientific, and Cultural Organization (UNESCO) became the forum for the international debate about cultural imperialism in the 1970s, in the new century it has taken up the cause of “cultural diversity.” This concept embraces not only nation states determined to foster their national cultures, but also minorities within them, including indigenous ones. UNESCO’s proposed Convention on Cultural Diversity would at least provide an ethical if not

a legislative basis for these cultures to resist pressures from those countries whose economic interests are served by free trade.

SEE ALSO: Globalization; Globalization, Culture and; Globalization; Hegemony and the Media; Media and Diaspora; Media Monopoly; Media and Nationalism

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media literacy

W. James Potter and William G. Christ

Media literacy is a term that has been used to refer to a great many ideas. It has been treated as a public policy health issue; a critical cultural

issue; as a set of pedagogical tools for school teachers or suggestions for parents; and as a topic of scholarly inquiry from a physiological, psychological, behavioral, sociological, and/or anthropological tradition. Some writers focus primarily on one culture, such as American culture, British culture, Canadian culture, or Chilean culture, while others concentrate on several countries and/or cultures. It is a term applied to the study of media industries, textual interpretation, context and ideology, production, and audience. The term is also used as synonymous with or as part of media education.

While the range of writing about media literacy is a positive characteristic that indicates widespread interest in the topic, it is difficult to make sense of all these ideas. For example, the media scholar Herb Zettl (1998) complained that the large amount of information on the Internet along with books, articles, and classroom materials does not help much in defining what media literacy is, because most of that material consists of recipes for how to prevent children from watching too much or unsuitable television programs.

It is possible, however, to group most of the writings on media literacy into two general categories. One of these categories includes conceptual concerns about what media literacy is. The writings in this category attempt to define media literacy, delineate its nature, and explain why it is so important. The other category includes implementation concerns about what to do about improving media literacy by working through existing institutions – particularly education and the family. The writings in this category provide suggestions about altering institutional structures and creating techniques that can be used to increase the general level of media literacy in the culture.

CONCEPTUAL CONCERNS

Many scholars have written about how “media” should be defined and how “literacy” should be defined. As for the first of these two terms, some writers emphasize certain media over others, such as oral and written language (Sinatra 1986), still and moving images (Messaris 1994), television (Zettl 1998), computers (Tyner 1998), or multimedia (Buckingham 1993), while others

span across many different kinds of media (Silverblatt 1995; Potter 2005).

As for literacy, some definitions focus primarily on skills, others focus primarily on knowledge, and some focus on a combination of skills and knowledge. One trend in defining media literacy is to argue that there are multiple literacies, and this serves to expand the idea of media literacy beyond the ability to recognize printed symbols, that is, to read a printed language (Meyrowitz 1998). Adams and Hamm (2001) argue for multiple literacies. They say that being literate now implies having the ability to decode information from all types of media and by media they include technological literacy, visual literacy, information literacy, networking literacy, and more.

Scholars convened the National Leadership Conference on Media Literacy in 1992 to try to reach a consensus about what media literacy should be. After several days of discussions, they crafted a definition that media literacy is the ability to access, analyze, evaluate, and communicate messages in a variety of forms and that a media literate person needs to be able to decode, evaluate, analyze, and produce both print and electronic media (Aufderheide 1997). Furthermore, participants agreed that most conceptualizations include the following elements: media are constructed and construct reality; media have commercial implications; media have ideological and political implications; form and content are related in each medium, each of which has a unique aesthetic, codes, and conventions; and receivers negotiate meaning in media.

Another approach to making sense of all this thinking was undertaken by Potter (2004), who attempted to synthesize the major ideas in the various media literacy literatures and from that synthesis build a theory to explain how media literacy works. In his synthesis, he reports there are five major ideas that underlie almost all of the literatures. First, there is a growing consensus that media literacy is not limited to one medium. Media literacy is the ability to recognize symbols in visual, motion, and aural media as well as on the printed page. And furthermore, media literacy is more than recognizing symbols; it is also concerned with the construction of meaning by humans who are exposed to the messages from all media.

A second idea is that literacy requires skills. While there is a range of skills listed by different writers, the major skills that show up most often are those of critical thinking, analysis, and evaluation.

A third idea is that literacy requires certain types of knowledge. This knowledge is then used to evaluate the accuracy of media messages so that people can protect themselves from being influenced by false information or partial sets of information that distort reality.

A fourth idea is that the purpose of media literacy is focused on primarily improving individuals in some way. The assumption is that if enough individuals experience amelioration, then society at large will experience benefits. For example, if individuals become more conscious of their media choices and their own personal needs, they will change their media exposure patterns. If enough people do this, the demand for messages that are harmful to people will diminish, and the media industries will respond by altering the types of messages they present. Thus, lasting change in media content comes from educating people to change the market more so than regulating media industries.

A fifth idea is that media literacy must deal with values. There has been a shift away from criticizing the popular mass media as being harmful, while other kinds of messages (such as news, documentaries, great literature, symphonies, and the like) are automatically good for people. This elitist view sanctions particular kinds of content and ignores the role of individuals in valuing different forms of media messages. For example, Masterman (1997) argues that media education does not seek to impose specific cultural values. He takes the position that media education should not seek to impose ideas on what constitutes "good" or "bad" television, newspapers, or films. Instead, media literacy should try to produce well informed citizens who can make their own judgments on the basis of the available evidence.

IMPLEMENTATION CONCERNS

Advocates of media literacy have moved beyond the conceptual debates and have tried to influence institutions (e.g., education and

family) to develop practices to help people become more media literate and thus better protect themselves from the unwanted effects from exposure to the mass media.

Historically, media literacy efforts in the US can be traced at least as early as the 1920s if one includes the early persuasion and newspaper studies. Most scholars would agree that recent worldwide efforts to develop media literacy programs can be traced to the 1970s. These programs tended to be developed along one or more of three orientations: to protect children from media messages from other cultures, to inoculate children from media messages that promote specific "inappropriate" content (e.g., violence and/or sex), or to educate children to understand their culture and themselves through interpreting media content and their media use.

Critics have observed that the US lags behind Australia, Canada, Great Britain, South Africa, Scandinavia, Russia, and Israel. Also, many other countries in Europe, South America, and Asia are developing media literacy courses and curricula in public schools. These critics argue that the relative lack of attention to media education in the US is a serious problem because the US is the most media saturated country in the world. However, in the US there are significant obstacles preventing media literacy advocates from getting their recommendations implemented in the public educational system. Perhaps the major obstacle is that decision making about the public school curriculum is decentralized across 50 states and more than 10,000 school systems. Also, within each school system, administrators must consider curricular priorities, development and cost, teacher training, time, and demands, and parental interest (Kubey 1997).

The purpose or importance of media literacy education can also be inferred by where it resides in a curriculum. In different parts of the world, it has been positioned as (1) part of either K–12 and/or higher education, (2) elements within an interdisciplinary program that cuts across subject matter, (3) elements within other subject matter (e.g., history, English, or social studies), (4) a stand alone course in secondary schools, (5) a course that is part of the general education or common curriculum of a college or university, (6) a course that is part of

a larger media sequence or minor, (7) the media studies program or minor itself, and (8) part of a professional media program.

In the US, with all the other demands on teachers and curricula, there has been a move in K–12 education toward positioning media education as part of other core subjects (such as English or social studies) with one or two classes in high school that are either required or are electives (e.g., multimedia, video, or technology classes). In higher education, schools tend to see their general education Introduction to Mass Media class as a media literacy class.

Curriculum design rests on how people answer at least five questions. First, is production essential to media literacy? Second, what is the role of media practitioners in media literacy? Third, who is responsible for media literacy? Fourth, how should media literacy be taught? Fifth, how can we assess the effectiveness of media literacy education?

First, there are some scholars who feel that production is an essential part of understanding media. But other people take a counter position, arguing that students need not learn production of media messages before they can learn to understand those messages better. This argument has roots going back many years. It is similar to ones asked years ago about whether you can understand poetry if you have not tried to write it. Also, there are people who feel that teaching students to produce messages as they are produced by the mass media only reinforces the status quo, that is, it does not help students develop a wider perspective on messages beyond the typical formulas and values dominating the current media messages.

Second, there are media literacy advocates who argue that professionals who work in the media industries have a lot to offer students and should be invited into classrooms to help teach students and perhaps even fund media labs. In the US many media programs in higher education pride themselves on developing links with practitioners. There are those involved in the K–12 media literacy movement who suggest that practitioners, working closely with media educators, have much to offer media education. However, other people see a potential danger in this, arguing that media professionals may not be theoretically educated, will not be willing or able to criticize the media in

which they work, or may simply tell “war stories” about how the media work without providing a broad context.

Third, who is responsible for media literacy: parents, schools, or both? If it is parents, who teaches them about the media, how it works, and its potential effects? Who gives them the skills to talk about media and the will to monitor what their children watch? If it is the schools, where does the money come from to buy equipment, train teachers, and develop coherent media literacy topics, courses, and/or curricula?

Fourth, how is media literacy taught? There are those who suggest a democratic approach to media literacy requires a paradigm shift in how media literacy classes should be taught. Instead of a hierarchical, top down education, there are those who advocate an approach to media literacy where the teacher and students discover meaning together. It is an approach that changes the teacher role from preacher extolling the virtues and sins of media, to a guide who allows students to make up their own minds about media’s meaning. By looking carefully at the teacher–student relationship, media literacy scholars also suggest the need to investigate not only teaching styles, but also student learning styles.

Fifth, in the US, assessment is being advocated by parents, legislative bodies, administrators, and accrediting associations, with faculty being called on to articulate what they are doing and provide evidence that they know their students are learning. Assessment is not only a pedagogical issue, but has also become politicized as funding and resources become allocated based on outcomes. Most media literacy scholars acknowledge the importance of evaluation in any media literacy program, but there are troublesome questions. How is it decided? Who decides that a student is becoming or has become media literate? What are the standards? What should be assessed: knowledge, skills, behaviors, attitudes, affect, and/or values?

In the US there are a number of state initiatives linking teaching objectives with assessment (e.g., New Mexico, North Carolina, Texas). However, these initiatives are hindered by a lack of a national standard. Some scholars have been arguing for the need of a national standard for media literacy and have suggested what that standard should be. The most visible

example of this comes from the National Communication Association (NCA), which adopted a standard that says media literate communicators should be able to (1) demonstrate knowledge and understanding of the ways people use media in their personal and public lives; (2) demonstrate knowledge and understanding of the complex relationships among audiences and media content; (3) demonstrate knowledge and understanding that media content is produced within social and cultural contexts; (4) demonstrate knowledge and understanding of the commercial nature of media; (5) demonstrate ability to use media to communicate to specific audiences (National Communication Association 1998).

There are many consumer activist groups concerned with media literacy (e.g., Center for Media Education, Center for Media Literacy, Children Now, Citizens for Media Literacy, Children’s Television Project). These groups are working to make parents more aware of the risks their children experience when they are exposed to the media, particularly video games, the Internet, and television. They create and distribute materials to help parents help their children.

Nathanson (2001) has found that there are primarily three strategies that parents use in dealing with their children’s media education: active mediation, restrictive mediation, and co-viewing. Active mediation consists of conversations that parents or other adults have with children about television. This talk need not be evaluative. Restrictive mediation involves setting rules about how much, when, and which types of television can be viewed. Co-viewing involves parents and children watching TV together; no conversation is required and any guidance from the parents is very informal and unfocused. In her review of surveys of families, she concludes that most families do not have media usage rules, nor do most parents use active mediation. Furthermore, tools developed to help parents monitor and control their children’s media use, such as the v chip, are rarely used and not widely understood.

SEE ALSO: Literacy/Illiteracy; Orality; Mass Culture and Mass Society; Mass Media and Socialization; Media; Media and Consumer Culture; Public Broadcasting

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media monopoly

Ben H. Bagdikian

The term media monopoly – concentrated control of major mass communications within a society – took on a new life in the second half of the twentieth century, thanks to global changes. These included new communications technology; growth of literacy in the population; demographics that increased the size of potential audiences; increasing democratization in the less developed world that heightened interest in politics and the media; and high profits and political influence that stimulated conglomerate ownership of all major means of mass communications. Since citizens increasingly depended on these media for political information and entertainment, the concentrated control by a small number of large business concerns inevitably produced public controversy.

Modern usage of the term mass media has its origins in the past. The word “mass,” for example, in its ancient Greek origin meaning a shapeless dough, to the present, has carried a disparaging implication that it is designed for what the nineteenth century British prime minister William Gladstone called the “lower orders” of society. Twentieth and twenty first century usage commonly referred to the least elegant publications as “mass circulation magazines,” implying Gladstone’s “lower orders.”

Its partner, “media,” has been troublesome from the start because the word encompasses so many disparate meanings. The plural, “media,” and its singular form (“medium”), have different meanings when used in mathematics, biology, logic, art, photography, and the theater. In modern political and commercial life it became

used generically for the content and machinery of mass distribution of information and entertainment, as in newspapers, magazines, books, radio, television, and the cinema, forming the basis for discussion of media monopolies and oligopolies.

The term media monopoly has emerged only in recent decades. Neither *The Encyclopedia of the Social Sciences* (1934) nor *Webster's New International Dictionary of the English Language, Unabridged* (1955) have entries for "mass media" or "media" alone, as a body of information intended for wide public dissemination. In contrast, the 1998 edition of the *Oxford English Dictionary* has a substantial entry for "media" in the modern usage of "media monopoly."

In the distant past, there was little need for the term. Media monopolies were the unquestioned prerogative of high priests, shamans, and royal and religious rulers (Frazier 1922). In contrast, contemporary democratic societies require diverse information about public issues and candidates for political office in order to permit informed voting. The degree to which this information is arbitrarily controlled, and therefore vulnerable to self-serving censorship by governments or corporations, has become a significant public issue (Bagdikian 1983). Modern technology in the twenty-first century – high speed printing, rapid and copious public distribution of information through devices like broad spectrum cable and satellite transmissions – permits near-unanimous reception within industrialized democracies. Commercially, global dimensions of these techniques represent profit-making possibilities of unprecedented magnitude and influence. These have intensified possible conflicts between corporate profit-making and public need for broad and diverse news and commentary (Bagdikian 1970).

Probably the first significant media monopoly of historic importance was the Alexandrian Library collection of 700,000 scrolls in the second century BCE, said to contain all learning in the known world. Media competition was introduced when Eumenes II, King of Pergamum (in what is now Turkey), challenged the Alexandrian monopoly, causing the Ptolemies in Egypt to forbid export of Nile River reeds, which could be split and pounded together when needed to form scrolls like those

in the Alexandrian collection. The King of Pergamum was forced to use animal hides on which to write. In order to make the resulting multiple pages of the animal skins less unwieldy, the left edges were tied in a hinge, which is believed to be the origin of the modern book. The newly invented book had the unintended advantage of being a random access body of information. Scrolls had to be unrolled in order to read their content, while the book could be opened at any desired page (McShane 1964). Whether by scroll, book, or official documents, rulers controlled the media. During the last days of the Roman Empire, posting of various *Acta* – official documents in public places – was permitted only to the authorities. From the beginnings of Gutenberg's fifteenth-century printing press, the published sheets created by handset type were almost exclusively the documents of the Roman Church, or sanctioned by it (Stephens 1988).

For centuries in Western Europe, media monopoly took the form of the exclusive use of Latin by the church, officialdom, and scholars in letters, literature, and ritual. Since Latin was not used by the masses, it was the language of the educated classes and served to prevent wide dispersion of new ideas among the populace. In the seventeenth century, for example, one of the charges that sent Galileo to the Roman Church Inquisition was his failure to use Latin in writing about his discovery that the sun, not the earth, was the center of the solar system – at the time a heresy in dogma. Because he wrote in vernacular Italian, authorities saw this as engendering religious doubt among the population at large (Licklider 1966; Drake 1999).

Until Gutenberg's creation of the printing press (ca. 1436), writing was done laboriously by hand. Mechanical reproduction of documents permitted relatively rapid and broad distribution of official and religious edicts and, eventually, unofficial ideas and information. Over time, the use of wine presses (origin of "the press" as news carriers) converted to make multiple imprints was improved by the rotary press, and new techniques for manufacturing large rolls of paper to feed presses continuously made possible large quantities of printed matter in hours rather than days (*Johns Hopkins Magazine* 1967). The ability to produce and sell large numbers of newspapers in a few hours led to

both political influence and opportunities for successful publishers to gain unprecedented profits and mass influence. Inevitably, as each publisher fought to gain a larger share of the profits from sales and advertising in the newspapers, some gained dominance in the competition. In the UK, great power accrued to publishers like Viscount Northcliffe (1865–1922); in the US, William Randolph Hearst (1863–1951), Joseph Pulitzer (1847–1911), and Edward Wyllis Scripps (1835–1906) created competing chains of newspapers. The competition paralleled the growth of literacy and centrality of the press in imperial and national politics. Ultimately, economies of scale produced dominating papers, monopolies, and near monopolies (Bagdikian 1970). Magazines arose as distinct from newspapers as early as 1165 in France, followed quickly by others, including *Philosophical Transactions of the Royal Society* in the UK in 1665 and in the early eighteenth century, *Tatler*, *Spectator*, and *Guardian*. Checked only momentarily by the Crown's costly Stamp Act, by the nineteenth century, magazines were once more a growing medium.

In the US, women's magazines became a substantial presence in national distribution and remained a major category well into the twenty first century. *Godey's Lady Book* (1830) employed 150 women to hand paint illustrations in every copy of the magazine. The 1879 Postal Act lowered magazine rates and quadrupled circulation of the genre. Among the most common were *Ladies Home Journal* and *Saturday Evening Post*, which by 1922 reached 2 million circulation. The 1930s were characterized by the emergence of three popular general circulation magazines – *Life*, *Look*, and *The Saturday Evening Post* – that thrived because they were the only national distribution of quality four color printing widely seen by the national population, and therefore highly desired by advertisers. Yet all three magazines died in the late 1960s, by which time color television had become a near universal household appliance and the dominant vehicle for full color advertising (Peterson 1975).

The term press enjoyed universal usage until radio became a popular medium in the 1920s. The addition of television in the late 1930s created more complex competition, eventually with major newspaper chains also operating

radio and then television broadcasting chains. Thus, the obsolete generic use of “the press” was replaced by “mass media,” and “press lords” by “media monopolies.”

The US experience in commercial broadcasting was not typical. The UK and most other nations had long initial periods of governmental systems, like the BBC in the UK and CBC in Canada.

Radio in the US began in the 1920s as an officially approved monopoly. Called the National Broadcasting (NBC) system, the government assigned differing functions (manufacture of sets, creation of programs, and wire transmissions to carry broadcasts to cities) to three firms. The tripartite division of functions fell apart when the first commercials showed how much more money could be made from sponsors of programs. The NBC divided into a Red and a Blue network. In the 1930s, William Paley (1901–90) established the Columbia Broadcasting System (CBS). A 1943 court decision forced divestiture of NBC's Blue network to form the American Broadcasting System (ABC), operated by the Chicago Tribune (Barnouw 1975).

After World War II, television quickly grew from a storefront demonstration novelty to a common household appliance. The three networks (ABC, NBC, and CBS) dominated all radio and television until Rupert Murdoch entered the US media scene. From his start as publisher of an inherited daily paper in Adelaide, Australia, Murdoch rose with skill and, some said, guile, to a powerful international presence in the mass media. His satellite broadcasting covered much of Europe and Asia. In London he owned a Sunday sex and sensation newspaper *News of the World* and the *Sun*, and despite objections by the country's Monopoly Commission, added the influential *London Times*, a morning daily, and the *Sunday Times*, thanks to his friendship with Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher.

Emigrating to the United States, Murdoch became a major operator in American broadcasting. American law forbade any foreign based company to own more than 24.9 percent of any US broadcast station. Nevertheless, though he kept his basic firm in Australia, the US government momentarily waived that law in his case. Murdoch eventually changed his

citizenship to US and created the Fox network. Fox became dominant in sports, and his radio and television featured highly conservative commentators with a reputation for corrosive, conservative, and frequently questioned assertions. His network expanded to become a leading conglomerate with holdings in all the major media: radio, TV, magazines, books, cinema, and satellite broadcast channels (Shawcross 1997).

Media conglomerates, most prominent in the US, became the norm in the late twentieth and early twenty first centuries. Five or six large firms dominated all the major media, each firm with strong positions in newspapers, magazines, books, radio, television, recordings, and cinema, with both partnerships and, at times, competition, involving Western European and Japanese communications industries. The major corporations dominating the mass media in the US were Time Warner (the largest media firm in the world); the News Corporation of Rupert Murdoch's Fox network; Viacom, the former CBS network; Disney Company; Bertelsmann, of Germany, the world's largest publisher of English language books as well as a leading producer of recordings; and General Electric, one of the largest corporations in the world that, while traditionally a producer of nuclear reactors, electric generators, and home appliances, entered the media field through the NBC network because of its high profit levels. Sony of Japan also held major media worldwide (Bagdikian 1983).

Scholarly study of the subject has centered on various aspects of conglomerate control of the media. Chief among them is copyright, which is important for exclusive rights and licensing fees for texts and images in the mass media. Disney's Mickey Mouse became a worldwide popular film figure augmented by billions of dollars earned by the rodent's image on toys, clothing, and trinkets. When the Mickey Mouse image copyright was due to expire in 2003, Disney became a leader in convincing the US Congress to extend copyright terms (Bagdikian 1983).

Scholars and much of the public feared that the periodic lengthening of copyright would soon place too much information under corporate control. Of intense concern to scholars was a trio of publishing conglomerates, two in the Netherlands and one in the US, that controlled most of the scholarly and scientific journals

used in research and teaching. The three firm oligopoly had raised prices to such high levels that even the largest universities were forced to limit purchases of scientific and academic journals. In reaction, hundreds of universities in North America, Europe, and Australia joined in the Scholarly Publishing and Academic Resources Coalition to apportion purchase of commercial journals and share requests for specific articles with their fellow academic member libraries. The concern also led to the Commons Movement, which urged scholars and authors to produce more works in the public domain or with only moderate copyrights (Bagdikian 2004). Controversy over modern mass communications in the twenty first century covered a broad spectrum of disputes. One side, enunciated by commercial broadcasters and promoters of free market philosophies, insisted that there was no monopoly danger because of multiple new channels and new visual and audio techniques. They expressed fear that inhibitions on conglomerates would hamper future inventions. Contrary opinions asserted that the size and multiple holdings of dominant firms had given existing conglomerates formidable lobbying power on governments that served industrial power and profit over public needs. They noted that despite growing numbers of channels, control by conglomerates produced routine duplication of the least expensive programs and replaced public interest information with narrow, self serving commentary. It was seen as evasion of US law that establishes airwave frequencies as public property.

The broad differences of opinion have stimulated a variety of methods of calculating what defines a media monopoly or oligopoly in modern society. Methods vary from complex mathematical formulae with which to calculate degrees of concentration, to social analysis based on case studies and anecdotal histories, the differing techniques often reflecting opposing opinions on media concentration. Global media communication techniques have created conflicting responses. Because powerful transmissions ignore national boundaries, the phenomenon caused some less developed nations and large ethnic populations to feel victimized by giant media conglomerates that reflect content suitable mainly for industrialized countries. In contrast, others have expressed a

sense of liberation from local parochialism. The future of media monopolies became further complicated by growth of the Internet and a rapid succession of similar new techniques that have increased the unpredictability of media monopoly issues (Bagdikian 2004).

SEE ALSO: Culture, Economy and; Culture Industries; Media; Media and Consumer Culture; Media and Globalization; Media Network(s) and; Media and the Public Sphere; Media, Regulation of; Public Broadcasting

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media and nationalism

Sabina Mihelj

Over the past few decades the relationship between media and nationalism has rapidly developed from a rather marginal topic to one of the most prominent issues in the field of media and communication studies. Developments in

communication technology, especially the introduction of satellite television and the World Wide Web, have fueled hopes about the gradual weakening of nation states and national attachments and the creation of an interconnected worldwide community. Yet nation states, nations, and nationalisms are alive and well despite – and perhaps because of – the dense communication flows circumventing national borders and challenging the national order of things both from above and from below.

As with many other social scientists, media and communication scholars have proved to be ill equipped to account for the proliferation of overt nationalist sentiments after the end of the Cold War, and more specifically for the role of media and communications in these changes. Tacitly accepting the main assumptions of the modernist vision of the world, they have long been accustomed to an understanding of modern society inside which nations and nationalisms were only marginal phenomena, bound to dissipate with the advancement of modernization and globalization. By and large, communication was seen as a crucial means of attaining higher levels of development and social integration, rather than an instrument for enhancing differences and fostering conflicts. The work of Deutsch (1953), and even more explicitly that of Lerner (1958), two of the most influential authors dealing with the relationship between nationalism and communication before the 1980s, has been driven by such a set of assumptions and ideals. Deutsch's widely quoted *Nationalism and Social Communication* (1953) was essentially an attempt to identify the main factors fostering the assimilation of various nations into a worldwide community of man kind. An increase in the skills and facilities of communication was, he believed, vital for the attainment of this goal. Since a nation was, according to his definition, primarily "a larger group of persons linked by . . . complementary habits and facilities of communication" (p. 70), the creation of a global community would therefore require the establishment of habits and facilities of communication on a global basis.

Although the main drive behind Deutsch's work – the ideal of a homogeneous worldwide community – soon came into disrepute, his understanding of the relationship between nation formation and communication remained

unchallenged for several decades. Within communication and media studies this was largely due to the fact that in the Cold War period the issues of nationalism, nation, and national identity did not command much attention, and if they were addressed at all they were often explained away as mere epiphenomena of some more fundamental reality, usually that of economy and the class struggle. Admittedly, within international communication studies, especially among the proponents of the cultural imperialism thesis, the relationship between cultural identity and the emerging global communications was an intensely discussed topic (Schiller 1976). Yet, as a rule, the debate started from a notion of culture as a bounded unit and communication as a kind of “hypodermic needle,” an external force which can either protect a specific culture or destroy it by injecting foreign cultural values. However, as was demonstrated by several studies of reception developed from the 1980s onwards (e.g., Liebes & Katz 1990), the very same cultural product may be interpreted and used in a variety of different ways, depending on the cultural framework of reception. But while the turn towards reception has provided an important corrective to the cultural imperialism thesis, it has also led researchers to focus on micro processes and away from the broader question of how media might succeed in creating a certain level of cultural homogeneity and arousing nationalist sentiments despite the variegated decodings occurring in the process of reception.

If most media and communication scholars have tended to overemphasize the effects of media and communication on culture and identity, nationalism scholars were prone to overlook the role of media and communication altogether. At best, the improvements in communication in the nineteenth century were mentioned as one among many factors laying the grounds for the proliferation of nationalism, alongside the development of transport, a standardized system of education, the army system, the modern state, etc., usually without any specification of the particular role of communication vis à vis other factors. Gellner's (1987) theory of nationalism is a classic formulation of such an understanding of the relationship between nationalism and communication. Nationalism scholars did however offer some

persuasive criticisms of Deutsch's theory considerably earlier than media and communication researchers. Connor (1972), and subsequently Breuilly (1993), pointed out that far from automatically inducing cohesion and agreement, an increase in the intensity of communication can in fact enhance differences and foster internal conflicts. Moreover, Deutsch himself expressed doubts about the cohesive potential of communication in states whose populations are already divided into several groups with different languages, cultures, or basic ways of life. But since these doubts appeared in a more explicit form only in some of his more recent texts, rather than in his usually quoted *Nationalism and Social Communication*, they were largely overlooked by his followers. Connor also emphasized that Deutsch, just like other early modernization theorists, generalized from experiences with the largely immigrant American society, overlooking the fact that these generalizations may not apply to societies with territorially based, indigenous minorities. A similar argument was developed by Smith (1971), who argued that one of the crucial defects of approaches such as Deutsch's is their omission of the particular context of beliefs and interests within which the mass media operate; usually, the effects of western type mass media outside the West were held to be identical to the effects within the West itself.

In placing communication as the focus of attention, Anderson's (1983) theory of imagined communities was a notable departure from the prevailing pattern of thinking about communication among nationalism scholars. According to Anderson, it was a particular form of communication, associated with print technology and the capitalist system of production and productive relations, that made nations imaginable and was thus central to the formation and spread of nationalism. This theory has a considerable influence among communication and media scholars. Although Anderson's analysis was limited to newspapers and fiction books, his notion of imagined communities was quickly implemented in research dealing with modern electronic media, including the use of these media among diasporas (Karim 2003). This was partly a consequence of the fact that many of Anderson's followers adopted a very partial reading of his theory, taking the role of imagination, rather

than print capitalism, as the principal inspiration. Such a reading led them to focus almost exclusively on textual analysis and abandon any sociological investigation or historical causal explanation of the origins, spread, and effects of nationalism. Another theory that aroused substantial interest among media and communication scholars and received a similarly one-sided reading was Hobsbawm and Ranger's (1983) theory of invented traditions. Together with the concept of imagined communities, the notion of invented traditions has become a standard phrase in explorations of nationalism in the field of media and communication studies in the past two decades.

While the shortcomings of recent works on nationalism and communication can in part be blamed on the one-sided reading of Anderson's and Hobsbawm and Ranger's theory, they are also a direct consequence of a blind spot inherent in these theories themselves. Although he never explicitly refers to Deutsch, Anderson actually perpetuates some of the questionable assumptions characteristic of his theory. First and foremost, his theory is still modeled on the cultural geography of the nation state in a world of sovereign states (Schlesinger 2000), which makes it entirely unsuited for tackling the contemporary complexities of relations between media and nationalism. Historically, the coincidence of nation, state, and communication is an exception rather than a rule. Even in the period when the nation state monopoly over collective identity and the communication space was strongest, at least some circuits of exchange of information and some collective attachments were established both at international as well as subnational levels. With the advent of satellite television and the Internet, border circumventing flows of cultural products became particularly dense, making a close fit between the nation state, nation, and communication virtually impossible (Morley & Robins 1995). Finally, a model assuming a close fit between nation, state, and communication is entirely inapplicable to landscapes of media and identity arising within political formations such as Canada or the European Union (Collins 2002). Yet while it is clear that the actual complexity of the relationships between nationalism and communication is far beyond the grasp of Deutsch's model, persuasive alternative

theoretical frameworks are still lacking. Castells's (1996, 1997) theory of the network society, which manages to capture all the multifarious levels of intersection between communication and collective identity, including those below and above the level of nation state, still remains largely centered on the role of communication in inducing cohesion rather than disassociation or conflict, and does not resolve the question of how contradictory interests, identities, and loyalties are dealt with in the context of a network like communicative space (Schlesinger 2000).

Another shortcoming of most theories dealing with the relationship between nationalism and communication or media is the fact that they cannot satisfactorily explain what, if anything, makes modern media and communication particularly suitable for spreading and perpetuating national attachments rather than, for example, regional or global ones. While one could easily agree, argue the critics, that communication is an indispensable means of achieving and maintaining a set of commonalities that transcend the differences within a certain group, it is far less clear why these commonalities should be national rather than of some other kind (Schlesinger 1991; Breuilly 1993: 421). Arguably, this shortcoming is closely related to the tendency to focus on the relationship between nationalism and the form or structure of communication rather than its content. Both Anderson and Gellner, for example, paid attention almost exclusively to the way media address their audiences and categorize reality, and not to the exact content of their messages (Schlesinger 2000). However, the structure of communications does not directly indicate what types of conflict or solidarity exist within a particular society, and therefore cannot in itself provide us with much idea about what kinds of nationalism will develop (Breuilly 1993: 406–7).

Finally, most existing theories fail to define how the role of media and communication in the rise and spread of nationalism differs from the role of other vital factors, such as the development of modern armies, nation states, education systems, etc. While some of these factors might have been crucial for the initial formulation of nationalism and national identity, others may have played the leading role in their spread, yet others in their continual reproduction, and

yet others may have been involved in the development of competing versions of nationalism and national identity (Schlesinger 1991: 160). A promising version of this approach has been developed by Rubert de Ventos (1994), who regards the development of communications as one of the “generative factors” contributing to the emergence of a national identity, and distinguishes it from “primary,” “induced,” and “reactive” factors. Another fruitful avenue to explore is the one opened by Billig’s (1995) theory of banal nationalism, which draws attention to the fact that in well established nations the contribution of media to the perpetuation of nationalism may be far less visible and more “banal” than in the case of recently established nations.

SEE ALSO: Community and Media; Media and Diaspora; Media and Globalization; Media and the Public Sphere; Nation State and Nationalism; Politics and Media; Postnationalism

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media, network(s) and

Terry Austrin and John Farnsworth

Networks have been described as one of the most significant features of the modern world. So central and pervasive are they that Manuel Castells (2000), for instance, has dubbed contemporary society the “network society.” More than that, a network society is one in which the media play a preeminent role because of their capacity to distribute and disperse information, and their facility in traversing, and even reconfiguring, space and time zones. Media networks can be regarded, then, as becoming foundational to the way modern societies function.

Yet the very idea of a network involves a paradox. Despite their pervasive global presence networks commonly appear to be largely invisible entities. Broadcasting networks are generally experienced only through television schedules or individual programs. Cellular networks are known to most users only through phone calls and text messaging. The Internet is mostly represented through individual web pages or links that lead like worm holes off into the unknown. Even those most human of

networks, social networks, are often only experienced when they are actively mobilized in the interests of either politics or a good party.

If networks are both so central and yet so elusive, how can they best be understood, let alone studied? One answer is to look at how accounts of what constitutes a network have changed over time, as networks themselves have evolved. Within a huge literature in the field, there are four approaches which are worth identifying. Each of these works within and across the whole domain of the media and mobilizes an image of the network in different ways. To some extent, they articulate different areas of social science research or theory that sometimes have their origins far from the media. For this reason, too, they are not a tidy set of categories, but are derived from a multiplicity of sources and debates. Nonetheless, it is possible to distinguish four: (1) a political economy perspective that highlights mass media network forms; (2) an everyday life perspective that takes up interactive usage, mobility, and domestic locales as key themes; (3) a social networks perspective which emphasizes the social linkages and connections both for different communities and for civil society as a whole; and (4) an actor network perspective which follows network formation and the key significance of sociotechnical assemblages to understanding how a complex, mobile modern society emerges or changes.

The first approach, drawing on thinking in political economy, divines how firms and markets are first organized and then stabilized through networks of corporate ownership and transactional relationships. In the broadcasting world this includes the way major broadcasting networks, so called, create ties to stable suppliers, distributors, and markets so that they can routinely produce and disseminate programming material. In the process, also of concern is how they attempt to shape regular patterns of audience consumption. It also involves networks of media industries and alliances of media occupations – whether producers, journalists, or craft groups – struggling to secure favorable regulatory protection, state patronage, monopoly control, or other forms of market advantage. Together, these activities have created the mass media landscape familiar, in most parts of the world, for most of the twentieth century.

A second approach that examines the impact of media on everyday life has emerged particularly from the development of new media technologies. Such technologies, many of them digital, include everything from the Internet to the mobile phone, from GPS handsets to MP3 players; in all, a vast, constantly changing range of hybrid devices, many with multiple, miniaturized functions. Together, these have reconfigured every aspect of media activity, and created new forms of networks, many of them interactive, at all levels of production, distribution, and consumption, in the process. John Urry (2000) describes this as “the mediatized nature of contemporary civil society.” On this view, new media networks and forms help to produce new societies or social arrangements. One important academic response to these developments, particularly through the European Media Technology and Everyday Life Network (EMTEL), has been to study how such networks infiltrate and rework the routines of domestic and everyday life. Researchers have examined how the complexes of new communication technologies shape patterns of mobility, inclusion, and exclusion, or how they enable new, interactive arrangements for ordinary individual users, as the mobile phone has for teenagers. Yet such technologies also create possibilities for a mobile, globalized world of flows – a constantly proliferating outflow of goods, services, and information that ceaselessly reshapes the relationships between producers and consumers. This raises the question for some commentators (e.g., Thompson 2003) as to whether the whole world is increasingly becoming an indiscriminated complex network.

This concern points to a third approach to networks. Political economy theorists, such as Thompson, distinguish markets (horizontal networks), hierarchies (vertical, often corporate networks of command and control), and social networks (including civil society, informal relationships, or ties of clan, kin, or friendship). While this approach attempts to impose some order on an otherwise undifferentiated network world, it also highlights the role of social networks in media worlds. A focus on the social ranges from Granovetter’s (1983) work on how strong and weak ties impact on the formation of communities – whether or not this is through media technologies – to how civil society itself

can be reworked or re represented, and then governed through the development of new “political technologies of the social,” as Patrick Joyce (2002: 8–9) puts it. Such technologies encompass diverse ways of constructing images of social networks, from maps and statistics to polling or social analysis, and then distributing them through media forms such as journalism, advertising, or promotional activities. This suggests how social networks struggle over the process of representation in ways which rework not only the sociopolitical terrain with which they are engaged, but also the technologies of representation. A recent example is the complex, shifting battle over P2P Internet file sharing of audio and visual materials, and whether this is defined as either legitimate free distribution or illegitimate piracy. At stake are moral, organizational, technological, and community boundaries that have not only persistently rearranged the networks engaged in the struggle, but also the file sharing technologies and regulatory restraints designed to gain a decisive advantage in a global dispute that defines notions of civil and commercial activity.

The fourth approach to networks implicitly undoes the assumptions of the other three. Beginning from the work of Bruno Latour, and incorporating actor network theory (ANT) and, more recently, science and technology studies (STS), it points to a major gap in the social account. This is the lack of attention paid in much recent social science literature to the centrality of objects and technologies in the formation of any network. The “social” is social on this account, precisely because it overlooks the importance of the technological. Yet, ANT researchers argue, the entire formation of contemporary society is only possible through the existence of the sea of technologies that enable social networks to take the form they do. The very invisibility of cellphone towers, microwave links, the precise segmentation of the frequency spectrum, the complex miniaturization of mobile technologies, the sophisticated digitization of analogue devices from clocks to X Boxes – provides just some of the foundations on which current communities, corporate fortunes, and contemporary market arrangements are increasingly built.

ANT researchers go a step further. It is not enough to point to how assemblages of

humans and technologies create networks (for example, the cuddly image of “me and my mobile phone” in Lasen’s (2004) phrase). Certainly, highlighting how human networks assemble around particular objects or technologies is important – Latour (1983, 2002) argues that such assemblages have been intrinsic to human societies since their beginning. ANT researchers go on to point to how unanticipated combinations of actors and technologies have themselves produced new assemblages that reshape central features of modern society. Pickering (1995) describes this as “the mangle of practice” which has produced, for instance, the institutions of television and radio that were the unanticipated assemblage of individual photographic, military, or sound experiments. No one, in this case, was attempting to “invent” television. Such outcomes were no more anticipated in their day than the emergence of the assemblage called the Internet was in ours. And this is the actor network point. The implications of this perspective are not only to do with how networks are understood, but also how they might be studied. It is helpful to contrast this with other approaches.

Where mass print and electronic forms are concerned, political economy approaches typically focus on how stable industrial and market arrangements are created or managed. In one version of mass media study, technologies dominate or determine how such networks are shaped (the technological determinism argument, now heavily challenged). In another version, corporate actors and key occupations deploy their expertise or power to control both specific technologies and the production of media products, as well as understandings of what audiences are, or what they are presumed to want. From this flows the huge volume of largely quantitative research that has looked not only at how production, distribution, and consumption patterns are organized, but also at the relationship between audiences and media institutions. It also involves, in both the reception and the uses and gratifications literature, what influences and shapes this relationship.

In contrast, everyday life approaches reconfigure the image of a relatively passive, variably receptive audience into one that depicts inter active, often mobile users engaged in fluid arrangements where they produce, rework, or

consume reversioned media materials. Crudely speaking, couch potatoes are transformed into smart, multi tasking, multi locational transactors reworking both domestic and public spaces. Such active, mobile subjects increasingly point to the use of qualitative or ethnographic study in order to track and engage them.

Of course, such approaches are far from distinct. There are overlaps, such as the accounts of Marvin (1988) or Boddy (2004) that describe the historical reconfiguration of private and public worlds brought about by new media forms. Both, for instance, discuss how the early telephone, a seminal network device, was used in different ways as both a private (one to one) and a public (one to many) technology, depending on its setting. Other researchers have indicated how these alternatives have been reproduced once again, after a long period of telephone use as a private technology, with the emergence of the mobile a century later (Grint & Woolgar 1997: 21). In each case, attention is paid to historical processes, institutional practices, and everyday engagements to highlight how networks of production and consumption are formed and reformed.

The same can be said of social network approaches where research shifts between the occupational adoption and employment of technologies, as well as the resistance and reworking of technological forms around class, gender, or ethnicity. Community radio, the alternative and radical press, blogging and bulletin boards are all typical examples where groups attempt to organize and shape the construction of civic spaces. Study here often emphasizes, for example, the social use of the Internet (Wellman & Haythornthwaite 2002), or how public media spaces or an information commons are constructed.

Yet, from the perspective of ANT, each of these three approaches privileges, and assumes, exactly the issue that requires problematizing: how the new sociotechnical arrangements called networks come into being in the first place (Latour 1997). How, actor network researchers ask, does the array of constituents for a potentially new assemblage come into conjunction? How are they aligned; how are supporters enrolled for them; how are political transactions mediated that may produce either the success or failure of the new configuration? And so on. The solution for actor network research is to

trace the active work required to produce particular, local networks, and the risks and struggles this necessitates, rather than settling on generalized or global descriptions.

As an example, Hennion (1989) pays “systematic attention to the role of the intermediary” in the formation of particular media networks, such as pop music. Intermediaries can be either humans or artifacts: interpreters, instruments, producers, recording devices, programmers – even documents that people these collective worlds. Intermediaries can be found, as Hennion and others show, in recording studios, in advertising, art worlds, or radio, where they assemble the work of others by negotiating and brokering the complex sociotechnical constituents that go into any media output. Within all media industries there are chains of such intermediaries: networks that together assemble products that may, or may not, find a public at their conclusion. And assemblages organized around different technologies produce, in different times and places, different genres and ideas of what constitutes authentic music. As Zolberg (1994) puts it: “In classical music, it is the score that has primacy; the instrument in ethnic or folk music; and media and the disc in rock music.” Compare this mode of research to one founded more in a political economy perspective, such as Petersen and Berger’s (1975) work on US pop music hits, which set out to identify, through quantitative methods, and in hindsight, patterns of innovation across a mass industry.

Each of these four approaches assumes a different image of the network but, whether this image is a mass, interactive, social, or sociotechnical one, it also serves to represent the network in different ways. Inevitably, this has implications for how study and research on networks is carried out. Ironically, where each approach is concerned, both the importance of networks to contemporary mobile societies and their elusiveness as actual objects of inquiry – the place we began – becomes figural to how each approach argues media networks can be studied or understood.

SEE ALSO: Actor Network Theory; Internet; Media; Media and Globalization; Media and the Public Sphere; Mediated Interaction; Networks; Telephone

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media and the public sphere

Peter Dahlgren

Increasingly, discussions on issues of democracy and the media are framed within the concept of the public sphere. In schematic terms, a functioning public sphere is understood as a constellation of communicative spaces in society that permit the circulation of information, ideas, debates – ideally in an unfettered manner – and also the formation of political will, i.e., public opinion. In the normative vision of the public sphere, these spaces, in which the mass media and now, more recently, the newer interactive media figure prominently, serve to permit the development and expression of political views among citizens. These spaces also facilitate communicative links between citizens and the power holders of society. While in the modern world the institutions of the media are the institutional core of the public sphere, we must recall that it is the face to face interaction, the ongoing talk between citizens, where the public sphere comes alive, so to speak, and where we find the actual bedrock of democracy.

While versions of the concept of the public sphere appear in the writings of a number of authors during the twentieth century, such as Walter Lippman (1922), Hannah Arendt (1998), and John Dewey (1954 [1923]), most people today associate the concept with Jürgen Habermas's version that was first published in 1962. Though the full text was not translated into English until 1989 (Habermas 1989), his concept had by the 1970s come to play an important role in the critical analysis of the media and democracy in the English speaking world. Since the translation, both the use of the concept and critical interventions in relation to it have grown considerably (see Calhoun 1992 for an excellent collection, including a reply by Habermas). Habermas has not attempted a full scale reformulation of the public sphere; it is clear that his view of the concept is evolving as his work in other areas develops (Habermas 1996).

In its original formulation, the public sphere is seen by Habermas to consist of two basic

domains. The first, and conceptually most developed, is the political public sphere. Yet Habermas also addresses the cultural public sphere, a domain constituted by the circulation – and discussion – of literary and artistic works. Certainly in today's mediated world, the cultural public sphere is of enormous import. All media output cannot be reduced to politics, and though Habermas did not develop this notion as much as he did the political public sphere, it still can be enormously fruitful to approach the mediation of culture from this conceptual angle. This is not least because the boundary line between the political and the cultural is not something that we can take for granted. This is especially the case today when there are new forms of public engagement emerging in the extra parliamentary domain that challenge traditional conceptions of what constitutes politics.

After an extensive historical overview, Habermas (1989) surmises that a public sphere began to emerge within the bourgeois classes of Western Europe in the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries. The institutional basis for this public sphere consisted of an array of milieux and media, such as clubs, salons, coffee houses, newspapers, books, and pamphlets, all of which in various (though incomplete) ways manifested Enlightenment ideals of the human pursuit of knowledge and freedom. For Habermas, the key here was not only the institutional basis, but also the manner in which communication took place in this burgeoning public sphere. However imperfectly, he saw that interaction in this social arena embodied the ideals of reason, i.e., the Enlightenment goals of rational thinking, argument, and discussion. In his notion of the public as a rational, dialogic process, Habermas's account of communication and democracy bears similarities with that of John Dewey. We can note that Habermas's work from the 1980s on communicative rationality (Habermas 1984, 1987) further developed normative perspectives on how communication should take place in order to enhance intersubjectivity and the democratic character of society.

Habermas sees the public sphere growing and deepening in the first few decades of the nineteenth century with the spread of mass literacy and the press. Gradually the decay sets in. Journalism increasingly loses its claim to

reason; public discourse degenerates into public relations. As the logic of commercialism increasingly shapes the operations of the media, the domain of rationality diminishes. Moving into the twentieth century, Habermas observes with pessimism the trivialization of politics, not least in the electronic media, the industrialization of public opinion, and the transformation of publics from discursive to consuming collectivities. These and other ills serve to constrict society's potential for democratic development, though, as noted, he has seemingly become somewhat less pessimistic and categorical in recent years. Offering horizons and entry points for empirical and critical analysis, the concept has inspired many studies of the media and their role in democracy.

THREE DIMENSIONS OF THE PUBLIC SPHERE

To render the notion of the public sphere into an analytic tool, it can be useful to conceptualize it as comprising three constitutive dimensions: the structural, the representational, and the interactional (Dahlgren 1995).

The structural dimension has to do with the formal institutional features of the public sphere. At bottom, the public sphere rests upon the idea of universality, the norm that it must be accessible to all citizens of society. This puts key structural aspects of the media into the limelight. If the media are a dominant feature of the public sphere, they must be technically, economically, culturally, and linguistically within reach of society's members; any a priori exclusions of any segment of the population collides with democracy's claim to universalism. Seen from this angle, the vision of a public sphere raises questions about media policy and economics, ownership and control, the role of market forces and regulation, issues of the privatization of information, procedures for licensing, rules for access, and so forth. The practical tasks of shaping media policy are often conceptually complicated and politically difficult, given the array of competing interests at stake.

The representational dimension refers to the forms and contents of mass media output (the newer interactive media are taken up below). This includes all the traditional questions and

criteria about media output – e.g., fairness, accuracy, pluralism of views, sensationalism, infotainment, diversity of cultural expression. Today, the media have become the language of our public culture, and the grammars of this language impact on the way we experience and think about the world and about ourselves. Yet, while the media are central to the public sphere, they also generate a semiotic milieu that far exceeds the boundaries of the public sphere. More specifically, we should recall that most media output does not address politics, but deals with entertainment, popular culture, sports, advertising, and so on. The mediated public sphere is competing for attention in a semiotic environment overwhelmingly oriented toward consumerist, rather than civic, matters.

The dimension of interaction reminds us that democracy resides, ultimately, with citizens who engage in talk with each other. The public sphere as a process does not “end” with the publication of a newspaper or the transmission of a radio or TV program; these media phenomena are but one step in a larger communication chain which includes how the media output is received, made sense of, and utilized by citizens in their interaction with each other. Here it is useful to recall that Habermas as well as other writers, such as Dewey (1954 [1923]), argue that a “public” should be conceptualized as something other than just a media audience. A public, according to Habermas and Dewey, exists as discursive interactional processes; atomized individuals, consuming media in their homes, do not comprise a public. To point to the interaction among citizens is to take a step into the sociocultural contexts of everyday life. Interaction has its sites and spaces, its discursive practices, its contextual aspects; politics, in a sense, emerges through talk (cf. Benhabib 1996).

CONCEPTUAL ISSUES AND DEBATES

Habermas’s work on the public sphere had a major impact on thinking about media, publics, democracy, and the nature of political communication. Observers have noted that Habermas’s historical account bears many of the markings of the original Frankfurt School of critical theory. With T. W. Adorno as his academic mentor, it is not surprising that Habermas shares

many of the attributes of the leftist high cultural critique of “mass society,” advanced capitalism, and the cultural industries. There is also a decidedly nostalgic quality to the analysis, the sense that there once was a historical opening, which then became closed off. Habermas certainly sees the limits of this bourgeois public sphere, not least in class terms; an early counterpoint to Habermas’s model even argued for a proletarian public sphere (Negt & Kluge 1993). Feminists have been quick to point out the gender limitations of the bourgeois public sphere – as well as in Habermas’s own thinking (cf. Fraser 1992). He has responded generously to his critics (cf. Calhoun 1992) and made constructive use of their interventions.

There is ambiguity with the concept: it is not fully clear whether what Habermas describes is the empirical reality of a historical situation, or whether he is fundamentally presenting a normative vision. Most readers conclude that it is both. He describes the structural mechanisms that erode the public sphere, yet at the same time he – and many of his readers – continue to be inspired by the vision of a robust public sphere serving a well functioning democracy. Indeed, as the use of the concept spreads, the idea of the public sphere has tended to gravitate away from its neo Marxian origins and joined mainstream discussions about media performance, journalistic quality, political communication, and the conditions of democracy. In practical terms, the normative horizons from the liberal or progressive traditions that promote “good journalism” or “information in the public interest” are not so different from ideals about the media inspired by the framework of the public sphere.

Another key theme of debate has centered on the tension between a unified, national public sphere versus a pluralistic or even fragmented one. The argument that each nation state should strive for a large, encompassing public sphere is based in part on the criteria for governability – with too many forums and too many voices, democracy ends up with an ineffective cacophony. This position also derives from concern that isolated islands of public discourse will become politically ineffectual. This view of the public sphere – as providing a unified political culture – was utilized (albeit indirectly) in, for example, defining the mission of European

public service broadcasting. Today, the importance of the public sphere concept is being reiterated in the context of the European Union (EU); there is a need to achieve some such semblance of a transnational public sphere, as well as the profound difficulty in attaining anything other than a collection of national mediated spheres in which EU matters are aired and discussed.

The arguments that see the public sphere in essentially plural terms base their claims in part on the complex and heterogeneous sociocultural realities of late modern society, including its increasingly globalized character. To even think of a unified communicative space for all citizens seems simply sociologically out of touch with the real world. Habermas seems to be moving in this direction in a more recent reformulation of the concept (Habermas 1996). Yet there is another, more assertive argument, namely that in a democracy, various groups, movements, interests, and other collectivities need a semi sheltered space to work out their own positions, promote collective identity, and foster empowerment. In some ways, the tension here reflects two basic perspectives on the public sphere: on the one hand, that it should provide a forum where opinion processes can feed into political decision making, and on the other hand, that it should offer a communicative space for horizontal civic communication that can have other important democratic functions beyond impacting on decisions. Obviously a democracy needs both, yet the heterogeneous quality of late modern life certainly raises problematic issues about shared political cultures.

One way to go beyond the either-or dead end is to conceptualize the public sphere as consisting of many communicative spaces structured in a tiered fashion. The major mass media of a society can be seen as creating the dominant public sphere, while smaller media outlets can generate a cluster of smaller spheres defined by interests, gender, ethnicity, and so on. Smaller spheres “feed into” larger ones, ideally resulting in interfaces that allow collective views to “travel” from the outer reaches toward the dominant center. This tendency is arguably beginning to grow with increased use of the Internet, where some interfaces between micro, meso, and macro levels might be observed (see below).

A further point of contestation has been the normative view of the kind of communication that should take place in the public sphere. There is in Habermas a strong leaning toward the rational; communication is theorized in a rigorous manner that emphasizes formalized deliberation. Among the common criticisms leveled against his approach is that he seemingly reduces democracy’s communication in a manner that excludes affective, rhetorical, symbolic, mythic, bodily, humorous, and other dimensions (cf. Dahlgren 1995). Furthermore, it could be argued that the criteria of traditional notions of rational speech may exclude other, specific communicative registers prevalent among particular groups, thereby undercutting their communicative legitimacy in the public sphere – a line of argument that readily links up with the theme above of a unified versus pluralistic public spheres.

PUBLIC AND PRIVATE

Certainly, one of the central quandaries of public sphere theory is that social and cultural evolution continues to scramble the distinction between public and private. This is a development that is abundantly visible in the late modern media milieu. The traditionalist stance is to define politics in a narrow way, focusing on the formal political arena in the mainstream media. In the process it thereby shuts its eyes, so to speak, to a lot of reality. The concepts of public and private encompass an ensemble of notions that readily align themselves into sets of polarities. The idea of “public” in traditions like the Habermasian is implacably associated with reason, rationality, objectivity, argument, work, text, information, and knowledge. One might also add, historically: the discursively dominant, the authoritative, the masculine, the Caucasian. The private resonates with the personal, with emotion, intimacy, subjectivity, aesthetics, style, image, and pleasure. (There is a large literature on these themes as they pertain to the media; for some recent treatments, see the collection by Corner & Pels 2003; Weintraub & Kumar 1997 offer some more overarching perspectives.) In the media context, the private is also closely related to consumption, entertainment, and popular culture.

At a fundamental level, what is at stake in the modern use of the public sphere perspective is the question of where the political resides, and how it is positioned against that which is deemed non political. There has been a flood of discussion and debate around this issue. Depending on circumstances, the seemingly private can often harbor the political, a point that has been forcefully made not least by feminist political theorists (Meehan 1995; Lister 1997; Voet 1998). And certainly cultural studies since its inception solidly affirms the always potentially political character of popular culture, a view that has also entered into some corners of political science. The possibilities for topics to become politicized are key elements of the open, democratic society. In the final instance, it can be said that politics has to do with decision making, but the realm of "political relevance" is larger, always shifting – and can never be fully specified.

INTERNET AND THE PUBLIC SPHERE

It is generally understood that the dramatic changes in the media landscape are having complex and long term impacts on the political system of western democracies (Bennett & Entman 2001). In recent years, considerable research attention has been devoted particularly to the Internet's role in the public sphere. The past 15 years or so have given rise to an international consensus that western liberal democracy is facing deep difficulties, and it did not take long before many enthusiasts were promoting the Internet as a means for enhancing democracy, precisely by offering the technology for a revitalized public sphere. Much of the enthusiasm soon began to wane, and a very modest view emerged, suggesting that while there have been some interesting changes for the way democracy works, on the whole, the import of the Internet is unexceptional; the Net is not deemed yet to be a factor of transformation. Margolis and Resnick (2000: 14) conclude that: "There is an extensive political life on the Net, but it is mostly an extension of political life off the Net." So while the major political actors may engage in online campaigning, lobbying, policy advocacy, organizing, and so forth, this perspective underscores that there

does not seem to be any major change in sight for the public sphere.

Other scholars challenge this view, arguing that the Internet has become particularly salient for the public sphere, but in the domain of informal, extra parliamentary politics. There has been a massive growth in what is called advocacy or issue politics, often in the form of ongoing campaigns. Some of the advocates are large and powerful interest groups, others take the form of social movements or activist networks; some operate on the global level, while others have a more grassroots character. Many represent versions of "new" politics (called "life politics" by Giddens 1991); such politics can materialize all over the social terrain, and manifest itself in many contexts.

Especially among young citizens, many have refocused their political attention outside the parliamentary system. Or they are in the process of redefining just what constitutes the political. Among such groups, the boundaries between politics, cultural values, identity processes, and local self reliance measures become fluid (Beck 1997). Politics becomes not only an instrumental activity for achieving specific goals, but also an expressive activity, a way of asserting, within the public sphere, group values, ideals, and belonging. These new politics are characterized by personalized rather than collective engagement, and by a stronger emphasis on single issues than on overarching platforms or ideologies (Bennett 2003).

It is precisely in the arena of new politics that the new interactive media become not only relevant, but also crucial: their capacity to facilitate "horizontal communication" is decisive. Access to the Net has helped promote the growth of massive, coordinated digital networks of citizens engaged in a vast array of issues, not least in global contexts. Single issue campaigns against specific corporations, movements for alter globalization, women's groups, environmental activists, human rights organizations, and many others – including, unfortunately, even neo nazi, racists, and various hate groups – can be found on the Internet. Many such groups and movements are in fact generating their own "counterpublic spheres" (cf. Warner 2002), where discussions, debates, and the exchange of information and experience take place.

Yet, for all its compelling qualities, the perspective of the public sphere thus still leaves unclear a number of important issues. Perhaps most significantly, it does not have much to say about *why* people actually participate in the public sphere. This points to the need to link up public sphere theory with more empirical sociocultural perspectives, including such themes as agency, practices, and identity.

SEE ALSO: Internet; Media; Media and Globalization; Media, Network(s) and; Politics and Media; Public Broadcasting; Public Opinion; Public and Private; Public Sphere

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media, regulation of

Denis McQuail

Media regulation refers to all means by which media organizations are formally restrained or directed in their activities. In this context, the reference is primarily to external control by way of public policy, law, and regulation, although it also includes some forms of self-regulation, especially when these are intended to meet public concerns. The term media refers to publicly available means of communication, in particular the mass media of print, film, television, and radio, however distributed. Media regulation may also apply to the distribution infrastructure, including cable, wireless, satellite, etc. New means of communication, especially the Internet, may be an object of regulation, especially where they are used as public means of communication. The emphasis in this entry is on the external regulation "in the public interest" and with attention to matters of organization and content rather than economic and technical matters. Internal regulation is only considered where it has public causes or consequences. However, new forms

of interactive communication are blurring the distinction between public and private communication and the forms and purposes of regulation are changing. Media regulation has always responded to changes in communication technology and successive “regimes” of media regulation can be identified, largely matching the dominant technology of the time.

Media regulation had its beginnings in the restraints placed by church and state authorities on printers and authors in order to protect the established order. The first forms of regulation involved the licensing of printers, advance censorship of particular works, and control of importation, plus laws by which authors and printers could be punished after the event of publication. Regulation in the form of censorship and licensing did not cease until democratic reform movements gained freedom of the press as a basic right guaranteed by the state itself. The first statutory right to freedom of the press was gained in Sweden in 1769, ahead of the more famous First Amendment to the US Constitution in 1791 that outlawed any federal lawmaking in respect of the press. In many societies freedom of the press came very late and it has often been intermittent or not respected in fact. Other restrictions, especially in the form of taxation of newspapers, were applied with a view to restricting circulation to the higher orders of society. Some regulations affecting media, including the self regulation by printers of their trade and later copyright laws, were designed to protect authors and the public.

These remarks are intended as a reminder that regulation is very mixed in its forms, aims, and effects, but there is always an intention to control publication on behalf of various beneficiaries, ranging from the state to the individual citizen or consumer. For this reason the regulation of media in democratic societies is always a sensitive social and political issue and any claims to benefit the public by way of regulation have to be viewed with caution. Resistance to regulation may also be suspect for other reasons. Nevertheless we can agree that an inescapable tension exists between media regulation, however well intentioned, and the freedom of publication that is a core value of democratic societies. There has to be a clear balance of advantage to the society for governmental regulation to be accepted as legitimate.

Regulation can be applied at four main levels of media operation. Firstly, to the infrastructure of distribution (cable, wireless, satellite, transport, cinemas, etc). Secondly, it can apply to the organization and structure of the organs of production (mainly but not only commercial firms). Thirdly, it can apply to production itself. Fourthly, it can apply to the content of what is published or disseminated. At the first level, regulation mainly relates to technical matters of standards, connectivity, and pricing, ostensibly in the interests of the industry itself and consumers. At the second level, issues of ownership, concentration, and diversity are most prominent. Regulation of production is not extensive, but there are sometimes controls on the amount of production and use of raw materials and other resources, plus various labor and industry related laws. The conduct of media organizations in collecting information may also be subject to regulation or self regulation. Content regulation is hard to reconcile with media freedom, but it is nevertheless quite extensive, justified by fears of public and private harm, especially where large scale audiovisual media are involved. In many broadcasting systems there is still effectively a form of censorship, largely with public approval. In general, the more distant regulation stands from the point of production and the actual content, then the more compatible it is deemed to be with press freedom.

ISSUES OF MEDIA REGULATION

The issues leading to demands for regulation can be classified as either of public or private concern. They can also be differentiated as either negative (the prevention of harm) or positive (securing some public benefit). In respect of public issues, the main headings of potential regulatory activity are as follows:

- *Safeguarding public order and the security of the state.* Most relevant are the possible stimulation of unrest, encouragement of criminal activities, subverting the justice system, publishing state or defense secrets, and assisting (wittingly or not) terrorist actions.
- *Respecting public mores.* This relates to matters of public taste and decency, portrayal

of sex and violence, bad language, blasphemy, and disrespect for national or patriotic symbols.

- *Securing public sphere benefits.* The reference is mainly to the encouragement of positive media contributions to the working of the democratic political system and other social and cultural institutions. The heading covers issues of access and diversity arising out of media concentration. Similar remarks apply to expected cultural benefits from the media.
- *Respecting human rights.* Questions of discrimination, prejudice, and encouragement of violence in relation to various kinds of minorities arise here.

In the private sphere, the following issues are prominent:

- *The protection of individual rights* to reputation, privacy, respect, and dignity.
- *Preventing offense to individuals* by way of shock, alarm, fear, disgust, distress, insult, etc.
- *Preventing harm to individuals.* Harm to publication can take several forms, including material loss as a result of defamation, moral corruption, instigation to suicide or violence, and incitement to violence on the part of others.
- *Protection of property rights* in communication and information. New media have extended the forms of intellectual property beyond those covered by original copyright laws.

There are other matters on which media may be regulated, especially in relation to infrastructure and structural and economic matters. In the latter respect, media are generally subject to regulations that apply to other firms and organizations.

MEDIA POLICY AND REGULATION

Although there are many ad hoc regulations to deal with specific issues arising from the operation of mass media, we can also identify some general principles underlying public policy for media that provide some degree of consistency

and also justifications for intervention in what should be free activities. The principles vary in salience and form of expression in policy according to place and circumstances, but there is widely shared agreement that mass media have a considerable potential for good or ill that may require some limitation or supervision. The main purposes of public policy can be summarized as follows:

- To guarantee freedom of publication.
- To protect individuals and society from possible harm.
- To promote a diversity of provision in terms of sources and content.
- To ensure wide or even universal access to communication facilities for private use and to participation in the mass media audience.
- To promote a number of social and cultural goals, including local, national, and sectional identification.
- To maintain open and effective markets in media services.

These goals are not always consistent with each other, especially when market operation conflicts with social and cultural objectives or where intervention to secure social and cultural goals interferes with market operation. The most basic potential contradiction is between guaranteeing freedom and also willing ends that freedom may not deliver.

PHASES AND MODELS OF REGULATION

The main phases of development of media technology had given rise to successive and corresponding models of media regulation that have coexisted with each other and to some extent still do so. The main models are as follows.

Print media, having escaped from early forms of control, have also avoided re regulation, especially any applying to content or involving advance censorship. Even so, print media can be held accountable for certain forms of private harm to individuals and limits can be placed on ownership and control. The general model of (non) regulation of print can be described as a "free press model." By default, music and film

have a similar regulatory position, although often without any constitutional protection.

Regulation of telegraph, wireless, telephony, and postal services accompanied the introduction of these new technologies in the late nineteenth century, with particular reference to ownership and control, connectivity, security, and technical standards. These media were not used for mass distribution, but mainly for internal use by businesses, bureaucracies, governments, transport services, and the military. The main aims of regulation were to ensure rapid development, technical efficiency and, where relevant, universality of service; to serve the strategic and military interests of the state; and to comply with international agreements for cross border communication and use of air waves. A common instrument of regulation was the state monopoly (although not in the US) – the traditional national PTT that has only recently largely disappeared. The model of regulation covering these media has been called that of a “common carrier” because they offer open access to all persons and content. For the most part, new online media have been developed under this model.

The new audiovisual media, starting with the cinema and extending to include radio and television broadcasting by mid twentieth century, attracted stringent forms of control. The aims of regulation of these “new” mass media were mixed and not always openly stated. The more ostensible reasons were the allocation of limited access to the channels; to protect health and safety (e.g., cinema regulation and rules affecting advertising of alcohol and tobacco); to safeguard morals and uphold public decency; to prevent harm to vulnerable individuals and to society (by the possible stimulation of violence, crime, or public disorder); allocation of limited access; to provide various educational, cultural, and informational public benefits. Less open motives were to maintain political and social control of a potentially destabilizing or disruptive influence; to protect the security and sovereignty of the state; to serve the national interest, commercially and politically; to protect existing media from excessive competition. This type of regulation has generally been described as a “broadcasting model.” Despite varied aims, this model is characterized by a strong focus on content and potential (harmful) effects.

Since the late twentieth century, regulatory models have gradually been adapted in order to take account of new communication technologies and other changes. Firstly, “broadcasting” is no longer limited in its distribution capacity (end of scarcity), nor restricted to the national space, thus removing the motive of allocating the scarce resource of access. In practice, allocation has been increasingly left to the market. Secondly, digital technology has abolished the clear boundary between print, broadcasting, and telecommunications, and along with it the rationale for the separate regimes (convergence of modes of communication). An additional factor has been a strong deregulatory trend, driven by liberal ideology, forces of globalization, and the widespread wish to maximize the economic benefits from new information technology. Between them, these changes have led to expansion, convergence, and the development of new media. This phase of media (de)regulation has also seen a further withdrawal from control of content, not least for reasons of practicality, given the impossibility of systematic monitoring and the lack of international forms of jurisdiction.

The most significant new medium – the Internet – has a somewhat ambiguous position in this account. It is the quintessential new medium, with immense capability, overlapping with all previous media. It is still almost entirely free from direct regulation of any kind. It began as a system for the exchange of scientific information by way of connected computers, but open for other uses and users, and it expanded rapidly after the invention of the web capability in the early 1990s, using international telephone connections. It has no formal central organization or national location, although there is a limited amount of direction by international, non profit bodies, especially the International Committee for Assigned Names and Numbers (ICANN). However, there are now many commercial Internet service providers with national locations that organize many activities and have in practice often come to be held liable in more than one national jurisdiction for uses of the Internet that contravene general laws affecting communication (e.g., libel). There is no international legal control for a medium whose activities often cross frontiers. As far as it can be placed within one of the regimes, it belongs to the “common

carrier” model applying to point to point communication. However, the Internet is increasingly being developed, as a result of broadband, as an alternative means of mass distribution (e.g., the downloading of music and film). There are also new issues of social concern that have arisen in relation to the Internet, especially to do with new types of “cybercrime,” national security, and threats to the integrity of the Internet system itself, on which so much business and other activity now depends. There are also new threats arising from the access that the Internet gives to young or vulnerable people in matters such as pornography and pedophilia. Despite its origins and some of its uses, the Internet is not beyond the scope of control and regulation (Lessig 1999) and increased regulation is more rather than less likely.

The factors mentioned have presented dilemmas for regulatory policy that have not been resolved, partly because they require international agreements. There has been international regulation of postal and telecommunications media from the early days of the telegraph, but traditionally mass media have been treated as matters for sovereign states and there is still only limited potential for cross national control, not least because of the need to safeguard communication freedom. The European Union has succeeded in agreeing some regulatory measures relating to cross border television transmission, but it is up to national governments to implement the rules.

THE MEANS OF REGULATION

When regulation is broadly defined to cover all forms of governance and all varieties of media, the range of forms is very wide. However, we can summarize the possibilities in terms of two dimensions, one of degree of formality (and thus of compulsion), the other according to whether the regulation is predominantly external or internal. This gives rise to four main categories. *Formal, external* regulation refers to laws and other public regulations to which media are obliged to conform. This includes the specific laws for press, broadcasting, and communication that some countries have, as well as general laws applying to all citizens that also apply to media (e.g., concerning defamation, respect for

property rights or privacy, incitement to hatred, crime, or violence). The largest body of media law is directed at broadcasting, both in respect of the constitution of public broadcasting systems that are still an important feature of many systems and dealing with the external regulation of private broadcasting. *Formal, internal* regulation covers the management and financial control exerted by a media firm in the pursuit of its objectives and with reference to obligations to clients, audiences, and society generally. The term *self regulation* applies to this category, where responsibility for meeting certain public standards is delegated to the media themselves. *Informal and external* regulation is a somewhat elastic category that covers the constraints exerted by market forces, lobby and pressure groups, and public opinion. *Informal, internal* regulation covers the control exerted by professionalism, organizational and work cultures, and sometimes embodied in voluntary codes of norms and practices that media claim to adhere to.

In the case of broadcast media, a near universal circumstance is that operators are licensed by the state or a regulatory body for a limited period and the licenses carry some conditions and requirements that form part of the regulatory framework. The reasons for licensing broadcasting, a practice inconsistent with true press freedom, lay originally in the scarcity of wavelengths and the need to allocate fairly and according to some principle of public benefit. Another reason lay (and still lies) in the fear of potentially harmful effects from what are believed to be powerful means of influence. There is great variability in the degree to which performance according to licenses is assessed.

A significant feature of change is the gradual shift from the direct regulation of the “broadcasting model” to a greater degree of self regulation by the various branches of the media themselves, by professional bodies such as associations of journalism, and by various external pressure groups and voluntary agencies concerned with media standards and transgressions. In a number of countries this has involved setting up a new (government appointed) regulatory authority between government and media with a wide ranging jurisdiction over economic, technical and accountability issues concerned with content.

Broadcasting aside, the means for regulating media are not considered very effective in practice or are uncertain in their efficacy. There are several reasons for this general state of affairs. One lies in the attachment to freedom of expression and publication which inhibits any drastic interference in what the media do. A second reason lies in the fact that most media operate in the free market and market disciplines are expected to take care of many external expectations or requirements of performance. The very fact of media operating under market conditions inhibits regulation, except where there is clear evidence of market failure, since this involves interfering in the working of the market and disturbing its operation. Where the market principle dominates there is a strong presumption that regulation should not require any aspect of performance that cannot be supported in economic terms. Despite these obstacles, one of the more effective instruments of regulation is action to limit concentration of ownership or cross ownership, since this is widely accepted in general as in the public (and market) interest.

THE FUTURE

The main trends in regulation that have been described involve a continuing process of deregulation, especially by increasing distance of government from media and increased reliance on market disciplines; a greater emphasis on economic and technological than content issues; the encouragement of self regulation by media industries; an attempt to increase the coherence of regulatory measures across different media; and small steps towards international regulation (accelerated somewhat by the wish to combat international crime and terrorism). A limiting condition for regulatory policy stems from the continuing expansion and change of all forms of media activity, making effective regulation more difficult or even impossible.

These issues are also influencing topics for research and theory. There is a good deal of international comparative inquiry, with a search for newer and more useful models of regulation. The emphasis has shifted somewhat from sociological approaches to legal, administrative, economic, and policy perspectives. Philosophical, ethical, and normative matters are also

receiving more attention in this area. The problems posed are evidently multidisciplinary as well as international in character. Even so, the basic tension referred to at the outset between freedom and regulation persists, although in changed forms. There is a real fear that digitalization can increase the powers of central control by way of electronic surveillance and monitoring, with an international reach. The apparent decline of regulatory power may be an illusion, although it will not be used, as in the past, to try and improve "communication welfare" in terms of equality, fairness, and quality of content, but for reasons of security.

SEE ALSO: Media; Media and Consumer Culture; Media and Globalization; Media Monopoly; Media, Network(s) and; Media and the Public Sphere; Politics and Media; Surveillance

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media and sport

Toni Bruce

In the twenty first century, it is almost impossible to escape the sports media. Mediated versions of sports events saturate the popular landscape via television, newspapers, magazines, video games, and the Internet. Billions of television viewers watch global events such as the soccer and rugby world cups and the Olympics. Television has helped to transform

sport to the point where broadcasters often dictate the constitution of specific competitions, rules and game times are regularly shifted to fit broadcast schedules, and advertisers pay huge sums to associate themselves with televised sports events. However, despite a long history of interdependence between sport and the media, the sociological analysis of the sports media has a relatively short history, and several significant areas remain underresearched.

Sociologists of sport initially paid little interest to the sports media as a research area. Intent on establishing the emerging subfield of sociology of sport within more traditional social scientific approaches grounded in structural functionalist theorizing, few of the early North American anthologies of sport in the late 1960s and early 1970s included a chapter on the sports media, and those that did relied upon historical research or the opinions of sports journalists rather than sociological analysis. However, by the 1980s, in concert with the burgeoning economic impacts of media investment in sports, the sociological analysis of the sports media appeared as a topic in its own right. By the 1990s, a diverse array of anthologies dedicated to the sports media began to appear.

Three major sport sociology publications, the *Sociology of Sport Journal*, the *Journal of Sport and Social Issues*, and the *International Review for the Sociology of Sport*, have regularly published analyses of the sports media, and special issues devoted to the topic have appeared in a variety of other journals including the *Gannett Center Journal*, *Media Information Australia*, *Arena Review*, and the *Journal of Communication*. More recently, the widespread and accelerating interlinking of sport and the media which has led to the unprecedented visibility of sport in popular culture has resulted in an explosion of interest from many fields of study, including the humanities, media studies, communication, leisure studies, and history.

However, sociologists of sport – operating at the intersection of mainstream sociology which showed little interest in the media, and mass communication and media studies which have rarely focused on sport – have been at the forefront of mapping the importance of the sports media in reinforcing dominant cultural ideologies. They have demonstrated that the sports media, and particularly television,

operate as a powerful conservative force. Rather than merely reflecting culture, the sports media play a constitutive role in a culture's understandings of itself. The popularity of sport and its apparent separation from political interference, reinforced by seemingly objective visual evidence, mean that sports media stories and narratives are potent sites for essentializing and naturalizing difference, particularly in regard to gender and race.

Early research was conducted in one of two theoretical traditions, both of which continue to inform the field, albeit unevenly. The “uses and gratifications” approach, based in social psychology, emerged from the North American mass communications field and was prominent in early United States research. Its continuing focus is on how the media, and television in particular, meets individuals' internal psychological and biological needs. Research drawing on British cultural studies and feminist theorizing has focused on issues of cultural power and ideology. Much of this work explains how media texts and production techniques ideologically construct cultural understandings of race, gender, sexuality, national identity, disability, class, and consumption in ways that maintain current power relations. Thus, at the same time that researchers in the United States were conducting experimental manipulations of television commentary to assess the effects of violence and conflict on television viewers, British researchers were drawing upon the ideas of Louis Althusser, Antonio Gramsci, and Raymond Williams to identify the structural and ideological effects of the mediation of sport through analyses of media coverage.

Current research is interdisciplinary and reflects a wide variety of theoretical positions, ranging from positivist and liberal feminist to figurational, phenomenological, and postmodern. The bulk of research engages at some level with the key concepts of power and ideology, and much of it is either directly or implicitly influenced by cultural studies, semiotics, critical theory, and various feminisms. The openness to a variety of theoretical perspectives that marks this field of research is reflected in the multiplicity of methods that have been employed by sports media scholars, including experimental and quasi experimental designs, random sample telephone surveys, in depth

interviews, fieldwork with media workers, personal narratives, collective stories, case studies, and content analysis and textual readings of sports media texts.

The focus of most research has been on media coverage of highly visible professional sports and athletes competing in global competitions such as the Olympic Games and tennis grand slams, international men's world cups in soccer and rugby, and major men's within nation sports such as basketball, football, baseball, and hockey in North America. Other sports that have attracted attention include handball, skydiving, women's basketball, windsurfing, skateboarding, women's rugby, professional wrestling, boxing, hammer throwing, and women's soccer.

Sports media scholars understand the sports media nexus as consisting of three interrelated areas. The first is the encoding or production of media texts, including the broader social, economic, and political contexts within which media organizations operate. The second is the texts and the "preferred" messages that are encoded in them, and the third is the decoding or interpretation of the texts by audiences. Although sport scholars acknowledge the importance of all three areas, empirical and the theoretical research into production and audience interpretations has lagged behind an overwhelming focus on sports media texts.

Most sports media research involves content analysis and textual readings of sports media texts with a focus on how the media representation of sports reproduces, legitimates, and sometimes challenges relations of domination. Much of this research has been influenced by Stuart Hall's (1980) encoding/decoding model of communication and, in particular, his proposition that "preferred" messages supporting dominant ideologies are encoded through production techniques such as visual images and commentary. Thus, much attention has been devoted to identifying the "preferred" or "dominant" messages that are encoded into sports media texts. Textual readings have encompassed a wide range of topics, including gender, race, national identity, sexuality, drug use, violence, illness, disability, football hooliganism, and celebrity. The range of content analyses has remained more limited, focusing primarily on gender, race, and disability.

Despite being underpinned by a wide variety of theoretical and methodological approaches, textual readings and content analyses clearly indicate that sport is overwhelmingly constructed in the mass media as a male arena, with professional male sports represented as the pinnacle of sporting value and achievement. The media representation of sport as the natural domain of men has ensured an ongoing concern with issues of gender in sports media texts. The analysis of gender has expanded from an early and continuing liberal feminist focus on documenting the absence and trivialization of sportswomen to include a variety of critical feminist positions focused on the role of the sports media in the social construction of masculinities, femininities, and sexualities. More than 25 years of textual and content analyses have identified a variety of techniques that operate to trivialize and sexualize female athletes and celebrate violent and instrumental masculinity. Independent of their level of success, females who reflect western ideals of attractiveness and heterosexuality and males who demonstrate willingness to risk pain and injury in full contact or physically dangerous sports receive the most coverage. Analysis of everyday media coverage of female athletes has revealed that most coverage reflects ambivalence, where positive descriptions and images of women athletes are juxtaposed with descriptions and images that undermine and trivialize their efforts and successes. Even during international sporting events, when coverage of women increases markedly as nationalism overrides gender as the key marker of identity, examples of ambivalent coverage abound.

Analyses of race strongly suggest an ongoing commonsense acceptance of black athleticism that works to naturalize the categories of "black" and "white" as distinct and biologically based. More specifically, despite research with male television commentators showing an awareness of racial stereotyping and a desire to avoid it, the texts of mediated sport appear to regularly draw upon racial stereotypes of black men as "athletes" and white men as leaders and hard workers. In its visual and narrative representations, televised sport naturalizes the fascination with black athleticism and recaptures the mind-body dualism that has dominated popular racial discourses.

In the face of theoretical arguments about the death of the nation state, sports media scholars point to the importance of the sports media in actively recreating and constructing the nation. Although sport itself is marked by the transnational flow of athletes, media coverage of international sport is imbued with ideologies of nationalism. Through visuals of national flags and athletes in national uniforms, the music of national anthems, and narratives and headlines emphasizing national unity, the sports media function as a potent site at which the nation is symbolically reconstructed.

Some research has focused on specific production techniques, such as image choice and length, music, commentary and narrative, headlines, and the use of slow motion and instant replay, that are intended to appeal to audiences and generate the intense involvement and identification demonstrated by sports fans.

A continuing drawback of textual and content analysis is an implicit assumption that analyses of texts reveal something about how audiences might interpret or be influenced by them. Many analyses of sports media texts imply that audiences may internalize and accept sports media messages as truth. For example, underlying much of the research on mediated images of women's sport is the assumption that trivializing, stereotypical, or ambivalent messages must necessarily disempower females. This assumption may partly explain the absence of empirical research into audiences for sport. Thus, despite the billions of people who regularly watch, listen to, and read about sports, sport sociologists know little about the ways that audiences actually make sense of the media representations they consume.

Although research on sports media audiences continues to reflect the existing division in theoretical traditions between uses and gratifications and cultural studies approaches, researchers using both perspectives reject the notion that audiences passively and uncritically absorb media content. Research points to a variety of responses by audiences who engage with sports media texts for a range of reasons. A number of studies have drawn upon Hall's theory that although preferred messages construct the boundaries within which audiences can interpret media texts, there are a variety of positions – ranging from dominant to

negotiated to oppositional – within which decodings can occur.

The importance of commentary in structuring audience understandings emerged from some early research from a uses and gratifications perspective. Using experimental methods to manipulate commentary to highlight or downplay violence or conflict, the researchers concluded that commentary was more important than images in influencing audience understandings of what they were viewing. Researchers working in the critical cultural studies traditions have drawn upon in depth interviews and observations of small groups of television viewers to suggest that making sense of the sports media is an active, interpretive process involving texts and audience members in specific personal, cultural, and historical locations that cannot be predicted from analysis of texts alone. Research on sports media audiences points to gender differences in consumption, with the undeniable masculine bias of sports coverage making it more difficult for many females to identify as fans and experience pleasure in their viewing.

Research on media production falls into two key areas. The first explores the broad cultural, political, and economic contexts within which media and sports organizations collaborate to produce mediated sport, and the second focuses on the processes of producing media texts. Researchers focused on the broader context have drawn attention to the ways in which the increasing linkages between sports and global media organizations have affected the structure and global circulation of popular professional sports. Grounding their analysis in theories of political economy, sports scholars have identified a global sports media nexus that is increasingly marked by vertical and horizontal integration in which global communications companies simultaneously own interests in sports teams, television rights, and media outlets such as newspapers, magazines, Internet sites, and radio and television stations. Research into the sports media nexus identifies the importance of sport to global corporations for whom it offers relatively inexpensive television programming that is highly desired by a key target audience of males aged 18–49 with disposable income. Thus, sport becomes *the* spectacle through which these corporations

generate viewers, corporate sponsorship, advertising, and profits.

The small but growing research into the processes of producing televised sport has identified a wide range of beliefs and practices that media workers use to translate “what happened” into a program that makes “good” television. Field based observations and interviews form the core methodologies as sports media scholars have explored the production of televised downhill skiing, golf, track and field, soccer, ice hockey, and basketball. With few exceptions, the television research focuses on the production of men’s sports. It has identified taken for granted professional beliefs that generally reflect dominant ideologies of masculinity and femininity, race, capitalism, and the importance of success.

The practices and ideologies that underpin the production of print media have been captured primarily by interviewing, field observation, and survey methods. Research concerns include how sports writers understand their position in the broader field of journalism, interactions between sports writers and sports personnel such as athletes, coaches, and support staff, and how specific professional ideologies embraced by sports writers contribute to the stories and images that are published. This research reveals that sports media personnel tend to draw upon and generally reflect widely circulating ideologies as they attempt to construct coherent narratives and images about sports events. A small body of phenomenological and feminist work investigating the experiences of women sports writers covering major men’s sports in North America has pointed to the importance of gender in determining interactions within the men’s locker rooms that the sports designate as the official interview areas.

Although the conservative role of the media in reinforcing and producing dominant ideologies has been well researched, studies of sites in the sports media nexus, such as during production or audience consumption, at which relations of domination might be challenged or subverted, are rare. Few full scale projects incorporating all three levels – production, texts, and audiences – have been undertaken and there remains a need for more studies of production and audience interpretation.

The first anthology devoted to sports advertising appeared in 2005, and it may encourage research into a broader range of sports media production and consumption contexts such as talkback radio, non commercial media, video games, the Internet, specialist magazines, and non live sports television shows which have received only limited attention. Sociologists of sport are expected to expand their research into these and other emerging forms of sports media as they continue to develop sophisticated explanations of the media in contemporary society.

SEE ALSO: Disability Sport; Gender, Sport and; Media; Media and Consumer Culture; Sport and Culture; Sport and Ethnicity; Sport and Race; Sport as Spectacle

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mediated interaction

Helen Wood

The phrase mediated interaction is now more popularly associated with the speed and ease of Internet connections which facilitate new ways of creating electronic interpersonal relationships and community building through facilities like web forums, SMS messaging, and ICQ. But that is to ignore the involvement of much of the “mass media” – and that phrase itself is problematic – interceding in forms of human life and relationships. Psychiatrists

Horton and Wohl (1956) wrote of the ways in which the mass media, radio, television, and film, give an illusion of face to face relationships between spectator and performer which they describe as “*para social*.” More recently, John Caughie has talked about the potential for *pseudo* involvements with media figures as “mediated social relationships.” The focus here is on continuities produced through different media over time in their various involvements in the human business of “interaction.”

Take television as a case in point. When talking about some forms of television like talk shows, there is discussion about how the elevation of the audience to the stage is part of a breaking down of the distinction between spectacle and spectator in modern public life. This has an important impact on the communicative strategies of the media, since Carpignano et al. (1990) suggest that the phenomenon is bringing about “new social relationships of communication embodied in the television medium which have progressively undermined the structural dichotomy between performance and audience.” How then can we think of these “new social relationships” built by the media’s forms? Traditional semiotic tools from media studies, which illuminate symbolic meanings, do not help us here. More useful is a perspective generated by authors such as Meyrowitz (1985) and Thompson (1994, 1995), who are concerned with the media’s communicative impact on daily life.

These authors locate such phenomena within wider conceptual themes presented by late modernity. They begin to represent a *social* theory of the media which reaches beyond traditional schools of thought descended from structuralism and semiotics. Thompson (1994) suggests that there is a poverty of resources in thinking about the way in which the media are embedded within the social world and are part of daily communicative action: “One is left with the impression that, for most social theorists, the media are like the air that we breathe: pervasive, taken for granted, yet rarely thought about as such.” Refusing some of the dominant paradigms which have overly concentrated on the determining effect of the media as a form of social control, he attempts to describe the way in which the media have had an impact on the nature of social interaction whereby “mediated

quasi interaction” supplements face to face communication in the modern world.

Television has often been thought about as a domestic medium whereby the home, the domestic, and suburbia are embedded within television’s history and form, which necessitates research into television’s place within family relationships and domestic politics. In turn, the space of the home as a site of the reconstruction of patriarchal relations has made gender central to thinking about television and the home. Hobson’s (1980) pioneering essay exactly intervened in this debate when she described the importance of the radio in providing companionship in the lonely space of the home in the daytime, as well as the way in which the scheduling of radio programs helped order the otherwise structureless day to day of the housewife. Notions of companionship and the everyday are suggestive of a type of familiar and even intimate relationship that women might have with broadcasting that is not directly related to the semiotic encoding of meaning. It is possible that this relationship is partly experienced as a type of mediated interaction (Wood 2005).

The media clearly play a determining role in generating new forms of interaction and new kinds of social relationships between individuals which have emerged from the changing phenomenological conditions of the contemporary era. Although not directly addressing the media *per se*, Giddens (1990) highlights the characteristics of modernity as partly due to the changes that have occurred in the social arrangements of space and time, whereby people inhabiting the premodern world would experience time as inextricably bound to a sense of place, whereas the modern era is characterized by “empty time” as an increasingly globalized sense of temporal arrangements. He refers to this as “time space distanciation,” whereby time and space have become increasingly dislocated in a modern world through the ongoing process of the disembedding of social systems: “by disembedding I mean the ‘lifting out’ of social relations from local contexts of interaction and their restructuring across indefinite spans of time space” (p. 21).

What then does this mean in terms of the media? Put simply, technological mechanisms have “lifted” social relations out of face to face contexts and “stretched” them across vast

distances. Therefore, we experience events happening at a distance, possibly even at a different moment in time, as though they are “live,” whereby “media events” are increasingly choreographed for the cameras as much as for the co present spectators (Dayan & Katz 1992). Social relationships therefore are no longer confined to the local. Modern communications systems mean that we can engage in interaction with distanced and absent speakers where co present and co spatial arrangements are no longer required. While at the same time consumption of media takes place in locations distant from each other, the moments of reception are simultaneous, which may have a huge impact on human relationships and the shaping of individual and collective identities (Moore 1997).

The process of “reembedding” provides a key to understanding the formation of new social relationships through the mediation of experience. Reembedding is “the reappropriation or recasting of disembedded social relations so as to pin them down . . . to local conditions of time and place” (Giddens 1990: 79–80). Moore (1997, 2000) articulates the way in which one can take this concept and apply it to mediated encounters. For instance, in the modern age we rely upon the trust we place in the institutional representatives of “expert systems,” such as that we place in architects as we sit in our homes, or in the aircrew as we board a plane. As we, lay individuals, come into contact with representatives of these expert systems, they engage in “facework commitments” where we are encouraged to place our trust in them – such as the rehearsed pleasantries of flight attendants as they allay our fears in the air. According to Moore (2000:112): “Without pushing Giddens’s notion of reembedding too far . . . we can fruitfully extend his notes on trust in co present encounters so as to take account of the facework commitments made by media figures in their regular interactions with absent viewers and listeners.” In taking his lead, we are not drawing upon concepts such as “simulacrum” and “hyperreality,” as put forward by Baudrillard and other postmodern theorists, which are suggestive of a “fake” or “substitute” world in which the media have duped the masses into an “unreal” set of relationships. Rather, we are focusing on how the media, and our use of them

(despite the reticent use of qualifiers such as *pseudo* and *para* in describing mediated social forms), can reconfigure parts of everyday communication through a mediated reality.

It is not too difficult to apply these sentiments to the ever changing space of new media forms. Obviously, the Internet and its encroaching impact upon other media technologies, gaming, broadcasting, cinema, etc., produces a context in which, increasingly, “connectivity” and not just “reception” defines our modes of engagement with different aspects of the media. While at present “interactivity” remains a marketing buzzword in the push to establish and maintain new kinds of relationships with niche audiences, it is clear that there is a continuum in which “mediated interaction” is taking on new forms of more explicitly two way communication which open out the electronic/lived space of everyday interaction. That is not to say that there is a finite economy of interaction where there exists a deficit model in which forms of mediated interaction encroach upon “real” interaction. Rather, we need to account for the spaces in which newly negotiated identities, “virtual communities,” etc. take shape in the contemporary context, and begin to redraw the lines and barriers of/to communication. All of which of course require charting in terms of their relationship with the very real, and not “quasi,” inequalities of the social world.

SEE ALSO: Audiences; Community and Media; Consumption and the Internet; Cyberculture; Information Technology; Interaction Order; Internet; Media; Mediation; Reception Studies; Television

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mediation

Brett Nicholls

The term mediation has historically functioned in four distinct ways. First of all, the concept has been employed as a third term in a triadic structure, mediating between one state of reality and another. Secondly, the concept refers to the technical transmission of messages, such as mass media. In this case, the sense of reality that the transmission conveys is under scrutiny. Thirdly, the concept refers to the dominance of media in contemporary constructions of knowledge. In this case the concept is analogous to mediatization. And fourthly, mediation refers to the process of linking nodal points in a network or an assembled structure, where reality is produced or performed. The first understanding has been the main focus of critical thought. The second developed in the context of industrial forms of mass media. And the third and fourth emerged recently as a consequence of post industrial or postmodern processes and the subsequent transformation of society.

Conventionally, the verb “mediate” has the meaning of interposing something as a medium between two things that are not connected.

This implies a separation of the things and the necessity of mediation, as in the human soul and God, the subject and the object, the individual and society. To mediate is to connect or reconcile separate things. Mediation is thus a third term between two things. It can function as a technological form in the case of media, the structure of consciousness in philosophy, or in the form of a third person in Christian theology or law. "Mediation" is also the contrary of immediacy, a direct connection or relation without the necessity of a third term. We could, for instance, distinguish between immediate experience, which would be to experience and understand an object directly as it is, and mediated experience, which would be to experience and understand an object via an intermediary. For the most part, the view that experience and understanding are mediated prevails. As social beings, our knowledge of the world is not received first hand but is mediated through specific structures such as mass media and institutions, language, the body, and consciousness itself.

The concept of mediation thus marks the tension between the "real" world as it is and the world as it is perceived and understood. This tension has been a philosophical problem since the ancients. It stands at the center of Plato's well known "Allegory of the Cave," in which Plato describes knowledge that fails to achieve the condition of philosophy. Occupying "a sort of underground den," the inhabitants are cut off from the outside, apart from the light that passes through an entrance that remains unseen. The world outside appears in the form of shadows and reflections on the wall of the cave, and even though these images are merely the mediation of the actual world, the people in the cave, who know no other reality, think that they are reality. For Plato, the perceived reality of the cave dwellers is incomplete, and they themselves are in many senses duped.

As the "Allegory of the Cave" reveals, Plato viewed mediated knowledge with suspicion. This suspicion continues to prevail in contemporary thinking and serves as a basis for critiques of social institutions and mass media. The tension between the actual world and our knowledge of it, between the material object and its mediation, has been central for philosophy and sociology. The possibility of direct

knowledge was a crucial issue for the idealist philosopher Immanuel Kant. Kant famously established the view that we cannot know the thing in itself. What we do know are the appearances of things as they are presented to consciousness through the senses. The demarcation of appearances and things was crucial to Kant, who aimed to outline the validity of reason free from the object, and guarantee the condition of freedom, the necessary condition for morality.

The prevailing sense of "mediation," in German *Vermittlung*, that emerges within idealism is that of reconciling opposites or establishing the harmony of opposites within the totality. After Kant's insistence upon appearances, mediation was celebrated as the basis for a stable sense of selfhood. Fichte would champion mediation dialectically as the unity of "the I," in which subject and object become one. Mediation is the third space of reflection, the arbitration of a dispute between opposites, with the result that in the middle everything is unified and connected, but the extremes remain opposed. Schelling likewise uses the term to describe the philosophical task of designating a point in which the object and its concept originally and without any mediation become one. Following Fichte and Schelling, Hegel refined the term via its relation to immediacy. To shore up the harmony of absolute knowledge with the structure of the known object, the core of Hegel's idealism, he introduces a triadic structure: the immediate, the mediated, and mediated immediacy. The immediate, the intrinsic nature of the object, is situated in an opposite relation to the "mediated," the object as it has been formed in a field of relations. This opposition is itself mediated, since both immediate and mediated processes structure things, knowledge, and logic for Hegel. Descartes, for instance, is mediated by his education, but through the process of sublation is able to rise above this education to be immediately aware of his own existence. The condition of doubt, famously outlined by Descartes, is a mediated immediacy (Hegel 1991: 113). Similarly, Hegel (1942) draws mediation into his theory of the state. Focusing on the immediacy of life and the will, Hegel charts how the minds of individuals are in conflict with other individuals in the marketplace and within civil

society. These conflicts, however, are ultimately mediated by the state. The state, Hegel argues, is an actuality with a history that is the materialization of the Absolute Spirit, God. It “is the actuality of the ethical Idea,” existing “immediately in custom, mediately in individual self consciousness, knowledge, and activity, while self consciousness in virtue of its sentiment towards the state, finds in the state, as its essence and the end product of its activity, its substantive freedom” (Hegel 1942: 155).

If idealism championed mediation as reflection and harmony, Marx focused upon contradiction and disharmony and opened the way for critical thought. A suspicion of the processes of mediation is central in this endeavor. Questioning the emphasis upon harmony in idealism, Marx (1975) contended that Hegel’s theory of the state is merely an “abstraction” that fails to grasp the life of individuals “in their specific character” (p. 12). With this emphasis on the material conditions of life, Marx went on to demonstrate how the movement of Spirit in Hegel’s philosophy is materially produced. Hegel’s state is not the actual realization of the ethical idea and freedom; it is the effect of the actual relations of bourgeois civil society.

Emphasizing the inequality of the material conditions of life between workers and the owners of capital, Marx argued that bourgeois civil society is violent rather than harmonious. Within the capitalist mode of production the self mediating labor of natural being, the uncoerced labor that mediates between the subject and nature, is perverted by the second order mediations – money, exchange, and private property – that are imposed upon productive activity. The mature Marx developed his suspicion of second order mediations in his examination of the relationship between production and consumption (1986: 28–9), and the “mystical character of the commodity” (1996: 81–94). Production provides the material and structure for consumption, while consumption provides a subject for commodities. Consumption thus mediates production by reproducing the need for commodities, but production mediates consumption by “producing a definite object which must be consumed in a particular way” (Marx 1986: 29). Moreover, commodities themselves are mystical in the sense that they possess the material power to mediate social relations.

In this account, mediation functions surreptitiously, or ideologically, producing social harmony on the surface while injustice and possible conflict remain hidden underneath.

In the study of media the concept of mediation has taken a slightly different form. With the same suspicion that marks Plato’s account of the cave, media studies has focused on the media as a system of transmitting messages between parties. In this approach, media serve the function of mediating the relationship between the state and the citizen, and the market and the consumer. In this process the media represent and mediate the differences between social categories such as race, class, gender, sexuality, ethnicity, and age. Metaphors such as mirror, reflection, window, and frame (McQuail 1994: 64–6) have been employed to critically describe this mediating function of mass media. Issues of media power (Lazarsfeld & Merton 1948), consensus (Wirth 1948), bias (Innis 1951; Glasgow University Media Group 1976), distortion (Lang & Lang 1968), ideology (Hall 1977), media hegemony (Gitlin 1994), and the social agency of the media audience (Ang 1985) have emerged to critically engage with this mediating function. In each of these, the referential capacities of media texts and the social power of the media industries and media audiences are, in varying degrees, in question.

If understandings of mass media are produced in terms of mediation as the transmission of messages between unequal parties, in the context of the digitalization of media, the increased proliferation of information and images, and the rise of immaterial commodities, the conventional concept of mediation has been transformed. A new set of issues and problems for critical approaches to the media have begun to emerge. At the forefront of this emergence, the French sociologist Jean Baudrillard contends that the relationship between representation and reality has been fundamentally transformed. Conventionally, the media have been understood as a transmission technology representing reality, mediating social differences and mediating the individual and the actual world. But now instead of standing in for something other than itself, that is to transmit messages about the social world, the media are producing a (hyper)reality, a media reality that is “more real than the real world” (2001: 14–15). In other words, the

representation of reality produced by media texts has become privileged over, or is now more believable than, actual reality. Moreover, Baudrillard (1983) argues pessimistically that the increasing proliferation of signs and information in the media destroys conventional meaning and leads to the breakdown of the division of representation and reality. In this way of thinking, the media are reality and reality is the media. Mediation, for Baudrillard, is thus no longer possible. To put this another way, media in the conventional sense – a force mediating between reality and the individual and between individuals – disappear. What we have today are media that function as a black hole of signs, information, and images that produce and reproduce meanings as effects of simulation rather than political and economic reality.

Baudrillard's extreme position is highly contentious. Giddens, for instance, holds the view that media continue to serve an important existential function. A mediated experience, for Giddens, is detached from experiences that "raise disturbing existential questions" in everyday life. This is a process that he calls "sequestration" (1991: 168). The media's preoccupation with death and love, and so on, serves the purpose of furthering the process of sequestration. The media enable the audience to enrich existential sensibilities at a distance and shore up the ontological security necessary for everyday life. There is, of course, no ontological security in Baudrillard, but he does open up the question of mediation in ways that have been important for contemporary media studies. Giddens seems to have mass media in mind in his outline of the process of sequestration. Baudrillard, on the other hand, has a different view of media. Rather than mass media, which are associated with the rise of industrial capital, Baudrillard's work addresses post industrial capital and the increasing centrality of information in everyday life. As the critical differences between Giddens and Baudrillard reveal, the contemporary employment of the concept of mediation tends to be shaped by assumptions about the validity of post industrial capital and the information economy. If no radical transformation is assumed, critical approaches tend to discuss media as transmission. If the contemporary moment is considered as a newly formed informational order, critical approaches

reject the possibility of mediation or employ it in order to mark the process of assemblage.

Following the trajectory of post industrial capital, it is possible to push Baudrillard's insights in affirmative directions, while paying heed to his strong reservations about contemporary media culture. Through new media studies and work on networks, mediation has come to stand in for the processes of assemblage. This is the approach that sees social categories and identities as being produced in the process of connection and interaction. Media are an integral part of this process, along with other social institutions and social practices. What counts here are the connections themselves and the sorts of social realities that they produce. Baudrillard's pessimism is undermined by this view, since the process of mediation produces social interactions and possibilities. And Plato's suspicion no longer holds any ground. The focus is not on the harmonious or ideological intersection of two fixed entities but on the linkage of disparate entities, whereby these entities (human or institutional) gain power and identity only through the quantity, solidity, and strength of the linkages.

Stuart Hall's (1986a, b) concept of articulations, built on an engagement with Gramsci, anticipates this idea of mediation. Hall's idea of "articulated traditions" as a constructed and contingent collective voice is an assemblage of sorts. Articulations are concrete linkages that produce social realities. Hall uses the example of an "articulated lorry" – with the cab and trailer hooked together – to explain the term. Something that is hooked together, such as an articulated lorry, can be unhooked and recombined to produce a new permutation. As social and cultural arrangements, articulations are a kind of sorting process, organizing and linking disparate elements to produce social and cultural relationships. Importantly, these relationships and the political reality that they produce are flexible and contingent. The relationships do not prefigure the arrangement, as if produced by a social agent, they are produced by the linkages themselves. Articulated arrangements thus produce social and political identities, and are more like cyborgs than organic bodies that have evolved through time.

As the new form of mediation, articulated arrangements rely upon communicative

networks that enable real time connections. Articulations can be quickly formed as a response to shifting conditions and then deformed and reformed in new arrangements. Articulations thus produce new political and critical possibilities but they also open up new problems. The first is the problem of access to networks. As communicative infrastructures, such as the Internet, become more central in everyday life, the issue of who controls the infrastructure and our access to it becomes crucial. Moreover, access points can be easily modified – as in Internet service providers and telephone services – and social and cultural arrangements can become dependent upon the commercial imperatives of the owners of communicative infrastructures. The second problem is the impact of speed on critical thought. The mediating possibilities of information processing technologies operating at absolute speed, in real time, close down the temporal delay that enables a critical relation to media and to the production of knowledge.

As information processing technologies increasingly take on the role of organizing social life – through databases that store information about social subjects, along with devices for storing and organizing cultural memories such as photographs and movie files, profiling software for managing the vast media choices that are available, and search engines for packaging information in digestible chunks – social life is increasingly impacted by processes external to human thought that are operating with a machinic speed and precision. Rather than a reflective relationship to this knowledge – there is no third space of reflection in this structure as in idealism's celebration of mediation as arbitrating the dispute between opposites – the subject is caught up in the flow of information exchange. The task for the subject is to access the already organized information and set it to work as quickly and efficiently as possible (Deleuze 1992).

The question of mediation today is thus inseparably linked to philosophical and sociological understandings of technology, which engage with the function and the impact of technologies upon human consciousness, and with the production, distribution, and social use of knowledge. Along with the possibility of flexible arrangements, mediation is a term that now marks the problem of critical reflection, so

central for critical theory, and perhaps reveals the necessity for critical interventions that operate at speed. As Scott Lash (2002: 65), acutely aware of the problem of speed, writes, "sociocultural theory . . . at the turn of the twenty first century increasingly must take on the form of information, increasingly take on the form of media." The issue here is whether or not critical thought should speed up or slow down (Virilio 1986; Latour 2004). Clearly, the question of mediation today demands a form of critical thinking that is adequate to its speeding object.

SEE ALSO: Hyperreality; Information Technology; Internet; Media; Media, Network(s) and; Mediated Interaction; Representation; Stereotyping and Stereotypes; Technological Innovation; Technology, Science, and Culture

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medical malpractice

Ferris J. Ritchev

Medical malpractice is “an instance in which a physician or other medical practitioner causes injury or death to a patient through negligent behavior,” involving actions that fail to follow acceptable standards of practice (Cockerham & Ritchev 1997: 81). Uncertain medical conditions, however, make establishing negligence very difficult. Less than 20 percent of claims involve *res ipsa loquitur* cases, those that “speak for themselves,” such as amputation of a healthy limb. Some claims for injury and/or negligence are questionable, while out of court settlements occur to avoid litigation costs. After 1970, malpractice claims increased dramatically with crisis periods of greatly inflated liability insurance costs. Liability reform legislation has been introduced in every state.

Obtaining reliable data on claims rates, settlement/jury awards, efficacy of capping awards, and insurance company profits is hampered by accounting complexities, decentralized records systems, and the politics of stakeholders,

including physicians, patient consumers, hospitals, trial lawyers, and the liability insurance industry. Nonetheless, enough physicians have incurred claims that it is no longer a surprising event, especially for obstetricians and surgeons. Many historical and structural changes in medicine, law, and society are posited to explain increasing litigation. Whether it is due to more injuries or to changes in tort law is unclear; however, the rapid increase of all types of litigation suggests the latter.

Increasing litigation is consequential for health care access. Premium increases result from claim losses, anticipated losses, and periodic downturns in investment markets and insurance carrier profits. These costs ultimately are covered by consumers and third party payers. Fears of litigation and risk reduction strategies incur additional costs, including defensive medicine – physicians ordering extra tests, second opinions, and referrals to high cost specialists for fear that records may be scrutinized in court. Surgeons and obstetricians avoid rural areas where hospitals are ill equipped to handle problems. Liability insurance industry competition forces carriers to restrict underwriting of liability policies to less risky segments of the health care industry.

Malpractice issues are reflected in sociological theories such as “medical deprofessionalization” and “countervailing powers,” concepts that challenge notions of professional dominance (Hartley 2002). A key feature of risk management is that institutional forces outside of medicine impinge on a physician’s interactions with patients and other practitioners. Greater peer review, involvement of lawyers and risk avoidance consultants, and skepticism of patients greatly reduce practitioner work satisfaction and autonomy. Jurisdictional disputes and cultural conflict between the values and interests of lawyers and medicine are another theoretical perspective on the dynamics of litigation (Peeples et al. 2000).

Increased litigation is an instance of Max Weber’s rationalization theory and George Ritzer’s McDonaldization thesis. At the organizational level, rationalization increases specialization and reorders role task boundaries. When actuating premium charges, liability insurance carriers restrict procedures according to medical specialty and require certification,

resulting in clearer delineations among special lists (Ritchey 1981). Fear of litigation and mandated risk management tasks make physicians more willing to relinquish tasks to assisting health practitioners, such as clinical pharmacists and physical therapists. At the interpersonal level, fear of litigation influences patient-practitioner interaction. Early research on increasing litigation focused on patient attributes and "suit prone" patients. Later research focused on institutional and practitioner characteristics (years in practice, medical specialty) and circumstances (practice setting) (Ritchey 1993).

A specific aspect of rationalization theory as it applies to medical liability is the development of an "audit culture" (Strathern 2000) that calls for greater accountability: "external regulatory mechanisms transform the conduct of organizations and individuals in their capacity as 'self actualizing agents'" (Shore & Wright 2000: 61). After the 1980s, regulatory trends in business and government were reflected in "new managerialism," which fashioned strategies such as continuous quality management, discipline, cost benefit analysis, best practices, external verification, accountability, and total quality management (Pollitt 1993). These trends coincided with increases in litigation as well as shifts to managed care. Underlying these management strategies are the assumptions that all behavior can be made efficient and certain, but that judgments to these effects cannot be entrusted to those who are behaving. Peers, superiors, and external agents oversee performance audits. "[A]udit procedures present themselves as rational, objective and neutral, based on sound principles of efficient management – as unopposable as virtue itself" (Shore & Wright 2000: 61; Pollitt 1993: 49). Resistance to accountability procedures implies unethical incompetence and even immorality. An untoward treatment outcome perhaps unrelated to physician behavior, such as an infant born with congenital defects, may nonetheless be perceived as a moral failure. In an accountability oriented society, medical uncertainty must coexist with the highly valued ideal of calculated certainty. Practice standards are defined within legal and moral as well as medical contexts. Although very few malpractice suits make it to court, the potential for a trial or deposition hearing can be perceived as a "Day

of Judgment" (Shore & Wright 2000: 59). Extra professional regulatory mechanisms, the means by which accountability is purported to be achieved, often become ends in themselves. Even where indicators of quality are of suspect validity and reliability, measuring it becomes a "ritual of verification" (Power 1997). This shift to asserting legitimacy in form rather than substance is a classic case of formal rationalization and it clashes head on with the ideal of professional autonomy.

SEE ALSO: Health Care Delivery Systems; Health Professions and Occupations; McDonaldization; Managed Care; Media Sociology; Professional Dominance in Medicine; Rational Choice Theories; Weber, Max

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medical school socialization

Frederic Hafferty

The study of medical education as a process of professional socialization is at best a dormant and at worse a dying object of academic inquiry. What once helped to legitimate an emerging academic field (medical sociology) in the 1950s and 1960s has since fallen on hard conceptual and analytic times. Today, cutting edge work on socialization appears not in sociology journals (where many of the earlier studies were published), but in journals such as *Academy of Management Journal*, *Administrative Science Quarterly*, and the *Journal of Organizational Behavior*. Within sociology, current work on socialization appears in subfields such as political sociology, the sociology of family (including parenting, child, adolescent, and spousal roles), mass media, and organizational sociology. Even when we restrict our focus to the “medicine,” studies of training and socialization are more apt to highlight other professions (or “quasi professions”) such as nursing, pharmacy, dentistry, physical therapy, mortuary science, and athletic training.

LEGACY

Forty years ago, the two most frequently cited studies on medical student training and socialization were Robert Merton and colleagues’ *The Student Physician* (1957) and Howard Becker and colleagues’ *Boys in White* (1961). The same is true today – a glaring commentary on the current paucity of well designed and comprehensive research in this field.

Both the Merton and Becker studies were large scale and well funded efforts to study the normative impact of undergraduate medical education. What sometimes is overlooked is that both were less about medical school training than they were opportunities to advance competing theoretical perspectives. The Merton team operated from a structural functional perspective, while Becker and company approached their study from a symbolic interactionist perspective.

Neither Becker nor Merton would return to the study of medical education in any substantive way, and while neither study provided the hoped for empirical knockout punch, both studies played a highly important role in advancing the subfield of medical sociology, along with the study of socialization (at least for a while), primarily in the field of nursing.

The legacy of these studies is multifaceted. Prior to the 1950s, the prevailing view of medical education was grounded in a “traits” perspective (Bloom 1989). Medical school admissions committees selected students who possessed “good” traits for a medical professional career and screened out students with “bad” traits. In turn, the education process would transmit the requisite knowledge and skills. “Core” personality traits were seen as fixed, unalterable by medical education. At best, students might internalize, via physician role models, what might be termed “clinical refinements.” Important work on adult (“secondary”) traits was still a decade into the future (Brim & Wheeler 1966). State of the times work on socialization is illustrated by Parsons and Platt (1970), who studied the widespread unrest taking place during the late 1960s on college campuses (including the particulars of student demonstrations at Harvard College, of which this author was a participant) and concluded that they had identified a new (and “important”) type of socialization: “studenty.” Merton and Becker, in comparison, represented a bolt of lightning across a field primarily lit by fireflies.

The flurry ignited by Becker and Merton would be short lived. In 1970, Eliot Freidson published his groundbreaking “Profession of Medicine” and “Professional Dominance.” Freidson argued, among a great many other things, that the current work environment was more predictive of work attitudes and efforts than prior socialization – and the sociological study of medicine began to shift from a more micro focus on professionalism and identity transformation to a more macro focus on organizational dynamics and structural change. Articles on medical school training continued to be published, but with a focus on student attitude change and the relationship of personality traits to specialty choice. The age of large scale investigations of education on identity and professionalism appeared to be over.

Nursing, reflecting a concern with its own professional status, continued to direct energies to the study of socialization and the internalization of a professional identity. Over time, however, even this commitment began to fade, finding some final respite within British sociology and studies of British medical and nursing training.

DEFINITIONS AND DIMENSIONS

The theoretical clashes between the Merton and Becker studies and the subsequent preference of sociologists for a symbolic interactionist approach to the study of medical student socialization notwithstanding, socialization is a process (sometimes involving rituals, ceremonies, and/or rights of passage) by which initiates/neophytes/"outsiders" acquire or internalize the norms (and normative behaviors), value systems (and related rationales supporting that value system), skills, and language (e.g., the culture) of a desired society, organization, or group. More colloquially, socialization involves "learning the ropes" or the "rules of the game." A commonly used metaphor, particularly within organization studies, is socialization as the "glue" that links the individual to social groups, as those groups wrestle with the dual problems of adapting to external forces and internal differentiation (Schein 1968). These definitional framings highlight (but do not exhaust) a number of important distinctions with respect to socialization. Specifically, socialization (1) involves the transmission of knowledge, skills, and values, with values sometimes assuming primacy; (2) involves the transmission of group or organizational "culture;" and (3) is (for some theoretical orientations) a special form of learning that involves internalization and identity formation.

EVOLVING FRAMEWORKS

Currently, medicine is being intersected by a number of social movements, all of which have implications for the way medicine is practiced – and with the potential for impact on medical student socialization. The three most prominent movements are professionalism, patient safety, and evidence based medicine (EBM).

Beginning in the mid 1980s, and driven by fears that medicine's "identity" and "soul" were being corrupted by the advent of managed care and the rise of "corporate medicine," organized medicine began to "rediscover" its professional core. A variety of medical groups, led by the American Board of Internal Medicine, the Accreditation Council of Graduate Medical Education, and the Association of American Medical Colleges, began to establish "core competencies" for medical students and residents, including "professionalism." Other groups (e.g., National Board of Medical Examiners) and private organizations (e.g., Arnold P. Gold Foundation) began to underwrite efforts to establish valid and reliable measures of professionalism. All of these (and related) efforts have direct implications for professional socialization, since there is still the issue of whether organized medicine will approach professionalism as something to be internalized (e.g., as a "core professional value") or as a "surface" attribute. Such distinctions will have a fundamental impact on how medical education is structured and delivered.

Similarly, issues of patient safety and EBM can be approached at the level of "knowledge" and/or "skill," or as an issue of "professional identity" and thus as something that would be grounded in socialization rather than "teaching." Organized medicine insists that it seeks change at the level of identity, but it remains to be seen whether the education and assessment processes will be structured to reflect this claim or whether things will play out at the level of social rhetoric – and thus outside the realm of socialization.

SEE ALSO: Emotion Work; Health Professions and Occupations; Hospitals; Mass Media and Socialization; Medical Sociology; Professional Dominance in Medicine; Resocialization; Socialization; Socialization, Agents of; Socialization, Anticipatory; Socialization, Gender; Socialization and Sport

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medical sociology

William C. Cockerham

Medical sociology is a subdiscipline of sociology that studies the social causes and consequences of health and illness (Cockerham 2004). Major areas of investigation include the social aspects of health and disease, the social behavior of health care workers and the people who utilize their services, the social functions of health organizations and institutions, the social patterns of health services, the relationship of health care delivery systems to other social systems, and health policy. What makes medical sociology important is the significant role social factors play in determining the health of individuals, groups, and the larger society. Social conditions and situations not only cause illness, but they also help prevent it.

In recognition of the broad impact of social factors on health, medical sociology is sometimes referred to as “health sociology” or the “sociology of health.” However, the traditional name “medical sociology” persists because it is preferred by many of its practitioners. Medical sociologists comprise one of the largest groups

of sociologists in the world. They have employment opportunities both within and outside of academia. Medical sociologists work not only in university sociology departments, medical, nursing, and public health schools and various other health-related professional schools, but also in research organizations and government agencies.

Medical sociology is a relatively new sociological specialty. It came of age in the late 1940s and early 1950s in an intellectual climate far different from sociology’s traditional specialties. Specialties like theory, social stratification, urbanization, social change, and religion had direct roots to nineteenth-century European social thought. These specialties were grounded in classical theory with major works by the subdiscipline’s founding figures. However, sociology’s early theorists ignored medicine because it was not an institution shaping society. An exception is Émile Durkheim’s *Suicide* (1951 [1897]), which is sometimes claimed as the first major work in the field. Medical sociology appeared in strength only in the mid-twentieth century as an applied field in which sociologists could produce knowledge useful in medical practice and developing public policy in health matters.

Moreover, physicians, not sociologists, produced much of the earliest literature in medical sociology. In the United States, John Shaw Billings, organizer of the National Library of Medicine and compiler of the *Index Medicus*, wrote about hygiene and sociology in 1879; Charles McIntire defined medical sociology in 1894; Elizabeth Blackwell, the first woman to graduate from an American medical school, published a collection of essays on medical sociology in 1902, as did James Warbasse in 1909 (Bloom 2002). The most important contribution came from Lawrence Henderson, a physician who taught a sociology course at Harvard in the 1930s. Henderson espoused structural functionalist theory and published a 1935 work on the patient–physician relationship as a social system. Henderson’s most direct influence on medical sociology was through Talcott Parsons, one of his students who became a leading figure in sociology (Bloom 2002). The first sociologist to publish extensively on medical sociology was Bernhard Stern, who wrote historical accounts of the role of medicine in society from the late 1920s until the early 1940s.

Medical sociology evolved as a specialty in sociology in response to funding agencies and policymakers after World War II who viewed it as an applied field that could produce knowledge for use in medical practice, public health campaigns, and health policy formulation. Ample funding for research to help solve the health problems of industrial society and the welfare state in the West during the post World War II era stimulated its growth. In 1949, for example, the Russell Sage Foundation in the United States funded a program to improve the utilization of social science in medical practice that resulted in books on social science and medicine and the role of sociology in public health. Particularly important was the establishment of the National Institute of Mental Health (NIMH) in the United States that funded and promoted cooperative projects between sociologists and physicians. A significant result of such cooperation was the publication in 1958 of *Social Class and Mental Illness: A Community Study* by August Hollingshead (a sociologist) and Frederick Redlich (a psychiatrist). This landmark study produced important evidence that social factors were correlated with different types of mental disorders and the manner in which people received psychiatric care. The book remains the seminal study of the relationship between mental disorder and social class. This study also played a key role in the debate during the 1960s leading to the establishment of community mental health centers in the United States.

At the beginning of medical sociology's expansion, many people in the field had tenuous roots in mainstream sociology and an orientation toward applied rather than theoretical work. Some had no training in medical sociology whatsoever. Many had been attracted to the subdiscipline because of the availability of jobs and funding for research. This situation led Robert Straus (1957) to suggest that medical sociology had become divided into two areas: sociology in medicine and sociology of medicine. The sociologist in medicine performed applied research and analysis primarily motivated by a medical problem rather than a sociological problem. Sociologists in medicine typically worked in medical, nursing, public health or similar professional schools, public health agencies, or health organizations like CDC and WHO.

Sociologists of medicine primarily worked in academic sociology departments and engaged in research and analysis of health from a sociological perspective.

The division in orientation created problems in the United States. Medical sociologists in universities were in a stronger position to produce work that satisfied sociologists as good sociology. Sociologists in medical institutions had the advantage of participation in medicine as well as research opportunities unavailable to those outside clinical settings. Disagreement developed between the two groups over whose work was the most important. What resolved this situation over time was a general evolution in medical sociology that saw both applied and theoretical work emerge on the part of medical sociologists in all settings. Medical sociologists in universities responded to funding requests for applied research, while some of their counterparts in medical institutions, like Anselm Strauss, produced important theoretical work.

A related problem in the early development of medical sociology was its potential to become dependent on medicine for its direction and research orientation. However, this did not happen, as medical sociologists adopted an independent course and made the practice of medicine one of its major subjects of inquiry, including its core relationships with patients and the organizational structure of health care delivery systems (Bloom 2002). Medical sociologists, in turn, brought their own topics to the study of health such as social stress, health lifestyles, and the social determinants of disease.

TALCOTT PARSONS

A decisive event took place in medical sociology in 1951 that provided a theoretical direction to a formerly applied field. This was the appearance of Parsons's *The Social System*. This book, written to explain a complex structural functionalist model of society, contained Parsons's concept of the sick role. Parsons had become the best known sociologist in the world and having a theorist of his stature provide the first major theory in medical sociology called attention to the young subdiscipline – particularly among academic sociologists. Anything he published attracted interest. Not only was Parsons's

concept of the sick role a distinctly sociological analysis of sickness, but it was widely believed by many sociologists at the time that Parsons was charting a future course for all of sociology through his theoretical approach. This did not happen. Nevertheless, Parsons brought medical sociology intellectual recognition that it needed in its early development by endowing it with theory. Moreover, following Parsons, other leading sociologists of the time such as Robert Merton and Erving Goffman published work in medical sociology that further promoted the academic legitimacy of the field.

THE POST PARSONS ERA

The next major area of research after Parsons developed his sick role concept was medical education. Merton and his colleagues (1957) extended the structural functionalist mode of analysis to the socialization of medical students, with Renée Fox's paper on training for uncertainty ranking as a major contribution. Four years later, Howard Becker and his associates published *Boys in White* (1961), a study of medical school socialization conducted from a symbolic interactionist perspective. This study became a sociological classic and was important for both its theoretical and methodological content. The techniques in participant observation provided a basis for the seminal work on death and dying and subsequent innovations in the theory and methods by Barney Glaser and Anselm Strauss (1965, 1967).

With the introduction of symbolic interaction into a field that had previously been dominated by structural functionalism, medical sociology became a significant arena of debate between two of sociology's major theoretical schools. This debate helped stimulate a virtual flood of publications in medical sociology in the 1960s. Moreover, the Medical Sociology Section of the American Sociological Association (ASA) was formed in 1959 and grew to become one of the largest and most active ASA sections. American influence was also important in founding Research Committee 15 (Health Sociology) of the International Sociological Association in 1967 (Bloom 2002). The Medical Sociology Group of the British Sociological Association (BSA) was organized in 1964 and

became the largest specialty group in the BSA, with its own annual conference.

In 1966 the *Journal of Health and Social Behavior*, founded in 1960, became an official ASA publication, making medical sociology one of the few sociological subdisciplines publishing its own journal under ASA auspices. In the meantime, in Great Britain, a new journal, *Social Science and Medicine*, was founded in 1967 and became an especially important journal for medical sociologists throughout the world. The growing literature in medical sociology also led to the publication of textbooks. The first textbook was Norman Hawkins's *Medical Sociology* (1958), but the early leaders were the first editions of books by David Mechanic (1968) and Rodney Coe (1970). Howard Freeman, Sol Levine, and Leo Reeder likewise made an important contribution by publishing the *Handbook of Medical Sociology*, which contained summary essays on major topics by leading medical sociologists. The first edition appeared in 1963 and the fifth edition in 2000, edited by Chloe Bird, Peter Conrad, and Allen Fremont.

During the 1960s, the symbolic interactionist perspective temporarily dominated a significant portion of the literature. One feature of this domination was the numerous studies conducted with reference to labeling theory and the mental patient experience. Sociologists expanded their work on mental health to include studies of stigma, stress, families coping with mental disorder, and other areas of practical and theoretical relevance. For example, Goffman's *Asylums* (1961), a study of life in a mental hospital, presented his concept of "total institutions" that stands as a significant sociological statement about social life in an externally controlled environment. An abundant literature emerged at this time that established the sociology of mental disorder as a major subfield within medical sociology (Cockerham 2006).

PERIOD OF MATURITY: 1970–2000

Between 1970 and 2000 medical sociology emerged as a mature sociological subdiscipline. This period was marked by the publication of two especially important books, Eliot Friedson's *Professional Dominance* (1970) and Paul Starr's *The Social Transformation of American Medicine*

(1982). Friedson formulated his influential “professional dominance” theory to account for an unprecedented level of professional control by physicians over health care delivery that was true at the time but no longer exists. Starr’s book won the Pulitzer Prize and countered Friedson’s thesis by examining the decline in status and professional power of the medical profession as large corporate health care delivery systems oriented toward profit effectively entered an unregulated medical market. Donald Light (1993) subsequently used the term “countervailing power” to show how the medical profession was but one of many powerful groups in society – the state, employers, health insurance companies, patients, pharmaceutical and other companies providing medical products – maneuvering to fulfill its interests in health care.

Another major work was Bryan Turner’s *Body and Society* (1984), which initiated the sociological debate on this topic. Theoretical developments concerning the sociological understanding of the control, use, and phenomenological experience of the body, including emotions, followed. Much of this work has been carried out in Great Britain and features social constructionism as its theoretical foundation. Social constructionism has its origins in the work of the French social theorist Michel Foucault and takes the view that knowledge about the body, health, and illness reflects subjective, historically specific human concerns and is subject to change and reinterpretation. Other areas in which British medical sociologists have excelled include studies of medical practice, emotions, and the experience of illness. Medical sociology also became a major sociological specialty in Finland, the Netherlands, Germany, Italy, Spain, and Israel, and began to emerge in Russia and Eastern Europe in the 1990s after the collapse of communism. In the meantime, the European Society for Health and Medical Sociology was formed in 1983 and hosts a biannual conference for European medical sociologists. In Japan, the Japanese Society for Medical Sociology was established in 1974 and, since 1990, has published an annual review of work in the field. Elsewhere in Asia, medical sociology is especially active in Singapore, Thailand, and India, and is beginning to appear in China. In Africa, medical sociology is

strongest in South Africa. Medical sociology is also an important field in Latin America, and because of its special Latin character, many practitioners prefer to publish their work in books and journals in Mexico, Brazil, Argentina, and Chile (Castro 2000).

From the 1970s through the 1990s, medical sociology flourished as it attracted large numbers of practitioners in both academic and applied settings and sponsored an explosion of publications based upon empirical research. Major areas of investigation included stress, the medicalization of deviance, mental health, inequality and class differences in health, health care utilization, managed care and other organizational changes, AIDS, and women’s health and gender. Several books, edited collections of readings, and textbooks appeared. The leading reader was edited by Peter Conrad and Rochelle Kern in 1981 and is now in a seventh edition (2005), with Conrad the sole editor. The leading textbook was William Cockerham’s *Medical Sociology*, first published in 1978 and due to appear in a tenth edition in 2007. Another major medical sociology journal, the *Sociology of Health and Illness*, was started in Britain in 1978, as was a new journal, *Health*, in 1999.

However, the success of medical sociology also brought problems in the 1980s. Research funding opportunities lessened and the field faced serious competition for existing resources with health economics, health psychology, medical anthropology, health services research, and public health. Not only did these fields adopt sociological research methods in the forms of social surveys, participation observation, and focus groups, some also employed medical sociologists in large numbers. While these developments were positive in many ways, the distinctiveness of medical sociology as a unique subdiscipline was nevertheless challenged as other fields moved into similar areas of research. Furthermore, some of the medical sociology programs at leading American universities had declined or disappeared over time as practitioners retired or were hired away. Yet the overall situation for medical sociology was positive as the job market remained good, almost all graduate programs in sociology offered a specialization in medical sociology, and sociologists were on the faculties of most medical schools

in the United States, Canada, and Western Europe (Bloom 2002).

The 1990s saw medical sociology move closer to its parent discipline of sociology. This was seen in a number of areas, with medical sociological work appearing more frequently in general sociology journals and the increasing application of sociological theory to the analysis of health problems. The *American Journal of Sociology* published a special issue on medical sociology in 1992, and papers on health related topics are not unusual in the *American Sociological Review*. While medical sociology drew closer to sociology, sociology in turn moved closer to medical sociology as the field remains one of the largest and most robust sociological specialties.

THE PRESENT

Ultimately, what allows medical sociology to retain its unique character is (1) its utilization and mastery of sociological theory in the study of health and (2) the sociological perspective that accounts for collective causes and outcomes of health problems and issues. No other field is able to bring these skills to health related research and analysis. Today it can be said that medical sociology produces literature intended to inform medicine and policymakers, but research in the field is also grounded in examining health related situations that inform sociology as well. Medical sociology no longer functions as a field whose ties to the mother discipline are tenuous, nor has it evolved as an enterprise subject to medical control. It now works most often with medicine in the form of a partner and, in some cases, an objective critic. Moreover, medical sociology owes more to medicine than to sociology for its origin and initial financial support, so the relationship that has evolved is essentially supportive. As medical sociology continues on its present course, it is likely to emerge as one of sociology's core specialties as the pursuit of health increasingly becomes important in everyday social life.

SEE ALSO: Goffman, Erving; Health and Medicine; Medical School Socialization; Medical Sociology and Genetics; Medicine, Sociology of; Merton, Robert K.; Parsons, Talcott; Sociology in Medicine

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medical sociology and genetics

Robert Dingwall

The rapid progress in genetic science associated with the Human Genome Project has attracted considerable interest among medical sociologists (Conrad & Gabe 1999; Pilnick 2002a). The basis of genetics is the observation that the biological constitution of all living things – plants, animals, fish, insects, bacteria, humans, etc. – is shaped by a chemical called DNA (deoxyribonucleic acid) found in the nuclear material of the cells from which they are all made. The various ways in which this chemical can be made up carry the instructions for the construction, articulation, and operation of cells. A gene is a segment of DNA that carries a particular set of instructions to perform a particular task in relation to cell assembly or functioning. The totality of genes found in an organism is called its genome. The human genome is made up of about 30,000 genes, whose instructions combine to produce the varied bodies recognizable as members of our species, *Homo sapiens*.

There is a considerable element of indeterminacy in these processes. The expression of genes is significantly influenced by their environment. This begins at the point of conception. During reproduction, a new combination of genes is assembled out of the set contributed by each parent, resulting in an organism that derives some features from each. The offspring is not identical to either parent and the novel combination may result in features that are not apparent in the parents. A first point of indeterminacy, then, is the combination of parents that actually occurs, which, in turn, reflects environmental opportunities to meet and fertilize. A second may be the conditions under which fertilization actually occurs: there are, for example, suggestions that the sex ratio in humans is influenced by climate and possibly by vaginal acidity. A third is the availability of nutrients and other chemicals, both *in utero* and after, affecting the resources on which gene products can operate. A fourth is the interaction between genes and the way in which one gene constitutes an environment for others that

contribute to a particular process or structure. A fifth is in the mutability of DNA itself, which can, rarely, lead to spontaneous and unpredictable changes, both at the level of an organism and at the cellular level. Finally, there is the overall interaction between the combined expression of a genome and the environment within which an organism is located: a gene that favors body fat, for example, may be advantageous during an Ice Age and disadvantageous under conditions of global warming.

The interest of medical sociology in genetics lies in the social attempts to manage the consequences of this indeterminacy. This is particularly apparent in three areas:

- The pressures that favor or disfavor the reproduction of organisms with particular traits.
- The possible identification of traits, derived from the absence or presence of particular genes, that affect the structure and/or functioning of individual organisms, making them more or less susceptible to particular environmental hazards.
- The possible identification of genes that make individuals more or less likely to behave in particular ways in particular environments.

SELECTIVE REPRODUCTION

All human reproduction is selective and socially structured. We can only reproduce with people that we actually encounter, either directly or indirectly as sperm or egg donors. None of these is a random subset of the population: medical sociologists have long established that our reproductive partners are most likely to be people like ourselves in terms of age, ethnicity, social status, and so on (Kalmijn 1994). Some groups are more likely to be invited, and to agree, to act as gamete donors: traditionally, medical students have been a major source of sperm. Selection also has a cultural dimension, the ideals of “fitness” that we use to choose among potential partners. These ideals – body aesthetics, moral character, intellect, practical skills, etc. – reflect the thinking in a social group about what contributes to its members’

adaptation to both the material and the cultural environment in which they live. If any of these have a genetic basis, reproductive selection will increase their prevalence within that group. Even if they do not have a genetic basis, though, their prevalence may still increase, if they are seen to be necessary for successful reproduction, by group members copying behaviors that seem to attract more, or more valuable, partners.

As the basic mechanisms of genetics and evolution were understood, in the late nineteenth century, some people thought that the direction of humanity's development could be consciously controlled (Kevles 1995). Eugenicists believed that characteristics such as intellect or moral character were strongly determined by biology. Existing societies showed the results of undirected but selective breeding, which had led to some individuals establishing themselves as respectable people with secure lifestyles while others drifted to the bottom – drunks, vagabonds, and delinquents, with little intelligence and low morals. The eugenics movement planned to build a better world by encouraging the “best” humans to reproduce more and discouraging the “worst” from reproducing at all. The limited success of their early voluntary strategies led many eugenicists to advocate compulsion. Laws facilitating the sterilization of people who were considered to be physically, mentally, or morally unfit were passed in many Northern European countries, Canada, and some US states during the early twentieth century. The excesses of the Nazi period in Germany discredited eugenics as a social movement, although many countries retained sterilization laws until the 1970s.

Contemporary geneticists have tried to escape the stigma of Nazi eugenics by emphasizing the role of individual choice in acting on genetic information. Currently, the only options are negative, in the form of terminating pregnancies or not implanting embryos where undesired characteristics are identified. Medical sociologists have questioned this in two ways. The first derives from studies of genetic counseling that have shown how the difficulties of giving information in a neutral and non directive fashion often result in the manipulation or encouragement of the recipients toward particular choices (Kolker & Burke 1998; Pilnick 2002b). The second looks at the aggregate consequences

of those decisions and argues that the result is still a form of “soft eugenics” (Shakespeare 1998). Judgments have been made about the value of human lives that are insensitive to the rights of people with disabilities and the extent to which disabilities are the result of disabling environments rather than essential properties of individuals.

In theory, positive choices could be made available by cloning, leading to the creation of embryos with preferred characteristics (Nussbaum & Sunstein 1998; McGee 2000). Although this technology has been used on animals, that experience raises serious safety concerns about its use in humans. Sociologists would also question the extent to which a cloned human would actually resemble its original because an infant born into a different generation would inevitably have different environmental experiences.

LIVING WITH OUR GENOTYPE

A major area of development has been in attempts to predict individuals' future health from knowledge of their genotype. This is well established in disorders caused by a single gene, like Huntington's disease, a neurological condition that only becomes evident in adult life and leads to serious disability and early death. More recently, it has become possible to identify genes or combinations of genes that influence susceptibility: carriers do not necessarily develop the condition but have a greater risk of doing so. The presence of BRCA1 or BRCA2 genes, for example, increases the probability that a woman will develop breast cancer in early adulthood. Medical sociologists are interested in the consequences of these developments in two ways.

One is the impact of being identified as the carrier of genes that increase the risk of ill health. There are currently few therapeutic options, which provokes concern over the ethics of testing for risks where no effective remedy is available: BRCA carriers can only be offered a prophylactic mastectomy, which may still leave some residual breast tissue in which cancers can develop, while those with Huntington's can only be advised to refrain from reproduction to avoid passing on their genes. Medical sociologists are examining the communication issues involved in

giving people information about their genetic status, especially as this will include indications about that of their close kin. This raises new problems of patient confidentiality, because relatives may have chosen not to receive or share that information. It underlines the extent to which all medicine is ultimately family or community medicine rather than being concerned with individuals outside their social and cultural environment. To the extent that risks can be managed, medical sociologists have examined the choices made, like decisions to undergo disfiguring surgery or to adopt long term changes in diet or exercise regimes (Hallowell & Lawton 2002). The latter links to other work by medical sociologists on the relationship between medical advice or health education and behavior, variously known as the problem of compliance, of adherence, or of concordance.

Knowledge of a person's genotype also has implications for other institutions. It creates particular problems for welfare provision based on personal insurance products – health insurance, disability insurance, or pensions – which raise issues for medical sociology (McGleenan et al. 1999). Insurance requires uncertainty, that we do not know when we are going to fall ill, become disabled, or die. People who stay fit or die young share the costs of those who fall ill or live longer. However, if we knew our fate in advance, low risk people would not buy insurance and subsidize high risk people. Conversely, high risk people might cheat by buying more coverage than their current premium warrants. Genetic knowledge reduces people's uncertainty about their fate and makes such behavior more likely. However, if people are required to share their knowledge with insurers, high risk people may find that coverage is unavailable or unaffordable. This is not a serious problem in many European countries, where personal insurance products are luxury goods and the whole population can be required to share risks through taxation or social insurance payments. However, it is a major issue for the US. The genetically disadvantaged may be excluded from personal insurance. They could also encounter job discrimination, either to minimize employer linked insurance costs or because their genotype affects their susceptibility to chemical or biological materials used in production processes.

THE GENETIC CONTROL OF BEHAVIOR

Early eugenicists were convinced that both intelligence and behavior were under strong genetic influences. Although this view was discredited by the early 1960s, it has never been extinguished and has been revived alongside the other new developments in genetics. The publication of *The Bell Curve* in 1994, claiming a biological basis for the association between intelligence and social class in the US, provoked a wide international debate among social scientists (Herrnstein & Murray 1994; Duster 1995; Taylor 1995). The authors derived this claim indirectly, by seeking to eliminate other explanations, rather than by identifying specific genetic markers. However, others have claimed the discovery of particular genes for aggression, crime, and sexual orientation. This has led to proposals for the pharmacological control of these behaviors. Medical sociologists have critically examined these claims. They have noted that the bioscientists' understanding of social action is often very crude: aggression may simply be assertiveness that offends bourgeois gentility; crime is not a universal but defined by the laws, rules, or other conventions established in a society; homosexuality is a very different phenomenon in environments where there is a free choice of sexual partners compared with those where there is not, like prisons. The complexity and plasticity of human social behavior makes it implausible to suppose that there is a simple genetic foundation (Dingwall et al. 2003). Medical sociology, then, is more interested in what these claims, and the credulity with which they are widely received, tell us about our society. Why is there a demand for knowledge of this kind? Whose interests are served by it? However, medical sociologists have also been reminded of the importance of the body as a material base for action or cultural interpretation, and of the need to acknowledge that it may be a constraint on the possibilities for social construction.

THE GENE INDUSTRY

The scale of investment needed to map the human genome required a strong marketing

effort by research scientists to governments, industry, and venture capitalists. This involved the projection of a future of molecular medicine, where knowledge of a person's genotype would allow physicians to use more precise therapies and where an understanding of the genetic basis of life would unlock new avenues for therapy, either by modifying defective genes or by introducing alternative means of achieving the structures or functions that they were not generating. In practice, this vision has been hard to deliver. The modern pharmaceutical industry exemplifies Fordism, with standardized products and huge economies of scale: highly individualized therapies seem unlikely to pass any reasonable cost benefit test. Gene therapy has proved technically difficult and risky. Some of the most promising areas, like cystic fibrosis, have seen considerable resistance from potential consumers, who have refused to participate in trials that may compromise their current health status for uncertain benefits, except to investigators who, they consider, are more interested in Nobel Prizes or corporate profit from selling new therapies back to them at high prices (Stockdale 1999). There has been a significant convergence between medical sociology and the sociology of science and technology to examine these issues with work on the present impact of different imagined futures, on the balance between science, commerce, and regulation in research and development, and on the organization and ethics of trials (Hedgecoe & Martin 2003).

GENETICIZATION AND GENETIC EXCEPTIONALISM

When genetic issues first reemerged into popular and scientific discourse, they were associated with claims that they represented revolutionary challenges to established institutions, practices, professional interests, and so on. The term "geneticization" was coined, by analogy with medicalization, to describe the way in which differences between humans were being reduced to differences in their DNA (Lippman 1992). It has been loosely associated with the idea of "genetic exceptionalism," the idea that genetic information is so radically different from other types that it requires an entirely new body of

thought about the ways in which it should be managed institutionally. In retrospect, however, these claims have come to look like medical sociologists buying into the marketing effort for gene research rather than critically assessing it. As further empirical work has been conducted, many of the supposedly unique features of genetic medicine have proved to be reincarnations of well established topics within medical sociology like professional-patient communication, the nature of disease and its relation to other forms of deviance, the structuring of health services and the choice between public and private systems of funding, and so on. The immediate challenge for medical sociologists, as genetically informed elements begin to creep slowly into health care, will be to avoid reinventing wheels.

SEE ALSO: *Bell Curve, The* (Herrnstein and Murray); Eugenics; Genetic Engineering as a Social Problem; Human Genome and the Science of Life; Medical Sociology

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medicine, sociology of

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Sociology of medicine is the sociological investigation of medicine as a subsystem of society. This label is given to the traditional study within medical sociology of the influences social forces have on the sciences, practices, and teachings of medicine, and how these components of medicine, in turn, affect society. Thus, the sociologist of medicine aspires to contribute to the development of sociological knowledge using medicine as a social institution worthy of study in itself. In the pure versus applied dichotomy of the social sciences, the work of the sociologist of medicine represents the academic or pure pursuit of knowledge. The sociologist of medicine is most often positioned outside the medical setting, in contrast to the position of the medical sociologist working in collaboration with medical or health

organizations. The dichotomy of sociology of medicine and sociology in medicine was formalized by Robert Straus in 1957, in an effort to identify the affiliations and activities of medical sociologists in the United States for creation of a communication network among this newly institutionalized professional group. The distinction is in part based on the structural position of the scholar, on where the basic professional affiliation of the scholar is held. Sociologists of medicine are likely to hold academic appointments in sociology departments.

Early in the institutionalization process of medical sociology, examination of the methodologies, organization, and structure of the medical institution was an obvious avenue of study, due to medicine's influence over as well as dependence on social forces. Organizational structure, role relationships, value systems, rituals, functions of medicine as a system of behavior, and social components of health and illness have been and still are predominant areas of study for the sociologist of medicine. During the 1950s and 1960s, however, sociology of medicine took a backseat to sociology in medicine. A majority of medical sociologists were involved in the applied side of the new discipline due to increases in research funding and expansion of medical schools, and well over half of the medical sociologists in the United States were positioned within medical or health organizations. Inadequate access to quality resources was a tremendous difficulty faced by sociologists of medicine who were operating from outside medicine rather than within medicine. Sociology of medicine recovered substantially during the Cold War as sociology in medicine's influence declined dramatically and medical sociologists moved into sociology departments in large numbers.

The sociologist of medicine uses the basic research methods of sociology to generate insights into the properties and patterns of social relationships and social organization of health and medicine. Potential hazards in this pure pursuit of knowledge have, however, been thoroughly documented. Similar to any sociologist involved in scrutiny of organizational systems, a danger faced by sociologists of medicine is a loss of objectivity through identification with the medical organization. Retention of a sociological perspective to serve the basic

interests of the discipline while studying health and medicine has proven difficult. This danger has been combated by the positioning of the sociologist of medicine outside of the medical organization. In a response to this positioning, it is argued that medicine's failure to respond to the sociological critique may be caused in large part by the failure of sociologists of medicine in becoming more actively involved in the social organization and culture of medicine. Thus, maintaining allegiance to the objective pursuit of knowledge for the sake of sociology has often restricted the voice of sociologists of medicine in potential influences of the medical system. This restriction, however, is experiencing change.

From the 1990s onward, sociologists of medicine have had increasing access to research opportunities within the field of medicine, and emphasis in the parent discipline on applied sociological work has led to some convergence of sociology of and sociology in medicine. Sociology of medicine retains its focus on the organizational and professional structures, roles, values, rituals, and functions of medicine as a subsystem of the social structure, and on the social psychology of health and illness. The acceptance and pursuit of applicable studies in sociology departments is increasingly pushing medical sociology to deliver a sociology with medicine rather than the dichotomous sociologies of and in medicine. A sociology with medicine contributes to a sociological understanding of medicine as a reflection of social life in general, as well as the opportunity to influence medical and health systems with applicable knowledge.

SEE ALSO: Health and Medicine; Medical Sociology; Sociology in Medicine

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megalopolis

Kevin Fox Gotham

Megalopolis refers to a cluster of densely populated cities stretching over a large region. The late geographer Jean Gottmann (1915–94) popularized the term in the early 1960s to classify the region from Washington to Boston, including New York, Philadelphia, and Baltimore. Gottmann urged researchers to view the megalopolis as a novel urban form that is multinucleated and multifunctional. Population growth fueled suburbanization and suburbs later became their own independent and autonomous regions that merged with the central city to form an extensive metropolitan region on the United States East Coast. In 1950, the megalopolis had a population of 32 million inhabitants. Today, the megalopolis includes more than 44 million people, 16 percent of the entire US population. Four of the largest CMSAs (Consolidated Metropolitan Statistical Areas) in the United States overlap with the megalopolis and account for over 38 million of the megalopolis's population. The four CMSAs are New York–Northern New Jersey–Long Island, Washington–Baltimore, Philadelphia–Wilmington–Atlantic City, and Boston–Worcester–Lawrence. The implication of Gottmann's study of the megalopolis was that “[w]e must abandon the idea of the city as a

tightly settled and organized unit in which people, activities, and riches are crowded into a very small area clearly separated from its non urban surroundings. Every city in this region spreads out far and wide around its original nucleus; it grows amidst an irregularly colloidal mixture of rural and suburban landscapes; it melts on broad fronts with other mixtures, of somewhat similar though different texture, belonging to the suburban neighborhoods of other cities" (Gottmann 1961: 5).

Over the years, different scholars have defined the megalopolis in several ways, and used the term to refer to different types of metropolitan growth patterns. Most studies seek to challenge ecological models that view metropolitan areas as comprising an economically dominant central city surrounded by bedroom suburban communities. Some researchers categorize a megalopolis as a complex urban region that has a density of 500 inhabitants per square mile. Others use the term to refer to an urban region made of several large cities, including suburbs and surrounding areas, that are economically and socially interconnected with a single urban agglomeration. More recently, scholars have defined a megalopolis as consisting of large core cities that are connected by an industrial or commercial belt of activities, including office parks, shopping centers, factories, refineries, warehouses, green areas, and residential areas. In particular, scholars draw attention to the process of megalopolitanization in which complex economic activities spread to small rural towns and assimilate into large core cities to establish a distinct continuum of cities. In addition to the US East Coast, megalopolises can be found, for example, in California, via the metropolitan areas of San Diego, Los Angeles, and San Francisco; in the United Kingdom in the Silicon Glen between Glasgow and Edinburgh; and on Japan's Pacific coast from Tokyo to Osaka. More recently, scholars have noted that megalopolises are also developing across national borders, forming cross border or multinational megalopolises. Notable examples include the Brussels to Zurich region, the Munich–Frankfurt–Stuttgart region, and the United States–Mexico border between San Diego and Tijuana.

Several methodological issues and unresolved questions currently define scholarly

understanding of the megalopolis and will guide future research on megalopolis growth and development. Research is not clear about the mechanisms that foster megalopolis growth. For example, why do megalopolises arise in some areas and not others? While some researchers contend that megalopolises are a natural result of central city and suburban population growth, others are skeptical and maintain that megalopolitanization is the outcome of the growth of new small cities between large cities, irrespective of large city growth. In the latter case, megalopolis formation may occur as central cities lose population and suburban areas grow and prosper economically. Other scholars suggest that geographical clustering of similar economic industries discourages megalopolis growth. Still others maintain that megalopolis growth contributes to spatial fragmentation which, in turn, feeds back to promote megalopolitanization through processes of functional interdependence and differentiation. What explains the uneven growth of megalopolises? Does megalopolis growth reinforce inequalities between cities and/or within cities? What role does networking among and between the government sector, the non profit sector (especially universities), and private business play in the development of different megalopolises? Such questions will remain central to urban research as technological advances, globalization, and the changing nature of work and residential life transform cities and regions into what might be called "network megalopolises."

SEE ALSO: Cities in Europe; Ecological Models of Urban Form: Concentric Zone Model, the Sector Model, and the Multiple Nuclei Model; Exurbia; Inequality and the City; Metropolis; Metropolitan Statistical Area; Multinucleated Metropolitan Region

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melting pot

Juan Battle and Antonio Pastrana, Jr.

Mainly used as a metaphor to evoke the experiences of assimilation for immigrants in the United States, the *melting pot* is a term that has been used by scholars in the field of race/ethnicity, immigration, and inequality. One strand of this concept rests on the belief that immigrant groups eventually shed beliefs, linguistic styles, and other cultural practices from their country of origin and meld with other people in order to form a new US based culture. However, another strand says that a melting of previous identities occurs but that what is newly created is a reflection of the dominant culture that exists in the US. The melting pot encompasses both of these ideas and has contributed to the growing literature on assimilation.

More broadly, this term has been used to identify areas of settlement where many different immigrant groups live in close proximity to one another. Still, the melting pot is usually used to reference immigrant settlement processes in the US, especially about the experiences of those in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. Other metaphors used to describe similar assimilation processes include *mosaic* and *salad bowl*. Similar to the mythologized rags to riches stories of Horatio Alger, the melting pot leaves individual and group level dynamics untouched, further perpetuating the status quo and leaving inequality unquestioned. Critics of the melting pot often point to the fact

that many racial/ethnic groups in the US have yet to be represented by political, economic, and cultural centers of power. Scholars have documented the various ways in which the melting process does not apply equally to all immigrant and racial/ethnic groups.

The actual term melting pot has its origin in a paper written by historian Frederick Jackson Turner in 1893. He was challenging the proposition that America's culture and institutions were formed solely by the original Anglo Saxon settlers. He argued that, instead, it was immigrants and their descendants from various places within Europe who were settling on the western frontier who had more influence: "in the crucible of the frontier the immigrants were Americanized, liberated, and fused into a mixed race" (1920 [1893]: 22–3). Turner's "crucible" became known as the melting pot – a phrase taken from a play written by Russian immigrant Israel Zangwell: "America is God's crucible, the great Melting Pot where all races of Europe are melting and reforming" (1909: 37).

An early study of the melting pot process was conducted in 1944 by Ruby Jo Reeves Kennedy. She was particularly interested in interethnic marriage rates. Reeves found that between 1870 and 1940 interethnic marriage soared; however, people did not tend to marry outside of their religious groups. This led her to coin the term *triple melting pot* – the theory that assimilation occurs first within religious groups and then later across religious groups.

Eventually, the melting process became (erroneously) synonymous with the assimilation process. In *Assimilation in American Life* (1964), Milton Gordon delineates at least seven stages or levels of assimilation, which influenced future race/ethnicity and immigration scholars. Central to the development of classical assimilation theory, Gordon's work is based on the experiences of early white immigrants to the US. This work was influential and important because it argued that assimilation occurs at various levels and at varying rates for different groups, starting with what Gordon called "cultural or behavioral assimilation" – when immigrant groups willfully change their cultural habits to reflect those of the host country. However, as some critics have noted, this type of assimilation does not always occur for some groups. Additionally, Gordon identified three consequences of

assimilation: (1) Anglo conformity, which occurs when immigrants are taught to adopt the dominant culture's normative behaviors and institutions; (2) melting pot, which, according to Gordon, occurs when something new and different is created when various cultures mix; and (3) cultural pluralism, which is when immigrants retain their native identities while still interacting within the host environment. All of these features helped to identify the various stages that immigrants and racial/ethnic groups go through in the assimilation process and contributed to the ever expanding notion of the melting pot.

Almost in direct contrast to the melting pot's ideas of cohesion, Nathan Glazer and Daniel Patrick Moynihan's *Beyond the Melting Pot* (1970) underscored how some immigrants and racial/ethnic groups often rely on the power of distinction in order to succeed. In fact, for Glazer and Moynihan, the melting pot did not happen. The important observation in this work was that the melting pot metaphor needed further expansion in order to include such things as individual choices and agency. Later, in *We Are All Multiculturalists Now* (1997), Glazer suggests that the melting pot metaphor should not be used anymore. Because US blacks have not melted, the promise of assimilation has turned into a myth. Instead, difference is viewed as a form of multiculturalism that highlights distinctions without really examining the types of cultures that continue to dominate and continue to form unjust policies.

The historical trajectory of research on assimilation suggests, then, that early white immigrant groups in the US were capable of melting and assimilating but that later immigrant groups, especially the non white identified ones, do not melt as easily. Instead, these groups often retain their native culture and function accordingly. Such a development coincides with the growth of identity politics in the US, which often rests on aspects of difference rather than on how well one assimilates to the dominant society. Researchers have found, for instance, that some black immigrants from the Caribbean consciously reject notions of the melting pot in order to differentiate themselves from US blacks, many of whom remain unassimilated and are disempowered by dominant cultures and institutions.

Social scientists make distinctions among three terms that are all too often used interchangeably: accommodation, acculturation, and assimilation. Sociologist William Kornblum (2005: 641) offers some clear definitions for these terms. Accommodation is the process by which a smaller, less powerful society is able to preserve the major features of its culture even after prolonged contact with a larger, stronger culture. Acculturation is the process by which members of a civilization incorporate norms and values from other cultures into their own. Assimilation is the process by which culturally distinct groups in a larger civilization adopt the norms, values, and language of the host civilization and are able to gain equal statuses in its group and institutions. The melting pot is, in theory, the new product that results from the assimilation process.

Throughout, the melting pot has been evoked to both support and challenge various government sponsored policies such as affirmative action, bilingual education, and numerous immigration limitation statutes.

SEE ALSO: Accommodation; Acculturation; Anglo Conformity; Assimilation; Immigration; Race; Race (Racism)

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Mendieta y Núñez, Lucio (1895–1988)

Margarita Olvera Serrano

Lucio Mendieta y Núñez graduated in law in 1920 and was awarded a doctorate in the discipline in 1950. He is unanimously considered the founder of the first sociological institutions to exist in Mexico. Although the Institute for Social Research (*Instituto de Investigaciones Sociales*, IIS) of the National Autonomous University of Mexico (*Universidad Nacional Autónoma de México*, UNAM) was created in 1930, it was not until Mendieta assumed the position of IIS director nine years later that the first institutionalized sociological research began in Mexico, along with steps to form Mexico's first communities of practitioners of this discipline. That moment also marks the beginning of the generation of a specific literature on the subject, around the *Mexican Sociology Journal* (*Revista Mexicana de Sociología*, *RMS*), founded by Mendieta in 1939. Mendieta's directorship marked the beginning of sociology's separation from law, ethnography, and anthropology, to gradually acquire its own identity. Lucio Mendieta y Núñez was also the primary promoter of the opening of the first school dedicated to training professional social scientists in Mexico, the National School of Political and Social Sciences (*Escuela Nacional de Ciencias Políticas y Sociales*, ENCPyS), which opened its doors in 1951, thereby marking the end of the phase of initial institutionalization of sociology and the formation of its first communities of knowledge.

The fact that he directed the IIS and the *RMS* for more than 25 years – in a period in which these were practically the only institutions dedicated to sociology in Mexico – and the fact that he authored the project upon whose

base the ENCPyS was created are sufficient reasons to explain why Lucio Mendieta is recognized by historians of sociology in Mexico as the intellectual leader of the institutionalization of the discipline. In addition to his contribution as creator of institutions, Mendieta also authored more than 50 articles, most of them published in the *RMS*, approximately 40 books (some translated into English, German, and French), and a long list of presentations and notes published in the minutes of the 16 national sociological congresses that he organized between 1950 and 1965. Parallel to this work, he promoted two important collections: the *Sociological Notebooks Library of Sociological Essays* (*Cuadernos de Sociología* and *Biblioteca de Ensayos Sociológicos*).

the publication of more than 100 titles by the most prestigious sociologists of the time from Latin America, Europe, and the United States, with the intention of making available to the sociological community relevant professional literature in Spanish. The practical and textual work of Lucio Mendieta y Núñez defines the institutional horizon and the representations of the knowledge that oriented sociology in Mexico for almost 30 years. Mexico's current institutions and communities are therefore in one way or another the heirs of the pioneering generation headed by Mendieta.

Lucio Mendieta y Núñez was born in the city of Oaxaca in January of 1895. Mendieta was a member, chronologically as well as physically, politically, and existentially, of the so-called Generation of 1915, which constituted the guiding minority of the constructivist era that followed the 1910 Mexican Revolution, and whose outstanding and relevant members numbered no more than 300. He completed his basic education at the school associated with the Normal School of Oaxaca, and studied his first year of middle to upper level studies at the Institute of Sciences, also in Oaxaca. He completed his high school level studies at the ENP associated with the National University, which conclusively suggests that the majority of his intellectually formative years took place within the politically effervescent climate of a Mexico immersed in an armed struggle that would last more than ten years and would radically modify the country's political, economic, and social structures. Furthermore, this movement produced significantly politicized students

of the time, in particular among ENP and ENJ students.

In those years the National University of Mexico was not simply the oldest but in fact the only upper level education institution in the country. After a relatively calm existence in the colonial era, the university became the center of fierce disputes between liberals and conservatives in the conflictive independent Mexico of the nineteenth century. In May 1910, the Constitutive Law of the National University of Mexico was published, through which the university reopened – in a way as a sign of the country's attempt to join the ranks of the select group of modern nations – to integrate the national high schools, the law, medical, and engineering schools, the fine arts school, and the upper level studies schools. The importance of these schools is explained by the fact that, from the nineteenth century, the privileged routes of social mobility were the military, the priesthood, law, and, to a lesser degree, the fields of medicine and engineering. It is relevant to note that on the eve of the 1910 Revolution, students at the National University numbered barely a thousand.

At the ENP Lucio Mendieta was influenced by the French positivist tradition, which had completely permeated this institution's intellectual atmosphere since its origins in the latter third of the nineteenth century. In the years of the Porfirio Díaz dictatorship, the intellectuals aligned with the regime took from Comte in particular his ideas on order and progress, which they considered highly pertinent in a society that had endured more than half a century of profound political and military disputes, as was the case of nineteenth century Mexico. The Porfirian intellectuals reinterpreted the assumptions contained in the discourse of Auguste Comte and accorded them a privileged position in the ENP curriculum, founded in 1867. During Lucio Mendieta's formative years, the established purpose of the ENP was to create an upper level elite capable of establishing an order based on a common foundation of truths. The expectation was that society's evolution would imply, at a determined moment, that scientific reason would displace commonsense judgments and would provide an objective basis for political decisions. Middle to upper level education spanned six years and was broad and scholarly,

including the study of foreign languages. This would turn out to be very important in the 1930s – when the first sociological institutions were built in Mexico – given that the country's intellectual environment was poor and sociological knowledge reached Mexico through works published primarily in France and the United States.

It would have been difficult for an author with the intellectual profile and social background of Lucio Mendieta y Núñez to step outside the boundaries of the legal field and pursue the incipient empirical research that would begin to open the way for sociology in Mexico as a discipline independent of law, ethnography, and anthropology. The event that radically modified the horizon of possibilities that lay before the generation of Lucio Mendieta was the Revolution of 1910, given that it opened lively new fields of participation, critique, discussion, and debate. While this generation was rooted in book learning and a scholarly and erudite environment, those roots branched out toward a social field in which the future appeared, and in fact was, open to action and unprecedented forms of intellectual sociability. The 1910 Revolution cracked the representation of the positivist world peculiar to the dictatorial years in which society appeared to be gradually evolving toward increasingly rational stages, confronting young university students with the political reality and the violence this could imply.

From this intellectual and political horizon was born Lucio Mendieta's concern for the indigenous situation and for the role of scientific knowledge in the reconstruction of post-revolutionary society, a context in which emerged the possibility of the existence of the social sciences in Mexico. Sociology germinated in Mexico as a disciplinary field precisely during those years, in which a minimum development of sociological reflection converged; an external situation in which society was reconstructing itself; a conception of science according to which its legitimacy in society would depend on the production of rational knowledge capable of illuminating action; and, finally, a group of individuals thoroughly convinced of the importance and pertinence of efforts to open and consolidate spaces designated to research the social reality. Lucio Mendieta y Núñez possessed the political

and intellectual sensitivity to understand that sociology did not fit within the boundaries of the legal field, and became convinced that a specific and solid niche was required to generate a sociological understanding of Mexican reality, nonexistent until then, but considered indispensable for the future of the nation.

In play in the 1930s were not only the institutional spaces for a new discipline in Mexico, but also the formation of a group of institutions capable of legitimizing the new governing elites, producing authorized empirical knowledge about the country, and attempting to orient lines of political action tending to resolve the gravest problems of a nation encumbered by a ten year civil war. In this scenario, in 1939 Lucio Mendieta y Núñez was named director of the IIS of the National University, and only then did this institution effectively begin to function as a research space, despite its foundation dating back to 1930.

As part of a reorganization process he initiated from his arrival at the IIS, Lucio Mendieta proposed the creation of new bodies of knowledge capable of justifying the existence of sociology in Mexico as an independent discipline. One of his first decisions was the foundation of the *RMS* as an instrument for the establishment of new forms of intellectual communication and social interaction. The purposes of this publication were to stimulate sociological research, disseminate the most recent studies by sociologists from Europe and the United States, and foment relations and promote exchanges with the primary intellectual institutions dedicated to social science studies. This editorial pursuit was based not only on naturalist type cognitive assumptions, but also on shared values and beliefs in regard to the reality derived from those assumptions, which functioned as a potent symbolic facet that oriented the practice of the communities of social scholars integrated by Lucio Mendieta within the IIS.

Lucio Mendieta conceived the relations between knowledge and power as collaborative rather than critical or oppositional. He proposed a collaborative link under the unfulfilled assumption that those in governing positions should guide their action in accordance with the results of the research that the IIS was soon to carry out, and thanks to that proposal he was able to secure the necessary material resources

and public support for the institutionalization of sociology in Mexico. For that purpose he put together a group primarily of lawyers, but also, in particular to support his editorial pursuits, a Latin American community of sociologists that included the likes of Ricardo Levene of the University of Buenos Aires; Raúl Orgaz of the University of Córdoba; Manuel Dieguez, Brazilian historian and sociologist; Roberto Agramonte of the University of Havana; Oscar Alvarez Andrews of the University of Chile; the Brazilian Mario Lins; Pitirim Sorokin of Harvard University; and Robert Redfield of the University of Chicago. These scholars, together with the Mexicans Francisco Rojas González Bonilla, Emilio Uribe Ramos, Roberto de la Cerda, and René Barragán, were Mendieta's most constant interlocutors and collaborators, forming a type of "invisible college" that put into play formal and informal links which, over time, defined what was understood as sociology and established what could and should be ascribed to this discipline between the 1940s and 1950s in Mexico. Through the *RMS*, Mendieta also maintained contacts with authors outside of his own naturalist intellectual tradition, as was the case of the exiled Spaniards in Mexico, among whom stand out José Medina Echavarría and Luis Recaséns, scholars of the German culturalist tradition linked to Max Weber, Ferdinand Tönnies, and Georg Simmel.

During the 1940s, the axis of Mendieta's work was the study of diverse ethnic groups that existed in Mexico, which led to the first empirical sociological research to take place in the country, relying primarily on the cognitive tools of the positivist methods as well as the intellectual contributions of anthropology and ethnography. The questions he attempted to answer were: Who are the indigenous peoples? How and where do they live? How should they be organized for their integration into national development? The study of indigenous peoples had strong political pertinence at the time; there was generalized agreement among university and political circles as to the need to integrate the empirically unknown indigenous population as quickly as possible within the whole of national society. This objective was animated by a concept of modernity particular to the positivist tradition. Integration of indigenous peoples was therefore envisioned as a

homogenization process that would necessarily imply the dissolution of the backwardness of the past and the indigenous tradition to make way for a developed and modern nation.

This body of research led to various publications, the most important of which was the *Ethnographic Atlas of the Mexican Republic* (*Atlas etnográfico de la República Mexicana*). Mendieta's analysis in these works remained within the boundaries of anthropological and ethnographic conceptions, as suggested by the use of the notion of "race," which was mixed with elements from a current of North American functionalist anthropology. Lucio Mendieta identified the indigenous as part of a traditional world that was dissolving in the face of the modern and rational world. According to this logic, the indigenous were different from the rest of the nation, therefore requiring specific governmental policies oriented to facilitate their access to the modern world that was opening to Mexico in the 1940s and 1950s. In other writings, such as *The Indigenous Room* (*La habitación indígena*, 1939) and *Sociological Essay on the Zapotecos* (*Ensayo sociológico sobre los zapotecos*, 1949), Mendieta reiterated this conception of the status of the indigenous. Sociology's task in this scenario consisted of empirically researching the indigenous to promote their integration around an imagined modern and homogeneous national culture. According to Lucio Mendieta, achievement of these objectives depended on a community of expert sociologists separated from them. These studies had a constituent rather than analytical character, given that sociology in Mexico at the time lacked an autonomous development differentiating it from neighboring fields of knowledge. Nevertheless, these first empirical research pursuits were the axis around which was consummated the creation of a distinct institutional space for sociology in Mexico, despite the absence of a solid profile of the discipline.

The opening of distinct institutional spaces for sociology in a country that lacked a well established intellectual community, a strong sociological tradition, and precise and clear cognitive boundaries vis à vis other fields of knowledge was made possible in particular by the close relations existing during those years between knowledge and public power. Institutionalized sociology emerged in Mexico, unlike

in Europe and the United States, to respond to an external demand for expert knowledge that could be applied to political social modernization programs that were just beginning to appear in Mexico.

Between the 1950s and 1960s, Lucio Mendieta delved into the terrain of concepts with speculative and essay type books that implied a gradual separation from the cores of law, anthropology, and ethnography. He addressed unprecedented topics in the Mexican intellectual sphere, such as experimental methods in sociology, sociological statistics, bureaucracy, social classes, the concept of revolution, planning and development, political parties, and methodological problems of definition in sociology. The most important publications of this period were: *Theory of Social Groupings*, *Theory of Revolution*, *Three Political Sociology Essays*, *Sociology of Development*, and *Essays on Planning, Journalism, the Legal Profession* (*Teoría de los agrupamientos sociales*, 1951; *Teoría de la revolución*, 1960; *Tres ensayos de sociología política*, 1961; *Sociología del desarrollo*, 1962; and *Ensayos sobre planificación, periodismo, abogacía*, 1963). The objective of these publications was to provide Mexican sociology with its own conceptual coordinates, as well as to define the type of processes and structures implied in the economic social modernization being experimented in by the country. The sociological tradition to which he had recourse was deeply linked with positivism and North American structural functionalism. Mendieta therefore assigned great importance to the adoption of a set of concepts that could unify sociological language.

Parallel to that work, Lucio Mendieta undertook intense public promotion of sociology, achieving two very important results for development of this discipline in Mexico: the foundation of ENCPyS in 1951, and the organization of annual national sociological congresses between 1950 and 1965 that brought together not only the incipient Mexican sociological community, but also, importantly, functionaries, politicians, government figures, and diverse professionals. The external scenario was favorable to these initiatives. International institutions with close ties with the majority of Latin American governments, such as the United Nations (UN), the UN Educational, Scientific, and Cultural Organization (UNESCO), and the

Latin American Economic Commission (CEPAL), among others, constituted the political and economic framework that demanded from the social sciences technical knowledge applicable to the development of the region's countries. This demand was seized upon by social scientists with shared optimism, providing important public promotion for these disciplines in Mexico, thereby consummating their definitive insertion in the institutional panorama of science in the country.

Lucio Mendieta y Núñez was the author of both the founding project of the ENCPyS and its first curriculum. Upon returning from a trip to Europe in 1949, where he had been invited by UNESCO to participate in the foundation of the International Sociological Association and the International Political Science Association, Mendieta proposed the creation of a school within UNAM dedicated to the professional formation of social scientists. His project included undergraduate degree programs in social sciences, diplomatic sciences, journalism, and political sciences. Years later, the first of these would change its denomination to sociology. The University Board approved this initiative in May 1951 and the novel ENCPyS opened its doors in July of that year, with 136 students distributed among the distinct programs. In this first stage, classes were taught primarily by lawyers, along with some legal philosophers, historians, anthropologists, physicists, physicians, and, to a lesser degree, economists. A well established teaching staff was lacking, so many courses were taught in the departments of philosophy and law. This was indicative of the nonexistence of a sufficiently broad sociological community in Mexico, which meant that the formation of the first generations of professional social scientists was left in the hands of lawyers. Nevertheless, thanks to this new space, by the mid 1950s Mexico would have its own nationally formed sociologists, such as Emma Salgado, María Luisa Rodríguez Sala, and Raúl Benítez Zenteno, who were systematically dedicated to empirical research of the Mexican reality.

Lucio Mendieta y Núñez left the direction of the IIS and the *RMS* in 1965. Through his work and organizational labor, in the almost 30 years in which he directed these spaces, Mendieta achieved the insertion of sociology in Mexico, the creation of a distinct disciplinary

profile, and the consolidation of its first community of practitioners. The contemporary significance that can be found in his work resides in the first order role he fulfilled in the institutionalization of this discipline in Mexico, the opening to the reception of the primary sociological traditions of his time through the *RMS* and his editorial work, and the winning of public recognition and of resources for development of this discipline. His work was of course not exempt from limitations, the most notable of which were the corporative and centralized character of his leadership, his close alliance with public power, and the absence of a critical approach to the sociological traditions that oriented him. Nevertheless, the professionalized and specialized sociology that was gradually constructed in Mexico starting in the 1970s would have been very difficult to develop without Mendieta's legacy and the pioneering generation he led.

SEE ALSO: *Caudillismo*; Indigenous Peoples; Modernization; Positivism; Structural Functional Theory

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mental disorder

Mark Tausig

Sociologists who study mental disorder work from a number of assumptions that define and distinguish their approach from other ways of understanding mental disorder. First, sociologists may view mental disorder as a normal consequence of social life caused by structured inequality rather than as a form of individual dysfunction. Second, they may regard mental disorder as the outcome of social processes that include the labeling of deviant behavior and stigmatic societal reactions to those labels. Third, they may define the object of study as psychological distress rather than as specific psychiatric disorders. Fourth, they may view the mental health treatment system as an institution for the social control of deviant behavior. Finally, the sociological perspective is concerned with properties of groups and populations and it is less informative regarding individual and clinical concerns. Although not all sociologists employ all of these assumptions in their research and some of these assumptions have generated considerable debate, collectively they represent what is distinctive about the sociological study of mental disorder.

The psychiatric medical model accounts for mental disorder as a function of individual biological reactions to environmental (including social) hazard and/or individual biochemical or genetic dysfunction – the broken brain. Biological psychiatry now dominates the way psychiatrists explain the origins of mental disorder and the way disorder is treated. The *social causation model* by contrast accounts for psychological distress as a function of the effects of positions in social structures of inequality.

Sociologists argue that disorder or distress arises from a *stress process* in which eventful, chronic, and traumatic stressors represent risks to well being. In turn, individuals can mobilize resources to offset the effects of stressors and, broadly speaking, the balance between risk and protective resources determines the psychological consequences of stressors.

Exposure to risk and the ability to mobilize protective resources are a function of social status. Although some risks are serendipitous, many are related to socioeconomic status, gender, or race. Also, protective resources such as access to information and effective instrumental and expressive social networks are related to social status. Over the life course individuals are exposed to stressors and have access to resources that consistently affect well being as a direct function of socially structured access to resources and exposure to risk factors. Hence, both risk and protective resources arise in the normal day to day lives of persons as a function of social status.

The strongest evidence for social structural effects on mental health is found in the relationship between socioeconomic status (SES) and psychological distress. SES affects income, work conditions, housing conditions, and neighborhood context in such a way that persons in lower SES positions are exposed to considerably more stressors and they have considerably fewer resources to deal with those stressors. Hence higher rates of distress are observed among persons of lower SES that are a direct function of what life is like for people who have low education and low income. As a group, young, single working mothers are found to have very high rates of depressive symptoms. They are also exposed to many stressors that are a function of social position. These young mothers are often solely responsible for childcare. Because they are young, their wages are lower and because they are women their wages will also be lower. The temporal, emotional, and financial strains they experience are clearly a function of social position and role expectations. Similarly, and beyond differences in education and occupational levels, recent research shows that racial and ethnic minorities in the United States are significantly affected psychologically by perceived discrimination in their daily lives.

Sociologists also view mental disorder as the outcome of a social process in which others evaluate and label deviant behavior. The labeling perspective represents an external causal explanation for disorder in which others confer a label on certain forms of deviant behavior. When an individual behaves in ways that others find deviant and unexplainable, that individual can be diagnosed (labeled) as having a mental illness as a way of explaining the deviant behavior. The label has powerful effects for both those who encounter the labeled individual and the labeled individual. The mental illness label is stigmatic and it is associated among the general public with negative attributes of dangerousness, unpredictability, and lack of personal responsibility. The public avoid and condemn persons with these labels. The unpopularity of neighborhood based housing for persons with mental disorders is a direct reflection of the negative attributes accorded to persons who have been given psychiatric diagnoses. Stigma may also explain why coverage for the treatment of mental disorders in medical insurance plans is not nearly as generous as for the treatment of physical illness.

The effects of labeling extend to the labeled person as well. The label of mental illness is deeply discrediting so that an individual's entire identity is *spoiled* by the label and the individual loses status, "drifting" into a lower SES, for example. Persons who have been labeled feel estranged from *normals* and often withdraw from or circumscribe their behavior in public as a result. Labeled persons are well aware of the negative reactions of others to psychiatric labels and to them. Anticipation of rejection by others can lead to demoralization, it can affect work performance, and it can strain interpersonal relationships. The label leads to isolation and secrecy and reinforces the notion that labeled individuals are *different*. Even persons who have been successfully treated for mental disorders report feelings of exclusion and hostility based on the continuing stigma of the label. They may be barred from some forms of employment, and access to other opportunities may be restricted as well.

Finally, labeling is a form of social control because it can be used to constrain behavior and because it reflects power relations in social systems. It takes power to confer a label and to

make it stick. Family members may refer to a member as crazy but there are few notable social consequences from such a label. When psychiatrists diagnose individuals, by contrast, the stigmatic consequences of the label are much more apparent.

Sociologists are not sure that psychiatric labels refer to real entities or diseases. There are strong theoretical and empirical grounds for believing that diagnostic categories of disorder such as those making up the *Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders* (DSM) of the American Psychiatric Association can be arbitrary, value laden, and normative. Diagnostic categories can change based on changing social attitudes and political influence processes that seem unrelated to disease. In addition, empirical studies show that symptoms for different mental illness diagnoses often overlap so that similar symptoms can lead to different diagnoses. Neither the stress perspective nor the labeling perspective used by sociologists requires a formal nosology of disorder. The stress perspective accounts for *distress* as a generalized form of demoralization and unhappiness that may appear in forms that are consistent with symptoms of depression, alcohol or substance use, anxiety, antisocial behavior, or dysphoric mood. Similarly, although there are some variations in public reactions to psychiatric labels depending on the label, the more general observation is that any psychiatric label results in rejection, avoidance, and condemnation. For sociologists, the specific diagnostic category is secondary to observing a psychological response to consequences of structured inequality or to labels imposed on individuals to account for and control deviant behavior. It should be noted that not all sociologists agree that diagnostic categories are unimportant or arbitrary.

Sociologists have observed that some deviant, *bad* behavior has been redefined as biological deviance and hence it becomes amenable to medical/psychiatric treatment. The medicalization of deviance argument describes a social process that turns deviant behavior into illness symptoms. In turn, this leads to medical treatment of mental disorder rather than punishment of a crime or delinquency, for example. The behavior is the same but it is categorized in terms of illness. Medicalization highlights the notion of the social control of deviant behavior

by showing, for example, how disruption of a school classroom can be controlled by treating attention deficit disorder. Although a medical explanation for disorder is claimed, the discovery of such a medical explanation is often preceded by recognition of the need to control deviant behavior. A review of diagnostic categories in the DSM suggests that many of the disorders described could also easily be labeled simply as non normative behavior. Also, the process whereby disorders are added to the DSM also suggests that social norms of behavior are a measuring stick for identification of illness symptoms.

If people in lower status positions in social structures are more apt to experience distress/disorder and those with less power are more likely to have mental illness labels attached to their behaviors, then the treatment of mental disorders takes on the appearance of social control. In this regard, sociologists view the mental health treatment system as a social control institution and they are interested in patterns of the use of mental health treatments, differences between public and private treatment modalities, the goals of treatment, and differential access to mental health services.

Large scale representative studies of the prevalence of mental illness in the community confirm that those in lower socioeconomic levels, especially, are more likely to have diagnosable mental disorders. Those same studies indicate that less than half of all those with a diagnosable mental disorder are so labeled and receive treatment. Persons in low SES positions and racial and ethnic minorities are less likely to receive treatment for those symptoms/disorders than high SES persons and whites. Higher status individuals are more likely to be treated in the private mental health system as a function of insurance availability and higher levels of trust in psychiatric care, while low SES individuals use the public mental health system, receive no mental health care, or are channeled into the criminal justice system to deal with drug and alcohol related disorders.

The evidence to support the notion that mental health treatment is a form of the social control of deviance is only partially supported by these data. However, when these data are combined with critiques of the possible over diagnosis of attention deficit disorder and the

widespread use of drugs such as Prozac, for example, a substantial case can be made that deviant behavior (if not mental disorder) is the object of medical control.

The study of mental disorder from the sociological perspective must be seen as complementary to biological and psychological perspectives on mental disorder because it focuses on the mental health status of social groups and populations. Sociologists do not attempt to explain why a particular individual feels depressed but why persons with low socioeconomic status, for example, are more likely to feel depressed compared to persons with high socioeconomic status. The perspective has limited application to clinical concerns and is not especially useful for explaining individual cases of disorder. By contrast, biological and psychological perspectives rarely recognize patterns of disorder prevalence or variations in treatment modalities.

It should be noted that many sociologists study mental disorder without making any of the assumptions described above. There are valuable studies of the impact of family structure and process on mental health, in depth studies of mental health treatment systems, and numerous studies of the consequences of mental illness for individual functioning over the life course.

SEE ALSO: Aging, Mental Health, and Well Being; Deviance, Medicalization of; Disease, Social Causation; Labeling; Madness; Social Epidemiology; Stigma; Stress, Stress Theories; Stressful Life Events

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meritocracy

Gad Yair

The term “meritocracy” has three interrelated meanings. First, it refers to the type of social order where rewards are distributed to individuals in accordance with criteria of personal merit. Put differently, it denotes the “rule of the talented,” a system of governance wherein the brightest and most conscientious individuals are accurately and efficiently assigned to occupy the most important positions, based on their talent and achievements. Second, the concept pertains to an elite social class, a definite group of people that enjoys high prestige because its select members proved to have merit based on their unique abilities and attainments (i.e., the aristocracy of merit as coined by Thomas Jefferson). Third, the term touches upon the criteria of allocation of positions, roles, prestige, power, and economic reward, whereby excellent individuals are over benefited in relation to others. These criteria are based on achieved rather than ascribed characteristics, and reflect the assumption that while achievements of merit are rare and difficult to attain, they are culturally valued.

In its elementary form, meritocracy is based on the allocation of rewards in congruence with human excellence, defined by Young (1958) as the sum of intelligence and effort ($M = I + E$, where M is merit, I is IQ, and E is effort). Practically, however, merit is usually equated with the achievement of educational qualifications, commonly measured by cognitive achievements and educational attainments. Meritocracy is also contrasted with systems that are based on selection by ascribed characteristics such as inherited wealth, social class, ethnicity, race,

and, more generally, with any system of nepotism (Daniels 1978).

In essence, a meritocracy is based on inequality of outcome. Paradoxically, however, it refers to the prior arrangement of equal opportunities that – when operated fairly in free markets and open societies – should result in unequal but morally deserving outcomes. Like the *Theory of Justice* proposed by John Rawls (1971), the meritocracy justifies social inequality under conditions of antecedent equality. Based on a principle of equity (rather than equality or need), it states that individuals should be provided with equal opportunities to make the most of their intellectual potential and moral character. But since there are inherent inequalities in human potential (e.g., the bell curve of IQ distribution), and since individuals exhibit variable levels of motivation to excel, the social order should reflect the hierarchy of attained merit.

The meritocratic ideal states that – given that equality of opportunity is in place – the distribution of outcomes should be decided by open competition between individuals. Furthermore, the behavior of individuals during the preparatory stages of this competition is to rank them according to their merits. Intelligent individuals who invest effort in the competition (i.e., education) deserve to benefit. Others of lesser merit should be ranked lower. The resulting hierarchical rank order in the educational competition should then be transferred to the distribution of rewards in adult society.

Based on these definitions and orienting remarks, the following discussion focuses on three interrelated themes. The first analyzes the modernist intellectual traditions of meritocratic ideas. The second and major theme focuses on the centrality of education in meritocratic systems. The final theme comments on the relationship between meritocracy and sociology.

INTELLECTUAL TRADITIONS: STATE AND MARKET

There were early precursors to the idea of a meritocracy (e.g., discussions of “philosophers as kings” and distributive justice in Greek philosophy). However, the meritocracy is largely a

modern idea. The moral and legal basis for the meritocracy rests on a twofold edifice. First, it is inscribed in modern precepts of democracy and the “just society” which refer to universal human and citizenship rights. Second, it is based on a Darwinian rationale of social and economic selection which states that individual capital and social utility are maximized in competitive free markets.

The modern nation state and its universal principles of citizenship and human rights constituted the preconditions for the appearance of meritocratic principles and social orders. Modern national constitutions were first to define citizenship by universal criteria and to outlaw unequal treatment of citizens based on ascribed characteristics, such as gender, race, ethnicity, or immigration. Based on the universal spirit of equality of opportunity expressed by the constitutions, court rulings have continually expanded the realms of meritocratic principles. By gradually expanding the rights of equal opportunity for women, minorities, and ethnic and racial groups, the courts have reestablished the basic principle of true meritocracy, namely, that rewards are to be allocated according to rational criteria of achievement in realms which are, in principle, open for all (Dworkin 1996).

The second edifice of the meritocracy rests on capitalist economic principles of the free market. The capitalist worldview assumes that by expanding universal access to the market and by withholding state interference, products will improve and prices will decrease. The model assumes that the ensuing competition among suppliers will necessitate innovation and decrease prices. On the demand side, it is assumed that availability of alternatives in the free market will benefit the more resourceful and motivated clients who can cleverly negotiate with different suppliers for their benefit. This theory assumes that economic efficiency and personal utility will be maximized when the market is left unregulated, making intelligence and effort the prime drivers for success, or in other words, for economic merit.

THE CENTRALITY OF EDUCATION

Education plays a prominent role in meritocratic systems. Educational credentials are often

used as the equivalents of merit. They also constitute the yardstick for assessing the extent to which other institutions are meritocratic. In that sense, education is both the gatekeeper for the meritocracy and its standard.

Individual merit is a latent trait. As with other latent traits, techniques of educational and psychological measurement are used to arrive at reliable and valid estimates of achievement. Haunted by a fear of inefficiency and litigation, the state deploys an industry of merit (e.g., Educational Testing Service) which uses sophisticated estimation and equating techniques (e.g., item response theory models) so as to verify that equal opportunities are supplied and that students are correctly detected and selected across tracks, classrooms, schools, and states. The boom of mandatory testing and the adoption of national standards are signs that – from the state’s legal standpoint – meritocracy cannot be left to be decided at a local level. If equal opportunity is the business of the state, so is meritocracy. There is no surprise, then, that the modern nation state and schooling go hand in hand.

The creation and expansion of the modern school system – in its ideal, egalitarian, and meritocratic form – was to provide the functional arrangement for a true meritocracy. Realizing the resistance of traditional separatist arrangements, governments and courts have increasingly imposed school integration policies in order to bring diverse populations together and provide equal opportunities for all. The expansion of citizenship and human rights required schools to become more inclusive, thereby fulfilling the promise of the “common school”: to provide equal opportunity for all to compete for merit, irrespective of gender, race, or ethnicity. Affirmative action and social promotion procedures are pursued to provide minority and failing students with opportunities for improvement. The inclusion of students with special needs is undertaken to allow all students to fully develop their potential merit. Furthermore, selectivity into ability groups, tracks, and streams is criticized as the censorship of equal opportunities to compete over merit (Oakes 1985).

In rising to the challenge of the meritocracy, the modern school provides intellectual preparation and moral socialization, thereby developing

the two components of merit: intelligence and effort. The main task of schooling is to impart knowledge and develop the intellectual abilities of students. Schools are also expected to inculcate the will to learn, either by setting high expectations or by constructing interesting and challenging learning environments. In this sense, schooling provides opportunities to learn, and schools are expected, at least during the early years of childhood, to distribute these opportunities on an equal basis.

While they are required to develop students' ability and aspirations, schools are also chartered as systems of organized competitions and examinations. Notwithstanding their compassionate mission of nurturing students' merit, schools have to assess merit and therefore produce inequality of outcome. In their capacity as arbiters of merit, schools construct open competitive arenas and repeatedly provide challenges and examinations in order to accurately decide student merit. In this capacity, schooling comprises the sorting machine that ranks students according to their cumulative merit in a lock step series of examinations in different intellectual disciplines. Schools supply opportunities to learn, and an open and free arena for exhibiting intellectual excellence. But it is students who have to perform at their best and prove their merit.

Schools are required to record and publicize this merit (Hanson 1993). Actually, school achievement as merit is repeatedly screened by tests, quizzes, book reports, and individual research papers, thereby producing a cumulative grade that is used as a proxy for student merit (intelligence tests and their equivalents aim for the same goal: predicting students' future merit). The highly achieving students (those who have proved their merit) are then selected by Ivy League universities, while their peers are funneled to lesser ranking institutions or directly to manual occupations in the labor market. In this way, the meritocratic order of the school is reproduced in the labor market. When these ranks match, the order is defined as efficient and morally deserving. This is the ideal way a meritocracy should work.

However, an overwhelming body of scholarship has repeatedly shown that schools and the schooling process betray the ideals of meritocracy. Often referred to as "social

reproduction" approaches to schooling, these studies have deciphered how ethnic, racial, and gender inequalities are perpetuated and exacerbated by education. Studies of tracking and ability grouping, like those of teacher expectations and school effectiveness, have repeatedly pointed at social biases in student selection, instruction, and assessment. They have shown that rather than serving as a mechanism for identifying and selecting intelligent students, education in fact tracks them by race and ethnicity (Bowles & Gintis 1976). Also driven by meritocratic ideals, these studies show that schools are yet to face the challenges of equal opportunities and real meritocracy.

Furthermore, the realization of meritocratic ideals in education is continually debated in political arenas, at times inviting intervention by the Supreme Court. Most conspicuous, perhaps, is the debate which proponents of meritocracy hold with advocates of affirmative action and anti discrimination lobbyists in higher education. Since the number of prestigious positions is limited (e.g., number of students accepted to medical school), and as there are more candidates than there are openings, the question of "who shall be educated" becomes a truly political one. The answers to this question are volatile and change with time. Leaders of the Civil Rights Movement argued that selection criteria into higher education should be partly based on ascribed characteristics in order to guarantee social representation in the student body, and as a consequence in elite positions in the labor market. Their political success has indeed opened new opportunities for minorities and diversified the student body. However, critics have recently countered this by showing that many deserved applicants are rejected while candidates of lesser merit are accepted, simply because the latter are from minority groups.

The last decade indeed witnessed winds of change. By the end of the 1990s, California's legislature decided to retract policies of affirmative action and adopt achievement criteria of admission into higher education institutes (a policy which promises the top 4 percent of each class an automatic place in California State universities). In 2003, however, the United States Supreme Court – seeking to protect a diverse student body – reaffirmed the legitimacy of race and ethnicity as just criteria for

selection to universities (*Gratz v. Bollinger* and *Grutter v. Bollinger*). The argument is that a true meritocracy will be served by diverse and socially representative student bodies. These changing sensibilities are likely to continue fluctuating as long as real equal opportunities for all are lacking. Therefore, the political and ethical debates over meritocratic principles in education are likely to continue.

SOCIOLOGY AND DEVIATIONS FROM CONSTITUTIONAL MERITOCRACY

The ideals of meritocracy and equal opportunity are, indeed, ideals. In practice, however, the project of modernity has yet to put meritocratic arrangements in their appropriate place. Families still reproduce social hierarchies. Schools are only partially effective in supplying equal opportunities. And the labor market is only loosely coupled to education. As a result, to paraphrase Young (1958: 14), the upper classes still have their fair share of geniuses and morons, and so do the workers. This implies that many individuals do not maximize their human capital and do not completely fulfill their potential. It also means that different social arrangements cause waste and economic inefficiency. Progress, although not halted, is slowed down.

Sociological studies of *stratification* monitor these deviations from the meritocratic ideal. Studies of social reproduction in families, schools, and universities are motivated by the Constitution and its ideals of equal opportunities and meritocracy. Such studies focus on mechanisms that make it difficult for individuals and social categories to realize their potential. Some of these studies focus on different organizational strategies which either expand participation and fair competition or actually decrease opportunities (e.g., studies of tracking, streams, ability groups, and private schools). Comparative studies of stratification share a similar bent. In measuring different facets of social inequality in different countries, scholars seek to assess progress toward the meritocratic and egalitarian ideals of western democratic countries, and to understand the features that withhold opportunities and hinder meritocracy. In this respect, the sociological science of stratification springs from modern conceptions of citizenship, equal

opportunities, and meritocracy, but is also bound by these political ideals.

CONCLUSION

Meritocracy is a modern capitalistic ideal. It promised to maximize efficiency and ensure a just distribution of rewards. Sociologists – from Durkheim in *The Division of Labor in Society* to these very early days of the twenty first century – have pledged allegiance to the ideals of meritocracy and equal opportunity (see Coleman 1974). Since a meritocratic order is implicitly set as their ideal standard for comparison, sociologists of stratification are preoccupied with issues of inequality of opportunity. Implicitly, they wish for a just, meritocratic yet deservedly hierarchical social order. As true modernists of state and market, they seek justice and join governments in battling the causes of undeserved inequality. Unwittingly, they call for deserved, or merited, social stratification. A kingdom yet to come.

However, the accomplishment of a working meritocracy is not likely to finalize the modern project of an open meritocracy. The open competitive basis of the social order is likely to produce new aristocracies of merit which will challenge this very basis. Highly educated and merited families are likely to guard their advantages, even though some offspring may be intellectually undeserving of their ascribed status. This tendency toward filial perpetuation is likely to challenge the openness of the meritocratic order. This means that tendencies for closure and bias are likely to continue challenging meritocratic social orders and the science of society. After all, sociology and meritocracy are children of similar intellectual traditions.

SEE ALSO: *Brown v. Board of Education*; Educational and Occupational Attainment; Opportunities for Learning; School Segregation, Desegregation; State; Stratification and Inequality, Theories of

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Merton, Robert K. (1910–2003)

Barry V. Johnston

Robert K. Merton is among the last of the pansophic scholars in American sociology. His works have opened or deepened new fields of study in the sociology of science, studies of social time, the development and analysis of social theory, and the exploration of the dynamic relationship between sociological theory and empirical research. To this brief list of intellectual contributions should also be added a highly improbable journey from working class origins in South Philadelphia to Harvard, a 62 year association with Columbia University, and a journey to the White House in 1994 as the first sociologist to receive the National Medal of Science. The last distinction was one of many acknowledgments for a renowned and distinguished life of scholarship and contributions to sociology and society.

According to Morton Hunt's (1961) profile of Merton the sociologist was born in a South Philadelphia slum, where rows of dingy, decrepit houses sheltered first generation immigrants from Italy, Ireland, and (Merton's parents among them) Eastern Europe. However,

Merton (1994) contested Hunt's assertion about his parents, the poverty of his early life, and the slum like qualities of his neighborhood. There he recalls that he felt no sense of deprivation, but instead a rich environment that stimulated discovery and learning. Among the avenues to this wider world was a large Carnegie Library, where he started reading biographies, literature, autobiographies, and the histories of science and literature with the help of the staff of then all lady librarians. It was also through the library that he came across the works of James Gibbons Huneker, the drama and literary critic that introduced him to new and unexpected dimensions of European culture. These included the French symbolists and the works of Ibsen, Bernard Shaw, and Flaubert among others. Merton was provided the opportunities for a stimulating and engaging introduction to the sciences and mathematics, as well as schooling in four years of Latin and two years of French. Clearly, it was an environment in which the young scholar thrived. These experiences demonstrate enrichment activities that led to an early engagement with a rich body of ideas and immersion in science, culture, and the arts.

Merton was clearly on his way to becoming one of sociology's most literate citizens and possessed a distinctive ability to see the unique in the ordinary. It was this keen intellectual capability that brought him to the attention of his first university mentor, George E. Simpson at Temple University. Through Simpson he learned that an objective science of sociology was possible, and this was later reinforced when, on his own, he read Sorokin's *Contemporary Sociological Theories* (1928). Simpson quickly identified Merton's intellectual promise, and as a mentor led Merton deeper into the works of the versatile and prolific Sorokin. When Merton later saw Sorokin in action at the meetings of the American Sociological Association in Washington DC, he firmly decided that it was with Sorokin that he wanted to do his graduate studies and it did not matter where he might be.

Once at Harvard Merton developed a style of life made up of hard work, long hours, creative adaptations to student poverty, fox trotting with the ladies, and a competitive tennis game. It was there too that he developed a close and professional relationship with George Sarton, who was even then considered a founding

force in the history of science. Sarton and Sorokin were the initiating stimuli that led to Merton's development and lifelong engagement with the history and sociology of science. While busy with these activities Merton also explored and published with Sorokin in 1937 the article "Social Time: Methodological and Functional Analysis" in the *American Journal of Sociology*. This early publication was later followed by such works as "Socially Expected Durations: A Case Study of Concept Formation in Sociology" (1984) and "On Becoming an Honorand at Jagiellonian University: Social Time and Socio Cognitive Networks" (1990). On his Harvard mentors Merton would later acknowledge that Sarton and Sorokin were quite different and these differences separated them widely from each other. While the contrast was palpable, little effort was required to work well with either of them. Discipleship was not necessary and independent thought was appreciated and acknowledged by each, though to different degrees. Merton later used these acquired skills to navigate the very stormy waters separating Sorokin and Talcott Parsons. Merton completed his degree in 1936. His dissertation's focus and title was "Science, Technology and Society in Seventeenth Century England." Sarton thought so highly of it that it was published in its entirety in his journal *Osiris*. This early work has often been considered one of the most widely read and reproduced dissertations in the discipline.

After Harvard, Merton taught and then chaired the sociology department at Tulane. Two years later he moved to Columbia University and there spent the next 62 years of his career. When he arrived, Harvard, Columbia, and the University of Chicago were the major institutions vying for preeminence in sociology. For some time, Robert McIver had provided leadership in theory at Columbia, while Robert Lynn did the same in methodology and empirical research. By 1941 these men were seeking their replacements. Lynn obtained a permanent position for Paul Lazarsfeld as a professor of sociology who would serve simultaneously as the director of the Bureau of Applied Social Research. Merton became the new theoretical voice in the department. The choices by Lynn and McIver resulted in one of the most synergistic and creative collaborations in the history

of the discipline. In the process the mathematician and the theorist added depth and luster to the practice of their respective and common crafts. By so doing they also kept Columbia in the trinity of competitors for disciplinary hegemony.

Such intertwining of theory and methods was a result of two critical, yet open minded scholars challenging the implicit and explicit assumptions of their different specializations. In the process of explaining to each other their methods of theory building and doing research they constantly engaged in explications of how they came to know what they knew. In the process Merton became more attuned to empirical and statistical methods, while Lazarsfeld gained new insights into construction and the explanatory power of theory. Their complementarities were visible in their seminars, where they often demonstrated for their students the blending of their sociological orientations as well as their distinctive personalities (Heeren 1975).

By the age of 40 Merton was a very important sociologist, a member of the National Academy of Sciences, and working with Lazarsfeld to establish a program of theoretically informed and empirically rigorous research at Columbia. Both of these scholars had great influence on many graduate students. Lazarsfeld inspired them to engage in rigorous empirical analysis, and many students considered him brilliant. They admired his commitment and that of Merton to reliable empirical evidence, and their image of sociological research as combining the ordinary, testable hypotheses, and high quality data.

Students were also deeply drawn to Merton. Indeed, very few students did not consider him among their reasons for coming to Columbia. He was a major influence on their intellectual development. The power of Merton's lectures, the clarity and elegance of his ideas, and the promise they demonstrated for sociology's development as a theoretical and applied discipline confirmed students' beliefs that they were onto something important. Indeed, the ideas and research methods that they were learning had great promise of yielding a deeper theoretical understanding of society that could be applied to social problems and the improvement of the human condition. Many students found in the teaching of Merton and Lazarsfeld

the elements necessary for a genuine science of society (Heeren 1975).

The relationship between these two great scholars resulted in not only more powerful, substantive, and empirical contributions that furthered theoretical sociology, but also brought to center stage what Merton called theories of the middle range. These theories existed between what their colleague C. Wright Mills called abstracted empiricism, which was gathering data for their own sake, without any connection to a body of theory, and grand theory, which had little or no connection to the real world and was only significant to the originating theorist and his followers. For Merton and Lazarsfeld, the most productive theoretical forms were those grounded in empirical data, and used to guide further research and theoretical development.

The influence of Merton and Lazarsfeld reached a broad audience at Columbia and the Russell Sage Foundation. Indeed, Merton would be a mentor to several generations of promising sociologists toiling at the boundaries and increasing the scientific rigor of contemporary sociology. Included among them were Peter Blau, James Coleman, Lewis and Rose Coser, Alvin Gouldner, Seymour Martin Lipset, Alice Rossi, and Arthur Stinchcomb. To these one could add Stephen and Jonathan Cole, Harriet Zuckerman, and Tom Gieryn, who Merton mentored in the social studies of science.

Merton was an unreconstructed pioneer working at the outer boundaries of his wide range of interests. He had a mind that constantly found the unique in the ordinary. Behind the incredible intellect was a loyal and exceptionally principled man committed to fairness and the highest professional standards. A case in point was his participation in a spontaneously organized, grassroots write-in campaign to get his old friend and mentor Pitirim Sorokin on the ballot for presidency of the American Sociological Association. The idea emerged from a conversation among O. D. Duncan, Beverly Duncan, and Albert J. Reiss, Jr. They recalled that Sorokin had yet to receive the traditional renomination for the office after his earlier defeat by Florian Znaniecki in 1952. In order to right the perceived wrong they formed a committee for his presidential renomination. Among those first contacted was Merton, who

not only accepted membership, but suggested that they begin by forming a committee of correspondence, followed by a mass mailing of postcards to solicit support for Sorokin. This committee of 8 reached 677 others with its initial letter. Among them were those who also chose to participate and in the process contacted 1,026 voting members of the ASA in their first mailings. By February 1963 almost all voting members of the ASA were aware of the campaign. In the end Sorokin received 1,344 votes out of the 2,073 votes cast. The strategy suggested by Merton, and implemented by the committee and the converts, had attained its goal and purpose. In the process it also righted a historical wrong (Johnston 1987).

On February 23, 2003 Merton died of terminal cancer in New York City. As many at his memorial service that May proclaimed, he had opened new areas of study, crafted many new and important ideas, and was a role model for the practice of the craft. He had lived an incredibly active and productive life characterized by engagement, brilliance, broad learning, endurance, and integrity. He was an exemplar of the classical scholar in an age of specialization.

SEE ALSO: American Sociological Association; Anomie; Lazarsfeld, Paul; Mills, C. Wright; Sorokin, Pitirim A.; Theory and Methods; Znaniecki, Florian

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mesostructure

Jeffery T. Ulmer

As the name suggests, mesostructure refers to the social processes and ordering that occur between the macro and micro levels of social organization. Mesostructure is the level of social analysis within which more macrostructural or cultural arrangements shape and condition situations of interaction between individuals or groups, and within which the latter in turn maintain, modify, or change the former. Mesos structure also provides a perspective from which to study social organization and structure without compromising an emphasis on the importance of interaction process and human agency. Mesos structure therefore extends Herbert Blumer's insight that people collectively and individually act in situations, and situations are conditioned (though not determined) by larger social structures and processes, but the latter are produced and potentially changed by the former.

The term was coined in print by David R. Maines in a 1979 essay in *Contemporary Sociology* titled "Mesostructure and Social Process." Maines further fleshed out the mesostructural perspective in a 1982 essay in *Urban Life*. Peter M. Hall (1987) then more explicitly formalized the notion of mesostructure and how it could guide empirical inquiry. More recently, Hall (1997) has expanded his treatment of

mesostructure into an analytical framework for studying the exercise of power at the mesostructural level.

Maines's and Hall's explication of the notion of mesostructure was animated by debate in sociological theory, especially in the 1970s and 1980s, about "the micro–macro problem," and how to link together micro and macro in sociological analysis. They argued that conventional treatments of the micro–macro issue tended to reify a false separation or dualism between the levels of face to face interaction processes on one hand, and large scale social organization and structure on the other.

Drawing on pragmatist ontological assumptions about human social life, they argued that micro and macro levels are not opposed dualisms, and certainly do not require different ontological assumptions and epistemologies. Rather, micro and macro are dialectically linked by social processes and the orders that emerge from them. Both Maines's essays and Hall's address pointed to Anselm Strauss's theory of negotiated order (which Strauss later renamed processual order) and his conceptualization of social worlds as prime exemplars of mesostructural thinking. Maines also argued that the idea was implicit in the work of earlier symbolic interactionists such as Herbert Blumer, Everett Hughes, Tomatsu Shibutani, and Gregory Stone.

Hall's (1987) formalization of mesostructure as an analytical perspective identifies six analytical categories focusing on the interrelationship between macro and micro:

- 1 *Process and temporality* focus attention on the ways in which past actions condition and constrain decisions and activities in the present, and the ways in which actors project future scenarios and strategies.
- 2 *Conventions and practices* focus attention on the generally shared, habitual, taken for granted ground rules for action and interaction. Conventions and practices facilitate cooperation and coordination, but also constrain participants' alternatives and choices.
- 3 *Collective activity* draws attention to chains of joint actions by two or more individuals with regard to some social object. Parenting, business enterprise, social movements,

and war are examples of such collective activity.

- 4 *Networks* are the sets of linkages, representing transactions or relationships, between actors. To study social networks is therefore to study mesostructure.
- 5 *Resources and power* are essential to mesostructural analysis. Resources represent "any attribute, possession, or circumstance" at the disposal of collective or individual actors to achieve desired goals. Power is seen as the capacity to achieve goals, gain compliance, overcome resistance, or limit others' alternatives.
- 6 *Grounding* lodges micro level interaction and decisions in historical, cultural, and structural contexts. Grounding interaction processes in such contexts is essential for understanding the conditions, constraints, and opportunities that shape situations of interaction.

More recently, Hall (1997) has elaborated on the fifth analytical category above (resources and power) and pushed the idea of mesostructure toward a theory of what he calls "metapower." Key mechanisms for wielding metapower are: (1) the ability to exercise strategic agency; (2) the ability to construct and routinize rules, regulations, and conventions that govern others; (3) the ability to structure situational contexts and establish relational control of others; (4) the ability to shape group culture and the socialization of group members; and (5) the ability to enroll subordinates as delegates. These analytical categories thus enable sociologists to analyze the exercise of power at the mesostructural level.

Mesostructural analysis, in principle, could be done with either quantitative or qualitative methods, so long as there is an emphasis on agency, interaction process, and situational embeddedness. Hall's (Hall & McGinty 1997) empirical work on national and state education policy and local schools is a particularly good methodological exemplar. On the other hand, quantitative data could be potentially useful for assessing the distribution and variation of mesostructural processes across large numbers of empirical cases, or for documenting the quantifiable characteristics of situations or local

contexts and how they relate to the outcomes of interaction.

Several explicit empirical applications of mesostructure exist across a variety of substantive topics, in addition to Hall's research on education noted above. Maines and Morrione (1990) interpret Blumer's analysis of industrialization and social change in mesostructural terms. Clarke's (1991) and Fine's (1984) applications of negotiated order and social worlds perspectives to organizational theory are very mesostructural. In addition, research has analyzed mesostructure in criminal courts and sentencing (Ulmer 1997), prisons (Thomas 1984), the accounting profession (Fischer & Dirsmith 1995), marriage and the family (Pestello & Voydanoff 1991), and other topics.

Anthony Giddens's theory of structuration and Pierre Bourdieu's theory of field and habitus are very parallel and compatible concepts with mesostructure, though there appears to have been little recognition of their common ground in the sociological literature. As Maines and Hall point out, however, the notion of mesostructural analysis in symbolic interactionism thinking considerably predates the work of Giddens and Bourdieu.

SEE ALSO: Habitus/Field; Micro Macro Links; Social Worlds; Symbolic Interaction

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meta-analysis

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There are at least three distinct meanings of the term "meta analysis" in social science. It can be used to indicate (1) a literature review of a body of empirical findings, especially in psychology; (2) a summary of replication research on a specific topic; or (3) a theoretical or methodological analysis of the complex philosophical problems associated with commonalities in scientific approaches. The first usage is common in psychology while the second is often used in physical science. Such reflexivity is predicated on an inductive approach. Involved in the third usage is, for example, Ritzer's (1975a, b) emphasis on the importance of *paradigmatic* "metatheory." His schema for analyzing sociological theory involves a "meta meta analysis" of three kinds of metatheory: (1) a means for deeper *understanding*; (2) a *prelude* to theory construction; and (3) a source of *overarching perspectives* (Ritzer & Goodman 2004: A 1 to A 22).

All calls for "reflexive sociology" (e.g., Bourdieu & Wacquant 1992) could be considered meta analyses. A meta analysis of methodological exemplars for different paradigms is often viewed as part and parcel of a metatheory, although there is a meta method, as well. The second order analysis of any theoretical formulation involves an attempt to clarify the relationship between that theory and other theories. Therefore, it is important to examine epistemological, ontological, axiological, and other philosophical aspects of the theory and its attendant methodology. For example, a discussion of "methodological individualism" requires sorting out the ontological assumption that only individual human beings are real versus the methodological assumption that real collectivities can be empirically studied through analysis of data which have been gathered through interviews of people who are members of such collectivities (e.g., organizations, neighborhoods). If the two assumptions are conflated, then a meta analysis that assumes all studies that are based on individual level interviews are representative of the category "methodological individualism" would be incorrect (Lukes 1994). A certain amount of "boundary work" is necessary in science (Gieryn 1983), and that is also true in social science. Merton (1976) argues that there may be conflicting norms in science. The ambiguous content of social scientific theories may create a certain degree of ambivalence concerning the degree to which certain criteria should be foregrounded. For example, there may be disputes in metatheory as to whether there should be theoretical or empirical commonalities that are emphasized. Theories can be similar to one another and yet have widely different applications to substantive topics. A theory developed in the study of deviance may be relevant to the study of social conflict but may also pertain to a meta analysis of topics such as socialization and collective behavior. Meta analysis is difficult to carry out. To take a bird's eye view of a substantive field and decide on commonalities requires an intimate knowledge of that field as well as a philosophical grasp of fundamental assumptions.

SEE ALSO: Economic Determinism; Meta theory; Methods; Paradigms; Science/Non Science and Boundary Work

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metatheory

George Ritzer

A metatheory is a broad perspective that overarches two, or more, theories. There are many metatheories – positivism, postpositivism, hermeneutics, and so on – of importance in sociology and other social sciences. Two of the best known and most important are methodological holism and methodological individualism. Methodological holism takes as its basic unit of analysis, and focuses most of its attention on, “social wholes” such as social structures, social institutions, imperatively coordinated associations, and capitalism. It overarches such large scale, macro level theories as structural functionalism, conflict theory, and some varieties of neo Marxian theory. Methodological individualism takes as its unit of analysis and focal concern individual level phenomena such as the mind, self, action, accounts, behavior, rational action, and so on. It overarches a series of micro level theories such as symbolic interactionism, ethnomethodology, exchange theory, and rational choice theory. There is a third, methodological relationism, that concerns itself with the relationship between social wholes and

social individuals and overarches a series of theories that arose mainly in the 1980s to compensate for the micro and macro extremism of the two extant metatheories. Methodological relationism encompasses a number of largely American micro–macro theories and more European agency–structure theories.

A particularly useful term to use in thinking about metatheories is Thomas Kuhn’s famous, albeit highly ambiguous and controversial, notion of a paradigm. In fact, a paradigm is broader than a metatheory because it encompasses not only theories, but also methods, images of the subject matter of sociology, and a body of work that serves as an exemplar for those who work within the paradigm (Ritzer 1975).

The social facts paradigm derives its name and orientation from the work of Émile Durkheim and his contention that sociology should involve the study of social facts that are external to and coercive over individuals. He distinguished between two broad types of social facts – material (now most commonly called social structures) and non material (now usually called social institutions). The two major theories subsumed under this heading are structural functionalism and conflict theory, and to a lesser extent systems theory. The social definition paradigm derives its name from W. I. Thomas’s “definition of the situation” (if people define situations as real, they are real in their consequences). Symbolic interactionism is a theoretical component of the social definition paradigm, as is ethnomethodology. Finally, there is the social behavior paradigm, adopting a focus on behavior from the psychological behaviorists, especially B. F. Skinner. Exchange theory and rational choice would be included in this paradigm.

The relatively narrow macro (social facts) and micro (social definition and social behavior) foci of extant paradigms led to the delineation of a more integrated sociological paradigm. Marx and his dialectical approach, especially to the relationship between the capitalists and proletariat on one side and the structures of capitalism on the other, are taken as the exemplar of this approach and this paradigm can be seen as encompassing the micro–macro and agency–structure theories mentioned above.

Metatheorizing can be seen as a specific form of metasociology that examines sociological

theory. While sociological theorizing attempts to make sense of the social world, metatheorizing attempts to make sense of sociological theorizing. As with other forms of metastudy, reflexivity is a crucial component of sociological metatheorizing. All metatheorizing involves a high level of reflexivity, although the highest level of reflexivity is found among metatheorists.

Metasociology encompasses not only metatheorizing, but also meta methods and meta data analysis. Meta methods involves the reflexive study of the discipline's various methods, while meta data analysis takes as its subject a range of studies of a given phenomenon and seeks to gain an overall sense of them and to aggregate the data in order to come to a more general conclusion about a particular issue.

A wide variety of work can be included under the heading of sociological metatheorizing. What distinguishes this work is not so much the process of metatheorizing (it may vary greatly in a variety of ways), but rather the nature of the end products. There are three varieties of metatheorizing, largely defined by differences in their end products.

The first type, "metatheorizing as a means of attaining a deeper understanding of theory (Mu)," involves the study of theory in order to produce a better, more profound understanding of extant theory. Mu is concerned, more specifically, with the study of theories, theorists, and communities of theorists, as well as with the larger intellectual and social contexts of theories and theorists.

The second type, "metatheorizing as a prelude to theory development (Mp)," entails the study of extant theory in order to produce new sociological theory. Thus Marx's intensive (and critical) study of the theoretical work of economists like Adam Smith and David Ricardo, philosophers such as Georg Hegel and the Young Hegelians, utopian socialists such as Charles Fourier and Pierre Joseph Proudhon, and many others provided the basis for his own theory. More contemporaneously, the McDonaldization thesis is derived, at least in part, from a study of the theories of Max Weber, especially his theory of rationalization.

The third type, "metatheorizing as a source of overarching theoretical perspectives (Mo)," is oriented to the goal of producing a perspective, a metatheory, that overarches some part or

all of sociological theory. Alexander's attempts to develop a "general theoretical logic for sociology," as well as his later effort to develop a post-positivist approach, would both be examples of this third type of metatheorizing.

Although metatheorizing takes place in other fields, it is particularly characteristic of sociology. The prevalence of metatheorizing in sociology is rooted in the fact that sociologists deal with culturally diverse and historically specific subjects. This makes universal truth claims difficult or impossible. The failure to discover universal truths and invariant laws of the social world has informed many metatheoretical efforts. The clashes of multiple paradigms competing in the realm of sociological theorizing create a perfect condition for the emergence of metatheoretical discourse.

Social theory is embedded not only in academia but also in the larger society. As a result, there are a series of larger forces that impinge on, even control, it. Metatheorizing serves to alert theorists to the existence of these forces as well as to the need to resist them.

The coming of age of metatheorizing in American sociology can be traced to the collapse of the dominant social facts paradigm during the 1960s. That paradigm, especially its major theoretical component, Parsonsian functionalism, had dominated American sociology for more than two decades before it was seriously challenged by rival paradigms, as well as critics from a wide range of other perspectives. The emergence of a multiparadigmatic structure in sociology in the late 1960s reflected the growing disunity of the discipline and increasingly fragmented sociological research. There emerged a widespread feeling that sociology was facing a profound crisis. It was this sense of imminent disciplinary crisis that helped to invigorate meta analyses of all types. At first, this took the form of what was, at the time, called the sociology of sociology. Later, metasociology had to overcome strongly negative views of the sociology of sociology as being dominated by minor studies of trivial aspects of the discipline. However, metasociology, especially metatheorizing, has survived, even prospered, as the sociology of sociology and its weaknesses have receded into history.

A more recent challenge and spur to metatheorizing is the rise of postmodern social

theory. Since the latter involves an assault on rationality and the modern orientation and metatheorizing is both modern and rational, it has come to be questioned by postmodernists. On the other hand, postmodernism has provided metatheorists with a whole series of new tools and approaches with which to study theory.

One example is deconstruction, a form of textual criticism that scrutinizes the ways in which texts, including theoretical texts, are constructed. A deconstructionist takes a finished text and analyzes the ways in which various literary devices and strategies of argumentation are used to give the impression of a coherent whole.

One important deconstructionist technique is decentering. This can mean several things to metatheorists. First, it might mean moving away from according primacy to the author (especially one associated with the discipline's canon) and giving up on the objective of attempting to discern what an author "really" means.

Second, it can mean the end of the effort to get to the heart, or central meaning, of a theory. Rather, the objective might be to focus on more promising peripheral aspects of that theory. Certain passages of specific works often are presented in such a way that they are made to seem of central importance. Over the years, metatheorists have tended to emphasize those passages or to enshrine other passages as being of key importance. In this context, deconstructionism leads one away from the familiar passages and into ignored aspects of the theory or perhaps rarely read footnotes.

Third, it might be advisable to focus on an undecidable moment in the history of social theory and an analysis of some of the courses taken and, more importantly from the point of view of deconstructionism, not taken by social theory.

Fourth, an effort might be made to reverse the resident hierarchy, only to displace it. There is, for example, a clear hierarchy of schools of sociological theory and there is a tendency to devote most attention to the leading schools. This suggests that what metatheorists need to do is focus more attention on the most marginal of schools (this is another version of decentering) for their marginality may tell us a great deal about the theoretical system

in which they exist. Furthermore, their very marginality may make them far easier to study than high ranking theoretical perspectives. This is traceable to the fact that those associated with lower ranking perspectives have little to hide, while thinkers linked with the premier schools have a vested interest in concealing things that may adversely affect their exalted status. Similarly, specific ideas have come to be seen as of central importance in every theoretical perspective. These ideas tend to come to the fore any time a given theory is examined or discussed. However, it is entirely possible that important ideas have been lost and a search for those marginal ideas could pay huge dividends.

However, the search for marginal schools, theorists, or ideas should not be turned into a routine or into a new, albeit reversed, hierarchy. Deconstructionism leads to the idea that all such routines, or hierarchies, need to be continually displaced. This prevents metatheoretical work from settling into any comfortable routines; any new construction immediately must be deconstructed.

It is this last aspect of deconstructionism that has the most important implications for metatheorizing. As modernists, most metatheorists have implicitly engaged in deconstruction, but almost always with the objective that they and/or those influenced by their work would engage in a process of reconstruction. This could involve the rebuilding of the theory they have just deconstructed or the use of the lessons learned to create an entirely new theoretical perspective. As modernists, most metatheorists would reject the idea of deconstruction in order to further deconstruct. Rather, they would be oriented to the modern view of progress toward the goal of the ultimate theoretical perspective, or truth about it. However, as with all modern notions, this seeks an end or closure of the theoretical "conversation" in the creation of that ultimate theory. The postmodern view is that the goal is not to end the conversation in some ultimate truth, but rather to continually deconstruct in order to keep the conversation going. Such an objective makes sense for metatheoretical work; in fact, it may be *the* *raison d'être* for such work. A round of metatheoretical work may be seen as merely the basis for the next one and not as aimed at some ultimate and conclusive objective. In these terms, metatheorizing

may be seen as the exercise par excellence in keeping the theoretical conversation going.

While it is possible to look at postmodern theory as a threat to modern forms of metatheorizing, it also is possible to see it as offering an array of provocative new ideas that could be of great use to it and point it in a variety of new directions.

SEE ALSO: Deconstruction; Durkheim, Émile; Hermeneutics; Meta Analysis; Positivism; Postmodernism; Postpositivism; Theory Construction

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methods

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In sociology the term methods can encompass different aspects of a methodical approach to empirical research. We can distinguish between “methodology” as the theoretical understanding of basic principles, and “method” as research techniques (Abbot 2001a). The topics discussed under methods often include both. A classical

experimental design (CED), with random assignment to an experimental group and a control group, is a basic aspect of methodology, while the importance of the specific statistical techniques that attempt to emulate aspects of a CED (without actually carrying out an experiment) is a topic in statistical methods. In most sociological research there is a multivariate approach. It would be very difficult to actually carry out an experiment on such multivariable models, hence we rely on “path analysis” (Land 1969) to simulate the logic of CED. The term methods is often used to represent specific techniques of research, both quantitative and qualitative, with the underlying logic of utilizing such techniques often left implicit in “normal science” (Kuhn 1970) approaches. But different individuals may be more knowledgeable about one or the other. Thus, for example, all of the inferential statistics, parametric and non parametric, may be studied as aspects of quantitative methods. Similarly, all aspects of ethnographic fieldwork, open ended interviewing, and observation may be considered in the context of qualitative methods. We do not consider a person who has specialized in certain techniques a “methodist.” We use the term methodologist to cover expertise in either techniques of research (e.g., Manton et al. 1994) or the underlying logic or methodology (e.g., Popper 1969).

There has been considerable work done on specific aspects of both quantitative (Raftery 2005) and qualitative (Atkinson & Delamont 2005) techniques, although there is also an interest in moving beyond the quantitative–qualitative distinction (Ragin 1987). There is a very vibrant literature on statistical techniques. For example, Karl Pearson’s “product moment correlation coefficient” (ρ) is based on a set of assumptions, including having data with a ratio or at least an interval “level of measurement.” But much sociological data are categorical, numerically ordinal, or even nominal. So many researchers have attempted to use Pearson’s ρ with ordinal or even nominal level data (Lyons 1971). Similarly, in qualitative data analysis there has been a move away from intuitive scanning of a complex body of material to the use of computer software packages which allow for summaries of aspects of the information gathered, especially blocks of text files. There

is an ongoing industry devoted to further refinement of specific techniques used in sociological research.

However, it is important to also consider the ways in which specific techniques relate to general problems in the logic of method. But the logic of method tends to overlap with the philosophy of science. That, in turn, has been influenced by science and technology studies (STS). Work on what actually happens in a laboratory (Latour 1999) provides a window on methodology in the broader sense. In the philosophical discussion of methodology there have been many efforts to discuss types of approaches or frameworks. For example, one widely discussed typology differentiates among positivism, interpretivism, and criticalism (Habermas 1971; Neuman 2006). Those “meta paradigms” can be seen as requiring quite different ways of collecting and evaluating evidence.

For the positivist social scientist, it is important to stress the epistemological questions related to conducting research in such a way that a truly scientific body of data will be collected. But there is considerable disagreement concerning the precise nature of science in the social sciences (Adorno et al. 1976). The term positivism has many different definitions. Halfpenny (1982) lists 12. Most important today are: (1) an epistemology stressing observation and empirical inquiry; (2) a natural science “social physics” approach to the study of sociological topics; (3) a program for unifying science (Wilson 1998); (4) stress on the hypothetico-deductive method (Hempel 1965; Zetterberg 1965; Wallace 1971); (5) belief in the possibility of causal laws which are transhistorical and transcultural; (6) Popper’s (1965 [1934], 1969) “falsificationism.” Those who hold rigidly to one or more of those principles can be said to be positivistic.

Many conceive of methods in terms of “positivism and its epistemological others” (Steinmetz 2005). Until the late 1960s there was a strong trend within sociology to try to make the discipline “scientific.” Sociology hit a “crisis” and a host of non-positivist methods were reiterated or invented. That crisis was predicted by Gouldner (1970), although he did not foresee the great variety of methodologies that would ensue. A great variety of methods became more acceptable. Pathbreaking was

an inductive “grounded theory” approach (Glaser & Strauss 1967). But the epistemological stress on grounded theory eventually led to a wider discussion reminiscent of the *Methodenstreit* (Nagel 1961: 535–606; Adorno et al. 1976).

The interpretive approach (Alford 1998: 72–85) downplays epistemological concerns and takes distance from physical sciences. Interpretive sociologists accept that the study of human beings is likely to produce different methodologies. One strain can be traced to Wilhelm Dilthey (1989). Another important root source for the interpretive meta-paradigm is Georg Simmel, whose work directly influenced the Chicago School. For the interpretive social scientist it is the question of “philosophical anthropology” that should be highlighted. How are human beings different? Are people different from rocks and stars? Are humans cognitively and emotionally different from other animals, even the higher apes? This sometimes leads to the conclusion that the best methodological approach is to study individual social actors and to regard all “functional” arguments about collective “structures” as ontologically suspect. The Chicago School of Sociology (Bulmer 1984) stresses the interpretive approach, as in the famous study of *The Polish Peasant in Europe and America* (1918–20) by Thomas and Znaniecki, which utilizes the kinds of documents that Dilthey thought highly of (Bulmer 1984: 53).

Where both the positive and the interpretive meta-paradigms tend to agree is that questions of axiology (morals and ethics) as well as long-term, historical teleology (future end goals) are better left out. As Max Weber (1949), following Heinrich Rickert, argued persuasively with regard to his own interpretive sociology (*verstehende Soziologie*), it is important to distinguish between the reasons we carry out research studies and the way in which we examine the evidence. A topic may have “value relevance” but the actual study, positive or interpretive, should strive to be as “value neutral” as possible.

The strong dissenting voice on this question of axiology and teleology is critical theory. The term is derived from the Frankfurt School but has gained wider coinage. Criticalists feel that some specific value or future end goal is of such

importance that considerations of epistemology and ontology are less important. Those who hold to this position tend to emphasize the ways in which notions of value free objectivity can be used to justify certain kinds of policy. The neo Marxian version of the critical approach is summarized by Gouldner (1962) in his critique of Weberian value freedom. Feminists (Harding 1986) also emphasize axiology and teleology, a society that has eliminated "patriarchy." Other forms of criticalism are environmentalism and Gandhianism.

Considerable debate continues to mark sociological research studies. The topic of triangulation has led to many different ways of conceiving a multimethod approach. The idea that it would be possible in principle to combine insights from positive, interpretive, and critical meta paradigms is a key to Habermas's general theory. Bourdieu (1984) has utilized multiple correspondence analysis (MCA), a form of data reduction based on dual scaling.

This has led to acceptance by some of a fourth attitude toward methods which can be called the postmodernist meta paradigm in sociology. The social science version of postmodernism is a rejection of all "foundationalisms." That lack of any methodological foundations does not, however, restrict postmodernist thinkers like Foucault, Baudrillard, Barthes, Lyotard, and Derrida from holding positions. A distinction needs to be made between postmodern epistemology and empirical study of the phenomena of late modernism (Mirchandani 2005). There have been modernist approaches to the study of postmodern societies (Ritzer 2004).

The confusion caused by the existence of many paradigms within sociology (Ritzer 1980) has led to a lack of agreement on methods. There is some question as to whether the "incommensurability" of paradigms may be overstated (Freidheim 1979). Nevertheless, those who adhere to a specific approach tend to continue to refine and adjust their own methods and invent new techniques. The ways in which specific approaches have been promoted have sometimes led to distortions of the historical record. Marx is often perceived as a contributor to scientific Marxist theory, but his Marxism is often interpretive and his scientific arguments are frequently clouded by his teleological goal: a future communist ideal society.

Durkheim is frequently still viewed as a follower of Comte who established a "scientific" approach to sociological research by using the logic of statistical argument. Durkheim's *Rules* and his *Suicide* are introduced to many students as adequate representations of Durkheim's oeuvre, but that ignores his interest in social change and the division of labor. Max Weber is usually seen as a comparative historical researcher, but he also carried out empirical work on farm labor and on factory workers (Lazarsfeld & Oberschall 1964). Platt (1996) has applied his historical, archival methods to the study of the history of sociological research methods and has corrected many fallacious interpretations.

The move from cross tabulation to regression and path analysis in sociology in the 1970s (Heise 1969; Land 1969) led to speculation concerning the possibility of a mathematical and statistical approach to sociology (Kemeny & Snell 1962; Beauchamp 1970), but to date the discipline as a whole has not embraced mathematical sociology.

Ragin (2000) has criticized the conventional approach to quantitative methods. He points out that researchers are often insensitive to the difficulty of determining a population. He also points out that we need to distinguish between necessary and sufficient conditions when making causal claims. He introduces a qualitative comparative analysis (QCA) that emphasizes the comparison of diverse cases. Ragin also indicates the usefulness of fuzzy sets versus crisp sets (Laio 2001). There has been significant rethinking of fundamental assumptions once taken as axiomatic (Abbot 2001b).

In the future it is likely that techniques such as partial least squares (PLS), singular value decomposition (SVD), penalized logistic regression (PLR), and recursive feature elimination (RFE) will lead to more sophisticated techniques for the study of complex sociological systems. Secondary data sets generate a large volume of sociological data. Bioinformatics (Chen & Wong 2005) will probably be extended to human social structures. Bayesian statistics will also be important (Iverson 1969).

SEE ALSO: Chicago School; Critical Qualitative Research; Critical Theory/Frankfurt School; Durkheim, Émile; Epistemology; Experimental Design; Experimental Methods;

Falsification; Grounded Theory; Mathematical Sociology; Methods, Arts Based; Methods, Boot strap; Methods, Case Study; Methods, Mixed; Methods, Postcolonial; Methods, Visual; Positivism; Quantitative Methods; Simmel, Georg; Statistical Significance Testing; Theory and Methods; Validity, Qualitative; Validity, Quantitative; Weber, Max

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methods, arts-based

Tom Barone

The arts and sciences have exhibited fundamental similarities since their beginnings. Each has always been an inherently aesthetic activity. There has always been artistry in science (including the social sciences) as there is inevitably an empirical basis to good art. Other commonalities include the imaginative process that inhabits the work of both the artist and the scientist, the drive of each to illuminate and interpret facets of the physical and social worlds, and the personal nature of these inevitably human enterprises. Indeed, historians of western thought have noted that before the nineteenth century no substantial differences were recognized between the arts and sciences.

Still, following the period of the Enlightenment, the arts and sciences were forced to occupy separate methodological chambers, as

within western culture distinctive techniques and modes of representation of each were emphasized. This strict segregation within an art/science dichotomy was most famously described in C. P. Snow's *The Two Cultures* (1959). This dualism, reaching its crescendo during the reign of the logical positivists, led to a widespread assumption among social scientists that any trafficking in artistic premises, principles, or procedures serves to sully and discredit their work.

Nevertheless, within the twentieth century certain developments began challenging the clear distinction drawn between the two cultures by social scientists referred to as *traditionalists* or *modernists*. Within the newly legitimated qualitative approaches to social science research, a heightened use of arts based methods became evident. Qualitative researchers in the human studies were increasingly employing approaches to inquiry and representation that had, since the nineteenth century, been associated primarily with the literary arts.

This spate of methodological experimentation became obvious in the 1970s, during a phase of qualitative research called the moment of blurred genres (Denzin & Lincoln 1998). Against that intellectual backdrop, Robert Nisbet, in his 1976 book *Sociology as an Art Form*, declared boldly that the science of sociology is “also one of the arts – nourished . . . by precisely the same kinds of creative imagination which are to be found in such areas as music, painting, poetry, the novel, and drama” (p. 9).

During this period, only a few commentators could be found insisting that art and science are identical. Nevertheless, the anthropologist/storyteller Clifford Geertz (1973) famously observed that within the human studies the boundary between Snow's cultures was indeed becoming increasingly “blurred.” In social criticism, journalism, ethnography, educational studies, and elsewhere, experimentations with arts based methods and representational forms yielded literary style ethnographic essays, New Journalistic reportage, sociological portraits, and so on.

This experimentation with, and recognition of, aesthetic design elements in social research texts gained momentum through subsequent decades. Increasing attention was paid to the “poetics” of social texts. Visual images and

other modes of disclosure could be found accompanying the written word in multimedia texts. The idea of performing study findings was recommended as a means of enhancing their impact on the research audience. Some methodologists questioned the value of, and some researchers defied, the established boundary between fact and fiction in textual representations.

Most of these researcher pioneers in the human studies continued to identify themselves as social scientists rather than as artists, no doubt because of their academic training and professional socialization. Most were sociologists and ethnographers who nevertheless came to appreciate the potential power and utility of literary elements in disclosing their research findings. But this aestheticization of the social sciences was matched by a parallel movement in which social researchers who identified themselves as *artists* began to emphasize the empirical basis of art making.

This emphasis accompanied the intellectual overthrow of the formalists within the field of art criticism. The formalists had characterized art as the creation of an inevitably elaborate construction of illusion. The work of art, in this view, is designed to transport the viewer to an aesthetic remove, bracketed off from the nearby world of experience. Pragmatist and postmodernist critics, however, successfully argued against this radically subjectivist rationale, noting that the roots of the arts, like those of all human endeavors, are planted in the mundane, "real" world of social commerce. The artist was now revealed as "searching" (and "re searching") for empirical evidence to be shaped into aesthetic content in the ongoing stream of everyday life. Honoring this new emphasis, an innovative group of scholars began to imagine a new form of social research.

The term arts based research was first used by qualitative researchers within the field of education. Elliot Eisner, an arts educator and painter, is credited with coining the term (1979). Eisner was initially interested in the application of arts criticism to phenomena within the fields of educational evaluation. What, he asked, might be learned from critics of theater, painting, literature, architecture, etc., for better appreciating and disclosing dimensions of schooling? Later, Eisner and others

began to advocate for (and experiment with) renderings that were not pieces of art criticism, but texts that themselves resembled works of literary art (e.g., the poem, novel, novella, short story, life story, autobiography, memoir) and, more iconoclastically, works of plastic or performing art (e.g., film, ethnodrama, readers theater, collage, painting, multimedia installations, and digital hypertext).

However, while most arts based researchers refused to label themselves as social scientists, many of the research methods and writing strategies employed (especially by those working in literary genres) were comparable and even identical to those used by qualitative researchers in sociology and cultural anthropology. These included interviewing, participant observation, gaining rapport with informants, the use of "thick description," and so on.

Still more overlap could be found in a prominent list of methodological features of arts based research (Barone & Eisner 1997). These features included (1) the creation of *virtual textual realities*, literary, storied recreations of lived worlds through the use of language that is (2) *expressive* rather than declarative, and (3) *vernacular/contextual* rather than technical/abstract. The use of contextualized and expressive language promotes vicarious participation in the lives of informants/story characters and thereby (4) *empathic understanding* of their worldviews. Within the same text, several perspectives may be represented. Some may stand in contrast to others.

The researcher's perspective is also included as the text is shaped into an expressive (5) *aesthetic form*. This form exists within a dialectical relationship with aesthetic content, or empirical observations, embodied within the work. The resulting work bears the researcher's (6) *personal signature*, one crafted to reflect his or her perspective on the phenomena under study. But the researcher's perspective is meant to stand, without special privilege, alongside that of the others, within an open, or indeterminate, text that creates in the reader a sense of (7) *ambiguity*. This "writerly" text, with multiple perspectives enhanced, signals a refusal to supply the reader with a final, single, correct meaning of events. Moreover, it demands his or her active reconstruction (or "rewriting") of textual meaning and significance.

The overlap between the arts and social sciences is evident in this list in at least three ways. First, it honors the reality stemming from traditional social science that, for most arts based researchers, words rather than non-verbal symbols and images have continued to be the preferred mode of expression. Second, several of these supposedly “arts based” textual characteristics can be found in aesthetically sensitive social science texts. The emphasis on empathic understanding, for example, is reminiscent of Weber’s formulation of *Verstehen* as a goal of a sociological text that moves beyond cognition into the realms of feeling and motivation.

Finally, since not all of these seven formal design elements can be located in every arts based text, a research text may be characterized as arts based to the *degree* that these features are present. This implies a continuum (rather than a clean division) of research texts, with art and (traditional) social science representing the poles.

Still, most current arts based researchers are unwilling to conflate arts based and social science research. Insofar as design is associated with function, these seven elements are meant to serve, like the design elements in traditional texts, as means to an end. For many arts based researchers what most distinguishes their work is indeed the end, or purpose, that its design elements enable it to serve.

In his book *Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature* (1979), Richard Rorty posited two fundamental purposes of human inquiry: the discovery of truth and the enhancement of meaning. Social science has traditionally been primarily aimed toward the first of these – toward an enhancement of certainty; Barone (2000) has suggested that arts based research usually honors the second.

Within a work of art, meaning – aesthetic substance – is enhanced through an expressive form. Instead of merely stating or declaring, the work of art reconfigures observed and experienced phenomena into a semblance, a composed and shaped apparition. But the purpose of arts based research texts has also been expressed in other, perhaps more fundamental, ways. What, after all, is the ultimate point of enticing a reader to empathically understand, to “deeply feel,” dimensions of lives lived by

others, or to appreciate the social world from an array of enhanced perspectives?

Eisner (1991) has argued that the point is to offer considerations to be shared and discussed, reflected on, and debated. The findings of arts based research are therefore not so much located in Truth as in their ability to refine perception and deepen conversation, or as Geertz (1983) put it, to “increase the precision with which we vex each other.”

More fundamentally, the aim of arts based research may be likened to that of postmodern art, as one of *critical persuasion*. Arts based projects may be valued according to the degree that they effectively persuade readers to interrogate commonly accepted norms, beliefs, and values. Good arts based texts will do this through artful redescriptions of social practices and viewpoints that have come to be taken as givens, uncritically accepted as useful and virtuous.

Active reconstructions of the art based text by readers are invited as the author researcher relinquishes control of the text – a generous but sometimes anxiety ridden act that signifies a shift of power in the politics of textual representation and interpretation. As readers from within different experiential and cultural spaces approach the text, its perceived meaning and import will vary. Nevertheless, the text itself maintains a presence, luring its audience into a (re)consideration of the social phenomena portrayed within, into a conversation about perspectives previously unavailable or unrecognized.

As suggested, the purpose of raising questions in the minds of readers stands in contrast to the rationale of traditional, modernist social science, the aim of which may be to enhance certainty about the phenomena under study through the production of valid and reliable knowledge. Many arts based researchers see the tendency of traditionalist critics to dismiss arts based research as inappropriate and even dangerous as a failure to grasp this shift in fundamental research purpose. Proponents argue that, because their research honors a historically disregarded but crucial purpose of social inquiry, traditional “goodness” criteria, such as objectivity, validity, and reliability, are inappropriate for judging arts based research. More appropriate would be an assessment of the degree to which arts based design elements

have been crafted into a form that enhances multiple meanings and so creates doubts and disturbances in the minds of readers of the research text.

For those proponents, arts based research should be judged in the same manner that works of arts are judged: within open, public reviews and critiques of the value of the work. Judgments about each piece may vary among reviewers; but as with social science based manuscripts, peer review of arts based studies is viewed as important for good decision making regarding suitability for dissemination and publication.

Some critics are willing to accept arts based studies as useful forms of scholarship or inquiry, but would deny them the label of “social research.” Responses to this denial have varied. While some are content to label their work as “arts inspired inquiry,” other arts based research proponents emphasize issues of language and power. The term “research” generally carries greater professional prestige than “scholarship” or “inquiry.” Others add that the *research* done by dramaturgs, filmmakers, painters, poets, and novelists in preparation for the production of their work is precisely that – even if its features are not identical to those honored by social inquirers with a different research purpose in mind.

SEE ALSO: Epistemology; Ethnography; Investigative Poetics; Methods; Naturalistic Inquiry; Objectivity; Paradigms; Poetics, Social Science; Representation; Subjectivity; Trustworthiness; Validity, Qualitative

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methods, bootstrap

Xitao Fan

Quantitative researchers in social and behavioral sciences rely heavily on statistical inference. The validity of parametric statistical inference, however, can be in question when the theoretical assumptions are violated. In addition, there may be situations where the theoretical sampling distribution (e.g., function coefficient in discriminant analysis) is not yet known. In these situations, an empirical resampling procedure may be considered as an analytic alternative.

Resampling procedures date back to the permutation test by R. A. Fisher in the 1930s. Quenouille's work on bias estimation by deleting “one observation at a time” and Tukey's “jackknife” approach for standard error estimation made resampling procedures popular. As generally recognized now, Efron (1979) extended the “jackknife” approach to what is now known as the “bootstrap” method.

The basic idea of the bootstrap method is to approximate *empirically* the sampling distribution of an estimator (e.g., regression slope) by repeatedly drawing “bootstrapped” samples from the original sample, using *sampling with*

replacement method. From these “bootstrapped” samples, the estimator is obtained and accumulated. With a reasonable number of bootstrapped samples (e.g., from hundreds to thousands, depending on the desired precision), the sampling distribution of the estimator can be approximated empirically. Because *sampling with replacement* method is used in bootstrap resampling, in a given “bootstrapped” sample, a particular observation may appear multiple times. The sample size for each “bootstrapped” sample is the same, and it is generally equal to the original sample size.

Once this sampling distribution is *empirically* approximated via bootstrap resampling, statistical estimation/inference (e.g., bias estimation, confidence interval construction) can be made based on this sampling distribution. For example, in the bootstrap method, a confidence interval for a population parameter can be constructed based on one of several approaches: normal approximation method, percentile method, bias corrected percentile method, and percentile *t* method (Stine 1989; Mooney & Duval 1993).

Conventional parametric statistical inference is based on a *theoretical* sampling distribution that typically has some assumptions. For the theoretical sampling distribution (e.g., sampling distribution of regression slope) to work well, the data must satisfy these assumptions (e.g., normality, homoscedasticity). However, because bootstrapped sampling distribution is approximated *empirically* from the data at hand, rather than derived theoretically under certain assumptions, the bootstrap method has few theoretical assumptions; as a result, the bootstrap method is considered a non parametric approach. As discussed by Lunnenborg (2000), statistical inference typically relies on ideal data/model assumptions, even though such assumptions may not be appropriate for the data being analyzed. The availability of inexpensive computing power makes resampling technique practical, which, in turn, makes it possible for us to draw analytical inferences based on our actual data conditions, instead of relying on inappropriate theoretical assumptions.

Bootstrap method has been applauded as one of the recent breakthroughs in statistics (Kotz & Johnson 1992). Because of its

simplicity and versatility as a non parametric analytic approach for statistical inference, the significance of bootstrap method has been widely recognized by quantitative researchers in different disciplines. Quantitative researchers in social sciences have applied the bootstrap method in a variety of situations, such as in structural equation modeling (Bollen & Stine 1993; Yung & Bentler 1996), in factor analysis and discriminant analysis (Lambert, Wildt, & Durand 1991; Dalglish 1994), and in correlation analysis (Mendoza, Hart, & Powell 1991).

The bootstrap method is a computing intensive data resampling strategy that requires considerable computing power. Current computing technology makes bootstrapping an attractive and viable analytic choice. Unfortunately, although the logic of bootstrapping is conceptually straightforward, bootstrapping has yet to enjoy widespread use in substantive research in social sciences. The major obstacle to its application appears to be the lack of automated options in major statistical software packages (e.g., SAS, SPSS). Consequently, researchers who desire to use this approach usually have to deal with programming for performing bootstrap resampling, a daunting task for many social science researchers.

This situation, however, appears to be changing. Some customized programs have been published for performing bootstrapping for different statistical techniques (e.g., for regression analysis, Fan & Jacoby 1995; for factor analysis, Thompson 1988). More recently, some commercial software programs have incorporated the bootstrap method as an analytic option, making bootstrapping widely available to many. For example, AMOS, a software program for structural equation modeling (SEM), has an automated option for performing bootstrapping (Arbuckle & Wothke 1999). Because SEM is a general analytic approach that subsumes many other techniques (e.g., *t* test, ANOVA, correlation, regression), this means that, using AMOS’s automated bootstrap option, a researcher can perform bootstrapping for many statistical techniques (Fan 2003). It is very likely that, in the not so distant future, bootstrapping will be more widely available from major statistical analysis software.

SEE ALSO: Factor Analysis; Quantitative Methods; Statistical Significance Testing; Structural Equation Modeling; Theory and Methods

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methods, case study

Kristina Wolff

Case study methods encompass a range of research techniques that are used to examine social phenomena. Researchers primarily focus their study on the micro level, concentrating on individuals, groups, organizations, institutions, and/or events. The analysis is aimed at investigating contemporary issues or events within their real life setting. A case study is considered a specific approach or strategy that can be used as a unit of analysis and also the means by which data have been gathered, organized, and presented.

A variety of disciplines utilize this mode of research, including medicine, law, political science, history, public administration, and policy studies as well as sociology. In sociology, case studies examine society to understand a variant of a specific social phenomenon such as the progression of an event, changes that may occur due to something like the implementation of a policy, program, or specific event, and/or as a means to understand a specific segment or group in society. This method is often used as a pilot study or as foundational research to support a larger study. Case studies are also a common method of research for thesis and dissertation projects.

One of the primary goals of conducting a case study is to generate thick, rich, detailed explanations of the phenomenon that is being investigated. This research is largely descriptive and/or exploratory in nature. Many cases focus on the "how" or "why" something is occurring in society. Researchers seek to document the complexities of a situation. For sociologists, case studies have historically been used as a means to develop an understanding of marginalized groups. For example, Liebow's (1967) study of "streetcorner men" and Becker's (1962) examination of marijuana users provide insight into groups that are considered subcultures in mainstream US society. Both conducted ethnographic case studies, utilizing a variety of qualitative techniques to gather rich data.

Becker and Liebow's studies are considered single case design case studies. These studies were conducted holistically, there were no subunits

involved, and the material was gathered using multiple methods, which adds to the depth of the data. Most case studies focus on a specific group or event, often as a means to observe or analyze something that has previously been inaccessible to researchers. By studying these subcultures, Liebow and Becker were able to provide insights in the complexities of these men's lives while also dispelling myths and stereotypes. While their results are not generalizable to the whole of society, this exploratory research illustrated the effects of macro level social problems such as racism and classism on these groups.

Case studies can also provide data that support or refute existing social theory. For example, Becker's work expanded as well as solidified theories about deviance in society. These studies also provide the foundation for the development of new theory. Grounded theory is formed out of the process of in depth, far reaching observation of society (Glaser & Strauss 1967). This group of theorists posits that sociological theory must be constructed in reference to real life. A series of case studies or multiple case studies enable scholars to build complex theories of society.

One of the critiques of case study methods within sociology as well as other disciplines is that while this type of research has brought into focus populations that are traditionally ignored within social science, many studies continue to overlook the experiences of a variety of groups. Feminist case studies purposefully concentrate on the lives of women in society. This approach has widened to include explorations of the complexities of the ways in which social factors such as race, ethnicity, gender, class, sexuality, ability, and age operate in relationship to one another in society. Research by Simonds (1996) and Diamond (1992) represents this expansion in case study methods. Simonds's examination of a feminist women's clinic and Diamond's analysis of nursing home caregivers place women's experiences and the relationships of gender/race/class at the center of their research.

These studies are considered embedded design case studies as they focus on one organization and the various groups and individuals within the organization. Often this approach is used when examining changes in policies

or practices. Investigators will conduct research that follows the progression of change from before the policy was adopted through to the implementation process and then to the outcomes of the policy. Both Diamond and Simonds utilize multiple methods in their research and they place their findings in the context of larger issues in society, particularly in relationship to health care policy and practices. They also provide recommendations for policy change.

One of the main critiques of the case study method is that it can result in biased accounts and narrow understandings of a specific event or group. Rigorous case studies utilize triangulation or multiple methods as a means of gathering their data. The examples provided here have primarily consisted of qualitative approaches, involving one on one interviews and participant observation. Case studies utilize an array of both qualitative and quantitative approaches including historical analysis, content analysis, discourse analysis, policy analysis, surveys, and secondary data analysis. These techniques of investigation are used to reduce bias, increase validity and reliability, and to provide the "rich" data required of case studies and to allow for flexibility in conducting the research. Data are analyzed for common themes and patterns with the purpose of providing new insights into a specific social phenomenon.

SEE ALSO: Grounded Theory; Methods; Quantitative Methods; Theory and Methods

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methods, mixed

Anthony J. Onwuegbuzie

Over the last several decades, numerous fields from the social and behavioral sciences, including the field of sociology, have undergone three methodological waves in research. In many disciplines, the quantitative research paradigm, which has its roots in (logical) positivism, marked the first methodological wave (circa the nineteenth century), inasmuch as it was characterized by a comprehensive and formal set of assumptions and principles surrounding epistemology (e.g., objectivism, independence of knower and known, real causes determining outcomes reliably and validly, time free and context free generalizations), ontology (e.g., single reality), axiology (e.g., value free), methodology (e.g., deductive logic, testing or confirming hypotheses/theory), and rhetoric (e.g., rhetorical neutrality, formal writing style, impersonal passive voice, technical terminology).

The years 1900 to 1950 marked the second methodological wave, in which many researchers who rejected positivism embraced the qualitative research paradigm. Denzin and Lincoln (2005) refer to this era as the first historical moment or the Traditional Period for qualitative research. Vidich and Lyman (2000)

describe earlier forms of ethnography that took place prior to the seventeenth century. However, Denzin and Lincoln's (2005) Traditional Period represents the first organized qualitative research movement. Although this moment was characterized by qualitative researchers attempting to write reliable, valid, and objective accounts of their field experiences, it paved the way for the subsequent qualitative moments that have incorporated paradigms that are extremely far removed from positivism. For example, in stark contrast to positivism, constructivism has been characterized by a different set of epistemological (e.g., subjectivist, knower and known are inseparable), ontological (e.g., relativism), axiological (e.g., value bound), methodological (e.g., dialectical, hermeneutical), and rhetorical (e.g., informal writing style using personal voice and limited definitions) assumptions.

Shortly after the end of the Traditional Period for qualitative research came the third methodological movement, which, during the 1960s, saw an increase in the number of researchers combining quantitative and qualitative approaches. (Combining qualitative and quantitative methods had taken place well before the 1960s. However, the mixing occurred unsystematically and often unconsciously, and these studies were not labeled as representing mixed methods research.) This movement was led by classical pragmatists (e.g., Pierce, Dewey, James) and later by neopragmatists (e.g., Davidson, Rescher, Rorty, Putnam). However, Campbell and Fiske's (1959) seminal article is credited as formalizing the idea of using multiple research methods. Campbell and Fiske introduced the idea of triangulation. This third methodological movement has been given many names, such as blended methods, integrative research, multimethod research, multiple methods, triangulated studies, pragmatist research, and mixed research. However, mixed methods research is the most popular term used to describe this wave. As noted by Johnson and Onwuegbuzie (2004), mixed methods research involves collecting, analyzing, and interpreting quantitative and qualitative data in a single study or in a series of studies that investigate the same underlying phenomenon.

Mixed methods research has been distinguished by an integrated and interactive set of epistemological (e.g., adopting both subjective and objective points of view), ontological

(e.g., accepting external reality; choose explanations that best produce desired outcomes), axiological (e.g., value bound), methodological (e.g., research influenced by theory/hypothesis and by text and observations), and rhetorical (e.g., formal and informal writing style using both impersonal and personal voice) assumptions that promote the compatibility thesis, which posited that quantitative and qualitative approaches were neither mutually exclusive nor interchangeable. Rather, the actual relationship between the two paradigms is one of isolated events lying on a continuum of scientific inquiry (Reichardt & Rallis 1994). Moreover, pragmatists contend that the logic of justification does not prevent researchers from combining quantitative and qualitative approaches within the same study or series of studies. Thus, researchers from the social and behavioral science fields can strive to attain the fundamental principle of mixed research, in which they collect multiple data using different strategies, approaches, and methods in such a way that the resulting mixture or combination is likely to result in “complementary strengths and nonoverlapping weaknesses” (Johnson & Turner 2003).

In recent years, mixed methods research has received increased recognition in the social and behavioral science fields and has become popular in many disciplines. In addition to sociology (Hunter & Brewer 2003), mixed methods research has been promoted by researchers representing the health sciences, education, psychology, nursing, management and organizational research, library and information science research, and program evaluation. These disciplines are represented in Tashakkori and Teddlie's (2003) seminal book.

To date, the third methodological movement has undergone three phases. The first phase (1960–ca. 1990) saw the emergence of a myriad of mixed methods research designs in which “qualitative and quantitative approaches are used in the type of questions, research methods, data collection and analysis procedures, and/or inferences” (Tashakkori & Teddlie 2003: 711). The second phase (ca. 1990–8) saw the birth of mixed model designs, in which qualitative and quantitative approaches are combined in all stages of the research process or across stages of the study (Tashakkori & Teddlie 1998). The publication of Tashakkori and Teddlie's (1998)

book gave rise to a period of eclecticism (from 1998), representing the third phase of the mixed methods movement. This third phase has seen a proliferation in the number of research designs, which have been based on an array of dimensions, such as time ordering (e.g., concurrent vs. sequential), type of mixing involved (e.g., within vs. across), degree of mixing, paradigm emphasis (i.e., equal status vs. dominant status), stage where mixing occurred (e.g., data collection vs. data analysis), goal of the study (e.g., understand complex phenomena vs. test new ideas), and type of mixed methods stance (e.g., dialectic vs. pragmatist). Indeed, in Tashakkori and Teddlie's (2003) book alone, at least 35 mixed methods research designs are presented (for a review of mixed methods research designs, see Teddlie & Tashakkori 2003).

The present era of eclecticism has identified what Teddlie and Tashakkori (2003: 4) refer to as “six major unresolved issues and controversies in the use of mixed methods in the social and behavioral sciences,” namely: (1) the terminology used in mixed methods research; (2) the utility of mixed methods research; (3) the epistemological foundations for mixed methods research; (4) issues associated with designing mixed methods research; (5) issues associated with drawing inferences in mixed methods research; and (6) the logistics associated with conducting mixed methods research. Onwuegbuzie and Collins (2004) added a seventh unresolved concern: the issue of sampling. Specifically, these authors outlined the problems associated with combining samples from the qualitative and quantitative phases of a study.

The period of eclecticism has brought with it the following four challenges or crises that researchers face when undertaking mixed methods research: representation, legitimation, integration, and politics. The challenge of representation refers to the fact that sampling problems characterize both quantitative and qualitative research. With respect to quantitative research, the majority of studies utilize sample sizes that are too small to detect statistically significant differences or relationships (i.e., average statistical power of .5) and utilize non random samples that prevent effect size estimates from being generalized to the underlying population (Onwuegbuzie et al. 2004). In qualitative research the challenge of representation refers

to the difficulties researchers encounter in capturing lived experiences via their social texts. As noted by Denzin and Lincoln (2005), the challenge of representation asks whether qualitative researchers can use text to represent authentically the experience of the Other.

The second challenge pertains to legitimation or validity. The importance of legitimation or what is more commonly referred to as validity has long been acknowledged by quantitative researchers. For example, extending the work of Campbell and Stanley (1963), Onwuegbuzie (2003) presented 50 threats to internal validity and external validity that occur at the research design/data collection, data analysis, and/or data interpretation stages of the quantitative research process.

With respect to the qualitative research paradigm, Denzin and Lincoln (2005: 17) argue for “a serious rethinking of such terms as *validity*, *generalizability*, and *reliability*, terms already retheorized in postpositivist . . . , constructivist naturalistic, feminist . . . , interpretive . . . , poststructural . . . , and critical . . . discourses. This problem asks, ‘How are qualitative studies to be evaluated in the contemporary, poststructural moment?’” Part of their solution has been to reconceptualize traditional validity concepts and to use new labels. For example, Lincoln and Guba (1985) presented the following types: credibility (replacement for quantitative concept of internal validity), transferability (replacement for quantitative concept of external validity), dependability (replacement for quantitative concept of reliability), and confirmability (replacement for quantitative concept of objectivity).

In mixed methods research the crises of representation and legitimation often are exacerbated because both the quantitative and qualitative components of studies bring to the fore their own unique crises. In mixed methods studies the challenge of representation refers to the difficulty in capturing (i.e., representing) the lived experience using text in general and words and numbers in particular. The problem of legitimation refers to the difficulty in obtaining findings and/or making inferences that are credible, trustworthy, dependable, transferable, and/or confirmable.

The third challenge pertains to integration. This challenge compels mixed methods researchers to ask questions such as the follow-

ing: Is it appropriate to triangulate, consolidate, or compare quantitative data originating from a large random sample on equal grounds with qualitative data arising from a small purposive sample? How much weight should be placed on qualitative data compared to quantitative data? Are quantitatively confirmed findings more important than findings that emerge during a qualitative study component? When quantitative and qualitative findings contradict themselves, what should the researcher conclude?

The fourth challenge is the challenge of politics. This refers to the tensions that arise as a result of combining quantitative and qualitative approaches. These tensions include any conflicts that occur when different investigators are used for the quantitative and qualitative components of a study, as well as the contradictions and paradoxes that come to the fore when the quantitative and qualitative data are compared and contrasted. The challenge of politics also pertains to the difficulty in persuading the consumers of mixed methods research, including stakeholders and policy makers, to value the results stemming from *both* qualitative components of a study. Additionally, the challenge of politics refers to tensions ensuing when ethical standards are not addressed within the research design.

In the last half century the field of mixed methods research has advanced far. However, as can be seen by the number of challenges and unresolved issues and concerns, it has a long way to go. As noted by Teddlie and Tashakkori (2003: 3), “the [mixed methods] field is just entering its ‘adolescence’ and . . . there are many unresolved issues to address before a more matured mixed methods research area can emerge.” Yet this means that the door is wide open for an array of exciting possibilities for mixed methods research in sociology and beyond.

SEE ALSO: Methods; Naturalistic Inquiry; Quantitative Methods; Validity, Qualitative; Validity, Quantitative

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methods, postcolonial

Wenda K. Bauchspies

Postcolonial methods utilize social, cultural, and political analysis to engage with the colonial discourse. Postcolonialism has been defined as both a social movement and a research approach whose main agenda addresses racism and oppression. Postcolonial research names the cultural, political, and linguistic experiences of former colonized societies by including voices, stories, histories, and images from people traditionally excluded from European/western descriptions of the world. It is through the shared experience of colonialism that postcolonial scholars and writers are articulating how colonialism has worked “through” and “upon” individuals, societies, and material culture.

Postcolonial theory started as a subversive literary phenomenon in the 1960s entitled *New Literatures in English* or *Commonwealth Literatures* that critiqued British imperialism by discussing and naming issues of identity, nationalism, colonialism, and otherness (for examples, see the journals *World Literature Written in English* and *Journal of Commonwealth Literature*). The early postcolonial writers/scholars were from former British colonies. These early authors were producing English literature that disrupted the European canon because they addressed migration, slavery, suppression, resistance, representation, difference, race, gender, place, and master narratives. In the late 1970s colonial discourse became popular through Edward Said’s application in *Orientalism* (1978) of Michael Foucault’s “discourse.” Colonial discourse theory focuses on the ways in which cultural practices, metaphors, and signs organize and reproduce social life within colonial relationships. Commonwealth literature intersected with colonial discourse to become what is thought of as postcolonialism today. The label

has shifted, but the focus has remained on understanding the cultural and political identities and experiences of colonized subjects as object and subject, authority and subaltern, and self and other.

Postcolonial critics aim to address the absences, omissions, and forgotten tales of colonial history. In the process of recovering lost or silent knowledges, postcolonial researchers have helped the colonized to develop strategies for traversing the chasms of their experiences, to create greater self understanding both within and outside of the postcolonial moment, and to understand the complexity of the dance of oppression maintained and perpetuated through dependency and desire. Postcolonialism as an interdisciplinary critique is committed to cultural pluralism that analyzes domination and resistance by acknowledging that colonialism is always present as a practice, not only as a metaphor or sign.

Post typically defines “after” and European colonialism was not the first time a nation/region dominated its neighbors. However, “postcolonialism” became such a strong label because European colonialism covered approximately three fourths of the world, making it truly a global event that significantly impacted a large percentage of the world population and their land usage. The term postcolonialism acknowledges that the impact, definitions, control, and experiences of colonialism linger long after “decolonization” has happened and continues in part as neocolonialism, the continuation of colonialism through economic and political means.

Postcolonialism occurs at the juncture of Marxism, poststructuralism, and postmodernism. The major divide between postcolonialism and postmodernism as defined by Simon During in *Postmodernism or Postcolonialism?* (1985) occurs over the role of the master narratives that postcolonialism uses and postmodernism denounces. Postcolonial theory uses the master narrative to make sense of the colonial encounter through epistemology, theory, and politics. Postcolonial theory “attempts to reform the intellectual and epistemological exclusions of [the western] academy, and enables non western critics located in the West to present their cultural inheritance as knowledge” (Gandhi 1998: ix).

From one perspective, postcolonialism pre-dates the other “post isms” while in practice postcolonialism is the youngest of the theories. Defining postcolonialism as beginning in opposition to colonialism rather than at the end of colonialism situates postcolonialism as older than postmodernism and poststructuralism. However, it is through the prominence of postmodernism and poststructuralism that postcolonialism has gained wider acceptance and validity in the academy. The “post isms” share a focus on decentering the center, employing subversive tactics and theories, and understanding experience through language and writing. However, postcolonial studies of imperialism, colonialism, and neocolonialism define its perimeters within strategies of resistance, subversion, appropriation, and rejection. Postcolonialism draws upon poststructuralism, postmodernism, feminism, critical race theory, and queer theory to study postcolonial discourse and culture.

Postcolonial methodology is being built upon feminist methods and shares much the same agenda, where instead of women or gender, postcolonialism is studying the third world, subaltern, other, oppressed, or colonized. Postcolonialism and feminism are clearly siblings and perhaps twins, as they both seek to include the marginalized, address inequities, and resist and critique the center. By sharing theories and methods they are challenging the other, while simultaneously stimulating themselves to explore new avenues of study within gender/colonialism. Similar overlaps occur between critical race theory, queer theory, and postcolonialism in the domains of difference, race, ethnicity, and sexuality. Critical race theory makes race and its intersection with other inequities the focus of research to challenge mainstream knowledge claims while including issues of social justice. Postcolonial, critical race theory and feminism utilize and value experiential knowledge within an interdisciplinary and transdisciplinary context.

The postmodern, poststructural, postcolonial lens has shown that qualitative research grounded in the disciplines of anthropology and sociology has been historically complicit with imperialism. This has redefined ethnography from a “timeless truth” to a situated story that includes the researcher in the history and analysis. Thus, anthropology and postcolonialism

share interests in developing a postcolonial ethnography that reflects and articulates cultures through a reflective (and perhaps experimental) voice of researcher and informants, as R. P. Clair illustrates in *Expressions of Ethnography* (2003). For example, part of the postcolonial discussion is about the production and meaning of postcolonial texts and how they communicate culture both within and outside their cultures. Postcolonialism is helping qualitative research to address questions of voice, language, resistance, subversion, and difference to the extent that researchers are beginning to write in opposition to the western research canon. Linda T. Smith in *Decolonizing Methodologies* (1999) offers an alternative research method by arguing that researchers need to be more responsible/responsive to the community they are studying by giving it agency in the research process, through direct involvement in knowledge production.

Theoretically and methodologically postcolonialism is an avenue to address the duality found in lived realities. It is not simply that postcolonialism gives voice to the other, but it recognizes the difficulties of doing so. It acknowledges the globalizing power of European colonialism while attempting to resist the universalizing power of that acknowledgment. However, as with feminism, it was not until attention was given to the category of women that the multiplicity of women's experiences could be valued. A similar move is occurring in postcolonialism: by working under the shared umbrella of colonialism the diversity, difference, hybridity, resistance, alterity, mimicry, and marginality of colonized peoples is finding voice.

There is the question of what is postcolonial: is it a historical moment that began at the end of colonialism and the moment of independence? Or is it grounded in the resistance that began with colonialism? Those that argue it began at the beginning of colonialism and in opposition to colonialism write post colonial with a hyphen. Those who use postcolonial without the hyphen are not necessarily making that same distinction. Postcolonialism is a story about power and oppression designed to shift the discussion to the "third world" perspective and experience. Some postcolonial critics do not use the terms first world and third world in order to avoid entering into the oversimplification and generalizations attached to such labels.

Many cultures and societies share the title of being postcolonial; however, different communities experienced colonialism differently, even under the same European power. Postcolonial theory acknowledges and addresses that the postcolonial condition is not universal, but a shared condition. Thus, postcoloniality is unified in addressing colonialism and its impact while exploring difference from various spaces and places. Postcolonialism is a social process that signifies "linkages and articulations" and is not static, monolithic, or universal. Postcolonial discourse "provides a methodology for considering the dialogue of similarity and difference; the similarity of colonialism's political and historical pressure upon non European societies, alongside the plurality of specific cultural effects and responses those societies have produced" (Ashcroft et al. 1995: 56).

Postcolonialism acknowledges how hybridization has been both a strength and weakness of postcolonial cultures that are continually transforming themselves at the boundary of colonial/indigenous culture. Through hybridity postcolonial scholars challenge typical binary categories with the hope of creating, finding, and naming new models of cultural expression, national identity, and celebrations of difference to address the silencing and subordination of imperialistic processes. Hybridization stresses continual, continuous, and mutual co creation, not the disappearance of difference, cultures, or knowledge. It is this focus on hybridization that is traditionally at odds with traditional anthropology and sociology, whose study of indigenous groups has often defined them as marginalized, endangered, static, and old fashioned. By maintaining and continuing to inscribe the binary distinction of "other" in traditional social sciences, postcolonial critics are excluded from engagement with the "non other." In other words postcolonial theory incorporates the dynamics of the borderland between colonized and colonizer, self and other, and dominator/dominated through hybridization.

The goal of postcolonial research is to highlight dichotomies and illustrate multiplicities. One method is through the study of place, as it symbolizes the confluence of language, environment, and history while capturing the displacement of the colonizer, colonized, settler, native elite, or other individual created in the

colonial encounter. Another method that addresses the multiplicities and inequalities of postcolonialism is the study of educational institutions and materials. Education was and still is a major imperial/colonizing force that is produced by a powerful (colonial) authority and is consumed by (colonized) locals. It is a rich site of postcolonial theory because education is simultaneously a technology of subjectification and a technology of resistance and subversion. Education and postcolonialism both embody “the possibility of thinking our way through, and therefore, out of the historical imbalances and cultural inequalities produced by the colonial encounter” (Gandhi 1998: 176).

Language is a discourse of power. The colonizer used language and education to control and subject the colonized. The colonized employed language as a tool of resistance and counter attack. Aime Cesaire, Albert Memmi, Frantz Fanon, and Leopold Senghor all wrote at the time of independence for many of the former European colonies. They articulated and captured the ideas that were emerging as these new nation states were creating national identities and new literary spaces in the aftermath of colonialism. They began the postcolonial discourse by analyzing the colonial discourse (that today has come to mean orientalism, primitivism, or tropicalization) and looking for ways to dismantle it, replace it, or diminish it through an anti hegemonic discourse.

Cesaire, with *Discourse on Colonialism* (1955), argued that colonialism and imperialism were obstacles to economic and cultural development. Memmi, with *The Colonizer and the Colonized* (1957), described the colonial enterprise as racist, contradictory, and detrimental to both colonizer and colonized. Fanon, with *Wretched of the Earth* (1963), identified three stages of development for colonial literature that would ultimately lead writers to an active political stage that would further the nation’s culture and consciousness. Senghor, with *Négritude* (1970), compared African ontology to European philosophy to conclude that négritude embraces and affirms the self realization of the African self through values based upon reciprocity, dialogue, equity, and equilibrium of communities and social organizations. J. M. Dash objected to the view of history espoused by négritude in an article in *Caribbean Studies* (1973) because he

perceived it to be destructive rather than creative for new theories and identities. Needless to say, among the early writers in the “Commonwealth Literatures” (that later became known as postcolonial literature) there was a lively debate and discussion about colonialism, colonizer, colonized, identity, nationalism, racism, and political activism that still continues in postcolonialism today.

The three major theorists in colonial discourse are Edward Said, Gayatri Spivak, and Homi Bhabha. Said’s discursive analysis of colonialism showed how the administrative, scholarly, and cultural colonial institutions imagined and represented the Middle East as an “other” that was a composite of European fears and desires. Said’s *Orientalism* (1978) decenters and dismantles the institutions of the West to illustrate the colonial and imperialist underpinnings of western intellectual authority and how this authority created the Orient as an oppositional other that enhanced the stature and status of Europe. Spivak’s *In Other Worlds* giving voice to the subaltern is multifaceted, complex, and should not be oversimplified. (*Subaltern* was used by Gramsci to denote an oppressed person.) For Spivak, it is impossible to give voice to the subaltern. Therefore, part of the role of the postcolonial critic is to make the marginal visible. Bhabha’s *The Location of Culture* (1994) identified the use of mimicry by colonial subjects to destabilize knowledge production and was read to signify “insurgent counter appeals.” Bhabha established the notion of hybridization within postcolonial theory with the story of how the Bible was transformed in India and its authority diminished when merged and appropriated by local knowledge communities.

Since the 1970s, postcolonial theory has moved beyond literature and English departments into other areas of the academy that include sociology, anthropology, economy, business, and architecture, to name a few. This outward expansion has made postcolonial theory both highly contested and an engaging field of research that has developed more nuanced and sophisticated analyses, particularly in the fields of neocolonial domination. For example, Chicano theory may not have been embraced by early postcolonial theory, but it is clearly included in postcolonial theory today, with

its unique placement between two (or more) cultures.

Often interdisciplinary and multicultural, postcolonial writings do not appear to be “academic” in voice, focus, or presentation. Minh ha’s *Woman, Native, Other* (1989) was one of the early postcolonial/feminist texts that highlighted the colonializing process of publishing, being a woman, doing anthropology, and being a third world other. She decentered the center of academic writing through a text written as a story that flows and tumbles upon itself, juxtaposed with images, quotes, and poetry. Anzaldúa’s *Borderlands/La Frontera* (1987) (another early postcolonial work) challenges the male, white hegemony through a text woven in Spanish and English. Through the rich poetry of the text, Anzaldúa provided a vivid sense of the contested ground, bodies, experiences, and memories in the borderland between two cultures. Both Anzaldúa and Minh ha utilized postcolonial method to help make space for and validate other voices in the academy.

During the 1990s postcolonialism expanded its own hybridization into historical and anthropological theories, concepts, and ideas. This increased the interactions and cross pollination within the social sciences (e.g., James Clifford’s *Routes*, 1997). Postcolonial theorist looked to sociology and anthropology for richer understanding of culture and society. One such scholar is Anne McClintock, who analyzed the contradictions of colonial discourse in a sociocultural historical framework in her work *Imperial Leather* (1995). She illustrated how institutions of power in addition to narratives contributed to the creation of “father and families, labor and gold, and mothers and maids.” Through the dangerous and contradictory bonds of imperial/anti imperial, money/sexuality, violence/desire, and labor/resistance, McClintock contributed to the postcolonial discussion of the interconnectivity of race, gender, and class.

Thus, by applying postcolonial methods to the context of study and to postcoloniality itself, postcolonialism has become a rich source of descriptions, knowledge, and understanding of social worlds. It started in the margins from the alienation of colonialism and has grown into a perspective, method, and theory that provides space and readings of “marginal” experiences in such a way to celebrate the pluralistic,

multifarious, and marginal nature of all experiences and knowledges.

Postcolonialism does not propose to be a grand theory of everything. Rather, it wishes to be a useful tool that can highlight the dominant discourse and the unspoken discourse in order to discuss questions, issues, and dilemmas of resistance, nationality, language, power, ethnicity, culture, and community. Its goal is to transform the dominant discourses in order to provide alternative models for understanding the place and role of the local in a global world.

As postcolonialism continues to affirm the dynamic potentiality in cultures colliding through resistance, hybridization, appropriation, and subversion to create new forms, alongside the dominant and indigenous narratives it will continue to articulate and comprehend knowledge and power production in order to apply it to new situations such as globalization, transnationalism, and the “rapidly mutating present” (Loomba et al. 2005). If traditional social sciences have served the nation state, then a postcolonial social science will address the global interests and more seriously question the nation state. Postcolonial methods are modifying the existing methods of the social sciences in order to remember who has been silenced, erased, and oppressed within colonial/postcolonial contexts and to rethink the predominant stories in order to include multiplicity and reflectivity.

SEE ALSO: Class, Status, and Power; Colonialism (Neocolonialism); Ethnography; Feminism; Globalization; Globalization, Values and; Hybridity; Nation State and Nationalism; Nationalism; Orientalism; Postmodernism; Poststructuralism; Power, Theories of; Queer Theory; Race; Stratification, Race/Ethnicity and; Third World and Postcolonial Feminisms/Subaltern; Transnationalism

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methods, visual

John Grady

Concern with visible evidence has been a part of sociology since the beginning with mostly still photographs, maps, and charts being deployed for various illustrative and emotive purposes. Rarely, however, did authors concern themselves with what made these images useful as data. Thus, while many social scientists acknowledged that visuals could make an argument clearer and more memorable, few considered how they might make an argument sounder. Only in the last three decades have researchers interested in a more visual sociology or anthropology responded to this challenge.

Visual methods refer to any research or analytic technique that produces or interprets

visually perceptible representations as data in a social scientific argument. Still photographs constitute the most commonly utilized form of imagery, but increasingly visual methods include film, video, and non figurative ways of displaying data for various analytic purposes.

Concern with developing protocols for research with visual materials first emerged in cultural anthropology where photography and film were used to document (if not salvage) the material culture, rituals, and other aspects of life in tribal societies. Gregory Bateson and Margaret Mead's ethnographic collaboration in Bali represents the first use of visual data that was methodologically rigorous and influenced by formal theory. Their work, however, did not have any significant influence on subsequent anthropological research (Bateson & Mead 1942). Applied anthropologists, however, continued to use visual methods, which led to the publication of Collier and Collier's *Visual Anthropology* (1986), an inventory of various techniques for studying culture and behavior photographically.

Howard Becker and Erving Goffman first developed an explicit concern with using images in sociological research. Becker (1974) contended that a major obstacle to using images in sociology was the widely held view that images spoke for themselves and were worth a thousand words. In contrast, Becker argued that images were only as informative as the questions that were addressed to them. Goffman (1976) demonstrated that analysis of print advertisements in popular magazines revealed a pattern of gender norms regulating how men and women should be displayed. He suggested that such typifications were idealized representations of social mores, and no less real than those mores themselves. Furthermore, Jon Wagner's collection, *Images of Information* (1979), established that images could be used for very diverse research agendas. Since then sociologists continue to explore using images to study pattern and variation in social life, social change, and the ways in which people create meaning in their lives (Grady 1996; Harper 2000; Wagner 2002).

There are many ways in which investigations are enriched by visual methods:

- Environments and events in a field study may be documented on a regular basis.

Visual documents of this sort provide information that supplements field observations and can be reviewed and reanalyzed much as field notes are. Ceremonial displays of one kind or another contain rich information about values and relationships (Collier & Collier 1986).

- *Rephotographing* the same situations and places at different times and over long periods provides invaluable information about variation and social change, although the framing of earlier images must be replicated as closely as possible (Rieger 1996, 2003).
- Images may be used to draw meaning from informants about the world depicted in the image. *Photo elicitation* can be carried out with photographs and other images produced or collected by the researcher or by the subjects themselves (e.g., family photo albums, home movies, and various kinds of yearbooks and other informal and official documents). The elicitation interview is conducted in a “closed ended” fashion – where the subject explains the function or operation of something displayed in a photograph – or in an “open ended” manner – where the image is used to jog a subject’s memory about the events displayed in the photograph. Photo elicitation has been used with both individuals and small groups (Gold 1991; Suchar 1992; Stiebling 1999; Harper 2002).
- Subjects have been provided with cameras and asked to record events in their lives that are of interest to themselves or the investigator. While *Subject image making* requires that subjects undergo training in composition and lighting, this technique illuminates a subject’s world and preoccupations (Rich & Chalfen 1999).
- Finally, all of these techniques and approaches can be combined in full blown *ethnographies* of different social worlds. Apart from their value as a supplement to memory and note taking, images that are taken sensitively and empathetically capture the emotions and feel of a situation or a moment in a way that few other sources of data can (Bateson & Mead 1942; Harper 1987). This is especially true if the medium is film or video. Notable examples include James Ault’s *Born Again: Life in a*

Fundamentalist Baptist Church (1987) and Robin Anderson and Bob Connolly’s trilogy about social change in the highlands of Papua New Guinea: *First Contact* (1982), *Joe Leahy’s Neighbors* (1988), and *Black Harvest* (1992).

All images share certain characteristics that affect their analytic use:

- An image *documents* something other than itself.
- What an image represents is invariably *framed* within boundaries established by the physical medium of representation.
- Most images are *composed*. Even photographic novices know to point the camera toward the picture to be taken and put what is of interest in the frame.
- Most images are *reproducible*. They can be copied.
- All images are *artifacts* that can be reused for purposes different from that for which they may have been intended.
- Most images, and certainly their reproductions, are *portable*. They can be carried from one place to another, the manner of their display often being little more than an accident of history.

Thus, an image always represents an event that interested the image maker and how the whos and the whats in the photograph were oriented to each other and the event. An image is also, however, a repository of diverse meanings, many of which are imputed to it after the fact of its creation. An image, therefore, can serve as data for a wide range of questions, many of which might not have occurred to either the photographer or those being photographed. Visual researchers are exploring the boundaries of what can be studied visually as well as developing standards for how research might most usefully be conducted.

Most researchers begin their investigations by determining who produced the image, as well as where and when – and for what purposes, and in what organizational context – it was both produced and preserved. This information establishes how various factors may have shaped the relationship between the representation and the empirical world it represents.

These include the contingencies of technology and technique; temporality (time of day; season and chronological date); the beliefs and ideological commitments of the photographer and/or collector; display conventions (whether professional or vernacular); and how the photographer and subjects were influenced by the social and cultural milieu within which the photographs were taken.

Most investigators using images look for specific information in the image as an answer to a theoretically informed question. But, whatever the purpose, all researchers attend to any information an image might contain. First, an image is carefully examined to identify everything that might provide information. Researchers make mental notes of their observations, very often by actually verbalizing them as a memory aid. Researchers then look at the image in its entirety to ascertain how specific elements relate to the entire picture. Second, researchers identify variables by comparing the images in their sample. Looking for patterns and how they may vary in all images usually reveals information that is not immediately apparent in a single image. Careful scrutiny encourages the development of more robust explanatory models.

Moving images, in particular, are especially useful for studying social processes and interactions, although posing challenges for coding and analysis. Moving images cannot be simply inspected like photographs are but must be "viewed" and reviewed many times to discover and retrieve the information in the clip.

Visual investigators require a clear research design to guide the production and collection of images. This is true whether the investigation is behavioral, ethnographic, or a content analysis of preexisting images. The research design must identify sites to be filmed or explored, events to be sampled, and relevant variables. To successfully conduct visual research in the field, however, requires that investigators balance the demands of the research design with two conflicting imperatives: the need for a comprehensive representation of the scene and its doings versus a more micro level coverage of social interaction and how people respond to the situations they find themselves in. Assigning different roles to two or more camera operators can resolve this dilemma. Investigators with only one camera, however, will construct a

shooting script for making images of the physical and institutional settings and events that establish a visual context for the investigation (Suchar 1997). In addition, more experienced investigators will build on the eye's natural propensity to frame action. Learning how to conduct research rigorously yet imaginatively while avoiding the pitfalls and temptations of impressionistic image making is an essential component of visual methods.

The photographer Robert Capa is quoted as saying, "If your pictures aren't good enough, you're not close enough." The same is true for visual methods generally. Visual research requires immersion in the subjects' worlds and developing a rapport where subjects take the camera for granted. For the researcher, immersion is surrender to the moment, following subjects on a journey deeper into their world and its meanings.

Developing a rewarding relationship with subjects is a complex process that raises many ethical and personal issues that have to be addressed in a professional manner. Because subjects can be readily identified in an image, it is necessary that they sign legally binding releases granting researchers the right to their image for various professional purposes. Additionally, because images can be taken out of context for various purposes, it is necessary that researchers be aware of the consequences that displaying an image might have for the subject and assume responsibility for those consequences that the subject might not be aware of. This is especially true for minors and other dependents. This might require the researcher to disguise a subject's identity or not use the image at all. Balancing the interests of the subject with the intellectual needs of the researcher's peers and the wider public is an abiding challenge.

Innovations in information technology have had a revolutionary impact on the making, archiving, and analysis of images. These developments include digital cameras and desktop software programs for altering, editing, storing, analyzing, and publishing images. It is now possible to create enormous amounts of high quality visual data for very little cost. Images are produced in the field and shared with subjects, enhancing their participation in the research process. The Internet also makes it

possible to integrate visual data into research reports. Prior to the digital revolution, social scientists only shared their visual data as illustrations. Now, entire databases can be put on CDs and DVDs, stimulating the research community to discuss the quality of evidence that images can provide.

Making visual data accessible, for example, promises to transform the social scientific study of popular culture. The content analysis of advertisements, cartoons, news photographs, feature films, and the like has often been hampered by researchers' inability to make and store legible copies of data. In the past, analysis depended on coders making accurate judgments on the spot. As a result, there was a tendency to restrict studies to those variables that coders could be trained to recognize reliably. The study of imagery in popular culture often became little more than establishing obvious correlations between status markers and social values and interests. Constructing large digital databases, however, makes for more flexible and sensitive analytic approaches to data analysis – like grounded theory – that invite replication. Nevertheless, it must be noted that images of readily identifiable individuals exacerbate the ethical issues that are raised in social research.

SEE ALSO: Barthes, Roland; Content Analysis; Grounded Theory; Methods; Photography; Representation; Semiotics

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metropolis

James Dickinson

Metropolis broadly refers to the largest, most powerful and culturally influential city of an epoch or region. Historically, the metropolis is a city which is relatively open, attracts commercial and other forms of exchange, and offers opportunities for sophisticated living.

A succession of great metropolitan cities charts the course of western urban history. In this history, three forms of the metropolis can be identified. In Antiquity, cities such as Athens and Rome developed the political and cultural potentialities of the polis, in part laying foundations for the later emergence of western urban democracies. With the revival of urban life in the Middle Ages, a strong symbiotic relationship between the form of the metropolis and economic growth was revealed, leading to the rebirth of the metropolis as the great mercantile, commercial, and later industrial center of modern capitalism. More recently, globalization and decentralization, vastly aided by new communication and transportation technologies, have transformed the metropolis from a single centered, bounded urban entity into a multi centered urbanized region extending over a vast geographic area. Within the rise, fall, and transformation of the metropolis are shards of a cultural continuity stretching over millennia.

METROPOLIS IN ANTIQUITY

Two features of the metropolis are revealed in the etymology of its Greek origins (*meter*/mother + *polis*/city). As population pressure forced some city states to found colonies, they became the “mother city” of those colonies. Within a region, one city might exploit its strategic location, dominate trade or control resources, accumulating wealth and attracting population as a result. Apex of a chain of lesser settlements, the metropolis was continually enriched by its control and exploitation of distant colonies, hinterland, or commercial empire (Mumford 1938). As polis, however, ancient metropolis is distinguished from other historical forms of the imperial city, for example, city states arising in pre Hellenic Mesopotamia, Egypt, and the Indus Valley, or the great urban centers of pre Columbian Aztec and Mayan civilizations. These cities were typically rigid, closed, and hierarchical. Residents had no independent rights and were ruled by totalitarian god kings and priests (LeGates & Stout 1996). In particular, they lacked any public space or realm which is central to life within a metropolis.

In its cultural and political moments, the metropolis was an extension of the Greek ideal

of the polis: a political community where strangers could gather as equals to forge a new identity around ideals of citizenship transcending the limited ties of family and tribe (Kitto 1964). Citizens had independent worth as well as rights and duties. The city consequently became an attractive place offering residents security, prosperity, and intellectual stimulation. For Aristotle, it constituted the natural home of mankind; forming the “point of maximum concentration for the power and culture of a community,” it was where “the goods of civilization are multiplied and manifolded” (Mumford 1938).

Ancient Athens is often considered the epitome of the Greek polis, its contributions to democracy, humanism, free and open inquiry, literature and the arts without parallel in shaping western values and civilization. By the fifth century BCE, Athens was in actuality a great metropolis, many times the size of the ideal polis as envisioned by Plato or Aristotle. Despite the magnificence of its public buildings most of the city’s residents lived in poverty and squalor. Its great wealth derived from confederation of the states Athens dominated, control of a vast trading empire, and exploitation of non citizens including metics (resident aliens who organized trade), and a huge population of slaves (Hall 1998).

Imperial Rome also developed the metropolitan urban form. Here politics was understood more as public authority than self ruling democracy. Citizens were passive bearers of rights granted by a sovereign power. The public domain thus centered on issues of rulership, including the nature, modes, and limits of power. Fostering compliance and combating resistance to legitimate authority were key political concerns (Weintraub 1995). Yet management of empire also emphasized practical arts such as military organization, civil engineering, and city planning. Roman power established many cities which shared features such as a *defined center* (a *forum* where the most important civic buildings and institutions were concentrated); a *clear boundary or perimeter* marked ritually (the *pomerium*, or sacred belt) as well as physically (walls or fortifications); and an overall spatial distribution of groups and activities in which the core was typically valued over more distant parts (Mumford 1961).

METROPOLIS AS GREAT CITY OF MODERNITY

Antiquity bequeathed to modernity a form of the metropolis which was conducive to economic growth. The modern metropolis is the foremost expression of the centralizing and accumulating tendencies of first mercantile, then industrial, now global capitalism. While accumulated wealth in Antiquity was generally consumed unproductively (extravagant life styles, public monuments), in the new metropolis wealth extracted from dependent satellites was more systematically invested in its own development (Braudel 1981). During its mercantile and industrial stages, capital accumulation found the inherited forms of the city useful, adapting existing ones (London, Paris), or creating new ones (Manchester, Chicago).

Growth of the market economy initially amplified the importance of the urban core in minimizing costs and maximizing the speed of communication. The modern metropolis grew up around a single center or business district; here opportunities multiplied for face to face interaction, exchanges of vital information, and access to capital and other business services. Comparatively, locations at a distance from the hub were at a disadvantage (Mumford 1938). Thus city growth produced the distinctive concentric ring pattern of development described by Ernest Burgess (Park et al. 1925). Urban populations continued to swell, confounding all notions that there was a natural upper limit to the size of even the richest cities.

METROPOLIS IN THE THIRD WORLD

Structural distortions inherited from colonial pasts have produced a severely unbalanced pattern of urbanism in the third world. Many developing countries are dominated by a single gigantic metropolis, or primate city, which as the main center of investment and growth is the principal destination of rural migrants. While cities such as Mexico City, Jakarta, and Bangkok have grown recently to rival or exceed those in the developed world, interior regions remain relatively under urbanized (Gottdiener 1994). As a result of rapid growth, many such cities face formidable economic, social,

and ecological problems. São Paulo has been described as a "colossus" (its population approaches 20 million) where "every notion about planning and architecture evaporates" and "every municipal organization is powerless against the proliferation of the city" (Nijenhuis & De Vriers 2000). As overpowering, chaotic, and violent as these third world cities may be, they continue to act as magnets.

THE CONTEMPORARY METROPOLIS

Relentless growth has transformed the metropolis from a bounded city with a single center into a vast urbanized region stretching over multiple jurisdictions. Early evidence of this shift is found in Victorian London, where the term "metropolitan" first appears in legislative and administrative language to describe services extending over the "whole city." This new usage coincided with a movement towards consolidation; the city annexed adjacent areas or adjusted boundaries to retain control over the increasingly large area that now made up the social and economic relations of the city. Elsewhere, New York and Philadelphia likewise responded to growth by annexing peripheral zones of population and economic resources. However, economic and technological forces have continually pushed development beyond the city. As a result, the metropolis has become redefined as a geographic or statistical area composed of one or more established urban nuclei with neighboring areas linked to it by continually built up sections and commuting links.

In the US, federal government agencies have been at the forefront of such redefinition. In 1910 the Census Bureau devised the *metropolitan district*, a central city with a population of at least 200,000 plus adjacent townships, to describe and measure growth occurring beyond the city proper. In 1949 this measure was replaced by the *standard metropolitan area*, consisting of the whole county containing a city of at least 50,000, plus surrounding counties which had a high degree of economic and social integration with the nucleus.

Rules now defining metropolitan areas are exceedingly complex. However, three principal types of metropolitan area are currently recognized. *Metropolitan Statistical Areas* (MSAs) are

metropolitan areas with populations of less than 1 million, regardless of the number of counties they may contain. If the metropolitan area exceeds 1 million, it is designated a *Consolidated Metropolitan Statistical Area* (CMSA). *Primary Metropolitan Statistical Areas* (PMSAs) are metropolitan areas in their own right, but are integrated with other adjacent PMSAs, forming multi centered CMSAs. These ever changing statistical constructions are part of the necessary "counting and mapping" the state does in order to "know the governed" (Joyce 2003).

Such designations describe a fundamental transformation of the metropolis from dense, bounded, single core city to extended urban region containing many centers of work, residence, and shopping which cross multiple administrative boundaries. These multi nucleated urban regions are perhaps the "first really new way people have organized their living and working arrangements in ten thousand years" (Gott diener 1994). Similar developments have also appeared in Japan and Germany.

New metropolitan regions are typically sharply bifurcated into areas experiencing either rapid growth or severe decline. In recent decades, globalization of economic activity, emergence of a new international division of labor, and revolutions in communication and transportation technology have reduced the importance of fixed urban aggregations of labor, skills, and resources in shaping regional and national economies. Downtown business districts steadily erode as corporations shift management operations to the suburbs and beyond; manufacturing jobs have likewise disappeared from cities as corporations seek cheaper labor in rural and suburban areas as well as in the third world (Fogelson 2003).

Growth beyond the city proper, however, has been unprecedented. In the US, undeveloped land adjacent to cities and a multiplicity of weak, competing jurisdictions have facilitated suburban hypergrowth. Subsidized highway construction, reform of mortgage lending, and tax breaks for homeowners have contributed to the spatial reorganization of the urban periphery. Traditional residential suburbs are now surrounded by or absorbed into multifunctional "technoburbs" or "edge cities" (Fishman 1987; Garreau 1992). Antiquated zoning laws, weak or divided local governments, and powerful

developer interests have combined to produce a miasma of centerless sprawl (Duany et al. 2000).

FUTURE OF METROPOLIS

For Mumford (1938), metropolis inevitably gave way to megalopolis, a "sprawling gigantism" destined to expire as nekropolis. In the 1950s, Gottman used the term megalopolis more positively to describe continuous zones of urbanization appearing in the US. More radical was the anticipation of "ecumenopolis," a single global settlement Doxiadis saw emerging from expansion of megalopolis over entire continents (LeGates & Stout 1996). Others still see a continuing role for the traditional metropolis with a few "global cities" providing the necessary specialized and shifting infrastructure on which globalization depends (Sassen 2001). As creative destruction, capitalism also continually reinvents older cities, transforming landscapes of production into new landscapes of consumption (Zukin 1991).

SEE ALSO: Central Business District; Cities in Europe; Exurbia; Global/World Cities; Megalopolis; Metropolitan Statistical Area; Multinucleated Metropolitan Region; Mumford, Lewis; Primate Cities

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Metropolitan Statistical Area

John E. Farley

A Metropolitan Statistical Area (MSA) is a geographical entity, defined by the Office of Management and the Budget (OMB) and used by the Census Bureau and other agencies, to represent a city or group of cities and its surrounding built up and/or economically integrated region. Counties form the building blocks of MSAs and are used because they allow for comparison between censuses, are widely recognized, and are geographical areas for which a wide variety of data are available. The basic concept of the MSA has existed, under various terminology, since the 1950 census, and various modifications in the definition have been made by OMB just prior to each census since. The number of MSAs has increased significantly over time, as smaller urban areas have grown large enough to become recognized as MSAs.

There is no limit to the number of counties that may be included in an MSA, and MSAs can cross state lines, with some including parts of as many as three states. The reason for having MSAs is that city boundaries are arbitrary political boundaries, and the true area in which a metropolitan region's residents live and work is always larger than the incorporated area of any given city. By having a metropolitan area defined on the basis of county boundaries, it is possible to have an entity that (1) captures the entire metropolitan region, not just an area arbitrarily defined by political decisions about incorporated area boundaries, annexations, etc., and (2) is based on county boundaries that remain relatively constant, thus permitting geographical comparisons of data over time.

The latest set of rules for defining and naming MSAs was announced by OMB in December 2000 and became effective in late 2003. Currently, an area is defined as an MSA if it contains a core urbanized area (i.e., a city, group of cities, and/or densely built up area, all contingent) with a population of at least 50,000. Any county containing a core urbanized area will automatically be part of an MSA, and is designated as a "central county." If the core urbanized area includes parts of more than one county, and if at least 10,000 of its residents live in an adjoining county that has at least half of its population in urban areas, that county will also be designated as a central county of that MSA. Additional counties will be added to the MSA as "outlying counties" if either (1) at least 25 percent of their residents work in the central county or counties of the MSA or (2) at least 25 percent of the workers employed in that county commute from the central county or counties. Thus, the criteria for defining MSAs and determining what counties are included in them are the presence of a large urban core and commuting patterns.

Within metropolitan areas, certain cities are identified as "principal cities," a new term in the definitions that went into effect in 2003. This replaces the widely recognized "central city" terminology used from 1950 until 2003. Formerly, it was possible for a metropolitan area to have up to three "central cities," which were typically the main city or group of cities around which the metropolitan area developed. Beginning in 2003, there is no longer a limit on

the number of “principal cities” that may be contained in a metropolitan area, although it remains the convention in most cases to name the metropolitan area on the basis of no more than its three largest principal cities. A city is designated as a principal city if *any* of the following conditions are true:

- 1 It is the largest city in the metropolitan area and has a population of at least 10,000.
- 2 It has a population of at least 250,000, with at least 100,000 persons employed in the city.
- 3 It has a population of at least 50,000 but less than 250,000, and the number of people employed in the city is at least as great as the city’s population.
- 4 It has a population of at least 10,000 but less than 50,000, is at least one third the population of the largest city, and the number of people employed in the city is at least as great as the city’s population.

Historically, it has been common practice to divide metropolitan areas into the portions of the MSA inside and outside the central city or cities (as was the terminology until 2003) and to examine aggregated statistics for those two parts of the metropolitan area. The part outside the central city or cities was considered to be an approximation of the aggregated suburban population of the metropolitan area. This view, regarding the part of the MSA outside the central city or cities as representing the suburban part of the metropolitan area, was common among census data users, and at one time this part of a metropolitan area was commonly referred to as the “suburban ring.” This was never precisely correct, however, because portions of the metropolitan area outside the central city are rural, since even counties with large suburban areas also include rural areas. However, analyses comparing the parts of the metropolitan area inside and outside the central city or cities were common, because the MSA offered the most readily available representation of central city and suburban areas that was geographically comparable between censuses. Given the removal of the three city limit on principal cities, and the new criteria for defining them, researchers using data for MSAs as defined in 2003 should use caution in this type of analysis,

and in particular need to recognize that the new “principal cities” and the old “central cities” are not comparable because they are defined according to different criteria, and the old limit of three such cities no longer exists. This has led to an increase in the portion of *some* metropolitan areas that falls within principal cities as compared to the old central city definition. For example, under the old definition, the only central city in the St. Louis, MO IL MSA was St. Louis, MO, but under the new definition, St. Charles, MO, an area widely regarded as suburban in character, is also recognized as a principal city. And in what is now designated the Minneapolis St. Paul Bloomington, MN WI MSA, there are now seven principal cities, in contrast to two central cities under the old definition. While the number of cities that may be recognized as principal cities is now unlimited so long as they meet the criteria, it remains the practice to name MSAs for no more than three cities, normally the three largest.

Another important change effective in 2003 is the creation of Micropolitan Statistical Areas. These are similar in concept to Metropolitan Statistical Areas, but are areas that develop around smaller urban cores, with urban core populations of at least 10,000 but less than 50,000. Like Metropolitan Statistical Areas, Micropolitan Statistical Areas are based on counties. Both Metropolitan Statistical Areas and Micropolitan Statistical Areas are subsumed under a broad category created for the 2003 definitions: Core Based Statistical Areas (CBSAs). Every CBSA is either a Metropolitan Statistical Area or a Micropolitan Statistical Area. At the end of 2003, there were 922 CBSAs in the United States, including 362 Metropolitan Statistical Areas and 560 Micropolitan Statistical Areas. There were an additional 13 CBSAs in Puerto Rico, including eight Metropolitan Statistical Areas and five Micropolitan Statistical Areas. In the United States, 82.6 percent of the 2000 population lived in Metropolitan Statistical Areas, 10.3 percent lived in Micropolitan Statistical Areas, and 7.1 percent lived outside CBSAs.

In 2000, Metropolitan Statistical Area populations ranged from a maximum of 18,323,002 in the New York Northern New Jersey Long Island, NY NJ PA MSA down to a minimum of 52,457 in the Carson City, NV MSA.

Forty nine MSAs had populations of at least 1 million, the five largest being New York North ern New Jersey Long Island, NY NJ PA, Los Angeles Long Beach Santa Anna, CA, Chicago Napierville Joliet, IL IN WI, Philadelphia Camden Wilmington, PA NJ DE, and Dallas Fort Worth Arlington, TX. Each of these MSAs, along with the Miami Fort Lauderdale Miami Beach, FL MSA, has total populations above 5 million. The 2000 populations of Micropolitan Statistical Areas range from a maximum of 182,193 in the Torrington, CT Micropolitan Statistical Area to a minimum of 13,004 in the Andrews, TX area.

Another change effective in 2003 is the system for defining MSAs in New England. Prior to 2003, MSAs in the six New England states were defined on the basis of towns rather than counties, reflecting the relatively unimportant basis of counties in that part of the country. However, beginning in 2003, Metropolitan and Micropolitan Statistical Areas in New England are defined on the basis of counties, as in the rest of the country. This makes MSA definitions in New England consistent with the rest of the country, and simplifies what was a very complex and laborious process of identifying the geographical area of MSAs in New England. However, to permit consistency with earlier MSA definitions, a new concept, the New England City and Town Area (NECTA), has been created that is similar in nature to the way MSAs were previously defined in New England. Thus, in New England, data may be obtained either for Metropolitan and Micropolitan Statistical Areas, or for NECTAs.

A final important change in metropolitan area definitions effective in 2003 is the elimination of Consolidated and Primary Metropolitan Statistical Areas. These entities were the product of one of several attempts by OMB to address the situation of the megalopolis, in which two or more adjoining metropolitan areas grow together into one very large urban agglomeration. The concept was replaced by a new area, the Combined Statistical Area (CSA), which is simply a combination of two or more nearby Metropolitan or Micropolitan Statistical Areas. This is done only when justified by commuting patterns between the two adjacent areas and/or local opinion (as represented by the area's Congressional delegation) that the areas

are closely related. In many cases, the total population of the CSA is not greatly larger than that of its largest constituent MSA, because they often are the combination of one or more small Micropolitan Statistical Areas with one very large Metropolitan Statistical Area. In a handful of cases, though, the population difference is quite large. For example, the Los Angeles Long Beach Riverside CSA, consisting of three Metropolitan Statistical Areas, has a population of 16,373,645 – about 4 million more than its largest constituent MSA. There were 113 CSAs in 2003. These can range widely in size, because some are combinations of very large Metropolitan Statistical Areas, while others are combinations of two small Micropolitan Statistical Areas. The largest is the New York Newark Bridgeport, NY NJ CT PA CSA, with a population of 21,361,797; on the other hand, the Clovis Portales, NM CSA had a population in 2000 of just 63,062.

A related but different situation is that in which one very large metropolitan area has multiple centers, such as Miami, Fort Lauderdale, and West Palm Beach in the Miami Fort Lauderdale Miami Beach, FL metropolitan area. In this case, which applies only when the urban core of the metropolitan area exceeds 2.5 million, the area may be subdivided into groupings of counties known as “Metropolitan Divisions.” Note from this example that the divisions do not necessarily correspond to the name of the MSA. The divisions represent groupings of counties around separate nodes or centers of the MSA, whereas the MSA is named for the three largest cities.

SEE ALSO: Exurbia; Megalopolis; Metropolis; Multinucleated Metropolitan Region; Urban

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Michels, Robert (1876–1936)

Dieter Rucht

Robert Michels is one of the founding fathers of modern political sociology. His writings focus on mass democracy, fascism, political leadership, political parties, and social movements. He has become famous for his widely cited “iron law of oligarchy,” which continues to be an important reference point for both social scientists and political activists.

Michels, born in Cologne in 1876, grew up in a liberal bourgeois merchant family. He studied in France, Germany, and Italy. After having joined the German Social Democratic Party, he also became a member of the Italian Socialist Party. In the early years of the twentieth century, he embraced the ideas of revolutionary syndicalism and socialist internationalism. However, when his academic career was blocked in part due to his political engagement, Michels discontinued his membership in both political parties. In 1907, he left Germany to teach economics, sociology, and political science in Turin. He became Professor of National Economics in Basel (Switzerland) in 1914. In 1923, he joined the Italian Fascist Party. His shift to the far right helped him obtain an appointment as chair of economics and the history of doctrines in Perugia (Italy) in 1928. This position had been deliberately created to provide

academic support to the fascist regime. Michels died in Rome in 1936.

Among his many writings, his monograph *Political Parties* (first published in German in 1911) stands out as his most widely read work. Based on his observation that modern democracy needs organization, Michels argues: “It is organization which gives birth to the domination of the elected over the electors, of the mandatories over the mandators, of the delegates over the delegators. Who says organization says oligarchy” (1962 [1911]: 365). Michels supports this view with a threefold set of what he calls technical administrative, psychological, and intellectual causes of oligarchy. The prototypical case for his general argument is the German Social Democratic Party which, according to Michels, transformed itself from a vibrant social movement to a rigidly controlled bureaucratic apparatus, whose basic concern was an interest in its own maintenance at the cost of the former movement’s revolutionary aims. Gradual oligarchization cannot be reversed, but can only be mitigated by raising public awareness. When oligarchy reaches an extreme state, it triggers resistance. However, after a period of glorious fights and a subsequent period of inglorious participation in power, the initial challengers are themselves subject to the iron law of oligarchy. Hence, the “cruel game” between the “incurable idealism of the youth and the incurable thirst for power of the old people” will never end. It is particularly this view that prompted J. D. May to characterize Michels as a “pessimistic romantic revolutionary.”

SEE ALSO: Authority and Legitimacy; Democracy; Democracy and Organizations; Fascism; Mosca, Gaetano; Oligarchy and Organization; Pareto, Vilfredo; Political Leadership; Political Parties; Political Sociology; Social Movements

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micro–macro links

Jonathan Turner and Barry Markovsky

Macrosociology addresses large scale phenomena such as institutional systems, whereas microsociology deals with smaller scale phenomena such as interpersonal behavior. Over the years, the theoretical agendas of macrosociology and microsociology have developed almost independently of one another. For some time, the issue of how to link these disparate levels of analysis – or how to close what is often termed the “micro–macro gap” – has been debated within theoretical sociology.

Empirically, it is relatively easy to link micro and macro levels. For example, a researcher may observe that individual political opinions and voting behavior are affected by social class membership, thus indicating an empirical linkage between micro variables (opinions and voting behavior) and a macro variable (social class). In most attempts to develop theories that link micro to macro (or macro to micro), however, conceptual gaps appear in the exposition. These gaps typically involve an inability to specify conceptually the processes by which micro and macro level forces influence each other. For example, Max Weber’s (1958 [1905]) famous analysis of how the psychological motivations of Protestants at “the level of meaning” led to the inception of capitalism is vague on the exact processes by which individual level motivations generate societal level outcomes. Similarly, it is often implicit in macro theories that large scale processes and phenomena have direct effects on individual behaviors, but again, the conceptual linkage

between macro and micro level processes is typically not specified.

To speak of a micro–macro “gap” may imply that there is a chasm that must be traversed, but that is not necessarily true. It is true that, for some purposes, linking micro and macro levels may generate insights that otherwise could not have been achieved. For other purposes, however, linking to other levels may provide no explanatory benefits whatsoever. In the social realm, as in any other realm of empirical investigation, some micro and macro phenomena are naturally interrelated, others are not. Still, mature sciences do make systematic efforts to link conceptualizations of micro and macro processes, although the sciences vary considerably in just how well their cross level theoretical connections are made. Even physics, certainly the most advanced science theoretically, has yet to complete its task of fully unifying theories of the micro and macro domains of the physical universe. Therefore, it should not be surprising that the younger social sciences have not achieved this goal. We can gain an appreciation for the problems in achieving theoretical integration by reviewing the various strategies that sociologists have employed to connect different levels of the social universe.

STRATEGIES FOR MICRO–MACRO LINKAGE

One of the most extreme approaches to linking micro and macro levels is simply to proclaim that the micro level takes precedence, and that intermediate (“meso”) and macro structures ultimately are “built from” or “emerge out of” behavioral and interpersonal processes (Schelling 1978). For example, Herbert Blumer (1969) asserted that society is no more than “symbolic interaction.” Randall Collins (1981, 2004) has argued that macro reality ultimately consists of “chains of interaction rituals” among individuals. In making such assertions, there is a presumption, rarely developed theoretically, that individual level behaviors somehow aggregate over time and space in ways that generate meso and macro level structures. Even rational choice approaches that tend to employ rigorous theoretical models become vague when trying to explain how macrostructures, in all their

complexity, emerge from individuals who are seeking to maximize their payoffs and minimize their costs (e.g., Coleman 1990). However, within the rational choice genre, some game theoretic models and computer simulations do successfully demonstrate mechanisms through which certain kinds of individual decisions produce certain macro level outcomes (see Carley 2001 for a review of simulation approaches to theorizing). Even here, however, the computer programs generating the outcomes do not necessarily incorporate sociological assumptions concerning the processes involved.

At the other extreme are macro theorists who assert that individual behaviors and interactions are inconsequential for the study of society (Blau 1977), or that they are so highly constrained by macrostructural forces that micro phenomena can be understood only through macro level theories. For example, a feminist theory of social power might contend that all male-female interactions at the micro household level are affected by the macro level distribution of political and economic power (e.g., Chafetz 1990). Each of the extreme positions, or what we might call *chauvinisms*, embodies a kernel of truth: structure and culture are not possible without being energized by human behavior and interaction, and behavior or interaction that is free of any influence by the larger social context is virtually inconceivable. Still, neither approach offers a strong case for how the linkages between the micro and macro levels are to be conceptualized.

Between the above positions is a range of alternatives. One strategy is to build a conceptual staircase from the micro to macro. Here, a conceptualization of individual action is first delineated, and then successively more structure is added. For example, Talcott Parsons (1937, 1951) began with unit acts and moved stepwise up to a social system and, eventually, to an overall action system (Parsons et al. 1953) and on to a general conception of the universe (Parsons 1978). But in moving up the conceptual staircase, large gaps appear in Parsons's argument. For example, Parsons argued that actions become "institutionalized" into social systems, but he never specified exactly how this occurs. In essence, Parsons jumped a number of steps at just the points where micro and macro levels should have been connected. An alternative

approach is to move down the staircase. For instance, in Anthony Giddens's (1984) *structuration theory*, structure provides "rules and resources" guided by "structural principles" leading to properties of "institutions" directed by "modalities" that, in turn, structure "social systems of interaction" driven by "unconscious motives" and by "discursive consciousness." Much like Parsons's ascent of the staircase, Giddens's descent appears to jump several steps, without specifying the processes through which macro and micro levels connect.

Another approach simply bypasses the micro-macro link by examining relational forms rather than the properties of actors. For example, Georg Simmel's (1950) call for a formal sociology has been heeded in network theories that attempt to explain the dynamics of resource flows based on the shapes of networks, regardless of whether these are networks composed of micro level units like individuals in interaction, or collective actors such as nation states (e.g., Emerson 1962; Willer 1981). By positing that there are isomorphisms between micro and macro processes, the theoretical gap presumably disappears because the same theoretical principles and models are used to explain the form of social relations at different levels of social reality. Although this approach provides an elegant macro to micro linkage, it fails to address an important issue: sometimes the nature of the unit does make a difference in the nature of social processes that ensue. There are, no doubt, isomorphic processes that cut across all types of social units, but it is also the case that some processes are unique to a particular level of reality. Thus, Simmel's formal sociology offers one way to bypass the problem of micro-macro linkage, but it does not obviate the problem of connecting theoretically diverse social forces operating at different levels of social reality. Moreover, even if person to person behaviors reveal properties similar to relations among collective units, the problem of how the collective units are generated by interpersonal behaviors, and vice versa, is not resolved. Rather, the problem is simply bypassed.

Another strategy for linking micro and macro is what we might call deductive reductionism. George C. Homans (1974) was perhaps the most prominent advocate of the view that the laws of sociology pertaining to social structure can be

deduced from the laws of psychology. Thus, the linkages between the micro and macro are to be found in the calculus of deductive logic whereby laws about macro and meso level phenomena are “derived” from those about micro level phenomena. Like formal sociology, this solution to the problem would be elegant, but Homans never completed the job.

Still another strategy for linking the micro and macro levels of reality can be found in recent lines of argument about “embeddedness” (Granovetter 1985). By this view, structures are conceptualized as residing inside of more inclusive structures and their associated cultures. The approach recognizes that, despite the constraints imposed by their broader contexts, micro processes have a life of their own and need to be addressed through concepts and principles appropriate to their level – just as the macro level requires conceptualization in its own terms. Most arguments about embedding tend to be empirical, however, and merely describe how a given behavior or microstructure is constrained by what transpires in the macro structure and the particular culture that contain it. As such, descriptions of embedded social processes do not provide general *theoretical* insights into micro–macro relationships.

One final strategy for dealing with micro–macro connections is to focus attention on phenomena at one level, and to attach an “all else being equal” or *ceteris paribus* clause to theoretical assertions. Presumably, one may then safely ignore the impact of other levels. The approach does not deny potential cross level effects, but rather treats them as constants, at least provisionally. This approach can be a useful short run strategy because it allows the theorist to focus on a particular set of processes without introducing complexities that may confound them. The strategy breaks down, however, when – as is most often the case – there is no theoretical follow up that relaxes the *ceteris paribus* constraint. Indeed, if this approach is not fully implemented in unpacking what has been bracketed out by the *ceteris paribus*, it becomes yet another end run around theoretically connecting the micro and macro.

The failure of each of the above strategies to resolve the micro–macro linkage problem does not mean that these strategies are unviable. On the contrary, they all have generated useful

theoretical insights. As noted earlier, the macro–micro problem is inherent in all sciences, not just sociology. It may be that sociologists worry about the issue more than other scientists, but the problem is not unique to the study of social reality.

Before leaving this review of various strategies for closing the micro–macro “gap,” we should note that this question is often conflated with another debate in sociology – the issue of “agency vs. structure” (see Ritzer 1990 for a review). Those who argue on the agency side generally are anti science and want humans to have free will, while those on the structure side are interested in generating theoretical principles about generic patterns of action and interaction, or structure. As a result, those who push for agency often emphasize microsocial processes in which individuals are seen as creative actors, whereas those who argue for the power of structure are often more macro in focus and see structure as highly constraining on individual actions. Still, collectively organized units can reveal agency (as when a society goes to war) and encounters almost always reveal structure. Thus, the agency–structure debate is a different kind of controversy in sociology than the micro–macro questions that concern us here.

A COMPREHENSIVE APPROACH

If current theoretical strategies do not fully resolve the problem of integrating conceptually the micro and macro, we can reasonably ask: is there an approach that might better address the problem? One way to get a better purchase on the theoretical problem of linking the micro, meso, and macro levels of reality is to begin with a controversial assertion: social reality actually unfolds at these three levels (Turner 2002, 2003). That is, while the micro, meso, and macro distinctions are analytical distinctions, they may be more than mere conceptual conveniences: they may denote just how social reality is organized. The following approach suggests a more comprehensive metatheoretical account of the kinds of cross level connections we have discussed thus far.

Assume that social reality exists at three levels: face to face encounters at the micro level, embedded within corporate or categoric units

at the meso level, embedded within institutional systems at the macro level. Corporate units include organizations and communities, as well as larger social groups that extend beyond a micro level encounter. Categorical units include social categories, such as social class, ethnicity, gender, and age, that are differentially evaluated and that arouse differential responses from people. Often social categories become a basis for corporate unit organization, as when an ethnic minority organizes to pursue its interests. Conversely, positions within corporate units can become broader social categories, such as mother, father, student, worker, and the like. Corporate and categorical units almost always are lodged within macro level *institutional systems*, such as economy, polity, law, kinship, religion, sport, medicine, and education.

Cultural systems direct action at each level. Looking from the bottom up, social reality is ultimately constructed from encounters of face to face interaction that become elaborated into corporate and categorical units that, in turn, generate institutional systems from which societies and inter society systems are built. A macro chauvinist would proclaim that encounters are so embedded in macro and meso units that what transpires at the interpersonal, face to face level can only be understood by the culture and structure of meso and macro units, whereas a micro chauvinist would argue just the opposite and proclaim that institutional systems are, at their core, strung together encounters that are organized across time and in space. They would both be right, but this conclusion does not get us past a good shouting match. We need, instead, a way to conceptualize how these levels of reality are *interconnected*.

One way to conceptualize the process of embedding is to visualize the three levels – micro, meso, and macro – as driven by sets of forces or processes uniquely associated with each level (Turner 2002, 2003; Turner & Boyns 2001). If this assertion is correct, then theories should be about the forces that drive the formation and reformation of structural units of each level. Theories are not about the units of each level, but about the forces that drive their organization and culture. Once this conceptual step is taken, the argument about which level is primary disappears. Instead, each level manifests its *own set of forces* driving the

formation and operation of its own sociocultural units.

The next question is how the levels are connected to each other, and here is where embedding enters as one conceptual “solution” to the micro-macro problem. The values or loadings of forces at one level are very much determined by the values of the forces operating at the next higher level and the sociocultural units in which the more micro units are embedded. For example, if an encounter is embedded within a formal organization and a couple of categorical units – say gender and ethnicity – the dynamics of the encounter will be greatly constrained by this particular pattern of embedding. To take another example, if a corporate unit, such as the nuclear family and the categorical units that also flow from this unit (e.g., mother, father, children), are embedded within a larger kinship system, then the culture of the kinship system will load the values of the variable for the corporate unit (nuclear family) and categorical units that become salient (mother, father, child). Notice that there is no effort to reduce one unit to another but, instead, the goal is to see how the loadings of the forces driving the formation of units at one level are related to the forces and units of the next higher. For example, an encounter (micro level) in a workplace (meso) may be embedded in an economy that is part of a world economic system (macro); and because of this embedding, the values for the forces driving the encounter will be directly influenced by the structure and culture of the workplace (and by categorical units, if any are salient). Because the workplace is part of an organization that is embedded in an economy which is also part of a system of economies, the culture and structure of the ever more macro systems also influence the loadings for the forces driving the encounter.

With this relatively simple conceptual edifice, it becomes possible to develop principles about the dynamics of the forces operating at each level and, at the same time, to incorporate the effect of the units at the next higher level in loading the values of the variables expressed in the principle. For example, if an encounter is embedded in an organization with an authority structure and a culture supporting this structure, and if those high in authority are of one gender or disproportionately so while those in

low authority positions are of another gender, the dynamics of the encounter – say, status, roles, expectation states, emotions, frames, exchanges, and other processes driving the formation of encounters – will all be loaded by this pattern of embeddedness. Moreover, it becomes possible to develop abstract principles about these loadings that are more than empirical summaries. For instance, we might assume that, if there is a high correlation between rank and categoric unit membership at the meso level, then encounters will reveal particular patterns of expectations states, rituals, framing, emotional arousal, and other forces operating at the micro level. Such an approach bridges the “gap” by seeking patterns at one level as they are conditioned by laws operating at higher levels.

One could argue that this solution to micro-macro linkage biases inquiry toward the macro chauvinist side of the debate. After all, it takes many more events at a given level to influence higher levels. For example, what transpires in one encounter is not likely to affect the division of labor of a corporate unit, whereas virtually every encounter will be influenced by each individual’s position in a corporate unit and membership in a categoric unit. Or, the behavior of one organization in an economy rarely impacts institutional systems to a significant degree. Thus, the fact of embedding biases theories toward a top down perspective. It is true, no doubt, that an economy is, in some ultimate sense, built from micro level encounters. However, the dynamics of these encounters are not likely to change the dynamics of the economy as much as the embedding of the encounter in the economy, via corporate and categoric units, will influence what transpires in the encounter. Hence, most bridging laws developed from this perspective will be of a top down character. We should not forget that sometimes what occurs in encounters in corporate units or in categoric units does influence the values of the variables in laws about macro level structures and cultures. It is possible to make bridging statements that are bottom up, such as when one has a special interest in the initial emergence of macrostructures. Thus, whether the principles one develops from this perspective appear to favor micro to macro or macro to micro bridges will likely depend on

the interests of the theorists utilizing the approach, e.g., whether they focus on the emergence of social structures or on the impacts of extant structures.

Note that these efforts to link levels of reality revolve around seeing how one level loads the values of variables in propositions governing the operating of another level. The debate is not about which level is primary but about whether or not the propositions can explain the operation of forces at any given level. As bridging propositions are developed, forces at one level will be increasingly linked to forces operating at another level. Thus, so long as the goal of theory is to develop laws that explain the operation of dynamics at one level of social reality and, then, to supplement these laws with bridging propositions across levels, the micro-macro problem becomes solvable in theoretical rather than philosophical terms.

CRITERIA FOR MULTILEVEL THEORIES

A multilevel theory has one or more bridges across levels of analysis. These may include micro to macro bridges, macro to micro bridges, or both. To aid in the production of multilevel theories – whether via the approach just described or some alternative orientation – we need to specify some provisional criteria that should promote explicit and concise micro-macro linkages, apply to any substantive units of sociological interest, and establish points of contact for linkages to theories that may address phenomena at even more macro or more micro levels (Markovsky 1997). Arguably, the greatest impediments to building micro-macro linkages are ambiguities in the language used to express theories and in the logic used to derive their conclusions and predictions. These issues are not mere formalities: first, ambiguity in the terms referring to micro units or macro units will transfer to any cross level linkages involving those terms, leaving different readers with varying impressions of the author’s intended meanings. Second, logical gaps rob theoretical conclusions of their force by disconnecting them from the very justifications offered to support them.

Theory Units

Among the terms that do not have a consistent meaning in sociology is “theory.” Because it would be futile to discuss multilevel theory without a clear picture of what a theory is, it will help to provide an explicit definition. First, however, we will define a useful building block called a *theory unit*. A theory unit includes logical operators, a minimal set of terms, a theoretical statement, and a scope statement. Logical operators are used in the construction of theoretical statements and might include words such as: “If . . . , then . . . , therefore . . .” or mathematical symbols. Their precise meanings are provided by a system outside of the theory unit, such as symbolic logic or algebra. The terms of a theory are the words used to carry meanings from theorist to readers. To accomplish this, meanings must be shared and so it is important that theorists define any terms that may not be understood the same way by all readers. To enhance communication, the theory unit should use as few terms as possible. Also, if the theory is to generalize beyond specific cases, the terms should be defined abstractly so that they can subsume specific cases without being limited by them. The theoretical statement within the theory unit uses logical operators to express an assumed relationship between theoretical terms, such as: “If an official has high status, then the official will have high power.” (Presumably, “official,” “status,” and “power” would be defined clearly for readers.) Finally, scope statements express conditions under which the theorist claims the theoretical statement applies, e.g.: “The statement applies in primitive economies,” or “The statement applies in face to face groups.”

Theories

Although a useful building block, theory units have limited value on their own. With only one theoretical statement to work with, it is not possible to use some statements to justify others, or to use multiple statements to generate new conclusions. Theories provide these services. A theory contains two or more theory units that are linked by their logical operators and terms such that they create logical arguments – chains

of reasoning whose conclusions are logically derived from prior statements. To be more precise, two or more theory units can form a theory only if (i) the set of terms of each theory unit overlaps with the terms of at least one other theory unit; (ii) their scope statements overlap; and (iii) the theoretical statement of each theory unit connects logically to at least one other. If (i) does not hold, then the theory units are talking about different things. If (ii) is not satisfied, then the theory units apply to different domains of phenomena. To illustrate (iii), the earlier statement “If an official has high status, then the official will have high power” could be combined with the statement “If an official has high power, then the official will have high autonomy” because the “then . . .” part of the first statement overlaps with the “If . . .” part of the second. In this manner, a new statement appearing in neither theory unit may be derived: “If an official has high status, then the official will have high autonomy.” Although this is only a simple example, it manifests an important quality of well formed theories: their capacity to capitalize on prior knowledge to generate new insights.

Multilevel Theories

Having thus defined theories, it is a relatively simple matter to provide criteria for multilevel theories. The micro-macro link requires two further conditions: *containment* and *bridging*. Conditions for containment ensure that the theory incorporates two or more distinct levels, defined in such a way that one is completely contained within the other. Examples could be members within groups, or organizations contained by industries. Bridging conditions are designed so that a statement that refers to terms existing at one level is explicitly connected to terms referring to another level.

Two rather different kinds of bridges may be built. First, there may be a theoretical statement, “If x then y ,” in which the level of x differs from that of y . For example, “If each member of a group feels powerless, then the group will revolt.” Note that while a group revolt contains multiple group members, it can not exist at the level of the individual person.

It would be defined as a collective phenomenon, the same way that a "beach" cannot exist at the level of the grain of sand.

The second type of bridge is definitional: the macro unit of one of the theory's statements (e.g., the x in "If x . . .") is defined in terms of a micro unit that is the subject of another theoretical statement, or vice versa. For example, "A group exists if and only if a set of interacting individuals define themselves as a distinct unit." Here, the relationship between "individuals" and "group" is established by definition. Thus, in this example, if there is a theoretical statement that asserts something about groups (macro), then by definition it also implies something about individuals (micro) because the former is explicitly defined in terms of the latter.

Multilevel theories abound in other scientific disciplines. In physics one may trace a chain of micro to macro theoretical linkages that span from the smallest "micro" particles at the subatomic level to the "macro" structure of the cosmos, via a host of meso level structures and processes. At each level, macro properties such as energy fields, states of matter, or nuclear forces also exert influences in macro to micro directions. Although sociology does not yet approach the breadth and precision of physics, nevertheless it has some exemplary multilevel theories, one of which is examined below.

Network exchange theory (NET) provides a good illustration of a multilevel sociological theory (Willer 1999). It was developed to explain and predict the role that social structures play in producing power differences that result in resource differentials among members. The theory operates on three levels: the behavior of individual *actors* whose exchanges of resources are guided by rules applying to their social ties or *relations*, which in turn apply within larger, relatively fixed *networks* of potential exchange relationships. The scope conditions of the theory specify constraints on actors' negotiation strategies and their responses to being included or excluded in exchanges, along with rules for how resources are infused into relations and distributed to actors. Definitions are provided for key terms such as actor, network, power, and others used in its theoretical statements or *axioms*.

The theory has expanded over the years to accommodate a broadening range of phenomena and to generate more exact predictions, but the four basic axioms in the core part of the theory will serve to illustrate its capabilities. The axioms are abstract and general, and so they apply to networks of any size and shape, and to any kind of actors and resources. These theoretical statements allow the derivation of predictions for the quantities of resources that will end up at each network position after negotiations and exchanges play out. NET's Axiom 1 is a mathematical model for translating each position's location within a network structure into a numerical index of its potential power. The second axiom uses the power indices to determine which actors will seek exchange with each other by assuming that no actor will seek exchange with another actor in a higher power position if there is an available exchange partner in an equal or lower power position. The third axiom indicates that no exchange occurs between two actors unless they seek exchange from each other, and the fourth axiom asserts that profits from exchange will correspond to differences in power indices: more power results in more profit.

Not only is it possible to derive individual profits from information on the exchange network structure (a macro to micro link) but the theory also has been used successfully to predict (i) structural changes based on exchange seeking assumptions (micro to macro), and how changing exchange rules causes changes in (ii) profits (meso to micro) and (iii) network structure (meso to macro).

CONCLUSION

The issue of how to link micro, meso, and macro levels of reality theoretically is not easily resolved in sociology and, for that matter, any other science. We have reviewed the various approaches and proposed substantive and logical pathways to dealing with the problem of closing the conceptual gap between levels. The most important conclusion, we feel, is to recognize that social reality operates at different levels and that chauvinistic proclamations about one level being more primary simply do not resolve the problem of conceptual linkages. Another key

conclusion is that levels of reality are embedded in each other and, hence, have effects on the operation of processes at other levels. Embedding does not mean that one level is reduced to another but, instead, that processes operating at one level are influenced by those at another level. This fact suggests that theories seeking to bridge across levels need to develop concepts, propositions, and models that capture the key dynamics of each level and, then, to develop bridging propositions connecting the concepts across levels.

There are many ways to formulate such bridging propositions. Network exchange theory proposes viewing the macro level as an exchange network that, through the workings of meso level relations, influences and is influenced by the actions of individuals located at various places in the network. Other theories reveal this same potential. For example, the large theoretical literature on social movements presents ample opportunities to explore how the emotions and actions of individuals lead to the formation of meso level organizational units that push for change in macro level institutional structures and culture. Conversely, these approaches can develop bridging propositions on how macro and meso level conditions, such as a stratification system embedded in the institutionalization of power and production, generate micro level responses of individuals that can explain, under conditions specified by bridging propositions, how micro encounters coalesce into change oriented social movements. The key point is that many theories illustrate what we advocate – moving across levels with a variety of bridging propositions – but most often they are ad hoc in character. Needed is more attention to the criteria, enumerated earlier, for developing multilevel theory. The key is to locate the level of reality to which most of the concepts and propositions of a particular theory pertain. Then, the next step should be to determine how the values for these concepts are loaded by other processes at other levels of reality. Finally, bridging propositions can be developed that denote generic relationships among concepts denoting properties of different levels of reality. If sociological theorists consistently followed these three guidelines, the cross level linkages would be more consistently made and, over time, broader theoretical (as opposed to

specific empirical) insights into the generic forms of linkage across levels of reality would become ever more evident.

SEE ALSO: Exchange Network Theory; Mathematical Sociology; Mesostructure; Micro sociology; Structuration Theory; Theory; Theory Construction

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microsociology

Thomas J. Scheff

The basic idea of microsociology is to fill in the human detail missing from abstract representations of human beings and their societies. The endeavor begins by describing, second by second, the structure/process of social life. The goal is to show the reciprocal relationship between these events and the nature of the society in which they occur, how each causes the other. There have been three main approaches: ethnographic, experimental, and linguistic.

Ethnography fills in some of the details by close observations and reportage of behavior in context. One example is the study by Edwin Lemert of paranoia among executives in business organizations. By interviewing and observing several subjects, Lemert was able to make a signal contribution to the development of labeling theory.

Experimental studies by Asch and others provide an important example of the use of the quantitative approach to show fine grained aspects of context that influence conformity and non conformity. Perhaps the most surprising result of these studies was that a large minority of subjects are easily but inappropriately influenced by their blatant conformity to the behavior of the majority.

Finally, discourse and conversation analysis of social interaction has demonstrated lawful regularities in linguistic sequences (such as questions and responses) that usually go unnoticed. Unlike the first two approaches, close reading of verbal texts reveals the otherwise invisible filigree that makes up a vital core of human relationships.

However, each of the three approaches is specialized to the point that important aspects are omitted or obscured. Ethnography is usually reported at the level of ordinary language, missing systematic observation and analysis of fine details. Quantitative studies are systematized, but leave out the details of context, sequence, and, for the most part, nonverbal components. Conversation analysis emphasizes system and sequence, but omits the link to the larger social context in which dialogue takes place. These difficulties pose a crucial problem for sociology. How can we represent human reality if there are no actual persons anywhere in our studies?

In one of Milan Kundera's essays on the history of the novel he addresses the problem of accessing human reality:

Try to reconstruct a dialogue from your own life, the dialogue of a quarrel or a dialogue of love. The most precious, the most important situations are utterly gone. Their abstract sense remains (I took this point of view, he took that one. I was aggressive, he was defensive), perhaps a detail or two, but the acoustic-visual concreteness of the situation in all its continuity is lost.

And not only is it lost, but we do not even wonder at this loss. We are resigned to losing the concreteness of the present. We immediately transform the present moment into its abstraction. We need only recount an episode we experienced a few hours ago: the dialogue contracts to a brief summary, the setting to a few general features. This applies to even the strongest memories which affect the mind deeply like a trauma: we are so dazzled by their potency that we do not realize how schematic and meager their content is.

When we study, discuss, analyze a reality, we analyze it as it appears in our mind, in our memory. We know reality only in the past tense. We do not know it as it is in the present in the moment when it is happening, when it *is*. The present moment is unlike the memory of it. Remembering is not the negative of forgetting. Remembering is a form of forgetting.

We can assiduously keep a diary and note every event. Rereading the entries one day we will see that they cannot evoke a single concrete image. And still worse: the imagination is unable to help our memory along and reconstruct what has been forgotten. The present—the concreteness of the present—as a phenomenon to consider, as a *structure*, is for us an unknown planet: so we can neither hold on to it in our memory nor reconstruct it through imagination. We die without knowing what we have lived. (Kundera 1995: 128–9)

How can a scientist or scholar capture reality, when we and the people whom we study usually cannot? As Kundera suggests, only the greatest of novelists, giants such as Tolstoy and Proust, have even come close, by reporting the evocative details of sight, sound, and context that we usually ignore or immediately forget.

Kundera's comments clarify and extend the Proustian quest, not only for the lost past, but for the lost present. Although most of Proust's commentary concerns the recovery of the distant past, a few passages concern a past so immediate that it edges upon the present. For example, in the section called *Within a Budding Grove*, there is an incident in which the narrator, Marcel, finally meets Albertine, the girl he has been yearning for (and who later becomes the love of his life). At first he is deeply disappointed with the meeting; the whole episode seems banal and empty; he and she both conventional and distant. However,

that evening, as he reconsiders the meeting, he begins to remember the fine details of her gestures, facial expression, and inflections. She comes to life for him, in his "darkroom," as he says, where he is able to develop the "negatives" of his impressions of her earlier in the day. By focusing on the details, he is able to regain a past so immediate that it points toward the possibility of recovering the present.

Proust is still ridiculed for his seeming preoccupation with minutiae. A favorite joke is that it takes him 15 pages to describe turning over in bed. This joke is a defensive maneuver, serving to protect the status quo described by Kundera. Proust implies that the ability to recover even fleeting moments of the past and present are the *sine qua non* of the great artist: it is these recovered moments that breathe life into art.

But why do we need the living present in the human sciences? Because it is needed to breathe life into our enterprise, also. Linking the minutia to larger wholes can restore human reality to the social sciences. This approach is a way of filling in the details of Proust's method of "developing our negatives in our darkroom." Using transcripts or verbatim texts as data, one interprets the meaning of the smallest parts (words and gestures) of expressions within the context of the ever greater *wholes* within which they occur: sentences, paragraphs, the whole dialogue, the whole relationship, the whole culture and social structure. A central theme in the work of Spinoza was that understanding human beings requires relating the "least parts to the greatest wholes." Microsociology proposes that this method may be carried out in a disciplined program of inquiry.

Social relationships can be represented by two main dimensions: power and integration. Marx's early work gave these dimensions equal attention, social class and rank representing power, alienation/solidarity, integration. But in his later work he focused almost entirely on the power dimension, leading to a huge gap in our understanding of social relationships.

The idea of the social bond can be seen as a way of representing integration in terms of alienation and its opposite, solidarity. The structure/process of actual social relationships involves mixtures of alienation and solidarity, and the exact proportion can be determined

through the analysis of verbatim discourse. The difficulty is that in order to carry out this program, one must enter a world that is all but forbidden in western societies: the world of specific emotions and actual relationships.

Charles Horton Cooley provided an important step toward understanding social integration: the looking glass self “seems to have three principal elements: the imagination of our appearance to the other person; the imagination of his judgment of that appearance, and some sort of self feeling, such as pride or mortification.” Cooley’s elements point to the basic components of social integration. The first two involve the imagination of the other’s view of self. The two elements combined can be called *degree of attunement*. The other component is made up of the emotional reactions that are real, not imagined, either pride or shame.

The first component, attunement, of “living in the minds of others, without realizing it,” as Cooley put it, is directly contrary to the very foundation of western culture, violating the canon of individualism. Living in the minds of others implies that individuals, as well as being separate units, may also be united, at least momentarily, as a pair or member of a larger group. Although the idea of unity between two or more persons (collective consciousness) instead of separation is a staple in eastern cultures, it is unacceptable to the extent of being taboo in western thought.

Cooley’s focus on pride and shame is also a deviation. Western culture has at its center the embedded idea of the isolated, self contained individual. The pride/shame component of social integration implies that our self feelings are dependent on other people. For this reason, discussions of shame and its relatives are usually avoided, both in lay and social science discourse.

Goffman did not acknowledge a debt to Cooley, but his analysis of concrete examples led him to a deep exploration of the looking glass self (Scheff 2006). Indeed, Goffman’s treatment of a large number of examples implies a fourth element. Cooley stopped at the third, with the experience of pride or shame. Goffman’s analyses, especially of impression management, imply a fourth step: the management of emotion. Goffman had nothing to say about the pride option, but his examples suggest that actors

usually do not accept shame/embarrassment passively. Instead, they try to manage it, by avoidance, if possible. Most of the embarrassment/shame possibilities in Goffman’s examples are not about the actual occurrence of emotions, but anticipations, and management based on these anticipations. (In European languages other than English, the anticipation of shame/embarrassment is taken to be a shame variant, such as the French *pudeur* – modesty.) This idea is expressible in English as “a sense of shame.” Goffman’s examples further imply that if shame/embarrassment cannot be avoided, then his actors actively deny it, attempting to save face, on the one hand, and/or to avoid pain, on the other. It is Goffman’s fourth step that brings his examples to life, because it touches on the dynamics of impression and emotion management that underlie most moments of everyday life.

The Cooley/Goffman looking glass self provides an underlying model of structure/process of social integration. Alienation/solidarity can be understood in terms of degree of attunement (Goffman called it mutual awareness), on the one hand, and the emotional responses that follow from it, on the other. Pride signals and generates solidarity. Shame signals and generates alienation. Shame is a normal part of the process of social control; it becomes disruptive only when hidden or denied. Denial of shame, especially when it takes the form of false pride (egoism), generates self perpetuating cycles of alienation.

Threats to a secure bond can come in two different formats: either the bond is too loose or too tight. Relationships in which the bond is too loose are *isolated*: there is mutual misunderstanding or failure to understand, or mutual rejection. Relationships in which the bond is too tight are *engulfed*: at least one of the parties in the relationship, say the subordinate, understands and embraces the standpoint of the other at the expense of the subordinate’s own beliefs, values, or feelings. The other is accepted by rejecting parts of one’s self. In engulfed families, a child can only be “good” by blind obedience and conformity, by relinquishing its curiosity, intuition, or feelings.

This view of alienation is congruent with, and further develops, Durkheim’s theory of social integration, which he derived from his

study of the causes of suicide (Durkheim 1952). He argued that suicidal inclinations were generated by bonds that were too loose (egoism) or too tight (altruism). This theory extends Durkheim's by describing the microscopic components of this system, and also the structure of a secure bond, which Durkheim only implies – one that is neither too loose nor too tight. In this scheme, a secure bond involves a balance between the viewpoint of self and other. Although each party understands and accepts the viewpoint of the other, this acceptance does not go to either extreme: neither giving up major parts of one's own viewpoint out of loyalty (engulfment), nor discounting the other's viewpoint (isolation).

The idea of balance leads to a crucial distinction between a secure bond (genuine solidarity) and an engulfed bond (blind loyalty). These two states are usually confounded in social science. Instead of seeing blind loyalty as a type of alienation (from self), it is seen as closeness. But the individual who is not attuned to self cannot be close (attuned) with anyone else either.

A second advantage is that this model of integration is grounded at both the interpersonal and the intergroup levels. The Kunderian idea of the concrete reality of relationships can be implemented by close study of verbatim recordings at the interpersonal level, and by the close analysis of the texts of exchanges between leaders of groups at the collective level. An example of dialogue between leaders of groups can be found in an analysis of the letters exchanged immediately before the beginning of World War I by the Kaiser of Germany and the Tsar of Russia, and between the Kaiser and the prime minister of England (Scheff 1994: 82–4). Their letters betray some of the emotional bases of what turned out to be an unnecessary and ruinously destructive war.

The version of microsociology proposed here can be applied both to interpersonal and social interaction in a way that may afford a path to linking the least parts (words and gestures) to greatest wholes (abstract theories and social structures).

SEE ALSO: Conversation Analysis; Cooley, Charles Horton; Ethnography; Goffman, Erving; Looking Glass Self; Mead, George Herbert; Micro–Macro Links; Social Psychology

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middleman minorities

Pyong Gap Min

Before the 1960s, social scientists usually used the dichotomous concepts of majority–minority groups or dominant–subordinate groups to discuss ethnic and race relations in the United States and other multi ethnic societies. However, they found they needed a new concept to refer to those minority groups that stood between these two poles in social status and economic role. Thus, they created the concept of middleman minorities to refer to these intermediate groups since the 1960s (Blalock 1967: 79–84; Eitzen 1971; Bonacich 1972; Bonacich & Modell 1980; Turner & Bonacich 1980; Zenner 1991; Min 1996).

The most important characteristic of middleman minorities is their intermediary economic role between the producers of the dominant group and the consuming masses (minority customers). Middleman minority members bridge a huge status gap existent in the host society by distributing products made by members of the ruling group to minority customers. Thus, their businesses are heavily concentrated in trade in low income minority neighborhoods. Middleman minorities are also characterized by their subjection to “host hostility.” On the one hand, middleman merchants encounter boycotts and arson of their stores, and other forms of rejection, by minority customers they serve. On the other hand, in time of political crisis, they can be scapegoated by the ruling group that controls the economy. Finally, another important characteristic of middleman minorities is

their strong ethnic ties/solidarity. Middleman minorities tend to maintain ethnic traditions and solidarity over generations. Although their lack of assimilation and ethnic solidarity may be partly caused by their group characteristics, it is largely the result of their economic segregation and reactions to their experiences with host hostility.

Social scientists consider Jews in medieval Europe and in pre war Poland, Asian Indians in South and West Africa, and Chinese in various Asian countries (Thailand, the Philippines, and Vietnam) as typical middleman minorities (Eitzen 1971; Bonacich 1972; Zenner 1991). These groups concentrated in small retail businesses (moneylending in the case of Jews in medieval Europe). They also experienced boycotts and other forms of rejection by minority customers. In addition, they maintained strong ethnic ties and solidarity. Bonacich and Modell (1980) consider Japanese truck farmers and Japanese wholesalers and retailers of farm products in the first half of the twentieth century as middleman merchants. Min (1996) has examined contemporary Korean immigrant merchants in black neighborhoods as middlemen that distribute white corporate products to low income minority customers.

Bonacich and other scholars (Bonacich 1972; Bonacich & Modell 1980; Light 1980; Light & Bonacich 1988: 17–18) have used the term “middleman minority” to refer to immigrant and ethnic groups with high concentrations in commercial occupations. In this definition, the group characteristics of middleman minorities, such as the proclivity to “take risks,” “sojourning orientation,” and the “separatist mentality,” mainly contributed to their middleman role. However, it is better to use the term “trading minorities” to refer to these immigrant and minority groups that are or were merely concentrated in commercial occupations. As noted above, classical theorists have reserved “middleman minorities” for the immigrant and minority groups that played the economic intermediary role between the ruling group of producers and the consuming masses. Since middleman minorities were needed to bridge the two socially stratified groups, the social structure of the host society in the form of a

“status gap,” rather than the characteristics of middleman minorities, was the main cause of the development of a middleman minority in a particular society.

The middleman literature shows that middleman minorities existed in two forms of societies with extreme types of social stratification. First, middleman minorities existed in pre industrial, aristocratic societies such as those found in medieval Europe or pre war Poland (Eitzen 1971; Zenner 1991). Jews played the role of the economic intermediaries as moneylenders or merchants in these pre industrial societies because there was no intermediate class that could have bridged the gap between the ruling group and the consuming masses. Second, middleman minorities developed in colonial societies, such as the Philippines or South Africa. The colonial ruling groups, Spaniards in the Philippines and whites in South Africa and other African countries, did not allow, or at least discouraged, the indigenous populations from developing economic power, which they feared might have been used to overthrow the colonial governments (Palmer 1957; Eitzen 1971). Thus, they brought in or encouraged the alien groups, Chinese in the Philippines and other Asian countries, and Asian Indians in South Africa and other African countries, to specialize in minority oriented businesses.

As noted above, middleman minorities existed in pre industrial or colonized societies where social strata were more or less polarized and fixed, and which had no significant middle class. The twentieth century United States, with the middle class accounting for a significant or a majority of the population, was not a society favorable for the development of a middleman minority. However, Rinder (1959: 257) pointed out that “although strata boundaries are continuous and flexible in American society, a status gap is apparent in the margins of white–Negro relations.” In the early twentieth century, Jews in New York, Los Angeles, Chicago, and other cities dominated retail businesses in black neighborhoods, playing a middleman minority role bridging white manufacturers and suppliers on the one hand and poor black residents on the other (Cohen 1970).

Compared to the number of Jewish merchants, the number of Chinese merchants in black neighborhoods was insignificant. Yet, the middleman role of the earlier Chinese immigrants in black neighborhoods, too, received scholarly attention. For example, Loewen (1971) emphasized the white–black status gap in explaining the concentration of Chinese immigrant families in the Mississippi Delta in the black oriented grocery business. Loewen argued that the social structure of the Delta, characterized by rigid segregation, a large racial status gap, and a sizable social distance between blacks and whites, was mainly responsible for the Chinese immigrants' concentration and success in black oriented grocery retailing.

Compared to a small number of Chinese immigrants running grocery stores in black neighborhoods in the pre 1965 era, an exceptionally large number of post 1965 Korean immigrants engage in grocery, liquor, produce, and other types of retail businesses in black neighborhoods in Los Angeles, New York, and other major cities. The similar structural forces relating to the white–black racial stratification system that contributed to the Jewish owned businesses in black neighborhoods in the earlier period have helped Korean immigrants establish these retail stores in black neighborhoods (Min 1996).

Blacks in inner city neighborhoods, even in contemporary America, have some resemblance to indigenous colonized minorities in the Philippines and South Africa. They still live in an “internal colony” controlled by an outside white society (Blauner 1972). Thus, the internal colonial model seems to be useful to understanding the middleman minority role of Korean immigrants in low income black neighborhoods in the United States. Like middleman minorities in other colonized societies, these Korean merchants have encountered boycotts, arson, and riots. However, unlike in colonized societies, in American society various immigrant groups have usually achieved intergenerational social mobility. Fluent in English, second generation Koreans have moved into the main stream economy (Min 2005). Thus, in the United States, a series of new immigrant groups plays the role of middleman minorities, without transmitting it over generations.

SEE ALSO: Assimilation; Boundaries (Racial/Ethnic); Colonialism (Neocolonialism); Division of Labor; Majorities; Scapegoating

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migration, ethnic conflicts, and racism

Karin Scherschel

Migration refers to a process of people shifting across borders. Recently, sociology has discussed migration as a core element of globalization. Some theorists, like Stephen Castles and Mark J. Miller (1993), have gone so far as to label the last decade of the twentieth century and the first decade of the twenty first as the "Age of Migration." A currently discussed topic has been classified as "new migration," which is founded on the following reasons: the number of countries and the amount of people that are nowadays involved in migratory processes is distinct from earlier movements. Contemporary migration flows have become globally significant because of the improvement of travel and communication facilities. This crucial effect of globalization has overcome further distances than before. Furthermore, one important aspect is diversity. Scholars distinguish between a wide range of migration types such as asylum seekers, refugees, undocumented migrants, and labor migrants (highly skilled, unskilled). Finally, since the 1990s the increasingly restrictive measures to control migratory process, particularly the flow of asylum seekers, has been qualified as a remarkable feature.

However, migration is an old phenomenon with people migrating from the beginning of humankind. Well known historical types of migration were caused by colonialism and capitalism. As the Industrial Revolution began, after the decline of feudalism, national awakening provoked a great labor migration. Theorists emphasize the important role of labor and forced migration (slavery) for the dynamics of colonialism, capitalist expansion, and the process of nation building. Contemporary migration and postcolonial ethnic conflicts are often seen as a result of former relationships between receiving and sending countries.

Migration study became a research area of sociology at the beginning of the twentieth century. The most influential work in this area was initiated by the Chicago School of Sociology. The important tendency in the first

period of migration study was to examine the process of assimilation and integration. Concepts such as generational, ecological, and economic cycle models, which focused upon different stages of assimilation, represented the broad body of scholarship during this time. One of the best known key concepts of this type of thinking was the "race relation cycle" developed by Robert Ezra Park (1950). According to Park, the process of assimilation has the following five stages: contact, competition, conflict, accommodation, and assimilation. All these concepts had an affinity to modernization theory because they were based on the assumption that assimilation is a gradual, progressive, and inevitable process. Racism against immigrants and ethnic inequality were treated as temporary periods and transitory tensions between groups in the process of incorporation into a modern society.

In contrast, ethnic groups and racist motivated actions did not disappear but rather became a prominent marker of multi ethnic societies over time. Considering the socioeconomic position of minorities, studies in this area have shown that these groups are systematically disadvantaged relative to the "life chances" of the majority group. A great amount of ethnic groups occupy structurally subordinate positions in some areas such as unemployment, housing, education, and health.

Later approaches became more sophisticated in two important ways. First, theorists took into consideration that race and ethnic relations must be seen as a reciprocal or dialectical process between social groups. Second, assimilation should be conceptualized as one possible result of others in dealing with interethnic relations. The consequence of this theoretical shift was that the assimilation approach relinquished its teleological bias.

The international migration process became an influential topic in sociology and subsequently led to a wide variety of works. One of the best known concepts of international migratory processes is the "laws of migration" developed by Ernest G. Ravenstein (1885, 1889). He was interested in examining empirical regularities of migration flows such as the relationship between distance and migration frequency. He also stressed the importance of migrants' economic patterns in migration process.

The international migratory process is based on interplay between various factors and it is impossible to identify one main movement pattern. The migratory process could be caused by economic, political, cultural, or environmental factors. Scholars differentiate between push and pull factors. Migration process on a micro level is seen as the result of decision processes made by individuals. Some theorists emphasize that individuals calculate risks, interests, and aims to maximize and improve their living conditions. Proponents of this assumption highlight that migrants act as rational choice decision makers. Other theorists focus upon subjective mind maps; they also take into consideration the important role that social networks such as kinship and family play for individual decisions (chain migration).

Migration flows on a macro level are often seen as a result of economic conditions and historical relationships between receiving and sending countries. Past and contemporary policies on immigration also play an important role in explaining migration flows. Recent debates stress the relationship between increasing transnational flows of capital, goods, information, and people. Migration should not be treated as an isolated phenomenon but rather should be seen as an interlaced relationship of the above factors. From an economic view, globalization has provoked a restructuring of capitalism which has led to a great demand for immigrant labor.

Of course, economic conditions play an important role in interpreting the conditions that initiate migratory process, but they are not capable of providing an explanation for the unfolding and the continuation of international migration across time and space.

Considering the above, the transnationalism approach offers a new scope of the perpetuation of the migratory process, thus providing a new framework for the study of international migration. Here the sociological focus is on social network building. A growing number of scholars identify the social networks of immigrants as a fundamental key in understanding contemporary migration. The reconsideration of the migratory process is based on the assumption that many migrants nowadays manage to live in two or more societies, their homeland and their host countries. Transnational migrants

create through exchange, reciprocity, and social support a common space or field of symbolic and collective representations beyond the nation state.

While the boundaries of nation states are more permeable than earlier times, we are simultaneously witnessing a resurgence of nationalist movements and politics of differentiation. As a topic of migration study, ethnic conflict became a prominent feature. Today, theorists observe minority groups and identity movements worldwide that struggle to have their culture, territories, and sometimes even sovereign states of their own. Such movements are, in most cases, accompanied by activities such as racist attacks, violence, expulsion, and extreme ethnic cleansing.

Ethnic conflict refers to a struggle between groups constructing themselves or constructed by others through some features such as traditions, a similar geographical origin, values, language, symbols, and artifacts. Ethnic conflict is a contested category and there is not a common scientific agreement of how the term should be defined. Ethnic conflict addresses migration and ethnicity studies in various ways.

Such conflicts are often seen as a push factor regarding the migratory process, especially for refugees who escape violence or persecution. After the collapse of the communist system, the proliferation of nationalism in successor states of the former East was treated as one fundamental factor for creating migration flows toward Western Europe. Theorists also label attacks on and violence against migrants in their host societies as ethnic conflicts.

Most of the work on ethnic conflicts deals with the meanings, origins, causes, extent, and persistence of ethnic conflicts. Some explanations stress economic conditions to approach ethnic conflicts. An early influential framework was the split labor market theory developed by Bonacich (1972), which focuses on conflicting resource interests of different ethnic groups. Working with two different ethnic groups at different wages for the same job, such a labor market will be created. Some theories argued that ethnic conflicts should be seen as a consequence of competition for scarce resources. Inequality among majority and subordinate groups is often seen as rooted in former relationships between the colonizer and the colonized.

Other theorists have emphasized the notion of mobilization, collective actions, and solidarity for articulating common group interest and achieving aims such as political, cultural, or material gains. In this respect, ethnic struggle should be conceptualized as an important resource and a powerful instrument to actualize group interests. Thus, ethnicity helps people to create a self understanding, thereby forming a distinct identity in relation to other groups, and furthermore helps them to define and struggle for their own place and identity in a globalized world.

Despite theoretical disagreements, most scholars consider the notion of ethnic conflicts to be treated as a complex phenomenon. A framework should take into consideration the interplay between economic, historical, and cultural dimensions. The majority of theories have overcome the modernistic view on ethnic conflicts as a transitory occurrence. The recent debate is influenced by anti essentialist thinking. In this respect, ethnic conflicts must be conceptualized as a relational concept including self identifications and social ascription. The analysis also should reflect how discourses such as academic, media, everyday, or political discourses emerge and heighten ethnic topics.

Ethnic conflicts mostly use images of blood, kinship, homeland, and common ancestry. In this respect, the concept of ethnic conflict is connected to the understanding of racism.

While racism on a micro level refers to a set of practices, beliefs, and attitudes of everyday cultures, the phenomenon is often treated on a macro level as an ideology, discourse, or marker of social stratification. Sociological interest in racism has developed over time into a broad body of studies, especially related to migration issues. Similar to ethnic conflicts, racism is a highly debated and also contested topic. There are a great number of accounts in which racist practices and ideologies have been conceptualized. Some theorists emphasize that the way scholars should theorize and define racism should take into consideration its empirical appearance in specific historical settings. Stuart Hall (1989: 917) suggested referring not to one single racism but to empirical racisms.

The word racism was first used in a book written by Magnus Hirschfeld (1938). The

term racism was applied to criticize and refute scientific racism during the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. In this respect, racism is related to the category of race. During this period, race was used as a category to classify human beings into unchanging, natural, and distinct groups. The historical scientific concept of race claimed a strict relationship between biological, moral, and intellectual characteristics of human groups. The use of the category race led to a hierarchical classification of human types that made it possible to distinguish them into "superior" and "inferior" racial groups. After World War II and the experience of German fascism, during the 1950s and 1960s UNESCO initiated four meetings where reputable theorists discussed the explanatory value of the category race. The result was the rejection of scientific racism. Since then, a growing number of theories of racism have dealt with race as a social construction.

The modern sociology of racism offers a broad range of topics regarding the persistence of racial categories, their influence on stratification, and institutional practices as well as the process of racialization, which describes how groups became naturalized. Sociologists also deal with the question of how the relationship and interplay between racism and related issues such as race, class, gender, ethnicity, and nation can be theorized.

Early Marxist approaches maintained that racism and ethnic identities could be explained by the dynamics of capitalism. Race was treated comparatively to class as a subordinated category, and furthermore as a transitory occurrence. The capitalist class used racism firstly as an ideological strategy to avoid class solidarity between working class blacks and whites. Distracting working class attention from the reality of class exploitation, racism leads secondly to a delusion of class consciousness. Critics of the above emphasize the reductionist tendency and its affinity to modernization theory because of its teleological imagination from a classless society.

Recent decades have witnessed new forms of racism and new extreme right primordialism. With the collapse of communism there emerged nationalist movements, which were accompanied by racist attacks and violence.

Some theorists highlight the role of migration policies and public debates that created “fears” about the likelihood of mass migration.

A more recent debate questions how contemporary racism differs from older concepts. Influential proponents like Barker (1981) and Balibar (1990) argue that the growing public debate about immigration in western countries and the foundation of such groups calling themselves, and being called, the new right have given rise to a new racism. The key issue of this racism is to claim the uniqueness of every culture and the necessity to preserve difference. From this position, thinkers of the new right derive the right of cultural difference and the argument that the presence of other cultures in their country will be threatening. Culture became a prominent marker and has justified unequal treatment of immigrants. The term has taken the place of biological arguments. According to Balibar and other proponents of the new racism or “cultural racism,” the term culture substitutes the older concept of race.

From a postmodern view, the relationship of racism to other modes of discourse, such as gender, nation, and class, should be centered on the question of the overlapping and multiplying of the above modes. Cultural theorists view the notion of race as a contingent and unstable cultural category. Representatives of this field also raise the question of how people construct their identities along various lines in an increasingly migratory and globalized world. An anti essentialist understanding of racism highlights that racist discourses are always woven together with other divisions such as class, gender, and ethnicity.

Migration, ethnic conflicts, and racism are multidimensional social phenomena. There is no simple model to explain their relationship in all its complexity. More research is needed to clarify their interplay on different levels such as everyday ideology production, modern institutions, nation state, and global change. While several studies deal with labor migrants, the living conditions of other groups, such as asylum seekers and undocumented migrants, are undertheorized. Further, future research should ask in which ways racism and ethnic conflicts emerge from global change. Racism and ethnic conflicts should not only be interpreted as a reaction to a deterritorialized and globalized

world; it is essential to see also how such phenomena will be fostered by opportunities such as worldwide communication and traveling created by the process of globalization.

SEE ALSO: Ethnic Cleansing; Ethnic Enclaves; Ethnic Groups; Ethnicity; Globalization; Hate Crimes; Migration: Internal; Migration: International; Nation State; Race; Race and Ethnic Politics; Race (Racism); Scientific Racism; Social Integration and Inclusion; Transnationalism; Violence

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migration: internal

Kyle Crowder and Matthew Hall

In general, internal migration refers to the movement of individuals or populations within a social system. More specifically, following the United Nations definition, internal migration is

a permanent change in residence from one geographical unit to another within a particular country. For example, internal migration may involve a change in residence from a rural area to a city, from one city to another, or from one region of a country to another. From the perspective of the destination or receiving area, an individual making such a move is an in migrant, while that same individual is an out migrant from the sending area. Because internal migration has profound individual level and collective repercussions, research on the topic remains a popular endeavor for economists, geographers, and demographers, despite the absence of ideal data or definitional consensus.

THE IMPORTANCE OF INTERNAL MIGRATION

The importance of migration derives primarily from its position as one of the central demographic processes that shape the size, distribution, and composition of populations. Changes in the size of a population can be thought of as a function of two forces, natural increase (the relative numbers of births and deaths) and net migration (the relative number of in migrants and out migrants). Whereas overall rates of mortality and fertility tend to change fairly slowly over time, the size of a population may increase or decrease substantially over a short period as a result of a sudden change in the number of in migrants or out migrants. Thus, internal migration tends to be the most volatile component of population change for geographical units within a country. Since internal migration represents a redistribution of the existing population of a country, internal migration flows simultaneously affect the size of the sending and receiving populations, affecting competition for food, housing, and other resources in both locations. Economists have long viewed internal migration as the primary mechanism through which the equilibrium between the distribution of economic opportunities and the distribution of labor across areas of a country is maintained.

Because migrants are rarely representative of the populations in either the sending or receiving areas, often differing from non migrants in terms of average age, education,

race or ethnicity, and other sociodemographic characteristics, patterns of migration have the potential to dramatically alter the composition of both sending and receiving areas. In fact, large numbers of in migrants to an area may be balanced by a similar number of out migrants leaving the area, producing a relatively low level of net migration, but a high level of total migration (in migration + out migration). While such a pattern may have little effect on the size of the population, it could, depending on the relative characteristics of in and out migrants, profoundly affect the composition of the population. Typically, high levels of internal migration affect both the size and the composition of a population, often with profound impacts for social and economic conditions in both sending and receiving areas.

The importance of migration extends well beyond the effects on sending and receiving populations; the effect on migrants themselves is at least as profound. Conceptually, a migration event not only involves a change in residence, but also represents a change in social environment and reorientation of the context of daily activities. In many cases, internal migration necessitates a search for new housing, competition for employment, and the loss of social contacts developed in the place of origin. The extent of these disruptions depends largely on the type of move undertaken and the relative social context of the place of origin and destination; a move from a city to a neighboring city may be less socially and economically disruptive than a move from a rural area to an urban center.

DEFINING AND MEASURING INTERNAL MIGRATION

Unlike fertility and mortality, migration has no biological basis and cannot be measured unequivocally. The definitional ambiguity of the term is reflected in two aspects of the UN guidelines. First, efforts to consistently define internal migration are complicated by the dubious permanence of many moves. The UN guidelines suggest that a permanent relocation is indicated by an absence from the place of origin that lasts for at least one year. Following this convention, internal migration is differentiated from daily commutes, vacations, and the

mobility of students and migrant workers who plan to return to their original place of residence within a few months. However, this temporal standard is somewhat arbitrary and has not been universally adopted, nor does it unambiguously distinguish migrants who have no intention to return to their place of origin from those making a longer but essentially impermanent sojourn to another city, state, or region for educational or employment purposes. Second, and perhaps more problematic, is the fact that the standard definition of internal migration does not specify the scale of geographical units or the distance across which a move must occur in order to be considered true internal migration. This lack of specificity creates the potential for tremendous variation in the operational definitions used in research on the topic.

Data on internal migration generally come from three sources, each of which is characterized by unique strengths and weaknesses. First, population registry systems, essentially continuous records of citizens' vital statistics, typically require individuals to register with the local administrative office upon moving to a new area of the country, creating a record of each internal migration event. Unfortunately, few countries maintain a population registry and many of those that do exist contain limited social and economic characteristics with which to assess the determinants or consequences of migration.

In lieu of data from population registries, migration researchers often rely on data from periodic population censuses. Based on these data, the magnitude of net migration (in migrants minus out migrants) can be assessed using an indirect method in which the estimated natural increase of the population (births minus deaths) is subtracted from the total population change in an area, leaving the component of change attributable to the net addition of migrants. While these estimates are simple and widely utilized, their reliability depends greatly on the quality of mortality and fertility data and they provide little information about the factors affecting migration or the influence of migration on the composition of the population. In most countries, census records document individuals' place of birth, place of current residence, and perhaps the place of residence at some intermediate point

of time. Comparing the place of residence at different points in time provides the basis for inferring internal migration events and for estimating population flows between specific origins and destinations. However, this basic method fails to capture migration events experienced by an individual between the two reference points and the potential for effective cross national comparisons is undermined by differences in the mobility intervals and levels of geography utilized in census items.

Surveys represent a final, somewhat rarer, source of data on internal migration behavior. In the US, surveys such as the Current Population Survey provide regular snapshots of annual migration behavior and afford the opportunity to assess the basic association between various types of migration and a variety of micro level characteristics. Even more powerful are panel studies that collect detailed information on the set of panel members at regular intervals across an extended period of time. These data make it possible to trace, prospectively, multiple occurrences of various types of migration behavior by individual panel members and offer the opportunity to rigorously test theoretical arguments about the determinants of migration. However, these surveys are of limited utility for assessing the overall magnitude of internal migration between areas or its impact on aggregate population change.

In combination with the definitional ambiguity of the phenomenon, the inadequacies associated with available data sources undermine the ability to make reliable cross national comparisons of the magnitude and dynamics of internal migration or to compare the results of research that may employ different operational definitions. Nevertheless, the combination of various sources has enabled the development of a rich and varied literature on the patterns, determinants, and consequences of internal migration.

EXPLAINING INTERNAL MIGRATION

Although a wide range of theoretical models has been employed in migration research, the push-pull theory remains the most widely used explanatory framework in the study of internal migration. While this model has been criticized for its lack of predictive power, it provides a

parsimonious framework for examining both aggregate flows of population between two locations and individual level variations in the propensity to migrate. In short, the model argues that migration events result from the combined influence of three types of factors. Push factors include undesirable characteristics in the place of origin that compel population members to consider leaving the area. Pull factors, in contrast, are those characteristics of a potential destination that attract migrants to the area. Following a rational choice framework, the likelihood of migration is high when the potential destination offers individuals more advantages than does the place of origin. However, responses to these relative push and pull factors are shaped by a third set of factors referred to as intervening obstacles. In essence, these intervening obstacles are conditions that increase the social or economic costs of migration and intervene between the desire to move and the actual act of migrating. Some intervening obstacles, such as a great physical distance or a high cost of transportation between the origin and potential destination, may increase the cost of migration for all potential migrants, thereby limiting the overall magnitude of population flow between two locations. Other intervening factors, such as the strength of social ties in the community of origin or destination, the availability of financial resources, health, and risk aversion, vary across individuals.

Economic opportunities available in the area of destination have long been treated as the primary push and pull factors in migration decisions and considerations such as relative employment levels in, and wage differentials between, the origin and destination areas continue to dominate explanations of many migration flows. However, the push-pull model also accommodates non economic factors as potential pushes and pulls, including the availability of housing and other resources, the relative political or sociodemographic conditions in the origin and destination, or the location of family and friends. For many individuals, internal migration accompanies major life transitions and represents a tool for attaining higher levels of education, a better job, or more attractive social surroundings.

Individual level variations in the response to various push and pull factors and the strength

of intervening obstacles help to produce migrant populations that are highly selective of certain characteristics. For example, internal migration (especially longer distance migration) is positively associated with education because, in comparison to those with less education, highly educated population members are often in the best position to take advantage of economic opportunities in the place of destination and tend to have access to both information about potential destinations and financial resources to carry out a move. The likelihood of migrating also varies by age, peaking in young adulthood when the long term, cumulative benefits of economic opportunities in another location are greatest and the obstacles associated with poor health, social obligations, and economic investment in the community of origin are least restrictive. A gender imbalance also characterizes many migration streams, and individuals who are married and/or have children are less likely to make a move because the cost of disrupting the social and economic ties maintained by family members often outweighs the pull of another geographical area. These selectivity factors depend on the type of internal migration considered and the amenities in the origin and destination that potential migrants must weigh, but all have important repercussions for the composition of both sending and receiving populations.

PATTERNS OF INTERNAL MIGRATION AND RECENT RESEARCH

Although data inconsistencies make cross national comparisons difficult, there is fairly strong evidence that the magnitude of internal migration varies across countries and regions of the world. Rates of migration are thought to increase with economic development, but the percentage of the population relocating each year varies even among highly industrialized countries; populations in Japan and European countries exhibit internal migration rates that are only one half to two thirds as high as those in the US, Canada, New Zealand, and Australia. Perhaps even more pronounced are international variations in the types of moves that affect various populations. While moves between rural areas, from urban areas to rural areas, and within

urban areas are common in many countries, internal migration patterns in developing nations are generally dominated by high rates of migration from rural to urban areas. As a result of this migration, combined with rapid population growth, the number of people living in urban areas has increased sixfold in Asia, Latin America, and the Caribbean, and by over nine times in Africa in the second half of the twentieth century. Thus, despite the countervailing force of rapid natural increase in rural areas, the percentage of the population residing in urban areas is expected to surpass the 50 percent mark in virtually every region of the world by 2025. Reflecting the importance of this urban transition, much of the research on internal migration in developing countries has focused on cross national variations in the pace of rural to urban migration, the uneven pattern of urban development, and the consequences of rapid urbanization for future economic development, the provision of city services, and environmental conditions in developing nations.

Consistent with Wilbur Zelinsky's (1971) migration transition thesis, patterns of internal migration tend to be somewhat more diverse in economically developed parts of the world where levels of urbanization are already high. In the United States, for example, researchers have focused on a wide range of major internal migration processes, including both historical and contemporary shifts in patterns of interregional migration, ongoing metropolitan decentralization, and migration between demographically and economically differentiated neighborhoods. Research on migration between states and regions within the US documented the westward expansion of the population during the early decades of the country's history, the concentration of population in the urban centers of the Midwest and Northeast as migrants from surrounding rural areas and other regions of the country were attracted to the economic opportunities available during industrialization, and then the reversal of these migration flows after World War II, with the original industrial core of the Northeast and Midwest losing both economic prominence and migrants to southern and western states. In addition to tracking these basic migration patterns and documenting their efficiency in redistributing the population, social scientists have investigated the causes of

these population shifts, giving rise to debates about the relative effects of aggregate adjustments to changing ecological conditions and the political and economic manipulation by corporate interests to spur competition between regions and cities for increasingly mobile capital. Common to most theoretical arguments is the acknowledgment that patterns of internal migration continue to respond to the distribution of economic opportunities. However, in the context of a post industrial, electronic economy, many researchers have also argued that non economic conditions are increasingly important in determining migration patterns. According to these arguments, the push and pull factors that shape patterns of internal migration in the US have become increasingly complex in recent decades, producing migration flows to various regions and states that differ sharply in terms of their sociodemographic composition.

Recent patterns of internal migration within regions of the US have been characterized by cycles of decentralization. As in most nations, American cities represented the central nodes of economic activity during the initial stages of industrialization and experienced explosive growth as a result of in migration. In the US, however, the process of population decentralization away from the urban core began almost immediately after the birth of US cities. After World War II, a combination of consumer preferences, demographic forces, and federal policy accelerated the pace of migration from central cities into suburban counties of metropolitan areas and set into motion a process of decentralization that continues today with the perpetual expansion of low density suburban fringes, the extension of metropolitan areas into surrounding counties, and residential development of non metropolitan counties. While suburban growth is largely the product of internal migration flows that cover fairly short distances – from central cities to suburban counties of metropolitan areas – the purported impacts have been dramatic, including economic disinvestment and the concentration of poverty in central cities, the entrenchment of residential segregation by race, metropolitan political fragmentation, the erosion of civic engagement, the loss of land available for agriculture, and environmental degradation.

Given continual shifts in the patterns of internal migration in both developing and more developed parts of the world, and the importance of these processes for social, political, and demographic conditions, mobility between geographical areas within countries will continue to garner a good deal of research interest. Ideally, data from censuses and surveys will be supplemented by new sources that provide the basis for more effective cross national comparisons of migration behaviors, the direct assessment of multifaceted motivations for migration, and the opportunity to explore how the composition of social networks, social structural conditions, and other factors alter internal migration behaviors.

SEE ALSO: Demographic Data: Censuses, Registers, Surveys; Environment and Urbanization; Metropolis; Migration: International; Migration and the Labor Force; Residential Segregation; Suburbs; Sunbelt; Uneven Development; Urban–Rural Population Movements

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migration: international

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International migration is generally defined as the change of a person’s usual place of residence from one country to another. The United Nations recommends that a time element of at least one year be added to this definition in order to differentiate international migrants from international visitors. Because international migration is a dyadic process, this definition applies both to moves into and out of a given country and the process can be examined from the standpoint of the sending or receiving country. Arrivals and departures of citizens and foreigners are part of the international migration process, which has four components: (1) the in migration of persons to a country other than that of their place of birth or citizenship; (2) the return migration of nationals to their home country after residing abroad; (3) the out migration of nationals from their home country; and (4) the out migration of foreigners from the foreign country to which they migrated. The first component, commonly referred to as immigration, has received the most research and policy attention.

MIGRATION AND THE NATION STATE

International migration is an appendage of the nation state era. Throughout history, people have migrated or left their communities and homelands and established residence elsewhere. Only after the world’s territory became organized into states with internationally recognized boundaries did the distinction between internal and international migrants emerge.

The movement to divide the entire globe into states with territorially defined borders accelerated in Western Europe during the Middle Ages and spread rapidly to other world regions in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries as former European colonies in North and South America, Asia, and Africa declared their independence. By the beginning of the twenty first century, all of the globe's territory was part of some nation state but boundary disputes between states and civil conflicts between ethnic groups within states continue to reshape the global state system and, in turn, the global migration system.

State boundary changes lead to changes in the volume and pool of persons who get classified as international migrants in today's world. After the USSR disintegrated in 1991, emigration from the former Soviet Union was transformed into emigration from 13 new sovereign countries, and in migrations from neighboring republics became either return migration of nationals from other Soviet Republics or in migrations of foreigners. In the Soviet case, migrations that used to be considered internal to the USSR became international migrations after state partition. The splitting up of the former Yugoslavia into Bosnia Herzegovina, Croatia, Macedonia, Slovenia, and Serbia and Montenegro in the 1990s led to similar changes in the designation of international and internal migrants by those states. The partitioning of the Indian subcontinent into Pakistan and India in 1947, the subsequent partition of Pakistan into Pakistan and Bangladesh in 1971, and Eritrea's declaration of independence from Ethiopia in 1993 are other cases where states subdivided, leading to changes in who was classified and counted as an international migrant.

Cooperation as well as conflict between states can lead to changes in state definitions of who is an international versus an internal migrant and thus to changes in the volume of migration between states. In the second half of the twentieth century, many states in different world regions entered into reciprocal economic and political treaties that have clauses that specify conditions under which their citizens and commercial goods can move across neighboring borders. Many of those treaties also specify the conditions under which nationals of the signatory countries can move to one of the other

signatories for work or residency purposes. Typically, these regional treaties place no restrictions on the migration of business people and highly skilled professionals but do restrict the migration of unskilled workers in order to protect native workers from low wage competition.

An example of such a treaty is the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) signed by Canada, Mexico, and the United States in 1994. NAFTA permits business people and highly skilled professionals who are citizens of any one of the three signatories to migrate to one of the other countries to engage in professional or business activities. While migrations within the NAFTA region are still considered international migrations by the sending and receiving countries, by easing travel and residency conditions, the overall volume of migrants increased sharply after NAFTA was signed. For instance, 2000 US Census data show that immigration in the 1990s from Canada and Mexico increased by 98 percent and 84 percent, respectively, over levels from those two countries in the 1980s. In comparison, recent immigration from all other countries to the United States in the 1990s increased by only 19 percent.

Europe is another region where cooperation between states in recent decades led to changes in the international migration system. In 1985, five countries (Belgium, France, Germany, Luxembourg, and the Netherlands) signed the Schengen Agreement in which they set the goal of removing border controls for people and commerce between their countries. By 2001, those five countries and nine other Western European countries had implemented the Schengen Agreement. Eastern European countries admitted to the European Union (EU) in the early 2000s will be allowed to implement the open border system in the near future. Among countries where Schengen is already operative, nationals of participating states are no longer subjected to internal border controls. Although intra European migrations can still be considered international migration, several EU countries no longer compile migration statistics on these flows because they consider them to be internal migrations. Increasingly, migration management in the EU focuses on monitoring entries and exits of foreigners from non EU countries. As a result, flows within the

region are in reality no longer international migrations.

In 2000, the United Nations estimated that there were 175 million persons worldwide currently living outside their country of birth, 14 percent more than did so in 1990. While this is a crude estimate of the total number of international migrants in the world, other evidence indicates that international migration is on the increase. The *Cambridge Survey of World Migration* (1995) documents the growth in international migrations that has occurred since 1945 in North America, Western Europe, Asia and Oceania, the Middle East, Latin America, and Africa. In contrast to previous historical eras when international migrations consisted of relatively small flows of settlers moving from Europe to overseas colonies or to former European colonies following their independence, today's flows are much larger and involve persons of all nations and creeds migrating along pathways that crisscross the globe. At the beginning of the twenty first century, virtually every country in the world was a sender or receiver of international migrants. While the United Nations estimated that only 3 percent of the world's people were international migrants in 2000, the trend was upward and believed likely to continue increasing in the decades ahead. In 1970, for instance, only 2 percent of the world's people were international migrants.

TYPES OF INTERNATIONAL MIGRANTS

While some of today's migrants are moving for the same reasons that propelled migration in earlier epochs, new types of migrants have emerged in recent decades or what may be called the globalization era. Today most international migrants can be classified as refugees, labor migrants, institutional migrants, family reunification migrants, and lifestyle migrants. Refugee migrations have existed for centuries and are propelled when persons are forced to flee their homeland in fear of their lives. Given their forced and involuntary character, these population movements are generally measured and managed differently than other international migrations. Most of the world's refugees are located in Asia and Africa but some are

admitted for resettlement in North America and Europe. In addition, growing numbers of foreigners from Africa, Asia, Eastern Europe, and Latin America come to Western European countries annually seeking asylum.

Labor migrations are driven by economic inequalities between countries as workers seek to improve their incomes and economic security by moving to countries where economic conditions are better than in their homelands. Workers participating in labor migrations are generally of low skill and typically moving from a poorer country to a richer neighboring country. While some labor migrations historically and today were started by labor recruitment and demand for labor in receiving countries, increasingly today those flows are driven by an oversupply of workers in sending countries and migrant networks that link sending and receiving countries. Large numbers of labor migrants do not have residence and work authorization from receiving countries, which raises concerns regarding whether the rights of these migrants are being adequately protected.

Institutional migrations include highly skilled migrants who are hired or transferred by corporations, governments, and other entities to another country for work purposes. In contrast to labor migrations, which are propelled mainly by migrants themselves and their households but often facilitated by labor recruiters, smugglers, and other intermediaries, institutional migrations are sponsored and organized by formal institutions that operate transnationally in the globalization era. Institutional migrations include a number of migrant flows that have increased during the globalization era. While these flows occur mainly from southern to northern countries, a significant volume of institutional migrations occurs from northern to southern countries as well as among countries in the North or South that have comparable economic levels. Included in this category would be: employees transferred by multinational corporations from one country to another; government officials; employees of international and regional institutions; foreigners who move to another country for graduate study; aid workers moving from northern to southern countries to work with bilateral and multilateral assistance agencies or non governmental organizations; religious workers proselytizing for their faith;

and a wide array of other foreigners who move to other countries for a few years to carry forward the work of the institution that sponsors them. Most receiving countries welcome institutional migrants and place few restrictions on their entry.

Whereas political factors are the underlying cause of refugee migrations and economic factors drive labor and most institutional migrations, social factors stimulate family reunification and lifestyle migrations. Foreigners who move to another country for refuge or work want their family members to join them. While most receiving countries in North America and Europe allow some family reunification, they also have established rules that limit which immigrants can bring their family members. For instance, countries differ in whom they consider an immediate family member and in the conditions that have to be met by immigrants before their family members can rejoin them. Family reunification also includes international migrations that result from the marriage of nationals of two different countries. Typically, one partner moves to the other partner's homeland. While statistics on international intermarriage are scarce, census data on spousal origins indicate that such marriages are increasing.

Of the five migrant types, lifestyle migrants are the smallest category and occur when people move to another country because they prefer its climate, cost of living, investment system, cultural milieu, or other factors. This category includes retirees who move to another country seasonally or permanently, migrants returning to their homelands after living abroad for decades, and wealthy investors who move to countries that are tax havens or that offer amenities not available in their homeland. Lifestyle migrations are enabled by the increased volume of international mobility in the globalization era, the lack of restrictions on the international mobility of people of means, and the general recognition by countries that relatively rich individuals such as retirees and investors bring capital that can stimulate their economies.

In order to keep international migration inflows at acceptable levels to their populaces, since the early 1900s governments of receiving countries have increasingly taken steps to control the volume of immigration and types of

migrants. However, the management of immigration is complicated in the globalization era because of increasing flows of capital, raw materials, goods, and information among countries. In general, countries view short term travel for business and tourism as in their national interest and adopt policy measures that encourage or accommodate institutional migrants, lifestyle migrants, and foreigners migrating for family reunification. Some countries also reset the modest numbers of refugees. While some countries allow large numbers of labor migrants to enter and work, as demand for admission by labor migrants has risen, debates have started in many receiving countries about the costs and benefits of labor migration and the numbers and means under which labor migrants should be admitted. Receiving countries face a dilemma, namely, how to control unauthorized labor migration while maintaining ready access for other types of migrants. Concerns over national security and unauthorized labor migration have led governments to increase vigilance over their borders in recent decades.

Countries use different policy modes to regulate the immigration of foreigners. A handful of countries – Australia, Canada, New Zealand, and the United States – grant foreigners the right to permanent immigration prior to entry. All other countries, and increasingly the permanent immigration countries too, issue for foreigners temporary residence and work visas that permit them to reside and work for a fixed time period in order to carry out an activity considered to be in the receiving country's political, economic, or social interests. While the length of the residence period granted by countries to foreigners admitted on temporary visas varies, countries generally are willing to renew these temporary visas and some do so multiple times or indefinitely. Thus temporary migration becomes permanent settlement as social and economic networks between nationals and foreigners expand, leading to the growth of a group of persons who might be called "transnationalists." These transnationalists tend to be frequent international travelers, carry two passports and maintain dual citizenship, spend parts of the year in both of their homelands, and are comfortable living in multinational settings.

THEORIES OF INTERNATIONAL MIGRATION

Why international migrations occur is a question asked by scholars of migration. Several partial theories have been advanced by social scientists to explain international migration but there is no general theory of international migration. Theories that have been offered to explain international migration tend to stem from disciplinary paradigms. Political scientists focus on the role of the state and the importance of state policies in channeling and limiting immigration while economists direct their attention to economic differentials between countries, particularly wage gaps and supply and demand for labor in sending and receiving countries, and look at how migration and development interact. Sociologists continue to be influenced by the Chicago School of Sociology which developed theories of immigrant incorporation and assimilation based on the experiences of European immigrants to US urban areas in the early 1900s. While immigrant assimilation remains a central study issue for sociologists, a number of sociologists have started to examine the origins of contemporary international migration and the global forces driving it.

Under the auspices of the International Union for the Scientific Study of Population (IUSSP), Douglas Massey and colleagues (1993a, b) undertook an evaluation of migration flows into North America, Western Europe, the Gulf States, the Asia Pacific region, and South America and concluded that those flows have their origins in the social, economic, and political transformations now occurring in sending and receiving countries. The IUSSP group also advanced the argument that international migrations are not driven by a lack of development, as is commonly argued, but by development itself (Taylor & Massey 2004) and are likely to grow in the years ahead. In other research, Massey (1990) offered the theory of cumulative causation to explain why international migrations continue after the precipitating economic or political factors that initiated the migration flow changes. According to cumulative causation theory, "new conditions that arise in the course of migration come to function as independent causes themselves:

migrant networks spread, institutions supporting transnational movement develop, and the social meaning of work changes in receiving societies" (Massey et al. 1993a).

New theories of international migration have been advanced by social scientists because earlier theories were considered inadequate to account for the changing direction, volume, and types of migration that have emerged during the globalization era of international migration. The earlier theories, including Lee's (1966) push-pull, Stouffer's (1940) intervening opportunities, and Zelinsky's (1971) mobility transition, were judged as too static to explain the directions of contemporary international migration or why some people migrate while most do not. Neoliberal theories advanced by economists that posited that individuals will migrate to destinations where they expect to receive the greatest net benefit were also criticized by sociologists for assuming both that labor market differentials alone determine international migration and that potential migrants can calculate those risks.

Criticisms have also been directed at the new theories. For instance, the theories advanced by the IUSSP group focus on explaining why labor migrations occur but ignore other types of migration. Alejandro Portes (1999) argues that the dimensions that are part of contemporary international migration are too disparate to be explained by a single theory. Portes (1999: 28) argues further that rather than focusing on a "grand theory" of international migration, scholars should direct their attention to four separate processes, including: the origins of immigration, the directionality and continuity of migrant flows, the utilization of immigration labor in receiving countries, and the integration and assimilation of immigrants in receiving countries.

Some scholars have begun the process of advancing theories on parts of the international migration process. Zolberg et al. (1989) elaborated a theory of refugee migrations that held that those flows have been transformed in recent decades by globalization forces that affect the scale of civil and political conflict within and between nations. Others situate the new international migrations in the changing transnational networks and systems of countries

that forge ties between particular sets of countries that stem from the sharing of historical relations or geographical location in a common region (Kritz et al. 1992). France, for instance, has received large influxes of migrants from North Africa and its former Francophone colonies in Sub Saharan Africa in the globalization era. Similarly, the United Kingdom has received most of its migrants from former British overseas colonies. Spain has received many migrants from Spanish speaking countries in the Americas.

METHODOLOGICAL ISSUES

Despite the growing importance of international migration for population growth in more developed countries and for economic and social structures and change in both sending and receiving countries, the statistics needed to monitor changes in migration volume and directions are poor. Available statistics tend to be gathered by receiving countries and determined by policy approaches toward immigration. Because policy approaches vary across countries, there is "lack of comparability between the statistics produced by different countries or even between those produced by different sources within a single country" (United Nations 1998). While scholars of international migration have lamented the lack of adequate data to study international migration, and the United Nations has issued recommendations to countries on the form that international migration statistics should take, the situation has not improved. As a result, compared to study and knowledge of other demographic processes, scholars know relatively little about the magnitude of international migration, or its determinants and consequences.

SEE ALSO: Chicago School; Citizenship; Consumption, Tourism and; Family Migration; Immigrant Families; Immigration; Immigration and Language; Immigration Policy; Migration, Ethnic Conflicts, and Racism; Migration: Internal; Migration and the Labor Force; Migration: Undocumented/Illegal; Networks; Refugee Movements; Transnational Movements

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migration and the labor force

Harriet Orcutt Duleep and Regan Main

The labor force includes those who work and those who are unemployed but wish to work. It is typically defined for a nation as a whole, or for a demographic or geographic subgroup within a nation. Migration is the movement of people across borders. If the borders are within a country, the migration is called internal or domestic migration, or simply migration. If the borders divide countries, it is international migration, with "immigration" denoting people entering a country and "emigration" denoting their exit. Social scientists' interest in internal versus international migration has waxed and waned with the ebbs and flows of immigration. When US immigration was severely restricted in the 1920s, the study of immigration lost its luster; after the restrictions were lifted in the 1960s, it reemerged as a hot topic.

Two focal points unite research on domestic or international migration and the labor force: how do migrants fare in the new labor market and what effect does migration have on "natives" of the host labor market? Similar methodological hurdles also shape research on the labor force and (internal or international) migration. These include how to discern migrant earnings and employment trajectories from cross sectional and cohort data, whether to use the individual, the family, or the group as the unit of analysis, and how to disentangle migration effects on a host region's labor market from the effect of the host region's labor market on migration.

MIGRANTS' LABOR FORCE OUTCOMES IN THE HOST REGION

The dominant model in the study of immigration and the labor market was an assimilation

model spawned in the 1920s University of Chicago sociology department and associated with the works of Robert E. Park. This model portrayed immigrants' trajectories in the host country as a single process relevant to all immigrants that eventually led to their cultural and economic assimilation.

Echoing Park's assimilation thesis, but focusing on labor market outcomes, Chiswick theorized that migrants often lack specific skills that would permit their home country human capital to be fully valued in the host country labor market. Assimilation in this context is acquiring host country specific skills that restore the market value of the immigrant's homeland human capital. For the US labor market, an obvious example is English fluency. Empirical research, based on cross sectional data, suggested that following an initial period of adjustment, immigrant earnings grew and generally approached the earnings of natives with similar years of schooling and experience after about 15 years in the US. Analogous findings surfaced in other immigrant host countries. A review of British immigration research, for instance, concluded that labor market conditions improve for immigrants the longer they live in the host country (Hatton & Price 1999).

This optimistic picture was shattered in a series of articles by Borjas. He showed that recent immigrants started at much lower earnings than their predecessors, a decline caused by changes in the country of origin composition of US immigration. A decline in immigrant entry earnings also occurred in other immigrant host countries (see, for instance, Winkelmann's 1999 study of New Zealand immigration). Tracing the earnings of earlier immigrant cohorts across censuses revealed only modest earnings growth, substantially lower than the cross sectional prediction. Borjas showed that where immigrant initial earnings are falling over time, as in the US and other economically developed countries, pairing the initial earnings of more recent immigrants with the earnings achieved by earlier cohorts after 10-15 years in the host country overstates the earnings growth of the earlier immigrants: his research invalidates the cross sectional approach. It does not follow, however, that the earnings growth of earlier cohorts is a good predictor of the earnings growth of more recent cohorts.

A third stream of papers by Duleep and Regets highlighted two overlooked aspects of immigrant skill transferability. (1) Immigrants whose home country skills transfer poorly to the new labor market will, by virtue of their lower wages, have a lower opportunity cost of human capital investment than natives or immigrants with high skill transferability. (2) Home country skills that are not fully valued in the host country labor market are still useful for learning new skills. Combined, these factors imply that low skill transferability immigrants will invest more in human capital and will do so over a longer period than high skill transferability immigrants or natives with similar levels of education and experience. A crucial prediction from the immigrant human capital investment (IHCI) model is that the higher incentive to invest in human capital pertains not only to human capital that restores the value of specific source country human capital, but also to new human capital investment in general. Empirical observations bolster this perspective. For instance, a Canadian study by Green (1999) finds higher rates of occupational change, and at older ages, for immigrants than for natives.

Because immigrants will invest more in human capital than natives, and low skill transferability immigrants will invest more than high skill transferability immigrants (holding initial human capital levels constant), immigrants will experience higher earnings growth than natives, and among immigrants there will be an inverse relationship between entry earnings and earnings growth. These expectations emerge in empirical analyses that follow cohorts and individuals: across groups, the lower the entry earnings, the higher the earnings growth; over time, as entry earnings have fallen, earnings growth has increased. Studies that use longitudinal data on individuals show high earnings or occupational mobility of recent immigrants, in the US (Duleep & Dowhan 2002), in Australia (Chiswick et al. 2002), and in Denmark (Husted et al. 2000). Further confirmation of the IHCI model comes from the earnings convergence that occurs among immigrant groups characterized by low and high skill transferability, as for instance immigrants who enter the US via family admissions versus employer based requests for specific employment skills. Immigrant entry earnings are thus poor predictors

of immigrant economic success. Methodologically, the inverse relationship invalidates the popular approach of controlling for cohort effects by including a zero one variable for each cohort in analyses that pool more than one cross section to measure immigrant earnings growth.

EARNINGS AND EMPLOYMENT WITHIN A CONTEXT

While much sociological research has followed in the footsteps of the Chicago School assimilation model and emphasizes the importance of human capital in determining labor market outcomes, sociologists also explore how predictors of immigrant economic assimilation and success are affected by a variety of contexts not necessarily captured by individual traits. Sociological studies highlight heterogeneity across immigrant groups in assimilation, unique social capital and networking patterns of various immigrant groups, geographic dispersion and concentration patterns, the importance of local labor market structures, and differences in the treatment of specific immigrant groups based on societal perception and government policy.

The structure of the host country's labor market is of course a key context that affects immigrant earnings and earnings growth. One conceptualization of the labor market stems from human capital theory. Another postulates that two types of demand determine the characteristics of jobs. Jobs in the primary sector (responding to the stable component of demand) are "good jobs" with security, responsibility, and career lines; jobs in the secondary sector (responding to highly variable demand) are dead end jobs. A third sector is the "enclave economy," which may help immigrants lacking access to primary sector jobs escape the confines of the secondary sector.

Case studies of the enclave economy document an immigrant sector in various industries characterized by mutually beneficial arrangements between recent and longer term immigrants in which recent immigrants working as unskilled laborers at low wages (or even no wages) in immigrant run businesses are provided training and other forms of support eventually leading to more skilled positions or self employment. Close knit communities, nurtured by kinship

ties, ease the economic assimilation of new immigrants providing both economic and social support, facilitating investment in human capital, and promoting immigrant entrepreneurial activities. Indeed, from a survey of various immigrant groups, an Australian Bureau of Immigration Research report by Morrissey et al. (1991) concluded that family and informal networks provide the most important and frequently utilized services for immigrants.

LABOR MARKET OUTCOMES FOR IMMIGRANT WOMEN

Paralleling the earnings and employment findings for men, several studies have found the decision of immigrant women to work and their earnings to be positively associated with years since migration, perhaps reflecting the learning of skills relevant to the host country's labor market. Yet, the labor force behavior of immigrant women differs from that of immigrant men and there are distinct differences in women's labor force behavior among immigrant groups. Monica Boyd's research reveals considerable stratification among groups of Canadian immigrant women in the extent to which they have lower occupational statuses than natives.

Underlying the differences in labor force behavior between immigrant men and women may be the same factors that contribute to differences in labor force behavior between native men and women. Analyses of immigrant women find that, like native women, their labor force participation is affected by children and by personal characteristics that affect labor market productivity such as level of schooling. Yet controlling for variables traditionally included in female labor force models, and controlling for variables that measure skill transferability such as host country language proficiency and years since immigration typically included in immigrant men models, large differences exist across immigrant groups in female labor force behavior. To understand these persistent differences, researchers are pursuing a family perspective. There has also been a growing consensus that men's labor market outcomes, typically the focus of earlier economic studies, cannot be fully understood without also considering the activities of their wives.

The family investment model, developed by Canadian, Australian, and US researchers, posits that family members can increase the future labor income of the family either directly by pursuing activities that increase their own skill levels, or indirectly by engaging in activities that finance or support the human capital investment activities of other family members. The expected return to a husband's or wife's investment in US specific human capital affects the spouse's decision about whether to work, how much to work, the timing of work decisions, and the kind of work that is pursued. Immigrant families may also temporarily postpone fertility to facilitate an initial period of heavy human capital investment.

Finally, a nascent body of research focuses on the role that immigrant women play within the household concerning decisions about work and how work affects the relationship between wives and husbands. This research finds that households become less patriarchal and more egalitarian as women gain access to social and economic resources previously beyond their reach.

EARNINGS AND EMPLOYMENT: INTERNAL MIGRATION

Several similarities unite international and domestic migration analyses of earnings and employment. In both arenas, the role of social networks is prominent. In both, a key variable is age. The younger migrants are, the longer the payoff time from migration. Opportunity costs also increase with age; as one works in a particular locality and firm, it becomes increasingly difficult to transfer the accumulated work experience.

Also common to studies of the labor force and internal or international migration is the problem that not all those who migrate stay in their new destination. Who leaves will affect the measurement of migrant earnings and employment profiles and underscores the importance of following the same individuals over time.

Another oft noted phenomenon in both internal and international migration is that once a group of persons begins to migrate to a particular area, the process persists. A shared unanswered question is: why does migration start when it does? What scholars sometimes suggest

as the pivotal factors often were in place years before the migration began. A case in point is the US black migration out of the South. Given that the higher incomes of the North from industrialization predate 1940, why did the pace of the black Southern exodus quicken so much after 1940? Perhaps a certain threshold must be passed in terms of the characteristics of the group in the original location and the fortitude of the network in the new location before a sizable group of potential migrants is ready to migrate. In both internal and international migration, it is not the poorest poor who migrate.

LABOR MARKET REPERCUSSIONS OF MIGRATION ON THE HOST REGION'S NATIVES

The second focal point in studies of migration and the labor force is how migration affects the labor force of the host region or country. Social scientists are far from resolving whether immigrants hurt, help, or have no significant effect on native born employment and wages. Angrist and Kugler (2002) find a negative immigration effect on employment in countries with restrictive institutions. Hartog and Zorlu (2002) find very small immigration effects on natives' wages in their analysis of the Netherlands, Britain, and Norway. Using aggregate time series data for Australia, Pope and Withers (1994) find increases in immigrant labor positively affect natives' wages. Hercowitz and Yashiv (2002) estimate negative employment effects in a study of immigration from the former Soviet Union to Israel, while an Italian study (Venturini & Villosio 2002) finds no negative effect on natives' employment.

Several interrelated problems contribute to this diversity of results. These include difficulties with measuring immigration, disentangling immigration's effect on natives from the effect of economic conditions on immigration, the clustering of immigrants within a country, the migration of natives in response to immigration, reconciling statistical evidence with anecdotal evidence and theoretical expectations, and failure to consider how industries may change their production practices or develop in response to immigration.

Immigrants may move to areas with better than average wages and employment opportunities, thereby obfuscating any potential adverse immigration effect on the economic status of the native born in cross area analyses. Even if immigrants do not locate in response to the economic conditions of areas, their presence may still correlate with economic conditions. Natives' wages in areas of high immigration may be lower than they would have been in the absence of immigration, even though the across area snapshot reveals a positive association between percent immigrant and native born wages and employment. This problem also afflicts time series; historical analyses have consistently shown an inverse relationship between immigration and the host country's unemployment rate. Natural experiments may help elucidate migrants' impacts on natives (see, for instance, Hunt 1992).

Another problem that may contribute to the variety of estimated effects is that immigrants tend to cluster in a few places. In the US, immigrants are concentrated in six states. Within those states, they are concentrated in the largest cities or SMSAs. One time cross state estimates of the effect of immigration on native born employment and wages (or the effect of changes in immigration) may be sensitive to economic circumstances (or changes in economic circumstances) in any of the principal immigration states. The problem of isolating the effect of immigration on native born economic status from the effect of perturbations in these states' economies can only be overcome by using time series information in combination with cross sectional information.

In gauging the effect of immigration on natives' economic outcomes, domestic and international migration research intertwine. Several scholars argue that analysts find little or no immigration effect on native born wages and employment in cross area comparisons because natives move in response to immigrant inflows: immigrants reduce the wages and employment opportunities of the native born and, in response, natives leave. No wage or employment effect is observed in analyses comparing areas of high and low immigration since the native born labor supply in high immigration areas has decreased with the out migration of natives from these areas. This migration

response obscures the measurement of potentially adverse immigration effects on natives' wages and employment.

A connection between native migration flows and immigration has been noted in historical periods such as the relationship between the South–North migration of blacks and the imposition and relaxation of immigration controls (Muller & Espenshade 1985). More recently, scholars have found that low educated natives move out and high educated natives move in to areas with large increases in immigrants. The differential response provides circumstantial evidence that immigrants, in particular recently arrived immigrants, are substitutes for low educated natives and complements for high educated natives. According to this interpretation, the migration response of natives is evidence of a negative wage and employment effect of immigrants on low educated natives and a positive wage and employment effect on high educated natives. There are, however, alternative explanations for this particular migration pattern and causality is difficult to determine.

Anecdotal and theoretical considerations suggest that an influx of unskilled immigrant labor will adversely affect unskilled native labor. One problem with reconciling anecdotal evidence of native job displacement with statistical estimates of no negative wage or employment effects stems from a tendency of researchers to conclude that an estimated negative relationship between percent immigrant and native born wages and employment in cross area analyses means that immigrants and natives are substitutes, and a positive relationship indicates that they are complements. In fact, there is no direct evidence in these studies on the nature of the relationship in production between immigrants and natives. A positive or negative estimated wage or employment effect of immigration only suggests that to the extent this relationship is causal there is on balance a positive or negative immigration effect on native born employment and wages. This is not inconsistent with the existence of specific cases of displacement and immigration induced wage declines. Furthermore, turnovers from native labor to immigrant labor do not necessarily constitute evidence that displacement has taken place. Where jobs traditionally filled by natives become dominated by

immigrants, case study evidence could elucidate how this occurred and what happened to the native workers who were formerly employed in these jobs.

The theoretical expectation that an increase in unskilled immigrant labor must necessarily harm the employment and wages of native unskilled labor comes from a tendency to think only in terms of two types of labor – skilled and unskilled. Yet immigrants and natives are differentiated by the nature of their work and the process by which they become employed, trained, and promoted even within specific unskilled occupations within specific industries. These distinctions need to be brought into discussions of the economic impacts of immigrants.

Beyond the relationship between native and immigrant labor in the production process, the economic effect immigration has on native labor will depend on how immigrants affect the demand for products produced by natives. Immigrant consumption patterns have only rarely been studied. Beyond the simple fact that immigrants themselves spend money and buy native produced products, natives' incomes will be affected by the extent to which the products produced by immigrant and native labor are substitutes or complements. If the presence of immigrants makes one product cheaper, the demand for complementary products will increase. There is also interplay between immigrant/native relationships in production and consumption effects: the availability of immigrants to tend children and clean homes allows middle class women to work and spend money on goods and services that may be produced by low educated natives. These types of relationships involving consumption and others have yet to be theoretically developed or empirically analyzed, even though they could affect whether and how immigrant inflows affect the wages and employment of native labor. Finally, businesses may develop or persist in response to the availability of certain types of labor that immigrant groups provide. Industries may change their production practices in response to immigration. This too is an area that merits further exploration.

SEE ALSO: Family Migration; Feminization of Labor Migration; Immigration; Immigration Policy; Labor/Labor Power; Labor Markets;

Migration: Internal; Migration: International;
Migration: Undocumented/Illegal

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migration: undocumented/illegal

Joanna Hadjicostandi

Illegal migration involves people moving away from a country of origin to another country in which they reside in violation of local citizenship laws. Entry into the receiving country can be legal (student, temporary work, or tourist visas) or illegal (crossing the border from places other than the legal entry ports). Illegal immigration has been studied widely and systematically only in the past two decades, partly because of the difficulties involved in obtaining information. The literature shows that illegal immigrants in most countries share certain characteristics closely related to their position of insecurity, fear, and precarious existence. Multiple reasons lead to people's movement from their country of origin to another illegally. Typically, illegal immigrants seek better livelihoods for themselves and their families, or seek to avoid persecution. Lack of and/or poor statistical recording systems and the illegal status and high spatial mobility of migrants make the measurement of numbers extremely unreliable. Nonetheless, examples from Southern Europe, the US, and Canada here will illustrate a few commonalities as well as differences.

Southern Europe has played a major role in shaping the global map of migration during the last few centuries. In the early 1980s it witnessed a remarkable migration turnaround from emigration to immigration – both return migration in the 1970s and early 1980s and the great influx of Eastern European, African, and Asian nationals. Reasons for the rapid change are multiple. They include the changes that happened in Eastern Europe and the effects of globalization on people in third world

countries. Another is local changes, which include some economic growth, characterized by increasing tertiarization and prevalence of small scale family enterprise, along with the development of segmented labor markets with large informal sectors. Further, the seasonal nature of intensive agriculture and construction, and the need for technologically backward areas of the economies to survive global competitiveness, have increased the demand for a flexible non unionized, cheap labor force able to move from place to place on short notice. Migrant workers typically operate within the informal labor market. Migrants find it easier to enter Southern European countries, either settling or using them as a step towards moving northwards. Southern Europe has become an alternative to traditional “more desirable” destination countries with strict frontier controls. Another reason is the proximity of Southern Europe to the countries of migrants (North Africa, the Balkans, Eastern Mediterranean) and the long coastlines, numerous islands, and mountainous border regions which are almost impossible to “seal” (King 2000). Cross border smuggling has become important in relation to the massive flow of Albanians into Italy and Greece. Ease of entry is also related to inadequate immigration policies, weak mechanisms for controlling migration flows, and national bureaucracies.

According to Lazaridis and Poyago Theotoky (1999) migrants from Eastern Europe are employed in six segments or niches of the Southern European labor market, some of which are monopolized by one gender. We find males working as seasonal agricultural workers in periods when demand is high, as well as in construction. Many nationalities are involved, including nationals of the former Yugoslavia in Madrid, and Ukrainians, Albanians, and Poles in Athens. Some are employed in small manufacturing and artisan workshops, others in tourism and catering (males and females). Street hawkers are all males, but females dominate domestic service, some as live in servants, others on a live out basis (Lazaridis 2000). Other females are involved in the sex industry. Each of these occupations involves some interaction with local people, but because they operate through the informal sector, with no contracts or welfare provisions, and with wages below the

legal minimum, they embody marginality and social exclusion.

With regard to policymaking no Southern European country has adequate immigration infrastructure or legislative enactments, although framework immigration laws were introduced at different stages in the four countries: 1985 in Spain, 1986 and 1990 in Italy, 1991 in Greece, and 1993 in Portugal. For example, the participation of migrant women with work permits in the collectivity of the modern Greek state is restricted in terms of legal, political, economic, civil, and social rights, depending on the color of their skin and ethnic origin. Undocumented migrant female workers without permits are the most restricted and therefore the most vulnerable of all workers, living a precarious existence, often institutionalized in legal, social, cultural, and economic apartheid. These patterns are not unlike patterns in informal labor markets globally, especially for undocumented workers. Discrimination in the provincial towns and villages is an area that is hugely under investigated.

In another part of the world, Hobbs and Sauer (2005) argue that the non status residents of Canada constitute a vast and highly exploited workforce, often working for very low wages and no benefits in unsafe conditions with no job security, although they contribute to the economy through paying taxes such as GST and PST, property tax, and gas tax. The Canadian economy benefits from and depends on this marginal, non citizen labor force, even as it denies non status individuals access to services to which they contribute. In addition to their paid work, non status persons also perform socially essential unpaid labor within the "private" spheres of home and family, often without the support of social assistance. Far from being a "drain on the economy," non status immigrants and refugees are crucial to economic well being. From a purely economic perspective, it is highly unreasonable to deny people without status the right to adequate social services.

In the US a number of immigration laws have been passed to implement a policy of restricting illegal immigration. Mexican immigrants – including those without documentation – have long provided a crucial labor force supporting, and at times rescuing, US agribusiness enterprises. Particularly in regions of the American

West, where labor intensive, hand harvested fruits and vegetables are the predominant farm crops, agribusiness development has encouraged a mobile, transient labor force. This has contributed to a migrant flow from Mexico that is deeply rooted temporally, and broadly enmeshed socially, in communities in the US. US immigration policies aimed at curtailing undocumented immigration appear, at best, to be generally ineffective. At worst, they may prove counterproductive, creating "an undocumented population that is markedly poor, less healthy, less educated, and more tenuously connected to the rest of society" (Massey & Espinosa 1997). Neither the US political economy nor its immigration policies provide reason to anticipate much, if any, reduction in the undocumented immigrant Mexican population. Despite significant associated human costs, including both traumas of the border crossing experience and the difficult "lived experience" that follows for most in the US, the steady flow of undocumented immigrants continues. Demographic estimates indicate that undocumented Mexican women, and particularly those accompanied by children, are migrating to the US in increasing numbers.

Theoretical frameworks (such as classical migration theory based on push pull factors and Marxist labor market theory based on social class within capitalist expansionism) that have historically dominated international migration analyses have focused on men. Where mentioned, women are incorporated as a component of the male study respondents' "social capital," or network of social ties that influence potential costs, risks, and benefits associated with the men's migration (Massey & Espinosa 1997).

The growing selection of explicitly gendered field studies that took off during the 1980s reveals the great complexity of issues migrant women face, particularly as they intersect with the fate of children. Studies initially were concerned with how to "add" women to the migration field, where their presence was either peripheral or simply invisible. They often appeared when issues of employment or reproductive rights were discussed. Numerous studies in the 1990s, however, placed women at the center of analysis as proper agents of structural and social change, thus reconceptualizing tools central to conventional models of migration,

such as regulating the patterns of skill transfer, household decision making, labor market segmentation dynamics, networking, and residential location choice. These studies debunk some of the myths on migration in general and illegal migration in particular by addressing issues pertinent to female migration, kinship relations, and the interconnections among gender, class, and race. The issues addressed in these studies, usually grounded in feminist theoretical analysis, vary from general gender migration theory, international labor migration, transnationalism, construction of national identity, participation in immigrant politics, citizenship, refugees, and gendered work, to emigration and household reproduction. The analytical frameworks, although unique to each study, address several dimensions: (1) the implications on policymaking and networking at the international and national levels, taking into account specific ideological, political, and socioeconomic constraints; (2) the importance of women at the center of economic production as well as social reproduction, not only in research but also in policymaking; (3) the analytic model of reconciling structure and agency with the importance of gender (Giddens's structuration model); (4) recognizing that families are important actors in the migration process and – most important for the analysis of female migration – whether this involves migration of the whole family, reunification, improvement of the family economic status, or reliance on the family for support; (5) the concept of “mothering” and “motherhood” as a central issue for mothers, who migrate often in search of better conditions for their children whom they leave behind with extended family members; (6) the role of kinship support, and of gendered aspects of household survival in shaping “migration work,” which varies by class (Willis & Yeoh 2000). For example, the limited data available on undocumented Mexican immigrant women follows the bulk of migration studies in focusing on the US–Mexico borderlands of the Southwest and California. Broadening the scope of inquiry beyond the borderlands poses significant questions about extrapolating from existent data, and may identify emerging second stage migration patterns that should be incorporated into immigration analyses (Andrews et al. 2002).

Thousands of people living without status in different parts of the world face the fear and very real threat of deportation or imprisonment. This situation prevents many people of low social status not only from obtaining decent employment, but also from using services such as social housing, education, health care, social assistance, and emergency services, including police protection. An example is the 1994 Proposition 187 in California, barring illegal immigrants from non emergency health care and public schooling (the proposition was later found to be unconstitutional) and the various reports presented by undocumented women (Tastsoglou & Hadjicostandi 2003).

The DADT (Don't Ask Don't Tell) Toronto Campaign is a policy which presents a local solution to the problem by preventing city employees from inquiring about the immigration status of people accessing city services. Also, it prohibits city employees from sharing information with federal and provincial enforcement agencies, including the Department of Citizenship and Immigration Canada (CIC), on the immigration status of anyone accessing city services (Hobbs & Sauer 2005) This policy represents a recognition of some of the most pressing theoretical and practical concerns of transnational anti racist feminist solidarity, which would provide all workers, including illegal workers, with a structure of dignity and societal inclusion. Transnational feminist solidarity work must be attentive to the different ways that “nations” are imagined and constructed by sexist and racist immigration policies, within a national landscape that is experienced very differently according to a person's identity.

SEE ALSO: Class, Status, and Power; Discrimination; Diversity; Family Migration; Inequality/Stratification, Gender; Migration: International; Migration and the Labor Force; Race; Race and Ethnic Consciousness; Race (Racism); Uneven Development

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Milgram, Stanley (experiments)

Markus Kemmelmeier

Stanley Milgram was one of the most influential social psychologists of the twentieth century. Born in 1933 in New York, he obtained a BA from Queen's College, and went on to receive a PhD in psychology from Harvard. Subsequently, Milgram held faculty positions in psychology at Yale University and the City University of New York until his untimely death in 1984. Although Milgram never held a formal appointment in sociology, his work was centrally focused on the social psychological aspects of social structure.

Milgram is mostly recognized for his research on obedience to authority. As many

social scientists of his time and as a Jew himself, Milgram was deeply influenced by the experience of the Holocaust. Based on earlier work of his mentor Solomon Asch (1907–96), Milgram suspected that notions of an aggressive personality or authoritarian cultural traits were not sufficient to explain the mass murder of the Holocaust. Rather, he suspected that the hierarchical structure of bureaucratic organizations and the willingness of people to submit to legitimate authority provided a more plausible explanation of why so many educated and civilized people contributed to barbaric torture and mass killings.

In a historic coincidence, in 1961, just as Milgram was about to begin work on his famous obedience experiments, the world witnessed the trial of Adolf Otto Eichmann, a high ranking Nazi official who was in charge of organizing the transport of millions of Jews to the death camps. To many, Eichmann appeared not at all to be the fervent anti Semite that many had suspected him to be; rather, his main defense was that he was only “following orders” as an administrator. To the political theorist Hannah Arendt, Eichmann's case illustrated the “banality of evil,” in which personal malice appeared to matter less than the desire of individuals to fulfill their roles in the larger context of a bureaucracy. Milgram's research is arguably the most striking example to illustrate this dynamic.

Milgram planned and conducted his obedience experiments between 1960 and 1963 at Yale University. In order to be able to study obedience to authority, he put unsuspecting research participants in a novel situation, which he staged in the laboratory. With the help of actors and props, Milgram set up an experimental ruse that was so real that hardly any of his research participants suspected that, in reality, nothing was what it pretended to be.

For this initial study, using newspaper ads promising \$4.50 for participation in a psychological study, Milgram recruited men aged 20 to 50, ranging from elementary school drop outs to PhDs. Each research participant arrived in the lab along with another man, white and roughly 30 years of age, whom they thought to be another research participant. In reality, this person was a confederate, that is, an actor in cahoots with the experimenter. The experimenter

explained that both men were about to take part in a study that explored the effect of punishment on memory. One man would assume the role of a “teacher” who would read a series of word pairings (e.g., *nice day*, *blue box*), which the other (“the learner”) was supposed to memorize. Subsequently, the teacher would read the first word of the pair with the learner having to select the correct second word from a list. Every mistake by the learner would be punished with an electric shock. It was further made clear that, although the shocks would be painful, they would not do any permanent harm.

Following this explanation, the experimenter assigned both men to the roles. Because the procedure was rigged, the unsuspecting research participant always was assigned to the role of teacher. As first order of business, the learner was seated in an armchair in an adjoining room such that he would be separated by a wall from the teacher, but would otherwise be able to hear him from the main room. Electrodes were affixed to the learner’s arms, who was subsequently strapped to the chair apparently to make sure that improper movements would not endanger the success of the experiment.

In the main room, the teacher was told that he would have to apply electric shocks every time the learner made a mistake. For this purpose, the learner was seated in front of an electric generator with various dials. The experimenter instructed the teacher to steadily increase the voltage of the shock each time the learner made a new mistake. The shock generator showed a row of levers ranging from 15 volts on the left to 450 volts on the right, with each lever in between delivering a shock 15 volts higher than its neighbor on the left. Milgram labeled the voltage level, left to right, from “Slight Shock” to “Danger: Severe Shock,” with the last two switches being marked “XXX.” The teacher was told that he simply should work his way from the left to the right without using any lever twice. To give the teacher an idea of the electric current he would deliver to the learner, he received a sample shock of 45 volts, which most research participants found surprisingly painful. However, despite its appearance, in reality the generator never emitted any electric shocks. It was merely a device that allowed Milgram to examine how far the teacher would go in

harming another person based on the experimenter’s say so.

As learning trials started, the teacher applied electric shocks to the learner. The learner’s responses were scripted such that he apparently made many mistakes, requiring the teacher to increase shock levels by 15 volts with every new mistake. As the strength of electric shocks increased, occasional grunts and moans of pain were heard from the learner. At 120 volts the learner started complaining about the pain. At 150 volts, the learner demanded to be released on account of a heart condition, and the protest continued until the shocks reached 300 volts and the learner started pounding on the wall. At 315 volts the learner stopped responding altogether.

As the complaints by the learner started, the teacher would often turn to the experimenter, who was seated at a nearby desk, wondering whether and how to proceed. The experimenter, instead of terminating the experiment, replied with a scripted succession of prods:

Prod 1: “Please continue.”

Prod 2: “The experiment requires that you continue.”

Prod 3: “It is absolutely necessary to continue.”

Prod 4: “You have no other choice: you must go on.”

These prods were successful in coaxing many teachers into continuing to apply electric shocks even when the learner no longer responded to the word memory questions. Indeed, in the first of Milgram’s experiments, a stunning 65 percent of all participants continued all the way to 450 volts, and not a single participant refused to continue the shocks before they reached the 300 volt level! The high levels of compliance illustrate the powerful effect of the social structure that participants had entered. By accepting the role of teacher in the experiment in exchange for the payment of a nominal fee, participants had agreed to accept the authority of the experimenter and carry out his instructions. In other words, just as Milgram suspected, the social forces of hierarchy and obedience could push normal and well adjusted individuals into harming others.

The overall level of obedience, however, does not reveal the tremendous amount of

stress that all teachers experienced. Because the situation was extremely realistic, teachers were agonizing over whether or not to continue the electric shocks. Should they care for the well being of the obviously imperiled learners and even put their life in danger? Or should they abide by a legitimate authority figure, who presented his instructions crisply and confidently? Participants typically sought to resolve this conflict by seeking assurances that the experimenter, and not themselves, would accept full responsibility for their actions. Once they felt assured, they typically continued to apply shocks that would have likely electrocuted the learner.

Milgram expanded his initial research into a series of 19 experiments in which he carefully examined the conditions under which obedience would occur. For instance, the teacher's proximity to the learner was an important factor in lowering obedience, that is, the proportion of people willing to deliver the full 450 volts. When the teacher was in the same room with the learner, obedience dropped to 40 percent, and when the teacher was required to touch the learner and apply physical force to deliver the electric shock, obedience dropped to 30 percent.

Milgram further suspected that the social status of the experimenter, presumably a serious Yale University researcher in a white lab coat, would have important implications for obedience. Indeed, when there was no obvious connection with Yale, and the above experiment was repeated in a run down office building in Bridgeport, Connecticut, obedience dropped to 48 percent. Indeed, when not the white coated experimenter but another confederate encouraged the teacher to continue the shocks, all participants terminated the experiment as soon as the confederate complained. Milgram concluded that "a substantial proportion of people do what they are told to do, irrespective of the content of the act and with out limitations of conscience, *so long as they perceive that the command comes from a legitimate authority*" (1965). However, additional studies highlighted that obedience is in part contingent on surveillance. When the experimenter transmitted his orders not in person but via telephone, obedience levels dropped to 20 percent, with many participants only pretending to apply higher and higher electric shocks.

Since its initial publication in 1963, Milgram's research has drawn a lot of criticism, mainly on ethical grounds. First, it was alleged that it was unethical to deceive participants to the extent that occurred in these studies. It is important to note that all participants were fully debriefed on the deception, and most did not seem to mind and were relieved to find out that they had not shocked the learner. The second ethical criticism is, however, much more serious. As alluded to earlier, Milgram exposed his participants to tremendous levels of stress. Milgram, anticipating this criticism, interviewed participants after the experiment and followed up several weeks later. The overwhelming majority of his participants commented that they enjoyed being in the experiment, and only a small minority experienced regret. Even though personally Milgram rejected allegations of having mistreated his participants, his own work suggests that he may have gone too far: "Subjects were observed to sweat, tremble, bite their lips, groan, and dig their fingernails into their flesh . . . A mature and initially poised businessman entered the laboratory smiling and confident. Within 20 minutes, he was reduced to a twitching, stuttering wreck who was rapidly approaching a point of nervous collapse" (1963: 375). Today, Milgram's obedience studies are generally considered unethical and would not pass muster with regard to contemporary regulations protecting the well being of research participants. Ironically, partly *because* Milgram's studies illustrated the power of hierarchical social relationships, contemporary researchers are at great pains to avoid coercion and allow participants to terminate their participation in any research study at any time without penalty.

Another type of criticism of the obedience studies has questioned their generality and charged that their usefulness in explaining real world events is limited. Indeed, Milgram conducted his research when trust in authorities was higher than it is nowadays. However, Milgram's studies have withstood this criticism. Reviews of research conducted using Milgram's paradigm have generally found obedience levels to be at roughly 60 percent (see, e.g., Blass 2000). In one of his studies Milgram further documented that there was no apparent difference in the responses of women and men. More recent research using more ethically

acceptable methods further testifies to the power of obedience in shaping human action (Blass 2000).

Milgram offers an important approach to explaining the Holocaust by emphasizing the bureaucratic nature of evil, which relegated individuals to executioners of orders issued by a legitimate authority. Sociologists have extended this analysis and provided compelling accounts of obedience as root causes of many horrific crimes, ranging from the My Lai massacre to Watergate (Hamilton & Kelman 1989). However, it is arguably somewhat unclear to what extent Milgram's findings can help explain the occurrence of the Holocaust itself. Whereas obedience kept the machinery of death running with frightening efficiency, historians often caution against ignoring the malice and sadism that many of Hitler's executioners brought to the task (see Blass 2004).

Milgram's dramatic experiments have left a lasting impression beyond the social sciences. They are the topic of various movies, including the 1975 TV film *The Tenth Level* starring William Shatner. Further, the 37 percent of participants who did not obey were memorialized in a 1986 song by the rock musician Peter Gabriel titled "We Do What We're Told (Milgram's 37)."

SEE ALSO: Aggression; Asch Experiments; Authority and Conformity; Experimental Methods; Holocaust; Organizations; Social Networks; Social Psychology; Zimbardo Prison Experiment

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military research and science and war

Brian Woods

The relationship between science, technology, and war has a long history. Studies of catapults, for example, have highlighted the important role of science and technology in ancient society and in ancient warfare. The rise of advanced catapults not only attracted the interest and financial support of "governments," but also combined early studies of geometry, physics, and technology, and led to the rise in the visibility and status of the engineers that worked on them. The medieval period also saw advancements in arms and armor, artillery, fortifications, and warships. Unlike the Roman Empire, which had centralized its arms manufacture, producing standardized weapons, it seems that the medieval arms industry was made up of a diverse array of artisans forging personalized weapons.

A challenge to the independent artisans came in eighteenth century France when state military engineers introduced technical drawings and the tools of manufacturing tolerance to affect standardization and the production of interchangeable parts for weapons and other military artifacts. Notwithstanding, science and engineering in France remained a relatively disorganized activity up until the Franco-Prussian war (1870-1). The French defeat and the siege of Paris in 1870 had both an immediate and a long term effect on science in France. During the siege, a range of science and engineering societies came up with ideas for both defense and survival. The Society of Civil Engineers, for example, developed mobile ram parts and the Paris Chemical Society was involved in improvements to the manufacture of explosives and cannon, developments in

synthetic foods and artificial milk (though with limited success), and the development of microphotography, which enabled a single pigeon to carry up to 30,000 telegrams. After the war, French scientists argued that their lack of success necessitated an increase in state funding and a rethinking of both science and scientific education. The Third Republic thus saw both the centralization of science and the increasing involvement of scientists in politics.

The American Civil War (1861–5) was the first war to witness the full impact of the industrial revolution. Although the institutionalization of science and the American preoccupation with its practical applications were stimulated in part during the American War of Independence (1775–83), which among other things saw the first use of a submarine in warfare and the establishment of West Point. The expansion of the American frontier during the nineteenth century brought with it among other things the mechanization of agriculture, the development of the railroads, steamships, telegraph, and advancements in both rifles and small arms, most notably the Colt revolver. While military requirements were not the primary driver of this build up of the industrial and technological base, they provided a powerful added stimulus. There was a strong interaction between military and civilian needs and between the engineers, inventors, entrepreneurs, and factory owners, who responded to both. While science and technology shaped warfare, again the Civil War shaped the institutions of science. The Union government established the National Academy of Science in 1863 to advise on the application of science and technology in warfare and, while it contributed little to the war effort, it eventually become one of the most important scientific institutions in the US.

The branch of the armed services with the longest history of sustained, organized scientific research in both Europe and the US has been the navy. For example, during the period of relative global peace from the end of the Napoleonic Wars (1799–1815) to World War I (1914–18), the British Navy substantially increased its investment in scientific research across a range of activities, including the establishment of specialized institutions dealing with matters such as the scientific design of ships' hulls using

models and towing tanks. World War I also brought with it further increases in the size and commitment to scientific naval research and development (R&D) and moves toward improving its organization to make it more responsive to navy needs.

Command technology (as William McNeill termed the deliberate attempt to create new weapon systems that surpass existing capabilities) was also a navy invention. Warships were the most expensive and complex weapon systems of their day and in the build up to World War I played a major role in the arms race between Britain and Germany. It was with World War I, however, that command technology came ashore. Faced with dependence on Germany for essential items such as optical glass, magnetos, and even khaki dye for uniforms, Britain established the Department of Scientific and Industrial Research and began the systematic incorporation of science and technology into government.

For many observers, however, the watershed of military science came with the outbreak of World War II (1939–45). Not only were radical new technologies developed during the war, but the very scale of effort and complexity of the science/military organization was also revolutionized. During the interwar years any large armaments company could count itself the equal of any government in terms of the resources and organizational input into weapons related R&D. By 1945, government science had grown enormously and shifted the balance toward scientists and government research laboratories. During World War II scientists came to play a new role: as advisers at the highest level of government.

Probably the most renowned collaboration between science and the military is the Manhattan Project, which brought together resources and scientific labor power on an unprecedented scale to produce the first atomic bombs, which the US dropped on the cities of Hiroshima and Nagasaki in 1945, ending the war with Japan. Soon after World War II the Soviet Union successfully exploded its first atomic bomb (1949), closely followed by Britain (1952), then France (1960), China (1964), India (1974), and Pakistan (1998). Other nuclear powers included Israel and South Africa, although only suspicion surrounds a possible test program by both countries, which collaborated closely during the

1970s and 1980s. In the early 1990s the Republic of South Africa became the first nuclear state to disarm, followed by Belarus, Kazakhstan, and the Ukraine after the breakup of the Soviet Union. The proliferation of nuclear weapons led many scientists to take a political stance against further development. The most recognized forum of this politics is the *Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists*, founded in 1945 by scientists who worked on the Manhattan Project at the University of Chicago.

In the US, the Manhattan Project affected post war science in three distinctive ways. First, it created a number of R&D facilities that survived the project and continued to play a critical role in the development of US science. Second, it created an operating philosophy – a set of operating procedures – that various agencies adopted on a range of scientific endeavors, including space and weapon systems development. Third, it influenced the post war US science policy of locating large government sponsored research projects in the private sector, the rationale for which was that it would be the best way to assemble quickly the labor power necessary to accomplish goals of national importance and then (in theory) disperse them when the goals were achieved.

Internationally, the effect of the nuclear arms race along with the collapse in US–Soviet relations was the Cold War (1949–89). For many observers, the Cold War was an R&D war. The intense rivalry between the Soviet Union and the US motivated government investment in R&D that was sustained, massive, and gave rise to projects that may have not been possible otherwise. In countries like the US and the UK, more than half of government funded research in the last half of the twentieth century, and close to a quarter of the national total, was funded out of defense budgets. By international standards, the UK remained a high spender on military R&D (although an order of magnitude behind the two superpowers, the US and the USSR) at least until the 1980s. In part, this pattern arose from Prime Minister Clement Attlee's decision after World War II to leap a generation and begin major R&D programs in atomic weapons, new aircraft, guided missiles, etc. In contrast, Germany, Italy, and Japan were limited by treaty from engaging in certain defense activities and the

French recovery in military R&D did not begin until the 1960s.

Increased government/state spending on evermore sophisticated, evermore destructive weapon systems was part of what Paul Baran and Paul Sweezy termed the permanent arms economy. In her seminal work *The Baroque Arsenal*, Mary Kaldor echoed many of Baran and Sweezy's concerns when she reflected on a runaway military technological machine that absorbed increasing amounts of public money on gross, elaborate, and very expensive hardware, but which produced little in the way of benefit, even for the military itself. For Kaldor, the emphasis on evermore costly and complex weapons systems could only be explained in terms of the structure of the military industrial institutions: the competitive dynamic of the armorers combined with the conservatism of the armed forces. To keep the whole system going new systems are continually dreamt up.

Within this environment, science, especially state sponsored science, often took on Cold War aims as its own. Military or quasi military R&D frequently received the highest priority, which, along with massive projects like the space program, diminished the difference between civilian and military science by encouraging scientists who were looking for funding to suggest that even so called pure or basic research had potential practical applications. As such, many observers have noted that it is difficult to make a distinction between military and civil R&D and that it is probably better to describe a spectrum with the extremes at either end rather than make any clear division.

Perhaps one of the most renowned sociological texts on military science and technology is Donald MacKenzie's *Inventing Accuracy* (1993). Tracing the development of nuclear missile accuracy, MacKenzie revealed the inner dynamics of military research and development, showing how individuals and group interests drive institutional patterns of organizational and technical change. Questioning ideas of both technological and political determinism, *Inventing Accuracy* illustrates how the missile revolution involved not only transformations in science and technology, but also the reworking of national defense strategies as well as military organization. Against the interests of the US Air Force, who were committed to

long range bombers, the Draper Laboratory and other powerful actors created an interest in guided missile technology. Importantly, the construction of the strategic need for guided nuclear missiles was simultaneous with (not prior to) their technical development. The technology was neither above politics nor beneath it. Guided missiles were not inherently better than long range bombers and so ordained to replace them, and Draper was not “ordered” from above to find alternative weapons of nuclear war. Instead, there was a creation of an interest in a particular technological form in order to institutionalize it – to make it appear a logical and natural progression.

More recently, Mary Kaldor has argued that increased weapon accuracy combined with information technology (IT) has revolutionized warfare in that it has enabled what she terms “the spectacle war” to take place: warfare that the aggressor can fight at a distance, with minimal casualties and beam home live for its citizens to watch on their televisions. For Kaldor, the cruise missile is the paradigmatic weapon of the spectacle war, but she also highlights computer gaming as an example of defense transformation because it enabled the military to image future wars through IT simulations from which they derived new ways of thinking and new ways of fighting. More notable, however, is Kaldor’s paradox: modern military technology has led to a decline in military power. The increasing destructiveness of modern weapon systems means that superior technology rarely affords control of a territory or outright military victory. In the “new wars” battles between armed opponents are rare, with almost all the violence inflicted on civilian populations.

SEE ALSO: Big Science and Collective Research; Gendered Aspects of War and International Violence; Military Sociology; Political Economy of Science; Technological Determinism; Technological Innovation; War

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military sociology

Irving Smith

Military sociology is an interdisciplinary subfield of sociology that employs sociological concepts, theories, and methods to analyze the internal organization, practices, and perceptions of the armed forces as well as the relationships between the military and other social institutions. Some of the topics generally covered in military sociology include small group processes related to race/ethnicity, gender, and sexual orientation, leadership, policy, veterans, historical cases, United States and foreign military organization, international affairs, manpower models, the transition from conscription to all volunteer forces, the social legitimacy of military organization, the military as a form of industrial organization, and civil–military relations.

The military institution and members of the armed forces have been an abundant source of information to address a broad range of sociological subfields including demography, stratification, social psychology, comparative sociology, and theory. Military sociologists often use both the differences and similarities between the military and society in conducting their analysis. The differences often spring from the unique cluster of duties and sacrifices asked of service members and the technology they use to perform their jobs. The similarities examined often assume that the military is a microcosm of society. This assumption stems from the fact

that military service members represent every part of their host society including its culture, values, attitudes, and demographic makeup. As such, military sociology has been used to understand not only the military and its relationship to other social institutions, but also social institutions in and of themselves. For example, research conducted on the relationship between the military and labor markets has increased our understanding of both military labor markets and labor markets in general.

Military sociology can roughly be divided into three distinct time periods corresponding roughly to the World War II (1941–50), Cold War (1950–89), and post Cold War (1989–present) eras. During each of these periods there have been general topics of study which have driven analysis, debate, and study within the field.

Although some of the earliest known sociological theorists, including Karl Marx (1848), Émile Durkheim (1897), Herbert Spencer (1902), and Max Weber (1927), used the military as a unit of analysis, the field of military sociology did not begin in earnest until the World War II period. During that period several sociologists and psychologists were mobilized by the US armed forces. Their research and observations both during and after the war were the foundations of the field of military sociology. This early period of military sociology focused on applying sociological knowledge to gain an understanding of the social dynamics involved in mobilizing and fighting a war. Some of the questions they sought to answer were: What motivated the rapidly mobilized US forces to fight? How did personnel policies affect motivation? What happens to veterans when they return to society?

Early military sociology was dominated by Americans. In 1941 the US Army's Information and Education Division conducted over 200 experiments and surveys to better understand the effects of military personnel policies on morale and motivation. These studies, conducted between 1941 and 1945, produced four volumes collectively known as *Studies in Social Psychology in World War II*. Stouffer et al. (1949) also used a great deal of this research to produce the American Soldier Studies, which included a wide range of topics including cohesion, small group dynamics, race relations,

morale, motivation, communication, and leadership. Stouffer et al.'s effort was the defining work of the period in that it set the agenda for work in military sociology and served as a model for the nascent field of survey methodology for several decades to come.

Another notable work of the period was Shils and Janowitz's "Cohesion and Disintegration in the Wehrmacht in World War II" (1948), which studied Wehrmacht prisoners and found that Wehrmacht soldiers fought because of interpersonal relationships within the primary group. Additionally, S. L. A. Marshall's *Men Against Fire: The Problem of Battle Command in Future Wars* (1947) found that infantry soldiers fought because of the presence or the presumed presence of a comrade. Marshall's work has for the most part been discounted because of allegations that he invented the data; however, his work is still significant in that he was one of the pioneers in bringing a sociological perspective to the study of the combat soldier.

The Korean War produced an increase in the volume of research on group processes and cohesion. During this period Roger Little conducted a study in which he observed a rifle company in combat for several months and found that "buddy relations" between men were critical to combat performance. As a result of President Harry S. Truman's 1948 Executive Order 9981 and manpower shortages, the United States Armed Forces were integrated and race relations studies were initiated by the Special Operations Research Office at Johns Hopkins. They found that integrated units did not suffer a decrease in performance in combat; however, the results were not released until the 1960s.

In general, the studies of this period used an applied research approach, applicable at the individual level of analysis, to gain a better understanding of soldier adjustment, motivation, and small group processes.

As the Cold War began to take shape, the field of military sociology rapidly expanded. The number of military sociologists, topics of inquiry, organizations dedicated to the study of military sociology, and literature increased during this period.

The Cold War broke a longstanding pattern of nations conducting mass mobilizations, fighting wars, and then rapidly demobilizing.

Several nations, including the United States, moved from mass mobilization models to large standing forces. This phenomenon caused many to think about how best to control these large standing forces and ensure that they remained subservient to civil authority. This is often referred to as the civil–military relations debate. The progenitors of this debate were Samuel Huntington and Morris Janowitz. Huntington (1957) expressed the view that a professional military could best be controlled by physically separating it from society and using objective control. Janowitz (1960) believed that isolating the military from its host society was dangerous and that a professional military could best be controlled by integrating it into society and using more informal controls.

In 1960 Janowitz founded the Inter University Seminar on Armed Forces and Society (IUS), which is still thriving today. His goal was to create an organization that facilitated the analysis of military organizations and collaboration across university, organizational, disciplinary, theoretical, and national lines. The IUS began publishing its own journal, *Armed Forces and Society*, in 1972.

In 1965 Charles C. Coates and Roland J. Pellegrin published the first major military sociology textbook titled *Military Sociology: A Study of American Military Institutions and Military Life*. In general, the topics that Coates and Pellegrin presented are still generally regarded as the focal points of military sociology.

In the late 1960s and early 1970s the research focus of military sociology moved from civil–military relations and the military profession to issues revolving around US involvement in the unpopular conflict in Vietnam and the perception of inequitable conscription in the US force. Simultaneously, America was engulfed in social tension created by strained racial relations, affirmative action, changing definitions of gender roles, changing definitions of the obligations and rights of citizenship, rising oil prices, and fear of nuclear destruction. These issues were manifest in the US military in the form of increased use of illicit drugs, fragging incidents, absenteeism, draft evasion, and race riots within the ranks of the United States Armed Forces.

The ensuing debates over the causes, remedies, and future issues associated with these problems fueled research and discussion within

both the field of military sociology and society at large and ultimately contributed to the end of military conscription in the United States. The end of conscription in the United States led to the establishment of the All Volunteer Force in 1973. The result of the strife within the American armed forces and the associated literature compelled other nations to focus on their armed forces as well; however, the field was still dominated by Americans. The *Journal of Political and Military Science*, founded in 1973 at Northern Illinois University, and *Armed Forces and Society* were the two major journals that provided a forum for these debates.

In the early 1970s Charles C. Moskos developed his institutional/occupational (I/O) model. He envisioned the military evolving from an institution being primarily oriented by tradition, patriotic values, and a sense of calling to an institution primarily oriented by economics, general business principles, and the self interest of individual service members. In essence, he believed that the military was moving from a calling to a job. This theoretical model was the impetus for much of the debate within the field throughout the 1970s and early 1980s. Many used this model as a springboard to examine military families, recruiting, veteran status, changing military missions (e.g., peacekeeping versus traditional war fighting), demographic changes, racial composition, and gender issues to understand how the armed forces and its relationship to society were changing.

During the 1980s the field continued to grow and became more internationally focused. The number of international governments, sociologists, and students studying within the field increased substantially during this decade.

The fall of the Berlin Wall in 1989 and the subsequent end of the Cold War in Europe opened a new chapter in the field of military sociology. These events essentially changed the nature of war and how states viewed the use of their militaries. Militaries around the world were confronted with new challenges, tasks, and missions that included responses to regional threats, peacekeeping operations, and military operations other than war.

These changes applied not only to American armed forces but to European armed forces as well. In the post Cold War period European armed forces became smaller, more mobile/

agile, and more professional. Several moved away from conscription and, like their American counterparts, their missions changed from traditional internal and territorial defense to international military peacekeeping and crisis management. Many of the eastern bloc nations transformed or are in the midst of transformation in their quest to gain admission to supra national organizations (e.g., the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, the European Union). Additionally, the post Cold War era has witnessed an increase in tribal conflict in Africa, ethnic strife in the Balkans, and increased hostility in both the Middle East and the Korean Peninsula. China, a major arms producer and a nuclear power, is booming economically and represents an imposing threat to the balance of power. Military sociology has attempted to understand how these changes have impacted the relationship between the military and society.

These post Cold War changes led some notable military sociologists to characterize the changes as evidence of a move from late modern to postmodern militaries. Charles Moskos, the architect of this thesis, developed it as an extension to the I/O model. Moskos and colleagues envisioned militaries with fewer differences based on rank, service, and combat versus support roles; increased interdependence between the military and civilian spheres; changing missions (wars to operations other than war); more international missions (loosening ties with the nation state); movement toward smaller volunteer forces; and increasingly more androgynous in composition. However, not all military sociologists subscribed to the postmodern military theory. In fact, some have argued that Moskos et al.'s conceptualization of a postmodern military was simply a post Cold War evolution of modern militaries (Booth et al. 2001).

Throughout this period there was also great concern that a culture gap existed between civil society and the military. Many believed that the United States military and its civilian leadership had very disparate political and social beliefs. As evidence of the civil–military gap, some argued that the military was becoming increasingly conservative and Republican in nature and that the vast majority of civilian leaders had little or no military experience. The ensuing debate over the civil–military

gap, originated by Peter Feaver and Richard Kohn, produced large volumes of work within the field.

The events of September 11, 2001 added a new chapter to military sociology. Several of the accepted norms about who, how, and why nations fight, including the boundaries between military and civilian, combat and support, ally and adversary, and even war and peace, have been obscured. The changes that are currently occurring are not confined to war fighting or even to military forces and their roles. These changes are part of a bigger movement concerning the spread of technology and globalization, and the threat of organized, ideologically motivated coercive violence experienced by the general citizenry of nations via terrorism. Military sociology has taken up the study of understanding the extent of this change and its effects on the military and civil–military relations.

SEE ALSO: Elites; Gendered Aspects of War and International Violence; Leadership; Life Course Perspective; Military Research and Science and War; Mobilization; War

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Mill, John Stuart (1806–73)

Sandra J. Peart

In the nineteenth century, social scientists such as John Stuart Mill struggled with the problem of the individual in society: how to achieve the “improvement of mankind” (Robson 1968) when society consists of free and responsible individuals. As he speculated about how behavior is conditioned by culture, habit, and institutions, and new habits form in the context of institutional change, Mill stepped into the burgeoning field of “speculative politics” or what we know of today as sociology. Social scientists, who now sometimes neglect questions relating to the acquisition of tastes or “character,” may fail to appreciate how much of Mill’s writing was designed to deal with problems of human development and interaction in the context of social change. Examples in what follows include the Irish land question, emancipation, the laboring poor, and women’s rights.

Mill was also, of course, at the forefront of explicating methodological principles for social science. He followed the method of Auguste Comte to the extent that he urged practitioners to adopt the positive approach for the investigation of social and political phenomena (Mill 1969 [1865]). Economic analysis treats “man’s nature as modified by the social state” (Mill 1967 [1836]: 321). Since the treatment of man in a social state runs into the problem of multiple causation, Mill urged that the study of different types of social facts might be “studied apart.” This supposition enabled him to develop a method for the science of society in which exchange was essentially a social activity. Towards the end of the century, social sentiments disappeared from economic analysis and material concerns become singularly important (see Peart & Levy 2005). At about the same time, political economists separated their study from that of sociology.

ABSTRACTING FROM DIFFERENCE

For analytical purposes, Mill presumed that people were essentially the same and circumstances

(society) differed. Observed behavior varied widely due to “custom” and “institutions,” but humans were humans whether black, American, Irish, or English. Mill’s 1836 *Essay on the Definition of Political Economy* urged the social scientist to abstract from differences to focus on the common. The “assumed” hypotheses of political economy include a set of behavioral assumptions relating to wealth maximization (Mill 1967 [1836]: 321, 323; see Blaug 1980). For reasons of practicality in the face of multiple causation, Mill called for specialization in the social sciences (Hollander & Peart 1999). In this, he departed respectfully from Comte. In his 1865 review of Comte’s *Positivism*, Mill insisted, contra Comte, on the scientific legitimacy of the specialized science of political economy (Mill 1969 [1865]: 305). In his 1848 *Principles*, Mill outlined the implication of such a method: it implied a rejection of racial (or gender) “explanations” of outcomes, which he condemned:

Is it not, then, a bitter satire on the mode in which opinions are formed on the most important problems of human nature and life, to find public instructors of the greatest pretensions, imputing the backwardness of Irish industry, and the want of energy of the Irish people in improving their condition, to a peculiar indolence and *insouciance* in the Celtic race? Of all vulgar modes of escaping from the consideration of the effect of social and moral influences on the human mind, the most vulgar is that of attributing the diversities of conduct and character to inherent natural differences. (Mill 1965 [1848]: 319)

Mill’s abstraction from race and his focus instead on property rights and incentives were sharply disputed in the decades that followed. Early critiques of abstract economic man held that important “inherent” differences characterized the Irish, former slaves, and women. The political economist and co founder (with Francis Galton) of the eugenics movement, W. R. Greg, attacked classical political economy for its assumption that the Irishman is an “average human being,” rather than one prone to “idleness,” “ignorance,” “jollity,” and “drink” (Greg 1869; see Peart & Levy 2005).

The Irish question raised the issue of whether the conclusions of political economy were universally relevant or of limited applicability (Bagehot 1876). In the latter half of the

century, attacks on economics focused in part on the legitimacy of studying economic phenomena separately from society as a whole (Peart 2001). Mill's proposal for land reform in Ireland, and his 1870 review essay *Leslie on the Land Question*, argued, in line with the historicists such as T. E. C. Leslie (1873) and J. K. Ingram (1878), that institutional – but not “inherent” – differences in Ireland rendered the conclusions of political economy invalid there.

SOCIAL IMPROVEMENT, HIGHER AND LOWER PLEASURES

So the conclusions of political economy are of limited applicability because man functions in a social world whose institutions vary across time and space. One is led to wonder, how do societies progress? First and foremost, Mill held,

progress in nineteenth century Britain required the acquisition of improved habits of self reliance among the laboring poor. Experience and discussion reveal to individuals that, for instance, their welfare depends on their decision to marry and have children. Mill's statement regarding the role of experience in revealing the difference between higher and lower pleasures provides a case in point. The same idea appears in the 1848 *Principles*, where Mill tackles the problems of emancipation. Emancipation is justified by the increase in human happiness and not by any increase in material output. Progress, however, will come as former slaves are first immersed in material desires, “provided that their gratification can be a motive to steady and regular bodily and mental exertion” (Mill 1965 [1848]: 104). While Mill might not approve of these material desires in *his* society, they are critical to the development of a capacity for self reliance.

PUNCH, OR THE LONDON CHARIVARI.—MARCH 30, 1867.



MILL'S LOGIC; OR, FRANCHISE FOR FEMALES.

"PRAY CLEAR THE WAY, THERE, FOR THESE—A—PERSONS."

Similar logic underscores Mill's assessment of the relative merits of schemes for improving the lot of the laboring poor: socialist proposals by Charles Fourier and the Saint Simonians compared to the capitalist exchange system in place at the time (Mill 1965 [1848]: 210–14). Whatever institutional system is in place, Mill argued, it must preserve the incentives for workers to habits of self reliance, including adequate foresight to control family size.

Yet how was concern for the self related to concern for others and how might the latter develop over time? Again, Mill's answer lies in experience and discussion, the mechanisms by which people increasingly come to sympathize with others around them (Peart & Levy 2005). In *Utilitarianism* Mill claimed that, with progress, education and "a complete web of corroborative association" serve to make us increasingly concerned with others: "[The individual] comes, as though instinctively, to be conscious of himself as a being who *of course* pays regard to others. The good of others becomes to him a thing naturally and necessarily to be attended to, like any of the physical conditions of our existence" (Mill 1969 [1861]: 232) Ideally, we count others equally *with our selves* as we move from our own desires to those of all others: "the happiness which forms the utilitarian standard of what is right in conduct, is not the agent's own happiness, but that of all concerned. As between his own happiness and that of others, utilitarianism requires him to be as strictly impartial as a disinterested and benevolent spectator (Mill 1969 [1861]: 218).

Whether Mill succeeds or fails in his explanation is a subject on which authorities are divided (Schumpeter 1954; McPherson 1982). He points to a continuing difficulty for social scientists considering the transition between social states: habits that evolve for sensible reasons in one society, might be counterproductive in another.

CONCLUSION

Mill paid dearly for his agitation in support of people of color, the laboring poor, and women. A glance at the Victorian magazine *Punch* for the first half of 1867 (when the Reform Bill agitation centered on the inclusion of women)

reveals a large number of articles with titles such as "Shall Lovely Woman Vote" (May 4, 1867) and "A Certain Person to Mr. Mill" (June 1, 1867). A "Letter to Mr. Punch" of June 8, 1867, entitled "Female Suffrage," ends: "One can hardly fancy a Woman in Opposition!" and is signed "An Old and Ugly M. P." In a *Punch* cartoon, Mill is mocked for using the degendered "persons."

As noted at the outset, Mill was also on the losing methodological side of debates over the nature of social science. Late in the century, the political economist William Stanley Jevons urged economists to specialize in the analysis of strictly economic phenomena (Peart 2001). As the profession came to do so, it moved away from the broad set of social concerns and analyses that so preoccupied Mill. Economics came to focus more narrowly on the individual, independently of custom, institutions, or society. Concern for self versus others then became a "normative" question outside the purview of economic analysis.

SEE ALSO: Comte, Auguste; Economic Sociology: Neoclassical Economic Perspective; Economy (Sociological Approach); Jevons, William; Political Economy; Race; Race (Racism)

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millenarianism

John Fulton

The term millenarianism, and its alternatives millennialism and chiliasm, are derived from the last book of the Christian Bible, Apocalypse (or Revelation), in which the prophet John recounts his vision of a thousand year godly kingdom, the return of Christ, and the end of time itself (20:1–7). In the social sciences, the term is applied to all movements and organizations that hold as a central belief the imminent arrival of a divinely inspired and this worldly society, whether a religious golden age, messianic kingdom, return to paradise, or egalitarian

order. Such movements can take on an active or passive, violent or peaceful, even revolutionary role. They are found the world over and throughout recorded history. Some writers extend the term to deep seated beliefs in secular utopias such as revolutionary communism, certain environmental and scientific technological movements such as eugenics and cryonics (Bozeman in Robbins & Palmer 1997), and racist movements such as white supremacy. Jewett and Lawrence (2003) argue for the existence of a contemporary form of millenarianism in the United States that reunites the secular and religious, calling it “millennial civil religion.” They find it in popular culture, the politics of the New Right, Reaganism, Bushism, and the “war on terror.”

The most documented cases occur within cultures significantly affected by Judaism, Christianity, and Islam, though there is a mainly historical and theological literature on millenarianism in Hinduism (the coming of Kalki), and most of the Buddhist and some Daoist traditions, e.g., the coming of Maitreya, the Bodhisattva, and the future messiah of the secret “White Lotus” sects. From the 1950s, there was an accelerated interest in the subject, beginning with Worsley’s (1957) study of cargo cults, Cohn’s (1957) classic on medieval movements, and, later, Wilson’s (1973) reappraisal of tribal and third world millenarianism. These better known studies were accompanied by the work of many other sociologists, anthropologists, and historians on African, Asian, and Native and Latin American millenarianism. The approach of the second Christian millennium led to an increasing number of studies on US millenarianism (e.g., Robbins & Palmer 1997) and contemporary millenarian sects worldwide (e.g., Barkun 1996; Hunt 2001). Contemporary mass media have focused on Domsday Cult masques: the Jim Jones’s People’s Temple at Jonestown, Guyana (1978), Aum Shinrikyo’s sarin gas attack in the Tokyo metro (1993), David Koresh’s Branch Davidian sect at Waco, Texas (1993), and the Order of the Solar Temple in Canada and Switzerland (1994).

Millenarianism has its roots in the religion founded by Zarathustra, Zoroastrianism (900 BCE). From around 600 BCE, its believers subscribed to a future this worldly savior, the Saoshyant, as well as to their founder prophet.

In Judaism, movements date back to the period 200 BCE–100 CE with the sects of the monastic style Essenes, the peasant driven and violent Zealots, and the very early Jewish Christians: all fervent believers in the imminent coming of a political religious messiah. Since then, millenarianism has appeared at varying times within Judaism, and especially in the Sabbatian movement of the 1660s (followers of messiah Sabbatai Zevi) that affected most Jews of the period, surviving today as an underground movement in both Judaism and Islam.

In Christianity, the millenarian biblical reference in Apocalypse is partnered by earlier ones in Paul's two letters to the Thessalonians. High millennial points in Christian history were the late medieval Taborites, who set up millennial and egalitarian communities outside the Czech city of Prague (1420–30). With the Protestant Reformation (from 1517), and freedom of access to the Bible, a spate of millenarian movements developed in the northern half of Europe, many from the Anabaptist sects. While followers of Menno Simons and Jakob Hutter were passive millenarians, those inspired by the anti Lutheran Thomas Münzer (d. 1524) took up arms to set up the "Kingdom of God" in the city of Münster, Germany (1534–5). In Britain, the Civil War (1641–9) between Crown and Parliament, particularly the execution of the monarch, led to a general state of millennial expectation among Puritans and to the appearance of the Diggers, Levelers, and, above all, the Fifth Monarchy Men, who vowed to install the millennial kingdom and came very close to doing so (St. Clair 1992).

The patterns of millenarianism were different in Islam. It is true that Christ appears in Qur'anic commentary as future slayer of the Antichrist and ruler of the Islamic community. However, Islamic chiliasm has developed mainly from the post Qur'anic *hadith* ("tradition") writings concerned with the period of war and intrigue over Muhammad's succession. The Shia movement (Iraq and Iran) has looked for its political religious messiah or Mahdi to the transfer of Muhammad's divine charisma through the line of descent of Ali, Muhammad's grandson in law. It believes that this person will be the self same descendant of Ali, Ibn al Hanafiyya, who disappeared in 700 CE without ever becoming ruler and who has been

"in concealment" ever since. But while Sunni and Shia share the belief in a Mahdi, Sunnis hold that its exact identity is still to be revealed, thus leaving the possibilities of millenarian movements among them more likely. Millenarianism played a significant role in the shaping of modern Iraq and Iran and, in particular, the Safavid movement (early seventeenth century – the Muslim followers of Sabbatai Zevi, above).

The explosive spread of millenarianism in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries was truly global. It grew out of clashes between modernity and imperialism on the one hand, and the more traditional beliefs of both western and non western societies on the other. Christian millenarianism even reached China in the T'aiiping Rebellion (1851–64). In Islam, the millenarian movement of Baba'u'llah led to the founding of the Baha'i religion, and the most politically successful millenarian movement of Islam was the Sudanese Mahdi rebellion and the setting up of a Mahdi Caliphate (1882–98). In Judaism Chabad Lubavitch, a millenarian movement from Belarus, settled in the US after World War II and its seventh leader, Rebbe Schneerson (d. 1994), became the messiah for many of its members.

Because of the large number of European protest sects that settled there, the US experienced millennial movements since its inception. Their numbers grew in the nineteenth century, particular additions being the Mormons, the Millerites (the future Seventh Day Adventists), and Jehovah's Witnesses, each of whom would develop into worldwide churches. Then in the twentieth century, the number of millennial Pentecostal churches grew significantly, many to merge into the Assemblies of God in the 1920s. Their missionaries and those of the Seventh Day Adventists were main sources for the spread of Christian derived millenarianism to Africa, Southeast Asia, and Latin America, where they are now numbered in their millions and where local populations have incorporated local beliefs and values into their worship, such as spirit possession.

At the same time as white millenarianism was growing in the US, millenarianism arose first among the West Coast Native Americans in the 1870 Ghost Dance movement, and then in 1890 among the far more important Plains Indians, whose Ghost Dance offered them

solidarity, however briefly, and the hope of a return to the old ways of plenty. Elsewhere in the world similar movements were being formed. These were the cargo cults of Southeast Asia and Oceania. Numbered in hundreds and spread over the other half of the globe, they too took place where tribes were disintegrating, as status and power through the ownership or access to animals or lands and the rituals of their cultural and religious heritage collapsed in front of western technology, capital, and military resources. Often combining tribal and Christian religious elements, prophets and messiahs arose almost spontaneously across this vast region to form both passive and aggressive movements, expecting to receive from above the wealth, knowledge, and technology typical of their white imperialists and, sometimes, a return to the ways of the past. In one such movement, the Maori Hau Hau (New Zealand 1864–6), the prophet Te Ua revealed that men from heaven would come down to teach them all the arts and sciences of the Europeans; all dead Maoris would rise again and share in their earthly paradise and a chant would protect them from the bullets of the local colonial regiment (Wilson 1973). The movement was shattered like others in the subsequent conflicts. Some of the more peaceful movements survived longer in the form of indigenous sects.

THEORIZING MILLENARIANISM

Generally speaking, millenarian movements and groups are socially significant primarily because such beliefs become active during periods of social uncertainty or unrest. They challenge oppressors and the current social and moral order of society or the religious establishment, promising reform – at least for the believers – or revolution. They are protest movements often ending in breakaway sects from parent bodies. Believers have expectations that divine intervention will favor them against their enemies. Marx and Engels integrated the movements into their general theory of social conflict and revolution. While they may be faulted for reducing the religious and cultural causes of the movements to a smokescreen hiding underlying class warfare, they were the first to recognize the dominant role of oppression in many of them.

Since then, other researchers have pointed to other elements affecting or constituting these movements. Imminent expectation of millennial events is as important to the movements as the millennial beliefs themselves. Key strategists are often required to maintain momentum. Also, such expectation requires states of high alertness accompanied with either great enthusiasm or deep depression. These elements are hard to sustain in the long term, leading to a loss of their vital potency. In fact, most active movements do not last and either implode or are suppressed. If believers retain their beliefs in the long run, it is because they have become institutionalized or more peaceful. Weber's notion of charisma has considerable relevance here: millenarianism is unstable and prophecy may be intermittent or disappear. To retain some of the charisma, organization supported by rituals is necessary, particularly where the prophet has little organization of his own, lost his charisma, or died.

Millenarian movements may foster violence when certain conditions prevail: believers view the rest of society as evil, corrupt, and irredeemable; the movement is relatively small and isolated; the leader of the movement is messianic and has tight control of people's minds and actions; believers are provoked by exploitation, dispossession, and sacrilege committed by outsiders. Of course, the violence may come instead from outside: non-believers may fear the movement and suppress it.

Many movements have the additional belief of apocalypticism or *catastrophic millenarianism*: the conviction that cataclysmic events and the violent end of an evil world are imminent and precede the divine millennium. For the many Christians that believed this in the early nineteenth century, it was a dreadful thought. Hence the appearance in the 1830s of the doctrine of the Rapture: Jesus is going to take his faithful off to heaven before the "tribulation" begins. An alternative belief to apocalypticism is *progressive millenarianism*. Believers have a role to play in building the millennial society, whether it is preparation for a messiah or not (see Wessinger in Robbins & Palmer 1997). Some authors still use the terms premillenarianism (the messiah and the "tribulation" come at the beginning of the millennium) and postmillenarianism (the messiah comes at the end) as earlier alternatives

to the above; but such terms are less inclusive, referring principally to Christian millenarianism.

SEE ALSO: Charisma; Charismatic Movement; Christianity; Conflict Theory; Engels, Friedrich; Islam; Jehovah's Witnesses; Judaism; Religious Cults; Revolutions

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Mills, C. Wright (1916–62)

Steven P. Dandaneau

C. Wright Mills is the most recognized figure in the history of American sociology. Mills is to American sociology as Margaret Mead is to American anthropology. He was prolific, provocative, and prescient. The author of, not one,

but three of American sociology's most influential and debated books – *White Collar* (1954), *The Power Elite* (1956), and *The Sociological Imagination* (1959) – Mills's scholarly oeuvre is a veritable microcosm of American sociology's distinctive character. Likewise, Mills's political writings remain partisan touchstones for social critics and citizens grappling with the baleful consequences of the postmodern society that Mills was among the first to glimpse at its inception, but did not live to fully decipher. A hero to some, a villain to others, the name C. Wright Mills evokes passion, for no one before or since has more fully embodied, nor more courageously battled, American sociology and its self imposed gods and demons.

C. Wright Mills was born Charles Wright Mills in Waco, Texas, on August 28, 1916. On March 20, 1962, he suffered a fatal heart attack in the West Nyack, New York, house that he had helped design and build. An obituary appeared in the *Washington Post and Times Herald*. Fidel Castro sent a wreath to mark Mills's grave.

Forty five years previous, Mills came of age as the only child of Charles Grover and Frances Wright Mills. Leavened by his mother's Catholicism, Mills was raised in an otherwise typical Texas middle class milieu. "Charleswright," as he was known to his mother, graduated from Dallas Technical High School in 1934 and endured an unhappy year at Texas Agricultural & Mechanical College (Texas A&M) before transferring to the University of Texas at Austin, where he earned a BA in sociology and an MA in philosophy. Married at 21, Mills was but 23 years old when his first scholarly paper was published, notably, in sociology's leading journal.

In that same year, 1939, Mills began graduate work in sociology at the University of Wisconsin at Madison, where he established a productive collaboration with the brilliant émigré German sociologist, Hans H. Gerth. Together, they produced the edited volume *From Max Weber: Essays in Sociology* (1946), which is perhaps the most influential single volume of Weber's work rendered in English, as well as the co authored *Character and Social Structure* (1953), a work in social psychology. Mills received his doctorate in sociology in 1942 on the strength of a dissertation that

advanced a sociological account of American pragmatist philosophy via study of its leading originators, namely, Charles Sanders Pierce, William James, and John Dewey. Originally “A Sociological Account of Pragmatism: An Essay on the Sociology of Knowledge,” Mills’s first book length study was published posthumously as *Sociology and Pragmatism: The Higher Learning in America* (1964), a title that captures the Alpha and Omega of Mills’s sociology – European sociology and American philosophy – as well as suggests how the confluence of Weberian sociology and Deweyian pragmatism in his own intellectual origins facilitated his development as a latter day Thorstein Veblen.

Mills spent World War II as a professor of sociology at the University of Maryland at College Park. He also worked briefly for the Smaller War Plants Corporation, preparing a report for the US Senate entitled *Small Business and Civic Welfare* (with Melville J. Ulmer, 1946). At the conclusion of the war, Mills accepted a post at Columbia University’s Bureau of Applied Social Research, which was directed by the eminent sociologist Paul F. Lazarsfeld, and an affiliation with the department of sociology, with the support of luminaries Daniel Bell, Robert K. Merton, and Robert S. Lynd. At the Bureau, Mills served as Director of the Labor Research Division, which resulted in the important study of American labor leaders, *The New Men of Power* (with the assistance of Helen Schneider, 1948), and he supervised the Bureau’s field research that led to *The Puerto Rican Journey* (1950). Mills left the Bureau in 1949 for a full time appointment in the department of sociology. In that same year he undertook a prestigious semester long visiting professorship at the University of Chicago. In 1951, *White Collar* was published and Mills was awarded tenure and promotion.

At the age of 35, Mills was as a member of the discipline’s premiere faculty and was well on his way to being a publicly recognized intellectual, yet controversy and discord continued to characterize much of his personal and professional life, just as it had since his first year in college. Many of the collegial relationships that facilitated Mills’s movement from Texas to Wisconsin, and from Wisconsin to Maryland and then to Columbia, for example, soon frayed

or were sundered altogether. Mills was also in these years twice divorced and remarried, with daughters Pamela and Kathryn children of Dorothy Helen Smith (known as Freya Mills) and Ruth Harper Mills, respectively, and son Nikolaas the child of Mills’s third spouse, Yaroslava Surmach Mills. Nor did Mills benefit from stable relationships with graduate students (Maryland’s William Form was his only doctoral advisee), although Mills did on occasion befriend the exceptional undergraduate, such as Columbia’s Dan Wakefield.

Recognizing his restless nature, Mills sought creative avenues for self expression far beyond typically effete forms of academic recreation and amusement. He tried subsistence farming and photography, baked bread, built houses, and experimented with motorcycle engines. (Mills’s first trip to Europe was a sojourn to the BMW factory in Munich!) These distractions did not, however, provide sufficient respite from the stresses concomitant with Mills’s own *raison d’être*, thorough going sociological criticism that goes full bore at the given and its existing justifications, and that is, therefore, always tilting toward unflinching self criticism, warts and all. More to the point perhaps, the irascible manner and prose style that brought Mills notoriety also left him repeatedly estranged from former sources of stability and support, as though having adopted the persona of Veblen, Mills’s own life, private and public alike, was fated to mirror Veblen’s tragic example.

Mills seems to have followed Veblen in another respect as well, as a harsh critic of wealth and power and an even harsher critic of the hypocrisies these generate in manifestly pious America. This is no more true than in *The Power Elite*, Mills’s critical study of the concentration of power in mid century America, a study which may have been on President Eisenhower’s mind when he later warned of the anti democratic consequences likely to result from an emergent “military industrial complex.” Mills came to think of this book as the last in an emergent “trilogy” on the subject of power in advanced industrial society. *The New Men of Power* is thus construed as volume one, in which Mills analyzed the increasingly anti communist and, for the most part, anti socialist leadership of the newly legitimate American industrial unions. By virtue of their

unions' strategic position in the US economy and their own command over substantial political mobilization, post war labor leaders wielded power sufficient, if used wisely, to expand the scope of democratic freedom within the sanctum sanctorum of western modernity. Volume two is *White Collar*, Mills's searing portrait of the new middle classes, the armies of pencil pushing managerial, technical, clerical, and sales functionaries who worked for the proverbial gray flannel suits, and who strode toward an abundant if also tacky suburban version of the American Dream. Goodbye farm and factory, hello Levittown.

In both earlier works, the structural antecedent to the power of labor leaders and various and sundry managers, technicians, and professionals is the advent of what Weber called legal rational or, simply, bureaucratic social organization. *The Power Elite* is consistent in its attention to the analysis of the command positions at the apex of post war US military, capitalist, and state bureaucracies. Mills also analyzes expansion of mass society, which mirrors the bureaucratization of everyday life. Only upon the basis of an analysis of this type and scope does Mills then analyze the nearly interchangeable types of men (and they were all men) who, by virtue of their position in society, were called upon to fill these increasingly integrated positions of national and global power. The former general and Columbia University president, Dwight D. Eisenhower, not only echoed Mills's analysis as he left the White House in 1961, he embodied it.

If *The Power Elite* is the third in a trilogy, it is also the first in a series of publications and life events in which Mills followed the logic of his own sociology toward a direct and at times startling participation in worldwide political crises. Between 1956 and 1962 Mills lectured and traveled widely in Western Europe, less frequently venturing to Mexico, Eastern Europe, the Soviet Union, and Cuba. Mills befriended young left intellectuals such as England's Ralph Miliband and E. P. Thompson, and he also made personal contact with those his senior, such as Jean Paul Sartre and Simone de Beauvoir. Having received a prestigious Guggenheim Fellowship in 1946, Mills was appointed a Fulbright lecturer in Denmark in 1956 at about the same time that several of his earlier books were deemed worthy of translation

into German, Russian, French, Italian, Japanese, and Polish.

In 1960 Mills became an adviser to Fidel Castro, who identified *The Power Elite* as a valued influence. Mills also issued his own political manifesto, the influential "Letter to the New Left" (1960). As an increasingly full time political writer, Mills focused his energies on influencing the politics of the day. He sought means to produce accessible and affordable mass circulation polemics. As capable of self criticism and irony as, at times, bravado and spite, Mills called these often strident pamphlets and articles his "preachings."

Among Mills's explicitly political writings are three major books. *The Causes of World War Three* (1958), which sold over 100,000 copies, addresses the bureaucratically rational, although obviously insane, preparation for nuclear holocaust promulgated as unavoidable by rival Soviet and American elites alike. This volume is replete with Mills's penchant for colorful neologisms such as Crackpot Realism and the Science Machine, and includes Mills's incendiary "A Pagan Sermon," an actual sermon twice delivered before church groups in which he reproaches Christians for their hypocritical submission to, if not overt support for, national defense by means of thermonuclear weapons.

As if his rebuke of Cold War Christians and his equation of US and Soviet elites as joint partners in the prevailing "higher immorality" were not enough, Mills also joined the Fair Play for Cuba Committee, known to history for Lee Harvey Oswald's membership more than for Mills's. Not surprisingly, Mills came under FBI surveillance, which only intensified with the publication of *Listen, Yankee! The Revolution in Cuba* (1960). Adopting the point of view of a fictional Cuban revolutionary (a composite of the revolutionary leaders Mills interviewed for the book), Mills argued passionately for the merit and glory of the Cuban revolution. A staggering 400,000 copies later, *Listen, Yankee!* was apparently even on President Kennedy's mind when, in a moment of apparent exasperation, he told a visiting French journalist critical of the US policy toward Cuba: "I'm not some sociologist, I'm the President of the United States."

The Marxists (1962) would not have further endeared Mills to Kennedy or J. Edgar Hoover,

but, alas, it appeared in print a few weeks after Mills's death. Not viewed as among his most discerning works, Mills's study of Marx's corpus and selected Marxian theoreticians and revolutionaries contains his declaration of allegiance to "plain Marxism," his own neologism that marks in theory the distance from his roots in American pragmatism and Weberian sociology evident in the praxis of his last years.

It would be incorrect, however, to regard Mills as having gone to his grave a Marxist. There is no question that Mills had come to share Marx's view that sociologists and their academic kin had long interpreted the world whereas the greater need was to change it. This commitment to a radical attitude toward history making did not, however, cause Mills to abandon academic self criticism.

Appearing in 1959, *The Sociological Imagination* is Mills's most complex and enduring book. Mills toyed with using "autopsy" in the title, but thought better of implying a discipline irretrievably expired when what he sought above all was to restate sociology's compelling original promise. *The Sociological Imagination* may be profitably viewed as an immanent critique of the professional ideology of American sociology. Ironically, portions of its first chapter commonly appear in introductory texts, as though either American sociology had long ago welcomed and favorably absorbed the essence of Mills's critique or, conversely, could stomach only a thimble's worth of his tonic.

In Mills's reading, American sociology had instituted a set of ideas and practices that functioned to suppress the implicit radicalism of sociology's mainly European founders, but which was also present in the Deweys and Veblens on his side of the Atlantic. This ideology included, not surprisingly, sociology's own professionalization and nearly wholesale adoption of a bureaucratic ethos. Mills also criticized the unacknowledged and untenable infusion of American traditions of moralistic reformism into sociological analysis, which threatened to render American sociology little more than the academic arm of the Salvation Army and increasingly punitive post war welfare state. Mills's greatest venom was reserved, however, for his celebrated contemporaries, Harvard's Talcott Parsons, who he charged with having created and then sanctified as unassailable a

historically irrelevant "grand theory," and his former boss at the Bureau of Applied Social Research at Columbia, Paul Lazarsfeld, who he charged with having sold his soul to an equally irrelevant "abstract empiricism."

For Mills, Parsons's and Lazarsfeld's versions of sociology – one too philosophical, the other too empirical – pointed to an alarming lapse in sociology's institutional memory, a systematic loss of contact with the animating purpose and promise that is evident in the work of those who knowingly and, more often than not, unknowingly, founded the new discipline of sociology. Mills identifies this spirit in what he calls "the classic tradition" (selections of which he collected and analyzed in an edited volume, *Images of Man*, 1960), which includes most prominently Marx and Weber, but also Durkheim, Simmel, Spencer, and Mannheim, among many others. Borrowing from each, Mills describes a shared desire to inculcate in modernity's democratic citizenry the quality of mind and type of self knowledge needed to make history in modern times; that is, make history without recourse to illusions ready at hand, under conditions, as it were, of no one's choosing.

Mills's argument that sociology should maintain fidelity to this posited founding *raison d'être* is tantamount to equating sociology and "critical theory." Critical theory is social and cultural analysis with emancipatory intent. Critical theory aims to unmask the true nature of prevailing institutions and cultural patterns – those which, when functioning even normally, produce forms of unnecessary unfreedom and distorted self understandings – and to do this by critically analyzing ideologies, the systems of ideas and patterns of life that inhibit such recognition. The hope and expectation is that sociological knowledge of this type would be used to guide practical forms of democratic self emancipation. *The Sociological Imagination* depicts American sociology as dominated by wordsmiths, number crunchers, the historically uninformed, and knee jerk liberal professors indistinguishable from the middle classes of *White Collar*. Fairly or unfairly, Mills perceived that something like a "sociological imagination" was becoming publicly recognized as the most needed and potentially most fruitful form of self consciousness available to make sense of the "traps" of postmodern life, the "issues"

and “troubles” that tormented the denizens of advanced industrial society, and also the “magnificent” new types of knowledge and understanding resulting from radical self awareness. Mills therefore held sociology to the highest possible expectations, the most lofty of purposes.

Since Mills was an inveterate writer, it is not surprising that he bequeathed to the archives not only the content of his own research file system, the general method for creating an assured beneficence which he promoted some what incongruously in an appendix to *The Sociological Imagination*, but also numerous significant works in progress, among them full length books on the “cultural apparatus,” a critical study of elites in Soviet society, and preliminary data for a massive multi volume world historical “comparative sociology.” Mills also began to elaborate on his previously published views on a much needed “new left,” which only furthers the impression that Mills had set out in his last days to create a full blown critical theory of postmodern society. Critique of the propaganda and the public sphere gives way to an emphasis on the critique of an emergent culture industry or apparatus, and critique of oppressive bureaucratic organization in post revolutionary societies is subordinated to an immanent critique directed, not to the working class, but to intellectuals and would be intellectuals strategically positioned in the post industrial mode of production, capitalist or communist in character.

Most importantly, however, Mills recognized the need for a critical alternative to modernization theory in the “third world,” which implicitly assumed that most of the earth’s inhabitants would want to, and would eventually, live as Americans or Soviets did. Mills understood that “the hungry nation bloc,” as he called them, faced massive obstacles to the full realization of reason and freedom, not the least of which was their obvious material and political impoverishment at the hands of a neocolonial world system. As *Listen, Yankee!* makes abundantly clear, Mills was inclined to give revolution a chance. So strongly was he committed to this struggle that he sacrificed his academic reputation and, later, his health, in efforts to support social change worldwide.

Evaluating Mills’s intellectual legacy in full is impossible for the simple reason that it

continues to be debated and reformulated. This fact notwithstanding, serious studies of Mills’s oeuvre are few. Mills the critical theorist is often overshadowed by circulating images of his riding his motorcycle at high speed and the not always apocryphal stories of his hulking 6’ 2” frame, insatiable appetite, and square jawed bravado. It is as though the new generation of academics in postmodern society crave little else beyond the titillation of endless tales of Mills’s wanton transgression of the new middle class habits of the heart. It is also easy to imagine a discipline in which neophyte instructors read only the same few pages from *The Sociological Imagination* that they assign neophyte students, or a discipline resigned to the illusion that professional societies doling out C. Wright Mills Awards is not the very sort of hypocrisy that Mills opposed. Mainstream sociology would appear mostly untroubled by Mills’s legacy framed in terms of 1960s student movement nostalgia and the simple minded question, who rules America?

Serious study of Mills would need to address his biography, which has yet to be treated in a fair and thorough manner, and would analyze the numerous theoretical mediations of vexing actual and conceptual polarities in his vast published and unpublished work that Mills sought, proposed, achieved, and failed to achieve. Among these are Mills’s synthesis of European and American social thought, including his translation of pragmatist philosophical insight into empirical sociological research programs. Mills is also a keen interpreter of Marx and Weber, which he undertook mindful of, but largely independent from, the Frankfurt School’s more familiar and influential efforts in this vein. Mills’s relatively early identification of postmodern society, what he also called the “fourth epoch,” deserves sustained analysis, and while he did not live long enough to more than experiment with the new styles of thinking and communicating called for by the emergence of postmodernity (e.g., his composite Cuban revolutionary in *Listen, Yankee!*, the dialogue format of the proposed “Soviet Journal,” his newfound concern for publicity over and against mere publication), any history of postmodern theory and presentation should account for Mills’s pioneering efforts to effect a form of ideology critique in an age where mass society

had first reproduced itself via mass media, and where as a result daily reality seemed eerily to confirm that all that is solid really had melted into air: polluted, ozone depleted air.

Academic appraisal aside, remembrance of C. Wright Mills the person should acknowledge that his supreme desire – to play a part in making history veer in the direction of human liberation – cruelly eluded him. A biographical vignette, then, as finality.

In December, 1960 – that is, 5 months prior to the Bay of Pigs invasion, 14 months prior to Mills's death, and 22 months prior to the Cuban Missile Crisis – C. Wright Mills was asked to debate A. A. Berle, Jr. on NBC Television. The subject was US policy toward Cuba and the expected audience numbered 5 million. Just prior to the scheduled broadcast, Mills suffered a severe heart attack and was hospitalized. He had known of a heart condition since being rejected as fit for conscription at the outset of World War II. With Mills in a coma, Congressman Charles O. Porter of Oregon filled in and the broadcast went ahead otherwise as planned. A few weeks after checking himself out of hospital, Mills learned that he had been named in a \$25 million lawsuit and that he was the target of an assassination plot, the former initiated by a Cuban libel claimant and the latter purportedly threatened by anti Castro sympathizers. Mills bought a gun. He traveled to Europe, Eastern Europe, and to the Soviet Union, in search of therapy for his heart, R&R, to visit a few of his remaining friends, and to consider immigration to England. Mills, however, returned to the US in January of 1962 and continued to work on various manuscripts, and Soviet freighters traversed their way to and from Cuba as Mills's estranged academic colleagues gathered at his Columbia University memorial service to confabulate on *his* having gone over the edge.

SEE ALSO: Critical Theory/Frankfurt School; New Left; Power Elite; Pragmatism; Sociological Imagination

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mind

David D. Franks

In common parlance, mind means cognitive intelligence, self consciousness, mentality, or reason, all of which were once considered unique to humans. While some animal forms exhibit these capacities to some extent, only in humans are they developed as primary adaptive mechanisms. In more academic circles, the use of the term mind rather than its other synonyms recalls its place in broader debates in western theories of knowledge. This is especially true in social psychology since the philosophically trained George Herbert Mead demonstrated the dependency of individual mind on society and behavior. Mind had been previously understood purely mentally, as a self enclosed, enduring entity in the head rather than an episodic biosocial, behavior dependent process. The broad outline of Mead's theory of mind remains important for a thoroughly social rendition of human mentality. Mead's theory and some current continuities and refinements from neuroscience are presented below.

Through his school of social behaviorism Mead transcended the futile debates between the idealists, rationalists, and empirical realists

of the Enlightenment era. Rather than viewing the primary link between mind and world as the rationalist's *reason* or the realist's *senses*, Mead saw the primary link as *behavior*. The world became known actively through the way it responded to our actions upon it, rather than by mere reflection or by passive registration through the senses. This view made mind dependent on behavioral *process* rather than some substantial *tabula rasa* on which experience could write "carbon copies," as contended by empiricists. Nor was mind solely a "projector" imposing its inherent forms on the experienced world, as some rationalists and idealists argued. For Mead, human knowledge was as much a result of the knower's contribution as what the impartial world contributed.

Behavior was defined through Mead's theory of the social act, which in turn provided the context for his theory of mind. Four phases comprised the act – impulse, perception, manipulation, and consummation. Thought, consciousness, and thus "minded behavior" arose in the manipulative phase of the act. Action was prior to, and necessary for, reflection since consciousness typically occurred when behavior was blocked. Otherwise one acted unreflectively and thus mindlessly. It was the "obdurate character" of the world of resistance that caused action to stop as individuals considered two things: hypothetical alternatives around the resistance and their own capacities for alternative conduct. Such processes assumed the capacity for *self-consciousness* which relied on the capacity for *taking the role of the other* – seeing one's own behavior from others' standpoints. Minded behavior incorporates both capacities, fostering flexible and coordinated social action.

In role taking, actors respond to their own oncoming behavior *as would the other* and then use the anticipated response to guide their lines of conduct. The cognitive demands on such a process guarantee that role taking will be episodic and situated. For example, it may be triggered when the person is confronting those whose responses matter or who have some capacity to constrain spontaneous behavior. Much of Mead's work centered on how self-awareness, and thus minded behavior, arose through the process of role taking.

Accuracy in role taking also implies a pre-existing social world of shared linguistic meanings that enable actors to respond to their own oncoming behavior in the same way as the other. Mead referred to words with shared meanings as *significant symbols*. Without them, role taking and coordinated behavior could not proceed.

Role taking, then, is a process of *voluntary self-control of behavior*. Rather than behavior being passively pushed by external past conditioning, behavior was pulled along by one's own future anticipation of its consummation. Lines of minded human behavior then were teleologically constructed wherein the termination of the act was implicit in its beginnings. Social behaviorism and Mead's theory of mind were born in opposition to the psychological and individualistic behaviorism of Watson and Skinner and offered the only available alternative as a voluntaristic theory of behavioral and self control.

The extrasensory character of symbols meant that humans could think beyond the immediately sensed actuality, considering the hypothetical or possible, i.e., how two originally unrelated objects could be joined together in a new way to produce tools. It also enabled cognition transcending particular time or space. Rather than thinking only of particular red objects, the symbol allowed one to think of abstract redness itself. This gave a great efficiency to human mentality.

A final feature of minded behavior consisted of the capacity for internal dialogues with one self using significant symbols. This involves the self reflexive, conscious process of being both speaker and spoken to as actors make indications to themselves in the flexible weighing of alternative behaviors before acting.

Giving balanced weight to the role of the organism and environment in forming the individual's perceptual experience made Mead's basic framework amenable to findings from contemporary neuroscience. Any individual *working* brain owes its functioning to interactions with other brains operating within symbolic cultural systems. But current findings are mounting that the brain itself adds significantly to our sociality with propensities for rudimentary prelinguistic thought, concepts, and innate

sensitivities to facial expressions and gazes (Brothers 2001). Independently of Mead's notion of role taking, neuroscientists currently talk of the infant's early capacities to create "theories of minds." This is the prelinguistic disposition to construct other's thoughts and to develop the notion of self and others' selves beyond observable bodies (Bloom 2000; Brothers 2001). According to Brothers, "it is by virtue of social participation that the practices constituting mind emerge." For example, the inability to invest other bodies with intentions and feelings is now thought to be a major deficit in autism. A theory of mind is also necessary for learning languages, which is often problematic for autistics. They have pronounced difficulty with pronouns, the understanding of which Mead attributed to the ability to role take.

Mead's theory of mind recognized the importance of the central nervous system long before the field of neuroscience had advanced enough to be useful to him (Mead 1934: 236n). Mind presupposes a highly developed brain, but the brain alone is not sufficient for mind. Current findings from neuroscience will no doubt further refine and change Mead's original theory.

SEE ALSO: Behaviorism; Complexity and Emergence; Identity: The Management of Meaning; Mead, George Herbert; Reflexivity; Role Taking; Self; Semiotics

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minzoku

Kosaku Yoshino

Minzoku is a Japanese word meaning an ethnic group, a nation, a race, or even a combination of all these. A Japanese dictionary defines *minzoku* as "(1) a social group sharing many common characteristics in race, language, culture, religion, etc.; (2) a social group sharing a territory, an economy and a fate and forming a state. A nation" (Umesao et al. 1989). *Minzoku*

Japanese words coined in the westernizing Meiji era (1868–1911) on the basis of original western concepts.

The multivocal nature of the word reflects the fact that ethnic, national, and racial categories rather vaguely overlap in the Japanese perception of themselves. The Japanese view of nation is very much an ethnic one. Japan's national identity has centered around the notion of the uniqueness of Japanese ethnicity shared by its members, a uniqueness which is a function of culture, religion, and race.

Although *minzoku* is commonly used in everyday language as well as in political discourses in Japan, conceptual ambiguities surrounding this concept render it unsuitable as an analytical tool in social sciences. In an effort to ensure greater analytical clarity as well as to deconstruct the notion of *minzoku* itself, social scientists generally make use of English social scientific terms such as nation, ethnicity, and race in examining *minzoku* related phenomena in Japan.

JAPANESE MINZOKU AS AN ETHNIC/RACIAL NATION

Traditionally, use of the term "ethnic" in English was restricted to minorities and immigrant groups. Many social scientists now extend the use of the word to connote a broader historical prototype or substratum of national community. For example, Anthony D. Smith understands nation – in the case of the first nations of Western Europe and several other leading states including Japan – as being based on ties of ethnicity, arguing that a nation arises upon

an ethnic community, which he calls *ethnie*. In the Japanese context, this can be taken to refer to a community or a group of communities that existed in what is now called the Japanese Archipelago in the period prior to the Meiji era, which was characterized by ethnic sentiment and an ethnic state but was not fully conscious of itself as a nation. In the Japanese language, however, there is no need to distinguish between premodern *ethnie* and modern nation. In fact, use of the notion of *minzoku* accentuates a sense of continuity between premodern developments in the formation of Japanese identity and the building of the modern Japanese nation.

The concept of “ethnic” can also refer to a substratal sense of identity among the contemporary Japanese based on culture and descent – though ambiguities surround the boundaries between ethnic and national sentiment. Again, it appears more realistic to use the Japanese notion of *minzoku* in depicting issues of Japanese identity, since ethnic and racial elements are fused with one another to form Japanese national identity.

The making of the Japanese *minzoku* (nation) had very much to do with the formulation in the late nineteenth century of the nationalist ideology that conceived Japan as a “family nation” of divine origin. Members of the family nation were perceived to be related “by kin” to one another and ultimately to the emperor. Kinship, religion, and race were fused with one another to produce an intensely felt collective sense of “oneness.” This nationalist ideology went into eclipse following Japan’s defeat in World War II.

More recently, the myth of Japan as a distinctive ethnic/racial nation resurfaced in a more subtle form as part of a resurgence of cultural nationalism in the 1970s and 1980s. Cultural nationalism of this period was closely associated with the dominant discourses, commonly referred to as *nihonjinron*, which defined and redefined the distinctiveness of the Japanese. It was widely held that Japanese patterns of behavior and thought are so unique that one cannot understand and acquire them unless one is born Japanese. It may be said that Japanese culture is here perceived to be the exclusive property of the “Japanese race.” It must be stressed that in reality there is no such thing

as a “Japanese race” and that “race” itself is a socially constructed notion. If ethnicity is a collectivity of people defined by virtue of belief in shared culture and history, race focuses upon, and exaggerates, a particular aspect of ethnicity, that is, kinship and kin lineage. Here, race is a marker that strengthens ethnic and, therefore, national identity. Subconsciously, the Japanese have perceived themselves as a distinct “racial” community, and this perception is characteristically expressed by the fictitious notion of “Japanese blood.” Although most Japanese may doubt that such an entity exists in reality, this rhetorical symbol facilitates the sentiment that “we,” members of the “imagined kinship,” are the product of our own special formative experience in history and that, because of this, “we” possess unique qualities.

This type of thinking, which closely associates culture with “race,” is, again, reflected in conceptual ambiguities surrounding race, ethnicity, and nation in the Japanese word *minzoku*. In addition, there is a myth of Japan as a homogeneous, uniracial/ethnic nation (*tan’itsu minzoku*), that is, a strong emphasis on the homogeneity of Japanese society and a corresponding lack of adequate scholarly attention given to ethnic minorities in Japan such as Koreans, Chinese, Ainu, and Okinawans.

CHANGING PERCEPTIONS OF JAPANESE *MINZOKU*

Due to developments in studies of nationalism and national identity as well as to changes in Japan itself and its external relations, discourses emphasizing the ethnic and racial qualities of the Japanese *minzoku* (nation) now tend to be identified as problematic among concerned scholars. In particular, use of the cliché *tan’itsu minzoku* (uniracial/ethnic nation) increasingly provokes controversy and criticism, given the now dominant trend toward demythologization of the unracial/ethnic nation of Japan. Some of the changes that have been occurring in the discourse on Japanese ethnic/racial/national identity may be mentioned here.

First, an increasingly large influx of migrant workers from Southeast Asia, the Middle East, and other developing regions in the 1980s and 1990s served as a catalyst for the Japanese to

reconsider the myth of homogeneous Japan. A growing number of newspaper articles, books, and television programs have featured race and ethnic relations involving these migrant laborers. The undeniable presence of visible foreigners living as neighbors in the community and working side by side with Japanese at construction sites and in factories and other workplaces has made it more and more unrealistic to refer to Japan (at least, urban Japan) as being homogeneous.

Second, in a wider context, the development of studies of ethnicity and nationalism has also provided stimulus for a critique of the *tan'itsu minzoku* myth. Recent years have seen a steady increase in the number of scholars who apply insights provided by theorists such as Anthony Smith and Benedict Anderson to explore some of the interesting issues of *ethnie* and nation that had hitherto been neglected. For example, it was long assumed that Japan was without a regionally based ethnic community comparable to the Basques in Spain or Bretons in France. With the development of the sociological debate on ethnicity, Japan's own prefecture of Okinawa has increasingly drawn the attention of scholars. Indeed, Okinawans' strong sense of possessing their own distinctive culture and history may well entitle them to be regarded as a distinct ethnic community.

A group of historians is now calling into question the very concept of the Japanese *minzoku* (*ethnie*) itself. A leading example is Amino, who is a long time critic of the notion of Japan as a uniraical/ethnic nation and whose writings have attracted increasing attention as the deconstruction of the *tan'itsu minzoku* myth has become part of the popular scholarly agenda. Amino maintains that, despite popular belief, the Japanese did not constitute an *ethnie* in the early medieval period or in the Kamakura period (1185–1333 CE). On the contrary, he argues that early medieval Japan consisted of an "East Country" and a "West Country" with two distinct types of social structures, political systems, and religious beliefs, and that the differences between the two "countries" were as large as or even larger than those between Portugal, Spain, Italy, and France or between the Netherlands and Germany before they became nations as we know them today. Even though different regions of Japan had objective conditions for

and the potential to develop into distinct *minzoku* (nations), Amino maintains that history did not take such a course due to various historical coincidences. His new interpretations of Japanese history are regarded as a prominent challenge to the *tan'itsu minzoku* ideology.

The notion that Japanese culture is the exclusive property of the "Japanese race" is also being challenged by the growing presence in Japan of "obvious" foreigners who speak Japanese just as naturally as the native Japanese, on the one hand, and those Japanese returnees from abroad (*kikokushijo*) whose behavior and use of the Japanese language appear "foreign," on the other. One result of these cases of Japanese like foreigners and un Japanese Japanese is a lack of fit between cultural and "racial" boundaries of difference, which in turn causes an inconsistency in and inefficacy of the symbolic boundary system that defines Japanese identity. The increasing occurrence of such "boundary dissonance," one byproduct of globalization, is posing a challenge to the assumption that those who speak and behave like the Japanese should be "racially" Japanese, and vice versa.

Still, the racial and cultural overtones in the notion of Japanese *minzoku* have deep roots. Ironically, these roots often reveal themselves in the process of the so called internationalization of Japan. Just to give one noteworthy example, Japan's immigration law prohibits the entry of unskilled workers partly because of fear that such an influx might endanger the racial homogeneity and harmony of Japanese society. While there is a real need for migrant workers in the labor market, the state is unwilling to change the immigration law. One measure the business community took to cope with this dilemma was to recruit South Americans of Japanese ancestry, as the law allows second and third generation Japanese South Americans to work legally in Japan provided that proof is submitted that one parent is of Japanese nationality. This case shows the continued relevance and changing arenas of the racial and ethnic nature of Japanese national identity amidst the phenomenon of globalization in the world economy and labor markets.

SEE ALSO: Ethnicity; Nation State; Nationalism; *Nihonjinron*

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mobility, horizontal and vertical

Wout Ultee

The notion that in contemporary highly industrialized societies persons may climb up or slide down the social ladder presupposed some scale with an upper end and a lower end and the possibility of ranking people on it. Individual income can be taken as such a scale, and if this is used it is possible to speak of upward and downward mobility and to quantify the extent to which a person is upwardly or downwardly mobile. Occupational status, as indicated by the prestige accorded to occupations in surveys involving representative samples from a country's population, also makes it possible to ascertain mobility. In these cases a sociologist speaks of *vertical* mobility.

Sometimes sociologists also speak of *horizontal* mobility. In that case, they do not avail

themselves of a scale allowing a full ranking of persons. A case in point are class schemas, for instance the one developed first by Goldthorpe (1980) for Britain and later by Erikson and Goldthorpe (1992) for research on social mobility involving a comparison of countries. This schema has a "top": the persons belonging to what they call the service class. It has a "bottom," too: the unskilled and semi skilled manual workers in industry, together with agricultural workers. However, the schema does not rank the intermediate categories, such as those for skilled manual workers, routine non manual workers, farmers, and small proprietors. Movement from these categories to the service class is upward mobility, and movement to the class of unskilled manual workers is downward mobility, but movement from one of these intermediate categories to another of these intermediate categories is horizontal mobility.

Of course, it is possible to rank the various intermediate categories according to the average income of their members, but class schemas are not about income. They refer to the work relations of persons (and the hypothesis for further research is that work relations affect income). Persons in some jobs follow commands, persons in other jobs give commands, and some persons have a business all their own that involves neither supervision nor being commanded. The labor contract of some persons stipulates that they can be laid off immediately in slack periods, while other contracts do not allow for this. The output of some persons is easily monitored and of others not at all. This multiplicity of work relations makes for classes that can be ranked below other classes and above yet other classes, but not among each other.

According to Goldthorpe, horizontal mobility is as interesting to study as vertical mobility. A case in point is the contraction of the agricultural sector in industrial societies. Farm laborers left their jobs, mainly going to unskilled manual jobs in the industrial sector, and farmers often became self employed in small businesses connected to the agrarian sector. Thus, this sectorial transformation of a country's economy did not lead to upward mobility, as some theories of modernization have held, but only to horizontal mobility.

SEE ALSO: Income Inequality and Income Mobility; Mobility, Measuring the Effects of; Occupational Mobility

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mobility, intergenerational and intragenerational

Wout Ultee

In *Social Mobility* (1927) Sorokin attempted to ascertain for early twentieth century western societies like England, France, Germany, Italy, and the US the extent to which “the occupational status of a father determines that of his children,” as well as “the intensiveness of inter occupational shifting within the life of one generation.” Later, these two phenomena were called intergenerational mobility and intragenerational mobility. Behind this distinction lurks the casual observation or conventional wisdom that, whereas in agrarian societies with autocratic or oligarchic rule the transmission of occupation from father to son along the whole range of occupations is strong, in democratic industrial societies people may work their way up the social ladder during the course of their lives. Because of issues concerning the comparability of data, Sorokin could do no more than suggest that intergenerational inheritance was never fully complete nor fully absent, leaving questions about differences between countries in intergenerational mobility and intragenerational mobility to future generations of sociologists.

The first comparison of father–son mobility across the line between blue collar and white collar jobs was that of Lipset and Bendix (1959).

It pertained to Denmark, France, Germany, Great Britain, Italy, Japan, Sweden, Switzerland, and the US in the first decade after World War II and involved the percentage of manual sons who were upwardly mobile, the percentage of nonmanual sons who were downwardly mobile, and the total mobility rate. Total mobility rates – the percent of sons in a job (manual, nonmanual) differing from that of their father (manual, nonmanual) – were around 30, which, according to the authors, was not only surprisingly high, but also surprisingly similar. The authors pointed to differences between countries in upward and downward mobility and maintained that similarity in the percentage of the population that is socially mobile does not mean that “equal opportunity” prevails to the same extent in these countries. However, they did not indicate how equal chances should be measured given tables cross classifying father’s and son’s occupation according to a schema grouping occupational titles into a limited number of categories.

Around 1980, primarily through the research of John Goldthorpe on Britain, it became clear that the degree to which the results of competitions between persons from two different origins for two different destinations amount to unequal chances is to be measured by odds ratios. First, make a table in which the occupation of a sample of persons, divided into manual and nonmanual occupations, is related to the occupation of the fathers of these persons, again divided into manual and nonmanual occupations. Then, compute the odds that sons from nonmanual fathers wind up in a nonmanual rather than a manual job. After that, compute the odds that sons of manual occupation fathers attain a nonmanual rather than a manual job. Divide the odds of downward mobility by the odds of upward mobility. Now, if the resulting odds ratio is unity, then competitions have equal outcomes. The more it goes beyond unity, the more loaded are the dice. Odds ratios below unity are logically possible, but societies in which high origins go together with low destinations have rarely been observed. Heath (1981) compared odds ratios for manual/non manual father–son mobility in some 20 highly developed industrial countries in the 1970s. The conclusion was that they indicated more

equal outcomes in countries with long periods of social democratic government, and the highest inequalities for countries with persistent conservative government. Erikson and Goldthorpe (1992), in a comparison involving a dozen highly industrial countries in the 1970s, used a more elaborate schema to classify the occupations of fathers and sons. They found that in some countries what they call "social fluidity" was more widespread than in others. However, when it came to specific combinations of pairs of origins and destinations, they found several historical particularities.

Blau and Duncan's (1967) model for the socioeconomic life cycle for the US in 1962 pertains to both intergenerational and intragenerational mobility. There are statistically significant "paths" from father's occupational status to son's first occupation after leaving school, and from father's occupational status to son's 1962 occupational status. The stronger these effects, the less intergenerational mobility. Son's 1962 occupation also is affected by his first job and his education. The stronger the effect of person's first job, the less intragenerational mobility. The path from first to present occupation indicates that persons who start out higher in occupational status, independent of their level of education, get even higher in later life.

As some reviewers pointed out, in Blau and Duncan's model for the socioeconomic life cycle the path from first to present occupation, depending upon the age of the person, covers a shorter or longer period in this person's life. In addition, when comparing models for several countries, the path stands for periods that perhaps do not differ much in average length, but may differ strongly in what happened in these periods, such as the number of years with or without double digit unemployment and the involvement or non involvement of a country in a war fought by a large part of the young population. To study effects of these factors on intragenerational mobility, sample surveys on some national populations need to include not only information on a person's first and present job, but also full job histories.

The prime collection of full job histories took place in Germany under Karl Ulrich Mayer in the early 1980s. The data were analyzed by event history techniques. Results, as

reported by Mayer and Blossfeld (Blossfeld 1986), indicate the presence of effects of the business cycle, both at time of entry into the labor markets as well as during later years of a person's job history. War effects were present, too. Persons born in 1930, who went through such matters as the shutting down of their schools due to allied bombing, evacuation from the cities to the countryside, forced relocation from the parts of Germany that became Polish, and finding a job in a time when industry was still in a shambles, despite the later German "economic miracle" in the wake of US Marshall Aid, never fully caught up in their career trajectory compared with persons born 10 years earlier, and were quickly overtaken in this respect by persons born 10 years later. An important study comparing job histories for four countries was published in 1997 by an international group headed by Thomas DiPrete.

SEE ALSO: Income Inequality and Income Mobility; Intergenerational Mobility: Methods of Analysis; Mobility, Measuring the Effects of; Occupational Mobility; Sorokin, Pitirim A.

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mobility, measuring the effects of

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Social mobility has always been a central concern of sociology, and theorists have offered a wide range of hypotheses concerning the social, political, and cultural consequences of mobility. For example, mobility has been claimed to reduce class solidarity, to produce tension or strain that finds an outlet in extremist politics, and to produce tolerance and breadth of outlook. Some of the claims about the effects of mobility apply primarily at the societal level, others at the individual level, and still others refer to both levels. Claims about the societal level effects can be evaluated only by comparing societies with different amounts or patterns of mobility. Such studies are difficult, since the number of units is necessarily small and obtaining reliable information on mobility patterns requires representative samples using comparable measures of social position. Hence, most empirical research on the effects of social mobility focuses on individuals.

The general approach of early studies was to compare the average attitudes or behaviors of "stayers" to those of people who had experienced upward or downward mobility. In an important article, Duncan (1966) pointed to a difficulty with studies of this kind. Suppose that position of origin and destination (designated x and z) are measured on the same interval scale, and y is some outcome of interest, also measured on an interval scale. The natural measure of mobility is $z - x$, the difference between destination and origin positions. If this difference is called v , a regression of y on v gives an estimate of mobility effects. However, an investigator would also have to consider the possibility that origin and destination have some effects in their own right, apart from mobility. Considering origin, destination, and mobility leads to the regression:

$$y = a + b_1x + b_2z + b_3v + e$$

Because each independent variable is an exact linear function of the other independent

variable, the parameters cannot be estimated. That is, any variation in the dependent variable can be interpreted as a consequence of origin and mobility, destination and mobility, or origin and destination. There is no statistical basis for preferring one of these interpretations over the others. Duncan's point applies not only to measures of social mobility, but also to all discrepancy measures, such as differences between spouses, geographical mobility, or "status inconsistency" (Lanski 1954).

Duncan recommended that investigators begin with the model:

$$y = a + b_1x + b_2z + e \quad (1.1)$$

and invoke mobility effects only if there were systematic departures from the predictions of the model. This approach means that mobility effects are equivalent to effects of non linear combinations of these variables. Some hypotheses about mobility effects can easily be expressed in these terms. For example, the idea that any discrepancy in status produces strain implies that the absolute value $|x - m|$ will affect relevant dependent variables even when controls of origin and destination are included. However, some hypotheses about mobility effects are more difficult to translate into this framework, and detecting departures from linearity generally requires large data sets and high quality measurement. Hence, studies that adopted Duncan's framework generally failed to find evidence of mobility effects, and the volume of research on mobility effects declined even as research on other aspects of social mobility flourished.

When categorical measures of social position are used, Duncan's approach involves fitting the main effects of origin and destination class. Sobel (1981) argued that theoretical conceptions of class effects were better represented by an alternative model:

$$y = ms_i + (1 - m)s_j + e \quad (1.2)$$

where i and j are indexes for the origin and destination classes, and s is a set of scores representing class effects. The parameter m can then be thought of as the weight or relative influence of the class of origin. In principle, m could have any value, although in practice it

usually falls between 0 and 1. Values outside of this range could be interpreted as representing “overconformity” (Blau 1956).

The w parameters give the predicted values for the diagonal of the mobility table – that is, for people whose class of origin and destination are the same. Hence, (1.2) is generally known as the “diagonal” or “diagonal reference” model. However, when the parameters are estimated by maximum likelihood, the cases on the diagonal do not have any special importance in producing the estimates of class effects. The feature that distinguishes the diagonal model from the standard model of main effects is that the relative positions of the classes are the same for origins and destinations. For example, a class cannot be “moderate” as an origin and “extreme” as a destination. Thus, the diagonal model is a special case of the standard model, and the implied restriction can be tested using standard methods. Like the standard model, the diagonal model can be extended to include controls for other independent variables that might affect the outcome.

Sobel originally proposed (1.2) as an analogue to (1.1): a baseline model to which terms representing mobility effects could be added. However, the framework of diagonal models has also suggested a new way of understanding mobility effects – as variations in the weight of origin and destination. That is, rather than the single value of w in (1.2), there may be multiple values depending on the values of origin or destination classes or other variables. For example, it has been suggested that people with ties to multiple classes tend to adopt the norms of the higher class. This hypothesis can be tested by specifying the combinations of classes representing upward and downward mobility and estimating the weight parameters separately for the groups. It is also possible that some classes have more weight as an origin or destination. For example, a class that required extensive training might put a strong stamp on new recruits and largely eliminate the effect of social origins. This possibility could be examined by estimating a separate p for each destination class. The weights of origin and destination class may also differ depending on other variables, such as gender, age, or marital status.

The development of diagonal models led to a modest revival of research on mobility effects.

Most of these studies fail to support classical hypotheses about mobility effects such as differential effects of upward and downward mobility. However, weights often vary depending on other characteristics – for example, the influence of origin declines with age (Nieuwebeerta et al. 2000). The majority of these studies examine political views or behavior, so it is not clear whether their conclusions would apply to other areas. However, since many discussions of mobility effects focused on politics, these findings are of considerable importance.

Although the study of mobility effects is not as prominent as it once was, there is still considerable theoretical interest in the effects of combinations of statuses, notably in recent discussions of the “intersection” of race, class, and gender (McCall 2006). The general principles and models developed for the analyses of mobility effects therefore remain significant for sociological research.

SEE ALSO: Income Inequality and Income Mobility; Intersectionality; Mobility, Horizontal and Vertical; Mobility, Intergenerational and Intragenerational; Regression and Regression Analysis

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mobilization

Hank Johnston

Mobilization is a basic concept in the study of social change, protest, and social movements. It captures the processes by which groups and resources are transformed from a state of quiescence, non involvement, and in consequence to availability, application, and influence in the social, political, and economic life of the broader community. In current practice the term most commonly refers to activating, marshaling, and putting to use groups and material resources – and often cultural resources – to achieve the success of a collective effort or campaign. So basic and general is the concept of mobilization that it has remained central in the study of protest and social movements despite major theoretical shifts in the field. These shifts have changed the concept's emphasis and application, but not the fundamental principle that in order for disparate and previously uncoordinated individuals and groups successfully to work together to achieve a goal or a collective good, mobilization is necessary. Thus, it is worth noting that *Mobilization* is also the title of the major peer reviewed research journal in the field of protest and social movement studies.

Theoretical perspectives current during the 1960s and 1970s, grouped under the rubric of collective behavior approaches, emphasized spontaneous and individual level mobilization. Later, resource mobilization and political process approaches focused the meaning of mobilization on social groups, material resources, organizational strategy, and rational decisions to commit to collective action. Also, in a different sense, the terms social mobilization, political mobilization, and electoral mobilization have been used widely by political scientists and sociologists (most notably Karl Deutsch, Amitai Etzioni, and David Apter) to refer to broad social changes whereby previously unintegrated segments of society are brought into political, economic, and social participation as part of modernization and political development.

Spontaneous processes of individual mobilization were emphasized as the subfield of collective behavior gained prominence in sociology beginning in the 1960s. At this time, social

disorganization was theorized to be the primary cause of the various ways that individuals were mobilized into action: panics, riots, crazes, and fads, as well as social movements and protest campaigns. The grouping together of these distinct social phenomena was justified because they all shared the characteristics of being (1) relatively uncommon and (2) uninstitutionalized responses to (3) the breakdown of various levels of social integration. Additionally, mobilization to action occurs in response to (4) the social and psychological strain caused by social breakdown and social isolation. This collective behavior approach to mobilization would include, for example, a financial panic in which depositors converge upon banks to demand return of their money as confidence in the banking system breaks down. A macro level example of mobilization to action would be when the breakdown of traditional social relations during periods of rapid social change leads to riots or protest. For example, in England between 1811 and 1816 craft workers destroyed looms and spinning machines during Luddite riots. In this example, individual workers were said to respond to strains produced by changing employment relations, low wages, and increasing unemployment caused by new technologies and the reorganization of textile production. They coalesced into protesting groups as a result of these pressures and in order to effect restoration of traditional ways of organizing production.

These spontaneous approaches to mobilization have been grouped under the rubric of breakdown theories, even though the label embraces two distinct perspectives. On the one hand, Neil Smelser stressed the centrality of mobilization for action in his *Theory of Collective Behavior* (1962), which was a structural analysis of panics, crazes, hostile outbursts, and social movements. Also, one might include in this category Kornhauser's mass society thesis, whereby groups that are socially isolated from authority and community structures are most prone to mass mobilization. On the other hand, Turner and Killian (1987) stressed emerging definitions of the situation and new normative guidelines – drawing on symbolic interactionist traditions – to explain why people behave as they do in fads, crowds, publics, and social movements.

More recent usages of the mobilization concept stress the ability to lay claim upon and extend control over political, social, and economic resources. This is accomplished by intentional, goal directed, planning and implementation of strategized courses of action by organizations, networks, and their leaders. These activities have the immediate objective of bringing to bear broader organizational and material resources for the sake of a collective cause. This usage draws upon images of broadly based and coordinated social mobilization for war; namely, putting social, cultural, organizational, economic, and psychological resources to work to ensure victory – dimensions that are widely recognized as crucial factors in the mobilization of social movements, protest, and organizing for or against social change.

The history of this definition can be traced to two seminal works in social movements and protest studies: Oberschall's *Social Conflict and Social Movements* (1973) and Tilly's *From Mobilization to Revolution* (1978). Oberschall challenged the social breakdown thesis – in particular its mass society elaboration – by showing that prior organization was the key to the mobilization of conflict groups. He stressed the communal nature of protest by demonstrating that participation is usually the result of group membership via bloc recruitment. Rather than the mobilization of isolated individuals from structural changes or pressures, Oberschall emphasized that groups are more correctly considered the unit of analysis for mobilization, and that it is through the existing structure of groups – their internal and external social linkages – that the probabilities of mobilization can be analyzed. For example, strong internal group ties reduce the costs of mobilization and increase the probability that the group can be mobilized to action.

By effectively shifting the focus of mobilization from individual participation to group participation, Oberschall ushered in a sea change in the analysis of mobilization processes that was extended and elaborated by Tilly. In contrast to earlier usage of the term that conflated the action and the mobilization, Tilly defined mobilization processes as the way that contending groups lay claim and activate control over resources necessary to act – not the action itself. Mobilization, according to his model, is but one

of five necessary components for a social movement or protest campaign to occur: common interest, organization, mobilization, opportunity, and then the collective action, which is defined as communal pursuit of shared goals and interests. Tilly concurred with Oberschall by (1) emphasizing that mobilization capacity is a function of organization, and (2) introducing other organizations into the equation – most notably the state and contending groups – via the category “opportunity to act together.” Specifically, the state and opposing groups find their way into Tilly's analysis through the way their actions affect the perception of costs for mobilizing actors. If costs are too high (say, if contending groups accord the state a strong propensity to repress), collective action will not occur.

These were the building blocks of the resource mobilization perspective, which provided the paradigmatic model for the analysis of social movements and protest during the 1970s and 1980s. It is arguable that because the resource mobilization perspective provided a focus on variables that were more easily measurable, the study of mobilization processes grew rapidly as a subdiscipline in sociology during this period. It is a fair characterization that as the field expanded, scholars often blurred the original distinction between mobilization of resources and collective action, that the independent variable – laying hold of resources – became synonymous with the dependent variable – collective action. The implicit assumption was that if groups can effectively mobilize resources, most of the collective action task was already accomplished, and the leap from resource mobilization to street protest would be automatic – a leap, incidentally, that often ignored considerations of opportunity factors such as opposing groups, state agencies, and institutional political structures. This oversight was later corrected by political process models of mobilization elaborated by McAdam and Tarrow in the 1990s.

Following the lead of John McCarthy and Mayer Zald, the resource mobilization perspective emphasized new variables: organizational capacity, material resources, cost reduction and mobilizing strategies, and the professionalization of movement activists, especially a cadre of upper level strategists in movement

organizations called social movement entrepreneurs. This approach accurately captured a trend in social movement development; namely, mobilization tasks were becoming increasingly rationalized and strategized, and in some cases, undertaken by large, bureaucratized social movement organizations. In the extreme, some organizations take on the characteristics of for-profit corporations seeking to maximize income as a means to pursue their cause – such as Greenpeace, Amnesty International, or Transcendental Meditation. For example, Johnston showed that TM started out as a small religious cult and grew to a multinational organization through mobilization efforts that mirrored multinational marketing campaigns rather than fitting the pattern of religious proselytization. In the case of Greenpeace, the concept of resource mobilization takes on new meaning as the resources it commits to ensure cash flow via solicited contributions parallel the resources applied to its various ecological campaigns.

Apart from this kind of highly professionalized organization, research has shown that preexisting groups and networks are the primary vehicles by which individuals are brought into participation in a protest campaign or social movement. Central to the emphasis on *mobilizing structures* was Morris's (1984) path breaking study of the origins of the Civil Rights Movement. He showed that Southern black churches were the basis of group recruitment into the early Civil Rights Movement. Similarly, McAdam (1982) demonstrated how social networks among students were the basis of participation in the 1964 Freedom Summer campaign. These preexisting mobilizing structures and networks influence how other mobilization processes are performed: they shape perceptions of opportunity, framing processes, and repertoires of contention.

Finally, consensus mobilization is a term that was introduced by Klandermans in reaction to the overemphasis on material and organizational resources characteristic of resource mobilization and the corresponding deemphasis of social psychological influences. Consensus mobilization refers to the ways that new attitudes, beliefs, and frames of interpretation are activated and spread among a previously quiescent group – or the *mobilization potential* of a movement. It is now widely recognized that

mobilization of participant consensus to act must occur alongside mobilization of resources in order for social movements and protest campaigns to occur. Consensus mobilization is most clearly treated by the recent literature on collective action frames, developed most notably by William Gamson, David Snow, Robert Benford, Hank Johnston, and others. A frame is a cognitive concept that represents a schema of interpretation that reorients participants' perception of events to make collective action more likely. Snow and Benford tended to emphasize the organizational activities of framing in order to achieve a consensus to act, thereby providing a social psychological link to resource mobilization perspectives. Gamson studied the social processes by which framing of consensus is achieved, especially the role of media in consensus mobilization. Johnston has emphasized broader cultural currents in his concept of frame mobilization.

SEE ALSO: Contention, Tactical Repertoires of; Crowd Behavior; Frame; Framing and Social Movements; Resource Mobilization Theory; Social Change; Social Movements; Social Movements, Recruitment to; Social Movements, Strain and Breakdown Theories of

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modernity

Gerard Delanty

The idea of modernity concerns the interpretation of the present time in light of historical reinterpretation. It refers too to the confluence of the cultural, social, and political currents in modern society. The term signals a tension within modern society between its various dynamics and suggests a process by which society constantly renews itself.

The word "modern" comes from the Latin word *modus*, meaning now, but the term "modernity" has a stronger meaning, suggesting the possibility of a new beginning based on human autonomy and the consciousness of the legitimacy of the present time (Blumenberg 1983). In Agnes Heller's words, modernity means: "Everything is open to query and to testing; everything is subject to rational scrutiny and refuted by argument" (Heller 1999: 41).

The first use of the term modern goes back to the early Christian Church in the fifth century when it was used to distinguish the Christian era from the pagan age. Arising from this was an association of modernity with the renunciation of the recent past, which was rejected in favor of a new beginning and a reinterpretation of historical origins. However, the term did not gain widespread currency until the seventeenth century French "Quarrel of the Ancients and the Moderns" on whether modern culture is superior to classical culture. The term modernity as opposed to modern did not arise until the nineteenth century. One of the most famous uses of the term was in 1864, when the French poet Baudelaire gave it the most well known definition: "By modernity I mean the transitory, the fugitive, the contingent" (Baudelaire 1964: 13).

Baudelaire's definition of modernity was reflected in part in modernism to indicate a particular cultural current in modern society that captured the sense of renewal and cosmopolitanism of modern life. It signaled a spirit of creativity and renewal that was most radically expressed in the avant garde movement. But the term had a wider social and political resonance in the spirit of revolution and social reconstruction that was a feature of the nineteenth century. Marx and Engels in the *Communist Manifesto* invoked the spirit of modernity with their description of modern society and capitalism as the condition "all that is solid melts into air." The writings of Walter Benjamin have been a point of reference for many of the recent debates on modernity. In his work, the cultural movement of modernism was blended with a social theory of modern society. Benjamin was interested in the ways modern society is experienced, in particular the highly mediated modes of experience that are a feature of modern life. He was struck by the momentary nature of such experiences.

Within classical sociology, Georg Simmel is generally regarded as the figure who first gave a more rigorous sociological interpretation of modernity, with his account of social life in the modern city. For Simmel, as for Benjamin, modernity is expressed in diverse "momentary images" or "snapshots" (see Frisby 1986). The fragmentation of modern society, on the one

side, and on the other new technologies such as the camera and the cinema led to more and more such moments and the feeling that there is nothing durable and solid.

Modernity may thus be described simply as the loss of certainty and the realization that certainty can never be established once and for all. It is a term that also can simply refer to reflection on the age and in particular to movements within modern society that lead to the emergence of new modes of thought and consciousness.

The concept of modernity was for long associated with the work of culturally oriented thinkers such as Baudelaire, Benjamin, and Simmel and was overshadowed by other terms, such as capitalism, within mainstream sociology and social theory as far as the conceptualization of modern society is concerned. Since the so-called cultural turn in the social sciences and the rise of post disciplinary developments, new interpretations of history have led to a wider application of the idea of modernity. The turn to modernity since the late 1980s can be in part explained by a dissatisfaction with the older ideas of modernization, on the one hand, and on the other capitalism as the key features of modern society. The idea of modernity indicated a concern with issues and dimensions of modern society that were largely ignored by some of the main currents in sociology.

As both modernization theory and Marxist theory lost their influence, modernity suggested a more fruitful theoretical approach to interpret modern society. The debate about postmodernism was central to this. Habermas's attack on postmodernism and his defense of modernity as "an incomplete project" was hugely influential in reopening the debate on modernity in a way that linked it into a systematic reappraisal of sociological theory.

In Habermas's social theory, the project of modernity concerns the extension of a potentially emancipatory communicative rationality to all parts of society. The implication of this is the permanent condition of a fundamental tension at the heart of modern society between communicative rationality and instrumental rationality. For Habermas this tension gives to modernity its basic normative orientation and the defining feature that it is an open horizon of possibilities as a result of this tension. It is for

this reason that modernity cannot be reduced to one particular structure, but is a societal condition formed out of the ongoing contestation of power. The modernity of modern societies is thus to be found in the ways societies find communicative solutions to problems created by instrumental rationality, such as capitalism.

Johann Arnason (1991) explains modernity as a "field of tensions." One major example of this is Castoriadis's (1987) characterization of modernity in terms of a radical imaginary confronting the institutional imaginary, which tries to domesticate it. His conception of modernity has become increasingly influential. The very condition of the possibility of society is made possible by the radical imaginary which projects an image of an alternative society. For Castoriadis, this is a constitutive feature of all societies and it is one that even the tendency toward domination and instrumental mastery does not eliminate. This approach has been developed into a more elaborated theory of modernity by Agnes Heller (1999) and has been taken up by Arnason. These approaches give prominence to the creative dynamics and tensions in modernity which result from the pursuit of the goal of autonomy, on the one side, and on the other the pursuit of power and material accumulation. Emerging out of these dynamics are self transformative tendencies and a self conscious reflexivity.

Developments within postmodern thought gave additional weight to modernity as containing autonomous logics of development and unfulfilled potential. Several theorists argued that the postmodern moment should be seen to be merely modernity in a new key (Bauman 1987). What has emerged out of these developments is a new interest in "cultural modernity" as a countermovement in modern society, but also what Koselleck has called a historical semantics. So modernity is now not just seen as an "incomplete project," to use Habermas's formulation, but it is also one that is on "endless trial," to cite Kolakowski (1990). For Koselleck (1985), modernity is characterized by the constantly changing interpretation of the present by reference to its past and to the open horizon of its future.

So what is emerging out of this way of the orizing modernity is an approach that stresses the ambivalence of modernity, which cannot be

reduced to a single dimension, as in the work of Weber, the Frankfurt School, or Foucault, for whom modernity is a matter of a disciplinary apparatus of power. Many theorists of modernity look instead to a double logic, which Peter Wagner (1994) has described as a relation of liberty and discipline, or in Alain Touraine's (1995) terms can be seen as a struggle of reason and the subject. This tension within modernity can also be illustrated by reference to Adam Seligman's characterization of modernity in terms of a "wager" over the nature of authority: modernity staked everything on reason and the individual as opposed to the sacred. There is some evidence to suggest this bet has not been won, given the return of ethnic and religious identities (Seligman 2003: 32–3). Whether or not this bet has been won or lost, this is one way of seeing modernity in terms of a tension that put risk at the center of its consciousness.

Anthony Giddens and Ulrich Beck, in different but related ways, have highlighted the reflexivity of modernity. The notion of reflexive modernization, or reflexive modernity, is aimed to capture the ways in which much of the movement of modernity acts upon itself. Beck has introduced the notion of late modernity as a "second modernity," while Giddens characterized modernity in terms of "disembedding" processes such as the separation of time and space. Such approaches to the question of modernity have been principally responding to the challenge of globalization. Globalization can be seen as a process that intensifies connections between many parts of the world, and as such it is one of the primary mechanisms of modernity today. This has led some theorists to refer to global modernity, for modernity today is global.

It is obvious from this outline of modernity that it does not refer to a historical era. Rather, the term refers to processual aspects, especially tensions and dynamics. Modernity is thus a particular kind of time consciousness which defines the present in its relation to the past, which must be continuously recreated; it is not a historical epoch that can be periodized. However, this issue has become more complicated as a result of new developments in the theory of modernity. Much of these developments follow from the relation of globalization to modernity. On the one side, modernity is indeed global,

but on the other there is a diversity of routes to modernity. The problem thus becomes one of how to reconcile the diversity of societal forms with a conception of modernity that acknowledges the consequences of globalization.

It is in this context that the term multiple modernities can be introduced. Originally advocated by S. N. Eisenstadt (2003), this has grown out of the debate on globalization, comparative civilizational analysis, and the postcolonial concern with "alternative modernities" (Gaonkar 2001). Central to this approach is a conceptualization of modernity as plural condition. Associated with this turn in the theory of modernity is a gradual movement away from the exclusive concern with western modernity to a more cosmopolitan perspective. Modernity is not westernization and its key processes and dynamics can be found in all societies.

Rather than dispensing with modernity, postmodernism and postcolonialism have given a new significance to the idea of modernity which now lies at the center of many debates in sociology and other related disciplines in the social and human sciences.

SEE ALSO: Benjamin, Walter; Capitalism; Civilizations; Globalization; Globalization, Culture and; Modernization; Postmodern Social Theory; Postmodernism; Secularization; Simmel, Georg; Social Change

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modernization

Ronald Inglehart and Christian Welzel

Modernization is an encompassing process of massive social changes that, once set in motion, tends to penetrate all domains of life, from economic activities to social life to political institutions, in a self-reinforcing process. Modernization brings an intense awareness of change and innovation, linked with the idea that human societies are progressing.

Historically, the idea of human progress is relatively new. As long as societies did not exert significant control over their environment and were helplessly exposed to the vagaries of natural forces, and as long as agrarian economies were trapped in a steady state equilibrium where no growth in mass living standards took place, the idea of human progress seemed unrealistic (Jones 1985; McNeill 1990). The situation began to change only when sustained economic growth began to occur (North 1981; Lal 1998).

After 8,000 years of agrarian history, economic growth began to outpace population growth in a sustained way only with the rise of pre-industrial capitalism in sixteenth century Northwestern Europe (North 1981; Hall 1989; Lal 1998; Landes 1998). As this happened, the philosophies of humanism and Enlightenment

emerged. The idea that technological innovations based on human intellectual achievement would enable societies to overcome the limitations nature imposes on them gained credibility – contesting the established view that human freedom and fulfillment can come only in the after life. Science began to provide a source of insight that competed with divine revelation, challenging the intellectual monopoly of the church (Weber 1958 [1904]; Landes 1998). The idea of human progress was born and with it theories of modernization began to emerge.

However, the idea of human progress was contested from the beginning by opposing ideas that considered ongoing societal changes as a sign of human decay. Thus, modernization theory was doomed to make a career swinging between wholehearted appreciation and fierce rejection, depending on whether the dominant mood of the time was rather optimistic or pessimistic. The history of modernization theory is thus the history of anti-modernization theory. Both are ideological reflections of far-ranging dynamics that continue to accelerate the pace of social change since the rise of pre-industrial capitalism.

THE ORIGIN AND CAREER OF MODERNIZATION THEORY

Modernization theory emerged in the Enlightenment era with the belief that technological progress would give humanity increasing control over nature. Antoine de Condorcet (1799 [1795]) was among the first to explicitly link technological innovation and cultural development, arguing that technological advances and economic growth would inevitably bring changes in people's moral values. This idea of human progress was opposed by notions that considered the changes they observed as indications of moral decay. Edmund Burke (1999 [1790]) formulated such an anti-modern view in his *Reflections on the Revolution in France*, while Thomas R. Malthus (1970 [1798]) developed a scientific theory of demographic disasters.

Adam Smith (1976 [1776]) and Karl Marx (1973 [1858]) propagated competing versions of modernization, with Smith advocating a capitalist vision, and Marx advocating communism. Competing versions of modernization theory

enjoyed a new resurgence after World War II when the capitalist and communist superpowers espoused opposing ideologies as guidelines for the best route to modernity. Although they competed fiercely, both ideologies were committed to economic growth, social progress, and modernization, and they both brought broader mass participation in politics (Moore 1966). Furthermore, both sides believed that the developing nations of the third world would follow either the communist path or the capitalist path to modernization, and the two superpowers struggled to win them over.

Modernization theory's career is closely linked with theories of underdevelopment. In the post war US, a version of modernization theory emerged that viewed underdevelopment as a direct consequence of a country's internal characteristics, especially its traditional psychological and cultural traits (Lerner 1958; Pye & Verba 1963; Inkeles & Smith 1974). This perspective was strongly influenced by Max Weber's theory of the cultural origins of capitalism, which viewed underdevelopment as a function of traditionally irrational, spiritual, and communal values – values that discourage human achievement motivation. From this perspective, traditional values were not only mutable but could – and should – also be replaced by modern values, enabling these societies to follow the path of capitalist development. The causal agents in this developmental process were seen as the rich developed nations that stimulated the modernization of “backward” nations through economic, cultural, and military assistance.

This version of modernization theory was not merely criticized as patronizing, it was pronounced dead (Wallerstein 1976). Neo Marxist and world systems theorists argued that rich countries exploit poor countries, locking them in positions of powerlessness and structural dependence (e.g., Frank 1966; Wallerstein 1974; Chirot 1977, 1994; Chase Dunn 1989). Underdevelopment, Frank claimed, is *developed*. Underdevelopment conveys the message to poor countries that poverty has nothing to do with their traditional values: it is the fault of global capitalism. In the 1970s and 1980s, modernization theory seemed discredited; dependency theory came into vogue (Cardoso & Faletto 1979). Adherents of dependency theory claimed that the third world nations could only escape from

global exploitation if they withdrew from the world market and adopted import substitution policies.

In recent years, it became apparent that import substitution strategies had failed. The countries that were least involved in global capitalism were not the most successful – they actually showed the *least* economic growth (Firebaugh 1992). Export oriented strategies were more effective in bringing sustained economic growth and even, eventually, democracy (Barro 1997; Randall & Theobald 1998). The pendulum swung back. Dependency theory fell out of favor and the western capitalist version of modernization regained credibility. The rapid development of East Asia, and the subsequent democratization of Taiwan and South Korea, seemed to confirm its basic claims: producing low cost goods for the world market initiates economic growth; reinvesting the returns into human capital qualifies the workforce to produce high tech goods; exporting these more expensive goods brings higher returns and enlarges the educated urban middle class; and once the middle class becomes large enough and confident about its strength, it presses for liberal democracy – the natural political system of middle class societies (Diamond 1993; Lipset et al. 1993). Evidence for this sequence discredited world systems theory.

However, one should be aware that the dispute between modernization and dependency/world systems theory was not a dispute about whether modernization takes place or not. It was a dispute about its causes and the repeatability of the Anglo Saxon model in other parts of the world. Dependency theorists and world systems theorists did not deny modernization took place, nor did they reject modernization as a goal for societies in the third world. They only claimed that the global power structure does not allow peripheral countries to modernize by integrating themselves into the international division of labor. They recommended dissociation from the world market and “autocentric development.” Despite the dominant rhetoric of neoliberalism, it is not clear that this strategy is entirely wrong. Actually, it seems that both autocentric development and world market integration work, if they are applied sequentially. The industrial histories of Germany, Japan, and South Korea illustrate that creating competitive

domestic industries requires an initial phase of protection of the domestic market from cheaper imports. In any case, the contradiction between liberal modernization theory and Marxist dependency theory shows that some of the most fundamental debates in the social sciences centered on the dazzling phenomenon of modernization.

DIMENSIONS OF MODERNIZATION

Consciously or not, even capitalist notions of modernization have adopted the Marxist idea that modernization starts with changes at the “socioeconomic basis,” from which it moves on to changes in the institutional and cultural “superstructure.” Modernization theorists usually avoid using these Marxist terms. Nevertheless, most descriptions of modernization start with technological and economic changes, tending to portray related changes in social structures, cultural values, and political institutions as reflections of technological progress. Most explicit in this respect is the ecological evolutionary approach of Nolan and Lenski (1999), which argues that, since economic production is the most basic sphere of human activities, changes in production technology are the most basic changes, instigating changes in all other domains of social life.

Hence, the term modernization connotes first of all changes in production technology inducing major economic transitions from pre-industrial to industrial societies and from industrial to post industrial societies. If one tries to extract a standard model of how these transitions proceed, it can be portrayed in the following way. The whole sequence starts with labor saving innovations in production technology, which increase labor productivity in a certain field of human activities. As this happens, the same material output can be produced by fewer and fewer people. This process sets part of the workforce free for productive activities in new areas. This happened first in the agrarian sector, which set people free for industrial production activities. Then labor productivity in the industrial sector grew to such an extent that people were set free for new activities in the service sector (Bell 1973). Nowadays, we observe a shift within the service sector toward intellectually creative activities, giving rise to a “creative

class” in the fields of marketing, consulting, communication, education, research and development, engineering and design, as well as art and entertainment (Florida 2002). These transformations have various consequences.

All these changes originate in humans’ intellectual achievements in the sciences, which manifest themselves in an ever increasing technological control over various mechanical, chemical, electronic, and biological processes. The social transformations initiated by these technological changes have various massive consequences on the societies’ outlook, as the following selection indicates.

- (1) *Growth of mass based human resources.* As humans gain technological control over natural processes and increase their productivity, material standards of living rise. Thus, financial resources, technological equipment, and information become available in growing amounts to widening parts of the public, partly closing the gap between elites and the masses.
- (2) *Occupational diversification.* With each technological breakthrough in productivity, a new type of economic activity is added to the scope of productive human activities. This leads to growing occupational diversification, professional specialization, division of labor, interdependence, and thus increasing social complexity.
- (3) *Organizational differentiation.* Growing social complexity proliferates an ever increasing diversity of economic, social, cultural, and political entities, such as corporations, congregations, agencies, departments, bureaus, associations, parties, committees, loose informal groups, and social movements, increasing the variety and interdependence of organized social life. Modern society is a highly organized society, consisting of a multiplex network of interwoven entities. All human activities in modern societies are channeled through the web of organized life.
- (4) *State capacity growth and state activity extension.* Compared to modern welfare states (even the more limited Anglo Saxon version), premodern states were rudimentary. To be sure, premodern states could be utterly despotic. But their despotism

was restricted to what came into the reach of a despot, which was severely limited in pre modern times, for the “nerves of government” (Deutsch 1968) were rudimentary in pre industrial times. Industrialization changes this situation drastically, since it enlarges mass based human resources. This broadens the state’s tax basis, enabling it to extract more resources. States have invariably invested these resources in the creation of a more elaborate administrative infrastructure and the extension of performed tasks. Thus, the widening of state capacities as well as the diversification of state services and regulations is another concomitant of modernization.

- (5) *Mass political involvement.* Through the extension of state activities, each individual comes into the reach of the state and is affected by what the state is doing and deciding. This creates a need to legitimize state activities by mass approval, leading to universal suffrage and other forms of mass participation. Thus, mobilizing the masses into politics, whether in authoritarian or democratic ways, is a core political aspect of modernization.
- (6) *Rationalization and secularization.* New kinds of human activities bring different existential experiences. Thus, each social transformation changes people’s life perspectives, interests, psychological orientation, and values, fueling cultural changes. Many authors argue that the most fundamental value change emerging with modernization is a transition from spiritual religious values to secular rational values, implying that the belief in rational forces and scientific human capabilities replaces the belief in supernatural forces and divine fate. Thus, everything from the production system to the political order comes to be considered objects of human creation, not divine creation.

THREE PERSPECTIVES ON MODERNIZATION

The common denominator of all these aspects of modernization is the growing complexity, knowledge intensity, and sophistication of

performed human activities. This overarching feature manifests itself on three levels: the system of organized entities, the mass of individuals, and connections between the individuals.

- (1) *The system of organized entities.* On the system level, growing complexity is reflected in the increasing functional differentiation of organized processes and entities. This makes organized entities increasingly interdependent but at the same time increases the autonomy of their internal operations. Division of labor and specialization in modern societies have reached such a degree that no entity can survive without the contributions of the others. But each entity is so specialized in performing its own task within the social system that no other entity can intervene in its internal operations (at least not without lowering the performance of the respective entity).
- (2) *The mass of individuals.* On the individual level, growing complexity is reflected in an increasing differentiation of social roles and a growing diversification of role models. Role differentiation means that people perform their social roles in different social circles. In pre industrial society, the family is the core unit in which all social roles, from biological reproduction to economic subsistence, are performed. In modern societies, family roles and economic roles fall apart and are performed in different social circles. Role diversification means that the role models used as devices to perform a social role multiply. This multiplication gives people a choice of which role model they want to follow or how they like to combine elements of different models. Role differentiation and role diversification increase individual autonomy, fueling “individualization.”
- (3) *Connections between the individuals.* On the level of social relations, growing complexity manifests itself in a transformation in the nature of social ties. Durkheim (1988 [1893]) noticed a transformation from “mechanical solidarity” to “organic solidarity,” meaning that people are no longer automatically interconnected on the basis of family or common lineage. Inherited

communal attributes, such as one's ethnicity, religion, and language, no longer suffice to bond communities into which people invest their entire personality. Instead, people cooperate voluntarily on the basis of mutually agreed interests. Such cooperation is partial, not holistic: it does not involve an individual's entire personality but only his or her interests. Tönnies (1955 [1887]) depicted this development as a transition from holistic "communities" to specific "associations." Simmel (1984 [1908]) introduced the concept of "cross cutting social circles" to illuminate that these associations bring together people from various social circles, replacing the bonding ties of communities with the bridging ties of associations. The crucial point here is the change in the nature of social cohesion: from clientelist relationships based on *inherited* loyalties to contractual relationships based on *negotiated* ties. The emerging bargaining character of social ties reflects the logic of a social contract, making social relationships a matter of giving and taking and voluntary mutual exchange. Beck describes this as a transition from "communities of necessity" to "elective affinities." This contractual transformation of social ties does not reduce people's dependence on social interactions, but it makes them less dependent on bonds to specific persons.

MODERNIZATION AND CULTURAL CHANGE

Modernization theories have been criticized for their tendency toward technological and socioeconomic determinism. Usually these critiques cite Max Weber (1958 [1904]), who reversed the Marxian notion that technologically induced socioeconomic development determines cultural change. Indeed, in his explanation of the rise of capitalism, Weber turns causality in the opposite direction, arguing that the Calvinist variant of Protestantism (along with other factors) led to the rise of a capitalist economy rather than the other way round. Revised versions of modernization theory (Inglehart & Baker 2000) emphasize that both Marx and Weber were

partly correct: on one hand, socioeconomic development brings predictable cultural changes in people's moral values; but on the other hand, these changes are path dependent, so that a society's initial starting position remains visible in its relative position to other societies, reflecting its cultural heritage. Nevertheless, recent evidence indicates that – even though the relationship between socioeconomic development and cultural change is reciprocal – the stronger causal arrow seems to run from socioeconomic development to cultural change (Inglehart & Welzel 2005).

While partly confirming Weber, Inglehart and Welzel (2005) correct him and his followers in still another respect. The rise of secular rational values is not the ultimate cultural aspect of modernization, nor is it the aspect that is most conducive to democracy. Instead, they argue, secular rational values arise in one specific phase of modernization – the industrialization phase – when increasing technological control over the forces of nature conveys the impression that everything is subject to human engineering and that all problems can be solved by human rationality. However, with the transition to post industrial society, all ideological dogmas, including the dogma of rational science, become subject to criticism. Moreover, an awareness of the risks of technological progress emerges, giving rise to new spiritual concerns about the meaning of life and the dignity of creation. Hence, the processes of secularization and rationalization are not permanent aspects of modernization.

MODERNIZATION AND DEMOCRACY

Another important debate involves the question of whether modernization necessarily leads to democratization, or whether authoritarian forms of mass politics are also compatible with modernization. The first position has been argued most explicitly by Talcott Parsons (1967), who saw the principle of "voluntary association" as the only political way to cope with modernity. He argued that social systems that do not give room to the principle of voluntary association are unable to produce legitimacy and unable to harness people's intrinsic motivation for the goals of the political system. Such a system has

access only to support that it can win by force and by bribes. Other things being equal, systems that are unable to mobilize people's intrinsic support will be unable to compete effectively with those that can. Hence, Parsons concluded that the Soviet system will either adopt the principle of association (i.e., democracy) or fail. Luhmann's (1995 [1984]) systems theory also predicted the failure of communist systems, arguing that totalitarian systems deny the subsystem autonomy that is needed to run complex modern systems in an effective way. According to these theories, modernization inevitably leads to democracy, for only democracies are able to generate legitimacy and to provide sufficient subsystem autonomy for a highly complex society to function effectively.

Moore (1966), by contrast, argued that the western path to liberal democracy was historically unique. Industrialization led to stable mass democracies only where limited versions of democracy already were in place in pre-industrial times. This was only the case in commercial freeholder societies that sustained a capitalist urban middle class, the bourgeoisie. Examples are Switzerland, the Lowlands, England, Scandinavia, or the British settler colonies in America and Australia. By contrast, when industrialization emerged in traditionally absolutist societies (Germany) or despotic societies (Russia), where the pre-industrial economies were largely "labor repressive," fascist or communist forms of mass politics have been the consequence. These totalitarian politics, too, employ universal suffrage to involve the masses, but they use it simply to enforce public expressions of mass loyalty.

Ironically, again, both Parsons and Moore are partly right – but they apply to different phases of modernization. Moore's insights are valid in that not all forms of economic development are necessarily conducive to democracy. If this were the case, the oil exporting countries should be model democracies. Today, it is evident that revenue from natural resources can make a country rich but not democratic. Industrialization is not the phase of modernization that is most conducive to democracy. As Moore pointed out, it can lead to fascism or communism as readily as to democracy, but the post-industrial phase of modernization makes democracy become increasingly likely.

MODERNIZATION AS HUMAN DEVELOPMENT

In a recent revised version of modernization theory, Inglehart and Welzel (2005) argue that the distinctive implications that industrialization and post-industrialization have for democracy reflect distinctive types of values that emerge in these two phases of modernization. Industrialization vastly expands technological human control over the natural environment. Humans spend most of their activities in an entirely man-made environment and are no longer helplessly exposed to the vicissitudes of natural forces. Everything, even the political order, seems to be a question of human engineering and all problems can be solved by science: everything, from economic growth to space exploration, is subject to human rationality. These perceptions in the industrial world favor the emergence of secular rational values.

The industrial phase of modernization links secular rational values with conformist values that emphasize group discipline over individual liberty. The reason for this is the standardization of life in the industrial world. This is particularly true for the working class whose members experience little personal autonomy, spending most of their lives at the assembly line or in their apartment buildings, in homogeneous groups, living under strong social controls and group pressures. These experiences support conformist values that do not give top priority to individual freedom. As a consequence, liberal democracy does not necessarily emerge in industrial societies. The mass mobilization of industrial societies requires mass involvement in politics, which leads to universal suffrage. But universal suffrage has more often been organized in authoritarian ways than in democratic ones. Even traditional democracies showed a relatively authoritarian outlook in the industrial age, operating an elite-led model in which party bosses commanded loyal troops of voters.

The emergence of a service-based economy in post-industrial societies destandardizes economic activities and social life, and in the knowledge society individual judgment and innovation take on central importance. Increasingly, people experience themselves as individuals who are autonomous in their judgments, activities, and life choices. This gives rise to

emancipative values that place individual liberty over group conformity. These values are closely linked with the core ideal of liberal democracy – human freedom. The emergence of these values has contributed to the emergence of new democracies in much of the world – and it also leads to a humanistic transformation of established democracies. Post industrial democracies lose their authoritarian aspects as rising emphasis on emancipative values transforms modernization into a process of human development. This type of society unfolds the emancipative potential inherent in democracy. This process can be described as human development because it features the most specifically human quality: the ability to base decisions and activities on autonomous judgments and choices.

MODERNIZATION, HUMAN DEVELOPMENT, AND SOCIAL CAPITAL

Another important debate is whether modernization erodes or creates social capital – an important debate because it is widely believed that any erosion of social capital undermines democracy. Putnam (2000) argues that some inherent aspect of post industrial society, such as the growing amount of time spent watching television, erodes social ties between people and diminishes their communal engagement. In line with this reasoning, many authors claim that, even if communal engagement does not entirely vanish, remaining forms of communal engagement are of a lower civic quality because they are based on egocentric cost calculations of people who become excessively self assertive.

Florida (2002), Inglehart and Welzel (2005), and others advance an opposite interpretation. Rising self expression values, they argue, have brought a decline of participation in elite controlled communal activities. The bureaucratic organizations that once controlled the masses, such as political machines, labor unions, and churches, are losing their grip – but more spontaneous, expressive, and issue oriented forms of actions, such as participation in petitions and demonstrations, are becoming more widespread. As Inglehart and Welzel (2005) argue, the rise of self expression values is linked with higher

levels of elite challenging collective action, focused on making elites more responsive to popular demands. The rise of elite challenging mass action is one more aspect of the humanistic transformation of democracies, making them increasingly people centered.

SEE ALSO: Bureaucracy and Public Sector Governmentality; Democracy; Dependency and World Systems Theories; Developmental Stages; Economic Development; Industrialization; Knowledge Societies; Legitimacy; Mobilization; Political Economy; Post Industrial Society; Postmodern Culture; Secularization; Social Capital; Social Change; Solidarity, Mechanical and Organic

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money

Nigel Dodd

The sociology of money is a new and thriving field. Significant theoretical contributions to a sociological understanding of money were made by Marx, Simmel, and Weber, among others. While Weber focused primarily on the legal status of money – he broadly agreed with Knapp's characterization of money as a “creature of the state” – Marx and Simmel undertook extensive investigations into the nature of money as a medium. According to Marx, money is a commodity, and its quantitative relationship to other commodities – its function as a “universal measure of value” – is made possible by the amount of labor time that it contains. This is true not only of precious metals but also of other forms of “credit” money, such as bank notes, which derive their value from a commodity such as gold. Thus, to view exchange relations merely as “monetary” relations or as a series of prices determined by supply and demand is to overlook the social relations of production – and, of course, exploitation – on

which they fundamentally depend. Simmel took a quite different view of the value of money. By his reckoning, money represents an abstract idea of value that is underwritten by “society”: its value, in other words, ultimately depends on a form of trust in society that Simmel likened to “quasi religious faith.” On the basis of the characterization, Simmel explored the roots and consequences of the development of the “mature money economy,” whereby an increasing number of social relationships are mediated by money.

Although the work of Marx and Simmel threw up some rich questions for debate, subsequent sociological theorists who contemplated money – for example, Parsons, Habermas, Luhmann, and Giddens – used it mainly to illustrate elements of their work without seriously investigating the nature of money itself. Those instances of a more explicit sociological examination of money that one finds scattered in the twentieth century literature were usually quite narrow in focus and too unrelated to constitute a “field” of inquiry in its own right.

Recently, however, a number of sociologists have produced major publications in which they sought to develop a systematic sociological treatment of money. Zelizer (1994) argued against an image of money as “neutral” and “impersonal” through a historical analysis that examined money in relation to the social context of its use. Dodd (1994) sought to elaborate Simmel’s concept of money as a “pure instrument” by relating it to consumerism and the globalization of finance. More recently, Ingham (2004) has brought sociological arguments to bear on theories of money in orthodox and heterodox economics.

Besides these programmatic efforts to develop a sociological interpretation of money, an increasing number of specialist studies have focused on particular lines of research. For example, they have looked at the role of money in the domestic economy, the emergence of monetary forms such as LETS (Local Exchange Trading Scheme) tokens and other “complementary currencies,” and the growth of Internet currencies and electronic money (or e money). But for all the empirical richness that these recent contributions bring to our understanding of money, there is no common view of what money is. There has never been a consensus

about this. The extant literature on money, not only in sociology but also in neighboring disciplines such as geography and anthropology, is replete with debates over competing definitions.

In economics, money is usually defined in terms of three main functions: money is a medium of exchange, a store of value, a unit of account. Classical sociologists were mainly concerned with money’s role as a store of value. Marx explored the relationship between money and gold, for example, while Weber discussed the distinctiveness and viability of state issued “paper” money. Even Simmel, who used money as a means for a much wider philosophical investigation into the role of exchange in modern culture, began his study with the question of value.

At the beginning of the twenty first century, sociologists are addressing a rather different set of concerns than their classical forebears. The central question no longer concerns the “value” of money once its connection with gold has been severed. Instead, sociologists, together with scholars in related disciplines (see Hart 2000; Helleiner 2003; Cohen 2004), have been exploring an apparent decline in the relationship between money and the state. This development is not a straightforward process, and its implications remain contested.

The work of Ingham revolves around the assertion that the social production of money is integral to a broader struggle for power. On one side of the struggle, monetary agencies (banks and so forth) compete to preserve and store value in money, to control its supply, and to extract interest. Against the monetary agencies, industrialists attempt to “monetize their market power” through rising prices or by borrowing. Problems such as inflation arise whenever this struggle becomes unstable. Although money’s *value* is determined by these competing interests, the definition of what *counts* as money is declared by a political authority that transcends such interests. In the modern era, this authority consists of the state, which defines the unit of account – or what Keynes called *money of account* – for the money which circulates within its territory (e.g., US dollar). It follows that any form of “money” that is not denominated in the official unit of account will be deficient. Unofficial money is too specialized in terms of its possible uses, and too restricted in its potential

sphere of circulation, to rival official currency. E money is likely to have an extremely limited capacity for success unless it is denominated in the official money of account. And local alternatives to currency are merely media of exchange which facilitate bartering. According to Ingham, then, states are likely to continue as the major suppliers and regulators of money.

Zelizer's work presents an intriguing contrast to that of Ingham. She conveys money as "multiple," i.e., as *monies*, not *money*. According to Zelizer, the multiplicity of money derives from the differentiated ways in which we impute meanings to it whenever it is in our possession. She calls this process "earmarking." Earmarking works in a number of interrelated ways: by restricting the use, regulating the allocation, modifying the appearance, and attaching special meanings to a particular quantity of money. For instance, by allocating specific quantities of our income to manage a domestic budget, or by setting aside currency received as a gift for a specific purchase, we impute a specific meaning to money which undermines its supposedly impersonal character. Zelizer (2004) has recently developed her analysis of the multiplicity of money with the concept of "circuits of commerce." Each circuit incorporates its own medium, for example "localized tokens." Zelizer's approach suggests that we need to take a micro as well as a macro approach to the analysis of money. In contrast to the argument that is advanced by Ingham, she suggests that we need to look at money from the perspective of its users, not its producers. By adopting this perspective, one can glean many insights from the fluid meanings of money – not the least of which is that the future of state issued currency is by no means assured.

Zelizer works with a broad and inclusive definition of money, while that of Ingham is narrow and exclusive. But their perspectives are by no means incompatible. The present day world of money is characterized by two countervailing trends. To some degree, these reflect the contrasting approaches of Ingham and Zelizer to the sociology of money. On the one hand, large scale currencies such as the US dollar are increasingly circulating outside the borders of their issuing states, and in some cases are actually replacing smaller currencies. This process constitutes a trend toward increasing

homogeneity. On the other hand, the range of monetary forms in circulation that are not state issued currency is increasing, primarily through the development of e money and complementary currencies. This constitutes a trend toward increasing *diversity*.

For sociologists, these developments offer some exciting research opportunities. One such opportunity is offered by the euro (see Dodd 2005). On the face of it, the single currency is consistent with the phenomenon of currency homogenization. Having replaced 12 separate national currencies, the euro is an internationalized currency in its own right, and already circulates beyond the borders of the euro zone. The euro represents a quantum leap in the homogenization of currency. Its emergence was due not to the dynamics of currency competition but to political fiat. As such, it was introduced into an unusually uneven – and sometimes hostile – socioeconomic terrain. It is possible that the operation of a single monetary policy in the euro zone might even foster conditions under which alternative forms of money could thrive. The euro has not been the unmitigated failure that many commentators were predicting, nor the spectacular success that its architects might have hoped for, economically, politically, and even culturally. As the euro zone expands, it will provide especially fertile ground on which competing sociological accounts of money can be put to the test.

SEE ALSO: Economy (Sociological Approach); Globalization; Markets; Money Management in Families; Simmel, Georg; Marx, Karl

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money management in families

Vivienne Elizabeth

The equal sharing of financial resources and, hence, material well being has become an assumed norm of contemporary heterosexual families. Of course, this is not to say that heterosexual couples actually enjoy financial equality or that they share a similar standard of living. In fact, as Pahl (1989) pointed out over 15 years ago, the failure to open up the black box of familial economies to sociological scrutiny has operated to disguise intrafamilial inequalities: amongst married couples these inequalities, as numerous studies have consistently demonstrated, possess a strongly gendered character. It is women and children who tend to be poor even when the households to which they belong are in receipt of adequate incomes.

Sociologists, in taking heed of Pahl's call to investigate the money management practices of families, have paid attention to a number of different dimensions of domestic economies. Firstly, they have sought to discover the practices through which families combine, distribute, spend, and save their financial resources. Secondly, they have examined the effects of these practices on different family members in both financial and social terms. Thirdly, they have pointed out that variations in the use of particular financial systems are associated with differences of class, ethnicity, and family structure. Fourthly, they have recently begun to consider the role remittances play in the choice of money management systems within ethnic minority families.

In pursuing this line of inquiry, largely with respect to married and, to a lesser extent, remarried and unmarried heterosexual couples and families, sociologists have consolidated and refined Pahl's original insight into the gendered inequalities produced through contemporary money management practices. Disparities in personal spending money are a particularly sensitive marker of the ways in which different financial systems operate to reduce or enlarge gendered inequalities. Other widely recognized sites of gendered disparity within the economies of heterosexual families include: differences in the power of each partner to influence decision making, especially over extraordinary expenditure; differences in who is accountable to whom for how they manage their financial affairs; and differences in the value attributed to each person's monetary contributions to the household. As Pahl (2000) aptly points out, these inequalities may well be aggravated by the emergence and increased usage of electronic banking practices that enable "credit rich" individuals to pursue their own financial goals without consulting other family members.

Four money management systems are now widely recognized to reflect the ways in which heterosexual couples and families organize their finances; the little we know about the money management practices of same sex couples and families suggests that two of these financial systems – the pooling and independent systems – are also in use within these households. The other two money management systems discussed below – the whole wage system and the housekeeping system – are clearly connected to a traditional gendered division of labor that allocates responsibilities for paid work to a male breadwinner and for unpaid domestic work to a female housewife and mother. Because a traditional gender division of labor, and the ideologies that have given it legitimacy, is in decline, both the whole wage and housekeeping systems are also decreasing in popularity. Furthermore, their strong connection to the practices of heterogender means that these systems are rarely, if ever, used by same sex couples.

The whole wage system consists of two variations. In the more common female whole wage system (in use by approximately 25 per cent of households in the UK), men retain a portion of their earnings for their own personal

use before passing over the remainder to their female partners who, after adding in their own earnings if any, are charged with the responsibility of meeting the household's expenses. In effect, the female whole wage system enshrines earner entitlement by guaranteeing men's access to personal spending money, while making women's access to personal spending money contingent upon the presence of a monetary surplus. Given the preponderance of the use of this system in low wage households, combined with a now well recognized tendency for women to prioritize expenditure that meets the needs of their children, the typical outcome of the female whole wage system is large differences in the personal spending capacities of men and women. In the second variant, the male whole wage system (used by approximately 10 percent of households in the UK), men retain and manage the income they bring into the household. Under this system men are positioned as financial gatekeepers and women as supplicants who, to the extent that they have no or limited incomes of their own, must ask their male partners for access to money in order to make autonomous purchases. Thus, women's capacity to influence financial decisions or engage in personal spending is even more highly constrained than within the female whole wage system.

In the housekeeping system (also used by approximately 10 percent of heterosexual families within the UK), men pass over a set amount of money at fixed intervals to their partners, whilst "husbanding" the remainder of their income in a separate account to cover both their personal spending needs and extraordinary household expenses. Typically, the housekeeping allowance is used to cover day to day household expenses and in many cases it is also expected to provide women with their personal spending money. Once again this system limits women's access to the combined financial resources of the household, their ability to influence major spending decisions, and their capacity to spend on themselves.

Unsurprisingly, given the emphasis on equal sharing within contemporary marital discourse and the growth in women's financial contributions to households through their increased labor market participation, pooling has become the most common system in use amongst heterosexual couples (with around 50 percent of

heterosexual households using it in the UK and upwards of 65 percent of couples in the US). Although research on the money management practices of non traditional couples and families, especially same sex families, is sparse, it appears that pooling also enjoys reasonable uptake amongst cohabitating heterosexual and homosexual couples (Blumstein & Schwartz 1983; Elizabeth 2001; Vogler 2005). Arguably, the use of pooling by these couples reflects their level of commitment to each other and hence their beliefs in the longevity of their relationships. However, the choice to use the pooling system may simply be a practical response to a partner's loss of income through childbearing, unemployment, or full time study.

In the pooling system, all (or nearly all) of the couple's income is placed in a joint bank account, permitting each partner to enjoy direct and, in principle, equal access to their combined financial resources. Despite the rhetoric that surrounds pooling, widespread inequalities in access to the family's joint income persist. These disparities are clearly evident in differences in the personal spending practices of major and minor (or non) earners. To a considerable extent, the discrepancy in personal spending money amongst pooling couples (both heterosexual and homosexual) reflects the difficulty many couples experience in completely setting aside ideas about "your" or "my" money in favor of "our" money, particularly with respect to discretionary expenditure. In other words, despite adhering to the principle of equal sharing, many pooling couples continue to hold onto a vestigial belief in the rights of income earners to determine how this money is allocated. The effects of an ongoing belief in earner entitlement amongst couples who pool are several. Firstly, it boosts the decision making power of the major earner even as it diminishes the influence of the minor (or non) earner. Secondly, it undercuts the capacity of lower or non earning partners to spend on personal items: this occurs as much, if not more, through self imposed restrictions as it does through restrictions imposed by the major earning partner.

Amongst heterosexual couples who pool, these inequalities of money and power are reinforced by the performance of heterogender in a context of ongoing gender related income

differentials and the continued gendered division of labor within many heterosexual families. Paradoxically, even in couples where the woman is the main earner, her superior income often fails to translate into greater decision making power or higher levels of personal spending money. Rather, women in this situation tend to divest themselves of this form of power in an attempt to minimize the discomfort that arises for many men when they find themselves in positions of dependency. This raises the question: to what extent are the well known inequalities in the domestic economy ameliorated in families that are formed around non heterosexual couples? Available research suggests an affirmative reply: both lesbian and gay couples report achieving high levels of egalitarianism in their relationships, a finding that is partly a result of maintaining high levels of workforce involvement, and hence financial independence.

Finally, the independent system is reliant upon each partner being in receipt of his or her own income: for this reason, the use of this system is associated with higher income, often childless, households. Its uptake is also connected to newer forms of family life: in the small number of studies on the financial practices of remarried and cohabiting (heterosexual and homosexual) couples, findings point to their higher rates of usage of this system: around 50 percent of these couples appear to use an independent system compared with less than 10 percent of the married population. However, the findings of several recent studies suggest that, although subject to geographical variability, the use of an independent system amongst married couples may well be on the rise: in Heimdal and Houseknecht's (2003) study, just under 20 percent of married couples from the US organized their money separately. Interestingly, the independent system is also in higher use in New Zealand, especially amongst Pacifica families where its use may facilitate the payment of remittances to extended family members (Fleming 1997).

In the independent system, each partner holds his or her earnings separately whilst making an agreed upon contribution to nominated joint expenses. Typically, this contribution is defined in terms of a 50:50 split of their joint household expenses; amongst some couples this

contribution is placed in a joint purse (or kitty) or bank account to avoid the complicated accounting processes that are often a feature of this system. Having made the appropriate contribution, the remainder of a person's income is defined as an individually owned and controlled resource. In other words, couples using an independent system place emphasis on the equality of their financial contributions to the family and, in exchange for making equal contributions, each partner enjoys equal control over his or her disposable income.

The attractions for women of this system are clear: the need to ask and seek approval for money to cover personal purchases, a key hallmark of financial dependency, is circumvented. Indeed, where women earn more than their male partners, the independent system, in affirming the principle of earner entitlement, makes it possible for women to wield more influence over spending decisions – both ordinary and extraordinary – than is often the case amongst heterosexual couples. But how frequently women are in receipt of an income that would enable them to exercise greater power, and secondly, how often they actually take advantage of this capacity, is a matter for further research. Early indications amongst lesbian couples who use this system, however, suggest that they avoid income differentials and downplay the significance of such differences in an attempt to maintain egalitarian relationships; amongst heterosexual couples the chances that women will earn more than their male partners, although on the rise, remains low. On the contrary, disparities in income levels tend to be skewed in men's favor. In this more common scenario, the failure of the independent system to address equality of access issues, at the same time as it entrenches earner control, may well disadvantage heterosexual women. Where incomes are disparate the principle of equal contributions will result in one partner paying a much higher proportion of his or her income toward the couple's joint expenses, thereby leaving that person with comparatively lower levels of spending power.

The independent and pooling systems each represent promising possibilities for the achievement of financial equality within contemporary heterosexual families. Yet attempts to eliminate inequalities between family members through

the use of these systems have proved to be flawed, at least under some circumstances. The continued emergence of financial disparities within families can be largely attributed to the ongoing salience of earner entitlements in contexts of income inequalities. As argued herein, both earner entitlements and income disparities are strongly inflected by the structures and norms associated with the operation of gender within heterosexual relationships. To understand more about the effects of earner entitlements and income disparities, it is time that sociologists turned their attention to the financial practices of same sex couples and families. It is entirely conceivable that through such research new ways of resolving the tensions between equality and autonomy will be brought to light.

SEE ALSO: Divisions of Household Labor; Family Poverty; Households; Inequalities in Marriage; Marital Power/Resource Theory; Money

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moral economy

Steffen Mau

Moral economy can be defined as a common notion of the just distribution of resources and social exchange. The concept has been developed and is used in the context of political and social analysis to understand, for example, various systems of social exchange or instances of rebellion. It is claimed that social communities tend to invoke a moral repertoire for all kinds of social exchanges and transfers that leads them to distinguish between legitimate and illegitimate social practices. The transition from traditional to market economies is emphasized by many authors, in particular, because this transition challenged traditional communal norms and values and can lead to social and political unrest. In more recent accounts, moral economy contends that economic activities are insufficiently understood in narrow economic terms. Rather, they need a broader understanding of how economic and normative motives are blended and how markets are permeated by social norms and values. The centerpiece of the moral economy argument claims that human action is embedded within the wider social environment and institutions and is therefore deeply colored by non-economic considerations.

E. P. Thompson's (1971) study on the eighteenth century food riots first popularized the term moral economy. He observes how the emergence of the market order seriously challenges traditional normative standards, and thereby evoked popular resistance and protest. According to his account, it was not "objective" forms of hardship that engendered social protest, but rather the violation of well entrenched communal values. Since there is a traditional and widespread consensus about legitimate and illegitimate social practices, and since the cash nexus of the market tends to threaten deep rooted moral precepts of a fair price or the right to subsistence, people are ready to engage in a moral protest. Thompson's contribution has inspired a whole branch of anthropological and ethnographic studies dealing with diverse peasant societies (e.g., Scott 1976, 1985). Their findings show that the marketization of traditional societies tends to violate well entrenched

norms and reciprocities and thereby triggers social and political unrest. In most of the scholarship, the peasantry appears to be a group especially vulnerable to the disruptive impact of the emerging market order because norms of reciprocity and subsistence prevail. Their social rather than economic way of reasoning and their lack of rational calculation can be explained by the intersection between economic and social functions of production, the close relation between production and consumption, and their risk proneness. According to moral economists these types of agrarian communities do not allocate resources so as to maximize total output, but to fulfill their subsistence needs (Bates & Curry 1992).

One of the key concepts of the moral economy approach is the idea of embeddedness, which highlights the notion that economic behavior in traditional societies takes place within the context of religious, social, and political institutions. Karl Polanyi's book *The Great Transformation* (1957) investigates the conditions and rationales of economic exchanges and distinguishes the embedded and the disembedded or autonomous economies. Polanyi argues that traditional societies are characterized by the fact that economic relationships are submerged in social relationships. In traditional societies there is no clear boundary line separating the economic sphere from society's institutions and values (e.g., religion, politics). Economic activities are also governed by non market institutions, traditions, and a set of normative expectations so that means and ends cannot be considered as autonomous. Following the Aristotelian notion of the good life and the distinct characteristics of "householding" in contrast to money making, he suggests that traditional economic forms of production and distribution were subordinated to the pursuit of the good life.

However, it is often remarked that this contrast between traditional and modern societies is largely overestimated. In the light of more recent evidence it has been suggested that the concept of the moral economy rests too heavily on the distinction between market and non market based societies (Booth 1994). Also, modern societies are not devoid of forms of moral regulation. Thus, beyond the accounts that deal with the trajectory from traditional to modern

societies, the moral economy framework has inspired a larger part of economic sociology challenging some of the propositions of economic and rational choice theory. Moral economists argue that the economic approach focuses too narrowly on the self interested and utility maximizing individual and it cannot be fruitfully applied to the many instances in which economic behavior is guided by and embedded in non economic institutions and values. Rather than conceiving the profit seeking individual as *the* pivot of economic behavior, a closer understanding of the sociocultural components and determinants of behavior is needed. By the same token, the idea of autonomous, self regulating markets needs critical revision in favor of revealing the institutional and political, but also normative prerequisites of how the market functions. Critics of the moral economy approach suggest that it "moralizes" and "oversocializes" individual actions. Hence, it fails not only to conceive that morality can be a bearer of self interest, but also that economic considerations can generate non market institutions (Arnold 2001). For some, the moral economic framework sticks to a rather generalized understanding of morality that is not prepared to construe and to identify the role of specific social relations (Granovetter 1985). Recent renewals of the moral economy concept have sharpened the analytical perspective by focusing on concrete social exchanges, highlighting the impact of institutional contexts and promoting the idea of social goods.

SEE ALSO: Community and Economy; Distributive Justice; Norm of Reciprocity; Polanyi, Karl

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moral entrepreneur

Mary deYoung

A moral entrepreneur is an individual, group, or formal organization that takes on the responsibility of persuading society to develop or to enforce rules that are consistent with its own ardently held moral beliefs. Moral entrepreneurs may act as rule creators by crusading for the passage of rules, laws, and policies against behaviors they find abhorrent, or as rule enforcers by administering and implementing them. Although these are different and distinct roles, the effect of moral entrepreneurship, according to Howard Becker who coined the term, is the formation of a new class of outsiders whose behavior now violates these newly minted regulations and therefore is subject to the opprobrious label of “deviant.”

In *Outsiders: Studies in the Sociology of Deviance* (1963), Becker elaborates on the concept of moral entrepreneurs through a case study of US marijuana laws. He identifies the Federal Bureau of Narcotics as the rule creator that mobilized its considerable resources to initiate an unrelenting moral crusade against marijuana use. Using rhetoric that resonated with hegemonic moral standards, the Bureau saturated the news media and popular culture with horror stories about the moral and social threats posed by those who violated these imperatives by smoking marijuana. As a rule creator, the

Bureau provided the enterprise that culminated in the passage of the 1937 Marijuana Tax Act, a new bill that created a new class of outsiders – marijuana users.

Rules, however, must be enforced. This obligation provides another, albeit different, opportunity for moral entrepreneurship. Becker presents the police as the quintessential example of rule enforcers. More objective and detached than the morally fervent rule creators, the police are armed with a great deal of discretion. They may or may not enforce a rule, depending on institutional priorities for doing so, the deference shown by the rule violators, and the insinuation of “the fix,” that is, the political and social connections and savvy of the rule violators, into the encounter. The influence of these variables illustrates Becker’s contention that rule enforcement is always socially structured.

Although Becker cautions against the simple dismissal of rule creators as “meddling busy bodies,” if only because history reveals that many moral crusades, as exemplified by Abolition and Prohibition, are humanitarian in intent and consequence, he describes them as self-righteous ideologues who often are quite willing to use whatever means possible to accomplish their stated mission. Rule enforcers, in contrast, are carrying out professional roles and are motivated to do the job well not so much by moral passion as by the institutionally created needs to win the respect of those they deal with and, more importantly, to justify their rule enforcing jobs.

Each of these needs creates a conundrum. Rule enforcers’ sense of security and of efficacy is, in part, dependent upon the respect of others, therefore a good deal of their professional activity is devoted to coercing that respect from those they tend to view with pessimism and even acrimony. If those alleged rule breakers respond with deference, if not respect, rule enforcers may exercise their discretion and drop the matter entirely; if not, they may use their power to label the alleged rule breakers as deviant. In exercising that choice, rule enforcers are subject to criticism by those in positions of authority and by the rule creators whose dogmatic expectation is that rules will be enforced without exception. A conundrum also is created by the rule enforcers’ need to justify their positions. They must successfully

convince the larger society that the evil and threatening behavior of rule violators is an exigent problem, while at the same time they must assure the larger society that the enterprise of rule enforcement is actually successful. The failure to skillfully negotiate these conflicting demands may put them at odds with authorities or with the larger society and, once again, with the rule creators whose righteous wrath may fuel yet another moral crusade to create even more or better rules.

Becker's concept of moral entrepreneurs is predicated upon the premise that deviance is inherent neither to a particular behavior nor to a particular rule breaker, but that it is nothing more than a label successfully applied by more powerful moral entrepreneurs to rule violators. This theory of deviance resonated with the American sociological imagination of the early 1960s. Becker's labeling theory, or interactionist theory as he preferred to term it, provided an alternative to the functionalist paradigm that had predominated since the turn of the century. By setting aside the functionalist tenet that deviance is a functional requisite of civil and moral society because it defines moral boundaries and strengthens social solidarity, interactionist theory could focus on how deviance is signified by the claims and activities of moral entrepreneurs as rule creators, why, and with what consequences. By rejecting the functionalist assertion that what constitutes deviance is consensually agreed upon, it could concentrate on the political enterprise of moral entrepreneurs as rule enforcers in deciding what rules are to be enforced, why, and with what consequences.

By theoretically positioning moral entrepreneurs as the initiators and executors of the enterprise of labeling deviants, and as the orchestrators of the social reaction to them, Becker vested interactionist theory with a specificity absent from the theories of his intellectual forebears. In doing so, he inspired generations of sociologists to examine the role of moral entrepreneurs as rule creators in both historical and contemporary international contexts. Among those falling under sociological scrutiny are individuals such as the nineteenth century American anti vice campaigner Anthony Comstock and British MP David Alton who spearheaded the campaign against "video nasties" a

century later; organized pressure groups like People for the Ethical Treatment of Animals, the Club to Protect Children from Comic Books in Japan, the Snowdrop Petition that crusaded for gun control laws in the wake of the massacre of schoolchildren in Dunblane, Scotland, and anti globalization groups around the world; and bureaucratic agencies such as the nineteenth century Societies for the Prevention of Cruelty to Children, the Legion of Decency that for three decades campaigned against morally objectionable films, the internationally organized Coalition Against Trafficking in Women, and the mass media.

Moral entrepreneurs as rule enforcers also came under sociological scrutiny. Becker's interactionist theory resonated well with the sociopolitical milieu of the early 1960s and its liberal critique of agencies of social control. With its thesis that rules and their enforcement are relative, persons already marginalized as outsiders – the poor, the powerless, the disenfranchised – increasingly were treated by sociologists as romantic, if not heroic, victims of rule enforcers. Thus, agencies of social control like the police and the courts, as well as professions that have a stake in social control, such as social workers, medical doctors, and psychologists, also became the subjects of critical sociological analysis.

In the years following the publication of *Outsiders*, the concept of moral entrepreneurs achieved an iconic status that has outlived the popularity of the interactionist or labeling theory of deviance to which it is central. The concept was not only exemplified in case studies, but also used to account for the claims and activities that generated the social construction of such diverse social problems as road rage, the HIV/AIDS epidemic, and "crack babies," and fueled such social movements as the anti nuclear movement in the United States and the boycott movement in South Africa. Yet, despite its contribution to sociological analysis, only a few refinements of the concept, let alone criticisms of it, have been ventured.

Jenkins (1992), as an example, extends the concept of moral entrepreneurs beyond the traditional examples of it. He identifies a loosely organized coalition of feminists, sexual abuse survivors, fundamentalist Christians, social workers, and conservative politicians who fomented

a moral crusade against satanic ritual abuse in Great Britain. This spin on moral entrepreneurs provides an entrée for the analysis of how such “strange bedfellows” come together in the first place, stay together, and act together to create and enforce the rules that label outsiders. In a multimediated, globally connected world, this notion of moral entrepreneur coalition building among grassroots, special interest, professional, and elite representatives remains a subject for further sociological analysis. O’Sullivan (1994), as another example, refines the concept. He criticizes Becker for underestimating the structural limitations on the power of most moral entrepreneurs to create and enforce rules. By contextualizing moral entrepreneurship within an arena of “local morality,” or limited social power, he reveals the theoretical necessity for another role of moral entrepreneurs – that of rule interpreters. This role describes professionals, such as judges, who are obligated to evaluate rules of evidence, procedure, and testimony before passing judgment and officially labeling a rule breaker as deviant. Since this role also is played in settings other than the legal arena that O’Sullivan describes, the moral entrepreneur as rule interpreter emerges as a subject for further sociological analysis.

The strongest challenges to the concept of moral entrepreneurs are embedded in critiques of Becker’s case study of the Marijuana Tax Act. Galliher and Walker (1978), for example, conclude that Becker’s focus on the role of moral entrepreneurs as rule creators and enforcers so resounded with the zeitgeist of the early 1960s that it created a synthetic history of the Act. Their review of newspaper articles and the Congressional Record found no evidence of the moral crusade that Becker alleges was orchestrated by the Federal Bureau of Narcotics. They conclude that the Bureau envisaged the Act not in moral terms at all, but as a means, more symbolic than real, of tightening social control of the economic and racial minorities who already were designated as outsiders. The Bureau, in their assessment, played an insignificant role, if any, in the creation of outsiders, or in the enterprise of labeling them as such.

The interactionist or labeling theory, to which the concept of moral entrepreneurs is central, has been the subject of criticism over

the last several decades and has lost much of its cachet. As it is, the concept has fallen prey to appropriation by the mass media that tend to use it as a sobriquet for virtually any person, group, or organization that makes any kind of moral claim, as well as by the corporate world to describe the captains of industry who fund initiatives to solve the world’s social problems, and by political analysts to describe the moral agendas of world leaders. Without a distinct tie to the interactionist or labeling theory of deviance, however, these appropriated descriptions are devoid of sociological meaning.

Over recent years, however, the concept of moral entrepreneurs is being reclaimed by sociologists who are turning a critical eye to moral panics and, in doing so, are restoring the term’s sociological relevance. While there are critical differences between the concept of moral *crusades*, such as the Federal Bureau of Narcotics’s campaign against marijuana use that Becker describes, and moral *panics*, such as the American drug panic of the 1980s that Goode and Ben Yehuda (1994) describe, moral entrepreneurs play a central role in each. Whether as representatives of grassroots, professional, or elite interests or whether as initiators, organizers, propagandists, ideologues, or enforcers, moral entrepreneurs endeavor to influence the content and the enforcement of rules. Some of their moral crusades will fail to achieve their mission, but those that do succeed will designate those who will become society’s “outsiders.”

SEE ALSO: Deviance; Deviance, Moral Boundaries and; Labeling Theory; Moral Panics; Social Control

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moral panics

David G. Bromley

Moral panic is an analytic concept that refers to a distinctive type of social deviance characterized by a heightened sense of threat in some segment of the population, sudden in emergence and subsidence, attribution of the troubled condition to a "folk devil," and a disproportionate response relative to an objectively assessed threat level. The concept is particularly useful in focusing analytic attention on the socially constructed nature of deviance through the interaction of claimsmakers, folk devils, and audiences.

The term moral panic was initially coined by Jock Young in an essay in Stanley Cohen's *Images of Deviance* (1971) and subsequently developed theoretically and applied empirically in Cohen's *Folk Devils and Moral Panics* (1972). Cohen studied two British youth movements of the 1960s, the Mods and Rockers, whose feuding in 1964 triggered what he analyzed as a moral panic. According to Cohen, the episode he studied was not unique; indeed, he proposed that societies are likely to experience moral panics periodically through their histories. He defined a moral panic as a group or condition that is a response to a threat to established values or interests. The group or condition is analyzed and diagnosed by various spokespersons and experts who make moral pronouncements and becomes the focus of sensationalized media coverage. Societal responses may lead

either to a subsidence or exacerbation of the situation.

Cohen identified the central actors that conveyed and expressed the moral panic as the media (which dispensed hyperbolic, stereotypical coverage), the public (which had to possess some level of concern that served as the foundation for the episode), law enforcement agencies (which broadened and intensified concerns as well as justified new methods of control and punitive counter measures), political officials (who symbolically aligned themselves against the condition or group at issue), and action groups (which coordinated the response to the problematic condition or group). In addition, he asserted that moral panics are characterized by the creation of "folk devils" (individuals or groups who personify evil by engaging in harmful behavior that must be halted) and a disaster orientation (in which warnings of impending catastrophe, rumors and speculations, and coping responses resemble behavior in natural disaster situations).

The most systematic theoretical formulation of the moral panics concept was developed by Goode and Ben Yehuda (1994). As they conceptualize the dynamics of moral panics, there is popular but exaggerated concern about a perceived threat; remedial action is undertaken but popular interest ultimately declines and turns to other issues. In their view, moral panic constitutes a significant, distinctive category of sociological analysis because it combines elements of deviance, social problems, collective behavior, and social movements, but is analytically distinguishable from each of these important analytic concepts. For example, while moral panics involve the social construction of deviance and social problems, neither of the latter concepts necessarily entails public concern that does not correspond to a demonstrable level of objective threat or the creation of folk devils. Similarly, moral panics share certain features with collective behavior. They involve rumor mongering that generates fears and an exaggerated sense of threat. They also involve certain features of natural disasters: an impact phase, damage assessment, survivor rescue, remedy proposals, and a recovery period. However, in disasters, causal agents and their consequences are usually more clearly defined,

phases are more sharply demarcated, and folk devils may not be created.

Goode and Ben Yehuda enumerate a number of indicators of the existence of a moral panic episode: (1) heightened concern (which may or may not overlap with fear) about the conduct of a group or category, as indicated by public opinion polls, media reports, social movement activity, or legislative proposals; (2) an increased degree of hostility toward the group or category resulting from a threat to the values or interests of a substantial segment of the society; (3) a consensus (agreement among a substantial segment of the population) that the threat is significant and attributable to the group or category; (4) disproportionality – an assessment that the number of individuals engaged in the behavior and the threat posed by the behavior are far greater than an independent, empirical evaluation would conclude; and (5) volatility – a pattern of sudden eruption followed by quiescence, even if the issue becomes institutionalized through legislation, control mechanisms, or social movement organization. Disproportionality is a key dimension of moral panics in the Goode and Ben Yehuda formulation. Indices of disproportionality include fabrication of evidence on the issue, inflation of indices of the issue, and public attention to the condition that appreciably exceeds attention paid to conditions that pose a comparable hazard or during previous times when the hazard was no greater.

A variety of theoretical explanations and approaches have been offered for interpreting moral panics. Hall et al. (1978) proceed from a Marxist perspective, treating the moral panics over mugging in England as the product of crises in the historical development of capitalism. In their formulation, the targets of moral panics are constructed to serve the interests of the ruling elite and deflect attention away from a crisis in the capitalist system. The ruling elite orchestrates moral panic episodes with support from the media and social control agencies. In the case of mugging, they argue, the law and order campaign against street crime was designed to deflect attention away from the real problem of the day – declining corporate profitability and growing economic recession. The exercise of repressive power by the state against street crime thus served to buttress the position

of the ruling elite during a historical moment of vulnerability.

Jenkins (1998) traces the social construction of child molestation over the last century. During this period there have been ebbs and flows in perceived child endangerment and shifts in the perceived sources of that threat. By contrast with Hall et al.'s Marxist explanation for moral panics, Jenkins explains the occurrence of the moral panic over child molestation by linking structural changes in the social order with the activities of a constellation of interest groups. For example, in the two decades beginning in the late 1950s child endangerment concerns increased. Jenkins explains this shift by delineating a number of socio demographic changes in contemporary America and Britain (e.g., age distribution of the population, percent of women in the labor force, percent of young children in daycare) and connecting them to a set of interest groups (therapists, child welfare agencies, law enforcement agencies, mass media organizations) that both shaped and responded to those changes.

Goode and Ben Yehuda also focus on the structural source of moral panic episodes by offering three alternative explanatory models for moral panics: grassroots, elite engineered, and interest group. They eliminate the elite model as useful for interpreting most moral panic episodes and propose a combination of the grassroots and interest group models. They conclude that active or latent stress at the grassroots level is a prerequisite for moral panics that provides the "raw material" for an episode. However, the way that stress or fear is directed is shaped by organizational activists who provide the focus and direction for moral panics. They illustrate this model using the cases of the Renaissance with craze, the American drug panic of the 1980s, and the 1982 drug panic in Israel to demonstrate the applicability of moral panics analysis across time and cultures.

Theorizing from a social constructionist perspective, the concept of moral panic offers a useful critique of naturalistic theories that presume a correspondence between problematic social conditions and the social control response. The emphasis on sudden emergence and decline without apparent changes in the environment, and attribution of troubling conditions to folk devils, invites a constructionist perspective.

Further, an analysis that focuses on the structural conditions that foster claimsmaking, the social processes through which claims achieve plausibility, and the success or failure of attempts to demonize certain individuals or groups sets the stage for an analysis that hinges on the location, resources, and interaction of claimsmakers, folk devils, and audiences. The concept of moral panics has been profitably applied to a number of episodes over the last several decades involving controversy over issues such as illicit drug use, the existence of religious and satanic cults, the vulnerability of young children, predatory crime, troublesome youth, and sexual exploitation and deviance.

As with many sociological concepts and theories, there is continuing debate over the conceptualization, measurement, and utility of moral panic. The most fundamental debate is whether moral panic constitutes a discrete, meaningful category of sociological analysis. Critics assert that case studies often proceed with the objective of demonstrating that the episode under study conforms to the moral panics profile rather than problematizing those relationships. Put simply, the problem is asserted to be presuming what should be empirically demonstrated. In the case of the characteristic of broad consensus on a high degree of threat, critics observe that a variety of measures (public opinion, media coverage) may be employed without stipulated thresholds or evidence that these measures are related in a specific case. With respect to the pivotal concept of disproportionality, it is typically asserted without supporting evidence that third party observers are more objective than involved parties and assumes that pre and post episode responses were proportional. Finally, while structural characteristics often are linked to the activation of interest groups in the emergence of moral panics, identifying decline is more problematic, particularly if structural characteristics remain unchanged. For example, decreased media coverage may or may not be indicative of a decline in concern; and since the impact of moral panics can vary considerably, it can be difficult to determine when a watershed point has been reached. Critics thus propose treating putative characteristics of moral panics as variables whose interrelationships should be determined empirically. These

various critiques suggest a number of theoretical and methodological issues that have yet to be resolved.

Such debates notwithstanding, there are some intriguing potential lines of exploration in moral panics analysis. One involves a sociology of knowledge investigation of the incorporation of the concept of moral panics into popular culture. As McRobbie and Thornton (1995) have observed, the succession of moral panics in recent decades has created a conscious awareness of the phenomenon and some understanding of its dynamics by both interest groups and control agencies. As a result, certain commercial interests and countercultural groups have strategically sought to precipitate moral panics in order to profit financially or promote group solidarity through the social reaction that is generated. At the same time, equally aware social control agents and media have developed a corresponding interest in discounting claims and discouraging strong reactions in episodes designated as moral panics as part of their organizational mandates. Obviously, the dynamics of moral panics emergence and development would be altered by such culturally savvy actors. It might also transpire that such manipulation would generate public cynicism about moral panics that would constrain their emergence and development. Should such developments occur, the dynamics of some moral panics, as well as the sociological analysis of them, may be transformed.

A second important issue that merits further exploration is the relative utility of consensus and conflict theoretical approaches for interpreting moral panics. A central idea in the analysis of moral panics is that at least some actors in the episode do not respond objectively or proportionately to the perceived threat. The nature of the response presumably could be the result of broadly based anxiety attendant to disruptive social change and/or manipulative tactics by interest or elite groups. Various mechanisms for creating a disproportionate response have been suggested, such as creating a mythic past that increases discontent and displacing tensions on to folk devils who serve as scapegoats. Since moral panics are such dramatic events, they offer a unique window on how public crises occur and hence a particularly

productive social venue for assessing the role of consensus and conflict in the social construction of deviance.

SEE ALSO: Child Abuse; Deviance; Deviance, the Media and; Deviance, Moral Boundaries and; Moral Entrepreneur; Satanism; Sex Panics

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moral shocks and self-recruitment

Mikaila Mariel Lemonik Arthur

Many analysts of social movements are interested in how it is that people come to participate in social movement activity. The decision

to participate is not a simple one – social movement participants may face significant risks and personal costs, such as arrest or violence, if they become involved. In addition, individuals often perceive social movements as being able to obtain desired goals without their own personal action, a dilemma that has come to be known as the "free rider" problem. Some popular explanations for individuals' decisions to join social movements have included biographical availability (McAdam 1986) and mobilization through preexisting social networks. However, there are individuals who participate in social movements without being connected to any existing networks or being in any significant way biographically available. The moral shocks perspective shows how these individuals, often ignored in research about participation in social movements, can recruit themselves into social movement activity due to their experience of a moral shock.

The term "moral shock" refers to the experience of a sudden and deeply emotional stimulus that causes an individual to come to terms with a reality that is quite opposed to the values and morals already held by that individual. Moral shocks can take a variety of forms. They often emerge as suddenly imposed grievances, but can also arise as a result of rhetorical appeals on the part of movement leaders or through shocking personal experiences (Jasper & Poulsen 1995). Some research on moral shocks and self recruitment looks at the framing strategies that movement leaders use to create a sense of shock in potential recruits, in particular the use of extreme graphics in public or through direct mail campaigns. Those moral shocks which are related to powerful and well known symbols are most influential in generating self recruitment on the part of potential social movement participants. Research using the moral shocks perspective has focused on social movements around environmental or nuclear hazards, abortion, animal rights, religious values, and other matters where individuals have strong personal and moral reactions to the issues at hand while not necessarily being part of networks which have a preexisting commitment to these issues.

Once potential recruits have experienced a moral shock, they are galvanized to participate in social movement activity. The "self recruitment" portion of the moral shocks and

self recruitment model then suggests that rather than waiting for an appropriate social movement organization to seek them out, potential recruits who have experienced a moral shock are likely to seek out social movement participation on their own. These individuals will search for a social movement organization that shares their personal, moral, and value based commitments to the issue that they believe in, and they will then join without much prompting from the social movement organization. As noted above, social movement organizations can take advantage of the self recruitment process by designing recruitment campaigns relying on moral shocks which cause individuals to believe that they are joining the social movement organization on their own out of a sense of moral duty.

Criticisms of the moral shock and self recruitment model of mobilization have tended to be rooted in the hypothesis that the majority of social movement participants are recruited through preexisting social networks like friendship groups or church memberships, and that therefore even if moral shock sometimes drives potential social movement participants to seek out and join social movement organizations, moral shocks are not very significant overall in explaining why people participate in social movements. In particular, those who study recruitment to high risk activism highlight the necessity of networks to fulfill the function of convincing people to participate (McAdam 1986), since merely coming to care deeply about an issue will not make an individual willing to take significant risks of arrest or physical harm in pursuit of social movement goals.

One of the most well known works that uses the moral shocks and self recruitment perspective to explain why people join social movements is Kristen Luker's *Abortion and the Politics of Motherhood* (1984). Luker explains how women who had never previously been active in social movements or in any kind of politics became mobilized as part of the anti abortion movement because of a variety of moral shocks. In particular, Luker outlines two main varieties of moral shocks that these potential recruits experienced: those surrounding their own reproductive decisions or options and those concerning the ways in which they first heard about the *Roe v. Wade* court decision.

SEE ALSO: Emotions and Social Movements; Framing and Social Movements; Mobilization; Moral Panics; Pro Choice and Pro Life Movements; Social Movements; Social Movements, Biographical Consequences of; Social Movements, Recruitment to; Values

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moralpolitik (*Confucian*)

SangJun Kim

Moralpolitik means politics based on moral ethical concerns. That politics and morals are closely related is a familiar idea. As Rousseau once stated, "those who want to treat politics and morals separately will never understand any thing of either of them" (Rousseau 1980: 235). In this regard, *realpolitik*, which means politics excluding moral ethical concerns, signifies a rather exceptional mode of politics, mainly applicable to a certain aspect of international politics, and is a residual concept of *moralpolitik*,

In *moralpolitik*, the relationship between morals and politics is double faceted: morals and politics are collaboratively intertwined on the one hand, and in antagonistic tension on the other. This double faceted relationship originates from the worldview of ethical religions.

From the viewpoint of ethical religions, the world has a double meaning: one sinful (morally wrong), the other blessed (God made). Moral discontent with the world marks the ethical character of “ethical religions” in the Weberian sense. This moral discontent causes the sharp tension between religious morals and worldly politics. The sharp tension between morals and politics leads to moral interventions in politics. These interventions constitute *moralpolitik*.

In the premodern era, *moralpolitik* took the form of religious politics, in which religious moral commands and politics were indivisibly fused. To take some prominent historical examples: the papal ecclesiastical politics of medieval Europe, the sage politics of Confucianism, the *purohita* politics of Hinduism, the *sangha cakravatin* politics of Buddhism, and the *imam ulamma* politics of Islam. These all took the form of theocracy, in which the sacred encompasses the secular.

In modern times, the relationship between the sacred and the secular is reversed: now, the secular encompasses the sacred (Kim 2003; see Fig. 1). The well known “secularization thesis” points to this relationship. The thesis, however, contains some flaws, because it has been often misunderstood as the claim that the sacred has withered away in the modern era. The sacred, however, has not withered away in modern times; it has become internalized. The internalization of the sacred is the core of the secular encompassment of the sacred. Internalized sacredness, or, in other words, individualized sacredness, cannot any longer be theocratic in modernity. Modern *moralpolitik* stands on the moral base of internalized, individualized sacredness. In premodern *moralpolitik*, religious commands and their representative church




Figure 1 The changing relationship (reversion of encompassment) of the sacred and the secular.

dominated over politics. In modern *moralpolitik*, internalized and individualized reflection mediates moral values and politics.

In the premodern era, the priests of ethical religions, armed with moral discontent about the world, made themselves the practitioners of *moralpolitik*. Thus premodern *moralpolitik* was also a priestly politics. However, by making themselves the politicians of the world, the priests of premodern *moralpolitik* were criticized on moral grounds by the theologically more radical wings, usually classified as heterodoxies in the history of religions. These challengers usually made themselves into another, usually more fanatic, brand of priestly politicians.

The Reformation in sixteenth and seventeenth century Europe is the most famous and dramatic example of this. Protestants challenged Catholic *moralpolitik*, criticizing Catholic priests' involvement in worldly political affairs. Protestants themselves, however, became deeply and even fanatically involved in political affairs, including wars. The “politics of the saints” of Calvinism represents one of the most fanatic forms of theocracy in human history. Historians have called the warring period of Reformation and Counter Reformation “the early modern era.” This early modern era was the time when religious fanaticism or “religious tyranny” rose at an unprecedented rate and intensity (Weber 1958).

Here originates the modern worry about extreme forms of *moralpolitik*. Immanuel Kant, who is one of the most important conceivers of the concept of modern *moralpolitik*, was well aware of this danger, and attempted to distinguish between the “moral politician” and “despotic moralists.” The former, according to Kant, is “someone who conceives of the principles of political expediency in such a way that they can co exist with morality”; the latter, on the other hand, are “those who err in practice, frequently act contrary to political prudence by adopting or recommending premature measures” (Kant 1991: 118, 119). For Kant, both types could be *moralpolitik*, but only the former is desirable. One must note, however, that for Kant the worst type of *moralpolitik* is that of the “political moralist” who “fashions his morality to suit his own advantage as a statesman.”

It is ironic that modernity, the process of the “internalization of the sacred,” was conceived

during the rampant wars of religious fanaticisms and intolerance when priestly *moralpolitik* he terrible experience of fanaticism and religious wars, the sacred moved inward. Through theological or philosophical reflections and also through political compromises for survival, the idea of religious individualism and the value of religious tolerance grew. Modern liberal ideas and the modern way of life grew out of religious individualism and religious tolerance. In sum, the unprecedented fanaticism of *moralpolitik* conceived and introduced modernity.

The general pattern of *moralpolitik* can be summed up as follows: the distinction of moral and political values; institutionalization of religious politics that attempts to realize religious moral principles in politics; the consequential tensions between religious moral authorities and mundane powers; the conflict between the two distinctive powers which eventually conceives and introduces modernity. This is also the case with Confucian *moralpolitik*.

According to Kim (2000, 2002), in the Confucian political history (of Korea and China), there existed double powers: one royal military, the other quasi priestly. In Confucian terms, the former is the royal dynastic lineage (*jeong tong* in Korean, *zhengtong* in Chinese), the latter the lineage of the Confucian Way (*dotong*, *daotong*). The power of the former was based on worldly dominance of the ruler, the latter on meticulous practice of Confucian moral principles.

Confucian doctrines were established by Confucian founders who engaged in moral struggle against the hegemony of the warlords of the pre Qin era. The prime founder of Confucian doctrine, Confucius, strove to persuade warlords of his time to stop waging wars and instead to govern their people in accordance with moral principles of humaneness, benevolence, compassion, and harmony. Later Confucians put Confucius at the head of the Confucian lineage, calling him “the king without the throne” (*sowang*, *sumang*). “The king without the throne” symbolized the moral and thus sacred kingship of Confucianism. “The king within the throne” could be legitimized only if he obeyed the moral teachings of “the king without,” Confucius and his disciples. Some prominent disciples of Confucius, like Mencius, earned the title of Confucian sage and were

deemed qualified to continue the sacred Confucian Way originated by Confucius.

The contrast between the material interests of the worldly rulers and the ideal interests of Confucian moralists produced sharp tension between the two. Nevertheless, this tension did not exclude the occasional cooptation of each other: the rulers’ need for moral justification of the throne and the Confucians’ need to expand their worldly influence frequently met. Therefore, the royal dynastic and Confucian sacred lineages were partly in tension and partly in collaboration, as were religious authorities and worldly power in the civilizations where ethical religions prevailed.

Confucians invented sage politics and consistently attempted to check the worldly power of the throne. Their weapons were Confucian morals and manners. In the famous opening chapter of *Mencius*, Mencius criticizes King Hui of Liang for pursuing “profits” instead of “benevolence” and “rightness.” In this argument, “profits” represent military, economic, and logistic empowerment, while “benevolence” and “rightness” indicate moral principles according to which peaceful harmony of a state (and the world as well) is to be achieved. These two principles of action – one military, economic, and logistic; the other moral – were in sharp tension in Confucian doctrine. Confucian manners or rituals (*ye*, *li*) were means through which Confucian moral principles were realized and practiced.

Confucians believed that the ruler’s pursuit of “profits” instead of moral principles would eventually result in continual usurpations of the throne by those seeking power. Historically, these usurpations were frequently accompanied by regicide and patricide – according to Confucianism, the most terrible signs of moral degradation. Confucians believed that only moral codes consolidating family values (or kinship orders) could prevent such moral failures. Therefore, Confucian morals and manners upheld family values like deference to elders and the earlier generations. The unique fusion of political and familial moral codes in Confucianism was thus created.

The “Confucian sage” (*seongin*, *shengren*) was the Confucian paragon who perfected the moral demands of political familial obligations in his person and fulfilled these obligations most

meticulously in his daily actions. Confucian *moralpolitik* was thus Confucian sage politics carried out in public action. Moral remonstrance and recurrent ritual disputes to correct the throne characterized Confucian *moralpolitik*. Confucians considered moral remonstrance even to death as their sacred obligation, and they attempted to regulate their king through recurrent moral critiques and ritual disputes. Many Confucian martyrs sacrificed their lives in order to confront their rulers who went against Confucian moral doctrine. Confucian *moralpolitik* represents Confucian moral discontent with worldly power.

In the western image of Confucianism, the concept of Confucian *moralpolitik* described above does not exist. For example, Max Weber fails to find the existence of the double powers in the Confucian world and to acknowledge the tension between them. His failure to recognize the moral discontent with worldly power in Confucianism results in his well known denial of the inner motivation and momentum toward modernity in Confucianism.

Confucian *moralpolitik* was on many occasions fanatic, waging moral wars not only against the ruler with moral defects but also against non orthodox Confucians who were usually labeled as “heretics” or, more literally, “rebel enemies against our doctrine” (*samunmanjeok, sivenluanzei*). The fanatic Confucian *moralpolitik* in late Ming China (sixteenth to seventeenth centuries) and late Joseon Korea (seventeenth to eighteenth centuries) in particular opened the door to “Confucian modernity” in both societies (Kim 2003). The specific historical paths through which Confucian modernity has unfolded cannot be the same as those of the West. Rather, it is more commonsensical to suppose that the paths of different civilizations toward modernity must have been different from each other.

SEE ALSO: Confucianism; Modernity; Moral Economy; Religion; Secularization

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mortality: transitions and measures

Irma T. Elo

In the course of human history, life expectancy at birth has increased from around 20–30 years during prehistoric times to 75–80 years in many low mortality countries today. Nearly half of this decline has taken place during the twentieth century. In the middle of the 1500s, at the start of the first available continuous series of national mortality estimates, life expectancy in England was still in the mid 30s and showed little sustained improvement until the nineteenth century. By the end of the 1800s, however, steady mortality decline had begun in all European countries for which reliable data series are available, and by the end of the twentieth century, life expectancy had reached the mid to upper 70s in many industrialized countries. Although national level mortality data did not become available for the United States until 1933, existing evidence suggests that mortality decline in the US was similar to that in England. The highest life expectancy has been recorded in Japan, a developed country where health improvements in the early part of the twentieth century lagged behind those of European countries, but where mortality declines have been particularly impressive since the

1950s. Life expectancy at birth in Japan reached 84.6 years for women and 77.6 years for men by the year 2000. Moreover, the United Nations' estimates show an average life expectancy of 74.8 years in the more developed regions of the world, with 56 percent of industrialized countries having life expectancies of over 75 years in 1995–2000 (Table 1). The lowest life expectancies in industrialized countries are found in Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union, where health conditions stagnated during the late twentieth century, particularly for adult men.

Historical mortality estimates for developing countries are scarce. The few estimates that do exist show life expectancies in the early twentieth century to be similar to those estimated for prehistoric populations – 24 years in India in 1901–11, 24 years in China around 1930, 27.9 years in Taiwan in 1920, and 30.6 years in Chile in 1909. By the middle of the twentieth century, however, life expectancy in the less developed regions of the world had reached 40.9 years and it had further increased to 62.5 years by the end of the century according to the United Nations' estimates. These gains are impressive and suggest that life expectancy more than doubled between 1900 and 2000 in most parts of the developing world. As a result, the gap in average life expectancy between more and less developed regions has narrowed over time – from about 26 years in 1950–5 to about 11 years in 1995–2000.

The mortality decline in developing countries, however, has not been uniform, and the slower pace of improvement in the least developed regions relative to others has led to a greater disparity among developing countries over time. This inequality is clearly evident in Table 1, which displays United Nations' estimates of life expectancies at birth and the distribution of countries by life expectancy for major regions of the world in 1995–2000. These estimates show an average life expectancy of only about 50 years in Africa, with only 21 percent of African countries having estimated life expectancies of 60 years or more. In contrast, the average life expectancy was estimated to be around 69 years in Latin America, with 64 percent of Latin American countries having life expectancies of 70 years or more (Table 1).

EPIDEMIOLOGIC TRANSITION

The epidemiologic transition, a shift from infectious diseases to chronic degenerative diseases as leading causes of death, has been instrumental in shaping trends in human mortality and the age pattern of mortality decline. The fall in death rates from infectious diseases led to significant improvements in the survival chances of infants and young children and was largely responsible for the rise in life expectancy in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries in industrialized countries, and during the second half of the twentieth century in less developed regions of the world. These reductions in infant and child mortality, together with a decline in fertility, have contributed to a shift in the population age distribution toward an older population in both developed and developing countries. As a result, chronic degenerative diseases have become more common and today represent an ever increasing percentage of all deaths even as adult mortality has continued to decline in most places. These transitions were already well under way in the middle of the twentieth century in industrialized countries and today well over 80 percent of all deaths in developed countries are due to chronic diseases. Future gains in life expectancy in industrialized nations will thus largely depend on trends in mortality from such leading chronic diseases as heart disease and cancer at older ages. Many observers are optimistic in this regard. Recent empirical evidence has revealed persistent declines in death rates at older ages in developed countries where reliable old age mortality estimates are available.

The epidemiologic transition is not as far along in less developed regions where the pace of change has varied considerably. According to the Global Burden of Disease Study, in 1990 communicable diseases continued to make up about 50 percent of all deaths in India and close to 65 percent in Sub Saharan Africa, where all five leading causes of death were communicable diseases. It has been further estimated that in 1990, 59 percent of the deaths in the poorest 20 percent of the countries in the world were due to infectious and parasitic diseases compared to only about 8 percent in the world's richest quintile. In contrast, non communicable diseases accounted for over 70 percent of all deaths

Table 1 Expectation of life at birth and distribution of countries according to life expectancy at birth for the world and the major regions of the world, 1995–2000.

	<i>Life expectancy at birth</i>	<i>Percentage of countries with life expectancy at birth of:</i>				<i>Number of countries</i>
		<i>> 75 years</i>	<i>70–75 years</i>	<i>60–70 years</i>	<i>< 60 years</i>	
World	64.6	21	24	27	28	184
More developed regions	74.8	56	26	19	0	43
Less developed regions	62.5	10	24	30	36	141
Africa	50.0	2	2	17	79	53
Asia and Oceanic		12	33	40	14	57
Asia	65.7					
Oceania	73.2					
Latin America and the Caribbean	69.4	19	45	32	3	31

Source: United Nations 1998.

in China and around 55 percent of all deaths in the Caribbean and Latin America, with other developing regions falling somewhere in between the estimates discussed above. These differences are reflected in the estimates of life expectancy shown in Table 1 and in regional variation in infant and child mortality. In 1995–2000, 56 percent of the least developed countries in the world had child mortality rates in excess of 140 per 1,000, with 45 percent of all African countries falling into this category. In contrast, none of the Latin American countries experienced child mortality this high and in over half of Latin American countries child mortality was estimated to be less than 45 per 1,000 in 1995–2000.

In its original formulation, Abdel Omran's (1971) theory of the epidemiologic transition predicted a unidirectional movement from the predominance of infectious diseases to chronic degenerative diseases as leading causes of death with variation only in the pace and timing of the transition. Different explanatory models were proposed for western countries, Japan, and the developing world. In subsequent decades, however, it has become increasingly evident that infectious diseases continue to play an important role in mortality transitions, a fact that is most apparent in less developed regions although also manifest in industrialized countries where infectious diseases take their highest toll among disadvantaged population subgroups.

Many less developed countries have experienced an epidemiologic transition characterized by overlapping eras whereby chronic diseases of middle and older ages have become more common as populations have aged, at the time that childhood infectious diseases have continued to create a major health burden among the poor. The emergence of HIV/AIDS and drug resistant varieties of tuberculosis and malaria is perhaps the best example of the continued impact of infectious diseases on mortality. HIV/AIDS has been responsible for increasing child and adult mortality in countries with high HIV prevalence and HIV/AIDS has become the most important public health concern in much of Sub Saharan Africa. In its 2002 revision of the world population prospects, the United Nations estimated that in 2000–5 there would be nearly 15 million excess deaths in

Africa due to AIDS – 36 percent more deaths than in its absence. The impact of HIV/AIDS will be felt in less developed regions for some time to come and the course of the epidemic will depend on many factors including behavioral responses of individuals to the epidemic, public health measures to reduce transmission, and development of new medical technologies. In most developed countries, HIV/AIDS has had a less devastating, although not a trivial, impact on mortality. In the United States, for example, HIV/AIDS has emerged as one of the leading causes of death among African American men and women in young adulthood and HIV/AIDS contributed to the widening of the black–white difference in adult mortality in the 1980s.

EXPLANATIONS OF MORTALITY DECLINE

Many factors have influenced the mortality trends discussed above, including improvements in living standards, public health measures, cultural and behavioral factors, modern medical technologies, and the actions of governments and international agencies and organizations. Although there is general agreement that each factor has played some role, there is far less consensus about their relative importance. Thomas McKeown (1976) underscored improved nutrition due to a rise in standards of living as the key cause of mortality decline in England and Wales between 1848 and 1971. He dismissed alternative competing hypotheses such as the role of public health interventions and medical technologies. Although research on individual's height points to the importance of improved nutritional status as a factor in mortality decline, it is important to remember that nutritional status is determined not only by the amount of food consumed but also by the disease environment that in turn is shaped by public health and sanitary measures and personal hygiene practices. The contribution of these causes has been emphasized among others by Simon Szreter (1988), who has made an empathetic case for the importance of public health measures in the mortality decline in England, and by Samuel Preston and colleagues, who have pointed to the importance of public health

and personal hygiene practices in the United States after the turn of the twentieth century as the germ theory of disease became widely accepted. Based on data from 43 countries, Preston (1976) further concluded that between the 1930s and the 1960s factors other than a country's current income level most likely were responsible for somewhere between 75 percent to 90 percent of the increase in life expectancy. He reached a broadly similar conclusion in subsequent analyses for a somewhat later period that incorporated calorie consumption and literacy level as independent explanatory variables, results that pointed to the importance of factors other than income and nutrition in mortality decline during the twentieth century (Preston 1980).

By the middle of the twentieth century, drugs to treat infectious diseases, such as sulfa drugs and penicillin, made further contributions to the decline of mortality from infectious diseases, and chronic diseases emerged as leading causes of death in developed countries. In subsequent decades, medical interventions for treatment of chronic diseases have played an increasingly important role in mortality reductions, particularly from heart disease. New drugs to dissolve blood clots and reduce high blood pressure and cholesterol, and surgical procedures such as heart bypass surgery and angioplasty, have been credited for saving thousands of lives from early death. In fact, much of the mortality reduction at older ages in the latter decades of the twentieth century was due to decline in death rates from cardiovascular diseases. In addition, behavioral changes, most importantly reductions in smoking, have contributed to mortality decline, especially among men.

Medical technologies played a more important role in the early phases of mortality transition in developing countries than was the case in developed countries, although other factors have also been important. For example, effectiveness of governmental interventions in the form of public health measures, such as the influential role of malaria control programs in mortality decline in Sri Lanka and Mauritius, has been well established. Others have emphasized the role of cultural, social, and behavioral factors, and public investments in

health and education, especially in female education, egalitarian social policies, and wide spread access to health care services as being important for achievement of low mortality. That the right combination of the above characteristics can lead to low mortality even in relatively poor countries has been demonstrated by the experiences of China, Costa Rica, Sri Lanka, and the state of Kerala in India among others, where life expectancies are close to those of many industrialized countries. A challenge these countries now face is how to manage the growing burden of chronic diseases and the relatively high cost of medical measures to treat such diseases. At the same time, many poor countries continue to face a high burden of infectious diseases, including HIV/AIDS.

DATA AND MEASURES

Accurate assessment of the levels and trends in mortality is greatly hampered by the absence of good quality data for much of the world's population. Only industrialized countries and a few Latin American, Caribbean, and East Asian countries have vital registration systems that are complete enough for accurate mortality estimates. Sample registration systems for selected areas are also available for China and India, but for the rest of the world registration systems are wholly inadequate for estimating mortality. In the absence of vital registration data, demographers have developed methods to estimate mortality from alternative data sources, including surveys and censuses. For example, the World Fertility Surveys (WFS) and Demographic Health Surveys (DHS) have been used to produce infant and child mortality estimates for a large number of developing countries. In addition, indirect demographic estimation techniques can be used to estimate child mortality from questions included in many population censuses asking women about the number of children they have ever had and the number of those children who are still alive. The above data sources have enabled demographers to map levels and trends in child mortality in many countries lacking vital registration systems, although these estimates are not always available for the most recent past.

Adult mortality is more difficult to estimate accurately than child mortality in the absence of death registration. A number of indirect estimation techniques have, however, been developed that are useful in this regard. These methods utilize information obtained from surveys or censuses on survival of siblings and parents, or census questions about deaths in the household in some defined period prior to the census. In addition, two consecutive censuses have been used to infer mortality conditions between two census dates. In the absence of any data on adult deaths, mortality is estimated with the aid of model life tables that combine empirical estimates of child mortality with model based estimates of adult mortality. Using a combination of the above techniques, both the United Nations population division and the World Bank publish mortality estimates for most countries in the world. Because of the considerable uncertainty in these estimates for countries with few data points, it is possible that the estimates prepared by the two agencies will differ.

Accurate estimates of cause specific mortality are even more limited than estimates of overall mortality. Cause specific estimates require both complete data on deaths and reliably recorded causes of death. In the absence of vital statistics data on causes of death, cause specific mortality estimates have been obtained from sample registration systems in a small number of countries, population centers and surveillance sites, and epidemiologic studies of special populations. In addition, model based estimates of cause specific mortality have also been developed in which the cause of death structure is modeled as a function of overall level of mortality. The most ambitious effort ever undertaken to estimate cause specific mortality worldwide using a combination of techniques is an effort to estimate the global burden of disease.

SEE ALSO: Biodemography; Demographic Data: Censuses, Registers, Surveys; Demographic Techniques: Gender, Health, and Mortality; Life Table Methods; Demographic Techniques: Population Projections and Estimates; Demographic Transition Theory; Healthy Life Expectancy; HIV/AIDS and Population; Infant, Child, and Maternal Health

and Mortality; Socioeconomic Status; Health and Mortality

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Mosca, Gaetano (1858–1941)

Bernd Weiler

Along with Vilfredo Pareto (1848–1923) and Robert Michels (1876–1936), Gaetano Mosca is commonly regarded as the main representative of the so called Italian School of Elitists. After graduating in law from the university of his hometown, Palermo, Mosca combined the life of a scholar, teaching constitutional law, administrative law, political economy, and political theory at the universities of Turin (1896–1923), Milan (1902–23), and Rome (1924–33), with a political career as editor of the proceedings of the Chamber of Deputies (1887–96), as deputy (1909–19), as Under Secretary for the Colonies (1914–16), and, from 1919, as senator. In December 1925, the 67 year old Mosca, who had been a staunch conservative, fierce critic of the parliamentary system, and moralistic pessimist throughout his life, delivered a famous speech to the Senate opposing the bill that was designed to strengthen the “prerogatives of the head of the government” and that actually granted dictatorial powers to Benito Mussolini. Shortly afterwards, Mosca retired from active politics to concentrate on his academic work.

Influenced by positivist philosophy, Mosca argued that the field of the social sciences was still in its infancy, irreducible to racial or environmental factors, and, like the natural sciences, in need of general principles which could be discovered by thorough and objective historical analysis. Imbued with the spirit of disillusioned, anti romantic realism, Mosca discarded the idea of societal progress and the Kantian notion of “man’s emergence from his self imposed immaturity.” Following Saint Simon’s

and Comte’s ideas concerning the role of the new scientific elite in modern society, Taine’s interpretation of the French Revolution as the replacement of an old ruling class by a new one, and Gumpłowicz’s reflections upon the eternal conflict between social groups, Mosca forcefully argued that in every society an organized minority (*classe politica, minoranza organizzata*) ruled over an unorganized majority. The idea that power was always in the hands of the few, which implied a rejection of the classifications of the forms of government by Aristotle and Montesquieu, was based upon his belief that it was impossible for the masses to get organized, and upon his deep seated conviction that some people always stood out from the masses because of their physical, material, intellectual, or even moral qualities. While the characteristics of its members changed, the ruling class remained. Furthermore, Mosca stated that the ruling class always sought to legitimate its power by appealing to an abstract principle or “political formula” (*formula politica*), held in high esteem in a particular historical situation, such as the popular or divine will, the ancient tradition of a king, and so on. Mosca first formulated his central ideas in the early work *Sulla teorica dei governi e sul governo parlamentare (On the Theory of Governments and the Parliamentary System)* (1884), published when he was 26. With some minor changes of emphasis he elaborated his theories in his best known book, *Elementi di scienza politica (The Ruling Class)* (1896), which went through three editions during his lifetime. Far from being a detached observer, Mosca was quite explicit in his writings that the “good” ruling class should be composed of rational, cultured, and honest public servants who were committed to the common good, knew that all reform had to proceed slowly, and were aware of the faults of the masses.

Critics have pointed out that, compared with Michels’s analysis of the oligarchical tendencies in society, Mosca’s strict dichotomy of an organized minority versus an unorganized majority is simplistic, non operationalizable, and too rigid when dealing with modern societies. Compared with Pareto’s more general conception of the elite, on the other hand, Mosca’s conception of the ruling class appears narrower, being more closely tied and applicable to the specific judicial and political sphere of late nineteenth century

Italy (cf. Albertoni 1987: 109–13). This might at least partially explain why Mosca's work, a large part of which has not yet been translated, has not gained a larger audience in the English speaking world.

SEE ALSO: Elites; Gumpłowicz, Ludwig; Michels, Robert; Pareto, Vilfredo; Political Sociology

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motherhood

Susan Walzer

Motherhood is the word that sociologists tend to use to refer to the social expectations, experiences, and structures associated with being a mother. The use of the term motherhood differentiates the biological fact of producing a

baby (becoming a mother) and the practices involved in taking care of children (mothering) from the public and cultural norms linked to the creation and care of children. Motherhood, in other words, is a social institution – one that contributes to the reproduction of gender differentiation and hierarchy in family and work.

Scholarship about motherhood shares the challenge of much sociology to represent a general social experience while at the same time acknowledging the diversity of social actors. Spanning disciplines beyond sociology, research about motherhood also exists outside of conventional academic contexts. One general body of work emphasizes social expectations for mothers and the processes through which mothers negotiate these norms. This literature tends to be more qualitative, interpretive, and directed at generating theoretical perspectives on mothering as a practice and motherhood as a social institution. Another body of work about mothers represents more positivistic attempts to document the determinants and effects of individual mothers' behavior through the use of surveys and other statistical methodologies (Arendell 2000).

The study of motherhood parallels and was shaped by changes in behavior and beliefs related to gender that emerged in the late 1960s and early 1970s. Increases during this time in the labor force participation of married women and mothers generated a vast amount of academic work – in part because the employment of mothers of very young children seemed to conflict with a particular image of mothers as always present and ultimately responsible for the well being of their children. Some researchers tested empirically for negative effects of maternal employment. Others criticized the question, suggesting that the "stay at home" mother image associated with institutionalized motherhood was historically specific to the splitting of productive and reproductive labor that occurred during nineteenth century industrialization.

The social construction of mothering as ideologically separate from material provision, most visible in the United States during the post war 1950s, has been identified as anomalous across cultures, races, and classes (Bernard 1974). Paradoxically, the expectation of constant maternal presence to children remains a

standard to which many mothers hold themselves, including scholars of motherhood. Some sociologists, such as Maushart (1999), write openly about being motivated to study motherhood by their own experiences of becoming mothers, their observations of contradictory expectations for mothers, and their identification with feminism as a conceptual framework with which to understand and change these experiences and expectations.

Theorists of motherhood treat its institutionalization as a social arrangement to explain, rather than as a biological given. Intensive social norms for mothers exceed biological necessity, Hays (1996) notes, and many mothers nurture children to whom they are not biologically linked. One of the approaches taken to explain more sociologically why mothers mother the way that they do is the view, grounded in psychoanalytic theory, that mothering behavior is transmitted intergenerationally. In Chodorow's (1978) influential work on the "reproduction of mothering," she argues that daughters internalize their mothers' identities, which tend to include an overinvestment in motherhood as a primary source of self esteem and accomplishment. Sons, on the other hand, develop their gender identities by disidentifying with their mothers, resulting, according to Chodorow, in a devaluing of the caretaking behavior that they associate with femaleness.

Another theoretical strand that surfaced in the 1980s suggests that maternal practice is not simply an outcome of gender hierarchy and women's disempowerment in a sexual division of labor, but represents an alternative to more self centered and competitive approaches to social life. McMahon (1995) notes, for example, that women change as a result of becoming mothers in ways that produce in them a moral transformation. In this view, first argued by Ruddick (1983), the behaviors of mothers contain the potential to be morally redemptive of society. "Maternal thinking" develops in mothers' responses to children's needs, which, at their best, reflect a desire to preserve and foster life. Maternal thinking offers the possibility of increasing human caring and peace beyond the private relationships of mothers and children.

Along with the interactions they have with their children, other social influences affect

how mothers think about their children's needs and arrange their lives as parents. Some sociology of motherhood examines dominant ideologies about appropriate maternal behavior as they are reinforced in expert advice literature, sustained in interactions between women and men, and internalized and owned by women as their identities. In these approaches, mothers are perceived as active agents in constructing motherhood, but they do so while encountering already existing prescriptions for mothers – perhaps most notably about whether and where labor force participation should fit into maternal identity.

Although some scholars suggest that employment is being integrated into dominant social conceptions of motherhood, others argue that mothers continue to be perceived as either more oriented to family or to work. Financial need is apparently the number one (though not only) impetus for maternal employment, yet what Garey (1999) refers to as an "opposition model" of motherhood and paid work is reflected in research that seeks to identify why mothers do or do not work. This question is not asked of fathers, and assumes that mothers are in a nuclear family context and generally have a choice about whether to earn money. More research is emerging, however, that looks at mothering from particular social locations, examining differences in ideology related to work as well as potentially negative outcomes, including poverty, of becoming a mother outside of marriage or in other ways that are not socially sanctioned (Arendell 2000).

Another twist on social definitions of motherhood appears in scholarship exploring implications of reproductive technology and situations in which maternity may be contested, such as when a surrogate mother does not want to give up custody of the baby to whom she has given birth. These types of circumstances resurface the question of how biology enters into definitions of motherhood, but with some new answers. While scholars in the 1970s dismissed biological arguments as justifications for maternal responsibility, some more recent work, such as Rothman's (1989), invokes the physical connection mothers have to babies as a way to empower them with decision making power for the fetuses they grow. Hrdy (1999) draws on an evolutionary perspective to argue for the

“naturalness” of women combining work and mothering.

There is a circular process to scholarship about motherhood – certain questions being asked, answered, and asked again about how motherhood is socially defined, the implications of its institutionalization for individual mothers and children, and its intersections and conflicts with other social institutions (Walzer 2004). Although some scholarly work about motherhood combines theoretical examination with empirical grounding, there remain gaps between what scholars think about motherhood and what they actually know through examination of mothers’ experiences. Future research should seek to close these gaps – testing theoretical contentions emerging from qualitative studies with larger, diverse samples that in turn generate new theory generating studies. Future researchers will also continue to struggle with the difficulty of recognizing mothers’ diversity without positioning them as entirely the same or different by virtue of their social locations, relationship statuses, family arrangements, and life courses.

Finally, future scholarship about motherhood is likely to benefit from less exclusive attention to mothers and greater exploration of the relationships and institutions in which they live. Mothers enact mothering with other people: their children certainly, and often, other adult partners. We will increase our understanding of motherhood by studying these interactions as well as the complementary and constraining assumptions underlying other institutions that intersect with motherhood: fatherhood, work, marriage, heterosexuality, and gender.

SEE ALSO: Childhood; Fatherhood; Gender, Work, and Family; Marriage, Sex, and Child birth; Role

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multiculturalism

Tariq Modood

Multiculturalism or the political accommodation of minorities became a major demand in the last quarter of the twentieth century, filling some of the space that accommodation of the working classes occupied for a century or more earlier. It thus constitutes powerful, if diverse, intellectual challenges in several parts of the humanities and social sciences, with profound political ramifications. Nevertheless, by the early years of the twenty first century it was in theoretical and practical disarray over the accommodation of Muslims in the West.

The term “multiculturalism” emerged in the 1960s and 1970s in countries like Canada and Australia, and to a lesser extent in Britain and the United States. The policy focus was often initially on schooling and the children of Asian/black/Hispanic post/neocolonial immigrants, and multiculturalism meant the extension of

the school, both in terms of curriculum and as an institution, to include features such as “mother tongue” teaching, non Christian religions and holidays, halal food, Asian dress, and so on. From such a starting point, the perspective can develop to meeting such cultural requirements in other or even all social spheres and the empowering of marginalized groups. In Canada and Australia, however, the focus was much wider from the start and included, for example, constitutional and land issues and has been about the definition of the nation. This was partly because these countries had a continuous and recent history of ethnic communities created by migration, usually from different parts of Europe; and because there were unresolved legal questions to do with the entitlements and status of indigenous people in those countries; and, in the case of Canada, there was the further issue of the rise of a nationalist and secessionist movement in French speaking Quebec. Hence, the term “multiculturalism” in these countries came to mean, and now means throughout the English speaking world and beyond, the political accommodation by the state and/or a dominant group of all minority cultures defined first and foremost by reference to race or ethnicity, and, additionally but more controversially, by reference to other group defining characteristics such as nationality, aboriginality, or religion. The latter is more controversial not only because it extends the range of the groups that have to be accommodated, but also because it tends to make larger political claims and so tends to resist having these claims reduced to those of immigrants.

Hence, even today, in both theoretical and policy discourses, multiculturalism means different things in different places. In North America, for example, multiculturalism encompasses discrete groups with territorial claims, such as the Native Peoples and the Québécois, even though these groups want to be treated as “nations” within a multinational state, rather than merely as ethnocultural groups in a mononational state (Kymlicka 1995). Indeed, in Europe, groups with such claims, like the Slovaks and the Scots, are thought of as nations, and multiculturalism has a more limited meaning, referring to a post immigration urban *mélange* and the politics it gives rise to. While in North America, language based ethnicity is seen as the

major political challenge, in Western Europe, the conjunction of the terms “immigration” and “culture” now nearly always invokes the large, newly settled Muslim populations. Some times, usually in America, political terms such as multiculturalism and “rainbow coalition” are meant to include all groups marked by “difference” and historic exclusion such as women and gays (Young 1990).

The latter meaning derives from the fact that the ethnic assertiveness associated with multiculturalism has been part of a wider political current of “identity politics” which first germinated in the 1960s and which transformed the idea of equality as sameness to equality as difference (Young 1990); or, in a related conceptualization, adding the concept of respect or “recognition” to the older concept of equality as the equal dignity of individuals (Taylor 1994). Black power and feminist and gay pride movements challenged the ideal of equality as assimilation and contended that a liberatory politics required allowing groups to assert their difference and to not have to conform to dominant cultural norms. Indeed, the attack on colorblind, culture neutral political concepts such as equality and citizenship, with the critique that ethnicity and culture cannot be confined to some so called private sphere but shape political and opportunity structures in all societies, is one of the most fundamental claims made by multiculturalism and the politics of difference. It is the theoretical basis for the conclusion that allegedly “neutral” liberal democracies are part of a hegemonic culture that systematically de ethnicizes or marginalizes minorities. Hence, the claim that minority cultures, norms, and symbols have as much right as their hegemonic counterparts to state provision and to be in the public space, to be recognized as groups and not just as culturally neutered individuals.

The African American search for dignity has contributed much to this politics which has shifted attention from socioeconomic disadvantage, arguably where their need is greatest. It has inadvertently promoted identities based on indigenous claims, language, religion, and suppressed nationhood, none of which properly addresses the identity concerns of African Americans. Nathan Glazer has indeed argued that there is no prospect of multiculturalism in the US; the processes of assimilation are doing

their work with non European immigrants, as they have done with their European predecessors (although Spanish has emerged as a major second language in parts of the US). Insofar as there is a group that will not melt in, it is African Americans; not because of cultural difference, but because American society lacks the determination to combat the racism and severe disadvantage to make it happen (Glazer 1997). In Glazer's view, the rise of multiculturalism in the US is a reflection of the lack of will to overcome the black-white divide.

On this reading it is of no surprise that the multiculturalist debate in the US is primarily in the field of education and, uniquely, higher education, where passion has been expended on arguments about the curriculum in the humanities ("the canon"), punctilious avoidance of disrespect ("political correctness"), and anxiety about the ethnicization of student dorms ("balkanization"). Academic argument has, however, no less than popular feeling, been important in the formulation of multiculturalism, with the study of colonial societies and political theory at the forefront. The ideas of cultural difference and cultural group have historically been central to anthropology and other related disciplines focused on "primitive" and non European societies. The arrival in the metropolitan centers of peoples studied by scholars from these disciplines has made the latter experts on migrants and their cultural needs. They also enabled critics from previously colonized societies, often themselves immigrants to the "North," to challenge the expert and other representations of the culturally subordinated. These intellectual developments have been as influenced by the collapse of Marxism as by postcolonial migrations. The failure of the economic "material base" explanations of the cultural "superstructure," as the social sciences took what has been described as "the cultural turn," shifting from the study of economic to cultural structures, has contributed to highlighting cultural identities and discursive analyses of cross cultural power relations (Said 1978).

The prominence of political theory in multiculturalism is also to be partly understood in terms of the internal dynamic within the discipline. Rawls's *Theory of Justice* (1971) is the founding text in the modern revival of normative Anglo American political theory.

It promised a philosophically grounded, systematic answer to questions of distributive justice in societies, such as the contemporary United States, which were assumed to be characterized by a value pluralism. Subsequent debate, including Rawls's reformulation of his own position, focused not on Rawls's conclusions about distribution but his assumptions about rationality and value pluralism. The generation of political theorists following Rawls thus has come to define their questions more in terms of the nature of community and minority rights than in terms of distributive justice, no less than their social theory peers defined it in terms of difference and identity rather than class conflict, and in each case the intellectual framework lent itself to multiculturalism, even when the term itself was not favored. While for most political theorists academic liberalism has been the primary reference point, Bhikhu Parekh has offered a philosophical multiculturalism grounded in an analysis of human nature and culture and which elaborates the intrinsic value of diversity as more fundamental than the accommodation of minorities (Parekh 2000).

One of the most fundamental divisions amongst scholars concerns the validity of "cultural groups" as a point of reference for multiculturalism. The dominant view in sociocultural studies has become that groups always have internal differences, including hierarchies, gender inequality, and dissent, and culture is always fluid and subject to varied influences, mixtures, and change. To think otherwise is to "essentialize" groups such as blacks, Muslims, Asians, and so on. Political theorists, on the other hand, continue to think of cultural groups as sociopolitical actors who may bear rights and have needs that should be institutionally accommodated. This approach challenges the view of culture as radically unstable and primarily expressive by putting moral communities at the center of a definition of "culture" (Parekh 2000). Empirical studies, however, suggest that both these views have some substance. For while many young people, from majority and minority backgrounds, do not wish to be defined by a singular ethnicity but wish to actively mix and share several heritages, there is simultaneously a development of distinct communities, usually ethnoreligious, and sometimes seeking corporate representation.

Multiculturalism has had a much less popular reception in mainland Europe. Its prospect has sometimes led to extreme nationalist parties winning control of some towns and cities, a significant share of the national poll, and some times even a share in the national government, as in the case of the Freedom Party in Austria. Anti multiculturalism is, however, not confined to extremist parties, nor even to those of the right. In France, where intellectual objections to multiculturalism have been most developed, multiculturalism is opposed across the political spectrum, for it is thought to be incompatible with a conception of a “transcendent” or “universal” citizenship which demands that all “particular” identities, such as those of race, ethnicity, and gender, which promote part of the republic against the good of the whole, be confined to private life. The implosion of Yugoslavia, with its “ethnic cleansing,” marks the most extreme reaction to multinational statehood and plural societies, and the political status of historic minorities, including the Roma (Gypsies), is conflicted throughout the territories of the former Austro Hungarian, Ottoman, and Russian empires. Many postcolonial states in Asia and Africa are experiencing ethnonationalist and secessionist movements and some, such as India, Malaysia, and Indonesia, are also struggling with non territorial multiculturalism.

Since “9/11” and its aftermath, it is Muslims that have become the focus of discourse about minorities in the West. This is partly an issue of security, but more generally is accompanied by a “multiculturalism is dead” rhetoric. This has led to, or reinforced, policy reversals in many countries, even pioneering ones such as the Netherlands, and is most marked by the fact that a new assimilationism is espoused not just on the political right, but also on the center left and by erstwhile supporters of multiculturalism. Muslims in Western Europe, it is argued, are disloyal to European states and prefer segregation and sociocultural separatism to integration; they are illiberal on a range of issues, most notably on the personal freedom of women and on homosexuality; and they are challenging the secular character of European political culture by thrusting religious identities and communalism into the public space. The last charge marks the most serious theoretical reversal of multiculturalism as the non privatization of

minority identities is one of the core ideas of multiculturalism (Modood 2005). Yet the emergence of Muslim political mobilization has led some multiculturalists to argue that religion is a feature of plural societies that is uniquely legitimate to confine to the private sphere. This prohibiting of Muslim identity in public space has so far been taken furthest in France, where in 2004 Parliament passed, with little debate but an overwhelming majority, a ban on the wearing of “ostentatious” religious symbols, primarily the *hijab* (headscarf), in public schools.

SEE ALSO: Assimilation; Balkanization; Bilingual, Multicultural Education; Colonialism (Neocolonialism); Immigration; Melting Pot; Race and Ethnic Politics

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multimedia

Chris Chesher

Multimedia is the integrated use of more than one medium of communication, usually mediated through digital computing technologies. “Multimedia” is a term with a complex

and ambivalent history that risks being either too narrow or too broad in its meaning. In its narrower sense, it was closely associated with the dead end that was CD ROM interactive multimedia in the mid 1990s. In its broad sense, multimedia can refer to any text, technology, or event that combines more than one medium of communication: a meaning so broad that it fails to denote any distinctive cultural form. Any definition of multimedia therefore needs to operate between these limits. Multimedia has specific meanings in different contexts, including performance, libraries, social semiotics, and computer science. In spite of these complications, recent attention on multimedia has raised some significant wider questions about media and communication.

Before multimedia was computer based and interactive, the term sometimes referred to presentations using multiple slide projectors with dissolve systems and synchronized music to deliver carefully choreographed linear sequence of images with a soundtrack accompaniment. Such systems were commonly used in museum exhibits, educational presentations, and popular culture happenings in the 1960s and 1970s. Another earlier use of the term was for multimedia resources and teaching machines marketed for schools and parents in the 1960s. In a fine arts context the term "multimedia" is sometimes used to refer to mixed media works that do not fit into conventional categories of oil painting, watercolors, sculpture, and so on. Librarians have long used the term "multimedia" to refer to collections of materials other than print publications. Such artifacts require libraries to maintain not only collections of work, but also specialized equipment for viewing such material: from video players and slide viewers to computer systems. In the context of constantly changing technical standards, demanding requirements for configuring and operating equipment, and the deterioration of physical media, maintaining a multimedia collection can be an expensive and complex task. A wider definition of multimedia puts it under the same umbrella as many cultural forms: opera, cinema, educational resources, computer games, performance art, consumer electronic devices, and more.

COMPUTER BASED INTERACTIVE MULTIMEDIA

The most common contemporary understanding of the term "multimedia" is in the paradigm of interactive computer based multimedia introduced in the 1990s. Research into sound synthesis, music, and computer graphics was conducted as early as the 1950s, but most business and scientific computers had very limited capabilities in image and sound. Exceptions included machines designed to support computer games, including 1980s microcomputers such as the popular Commodore 64, which had relatively advanced sound and graphics. Games have always been the main driver for more powerful sound and graphics hardware and software, but manufacturers and publishers began to advocate a more respectable and expansive promise of multimedia.

Multimedia achieved a high public profile in the early 1990s as a pretender to transform or even replace conventional forms of publishing. This more restricted conception of multimedia was often qualified by the prefix "interactive," in which users have some capacity to influence the flow of multimedia events, usually by browsing menus, submitting queries through search fields, direct manipulation control, or game play. The term was closely associated with commoditized titles published on compact disk read only memory (CD ROM). Driven largely by extravagant claims from hardware manufacturers and start up companies, "multimedia" quickly became a marketing cliché more than an actual technology or cultural form.

Advocates of interactive multimedia in the 1990s discovered a history that allowed them to place it in a context. This history typically credits Vannevar Bush, the wartime director of the Office of Scientific Research and Development in the US, with anticipating the future form for multimedia computing. His article, "As We May Think," was published in the July 1945 edition of *Atlantic Monthly*, proposing an electromechanical machine called the "Memex," which individuals could use to store all their documents as an "enlarged supplement to memory." He envisioned that the documents would not be categorized by conventional

library classification, but rather would be connected by association, in the same ways that he understood the mind to work.

Another key figure in this history is Ted Nelson, who is credited with coining the term “hypertext” to refer to electronic text that includes “hyperlinks” that allow users to jump from one textual unit to another. Hypertext becomes “hypermedia” when multiple media, such as images, video, animations, and sound, are incorporated in the works.

The multimedia paradigm emerged as an actual consumer technology with computers featuring graphical user interfaces (GUIs), largely superseding “command line” text only interaction. This style of interface is traced from the 1960s US Defense Department’s Augmentation Research Center, headed by Doug Engelbart (Bardini 2000) through to the Xerox Palo Alto Research Center (PARC), which developed a GUI interface for the “Alto,” but never commercialized it. The GUI was finally popularized by the Apple Macintosh, released in 1984, which used bitmapped graphics, a Windows, Icons, Menus, and the mouse Pointing device (WIMP) interface, and built in sound (Levy 1994). The GUI style of interface was also adopted by Microsoft, with Windows, which became the dominant personal computer operating system by the mid 1990s.

Multimedia over the Internet became viable with the 1993 release of the NCSA Mosaic browser. The World Wide Web standards that became HTML (HyperText Markup Language) and http (HyperText Transfer Protocol) had been developed by Tim Berners Lee at CERN by 1990. Mosaic added a GUI interface, and supported embedded images and, soon, plug ins that allowed animations, panoramas, sound, video, 3D, and other types of content to be included on a web page. Although websites could not compare in audiovisual terms even with CD ROMs, they were mainly accessible for free, and supported more complex transactions between users and site owners. Electronic mail attachments and real time chat also supported transfer of multimedia files.

Multimedia developers and theorists identified and extended a range of functional and aesthetic conventions distinctive to this media form. Some early theory was largely either speculative or descriptive, extending on early

experiments with new aesthetics and capabilities (e.g., Benedikt 1992). Later work became more concerned with emerging aesthetics apparent in actual multimedia works and applications. Janet Murray (1997) identifies immersion, agency, and transformation as key aesthetics of the medium. Lev Manovich (2001) nominates the database and navigable space as forms distinctive to new media. He argues that databases displace narrative as key organizing form by presenting the world as a list without any necessary ordering: they remain open to unending search, navigation, and viewing. Navigable space also organizes elements in virtual space, rather than presenting them with the linearity of narration characteristic of most cinema.

While some conventions did emerge, actual multimedia applications established a diverse range of styles and genres. For example, there are many different ways of producing and presenting immersive and navigable spaces. Some applications (e.g., Cyan Worlds’ 1993 game *Myst*) present single images with hotspots that take users from one space to another. Another model is found in the immersive panoramas created by stitching together multiple still images, introduced with Apple’s QuickTime VR (Virtual Reality) in 1994, which retains a close connection with photography. On the other hand, navigable 3D virtual reality spaces such as those featured in the first person shooter games genre popularized by id Software’s *Doom* in 1993 generate moving images in real time by rendering the perspective of a moving virtual camera position within a mathematically described environment modeled with polygon primitives. While each creates a sense of immersion (and there are many other variations of applications that operate with this aesthetic), no general purpose or universal system emerged.

By the end of the 1990s, CD ROMs had not established themselves as a mainstream format for publishing authored content titles. The crash in high technology stocks in 2000 deflated any remaining optimism about this form, ironically just at the time that multimedia applications were being taken up, particularly on the Internet. The CD ROM was a critical but flawed component of this generation of multimedia. It was a storage medium that could hold 650 MB of data – at the time a very substantial capacity. However, as the drives were based

on a standard developed for audio, the early CD ROM drives were initially frustratingly slow. The audiovisual impact of multimedia did not compare well with television, cinema, or even games. Most importantly, CD ROM content titles had no clearly defined market, never sitting comfortably in computer shops, bookshops, or video rental outlets.

Within less than a decade, the mid 1990s paradigm of multimedia had clearly failed. A new range of digital communications and media technologies grew dramatically, most notably the Internet, computer games, digital stills cameras and video cameras, DVDs, and mobile telephones. Each of these had advantages over CD ROMs: more direct cultural progenitors, stronger affective resonances, better economic models, and better defined locations within increasingly complex technical and social networks.

The conception of multimedia that emerged in the 2000s moved away from the emphasis on packaged, integrated, and commoditized CD ROM titles toward communications products and campaigns that employ multiple media (Lévy 2001). For example, advertising and entertainment increasingly produced media events that integrated television programs with mobile data (SMS: short message service), iMode multimedia phones (particularly in Japan), 3G phones, interactive television, and websites. Media industries such as cinema became increasingly dependent on cross media tie ins such as games and soundtrack rights, product placement, and DVD releases.

In the early 2000s, the increasing accessibility of broadband Internet connections, as well as advances in rich media and data compression standards, made it increasingly possible to distribute multimedia content online. The Internet also became infamous for its informal and even illegal use for distributing multimedia files: copyrighted music, pornographic images, pirated software, and even entire new release movies.

LOGOCENTRISM, MULTIMEDIA, AND MULTIMODALITY

If multimedia is the marked term for any communication that involves more than one

medium, this implies that communication using a single and discrete medium is the normal state of affairs in western culture. Canadian media theorist Marshall McLuhan is most prominent among those who have argued that writing is the dominant medium. He argues that the West inordinately privileges the visual sense, encouraging excessively linear thought and diminishing the immediacy, involvement, and the immersiveness of sound (McLuhan 1962). He sees some promise in electric media to challenge the dominance of print, to rebalance sense ratios. McLuhan's work has recently been taken up enthusiastically by multimedia advocates (Packer & Jordan 2001).

Another perspective is offered by Jacques Derrida (1976), who argues in *Of Grammatology* that in western culture is actually speech. Writing is most often (wrongly) seen as a diminished record of the speech that supposedly calls on the presence of the speaker for its authority. Derrida claims that western rationality is based on a logocentrism that privileges language over non verbal communication, and reduces all communication to language (and the implied presence of a speaker).

Some advocates of multimedia (and hypertext, in particular), notably George Landow, invoke Derrida's critiques of the logic of presence in written texts, but reach an almost opposite conclusion: that the technology of hypermedia actually overcomes the metaphysical limitations of previous media (Landow 1992). While such claims might be too strongly technologically deterministic, the development and adoption of new communication technologies does have significant implications for cultural and social practices.

The emergence of multimedia has foregrounded an important distinction between "multimedia" and "multimodality" – the materiality of a mode of communication, and the codes and conventions in operation. The term "media" (which is already complex and plural) refers to an interval between two entities, the intervening substrate, which is crossed using some mode of transportation or communication. The modality refers to the qualitative properties of the mechanisms by which this interval between entities is crossed. The modality of human communication includes the senses involved (sight, hearing, touch), and the

conventions that make the contact between entities significant or meaningful.

Multimodality has recently become a significant question for linguistics, which has traditionally privileged the structural features of written and spoken language. Image, gesture, and action have usually been seen as only supplements to the communication carried by language. Recent work by Gunther Kress and Theo van Leeuwen (1996), among others, insists that cultural shifts have displaced writing on paper as the dominant mode of communication in favor of images on screens. All communicational events mobilize more than language. In this light, all meaning making practices need to be reexamined.

Multimedia production also requires changes in work practices of media producers (Woolgar 2002). Production often combines the work of professionals from very different worlds. Larger projects require designers (interface, visual, and instructional), programmers, writers, artists (computer and traditional), and others to collaborate closely.

The term “multimedia” remains a problematic but important term. While multimedia has not become a discrete and well defined cultural form, many applications of computers can be described as multimedia. Media production for traditional media including print, sound, photography, video, and cinema now almost universally involves computers. Many of the aesthetics developed in CD ROM interactive multimedia have been adapted to DVD videos, interactive television, broadband Internet, computer games, and mobile audiovisual and data applications.

SEE ALSO: Cyberculture; Digital; Information Technology; Internet; Text/Hypertext

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multinucleated metropolitan region

Chigon Kim

The multinucleated metropolitan region is an emerging spatial configuration characterized by massive regional sprawl and the presence of multiple specialized activity centers outside of the downtown central business district (CBD). This concept is useful for understanding both changes in metropolitan spatial structure and the dynamics of metropolitan life. It underlines the interactive character of the metropolitan region tied together by the complex webs of communications and traffic flows. As a pattern of settlement space, it suggests that urban life is organized into multiple centers spreading across an extensive metropolitan region.

The idea of the multinucleated metropolitan region can be traced to the early Chicago School of urban ecology. Roderick D. McKenzie, among others, was a pioneer who extended the ecological approach to the study of the metropolitan region. In 1933 McKenzie published a seminal book, *The Metropolitan Community*, in

which he investigated structural and historical changes in urban settlement space. Unlike advocates of other ecological models focusing on the internal structure of the city as a container, McKenzie called attention to the metropolitan region as an appropriate unit of analysis and explicitly highlighted metropolitanization and multinucleation as dominant social trends. As McKenzie pointed out, the pattern of metropolitan development has deviated significantly from the monocentric urban form (epitomized in the Burgess's concentric zone model) since the early 1930s.

The sprawling, polynucleated nature of metropolitan growth has been of particular concern among scholars, practitioners, policy makers, and journalists since the early 1960s. They have coined a number of neologisms to describe this phenomenon, focusing primarily on changes in the urban fringes and peripheries. Examples include edge cities, exopoles, network cities, postsuburbia, outer cities, suburban downtowns, suburban employment centers, suburban growth corridors, technoburbs, and urban villages. Many of these labels underscore a particular aspect of polycentric metropolitan spatial structure, such as the regional scale of metropolitan growth, the suburban location of specialized centers, the spatial array of clustering, and the socioeconomic function of multiple nuclei.

In the early 1970s the suburbanization of employment came to the attention of the public. Beginning in the mid 1970s, various types of specialized clusters, such as high technology corridors and office parks, emerged and increased in number and kind. By the mid 1970s, urban spatial structure shifted from the monocentric to the polycentric form with a multitude of specialized centers mushrooming in the suburban ring. Since the 1980s the trend toward economic decentralization has been increasingly dominated by highly specialized business functions. These functions include headquarters, FIRE (finance, insurance, and real estate), and advanced business services. In the 1990s, many suburban downtowns matured into full fledged regional centers.

Although the spatial layout of suburban employment centers may vary from place to place, clustering and scattering remain two of the most salient forms. Clustering is a

geographic concentration of economic activities in the nodal point in which industrial parks or campus like office complexes are located. Benefits of clustering include easy access to the specialized labor force, the creation of innovation networks, the exchange of tacit knowledge, and the development of business infrastructure. The concentrated activity centers become highly diversified and functionally specialized as the deconcentration of business functions and services continues.

Clustering is characterized by concentrated and mixed land use. By contrast, scattering is characterized by widely dispersed, somewhat random, and usually single land use. As shown in high technology corridors or commercial strips along highways, accessibility is the key to a scattered pattern of nucleation. In many metropolitan regions, suburban employment centers share less than half of total metropolitan employment due to the scattering of business functions and services without any distinct land use patterns. This unorganized, scattered, and sprawling pattern of suburban economic nodes is congruent with the postmodern conception of urban spatial structure.

There are various ways in which polycentric spatial structure can emerge. Some metropolitan areas have developed with multiple nuclei from the beginning; others have transformed into polycentric structures through migration and functional specialization; and still others have undertaken polycentric development through incorporating or merging several previously independent centers. The origin and growth dynamics of suburban activity centers may differ from place to place, but these new centers are beginning to rival the traditional CBD.

To explain the dynamics of this spatial formation, the ecological perspective tends to delineate a general evolutionary path of metropolitanization such as urbanization, suburbanization, and the urbanization of the suburbs. In this perspective, the development of multicentered metropolitan structure is attributed to advances in transportation and communication technology, agglomeration economies and diseconomies, or a tradeoff between housing and commuting costs. The relocation decision of business and industry, for example, is accounted for by a tradeoff between agglomeration economies (e.g., reduced transaction costs,

face to face information flows, and innovation capacities) and congestion costs (e.g., traffic congestion, pollution, higher land values, and higher labor costs). From this perspective, the relocation decision is made when congestion costs far exceed the benefits from agglomeration economies. While an increase in congestion costs in dense locations pushes business and industry to decentralize their economic activities, the benefits from agglomeration economies provide a strong incentive for recentralization.

Although the ecological perspective highlights the spatial process of metropolitanization, it tends to ignore how emerging urban spatial structure is linked to underlying structural transformations. The sociospatial perspective provides a more comprehensive framework for understanding the newly emerging metropolitan form, its underlying processes, and its social consequences. The benchmark is Mark Gottdiener's *The Social Production of Urban Space* (1985). Contrary to ecologists, Gottdiener defines the multinucleated metropolitan region in terms of macro level structural changes which may be conceptualized as the transition from Fordism or monopoly capitalism to the regime of flexible accumulation or global capitalism. Such structural transformations were coupled with the spatial process of deconcentration.

Deconcentration comprises two movements of people and activities within and between metropolitan regions: decentralization and recentralization. Decentralization means the movements of people and activities away from the urban core. It includes the shift of industries, jobs, and workers from the older central cities toward the suburbs, Sunbelt regions, and overseas. Recentralization refers to the process whereby those movements tend to concentrate into functionally specialized areas. This tendency toward concentrated decentralization in conjunction with recurrent socioeconomic restructuring generates multiple nodes around which interconnected activities and functions cluster.

The sociospatial perspective posits that the sprawling, multinucleated metropolitan region is a product of the dialectical articulation between structural forces and agency. The rise of the multinucleated metropolitan region involves a complex but contingent articulation

of political, economic, and social factors operating at local, regional, national, and global levels. In addition, the distribution of people and activities within and across metropolitan regions is not amorphous; rather, it is driven by powerful actors and channeled by institutional mechanisms.

First of all, the rise of global capitalism has altered the landscape of metropolitan areas. Under the pressure of intensified international competition over fragmented consumer markets, the structure of industrial organization has been transformed into a flatter, leaner, and more flexible one. In search of greater flexibility in production, flexible firms put a premium on strategic alliances and subcontracting relations. They sell off their divisions in pursuit of lean and mean organizational structures, focusing on core competencies. This widespread tendency toward vertical disintegration, along with the mobility of capital, has contributed to the spatial dispersal of production. This decentralization of production has increased the need for centralizing the coordination and control functions in corporate headquarters. Coupled with the concentration of administrative and control functions is the explosion of advanced business services supporting business operation on a global scale. These administrative functions and advanced business services, which used to locate in large CBDs, are burgeoning in the suburban centers.

Government intervention also played a significant role in the restructuring of urban space after World War II. Governments at the local, regional, and national levels have facilitated private profit making not only indirectly in the form of housing and transportation policies, but also directly through government expenditures and subsidization. For example, strategic industries located in the Sunbelt, such as energy and high technology industries, have been heavily subsidized by governments. Together with defense related spending, these industries are pillars of Sunbelt growth. Additionally, in an effort to attract global investment, local governments often offer tax breaks, loans, grants, or other subsidies. The mobility of capital and the competition among different places for their share of investment have much to do with the geographic differentiation and functional specialization of concentrated economic centers.

In addition to economic and political forces, cultural representations and practices play a role in shaping multicentered metropolitan regions. The production of urban space is a contentious process involving many contending interests of the stakeholders, who justify their actions by appropriating cultural representations. The real estate industry incorporates images and symbols into themed environments as a marketing strategy to attract clients. Local government uses place representations as a source of legitimacy for urban development and redevelopment policies. Local residents produce, circulate, and consume a set of images and symbols that signify a particular place identity. In the struggle over social space, they reaffirm these place representations. In addition, locational choices are affected by cultural values and lifestyle preferences.

The major agent of urban change is the real estate sector. Under late capitalism, competition between capitalists results in overaccumulation. A temporary solution to this chronic problem is a switch of capital flow into the secondary circuit of capital, which involves investment in the built environment for profit. The flow of investment in the built environment is usually induced by government intervention. Whereas real estate development is a separate source of acquiring wealth, returns on investment in the built environment are uncertain because of the long investment cycle. For this reason, local governments, interested in increased tax revenues, usually provide incentives to make real estate an attractive investment. Thus, land based interest groups, aligning themselves with local governments, carve out growth networks which are active in making profit from the turnover in land use.

Growth networks are coalitions of individuals and groups that channel spatial transformations into specific places and directions. They are composed of land developers, government officials, financial institutions, speculators, construction companies, and real estate agents. These coalitions usually cut across rigid class boundaries. Growth coalitions produce and disseminate boosterism and pro growth ideology to legitimate real estate development. Their land based interests are powerful enough to produce the unique features of the built environment. However, opponents of pro growth interests

counter development with the idea of "community control," which emphasizes the social costs imputed to local residents, including pollution, traffic congestion, and higher crime rates. The restructuring of urban space, in sum, represents a deep rooted ideological battle over the use of space.

The polycentric spatial formation has become the focus of urban studies in North America, Europe, and Japan. Recent studies have explored various issues relevant to the development of multinucleated metropolitan regions. Some studies empirically examined how these centers emerge, grow, and change over time. Others explained their competitive advantages, functional specialization, location, and interdependence. Still others explicated their effects on the quality of urban life. Now, the fear of terrorism is added to a list of structural forces behind the decentralization of key business activities and services.

A major methodological issue associated with polycentric spatial structure is how to specify its boundaries. At the inter metropolitan level, the multinucleated metropolitan region is a functionally integrated area encompassing a constellation of politically independent cities. Proximity and interaction are two criteria generally used to specify boundaries. The level of interaction, usually measured by commuting flows, is an indicator of functional interdependence of separate cities, whereas proximity, measured by traveling time, is an indicator of spatial integration. Yet there is little consensus about what minimum thresholds should be applied before a place can be considered part of a single, functionally integrated metropolitan region.

Operationalization is another methodological issue related to the concept of polycentricity. Operationalization and measurement differ from study to study, depending on the available data used. The units of analysis vary greatly, ranging from counties, incorporated municipalities, ZIP codes, and census tracts, to transportation analysis zones (TAZs).

Polycentric spatial structure is first measured by comparing the growth of jobs in the suburbs and in the central city. The degree of economic deconcentration is the key to this measure. If a metropolitan region has more jobs in the outlying suburban areas than in the central city,

then it is considered to be an indicator of polycentricity. Although this indicator is easy to measure, it fails to capture a tendency toward the concentrated decentralization of economic activities and the functional specialization of a place.

The employment to residence (ER) ratio is a measure that takes into account the functional specialization of a place. An employment center is characterized by a high ER ratio. If the ER ratio is greater than 1, then it is classified as an employment subcenter; by contrast, if the ER ratio is less than 0.5, then it is considered as a residential community. Many studies show that the suburban share of employment within metropolitan areas has dramatically increased and many suburban areas contain jobs that outstrip the number of resident workers.

Polycentric spatial structure is also measured by commuting patterns based on census journey to work data. Most OECD member countries, including the US, use the intensity of commuting patterns to identify the functional integration of contiguous urban areas. Changes in commuting patterns reflect changes in the distribution of employment within a metropolitan area. As a result of economic deconcentration, commuting flows to and from urban peripheries increase, whereas commuting trips to the urban center decrease. By 1980 the volume of suburban to suburban commuting flows doubled that of suburban to central city work trips. Along with the dominant suburban to suburban commuting flows, reverse commuting from the central city to the suburbs has become quite significant.

The disadvantage of the above three measures is that they are unable to identify the number and location of suburban employment centers. An alternative measure that overcomes this limitation is the employment density gradient. The popular unit of analysis in the employment density gradient is the TAZ. Employment growth outside the downtown CBD is often concentrated in a relatively small number of zones. If changes in employment density are drawn on a graph along the distance from the downtown CBD, then the gradient tends to decrease with multiple peaks. These peaks will rise in the areas around outlying employment centers.

The identification of employment centers may vary depending on the threshold

employment density (e.g., 5,000 employees per square mile instead of 7,000) and the threshold total employment (e.g., 10,000 total employees instead of 20,000). The density of suburban employment centers could be low relative to the density in the downtown CBD, but the number of outlying employment centers and their share of the total metropolitan employment tend to increase. In addition, these employment centers become economically more diversified and specialized. The functional specialization of an employment center can be assessed by examining its composition of industries, jobs, or business functions and their relative shares in the entire metropolitan area. More recent studies use remote sensing, GIS, or other mapping techniques to identify an employment center and its functional specialization.

Multinucleated metropolitan regions share some defining features, although they may have followed different trajectories of development with unique spatial configurations. The size of a metropolitan area is highly associated with its number of suburban employment centers. In general, larger metropolitan areas exhibit more suburban employment centers. However, there are regional differences and geographical variations in multinucleation. For example, the dispersed, leapfrogging development of economic nodes in the urban fringe is more prevalent in rapidly expanding metropolitan areas of the Sunbelt region.

Some urban scholars and practitioners highlight the benefits of polycentric metropolitan development, including improved regional economic competitiveness and greater choices of urban services. For others, however, uneven development is the end product of the rapid, uncoordinated spatial transformations under late capitalism. Both spatial dispersal and agglomeration result in geographical splits and disparities, as represented by the vivid contrast between well off and impoverished areas across and within metropolitan regions. The pattern of uneven development is reinforced by spatial competition that makes capital resources bypass impoverished areas. Spatial transformations generate, rather than solve, a host of urban problems. Those problems include residential segregation, social polarization, fiscal crisis, crime, pollution, and traffic congestion. The scope of these urban problems is beyond the reach of fragmented political

jurisdictions and calls for regional cooperation and interdisciplinary research.

SEE ALSO: Growth Machine; Uneven Development; Urban Ecology; Urban Political Economy; Urban Space

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multiracial feminism

Michele Berger and Silvia Bettez

Women of color have always actively participated in women's issues. However, their experience with feminist work has often been

overlooked and largely undocumented (Hurtado 1996). Multiracial feminism refers to the activist and scholarly work conducted by women of color and anti racist white allies to promote race, class, and gender equality. In comparison to the highly documented second wave white, middle class feminism, which centered on abolishing patriarchy and privileged patriarchy as an oppression over all others, women of color feminism resists separating oppression and insists on recognizing the intersectionality of race, class, and gender oppression.

A metaphor increasingly used to identify the various stages of feminism in the United States has been that of "waves." The first wave denotes the period when white abolitionist women and free black women organized for the right to vote and won passage of the 19th Amendment. The second wave is identified as 1970s feminism, which challenged women's exclusion from the public sphere of employment and politics. The third wave is ongoing and marks the ways in which young women manage some of the social and political freedoms gained from the previous generations. Multiracial feminist organizing and theory building can be identified throughout every historical period of these waves.

Multiracial feminism refers most often to the feminisms of Black/African American, Latina/Chicana, Native American, and Asian American women; however, it includes the voices of anti racist white women and of all women of color including East Indian women, Arab women, mixed race women, and women of color not from the United States. Multiracial feminists have often identified themselves under the rubric of "women of color." The identification of women of color as a political, strategic, and subjective identity category is a relatively recent phenomenon. The term "women of color" connotes both affinity and similarity of experience.

To demonstrate an alliance with women of color across the globe and a commitment to postcolonial struggles, in the early 1970s some feminist women of color in the US began claiming the term "third world women" (Sandoval 1990; Mohanty et al. 1991). Third world feminists used the term to deliberately mark a connection with global women's issues foregrounding colonization, immigration,

racism, and imperialism – concerns that many white feminists did not address.

This identification with other women across the globe also encouraged US women of color to acknowledge long traditions of anti racist collective organizing that was often ignored, suppressed, or obscured during second wave feminist activism. These conditions helped to solidify the strategic use of the term women of color and have supported over the last two decades global organizing in Brazil, England, Africa, Australia, and New Zealand. Aída Hurtado (1996) argues that there are four overarching principles that connect almost all feminists of color: (1) an insistence on recognizing the simultaneity of race, class, and gender oppressions; (2) a claim to their racial group's history as part of their activist legacy, including struggles in their native lands; (3) an understanding that theorizing can emerge from political organizing, everyday interactions, and artistic production as well as the academy; and (4) an opposition to heterosexism in their communities.

Although there are commonalities between multiracial feminists, there are also concentrations on specific topics that distinguish over 30 years of scholarship and activism. Asian American women have documented pervasive and debilitating stereotypes that promote passivity and exoticization, domestic violence, and the US military's role in sex tourism. African American multiracial feminists have consistently called attention to "controlling images" of black female bodies (especially regarding sexuality) that seek to justify disenfranchisement through law, ideology, and social policy. Chicanas and Latinas have often concentrated on immigration, challenging patriarchal definitions of family, the sexual double standard, and critiquing the black/white conceptualization of US racial politics. Sovereignty and land rights, environmental justice, spirituality, and experiences of cultural appropriation and genocide have been primary concerns of Native women who espouse multiracial feminism.

Multiracial feminism is often viewed in contrast and reaction to white, middle class feminism; however, it is important to recognize that there have often been women of color working within white dominated feminist groups pushing for a multiracial feminist politic. For example,

two African American women, Margaret Sloan and Pauli Murray, helped found the National Organization for Women (NOW) in 1966, and black feminist Doris Wright was a founding member of *Ms. Magazine* in 1972 (Thompson 2001).

Women of color feminists organized around a wide range of public issues historically ignored by white, middle class feminists. Multiracial feminism addressed: reproductive rights, sterilization abuse, welfare rights, police brutality, labor organizing, environmental justice issues, rape, domestic violence, childcare access, school desegregation, prison reform, and affirmative action. To address these public issues, in addition to working in white dominated groups, women of color also developed their own autonomous feminist organizations and caucuses. These organizations grew out of both civil rights groups and white women's groups. Black women organized in 1973 to create the New York based National Black Feminist Organization (NBFO) and launched a conference attended by 400 women representing a variety of class backgrounds (Thompson 2001). Additionally, the NBFO inspired the formation of another black feminist group in 1974, the Combahee River Collective, who wrote a now famous statement describing the genesis and politics of black feminism. Other women of color groups that grew out of race based political organizations include the Third World Women's Alliance, which emerged from the Student Non Violent Coordinating Committee; the Chicana group Hijas de Cuauhtemoc, founded as an offshoot of the United Mexican American Student Organization; Asian Sisters, which grew out of the Asian American Political Alliance; and Women of All Red Nations (WARN), initiated by members of the American Indian Movement (Thompson 2001). These feminist multiracial groups addressed a multitude of issues related to racism, classism, and sexism that were affecting women of color.

Multiracial feminism came to the fore with the 1981 publication of *This Bridge Called My Back: Writings by Radical Women of Color*, an anthology representing black, Latina/Chicana, Native American, and Asian American women grappling with issues of racism, sexism, homophobia, and classism. The writings reflect women of color activism in previous years.

Although there were activist women of color texts preceding *Bridge*, such as the anthology *The Black Woman* by Bambara (1970), the 1980s marked a burgeoning of feminist texts by women of color. In 1983, Barbara Smith published *Home Girls: A Black Feminist Anthology* featuring writings by black feminist activists, and in 1984 Beth Brant published *A Gathering of Spirit: A Collection by North American Indian Women*. All of these texts included the voices of lesbian and feminist women of color, and the second edition of *Bridge*, printed in 1983, provided a largely international perspective expanding the concept of intersectionality from race, class, and gender oppressions to include sexuality and nation.

Simultaneously, there was an explosion of creative work by multiracial feminists that contributed to the vibrancy of the activism of the late 1970s and early 1980s and that expanded the theory building that was taking place in multiple locations (e.g., community centers, conferences, women's centers, educational institutions). Writers of both fiction and non fiction created academic and popular interest in exploring the multidimensional lives of women of color in ways that had not been previously attempted.

Alice Walker advanced the articulation of multiracial feminism as distinctive, culturally specific, and part of a legacy of social justice. Her groundbreaking book *In Search of My Mother's Gardens* (1983), a collection of essays, introduced the term "womanism." Walker does not reject the term feminism but offers a parallel affirmative expression for the multiple and complex ways that women of color view their communities and commitments in those communities. It also explores many facets of life important to women of color that a radical strand of 1970s feminism often eschewed, including spirituality, the suffering of men of color due to racist oppression, and the relationship between art and activism.

Multiracial feminism has been critical in identifying new metaphorical spaces for theory, praxis, healing, and organizing, highlighting the intersection of experience including the concept of "borderlands," "sister outsiders," "new mestizas," and "Woman Warriors" (Sandoval 2000). Transformation of the self is considered important to counteract the reductive and homogenizing tendencies of the

uncritical idea of "sisterhood" espoused by white feminists; it can include renaming, recasting, and reclaiming buried components of one's identity. Women of color feminists organizing in early second wave feminism, whose needs were often marginalized or ignored in both white women organizations and race based organizations led by men, also emphasized the importance of creating exclusive women of color spaces, as evidenced by *This Bridge Called My Back* and the various women of color caucuses.

Women of color entered into the academy in greater numbers during the 1980s. Many were from activist backgrounds and espoused multiracial feminist viewpoints; they began documenting their experiences challenging prevailing theoretical frameworks. Some scholars revisited the historic tensions of the mainstream feminist movement, arguing for a more relevant analysis applicable to diverse communities. Beginning with her landmark book *Ain't I A Woman? Black Women and Feminism* (1981), bell hooks blended personal narrative, theory, and praxis in a distinctive style. hooks is one of the most prolific and widely read multiracial feminists. Multiracial feminism has changed the landscape of both theory and methods in the social sciences and humanities.

Multiracial feminists have argued that multiple oppressions can combine and create new and often unrecognized forms of encounters in daily life. The concept of "multiple oppressions" and the "intersection of experience" approach have been primarily used to help understand non dominant groups' experiences navigating the social world. In the last 20 years, activists and theorists located outside the US have developed these insights to support a global analysis of power and difference.

The call to redefine work through a race, gender, and class analysis has had a significant impact, beginning in women's studies and spiraling out across other fields and disciplines, especially in the field of sociology. Patricia Hill Collins introduced the concept of the "matrix of domination." She argues for viewing race, class, and gender as a central organizing principle that allows scholars to investigate how individuals and groups can simultaneously occupy areas of privilege and domination. Sarah Mann and Michael Grimes note the influence of "intersectional work" in the academy and suggest that its

scope is pandisciplinary. Scholars have used the concept of “race, class, and gender” as an interlocking site of oppression, in multiple ways, to create theory as an analytical tool or as a methodological practice (Berger 2004). Research explicitly utilizing intersectional analysis tends to cluster in pockets in a few traditional social science disciplines (sociology, psychology, education) and in multidisciplinary programs including women’s studies, ethnic studies, criminology, and environmental studies. Several sociologists have compiled anthologies that examine the intersections of race, class, and gender. Two key texts that provide a conceptual framework for understanding the complex intersections of oppressions have been written by sociologists: *Privilege, Power, and Difference* (2001) by Allan Johnson and *Understanding Race, Class, Gender, and Sexuality: A Conceptual Framework* (2001) by Lynn Weber.

Multiracial feminism is a burgeoning field that centers on the voices of women of color but includes writings by anti racist white women, women outside the US, and feminist men of color. Comprehending the intersections of oppressions in order to promote equity across lines of race, class, and gender and nation differences is a key component of multi racial feminism.

Sociologists have contributed greatly to this endeavor. Multiracial feminism offers new formulations about organizing, coalition building, and critical theory production. The field has reached a maturity and sophistication in both activist and scholarly communities, enriching the conceptualization of power, identity, and inequality.

SEE ALSO: Black Feminist Thought; Feminism; Feminism, First, Second, and Third Waves; Intersectionality; Matrix of Domination; Race; Race (Racism); Third World and Postcolonial Feminisms/Subaltern; Transnational and Global Feminisms

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multivariate analysis

Nina Baur and Siegfried Lamnek

One way to classify quantitative methods of social research is by the number of variables involved in statistical data analysis procedures. In univariate statistics, just one variable is of interest, while in bivariate statistics the relation between two variables is analyzed. Multivariate analysis involves, in the loose sense of the term,

more than two variables and, in its strict sense, at least two dependent and two independent variables. With increasing numbers of variables, statistical modeling becomes necessary and more complex. At the same time, these models are more appropriate for social sciences, since in social reality many variables are intertwined and there is rarely one central determination.

Once data are collected and read into a data base processable by statistical software, the typical steps in a multivariate data analysis are the following.

- 1 *Framing the research question* in such a way that it can be modeled mathematically.
- 2 *Selecting the right statistical model*, since many kinds of multivariate methods exist and researchers continually develop new multivariate methods. Every multivariate model searches for certain patterns in data. It might miss other patterns. Using different multivariate methods therefore may lead to different results. Thus selecting the right theoretical model at the beginning of data analysis is essential. For example, a statistical correlation may point to a “causal” relation or a latent variable. If one applies regression analysis, one usually only investigates the possibility of a causal relation. However, experienced researchers can use the same statistical method for different theoretical goals, e.g., regression analysis could also be used in other ways than causal analysis.
- 3 *Verifying that assumptions and prerequisites* for the chosen statistical procedure are met. Most multivariate procedures require at least (a) valid, standardized data; (b) a minimum number of cases; (c) a random sample; (d) a specified variable scale type; (e) a certain (very often, a normal) distribution of variables and residuals; (f) a minimum variance of variables; (g) in causal analysis usually independence of independent variables. If any of these assumptions are not met, a different multivariate procedure should be chosen as results may be erroneous. Again, profound research experience and statistical knowledge are needed to assess when violated assumptions lead to invalid results and when they lead only to less stable results.

- 4 *Preparing data for the specific analysis*. A special case of data preparation is data mining, which specializes in extracting variables from complex data banks for statistical analysis.
- 5 *Computing the model* using a special statistical computer package such as SAS, SPSS, or Stata.
- 6 *The results of data analysis always have to be interpreted*. Statistics may help in interpreting data, but they never prove theories.

Multivariate analysis procedures can be classified in different ways, and no classification is exhaustive, especially due to the dynamics of the field. Two common ways are (1) on what scale variables have to be measured in order to apply the model and (2) what kind of theoretical model underlies the analytic procedure. Among the theoretical questions multivariate analysis can address are (a) identifying latent classes; (b) causal analysis; (c) identifying patterns in time; (d) network analysis; and (e) multilevel analysis. Most multivariate procedures can be viewed as a special case of general linear models (GLM).

Identifying latent classes. Associated variables can be interpreted measuring a background variable that was not or cannot be measured, such as typologies, classes, or dimensions. For example, the correct number of answers in a test can be seen as a sign of greater or lesser intelligence. Esping Andersen identified welfare regimes by classifying countries according to socioeconomic and political similarities. Multivariate analysis procedures that identify latent classes include cluster analysis, correspondence analysis, factor analysis, principal component analysis, and multidimensional scaling (MDS).

Causal analysis. Correlation can also mean that one or more variables induce one or more other variables. For example, education and country of origin both have a strong influence on income. Note the specific underlying concept of causality: “cause” in the sense of statistical techniques usually means the relationship between variables, while, as Abbott (2001) points out, only persons (not the variables used to describe them) can act – and thus “cause” anything. Most statistical techniques

Table 1 Types of cases and groups.

		<i>Independent variables</i>	
		<i>Nominal</i>	<i>Metric</i>
Dependent variables	Nominal	Correspondence analysis Log-linear models Tree analysis, e.g. CHAID	Discriminant analysis Logistic regression
	Metric	Analysis of variance (ANOVA; MANOVA)	Canonical regression Partial correlation Multiple regression Multivariate regression Path analysis (LISREL)

of causal analysis try to assess existence, kind, and strength of causal relationships between variables. One distinguishes, for example, non recursive relationships (i.e., one way causal relationships); recursive relationships (variable A influences variable B and vice versa); additive multicausality (many causes independently affect the dependent variable); interaction (a cause only impacts if the case belongs to a certain category in a third – control – variable); common causes (one dependent variable influences several distinct independent variables); intervention (a causal chain exists, i.e., variable A influences variable B, which in turn influences variable C, etc.); circularity (variable A influences variable B; variable B causes variable C; variable C affects variable A). Causal links between variables can be much more complex, especially if variable number increases. Most social scientists focus on establishing the kind of causal relationship between many variables and on distinguishing causally relevant variables from irrelevant variables. Table 1 gives an (incomplete) overview of multivariate procedures for establishing causal relations, classified by the minimum variable scale required. If few relevant variables (preferably on a metric scale) exist, one can try to estimate the exact effect size using econometric techniques.

Identifying patterns in time. Many methods exist to analyze the change of (typical) human action. Most of them originally stem from demography, economic sociology, and life course research. Examples are cohort analysis, times series, event history analysis (survival analysis), latent growth curve models, and

sequential analysis (optimal matching techniques). These methods usually either require a variable measuring time (such as age) or research designs with several measuring points (such as trend design, panel design, continuous measuring).

Network analysis. An individual case (such as a person, a word, situation) can interact with other individuals but is often part of higher level cases forming a collective (= aggregate), e.g., a person can be part of an organization or a country; a word can be an element of a sentence or a book; a situation can be part of an interaction system. Network analysis procedures investigate the relation between individuals forming a collective on a higher level, for example the intensity of social contacts between members of a non governmental organization.

Multilevel analysis. Sometimes, the relationship between different analysis levels is of interest, e.g., the influence of regional unemployment rate (analysis level: region) on voting behavior (analysis level: persons) or the effect of youth violence (analysis level: persons) on legislation (analysis level: countries). In this case, multilevel analysis procedures are applicable.

SEE ALSO: ANOVA (Analysis of Variance); Computer Aided/Mediated Analysis; Experimental Methods; Factor Analysis; General Linear Model; Hypotheses; Latent Growth Curve Models; Log Linear Models; Mathematical Sociology; Path Analysis; Quantitative Methods; Regression and Regression Analysis; Social Network Analysis; Statistics; Structural Equation Modeling; Time Series; Variables

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Mumford, Lewis (1895–1990)

Mark Luccarelli

Lewis Mumford was born in New York City. He is best known as an architectural critic and urban historian, and author of *The City in History* (1961), undoubtedly his greatest work. Of mixed German and German Jewish heritage, Mumford grew up with his mother and maternal grandfather – an immigrant and head waiter who took the boy for long walks, initiating Mumford’s lifelong interest in cities. With the publication of *The Culture of Cities* (1938) Mumford achieved widespread recognition that grew when the *New Yorker* magazine hired him to write its *Skyline* column. A journalist by profession, he had wide ranging intellectual interests and wrote convincingly on a variety of topics, including technology and culture, literary criticism, social ethics, and politics.

Mumford was a “public intellectual” who addressed the educated public rather than a specific academic community. Despite or perhaps because of his audience, he undertook an ambitious intellectual project: the reexamination of modernity in the light of growing scientific and imaginative understandings of evolutionary processes. Mumford thought that in respect to developments in technology, architecture, and urban form, culture could be likened to the workings of nature, and like the philosopher John Dewey he held that creative innovation holds the key to evolving designs appropriate to the task of reconciling human values and natural processes.

The barbarism of World War I and the subsequent collapse of Progressive Era reform politics in the US set the stage for Mumford’s intellectual journey. A polymath, he naturally took to Emerson’s maxim that all education is essentially autobiographical. Aside from diverse courses he took at the City College of New York that failed to add up to a Bachelor’s degree, his most important training came from contacts he developed himself, particularly during a formative trip to Britain undertaken in the 1920s. These contacts included the botanist and urbanist Patrick Geddes and the sociologist Victor Branford. From Geddes, Mumford learned the technique of the “regional survey” of the city and its environs. Through Branford, he was introduced to sociological theory and in particular the ideas of the nineteenth century French regionalist, Frederick Le Play. Regionalism became a philosophy of living and an expression of Mumford’s concern for the dynamics of place. As visiting editor of Branford’s journal *Sociological Review*, Mumford published a series of articles on regionalism in which he argued that an empirical understanding of both the natural and man made environment is fundamental to the assessment of culture. Natural geographic patterns contribute to fundamental ecologies that shape culture, regardless of the level of sophistication (technological and economic) achieved. Mumford was primarily interested in *regional ecologies*; that is, in the technological and aesthetic principles that underlie a built environment and structure its relation to the surrounding natural region. At the same time, he reasoned along the lines of the Chicago School of sociology, that

the emphasis on place opens the need for social scientists, city officials, and planners to understand and support the *social ecologies* of neighborhoods.

In one sense, Mumford's project was defined by a paradox: a modernist cosmopolitan who turned to the past for inspiration. His inclination toward landscape and community was in line with nineteenth century sociological observations of modernity as productive of anomie (Durkheim) and loss of organic community (Tönnies). But unlike cultural conservatives' attempt to locate an authoritative cultural voice based on memory and tradition, Mumford's interest in landscape and community was linked to a strong faith in technological modernization and modernity. Reexamining nineteenth century American intellectual and cultural life in books on architecture (*Sticks and Stones*, 1924) and literature (*The Golden Day*, 1926 and *Herman Melville*, 1929) inspired a number of successors in the soon to be created academic field of American studies and piqued interest in the antebellum New England writers. But his purpose was to find a "usable past" that could serve to remind the reader that history should not be seen as an inevitable progression to the present moment. It was meant, furthermore, to demonstrate that liberal capitalism had undermined an earlier America that Mumford now held up as a mirror to the faults of the liberal capitalist order: environmental rapacity, lack of social solidarity, dismissal of the intellectual and cultural life, and lack of creativity.

Mumford was not particularly interested in socialism or social democracy as an alternative, though he certainly accepted the idea of the positive state and, during the 1930s, even flirted with notions of centralized economic planning. He advocated the use of state power in the late 1930s, arguing forcefully for early American entry into World War II, even though it certainly contributed to the build up of the American military power which he later denounced. His imagined syntheses between community and innovative technology, natural landscape and modernist architecture, were along the lines of Henri Bergson's notion of a technically inspired unity with nature. To the contemporary reader, Mumford's images of gleaming machines in verdant settings in *Technics and Civilization* (1934) can feel flat and

overdetermined. Yet Mumford was also practical, pragmatic, democratic, and tough minded, and the naïveté implied in his treatment of technology in the 1930s was clearly corrected in his two volume work *The Myth of the Machine* (1966, 1970). His thesis is the detachment of technology from human purpose. Both the "megamachine" – great and terrible technologies of production and destruction – and the "pentagon," the symbol of the "fortress of power," began in the quest for predictability, order, and control, but quickly descended into a pursuit of the one human value capable of subverting all others: power. What is frightening about certain machines is not the mechanism itself. At root, Mumford argues, the machine is human. Its origin is bureaucratic and organizational: the "mechanisms" of "organized work" (forced labor) and "organized destruction" (war). Alternatively, machines can be designed to preserve and extend human values – technologies compatible with humanistic objectives: the full development of the human personality and the establishment of a satisfying community life.

Early on Mumford decided that reworking urbanization was the key to change. The ongoing transportation and communication revolution was transforming the city from the inside out, placing a premium on mobility and access, and calling central place theory into question. In part, Mumford saw this as an encouraging development: it undermined the centralized and hierarchical order that had structured western urban life. In addition, society had become more fluid as the consequence of the multiplication of social networks. It was in this combination of fluidity and spatial diffusion that Mumford saw the promise of a new democratic regional order. Working with a small group of visionaries who dubbed themselves the Regional Planning Association of America, Mumford launched a verbal assault on conurbation while arguing that the movement of population, industry, and commerce out of the metropolitan centers (what we now call the edge city or more simply, sprawl) might still find an appropriate form: a decentralized multi modal urban pattern. Careful attention to the natural ecology of the region became a key component in the planning and development of what might be called a regional metropolis. Town planning should develop a principled

program of decentralization that could permit the amorphous strivings of post metropolitan society to find its own characteristic form and purpose. The resulting landscape would preserve significant natural features and functions and shape healthy urban centers – of varying sizes – within the urban region as a whole.

By the 1960s the real world effects of urban diffusion looked positively sinister to Mumford. He had always complained about overdevelopment of the urban core. High densities brought over crowding that made the preservation or creation of adequate public spaces difficult. Inhuman housing projects that warehoused people in massive towers were symptomatic of an architecture that had forgotten about the importance of human scale. Mumford was not against tall buildings per se, but he argued that they should not be permitted to form a dense and relentless mass of concrete and steel. The construction of a massive network of superhighways had added other problems. The highways tore up the fabric of urban life as they encouraged abandonment of the city. Yet overdevelopment of the metropolitan core had not ceased. Instead, the historic urban core continued its march toward overspecialization of function, becoming a “city” of office buildings – a tendency now conjoined with the abandonment of significant historic buildings and spaces. In the rush to accommodate a society moving steadily toward the goal of an automobile for every resident of driving age, a “parking lot city” was being created. It is a city given over to the habit of “space eating” and it marked, Mumford feared, the beginning of the end of urbanity – of pedestrian orientation, mixed use spaces, and human scale.

Democratization of the workings of the civil society was a theme of the 1960s and 1970s, and it was one that Mumford had long endorsed. But when the rising urban critic Jane Jacobs argued that ordinary people living in urban neighborhoods should be the sovereign planners of their own future, Mumford rebuked her. He refused to repudiate the traditional spheres of professional design and technical expertise that comprise what he meant by town planning, and he argued that neither neighborhood planning nor historic preservation alone or in combination could possibly address the coming ecological crisis of the edge city.

Mumford died in 1990 in Amenia, New York, at the beginning of a decade that saw a massive revival of interest in his work.

SEE ALSO: Built Environment; Chicago School; Ecological Models of Urban Form: Concentric Zone Model, the Sector Model, and the Multiple Nuclei Model; Environment and Urbanization; Evolution; Exurbia; Urban Ecology; Urban Renewal and Redevelopment

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museums

John Dorst

In its modern application, the term “museum” has become the umbrella for a bewildering array of institutions. At a minimum, these

institutions share the functions of preserving and putting on display cultural goods deemed by some social group to be especially valuable, noteworthy, representative, unique, or other wise deserving of public attention. Beyond this basic commonality, it is difficult to generalize about cultural institutions that range from comprehensive, flagship organizations addressing the arts, the sciences, and history (e.g., the Metropolitan Museum of Art, the Smithsonian museums) to local collections of memorabilia and oddities from nature that, in some cases, closely resemble the premodern cabinets of curiosity frequently cited as one point of departure for what we think of today as museums. Between these extremes lies a seemingly endless array of general or specialized, meagerly or opulently supported, fully or barely professionalized, well known or obscure institutions devoted to collecting and displaying cultural goods.

The American Association of Museums, the field's principal professional organization in the United States, estimates there are over 16,000 museums in the US alone, a number that includes zoos, aquariums, and botanical gardens. Taken together, these institutions account for more than 850 million individual museum visits per year. An Association survey conducted between 2000 and 2002 revealed that more than a billion dollars are expended annually, solely to care for the estimated 750 million objects and living specimens in the varied collections of American museums. Comparable statistics from Europe confirm that great density of museums and widespread museum going may fairly be taken as signature features of the industrialized first world. The level of a country's or a region's museum "saturation" provides a meaningful index to its degree of integration into global economic and cultural systems.

In broadest conception, museums have affinity with other cultural institutions devoted mainly to non commercial, intellectual enterprises, notably libraries, archives, and universities. For many museums, education and research are as important as collection and display. Indeed "museum," in its literal meaning of "seat of the muses" (*mouσειον*), was the name of a particular university building in ancient Alexandria. According to the Oxford English Dictionary, by the seventeenth century the

word's generalized application in English was to buildings or apartments "dedicated to the pursuit of learning or the arts." The British Museum continues to exemplify the close historical connection between the collection and display of artifacts and the production of texts and ideas.

Although one may point to some eighteenth and early nineteenth century precursors, such as the Peale Museum in Philadelphia, the basic principles and structures of modern museology took shape mainly over the last third of the nineteenth century. Above all, the spirit of scientific rationality, with its emphasis on taxonomic and sequential ordering, informed the public museums established in this period, no less so those focused on art than on the sciences. The emergence of the discipline based comprehensive university is an analogous and closely related cultural development. Unlike the university or the archive, however, the museum makes visual experience, or more specifically, the sequential, transitory perusal of objects, images, and designed displays, the primary vehicle for educating and edifying the public. Thus the modern museum, despite its elite associations and scientific foundations, also has affinity with popular forms of display and spectacle – fairs, arcades, circus sideshows and theme parks, to name a few.

It has also been widely observed that the appearance of the modern museum is roughly contemporary with, and in various ways connected to, the creation of the department store. Though the latter is explicitly commercial and the former non profit, these institutions offer very similar kinds of experience, notably, feelings of wonder and enticement generated through visual encounter with compelling objects and attractive displays. That the refinement of public taste and the cultivation of bourgeois sensibility were among the avowed goals of early museums places them squarely in the context of emerging consumer capitalism in the nineteenth century (Leach 1993).

Recent developments in the museum world seem especially explicit reflections of consumer culture's pervasive presence. For example, the "blockbuster" exhibition and the explosion of museum merchandising through greatly expanded museum shops, catalogue sales, and online marketing bespeak a well established

trend toward commodification of museum artifacts, images, and experiences. The many forms of revenue generating reproduction deployed by museums make them virtual laboratories of the advanced consumer social order. Walter Benjamin's famous essay, "The Work of Art in the Age of Mechanical Reproduction" (1936), is the *locus classicus* for theoretical reflection on these issues.

If processes of reproduction make museum goods available as a class of commodity, an even more complex and subtle commodification may be seen in the increasingly pervasive *museumization* of mundane social experience. The trend in recent years toward more "interactive" interactive strategies – hands on exhibits in science museums and personal encounters with historical figures at living history museums, for example – strives to break down the boundary between the institutional space of display and the personal space of the visitor. Less self-conscious but more subtly revealing of modern social life is the complementary process through which many people transform private spaces into museum like environments. The more or less formal display in homes of personal collections, often accompanied by highly developed connoisseurship, is the most obvious example here. One also increasingly finds such things as the domestic display of animal trophies not as heads on the wall but as diorama like natural history exhibits and the reproduction of historical periods in the form of room decor and furnishings (Dorst 1989). Such museumizing of the private sphere, while especially intense and socially dispersed in advanced capitalism, is hardly a creation of the present age. The Victorian era already saw such processes at work, at least among elites. Whatever their other functions, museums, past and present, have educated the public in the protocols of such consumer culture display.

There has emerged recently a branch of cultural studies devoted to the critical examination of museums as components of the culture industry, having important agency in the reproduction of ideologies and the construction of social identities. The "museum studies" movement addresses such issues as the politics of exhibitions, the formation of audiences, and the discursive patterns of museum display. Attention to historical contexts also characterizes this

scholarly trend, which views museums in relation to the other "disciplinary" institutions of modernity. Among the many promising future directions in this field is the analysis of global flows in goods, images, and people, as mass tourism, movements to repatriate artifacts and human remains, and proliferation of online "virtual museums" contribute to an unprecedented expansion of museum related experience around the world.

The museum and art worlds are currently engaged in reflexive self examination analogous to that found in academe. Often marked by a tone of playful irony, a growing number of individual works and whole exhibitions self-consciously call attention to the nature of museum objects, displays, and implicit gallery "narratives." One of the most complete examples of this trend, the wry Museum of Jurassic Technology in Culver City, California, presents in the sober guise of authoritative museum discourse exhibits on subjects that play along the edges of plausibility, passing in some cases into the blatantly fantastic. The museum going experience is purposely defamiliarized, and the whole institution takes on the quality of a reflexive work of art (Weschler 1995).

SEE ALSO: Consumption, Tourism and; Cultural Studies; Department Store; Popular Culture Forms

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music

Richard A. Peterson

Music has been a focus of sociological inquiry since the earliest days of the discipline. Max Weber, for example, used the development of the system of musical notation as a prime illustration of the increasing rationalization of European society. Nevertheless, music has not become the locus of a distinctive fundamental approach in sociology as have topics like socialization, deviance, and the like. While no musical sociology has developed, and there is no comprehensive text on the sociology of music, numerous aspects of music making and appreciation have been the substantive research site for addressing central questions in sociology. Five ongoing research concerns can be identified.

First, sociologists have been concerned with the relationship between *society and culture*. What began as an attempt to link distinct types of societies with distinct kinds of music has become an effort to identify specific links (e.g., the circumstances of a nation's founding and its national anthem, or the construction of "Englishness" in contemporary British pop music). Other contemporary studies exploring the society–music link focus on the globalization of music culture. They show the resilience of local forms of musical expression in spite of media globalization.

Second, there have been many studies of specific *art worlds* or *scenes* where music makers, managers, devoted fans, and tourists congregate around a kind of music and its subculture. The perspective focuses on the interaction of individuals and groups in making and appreciating music. There have been studies of hip hop scenes as well as scenes built around jazz, blues, goth, classical music, women's music, punk, dance music, and music recording in places like Los Angeles, Bombay, and Nashville.

Recent studies have explored the role of the Internet in shaping music scenes.

Third, studies have focused on the *organizations and infrastructure* that support distinctive music fields. This is of special interest because the process of music production influences the content of the music created. Three general sorts of practices can be identified. The forms of *popular music* are shaped by the commercial nexus that dictates an oligopoly of a few multinational companies, a rapid succession of hits, and attempts to shape mass consumer tastes. This structure is under threat from the effects of digital technology in music production and distribution. In sharp contrast with the mass market pop field, diverse *niche markets* foster a vast array of kinds of musics. Due largely to digitalization and their do it yourself mode of organization, they can thrive outside the realm of the oligopolies. Finally, *art music* forms the third way of organizing music fields. Here the criterion of success is critical acclaim, service to dedicated patrons, and the ability to garner private, government, and corporate patronage sufficient to make possible training, composition, and performance. Classical music, opera, and increasingly jazz fit this model.

Fourth, music is used in all known societies as a means of expressing *identity* and *marking boundaries between groups*, and a number of authors have shown the place of music in social class and status displays. Also, music is gendered in many ways. Men are more likely to be producers. Women are often demeaned in the lyrics of rock, rap, and heavy metal, but they are characterized as strong in country music lyrics. Numerous studies since the "jazz age" of the 1920s have explored issues of racism in the meanings ascribed to music and its creators. And music has been one of the primary ways that generations are defined and define themselves. In the 1990s, for example, one slogan of the young was "If it's 'too loud,' you're too old."

Fifth, there are studies on *how music affects people*. Adults have tended to equate the music of young people with deviant behavior. Jazz, swing, rock, punk, disco, heavy metal, and rap, in turn, have been seen as the cause of juvenile delinquency, drug taking, and overt sexuality. Researchers have made analyses of song lyrics on the often unwarranted assumption that one can tell the meaning a song has for its fans by

simply interrogating lyrics (Frith 1996). Music has also been an integral part of most social movements, as has been shown by studies such as that of Eyerman and Jamison (1998).

SEE ALSO: Art Worlds; Consumption of Music; Content Analysis; Culture, Production of; Deviance; Institution; Music and Media; Music and Social Movements; Race; Race (Racism); Social Movements

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music and media

Christopher J. Schneider

Popular music is a basic part of culture in the United States and much of the world. Music in the broadest sense is not clearly definable.

When considering the significance and impact of the media in the modern world, developing a concrete definition becomes more problematic. Definitional concerns are most apparent when music is discussed or thought of in a “universal sense” (music as the universal language). Nevertheless, music can be generally understood as the human temporal organization of sounds that differentiates such sounds from noise, speech, and so on. Modern developments that accompany changes in the ways in which music is produced and consumed can be attributed directly to the media. Generally, use of the term media refers to the ability to disseminate information to a wide variety of people. For centuries this process was accomplished exclusively through the circulation of printed materials, most notably newspapers; however, more recently this also includes radio, television, and the Internet.

Music has been studied under the auspices of musicology (the historical and scientific study of music), ethnomusicology (the study of music as culture), and the general social sciences. The sociological study of music has been a subject of inquiry for the better part of a century. Sociological work that addresses some of the ways meaning is conveyed through music has yielded key insights into the ways in which we understand music production and consumption as an important social activity. Max Weber’s classic work, *The Rational and Social Foundations of Music* (1958), remains among the most prolific and largely overlooked sociological pieces concerning music. Other sociological works by Alfred Schütz (1951), Theodor Adorno (1973, 1976), and Howard Becker (1951, 1974) are equally noteworthy.

In general, these works operate on the basic assumption that music acts not only as a form of expression, but also as an important and socially significant realm of symbolic communication. When considering the ways in which meaning is produced and reproduced through music, it then becomes imperative to consider the subtle contextual and more blatant ways the logic employed by the media contributes to this process (Altheide & Snow 1979). The media have taken on a role in the twenty first century unseen in any previous historical epoch. Under standing then the dominant, if not hegemonic, role of contemporary media, the association of

music with these media, how this process might change or alter existent music, and how music is now produced, consumed, and subsequently interpreted remains for the most part an area of emerging scholarship.

There are very few places in industrialized nations that have not been affected by prerecorded (recorded) music. Initially, the ability to disseminate music to large audiences can be directly attributed to the advent of the radio. In the western world, recorded music has quickly developed into an integral component of both our personal and public lives. It is present in our homes, cars, workplaces, shopping malls, movie theaters, and even in prisons. The pervasiveness of recorded music in our everyday lives cannot be overstated. It is not uncommon, for instance, that we make a conscious effort in seeking out (absent of music or sound) a place of peace and quiet. The most significant historical developments to establish the current inextricable linkage between music and media concern the invention of recorded sound and the development of radio technology.

MUSIC AND THE DEVELOPMENT OF MODERN MEDIA (RECORDED SOUND AND THE RADIO)

Prior to the development of recorded sound, music was enjoyed live and always transmitted through human agency. The history of the development of recorded sound can be traced to the 1850s. However, it was not until the invention of the phonograph (a device for recording and replaying sound) by Thomas Edison in 1877 that a noticeable market ensued. The invention of the phonograph paved the way for the development of the modern era of recorded music media and remained a market stronghold for nearly 100 years. In the United States, early recordings were played on a phonographic cylinder, but were soon phased out with the introduction of disc records. Phonographic discs (records) were easier and less expensive to market and mass produce. Although, there was little if any fidelity distinction between the two recorded media, market forces can nonetheless be attributed to the subsequent rise and fall of the phonographic cylinder. With the development of the radio, recorded sound (one of the

great marvels of the early twentieth century) expanded well beyond the phonograph.

The social impact of the radio and the technology to broadcast recorded music to the masses is simply immeasurable. The first radio waves were created in Germany just before the turn of the twentieth century and the first transatlantic tests were conducted in 1901 and 1902 (Hillard 1970). The ability to disseminate information (and later music) to larger audiences and the resultant excitement that ensued were bolstered in the early twentieth century by the advent of the radio, which thrust the emerging possibilities of broadcast media to insatiable heights. In 1907, Lee DeForest (considered by many as the founding father of radio) patented the vacuum tube, which would later be developed and used in early tube amplifiers. The first applications of this technology in the United States can be traced back to the American military. Use of the term "radio" is thought to have derived from US naval use of the term "radiotelegraph" rather than "wireless," whereby naval orders were then "broadcast" to the fleet (Hillard 1970).

According to the *Oxford English Dictionary*, people began to speak of "the media" in the United States in the 1920s, and around this time Dr. Frank Conrad (a Westinghouse engineer) is credited as the first person to broadcast music over the radio airwaves. Conrad, who operated an experimental radio station in Pittsburgh, caused a fury of excitement in 1919 when he used music rather than spoken words to test reception of his radio broadcast. In addition to receiving hundreds of letters of fan mail, a local department store began advertising Westinghouse crystal sets for sale to hear "Dr. Conrad's popular broadcasts" (Emery & Emery 1978: 394). Shortly thereafter, the first American radio stations that sought to gain a consistent listenership began emerging.

In the 1930s it was unusual to hear records on the radio because many radio stations had their own in house musicians and also because records were widely regarded as a sign of poverty (Gronow & Saunio 1998). Nevertheless, the popularity of the phonograph was booming and in 1929 (shortly before the stock market crash) the recording industry had sold nearly 150 million records in the United States. Just four years later in 1933, in the midst of the

Depression, sales had plummeted to 10 million (Gronow & Saunio 1998). Around this time, a copyright infringement movement forged by the American Society of Composers, authors, and various corporations publishing musical compositions emerged to outright ban the play of records on the radio based on rights conferred by the Copyright Act, which among other things granted the exclusive right to perform copyrighted musical compositions in public for profit. Imperative to the future of broadcasted music, the United States Supreme Court ruled on behalf of the stations (see *Gibbs v. Buck*, 307 US 66 (1939)).

Many credit Martin Block as the first radio disc jockey to regularly play records on the radio during his popular program "Make Believe Ballroom," where Block created the illusion that he was broadcasting from a live ballroom. The widespread popularity of the program prompted the station, WNEW in New York, to construct a simulated ballroom for his broadcasts. Block was among the most popular, imitated, and highest paid radio personalities on the air. The booming popularity of the radio and the introduction of the jukebox resulted in an increase of record sales (from the Depression era slump) and also characterized the initial shift of recorded music slowly working its way into the context of everyday life.

During the period of World War II (1941–5), widespread radio broadcasts had reached near epic proportions. However, the ways in which Americans listened to the radio would be fundamentally changed with the introduction and development of the FM (frequency modulation) radio. The FM frequency sought to draw listeners away from the standard AM (amplitude modulation) radio format. FM radio was capable of providing smaller towns with thousands of radio stations and thus a greater variety (FM radio frequency covers smaller areas, often with improved or better reception). The FM radio was slow to catch on and lagged in popularity during the 1950s. In 1960, there were 688 FM stations and this number had almost doubled to 1,270 in 1965. Just 12 years later, the number of FM radio stations would nearly triple to 3,743 (Emery & Emery 1978).

The dramatic increase in the popularity of the radio was met with an increase of the development of home audio systems marketed

generally as high fidelity (hi fi) as a broad reference to available audio equipment, most notably a record player or turntable, tube amplifiers, and loudspeakers. As a direct result of the war, recording technology was vastly improved and the introduction of tape recording and the LP (long play) record fueled the popularity of the hi fi industry. Until the late 1950s, however, the standard for hi fi consisted only of monophonic (mono) recordings that limited sound reproduction to one line of sound over a single channel. The introduction of stereophonic (stereo) records in 1958 expanded sound reproduction to dual channel, which reproduced sound more consistent with a natural listening experience. The record, although by contemporary standards obsolete, continues to remain popular among audiophiles and music enthusiasts alike and has enjoyed a recent resurgence with the ever increasing popularity of rap and hip hop music, which make extended use of this media (see Rose 1994).

MUSIC AND TELEVISION (THE SHIFT FROM AURAL TO VISUAL)

With the introduction of televisions into the consumer market in the 1950s, providing popular and attractive entertainment was imperative to the television networks' ability to attract the largest audience, and so to increase revenues through advertisements. Broadcast music had been widely successful on the radio and thus the format was maintained (in part) for television. The most notable and successful program to utilize an equivalent format was the Ed Sullivan Show. The Ed Sullivan Show ran on the Columbia Broadcasting System (CBS) (one of the three dominant networks at the time) every Sunday night from 1948 to 1971. All types of entertainment were featured on the show, including musical acts. As its popularity increased, watching the show soon became a staple of American life. The Ed Sullivan Show rose in popularity in the 1950s with the then controversial Elvis Presley performance in 1956, and its popularity culminated in the 1960s, highlighted by the four performances given by the Beatles and the controversy surrounding the Doors' performance in 1967. Many attribute to the Beatles performances on the Ed Sullivan

Show the start of what has been described in the US as the “British Invasion,” but more importantly credit these performances as the genesis of American modern popular culture.

In the 1970s, the music industry stagnated. The breakup of the Beatles in 1970 and the cancellation of the Ed Sullivan Show in 1971 surely contributed to this. Moreover, conventional radio programming, although still largely popular, was beginning to be eclipsed by other forms of entertainment. Popular television sitcoms, technological advances in television quality, and the affordability of color television sets partially accounted for this. The music industry needed resurgence. The development of cable television in the late 1970s and the introduction of Music Television (MTV) in the early 1980s would not only resurrect the depressed music industry, but also catapult it to unimaginable heights.

MTV was created in August of 1981 with financial support of the Warner Amex Satellite Entertainment Company (WASEC). In 1981, MTV was first broadcast locally and sparsely in the New York City area. With the introduction of cable television, MTV expanded nationally and broke into the two major music markets (New York City and Los Angeles) in January of 1983. The creators of MTV relied heavily upon radio as their model. The early MTV format consisted merely of a reflection of Top 40 music (with a particular allegiance to rock music) and was marketed toward the generation of post war baby boomers. Oddly enough, the Top 40 radio format (referring to the list of the 40 best selling singles), many suggest, was initially created to draw back listeners from the subsequent audience shifts from radio to television. Music videos that initially aired on MTV often consisted of sparse concert footage mixed with promotional music video clips. However, as the popularity of MTV soared, the recording industry soon realized the commercial potential and funded the production of more elaborate music clips by hiring well known directors for the purpose of producing and creating music videos.

With newfound popularity, MTV soon became the leading commissioner (trumping the traditional radio outlet) of forthcoming talent. Aside from a few shortcomings in the mid 1980s, the popularity of the MTV format

grew steadily throughout the duration of the decade. Several artists such as Madonna saw what could have otherwise been lackluster careers skyrocket due to the exposure MTV accorded. MTV spinoffs soon followed, one of the more popular of these being Video Hits 1 (VH1), which was marketed toward an older age cohort. The 1990s saw a different MTV, one with much less music and more programming. In an effort to recapture their initial demographic, MTV2 was introduced on MTV’s fifteenth anniversary as an all music channel (much like the MTV of old). Various format changes have accompanied MTV2 throughout its tenure (including the elimination of strictly music videos) and currently MTV2 much resembles its parent station, MTV. Although MTV no longer dedicates itself to the exclusive format of music videos, the indelible earmark that MTV continues to leave on popular culture, and the way music is marketed, produced, and consumed, is simply astounding.

MUSIC AND CONTEMPORARY MEDIA: THE DIGITAL ERA (COMPACT DISC AND MP3)

In between the record and the compact disc (CD) there were two basic forms of music media available to the public, and both were relatively short lived: the 8 track and audiocassettes (both magnetic audio storage cartridges). The 8 track, initially introduced in the 1950s, sold moderately, remained largely unpopular, and by the 1970s had been swept into the dustbin of history. The audiocassette (the first media capable of recording and rerecording music) was introduced nearly a decade after the initial introduction of the 8 track and was a popular alternative to records. The popularity of the audiocassette grew steadily during the late 1970s and culminated in the 1980s with the introduction of the Sony Walkman, the first and widely marketed personal and portable music playing device. With the introduction of the CD, these two formats have been nearly erased from existence in popular culture.

The CD was first marketed in the United States in 1984. The following year CD players were readily available. Compact discs were the

first available music media to store their contents digitally (rather than in analog format as previous music media had). The difference between the two media rests with high fidelity reproduction. Over time, and through prolonged use, analog recordings drastically wear down, thus compromising the quality of the music. Digital recordings, on the other hand, sound exactly the same every single time, no matter how many times the recording is played. As a selling point, this distinction was crucial during the transition from records and cassettes (both analog) to compact discs (digital). Overall, growth in the music industry slowed during the early 1990s; however, profit margins increased because CDs were on the average \$4 to \$6 more expensive than records. Moreover, with great success, the recording industry repackaged and aggressively marketed digitally “cleaned” versions of records (wear and tear on records caused them to produce “pop” and “scratch” noises).

The next and most recent phase in digital music media rests with the introduction and development of the MPEG 1 Audio Layer 3 (MP3). The MP3 was designed to reduce the amount of data needed to reproduce audio. The MP3 is a digitally compressed music file and was first developed in Germany in the early 1990s. The technical process by which the digital data file is minimized, when compared to CD, compromises the quality of the music (to reduce the file size certain elements of the composition must be eliminated, most of which are not distinguishable by the human ear). Because of its size and potential for accessibility via Internet technology, the MP3 invigorated the possibility for expansion toward unprecedented consumer access of recorded music, although due to regulation issues this was initially vehemently opposed by the recording industry.

In the United States, the arrival of the Internet occurred sometime between 1993 and 1995. The media popularized the Internet by promoting its ability to foster economic opportunities for both entrepreneurs and corporations. Storage of MP3s on home computers coupled with the rise of the Internet made it very simple to “share” music with others through such media as email, but most notably through “peer to peer” networks. In 1999, Shawn Fanning introduced Napster, a peer to peer

file sharing network that facilitated the capability to share music files (copyrighted or otherwise) globally, with little if any restraint. Napster was subsequently sued by the recording industry for copyright infringement leading to its eventual restructuring (see *A&M Records, Inc. v. Napster, Inc.*, 239 F.3d 1004 (9th Cir., 2001)). This injunction, however, spawned a multitude of unauthorized peer to peer file sharing networks.

Resultant technological advancements coupled in part with the Internet’s ability to quickly deliver these media heralded the development of digital audio (MP3) players. The world’s first mass produced MP3 players were introduced in 1998. These early devices were quickly met with litigation from the Recording Industry Association of America (RIAA) (see *Recording Industry Association of America v. Diamond Multimedia Systems, Inc.*, 180 F.3d 1072 (9th Cir., 1999)). Due to rapid advancements in technology these older devices, now primitive by today’s standards, were noticeably larger and heavier and, although portable, were often too large to even fit into one’s pocket (they were usually clipped to a belt).

Currently the most popular and dominant portable digital audio player is the iPod. Developed and marketed by Apple Computers, the first generation iPod model (originally only compatible with Apple Macintosh computers with a capacity to hold approximately 1,000 MP3 files) was introduced late in 2001. The interface of the iPod is designed around a user friendly scroll wheel that provides easy access to the data stored on the device. The iPod is designed to work with Apple’s iTunes software, which allows users to store and “manage” their music libraries on their home computers.

The iPod continues to dominate the market share of portable MP3 players through subsequent release of new multimedia “generations” of iPods, with each model significantly upgraded. These updated versions of the iPod can now hold vast amounts of data (some models allow the capacity to hold as many as 15,000 MP3 files), digital photographs, and digital videos, and can store other data such as word processing documents (serving as a portable hard drive) and in some instances even act as a personal digital assistant (PDA) device.

The music industry is currently struggling to cope with these emergent technologies because it cannot yet regulate with any fixed authority the copying and unauthorized distribution of copyrighted music. It seems certain that the recording industries' adjustment to these emerging technologies will certainly direct the future of music media.

SEE ALSO: Consumption of Music; Hegemony and the Media; Media; Music; Music and Social Movements; Popular Culture Forms (Hip Hop; Jazz; Rock 'n' Roll)

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music and social movements

Ron Eyerman

In academic discussions, social movements and music have rarely been conceptualized together, while in actual practice the two have always been linked. Music has been important to social movements as an organizing tool: drawing individuals to participate in movement-related activities, it has served as a source of courage and strength in trying situations, and has helped create the sense of collectivity, of moving together, that is so vital to any form of collective action.

Social movements are more than organizations and it takes more than effective leadership to gather, motivate, and move collections of individuals in what is often risky activity. Music has provided an important resource in this process of mobilizing individuals to collective action. It has been central to the building of collective identities and a powerful resource in building and maintaining group awareness and solidarity. Music has been used as a recruiting tool to help draw sympathizers among the curious into the fold and has been a source of strength in trying situations or of solace in defeat. Collective singing has helped striking peasants stand up to armed cavalry, helped create "workers" out of working individuals, and helped students withstand the blows of police batons. Beyond organization and mobilization, social movements create spaces not only for collective action, but also provide alternative social spaces, arenas in which to raise consciousness, promote critical reflection; they are in other words incubators of social and cultural creativity. The interplay between social movement and music can help alter aesthetic values, as well as political values. Social movements have inspired musicians and other artists to creative acts and to political action. One can make a case that social movements often challenge and change aesthetic, as much as political, values in a society.

With an emphasis on mobilizing resources, Denisoff (1971) and Pratt (1990) provide insight into the roles of singers and songs in

social movements, giving to each social functions and roles. Music as a resource for social action is also a central part of Bourdieu's social theory. Bourdieu (1984) discusses music and art as resources, forms of symbolic capital, useful in attaining social position in the realm of production and social distinction in the realm of consumption. Within British cultural studies, Hebdige (1979) and Gilroy (1993) have shown how subcultures have used music as central resources in resisting societal demands for conformity and integration. Eyerman and Jamison (1998) have explored how songs can act as a cultural resource for collective action, identity, and memory, a device to learn values and goals of a movement, or as an expression of protest. Roscigno and Danaher (2004) explore how music and local radio served to unify striking textile workers in the American South.

If we ask how social movements move individuals to collective action, we understand the significance of music and of expressive and representative culture to social movements. As part of a specific movement culture, music helps shape the structures of feeling that are part of what being in movement means. Music is often used as a resource in recruitment, in shaping a sense of collective identity and mission, and as a source of strength and courage in threatening situations. Music is also a form of communication and knowledge, providing an alternative to established mass media. It can unite a local community and help link an imagined one.

At another level, social movements, like music, can also be usefully studied as performances. While it is common to view movements as events, organizations, and even as texts, social movements can be viewed as forms of acting in public – political performances which involve representation in dramatic form. As political performance, social movements engage the emotions of those inside and outside their bounds, expressing and communicating a message of protest. They are meant to evoke as well as provoke. Music is often part of this performance, and thus expressive of the movement itself, a form of exemplary action rather than an instrument or resource for something else.

Professional musicians have offered their creative performances to support social movements. During the American Civil Rights Movement of the 1950s and 1960s performing

artists offered their services to promote movement aims, lending their prestige through public appearances and giving benefit concerts (e.g., the gospel singer Mahalia Jackson and more popular singers like Harry Belafonte and Ray Charles) (Ward 1998). Singing groups emerged from the ranks of movements, like the Freedom Singers, some of whom went on to professional careers. At the same time, social movements have offered amateurs and professionals new sources of inspiration and new audiences. Musical genres have survived and been revitalized through social movements, like folk singing and song in the US. By mobilizing and recombining musical traditions, the movements of the 1950s and 1960s made important contributions to fundamental processes of cultural transformation. Traditional as well as newly written topical songs were performed at political demonstrations and festivals that helped provide a collective identity which was at the core of social movements. Topical songs and so called freedom songs were central to these movements.

The relation between social movements and music can also be seen to have altered the popular culture of American society, as well as the careers of the performers. Music and popular culture generally may also have influenced participation in or affected sympathy for social movements. Ward (1998) argues that white youths listening to black radio stations may have predisposed them for a more sympathetic attitude toward the aspirations of the Civil Rights Movement. It may also have helped move them toward more active participation.

Nationalist movements have used traditional musical forms to raise emotions and to ground claims of national origin and identification. These need not necessarily be indigenous forms of traditional music. Ramos Zayas (2003) has shown how urban Puerto Rican youth in Chicago draw on hip hop and rap music in their attempts to raise a nationalist consciousness. Music embodies tradition through the ritual of performance. It can empower and help create collective identity and a sense of movement in an emotional and almost physical sense. This is a force which is central to the idea and practice of a social movement. Singing a song like "We Shall Overcome" at a political demonstration is a ritual event, as is singing "Solidarity Forever" or the

“International” at trade union meetings or the singing of a national anthem or other patriotic songs at a nationalist rally. Such preordained ceremonies serve to reunite and to remind participants of their place in a collective and also to locate them within a longstanding tradition of struggle and protest, or, as in the case of a national anthem, a tradition of national identity. Such songs can also have a wider and more multidimensional appeal. Songs from the Irish Rebellion in the early part of the twentieth century still resonate with audiences today, both as forms of collective memory and, more generally, as powerful musical performance.

SEE ALSO: Bourdieu, Pierre; Music; Music and Media; Popular Culture Forms (Hip Hop); Social Movements

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myth

Leslie Wasson

A myth is a story that has a parallel structure linking the past to the present and suggesting directions for the future. A myth may be a cautionary tale, as in the urban myths that teenagers tell about the dangers inherent in

parking on dark side roads. A myth may also be a moral tale, as in morality plays and bed time stories. Myths also may be about idealized behavioral standards, as in hero myths. As a sociological term, however, the primary use of the word myth has been rather casual. Sociological writers are likely to refer to the “myth” of masculinity (Pleck 1981), the “myth” of self esteem (Hewitt 1998) or the “myth” of the mommy role (Douglas & Michaels 2006). This use of the term imputes a less than factual status to the topic of reference and calls into question the veracity of others’ accounts and theories. However, sociology currently lacks a clear concept of myth such as is found in anthropology or cultural studies.

Comparative evolutionary anthropology, of which Frazer’s *The Golden Bough* (1890) is perhaps the most recognized example, links contemporary myths to primitive rituals in the search for meaning through mystical experiences. This set of comparative principles was developed by T. S. Eliot in both his poetic work and in his 1923 article “*Ulysses, Order, and Myth*.” Later, in 1966, Vickery suggested that an interdisciplinary examination of the larger patterns of myth making was more effective than analyses of single texts. This “myth criticism” enjoyed great academic and popular success, propelled in part by Campbell’s 1949 work, *Hero with a Thousand Faces*.

A more modern structural approach to the anthropology of myth derives primarily from the work of Lévi Strauss (1995), in which he reexamines the dismissive attitude of western cultures toward the myths (cultural narratives) of non industrial societies and suggests the valuable purpose of myth in human culture and history. Myth, according to Lévi Strauss, allows anthropology to understand the underlying structure of a culture by examining linguistic elements and their relations to one another. Lévi Strauss locates the modern use of the term myth in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries with the development of science as a category of logical endeavor separate from the messy everyday world of the making of common sense from our perceptions of reality. He also suggests that science will progressively broaden its purview to incorporate many problems previously considered outside its territory, such as myths, which appear

the world over, yet in different forms in each culture.

Myth is a form of meaning making that seems ideal for sociologists, yet few have risen to the challenge of studying its processes. Durkheim (2001) begins to develop a sociological concept of myth. However, its energetic pursuit by anthropologists may have resulted in its being abandoned as a boundary setting maneuver by sociologists. One direction for contemporary sociologists seeking to investigate a sociological construct of myth might be the work of Barthes (1972), in which he uses the narrative of myth making to explain sense making of everyday lives and experiences. Also, although they do not employ the term myth, Holstein and Gubrium (2000) describe a narrative self that relies on its reflexive yet socially embedded story for temporal structure and continuity. Readers seeking an empirical use of the term myth might seek out the literature on rape myths reviewed by Lonsway (1995).

SEE ALSO: Critical Theory/Frankfurt School; Culture; Durkheim, Émile; Mythogenesis; Narrative; Postmodernism

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mythogenesis

Richard Slotkin

Myths are stories drawn from a society's history, which have acquired through persistent usage the power of symbolizing that society's ideology, and explicating the meaning and direction of its history. A society's mythology is, in effect, its memory system. Myths usually develop around cultural crises or moments of collective shock or trauma, when events challenge the belief system on which the society has hitherto operated. The most durable myths develop around issues or problems that are fundamental to the society's organization and persistent in its history: for example, the problem of kingship and succession in premodern societies, and the tensions between individual rights and social authority in modern nation states.

As a society experiences the stress of events, its cultural leadership recalls and deploys mythologized "memories" of the past as precedents for understanding and responding to contemporary crises. Over time, through frequent retellings and deployments as a source of interpretive meta-phors, the original mythic story is increasingly conventionalized and abstracted, until it is reduced to a deeply encoded and resonant set of symbols, "icons," "keywords," or historical clichés. In this form, myth becomes a basic constituent of linguistic meaning and of the processes of both personal and social "remembering." Each of these mythic icons is in effect a poetic construction of tremendous economy

and compression, and a mnemonic device capable of evoking a complex system of historical associations by a single image or phrase. For an American, allusions to “the Frontier,” or to events like “Pearl Harbor,” “The Alamo,” or “Custer’s Last Stand,” evoke our implicit understanding of the entire historical scenario that belongs to the event, and of the complex interpretive tradition that has developed around it.

This kind of mythology is of a different order from the cosmogonic mythologies that inform the religious worldview of tribal cultures and religions; different too from the archetypal mythologies linked to psychological development in Jungian theory – although social myths necessarily draw on religious mythology, and resonate with personal and group psychology. The myths being discussed here are historical fables that have a special function in human societies, and especially in modern nation states. As such they are an important source for the study of cultural history, and an analysis of the form and content of political rhetoric.

Myth expresses a society’s ideology in the form of a symbolic narrative, rather than in a discursive or argumentative form. Its language is metaphorical and suggestive rather than logical and analytical. The movement of a mythic narrative, like that of any story, implies a theory of cause and effect, and therefore a theory of history (or even of cosmology); but these ideas are offered in a form that disarms critical analysis by its appeal to the structures and traditions of storytelling and the clichés of historical memory. Although myths are the product of human thought and labor, their identification with venerable tradition makes them appear to be products of “nature” rather than history – expressions of a transhistorical consciousness or of some form of “Natural Law.”

Myths are formulated as ways of explaining problems that arise in the course of historical experience. The most important and longest lived of these formulations develop around areas of concern that persist over long periods of time. But no myth/ideological system, however internally consistent and harmonious, is proof against all historical contingencies. Sooner or later the bad harvest, the plague, defeat in war, changes in modes of production,

internal imbalances in the distribution of wealth and power produce a crisis which cannot be fully explained or controlled by invoking the received wisdom embodied in myth. At such moments of cognitive dissonance or “discontent,” the identification of ideological principles with the narratives of myth may be disrupted; a more or less deliberate and systematic attempt may be made to analyze and revise the intellectual/moral content of the underlying ideology. But in the end, as the historical experience of crisis is memorialized and abstracted, the revised ideology acquires its own mythology, typically blending old formulas with new ideas or concerns.

This approach to the formation and evolution of social myth emphasizes the role of historical and social contingency, and the activity of human culture producers or “authors” in creating and modifying the various forms of cultural expression that serve as vehicles of myth. It is distinctly different from theories which treat significant cultural expressions as the products of an autonomous (or semi autonomous) mental activity, in which a linguistic or psychological program of some sort – a “collective unconscious” or “grammar” of tropes or archetypes – determines the structure of all myth/ideological expression.

Myths are cultural clichés, stories whose patterns we recognize instantly. They function socially through a more or less spontaneous process of pattern recognition, which leads people to deploy a myth in response to a crisis. It is this recognition factor that makes mythic associations effective. They offer a reading of a crisis that is familiar, and therefore wins a credulous rather than a skeptical response. If the analogy between mythic pattern and real world event proves apt, we will be inclined to treat the new phenomenon as a recurrence of the old; to the extent that the new phenomenon differs from the remembered one, our sense of the possibilities of experience will be extended. If symbol and experience match closely enough, our belief in the validity and usefulness of the symbol will be confirmed; if the match is disappointing, we will be forced to choose between denying the importance of the new experience, or revising our symbolic vocabulary. As the course of experience confirms or

discredits its symbolism, the structure of mythology is continuously confirmed or subjected to revision.

The mythologization of history is common to all cultures, but is of critical importance to the development and maintenance of the modern nation state. Versions of this idea have been a commonplace in American studies at least since 1950; the recent work of Anthony Smith, Benedict Anderson, Étienne Balibar, and Immanuel Wallerstein (among others) on the cultural origins and development of modern nations has given this idea a more rigorously theoretical formulation, and a broader comparative application. The nation state was a distinct innovation in human politics. It had no history, as such. The cultural and political elites who were the founders of most modern nations invented or reinvented their peoples' histories, revising the traditional chronicles of tribes, empires, and dynasties so that they would explain (and justify) the development of the nation.

Hence, nationalities are to a large extent "imagined communities" (as the anthropologist Benedict Anderson has called them) – or, in Balibar's phrase, "fictive ethnicities." No one is really "born American." People are born into the "organic" communities of family, clan, and tribe; they have to be taught to "imagine" themselves as American nationals. The teaching is done through organized public rituals, in schools provided (mostly) by the state, and by mass media organized to address a national public. That public is divided by differences of class, culture, provincial loyalties, religion, and interest. They are able to function as a national public because they have been taught to share certain basic values and beliefs – call these the "national ideology" or "consensus." But the base of this consensus is the belief that all elements of the public share a common "American" or other history; that we belong to a single society, continuous in time; that we, collectively, are heirs to a common past and so bear responsibility for a common future. As the term is used here, myths are the stories – true, untrue, half true – that effectively evoke that sense of nationality.

The mythology produced by mass or commercial media has a special role in the US

cultural system: it is the form of cultural production that addresses most directly the concerns of Americans as citizens of a nation state. The history of the development of the forms and institutions of commercial or "mass" popular culture is directly related to the development of a political ideology of American nationality, and to the creation of nationwide networks of production and distribution. The basic structures of this commercialized national culture were developed between the Revolution and the Civil War: the emergence of national parties; the development of a nationwide trade in books, magazines, and newspapers utilizing an ever expanding transportation network. Between the Civil War and the Great War the nascent "culture industries" took advantage of new technologies to meet the demands of an ever growing and increasingly polyglot culture, with varied and complex needs and tastes. By the 1920s this form of cultural production was fully industrialized, and had become so ubiquitous that it is fair to characterize it as the clearest expression of American "national culture": when one looks beyond the family, ethnic community, or workplace for symbols expressive of "American" identity, one finds the mythologies of the popular culture industry.

Since the concern of commercial media is to exploit as wide an audience as possible, their repertoire of genres in any period tends to be broad and various, covering a wide (though not all inclusive) range of themes, subjects, and public concerns. Within this structured marketplace of myths, the continuity and persistence of particular genres may be seen as keys to identifying the culture's deepest and most persistent concerns. Likewise, major breaks in the development of important genres may signal the presence of a significant crisis of cultural values and organization. The development of new genres, or the substantial modification of existing ones, can be read as a signal of active ideological concern, in which both the producers and consumers of mass media participate – producers as exploitative promulgators and "proprietors" of their mythic formulations, consumers as respondents capable of dismissing a given mythic formulation, or affiliating with it.

But one should not assume that the mythologies of mass media are a kind of modern

“folklore,” or that they constitute the totality of “American culture.” The productions of the cultural industries are indeed varied and ubiquitous – from the newspapers and mass entertainment to the textbooks that teach our children the authorized versions of American history and literature – but the authority of these “mass culture” productions has been and is offset by the influence of other forms of culture and expression that are genuinely “popular”: produced by and for specific cultural communities like the ethnic group, the family clan, a town, neighborhood or region, the work place or the street corner. Although few of these subcultural entities are now isolated from the influence of mass media, they are still capable of generating their own myths, and their own unique ways of interpreting the productions of the media. A Harlem or Little Italy, an Appalachian or Mississippi Delta county, a Hasidic or Mennonite community, a Rustbelt mill or mining town, to take US examples, have been and in many cases continue to be centers of exception or resistance to the formulations of the commercial culture industries; and their productions (particularly in music) affect the development of mass culture. Nonetheless, the symbols and values generated by mass culture have steadily infiltrated, transformed, and compromised the autonomy of “local” cultures. For that reason, it is useful to speak not only of “mass culture,” but also of the development of an “industrial popular culture,” whose artifacts are produced primarily by a commercial culture industry, but whose symbols become active constituents of a *popular* culture: i.e., the belief and value structures of a national audience or public.

SEE ALSO: Culture Industries; Culture, Production of; Ideology; Myth; Narrative; Popular Culture Icons (Myth of the American Frontier)

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N

narrative

Sam Binkley

A sociological interest in narrative has followed upon what is termed the post positive interpretive turn. With challenges to the presumed detachment and objectivity of social inquiry, skepticism about structural causality and quantification as shibboleths of sociological explanation, and with increasing demands for the foregrounding of the unique experiences and perspectives of actors themselves in accounts of social phenomena, the study of narrative has emerged as a key methodological and interpretive focus (Maines 1993). The “narrative turn” in sociological research has many precedents in the interpretive and qualitative traditions that preceded the institutionalization of sociology as a positive science in the post World War II period. Thomas and Znaniecki’s study *The Polish Peasant in Europe and America* and other classics of the Chicago School were celebrated works of interpretive research which highlighted the importance of narrative, though this tradition was largely marginalized with post war American sociology’s embrace of quantitative research and other positivistic methodologies.

A return to narrative in sociology began in the 1980s with such works as Mitchel’s *On Narrative* (1981) and Plummer’s *Documents of Life* (2001), which variously asserted the value of biographical and historical narrative from a range of interdisciplinary perspectives. Two decades later, reflections on narrative have provided openings for feminist and postmodernist engagements with the sociological tradition, primarily through the study of biographical life history.

Indeed, narrative has entered the sociological lexicon in at least two distinct ways. First,

narratives situate the self understandings and group affiliations of actors in the experienced time of action itself. Narratives explain actions through the specific linguistic conventions used by actors to make sense of, or tell stories about, their own choices and behaviors. Narrative explanations highlight the cultural frameworks surrounding behavior, while playing down various structural causal factors. Second, narrative is applied to the products of sociological researchers themselves, who (following Clifford Geertz’s assertion that all research accounts are equally the “fictions” of their authors’ creations) conceive of their own sociological studies in terms of their implicit rhetorical and narrative structures (Geertz 1973). Recent interest in the reflexivity of sociological inquiry as a textual rather than merely technical accomplishment has inspired ethnographic departures in the direction of “auto ethnography,” studies of human experience which interrogate the narrative and discursive conventions of their own construction (Clough 1998).

Moreover, studies of narratives have become useful in the study of identity formation in the context of contemporary society. Anthony Giddens (1991) has described identity as a fundamentally narrative production, a “reflexive project of the self” in which the retrospective storying of one’s experiences defines the core of a durable sense of self. For many authors, such narrative identity is difficult to achieve under conditions of accelerated cultural and social change, temporal fragmentation, and generational discontinuity. Postmodern theorists, while welcoming of narrative methodologies for their power to dislodge the univocal authority of positivistic scientific inquiry, are at the same time doubtful that contemporary conditions can produce stable social and personal narratives to the extent once possible.

SEE ALSO: Biography; Ethnography; Identity Theory; Journaling, Reflexive; Life History; Reflexivity; Self

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nation-state

Walker Connor

The term nation state was originally intended to describe a political unit (a state) whose borders coincided or roughly coincided with the territorial distribution of a nation, the latter in its pristine sense of a human grouping who share a conviction of being ancestrally related. The word nation derives from the Latin verb *nasci* (meaning to be born) and its noun form, *natio* (connoting breed or race). The very coining of the hyphenate, nation state, illustrated an appreciation of the essential difference between its two components, but careless terminology has subsequently tended to obscure the difference. Today, nation is often used as a substitute for a state (as in "the United Nations") or as a synonym for the population of a state without regard to its ethnonational composition (e.g., "the British nation"). With the distinction between nation and state thus blurred, the term nation state has lost much of its original value as a means of distinguishing

among types of states. Although only some 10 percent of all states are sufficiently ethnically homogeneous to merit being described as nation states, it has become an increasingly common practice to refer to all states as nation states.

The confusing of nation with state would not be so troublesome were all states nation states. In such cases, loyalty to nation (nationalism) and loyalty to the state (patriotism) reinforce one another in a seamless manner. The state is perceived as the political extension or expression of the nation, and appeals to the one trigger the same associations and emotions as do appeals to the other. The same blurring of the two loyalties is common in the case of a *staat volk*, a nation which is sufficiently preeminent – politically, culturally, and usually numerically – that its members also popularly perceive the state in monopolistic terms as the state of our nation, even though other nations are present. (Examples include the Han Chinese, the Russians, and, at least prior to the very late twentieth century, the English.)

For people with their own nation state and for *staatvolk*, then, nationalism and civic loyalty coincide and reinforce. But the overwhelming number of nations neither have their own state nor constitute a *staatvolk*. For them, civic and national loyalty do not coincide and may well conflict. And, as substantiated by the commonness of secessionist movements waged under the banner of national self determination, when the two loyalties are perceived as being in irreconcilable conflict, nationalism has customarily proven the more powerful of the two loyalties.

The nation state therefore best lends itself to the concentration of authority because it is the simultaneous focus of two powerful loyalties (nationalism and patriotism) on the part of all major segments of the population. The fanatical devotion that the ruling regime of such a state can muster was demonstrated during World War II by the willingness of the German and Japanese people to make any sacrifice, including a willingness to continue, with great loss of life, to pursue a war after they were aware that it was unwinnable. Such devotion, when observed in a war of national liberation, can be attributed to nationalism, but the German and Japanese leadership were able to elicit such fidelity in an imperialistic war to create

multinational empires because the state and its goals had blended with the nation and its interests in a homogeneous mix. *Raison d'état* and *raison de la nation* were one. And thus for a Japanese kamikaze pilot or a banzai charge (a mass death charge) participant to be asked whether he was about to die for Nippon or for the Nipponese people or for the emperor (who was regularly extolled as the "father" of the nation) would be an incomprehensible query since the three blurred into an inseparable whole. Similarly, Hitler, who in *Mein Kampf* had noted that "We as Aryans are therefore able to imagine a State only to be the living organism of a nationality" (Hitler 1940), could variously make his appeals to the German people in the name of state (Deutsches Reich), nation (Volksdeutsch), or homeland (Deutschland) because all triggered the same emotional associations.

In recognition of the unparalleled advantage that the nation state enjoys over other forms of states for mobilizing the entire population under its jurisdiction, governments have adopted policies aimed at increasing national homogeneity. Although, in a very few cases, governments have permitted – in still rarer cases, even encouraged – a homeland dwelling minority to secede, determination to maintain the territorial integrity of the state customarily places secession beyond governmental contemplation. More commonly, governments have pursued homogenization through what is currently called "ethnic cleansing." Genocide, expulsion, and population transfers, employed separately or in combination, are the usual means of achievement. Far more commonly, however, governments of heterogeneous states accept the current inhabitants of the state as a given and pursue homogenization through assimilationist programs. Such programs vary considerably in scope, complexity, intensity, ingenuity, degree of coerciveness/persuasion, envisaged timetable, and fervidity of the implementors. But programmed assimilation does not have an impressive record, as we are reminded by the history of the Soviet Union wherein national consciousness and resentment grew among non Russian peoples despite 70 years of comprehensive and sophisticated governmental efforts to solve what was officially termed "the national question." As a result of such failures,

an increasing number of governments have elected to shun the nation state model in favor of programs seeking to peacefully accommodate national diversity through the granting of greater cultural and political autonomy to minority nations.

SEE ALSO: Assimilation; Ethnic Cleansing; Ethnonationalism; Genocide; Multiculturalism; Nation State and Nationalism; Nationalism; State

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nation-state and nationalism

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Nationalism can be defined in a broad and a narrow sense. In its broadest sense it refers to the sum of those beliefs, idioms, and practices oriented to a territorially delineated "nation," and embodied in the political demands of a people who collectively identify with a nation. This may or may not entail the existence of or demand for a separate national state, or be realized in a self-conscious nationalist movement, though historically this is often the eventual outcome of national identification. In its narrower meaning, nationalism refers to a political ideology or doctrine whose object is an existing or envisaged nation state wherein cultural and political boundaries coincide.

Both of these meanings presuppose the nation, which analytically, though not necessarily historically, precedes that of nationalism. The origins of the term nation and its non-English, Western European equivalents can be located in the Latin term *natio* – “something born” (similar in meaning to the Greek *ta ethne* and the Hebrew *amamim*). This label was once reserved for “foreigners,” and originally had a derogatory meaning. In medieval Western Europe it came to be applied to groups of students at some universities who were united by their place of origin. The word gradually lost its derogatory connotation and also came to refer to a “community of opinion and purpose.” It then underwent successive changes in meaning, until in sixteenth century England the nation became synonymous with the collective noun “the people” (Greenfeld 1992: 3–9). While it is debatable whether or not this launched the modern era of nationalism, as Greenfeld claims, it certainly represented a watershed in the development of a specifically modern vocabulary of “nationness.” But this vocabulary has always been ambiguous. It has been ambiguous because of the sociological diversity of nations’ concrete instantiations, the political capital at stake in determining who and what should count as a nation, and because of a bifurcation between definitions of the nation based on political criteria and those based on cultural criteria; a cleavage rooted in differences between Enlightenment and Romanticist accounts of nationality.

Friedrich Meinecke (1970 [1907]) famously elaborated this distinction between the *Staatsnation* and the *Kulturnation*. The former refers to a political and territorial conception of nationality, whereby the nation either forms on the basis of a voluntary association of individuals within a given territory, claiming citizenship rights and self-determination in the form of their own state, or forms around a preexisting state. The latter refers to a pre-political cultural entity, where a spirit of solidarity and community derives from commonities of custom, language, heritage, and collective memory.

While this ideal typical distinction is valid for some purposes, too often it has had the misfortune to be linked with ethnocentric accounts that equate civic conceptions of the

nation with the West and all that is progressive and enlightened, and cultural conceptions with the East and all that is primordial, archaic, and backward looking. In reality, there is no fire wall between *Staatsnation* and *Kulturnation*, as political and cultural elements can be identified in *all* expressions of nationalism, even though they vary with time and circumstance and are constantly contested. It is the conjoining of culture and politics, rather than their separation, which gives the national principle its specificity.

HISTORICAL CONTEXT

The conjoining of culture and politics in the form of the modern national state occurred over the course of several centuries of early modern European history, between roughly the beginnings of the sixteenth and nineteenth centuries. While “modernists,” “ethnosymbolists,” and “primordialists” disagree on periodization (and much more besides, as discussed below), there is some convergence of opinion in respect of developments widely viewed as crucial in the growth of a *modern national field* of political orientation and action. These developments include the growth of powerful centralized states and the formation of a multipolar interstate system premised on exclusive, clearly demarcated territorial jurisdiction. In addition, the consolidation of written vernacular languages by commercial printing, the spread of Protestantism, and the decline of Latin facilitated the crystallization of more uniform, large-scale domains of communication and cultural intercourse. This was coupled with the growth of capitalism, which encouraged the emergence of relatively unified fields of exchange and administration, as well as driving highly uneven economic development that was a potential source of nationalist conflict. Finally, the birth of an individualized public sphere, with its associated extension of disembodied, abstract social relations on the one hand, and the ideals of democracy and civic equality on the other, was central to the formation of national consciousness (see the entries in Hutchinson & Smith 2000 for extensive coverage of the relationship between these developments and nationalism). All of this contributed to a gradually sharpening

national frame of reference which, in Western Europe at least, had condensed into a recognizably nationalist politics by the eighteenth century.

The American and French Revolutions and their aftermaths provided a further impetus to nationalism. The declaration of independence by Britain's 13 American colonies marked an early experiment in anti colonial nationalism, though it was not at first articulated in nationalist terms. The anti colonial rhetoric and practice of the American rebels would be emulated in future anti colonial struggles, not least those waged in Ireland in the 1790s and by their South American counterparts in the early decades of the nineteenth century. In fact, the fracturing of Spain's American Empire into 18 separate states represents the first major wave of secessionist nationalism, which in turn provided a model for other nationalist movements to emulate.

The French Revolution also made a profound contribution to this new nationalist political language and practice upon which aspiring "nations" could draw inspiration. Its founding document, the *Declaration of the Rights of Man*, asserts that the "principle of all sovereignty resides in the nation," and that political authority is derived from the "general will" of the nation conceived as the entire people, composed of citizens with equal rights before the law. Ironically, this vision was disseminated through Europe on the points of Napoleon's bayonets, sharpening national sentiments in territories that were occupied.

In the aftermath of the Napoleonic Wars, the quickening tempo of uneven economic and industrial development was a key stimulus to the nationalizing of politics in Europe and, from the latter part of the nineteenth century, parts of the Middle East, Asia, and Africa. Many commentators have noted how economic underdevelopment has frequently become a source of nationalist umbrage, and has intensified nationalism amongst late industrializers. States that were not in the vanguard of industrialization were subject to the economic, political, and military disadvantages of their positions within a hierarchy of industrializing states. This was responded to with economic protectionism, heightened political particularism, and a sharpened consciousness and

promotion of cultural distinctiveness in the second half of the nineteenth century, encouraged by mass education, conscript armies, and colonial adventures. The unification of Italy from 1860, Germany in 1870, and the Meiji Restoration in Japan in 1868 represent the most well known examples of nationalist projects initiated from above and energized by uneven industrial development.

But nationalism was by no means limited to these cases. Uneven industrial development, combined with internal repression by culturally distinct elites, led to a proliferation of national claims in the Ottoman and Habsburg Empires from the middle of the nineteenth century. Serbia, Romania, and Bulgaria followed the precedent set by Greece in 1830, and achieved independence from the Ottoman Turks on the basis of ethno-religious claims to nationhood, thus accelerating the "Balkanization" of the Balkans (Hobsbawm 1990). Similarly, the nationalities question, as it was then termed, was the preeminent political issue throughout the Habsburg Empire, being reflected in numerous demands for autonomy or secession, in addition to mass nationalist mobilizations and outright nationalist revolts. These challenges to imperial power were usually met with brutal repression, thus fueling nationalist grievances which in turn prompted more repression and a downward spiral of political violence – a dynamic common in many subsequent nationalist conflicts.

EARLY APPROACHES TO UNDERSTANDING NATIONALISM

It was against this historical background that socialist, conservative, and liberal thinkers began to grapple more seriously with national phenomena in the second half of the nineteenth century. As implied above, the language of nation had infused politics and scholarship much earlier than this, being evident, for example, in the sixteenth century works of Machiavelli and Shakespeare, and numerous works of political philosophy in the following two centuries (Diderot, Hegel, Kant, Rousseau, Voltaire, Paine, Herder, and Fichte). Yet none of these strands of thought dealt systematically with nationalism and the nation as phenomena

whose sociological roots could or should be explained. This changed in the decades after the “springtime of peoples” revolutions in 1848.

Despite the frequently noted judgment that nationalism “represents Marxism’s great historical failure” (Nairn 1975: 3), Marx and Engels were amongst the first of a new wave of mid nineteenth century thinkers to register the political significance of what they termed the “national question.” Their legacy is a contradictory one. On the one hand, they resurrected the Hegelian distinction between “historic” and “non historic” nations, in the context of revolution and counterrevolution in Europe in 1848. In spite of its invocation of history, this distinction was ahistoric. It represented a crude dualism that was burdened with evolutionary assumptions and dubious judgments about the “non viability” of particular nations, many of which would go on to achieve independence in the aftermath of World War I. On the other hand, they adopted a position that was more accommodating of the nationalism of the oppressed. This was most clearly expressed in their changed attitude to Irish and Polish nationalism from the 1860s. They not only supported the rights of Poland and Ireland to self determination, they also positively encouraged the exercise of those rights, as summed up in Engels’s stricture that the Poles and Irish had a “duty to be nationalistic before they become internationalistic.” This was part of a realization that colonialism could just as well retard capitalist development as promote it, and that national oppression was an impediment to class consciousness and solidarity in oppressed and oppressor nations alike. As Marx famously stated, a nation that oppresses another “forges its own chains.”

But socialists were not the only thinkers to become interested in nationalism in the second half of the nineteenth century. In 1864, the militaristic conservative Heinrich von Treitschke echoed the liberal John Stuart Mill in identifying nationality as the legitimate basis of state power. In 1882, and in explicit opposition to Treitschke, the liberal French historian Ernest Renan confronted head on the question *Qu’est ce que c’est qu’une nation?* His memorable answer was that it is “an everyday plebiscite,” a “perpetual affirmation of life,” based on shared remembrances

of the past, and a collective consent to live together in the present. It is the collective memory as embodied and reproduced in myth, especially of past sacrifices by national “ancestors,” which is “the essential condition of being a nation” (Renan in Hutchinson & Smith 1994: 17–18).

Curiously, a specifically sociological perspective on nations and nationalism has its roots in the works of Durkheim and Weber, even though neither wrote a great deal on the subject. With respect to Durkheim, the key text is *The Elementary Forms of Religious Life* (1915). Here Durkheim argued that any human community, small or large, must periodically regenerate itself through the public reaffirmation of shared beliefs and values. It does so through collective rituals and rites, which take on a sacred, transcendent character, irrespective of the content of the beliefs expressed. Consequently, in all relevant respects Christian or Jewish rituals are no different from “a reunion of citizens commemorating the promulgation of a new moral or legal system or some great event in the national life” (1915: 427). Here nationalism is presented as a functional equivalent to religion: a meaning bestowing and cohesion enhancing phenomenon in a world where anomie grows and mechanical solidarity has been effaced, but where organic solidarity alone is unable to perform all of the morally integrative functions necessary for ordered social life.

The situating of nations, nationalism, and the related concept of ethnic group within the broader problematic of modernity is also characteristic of Max Weber’s work. While in Weber’s view nations and states existed under premodern conditions, it is only in modern Europe that they became conjoined in the nation state. Nationalism is bound up with this conjoining. He suggests that national identity is derived from diverse sources, which can include religion, race, ethnicity, customs, language, and political memories. While these “objective factors” might contribute to the formation of national sentiment, they do not necessarily do so. For a nation to actually emerge depends on a given population believing that they are a nation, and expressing this belief in the formation of, or demand for, their own state. In other words, in addition to objective factors facilitating nation formation, there

is also an important subjective element. The form that this subjective element takes is strongly influenced by the objective features of a given nation, which are imbibed with value and invoked as markers of cultural distinctiveness. Hence, “the ‘nation’ is usually anchored in the superiority, or at least the irreplaceability, of the culture values that are to be preserved and developed only through the cultivation of the peculiarity of the group” (Weber in Gerth & Mills 1949: 176). But for these culture values to have a specifically national expression, they must be oriented to a state.

CONTEMPORARY APPROACHES TO UNDERSTANDING NATIONALISM

In the decades following the death of Durkheim and Weber, in 1917 and 1920 respectively, the reality of intensified nationalism was not reflected in an equally vigorous sociology of nationalism; certainly not in the English speaking world. The nationalistic cataclysm of World War I had ended with the dismemberment of the multinational Habsburg and Ottoman Empires along national lines. This paralleled the proclamation of the universality of the principle of national self determination by the liberal Woodrow Wilson and the communist Vladimir Lenin. It was followed by the new, supposedly internationalist Soviet state embracing the nationalistic doctrine of “socialism in one country,” and by the growth of European fascism and Japanese militarism with their virulent nationalist ethos married to a grand imperial vision. The Great Depression only served to magnify these nationalistic tendencies, with a beggarly neighbor economic nationalism marking most liberal democratic governments’ trade policies in the 1930s. At the same time, anti colonial national liberation struggles – led by such nationalist icons as Gandhi, Nehru, Ho Chi Minh, Sukarno, and Kenyatta – were gaining momentum in many parts of Asia and Africa, which would be realized in the independence of dozens of new states in the two decades after the end of World War II. Most if not all of these were formed on the administrative space of the previous colonial regime, with little or no regard for cultural, linguistic, and political differentiation within that space. This laid the

foundations for much of the nationalist contention that punctuated the rest of the century. The most recent proliferation of subnational challenges to failed or failing states in Africa, Asia, and Oceania in the 1990s, along with the breakup of the Soviet Empire and Yugoslavia and the growth of far right nationalist populism in western countries, marked the zenith of this contention.

All of this bespeaks a reality in which nationalism was central to twentieth century social and political life. But this centrality was in an inverse proportion to the importance accorded to the study of nationalism in sociology, where it remained marginal until the 1980s. Why was this? There were two main reasons. On the one hand, mainstream sociology was itself premised on a pervasive methodological nationalism, which assumed that the discipline’s object of investigation was a bounded “society” that was congruent with a nation state. This elision and reification had the effect of diverting attention away from the historically contingent, socially constructed foundations of nations and nationalism. On the other hand, the intellectual division of labor that was cemented in the middle decades of the century institutionalized the view that the proper focus of sociology was the industrialized West. Given that the most prominent sites of nationalist contention after World War II were in less developed zones – the preserve of anthropologists and political scientists – it is understandable, if not excusable, that nationalism was neglected by sociologists. But this changed in the 1980s, after the publication of Benedict Anderson’s *Imagined Communities* and Ernst Gellner’s *Nations and Nationalism*. Irrespective of the veracity of the substantive claims advanced in these texts, their enduring significance is to have stimulated two key debates. These are, namely, a debate about the “nature of nations” and a debate about the origins of nations, nationality, and nationalism, and their relationship to modernity.

THE “NATURE OF NATIONS”

In terms of the first debate on the nature of nations, five main approaches can be identified. These are not mutually exclusive, but can be distinguished by their characteristic emphases.

While they all transcend nationalist images of the nation – in that they accept that nations ought not be naturalized by defining them exclusively with reference to some objective, national substance, but must embody a degree of historical contingency and subjective, national self definition on the part of a given population – some are closer to that image than others.

In the first approach, for example, nations are conceptualized in terms of a number of essential features. These usually include attributes such as a common language, a shared culture, a contiguous territory, a common stock of memories and shared sense of belonging, which become the bases for the veneration of or the placing of demands on an existing state, or the striving for a new state. In this view, nations are treated as real, tangible, and enduring entities, which have the continuity of subjects and which embody the distinctive character, culture, and political aspirations of a clearly delineated people. Here nations are a source rather than an expression of nationalism.

The second approach rejects this “objectivist” view, arguing instead that nations can only be conceived with reference to people’s subjective states, as it is these that ultimately underlie all instances of the nation. Here a nation exists “when a significant number of people in a community consider themselves to form a nation, or behave as if they formed one” (Seton Watson 1977: 5). In Walker Connor’s similar formulation, the nation is in essence “a psychological bond that joins a people and differentiates it, in the subconscious conviction of its members, from all other people in a most vital way” (1994: 92).

A third approach eschews what it views as the naturalizing myths of nationhood, insisting that nations are invented categories rather than real collectivities. In Ernst Gellner’s (1983: 55) frequently cited argument, nations are invented by nationalism rather than being the latter’s source. They are invented in order to fulfill some functional needs generated by the structural transformations wrought by industrialization. This is a view that informs all of those positions that emphasize the “invention of tradition” in the constitution of national phenomena, as well as Marxist inspired analyses that view the nation as a socially constructed entity that serves the structural requirements of the

capitalist economy and the ideological interests of the bourgeoisie.

In the fourth approach identified here, nations are viewed as “imagined communities,” though they are no less real for being imagined. This was of course the definition popularized by Benedict Anderson (1991 [1983]), for whom nations are imagined because their individual members envisage a common bond, “a deep horizontal comradeship,” despite never knowing, meeting, or hearing of the vast majority of their co nationals. In the mind of each lives an image of their national communion, Anderson suggests.

Finally, in more recent writings, nations are conceived of as *symbolic frames* (Delanty & O’Mahony 2002) or *discursive formations* (Calhoun 1997), defined not so much by any identifiable empirical property as by the claims made in evoking and promoting nations. Here nations are constituted “by the way of talking and thinking and acting that relies on these sorts of claims to produce collective identity” (Calhoun 1997: 5). The precise content of the claims will differ from case to case, but they share a “pattern of family resemblance,” which allows us to identify them as features of the “rhetoric of nations” rather than as essential features of some empirically verifiable entity.

All of these positions on the nature of nations and nationalism have been critiqued. Drawing upon the fifth approach, it has been suggested that the first concedes too much to nationalist mythologizing, in that it reifies nations, treating them as real, tangible, and enduring entities rather than as discursive formations and cognitive frames that arise in particular political and cultural fields. Categories of nationalist practice are thereby adopted as categories of analysis, which risks reproducing in scholarship the naturalizing myths that sustain nationalism (Brubaker 1996: 15–16).

The second approach is open to the general charge of idealism or psychological reductionism. That is, people’s ideas are taken to determine their reality, without due regard to the institutional and power configurations in which those ideas are embedded. While it is of course mistaken to think that people’s ideas, collectively and individually, are irrelevant in the determination of group formation and societal interactions, those ideas must, it is said, be

located within the broader structures of constraint and enablement provided by their social circumstances. Furthermore, defining the nation exclusively with reference to psychological states is viewed by many as severing the necessary connection between social identity formation and group formation. Michael Hechter (2000: 97) has persuasively made the point that social identities are parasitic on group formation, rather than being their basis. Posed differently, to have a social identity is to identify with a particular group. Therefore, national identity presupposes the existence of national groupings.

The third approach still has a good deal of influence in the literature, but has been subject to sustained criticism in recent years. Its main drawback is said to be its inability to explain how and why what is essentially a "fiction" has been so successful in firing people's imaginations and actuating their behavior. Starkly positing that nationalism invents nations where they do not exist underestimates the degree to which pre-national cultural communities may contribute to the formation of national ones. While we should avoid conflating premodern cultural identities with specifically *national* identities, there is certainly a need to acknowledge demonstrable cultural continuities that provide fertile grounds upon which nationalists can promote and mobilize "their" nation. Part of the problem is that this third approach wrongly counterposes national communities to *real* communities, which belies a very impoverished conception of the real. Benedict Anderson drew out this problem when he rebuked Gellner for assimilating "'invention' to 'fabrication' and 'falsity,' rather than to 'imagining' and 'creation'" (1991: 6).

Despite its continuing popularity, the imagined communities approach to nations and nationalism has not been without its detractors. Anderson's emphasis on imagination has been criticized for dissolving the nation into a chimera that is no more than the sum of its cultural representations. For Anthony Smith, this unduly emphasizes the idea of the nation as a narrative that can be deconstructed. As a result, "causal explanations of the character and spread of a specific type of community and movement tend to be overshadowed or relegated" (1998: 138). The imagined communities approach has also been criticized for neglecting the ideological power of nationalism,

in the sense of underestimating the strategic and self-conscious political uses to which nationalism is put by various social groups pursuing their sectional interests under the guise of the national interest. While it is laudable to accentuate the expressive basis of the nation as Anderson does, this should not be at the expense of its instrumental dimensions or its contested character. Finally, Anderson has also been taken to task for projecting onto the rest of the world models of the nationally imagined community that developed in Europe and the Americas and which then allegedly became modular. This relegates nationalism and nationalist agency in the colonial and postcolonial world to pale imitations of their western forebears.

The final approach to the conceptualization of nations and nationalism is vulnerable to many of the criticisms made of the second and fourth approaches. In addition, it has been suggested that it tends to reduce nations to their symbolic and discursive dimensions. It thereby neglects the institutional reality of the social allegiances, networks of interaction, bonds of belonging, and reciprocal obligation that constitute the sociological foundations of any nation. Consequently, while we might agree that nations *do* function as "symbolic frames," "discursive formations," and "categories of practice," this should not preclude us from recognizing them as "real" communities, even if these are socially constructed, partly invented, and cannot be observed directly.

NATIONALISM AND MODERNITY

The debate about the nature of nations is closely bound up with a broader debate about the origins of nations and nationalism, and about their relationship to modernity. This debate can be most simply characterized as one between "modernists" on the one hand, and "ethnosymbolists" on the other (with earlier "primordialist" perspectives having been widely discredited, and hence not necessary to this discussion).

Despite many substantive differences, what all modernists share is a view that the origins of nations and nationalism are to be located in the transformations wrought by modernity. Here the development of the modern centralized

state and the interstate system and the subsequent emergence of democracy and capitalism are viewed as key determinants in the growth of a national field of political action and orientation. Within this general modernist frame, we can identify accounts that emphasize the socioeconomic foundations of nationalism as against those that emphasize its political bases, and those that are functionalist in tone as opposed to those that offer causal explanations.

Modernist accounts emphasizing the socioeconomic foundations of nations and nationalism have typically, but not exclusively, been articulated by those influenced by Marxism. Here modernity is largely coterminous with capitalism. Nations and nationalism are viewed both as ideologically biased, reintegrative responses to the community dissolving effects of capitalism and as byproducts of uneven capitalist development at the level of the world system. Either way, nations and nationalism are seen to serve the structural requirements of capitalism and the ideological interests of the bourgeoisie, by obscuring the class bases of power and privilege upon which all states are founded.

But socioeconomic and functionalist accounts of national phenomena have not been limited to Marxists. The most influential non Marxist account in this genre is that of Ernst Gellner (1983). For Gellner, it is not capitalism but industrialism that demands and begets nationalism – defined as the principle of political legitimacy demanding that ethnic and political boundaries coincide. This principle was necessarily absent in pre agrarian and agrarian societies, Gellner contends, but became an imperative with the transition to industrial society and its characteristic fusion of a polity with a “high culture.” He argues that the extensive division of labor in industrialized societies necessitates and engenders a high degree of social mobility. This in turn demands a universal, standardized education system, staffed by specialists, so that people can adequately fulfill plural roles as well as communicate with the anonymous persons with whom these roles will bring them into contact. As a result, the state’s monopoly over legitimate education is now more important than its monopoly over legitimate violence, and provides the main key to understanding the roots of nationalism. It is the main clue to understanding why state and

culture *must* be linked. The modern state’s attempts to homogenize its population through a standardized education system expresses the objective needs of a social order based on industrialization, a complex division of labor, and social mobility. It is not so much that nationalism imposes homogeneity, but that the objective need for homogeneity under modern conditions is reflected in nationalism (Gellner 1983: 39, 46).

These views have been criticized for their functionalism, for their unwarranted linking of nationalism to industrialism and capitalism, and for their reduction of politics to economics. The functionalist explanation of nationalism, for instance, is viewed as wrongly positing consequences as causes, which obscures the causal mechanisms connecting the alleged societal need (the need for effective communication, cultural homogeneity, and ideological cohesion) to the phenomenon that is said to meet that need (in this case, nationalism). In addition, many thinkers have rightly pointed out that nationalism has often been present where industrialism and capitalism are absent, thus undermining the case for their necessary connection. Finally, socioeconomic accounts have been criticized for their mishandling of politics: in Gellner’s case, for his insensitivity to the impact of different political and constitutional structures on nationalism; in the Marxist case, for its reduction of politics to economics, even if in the last instance. Such criticisms inform modernist positions that emphasize the centrality of politics.

Michael Mann (1993) and John Breuilly (1993) have been amongst the most influential modernist thinkers offering non functionalist and essentially political accounts of the rise of nations. While both concede that national sentiments existed as early as the sixteenth century, these were not sufficient to constitute either nations or nationalism. They were at best expressions of a “proto nationalism,” which was not yet liberated from dynastic and religious principles of political legitimacy. This liberation would have to wait until the latter part of the eighteenth century whereupon centralized states, and political oppositions to those states, increasingly articulated a nationalistic rhetoric centered upon the sovereignty of the “people” understood as a nation. This in turn generated new forms of participation within

and loyalty to the state, and connected culture and politics in novel ways. Thus the rise of the nation and nationalism, for both Mann and Breuille, was very much bound up with the struggle toward representative government and citizenship.

These modernist positions, in both their socioeconomic and political guises, have been subject to increasing challenges in recent years by what Anthony Smith (2001) has labeled as ethnosymbolic accounts of the origins of nations. These take modernists to task for mythologizing the modernity of nations, for failing to discern the continuities between “modern” nations and premodern cultural collectivities, and for neglecting the centrality of myth and symbolism in the constitution of national identity.

By contrast, ethnosymbolists argue that nations and national identity have premodern cultural roots, and that it is the longevity and depth of these roots that help explain the emotional appeal and enduring power of national sentiment. In the trailblazing account *Nations Before Nationalism* (1982), for example, John Armstrong focuses on the persistence of group identities within the civilizational zones centered upon the Judaic Christian and Islamic religions. He suggests that these religions were particularly well suited to penetrating the masses of a population because of their commitment to proselytizing and their tendency to fracture along sectarian lines. Both attributes necessitated forms of communication that were accessible to non elite groups. This stimulated the use of vernacular languages, which in turn served as symbolic boundary markers of group identity and encouraged the persistence of large scale collective identities. Of these, Armstrong views the Jews beginning from around 1000 BCE, and the Armenians from around 400 CE, as constituting the first premodern nations. While the cultural content of what it means to be Jewish or Armenian has changed dramatically since then, the symbolic boundary distinguishing insiders from outsiders has remained intact, thus preserving the continuity of Jewish and Armenian national identity.

Not all ethnosymbolists, however, are prepared to countenance the existence of nations in antiquity or even, for that matter, in medieval Europe. Anthony Smith’s voluminous works, for example, generally suggest that this view

mistakenly conflates ethnicity with nationality and overstates the importance of boundary maintenance in the constitution of nations. Yet at the same time he also takes issue with modernists, who are said to neglect the continuities between modern and premodern collective identities. Most important here are premodern “*ethnies*” – “a named population with common myths and shared historical memories, elements of shared culture, a link with a historical territory, and some measure of solidarity, at least among the elites” (1995: 57). These constituted the “ethnic cores” around which many modern nations formed, which Smith claims helps explain the emotional depth and appeal of nationalism. In this way, Smith can argue for a relative degree of continuity between modern and premodern collective identities, without conflating group identities whose differences are too great to be subsumed under the single concept of the nation.

While Smith’s position has the virtue of avoiding some of the more inflated claims of the modernist and ethnosymbolist perspectives, his main theses are not without difficulties. In particular, it is not at all clear why relatively ancient ethnic sentiments should have a more powerful emotional appeal than more recent ones. Even where Smith’s thesis seems to be on firmer ground – in the first states of Europe – it can be challenged for essentializing ethnic sentiment. Many have argued that shared ethnicity in centralizing states such as France and England was a product rather than a cause of what he calls nationness. Similarly, many “instrumentalists” have argued that ethnic groups and ethnicity more generally are the creation of modern elites who draw very selectively on the cultural materials of groups that they claim to represent, as a way of advancing their own sectional interests. Finally, the ethnosymbolist position of Smith and others has been criticized for failing to specify the mechanisms that link old *ethnies* and new nations. Part of the problem here is the failure to distinguish between culture and identity, and the misplaced tendency to assume that a demonstration of continuity in the former is enough to prove continuity in the latter (Delanty & O’Mahony 2002: 84–5). Identity is not simply derivative of some preexisting cultural substrate, but can be a conscious project that can be created and recreated.

NATIONALISM TODAY

It is a curiosity of contemporary intellectual history that the “global turn” in sociology has coincided with a sharp increase in substantive and theoretical work on nationalism. The proliferation of books, journals, articles, and symposia on nationalism and national identity has vastly expanded our knowledge of and conceptual tools for analyzing these phenomena. This reflects not so much Hegel’s wise owl of Minerva flying at dusk (i.e., our understanding increasing in the period of nationalism’s dénouement) as the contemporary efflorescence of nationalism itself, despite what some had supposed about the universalizing and homogenizing thrust of intensified globalization. Far from dissipating nationalist convictions, increased global interdependencies seem to have enhanced national particularism, as evidenced in nationalist conflicts from the states of the former Yugoslavia and Soviet Union to the failed and failing states of Africa. The mechanisms connecting these contradictory tendencies are still imperfectly understood, as is the continuing emotional power of national identity and its relationship to contemporary religious forms. These are but some of the areas demanding the attention of nationalism scholars. Unfortunately, if the opening years of this century are anything to go by, it seems that their analytical skills and insights will be in heavy demand in the years ahead.

SEE ALSO: Capitalism; Citizenship; Democracy; Empire; Gellner, Ernst; Global Politics; Imagined Communities; Modernity; Nation State; Nationalism; Postnationalism; State

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nationalism

Athena S. Leoussi

Nationalism is a complex social phenomenon with the nation as its object. Rooted in the Latin *natio*, denoting community of birth, the term *nationalismus* seems to have been coined

by Johann Gottfried Herder as a part of his Romantic celebration of cultural diversity. Nevertheless, modern nationalism has its ideological roots in both the Enlightenment and the Romantic reaction to it. Definitions of “nationalism” as, indeed, of the “nation” vary in the social sciences: first, according to the particular aspect of “nationalism” that they emphasize as essential to its nature. From this perspective, definitions can be divided mainly between political and cultural variables. Some scholars, like Hans Kohn, Carlton J. H. Hayes, John Plamenatz, Hugh Seton Watson, and A. D. Smith, have favored either typological or more inclusive definitions. Second, definitions vary according to the dating of nationalism, either before or during the French Revolution. This dating divides them into premodernist and modernist theories. Variations can also be found in explanations of nationalism, i.e., in the motivations and circumstances behind the rise of nationalist demands. Apart from the lack of consensus regarding the nature of nationalism, there is the further difficulty of distinguishing between the ideological and the analytical approaches to the phenomenon.

Political definitions of nationalism present it as a primarily political doctrine and movement, centered on the state. According to these definitions, nationalism is the demand that the ruler and the ruled should be the same, either culturally or politically.

The cultural convergence of ruler and ruled may involve the following.

- (1) The acquisition or maintenance of a nation state. This implies either the defense of the political independence of cultural communities called nations which already possess a state and are faced with an external threat, or the acquisition of statehood for nations living in multinational states and dominated or persecuted by other and more powerful nations who control the state. A nationalist movement may thus consist of resistance to foreign rule or pursuit of national self government (self determination) to ensure the physical and cultural survival of the nation. This kind of political nationalism considers the nation state, the principle of
- (2) State led cultural homogenization of the people of a state. In this case, the state assumes a new role: a cultural role. The state now becomes the protector of a culture and the educator of a people. It “builds” the nation. State led cultural homogenization or, as we should say, nationalization, may involve: first, the creation of state sponsored schools whose attendance is compulsory for all; second, standardization of some preexisting cultural elements, and especially language, by state sponsored, national academies which guide the educational institutions of the state. The standardization of language was first introduced in Europe by Louis XIV in France with the founding of the French Academy in 1635, but its users were a small educated elite. State led cultural homogenization can have positive implications, such as the *incorporation* of the periphery, the mass of a population, into the center as part of the whole, as equals. This, according to Eugene Weber’s famous phrase, turns “peasants into Frenchmen.” The process also leads to the creation of a common culture in all spheres of life and across classes through the mixture of folk, peripheral cultural motifs with “high” elite and modern cultural orientations. This helps the creation of unanimity: the sharing of common ideas and purposes. The demand for homogeneity can have *negative* implications: first, conflict over the nature of the national culture; second, forced solidarity on the basis of cultural similarity; third, ethnic cleansing of cultural minorities; fourth, forced assimilation of

“one nation one state, one state one nation,” as the ideal form of human political organization. This makes nationalism an independence movement, and, to some extent, a liberal movement.

The chief representative as well as critic of this vision of statehood is Elie Kedourie. For Kedourie (1960), nationalism is a type of *doctrine* of self government taken from German Enlightenment and Romantic philosophy, and especially from Kant, Herder, and Fichte.

minorities; fifth, the loss of personal freedom through state coercion to conform.

Among the scholars who have described nationalism as a state led homogenizing enterprise, Ernst Gellner is probably the most subtle. For Gellner (1983), the cultural homogenization of the people of a state is specifically associated with the modern state, and is distinct from earlier policies of, say, forced religious homogenization. Modern state led nationalization of populations is unique in its aim, means, and content. The aim is economic growth and general prosperity. The means is education of the whole population into modern scientific reasoning and knowledge. This is done through socialization in state schools and universities. It is this state sponsored scientific culture that constitutes the modern "high culture." Its vehicle is a standardized version of a native, vernacular mode of speech, which becomes the official, national language. And it is this native language that particularizes what is otherwise a potentially universal civilization. Gellner has stressed the importance of both education and literacy, and especially literacy in one's own language for gaining access to the benefits of modern civilization. This economically oriented civilization consists, first, in the application of science to technology for industrial production; and second, in the manipulation of information through literacy and the expanding communication technologies which constitutes "work" in modern societies.

The political convergence between ruler and ruled involves political homogenization: the equal participation, through representation, of all the people of a state in the political process. It involves the abolition of the distinction between ruler and ruled through citizenship rights for the "demos." Nationalism demands "power for the people," with, or without, cultural qualifications for being or becoming a citizen. Scholars who have defined nationalism as a primarily democratic movement for creating territorially defined communities of citizens include Ernest Renan and Dominique Schnapper (1998).

Cultural definitions of nationalism emphasize the cultural and specifically traditionalist aspects of national project. They describe nationalism as a movement which advocates

the revival of the traditional culture and especially the "golden age" of the community into which one is born, the ethnic community. As such, nationalism is an educational movement directed to inner reform. It provides the individual and the group with collective identity: a sense of origins and a set of values found in the community of birth. Nationalism advocates and defends individual (and collective) identification with one's own ethnic origins, physical type, language, territory, history, myths, symbols, and traditions; in short, with the way of life of one's parents and ancestors. The maintenance and revival of these cultural resources considered to be, according to Max Weber, "irreplaceable culture values" constitute this form of nationalism.

These values may be part of a low (folk) or high (elite) culture, or, indeed, a world civilization. This conception of nationalism emphasizes the role of intellectuals, poets, musicians, and artists in the affirmation, articulation, and regeneration of the ethnic culture. Such a cultural understanding of nationalism minimizes the importance of independent statehood in nationalist movements. In fact, it presents the acquisition of statehood as just one of many possible ways in which a community can satisfy its primarily expressive need: to live out its culture, or *Weltanschauung*. And, indeed, nationalism, thus defined, can emerge among members of a cultural community or nation which already possesses a state. Scholars associated with this account of nationalism include Herder and John Hutchinson.

Both political and cultural definitions of nationalism recognize the community forming role of the nationalist demand for either statehood or cultural renewal. They recognize nationalism as a principle, on the one hand, of social selection, and, on the other, of unity and solidarity. Thus, nationalism offers criteria for *commensality*, *connubium*, *commercium*, and political loyalty: cultural affinity and/or shared freedoms. As such, it is a particularist principle of human association. It advocates association and obligation, *either* to the state and fellow citizens who guarantee with the force of law one's freedoms and way of life, *or* to the cultural community of birth (ethnocultural community), which it presents as an extended family.

Some scholars, and above all Isaiah Berlin, as well as Gellner and Liah Greenfeld, have perceived the desire for *status* or prestige in nationalist movements. Berlin (1998) has specifically defined nationalism as a movement for *Anmerkung*: for raising one's bent back from humiliation. Nationalism demands the recognition of the value of one's own cultural community and, by extension, of one's own collective self as at least equal to all other cultures and communities. This recognition can be achieved, first, through the acknowledgment of the sovereignty of a cultural community in its own homeland or through the reaffirmation of its hitherto suppressed culture. Similarly, Greenfeld (1992) has argued that *ressentiment* toward a repressive dominant culture is the principal cause of nationalism.

Political or state centered definitions of nationalism typically present it as a modern phenomenon, associated with the specificities of the modern state, whereas cultural definitions emphasize the cultural and social continuities of modern nations with premodern societies. More inclusive definitions of nationalism emphasize the complexity and mutability of movements on behalf of the nation. This also applies to typological definitions. Anthony D. Smith's definition of nationalism is probably the most inclusive. It describes it as an ideological movement for attaining and maintaining, first, political and economic autonomy (or independence) and citizenship rights; second, ethnocultural identity; and third, social unity, on behalf of a population which is deemed by some of its members to constitute a nation.

Two typologies of nationalism have been particularly influential since World War II. Those of Hans Kohn and Carlton J. H. Hayes recognize the existence of different kinds of nationalism and reconcile the division between political and cultural theorists. Kohn (1961 [1944]) distinguished between "West" and "East" (of the Rhine) European nationalisms. Kohn's two types of nationalism are now usually referred to as "civic" and "ethnic" nationalisms and are applicable outside European societies, to Asia and Africa, where they have been diffused. Civic nationalisms of the West European type are inspired by the political, democratic, rational, and classical values of the Enlightenment and the French Revolution:

liberté, égalité, fraternité. Ethnic nationalisms of the East European type are inspired by the traditionalism, mysticism, historicism, and folklorism of Romanticism. Hayes (1960) distinguished between "political" and "cultural" nationalisms. Political nationalism is when a cultural group or "nationality" strives for a state of its own; cultural nationalism is when a nationality cherishes and extols its common language and traditions without political ends.

Different *explanations* have been proposed for nationalism in its various manifestations. As with disputes over the definition of the phenomenon, disputes over its causes can be broadly divided into modernist and premodernist.

Modernist explanations can be either structural functionalist or instrumentalist. The former claim that the structures of modernity require nationalism. Instrumentalist explanations affirm the existence of ulterior motives in the minds of the leaders of nationalist movements. They particularly challenge the cultural pronouncements on behalf of the nation as pretexts masking essentially political and economic ends. The modern conditions which require or make use of nationalism can be political, economic, or cultural.

- (1) *Political*: For scholars like Charles Tilly (1975) and John Breuilly (1982), the modern centralist, sovereign, and militarist state requires linguistic cultural homogeneity for staffing its vast bureaucratic administrative machine and for organizing a rational and scientific army led by professionally trained personnel. For Paul R. Brass (1991), in modern mass democracies, elites manipulate the masses for support in their competition with other elites for gaining positions of power. The "masses" tend to support those who advocate emotionally powerful ideas of common descent and cultural values and especially religion. These "nationalist" elites mask their real motive: the quest for power.
- (2) *Economic*: According to Gellner (1983), modern industrial society bent on economic growth requires nationalism, in the sense of a homogeneously literate and scientifically educated workforce which can be easily deployed throughout its

borders without encountering problems of communication and manipulation of information. For the manipulation of matter is now undertaken by machines operating to human instructions. The great scientists, inventors, and entrepreneurs of the Industrial Revolution did not know what they were doing: they were creating the conditions essential for nationalism – cultural homogeneity. Thus, for Gellner, nationalism is a movement for prosperity through sociocultural modernization and homogenization. It pursues not the old culture, but the new, scientific culture made available in one's own language. Consequently, loyalties become national because language determines one's employability. Another economic reason for nationalism is provided by Eric Hobsbawm. Hobsbawm (1990; Hobsbawm & Ranger 1983) maintains that the new bourgeois capitalist society, which is effectively divided by competing class interests and which requires exploitation for the accumulation of profit, also requires the solidarity of the workers with the capitalist owners of the means of production. To this end, bourgeois intellectuals invent and propagate the *ideology* of a common ethnocultural identity and a shared past between the two classes. On this basis, they claim national solidarity: the cooperation and sympathy existing among kin members, i.e., members of the same family. Thus national identity and national solidarity are inventions: false consciousness for exploitation as against the reality of class identity and solidarity.

- (3) *Cultural*: According to Kedourie (1960), the experience of uprooting, dislocation, and loss of a sense of community caused by modernity's urbanization and triumph of cold, scientific reason lies at the root of nationalism. Nationalism is a doctrine developed by alienated intellectuals, a form of neotribalism. It is a way of coping with modernity, first, through a return to the warm community of birth, the village of premodern times for which statehood is claimed; and second, through the uncritical absorption in the certainties of traditional culture. Nationalism represents the

ethnic culture and community as the natural and authentic conditions of human existence.

In another variant of this approach, Benedict Anderson (1983) has proposed a relatively *longue durée* of modernization and national development. Initially, religious and economic conditions, and especially Protestantism and print capitalism, require linguistic homogeneity and literacy in the vernacular: partly for religious reasons concerning direct access to the word of God; and partly for economic reasons of profit – the more there are people who can read books, the greater the profit from the sale of books. At a later stage, with secularization, the community of faith is replaced by the community of language as a new “imagined community” made possible through communication via newspapers and the novel.

Anti modernist explanations are of four main types: sociobiological, primordialist, perennialist, and ethnosymbolist.

- (1) *Sociobiologists* like Pierre L. van den Berghe (1987) claim that nationalism as a social movement demanding solidarity among culturally similar persons is biologically determined. Nationalism is the rationalization or realization of the biological impulse toward kin selection. Kin selection ensures the survival or reproduction, through mating with genetically similar individuals, of one's own genes. Nationalism is conscious Darwinism.
- (2) *Primordialists* like Edward Shils (1957) and Steven Grosby (1994) see the origins of nationalism in the facts of birth in a particular community and territory. Human beings are naturally attached to the primary, life giving forces of family and territory. Human beings tend to perceive these ethnic attachments as given, vital, and overriding social bonds. Unlike sociobiologists, primordialists view nationalism as a sentiment of affection, obligation, and sympathy toward the sources of human life: the family and the land, and the persons associated with them through cultural similarity and place of residence. Similarly, Walker Connor (1994) has emphasized the emotional basis

of nationalism, which he calls ethnonationalism: the powerful bond felt toward, if not actual, presumed kinsmen and co ethnics.

- (3) *Perennialists* like John A. Armstrong (1982) see nations as premodern ethnocultural social formations shaped over a *longue durée* by an accumulation of collective experiences, myths, and symbols and by encounters with other nations. Nationalism, however, as an often fanatical and aggressive ideology, disseminated by elites to mobilize nations against one another, is modern. Nationalist elites scan the fund of popular beliefs and symbols to mobilize their constituency for status, territorial as well as material interests.
- (4) *Ethnosymbolists* like Anthony D. Smith (1986) and John Hutchinson (1987) are neither modernist nor anti modernist but can be described as “qualified modernist.” These theorists explain modern nationalism, first, in its own terms: as a new doctrine or ideology which advocates the pursuit of its declared ends for their own sake; and second, as a response to the socially and morally disruptive impact of modernity. Triggered by modernity’s triple revolution of universalistic democratic politics, secularizing scientific culture, and the prosperity of industrial capitalist economy, nationalism is not a conservative, neotraditionalist rejection of modernity. Rather, it is a way of facilitating the transition to its advantages and compensating for its disadvantages. First, by selectively reviving and emphasizing those experiences from the community’s own past which have affinities with modernity and especially its openness to change, innovation, and exchange with other cultures, thereby legitimizing change from within. And, second, by remoralizing the community, disoriented by modernity’s anomie. The ethnic culture provides a repertoire of models and symbols of human association and belonging, including religious principles and ethnocultural bonds, and stabilizes modern personalities confronted with the dilemmas of the age of reason. Consequently, for these theorists, nationalism combines the old with

the new and its success is given as evidence of the persistence of the past, the flexibility rather than fixity of cultural identities, and the human need for continuity with the past as against the modernist belief that humankind can be and was recreated *ex nihilo* in 1789.

The collapse of international communism in the former Soviet bloc, beginning with the fall of the Berlin Wall in 1989, and the “ever closer” unification of the member states of the European Union since the Maastricht Treaty of 1992, have given rise to two apparently contradictory tendencies: the revival of nationalism and the reduction of the salience of personal identification with the national state. The latter tendency has been reinforced by an expansion of multicultural policies on a world scale, underpinned by the United Nations Universal Declaration of Human Rights. Both trends, notwithstanding the forces of globalization, converge on the importance of ethnocultural tradition and community in the twenty first century.

SEE ALSO: Collective Identity; Ethnic Groups; Ethnonationalism; Gellner, Ernst; Imagined Communities; Nation State; Nation State and Nationalism; Nationalism and Sport; Postnationalism

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nationalism and sport

Alan Bairner

The existence of a close relationship between sport and nationalism is widely accepted. This relationship manifests itself in the concept of national sports, in the enduring popularity of international competitions, events, and contests, and in the myriad ways in which politicians and politically motivated groups have sought to harness sport to national causes. On the other hand, questions are increasingly being asked not only about the future of the relationship between nationalism and sport, but also about the fate of the nation itself. The argument is perfectly straightforward, even though it is commonly expressed in far from accessible language. Put simply, it is asserted that economic, political, cultural, and ideological trends, supported by a pervasive and all powerful global media industry, must inevitably destroy the distinctiveness upon which nations, nationalism, and national identities depend for their very existence.

Specifically in relation to sport, it is claimed that the global exchange of sporting bodies makes it increasingly difficult for the nation state to be represented by conventional corporeal symbols. As a consequence of this and other far reaching developments, it is believed by some that we may be at the earliest stages of the development of a transnational or global culture, of which sport is a part. Yet, sport also provides considerable evidence of cultural exchange that is undoubtedly at odds with the vision of a process of homogenization that is often encapsulated in the concept of Americanization. Furthermore, in any debate of this type it is dangerously misleading to equate the nation with the nation state. Indeed, it can be claimed that the forces associated with the idea of globalization have actually created political and cultural space in which nations and nationalities that have historically been submerged within nation states have been reawakened and infused with new vitality.

One need go no further than the United Kingdom in order to clarify the distinction between nation and nation state. "Britain" is in itself a nationless entity. Nowhere is this demonstrated more publicly than in the world of international sport. With a single Olympics squad, four "national" soccer teams and three "national" rugby teams together with Northern Ireland's part share in the Irish team, the UK's sporting landscape is testimony to the complex relationship between nations and nation states. Thus, when we refer to the prestige that nations can derive from sport, it is important to think in terms not only of internationally recognized states whose politicians seize upon sporting success for ideological and propagandist reasons, but also of submerged nations (Scotland, Wales, Québec, the Basque nation, Catalonia, and so on) for which sport has commonly been one of the most effective vehicles for cultural resistance by both cultural and political nationalists. For them, sport provides athletes and fans with opportunities to celebrate a national identity that is different from, and in some cases opposed to, their ascribed nationality. The two forms of engagement need not be mutually exclusive. It is possible to support both British teams and Scottish ones or to represent Wales and also the United Kingdom. It can be argued, though, that national identity

takes priority in the minds of sports fans. Nationality, however, is likely to be what matters to athletes since this alone guarantees the right to compete on behalf of nation states, which, unlike many nations, may be represented in international sport just as they are at the United Nations itself. It is worth noting, of course, that nationality rules have become increasingly flexible in sport as a response to labor migration.

The desire, particularly on the part of fans, to express their national identity in the realm of sport is clearly linked to nationalism in the broadest sense or, at the very least, to patriotism. Former Member of Parliament Jim Sillars dismissed the attitude of his fellow Scots toward national sporting representatives as “ninety minute patriotism.” For example, Irish support for national representatives in global sporting activities such as track and field, rugby union, and soccer is in most cases patriotic and, by implication, relatively politically shallow. The relationship between Gaelic games and Irish nationalism is, on the other hand, much more profound. In general, however, attempts to distinguish the passions aroused by international sport from “real” nationalism miss the point. It is undeniable that expressions of solidarity for players and teams that represent one’s nation are closely linked to cultural nationalism. Whether or not they are also bound up with political nationalism is a different question, the answer to which necessarily varies from one individual to the next. For many people, even ones whose national identity is associated with a submerged nation, cultural nationalism is enough. They may well feel that they could not become any more Scottish or Welsh or Catalan than they already are with the formation of a nation state that would correspond to their sense of national identity. For others, though, cultural nationalism is nothing more than the emotional embellishment of a strongly held political ideology that will settle for nothing less than national sovereignty.

For most sportsmen and women, even in an era when money is a major incentive for sporting success, representing the nation remains important. It is not inconceivable that they might represent more than one nation, with neither ethnic origin nor even well established civic connections being necessary for a move

from one to another. However, for the overwhelming majority of athletes engaged in international sport, the matter is still relatively clear cut. For fans, things are arguably even simpler. In the modern era, following one’s “proxy warriors” into international competition is one of the easiest and most passionate ways of underlining one’s sense of national identity, one’s nationality, or both. Needless to say, not everyone wishes to celebrate their national affiliation in this way, in most instances for the simple reason that they are not interested in sport, the nation, or the relationship between the two. But just as for most active participants, for the majority of sports fans the choice is relatively straightforward. This is not to deny that in certain circumstances athletes and fans alike may well understand their nations in different ways. Furthermore, it is not only sporting individuals who demonstrate the contested character of most, if not all, nations. Sports themselves also do so to the extent that they become “national” in the popular imagination for a variety of reasons.

National sports take different forms and, in so doing, they provide us with insights into the character of particular nations. Indeed, the concept of the “national” sport not only provides insights into the relationship between the various terms listed above that are associated with the nation, but also helps us to understand how it is that nations resist globalization even in a global era. Some “national” sports are peculiar to specific nations. Their “national” status is ring fenced by their exclusivity – echoes here of ethnic nationalism. National sports and games of this type are in some sense linked to the essence of the nations in question, even though their actual origins may be prenational or at least prior to the emergence of nation states. They represent “the nation” symbolically despite the fact that they may well have demonstrably failed to capture the interest of most of the people who constitute the civic nation and/or the nation state.

It should be noted that those activities that are most likely to be ring fenced because of their specific cultural resonance do not always find favor with members of particular nations’ cosmopolitan elites, who may well believe that the nation is better represented by sports that are both modern and transnational. Certainly,

the *corrida de toros*, the classic form of the bullfight, is not universally popular throughout Spain, nor does it even take place at all in some Spanish regions. In terms of popularity, the “national sport” of Spain is almost unarguably association football (soccer). Yet, at least as much as taurine activities, the game helps us to appreciate the extent to which Spain is at best a divided nation and, at worst, not a nation at all – merely a nation state.

In Ireland, whilst hurling may well be the sport of choice in the eyes of Bord Failte or the executives responsible for selling a variety of Irish products, including stout and whiskey, the sport’s popularity varies considerably from one county, and even one parish, to another. Gaelic football is more uniform in terms of the support that it receives throughout the 32 counties. Yet there are isolated pockets where it loses out to hurling. Furthermore, the right of any Gaelic game to be assigned “national status” is considerably weakened not only because some Irish nationalists opt for other sports, such as rugby union and soccer, but also because the overwhelming majority of the Protestant community in the north of Ireland have resolutely turned their backs on the whole Gaelic games tradition. It might seem easy to dismiss this difficulty by simply taking these people at their word and accepting that, since they do not consider themselves to be truly Irish, their sporting preferences need have no impact on what does or does not constitute an Irish national sport. But this would be to ignore the basic precepts of Irish republican ideology that has consistently sought to embrace not only Catholics but Protestants and dissenters as well.

Games such as rugby union and soccer have some claim on the right to be called “national” in the Irish context. Despite their British origins, they are played throughout the island. Moreover, although rugby tends to be played by Protestants rather than Catholics in Northern Ireland, both football codes enjoy considerable supports from both traditions on the island as a whole. They offer Irish sportsmen the opportunity to represent the nation at the international level. Indeed, rugby, unlike soccer, allows northern unionists the chance to acknowledge their sporting Irishness whilst retaining a political allegiance to the union of the United Kingdom and Northern Ireland. It should be

noted, however, that regardless of any claims that either sport may have to be recognized as “national,” neither has escaped the influence of globalization. The two Irish “national” soccer teams have both fielded players whose ethnic “right” to belong has been relatively weak. The same thing has happened in rugby union, which in recent years has witnessed a flood of antipodean coaches and players, some of whom have qualified to play for Ireland despite having accents that conjure up images of Dunedin or Durban, not Dublin or Dungannon.

Gaelic games have been less affected by the movement of people that is commonly linked to globalization, except in the sense that Irish migrants have taken their traditional activities to other parts of the world, most notably North America. This is not to deny that changes taking place beyond the shores of Ireland have had an impact on the Gaelic Athletic Association (GAA). Nevertheless, the factors that have been most influential are best understood in terms of modernization and capitalism as opposed to the more specific category of globalization. Gaelic games have been relatively unscathed by the latter. As a result, the GAA offers rich insights into the processes whereby the nation has been able to resist the global in sport as in much else.

There are some grounds for believing that the link between nationalism and sport is becoming weaker and that the very existence of international competition is threatened by the twin forces of globalization and consumer capitalism. For the time being, however, the relationship between sports and nations remains strong, although this relationship manifests itself in many ways.

SEE ALSO: Globalization, Sport and; Identity, Sport and; Nationalism; Olympics; Politics and Sport; Sport and Culture

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naturalistic inquiry

Yvonna S. Lincoln

Naturalistic inquiry is a label given to certain forms of phenomenological inquiry, including some qualitative research, much interpretive research, and many other forms of non-experimental and non-positivist inquiry, which relies heavily on the assumption that sensemaking or meaning-making activities constitute forms of reality[ies] as meaningful, or more meaningful, to study than physical realities when dealing with human research. While positivist and experimental forms of inquiry rely heavily on factors which can be weighed, measured, assessed, or otherwise quantified, naturalistic inquiry – or constructivist inquiry, as it is more accurately labeled today – balances the inquiry focus by moving beyond tangible or measurable variables to focus on the *social constructions* of research participants. Social constructions are those products of the meaning-making, sensemaking (Weick 1995) mental activities that human beings engage in as a consequence of interaction with other human beings.

Social constructions are critical simply because they determine how individuals (and groups) will respond to interactions, situations,

events, and the other phenomena that swirl by them. It is not the situation, event, or interaction which determines an individual's response, but rather the social location, standpoint, gender, age, social class, attitudes, values, beliefs, and other attributes of his standpoint that frame the meaning-making possibilities for that individual. In short, the world of physical and social phenomena is not received directly by individuals (or groups), but rather is mediated by unmeasured and theoretically unmeasurable characteristics the individuals carry with themselves as a part of their own identity, heritage, and personality structure. The ability to know, to comprehend, and to construct meaning from individual and group identities is termed standpoint epistemology.

Naturalistic (or constructivist) inquiry is characterized by an ontology, epistemology, methodology, and axiology/aesthetics which differ considerably from conventional (or positivist or experimental) models of research. Taken together, the postures on reality (ontology), ways of coming to know (epistemology), means of knowing (methodology), and values and aesthetics (axiology) form a *metaphysics*, a paradigm (model) which is philosophically integrated and mutually reinforcing within itself. When naturalistic, constructivist, or interpretivist inquirers speak of a paradigm for their research, it is to this internally coherent, mutually reinforcing and integrated philosophical system that they are speaking. The paradigm itself suggests certain methods are more useful, frequently, than others, but paradigm does not refer to the methods themselves (e.g., qualitative); as a result, it is likely a misnomer to speak of some *qualitative paradigm*. As constructivists deploy the term paradigm, it is incorrect to speak of a qualitative paradigm, since constructivists can and do frequently employ quantitative methods in their work, particularly in creating thick descriptions of phenomena under investigation (Guba & Lincoln 1981, 1989, 1994; Lincoln & Guba 1985, 2000). Those inquirers who are persuaded that constructivist inquiry utilizes solely qualitative methods sometimes argue for an expanded repertoire, to include quantitative methods, and consequently advocate for *mixed methods research*. All research, however, holds the possibility for mixing of methods, and naturalistic, constructivist, and interpretivist inquiry is no

exception, as Lincoln and Guba (1985, 2000) and Guba and Lincoln (1981, 1989, 1994) have made clear from 1981 onward.

METAPHYSICS AND THE PARADIGM

The ontological position for naturalistic inquiry holds that reality is not merely physical, although physical realities (those factors which can be weighed, measured, parceled, or subdivided) are often important, but is also those entities known as social constructions. Constructions are the mental and sensemaking processes and products which humans engage as they make sense of, and organize, the physical realities, sensory data, situations, contexts, experiences, attitudes, values, beliefs, expectations, and the like which swirl around them. Inasmuch as humans act on their own (and others') constructions, constructions acquire an ontological status equivalent to, if not exceeding, physical or tangible realities. Unlike "measurable" physical realities, constructions cannot be dealt with adequately, that is, in a scientific sense, by parsing or fragmenting them into smaller units, or variables; they can only be dealt with holistically, as an integrated set of meaning instances. Further, they are not reducible to a single, "true" picture of some reality, but rather exist as individual and group idiographic portraits of some sensemaking activity. In other words, they are not singular, but rather multiple, existing in as many forms and instances as the individuals from whom they have been sought.

Epistemological questions likewise diverge significantly from those of conventional inquiry. The first and foremost question epistemology raises is: What is the nature of the relationship between the inquirer and the inquired? The second question epistemology raises is: What shall we agree is a truth statement? What is truth, within the paradigm? The third epistemological question is: What would be the nature of causality, if we are to include causal statements? The fourth and final epistemological question is: How shall we come to know what we are inquiring about (the methodological question)?

The major issue, currently under serious discussion, is the nature of the relationship

between the inquirer and her respondents. There are a variety of serious proposals abroad, from feminists, poststructuralists, postmodernists, race and ethnic studies scholars, queer theorists, and others. Each varies from the other, some in serious ways. The naturalistic or constructivist's answer to this question is that the relationship is far more subjective, in that the relationship often "creates" the data proffered for research purposes, but that researcher and researched exchange roles several times between teacher and learner, between researcher and researched, as the researcher teaches the respondent what she is interested in, and the respondent then assumes the role of teacher, teaching the researcher about his or her lived experience. Respondents are not objectified, but rather are accorded respect as agents with dignity, rights of refusal, full locus of control, and self agency. Deception is disavowed, and often researchers share themselves and their own lives as a part of the research relationship.

Truth statements are considered not only "factual" data (e.g., number of children enrolled in a school district, number of patients administered flu shots in a single clinic), but also the many constructions around the phenomenon of interest. Both physical and sensemaking data are given equal weight, with social constructions being accorded status as wholly meaningful and indeed critical scientific data. Thus, there is a rebalancing between physical and mental data, with meaning making constructions accorded heavy weight in terms of their ability to bring about, affect, effect, or influence human behavior and values.

Causality is a particular issue with naturalistic inquiry. Conventional models of causality assume a unidirectional and linear relationship between cause and effect. Constructivist inquiry assumes a multidirectional field of influence, often termed "mutual causality" to indicate the difficulty in sorting cause and effect. Feedback, feed forward, and feed through all become important concepts, as "causes," or mutual shaper and shaping forces, move through situations and contexts. Thus, naturalistic inquirers speak little of cause and effect, but rather speak of "webs of influence," "plausible inferences," and "mutual shaping."

Methodological issues, as a part of epistemology, have come to the fore, and indeed, some researchers term interpretive inquiry “qualitative paradigms,” a term which we believe to be a misnomer (since practitioners from many paradigms can and do utilize qualitative research). The reason, however, that naturalistic, constructivist, and interpretivist research has come to be called the qualitative paradigm is because, in the collection of social constructions, qualitative methods turn out to be the best adapted to the task of probing the constructions of respondents, requesting clarifications and examples, and exploring the deeper values which undergird those constructions.

The final paradigmatic concern is axiology, or the place of values in naturalistic and/or constructivist values. Like related paradigms, such as critical theory, and unlike conventional inquiry, where objectivity is the presumed stance of the researcher, values are openly acknowledged as a part of the inquiry effort. Bias is attended to by explicating, as fully as possible, the values of the inquirer, and the values which inhere in the research context. Naturalistic inquirers believe values to be a part of any human project, including scientific research, and prefer to deal with values as a part of the systematic and disciplined inquiry effort, rather than attempt to obscure the role of values by claiming a philosophically impossible value neutrality (Hesse 1980) or unattainable objectivity (Bullock & Trombley 1999). Researchers have a variety of means to explore their own values and the manner in which their values impinge on a particular inquiry, and research more broadly, but whatever systematic strategies are chosen, value exploration is always a part of any inquiry project.

Naturalistic inquiry offered the first organized effort to attempt to codify an alternative to conventional and experimental inquiry in terms of an overarching paradigm. In subsequent years, thoughtful inquirers have both criticized and enlarged the considerations of method and epistemology around a variety of alternatives, and today, naturalistic inquiry is one among several paradigms, and one among many theoretical lenses (e.g., feminist theory, critical race theory, queer theory) which can be adopted to explore social issues and problems.

SEE ALSO: Epistemology; Interviewing, Structured, Unstructured, and Postmodern; Journaling, Reflexive; Methods, Mixed; Paradigms; Phenomenology

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nature

Adrian Franklin

The sociological analysis of nature as it is used in the modern West (by specific cultures and space(s)) is fraught with definitional problems, notably the seemingly very different and overlapping senses of the word nature. “Nature,” says Williams (1983: 219), “is perhaps the most complex word in the language.” However, on the same page, he is able to show that it is usually not difficult to distinguish its varied meanings: “indeed it is often habitual and in effect not noticed in reading.” Three meanings can be distinguished: (1) nature as an essential quality of something; (2) nature as a force at large in the world; and (3) nature as the world itself including objects, humans, and non human organisms.

Williams says that the meanings are variable across (2) and (3) but that the area of reference is broadly clear; that these senses relate to each other in an important historical developmental sequence and that all three senses are still common and actively used. The first sense is a specific singular and was in use in the thirteenth century. The second and third senses are abstract singulars, the former deriving from the fourteenth century and the latter from the seventeenth century, though they overlapped in the sixteenth century. Williams relates this linguistic transformation to changes in religious and scientific thought where sense (1) derived from a more plural pantheistic worldview of gods and forces, and where sense (2) derived from a more omnipotent singular directing force as a universal power, while sense (3) emerged later to describe the unity of the material world so ordered. The seeming diversity of the material world is therefore made to have a commonality in post Enlightenment thinking, although the source of the singularity of nature changed from a creating, omnipotent God via singular personifications such as “mother nature” to the playing out of natural laws, the laws governing all things in the universe, where nature was personified as a constitutional lawyer, and later, after Darwin, as a selective breeder (Williams 1972: 152).

While Williams was able to tease out fascinating social constructions of nature, it was not equally true that sociology took much notice of nature until very recently. Nature and society were opposing poles in the “Great Divide” between the sciences and the humanities. While all along scholars have upheld connection over separation, the nature of disciplinary cultures has meant that very little connectivity actually took place. It is partly an artifact of sociology’s success in making a case for its specialist field. When Durkheim argued for social facts as a separable class of reality, it became possible for the new discipline of sociology to bracket out nature, leaving it to the mercies of the natural sciences. The irony is that social anthropology, a fertile site of sociological theory, focused specifically on the connections between nature and culture. In the work of Durkheim, Lévi Strauss, Evans Pritchard, Mary Douglas, and Tim Ingold, we can chart a history of at least 100 years of scholarship and development – yet

very little crossed into mainstream sociology (Franklin 2002).

One reason for this is that by the time sociology emerged, western humanity was increasingly urbanized and the city was clearly taken to be outside and opposed to the natural world. This separation of civic society from the countryside, its agricultural hinterland, and from wild nature, its opposed other, enabled sociologists to imagine a province comprised purely of the social and cultural. In essays such as “The Metropolis and Mental Life,” Simmel was thus able to describe the specificities of a big city culture, as a self contained sociality (Frisby & Featherstone 1997). Moreover, this essay shows how the city produced a new kind of person from the small town or rural village, with a different psychological makeup, emotional content, and intellectual capacities born of a different environment of stimulations. Because the city was not governed or anchored in nature, natural rhythms, or cycles, it was cut loose to develop in new ways. Sociology is almost exclusively urban in location and has been able to ignore the nature of the countryside or wilderness as an irrelevant variable.

Macnaghten and Urry suggest that the work of Dunlap and Catton (1979, 1994) was the only exception to this trend. Their work was predicated on an interdisciplinary approach to “environmental” problems, and as Macnaghten and Urry (1998: 5–6) point out, they played second fiddle to the more obviously significant and dominant scientific disciplines. The environment was a problematized nature, the problem being caused largely by people. While the environmental problem was to be defined, monitored, and fixed by science, sociologists could do their bit by explaining the social dimensions and causes of environmental harm and its impacts and suggesting the means by which a social solution could be arrived at. By these collaborations, sociologists found themselves working according to an agenda set by science in which they were able to develop only a partial and instrumental sociology of nature.

The call for a sociology of nature can be dated in one way to 1995, when two influential articles were published. Murphy’s plea for “a sociology where nature mattered” argued that the immanent and irrefutable environmental and ecological crisis could not be ignored any

longer by sociology; that the environmental and ecological movement required collaboration with sociology because the environmental crisis was composed of two challenges: to produce the right scientific diagnoses and responses to questions of sustainability and the right social responses that would be consistent with those. More broadly, and in the medium term, he asked how we were to change society in order to live *with* nature. How could two separate systems be restored to equilibrium? This was a noble initiative, even if it did disregard the entire work of the sociology of science – both the sociology of scientific knowledge and its opponents in science and technology studies (STS) – and especially STS’s justifiably skeptical position on the ontological separability of nature from humanity. Those writing from the STS position argue that it is pointless to shift our allegiance and identity from the human to the natural realm. Rather, we should concentrate our energies on how to bring about good associations between humans and non humans (see especially Braun & Castree 1998: 171).

In common with realist demands for more sociological participation in environmental issues and theory, Murphy preserved the ontologically separable status of society and nature and wished only to understand (and change) the exchanges between them. Critical realist thinkers (e.g., Dickens 1996) theorized a dialectical relationship between humanity and nature such that both have agency conceived very abstractly as “causal powers.” These were conceived as inherent in natural and social objects. Such objects were not constituted by and through their ongoing relations with heterogeneous others, an ontology preferred by Donna Haraway, Bruno Latour, and John Law. Rather, since their existence was a given and relatively enduring condition, their causal powers remained fixed aspects of their scientific makeup. This is why those critical realists who have contributed to environmental debates tend to adopt a restorative approach; that the natural world has a proper shape and content that humanity has disturbed and imbalanced. Environmentalists should therefore seek to restore or repair nature and find ways of mirroring nature’s proper balance with sustainable and socially just human footprints on the world

(Peter Dickens’s book of 1996, for example, was titled *Reconstructing Nature*).

In this was preserved both the separable and separated objects of nature and society in a dutiful Enlightenment manner, preserving too the distinct and separate domains of science and sociology. It is for these reasons that sociology was called upon to play a supporting role; to find ways of sustaining a world that only science could properly diagnose and prescribe. And it was for these reasons that critical realism concentrates predominantly on the social side of the equation, the side of the Great Divide that, according to its adherents, is the source of change and the source of salvation. In this way, like political ecology itself, critical realism has remained predominantly interested in issues of social justice, health, ethics, Marxism, and capitalism (see, e.g., Dickens 2001).

Macnaghten and Urry’s 1995 paper, on the other hand, was warranted by the considerable social content already manifest in environmental agendas and ontologies, and this became of interest to those working in many established fields of sociology: social movements; social justice; leisure and tourism; feminism; science and technology studies; neo Durkheimian studies. This paper, together with their book *Contested Natures* (1998), spawned one of the most healthy and vital domains of sociology of the past 10 years, sensibly avoiding or bypassing the squabble between social constructivism and critical realism.

Macnaghten and Urry were aware of post structural currents that were rapidly undermining the nature–culture binary and they tried to account for the contested, culturally specific biopolitics of environment by looking at nature and society as a conjoined human lived experience. Usefully, they forged a synthesis between the sociology of the body and sensual engagements with the world and Heidegger’s notion of *dwelling* via the work of anthropologist Tim Ingold (1993, 1995). The result was an inspiring sketch of the multiple ways in which modern Europeans were embedded in their natural world, the way nature was inscribed on modern sensibilities and bodies, but also the way in which nature and humanity were a mutual unfolding or becoming where neither forms a controlling or prior center. This had a radically different feel to the purist boundaries of critical

realism and it offered a valuable perspective to environmental organizations that were just beginning to feel the chill away from the zeitgeist. Clearly, environmental organizations could not rely on the power of argument alone and they needed to acknowledge that environmental support had personal, lived, embodied, and local dimensions; that global crises had to be felt as well as related.

Since these debates, nature or the non human has become far more significant in a range of sociological work. In particular, discussions have moved away from a primary focus on the environment to embrace such things as the relation between biology and society, biopolitics, and “life itself” (Rose 2005); the implications of dissolving the nature–culture difference (e.g., Haraway 2003); the fluid and commodified nature of “life itself” in post genomic society (Franklin 2001); and new ontological understandings of relations between humans and non humans (Michael 2000). The sociology of nature is one of the most exciting leading edges of sociology.

SEE ALSO: Actor Network Theory; Actor Network Theory, Actants; Animal Rights Movements; Culture, Nature and; Ecofeminism; Ecological Problems; Ecological View of History; Ecology; Ecology and Economy; Environmental Movements; Globalization, Culture and; Human–Non Human Interaction; Posthumanism; Society and Biology

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negative case analysis

Lonnie Athens

Negative case analysis boils down to using a small set of powerful heuristic principles to generate scientific hypotheses that enjoy strong empirical support from the intensive study of a small sample of cases. Over the years, negative case analysis also has been referred to as analytic induction or the limited case study method. Regardless of the name, the researchers who use this method deliberately search for empirical cases that contradict a scientific law or a working hypothesis with the goal of improving the hypothesis or law as well as the underlying conception of the problem to which the law or hypothesis applies. Thus, researchers who use this method do not eschew the discovery of a negative case. On the contrary, they would welcome such a discovery because it not only

gives them the opportunity to overturn an established scientific law, but it also gives them a chance to invent an alternative hypothesis that could potentially become a pathbreaking scientific discovery (Becker 1998: 194–212).

Although seldom recognized, negative case analysis actually has been applied for two different but related purposes. One purpose is to chronicle the development of scientific knowledge about a particular problem. According to Mead (1917), scientific advance takes place over a process which, for expository purposes, can be divided into three distinct stages. During the first stage, *refutation*, researchers detect what Mead calls an “anomaly,” a negative case that, at the moment, appears only to them to contradict an established scientific law, which for him simply represents a long and widely accepted hypothesis. According to Mead, the detection of negative cases is “the growing point of science.” During *invention*, the second stage, researchers mull over the precise nature of the anomaly or negative case discovered earlier until they can finally devise an alternative hypothesis that, at this early point, they alone believe can account for the negative case. With the inception of this new hypothesis, the anomaly becomes transformed into what Mead called an “instance,” a case that affirms rather than disconfirms a hypothesis or scientific law. During the third stage, *endorsement*, the larger scientific community must give its stamp of approval to this alternative hypothesis, which raises its status from lowly working hypothesis to acknowledged scientific law.

Although enlightening, Mead’s use of negative case analysis to explain the evolution of scientific knowledge suffers from some obvious flaws. The most important one is overlooking the impact of scientific cliques on how long it takes for the scientific community as a whole to accept new hypotheses as legitimate scientific laws. Depending on these cliques’ perceived interests and power, they can create or remove obstacles toward achieving the ultimate acceptance of new scientific laws. Another obvious flaw is that in some scientific fields, such as sociology, there are relatively few well established laws, yet many different hypotheses vying to become one. Despite the disregard for the influence of scientific cliques and the relative absence of scientific laws in some fields, Mead’s use

of negative case analysis to chronicle the evolution of scientific knowledge retains a certain charm.

The second and more important purpose for which negative analysis has been applied is as a general research method that can be effectively used in any science, sociology included. In the *Method of Sociology*, originally published in 1934, Florian Znaniecki argued that what he called “analytic induction,” rather than “enumerative induction” had to be used in sociology if it was to advance as an empirical science. According to Znaniecki, analytical induction is superior to the enumerative form, which, according to him, reaches its highest expression in statistical tests because only analytic induction can satisfy the requirement that “all S are P.” Unfortunately, he did not always define “S” and “P” in a consistent manner. When Znaniecki defined “S” as the hypothesis and “P” as the problem under study, he meant by this phrase that a hypothesis must explain all the cases falling under a researcher’s definition of the problem, rather than only a significant portion of these cases. Restated in more contemporary terms, Znaniecki means that a hypothesis must be able to account for 100 percent of the variation in the cases that he studied. Thus, negative case analysis can aptly be described as a method for developing “universal” or, more precisely, invariant hypotheses.

In Znaniecki’s opinion, analytic induction is not only superior to enumerative induction, but it also makes the use of enumerative induction a superfluous research exercise. However, one can recognize the superiority of analytic over enumerative induction without completely dismissing the need for using the latter. In fact, it could be forcibly argued that they can be used effectively in conjunction with one another (Turner 1953). On the one hand, the statistical findings that researchers produce through enumerative induction can be used to help identify the crude outlines of the underlying causal process that produces a problem. On the other hand, the causal processes that researchers pinpoint by their use of analytic induction can be used to help explain the statistical findings grossly associated with the problem, a point that Sutherland (1942) demonstrated in the development of his famous theory of differential

association. Thomas (1967: 244) sublimely describes the reciprocal relationship between these two forms of induction in his often repeated remark that “taken in themselves statistics are nothing more than the symptoms of unknown causal processes.” Thus, regarding Znaniecki’s contention that analytic induction renders statistical analyses gratuitous, time has shown that he was dead wrong (Turner 1953).

Using negative case analysis, researchers develop invariant hypotheses by performing the following four steps. First, on the basis of their first hand knowledge, scouring of previous research, especially extant theories, or preferably both, researchers must develop a working definition of the problem chosen for study and a provisional hypothesis to explain it. In developing the initial and all subsequent hypotheses, the researcher must identify by successive approximation the “causal process” and, thereby, both the necessary and sufficient stages for the problem under study to appear. By “necessary” and “sufficient,” it is meant that the problem under study only occurs after all the stages identified by the researcher have occurred, so that if even one of these stages fails to occur, then the problem will also fail to occur. Moreover, the researcher must not only identify provisionally the necessary and sufficient stages involved in this process, but also the specific order in which they must unfold.

Second, the researcher must examine a few empirical cases that fall under their provisional definition to determine whether their working hypothesis can explain these cases. If any of the cases examined contradict this working hypothesis, then researchers have one of two options. They can either (1) alter their hypothesis so that it can account for the negative case, or else (2) modify their provisional definition of the problem under study to exclude the negative case from their study’s purview. It must be underscored here, however, that researchers should never eliminate a negative case from the problem under study merely for the purpose of excluding it, but only if its elimination will improve their conception of the problem. Thus, before deciding to eliminate a negative case from the scope of their study, researchers must be always certain that their problem was, in fact, earlier misconceived.

Third, if researchers develop a hypothesis that can account for all the cases examined so far that fall under their current definition of the problem, then they must deliberately search for empirical cases that negate their latest hypothesis, for the purpose of further perfecting either this new hypothesis or the definition of the problem to which it applies. If new negative cases are uncovered from this search, then researchers must once again revise either their working hypothesis or their definition of the problem, a process that one can expect to repeat many times during the course of a study. The need for researchers to revise their hypotheses or their definition of the problem should not be construed as a bad sign, but as a positive indication that they are learning something from their study of actual cases and, thereby, their contact with the empirical world.

Fourth, if researchers feel confident that they have reached a final definitive hypothesis after having studied a number of different cases, then they must restart their search for negative cases. This time, however, they would not deliberately look for negative cases that fall inside their present definition of the problem. Instead, they would intentionally look for negative cases that fall outside their present definition of the problem. If their latest hypothesis does not apply to these exogenous cases, then the researchers can be reasonably assured that their final definitive hypothesis has been empirically confirmed. Although this is the last step in the method that researchers must carry out, it is no less important than the earlier ones.

Only rarely have sociologists used negative case analysis as it is described in these steps. In fact, there exists probably no more than a handful of published sociological studies that utilize negative case analysis in this rigorous form (Becker 1998: 194–6), and most of these have been conducted in the subfield of criminology, which often requires methods that can be applied to small samples (Cressey 1953; Becker 1963: 41–78; Lindesmith 1968). At least two good reasons may be surmized for sociologists’ apparent hesitancy to adopt this method for their studies. Even when compared against other qualitative methods of analysis, there are relatively few methodological guidelines for using negative case analysis, an important

shortcoming that critics have missed. This general lack of rules of thumb forces researchers who use this method to rely on their own devices, which may prove unnerving, especially to those just starting their careers.

No doubt, sociologists also may be apprehensive that negative case analysis may not be well received in the sociological community because of the criticisms that it has drawn. Among other things, critics (Robinson 1951; Turner 1953; Denzin 1989: 166–9) have charged that in its strictest form this method (1) generates quasi tautologies rather than logically sound theories; (2) identifies only the necessary causes, instead of both the necessary and sufficient causes; (3) isolates factors associated with but not necessarily the essences of the problem under study; and (4) demands a large investment of time and energy on the part of the researcher with no guarantee of a significant research payoff.

All these criticisms of negative case analysis, except for the last one, however, can be largely discounted on two grounds. Despite claims to the contrary (Turner 1953), some of the early critics of negative case analysis have confused weaknesses in particular research applications of the method or statements of its operating principles with inherent defects in its underlying logic. Also, critics have either intentionally or inadvertently given the false impression that some of these weaknesses are unique to negative case analysis when, in fact, they can be equally applied to statistical methods of analysis. If these criticisms are placed in proper perspective, then it may be concluded that negative case analysis remains a relatively powerful although admittedly underdeveloped logical procedure. As for the perennial problem in sociology of the divorce between our theories and the empirical world to which they refer, no better palliative now exists than negative case analysis (Blumer 1969: 21–47).

Nevertheless, researchers will be unable to exploit its full potential until more methodological guidelines for discovering negative cases and inventing new hypotheses or definitions of the problem under study to accommodate them become developed. To help systematize the process whereby these new hypotheses and definitions are devised, Becker (1998) argues that researchers can construct what Ragan

(1994) aptly labels a truth table – a table where the columns represent the conditions or stages in a process that are either absent or present and rows represent each case studied. By constructing truth tables, researchers can record whether a particular condition or stage takes place and the time order in which that stage or condition occurs in the cases subsumed under their varying conceptions of the problem under study. Although the use of truth tables would represent a significant methodological advance as far as the use of negative case analysis is concerned, other rules of thumb also need to be developed. In the meantime, sociologists who possess both real ingenuity and great confidence in their ability to solve empirical puzzles should not let these criticisms dissuade them from using negative case analysis, especially if they have a burning desire to conduct a study that challenges the prevailing wisdom in their field.

Finally, the relationship between the two different uses for negative case analysis needs to be pointed out. On the one hand, if researchers successfully use negative case analysis as a general research method, then they can potentially discover new laws that could revolutionize their scientific fields. On the other hand, if researchers use negative case analysis only for unraveling the evolution of scientific knowledge, then they can use the former discoveries as they chronicle the development of that particular scientific field's development. Thus, ultimately, the use of negative case analysis as a specific method for understanding the accumulation of scientific knowledge depends on its success as a general research method for conducting scientific studies.

SEE ALSO: Analytic Induction; Sampling, Qualitative (Purposive); Scientific Revolution

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nenko chingin

Ross Mouer

Nenko chingin was a central concept in discussions of Japanese style management in the 1960s, 1970s, and 1980s. A shorthand for *nenko joretsu chingin seido* (literally, “age merit ordered wage system”), the term has commonly been rendered in English as the seniority wage system. It continues to be used to describe a variety of payment schemes which link age and merit to the wages received by Japanese employees in many established firms. Although the term is readily recognized by most employees in Japan, it is the first component of the term, *nenko* (meaning age and merit), that allows for interpretation and ultimately clouds debates about the importance of seniority in determining wages in Japanese firms. The first character of the Chinese compound for *nenko* is *nen*, which is read alternatively as *toshi* and means year or age. The second character means merit.

Nenko based wage systems were adopted for tenured administrative staff and managers in many of Japan's large pre war firms. There has been debate on the origins of that approach to remunerating tenure. Some have emphasized its importance as an effective strategy in firms wishing to retain skilled labor that is in short supply in order to protect their investment in training staff in new technologies and in the organization's administrative procedures. Others, including Hazama (1971), have come to emphasize the extent to which the system was an outgrowth of a peculiarly Japanese approach to paternalistic management, although such explanations are pressed to explain variations in its application. Still others, such as Kaneko (1980), have pointed to the practice of Japan's more successful commercial establishments which through a practice known as *nor enwake* rewarded employees by giving them franchise rights (and hence the opportunity to increase their income) as they moved through the latter half of their work careers. Kaneko also noted that Japan's wartime government sought to implement an age based system in certain critical industries in order to stop the rampant job shifting which accompanied inflationary conditions during the early 1940s. Nevertheless, age based and seniority based wage systems were in place for only a small minority of Japan's labor force at the end of the war in 1945.

It was in the immediate post war years that the *nenko* system became fully institutionalized. At a time when Japanese were experiencing great poverty, high unemployment, and continuing inflation, left wing unions sought to take over the running of enterprises and pushed for a new social contract with management at a time when many managers were still tainted by their association with Japan's wartime effort. The resultant struggle culminated in a long strike in the electric power industry and in the union winning its demands for an age based wage system. Known as the *Densan gata* [electric power industry] scheme, that approach was soon adopted in a wide range of firms. At a time when many were living at a subsistence level, it was based on a notion of life cycle needs similar to those associated with the paternalism that characterized the way many of Japan's large pre war firms managed their elite employees. Unions sought to have this

tenure linked system in place for all regular employees. Many unionists believed it was a transparent, fair system that remunerated all workers/employees according to their life cycle needs and removed the discretion of management to discriminate among employees according to nebulous and/or non transparent criteria simply to increase their profits at the expense of the working class. Employers saw it as a system that would secure the cooperation and support of all employees at that particular juncture in history.

The implementation of the *Densan gata* wage system meant a considerable loss of managerial prerogative in the setting of wage rates. It limited the discretion of firms to adjust wage rates as a means of regulating their supply of labor and/or disciplining their employees. Although the system worked for management in securing a certain class of skilled employees, much of Japan's industrial relations over the quarter century following the war revolved around *nenko* based wages and management's attempts to rationalize the use of labor by tying wages to other criteria. In combating militant left wing industrial unionism over that period a major aim of management was to limit the weight given to age in the setting of wage rates and the accompanying guarantees of long term employment. It initially sought to alter the *nen* component by replacing age with notions of seniority. The other longer term strategy was to alter the *ko* component, and over time it evolved to incorporate level of education attained, skill levels, job categories, and various aspects of performance.

In the late 1970s debate came to focus on the extent to which the *nenko* wage system was unique to Japan. Those seeing it as unique tended to link it to the practice of long term employment, arguing that the two were underpinned by a unique set of Japanese values which emphasized group loyalty and vertical interpersonal relationships. Those skeptical of such arguments pointed to the widespread research of Becker and others (see Blaug 1968) studying the economics of education. That scholarship revealed how similar age-wage earnings profiles differentiated by level of education could be found in most industrialized societies. Koike (1989) argued against notions of cultural difference setting each worker's values concerning work, accepting that the

choices of Japanese workers with regard to work and their firm were influenced markedly by the more universally valid rationality associated with calculated returns to an individual's or a family's investment in education. He documented how institutional arrangements in Japan might account for different behavioral outcomes even though workers were guided by a universal set of values. He argued that Japanese firms had elected to hire a small number of outstanding high school graduates and then invest corporate funds in their careers as highly skilled blue collar workers. According to Koike, firms sought to protect their investment in human capital by placing those individuals on age earnings curves similar to those normally generally associated only with more educated and skilled employees in most other societies. For Koike, this was the critical difference in Japan that bound that category of employee to the firm. It explained how rational workers would make market conforming decisions to work long hours of overtime and to make a serious commitment to quality control schemes and other procedures that contributed to the overall success of their firms. In the 1980s Koike continued to develop his research around theories of skill formation and internal labor markets that emphasized the effect of specific organizational techniques he characterized as Japanese style management.

While Koike's propositions about *nenko* came to be widely accepted, debate on the overall significance of *nenko* in determining wages continued into the 1990s. Scholars had noted for some time that the *nenko* criteria were most heavily weighted in remunerating regular (male) employees in Japan's large unionized firms. Although they noted that the majority of Japan's employees worked for firms with fewer than 100 employees and that many employees were employed on a casual basis even in large firms, others continued to emphasize the importance of seniority and the *nenko* criteria as social ideals. In the final analysis, arguments about *nenko* have been hard to resolve for several reasons. As Matsushige and Ohashi (1993) concluded in their study of wage setting in an iron and steel plant, the remuneration system in most Japanese firms is so complex that even employees have difficulty assessing how their fellow employees are

rewarded in any precise manner. Given a work culture that discourages individuals from openly discussing their incomes with work mates, many employees seem to be uncertain as to how their wages are ultimately calculated, although most know that *nenko*, performance assessments, overtime, and bonuses all contribute to their annual earnings.

To some extent the concern with *nenko* receded in the late 1990s. The salaried university graduate with long term career prospects in the internal labor market of a large firm is no longer a universally held ideal for Japanese males entering the labor force. The economic slow down and recession of the 1990s saw many firms implement redundancy packages, and the long term employment guarantees associated with the *nenko* wage system were undermined. Immigration and the spread of a new work culture among Japan's youth have also contributed to the multiculturalization of the Japanese labor force. Today, casualized forms of employment have become more common for young men, and career linked seniority is less critical to economic survival in a more affluent Japan than was the case immediately after the war. While *nenko* has a universal validity in terms of the more general theories associated with the economics of education, it must be seen as only one factor shaping choices at work among members of Japan's increasingly diversified labor force. Mouer and Kawanishi (2004) discussed how growing income inequality in Japan needs to be understood not only in terms of firm based remuneration schemes, but also in terms of policy choices at the national level that shape the overall distribution of rewards which flow from active involvement in the Japanese labor force.

SEE ALSO: Aging and the Life Course, Theories of; Educational and Occupational Attainment; Income Inequality and Income Mobility; Japanese Style Management; *Nihon jinron*; *Shushin Koyo*

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neoconservatism

Andrew Gamble

Neoconservatism is a particular variant of American conservatism. The label was first applied in the 1970s to a group of dissident liberal intellectuals around particular journals such as the *Public Interest* and *Commentary*. They included Irving Kristol, Norman Podhoretz, Daniel Bell, and Seymour Martin Lipset. Unlike the term neoliberal, the neoconservatives adopted the label with enthusiasm, describing it as a persuasion rather than as a faction. As an important if small intellectual elite, they became a component of the growing conservative movement in America through the 1980s and 1990s. Some neoconservatives were influential in the Reagan administration, but they appeared to be in decline in the 1990s. Nevertheless, several neoconservatives were appointed to significant posts in the George W. Bush administration, and speculation on the influence of neoconservatism on the policies of the administration after 9/11, particularly the war against Iraq, mounted.

Most of the neocons did not start off as conservatives. They came from a range of

ideological backgrounds, including various kinds of liberalism as well as Trotskyism. The formative experience which made them neocons was their reaction to the events of the 1960s, in particular the student movement, the anti war movement, and the counterculture with its strident denunciations of traditional culture. They criticized the cultural nihilism of the counterculture as well as the consequences of big government, in particular the expansionary welfare programs of the Great Society under Lyndon Johnson. They rejected defeatism about America, particularly in the aftermath of the Vietnam War, and celebrated the virtues of the American republic and the need to defend it as a unique regime. Many neocons were against the policies of détente with the Soviet Union pursued first by Nixon, then by Carter, favoring a more robust foreign policy of the kind pursued by Israel. From the beginning, Israel as a democratic nation that deserved to be defended against its enemies figured as a major presence in the neocon imagination.

Neoconservatism is hard to distill into a single doctrine because neoconservatives tend to be highly individual and idiosyncratic and frequently disagree with one another. Nevertheless, some broad themes do emerge. As a political doctrine, neoconservatism has an acute sense of the political and stresses the primacy of politics. This is in sharp contrast to neoliberalism, which presents itself as an anti political doctrine, seeking to minimize the role of politics as much as possible. Neoconservatism could hardly be more different in this respect. Its instincts belong to the classical republican tradition, with its concern for the virtues and institutions that will sustain a public realm and maintain the security of a political regime. The economy, though important, is a secondary concern to the well being of the political community. This allows neocons to celebrate the public and public service in a manner that neoliberals always find difficult. Neocons do not hate the state; instead they have high ambitions for it, and high standards. The values that are uppermost for them are leadership, security, and strength.

A notable influence on several of the neocons was Leo Strauss, the political philosopher who taught at the University of Chicago until his

death in 1973, though his importance is often exaggerated. Strauss himself was not a neocon and wrote little directly on contemporary politics, and only a handful of those who became neocons actually studied under him. Many myths have developed about his influence. What he did provide was a reevaluation of politics in the classical world, of the importance of the education of elites, of the codes and values by which they operated for sustaining particular conceptions of politics and the political regime itself, of the weaknesses of democracy and the dangers of tyranny. It is the importance of a positive conception of politics that Strauss bequeathed to the neocons, rather than any substantive political program.

One implication of the neocon outlook is wariness toward democracy. But whereas neoliberals reject democracy because of the dangers of popular sovereignty legitimating an extension of state powers, neocons are much more concerned that democracy may breed a cultural atmosphere which leads to a weak government that is supine in relation to external threats and security, defeatist, prone to appeasement, slow to arouse, self indulgent, decadent, shallow, and ruled by fashion and passion rather than by reason. Democracy tends to undermine traditional elites and promotes celebrity rather than leadership, and in so doing removes one of the most important supports for a public realm and an independent politics.

As an economic doctrine neoconservatism adopts in practice many neoliberal prescriptions. It shares in particular the critique of the welfare state, attacking the programs of the Great Society for creating an underclass and a permanent category of poor people dependent on welfare. According to the neocons, the Great Society enfeebled American society while at the same time creating a new class to run it – the public sector workers, lawyers, social workers, administrators, and academics. These formed a new elite, but their values are seen by neocons as inimical to the traditional values of the elites that formed the American republic. The argument is not one about big government as such. Neocons do not favor a minimal state on a point of principle; if the purposes are right ones, it is legitimate to expand the state. Neoconservatives are scornful about the neoliberal concern with balanced budgets and neoliberal worries about

deficits under Reagan and George W. Bush. For neoconservatives, such deficits are justified given the security threat faced by the nation. Politics trumps economics every time.

As a cultural doctrine, neoconservatism has strong affinities with traditional conservatism. Neoconservatives oppose cultural nihilism, regarding it as a serious internal threat to the survival of the nation and the state. They tend as a consequence to be moral fundamentalists, believing in the traditional values that have defined Americans as a community, with their clear lines of good and evil. This acceptance of the Christian basis of the republic is a vital point of principle for neocons, and any thing that tends to undermine it has to be opposed. It is also the basis for their aggressive stance on security. Evil must not only be denounced, it must be confronted, and the republic keeps itself pure and renews itself by distinguishing clearly between its friends and its enemies and by challenging and defeating the latter. The neoliberal utopia of a politics free world strikes neoconservatives as complacent, inert, and mediocre. Only challenge and struggle can bring out the highest human qualities.

Neocons are not shy in pointing to dangers threatening the republic. For them the nation is always in danger, requiring the right kind of leadership to guide it. The cultural and moral crisis of the 1960s, the new cold war of the 1970s and 1980s, and the security crisis after 9/11 led neocons to call for the formation of a new American leadership which could restore the founding values of the republic. The collapse of the Soviet Union in 1990 led to a period in which the neocon vision seemed to be irrelevant, and neocon warnings were increasingly disregarded. With the disappearance of the regime that had been the main enemy of the United States since 1945, there was a vacuum in American policy and cosmopolitan dreams of a world of peace and harmony and steady, unspectacular economic and social progress flourished. This vision was even articulated by a leading neoconservative, Francis Fukuyama, when he declared, following Hegel, that history had ended.

The end of history, however, did not fit the pessimistic neocon view of the world. Neoconservative concerns were reflected more sharply

by Samuel Huntington with his warnings of a possible clash of civilizations. Huntington argued that the West, and in particular the leader of the West, the United States, had to be ready to defend its own heritage and values against challenge if conflict were to be avoided. The West could not afford to be defensive in relation to other civilizations, or to accept dilution of western values or any kind of multiculturalism. Americans needed to be clear of their own identity and how it could be preserved and strengthened.

The concern with identity and how to prevent its loss permeated neoconservative thinking, and also shaped discussion of the security doctrine the United States should develop in the new global order where it was overwhelmingly the dominant superpower. *The Project for the New American Century*, published at the end of the Clinton presidency, argued for a doctrine of US primacy, putting US interests first in the determination of its foreign policy, disregarding when necessary international opinion, especially as represented by the United Nations, and being prepared to intervene diplomatically, economically, and militarily whenever American interests were threatened. The novelty of the doctrine was that it suggested that it was no longer in America's interests, as it had been for much of the Cold War, to give support to authoritarian regimes and military dictatorships so long as they were pro American. Instead, the neocons now argued that the United States should seek wherever possible to encourage the development of pro western democracies, removing by force those regimes which tyrannized their people.

This doctrine was a long way from traditional American conservative foreign policy, with its strong isolationist emphasis and its desire to keep the United States free of foreign entanglements. To some critics it sounded like a reworking of the universalist liberalism of Woodrow Wilson, with its ambition to remold the whole world in the image of America, bringing with it the benefits of democracy and liberty. But where the neocons differ from Wilson is in their realist doctrine about international relations. They have no illusions about the nature of the world, they merely think that America is likely to be safer if it acts preemptively to remove "rogue" regimes and "failed

states” and obliges the whole world to adopt democracy. Leaving things as they are is not an option.

This vision of the world was only one strand inside the George W. Bush administration after 2000, and not at first the most influential one. Isolationist and traditional conservative tendencies were uppermost. September 11, 2001, changed the balance of forces within the administration and allowed a coalition to be forged between neoconservatives like Paul Wolfowitz and Elliott Abrams and nationalist conservatives like Donald Rumsfeld, Dick Cheney, and Condoleezza Rice, isolating other voices such as Colin Powell. What the neoconservatives both inside and outside the administration provided was a clear new doctrine for the conduct of American foreign policy in a world in which America could seemingly be attacked at its heart by a new enemy. The sliding together in the new discourse of the terrorist network of al Qaida with states accused of supporting terrorism or producing weapons of mass destruction – the axis of evil – provided a new set of enemies, and with it a new way of defining friends. The attacks on Afghanistan and on Iraq at first rallied international support to the United States and then shattered it, dividing the US from many of its allies in Europe. From a traditional post war American foreign policy perspective this looked foolhardy, but from a neocon perspective it was exactly what was needed to sharpen American will and purpose, freeing itself from false friends and entanglements and providing clarity to the exercise of American power.

Neoconservatism is an unsettling and dynamic doctrine, which shares much in common with other doctrines of political will and power such as those of Carl Schmitt. It puts supreme importance on leadership and identity, and therefore on the public realm as the place where these must find expression. Not any leadership will do, however. It must be leadership of the right kind that is true to the historical experience of the nation and its traditional values. It is very hard to organize such leadership in a democracy, but not impossible. Neoconservatives are rarely satisfied with what they have achieved, but for them politics is fundamentally a constant struggle for good to triumph over evil, and the battle is never finally won.

SEE ALSO: Conservatism; Democracy; Neoliberalism; Political Leadership

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neoliberalism

Andrew Gamble

Neoliberalism as a distinctive strand of liberal ideology first appeared in the 1940s, but its period of major influence is usually dated from the 1970s. The label is disliked by neoliberals themselves, who generally prefer to be known as classical liberals, libertarians, social market liberals, or simply liberals. Neoliberalism is not a uniform doctrine and has many internal tensions, not least between a *laissez faire* strand which believes that the best policy is to allow markets to operate with as few impediments as possible, and a social market strand which believes that for the free market to reach its full potential the state has to be active in creating and sustaining the institutions which make that possible.

The first people to call themselves neoliberals were German liberals such as Alexander Rüstow, who first used the term in the 1930s to describe new currents of liberal thought that were hostile to the forms of statism and collectivism which had been so dominant in the first half of the twentieth century, and sought a new form of political economy that would give priority to market rather than bureaucratic or

hierarchical means of ordering the economy, within a framework of law. The German neo liberals sought to revive liberal principles after the devastating impact of Nazi totalitarianism on German society and politics, by calling for a return to the rule of law, a competitive market economy, private property rights, and an ethic of personal responsibility, while also allowing the state to be active in guaranteeing a social minimum. These ideas crystallized in the conception of the social market economy, which provided the intellectual underpinnings of the post war German economic recovery under Ludwig Erhard.

The German neoliberals became part of a wider movement of western liberals after 1945 seeking to reverse the long retreat of liberalism in the face of collectivist ideologies and reasserting what they saw as the basic principles of liberalism – the rule of law, the minimal state, individual liberty – against all forms of collectivism, including many versions of liberalism, such as New Liberalism and Keynesianism, which had sanctioned an expanding state to provide welfare programs, full employment, and economic prosperity. Under the guidance of F. A. Hayek, the Mont Pelerin society was launched in Switzerland in 1947. It included prominent liberals such as Ludwig von Mises, Milton Friedman, Max Hartwell, Lionel Robbins, and Karl Popper.

The classic statement of neoliberal principles was Hayek's *The Constitution of Liberty*, published in 1960. This set out the political institutions and rules necessary for a liberal order, drawing on the classical liberal tradition, in particular the critical rationalism of Adam Smith. Hayek was keen to distinguish true liberalism from false liberalism, and to recapture the term liberal from its contamination by collectivist ideas. His efforts were heavily criticized as a return to the discredited *laissez faire* liberalism of the nineteenth century. Many thought that the basics for such a creed had disappeared and could not be resurrected. The bureaucratic organization needed to coordinate the economy made a return to the minimal state impractical.

Neoliberal ideas began to gain ground, however, through the 1960s and 1970s. The adoption of basic neoliberal precepts by the international agencies such as the IMF for

containing the problems of stagflation was key. The translation of these ideas into the dominant ideological common sense in several key western states, notably the United States, Britain, and Australia, followed. Reasons for the rise of neoliberalism to such prominence and the discrediting of Keynesianism included the economic difficulties faced by the western economy from the late 1960s onwards, with the erosion of the exceptional conditions for economic growth that had existed in the early 1950s, the acceleration of inflation and growth of unemployment, and the resultant fiscal crisis of the western welfare states. These problems were exacerbated by the collapse of the post war monetary system in 1971, the floating of the dollar, and a series of financial shocks, most notably the quadrupling of oil prices by OPEC in 1973. The need for a new set of guiding principles to manage the global economy was supplied by neoliberalism, initially in the ideas of monetarism put forward by economists such as Milton Friedman to tackle inflation, but soon widened into a more general neoliberal political economy for removing the wider institutional causes of inflation, which included trade union power, welfare states, taxation, regulation, and barriers to competition.

Neoliberalism revived many (although not all) of the basic principles of classical liberalism, but expressed them in novel ways. The result has been a distinctive new form of liberalism which has attracted many intellectual adherents and has had a lasting influence on public policy. As an economic doctrine, the core of neoliberalism has been an attempt to revive the case for reducing the role of government in the management of the economy as much as possible, giving primacy to markets and the free play of competition. It is axiomatic in neoliberalism that government solutions are inferior to market solutions because they are less efficient in economic terms and they harm individual liberty. The solution to every public policy problem is to take responsibility away from government and allow markets to function freely. Typical neoliberal policy prescriptions are therefore for deregulation of economic activity, privatization of assets owned by the state, and reduction of welfare spending except for the provision of a safety net for the very poorest. This, combined with a more general

withdrawal of the state from involvement in many other areas of social and economic life, gives scope for large cuts in taxation and the share of state spending in national income.

The role of the state in the neoliberal program is not a passive one. It has to be both active and forceful. The free economy requires a strong state in order to function properly. The state should not intervene directly in the workings of the market; instead, its task is to guarantee the basic institutional requirements of a liberal market order. These include the minimal state functions of external defense and internal order, the rule of law, sound money, and the enforcement of property rights. Without these requirements individuals do not have the confidence or the incentive to produce and exchange freely. The market order is a natural spontaneous growth, but it is also very fragile and easily damaged by state intervention and state control, or by private monopolies which prevent free exchange. The state has to reform its own practices so as to minimize their harmful effects on the economy; at the same time it needs to remove all other obstacles to the free working of the economy. These may include restrictive practices of all kinds, by companies, trade unions, professions, and public bodies. The role of the state is to be the champion and defender of the free market, by enabling the institutions it requires and empowering its agents.

As a political doctrine neoliberalism sees the state as a necessary evil, which has vital functions to perform in respect of the market order, but which has always to be watched. Neoliberals are suspicious of the state and of the motives of politicians and civil servants and are therefore always seeking additional checks and balances. They take the classical liberal principle that government should be of laws rather than of men in arguing for a return to a strict *Rechtsstaat*, in which government is by general rules and the amount of discretion allowed to the individual public official is reduced to the minimum. The constitutionalist wing of neoliberalism associated with James Buchanan and the Virginia School has argued for amendments to be inserted into the US Constitution to curb big government, obliging the federal government, for example, to maintain a balanced budget as a matter of law.

Similar tendencies are at work in respect of neoliberal ideas about democracy. Although neoliberals favor democracy as the least worst form of government, they are also extremely wary of it, since the doctrine of popular sovereignty and the idea of the sovereign nation in the modern era have legitimated the expansion of the state and infringements of the market order under governments of both left and right. For neoliberals, democracy is therefore at best an imperfect mechanism for government, and certainly does not represent a higher value than individual liberty. Neoliberals prefer authoritarian regimes that respect basic economic freedoms to democratic regimes that do not. This was the justification that Hayek and Friedman gave in supporting the Pinochet regime in Chile. Civil and political liberties are important, but less important than the liberties that are at the heart of the market order. Neoliberals have sometimes proposed ways in which democracy might be reformed, which involve restrictions on the right to vote and restrictions on the powers of elected governments. This means placing basic principles of the market order in a category where they are beyond the reach of the elected government of the day.

As a cultural doctrine neoliberalism is less distinct. Many of its critics argue that neoliberalism concentrates too heavily on economic liberty, neglecting other forms of liberty with which classical liberals were equally concerned, as well as the values of autonomy and self development. The situation is also confused because of the rise alongside neoliberalism of libertarianism, which shares many neoliberal assumptions but extends them much further. Neoliberals are not ultimately libertarians, since one of their core beliefs is that there has to be a state, however regrettable. A minimal state is required for a market order to exist. But what are the cultural conditions for a market order? The libertarian wing of neoliberalism argues for personal freedom to be extended to all areas of social life, with the state withdrawing from the regulation of sexual behavior, drugs, alcohol, and gambling, as well as removing controls on immigration. The communitarian and conservative wings of neoliberalism which Hayek increasingly articulated in his later writings argue strongly against permissiveness, believing instead in the necessity of morals, nations, and

languages as spontaneous orders which have grown up with market orders and which provide an essential underpinning for them. This provides one of the bridges between neoliberalism and neoconservatism.

From being a heresy, neoliberalism became an orthodoxy in the 1980s and 1990s, and many of its favorite nostrums were crystallized in the Washington consensus, a set of assumptions and prescriptions about the world and how it should be governed that was widely shared in the Washington policy community. Neoliberalism became the policy prescription of globalization, setting out the conditions which countries had to meet in order to integrate fully into the global economy and be in good standing with the financial markets. To its critics neoliberalism had become a form of market fundamentalism, which advocated the breaking down of obstacles to the commodification of social life and the penetration of market forces into all areas of economy, society, and politics.

With the collapse of the Soviet Union neoliberalism was triumphant, and its message that there was no alternative to markets and private property in coordinating modern, complex, large scale economies appeared unchallenged. The absence of alternatives to neoliberal ideas forced all governments to become in some sense neoliberal, since they were obliged to operate within a set of structures in the global economy that reflected, however imperfectly, neoliberal principles of global order. This new order proved able to accommodate a wide variety of different regimes, many of them social democratic in their orientation, reflecting the two faces of neoliberalism, the *laissez faire* and social market strands. However, it also came under challenge as a result of some of its own internal tensions, between its urge to shrink the state as much as possible and its need for an active state to ensure the democratic legitimacy of the market order, and also from the rise of neoconservatism, which challenged some key elements of neoliberal political economy, in particular its hostility to government and the public realm and its adherence to strict rules such as sound finance as priorities above all other political objectives.

SEE ALSO: Conservatism; Democracy; Liberalism; Markets; Neoconservatism

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neo-Marxism

Alberto Toscano

Neo Marxism is a wide ranging term referring to the critical renaissance of Marxist theory in the post war period, most often used to denote work in radical political economy which tried to combine the revolutionary aspirations and orienting concepts of Marxism with some of the tools provided by non Marxist economics, especially the work of Keynes. Though the label “neo Marxist” is sometimes applied to figures (e.g., the members of the Frankfurt School) who combined a fidelity to Marx’s critical and political aims with a sense of the limitations of Marxism in the face of phenomena like fascism or mass culture, it seems to have been first introduced to describe thinkers – such as Joan Robinson, Paul A. Baran, and Paul M. Sweezy – who sought to renew the critique of political economy in a situation marked by the rise of global corporations, anti colonial struggles for national liberation, and the politics of American imperialism.

Whereas, following the distinction proposed by Perry Anderson, the post World War I Marxist concern with the cultural sphere and political subjectivity can be put under the aegis of “western Marxism” (as opposed to “classical Marxism”), neo Marxism is a useful designation for the attempt, during and after World War II, to reflect on the pertinence of Marxist categories for an understanding of the changed

conditions of capital accumulation and the political realities that accompanied them. Having intersected the Frankfurt School (Baran was present at the Institute for Social Research in 1930), and later influencing some of its erstwhile members (*Monopoly Capital* was a considerable reference for Marcuse's *One Dimensional Man*), neo Marxists shared with them a conviction regarding the increasingly prominent role of the state within the capitalist system. Hence the influential use of the expression "state monopoly capitalism" to designate a situation where the state itself becomes a "collective capitalist" rather than the mere enforcer of the capitalist system of social relations.

The experience of Roosevelt's New Deal, as well as those of the Marshall Plan and the rise of what Eisenhower would dub the "military industrial complex," persuaded the likes of Baran and Sweezy that the orthodox Marxist understanding of crisis and development within capitalism was insufficient to grasp post war realities. Thus, they tended to give short shrift to the labor theory of value and to regard the tendency of the rate of profit to fall as an inadequate tool in light of the long boom of an American led capitalist system after 1945. Furthermore, following Keynes, they replaced the notion of surplus value with a far broader one of "economic surplus." Most significantly, though returning to Lenin's discussion of the link between monopolies and imperialism, neo Marxists broke with classical Marxism by radically downplaying the importance of price competition between corporations, arguing that their profits were generated instead by competition in other spheres (advertising, marketing, finance).

With regard to their understanding of imperialism, Baran and Sweezy saw monopoly capital as a system unable to absorb surplus either in terms of effective demand or through productive investments. Moreover, they conceived of monopoly capitalism as fundamentally irrational, insofar as it subordinated all dimensions of social existence (from sexuality to art, body posture to religion) to the calculated, "rationalized" attempt to realize economic surplus. Even the capitalist rationality of *quid pro quo* breaks down: "Human and material resources remain idle because there is in the market no *quid* to exchange against the

quo of their potential output" (Baran & Sweezy 1966: 325).

The anti imperialist bent of neo Marxism, and specifically Baran's notion that monopoly capitalism led to the "development of under development" in peripheral settings, was a significant component in the formulation of dependency theory and the work of figures such as André Gunder Frank and Samir Amin. Its political influence on debates about socialism and national liberation in Cuba, Latin America, and elsewhere, especially through the journal the *Monthly Review*, was massive.

In Anglo American sociology, this renewed emphasis, from the standpoint of political economy, on questions of exploitation and imperialism in the new, "affluent" society influenced a host of research programs that have often been described as neo Marxist. Thus, in the work of Willis, or Bowles and Gintis, we encounter a neo Marxist sociology of education that seeks to analyze the reproduction of capitalist socioeconomic structures through curricula, as well as the forms of resistance and conflict that accompany these processes. In works by Braverman and Burawoy, the labor process and its ideological reproduction are subjected to neo Marxist scrutiny. In the domain of class analysis, the work of Erik Olin Wright has sought to combine a Marxist analysis of class exploitation with a Weberian analysis of status and domination, crystallized in the notion of "contradictory class locations." Spurred by the work of Nicos Poulantzas, Bob Jessop and others synthesized a neo Marxist analysis of the capitalist state, questioning any univocal correspondence between the form of the state and its economic function, and seeking to delve into the class relations and class fractions that traverse the state itself. In the field of political economy, the neo Marxist label has also been applied to the French Regulation School – with its emphasis on the social and governmental "modes of regulation" that contingently govern the reproduction of "regimes of accumulation" – as well as to more orthodox Marxists seeking to analyze the transformations of "late capitalism" (Ernest Mandel).

Despite the absence of any single, coherent program or statement of its departures from classical Marxism, neo Marxism is best periodized and comprehended as an intellectual sensibility which tried to amalgamate a fidelity to

certain guiding ideas of classical Marxism (economic exploitation, class struggle, the horizon of social emancipation) with an attention to the transformed conditions under which capitalist social relations were being reproduced in the post war period. This entailed attending to the specificity and relative autonomy of the contemporary capitalist state, as well as to the political and economic consequences of militarism, imperialism, and the rise of the corporation as a social force. Many neo Marxist authors felt compelled to inject non Marxist ideas (from the likes of Keynes or Weber) into Marxism to cope with unprecedented transformations within capitalist society – whence the eclecticism that critics have often accused in their work. Politically, neo Marxist ideas on power, the state, and political subjectivities beyond the traditional working class fed into the development of the new left in the 1960s and 1970s.

In the past 20 years or so, many neo Marxist writers have abandoned any residual commitment to Marxism proper, though some, like Wright, remain wedded to foundational Marxist concepts. The work of neo Marxists has also been profitably and critically integrated by authors happy to remain within the classical Marxist or historical materialist camp.

SEE ALSO: Class; Critical Theory/Frankfurt School; Dependency and World Systems Theories; Imperialism; Marx, Karl; Marxism; Marxism and Sociology; New Left; Regulation Theory; Weber, Max

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network society

Stuart Allan

Social theorist Manuel Castells coined the phrase the “network society” as a form of analytical shorthand to characterize the global forces transforming collective action and institutions from one national context to the next. The network society is the social structure of the Information Age, being organized around relationships of production/consumption, power, and experience. Its prevailing logic, while constantly challenged by conflicts, nevertheless gives shape to the pervasive infrastructure of cultural life in most societies – albeit with unpredictable outcomes.

Castells’s (1996, 1997, 1998) major work, the three volume *The Information Age: Economy, Society, and Culture* spanning some 1,500 pages, provides a dazzling array of insights into how “informational capitalism” operates. In essence, he argues that this distinctive form of capitalism – with its globalizing reach and flexible adaptability to change – is recasting the imperatives of time, space, and distance around the globe. In tracing the origins of its organizing principles to the early 1970s, Castells maintains that the historical coincidence of three processes became evident at that time: the information technology revolution; the economic crises of both capitalism and statism (and their subsequent restructuring); and the “blooming” of cultural social movements. By examining the interaction between these interdependent processes, together with the responses they engender, he discerns the emergence of the network society as a new dominant social structure (see also Castells 2000, 2001).

From this perspective, the familiar notion of an “information society” can be safely

discarded. In its place, Castells seeks to elaborate a grounded theory of information technology powered networks. The distinguishing feature of the network society, he believes, is its dialectical interaction between modes of production (goods and services are created in specific social relationships) and those of development (especially technological innovation). This interaction is neither linear nor mechanical in the manner in which it operates. Nor, crucially, is it contained within the authority of the nation state. Rather, the network society is indicative of a new power system, where the once sovereign nation state's very legitimacy is tested by factors largely beyond its control.

Castells's approach has been heralded for being suggestive of fresh ways to investigate the geometry of power unfolding around us. We are poised at the cusp of a technological revolution, he explains, one centered around microelectronics based information/communication technologies and related sciences (such as genetic engineering and nanotechnology). Knowledge generation, together with information processing, are at the heart of this dramatic transformation. Evolving in conjunction with this emergent "ecosocial system," he contends, is a new informational/global economy, as well as a new culture of real virtuality.

Turning first to the dynamics of this new economy, Castells describes how the international division of labor is changing, and in so doing becoming increasingly reliant on information based production and competition. This informational economy is global and networked, that is, it is marked by its interdependence, its asymmetry, and its dissolution of the familiar features of historical and economic geography. Capitalism is rapidly acquiring an enhanced flexibility mainly due to the decisive role played by these emergent "tools for networking, distant communication, storing/processing of information, coordinated individualization of work, and [the] simultaneous concentration and decentralization of decision making" (1998: 368). This "new brand of capitalism," with its new rules for investment, accumulation, and reward, is encompassing almost the entire planet (North Korea, he notes, being the one exception) for the first time in human history.

Against this backdrop, Castells discerns the culture of real virtuality. In his words, it is "a system in which reality itself (that is, people's material/symbolic existence) is fully immersed in a virtual image setting, in the world of make believe, in which symbols are not just metaphors, but comprise the actual experience" (1998: 381). To clarify, this culture is real, but also virtual in that it is constructed primarily through electronically based processes of communication. This virtuality is, in effect, a "fundamental reality" where questions of identity are made meaningful. That is, in Castells's view, it is "the material basis on which we live our existence, construct our system of representation, practice our work, link up with other people, retrieve information, form our opinions, act in politics, and nurture our dreams" (2001: 203). Efforts to explicate the lived materiality of this culture at the level of experience thus need to recognize that all domains of social life are implicated ever more deeply in the time spaces of networked communication.

More specifically, two emergent forms of time and space, namely, "timeless time" and "the space of flows," characterize the network society. While both coexist with prior forms of time and space, their inflection in the new social structure pinpoints their significance. Timeless time, defined in contrast with the rhythm of biological time and the tick of clock time, represents the way new information/communication technologies are exploited to "annihilate time." That is, time is both compressed (e.g., split second global financial transactions) and desequenced (e.g., in the blurring of past, present, and future by electronic hypertext). The space of flows refers to the ways in which social practices can be organized without geographical contiguity. Citing examples such as financial markets, transnational production, media systems, even social movements, Castells shows how they revolve around relationships connecting people and places (often in real time) that are otherwise being processed within distant, decentered networks. These relationships entail a territorial dimension, but are not conditioned by it in the same way that the space of places (where meaning, function, and locality are closely related) tend to be negotiated.

In documenting the contours of the network society, then, this approach underscores the ways in which information has become the “privileged political weapon” in the age of the Internet. The displacement of human values by commercial ones is rendered especially sharp where the uneven structures of the digital divide are concerned. As Castells points out, to be “disconnected, or superficially connected, to the Internet is tantamount to marginalization in the global, networked system” (2001: 269). Precisely how the dynamics of differential access unfold in different social contexts is largely a matter of possessing the capacity – or not – to adapt to the speed and uncertainty of change. “The differentiation between Internet haves and have nots,” he observes, “adds a fundamental cleavage to existing sources of inequality and social exclusion in a complex interaction that appears to increase the gap between the promise of the Information Age and its bleak reality for many people around the world” (2001: 247).

These and related issues highlight several of the reasons why the “network society” concept continues to figure so prominently in sociological research and debate. Castells’s conceptual elucidation of its myriad features using empirical, cross cultural modes of investigation constitutes a major contribution.

SEE ALSO: Capitalism; Global Economy; Globalization, Culture and; Information Society; Information Technology; Internet; Media and Globalization; Media, Network(s) and; Networks; Spatial Relationships; Time

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networks

James J. Chriss

The concept of social networks finds its beginnings in the work of Georg Simmel. Simmel argued that a pure or formal sociology ought to take as its special focus the study of societal forms. Employing a geometric analogy, Simmel suggested that social forms can be identified and defined, thereby allowing the sociologist to group together a myriad of substantive phenomena under the broader or more abstract formal categories.

But instead of geometric sides and angles, the essential elements comprising the forms for sociological analysis are simply human social interaction (or what Simmel called “sociation”). As Simmel (1950: 22) explained, the societal forms “are conceived as constituting society (and societies) out of the mere sum of living men. The study of this second area may be called ‘pure sociology,’ which abstracts the mere element of sociation.” Building on Simmel and certainly going beyond him, the social networks approach is a type of structural sociology which emphasizes the relationships between social units (see Blau 1994: 3–8). It was not until the 1930s that an explicit networks research agenda appeared, first in the guise of Jacob Moreno’s sociometric studies (see, e.g., Moreno 1941) and later, for example, in Elizabeth Bott’s (1957) study of the network characteristics of the family.

The social units of network analysis can be persons, small groups, organizations, and even larger entities. A good illustration of network analysis couched at the macro level is Alderson and Beckfield’s (2004) study of power and position in the world city or global system. This research verifies that certain “world cities” such as Tokyo, New York, and Paris are more powerful and prestigious within the global city system because of their high degree of centrality (for more on this concept, see below) relative to other cities.

A convention of network theory is to use the term node to refer to a position, that is, a network location occupied by an actor (whether an individual, group, or organization). Actors in this sense are “decision making entities” that

occupy positions (nodes) linked by relations (or ties) (Markovsky et al. 1988). Owing largely to the work of Linton Freeman (1979), one of the more important network concepts is centrality, namely, the extent to which an actor is centrally located within a network. Degree centrality is the number of direct links with other actors. Betweenness centrality is the extent to which an actor mediates, or falls between, any other two actors on the shortest path between those actors (Brass 1995). In whichever guise it appears, the issue of centrality is of abiding concern to network theorists. Actors in central network positions have greater access to, and potential control over, relevant resources. Actors who are able to control relevant resources are able to acquire power, largely by increasing others' dependence on them (Krackhardt & Brass 1994: 210).

Although much early network research had indeed found support for the idea that nodes centrally located in networks tend to hold more power relative to other nodes, later generations of researchers, who have introduced more complexity into their research designs with the introduction of elements of exchange theory (e.g., the research tradition of network exchange theory innovated by David Willer), have been more apt to view the association between power and centrality as a hypothesis requiring empirical confirmation (see Mizruchi & Potts 1998).

How centrality is related to power has much to do with the starting assumptions researchers make about the nature of networks. In network theory, one of the preferred research strategies is small group experimental research. An example of this kind of small group experimental design is the network exchange model of identity developed by Peter J. Burke (1997). Burke seeks to augment the general finding from network theory that power is associated with one's position in network structures (again, those with higher centrality tend to be more powerful in exchange relations), by examining more closely the processes at work in exchange networks. In other words, Burke seeks to answer the question: "What are actors trying to accomplish from the positions they occupy in particular networks?" Although network location is indeed important, perhaps just as important in determining what actors are attempting to

accomplish is the way identity processes operate to structure exchanges.

Burke placed research subjects into simulated exchange situations, taking them through 40 rounds of exchange to determine how a preestablished pool of points (in this case, 24) would be distributed upon completion of the rounds of exchange. What Burke discovered was that, by introducing identity (by way of the assumptions concerning actors' participation reference standards) into the network exchange design, long term stability was reached only after actors made the decision to break off into smaller subnetworks. Since the highest level identity standard is to participate in exchange 100 percent of the time, actors found that subnetworking helped them achieve close to the 100 percent participation reference standard. In networks consisting of odd numbers of nodes – such as the five node kite structure – actors who exchanged did so in adjacent dyads, which meant one node was always excluded. The excluded persons would always offer slightly more (13 points), then upon reentry into the exchange relationship would settle back on the 12/12 point of stability characteristic of the dyadic exchanges. This also appears to be a living, breathing example of the way equity considerations structure such activities.

Burke's study of how identity processes affect exchange relations is consistent with the concept of negotiated exchange, the latter of which is illustrated in a study conducted by Lovaglia et al. (1995). These authors set up experiments in which profit expectations of the subjects were taken into account. Two factors that have been found to affect profit expectations, and hence the actual forms of exchange and negotiation taking place between actors in various network configurations, are degree centrality and the likelihood of a person completing exchanges with another. Actors who perceive themselves to be central as a result of many direct ties to others are more likely to expect that they will do well in exchanges as a result of their central position, and this expectation of profit affects negotiation strategy; for example, they are more likely to resist an offer that appears to be lower than what they could reasonably expect given their location and history of negotiations. This illustrates a general

trend within network studies, namely, the move toward a more dynamic model of exchange that takes into account the history of ongoing negotiations, rather than relying on initial offers as in the case of earlier experimental studies.

As Simmel (1950) noted long ago, triads are stable to the extent that they are transitive, meaning that feelings and relations among the members of the group are balanced or consistent (Caplow 1968). However, if for example one member of the triad begins accumulating resources far above the level of the other two members, we now have an intransitive triad in which the ties between members are qualitatively unequal, as in Granovetter's (1973) "forbidden triad." Intransitive triads are unstable and therefore susceptible to coalition formation, a situation in which the two weaker or oppressed members of the triad combine their resources to oppose the stronger member. Indeed, coalition formation is one method by which weak or exploited members of coalitions seek to reduce power differences.

Bonacich and Applebaum's (2000) research on the basic structure of the garment industry in Los Angeles is a useful illustration of coalition formation within networks. These authors discovered that manufacturers try to ensure that the various contractors they work with are not known to one another. By doing this, manufacturers hope to strengthen their bargaining position with contractors because they can always claim that some unknown contractor has tendered a better offer. This prevents concerted action, that is, coalition formation, on the part of contractors to nullify or reduce the advantageous position manufacturers enjoy. Bonacich and Applebaum (2000) go on to report that manufacturers ensure their edge by proclaiming their contractor lists are "trade secrets," a position backed and enforced by federal trade law.

Perhaps the single most influential contribution to network analysis is Mark Granovetter's (1973) conceptual distinction between weak and strong ties. According to Granovetter, strong ties exist between persons who know one another very well (e.g., family members and close friends). Weak ties, on the other hand, exist between loosely associated nodes, that is, between persons who are merely acquaintances. Persons who are loosely associated may act as a

bridge between clumps of densely tied friendship networks. These dense networks of strong ties would have no connections with other networks were it not for the occasional node weakly tied between them. Hence, in an ironic twist, Granovetter illustrates the strength of weak ties. Weak ties have a special role in a person's opportunity for mobility. Individuals with few or no weak ties will be deprived of information from distant parts of the network, and by the same token, being caught up in strong tie networks, they will receive only news and views of their close friends. The lack of interaction with diverse individuals situated beyond a person's local, dense network means that the person will be less likely to hear about potential job openings, and hence, mobility is restricted (Granovetter 1983).

The advantages of weak ties, whereby an actor acts as a bridge between two densely tied networks or subnetworks, has also been explored by Ronald Burt. Burt's (1992) concept of structural holes is almost as well known as Granovetter's weak tie/strong tie distinction. Whereas the great majority of network analysis is concerned with the nature and strength of ties between nodes, structural holes turn analytical attention toward the absence of ties. Because nodes in densely clustered networks tend to receive redundant information, some actors may seek to invest in connections to diverse others in order to receive novel or non redundant information. These nodes must be disconnected from other nodes in order to ensure information is non redundant. It is these disconnections between diverse others that are structural holes. For example, expertise in a particular field (such as the position of journal editor) allows gatekeepers to monopolize information and maintain structural holes (Corra & Willer 2002). Similarly, ideas which are endorsed by more distant contacts (such as external reviewers) are more likely to be considered good or important than those endorsed by friends or other close acquaintances (Burt 2004).

SEE ALSO: Economy, Networks and; Exchange Network Theory; Power, Theories of; Simmel, Georg; Social Exchange Theory; Social Movements, Networks and; Social Network Analysis; Social Network Theory; Weak Ties (Strength of)

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neurosociology

David D. Franks

Neurosociology is an inquiry into the social dimensions of functioning brains and the fusion of brain functioning with minded behavior and self processes. Neurosociology puts individualistic tabula rasa theories of knowledge to rest. The environment may trigger responses, but the brain selects, interprets, edits, and changes the very quality of incoming information to fit its own requirements and limitations. Much of this "revisionism" is produced by its robust cognitive and emotional capacities. The "living content" of these capacities (meanings) are supplied by culture and human talk. Working brains develop only in interaction with other brains and the cultural content they produce (Brothers 1997). This makes experience more of a projection than a recording. Thus, the largely interpretive and culture dependent nature of selfhood, memory, and even sensed perception opens the door to neurosociology. It studies the effect of culture and learning environments on brain processes and neuronal structure, as well as the effect of brain processes in creating emergent social structures.

In 1972 TenHouten was a co author of the first publication using the term neurosociology. The next year, TenHouten co authored the first sociological inquiry into scientific and synthetic modes of thought based on the different capacities of the brain's hemispheres. In the late 1980s and early 1990s TenHouten was editor of the *Social Neuroscience Bulletin* and has continually contributed to what he has referred to as neurosociology since that date. The first collection of works in neurosociology, edited by Franks and Smith, was published in 1999.

Some exemplar findings from that volume are as follows. Culture "works down" to effect neuronal structure. Ecological demands on various cultures differentially select certain brain capacities as valuable for that society. Since different parts of the brain have different capacities, certain neurological systems are used and developed more than others depending on the society. TenHouten has found that Australian

Aborigines utilize the gestalt synthetic capabilities of the right brain more than westerners, who make relatively more use of the logical analytic left brain capacities. This leads, for example, to extraordinary aboriginal skills in tracking and route finding valuable in their desert culture. It also means that time is experienced cyclically rather than in western linearity. When the experience of time differs fundamentally, so do many other aspects of existence.

In contrast, brain structures also “work up” to influence structure. Smith et al. have investigated the way brain processes that help control anxiety create emergent qualities in family organization. Neurosociology has also drawn on the predominantly emotional makeup of the human brain to challenge the model of affect free rationality assumed by rational decision making theorists. Highly intelligent persons injured in the ventromedial prefrontal cortex can think of an emotion but cannot feel it. Having no felt preferences, decision making is limited and learning is impaired (Damasio 1994). Not able to care about people or their own futures, patients lack the social skills and impulse control necessary for social interaction and business judgments. Turner (2000) has investigated the biological embeddedness of social interaction and the subliminal emotional cues communicated to others in face to face encounters. He has also offered an evolutionary theory of the brain which explains why humans frequently chafe at social constraint; this perspective suggests corrections to sociology’s “oversocialized conception of man.”

Gregory has investigated subliminal voice accommodation and how social status signals embedded in the human soundwaves communicate dominance and subordination to audiences. Such an analysis was effective in predicting the outcome of the 1992 presidential and vice presidential debates between Clinton and Dole as well as Gore and Kemp. Tredway et al. have reanalyzed Spitz’s findings that lack of emotional support caused major physiological, social, and psychological dysfunctions in infants to the point of breakdown in their immune systems and death. The identification of these brain processes is critical for effective intervention and social policy decisions.

TOPICS OF MUTUAL INTEREST BETWEEN NEUROSCIENCE AND SOCIOLOGY

Despite the vast differences in methods and paradigms, current social psychology and neuroscience have agreed on several important topics as critical for understanding human behavior. Research using highly technical imaging techniques as well as patient brain injuries is in strong contrast to methods of sociology. However, a very strong argument for validity is made possible when convergence occurs regardless of differences in method and conceptual frameworks.

In both fields the linguistically generated self, once seen as a notion of dubious value to science, has risen to a key concept in understanding human behavior. These convergences include the importance of an “agentive” view of the self regardless of its fictional nature, and the crucial nature of role taking (or mind reading) in establishing a normally functioning brain (see Brothers 1997 on the lack of this ability in autism). Convergence is especially interesting on the importance of viewing self as a process enabling the flexible control of behavior and the self conscious monitoring and control of impulses (see LeDoux et al. 2003).

Following from the image of the brain as a “projective” editor of experience, both fields converge on some form of constructionism (Franks 2003). Findings leading to this conclusion are as follows. (1) The brain manufactures patterns even where there are none. (2) Our brains are not perfect. Recently evolved brain mechanisms must be built on and constrained by preexisting structures. (3) The brain must heavily edit and simplify perceptual information for it to be processed as meaningful. (4) The brain has a tendency to capture and remember only “the gist” of things. (5) The number of human senses is totally inadequate to apprehend “what is out there.” (6) The boundaries of human reason are limited to concepts arising from contact experience with the physical world and the metaphors they allow. The possibility of generating determinate knowledge transcending the peculiar nature of the human body and brain becomes highly questionable in light of current neuroscience.

Another long recognized convergence is the continued neuroscience finding concerning the critical function that language plays in the construction of human thought and the normal functioning of the brain. As early as 1969, Lindsmith and Strauss noted the sociological importance of work on aphasia by Head in 1926, Goldstein in 1948, and Luria in 1966. Both fields are interested in the way language permeates human thought when seen as inner dialogue.

DIVERGENCES AND APPARENT DIVERGENCES

Many sociologists still see any biological framework as reductionistic and antithetical to sociocultural explanations. Certainly, the charge is not accurate among most of the leading neuroscientists writing to audiences beyond neuroscience. In 1965 the Nobel Prize winner Roger Sperry wrote that thought itself was an emergent from the parts of the brain's neuronal communication process. He argued that self-conscious thought in the dominant left hemisphere of the brain exerted causal, top-down control over the more specific modular parts of the non-verbal right brain. This put mind back into positivistic neuroscience and, as Sperry and his influential students knew, where there is mind there is society. Michael Gazzaniga, Sperry's student, built on his non-reductionist approach in his seminal split-brain research so commonly accepted in neuroscience and also so important to neurosociology (see Franks & Smith 1999; TenHouten 1999).

Importance of the Unconscious

Some sociologists may be uncomfortable with the neuroscience emphasis on the unconscious because they associate it with the more fanciful early notions of Sigmund Freud. The unconscious of neuroscience is derived from very different methods of investigation and has little resemblance to such ideas. For example, Lakoff and Johnson (in Franks & Smith 1999) state that at least 95 percent of cognitive functioning is outside of awareness, and Gazzaniga (1998) insists on 97 percent. For a three-pound brain that consists of between ten to one hundred

billion neurons, one hundred trillion synaptic connections, and nine times as many glial cells, however, the remaining 3 percent of conscious deliberation is more than significant for sociologists. It includes the processes of self-awareness, role-taking, and the agentive self as well as the social control making society possible. None of this challenges theories of self-awareness. One smells, tastes, and sees with no knowledge of the brain mechanisms involved. In this context, thinking, feeling, and self-monitoring are accomplished with equal unawareness of the brain dynamics making this possible.

A second issue relating to the importance of unconscious processes is the fact that most of what humans become aware of doing actually begins one quarter of a second before it becomes conscious (see Gazzaniga 1998). However, this finding is not that different from G. H. Mead's insight concerning the four stages of the act: "Stimuli are means," he wrote to Dewey, "[t]endency is the real thing." Here, impulse and tendency overlap significantly. Perception, manipulation, and consummation as other stages of the act subserve these impulses, most of which come too fast for conscious recognition. For example, we selectively perceive those stimuli that support or block manipulations gratifying our impulses. Current neurological evidence for this comes from many sources, but perhaps findings from split-brain research have been most dramatic on this general point.

When the two brain halves have been severed from each other (in order to control epilepsy), researchers can communicate orders to the mute right brain without the patient's conscious left brain knowing what the orders were. This is because the usual electrical and chemical communication between the hemispheres no longer exists. When the patients act according to the researchers' orders, their linguistic and cognitively oriented left brain immediately produces what amounts to an ad hoc rationalization or motive statement for the action. The only ones fooled about the source of the behavior are the patients, whose totally contrived explanations come too fast to notice the effort involved in creating their own reasons. There is ample evidence that normals also generally act first and rationalize later. Once again, impulse (much of which can be below awareness) is the

beginning of the act, as G. H. Mead suggested. Gazzaniga explicitly views these rationalizations as sociological “accounts” with their concern for culpability in the eyes of others. This produces impressive convergence on the importance of accounts as well as very strong supporting evidence for them.

The modular makeup of the brain also gives insight into the sources of impulses that the self must monitor. The brain is comprised of separate modules, each with their own tendencies for memories, moods, actions, and other responses. The modules of the right brain deal with special perception such as face recognition, tactile information, and special orientation. The right brain, lacking ability or interest in cognitive interpretations, is accurate, precise, and literalistic. Its modules have no deductive capacity. In contrast, the left brain is interpretive to the extent of rendering things meaningful even when they are not. Guided by cognitions mainly generated and organized by language and social learning, it allows predictions, deductive powers, and flexibility at the cost of guaranteed accuracy. Nonetheless, the left brain provides executive power and goal direction to the brain’s impulsive cross purposes and it must struggle to make the unity necessary for sanity out of the “modular army of idiots,” as they are called by Dennett. The left brain is called the “interpreter” because of this integrative, executive character. The sense of unity and control it supplies, being the result of its own prioritizing and editing, is by necessity fictional. There is no real way to make sense of the various contradictory modular impulses. But this fiction is essential for effective action and must be seen as important in its own right. It becomes who we are. Patients traumatized in the medial prefrontal cortex (where self related processes come together) lose the sense of ownership of their bodies. Since unity demands continuity, the self becomes a narrator taking its content from memory and being the owner of its story. Memory, however, is a notoriously inaccurate, self enhancing process always recreated in the present rather than reproducing actual past events. Emotionally experienced events are those most often remembered. The necessary sense of unity and continuity of the self is built on shifting sands. The question is not so much “from

whence comes insanity?” as “from whence comes sanity?”

The most significant finding about the unconscious for social psychology is the ubiquity of implicit social learning. The emotional amygdala, in the primitive part of the brain, functions to give lightning fast assessments of the self relevance of oncoming stimuli. Without cognitive contributions, it enables quick responses to danger but is often very wrong. Banaji (2003) has used this fast, unmonitored response to measure prejudice, asking respondents to answer questions so quickly that self monitoring cannot come into play. She found that black, white, and Asian unmonitored responses overwhelmingly showed a preference for their own kind regardless of one’s self conscious convictions otherwise. Banaji’s research has been broadened to measure a host of unconscious group preferences like class standings, ethnicities, and places of residence. Here too, people implicitly prefer the company of others seen as similar to themselves. Therefore, much prejudice and ethnocentrism is learned implicitly and not under cognitive control. Prejudiced persons are frequently the last to know. This not only contributes to our understandings of race relations, but also directs attention to the importance of human impulses and unconscious selfhood.

The self and its monitoring functions are nonetheless real in terms of interactional consequences and the authentic determination to control certain impulses. Another possible divergence has to do with the importance of unconscious emotions and how they (1) determine the agenda for thought; (2) select what is salient to one’s thinking; and (3) become the terms in which one sees the world. Being the lens through which the world is experienced, emotions can be the last to be noticed. For example, insofar as beliefs are ideas held with the emotion of conviction, persons evaluate evidence only insofar as it maintains the belief. Thus, political and religious arguments between equally intelligent people have little to do with reasoned opinion, because the opinion guides the reason. They usually lead nowhere.

In contrast to purely constructionist views of emotions seen as linguistic products through and through, neuroscience has generated other evidence that non verbal, unconscious emotion

is a prime driver of minded behavior. The neural pathways between cognition in the pre frontal cortex and emotional systems in the so called limbic system influence each other because they run both ways. Nonetheless, the connections running from emotional systems to the cognitive ones are far greater. Emotion fixes us in the world and cognition allows flexibility, but as with the impulses produced in split brain research, emotionally driven impulses are prior to cognitive considerations. Once again, by the time an event becomes conscious, the brain's emotional systems "shower the neocortex with emotional messages that condition its perception" (Massy 2002). Every phenomenological event has a neurological substratum. Each is as real as the other.

SEE ALSO: Biosociological Theories; Emotion: Social Psychological Aspects; Mead, George Herbert; Reflexivity; Role Taking; Self; Social Cognition; Symbolic Interaction

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New Age

Massimo Introvigne

Although "New Age" is now a household term throughout the world, its precise definition remains elusive. Sociologists have insisted that, although it is often referred to as the "New Age movement," it is not really a social movement but a network. Disparate "alternative" groups started networking together in the 1960s and met in common festivals, meetings, and conferences under the general label of "New Age," and the common concept that a new, better era was coming. The Findhorn community in Scotland and the Esalen Institute in Big Sur, California, both established in 1962, are regarded by many as the beginning of the international network, although "New Age" became internationally well known only in the 1970s. The network emphasized its "alternative" nature, seeking at the same time forms of spirituality different from western mainline Christianity, healing techniques alternative to mainline medicine and psychology, and a style of political participation different from traditional parties and organizations. New Age was largely a coming together of preexisting networks, from

those focused on eastern or metaphysical spirituality to those interested in non mainstream medicine or “deep” ecology. In this sense, some sociologists defined New Age as a network of networks, or metanetwork.

The roots of this metanetwork lie in different traditions. It may be suggested that the international network of New Age really included two rather different conflicting wings. The first had its roots in the occult subculture, and was influenced by both the western esoteric tradition and eastern religions. Influenced by the Theosophical Society and by the movement of Alice Bailey (1880–1949), who first used the term “New Age” in its contemporary meaning in the 1920s, this esoteric tradition also included a form of progressive or optimistic millennialism (Wessinger 1988) inspired by Annie Besant (1847–1933). This wing of New Age focused on the coming of a global renewal and of an “Age of Aquarius,” an astrological concept originating with French esoteric author Paul Le Cour (1871–1954) and supposedly connected with a forthcoming golden age.

On the other hand, New Age included a second wing which was influenced by the tradition of a much more individually oriented spirituality, including the nineteenth and early twentieth century New Thought and positive thinking (Melton et al. 1991: 346). Neither of these traditions, unlike those influential on the New Age’s first wing, were millenarian, nor did they focus on a future global renewal of the society. Rather, they focused on the individual. Occasionally, seminars and groups centered on the promise of individual happiness were criticized within the New Age as spiritually selfish, or as a form of narcissism. On the other hand, British sociologist Paul Heelas (1996) indicated that individualistic “seminar religion” was always part and parcel of the New Age.

While in the 1970s and 1980s the utopian first wing dominated the New Age, by the 1990s several leading New Age spokespersons were discussing a “crisis” of the network, which eventually led to the emergence of a “second” New Age (occasionally referred to in some continental European countries, but never in the United States, as “Next Age”) much more focused on the aims and techniques of the individualistic second wing. A significant event spelling out the New Age crisis was the publication

in 1991 of *Reimagination of the World*, by David Spangler, possibly the most authoritative spokesperson for the New Age movement internationally, and William Irwin Thompson (Spangler & Thompson 1991). The book presented lectures given by Spangler and Thompson at two 1988–9 seminars, where they concluded that New Age had been “degraded” by commercialism and was in a state of deep crisis. When this crisis was examined by social scientists, they did not mention commercialism as the only (or even the most important) cause. Melton (1998a) argued, for instance, that, in the United States at least, there were empirically verifiable indicators of New Age’s impending crisis, including the bankruptcy of several New Age bookstores, publishing houses, and magazines, and the fall in the price of crystals, a crucial commodity in the New Age market. Melton acknowledged that commercialism was deeply resented by a number of New Agers. However, he also mentioned that the utopian, millenarian expectation of a golden age had failed the empirical test.

Sociological theories on millennial thought have proposed a distinction between “catastrophic” and “progressive” millennialism (Wessinger 2000). While catastrophic millennialism can usually claim that at least some small catastrophe has confirmed its doomsday predictions, progressive millennialism is more exposed to empirical disconfirmation. When a prophecy about an apocalyptic event fails, it is easier to claim that wars, epidemics, and other catastrophic events have at any rate occurred somewhere in the world. But, when a “progressive” millennial group such as the New Age announces a golden age, and fails to deliver, crisis is inevitable. When its promised golden age failed to materialize, New Age first resorted to messages channeled by supernatural “entities.” It claimed that these entities were in a position to know better, and perhaps a new, golden age was in fact emerging on Planet Earth. Human eyes were not capable of seeing it, but superhuman channeled Masters had other and safer ways of knowing. Ultimately, however, the idea that a “New Age” of general happiness was in fact manifesting itself, notwithstanding any evidence to the contrary, could not be sustained. Empirical disconfirmation prevailed over prophetic utterances. The New Age crisis was, thus, neither purely a

byproduct of excessive commercialism nor an invention of scholars, as some irate New Agers claimed. Ultimately, New Age went the same way as many other forms of progressive millennialism had gone before it.

In the face of the crisis, a number of New Agers simply abandoned the movement, but there is no evidence that this was the prevailing response. The two main tenets of "classic" New Age were, firstly, that a golden age of higher consciousness was manifesting itself on Planet Earth; and secondly, that it was possible to cooperate with this happy manifestation without the need of a dogmatic creed or formal structures. When crisis struck, one possible reaction was to claim that the utopian aim of the New Age was still achievable, but that the flexible network was not the most appropriate tool. Rather, organized, hierarchical movements with a strong and clearly identified leadership were needed. "Classic" New Age was not a new religious movement. It did not, for instance, recognize, and indeed often scorned, leaders authorized by definition to declare a creed. Post New Age movements entrust precisely their authoritative leaders with the task of "saving" New Age from its crisis. While J. Z. Knight started her career as the quintessential New Age channeler, she later established what she calls an American Gnostic school in Yelms (Washington). There, nobody questions her right (or, rather, the right of Ramtha, the ancient spirit she channels) to define a creed or a doctrine. The New Age audience of J. Z. Knight, the channeler, thus became Ramtha's School of Ancient Wisdom, a post New Age new religious movement (Melton 1998b). Older movements, marginalized in "classic" New Age because they operated within closed (rather than open) structures with a precise creed and an authoritative leader, saw themselves revitalized in the wake of the New Age crisis. In Italy a number of former New Agers joined Damanhur, a community of some 400 members near Turin which calls itself "Aquarian" but, at the same time, makes clear creedal statements (see Berzano 1997) and affirms the authority of the founder leader, Oberto Airaudi, to define or change doctrine. Joining a post New Age new religious movement is not, however, the only possible solution to the New Age crisis for those unwilling to simply abandon it. A larger

number of New Agers seem more interested in redefining New Age itself.

That redefinition involved New Age's passage from the third to the first person. While New Age had been described as a "sacralization of the Self" (Heelas 1996), the "second New Age" is rather a "sacralization of myself." Classic, utopian New Age argued that Planet Earth, as a whole, was heading toward a new age of collective higher consciousness and happiness. The neo New Age recognizes that a golden age may never happen collectively, in and for the whole planet. What remains possible, however, is that an enlightened minority will enter into its personal New Age through certain exercises and techniques. Whilst such techniques are not substantially different from those advocated by classic New Agers, the "second" New Age is conceived as private while the first was public and collective. The new trend confines itself to nothing more than a promise of individual happiness. The network itself becomes less important and organized, and most remain in contact with this neo New Age by simply reading books or renting videos. Whether or not individual well being achieved by a significant number of individuals will also cause Planet Earth to heal is a vague, secondary possibility, and is no longer regarded as crucial. To this, a mythological self reinterpretation of New Age history is added, whereby it is claimed that the original network was never really millenarian or utopian, that the idea of a future Aquarian Age was merely a poetic metaphor, and that individual self transformation was always the movement's primary aim.

"When prophecy fails," it has been argued, catastrophic millennialism may nonetheless prosper through processes of cognitive dissonance (Festinger et al. 1956). The evolution of the New Age indicates that the process may indeed be different in catastrophic and progressive millennialism. When the optimistic prophecy of progressive millennialism fails, one possibility is privatization. The prophecy, it could be argued, may still come true for a selected group of individuals, although it will probably *not* come true for society, or Planet Earth, as a whole. When progressive millennial utopia fails, private utopias restricted to personal life may develop through privatization processes.

Whether there are really two different New Ages, the first and the second, or whether the New Age is one and differences should not be overemphasized, depends on how New Age is reconstructed. If one assumes, as Hanegraaff (1996) does, that utopianism was or is not crucial for New Age, it could be argued that no New Age crisis has ever taken place, and that the movement in the 2000s remains essentially the same phenomenon as existed in the 1980s. Definitions are, of course, result oriented tools, and no definition of New Age is any more “true” than another. It may be argued, however, that definitions (or descriptions) of New Age, in which the utopia of a forthcoming golden age was crucial, were widespread within the community of New Agers themselves. In this respect, the non utopian “second” New Age is a phenomenon which exhibits important differences from the original network.

SEE ALSO: Millenarianism; New Religious Movements; Utopia

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new left

Richard Flacks

Although the phrase “new left” was used as a shorthand for a variety of social movement phenomena of the 1960s, it refers specifically to a project in Britain and the US aimed at renovating the discourses and practices of the established lefts in both societies.

The term “new left” came into use in the late 1950s, when it was adopted by British intellectuals who came together after the Khrushchev revelations about Stalin, the Soviet invasion of Hungary, and the British invasion of Suez. Politically, this group shared a rejection of both Stalinism and the rightward drift of social democracy and a determination to oppose the political framework defined by the Cold War. As intellectuals, they sought new directions for critical social theory, questioning economic versions of Marxian class analysis in favor of an emphasis on culture and consciousness as frameworks of both domination and resistance. The group included many who would become seminal in historical and cultural analysis: E. P. Thompson, Stuart Hall, and Raymond Williams. The journal *New Left Review*, founded in 1960, gave international visibility to this intellectual/political project and to its label, and became the primary English language periodical for articulation and dissemination of new critical theory.

The main figures in the British new left were not primarily sociologists as such, but their work was both deeply sociological and became deeply influential in sociology, especially for those in the generation of the 1960s and 1970s. But a similar US based intellectual/political dynamic paralleled the British formation, and, though influenced by it, had its own indigenous roots. Restlessness among American socialists

and other radicals with ideological and theoretical foundations originating in Europe was emerging in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. Historian Christopher Lasch identified what he called a “new radicalism” in the political practice and thought of such early twentieth century intellectuals as Jane Addams, Walter Lippman, and Randolph Bourne, who shared a sense that cultural and educational change was fundamental to the fulfillment of visions of radical democracy. One can see in the thought and action of John Dewey a restless quest, over several decades, for a radical political formation that would be grounded in American experience and language.

The organizational experiments of A. J. Muste to create a revolutionary framework rooted in Gandhian and Thoreauvian pacifism resulted in formations, including the Congress On Racial Equality (CORE) and the Committee for Non Violent Action, which, by the 1960s, transformed American protest strategies and tactics as well as the ideological premises of many American radicals. His journal, *Liberation*, joined several other newly created publications in the 1950s that, each in its own way, tried to chart a new direction for American radical analysis and politics. *Dissent*, co edited by sociologist Lewis Coser, represented a home, during the McCarthy era, for radical critique of American society, while maintaining a staunch anti communist perspective. *Monthly Review*, although continuing an “old left” posture of support for the Soviet and Chinese revolutions, sought to define a type of Marxian political economy that would be relevant to the analysis of the US as the global center of capitalism, and challenged orthodox Communist Party strategies from the left.

By the late 1950s, efforts to define a radical critique and to articulate alternative social possibilities were being advanced by several public intellectuals who commanded large audiences. Paul Goodman used a fusion of anarchism, pragmatism, and social psychology to revive utopian imagination and sharpen critical awareness. Erich Fromm popularized ideas derived from Frankfurt School fusions of Marx and Freud in a number of bestselling books. The most explicit exponent of the need and possibility for an American new left was sociologist C. Wright Mills. Mills’s intellectual

development was itself a synthesis of many of the strands of critical theory and radical tradition that became the defining features of the new left project. He was schooled in the pragmatism of Mead and Dewey and in the critical theory of Frankfurt School and other European Marxists. His social worlds spanned both the academy and the circles of labor and socialist intellectuals. In the space of some seven years, Mills wrote a series of books and articles that contributed much to setting the agenda of what became the new left formation in the US. These included the *Power Elite* (an effort to rework radical analysis of power relations), a reader on Marxism with his own theoretical annotations, *The Sociological Imagination* (a scathing critique of academic sociology combined with a stirring program for its renovation), pamphleteering analysis and denunciation of the Cold War and its politics, and a “Letter to the New Left” enunciating a hope for new sources of radical political agency.

Alongside these fresh intellectual fusions and visions came, as the 1950s turned into the 1960s, an outburst of unexpected grassroots social movement. The prevailing understanding of post war America, as depicted by many academic and independent writers, emphasized its political quiescence, conformity, and conservatism. The rise of mass protest by African Americans in the South, and the simultaneous emergence of a movement against the nuclear arms race in Britain and the US, challenged that understanding. On the other hand, these movements provided a popular validation and further inspiration for new left social criticism of established structures of power and opportunity. Moreover, the social sources of the new protest challenged orthodox Marxian class analysis, as well as functionalist social systems analysis.

Emerging civil rights and peace movements appealed strongly to significant fractions of the American student body. The first wave of youthful activism was the mass non violent actions, including sit ins and freedom rides, of mostly black students in the South, beginning in 1960. White and black students on a number of Northern campuses engaged in sympathy protests in support of the Southern sit ins; these actions sparked a strong moral/political turn in the intellectual subcultures of university towns after years of self conscious disaffiliation.

A number of new journals, some modeled on *New Left Review*, were suddenly coming out of these towns (these included *Studies on the Left* in Madison, *New University Thought* in Chicago, and *Root and Branch* in Berkeley). They shared theme: the new potential for a resurgent left, and the need to ground that left on new terms. There was, as well, a considerable emphasis on the failures of higher education and academic research to provide critical resources for the search for social alternatives.

A major breakthrough in the development of the new left was the founding meeting of a new national student organization: Students for a Democratic Society (SDS). The organization had its roots in the “old left” tradition: it grew out of the Student League for Industrial Democracy (SLID), which itself had begun as the Intercollegiate Socialist Society in 1905. The League for Industrial Democracy was founded by a number of prominent intellectuals and labor leaders (John Dewey was an early president), and SLID had been an important campus organization in the activist 1930s. A small group of students, led by Al Haber, persuaded the LID board to turn the moribund SLID over to them in hopes of creating a new organizational format for the emerging student activism of the early 1960s. With this ambition and a small budget, Haber was able to recruit a number of local leaders of the campus activism to the project. Among these, Tom Hayden, editor of the University of Michigan *Daily*, was perhaps the most ambitious to create a new radical intellectual as well as organizational synthesis. Hayden, a voracious reader and stylish writer, strongly identified with the British new left. In addition to reading their work, he, like other early 1960s activists, was affected by Camus’s critique of revolutionary strategies based on power and violence. He was impressed with Mills’s work, his social analysis, and his presentational style. He could see, in all of these, sources for crafting a morally grounded political manifesto for a new generation of the left. He persuaded the SDS initiators that their organizational founding should focus on just such a project. He brought a draft of the manifesto to the founding meeting at Port Huron, Michigan in 1962; the several dozen assembled there spent some days debating its substance. Out of this deliberation came the *Port*

Huron Statement, which is generally regarded as the seminal document of the American new left.

In addition to the Northern white activists who came to Port Huron, there were several leaders of the Student Non Violent Coordinating Committee (SNCC). Their own visions of direct democracy and beloved community were part of what inspired the themes and language of the final document. The SNCC critique of top-down leadership and hierarchical organization, and the radical populism it expressed (“let the people decide” was a slogan), had many religious, cultural, and generational sources. But a particularly strong influence was Ella Baker, a seasoned veteran of the Civil Rights Movement who strongly articulated, to her SNCC protégés, an organizing vision that converged with the spirit of “participatory democracy.”

That phrase captures the central idea of the *Port Huron Statement*. A young pragmatist philosopher (and teacher of Hayden and other SDS founders) at Michigan, Arnold Kaufman, coined the term, but it was the *Port Huron Statement* that gave it currency. The phrase itself condenses much of what the new left project was about: it was a neologism designed to displace “socialism” in defining left vision and program; it tried to situate the left squarely in the American democratic tradition; it was, however, a *radicalization* of that tradition because it extended democracy’s meaning beyond the conventionally political and electoral. “Participatory democracy” establishes a critical standard for evaluating all institutional arrangements: the family, the school, the church, the prison, the workplace – as well as the state (and by so doing connects to the culturally based social critiques identified with John Dewey, as well as with a multiplicity of anarchist thought streams). Indeed, the phrase quickly became identified with efforts to create new forms of *internal* organization within the new social movements of the 1960s, replacing “party” style structures with forms of direct democracy, consensus decision making, and decentered leadership.

There were a number of other “new” ideas expressed by the *Port Huron Statement*. The manifesto explicitly rejects the Cold War as a framework for thought and action, condemning the communism of the Soviet bloc and the communist parties as profoundly anti democratic,

but also criticizing anti communism as a major barrier to articulate social criticism and collective action. Its anti anti communism greatly distressed most “adult” leaders of the old “democratic left” (although it was prescient about how the left in both Europe and the US would be reconstituted in the decade to follow).

Equally prescient was the statement’s argument that a new left must have an important base in the university. The university, it declares, is now a crucial social institution; the knowledge it creates and distributes is critical for social change; its inhabitants, especially the students, may be ready for active mobilization. But academia as currently constituted needs reform: it must be a space where scholars and students can connect both to the world of ideas and to the public sphere (especially the social movements).

Thus, in its formal beginning, the American new left was an effort to: (1) define a post Marxian radical democratic ideological foundation for radicalism; (2) foster new strategies, organizational forms, and tactics of grassroots collective action; (3) legitimize the role of the “public intellectual” within the university; and (4) sustain ongoing internal critique of radical activism itself in terms of a radical, participatory democratic standard.

SDS, by 1965, had become a mass student organization, because of its early leadership of protest against the Vietnam War. As it quickly grew, and because of its participatory democratic insistence on decentralized, rotating leadership, its founding generation soon gave way to a much more politically diverse set of leaders, and the Port Huron definition of the new left no longer characterized the organization. The founding generation, after fitful effort, failed to establish an “adult” organization; as a result, no new left organizational structure capable of national leadership came into being. Instead, new left discourse continued to be carried on in a variety of journals and periodicals on both sides of the Atlantic.

At the same time, parallel new lefts were being formed, largely by the rising generations of radical activists and intellectuals in various European countries as the spirit of the student movement spread. The German new left was a particularly important political and intellectual formation. The German social theorist Jürgen Habermas began an ambitious effort to

reinterpret and resynthesize Marxism, psychoanalysis, and pragmatism to create a critical theory appropriate to late capitalism. He and other European theorists took serious note of the new left and the emergence of “new” social movements as signs of a new stage of social development.

Meanwhile, in Latin America, the Cuban revolution had spawned a wide range of revolutionary groupings which, like those headed by Castro and Guevara, challenged orthodox Leninist revolutionary theory and practice. American new leftists perceived these developments, as well as the struggle of the NLF in Vietnam, as somehow akin to their own struggle against institutional power and efforts to empower the disenfranchised. The obvious contradictions between non violent and armed revolution and between an “American” and “third world” left orientation contributed to growing internal conflict in SDS and other new left groupings.

As the years went on, the self consciously post Marxian and radical character of the early new left discourse gave way to a variety of diverse and contradictory orientations. On the one hand, there were those who identified with Maoist and other third world revolutionary perspectives. In opposition to that tendency, there was a revival of Marxian political economy (“neo Marxism”), a variety of socialist feminist perspectives, a revival of left wing social democratic programs (in the US often called “economic democracy”), and, as the strength of the electoral right grew in both countries, a return to electorally oriented national and local politics.

Although the specific new left projects of the early 1960s were not sustained, important elements or traces of their perspectives were incorporated into social theory, analysis, and movement. Among these:

- A continuing demand for forms of participatory democratic decision making. This can be seen in the global emergence of community based movements seeking local voice or control over development; in the spread of environmentalist consciousness, questioning market or technology based planning; in mass street mobilizations challenging authoritarian regimes in many countries; in the World Social Forum and related manifestations challenging established global

trade and economic structures; in the rise of the Green Party in several European countries whose program tried to embody these values.

- Decentralized forms of social movement mobilization and decision making based on affinity groups, loose coalitional networks, Internet based communication, and so on.
- Emphasis on “cultural” and social psychological rather than “economistic” frameworks for analysis of political consciousness and for framing political perspectives; use of “race,” “gender,” and other non class frameworks for interpreting collective identity and conflict.
- Continuing efforts to legitimize and promote “public” social science (as opposed to strictly “academic” or “policy” bases of legitimation). As the *Port Huron Statement* argued, and as some sociologists since have tried to practice, the fulfillment of the new left project depends on processes of interaction between the intellectual worlds of universities and of social movements in hope of generating knowledge of democratic use.

SEE ALSO: Anti War and Peace Movements; Civil Rights Movement; Critical Theory/Frankfurt School; Democracy and Organizations; Fromm, Erich; Marx, Karl; Marxism and Sociology; Mills, C. Wright; New Left Realism; New Social Movement Theory; Socialism

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new left realism

Walter S. DeKeseredy

Left realism is “[o]ne of the most important critical criminologies in the world” (Schwartz & Hatty 2003: xii). Although there are variations in this school of thought, all versions begin with the assertion that inner city crime is a major problem for socially and economically disenfranchised people, regardless of their sex or ethnic/cultural background. Further, left realists contend that chronic urban poverty and an exclusionary labor market are major symptoms of contemporary capitalism, which in turn spawn crimes committed in public housing complexes and other poor areas. However, for left realists, it is not sheer poverty and the absence of prized material possessions (e.g., cars, high definition television sets) that motivate socially and economically marginalized people to prey on each other. Rather, it is a “lethal combination” of relative deprivation and market individualism (Young 1999). Thus, as left realists remind us, it is not absolute poverty, but poverty experienced as unfair (relative deprivation when compared to someone else) that breeds discontent. The form of capitalism that is predominant in North America, individualism, takes such discontent to the extremes, where in the most exaggerated situations one finds the urban poor living in a “universe where human beings live side by side but not as human beings” (Hobsbawm 1994: 341). Crime, then, is an individualistic solution to experiences of injustice (Young 1997).

Left realists also argue that people who lack legitimate means of solving the problem of relative deprivation may come into contact with other frustrated disenfranchised people and form subcultures, which, in turn, encourage and legitimate criminal behaviors (Lea & Young 1984). For example, receiving respect from peers is highly valued among ghetto adolescents who are denied status in mainstream, middle class society. However, respect and status are often granted by inner city subcultures when one is willing to be violent, such as using a gun.

Although left realists devote considerable attention to theorizing about crime and its control, they also offer many different progressive crime control and prevention policies. Still, all left realists have two things in common. First, while they would all like to see a major transformation from a society based on class, race/ethnic, and gender inequality to one that is truly equitable and democratic, they realize that this will not happen in the immediate future. This view is well founded, given that there is massive public support for neoconservative governments and their economic and social policies, such as government cuts to health care and unemployment insurance. So, left realists seek short term gains while remaining committed to long term change. This is why they propose practical initiatives that can be implemented immediately and that “chip away” at patriarchal capitalism. Examples of such policies are higher minimum wage, job creation and training programs, and housing assistance.

Second, all left realists are sharply opposed to policies heavily informed by what Jock Young (1998) defines as “establishment criminology.” Establishment criminologists see crime as a property of the individual rather than of broader social, cultural, economic, and political forces. Moreover, they call for policies such as bringing back chain gangs, longer prison sentences, and using other draconian means to prevent and reduce crime. This is not to say, however, that left realists are opposed to criminal justice reform. For example, British left realists call for strategies such as democratic control of policing and community participation in crime prevention and policy development.

Left realism was born in the 1980s and was primarily a response by North American and British scholars to their respective governments’ “law and order” programs with progressive analyses that accepted as legitimate poor urban communities’ fear of crime (DeKeseredy & Schwartz 1991). In doing so, they answered the late Ian Taylor’s (1981: xxi) famed call for the “reconstruction of socialist crime politics” by proposing practical crime control strategies. These methods, some of which were briefly described above, were meant as important alternatives not only to the programs of liberals and conservatives, but also to those programs implicit in the analyses of the so called “left idealists” who have a tendency to idealize oppressed socioeconomic groups and to overlook antisocial behavior within them.

Despite their common ground, however, there are important differences between British, Canadian, and US left realists, rooted in very distinct political agendas. For example, there has been a more receptive audience, at least at the local level, for socialist suggestions in Great Britain and Canada. The marginalization of US socialist scholars, when combined with a limited discussion of concrete recommendations for change on the local level, has meant that they have had less impact on social policy than British and Canadian left realists.

US left realists also do little, if any, empirical work, while their Canadian and British counterparts rely heavily on local victimization surveys to elicit rich data that can be used to challenge erroneous right wing interpretations of both street crime and male to female violence in intimate relationships, and ineffective means of curbing these problems (e.g., imprisonment). Consider, too, that left realist surveys typically uncover much higher rates of woman abuse, racial harassment, and other crimes committed by and against socially and economically excluded people than those uncovered by major government studies like the National Crime Victimization Survey.

Left realism has undergone some major changes since its inception in the 1980s. For example, left realists were heavily criticized for ignoring crimes of the powerful, such as corporate crime. In response to this major concern, some left realists conducted local surveys

on workplace hazards, unlawful trading practices, the victimization of housing tenants, and corporate violence against Punjabi farm workers. Note, too, that left realists now devote more theoretical, empirical, and political attention to the ways in which broader structural changes that have occurred in capitalist countries since the 1970s (e.g., deindustrialization, the North American Free Trade Agreement) contribute to woman abuse and other harms in poor urban communities (see Young 1999; DeKeseredy & Schwartz 2002; DeKeseredy et al. 2003).

Despite effectively addressing some major criticisms raised by a myriad of conservative and progressive scholars, left realists still continue to ignore women's experiences of crime as suspects, offenders, defendants, and inmates. To date, left realists have not attempted to theorize about both why women's offenses are distinct from men's and the sexist nature of the criminal justice system. Further, thus far there has been no attempt to develop and/or test a left realist theory of corporate crime. In its current form, left realist theory cannot explain crimes committed by corporations like Enron because it mainly focuses on how broader economic, social, cultural, and political forces influence interpersonal relations between economically and socially excluded individuals (Pearce & Tombs 1992; DeKeseredy 2003).

There are several other criticisms of left realism and because they are well documented elsewhere, they will not be repeated here. Many more new ones are likely to emerge too, given that left realists are constantly modifying their theoretical, empirical, and policy contributions in accordance with rapid social, economic, political, and cultural changes now occurring in societies such as Canada, the US, and the UK. For example, several North American left realists have developed integrated theories to explain separation/divorce, woman abuse in public housing, and woman abuse in cohabitation. Moreover, some left realists are becoming much more involved in qualitative research on issues related to inequality, crime, and social control.

SEE ALSO: Crime; Crime, Radical Marxist Theories of; Criminology; Deviance; Deviance, Crime and; Theory; Urban Crime and Violence; Urbanization

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new middle classes in Asia

Abdul Rahman Embong

Asia is the world's largest continent with great complexity, diversity, and different levels of economic development. Such characteristics make it difficult to describe the continent – and by extension its new middle class – in any

general way. Necessary as they may be, we should thus be careful when making generalizations about the Asian middle class lest we unwittingly gloss over its heterogeneity across regions.

It may be recalled that while the past two centuries have respectively been hailed as “the European century” and “the American century,” the twenty first century has been hailed as “the Asian century.” This generalization – undoubtedly problematic – does, however, draw attention to one striking fact that the economies of a sizable part of Asia, namely, East and Southeast Asia, have recorded impressive growth rates and undergone deep rooted transformation since the 1970s. Thanks to such growth and newfound prosperity, Asia today has produced the world’s largest middle class, estimated to be between 800 million to 1 billion, thus making Asia “the biggest market for almost everything.”

THE MIDDLE CLASS IN EAST AND SOUTHEAST ASIA

In the several decades before the 1997–8 Asian crisis, the East and Southeast Asian rapid economic growth was regarded as a “miracle.” Being late industrializers, the respective states in the region played a strong developmental role, attracting foreign investment and stimulating export oriented industrialization as well as urbanization and modernization, leading to the growth of a burgeoning new middle class. With their proportion in the workforce of these countries ranging from about 15 percent to over 40 percent and still growing, members of this class have come to occupy important positions as managers, administrators, professionals, and technical workers in both the public and private sectors, including in many transnational firms.

The rise of the middle class or the “new rich” in Asia has been described as a “revolution,” with some writers suggesting that the twentieth century is “the age of the middle class.” Many studies have been undertaken to analyze this new phenomenon, with some using an eclectic approach of a convergence between the Marxist and the Weberian perspectives. Worthy of note are two major research projects undertaken since the early 1990s – the East and Southeast

Asian Middle Class Project based in Academia Sinica, Taipei, coordinated by Professor Michael Hsiao, and the Murdoch Middle Class Project coordinated by Professor Robison.

What are some of the salient characteristics of the Asian middle class based on these studies? First, the middle class is heterogeneous, with fairly clear internal differentiation, making it more appropriate to use the term in the plural, “middle classes.” They can be divided into three categories – the *new* middle class (managers, administrators, and professionals), the *old* middle class (small employers and shopkeepers or the petite bourgeoisie), and the *marginal* middle class (routine non manual employees). Unlike in the West, the rise of the new middle class in this region has not led to the decline of the old as well as the marginal middle classes. Instead, rapid economic growth has also spurred the growth and expansion of the latter.

Second, the Asian new middle class is a *first generation* middle class. The majority of its members came from non middle class backgrounds such as farmers and agricultural workers (e.g., in South Korea, Taiwan, and Malaysia) and working class or self employed worker families (e.g., in Hong Kong and Singapore). Born mainly after World War II and originating mostly from such humble backgrounds, many of them experienced poverty and hardship during their childhood years. Their upward mobility was made possible by opportunities for higher education as well as the availability of middle class occupations.

Third, being the beneficiary of the rapid capitalist development, the middle class is relatively affluent, enabling its members to enjoy a different lifestyle from that of their parents. They lead a life of conspicuous consumption, owning property such as modern urban houses, cars, and other expensive items including household items, patronizing shopping complexes and hotels, becoming members of exclusive clubs, as well as engaging in foreign travel and tourism. However, being a class that has just “arrived,” they also have a fear of falling and are very concerned about middle class reproduction to ensure their children remain in the same class. Their families are mainly nuclear, but they attempt to maintain or recreate the old extended kinship network with their family of origin under new urban conditions.

Fourth, the middle class is also regarded as an “ascending class” and a modernization force providing indispensable professional services to society. Often associated with the proliferation of NGOs, the middle class is an ascending political force that attempts to define the society’s sociopolitical agendas such as the advancement of democracy, human rights, gender issues, environmentalism, consumer rights, and so on, thus imprinting its own stamp on its country’s trajectory.

THE MIDDLE CLASS IN JAPAN AND CHINA

Special mention must be made of the middle class in Japan and China, which followed different paths than the countries mentioned above. Japan had no colonial experience and is the first Asian country to join the ranks of the developed nations. Emerging from the ashes of the war in 1945, it undertook rapid economic reconstruction under American supervision until 1950. Although the Japanese middle class was already visible, what is more important is the new generation of the Japanese middle class that emerged out of the post war reconstruction and the subsequent Japanese economic boom when the ambitious 10 year Income Doubling Plan was announced in 1960. The class consists of white collar employees, clerks, shopkeepers, and others regardless of the line of business they are in. The improved living standards due to high economic growth particularly helped make achieving middle class status a symbolic goal of affluence. As in other industrialized countries, the proportion of the workforce occupied by white collar workers grew rapidly. The increased number of white collar workers not only reflected higher social mobility, promoting the formation of a new middle class, but also contributed to the creation of a “mass society.” In fact, from the 1960s onwards, Japanese middle class men holding white collar jobs in companies and who became known as *sararimen* (“salary men”) represent a social status symbolizing economic success and comfort, and their lifestyle came to be regarded as “ideal” among many Japanese.

The middle class in Japan is a class position defined subjectively by members of the middle

class themselves, i.e., in terms of their consumption made possible, and in fact spurred, by the economic prosperity and the increased purchasing power of the employees. According to surveys conducted under the auspices of the Japanese Prime Minister’s Office, while 76.2 percent of Japanese identified themselves as “belonging to the middle class” in 1960, the figure rose sharply to 90.0 percent three decades later. By the early 1990s, the proportion of the Japanese people who identified themselves as upper class and lower class were made up only of very small proportions, 1.2 percent and 5.6 percent, respectively. More than half of the Japanese (57.0 percent) ranked themselves as being “in the middle of the middle class.” This shows that the overwhelming majority of the Japanese regarded themselves as having “arrived,” i.e., enjoying the middle class standard of living and social status.

The situation is different in China, the world’s largest nation with a population of 1.2 billion. China has a checkered history of colonial intrusion, revolutionary wars, and the adoption of socialism and centralized planning since 1949 until it opened up and adopted the market economy after 1978. As China has been focused on social leveling and the elimination of classes under the guidance of the Communist Party’s Marxist ideology, one would not expect a middle class to grow under such a system. However, with the introduction of the market economy and the resulting new prosperity, unprecedented social transformation has taken place, and new social formations, namely the middle class, are emerging. To date, not many studies have been conducted on the Chinese middle class, and most of the writings have been rather anecdotal. Nevertheless, some market analysts estimate the size of the middle class as already huge, i.e., some 150 million persons or about 12.5 percent of the Chinese population, comprising particularly those living in major coastal cities. By 2010, this class is expected to constitute about two fifths or 40 percent of the population.

If we take consumption as a proxy, we will have an idea of the emergence of this new class. Following China’s open door policy in the late 1970s, China’s economy has been growing at 10 percent per annum since 1980, and the growth rate is still sustained today. China’s

industrialization has made impressive records, with the industrial sector's contribution to the gross national product (GDP) increasing from 42 percent in 1990 to 51 percent in 2000. The Chinese "consumption ladder," as some scholars call it, has continued to rise with China's rapid development and increased prosperity. This is manifested socially in changing patterns of ownership of household items. For example, prior to the economic reform when most of the family income was spent on basic necessities such as food and clothing, the most popular household goods were the "four big items" – sewing machines, watches, bicycles, and radios. In the 1980s, the old "four big items" had been replaced by the new "six big items" – color televisions, refrigerators, cameras, electric fans, washing machines, and tape recorders. By the 1990s the luxury items consisted of video recorders, hi fi systems, and air conditioners, while by the 2000s other luxury items have been added, namely cars and condominiums.

Other important indicators of the changing lifestyle of China's middle class are its members' craze for shopping as well as their participation in overseas travel and tourism. However, a new indicator of affluence is the increasing number of golf players and enthusiasts, together with the emergence of golf clubs patronized by the "new rich."

While the new middle class in Asia advocates modernization, the latter should not be equated with westernization. Members of the Asian middle class are in search of themselves and their identity. In this regard, we see the revival of traditional ethnic cultures with new elements of universality, and all these are spearheaded by the middle class. Some scholars are observing that a new artistic style is emerging, drawing on both Asian and western cultures but with an emphasis on the East. Thus, while Asia may be bombarded by western, namely American, middle class values, members of the Asian middle class are also turning to their sociocultural roots. All these will mean the assertion of certain distinct features of the Asian middle class that differentiate it from its western counterpart.

SEE ALSO: Civil Society; Class; Consumption; Developmental State; Marx, Karl; Modernization; Salary Men; Social Change, Southeast Asia; Urbanization; Weber, Max

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new religious movements

Eileen Barker

The term new religious movement has been employed to refer to a number of distinguishable but overlapping phenomena, not all of which are unambiguously new and not all of which are, by at least some criteria, religious. There have, of course, always been new religions – Zoroastrianism, Buddhism, Christianity, and Islam all started off as such. With the hindsight of history, it is possible to recognize periods that have been particularly prone to the growth of new religions. Examples would be the 1530s in Northern and Central Europe; England between 1620 and 1650 and again at

the turn of the nineteenth century; the Great Awakening of the late 1730s followed by the Second Great Awakening of 1820–60 in the United States; and a “Rush Hour of the Gods,” to borrow Neill McFarland’s (1967) term, arrived in Japan when the new religions that had been suppressed during World War II became liberated in the mid 1940s; then, roughly 30 years later, they were joined by what are now referred to as the Japanese new new religions (Shimazono 2004).

TERMINOLOGICAL PROBLEMS

The fact that no social phenomenon is ever completely new and that none is ever completely unchanging can make the term “new” problematic. But around the late 1960s the term “new religious movement” (NRM) started to be used to describe a special subject of study within the scholarly community of North America and Western Europe. It referred to two types of “new” religions: first, as in *The New Religions* (1970) by Jacob Needleman, it covered various forms of eastern spirituality that were new to most westerners. These new arrivals, which had frequently been in existence for hundreds or even thousands of years in their countries of origin, did not change much in their traditional beliefs and practices insofar as they were restricted to immigrants from those countries. Some, however, adopted new characteristics when they were embraced by westerners, making it possible to argue that they had become new movements in the more common, second sense, which referred to the motley assortment of groups that had been founded since World War II and were being identified as “cults” or “sects” in the popular media. These NRMs were new in the sense that they consisted predominantly of first generation converts, and their founding leaders were still alive.

Another terminological difficulty arose when many of those movements resisted being called a religion – the Brahma Kumaris, for example, prefer to be seen as a spiritual or educational movement. On the other hand, the Church of Scientology, although called a new religion by its founder, L. Ron Hubbard, has had to fight in courts around the world to be recognized as

a religion in order to obtain such secular benefits as tax exemption.

Most NRMs would fit into the sociological category of either sect or cult, but scholars came to favor the term NRM in order to avoid the pejorative overtones associated in the public mind with these labels. This has, however, led to “NRM” being associated in the rhetoric of the movements’ opponents with what they consider to be not a neutral but a “cult apologist” position. This politicizing of the term, the confusions caused by the fact that many of the movements had (or now have) been in existence for some time, and the ambiguities associated with the label “religious” have led to attempts to find other terms, such as alternative religions, minority faiths, or spiritual communities. But none of these had successfully replaced “new religious movement” by the beginning of the third millennium.

CHARACTERISTICS OF NRMS

The enormous diversity within the current wave of new religions cannot be overemphasized. Whilst nineteenth century sects such as the Jehovah’s Witnesses, Mormons, and Seventh Day Adventists certainly differ from one another, they do share some sort of relationship to the Judeo-Christian tradition. The new religions come, however, from a far wider range of traditions – not only Buddhist, Hindu, Muslim, Shinto, paganism, and various combinations of these, but also from other sources such as science fiction, psychoanalytic theories, and political ideologies.

There are those, particularly historians of religion such as J. Gordon Melton (2004), who have argued that NRMs have more in common with the traditions from which they emerged than with each other, and certainly it would be difficult to understand Krishna Consciousness without knowing something of the Hindu tradition, The Family without a knowledge of Christianity, or Soka Gakkai without knowing about Buddhism in general and the Nichiren tradition in particular. That said, however, it is also the case that there are certain characteristics which the movements might be expected to share insofar as they are new and religious.

Firstly, almost by definition, NRMs have a membership of converts, and converts to any religion are notoriously more committed and enthusiastic than those born into their religion. Secondly, founding leaders are frequently accorded a charismatic authority by their followers. This means they are accorded the right to have a direct say over more aspects of their followers' lives than, say, the pope, or even an ayatollah, and are unlikely to be held accountable to anyone, except perhaps the God(s) to whom they alone may have a direct hotline. Furthermore, being unbounded by rules or traditions, they are likely to be unpredictable, changing revelations and instructions at a moment's notice.

Thirdly, NRMs tend to appeal to an atypical representation of the population. Those that appeared in the West in the second half of the twentieth century were, for example, disproportionately young Caucasian adults from the better educated middle classes, although there were NRMs that attracted converts with different demographic profiles, such as the young black males who joined the Rastafarians or the Nation of Islam.

A fourth, but by no means universal, characteristic of new religions is that they frequently operate with a dichotomous mindset. Their belief system is seen as unquestionably True and Godly, and that of others as false and possibly satanic; their morals are good, others are bad. The primary defining identity is membership – one is either a Jesus Christian or one is not; and, to protect a vulnerable membership that has embraced beliefs and practices alien to those of their relatives and friends, NRMs throughout history have frequently encouraged their members to sever close contact with non members (Luke 14:26). Clear boundaries are, thus, drawn between “true” and “false”; “good” and “bad”; “them” and “us”; and “before” and “after” (conversion).

Fifthly, NRMs have been greeted with suspicion, fear, and even hatred by those to whom they pose an alternative. The early Christians were fed to the lions, the Cathars were burned at the stake, the Baha'i continue to be persecuted in Iran and the Ahmiddyia in Pakistan. At the turn of the third millennium, the People's Republic of China have imprisoned tens of thousands of Falun Gong practitioners for “reeducation” on the grounds that they

are considered a threat to individuals and the state; Jehovah's Witnesses have been physically attacked in Georgia, and “liquidated” by a Moscow court. Parents have paid tens of thousands of dollars to have their (adult) children kidnapped from NRMs and involuntarily imprisoned until either they escaped or promised to renounce their faith. This practice of deprogramming, although not entirely abandoned, is now rare in North America and Western Europe, but it continues in Japan and elsewhere. A number of countries have amended their constitutions or passed laws that distinguish (crudely or subtly) between new and more traditional religions, denying the former privileges or rights accorded to the latter (Richardson 2004). The European Court of Human Rights has accepted a number of cases from NRMs objecting to such practices, and the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) has issued numerous statements criticizing the treatment meted out to minority religions.

A sixth characteristic of NRMs, and one that has been surprisingly often ignored, is that they are likely to change more fundamentally and rapidly than older religions. This is obvious merely from a demographic perspective. Converts, who had enjoyed the freedoms of youth, find themselves with the responsibilities of parenthood and dealing with children who, unlike dissident converts, cannot be expelled. Paying the rent or coping with aging and ill health can become more pressing challenges than saving the world. Charismatic leaders die; the organization becomes increasingly bureaucratized and governed by rules and traditions, and, thus, more accountable and predictable. Unfulfilled prophecies may result in a relaxation of theological fervor and contribute to accommodation to the host society. NRMs that were at such pains to explain how different they were from the rest of the world might start to insist that they are basically just like anyone else. Non members can become more familiar with at least some NRMs and lose some of their fear as the movements merge into the ever growing diversity of religions, cultures, and moralities of an increasingly globalizing world.

Furthermore, economic, political, and social changes in the outside world can introduce radical changes within the “cult scene.” With the collapse of the Berlin Wall in 1989, hundreds of

NRMs swept into Eastern Europe, initially enjoying the freedom that was celebrated throughout the region, but gradually being repressed and controlled, particularly with the traditional churches objecting to foreign organizations “stealing their flock” (Borowik & Babinski 1997). Another significant change has been the arrival of the Internet, facilitating the rapid exchange of information both for the benefit and to the detriment of NRMs (Hadden & Cowan 2000).

While the earlier Christian sects were classified in *Religious Sects* (1970) by Bryan Wilson according to the actions that they believed necessary to achieve salvation, no such satisfactory typology has been developed for the more disparate NRMs. Possibly the most useful distinction is that elaborated in *The Elementary Forms of the New Religious Life* (1984) by Roy Wallis between world rejecting, world affirming, and world accommodating movements. World rejecting movements (such as the Children of God in its early days) typically entertain some kind of millennial expectation that the world will undergo radical change. World affirming groups (such as Scientology) claim to help the individual to cope with and/or succeed in society with its current values. World accommodating movements (to which Wallis assigns the Aetherius Society, Subud, and Charismatic Renewal) are fairly content with, or indifferent to, the world as it is.

Some have argued that the movements are a reflection of society, others that they arise in reaction to it; both accounts have some truth in them. It has often been observed that the more fundamentalist NRMs arose as a reaction to modernization and secularism. Bryan Wilson (1990; Wilson & Dobbelaere 1994) has argued that NRMs such as Scientology and Soka Gakkai reflect the preoccupations of a modern, secularized society in which individuals exhibit a greater concern for self development and psychic well being than for otherworldly salvation. As society moved from a production oriented economy (with the work ethic playing a central role) to a consumer economy, the image of a personal God was replaced by the idea of an impersonal force or spirit, and rewards became increasingly sought in this life, in this world – or, via reincarnation, in the next life, but still in this world.

COUNTING NRMS AND THEIR MEMBERS

No one knows exactly how many NRMs there are. The uncertainty lies partly in the definition, and partly in deciding where to draw boundaries. Are the hundreds of New Age groups all to be individually listed or should they be counted in clusters? There are, moreover, undoubtedly NRMs about which few but their members have ever heard. It is, however, probable that there are around 2,000 identifiable NRMs in Europe and North America, with a roughly similar number in Asia and possibly (depending again on what is included by the definition) several thousand more in Africa and elsewhere.

But while the number of NRMs is large, the number of members is usually relatively small. Again, it is difficult to estimate precise figures for most movements. Both NRMs and their opponents tend to exaggerate membership statistics, but further confusion arises because, just as with older religions, there are several ways of counting: there are core members who, like priests, nuns, or missionaries, devote their entire lives to the movements; but there are also congregational members, others who participate on special occasions only, and yet others who are sympathizers, but might be included as members, even though they could belong to another religion. In fact, although core members of world rejecting movements tend to have an exclusive relationship with their particular movement, those who associate with world affirming groups may be quite promiscuous in their allegiances at a more peripheral level, practicing transcendental meditation, partaking in a number of complementary medicines, attending an assortment of encounter groups, communicating with the angelic realm, and dropping into a Krishna restaurant for a vegetarian meal.

Another difficulty is a high turnover rate, with joiners being counted more assiduously than leavers. Many people have joined an NRM for a short period of time, but then decided that it was not for them after all, and have left. This fact, which has been demonstrated by a large number of scholarly studies of a variety of movements, causes embarrassment for both the NRMs and their opponents, the latter being eager to explain membership of

NRMs in terms of brainwashing or mind control – especially when they have had an interest in the illegal practice of involuntary deprogramming. However, while it is true that many NRMs, at least in their early days, have, like evangelical Christians, put considerable pressure on potential converts, this tends not to be all that effective. A study of the Unification Church in the late 1970s, when accusations of brainwashing were at their height, discovered that over 90 percent of those who became sufficiently interested in the movement to attend a residential workshop decided not to join, and the majority of those who did join left within two years (Barker 1984). Indeed, many NRMs fail to survive much beyond two or three generations.

RESPONSES TO NRMS

Different individuals, groups, and societies have responded to the contemporary NRMs in a variety of ways. Some individuals have become involved in active opposition – particularly the parents of young converts who have given up promising careers and cut themselves off from family and former friends. Not that all parents have been upset – there are those who have welcomed their children's new found faith, and more who, while not exactly overjoyed, have become resigned to the situation. At least part of the variation is likely to be traceable to previous relationships, and part to the extent to which an NRM demands exclusive commitment from its members.

Since the 1970s there has been a mushrooming of groups formed by parents and others opposed to specific NRMs or the movements in general. These began to network and came to be generically referred to as the anti cult movement. As with the NRMs, these groups and their members can differ quite radically from one another, but generally speaking they have been primarily concerned about the actual and potential harm that NRMs might cause, and have tended to select only negative actions in their depiction of what they frequently refer to as “destructive cults.” There are also a number of frequently overlapping groups, referred to as the countercult movement, concerned

more with the “wrong theology” than the “bad actions” of NRMs. Another type of “cult watching” group that has arisen is the research oriented group. These adopt the methods of the social sciences in trying to be as objective and balanced as possible in their analyses of NRMs, using, for example, the comparative method to discover whether a particular action (such as suicide or child abuse) might be found at the same or even a higher rate among members of traditional religions as it is amongst NRMs, although the action has become far more visible when reported in the media as a “cult activity” (the religious affiliation of members of mainstream religions rarely being reported in accounts of their crimes). Fourthly, there are what have been referred to as cult apologist groups, which are often closely associated with the NRMs themselves. These form a mirror image of anti cult groups insofar as they select only positive aspects of NRMs and highlight the negative features of the anti cultists.

Official responses to the NRMs have varied, from their being completely outlawed in some Islamic countries to their being treated in the same way as any other religion in countries such as the Netherlands or the US, although actual practices have not always been as even handed as the law would seem to demand. Several countries require religions to register in order to become recognized legal entities, and sometimes there are two or more levels at which registration may occur, with special privileges for, say, established, state, or traditional religions. Some times criteria for registration require having been active in the country for a certain number of years, or having a minimum number of members, both of which can militate against NRMs. Several governments have commissioned official reports about the movements. Some, such as the Dutch and Swedish reports, concluded that the law as it stood was adequate to deal with any antisocial behavior in which NRMs might indulge; other reports have recommended strong action being taken against the movements; and the French and Belgian reports included lists of “sects” (including the Quakers and the YWCA) which, although not officially adopted by the respective governments, have unofficially “given permission” to people to treat religions on the list in a discriminatory fashion.

SEE ALSO Charisma; Charismatic Movement; Fundamentalism; Globalization, Religion and; Millenarianism; New Age; Religious Cults; Satanism; Scientology; Sect

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new reproductive technologies

Karen Throsby

The new reproductive technologies constitute a broad constellation of technologies aimed at facilitating, preventing, or otherwise intervening in the process of reproduction. This includes,

for example, contraception, abortion, antenatal testing, birth technologies, and conceptive technologies. These interventions focus predominantly, although not exclusively, on the female body and, with some notable exceptions (e.g., a privately arranged and implemented donor insemination), operate within the medical domain. The description of these technologies as "new" is contested, particularly by some feminists who have argued that they are simply part of a long history of attempts to control women's bodies (Klein 1987). However, others have highlighted the extent to which the new reproductive technologies are both produced by, and productive of, contemporary biomedicine, and that women are not simply passive recipients or victims of those technologies but are actively involved in their production (Saetnan et al. 2000).

The new reproductive technologies constitute a highly controversial and contested site. One of the key areas of debate is in relation to the disputed "life" status of embryos and fetuses. These debates lie at the heart of attempts to draw ethical, moral, and legal boundaries around the conditions under which women are allowed to terminate pregnancies. Imaging and antenatal testing technologies are central to these debates, making the fetus visible during pregnancy and leading to the production of images that have been readily taken up by the "pro life" movement as demonstrative of its "life" status. However, many feminists have highlighted the ways in which particularly ultrasound imaging focuses only the fetus, to the exclusion of the broader context of that image – the body of the pregnant woman. The title of Rayna Rapp's book *Testing Women, Testing the Foetus: The Social Impact of Amniocentesis in America* (1999) challenges this technological separation of woman and fetus, and in the book she highlights the ways in which antenatal testing offers significant possibilities for women to terminate pregnancies affected by serious disabilities, but also confronts them with difficult choices and dilemmas. More recently, not only fetuses in the uterus but also embryos created outside of the body, for example in in vitro fertilization (IVF) treatment, have become a focus for these debates, particularly in relation to the destruction of embryos not needed for further

treatment, or the use of embryos for research (Williams et al. 2003).

Another feature of the new reproductive technologies is their role in the production of novel, and often controversial, family structures, redefining relationships and kinship categories (e.g., Edwards et al. 1999). In addition to the longstanding use of donor insemination techniques by single and lesbian women to facilitate reproduction outside of the heterosexual nuclear family structure, IVF techniques and the ability to cryo preserve gametes and embryos have led to the fragmentation of the conventional categories of reproduction. Social, genetic, and gestational parenthood can become separated out in surrogacy and donor gamete arrangements, and conventional kinship categories are confounded by intergenerational and intrafamilial surrogacies. These novel family structures are controversial, and are often reported in the media as indicative of a potential breakdown of "family values" and the "natural" reproductive order. However, the new reproductive technologies also offer new family building possibilities for those for whom reproduction within the normatively prescribed boundaries of the heterosexual nuclear family is either undesirable or impossible.

These very high profile and extraordinary cases tap into widely held concerns about the extent to which the new reproductive technologies might go "too far." These fears are encapsulated in the increasingly ubiquitous figure of the "designer baby" (e.g., Gosden 1999) – a shorthand referent which bundles together a wide range of present and (imagined) future technologies of embryo selection, design, and cloning which are seen as fundamentally challenging what it means to be human. However, while these present and imagined future cases are undoubtedly significant in sociological terms, they are also not representative of the more mundane, everyday experience of the new reproductive technologies. In particular, the technologies themselves are inaccessible to many people, either through religious, social, or cultural proscription, or because of the prohibitive costs. This is true not only for the more "high tech" technologies such as IVF, but also for contraception, abortion, and antenatal and

birth technologies. Conversely, while women in many countries have fought high profile struggles for the right to have an abortion, other women have found themselves struggling for the right *not* to use particular technologies. For example, some women are coerced into unwanted abortions as a result of strict population control policies or socially held preferences for children of a particular sex; others have been subject to coercive sterilization programs, or to fertility damaging and harmful contraceptives. Race and class are therefore crucial dimensions to people's experiences of the new reproductive technologies, both within national contexts and internationally. This international dimension is becoming increasingly important with the growing global trade in gametes, embryos, and stem cells, raising important questions about the power relations between donors and purchasers.

SEE ALSO: Abortion as a Social Problem; Body and Society; Cloning; Family Planning, Abortion, and Reproductive Health; Genetic Engineering as a Social Problem; Infertility; Pro Choice and Pro Life Movements; Women's Health

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new social movement theory

Steven M. Buechler

New social movement theory (NSMT) emerged in the 1980s in Europe to analyze new types of social movements that appeared from the 1960s onward. These movements were seen as “new” in contrast to the “old” working class movement identified by Marxist theory as the major challenger to capitalist society. By contrast, new social movements are organized around race, ethnicity, youth, sexuality, countercultures, environmentalism, pacifism, human rights, and the like. NSMT is a distinct approach to the study of social movements, albeit with significant internal variations (Cohen 1985; Klandermans 1991; Larana et al. 1994).

The distinctiveness of NSMT became evident when it was transplanted into US sociology where it contrasted sharply with resource mobilization theory and shared some affinities with social constructionism. Both NSMT and social constructionism signified a cultural turn in social movement theory. NSMT emphasized culture as both the arena and the means of protest. As an arena, this meant a shift from conventional instrumental struggle in the political sphere to contests over meanings, symbols, and identities in the cultural sphere. As a means, this meant that activists were less concerned with accumulating material resources and more interested in promoting expressive, identity oriented actions whose very form challenged the instrumental rationality of political elites. New social movements and theories about them thereby decentered politics as the central site of struggle and shifted attention to culture and civil society instead (Melucci 1996).

A second aspect of NSMT most clearly reflected its European heritage; this was the tendency to analyze new social movements as a historically specific response to new social formations. These theorists were as interested in the changing contours of the larger society as they were with the new movements that responded to them; the emphasis on “newness” was as much about changes in social order as it

was about new protest forms. Thus, just as Marxists argued that the “old” labor movement was a logical response to industrial capitalism, new social movement theorists argued that new movements were equally logical responses to a new social formation identified as post industrial, information based, postmodern, or advanced capitalist society. This insistence on examining the links between changes in social structure and social activism was the most distinctive aspect of NSMT (Buechler 2000).

What resonated in the US context was NSMT’s emphasis on collective identity, which has been widely adopted by mainstream US social movement theory. Again, a contrast with the “old” labor movement is helpful. Marxists often wrote as if an “objective” class based identity was unproblematic and the only challenge was to cultivate a corresponding “subjective” class consciousness. For NSMT, no group identity is objectively more central than any other, and every collective identity must be socially constructed before collective action is possible. The “old” issue of cultivating class consciousness has been replaced with the “new” one of constructing collective identity itself. This issue has moved to center stage precisely because recent social transformations have replaced stable identities rooted in neighborhoods, churches, and unions with transient and multiple identities refracted through the lenses of mass culture. In this new social formation, the social construction of a symbolically meaningful collective identity is a major accomplishment of new social movements and a prerequisite for other movement objectives (Melucci 1996).

These premises about cultural politics, social formations, and collective identity are the core of NSMT; additional themes appear in most versions of the theory. One concerns the diffuse social base of new social movements. In contrast to the working class base of old social movements, new social movements are more often identified as broadly middle class or specifically new middle class, drawing on knowledge based professions for their base (Kriesi 1989). Alternatively, new social movements may be rooted in other social identities that cross cut class categories, such as race, ethnicity, generation, gender, or sexuality. Finally, some new social movements defy classification by standard

group identities because they revolve around a common ideology or worldview such as environmentalism or pacifism.

The types of values that underlie these movements are another theme in much NSMT work. If the old social movement was rooted in materialist values, new social movements are seen as rooted in postmaterialist values (Inglehart 1990). Hence, the concern is less with redistributive struggles and quantity of life as it is with quality of life issues that are especially salient for middle class constituencies who can presume some level of material comfort. Other postmaterialist values are reflected in campaigns that seek self determination and autonomy from intrusive social controls. Rather than seeking to "get more," such struggles strive to "get free" from forces that control, colonize, or commodify life in late modern society (Habermas 1987).

Another theme in much NSMT is the politicization of everyday life. Again, this is a feature not just of movements but also of new social formations whose increasingly intrusive forms of power saturate everyday existence and thereby create new terrains of struggle. As a result, new social movement activists do not make sharp distinctions between their politics and their lives; they see politics as embedded in and flowing out of private life. The 1960s slogan that "the personal is political" reflects this politicization of everyday life that typifies many new social movements (Larana et al. 1994).

A final theme in NSMT concerns organizational form. Whereas both Marxism Leninism and resource mobilization privilege large, centralized, bureaucratic, and hierarchical structures, new social movements favor decentralized, non hierarchical, participatory processes. Although centralized organization may be more likely to succeed, new social movement activists reject it on multiple grounds. First, centralized organization creates problems of oligarchy and power differences within the movement. Second, the values of activists often lead them to favor egalitarian participation over instrumental success. Such movements prefer "prefigurative politics" whereby the movement's egalitarian organizational form foreshadows the larger social changes it seeks. If the old organizational image was a centralized army ready to do battle, the new image is diffuse, submerged, intersecting

cultural networks where membership and participation are valued over discipline and success. Such forms may not be the most strategically effective, but they can be powerful mechanisms for creating and sustaining member loyalty and commitment (Melucci 1996).

These themes distinguish NSMT from both classical Marxism and resource mobilization with their emphases on political contention, material resources, formal organization, and instrumental success. They also suggest some common concerns between NSMT and collective behavior or social constructionist approaches with their emphases on symbolic meaning, grievance articulation, fluid processes, and malleable identities. Having described NSMT, it is also important to acknowledge some internal variations in this paradigm as it emerged in European sociology.

Four founders of this perspective help illustrate its common as well as variable features. For Manuel Castells (1983), it is capitalist development that has transformed urban space and provoked new urban movements demanding non commodified forms of collective consumption, emphasizing community identity and culture, and seeking political self management and autonomy. For Alain Touraine (1981), it is post industrial society that has made possible the increasing self production of society, but control of this capacity is the object of a new class struggle between state managers and technocrats on the one hand, and consumers and clients on the other. For Jürgen Habermas (1987), it is advanced capitalism's imperatives of money, power, and instrumental rationality that threaten to colonize the everyday life world and have provoked new constituencies to mobilize and articulate a communicative rationality in defense of a beleaguered life world. For Alberto Melucci (1996), it is postmodern forms of social control, conformity pressures, and information processing that have provoked new social movements to develop personal, spiritual, and expressive forms of protest that create new collective identities while rejecting the instrumental rationality of the dominant social order. These examples illustrate different emphases within NSMT while also underscoring common efforts to link changes in social formations with new social movements.

Much of the variation within NSMT may be captured in an ideal typical contrast between “political” and “cultural” versions of the theory. The political version of NSMT is a neo Marxist approach that identifies advanced capitalism as the dominant social formation that provokes new social movements. This variant sees power as systemic and centralized, is macro oriented and state centered, and envisions a politics that retains an instrumental orientation while also building alliances between traditional class actors and new social movements. The cultural version of NSMT is a post Marxist approach that identifies a post industrial or postmodern information society as the dominant social formation provoking new social movements. This variant sees power as diffuse and decentralized, is meso and micro oriented with a focus on civil society, and envisions a politics that is culturally driven and privileges new social movements over class actors. The political version still sees merit in instrumental struggles and views culturally oriented groups as a potentially apolitical diversion from such struggles. Conversely, the cultural version sees conventional tactics and struggles as a trap that coopts political movements, and instead portrays culturally subversive actions as posing the most fundamental challenges (Buechler 2000).

Despite these variations, NSMT was seen as a unified perspective alongside resource mobilization and social constructionism within US social movement theory. The most common criticism of NSMT concerned its apparent claim of a sharp disjuncture between old labor movements with one set of characteristics and new cultural movements with another. The most incisive critiques reexamined the history of labor movements and argued that many of the supposedly distinctive features of new social movements were crucial to the mobilization of this “old” movement, including an expressive politics of cultural symbols and ongoing efforts to establish a collective identity. The role of “new” social movement characteristics in the “old” labor movement poses serious questions for some NSMT claims.

The more interesting story about the reception of NSMT in US sociology is one of selective cooptation. The grand theorizing behind European versions of NSMT was simply too

foreign to take root in the pragmatic, middle range, and frequently positivist soil of US sociology. Thus, as it entered US sociology, NSMT was stripped of its most sweeping and distinctive claims about the connections between social formations and types of movements. Instead, the paradigm was reduced in elementarist fashion to new dimensions or factors that needed to be considered alongside more familiar ones. It is ironic that once NSMT was distorted in this fashion, the decontextualized concept of collective identity became very popular in mainstream research as well as attempts to synthesize different traditions by combining notions of mobilizing structures and framing processes with that of collective identity. For these reasons, the story of NSMT remains entangled with larger differences in theoretical style between European and US sociology (Buechler 2000).

SEE ALSO: Anti War and Peace Movements; Civil Rights Movement; Collective Identity; Culture, Social Movements and; Environmental Movements; Framing and Social Movements; Global Justice as a Social Movement; Identity Politics/Relational Politics; Personal is Political; Resource Mobilization Theory; Social Movements; Student Movements; Women’s Movements

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new urbanism

Elyshia Aseltine

New urbanism is a philosophical and spatial use approach to architectural and city planning that emphasizes creating high density, self-contained communities that meet both the spatial and social needs of neighborhood residents. The ideal new urbanism community is compact, multi or mixed use, diverse in terms of race, ethnicity, income, and age, and pedestrian and public transportation friendly. New urbanist ideals have been used in both revitalization efforts of existing neighborhoods as well as in the creation of new communities, such as Celebration, Florida, Kentlands, Maryland and Laguna, California. New urbanism gained popularity as a planning approach in the 1980s as a criticism of mid nineteenth century development patterns of suburban sprawl and disinvestment in central cities. Despite the recent increase in support of new urbanist ideals, new urbanism is not considered a new approach to community planning; instead, its proponents espouse a return to a more “traditional urbanism” (i.e., compact, close knit communities that developed naturally until the twentieth century). For advocates of new urbanism, current zoning regulations and subdivision laws are creating communities that are environmentally, physically, and socially destructive. New urbanism supporters suggest that suburban sprawl and central city disinvestment lead to increasing racial and economic segregation, overuse and destruction of environmental resources and habitats, threats to distinct local cultures of place, and limited access of the poor to decent,

affordable housing, as well as adequate services and employment opportunities. Advocates propose the principles of new urbanism as a means of revitalizing declining urban areas, promoting local culture, preserving limited natural resources, assisting in addressing social inequalities, and creating spaces more conducive to challenging social problems, such as crime. While the link between the spatial organization of a community and its social health is not new to urban planning overall, new urbanism is unique in that it makes this connection explicit in its planning strategies (Congress for the New Urbanism 2000). Given its broad depth of concerns, new urbanism has piqued the interests of individuals and groups concerned with environmental protection, historical preservation, smart growth, transportation, and social justice.

Despite new urbanism’s popularity, there has been little concrete investigation and documentation of how effectively new urbanism developments meet the spatial and social goals espoused by new urbanism proponents. Critics of new urbanism as a planning approach argue that “New Urbanism is much too malleable to provide meaningful regulation of inner city renewal efforts . . . Extremely broad and conflicting sets of agendas can be accommodated under principals of New Urbanism [i.e. diversity, pedestrian orientation, accessible public spaces and community institutions, and celebration of unique local elements], rendering its design guidelines so elastic as to be ineffective” (Elliot et al. 2004). Critics of the resulting neighborhoods of new urbanism projects argue that these communities are predominantly high income, ethnically homogeneous communities that fail to demonstrate achievement of the social goals outlined by new urbanism (Bohl 2000). Despite criticism, most agree that new urbanism has “rekindled the longstanding debate over the relationship between environment and behavior” (Bohl 2000). In the future, expect to see an increase in research that scrutinizes the connection between place and social health, that examines the effectiveness of new urbanism endeavors in meeting its social goals, and that explores the policy and financing barriers and limitations to new urbanism projects.

SEE ALSO: Built Environment; City; City Planning/Urban Design; Suburbs; Urban;

Urban Renewal and Redevelopment; Urbanism/Urban Culture; Urbanization

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NGO/INGO

Leslie Sklair

Non governmental organizations (NGOs) and international non governmental organizations (INGOs) are umbrella terms that refer to organizations not directly controlled by the state or governments, mostly concerned with human rights of various kinds (including civic and political, economic and social, and environmental rights), professional and occupational interests, and various other enthusiasms. They range from very large organizations with considerable budgets and international recognition, through national organizations with a strictly domestic agenda, to small, locally funded neighborhood groups. Many are connected and overlap with social and political movements. However, the existence of many domestically and internationally powerful QUANGOs (quasi NGOs) and GONGOs (government organized NGOs) suggests that, in practice, "non governmental" is not as straightforward as it at first appears. The close involvement of many NGOs/INGOs with governments, intergovernmental bodies (notably the UN and the World Bank), and

transnational corporations and other organs of big business is a constant source of controversy.

The most influential human rights INGO is Amnesty International, with around a million members in more than 160 countries and national sections in over 50 countries. Its budget of around US\$25 million is raised from individual subscriptions and funding from private foundations. It does not accept money from governments, although most NGOs/INGOs do. The AI web site is heavily used and the AI link with the UN Commission on Human Rights is particularly useful for studying the contradictions inherent for genuinely non governmental INGOs forced to work with governments and intergovernmental agencies. Despite the work they do, many human rights INGOs have become rather elitist organizations and this has created difficulties for those they are dedicated to serve. The same can be said for the major environmental INGOS, notably Greenpeace and Friends of the Earth. The mainstream view of NGOs/INGOs is that their growth has paralleled the growth of global civil society (indeed, for many scholars in the field, this is a tautology). The success of the largest of them has led to the creation of a new class of activist lobbyists, who command respect if not affection from governments and big business for their expertise (particularly their use of the media to highlight abuses of human rights and environmental justice). As a result, some prominent NGO/INGO leaders have taken up lucrative job offers in the state apparatus or in big business. This has led to splits between the large, powerful NGOs/INGOs and some of their smaller, more radical, anti establishment counterparts, who came together in the meetings of the World Social Forum first in Porto Alegre, Brazil in 2001, and all over the world since then.

SEE ALSO Civil Society; Global Justice as a Social Movement; Human Rights; Organizations, Voluntary; Social Movements; Transnational Movements

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Nietzsche, Friedrich (1844–1900)

Robert J. Antonio

When Nietzsche was only 25 years old he was granted a doctoral degree from the University of Leipzig without completing a dissertation, and was appointed to a position in classical philology at the University of Basel. From the start, his philosophical writing was brilliant, unorthodox, and controversial. He dispensed with the formalities of academic writing and systemic philosophizing. Arthur Schopenhauer's philosophy and Richard Wagner's music exerted influence on young Nietzsche's thinking. Brief service as a medic in the Franco Prussian war and the experience of wartime devastation led him to criticize the modern state and view patriotic fervor as the bane of all genuine culture. After 10 years of teaching, poor health forced him to leave his academic position. He wrote his major philosophical works in relative obscurity, but his fame grew meteorically shortly after madness ended his writing in 1889. He had enormous literary and cultural impact and influenced many of the twentieth century's most important philosophers and social theorists.

However, Nietzsche's impacts are not easy to trace because they have been multifarious and diffuse. Relatively few social theorists directly engage his texts or quote extensively from them. Rather, many Nietzsche influenced thinkers just mention his ideas or name him in poignant passages at key junctures, draw on Nietzschean themes that have been incorporated into the cultural atmospherics, or declare simply that he had a major impact on their thinking. Carl Jung spoke compellingly of his trepidation about reading Nietzsche – a journey of discovery to the world's "other pole" that can take away

the ground from under one's feet, he feared. Although rejecting Nietzsche, Jung declared that engaging and being deeply disturbed by the philosopher, who he thought went "over the brink of the world," was a "tremendous experience" that left a deep imprint. Many other thinkers of Jung's generation spoke similarly of being moved by Nietzsche, albeit with diverse results. Max Weber said that "after Nietzsche" only a "few big children" believe that science could save us from ethical decision or give meaning to life. He purportedly declared that Nietzsche, along with Marx, changed profoundly social theory's discursive field and that all serious social theorists must address the two thinkers, at least indirectly. Nietzsche's shadow can be seen at important points in Weber's work. However, even obvious Nietzschean themes are often missed by readers who have not engaged with Nietzsche.

Intellectual historians and philosophers often have argued that Nietzsche contributed substantially to and became emblematic of growing doubts about Enlightenment rationality and about related ideas of social progress and modern political ideology, which deepened along with intensification of modern industrial society's problems and increased application of its scientific and technological powers in the service of mass regimentation, indoctrination, and warfare. Nietzsche's trenchant criticism of modernity has been attractive to thinkers with diverse points of view, and his aphoristic, fragmented texts have been interpreted in divergent ways and fused with contradictory approaches. In moments of perceived crisis, Nietzschean discourses explode on the scene, amplifying wider public sensibilities that liberal, left, and conservative politics are exhausted. At the end of World War I's mass blood letting, Thomas Mann's declaration that he saw "Nietzsche, only Nietzsche" and Randolph Bourne's assertion that Nietzsche was *the* needed tonic to counter "optimism haunted philosophies" gave voice to growing alienation from the political and cultural circles who supported uncritically and even celebrated entry into the war and opposed wartime dissent. Also addressing the war related malaise, Weber expressed fears, in his famous "politics as a vocation" speech, that impatience with liberal democratic politics was opening the door to extremist demagogues.

He warned prophetically that antiliberal currents were creating conditions for the rise of authoritarian leaders and true believer followers who would impose, within a decade, a “period of reaction” and “polar night of icy darkness and hardness.” Weber did not mention Nietzsche in this speech, but its main theme converged with the philosopher’s warnings about the likely apocalyptic consequences of the new forms of political fanaticism. In the late 1980s, neoconservative Alan Bloom attacked “Nietzschean” postmodern, poststructuralist, and multicultural theorists. He charged that Nietzsche had replaced Marx as the totemic theorist of the cultural left and that they fueled destructive relativism, which diluted culture, empowered “politically correct” know nothings, weakened moral discipline, and paved the way for proto fascist currents. However, Bloom himself deployed Nietzschean themes against the cultural left “Nietzscheans.” Other prominent neo conservative, paleoconservative, and New Right theorists also borrowed from Nietzsche, or claimed to be inspired by his ideas.

Just before the onset of debilitating madness, Nietzsche declared that one day he would be linked to “a crisis without equal on earth.” The iconic photographs of Hitler being greeted by Nietzsche’s sister at the door of her deceased brother’s archive and pondering intently the philosopher’s bust provide evidence that the prophecy came true in a way that this self identified “antipolitical” thinker would have detested. Hitler and Mussolini both claimed to follow in his tracks. Yet Nietzsche’s imprint also is easily visible in major left critiques of fascism, Stalinism, and corporate capitalism, such as Adorno and Horkheimer’s *Dialectic of Enlightenment* and Marcuse’s *Eros and Civilization*. Karl Löwith (1986: 83) declared that Nietzsche was “precursor of the German present, and at the same time its sharpest negation – ‘National Socialist’ and ‘Cultural Bolshevik.’” Nietzsche’s vehement attacks on mediocrity and clarion call for entirely new types of leaders, who are “beyond good and evil” and who have the ability to create a fundamentally new cultural order, transcending “decadent” western civilization, have inspired counterculture drop outs, quasi religious aesthetes, and political extremists, as well as serious artists, intellectuals, and radicals with high aspirations. He

also influenced theorists who support cultural openness, diversity, and tolerance against chauvinism, hubris, and cruelty. Still, most Nietzscheans have warned about cultural decline, disintegration, crisis, and consequent political exhaustion. Today, Nietzscheans on the left and on the right pose parallel “end of modernity” and “end of alternatives” scenarios, chronicling the collapse of post World War II modernization theories and their optimistic hopes for social progress.

Nietzsche posed a radical subversive challenge to the presuppositions of canonical views of western modernity as a progressive transcendence of tradition and mythology. Like many other western philosophers and social theorists, Nietzsche traced the roots of modernity to classical Greek antiquity. Stressing emphatically culture’s formative powers, he argued that an “order of rank” (i.e., an enduring value system and worldview) gives shape to civilizations, which can last for millennia. Nietzsche declared that he wanted to replace “sociology” with a “theory of the forms of domination” and the concept of “society” with (his chief interest) the “culture complex.” He held that civilizational culture complexes’ long lasting values and ideas take on different forms under divergent historical circumstances, which they also paradoxically shape. He held that “ascetic priests” or ingenious philosophical elites fashion civilization’s normative and ideational foundations; they frame mythologies that cultivate self control and self discipline among the vast majority, a mass of mediocre people, and that forge them into a compliant “herd” or society. “Slave moralities” force the herd to act in socially acceptable ways, stem their potentially disruptive biological drives, and redirect their consequent frustration into “imaginary revenge” inward against the self (i.e., guilt) and outward against cultural enemies (i.e., hatred of non compliant, different, and exceptional people). Promising salvation for the obedient, slave moralities create social order and provide meaning to human suffering by establishing blame and punishing outliers. Nietzsche claimed that healthy, uninhibited, superior individuals are prime targets of the herd’s rancorous social psychology or “ressentiment” and consequent hostile inclinations. But he argued that the strongest, cleverest people of this “noble” stratum of

“sovereign individuals” resist the herd’s machinations, stand above slave morality, and will give rise to *Übermenschen*, who will fashion a new postmodern civilization. Considering Herbert Spencer to be a “decadent,” Nietzsche contended that his utilitarian “shopkeeper’s philosophy” and Social Darwinism put mediocrity on a pedestal and celebrated the victory of ascetic priests and their herd of weaklings over the strong and noble as evolutionary progress. Nietzsche’s elitist individualism animated his “antisociological” critique of mass political leaders, obedient masses, and modern society. In *Civilization and Its Discontents* Freud drew in part from Nietzsche’s argument that cultural elites forge individuals into a society by acculturating them to values that repress their impulses, shape them into conformist social beings, and thus “make them sick.”

In contrast to Eurocentric theories, however, Nietzsche portrayed the “rise” of the West to be a history of cultural decline rather than cultural progress. Seeing western civilization’s “subjectified culture” as the prototype slave morality, Nietzsche argued that Christianity fused Judaic prophetic religion with Socrates’ Hellenic break with pre Socratic antiquity’s naturalistic, aesthetic culture. Nietzsche charged that Christianity’s brutal vision of the crucifixion, repressive approach to sexuality, threat of eternal damnation, and extreme violence against heretics and infidels gave rise to generations of inward, guilt ridden, timid, “decadent” masses who comply readily with authority or the “good” and, on command, smash cultural foes, or “evil.” He held that Christian cultural roots have been refashioned into secular forms (e.g., socialism, feminism, liberalism, democracy), which employ more multifaceted, comprehensive, and rationalized mechanisms of cultural control, but preserve Christianity’s binary frameworks of good versus evil and friend versus foe. He charged that sociology sanctifies “decaying forms of society” by treating western modernity’s secular cultural control system (i.e., decadent values, tireless work, repressed drives, and strategically managed, artificial, conformist selves) as progress. Attacking the Protestant work ethic and “industrial culture,” he condemned the need for workers to submit to “vulgar,” “bloodsucking” employers and to a dreary life of “work without pleasure.” Nietzsche

denounced the vast cultural damages of capitalist rationalization; he contended that its philistine instrumentalization and homogenization erode genuine belief and character and produce confused, indiscriminate selves who embrace enthusiastically deranged, fanatic, ersatz versions of ascetic priests and unleash repressed impulses in socially disintegrative ways. He portrayed later modernity to be on the absolute brink of total cultural meltdown. Nietzsche held that European “nationalism” and “race hatred” (“scabies of the heart and blood poisoning”) and, especially, German nationalist, anti Semitic impulses demolished cultural creativity and was a harbinger of a frightening new mass politics that would carry authoritarian regimentation and viciousness toward outsiders to unimaginable heights and put an ultra violent end to the most decadent, final phase of western civilization.

Although mostly indirect and often unrecognized, Nietzsche’s contribution to sociology and modern social theory is multifaceted and basic. His critique of Enlightenment rationality and arguments about the limits of modern science have contributed, especially through Weber’s appropriation, to discourse about the relation of facts and values, the role of science in modernity’s disenchanting public spheres, and the problem of meaning in post traditional cultures. Nietzsche’s stress on the importance of aesthetic, emotional, bodily sensibilities as a source of value and pivotal element in interpersonal relations counters overly rational, cognitive, conformist theories of socialization. His perspectivist critique of absolutist truth claims and a connection of knowledge and value creation to situated cultural interests and, especially, his “genealogy of morals” contributed to the rise of the sociology of knowledge, critical theories, and standpoint theories. His views about the primacy of culture and crucial role of cultural reproduction in the formation and perpetuation of enduring civilizations anticipated the rise of cultural sociology and comparative civilizational studies. Nietzsche’s argument about western “decadence” influenced later twentieth century critiques of “Eurocentrism” and “declinist” cultural theories.

However, Nietzsche’s argument about the entwinement of morality and power is likely his most important contribution to social theory;

it provokes fundamental questioning of the taken for granted identity of the moral with the good. This core, ironically sociological facet of his antisociology has stimulated theorists such as Weber, Mannheim, Heidegger, Arendt, Strauss, Adorno, and Foucault to ponder the normative presuppositions of modern social theory and social science and the overall normative directions of modern culture and politics. Nietzsche held that moral claims often call for unreflective obedience and put halos around manipulation and violence. His self identified “immoralism” calls on social theorists to reflect critically on normatively guided actions and expose their hidden intentions and divergent, often unintended, sociological and political consequences. Nietzsche understood that determination of culpability and aversion to imprudent moral responses and unfair, inhumane, immoral consequences require deliberate, critical reflection on the problematic relation of values and norms to particular conditions of specific situations. Thus, Nietzsche held that unquestioned obedience to morality obliterates ethical reflexivity. He also questioned modern social theorists’ tendency to endorse too readily internalized values and norms as the prime source of healthy individuality and of the good society. Deconstructing conventional morality’s good versus evil and friend versus foe binaries, Nietzsche saw hasty moral rhetoric as producing prejudicial snap judgments, which justify narrow mindedness, exclusion, or violence. He warned that the social costs of these moralizing tendencies can be enormous when they are manifested by persuasive demagogic leaders, who control the means of mass violence and aim to justify the use of force against cultural enemies.

Nietzsche argued that the leaders of nations at war would block critical opposition by identifying the enemy and their alleged collaborators with evil and draping the mass violence with the cloak of morality (e.g., “following God’s will,” “defending the homeland,” “creating democracy,” “liberating the people,” and “patriotism”). He also held that the herd would follow their lead. What Nietzsche feared came true; the twentieth century was marked by fanatical politics, fundamentalism, ethnic and religious struggles, bloodbaths, and genocide. Its mass warfare killed and maimed tens of millions of people, including enormous numbers of

innocent noncombatants. Even “small wars” have had huge “collateral damage.” The Vietnam War alone incurred an estimated 2–4 million civilian casualties. Assuming that “stopping communism” and “fulfilling national obligations” were worth the extraordinary bloodshed and destruction, some pundits still assert that the US quit Vietnam prematurely. Nietzsche urged people to slow down their moral impulses and to think them over from multiple perspectives. In the wake of globalization and the events of 9/11, resurgent fundamentalism and the rampant political invocation of the good versus evil and friend versus foe binaries make Nietzsche a most timely twenty first century theorist. Nietzsche’s method of exposing the linkage of morality and power also has powerful ethical force and stimulates provocative sociological questions when it is deployed to interrogate the role of morality in more taken for granted and private social and cultural spaces, including one’s own scientific, political, and (even) caring and loving beliefs and practices. As Foucault’s Nietzsche inspired inquiries demonstrate, the exercise of power through moral attributions and related complexes of knowledge and culture stretches from the microscopic to the macroscopic level and suffuse modern culture. However, Nietzsche’s popularity has itself derived in part from his own intense moralizing and gnostic tones. Thinkers such as Mann and Bourne embraced him because they were taken by his inspiring, ethically driven deconstructive jabs at modernity’s fusion of morality, cultural control, and violence, which made problematic what all too many rationally argued, “moderate” approaches have left unquestioned. Foucault and his followers alike have been attracted by the same powerful ethical impulses.

Nietzsche held that we are valuing beings who cannot live well without the normative ends provided by and which animate a cultural order of rank. He attributed the west’s worst pathologies to its “nihilism.” In his view, Christian rooted morality has lost vitality, is detached from genuine “life,” and does not give people adequate direction. However, he also held that late modernity contained seeds of *Übermenschen*, who will arrive “the day after tomorrow” and create a new culture complex that valorizes bodily needs, cultivates more uninhibited, spontaneous living, balances rational control with

aesthetic freedom, and, ultimately, expunges *ressentiment*. Nietzsche employed the term “good European” to praise the emergent hybrid peoples that he saw arising in the contradictory interstices of late modernity’s urbanization and deterritorialized cosmopolitan culture. He argued that exposure to divergent values and ways of life provided the vital cultural resources that allow people to see from multiple perspectives and share attitudes, aesthetic experiences, and emotions with outsiders. George Herbert Mead and John Dewey later framed a parallel cultural theory based on a more elaborate social psychology. Nietzsche thought that cultural diversity would cultivate new capacities for pleasure, imagination, and vision. He held that this multiplicity would produce beings capable of forging a postmodern civilization that would recover the vigor of the pre Socratic world’s “tragic culture” and preclude a return to insular tradition. Nietzsche called for a reinvigorated culture complex, anchored in aesthetic pleasure and creativity, to replace the gray on gray, bourgeois economic imperative and workaday life.

However, Nietzsche’s virulent antiliberalism, apocalyptic tone, and failure to clarify the institutional structure of his hoped for postmodern civilization left his vision politically ambiguous and opened it to conflictive appropriations. Moreover, his castigation of weakness and affirmative references to warlike, masculinist qualities resonated with the far right. Later twentieth century protofascists reinvented his name in calls for a remilitarized, hierarchical culture and in bitter opposition to social democrats, feminists, lesbians and gays, immigrants, and other “outsiders.” Clear traces of right wing Nietzscheanism were also visible in major neo conservative critiques of social liberalism, multiculturalism, and anti militarism. Yet Nietzschean threads were also prominent in many opposing postmodern, postcolonial, and neopragmatist theories. Left leaning globalization, human rights, immigration, and citizenship studies discourses also were framed in a climate influenced by neo Nietzschean countercurrents. Marcuse’s impassioned argument about opposing “the body against the machine” invoked Nietzsche in a call for cultural revolt against post World War II capitalism’s workaday life, consumer culture, military industrial complex, and “society without opposition.” Today’s anti globalization actions,

critiques of neoliberalism, and post 9/11 risks of terror, war, and environmental catastrophe provide fertile cultural and political grounds for similar Nietzsche appropriations.

SEE ALSO: Critical Theory/Frankfurt School; Foucault, Michel; Knowledge, Sociology of; Marx, Karl; Weber, Max

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nihonjinron

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The Japanese term *nihonjinron* refers to discourses on the distinctiveness of the society, culture, and national character of the Japanese. As such, *nihonjinron* have manifested themselves

periodically from the Meiji era (1868–1911) to the present, while continually undergoing changes in form. In its narrower and most recent sense, the term refers to the vogue of such discourses during the 1970s and the early 1980s, when a very large quantity of works on the unique qualities of the Japanese inundated bookstores – the so called *nihonjinron* boom. In the aftermath, a period of critical reaction to the *nihonjinron* set in, and this in turn has had a large impact on the ways in which Japanese society and culture are discussed today.

For the most part, the *nihonjinron* were not written as rigorous, objective studies of Japanese society, culture, and national character, but rather as works of popular sociology intended to be received favorably by wider sections of the population. The works reflect the concerns of the particular historical period in which they were written, concerns with the social, cultural, and economic conditions of the times, as well as the prevailing international relations. Characteristics of the Japanese chosen for discussion as well as the tone of discussion vary according to each historical epoch.

For example, works written in the 1950s mainly took on a self-critical tone and dealt with the feudalistic aspects of Japanese society as causes of ultra-nationalism and militarism that led Japan into World War II. During that introspective period, Japanese intellectuals produced a series of works on some distinctive features of Japanese society and depicted them as feudalistic obstacles to the democratization of Japan. Among such works were sociologist Kawashima's *The Familial Structure of Japanese Society* (1950), anthropological geographer Iizuka's *The Mental Climate of the Japanese* (1952), and social psychologist Minami's *The Psychology of the Japanese People* (1953).

In contrast to this, the *nihonjinron* that flourished in the 1970s and the early 1980s sought a more positive reevaluation of Japaneseness. The literature portrayed the distinctive features of the society and culture of Japan taking the West as the main standard of comparison. The *nihonjinron* of this period featured a wide range of participants including, in addition to academics, cultural elites with diverse backgrounds such as business elites.

IMAGES OF JAPANESE SOCIETY AND CULTURE

The *nihonjinron* of the 1970s and the early 1980s focused on and consolidated certain images of Japanese society, culture, and national character. These may be summarized in terms of the following propositions and assumptions.

First, Japanese society is characterized in the *nihonjinron* by groupism or “interpersonalism” (*kanjinshugi*), vertical stratification (intra-company solidarity), and dependence, as opposed to western society which is characterized by individualism, horizontal stratification (class solidarity), and independence. Among the many books written on Japanese group orientation, Nakane's *Japanese Society* (1970) and Doi's *The Anatomy of Dependence* (1973) are two of the most prominent. Social anthropologist Nakane employed the key concept “vertical society” in an attempt to identify peculiarly Japanese forms of social organization and interactions. The Japanese are described as a group-oriented people preferring to act hierarchically within the framework of a group, typically, a company. Psychiatrist Doi identified the attitude of passive dependence (*amae*) as being prolonged into adulthood in Japanese society. *Amae* is considered to occur typically as a quasi-parent-child relationship in companies and political factions, where a person in a subordinate social position assumes the role of a child toward his superior who plays the role of a parent. The notion of group orientation was often discussed in the context of business organization, management practices, and industrial relations.

Generally, the concept of groupism is contrasted with that of individualism. Some argue, however, that groupism does not accurately conceptualize Japanese patterns of behavior and thought, as it tends to imply group members' immersion into and loyalty to the organization. Hence, sociologist Hamaguchi proposed the notion of *kanjinshugi* (literally, “interpersonalism,” or in his own translation, “contextualism”), which is characterized by mutual dependence, mutual trust, and human relation in itself. It is maintained that this better describes what it really feels like to be part of the group for the Japanese in their everyday life.

The second major proposition of the *nihonjinron* concerns the patterns of interpersonal communication of the Japanese. Again, in contrast with the communication style of the West, which is said to value verbal skills and logical presentation, the non verbal and supralogical Japanese style of communication was stressed. Essential interpersonal communication among the Japanese is supposed to be performed non verbally, non logically, and empathetically. Supposedly Japanese characteristics such as “belly talk” (*haragei*) and empathetic understanding (*ishin denshin*) were often discussed in this connection.

Thirdly, the *nihonjinron* emphasized and assumed the homogeneity and uniformity of Japanese society. Here again, the contrast is with the multi ethnic and multiracial composition of the West, in particular the society of the US, with the racial and ethnic homogeneity of Japan underscored.

Fourth, social and cultural traits such as groupism, “interpersonalism,” non verbalism, and supralogicalism are usually explained in terms of historical formation deriving from climatic conditions and modes of production, that is, rice cultivation, which required solidarity and mutual dependence in a village community. In this instance the contrast is with what are taken to be western historical modes of production such as pastoralism and nomadism, which are conducive to individualism (e.g., Aida 1972).

The above themes are interrelated. The Japanese patterns of interpersonal communication, which discourage logical and verbal confrontation, are strongly related to the high value placed on consensus and harmony in interpersonal relations, while non verbal, empathetic, and supralogical communication is assumed to be a product of homogeneous society. This leads to an assumption that the Japanese patterns of behavior and communication are so unique that they can only be understood by persons born Japanese.

NATIONAL IDENTITY AND NATIONALISM

Although one may be inclined to think that *nihonjinron* type discourse is peculiar to Japan,

intellectual curiosity about the perceived unique traits of one’s own nation has been widely observed in various periods of history and in many parts of the world. In fact, exploration and articulation of ideas of national distinctiveness are an essential part of cultural nationalism. *Nihonjinron* should be regarded as one variation of the more general phenomenon of discourses on national distinctiveness. This enables comparison with other national cases as well as the theoretical understanding of national identity and cultural nationalism.

If cultural nationalism is the project of creating, preserving, and strengthening a people’s cultural identity when such identity is felt to be lacking, inadequate, or threatened, it is understandable that intellectuals should play a prominent role in systematizing ideas of national distinctiveness. In fact, the history of modernity saw an evolution of a systematic comparison of the characters of different peoples – whether in terms of a holistic construct such as *Volksgeist* or by reference to institutions as key elements in creating a sense of national identity.

If *nihonjinron* gives the impression of being an extreme case of such a phenomenon, it is partly because Japanese intellectuals’ ideas of Japanese uniqueness have been highly holistic. Their primary concern is, on the assumption of Japanese society as a homogeneous and holistic entity, to explore and describe the cultural ethos or collective spirit or, to be more exact, the characteristic mode of behaving and thinking of the Japanese that underlies objectified institutions and practices.

CRITICISMS OF THE *NIHONJINRON*

In the 1980s criticisms of the *nihonjinron* began to be expressed by scholars concerned about the large influence of these types of writings. In turn, discourses critical of the *nihonjinron* came to form their own genre in intellectual debates in and out of Japan. Sugimoto and Mouer’s *Are the Japanese Very Japanese?*, published in 1982, pioneered a critique of the *nihonjinron*. Befu was also one of the earliest critics, notably in *The Discourse on Japanese Culture as an Ideology* (1987). Another noteworthy effort in this vein was Dale’s *The Myth of Japanese Uniqueness*

(1986), which leveled criticism at a wide range of *nihonjinron* type materials, both contemporary and historical.

Criticisms took many forms. There was, first of all, a methodological criticism. Writers of the *nihonjinron*, it was pointed out, based their conclusions on personal experiences and everyday anecdotes, picking and choosing evidence in an arbitrary manner that supported their arguments, and thus their conclusions lack a sound methodological basis and any scholarly value. As to why the writers employed such a self-serving method of amassing examples to back their theories, one answer is to be found in their ideological orientations.

Second, the *nihonjinron* was criticized as constituting a conservative ideology well in tune with the interests of the ruling elite in society. It is true that there was, as discussed earlier, a strong tendency to expound on the virtues of village communal culture, rice cultivation culture, and so on, and this tended to affirm and support the group solidarity ethos of Japanese corporations. Rather than class solidarity, the *nihonjinron* theories can be used to buttress intracompany solidarity and group harmony, and it is this conservative ideological bent that was criticized. A third type of criticism leveled at the *nihonjinron* was that it was a nationalist ideology that extolled the superiority of Japanese culture by explaining Japan's post war economic growth and success by reference to Japan's supposedly unique group harmony and communal style of interpersonal communication. A fourth line of criticism voiced in many quarters was that the *nihonjinron* overemphasized the cultural and social homogeneity of the Japanese, to the serious neglect of diversity existing within the society.

In response to such criticisms, there began to appear in the 1990s a new type of discourse that endeavored to take into account Japan's internal diversity as well as similarities between Japan and other societies. For example, Amino's *Perspectives on Discourses on Japan* (1990) and Oguma's *A Genealogy of "Japanese" Self Images* (2002) are representative of this trend. It is fair to say that an approach that favors demythologizing of Japan's homogeneity has become the norm in studies of Japanese society.

CONSUMERS OF THE *NIHONJINRON*

Nihonjinron critical literature also sought to provide explanations about why discussions of Japanese distinctiveness became such a significant social phenomenon. It was commonly argued that readers were attracted to the *nihonjinron* because they offered a salvation from an identity crisis derived from the westernization of Japanese culture, or that such works promoted feelings of cultural superiority by way of their explanations of Japanese economic success as the result of unique cultural traits.

Such assertions prompt the following sociological questions to be raised: who, in fact, read the *nihonjinron*, and in what manner? What types of social groups for what reasons responded actively to and consumed these writings? These issues are addressed in Yoshino's *Cultural Nationalism in Contemporary Japan* (1992), which analyzed the social process of the consumption (acceptance) of the *nihonjinron*. Unlike cultural, business, and other elites, who concerned themselves with abstract notions such as threatened identity and culturalist rationalization of economic strength, consumers of the *nihonjinron* tended to be attracted to what they felt to be practical benefits in their immediate personal environments such as in understanding and dealing successfully with problems of the workplace.

Several types of concrete concerns became apparent. For example, as the *nihonjinron* often concerned themselves with peculiarly Japanese social characteristics of business management and company organizations, they exercised an especially strong appeal to the likes of businessmen in companies. Furthermore, the *nihonjinron* appealed to people with an interest in intercultural communication. Such people tended to feel that true international understanding required not just knowledge of English, the international language, but also a firm grasp of cultural differences between Japan and non Japanese (European and North American) societies. The *nihonjinron*, with their characteristic style of comparisons and contrasts between Japanese and western cultures, provided them with fertile ground to explore and understand problems of intercultural communication.

GLOBALIZATION AND CULTURAL DIFFERENCES

Nihonjinron as the activity of intellectuals and cultural elites had its heyday in the 1970s and the early 1980s and then became subject to criticism. This is not to say, however, that *nihonjinron* lost their importance in the time that followed. On the contrary, *nihonjinron* discourses in various guises underwent a process of reproduction and were diffused to broader segments of the population. To take one example, *nihonjinron* themes have been reproduced in the foreign language education industry. Mastery of foreign language skills is a requisite qualification for employment in a globalizing world; so too is knowledge of cultural differences. Reproduction of *nihonjinron* discourses is typically seen in the private English language teaching (ELT) industry, where these types of discourses about Japanese society and national character find their way into the classroom as part of the project of improving intercultural communication. This is not limited to ELT. In foreign language training in general, we often see two cultures, one represented by the mother tongue and the other by the foreign language, being compared and contrasted as part of language instruction. Also, in the case of Japanese language teaching for non-Japanese, comparative cultural discussion is often added to the teaching content. Students of Japanese do not merely receive instruction in Japanese grammar and vocabulary, but often the teacher will feel compelled to proffer *nihonjinron* type insights to students and will use *nihonjinron* writings as study materials. Indeed, in more advanced Japanese classes the trend is to use quite a lot of *nihonjinron* writings as study materials. Thus, classic stereotypical images of the Japanese propagated by the *nihonjinron* continue to be reproduced and consumed in the realm of language teaching.

The thematic importance of *nihonjinron* can be said to be actually gaining weight. Ideas of national distinctiveness and cultural differences, while ever shifting in shape, continue to be reproduced in new and different settings. Indeed, it may be said that discourses on cultural

differences are flourishing more than ever in the age of globalization.

SEE ALSO: Japanese Style Management; *Minzoku*; Nationalism; *Seken*; *Tatemaie/Honne*

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Nobel Prizes and the scientific elite

Steve Fuller

The elite basis of scientific knowledge is traceable to the Greeks. Plato treated knowledge as a principle of social stratification that is distributed as talents across the population. Accordingly, education is about discovering the social role or function for which one has been biologically endowed. In a highly differentiated society, all such roles are “elite” in that a select few can play them well. The distinctiveness of science for Plato is that its form of knowledge makes one, at least in principle, fit to rule society as a whole. It is worth contrasting Aristotle’s somewhat different view of the situation. He shared Plato’s views about genetically based individual differences but treated the capacity to rule as a general talent common to those whose families have a proven track record of estate management. For Aristotle, science was “elite” in the sense of a leisure activity that such people should undertake, much like sports, once they have attended to matters of the estate.

Both Plato’s and Aristotle’s perspectives on the elite nature of science underwent significant change in the modern period, especially as science metamorphosed from a specialized mental discipline to the basis of technological innovation and society’s infrastructure. Yet, relatively pure versions of these classical views have persisted. On the one hand, Platonism survives in the idea of an “internal history of science,” whereby science proceeds according to a trajectory defined by a self-selecting class of scientists. Once sufficiently matured, the knowledge of this class is then applicable to society at large, with varying degrees of consent from those to whom it is applied. This idea was enshrined by Cold War theorists of science like James Bryant Conant and Thomas Kuhn. On the other hand, Aristotelianism survives in the neoliberal political economist Charles Murray, who has questioned the increasing relevance of science, and academic knowledge more generally, to job training across all sectors of society. According to Murray, this only ends up dissipating and corrupting science, while providing a

false sense of competence to the intellectually deficient.

The monotheistic idea that humans are created in the image and likeness of God reoriented the Greek elitist heritage by implying that science is not the knowledge of an elite but the elite part of universally available knowledge. As this idea was secularized, scientists justified their elite status as merely temporary, portraying themselves as the vanguard of overall social progress. The expectation, then, was that scientific knowledge would ultimately “rationalize” all of society. Early scientific societies in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries argued this way in return for political protection and legal autonomy. The image has remained persuasive as scientific societies and state power fed off each other: the intensification of scientific effort required more full-time workers in the field. States realized that these scientific recruits could also function as civil servants. By the late nineteenth century, the image of scientists as salaried professionals requiring specialized, yet non-esoteric, training began to receive widespread acceptance. Indeed, as opposed to the class snobbery that persisted in the humanities, a career in science came to be seen as a means for upward social mobility.

However, this anti-elitist tendency was undermined in the twentieth century from two directions, one subtle and infrastructural, the other more public and symbolic. The former involved the so-called peer review process by which scientific research has been evaluated since the seventeenth century. Originally, peer review enabled science to function as an egalitarian community, in which any scientist (at least in a given specialty) was literally eligible to evaluate the work of any other scientist. But as the ranks of scientists swelled, and perceptions about their merit became more discriminating, peer review itself became elitist: relatively few pass judgment on the increasingly many.

This tendency has been exacerbated by the extension of peer review’s purview from publication to funding issues – not just whose research is meritorious, but who is fit to do research in the first place. Robert Merton has called this the principle of cumulative advantage, popularly known as the Matthew effect. Scientists whose work is cited more tend to

publish more, which usually implies greater access to resources (including time), which in turn reflects the scientist's institutional location, itself a product of job market considerations, which are themselves biased toward the scientist's academic pedigree. While Merton hailed these nested constraints as evidence of science's own version of the "invisible hand," it equally looks like a return to the hereditary transmission of status, albeit not along strictly biological lines.

The second elitist revival in twentieth century science has come from the institution of the Nobel Prizes, awarded annually since 1901, from an endowment provided in the will of the inventor of dynamite, Alfred Nobel. Against the ongoing professionalization of science, the idea of prizes for scientific achievement recalled an older amateur ethic, whereby clever people from various walks of life competed to solve practically inspired problems by scientific means. In fact, the main difficulty in implementing Nobel's wishes was his desire to reward the latest and most beneficial achievements, yet as defined in terms of scientific disciplines (physics, chemistry, physiology, and medicine) which are naturally organized along a longer temporal and deeper theoretical horizon. This tension has been historically resolved by a tendency to award Prizes for empirical, but rarely theoretical, work of clear academic significance. And given that the Nobel Prizes were conceived before biology became institutionalized as an academic discipline, no prize has ever been given for work specifically related to the neo Darwinian synthesis that theoretically unifies the field.

The sociological impact of the Nobel Prizes on scientific enterprise has been complex. The large purse associated with each prize (about \$1.5 million) has made scientists more focused, competitive, and proprietary as they try to second guess the inclinations of the Sweden based award committees. However, since these committees operate by consensus, controversy arises more over who should be included in an award (up to three people allowed) than the achievement recognized in the award. At the same time as the prizes have lived up to Nobel's desire for the internationalization of science, they have also enabled certain countries, notably the United States, to serve as magnets for

researchers with Nobel ambitions. Finally, the Nobel Prizes have inspired comparably funded prizes in other disciplines. Together they have provided significant public relations for science as a whole, while reinforcing the difference between its elite and rank and file practitioners.

SEE ALSO: Expertise, "Scientification," and the Authority of Science; Matthew Effect; Merton, Robert K.; Peer Review and Quality Control in Science; Speaking Truth to Power: Science and Policy

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non-resident parents

Bruce Smyth

Family life has undergone dramatic change in recent decades, especially in relation to family structure. Marked increases in union dissolution and nonmarital childbearing have resulted in a growing number of children living apart from one of their parents. Most non resident parents are fathers but with resident fathers becoming one of the fastest rising family forms in many western countries, non resident mothers too are increasing in number.

Throughout history, fathers have been absent from their children's lives for many reasons: for work, to fight wars, or through incarceration. But more recently, the transition to non resident parenthood typically occurs in one of

three ways: nonmarital childbearing where parents never live together; the breakdown of the relationships of unmarried cohabiting parents; or marital dissolution between parents. Non resident parenthood has become a common transition in the life course of many parents, even though most parents, of course, never anticipate such a transition.

Up until recently, not a great deal has been known about non resident fathers. Even less remains known about non resident mothers. While concern for children's well being has catalyzed research efforts, researching non resident parents is no easy task. Non resident parents are hard to identify, locate, and recruit for research. They can be geographically mobile, and can have tenuous living arrangements as boarders, housemates, or as those not legally related to other people in a household. As such, they can slip through surveys that make use of traditional household rosters to identify target respondents. Non resident parents have been found to underreport their parental status – some may be reluctant to declare it; some fathers may not know this status. The relatively small proportion of non resident mothers, in particular, means that even in large national surveys there are often insufficient numbers of them to explore meaningfully and reliably.

Non resident parents have attracted much negative attention in recent years – stigmatized as *deadbeat dads* or as *bad moms* – and so their reluctance to participate in research is perhaps not surprising. This negative attention is beginning to give way to emerging evidence that many non resident parents want to play an active role in their children's lives but struggle to do so in the face of numerous emotional and practical obstacles. Emotional issues include: dealing with the loss of daily interactions with children and familiar family activities; the pain of brief, superficial contact "visits" with children; role ambiguity; a sense of inadequacy and rejection; and feeling disenfranchised and disconnected (Am I a "real" parent?). Practical difficulties include: fewer financial resources in the aftermath of parental separation (particularly in light of rigorous child support enforcement regimes); finding adequate housing that can provide a home or home like space for caring for children; and maintaining a connection with children in the face of parental conflict,

physical distance, new family responsibilities, and children's peer, school, and extracurricular activities. These challenges, individually and in combination, lead many non resident parents to believe that they cannot maintain much more than a superficial relationship with their children. In particular, the time limited nature of contact means that non resident parents often feel under pressure to engage in recreational and social activities with children (giving rise to the phrase *Disneyland Dads/Disneyland Moms*).

It is noteworthy that a sizable proportion of non resident parents (especially fathers) do not appear to be able to overcome the above challenges, and as a consequence have little or no contact with their children (estimates vary in time and place from 20 to 50 percent of separated/divorced parents). Father absence has enormous implications for children's well being, and has been shown to be associated with a plethora of social ills for children (from poor academic achievement to youth suicide), spurring a flurry of concerned social commentary in recent years. However, there is compelling evidence that parental conflict and the economic fallout from parental separation drives many of the negative consequences of divorce for children – not parental absence per se.

Much of the research into non resident parenting has focused on two domains of critical importance to children's well being: *parent-child contact* and *child support*.

Most studies of parent-child contact have taken a quantitative tack, measuring the frequency and/or overall amount of face to face contact between non resident parents and their children. There is mounting evidence, however, that the nature and quality of the interaction are more important than how often contact occurs. In particular, *authoritative parenting* (encompassing warmth and involvement, the encouragement of psychological autonomy, and monitoring and boundary setting) has been shown to be an important dimension of relationship quality. In pursuit of a better understanding of what non resident parents do when they are with their children, research is moving away from the use of simple measures of contact frequency toward approaches that aim to recognize and describe the multiple qualitative and quantitative differences in the ways that non resident parents can share the care of children.

In the meantime, there is much to suggest that family dynamics in tandem with demographic factors temper the form that contact takes. These factors largely reduce to the three Rs – repartnering, relocation (i.e., physical distance), and residual bad feelings (particularly conflict) between parents. To this list may be added three other Rs – relative economic disadvantage, “rotten behavior” by a parent (including abuse, domestic violence, or obstruction of contact), and regard for parents’ work patterns, and children’s age, developmental stage, individual temperament, resilience, experience, and wishes. Not surprisingly, higher levels and qualitatively richer types of contact appear to be associated with lower levels of interparental conflict, lower rates of repartnering, less physical distance between parents’ households, and higher levels of financial resources.

The above factors also appear to influence or mediate the close but complex links between contact and child support. Parent–child contact and child support often go hand in hand (the so called *access–maintenance nexus*). Non resident parents who pay child support also tend to spend time with their children; those who do not see their children tend not to pay child support. Seltzer et al. (1989) have proposed three broad causal explanations for this seeing–paying relation: common demographic causes, unobserved psychosocial factors, and more direct causal relationships between contact and child support themselves.

Common demographic factors constrain or enhance the resources necessary for contact and the payment of child support. For example, the presence of new children in the non resident parent’s household places constraints on time and money and this is likely to reduce the frequency of contact and the amount of child support paid to children of a previous union. *Unobserved psychosocial factors* can also influence the co occurrence of contact and child support. For example, non resident parents’ commitment to their children and the desire for a close emotional bond might result in the payment of child support and regular parent–child contact. Finally, contact and child support can themselves be *causally related*. For example, parent–child contact can foster a context in which non resident parents stay in touch with children’s material needs, and the costs of these

needs. They might thus be more inclined to provide financial support than parents who do not see their children. Where conflict exists between parents, the causal links between contact and child support can be quite explicit: both activities can become power play activities whereby children become “pawns” in a power struggle between parents in which the pieces traded are contact and child support: money from the non resident parent is traded for contact with children (“I pay so I see”), or vice versa (“You don’t pay so you don’t see”).

These three causal explanations are not mutually exclusive. Indeed, a combination of these processes is likely to define the particular seeing–paying relation (such as where parents’ commitment to raising their children influences their decision to live near one another). These processes are also likely to alter over time as parents’ circumstances change and as children grow older. Changing relational, economic, and life circumstances can trigger sudden shifts in parenting arrangements (and vice versa). For example, informal parenting arrangements around contact and financial support might become highly structured as a result of one parent repartnering and moving some distance from the children’s other parent. The contact–child support nexus, and the dynamics around it, can thus be quite complex and fluid.

Complexities aside, a solid body of data indicates that the payment of child support by non resident parents improves children’s well being on many levels, and significant gains have generally been made in the collection rate and amount of child support paid for children since enforcement regimes were introduced in recent decades – although some schemes have been more successful than others.

Child support nonetheless continues to act as a “lightning rod” for much pent up anger, grief, and disappointment by non resident parents surrounding relationship breakdown and the loss of everyday family life. Not surprisingly, non resident parents and resident parents differ markedly in their criticisms of legally mandated collection regimes. The most common complaint by parents who pay child support (mostly non resident fathers – especially those who have new families to support) is that they are paying too much. By contrast, the most common complaint by resident parents eligible

for child support (mostly mothers) is that payments do not occur, debts are not pursued, or that the child support system can be manipulated in order to minimize or avoid child support obligations altogether. In recent years, these different perceptions have been given voice through the emergence of a number of grassroots fathers' or mothers' pressure groups that seek to shape policy reform. Gender politics loom large in relation to contact and child support issues.

Gender differences also pervade non resident parenting itself. While non resident mothers report experiencing many of the same pressures and feelings as non resident fathers, they typically carry the additional burden of greater economic vulnerability. Women are generally more vulnerable financially across the life course than men; marital disruption often exposes this vulnerability. Non resident mothers are generally poorer than non resident fathers, and a lack of economic resources in the first place is one of the most common reasons that mothers voluntarily give up the full time care of their children. Many non resident mothers believe that their children's father is in a better position financially to raise their children. Related to their often weaker economic circumstances, non resident mothers are less likely to pay child support than non resident fathers (but still provide in kind contributions such as clothing, toys, and outings).

Social attitudes toward non resident mothers are also more likely to be negative than toward non resident fathers. This is because society expects women to be the nurturers and carers of children. Traditional gender role expectations place greater pressure on non resident mothers than on non resident fathers to stay in touch with children. The empirical data (albeit piecemeal) suggest that this is indeed the case. Non resident mothers are more likely than non resident fathers to see their children, and to do so more often and in qualitatively richer ways (such as through overnight stays or extended contact). Non resident mothers may also be more inclined than non resident fathers to use other forms of communication (such as telephone and letters) to maintain a connection with their children in the absence of daily face to face contact. Moreover, there may be greater intimacy between non resident mothers and

their children and a higher level of involvement than is the case for non resident fathers, as evidenced by the discussion of feelings, talking about daily problems and concerns, and more open communication generally. These apparent qualitative differences between non resident mothers' and non resident fathers' relationships with their children probably mimic pre separation gender differentiated parenting roles.

Regardless of gender, one of the fundamental challenges for all non resident parents is to learn new ways of contributing to their children and staying involved in their lives while living elsewhere. A broad array of policies, interventions, and research continues to be developed to support non resident parents in this crucial endeavor.

SEE ALSO: Child Custody and Child Support; Children and Divorce; Divorce; Family Demography; Family Structure; Life Course and Family; Lone Parent Families; Stepfamilies; Stepfathering; Stepmothering

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norm of reciprocity

James J. Chriss

According to Lester Ward (1883, 1: 464–8), human society has passed through three stages of development, with a fourth stage not yet realized. In the first stage (the autarchic), human beings were savage and solitary creatures. With their higher mental powers in comparison to the lower animals, human beings gained mastery over most other creatures, yet what they required most was protection from their own kind.

Even so, their relative security against external threats (save those of other tribes) meant that at some point human populations began to multiply. In this second, or anarchic, stage, human beings were forced into closer contact with greater numbers of others, but since they were ill adapted to association and social conditions – conditions in which ethics and virtues had not yet arisen – selfish passion continued to hold sway.

As headships emerged to rule over human populations along tribal and communal lines, rules were created to regulate important forms of human association, including most importantly sexual relations. This establishment of the first rudimentary elements of government represents the third or politarchic stage. As population growth continued and as more tribes came into contact, the ancient pattern of conflicts fueled by ingroup/outgroup hostilities – ethnocentrism in Sumner's later terminology – gave way to cooperation and the enlargement of the spheres of social organization.

To keep the peace, otherwise warring tribes offered things of value to one another, thereby giving rise to the "gift" or the norm of reciprocity more generally. One of the great inventions of this third, politarchic, stage of societal development, for example, was the rule of exogamy and the creation of a dowry system within the marriage institution. This created obligations between families as they exchanged daughters (or other valued items) for sons in marriage, thereby reducing conflict and expanding the notion of the "we" beyond the isolated kinship group.

The fourth stage of the development of human society, the so called pantarchic, is not yet realized. According to Ward, government, which became necessary as population growth pushed disparate groups of humans into conflictual relations, will eventually disappear as the ideas of reciprocity, altruism, and social support spread out beyond the level of the tribe or community or nation, eventually uniting all elements of the world community into one global solidarity that will render the idea of the nation obsolete. (We will see this idea of a one world order resurface in the later writings of George H. Mead, to be discussed shortly.)

To summarize, human beings evolved from brutish and solitary (the original state of nature envisioned by Hobbes) to sympathetic, social, and oriented toward the provision of mutual aid beginning in the third or politarchic stage. Echoing Ward but also borrowing the notion of sympathy from Adam Smith, Franklin Giddings (1896) made the "consciousness of kind" the foundation of organized, stable human society. About the same time Ferdinand Tönnies in Germany argued that human society is held together only to the degree that its members mutually or reciprocally influence one another. Somewhat later, fellow German Georg Simmel had arrived at the same position, stating that the reciprocal influences persons exerted on one another were the basis of sociation and the social order more broadly (Thon 1897).

Sympathy or "fellow feeling," which first came into view during the third stage of the development of human society, is the basis of the norm of reciprocity. According to Gouldner (1960) and Uehara (1995), the norm of reciprocity consists of three interrelated moral ideals: (1) people should help those who have helped them; (2) people should not injure those who have

helped them; and (3) people should avoid overbenefiting from (i.e., should not take advantage of) those who have helped them.

Explicit statements concerning the nature of reciprocity began appearing during the 1920s. For example, in his 1922 book *Argonauts of the Western Pacific*, Bronislaw Malinowski discovered that inhabitants of these islands had created a circular system of exchange whereby local cultural artifacts – shell armbands and shell bracelets – traveled in different but predictable directions between the various groups. Although the exchanges had little or no economic value, they did help to maintain social solidarities.

Generalizing from the studies of Malinowski and others, Marcel Mauss argued in his 1925 book *The Gift* that human social relations are stabilized with the rise of the archaic form of exchange appearing in the politarchic stage. The “gift” is a special form of exchange based on three unwritten laws, namely, the obligation to give, the obligation to receive, and the obligation to repay (Burke 1992: 70). Several decades later Claude Lévi Strauss published his *Elementary Structures of Kinship*, wherein he argued that such things as the incest taboo, rules of exogamy, wife buying, and even marriage through capture were all examples of the law of reciprocity. Even further, this law of reciprocity, which places under its rubric a number of seemingly disparate acts taking place within the marriage institution, is itself generated by a still more fundamental phenomenon, namely, the structure and functioning of the human brain. In tracing the form and function of society to mental constraints, Lévi Strauss developed a form of structuralism which repudiated the naïve realism characteristic of positivism and naturalism.

Whereas Ward speaks of master transitions in the development of human society paralleling the upgrading of the intellect and the rational faculty – that is, from egoistic passion and hedonism to thoughtful contemplation of others – George H. Mead focuses on the acquisition of language as the foundation upon which sympathy and reciprocity were built. Mead’s theory of the social self is in essence an effort to explain the social nature of ethical conduct in other than behavioristic or individualistic terms. For Mead, communication – which is the major tool

through which cooperation and shared social worlds are forged – does not arise out of competition (“survival of the fittest”) nor in imitation (Tarde), but in constructive cooperation. Rather than a prudent strategy for individual survival or dominance, sociability was actually present with the appearance of language. And rather than the lower level conversation of gestures in which animals engage, human desires are laden with emotions, and the significant symbols which arise in human communication externalize these otherwise private or internal plans of action. According to Mead’s theory of self, it is through the response of others that we become aware of our own attitudes and selves. Importantly, we cannot know ourselves without first being involved in symbolic communication with others. In contrast to Ward and others, then, this implies that sociability is already implicated in human communication.

For Mead, self’s knowledge of the other’s role is the basis of human cooperation and the starting point of ethical reciprocity. Role taking is not only something that occurs naturally in the human condition, it also provides a means by which human beings are able to cooperate and ideally realize the democratic ideals of the just and good life. For example, the notion of “rights” makes sense only to the extent that self consciousness arises as we take on the attitude of others, that is, as we assume the attitude of assent of all members of the community (the “generalized other”). Like Ward before him, Mead held out hope that this generalized other would expand outward from communities to nation states and eventually to the global level. As Mead (1932: 195) stated, “The World Court and the League of Nations are other such social objects that sketch out common plans of action if there are national selves that can realize themselves in the collaborating attitudes of others.”

Even given their seeming differences, Ward and Mead are not as divergent on the issue of sociability and reciprocity as it would initially appear. This is because both theorists’ views on human cooperation and sociality – and thus reciprocity – are close to the sympathy theories of society beginning with Aristotle, but which were developed most fully in the modern era beginning with Adam Smith’s *The Theory of Moral Sentiments*. For example, Ward’s (1883)

emphasis on feelings is a type of sympathy theory, to the extent that he emphasizes not merely the innate, physiological side of feelings, but more importantly, the cognitive and subjectivist side. For Ward, sympathy makes possible altruism and, hence, all humanitarian advances in society. As Ellwood (1912: 318) notes, "The sympathetic feelings are, then, according to Ward, the essentially progressive forces in human social life."

We see, then, how Smith's theory of moral sentiments cut two divergent paths into modern social science, one running through the naturalism and positivism of Ward, Giddings, and other early American sociologists, the other through Mead and modern social psychology (see Park 1904). Sympathy, although rarely explicitly invoked in the anthropological literature discussed above, also lies behind the conceptualization of reciprocity as a universal feature of human social order.

SEE ALSO: Generalized Other; Gift; Gift Relations; Mead, George Herbert; Norms; Role Taking; Self; Structuralism; Ward, Lester Frank

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norms

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Norms are informal rules that guide social interaction. They are, as Cristina Bicchieri (2006) calls them, "the rules we live by." As such, norms constitute a critical component in the makeup of human cultures and therefore play a highly significant role in determining what it means to be human. When codified, norms are rendered laws or other types of institutionalized regulatory strictures. When conceived without moral consequence, the term can also refer to mere behavioral regularities, even though adherence or lack thereof to these can and often does result in significant consequences (e.g., it would be highly unusual as well as probably harmful to name an American child Adolf Osama or, depending on one's constructed gender, Sue). Various defined even by sociologists themselves, there is perhaps no other sociological concept more regularly and widely deployed in everyday talk, nor one about which more has been written and discussed. It is therefore not surprising that a concept as equally vague as it is elemental to the sociological enterprise is also one that is the subject of continuous theoretical debate.

Typically considered the founder of modern sociology, Émile Durkheim famously theorized society as both a system of integration involving social bonds and institutions and, even more importantly, as a normative order *sui generis*. While the former manifestation of society is highlighted in the title of his *The Division of Labor in Society* (1893), the latter is more clearly at stake in his last great book, *The Elementary Forms of Religious Life* (1912). For Durkheim, society was said to function to produce varying degrees of cohesiveness and regulation within groups, the former an attribute of the type and quality of reciprocal social bonds produced by a given division of labor, the latter the outcome of external repressive forces exerted by a moral fabric that is greater than, objective to, and constraining of individuals. The threads composing this fabric are norms.

In this view, the existence of norms is empirically given in the non random patterns

of behavior common in one and another social situation. Though invisible, norms nonetheless exert considerable force, as actors consult them in order to anticipate how they are expected and not expected to act in a given situation. Norms also, therefore, guide the distribution of sanctions, both positive (rewards) and negative (punishments). Conformity to expected behavior typically meets with approval (e.g., standing quietly on the elevator nets the actor a reputation as trustworthy), whereas deviation from expected behavior is likely to meet with informal punishment (e.g., facing the back of the elevator while singing the National Anthem quietly to oneself leads others to deem the actor odd and untrustworthy, with negative consequences following the actor into future interactions). Indeed, in Durkheim's estimation, the success or failure of a given normative order to regulate such simple, everyday behavior is tantamount to the success or failure of society to reproduce itself as a coherent totality. Durkheim thus imagined that society as such – as an essentially normative or what he called *moral* phenomenon – separated human action, or at least the great part of it, from mere animal behavior. In a word, norms make humans.

Norms can also, however, undo humans. In *Suicide* (1897), Durkheim addressed what he regarded as the twin threats undermining modern society's ability to maintain itself as a stable going concern. In terms of social integration, he warned against excessive individualism, while in terms of normative regulation, he saw in modernity a tendency toward "anomie," the fragmentation and weakening of social norms to the point where resultant aggregate social behavior exhibited a pathological level of confusion and unchecked expression of raw animal emotion. In an attempt to provide empirical evidence of society's integrating and regulating functions, *Suicide* presented data that seemed to correlate with Durkheim's basic sense that humans thrived only in the context of socially integrated and morally regulated groups. In groups with evidently less integration and fewer regulating norms (e.g., Protestants versus Roman Catholics and Jewish groups or married couples with children versus individuals who were not married and were without children), rates of suicide tended to be elevated. In other words, in the absence of sufficient bonds (emotional

attachments, mutual obligations, shared lives, etc.) and coherent and constraining norms (informal yet clear rules that define the meaning of success/failure, good/bad, progress/regress, etc.), a truly human existence threatens to decay into premoral forms. At the extreme, a human life worth living becomes so remote, the actuality of daily social existence so intolerably isolating and vacuous, as to lead to self destruction. Durkheim feared that anomie would characterize the social situations faced by a growing scatter plot of individuals in *les temps modernes*.

But not only under conditions of modernity. A classic empirical description of a decaying normative order is found in anthropologist Colin Turnbull's famous *The Mountain People* (1972). The Ik, a hunter gatherer people of Uganda, once exhibited an unsurprising humanity that entailed considerable attention to mutually beneficial integration and reciprocity. But the Ik society that is the subject of Turnbull's fieldwork was one that was decimated to the point of starvation, and in this situation the Ik turned against one another in favor of extreme individualism. Instead of regular adherence to norms understood to benefit all, the Ik were reduced to aggressively avoiding norms that, if accepted and acted upon, would only thrust them, at least individually, into further peril. Turnbull illustrates their normative condition with an anecdote: having provided his informant medicine for the informant's ailing spouse, Turnbull learns from another that his informant is selling the medicine for profit and that the wife is several weeks dead and secretly buried so as to avoid Turnbull's detection. When Turnbull then confronts his informant with his knowledge of his informant's deceit and callousness, his informant is unembarrassed, much less ashamed. Instead, and to Turnbull's chagrin, he simply changes the subject of conversation. This raises the question as to whether norms that are ignored in practice and largely unfelt as an internal guide can be said to truly exist.

Another example of the use and abuse of norms is given in Stanley Milgram's famous study, *Obedience to Authority* (1969). In this case, and in contrast to the Ik's *avoidance* of norms, western scientists in New Haven, Connecticut, *imposed* norms upon unsuspecting research participants. In order to test the degree of authority

that norms might hold over everyday people in western society, Milgram and his colleagues concocted a faux learning experiment in which research participants were compelled to administer electric shocks to hidden “learners” (people who were actually working for Milgram). These shocks were given in increasing voltages to the point of causing apparent discomfort, pain, severe harm, and in some cases even the learner’s apparent death. Although complicated by numerous intervening variables, Milgram found that as many as two thirds of the participants followed the faux rules of behavior that defined his experimental situation. Often begrudgingly but nonetheless voluntarily, the majority of research participants substituted new and morally dubious rules of conduct for those, such as Thou Shall Not Kill, they had presumably spent a lifetime internalizing as their own. Many, however, rejected Milgram’s authoritative definition of the situation. Their prior socialization provided them with sufficient strength to resist his concocted external constraints. That Milgram and his colleagues felt their experimental design and its predictable negative consequences for hundreds of everyday citizens normative, that is, conforming to prevailing rules for how research should and should not be conducted, is itself a fact that sparked controversy and that remains a touchstone for continued debate on research ethics.

An instructive history of norms is given in Lennard J. Davis’s *Enforcing Normalcy: Disability, Deafness, and the Body* (1995). In a style of theory reminiscent of George Canguilhem and Michel Foucault, Davis argues that it was not until 1840 and concurrent with the strengthening of the western eugenics movement that the notion of “normal” came to be associated with adherence to a common standard as defined statistically or by other rational means. Here, norm is rendered in the sense of a bell curve, where distance from a calculated equilibrium constitutes a measurable level of deviation. When such types of conceptualization are applied to human beings, diverse in all manner of ways as they actually are, the result is a type of forcing of empirically square pegs into conceptually round holes. Davis is especially keen to demonstrate the historical construction of otherwise taken for granted assumptions about what is and is not “normal,” as he does, for example, with

respect to the invention of deafness. He is also wont to stress the profoundly harmful consequences such supposedly rational, scientific norm making has wrought on persons deemed deviant due to so called defective, broken, and flawed bodies.

Yet, even social Darwinists have made important contributions to the study of norms. In his famous *Folkways: A Study of the Sociological Implications of Usages, Manners, Customs, Mores, and Morals* (1906), the early American sociologist William Graham Sumner usefully distinguished between mores (pronounced more ays), which are norms whose violation meets with the utmost severe sanctions, and folkways, which are norms with no discernible negative sanctions at all. Dining on human flesh violates mores against cannibalism, whereas whether one so dines with a table or a salad fork, an example of a folkway, will add nothing to the moral reprobation caused by the former. While mores vary from society to society and across historical periods, cannibalism, bestiality, and incest, not to mention combinations of the three, are among those acts most regularly proscribed at the level of mores. The violation of mores typically produces immediate and wide spread revulsion as well as sure and swift humiliation, severe punishment, perhaps torture, and, just as often, capital punishment.

Folkways, on the other hand, are as common as every myriad pattern of regular behavior, from the sequence by which one puts on socks and shoes (both socks first, then both shoes, or one sock and one shoe followed by the second sock and second shoe, assuming two feet and the presence of shoes), to the rules governing a professor’s behavior at the front of a lecture hall (stand behind a lectern or pace back and forth, maintain distance from the students or enter *their* space by patrolling the aisles and stairs while lecturing, clear throat before first speaking or deploy another method of opening the interaction). Mores are norms that are so taken for granted as to be thought basic to nature, human and otherwise, hence the fear and violence associated typically with reactions to their violation. Folkways, for their part, are norms that regulate superficial and largely inconsequential behavior, hence the mild amusement and titillation, if not outright indifference, that typically greet their violation. Shame

and guilt can follow even the thought of violating mores, whereas folkways tend to loiter in our minds only when called to our attention by “did you ever notice?” comedians.

The state of norms in postmodernity remains contested terrain for contemporary sociology. Rational choice theorists, for example, have looked to norms as potential explanation for otherwise seemingly irrational individual behavior. As Hechter and Opp (2001) argue, basic phenomena such as cooperation and collective action, not to mention social order itself, are difficult to explain using only “rational egoistic behavioral assumptions” of the sort typical of rational choice theory. In Bicchieri’s (2006) noted account, the power of norms to constrain behavior is tested primarily using game theory simulations, such as Ultimatum, Dictator, Trust, and Social Dilemma.

Thus, on the one side there is speculation as to whether certain fundamental norms are inherent and universal in human sociation. Alvin Gouldner (1960) once famously argued that “the norm of reciprocity,” like the incest taboo, was very probably a cultural universal, which meant that guidelines were everywhere and always in some manner in effect that encouraged actors to help, and not harm, those who have helped them. This comes very close to positing a Golden Rule, although sociologically. On the other hand, there is attention to the power of actors to suppress, reject, alter, fabricate, or create spontaneously norms of one or another type and consequence, even with respect to those previously deemed sacred and connected to emotionally entrenched values. For Bicchieri (2006), norms can even “endogenously emerge” as a result of nothing more than the interaction among actors sharing prior dispositions.

Alan Wolfe’s (1989, 1998) influential sociology seeks to merge these two tendencies in a coherent analysis of contemporary norms. Drawing, for example, on Émile Durkheim and William James, Wolfe (2001) argues that the current century will be “the century of moral freedom,” which is to say, that individuals will increasingly choose their own norms from the plurality of normative systems characteristic of postmodern society, thus setting for themselves their own course toward the true, right, and good. While this proposition may

seem out of sync with Durkheim’s concern about anomie, Wolfe is keen to emphasize individuals’ capacity for moral discernment and decision, which is not at all inconsistent with Durkheim’s (1973 [1898]) own advocacy for a type of moral individualism. Likewise, Jamesian attention to the “varieties of moral experience” is not inconsistent with cohesion in a pluralistic society that values its own pluralism.

SEE ALSO: Deviance, Theories of; Durkheim, Émile; Gift; Gift Relationships; Milgram, Stanley (Experiments); Norm of Reciprocity; Scientific Norms/Counternorms

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Nozick, Robert (1938–2002)

Stephen Hunt

Robert Nozick, a noted Harvard philosopher, emerged as something of an icon for the libertarian right from the 1970s. Perhaps his most renowned work, *Anarchy, State, and Utopia* (1974), marked a powerful philosophical challenge to the most widely held political social stances of liberals, socialists, and conservatives. In this volume, Nozick advances a sophisticated defense of the rights of the individual in relation to the state. He argues that the legitimacy of the state is only justified when it is severely limited to the narrow function of protecting the citizen against force, theft, and fraud, and the enforcement of contracts. Any more extensive activities by the state, Nozick insists, will inevitably violate individual rights.

By offering critiques of John Locke's justification of the governance of citizens founded on the state of nature, as well as what he views as the flawed thesis of John Rawls, Nozick develops a new theory of "distributive justice" and, in doing so, attempts to integrate a system of ethics, legal philosophy, and economic theory. In this regard, Nozick brings his own distinctive model of a utopia which he sees as equivalent to the minimal state. Such a state, Nozick insists, ideally treats its individuals as inviolate individuals, who may not be used in specific ways by others as a means, tool, instrument, or resource. Hence, the state should treat the individual as having perfect rights and with the dignity that this constitutes. It follows that freedom to choose one's life preferences and realize personal ends comes merely through the voluntary cooperation of other individuals with the same rights and dignity.

Continuing his search for the connection between philosophy and ordinary experience,

a key concern of Nozick's work, as evident in his volume *The Nature of Rationality* (1991), was to demonstrate how the rationalities of decision and belief function at the everyday level and underscore efforts of productivity and peaceful coexistence with others. This allows Nozick to move beyond the confines of political philosophy to address a range of ethical and social problems, as well as embarking upon a search for the connections between philosophy and "ordinary" experience that constitutes humanity's "specialness."

In Nozick's view, misconceptions of rationality have resulted in many intractable philosophical problems. For example, the Kantian attempt to make principled behavior the sole ultimate standard of conduct extends rationality beyond its bounds. While acknowledging the limits of instrumental rationality, Nozick proposes a new rule of rational decision: "maximizing decision value," which is a weighted sum of causal, evidential, and symbolic utility. Nozick thus advances what he views as a new evolutionary account that explains how some factual connections are instilled in social actors as seemingly self-evident. This leads Nozick to advocate a theory of rational belief that includes both the intellectual credibility of the belief and practical consequences of believing it.

SEE ALSO: Anarchism; Economic Sociology; Classical Political Economic Perspectives; Economy, Culture and; Neoliberalism; Political Economy; Rawls, John; Utopia

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O

objectivity

Thomas A. Schwandt

In everyday life we worry about objectivity. We hear things like: “that judge wasn’t very objective”; “he is speaking from his own prejudices”; “that was a very biased comment,” and so on. If we analyze these ways of speaking, we realize several different uses of the term *objectivity*. It can refer to a *property or quality of a claim*: a claim or statement is objective if it is supported with reasons and evidence (or warrantable, sup portable), and it is subjective if it is not so supported and only an expression of individual taste or preference. Objectivity can also refer to a *characteristic of a person*: the objective person is unbiased, unprejudiced, and evinces respect for the importance of evidence and argument. Finally, an *aspect or characteristic of a process* or means by which a claim is warranted can be called objective. Hence, some argue that the enterprise of science is objective because the claims of scientists are subject to public scrutiny and intersubjective criticism.

In the literatures on social science methodology and philosophy there are several interrelated but distinct senses of this term:

- 1 An absolute or ontological sense reflecting a belief in metaphysical realism. Thus, objectivity here refers to the idea of objectively perceiving an independently existing reality.
- 2 A disciplinary or critically intersubjective sense that associates objectivity with a particular aspect of the process of inquiry, specifically, the ability to reach consensus within some specialized disciplinary community through dialogue, debate, and reasoned argument.
- 3 A mechanical sense in which objectivity connotes following the rules or procedures because these are a check on subjectivity and restrain idiosyncrasy and personal judgment.
- 4 A moral political sense in which to be objective means to be fair and impartial, and to avoid the kinds of self interest or prejudice that distort judgment.

Objectivity has also been associated (for better or worse) with three other important notions in social science methodology: value neutrality, objectivism, and objectification. Value neutrality is an ideology that holds that politics and values should be external to the practice of scientific inquiry. Scientists ought to maintain a certain distance or detachment from social and political values; objectivity in science demands such neutrality. Objectivism is a term that designates a complex set of interlocking beliefs about the nature of knowledge (foundationalist epistemology), the nature of reality (metaphysical realism), the manner in which that reality can be known and knowledge claims justified (logical positivist or representationalist epistemology), the role of the scientist (an axiology of disinterest), and the Enlightenment belief in the unquestioned power (and authority) of science to shape society. Objectification is a belief in a particular metaphysical and epistemological relation of subject to object often characterized by the ideas of disengagement from and yet an attempt to control the object of knowledge. For example, Bourdieu (1990: 52) defines objectivism as the “theoretical relation” to the world. In that relation, the social world is “a spectacle offered to an observer who takes up a ‘point of view’ on the action and who . . . proceeds as if it were intended solely for knowledge.” For Bourdieu, the important contrast is between the theoretical relation to the world with its attendant attitude of objectification and a practical relation to the world.

When the notion of objectivity is criticized in social science it is important to fully understand just which of these meanings of objectivity are the object of the critique. One can endorse objectivity in the sense that one expects others not to always speak from self interest and to offer warrants for their claims, and yet reject ideas such as disengagement, purely objective perception of reality, and value neutrality. Some who are critical of objectivity are probably expressing disdain for metaphysical realism – the belief in an ability to know things as they really are. Other kinds of criticisms are aimed at objectivity as disengagement – a stance or posture from which an inquirer allegedly can view social life unencumbered by prejudices and personal characteristics. Still other kinds of criticisms, specifically those raised in feminist epistemologies, are often simultaneously political and epistemological; for example, putatively objective science has a sexist bias; a concern with scientific objectivity has imposed a hierarchical and controlling relationship on the researcher–researched pair; holding to objectivity as a regulative ideal has meant excluding personal, subjective knowledge from consideration as legitimate knowledge.

SEE ALSO: Epistemology; Realism and Relativism; Truth and Objectivity; Strong Objectivity; Subjectivity

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observation, participant and non-participant

Martyn Hammersley

As a method of inquiry, observation is an alternative or complement to the use of interview, documentary, or questionnaire data. It is usually conceived as taking place in “natural” rather than experimental situations, even though experiments necessarily rely on observation by the experimenter. At a minimum, observation involves a researcher watching and listening to actions and events within some context over some period of time, and making a record of what has been witnessed.

The distinction between participant and non participant observation draws attention to the fact that the role of an observer can vary a good deal. He or she may play a participant role in the setting or the events being observed, albeit perhaps a marginal one, or may play no such role. The primary concern motivating this distinction is reactivity, in other words, the extent to which and ways in which the behavior of the people being studied is shaped both by the fact of being researched in a given way (procedural reactivity) and by the particular characteristics of the researcher (personal reactivity). Reactivity is widely regarded as a potential source of error: it may render inferences from observational data about what happens on other occasions and in other contexts false; indeed, it may be concluded that reactive data can only tell us how people behave when they are being researched.

While useful for some purposes, the distinction between participant and non participant observation is not entirely clear in its meaning, and can be misleading. This is because it refers not to a dichotomy but to a multidimensional

space that can properly be made sense of only by more subtle distinctions. The following *dimensions* are involved:

- 1 The extent to which and ways in which the people being studied are aware that they are being observed. Two types of covert observational strategy are possible: the researcher may observe from a position that is not visible to participants, for example by means of hidden cameras or via a one way mirror; or the researcher may do the research by covertly playing a participant role within the setting. Of course, if the people concerned know that they are being researched, even without being able to see the researcher, there is an important residual sense in which he or she nevertheless has a presence: some identity and purposes will be ascribed, and this may affect how people behave. Where the people being studied are completely unaware of being researched, procedural reactivity will be absent, though personal reactivity will still occur in the case of covert participation. Where research is overt there will usually be both kinds of reactivity, but their level and direction can vary significantly. It is important to remember that overt/covert is not a dichotomy: some of the people being studied may know about the research while others do not; and there may also be variation in how much, and what, particular people know.
- 2 Where the researcher takes on some role in a setting, there may be variation in how central that role is to the events being observed – in other words, in how consequential the ethnographer's actions are for what happens in the setting. It is important to remember the complexities of role taking. Even where the formal role is that of visiting researcher, the observer may well engage in informal conversation with participants and this will give information about him or her as a person. Furthermore, refusing to engage will almost certainly stimulate speculation about who the researcher is and about the underlying purpose. Indeed, it is not uncommon for characteristics and purposes that go beyond, or even conflict with, the researcher role to be ascribed: the observer may be seen as a spy, as a potential friend or

target, and so on. Thus, even where a relatively marginal role is adopted, both procedural and personal reactivity may be involved. Where the researcher adopts one of the established participant roles in the field, rather than that of visitor, the effects of procedural reactivity may be lower. However, much depends upon the nature of that role, since to some degree what people say and do in front of the observer will be shaped by their perceptions of his or her role, and these may vary across different categories of participant. The researcher's personal and social characteristics (gender, age, social class, ethnicity, knowledge or skills, and so on) may have implications for what participant role it is possible to take on, as well as for how people respond. Furthermore, participants may seek to alter the role that the researcher plays: requests for help may be made, invitations to participate in particular activities offered, or threats made to dissuade certain lines of action. As a result, the nature of the role may change over time, by no means entirely under the control of the observer.

- 3 A final dimension sometimes implied in the distinction between participant and non participant observation concerns the degree to which the observation is structured: whether or not it involves the assignment of events to pre identified categories (see Foster 1996). In structured observation the focus is usually on counting or measuring the frequency of particular types of act. By contrast, in much qualitative research observation is relatively unstructured, in that it is not governed by any pre established set of categories. Of course, it *will* be guided by initial research problems, ideas about the setting and the people who live or work there, and so on. However, there is often an attempt to minimize the effect of these initial assumptions, so as to be open to surprise, to noticing things that are puzzling, without being overly concerned, initially, about whether or not they are relevant to the research topic. Unstructured observation may rely on recording of fieldnotes, often complemented, or even largely replaced, by audio or video recording. Fieldnotes are usually jotted down during the course of observation and written up as soon as

possible afterwards, employing relatively concrete language and aiming at verbatim accounts of what was said (see Emerson et al. 1995). There may also be use of photography and other sources of visual data. The structured–unstructured dimension obviously has direct implications for the nature of the data collected (qualitative or quantitative), but it may also affect the level of reactivity. It may be hard for someone carrying out structured observation to blend into the scene in the way in which many participant observers seek to do. Equally important, audio recording, and especially video recording, may generate reactivity.

Whether reactivity is a problem, how serious a problem it is, and how it can best be dealt with, are issues about which there are currently discrepant views among researchers. Some argue that, in order to minimize reactivity, the people and situations studied must all be dealt with in the same way, so that the stimulus presented is similar for all. Other commentators point out that standardization of the research approach does not standardize reactivity, because people do not respond to stimuli in fixed ways but on the basis of diverse cultural orientations. For this reason, it may be argued that reactivity can best be minimized through the researcher adapting differently to different situations, in order to fit in with them and thereby minimize disturbance. Moreover, staying a long time in a setting may allow patterns of behavior to revert to their usual forms. A third argument is that reactivity is unavoidable but that this does not prevent sound conclusions being drawn from the data. It is argued that, by reflecting on what people are saying and doing, the effects of reactivity should be detectable. Furthermore, we may be able to draw parallels between how people respond to being researched and how they respond to outsiders of particular kinds. A related argument is that the sheer fact of reactivity is not, in itself, a source of error. What matters is whether or not the reactive effects are relevant to the focus of inquiry, and sometimes they will not be. Finally, it may be pointed out that any concern with reactivity is premised on a commitment to producing knowledge about phenomena that are assumed to be independent of the research process. For any researcher who

abandons that commitment, and some claim to do this, reactivity is no longer a problem. Overall, then, there is not much agreement at the present time about how significant a threat to validity reactivity is, what form the threat takes, and how it can be or whether it needs to be dealt with.

As these differences in view about the significance of reactivity indicate, we need to take account not only of internal variation in the character of observation, but also of the broader kinds of inquiry within which it is employed. Participant observation is closely associated with ethnography, where it is often given a central but by no means an exclusive role, being combined with the use of both informal and more formal interviews, documents, and even official statistics or questionnaires. Observation of more structured kinds often forms part of research projects that are closer in character to large scale surveys and rely primarily on quantitative analysis, though this is not necessarily the case (McCall 1984; Croll 1986). And conversation and discourse analysis rely heavily, and sometimes exclusively, on audio or video recordings, with the analyst often not having been present to observe events in person. There is potential disagreement about whether this amounts to observation, as there is also in the case of Internet data.

Reactivity is not the only methodological issue relevant to observational research. Others include: problems in gaining access, the personal qualities required for participant observation, sampling, variation in the types of data produced, and ethical issues. The remainder of the discussion will focus on these.

The problem of access takes on different forms depending on the nature of the observational role. Where the research is overt, entry to sites will usually have to be negotiated, perhaps through gatekeepers, and access to the kinds of data required will also need continually to be secured, as well as agreement reached about what roles can and cannot be taken by the observer in the field. Where the research is covert, access may not need to be negotiated, but the researcher must still find some way of getting into a position to be able to observe the situations and people of interest. In both forms of research the personal and social characteristics of the researcher may play an important role

in easing access or making it difficult, depend on the nature of the people being studied; though no characteristics should be regarded as inevitable barriers or automatic entry tickets.

There are some general personal qualities that are required for participant observation. These include at least a minimum ability to converse with people, to hang around with them without looking too uncomfortable, and to avoid dominating situations. Also required is a capacity for toleration both of people and of ambiguity and uncertainty, and a preparedness to allow one's preconceptions to be undermined. Some boldness may also be required to get behind official appearances and fronts, and the disguises that people use to protect their interests. Above all, there must be a commitment to inquiry, to understanding other people's lives, over and above any attachment to particular ethical, religious, or political principles. Some of these qualities are less necessary for structured observation, but training and practice may be required to facilitate effective use of observational schedules or instruments: learning how to recognize relevant types of actions and events, how to record these speedily and clearly, and so on.

There are sampling issues involved in observation, as with other research methods. These include: what situations to observe, at what times, and on whom or what to focus one's attention within the scene. There can be various strategies here: concentrating on a particular place and the behavior that occurs there over lengthy periods of time; comparing what goes on in several locations of the same or contrasting kinds; concentrating on a particular type of event or series of events; or shadowing, going along with, a particular person playing a particular role as he or she moves through various contexts over the course of time. These strategies will tend to provide different kinds of information: about temporal patterns in particular locales, significant similarities and differences across settings, or variations in orientation on the part of the same person across contexts. Also relevant here are questions about how long observation periods need to be in order to capture what is important. Besides these concerns, sampling of what to observe and when may also be governed by emerging theoretical ideas, in the manner of grounded theorizing. With

structured observation, time sampling may also be necessary within periods of observation, where the actions or events being identified are very frequent.

We have already noted that the character of observational data can vary according to whether it is structured or unstructured. In some respects, this is a matter of degree, since many modes of structured observation include room for non structured description, in much the same way that questionnaires sometimes include free response items. Furthermore, there are different kinds of structured observation, varying not just in the specific categories used but also in the kind of time sampling employed (Croll 1986). Unstructured observation also varies in how the data are recorded: fieldnotes, audio and video recording transcriptions, or some combination of these. There is further variation within each of these categories, concerning the form and style of fieldnote writing or the nature of the transcription system employed. In the case of participant observation, data may also be derived from the experience of participation. There are different attitudes toward this source of data and their significance. Some emphasize that participation can provide first hand experience that may enhance the researcher's understanding of how people feel and why they behave in the ways that they do. A few commentators even recommend a period of immersion in the field in which the role of researcher is abandoned. Others point to the dangers of "going native," emphasizing the need to maintain a marginal position so as to retain the analytic distance required to see the familiar as strange. Of course, in some contexts, participation may be essential in order to learn the culture, and/or the language, of the people being studied. And keeping a journal in which personal responses and feelings are recorded is common practice among participant observers.

The particular role taken on by an observer has consequences not only for reactivity but also for the kinds of data that will be available and the likely sources of error involved. If the research is covert, certain sources of data may not be available, formal interviews are probably ruled out, access to some parts of a setting may be barred that would have been accessible to an open researcher (though the reverse may also be true), and there may be implications for how

(and how easily) the data can be recorded (this, in turn, having implications for their accuracy). Some participant roles will allow note taking at the time, and perhaps even the use of recording devices, while others will not. Similarly, taking on particular roles in the field will open up some sources of information, and perhaps close down others; for example, there will usually be restrictions on who will tell what to whom. Playing a particular role may enable one to be accepted on equal terms by people in that role, but undermine the possibility of building rapport with other groups. Some researchers switch roles in the course of the fieldwork to try to get over this problem. These issues are sometimes conceptualized in terms of how far the researcher succeeds in becoming a member of the group being observed. However, membership is a complex matter, permitting various degrees and kinds, and very often multiple groupings operate within a setting (Adler & Adler 1987).

There are ethical issues to do with covert research, about which there has been considerable debate over the years (Bulmer 1982), as well as issues to do with personal safety. However, there are also important ethical problems involved in overt research. While covert research is often rejected because it entails deceit, potential invasion of privacy, etc., these issues are by no means absent where observation is overt; arising partly from the fact that, as we have seen, the distinction is a matter of degree. There are thorny issues about what counts as informed consent, given that people may understand what they are told in different ways, forget they are being researched, or feel that they cannot refuse to be observed for one reason or another. In addition, there are ethical issues surrounding any participant role that an observer adopts in the field, for example to do with the use of information gained under one role for the purposes of the other. Finally, building rapport means building trust and thereby establishing implicit contracts with people. As a result, they may come to see the researcher as a friend and therefore be hurt and upset when he or she behaves in ways that are necessary for the inquiry but that they regard as failing to honor the duties of friendship.

Observation is an important method of data collection that has been widely used by sociologists. It can take a variety of forms, and a

wide range of considerations needs to be taken into account when it is used. The significance of these will vary depending upon both the researcher and the nature of the people and places being studied: some quite different issues would arise, for example, in studying accountants, motorcycle gangs, or kindergarten children. Furthermore, what is possible, and to some extent what is ethical, will vary considerably according to the society and local community in which the research is carried out.

SEE ALSO: Ethics, Fieldwork; Ethnography; Grounded Theory; Role Taking; Validity, Qualitative

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occupational mobility

Donald J. Treiman

Occupational mobility refers to changes in the kind of work people do across generations (*intergenerational mobility*) or over the course of people's lives (*intragenerational* or *career mobility*). This entry focuses on *intergenerational mobility*, a topic that has given rise to a

large and truly international research literature despite difficult conceptual and measurement issues.

In its simplest form, research on intergenerational occupational mobility involves analysis of a single two variable table, in which the occupations of men (almost all of the research to date has been restricted to men) are cross tabulated by the occupations of their fathers when the men were young (e.g., at age 14). In early research, the focus was simply on the degree of association in such tables – the extent to which the occupations of sons could be predicted from the occupations of their fathers – which was taken as an indicator of the degree of societal “openness.” The idea was that societies in which men “follow their father’s footsteps” can be thought of as more rigid and less open to achievement based on individual merit than societies in which the occupations of men are largely independent of those of their fathers. Later research began to be concerned about the *pattern* as well as the *amount* of mobility.

Almost from the outset, such research has been comparative, asking either whether the extent of mobility has changed over time or whether it varies across societies, or both. One reason for this is that it is hard to assess in absolute terms how open a society is; that is, whether any measured amount of openness is large or small.

MEASUREMENT ISSUES

To study occupational mobility it is first necessary to define what occupations are. There are many ways to aggregate the specific jobs people do into categories. One way is to classify jobs on the basis of similarity in the kinds of tasks performed – driving a bus, installing or repairing plumbing, teaching high school students, etc. Such aggregations produce *occupational* classifications (as distinct from *industrial* classifications, which aggregate jobs on the basis of the kind of enterprise within which they are performed, or *employment status* classifications, which distinguish self employed, salaried, and other kinds of workers). Jobs may be aggregated into occupational classifications at successively higher levels. For example, the *Dictionary of*

Occupational Titles distinguishes about 12,000 occupations; the US Census detailed occupational classification distinguishes about 500 occupations; and many occupational mobility tables distinguish no more than a handful of occupational categories (often fewer than ten). The level of aggregation is very substantial, since in 2000 there were about 130 million employed people in the US, each holding a distinct job (or sometimes more than one job).

A variety of principles have been used to aggregate specific occupations (e.g., carpenter) into a small number of categories. However, most such classifications group occupations on the basis of some combination of the degree of skill entailed, the amount of responsibility exercised, the extent to which people in particular occupations supervise or are supervised by others, and the terms of employment and conditions under which the work is performed. A conventional set of distinctions is between professional, managerial, clerical, sales, manual, service, and agricultural occupations, with manual occupations often subdivided on the basis of skill, into skilled, semi skilled, and unskilled categories, and agricultural occupations often subdivided into farm owners and managers and agricultural laborers. An overarching distinction is often made between “non manual occupations” (the first four categories) and “manual” occupations (the remaining categories), on the ground that nonmanual work usually involves working with symbols rather than objects, is often paid a salary (fixed income per week or month) rather than a wage (payment per hour of work performed), and usually entails greater job security. Of course, there are many exceptions to these generalizations.

An important development in the study of occupational mobility has been the construction of scales of occupational status. It has been shown that the relative prestige of occupations is more or less invariant over time and across societies, and also that the prestige of occupations mainly reflects the knowledge and skill required and the income and other rewards attached to each occupation. These results have given rise to scales that measure the relative prestige or the relative socioeconomic status of occupations, which in turn make it possible to study occupational mobility, or occupational status attainment, with multivariate methods.

AMOUNT AND PATTERN OF MOBILITY

At the descriptive level, it is evident that, at least in modern industrial societies, the dominant pattern is one of occupational mobility rather than occupational inheritance. Most men do different work from their fathers. Specifically, in industrial societies about 90 percent of men hold jobs in different 3 digit census occupational categories (e.g., “truck drivers,” “accountants and auditors,” “electricians”) from the jobs held by their fathers when they were growing up. Moreover, most men do not even work in the same general occupational “class” (or census major occupational group) as their fathers; even when highly aggregated (e.g., 6 category) occupational classifications are considered, typically about 70 percent of men end up in different categories from their fathers. Farmers’ sons become factory workers; factory workers’ sons become salesmen; the sons of manual workers become professionals; the sons of managers or professionals become manual workers or low level clerical workers; and so on.

To a considerable extent, intergenerational occupational mobility reflects the striking shift in the distribution of the labor force in industrialized nations over the past 150 years and a corresponding, but much compressed and still ongoing, shift in developing nations – from agriculture to manual work to nonmanual work. Between 1900 and 2000 in the US, the percentage of the labor force doing agricultural work declined from 38 percent to 1 percent, while the percentage doing nonmanual work increased from 18 percent to 60 percent. This pattern of change can be found in most industrialized nations. Such shifts over time have induced considerable mobility between generations; clearly, if 25 percent of fathers and 10 percent of sons do agricultural work, most sons of agricultural workers must be occupationally mobile relative to their fathers. This observation has led researchers to distinguish between “structural” mobility (that caused by the shift in the distribution of jobs across occupations) and “exchange” or “relative” mobility (mobility other than that caused by structural shifts) and to develop new statistical methods (log linear and log multiplicative models) to appropriately distinguish between the two. Much of the

interest of students of occupational mobility has been in the “relative” mobility chances of those from different social origins: for example, the relative odds that the son of a laborer and the son of a professional will become a professional.

Several generalizations have emerged from such research. The *pattern* of mobility – the relative chances of moving between particular occupational categories – is more or less invariant across industrial societies. The pattern of mobility is also more or less invariant over time in stable societies such as the US and Great Britain, but can change substantially as a consequence of abrupt social change (e.g., the establishment of communist governments usually resulted in the abolition of independent farming and a very substantial reduction in the proportion of small shop keepers). Relative mobility chances generally follow a status gradient. That is, mobility is greater between categories that are similar in socioeconomic status or prestige than between categories that are dissimilar. Despite considerable intergenerational mobility, there remains a substantial amount of “occupational class” inheritance. That is, men are disproportionately likely to do jobs that are in the same general category as their fathers’ jobs – the sons of professionals are disproportionately likely to become professionals; the sons of managers to become managers; and so on. The *amount* of mobility has been increasing over time. There is considerable variability in the amount of mobility in different nations, but there is as yet no consensus regarding the determinants of cross national variations.

OCCUPATIONAL STATUS ATTAINMENT

A second, distinct strand of research on intergenerational mobility has been the study of occupational status attainment. The development of occupational status scales accompanied a shift in focus on the part of some researchers from the study of two variable occupational mobility tables to the study of the determinants of occupational status, where fathers’ occupational status was only one of several factors affecting occupational outcomes. The new conception was that parental status (father’s occupation, father’s and mother’s education, etc.)

affects educational attainment and that parental status and educational attainment affect occupational status attainment. Each of these factors can be measured in a quantitative way, which meant that it was possible to determine the relative importance of various "paths" linking occupational status across generations. Most of the early research in this tradition was also confined to men, though gender has more often been a focus of more recent research.

The main result of this research has been the demonstration that education is both the principal engine of intergenerational mobility and the main vehicle of intergenerational status transmission. The extent of intergenerational occupational status transmission – the propensity for those from high status families to acquire high status positions themselves – is generally quite modest in industrial societies. The principal way that intergenerational status transmission occurs is through education. Those from high status families tend to do better and hence go further in school; and those with the best education win out in the competition for the highest status jobs. In this way, education is the main vehicle of intergenerational status transmission. But education itself is only moderately affected by social origins. In industrial societies education tends to be available at no or low cost, which provides an opportunity for the bright and well motivated children of disadvantage to further their schooling and hence achieve high status occupational positions. At the same time, since many positions now require educational credentials, even those from high status families who do not do well in school are precluded from many high status occupational opportunities.

One advantage of the status attainment approach, and the accompanying statistical technology (structural equation modeling, originally known as path analysis), is that it is easy to introduce additional factors into the attainment process. This has led to an increasingly elaborate and sophisticated understanding of how the status attainment process works. Much of the elaboration has focused on the link between social origins and educational attainment, with attention to social psychological factors, peer influences, the role of family cultural capital, and school curriculum tracking and other school effects. Some research has focused specifically on the link between schooling and work and

how that linkage varies across countries depending on characteristics of schools (whether there is a single system or separate academic and vocational systems and, in dual track systems, how early the choice must be made between them) and how labor markets are organized.

A promising new development in comparative research on occupational status attainment is the use of multilevel modeling methods. The strategy is to combine data from sample surveys conducted at different points in time and for different nations into a single large data set and then to reorganize the data to represent social "contexts," defined by dividing the data from each nation into five year birth cohorts. For example, if complete data were available for 50 nations covering the entire twentieth century, it would be possible to define 1,000 (= 50*20) contexts. Of course, complete data are not available, since for many nations national sample surveys began to be conducted only recently, but nonetheless the method typically yields several hundred contexts. The process of status attainment is then studied within each context and, in a second step, variations in the process are linked to variations in the characteristics of the social context (e.g., the level of economic development, the availability of free education, whether the political system is communist or capitalist, and so on). While most of the work to date has been concerned with educational attainment, this is a promising approach to the comparative study of occupational status attainment as well.

SEE ALSO: Educational Inequality; Educational and Occupational Attainment; Intergenerational Mobility: Core Model of Social Fluidity; Intergenerational Mobility: Methods of Analysis; Mobility, Horizontal and Vertical; Mobility, Intergenerational and Intragenerational; Occupational Segregation; Occupations, Scaling of; Stratification Systems: Openness; Transition from School to Work

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occupational segregation

Kim Weeden

Occupational segregation refers to the differential distribution of groups defined by ascribed characteristics (e.g., sex, race/ethnicity) across occupations. The *level* of segregation indicates the strength of the association between group membership and occupations. Levels vary on a continuum bracketed by perfect segregation and perfect integration. Perfect segregation occurs where occupation and group membership correspond perfectly, such that no occupations are populated by more than one group. Perfect integration occurs if there is no association

between occupation and group membership, where this typically means that each group holds the same proportion of positions in each occupation as it holds in the labor force.

The *pattern* of segregation refers to the precise configuration of a group's over- or underrepresentation in particular occupations. Patterns can vary independently from levels. For example, the segregation level may remain stable even if a particular occupation switches from male overrepresentation to (equivalent) female overrepresentation. Conversely, levels may decline without altering the underlying pattern if all occupations shift from being highly segregated to only moderately so.

Interest in occupational segregation stems from two sources. Segregation is a known precursor to inequalities in pay, autonomy, promotions, working conditions, prestige, and even lifestyles. Recent evidence suggests, for example, that the gender gap in wages is driven more by segregation across jobs than by pay discrimination within jobs. At the same time, segregation is an outcome of interest in its own right, for it is a fundamental indicator of the extent to which a society is characterized by ascriptive inequality. Segregation scholars have focused on three tasks, each of which is elaborated below: describing how segregation varies across time and space; understanding its sources; and accounting for trends and cross national variations or similarities.

Descriptive research shows that segregation is extensive, characterizes all known societies, and is remarkably persistent over time. In the United States, blacks are over- or underrepresented in the average occupation by a factor of 2.1, and nearly 21 percent would need to change occupations in order to reach perfect integration with whites. Sex segregation is yet more extreme: men are over- or underrepresented in the average occupation by a factor of 5.5, and 51 percent would need to change occupations for full integration (author's calculations, 2000 Census PUMS). In terms of the pattern of segregation, men are disproportionately found in managerial, craft, and farming occupations and women in clerical and service occupations.

Conventional wisdom holds that levels of race and sex segregation were relatively stable in the United States until the 1970s. Since 1970, integration by both race and sex has been

appreciable, but slower than one might expect given the rapid diffusion of egalitarian views, the decline in (and criminalization of) overt employment discrimination, and the shrinking gap in college attainment. Evidence on patterns of sex segregation indicates that integration has also been uneven: some formerly male dominated occupations (e.g., accountants) have integrated while others remain female dominated (e.g., nurses), and yet others have tipped past full integration to become female dominated (e.g., court reporters). Such “feminization” is often accompanied by a decline in the occupation’s skills, position on promotion ladders, and wages, although it is unclear whether this “down grading” is a cause or consequence of feminization. We know far less about changing patterns of race segregation, but it is plausible that racial integration has also been more pronounced in some occupations than others.

Race and sex segregation also vary across space. Some of the highest levels of sex segregation, for example, are found in countries known for gender egalitarian ideologies (e.g., Sweden), while the lowest levels are in countries with more traditional ideologies (e.g., Japan). Similarly, although the general pattern of sex segregation across major occupational groups that obtains in the United States characterizes most advanced industrial countries, the sex type of particular occupations can vary substantially across countries. Physicians, for example, are disproportionately male in the United States, but not in post socialist Eastern Europe. Analogous cross national comparisons of racial segregation are lacking, but comparisons across local labor markets in the US show segregation increases with the size of the black population.

Efforts to understand the sources of segregation are typically categorized into supply side accounts, which emphasize the investment decisions and choices of workers, and demand side accounts, which focus on the hiring and promotion decisions of employers. The line between supply and demand side forces is blurred, though, whenever workers’ choices reflect demand side constraints. Moreover, segregation may be jointly determined by workers’ and employers’ decisions.

Supply side forces include socialization, stereotypes about competence, and income maximizing decisions. Socialization refers to

the lifelong processes through which people internalize attitudes, skills, beliefs, and knowledge. If the content of socialization differs across groups, it will generate group specific occupational preferences, or “tastes” for types of work, and occupational expectations, or “realistic” judgments about occupations where success is likely. If such judgments are affected by existing patterns of segregation and discrimination, socialization is no longer a purely supply side process.

Even absent differential socialization, group linked stereotypes about competence (“status beliefs”) can generate differences in workers’ behaviors and preferences. Cecilia Ridgeway (1997), for example, has argued that in mixed sex, task oriented settings (e.g., work, school) where direct evidence of competence is lacking, men and women alike typically assume that men are more competent at all but the most “feminine” tasks. As a result, male group members are more influential, obtain higher evaluations (from self and others), and emerge as leaders. While the theory has obvious promise for explaining the dearth of women (and racial minorities) in management, it may also help explain why young women who are skilled at math and science are reluctant to pursue related careers.

A third supply side account argues that segregation stems from workers’ rational decisions to maximize lifetime or household earnings. Workers who expect intermittent participation in the paid labor force (e.g., to raise children) will choose occupations in which wages depreciate least during unemployment. Workers who expect that their energies will be spread across paid and unpaid labor will choose low effort occupations that entail little overtime or travel. And, whether because of gender discrimination in the labor market or women’s lower pre market investments in training, household earnings can be maximized if women specialize in unpaid labor.

Demand side explanations emphasize the organizational hiring and promotion practices that create segregation, some of which are overtly discriminatory. Pure discrimination occurs when employers, customers, or co workers simply prefer to hire, purchase from, or work with members of a favored group. Employers hire members of the disfavored group only at wages

low enough to compensate for the disutility of hiring them, losing customers, or angering co-workers. Statistical discrimination occurs when employers avoid hiring one group because (1) they believe that, on average, members of the group are less productive *and* (2) no other cost effective screens for productivity are available. Unlike pure discrimination, statistical discrimination is therefore economically rational. Radical scholars note that discrimination may also be “rational” in that it perpetuates capitalism (by dividing workers and providing a pool of cheap labor), patriarchy (by ensuring women’s dependency), and racism (by solidifying and legitimating whites’ economic advantages).

Other demand side accounts emphasize that organizational hiring and promotion practices need not be overtly discriminatory to generate segregation (see Reskin et al. 1999). For example, employers who recruit through their employees’ social networks will tend to hire workers who are the same sex or race as existing employees. Likewise, seniority based promotion systems and formalized job ladders in which upper level positions are filled exclusively from “port of entry” jobs that are male dominated, limit women’s access to upper level positions. In both cases, disadvantages are embedded in formally gender or race neutral rules.

Efforts to understand cross national variations and historical trends in segregation borrow heavily from these theories. To account for sex segregation’s stability over time and space, for example, scholars emphasize the pervasiveness of sex typed socialization, role divisions within the family, biological differences between men and women, gendered job information networks, and systems of patriarchy. To account for the gradual decline of segregation levels since the 1970s, scholars emphasize the egalitarian pressures that eroded discriminatory tastes among employers, loosened gender specific socialization, equalized occupational aspirations and human capital accumulation, shifted the focus of labor markets from the family to the individual, promoted equal rights legislation, and led to the diffusion of bureaucratic organizational forms.

These theories speak to variability (or stability) in the level of segregation more than its pattern. They are accordingly at odds with the empirical evidence, which suggests that

egalitarian pressures do not affect all occupations equally nor necessarily even reduce segregation, as the case of Sweden illustrates. To begin to reconcile theories with evidence, some scholars distinguish between *vertical segregation*, which occurs when one group holds a disproportionate share of the occupations with high pay, prestige, and promotion prospects, and *horizontal segregation*, which occurs when groups hold “separate but equal” occupations. Vertical segregation is incompatible with contemporary forms of egalitarianism, and hence should decline over time. Horizontal segregation, by contrast, is compatible both with liberal egalitarianism and with essentialist ideologies that characterize group linked skills and preferences as “natural.”

The theoretical literature on segregation is thus reasonably rich. The methodological literature has, until recently, struggled to keep pace. Early methodological efforts focused on quantifying the level of segregation, but not its pattern. This work yielded the important observation that the more fine grained the labor market structure, the more segregation one observes: segregation is greater across detailed occupations (e.g., physician) than major occupational groups (e.g., professional), and greater across jobs (e.g., Associate General Counsel at IBM) than occupations (e.g., lawyer). In light of this, standard practice is to disaggregate as much as possible while retaining comparable categories across the contexts (e.g., nations, time). Even so, scholars typically must assume that trends or cross national variations in segregation are parallel at different levels of aggregation.

The early quantitative literature also became mired in debates over which summary index is most appropriate for measuring segregation levels. Two indices are most often used: the index of dissimilarity (D), which is the percentage of one group who would need to change occupations in order to bring about full integration, and a size standardized variant (D_s), which adjusts D to compensate for its sensitivity to historical or cross national variations in the relative size of occupations. D_s is sensitive to variations in the gender or racial composition of the labor force.

More recently, Maria Charles and David Grusky (e.g., 2004) argued that if the goal of segregation research is to reveal contextual

variations in the strength of the underlying association between occupation and group membership, scholars should use an index that is unaffected by the occupational structure or the composition of the labor force. They define an index, based on odds ratios, that meets both criteria. Their core, and often overlooked, methodological critique, though, is that all indices implicitly assume that the pattern of segregation is either constant or uninteresting. They instead offer a log linear modeling approach that allows scholars to (1) evaluate whether variation in segregation is in fact merely a matter of degree; (2) assess whether cross national or historical similarities in the pattern of segregation hold at all levels of aggregation; (3) formally test whether groups are segregated vertically, horizontally, or both; and (4) evaluate explanatory models of segregation.

Many descriptive, theoretical, and methodological challenges still face segregation researchers. First, the obsession with occupational segregation has led scholars to ignore all other market structures (e.g., industries) or treat them as contexts across which occupational segregation varies. This strategy fails to appreciate that what appears to be occupational segregation may reflect the unequal distribution of occupations across other labor market structures that are themselves segregated. Substantively, such “unidimensional” thinking fails to do justice to theories of inequality that recognize the complex interplay between labor market structures.

Similarly, the race and sex segregation literatures have developed largely independently of each other. The few scholars who are interested in both typically analyze sex segregation by racial group, race segregation by sex, or the segregation of jointly defined groups (e.g., white women). This line of research, while undeniably influential, is hampered by the inability of conventional methodologies (but not log linear methods) to gracefully incorporate multiple race categories and to tease apart “net” patterns and levels of segregation. More generally, the separation of the segregation literatures on race and sex has led to a superficial treatment of interdependencies in systems of racial and gender based inequalities. Finally, there is still much room to elaborate and evaluate causal theories of patterns of segregation and how they vary across time and space.

SEE ALSO: Affirmative Action (Race and Ethnic Quotas); Divisions of Household Labor; Gender, Work, and Family; Inequality/Stratification, Gender; International Gender Division of Labor; Intersectionality; Occupations, Scaling of; Sex Based Wage Gap and Comparable Worth; Socialization, Gender; Stratification, Gender and; Stratification, Race/Ethnicity and

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occupations

Steven Rytina

Occupation refers to the kind of work usually done for a living. Type of work provides one of the best single indicators of the overall life situation of workers. This rests on a thesis that is powerful (but varies in validity) – type of work is a key cause and consequence of relative

position with respect to stable inequalities or social stratification.

Occupation is one of the most complex indicators in social science. There are many ways of classifying work into types. An initial issue is what counts as occupation and what does not.

Many authors, and most government statistical agencies, restrict occupation to work performed for pay outside the home. Unpaid domestic or household labor is thus commonly excluded. Agricultural labor by kin for kin, including that by children, is also not counted. These excluded possibilities lack traits that equate “usual occupation” with work divided into distinct kinds, including task specialization, contractual regulation, and barriers to entry like required formal training, licensing, or previous experience.

These traits help delimit the ever finer divisions of work that emerge wherever rural, agricultural economies were displaced by urban and industrial alternatives. Unspecialized work gave way to specialized, potentially lifelong vocations that became a key determinant of mode and level of living. (Living levels for dependent household members also turn on occupations, but complications arise when no one is gainfully employed or more than one member is.) Government concern for distribution over vocations is almost as old as urbanism – in 305 BCE, the Roman emperor Diocletian decreed that all sons would follow the trade of their fathers, apparently without much success. Modern occupational tabulations date from the early industrial era when the term statistics retained its older meaning of measures created for purposes of state (Desrosières 1998).

From the outset, designers of codes took occupation as a potential master status, “the best single criterion of a man’s social and economic status” encompassing “the kind of associates he will have,” “the kind of food he will eat,” and “the cultural level of his family” (Alba Edwards, in charge of occupational statistics for the US Census Bureau 1920–40, quoted in Conk 1980: 26). Reliable, and often large, differences between occupations indeed run the gamut from leisure pursuits (Bourdieu 1984) to death rates (Johnson et al. 1999).

Such empirical potency is achieved in spite of uneven foundations. Since a principal goal was to code census responses to questions about the work usually performed, designers

incorporated folk distinctions among well known trades, such as carpentry, that were skilled (or thought to be so). New industries, based on novelties like chemicals or electricity, were added by analogy, not without expressed doubt that such work required much in the way of distinguishing skills. Categories were added for jobs titled to reflect educational specialties that grew apace as science and engineering played ever larger roles in the economy. Sound reasons mingled with guesses and hunches – the paucity of specific information about specific jobs and industries is often cited in accounts of code design. This uncertainty is reflected in residual categories, such as Machine Operatives, Not Elsewhere Classified, that are left open as catch alls for cases that do not fit elsewhere.

This state of affairs resists easy summary. Codes are compromises – dictionaries of occupation titles distinguish upwards of 10,000 occupations while data collectors distinguish several hundred, at most. Any coding effort achieves no more than partial separation by exclusion – code assignments record unambiguous disqualification from most possibilities, even while final assignments can be uncertain over some short list and much variety remains among jobs collected in specific categories. The end result is simultaneously potent and incomplete. Empirical summaries fall into the fuzzy mid range where half empty meets half full. Typically, somewhere between one to two thirds of variation in concomitants like education or earnings are between occupational categories, entailing ample residual variation among individuals who share occupational categories.

This pattern of robust but imperfect connection to diverse forms of inequality raises challenging issues. Since codes are, at best, fallible overlays riddled with uncertainty, why do they work – why do categories of jobs exhibit homogeneity on just about any criterion of social rank? Another issue is the stability implicit in taking occupation as an indicator of individual social standing, as rank that persists over time and even across changes of job.

Homogeneity and contrast are generally seen as fostered by labor markets. Market logic forces buyers and sellers toward agreement on categories defining interchangeable substitutes, segregating non substitutes into separate categories.

The disruption inherent in adding replacements to work teams shapes categories. Technical demands motivate screening replacements for training that will reduce transition strains. Where that training takes more time, to the exclusion of alternatives, barriers arise against substitution, reserving collections of jobs to ever narrower pools of persons that undergo specific preliminary sequences. Persons holding jobs acquire stakes in jobs defined as open to them, sometimes in tension with the interests of employers and holders of other jobs. Stake holding potentially induces collective actors formed around joint interests, including limiting competition by imposing criteria of gender, ethnicity, or training beyond what is needed to do the job.

Conversely, where neither technical intricacies nor worker organization raise barriers to replacement, there are limited bases for securing advantages or for cementing lifetime attachments. In this sense, degree of occupational articulation is a facet of stratification, with clarity of occupation weaker where advantage is lesser.

Coded finely or coarsely, type of work thus provides a rough cut of similarity with respect to key components of bargaining power between jobholders and those with an interest in keeping a job filled (usually employers). Employees gain relative power when reliability in coming to work is more crucial, when team outcomes are more dependent on individual contribution, and when replacements are scarce relative to demand and thus expensive. As a rough but reasonably accurate summary, levels of formal education summarize relative scarcity and hence rank.

One tradition has taken relative rank as an externally fixed, hence rigid, framework within which attributes of individuals "cause" relative placements. Blau and Duncan (1967) termed this scaffolding. The referent was flexible – occupation referred to 400 plus detailed occupations arranged along a dimension by Duncan's socioeconomic index (commonly called SEI) and to a 17 fold category scheme generated by imposing industry subdivisions onto a tenfold scheme traceable to Alba Edwards.

This shifting referent of occupation reveals a central difficulty – occupation must be mapped into one of several forms that are more methodologically tractable before empirical application

is possible. Sometimes heated controversies have emerged among proponents of, for example, class schemes drawing on relatively few categories and schemes for supplying numerical ranks to detailed categories.

Another stance takes entry requirements and relative rewards of occupations as outcomes shaped by collective action and contest. Abbott (1988) showed how professions competed in carving out domains of expertise. The most successful groupings further got schooling and/or licensing requirements established in law, thereby limiting numbers and raising rewards. Parkin (1979) grouped such processes with comparable attempts at exclusion by wage workers that also aimed to control or restrict labor supply to enhance the advantages of those inside relevant boundaries. Such arguments emphasize that occupations are created when interested parties draw lines around jobs and enforce restrictions over entry.

What counts as qualification is subject to change. Conk (1980) reports late nineteenth century manuals for employers that stereotyped ethnic groups as distinctively suited or unsuited for long lists of specific occupations. In practice, occupational specialization by ethnic origin was extremely marked during the high tide of European immigration. This gradually faded as generations succeeded, except for those of African descent (Lieberson 1980). Occupational segregation by gender is extremely marked and the changes have been compared to queues where the "lesser" gender only takes over the least desirable or tail end of available jobs (Reskin & Roos 1990). Tilly (1998) has even argued that occupational categories are not so much causes as empty containers that organization designers assign to contrasting genders, ethnic backgrounds, or other bases to stabilize and legitimate unequal work relations and unequal outcomes. Occupations thus remain central to understanding how stable differences are marked and managed, even as debate persists over how and why work specialization channels inequalities.

SEE ALSO: Division of Labor; Labor Markets; Labor Movement; Labor Process; Mobility, Horizontal and Vertical; Mobility, Intergenerational and Intragenerational; Mobility, Measuring the Effects of; Occupational

Mobility; Occupational Segregation; Occupations, Scaling of; Professions; Stratification and Inequality, Theories of

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occupations, scaling of

Wout Ultee

In their empirical research on societal stratification, sociologists in national sample surveys often ask people about their present occupation, first occupation, the occupation of their father and of their mother, and the occupation of their spouse and their siblings. The occupational titles obtained in this way nowadays are coded according to the International Standard Classification of Occupations (ISCO) issued by the

International Labor Office, or the equivalent of this classification used by official national bureaus of statistics. The 1988 ISCO reduces occupational titles to 10 major groups, 28 sub-major groups, 116 minor groups, and 390 unit groups. Major groups are given one digit, unit groups four digits. Since these groups are no more than nominal ones and not attuned to questions in sociology about societal phenomena like downward mobility and "marrying up," sociologists have developed scales that rank occupations from higher to lower.

One way to do so is to have a representative sample of persons rate occupational titles for the standing accorded to them by society at large, with the percent rating an occupation in the highest category giving the value for this occupation on the occupational prestige scale. It turns out that there is much agreement about this among respondents of different backgrounds (if they differed strongly, the scores for all occupational titles would be about average, which they are not). Also, as Treiman (1977) showed, occupational prestige ladders for various countries closely resemble one another. It should be added that Haller and Bills (1979) found that a prestige ladder for a social democratic country (or a communist country) resembles that for a conservative country less than do the scales for two social democratic countries (or two communist countries, or two conservative ones). So, assume that sociologists have a sample of respondents from a country's population who rate a sufficiently high number of occupational titles according to social standing. Also, assume that these sociologists selected these titles in line with existing nominal occupational classifications. Finally, assume that these sociologists know the title of the present occupation of a sample of persons and the occupational title for their parental home. If these three assumptions hold, then sociologists avail themselves of a criterion with which to measure the extent to which the inhabitants of a country are upwardly or downwardly mobile, and similar phenomena.

Given the unwieldy number of occupational titles to be rated by respondents, scores for titles not rated have been obtained by another procedure. If it is known from censuses or labor force surveys what are the average income and the average education of persons with a

four digit ISCO score, it is possible to estimate a mathematical equation which predicts the observed prestige for rated titles, from the average level of education and the average income of the persons with this occupational title. Given this equation, it is possible to predict a prestige score for non rated occupational titles with known average income and education of the holders of this occupation. The first example of this exercise was performed by Duncan (1961) on US data for the 1960s. This scale was used in the first big study of inter and intragenerational occupational mobility in the US, conducted by Blau and Duncan (1967).

Occupations also have been scaled by way of tables in which detailed occupational titles for husbands and wives and for pairs of good friends are cross classified. A computer program orders the titles in such a way that the best fit is obtained by placing frequent combinations close to one another and infrequent combinations further away from one another. It is possible that these statistical exercises yield more than one dimension along which occupations can be ranked, leading to the question of how to interpret these dimensions. One refers to general standing, another sometimes seems to pertain to close proximity in the working place (e.g., surgeons and nurses). It is clear that there are special difficulties in using the occupational scales so obtained when studying changes in who marries whom.

Finally, there are schemas which reduce occupational titles to a small number of categories that are not fully ordered in a hierarchical way. A prime example is the often used class schema originally developed by John Goldthorpe for the UK and later amended for country comparisons with respect to father-son mobility by Goldthorpe together with Robert Erikson. This scale has a clear bottom and a clear top, but leaves various categories below the top and above the bottom unordered. This is because the schema is not supposed to capture occupational prestige – according to some theories a more tangential phenomenon of societal stratification – but the nature of work relations, an aspect of stratification held to be more fundamental to the outcome of various societal processes like unemployment and educational inequality.

SEE ALSO: Class; Connubium (Who Marries Whom?); Occupational Segregation; Occupations; Regression and Regression Analysis; Status

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office ladies

Tomoko Kurihara

“Office lady” (*ofisu red*), or in its shortened form OL (*o eru*), is a term commonly used in Japan to describe female workers who are employed in submanagerial positions in white collar work places. In its popular usage, the term OL lacks specificity and usually refers to women who work in any office environment, in a firm of any size, and in any sector or occupation, whereas the scholarly work on OLs has tended to focus on women working in large companies employing over 1,000 people. Typically, OL refers to young unmarried women in their twenties and thirties, but its usage is flexible and may refer to the full range of marital statuses, including married individuals with or without children, and older, either single or widowed

working women. The term OL was coined by the media in the 1960s to represent the greater numbers of women who had entered the labor market following the structural changes in the post war economy, mainly in the expansion of the service, wholesale, and retail industries. The emergence of the term appeared to mark the empowerment of women in society, suggesting that women were able to form an identity primarily based on their role as workers. In spite of this, for much of the twentieth century the image of the independent working woman in Japan was limited to her main role as a powerful consumer of high fashion and overseas travel. For this reason, in parallel to the feminist critiques of patriarchy and workplace employment practices, it seems that the term OL has acquired somewhat pejorative connotations, as keeping women on the periphery of economy, workplace, and society. From the late 1990s onwards, the term "career woman" has become a respectful self reference preferred among the new generation of OLs. Indeed, postmodernization and the expansion of knowledge intensive occupations have allowed a greater proportion of female workers to take up jobs in specialist clerical, professional, and managerial positions in the fields of banking, finance and retail distribution, and information technology.

Although individual OLs' specific experience of work will vary depending on the size and location of the firm, industry, occupation, age, and personal political views, OLs can, nonetheless, be viewed as a Durkheimian category insofar as the group shares common experiences and a collective representation. Upon graduating from four year university courses and two year junior college courses, OLs are recruited by large companies to fill full time positions. Following the career tracking system (*kosu betsu koyo seido*) introduced by the Equal Employment Opportunity Law (EEOL) (1986), large companies divide new recruits into clerical (*ippan shoku*) and managerial/career tracks (*sogo shoku*). The clerical track is characterized by less complex and more manual jobs, lower pay, fewer job rotations and only limited transfers, and promotion limited to lower level or local management positions. In contrast, jobs in the career or managerial track are seen to require complex judgments such as business negotiations, personnel management, designing

or developing products, and planning company policies or strategies. Further, there is no limit to promotion and the individual is subject to job rotations and transfers. The majority of women are channeled into the clerical track, and where only a select few successfully make the career track, male graduates are automatically assigned to career track positions.

In fact, the EEOL introduced official status differences among women, while it did not necessarily put women on an equal footing to their male counterparts in the company. In *Women and Japanese Management: Discrimination and Reform* (1992), Lam explains that the career tracking system was designed to prohibit employers from engaging in unlawful discriminatory practice in the hiring, retirement age, resignation, and dismissal of women, as well as in the provision of basic training and fringe benefits. In spite of this legislation, companies are given considerable leeway to practice discrimination in order to preserve the core management system. Moreover, the tracking system complicated the relationships between women. Educational background remained the principal structural barrier to promotion for women with fewer years of education, even though they might have outperformed women with higher educational qualifications, evaluated in terms of length of service and amount of responsibility handled on the job. This further complicated social relations between women already compounded by factors of age, tenure, and status. Also, the women in the career track face complications in their social relations with male colleagues who confine them to supporting roles on account of an inability to surrender their traditional gender role expectations.

On the whole, then, OLs' wages, employment status, occupational roles, and promotional chances remain low in relation to their male colleagues. Moreover, OLs tend to encounter the problem of status ambiguity (see Lebra 1981). This is because OLs hired by large companies have been educated at Japan's most prestigious universities and colleges, and in working for large corporations such women are among the economic elite or new middle class. As a status group, the qualities of the economic elite are defined by achievement (not ascribed characteristics), power (not prestige), and class of wealth (as opposed to "status of honor").

Female workers who enter this status group find, nevertheless, that ascribed characteristics, mainly sex, when combined with sociocultural norms expected of women's lives, produce status differences between men and women in the office. Thus, formal structural inequalities in wage and promotion give women, including those on the career track, low status in comparison to men, producing the effect of status ambiguity.

In the academic literature, the position, status, and identity of OLs have been an important means by which the perpetuation of gender inequality in Japanese society and workplaces has been explained. Even predating the literature on OLs, however, there has been a tradition of representing female workers in the Japanese labor market as oppressed victims of patriarchal society. Historical accounts of the role of women in the development of industry in modern Japan have thoroughly documented the structural basis which precipitates this reality (see Bernstein 1991; Hunter 1993). Other macro level studies of female workers have provided insightful critiques that explain women's peripheral status in the workplace in terms of their exclusion from the benefits of internal labor markets, specifically the lifetime employment system (see Rohlen 1974; Brinton 1993; Osawa Machiko 1993; Osawa Mari 1996). Also within this paradigm (labeled the gendered organizations framework), ethnographies of female office workers have accounted for the low status of women by showing how organizations are structured in terms of a dichotomy between masculine and feminine roles (see Lo 1990; Saso 1990). Ethnographies under this framework also include Dorrine K. Kondo's *Crafting Selves: Power, Gender, and Discourses of Identity in a Japanese Workplace* (1990), Yuko Ogasawara's *Office Ladies and Salaried Men: Power, Gender, and Work in Japanese Companies* (1998), and Tomoko Kurihara's *Japanese Corporate Transition in Time and Space: An Ethnography of Community, Status Politics, and the Introduction of ICTs* (2006). These authors apply a deconstructionist framework to analyze the process of gendering at the level of discourse, individual identity, and interaction, and place importance on the meaning women give to their own work. Such studies maintain the significance of the historical and culturally specific conditions

under which gendering in white collar organizations occurs, yet they allow room to account for improvement in gender relations within work environments and the social sphere.

Although status ambiguity and gender inequality persist, the conditions in workplaces appear to be improving, albeit slowly, and this was particularly clear in the late 1990s. The EEOL (1986) was revised in 1997. The modifications that came into effect in April 1999 took account of a number of social trends: the increases in the total number of female recruits; the prolonged length of women's service in the workplace; the expansion in the type of jobs to which women applied; changing awareness among the general public regarding women's work; and changes to the way companies tackled human resource issues with regard to the equal treatment of female workers. Notably, the most significant shift of recent times is in relation to women's attitudes toward balancing their careers with domestic responsibility, and their wish to continue working in jobs which are equal to or better than the position held before childbirth. Furthermore, addressing a highly problematic domain, a directive on the prevention of sexual harassment in the workplace was issued. However, a clear definition of sexual harassment is still lacking, and judicial policy on the subject largely seems to consist of an empty formality, designed only to raise awareness of sexual harassment in Japanese workplaces in alignment with western standards. The restrictions on overtime and late night work by women (including those engaged in child or family care) have also been lifted, a change that is expected to increase the promotional prospects of women. Moreover, the Japanese government is now playing a more active role in its attempts to enforce the law. The Ministry of Labor has agreed to provide the necessary administrative guidance to companies in the form of advice, instructions, and recommendations. Provisions are being made for a consultation and arbitration service to enterprise owners, voluntary in-house resolution of complaints, assistance for dispute settlements through the Director of Prefectural Women's and Young Workers' Office, and relief from disputes through mediation by the Equal Opportunity Mediation Commission. As a further means of reinforcing this new standard, the government is regulating

companies known to be exercising discriminatory practices through threat of public exposure (*kigyomei kohyo seido*). But the extent of the success of this measure is questionable given the influence of large companies on political matters. It seems clear that the EEOL cannot be enforced effectively in companies if the wider social context is not supportive of working women, yet it is necessary to account for and improve the working conditions of men if gender equality is to be achieved (see Ueno 1995).

SEE ALSO: Discrimination; Gender Ideology and Gender Role Ideology; Gendered Organizations/Institutions; Japanese Style Management; Salary Men; *Shushin Koyo*

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older adults, economic well-being of

Stephen Crystal

In the contemporary world, and especially in the developed countries with their aging populations, providing for the economic needs of the elderly has become a central and increasingly controversial social problem. Expenditures aimed at meeting these needs – directly through income benefits such as those provided by Social Security in the US, and indirectly through tax expenditures and in kind programs such as health benefits – constitute a dominant share of public spending in the developed countries, and will increase further as the large post World War II birth cohort reaches old age and the proportion of retirees to workers increases. While economists have been more prominent than sociologists in the literature on the size and distribution of the elderly's economic resources, these issues pose fundamental sociological questions, and sociological perspectives are vital in understanding the processes that shape these outcomes. Work in the neoclassical economic tradition, for example, has often begun with the assumption that consumers are rational, well informed utility maximizers who actively organize their economic affairs and choices so as to optimally distribute consumption over the life course (Modigliani 1988). (Under some versions of economic life cycle theory, utility maximizing would be predicted to result in spending one's last dollar on the last day of one's life). As sociologists might suspect, such models tend not to do well in predicting actual patterns of accumulation and spending down of savings over the life course.

Sociological perspectives are particularly important in understanding economic inequality in late life and the processes that generate or

moderate them, as part of a more general analysis of social stratification and status attainment processes and of the distributional consequences of public policies. From a sociological perspective, the pattern of late life economic outcomes can be seen as the result of influences and interactions over the life course among individual life events (e.g., educational attainment, health changes, labor force participation); social structural and cultural influences (e.g., family structures, gender role expectations); and formal systems and public policies (e.g., structure and rules of public and private retirement income systems, health care financing, disability benefit systems) (Crystal & Shea 2003). Thus, longitudinal analyses of data from panel surveys – such as the Health and Retirement Study, Panel Study of Income Dynamics, National Longitudinal Surveys, and others – are key to understanding the dynamics of late life economic well being (Crystal & Wachrer 1996; Juster & Smith 1997). As sociologists, particularly demographers, have noted, these longitudinal processes can be viewed from an age, cohort, or period perspective. While aging processes bear similarities across cohorts, each birth cohort can also be seen as experiencing a unique historical experience as it encounters changing social and economic circumstances at particular ages. With respect to the net impact of life course events and social policies on late life income outcomes as compared with those earlier in the life course, conceptual models that have been proposed include leveling (Fuchs 1984); status maintenance (Henretta & Campbell 1976); and cumulative advantage and disadvantage (Crystal & Shea 1990).

In the years following World War II, growth in the US economy created new economic opportunities and income growth for the working age population, but incomes of the elderly lagged behind. In 1959, for example, 35 percent of persons over 65 had incomes below the poverty line; elderly persons were often, of necessity, financially dependent on adult children; and political pressures to address the unmet income and health care needs of older people began to increase. Substantial improvement in elderly poverty rates in the following years, largely as a result of increases in Social Security benefits, represented a social policy success story, particularly in contrast to the lack of sustained

improvement in child poverty rates despite the War on Poverty. By the mid 1970s the elderly poverty rate had fallen to 15 percent, lower than the 17 percent rate for children. And by 2002 the elderly poverty rate had further dropped to 10.4 percent, slightly lower than the rate for persons 18–64, while the child poverty rate was again at 17 percent (Federal Interagency Forum 2004).

The elderly also compare favorably to the non elderly on overall average levels of income and assets. Taking account of household size, the economic value of assets as well as income, and the known underreporting of non salary income such as pensions, interest, and dividends, Crystal and Shea (1990) estimated that by the mid 1980s, mean income of persons over 65 was higher than at any other age except for ages 55 to 64. Mean income of the elderly has continued to compare favorably to that of non elderly adults, while mean assets have steadily improved as a result of appreciation in stocks, real estate, and other investments. In 2001, mean asset holdings for elderly headed households were estimated at \$180,000, a 50 percent increase from the 1994 level, based on Panel Survey of Income Dynamics data (Federal Interagency Forum 2004).

However, closer examination of the elderly's income and wealth patterns suggests that important issues of adequacy and equity remain. Income distribution among the US elderly is highly skewed. It has been estimated that the least well off 40 percent of the elderly in 1997 shared 13 percent of the elderly's income, while the best off 20 percent shared 52 percent, a higher rate of income concentration than prevails at younger ages (Rubin et al. 2000). These estimates probably underestimate income concentration among the elderly, as they do not adjust for underreporting of pension income and investment interest, which predominate among higher income elderly, and are less completely reported than Social Security income, which predominates in lower income quintiles. Disparities by race, marital status, and health status among the elderly are large for income and especially large for wealth (Wolff 2003). For example, in 2001, mean wealth for elderly headed African American households was only one fifth that of their white counterparts, and the gap was even greater (more than six to one)

for households with an elderly head with less than high school education, as compared with those with a college education (Federal Intergenerational Forum 2004). Early advantages and disadvantages strongly foreshadow late life disparities in economic outcomes. For example, years of schooling attained in early life predict post retirement age income even more strongly than income at earlier ages (Crystal et al. 1992). High out of pocket expenditures resulting from gaps in Medicare coverage disproportionately erode the economic resources of lower income elderly (Crystal et al. 2000). Despite the relatively low proportion below the official poverty line, many elderly are clustered in the near poor income range; for these elderly, the relatively high mean income of the overall elderly population, driven largely by high incomes among those in the upper quintile, provides little comfort.

In projecting the likely pattern of outcomes for the large baby boom cohort, it is important to distinguish between means and distributional outcomes. Despite much publicity about problematic prospects for the economic future of the baby boomers, comparisons of income trajectories of baby boomers compared to those of pre boomer cohorts suggest that their average prospects *as a group* are more favorable than those of preceding cohorts (Johnson & Crystal 2003). However, outcomes for disadvantaged subgroups – such as racial ethnic minorities, those with limited formal education, and those with serious chronic health problems – are more questionable.

It is reasonable to project continued high, if not exacerbated, levels of economic inequality for future cohorts of elderly in the US, continuing existing patterns. Longitudinal studies across multiple cohorts have demonstrated that income inequality in the US increases within cohorts as they age (Crystal & Waehrer 1996). Cross national studies also show that late life economic inequality is substantially higher in the US than in nearly all other developed countries, due largely to the smaller proportion of the elderly's overall income that is accounted for by public retirement benefits (Social Security) and the relatively low level of minimum benefits (O'Rand & Henretta 1999; Disney & Whitehouse 2003). Nevertheless, the Social

Security program in the US does have a leveling influence that reduces what would otherwise be even higher levels of late life inequality. The importance of the program in its current form to lower and moderate income elderly is suggested by the estimate that Social Security in 2002 accounted for 83 percent of the income of those elderly in the lower 40 percent of the income distribution, and 67 percent for those in the middle fifth. In contrast, Social Security accounts for less than 20 percent of income for those in the highest income quintile (Federal Intergenerational Forum 2004).

In the US, proposals put forward by President George W. Bush in 2005 suggested the erosion of what had been a long period of relative consensus on the basic structure of the Social Security system. Critics of these proposals suggested that the redistributive features of the existing system would be difficult to retain if Social Security revenues were diverted, as proposed, into individual, private retirement accounts. Regardless of the short term outcome of the Social Security debates of the mid 2000s in the US – and of public policy debates taking place worldwide as public pension systems come under financial pressure – financing the economic needs of the elderly is likely to become an increasingly contentious issue in all the developed countries in coming years. Social insurance systems that provide retirement pensions will continue to play a central role in buffering high levels of inequality that are produced by processes of cumulative advantage and disadvantage over the life course. However, the level of national resources devoted to these systems is likely to be a central issue in public policy debates, along with the design choices that determine who pays, who benefits, and how much. Thoughtful and rigorous sociological analyses will be much needed to clarify the potential impact of alternative public policy choices, and to link these considerations to a broader understanding of processes of social stratification and life course dynamics.

SEE ALSO: Age, Period, and Cohort Effects; Aging, Demography of; Aging, Longitudinal Studies; Aging and Social Policy; Aging and Work Performance; Gender, Aging and; Income Inequality and Income Mobility

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oligarchy and organization

Dieter Rucht

In the classical Greek period, oligarchy (literally, the rule by a few) usually had a negative connotation. In Aristotle's typology of political systems, oligarchy refers to a rule that mainly serves the interests of the rich at the expense of the large majority of the community. By contrast, aristocracy, though also being a rule by a small minority, was understood as a government of "the best" in service of the public good. In common language from the Roman Empire to the Middle Ages to the present, oligarchy denotes a political regime in which the power is concentrated in the hands of a small group, regardless of whether this power is based on wealth (usually referred to as a plutocratic system), weapons, or other sources of influence and control. In line with Aristotle's understanding, many political theorists and sociologists use the term oligarchy in a pejorative sense, denoting a degenerate rule to the disadvantage of the political community at large.

Other theorists consider oligarchy to be inevitable, at least in large and complex societies. Because human beings, by nature and/or due to opportunities, differ in their capacities to accumulate resources, power always will be distributed unevenly. Therefore, oligarchy is not the exception but the rule, regardless of whether the political system is called a democracy, an aristocracy, or something else. In this view,

oligarchy is not per se negative for society at large, provided that elites do not exclusively recruit from their own milieus and/or that they can be replaced by other elites on the basis of democratic elections.

In modern social sciences, Robert Michels is widely considered as *the* theorist of oligarchy. Michels's empirical reference point was the German Social Democratic Party (SPD), which had its roots in the socialist labor movement. According to Michels's seminal work *Political Parties* (1911), the SPD, rather than pursuing the initial goals of the socialist labor movement, became preoccupied with maintaining and enlarging its own organization. Leadership became separated from the rank and file, and the apparatus of the party developed an interest in itself.

To Michels, the SPD was merely a paradigmatic case of a more general development that can be observed wherever large groups come into existence. Oligarchy is a universal pattern inherent to any complex society, including democratic states and even libertarian organizations. "By a universally applicable social law, every organ of the collectivity, brought into existence through the need for the division of labor, creates for itself, as soon as it becomes consolidated, interests peculiar to itself" (Michels 2001 [1911]: 233). Consolidation implies organization which, in turn, implies oligarchy according to the famous dictum: "Whoever says organization, says oligarchy." Organization "gives birth to the dominion of the elected over the electors, of the mandataries over the mandators, of the delegates over the delegators" (p. 241). Michels sees the underlying reason for organization, and hence the "historic necessity of oligarchy" (p. 240), in the political indifference of the majority and the necessity of leadership. He registers a tension between the fact of oligarchy and the ideals of democracy (p. 241). Even though oligarchy is declared as inevitable, Michels believes that it can, and indeed should, be limited. He therefore advocates a "social education" that teaches people, in their search for democracy, about the necessity of fighting oligarchy (Michels 1987 [1908]: 172; Michels 2001 [1911]: 244). At the end of his book, Michels compares the democratic tendencies in history at large with a sequence of waves that carry despair but also hope. Democracy, after

some time, degenerates to a structure from which it initially sets itself apart. Yet this very process of degeneration also creates new forces that oppose oligarchy, become part of the ruling class, and thereby initiate a new oligarchic cycle that is doomed to further contestation. While deploring oligarchy on the basis of his socialist and democratic stance in *Political Parties*, Michels gradually changed his views, moving to the political right and joining the fascist party in Italy in 1923.

Michels's "iron law of oligarchy" is widely cited and continues to be debated in the social sciences, particularly since we now live in a "society of organizations," as Perrow (1991) has put it. Taken as an empirical "tendency" rather than a "law" (Michels uses both terms in his writings), most social scientists would agree with his observations. For example, few would deny that economic corporations and state administrations are based on the rule of the many by the few, lead to concentration of power, and hence can be called oligarchic. In these cases, oligarchy, along with hierarchy, may be taken as almost "natural." However, oligarchy is a pertinent problem for all those who strongly value democracy and equality, and who believe that these principles can and should be realized in at least some parts of society, for example in political systems, political parties, public interest groups, or social movements. To these critics, oligarchy is an evil that should be kept to a minimum if not abolished altogether.

In the scholarly world, problems of organization and oligarchy have probably been most intensively discussed in social movement research. According to one tradition which was strongly influenced by the mass psychology that flourished in Europe around the turn of the twentieth century, social movements were seen as unorganized crowds that are affected and driven by emotions. Following this line of thinking (which also influenced Michels), quite a number of scholars have argued that social movements start out as energetic and largely informal enterprises, but lose their social movement character as they become professionalized and institutionalized. Often, such a structural change is seen as necessarily accompanied by a trend toward deradicalization. These ideas have also inspired various life cycle models of social

movements that typically end with a stage of institutionalization or even bureaucratization. Movement and institution are thus mutually exclusive, as Alberoni (1984 [1977]) and others have argued.

Another tradition in social movement literature recognizes the reality of and need for organization – though not necessarily oligarchy – in social movements. This way of thinking was particularly salient among European political leaders and analysts who were close to either leftist or rightist ideas. With regard to the labor movement, for example, the main issue was not about the need for organization, but rather the specific form it should take. Following the Leninist concept of the *avant garde*, one ideological current within the communist left emphasized the need for strong leadership and firm organization. Another current, represented by German communist Rosa Luxemburg, favored a more decentralized and democratic organization of the left. A small minority of anarchists went even further, distrusting all forms of formal organization because they saw them as sources of unacceptable power.

With the rise of the new left in the 1960s and the subsequent wave of new social movements in many countries of the western world and beyond, much emphasis was given to the principles of participatory democracy and the building of networks rather than firm organizations. These groups were convinced that oligarchy could be mitigated, if not avoided completely, by insisting on decentralization, subsidiarity, rotation of tasks and responsibilities, imperative mandates of delegates, and consensus as a precondition for taking action. Scholars sympathizing with such values also tend to see oligarchy as evitable (Breines 1982). This preference for informal networks is to be found as well in the more recent wave of global justice movements. In practice, however, a diversified movement infrastructure has emerged, ranging from largely informal and decentralized networks of grassroots groups (e.g., Peoples' Global Action) to loose alliances or umbrella groups of fairly democratic associations based on formal individual membership (e.g., Friends of the Earth) to more hierarchically structured transnational organizations (such as Amnesty International, Greenpeace, or Transparency International). While oligarchy is an ongoing concern and

a matter of intense debate for these groups, right wing movements usually embrace strong, hierarchical organizations. The organizational ideal of right extremists may even go beyond oligarchic principles insofar as they long for a single leader at the top of the organizational pyramid rather than an oligarchic clique.

Few studies have been undertaken to empirically examine the process of organization building as a path leading to potential or actual oligarchization. One of the exceptions is Lipset et al.'s *Union Democracy* (1956), in which the authors suggest that oligarchy can be avoided even in large organizations, though only under certain conditions and to a limited extent. The debate on oligarchy has become more differentiated in light of empirical, and often inconclusive, findings in social movement studies during the last few decades (Clemens & Minkoff 2005). The so called resource mobilization approach has emphasized the need of social movements to rely on organization and has promoted the use of terms analogous to economic phenomena, such as "social movement industry" and "social movement entrepreneur." Key representatives of this approach have also pointed to a trend toward professionalization in American social movements (McCarthy & Zald 1973), though they only casually engage in the debate on oligarchy and life cycles of social movements. Comparative research seems to indicate that the degree of formalization and oligarchization varies considerably across movements and across countries, suggesting that the overriding theme and ideology of a movement, along with its political and sociocultural environment, may have an impact on its organizational form. For example, a movement for democratization is more likely to resist oligarchic tendencies within its own ranks than, say, a farmers' movement demanding more state subsidies. The fact that external factors also influence the propensity to institutionalization (and, ultimately, oligarchy) is exemplified by the higher degree of structuration of the women's movement in the US compared to most European countries. Still, the empirical basis in social movement research is too weak to draw strong conclusions. Most studies on social movements cover a time span too short to make a grounded statement on whether or not oligarchy necessarily emerges and which factors might account for this. In addition, the

concept of oligarchy, to the extent that it implies goal displacement and bureaucratic conservatism, cannot account for radical organizations that are dominated by a ruling elite (Leach 2005). Furthermore, as Freeman (1982 [1970]) has argued, formal structures have the advantage of making power visible, while informal power structure may lead to a "tyranny of structurelessness."

Based on his study of various movement groups and their protest activities in Germany, Rucht (1999) finds that groups tend to become more formalized and centralized over time. However, contrary to what Michels assumed, the results are inconsistent on the question of whether or not movement groups also become more moderate over time. Hence Rucht (1999: 166) concludes that "there is no such thing as an 'iron law' at work" leading to deradicalization.

In the field of organizational studies and the sociology of organizations, explicit references to oligarchy are rare. It appears that basic elements of Michels's concept of oligarchy are too crude (e.g., the separation between leaders and followers), unclear, or largely inapplicable to many organizations (e.g., the tendency to be compromised). Greater emphasis is generally placed instead on concepts *related* to oligarchy, such as formal and informal power, functional differentiation, division of labor, hierarchy, styles of leadership, authority, governance, and control. In surveying the broad development in this field during the past decades, it seems that there is a shift of emphasis from the formal to the informal, from high to low hierarchies, from binding orders to directives, from organizational structure to organizational culture, and from organizations to networks (Castells 1996). To borrow an analogy from the computer world, this development reflects a shift from the "hardware" of organizations to their "software."

Although there is to date little mutual attention or recognition between organizational studies on the one hand and social movement studies on the other hand (for an exception, see Davis et al. 2005), a convergence of interests and paradigms seems to occur. For example, striking similarities can be found on the conceptual level between the work of the French school of organizational studies, represented by Crozier and Friedberg (1980), and the resource mobilization

school in social movement studies, as represented by McCarthy and Zald (1977).

Both in the world of economic, political, and administrative actors and among their scholarly observers, the relationship between organization and oligarchy remains a contested issue. While, with very few exceptions, nobody would deny the need for organization of and within complex societies, there remain strikingly different views on *how* social entities can and should be organized. Of course, such views depend on the kind of organization in question, its aims and its contexts. A transnational capitalist corporation, for example, rests on different principles and needs than a charity association devoted to humanitarian aid. In spite of these differences, there is, on a prescriptive level, a major dividing line between those who favor "strong," hierarchical organizations that concentrate power in the hands of a few and those who favor a decentralized and participatory structure in which the organizational subunits and individuals enjoy a high degree of autonomy. These two poles also serve as points of reference and mark tensions within many organizations. While it appears that the actual leeway for decentralization and autonomy is very small in capitalist enterprises and all kinds of state administrations, there is considerable room for maneuver in most civic associations, and even more in social movements, as variation between such groups demonstrates. In some of these, a marked oligarchy not only exists but is also even perceived as a strength. For example, leading representatives of Greenpeace have argued that participatory democratic principles would undermine the organization's ability to deal quickly, professionally, and effectively with mass media.

To other groups, oligarchy (often associated with inequality, hierarchy, bureaucracy, centralization, etc.) is a threat that constantly requires not only attention but also active countermeasures. While very few large civic associations and networks would claim for themselves to be completely free of oligarchy, most civic associations accept concentration of power within certain limits. To the extent that they believe in the value of democracy not just as a formal principle of government but as a way of life, they continue to struggle with and against the trend toward oligarchy in many spheres and at all

levels, from the local to the global. Accordingly, these groups are marked by sometimes heated internal debates about reconciling the “logic of membership” with the “logic of influence” (Schmitter & Streeck 1981). Put another way, they seek to find a balance between a group structure offering room for self realization, respect, and reciprocity on the one hand, and, on the other, a framework guaranteeing a certain degree of unity and allowing for effective decision making and outward directed strategic action. The theoretical assumption is that an oligarchic structure enhances the capacity for strategic intervention but at the same time may undermine the members’ commitment to the group or organization. Particularly in the absence of charismatic or at least widely accepted leadership, members lose motivation, become frustrated, and may therefore choose to quit the group.

Similar problems also arise at the level of nation states. While in this case “exit,” to use Hirschman’s (1970) typology, is not an option for most citizens, oligarchic structures within a nominally democratic framework are problematic for other reasons. Oligarchy is likely to either foster a disenchanting and increasingly passive citizenry or stimulate “voice,” i.e., protest movements that challenge the incumbent oligarchic powerholders. Whether this leads to a mere “circulation of elites” (Pareto 1935) and thus to the perpetuation of oligarchic structures or toward a “strong democracy” (Barber 1984) is an open empirical matter.

SEE ALSO: Authority and Legitimacy; Bureauocracy and Public Sector Governmentality; Democracy; Democracy and Organizations; Global Justice as a Social Movement; Globalization and Global Justice; Leadership; Luxemburg, Rosa; Michels Robert; New Left; Political Leadership; Political Parties; Resource Mobilization Theory; Social Movements; Social Movements, Leadership in; Social Movements, Participatory Democracy in

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Olympics

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The Olympics comprise both the athletic and cultural dimensions of the modern International Olympic Movement. The brainchild of the widely acknowledged founder of the modern Olympics, Pierre de Coubertin, the modern International Olympic Movement was voted into being on June 23, 1894 at the International Congress in Paris. A total of 79 delegates representing 49 sports associations from 12 countries unanimously voted for the restoration of the Olympic Games and for the creation of a permanent International Olympic Committee (IOC). With unquestionable powers as guide, guardian, and arbiter, the IOC remains the umbrella organization and ultimate authority in the conduct of the games.

The first modern Olympic Games were held in 1896 in Athens, and with the exception of the war years (1916, 1940, 1944) and the interim games of 1906, the games have been held quadrennially ever since. The first winter games were held in 1924 in Chamonix. Beginning in 1994, the winter and summer adopted alternating quadrennial calendars. Both summer and winter games have remained ambulatory throughout their history.

The fine arts competition, the Pentathlon of the Muses, was first held in conjunction with the 1912 Stockholm games, with awards in architecture, dramatic art, choreography, decoration, literature, music, painting, and sculpture. In 1948 the arts competitions were replaced with cultural festivals, gymnastic and dance demonstrations, art exhibits, and theater and music performances. After the 1968 Mexico City games, the IOC amended the rules and regulations and the cultural Olympiad was subsequently limited to national rather than international exhibitions and performances.

As the chief architect of the modern Olympic Movement, Coubertin revived the ancient games as an expression of his profound belief in the enduring educational values inherent in competitive sport, what he called *la pédagogie sportive*. Committed to the ideal of sport as a social and moral endeavor, Coubertin conceived of the Olympic Movement as a broad based humanitarian project, and he enlisted the services of the games in the pursuit of international harmony, peace, and goodwill. To this day, the ideology of the Olympics, Olympism, broadly construed, connotes education, international understanding, equal opportunity, fair and equal competition, cultural expression, the independence of sport, and excellence.

The modern games have evolved from a *fin de siècle* curiosity of the late nineteenth century into an early twenty first century spectacle of truly global magnitude. In 1896, 245 male athletes from 14 countries competed in 43 events. More than 10,500 male and female athletes from 102 countries competed in 300 events in the 2004 Athens games. While the first IOC comprised 15 male members from three continents, the current IOC is comprised of 122 members, including 12 women, representing five continents. Over 20 commissions study relevant issues and make recommendations to the Executive Committee of the IOC. Once a fledgling athletic event, the Olympic Games of today attract the attention of a massive worldwide audience and are organized and administered on the basis of multibillion dollar budgets. The 2004 Athens games cost an estimated \$10–\$12 billion and the organizing committee spent an additional \$1.2 billion on security measures.

One of the most spectacular and successful expressions of modern international sport, the Olympics are in fact a derivative of an ancient Greek project that located competitive athletics at the heart of Hellenic culture. First held in 776 BCE at Olympia, the games remained a significant feature of the ancient Greek calendar until their abolition in 393 CE by the Holy Roman Emperor, Theodosius I. One of a series of Pan Hellenic games, the games at Olympia were the oldest, most prestigious, and most famous of all the sporting festivals of antiquity. Although the precise origins of the games remain shrouded in prehistory, the Olympics began as religious ceremonies and developed into cultural

celebrations whose influence was felt throughout the ancient Greek world. A classic expression of the Greek love of athletics, the games also promoted unity and solidarity among the various city states. Held every four years in conjunction with the worship of Olympian Zeus, the Olympic Games glorified the quest for excellence and perfection that became the hallmark of ancient Greek culture. Increasingly trained by professionals, sponsored by city states, and awarded lavish prizes and privileges at home, Olympic athletes attained heroic status and were immortalized in history and verse. Despite the cultural preeminence of the games, the truly refined notion of Hellenic athleticism gradually declined. Buffeted and compromised by civil war, military conquest, and Christian asceticism, the last of the ancient Olympic Games was held in 392 CE. Although various forms of Olympics were held sporadically throughout medieval, Enlightenment, and modern times and reference to the ancient games survived in the professional records of historians, travelers, archaeologists, cartographers, and palaeographers, and in the works of educational theorists, philosophers, and artists, only Coubertin's modern creation has attained significant institutionalized permanence.

Notwithstanding early works on the history of the ancient and modern Olympics, accounts by those most closely connected with the modern Olympics, including Coubertin's own memoirs, as well as journalistic reports and official records, it was not until the 1970s that the Olympics began to attract serious and sustained scholarly interest. Once disorganized, nationally segregated, and often marginalized with their own disciplines, social scientists, including sociologists, social psychologists, political scientists, social historians, anthropologists, and critical theorists have increasingly established a credible, legitimate, and coherent body of Olympic scholarship.

Sociologies of the Olympics have been derived from descriptive analyses, studies of the Olympics as a formal organization, analyses of the relationship between the Olympics and various regulative and expressive cultural institutions, most especially the national state, and studies of the Olympics as a cultural system. More recent studies have analyzed the games within the context of postcolonialism, feminist

theory, and postmodernism. Postmodernist analyses of the games, for example, locate the Olympics at the heart of the media culture and within the context of the cultural logic of late capitalism. As a result the games are characterized as a powerful amalgam of corporate and classical mythology whose semiotic and spectacular power is diverse, fungible, and endlessly productive on a global and local basis. One of the most prominent sociological genres in the recent study of the Olympics derives from the definition of the games as "mega events," large scale cultural events that have dramatic character, mass popular appeal, and global significance. Studies analyze the ways in which the Olympics as mega events contribute to the meaning and development of public culture, cultural citizenship, and cultural inclusion/exclusion in modern societies. Mega event sociology adopts a multiperspectival approach and calls for a combination of dramatological (ethnography, textualism, cultural functionalism) and contextual (economic functionalism, political instrumentalism, critical functionalism) approaches.

Social psychological analyses of the Olympics have been derived from two main perspectives: first, those that have sought to investigate how the human mind and body respond to the demands of high level Olympic sport; and, second, those that have sought to plumb the depths of human athletic potential and to determine how to adapt the athlete's body and mind to the ever increasing demands of Olympic sport. The latter technocratic perspective has invariably been adopted by those seeking to produce record breaking performances and has been contextualized within the framework of a nationalized and technologized performance enhancing drug culture.

Notwithstanding claims of a categorical distinction between politics and sport, early Olympic political science employed largely descriptive methods grounded in rational choice theory, formal modeling, and quantitative methods as the preferred approach to understanding the role and scope of the Olympic Games within the panoply of national and international politics, especially with regard to co-optation of the Olympic Games in the service, and as a reflection, of particularized nation state objectives. This hegemonic approach has more recently been challenged by Olympic political

scientists, who have argued that reliance on deductive theory and quantitative methods has caused neglect to the historical and contextual processes that shape particular political institutions, practices, cultures, ideologies, and identities. As a result, qualitative methods of inquiry, including interpretive textual analyses, ethnographic fieldwork, media analysis, in depth interviews, and case studies, have augmented traditional methodologies as ways of identifying the institutional, historical, and cultural factors that constitute the Olympic Movement both as a political phenomenon in itself and as a dimension of international diplomacy, nation building, and cosmopolitanism.

While traditional Olympic histories and biographies abound, recent Olympic history has sought to place the games within the panoply of social history and has typically adopted a post modern historiography that is both self reflective and cognizant of the philosophical and ideological ingredients in geographical and historical representation. As a result, social histories recognize the Olympics as a response to the human need for identity and agency, as negotiated and invented tradition, and as a significant component of “the life world” (interpersonal structures of meaning and experience relating to self, others, embodiment, time, and space) (Roche 2000).

Olympic anthropology emerged in the context of semiotic and structural anthropologies, of cultural performance theories born from a renewed interest in myth, symbol, and ritual, and of culturalist approaches to national and international phenomena. Carried out in a post Cold War world of increasingly significant transnational identities, the most recent Olympic anthropology reflects and employs postmodern concerns with familiar issues such as the production of national identity on international occasions, traditional compared to modern forms of each, and the recruitment and fate of individual actors in such mass mediated public dramas as the Olympics (MacAloon 1999).

Olympic critical theories include a Marxist critique of the games as a repressive social practice that mirrors the dominant values of capitalism and bourgeois imperialism, Gramscian accounts in which the games are viewed as a significant site at which the dominant ideology is constructed and dominant interests served, and feminist and postcolonial critiques which

have respectively depicted the games as models of masculinism and westernization (Americanization, creolization). Most recent critical accounts view the games as globalized events in which social activist, minority, and specialized local interests are summarily dismissed in the face of a nationalistic entertainment juggernaut that serves the interests of the corporate, political Olympic establishment and in which the values of democracy and social justice are threatened (Lenskyj 2002).

As the focus of a broad range of sociohistorical explorations and theorizations, future sociologies of the Olympics will need to consider a wide variety of interlocking issues including the recognition that politics, ideology, and culture are intertwined discursive formulations, the understanding that the international and the domestic are simultaneously mutually constituting phenomena, the personal and interpersonal meanings attributable to mega events such as the Olympics, the main elements of the Olympics that contribute to the production of a world society (including global governance, global citizenship, economic and cultural globalization, global structuration, mesosocial processes), and the notion of the Olympic Games as “makers of history.”

SEE ALSO: Globalization, Sport and; Nationalism and Sport; Sport and Culture; Sport and the State

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one drop rule

Anthony Lemelle

The one drop rule was a social construction that emerged discursively in US history. The language was first used by the government in the Fourteenth Census in 1920 when the color line was redefined by the Census Bureau. Instead of using the category "mulattoes," the Bureau adopted the one drop rule. According to it, "the term 'white' as used in the census report refers to persons understood to be pure blooded whites. A person of mixed blood is classified according to the nonwhite racial strain." Thus, "a person of mixed white . . . and Negro . . . is classified as . . . a Negro . . . regardless of the amount of white blood" (Bureau of the Census 1923). By 1924 the term one drop rule was also being used in state legislation. For example, in 1924, a Virginia Act for "Preservation of Racial Integrity" defined a white person as someone with "no trace whatsoever of any blood other than Caucasian" (Hickman 1967). And the Virginia legislature in 1930 defined as colored any one "in whom there is ascertainable any negro blood" (Hickman 1967).

The one drop rule became pervasive and courts ruled on it as a principle of law, particularly in the confiscation of property, or in

such codified exclusions as denying legal redress to persons of color. The history of the one drop rule is marked by two major interventions by the powerful in jurisprudential thinking: (1) it was necessary to transform the way blacks were socially identified from skin color to blood content; (2) it was necessary to change the rule of descent from father to child to from mother to child. Accomplishing these two adjustments in the social order allowed white males to benefit from the eventual enactment of the one drop rule. White males benefited most from the mulatto practice leading to the enactment of the rule because it protected them from any responsibility for supporting their children by black women slaves. In fact, the children became property and the slave holders could count them as capital value.

Therefore, the birth of mulattoes provided an economic advantage to both the father, because he did not have to care for his black children, and the mother's slaveholder, because he acquired another slave with a birth to a mulatto. And of course, this whole system encouraged the psychological and physical degradation of the mulatta, not to mention the degradation that was afforded her children for their "condition." Initially the practice and jurisprudence of determining blackness was a matter of observation and not blood content. The goal of creating the mulatto category and the rise of miscegenation law was, as noted black historian Carter G. Woodson remarked, "to debase to a still lower status the offspring of blacks" and to finally leave women of color without protection against white males (Woodson 1925: xv).

In her distinguished study of blacks and the law, Helen Catterall observes that by 1667 in Virginia, "baptism ceased to be the test of freedom and color became the 'sign' of slavery: black or graduated shades thereof. A negro was presumed to be a slave" (Catterall 1968: 57). By the founding of the US, the father of American psychiatry, Dr. Benjamin Rush, had discovered a "cure" for blackness. His therapy was totally concerned with changing the "awful" skin color of blacks through methods like bloodletting and purging through enemas. To Rush, the problem of skin color was in part a problem of blood. He argued that non white skin color was one form of leprosy and the bacterium had obviously contaminated the blood: "Depletion, whether

by bleeding, purging, or abstinence, has been often observed to lessen the black color of negroes" (Rush 1799: 295).

The end of the eighteenth century brought a new discourse that focused on blood and genealogy to explain blackness and this influenced the rise of the eventual one drop rule. For example, in 1785, Virginia legally defined a Negro as an individual with a black parent or grandparent (Davis 1991). Prior to 1785, a mulatto could own up to one half "African blood." With the 1785 law's enactment, anyone having one quarter or more of African blood would be considered a Negro and presumed to be a slave.

A statute passed by the Virginia legislature in 1662, 43 years after the first Africans arrived, shows the early importance of drawing broad boundaries around the Negro race. Undoubtedly in recognition of the fact that most interracial fornication occurred between white men and black women, the law provided: "children got by an Englishman upon a negro woman . . . shall be held bond or free only according to the condition of the mother" (Finkelman 1986: 16). This was a major change in traditional English common law, which held that children follow patriarchal descent (Higginbotham 1978: 44, 194).

This precedence in law had widespread influence in the demarcation of blackness. It provided that children born of a black mother and white father would follow the common law applicable to farm animals (Higginbotham 1978). The law was very explicit about this in its tradition; animals belonged to the owner of the mother of the offspring. In fact, the imagery may have deeper expression in language since the root of the word mulatto derives from the Spanish *mulatto*, the diminutive of *mulo*, which means a mule. Here then, through law, we find a key element in the construction of the tradition of the so called black matriarchy.

The function of the one drop rule was the subjugation of those who came to be defined as black. It increased the number of individuals who would be placed in that category. It developed over a long history of customs, folkways, mores, norms, and juridical developments. Its discursive development was linked to debates about skin color and rights associated with inheritance. But use of the concept of race functioned to subjugate those who fell under its

categorization. This led W. E. B. Du Bois (1986 [1897]) to opine that race "is a vast family of human beings, generally of common blood and language, always of common history, traditions and impulses, who are both voluntarily and involuntarily striving together for the accomplishment of certain more or less vividly conceived ideals of life." However, as English professor Teresa Zackodnik points out, "For Du Bois, blood becomes a metaphor for political commitment, not the carrier of inherent racial traits; racial groups are not natural formations along heritable blood lines but a group of individuals sharing certain loyalties and a degree of common experience while pursuing shared economic, political, and philosophical goals" (2004: 28).

SEE ALSO: Biracialism; Color Line; Double Consciousness; Interracial Unions; Race and the Criminal Justice System; Race (Racism); Racialized Gender; Slavery; Whiteness

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operations management

John Edwards

Operations management is a discipline that is seen by some as caught between the pragmatic and the theoretical. In common with its cognate disciplines such as operational/operations research and information systems – and indeed systems thinking more generally – there is often an uneasy tension between the need to be able to carry out research that leads to generalizable findings and the desire for actions that make an impact in specific cases.

With a field that is practice based, and thus constantly evolving, such as operations management (OM), too precise an attempt at definition can be unhelpful. The definition used here will thus be the one implied from the Academy of Management's Operations Management Division: "the management of the transformation processes that create products or services" (aom2.pace.edu/om/, accessed January 24, 2005). Since every organization offers some kind of product and/or service, it may be seen that the scope of OM is, quite literally, the management of these transformation processes in all organizations. An authoritative and readily accessible source of definitions for the field of operations management is Hill's *Encyclopedia of OM Terms* (www.poms.org/POMSWebsite/EducationResources/omencyclopedia.pdf, accessed January 24, 2005).

It is difficult, if not impossible, to establish a precise starting point for the field of operations management. OM problems have been investigated for centuries, if not millennia. Some trace the discipline of OM back to F. W. Taylor's "scientific management" in the early twentieth century, or indeed the development of interchangeable parts by Eli

Whitney at the beginning of the nineteenth century. As a discipline, however, OM emerged somewhere between the 1940s, when it was certainly being widely pursued, and the 1960s, when the term operations management began to come into widespread use.

The definition above is a very modern one: modern in the sense of "up to date" rather than that of modernist thinking. Two aspects of the definition are significantly different from what might have been seen in a 1970s definition: the inclusion of services and the emphasis upon processes.

The phrase "products or services" in the definition signals probably the most significant change in the field of OM over its history. As indicated above, management of operations as a field of interest was originally identified and then studied in the context of manufacturing industry. As a consequence, OM originally concentrated on manufacturing management, and was generally described either by the latter label or more frequently by the term production management. As the global economy, especially in the industrialized western countries, has come to place an increasing emphasis on service industries, so the importance of studying the management of their operations has correspondingly increased. There has therefore been a fundamental shift in the scope of the field, from a concentration on manufacturing only, to encompass service industries in addition, and indeed to embrace other sectors such as the delivery of health care, which might not always be seen to fall within the "service industry" definition.

This shift has also led to concomitant changes, not always universally agreed, in the terminology of the field. As an illustration, the British Production and Inventory Control Society (BPICS) was founded in the 1960s as the result of the establishment of chapters of the American Production and Inventory Control Society (APICS) in Britain. In 1996, BPICS members voted to change the name of the society to the Institute of Operations Management.

The "manufacturing or service" issue continues to affect the field, particularly in debates as to whether the field should be called production and operations management, or operations and production management, or whether or not operations management includes production management. The assumption here is that

operations management includes production management.

The second major shift encapsulated in the earlier definition stems from the use of the phrase “transformation processes.” OM in the 1960s tended to adopt a functionalist view of the organization. This would be consistent with the pragmatic focus, as most manufacturing companies at that time were structured on the basis of functional hierarchies. Later developments such as total quality management (TQM) and business process reengineering (BPR) fostered a process view of organizations. The principal difference is that the process view looks first at what organizations do rather than how they are structured. This process view has now become part of mainstream thought, not only in OM but also in management more widely, with the processes variously described as business processes, transformation processes, or realization processes, the latter being the term used in the 2001 version of the ISO9000 standard for quality management systems.

CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORKS

The pragmatic nature of the OM field gives free rein in terms of both frameworks and methodologies. To quote from the website of the Production and Operations Management Society (POMS), “the Society’s approach to Production and Operations Management is problem centered; it does not rely on particular methodologies” (www.poms.org/POMSWebsite/About.html#History, accessed January 24, 2005). Note that the term “methodologies” as used in the POMS definition appears also to cover theoretical frameworks. As will be seen in this section, there is an interesting tendency for many of the frameworks to have a geographical association. Pilkington and Liston Heyes (1999) considered whether indeed OM was a discipline at all. They concluded that it was, but that there were significant differences between thinking in different parts of the world.

Given its origins in manufacturing, it is not surprising that one major strand of thinking in OM has always followed a strongly positivist tendency derived from its roots in industrial engineering and engineering management.

Here the paradigm is that of “hard” operations research, management science or systems engineering – a single, agreed objective (at worst, multiple agreed objectives), a well defined system, and non controversial implementation. The challenge in any study is therefore to understand the difficulties and then design an appropriate “solution.”

The pragmatic nature of the field also means that academic OM has found very fertile ground in surveys of practice, generally also from a positivist, hypothesis testing standpoint. Most of the professional societies in OM embrace both academic and practitioner membership, providing academics with useful networks for identifying survey populations and samples.

Independently of the broadening of the scope to embrace service industries, the realization was developing that these approaches were not appropriate for all OM problems. Three of these will be mentioned here: all began during the 1960s, interestingly in different geographical locations – the UK, Scandinavia, and Japan, respectively.

Although it is not now generally associated with an OM label, the OM problems of the petrochemical company ICI were the main stimulus leading to the development by Peter Checkland of his soft systems methodology (Checkland 1999) from the late 1960s onwards. Beginning at about the same time, there came to be a wider appreciation of humanistic, people centered approaches to OM, stemming originally from Scandinavian countries. Here the concerns were again driven by manufacturing, but mainly from the issues of implementation. Swedish companies such as Volvo and Saab were seen as pioneering these approaches – for example in the use of assembly teams rather than a production line specialization approach.

Meanwhile, there was another parallel development, mainly applied in Japan, with an emphasis on participation in the problem identification and solution design activities. This had begun earlier, but came into prominence more gradually. This school of thought was combined with American influences in quality control approaches (Juran 1964) to lead to the development of TQM, as mentioned above, and also led to other areas of progress such as Toyota’s production system (Swamidass 1991).

CURRENT EMPHASES

All of the frameworks mentioned above are still alive and well in current OM. Hard, positivist, single objective approaches, softer, phenomenological approaches, and humanistic, participative approaches may all be found. Volvo even continues to feature in teamworking articles after some 40 years (Van Hootegeem et al. 2004)!

Both quantitative and qualitative approaches are common in current OM, often even within the same project or case study. Naturally, the positivist approaches lend themselves to quantitative measurements. However, any published work focusing on practical considerations is likely to give explicit consideration to human aspects of implementation. An analysis of a case in terms of “people, processes, and technology” is a structure commonly found.

Nevertheless, this consideration of “softer” aspects does not usually go as far as acknowledging the problem as complex in the way that Checkland sees it, let alone further criticisms of “soft” approaches relating to issues such as power and coercion. Systems approaches in OM, as elsewhere, received a boost from the popularity of the book by Senge (1990) and its advocacy of system dynamics, but many who draw on Senge’s work seem to take a much more positivist approach than those using other systems theories.

It remains the case that “outsider” views of OM often perceive only the quantitative side, for example: “in general, operations management uses a quantitative or mathematical approach” (Williams et al. 2004: 26).

The pragmatic nature of OM means that there can be very strong emphases on certain areas for a period, which then fade away, either partially or completely. The latter topics can be fairly categorized as “fads.” Other topics, by contrast, have maintained their importance since OM began, and are likely to continue to do so in the future. Only one example of an article relevant to each area is given here.

At the time of writing, the main “new” areas that are at their peak are e business (Olson & Boyer 2005) and supply chain management, together with knowledge management, although the latter is generally seen as not specifically an OM concern, and therefore somewhat peripheral to the main literature. Areas possibly just

past their peak but still finding their longer term levels include lean manufacturing, agile manufacturing (Guisinger & Ghorashi 2004) and “just in time” (JIT) approaches. More permanent areas include operations strategy (Aranda 2003), systems design (Johansson & Johansson 2004), quality (Sanchez Rodriguez & Martinez Lorente 2004), logistics (van Hoek 2002), teamworking (Van Hootegeem et al. 2004), performance measurement (Melnik et al. 2004), and project management (Zwikael & Globerson 2004). Naturally these permanent areas have evolved over time and have been influenced by management thought in other areas, for example in the way that performance measurement in OM has been influenced by “balanced scorecard” approaches.

A further topic which is at present of concern in several different areas within OM is trust. This can take several forms, including: trust between organizations in a supply chain or an alliance; customer trust in online businesses; and trust between team members (Adler 2003).

METHODOLOGICAL ISSUES AND PROBLEMS

The appropriate relationship between theory and practice for such a practice driven field continues to be a subject for debate within OM. See, for example, the paper by Slack et al. (2004), Slack being the lead author of one of the foremost UK textbooks on OM. Epistemology, however, is rarely explicitly discussed in the OM literature. A literature search carried out on Web of Science in late 2004, for the phrases “operations management” and “epistemology,” yielded no hits at all.

The most preferred approaches for articles currently appearing in journals tend to be either detailed single case studies or large scale surveys. The former show an increasing proportion of interpretive approaches, while the latter continue to be mainly positivist. A significant difficulty is emerging for the latter in the form of “survey overload.” A recent call for papers for a special issue of the *Journal of Operations Management* observed: “Unfortunately, there is considerable anecdotal evidence that practitioner willingness to participate in survey research is declining.” Although this problem is by no

means unique to OM studies, there may be some data sources highly relevant to OM that can be used as alternatives, or for triangulation, for example the increasing number of performance indicators that must be reported publicly, or web based customer rating and self reporting sites.

Partly because of the increase in interpretive approaches, the status of action research is still seen as a current issue in OM (Coughlan & Coughlan 2002), even though Checkland identified the inadequacy of hard systems action research approaches as one of the drivers behind the development of his soft systems methodology. The two main positions are those from the positivist viewpoint who would not see action research as presenting a sufficiently generalizable result, and those who acknowledge that action research has a different epistemology. Coughlan and Coughlan (2002) advocate action research for "its ability to address the operational realities experienced by practising managers while simultaneously contributing to knowledge," but there is perhaps a third position apparent in the literature. This accepts the difference in epistemology and the theoretical benefits, but questions whether many real projects labeled as "action research" actually do contribute to knowledge, as opposed to carrying out what is effectively consultancy for the organization concerned.

FUTURE DIRECTIONS

The two major current areas identified above (e business and supply chain management) point the way to future developments, especially when combined with the continuing theme of teamworking, in a world where those teams are increasingly likely to be virtual. More pervasive and more rapid communications change not only working practices, but also the way in which organizations are structured, and perhaps even conceived. The image of the fixed organization with clearly identifiable boundaries may have to give way to one of a fluid coalition formed for a specific purpose and dissolved when that purpose has been achieved. The transformation processes of such an organization are likely to draw in the organization's

customers and suppliers much more closely. If recent developments such as the explosion in use of the Internet and World Wide Web may be characterized as "e everything," then the next trend that is already visible can be called "m everything," with the m standing for "mobile." The cell phone has already revolutionized communication for business people, teenagers, and soccer hooligans alike. Developments such as radio frequency identification (RFID) tags, at present being pioneered by organizations such as Wal Mart in the US, seem likely to continue these trends further. The likelihood is that there will be increasing convergence between the disciplines (if such they are) of operations management and information systems, as these systems become more and more central to carrying out transformation processes – operations – in all kinds of organizations. Yet as the technology leads to convergence and integration, so the increasing fluidity and virtuality of operations will surely lead to more difficulty in identifying stakeholders and objectives. The tension between "hard" and "soft" approaches is thus likely to continue.

SEE ALSO: Action Research; Fordism/Post Fordism; Knowledge Management; Supply Chains; Taylorism

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opportunities for learning

Adam Gamoran

Central to the sociology of education are questions about how schools operate to produce learning. Sociological models of schooling recognize that school systems are complex organizations, with a technical core consisting of classrooms in which teaching and learning – the core technology of schooling – take place. The concept of opportunities for learning provides a key to answering questions about how schools and classrooms can produce higher rates of learning (educational productivity), and about why some students learn more than others (educational inequality).

The notion is a simple one: students are more likely to learn what they have been taught, and stand less chance of learning what they have not been taught. More generally, the concept of opportunities for learning refers to the content and quantity of curricular materials, activities, and assignments that students encounter in their classrooms; that is, the *manifest curriculum*, as opposed to the *hidden curriculum*. Analysts frequently refer to three dimensions of the manifest curriculum: the *intended curriculum*, which the state or district may set forth, the *enacted curriculum*, which teachers cover in classrooms, and the *achieved curriculum*, what students actually learn (e.g., Smithson & Porter 2004). Opportunities for learning are reflected in the enacted curriculum.

BACKGROUND TO RESEARCH ON OPPORTUNITIES FOR LEARNING

An early use of the concept appeared in Carroll's (1963) "model for school learning." For Carroll, "opportunity to learn" referred to the time available for learning which, when combined with the quality of instruction and student effort and ability, would have a major influence on student performance. Recent writers use the term more broadly to refer not only to time, but also to instructional content and

pedagogy. While a few studies followed up directly on Carroll's model, two subsequent literatures served as major stimuli to research on opportunities for learning: studies of tracking and ability grouping, and international comparative research on educational achievement.

Opportunities for Learning in Research on Tracking

In response to the Coleman Report's findings that student achievement varied far more within schools than among schools (Coleman et al. 1966), sociologists began to explore aspects of schools that contributed to within school achievement inequality. Chief among these was the practice of dividing students for instruction according to their purported interests and abilities into separate groups or tracks. Students assigned to higher status positions learned more, and students in lower status positions learned less over time, even after taking account of differences among students before they were assigned to their tracks. Why did this occur? Researchers have pointed to differentiated opportunities for learning as a major explanation for growing inequality of achievement among students placed in different groups and tracks (Barr & Dreeben 1983; Rowan & Miracle 1983; Gamoran et al. 1995, 1997; Applebee et al. 2003). Teachers in high track groups and classes tend to cover richer material at a faster pace, while teachers in low track classes commonly introduce a more fragmented, slower paced curriculum. In the US and internationally, learning opportunities are embedded in curricular divisions and course sequences (Oakes et al. 1992).

Partly due to their association with tracking, opportunities for learning tend to be differentially available to students from different racial, ethnic, and economic groups (Oakes et al. 1992). When students are divided for instruction on the basis of prior achievement, they are also separated by social background, which tends to be correlated with achievement. Consequently, when opportunities for learning differ across tracks, they differ for students from varied backgrounds. Learning opportunities may also vary from one school to the next, for example when schools with small numbers of high achieving students fail to offer advanced courses such as

middle school algebra or high school physics, calculus, or AP English. This practice also works to the disadvantage of students from minority and low income backgrounds, who are overrepresented in such schools. Schools with predominantly working class populations may also offer less challenging elementary curricula than schools with middle class populations. These school level patterns may be mitigated by a countervailing tendency: even schools with many low achieving students tend to have *some* high level classes, and students from disadvantaged backgrounds have relatively *greater* access to these classes in such schools, apparently due to the lower levels of competition for enrollment. Overall, however, unequal access to valued opportunities for learning is an important dimension of educational inequality for students from varied racial, ethnic, and socioeconomic groups.

Learning opportunities have also played a prominent role in gender inequality, specifically in the gaps between boys and girls in mathematics and science achievement. US based research in the 1980s showed that test score differences among secondary school boys and girls were substantially attributable to differences in mathematics and science course taking (Pallas & Alexander 1983). More recently, gender gaps in both achievement and course taking are smaller, with girls enrolled at equal or higher rates in most advanced courses, and boys' advantage now limited to physics and calculus (US Department of Education 1999). Similar patterns are emerging in other nations (e.g., Croxford 1994).

International Comparisons of Educational Achievement

Another major motivation for research on opportunities for learning has come from research on international comparisons of educational achievement, primarily in the areas of mathematics and science (Floden 2003). Dating at least back to the First International Mathematics Study (Husen 1967), researchers and policymakers have been interested not only in how nations compare in the performance of their students, but also in what some reasons might be for cross national variation. Differences in opportunities for learning were seen as

a prominent possibility, so researchers asked teachers to indicate what proportion of their students had the opportunity to learn each item on the international test. The original purpose of the question was to check whether the common international test was equally appropriate for each country, but the question took on more policy relevance by the time of the Second International Mathematics Study (McKnight et al. 1987), when it was refined to focus on whether the topic reflected by the test item had been covered *in that year*. Even more specific questions were posed to teachers about classroom coverage and other potential sources of opportunities for students to learn content in science as well as in mathematics for the Third International Mathematics and Science Study and its successors, which have been renamed the Trends in Mathematics and Science Study (TIMSS). Generally, countries in which achievement levels are higher also provide more opportunities for students to learn tested content (Floden 2003), leading to speculation that differences *within* countries may also be attributable to differences in students' opportunities for learning (Schmidt et al. 1999). From this literature, the concept of opportunities for learning has emerged as a major policy variable, potentially manipulable as a force to improve achievement levels and reduce inequality.

MEASURING OPPORTUNITIES FOR LEARNING

A major challenge to testing hypotheses about the impact of opportunities for learning on student achievement within countries – and to using opportunities for learning as a policy instrument – is the difficulty of developing powerful measures. While aggregate associations between tested content and average performance are high, the associations are more modest at the individual level within countries (Floden 2003). Moreover, the international studies' approach to measuring "opportunity to learn" focuses exclusively on content topics, whereas the general concept is broader, particularly in its policy use. While early studies in the US focused on time as the indicator of opportunity, more recent concerns emphasize additional elements including time allocated to

specific activities, salience of content areas, cognitive demands in tasks for students, teacher–student interaction in classrooms, the use of homework assignments, and other aspects of teachers' instructional strategies.

In first grade reading, Barr and Dreeben (1983) discovered that a count of the number of new words and phonics to which students were introduced, along with the time spent on these activities, was highly predictive of students' learning over the course of first grade: the more students were taught, the more they learned. Gamoran showed that these measures of opportunity accounted for all of the effects of ability grouping on first grade reading achievement. Rowan and Miracle (1983) similarly demonstrated that one could predict third grade reading achievement by counting the number of stories to which students were exposed in their reading materials. However, as students progress through the grade levels, it becomes increasingly difficult to measure opportunities for learning by simply counting the curricular units to which students have been exposed. Nystrand responded to this challenge by using classroom observations to assess learning opportunities embedded in teacher–student interaction, focusing particularly on whether classroom instruction is "dialogic," involving authentic exchanges of information between teachers and students and among students, instead of recitation of facts and ideas predetermined by teachers. While dialogic instruction predicts learning in English and social studies, and partially accounts for the effects of ability grouping in English (Gamoran et al. 1995; Applebee et al. 2003), it is not as powerful a predictor as curricular units in the early elementary years, and it lacks the content focus of those measures. Observational measures of learning opportunities have the advantage of being objectively rated across a wide range of classrooms, but the high cost of sending observers to classrooms may limit the scale to which this approach can be applied.

Other approaches to measuring opportunities for learning have adopted much more fine grained perspectives. Porter (2002) has used questionnaires to ask mathematics teachers to report their instruction on a grid of 93 mathematics topics (e.g., place value, functions) by six cognitive demands (memorize facts, understand

concepts, perform procedures, collect/interpret data, solve word problems, and solve novel problems). The resulting grid can then be mapped onto an assessment to indicate the degree of alignment between instruction and assessment. Similar schemes have been developed for science (Smithson & Porter 2004), and work is underway on a comparable approach to assessing opportunity in literacy. Gamoran et al. (1997) found that Porter's approach to measuring opportunities predicted learning gains in mathematics, and explained most of the variation between different types of ninth grade mathematics classes (e.g., general math, algebra). Floden (2003) has noted two limitations of the approach: first, completing the survey is demanding and time consuming for teachers; and second, if opportunity is measured according to the alignment between instruction and assessment, that may only be useful information if the assessment is inherently meaningful. Current work by Smithson and Porter (2004) has extended the approach to develop the *Survey of Enacted Curriculum*, a tool for assessing the degree of alignment between state, district, or professional standards, instruction, and assessment. This development provides a way to ensure that the opportunities measured with the teacher survey are indeed meaningful, insofar as they are represented in external standards.

Recent US national surveys have included questionnaires for teachers about their instructional strategies and emphases, and these items have been used as measures of learning opportunities to predict student achievement. National surveys are much less detailed than Porter's (2002) fine grained approach, and one may question whether they have sufficient reliability to serve as adequate measures of opportunity. Burstein et al. (1995) argued that mismatches between measures obtained from year end questionnaires and those from ongoing teacher logs indicated that questionnaire measures tended to be unreliable, although the authors found that questions about time spent in particular activities could be addressed more reliably than questions about general emphases on instructional topics or goals. Mayer (1999) also questioned the reliability of teacher survey measures, but he acknowledged that scales constructed from such measures may have sufficient reliability to be useful. Reviewing

progress in the development of opportunity to learn measures, Floden (2003) commented that just as achievement tests have been developed over several iterations, with more reliable items replacing less reliable ones over time, survey measures of opportunity to learn may also improve with experience.

New international comparative work has also focused on differences in the cognitive demands of instruction and assessment (Klieme & Baumert 2001). This research has identified distinct national profiles of learning outcomes, which are interpreted as reflecting different opportunities for learning present in instructional approaches that vary internationally.

OPPORTUNITIES FOR LEARNING IN AN ERA OF ACCOUNTABILITY: A US EXAMPLE

Opportunities for learning have been examined in many national contexts, with a common focus on the differentiation of opportunities to students of varied backgrounds and destinations (Oakes et al. 1992). The US provides an example of how this research may enter the policy realm.

Issues of opportunities for learning have taken on new salience in the US in light of recent changes in federal education policy. The No Child Left Behind Act of 2001 (NCLB) requires states to set standards for student performance, to assess students according to these standards, and to hold schools accountable for achieving standards. Schools must meet standards not only for the performance of their students on average, but also for a variety of sociodemographic subgroups, including those who – in part due to limited learning opportunities – have traditionally underperformed. If schools are to be held accountable for the performance of *all* students, the goal of creating more equitable opportunities for learning gains increasing prominence. Moreover, if schools are applying sanctions to *students* who fail to meet standards, as is occurring in many districts, questions of fairness may arise if students are being held accountable for learning yet lack the relevant learning opportunities.

As the US standards movement developed from *A Nation at Risk* in the early 1980s

through *Goals 2000* during the 1990s, efforts to balance the federal role with states' rights and the tradition of local control over education included plans to allow states to set content standards for opportunities for learning, overseen by a federal agency that would certify the quality of state standards. This plan was soon abandoned in the face of two major objections. First, states were unwilling to subject their standards to federal oversight, on grounds of both local autonomy and the cost of enforcement. Second, scholars and policymakers alike questioned the strategy of monitoring *input* standards, when *output* standards (i.e., student achievement) were the ultimate goal. After all, even the best measures of opportunities for learning exhibit substantial slippage from opportunities to performance, as has long been recognized in the distinction between the enacted and the achieved curriculum. As Porter (1994: 431–2) noted, “opportunity to learn does not translate directly into student achievement. Schools must provide a quality educational experience, and students must apply themselves.”

The most recent federal legislation, NCLB, does not attempt to legislate opportunities for learning directly. Instead, NCLB's approach to improving learning opportunities is to call for “highly qualified teachers” in every classroom. In particular, NCLB emphasizes subject matter expertise, on the theory that teachers with greater subject matter expertise will provide more rigorous, content focused instruction that will enable students to reach achievement standards. On the one hand, it is hard to argue against teachers having greater subject matter knowledge. On the other hand, only a modest research base supports teacher content knowledge as a lever for change in student achievement. Consequently, the impact of increasing access to “highly qualified teachers” cannot be predicted at this time. The importance of high quality opportunities for learning is also reflected in NCLB's demand for instructional practices that reflect scientific evidence of their effectiveness. Whether such practices can be identified and implemented on a mass scale also remains to be seen.

Sociologists have long recognized that the contribution of schools and schooling to variation in learning among individual students is modest, compared to the importance of family

background (Coleman et al. 1966). Schools produce learning, but variation from one school to another is relatively small compared to the wider variation within schools. Among the elements of schooling that do matter for how much learning schools produce – and why some students learn more than others – opportunities for learning are perhaps the most powerful predictor that has yet been detected. Despite the challenges of measuring opportunities, a variety of viable schemes has been developed, and ongoing research in this area will likely lead to further improvement. Opportunities for learning thus offer potential leverage for policy intervention.

SEE ALSO: Coleman, James; Cultural Capital; Education; Educational Inequality; Globalization, Education and; Hidden Curriculum; Math, Science, and Technology Education; Stratification and Inequality, Theories of; Teaching and Gender; Tracking

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oral sex

Bruce Curtis

Oral sex is broadly defined as oral genital stimulation. Cunnilingus refers to oral vaginal stimulation, fellatio to oral penile stimulation, and anilingus to anal lingual stimulation. Across the sweep of sexual practices in human societies both historically and cross culturally, oral sex figures in an extremely wide variety of forms, themselves valued in very different ways. The focus here is on oral sex within heterosexual relations, but oral sex plays an important part in homosexual relations. In some historical configurations of sexual practices in South Asia, for instance, the tasting of another man's semen was thought to stimulate the desire for heterosexual intercourse. In another configuration, fellatio was seen as a substitute for heterosexual intercourse, something to be received from a eunuch, but certainly not by a man from his wife. In the West, oral sex was often subject to legal prohibitions against "sodomy," both heterosexual and homosexual, and in some states in the US it remains a criminal offense.

The location of oral sex in typical sequences of sexual practice has been immensely variable. Public attention has been focused recently on the shifting place of oral sex in the repertoire of western heterosexual practices. In Victorian erotic literature, cunnilingus or "gamahuching" was presented as both a pleasurable and a contraceptive practice. Authors of English language sex advice and marriage manuals from the early 1900s to the 1940s gradually came to endorse what they called "the genital kiss," initially referring not to fellatio but rather to cunnilingus. This endorsement of cunnilingus stemmed from the commonly held belief that women were far slower to arouse sexually, if they were capable of sexual pleasure at all, than were their husbands. Husbands were counseled to prepare their wives for intercourse by carefully graduated caresses, which could include oral genital contact to encourage lubrication and receptivity.

Before the end of World War I, there was a noticeable absence of discussion of sexual relations except as necessary elements in reproduction. For reasons which remain unclear,

marriage and advice manuals in the period from about 1920 witnessed both a "discovery" of women's sexual pleasure and the invention of sexual foreplay. It is tempting to relate these changes to transformations wrought by women's wartime employment, the relaxation of moral codes in the wake of the war, and the ongoing decline in most western countries in both fertility and infant mortality rates. In any case, advice manuals began to emphasize the importance of female orgasm in the marital sexual relation and to stress the exchange of mutually enjoyable preliminary caresses before intercourse. Heightened emphasis was placed on the acceptability and importance of cunnilingus. It was only sometime after the discovery of women's sexual pleasure and the invention of foreplay that fellatio began to be spoken of approvingly as a marital sexual practice. Women were increasingly portrayed as active participants in foreplay and intercourse, able to give as well as to receive caresses, including fellatio. Still, authors were initially very hesitant about recommending that women engage in the practice and urged caution on them. On the one hand, fellatio had a reputation as a homo sexual practice and wives were warned that they risked unmanning their husbands through the assertive pursuit of the practice. On the other hand, sexual pleasure was still primarily seen as an adjunct to reproduction, and it was feared that fellatio leading to orgasm might lead couples to neglect their social obligations to produce children.

The post war period witnessed an enormously significant change in the evidence made available by a new wave of sexology studies. The Kinsey (1948, 1953) and Masters and Johnson (1966) studies quickly reached a much wider audience which had a thirst for sexual knowledge that was a product of the ongoing sexual responsabilization of adults for the success of their sexual relations, and these studies further legitimized the public discussion of sex. It was into this milieu that the double ideological thrusts of these studies were projected. First, from Kinsey came the emphasis on human sexual variability, which fractured the paradigm that had normalized a single model of heterosexual marital sex outside of which all else was deviant. From Masters and Johnson came the highlighting of an essential similarity in the

sexual responses of males and females; their "human response cycle" eroded the longstanding preoccupation with the differences between the sexes. These studies accentuated the theme that the pursuit of sexual pleasure was important in securing marital stability. From the 1960s oral sex came to be regarded as an act of considerable intimacy which typically followed marriage and intercourse for most heterosexual couples. Alex Comfort epitomized this view through his analogy between the sexual and the culinary arts. Sex, like a good meal, consisted of a number of courses; and one of these would frequently involve mutual oral sex.

The coming of age of the post war baby boom generation coincided with the diffusion of reliable oral contraceptives for women, effective treatments of most sexually transmitted diseases, sustained economic growth, the relaxation of sexual mores, and the elimination by many governments of attempts at regulating non heterosexual marital practices. Popular sex manuals, such as the various versions of Comfort's agreeably illustrated *The Joy of Sex*, provided technical advice and active encouragement for a broad range of mutually accepted hetero and homosexual practices, including all forms of oral sex. Fellatio was publicized and perhaps popularized as well by widely distributed early pornographic films such as *Deep Throat*. By the 1990s, there was a considerable English language market for specialized oral sex instruction manuals. The practice was something every sexually competent person was expected to master. While there are important national and regional variations in the popularity and prevalence of various sexual practices, oral sex has become commonplace in the sexual repertoire of adults and adolescents. These changes are signaled in shifts in the language used to refer to sexual practices and relations. The "petting," "making out," or "snogging" of an earlier period are displaced by "hooking up," which in North America is understood by adolescents to refer to oral sex, especially fellatio. Some adults point to a worrisome fellatio "epidemic," in which teens and at times preteen girls give older, higher status boys unreciprocated "blowjobs" to achieve standing with their peers. Adolescent boys seem less interested in performing cunnilingus. Medical professionals express concern that adolescents believe

unprotected oral sex to be “safe sex,” while in fact the practice may be a transmission vector for disease. Still, in a context of campaigns against HIV/AIDS which privilege condom use as a means of “safe sex,” oral sex can easily be redefined as “not having sex.” Fellatio has been redefined for a majority of the post AIDS generation as casual “outercourse,” in contrast to vaginal penile intercourse, and as a practice compatible with notions both of sexual “abstinence” and “safe sex.”

SEE ALSO: Age, Period, and Cohort Effects; Body and Sexuality; Femininities/Masculinities; Intimacy; Masturbation; Pornography and Erotica; Sexuality; Sexuality and the Law; Sexuality, Masculinity and

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orality

Martin M. Jacobsen

Orality describes cultures or populations whose worldviews, rhetorical principles, and mental constructs develop in the absence of wide spread, systematic, and habitual literacy and also refers to the coexistent or residual presence of orality in habitually literate cultures. Thus, it is necessary to distinguish between primary orality and secondary orality. Primary orality

(and thus primary oral cultures) describes cultures that privilege the spoken word as the only means of social and interpersonal communication, often lacking even a basic orthography. Secondary orality describes the presence of oral and/or pseudo oral elements in habitually literate cultures. Each of these will be discussed in more detail.

Much early work on orality is grounded in the literary concept of the “oral tradition,” a literary term used to postulate the state of important western narratives prior to their being written down. Most of the discussion focused on elements in the written versions that reflected the rhetorical aspects of spoken discourse, for instance, the use of stock phrases. Later work by psychologists, sociologists, anthropologists, folklorists, and other social scientists drew on data and observation drawn from actual populations participating in an oral lifeworld in the Balkans, the former Soviet Union, Australia, Africa, and other places. These studies confirmed much of the speculative work of earlier theorists but also exposed gaps in the literary analysis. Together, these approaches codify orality.

The most influential figure in the study of orality is Walter J. Ong, whose landmark book *Orality and Literacy* (1982) popularized the concept of orality across many disciplines. Ong draws together the literary and social scientific sources concerned with orality to that point in time in a remarkably brief but comprehensive way and then discusses how literacy emerged from orality. The concept of primary and secondary orality delineated in his work will underlie those definitions here.

Intellectual, psychological, cultural, and linguistic paradigms in primary oral cultures differ significantly from those of a habitually literate society. Ong’s inventory of characteristics for a primary oral culture abstracts the nature of such a culture, linguistically, rhetorically, intellectually, and socially. Linguistically, the grammar of primary orality tends toward parataxis, which Ong calls “additive rather than subordinative” (1982: 37–8), repetition or the “redundant” inclusion of what was just said (pp. 39–40), and aggregation or the use of clichés and other stock phrases (pp. 38–9).

Rhetorical practices are immediate, concrete, and communal. It may seem difficult to reconcile

Ong's assertion that primary oral cultures are "agonistically toned" (pp. 43–5) with the argument that rhetorical practices are communal. The point is, however, that the agonistic nature of face to face confrontation requires the participants to actually be face to face. In a literate culture, challenges and claims are often made in writing (or by telephone). The idea of confrontation is lessened by the fact that the writer is not there to question and the recipient is not immediately able to respond. Perhaps less peculiar is Ong's claim that primary orality is "empathetic and participatory" (pp. 45–6), meaning that a person cannot participate if absent and does not know the story unless able to see the storyteller. In such a context even the act of confrontation is the hallmark of a communal system, in that such an agonistic tone requires the co presence of foes.

Intellectually, Ong argues that primary oral culture observes a number of guiding principles that seem out of place in a habitually literate society. The absence of writing affects the importance of memory to the culture. The primary oral culture tends to be "homeostatic" (pp. 46–9): constantly purging memories so that intellectual space can remain available for use in the here and now. Thus, words seldom have layers of meaning because they are not objects stored in dictionaries where they can be retrieved, revived, or expanded upon. Homeostasis is a natural fit, then, with the more "traditionalist" (pp. 41–2) lifestyle of the primary oral culture. Learning new ideas in a literate culture is not threatening because the old ideas are only a few pages away at any moment, much like the words in the dictionary. In a primary oral culture, traditional beliefs and practices sustain and are sustained by a citizenry that finds experimentation risky. Even the most basic lifestyle requires considerable mental activity, and knowing what one knows provides comfort and stability. Clearly, the traditionalist approach is concomitant with Ong's theory that primary orality is "situational rather than abstract" (pp. 49–57), meaning that ideas are interpreted as living things needed to encounter daily challenges rather than objects stored and available for use through a recall process. Every situation presents as a total experience (like the action in an oral epic – foregrounded and completely delineated). Thus, in Ong's view,

primary oral cultures do not need advanced mathematical or logical systems, elaborate and refined definitions, or even a well delineated concept of themselves. Rather, as Ong states, the lifestyle in a primary oral culture is "close to the human lifeworld" (pp. 42–3); that is, the members of such a community are little concerned with anything outside their physical ability to perceive. Their lives are immediate – concerned with what happens here and now. Habitually literate cultures, especially post industrial societies of the first world, live highly mediated lives and are concerned with abstractions such as past and future, so consumed by signs that an authentic experience may pass unnoticed, or worse, need to be put into some series of signs before existing at all. Primary oral cultures live in the moment and space that they inhabit.

Ong accounts for the presence of orality in habitually literate cultures with the term secondary orality. Secondary orality describes the way in which traditionally oral situations in literate cultures mimic orality but are based on textual practices. For instance, oral events that are recorded, televised, conducted by telephone, or otherwise mediated by technology render the spoken word into a transmitted text. Even the act of recitation is secondarily oral because of its basis in a written text that is then memorized word for word (a concept somewhat foreign to primary oral culture because there are no texts to memorize). Further, much of the orality disseminated through technological means derives from written foundations such as scripts. In fact, one theorist (Killingsworth 1993) argues that literate cultures have reached the point of secondary literacy, which encodes secondary orality in written form or perhaps even lessens the need for writing because so many avenues of technologically assisted orality exist. For example, the notion and practice of "voicemail" exhibits the developing nature of both secondary orality and secondary literacy.

Some theorists argue that comparing orality to literacy, or, in effect, seeing the former through the latter, reflects the bias of the literate perspective and derogates primary oral culture. This bias is shown through the use of a term such as "preliterate," implying that literacy is the touchstone rather than seeing literacy as an encoding of the spoken word and a symbolic

expression of the oral foundation of human language. "Oral literature" suggests that the cultural space occupied by narrative in primary oral culture must be validated by being named literature, even though the very word literature denies the nature and importance of narrative in oral societies. Moreover, the concept of illiteracy is sometimes confused with primary orality, even though they are completely unrelated because illiteracy can only exist in cultures with widespread, systematic, and habitual literacy. This false comparison further disparages primary oral cultures by suggesting they could write and decide not to learn. A primary oral culture has no writing system to learn.

While comparing orality to literacy may very well diminish or derogate primary orality, literate cultures are as bound by their need to make the comparison as oral systems are by their inability to do so. It is difficult to escape the irony of our learning about orality through books, articles, transcripts, and other written means or through recordings of oral systems. These render the oral act the theorist hopes to capture secondarily oral because the oral event is trapped in a textual form and elaborated as a text, usually accompanied by other texts that explain, refine, or contextualize it. What Ong calls the "evanescent" (p. 32) nature of sound – that it disappears as soon as it is produced – becomes permanent, therefore changing its nature. This is similar to the idea that "saving" a language means "giving it an alphabet" and "writing it down," which changes the nature of that language.

The current research trends regarding orality are puzzling. Scholars continue to examine classical texts for evidence of the oral tradition that preceded their written analogues. Literary theorists are examining the way orality is elaborated in written literary texts of virtually every period and genre, both in the West and beyond. Both of these enterprises are in many ways an examination of secondary orality. There is also some interest in orality among African, Native American, and other tribal or postcolonial peoples; however, even some of this work is being done by examining evidence of orality in texts, rather than by listening to the primary oral cultures. Attempts to codify and standardize contact languages such as pidgins and creoles offer an interesting interstitial domain between

orality and the advent of literacy; however, little attention has been given to this area.

Areas of possible interest for researchers interested in orality include the nature of the "home" language spoken by many in bilingual situations, where the person's written language is a second language and the home language is a first language and is often used in a primary oral situation, something of a reverse of the contact language issue. Anthropologists and others study primary oral cultures for a variety of linguistic (often sociolinguistic) reasons. However, interest in primary orality remains limited or perhaps assumed as a characteristic of the culture but not considered interesting as a focus of study. Further, some may see the question of orality and literacy as too prejudicial to oral communities to approach. Much of the theory elaborated here borders on the concept of linguistic relativity (if not linguistic determinism) based on the mode of expression rather than grammatical structures. This may spark a backlash among theorists who suspect the pejorative and hegemonic potential of the linguistic relativity hypothesis may serve to demean primary oral culture.

Finally, the immediacy of communication in every form facilitated by the Internet has led to inevitable comparisons to the immediacy of orality. While some work has been done in this area, no definitive or perhaps even adequately critical examination has emerged, perhaps because scholars have focused more attention on the way in which computer mediated communication influences textuality. The relationship between orality, literacy, and computer mediated discourse has received some critical analysis and stands as another potential area of interest.

SEE ALSO: Discourse; Globalization, Education and; Literacy/Illiteracy; Mass Culture and Mass Society; Mass Media and Socialization; Media; Media and Globalization; Media Literacy

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organization theory

Royston Greenwood

Organization theory is concerned with organizations, the relationship between organizations and their environment, the effects of those relationships upon intra organizational functioning, and how organizations affect the distribution of privilege within society. A central concept is *organizational form*. The ability of societies to respond to social and economic problems depends upon the availability of diverse forms. Organization theorists are thus interested in the range of organizational forms, their capabilities and consequences, in how new organizational forms arise and become established, and in who controls them for what purposes.

Although the origins of organization theory reside in the early twentieth century, especially in the contributions of scientific management, classical management theory, and Weberian analysis of bureaucracy, organization theory as a discipline is better traced to the late 1950s and early 1960s. The discipline contains multiple theoretical perspectives that provide a rich array of approaches and insights. Two foundational perspectives are *structural contingency theory* and the *behavioral theory of the firm*. The former focuses upon the alignment of organization form and environmental context, answering which forms are effective in which contexts. The latter focuses upon how alignment and adaptation might happen.

Prior to the 1960s, “bureaucracy” was regarded as the most efficient organizational form because it imbued organizations with technical rationality. Beginning in the late 1950s, a series of studies showed that the relevance of the Weberian model was “contingent” upon the degree of task uncertainty, complexity, and organizational size. Burns and Stalker (1961), for example, found the bureaucratic form effective only in stable and predictable environments. In unpredictable contexts, loosely structured “organic” forms are more successful. Chandler (1962) traced how diversification strategies affect the appropriateness of particular structural arrangements by increasing decision making complexity. Pugh et al. (1968) measured organizational structures and produced a taxonomy of forms associated with (caused by) contingencies of size, age, technology, and uncertainty.

The term structural contingency theory thus defines organizational form as dependent upon situational contingencies. Researchers in this tradition seek to identify differences in organizational forms and to understand which forms are appropriate for which circumstances. Noticeably, the focus of contingency analysis is the individual organization, the dependent variable is organizational structure (form), the determining variables (size, environment, strategy) are economic (technical) in nature, and a diversity of organizational forms is anticipated. Further, the imagery is rationalistic with organizations portrayed as mechanically adjusting to technical exigencies in pursuit of economic goals. Missing is any recognition that organizations have difficulties either identifying which contingencies are important or in selecting appropriate responses. Nor is there recognition that changing structures to achieve fit might be problematic.

Structural contingency theory dominated thinking about organizations well into the 1970s and developed in two directions: strategic choice theory and configuration theory. *Strategic choice theory* challenges the idea that organizations are determined by their contingencies and that executives have minimal discretion in selecting organizational forms. Decision makers occasionally have the power to manipulate their environments (a thesis elaborated as resource dependency theory, discussed below).

Moreover, perceptions are an intervening link between contingencies and organizational actions (see sensemaking theory, below). *Configuration theory* emphasizes that strategies, structures, and processes are underpinned and given coherence by resilient core values, making change difficult to achieve. Further, organizational forms are not free floating assemblages of structures and processes easily discarded or rearranged; they are tightly aligned patterns of dynamic routines that work *against* change.

A second foundational perspective is the behavioral theory of the firm. Cyert and March (1963) explored how individuals use simplifying decision rules to model and cope with complexity. Decision making is thus “boundedly rational.” Bounded rationality acknowledges the intendedly rational behavior of organizational actors, whilst recognizing cognitive limitations and the high costs of information search. Unlike structural contingency theorists, who sought to understand which organizational forms matched contingent situations, Cyert and March (1963) sought to understand how organizations adapt to their environments. The image is of organizations as intendedly adaptive systems struggling to cope with complex and ambiguous information. Further, organizations are composed of participants with different preferences, leading to contested goals. Portrayed in this manner, the key managerial challenges are computational (how to handle uncertainty) and political (how to secure cooperation).

Central to the theory is the idea of learning achieved through organizational routines. Subsequent research has drawn an important distinction between routines that enable learning within a prevailing set of parameters (single loop learning) and double loop learning, where the organization breaks from existing assumptions. Unlike structural contingency theory, which assumes that adaptation to changing circumstances is non problematic, research in the behavioral tradition shows that most organizational learning is essentially conservative.

Structural contingency theory and the behavioral theory of the firm share the idea that there is an environment “out there,” to which organizations respond. Weick (1995) shifted this emphasis, offering a *sensemaking theory* of how organizations relate to their contexts. This theory denies that contexts are detached from

organizations. The shift is from seeing the problem as one of information processing to one of understanding how managers socially construct their world. Managers build “mental models” that shape how they think about their industry and understand possible courses of action. How such mental models develop, how they shape behavior, how they constitute organizational routines, and how they can change, remain important questions. Weick also introduced the idea that organizations *enact* their contexts. That is, sensemaking concurrently involves reflection (often retrospective) and action to “test out” tentative and incomplete understandings. But actions shape contexts, bringing them into being, thus “confirming” emergent mental models. Weick’s thesis anticipates Giddens’s notion of structuration, albeit at the level of the organization.

A fundamentally different theory addresses a logically prior question: why do organizations exist at all? *Transaction cost theory* (Williamson 1981) points to market failures as the reason for organizations. The theory assumes that the motivation of managers is to maximize profits and that their efforts are constricted by uncertainty (e.g., the inability to draft contracts that fully anticipate future circumstances) and opportunities for opportunistic behavior (e.g., where a party to an exchange invests in an asset that cannot easily be used elsewhere and thus becomes dependent upon its users). Unanticipated disagreements and investments in specific assets are managed by incorporating activities into an organization, using hierarchy rather than markets as the governance mechanism. Transaction cost theory resonates with recent interest in the disaggregation of vertically integrated firms.

Structural contingency theory and the behavioral theory of the firm assume that organizations adapt to their contexts. *Resource dependence (R/D) theory* (Pfeffer & Salancik 1978) takes a different stance, proposing that organizations seek to control their environments by not becoming overdependent on other organizations for resources necessary for organizational survival, whilst creating and exploiting situations where organizations are dependent upon them. Resources are both material (e.g., finance, labor, supplies) and symbolic (e.g., social approval). Building alliances, engaging in joint ventures, and using interlocking board directorates are

examples of how organizations seek to manage their resource dependencies.

The central insight of resource dependence is that the relationship between context and organization is not unidirectional but reciprocal. However, although organizations can act individually or collectively (e.g., through associations or the professions), only modest attention has been given to how organizations act collectively, possibly missing the more dramatic instances of how organizations shape societal institutions and public policies. A second contribution of the theory is its explanation of why some groups have power within organizations. Power resides with those subunits best able to handle critical external dependencies.

The above theories provide insights into how organizations understand, enact, and respond to their "environments." The environment is understood as an economic context, comprising consumers, competitors, suppliers, and, to a lesser extent, regulators who set the rules of the marketplace. Organizations are portrayed as social systems responding to contextual factors in pursuit of collective ends. *Neo institutional theory* expands the meaning of environment and questions the functionalist tone of earlier theories. Meyer and Rowan (1977) observed that within any given industry, organizations use similar organizational forms because social conventions prescribe socially acceptable ways of doing things. Organizations conform because doing so provides social legitimacy and enhances survival prospects. Neo institutional theory thus advises that organizations are not simply production systems but social and cultural systems embedded within an "institutional" context, comprising the state, professions, interest groups, and public opinion. Importantly, institutionalized prescriptions are enduring and often taken for granted. One consequence is that organizations founded in the same era tend to adopt and retain organizational forms fashionable in their early years. This idea of "organizational imprinting" contradicts the logic of structural contingency theory. Importantly, neo institutional theory implies that organizational forms, patterns of control, and distributions of benefits are not derived from immutable laws of "markets" but are outcomes of socially constructed, institutionalized conventions and beliefs. Market structures are institutionally

defined and thus institutions frame and legitimate outcomes of those structures.

During the 1980s and early 1990s, considerable effort was applied to confirming the effects of institutional processes, especially patterns of diffusion. Less attention was given to coercive processes (associated with the state) or normative processes (associated with the professions), reflecting a neglect of important power structures. The late 1990s heralded a shift in emphasis in favor of understanding institutional change and the emergence of new organizational forms. Current research acknowledges the importance of motivated agency ("institutional entrepreneurship"), correcting the previous imagery of institutional determinism. Further, it is more openly examining how institutional structures embed patterns of privilege and power and suppress and/or disadvantage certain interests.

Typically, institutional research describes *field level* processes, contrary to previous theories that focused upon individual organizations. Fields consist not only of organizations using similar organizational forms to deliver a given set of services or goods, but also suppliers of resources, consumers, and regulatory agencies. Field level analysis draws attention to processes of structuration. That is, organizations are constrained by institutional prescriptions, but, in acting out those prescriptions, reproduce and translate them, sometimes imperfectly. The imagery, then, is of organizations responding to institutionalized expectations and, in so doing, amplifying, elaborating, and modifying them. New organizational forms can thus arise by accidents of translation or deliberate insurgence as disadvantaged interests seek change.

Population ecology appeared at the same time as neo institutional theory and rapidly developed into one of the most rigorous approaches within organization theory (Hannan & Freeman 1977). It is concerned with the variety of organizational forms and regards organizational survival as the product of fit between organizational forms and, primarily, market forces. The theory is distinctive in two ways. First, ecological theories are interested in why organizational forms per se (not individual organizations) become established and survive or decline. A core idea is that forms best aligned to given contextual locations flourish. Less well aligned

forms disappear. Second, changes in context pose survival challenges because managers are unable to change organizations quickly enough. Movement between organizational forms is thus highly problematic. Instead, organizations using a particular form cease to exist as environmental shifts render the form inappropriate. By highlighting the difficulties of achieving change, ecologists are at the opposite extreme to structural contingency theory and distant from resource dependence. Nevertheless, ecological theories echo the basic assumption of those theories, that organizational forms survive to the extent that they match the exigencies of the economic context.

Ecological theory emphasizes that the ability of organizations to achieve radical change is low. Nevertheless, some organizations exhibit adaptive behavior. Hence, recent research seeks to understand how environmental factors interact with organizational forms, affecting the rates at which existing forms prosper and new forms arise, and the rates at which existing forms mutate. *Evolutionary theory* emphasizes three things: classification of organizational forms to identify their defining features; attention to the mechanisms by which organizational forms are "isolated" and retain their distinctiveness; and the interactions between organizations and their environments that enable them to explore new forms of adaptation. In other words, evolutionary theory portrays organizational alignment and adaptation as the balance or imbalance between genealogical processes that reproduce existing practices whilst allowing for organizational learning and ecological processes that shape survival rates. The implicit assumption is that efficiency considerations drive selection of organizational forms.

The shift in level of analysis displayed by institutional and ecological theories, from organizations to organizational fields and populations, is also found in *network theory*. The study of networks flourished in the 1990s, partly arising from the desire to understand the success of geographical locations such as Silicon Valley and the Japanese *keiretsu*. Three distinct streams of research can be identified. One approach focuses upon the topography of links ("ties") connecting organizations. In this approach the network is a structure of resource opportunities which organizations differentially

access by their connections and positions within the network (e.g., Burt 1992). This way of looking at networks has a clear affinity with resource dependence theory. A second approach, closer to institutional theory, sees organizations not as taking advantage of a network but as being shaped by it. Research in this tradition explores how ideas and practices disseminate through networks resulting in convergence around a limited range of organizational forms. A third approach conceptualizes networks as embedded relationships. These studies focus upon how networks are constructed and the consequences of networks, such as their ability to innovate.

The difference between networks as relationships and networks as opportunities is significant. Those who regard networks as structures of opportunities see benefits arising from the diversity and pattern of an organization's ties. The relational approach, in contrast, sees benefits arising from social norms that enable coordination and cooperation between organizations by removing the fear of opportunism in economic exchanges. An organization's advantage is thus a function of the normative strength of the network in which it is embedded. This distinction is important because it redefines the concept of organizational form. That is, although interest in networks began by depicting networks as context and thus as a determinant of organizational form, recent research treats networks as organizational forms in their own right.

The dominant theme reflected in the above theories is understanding the relationship between organizations and their contexts. Central questions concern the reasons for diversity in organizational forms, the extent to which organizations are contextually determined (whether by economic and/or institutional forces), whether and to what extent organizations are capable of adaptation, and, if so, how that occurs. These themes resonate within structural contingency theory, the behavioral theory of the firm, institutional theory, resource dependence, ecological and evolutionary theories. Missing from these accounts is systematic attention to issues of power and consequences. Insofar as consequences are considered, it is in terms of efficiency, innovative capability, or the speed of decision making. There is an implicit assumption that organizations are instruments of

collective effort whose consequences are beneficial. *Critical theory* takes a fundamentally different and more radical stance.

Critical theory asks, who controls organizations and for whom? The theory has several disparate strands but its focus upon power and distributive outcomes is a longstanding theme in organization theory (Clegg & Dunkerley 1980). The theory proposes that organizations be regarded as instruments of political exploitation with distributive consequences. Perrow (2002), for example, sees the large modern corporation not as a response to functional pressures but as the means by which elite interests preserve and enhance positions of privilege. Critical theory, in this form, is inspired by Karl Marx, not, as are most organization theories, by Max Weber. As such, the theory reinterprets much organization theory. For example, it sees networks as mechanisms by which class interests are nurtured and sustained. It treats taken for granted institutional prescriptions not as processes for coping with ambiguity but as hegemonies of ideas serving particular interests. Similarly, it regards organizational forms not as responses to economic requirements but as socially constructed means of generating resources and opportunities and for sustaining their (unequal) distribution. Critical theorists thus question whether organizational forms are a "natural" response to contextual exigencies; instead, they portray organizational forms as expressions of power. A more modest version of critical theory points not to the hidden hand of elite, class interests but to the unequal distribution of benefits within organizations and the marginalization of certain interests (e.g., those of women, lower level employees, ethnic minorities).

The range of perspectives within organization theory continues to grow. For some, the result is confusion rather than coherence, even though attempts are being made to combine or compare perspectives. Others criticize the relative solitudes of North American and non North American scholarship. There is, thus, no organization theory per se, but a fertile array of complementary, competing, and enlightening insights into one of the most significant societal constructs: the modern organization.

SEE ALSO: Bureaucracy and Public Sector Governmentality; Critical Theory/Frankfurt

School; Institutional Theory, New; Management Theory; Networks; Organizational Contingencies; Organizational Learning; Organizations as Social Structures; Organizations and the Theory of the Firm; Organizations as Total Institutions; Power, Theories of; Strategic Management (Organizations); Weber, Max

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organizational careers

Catherine Paradesse

Everett Hughes (1958), the leader of the so-called Second School of Chicago, noticed that life in any society is ordered partly according to individual choices, and this order is partly institutionalized. Over time, individual choices in partly institutionalized environments build social careers. In that sense everyone experiments with a social career, even though this remains to a certain extent unconscious and unseen. A career has a subjective facet, moving with the career itself. It is the way in which someone sees her life as a whole and interprets the meaning of the various attributes, actions, and occurrences that happen through life. It also has an objective facet, consisting of a series of social statuses. In modern societies, social order largely derives from interaction between persons and their work. An individual career has been first objectively described as a sequence of jobs, orderly or otherwise, that originates from early socialization and education and has consequences for status. Socialization generates capabilities, social capital, and aspirations that qualify one for a work career. In industrial societies, prestige, power, and wealth in society at large are in turn strongly shaped by work careers.

Careers develop inside, outside, or between organizations. The number and size of bureaucratic organizations have increased with the rise of modern society. During the twentieth century, large private and public organizations shaped orderly career patterns by developing internal labor markets. Organizational careers developed at the point between individual capabilities and aspirations and occupational routes built into organizations. At the end of the century, downsizing and flexibilization of firms led to changes in the role of organizations in the building of individual work career paths.

FROM ORGANIZATIONAL CAREERS. . .

A number of social science disciplines focus on the various perspectives opened up by the dual nature of careers.

Psychology stresses the subjective facet of careers. It centers on "people looking for jobs." In *Careers in Organizations*, Hall (1976) defines career as the individually perceived sequence of attitudes and behaviors associated with work related experiences and activities over the span of a person's life. Early studies on organizational careers started in the 1950s in the Department of Education, Psychology, and Philosophy of the University of Columbia. Scholars such as Roe (1956) and Super (1957) developed an interest in personal mobility behavior in organizations. Psychology understands career as a subjective personal history relating individual vocational interests, internalized career images, rational choice of an occupation, and actual work experience. It embraces topics regarding the process of career choice, the passage through career stages, and the attributes of career effectiveness (psychological success, performance, adaptability, identity). It explores questions such as career motivation, loyalties, and commitment within organizational settings.

Administrative science and institutional economics look at the other side of the coin, jobs looking for persons. They describe career structures as regulated administrative processes of workforce allocation into positions, with the purpose of inducing performance. They scrutinize the building of career patterns by organizations through recruitment, promotion, demotion, and succession rules. They treat rules as a set of incentives to employees. The function of rules is to regulate an adequate provision of organizational capabilities in relation to scarcity and quality of the labor force. The open market can provide an unskilled labor force that does not require investment in costly specific training and does not ensure upward mobility. On the other hand, skilled labor is costly, usually combining formal training and learning by experience, and may be scarce. As first noticed by Weber in *Economy and Society* (1921), one way to solve the problem of adequate provision of a qualified workforce is by "mutual appropriation" of employees and employers within organizations. Mutual appropriation (or labor market closure) is based on mutual benefit. It favors loyalty rather than exit or voice. Employers exchange incentives such as differentials in salaries, marginal benefits, and the promise of upward intraorganizational mobility for their

employees' faithfulness and dedication. Psychologists analyze such an exchange as a relational contract (Rousseau 1995). Institutional economists conceptualize the frame for orderly intraorganizational careers as internal labor markets, defined as "administrative units, such as a manufacturing plant, within which the pricing and allocation of labor is governed by a set of administrative rules and procedures" (Doeringer & Piore 1971).

It took some time for sociology to overcome the limitations built into the Weberian ideal type of bureaucratic career. This concept was extensively used in sociological research during the 1950s to analyze topics such as the patterns of industrial bureaucracy, social mobility in industrial society, and bounded rationality in organizations. Wilensky (1961) insisted that to be precise, the concept of career should be restricted to individual progression within an organization. Yet another trend led to approaching careers as interaction processes between individuals and organizations (or occupations), sustained by continuous socialization and adjustment experienced by mobile individuals.

Miller and Form's *Industrial Society* (1951) stressed career as a socialization process, adjusting individuals to their social and occupational environment. Hughes (1958) and his students exploited a similar vein later on in Chicago, aiming to relate the objective and subjective facets of career. Following the life history methods developed by Thomas and Znaniecki to study *The Polish Peasant* (1918), they concentrated on producing extensive empirical monographs on all kinds of occupations, from the most prestigious, such as medical doctors, to the most modest or marginal, like nurses, schoolteachers, or jazz musicians. When studying an individual's career, they not only addressed socialization at the early stage of the working life, they also explored roles and status building at each stage of the career as a continuous reconstruction of the meaning of work. They showed that career development went along with discovering new work contents and possibly leaving one's central occupational activity to fill higher managerial positions. While labor markets are not all socially organized to the same extent, they each follow rules and conventions that are neither fully conscious nor formally set. When studying occupational

(rather than organizational or professional) careers, the Chicago sociologists aimed to discover these norms even when not expressed in bureaucratic terms. Taking socialization processes and occupational norms together, they stressed the interdependency of careers and the social worlds in which they are embedded. Careers are shaped by (and shape) these worlds' conventions. Formal and informal rules and conventions are critical for social order in modern societies because they relate two time scales. They link institutional patterns developed at the generally stable time scale of society to conscious and unconscious choices in the short time scale of the life of a human career. Careers express the dialectics between generality and uniqueness in social life.

Most pioneer works on careers also paid attention to organizations, as they appeared as the settings in which most careers develop (Glaser 1968). In the 1970s, organizational behaviorists at the Leadership Center of the MIT Sloan School of Management planned to elaborate "organizational careers" as a specific field. This interdisciplinary concept integrating both the individual and organizational side of careers would deal with the subjective and objective aspects of all stages in the work life, whatever the social status or the type of organization. It would help in building optimal careers for individuals and aid organizations by matching individual characteristics and organizational environment. This perspective is based on a functionalist psychological trait factor theory. Individuals are supposed to possess objective personality traits whose measurement could favor their adaptability to given environments (Van Maanen 1977; Shein 1978). Organization theory continues exploring the dual nature of careers, for instance building integrated models predicting actual mobility patterns by accounting for individual level and organizational level variables and their interaction (Vardi 1980).

Wilensky's (1961) criticisms of the Chicago concept of career exhibit the path favored by organizational career theory in the 1970s and 1980s. It focused research on particular white collar managerial, technical, and professional careers. Careers are identified with upward intraorganizational mobility, where the notion of "orderly career" makes sense. It neglects considering people who, for whatever reason,

do not experiment with orderly careers and total dedication to their organizational work. Explanatory variables basically link career differentiation to organizational factors. This approach pays no attention to the embeddedness of work careers in a variety of concrete social worlds. The latter are conceptually reduced to an all embracing environment. For instance, research on female careers remained rare until the 1990s. Women at work were paid no real attention for what they were (for instance, a major source of administrative labor force in firms) or in relation to the career tracks they were (not) offered. Women were mostly considered through the lenses of their conflicting roles as wife, mother, and employee and the implied ways of solving the dilemmas (Crouter 1984; Silberstein 1992).

...TO BOUNDARYLESS CAREERS

The interest in organizational careers theory arose with human resource problems specific to the "new industrial state" analyzed by Galbraith in his 1971 book of that title. Performance was based on the management of the internal labor market in large, stable, multidivisional firms. Employees weigh up intraorganization career opportunities according to the current and likely forthcoming value of incentives they offer. Human resource management thus builds a winner-winner game involving individuals and organizations. Organizational careers offer a life goal to individuals looking for identity, security, and increasing rewards through work. Organizations are protected from qualitative and quantitative manpower shortages by pooling faithful, trustworthy, and competent human resources to fill vacancy chains within their boundaries.

As described by Arthur (1994), the concept of boundaryless careers reciprocally refers to a new principle of management based on individualization of rewards and flexibility of jobs. By associating corporate restructuring and downsizing with subcontracting of expertise outside the core competencies of firms, human resource management opens the way to decreased job security within organizations. Organizations lose interest in managing career tracks, because they have lost the structural stability and job content continuity that made this a solution to human

resource management (Peiperl et al. 2002). The focus of research on intraorganizational issues raised by managerial, professional, and hierarchical careers minimized the gap between subjective and objective career views. The divergence between individual and organizational orientations reopens this gap. Individuals now have to take care of what the organizations had previously secured: their continuous marketability on the objective side of their career and the meaning of work on the subjective side.

The theory of boundaryless careers relates to the transition from industrial to professional rationality in organizations. In *The Rise and Fall of Strategic Planning* (1994), Mintzberg argues that lower status internal labor markets characterizing "machine bureaucracies" shrink and leave the field to flexible neo Taylorist organizations. When they do not outsource the labor force to the external labor market, they offer new forms of stabilization based on internal flexibility, experience built capabilities, and highly horizontal intrafirm mobility contrasting with former upward routes. "Professional bureaucracies" decline in favor of new "ad hoc organizations." Instead of allocating standardized certified skills to tasks by way of rigid organizational norms, ad hoc organizations aim at adjusting technically specific skills to given short term projects requiring cooperation between rapidly evolving capabilities, largely built by experience outside formal training. Valuable people become those who can work with different persons in various places (Gadrey & Faiz 2002).

Most career research assumed in the 1980s and early 1990s that "organizations cause careers." If organizational careers are no longer feasible, individuals must find new routes to market ability and work meaning. Careers become non foreseeable, non linear, non hierarchical. A new research agenda is needed to deal with the "crisis of careers" by turning the problem the other way round. Careers impact organizations as much as the reverse. It is of little theoretical interest to consider career as a sequence of positions. What makes sense is that employment is a vehicle for individuals to accumulate both explicit and tacit knowledge. For organizations, it offers an opportunity to develop capability, cooperation, and competition (Hall et al. 1996).

In that sense, “careers cause organizations.” The more specialized the skills, the more sticky the knowledge, the more critical the recruitment of the right person at the right time and place.

Independent careers, like professions or traditional skilled manual work dedicated to personal services, develop outside organizational boundaries. The external market regulates a large proportion of low skill jobs. Skilled jobs, on the contrary, come to be largely embedded in internal, intraorganizational labor markets. Career tracks afford personal security and promotion by withdrawing employees from the market. Increasing job complexity, skill requirements, and rapidity of knowledge obsolescence in quality based performance now lead to a stress on achievement through horizontal interorganizational mobility rather than intraorganizational advancement. Hierarchical ladders are broken (Osterman 1996). Work identities are withdrawn from organizations. The value of highly skilled occupations is defined by external occupational markets of qualities, where individuals compete by networking and building reputation (Granovetter 1973). New, highly skilled occupational markets bring back uncertainty. Bennett proclaimed *The Death of the Organization Man* (1990). Salaried employees leave the organization to become freelance “portfolio workers” with “portable” skills that are hired for short term jobs (Cohen & Mallon 1999). Continuous acquisition of knowhow maintains skills. Embeddedness in occupational networks maintains reputation. Taken together, they preserve employability. Individuals build their own careers by self organizing weak environments. From bounded to boundaryless careers, the psychological contract that founds the exchange between employers and employees moves from relational to transactional. Stress becomes an ever more important new occupational pathology, as the new “occupational man” has, so to speak, to “carry society on his shoulders.”

THEORY AND THE REAL WORLD

Yet, how well does this theorization grasp the real world? Low skilled labor markets have

profoundly changed through extensive externalization, while high skilled careers have diversified. At the other end of the status spectrum, labor markets diversify. New occupational labor markets develop in high skill jobs where careers may look like an odyssey. Individual occupational history is no longer built according to a standard upward organizational pattern but can be described as the complex outcome resulting from the interaction between changes in job supply and changes in individual self image and life sense making (Dany et al. 2003). The situation in a way resembles professional labor markets with a low level of institutionalization. Individuals may develop positive identities and rewarding careers without being submitted to the iron rule of upward mobility in organizations. In that sense, interfirm mobility as well as career reorientation could be considered as achievements rather than being stigmatized as sterile instability. This opens the way for an understanding of specific social or gender group behaviors at work.

Many authors are cautious about the subjectivist and postmodernist myth of free actors in boundaryless careers (Dany et al. 2003), as developed for instance by Sennett in *The Corrosion of Character* (1998). They recall that organizations have never totally determined careers and are doubtful as to whether analyses originating mainly in the US make sense in other countries. Scholars insist upon the lack of systematic investigation in assessing the extension of boundaryless careers and challenge individuals’ ability to build their own careers. The rise of uncertainty pushes ordinary people to adopt pragmatic behaviors aimed at protecting themselves against hazards rather than encouraging them to venture out on their own. As can be observed by statistical analysis of interfirm mobility of managers (Capelli 1999), far from disappearing, organizational careers remain prestigious and attractive (Valcourt & Tolbert 2003).

SEE ALSO: Class, Status, and Power; Employment Status Changes; Human Resource Management; Labor Markets; Occupational Mobility; Organization Theory; Postmodern Organizations; Stress, Stress Theories

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organizational communication

Dennis K. Mumby

The term organizational communication denotes both a field of study and a set of empirical phenomena. The former is a largely US based sub discipline of the field of communication studies (though programs are being established in New Zealand, Australia, Japan, South Korea, Europe, and China); the latter refers broadly to the various and complex communication practices of humans engaged in collective, coordinated, and goal oriented behavior. In simple terms, organizational communication scholars study the dynamic relationships between communication processes and human organizing. Communication is conceived as foundational to, and constitutive of, organizations, while organizations are viewed as relatively enduring structures that are both medium and outcome of communication processes. While research has focused traditionally on corporate organizational forms, recently the field has broadened its scope to study non profit and alternative organizations.

As a field of study, organizational communication differs in its intellectual origins and

current disciplinary matrix from cognate fields such as management, organization studies, and organizational/industrial psychology, though it shares a number of research agendas with these fields. Based in the discipline of communication studies, organizational communication scholars draw on both social scientific and humanistic intellectual traditions, and share academic departments with rhetoricians, media scholars, social psychologists, and discourse analysts, to name a few.

HISTORICAL OVERVIEW

The historical emergence of organizational communication reflects its dual allegiance to both the social sciences and humanities, though it did not emerge as an identifiable field of study until the 1950s. Indeed, the term organizational communication did not become the accepted descriptor of the field until the late 1960s. In his history of the early decades of the field, Redding (1985) identifies its multiple and eclectic precursors, including classical rhetoric (particularly the Aristotelian tradition), business speech instruction, Dale Carnegie courses, early industrial psychology, and traditional management theory. However, Redding suggests that it was the “triple alliance” of the military, industry, and academia during and immediately after World War II that laid the foundation for the development of a coherent and programmatic research agenda. This alliance emerged out of a need for wartime college courses in “basic communication skills” for both military personnel and industrial workers. The task of teaching these courses fell mostly to English and speech (the latter the forerunner of communication programs) instructors, hence generating a network of scholars interested in communication in military and industrial settings. The establishment of a “Training within Industry” program by the Manpower War Commission, part of which focused on training supervisors in human relations skills, further solidified the recognition that “communication in industrial settings” was a legitimate focus of research.

Interestingly, Redding (1985) indicates that, for the most part, communication remained a rather peripheral organizational phenomenon for the already established social science disciplines

such as industrial psychology, management, economics, sociology, and industrial relations. As such, they ceded the study of “industrial communication” to nascent programs affiliated with speech (later, communication) departments. Hence, Redding identifies the 1950s as “the decade of crystallization” during which a number of such dedicated programs were established; the “founding” departments included those at Purdue University, Michigan State University, Ohio State University, Northwestern University, and the University of Southern California. Most of these programs adopted the moniker “business and industrial communication” to describe their domain of study, reflecting both a focus on corporate settings and a strong managerial orientation toward research problems (an orientation also inherent in other organization related fields, of course). Thus, research agendas typically focused on demonstrating causality between communication processes and corporate efficiency and productivity, and covered topic areas such as diffusion of information, upward and downward communication, communication networks, techniques for improving communication skills, and “human relations” issues.

This research agenda remained fairly stable for more than two decades. Indeed, Goldhaber et al.’s (1978) “state of the art” review of the field – called, simply, “Organizational Communication: 1978” – identifies two broad areas of research: “information flow” and “perceptual/attitudinal factors.” The former includes the study of communication networks, communication roles within those networks (liaisons, isolates, bridges, etc.), and channel and message features; the latter examines member perceptions of, for example, organizational climate, information adequacy, and job satisfaction. The review reflects the then dominance in the field of the “systems” model, with its efforts to understand organizations as systems of interdependent practices engaged in information processing. Such research continued to have a distinctly managerial/corporate orientation, with focus on issues such as efficiency, productivity, employee retention, and human relations.

Goldhaber et al.’s review is an interesting historical document insofar as it presents a snapshot of a field that, just a few short years later, would look very different. In the early

1980s the rather circumscribed research agenda that Goldhaber et al. describe gave way to a more ecumenical approach to organizational communication. This broader agenda is rather neatly summarized by Pacanowsky and O'Donnell Trujillo's (1982: 116) claim that "more things are going on in organizations than getting the job done . . . People in organizations also gossip, joke, knife one another, initiate romantic involvements . . . talk sports, arrange picnics." Various identified as the cultural, interpretive, or meaning centered approach, this research took seriously the idea that everyday "informal" communication practices are the very stuff of organizing. While earlier research rather assumed "organization" as a given and thus studied communication as a variable that occurred *in* organizations, the interpretive perspective removed the "variable" tag, privileging communication as constitutive of organizing.

Probably the most significant impetus behind this "interpretive shift" was a series of conferences in Alta, Utah, beginning in 1981 and devoted to this nascent research agenda. A number of important publications emerged from the first such conference, including (perhaps most significantly) Putnam and Pacanowsky's edited volume, *Communication and Organizations: An Interpretive Approach* (1983), and a special (1982) issue of the *Western Journal of Speech Communication* devoted to interpretive organizational communication research. While by no means unified in their characterizations of this approach, all of the essays in these two publications took seriously the idea that communication created organizations, conceived as complex systems of meaning.

Examined more closely, this turn toward meaning centered scholarship reveals the emergence of three distinct yet related approaches to the relationship between communication and organizing. First, interpretive studies drew on both the "linguistic turn" in continental philosophy, including hermeneutics and phenomenology, with its "anti representational" view of language as the medium of experience rather than expression, and Geertz's development in his classic *Interpretation of Cultures* of an interpretive anthropology that situates meaning as a public, semiotic, communicative – rather than cognitive or structural – phenomenon. In Geertz's view, the study of culture involves the

creation of "thick descriptions" that unpack the relationship between everyday communication practices and collective sense making and meaning construction. Second, critical studies articulated together three research traditions – hermeneutics and phenomenology, Marxism and critical theory, and Freudian theory – to examine the relationships among communication, power, and organization. This scholarship argued that while interpretive research appropriately focused on how organization members collectively constructed systems of meaning, it overlooked the extent to which such meanings were the product of largely hidden, "deep structure" power relations that systematically distorted meaning construction processes to favor dominant power interests. Third, rhetorical studies brought together developments in continental philosophy with classical rhetoric in the Aristotelian tradition to explore processes of persuasion in organizational settings. Here, the focus was on examination of how organizational rhetoric can produce worker identification with organization values, inculcate decision premises in members through enthymematic corporate discourse, and function as a form of unobtrusive control.

Of course, this "interpretive turn" by no means signaled a complete, overnight paradigm revolution in theory development and research in organizational communication. Indeed, Putnam and Cheney's (1985) overview of the field identifies the four principal "research traditions" in the field as the study of communication channels, communication climate, organizational networks, and superior–subordinate communication. At the same time, they designate information processing, rhetorical studies, culture studies, and power and politics (i.e., critical studies) as "new directions." In this sense, the 1980s and 1990s represented a period of ferment when the newly emergent approaches competed with the long established research traditions over what counted as legitimate ways of conceptualizing and studying organizational communication. At the center of these debates were questions not only about appropriate methods, theory development, and so forth, but also about the ontological status of organizations as communication phenomena; that is, do they have real, material features independent of human sense making and communicative

practice, or are organizations reducible to systems of socially constructed meanings?

In the last few years this ferment has given way somewhat to a recognition that the study of organizational communication benefits from an exploration of both the connections and tensions between and among theoretical perspectives. As such, organizational communication as a field of study has developed an interdisciplinary identity that is home to diverse theoretical perspectives and epistemological assumptions, including (post)positivism, realism, interpretivism, rhetoric, critical theory, postmodernism and poststructuralism, feminism, and postcolonialism. In this sense, organizational communication at the beginning of the twenty first century can be characterized as a multi perspective field that is ecumenical in its approach to methods, theories, research domains, and philosophical assumptions. The rather fractured, polarized debates of the 1980s and 1990s about “paradigm incommensurability” have developed into, if not paradigm consensus (a condition that no one really considers desirable), a recognition that different epistemologies represent different resources upon which scholars can draw to address the relationship between communication and organization (Corman & Poole 2000).

CURRENT THEORIES, CONSTRUCTS, AND RESEARCH AGENDAS

Taylor et al.’s (2001) overview of organizational communication research provides some sense of the major transformations that the field has undergone in the last 25 years or so. Indeed, in juxtaposing Goldhaber et al. and Taylor et al.’s reviews, it is difficult to believe that the respective authors are – at least ostensibly – addressing the same field of study. Of course, in many respects they are not. If Thomas Kuhn is correct in asserting that, post paradigm revolution, scholars are not just looking through a new lens but viewing a transformed world, then the field of organizational communication is the product of its own Copernican revolution. A brief enumeration of the theories and topics addressed in Taylor et al.’s review provides some sense of the scope and diversity of the field’s current research agenda. Their review includes discussion of interpretivism and its various iterations

(rhetoric, critical theory, feminism, postmodernism), ethnography, structuration theory, activity theory, artificial intelligence, the symbolic–material dialectic, and diversity in organizations. Emergent topics they identify include expanding our notion of what counts as an organizational form to include global, network, virtual, nonprofits, cooperatives, etc.; relationships among technology, organizations, and society; group based structures (often mediated by communication technology); new forms of leadership; organizational change; new iterations of network research; the relationship between work and non work domains; organizational ethics; and the connection between local and global organizational forms.

Of course, there are important continuities between organizational communication circa 1978 and 2006. In general, while it no longer enjoys the hegemony it once did, there is still a healthy and vibrant (post)positivist research tradition in organizational communication that both captures the complex dynamics of communication practices and situates that complexity within a concern for the ongoing stability and reproducibility of organizations as social structures. For example, the concern with organizations as social structures is still evidenced in the systems approach to organizing, with its focus on interdependence and collective, goal oriented behavior; in this regard, network research is still a mainstay of the field. However, the progeny of 1960s and 1970s network research bears only passing resemblance to its forebears, with its current investigation of semantic and relational networks, and employment of chaos theory and principles of self organizing systems. Furthermore, Monge’s (1982) critique of the disjuncture between the process orientation of systems theory and the rather static, reductive empirical methods used to study organizations has led to efforts to develop analytic techniques, including computational analysis, that better capture the dynamic character of these systems features (Monge & Contractor 2003). In addition, leadership research still enjoys considerable currency, though again scholarly focus has shifted from efforts to identify leadership as an individual trait, style, etc., toward more discursively oriented models that see leadership as a communicative, interaction based phenomenon that is more widely distributed in organizational life.

One interesting measure of both continuity and discontinuity across decades involves a comparison of the first (1987) and second (2001) editions of *The Handbook of Organizational Communication*. In both editions, chapters are allocated to leadership; information technology and information processing; organizational culture; communication networks; organizational structure; organizational entry, assimilation and exit; decision making; and power and politics. Chapters new to the 2001 edition are discourse analysis; quantitative methods; qualitative methods; globalization; organizational learning; communication competence; organizational identity; new media; and participation. One might claim, then, that there is every bit as much continuity as change over the last 20 years of theory development and research. It is also true, however, that while research domains evince much continuity, approaches to these domains have shifted a good deal, especially given developments in the various meaning-based approaches to organizational communication. Clearly, in a short space it is not possible to provide a complete overview of the current and diverse state of organizational communication research. However, a few key issues, trends, and theoretical developments are worth noting.

First, from a disciplinary perspective, there is a distinct and ongoing effort to constitute the field as simultaneously unique in its approach to organizing and interdisciplinary, with connections to management, organizational sociology, industrial psychology, and so forth. For example, in an effort to develop a distinctly communication based approach to organizing, Deetz (1996) developed a critique of Burrell and Morgan's classic book *Sociological Paradigms and Organizational Analysis* (1979) and its widely adopted metatheoretical framework. He argued that while Burrell and Morgan provided a useful way of making sense of the field of organizational sociology, they ultimately led organizational communication scholars down a conceptual cul de sac. Deetz claimed that their characterization of all sociological paradigms as either subjective or objective in their approach to knowledge generation had the dual – and contradictory – effect of (a) providing a space for critical interpretive scholars to argue for the legitimacy of their approach, and (b) preserving the “subjective”/“objective” split that ensured

the continued hegemony of variable analytic (“objective”) research and the “othering” of critical interpretive (“subjective”) studies. A communication based approach, Deetz suggested, refuses the subject–object dichotomy inherent in Burrell and Morgan's model, and instead positions communication as the constitutive process through which claims for subjectivity or objectivity even become possible. As such, the study of organizations is less about the relative merits of “subjective” and “objective” epistemologies, methodologies, and so forth, and more about understanding how different perspectives discursively construct the phenomenon being studied. For example, according to Deetz, interpretive studies discursively construct social actors and their own discourse as central to knowledge formation, while normative/social science research views the a priori development and subsequent testing of concepts through study of social actors' behavior as central to the knowledge construction process.

Deetz's efforts to develop a communication based framework for making sense of organizational communication studies is one among several efforts to frame organizational communication scholarship from within the field itself, rather than relying on concepts, theories, and perspectives developed in cognate disciplines such as psychology, sociology, and management. While Redding (1985) is certainly correct that other fields largely ceded the study of “communication in organizations” to researchers in the field of communication, nevertheless organizational communication researchers have had a hard time developing a body of research that is not derivative of perspectives long established in those other fields. However, current research has shifted significantly toward communication analyses of organizational phenomena, rather than, say, psychologically or sociologically based analyses of “communication in organizations.” A number of those efforts are addressed below.

Second, advances in communication technology (CT) in the last 20 years or so have profoundly influenced how organization members engage in information processing and decision making. Organizational communication scholars have developed a significant body of scholarship that addresses these effects, focusing on how CT has reconfigured the organizing process in

important ways. While early research tended to be instrumental in its approach, examining CT as “hardware” that users appropriated as an aid to information processing, more recent scholarship has adopted a more meaning centered approach, examining the social construction of CT by organization members. Thus, rather than asking, “How is CT used by organization members?” the defining question for organizational communication researchers has been, “What does CT *mean* for organization members?” For example, Poole, DeSanctis, and colleagues have developed adaptive structuration theory (drawing on Anthony Giddens’s structuration theory) to study the interaction between group decision making and CT. Their development and study of group decision support systems – the use of CT to improve participation in collective decision making – illustrates how, over time, groups adapt CT to their own particular use, constructing it not as determining group decisions, but rather as medium and outcome of the emergent group decision making dynamic. In this sense, CT is socially constructed as a set of rules and resources that both enables and constrains decision making processes. Communication scholars therefore resist a determinist view of either the features or social uses of technologies. Studies of CT have also spawned a large body of research on new modes of organizing, including the emergence of online communities, and virtual worlds and identities (through online gaming, role playing, blogging, etc.). In related fashion, researchers have also examined how advances in CT have challenged basic ideas of organizations as having distinct “internal” and “external” communication processes. For example, research on telecommuting has made problematic traditional conceptions of employee identification with and socialization into organizations. In addition, research on the linkages between “internal” practices of communication and patterns in advertising, public relations, and marketing has played an important role in moving the field beyond the “container” metaphor of organization.

Third, the study of organizations as communicative sites of power and politics has become a ubiquitous feature of the field. While early post interpretive turn research drew largely on the tradition of Marxism and Frankfurt School critical theory, the last 15 years has witnessed a

broadening of perspectives to include feminist, poststructuralist, and postmodern thought. Research motivated by the critical tradition has focused largely on the connections among communication, ideology, and power, exploring how the process of organizing is inflected with deep structure relations of power that are obscured in the very process of (ideological) meaning construction. In this context, critical organizational communication scholars have explored a variety of discursive phenomena such as stories, metaphors, everyday talk, rituals, and so forth, to examine how particular interests and power relations are ideologically secured, contradictions hidden, and certain social realities reified. A related research agenda takes up philosopher Jürgen Habermas’s critical project, addressing the ways that the privileging of technical forms of organizational rationality produce systematically distorted communication and discursive closure (“corporate colonization”) that limit possibilities for alternative ways of thinking about, experiencing, and valuing the organizing process. Two related outcomes of this work are an ongoing concern with theorizing models of organizational democracy, and a focus on corporate ethics and social responsibility (a focus that has intensified in the wake of publicity surrounding the exposure of corporate malfeasance).

In recent years critical organization studies has come under increasing criticism and scrutiny for both its rather gender blind approach to power and politics and for its rather undifferentiated conception of the everyday dynamics of organizational power. Since the early 1990s, then, a number of scholars have actively taken up a variety of feminist perspectives to explore organizational communication as a “gendered” practice. While it is not possible here to differentiate among these feminisms, many share a concern with viewing gender as a constitutive feature of organizing; examining everyday workplace struggles as a gendered process; exploring the mundane production of masculine and feminine workplace identities; examining hegemonic masculinity and patriarchy as endemic features of organizational life; and deconstructing the gendered features of mainstream organizational theory. Postmodern and post structuralist analytics have provided a similar impetus in providing alternative readings of

organizational power. Motivated in particular by the work of Michel Foucault, communication researchers have examined organizations as sites of disciplinary practice that employ various technologies of power to produce identities, docile bodies, and normalized discourses. The shift is thus away from a view of power as repressive, negative, and inimical to emancipation and social transformation, and toward one in which power and knowledge intersect to create the very possibility of particular identities, modes of truth, ways of speaking, and so forth.

More recently, the intersection of feminist and poststructuralist thought has drawn attention to organizations as gendered sites of both disciplinary practice and everyday struggles of resistance. While early critical research tended toward rather non dialectical accounts of organizational power as monolithic and inescapable, current research has shifted toward exploration of the fissures, gaps, and contradictions of daily organizing that belie the apparent seamlessness of managerial control efforts. Here, discourse and all forms of symbolic action are conceived as latent or actual resources that employees strategically utilize in carving out spaces of resistance, hence limiting the reach of corporate colonization. A key element of this research, then, is the “return of the subject”; that is, an effort to theorize more adequately the role of agency – both individual and collective – in mediating the effects of corporate control processes. Much of this research has adopted a poststructuralist feminist perspective, examining the dialectical relationship between the discursive production of gendered organizational subjects, or identities, and the ways that subjects subversively appropriate these same discourses in order to construct resistant and alternative organizational realities.

Fourth, and related, organizational communication scholars have begun to treat seriously the issue of organizational diversity, particularly as it relates to matters of “voice.” For the most part, this effort has moved beyond the question of “managing diversity” – an approach that some scholars have critiqued as a primarily management defined effort to “deal” with the “problem” of diversity in the workplace. In contrast, organizational communication scholars have examined diversity in terms of the ways in which issues of gender, race, class, and sexuality

are organized into or out of both organizational theory and research and daily organizing processes. For example, scholars have explored the ways that research on organizational socialization implicitly organizes difference out of the socialization process. Researchers have also begun to examine the body and sexuality as both a target of organizational discipline and a locus for transgression and resistance. Extended further, the issue of voice relates also to what “counts” as appropriate organizations to study. Increasingly, organizational communication scholars are expanding their domains of study to address organizing in alternative contexts and structures, including nonprofits, collectives, NGOs, and so forth. In this context, researchers are interested in studying communication as both medium and outcome of issues such as alternative forms of decision making, organizational ethics, and systems of empowerment. In general, the focus on issues of voice has enabled organizational communication scholars to move beyond rather narrow, managerialist definitions of organizational life.

Fifth, organizational communication scholars have contributed to the ongoing, interdisciplinary debate over the relationship between discourse and organizations. One of the consequences of this scholarship has been to challenge the stability of the very idea of “organization.” While for decades scholars have presumed the existence of “the organization,” focusing research efforts on communication “within” this stable structure, one current focus lies in exploring the precarious, contingent features of organizing as a moment to moment process shot through with ambiguity. In particular, the “Montreal School” of Jim Taylor and his colleagues have articulated together a number of different theoretical perspectives, including ordinary language philosophy (Austin, Searle, Greimas), the actor network theory of Bruno Latour, and complexity theory, as a means of explaining organizing as a dialectic of conversation and text that implicates social actors in a continuous but never resolvable search for closure and stability. Much of this work intersects with efforts in both management and organization studies to grapple with the discourse–material dialectic; that is, what are the implications of characterizing organizations as purely contingent, discursive constructions on the one hand,

or as having stable, material, “extra discursive” features on the other hand? For example, does the “organization as discourse” perspective underplay the role and impact of economic conditions on organizational life? On the other hand, if we view organizations as “extra discursive,” do we obscure the ways in which even the most apparently “material” features of organizing (e.g., economic conditions) are made sense of and constructed as meaningful through discourse?

Sixth, organizational communication scholars have turned to examinations of the relationship between globalization and organizing. Not only is the very notion of “organization” being brought under scrutiny, but researchers are also challenging the view of the organization as a fixed, physical site that one “enters” and “exits.” This rather parochial conception is giving way to a view of organizing as recursively related to processes of globalization. Thus, issues such as the compression of space and time, the fragmentation of identities, increased levels of worker mobility, shifts toward outsourcing and use of temporary employees, the disintegration of local communities, effects of branding, the homogenization of cultures, and so forth, are being studied increasingly in terms of a dialectic between local, micro level communication processes and global, macro level movements of information, people, money, etc. This research further redirects our attention to organizations as nodal points of shifting, temporarily stable discursive practices that are increasingly susceptible to the forces of globalization and that, in turn, shape the globalization process. As such, organizational communication scholars increasingly are eschewing treating organizations as if they are self contained, hermetically sealed entities, and instead contextualizing analyses within larger, macro level social, political, and economic processes.

The above discussion necessarily paints a picture of the field of organizational communication with a very broad brush. Theoretical nuances are glossed, lines of inquiry are collapsed together, and some research perspectives are overlooked. These limitations notwithstanding, the primary goal of this overview has been to provide a broad sense of the important questions, assumptions, and perspectives that drive research in the field.

FUTURE DIRECTIONS

There is a strong sense in which the future of organizational communication research inheres in the present. Given the shift toward epistemological plurality in the last few years, it seems clear that the seeds of future research agendas are already sown and budding. First, while organizational communication studies has always been strongly interdisciplinary, the reciprocal nature of the ties to other fields – sometimes tenuous – appears to be strengthening. In particular, its connections to both management and organization studies have become particularly dynamic. For example, there is a great deal of cross pollination between critical scholars in organizational communication and in critical management studies, particularly between those investigating the relations among power, discourse, and organizing. Furthermore, the organizational communication and information systems division of the Academy of Management brings together both communication and management scholars examining CT, communication networks, virtual organizing, and so forth. Such collaborative efforts can only serve to promote interdisciplinary research and the sharing of perspectives, resources, and ideas.

Second, drawing on insights from feminism and poststructuralism, organizational communication researchers will continue to destabilize the notion that organizations are neutral with regard to issues of race, class, gender, and sexuality. Scholars are becoming increasingly sensitized to the idea that organizations are raced, sexed, classed, and gendered institutions that are both medium and outcome of member subjectivities. In this sense, focus will continue on the myriad ways in which difference is organized, normalized, works transgressively, and so forth. From a communication perspective, researchers explore identities as performed and embodied through various symbolic and discursive practices.

Third, research on organizational communication will increasingly turn its efforts to capturing the in situ, moment to moment, everyday communication practices of organization members. For much of its history the field of organizational communication has been content to rely on paper and pencil, self report instruments that, while producing data susceptible to careful

measurement, have largely overlooked the complexities, contradictions, and ambiguities of actual organizational behavior. While qualitative research methods are typically associated with the study of real time human organizing, quantitative researchers are also developing tools that better capture the ongoing, processual features of organizational life.

Fourth, the shift toward viewing organizations as changing, dynamic, permeable sites of discourse will continue apace. This has several implications for future research, in addition to the ones addressed above. For example, it suggests a need to further explore the relationship between work and other domains, such as home and the wider community. As the separation between corporations and these other realms becomes increasingly fragile, it is important to understand the effects of such shifts on individual identities, conceptions of democracy, what counts as private or public, definitions of both work and leisure, and so forth. If organizations are simultaneously *both* more pervasive in their effects on human community *and* less easily identifiable as empirical phenomena with clear boundaries, then it is increasingly important that the field of organizational communication develop perspectives and research agendas that can adequately investigate these effects.

Fifth, and related, the study of alternative forms of organizing will continue apace. This will involve not only the study of non corporate organizations, but also the exploration of organizing processes where there is no identifiable organizational "site." As mentioned earlier, there is a vibrant and growing body of research that examines virtual organizing; organizational communication scholars are well placed to study how the development of such organizing structures shapes human identity, enables the development of new discursive practices, and influences participation in public discourse and decision making.

In sum, organizational communication is, by most standards, a young field that has only just passed its 50th birthday. While it has sometimes struggled to establish an independent identity, it has developed into a vibrant, dynamic research community that has added much to our understanding of the organizational form – a social structure that has, arguably, been the

defining institution of modernity over the last 100 years or so.

SEE ALSO: Critical Theory/Frankfurt School; Culture; Foucault, Michel; Hermeneutics; Marxism and Sociology; Organization Theory; Positivism; Postmodernism; System Theories

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organizational contingencies

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Organizational contingencies are factors that moderate the effect of organizational characteristics on organizational performance. Whether a particular level of organizational characteristic would lead to high performance depends on the level of the contingency factor. If there is a fit between the level of contingency and the level of organizational characteristic, then,

other things being equal, superior performance results; if there is a misfit, performance suffers.

An organizational contingency is thus best understood as one of the variables in a three variable relationship, the other two variables being an organizational characteristic and organizational performance. Each of these variables has a fairly broad meaning:

- 1 Organizational contingencies include two general groups of factors: those internal to the organization, such as organizational size, technology, and strategy, and those external to it, covered by the umbrella term "organizational environment."
- 2 Organizational characteristics most frequently imply dimensions of organizational structure (e.g., formalization, centralization) and an overall structural type (e.g., bureaucratic structure) or structural design alternative (e.g., divisional structure).
- 3 Organizational performance covers a wide range of measures, including standard financial measures, such as efficiency and profitability, and various indicators of effectiveness, such as rate of innovation and stakeholder satisfaction.

The concept of organizational contingency is the cornerstone of the contingency theory paradigm in organization studies. The contingency theory paradigm covers a plethora of contingency theories that focus on different organizational characteristics and various organizational contingencies. The earliest and arguably most developed stream within this paradigm focuses on those contingencies that influence organizational structure and is therefore usually referred to as *structural contingency theory*. Contingency theories have also spread to other areas of organization studies, including strategy and leadership.

The contingency approach to organizational structure was pioneered by Burns and Stalker (1961), followed closely by Woodward (1965) and Lawrence and Lorsch (1967) amongst others. The main organizational contingencies associated with organizational structure are organizational size, strategy, technology, and environment. Each of these contingencies is linked to a particular typology of organizational structures

that highlights a specific set of the salient characteristics of organizational structure.

Organizational size is linked to a typology of organizational structures that distinguishes between simple structure (centralized, low on functional specialization and formalization) and bureaucratic structure (decentralized, high on functional specialization and formalization) (Blau 1970). Small organizations perform better with a simple, non bureaucratic structure; but, beyond a certain size, a greater degree of bureaucratization is positively correlated with better performance (Child 1988).

Organizational strategy is linked to a typology of organizational structures based on the principle of departmental grouping. This typology distinguishes between functional structure, or U (unitary) form, in which activities are grouped by task (e.g., marketing, finance), and divisional, or M (multidivisional) form, in which activities are grouped by output (e.g., product 1, product 2). Functional structure is said to be better suited to a strategy oriented on the production of a single product line or service, or an undiversified strategy. Divisional structure is said to be better suited to a strategy of diversification. The dictum "Structure follows strategy" refers specifically to the historical shift in the strategy and structure of large firms, first documented in the development of American industry (Chandler 1962). This shift involved the transition in strategy from single to multiple product lines and the concomitant structural innovation, the introduction of divisional structure, which made it possible to overcome the inefficiencies of functional structure (in particular, decision overload at the top of the organizational hierarchy).

Technology is linked to a typology of organizational structures that distinguishes between mechanistic structure and organic structure. In mechanistic structure, tasks are broken down into specialized, separate parts and are rigidly defined; there is a strict hierarchy of authority and control, and there are many rules; knowledge and control of tasks are centralized at the top of the organization; communication is vertical. In organic structure, employees contribute to the common task of the department; tasks are adjusted and redefined through employee teamwork; there is less hierarchy of authority and control, and there are few rules; knowledge and

control tasks are located anywhere in the organization; communication is horizontal (Burns & Stalker 1961). Based on the degree of technological complexity, production processes have been subdivided into unit production (production of simple units to order or of small batches), mass production (production of large batches on an assembly line), and process production (continuous flow production of liquids, gases, or solid shapes). Mechanistic structure is said to be better suited for mass production, while organic structure is better suited for unit and process production (Woodward 1965).

Organizational environment is linked to the two sets of typologies: the mechanistic-organic typology and the typology based on the degree of differentiation and integration. Both typologies pertain to one important characteristic of the environment – environmental uncertainty. The first, mechanistic-organic typology, has been already described above. It is sufficient, then, to state here that mechanistic structure is said to be better suited to relatively stable and certain environments, while organic structure is said to be better suited to volatile and uncertain environments (Burns & Stalker 1961). The second typology emphasizes two organizational characteristics: (1) differentiation, i.e., differences in cognitive and emotional orientations among managers in different organizational departments, and the difference in formal structure among these departments, and (2) integration, or the quality of collaboration between departments. It has been noted that organizations that perform well in uncertain environments have high levels of both differentiation and integration; in contrast, organizations that perform well in less uncertain environments have lower levels of differentiation and integration (Lawrence & Lorsch 1967).

Theories focusing on leadership present the most elaborate models of contingency outside structural contingency theory. The essence of a contingency approach to leadership is that leaders are most effective when they make their behavior contingent upon situational factors, such as group member characteristics. For example, a manager who supervises competent employees might be able to practice consensus readily. Fiedler's (1967) theory of leadership is the most widely cited. Its key proposition is that leaders should adopt a more task oriented style,

if the situation is one of high or low control for the leader, but that when a leader has moderate control, a relationship oriented style works best. In practical terms, the theory suggests that leaders can improve their situational control by modifying leader–member relations, task structure, and position power.

Another example of the contingency approach outside structural contingency theory is Mintzberg's (1990) decision making framework for dealing with environmental uncertainty. The framework suggests that a rational model of strategy should be followed in a relatively certain environment, while under more complex environmental conditions the decision maker may need to adopt a more emergent approach to strategy. The practical implication is that the decision maker should engage other members of the organization, allowing strategy to emerge from existing structures and processes in the context of continuous interaction.

Contingency theory of ownership represents an example of the more recent extensions of the contingency approach to other areas of organization studies. Contingency theory of ownership suggests that in the "opaque" industries – industries which have highly specific capital investments and where the monitoring of managers thus requires special expertise and information, which most shareholders are unlikely to possess (e.g., microprocessors, pharmaceuticals) – large block owner managers may be more effective. Alternatively, in the more "transparent" industries – industries characterized by less firm specific capital and thus by relatively simpler monitoring requirements (e.g., textiles, steel) – large block outsider owners may be more effective (Kang & Sorensen 1999).

To return to the general discussion of organizational contingencies, the contingency paradigm belongs to a group of organization theories espousing an adaptationist view of organizations (which also includes, among others, resource dependence theory, transaction cost economics, and neo institutional organizational sociology). This view holds that organizations are capable of changing their structures, procedures, and practices in such a way as to adapt their characteristics to the requirements and pressures of their environment and to improve thereby their performance and/or survival chances. Contingency approach suggests that organizational

change can be described by the following model of "structural adaptation to regain fit" (SARFIT) (Donaldson 1987): an organization initially in fit changes its contingency and thereby moves into misfit and suffers declining performance. This causes adoption of a new structure so that fit is regained and performance restored. Hence, the cycle of adaptation: "fit → contingency change → misfit → structural adaptation → new fit."

To put research on organizational contingencies into a historical perspective, the contingency theory paradigm emerged in the early 1960s as a counterpoint to classical management theory. The main quest of classical management theory was to find the best organizational structure. In contrast, contingency theory declared that there was no one best structure that would fit any organization under any circumstances and focused instead on specifying what structure would be more appropriate for a particular set of conditions. The emergence of contingency theory can be regarded as the beginning of modern organizational analysis as we know it now.

Research on contingencies, particularly structural contingencies, flourished during the 1970s and 1980s. Since then, its popularity within organization theory has declined. New theories, such as resource dependence (Pfeffer & Salancik 1978), neo institutionalism (Powell & DiMaggio 1991), and organizational ecology (Hannan & Freeman 1989), have subsumed or superseded contingency theory. The general contingency principle – that different organizational structures, procedures, and practices are suitable to different environmental conditions – has, however, permeated practically all modern organization theories in some shape or form. Contingency theory has also spread to other disciplines such as public administration, information technology, marketing, and accounting, which continue to draw upon and to develop its principles. Contingency theory (unlike many more recent organizational theories) has also found its way into most of the introductory textbooks on organizational behavior, organizational theory, and organizational design. The theory's intuitive appeal, ease of representation, and reasonably unequivocal managerial implications all contributed to this wide acceptance. The concept and the theory, however, are far

from being common sense and common knowledge, as research on managers suggests (Priem & Rosenstein 2000).

Despite its favorable status, contingency theory is continually being called into question because of its apparent inability to resolve persistent theoretical and empirical problems. One of the main lines of critique is captured by the concept of "equifinality": even if the contingencies facing the organization are the same, the final state or performance can be achieved through many different organizational structures (all roads may lead to Rome) (Pennings 1987). The possibility of multiple, equally effective designs undermines the predictive value of the contingency approach (Galunic & Eisenhardt 1994). Another line of critique concerns managerial preferences: managers may vary in their response to contingency according to their perceptions, interests, and power. They may prefer to minimize misfit rather than to maximize fit (Drazin & Van de Ven 1985). Thus, there is a degree of "strategic choice" in organizational structuring (Child 1972), particularly apparent in the case of top managers.

Given criticisms of contingency theory, there is a need for more research, particularly in the area of structural contingency theory. One may want to consider, for instance, how classical contingency arguments hold under more dynamic conditions that characterize contemporary organizations. Contingency studies might be designed to permit comparative evaluation of several forms of fit. Relatedly, one might attempt to delineate the boundaries of proactive behaviors possible at the organizational and individual manager level. Other areas of contingency theory, such as those in leadership or strategy, may also benefit from a more explicit examination of fit in their area.

SEE ALSO: Institutional Theory, New; Leadership; Organization Theory; Organizations as Coercive Institutions; Technological Innovation

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organizational deviance

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Deviance has most typically been viewed in individualistic terms. But some of the most significant and consequential deviance and crime is carried out on behalf of organizations, and through the resources that only organizations are able to provide. Accordingly, in the most common invocation of the term organizational deviance, the organization is conceived of as the "actor" that carries out deviant and criminal activities (Bamberger & Sonnenstuhl 1998). Since organizational deviance is inherently social, and collective, it should be of special interest to students of sociology. It has always been a fundamental tenet of sociology that a social entity is more than simply the sum of its individual participants and members.

The concept of organizational deviance or crime has sometimes been used interchangeably or confused with the more familiar concept of organized crime. Organizational deviance is carried out in the context of an organization with a legal and legitimate purpose; organized crime has referred to organizations directly dedicated to the commission of illegal activity. However, corporate crime from the outset has sometimes been characterized as a form of organized crime, and has been compared to more traditional (i.e., Mafioso type, or syndicated) forms of organized crime. And traditional syndicated crime operations have increasingly infiltrated and merged with legitimate business entities.

The immense growth in the number of organizations and their significance within society has been an especially striking development of the past century or so. In *The Asymmetric Society* (1982), James S. Coleman argued that corporate actors are playing an increasing role in our society while natural actors are playing a decreasing role. Accordingly, the activities of organizations have assumed great importance in the contemporary era. There is a long history of according organizations a legal status parallel to that of natural persons, that is as "juridic subjects," accountable to legal sanctions. In the late nineteenth century, lawyers for American corporations were especially aggressive in demanding that due process rights guaranteed

to all American citizens by the 14th Amendment be applied to corporations as well.

Regulatory and administrative agencies play an especially large role in societal efforts to control organizational deviance. These agencies may themselves engage in some forms of deviance or rule breaking. Organizations as organizations have been charged with crimes, have been indicted, tried, and convicted, and have been "punished" as organizations. Sentencing guidelines have been developed for organizations as well as for natural persons. Of course, organizations cannot be punished in all the same ways as natural persons can be punished. Corporations cannot be put into prison, or executed. The imposition of fines, which can be applied to both organizations and natural persons, has been the most common form of sanctioning applied to corporations. But corporations have also been put on probation, required to perform services, and "executed" in the sense that their charters have been revoked.

Organizations may deviate from societal norms without necessarily violating the criminal law (Vaughan 1999); they may violate the criminal law without necessarily violating prevailing societal norms; they may deviate from regulatory and administrative agency rules that may or may not be at odds with criminal law and societal norms; they may deviate from the norms subscribed to by peer organizations, but not necessarily those incorporated in the formal law or held by the society as a whole.

With respect to the last of these possibilities, for example, a corporation may produce an inferior quality of goods that are viewed by other corporations producing the same type of goods as harmful to the reputation of their industry, and thus deviant, although these inferior goods do not necessarily violate legal standards. Or a corporation may adopt such progressive labor policies that competing corporations believe they are made to look bad by comparison, and so they treat this corporation as a "deviant" within their industry, stigmatized and shunned. On the other hand, within some industries, a certain level of manipulation of corporate financial reports may be the norm and a widely accepted practice, even if it is technically illegal. Of course, in many cases organizations may engage in conduct that is both deviant and criminal, relative to societies'

standards and laws as well as those within the industry in question.

Organizational deviance may be carried out on behalf of governmental organizations, quasi public entities such as the International Monetary Fund, and private sector entities, or corporations (Ermann & Lundman 2002). Organizational deviance may be carried out by any type of organization, including religious organizations and churches. The monstrous crimes carried out by Nazi Germany – most notably, the extermination of some 6 million people during the Holocaust – required a high level of bureaucratic organization, and could not have been accomplished outside of an organizational framework. Indeed, there is much reason to believe that many of those who participated in the crimes of the Holocaust only did so as part of an organization that promoted and supported these activities, which they would not have engaged in as individuals. Organizations such as the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund carry out policies that seem to disproportionately favor multinational corporations and elite interests in developing countries, but cause various forms of harm to millions of ordinary citizens in such countries. To the extent that high level officials of the Roman Catholic Church did not adequately address allegations of sexual abuse of children by priests, they engaged in a form of organizational deviance carried out on behalf of the church, to protect the church from scandal and legal liability. And corporations have engaged in a wide range of activities that cause harm to citizens, consumers, workers, and investors.

Organizations foster and promote many forms of harmful and illegal activity, as long as the activity is viewed as advancing the interests or objectives of the organization. The top leadership of an organization may attempt to protect itself from being held liable for forms of organizational deviance that are illegal, by a tactic of “concerted ignorance” or by not becoming directly involved in active engagement in the illegal activity. But insofar as they convey expectations of outcomes from middle managers and employees that they know or certainly should know can only be achieved through the commission of deviant or criminal actions, they are often responsible in a fundamental way for

those actions. Organizations generate an organizational culture or ambience that may promote deviant and illegal activities. Some organizations are part of a larger environment – e.g., an industry – that is “criminogenic” in the sense that elements of that environment promote deviant or illegal conduct. Studies of one significant form of organizational deviance – corporate crime – have attempted to identify a range of external and internal factors that seem to be correlated with engagement in such crime (Friedrichs 2004). External factors include the economic climate, political and regulatory environment, level of industry concentration, style and strength of product distribution networks, and norms within industries; internal factors include the size of the corporation, the financial performance of the corporation and the degree of its emphasis on profit, the diffusion of responsibility through different divisions, and a corporate subculture that promotes loyalty and deference to the interests of the corporations.

The effective control of organizational deviance presents special challenges relative to the control of individual deviance. A significant sociological literature has by now explored the regulating, policing, adjudicating, and sanctioning of organizational deviance. Regulatory agencies – such as the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) and the Occupational Safety and Health Administration (OSHA) – play a key role in the response to organizational deviance. A fundamental dilemma for such agencies has been captured by the title of John Braithwaite’s book *To Punish or Persuade?* (1985). An effective response to organizational deviance contends with the fact that organizations typically engage in many productive activities apart from their deviant activities. Given the complexity of much organizational deviance, it is often difficult to prosecute cases of criminal malfeasance against them. Organizations typically have tremendous resources available to them to defend themselves – often far greater than the agencies attempting to sanction them. In addition, when organizations are legally sanctioned, innocent parties may be harmed or threatened; for instance, if a polluting plant is closed down, its workers may be forced onto unemployment lines.

The concept of organizational deviance has also been applied to the deviant or criminal activities of individuals acting within the context of an organizational position (Tittle & Paternoster 2000). Organizations structure opportunities for individuals to engage in deviant or criminal conduct, independent of – and sometimes directly at odds with – the interests of the organization itself. An embezzler must have a formal position with an organization – e.g., a bank – if he or she is to embezzle; a police officer is able to brutalize and infringe on the rights of citizens as a function of being authorized and armed by the state; a priest may have special opportunities to engage in and conceal sexual molestation due to his status within the church.

Organizations are the sites of significant manifestations of deviant or criminal conduct, then, beyond those actions carried out specifically on behalf of the organization. Much corporate crime is carried out primarily to benefit the corporation as a whole, although key executives naturally benefit disproportionately when such crime achieves its objectives. But in the case of high level executives of corporations who “cook the books” primarily to enrich themselves, or police officers who use impermissible levels of force to achieve social control objectives or extract confessions, or bishops who provide cover for priests who have molested children, the characterization of the activity as organizational deviance is open to different interpretations: is the activity really engaged in on behalf of the organization, or the individual actor, or both? Some crimes – e.g., embezzlement – are carried out by employees against the organization. Some actions – e.g., sexual harassment – may deviate from organizational norms and rules without necessarily being in violation of criminal laws. Some conventional forms of crime – e.g., violent assault on a fellow worker – are carried out in the context of the organizational setting, or workplace, without being linked directly with the organizational role or the basic activities of the organization. Accordingly, one can differentiate between occupational crime (e.g., embezzlement), occupational deviance (e.g., sexual harassment), and

workplace crime (e.g., assault), although admittedly such terms have all too often been used quite interchangeably (Friedrichs 2002).

Organizational deviance in its various manifestations is quite certain to achieve even greater significance in the increasingly complex world of the twenty first century. Within sociology, more dialogue and cooperation will have to be fostered between such specialties as criminology and the sociology of organizations (Tonry & Reiss 1993). The understanding of organizational deviance will also require the expansion of interdisciplinary and transdisciplinary approaches, and the ever more sophisticated development of modes of analysis integrating macro level and micro level forms of explanation (Vaughan 2002). A newly emerging science of networks, for example, will play a role in all of this. The formidable methodological challenges involved in the empirical study of powerful organizations – including their frequent resistance to being studied – will have to be overcome.

SEE ALSO: Corruption; Crime, Corporate; Crime, Organized; Crime, White Collar; Culture, Organizations and; Deviance, Crime and; Deviance, Criminalization of; Deviance, Theories of; Organization Theory; Organizations as Social Structures; State Regulation and the Workplace

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organizational failure

Stephen Ackroyd

By organizational failure is usually meant failure against some measure of performance, or failure to achieve a goal that is normally expected. Thus, a company can be identified as failing if it is not profitable, or a school if it does not educate students to a required level, or in sufficient numbers. Clearly, such *measured* organizational failure might be purely nominal (and/or imposed), an artifact of the application of performance criteria, rather than a *substantive* failure of organization as such. Thus, the internal working of an organization might be highly efficient given the resources available; but, nonetheless, because it does not reach a prescribed level of performance, it is deemed to fail. If the price of an indispensable commodity suddenly makes production at a saleable price impossible for a firm, failing profitability is almost inevitable and, for a small or new organization, bankruptcy (the most commonly used indicator of failure) is likely.

Of course, it may be also that an organization that is failing to perform against the customary criteria of success is also failing in some more fundamental way. If there are organizational problems that management has failed to resolve and which detract from measured performance, then there is a correspondence between

measured and substantive organizational failure. But failure to perform against particular criteria is a customary or legal definition of failure, and may or may not indicate that there is some more fundamental problem of organization.

Many writers on management have conveniently conflated the distinction between measured and substantive organizational failure. The early or classical theorists of management asserted that an efficient organization, which followed the best practices as they prescribed them, would not fail. Later it was argued that the appropriate modes of organization and management might vary a good deal according to circumstances, but this was merely a more subtle version of the idea that reproducing the features prescribed would lead to the avoidance of failure. Only in the final years of the twentieth century, after considerable development of the sociology of institutions, did awareness emerge that organizations may survive despite judgments that they have failed. In 1989 Meyer and Zucker argued that many “permanently failing organizations” could be identified and their attributes analyzed.

However, even today the features of substantive or actual organizational failures are not seriously analyzed. Today, organizational failures, as indicated by particular measures, are nonetheless thought of as opportunities for learning (Cannon & Edmonson 2005). But when and whether failures are also substantive failures of organization is seldom discussed. It is, obviously, possible to find examples of organizations that have failed in a basic way. A routed army is one. However, instances in which an organization has disintegrated, without some compelling (and usually external) cause, are rare. It is a feature of social organizations that they tend to adapt themselves, despite incipient tendencies to entropy. Because of the evolutionary advantages it confers, a capacity for cooperative activity as well as conflict is deeply rooted in the human psyche. Because this is so, basic organizational failure is unlikely except in extreme or unusual circumstances.

SEE ALSO: Economy (Sociological Approach); Institution; Institutionalism; Management Discourse; Organization Theory; Organizations and the Theory of the Firm; Performance Measurement

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organizational learning

Polly S. Rizova

Organizational learning is a construct employed to depict a set of rational and non rational processes relevant to the creation, retention, and transmission of knowledge in organizations. The concept has been linked to organizational performance, sustainable competitive advantage, organizational transformation and corporate renewal, organizational and technological innovation, and entrepreneurship among other themes. Change, adaptation, and learning have all been used to denote the process by which organizations adjust to their environments; organizational change is often understood as a manifestation of learning. Various conceptions of learning have been advanced in the field; for instance, learning as improving, learning as recording knowledge, and learning as the evolution of knowledge. Research in the area seeks to understand how learning in formal organizations takes place, what its sources are, and what its effect is on the performance and maintenance of organizational stability. For quite some time organizational learning and learning organization were used interchangeably; lately, a somewhat tentative agreement has been established that the two terms are not to be confused. Whereas in the former the emphasis is on learning, and more specifically on the process of learning in organizations, the latter stresses the organization per se. Among the questions addressed by the scholars of organizational learning are: what are the essence and the bases for organizational learning – rational, subconscious, or experiential? Who is the agent of

learning – the individual, the organization, or both? How does organizational learning manifest itself? How is knowledge in organizations acquired, retained, and transferred? What affects the ability of organizations to learn?

This field of organization studies developed in two discrete stages – a theoretical stage, which began in the 1950s and lasted until the late 1980s, and an empirical stage. The theoretical implications of organizational learning have been recognized ever since the notion was introduced in the 1950s with the work of March, Simon, and Cyert. The idea drew a lot of attention as it was regarded as a needed and viable alternative to the rational choice assumptions promoted by economists. It represented an attempt to explain how knowledge, structures, beliefs, and actions of an organization could affect, and in turn be affected by, not necessarily rational and yet critical institutionalization processes. In light of this, March and Simon argued in *Organizations* (1958) that the behavior of organizations is determined by complex and interconnected processes which introduce a significant degree of unpredictability into the decision making process. Organizations react to this challenge by developing highly elaborate, organized sets of responses and operating procedures and they resort to their usage when recurring decision situations arise. In *A Behavioral Theory of the Firm* (1963), Cyert and March advanced the understanding of the organizational learning process by depicting it as a “learning cycle.” Organizations, they argued, respond to environmental upsets by fine tuning the probability of relying on specific operating procedures that have been used successfully in the past. In this view, organizational adaptation is attained through the application of a multi level hierarchy of specific procedures. Organizations use those to respond to externally imposed uncertainties and calamities and to offset them.

The early notions of organizational learning regarded the learning process as a by and large rational response of adaptation to the demands imposed on the firm by an unstable and unpredictable environment. This viewpoint was challenged by March and Olsen (1975), who argued that the assumption on which learning models were built was not viable since ambiguity is both unavoidable and ubiquitous. They proposed,

instead, that under conditions of ambiguity, non rational forces – beliefs, interpretations, trust, and perceptions – shape outcomes. Therefore, improved performance, and positive outcomes in general, are not the only plausible consequences of organizational learning. Since then, researchers have acknowledged that learning could have unintended consequences which could be negative. In light of this insight, Levinthal and March (1981) contested the idea of learning as being rationally adaptive and introduced a formalized learning model under conditions of ambiguity.

Therefore, the origins of the field and its first developmental stages were theoretical. Since the late 1980s and early 1990s, however, particularly with a special issue being devoted to organizational learning by *Organization Science* in 1991, interest in the topic surged and attention shifted from theoretical to empirical investigation. Recent approaches to organizational learning tackle the notions of unlearning and emphasize the creation of routines as storage mechanisms of knowledge (Levitt & March 1988). According to this view, organizational learning is a process, in which new organizational routines are created and old ones are modified in response to experiences and environmental changes; thus, knowledge manifests itself in routines. Examples of organizational routines are organizational strategies, rules and procedures, roles, structures, technologies, as well as cultural practices. These mechanisms are used to record and store the knowledge that is gained from various sources: new insights, past experiences, from putting new structures or systems in place, from actions taken by the organization and by other organizations, as well as from experimentation and failure. Most recently, a new direction of empirical investigation has been under development whose concern is the creation of a community of learners.

Despite the widespread acceptance of the concept of organizational learning, no one theory or model has been generally adopted. Some agreement has been reached, though, on several of the early debates that characterized the field. Among those are: organizational learning is a process; there is a distinction between individual and organizational learning; and there is accord that contextual factors affect

the plausibility of organizational learning taking place. For instance, empirical research has found that the following factors affect organizational learning: organizational and corporate culture, an organization's strategy, and the structure and the degree of complexity and unpredictability of both internal and external environments.

Among the unresolved or partly resolved old debates two stand out in particular: (1) how to explain the linkage between the individual and organizational levels of learning and (2) whether organizational learning implies behavioral or cognitive change and how to reconcile the two.

Central to the topic of learning in organizations is the issue of the level of analysis. In other words, who is the learning agent – the individual or the organization? While the old debate between individual and organization levels of analysis has abated, the role of the group level has become more prominent. In addition, research has expanded to examine learning not only within organizations but also between organizations. The scholarship on technological innovation is a case in point. In this venue, the effect of social networks has received great attention in terms of learning both within and between organizations.

Learning in organizations presupposes that individuals gain knowledge and that which they learn is retained, i.e., stored in routines developed not by organizations but by individual organizational members. Thus, the individuals create and carry out the routines, but the latter acquire a life of their own as they endure even when those who have created them leave the organization. Individual learning, therefore, is a necessary but not a sufficient condition for organizational learning. Institutional processes must be put in place to store and transfer what has been learned by individual members to the organization and back to all organizational members. Furthermore, there has been an agreement that organizational learning is not just the cumulative knowledge possessed by individuals (Fiol & Lyles 1985). Thus, the question that any cross level model needs to provide an answer to is how individual knowledge is shared and how the organizational knowledge, codified in routines and the firm's culture, is transmitted to new and old individual members.

The importance of formal and informal organizational socialization processes through training and mentoring, organizational rituals and ceremonies, and storytelling has been well understood and acknowledged. However, a definitive answer to this question has yet to be found.

A model proposed recently by Crossan et al. (1999) – the 4I framework – addresses several of the above mentioned cross level challenges: it is a multilevel model which aims at bridging the individual, group, and organizational levels of analysis throughout the four processes that constitute organizational learning: Intuiting, Interpreting, Integrating, and Institutionalizing; hence the name – 4I. It is dynamic in the sense that it specifies the mechanisms through which learning occurs and knowledge is created, stored, and transferred at each level as well as between levels. Furthermore, it addresses the question of the nature of organizational learning as conscious, experiential, or subconscious. The model also considers what has been known in the literature as the critical challenge to an organization's strategic renewal – the tension between *exploration* (novelty, new learning) and *exploitation* (continuity, using what has been learned).

While the first debate in the field of organizational learning concerns the levels of analysis, the second one looks at the content of organizational learning and adaptation. In this regard, a distinction has been drawn between cognition and behavior. Fiol and Lyles (1985) depict the difference in a sense that *learning* reflects changes in cognition whereas *adaptation* reflects changes in behavior. The cognitive approach emphasizes content at the individual level; it focuses upon the production and sharing of beliefs, as well as on the preservation and dissemination of knowledge. From this perspective, organizational learning is understood as changes in the belief systems. Most of the research in this perspective is based on interpretive methodologies, such as case studies. In contrast, the behavioral approach concentrates on the development of new responses or actions at the organizational level. Examined behaviorally, the focus of learning is on those changes that the organizations create and implement as a response to their own experiences and the

environmental conditions. Researchers study organizations in this perspective by examining the changes in organizational structures, technologies, systems, and routines. The most often used methods of inquiry are those of quantitative studies and simulations.

The tension between these two aspects of learning comes as a result of the fact that cognition and behavior do not necessarily occur in parallel. In other words, it is plausible that changes in behavior may take place without the development of cognitive associations and changes. Vice versa, learning may or may not lead to changes in behavior or organizational performance. For instance, small and incremental behavioral changes do not necessarily result in important learning. At the same time, there is no empirical evidence that suggests that large scale behavioral changes would lead to proportionally large changes in cognitive associations. Fiol and Lyles (1985) illustrate this point by using the example of the wave of mergers in the 1960s when rapid and profound changes were taking place in the forms of acquisition and yet in the absence of learning. When studying organizational behavior under conditions of immense uncertainty and crisis, Starbuck and colleagues (1978) found that the firms' response was to keep introducing various changes in the hope that one will eventually work. The issue that scholars in the field grapple with is how and in what ways might this tension be resolved and the two perspectives integrated. In recent years the debate about it has subsided as researchers have been more willing to accommodate both aspects under a broader definition of organizational learning.

At present, there are several challenges that are either taking place or beginning to appear in the field and which contain potential for future research. Further exploration and successful reconciliation of the strenuous linkage between behavior and cognition is one. Yet another link remains grossly underexplored – that between organizational learning and power, leadership, and the politics of institutionalization. The question of the nature of organizational learning – whether it is a rational solitary experience or is based on daily social interaction – needs a more definitive answer too. Other unresolved issues are those of

methodology – whether quantitative or interpretive studies are more likely to provide answers to the main questions in the field – and where the boundary of organizational learning as a field of organization studies lies. These issues reflect the growing uncertainty of the distinction between organizational learning and knowledge management.

SEE ALSO: Change Management; Knowledge Management; Management Innovation; Organizations; Performance Measurement; Social Movements; Technological Innovation

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organizations

Stephen Hunt

A broad definition of an organization could be said to be that of any purposeful arrangement of social activity that implies active control over human relations ordered for particular ends. In this sense, organizations involve patterns of relationships beyond primary group associations that are largely spontaneous, unplanned, and informal, and that are typified by kinship relations, peer groups, and localized community networks. There is, however, no generally accepted definition of an organization since its meaning may vary in terms of the different sociological approaches applied to the subject. Moreover, while organizations may be deliberately constructed or reconstructed for specific ends, the problem of definition founders on the specification of “organizational goals,” since groups and individuals within organizations may hold a variety of different and competing goals and the level of compliance and cooperation displayed by subordinates may vary, thus leading to the distinction between “formal” and “informal” organizations.

There are numerous existing sociological frameworks of organizational analysis and many have sought to categorize their forms by recourse to various criteria. For example, by using a classification of motivation behind adhering to organizational authority, Amitai Etzioni (1975) identifies three types. Those who work for remuneration are members of a utilitarian organization. Large commercial enterprises, for instance, generate profits for their owners and offer remuneration in the form of salaries and wages for employees. Joining utilitarian organizations is usually a matter of individual choice, although the purpose is that of income. Individuals joining normative organizations do so not for remuneration but to pursue goals they consider morally worthwhile, perhaps typified by voluntary organizations, political parties, and numerous other confederations concerned with specific issues. Finally, in Etzioni’s typology, coercive organizations are distinguished by involuntary membership which forces members to join by coercion or for punitive reasons.

Max Weber (1946 [1921]), to whom the first comprehensive sociological treatment of organizations is usually attributed, offered a distinction between modern bureaucracies and other forms of organization (*Verband*). Weber pointed out that patterns of authority in previous forms of organization did not conform to what he regarded as his typology of “legal rational” authority that infused the modern bureaucracy. Formal organizations, however, as Weber accounts, dated back to antiquity. The elites who ruled early empires, ranging from Babylonian, Egyptian, to Chinese, relied on government officials to extend their domination over large subject populations and vast geographical areas. Formal organizations, and their attendant bureaucratic structures, consequently allowed rulers to administer through the collection of taxes, military campaigns, and construction projects.

Typically, cultural patterns in pre industrial societies placed greater importance on preserving the past and tradition than on establishing rationally oriented organizational structures. The systems of authority underlying early organization forms were, in Weber’s typology, “affectual” or “emotional” loyalties or those solicited from custom or force of habit. In their rationalized bureaucratic form, Weber identified organizations as pervading the structures of modernity and holding increasing sway over human life, including the agencies of the state, business enterprises, education, infirmaries, the military, political parties, penal or rehabilitation institutions, and even religious establishments. This hegemonic hold of such organizations was also exemplified in Etzioni’s famous statement that “we are born in organizations, educated by organizations, and most of us spend much of our lives working for organizations” (1975: 1). There were various historical reasons identified by Weber for this expanding mode of bureaucratic existence. These included, in the West at least, the overlapping developments of the calculated pursuit of profit in the emergent capitalization of the marketplace, the diffused Protestant work ethic, an advanced form of geographical communication, the growth of representative democracy, and inscribed for mats of legal regulations.

Weber considered the bureaucratic organizational type to be the clearest expression of a

rational worldview because its principal elements were intended to achieve specific goals as efficiently as possible. In short, Weber asserted that bureaucracy transformed the nature of western society in the same way that industrialization revolutionized the economy – pointing out that large capitalist enterprises are unequaled models of strict bureaucratic organizations. In his exploration of their proliferation, Weber’s “ideal type” bureaucracy displayed a number of overlapping characteristics. Firstly, there is the distinguishing feature of specialization. Throughout most of human history, social activity was dominated by the pursuit of the basic goals of securing food and shelter. Bureaucracy, by contrast, assigns to individuals highly specialized duties. Secondly, bureaucracies arrange personnel in a vertical hierarchy of offices. Each official is thus supervised by superiors in the organization, while in turn supervising others in lower positions. Thirdly, rules and regulations replace cultural traditions through operations guided by rationally enacted rules and regulations. These rules control not only the organization’s own functioning but also, as much as possible, its larger environment. Hence, a bureaucracy seeks to operate in a completely predictable fashion. Thirdly, a bureaucratic organization anticipates that officials will have the technical competence to administer their official duties. It follows that bureaucracies regularly monitor the performance of staff members. Such impersonal evaluation based on performance contrasts sharply with the custom or patronage which informed earlier forms of organization. Fourthly, in bureaucratic organizations rules take precedence over personal caprice, encouraging uniform treatment for each client as well as other officials. Finally, rather than casual verbal communication, bureaucracies rest on formal, written reports which subsequently underpin their mode of operation.

While Weber recognized the unparalleled efficiency of bureaucratic organizations, he identified them as simultaneously generating widespread alienation. The stifling regulation and dehumanization of the “iron cage” that came with expanding bureaucracy led to an increasing “disenchantment with the world.” Bureaucracies, Weber warned, tended to treat people as objects and a series of “cases” rather

than as unique individuals. Moreover, working for large organizations demanded specialized and often tedious routines. Weber therefore envisaged modern society as a vast and growing system of rules seeking to regulate everything and threatening to crush the human spirit. Weber also predicted that the same rationality would overspill into other aspects of social existence and subject individuals to apathetic functionaries. In total, bureaucratic rationality stifled creativity and turned on its creators and enslaved them, reducing the official to “only a small cog in a ceaselessly fixed routine of march.”

The alienating nature of organizations was much later to inform such works as that of George Ritzer in his account of “McDonaldization,” whereby the rationalizing processes of production in large scale capitalist enterprises entail “efficiency,” the quickest and most effective way of reaching a goal; “calculability,” mass produced uniformity according to a calculated plan; “uniformity” and “predictability,” which result from a highly rational system of organization that specifies every course of action and leaves nothing to chance; and technological “control” over people and eventually automation, which replaces even the standardized operations of individual workers. In echoing Weber’s fear that rationality may be irrational in its consequences, Ritzer suggests that the “ultimate irrationality” of such processes has a tendency to contaminate other dimensions of social existence and brings the danger that “people could lose control over the system and it would come to control us” (Ritzer 1993: 145).

Weber also added to his fears the observation that the “technical superiority” of bureaucracies was not necessarily superior. Neither, he asserted, was it excluded from personalized interests that were typified by the pursuit of the accumulation of capital. On the latter count, one of the major foci of the extensive literature from the 1970s was on the politico economic environment which circumscribed organizational dynamics. In this respect, Marxist interest in the nature of organizations offered far reaching critiques of bureaucracies, particularly in their relations with state and corporate power, alongside an assessment of the embedded interests of professional groupings in organizational life. Such a perspective threw light upon the nature

of domination observable through systems of repression and exploitation.

Weber’s fear that bureaucracies were not devoid of personalized interests was taken to its furthest extreme by another classical theorist of organizations, Robert Michels (1958 [1915]). Michels’s dictum of the “iron law of oligarchy” supposed that organizational control inevitably gave way to elitist rule that negated democratic participation. This was exemplified by political parties, which tended to have a tendency to replace organization controls with those at the apex of the organizational hierarchy. Hence, a position of dominance invariably led to the pursuit of interest even in opposition to stated organizational goals, alongside the recruitment of underlings involving a system of patronage and deference.

The early critiques of organizational functionality did not, however, curtail the tendency for the discipline of sociology to view the organization as a central hallmark of modernity. This explains the normative appeal of particular schools of organization theory that dominated for so long within the discipline. A yardstick of such an attraction was inherent in the mid twentieth century analytical frameworks of the structural functionalist accounts of Talcott Parsons, who established an organizational typology that was underpinned by rational instrumentality (Parsons 1960). In short, functional imperatives and rules established a relationship between the needs of organizations as organic social systems and individual and collective roles and motivations.

The structural functionalist analysis of organization provided a theoretical paradigm that was subsequently subject to attempts to elaborate upon a fairly simplistic model. One challenge was to identify and explain dysfunctional aspects of the organizational structure. A common assumption was that any potential temporary disequilibrium was likely to be generated by one element in the organic system changing more rapidly than others. In contrast, Robert Merton saw the potential for dysfunction built into the very nature of organizational life (Merton 1968). To this end, he coined the term “bureaucratic ritual” to designate a preoccupation with rules and regulations to the point of thwarting an organization’s goals. For Merton, ritualism impedes individual and organizational

performance since it tends to stifle creativity and innovation. In part, ritualism emerges because organizations, which pay modest fixed salaries, provide officials little or no financial stake in performing efficiently. Merton further argued that if bureaucrats have little motivation to be efficient, their principal incentive derives from endeavors to sustain employment. Hence, officials typically strive to perpetuate their organization even when its purpose has been fulfilled. The result has frequently been termed “bureaucratic inertia” – the tendency of organizations to perpetuate themselves even beyond their former objectives – and this is one of the reasons why, in his account of bureaucracy, Weber wrote that “once fully established, bureaucracy is among the social structures which are hardest to destroy.”

A further critique of the structural functionalist framework was developed by theorists such as Crozier (1964) and Simon (1976 [1945]), who suggested that far from exhibiting an underlying principle of rationality, organizations were best identified by fragility, instability, and weakly integrated internal relations. Organizations were thus best appraised as a conglomeration of conflicts, adjustments, and negotiations. Ironically, then, an efficient organization was not necessarily one tending toward an equilibrium and ordered functioning, but one of complexity, compromise, and uncertainty. Such concepts as Simon’s “bounded rationality” and Crozier’s view of organizational power as being essentially problematic were to become associated with “contingency theory,” which pinpointed the dynamics of internal competing forces. Put succinctly, organizations could no longer be conceived as unified organic systems based on rationalizing prerequisites.

In questioning the efficiency of formal rules and regulations, Blau (1963) insisted that unofficial practices are an established and vital part of the structure of all organizations, serving to increase internal efficiency. In particular, it is via informal networks that information and experience are shared and problem solving facilitated. Hence, knowledge of complex regulations is widened, leading to time saving and efficiency, while consultation transforms the organizational staff from a disparate collection of officials into a cohesive working group. Moreover, informality may help to legitimate needs

sometimes overlooked by formal regulation, or may amount to “cutting corners” in the carrying out of duties in order to simplify the means to achieve specified goals. Thus, paradoxically, unofficial practices which are explicitly prohibited by official regulations may further the achievement of organizational objectives.

Other accounts conceptualized environmental effects within the context of the particular goals established by organizations. While different types of environments were surveyed, a popular theme has been the dynamics of entrepreneurial organizations within the market economy. The indications are that they involve a complex web of interdependence and institutional laws that tend to limit organizational dependency in an uncertain economic environment and thus render them dysfunctional: for example, deliberately overproducing or selectively promoting new products. Economists such as Eggertsson (1990) also addressed the nature of organizational practice through what came to be known as the “new institutionalism.” Inherent in this developing critique was the insistence that goal oriented rationality actually provides constraints in the dynamics of bureaucratic structures, especially in terms of the transaction cost endeavors of some forms of organization.

Despite the apparently dysfunctional aspects of a good deal of organizational life, the normative stance that was engrained in structural functionalist perspectives retained its appeal in neorationalist theory. Basic to this school of thought was that functional rationality should remain a desirable and reachable ideal. This view identified organizational managers as the strategic agents in determining roles, goals, and the nature of the organizational structure. Recognizing the actual or potential failures of organizational life, managers were held to be the gatekeepers in identifying goals–means imperatives and ideally responsible for rational order and behavior, while simultaneously accountable for necessary innovation and change. Integral to such an approach was the flexibility demanded by rapidly changing technological systems, the important role of human resource management, and adaptation to environmental conditions.

The postmodern approach to organizations is clearly currently increasingly influential. It has tended to deny the previous sociological

preoccupation with organizational analysis. This is because postmodern accounts, which center on the application of literary and cultural theorizing, lead to the neglect or denial of structural theory in any shape or form. The increasing popularity of a postmodern approach, with its central concern of deconstructionism, has in turn added to a further development in organization study and theorizing: its increasing fragmentation and isolation. However, as noted above, organizational analysis, especially in the United States, continues to focus on the intricacies of structure, systems, hierarchy, and technology. Thus there remains an enduring interest in the relationship between organizations and their wider environment, particularly with macroeconomic factors and the dynamics of the contemporary marketplace.

The work of Foucault (1975), to some degree at least, has informed postmodern concerns. Marking a radical departure from the structural analysis of organizational study, Foucault's historical interpretations have attempted to uncover discursive systems that permeate the growth of coercive institutions, including organizational forms which exerted an all embracing domination over the human subject. Of particular influence has been Foucault's exploration of "surveillance" and discipline in the industrial and institutional fields of the state, and the ways in which new forms of production of information and knowledge led to relations of power in organizational life. Put succinctly, Foucault's concern with the growth of organizational control turned upon a historical appraisal of the role of "mass" organizations in the control, discipline, and surveillance of subject social groups in such settings as the mental hospital, penal institutions, and the large scale armed forces.

There have proved to be numerous other threads discernible in the postmodern approach to organizations. Overall, however, postmodernists have offered a new wave of critique derived from broader philosophies of culture and language that constitute a thorough undermining of the "project" of modernity. In contradiction to earlier organization theory is the focus on the subjectivity and random nature of "truth" claims and instrumental rationalities at the core of modern organizations. This move away to a postmodern scrutiny of organizations emphasizes the discursive practices of bureaucratic life

and its theorization. Nonetheless, the postmodern analysis of organizations, their agencies and operation, has also taken off in other directions that embrace the problematic areas of management, performance, and productivity. For instance, Clegg (1990) observes that capital oriented organizations in a post Fordist economy have often developed as conglomerates with distinct elements dealing with different aspects of the marketplace. The strategy for the company does not therefore originate from a central source coordinating the activities of diverse parts of the conglomerate. Instead, strategy originates from members of the organization with "core competencies," that is, a particular expertise in the area on which the organization concentrates.

In addition to such areas of focus, many other sociological concerns have emerged in organizational studies which would appear to be concomitant with postmodernity: the emergence of micro level "spontaneous" and temporary forms of organization such as self help groups and those expressing a variety of mutual interests. Many such forms of organization may be derived from primary association, which subsequently and ironically renders a reworking of those definitions of organizations from which the subdiscipline of sociology initially emerged.

SEE ALSO: Bureaucracy and Public Sector Governmentality; Democracy and Organizations; Institutional Theory, New; Oligarchy and Organization; Organization Theory; Organizational Failure; Organizations as Coercive Institutions; Organizations as Social Structures; Organizations as Total Institutions; Organizations, Voluntary; Political Parties; Postmodern Organizations

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organizations as coercive institutions

Joseph Soeters

Coercive organizations are the state's instruments used to ensure safety and public order both of its borders and within its borders. As such, these organizations are authorized to approach the general public in a coercive manner and – in the last resort – they are legitimized to use force and violence against those who intend to harm the interests of the state and its citizens. The military, the gendarmerie (Carabinieri, Guardia Civil, Jandarmerie), and the police as well as fire guards and forest rangers all belong to this specific category of organizations. The police and fire guards traditionally have an internal role, whereas the military has as its primary task protecting the state against threats from abroad. However, these distinctions are not always and everywhere clear. In many countries, including in Western Europe, the military is sometimes called upon to perform internal tasks, whereas police officers increasingly are sent to distant regions outside their own nation state.

Coercive organizations are peculiar, in particular with respect to the way they treat their personnel. Personnel employed by coercive organizations are highly visible because of their

uniforms; they are trained in specific educational institutions such as military, police, and firefighting academies; they are on permanent, 24 hour call with rather idiosyncratic working hours, whereby their leave is subject to cancellation; and the work in coercive organizations may be dangerous and potentially life threatening, for which reason personnel are usually armed or at least equipped with protective materials (Soeters 2000).

As the state's instruments, coercive organizations need to be fundamentally non discriminatory toward citizens and as a principle they need to comply with decisions taken by elected politicians. If coercive organizations fail to do so, they threaten one of the cornerstones of modern democracy (Caforio 2003). In non democratic states, coercive organizations may – and indeed sometimes do – take over power if they deem the political situation to be dangerous to their country. The 1981 attack by a few Guardia Civil officers on the Spanish Parliament was the most recent incident in this respect to have occurred in Western Europe, but in many other parts of the world – particularly in Africa – such threats are still present.

ORGANIZATIONAL FEATURES

Coercive organizations are relatively isolated from society, although the level of isolation varies: clearly, the police are more a part of every day societal life than the military or fire squads. Coercive organizations experience a strong communal life without much privacy, a condition that starts in the training institutes and is continued throughout the whole working career (Lang 1965). Personnel in coercive organizations know each other very well, their personal and working lives tend to overlap, and their career orientation is traditionally internally directed. For instance, traditional police force members tend to see themselves as cops for the rest of their lives. New personnel are frequently recruited from channels related to personnel already in the organization, such as family or friends. Hence, it helps if one has a father who is a police officer. In the military, female personnel very often marry colleagues from within their own organization, even from within their own unit. As such, coercive organizations'

cultures tend to be clearly more collectivistic than organizational cultures in civilian companies (Soeters 2000).

Furthermore, coercive organizations are known for their visible, steep hierarchies and elaborate organizational structures based on a strong, functional division of labor. These structural elements are formalized in documents containing detailed rules and regulations. However, who commands who can even be inferred from the insignia on the uniforms, and there is no discussion about this: rank equals authority. More than in civilian organizations, employees in coercive organizations are used to experiencing relatively high degrees of power asymmetry (Soeters 2000). Relatedly, they know that disobedience can result in overt punishment, and hence discipline is an ingrained characteristic of coercive organizations' cultures. In addition, rules are important to avoid insecurity concerning how to implement the organization's policies, and the use of violence in particular. The organizational output may impact on people's life and death, and for that reason coercive organizations attract considerable political and social attention, through extensive coverage by the mass media.

Coercive organizations do not always maintain an action ready pose: fire guards even know the distinction between "cold" and "hot" organization, but that distinction applies to the police and the military as well. The "cold" organization obviously does not face the heat of fires and crises, and hence it comprises more white collar work (although performed in uniform), more planning, more meetings, paperwork, quality and cost control as well as more bureaucratic politics. It is the world of the "management cops" and the "office generals." As such, it conforms to the image of the classical bureaucracy. At the level of the rank and file, the "cold" organization is continuously preparing for the worst case through exercises and simulations in garrison, barracks, or on routine sailing missions. Personnel in the "cold" organization often complain about boredom, stimulus deprivation, perceptions of underutilization, and concerns for privacy. Such matters require specific leadership attention. To compensate for the lack of real action, the "cold" organization attaches high significance to ceremonial practices such as parades

and flag showing, events that – again – are based on discipline and obedience.

The "hot" organization, on the other hand, is built around flexible groups having all the characteristics of either the simple ("one leader") structure or – when explicitly based on self managing – the adhocracy. For employees in the "hot" organization, local response and flexibility are more important than preplanned and "packaged" solutions to problems. Street police officers as well as the military in action have a sense of territoriality ("this place belongs to us"), and they develop their own informal codes of conduct that stress safety, comradeship, but often also cynicism and suspicion (Tonry & Morris 1997). They are often full of "us" and "them" classifications: "them" being the enemy, the criminals, the general public, the media, but also the managers in the "cold" organization. Since personnel in the "hot" organization generally are rather distressed, they need to stick together emotionally, creating outside groups to resist. Sometimes this leads to improper actions and malfeasance, such as corruption, discrimination, and even the beating up or killing of innocent people. Both the police and the military are occasionally accused of committing such crimes.

DEVELOPMENTS

Like most other organizations, coercive organizations experience continuous changes in their task environment and are subject to influences exerted by society at large.

First, coercive organizations are tending to become more active. Probably this is a result of an increasingly critical attitude among the general public that wants "value for money." The police, of course, have always been operational on a day to day basis, but fire guards, who used to wait for the next fire, are currently initiating activities to prevent fires and explosions. For instance, they develop educational programs to help the general public take preventive measures to preclude dangerous situations. The European military has experienced similar developments since the end of the Cold War. Since the 1990s military forces from all around the world have increasingly been engaged in peacekeeping operations, such as in

the former Yugoslavia, Afghanistan, and in various African regions. Being active on an every day basis provides the military and fire guards with continuous "reality checks" from outside the organization; nowadays they receive considerably more feedback than before. The general public, local populations, authorities, NGOs, the media, politicians, and other coercive organizations are all likely to circulate indications of the coercive organizations' performance. According to organization theory (Adler & Borys 1996: 82-3), this particular situation will make the nature of coercive organizations less classically bureaucratic, i.e., less hierarchical and less based on strict compliance with detailed rules and orders from above. This situation, added to the geographical dispersion of the organization's current activities, necessitates the transfer of responsibilities to lower levels in the organization. Hence, the bureaucratic character of the coercive organization is gradually becoming more "enabling." This implies that the rank and file in the organization will need to behave more autonomously and in a self steering way, albeit in concordance with the organization's general philosophies, standard operating procedures, and frames of references. Such a development is not solely the result of organizational changes. The personnel's increasing educational level is conducive to this development as well. In this way, coercive organizations, such as the military and fire guards, gradually will start to resemble the police and most civilian organizations, which have always been more influenced by reality checks from outside the organization.

A second development relates to the normative orientation of the employees. Coercive organizations' employees have traditionally been motivated by the institution itself. The only thing that traditionally mattered in their working life was the military (or the police, or the fire guard) and the values for which it stood: the nation or constitution, the king or the queen, the safety of society and the general public. In the sociology of the military (Moskos & Wood 1988; Caforio 2003) this is indicated as the institutional orientation. On the other hand – and this seems to be a manifestation of modern times – employees increasingly tend to see working with the military (or the police or the fire guard)

as "just another job." They are progressively becoming more oriented toward continuing their career outside the organization; they are increasingly striving for market wages; and they prefer to acquire educational qualifications that can also be utilized outside the organization. This attitude is labeled as the occupational orientation. It should be noted that this modern work orientation is not the result of changing attitudes among employees only. Increasingly, coercive organizations themselves – the military, in particular – want their personnel (service personnel and officers) to leave the organization after a specific contract period. Such a policy is part of a general organizational ambition to become more flexible and reduce labor costs.

A third development concerns the internationalization of the coercive organizations' activities. When crime crosses borders, the police should deploy actions on a scale that goes beyond national borders. In the post 1990 era, military operations have become inherently international. The international character of an operation contributes to its legitimacy; furthermore, internationalization has become inevitable, because most of today's downsized militaries are no longer capable of carrying out large operations independently. This implies that coercive organizations increasingly need to work together with organizations from other nationalities; such collaborations can also create greater legitimacy than if just one power dispatches its troops alone. The problems that arise correspondingly resemble the issues that civilian companies face when getting involved in a multinational merger or acquisition. It has been demonstrated that coercive organizations display their own national styles of organizing and operating (Soeters et al. 1995; Soeters 2000). The interaction between these various national styles need not necessarily be problematic, but if not well managed it may lead to frictions, misunderstandings, and even severe mutual blame behavior. One way to avoid such problems is to separate the various national organizations, allocating to each its own area of responsibility. This has been a dominant strategy in the former Yugoslavia. But often such a solution is impossible. In that instance, proper cultural awareness and sensitivity among commanding officers are required to prevent the operation ending in failure and fiasco.

Fourth, our world is increasingly becoming multicultural (Kymlicka 2001). Within nation states indigenous peoples, migrants, and other cultural minorities are strengthening their identities and claiming their citizen rights. These rights may concern language issues, religious affairs, educational policies, and media facilities. For the police and the armed forces this development has important consequences. Often, coercive organizations have not enlisted many representatives of these minority groups and, due to their lack of educational qualifications, those who are recruited generally do not attain the highest ranks. Until World War II, for instance, African Americans were not allowed to become pilots in the US Airforce, because they were not deemed talented enough to master the complex aircraft. Of course, such policies are highly problematic since they are inherently discriminatory, but they also damage the interests of the coercive organization itself because recruiting pools are reduced as a result (Soeters & van der Meulen 1999). It is hardly surprising that this US Airforce policy was banned as soon as the number of suitable candidates no longer met the increasing demand for pilots during the war. Even more questionable is another aspect. If minority groups are barely represented in the police or the armed forces, it is likely that the coercive organizations' personnel are prejudiced toward those particular minority groups. This may lead to serious malfeasance when the coercive organization is called upon to take action with respect to these specific groups. In Bolivia such a situation occurred in 2003 when indigenous people protested against rising prices and unemployment; the army (having a better reputation than the police) was ordered to calm the situation, which they did by killing 100 protesting citizens. Since then, the government resigned and the new government has forced the military to open up its organization for young men and women from indigenous groups. In many other ethnic conflicts similar behavior by police and armed forces (including non-intervention when one ethnic group attacks another) has been reported (e.g., Tambiah 1996).

A comparable but less problematic issue concerns the integration of women. Due to their affinity with violence and physical action, coercive organizations have always had the

reputation of being "masculine" (Soeters & van der Meulen 1999; Caforio 2003). Clearly, until some 25 years ago armed forces, fire guards, and the police were largely the "playground" of men only. Even now, the number of women in the armed forces ranges from a negligible 1 percent (Italy, Turkey) to 15 percent (US). But these numbers are likely to increase, and the police currently have considerably higher numbers of women among their rank and file and commanding officers. This does not imply that problems with respect to the integration of women in coercive organizations are absent; sexual harassment still seems to be more prevalent than in civilian organizations, although its occurrence, if proven, is fiercely punished. However, this issue seems to pale in comparison with the integration of minority groups in coercive organizations.

REMAINING ISSUES

Coercive organizations are in a process of permanent development. Issues with respect to effectiveness and efficiency still remain to be solved. The ratio between input of resources and output – preventing and fighting disorder – is usually vague and often perplexing. The Bolivian army, for instance, is twice as large as the Canadian or the Dutch armies, a size which is legitimized by reference to possible threats from neighboring countries which, in the past, have invaded the country, such as Chile in 1879 and Paraguay in 1932. There is another problem as well. The number of deployed military units or policing units on the street compared to personnel in the office (the "cold" organization) is frequently surprisingly low, a general complaint heard among the general public with respect to the police. As regards the western armed forces, it is an opinion often voiced by NATO officials. In general, remonstrations are expressed concerning the lack of coercive organizations' flexibility. If the input–output ratio turns out to be too low, it implies that either the number of actions needs to increase or the resources on the input side could be cut. Hence, the current struggle against decreasing resources is likely to continue for most coercive organizations, not only in the western hemisphere.

Coercive organizations are subject to massive attention from the media, politics, and the

general public. It is this fact, combined with an almost worldwide aversion to killing and getting killed (the latter is also known as casualty aversion), which restrains coercive organizations from acting in the way they were free to do in recent historical times. The US armed forces suffered 50,000 casualties during the Vietnam War (1975), a number far from being reached in the Iraq operations at the beginning of the twenty first century. People, especially mothers, but also unions, nowadays would never accept the loss of lives that they did only 30 years ago. It is a development that can be seen on a world wide scale, including, for instance, in Russia. If being killed is less acceptable than it used to be, killing is no longer an option either. Every action where not only bystanders but also enemies and criminals die (or are tortured) will be subject to scrutiny. Sometimes this leads to the disbanding of whole units, as happened with a Canadian airborne regiment that saw an innocent boy beaten up and killed during a mission in Somalia.

Permanent downsizing and the cry for more flexibility on the one hand, and an ever increasing critical general public on the other, lead to a situation where privatization of coercive activities tends to become a new solution in both the military and the armed forces (Tonry & Morris 1997; Singer 2004). Private coercive organizations are likely to be more flexible and less scrutinized by the media, politics, and the general public. As far as the military is concerned, private military companies have recently played decisive roles in actions in African and Middle Eastern regions. But those private coercive organizations evade the political and civilian control that democracies have always made a cornerstone of their constitutional arrangements.

SEE ALSO: Bureaucracy and Public Sector Governmentality; Bureaucratic Personality; Change Management; Culture, Organizations and; Military Sociology; Organization Theory; Organizations as Total Institutions; Police

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organizations and sexuality

Jeff Hearn

The recognition of sexuality as a central feature of organization(s) is relatively recent, and prompted by a range of disciplinary and theoretical positions. Foremost of these is second wave feminism, highlighting concerns with women's control over their bodies and sexuality, and offering critiques of the sexualization of organizations and sexist uses of sexuality, in advertising and other organizational displays. A second force for change has been the modern lesbian and gay movements. Another stimulus

has been poststructuralist and postcolonial theory. The most profound impact of such moves has been in problematizing sexuality, especially heterosexuality, and essentialized, naturalized views of sexuality, and, with queer theory, “homosexuality” too.

A strong empirical focus on sexuality and organizations has developed in four main ways. A first aspect was journalistic and political interventions in naming repeated, unwanted sexual behavior as sexual harassment in the mid 1970s. There followed general social analyses, detailed examinations of legal cases, and broad sexual social surveys (Gutek 1985), establishing the pervasiveness of sexual harassment by men. Second, there have been empirical studies of heterosexual relationships and sexual liaisons in organizations. Third, another empirical strand developed in the 1980s on lesbians’ and gay men’s experiences in organizations, particularly, though not only, of discrimination and violation. These were often initially part of campaigns or other political interventions. More recent studies have examined the wider experiences of lesbians and gay men throughout organizations, including business, police, military, community, and public service sectors (Humphrey 2000; Lehtonen & Mustola 2004).

Fourth, there have been case studies of specific organizations, including how sexuality may link to appointment processes, reinforcement of gender power relations, managerial controls, and shopfloor dynamics. These build on established case study research on sexuality in total institutions. For example, prisons can be understood as organizations that control sexual relations, as well as creating new possibilities for different sexualities and, indeed, sexual violences. In several workplace case studies, Cockburn (1983, 1991) has examined how men maintain and reproduce power over women in workplaces, including by sexual domination alongside labor market domination. Pringle (1988) has analyzed bureaucracies and boss–secretary relationships and has recorded the pervasiveness of gender and sexual power in organizations. Drawing critically on poststructuralist theory, she has charted how gender/sexual power relations operate in multiple directions and may be understood more fully through psychodynamic, unconscious, and fantasy processes.

These empirical studies have been accompanied by more general reviews of the place of sexuality in organizations. The text “*Sex at Work*” (Hearn & Parkin 1995 [1987]) outlined ways in which organizations construct sexuality, sexuality constructs organizations, and organizations and sexuality may occur simultaneously: hence the notion of “organization sexuality.” This simultaneous phenomenon may occur in terms of movement and proximity, feelings and emotions, ideology and consciousness, and language and imagery. The concepts of sexual work/labor and sexual labor power are developed, as is perhaps clearest in some retail, advertising, tourism, and leisure industries. Such themes were explored further in *The Sexuality of Organization* (Hearn et al. 1989). The contributors, in different ways, placed sexuality as a very important element in understanding organizational processes, not just something to be added to analysis. Thus, sexual processes and organizational processes are intimately connected, in both the general structuring of organizations and the detail of everyday interaction. Both general and empirical studies emphasize interconnections of sexuality and power in organizations, including the problem of men’s power (Gruber & Morgan 2005) and the “male sexual narrative.” Some studies recognize the homosexual or homosocial subtext in men’s relations with each other, for example, in (homo)sexualized forms of horseplay between men identifying as heterosexual.

Organizations, or at least most organizations, can be understood as *sexuated*, that is, having meaning in relation to sexuality rather than specifically sexualized. This is for several reasons. First, sexual arrangements in private domains provide the base infrastructure, principally through women’s unpaid labor in families, for public domain organizations. Second, most organizations continue to exist through dominant heterosexual norms, ideologies, ethics, and practices, for example, in constructions of men top managers’ wives. Third, organizational goals and beneficiaries relate to sexuality in many ways, including sexploitation organizations (e.g., sex trade), sexual service organizations (e.g., sex therapy), mutual sexual organizations (e.g., lesbian and gay telephone lines), subordinated sexual organizations (where members’ sexual interests appear subordinated

to “non sexual” organizational tasks) (Hearn & Parkin 1995 [1987]). Fourth, gender and sexuality interrelate, intimately and definitionally; it is rather difficult to conceive of gender and sexuality without the other. Fifth, despite links between sexuality and gender, empirical distinctions can be made between sexual and gender dynamics in organizations, for example, in terms of presence/absence of organizational members with different genders and sexualities. Sixth, we live in a period of historical transformation of sexuality, sex trade, and sexual violence, not least with global information and communication technologies (Hearn & Parkin 2001).

Analysis of organizations and sexuality also raises more general theoretical issues: relations of work/labor and sexuality; status of “the economic,” specifically capitalism, in constructions of sexuality; relations of material oppressions and discourse; intersectionalities between age, class, disability, ethnicity, gender, generation, “race,” religion, and violence in analyzing organizations and sexuality. Critiques of (hetero) sexuality lead onto consideration of relations of surface/appearance and reality/knowledge, in terms of the sexuality of dress or the epistemological significance of looks/appearance for gender analysis. Overall, organizations can be understood as structured, gendered/sexuated, sexually encoded (re)productions, for both organizational members and organizational analysts.

SEE ALSO: Feminism; Feminism, First, Second, and Third Waves; Gender, Work, and Family; Gendered Organizations/Institutions; Queer Theory; Sex and Gender; Sexual Harassment; Sexual Markets, Commodification, and Consumption

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organizations as social structures

Randy Martin

Organizations as social structures is a perspective that focuses on the hardware of human association, the durable factors that govern people's ways of being together as they achieve common goals by coordinated means. As it has been understood in the literature, social structure is what permits the organization's persistence over time; it describes relations among differentiated positions, and references an agency or institutional will that transcends that of individuals. Structure implies wholeness rather than aggregates, predictable patterns of transformation, self regulation, and closure. Structure itself is a term borrowed from architecture, hence the spatial emphasis on prescribed places that people can inhabit. But if the architect designs the structure before it is inhabited, the organizational cognate can be discerned only after the fact by means of analysis. As the building goes up, its structure is visible to the untrained eye. Only the effects of social structures are visibly manifest in human

responses to institutional circumstances – their material is not so much physical as latent. Organizational studies would need to be devised to disclose the plans and patterns of the social edifice.

The possibility of identifying structure rested upon a positive disposition toward the nature of society; namely, that the interconnections among persons were an entity in their own right, but also that these fixtures bore the properties of reason. Society is rational, and structures are the register in which rules can be read. The historical and conceptual novelty and gain of such a sweeping claim needs to be appreciated in relation to its opposite. The rationalistic view confronted the conviction that human action is given by nature, directed from without by omnipotent figures, and that local acts of common people are devoid of logic, insignificant, unworthy of serious attention. The anxieties swirling around the turbulence of market societies derived from the concern that those displaced from traditional beliefs and dispossessed from their ways of life constituted a mass that would devolve into a mob, threatening public order and property. The emerging sociological profile was Janus faced: modern society was rule giving, but also generated its own forms of unreason; it normalized but engendered abnormality; it imposed association in common but was riven by conflict. As organizational studies coalesced in the twentieth century around the notion of social structure, they undertook the analysis of these societal antagonisms in terms that could be either apologetic or critical.

INTELLECTUAL ORIGINS

Early organizational studies, whether prescriptive like those of Taylor (1911) and Fayol (1919) or more predictive like Roethlisberger and Dickson (1939) or Roy (1952), were oriented toward most effective maximization of effort for the reasonableness of profit taking work. Barnard (1938) and Selznick (1948) launched the turn toward structure by treating the organization as a *sui generis* entity, an adaptive system in its own right. The concern with labor control that had been so explicit in the first studies seemed masked by the claims that

organization was a universal form that transcended the particularities of the workplace. Yet the seminal studies of the 1950s reflected as much economic changes that increased public sector employment (Selznick 1949), deepened unionization (Gouldner 1954; Lipset et al. 1956), or the rise of professional service fields (Blau 1955).

The consolidation of organizations as a generalizable field of study corresponded less to the passage away from industrialization linked to the first half of the century than to a deepening and extension of the industrial model to domains of activity and association hitherto untouched by it. The resonance of structures across what were presented as functionally distinct domains of polity, culture, and economy made the case that society was becoming increasingly rationalized. At the same time, rationality was itself grounded in problems of labor control and inspired by models of decision making derived from research and development in the military and the stock market. If the key conceptual turn that gave rise to the field of organizations was the use of structure to treat human association as a system, an architectural metaphor was being used to underwrite the idea that society worked like a machine. But if the system metaphor was to serve the legitimating perquisites of a modernizing society grounded in expanding opportunities for wealth and progressive opportunities for participation in general decision making, it would need to attend some dynamic of change or morphogenesis in its structure.

The machine is a closed entity, a bounded box, where each part serves the needs of the whole design. Modern society is, by contrast, auto evolutionary, a machinery that improves itself. To achieve rational evolution (and not simply directionless variation or change), information from the surrounding environment must be taken in to correct the operations of the existing structure. If natural or mechanical systems existed in a state of equilibrium where inputs and outputs were internally recycled, social systems subject to innovation and its uncertain consequences would stray far from equilibrium. Structures would have to change in the face of both internal stresses and external strains. The strategic means to manage these tensions would take the form of systems,

operations, informatics, and organizational research. The adaptive structure for the now open system would be the servomechanism (Scott 1975: 3), in actuality a device used in World War II anti aircraft machine guns to try to get a fix on their moving targets (De Landa 1991). Problems of disequilibrium were also being attacked by students of the stock market, like Henry Markowitz, whose portfolio theory advised internal diversification of positions in stocks to deal with external uncertainty. Internalization of external complexity became a main stay of organizational theory through the 1970s.

But machines were not simply a metaphor in organizational research and its ideas about structure. The goal of military and portfolio research was to perfect decision making – or at least mitigate the distorting effects of uncertainty on the capacity to secure predictable outcomes based upon prescribed calculation (a killing on the battlefield or the stock market). The infallible decision maker, the intelligent machine, the computer first envisaged by Turing was enhanced by the work of computer science pioneer Herbert Simon, who had teamed with Jim March and others in the 1950s and 1960s to model the organization itself on measurably discrete individual decision making. The notion that structure is the design element of hardware, the architecture of the computer, is as much a literal reference as it is a metaphor. Paradoxically, the work on open and far from equilibrium systems initiated in the 1950s had a deferred reception in the field until the 1970s after the reign of structure had its day.

CONCEPTUAL FLORESCENCE AND CHALLENGES

The dialectic between fixity and contingency, continuity and change was expressed in the dualism of structure and process which oriented organizational sociology during its florescence from the 1950s to the mid 1970s. If structure described regularities, process could divine motivation, as decision makers responded to unintended consequences. Structure could identify variation along three dimensions, complexity, formalization, and centralization. Complexity meant more than that size matters.

It assumed that the sophistication of decision makers as evident in their specialization, professional experience, and activity spoke to horizontal and vertical differentiation within a given organization as well as to the spatial dispersion of coherent operations at far flung sites (like a mobile sales force, maintenance and repair staff, or consultants). Formalization measured the rules and procedures used to handle contingencies but also the deformations that could result when rigid bureaucratic personality types were internalized. Finally, centralization referred to the distribution or concentration of power within the organizational hierarchy (Hall 1972).

In their emphasis on professionals within the organization and on decision making as a function of meritocratic competence, the structural perspective not only displaced labor with norms of participation, but also in so doing reimagined the worker as manager. If people suffered the tyranny of organizations, it was due to “insidious control” that robbed people of their sovereignty, not discretion over how to dispose of associatively created wealth (Blau & Schoenherr 1971). This critical observation returns organizational sociology to its intellectual roots in a tragic Weberian view of rationality that informed critical theory of the Frankfurt School. The technical competency meant to serve fundamental judgments incarcerates social values. The asphyxiating consequence of rule governed organization was a narrow specialized interest that colonized the general interest in forming associations as an end in itself. The defense of individual iconoclasm against organizational conformity was also part of C. Wright Mills’s critique, one which, like the subsequent organizational studies, took the lost autonomy of the professional as its model.

The primacy of structure in organizational sociology was challenged on a number of fronts in the 1970s. The critique of society as a conformity inducing machine, a staple of sixties movements, was anticipated in the study of organizations. But organizational studies could not sustain the more radical turn that sociology took. The engagement with Marxism, especially the reception of Antonio Gramsci and Harry Braverman, articulated a potent critique of labor, capital, and the state via an interest in the labor process and in cultural studies. The question of structure could no longer be

considered formally as a value neutral mechanism, but pertained to the domination of social life by particular class interests and capacities. Cultural studies unseated the normative conception of culture as shared values, and introduced more nuanced interpretive approaches to questions of agency that the term process had sought to understand.

At the same time, the institutional conditions for organizational studies were undergoing transformation. Professionalization was making itself felt on the liberal arts ideals of education as an end in itself. University enrollments were expanding and much of the growth was concentrated in professional programs like business. Business and management programs, seeking legitimacy as research based disciplinary endeavors, hired organizational sociologists. The instrumental and prescriptive demands that had characterized the first management studies made themselves felt again. Service to the profession jostled with the claim that organizational structure or theory could be treated as an end in itself. While the 1970s were characterized by labor militancy, a proliferation of social movements politicizing the life world (feminism, environmentalism, civil rights, gay and sexual liberation), and nationalist revolutionary movements for decolonization (from Vietnam to Angola to Nicaragua), managerialism as a way of life was also on the rise. Over the next 20 years, self help manuals directed toward every conceivable human activity adopted the premise that any problem could be solved or situation improved – be it sex, finances, or personal enlightenment – by application of rational techniques, rules, and formulas. The hubris of organizational studies' confidence in universal structures had been popularized, secularized, commercialized, and profaned. Rationality was specified as providing not just rules, but ruling frameworks for advancing interests attached to historical structures of western colonialism, patriarchy, and capital.

RECENT DIRECTIONS

Over the past 30 years organizational studies have continued within sociology (and perhaps more robustly without). The idea of organizations as bounded entities containing discrete

memberships and fixed structures has become untenable, both in concept and in practice. Structure and process have merged and internal and external adaptations have become intertwined (Ahrne 1994). Where once the corporations appeared to have endless capacity for taking the world's complexity into their midst, outsourcing, downsizing, and reengineering have become the order of the day so that now externalization makes suspect the notion of structure as a thing or entity (Scott 2004). On the one hand, organizations have been invited to focus on core competencies, slim down, and become "lean and mean" (Harrison 1994). Yet at the same time, mergers and acquisitions and the ever enlarging scope and scale of economic activity have continued apace. Corporations over the past 30 years have themselves seen the blurring of inside and outside, and seen structure and process take the form of an amalgamation of the functions of production and circulation, once separated between industrial concerns and banks. Now, General Motors Corporation's largest revenue stream comes from its financial services division, small garment manufacturers trade in currency futures, and, with personal computer based constant vigilance over one's portfolio, daily life is more finely calibrated than ever before to the discipline of financial management. A plethora of financial instruments has emerged, the value of which has dwarfed the annual global product by a factor of ten.

This trend toward financialization has had significant organizational consequences. Securitization, the bundling together of discrete debts (such as from mortgages, credit cards, or auto loans) into tradeable commodities, achieves a complex spatial dispersion of association via ownership that is no longer localized in a particular institution (like a thrift or savings and loan). Derivatives, financial tools for managing risk that tie a prospective variation in, say, exchange rates to the underlying value of a commodity, are now a \$100 trillion market by which relatively small but volatile investments can send ripple effects through global financial markets (as occurred in the Asian financial meltdowns of the late 1990s, the scandals associated with Enron, or the failed high stakes hedge fund Long Term Capital Management) (Li Puma & Lee 2004). Where structure

referred to well bounded closed organizational systems, managerial strategies were oriented toward the externalization of uncertainty. Financialization rewards risk, and suggests a logic where the inside (firm assets, personnel, branding) can be leveraged to forms of association or economic interconnection that are features of organizational environments (Martin 2002). This logic of highly leveraged risk embrace, evident in militaristic foreign policy, approaches to fiscal regulation (tax cuts and anti inflationary monetary approaches), and the shift from defined benefit to defined contribution notions of social welfare (compassionate conservatism and the ownership society) augur a potential return of organizational structure's interest in patterns and regularities across apparently discrete societal domains. If, contrary to recent sociological formulations, contemporary society is characterized not simply by efforts to externalize risk, but also by risk embrace through structural effects unleashed on the world by a series of organizational initiatives, something like structure, albeit in revised form, may be poised for a return to analytic attentions.

This has certainly been the direction of much recent work in organizational theory, some of which has identified explicitly a "new structuralism" to expand the earlier objectivist concept to embrace external resources and agential meanings and embodiments (Lounsbury & Ventresca 2003). But even this new structuralism has kept its sociological sources and debts closely guarded. Unlike the broad transdisciplinary framework from which it takes its name and to which organizational studies aspired, this trend has tended to stay close to the sociological border. For the idea of social structure to stage a robust comeback, organizational theorists will need to be sufficiently sensitive to nuanced analytic approaches that complicate the basic concept and its attendant metaphors and applications. As historians of the field have noted, organization theorists achieved substantial scholarly recognition by turning inward, engaging a deep and generative conversation and research agenda among themselves (Scott 2004).

What was lost to these endeavors was the benefit of more philosophically endowed interlocutors. Hence sociology's structural functionalism made scant use of the structuralism developed through semiotics and other

interpretive approaches from aesthetics, literary studies, psychoanalysis, and anthropology. The cost of this intellectual parochialism was high. Social structure existed in space, but without history. It attained objectivity, but one divorced from subjective intentionality and agency. The result was a highly formalistic separation of structure and process, inside and outside, macro and micro. The two halves of these binaries were always found wanting the other. Adding body to mind, subjective to objective, stasis to change, decision to environment did little to upend the brittle dualistic thinking that had produced these semantic chains to begin with. The more supple cache of approaches – loosely grouped under the rubric of poststructuralism – that were committed to critically rethinking the binary structures of thought that gave rise to the human sciences was, until recently, viewed with suspicion.

During the 1990s, most notably in the pages of the journal *Organizations*, that state of affairs began to change. A much broader disciplinary and philosophical archive has been brought to bear on the study of organizations. New immigrants to business and management and other professional programs that treat organizations as conceptually central to their enterprises have brought with them different customs of reading and research. Appropriate to the times, the architectural metaphor that social structure had rested upon may shift its reference from buildings (the internal skeleton) to computers, where the term applies at once to hardware and software. Structure's future may lie in its ability to transit in between.

SEE ALSO: Organization Theory; Postmodern Organizations; Poststructuralism; Structuralism; Structure and Agency; System Theories

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organizations and the theory of the firm

Pursepy P. M. A. R. Heugens

When economists speak of a theory of the firm, they mean something very specific. They use the term either to denote a theory that

addresses the issue of the existence and boundaries of the multi person firm, or to explain its internal structure and organization. Examples of the former type may rightly be called *why* theories of the firm, as they seek to explain why firms exist in the face of institutional alternatives like markets and hybrids. Representatives of the latter type are best addressed as *how* theories of the firm, as they set out to provide accounts of how complex organizations succeed in combining the heterogeneous inputs of differentially motivated individuals into meaningful collective outcomes (Heugens 2005).

The distinguishing characteristic of all *why* theories of the firm is that they treat the formal organization as an aberration, which requires explanation because alternative institutions for organizing economic activities exist. In the words of Ronald Coase (1937), theoreticians should “attempt to discover why a firm emerges at all in a specialized exchange economy.” Coase’s fundamental observation in this respect was that markets are not and can never be without friction, and that there is therefore always a cost attached to using the central coordination system of the market (i.e., the price system). These so called transaction costs primarily consist of finding prices, negotiating contracts, and bearing the risk of adaptation to changing circumstances. These transaction costs are so fundamental to processes of material exchange that economics Nobel laureate Kenneth Arrow simply refers to them as the “costs of running the economic system.”

Coase’s observations on the theory of the firm are important because of their unique descriptive qualities, which allow observers of individual firms to determine why some authority (the firm’s “entrepreneur”) has decided to save certain marketing costs by forming an organization. But what really gave transaction cost economics the predictive power to forecast which transactions would have to be organized within the firm and which could safely be left to the market was Oliver Williamson’s specification of the material characteristics and the human behavioral features that drive the transaction cost of each transaction type. The most important material characteristic of economic exchanges is their asset specificity: the extent to which they involve “durable investments that are undertaken in support of particular transactions, the

opportunity cost of which investments is much lower in best alternative uses or by alternative users should the original transaction be prematurely terminated" (Williamson 1985: 55). The most important behavioral characteristic of contractual man (*sic*) is that he sometimes (though certainly not always) resorts to subtle or less subtle forms of deceit to advance his self interest "with guile" (p. 47). In conjunction, these two characteristics produce market imperfections because no rational producer would invest in non redeployable assets if there were the likelihood of premature contract termination by an opportunistic buyer. In turn, this explains why firms exist, because these imperfections leave the buyers of goods that require non redeployable assets for their production no other option than to erect a hierarchy in which professional managers are given the rational legal authority to safeguard such investments from opportunism.

Alchian and Demsetz (1972) have offered a different but related view on why certain productive activities can better be organized within the firm than across markets. They observe that it is often possible to increase the productivity of a collective of individuals through teamwork. In a team the gains from specialization and cooperative production typically yield a cooperative surplus, which cannot uniquely be attributed to the efforts of any individual member. The problem with team production is that there are costs associated with determining the effort levels and marginal productivity of members. Because of these metering costs, each worker has a greater incentive to shirk when he or she works as part of a team as compared to being self employed. The metering problem calls for the appointment of a specialist, whose main task is to estimate marginal productivity by observing or specifying input behavior. If this specialist were simply another employee, however, the classical *quis custodiet ipsos custodes* in the background. The only solution to the monitoring the monitor problem is to make the specialist the residual claimant of the team, and to endow him or her with the exclusive rights to observe input behavior, to write contracts for the collective, to hire and fire, and to sell all of the aforementioned rights to third parties. This concentration of rights in the hands of a single entrepreneur marks the birth of a classical

capitalist firm, and the tandem of the team productive surplus and the metering problem thus offers a second answer to the question of why firms exist in the face of institutional alternatives.

Agency theorists – representatives of a third *why* theory of the firm – take issue with the Alchian–Demsetz definition of the entrepreneur as "the centralized contractual agent in a team productive process." Fama (1980), for example, suggests that the entrepreneur as manager risk bearer should be laid to rest because management (i.e., the above functions of observing input behavior and writing contracts) is naturally separated from risk bearing (i.e., the right to economic residuals and the right to sell this right) in the context of the modern corporation. This observation is significant because an acknowledgment of the separation between ownership and control implies a subtle shift of the *why* question. As Jensen and Meckling (1976) have framed it: "How does it happen that millions of individuals are willing to turn over a significant fraction of their wealth to organizations run by managers who have so little interest in their welfare?" The agency theory response to this question hinges on two assumptions. The first of these is that it is not in the best interest of an individual securities owner to participate in the strategic management of any individual company directly, as the optimal portfolio for any investor is likely to be diversified across the securities of many firms. Investors thus need agents. The second assumption is that organizational hierarchies are more efficient instruments for curbing managerial opportunism than market based contracts (Fama 1980). The logic of this second assumption is completely the opposite of the first. By embedding managers in managerial hierarchies, they are typically prevented from diversifying their most important source of income: the compensation paid for their services. Once the manager is made dependent on the corporation, the agency problem can be solved by making the pay of the manager dependent on the performance of the corporation. In the view of agency theorists, organizations thus exist because they provide the most efficient governance solution for securities holders who cannot or who do not want to participate directly in the securing of their investments.

The marvel of the three types of *why* theories is that they show why the erection of managerial hierarchies is a necessary and efficient response to the opportunism problems faced by investors in non redeployable assets, loyal team workers, and securities holders, respectively. Arguably, this is the greatest achievement in the field of economic organization of the last six or seven decades. There are nevertheless problems with this combined body of work, the most pressing of which is that the image of the modern business firm that emerges from it is at best an abstract notion like a nexus of contracts and at worst an empty box (Jensen & Meckling 1976). In the words of Fritz Machlup (1967):

The firm in the model world of economic micro-theory ought not to call forth any irrelevant associations with firms in the real world. We know, of course, that there are firms in reality and that they have boards of directors and senior and junior executives, who do, with reference to hundreds of different products, a great many things which are entirely irrelevant for the microtheoretical model. The fictitious firm of the model is a 'uni-brain,' an individual decision-unit that has nothing to do but adjust the output and the prices of one or two imaginary products to very simple imagined changes in data.

The *why* theories of the firm thus typically abstract from any notion of organizations as social structures and evade the complex set of questions pertaining to the internal design of the modern firm. Inevitably, a scholarly attempt would come to fill in this lacuna and address the central problem of internal organization: How exactly do firms connect individual actions to collectively productive outcomes?

How theories of the firm typically do not address the question of why firms exist in light of institutional alternatives, but rather take the fact that firms exist as given. In contrast with "why" theoreticians, students of the "how" perspective seek "conceptualizations and models of business enterprises which explain and predict their structure and behaviors" (Grant 1996). The fundamental question these latter alternatives must address therefore is how purposeful collective outcomes can be obtained from the many individuals employed by a given organization. This question is not straightforward to answer because workplace diversity is

substantial even for the most homogeneous of organizations. Each individual member has (1) a unique knowledge base, (2) a sheer unlimited set of action alternatives at his or her disposal, and (3) an idiosyncratic interest structure. These three sources of variety (and strategies to manage them constructively) take center stage in the knowledge based, evolutionary, and behavioral theories of the firm, respectively.

Knowledge based theory proposes that firms are essentially repositories of individuals whose knowledge bases are irreducibly different (Conner & Prahalad 1996). These differences can be productive. If organization members are allowed to specialize in certain forms of knowledge, significant economies of knowledge acquisition can be realized at the individual level. Collectively, knowledge differences allow for the exploitation of comparative person to person advantages within the firm. But the exploitation of knowledge heterogeneity involves a coordination problem because functional specialization breeds internal interdependencies. Knowledge based theoreticians tend to seek the solution to this problem in organizational design efforts that are highly reminiscent of James Thompson's writings on technology and structure. Thompson has proposed that the key to managing interdependencies lies in the design of work settings: "By delimiting responsibilities, control over resources, and other matters, organizations provide their participating members with boundaries within which efficiency may be a reasonable expectation" (Thompson 1967: 54). The exact shape of the setting has to depend on the type of interdependencies that exist between the tasks required to "get a job done" (see March & Simon 1958). In the situation that each task renders a discrete contribution to the whole, coordination efforts among specialists must take the form of standardization. Where interdependence takes a serial form, such that one specialist's output forms the input for another, coordination by plan is key. When interdependencies are reciprocal, and each specialist simultaneously produces inputs for other specialists and processes their outputs, coordination inevitably takes the form of mutual adjustment. The gist of these arguments is that organizations can foster and accommodate knowledge heterogeneity as long

as their work settings are designed in accordance with specialists' coordination needs. The knowledge based answer to the "how" question is therefore that organizations connect individual actions to collective outcomes by aligning work settings with task interdependencies.

The evolutionary theory of the firm (Nelson & Winter 1982) offers a related perspective on the question of how organizations link individual actions to collective outcomes. Like knowledge based approaches, evolutionary theories are explicitly microfounded "in the sense that they must involve or at least be consistent with a story of what agents do and why they do it" (Dosi 1997). One of these microfoundations is that agents continuously introduce various forms of novelty in organizations because they continuously discover new organizational setups, technologies, and behavioral patterns. Yet the theory simultaneously tries to offer explanations for coherent aggregate phenomena like organizational innovation and learning, economic growth, and industrial change (Nelson & Winter 1982). The central question of the evolutionary perspective is therefore: What is the source of this coherence, or why do firms "hang together" in the face of this continuous variation at the micro level? Nelson and Winter point to the central role organizational routines or decision rules play in this respect: "The basic behavioral premise [of evolutionary theory] is that a firm at any time operates largely according to a set of decision rules that link a domain of environmental stimuli to a range of responses on the part of firms" (Nelson & Winter 1974). The innovative and exploratory behaviors of organization members are thus tamed by decision rules that direct their efforts toward the achievement of organizational goals (Heugens 2005). In contrast with the knowledge based view of the firm, the basic challenge of the evolutionary perspective is not to explain how firms cope with irreducible knowledge differentials among members, but how they should deal with the a priori limitless array of behavioral options these members have at their disposal. Furthermore, the variety controlling mechanism that evolutionary theorists propose is not to better design work settings, but to infuse organizational members with decision rules that act upon the menu of behavioral options available to them. The evolutionary theoretical

answer to the *how* question is therefore that organizations connect individual actions to collective outcomes by routinizing the behavior of organizational members.

The behavioral theory of the firm (Cyert & March 1963) offers the third and last perspective on the question of how firms function. The key to understand the behavioral approach is to take into account how it differs from neoclassical theories of the firm. Proponents of the latter theories take the firm to be a homogeneous production unit guided by an undisputed goal (e.g., profit maximization). Behavioralists, in contrast, recognize the fact that a firm consists of a series of component subunits and that idiosyncratic interests and motives typically characterize each of these subunits. This situation potentially leads to conflict within organizations because a given organizational subunit may perceive the goals of other units as plainly unacceptable, as incomparable with its own, or as uncertain factors that may interfere with the realization of its own ambitions in unforeseen ways (March & Simon 1958). The central question of the behavioral perspective therefore is: How can organizations be collectively productive in the face of all this potential internal conflict? Behavioralists propose that this is the case because there are stabilizing factors at work at both the subunit and organizational levels. At the subunit level, managers are compelled to work toward attainable and acceptable outcomes rather than toward maximum outcomes ("satisficing" rather than "maximizing"). This reduces intra organizational conflict because where maximizing behavior would turn organizations into "winner take all" environments tainted by many losers, satisficing behavior offers multiple subunits the opportunity to realize at least some of their objectives. At the organizational level, planning and budgeting cycles act as measures to manage time and reduce organizational conflict (Cyert & March 1963). Not only are these cycles characterized by periodicity – such that they concentrate organizational conflict in certain periods after which business can proceed as usual – they also provide schedules specifying the minimally required actions and outcomes over which haggling is not possible. In sum, the behavioral answer to the "how" question is that organizations connect individual actions to collective

outcomes by reducing the potential for intra-organizational conflict.

Measured by the usual strict and forbidding definitional standards that economists tend to employ, organizational sociologists do not have a theory of the firm, only organization theories. What they lack specifically is the ambition to resolve the type of questions that economists typically occupy themselves with (“why do firms exist” and “how do they connect individual inputs to collectively meaningful outputs”). But sociologists do have something that comes pretty close: theories of bureaucracy. Sociologists have long had an interest in bureaucratic life. Most tend to look upon bureaucracies as highly interesting quasi-experimental settings that possess a number of characteristics of due significance to the sociologist’s eye: they are large, numerous, permanent, accessible, and purposive (Blau & Meyer 1987). As such, it is hard to imagine a more benign playground in which the empirically inclined sociologist can test his or her theories about authority relations, compliance structures, group coherence, deviance, and a host of other topics the casual reader can find scattered across the pages of the present volume.

But not all sociologists look at bureaucratic organizations as if they were merely convenient laboratories full of briefcase-carrying guinea pigs. Some sociologists have recognized bureaucracies as the socially unique and economically indispensable phenomena they really are, and proceeded by studying them in their own right. Their labors have yielded many fruits that have changed the landscape of organizational sociology forever. Some of these include theories portraying organizations as coercive institutions that manage to lock individual members ever more tightly into the “iron cage” of modernity (Weber 1978). Others have looked upon bureaucracies as powerful instruments that easily spin out of control due to a lack of self-correcting mechanisms, which lead to “trained incapacity” and “overconformity” on behalf of their members (Merton 1968). Still others have demonstrated that even though they possess a number of relatively universal characteristics – impersonal rules, centralization of decisions, isolation of organizational strata – bureaucracies are still institutions that are deeply embedded in and thus unique to the cultures that host them

(Crozier 1964). Finally, others have demonstrated that bureaucracies, due to their propensity to encode new experiences and dilemmas in relatively durable organizational rules, are superior vehicles for organizational learning (Levitt & March 1988).

Such sociological bureaucracy theories have of course attracted a lot of implicit and sometimes rather overt criticism by economists. Much of this criticism can be summed up, in a nutshell, as mistaken imperialism. Many economists simply do not like to acknowledge the fact that it is possible to say sensible things about economic organization by means of sociological methods. But this is unfortunate, since theory of the firm scholars and bureaucracy theoreticians are closer together on many issues than many would be willing to admit. For one, they share an empirical object. Furthermore, it is hard for sociologists to deny that economic factors like efficiency and productivity play a decisive role in the design of private – and increasingly even public – bureaucracies. Alternatively, many economists are slowly warming up to the idea that social factors may have a profound influence on, say, the production functions of firms. More importantly, the profound differences in terms of foci and explanatory strategies that undeniably exist between economists and sociologists could in fact turn out to be beneficial complementarities. With respect to a further, productive integration between theories of the firm on the one hand and theories of bureaucracy on the other, sociologists could certainly benefit from the economic focus on the existence of bureaucratic structures and their ability to generate surplus value. In turn, economic theories of the firm would in many cases be better off with a “thicker” description of economic reality – even if we respect the discipline’s almost obsessive fetish for parsimony. A hopeful trend in this respect is the profound increase in the popularity of behavioral boundary conditions to otherwise orthodox economic theories. Seen from that perspective, the chasm that separates theories of the firm and theories of bureaucracy begins to appear less massive and intimidating than it once did.

SEE ALSO: Organization Theory; Organizations as Coercive Institutions; Organizations as

Social Structures; Rational Legal Authority; Strategic Management (Organizations); Team work; Time; Workplace Diversity

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organizations as total institutions

Nick Perry

The analysis of the characteristics of total institutions is the subject of a lengthy essay by Erving Goffman, a Canadian born sociologist best known for his complex and subtle contributions to the analysis of social interaction. He defined the term as “a place of residence and work where a large number of like situated individuals cut off from the wider society for an appreciable period of time together lead an enclosed formally administered round of life” (Goffman 1961: xiii). Shorter versions of his argument were first published in 1957. It was, however, through the longer paper’s appearance as the lead essay in his second book, *Asylums* (1961: 1–124), that the concept became best known.

The term itself had actually been coined by his graduate school teacher, the Chicago based sociologist Everett Hughes. Hughes had cited nunneries as an example, but Goffman’s development of the idea was based upon his three year study of psychiatric inmates, including a year long period of participant observation in a large mental hospital in Washington, DC. Goffman was, however, at pains to emphasize that he understood the concept to have an altogether wider relevance and applicability. Thus in his analysis, examples of total institutions include not only mental hospitals but also prisons, boarding schools, monasteries and convents,

ships, army barracks, and isolated work camps. He further argued that all such enterprises are distinguished by the extent to which they share a distinctive cluster of structural characteristics and internal social processes. For as he points out, most members of modern societies tend to sleep, play, and work in different places, with different co participants, under different authorities and without being subject to some overall design. What distinguishes total institutions, however, is that the barriers between these aspects of life are broken down. Not only are all aspects of life conducted in the same place and subject to the same single authority, those activities are also subject to "batching," that is, they are undertaken alongside others who are treated alike and expected to do the same things together. Moreover, each day's activities are imperatively and tightly scheduled in accordance with a system of rules and the demands of a body of officials. This wide ranging system for the coordination of daily activities is purportedly in accordance with a single rational plan through which the official aim of the institution may be fulfilled (Goffman 1961: 5-6).

Some commentators have suggested that Goffman's use of the word institution is somewhat misleading, in that the term "social institutions" has a particular cluster of meanings within the sociological literature. It expresses a recognition of the continuity and endurance of social life as it is formed and reformed in and through such phenomena as the law and the family. "Total organization" has therefore been proposed as an altogether more accurate and appropriate category. Against this, Goffman's choice of terminology reflects his conception of a total institution as a "social hybrid, part residential community, part formal organization." What is insinuated by his employment of the term "institution" is that the associated social processes are understood as something more than the impersonal workings of bureaucratic procedures or market forces. For they involve the allocation of identities as well as the distribution of duties and the provision of rewards. Hence what is also conveyed is a diffuse sense of the cultural "embeddedness" of organizational practices. This is a theme that is echoed in the otherwise different approach to organizational analysis of scholars such as

Philip Selznick and subsequently Mark Granovetter – influential practitioners of what Charles Perrow (1972) has identified as the "institutional school" of organizational sociology.

IMPLICATIONS FOR INMATES AND STAFF

What Goffman goes on to explore are the effects of the characteristics of total institutions upon the constituting of selfhood, more specifically the selfhood of mental patients. From the point at which they enter into total institutions, inmates' prior conceptions of their selves are subject to a process of mortification. This occurs directly by way of the institution's degrading admission procedures, and indirectly through the curtailment of the repertoire of roles and opportunities for interaction that are matter of factly available to persons in the world outside. In the institution's engagement with the resultant diminished self, its staff strive to establish an alternate, all embracing notion of inmate identity, one that is consonant with institutional expectations and which is based upon its control of what were hitherto taken for granted privileges. The objective is to go beyond eliciting an outward behavioral conformity; the intention is to induce the inmate's active acceptance and internalizing of the institution's conception of what it is to be a "proper" person.

Goffman further suggests that there are clear affinities between the reactions and responses of mental patients and those that are typical of the inmates in other types of total institutions. Faced with a restricted range of opportunities for interaction, inmates seek to preserve and protect a sense of self through various strategies of adaptation and adjustment. These latter include fantasizing and intransigence that, in context, are both meaningful and reasonable. But in what Robert Merton and others might well identify as a self fulfilling prophecy, such strategies are typically interpreted as warranting the very control procedures that have served to elicit these kinds of responses. For inmates generally, the modal procedure for ensuring the preservation of the self may thus be one of "playing it cool," i.e., being suitably compliant in the presence of staff but supportive of

countermoves with their peers. What such patterns of interaction suggest with respect to mental patients is thus that it is organizational processes rather than illness which are responsible for the formation of a particular concept of patient identity. As Goffman sardonically notes at one point, “the staff problem here is to find a crime that will fit the punishment” (1961: 85).

As this observation implies, the staff of total institutions face dilemmas of their own. These are a consequence of (1) the difficulties that derive from a conception of people as material to be processed, and (2) the contradiction between what the institution does (functions as a “storage dump for inmates”) and what staff are expected to say it does (“reforms inmates in accordance with some ideal standard”). A subsequent sociology of organizations literature would identify this latter contrast as having a wider applicability. Thus for Meyer and Rowan (1977: 340), the formal structures of many organizations are understood to be ceremonial and to “reflect the myths of their institutional environments instead of the demands of their work activities.” As a result, such organizations build gaps between the acceptable public face that is enshrined in their formal structures – upon which they depend for funds and legitimation – and those practices through which their real work gets done. The decoupling of these activities and management of the consequent gaps is thus a responsibility of, and dilemma for, the staff of such organizations.

Goffman may have been sardonic about psychiatry, but he was not hostile to its practitioners. This is indicated by his acknowledgment of the intellectual openness and support of psychiatric staff members, and the receptivity that they accorded to his study. Rather, what was distinctive about Goffman’s argument was that, in the absence of physical indicators of illness, he saw psychiatrists as adept at generating sociological observations. What they produced were data about rule following and rule breaking rather than diagnoses with a material grounding. But as a result of its explicit foregrounding of the social world of the mental patient, Goffman’s study was interpreted as congruent with the emerging anti psychiatry movement associated with the work of Thomas

Szasz, R. D. Laing, and others. His work thus came to be seen as part of a more general critique of the institutionalization of the mentally ill that developed during the 1960s. The associated shift in treatment strategies, with its emphasis on returning inmates to the wider community, linked conservative(s’) concerns with costs to radical(s’) arguments about personal freedom.

CULTURAL CONTEXT AND CRITICAL RESPONSE

The study’s impact was by no means limited to this milieu, however, or to analyses of the mental hospital. Following the initial presentation of his ideas to an audience of psychiatric professionals, the longer version of Goffman’s essay had first featured as a contribution to Donald Cressey’s (1961) influential volume of papers on the prison. Beyond this, the concept was perceived to be of more general relevance to the sociology of organizations. This is evident from its incorporation in most of the best known collections of readings and its citation in the standard textbooks of the subdiscipline. For example, in 1965 it was referred to in several of the independently authored chapters of the *Handbook of Organizations* edited by James March. This substantial volume is generally regarded as an authoritative summary statement of the state of play within the field at that time. What total institutions were seen to represent was a categorization of establishments that offered an analytic advance over “common sense” classifications. Moreover, this was combined with an emphasis upon (inter)actions and meanings rather than what was – at that time – the more conventional focus upon organizational structures. This emphasis facilitated what has come to be recognized as a characteristic oscillation in Goffman’s writing – that between the manifest elaboration and nuanced interpretation of subtle differences and the tacit affirmation of an underlying pattern. For what Goffman’s study sought to signal is that it was not just total institutions but organizations generally that should be viewed as places for generating assumptions about identity.

The specific social and cultural context in which the total institution concept was

developed was that of the US during the 1950s. With hindsight, it can be seen to bear the trace of the Cold War concerns of that time. Thus it is possible to discern both (1) the period's political preoccupation with totalitarianism as a theme and (2) concurrent anxieties about conformity at home, as they were expressed by American cultural commentators and critics such as William Whyte, David Reisman, and C. Wright Mills. Totalitarianism was a notion that both linked together Nazi Germany and Soviet Russia (and, prospectively, Communist China) and clearly contrasted with the pluralism that was understood to be a – if not the – defining attribute of American society and politics. Yet what the total institution concept explicitly pointed out was the presence within plural societies of a distinctive category of social establishments in which the preconditions for pluralism were purposely not met. Goffman's account thus served both to (1) identify affinities between the internal social processes of such local establishments and those of totalitarian regimes and (2) mirror contemporary critical concerns about conformity.

Goffman's elaboration and qualification of the concept is often witty. It also involves something more than a conventional compromise between conceptual clarity and empirical adequacy; between an elegant idea and its altogether more disorderly social expression. It is presented as if empirical but is in part speculative; presented as comparative but with an emphasis on the mental hospital. Goffman is both prolific in his use of footnotes and eclectic with respect to his sources, drawing upon not just academic journals and monographs but also personal memoirs, anecdotes, novels, and popular magazines as well as his own astute observations. The examples he invokes are therefore better understood as designed to illustrate a concept or to elucidate a process rather than to prove an argument. This characteristic mode of presentation has engaged many commentators and enraged some of them. Its import is both textual/aesthetic and methodological. For example, Patricia Clough (1990: 189) offers what is presently the best account of Goffman's distinctive literary style, locating its ambivalent appeal in the way that it "seduces the reader less into the forward movement of a text and

more into submission to a detailed behavioral protocol."

METHODOLOGICAL ISSUES AND CONCEPTUAL DEVELOPMENTS

The concept has also prompted a related debate over methodology. First of all, the study had benefited from Goffman having taken up a year long position as the assistant sports coach in a large mental hospital. This location both placed him outside the main line of authority and allowed him substantial freedom of movement. But the subsequent account does not read like a conventional ethnography, in that the reader is not provided with background material on the research site nor even any quotations from informants. It is instead what Philip Manning (1992: 9) refers to as the ethnography of a concept rather than the ethnography of a place. Second, Goffman acknowledges that the characteristics of total institutions are neither peculiar to total institutions nor shared by every one of them. Rather, they are present to an intense degree, and in later published versions of his analysis he (somewhat misleadingly) invokes the notion of ideal types as a methodological warrant for his emphasis on the similarities between total institutions. Subsequent studies have, by contrast, sought to identify and to explain the differences between them in accordance with a more obviously comparative intent.

Thus Lewis Coser (1974), in noting that there are overlaps between "total" and his own notion of "greedy" institutions, nonetheless insists on the distinctiveness of the latter. Examples of greedy institutions include traditional domestic servitude, the Bolsheviks, and the Catholic priesthood, and the total loyalty and commitment which they seek from their membership. Although they may in some instances make use of the physical isolation characteristic of total institutions, they are actually defined by, and are concerned to construct, symbolic barriers between insiders and outsiders. They also tend to rely upon voluntary compliance rather than enforced coercion – itself one of the salient distinctions *within* total institutions that is blurred by Goffman's

analysis. And in an independently conceived but somewhat similar initiative, Amitai Etzioni (1975: 264–76) put forward the notions of scope and pervasiveness, understood as discrete variables rather than as principles of organizing. Organizations whose participants share many activities are identified as broad in scope, whereas narrow organizations are those which share few. Pervasiveness refers to the normative boundaries of a collectivity whereas scope refers to its action boundaries. That these do not necessarily coincide leads Etzioni to suggest a systematic distinction between two kinds of “total organizations”; both are, by definition, high in scope but one (e.g., the prison) is low and the other (e.g., the nunnery) high in pervasiveness. It is suggested that this distinction is linked, in turn, to other kinds of differences.

Nevertheless, almost 50 years after it was first introduced, what has come to seem most contemporary about the concept of the total institution is what it has to say about the general relationship between any organization and the process of identity formation. “Contemporary” because of the influence of Michel Foucault’s writings upon current versions of the sociology of organization and the processes of subject formation. If Goffman’s essay is filtered and read through such a framework, then – the differences in their respective idioms notwithstanding – what emerges are some striking parallels. There are clear affinities between total institutions and Foucault’s notion of carceral organizations, and between their respective conceptions – Goffman’s ethnographic, Foucault’s historical – of what Foucault meant by disciplinary practices and normalizing power. Thus when Goffman observes that “Built right into the social arrangements of an organization, then, is a thoroughly embracing conception of the member – and not merely a conception of him *qua* member, but behind this a conception of him as a human being” (1961: 180), what he indicates is that he sees total institutions as the limit cases of a general tendency.

SEE ALSO: Ethnography; Foucault, Michel; Goffman, Erving; Ideal Type; Interaction Order; Mental Disorder; Organizations as Coercive Institutions; Organizations as Social Structures;

Prisons; Self; Self Fulfilling Prophecy; Surveillance; Totalitarianism

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organizations, tradition and

Steven P. Feldman

The essence of tradition is sequential pattern, a sequence of related meanings that are received and transmitted over time. The meanings can be related by association to common themes, in the contiguity of presentation and transmission, or in descent from a common origin (Shils 1981). For example, pharmaceutical company Johnson & Johnson has maintained a company “credo” since the 1930s. The credo has been changed multiple times during this period, but similar themes, the style of education and communication, and the connection to its origin

have remained. Thus, Johnson & Johnson has a business philosophy tradition. This tradition can be seen in the way managers thought about and reacted to the Tylenol crisis in the early 1980s.

Tradition is anything but unitary or static. Indeed, its form and content are continuously changing. Tradition represents an accumulation of experience that is continuously updated or corrected as new experience challenges accepted beliefs or practices. For example, in 1975 James Burke, then a senior executive at Johnson & Johnson, held a series of “challenge meetings” to reinvigorate the credo and bring it into line with current business and social realities. These meetings brought out the fact that the credo was seen differently by different people. Tradition, in organizations as in societies, is a complex and diversified object, for many reasons. At this point, it is enough to say that a tradition is not one thing, but exists in numerous variations. There are always elements of different ages that are given different weights by different people; and even if given the same weights, the elements are often interpreted differently. Here the sociology of tradition meets political sociology, because dominant powers always try to reduce the manifoldness of tradition to a form that supports and legitimates their base of power. Tradition is always part of political life and conflict in organizations.

RATIONALITY AGAINST TRADITION

Tradition plays a role in organizational life and politics in a second way in addition to being a bone of contention. Traditions are usually tacit. People follow them unthinkingly. Many times organizations follow traditions most unthinkingly just when they think they are most rational and scientific. Actions are not traditions. Traditions are the patterns of thought and belief that surround the field of action where passion and calculation dominate. Traditions define the ends, standards, rules, and even means that are part of the social context of action. Traditions as tacit knowledge can enter into organizational life by stifling learning or creating resistance to organizational change. For example, at DEC Corporation a tacit “engineering culture” developed that made it impossible for managers to

focus fully on the needs of customers who desired “simple” or technologically unsophisticated products (Schein 2003). Tacit assumptions were never part of strategic reviews and perceptions arising from tacit assumptions were defended as unchallengeable. DEC’s cultural inflexibility led to its downfall as managers and engineers obsessed with sophisticated technology ignored the huge growth in demand for personal computers.

By and large, people who study organizations have seen tradition as the enemy of organizational health and success. Tradition has been seen as an irrational (unthought) force that undermines organizational rationality and effectiveness. Indeed, much of the study of organizations in the twentieth century has been aimed at ridding organizations of traditional (tacit) forces and replacing them with ever higher levels of rational thought. Early on Barnard wanted to keep the irrational emotions of workers, but to do so under the rational control of rationally superior executives. When it turned out executives could not meet these superior levels of rationality or control the minds of employees even when they did, Dalton (1959) launched a broad based attack on traditions in organizations – what he called “moral fixity” – in an effort to increase organizational rationality by removing all traditional constraints on action.

This did not increase organizational rationality either. Crozier’s and Kanter’s data on organizational behavior a decade later is quite consistent with Dalton’s. Next came psychological and social psychological attempts to increase the rationality of organizations by addressing the problem on the individual and small group level. A prominent example is Argyris and Schon’s double loop learning model. They draw a distinction between the individual’s “espoused theory” of action and the “theory in use,” the latter containing all the tacit (traditional) elements of decision and action. By educating the individual to recognize the tacit dimension of behavior, it is hoped that this dimension can be brought under conscious (rational) control. Traditional elements can then be chosen or rejected according to their rational contribution to organizational goals.

The history of the study of organizations in the United States can mostly be characterized by this unending attempt to remove tacit

knowledge (traditions) from organizational decision making and life. Indeed, Schein's (2003) study of DEC Corporation's demise concludes that "innovative cultures" must periodically be dismantled if organizations want to stay innovative, because over time tacit culture will engrain itself and undermine organizational adaptability and change. Interestingly, Schein argues the only way to "dismantle" a culture is to change the people. He appears to have given up on decades of organizational change and development literature purporting to know how to change the organizational culture by *developing* the people.

Culture (tradition) need not be seen as so inflexible. And in any case, tradition cannot be removed from human life. Schein's (2003) suggestion to change the people to rid the organization of the stultifying effects of inflexible traditions would only result in the exchange of one set of traditions for another. One weakness in the literature on "organizations" is its heavy focus on organization level "cultures" at the expense of the societal culture of which the organization is an example. Some brief comments are sometimes made about profession level and society level cultural influences, but the lion's share of attention goes to the relation between organizational "culture" and organizational goals. However, many times changes in leadership and/or organizational mergers and acquisitions fail to achieve the freeing of traditional (cultural) constraints so strongly desired. The reason for this is that "new" leaders often cannot change or even communicate with organizational personnel. In any case, any potential leader not only represents a limited range of cultural knowledge, but also any "new" knowledge he or she has will still need to be adapted and applied. The original organization and its leaders also have this potential for adaptability and change based on their traditional knowledge.

One exception to the lack of attention to supraorganizational cultural forces that influence cultural development on the organizational level is the "new institutionalism." In this tradition, "institutions" are seen as industry, profession, and society level abstractions that operate on the preconscious, cognitive level, providing routine prescriptions for individual and collective behavior. The new institutionalism can be

helpful in the study of tradition in organizations because its focus on supraorganizational ideational influences on behavior brings into view the broader social and historical context from which traditions in organizations originate. But the new institutionalism's commitment to macro structures deemphasizes the centrality of family life and the long socialization human beings go through in the process of becoming socially functional and emotionally integrated. Traditions are first learned and personal identity first established inseparably from the warmth and coldness of family relationships. By focusing on the autonomy of macro structures and the impersonal cognition that results from them, the new institutionalism deemphasizes the centrality of filial relations in the transmission of traditions. This results in an insensitivity to conflict because the complexities of individual development and historical specificity are overshadowed by the generalities of social structure. This can be seen in Vaughan's (1996) study of the *Challenger* disaster where homogenizing, preconscious macro forces override local leadership, power relations, and emotional dynamics at the Marshall Space Center in explaining the decision making process.

TRADITION AS A PLATFORM FOR RATIONALITY

To exist, an organization must be continually reenacted (Feldman 2002). Its statements about its goals, plans, activities, and identity must be repeatedly resaid. The reenactments and resayings are guided by what individual members remember about what has happened in the past, what roles and responsibilities they had in the past and expect to continue to have in the future, what they remember they share with others about what they and others must do and not do, and what they remember about their rights and duties and the rights and duties of others to act in certain ways (Shils 1981). In addition to memory, some parts of some of this information are recorded in written documents such as job descriptions, strategic plans, formal directives, and informal agreements. Hence, organizations are complex webs of formal and informal knowledge, much of it tacit, that regulate social interaction and make it possible for

collective action to take place in a more or less shared and coordinated way. This system of knowledge is maintained to considerable degree in organizational traditions.

The fact that the vast bulk of the organization studies literature sees these systems of knowledge, especially the tacit components, as drags on rational goal seeking behavior misunderstands the workings of rationality as well as tradition, especially the essential contribution tradition makes to rational action. Without guidelines and constraints organized and maintained in tradition, creativity and goal seeking would not be more rational but less. Managers would have no way to evaluate their plans and actions and would strike out in many sterile directions, having no organized body of knowledge to give them the benefits of previous experience.

Managers without traditions are akin to novices. Having no platform to orient themselves and from which to start, they would have many more false starts than managers working from established traditions (Shils 1975). The most talented would only discover what others have already discovered. It would take the most powerful and disciplined minds to find their way to essential information in what would be a disorganized and disorderly state of knowledge. The less powerful minds would be lost or misled much of the time. Even geniuses would be constrained in a world without traditions, because they could not possibly rediscover all that traditions, maintained and cultivated by whole communities, past and present, would provide, thus limiting the full utilization of their capacities.

Traditions provide the intellectual and experiential platform by which rational thought and actions can be formulated, critically reflected upon, and advanced. Rationality is an unfolding within traditional knowledge. More to the point at hand, shared understanding is essential for individual and organizational effectiveness. Traditions maintain the knowledge that makes shared understanding possible.

THE UBIQUITY OF TRADITIONS IN ORGANIZATIONS

The survival of traditions in organizations from the attack on traditional authority by forces of

rationalism, or what Schumpeter overly optimistically called "creative destruction," can be attributed to several reasons in addition to the necessary role tradition plays in developing knowledge and organizing cooperative effort. First, much of the acceptance of traditional beliefs is due simply to the massiveness of their existence. A newcomer to an organization has her hands full just to try to work effectively in the ongoing processes and systems already in place. The idea that she would create the knowledge she needed for every decision or action just when she needed it is out of the question. She has neither the time, the resources, nor the approval of her superiors to review all organizational procedures and processes. On the contrary, she must find a way to act acceptably and organizational traditions offer her a ready made and legitimate model. In addition, most people are affected psychologically by the fact that many people around them are working with a common stock of knowledge. The newcomer assumes the legitimacy of this knowledge out of respect for the many and for the ongoing "success" of the organization. The sheer pervasiveness of traditions in organizations is probably the most central reason for their acceptance.

A second reason tradition is so widely accepted is that most people do not have the imagination to create new guidelines for the situations they encounter. In the face of the overwhelming challenges a world with even limited traditions would pose for most people, traditions "permit life to move along lines set and anticipated from past experience and thus subtly converts the anticipated into the inevitable and the inevitable into the acceptable" (Shils 1981: 198). Thus tradition provides answers for the scarcity of information, the limits of intellectual capacity, and the moral and psychological needs of the individual.

The need for collective and individual identity is the third reason people in organizations are powerfully drawn to traditions. It is true individuals vary in regard to how much they internalize an organizational identity, but all individuals do so to some extent if for no other reason than to effectively participate in the life of the organization. For many others, however, a more intensive identification with the organization is sought. At the old

“Ma Bell” telephone system, for example, employees referred to each other as having “Bell heads.” Individuals seek organizational traditions to designate themselves as members of the organization. They need to do this to make sense of and give a rationale for their life in the organization. The “Bell heads” understood the organization as a public service organization and this justified the sacrifices that were demanded of them to maintain telephone service in times of natural disasters. Only traditions, generalized and refined over time, provide the integration of diverse experiences around a unifying theme or set of beliefs. It is this integrative process that is able to provide the individual with self designation in the transindividual organization.

The motivation for seeking organizational identity is complex. Postmodernists and critical theorists have called attention to the “brain washing” that takes place in organizations through the intimidation of power and the socialization into organizationally self serving values such as materialism and hierarchical status. But there is another reason: individuals identify with organizations to transcend themselves as individuals in an effort to associate themselves with important and vital things. For the Bell employees this was helping the weak and needy in times of disaster. Important and vital things are not fashions but beliefs or perceptions that have a depth in time. To have a depth in time, these beliefs and perceptions must be encapsulated in traditions. Without this attachment to important and vital things whose existence transcends not just the individual but his contemporaries as well, organizational identity is weak and shallow, making it vulnerable to manipulation and degradation, as was demonstrated, for example, in the moral collapse of Enron’s culture.

The need for moral culture is the fourth reason tradition is essential to organizational life. Contemporary organizations such as Enron demonstrate clearly the problem people have in an environment without moral limits. It is not just the interpersonal dishonesty, lying, deception, unbridled aggression, manipulation, and theft. In Enron’s case, one high ranking finance executive at the center of the scandal committed suicide. To say individuals seek to transcend themselves through identification with the organization as a means to order and justify their

experience implies the profound moral effect organizations can have on their members. In some organizations – churches and schools, for example – a transcendent realm is sought where sacred values can be reflected upon and cultivated in order to seek help in knowing how to live and even why to live. Hence, organizations maintain and inculcate the most basic and long standing values that constitute the broader society.

These traditions promulgated by churches and schools are, in a more attenuated form, the same traditions found in most organizations. Non profit organizations, for example, are “mission driven” and the mission is the cultivation and practice of moral values. Take for example the Red Cross, which provides assistance to victims of disaster, or the Sierra Club, which seeks to safeguard the natural environment.

In the for profit area, the record is more mixed. Many businesses merely pursue profits with little regard for anything more than obeying the law to avoid indictments, fines, and jail or the great economic costs of severe stakeholder backlash. But even in the for profit area, “socially responsible” businesses contribute to the maintenance, cultivation, and practice of some of the most central moral values in our society: Levi Strauss & Company, for example, pulled its business out of China partly because of human rights violations; and the sporting goods maker Patagonia pulled its mountain climbing products off the market because they were damaging the natural environment.

CONCLUSION

As long as we desire to act collectively, we will need organizations; as long as we need organizations, we will utilize structures of authority; as long as we create structures of authority, authority will enmesh itself in tradition to stabilize and prolong itself. This is not, though it often becomes, a mere “power grab” by the possessors of organizational authority. Authority and the traditions that maintain it are a necessary requirement of social organization. For those who seek to correct abuses of power (or to exercise power themselves), the cause of “organizational change” seems right and just. But when changes so undermine the structure

of traditional authority, there is little left to oppose the march of power or its total enactment in an Enron type regression to total exploitation and greed. In these situations, few have the sense or the courage to challenge the powers that be, no matter how corrupt. Indeed, in the Enron case, even the moral leaders and legal experts on the board of directors supported and formally approved management behavior. It is here that traditions in organizations have their most vital role to play: to maintain and cultivate the moral standards by which interpersonal relations and collective action can be limited and regulated. Tradition, because of its partial autonomy from the structure of organizational power through its depth (legitimacy) in time, is most well suited as a force to limit the abuse of power in organizations.

SEE ALSO: Charisma, Routinization of; Collective Memory (Social Change); Culture, Production of; Institution; Institutional Theory, New; Organization Theory; Tradition

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organizations, voluntary

Jenny Onyx

Voluntary organization is a generic term used to refer to a specific type of organization, some times also referred to as nonprofit organizations, NGOs (non government organizations), third

sector organizations, and civil society organizations. Each of these terms reflects a slightly different emphasis. For example, the common definition of a nonprofit is “an organization whose goal is something other than earning a profit for its owners. Usually its goal is to provide services” (Anthony & Young 1990). The definition emphasizes the nonprofit aspect of voluntary organizations but does not distinguish between other organizations that might not be profit seeking, such as state run or government organizations. Similarly, NGOs can technically refer to private for profit organizations as well as voluntary organizations, although the term is usually reserved for large international nonprofit organizations (which nonetheless may earn a profit from some aspects of their operations, such as, for example, the Bangladesh NGO BRAC).

The term voluntary, as the name implies, emphasizes the fact that citizens freely form these organizations, and thus they are autonomous, independent of both government and the market. The term is often taken to refer to the presence of volunteers within nonprofit organizations, although many voluntary organizations are more dominated by professional staff than volunteers. Finally, these organizations are often identified as being independent of both the state and the market, belonging to a third sector or to civil society. As some scholars have argued, the formation of voluntary organizations may occur as a response to the failure either of the market (in providing a low cost service) or of the state (in providing a service for minority needs) (Hansmann 1987). Indeed, service oriented nonprofits can be found in fields as diverse as health, education, sport and recreation, social services, and religion.

More recent scholarship has focused on the positive attributes of nonprofits, for example that voluntary organizations provide a “school for democracy,” or a form of community mutual support as an expression of social capital (Putnam 2000). Many, though by no means all, voluntary organizations are embedded in social movements that generate new collective social responses to social, economic, or environmental issues (Melucci 1988). International scholarship has also emphasized the variable and complex nature of voluntary organizations, which makes it difficult to identify a set of

characteristics that serve as essential criteria for all such organizations.

Voluntary organizations vary greatly in size. The great majority in all countries are small, relying entirely on the voluntary labor of their members. These are grassroots organizations, often with strong traditional roots, but without any formal legal structure, particularly in traditional village societies. Other voluntary organizations are very large indeed, with a national or international reach, with thousands of volunteers and several hundred paid employees (Salamon et al. 1999).

Despite the diversity, there are several characteristics of voluntary organizations that generally set them apart from other organizations. Foremost is the nonprofit distribution principle. Voluntary organizations may make a profit, but that is not their primary purpose. Profits may be used to enhance or expand services; they may not be distributed to individual shareholders. This fundamental principle has implications for internal accounting and external tax and legal considerations. It also means that, unlike business entities, the bottom line cannot be used as a measure of performance. What does count is the mission of the organization. The mission of a nonprofit defines the value of the organization to society and creates the organization's purpose, and so it becomes the measure that must be used to evaluate performance (Moore 2000).

Second, voluntary organizations do not normally create a direct revenue stream, and thus remain dependent on other sectors for financial resources, through corporate sponsorship or government funding, or else on the wider public for donations. Some organizations have attempted to escape the uncertainty that these dependent relationships engender by moving to a user pays or membership fee basis, or by developing a profit generating arm of the organization to cross subsidize the nonprofit arm, thus leading to complaints of unfair tax advantage by for profit competitors. Volunteer labor is often a major resource for voluntary organizations, but is seldom accounted for as such.

The form of human resources is often quite different in voluntary organizations. Volunteer labor, including the voluntary overtime of paid professional staff, often underwrites the performance of the organization (Salamon et al. 1999).

Professional staff typically accept up to 25 percent lower salary for the privilege of working in a voluntary organization (Preston 1990). Staff are primarily motivated by the mission/value base of the organization rather than by personal rewards (Moore 2000). As such, human resource policies must be designed accordingly.

Given that the organization is voluntary, the forms of governance are likely to be distinctive, being controlled by stakeholders who are citizens rather than shareholders or delegates of government instrumentalities. There are, however, no specific ideal forms of organizational structure or governance. Historically, voluntary organizations have experimented with various forms of dispersed or flat structures designed to maximize the opportunities for participatory democracy. These include variations of the collective model, the cooperative model, and the community management model, all of which apply the subsidiarity principle, in which decisions are made by those most affected by the outcomes of the decision.

Those voluntary organizations seeking government funding or corporate sponsorship are particularly vulnerable to the impact of the isomorphic assumptions of their donors (DiMaggio & Powell 1991). That is, funding bodies tend to be suspicious of organizations that do not look like them. For instance, when organizations are required to incorporate to obtain legal status, or as they increase in size and complexity, thus requiring more formal procedures for decision making and accountability, they often have to take on the attributes of more formalized, standardized, and centralized organizations to be seen to be acceptable. As a result of these processes, many voluntary organizations acquire large bureaucratic structures and hierarchical systems of accountability, overseen by formal boards of management. Within this corporate model, there is increasing emphasis on the voluntary organization being seen to be run as an effective and efficient business.

A major preoccupation in nonprofit texts and scholarship journals over the past 15 years has been the issue of "governance" and the relationship between the CEO of the voluntary organization and the board of management. Boards comprise voluntary people with responsibility for the governance of the organization.

The functions of boards are variously defined (Harris 1996) as: ensuring accountability; employing staff; formulating policy; securing resources; and acting as “boundary spanner.” In fact, there is considerable role ambiguity and potential role conflict between CEO and chair (Otto 2003). There is also enormous variation in the form of governance adopted within the sector. On the one hand, the board carries ultimate legal responsibility under most forms of incorporation, being designed to determine the overall direction of the organization, to represent the interests of the wider constituency or membership, and to monitor staff compliance. On the other hand, board members may well lack the time, detailed knowledge, or expertise to carry out these tasks, and may see themselves rather as a supportive, “rubber stamp” of management. The reality in many organizations is one of interdependence or partnership, in which both staff and board perform a variety of functions in relation to each other, and as negotiated according to the specific skill mix of both.

Balanced against the concern with boards and CEO behavior, there has also been something of a counter revolution within voluntary organizations over the past five years, leading to a greater demand for participation, reverse accountability, and constituency responsiveness. These countermoves have been driven by several global trends, notably the downsizing of government, the rise in the demand for voice by members of civil society (e.g., with formal representation within United Nations deliberations), and the recognition of the importance of social capital. Social capital as a concept has gained prominence through the work of Putnam (2000); while the concept is still contested, it highlights the importance of social resources (networks, values, and trust) as opposed to economic resources in developing a strong community and a strong organization. As a consequence of neoliberal public policies emerging to steer many late modern capitalist economies, governments have withdrawn from direct welfare provision and transferred increased responsibility for welfare service delivery to voluntary organizations (Nowland Foreman 1998). At the same time, government funding bodies have attempted to institute increased surveillance and compliance mechanisms on the ways in

which voluntary organizations perform these services. Yet there are also many new advocacy organizations being formed in response to the perceived loss of welfare services and the greater inequalities generated by global economic reform, such as those negotiated by the World Trade Organization and World Bank (examples include CIVICUS and the Social Forum). Right wing think tanks (often supported by conservative neoliberal governments) object to these advocacy organizations having a voice on the grounds that they have a very limited constituency (though they may claim to speak for the public good) and/or that they have poor forms of representation and accountability. Indeed, these accusations have triggered new debates within the third sector academic community (ISTR conference, 2004) concerning the appropriate forms of democratic action within voluntary organizations and the forms of accountability and transparency required.

After some 15 years of neoliberal economic reform, with its exclusive focus on economic growth at the expense of social justice and the environment, many nations are now identifying serious fallouts in terms of increased social problems (decreased services and populations in rural towns, youth disaffection and unemployment, rising rates of suicide and depression among some demographic categories, and so on). There is also an increased concern about issues of environmental degradation and global warming. There is an emerging recognition that the global preoccupation with economic growth has occurred at the expense of the social infrastructure and the environment. There are many calls for a reconciliation of the social, environmental, and economic imperatives. In this context, the work of Putnam (2000), in particular, has identified the crucial role of civil society organizations in generating social capital and identifying potential solutions to social and environmental problems. Civil society organizations are thus the principle base for active citizenship. They cannot perform that function without high levels of participatory and deliberative democracy, both within and between organizations. The pressure is now felt to find new organizational forms and processes beyond the bureaucratic or corporate model of governance.

SEE ALSO: Collectivism; Community; Decision Making; NGO/INGO; Organizations; Organizations as Social Structures; Social Capital

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Orientalism

Peter Chua

Orientalism is the study of the “Orient” and its “eastern” arts, languages, sciences, histories, faiths, cultures, and peoples by Christian theological experts, humanist scholars, and natural and social scientists since the 1500s. Orientalist writers consider the “Orient” as consisting of societies geographically east of Christian Europe to be explored, acquired, and colonized for their raw materials, abundant labor, and pieces of seemingly opulent civilizations in decline. These colonial explorations resulted in man made, imaginary geographies and political demarcations such as the Near East, the Middle East, Central Asia, the Far East, the Pacific Isles, the New World, and the “Dark Continent.”

Since the 1950s, Orientalist scholarship seriously criticizes the objectionable exoticization, racialization, and cultural embodiment of first world imperialist projects. These critics object to their claims of validity and objectivity and to the authoritative statements and classroom materials on topics such as Islam, Middle Eastern affairs, Indian civilization, and Chinese philosophies. Moreover, they charge that Orientalism assists in the economic and political domination and restructuring of the “Orient” through its denials, distortions, and suppressions of lived experiences under western imperialism with its claims of western and Christian superiority in knowledge, commerce, gender relations, and ways of life.

Cultural theorist Edward Said offers, in his landmark *Orientalism* (1978), a sustained study of Eurocentric discourse representing itself as innocent, objective, and well intentioned (see Clawson 1998). He argues that it is never simply negative racial stereotyping and prejudice by those who never had contact with the orientalized “other.” Instead, US, British, French, and other first world scholars often have had and needed direct contacts with their “others” to produce Orientalist knowledge in attempts to explain and justify imperialist projects during their respective periods of conquest and empire.

Said argues that US, British, and French Orientalisms produce racialized discourses in the arts, media, politics, and social science

knowledge that are erroneous abstractions, in particular, of people of Islamic faith and from the Middle East. To legitimate and maintain western dominance since the late 1960s, US Orientalism, for instance, represents the Middle East as an Islamic place bursting with villains and terrorists and denies the historical, lived, and racially and religiously diverse realities of dispossessed Palestinians. These varying strategic deployments of Orientalist discourse produce a global politics and civic engagement tinted by a deeply distorted image of the social complexity of millions of people practicing Islam or residing in the third world.

Feminist scholars such as Kum Kum Bhavnani, Chandra Mohanty, Reina Lewis, and Lila Abu Lughod document how Orientalist constructions have been significantly sexualized and gendered. Prominent male scholars are not the exclusive producers of these constructions; some feminists and women's studies scholars historically have participated in Orientalism too. Bhavnani, Mohanty, Lewis, Abu Lughod, and others analyze the ways Orientalist scholars deploy problematic gendered, sexualized, and racialized discourses to further "the [western and liberal] Feminist Project" and to liberate women from seemingly oppressive, traditional third world cultures. The analyses of Bhavnani et al. encourage present research on gender and culture that is sensitive to the complex historical and contextual lives, struggles, and experiences among Muslim, Middle Eastern, and other third world women. These studies overcome defective dichotomies such as "tradition" and "modernity," of "universal sisterhood" and "nationalism," and of "global women's rights" and "local gender empowerment." They consequently examine the dialogue on gender, social, and economic justice, all of which are situated in locally negotiated feminisms and in difficult and dangerous cultural, national, and global contexts.

Sociologists Bryan Turner and Stuart Hall contend that Orientalist discourse exists in the underlying assumptions, fundamental concepts, epistemological models, and methodological procedures of modern sociology. Turner, Hall, and others trace the origins of this discourse in the writings of early influential theorists in Western European sociology and examine their varied legacies, such as Herbert Spencer's social

Darwinism; Karl Marx's materialist analysis of the "Asiatic" type of societies; Max Weber's comparative historical analysis of religion, culture, economy, domination (particularly its "patrimonial" form), and rational modernities; and Émile Durkheim's and Sigmund Freud's structuralist analysis of indigenous American and Australian totems, taboos, "primitive" classifications, and collective representations. As a consequence, sociology has participated in fostering Orientalism and unduly assists first world imperialist projects through its varied theoretical, research, and policy practices.

Early University of Chicago sociologists such as Albion Small, John Dewey, George Herbert Mead, Robert Park, and Emory Bogardus produced Orientalist formulations as they deliberated on the US empire and one of its own parts of the "Orient" – the Philippines from 1899 to 1946 (Chua 2006). These formulations crucially influenced theoretical and empirical inquiries in the sociology of symbolic interactionism, race relations, and the third world. They demonstrate the racist epistemologies and Orientalist knowledge of these US sociologists as they deliberated on the Philippine colonial problem. This draws attention to how these Orientalist perspectives assisted in the development of the first hundred years of US sociology and how such Orientalist sociology underlies much of the public ideology and academic edifice justifying the expansion of the US empire from the Philippines to Afghanistan and Iraq.

After half a century of rigorous and multifarious attempts to halt Orientalism and its cooperation with imperialist projects, it persists – yet a bit injured – worldwide within sociology and other arenas of knowledge and power. Often celebratory of neoliberal economics, cultural globalization, and western interventionist politics, defenders and practitioners of Orientalism, as Edward Said had remarked, continue to be provincial. To overcome the provinciality of Orientalism and engage in productive dialogue with its critics, responsible defenders today seek to be less intellectually careless and more ethically accountable to humanity.

SEE ALSO: Culture, Gender and; Empire; Eurocentrism; Globalization, Culture and; Islam; Methods, Postcolonial; Third World and Postcolonial Feminisms/Subaltern

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Orthodoxy

Nikos Kokosalakis

Orthodoxy is a major branch of Christianity, represented by the Eastern Orthodox Church, with an unbroken continuity to the apostolic tradition and a claim to be the depository of the authentic Christian faith and practice. Today, the Orthodox Church consists of the ancient patriarchates (Constantinople, Alexandria, Antiochia, Jerusalem) and various national autocephalous churches. The Patriarchate of Constantinople, also called Ecumenical, enjoys the primacy of honor among all the other patriarchates and the rest of the Orthodox autocephalous churches without having any administrative or other jurisdiction over them whatsoever. The churches of Russia, Serbia,

Romania, Bulgaria, and Georgia carry patriarchal status – being led by a patriarch. The churches of Greece, Cyprus, and Albania are led by archbishops. There are also the smaller, autonomous Orthodox churches of Poland, Finland and former Czechoslovakia. The Greek diaspora, with full church organization (dioceses, parishes, etc.) in America, Europe, and Australia, is under the jurisdiction of the Ecumenical Patriarchate. The Russian diaspora is under the Patriarchate of Moscow. In all, the Orthodox populations (practicing in the broad sense) in the world today are estimated between 170–180 million. According to Ware (1963: 15): “The Orthodox Church, thus, is a family of self governing Churches. It is held together . . . by the double bond of unity in the faith and communion in the sacraments.”

HISTORICAL PROFILE

The connection of Orthodoxy to the original “undistorted” Christian faith is claimed on the fact that the early Christian communities of the Eastern Church were established by the apostles. The Apostolic synod (49 CE) decided that Christianity should go outside the confines of Judaism and be spread to the Gentiles. This and St. Paul’s Hellenic education and the fact that the books of the New Testament (with the exception of the Gospel of St. Matthew) were written in Greek gave the Eastern Church a distinctly Greek cultural character. The early Christian communities around the Mediterranean – including the community of Rome – were mostly Greek speaking and the theology and practice of the Eastern Church gradually developed a different ethos and character to that of the Western Church, which was largely Latin based.

The terms Orthodox and Orthodoxy, however, developed later after Emperor Constantine had transferred the capital of the Empire from Rome to Byzantium (330). The term Orthodoxy (from the Greek *orthodoxia*), meaning both right faith and right worship, developed and came to usage during the fourth and fifth centuries in order to distinguish and protect the faith of the church from a variety of heretical movements, Nestorianism and Arianism in particular. During this period, with the protection of the state,

the church acquired the Troeltschian characteristics of the Ecclesia. It thus became an essential institution of the emerging Byzantine Empire.

The early ecumenical councils produced the formal creeds of the church and consolidated the notion of Orthodoxy, but the Nestorians rejected the decisions of the council of Ephesus (431) and the Monophysites those of the council of Chalcedon (451). Out of these quarrels, which produced the first splits in the Eastern Church, derive today's Armenian Orthodox Church and the Coptic Church of Ethiopia.

The Greek Fathers, especially the Cappadocians, wove into Christian theology platonic and neoplatonic ideas. Parsons (1979), in fact, saw in this synthesis the seeds of the subsequent development of religious and economic symbolism in Europe and the western world at large. Along with such basic theological components, the development of hermetic monasticism in Egypt, Asia Minor, and the Middle East during this early period left an indelible mark on Orthodoxy.

The model of church–state relations established by Constantine, who made Christianity not just *religio licita* (permitted religion) but official state religion, persists in modified form in Greece and Cyprus to the present day. The model involved a special fusion of religion and politics, which became the hallmark of Byzantine civilization. In Byzantium there was a total overlap between religion and society and Orthodoxy was synonymous with culture (Nicol 1979). The emperors had power over and direct involvement in ecclesiastical affairs and had the last word in the appointment of the patriarchs. Yet, this model, which has been characterized as Caesaropapism, did not mean arbitrary power of the state over the church. As this was a theocratic empire, the clergy and the monks could exercise essential direct and indirect pressure on the polity. Indeed, many emperors were deposed or killed because of their religious politics.

Evidence of this fusion of religion and politics, based on the fusion of religion and society, is also forthcoming from the quarrels over icons, which shook the empire to its foundations between 726 and 843. Icons in the Orthodox tradition are not just religious symbols or religious art, but material forms of deep spiritual and theological communication (Kokosalakis

1995). Icons are also indicative of the different theological and cultural conception of Christian faith in Orthodoxy compared to the other major branches of Christianity – Roman Catholicism and Protestantism. It was in fact such different appreciation along with major political and cultural differences between the Eastern and the Western Churches which brought about their schism and anathema to each other in 1054. Since then, because of historical and political circumstances (the crusades, etc.), the gulf between the two churches was consolidated and widened. Also, the threat from Islam and the gradual weakening of the empire gave Orthodoxy a more circumscribed and defensive outlook. On the other hand, the claims for supremacy of the pope were not accepted by the Orthodox and led to the failure of attempts for reunification of the two churches in the councils of Lyon (1274) and Florence (1439).

The Byzantine Church was essentially Greek but also ecumenical. Christian elements had existed in the peoples of the Balkans (Illyrians, southern Slavs) and around the Black Sea (Georgia) since apostolic times, but it was the Byzantine mission which transmitted and consolidated Christianity to these people. The missionaries Cyril and Methodios translated the Bible and Orthodox liturgical texts into Slavonic and are considered the founders of the church in the ninth century in contemporary Bulgaria, Romania, and Serbia. In Russia, Orthodoxy was also transmitted from Byzantium and the church was officially established there after the massive baptism of the *Ros*. Queen Olga was baptized in Constantinople (957) and her grandson Vladimir married the Byzantine Princess Anna (988). Orthodoxy in Russia took deep roots and was further strengthened after the collapse of the Byzantine Empire with the conquest of Constantinople by the Ottomans (1453). The marriage of Princess Sophia, niece of the last Emperor of Byzantium, to the Tsar Ivan III was seen as the establishment of Moscow as the Third Rome. The Russian Church, however, became hopelessly entangled with the power and the political whims of the tsars, till its near total elimination by the Bolsheviks after 1917.

For the Patriarchate of Constantinople the end of the empire and its conquest by the Ottomans during the sixteenth, seventeenth, and eighteenth centuries meant, paradoxically, the

strengthening of both its ecumenical and ethnic character. It was Islamic practice going back to the Prophet that conquered people be allowed to practice their faith in return for obedience to Islamic authorities and the payment of taxes. The Ecumenical Patriarch was recognized by the Sultan as leader of the Orthodox people (*Milet Bashi*) on condition of guaranteeing their obedience and collecting taxes. A definite administrative structure thus developed between the High Porte and the Patriarchate. This gave the latter not only special privileges but also a special authority over the Orthodox believers, who now had not only their spiritual but also their civic affairs administered by the church. For the Greeks as for other Orthodox ethnic groups in the Balkans this meant that Orthodoxy was closely interwoven with their national ethnic identities and this at a time when nation state societies were being formed and consolidated in the rest of Europe. Especially for the Greeks, the church during that period was not just the depository of the Orthodox faith, but also the main carrier and preserver of the Greek language and identity. Thus, Orthodoxy did not just survive the Ottoman rule, but during the nineteenth century reemerged as a strong ideological and cultural force in the pursuit of independence for Greeks, Romanians, Serbians, and Bulgarians.

The French Revolution deeply affected the revolutionary movements in the Balkans in the nineteenth century. Unlike France and later Russia, however, where religion and the revolution were in conflict, in the Balkans religion became intertwined with nationalism and fostered the revolutionary spirit. One consequence of this was that Orthodoxy acquired a strong ethnic character in the region and the organization of the Orthodox Church was completely transformed with the establishment of national independent churches, severed unilaterally from the Ecumenical Patriarchate, which eventually recognized their autocephalous status as a *fait accompli*. So the church of the new born Greece was established in 1833 and recognized by the Patriarchate in 1852. The Church of Serbia became autonomous in 1831 and autocephalous in 1879, but the incorporation of Serbia to the Kingdom of Yugoslavia along with Catholic Croatia and Slovenia after World War I created new ethnic conflicts which

became violent after the collapse of the socialist bloc in the early 1990s. The Church of Bulgaria declared its independence in 1870, when the country was still under Turkish rule, but the Patriarchate recognized it only in 1945, after much controversy. The Church of Romania, established in 1862, was recognized by the Ecumenical Patriarchate in 1885.

There were cultural and political anomalies in the establishment and administration of these churches in that the monarchs of Greece, Bulgaria, Serbia, and Romania were initially Catholic, who were heads of church and state in countries with predominantly Orthodox populations. This and the fusion of Orthodoxy and nationalism along with the problems of modernization and secularization in these states created great tensions and politicization in these churches throughout the nineteenth and twentieth centuries.

The Church of Russia after 1917 and the churches in the Balkans after World War II – with the exception of the Church of Greece and Cyprus – were either in severe persecution or mere toleration by the socialist state. The degree of oppression and/or persecution of Orthodoxy, and religion generally, differed from one communist country to another and the church as an institution was forced to compromise variously in each case. It is noteworthy that, especially in Russia, religion in popular form managed to survive over 70 years and even show signs of revival after the collapse of the socialist bloc in 1989–90. This can be partly explained by the cultural anthropological specificity of Orthodoxy and its relation to modernity.

CULTURAL ANTHROPOLOGICAL SPECIFICITY OF ORTHODOXY

Within the Christian religion generally a distinction must be made between the church as an organized institution and the faith and practice of the people. Although this applies to the Orthodox tradition as well, the relation in it between popular and official faith is very vague and blurred. The basic doctrines were formalized by the theologians and the councils of the church during the fourth and fifth centuries and became deeply ingrained in the faith and

practice of the Christian communities – above all in the liturgy. Thus, what came to be known as ecclesiastical consciousness expresses the authentic Orthodox ethos, which derives directly from the faith and practice of the community within the church. The bishops are central to the continuity and interpretation of the apostolic faith, but the authority of the church does not rest with the clergy in any legalistic sense but derives from the communion of faith in the *homoousian*, the undivided trinitarian God.

As an ideal this ethos is deeply democratic and is translated in practice into a fusion of official and popular religion. One of the remarkable features of the Orthodox Church, throughout its history everywhere, has been its capacity to absorb in its own lifestyle popular religious culture and even what to outsiders must appear to be the magical and superstitious practices of peasant communities. Basic features of the Orthodox ethos are ambiguity, flexibility, and openness: even Canon Law is subject to popular faith. One reason for this is that early in the life of the church there entered the principle and practice of *oikonomia*. This practice meant that the church compromises in the face of transgression by individual believers. Thus, as a compromise, bishops and priests, who were forced to eat pagan sacrificial meals during the persecutions by the Emperors Decius and Diocletian, were not excommunicated. Also, the second ecumenical council accepted the baptism of heretics as valid, compromising with Apostolic Canon 46 which rejected it. The principle of *oikonomia* continues to be practiced by the Orthodox Church to the present day concerning ethical problems emerging from social change, such as divorce, birth control, bioethical issues, etc.

Another specific cultural feature of Orthodoxy involving official theology and popular faith is the process by which holiness emerges and is recognized. Saints (*Aghioi*) in the Orthodox Church are formally declared as such by the Ecumenical Patriarchate, but only if and long after they are so recognized by the community at the grassroots. Holiness thus enters the liturgical life of the church and becomes publicly recognized from below.

At a deeper and more central theological level the christological, trinitarian, and eschatological

doctrines are directly related to a specific anthropological conception of salvation. In Orthodox theology there is a deep phenomenological entanglement of the human and the divine. The sacred permeates nature and human nature as a matter of the divine plan and act of salvation not as a conception of pantheistic fusion, but as a matter of conscious divine and human personal choice. Thus, in the life of the Orthodox believer, salvation and *theosis* become inextricably linked. The prototype to strive toward is the person of Christ, whose image is potentially present in any other human being.

There is a central eschatological vision in Orthodox theology where the past, the present, and the future are intertwined in a projected final dimension of salvation. On the part of the person, this entails struggle and constant *askesis* against the powers of this world (often personified in the devil) and, above all, the outrageous *self*, but the final outcome is victory due to the risen Christ.

These soteriological dimensions are ecumenical, universal in character, and according to St. Paul (Galatians 3: 28) transcend sociocultural boundaries of any kind, but in the actual life of the Orthodox Church they are in tension and often in conflict because of its embodiment in various ethnic groups and local and national societies.

ORTHODOXY AND MODERNITY

Orthodoxy is a premodern culture in the special sense that it was not disrupted directly by the foundational movements of modernity: the Renaissance, the Reformation, and the Enlightenment. Modernity also has been exogenous to societies where Orthodoxy has been the dominant religion because capitalist development and industrialization in these societies came late during the second half of the twentieth century. During the nineteenth century Orthodoxy was in tension with modernity not in the context of possession and transmission of power from clerical to secular hands, but in the context of its connections to ethnic identities and nationalism and the politicization and secularization of the church itself. Secularization thus had a specific

and different development in Orthodoxy to that experienced in western Christianity. During the twentieth century, despite the opposition to religion in the communist bloc, Orthodoxy at the popular level survived well and the Orthodox churches in these countries have revived.

During modern and late modern times religion generally has disengaged itself from the social structure and has become a fluid and diffused cultural force and resource. This process seems to be conducive to the revival of the Orthodox cultural ethos, described earlier, at a time when the ideological dimensions of modernity have become attenuated and globalization has further relativized all cultural certainties (Gianoulatos 2001). Although Orthodoxy is undergoing severe tension in late modernity, at the same time it shows renewed vitality and cultural resilience. Both have to do with its salvationist message. In the context of risk society and a world of great uncertainty, a deep Weberian analysis of Orthodoxy would show that its crucial sociological significance lies in its eschatological, optimistic character and its general soteriological message. Weber insisted that the world always was and always will be in need of salvation. Indeed, salvation according to him constitutes the essence of religion. His own severe pessimism about the fate of modernity is well known and the tone of most analyses of global developments in the early twenty first century seems to share such pessimism. Certainly, the initial optimism characteristic of early modernity at the age of the Enlightenment turned into its polar opposite by the late twentieth century.

In the midst of this general despondency Orthodox theology and the Orthodox culture generally remain optimistic. In Orthodox theological, eschatological terms, the negative forces which militate against salvation, and death itself, are ultimately conquerable through God's plan for the salvation of the world and the power of the risen Christ. Death and renewal as a recurrent historical drama are at the heart of Orthodox theology and culture.

SEE ALSO: Catholicism; Christianity; Church; Civil Religion; Nation State and Nationalism; Popular Religiosity; Protestantism; Science and Religion; Secularization

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outliers

Roger E. Kirk

An outlier is an observation or measurement that is unusually large or small relative to the other values in a data set. Outliers occur for a variety of reasons. They can represent, for example, an error in measurement, data recording, or data entry, or a correct value that just happens to be extreme. Outliers can seriously affect the integrity of data and result in biased or distorted sample statistics, inflated sums of squares, distorted p values and effect sizes, and faulty conclusions. Alternatively, they can be the most interesting finding in the data. His tory records many scientific breakthroughs that have resulted from following up on extreme observations.

There is no rigorous definition of an outlier; and no mathematical calculation can tell with certainty whether an outlier comes from the population of interest or a different population. Some outliers are obvious: a student's height of

53 feet and their IQ score of 1,200. Not all outliers are so obvious. A number of rules have been suggested for identifying obvious and not so obvious outliers. Most of the rules involve quantifying how far an outlier is from other data values. One rule identifies an outlier as any measurement or observation that falls outside of the interval given by $\bar{Y} \pm 2.5S$, where \bar{Y} and S denote, respectively, the sample mean and standard deviation. Unfortunately, \bar{Y} and S are greatly affected by extreme observations. It is preferable to use rules based on measures of location and variation that are not themselves affected by outliers such as the median, Mdn , and interquartile range, $Q_3 - Q_1$. One such rule identifies an outlier as any measurement or observation that falls outside of the interval given by $Mdn \pm 2(Q_3 - Q_1)$. John Tukey (1977) proposed a widely used rule based on a box plot (box and whisker plot). A box plot for the scores $Y_i = 7, 9, 10, 12, 13, 15, 32$ is shown in Figure 1. The box plot identified one outlier, $Y_i = 32$. The rule based on the mean and standard deviation failed to detect this outlier. For bivariate data, inspection of a scatterplot is useful for identifying outliers.

Once an outlier has been identified, the next step is to determine whether the outlier is really a correct, extreme value or an error. If the outlier is an error, it should be corrected or deleted. Dealing with a correct, extreme value is more difficult. Including the outlier in an analysis produces summary statistics that describe neither the bulk of the data nor the outlier. One alternative is to transform the data. Square root and logarithmic transformations soften the impact of outliers because they shrink extreme




Figure 1 Box plot. The ends of the box represent $Q_1 = 9.25$ and $Q_3 = 13.75$. The vertical line in the middle of the box is the $Mdn = 12$. The two whiskers extend from the ends of the box down to 7 and up to 15. There are the outermost data points that fall within $Q_1 - 1.5(Q_3 - Q_1) = 2.5$ and $Q_3 + 1.5(Q_3 - Q_1) = 20.5$, respectively. One outlier, $Y_i = 32$, is identified by *.

values more than non extreme values. Another alternative is to use analysis procedures that are robust in the presence of outliers such as non parametric and distribution free statistics or Winsorized robust measures. To Winsorize data, the smallest, say, 10 percent of observations are each reset to the smallest value not included in the 10 percent. Similarly, the largest 10 percent of observations are each reset to the largest value not included in the 10 percent. Winsorizing data significantly reduces the variance and the standard error of the mean. If the forgoing procedures are not acceptable, as a last resort, the correct, extreme value can be deleted. If this course is followed, it is desirable to report the results both with and without the outlier.

SEE ALSO: Measures of Centrality

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outsider-within

J. Michael Ryan

Patricia Hill Collins’s idea of the outsider within has quickly become a classic in feminist theories. Developed primarily in her book *Fighting Words: Black Women and the Search for Justice* (1998), the term was originally used to describe the location of individuals who find themselves in the border space between groups: that is, who no longer have clear membership in any one group. Dissatisfied with this usage because of its resemblance to early sociology’s “marginal man,” Collins later modified the term to “describe social locations or border spaces occupied by groups of unequal power”

(1998: 5). Rather than static positions, these locations contain a number of contradictions for the individuals who occupy them. While individuals in these unique locations appear to be members of the dominant group based on possession of the necessary qualifications for, and apparent rights of, member standing, they do not necessarily enjoy all of the experiential benefits afforded to formal members. Collins uses the example of blacks in the United States; while they have basic citizenship rights, they are often treated as second class citizens.

Knowledge production is also central to Collins's work. In a search for social justice, the outsider within location describes not only a membership position but also a knowledge/power relationship. This unique location is one where members of a subordinated group can access information about the dominant group without being afforded the rights and privileges accorded to group members. It is this unique knowledge of both sides that distinguishes the outsider within from both elite and oppositional locations.

Collins is particularly interested in the social location of black women as a historically situated group, and the power relations inherent in the construction of knowledge that help influence a notion of critical theory. One of her goals in developing the concept of the outsider within was to help create a body of knowledge that would be specific to black women and their unique social location in order to insert an identity into the stream of theoretical consciousness that had long been missing. By analyzing social theory in this context, she notes that: "Far from being neutral, the very meaning and use of the term social theory represents a contested terrain" (1998: ix). Collins asserts that social theory is both knowledge *and* lived institutional practices that attempt to answer the questions and concerns facing groups based in specific political, social, and historical situations. Thus it does not derive from elite positions but rather from actual groups of people in specific institutional settings. Since it is these groups of people who legitimate social theory, it is their concerns that should be reflected by it. This ideology demonstrates Collins's commitment to placing outsider groups at the core of her analysis and to create "issues where absence has long been the norm" (1998: 105).

SEE ALSO: Black Feminist Thought; Feminism; Feminist Standpoint Theory

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outsourcing

Natalia Nikolova

Outsourcing refers to the fundamental decision to contract out specific activities that previously were undertaken internally. In other words, outsourcing involves the decision to reject the internalization of an activity and can be viewed as vertical disintegration. As it means to obtain by contract from an outside supplier, it is also called contracting out or subcontracting.

Outsourcing is not new. Contractual relationships dominated the economic organization of production prior to and during the Industrial Revolution. However, from the mid nineteenth century until the last 20 years, the internalization of transactions within organizations became the dominant trend. From the 1880s, there was a shift from a regime of *laissez faire* production consisting of many small firms to a regime based on large, vertically integrated corporations, or what is called a shift from markets to hierarchies, which culminated in the large scale public and private sector bureaucracies of the post war era. Two reinforcing tendencies played an important part in this trend: the growth of direct government involvement in economic activity and the development of production technologies that favored large, vertically integrated organizations. Those same factors forced the retreat from outsourcing in the 1980s and 1990s. In the first years of this outsourcing trend, mainly non core and less strategically important activities were subcontracted, such as cleaning,

catering, and maintenance, also called blue collar activities. Increasingly, however, organizations began to outsource white collar, business services, which many might claim are strategic, such as IT and telecommunications. The off shore contracting out of manufacturing and especially of service activities to developing countries is the reason for a growing skepticism toward outsourcing in the developed countries.

There are two main forms of outsourcing. (1) Long term or embedded outsourcing is characterized by a long term partnership between the outsourcing organization and the outsourcing provider (e.g., strategic alliance, franchising). It involves an intensive interaction, the development of trust between the involved individuals, better communication, and the sharing of the cooperation of risks and outcomes. Such partnerships are usually called networks. (2) Arm's length subcontracting is characterized by a loose relationship between the outsourcing organization and the outsourcing provider, which is similar to the traditional market relationship. These two outsourcing forms differ in their economic implications for the outsourcing company and in the associated requirements on the management of the outsourcing process.

The economic effects of long term outsourcing (networks) and arm's length subcontracting (arm's length, market relationships) are discussed in the literature as a part of the broader issue of the boundaries of the firm – what explains why certain transactions are governed in house (through hierarchy or vertical integration) while others are governed through market relations (arm's length subcontracting) or through networks (long term outsourcing)? Two major theoretical streams concentrate on the question of what are the conditions that make one or the other governance form more efficient in governing economic activities: the transaction cost theory and the knowledge-based view of the firm (and its extension, the capabilities approach). These approaches discuss the motives of organizations to undertake outsourcing and the impact of outsourcing on their performance.

Transaction cost theory has its origins in economics. Williamson, one of the leading figures of the transaction cost perspective, developed a model that proposes that the main motive of organizations to outsourcing activities is to

reduce transaction costs. The model is based on two underlying assumptions about the individuals involved in the regarded transactions: their bounded rationality and the potential danger that they will behave opportunistically. Furthermore, three exchange conditions – uncertainty, asset specificity, and frequency – determine when long term outsourcing (called hybrids within the transaction cost approach), arm's length subcontracting, or vertical integration is more efficient. Asset specificity, which refers to the degree to which an asset can be redeployed to alternative uses without sacrifice of value, is the central category in the argument. Asset specificity creates bilateral dependency and poses contracting hazards to the involved organizations. It is argued that activities that are related to transactions with a mid to strong degree of asset specificity and a middle frequency should be outsourced and executed in close cooperation with the outsourcing provider because hybrids are the governance form with the lowest transaction costs in such cases. Arm's length subcontracting is, in contrast, the most efficient governance form in all cases of low degree of asset specificity. Thus, the focus of this approach is on transaction costs – all problems of economic organization (including the motives and effects of outsourcing) are seen as a problem of reducing incentive conflicts. The role of routines, limited knowledge and capabilities, and consequently of production costs, is neglected. Dynamic aspects, such as learning and innovation, are also not discussed. Therefore, this approach delivers only a restricted explanation as to why organizations outsource and what form of outsourcing they choose.

The second approach developed in the late 1980s is still not a coherent theory of the firm but, rather, a collection of ideas and works based on the assumption that firms possess distinct, firm specific capabilities, which are the reason for differences in their production costs. It is claimed that different capabilities imply differences in terms of the efficiency with which resources are deployed. According to this approach, firms will vertically integrate those activities in which they have greater experience and/or organizational capabilities than potential external providers and will outsource marginal activities. This allows organizations to

concentrate on their strengths and to profit from the expertise of specialized outsourcing providers. Furthermore, the approach states that non core activities that are to some degree strategically important will be executed in a long term partnership with the outsourcing provider. When the outsourced activities do not have strategic relevance, organizations will choose arm's length subcontracting. A critical question related to this approach is, therefore, how to identify those activities in which a company believes it has its distinctive advantage. The reality shows that most companies struggle to find the right answer. Furthermore, unlike the transaction cost approach, this approach cannot yet generate empirical predictions but rather *ex post* explanations only about which activities should be outsourced. In general, the knowledge based approach cannot explain all reasons why firms outsource (e.g., to achieve specialization effects and, at the same time, to limit the negative effects of opportunistic behavior). Therefore, both views, the transaction cost approach and the knowledge based approach, contribute to some degree to a better understanding of outsourcing.

Additional to these theoretical approaches, a large number of studies are primarily engaged with the empirical proof of the existence of cost efficiencies from outsourcing (whereas most of them do not clearly differentiate between long term outsourcing and arm's length subcontracting). As a leading figure in this research, Domberger undertook several empirical studies of outsourcing in the UK and Australian public and private sector, reporting that, on the average, organizations realized 20 percent increases in efficiency and decreases in cost through outsourcing. These cost efficiencies result, for example, from the reduced capital intensity and lower fixed costs for the outsourcing companies and in the reduced costs of the outsourced activity due to the supplier's economies of scale and scope. Additionally, other positive effects have been proposed, such as higher flexibility through the choice between different suppliers and the easy switch between technologies, quick response to changes in the environment, increased managerial attention and resource allocation to tasks where the organization has its core competences, and increased quality and innovativeness of the purchased

products or services due to specialization of the supplier and spreading of risk.

Despite the arguments that outsourcing firms often achieve better performance than vertically integrated firms, there is a lack of consistency as to the extent to which outsourcing improves the performance and the competitive situation of organizations. Several studies show that efficiency gains are often much smaller than claimed, or even that costs increased after services are contracted out. Additionally, it has been argued that using outsourcing merely as a defensive technique can cause long term negative effects. Because of outsourcing, there is the danger for firms to enter the so called "spiral of decline" (also called hollowing out of organizations): after contracting out, companies need to shift overhead allocation to those products and services that remain in house. As a result, the remaining products and services become more expensive and less competitive, which raises their vulnerability to subsequent outsourcing. This process can lead to the loss of important knowledge and capabilities and, as a result, can threaten the long term survival of organizations. Some other important disadvantages that may result from outsourcing are a negative impact upon employees that remain in the company (e.g., lower employee commitment, drop in promotional opportunities, drop in job satisfaction, and changes in duties), declining innovation by the outsourcer, dependence on the supplier, and the provider's lack of necessary capabilities. Especially the social cost associated with loss of employment in the outsourcing organizations has been strongly criticized by opponents of outsourcing. Partly because of such negative effects, it has been suggested that organizations adopt outsourcing because of the lure of fashionable normalization. From this perspective, efficiency arguments are of less consequence than those that stress institutional factors, especially mimetic isomorphism. It has been claimed that modern societies consist of many institutionalized rules providing a framework for the creation and elaboration of formal organizations. Many of these rules are rationalized myths that are widely believed but rarely, if ever, tested. They originate and are sustained through public opinion, the educational system, laws, or other institutional forms. Thus, many of the factors shaping management and

organization are based not on efficiency or effectiveness but on social and cultural pressures to conform to already legitimate practices, especially when influential consultants recommend a course of action such as outsourcing. Thus, the main problem, as these authors see it, is the danger of misapplication of outsourcing simply because it is fashionable.

The problem with the debate between efficiency and fashion is, however, that outsourcing can be sought both because it is a widely institutionalized and legitimized practice and because it delivers cost reductions. Therefore, these approaches are not necessarily competing but can as well be complementary. An organization that primarily adopts outsourcing in order to conform to other organizations can, at the same time, realize some benefits, e.g., cost efficiencies from the outsourcing practice. The crucial questions are, therefore, (1) whether the cost of exchange of goods and services is significantly higher when this transaction occurs between separate organizations than when it takes place within them, and (2) whether these costs are higher when organizations engage in long term, strategic outsourcing than when they establish arm's length, market relationships. It has been indicated that the answer to both questions is largely dependent on the management of the relationship with the outsourcing provider. Benefits and costs of outsourcing depend crucially on how outsourcing is designed and implemented.

SEE ALSO: Alliances; Franchise; Institutionalism; Management Fashion; Management Networks; Networks; Social Exchange Theory

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P

paradigms

Yvonna S. Lincoln and Egon G. Guba

Paradigms are perhaps one of the most contested terms in qualitative research. While some authors and methodologists use the term to denote a set of methods or methodologies (Tashakkori & Teddlie 2003), others claim that the term has many uses. Some authors point out that Thomas Kuhn, who brought the term into common usage in his *Structure of Scientific Revolutions* (1962), himself used the term in over 25 different ways. Kuhn's general thesis was that paradigms were dominant theories or models by which science proceeded, until they were overtaken and superseded by newer and more encompassing theories or models, or both. Rohmann (1999: 295) defines paradigm as "An ideal or archetypal pattern or example that provides a model to be emulated." A preference here, however, is the definition provided by Reese (1980) and adopted by Lincoln and Guba (1985: 15): "a *set* of basic or meta-physical beliefs . . . sometimes constituted into a *system of ideas* that 'either give us some judgment about the nature of reality, or a reason why we must be content with knowing some thing less than the nature of reality, along with a method for taking hold of whatever can be known' [Reese 1980: 352]."

The distinction between definitions of paradigms as sets of methods or methodologies, and a definition which encompasses an entire set of ideas based on sets of fundamental or metaphysical beliefs, is a crucial one. In general, methods can be utilized in the service of any set of beliefs to a greater or lesser extent. Sets of metaphysical beliefs, however, are rarely transferable (in the same way methods might be deployed and redeployed), nor do they readily

mix with other beliefs which are contradictory. That is, sets of beliefs tend to exhibit internal coherence and resonance. For this reason, discussions of paradigms as metaphysics of science tend to involve discussions of ontology (the nature of reality), epistemology (theories of knowing and theories surrounding the nature of the relationship between knower and to be known), axiology (theories regarding what is considered *good* and what constitutes an appropriate *aesthetics* for a project or regime), and methodology (or implied best procedures for coming to know). Increasingly, paradigm theorists also discuss teleology, or the explanation of things according to their ends or purposes, or, in ethics, explanations in terms of consequences. Thus, for instance, researchers could speak of the portraits of the poor provided by social scientists of the 1960s and 1970s as having been captured by the political Right, and twisted to its own purposes, including the caricaturing of poverty, welfare recipients, racial and ethnic minorities, and the like (Fine et al. 2000).

Paradigms are important to qualitative research because they perform two critical functions. First, they signal that qualitative methods are being deployed in the service of a paradigm which is an alternative to conventional, experimental, or positivist research. Most often, the alternative paradigm is referred to as phenomenological, interpretive, ethnographic, constructivist, or naturalistic. Unlike conventional research, the goal of such research is neither prediction nor control, but rather explanation, deep understanding of some social phenomenon (*verstehen*), or the creation of a *pattern theory*, or all three. Pattern theories are more likely to emerge from interpretive, phenomenological, or ethnographic inquiry because pattern theories, unlike hypothetico-deductive theories, rarely specify cause-effect chains in variables

(factors). Rather, pattern theories theorize motifs, arrangements, or representations of phenomenal elements that appear to be regularized or routinized in their propinquity to each other (Kaplan 1964). For example, less than robust health indicators are frequently seen in conjunction with poverty. It is likely that poverty itself does not cause ill health, but rather that other indicators closely aligned with poverty conditions – substandard housing, limited access to adequate health care, the paucity of high quality nutritional support, and the like – work together to bring about the high incidence of chronic health problems among the desperately poor. Poverty itself is not a causative agent, but rather signals a constellation of factors that often work together to form a pattern of health relative to poverty.

Second, paradigms serve to create “cognitive economy,” as Patton (1978) and others have explained. Paradigms are worldviews, entire philosophical systems for guiding how inquirers think about reality and how reality might be broken down, understood, or investigated. Paradigms are simultaneously both evocative (suggesting how one might conceive of some phenomenon or reality) and normative, specifying legitimate and reasonable means of exploring that reality which would be understood and assented to by other inquirers exploring the same reality. Paradigms serve as both metaphysical and methodological frameworks for socializing practitioners into their respective disciplines, and consequently, disciplinary practitioners will understand some portions of their own paradigms well and other portions may remain intuitive. Paradigms are cognitively efficient because, once adopted, they abrogate the necessity of epistemological or methodological debates each time new disciplinary problems present themselves for investigation.

Paradigms have substantial “staying power” and as a result are shifted only when evidence becomes compelling or overwhelming that a new paradigm is more useful. Practitioners of a given paradigm have typically arrived at some cognitive peace with themselves regarding what they believe regarding what is real, and what can be known about what is real, and are able to frame inquiries which conform to those fundamental, basic beliefs. As Patton points out,

this is both the strength and the weakness of paradigms: a strength because it enables action without further metaphysical debate, and a weakness because the paradigm’s “version of reality tends to become ingrained, influencing the very choice of questions deemed worthy of study, the methods used to study those questions, and the interpretations of the results” (Rohmann 1999: 296).

Because paradigms represent sets of foundational beliefs, they tend to persist over time in individuals as well as disciplines. They frequently represent both disciplinary commitments and the kinds of questions that adherents believe to be important for social science investigations. A plurality of paradigms is likeliest to provide the richest social science; the question is not which paradigm is best suited to science, but rather which paradigm exhibits the best fit with the kinds of questions being posed.

SEE ALSO: Aesthetics; Constructionism; Epistemology; Kuhn, Thomas and Scientific Paradigms; Positivism

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parental involvement in education

Sophia Catsambis

Scholarly interest in parental involvement was sparked in the late 1960s, when the seminal Coleman report (Coleman et al. 1966) found family social background to be the most important predictor of children's academic success in the United States. Educational inequalities by social class are found in most countries and such findings prompted researchers' efforts to identify what aspects of family background are responsible for children's educational success (Gonzalez 2004). Some focus on economic resources, family structure, or parental education, while others investigate parental involvement in children's education.

Despite a significant amount of research on parental involvement, there are considerable differences in its conceptualization and measurement. Early researchers conceived of parental involvement as participation in school activities, while contemporary scholars recognize that it consists of a multitude of family activities (Ho 1995; Hoover Dempsey & Sandler 1997; Epstein 2001). Epstein (2001) developed a widely used classification of parental involvement that defines six distinct types: (1) establishing a positive learning environment at home; (2) communicating with school about educational programs and student progress; (3) participating and volunteering at school; (4) participating in students' learning at home; (5) being involved in school decision making; and (6) collaborating with the community to increase students' learning.

Many family practices fall within each type of involvement. Findings from a number of countries, such as the US, England, Korea, and Hong Kong, show that the specific practices and the types of involvement that different families adopt may vary across nations and are generally affected by children's age, socioeconomic and race/ethnic background, family relationships and experiences, school policies, or neighborhood living conditions (Ho 1995; Huss Keeler 1997; Catsambis & Beveridge 2001; Epstein 2001; Gonzalez 2004; Wang 2004).

PARENTAL INVOLVEMENT FROM PRESCHOOL AND BEYOND

Parental involvement in education begins even before children enter school. Parents adopt a number of family practices in order to address children's developmental and educational needs. Parents of preschool children engage in home based educational practices, such as reading to children, and in activities involving the wider community, such as taking children to museums, zoos, libraries, and day care centers. Parental involvement reaches its peak when children enter elementary school. At that time, nearly all parents communicate regularly with the school and many engage in school related activities, such as volunteering at school and participating in PTA. Parental involvement in the elementary grades is often initiated by school personnel and typically consists of notes and memos transmitted by the child. Parents and teachers may also communicate by brief conversations before and after school and on "parent night" or by special appointment and telephone conversations. Less frequently, teachers establish relationships with parents by visiting children's homes (Epstein 2001). While these specific practices are documented in the US, schools in most countries initiate communication with parents and encourage involvement in their children's elementary education (Carvalho & Jeria 1999; Gonzalez 2004).

Monitoring children's homework is the main venue through which parents participate in their children's elementary education. In addition to its academic purpose, homework provides opportunities for communication among parents, children, and their teachers. Teachers often ask parents to help with children's academic and discipline problems, and therefore parents spend more time supervising homework if their children are having trouble at school (Epstein 2001).

Scholars and educators generally believe that parental involvement declines when children enter middle school. At that time parents may lose confidence in their ability to help with more advanced schoolwork and teachers no longer ask for parent participation. However, it is possible that declines in parental involvement are reported because most studies do not

investigate developmentally appropriate practices for older students (Hill & Taylor 2004). Parental involvement in secondary education has received little attention and not much is known about its nature and effectiveness for high school students. National longitudinal data tracing changes in parental involvement as children grow have been available only in the US. These data reveal that most parents of middle grade students continue some of their already established practices of supervising children's lives and education at home (establishing rules for completing homework, TV viewing and curfews, and discussing career aspirations and plans about future education). When children reach high school, parents drop their involvement in learning activities at home and loosen daily supervision. They increase their communication with schools regarding academic programs and student progress, and participate more at school events. Overall, at this stage of schooling, parents are concerned with preparing adolescents for their future lives and careers and they begin to take actions related to college attendance (Catsambis & Garland 1997).

DOES PARENTAL INVOLVEMENT MAKE A DIFFERENCE?

Empirical evidence in the US, Canada, Australia, and many European and Asian countries has established that parental involvement is important for the academic success of students at all stages of schooling (Villas Boas 1998; Epstein 2001; Gonzalez 2004; Hill et al. 2004). Children whose parents are involved in school have more positive attitudes about school, better attendance and work habits, and higher academic success than do children whose parents are not involved (Epstein 2001; Hill et al. 2004).

Scholars note that not all family practices are effective for children's academic success (Muller 1995, 1998; Lareau 2000). Moreover, given changes in children's developmental needs, children of different ages may respond to different kinds of involvement from their parents (Muller 1998). It is only parental educational aspirations for their children that are strongly associated with academic related attitudes and success

across all school grades (Astone & McLanahan 1991; Singh et al. 1995; Juang & Vondracek 2001; Wang 2004). In the elementary grades, reading activities at home are most important for students' achievement growth (Epstein 2001). In secondary education, students' achievement is positively related with parent/student discussions regarding school matters and general parental supervision and, to a lesser extent, with parent-school contacts and participation in school activities (Astone & McLanahan 1991; Schneider & Coleman 1993; Ho & Willms 1996). By the last years of high school, effective parental involvement may consist of activities that support adolescents' educational decision making regarding course selection and plans for postsecondary education (Catsambis 2001). Much more work is needed to identify changes in effective parental practices associated with children's age and to develop a comprehensive theoretical framework of parental involvement.

DOES ONE MODEL FIT ALL?

Factors related to families' social conditions influence the extent and effectiveness of parental involvement practices. Although research indicates that the negative effects of single parent families and working mothers on parental involvement may be exaggerated (Muller 1995), it has provided consistent cross national evidence of the importance of socioeconomic status and of parental education (Gonzalez 2004; Hill et al. 2004). Parents from middle and upper classes are more knowledgeable about how to be involved in their children's schooling, and their involvement is more effective than those of less advantaged parents (Lareau 2000).

Race and ethnic variations also exist in the levels and effectiveness of parental involvement, but findings are inconsistent in this regard. Some findings show that in the US, Hispanic and African American parents are more involved in their children's education compared to whites once other factors are controlled (Ho & Willms 1996), while others show no such differences (Hill et al. 2004). These inconsistencies may be explained by limitations in existing theory and research that have not adequately considered national or international variations in family life

and parenting (Huss Keeler 1997; Gonzalez 2004; Hill et al. 2004). Some disadvantaged parents may have had negative experiences with school, which may instill a level of distrust toward schools (Hoover Dempsey & Sandler 1997). In other cases, ethnic minority parents may participate little in their children's education because they value highly teachers' professional status and delegate authority for their children's education entirely to schools (Hoover Dempsey & Sandler 1997; Lareau 2000). Others suggest that more study should be devoted to how culturally specific parent-child activities may influence the academic development of children from different ethnic backgrounds (Huss Keeler 1997).

More study is also needed on how the social environment of communities or neighborhoods may affect parents and their children. Specifically, disadvantaged neighborhoods may pose constraints on parents' ability to adopt effective parental practices (Brooks Gunn et al. 1997; Catsambis & Beveridge 2001). A recent US study revealed that although disadvantaged neighborhoods suppressed parents' ability to help children succeed in school, parents' frequent communication with children, close monitoring of their activities, and provision of out of school learning opportunities offset some of the educational disadvantages associated with living in such neighborhoods (Catsambis & Beveridge 2001).

CAN PARENTS DO IT ALL?

The above findings underscore the importance of institutional interrelationships for children's learning and development. While family is a significant force behind students' academic success, parents alone cannot overcome the educational challenges that many children face. Most parents are interested and make efforts to participate in their children's education, but many of them require assistance in order to engage in educationally supportive activities (Epstein 2001). To be effective, parents need to draw support and resources from the wider social environment, and especially from schools. Both families and schools need to take each other's perspectives, expectations, and actions into account in developing practices that promote

student learning (Huss Keeler 1997; Epstein 2001). Indeed, the importance of parent-school supportive relationships has gained widespread recognition and many educational reforms and intervention programs throughout the world target parental involvement as a key strategy for improving student achievement (Schleicher 1992; Carvalho & Jeria 1999; Gonzalez 2004). The success of such reforms greatly depends on scholars' continuing efforts to close gaps in existing research and develop a comprehensive theoretical framework of parental involvement.

SEE ALSO: Cultural Capital; Cultural Capital in Schools; Educational Attainment; Educational Inequality; Family, Sociology of; Social Capital; Social Capital and Education

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Pareto, Vilfredo (1848–1923)

Gerald Mozetič

Vilfredo Pareto is famous for his seminal contributions to neoclassical and mathematical economics, his analysis of power, and his inquiry into the psychological and social foundations of human conduct. Born in Paris, where his father, a Genoese *marchese*, supporter of Mazzini and a civil engineer, lived in political exile, Pareto grew up in a bilingual and liberal aristocratic milieu. Upon his family's return to Italy in the 1850s he received a broad humanistic education and studied mathematics, physics, and engineering in Turin. After his graduation in 1870 Pareto moved to Tuscany, where during the next two decades he worked in upper managerial positions for a railway and an iron company. In this period he traveled extensively, frequented the aristocratic salons of Florence, studied the works of Comte, Spencer, Darwin, and J. S. Mill, joined the Italian Adam Smith Society to spread *laissez faire* economics, and began to write articles on various economic and policy issues. His political ambitions to be elected to the Chamber of Deputies remained unsuccessful. In 1890 he met the economist and leading Italian proponent of marginalism, Pantaleoni. Pantaleoni introduced Pareto to Walras, whom Pareto succeeded as a professor of political economy at the University of Lausanne in 1893. In the following years Pareto wrote his main works: *Cours d'économie politique* (1896–7), *Les Systèmes*

socialistes (1902–3), *Manuale di economia politica* (1906), and *Trattato di sociologia generale* (1916). With age, Pareto grew disillusioned with the workings of the democratic system, especially in Italy and France, and became increasingly conservative. After their rise to power the Fascists conferred honors upon Pareto, using his concept of elites, his critique of parliamentary democracy, and his ideas concerning the function of violence in history for their own purposes. Though Pareto sympathized with the advent of Fascism, it should be noted that he died only a couple of months after the March on Rome, and that his fervent support of laissez faire economics as well as his conviction that the state should protect the civil liberties of the individual ran counter to totalitarian ideologies.

As one of the great figures of neoclassical economics Pareto built upon Walrasian general equilibrium theory, modifying some of its premises. Trying to go beyond utility maximization in perfect market conditions, he based the analysis of economic equilibrium upon the opposition of tastes and obstacles to satisfying them. In order to avoid the difficulty of comparing interpersonal utilities he used the distinction between cardinal and ordinal utility. Among his many other contributions, it must suffice to point to two ideas that are still discussed in economic theory: the so called “Pareto’s law,” which uses a logarithmic formula to describe income distributions, and the concept of “Pareto optimum,” or rather “Pareto efficiency,” an allocation of resources in which no party can increase its welfare without lowering the welfare of another party.

Realizing that the premises and models of “pure economics” were insufficient for the analysis of human conduct, Pareto argued that economics had to be complemented by a more realistic approach which was able to grasp the complexity of everyday life. This approach, outlined most fully in his sociological masterpiece *Trattato*, is based upon the fundamental distinction between logical and non logical actions. The former are characterized by the logical linking of means and ends, both from the subjective standpoint of the actor and from the standpoint of the person with objective, scientific knowledge. If there is no logical correspondence between means and ends, an

action is considered non logical. Despite the fact that people usually try, ex post, to give good reasons for their actions, Pareto argued that the vast majority of human conduct belonged to the non logical type. Rather than emphasizing the tension between reason and passion, Pareto followed Hume’s famous dictum that reason is “the slave of the passions.” The main task of sociology, according to Pareto, was to analyze the pervasive influence of non logical actions in social life. In this context he introduced the categories of “residues” and “derivations,” which can be understood as the basic elements of non logical human conduct. Residues as the more constant part refer to impulses and basic sentiments of human action; derivations as the more variable part comprise the rationalizations people use to explain and justify their behavior. Pareto argued, for example, that within the political sphere the “derivations” *par excellence* of his age were the call for liberty, equality, democracy, etc. After defining and classifying the various residues and derivations, which makes up a large part of the *Trattato*, Pareto sought to combine his analysis of the basic elements of non logical actions with his idea that the fundamental morphology of all societies was formed, on the one hand, by the opposition between the elites and the masses and, on the other hand, by the incessant circulation of elites. According to Pareto, the ability of an elite to maintain power depended upon a certain mixture of residues of class I (“instinct of combination”) and residues of class II (“persistence of aggregates”). When, however, a ruling class remained in power for some time, it tended to become dominated by the residues of class II. This type of elite was only poorly equipped to cope with social transformations. In such a situation a new and innovative elite would emerge in which the residues of class I prevailed and displace the old one. Echoing Marx, Pareto remarked that history was “a graveyard of aristocracies.” The assumption of the universal existence of two opposing social strata and the cyclic conception of history are central to the so called Italian Elitist School, represented, apart from Pareto, by Mosca and Michels.

In economics Pareto’s contributions to neoclassical theory have been debated since the 1930s and 1940s, especially within welfare

economics. In sociology his ideas – the *Trattato* was translated into English in 1935 – were intensively discussed in the “Pareto circle” at Harvard University in the 1930s, and were the subject of books written by Homans and Curtis in 1934 and Henderson in 1935. In his work *The Structure of Social Action* (1937), Talcott Parsons regarded the Italian sociologist, along with Marshall, Durkheim, and Weber, as one of the eminent figures who had paved the way for a theory of social action. Despite this early appreciation, the reception of Pareto’s sociology seems to have been hampered by his anti-democratic bias, his sympathies for Fascism, and by the idiosyncratic nature of the *Trattato*. In contrast to his economic writings, the sociologist Pareto was not a very systematic and analytic author. Some of his key concepts, as critics have repeatedly noted, are poorly defined. Furthermore, his theoretical reflections are interspersed with (not to say buried under) long digressions, containing anecdotes, ingenious and aphoristic remarks, and cynical comments, as well as a mass of data from ancient philosophy, philology, history, jurisprudence, literature, etc. Though the chaotic richness of the *Trattato* makes it difficult to codify his sociology, it also makes it probable that Pareto will be revisited, reinterpreted, and rediscovered by generations to come.

SEE ALSO: Conservatism; Elites; Michels, Robert; Mosca, Gaetano; Political Sociology

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Park, Robert E. (1864–1944) and Burgess, Ernest W. (1886–1966)

Peter Kivisto

Robert Ezra Park and Ernest Watson Burgess advanced American sociology during its formative period and made lasting contributions to ethnic studies, urban sociology, and the study of collective behavior. Their methodological preference was for ethnography, while they articulated a theoretical perspective shaped in particular by human ecology.

Though the sociology department at the University of Chicago had been successfully established by Albion Small and his successor William Isaac Thomas, Park and Burgess were the two central figures responsible for defining and shaping the Chicago School during its most influential period. Although he was in his fifties before his sociological career began, Park quickly assumed the chairperson’s position in the department after the forced departure of Thomas due to a morals charge. His younger colleague Burgess became a valued collaborator and assistant. Although Park was the more original of the two, they formed a creative partnership in which their roles were symbiotic: Park the “idea man,” Burgess the “details man”; Park the charismatic leader, Burgess attuned to the needs and concerns of others.

Born in Harveyville, Pennsylvania, Park was raised in Red Wing, Minnesota, where as a child he claims to have encountered Jesse James as the bandit fled a bank robbery. He attended the University of Michigan and Harvard, studying with John Dewey at the former and William James, George Santayana, and Josiah Royce at the latter. As did many of his generation, he spent time studying abroad in Germany, where he attended the lectures of Wilhelm Windelband and Georg Simmel. Simmel's lectures constituted his only education in sociology and had a pronounced impact on his sociological vision.

Upon returning to the US, Park worked as a muckraking journalist for the Congo Reform Association (CRA), an organization committed to challenging Belgian colonial rule. He met Booker T. Washington in the CRA and spent several years thereafter in Tuskegee serving as Washington's personal assistant and ghostwriter. He began his career at Chicago at the invitation of Thomas, who initially employed Park as a part time summer instructor. Park and Thomas shared an interest in ethnicity and migration, leading to collaborative work on immigration as part of the Carnegie Corporation's project on Americanization. Reflecting his newspaper past, Park was especially interested in the role of the immigrant press. Park chaired the department from 1918 until his retirement in 1933, after which time he taught at Fisk University.

Burgess was born in Tilbury, Ontario, though his family moved to the US early in his life. His formative years were spent in Michigan and Oklahoma. After completing his undergraduate studies at Kingfisher College in Oklahoma, he pursued his PhD at the University of Chicago and was one of the first sociologists to complete his doctorate at a US institution. After one year appointments at Toledo, Kansas, and Ohio State, Burgess returned to Chicago, where he was to spend the rest of his academic career. Never married, he lived with his father and sister in a home near the campus for many decades. Burgess had warm relations with Jane Addams and her associates at Hull House, though he and Park shared a conviction that for sociology to progress, it needed to separate itself to a large extent from reform activities. Beyond the areas of sociology where he and Park

shared a common interest, Burgess also made contributions to the sociology of the family, aging, and crime and deviance.

The 1921 publication of their co authored textbook *Introduction to the Science of Sociology* – which became known as the Green Bible – served to codify their particular perspective on the emerging discipline. They identified various substantive concerns that they deemed central to sociology and articulated their commitment to empirical inquiry and to linking research to theory. In terms of theory, Park and Burgess were simultaneously influenced by human ecology and by a perspective that was concerned with meaningful social action as defined by the actors themselves.

Park and Burgess embraced Simmel's conviction that modernity would express itself most tangibly in the city, which increasingly became the locus of the worldwide migration of peoples. This led Park (1950: 160) to comment that the world could “be divided into two classes: those who have reached the city and those who have not yet arrived.” Park and Burgess promoted a sociology that focused on the extraordinarily heterogeneous subgroups of urban dwellers. Of special interest were the ethnic and racial minorities migrating to cities, be they immigrants from Europe or Asia, or blacks, who were considered to be internal migrants experiencing dislocations quite similar to those experienced by migrants entering the nation from elsewhere.

The primary focus of much research was on the marginalized and oppressed members of the urban landscape, whom Park and Burgess wanted to see depicted in a dispassionate manner devoid of middle class disdain or the patronizing attitude of many social reformers. The idea was to produce research that sought to understand, rather than revile or romanticize. Central to their version of sociology was a keen awareness that the modern world brought together, via mass migration, a wide array of racial and ethnic groups as a consequence of a newly emerging economic world system. Immigrants were compelled to adjust to their new social circumstances and to the diverse groups that they encountered. Park in particular was interested in delineating the processes of immigrant adjustment, which he did by developing a version of assimilation theory in 1914.

He would return to this topic in subsequent decades.

Though often viewed as the canonical formulation of assimilation theory, Park's ideas have also been badly misinterpreted. His perspective has been portrayed by some as the theoretical articulation of the melting pot thesis, as a synonym for Americanization, the final outcome of a "race relations cycle," and an expression of a "straight line" process of incorporation. If any of these was true, Park's understanding of assimilation pits it against theories of cultural pluralism and multiculturalism. However, a close reading of Park's writings on assimilation leads one to conclude that in fact it does not necessarily entail the eradication of ethnic attachments, but instead can be seen as occurring in a multicultural context where ethnic groups maintain their distinctive identities while at the same time being committed to the interests and ideas of the larger societal community.

In their co authored textbook, Park and Burgess took issue with two perspectives on assimilation common at the time in sociological circles. First, they dispute the idea that identification with the larger society or the nation state requires a simultaneous decline in ethnic identification. Second, they critique what they refer to as the "magic crucible" view of assimilation. They link this idea to the concept of "like mindedness," which they associate with the work of Franklin Giddings. They distinguish accommodation – which they describe as a process that reduces levels of conflict and unbridled competition in order to establish social order and stability – from assimilation – which they depict in terms of cultural fusion: "a process of interpenetration and fusion in which persons and groups acquire the memories, sentiments, and attitudes of other persons or groups" with the result being a "common cultural life" (Park & Burgess 1969: 735).

They make three points about assimilation. First, it occurs most rapidly and completely in situations where social contacts between newcomers and native born occur in the realm of primary group life, while if contact is confined to secondary groups, accommodation is more likely to result. Second, a shared language is a prerequisite for assimilation. Third, rather than being a sign of like mindedness, assimilation is

a reflection of shared experiences and mental frameworks, out of which emerge the possibility of a community with a shared sense of collective purpose.

Park and Burgess's work had a marked impact on American sociology prior to World War II. Among their most prominent students are those who subsequently played significant roles in the discipline, including Herbert Blumer, E. Franklin Frazier, Everett Hughes, and Louis Wirth. However, after that time the center of gravity shifted from Chicago to Harvard with the ascendance of the Parsonian theoretical project, which operated with the assumption that grand system building was essential if a foundational sociology was to be established. The Chicago School brand of sociology was frequently criticized for being atheoretical and unsystematic. Moreover, Park and Burgess were criticized for being inattentive to power and politics. Methodologically, advocates of survey research challenged their emphasis on ethnography. In the area of urban sociology, their ecological approach gave way to approaches more influenced by political economy, while in the area of race relations, the idea of assimilation was widely dismissed.

In recent years there is substantial evidence of a widespread renewal of interest in the work of Park and Burgess, as sociologists and historians alike have sought to reassess their place in the history of the discipline. Since the 1970s, coincident with the demise of Parsonian domination, a spate of books and articles has appeared seeking to revisit and reappropriate the legacy of the Chicago School. The result has been that many earlier misconceptions have been corrected. For example, Park's criticisms of "do gooders" notwithstanding, he was himself a reformer, from his days as a muckraking journalist to his involvement in the Urban League in Chicago. Their Chicago School was more theoretically sophisticated than has been appreciated, shaped chiefly by the thought of Durkheim and Simmel. Ethnographic research is now far more accepted than it was during the heyday of structural functionalism. At the same time, the ecological approach has largely been abandoned because of its theoretical shortcomings. Critics make a persuasive case when they contend that Park and Burgess were relatively inattentive to power and to many issues related

to social class. In short, what has emerged is a clearer portrait of this influential duo that reveals both the weaknesses and the strengths inherent in their work.

SEE ALSO: Blumer, Herbert George; Chicago School; Chicago School: Social Change; Frazier, E. Franklin; Robert E. Park, Ernest W. Burgess, and Urban Social Research; Urban Ecology

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Parsons, Talcott (1902–79)

Victor Lidz

Talcott Parsons was the preeminent sociological theorist of his generation. He developed a “general theory of action” that still serves as a

comprehensive framework for understanding human social relationships and behavior. First adumbrated in articles published in the late 1920s, the theory was elaborated to a high level of analytic complexity in books and essays published over the next 50 years. Several works, including *The Structure of Social Action* (1937), *The Social System* (1951), *Economy and Society* (with Neil J. Smelser, 1956), and essays collected in *Politics and Social Structure* (1969) remain landmarks in the history of sociology. Parsons was interested in the relations between sociology and other social sciences, including economics, political science, psychology, psychiatry, and anthropology, and he contributed basic ideas to each of these disciplines. At Harvard University, where he served on the faculty from 1927, he became in 1947 the founding chair of the Department of Social Relations, an international center of interdisciplinary teaching and research in sociology, clinical and social psychology, and social anthropology until it split up in 1968.

Parsons was born in Colorado City, Colorado into a family of New England heritage, broad intellectual interests, and progressive political views, characteristics he retained throughout his life. He studied at Amherst College, focusing on institutional economics, Kantian philosophy, and evolutionary biology, the London School of Economics, and the University of Heidelberg, where he encountered the works of Max Weber. Weber's *The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism*, which Parsons later translated, made an immediate and transformative impression, but the comparative studies in religion, the essays on methodology, and the conceptual framework of *Wirtschaft und Gesellschaft* had still greater influence. Under Weber's spell, Parsons completed a DPhil degree at Heidelberg and began his career at Harvard as an Instructor in Economics. He became fully identified as a sociologist only after transferring to Harvard's new Department of Sociology in 1930.

The Structure of Social Action presented Parsons's first attempt at a unified conceptual framework for sociology, a set of categories to apply in all times and places, address all aspects of human social organization, and be open to refinement as the discipline advanced in ability to relate theory to empirical findings. In its

elementary formulation, Parsons's conceptual scheme analyzed the "unit act" – the concept of *any* instance of meaningful human conduct – into four essential elements, ends, means, norms, and conditions, and in some statements a fifth, effort, to implement action. Parsons argued that action is not possible unless an instance of each element is entailed in the process and, conversely, all human action can be understood as emerging from combinations of these kinds of elements. This twofold proposition grounded Parsons's argument that his schema, which he called the *action frame of reference*, provided a universal starting point for social science, whatever further development it might require.

Parsons formulated this schema through a probing critique of the theories of Max Weber, Émile Durkheim, Alfred Marshall, and Vilfredo Pareto. He argued that these figures, though working in different intellectual settings, had "converged" on the action frame of reference with its emphasis on normative elements. He concluded that if theories fail to emphasize normative elements, they are in principle flawed. Utilitarian theories, including neoclassical economics, and behaviorist theories are prime examples. Idealist theories are flawed, he claimed, because they overemphasize ends and norms while underemphasizing conditions and means. What we now call structuralism errs by assimilating norms and conditions into its notion of structure, denying their independence, while also underemphasizing ends and means. The action frame of reference was designed to avoid the selectivity among basic concepts that has, in various ways, compromised most social scientific frameworks.

Parsons's focus on frames of reference was based on a methodology, "analytical realism," shaped by his studies of Kant and, more directly, A. N. Whitehead's philosophy of science. Analytical realism views frames of reference as logically prior to other forms of theory, because they guide the abstraction from reality that underlies all empirical observation and, therefore, all propositions, hypotheses, or generalizations pertaining to empirical conditions. Parsons maintained that establishing a sound frame of reference is the logical starting point for a science. His writings contain many examples of other forms of

theorizing, but he saw clarifying frames of reference and their theoretical consequences as his distinctive contribution.

In *The Social System*, Parsons replaced the unit act as his central sociological concept. Working in an interdisciplinary department, he had developed interests in sociology's relations to personality psychology and cultural anthropology. His new formulations related social systems to cultural systems, the domain of anthropology, and to personality systems, the domain of psychologists. He defined social systems as involving interaction and relationships among actors; culture as involving symbols and beliefs that orient action; and personality as involving motivational patterns of individuals. He suggested that the three kinds of systems are integrated by normative standards, which derive meaning from contexts of moral culture, are institutionalized in social systems, and are internalized in the superegos of personalities. *The Social System* explored the connections among cultural, social, and personality systems and examined the dynamics by which normative standards are institutionalized in social relationships, notably in chapters on socialization processes and on deviance and social control. A chapter on medical practice analyzed the sick role and the physician–patient relationship as examples of the dynamics of social control. Parsons emphasized that processes of social control are embedded in all relationships and are universals of social life.

The revised frame of reference centering on social relationships raised questions of how social systems sustain themselves over time. Parsons's discussion emphasized two functions: resource allocation and social integration. Resource allocation enables actors in various roles to control means, whether tools, skilled personnel, or financial means, to attain the ends expected of them. Social integration involves mechanisms of social control through which actors, in responding to one another's expectations and use of rewards and punishments, meet obligations associated with their respective roles. Large scale social systems require formal mechanisms to fulfill these two functions, including economic markets for resource allocation and legal institutions for social integration.

Parsons soon replaced this conception of functions with a more sophisticated "four function

paradigm.” The four functions are not, like previous formulations of social functions, an ad hoc list of functional requisites of social systems, but an analysis of the concept of action *system* into four general dimensions or aspects. Parsons’s basic insight was that any action system can be analyzed in terms of four universal dimensions. This approach facilitates efficient theorizing as it leads to general knowledge of how operations serving each function are organized across empirical settings. The four functions are:

- *Pattern maintenance* or the processes of developing enduring attachment to basic principles that distinguish a system from its environment, for example, its basic values. In societies, processes of socialization serve this function, as do institutions of religion, family life, and education.
- *Integration* or the processes of reciprocal adjustment among a system’s units, promoting their interdependence. In societies, institutions of solidarity and social control, including civil and criminal law, community, and strata formation, serve this function.
- *Goal attainment* or the processes of changing a system’s relations with its environments to align them with shared ends. In societies, goal attainment centers on political institutions that set collective ends and mobilize resources for reaching them.
- *Adaptation* or the processes of developing generalized control over the environment. Adaptation involves development and allocation of diverse resources. In societies, it typically involves economic production and exchange through markets.

Parsons’s most important application of the four function paradigm was a theory of four functionally specialized subsystems of society. The outlines of this theory emerged in the mid 1950s, but Parsons elaborated it over the rest of his life. In the later formulations, the four subsystems were identified as (i) the economy for the adaptive function, (ii) the polity for the goal attainment function, (iii) the societal community for the integrative function, and (iv) the fiduciary system for the pattern maintenance function.

In exploiting his idea of four subsystems of society, Parsons first sought to integrate his

sociological understanding of economic institutions with Keynesian theory in economics. He then developed his conception of the polity through critique of the scholarship on power and authority as well as electoral, executive, and administrative institutions. These aspects of his work progressed rapidly, producing many applications of the four function paradigm to the analysis of specific institutional complexes. His writings on the fiduciary system codified previous research on religion, family, socialization processes, and educational institutions, while his writings on the societal community built on scholarship on reference groups, status systems, social classes, ethnicity, and legal institutions. These works faced greater challenges than his writings on the economy and polity, because the extant literatures were less highly developed. The resulting formulations are less tightly integrated and less thoroughly grounded empirically, yet are richly suggestive for future research.

Parsons’s work on the societal subsystems led to a general model of action systems. In this model, every subsystem is a complex entity organized in terms of several differentiated sets of structures. The structures are maintained over time by specialized control mechanisms. The system meets functional needs and adjusts to changing conditions through dynamic processes of its own, and it has processes of change and growth for long term expansion of its capacities. At its boundaries, each subsystem exchanges resources with the other three subsystems, obtaining means essential to its own operations while giving up means essential to the other subsystems. Each subsystem was thus treated as dynamically interdependent with the other three. Parsons proposed that the six pairs of exchanges between subsystems make up a society’s general equilibrium, thus giving specific content to Pareto’s classic idea.

The idea of exchanges between subsystems was a generalization of economists’ treatment of the double exchanges between business firms and households, wages for labor, and consumer spending for goods and services, all of which Parsons located at the boundary between the economy and fiduciary system. Noting that economic processes are mediated and regulated by flows of money, Parsons sought to generalize on money’s role by identifying similarly

symbolic media for the other subsystems. Essays followed on power as the symbolic medium and regulator of political processes, influence as the medium of the societal community, and value commitments as the fiduciary medium. The concept of generalized symbolic media is among Parsons's most original and potentially fruitful ideas, although critics have identified problems in his particular formulations.

Aside from his contributions to general theory, Parsons wrote over one hundred essays on specific empirical problems. Major topics include the rise of Nazism in Germany, American family and kinship, the professions, social stratification, the McCarthyism of the 1950s, economic and political modernization, the sources of order in international relations, value systems, ethnicity, institutions of higher education, research institutions, and American religious culture and institutions. Many of these essays gained fame for originality and insight, and a number stimulated influential directions of investigation for others. Most applied theoretical ideas that Parsons was exploring when he wrote them, although he often left their conceptual underpinnings implicit.

Parsons was a distinguished teacher who inspired generations of students, including many who became productive social scientists. He was active in the American Sociological Association, the American Association of University Professors, the American Academy of Arts and Sciences, which he served as president, and on faculty committees at Harvard University. In all of these settings he was a steadfast proponent of freedom of thought, investigation, and association.

Parsons was not a Grand Theorist advocating a closed system, as he has often been caricatured. He was a pragmatist who used a keen analytical mind to critique and refine basic concepts of sociological theory step by step and to explore their implications in many empirical fields. He was a persistent critic of his own writings, theoretical and empirical, who was confident of his ability to improve on previous formulations. His main legacy is belief in the value of progressive refinement of general ideas in the social sciences.

SEE ALSO: Culture; Durkheim, Émile; Functionalism/Neofunctionalism; Institution;

Modernization; Professions; Religion, Sociology of; Social Control; Social Integration and Inclusion; Structural Functional Theory; Theory Construction; Values; Weber, Max

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passing

Nicole Rousseau

Passing is a process by which an individual crosses over from one culture or community into another undetected. The historical connotation of the term, however, is intimately connected with black America, and "passing," "crossing over," or "going over to the other side" typically refers to a black person whose appearance is such that they can *pass* for white. The vivid language of the term itself evokes many images: passing one's self off as white; choosing to pass over into white society; the passing away of a person's black identity,

reborn as white. As drastic a choice as this “social death” may seem, for some blacks in segregated America, there was little choice (Gaudin n.d.).

Homer Plessy, an American man, seven eighths white (and one eighth black), sued the state of Louisiana in 1892 for being jailed for sitting in a “whites only” railroad car. Plessy’s argument was that he should be legally identified as white and thus allowed all the usual civil liberties and privileges of his white peers as stated under the 13th and 14th amendments of the US Constitution (Cozzens 1999). The judge, John Howard Ferguson, ruled against Plessy. Plessy then took his case to the Supreme Court, where the historic 1896 *Plessy v. Ferguson* decision upheld Ferguson’s ruling, ushering in over 60 years of legally sanctioned segregation, commonly referred to as the Jim Crow Era. This “separate but equal” ideology represented a period of extreme oppression for blacks, socially, economically, and even physically, as many were victims of mob violence. Rather than endure the racist and segregated world that blacks were subjected to at this time, in some instances those who were able opted to pass for white.

In the slave era preceding Jim Crow significant race mixing had occurred. Through rape, forced breeding, and a host of other coercive means, several generations later, the concept of “colored” had developed into a social construction which no longer strictly represented one’s phenotype. Though passing and segregation were not new developments of the twentieth century, the dawn of the 1900s saw a definite rise in the number of light skinned “blacks” passing for white as they particularly felt the sting of segregation.

In order to fully exploit economic, social, and educational opportunities, some blacks, who were able, generally passed into white society on three levels: basic, complex, and fundamental. At the *basic* level of passing, an individual might occasionally accept the mistaken assumption that she or he is in fact white. This allows black citizens certain freedoms that they would otherwise be denied, such as moving about the cities where they live without fear of violence, shopping in any store, and eating at any lunch counter.

The *complex* level of passing is more purposefully planned. Individuals might work on one

side of town under the premise of being white, where they could earn money and advancement, or even attend a university as white students. Yet when they return home at night or during holidays, they resume their black lives. This level is quite complicated and dangerous. In order for individuals to navigate this dual reality, they must move seamlessly from one world into another, all the while keeping their two worlds – one black and one white – completely separate.

The *fundamental* level of passing sees the black person actually casting off his or her entire black reality in favor of a white identity. They may choose to move away from family and friends; they might even *pass* them on the street and look the other way in the interest of committing to life as a white person. Often times they marry whites, falsify documents, and never offer any reasonable doubt as to their “race.” The changes one makes for this level of commitment are not merely cosmetic. Instead, one must make profound changes to one’s thoughts, memories, beliefs, history, culture, language, politics, ethics, etc.

Each level of passing offers its own dangers, as at any time anyone could be discovered. An acquaintance from childhood, a family member who will not be ignored, even a black stranger embittered by the passing person’s choices, could be one’s downfall. Anything could betray one’s black secret. Blacks at the basic and complex levels of passing could be discovered with a little research, while those at the fundamental level may prove to be their own worst threat. Choosing to have children is a 9 month experiment in torture for a person who is passing for white, as very few whites could justify a brown skinned child to their white spouse.

Living in fear that one’s own genes may betray one’s entire life leads to two other significant issues inexorably linked to passing: internalized racism and the color complex. In order to survive as a white person in a white dominated world in an era when the black person is commonly disdained, it stands to reason that the person passing could come to hate blackness. This may include their black family, former black community, and everything reminiscent of that life. Du Bois (1996) asserts that black Americans suffer an internal clash of ideals versus reality that keeps blacks

forever at war with themselves. For people passing, this awareness – or double consciousness, as Du Bois references it – may lend itself to bitterness. Black acquiescence coupled with the shame of going over to the other side may result in feelings of disgust towards the struggles of black America, promoting a general feeling of self loathing as individuals internalize the symptoms of racism. This antipathy for the race often manifests itself as an abhorrence of blackness. When Larsen's (1997) character, Gertrude, states, "nobody wants a dark child," she is not concerned with keeping a secret – she has a white husband, but is not passing, herself. Instead, she is simply verbalizing a commonly held sentiment within black communities: the color complex.

Though the term passing is commonly used as a reference to a long ago era it is important to note that in the multicultural polyethnic new millennium, color, and now culture, is as ambiguous as ever. Thus, one cannot ignore other populations for whom passing remains a viable option, such as gays and lesbians, Latinos, and people of Middle Eastern descent. In a post 9/11 world, amid a culture of "don't ask, don't tell," many populations other than blacks are employing various elements of passing in order to navigate the rough waters of inequality.

SEE ALSO: Coming Out/Closets; Double Consciousness; Race; Race (Racism); Segregation

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paternalism

Charles Jarmon

Paternalism is evidenced by a pattern of gift giving (or sponsorship) from a more powerful or higher status group or individual to a lower status group or individual that is consistent with a system designed to maintain privileged positions. It usually occurs in situations where there are sharp differences in power and status between groups or individuals. The "benevolence" associated with the actions of those in the more favorable position is usually reciprocated by acts of dependency or accommodation by those in the less favorable position. It is manifested in the different configurations and levels of race and ethnic identities, such as between national groups and groups and individuals within nations. Fanon (1963) provides an incisive analysis of paternalism in the relations between some of the former European colonial powers and the formerly colonized nations of Africa, Asia, and South America. Much more discussion has focused on paternalism within the nation state, in countries where slave or apartheid systems developed as in the US and South Africa (DuBois 1903; Frazier 1939, 1957; Myrdal 1944; Thompson 1944; Cox 1948; Stamp 1956; Ruef & Flechter 2003). This discussion illustrates how paternalism has functioned in the US.

In the relationship between African Americans and whites, paternalism was most fully developed under the system of slavery, where the status difference between blacks and whites was most clearly defined. The power and status of the slave owner over the slave

was institutionalized by custom and law. But not only did the slave owner have dominion over the slave, the system required him to assume responsibility over his welfare, whether adult or child, man or woman. In this system, paternalism was legitimated by the racial ideology of the time, and it emerged as a way of "normalizing" the associations between the two status groups. It was not a means for changing the inferior status of the slave.

A form of paternalism was perpetuated after slavery and became embedded in the cultural milieu of the late nineteenth and early twentieth century. The most visible occurrences of it were associated with the liberalism of leaders of white Northern philanthropic, religious, and political organizations whose prime consideration was to improve personal and material conditions of blacks under the Southern system of segregation. Many of the educational and religious leaders in the segregated, black communities of the South viewed these organizations as a source of funds to establish and advance their organizations within the context of the black community; their primary goal was not to prepare black folk to go outside their communities to compete directly with whites for non traditional social, economic, and political positions.

Paternalism continued to be a part of the social conventions of the 1950s and 1960s. For example, Frazier (1957) noted that black churches in big Northern cities were often the beneficiaries of contributions from large corporations, which were made to persuade workers not to join unions. In small towns of the South, a black worker who encountered difficulties with the law could frequently rely on his white employer to extricate him from the legal system simply by providing testimony about his character; the same would have been true if this man had attempted to get a loan from the local bank. A domestic worker, living in the North or South, oftentimes rode the bus home from work across town carrying a large shopping bag filled with old clothing for her family given to her by her white employer, who most often referred to her by her first name, "auntie," or "girl." With respect to this last example, scholars (Clark Lewis 2003) are beginning to provide in depth historical analyses of the life and work culture of domestic workers, particularly

on how they negotiated this paternalist system. The vignettes above illustrate the extensiveness of paternalist exchanges marking the decades of racial segregation and that came to structure many of the relations between blacks and whites.

In contemporary America paternalism has become more difficult to identify as the historically entrenched segregated institutions and ideological foundations have weakened. Blacks, who predominantly live in cities or urban metropolitan areas, increasingly work in white collar occupations in state and federal agencies, industrial enterprises, private corporations, and unions, occupying positions no longer considered along racial lines. Increasingly, other blacks work as newly transformed, high wage technology workers, bus drivers, policemen, firemen, printers, athletes, actors, etc. In these occupations paternalism may or may not be overtly expressed. But it continues to exist in the hierarchical arrangement of power and authority in the work environment. Whites, who occupy most of the top management and supervisory positions in the organizations and institutions mentioned above, continue to make decisions about hiring practices, salaries, job assignments, and promotions. Most black workers, therefore, continue to be involved in relations with white supervisors, who by virtue of their authority, control the relationship. In this situation many blacks mask their true attitudes and feelings about the relationship, or about values and issues expressed by supervisors, even when they are resentful of what is being expressed; they fear to do otherwise might be interpreted as disrespectful and lead to subsequent loss of sponsorship. Thus, interpersonal contact between white supervisors and black workers can easily develop into paternalistic relationships.

Let us examine briefly two conditions under which paternalism occurs in contemporary society: the glass ceiling and affirmative action. The glass ceiling phenomenon, a form of institutional discrimination without official sanction that functions to exclude members of certain racial, ethnic, or gender categories from positions in the institution's upper echelons, is another basis for paternalistic relations. Black workers, meeting required credentials, skills, and work habits, begin their jobs with high expectations of moving up the ranks in competition with their white counterparts to gain

entry into upper level positions. However, a large majority run into the glass ceiling, which contributes to low morale among many black government workers, who more frequently receive small annual bonuses than promotions to middle management and senior level positions. As their white co workers move up, the build up of anger, frustration, and disappointment about not moving up the ranks themselves often becomes a morale problem and leads to poor or only average work performance. This then becomes an official reason to deny them promotions. The magnitude of this problem becomes apparent when we note that in some government agencies about 30 percent of the workers are African Americans. While some of these black workers challenge such conditions by joining unions and filing suits in the courts against their agencies, many other workers refuse to engage in such actions, and concentrate on ways to mitigate this situation by cultivating paternalistic relationships with their white supervisors and managers.

Affirmative action policies, the benign race conscious laws that were enacted to undo and correct past and present discrimination against African Americans and other minority groups, constitute a form of state sponsored paternalism, despite the fact that it took the struggles of the Civil Rights Movement to pressure the government to introduce these reform measures. But these reform oriented policies in universities, government agencies, and industry have only partially eliminated racial barriers encountered by blacks, mainly because the enforcement of the laws continues to favor those in power. Affirmative action has created many more opportunities for blacks to participate in organizations of mainstream society (Herring 1997), but not without unfavorable consequences. One baneful side of affirmative action is in the frequent stigma that high achieving blacks feel when their successes are demeaned by those opposing affirmative action and when recognition is denied for their hard earned achievements.

Paternalism is one of the complex aspects of the relationship between blacks and whites, and a scientific theory of it is needed to elaborate and connect the elements of gift giving and sponsorship by whites occupying superior statuses and the patterns of accommodation or

non compliance by blacks. Three questions form the bases for a beginning in this direction. First, for whites, what are the material benefits or psychological consequences associated with paternalism? Second, what is lost or gained when blacks hide behind the mask, conceding dignity, honor, and pride as they act in ways that help to sustain the paternalistic system? Third, what social and political actions from the wider community are likely to diminish the significance of such behavior? Social scientists appear to have left such concerns to novelists, poets, playwrights, and comedians. They interpret and manipulate the associated cultural stereotypes derived from paternalism, but their handling of the subject is usually shallow and insufficient to explain the complex questions that need to be clarified.

SEE ALSO: Affirmative Action (Race and Ethnic Quotas); Occupational Segregation; Race and Ethnic Etiquette; Slavery; Stratification, Race/Ethnicity and

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path analysis

William H. Swatos, Jr.

Because of the difficulty in sociological research of conducting experiments that will yield valid and meaningful results, sociologists have looked for quasi experimental designs in which statistical measures can be interrelated in a logical sequence to suggest causality. Path analysis is the most widely used of such approaches. Path analysis combines both a theoretical (or logical) analysis with a statistical analysis, inasmuch as a logical argument must be introduced to suggest appropriate causal sequences. While some of these logical connections are obvious (gender obviously comes before marriage, for example), others are a matter of theoretical argument as part of a larger project (does image of God precede or follow religious affiliation or are

there ongoing interaction effects between the two?). Through multiple and partial regression analysis, and statistical controls that attempt to match test and control populations as closely as possible, a researcher attempts to demonstrate both quantitatively and logically a pattern of causality that would be similar to what might result if an actual experimental design were able to have been put into place by providing estimates of the total direct and indirect effects of one variable on another. In most simple causal modeling, path coefficients are *beta weights*, which represent a measurement of changes in a dependent variable in terms of standard deviation units for each of the other variables (standardized regression coefficients) in series, creating adjusted slopes of the regression line which are comparable from one variable to the next, working backward from the dependent variable.

These results are normally displayed in a *path diagram* (or *path model*), where arrows are drawn to designate the causal sequence connecting the variables and the statistical results are noted as *path coefficients* (see Fig. 1).

On the surface a path analytic model presents the advantage that the analyst must present a logical argument of the interrelationship of variables in a causal sequence that is then tied to both the conduct of the research and the presentation of the results. One does not simply




Figure 1 This is a path model showing the standardized estimates for the role of religion as an asset in contributing to junior and senior (in parentheses) high school boys in “thriving” on the one hand, while reducing risk factors on the other. This shows that religious importance and participation contribute both directly in a small degree to thriving and more largely as a developmental asset. Similarly, risk is reduced. Note on the left the strong interaction effect between religious importance and religious participation.
 Source: Wagener et al. (2003: 279). © Religious Research Association, Inc. Used by permission.

“control for *a*” without presenting an argument for the relationship between *a* and the posited explanatory sequence. In empirical cases, however, the issue of causal relationships is often unclear. This is most obvious when bidirectional arrows appear in models, suggesting unanalyzed relationships among causal variables. There is also no clear rule or procedure for setting time limits on the posited causal sequence – i.e., how far back in time it is necessary to go to determine a “valid” set of potential causes or cause and effect relationships. While it is certainly clear that later events cannot explain prior events, it should not necessarily be assumed that prior events explain later events simply because the prior events are prior, even if there does seem to be some statistical association among them. Those statistical associations may be true statistical associations among variables but not sociologically significant explanations for the variable one is trying to “explain.”

In spite of these liabilities, path analysis likely remains the most widely used quasi-experimental analytic tool in the presentation of quantitative sociological research attempting to describe causal sequences.

SEE ALSO: Multivariate Analysis; Regression and Regression Analysis; Statistics

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patient–physician relationship

Eugene Gallagher

No topic is more central to a general understanding of medicine in modern society than the patient–physician relationship. Few topics

have so actively focused the attention of social scientists, the thinking public, and medical/health practitioners. No other topic is so closely keyed to the emergence in the 1950s of medical sociology as a distinct, important, and very sizable field of research, teaching, and public policy relevance in sociology.

In trying to capture and describe the patient–physician relationship a good starting point is to think of it as generically a helping relationship: one person helping another. The physician as a trained professional possesses resources – knowledge, skills, and experience – from which the patient can benefit. Further, the physician is committed to the well being of the patient – not unlike the stance of a parent toward their child. Reciprocally, the patient depends upon the expertise and trustworthiness of the physician.

Three stages have marked the sociological study of the patient–physician relationship since the 1950s. Stage 1 predominated from 1950 to 1965. It was guided by the conceptions of Talcott Parsons and the functionalist theory that prevailed in Parsonian thought and in sociological theory more generally. Stage 2 prevailed from 1965 to 1985. It directed a trenchant critique toward the Parsonian model; its theoretical orientation was expressed through conflict theory. It also responded to the ferment and discontent that were expressed in American society during those years. It finds its most cogent expression in the work of Eliot Freidson (1970a, 1970b). As will be seen, it is possible to view Stage 2 less as an attack on the Parsonian model and more as an expansion or enlargement of the model. Stage 3, continuing into the present, is a conceptual response to the rapid growth and complex differentiation of the medical sector in contemporary society. Yet even in the face of staggering changes in the health care enterprise, what goes on within the patient–physician relationship remains as an influential nucleus to guide behavior.

Talcott Parsons was the first sociologist to put forth a broad, logically integrated conception of the patient–physician relationship. Parsons’s grand objective in sociology was to build a theory of social action – a conceptual edifice that, though interdisciplinary in its scope, was distinctively sociological in its grasp of human motivation, cognition, and interaction. His formulations of the sick role, the doctor–patient

relationship, and health/illness came rather quickly to form the building blocks of medical sociology, whereas his recondite theory of social action had less acceptance in the parent discipline of sociology. For Parsons, medical sociology and the doctor–patient relationship comprised but one chapel in an overarching cathedral of ideas. On several occasions Parsons expressed his satisfaction over the formative influence he had played in medical sociology itself, but also some puzzlement over this impact, which he neither sought nor expected.

We turn now to the Parsonian conception of the patient–physician relationship, as Parsons laid it out in *The Social System* (1951). Pursuing the analogy of the physician with patient, and parent with child, it can be stated that as the parent loves the child so the physician has a positive attachment (often, Parsons used the psychoanalytic term *cathexis*) to the patient. However, the physician’s attachment falls short of parental love in scope and intensity. Further, the parents’ stance with their child is “affective,” while the physician’s stance with the patient is “affectively neutral”; that is, emotionally restrained (but not cold or indifferent). The physician is expected to assess objectively the patient and the latter’s illness, clinical needs, and limitations, and not to be swayed by the strong feelings and passions that frequently dominate family life.

In another direction, the parents deal with the child in a “functionally diffuse” manner, while the physician deals with the patient in a “functionally specific” manner. This means that society expects the parent to recognize and cope with any demand, need, or distress expressed by the child, while the physician is expected to deal with only those needs and conditions that can be addressed by his or her medical knowledge and expertise.

Tracing out expectations between physician and patient, and comparing these with the parent–child relationship, lead into the idea of social roles, a key element in Parsonian thinking (and that of many other sociologists). Patient and physician enact social roles. Their role behavior and motivation are subjectively meaningful and voluntary, not forced by biology or instinct, and not rigidly scripted by cultural mandates. Social roles are stereotypically familiar to members of a society or groups within it.

We referred above to patient and doctor as participating in a helping relationship where each enacts a role in mutual response to the other. The physician is the dominant member of the dyad and the bearer of medical responsibility. The patient’s role enactment is both generated and circumscribed by the fact that he or she has medical problems – actual or potential. Although the person is free to withdraw from the relationship, within it they have less power than the physician.

It should be noted that several scholars and academic physicians dealt with the patient–physician relationship before Parsons. Among them are the physiologist Lawrence J. Henderson (1935), the medical historian P. Lain Entralgo (1969), and the German social medicine advocate Rudolf Virchow (Ackerknecht 1953). While frequently insightful, their work lacks the systematic rigor and strong sociological orientation that Parsons achieved. In another direction, it is noteworthy that Parsons’s work on the patient–physician relationship and other topics in medicine is of necessity highly original because none of the earlier generations of sociologists, whether in Europe or America, touched upon the role of medicine in society. Cockerham (2001: 11) notes this curious lack and accounts for it as follows: “Unlike law, religion, politics, economics, and other social institutions, medicine was ignored by sociology’s founders in the late nineteenth century because it did not shape the structure and nature of society.”

Parsons’s account of the patient–physician relationship depicts it as an ideal type cultural phenomenon. It can be likened to a thought experiment in physics that assumes impossible things such as a perfect vacuum or a frictionless plane. Parsons attributes various “role appropriate” attitudes and feelings to the patient such as trust, cooperativeness, and dependency, as well as how the physician feels and acts toward the patient. Such attributions may be reasonable as provisional assumptions. However, unless their empirical accuracy can be ascertained or at least questioned, they chill discussion of vital issues such as patient autonomy and initiative within the relationship.

The Parsonian level of abstraction creates space for other distortions. As noted above, his model portrays the physician as the one in charge in the dyad – in charge not from a

tainted drive for dominance or self aggrandizement, but rather from the argument that by being in charge he or she can more effectively bring therapeutic skills into play. The simplicity of the model fosters an ascription of moral idealism and dedication to the physician. Once again, such ascriptions may be tentatively accepted, but this should not be allowed to inhibit further critical exploration. Even on the premise that the physician is fully competent and dedicated, it should not be taken for granted that, for example, “whatever helps the doctor helps the patient.”

Parsons’s picture rises from his knowledge of medicine as it was practiced in the 1940s and earlier. Stage 2 accounts, in contrast, rise from a later and much different medicine – a much broader utilization of medicine by a more diverse public, and a greatly expanded medical profession, internally dichotomized into primary care and a rising tide of specialization, and externally assisted by a growing cadre of “health care workers.” With these many changes it became inevitable to fill in areas that the Parsonian paradigm ignored. Instead of thinking about “the patient” as an undifferentiated human being, it became necessary to ask about who the patient is and how the patient’s pursuit of medical care and responses to the physician vary according to characteristics such as age, gender, ethnicity, religious affiliation, socioeconomic level, and even by health status.

Another phenomenon ignored by Parsons is the very rapid and substantial formation of medical specialties. While the Parsonian account does acknowledge surgery and referral etiquette among physicians, it most comfortably projects the image of an undifferentiated patient under the care of a family doctor in a primary care environment. It is largely silent about medical hierarchies, technological advances, third party payment of medical bills, and many other related factors affecting the patient–physician relationship.

While one should not interpret the contrast between the theoretical allegiances of Parsons and Freidson as forming a major clash, there are clear differences in tone and emphasis between them. Cockerham and Ritchey (1997: 44) describe the difference thus: “Parsons’s functionalist description of the physician–patient relationship [asserts] that the physician’s status

[constitutes] a form of ‘medical dominance’ that may be detrimental to good patient care and relationships with other health care workers.” Neither Parsons’s nor Freidson’s differences divide them cleanly between the pastel, simple doctrine of functionalism (Parsons) and the more strident, differentiated frame of conflict theory (Freidson).

In Stage 2, medical sociology became unavoidably aware of developments in medical care that resulted in a more complex and contemporaneous picture of the patient–physician relationship. However, old trends and issues have become more acute and new ones have come into view. We see two issues – medical uncertainty and fiduciary trust – as particularly central and inclusive of many other trends in the relationship. Here we will describe each and also indicate why they deserve focused inquiry and research.

Medical uncertainty is certainly not new in medicine. However, new realms and even styles of biomedical knowledge have made the physician simultaneously more knowledgeable and also more tentative about disease and treatment. Consider, for example, two new realms of knowledge: genetics and body imaging. Recent and ongoing research on chromosomes and genes has established a wealth of information about chromosomal defects and rogue proteins that do – or may – underlie clinical pathology, such as cystic fibrosis. While some of this new information provides the basis for fruitful diagnosis and treatment, much of it constitutes a mounting “overhang” of knowledge that is clinically inapplicable, though it may establish bridges to beneficial application in times to come.

This veritable explosion of knowledge can be seen as evidence of the endless advance of biomedical science. It also calls into question a longstanding guardedness by the physician about sharing information with the patient. It tends to move the physician–patient relationship toward greater physician willingness to communicate with patients – even perchance to “impose” information and decision making responsibility. The choice of treatment (or watchful waiting) in regard to breast and prostate cancer, and in coronary artery disease, affords a current example. The jurisdiction of the physician in the relationship is yielding gradually to a greater share for the patient; this

has particular implications for the role of bio medical and clinical information within the dyad. Also, the relentless pressure on physicians to “keep up” with advances in medical knowledge is now given an additional thrust by the need to involve the patient.

Issues in fiduciary trust confront the relationship with an entirely different set of challenges. They are concerned with the question: Can the physician adhere straightforwardly to his or her professional obligation to serve the patient in the face of conflicting pressures and temptation? The most obvious arena for conflict is the economic, concerning the reimbursement the physician receives for services. In the days when the complete picture of medical care included nothing more than the patient, the physician, and the latter’s “small black bag” (containing “tools” and medicines), economic issues were scarcely important. The physician might be for bearing in setting fees, or be greedy and set them high, but at least the issue was clear and relatively open to view and discussion. Economic arrangements are more complicated now and shielded more from view. The physician may very well elicit informed consent from patients, but may not disclose his or her own financial interest in the treatment. Patients do not usually know the extent to which financial interest influences clinical judgment. Consequently, future studies of the patient–physician relationship are likely to be more complex than those in the past because the relationship is changing (Gallagher & Sionean 2004).

SEE ALSO: Health Care Delivery Systems; Health Locus of Control; Health and Medicine; Health Professions and Occupations; Health and Social Class; Illness Narrative; Managed Care; Parsons, Talcott; Professional Dominance in Medicine; Sick Role

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patriarchy

Donald P. Levy

Patriarchy is most commonly understood as a form of social organization in which cultural and institutional beliefs and patterns accept, support, and reproduce the domination of women and younger men by older or more powerful men. Literally the “rule of the fathers,” today sociologists view as patriarchal any system that contributes to the social, cultural, and economic superiority or hegemony of men. Consequently, sociologists study the manner in which societies have become and continue to be patriarchal by investigating both social institutions and commonly held cultural beliefs. At the same time, scholars investigate the consequences of patriarchy, i.e., differential access to scarce societal resources including power, authority, and opportunity by gender.

Although some scholars simply use the word patriarchy to describe what they consider to be a natural or inevitable form of social organization, more recently scholars, stimulated by the work of early feminist writers (Beauvoir 1972; Bernard 1972), have come to recognize patriarchy as a prevalent system of inequality similar in some ways to racism or classism (Hartsock 1983). Prior to the critical work of feminist scholars, many considered patriarchy to be the natural result of biological difference or rather a truly complementary system based upon differential inclinations that served to address society’s need for a division of labor (Durkheim 1933; Parsons 1956). A more critical analysis of

the origins of patriarchy, however, looks to its cultural and social genesis as located within both beliefs and specific social institutions.

Scholars today explore the manner in which patriarchy, or male domination, has become institutionalized, that is, built into the major social systems including the family, religion, the economy, government, education, and the media. In so doing, the taken for grantedness of patriarchy is exposed and analyzed (Smith 1987). If indeed, as feminist and pro feminist scholars ask, patriarchy is a socially constructed system of inequality, how is it that despite being exposed patriarchy appears to be natural and continues to reproduce itself?

Many scholars have looked to the institution of the family in order to explain the origins and persistence of patriarchy. Engels (1970) described the patriarchal structure of the family but centered his analysis on its contribution to capitalist rather than primarily gender oppression. Lévi Strauss (1967) observed and chronicled the cultural roots of patriarchy and highlighted a key implicit component, that of the objectification and devaluation of women by men. More recently, Bernard demonstrated the differential structure of marriage and family by gender that deterministically reproduces patriarchy. The family, including the household division of labor (Hochschild & Machung 1997), divorce, childrearing, as well as power and cultural perception (Smith 1993), have been and are continuing to be specific sites in which patriarchy is seen, analyzed, and in some cases resisted.

As Engels pointed out, the family as an institution is at all times interacting with the economy or public sphere. Despite functionalist assertions of complementarity and balance, the women's movement and feminist scholars have continued to point to the multiple ways in which the economic sphere as well as the interaction between the family and the economy serve to reproduce and enforce patriarchy as a social system. Issues including, initially, access to economic opportunity, and more recently the gendering of occupations, the glass ceiling (Williams 1992), and sexual harassment, have concerned both activists and scholars. A Parsonsian expression of balance between the public (economic) sphere and the private (family) sphere argues in favor of men being primarily

active in the public and women in the private. Currently, feminist scholars and most sociologists dismiss this characterization as patriarchal and focus on the manner in which the institutions that perpetuate this unequal system are structured.

Other scholars have demonstrated sociological insight by pointing to the manner in which other significant social institutions interact with both the economy and the family to reproduce patriarchy or to present themselves as sites in which patriarchy can be resisted. Since the beginnings of feminism as a social movement in the nineteenth century, activists have sought equal legal rights for women. Theoretically, this movement demonstrated the irony of a social contract that disenfranchised half of its inferred signers (Pateman 1988). In other words, a democracy that promised equal representation to every citizen only so long as they were men represented a patriarchal system. Needless to say, other marginalized groups were also left unrepresented. Although first wave feminists succeeded in obtaining women's suffrage, and despite a lull in the social movement subsequent to that victory, the struggle for full and practical legal rights and representation remained a focus of the feminist struggle against patriarchy in the governmental institution. Second wave feminism rallied around abortion rights and the Equal Rights Amendment (ERA) as core issues in both the exposition of and struggle against patriarchy. Today, activists are once again preparing for a dynamic public debate over abortion, while the ERA is no longer discussed. Still, patriarchy is demonstrated in the continuing disproportionate power of men over women in government, as noted in numbers of men and women in elected positions as well as in legal and judicial debates over issues like family leave, divorce, and sexual harassment. In fact, the interaction of the family, the economy, and the government as that interaction contributes to the persistence of patriarchy is demonstrated in issues or concepts like the "mommy track" or welfare reform (Hays 2003).

Oftentimes, scholars as well as other social critics look to the educational institution as a potential avenue of either conservative social reproduction or social change. Relative to patriarchy, education is discussed in both ways. Many now cite the successes of women in

education in terms of the number of women obtaining college or postgraduate degrees. Today over 50 percent of college graduates are women. This fact supports the lessening of patriarchy as women receive equal education and credentials. Still, critics note the gendering of credentials, i.e., women obtaining degrees in less highly valued fields (Kimmel 2000) as well as the "hidden curriculum" of education (Coleman 1961) in which the structure and beliefs of patriarchy are taught regardless of the gender of the student. Additionally, scholars continue to observe and report the differential treatment of students by gender by teachers (Sadker & Sadker 1994) that begins in some cases in either elementary school (Thorne 1993) or even kindergarten (Jordan & Cowan 2001).

Patriarchy continues to be observed, reproduced, and resisted in other social institutions including the military, religion, and the media. Despite increasing participation in the military by women, the structure and culture of the institution remain patriarchal (Cohn 1993). Religion has long been seen by scholars, of course with extreme variation between traditions, as providing justification for patriarchy. Still, today many traditions are beginning to question and change their theologically mandated patriarchal structure while others remain virtually unchanged. The media, although more inclusive than either the military or religion, remain a domain in which examples of male domination often go unquestioned. One need only consider the centrality of male dominated sport to see the manner in which the media participate in the perpetuation of patriarchy. Still, recent manifestations of popular culture sponsored by various media sources are beginning to place women in positions of power and centrality, both of which may serve to lessen the seeming naturalness of patriarchy.

Given the ubiquity of patriarchy within individual societal institutions as well as the manner in which these institutions interact, it is no wonder that patriarchy continues to appear natural and necessary, that is, hegemonic (Gramsci 1971). Still, as feminist theory has pointed out, patriarchy is a political issue, for both groups and individuals. The "personal" is indeed "political." As such, patriarchy as a system of social organization, although deeply

ingrained in both social institutions and consequently in the individuals that find themselves living within those institutions, is subject to both contestation and resistance. Gender relations as currently constituted in a patriarchal system are subject to change.

Organizations including the National Organization for Women (NOW), Planned Parenthood, and many others continue to publicize the manner in which patriarchy is built into various social institutions and this serves to perpetuate the social power of men over women. Feminist scholars today continue to struggle against patriarchy but have now broadened their focus to include multiple forms of privilege that serve to oppress not only women, but also other marginalized groups (Collins 1986; Johnson 2001). They are joined today by smaller but active organizations of men as well as scholars of men's studies including the National Organization of Men Against Sexism (NOMAS). At the same time, scholars have begun not only to demonstrate how patriarchy is embedded in social institutions and ingrained in the manner in which we do gender (West & Zimmerman 1987) but also to call for undoing gender, that is, to remove gender and consequently patriarchy as a central organizing principle of social relations (Butler 2004; Lorber 2005).

Patriarchy is a system of social organization that recognizes, encourages, and reproduces the seemingly natural and necessary domination of men over women. Despite the legal and social changes fought for and achieved by activists supported by scholars over the last 150 years, patriarchy is indeed quite persistent. This persistence is due to the manner in which patriarchy has become deeply ingrained in each and every aspect of each and every significant societal institution, and consequently in the manner in which individuals learn to practice gender. The deconstruction of patriarchy is therefore both an individual and an institutional quest dependent on scholarly insight and exposition, as well as individual courage, good will, and commitment to justice.

SEE ALSO: Bernard, Jessie; Doing Gender; Feminism; Feminism, First, Second, and Third Waves; Gender Ideology and Gender Role Ideology; Hegemonic Masculinity; Hidden Curriculum; International Gender Division of

Labor; Matrix of Domination; Personal is Political; Privilege; Sex and Gender; Sexism

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peace and reconciliation processes

John Darby

The use of the term peace process may be recent, but the concept is as old as war. Sophisticated conventions on ceasefires and peace negotiations were already well established and accepted when the *Iliad* was composed. The negotiations preceding the Peace of Westphalia in 1648 had some resemblance to contemporary peace processes: they lasted for four years; the principal negotiators never met; and they adopted approaches similar to the "proximity talks" and shuttle diplomacy used at Dayton for Bosnia and in Northern Ireland, with the main parties separately quartered in Münster and Osnabrück. More than three centuries later, these techniques and approaches were formalized and designated as peace processes. Harold Saunders recounts how the term "negotiating process" was used by those working with Henry Kissinger in the Middle East in 1974. Eventually, finding the phrase too narrow, "we coined the phrase peace process" to capture the experience of this series of mediated agreements embedded in a larger political process" (Crocker et al. 2001).

The popularity of the term and the processes themselves increased markedly during the 1990s, reflecting an increase in both internal violence and internal settlements following the end of the Cold War. Fifty six civil wars

came to an end between 1989 and 2000 (Wallensteen & Sollenberg 2001), although not all of these resulted from peace processes. Indeed, the extensive set of variables involved during peace processes greatly complicates the task of defining them. Despite this, peace process has become a convenient term to describe persistent peace initiatives that develop beyond initial statements of intent.

Darby and MacGinty (2003) proposed five essential criteria for a successful peace process: (1) protagonists are willing to negotiate in good faith; (2) key actors are included in the process; (3) negotiations address the central issues in dispute; (4) force is not used to achieve objectives; and (5) negotiators are committed to a sustained process. Outside these general principles, each peace process has its own distinctive dynamic. Nevertheless, most commentators accept that peace processes develop through a four phase cycle: prenegotiation, the negotiations themselves, the peace agreement, and post agreement reconstruction and conflict transformation.

If every peace process had to wait for violence to end, few would get off the ground. Conflicting parties rarely want to reach a settlement at the same time. During the 1993–4 war in Bosnia, for example, the willingness of Muslims, Serbs, or Croats to engage in negotiation was determined primarily by their fortunes on the field of war and the resulting territorial gains or losses. By definition, these conditions never coincide for all parties. Windows of opportunity, when all parties are simultaneously prepared to negotiate, are rare, and close down quickly. Yet it is only during such relatively infrequent opportunities that a settlement may be reached. The central metaphor in determining these opportunities is Zartman's (1995) concept of a "ripe moment," when the parties reach a mutually hurting stalemate and "find themselves locked in a conflict from which they can not escalate to victory and this deadlock is painful to both of them."

Most peace processes begin with secret talks. These are attractive to negotiators because of their low exit costs. Occasionally, the difficult move from secret to open negotiations is managed by the protagonists themselves, but it often benefits substantially from contacts established by intermediaries such as the business

community, churches, and academics. In the suspicious climate that accompanies the early stages of prenegotiation, confidence building measures – concessions by one side to encourage movement from the other – can reassure opponents, but they carry high risks. The symbolic gestures by Mandela to white South Africans greatly eased the first stages of negotiations. The danger is that premature concessions may be banked rather than reciprocated by the recipients, as was the case in 1998 when Andreas Pastrana ceded territory to the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC). In general, it is more effective to negotiate reciprocal concessions, as when significant demobilization by Guatemala's armed forces and by the FMLN was carried out simultaneously, with UN supervision, by 1993.

Who participates and who manages the process? The fact that negotiations are taking place at all presumes an acceptance that the representatives of militants have been admitted to negotiations in return for giving up violence. Their inclusion, with whatever pressures it imposes on the process, admits militants to the common enterprise and applies some pressure on them to preserve it in the face of violence from dissidents or spoiler groups.

Shuttle diplomacy may be needed to establish the preconditions and ground rules for participants, and proximity talks are often necessary before the participants are willing to meet in plenary sessions. The establishment of agreed ground rules must be acceptable to all parties; these may be negotiated by insiders, as in South Africa, or with the help of outsiders, as in Namibia. In El Salvador and Guatemala the processes were strongly supported by a range of external actors, including the United Nations, the US, and other countries from the region and Europe. Responsibility for preparing discussion papers on procedures for negotiation falls primarily, but never exclusively, to government. The central involvement of both the British and Irish governments in guiding talks in Northern Ireland provided necessary reassurance for both unionists and nationalists.

Peace processes are always played out to a background of violence. Even when political violence is ended by the declaration of a cease fire, it mutates into other interrelated forms to threaten the evolving peace process. Militant

spoilers seeking to continue armed opposition are the most common threat. Elements within the state apparatus may also work through militias or paramilitary organizations to maintain a high security presence, even while their colleagues are engaged in negotiations. Quite apart from these deliberate attempts to foment violence, the declaration of a ceasefire may simply replace conventional war by more volatile face to face clashes and a rise in conventional crime. Indeed, the declaration of a ceasefire alters the context of conflict at a stroke. Issues that cannot even be discussed during wars – release of prisoners, amnesties, policing and army reforms – not only become part of the new agenda, but also demand immediate attention. Disarmament of militants and demobilization of security forces are among the most difficult. In retrospect, it seems clear that the decommissioning problems that plagued post accord reconstruction in Northern Ireland might have been avoided by choreographed demilitarization by both the state and militant organizations.

Christine Bell describes the 1990s as “the decade of the peace agreement” (Darby & MacGinty 2003). Her review of peace accords found “over 300 peace agreements of one description or another” signed in more than 60 situations during the 1990s. Increasingly, peacemakers have tended to borrow the text, frameworks, and approach adopted in earlier peace accords, as demonstrated by the similar language of many Latin American peace agreements.

The fundamental question for most peace negotiations is: Can the central grievances be resolved within the existing national framework, or do they require secession and autonomy? Many contemporary peace processes concentrate on the constitutional options between secession and reform. Most of them demand an element of power sharing, although power sharing arrangements rarely survive in the long term. It is best to regard them as a transitional process. “Ideally,” Sisk argues, “power sharing will work best when it can, over time, wither away” (Darby & MacGinty 2003).

If the peace accord reached through negotiations between elites is to become a settlement accepted by their followers, it must be subjected to democratic validation through referenda or elections. The choice is important – the hurried 1999 referendum in East Timor increased the

level of violence instead of easing it. As a general rule, the need for secrecy must be eased as negotiations proceed, in order to initiate the campaign for public support. An excess of early publicity entrenches differences before an agreement can be reached. An excess of secrecy not only encourages conspiracy interpretations, but also fails to prepare public opinion for the inevitable compromises.

In order to achieve an agreement, it is tempting to assign some sensitive issues for post accord attention, laying mine fields for the future in the interests of short term gain. During the Oslo negotiations, for example, five critical issues, including Jerusalem, settlements, and refugee return, were “blackboxed” to enable the two sides to move forward on other less inflexible issues. In Northern Ireland the post war years were dogged by the deferred issues of policing and decommissioning. The dismantling of war machines is often a dominant theme. The transfer of ex paramilitary activists into the police and security forces in the Palestinian Territories and South Africa were tangible acknowledgments of past abuses and an effective way of converting a potentially destabilizing armed threat into support for the new structures. It is also a tangible demonstration of commitment to fair employment practices, with the important qualification that the main beneficiaries are militants rather than the general population.

Apart from having to confront these continuing disputes, post settlement administrations also inherit the problems left by years of violence and confrontation. Truth commissions have become a common but far from universal approach to confront past misdemeanors, with mixed records of success. Latin American truth commissions and the Truth and Reconciliation Commission in South Africa attempted to address the hurts of victims as a basis for reconciliation. The controversy surrounding these bodies demonstrates that it may take as long to repair community dysfunction as it took to create it – decades rather than years.

Reconciliation, if mentioned at all in peace accords, was often “a euphemism for the compromises made during the political negotiations – compromises that papered over the fissures of the past in the interest of national unity but at the expense of the socially marginalized”

(Hamber, in Darby & MacGinty 2003). Recognition that reconciliation should be a central concern in peace agreements is growing, as a consequence of the increasing number of peace processes that have collapsed even after an agreement has been signed. Peace agreements have been typically negotiated by elites and have focused on the minutiae of disputes. They have paid less attention to the need to transform conflicting communities into stable and sustainable societies. The last decade has demonstrated that failure to do this can lead to public disillusionment, and may precipitate the collapse of the agreement itself. The tendency to broaden the nature of peace accords, and to include strategies for reconciliation at every level of society (often called conflict transformation), is already evident. It seems likely to increase.

The success or failure of contemporary peace processes is primarily determined by internal dynamics, but they have also been powerfully shaped by the regional and global environment. Since the 1980s three changes in the global context have significantly affected local approaches to peacemaking and reconciliation. During the Cold War the two superpowers maintained their own forms of order within their respective spheres of control. The Soviet Union stepped in forcibly when it felt its interests were threatened by liberation movements in Hungary, Yugoslavia, and parts of Russia. The US maintained a similar control in the Americas. The collapse of the Soviet Union altered both the nature of ethnic violence and approaches to its resolution. Initially, the United Nations filled some of the vacuum, gradually shifting towards a multidimensional approach (notably in Cambodia and El Salvador). It became involved in peacemaking, peacekeeping, and peacebuilding, sometimes simultaneously. At the same time, the new internal approaches to peacemaking in South Africa and elsewhere began to emerge during the 1990s.

Developments following the al Qaeda attacks on September 11, 2001 have again shifted the global context within which many traditional conflicts were located. The "War against Terror" has made it increasingly difficult to distinguish between the campaign against al Qaeda and longstanding guerrilla struggles in Indonesia, Palestine, and Sudan. Some governments, encouraged by growing concern about

international terrorism, have introduced or extended tougher security approaches against dissidents. This has angered Muslim groups in many countries, and violent resistance has intensified, especially in parts of Asia and the Middle East. On the other hand, it is clear that the new global temperature has reduced support from diaspora populations for the Tamil Tigers in Sri Lanka and for dissident groups elsewhere. In general, the model of peace processes developed during the 1990s has been increasingly undermined. This model had been characterized by an inclusive approach to peacemaking, one that sought opportunities to negotiate rather than confront; its characteristics were compromise and optimism. The War against Terror encouraged an alternative model, one that sees a greater possibility of victory over dissent; its characteristics are strength and the presentation of stark choices. By 2005 the two models coexisted uneasily, raising two key questions: Are we moving toward a form of peacemaking that is predominantly driven by security interests, rather than by opportunities for a negotiated settlement? Is this a transitory shift or a sea change?

SEE ALSO: Anti War and Peace Movements; Peacemaking; Truth and Reconciliation Commissions; War; World Conflict

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peacemaking

Wayne Gillespie

Peacemaking is a state of existence or a way of being that is based on love and compassion; in particular, this mode of life calls for an end to human suffering through nonviolent means. It is a philosophy that encourages personal transformation and guides everyday life. Yet the peacemaking perspective also influences broader social changes and informs academic theorizing, research, and public policy. As it applies to criminology, peacemaking takes as its basic assumption that crime is suffering; since the way of peace necessitates an end to suffering, peacemaking criminology envisions an end to crime through the abolition of all suffering. Richard Quinney is the main theorist associated with peacemaking criminology.

The primary goals of peacemaking include an understanding of personal suffering, an end

to the many forms of suffering, and the realization of a society that maximizes human development and unites humankind (Quinney 1991, 1995). An awareness of human suffering is an integral element of peacemaking. Quinney (1991) noted that suffering occurs at intrapersonal, interpersonal, societal, and global levels. Intrapersonal suffering involves the physical pains and psychological problems that occur within the human body, whereas interpersonal suffering results from violence inflicted on one person by another. Poverty, hunger, homelessness, pollution, and the destruction of the environment are all examples of suffering at the societal level. Lastly, global suffering includes warfare and the threat of nuclear destruction.

Quinney (1991) also proposed that interpersonal, societal, and global suffering are symptomatic of the intrapersonal suffering within each of us. In order to end social and global suffering, the intrapersonal pain of existence must first be addressed. Quinney believed that the key to ending all suffering lies within cognitive abilities such as mindfulness. An awareness of suffering allows us to understand the true nature of reality as an interconnectedness of all things. Humans are part of the world; we are not separate from it. Care and compassion develop through right understanding or the knowledge that all things are connected. "We cannot end our suffering without ending the suffering of all others" (p. 10). Developing compassion in oneself and loving kindness toward others is another important step in the peacemaking process. Charity and service then arise from the realizations that everyone suffers and all humans are connected.

Buddhist teachings such as the Dhammapadam and Samadhi influenced Quinney's interpretation of peacemaking. In fact, the three essential themes from Quinney's writings are the Buddhist principles of awareness or mindfulness, connectedness, and compassion or caring. Peacemaking also has roots in secular humanism. Klein and Van Ness (2002) discussed the similarities between peacemaking criminology and humanistic sociology. They suggested that humanism and peacemaking both seek to create a better world. As Quinney (1995: 150) remarked, "Peace and the realization of the human project go together; they are one and the same." Both perspectives rely on

the development of social justice that emphasizes human rights and just relationships between people. Peacemaking views punishment, particularly incarceration, as a form of state violence that only increases suffering throughout the world. Thus, a model of justice based on social humanism and peacemaking cannot endorse the basic justice model of deterrence. For dealing with individuals who have violated the criminal law, peacemaking favors rehabilitative and restorative programs that emphasize conflict resolution, mediation, reconciliation, abolition, and humanistic action (Quinney 1991).

In addition to religion and secular humanism, feminism and critical theory are traditions closely associated with peacemaking (Pepinsky 1991). Harris (1991) outlined three tenets of feminism that are quite complementary to peacemaking: all people have equal value as human beings, harmony and felicity are more important than power and possession, and the personal is the political. Feminist criminology does not objectify criminals as "other"; rather, crime is conceptualized in terms of power. From this realization, a care/response orientation forms where conflicts and injury are dealt with through a process of communication and involvement that treats the needs and interests of all parties.

While critical theory encompasses several perspectives within sociology, the most prominent among them is Marxism. The connection between Marxism and peacemaking criminology is probably best understood in terms of the progression in Quinney's writings from the late 1960s until the present. In *Critique of Legal Order* (1974), Quinney used Marxist theory to interpret the criminal justice system in capitalist society; yet, in later works, he synthesized eastern thought, existentialism, and socialist humanism to form peacemaking criminology (Anderson 2002). There is actually some overlap in the contributions to peacemaking of Marxist theory and feminism. Both see the capitalist social structure as propogating negative values that subjugate the interests of millions to the desires of a few. Through its emphasis on competition and domination, capitalism promotes suffering and violence throughout the world. Thus, capitalism is inadequate in the best possible world offered by peacemaking. However, unlike Marx's Communist Manifesto, peacemaking texts advocate change through

nonviolent means that ultimately begin with an intrapersonal awakening to the suffering of one self and others.

SEE ALSO: Buddhism; Crime, Radical/Marxist Theories of; Criminology; Feminist Criminology; New Left Realism; Peace and Reconciliation Processes; Religion; Truth and Reconciliation Commissions

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pedophilia

Richard Yuill and David T. Evans

Pedophilia's significance in late modernity rests on its unconventionality, an extreme symbol of sexual decadence threatening "moral" communities and nation states. Over the past 25 years, pedophilia has mostly been formulated through political campaigns, professional etiologies, and media led local "moral panics," notably in the campaign for "Megan's Law."

Pedophilia was coined by Krafft Ebing in *Psychopathia Sexualis* (1892), defining a range of desires and practices associated with adult sexual attraction to children. Contemporary definitions vary from medical psychiatry stressing pathological and behavioral attributes to social policy disciplines emphasizing multifactor personality, familial, and cultural explanations. Subsequent clinical refinements have included Hirschfeld's hebophilia (1906) and Glueck's ephebophilia (1955), specifying adult sexual attraction to pubertal and post pubertal young people. Historical and cross cultural studies highlight contrasting non western cartographies of adult-child sexual practices, including adult male (*erastes*)-youth (*eromenos*) relationships in classical Greece; insemination "rites of passage" in African and Melanesian tribal communities; widespread cultural expressions of pederastic desire in the Near, Middle, and Far East from the Middle Ages through modernity; and finally, revivals of "Pedagogical Eros" in Europe from the Renaissance through the early twentieth century.

Attempts to demarcate child and pedophilic sexualities are compounded by shifting and conflicting cultural notions of childhood, "childhood sexual innocence," and adolescence. This is reflected in significant variations in age of consent statutes, problematic uses of developmental and biological markers to define age categories, and inconsistent approaches to children's agency. Thus, in the UK and US, sexual offenses by children have been increasingly recognized, leading in the UK to legislative regulation (Sex Offenders Act 1993), with 10 year old males being legally responsible for their actions, as in rape, and having their names placed on the sex offenses register – indications of inherent contradictions in laws demarcating "child sexual innocence."

Efforts to challenge dominant clinical and legal discourses and to promote positive views of pedophilia have met with failure. Following the Gay Liberation Front's (GLF) assault on heteronormativity, the Pedophile Information Exchange (PIE) emerged in the UK. It provided a public forum for pedophiles, whilst seeking political and legal reforms. Following high profile trials, some members were imprisoned and PIE was effectively wound up in 1984. NAMBLA (the North American Man-Boy Love Association) advocates abolishing age of consent

laws. A number of European countries and Internet sites maintain boylover support groups.

Mainstream contemporary social science research locates pedophilia within wider socio cultural contexts of hegemonic masculinity, patriarchal family, and Enlightenment conceptions of children as powerless. However, previous associations of pedophilia solely with adult male attraction to female children have been questioned due to significant numbers of adult women-boy relationships. Whereas earlier taxonomies drew distinctions between exclusive and infrequent attraction, recent formulations focus on age and gender of victim, recidivism rates, and potential risk factors. Pedophiles have been subsumed within generic approaches to sex offenders, notably causal explanations for seeking child sexual partners including inability to form adult relationships, distorted cognition, and abused/abuser cycles.

Most recent pedophile stories have been recounted by childhood sexual abuse (CSA) survivors. The 1990s and 2000s saw a heightened attention in media and policymaking circles through concerns over Internet chat rooms and sex tourism. Jenkins (1998) identifies such stories as heightened "moral panics," strategically utilized by Christian fundamentalism, mainstream feminism, professional agencies, and national governments for political agendas.

Boylovers criticize the general sex negative, ageist western cultural scripting for adult-child sexual relationships (including state intervention and professional pastoral monitoring). They adopt two rationales for adult-child sexual relationships: firstly, a child liberationist position which contends that whilst conventionally children are subservient to adults in all areas of social life, their rights in certain contexts (including financial and political) are being institutionally recognized, and that, as future citizens, they are increasingly empowered to make more autonomous choices. Why then should issues of intimacy and sexuality be excluded? By implication, it is argued, unrecognized intergenerational friendship, intimacy, and sexual relationships can also be positive and beneficial. Secondly, they contend that boys especially can benefit from educational guidance and friendship from an adult male.

For opponents, two issues are paramount: firstly, the preexisting power disadvantages

and subjectivity discrepancies between adults and children; secondly, omnipresent risks to children in such relationships, including post traumatic stress disorder (PTSD), sexually transmitted diseases (STDs), and addictions. This “relationship” between CSA and harm was challenged by Rind et al. in 1998, citing considerable neutral and positive outcomes of intergenerational relationships in college and community samples, accounts conventionally silenced in victimological approaches.

The demonization of pedophilia rests on dominant discursive depictions and practical regulations of “innate childhood sexual innocence,” but ambiguously such calls for protection contradict escalating empowerment given to children in other areas. Consequently, only adults may speak on intergenerational relationships, where children’s voices are silenced along side certain adults. Furthermore, governments and media demonize the pedophile as the ultimate sexual “folk devil,” the shadowy pathological individual “enemy within,” effectively distracting attention from a moral crisis in which supposedly “moral” states consistently retreat in the face of amoral market pressures to commodify, exploit, and sexualize childhood, where cases occur within the bastion of “moral” values: the family. Logically, forceful contemporary proscriptions on pedophilia will inevitably be weakened by inherent amoral consumerist capitalism and the political and legal ambiguities that result. Further destabilizing tensions include whether age boundaries remain within Enlightenment paradigms, how far children can be viewed as meaningful social actors, and yet not erotic agents, and the extent to which the legitimacy of CSA discourses may be sustained as they further encroach on idealized notions of the bourgeois family.

SEE ALSO: Child Abuse; Childhood Sexuality; Krafft Ebing, Richard von; Moral Panics; Sex Tourism; Sexual Citizenship; Sexual Deviance; Sexual Markets, Commodification, and Consumption; Sexual Practices; Sexual Violence and Rape; Sexuality and the Law

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peer debriefing

Valerie J. Janesick

Peer debriefing is a technique used by qualitative researchers for multiple reasons. Good qualitative researchers plan ahead when designing a study to include peer debriefing or a variation of it. Peer debriefing allows a peer to review and assess transcripts, emerging categories from those transcripts, and the final report. In addition, a peer acts as a sort of critical detective or auditor. This peer may detect whether or not a researcher has over emphasized a point, or missed a rival legitimate hypothesis, under emphasized a point, and in general does a careful reading of the data and the final report. Many writers have suggested that peer debriefing enhances the trustworthiness and credibility of a qualitative research project (Lincoln & Guba 1985; Creswell 1998; Spall 1998; Spillett 2003; Janesick 2004). Included in the peer review of information might be the full data set such as observations, transcripts, documents, photographs, and videotaped interviews.

The term itself, peer debriefing, is favored in the field of sociology. In other fields, similar terms are used to denote the same process. These terms include the words outside reader, auditor, and peer reviewer. In the history of anthropology, outside reader was the term used to characterize what has evolved into the role of peer debriefing. For example, Margaret Mead and Gregory Bateson used the term outside reader and in fact read each other’s field notes. Janesick (2004) uses the term peer reviewer to mean the peer who is involved in the process of peer debriefing. In fact, she advocates that emerging researchers use a statement of verification

or peer reviewer form for testifying to the fact that the peer actually read, critiqued, and gave feedback to the researcher throughout the research project. A sample form might use information such as: "I [name] have served as the peer reviewer for the study [title and author]. In this role, I have worked in collaboration with the researcher [name] throughout the study reviewing notes, transcripts, documents, and photographs." Whatever the term selected the notion that a report benefits from a peer review or debriefing is accepted by many qualitative researchers in the social sciences. In fact, in reviewing the latest dissertations over the past ten years using qualitative methods, one can find a regular, sustained use of the peer debriefing technique.

Who might fill the role of peer debriefer? It makes sense to select someone who has the methodological training to understand the purpose and methods of a given study, as well as the analysis and representation of data in the report. Likewise, it makes sense to have a person who is aware of the theoretical framework for the research and who is conversant with the literature on qualitative research in general and someone who knows the particular set of qualitative techniques used in the study. For example, someone doing an oral history project should use a peer reviewer who is knowledgeable about the purposes, theory, and techniques of oral history. Peer debriefing ought to be done with a critical, self reflective eye, based on content knowledge and willingness to serve as a peer debriefer. It is important that a peer debriefer be articulate in terms of stating personal beliefs and values and trace how the debriefer came to volunteer to act as a reviewer of the project. In other words, the peer is filling roles as a critic, auditor, detective, and expert observer and listener.

In any event, once a peer debriefing is completed, both the researcher and debriefer should be able to describe, explain, and trace throughout the project any changes or confirmations arrived at following the peer review. Just as in any scientific endeavor, there is an elastic band width for creativity, imagination, and for common sense. Likewise, there is no one way to do peer review or debriefing and quite a bit depends on communication and trust between researchers and peer debriefers.

Many of the questions and even some interest in peer debriefing arises out of some degree of unawareness of the purposes, traditions, theoretical frames, techniques, and conduct of qualitative research in the social sciences. This is unavoidable since as researchers formulate questions best addressed by qualitative research methods, we will only have more emphasis on the checks and balances in the system. One credible, valuable, and dependable technique for checks and balances in qualitative research is peer debriefing.

The enormous amount of written text on qualitative research methods in the social sciences continues to grow as qualitative researchers refine their techniques and methodology. Currently, it is not difficult to find commentary and examples of peer debriefing in projects such as case studies, life histories, narrative inquiry, phenomenological studies, interview studies, biographies, and ethnography. Resources are available in many fields, including nursing, medicine, engineering, education, sociology, anthropology, psychology, and history. Dissertation abstracts contain many resources embedded in dissertations which used a peer debriefing process. Peer debriefing is emerging as a useful technique which provides additional insight into the methods, rationale, and outcomes of a given study. Consequently, emerging and experienced qualitative researchers will find it useful to employ peer debriefing techniques.

SEE ALSO: Ethnography; Interviewing, Structured, Unstructured, and Postmodern; Micro sociology; Outsider Within

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peer review and quality control in science

Stephen Turner

Peer review is a practice used in the evaluation of scientific and scholarly papers in order to select papers for publication in scholarly journals. The practice has also been extended to other domains, such as the evaluation of grant proposals, medical practice, book publication, and even to such areas as teaching evaluation. The primary area that has been of interest to sociologists, however, has been publication in scientific journals. The practice is usually understood to have begun in the seventeenth century in the Royal Society in London, but it has also been claimed that there have been precursors to this practice. In the popular mind, peer review in science is a means of “bullet proofing” research, as a *Wall Street Journal* article once put it, that is to say as a guarantee of quality. But within science it has a very different meaning.

PROBLEM OF LEVELS OF CONSENSUS

The original interest in the sociological study of peer review was in relation to the idea of scientific consensus. It was believed that the physical sciences were high consensus fields, contrasted to the social sciences and humanities which were low consensus fields, with the biological sciences falling somewhere in between. An early study by Zuckerman and Merton (1971) compared rejection rates for leading journals in different fields and used this as a measure of consensus. Although the authors recognized that editorial practices (especially the use of numerous referees) differed, they assumed that the rejection rates reflected the fact of scientific consensus.

Subsequently, two of Merton's students, Jonathan and Stephen Cole (1981), did a study of peer review of grant proposals in the National Science Foundation. In this setting, which they characterized as the research frontier, they found that the idea that fields varied according to their supposed degree of consensus did not predict the actual variations

between fields. Indeed, it appeared that fields were strikingly similar in the extent to which disagreements between reviewers occurred, that significant disagreements were quite common, and that funding decisions depended to a significant extent on the luck of the draw of referees. This research used inter rater reliability as a measure of consensus.

The original Zuckerman/Merton study had not dealt with this kind of peer review process. But the contrast in findings raised the question of which was anomalous, journals or funding decisions. This led to a more careful consideration of differences in editorial practices. One difference was that the review process in physics typically involved one reviewer, with a second review being commissioned only if the first reviewer rejected the paper. Since the acceptance rates for these journals were very high and rejections rare (and often about appropriateness for the journal rather than flaws in the research), it was plausible to think that a rejection by one reviewer indicated a serious error about which there was likely to be less significant differences of opinion. In the social and behavioral sciences, in contrast, there were typically several referees, and acceptance usually required consensus for acceptance.

The standard for acceptance was also different. As an editor of the major physics journal *Physical Review* put it: “The editors consider that their charge is to publish all properly prepared reports of substantial, competently conducted, researches . . . And when controversy does arise – as occasionally happens – the editors consider that the argument should be settled in the intellectual agora by the whole community rather than by a few referees and an editor working in camera” (Adair 1980: 12). This was not the ethic of social science journals. The difference was reflected in the divergent paths that science and social science journals took in the 1950s and 1960s. In physics, journals expanded enormously in response to increased research, and charged page charges to authors. In the social and behavioral sciences, however, the typical pattern was for journals to become more selective, rather than expand, and for new journals to be created.

How does this relate to consensus? There is a chicken and egg issue. For the defenders of the idea that rejection rates are an index of

consensus, the fact that physics expanded and that it kept its low rejection rates even as it expanded simply reflected its high level of consensus. For those who used inter rater reliability as a measure, what differed were the editorial practices of the communities.

ISSUE OF QUALITY

Sociologists were not alone in writing on peer review. Practitioners in various fields did their own research, much of which undermined the credibility of peer review. One set of issues, restricted largely to the behavioral sciences and to some extent medicine, concerned journal reviewing. The other major set of issues concerned the reviewing of grant applications for public agencies such as the National Science Foundation and the National Institutes of Health.

A series of studies was performed, primarily on psychology journals, which showed that the peer review process in various journals was (1) biased against authors from less prestigious institutions, (2) prone to significant errors, such as failing to recognize papers that were previously published and resubmitted as part of the experiment, and (3) prone to very high rates of unreliability as a result of randomness that resulted from low rates of inter rater reliability between reviewers.

The fact that the peer review system, which relied on expert advice, performed so poorly raised fundamental questions about the equitability of the process and the value of relying on the facts of peer review as a guarantee of quality. These studies were generally done by authors. The most compelling studies (e.g., Peters & Ceci 1982) used fake submissions to test the system. They found that previously accepted articles which were resubmitted with fake authorship were typically rejected, usually on methodological grounds, without the supposedly expert authors recognizing them.

This research approach raised ethical questions and was strongly opposed by editors. Editors and persons with access to editorial files granted by editors responded with studies that supported the general equity of journal decision making processes, though they acknowledged that there was no independent measure

of quality and did not address the fact that the grounds for rejection were arbitrary (Bakanic et al. 1987). Yet the fundamental discoveries of exceptional and surprising errors in decision making and of arbitrariness as shown in the diversity of responses to submissions provided grounds for significant doubt about the peer review system, understood as a means by which decisions about the quality of submissions were accurately made. And the finding of arbitrariness was replicated in many fields by later studies, including journals in science fields where, unlike physics, rejection rates were high.

The second body of research was originally provoked for the opposite reasons. The science community itself, as well as outside critics, had raised questions about the peer review system in major funding agencies, and the criticisms focused particularly on the questions of whether the system was hostile to innovative ideas and whether it promoted group think. It was also argued that the system allowed a small group of major universities to monopolize research funding. The study by the Coles mentioned above was commissioned by the National Science Foundation to investigate various questions related to its decision procedures and especially to examine peer review. The questions dealt with in peer review of grant applications, however, are different from the question of whether to publish a paper in a journal, and have a zero sum character. Since this study had access to National Science Foundation files, and access was denied to other researchers, the critics of peer review were forced to use other approaches.

In a study of the National Institutes of Health, researchers gained access through the Freedom of Information Act to rejected proposals, and surveyed the scientists whose proposals were rejected. Surveys of all applicants for grant funding showed a high level of agreement with the idea that reviewers were reluctant to support unorthodox or high risk research and a substantial body of opinion that reviewers were biased against researchers at non major universities or in certain regions of the US and that ideas were routinely pirated from research proposals by reviewers. The surveys showed no support for the claim that researchers were biased against women or minorities and slight

support for the idea that researchers were biased against young researchers (Chubin & Hackett 1990).

ISSUES TODAY

Subsequent research on peer review in science journals has primarily been conducted under the sponsorship of biology journal editors, notably the editors of the *Journal of the American Medical Association* and the *Annals of Internal Medicine*, with an eye towards improving the review process. These journals are influential and have relatively high rejection rates. Some of the research has focused on reviewer quality and indicates that reviewers known to the editor from prestigious institutions are substantially more likely to produce high quality reviews.

Although peer review is no longer a topic of substantial research interest in either sociology or science studies, the more general phenomena of validation of scientific knowledge and scientific merit have been the subject of theorizing in the area of science studies. From the point of view of this theorizing, scientists face a general problem of providing knowledge to persons who are not in a position to evaluate the grounds for the claim that something is valid knowledge. Consequently, science engages in many elaborate processes of certifying and guaranteeing such things as the quality of a scientist's education and the quality of research contributions through evaluation processes such as peer review, which serve to provide guarantees or assurances to consumers both within science and outside of the work of science. This activity of certification, often relying on peer review, consumes a great deal of the time of scientists and represents a considerable amount of effort. Institutions such as journals compete with one another with respect to their prestige, which represents, according to this theory, their power to certify or assure quality to readers. This approach treats the various forms of peer review as means of adding value to scientific achievements in the competitive market itself and in science understood as a competitive market.

Although there are many criticisms of peer review, the scientists have generally been strong

defenders of the peer review as the least bad alternative. In sociology itself, peer review has not been a primary interest of reformers, who have instead concentrated on assuring diversity at the level of journal editors themselves.

SEE ALSO: Matthew Effect; Nobel Prizes and the Scientific Elite; Scientific Norms/Counter norms; Scientific Productivity

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performance ethnography

Ronald J. Pelias

Performance ethnography takes as its working premise that a theatrical representation of what one discovers through participant observation fieldwork provides a vibrant and textured

rendering of cultural others. Performance for the performance ethnographer is typically understood as an aesthetic act within a theatrical tradition. In western cultures this artistic endeavor calls upon actors through their use of presentational skills to evoke others for the consideration of audiences. Not to be confused with the ethnography of performance which examines cultural performances as objects of investigation, performance ethnography relies upon the embodiment of cultural others. As such, it is a method of inquiry that privileges the body as a site of knowing.

This method of inquiry is a close cousin to standard ethnographic practices. In fact, performance ethnographers deploy the same methodological strategies available to all ethnographers in their fieldwork. What marks the performance ethnographer as distinct, however, is their mode of representation. In print representations of others based upon observation or even full participation in cultural practices is insufficient for the performance ethnographer. Instead, they strive to represent their cultural findings through the enactment of cultural others. By doing so, they believe they add flesh to the dry bones of the traditional ethnographic print account. Furthermore, they argue that by representing others through performance they discover additional, emergent insights born in the performative moment. The actor's body, trained in empathic engagement and nuanced techniques for becoming others, takes on others, not only cognitively, but also affectively. Working at the level of feelings, at the level of embodiment, offers a profound way of coming to understand others. To capture in performance the thinking and feelings of others is quite different than to tell about them in print.

Such thinking was foundational for the two individuals – performance studies scholar Richard Schechner and anthropologist Victor Turner – who are credited with the emergence of performance ethnography in the late 1970s and early 1980s. Schechner was working toward the establishment of the field of performance studies, a field that would move beyond the narrow confines of traditional theater departments to embrace the broad spectrum of human performance practices across western and non western cultures, from performing arts to rituals, sports, and everyday life entertainments

and actions. Turner had found in performance not only a heuristic metaphor for explaining human behavior, but also a site where cultural logics were most fully displayed. Brought together through a series of conferences on ritual and performance, Schechner and Turner began experimenting with the potential of staging findings from the field and discovered that restoring behavior removed from its place of origin was compelling and enlightening. Based upon their early collaborate efforts, performance ethnography has flourished into a wide range of methodological stances and motives, perhaps best characterized under the labels of ethnographer as reporter, witness, and advocate.

Performance ethnographers who see themselves functioning as reporters strive to foreground cultural others and to minimize or eliminate their own presence in their presentations. Modeled after a scientific sensibility, their performances are offered as reliable, valid, and replicable. While cognizant that no production can be purely objective, these performance ethnographers nevertheless believe that they can offer, within limits, accurate renderings of cultural others – that they can portray what they found in the field. In short, they trust in their ability to bring what is “out there” to the stage and to bury their own role in creating what they present. The audiences for such productions are usually people who live outside the culture that is being staged. When such productions are successful, audience members often feel that they have been invited into another world, perhaps familiar, perhaps not, that captures the culture's complexity in all its sensuousness.

Performance ethnographers who view themselves working as witnesses believe that they are obligated to stage their own role in constructing and, at times, their own interactions with cultural others in order to portray an honest picture of their fieldwork encounters. They take on the role of one who has been there, telling how they made sense of the events they saw, sharing how their presence had an impact on themselves and others, filtering all they want to say through their own experiences. As witnesses, they may confess to what they consider problematic fieldwork behaviors (e.g., betrayal of an informant, sexual encounters). Or they may share how their perceptions changed during their fieldwork; in effect, creating a story

that features the ethnographer's coming to awareness. Or they may highlight their own emotional responses to cultural practices different from their own. These and others possibilities place the ethnographer as a central character in the production, one who is fundamental to the unfolding of the plot. Audience members viewing such performances not only sense that they are being invited into another world, but also find themselves responding positively or negatively to the testimony they hear. When such productions work well, audiences feel they met a primary witness who they can trust, one who gave a good account of the events, one whose honesty was disarming and compelling, and one whose company they enjoyed keeping. In such performances the presence of the witness may be so great in fact that audiences feel that what they have before them is an autoethnographic account or a personal narrative.

Performance ethnographers who consider themselves engaged as advocates are convinced that research should make a difference in the world. They work, like critical ethnographers, as social agents on behalf of social justice. They proceed, like all ethnographers, by gaining access and coming to understand another culture, but then, after feeling they know the culture sufficiently well, they call for social change. Their call may be directed at those within or outside the culture. For example, a production might ask cultural members to consider how they are handling sanitation within their village or date rape within their community, or it might ask outside audiences to reflect and act upon discriminatory laws or the economic conditions that affect cultural others. Performance, in this scheme, is used as a tool for intervention. It offers an opportunity to display alternative ways of being, new configurations of social practices, and fresh insights into unproductive behaviors. In this sense, performance ethnography can be linked to critical pedagogy, where actors and audience members are cast as students who are invited to take responsibility for their own and others' education as they move toward a more just world. Audience members of such presentations are urged to drop their typical passive audience role; instead, they are encouraged to take action in the world. Their range of actions may vary,

from opening a dialogue to radical political change, but the goal is always to make the world a better place. The best productions make audience members care, and, ultimately, help them act in the name of social justice.

Whether functioning as reporter, witness, or advocate, performance ethnographers face a number of issues as they move from fieldwork to stage work. First, they must decide whether they will cast an ethnographer in the show, and, if so, whether they will cast themselves or someone else to play the role. Productions that do not explicitly have an ethnographer character imply a constructing presence, a backstage person who is offering findings without stepping forward. Most often, however, productions do have an ethnographer on stage who typically serves as a narrator of the events. The narrative role varies – from minor to major, from observational to participatory, from credible to unreliable – with each production. In addition, each production will differ in regard to the degree of showing (replicating the experiences in the field) and telling (featuring the ethnographer's analyses, memories, current feelings, and so on). This jockeying between the “there and then” and the “here and now” is central to how audience members are led through the performance and to how they understand what is before them.

The second issue performance ethnographers meet when moving to the stage is script creation. Performance ethnographers, like all theater practitioners, want their productions to be good theater. In creating their scripts, they write with an eye toward theatrical effectiveness, perhaps structuring their findings into a well made play or gravitating to moments from the field that display conflict and heightened drama. While doing so, they also keep an eye on what is true to the field, not wanting the desire for good theater to misrepresent what they discovered. Balancing “true to the field” and “effective for the stage” is tricky work. Particularly troublesome is dealing with dialogue. Some performance ethnographers strive only to represent actual conversations from the field; others feel at liberty to alter dialogue for clarity, precision, and focus, or to create altogether new dialogue that is typical of interactions that have occurred. Other considerations, as well, come into play: How best to deal with set design, costuming,

and stage properties? How many cast members are needed and what demographic features must the cast members possess in order to stage the show? How to fit findings into the usual length of a theatrical presentation? Such issues may be easily handled or may be irrelevant on the page, but take on considerable weight on the stage.

Some scholars working under the label of performance ethnographer have turned to performative writing as a means for representing field findings on the page instead of the stage. In effect, they create scripts that are never literally performed but imply performances by calling upon the literary and evocative to do the work of the stage. They believe it is the aesthetic, whether in written or staged form, that is key to capturing a feel for the field. A printed script, however, no matter how performatively presented on the page and no matter how well it may signal its readiness for theatrical presentation, does not embody cultural others. Other scholars will employ performative writing when reporting in print about their staged ethnography. In this case, literal performance comes first and performative writing follows to capture the staged experience.

Third, performance ethnographers must make concrete decisions regarding the degree of impersonation. Some performance ethnographers will invite cultural others to portray themselves on stage in the desire to guarantee authentic representations. Having individuals move their everyday behaviors onto the stage, however, is not an easy task. Conspicuously situated, their feelings of self consciousness may obscure just what the ethnographer wishes to feature. Other performance ethnographers will offer as complete as possible characterizations of the individuals they wish to stage. This typically involves studying video recordings of the vocal and physical details of individuals to such an extent that they may be replicated in performance. Such is the procedure of Anna Deavere Smith. Perhaps the best known performance ethnographer, Smith puts on display her ability to capture the subtle nuances of each character she portrays in her one person shows *Fires in the Mirror* and *Twilight: Los Angeles 1992*. The danger here is that audiences may find themselves more focused upon the performer's virtuosity than upon the character being presented. Other performance ethnographers

will present fully developed characters but do not feel the obligation to capture an exact imitation. What individual characteristics get left in and left out, however, may lead to accusations of caricature, stereotyping, and misrepresentation. Still others are content to create a feel for cultural others, including offering composite characters based upon several individuals they have encountered. In this case, performers never imply that they are fully taking on cultural others; instead, they are merely giving a suggestive rendering. They face questions of sufficiency. Each choice described above establishes different accountabilities for the performers and different experiences for audiences. The question of authenticity that emerges across all of these choices is often a critical concern for audience members, even for those who are skeptical about the ability to ever make authenticity claims.

Fourth, performance ethnographers encounter a number of ethical issues when staging their findings. Conquergood (1985) calls upon performance ethnographers to create "dialogical performances," where genuine conversation can occur between self and other. He cautions ethnographers to avoid several morally problematic stances, including "the custodian's rip off," "the skeptic's cop out," "the enthusiast's infatuation," and "the curator's exhibitionism." The custodian's rip off suggests how performances may exploit others, perhaps by performing rituals that only certain members of a culture have the authority to perform, or by making a personal profit by selling replications of cultural artifacts against the objections of cultural members. The skeptic's cop out points toward ethnographers' hesitancy to perform others on the grounds of difference. Detached and removed, ethnographers within this stance keep themselves enclosed within their own worlds. The enthusiast's infatuation warns against superficiality, against performances that are based upon shallow and naive understandings and inappropriate identification. The curator's exhibitionism notes the dangers of exoticizing the other, of offering performances that sensationalize or romanticize difference. Conquergood's moral map remains a useful guide for many performance ethnographers, however, as they pursue their desire to produce dialogical performances, and as other ethical risks emerge.

The most important of these is how cultural others process their own enactments by performers. When given the opportunity (and one can argue that it is problematic when not given an opportunity) to view an ethnographic performance based upon their lives, cultural others may meet themselves for the first time, not in manuscript, but presented on stage with all the accuracies and inaccuracies that the embodiment might entail. Regardless of the preparation one has before seeing oneself on stage, even for those with previous theatrical background, the event is often highly charged. It is an event where one sees oneself held up for public display, witnesses the audience's collective and spontaneous response, and sits without the ability to defend or correct. Watching the actors take on their voice and body, cultural others come to realize that reading about themselves is not the same thing as seeing themselves performed. Adding flesh adds consequences, particularly when their portrayal appears to cast them in a negative light. For example, behaviors that typically go unnoticed in everyday interactions may become comic within a theatrical frame. Sometimes, sacred practices and deeply held beliefs may appear mocked when audiences laugh. Other times, performed caricatures may be both recognizable and disheartening. Still other times, seeing oneself performed may reveal aspects of the self never recognized before. The list could continue, but the point seems clear: how an individual processes his or her own enactment is likely to be significant, even profound. Ethical performance ethnographers can help by bringing cultural others into rehearsals, by trying to portray others with respect, and by anticipating possible audience responses, but it is extremely difficult to control for all the contingencies of live performance.

A fifth concern performance ethnographers confront when staging their findings is the question of audience. For whom is the production staged? Is it performed for the members of the culture that is being represented, for a general audience that has limited familiarity with the culture being portrayed, for an academic audience with some expertise on the culture and performance ethnography, or for some combination of the above? Each possibility presents challenges, calling for adaptation in scripting and performance to account for

varying motives and knowledge levels. As noted above, some performance ethnographers would maintain that they carry an obligation to stage their work for the culture members that are being studied. Such a demand, however, may encounter insurmountable practical difficulties and may limit the potential of performance ethnography as advocacy. Whatever decision performance ethnographers make, they face the ethical questions surrounding their choice.

The final issue before performance ethnographers is whether they see a production as equivalent to print publication or as a methodological step in the research process. For some, an ethnographic performance, like an article in a journal, offers findings from the field in a polished form that makes its rhetorical case. The difference is only one of venue: stage or page. They may choose to write about their productions, in part because of performance's ephemeral nature, but they do so feeling the inadequacy of print to capture the stage and field experience. For others, all performances offer methodological insights. Each time performers stage others they learn more and more. They write about performances in order to articulate what they have discovered and felt as they used their voices and bodies to become others. This product/process distinction influences how performance ethnographers are likely to proceed and how they narrate their work to various audiences.

Moving findings from the field to the stage, then, is no small matter. Performance ethnographers must not only have the skills and expertise of the ethnographer, but also understand the workings of the theater and its methodological and theoretical commitments. Performance ethnography uses the power of the stage as a tool for representing others. It insists on seeing performance as a method for turning disembodied fieldnotes into a full sense of the cultural other who comes alive when given, once again, voice and body, who appears through the performer's ability to stand in for others, and who is understood, in part, by the portrayal put before an audience. The ultimate challenge for performance ethnographers, whether working as reporter, witness, or advocate, is to embrace their dual role – ethnographer and performer – in the belief that the richest account of cultural others occurs by their combination.

SEE ALSO: Autoethnography; Critical Pedagogy; Ethnography; Narrative

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performance measurement

Barbara Townley and Rosemary Doyle

Performance measurement encompasses the role of performance indicators, measures, and targets within a performance management system and is designed to improve organizational functioning. Indicators, or key performance indicators, identify key areas of strategic and operational performance in organizations. Measures seek to give a numerical evaluation of their achievement, while targets are designed as aspirational statements of intended future performance. The purpose of performance measurement is to improve organizational performance by focusing on the key functions or activities that are designed to achieve organizational objectives,

and motivate and influence behavior through the setting of targets. Performance measurement is central to strategic management approaches, which utilize core mission statements, strategic objectives, and a focus on outputs to drive organizational performance.

Performance measurement systems are designed to focus all levels of an organization on performance, as reflected in measures and targets. The aim is to integrate the top level of strategic planning with the operational priorities of individual departments and the personal performance of individual employees. A strategic performance management system ensures that achievement at all levels is evaluated against targets, and action is taken in the event of failure to achieve objectives.

Performance measures may play a variety of roles in management: to look back, look ahead, compare, compensate, motivate, cascade down, and roll up an organization. They are designed to improve operational processes and productivity, by providing an incentive for performance improvement and supporting learning. They provide data for strategic planning and assist in the allocation of resources. They may be used as the basis for comparisons between departments or organizations, in order to establish benchmarks of good performance (Meyer 2002).

Within private sector organizations, performance measurement initially focused on financial indicators, such as, for example, market valuation, profit, revenues, or proxies of financial success such as sales, market share, and growth. More recent developments have emphasized the importance of other indicators. For example, the balanced scorecard highlights four categories of performance indicator ("perspectives"), each incorporating a range of specific indicators, for example: revenues, sales, margins (financial); market share, customer satisfaction and retention (customer); product design, production processes (internal business processes); employee retention, productivity or competence (growth and learning). Later forms integrate these perspectives into a strategy map which cascades indicators down through an organization, linking top level strategic decisions to the actions of individual staff members (Kaplan & Norton 2001).

In the public sector, performance measurement has been associated with the rise of new

public management, with its emphasis on an increased reliance on market mechanisms for public service delivery (Osborne & Gaebler 1992). While reflecting private sector concerns of increased productivity and service delivery, performance measures in the public sector are also associated with a democratic imperative, which demands evidence of accountability and transparency in the management of public resources. Performance measures have increasingly replaced the “logic of good faith,” which assumed that the provision of public service lay with professional judgment and commitment to the public good.

The experience of working with performance measures varies. They are advocated to increase transparency, learning, incentives for improvement, and as a stimulus to strategic behavior. They may, however, generate perverse consequences. A number of dysfunctions are associated with their operation: tunnel vision (focusing solely on the measure to the exclusion of anything else); goal displacement (trying to affect the measure of performance rather than performance itself); suboptimization (focusing on the unit, rather than organizational performance as a whole); myopia (short term objectives over long term needs); ossification (stultifying innovation); gaming (the search for strategic advantage over others); and misrepresentation (Smith 1993).

Generally, measures are less problematic in those organizations where activities are relatively homogeneous, where there are clear and uncontested objectives, where outcomes are tangible and where the relationship between resource input and performance outcomes is relatively direct, and where the organization has a large degree of control over its outcomes. Equally, in the converse situation, i.e., where activities are heterogeneous, objectives contested, outcomes intangible, the relationships between input and outcome lacking clarity, and control less determined, the operation of performance measures is more contested and deemed to be “political” (Carter et al. 1992).

There are two assumptions that sustain the operation of performance measures: basically, that there is something identifiable that may be captured as performance, and that this essence can be reflected by measures. Both assumptions, although seemingly obvious and

unproblematic statements, are, in theory and in practice, highly contentious, and lead to different emphases in the understanding and study of performance measurement.

One perspective assumes that performance is an underlying attribute of organizational activity, independent of observers and the process of observation, and accessible through the application of the correct measurement tools. From this perspective, it is possible to define performance adequately and accurately. Sometimes characterized as managerialist, this quasi realist presentation of performance views performance measures as uncontested, neutral tools of management, designed to reflect an objective position. The reasons for their adoption are technical: to improve organizational performance through the search for better measures that give a more accurate “picture.” Dysfunctions associated with their operation are thought to reflect the choice of incorrect measures or managerial and organizational failings in their introduction and implementation. A frequent metaphor associated with this view of performance measurement is that of a “full picture” or “snapshot” that seeks to capture what is before the camera’s lens. Measures are a reflection of an objective reality. They seek to represent an activity or series of activities, to those who are not party to them, in a manner that allows knowledge to be gained, decisions to be made, and actions to be taken.

A second perspective emphasizes an interpretivist understanding of performance measure. From this perspective, performance is rather more elusive, fluid, and ambiguous. The interpretivist position emphasizes the plurality of interpretations of performance, dependent on the position of those involved, and does not make such a stark distinction between the observer and the observed. Rather than measures *reflecting* a given performance, measures are a *representation*. Representation is necessarily an abstraction, i.e., it abstracts from, or out of, complex interactions, thus reducing and simplifying a qualitative understanding. Decisions on what to measure, how to measure, how to represent an arena and interpret the results are therefore not seen as technical questions but as political issues. They both represent and constitute how people perceive their interests and what positions they may be able to adopt

in political argument. Measures may reflect the agreement, consensual or otherwise, of contested interpretations, or the imposition of a dominant interest. In addition to the issues of accuracy and adequacy that characterize discussions of measures in the former perspective, an interpretivist perspective addresses the added ethical issues of the potential use and abuse of measures: not only whether measures are applicable in this context but also whether or not they *should* be applied, and with what consequences (Paton 2003).

Although the constructivist position has some similarities with the interpretivist position, and shares some of the political understandings of the role of measures, it diverges over its understanding of representation. Both deny the assumption that representation is the neutral reflection of that which is present; however, the constructivist position denies the implicit relativism of an interpretivist position, i.e., that measures solely reflect an intersubjective understanding. For the constructivist, that which is presented is not the “real” but its inscription. Inscription takes the place of that which is present, and “speaks” on its behalf. Measures both represent, i.e., are deemed to authoritatively take the place of, and also represent the real, i.e., present in a different form. They are thus constitutive of a realm, bringing into being practices, activities, and identities that sustain it (Townley et al. 2003).

This perspective highlights the social processes that are required in making measures routine, taken for granted, and embedded within organizations, and more broadly in society. They require a discourse that sustains them as a legitimate activity in which to be engaged. Embedded within this are theories of behavior, motivation, interests, and identity, not only of those who use and consult them – managers, consumers, citizens, patients, for example – but also those who will operate under them – managers, employees, professionals, and politicians. They require processes of annotation and inscription that allow events to be translated and transferred across time and space, and to be taken to represent that to which they symbolically refer. They require organizational processes and routines that collect, collate, and transfer information as measures, often requiring sophisticated technological resources and

support. They require a degree of numerical familiarity and comfort in those who engage with them, and a learned process of sensemaking that allows measures to be interpreted in a “meaningful” way. Thus performance measures require an elaborate social, technical, and epistemological infrastructure or edifice for them to be able to function (Townley 2002a). These “supports” are required generally, but elements of them are also called into operation every time use is made of performance measures, a failure of any results in the taken for granted nature of measures being called into question.

Just as there are different frameworks for understanding performance measures, there are also different explanations as to the apparent emphasis or prominence currently given to performance measures.

Within the private sector, changes in organizational structure, in particular decentralization, downsizing, and outsourcing, reflective of responses to global capital, have introduced a greater role for performance measures as part of the governance mechanism of contracts. Increasing consumerism and competition and intensified production cycles have also placed a growing emphasis on demonstrable performance improvement. Equally, public sector restructuring, with the provision of public services through privatized and devolved agencies, has also seen the increased use of control and contract enforcement through performance measures. Within the public sector, performance measures have gained salience in a climate that has seen the increased questioning of professional judgment, an increased emphasis on consumer choice, and a decline in appeals to the concept of the public good. There has been an increased emphasis on public services providing visible “proof” of performance. Where an organization’s “products” are intangible, for example, “education” or “health,” and their technologies ambiguous, there is a necessary reliance on wider social legitimation to support an organization’s activities and practices. When this broader legitimacy is challenged, an organization may be obliged to adopt certain procedures and practices to demonstrate that they are acting legitimately. Performance measures fulfill this role. Because measures are expressed in numerical form, they also carry some of the connotations that attach to numbers, most

specifically their association with hard and objective data, their quasi scientific status, and their apparent depoliticization of decision making. In an era that has been characterized by a loss of political ideology, measures are far more conducive to a “what works” public justification and “evidence based” policy.

A broader interpretation of social change sees the emphasis on performance measurement as reflective of an increased rationalization of social engagement, whereby judgments, decisions, and actions are based on numerical indicators or measures, rather than the reflection of norms, values, or explicit political positions (Townley 2002b). Numbers provide an ease of transportability and a quasi universal significance that allows them to be transferred through time and space, without the loss of meaning that would accrue to qualitative indicators. In an increasingly globalized environment where cultural and social anchors are less determining, measures of performance take on a greater pertinence. They provide a medium for interaction or coordination between diverse and diversified arenas (Porter 1995).

Measures, and the numbers that attach to them, are integral to the problematizations that shape government and governance: what should be governed and what it is to be governed. From a pluralist perspective, performance measures may provide the basis of contestation to authority, challenge claims to efficiency and effectiveness, and generally contribute to increased accountability and a functioning civil society. Their use reflects a more educated and independent population where traditional bases of authority are increasingly disputed. Or, alternatively, through their functioning as an abstraction, measures may depoliticize politics, i.e., reduce political debate to technical disputes, transforming poverty and hunger into statistical indicators. One question from this perspective is how it is possible to ensure that measures function to increase a democratic agenda. From a perspective of governmentality, measures, such as exam results, fear of crime, unit performance, bring into being entities that are then the foundation of government and management initiatives and interventions, and become incorporated into organizational and individual identities, understandings, and actions (Rose 1999). They are mechanisms that link self government

with broader programs of government. A question raised by this perspective is, how do domains come into being and acquire their taken for grantedness, and with what consequences?

SEE ALSO: Bureaucracy and Public Sector Governmentality; Management Theory; Organization Theory; Organizational Learning; Outsourcing; Strategic Management (Organizations)

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personal is political

Barbara Ryan

The *personal is political* was a term used in the early days of the contemporary women's movement to mean that if something was happening to you, it was happening to other women too.

What appeared to be a personal issue was actually a political one that occurred because of unequal gender relations. Exclusion and exploitation were not individual acts, but were shared under a system of patriarchy.

The branch of the contemporary movement known as the radical or women's liberation sector met in small groups to talk about their lives. The intent and effect was what became known as consciousness raising: becoming aware of things you did not notice or accepted without considering how such assumptions or practices came to be, and especially not questioning who benefited from these practices.

One way to think about the feminist use of the *personal is political* is to put it into a sociological framework. In doing this, a term that comes to mind is the "Sociological Imagination" of C. Wright Mills (1959), who recognized the importance of context and drawing connections between one's experience and social reality. Mills wrote about locating personal troubles in the structural/political realm and the importance of positioning biography within history. Although he never used the term, his ideas are there and predate feminism, but it took the movement to crystallize the meaning and apply it to concrete experiences connected to women's lives.

Another sociological concept tied to the meaning of the *personal is political* is the social construction of reality. This concept can be seen in how we are led to think that what happens to us is our fault rather than a pattern of interactions that places us in a particular sector of society. The idea of "pulling yourself up by your bootstraps" or "any boy [*sic*] can grow up to be president" are socially constructed ideologies legitimating a system of structured inequality. Also applicable is the "definition of the situation" from W. I. Thomas (closely connected to the Thomas Theorem: "if men [*sic*] define situations as real, they are real in their consequences"), which calls for us to consider the meaning inherent in our situation and that of others like us. Redefining can be seen in feminist efforts to resist social definitions that lead to internalized oppression. Outside of sociology, socialist feminists, African American feminists, and anarchist feminists (e.g., Emma Goldman) made similar analyses of dominant values and personal troubles for

women, poor people, the working class, and African Americans.

The first reference in print was from Carol Hamish's article "The Personal is Political" in Firestone and Koedt (1970). She is credited with coining the term, which became an early slogan of developing women's consciousness in the late 1960s women's liberation movement (Humm 1995).

Firestone and Koedt (1970) were theorists and activists who defined themselves as radical feminists. Firestone authored *The Dialectic of Sex* (1970), a book advocating the elimination of sex/gender inequalities through the removal of biological differences with artificial reproduction, community childrearing, and abolition of the family (Ryan 1996). Koedt is best known for her article "The Myth of the Vaginal Orgasm" (1973), as well as her writings on lesbian feminism and the radical sector of the women's liberation movement. In the preface to *Radical Feminism*, Koedt, Levine, and Rapone (1973) argue sexism is a political system only understood when women are seen as a political class defined by sexist ideology and institutions; women's experience "reflects this understanding of the political nature of what has always been deemed personal."

The *personal is political* was confronted in the 1970s by lesbians who felt shunned in the larger women's movement and by African American women in the 1980s for the lack of attention to race issues (Ryan 1992). They, and later other racial/ethnic groups, charged the movement with a sisterhood that only represented white middle class heterosexual women whose concept of the personal extended solely to them, and whose political strategies were forged to address the issues affecting them. By the 1990s, identity politics challenged the concept *women* – as in all women – for the failure to acknowledge the intersections of race, class, ethnicity, sexual orientation, sexuality, disabilities, age, nationality, occupation, and education – in short, all of the differences among women that affect their place in social, economic, and political systems (Ryan 2001).

The discord so rampant in those years actually focused more on the idea of sisterhood than the concept of the personal is political, which could be applied to any group identity, including multiple identities. The concept is

germane to seeing how individual lives are delimited and determined by social and political forces that affect not just them, but others like them. No longer were women left to feel that their inability to succeed was a personal failure or a character fault. Indeed, unfulfilling marriages, low level jobs and incomes, domestic violence, and depression could all be seen as systemic to a social system that purposely denied opportunities to women and that devalued the work that women do. And, importantly, the concept was able to expand and incorporate the recognition that structural inequality impacted women differently based on the other group characteristics they inhabited, including the prejudice and discrimination visited upon men of oppressed social groups.

Other social movements have used this concept, in varying terms, to organize for change in their group's behalf, some before the contemporary women's movement and others after it became part of public discourse. The Civil Rights Movement stressed how being black placed you in a repressed and restricted role, the anti war movement uncovered common policy patterns from wealthy countries to poor countries, the New Left protested the inherent educational and occupational privilege in class relations, and colonialism and imperialism revealed a dominant-oppressed dynamic on a global scale. Thus, connections could be made with patriarchy and sexism to white supremacy and racism, to imperialism, domination and war.

Since the 1990s the links among structural divisions are more clearly recognized. Not only are activists involved in seeing the personal is political for individual lives, but also that the multiple oppressions in people's lives intersect. Domination of one group over another, whatever the guise, leads to the awareness that the personal is, indeed, political.

SEE ALSO: Consciousness Raising; Feminism, First, Second, and Third Waves; Radical Feminism; Women's Empowerment; Women's Movements

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phenomenology

Gerhard Schutte

Originally of philosophical origin, phenomenology reasoned that the pure meanings of phenomena were only to be subjectively apprehended and intuitively grasped in their essence. It achieved relevance to the social sciences within the tension between logical positivism and interpretivism or (in nineteenth century terms) the natural and cultural sciences. At the turn of the twentieth century the neo Kantians' insistence on a distinctive epistemology and methodology for the "cultural" sciences found a well considered resonance in German sociological thought (e.g., Weber's). The growth, explanatory force, and extension of natural science's objective perspective and positivistic methodology to the domains of the cultural sciences did not go unchallenged. It was the mathematician turned philosopher Edmund Husserl who laid the foundation of the twentieth century

phenomenological movement by taking to task the positivistic approach to psychology.

Turning away from the external objective world as source of knowledge, Husserl reverses the perspective to that of the subject's experience of reality. This experience is always an experience "of" and is directed to the object. Husserl uses the concept of *intentionality* (Brentano) to describe this relationship. The subject apprehends the world through passive synthesis by giving meaning to it in an unreflective, spontaneous manner. He or she can share experiences with others in an intersubjective way. Subject or intersubjectivity exists in a world of experience. This is the "lifeworld" experienced in the "natural attitude." To the subjects, this lifeworld is given in an unquestioned way.

Husserl thus grounds his epistemology in the experience of everyday life and moves from there to the next level, which he calls phenomenological reduction. This involves a procedure called bracketing or *epoché*. What is apprehended in the natural attitude as "natural" or naturally given is bracketed and regarded as if it represents only a claim to self-evident existence. It is thus reflected upon and considered to be an "appearance" (i.e., a phenomenon). This level of cognition, though, is insufficient because it leaves the question unanswered as to what something is the appearance of.

In order to address this question Husserl introduces "eidetic reduction," which incorporates the idea of grasping the essence or *eidos* of a phenomenon. The essence has an a priori existence and instead of being grasped through reflection, it is intuitively apprehended. In a somewhat oversimplified example one may look on one level at a red object in a naturalistic way, then bracket and question one's judgment of it as having this hue red and not a different one, and finally proceed to intuit the essence of redness.

Ultimately, it was Husserl's objective to grasp the structure of pure consciousness and the transcendental ego. His thoughts spurred existential philosophers such as Heidegger and Sartre to reflect on the ontological question of "Being" (*Sein, Etre*). Alfred Schütz, however, took up the task of making the subject's experience and situatedness in the lifeworld concrete and amenable to empirical investigation. The

intellectual climate he worked in during the early decades of the twentieth century was heavily influenced by the Vienna Circle. It posited an objective world amenable to disclosure and explanation by logical positivist methods. Human realities were part of the objective world. To Schütz, the object of social inquiry was far more complex. He realized that the objects of social inquiry were human *subjects* endowed with freedom of will, and at the same time they and their actions were *objects* of investigation and explanation. He embarked on a rigorous analysis of social action as the point of entry for a phenomenological account of both its subjective and objective dimensions. The perspective of the social actor (instead of the philosopher's "subject") is central and intersubjectively linked to others in a shared lifeworld. His pioneering work *Phenomenology of the Social World* concentrates on the meaningful construction of the social world. He thus reconceptualizes Husserl's lifeworld as the universal dimension of human experience with the more specific "social world." The actor experiences the (social) lifeworld from the "natural attitude," taking it for granted in an unquestioning way. The cognitive style of the lifeworld is that of the "suspension of doubt" and its status is that of "paramount reality" governed by the "fundamental anxiety" of the subject about his or her death. This social world is spatially and temporally structured from the point of view of the actor. Spatially, it slopes away from the actor from social relationships of familiarity to those of greater anonymity. Temporally, it reaches backward to predecessors and forward to successors. It is within this framework that he or she creates or draws on typifications of situations and persons, on typical recipes for action. Schütz calls the actor's typifications in everyday life first order constructs. These constructs are taken for granted and intersubjectively shared among society's members. With regard to social action it is the task of the social scientist to distinguish the actor's motivation for it from the observational understanding of an outside observer. He thus improves on Max Weber's approach that telescoped the insider and outsider perspectives in an attempt to explain social action through understanding.

Drawing on Husserl's phenomenological reduction and the procedure of bracketing,

Schütz focuses on “second order constructs,” the constructs of science in general and of social science in particular. Scientific constructs go beyond the natural attitude. In transcending the lifeworld of the mundane, phenomenologically oriented scientists utilize a cognitive style that suspends belief rather than doubt. They “detach” themselves as disinterested observers. The typifications they produce are not concrete, but more abstract and generic. They are “ideal types” in Weber’s sense and serve heuristic and analytic purposes. Yet, science and social science as “finite provinces of meaning” have to maintain a nexus with the everyday world in order to remain relevant. Schütz produced exemplars of such sociological ideal types of actors in his essays on the stranger and the homecomer. They ideal typically reproduce the immigrant and returned soldier, respectively, without sacrificing their relevance to “real” persons.

Science and sociology are not the only domains with cognitive styles and forms of consciousness qualitatively different from that of everyday life and the lifeworld. Schütz distinguishes the world of phantasms and dreams, among others, as different “finite provinces of meaning.” The worlds of art and that of religious experience – each with its own cognitive style – are further examples.

Schütz stops short of Husserl’s next step of “eidetic reduction,” which aims at grasping essential and a priori realities. To him, this was the domain of phenomenological philosophy. However, this dimension of Husserl’s phenomenology was taken up by other disciplines such as social philosophy and comparative religion. Rudolf Otto’s *The Idea of the Holy* (1917) – in which he intuits the essence of the divine – still stands as an exemplar of eidetic reduction.

In their seminal work, Berger and Luckmann (1972) brought the phenomenological perspective to a much wider audience than their teacher Schütz reached during his lifetime. Their concern was the social construction of *reality* as such and not just that of social reality or that of the social world. They adopt Husserl’s bracketing in order to examine the ontological claims of society with regard to the shared vision and beliefs of its members about “reality.” In an ambitious integrative project they attempt to

account for the intersubjective construction of reality, its institutionalization as structure and internalization in a dialectical fashion that portrays humans as both constructors and constructs. They position their sociology of knowledge between the taken for granted “ontology” of the “man in the street” and the reflective ontology of the philosopher.

The relationship between sociology and philosophy is not always clear in phenomenologically inspired sociologies. Some contemporaries and successors to Schütz preferred to present phenomenological sociology in a way as one would define functionalism or the sociology of conflict as paradigms. Phenomenological sociology was thus seen as another paradigm in a Kuhnian sense (Psathas 1973). In this form it found recognition in the American Sociological Association when the first session on phenomenological sociology was organized in 1971. Paradigms, however, tend to be superseded by others.

Luckmann adopts a different perspective by returning to the original Husserlian injunction that installs phenomenology as a fundamental alternative and successor to logical positivism. Phenomenology to Luckmann is a philosophy that pursues knowledge, and thus sociology offers descriptions of universal structures of subjective orientation in the world. It provides the discipline with an *egological* perspective that places human experience at the center and requires a description of that experience by returning to its intentional features. It does not constitute a discipline and is not a paradigm of sociology. Its cognitive style is impersonal rather than the personal reflection of phenomenology; its evidence is public rather than subjective experience. Social realities do however refer to universal structures of subjective orientation and it is here that phenomenology and social theory may articulate with each other.

Schütz’s phenomenological approach inspired a further branch of interpretive sociology pioneered by Aaron Cicourel and Harold Garfinkel: ethnomethodology. It focuses on everyday life, but instead of emphasizing the taken for grantedness of the world of experience, it problematizes the way in which ordinary members of society achieve that sense of normalcy. It thus breaks away from the idea that lay people share a set of symbolic meanings and replaces it with an

exposition of their unending work towards the achievement of a set of shared meanings. What members of a group do share are the methods for making sense of their reality.

Phenomenology has had a lasting impact on the social sciences. More recently a shift of emphasis occurred, moving attention away from reflections on their deeper philosophical and epistemological roots towards studies of mundane realities and the ways people made sense of and acted upon them. Understandably, phenomenology's subjective perspective stimulated a methodological debate on the production of evidence and its analysis. A number of manuals on qualitative research have demonstrated their indebtedness to the phenomenological perspective. Ethnography, though traditionally the preserve of anthropological research, received a new impetus from phenomenology and extended itself to the description and study of mundane realities and lifeworlds within societies. The phenomenological orientation in social science and the humanities today extends well beyond the German and English language communities of its origin. It spread early to Japan, the Netherlands, France, and Spain, with other European countries, Latin America, and Britain among others to follow.

At the beginning of a new century, phenomenological description and analysis consolidated existing foci on religion, education, art, architecture, and politics (to name but a few) and widened its scope to include such further worlds of experience as medicine, nursing, health care, the environment, ethnicity, gender, embodiment, history, and technology (Crowell et al. 2001).

SEE ALSO: Ethnomethodology; Intersubjectivity; Knowledge, Sociology of; Schütz, Alfred; Weber, Max

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photography

Martin Lister

By chemically fixing the images produced by cameras, photography (literally "light writing") was the first technology in history to automate the production of visual images by freeing them from a reliance on skilled hand-eye coordination. It also enabled the mechanical reproduction of existing visual images. From the mid nineteenth century onwards, photography radically changed when and where images could be made, their relationship to time and movement, who could make them, and the uses to which images could be put. It placed the visual image at the center of a wide range of social, cultural, and scientific practices. Photography was a key factor in the emergence of modern societies pervaded by throwaway images, seductive spectacles, and surveillance through vision.

Within a decade of their invention photographs were being produced in many parts of the world, and within 20 years the rudiments of commercial, scientific, social, and artistic practices were established. In a remarkably short time, photography was being used for ethnographic, pornographic, surveillance, criminological, medical, and propaganda purposes. From early on, photography was utilized in war reportage, programs of social reform in the new industrial cities, as a means of marketing commodities and celebrity, and in the affirmation and construction of personal identity, biography, memory, and social status.

From the late nineteenth century until the establishment of broadcast television in the

1950s, photography was the socially dominant visual mass medium. Since the early 1990s, photographic technology has been increasingly displaced by digital technology in the form of digital and virtual cameras and computer software for image manipulation and generation. However, images which appear to be photographs, and are received and used as photographs, continue to be produced and circulated on a vast and global scale. Despite the displacement of photographic technology, the aesthetic and signifying properties of the “photographic” continue to be central in contemporary visual culture. “Photographic realism” remains the very benchmark of realism in visual representation. If a fantasy or a physically impossible event is to appear real and credible in a computer generated image (a tiled floor morphing into the Terminator, in the film of that name, for example), then it needs to look just as it would if it had been photographed (Allen 1998). In this sense, in what is now frequently referred to as a “post photographic” age, the characteristics of the photographic image and the values invested in it continue to have currency. Two practical systems of fixing images made with cameras were announced in 1839, in France (Daguerre) and in England (Fox Talbot) following a lengthy prehistory of experiment and anticipation in the eighteenth century. Both methods fixed, by chemical means, an image cast by a camera lens upon a light sensitive surface. Importantly, Fox Talbot’s method did more than mechanically produce images. It created a negative image from which multiple positive versions or prints could be made. This was the basis for an eventual industrialization and mass production of visual images. With the invention of the halftone screen in the 1880s, it became possible to print photographs alongside text and other graphic elements and they began to circulate in the mass media of newspapers, magazines, and publicity materials. By the end of the nineteenth century, with continuous technical development in lenses, film speed, and the size of cameras, the limitations posed by the cumbersome nature of earlier photographic apparatus and processes were overcome. Exposures of a fraction of a second became possible, cameras were miniaturized, and the relationship of visual images to time,

movement, and circumstance was effectively changed.

The birth of photography took place broadly within the context of nineteenth century western industrialization, urbanization, imperial warfare, and colonial exploration and administration. Its development paralleled that of mechanized transport and modern travel and tourism. Via its use in advertising it was a key factor in the emergence of a commodity culture and consumer society. In its popular and domestic forms, photography played a key part in the establishment and celebration of the culture of the nuclear family unit. In relation to an empiricist turn in the natural and social sciences and the demands of complex industrial societies, it rapidly became a tool of social surveillance and ethnic and social class classification. Photography was put to use, developed, and given meaning in each of these contexts.

Given its cultural ubiquity and diversity, it has been widely accepted since the 1970s that the many genres and practices of photography that exist cannot adequately be defined and understood according to essentialist universal characteristics of the medium. Photography is best thought of as many practices (or photographs) arising from the historically specific social and cultural uses of a common technology, some of which are based upon understandings of the medium’s nature which are contradictory.

Throughout its history, the nature and ontological status of the photographic image have been a subject of philosophical inquiry and debate. This debate centered upon a kind of paradox, which is reflected in realist and constructivist theories of the photographic image. On the one hand, the photograph has been thought to have a special relationship to the material reality it depicts. In this sense, it has been understood and used as if it were a neutral and objective record, a truthful report, on the appearance of the natural or material world. Such views stem from the perception that photographs are a kind of trace or imprint of the objects and events they depict via the operation of light and chemistry. In this sense, the photograph was (and in many pragmatic ways still is) thought to have a privileged relationship or access to the real; it is conceived as being like a cast that was formed by being physically in touch with an object, and

therefore, in this respect at least, unlike other kinds of visual image. In semiotic terms, it is an indexical sign; a sign that is caused by the thing it represents. Temporally, the photograph always refers to something in the past, that did exist or happen. Also contributing to this sense of photography's truth value was the mechanical nature of the "capture" of images by the photographic process and the lack of evident human (hence subjective) invention or intervention in the process. Importantly in this respect, photography emerged within a period of western culture dominated by empiricism and positivism and was valued from early on as a scientific instrument for the collection, recording, measuring, and classification of appearances that could be treated as reliable facts.

On the other hand, the practice, and indeed the very technology, of photography is part of a longer western tradition of image making (e.g., photographic lenses embody the optics of linear perspective and cameras are designed to frame and resolve images in traditional "portrait" and "landscape" formats). Photographers also employ a wide range of pictorial conventions. Within the complex photographic process, from exposure to print, a photograph can be subject to many kinds of technical and aesthetic manipulations such as the control of focus, depth of field, contrast, detail, and resolution, and to practices of juxtaposition, combination, and composition. The meanings of photographs also have an important relation to the written texts that usually accompany them and the institutional and discursive contexts in which they appear. In such ways photographs serve a wide range of ideological purposes.

An abiding concern has been the question of photography's status as an art. For many critics, photography was to be excluded from the canon of art because of its unselective and slavish depiction of reality and its inability to penetrate superficial appearances to reveal deeper political and intellectual realities. However, an alternative view, associated particularly with the German critic Walter Benjamin (1970 [1936]), holds that photography brought about a revolution in visual culture with democratic potential. All unique works of art became endlessly reproducible and available to new audiences, while information and knowledge about

the world at large became popularly accessible through the mass circulation of photographs. In this process, images lost the aristocratically sanctioned and didactic authority they had held up until the advent of photography. At the same time, photography gave rise to a new way of seeing as it was able to capture aspects, details, and relationships within the visual world which were not perceivable by the naked eye. In the 1920s and 1930s, artists of the Surrealist movement valued photography precisely for its uncanny ability to make the familiar and everyday strange. From the 1930s, particularly in the US, modernist photographers sought to establish photography as an art form in its own right by pursuing and refining what they took to be an essentially photographic vision and language.

Ethnographic and documentary uses of photography arose early in the context of nineteenth century social anthropology. As colonial subjects, African, Asian, and Australasian peoples were subjected to the surveying and controlling gaze of the camera, framed as exotic "others" and constructed as evidence for social evolutionist and eugenicist theories about racial difference and social class. Within Europe and America, the new social problems arising in the overcrowded and unsanitary industrial cities were documented in photographs. Fears about crime, the spread of disease, and the regulation of the lives of the urban working class became an object of photographic surveillance. Photography came to be viewed as a tool of scientific interrogation and the objective recording of appearances as evidence. Examples of such uses include: the identification of criminals, the representation of mental illness, establishing norms for the "healthy" human body, and providing evidence of the need for social reform.

In the 1930s, social documentary photography and photojournalism became cultural practices of great importance. They were facilitated by the use of lightweight cameras and the expansion of mass circulation photographic magazines and the popular press in Europe and North America. Documentary photography in its mid twentieth century form had a social conscience and sought to contribute to social change and reform. It was informed by humanist, social democratic, and sometimes socialist values. The American "Farm Security Administration"

project was state funded and designed to provide images for reports on the recovery of the American economy after the Depression of the 1930s, while in England, the "Mass Observation" movement attempted a visual anthropology of "everyday life" in Britain.

Popular photography has been a major factor in the construction of identity and lifestyle choices. It is simultaneously a clear example of the way in which the dynamics of commodity capitalism have shaped a practice of self representation. Within a decade of its invention, photography had found a place in the high street, where specially built portrait studios with a large middle class clientele and a high financial turnover were established. Alongside these, disreputable "street photography" establishments run by charlatans sprung up. Both kinds of establishment catered for a growing demand amongst the urban classes for "likenesses." In this way, photography was a new means of production which replaced the expensive, labor intensive practice of portrait painting which had historically been confined to the aristocracy. The "carte de visite" was an early form of postcard, either a portrait of a middle class sitter produced in multiples, or a portrait of a celebrity of the day mass produced for sale. This was an early form of the commodification of the photograph and the beginnings of a photographic industry that trades in images of celebrity and glamour.

However, photography remained a difficult craft for much of the nineteenth century and only truly became a form of industrial production for a mass market in the last decades of the century, alongside the continuing development of the popular press, consumer magazines, and advertising. The development of popular photography for private consumption took place firmly within the context of a highly ideological view of the family, a rapidly expanding commodity culture, and tourist, leisure, and lifestyle industries. In 1888 George Eastman introduced the user friendly Kodak "point and shoot" camera, which used roll film and included processing and printing within its price. This effectively put the means of making photographs into the hands of "ordinary" people and facilitated the possibility of photographing the events and moments of family and everyday life. The extreme simplification of the

photographic process which is built into mass market cameras means that "snapshot" photography is severely circumscribed in aesthetic and semiotic terms. It also became evident to the Kodak company that the mere possibility of photographing everyday life that the technology provided was not met by a popular desire to do so. Hence the marketing of popular photography, gendered in its primary address to women, by encouraging images to be made that depicted the family at leisure. In this way, the democratic impulse of popular photography was, to a large extent, channeled into a celebration of the family unit consuming and at leisure, centered upon images such as family festivities, children at play, seaside holidays, suburban life, and the family motorcar. From the 1930s onwards, family photography was reinforced in this direction by popular magazines and advertising offering images of an ideal world of domestic consumption.

Over a history of more than 160 years, vast numbers of photographs have been accumulated in institutional archives, collections, and private albums. Of particular interest is the manner in which these construct a view of history and the politics of the archive as they have been shaped by the purposes and ideologies that originally informed the selection of images for inclusion. Since the early 1990s many large photographic archives (artistic, documentary, journalistic, specialist) have been digitized and become the electronic property of corporate image banks, such as Microsoft's Corbis or Getty Images plc. These online image banks trade globally and now provide a high proportion of all images used in publicity, advertising, and editorial work. Digital cameras are now widely used in personal and snapshot photography and "family albums" are now frequently stored and viewed on computer and television screens and published on websites. The early use of photographs (and now video stills) for surveillance, security, and criminal detection purposes continues and has become truly panoptic in the twenty first century. The inclusion of digital cameras in mobile (or cell) phones is a recent development which promises, in principle, to turn every man and woman into a photo reporter.

SEE ALSO: Benjamin, Walter; Media; Media and Consumer Culture; Methods, Visual; Semiotics; Surveillance

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Pietism

Jean Paul Willaime

The word Pietism is applied to that religious awareness that developed from within Protestantism, in particular in the seventeenth century. It constituted neither a unified theological tendency nor a structured orientation. This awareness expresses a desire for a more intense and practical expression of piety, which has been articulated throughout the ages and in a number of churches. It can be said that Pietism is a reaction to the mundane and intellectualist tendencies of Protestantism, a reaction which stresses the personal religious experience of each believer as well as the mediation of the Bible in everyday Christian behavior. Pietism stems not only from the development and intensification of inner life, but also from the founding of schools, orphanages, and missions. It represents a theology of the heart, which is

relatively indifferent to doctrinal matters and for which the fundamental criterion is authenticity. Sociologically, Pietism is a popular and enterprising movement that crosses a range of diverse Protestant denominations. It is particularly manifest in Lutheranism, Methodism, and in the many revivalist religious movements that have punctuated the history of Protestantism.

Historically, Pietism appeared in German Protestantism in the seventeenth century. Philipp Jakob Spener's book published in 1675, *Pia Desideria* (Pious Wishes), is one of the outstanding works of the period. He encouraged the formation of lay conventicles called *collegia pietatis* in order for male and female believers to grow spiritually and to deepen their faith by means of meetings in the official church (*ecclesiola in ecclesia*). For Spener and his followers, Christianity is not primarily a branch of knowledge, but a way of life that has to be expressed through specific behaviors. In the training of pastors, spirituality is more important than theological ability. The aim of the Pietists is to revive, from within the church, Christian faith and the Christian way of life of each believer. But other more radical Pietists go further in thinking that the true Christian church can be found only in small communities of bona fide believers separated from the established churches. Pietism is a kind of protest, developed from the Protestant church, against the fossilization of Christian life in dogmatic orthodoxy and routine liturgy, and for a revival of faith understood as sentiment and action.

Pietism was not only a resurgence of religious sentiments. It operated through many charities and its social and cultural influence was important. The two most important areas where Pietism was active were in Germany, in the faculty of theology at the University of Halle dominated by the work and teachings of A. H. Francke (1663–1727), and the University of Württemberg, where the theologian J. A. Bengel (1687–1752) was known for his notion of biblical sciences (Engels particularly criticized the “Württemberg Pietism”). Francke founded the University of Halle and developed an educational, social, and cultural movement through “foundations” (orphanages, a book shop, schools, a publishing house, and a Bible society). He also founded a printing house which distributed many millions of Bibles

throughout the eighteenth century. He also set up the first Protestant missions in India and supported the first Protestant missions to the Jews. Bengel illustrates the relationship between Pietism and biblical sciences; he established a new Greek edition of the New Testament and its translation.

One other important figure in Pietism is Count Nikolaus Ludwig von Zinzendorf (1700–60), who welcomed religious refugees to his estate in Upper Lusatia, notably the descendants of the pre Reformation Hussite movement, the Moravian Brethren. He founded religious communities characterized by a number of acts of piety. He wanted to gather Christians into an ecumenical society transcending all confessional divisions. Pietism developed particularly in Prussia under the reign and with the support of King Friedrich I (1713–40). The relationship of *Aufklärung* (Enlightenment) to Pietism was complex – far from being mere opposites, they shared some affinities: the Pietist promotion of a religion centered on the “heart and actions” did not appear strongly opposed to the importance given to individuality and reason.

Pietism had considerable influence because of the charitable work it conducted in missions, the distribution of Bibles, and its educational and charitable institutions. Through such dynamism, Pietism clearly manifested traits that emphasized a practical Christian nature. Nevertheless, it generated moralism and an elitist conception of Christianity based on the good deeds carried out by its followers. Criticized for its anti intellectualism and the strong sentimental character of its view of the Christian faith, Pietism always had strong opposition; for example, in Württemberg, where it is still present in spite of the vehement and continued resistance from the faculty of theology at the University of Tübingen. The faculties of theology in Wittenberg and Leipzig were anti Pietist, too, while that of the University of Königsberg was pro Pietist. That is to say that Pietism created turmoil within religious and secular spheres: not only were theologians and the clergy divided into Pietist and anti Pietist factions, but parishioners and city councils were as well.

Through its influence and through what it embodies, Pietism has widely surpassed German Protestantism and Lutheranism. It

appeared also in the Reformed Church (e.g., in Bremen). Several Pietist tendencies, while condemning infant baptism and promoting adult baptism, resemble Baptist and Puritan concepts. For example, the Brethren churches are a synthesis of Pietism and Anabaptism. With different varieties according to countries and churches (Reformed, Baptist, Methodist, Pentecostal), many elements of Pietism can be found in the different revival movements throughout the history of Protestantism. The same opposition occurred over and over between those who advocated a revival within the established church and those who argued for the need to establish other churches. However, these sensibilities, which advocated a more pious sense of Christianity, subsequently clashed with more liberal and accommodating ones, as well as with orthodox attitudes such as those associated with Lutheranism, Calvinism, Baptism, and so on. All of these were generally alert to religious experience and sensitivity as being the criteria of authentication of the Christian faith. This is true in both doctrinal and moral domains. Today, it can be said that most characteristics of Protestant Pietism are present in Evangelicalism, which emphasizes personal conversion, piety, and a rigorous way of life. Moreover, like Pietism, Evangelicalism is transdenominational. As Martin (2005) wrote, one can trace a genealogy from Pietism to contemporary Pentecostalism.

SEE ALSO: Christianity; Protestantism; Religion

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place

Leslie Wasson

The concept of place is used three ways in sociology. First, there is the microsociological concept of place as a material location: a fixed, bounded site which can be identified with a particular set of situated expectations and behaviors. A second use of the term refers to the identification or attachment an individual develops to a particular location, usually geographical, which has an influence on his or her ongoing self identity. A third use of the term refers to the niche in the social stratification system in which the individual belongs.

It also would be possible to confuse the term place with the very similar term space. However, these are different ideas (Gieryn 2000; Tuan & Hoelscher 2001). Place refers to a specific location in the physical or cultural world and the attributes of that setting or niche. Space refers to the amount of physical or social distance that is maintained among the social actors.

PLACES OF SITUATED INTERACTION OR IDENTITY

In the first use of the term place, much interaction theory rests on the pioneering work of Erving Goffman (1959, 1961, 1963) and his development of dramaturgical theory. Goffman's treatment of social settings as staging areas for the enactment of social scripts demonstrated the importance of places in the social construction of reality. Participant observation or fieldwork studies often contain elements of place or setting as integral framing concepts in their analyses. Place characteristics can have a profound effect on the kind of interaction that will occur. This insight has been influential in architecture and urban planning as well as in sociology (Sommer 1983).

Place can be a predictor variable, but it can also be an outcome variable. People's conception of identities they possess already or aspire to can drive the construction or location of the places they inhabit. Pieces of material culture then become important identity or personal history markers (Csikszentmihalyi & Rochberg Halton

1981). The desirability of high status places such as penthouse apartments or the best neighborhoods is another demonstration of the interplay of place and identity.

SENSE OF PLACE OR PLACE ATTACHMENT

In the second sense of place, part of the individual's self concept may derive from his or her socialization or other experiences in a particular geographical location (Stedman 2002). The individual may express nostalgia or homesickness for the prior location, and link its influence to elements of self or social character in the present (Milligan 1998; Wallwork & Dixon 2004). Oldenburg's *Great Good Place* (1999) might be an example of this pattern, or Milligan's (2003) study of employees in a university coffee shop. Place in this sense is composed of more than just the physical elements of the location. It incorporates also the interpersonal attachments, group identities, or community bonds among those persons routinely interacting in that place.

Place in this second sense can be a key variable in larger studies also. Classical community studies such as Lynd's (1959) study of a medium sized American city began with a long description of the place and its characteristics before their exposition of human behavior and belief in that location. Likewise, studies such as Rubin's *Worlds of Pain* (1992) or Gans's *The Levittowners* (1992) emphasize the centrality of the physical place and its components for the emergence of certain kinds of community culture within its boundaries.

SOCIAL STATUS AND KNOWING ONE'S PLACE

In its third sense, place is a cultural or social location rather than a physical setting. Having a sense of social place is especially important when a society is highly stratified. Frequently there are elaborate rituals of deference, acknowledgment, and space use associated with the social place of the individual (Creswell 1996). The distribution of access or resources may hinge upon it (Kitchin 1998). Many a comedy or tragedy in fiction and theater has been based

on accidents or misunderstandings of social place.

Specific effects of social place on interaction may vary across cultures. Tocqueville reported in *Democracy in America* (2001) his astonishment at the practice of Americans addressing each other boldly as equals, even when the individuals were unknown to one another. He contrasted this brashness with the reserve of the British, whom he described as being reluctant or even unable to converse unless they had been properly introduced, and therefore knew each other's social place and the associated interactive conventions.

SEE ALSO: Dramaturgy; Goffman, Erving; Identity: The Management of Meaning; Levittown; Space

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plastic sexuality

Gail Hawkes

The concept of plastic sexuality is developed theoretically by Anthony Giddens (1993). "Plastic" refers to the malleability of erotic expression, in terms of both individual choice and frameworks of social norms. "Flexible sexuality" is argued to emerge in the context of the social changes in late modernity and postmodernity. It stands in contrast to the features associated with modernist sexuality, conceptualized as fixed, by biology or by social norms. "Fixed sexuality" is associated with the binaries of modernity – either heterosexual or homosexual, either marital (legitimate) or extramarital (illegitimate), either committed or promiscuous, either normal (coital) or perverse (anal, autoerotic, sadomasochistic).

For Giddens, plastic sexuality is the consequence of effective contraception, of the economic and social independence of women that also "liberated" men from the constraints of traditional gender expectations. Plastic sexuality is that which can be shaped according to individual erotic needs and wants. It can also serve as a marker of individual identity and/or as the means by which to make radical sexual

demands. Thus, the consequence of disengaging sex from reproduction is to increase the emphasis on pleasure and decrease the emphasis on phallic sexuality.

Giddens's key claim for plastic sexuality is that it is "autonomous" sexuality. It is emancipatory in its positive potential, a potential that is equally representative in the parallel development of a "pure relationship." This is conceptualized as the postmodern prototype of a new form of intimacy. It is "pure" because it is subject primarily to the needs and wants of the individuals involved. It is defined by these needs, and lasts only so long as they are being met by both parties. It may be married and heterosexual but can equally involve same sex love and intimacy. The correlation between plastic sexuality and the pure relationship is, Giddens argues, partly causal. Through such pure relationships the gender imbalance of power can be neutralized, since the emphasis is on erotic parity and equality of involvement. The place for plastic sexuality in such a relationship is central, since it emphasizes the importance of erotic rights and of the close relationship between erotic expression and individual identity.

Giddens recognizes some limitations to the positive potential of this process. First, that the focus on sexual pleasure does not necessarily defuse the gendered definition of eroticism. He uses pornography, hard and soft, to illustrate how, in this "normalization" of commodified sexual pleasure, the "malleability" of sexual desire and pleasure remains defined through the gaze of the desiring and active man. Second, there may be a tension in the foundation of the pure relationship – equality and parity – and the "rights" implied by the concept of plastic sexuality to adjust one's sexual expression to suit individual needs.

These limitations have been recognized and developed by Lynn Jamieson (1998), who argues that the optimism of Giddens's analysis is overstated. His theory fails to address the persistence of gender and class inequality that militates against the possibility of meaningful engagement with lifestyle choice and individualized self-expression. She cites a range of data gathered in studies of family and intimate relationships in the UK, Australia, and the US that indicate that traditional gendered expectations

persist within the more flexible negotiated forms of intimacy. Jamieson's more pessimistic interpretation of plastic sexuality identifies "rampant self-obsessive individualism" as a destructive rather than a creative dynamic in intimate relationships.

A more optimistic interpretation of plastic sexuality has been developed recently by Bech (1999), Roseneil (2000), Budgeon & Roseneil (2001), and Weeks et al. (2001). These authors ground their optimism in a wider interpretation of the dynamics involved in the concept. Bech (1999) identifies the "normalization" of the homosexual and Roseneil (2000) the destabilizing of the hetero/homosexual binary of modernity. While these works emanate from queer scholarship, their focus is on the fragility of heteronormative categories of sexual and intimate relationships exposed by the positive dynamic involved in the "queering of the social" (Budgeon & Roseneil 2001). Individuals are increasingly making reflexive choices about the role of sexuality and sexual identity that are creating new ways of interacting with or without more traditional notions of "sexuality."

These authors identify the weakening of the "sex/love" bedrock of heteronormative relationships, and instead use research findings to illustrate the replacement of romantic couplings of the heterosexual norm with more flexible and agentic friendship networks that may or may not include sexual intimacy. These new forms of intimacy invest agency and choice that, while empowering individuals, simultaneously create a new social terrain within which to negotiate new forms of intimacy that transcend the former normative distinctions between homosexual and heterosexual relationship priorities and patterns.

SEE ALSO: Bisexuality; Heterosexuality; Homosexuality; Intimacy; Lesbianism; Postmodern Sexualities; Transgender, Transvestism, and Transsexualism

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play

Thomas Henricks

Within the social sciences, play has been an especially difficult phenomenon to define and study. Some scholars have described play as a pattern of individual behavior or social interaction, which features competition, improvisation, and fantasy. Others have emphasized play as a pattern of experience or awareness. By that standard, some participants in a shared activity may be playing while others are not. Still other researchers have focused on the cultural frameworks or scenes of play, with the understanding that all that happens within those settings should be deemed playful. Such settings frequently include games and sports; gambling; festivals, parties, and masquerades; artistic and musical expression; daydreams; jokes, rhymes, and storytelling; teasing and other forms of disrespect; rough and tumble behaviors, dramatic role performances, and adventurous pursuits like caving and skydiving. In that light, many of the daily activities of young children are characterized as play; and playfulness is considered to be an important trait of various species of mammals.

Early theories of play emphasized the unique nature of the activity and posited the functions of play for individual and species survival (see Ellis 1973). Such explanations pointed to play's role in satisfying imitative instincts, training

the young, exercising self restraint, and establishing patterns of dominance and submission. Perhaps the most fully developed portrait of play was offered by the Dutch historian Johan Huizinga in his book *Homo Ludens* (1955). Huizinga characterized play in the following terms. (1) Play is a relatively free or voluntary behavior in which participants set the terms and timing of their involvement. (2) Play differs from routine or ordinary life in that it exhibits few consequences beyond the event itself. (3) Play is secluded or cut off from other activities by the use of curious rules and procedures, equipment, playing spaces, costumes, and definitions of time. (4) Play combines order and disorder in that players frequently create and employ rules to structure their disruptive or creative ventures. (5) Play features the "secret" gathering of people into groups and activities that may be considered outlandish or trivial by others. Although later scholars have challenged aspects of Huizinga's description, his approach remains important because it emphasizes the extent to which play is a general pattern of human expression that can arise in any public or private activity. Moreover, Huizinga argued that play has served significant social functions in the historical development of societies and that it is as important for adults as it is for children.

More recent theories have described the nature of play as a distinctive quality of relationship between individuals and the conditions of their lives (see Sutton Smith 1997). The developmental psychologist Jean Piaget (1962) argued that play features the conscious effort of people to oppose and manipulate external factors and forces in accordance with their own internal schemes and desires. Through play, children construct and then apply increasingly abstract systems of thought, which they use to comprehend the world and operate within it. In later works, Piaget demonstrated how childhood games are also important contexts for the development of moral reasoning.

This oppositional or assimilative stance of players may be expressed toward cultural objects and patterns (e.g., through inventive processes in science, language, and art), toward aspects of the natural environment (e.g., in forms of physical exploration, assertion, and creativity), and toward social patterns (e.g., through

competitions with others, teasing, role play, and status inversion). Play may even focus on the psychological and physical characteristics of the participants themselves (e.g., in tests of endurance, balance, and mental confusion). In such ways, play explores the boundaries of the world and affirms the capabilities of people to comprehend and control that world in their own fashion (see Erikson 1950).

However, play also features significant emotional and relational components. Traditionally, play has been considered to be an activity that people pursue for personal or experiential reasons rather than for external or instrumental purposes. Even when there are clearly defined goals or end states in play (as in many types of games), these ends are meaningful primarily within the context of the game itself. For such reasons, people at play may feel more deeply focused or engaged – and have stronger feelings of personal control – than they do in other portions of their lives (see Csikszentmihalyi 1990). This search for “optimal” levels of emotional satisfaction or arousal significantly shapes the course of the action. Although play is typically a quite conscious pursuit of sensations and achievements, Freud (1958) emphasized the role of impulsive or even unconscious wishes as determinants of action. These non rational factors, coupled with the unpredictable resistance and response of the objects that are challenged, tend to give play a dialectical, sometimes mysterious, character (see Sutton Smith 1997).

Because of the frequently oppositional or even irreverent attitude of its participants, play should be distinguished from more passive forms of diversion and pleasure seeking, such as eating, bathing, and television viewing. Although play often overlaps with leisure and recreation, it is not their equivalent. Unlike other kinds of personal relaxation and rejuvenation, play is typically a search for unusual or even novel challenges that intrigue participants and drive the action forward. In that light, play is sometimes distinguished from more formally controlled activities like ritual and from manipulative, but instrumental, behaviors like work.

Historically, the interdisciplinary study of play has been influenced strongly by researchers in many disciplines. Psychologists and educational researchers have tended to see play in an

individualistic and somewhat idealized way. Their studies focus typically on the play of children and emphasize how play contributes to patterns of physical, emotional, and intellectual maturation. Additionally, they have explored the role of adults in guiding the growth and self-awareness of children in school, family, sport, and therapeutic settings.

Folklorists have focused on the play of children alone or in informal groups away from adults (see Sutton Smith et al. 1995). Through their collections of the stories, songs, jokes, rhymes, and games of children through the centuries, these researchers have emphasized the darker, non rational side of the experience. In that light, play is a reflection of the persistent tensions of child life and exhibits disruptive, aggressive, and even sexual themes. This emphasis on the special importance of play to young creatures has also been a theme of animal behavior studies.

Anthropologists have focused on the play of adults as well as children in various cultures and subcultures. The close relationship between play and ritual in traditional societies has been well described. In its festive and ceremonial contexts, play activities frequently dramatize prevailing community values and power structures, offer alternative cultural visions, permit the expression of normally forbidden identities and opportunities, and facilitate social bonding among participants in ritual processes (see Handelman 1998).

Sociology has also made important contributions to the study of play by highlighting the dialectical or interactional character of play itself, the social causes and consequences of playful activity, and the ways in which formal organization transforms play. Even more generally, sociologists have emphasized the degree to which social and cultural patterns “frame” playful expression.

George Herbert Mead, one of the founding figures of symbolic interactionism, stressed the concept of role play in explanations of the development of self concept. In Mead’s (1934) analysis of the relationship between thought and action, he argued that people exhibit in their own minds an “internalized conversation of gestures” in which they try to anticipate how certain words and behaviors will be received by others. For Mead then, an important stage of

self development is the “play stage,” during which children learn to experience imaginatively and act out dramatically the implications of various roles. This ability to “take the role of the other” is critical to empathetic and informed behavior in the world. A further, more complicated level is the “game stage,” in which children examine their standing in social groups involving many persons and roles. In that sense, role playing games constitute fascinating “social worlds” which players create and explore (see Fine 1983).

Other sociologists pushed forward this view of social life as the interplay of self interested but culturally aware actors. Erving Goffman created a vision of interaction in general as a kind of information game in which people strategically reveal and conceal clues about their character and intentions to others. Goffman was fascinated by play activities (especially dramas and contests) as metaphors for public behavior; but he was also concerned with the orderliness of play and with the ways in which that activity is framed by cultural devices. In that context, Goffman (1961) analyzed how people create and enforce norms to define the action, protect it from interference, and focus the attention of participants. Among these structures are what he called “transformation rules,” devices to help players deal with distractions and interruptions that do arise. In such ways, Goffman argued, play is not so much a spontaneous activity as a clearly understood type of behavior that people anticipate and then perform with assurance. However, the play world is also a delicate “bubble” of social commitments that must be protected and maintained with care.

This view of play as behavioral form was developed most brilliantly by Georg Simmel in an essay on sociability as the “play form” of association. Simmel (1950) explained that social gatherings like parties or festivals follow their own generally understood logics to which participants submit. For example, guests at a fancy dress party are aware that they should support a collective spirit of generosity, courtesy, and buoyant good will. Matters that are too personal, abstract, or morally urgent should not be central elements of conversations. Moreover, people should appear only as stylized versions of themselves, i.e., in the role of guest

or attendee. For both Simmel and Goffman then, play offered fascinating glimpses of how people construct and maintain social order in settings that are exceedingly fragile and fluid. Furthermore, their shared emphasis on the reserved, fragmentary, and quasi personal participation of players has been an important correction to psychological approaches.

Other sociologists have emphasized the placement of play within the historically developing context of society itself. For example, Max Weber argued that a hallmark theme of western civilization – the abstract, calculating approach to life he termed “rationalization” – was transforming every aspect of culture including playful and expressive activity. In a book on music, Weber (1958) showed how such cultural inventions as the development of the octave and the movement and fixing of tones within it, systems of written notation, and the standardization of musical instruments led to profound changes in playing. These changes included the development of complicated harmonies, the rise of highly organized “symphonies,” and prominent roles for the writers and conductors. In that sense, an older, innovative style of playing became replaced by more precise and merely interpretive styles.

However, Weber was also aware that expressive behavior might develop as a reaction to the wider bureaucratization of culture, as in the case of jazz or other forms of modern music. That view has been developed by other sociologists, including Elias and Dunning (1986), who argued that modern societies are animated by a “quest for excitement” arising from the more socially controlled, purportedly civilized conditions of many people’s lives. This issue – whether play activities tend to be reflections of personal and social life or pointed reactions to it – continues to be an important one for the study of play.

By emphasizing the social contexts of play, sociologists have challenged Huizinga’s conception of the relative isolation and voluntarism of play. Play activities are frequently sponsored and controlled by social groups pursuing interests different from those of the players. Play in these settings is often colored by external, material incentives. This is especially apparent in the case of games, which represent culturally organized – and often socially competitive – frameworks

for playful endeavor. Moreover, access to the playground often is not entirely voluntary or “free” but rather is regulated by a host of economic, social, and political restrictions (see Henricks 1991). Thus, the sociological history of play is as much about processes of exclusion – on the basis of gender, class, race, age, and social affiliation – as it is about the organization and conduct of the participants (see Hargreaves 1994).

Furthermore, sociologists have examined the personal and social consequences of the formal or bureaucratic organization of play. In contrast to most psychologists and educational researchers, sociologists have recognized the negative aspects of highly organized, adult dominated structures for children’s play, especially in the case of youth sport (see Coakley 2004). Under such circumstances, play becomes subordinated to a regime of officials, leagues, record keeping, training procedures, and preoccupations with competitive success. Further complexities are introduced when play becomes display, i.e., when the enjoyment and creative expression of spectators become more important than the event based satisfactions of the players.

This concern with the role of non players in managing the expressive life of others has been developed most highly in Marxian sociology and critical theory (see Maguire & Young 2002). That tradition has emphasized that when expressive behavior is reorganized as a commodity, it no longer reflects or rewards the creativity of its producers. In such instances, traditionally playful activities – such as music, art, sport, or sexual expression – reappear as alienated forms of experience. Furthermore, the highly publicized, spectatorial forms of play may promote various social problems – including the encouragement of artificial allegiances and rivalries, misdirection of collective creativity, and the undermining of broader cooperative visions.

Despite these considerable accomplishments, the sociological study of play continues to be hindered by a commonplace view of that activity as trivial, evanescent, and inconsequential – something more for children than adults. This is surprising in light of the now established understanding that many societies have moved into an advanced industrial stage in which personal expression and leisure activity are central

elements. In that context, it should be noted that postmodernist scholars in literature and philosophy have posited play as a central metaphor of contemporary life (see Spariosu 1989). Like players, people in postmodern settings are said to assert themselves provisionally, continually refashion their identities, and savor what satisfactions they can in cultural contexts characterized by fragmentary and transient meanings.

Future studies of play must return to the challenges set forth by Huizinga more than a half century ago. At one level, this means understanding the nature of play within a more general theory of human expression. Like work and ritual, play is one of the fundamental forms of human behavior; and the responsibility of sociology, as a human science, is to comprehend the meaning of such activity for personal and public identity. Furthermore, Huizinga’s ambition to understand the different ways in which play has been organized historically as well as its functioning in different types of societies remains uncompleted. Finally, studies of play among various categories of people (distinguished by gender, class, age, etc.) and in different contexts (e.g., sports, casinos, amusement parks, video games, playgrounds) must become the basis of a more comprehensive and differentiated understanding of that phenomenon.

SEE ALSO: Goffman, Erving; Leisure; Mead, George Herbert; Play Stage; Postmodernism; Simmel, Georg; Sport; Weber, Max

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play stage

D. Angus Vail

The play stage is one of the three central components of George Herbert Mead's seminal discussion of the social foundation and development of the self. According to Mead, the self has a social genesis which becomes evident if one examines the ways that people develop a sense for their own being as something separate from, but also interdependent with, other people. In essence, the self is situated in the

individual's capacity to take account of him/herself. By examining children's styles of play, followed by the games they play, one can see how they develop a capacity to take into account not just the role of a singular other person, but also eventually the roles of many people simultaneously. It is only once a person has reached this stage of development that she or he is said to have developed a complete self. Mead (1962 [1934]: 150, 152–4) first addressed the stage of development he called the play stage.

Mead's discussion of the play stage begins with his assertion that children at this stage *play at* specific roles rather than enacting complex relationships. Thus, a child at this stage *plays at* roles of a significant person such as a police officer or nurse or parent. In playing at these roles, children mold their behavior to the set of roles that they tend to associate with the target of their play. Thus, in playing at being a parent, they may send a bad Barbie or GI Joe to her or his room for being naughty. In playing at being another person, they do not have to take account of the varying, divergent, and malleable roles that may become more visible in group settings. According to Mead, this suggests that the child has yet to develop a full sense of his or her effect on social settings. It also suggests that the child is capable of taking the role of the other and is thus coming to realize that she or he is a social animal. It further suggests that the child is developing a capacity to take account of him/herself.

The nature of playing at a particular role also has a temporal character to it. It involves the child's switching alternately between the role of the other and his or her self. Borrowing from Mead, when a child plays "store," she may "pay" for her groceries while playing at being the customer and subsequently "give change" while playing at being a clerk. The temporal structure of these interactions follows a fairly strict sequential order. Thus, a child at this stage of development is not likely to play at the transaction being interrupted by an irate customer returning smashed eggs; nor will she play at the next clerk showing up for a shift change. Such behavior would require too much subtlety and too far advanced skills at taking the roles of several, if not many, people at the same time. Mead suggests that such skills only

become apparent in the subsequent game stage of development when the child develops a more sophisticated sense of the rules that govern interactions.

SEE ALSO: Mead, George Herbert; Game Stage; Generalized Other; Play; Preparatory Stage; Role; Self

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Playboy

Kim MacInnis

Playboy is a magazine founded by Hugh Hefner in 1953 when Hefner was 26 years old. The magazine was initially created under the company name HMH Publishing Co., Inc., and then went public under the name Playboy Enterprises, Inc. in 1971. *Playboy's* original name was to be "Stag Party," but an outdoor magazine called *Stag* contacted Hefner and informed him of their trademark name. Hefner's co founder and executive vice president Eldon Seller suggested the name *Playboy*, based on a Playboy Automobile Company in Chicago. The first issue of *Playboy* was published in December 1953. The issue sold for \$0.50 and was an immediate success, selling out in a few weeks.

Known circulation was 53,991. According to Hefner, *Playboy* was influenced by the Jazz Age, his strict Midwestern Methodist upbringing, and a response to the post war period, which was described as socially and politically repressive. Additionally, the magazine was inspired by the Kinsey Reports, which focused on the study of sexuality in the United States in 1948. These reports revealed that many Americans were not as conventional as society believed concerning sexual behavior. The Kinsey Reports helped to promote sexual openness. Many scholars such as Kenon Breazeale and Barbara Ehrenreich contend that *Playboy* was inspired by male sociosexual identity crises. Ehrenreich argues that in the 1950s American men revolted against their most prominent role as breadwinner, which largely defined male identity. Men, she contended, needed more than responsibility in their lives, they needed desire. Whether or not Hugh Hefner agreed with this particular assessment, he created the magazine for men.

The *Playboy* logo depicting a profile of a rabbit wearing a bowtie was created by art designer Art Paul for the second issue and is the established trademark. *Playboy* reached its peak in the 1970s with a paid circulation of more than 7 million but has experienced a decline in circulation mainly because of increased competition from *Penthouse* and more current magazines, *Maxim* and *FHM*. The bestselling issue of *Playboy* was the November 1972 issue, which sold 7,161,561 copies. The centerfold was Leno Soderberg and the cover featured the principles of Dharma Art.

Christie Hefner, the daughter of Hugh Hefner, has been the chairperson and chief executive officer for Playboy Enterprises since 1981. She became CEO of *Playboy* in 1988. Playboy Enterprises is located on the 15th and 16th floors of 680 N. Lake Shore Drive, Chicago. *Playboy* is comprised of many facets or divisions. The company has a publishing group responsible for *Playboy Magazine* and Playboy Newsstand Specials. It has an entertainment group responsible for Playboy TV and Spice Television. Playboy Enterprises is a licensing group handling Playboy trademarks on apparel and accessories as well as an online group responsible for Playboy Online, PlayboyStore.

com, Playboy Cyber Club, Playboy Plus, and Playboy.net. Finally, Playboy Enterprises enjoys a College Division responsible for promoting Playboy on Campus. Interestingly enough, the National Library Service for the Blind and Physically Handicapped has published a braille edition of *Playboy* since 1970. This edition includes all the written words in the non braille magazines but no image representations.

Playboy is an adult entertainment magazine characterized as “softcore” pornography. *Playboy* is one of the world’s best known magazines published worldwide; however, it is not welcome everywhere. In most parts of Asia (including China, South Korea, India, Malaysia, Thailand, Taiwan, Singapore, and Brunei) *Playboy* is banned. In the United States, the convenience store chain 7 *Eleven* removed the magazine from its stores in 1986. The store resumed selling the magazine in 2003. The magazine is published monthly and features articles on sport, fashions, consumer goods, and fiction as well as photographs of nude women. Politically, the magazine generally posits a liberal stance on social issues. More than 50 percent of the women featured in *Playboy* are blondes. The first centerfold for *Playboy* was Marilyn Monroe in 1953. Since then there have been a wide variety of celebrities, including sports figures, movie stars, singers, and television stars. Some include Drew Barrymore (January 1995), Charlize Theron (May 1999), Farrah Fawcett (December 1995 and July 1997), women of *Baywatch* (June 1998), Katarina Witt (December 1998), Gabrielle Reece (January 2001), Nancy Sinatra (May 1995), and Debbie Gibson (March 2005).

Sociologically speaking, theoretical stances on *Playboy* vary. Feminist and legal scholar Catharine MacKinnon characterizes *Playboy* as a form of pornography. To paraphrase, she defines pornography as the graphic, sexually explicit subordination of women, whether in pictures or in words: women are presented as dehumanized sexual objects. MacKinnon would argue that *Playboy* fits the bill as far as dehumanizing women in sexual ways is concerned. Additionally, she contends that all pornography encourages and promotes violence against women. Martha Nussbaum criticizes *Playboy* on the grounds that it dehumanizes and sexually objectifies women. She argues that

women are presented as mere objects for sexual enjoyment and are generally valued for little else. Virginia Sapiro examines this argument in *Women in American Society* (2003). She examines the contention by feminist critics that violence against women is central to dominant male definitions of the erotic and that pornography essentially establishes dominance over women. Sapiro claims that very few studies substantiate these claims that pornographic materials may be a contributing factor to violence against women. Alan Soble in *Pornography, Sex, and Feminism* (2002) argues against these claims, basically stating that many feminists are imposing their own perceptions of sexual enjoyment on *Playboy*. Soble claims there is no definitive evidence that *Playboy* causes harm to women. First Amendment critics would be opposed to feminist claims of sexual objectivity, stating that women are free to express themselves in any form they wish, as are corporations that specialize in portrayals of sexuality and the erotic. First Amendment arguments abound in any discussion of pornography and *Playboy* will likely remain in business as long as it is protected by the First Amendment and supported by the American public.

SEE ALSO: Body and Sexuality; Feminism; Gender, the Body and; Gender Oppression; Kinsey, Alfred; Popular Culture; Pornography and Erotica

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plural society

John Rex

Many of the societies which have problems of multicultural governance are former multi ethnic colonies. A theory of such colonial and postcolonial societies draws particularly on the work of J. S. Furnivall and M. G. Smith. According to Furnivall, different ethnic groups in a plural society meet only in the marketplace. This marketplace, however, lacks the characteristics which Durkheim envisaged in his concept of organic solidarity. It lacks the shared values which organic solidarity requires and involves brutal conflict and exploitation. The sense of solidarity on which morality depends is to be found within the different ethnic groups when they go home from the marketplace. Within these groups there is intense solidarity and moral unity. Furnivall worked in Burma but wrote about Java, drawing on the research of Dutch economic theorist Boeke. Boeke wrote that in the economy of Netherlands India "there is a materialism, rationalism and individualism and a concentration on economic ends far more complete and absolute than in homogeneous Western lands" (quoted in Furnivall 1939: 452). As he sees it, this is a capitalism quite different from that which grew slowly over hundreds of years and maintained its moral roots.

M. G. Smith wrote originally about Grenada but his theory of the plural society has been widely used in the analysis of colonial and postcolonial societies in the Caribbean. Smith is aware of the general sociological theory of Talcott Parsons and its assumption of four mutually supportive institutions. In the Caribbean, however, he argues that there are several coexisting ethnic groups, each of which has a nearly complete set of social institutions. Setting his argument within the context of a review of social anthropological theories used in studying the Caribbean, he sees the various ethnic groups as having their own family systems, their own productive economies, their own languages and religion, but not their own political system. In the political sphere they are all controlled by one dominant segment. To put this in more concrete terms, blacks are

descended from slaves, Indians from indentured laborers. The groups have remained distinct and have their own institutions. They exist, however, politically under the domination of an outside power. Thus the defining feature of a plural society is seen as this process of the domination of all ethnic groups by the colonial power. New problems arise when the colonial power withdraws. Whereas Furnivall sees the different ethnic groups as bound together by the economic fact of the marketplace, Smith sees them as bound together by a political institution, the colonial state.

One crucial institution in the Caribbean was the slave plantation. The history of plantations is traced by Max Weber in his *General Economic History* to the manor. But the Caribbean slave plantation comes into existence when capitalism directs horticultural production to the market. Similar developments occur in mining. M. G. Smith's theory has to take account of this. In fact, he sees the plantation as one form of political institution. Smith collaborated with the South African Leo Kuper in producing a series of essays on Africa and also turned his attention to the United States in his book *Corporations and Society*. The case of South Africa is of special interest, calling for an analysis of a society based upon rural labor migrating to the gold mines. The United States has developed as neither homogeneous nor plural but heterogeneous.

Smith has to deal with the question of social class. This is easy enough for he has only to say that each group has its own internal class structure. He does, however, have to compare his own theory to that of Marx. He cannot accept that group formation occurs between those having the same or different relations to the means of production, nor that "in the social production of the means of life men enter into circumstances which are independent of their will." For Smith the culture of ethnic groups in a plural society is not simply determined in this way. The plural segments in colonial society operate according to a different dynamic which it is the purpose of plural society theory to explain.

Rex has attempted to set out a theory of the plural society which does justice to Marxian and other theories as well as those of Smith. This involves first of all recognizing that such

societies go through several phases of development, precolonial, colonial, and postcolonial. In the colonial phase relations to the means of production are important, even though they are more varied than Marxist categories suggest, involving such structures as the *encomienda* in Spanish America. At the same time, however, groups have a relationship to each other reminiscent of the medieval estate system in Europe, different groups having the cultures, rights, and privileges which attach to their function. In the postcolonial phase there would be, according to this theory, a number of developments. One would be the subordination of peasants to the large estates or *latifundia*, a second would be the replacement of the former colonial power by a group able to take over its powers, a third would be a change in which new, primarily economic centers replaced the colonial power. So far as resistance and struggle within the new system are concerned, Fanonism lays emphasis upon the national struggle, which would take precedence over class struggle.

The application of plural society theory to capitalist societies based upon mining produces a different set of problems. There rural agricultural reserves are expected to provide social backup so that males of working age can live in segregated compounds or locations and be intensively exploited. This is a situation very much like that described by Furnivall.

SEE ALSO: Apartheid and Nelson Mandela; Colonialism (Neocolonialism); Conflict (Racial/Ethnic); Decolonization; Indigenous Movements; Multiculturalism; Pluralism, American; Pluralism, British

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pluralism, American

Joseph Gerteis

Pluralism refers to the condition of living amid diversity and also to a positive appreciation for that condition. The many similar metaphors describing America as a “melting pot” of different cultures or a “nation of nations” recognize both the historical fact of diversity and its role in shaping the American national character (see Kohn 1961). “What then is the American, this new man?” asked Jean de Crèvecoeur in an often quoted passage from *Letters from an American Farmer* (1782): “He is either a European or the descendent of a European, hence that strange mixture of blood, which you will find in no other country . . . Here individuals are melted into a new race of men, whose labours and posterity will one day cause great changes in the world” (cited in Gleason 1980: 33).

Crèvecoeur emphasized both ethnic difference and cultural solidarity. From the many come *one*; into the melting pot go many different elements, but out comes a single, homogenized alloy. However clearly this new, emergent solidarity appears in such formulations, it has never been taken for granted. The fact of difference has always been central to the American national self image, yet there has also been a persistent tension between the recognition and appreciation of difference and a desire for a coherent national culture. By 1915, Horace Kallen painted this tension as one of the central issues for American society in his essay “Democracy Versus the Melting Pot.”

Conceptually, pluralism and assimilation have thus been defined against one another, however much they have coincided in practice. Assimilation – or “Americanization” in an older language – deals with difference by insisting that newcomers or outsiders blend into the dominant

society. It should be said that this does not necessarily constitute a rejection of those who are different so much as a rejection of the cultural differences that they bring; it insists on a common cultural “core” shared by all members of the society (Alexander 2001; see, e.g., Schlesinger 1991; Huntington 2004). From the pluralist viewpoint, cultural difference is something to appreciate on its own terms. In the past two decades, the term “multiculturalism” has come into vogue as a way to describe the multilayered social differences that are so obvious in modern life as well as the demands for recognition that have surrounded them. At the same time, the modern debate over multiculturalism is simply the latest incarnation of this longstanding tension.

The successive waves of immigration have been at the center of this tension. In a review essay, Gary Gerstle (1997) has pointed out that while an early generation of immigration scholarship emphasized cultural incorporation and assimilation, newer work has accentuated the difficulties that have always gone along with the religious, ethnic, and cultural differences that immigration brings. Whichever way the scholarly literature has blown, this balance between difference and solidarity has always been fragile.

Early on, a figure such as Benjamin Franklin could praise plurality in the abstract as part of the national character, and yet complain privately about German immigrants to Pennsylvania who he thought to be unassimilable. “This will in a few Years become a German Colony: Instead of their Learning our Language, we must learn theirs, or live as in a foreign country,” he wrote (cited in Kohn 1961: 143). Later waves of European immigrants were themselves initially seen as problematic, but within a few generations they were often accepted as “white” (Jacobson 1998; Barrett & Roediger 2002). Other groups have posed a more enduring problem for the assimilationist paradigm. Hostility toward Chinese immigrants was manifest in sharp cultural and legal forms of exclusion (see Takaki 2000). Gunnar Myrdal and his co authors noted the contradiction between the “American creed” of freedom and equality and the blatantly unequal treatment of African Americans as the most obvious challenge; this discrepancy remains a central problem for

modern debates (Myrdal 1996 [1944]; Glazer 1997).

Although pluralism has been broadly defined in opposition to assimilation, it is worth noting that at least three different models of pluralism have been put forward in the scholarly literature (Hartmann & Gerteis 2005). Perhaps the most commonly referenced types are what might be termed “cosmopolitan” and “fragmented” models. Both place much less emphasis than does the assimilationist paradigm on a common cultural “core” that must be shared by all. The difference is that the fragmented version emphasizes instead the different, discrete cultures of the society’s component groups (Portes & Rumbaut 2001). The cosmopolitan version does not focus on cultural constraints but instead on the openness and voluntary nature of both group affiliation and personal identity in a “hyphenated” society (Walzer 1990; Hollinger 2000). A third “interactive” model insists on recognition of group differences but also that a new form of solidarity might emerge as such differences are incorporated (Alexander 2001; Taylor 2004). In turn, the nature of the common cultural core is itself transformed.

SEE ALSO: Acculturation; *American Dilemma, An* (Gunnar Myrdal); Assimilation; Ethnicity; Melting Pot; Multiculturalism; Plural Society; Pluralism, British; Race; Race (Racism)

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pluralism, British

Trevor Hogan

The civil societies of most modern nation states in the world today are "pluralist" if by this we mean the linguistic, ethnic, and subjective dimensions of culture. Cultural definitions of pluralism, however, address neither social factors of hierarchy, status, and power nor the politics of managing cultural difference and diversity in representative democracies. Communal democracies (like Malaysia) are different to the pluralist liberal democracies of the new

world such as Canada and Australia. Arguments about political pluralism as normative goal and practice have largely emanated from liberal democratic societies. British and American pluralism are the two leading examples across the last century.

British pluralism is a critique of the authority and structure of the modern state. American pluralism, in contrast, is a theory of political competition in which organized interest groups seek, but cannot attain, a monopoly of state power. American pluralism as theory and practice is more widely known and debated across the globe, especially during the post World War II and Cold War period (see especially Robert A. Dahl). British political pluralism, however, in its proposals for the dispersal of the modern state, arguably offers more succor to those committed to the extension of liberal democracy.

British pluralism first emerged as a radical current of thought amongst socialists, Christians, anarchists, and social liberals between 1880 and 1920, partly in response to the rise of the labor and cooperative movements and the challenge of managing an emergent representative democracy that was also the most extensive and largest empire in world history. Key thinkers included the legal theorist and historian F. W. Maitland, the philosopher John Neville Figgis, and the social and political theorists Harold Laski and G. D. H. Cole. Whilst very different thinkers in style and focus, they shared a common interest in law, political institutions, and theory, and in practical forms of social life and democracy. They combined his torical arguments (pluralists were important for reviving an understanding of medieval law and forms of civic association in Britain and in continental Europe) and a philosophical defense of civil society vis à vis a theory of the state. In particular they were wary of the capacity of states to become tyrannical even in representative democratic societies and were critical of the logic of the will of the majority. The epicurean, Christian socialist monk Figgis, in particular, showed that, in both sociohistorical and analytical terms, the state is derivative of the politics of association, and not vice versa. That is, the state does not grant license to social organizations but rather must codify its laws in such a way as to protect the rights of political association over and against the state's

obligation to abstract entities such as “the people” (collective and individual). Group life is intrinsic to individual welfare and precedes it both in practical and in ideal terms. Both Cole and Laski endeavored to show how state power could be dispersed to reflect not only territorial but also functional needs at all levels of the life of society in ways that reflect the specific and diverse interests of citizens.

British pluralism, as a movement and research program, was obliterated in the 1920s and 1930s partly because of its own failed experiments in guild socialism and social credit schemes, but also by the Great Depression and the rise of communist, fascist, and social democratic ideologies and governments. It remained in obscurity until the late twentieth century, when the Oxford political scientist, Anglican priest, and Christian socialist David Nicholls (1994 [1975]) first began to recover its arguments. It was Paul Q. Hirst, the post Marxist social and political theorist at Birkbeck College, London, however, who most clearly developed political pluralism for contemporary reappraisal in the last two decades of the twentieth century. After putting the first generation of British pluralists back into print in *The Pluralist Theory of the State* (1989), Hirst developed a political pluralist critique of representative democracy in *Representative Democracy and its Limits* (1990), and then constructed a positive set of principles, policies, and programs for developing political pluralism as a viable and workable option in modern complex societies in *Associative Democracy* (1994; see also Cohen & Rogers 1995). In this retrieval and extension of the arguments of the first generation of British pluralists, we have the agenda of a theory and research program that is ripe for development, but – in the absence of a contemporary equivalent of labor and cooperative and mutualist associations – it is still a program without agents and institutions.

SEE ALSO: Civil Society; Democracy; Nation State; Pluralism; Pluralism, American; State

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poetics, social science

Ivan Brady

Poetics in an Aristotelian sense is a system of normative rules for composition. A more practical and theoretically useful definition is to see poetics as a collection of choices concerning style, composition, and thematics made at different levels by an author or a group (Hallyn 1990: 14). These choices help to determine (and are determined by) aesthetic and related representational interests in speech or writing, or both, that is, by *poesis* – the cognitive process of “being” and “doing” in variable contexts, a dynamic and reflexive process of construction, selection, and representation. The composite is an action plan for constructing the work. Putting it into place in the social sciences begs several problems simultaneously, including the place of aesthetic interests in the subject matter traditionally corralled by social scientists, the points of entry into research, and the visibility of the authors in representations.

A careful study of both conventional scientific inquiry (with its distancing methods) and the more immersive and subjective techniques of artisan frameworks, including poetics, shows that nothing we say can be nested in the entirely new; that the field of experience and representation is by definition both culturally cluttered and incomplete for all of us at some level. Scientific inquiry can help us sort this clutter more or less dispassionately, giving us a glimpse of patterned relationships among things and behaviors. But even when that is done to the best advantage, the results are still in the last analysis plural, imperfect, and

impermanent. Meanings change with changing perceptions of environmental circumstances, and science does not cover that well. Science does not give us ordinary reality, the world we live in *as* we live it through our senses and our culturally programmed intellects. Self-conscious immersion has a better chance of getting at a realistic account of such experiences primarily because of its devotion to sensuous particulars. Poets are potentially expert *re* presenters who offer comparative experiences in a commonly held domain, that of the active body itself, and the ultimate aim of poetic expression is to touch the universal through the particular – to evoke and enter into discourse about the sublime, to move the discourse to what defines us all, what we share as human beings. Poetry is necessarily about all of us.

Poetry is also perhaps the most conspicuous or unexpected form for representing aesthetic, social, and ethnographic concerns in the social sciences. It can be verse or prose, of course, and it is not by any means confined to entertainment interests. No subject is beyond its reach, internal or external, in the life of the mind or the quotidian realities of whole societies (e.g., see Brady 2003a; Hartnett 2003; Hartnett & Engels 2005). This argument applies to everything we think and do – to every interpretation (and therefore every representation), from the maskings of rituals to the revelations of things in dreams – from cradle to grave, everything, every waking moment. Bracketed against more scientific modes of inquiry and representation, poetry shows itself as another way to encode and share the foundations of such experiences. It can ground theories of the world that actually involve interactions with it, not just abstractions from it. Instead of writing or talking exclusively about their experiences through abstract concepts, as one might do in applying productive scientific theory, trying to make language as invisible as possible while focusing on the objects of scientific expressions, poets report more concretely, *in* and *with* the facts and frameworks of what they see in themselves *in relation to* Others, in particular landscapes, emotional and social situations. They aim for representation from one self-conscious interiority to another in a manner that flags the language used as proprietary, finds the strange in the everyday, and takes us out of ourselves for a

moment to show us something about ourselves in principle if not in precisely reported fact, thereby contributing at one level or another to the whole of our knowledge about any experience.

Because multiple interpretations of the same phenomena are always possible, it follows that any theory that purports to explain or predict everything about particular human behaviors is not actually attainable, at least not by consensus. Methodological pluralism is the key to robust accounts in the social sciences today, especially where an exclusive focus on behavior gives way to the relationship between behavior and meaning as the object of study (Brady 1998). There will always be a plurality or “surplus” of meaning in what we experience, classify, or otherwise try to explain. We can also come to know these things in many ways (Brady 1991, 2003a, 2004, 2005). No single method or genre of thought can conquer it all. The problem is choosing among the alternatives – or worse, having someone choose for you, as a matter of convention, applying political pressure to standardize your work according to the “received” view of social science methods, journals, and funding agencies. That undermines creativity by setting arbitrary limits on both research and reporting modes. Moreover, since every newly established interpretation becomes in its appearance and recognition a source for a new reading, a reopening, the role of the observer (reader, interpreter, writer) in the analytic equation cannot realistically be avoided.

It follows that close interpretations of speech, written texts, or whole societies must be infused at some level with self-conscious accountability for satisfactory results, that is, with *more than* scientific forms of interpretation. Among other considerations, there is a need for cultivating the actor’s point of view, ours as observers and participants, and, insofar as it can ever be ascertained, that of the people we study. This is consistent with the need to discover and examine critically all of the ways a subject can be represented. In that diversity the social science poet finds a measure of truth. Unafraid of sensual immersions, subjectivities, mutual constructions of meaningful relationships, political accountability, authorial presence in texts, and sometimes deliberately fictionalized realities

that “ring true,” poetic rendering is more than another way of telling (writing or speaking). It is another way of interpreting and therefore of knowing the nature of the world and our place in it, some of which is not available to the same extent, in the same form, or at all through other means (Brady 2003a, 2003b, 2004). Privileging one form to the exclusion of the other as Truth for all purposes is to be satisfied not only with one tool for all jobs, but also with the politics of the moment, in and out of the academy. Softening or solving such problems (e.g., by reaching beyond analytic categories whose only reality lies in the minds and agreements of the researchers themselves) matters if we are ever going to get a handle on the realities of the people we study – the universe *they* know, interpret, and act in as sentient beings. These things escape only at great cost to understanding ourselves, how we are articulated socially and semiotically, how we construct our Selves as meaningful entities, in our own minds and in relation to each other, and what that contributes to acting responsibly on a shrinking planet.

For these reasons and others, the entrance point for modern ethnography and related kinds of studies is probably best served by some combination of humanistic and scientific designs – in the realm of “artful science” (Brady 1991, 2000, 2004). At the center of this methodological pool are two prospects put nicely in a plea from cognitive scientist Raymond Gibbs, Jr., namely, learning to recognize the poet in each of us and cultivating the simple fact that “*figuration is not an escape from reality but constitutes the way we ordinarily understand ourselves and the world in which we live*” (1994: 454, emphasis added), no matter what the discipline. Conjectural mentalities and metaphor itself, the raw material for poets everywhere and a tool of and for discovery in what we study, are fundamental to human life, including all of our arts and sciences.

SEE ALSO: Culture; Investigative Poetics; Theory; Theory and Methods

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pogroms

Joanna Michlic

The term pogrom came into widespread use in Russia in the late nineteenth century. Originally it defined an organized massacre for the destruction or annihilation of any group of people. Since 1905–6, in the English speaking world, it evolved into a term chiefly used to describe any riots directed against Jews in the

modern era. Both in Russia and the West the term pogrom came to connote “official planning and collusion,” and was contrasted with the term riot defined as spontaneous strife or disorder on the part of the populace. It has recently been argued that neither the term riot nor pogrom effectively captures the dynamics of the most violent occurrences involving large crowds, which tend to share the features of both definitions: elements of organization and planning on the one hand, and spontaneity on the other hand (Brass 1996).

The most extensively researched anti Jewish riots are the pogroms of 1881–2, which swept the southwestern provinces of the Russian Empire. These pogroms are widely regarded as the major turning point in modern Jewish history. Among Jews, the pogroms prompted disillusionment with a solution to the Jewish Question based on civic emancipation and social integration. They resulted in new forms of Jewish politics of a nationalist type, such as Zionism, and the growth of socialist organizations aimed at Jewish proletarians. The Russian state, in turn, moved away from policies designed to promote Jewish acculturation and integration. There were approximately 250 pogroms, varying greatly in length and severity. They produced about 50 fatalities, of whom a half were the perpetrators killed during the suppression of the riots. Both the Russian government and society at the time depicted the pogroms as a popular protest against “Jewish exploitation” in the countryside. This assumption inspired legislative efforts (the so called “May Laws” of 1882) to segregate peasants and Jews by driving the latter out of the countryside. These measures did not prevent additional pogroms in March 1882, most notably in Balta (Podolia province). There was also a large pogrom in Warsaw on December 25, 1881, and serious but one off pogroms in Ekaterinoslav (1883) and Nizhnyi Novgorod (1884).

The pogroms of 1881–2 gave rise to a host of assumptions that became firmly established in the historical scholarship on anti Jewish violence in modern Russia: (1) that the pogroms were instigated, tolerated, or welcomed by Russian officials, on the national, provincial, or local level; (2) that the pogroms were invariably accompanied by atrocities, including rape and murder; (3) that Jews were always passive,

unresisting victims, at least until Jewish socialists organized armed self defense in the early twentieth century; (4) that, especially in the twentieth century, pogroms were an officially inspired effort to divert popular discontent against the Jews, “to drown the Russian revolution in Jewish blood”; (5) that the great wave of Jewish out migration from the Russian Empire in the quarter century before the Great War was prompted by pogroms and restrictive legislation. Since the 1980s, all of these assumptions have been questioned by new scholarship (Aronson 1990; Klier & Lambroza 1992; Rogger 1986).

The anti Jewish riot of 1903 in Kishinev, then the capital of Bessarabia province, has also been extensively analyzed in the historical literature. It also inspired a classic work of poetry by Chaim Nachman Bialik, “The City of Slaughter,” written in Hebrew and Yiddish versions, which led to the creation of the legend of the Kishinev pogrom. The Kishinev pogrom, which broke out during Easter Week, and claimed at least 49 victims, gained greater notoriety than virtually any other anti Jewish riot in the Russian Empire. It discredited Russia abroad and reenergized all forms of Jewish political activity. As in the case of the anti Jewish riots of 1881–2, the same major assumptions that the local government was responsible for organizing the pogrom and that the Jews were passive, non resisting victims were made in the historical analysis in the first half of the twentieth century. These assumptions have been challenged by recent scholarship.

Another wave of anti Jewish riots discussed in the literature is the violence which accompanied the Revolution of 1905 in Imperial Russia and the attacks on Jews during the Russian Civil War (1919–21). It is recognized that the anti Jewish violence that erupted during the Civil War was the most brutal case, which exceeded any former riotous events in terms of the number of casualties and savagery. The total number of Jewish fatalities during Civil War pogroms is disputed, but certainly exceeded 500,000. There was also immense damage to Jewish property.

Sharp divisions remain on the issue of the causes of and the responsibility for the pogroms. In the past the general tendency was to put forward a monocausal explanation of violence by looking either to anti Semitic ideology or

the need for plunder. Recent scholarship has tended to recognize that these events are the product of multiple causal tendencies, which may be intertwined, so giving rise to new complex explanations and interpretations of the anti Jewish violence of 1918–21. The crystallization of similar approaches can be observed in the recent analysis of anti Jewish violence in Poland between the two World Wars, 1918–39, and during the early post war period, 1945–6, which erupted on the largest scale in Poland, but also occurred in Slovakia and Hungary.

Other developments in the study of anti Jewish violence focus on the mass massacres of the summer of 1941 in Eastern Europe in the aftermath of the Nazi invasion of the Soviet Union. The waves of killings carried out by sections of local populations in Lithuania, the Ukraine, Poland, and Romania brought about new questions concerning the nature of the mass murder of the Jews during World War II and about the reactions of segments of local populations to the Nazi anti Jewish policies. Other questions about the applicability of the word pogrom to these collective massacres and the connection between local anti Jewish riots and the genocidal project the Nazis brought to Eastern Europe are also being asked.

In recent scholarship one can also observe that most of the main approaches to the study of pogroms have been particular, descriptive, and statistical. There is an urgent need for a comparative approach and the contextualization of the pogroms within broader societal developments.

SEE ALSO: Anti-Semitism (Religion); Anti-Semitism (Social Change); Conflict (Racial/Ethnic); Ethnic Cleansing; Holocaust; Riots; Violence

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Polanyi, Karl (1886–1964)

*James Ronald Stanfield and
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Karl Polanyi was born in Vienna on October 21, 1886 and spent his childhood in Budapest. His formal university studies were in law, which he practiced for a very brief time after graduating in 1910. Informally he immersed himself in the rising tide of radical and modern liberal dissent and engaged in political activities, notably on behalf of the short lived National Citizens' Radical Party, which was formally chartered in June 1914. Polanyi's political and legal career was interrupted by World War I in which he served in the Austro-Hungarian army. Thereafter he began a relationship with the radical activist Ilona Duczyńska, whom he married in 1923.

Polanyi worked as an economic journalist in Vienna from 1924 to 1933, when fascism led him to emigrate with his family, first to England, then to the US. From 1940 to 1943 Polanyi lived in the US, giving guest lectures and holding a visiting scholar's appointment at Bennington College in Vermont. He returned to England for a short period, then returned to the US soon after the end of the war, serving as a visiting professor at Columbia University, where he was co-director (with Conrad Arensberg) of the Interdisciplinary Project on the Institutional Aspects of Economic Growth, which resulted in the very influential *Trade and Market in the Early Empires* (1957). Polanyi's final major project was the founding of *Co-Existence*, an interdisciplinary journal for the comparative study of economics and politics,

dedicated to the cause of world peace through knowledge of the realities of cultural differences and the unity of the human condition. After organizing a distinguished editorial board and seeing the first issue to the printer, Polanyi died on April 23, 1964.

Polanyi was influenced by the powerful historic events from his coming of age to his death – two World Wars, hyperinflation, revolution, global depression, fascism, and Cold War. His idealism was early on evident in his contribution to the socialist economic calculation debate. In sharp contrast to the central focus of the debate on the potential for efficient allocation of resources in a socialist economy, Polanyi's essay in the *Archiv für Sozialwissenschaft* (1922) focused on the moral superiority of socialism. This early concern for the place of economy in society, gleaned from Owen and Marx in his college days, was reinforced by Polanyi's first hand observation of the cataclysm that a poorly instituted political economy can provoke. Polanyi's central interest became the problem of lives and livelihood: the relation of individual and community life to the manner by which the community makes its living – the place of economy in society. Economic behavior or transacting is structured by political and social conditioning and it has political and social consequences.

Lives and livelihood were the central problem of Polanyi's classic *The Great Transformation* (1944) and his influential essay in *Commentary* (1948), "Our Obsolete Market Mentality." He considered the idea of a self regulating economy driven by individual economic interest to be utterly unrealistic and profoundly disruptive of the social order. Polanyi's model of market capitalism consists of a "double movement" in which the extension of market exchange to additional areas of social life is met by a spontaneous socially protective response directed at limiting the self regulating market system to contain its erosion of social and community life. Polanyi referred to the market capitalist economy as disembedded to emphasize that its celebrated impersonal nature means that economic transactions are separated from the traditional moral fabric of interpersonal relationships. The market exchange economy requires social conditioning and legitimation of competitive economic self interest which is ultimately inconsistent

with the social cohesion necessary for orderly social cooperation. The concept of the disembedded economy refers to a tendency for market economic relationships to become superior to the social relationships of kinship and polity.

In his economic anthropology work at Columbia, Polanyi expanded his criticism of the market mentality by developing his criticism of the formalist methodology of economics. He found this approach of taking the economy as a self contained system to be inadequate in its treatment of the modern economy and incapable of guiding the understanding of premodern economies that were organized on the basis of socially structured reciprocity and redistribution transactions. He saw the market pattern to be ultimately receding in the face of the protective response, and formalist economics, an explicit expression of the market mentality, to be incapable of comprehending the past, and therefore unable to guide the imagination of the future. Polanyi argued that a substantive conception of the economy as an instituted process for provisioning society was necessary in these regards.

Polanyi's emphasis on distinguishing the formalist and substantivist conceptions of the economy and his focus on the place of economy in society, the issue of embeddedness, have been influential in economic sociology, economic anthropology, and institutional economics. Polanyi like Marx before him emphasized the place of economy in society, criticized the ethnocentric interpretation of premodern economies, and wrote of the disembedded, socially dominant character of market exchange transactions in the capitalist social order. However, Polanyi's concept of the protective response is a departure from Marx's expectation that the objective conditions of capitalism would clarify the class struggle and more or less resolve social conflict into capital versus labor. Polanyi's analysis suggests that the protective response interferes with the laws of motion of capitalism, thus preventing the realization of the logical tendencies of capitalism that Marx anticipated. Hence various sectoral interests will persist and class identification will never reach the clear division into the two major classes upon which the Marxist teleology depends.

Polanyi may be considered an early post Marxian in that he emphasized the Marxian

concern with lives and livelihood but presented a different conception of the social economic tendencies of market capitalism. He is a fore runner of today's non essentialist Marxism. His existential and ethical view of economic relationships has much in common with postmodernism in its deconstruction of the contentious overbearing themes of economic efficiency and progress that permeate the debate between the left and the right. Polanyi's socialism is not so much political economic as ethical and there is running through it a strong conservative respect for cultural tradition.

SEE ALSO: Community and Economy; Economy, Culture and; Institutionalism; Social Embeddedness of Economic Action

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police

Ivan Y. Sun

Police have been traditionally defined as the social agency of a government that is responsible for maintaining public order and preventing and

detecting crime. This definition emphasizes the social control function that police are supposed to perform in a society. It has been severely challenged, however, mainly because of the finding of a small number of studies conducted in the 1950s and 1960s. Though police are often portrayed as law enforcers and crime fighters, the large scale observational study mounted by Reiss and Black showed that they spend a large amount of their time in handling non crime related incidents (Reiss 1971; Black 1980).

As a result, scholars propose a "force centered" definition of police as an alternative to the conventional approach. Bittner (1980) asserted that police are the main, and sometimes the only, mechanism for the state to distribute non negotiable force in handling emergencies in a society. Similarly, Klockars (1985) argued that it is problematic to define police based on their supposed function. He further explained that the authority of using coercive force given by the state to police entails legal legitimacy and territorial coverage, which distinguish police from other occupations. Klockars (1985) thus defined police as individuals or institutions empowered by the state with the general right to use coercive force within the state's domestic territory.

Why should all modern societies find it necessary to create and maintain such an institution? The necessity for the police lies not only on the distribution of coercive force for disposing of incidents but also on the availability of an agency in handling emergencies *immediately*. Therefore, police are created by the state mainly as a 24 hour available agency to serve public needs.

Major dimensions of police include strategies, discretion, problems, and innovations. Since the establishment of the first modern police department in England in 1829, police have relied heavily on three core strategies in combating crime: preventive patrol by uniformed officers, rapid response to emergency or service calls, and criminal investigation by detectives. Preventive patrol is designed to deter or intercept crime, to increase feelings of public safety, and to make officers available for service (Walker & Katz 2002). Motorized and foot patrol are the most common types of patrol. Other types of patrol include bicycle, motorcycle, marine, and horse patrol. Many departments also adopt a

directed patrol approach, which involves directing officers to spend their uncommitted time in certain areas, utilize certain tactics, and watch for certain types of offenses. Rapid response is thought to have the potential for increasing the probability of an arrest and enhancing citizen satisfaction with the police. Most departments utilize a differential police response method that involves screening incoming service calls and providing different responses to different kinds of calls. Criminal investigation consists of two stages: the preliminary investigation and the follow up investigation. The former is carried out mainly by patrol officers who often locate the suspect and make the arrest at the scene, while the latter is normally handled by detectives who may have to spend more time to solve complex and difficult cases (Walker & Katz 2002).

Since its recognition by the American Bar Foundation (ABF) survey in the 1950s (Walker 1993), discretion has been the focal concern of police reform and research. Discretion may be defined as decisions made by a police officer based on his or her own judgment of the best course of action (Walker & Katz 2002). Police discretion is now widely viewed as inevitable and even desirable. Much attention has thus shifted to the control of police discretion. Better control of police discretion can be accomplished through clear written policies and rules. Major improvements have been achieved by American police regarding control of police discretion in the area of use of deadly force and high speed pursuits (Walker 1993).

Police problems center on two critical issues: use of force and corruption. Although police use of force is relatively rare, it has been the major source of conflict between the police and citizens, especially minorities. Many departments have implemented policies and rules regulating use of force. For example, most departments have a use of force continuum in place, ranking force from low coercive (e.g., verbal command and threaten), to medium (e.g., search and seizure and physical restraint), to high coercive (e.g., arrest and deadly force) and specifying levels of force appropriate for particular situations. The general policy for applying deadly force is called the defense of life rule, which means that deadly force can be used only if the officer's life, the citizen's life, or another

officer's life is in danger. Police use of force remains problematic since perceptions of appropriate levels of force for a particular situation are highly subjective and citizens have little input in the investigation of complaints of excessive force.

Corruption has been a traditional problem for the police. It may be defined as police behavior that involves illegal use or misuse of police authority for personal gain (Sherman 1978). Common forms of corruption include gratuities (e.g., accepting free meals and drinks), bribes (e.g., accepting money for not issuing a speeding ticket), theft and burglary (e.g., stealing drug dealers' money), and internal corruption (e.g., paying for promotions and favored assignments) (Walker & Katz 2002). Police corruption is mainly a result of police working environment and subculture. Corruption may be controlled through internal and external mechanisms, such as writing guidelines, training and education, supervision, early warning systems, federal prosecution, and citizen oversight. It is almost impossible, however, to completely eliminate the problem because of the nature of police work and culture.

Police innovations can be viewed simply as survival tools for police. To survive, police departments need to adjust their philosophy, strategies, and operations in response to external and internal changes and demands. In the United States, for example, since the mid nineteenth century police have evolved from political connected control forces to legal oriented law enforcement organizations to community centered service institutions. Major police innovations over the past century involved professional movements (e.g., selection and training standards adopted by police), technological advances (two way radios and mobile digital units mounted in the patrol cars), and legal compliance (search and seizure laws prescribed by the courts).

The most notable recent innovation for police is community policing (CP). The emergence of CP in the 1980s and 1990s promoted fundamental changes in police operational styles and organizational philosophy and structure. Though CP is currently a worldwide movement, there is no generic form of CP. Police agencies have implemented CP with distinctive orientations, such as problem solving, broken windows, and

community building (Mastrofski et al. 1995). The problem solving model focuses on the use of proactive intervention rather than reactive responses to calls for service, the resolution of root causes rather than symptoms, and the mobilization of multiparty, community based problem solving resources rather than unilateral police response (Goldstein 1979). The broken windows approach calls for more police attention to minor offenses and disorders since they can grow into larger problems that influence "quality of life" in the neighborhood (Wilson & Kelling 1982). The community building model stresses building greater rapport with minority neighborhoods, crime prevention, and victim assistance (Mastrofski et al. 1995).

Research on police conducted since the 1960s has been directed toward two general areas. The first body of research examined the impact of various factors on police behavior. Four main approaches have been utilized, including situational, individual, organizational, and community. Situational explanations argue that police behavior is affected by situational characteristics of police-citizen interactions. Several situational variables, such as crime seriousness, evidence strength, and citizen demeanor, have shown consistent influences on police actions. Individual explanations of police behavior assert that police officers' personal characteristics (race, gender, education, and experience), occupational outlooks, and work assignments influence their behavior during police-citizen encounters. Previous studies of the effect of officers' characteristics on police behavior have concentrated on coercive activities (e.g., arrest and use of force) and have generated mixed results. Situational variables are generally found to have greater explanatory power than individual characteristics.

Organizational explanations suggest that police formal and informal socialization, subculture, command and policies, structure, departmental styles, and other organizational factors affect police behavior. Neighborhood explanations posit that the demographic, economic, and political characteristics of communities, such as racial composition, socioeconomic status, and type of local government, influence police behavior. Despite their potential influences over police behavior, organizational and neighborhood factors have received relatively little

empirical attention and the results are far less than conclusive.

A second line of inquiry focuses on the influence of police strategies and activities on crime. Early studies have focused on the effectiveness of the three main strategies (preventive patrol, rapid response, and criminal investigation). Contrary to what people and police expect, the core strategies of contemporary policing showed no or weak impact on crime rates, victimization, and public satisfaction. Though these studies are severely criticized for methodological shortcomings, the effectiveness of traditional police strategies has not been firmly confirmed. More recent research concerns the effectiveness and efficiency of community policing. The results are generally more encouraging. Community policing has been shown to have positive effects on citizen satisfaction with police and police job satisfaction.

Future research should consider the following areas. First, future research should pay more attention to non coercive police behavior since previous studies have focused predominantly on coercive actions. One may argue that prior research is inadequate in terms of understanding the range and/or effectiveness of police actions in handling incidents since coercive actions are rare events and police routinely utilize non coercive tactics during their encounters with citizens. If non coercive behavior can be clearly defined and measured, then the evaluations of these actions may allow us to capture some what different aspects of police responses from coercive actions.

Second, more research on the influence of organizational factors on police behavior should be conducted. It will be of interest, for example, to explore how and the extent to which changes in departmental policies and procedures resulting from the 9/11 terrorist attack influence officer behavior in the field. More efforts should also be devoted to further develop and test how variations in neighborhood social, economic, and political dimensions influence police behavior. Finally, more cross national analysis of police should be considered. Despite the value of comparative studies, systematic investigation of police across countries has been sporadic. Researchers should examine the effects of variations in national level factors on police operations and effectiveness.

SEE ALSO: Crime, Broken Windows Theory of; Courts; Crime, Hot Spots; Criminal Justice System; Law, Criminal; Organizations as Coercive Institutions; Public Order Crime

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political economy

Francesco Ramella

Political economy refers to a current of study that analyzes the reciprocal influences among economic, social, and political factors and their impact on how activities are regulated in different institutional contexts. Even though historically the origins go back to the birth of economics, over recent decades this subject of study has witnessed a revival in a variety

of scientific sectors. Two aspects characterize this recent tendency: on one hand, a new attention – often in a comparative perspective – to the study of institutions and of the interrelations between economic and sociopolitical phenomena, and, on the other, greater interdisciplinary activity.

That said, the use of the same denomination masks the existence of various analytical perspectives. The term new political economy is used to underline not so much the emergence of a common theoretical framework as renewed interest in a field of inquiry that, because of its very subject, encourages the reopening of dialogue between different disciplinary sectors. The signs of this revival of political economy, limited to some of the more significant developments in the three major disciplines involved – economics, political science, and sociology – are discussed below.

ECONOMICS

An important development in economics is the introduction of the new institutional economics, a theoretical perspective that reintroduces institutions into economic analyses. Unlike the old institutionalism, however, the new version does not place itself as an alternative to mainstream (neoclassical) economics. Nevertheless – thanks to the support of economic history – it widens the analytic perspective toward a comparative reflection on the different modes of organizing economic activities at both a macro and a micro level. This new approach consists of two distinct yet complementary currents. The first concentrates above all on the institutional environment of economics, i.e., on the fundamental political, social, and legal rules that regulate production, exchange, and distribution (Davis & North 1971: 5). The second current – developed by transaction cost economics – studies instead the governance of contractual relations between productive units (through the market, the hierarchy, or hybrid forms). A link exists between these two perspectives because the efficacy of different modes of governance depends not only upon the characteristics of the economic actors, but also upon the institutional context, modeled by history according to the logic of path dependency (Williamson 1994: 95).

Along with the new institutionalism – which has aroused great attention within both economics and the other social sciences – other trends that favor interdisciplinary dialogue are also evident. First is a revival of old economic institutionalism and of evolutionary approaches that underline the role of institutions in economic and technological change and the different trajectories of development of various countries. The same is true for another current of study that, taking up Alfred Marshall's original formulations on industrial districts, concentrates upon the spatial dimension of economic activities, i.e., upon the territorial agglomeration of small and medium sized firms (Pyke et al. 1990). A tendency to reflect on institutions and new scenarios designed by the crisis of Fordism also characterizes the so called "French Regulation School" (Boyer 1990), which concentrates upon the economic impact of various coordination mechanisms (market, state, hierarchy, associations, communities). Finally, interesting developments can be seen in the economics of development and in the resurgence of a new comparative economics that analyzes the different forms of capitalism in developing and advanced countries, as well as in economies in transition. These studies tend to emphasize the importance of socio institutional governance in explaining not only economic performance but also the different results of the transition to capitalism in the former socialist countries (Djankov et al. 2003).

POLITICAL SCIENCE

Within political science, the spread of political economy – mainly in the United States – has assumed the form of an extension of the economic paradigm to the study of political phenomena. The assumptions of the methodological individualism of the neoclassical matrix, with its corollaries linked to the rational and maximizing behavior of individual actors, have been developed in the formulations of game theory, rational choice, and public choice, giving birth to a variegated "economic approach to politics" (Monroe 1991). Even though its diffusion has taken place especially since the second half of the 1970s, the initiating models were developed in the 1950s and 1960s. Several of

the most well known are: the *theory of committees*, which confronts the theme of the relations between individual preferences and procedures of choice within groups; the *theory of political coalitions*, which studies the formation of political alliances on the basis of a size principle, in which actors tend to construct "minimum winning coalitions"; the *spatial theory of voting*, which deals with the logics of electoral competition between parties; and *public choice theory*, which deals with collective decisions considering public policies as the result of the encounter between the demands of citizens (who aim at maximizing their preferences) and the offer of politicians and bureaucrats (who aim at maximizing their power). A series of studies within this latter current – referring to so called political business cycles – seeks to explain the inflationist phenomena of the 1970s in advanced economies. Scholars focused upon the increases in public spending decided by governments with the aim of stimulating the economy and in this way obtaining reelection. In the second half of the 1980s, as a result of contamination with the neo institutionalist current that was affirming itself in political science, there was a partial revision of the economic approach to politics. While still maintaining many of the previous assumptions, the new political economy placed greater emphasis upon institutions, decisional procedures, and the empirical verification of theoretical models (Alt & Alesina 1996).

SOCIOLOGY

In sociology, a different orientation of political economy began to spread, especially in economic sociology, starting from the second half of the 1970s. The paradigm of rational choice gained little ground, especially in Europe, while attention was directed toward the sociocultural and political institutional factors influencing instability of advanced economies. In particular, analysis focused upon the changes in class relations and the delegitimization of social inequalities that were at the base of the distributive conflicts that exploded in many industrialized economies. This current, however, underlined the variable intensity of these conflicts, positioning them in relation to the different social and

political set ups of individual countries. A fruitful convergence of sociological and political studies was thus created. The contraposition of neocorporative and pluralist models of representing interests and decision making assumed particular importance (Schmitter & Lehmbruch 1979).

The neocorporative type (diffused through out the Scandinavian countries and in continental Europe) is characterized by the presence of a few large associations organizing broad economic professional sectors and deciding policies together with governments. In the pluralist type (present in countries like the United States, Great Britain, and Italy), on the other hand, there are many organizations that represent more limited and sectorial interests, carrying out policies of pressure on government agencies. Research undertaken has shown that, during the 1970s, neocorporative arrangements were associated with minor social conflict and more contained levels of inflation and unemployment thanks to their capacity to mediate and hierarchize social questions. The debate over neocorporatism was also strictly interwoven with the comparative study of different welfare state models. In this instance too, there was a prevailing attempt to link the characteristics of systems of protection to social political differences present in the various countries, and then to study their fallout upon development and class inequalities (Esping Andersen 1994). What needs to be underlined is that this first generation of political economy studies in sociology was carried out mainly at the macro (national) level and brought the role of the state and interest groups to the center of analytical reflection.

Starting from the early 1980s, the sociological approach witnessed further developments that dealt with post Fordism models of production, the varieties of capitalism in advanced societies, and the different paths followed by the less developed countries. The first current started from research that dealt with the question of productive readjustment in the phase of post Fordism. After the crisis experienced by many large, vertically integrated firms, more flexible and cooperative enterprise forms were introduced. These are based on network forms of organization concerned with the quality and diversification of products. In brief, this research

brought to light the emergence of a new productive paradigm denominated "flexible specialization" or "diversified quality production" (Piore & Sabel 1984; Streeck 1992). Studies on the so called Third Italy and on industrial districts of small and medium sized firms underlined the territorial character and the *non economic* preconditions of these new systems of production that are strongly embedded in local contexts (Bagnasco & Sabel 1995; Trigilia 2002).

The second current analyzed the variety of capitalist systems, connecting micro and meso level reflections on industrial readjustment with the tradition of study of the different regulation models at the macro level. In this way, two ideal types of contemporary capitalism were identified: the Rhine model, or the so called coordinated market economies, and the Anglo Saxon model of liberal market economies (Soskice 1990; Albert 1991). The Anglo Saxon model (which includes countries such as the US and Britain) is characterized by the greater space given to the market in socioeconomic regulation. In the coordinated economies (which include, other than Japan, many Central and North European countries), on the other hand, the joint action of the political institutions, interest organizations, and banks tends to limit market mechanisms and design more extensive systems of social protection. This literature has analyzed the variable influence of the forms of governance on occupation and economic development during the 1980s and the 1990s. Finally, with regard to the newly industrialized countries, the extraordinary growth in the Asian economies stimulated a strong revival of attention to the complex interrelations between the state and the economy in the processes of development. Thus, in the field of the sociology of modernization, a comparative political economy trend also became established (Evans & Stephens 1988).

To conclude, it is appropriate to mention two present trends in political economy. The first concerns the phenomenon of globalization. In different disciplinary fields, political economic research is spreading, aimed at analyzing the consequences of these processes on international relations, on the regulatory capacity of states, on the varieties of capitalism, and on democratization and the transition of many former socialist economies to capitalism. The

second current – connected to the former – examines the processes of economic regionalization with particular reference to the phenomenon of local development, “systems of innovation,” and new forms of urban governance.

SEE ALSO: Development: Political Economy; Economic Sociology: Classical Political Economic Perspectives; Economic Sociology: Neoclassical Economic Perspective; Fordism/Post Fordism; Global Economy; Globalization; Institutionalism; Political Economy of Science; Political Economy and Sport; Rational Choice Theory (and Economic Sociology); Regulation Theory; State and Economy; Transition from Communism; Transition Economies; Welfare State

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political economy of science

Brian Woods

Science has never been at the forefront of political economy and usually only appears as an “exogenous shock,” or is suppressed by an assumption within the theory of the firm of a given stock of scientific and/or technological knowledge from which firms make their choices and then employ them in producing a given volume of output. Nonetheless, some theorists and empiricists have explored (in very broad terms) the role of science and technology in economic growth, the relations between science, technology, the state, and capital, and science and development.

From Adam Smith, Charles Babbage (better known as the pioneer of computers) took the idea that invention was a consequence of the division of labor, but his *Economy of Machinery and Manufactures* went further to explain the implications of the division of labor for science and technology. He saw that the extension of the division of labor and improvements in production technologies would necessarily lead to the establishment of large factories working to economies of scale. Babbage also saw that this

progress would come to depend on the deepening relations between science and industry and that, in turn, science itself would become subjected to the law of the division of labor. As science became a full time activity and the costs associated with the discovery of the “principles of nature” increased, specialization would unavoidably follow.

Babbage’s analysis influenced Marx, who in turn considered science a fundamental factor in explaining the exceptional growth in resource productivity and humanity’s capacity to manipulate the natural environment for human purposes. Marx’s treatment of scientific progress was nonetheless consistent with his broader historical materialism. Just as the economic foundation shapes political, legal, and social institutions, so too did it shape scientific activity. Science did not develop in response to forces internal to science or the scientific community: it is not an autonomous activity, but rather a social one that responded to economic forces. As such, Marx did not see science as a driver of social change. Instead, he thought that specific scientific disciplines developed in response to specific social problems that arose in the sphere of production.

Marx’s central point though was that science emerged at a particular point in human history. The marriage of science and industry did not occur with the historical emergence of capitalism, but centuries after when the system of manufacture demanded to be free of human frailty and relied instead on the predictability and impersonality of the machine. It is with the rise of the factory, its organized system of machines, and crucially the point at which machines started to make machines that the application of science became the determining principle everywhere.

Joseph Schumpeter identified with Marx the role played by capitalism in accounting for progress in science and technology. In a direct attack on the rigorously static framework of neoclassical economics, Schumpeter’s *Capitalism, Socialism and Democracy* drew upon Kondratiev’s hypothesis of long cycles to develop an evolutionary model of economic change within which science (and technology), along with the entrepreneur as innovative agent, plays the most significant role. Like Marx, Schumpeter thought that capitalism was inherently dynamic

and the fundamental drive that kept the system in motion came from new consumer goods, new methods of production or transportation to new markets, and/or new forms of industrial organization. These changes incessantly revolutionized the economic structure from within, destroying old ones and creating new ones. This process, which Schumpeter termed “creative destruction,” was for him the “essential fact about capitalism.” Innovation leads to the creation of an economic space where swarms of imitators produce other innovations by copying or modifying the new technologies. Thus, in every span of historic time Schumpeter would argue that it is possible to locate the ignition of the process and to associate it with certain industries from which the disturbances then spread over the entire system.

Similar to Marx, Schumpeter also thought that the capitalist system would inevitably self destruct. Unlike Marx though, this destruction would not come about because of the proletarian revolution, but because first, the rationalizing influence of capitalist institutions (which created the growth of a rational science) would eventually turn back upon the mass of collective ideas and challenge the very institutions of power and property. And second, because scientific and technological progress would increasingly become the business of teams of specialists who would create what is required in a predictable way, so leading to the demise of “the carrier of innovation:” the entrepreneur. The context for this rationalization of innovation was the growth of the large scale enterprise and, with it, the industrial research laboratory: the site of the systematic harnessing of science and technology to corporate objectives.

The rise of the giant corporation and its role in staving off the crisis of capitalism was the central point of analysis for Paul Baran and Paul Sweezy’s seminal work *Monopoly Capital*. For Baran and Sweezy, capitalism had entered a new stage of development – monopolization – characterized by the domination of massive corporations sharing rather than competing for production and markets. This domination enabled monopoly firms to extract enormous surplus and then absorb it through imperialism and the permanent arms economy. Increased government spending on evermore sophisticated, evermore destructive weapon systems

created the demand required to prevent capitalism from falling into crisis.

While neo Marxists forwarded the underconsumption argument, another utilitarian argument found strength in Vannevar Bush's *Science – The Endless Frontier* and John Maynard Keynes's *General Theory of Employment, Interest and Money*, both of which changed the political/economic landscape and formalized science policies on the assumption that scientific progress would ultimately improve living standards. Bush's report set the paradigm that influenced both policymakers and academics about the process of science, technology, and economic growth: the so called linear model as represented by Basic Research–Applied Research–Development–Enhanced Production–Economic Growth.

Keynes proposed that the economic function of government was to correct the follies of the market and stave off crisis through the promotion of full employment by means of large public works. Different countries adopted various means to achieve the goal of full employment, but Keynes's theorem did stimulate massive state sponsored scientific/technological projects such as nuclear power, supersonic transport, and space programs. "High technology" and "Big Science" were seen as politically beneficial in that they not only avoided direct competition with private capital, but they also promoted highly skilled employment and contributed to the expansion of the industrial infrastructure.

In *The New Industrial State* John Kenneth Galbraith explored the consequences of these ideas. Following the familiar theme that the dependence of the modern economy on science, technology, and planning necessitated the ever increasing specialization and division of labor, Galbraith added analytical weight to President Dwight Eisenhower's warning about the inordinate power of the military industrial complex and the scientific technological elite. As science and technology become more complex and lead times between design and production become longer (because of the amount of technological scientific knowledge brought to bear on every micro fraction of the task), the production process becomes inflexible. Increased complexity also leads to increases in capital investment (by orders of magnitude) and increased risk, which

in turn leads to more need for control, for planning, and consequently for large organizations. Power, Galbraith argued, had shifted to those with technical knowledge. The scientific, technical, organizational, and planning needs of the "technostructure" brought into being a large scientific estate, the political consequences of which was that in the modern economy technological compulsions and not political ideology drove industry to seek protection from the state. The technostructure extended its influence deep into the state, it identified itself with the goals of the state (economic growth, full employment, national defense), and designed and developed artifacts and systems to meet those goals. But, ultimately, the goals of the state reflected the needs of the technostructure.

Robert Solow's economic analysis in the late 1950s, however, seemed to confirm and support government involvement in the promotion and production of science and technology when he concluded that capital investment did not determine economic growth, but rather productivity investment did (i.e., investment in research and development – R&D). Since Solow, economists have conducted statistical research to find the scientific/technological determinants of economic growth and while many confirmed the high returns from R&D investment, others laid down three very different propositions about the economics of science. First, the economic value of science is difficult to forecast. Second, the realization of profits or property rights from science is intrinsically difficult to determine because of the organizational norms of "open science." Third, because private returns to investment in science are highly uncertain, there exists a systematic market failure, which in the absence of government action would result in an underinvestment in science. These propositions have over time served as the basis for treating science as a "public good" that requires public funding.

The traditional analysis of the efficient production of public goods was for governments to engage directly in the production of scientific knowledge, allow free use of it, and finance that production from general taxation. This was done either through the university or through government R&D laboratories that publicly disclosed their findings. The rise of a new economic doctrine during the 1980s, however

(as epitomized by Milton and Rose Friedman's *Capitalism and Freedom*), called on governments to reduce both taxation and state expenditure, which led not only to large scale budget cuts, but also to the systematic restructuring and commercialization of public sector R&D laboratories and universities. Accompanying the rise of the new enterprise culture was a range of organizational changes that intended to mimic practice in the commercial sector, in particular a large growth in university companies geared to the commercial exploitation of their staff's expertise.

Notwithstanding, policymakers have long drawn inference from economic studies on the need to focus on R&D investments in the private sector. The argument underlying such a focus is that, through incentives, firms will continue to invest in additional R&D projects that increase the production of scientific knowledge and thus continue to stimulate economic growth and enhance standards of living. The traditional incentive for R&D investment has been the patent system, which grants monopoly rights over a specified period. Research on the economic role of patents has found a strong positive correlation between R&D expenditure and patents, and a positive correlation between patent activity and various measures of economic performance. However, other research has also suggested that the use of counts of patents as an indicator of innovative output can be misleading.

Finally, the role of science and technology in development has long been a matter of investigation for international political economy. Modernization theorists view science as essentially beneficial, in that both knowledge and technology transfer from the North aids developing nations. The idea rests on the linear model of the relationship between science and economic growth, the basic assumption being that science and technology are autonomous from society – that they are able to produce particular effects regardless of the social or cultural context in which they are placed. The Green Revolution is an illustrative case, whereby widespread food shortages, population growth, and predicted famine in India prompted major international foundations to invest in agricultural research. New types of maize, wheat, and rice emerged

from this work, which promised higher yields and rapid maturity. But they did not come with out other inputs and conditions such as fertilizers, pesticides, herbicides, fungicides, and even irrigation technologies. Moreover, seeds for these new varieties had to be purchased anew each year.

Dependency theorists, on the other hand, argue that relationships with the North, in particular with multinational corporations, are barriers to development, because outside forces controlled economic growth. As such, science is not viewed as a benign force, but rather as one of a group of institutional processes that contribute to underdevelopment. Because scientific research concentrated in the North, dependency theorists claim that the research is also conducted for the benefit of the North and that knowledge and technology transfer are just another means of profit accumulation for Northern corporations.

SEE ALSO: Big Science and Collective Research; Braverman, Harry; Economic Development; Economic Sociology: Classical Political Economic Perspectives; Economic Sociology: Neoclassical Economic Perspective; Marx, Karl; Marxism and Sociology; Mass Production; Military Research and Science and War; Modernization; Political Economy; Schumpeter, Joseph A.; Smith, Adam; Speaking Truth to Power: Science and Policy; State and Economy; Technological Determinism; Technological Innovation

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political economy and sport

George H. Sage

For over 350 years the term political economy has been used to articulate the interdependence of political and economic phenomena. The first published use of the term “political economy” is found in *Treatise on Political Economy* authored by a French writer, Antoyne de Montchrétien, in 1616. The first publication in English using this term was Sir James Steuart’s book *Inquiry Into the Principles of Political Economy* in 1767. Political economy is considered to be the original social science because the broad theoretical visions of society articulated by Adam Smith, John Stuart Mill, and Karl Marx in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries predated the splintering of social science into narrower disciplines of economics, political science, sociology, and anthropology.

Study in the field of political economy has always been a broader field than the conventional study of either economics or political science. Much of political economy scholarship has involved analyzing relational issues of politics and economics because markets are embedded in political and cultural contexts. Therefore, political economic scholarship has also typically addressed basic moral issues of social justice, equity, and the public good (Gondwe 1992; Gilpin 2001).

Scholarship in political economy encompasses three broad perspectives representing fundamentally different visions of the good society. They are classical political economy, neoclassical economics, and radical political economy. Furthermore, three competing ideologies dominate the literature of political economy – liberal, conservative, and radical – as models of social order. Thus, the different political economy perspectives that have persisted over time include pervasive and contested ideological motifs underlying them (Gondwe 1992; Clark 1998).

As one of the most popular forms of cultural practice in the modern world, sport has become a topic of considerable political economic interest. Research on the political economy of mass sports has often involved issues about public

policy on behalf of providing for people’s leisure needs. One of the major contested questions has been whether the government should intervene in sporting practices or whether such matters should be left to the private sector.

Studies show that governments throughout the world have taken a larger role in sport and physical recreation at all levels, from local to international. In the United States, for example, support for public high school and college sport was initiated by local and state governments because such sports were believed to foster socialization experiences that would prepare young people, especially young men, to be productive workers. A more common political economy connection is represented by Sport and Recreation New Zealand (SPARC), formed in New Zealand in 2002, as a nationwide government/private partnership committed to ensuring that New Zealand remains a thriving, healthy nation by improving sport and recreation opportunities for all its citizens. Such partnerships, structured in different ways, have been formed in many nations.

Research has also focused on a professional sport industry that has proliferated throughout the world during the past half century. Young (1986) captures the essence of this trend: “The most significant structural change in modern sports is the gradual and continuing commodification of sports. This means that the social, psychological, physical, and cultural uses of sport are assimilated to the commercial needs of advanced monopoly capital” (p. 12). The professional sport industry, generally privatized and structured to generate profits, is composed of franchise owners, events sponsors, athletes, coaches, and ancillary workers. Although the owners of sports teams have consistently favored a minimum of government interference, they have often lobbied political leaders and received unique and favorable national and local government subsidies, protections, and beneficial legislation. The form of such government support varies from nation to nation, but research shows that government policies have consistently played an important role in how the sport industry operates (Johnson & Frey 1985). In the case of the major men’s team spectator sports in the US, owners have benefited from favorable court decisions, enabling them to monopolize their industry. Thus, between their own power of

ownership, personal wealth, and legislative and judicial support, the owners' monopoly of professional team sports allows them several means of capital accumulation.

A significant political, economic, and cultural transformation in the world order has been under way during the past half century as globalization has increased interdependence among the world's nations. One manifestation of globalization is the proliferation of international sporting events, such as the Olympic Games and the World Cup in men's soccer/football. International sports have attracted political economy scholarship because developed nations have the opportunity to demonstrate their power while small nations can obtain recognition for world class achievements. At the same time, these events are bound up in issues of national identity and ideological rivalries between nations; additionally, they have massive economic significance. The mass media, sporting goods and equipment, travel, lodging, and food industries, to name only a few, are beneficiaries of these events. Economic and political interests become intertwined, and political economy research has often been designed to elucidate the actual functioning and evolution of international sporting events.

One economic aspect of globalization is known as "export oriented industrialization," which is organized and driven by transnational corporations and their subsidiaries. In this system, product research, development, and design typically take place in developed countries while the labor intensive, assembly line phases of product manufacture are relegated to less developed countries (LDCs). The finished product is then exported for distribution in developed countries of the world. Foreign governments provide transnational corporations lavish subsidies, protection against labor organization, and tax relief, while home governments provide relief from tariffs and taxes.

Studies have also shown that the transnational corporations that develop, produce, and sell sporting goods and equipment have moved their manufacturing operations to numerous low wage export processing zones across the world (Sage 2005). Moving plants and operations to LDCs boosts profits for corporations such as Nike and Reebok, the world's largest suppliers of sport footwear and apparel, but for

workers and their communities in both developed and developing countries the consequences are often dismal.

SEE ALSO: Globalization, Sport and; Political Economy; Politics and Sport; Sport and Capitalism; Sport and the City; Sport and the State

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political leadership

James Walter

Political leadership concerns those who play the decisive roles in institutions that determine "who gets what, when, how" (Lasswell 1977). It is best understood in terms of process (the means by which an individual or group persuades followers to accede to the leadership's purposes) rather than of status (those in specific roles). While power relations, and hence

politics, exist in the smallest of groups, and leadership can be studied at every level – from the work group to global forums – political leadership is usually analyzed in a broad societal context in relation to processes of governance.

When the perpetual revolution of capitalism swept away the given authoritative roles and relatively static structures of traditional societies, leadership became an issue: Who should exercise it? In what manner? How was legitimacy to be recognized? Complex modern societies demand high levels of organization and bureaucratic management (promoting the sociological analysis of emergent structures) on the one hand, and the reflexive achievement of individual identity (promoting individualistic theories of psychology) on the other. Both imperatives have influenced the study of leadership. Some social scientists understand leadership as a necessary social function within group and institutions, while others interpret it in terms of individual characteristics that seed the drive for power and facilitate success or failure in its exercise. The first approach drew on the foundational analyses of elite formation and bureaucratic rationalization (Michels 1968; Weber 1961), while the second drew on psychological theory as applied to the question of power (Lasswell 1977). Both were to be tempered by the emergence of social psychology and the best contemporary work bridges institutional structure, historical context, group processes, and psychology (Elcock 2001).

Weber's (1961) exposition of bureaucracy as fundamental to modern society was accompanied by an influential theory of leadership, based on distinctions between traditional authority (deriving from ascribed status, linked to custom and convention), charismatic authority (deriving from subordinates' perceptions of and devotion to extraordinary qualities in a leader), and rational legal authority (based on the mutual acceptance by those in dominant and subordinate roles of a prescriptive framework defining and supporting leadership roles in relation to specific objectives). Weber's delineation of charismatic authority informed transformational theory and the study of revolutionary leaders, and his view of rational legal authority decisively shaped organizational analysis (and eventually management studies) while contributing to elite theory.

Leadership as a social function was initially elaborated by elite theorists. Just as Weber was convinced of the inevitability of the "iron cage" of bureaucracy, Gaetano Mosca, Vilfred Pareto, and Robert Michels were persuaded of the inevitability of elite rule. While Mosca provided a historical account of elite dominance, and Pareto sketched the dynamic behind the rise and fall (or "circulation") of elites, Michels's (1968) postulation of the "iron law of oligarchy" was closely linked to a theory of bureaucracy and most influential on later political analysis. He argued that in modern organizations role specialization, differentiated knowledge, and the need for firm direction and adherence to prescribed behaviors mean that leadership inexorably becomes oligarchic; thus, leaders are corrupted, developing vested interests they are driven to defend.

Elite theory became integral to the views of new liberals in the early twentieth century. Walter Lippmann, for instance, sharing the skepticism of Pareto and Michels about democracy, argued that public opinion was formed by elites using modern media to ensure that the "pictures in the heads" of most people were in line with the realities that only an expert few could properly understand and that "the public" itself is a chimera: instead, there are insiders and outsiders, and the course of public affairs is determined by accommodations between insiders who – only at elections, or when a resolution between themselves cannot be achieved – attempt to educate outsiders so as to enlist support for their cause.

At mid century, C. Wright Mills (1956) was to give this argument a more radical turn, appropriating elite theory to argue that those who enjoyed the corporate, military, and governmental "command posts" in modern society had common backgrounds and used their positions to exploit the masses and to maintain their monopoly of power. Such arguments were to be further developed in the 1960s and 1970s by Marxist theorists such as Ralph Miliband, according to whom the elites of central state institutions act to defend ruling class interests. Most such studies, however, failed to counter Robert Dahl's critique of Mills: showing that there is potential for those in elite positions to exercise unified power is not equivalent to demonstrating that they act in a concerted

fashion. In response, theories have developed of elite pluralism (in which contending elites emerge as representatives of underlying groups and negotiate political settlements) and of fragmented elites (where power is shared and contested between dispersed local, national, and international elites). Studies of elite formation and elite recruitment have remained a staple of political science, and a practical turn especially evident in recent research has been the study of those in executive roles, giving rise to detailed study of the “mandarins.”

Elite theorists conceive leadership in terms of social dynamics, but the exploration of leadership psychology has been a more controversial exercise. Individual leaders’ actions are not readily amenable to the analytical methods demanded by social science, except when it comes to broad patterns (such as those of elite recruitment). And to the extent that individual political psychology presents problems of empirical verifiability, its application to leadership behavior has been regarded with skepticism. Nonetheless, some scholars saw a need to bridge the gap between popular interest in (and popular writing about) leadership and social scientific method, both in order to understand agency within our institutions and to encourage an informed citizenry. They intended to introduce rigor and methods that would enable productive comparisons and generalizations to be made from single cases.

As with so much else in twentieth century political science, the initial drive came from North America. Harold Lasswell, at the University of Chicago, was a founding figure in both political psychology and leadership studies. Lasswell’s initiatives from the 1930s on (Lasswell 1977) laid the groundwork taken up in the “scientific study of leadership” after the war. Further impetus came from historical studies of the way certain psychological dispositions meshed with contingent circumstances to allow some leaders to speak for “the historical moment” (Erikson 1959). This entailed recognition that leadership success depended on a resonance with followers’ needs. Others have since developed more theoretically elaborated insights into this latter point; for instance, Little’s (1985) typology of “political ensembles” crystallizing around “strong,” “group,” or “inspiring” leaders.

One outcome of these approaches was the turn to biographies and psychobiographies of political leaders, a field too capacious to summarize here. We can note in passing the attempts to specify “the tasks of biography” and the argument that theoretically informed biography enables comparative generalization (Edinger 1964), while remarking that the Anglophone tradition of attention to detail still gives substantial insight into leaders at work. Another outcome was the sustained comparative study of presidential leadership, aiming to develop typologies with regard for the qualities that enhanced or diminished performance in particular aspects of the role, and addressing sociological and historical features of the context in which a president acted (Greenstein 2000; Neustadt 1990). Such approaches have since been extended to leaders in non presidential polities (Elcock 2001). A third outcome has been the emergence of arguments positing particular constellations of characteristics, relating, for example, to trait theory (Stogdill 1974), the investment in power (Winter 1973), contingency (or leadership effectiveness) theory (Fiedler 1967), and political entrepreneurship (Sheingate 2003).

At an intermediate point between the broad study of elites and the close study of individuals, exploration of psychological processes in small groups has generated alternative approaches to leadership. W. R. Bion serves as one example. Bion’s (1961) observations led him to distinguish between the tasks a group comes together to achieve (“the work group”) and the tacit assumptions that determine interaction within it (“the basic assumption group”). It is the “basic assumption” rather than objective work that governs interaction, and Bion postulated three common types of group behavior: the dependency group (which “gathers to gain security from one individual on whom they depend”); the fight flight group (which focuses on fighting or fleeing from potential threats and seeks a leader adept in identifying threats and facilitating aggression or evasion); and the pairing group (attuned to unity, to coming together, with symbolic focus on creative “pairing” interactions, but an unrealistic, sometimes messianic vision). Political scientists elaborated on Bion’s model to analyze the ties between leaders and followers. Little (1985), for instance, not only illuminated mainstream politics with a

sophisticated model of what he called “political ensembles” (based on Bion’s basic assumption groups), but also linked these to the “political climates” that favored the success of one type of political ensemble rather than another.

Another approach was to look at group processes as they related to decision making, in leadership groups themselves. An influential and hotly contested example is Janis’s (1972) theory of “groupthink.” Seeking to understand the sources of “policy fiasco,” Janis came to the conclusion that high cohesiveness and a concurrence seeking tendency that interferes with critical thinking produce the syndrome he dubbed groupthink. Typical indicators are the group’s investment in consensus or compliance with directive leadership, which precludes the open examination of alternative or dissenting views; selective utilization of confirming information; a drive for quick and painless unanimity on issues the group has to confront; the suppression of personal doubts; a belief in the inherent morality of the group; the emergence of “mindguards” who police group orthodoxies; and a view of opponents as evil. While critics routinely condemned Janis’s theory (based as it was not on laboratory observation but on case studies of foreign policy decision making) as incapable of replication or experimental validation, it has recently come to public prominence again as inquiries into intelligence failures in Britain and the US (in connection with the promulgation of the 2002 war in Iraq) each came to the conclusion that “groupthink” had played a role in the acceptance of manifestly inadequate evidence. Despite the contention surrounding groupthink, contemporary attention has shifted to methodical attempts to tie the elements of groupthink more closely to organizational theory and to the nexus between political and bureaucratic decision making.

Philosophical analyses of leadership stretching back to Plato, Aristotle, and beyond have long been deployed both to scrutinize leaders and as guides to action – Machiavelli remains a staple of political theory. In contrast to the psychological and dynamic typologies above, philosophical theory often relies on archetypes. Attention to values versus pragmatics, to affect and to ethics, encourages consideration of the meanings and moral impact of leadership. An example is John Kane’s study of the necessity

for a leader to generate and to maintain moral capital in the eyes of followers if an effective regime is to be maintained.

Despite this history of leadership studies and the enormous popular interest in leadership, it remains a minority interest in political science and sociology. Leadership instead has come to be the preserve of business and management studies, where the attributes of ideal leadership types, or the characteristics that fuel success given particular opportunities, are keenly pursued. In this domain there is frequently an emphasis on behavioral theory as related to organization, and this can also illuminate political behavior. When such studies deploy shared bodies of theory (such as those developed in social psychology, sociology, or group psychology), or give descriptions of the dynamics of recognizable traits, they can be useful and provide analogies for political leadership – see, for instance, the way in which Greenstein (2000) deploys “emotional intelligence,” a concept developed by business analyst Daniel Goleman, in explaining the “presidential difference.” Too often, however, business studies of leadership are driven by short term management fads, questionable assumptions about shared norms, or superficial appropriations of psychology to be of much use to the student of politics. More is to be gained by attending to those (e.g., Elcock 2001) who remain attuned to politics as a vocation.

SEE ALSO: Bureaucratic Personality; Charisma; Elites; Groups; Leadership; Mills, C. Wright; Political Parties; Power Elite; Social Movements, Leadership in; Weber, Max

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political machine

Patricia M. Thornton

An urban political machine is a partisan organization that mobilizes its members to vote primarily through the dispersion of material incentives and other forms of preferential treatment, including favoritism based on political criteria in personnel decisions, contracting, and the administration of laws. While the degree and scope of political machines varied, both from city to city as well as over time, they were widely perceived as organizations capable of mobilizing broad swaths of the urban electorate to deliver a vote with mechanical predictability.

The concatenation of historically unique pressures, including industrialization and immigration, presaged the emergence of the political machine during the early nineteenth century.

By the turn of the century, newly arrived immigrants comprised on average nearly a quarter of the total population of America's 50 largest cities; in a few cases, the foreign born population hovered near the 50 percent mark. Following on the heels of a decade of intense labor conflict and an economic downturn second only to that of the Great Depression of the 1930s, immigrant workers represented a nearly infinite supply of cheap labor, and made their appearance just as many American cities commenced a cycle of intensive growth and expansion. Most historians agree that by the dawn of the twentieth century, the political machine had become the dominant institutional feature of American urban political landscape, and began to wane around the time of the New Deal.

There remains significant scholarly disagreement about how and why political machines emerged, the nature of their long term impact on American political culture, and whether they persist today. Most scholars agree with Wolfinger (1972), who draws a clear distinction between machine politics – defined as “the manipulation of certain incentives to partisan political participation” – and the political machine as a centralized partisan organization within a jurisdiction that routinely practices machine politics by controlling and distributing patronage. While machine politics remains a common phenomenon, the mature, consolidated political machine is relatively rare today. Scott (1972) argued that the machine represents the product of a particular stage of political development, and noted variations of which could be found in democratizing nations across the globe. Various permutations of the political machine have been described in Japan, Mexico, and post Soviet Russia.

Many have argued that urban political machines developed in the US as a result of the great waves of mostly European immigrants who arrived in American cities during the latter half of the nineteenth century. Such theorists note that urban political machines were solidly rooted among particular ethnic groups, and that the distribution of material benefits and patronage followed ethnic lines. For example, Glazer and Moynihan (1963) proposed that in New York, “the machine governments resulted from a merger of rural Irish custom with urban American politics.” In this view, the operational

features of the machine – specifically, its reliance on patronage and the exchange of particularistic benefits – were entirely consistent with the more “private regarding” cultural backgrounds of the newly arrived immigrant populations. Similarly, some argue that the machine developed as a collective adaptation to the great social dislocation and pressing needs of the swelling immigrant population. Often arriving without either a solid grasp of the English language or the material resources to sustain themselves, new immigrants gravitated toward local leaders rooted in nascent ethnic neighborhoods that provided the services they needed. Neighborhood leaders thus earned their political loyalty in exchange. When such ties hardened into partisan institutional affiliations, such relationships formed the backbone of the urban political machine.

Merton (1968) famously argued that urban political machines evolved and persisted largely because they effectively fulfilled needs left unmet by official political organizations. Merton’s functionalist interpretation identified “latent” needs within various strata of urban society that were met by the political machine. For the “deprived classes,” the precinct captain provided not only goods and services, but did so in a “humanizing” and “personalizing” manner, effectively transforming impersonal political connections into a dense network of personal ties. Urban businesses, both large and small, turned to the machine boss not only as an economic tsar who organizes and regulates local competition, but also as an ambassador to the more distant realms of government bureaucracy. Thus the machine boss organized, centralized, and effectively managed “the scattered fragments of power” within the political system, an interpretation that echoed Hofstadter’s (1960) earlier suggestion that machines developed in order to fill the vacuum created when rapidly growing cities with diverse populations outgrew the managerial capacities of existing government institutions.

Subsequent case studies of individual machines both challenged and extended these early interpretations. Guterbock’s 1980 study of machine politics in Chicago found that the correlation between personalistic cultures and machine politics was not supported by empirical evidence. Instead of channeling jobs and services to the mass of economically disadvan-

tagged voters in the areas under their jurisdiction, Guterbock found that machine bosses tended to funnel resources to wealthy supporters to ensure their continued support, as well as to staff their own party organizations. In his work on New York City’s infamous Tammany Hall machine, Shefter (1976) downplayed sociological factors to argue “that the political machine was, in the first instance, a political institution” which, in its time, competed with other urban political institutions for power and resources. Shefter’s historical institutional analysis suggested that the cross class coalitions that served as the backbone of the machine hindered the politicization of the American working class by effectively “organizing out” of urban politics the central cleavage of socioeconomic class. Finally, Erie’s 1988 study of Irish American machines in six cities found that while machine bosses did preferentially distribute jobs, contracts, and services to their Irish American constituents, the scarcity of resources at their disposal prompted them, on the one hand, to build alliances with state and federal officials in order to expand such supplies, and to offer symbolic recognition to their non Irish supporters on the other.

While earlier studies of political machines proposed that such political structures, despite their shortcomings, served the larger purpose of assimilating ethnic minorities into mainstream American political culture, case studies have shown that consolidated political machines were more exclusive than inclusive over time. Urban economic restructuring, as well as increased federal oversight during the New Deal era, challenged dominant urban party machines and rendered them vulnerable to internal fragmentation and pressures for reform. One recent trend in studies of political machines is to place them within the broader context of urban regime analysis, comparing machine based regimes to other types of governing coalitions, in the attempt to elucidate the links between formal and informal structures of political power (DiGaetano 1991a, 1991b).

SEE ALSO: Ethnic Enclaves; Ethnic Groups; Functionalism/Neofunctionalism; Immigration; Institutionalism; Melting Pot; Merton, Robert K.; Political Opportunities; Political Parties; Urban Political Economy

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political opportunities

David S. Meyer

Political opportunities, sometimes referred to as political opportunity structure or the structure of political opportunities, is a catchall term that refers to the world outside a social movement that affects its mobilization, development, and ultimate impact. The notion that the social and political context matters is well established in the social sciences, but scholars dispute which aspects of the environment influence social movements, and how, and contest the analytic utility of the concept of political opportunities as it has developed. Tarrow's (1998: 19–20) economical definition, “consistent – but not necessarily formal or permanent – dimensions

of the political struggle that encourage people to engage in contentious politics,” affords researchers considerable latitude in tailoring the concepts to the case at hand. The challenge for scholars of social movements is to conduct theoretically oriented empirical studies of the interactions of movements with their contexts to test and refine the theory.

Modern use of the term political opportunities is rooted in the scholarly response to the social movements of the 1960s, which challenged the notion that protest was a phenomenon wholly unconnected with more conventional politics. Scholars (e.g., Lipsky 1970) contended that protest could be a rational political strategy for those poorly positioned to exercise influence in other ways.

Establishing the potential rationality of a social protest movement and the individuals who animate it, much research on social protest movements turned to looking at the processes by which organizers mobilized activity, directing their attention to the internal operations of social movement organizations and their relations with sponsors and members. Effectively, they considered the context in which these processes take place as a constant, factoring out much of the stuff that comprises politics.

Political opportunity or political process theory arose as a corrective, explicitly concerned with predicting variance in the periodicity, content, and outcomes of activist efforts over time and across different institutional contexts. The approach emphasized the interaction of activist efforts and more mainstream institutional politics, based on the premise that these phenomena were closely related. The “structure of political opportunities,” analogous to the structure of career opportunities individuals face, explicitly refers to the available means for a constituency to lodge claims against authorities.

The primary point of this approach was that activists do not work in a vacuum. Rather, the political context, conceptualized fairly broadly, sets the grievances around which activists mobilize, advantaging some claims and disadvantaging others, encouraging some strategies of influence and forms of organization while discouraging others, and responding through policy reforms more readily at some times than others. The wisdom, creativity, and outcomes of activists' choices, briefly their *agency*, could

only be understood by looking at the political context and the rules of the games in which those choices are made, that is, the *structure*.

Peter Eisinger (1973) was the first to use a “political opportunity” framework explicitly, to explain why *some* American cities witnessed extensive riots about race and poverty during the late 1960s. He found that cities with a mix of what he termed “open” and “closed” structures for citizen participation were most likely to experience riots. Cities with extensive institutional openings preempted riots by inviting conventional means of political participation; cities without visible openings for participation repressed or discouraged dissident claimants to foreclose eruptions of protest.

Tilly (1978) built upon this concept to work toward a more comprehensive theory, suggesting national comparisons, recognizing changes in opportunities over time, and arguing that opportunities would explain the more general process of choosing of tactics from a spectrum of possibilities within a “repertoire of contention.” For Tilly, activists try to make the most of available openings to pursue a particular set of claims at a particular time. Like Eisinger, he contends that the frequency of protest bears a curvilinear relationship with political openness. When authorities offer a constituency routine and meaningful avenues of access, few will protest, because less costly, more direct routes to influence are available. At the other end of the spectrum of openness, authorities can repress various constituencies such that they are unable to develop the requisite capacity to stage social protest movements altogether. Protest then takes place in a space of toleration, when claimants are not sufficiently advantaged to obviate the need to use dramatic means to express their interests, nor so completely repressed to prevent them from trying to get what they want.

Taken together, Tilly and Eisinger offer models for both cross sectional comparisons and longitudinal studies, and restrictive and inclusive models. They also set out a spectrum of conceptual possibilities for subsequent scholars. Both broader and more restrictive conceptualizations of political opportunity theory appeared, with findings from one case often generalized to widely disparate cases. Scholars included factors of particular – or exclusive – relevance to the cases they examined. Synthetic theoretical work,

however, was often distant from the particular specifications researchers employed in empirical work. Particularly influential was Doug McAdam’s (1982) study of the Civil Rights Movement in the United States. Examining the trajectory of civil rights activism over 40 years, McAdam explicitly offers political process theory as an improvement over previous collective behavior and resource mobilization approaches. African American civil rights activism, McAdam contends, only emerged forcefully when external circumstances provided sufficient openness to allow mobilization. Favorable changes in policy and the political environment, including the collapse of the cotton economy in the South, African American migration to Northern cities, and a decline in the number of lynchings, for example, lowered the costs and dangers of organizing for African Americans, and increased their political value as an electoral constituency. The Supreme Court decision *Brown v. Board of Education* legitimated concern with civil rights, and forced political figures to address the issue. In explicitly endorsing integration, it also provided African Americans with a sense of “cognitive liberation” that encouraged action. McAdam’s analysis of the Civil Rights Movement, explicitly offered as an exemplar of a political process approach, inspired subsequent analysts looking at other cases.

Tarrow (1989) applied a similar model to explain the broad range of social movement activity over a tumultuous decade, 1965–1975, in Italian politics. He examined a “cycle of protest,” including decline, by considering institutional politics along with social protest and disorder. Early on, government openings reduced the cost of collective action, and the initial mobilization of one constituency encouraged others to follow. Workers, students, religious reformers, and leftist factions within parties all took to the streets. Government responses initially encouraged additional mobilization until some turned violent. Violence and disorder legitimated repression, raising the costs of collective action and diminishing protest, while some social movement actors turned their attention to more conventional political activity, reducing their claims and moderating their tactics.

These studies followed the outlines of Tilly’s broad theoretical argument, but focused on the

emergence and institutionalization of constituencies disadvantaged in institutional politics, emphasizing “expanding opportunities” as a proximate condition for mobilization. In effect, by focusing on emergent mobilization on behalf of excluded constituencies, they emphasized one end of the opportunity curve. Other studies (Meyer 1990; Smith 1996), however, demonstrated that unwelcome policy and government closings could also provoke mobilization. These ostensibly different, but clearly compatible, templates coexist in the scholarly literature.

Most commonly, analysts have written more or less nuanced treatments of particular social movements over time, explaining their trajectory with reference to the broader political field. This approach has been helpful in explaining a wide range of cases, but the diversity of cases has meant that analysts have termed an extraordinarily broad range of factors as elements of political opportunity, depending upon the case at hand. Further, they use a political opportunity approach to explain at least three distinct outcomes: the volume and character of protest; the adoption of organizational forms; and social movement outcomes (Meyer & Minkoff 2004). Often coupled with writing that suggests movements flourish during “favorable” or “expanding opportunities” and fade in times of less favorable or declining opportunities, the collective scholarship has been slow to generate findings that clearly hold across defined categories of cases.

A relatively small number of studies empirically test political opportunity hypotheses against alternative theories. The premises of the political process approach, at least as articulated by the scholars testing it, generally do not perform well. Goodwin (2002) conducted a macroanalysis testing one set of specifications of political opportunity theory, coordinating a large team review of 100 monographs on numerous movements, covering a wide variety of social movements ranging from the Huk rebellion to the Harlem Renaissance. The researchers coded each study along four variables articulated by McAdam (1996): (1) increasing popular access to the political system; (2) divisions within the elite; (3) the availability of elite allies; and (4) diminishing state repression. Despite numerous problems with the survey, acknowledged by Goodwin, the aggregate results raise

troubling questions for political opportunity theory: one or more of the political opportunity variables he considers appear in only slightly more than half (59) of the accounts. Excluding explicitly cultural movements such as “hip hop” from the analysis increases the percentage of cases where political opportunity turns up slightly, but problems remain. Not the least of these is the formulation of “expanding political opportunities” in terms of increased access, which appeared far more frequently in non democratic contexts (73 percent of cases) than in democratic contexts. Moreover, contracting opportunities, seen in reduced access to the political system, appear important in at least one third of the cases in which political opportunities matter at all, primarily in democratic contexts.

The mixed record of political opportunity theory in explicit empirical tests highlights important challenges for social movement scholars. First, because competing hypotheses coexist within the literature, virtually any finding can be used to support or refute a preferred version of the theory. Clearly, reconciling these ostensibly conflicting hypotheses theoretically is essential for the continued development of the political opportunity perspective. Second, scholars differ in how broad a range of factors in the political environment they will consider as components of political opportunity. Thus, when grievances, for example, turn up as a significant explanatory variable, this can be used to support or refute political opportunity theory. Third, because there is considerable flexibility in not only the conception of political opportunity but also the specification of opportunity variables, it is rarely clear that scholars have picked the most appropriate specification for the variables in each case. Nonetheless, results from empirical tests demand further theoretical development as well as additional empirical examinations.

Core elements of political opportunity, such as political openness, are likely to operate differently for different outcomes – and for different sorts of movements. Unwelcome changes in policy, for example, may alert citizens of the need to act on their own behalf or may cause elite actors to side with, or try to activate, a largely disengaged public. We can develop a more comprehensive theory of political opportunity by returning to Tilly’s (1978)

curvilinear conception of openness and mobilization. Well established constituencies, and the issue based movements they animate, such as the largely middle class environmental and peace movements, may need to be forced out of institutional politics in order to stage a social movement. In contrast, more marginal constituencies, such as those based on ethnic identity or sexual orientation, may need to be enabled into mobilization by institutional openings. Whereas the former is pushed out to the social protest part of the curve, the latter is invited into mobilization to reach the same point on the curve. The same differences play out in the question of outcomes. When government openings and favorable policies invite mobilization, a large movement is likely to be accompanied by other political and policy gains. When, in contrast, activism emerges in response to proposed unwelcome changes and political closings, movement influence may be little more than small moderations in proposed policies that veer toward preserving the status quo. In the former case, movement influence is magnified, in the latter, it is obscured, but it can be real.

Sorting out these issues, specifically, assessing the role of threats and openings for different constituencies and different groups within a movement coalition, and separating out different outcomes, is the essential step for building political opportunity theory.

SEE ALSO: Civil Rights Movement; Collective Action; Contention, Tactical Repertoires of; Mobilization; Political Machine; Political Process Theory; Protest, Diffusion of; Resource Mobilization Theory; Revolutions; Social Movement Organizations; Social Movements

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political parties

Dylan Riley

Political parties are organized currents of opinion that aim to realize a program by controlling a political association. Parties can emerge

only where there exists politics defined as a struggle over the leadership or the influence of the leadership of a human group. To the extent that leadership divides among estates, clans, or families according to tradition and is not the object of struggle, neither politics nor parties can exist. Modern party organizations are connected with the rise of the modern state, because modern parties aim at seizing (either through electoral means or violence) state power (Weber 1958 [1946]: 78–81; Sartori 1976: 4; Pombeni 1985: 20; Held 1987: 165). There are three broad schools of thought about parties: Marxism, pluralism, and elitism.

For Marxists, parties emerge as specialized organizational apparatuses of social classes in *capitalist* society. This combines two arguments. The first is a claim about the general conditions of possibility for the “party form” of political organization. The second is a claim about the sociological basis of politics.

The differentiation of economic exploitation and political rule, a structural feature of capitalist society, makes possible the “party form” of political organization. Capitalism is characterized by a split between “bourgeois and citizen,” man as a member of civil society and man as a member of political society (Marx 1994: 9). Politics in capitalist society is specifically autonomous from economic production and thus becomes the concern of a specialized class of persons (Gramsci 1971: 144). Parties arise in these conditions to manage the political interests of social classes. Thus it is the basically economic character of classes in capitalist society that explains the need for a specialized apparatus to organize class interests politically. Parties exist neither in non capitalist class societies (such as feudal or slave societies) nor in socialist societies in which classes have ceased to exist. Thus, the first central claim of the Marxist theory of parties is that the “party form” of political organization is specific to capitalism.

Most Marxist arguments include the further claim that classes, defined as groups that form around the ownership and non ownership of the means of production, constitute the social basis of parties. Capitalist societies are divided by a fundamental conflict of interest between the owners of the means of production and the direct producers. Parties express and organize the interests of these fundamentally divided

social classes (Gramsci 1971: 148; Marx 1994: 119). Parties, in most Marxist accounts, do not however simply express the economic structure and class divisions of capitalist society. They also play an active role in the process of class formation through the mediation of class and intraclass struggles (Gramsci 1971: 180–3; Marx 1994: 166–7).

Both of these theses (the specificity of parties to capitalism and the class basis of parties under capitalism) have been challenged. The first challenge, posed in a particularly acute way by Stalinism, is that party apparatuses have existed in non capitalist societies. The second problem, posed by the emergence of “catch all” parties, is that parties may not represent social classes at all, but rather a complex of interests that are not well understood in terms of classes. It is important to distinguish these two types of challenges because they do not logically imply one another. It may be true that party organizations can arise only under conditions of capitalist production, yet not be closely associated with class interests. Alternatively, it may be true that parties are not specific to capitalist production but that in capitalism they are primarily organizations of social classes. Both sets of arguments exist in work on parties.

It is convenient to divide the pluralist position into two subgroups: classical liberalism and modern “interest group” pluralism. Although related, these positions have different views of political parties. Classical liberals distrust political parties. Sovereignty, for them, is located in a chamber that represents (in the double sense of mirroring and constituting) the national interest, understood as an outcome of the deliberative processes of deputies. Classical liberals argue that deputies should represent the material and ideal interests of autonomous, reasonable, and generally propertied *individuals*. This theory is based on the conception of parliament as a “talking shop” or “public sphere” in which interaction among educated men would produce rational political decisions. For most classical liberals, political parties constitute a double threat. First, parties threaten to strip individuals of their means of political expression. By subordinating individuals to a bureaucratic organization, parties undermine the social structural basis of liberal consensus, because they undermine the possibility of reasoned debate in the

public sphere. Second, parties, by subordinating deputies to programs elaborated *before* their entry into parliament, undermine the liberal model of deliberation (Schmitt 1985 [1923]: 6–7, 40–1; Weber 1958 [1946]: 102–3).

Interest group pluralism is an attempt to reconstruct classical liberalism in the age of mass democracy. Like their classical liberal forebears, pluralists accept that parliament represents a general interest. But far from seeing party organizations as a threat to the constitution of that interest, they explain how party organizations can function to guarantee it. Pluralists argue that politics in modern societies is the concern of a specialized “political system” (Sartori 1976: 45). Further, they suggest that competing interest groups characterize modern societies, and that these groups are likely to organize for their interests (Sartori 1976: 13).

Unlike classical liberals, however, pluralists argue that the divisions of modern society make possible *consensus*, understood as an “endless process of adjusting many dissenting minds (and interests) into changing ‘coalitions’ of reciprocal persuasion” (Sartori 1976: 16). Given a plurality of interests, parties, especially in functioning two party systems, do *not* and indeed *cannot* represent only social classes. Rather, they attempt to both constitute and express common ground among the broadest possible coalition of groups. Thus, parties, even when they represent a “part” of the social whole, propose policies and govern in the “general interest” (Sartori 1976: 26–7).

The pluralist view of parties depends on a specific conception of society. Individuals with preferences constitute society for thinkers in this tradition. Social groups are accidental and temporary coalitions that form around a variety of aims and interests. Parties seek to elaborate and articulate a social consensus by appealing to the interests of voters as individuals. Thus consensus is possible, despite the existence of social conflict, because social structures are fluid. They do not trap individuals into durable groups, such as Marxist classes.

Michels, Pareto, Weber, Mosca, and Schmitt in different ways suggest that the Marxist theory of parties is wrong to assume that political organizations develop as an expression of underlying class interests. For all of these thinkers, party organizations possess distinctive

power resources and interests that separate them from their social base. This is particularly true of socialist parties that depended upon large masses of followers with few economic and cultural resources (Michels 1968 [1915]: 70). The elitists, however, do not stop at a critique of Marxism. They generalize their argument to a critique of liberal democracy. While parties are an inevitable development in modern society, party democracy, according to these thinkers, is a contradiction in terms (Held 1987: 143).

A broadly elitist view of party organizations is also common among research influenced by Pierre Bourdieu and the idea of the political field. Bourdieu suggests that parties constitute themselves, and “take positions,” primarily in relation to other organizations in the political field. There may exist a homology between position taking in the political field and social groups outside the political field. Yet, Bourdieu emphasizes, the primary determinant of politics is the interests of those who possess a relative monopoly on political capital (understood as the totality of organizational and cultural resources necessary to represent social interests) (Bourdieu 1991: 172).

One of the most important revisions to the strict elitist traditions is the theory of competitive elitism. The competitive elitists accept much of elitist critique of parties. But instead of drawing the consequence that modern democracy is a sham, they argue that competing party organizations guarantee some responsiveness to the underlying population. This position differs from the pluralist position, because competitive elitists do not argue that parties seek to represent a general interest, or a consensus. Rather, the competitive elitist point is simply that in the face of the overwhelming organizational resources of parties, having competing parties is better than not having competing parties.

Scholars working broadly in the elitist tradition have produced some of the most important work on the internal organization of parties. They identify two organizational dimensions: the structure of membership and the articulation of party organizations. Membership may be structured in three basic ways. In cadre parties most of the party’s political supporters are not members. They may vote for the party at election time or support it in other ways, but they do not pay dues and they do not have a party card.

Indirect mass membership parties have a mass membership, but this membership is formed by affiliations with non party groups such as trade unions. Members of direct mass membership parties in contrast join the party through the voluntary act of purchasing a party card (Duverger 1959: 5–40). Parties may also be articulated in different organizational forms. Caucuses emerged as circles of notables formed to influence opinion in the context of restricted suffrage. Branches are territorial organizations that generally reflect the administrative divisions of the state. Branches, unlike caucuses, aim at increasing their memberships. Cells are based on the workplace. Parties with organized militias first emerged with fascist parties. There were two types. The Nazi Party militia was an affiliate but separate party organization. The Italian Fascist Party was a “party militia,” meaning that the militia organization was initially the basic unit of party organization.

There exist few general works seeking to explain the origins of parties. Most work on parties, however, would agree with the following points. First, at a very broad level, the historical trend, at least up until very recently, has been from cadre parties to mass parties, at least in Western Europe. Most scholars argue that this transition is associated with the emergence of universal suffrage. Second, the emergence of mass parties can occur in one of two ways. They have developed either out of parliamentary groups, which became mass parties in the age of universal suffrage, or from extra parliamentary social movements, which became parties at a subsequent stage. The first path was typical of parties in England and the United States. The second was typical of the European socialist parties, but is also true of extreme right parties like the fascist parties. Thus in continental Europe and in England a transition occurred from parties of notables or cadre parties, which were loose groupings of local elites, to mass parties that were more ideological and tended to issue membership cards. Socialist parties developed the model of the mass membership party, but socialist organizational techniques were to some extent adopted by other parties, particularly fascist parties. The difference between these two forms of party largely corresponds to a distinction between the Anglo Saxon world and continental Europe. The transition from cadre

to mass parties was most pronounced in countries that had strong socialist parties (particularly Italy and Germany), but also occurred to some extent in England. The United States forms an exception to this rule. In this case, mass parties emerged very early (some scholars date their emergence from the 1820s). Mass party formation in this instance did not occur under pressure from socialism or from other political organizations of the industrial working class.

Work on political parties distinguishes three types of party “systems”: single parties, two party systems, and multiple party systems. Single party systems are usually considered to differ qualitatively from multiparty and two party systems. Yet some scholars have pointed out that effective single party systems at the local level can coexist with multiple or two party systems at the national level. Further, single parties are compatible with democracy if there is intraparty competition, especially if this competition takes the form of an electoral struggle among organized factions (Epstein 1966: 48).

Many scholars seek to explain the difference between two party and multiparty systems. Two approaches are common. One focuses on the electoral system. Two party systems are generally thought to be more compatible with single member constituencies than proportional representation because in single member constituencies the “winner takes all.” Permanent minorities are not able to gain representation. Therefore, pressure builds to form permanent coalitions of “ins” and “outs.” These pressures do not operate in systems with proportional representation.

A second approach explains party systems as the consequence of religious, class, or cultural “cleavages.” Overlapping cleavages produce multiparty systems. Unlike the approach focusing on electoral rules, this approach stresses the social basis of party formation. According to this view, multiple party systems may persist even where electoral rules might lead one to expect the emergence of a two party system.

Perhaps the central question of current debate is: are political parties necessary for the functioning of modern mass democracy? A dominant argument in both political sociology and political science is that parties are functionally necessary to aggregate interests in mass societies. There are two reasons for this. First, the very diversity

of modern societies requires some mechanisms to aggregate individual interests. Second, the complexity of modern administration requires that information be summarized in programs that voters can relate to their ideal and material interests. Thus, for purely technical reasons, mass democracy is inconceivable without parties.

There are two possible responses to this argument. The first is that party organizations do not all have the same relationship to their electorate. Indeed, different parts of the electorate are able to subject party organizations to more or less control. Thus the “functions” that parties serve (aggregating interests and summarizing information) are more important for sectors of the population that are culturally and materially deprived. Thus, increases in leisure time (embodied in reductions in the work week) and decreases in cultural and economic inequality should lead to more responsive parties.

A second line of argument suggests that with the advent of mass media, the Internet, and other advanced means of communication, the technical constraints imposed by large states are undermined. According to this argument, direct democracy has now become a technical possibility and, for some thinkers, normatively superior to party democracy.

This raises a key empirical question: are we moving toward a “post party” democracy under the impact of technological transformation? A strand of literature in the 1990s argued for the increasing irrelevance of parties, especially in the United States. This view, however, now seems decisively refuted by recent historical experience (especially from the elections of 1994), when the rise of a highly disciplined Republican Party and a general increase in partisanship undermined the view that parties were declining. Indeed, parties use the very techniques that the technological argument sees as threatening to them (such as opinion polls and the Internet). The Internet may even have strengthened the “party ness” of the American Democratic Party. The same is true of political techniques such as referenda. Since referenda place issues directly before voters, they would seem to weaken party organizations. Many scholars, however, point to the limits of referenda. They can work only where issues can be posed

in such a way that a “yes” or “no” vote is appropriate. Further, the role of parties continues to be central in organizing referenda, getting signatures, and mobilizing voters.

Two areas of research on political parties are likely to be particularly fruitful. The first concerns the differential relationships between political parties and the underlying “base” for different social groups. Clearly, parties are in no simple way the “expression” of underlying social forces. Yet parties are also not equally “autonomous” from all social groups. As Bourdieu, Weber, and Gramsci in different ways emphasize, the relationship between parties and wealthy groups with significant leisure time is likely to be very different than the relationship between parties and sectors of the population with little leisure time, cultural capital, and wealth. Thus a crucial area for further research concerns the relations between parties and the more general structures of inequality in society.

The second key area of research concerns the explanation for the rise of political parties. There exist very few such explanations. The consensus view seems to be that two broad historical preconditions must be in place to have political parties: universal suffrage and national states. But these explanations remain overly general. There have been mass democracies without modern political parties, and there have been modern political parties without mass democracy. Further, the relationship between mass parties and nation states is not as strict as it would seem. Parties often arise as international organizations (particularly socialist parties). While they may primarily be oriented to power at the level of the nation state, most parties are also committed to a particular international order. Thus researchers would do well to explain the specific relations between parties and social structures, and the broader historical conditions of possibility for the party form of political organization.

SEE ALSO: Capital; Capitalism; Class, Status, and Power; Class and Voting; Democracy; Elites; Habitus/Field; Liberalism; Marx, Karl; Pluralism, British; Political Machine; Political Opportunities; Political Sociology; Politics; Public Sphere; State

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political process theory

Neal Caren

The standard explanation for social movement mobilization, known as political process theory (PPT), emphasizes the role of political opportunities, mobilizing structures, and framing processes, along with protest cycles and contentious repertoires. Developed in the US in the 1970s and 1980s and rooted in an analysis of civil rights struggles, PPT focuses on the interaction between movement attributes, such as organizational structure, and the broader economic and political context. Critics argue that the theory is overly structural and invariant. Recent research by core PPT theorists has shifted focus to a more dynamic analysis of the reoccurring mechanisms and processes of contentious politics.

PPT is the culmination of a series of critiques against the then prevailing social scientific view

that protestors and other social movement participants were irrational mobs, overwhelmed by a collective mentality. Movements did not result from alienation or abnormal psychological dispositions, but rather were means to achieve political ends and resolve legitimate grievances. Three precursors to PPT are noteworthy for their contributions to establishing this new analysis. First, Olson's (1965) analysis of collection behavior turned old notions about the irrationality of protestors on its head, exploring the rational and deliberate choices that individuals made before joining a movement. Second, in an influential analysis of the farm workers' movement, McCarthy and Zald (1973, 1977) found that the availability of resources to the movement, as opposed to the degree of oppression, explained much of the variation in the level of mobilization. This resource mobilization perspective counted more than just material goods as resources, including aspects such as organizational strength and the presence of elite allies. Third, Piven and Cloward (1977) brought attention to important aspects of the economic and political system. Only during periods of great system wide crisis, such as during the Depression, for example, were movements able to extract concessions from elites. Combined, these three developments formed the basis of PPT.

The foundational work in PPT is Charles Tilly's *From Mobilization to Revolution* (1978), which synthesized these insights, along with those of other historical and political sociologists. Tilly asserts that the interaction between three components – interests, organization, and opportunity – explains a contender's level of mobilization and collective action. Interests represent the potential gains from participation; organization represents the level of unified identity and networks; and opportunity represents the amount of political power, the likelihood of repression, and the vulnerability of the target. *From Mobilization to Revolution's* impact on social movement scholarship is largely indirect, as McAdam's subsequent analysis of the Civil Rights Movement became PPT's central text.

PPT crystallized in McAdam's *Political Process and the Development of Black Insurgency* (1982). Drawing on earlier critiques of classical approaches, and building on resource mobilization and especially the work of Tilly, McAdam

analyzed the rise and decline of the US Civil Rights Movement as a direct result of three factors: political opportunities, indigenous organizational strength, and cognitive liberation. Political opportunities resulted from “*any* event or broad social process that serves to undermine the calculations and assumptions on which the political establishment is structured” (p. 41). The definition was broad, and his examples included wars, industrialization, international political realignments, prolonged unemployment, and widespread demographic changes. Political opportunities worked indirectly, by changing the degree of power inequality between the challenging group and the target. Among the opportunities that McAdam found leading up to the Civil Rights Movement was the Southern black population shift from a rural to urban environment, the decline in lynchings, and the potential for international embarrassment during this phase in the Cold War.

A second factor that encouraged mobilization was the strength of indigenous organizations. These are not the organizations that were formed in the heat of the struggle, but rather the preexisting political and potentially political organizations that existed among the aggrieved community. The organizations provide members who can be recruited as a group, respected leaders, a communications network, and individual ties. For the early Civil Rights Movements, these institutions included black churches, black colleges, and the NAACP, all of which saw rapid growth in the decades immediately prior to the movement.

The third element of McAdam’s political process model is a sense of cognitive liberation among potential social movement participants. This is a result of a group process, and flows directly from the political opportunities and through local organizations. In order to participate, McAdam argues, drawing on Piven and Cloward (1977), individuals must feel that the current political system lacks legitimacy and their social movement participation could make meaningful change happen. In the case of the Civil Rights Movement, McAdam notes a dramatic shift towards optimism about the future for African Americans in polling data in the 1950s.

In addition to shifts in all three of these factors accounting for the rise of the Civil

Rights Movements, McAdam also argues that PPT accounts for the decline of mobilization as well. He charts a negative shift in all three factors in the late 1960s, which, he argues, accounts for the end of civil rights protesting during that period.

PPT has evolved since McAdam’s formulation. Notably, framing has largely replaced cognitive liberation and indigenous organizational strength has been replaced by mobilizing structures. Political opportunities – the element which has received the most attention – have been both narrowed and broadened. Additionally, Tarrow’s (1994) notion of protest cycles is sometimes included as a part of PPT, as is Tilly’s concept of repertoires of contention.

In place of cognitive liberation, PPTists soon began to speak of a movement’s framing process. Drawing heavily on the work of David Snow and colleagues, framing is the “conscious strategic efforts by groups of people to fashion shared understandings of the world and of themselves that legitimate and motivate collective action” (McAdam et al. 1996). While McAdam’s cognitive liberation was focused on an individual sense of empowerment prior to involvement, analysis of framing processes emphasizes the more strategic decisions achieved at a higher organizational level as an ongoing, dynamic process. At a minimum, a group needs to describe their grievances persuasively, the diagnostic frame, and present a feasible solution, the prognostic frame. Large movements often provide master frames, such as “civil rights,” which subsequent movement and groups can easily refer to. In contrast to the other two primarily structural elements, framing processes are the major place where the cultural is incorporated into the model. As such, framing is sometimes stretched to include all non structural elements impacting mobilization. This tendency is something that PPT critics fault as a model flaw and that PPT advocates warn against.

In a shift away from the explicit bias in favor of formal preexisting organizations in McAdam’s indigenous organizational strength, PPTists moved toward an analysis of mobilizing structures, which are “those collective vehicles, informal as well as formal, through which people mobilize and engage in collective action” (McAdam et al. 1996). This includes not only

preexisting groups, but also movement organizations and the informal networks among potential activists.

Similarly, political opportunities were found by scholars in such a variety of places as to make the concept nearly unfalsifiable. As McAdam et al. (1996) noted in their introduction, political opportunities had become an increasingly unwieldy concept, with each author operationalizing the concept in unique ways. They attempt to specify the idea by focusing on four dimensions: (1) the relative openness or closure of the institutionalized political system; (2) the stability of that broad set of elite alignments that typically undergirds a polity; (3) the presence of elite allies; and (4) the state's capacity and propensity for repression. Where McAdam's original definition had grown to fit just about everything external to the movement, this reformulation attempted to narrow the scope by focusing on more specific aspects of the political system. These efforts did not go far enough, however, for critics.

A fourth concept that is often associated with PPT is the protest cycle. This refers to historical periods of heightened contention across the political sphere, such as in 1968 in the US or 1989 in Eastern Europe, when a host of groups was challenging the legitimacy of the state. As a new political opportunity usually affects more than one group and as frames are often transferable across movements, movements that are not obviously linked can share similar life courses.

While the number of ways that a movement can make itself heard is potentially unlimited, in practice the number available to any given movement is actually quite finite. Following Tilly (1995), this limited set of ways that actors can make claims constitutes the repertoire of contention. Tilly finds that the modern repertoire of contention, which includes strikes, demonstrations, and social movements, originated in the second half of the nineteenth century. These modular forms of protest can be transferred across issues, as petitions can be organized to free political prisoners or revive cancelled television shows; in both cases the organizers, signers, and targets all know that a petition is a form of protest.

Combined, these five elements – political opportunities, mobilizing structures, framing processes, protest cycles, and contentious

repertoires – constitute the core of contemporary PPT research. In addition to explaining the rise and decline of social movements, they are also used to explain the form that protest takes and the outcomes that result.

In regards to the research by other scholars, the political opportunities element of PPT has received the most attention. In fact, the terms political opportunities and political process theory are often used interchangeably. Political opportunity has also been the focus of much, but not all, of the critiques. Goodwin and Jasper launched the best known set of criticisms in a special issue of *Sociological Forum*. Their piece, along with a variety of responses from PPT defenders and agnostics, was published in Goodwin and Jasper (2004).

Goodwin and Jasper, along with other critics from more cultural camps, see PPT as overly structural, centering stable, external factors and analyzing non structural features as if they were structures. The search for a series of invariant causal variables to explain social movement emergence, which is the hallmark of PPT, is fruitless. The varied historically specific conditions under which movements arise make such causal factors defined either in such a broad way as to be tautological and trivial or so narrow as to be only relevant for the examined case. This is particularly true for political opportunities, they argue, despite some efforts by PPTists to focus the definition. Similarly, they see mobilizing structures, including both formal and informal networks of individuals and institutions, not so much as causal factors for social movement emergence, but rather implicit in the notion of a movement as a collective. As such, it adds little to our understanding of the conditions for movement emergence. Framing process, in contrast, they see as a limited concept, forced to carry all of the non structural elements, while ignoring such relevant factors as emotions, symbols, and moral principles.

McAdam, Tarrow, and Tilly (2001), the central PPTists, have moved away from general causal arguments to a more dynamic approach to the study of "contentious politics." In place of opportunities, mobilizing structures, and framing processes, they speak of environmental, relational, and cognitive mechanisms. The emphasis is not so much on asserting that all three are causally necessary, but on identifying

the specific mechanisms within each that can be found across multiple movements. Examples of such mechanisms that they identify include brokerage, the linking of previously unconnected units; category formation, the creation of identities; and certification, a target recognition of a movement, its tactics or its claims. However, despite this distancing by its founders, PPT remains the dominant paradigm for social movement research.

SEE ALSO: Civil Rights Movement; Framing and Social Movements; Political Opportunities; Social Movement Organizations; Social Movements

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political sociology

Ryan Calder and John Lie

Political sociology analyzes the operation of power in social life, examining the distribution and machination of power at all levels: individual, organizational, communal, national, and international. Defined thus, political science becomes a subfield of sociology. Parsons (1951), for example, treated the political as one of the four principal domains of sociological analysis. In practice, however, political sociology has developed as a sociological subfield, with its distinct concerns and fashions.

Aristotle, Ibn Khaldun, or Montesquieu may rightfully claim to be the founder of political sociology insofar as they highlighted the *social* bases of power relations and political institutions. However, most contemporary scholars trace their intellectual lineage to Marx or Weber. Political sociology emerged as a distinct subfield in the 1950s, especially in the debate between pluralists and elite theorists. In the 1980s and 1990s political sociologists focused on social movements, the state, and institutions.

MARX AND WEBER

According to Marx (and Engels), economic structure and class relations are the basis for all political activity (Miliband 1977). The dominant mode of production determines who wields power in society. Under the capitalist mode of production, the capitalist class controls the state, which serves to perpetuate its domination of subordinate classes and manage "its common affairs." There are two principal strands in Marxist political sociology. The instrumentalists portray the state as the tool of a unified capitalist class that controls both the economic and political spheres. In this model, the state is virtually epiphenomenal to the dominance of the ruling class. The structuralists view the state (as well as politics more generally) as a relatively autonomous product of conflict between classes and sometimes within classes.

Whereas Marx viewed social classes as the basic units of competition, Weber (1978) recognized that competition occurs among many different types of entities, including not only

social classes but also status groups (defined in terms of consumption, codes of honor, education and credentials, ethnicity, and other criteria), as well as political agencies and agents. Contestation for power occurs both across and within various institutions and organizations: heads of state clash with parliaments and civil service bureaucracies over legislation; trade unions and professional groups vie to influence legislators; politicians and bosses fight for control of a political party. The political sphere, while linked to events in other spheres, has its own logic of contestation.

Against the Marxian stress on the economy and class struggle, the defining feature of modern western societies for Weber is the ineluctable advance of rationality. Thus, the bases of political authority shift from traditional or charismatic claims toward legal rational forms of legitimation and administration. For example, the whim of a king or lord who asserts the right to rule based on dynastic precedent (traditional authority) or heroic acts and personal qualities (charismatic authority) is replaced by state control of the populace according to normalized standards and codified laws (legal rational authority). For Weber, the modern state also extends and entrenches its domination of society by expanding its coercive apparatus, chiefly in the form of bureaucratization. The central function of modern mass citizenship is to legitimize this iron cage; even in a democracy, real power would reside in the hands of a few.

ELITE THEORY, PLURALISM, AND THE THIRD WORLD

That power in society is always concentrated in the hands of a few is the basic assumption of the elite theory of society (Bottomore 1993). The elite theorists drew heavily on Weber, but placed greater emphasis than Weber on *power* rather than *authority* as the key to political dominance. Whereas Weber agreed that the power to make major political decisions always concentrates in a small group, he viewed the authority that stems from popular support as the foundation for all institutions that provide this power. For the elite theorists, it was the reverse: power made authority, law, and political culture possible.

Michels (1966) proposed “the iron law of oligarchy”: the thesis that all organizations – whether political parties, trade unions, or any other kind – come to be run by a small group of leaders. He saw the oligarchical tendency as “a matter of technical and practical necessity,” citing several causes for this tendency: the impracticality of mass leadership, the organizational need for a small corps of full time expert leaders, the divergence of leaders’ interests from those of the people they claim to represent, and the masses’ apathy and thirst for guidance. Schumpeter agreed with elite theorists, including Pareto and Mosca, that mass participation in politics is very limited. Emphasizing the lability and pliability of popular opinion, he stated that “the will of the people is the product and not the motive power of the political process” (Schumpeter 1976).

With *The Power Elite* (1956), C. Wright Mills produced a radical version of elite theory. Mills described a “power elite” of families that dominated three sectors of American society: politics, the military, and business. The power elite was cohesive and durable because of the “coincidence of interests” among organizations in the three sectors, as well as elites’ “similarity of origin and outlook” and “social and personal intermingling.” Radical elite theory presumed the passivity of mass politics, which was articulated most influentially by Marcuse (1964).

Radical elite theory was largely a response to pluralism, which was particularly influential in US social science in the two decades following World War II. Pluralism has its roots in Montesquieu (1989), an advocate of the separation of powers and of popular participation in lawmaking, and Tocqueville (2004), who famously observed decentralization of power, active political participation by citizens, and a proliferation of associations in the early nineteenth century US. In addition to these earlier theorists, pluralists also drew inspiration from Weber, particularly in his view of the political sphere as a realm of constant contention.

The basic assumption of pluralism is that in modern democracies power is dispersed among many groups and no single group dominates. Power is dispersed in part because it has many sources, including wealth, political office, social status and connections, and popular legitimacy. Pluralists also note that individuals

often subscribe to multiple groups and interests, making pluralist systems more stable in their opinion. In this model, the state is largely an arbiter facilitating compromise between competing interests.

The 1950s and early 1960s were the heyday of pluralist theory, coinciding with the apparent stability of liberal democracy in the US, which most pluralists viewed as an exemplar. David Truman's 1953 book *The Governmental Process* was a defining work of the period, focusing on interest groups as its basic unit of analysis and examining how their interaction gave rise to policy (Truman 1971). In *Who Governs?* (1961), Robert Dahl argued that city policies in education and development were a function of input from many individuals and groups, and that neither individual office holders nor business leaders wielded overriding influence. Lipset and colleagues (1956) challenged empirically Michel's iron law of oligarchy in their analysis of a trade union.

The Cold War directed attention to democratization in the face of rapid industrialization, transition from colonial rule, and other conditions that prevailed in the third world: the world outside of Europe and North America. Modernization theory posits that societies follow a stage by stage process of political, economic, and social development. It typically portrays western democracies as consummately "modernized" societies. Different modernization theorists have highlighted different social conditions as critical to democratization. For example, Lipset (1994) has argued for the importance of "political culture," defined as popular and elite acceptance of civil and political liberties. Allied with pluralism, modernization theory delineated an optimistic, evolutionary account of democratization and development. Moore's *Social Origins of Dictatorship and Democracy* (1966) provided a profound critique – not only stressing the role of power and class struggle, but also the fact of distinct trajectories of political development – and laid the foundations for historically oriented political sociology. Dependency theory emerged in response to the apparent failure of modernization theorists' prescriptions in the developing world. Drawing heavily on Marx, dependency theory argued that the economic and political problems of the developing world were not a function of "backwardness,"

but rather of developing societies' structural positions in the capitalist world economy (Cardoso & Faletto 1979). Dependency theory inspired much of world systems theory and would come to engage in dialogue with it (Wallerstein 1984).

SOCIAL MOVEMENTS, THE STATE, AND THE NEW INSTITUTIONALISMS

Crises of authority and production shook the industrialized world in the 1960s and 1970s, including the Civil Rights Movement and protests against the Vietnam War in the US, the social upheaval of May 1968 and radicalization of the Left in France, and the global oil shocks and stalling of growth regimes. These events suggested flaws in pluralist models of democratic society that assumed stable competition among groups and consensus about the rules of the political game. Meanwhile, anti colonial nationalist movements in Africa and Southeast Asia drew further sociological attention to questions about collective behavior and the conditions for successful mobilization against state structures. In this environment the study of social movements evolved and gained prominence within sociology.

The three major theoretical models of social movements have corresponded with the pluralist, elite, and Marxist models of institutionalized power in society (McAdam 1982). The classical model of social movements portrays them as the result of structural pathologies that led to psychological strain and the desire to pursue non conventional channels for political participation in an otherwise open system. The "resource mobilization" model of social movements posits that they arise and grow because rational individuals decide that the benefits of joining outweigh the costs and because the necessary resources are available and worth investing. As such, they do not reflect social pathologies or psychological abnormalities, but are a natural feature of political life (McCarthy & Zald 1977). Finally, the political process model of social movements blends elite theorists' position that power is highly concentrated in society with the Marxist conviction that the "subjective transformation of consciousness" through popular movements nevertheless has the immanent

power to force social change (McAdam 1982). It stresses the interplay between activist strategy, skill, and intensity on the one hand, and the favorability of resources and political opportunity structures to movement tactics and goals, on the other.

One objection raised in the late 1970s to the dominance of post World War II theoretical models in the pluralist, elite, and Marxist camps was that social scientists had been focusing on social and economic activity and had largely ignored the operations of the state as an autonomous entity. Advocates of “state centered” approaches sought to remedy what they saw as a “society centered” bias in scholarship. In the introduction to *Bringing the State Back In*, Theda Skocpol (1985) remarks on the trend toward viewing states as “weighty actors” that shape political and social processes. She notes that “states . . . may formulate and pursue goals that are not simply reflective of the demands or interests of social groups, classes, or society” – that is, states are autonomous.

Research on how the modern form of the state arose has been an important part of the movement to refocus attention on the state: how states became centralized, developed functionally differentiated structures, increased their coercive power over their populations, and developed national identities that superseded class and religious differences. The bellicist model of state formation points to the pressure to organize for, prosecute, and pay for war in an environment of interstate competition on the European continent as the driving force behind the evolution of the modern state. As Tilly (1979) put it, “states make war, and war makes states.” Other scholars have emphasized different factors. Anderson (1979) stressed the power of class relations and struggles. Gorski (2003) has called attention to the significance of religion and culture. Mann (1986) has traced European state formation and the growth of western civilization in general as a function of interrelations between four types of power networks – ideological, economic, military, and political – with each taking on different levels of importance at different stages and locales in European history.

The initial call to “bring the state back in” was followed by a recognition that as broad a concept as “the state” is best analyzed in terms

of the various institutions that compose it. This led to a renewed focus on institutions, both within the state and outside it. The so called new institutionalisms build on the “old” organizational institutionalism of mid century. Selznick (1949) had called attention to the importance of informal institutions and extra organizational interests in shaping policy outcomes.

Each of the new institutionalisms defines and operationalizes institutions differently, largely a function of its origins in a social science discipline. Rational choice institutionalism, which grew out of the economics literature, defines institutions as the formal rules or “structures of voluntary cooperation that resolve collective action problems” (Moe 2005). Historical institutionalism defines institutions as formal and informal rules and procedures (Thelen & Steinmo 1992). Finally, organizational institutionalism is rooted in the sociology of organizations and embraces a wider definition of institutions than the other two institutionalisms. In addition to formal rules, it considers habits, rituals, and other cognitive frameworks to be institutions, thus situating a large part of the force of institutions within the minds of actors (DiMaggio & Powell 1983).

REDIRECTING POLITICAL SOCIOLOGY

Recent changes in national and international political environments have taken political sociology in new directions. Political sociologists have participated in the proliferation of literature on globalization, including work on postnational citizenship (Soysal 1994) and transnational advocacy networks (Keck & Sikkink 1998). The postmodern turn in the human sciences has found adherents among students of post industrial politics (Bauman 1999). There is growing interest in the realm of “subpolitics” that analyzes power outside the traditional realm of politics as a contestation for state power (Beck 1992). In this regard, gender remains understudied in the realm of politics (Gal & Kligman 2000). Theorization of the politics of ethnicity and identity has taken on new urgency in the wake of genocide in Rwanda and Bosnia (Lie 2004).

Theoretically, there are serious challenges to the very foundations of political sociology. Rational choice models are based on game theory, treating individual entities in political contexts as rational actors seeking to maximize their utility (Friedman 1996). In so doing, they deemphasize and at times ignore the social origins or dimensions of politics. From very different perspectives, Unger (1997), who argues for the autonomy of politics, and Foucault (1977), who probes the microphysics of power, bypass traditional sociological concerns with groups and institutions. For Unger and Foucault, political sociology misrecognizes the very nature and operation of power.

The evolution of political sociology has mirrored the great political movements of modern history. Just as class based models of state and society have drifted upward and downward with the political cachet of socialism and communism, and conservative elite theory linked itself to Italian Fascism in the 1920s, so pluralist models have been fellow travelers of liberal democracy's credibility and theorists of social movements interrogated the global upheavals of the 1960s and 1970s. Today, as the meaning of national boundaries and identities changes in a global age, political sociology continues to expand its intellectual horizons and investigate new configurations of power.

SEE ALSO: Democracy; Institutional Theory, New; Marx, Karl; Pluralism, American; Pluralism, British; Political Leadership; Political Machine; Political Parties; Politics; Politics and Media; Power Elite; Power, Theories of; Revolutions; Social Movements; State; Weber, Max

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politics

Peter Murphy

The discipline of sociology has generated few outright political classics. The most splendid of all of the sociological classics, Weber's *Economy and Society*, contributed a great deal to the understanding of political behavior. Yet it is not a political work in the same sense as Aristotle's *Politics* or Hobbes's *Leviathan*. *Economy and Society* sometimes hints at but never enumerates the "best practical" regime. Aristotle and Hobbes had no doubt that such a regime existed, even if they disagreed about what it was. Weber's comparison of traditional, charismatic, and procedural authority bears a passing resemblance to the comparison of monarchy, aristocracy, and democracy perennially made by the great political thinkers. But the resemblance is limited.

The discipline of politics persistently asks "what is the best type of state?" Answers vary, but the question is constant. The prime object of sociological inquiry is not the state but society. Even Weber, who was politically astute,

preferred terms like "authority" and "domination" to "the state." Sociological categories have a much broader application than expressly political categories like "democracy" or "monarchy." Weber's discussion of legitimate authority was a major and enduring contribution to understanding the consensual foundations of power. But it did not replace the older and equally enduring topic of political regime. The limits of political sociology are exemplified by the following. A democracy can be traditional, charismatic, or procedural, depending on time and circumstance. Even if we can resolve which one of these types of legitimate authority we favor, and which we think would be most feasible for a country in a given period or situation, larger questions still remain. Is democracy preferable to monarchy or military rule? Which regime – stratocracy or democracy, oligarchy or monarchy – is most compatible with tradition, charisma, and procedure?

Lewis (2003) illustrates neatly the difference between political sociology and classic political inquiry. Lewis uses Weber's categories to analyze the pervasiveness of traditional authority – such as clientalism and patrimonialism – in contemporary Arab societies. But the alternative postulated to this – democracy – is originally a Greek term with a very old lineage extending back to antiquity. Its provenance belongs to political thinkers from Plato and Aristotle to Rawls and Strauss.

In short, sociology is not political science reborn. Yet sociology does have a political resonance. It is a kind of deferred politics. This stems from one overwhelming fact. Sociology emerges out of the disintegration of hierarchical societies or, in Weber's terms, out of the fraying of traditional authority. At its core, sociology is an answer to a neo-Kantian question: How is society possible without the binding agent of hierarchy? This is a political question insofar as, until the beginning of the nineteenth century, all states – whether they were city states, monarchies, or empires – were built around social hierarchies. Political forms turned on the social orders of master and servant, noble and commoner, tribute receiver and giver, citizen and free person, slave owner and slave. Something staggering began to happen in the late eighteenth century. The traditional social authority of hierarchy started to be replaced.

The drive to explain what it was that was replacing hierarchies created sociology. This had a political spin off. Anyone who tried to explain the post hierarchical social condition also had to hypothesize about the nature of post hierarchical states.

One of the best hypotheses was Weber's idea that traditional authority was being replaced by legal rational authority. This, though, applied as much to the business corporation as it did to the state. It was a social not just a political phenomenon. The rise of procedural rationality changed the nature of businesses and associations as much as it did the state. There was also the question of how sociology judged procedural rationality. Political science always operated with the image of the best, or the best practical, state. It might have been a monarchy or a mixed regime, a democracy or a republic. Sociology hedged its bets much more. Weber, for instance, equated the future with legal rational institutions, seeing their sway as inevitable. Yet he had grave misgivings about procedural bureaucracies dominating decision making.

Muddying the waters, legal rational bureaucracy produced its own kind of hierarchy. But this type of hierarchy – organizational hierarchy – was quite unlike traditional social hierarchy. Durkheim introduced the following distinction that helps clarify the situation. The old hierarchical society generated uniformity. Its binding force was “mechanical” or repressive. In contrast, the solidarity of the new society was “organic” or sympathetic. The shift from the old order produced specialized, differentiated, functional hierarchies (i.e., organizations). The qualified labor, professionals, and skilled workers who filled these organizations cooperated out of altruism and imagination rather than because of repressive direction. Yet Durkheim also observed that this “organic” solidarity often failed and was often pathological. The reason for this, Durkheim thought, was the persistence of inequality. The Achilles' heel of the new egalitarian society that emerged out of the old hierarchical order was a lack of equality. This paradox was to perpetually haunt the sociological discipline.

As traditional hierarchies crumbled, organizational ties replaced personal relations, engineers replaced aristocrats, and political parties

replaced kings and notables. Legal rational procedures helped transform social classes into functional classes. Sociology was ambivalent about whether the new world of differentiated, functional organizations was bound together by ethics or by knowledge. It was often unclear whether the cooperation of differentiated organizations was due to the knowledge seeking of professional and skilled classes – or whether it was due to the moral character of those classes. Notions of professional and vocational ethics (Durkheim, Weber) were a hedge against the need to decide the question definitively. Sociology thus bequeathed two interrelated strands. One said that post hierarchical societies were knitted together by “constructive knowledge” (Comte). The other attributed social integration to ethical norms like contractual honesty that replaced the loyalty and faith of hierarchical orders.

Often, post hierarchical society was seen as the product of an epochal transition – from metaphysical to positive knowledge (Comte), militant to industrial society (Comte and Spencer), consumer to producer society (Comte), status to contract, community to society, class to classless society (Marx), uniformity to differentiation, producer to consumer society, ascription to achievement, anarchic local power to pacified territorial power (Elias), and so on.

Each of these stage like models was obliquely political. Each model assumed that the evolution from martial to industrial society also transformed state, law, and justice. This is evident, for example, in the case of Marx. He observed that the hierarchical state of estates was in decline. The struggle of social classes was both the final gasp of the old order and the first breath of a new world without masters and servants. This was not far from the truth. A different social order was emerging out of the declining world of social hierarchy. Marx was shy when talking about the shape of this new order. His labeling of it as communism was misleading. Yet, like many nineteenth century thinkers, Marx did think that this new society was being erected on the foundations of science. Knowledge was a bonding agent of societies that were wrenching themselves free from hierarchy. Whether this was creative knowledge or instead more narrowly professional knowledge was less clear. Free time to work at the arts and sciences

and the immanent creation of socialism out of capitalist organization were both leitmotifs of the older Marx.

The political thinker most admired by sociologists – Alexis de Tocqueville – spoke repeatedly of the transformation of society from hierarchy to equality. The outgrowth of this shift was democracy. Democracy conceived as the offspring of equality first emerged in the US. The US was a laboratory for inventing the future of the world. This happened because hierarchical ties were weak among the American colonists (Wood 1992). What emerged from this crucible was a new type of society. It had patrimonial political bosses and chattel slavery. But, in many of its fundamental aspects, its social constitution dispensed with traditional hierarchy. American sociologists gave various names to the kind of society that this produced. It was a society of people who were “lonely” or “marginal” and who constantly met other people they were unacquainted with and consequently developed dramaturgical skills to negotiate the expanding public world of strangers. With these stage skills, they learnt to “present” themselves in everyday public situations and manage other people’s impressions of them. They also learnt to move adroitly between primary intimate relations, secondary work relationships, and tertiary long distance anonymous relations.

Underpinning this was the growth of a large scale pacified political territory in the US. This was akin to what Elias (2000) observed of Europe, but it was on a much more extensive scale. The American polity was integrated by powerful communication networks and was achieved by multiple wars in North America in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. Comte had schematized the evolution of society from city state to nation state, and had predicted a coming cosmopolitan order of mini states. America, it seemed, had realized a version of this before Comte had even imagined it. The European transition from hierarchical order was rockier, more fraught, and slower than in the US. Nonetheless, European sociology contributed enormously to understanding the consequences of this epochal development. The pressure on hierarchies in Europe caused sociologists to look closely at social clusters that did not fit into the frame of traditional

hierarchies – such as “strangers,” “free floating intelligentsia,” and “entrepreneurs.”

Some sociologists embraced the post hierarchical world enthusiastically. But most were ambivalent about it. Sometimes the ambivalence grew out of a feeling that equality had not displaced hierarchy sufficiently. It was variously observed that race theorists had invented new pseudo hierarchies to replace old ones, relations between men and women resisted equality, and that former European colonies embraced the rhetoric of proceduralism but practiced clientalism. Other sociologists wondered whether the loss of hierarchy led to anomie and the “twilight of authority.” Some asked whether procedural reason created human beings without character. Many sociologists who pressed for greater equality also regretted the passing of the intimacy and warmth of personalized hierarchies. They were often unfriendly towards procedural social and political forms, and sometimes surprisingly well disposed to collegial patrimonies. Some also wondered whether primitive, heroic, martial, or militant societies made better, more lasting, and more substantial things than the newer egalitarian societies. Democratic societies proclaimed equality but in practice were status obsessed. This status, though, was not the inheritable kind typical of a hierarchical society. It was rather the status that accrued to the conspicuous consumption of dematerialized signs of display and spectacle that proliferated especially in media saturated democracies.

This, though, was still politics at a tangent. Sociological anxieties generated a large literature on race, gender, and consumption. Some of it had some impact on legislation. Other times, though, sociology found itself in the contradictory position of arguing for equality but criticizing its outcomes. Such ambivalence neutered it as a political force. Its collective concerns never generated the kind of capital P politics that we find in Aristotle or Hobbes. A theory of politics invariably rests on a notion of the best way of living. In the classic political tradition there are essentially three answers to the question of “what is the best way of living?” Two were given by Aristotle: (1) citizenship of the city and (2) contemplative or theoretical knowledge. The third answer to the question originated with the Stoics and Epicureans, and

was reformulated by Hobbes: freedom from fear, most particularly freedom from the fear of death.

Sociology, for the most part, downplayed these classic axioms. The following examples illustrate some of the ways in which this happened. Weber declared the city to be a “non legitimate form of domination.” Bourdieu held that cultural and symbolic capital frustrated equality. Beck replaced freedom from the fear of death with the incalculable uncertainties of a “risk society.”

The skewed distribution of risk was the new est of the new inequalities of the late twentieth century. The risk society was overdetermined by global threats (e.g., viruses) uncontainable by national borders. The analysis of it generated sociology for cosmopolitan bureaucracy. The moral of this is that each new discovered inequality in post hierarchical societies leads to the creation of an expert bureaucracy to manage it, which, in turn, creates new unexpected inequalities. The difficulty of sociological politics – as opposed to classical politics – is that its value horizon (equality) is constantly in flux. The polarity between hierarchy and equality generates perpetual dissatisfaction. The forward march of equality is never sufficient while the backward glance to old hierarchies is tinged with regret. The ghosts of the past whisper seductively about the certainty, intimacy, community, and immobility of the old order. The sociological conscience worries that this is anti modern and unprogressive.

Not all sociologists, though, have been indifferent to the classic political ideals of urbanity, intellect, and happiness. Robert Park and the Chicago School, and their legatees like Sennett, eulogized the city. Others, like Daniel Bell, Agnes Heller, and Cornelius Castoriadis, recognized the centrality of creative knowledge in post hierarchical societies. The analyses of this spirited, inventive knowledge owed as much to Aristotle as to Durkheim. This was more than the sociology of professional or vocational knowledge. It also reached high into the imaginative realms of the arts and sciences and philosophy. Florida applied ideas about creative societies and creative classes to the analysis of cities and workplaces. This urbane sociology drew three basic conclusions. The intensification of creative imagination is the defining trait

of autonomous post hierarchical societies. Great cities are their incubators. The personality types most at home in these societies are happy, confident, courageous, witty, skeptical Stoic Epicurean types (Heller 1985).

Such analyses owed something, even if only distantly, to Marx – who, in turn, owed something, again distantly, to Aristotle and Epicurus. Marx’s influence on sociological politics, though, overall was ambivalent. For one thing, it confirmed the thinness of sociological theories of the state. This could not be otherwise because Marx’s classless society was also a stateless society. The sociological thinkers who resisted this apolitical conclusion tended to have some interest in the classic political tradition from Aristotle to Hobbes. For those sociologists who did not, a tension was created. On the one hand, they carried over tacit assumptions about the coming of the stateless society from nineteenth century Marxism and classical liberalism. On the other hand, they knew the reality of the twentieth century state, which had expanded not shrunk, and that delivered roads and hospitals, welfare and social security, defense and education.

Sociology ended up in a double bind. Its mainstream engaged in strenuous polemics with classical liberals or philosophical anarchists who wanted small government as a step toward a stateless society. At the same time, many of its number criticized the bureaucracy, repression, systemic nature, waste, normative discipline, or militarism of the state. Theories touched by anarchism, such as Foucault’s, were popular with such critics – as was Habermas’s pragmatism that counterposed an idealized public sphere to the institutionalized state.

Alvin Gouldner presents a good example of a sociologist crossing the road from institutionalism to anarchism to pragmatism. Like Selznick and Bendix, Gouldner’s political sociology starts with Weber inspired studies of America’s industrial bureaucracies. Yet his work is colored with sympathy for wild cat strikes against that bureaucracy. The later Gouldner, like C. Wright Mills before him, turns to Dewey’s idea of the public in order to resolve the tension between institutional and romantic sociology. In Gouldner’s case, he finds his way to the pragmatic public via Habermas. This detour is significant. For while Dewey’s notion

of the public is much closer in spirit to Comte than to Hegel, the main currents in twentieth century sociology reinterpret the idea of the public in the spirit of critical negation rather than positive knowledge. For Habermas, in particular, the logic of the public presupposes the defense of the pre institutional lifeworld against institutional systems. Correspondingly, while systems, based on power and money, are not to be demolished, they are to be constrained.

The difficulty for sociology as an intellectual discipline is that it ends up both defending the state and wanting to be rid of it. The tradition of classic political thought has to bear less of a burden. It supposes that the state is a given. Societies for the most part produce states. The political question is not whether the state exists or not, but what is the endpoint of the state? Does the state serve the *telos* of city life, intellect, and freedom from fear – or not? Classic politics advances a triptych of freedoms: the freedom of the city (citizenship), the freedom of the mind (knowledge), and the freedom from worry (happiness). There is no doubt that the sociological question of whether the state serves hierarchy or equality is important. Yet neither hierarchy nor equality constitutes a substantive end. Without the anchor of such an end, each can turn tyrannical and destructive. Tradition, charisma, and procedure by themselves provide no inherent barrier to this happening.

SEE ALSO: Democracy; Marx, Karl; Political Leadership; Political Opportunities; Political Parties; Political Sociology; Politics and Media; Politics and Sport; State; Weber, Max

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politics and media

Brian McNair

In 1922 the American journalist and social commentator Walter Lippmann wrote that “the significant revolution of modern times is the revolution taking place in the art of creating consent among the governed” (Lippmann 1954). From his vantage point in the early twentieth century, just four years after the end of World War I, Lippmann was drawing attention to the fact that politicians were entering a new era in which the role of the media was going to be central to effective government. Henceforth, they would have to know and understand how the media impacted on public opinion. Such knowledge, he predicted, would “alter every political premise.”

And so it has turned out. Politics in the twenty first century is inconceivable without the part played by media institutions. As reporters, analysts, and interpreters of events to mass electorates the media are integral to the democratic process and no politician, party, or government can afford to ignore or dismiss them. This entry examines how the media came to acquire this role, and its implications for how politics is conducted in modern societies.

POLITICS AND MEDIA: A HISTORY

Since the invention of the printing press by Gutenberg in the late fifteenth century, media have driven politics. Early correspondents were employed by monarchs, bishops, aristocrats, and other elites in feudal societies as sources of information, be it from the far reaches of the kingdom, or from overseas. The first journalists provided a form of surveillance for political elites, making available information on the state

of markets and commodity prices, or the progress of wars and court intrigues. The news informed decisions and policymaking, although it was heavily censored to prohibit any criticism of established political power. Feudal monarchies were authoritarian, and like authoritarian regimes then and since, freedom of thought and of media outlets to express it were severely restricted. They were potent political tools, nonetheless. The first books and pamphlets were crucial to Martin Luther's Reformation, spreading revolutionary Protestant ideas and ending the primacy of the Roman Catholic Church in countries where it had previously ruled.

The rise of recognizably free media accompanied the rise of democracy from the ashes of feudalism in the seventeenth century, and was indeed an essential part of that process. The English Civil War saw the relaxation of feudal censorship and the emergence of the first independent newspapers, free to take sides in political disputes. This they did with enthusiasm, promoting and propagandizing the positions of the royalists on the one hand or the roundheads on the other. For the first time journalists became participants in political events rather than merely reporters of them. During the 1640s, as civil war raged in England, leading to the execution of Charles I and the abolition of the monarchy, newspapers and pamphlets were heavily partisan, inflating the atrocities and outrages of the opposing side while downplaying the crimes of their own.

The restoration of Charles II temporarily brought an end to press freedom in England, but as capitalism and constitutional monarchy took root in the late seventeenth and eighteenth centuries the rights of the media to report politics, and themselves participate in political debate as significant actors, came to be viewed as essential elements of an emerging democracy. Philosophers such as John Milton articulated a theory of democracy within which the media would play the role not just of reporting events, but of scrutinizing power. Mindful of the possibility of a return to the censorship practices of feudal times, Britain's rising bourgeoisie allotted to journalists the role of Fourth Estate, overseeing the activities of representative government, defending intellectual freedom and diversity, and preventing the restoration of

despotism. A free media and an effective democracy would henceforth be inseparable.

In the late eighteenth century similar ideas also drove the French and American revolutions. In the former's overthrow of a decadent aristocracy the media played a key role, disseminating ideas of liberty, freedom, and equality to a nation ready for revolutionary leadership. In America, fighting for its independence from the colonial master Britain, journalists spearheaded a process within which, as Paul Starr's *Creation of the Media* (2004) puts it, "restrictive information regimes [evolved] into more open ones." With the help of independent media, and with press freedom written into the Constitution, post revolutionary America developed free of "the legacies of feudalism and absolutism."

Between them, the English, French, and American revolutions defined the modern role of the media in democracy as active, interventionist, and adversarial. The journalist was to be a constraint on the exercise of political power, one of the checks and balances without which democratic government could so easily slip back into authoritarian habits.

The media also became the foundation for what German philosopher Jürgen Habermas called the public sphere, referring to that common communicative space in which events and ideas can be discussed and public opinion formed. If democracy emphasized freedom of political choice exercised through the act of voting, choice could only be meaningful given the availability of reliable and accurate information, and after rational debate. The public sphere was where such debate ideally took place, and the media were the institutions which comprised the public sphere. The early days of democracy saw the rise of "coffee house cultures" in major European capitals such as London, Edinburgh, Paris, and Berlin, where members of the political and intellectual elites would gather to read their newspapers and debate with each other on the meaning of the events reported in them. Journalists helped make sense of political affairs for their readers, who would then use that understanding to make decisions at election time. In America, observes Starr (2004), the media had by the early 1800s become "vehicles of discussion ... immense moral and political engines."

THE MEDIA AND DEMOCRACY

These elites comprised the wealthy, relatively well educated men who in those days monopolized voting rights. They were often also progressive and reformist, campaigning for the extension of the democratic rights which they enjoyed to broader sections of the population. Under the influence of reformist media and democratic theorists such as John Stuart Mill, suffrage expanded to include more and more of the population, irrespective of social background, property, or educational qualifications. By the early twentieth century in most countries women had the vote, although it took until the 1960s for African Americans to be given full democratic rights in the US. Around the world democracy has expanded from a small minority of countries a century ago, to the great majority today, including Russia and most of the countries of the former Soviet Union after 1989, South Africa in 1994, and Iraq and Afghanistan in recent times.

At the same time as democratic rights were being extended to more and more people, the media were evolving into institutions for the masses. As capitalist societies developed, universal education and mass literacy became a reality and the market for journalism expanded to include the middle and lower classes. In the nineteenth century Britain saw the emergence of a "pauper press" aimed at working people, then a commercial press targeted at a mass readership (Curran & Seaton 1997). At the same time America gave birth to a "penny press," and by the late nineteenth century the number of publications in the US had risen from around 600 to more than 2,000. Newspapers fell in price, and popular journalism as we know it today came into being. Politics remained important in content, but was increasingly presented alongside a journalism of entertainment and recreation.

By the 1920s, and Walter Lippmann's influential study of *Public Opinion*, the combination of mass media and representative democratic institutions had transformed the political environment, making politicians necessarily more responsive to popular feelings than they had ever been required to be before. For the first time in human history, something called public opinion mattered. People had democratic rights, and politicians had to respect them if they

wished to be elected. Once elected, the media monitored and scrutinized political performance before a public empowered to remove any government from office. This is what Lippmann meant when observing that every political premise had been altered.

PUBLIC OPINION, PUBLIC RELATIONS, AND PROPAGANDA

The implications of the new political environment became clear during World War I. Although universal suffrage did not yet exist anywhere in the world when war broke out in 1914, democratic rights had by then expanded sufficiently to ensure that the British and American governments could not prosecute war with Germany in the absence of a compliant public. Official efforts began to persuade publics of the merits of war, which included crude propaganda of the type which would have been familiar to the journalistic partisans of the English Civil War, but also more sophisticated efforts at opinion management. World War I saw the US and British governments, among others, establishing the first official information agencies to manage news (and thus public opinion) about conflict. The same tools were used after World War I in the dispute with Bolshevik Russia, and are now standard practice for democratic governments engaged in conflict. Governments can no longer take their countries to war without consideration of the state of public opinion. If they dare to do so they risk electoral defeat and political impotence, as experienced by the government of Jose Maria Aznar in Spain. In that case, Aznar and his party underestimated the popular mood against the country's involvement in the US led invasion of Iraq. When al Qaida terrorists killed 200 people in Madrid on March 11, 2004, two days before the general election, they also brought about Aznar's defeat.

The growing importance of public opinion in the twentieth century propelled the growth of a new kind of communication, expressly intended to influence media output and through it public opinion. Lippmann and other pioneers of what we now know as public relations called it "press counseling," meaning the effort to influence what media organizations wrote and said about politics. Practicing this new form of

communication were press counselors, skilled in the techniques of making media amenable to the wishes of politicians. There have always been those who played this role, going back to feudal times and beyond. The great English diarist Samuel Pepys was a press counselor for Charles II, and political leaders have always relied on advisers when it comes to managing the opinions of those who matter to them. In those days, such opinion management as was deemed necessary took place largely within and between small groups of courtiers or factions, on whom the king or bishop relied for support for a particular policy.

Public relations in the modern sense is a direct response to the growth of mass democracy on the one hand, and mass media on the other. Both make necessary an intermediate communicative class, a Fifth Estate operating in the space between politics and journalism, whose professional role is to manage, shape, and manipulate public opinion through managing, shaping, and manipulating the output of the media. Today, it is often called spin, a term which carries a negative connotation, but which quite accurately conveys the notion that this form of political communication aims to put a "spin" on the meaning of events as they appear in the public sphere. Events happen, and they are reported. Spin, and spin doctors, strive to ensure that the reportage, as well as the analysis and commentary which make up so much of contemporary political journalism, are advantageous to their political clients.

The importance of this communicative work means that all serious actors in modern politics undertake it. In a world where politics is conducted in public, through the media, competent public relations is an integral element of effective political action. This is true for al Qaida as much as for the US and British governments; for trade unionists and churches as much as for employers' federations and consumer lobbies; for all organizations, in short, which aim to influence the political environment in one way or another.

We have seen in the course of the twentieth century, and in recent decades in particular, the growth of military public relations, as governments have sought to persuade publics of the legitimacy of military actions in the Falklands, the Balkans, and the Middle East, among other

places. We have seen the rise of terrorist public relations, as groups such as the IRA and ETA have developed sophisticated media management divisions, capable of capturing the news agenda and influencing public opinion about their respective grievances. An event like the destruction of the Twin Towers on September 11, 2001 can be viewed from this perspective as public relations by al Qaida insofar as its aim, ruthlessly executed, was to command the news agenda and strike fear into western populations. Al Qaida's political goals – the destruction of western civilization and democracy – were not made more likely by these spectacularly violent acts of political communication, but they brought forth a change in the political environment which will shape the world for years to come.

We have seen the rise of party political public relations, as parties and their representatives use techniques adapted from advertising and marketing to package and promote themselves. This may involve the "selling" of particular policies and programs, especially during election campaigns, or it may involve image management, making individual politicians more personally attractive to voters. As time passes the sums spent on political public relations increase (as does advertising spend), and the numbers of professional PR advisers expand. Once in government, parties harness official information agencies to promote policy decisions and manage public responses to them. Unelected press secretaries, media spokespersons, and communication advisers proliferate as the government information apparatus expands.

POLITICAL PUBLIC RELATIONS: DANGER TO DEMOCRACY?

The rise of political public relations has been criticized by many observers. For UK scholar Bob Franklin (2004), it amounts to a "packaging" of politics which fundamentally undermines the integrity of the democratic process. Jürgen Habermas, having developed the concept of the public sphere to describe how the media should work in democracy, criticizes the corruption of the ideal by the privately motivated, highly partial communications of the PR professional. If democracy is about

rational choice and debate, argue the critics, do not the efforts of professional advisers to manipulate both media and publics represent the antithesis of rationality?

These are powerful arguments, supported by the evidence of the efforts of some spin doctors to intimidate the political media into following their wishes. In Britain, the bullying tactics of Bernard Ingham for Margaret Thatcher in the 1980s, or Alistair Campbell on behalf of Tony Blair, have become emblematic of the excesses of political public relations. After Campbell's resignation from his post as Blair's chief media adviser the Labour government was obliged by hostile journalistic and public opinion to reform its communication apparatus. The names of Ingham and Campbell, of Bill Morris and Karl Rove in America, and their equivalents across the democratic world, have become associated with a perceived erosion of the democratic process, and the contamination of rational political communication with duplicitous propaganda.

The defenders of spin, on the other hand, point to trends in the developing relationship between politics and the media which make managed political communication inevitable and essential, if not necessarily desirable in the best of all possible worlds.

First, there are many more media outlets, providing much more information, circulating at much faster rates than ever before in history. Newspapers and broadcasting and online media have produced a turbulent and chaotic media environment in which it becomes evermore difficult to communicate effectively. Public relations, it is argued, restores order to the chaos of political communication. In a democracy we may choose not to accept the message, but at least we should be aware of what it is.

It has been argued, second, that the traditional adversarialism of the media towards politicians, enshrined in democratic theory since the eighteenth century, has tipped into excessive "hyperadversarialism." American writer James Fallows (1996) has used this term to describe what he sees as the commercially driven tendency for journalism to become confrontational towards politicians, and to turn the legitimate scrutiny of power into gladiatorial spectacle. The commercial pressure to attract readers and viewers has produced a form of political journalism which is all style and no substance,

mistaking argumentation and dispute for debate. Journalists have become celebrities, elevating their own opinions and prejudices over their democratic duty to provide straightforward reportage of politics. British journalist John Lloyd, in a book entitled *What the Media Are Doing To Our Politics* (2004), is one of those who have accused journalists of adopting a stance of "corrosive cynicism" towards politicians and politicians, and contributing to declining rates of electoral participation and public apathy.

In this context, public relations and spin become a means of ensuring that political messages are communicated and understood by those for whom they are intended, the public. In an environment where the default position of the journalist towards the politician can be summed up by the phrase "why is that lying bastard lying to me?" the communications adviser is an essential tool in the struggle to be heard.

LOOKING AHEAD

Just as politicians and media professionals have their ethical codes which can be abused, so the profession of public relations can be employed for corrupt ends. To denounce spin in absolute terms is, then, no more rational than denouncing all politicians or all journalists. For better or worse, the spin doctor has become a pivotal element in the politics-media-public relationship. As media channels continue to proliferate and the political environment to grow more volatile as a consequence, that relationship will continue to be a focus of debate about the health of democracy, as it has been since Lippmann's observation of nearly a century ago.

SEE ALSO: Media and the Public Sphere; Political Leadership; Political Sociology; Politics; Public Opinion; Public Sphere

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politics and sport

Barrie Houlihan

There are many definitions of politics which, while not mutually exclusive, highlight distinct understandings and orientations. The dominant definition limits politics to the study of the institutions of government at national and transnational levels. However, this narrow focus on the public sphere has been strongly challenged by, among others, critical theorists and feminists on the grounds that politics can also be defined more broadly as concerning any social relations which involve the exercise of power and authority. Such a definition expands the focus of the study of politics beyond the institutions of government to include institutions in civil society such as national sports federations, the World Anti Doping Agency, local sports clubs, and individual teams. A third definition emphasizes processes of decision making and would, for example, draw attention to the influence of the media and the role of interest groups and individuals in lobbying governments. Finally, there are definitions of politics that emphasize the outcomes of political processes, best summed up by Harold Lasswell as “who gets what, when, and how.”

Whether the emphasis is placed on institutions, processes, or outcomes, central to all these definitions of politics is the complex and elusive concept of power. From within a broadly positivist epistemology, power refers to the capacity of one group of interests to impose its will in the face of opposition from other groups. For example, the outlawing of sports considered by some to be dangerous to participants (e.g., professional boxing) has, in many countries, been the regular subject of lobbying and parliamentary debate regarding the need for state regulation.

However, this pluralist conceptualization of power, as an essentially observable phenomenon, was challenged by Bachrach and Baratz (1963) who argued from a neo elitist position that power may also be exercised covertly to ensure that an issue is kept off the political agenda. The exclusion, at various times and to varying degrees, of women and people from ethnic minorities from participation in sport across a wide range of countries provides ample evidence for the effectiveness of what Schattschneider (1960) referred to as the “mobilization of bias” to steer the agenda so that issues and proposals that challenged established norms and patterns of privilege were not subject to significant public debate.

Working within a broadly Gramscian neo Marxist ontology, Lukes (1974) further developed the debate by arguing that power could also be conceived of as preference shaping, that is, preventing people from expressing their grievances by shaping their perception of their own interests such that they accept the current social economic arrangements. For example, it could be argued that the underparticipation of certain social groups in sport is due not to the overt or even covert rejection of their claims for access, but to their acceptance that sports participation is inappropriate social behavior. Such groups are considered to be unaware of their true interests or, in Marxist terminology, are victims of false consciousness. This conceptualization of power is central to much Marxist and feminist political theory, which argues that the exercise of power, whether intended to defend capitalism or patriarchy, extends beyond the narrow public political sphere and permeates all social institutions.

A more radical conceptualization of power is provided by Foucault, who emphasized the close interconnection between power and expert knowledge and drew attention to the role of discourse in structuring power in society. For him the capacity to control the discourse used to discuss social issues and relationships was a key reflection of power. According to this view, the medical profession would be considered to fulfill a key role in the complex process of signification and legitimation that shapes the social construction of disability sport and the competitive context within which it takes place.

Political scientists were generally slow to recognize sport as an appropriate topic for analysis, largely because of the dominance of definitions of politics that emphasized the centrality of the role of government and state institutions. Until the mid 1960s few governments took more than an occasional interest in sport. Much of the early systematic political analysis of the relationship between politics and sport came from Marxists, for whom the state was a superstructural phenomenon determined by, and dependent upon, economic power, and for whom concepts such as ideology, false consciousness, class and social control were central to their social analysis. Drawing loosely on Gramscian Marxism, the American Paul Hoch (1972) analyzed the US sports system and concluded that sport fulfilled the same function of ideological control that Marx claimed for religion in the nineteenth century. For Hoch the exploitative capitalist sports system was maintained not through force but through ideological manipulation. A similar analysis was produced by Jean Marie Brohm (1978) who, writing from within a European context, emphasized not only the ideological importance of contemporary sport, but also the role of the state in constructing and promoting that ideology. For Brohm the state played an important part in the commodification of sport and in facilitating the use of sport as a means for imposing capitalist discipline on the working class.

A related theme in the analysis of sport and politics was provided by those Marxists interested in the colonial experience. James (1963) provided a sophisticated and classic study of the experience of colonialism through an analysis of the role of cricket in Caribbean society and also identified the limitations of western Marxism in dealing with issues of race. The politics of race and sport rapidly became a major theme in sport studies along with other equity issues relating to gender, wealth, and space.

As sport became more firmly established as a normal part of democratic state activity from the late 1960s it began to attract interest from academics who subscribed to the narrower definitions of politics, which focused substantially on the institutions, processes, and impact

of the state. However, it should be remembered that earlier in the 1950s a number of European communist countries, most notably the German Democratic Republic and the Soviet Union, invested heavily in sport, often to support nation building and to use international, especially Olympic, success to demonstrate the superiority of communism over capitalism. For many non communist industrial countries, the 1960s was the decade when state involvement changed from being substantially reactive, tentative, and episodic to being proactive, extensive, and systematic as governments in many industrialized countries gradually expanded their direct involvement in sport through the establishment of administrative units, the appointment of ministers, the allocation of budgets, and the formulation of strategic plans for sport. By the early twenty first century, sport had become an established element in the remit of governments of most industrialized countries, both in its own right and, more usually, as an aspect of other policy areas such as foreign affairs, health, and economic development.

As the foregoing discussion suggests, the contemporary scope of the study of politics and sport is broad. With the various definitions of politics and power in mind, it is useful to distinguish between politics *and* sport and politics *in* sport. The study of politics *and* sport directs our attention to the use made by governments, whether democratic or not, of sport and the process by which public policy is made and implemented. A focus on politics *in* sport is derived from the definitions of politics which do not demarcate between the public and the private spheres and which treat politics as a ubiquitous aspect of all social institutions and relations.

A concern with politics *and* sport tends to direct analysis toward the role of the state and particularly the motives for, and modes of, state intervention. In many countries state involvement in sport was initially motivated by a concern to control or outlaw certain activities considered to be cruel (forms of hunting) or dangerous to the participant (sword fencing/dueling). More recently, governments have been very active in attempting to control the use of drugs in sport. A second common motive is the use of sport to achieve greater social integration

and control, whether related to the populations of new states, rapidly urbanized populations, immigrants, or particular groups such as juvenile offenders. Nation building through sport is common even in economically advanced and politically stable countries. Few governments ignore the opportunity to use the symbolism of sporting success to reinforce national identity. However, sport is not always an integrative force as there are many examples of sport being used to emphasize subnational and separatist identity, including in Québec, Catalonia, and among the nationalist community in Northern Ireland. The symbolism of sport is powerful but not always as malleable and stable as governments would like.

A third major motive for government involvement in sport is as a diplomatic tool. The rapid internationalization of sports competition in the last 60 years and the advances in media technology of the last 40 years have combined to make sport an increasingly attractive diplomatic resource. Its attraction to governments lies in its combination of high visibility, low risk, versatility, and low cost. Sport has been used variously as a device for building a closer relationship between enemies, as was the case when the United States sent a table tennis team to China in 1972 as a first step in improving relations between the two countries. Sports diplomacy is more commonly used as a means of maintaining good relations with allies or neighbors. For example, the importance of the Commonwealth Games has increased as the significance of the Commonwealth in global politics has declined. A further diplomatic use of sport, most common in the 1970s and 1980s, is as a means of registering disapproval of a state's actions through attempts to isolate a state from international sporting contact. Apartheid in South Africa and the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan prompted boycotts of major sports events by disapproving states.

The attempt to isolate South Africa because of its policy of apartheid is a particularly valuable illustration of the use of sport diplomacy as well as of the interaction of domestic sport policy with the actions of international political actors. Much has been made of the powerful symbolism of sport to white South Africans, but an undermining of the opportunity to experience that symbolism through the

application or threat of a boycott was, in itself, an irritation rather than a major threat to apartheid. More important was the way in which the groups opposed to apartheid used international sport as an activity, and international sports organizations as contexts, initially to raise awareness of the issue of apartheid and then to ensure its continued prominence. Lobbying by the South African Non Racial Olympic Committee through the more easily accessed international sports bodies, such as the International Olympic Commission (IOC), the Commonwealth Games Federation, and the International Amateur Athletics Federation (IAAF), was used as a stepping stone to more powerful organizations such as the Commonwealth Heads of Government Meetings and the United Nations. Sport's value was therefore primarily in providing a point of entry to the agendas of major global political actors (Houlihan & Keech 1999).

A final major motive for government interest in sport is to use it as a tool for economic development and regeneration. At a national strategic level, Japan, South Korea, and Greece used the hosting of the Olympic Games as opportunities to project images of modern sophisticated economies. Other states have selectively developed those sports, such as golf and skiing, that helped to promote tourism. It is also increasingly common for bids to host major sports events to be part of a regional or metropolitan economic strategy. Both Barcelona and Athens, as hosts to the 1992 and 2004 Olympic Games respectively, built major urban regeneration and tourism promotion strategies around their successful bids.

In considering the nature of politics *in* sport, a good starting point is Lasswell's definition of politics as the study of "who gets what, when, and how," which draws attention to the significance of sports organizations and non sports organizations, especially from the commercial sector, in affecting access to, and the nature of, sports opportunities for individual athletes or of groups which may be defined, for example, geographically or by sport, race, or gender: sports and non sports organizations are, in effect, part of the private governance of sport.

The growth of commercialism has altered the power relations in sport and has led to changes to the rules of sports to suit major corporate

sponsors, the marginalizing of non western and especially non Olympic sports, and the undermining of the ethical basis of sport in the interest of more dramatic (aggressive) and more sensational sport to meet the requirements of the media. At a broader level, the increased commercialization of sport raises the prospect of the continued asset stripping of the sporting talent of poorer countries such as those in Africa and South America and the relegation of these countries to markets for imported televised sports. Increasingly, Africa and South America are becoming sources of sporting talent for the rich countries. Apart from the vulnerability of economically weak countries, the other potential victims of increasing commercialization are the domestic and international governing bodies whose control over sport is undermined by their need to attract sponsors, the increasing pressure from athletes for a greater share of commercial income and a greater say in decision making, and the growth in profit oriented clubs and leagues.

A second major issue within sport concerns the relationship between forms of social discrimination such as race and gender, and access to, and take up of, sports participation opportunities. As many writers (e.g., Lapchick 1976; Hargreaves 1994; Hoberman 1997) have demonstrated, both these dimensions of inequality are intensely political insofar as they can have a profound impact on individual choice and quality of life.

The future direction of research into the relationship between politics and sport will be shaped, first, by the continuing growth in governmental interest in sport at both the national and international levels and, second, by the pattern of prominence of particular issues. At the national level, the place of sport within the range of activities considered to be within the normal remit of the state is acknowledged by governments from across a broad range of the political spectrum. In many countries state interest has broadened to include: a greater willingness of the courts to accept jurisdiction in cases concerning matters previously considered private, for example violence on the field of play; a concern by governments to protect young athletes from abuse; and a willingness by governments to identify sport as a tool in

achieving an increasingly wide range of non sporting policy objectives such as those related to health, educational attainment, and community development. The concern of many governments has also deepened, as indicated by their willingness to: provide considerable subsidies to host major sports events; invest heavily in the development of elite athletes; and intervene directly to shape the curricular and extracurricular sporting experience of the young. The contemporary motives of governments, the differences between government strategies and the reasons for these differences, the impact of globalization on national sports policies, the techniques of intervention adopted by governments and the impact of their intervention are all seriously underresearched. However, the political scientist whose interest lies in questions relating to public sector management, policy analysis, political party ideology, electoral behavior, and central/federal-provincial/local relations will find that the emergence of sport as an area of sustained government interest not only broadens the range of areas for analysis, but also offers the prospect of providing a distinctive insight into some of the generic concerns in these sub fields of political science.

The greater breadth and intensity of interest among national governments has had implications for the sports organizations at the transnational level, not simply because of the growth in international sports events but also because many of the issues which manifest themselves in national contexts, such as doping, sports violence, and the protection of the young, require action at the international level. Consequently, the interaction between international bodies such as the Court for Arbitration in Sport and the World Anti Doping Agency on the one hand, and domestic sports organizations and national governments on the other, is of increasing significance and interest. A related area for further research concerns the future role of the major international sport bodies such as the international federations and the major event organizing bodies (e.g., the IOC). The control that they have exercised over the development of sport is coming under increasingly severe challenge, not only from individual governments and from commercial, particularly television, interests, but also more recently from

players' unions and agents, and from international organizations such as the European Union, the World Anti Doping Agency, the Council of Europe, and, to a lesser extent, UNESCO. The capacity of the IOC and the major international federations to plot the course of sports development has always involved a compromise with other interests, but the increasingly interventionist stance of many international governmental organizations and the increasing assertiveness of international athletes and corporate sponsors require international federations and the IOC to operate in a much more complex political environment. The international governance of sport is thus a further area of research that will doubtless attract the interests of an increasing number of political scientists.

SEE ALSO: Nationalism and Sport; Political Economy and Sport; Politics; Sport and Capitalism

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pollution zones, linear and planar

Koichi Hasegawa

The concepts of linear and planar pollution zones refer to the geographical figuration of the polluted area caused especially by high speed transportation pollution. Whereas bullet trains and high speed expressways create linear pollution zones 20–50 meters wide on each side along their routes, airplanes produce planar pollution zones along their takeoff and landing routes surrounding the airport. In the former case, the number of victims at any given site suffering severe noise pollution may be relatively limited, typically at most several thousands of residents. In the latter case, though, victims may number more than 10,000 residents over several cities and towns.

These differences result in differences of (1) the organizing and mobilizing process of protest movements against noise pollution or the construction of new facilities; (2) the attitude of affected municipalities; and (3) the counter measures taken.

In general, the planar pollution zone imposes similar sufferings on the residents of whole neighborhoods and their neighborhood associations. The linear pollution zone, however, does not always include whole neighborhoods and their associations, but can run through many of them. In planning the routes of a bullet train line or expressway, the first priority is to make it straight to improve speed. This goal tends to neglect the existing residential area. The degree and type of suffering depend on the noise level, which is reduced by distance.

These different social impacts mean that in the case of the planar pollution zone, organizing and mobilizing based on the neighborhood association and existing local community is relatively easy and quick. Similarity of sufferings makes for common interests and strong solidarity among the residents. Since the Osaka International Airport lawsuit filed in 1969, many similar lawsuits have appealed for reduction in airport noise. For municipalities or local governments, getting involved in the issue is relatively positive and easy.

But in the case of linear pollution zones, organizing and mobilizing based on the neighborhood association and the existing local community is relatively difficult. For victims to respond to this pollution, they have to establish a new specific association. Residents have a variety of interests in the issue, depending on their distance from the route, the noise level they suffer, and their economic backgrounds. For instance, some households prefer to just move to another quieter place. For others, such as self-employed households with small local shops and factories, moving carries the risk of losing customers acquired over many years. The number of lawsuits against bullet train or high speed expressway noise pollution, such as the Nagoya bullet train lawsuit filed in 1969, is very small and successes are limited. Since the pollution does not affect all the residents of a community, municipalities or local governments have tended to decline getting deeply involved in the issue.

SEE ALSO: Ecological Problems; Environment, Sociology of the; High Speed Transportation Pollution; Local Residents' Movements

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polyamory

Christian Klesse

Polyamory is a novel concept. It has surfaced over recent decades in the debates about non monogamy. Polyamory circumscribes a relationship philosophy, an identity, or a lifestyle that evolves around the belief that it is worthwhile and valid to have more than one partner. Combining word elements derived from Greek (poly) and Latin (amory), the term literally translates into "many loves." The concept of polyamory aims at providing a positive

alternative to the more common term "non monogamy," which draws its meaning primarily from a negation of the dominant term "monogamy." As a relationship ideology, polyamory encourages multiple or open relationships and challenges the normative ideal of compulsory monogamy.

Polyamory spread in the United States throughout the 1980s and 1990s, where polyamorous communities have formed in many larger cities. Over recent years the term has gained significant popularity. The Internet has been an important tool for the development of an international online community. Today the term provides a point of reference for people interested in alternative lifestyles and sexualities beyond the North American continent and Europe, where the first networks around polyamory originated. There is no essential link between polyamory and any particular sexual identity. However, it seems as if discussions about polyamory have been particularly prominent in bisexual and lesbian contexts (cf. Munson & Stelboun 1999; Anderlini D'Onofrio 2004).

A range of very diverse cultural and ideological influences has fed into the emerging discourses around polyamory. Compulsory monogamy has been criticized from within a range of social movements around sexuality and gender, including the feminist, lesbian, gay, bisexual, sadomasochist, and queer movements. Experiments in communal living within these movements and the "counterculture" in general have also contributed to the development of new relationship philosophies and family practices. The feminist movement has advocated a range of values that are salient within polyamory, such as caring, intimacy, and honesty. Lesbian and bisexual feminisms have invested in a culture of female friendship that fosters non exclusive intimate and sexual relationships between women based on relational autonomy and voluntary association. A lot of the contemporary debates about polyamory are strongly influenced by spiritualist ideas and shaped by new age rhetoric (cf. Anapol 1997; Anderlini D'Onofrio 2004). Thus, polyamory has been merged with paganism, polytheism, and primitivism. Religious references are manifold, but as is common within the new age movements in the West, proponents of polyamory have in particular appropriated ideas from within a range of eastern

religious traditions and indulged in an undifferentiated Orientalism (Haritaworn et al. 2006). Polyamory movements have formed at a juncture of different social movements and heterogeneous cultural trends and tend to draw on a blend of diverse ideological traditions.

Polyamory covers a vast range of relationship forms: open couple relationships, primary partnerships, open to secondary and tertiary relationships, triads, V structures, polywebs, open group marriages, closed or polyfidelitous group marriages, and so on (Munson & Stelboun 1999). Polyfidelity is a form of polyamory practiced by a group of people that are intimately and/or sexually related to each other, but promise to be faithful to the group. Polyamory aims at leaving a lot of space to individually work out the shape and boundaries of particular relationships among the people involved. It evolves around the idea that there is no singular valid mold to live relationships and that each relationship should be taken on its own merits. Although polyamory is committed to diversity, certain relationships and sexual practices have been continuously contested within polyamorous movements and communities. Thus, there has been much controversy about whether swinging and casual sex would belong within the realm of polyamory (cf. Lano & Parry 1995; Anapol 1997; Easton & Liszt 1997). Whereas some positions on polyamory take a more sex radical stance, others are adamant that polyamory would rule out sex focused approaches to non monogamy.

Love is a central feature within polyamorous discourse. Even if largely undefined with regard to many aspects, polyamorous partnerships are usually supposed to be "loving" relationships (Anapol 1997). Many texts emphasize that it is not the major point of polyamory to have many sexual partners. Like people who practice serial monogamy (i.e., people who have one monogamous relationship at a time, but have more than one lifetime partner), polyamorists may have either a small or a large number of sexual lifetime partners. The only difference between (serial) monogamists and polyamorists, from this point of view, is that for the former the beginning of a new relationship always marks the end of the existing one.

Other central values within polyamorous relationship ethics are commitment, intimacy,

negotiation, mutual respect, and honesty. The expectation is that important emotional issues are communicated and that major decisions about the relationship find consensus among all partners. Against the backdrop of these ideals, polyamory has frequently been defined as "responsible non monogamy" (Lano & Parry 1995; Anapol 1997).

There has been an absolute lack of research into polyamory. Most of the literature available to date falls either within the genre of popular relationship guides (Anapol 1997; Easton & Liszt 1997) or presents a mix of first person narratives, activist writing, small studies, and short theoretical contributions (Lano & Parry 1995; Munson & Stelboun 1999). The absence of empirical research is surprising, because polyamorous practice touches on a range of issues that have strongly preoccupied social scientists over recent years.

The spread of the popularity of polyamory testifies to radical changes within intimate and sexual cultures over recent decades. Polyamorous relationships provide a prime example of the social construction of kinship and families through chosen affinities. They illustrate the growth of diversity of relational bonds that has been reflected in a shift from family sociology to a sociology of intimacies. An engagement with polyamory (and other forms of non monogamy) could further provide novel insights for the study of social and sexual identities, social movements, parenting practices, and the organization of households. Polyamory may also provide an interesting field of study for the growing scholarship that is concerned with the pervasiveness of heteronormativity in hegemonic cultural formations.

SEE ALSO: Compulsory Heterosexuality; Friendship: Interpersonal Aspects; Friendships of Gay, Lesbian, and Bisexual People; Intimacy; Kinship; Lesbian and Gay Families; Love and Commitment; Marriage; New Age

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polyethnicity

Bhavani Arabandi

In a world characterized by massive immigration and high rates of intermarriage, it was inevitable that a new type of ethnicity, polyethnicity, would emerge. Whereas ethnicity is commonly understood to reflect the shared ancestry and history of a people, polyethnicity in this context refers to the ability and willingness of individuals to identify with multiple ethnicities and multiple identities.

Although some scholars have traditionally argued that race and ethnicity are biologically determined, what seems increasingly evident to most scholars today is that race and ethnicity are social constructs, i.e., ideas, assumptions, and classifications that change over time and space (Waters 2000). Thus, ethnic groups are no longer seen as static and unchanging, but as emerging groups whose identities are constantly shifting as groups redefine their boundaries and criteria for membership. Today, for example, there is also the recognition that ethnicity has changed from its initial emphasis on division and exclusion between and among ethnic groups to its increasing importance as an idea and value supporting the intermixing and merger of various ethnicities. This intermixing, through immigration and intermarriage, has not only promoted a sense of interconnectedness and polyethnicity, but has also given rise to new patterns of social organization (Pagnini & Morgan 1990; Spikard & Burroughs 2000)

which have served to blur preexisting racial and ethnic lines.

Max Weber (1968 [1922]) anticipated that as the world becomes increasingly modern, traditional attachments such as ethnicity would decline when confronted with advanced rationalization of human action and organization. However, far from eroding, ethnicity and an accompanying heightened sense of ethnic identity have increased in geometric proportion today, with groups fighting over ideology, religion, scarce resources, political spaces, and national identity. Theories of assimilation emphasized by American sociologists (Gordon, Moynihan, and van den Berghe in particular) were based on white European immigrants to the US and argued that, over time, immigrants would be absorbed into the mainstream where they would be indistinguishable from one another and, in the process, adopt an American identity. However, the inadequacy of these theories was revealed when certain groups did not fit the model. For example, they ignored the African Americans for whom economic integration with the mainstream had not been successful. And they did not accommodate the recent immigrants such as Asians and Latinos who have not only kept their ethnicity intact using a pattern of "segmented assimilation," but also used it to achieve economic mobility (Portes & Zhou 1993). Further, these theories failed to recognize immigrants as active agents having a hand in the shaping of their ethnic identity in the host environment (Song 2003; Lee & Bean 2004). And lastly, the increased salience of ethnicity is thought to be "symbolic" (Gans 1979) for the white European immigrants who held onto their ethnicity despite their integration into the mainstream.

Polyethnicity challenges the claim that one has to belong to only one ethnicity, and cannot be both or more. It also challenges the assumption that distinctions amongst individuals are readily identifiable and separable (Cornell 2000). The United States has come a long way from the anti miscegenation laws that prevented interracial and interethnic marriages prior to 1967 (Spikard 1989), to a growing polyethnic population that could account for one fifth of the US population by the year 2050 (Lee & Bean 2004). And as interethnic marriages are increasing, both partners and their children are

resisting the idea of choosing a singular ethnic identity to define themselves as had once been demanded (Cornell 2000). Further, immigration of various peoples from around the world, especially by the late twentieth century, has also complicated the claim of a single ethnicity, and changed the world's ethnic landscape. Recognizing this change and the increase in polyethnic individuals, the US Census Bureau, for the first time in 2000, offered multiple choices for race/ethnicity.

Despite these changes, the idea of polyethnicity has not been free of ambiguities and contradictions. For example, according to Cornell (2000), "those who carry multiple racial and ethnic identities may struggle not only against the dominant group's insistence on clear boundaries and unitary classifications, but against the similar insistence on the part of the subordinate groups." Thus, the discourse around ethnic identity tends to be binary and exclusive in nature, and even though there is growing inter-ethnic marriage amongst various groups, the experience of the groups is very different. Lee and Bean (2004) posit the view that Asians and Latinos have much higher rates of interethnic marriages than do blacks, and they are more likely to report polyethnicity than blacks who more often than not claim a single ethnicity and racial identity. This is the case, the authors argue, because blacks have a "legacy of slavery," a history of discrimination, and have been victimized by the "one drop rule" (where having any black blood automatically labeled one black) in the US. However, despite this pressure to identify with one ethnicity or another, polyethnic people are asserting their desired identities and affiliations. But one should keep in mind that those characterized as polyethnics in themselves do not constitute an actual group simply because of the diverse experiences of the individuals in that group. Much research needs to be done in order to capture the varied experiences of polyethnic people, and how they conceive of their identity. Future directions in this area might include multiple ethnic memberships in an increasingly transnational context where national borders are less fixed.

SEE ALSO: Accommodation; Acculturation; Assimilation; Ethnicity; Ethnic Groups;

Interracial Unions; Melting Pot; One Drop Rule; Passing; Race; Race and Ethnic Consciousness; Race (Racism)

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popular culture

Toby Miller

The word "popular" denotes "of the people," "by the people," and "for the people." In other words, it is made up of them as *subjects*, whom it textualizes via drama, sport, and information; *workers*, who undertake that textualization

through performances and recording; and *audiences*, who receive the ensuing texts.

Three discourses determine the direction sociologists have taken towards this topic. A discourse about art sees it elevating people above ordinary life, transcending body, time, and place. Conversely, a discourse about folk life expects it to settle us into society through the wellsprings of community, as part of daily existence. And a discourse about pop idealizes fun, offering transcendence through joy but doing so by referring to the everyday (Frith 1991). “The popular” circles across these discourses.

For its part, the concept of culture derives from tending and developing agriculture. With the emergence of capitalism, culture came both to embody instrumentalism and to abjure it, via the industrialization of farming, on the one hand, and the cultivation of individual taste, on the other (Benhabib 2002: 2). Culture has usually been understood in two registers, via the social sciences and the humanities – truth versus beauty. This was a heuristic distinction in the sixteenth century (Williams 1983: 38), but it became substantive as time passed. Culture is now a marker of differences and similarities in taste and status within groups, as explored interpretively or methodically. In today’s humanities, theater, film, television, radio, art, craft, writing, music, dance, and electronic gaming are judged by criteria of quality, as framed by practices of cultural criticism and history. For their part, the social sciences focus on the languages, religions, customs, times, and spaces of different groups, as explored ethnographically or statistically. So whereas the humanities articulate differences *within* populations, through symbolic norms (e.g., which class has the cultural capital to appreciate high culture, and which does not), the social sciences articulate differences *between* populations, through social norms (e.g., which people play militaristic electronic games and which do not) (Wallerstein 1989; Bourdieu 1984).

What happens when we put “popular” and “culture” back together, with the commercial world binding them? “Popular culture” clearly relates to markets. Neoclassical economics assumes that expressions of the desire and capacity to pay for services stimulate the provision of

entertainment and hence – when the result is publicly accepted – determine what is “popular.” Value is decided through competition between providers to obtain the favor of consumers, with the conflictual rationality of the parties producing value to society. The connection of market entertainment to new identities leads to a variety of sociological reactions. During the Industrial Revolution, anxieties about a suddenly urbanized and educated population raised the prospect of a long feared “ochlocracy” of “the worthless mob” (Pufendorf 2000: 144). Theorists from both right and left argued that newly literate publics would be vulnerable to manipulation by demagogues. The subsequent emergence of public schooling in the West took as its project empowering, and hence disciplining, the working class.

This notion of the suddenly enfranchised being bamboozled by the unscrupulously fluent has recurred throughout the modern period. It inevitably leads to a primary emphasis on the number and conduct of audiences to popular culture: where they came from, how many there were, and what they did as a consequence of being present. These audiences are conceived as empirical entities that can be known via research instruments derived from sociology, demography, psychology, and marketing. Such concerns are coupled with a secondary concentration on content: *what* were audiences watching when they . . . And so texts, too, are conceived as empirical entities that can be known, via research instruments derived from sociology, psychology, and literary criticism. So classical Marxism views the popular as a means to false consciousness that diverts the working class from recognizing its economic oppression; feminist approaches have varied between a condemnation of the popular as a similar diversion from gendered consciousness and its celebration as a distinctive part of women’s culture; and cultural studies has regarded the popular as a key location for symbolic resistance of class and gender oppression alike (Smith 1987; Hall & Jefferson 1976).

The foremost theorist of popular culture in the sociological literature is Antonio Gramsci, whose activism against Mussolini in the 1920s and 1930s has become an ethical exemplar for progressive intellectuals. Gramsci maintains

that each social group creates “organically, one or more strata of intellectuals which give it homogeneity and an awareness of its own function not only in the economic but also in the social and political fields”: the industrial technology, law, economy, and culture of each group. The “‘organic’ intellectuals which every new class creates alongside itself and elaborates in the course of its development” assist in the emergence of that class, for example via military expertise. Intellectuals operate in “civil society,” which denotes “the ensemble of organisms commonly called ‘private,’ that of ‘political society’ or ‘the State.’” They comprise the “‘hegemony’ which the dominant group exercises throughout society” as well as the “‘direct domination’ or command exercised through the State and ‘juridical’ government.” Ordinary people give “‘spontaneous’ consent” to the “general direction imposed on social life by the dominant fundamental group” (Gramsci 1978: 5–7, 12). In other words, popular culture legitimizes sociopolitical arrangements in the public mind and can be the site of struggle as well as domination.

The counter idea, that the cultural industries “impress . . . the same stamp on everything,” derives from Adorno and Horkheimer (1977) of the Frankfurt School, an anti Nazi group of scholars writing around the same time as Gramsci. After migrating to the US, they found a quietude reminiscent of pre war Germany. Their explanation for the replication of this attitude in the US lies in the mass production line organization of entertainment, where businesses use systems of reproduction that ensure identical offerings. Adorno and Horkheimer see consumers as manipulated by those at the economic apex of production. “Domination” masquerades as choice in a “society alienated from itself.” Coercion is mistaken for free will, and culture becomes just one more industrial process, subordinated to dominant economic forces within society that insist on standardization.

While much of this dismay is shared by conservatives, for some functionalist sociologists, popular culture represents the apex of modernity. Rather than encouraging alienation, it stands for the expansion of civil society, the moment in history when the state becomes receptive to,

and part of, the general community. The population is now part of the social, rather than excluded from the means and politics of political calculation, along with a lessening of authority, the promulgation of individual rights and respect, and the intensely interpersonal, large scale human interaction necessitated by industrialization and aided by systems of mass communication. The spread of advertising is taken as a model for the breakdown of social barriers, exemplified in the triumph of the popular (Shils 1966).

These approaches have produced a wide array of topics and methods for researching the popular. Cultural studies has perhaps been the most productive. Historical and contemporary analyses of slaves, crowds, pirates, bandits, minorities, women, and the working class have utilized archival, ethnographic, and statistical methods to emphasize day to day non compliance with authority, via practices of consumption that frequently turn into practices of production. For example, UK research on the contemporary has lit upon Teddy Boys, Mods, bikers, skinheads, punks, school students, teen girls, Rastas, truants, dropouts, and magazine readers as its magical agents of history: groups who deviated from the norms of schooling and the transition to work by generating moral panics. Scholar activists examine the structural underpinnings to collective style, investigating how bricolage subverts the achievement oriented, materialistic, educationally driven values and appearance of the middle class. The working assumption has often been that subordinate groups adopt and adapt signs and objects of the dominant culture, reorganizing them to manufacture new meanings. Consumption is thought to be the epicenter of such subcultures. Paradoxically, it has also reversed their members’ status as consumers. The oppressed become producers of new fashions, inscribing alienation, difference, and powerlessness on their bodies (Hall & Jefferson 1976).

Of course, popular culture leaves its mark on those who create it as well as its audiences. This insight leads us towards a consideration of the popular as itself an industry, whose products encourage agreement with prevailing social relations and whose work practices reflect such agreement. Today, rather than being a

series of entirely nation based industries, either ideologically or productively, popular culture is internationalized, in terms of the export and import of texts, attendant fears of cultural imperialism, and a New International Division of Cultural Labor. That division sees European football teams composed of players from across the globe, and Hollywood films shot wherever talent is cheap, incentives plentiful, and scenery sufficiently malleable to look like the US (Miller et al. 2001a, 2001b).

This relates to other significant changes in popular culture. The canons of aesthetic judgment and social distinction that once flowed from the humanities and social science approaches to culture, keeping aesthetic tropes somewhat distinct from social norms, have collapsed in on each other. Art and custom are now resources for markets and nations (Yúdice 2002) – reactions to the crisis of belonging and economic necessity occasioned by capitalist globalization. As a consequence, popular culture is more than textual signs or everyday practices (Martín Barbero 2003). It is also crucial to both advanced and developing economies, and provides the legitimizing ground on which particular groups (e.g., African Americans, gays and lesbians, the hearing impaired, or evangelical Protestants) claim resources and seek inclusion in national and international narratives (Yúdice 1990). This intermingling has implications for both aesthetic and social hierarchies, which “regulate and structure . . . individual and collective lives” (Parekh 2000: 143) in competitive ways that harness art and collective meaning for social and commercial purposes. To understand and intervene in this environment, sociologists need to be nimble in their use of textual, economic, ethnographic, and political approaches to popular culture.

SEE ALSO: Birmingham School; Consumption, Mass Consumption, and Consumer Culture; Critical Theory/Frankfurt School; Cultural Studies; Culture Industries; Deviance; Elite Culture; Gramsci, Antonio; Leisure, Popular Culture and; Mass Culture and Mass Society; Media; Media and Consumer Culture; Popular Culture Forms; Popular Culture Icons; Shopping; Shopping Malls; Sport

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popular culture forms

Sociologists have addressed a wide range of topics under the heading of popular culture. In fact, there are far too many to cover adequately in this Encyclopedia. Thus, a decision was made to give at least a sense of this literature by sampling some of the key topics examined by sociologists and offering an indication of the way in which they have been covered. In this entry a variety of forms of popular culture are considered – the beach, hip hop, jazz, P2P, reality TV, rock 'n' roll, science fiction, soap operas, and zoos. Of course, this is a highly selective and, in most cases (two exceptions are the beach and zoos), time bound list. Thus, many other topics could have been chosen and, of those that have been included, some (reality TV is a good example) could disappear in a short period of time. However, the point of this entry is not to give the reader a full sense of timeless forms of popular culture, but rather to offer a sampling of work in sociology on this topic. – GR

beach

Adrian Franklin

“The beach” is a dominant site and form of recreation and tourism – and not merely on the new pleasure peripheries of Southeast Asia, Mexico, the Caribbean, Bali, or Australia. The seaside towns of the United States and the UK, for example, have been through a turbulent period of change as they faced new competition, but even they are remarkably resilient, morphing into new lives for fashionable nostalgias and kitsches; homes for theme parks; new and desirable locations for weekend villas, condos and spaces of retirement, and as centers for conferences and conventions. At the same time, many have continued to provide a relatively cheap holiday. As an example, the most famous seaside beach of them all, Blackpool Pleasure Beach, is still Britain’s most popular tourist attraction. It is visited by over 7 million people annually and has more hotel beds than all of Greece, including its islands (Roodhouse 2001), and its range of clientele has remained very wide. Further, despite British heliotropism (which might be defined as a preference for sunnier beach holidays abroad), according to the UK Day Visits Survey a total of 81 million day trips to the seaside were made in 2000 (www.staruk.org.uk). At the opposite extreme perhaps, in the state of Florida, a recent survey of beach visits revealed that 84 percent of Florida residents visited the beach at least once a week and that these visits might include up to 14 different types of activity. A more extreme example is Australia where an entire nation has been founded on the ideal of proximity to the beach. As Fiske et al. (1987: 54) argued, the ideal beach “contributes to everyday existence”; it

must be “metropolitan and therefore urban,” and there are cities “that are planned solely in order to be by the beach thus clearly highlighting the relationship between the beach and the city.” The fact that Garland’s book *The Beach* (2000) became an international bestseller reveals the continuing relevance of the coast as a tourist destination. Even *water* itself has been a remarkably resilient component of leisure and tourism, as Anderson and Tabb (2002) make clear.

BEACH AS SEASIDE

In its early days as a mass seaside holiday center (as opposed to the earlier “medicinal” seaside that preceded it), the beach was a wonder world, a “dreamland”; a utopian promise of the future brightness and consumerism of a post depression, post war world. Seaside was an important ritual of transition into the new world of consumerism, spectacle, and pleasure. However, the more every day life borrowed or styled itself on the seaside (producing universal all year round access to pleasure), the less specific seaside resorts were able to reproduce that rapture, breathlessness, and euphoria. Seaside and the subsequent routinizations of pleasure after the style of seaside produced a second, blasé period of connoisseurship; a more socially stratified, spatially extended, rarefied, and measured set of expectations and ritual. The beach then became just one of very many alternative types of pleasure. However, it remains one of the most important precisely because it retained its basic ritualistic formula: it maintained its liminoid space of the beach, its ritual devotion to the sea, the sun, and the body, and its unhurried basic structure as a ritual of

passage. When people say they need to get away, when people conjure an ideal holiday or break, in their imaginations the beach is still a dominant evocation.

BEACH THEORY

The beach was first interpreted in structuralist terms. Placed on the elemental margin between sea and land, much was made of its liminoid, in between character and comparisons were made with other such spaces and their significance for ritual, freedom, and especially rites of passage. The suspension of everyday social norms at the beach was noted, particularly those related to dress codes, sociability and *communitas* (especially with fellow travelers), sexuality, time, and social reserve (drinking and spending were more exuberant, for example). The beach at Brighton was one of Shields's (1991) "places on the margin" that opposed the everyday/social center and legitimated transgressive behavior. At various times Brighton embodied such a reputation. It was a place of secret liaisons and planned divorce evidence in the early part of the twentieth century and one of the first nude bathing beaches close to a town later in the century. Fiske et al. (1987: 61), on the other hand, located the beach in Australia between the core structuralist binary of nature and culture/city and made the argument (among others) that the tanned look is an anomalous category between skin (culture) and fur (nature).

Such accounts were criticized for their selective use of evidence. It is quite clear, for example, as Booth (2001) shows, that whether suburban or more remote, the Australian beach has a history of very conservative moral regulation, with beach inspectors employed to make sure bathers complied with relatively prudish rules of beachwear and anti nude beach campaigns fuming until present times. Urbain (2003: 134) is also opposed to the simplistic application of binaries to understand the beach. Certainly for him (and the French, specifically), it is never nature; rather, the beach has been specifically *denatured* as resorts have made it a place of regulation, selected sites sheltered from the ravages of wild nature (gently shelving beaches, fine undisturbed sands, quiet waters) and with "locals" (especially "savages") chased away, making way for the civilized beach vacationer, those who come to occupy the beach

for set periods. Urbain deploys the "world making" Robinson Crusoe metaphor to suggest that the beach was part of the ordering or pacification of the world: subjecting nature and "the other" to the norms of his "aesthetic, worldly, therapeutic or technological models" (2003: 127). However, Urbain argues that the Crusoe figure is inconstant and harbors secret desires to transgress the order he creates.

For Urbain, both Crusoes are looking for "a cultic site and a 'prayer rug' for the performance of ritual," and this corresponds closely to Franklin's (2003) reanalysis of the modern beach as a *continuing* site of embodied ritual. Whereas the ritual basis of early seaside forms can be located in emergent consumerism and also, to a degree, nationalism and a new erotic of the healthy body (a body routinely in danger of ill health and disease), later, more contemporary forms relate to a continuing ritual emphasis on the body, albeit deploying new technologies of the "sustainable" body (a body requiring constant and regular attention especially in relation to new dangers of stress, change, and ontological insecurity). It is a body that seeks the "never quite fulfilled" state of "fitness" (Bauman & May 2001). New technologies of the body are also designed to slow down "fast time" and produce yet more liminoid experiences and ritual transformations. From the regimes of healthism to the Goan beach trance parties and the surfer's achievement of "flow," this is a very different beach.

SEE ALSO: Body and Cultural Sociology; Consumption, Tourism and; Leisure; Leisure, Popular Culture and; Ritual

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hip-hop

Karen Bettez Halnon

Hip hop originated in 1974 as a local subculture in the South Bronx, New York City with Kingston, Jamaica born Clive Campbell, the founding "Father of Hip Hop." In the rented recreation room of the apartment building where he lived, Campbell held house parties, advertised three weeks in advance on index card/flyers simply but provocatively featuring "Kool Herc" (short for Hercules). There Herc played "exclusive" records that were "the bomb," or ones not on the radio. The parties, with admissions under a dollar and often lasting until morning, became so popular that they often grossed \$400 or \$500 a night. Herc's popularity as DJ was due to an experiment. Using two turntables, double copies of a record, and no headphones, he isolated and repeatedly cued the "breaks," the "get down" percussion sections, or the most danceable part of songs (from his favorites, such as James Brown, Dennis Coffee, or Scorpio). During continued breaks, "freestyle" dancers (later called B boys and B girls, or break dancers) would "go off" into a dancing frenzy. Herc's popularity was also due to use of Jamaican "toasts," where he would talk over but to the beat of the music in playful rhymes about people or events in his immediate environment; for example, "Yo this is Kool Herc in the joint ski saying my mellow ski Marky D is in the house." As Herc progressed as DJ, he turned over microphone duties to his friends Coke La Rock and Clark Kent, thus constituting the first emcee team, Kool Herc and the Herculoids (Chang & Herc 2005).

The main elements of hip hop culture, as suggested in part above, include DJing (cutting and scratching with two turntables, and

performing with the microphone); B boying/B girling (breaking or break dancing); emceeing (rapping, or talking in rhyme to the rhythm of the beat); and tagging and graffiti art. Tagging began in New York City in the early 1970s with Vic 156, a mail courier who wrote his name and courier ID number on every subway and bus he rode. Graffiti was made famous by TAKI 183, a Greek teenager from Washington Heights named Demetrius, and the Ex Vandals were one of the most revered graffiti crews. The Graffiti Bombing movement began in Philadelphia in the mid to late 1960s with writers CORNBREAD and COOL EARL. Aided by commercialization, hip hop is also a style of dress (designer baggy shirts and pants, silver and gold chains, backwards baseball caps, scullies, bright white sneakers, and/or Timberlands). Many would surely add the distinctive urban "street" language and the spirit of "keepin' it real" (or keeping the music reflective of everyday language, happenings, sufferings, perspectives, and/or realities of black urban life, and minimizing the distorting forces of commercialism). However, the "bling, bling" and flashy "cribs" of successful rappers are a central staple of success, and are made explicit to the point of parody in New Orleans rapper band Cash Money Millionaires.

With Herc as first inspiration, house parties, block parties, and club parties soon sprang up all over the New York ghettos for many who did not have the money to go to the expensive mid town clubs. Emceeing, later known as rapping, also caught on with many urban youth because it was a means of accessible and affordable self expression. Governed by very few rules, and costing nothing to participate, anyone with the inclination and a bit of verbal skill could rap, hone their rapping skills, convey their personality in rhyme, and (if good enough) elicit affirmation from peers. It should be noted that rapping is continuous with a variety of African American verbal jousting traditions, such as signifying, testifying, Shining of the Titanic, the Dozens, schoolyard rhymes, and/or prison "jailhouse" rhymes.

The rise in hip hop's popularity can be also attributed to changes in black radio, an important traditional medium of African American self expression. In the 1970s, disco emerged as a European and generic sounding, watered down type of funk music, and soon, to the chagrin of many, found a home on the airwaves of black radio. The loss of a soulful and authentic African American

sound thus created a void that hip hop helped to fill (as did Chicago's house music, Washington, DC's gogo music, and California's reembrace-ment of funk, which all arose at approximately the same time).

Beyond Kool Herc, other co originators of hip hop include: Pete DJ Jones, DJ Hollywood, Eddie Cheeba, "Love Bug" Starski, Grand Master Flash, Afrika Bambaataa (founder of the Zulu Nation in New York), and Run DMC. Other best rappers up to the late 1970s include Chief Rocker Busy Bee, Grand Wizard Theodore, the Fantastic Romantic Five, Funky Four Plus One More, Crash Crew, and Master Don Committee. The first rap records were Fat Back Band's "King Tem III" and Sugar Hill Gang's "Rapper's Delight," the latter being the first commercial rap record in 1979, and one that gave wide mainstream exposure to the term "rap."

During the 1980s hip hop was centered in New York, and gave rise to artists such as Kurtis Blow, LL Cool J, and Slick Rick. Public Enemy gained notoriety and popularity for its political and militant lyrics. By the early 1990s "East Coast" rap-ers found Los Angeles centered "West Coast" rivals among Gangsta rap bands such as NWA and Notorious BIG. NWA's gold status *Straight Outta Compton* (1989) is notable in that the album sold over 2.5 million copies with virtually no radio play and an MTV ban. Most notorious of the LP's tracks was "F*** Tha Police," an angry reactive song accusing police of the racist killing of minorities. NWA's music elicited numerous protests and even FBI intervention. The media fanning the flames between East and West Coast rivalries, the violent tensions culminated in the murders of Tupak Shakur and Notorious BIG in the mid 1990s.

While critics have condemned rap music as sexist, misogynist, homophobic, and violent, the more general influence of hip hop culture pervades youth culture today in language, styles of dress, cultural and artistic aesthetics, and musical preferences. By the year 2000 hip hop culture had become a billion dollar industry. Hip hop has also achieved cultural recognition via the application of much serious scholarly inquiry and being the object of several noted national museum exhibits.

As suggested, the role of women in hip hop culture is somewhat limited. However, following the first commercially successful female rappers, Salt n Peppa, has been an array of others who turn

the objectifying tables on male rappers by demanding that men are at their sexual service. Rapping in this spirit are Foxy Brown, Trina, and Lil Kim.

While hip hop is an African American sub culture, with greatest rappers including Biggie Smalls, Jay Z, Nas, MOP, Ice T, DMX, and Snoop Dog, the most successful rapper of all time (by measures of the music industry) is Eminem, winner of nine Grammy awards and voted number 6 on VH 1's 50 Greatest Hip Hop Artists of All Time. The debate over hip hop's racial ownership has included accusations that Marshall Bruce Mathers, a blue eyed, peroxide blond kid from a Detroit ghetto, cashed in on black culture. However, Eminem's marketability with fans may be less an issue of race than one of the urgent consumer desire for authenticity and non conformist individuality amid the alienating pressures of commercialism in a society of the spectacle. For millions of white suburban youth, at least, this desire translates as attraction to what is raw, real, and unmediated, and/or having the "moral daredevil" courage to say "F*** you with the free est of space this divided state of embarrassment will allow me to have," as the double M'd rapper explains and inspires with his Slim Shady alter ego in the song "White America" (Halnon 2005).

SEE ALSO: Alienation; Consumption, Youth Culture and; Music; Popular Culture; Subculture; Urban Poverty

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jazz

Adrian Franklin

Jazz is a musical style that developed from both African and European traditions emerging around the beginning of the twentieth century in African American communities, particularly in New Orleans. While there are now many styles, they all share some or many of the following musical qualities: syncopation, swing, improvisation, “blue notes,” call and response, sound innovation such as growls and stretched notes, and polyrhythmic structure. Jazz is one of the most interesting sources of countercultural fusion between black and white cultures in the West and is frequently used as a metaphor for openness, cool, equality, and freedom of expression often expressed in an embodied way through dance.

The origin of the word jazz is controversial but the most likely genealogy follows *jasm*, an American English word (first seen in print in 1842) for semen that also meant vitality and virility, through *jazz*, a slang term for copulation used among dice players (both black and white) in San Francisco some 70 years later. The word “jazz” first appeared in San Francisco baseball articles in 1913 to describe a player’s magical qualities of life, vigor, or effervescence. It was then used to describe the music of a ragtime band who entertained players at a training camp, and from there it spread through musician networks to Chicago and New York by 1916. It was not until 1917 that the term was used in New Orleans, where the music style had its origins (Quinion 2004).

The earliest forms in New Orleans were marching bands where brass instruments and African rhythm and beat fused to form “raggedy” or ragtime music. Ragtime was quickly absorbed into early twentieth century mainstream white musical cultures (e.g., in Irving Berlin’s songs) where black

music and dance had been influential and popular since minstrel shows and public dance hall music. But as the New Orleans ragtime moved north through California and upriver to Chicago and to New York, new variants appeared and with each variation there were both the commercial forms of the major clubs and hotels and the purer musician forms in the bars and speakeasies (Becker 1973). Becker shows how jazz musicians (and jazz itself) were formed into cultural groups and social cliques and how individual musicians negotiated careers between the poles of pure (uncertain and poorly paid) and commercial (secure and affluent) jazz.

As jazz moved through the twentieth century, new forms such as “big band” in the 1930s, “swing” in the 1940s, and “bebop” in the 1940s and 1950s ebbed and flowed. After that there were new styles and fusion styles from the avant garde sound of Keith Jarrett and Eberhard Weber through jazz funk and acid jazz to jazz house and nu jazz. While there is much talk of the decline of jazz sales, it is also possible to argue that it continues under these and other popular music styles world music being a genre that continues to deploy many jazz variants.

The sociological interest of jazz is not restricted to its musical styles, its cultural forms, and origins. It is also possible to talk of the social spaces of jazz as a countercultural space or deviant culture. Jazz clubs emerged in the days of alcohol prohibition as sites away from surveillance and the policing of alcohol and drugs. Jazz then became synonymous with a variety of countercultures (black, gangster, immigrant, youth) in which individual freedom and Dionysian values were cultivated. It is for this reason that jazz was often referred to as “the devil’s music.” Critically, jazz opened up spaces of cultural transition. As a cultural form jazz was socially open, inclusive, and hospitable anyone and everyone could find a welcome in the spaces of jazz. As Santorno (2001) argued, “Black Americans (and other ethnic outsiders) could use it to enter mainstream society, white Americans could flee to it from mainstream society, and the transactions created a flux and flow that powered American cultural syntheses.” In this way, jazz played an important role in breaking down traditional lines of American culture and paving the way for a more permissive, open society. But not just in America.

Meller (1976) showed how jazz jumped the Atlantic to England during and after World War I

and the social and cultural impact it had. Up until then, working class leisure culture was tightly organized around neighborhoods and their chapels. Dancing was strictly supervised and limited and music styles conformed to the stringent moral regime of nonconformist life. The arrival of jazz and watered down dance variants reconfigured this completely. Coinciding with public transport systems, electrification, and rising youth wages, the new music found expression in new city center dance halls. These were commercial and more permissive, and as the possibility and styles of dancing became more exciting so thousands of dance schools emerged to educate the new generation into jazz inspired freedoms. Among other things it ushered in more intimate premarital social relations between the sexes, the beginnings of teen age culture, and more freedom for women.

Jazz is also significant in developing a form of individualism commensurate with its counterculture aspirations. It inspired the personal politics of "cool" and "hip," which, as Pountain and Robbins (2000) maintain, now dominate contemporary forms of individualism everywhere. Cool is now a generalized expression of opposition and defiance to a variety of authority figures, especially the state and its agencies and agents. It has become a permanent stance to the world, not necessarily a life stage that one will grow out of. Cool also registers the new significance of individualism and individualized, as opposed to collective, politics. For these reasons, cool is no longer the preserve of the young but is distributed across large sections of society, particularly among those who have lived in the post 1960s countercultures.

SEE ALSO: Cool; Cultural Studies; Music; Music and Social Movements; Popular Culture Icons (Sinatra, Frank)

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P2P

Chris Rojek

Peer to peer communication systems enable users to exchange files over the Internet. In the 1990s the spread of file exchange servers such as Napster, eDonkey, KaZaA, Morpheus, and Grokster became a *cause célèbre* in the recording industry. P2P exchange created a contraction in sales of sound recordings, especially singles. The Recording Industry Association of America (RIAA) engaged in litigation against both consumers and file servers. It alleged copyright violation and demanded heavy penalties to discourage exchange. The RIAA successfully lobbied for the introduction of the Digital Millennium Copyright Act (DMCA 1998), which criminalizes production and dissemination of P2P technology with the capacity to circumvent copyright, and increases penalties of infringement. The act makes provision for exemption for non profit organizations like archives, libraries, and education institutions, but limits the conditions under which exemption applies. However, the provisions of the act have proved to be very difficult to enforce. The proliferation of the Web and the absence of a commercially viable policing system have impeded detection of copyright violation. In addition, litigation has produced victims and popular reaction against the recording industry. A case in point was the legal action brought against Brianna LaHara, a 12 year old American Catholic, who was arraigned to face a multi million dollar lawsuit for downloading sitcom soundtracks and nursery jingles like "If You're Happy and You Know It." The case was eventually settled for \$2,000. However, the public perception that the recording industry is greedy and insensitive was reinforced.

The RIAA did achieve a symbolic victory in forcing the P2P pioneer Napster to introduce a fee paying structure. Launched in 1999, Napster

was the most potent symbol of Net banditry. It embodied the spirit of consumer rebellion against multinational super profits and became a legend in campus culture. However, the victory against Napster has not sounded the death knell for P2P systems. Companies like KaZaA effectively transform home computers into mini servers, so policing copyright detection is problematized. In addition, they divide ownership between many companies as a deliberate strategy designed to evade detection.

The P2P revolution raises thorny questions about the rights of commercial providers of intellectual property and the opportunities produced by globalization and the new technology to widen access. In April 2004, in a set back to the RIAA, the US District Court ruled that file sharing servers cannot be held responsible for the illegal conduct of their users. Because companies like Morpheus and Grokster are not based in a central index of files, but treat domestic terminals as mini servers, they support a system of P2P exchange that approximates more faithfully a gift relationship. To the consternation of the recording industry, the ruling was upheld by the US Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals in August 2004.

The pivotal issue here turns on the American Constitution's First Amendment that guarantees freedom of speech and press. By attempting to block P2P exchange, the RIAA was deemed to challenge the First Amendment. Until the US Appeal Court ruling in 2004, the famous 1984 US Supreme Court ruling in respect of the Sony Betamax video recorder set the most significant legal precedent of recent times. This established the principle that the social value of the legal uses of the device outweighed the potential for abuse, and found Sony not guilty of copyright infringement. It is this immunity that is currently being contested by the recording industry. The strategy of the RIAA has now shifted to apply criminal penalties against companies and businesses found to *induce* or actively encourage copyright infringement.

In conflating the issue of illegal exchange with that of the gift relationship, the recording industry opens up a Pandora's Box for consumer culture and copyright law. If copyright holders seek to extend their rights over technologies that induce infringement, they introduce what many would regard as unreasonable restraints on free speech. The future is likely to consist of some

form of differentiated licensing system in which downloads may be purchased or registered for a fixed period. Apple's iTunes Music Store already operates a successful system of fee based downloading. Other companies have followed suit and the consumer is benefiting from a price war between iTunes, Warner Brothers Online, EMI, Sony Music Entertainment, Universal, and Wall mart. This is likely to change the culture in which popular music is purchased, with record stores needing to diversify in order to stay in business.

SEE ALSO: Globalization, Culture and; Intellectual Property; Internet; Leisure; Music and Media; Popular Culture

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reality TV

Annette Hill

Reality TV is a catchall category that includes a wide range of popular factual programs. Sometimes called factual entertainment, or infotainment, reality TV is located in border territories, between information and entertainment, documentary and drama. Originally used as a category for law and order programming, reality TV has become the success story of television in the 1990s and 2000s.

The rise of reality TV came at a time when networks were looking for a quick fix solution to economic problems within the cultural industries. Increased costs in the production of drama, sitcom, and comedy ensured unscripted, popular

factual programming became a viable economic option during the 1990s. The deregulation and marketization of media industries, especially in advanced industrial states such as the United States, Western Europe, and Australasia, also contributed to the rise of reality TV, as it performed well in a competitive, multichannel environment.

There are three main strands to the development of reality TV, and these relate to three distinct, yet overlapping, areas of media production: tabloid journalism, documentary television, and popular entertainment. There are a variety of styles and techniques associated with reality TV, such as non professional actors, unscripted dialogue, surveillance footage, hand held cameras, seeing events unfold as they are happening in front of the camera. However, the treatment of "reality" in reality programming has changed as the genre has developed over the past decade. The main formats include infotainment (on scene footage of emergency services, e.g., *Rescue 911*), docusoap (popular observational documentary, e.g., *Airport*), lifestyle (home and personal makeovers, e.g., *Changing Rooms*), and reality gameshow (experiments that place ordinary people in controlled environments, e.g., *Big Brother*). These formats were successful because they drew on existing popular genres, such as soap opera or gameshows, to create hybrid programs, and focused on telling stories in an entertaining style, usually foregrounding visuals, characterization, and narrative. Reality TV has been the motor of primetime throughout the 1990s and 2000s, drawing at times unprecedented market shares of over 50 percent, and regularly appearing in the Top 20 shows on network TV. With such high ratings, its place in primetime schedules is assured for some time to come. In addition, reality formats are international bestsellers, with local versions appearing all over the world.

Since the early days of reality TV, cultural critics have consistently attacked the genre for being voyeuristic, cheap, sensational television. There have been accusations that reality TV contributes to the "dumbing down," or tabloidization, of society and culture. Such criticism is based on general concerns about quality standards within public service and commercial television, the influence of television on viewers, and the ethics of popular television.

On the topic of quality, the ways in which program makers, or critics, judge the quality of

reality TV are different from the ways viewers assess good or bad programs. What makes a reality format "good" according to younger viewers will make it "bad" for older adults. The quality criterion used by different social groups highlights the diverse ways people value popular culture.

The question of influence is a difficult one. There is no doubt television influences viewers, but there is a great deal of doubt about how and to what degree it influences viewers, and whether this influence is prosocial or negative. When it comes to reality TV, there is an argument to be made that it negatively influences viewers, for example encouraging people to manipulate others in order to "win the game," or positively influences viewers, for example in learning about first aid. Until there is more empirical evidence to support either argument, the alleged negative influence of reality TV needs to be treated with some degree of skepticism.

Although some people might argue that ethics are absent from reality programming, in fact ethics are at the heart of reality TV. Ethics inform understanding of the treatment of ordinary people by program makers, and the content of stories about people's private experiences and dilemmas. Rights to privacy, rights to fair treatment, good and bad moral conduct, and taste and decency are just some of the ethical issues that arise when examining reality TV.

Early academic work focused primarily on the definition of the reality genre and its relationship with audiovisual documentation. Work by Bill Nichols (1994), and John Corner (1995) examined the "reality" of reality TV, raising important questions about actuality and the epistemology of factual television that have still not been answered today. Recent work by scholars in documentary studies and cultural studies suggests reality TV is a rich site for analysis and debate. John Dovey (2000) argues that reality TV foregrounds private issues at the expense of wider public debate about social and political matters. Kilborn (2003) examines the economic, aesthetic, and cultural contexts to the genre. Hill (2004) has conducted audience research that suggests viewers are critically engaged with the truth claims of reality formats. Further research has emerged on issues such as surveillance, gender and identity, performance, celebrities, and new media.

Reality TV is an extraordinary success story, an example of television's ability to cannibalize itself

in order to survive in a commercially uncertain media environment. However, the costs incurred as a result of its success have been felt most by public service broadcasting, in particular news, current affairs, and documentary. Thus, reality TV has repositioned factual and entertainment programming within popular culture. And this shift between information and entertainment is irreversible, blurring the boundaries of fact and fiction for a new generation of television viewers.

SEE ALSO: Audiences; Genre; Popular Culture; Television

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rock 'n' roll

Peter Beilharz

Rock and roll refers to the music generated originally out of the experience of black folks and then whites in the US from the post war period, which became a global style and key indicator of modern culture. Its semantics refer to sex—rocking and rolling has always had sexual connotations, as in B. B. King's "Rock Me Baby," though its subsequent imaging is also often connected to the guitar and the automobile, both also sexual images in themselves. Images of freedom, movement, release, and romance are all central to the rock and roll legacy, as is alcohol and substance abuse, dance, and noise. The precondition

of rock and roll is not only gasoline, but especially electricity, both actual and metaphorical. Rock and roll is the result of the Electric Age. Rock and roll is Fordism on a Friday night.

Rock and roll is best viewed sociologically as a confluence of influences and origins, which first came together in the US. It has strong connections to white country and hillbilly music, and likely better recognized origins in African American music, gospel, jazz, and blues or plantation field music. Thus the cliché "the blues had a baby and they called it rock and roll" only captures the main line of development, from Memphis to Chicago.

The iconic figures of early rock and roll are indeed black, as exemplified in Little Richard, Fats Domino, and Chuck Berry, Berry even more so for his guitar and licks that ran right through to the Rolling Stones and AC/DC. The central transitional figure, as well as being the icon of rock and roll in his own right, is Elvis Presley. Elvis was the most important messenger between the South and North between black and white audiences. Once black music like rock and roll was no longer cataloged as "race music" its influence extended dramatically, though the critics of this process would also damn it as the dilution of the form via its mainstreaming and commodification. For the critics of this process, whether white musical purists or black pride separatists, mainstreaming rock and roll was tantamount to repackaging it as white bread—white boys, on this account and white music businesses literally took this bread from black tables.

While white boys like Elvis, Johnny Cash, Carl Perkins, and Jerry Lee Lewis were later to record in Memphis at the Sun Studios into the 1950s, African Americans like Jackie Brenston and his Memphis Cats cut the first rock and roll disc, "Rocket 88," there in 1955. The association of this musical form with the automobile was strong, from Robert Johnson's "Terraplane" through to Berry's "No Particular Place to Go," and the Beatles' "Drive My Car." Meantime, in Chicago, the black blues of Chess Records was growing. It reflected the Northern odyssey of black musicians like Muddy Waters, who traveled from the South seeking work after the mechanization of the plantations, and dreaming of freedom and wages we now associate with the era of Fordism. In Detroit, the home of Ford Motors, into the 1960s, soul music was promoted by Tamla Motown, directly

associated with Fordism, and then in Atlanta by Stax, where some of the finest mixed race bands emerged, such as Booker T and the MGs. The Chicago equivalent appeared with mixed race blues bands like Paul Butterfield's. On the West coast the surf music scene produced at its best bands like the Beach Boys, now thought by some to be the alter egos of the Beatles. Then, later, there was the peculiar genius of the Doors, and the trajectory of cowboy rock which went through to the Eagles, then the Red Hot Chili Peppers.

But in the beginning, in the big picture, there was Elvis. And then there were the Beatles. How did the Beatles happen? Their influences were also American, via skiffle music, Lonnie Donegan, and lyric harmonies like those of the Everley Brothers, as well as the usual culprits, Little Richard and Chuck Berry. The Beatles offer as clear an example of cultural traffic as might be imagined. They imbibed the local culture of skiffle and American ideas in maritime cities, Liverpool and Hamburg, and then made the momentous decision to write for themselves rather than to copy American rhythm and blues. At the same time the Rolling Stones and the Yardbirds followed a similar path, shifting from mimicry of black music to more evident practices of innovation, the Stones always dirtier. Where the Beatles had "Revolution," the Rolling Stones' equivalent bid for an anthem was "Street Fighting Man," or perhaps it was "Sympathy for the Devil."

Guitar music was central to all this. The Yardbirds alone threw up three signal talents: Eric Clapton, Jeff Beck, and Jimmy Page. Illustrious British guitar players also went through the local blues scene, notably working with John Mayall (Clapton again, Peter Green, and Mick Taylor, the latter replacing Brian Jones in the Stones). For a while the "British invasion" of American rock involved British acts taking American rhythm and blues back to different, new white audiences in the US; the British blues revival had a similar effect. The Stones, indeed, took back to the Northern states music by blacks like Muddy Waters, opening new doors to local listeners whose reception was hitherto obstructed by racial obstacles or absences. British bands like Cream, traveling through the US, did more to legitimate blues music for white audiences than black individuals like B. B. King, Freddie, or Albert King could ever have achieved on their own. But the results of these processes could still be seen as racial

commodification, more white bread. For performers like B. B. King they did, at least, mean bread.

If the British bands took rock and roll back to the US, they also necessarily added something. There was more than a Cockney or Midlands accent to this. In the case of bands like the Animals, the Kinks, and the Who, it included the Carnaby Street fashion sense of swinging London together with mordant wit and romantic love hate for city and suburb. This was a rock and roll set against the cosy or constricted domesticity of post war Britain. Rock and roll tongues were now firmly in cheek. Lyrics became critical and ironic, a contrast to the simpler '56 romance of Buddy Holly or the more openly direct sexuality of Little Richard or Muddy Waters. The 1960s were flash, in fashion terms, but the hippie edge of the counterculture also bit. Rock and roll became a vital part of the opposition to the Vietnam War, but it was also the soundtrack for the often black infantry who had to fight in Vietnam. Certainly, Hendrix was a guitar hero for both sides.

So called psychedelia hit hard. British bands like Pink Floyd were influential here, as were the various permutations of David Bowie, but the hardest hitting drug bands were to be found in the West Coast of the US, as in the Grateful Dead or, more inventively, Frank Zappa and the Mothers of Invention. White American blues took off, exemplified by Southern bands like the Allman Brothers and Lynard Skynard. By 1970 the Beatles were gone as a live presence, and pioneer blues cum heavy metal bands like Led Zeppelin dominated live music. While the Beatles' own version of cultural hybridity included especially influences from the old British Empire, most notably India, Led Zeppelin also took in influences from Africa and the Celts. The Jamaican diaspora in Britain laid a fresh path of reception for reggae and ska. The glam and glitz of seventies pop gave way to punk, and then rap. Punk was extraordinarily influential, both in terms of its in yer face attitude and its final step in the direction of democratizing music. By the 1980s garage bands were everywhere, in the metropolis and in the peripheries. The sense that you could do it for yourself, and the availability of the musical technology to facilitate this, then found its ultimate result in the mixing and scratching of electronic music and the DJ scene. Bass and drum, and sometimes guitar and drum setups like the Black Keys, took blues music back, in one sense, to its origins, where bands might skip an

instrument like bass simply if there was no one there on the night to play it. More people were producing rock music, more consuming it.

Definitional arguments abound as to how precisely to establish the nature or limits of rock and roll. There are various disputes about exact originary moments, though most of them are dated to the middle 1950s. A more difficult if pertinent question is whether rock and roll is over, or dead. Certainly, video killed the radio star, and the video clip and MTV have dissolved the clear distinction between the music video hit and the advertisement, not least when the sexualized imagery of new female faces and bodies of pop music are added in. Rock and roll, in the stricter sense, say, of 1956–80, was never systematically feminized. Its imagery and practice were much more substantially masculine: the guitar as phallic symbol; women as groupies or fans, consumers or sex objects rather than producers; automobile imagery dominant as the motif of freedom and male escape. The popularity of girl groups, now ironically called R & B, indicates some change in the gender dynamics of pop music, though via the use of visual imagery that sometimes seems closer to soft porn.

Alongside issues of the gender and race dimensions of rock and roll and the pervasive influence of the visual even at the expense of the aural, the sociological question of periodization also necessarily arises. If rock and roll coincides with Fordism and the cultural traffic characteristic of post war patterns of migration, then it should reasonably be expected that as the product of its time rock and roll must also pass. Other cultural forms exhaust themselves—why not rock and roll? In this interpretation, rock and roll's last gasp would have been that of Freddie Mercury, or at least Kurt Cobain. An alternative interpretation of this process of change would be to say that rock and roll has disappeared into the mainstream, simply become part of mass or popular culture, and therefore part of the pop or contemporary music scene. Mainstream rock and roll now often seems tediously formulaic, as demonstrated in the seemingly endless tours of the Rolling Stones, or in terms of new variations on basic themes, as in Oasis or more recently Jet. Musical innovation seems more often to occur with the development of the mix, or the more extensive pluralization of musical styles and references and genres by particular bands, such as You Am I and Augie March. Culture remains a massive storehouse of

possibilities. In both cases, mainstream and more innovative, the sense of pastiche prevails; it is still, as with the Beatles, the mix that makes it. Alongside the homogenized forms of musical McDonald's, it may also be the case that rock and roll lives on in the garage, and in the club, closer in spirit to where it began.

SEE ALSO: Consumption; Drug Use; Media and Consumer Culture; Music and Social Movements

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science fiction

Andrew Milner

In science fiction (SF), as in much myth, folktale, and fantasy, the entire narrative is dominated by what Darko Suvin calls the “novum,” that is, a fictional novelty or innovation not found in empirical reality. In SF this novum is depicted as compatible with the cognitive logic of science (e.g., rebelliously intelligent robots or time travel), whereas in fantasy it is not (e.g., vampires or werewolves). SF is thus a characteristically modern, post Enlightenment type of imagining. The term itself first appeared in American interwar “pulp fiction” magazines. Hugo Gernsback coined the word “scientification” in 1926 for the first issue of his *Amazing Stories*. “Science fiction” itself became common after John W. Campbell, Jr. changed the name of a rival pulp from *Astounding Stories* to *Astounding Science Fiction* in 1938. Gernsback had also traced the genre's origins to an earlier tradition of fictional writing about

science represented by Jules Verne in France, H. G. Wells in England, and Edgar Allen Poe in the US (Clute & Nicholls 1993). A common starting point in much recent commentary has, however, been Mary Shelley's *Frankenstein* (Aldiss 1986; Kadrey & McCaffery 1991; Slusser 1992; Clute & Nicholls 1993). Whatever its origins, the genre has spread across the field of popular culture to embrace film, radio, comics, television, computer games, and rock music. Sociological interest in SF tends to focus on four main topics: the kind of SF that might be considered social science fiction; the application of mainstream social theory to SF texts; the social geography of the genre's production; and the social demography of its audience.

SOCIAL SCIENCE FICTION

Some SF quite explicitly plays with the notion of hypothetical new social sciences: the best example is probably the science of "psychohistory" depicted in Isaac Asimov's *Foundation Trilogy* (1951 3) and its less interesting sequels. Most social science fiction is not so much about social science, however, as about society. It thus tends to take the form of either utopia or dystopia. Utopias are much older than SF: the term itself was coined by Thomas More in 1516 and recognizably utopian "ideal states" have been staples of literary and philosophical imagining since classical antiquity. Nonetheless, Suvin (1979) argues that SF retrospectively "englobed" utopia, thereby transforming it into "the sociopolitical subgenre of science fiction." Williams (1980) also treats SF as a distinctly modern form of utopia and dystopia. There are four characteristic types of each, he observes: the paradise or hell, the positively or negatively externally altered world, the positive or negative willed transformation, and the positive or negative technological transformation. The latter two are the more characteristically utopian/dystopian modes, he concludes, especially in SF, because transformation is normally more important than mere otherness.

Neither Suvin nor Williams equates utopia with radical perfection. They understand it comparatively rather than superlatively, as "organized more perfectly" (Suvin 1979: 45) and dealing with "a happier life" (Williams 1980: 196) than that found in empirical reality. Perfect utopias are only a limit case, a subclass of a wider species of merely

more perfect worlds. The obverse is also true for dystopias. SF utopias and dystopias have been inspired by much the same hopes and fears that inspire politics and social science in the real world. Late nineteenth century utopian fictions were thus very often socialistic; for example, Edward Bellamy's scientific and state socialist *Looking Backward 2000 1887* (1888) or William Morris's neo Romantic and libertarian socialist *News from Nowhere* (1890). H. G. Wells's later technocratic utopias were similarly informed by his Fabian socialism. Explicitly Marxist utopias were less common, but there is at least one important Marxist anti capitalist dystopia, Jack London's *The Iron Heel* (1907). For the most part, however, anti capitalist dystopias were as likely to be inspired by political liberalism, for example Karel Čapek's *R.U.R. Rossum's Universal Robots* (1920, in English 1923) and Aldous Huxley's *Brave New World* (1932). The middle decades of the twentieth century also witnessed a number of important liberal or libertarian socialist anti totalitarian dystopias, notably Yevgeny Zamiatin's *My* (1920, in English *We* 1924) and George Orwell's *Nineteen Eighty Four* (1949).

Late twentieth century utopias and dystopias were often associated with anti racism, the movement for gay rights, feminism, environmentalism, and their reconciliation in ecofeminism. At one level, all SF treatments of alien species touch on the politics of race, at least by implication. But Pierre Boulle's *La Planète des singes* (1963, in English *Monkey Planet* 1964) deliberately used the dystopian device of the planet of the apes so as to critique both racism and anthropocentrism. Samuel R. Delany's *Triton* (1976) is perhaps the best known utopian SF treatment of gay and other alternative sexualities. Important examples of feminist utopias include Ursula K. Le Guin's *The Dispossessed* (1974), Joanna Russ's *The Female Man* (1975), and Marge Piercy's *Woman on the Edge of Time* (1976). The most significant feminist dystopia was almost certainly Margaret Atwood's *The Handmaid's Tale* (1985). Environmentalist themes were central to Kim Stanley Robinson's *Mars Trilogy* (1992 6), albeit in contradictory relation to socialistic notions. Socialist anti capitalism, with an occasionally Marxist inflection, also reappeared at the very end of the century in China Miéville's dystopian *Perdido Street Station* (2000).

These later utopias often contained significant dystopian motifs, and the dystopia's significant

utopian motifs. Indeed, one interesting feature of late twentieth century SF was precisely its practical resolution of the opposition between utopia and dystopia, in what Tom Moylan and others have termed “critical dystopia.” So Moylan observes that much of this writing “burrows” within the dystopian tradition “in order to bring utopian and dystopian tendencies to bear on their exposé of the present moment”; and that, although utopian in intent, it does “not go easily toward that better world,” but rather lingers “in the terrors of the present even as they exemplify what is needed to transform it” (Moylan 2000: 198–9). As Williams (1980) recognized, utopias of this kind constitute an inherently more realistic and open ended form than the earlier variants.

SOCIAL THEORY AND SCIENCE FICTION

Mainstream social theory has inspired a substantial and growing body of SF criticism. Some of this is Marxist: Suvin’s *Metamorphoses*, for example, and Moylan’s studies in utopianism, but also Carl Freedman’s *Critical Theory and Science Fiction* (2000) and Fredric Jameson’s many essays on SF, especially his “Progress v. Utopia; or, Can we Imagine the Future?,” first published in the journal *Science Fiction Studies* in 1982. Some is feminist: Le Guin’s two collections of essays, *The Language of the Night* (1979) and *Dancing at the Edge of the World* (1989), Susan Lefanu’s *In the Chinks of the World Machine* (1988), Marleen Barr’s *Feminist Fabulation* (1992), Jenny Wolmark’s *Aliens and Others* (1994), and Russ’s collection *To Write Like a Woman* (1995). Some is postmodernist, notably Scott Bukatman’s *Terminal Identity* (1994) and Damian Broderick’s *Reading by Starlight* (1995). Some is queer: Eric Garber and Lyn Paleo’s *Uranian Worlds* (1990), for example, or Delany’s *Silent Interviews* (1994).

In at least two cases Baudrillard’s theory of postmodernism and the debate over posthumanism SF occupies an unusually central location in relation to the theory itself. For Baudrillard, postmodern culture is above all simulacral and hyperreal. He uses the term *simulacrum* to mean a sign without a referent, “never exchanged for the real, but exchanged for itself”; and *simulation* refers to simulacra, or the non referential equivalent of representation (Baudrillard 1994: 6).

He argues that there have been three orders of simulacra since the Renaissance, respectively, the natural, the productive, and “the simulacra of simulation.” The shift from the second, founded on industrial manufacture, to the third, founded on information, marks the shift to postmodern “hyperreality.” Each of the three orders of simulacra has been accompanied by a corresponding “imaginary,” he suggests, so that utopia belongs to the first order, science fiction proper to the second, and a new kind of “implosive” fiction, “something else . . . in the process of emerging,” to the third (p. 121).

Baudrillard cites the work of Philip K. Dick in the US and J. G. Ballard in Britain as instances of this “science fiction that is no longer one.” Commenting on Ballard’s *Crash*, he writes: “there is neither fiction nor reality anymore . . . hyperreality abolishes both . . . science fiction in this sense is no longer anywhere, it is everywhere, in the circulation of models, here and now, in the very principle of the surrounding simulation” (p. 126). This notion that contemporary reality is itself science fiction accords a much more general cultural significance to the genre’s wilder speculations. Hence, the judgment that *Crash* “is the first great novel of the universe of simulation” (p. 119). SF cinema famously repaid this compliment in the Wachowski brothers’ *The Matrix* (1999), when the character Neo pointedly made use of a simulacral copy of Baudrillard’s *Simulacra and Simulation*.

SF has also occupied a central position in recent speculation about the “posthuman.” This term seems to have been coined by Ihab Hassan in 1977 to mark the “coming to an end” of “five hundred years of humanism” (Hassan 1977: 212). In itself, this was little more than an elaboration on structuralist and poststructuralist understandings of subjectivity as an effect of discourse. But this theoretical anti humanism was soon complemented by the practical posthumanism implicit in a whole range of actual or potential new technologies for reembodiment and disembodiment, ranging from genetic engineering to advanced prosthetics, from artificial intelligence to virtual reality. Donna Haraway famously synthesized the claims of the theory, the technology, and feminist politics in her “Cyborg Manifesto,” which eagerly anticipated a “cyborg world . . . in which people are not afraid of their joint kinship with animals and machines” (Haraway 1991: 154).

These and similar notions have been widely canvassed in recent philosophy and social and cultural theory, from Elizabeth Grosz's *Volatile Bodies* (1994) and Katherine Hayles's *How We Became Posthuman* (1999), to Chris Gray's *Cyborg Citizen* (2001) and Francis Fukuyama's *Our Posthuman Future* (2002). They are also central to much contemporary SF. In addition to *The Matrix* trilogy, important examples from the cinema would include both versions of Ridley Scott's *Blade Runner* (1982, 1992), the *Terminator* (1984 2002) and *Robocop* (1987 93) trilogies, Steven Spielberg's *AI* (2001), and two of Alex Proyas's films, *Dark City* (1998) and *I, Robot* (2004). From print, one could cite Iain M. Banks's "Culture" novels, Octavia Butler's *Xenogenesis* trilogy (1987 9), Ken Macleod's *The Stone Canal* (1996), Greg Egan's *Diaspora* (1997), Michel Houellebecq's *Les Particules élémentaires* (1998, in English, *Atomized* 2000), Atwood's *Oryx and Crake* (2003), and much of the cyberpunk and post cyberpunk writing of William Gibson and Bruce Sterling.

SOCIAL GEOGRAPHY OF SF PRODUCTION

The social geography of SF follows a fairly clear pattern. Conceived in England and France at the core of the nineteenth century world order, it continued in both throughout the twentieth and into the twenty first century. Its frontiers expanded to include the Weimar Republic, early Soviet Russia, and interwar Czechoslovakia. Exported to Japan in the post World War II period, it also flourished in communist Poland and more significantly in late communist Russia. But the US became absolutely central and near hegemonic, nonetheless, from the interwar period through to the present. Moreover, this American hegemony extended from print to film and television. In the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries the pattern merely reproduced the general importance of England and France in the commercial production of literature. But more recent trends are less easily explained. Csicsery Ronay (2003) argues that they are best understood as a correlate of imperialism. A more plausible explanation, however, might be that twentieth century SF developed in what Moretti (2000), after Wallerstein, would see as the semiperiphery of the world literary system.

This extrinsic pattern is matched by epistemic ruptures within the genre. Verne and Wells had generally written from within a self confidently optimistic positivism, bordering on the utopian. Science fiction in Germany, Russia, and *Mittleuropa* abandoned liberal futurology, opting either for an explicitly communist utopianism or, more interestingly, for dystopia, whether communist or capitalist, a theme later reimported into England by Orwell. Positivistic science fiction was resumed in interwar America, but in a different register, as an escapist response to the Great Depression rather than an easy celebration of scientific triumphalism. This second epistemic shift was a distinctly American achievement, though it is worth noting that the US was still then nearer to the periphery than the core of the world literary system. The American variant seems to have become, in turn, the core of a new science fictional subsystem of the world literary system and the primary source for later mutations into other popular media.

SOCIAL DEMOGRAPHY OF SF AUDIENCES

As to the social demography of SF audiences, there is evidence to suggest that they are disproportionately male and concentrated among supervisors and technicians rather than either higher professionals or manual workers (Bennett et al. 1999). It is also clear that SF, like sport and popular music, tends to acquire "fan" audiences (literally, fanatics). The most famous example are the *Star Trek* fans, or "Trekkers." For structuralist semiology, fans often seem the most readerly of readers, subjected to the most closed of closed texts (Eco 1981). But recent quasi ethnographic research has tended to suggest otherwise. Fan reading seems not only *not* passive, but also positively creative, to the point of stimulating cultural production, in the full sense of the active making of new artworks. Jenkins (1992) uses the term textual poaching (borrowed from Michel de Certeau) to describe how SF fans appropriate materials from the dominant media and rework them in their own interests (de Certeau 1984; Tulloch & Jenkins 1995). The analogy is with poaching from a gamekeeper, rather than poaching eggs.

An extreme example of textual poaching is in the so called "slash fiction" devoted to the theme of a gay relationship between Captain Kirk and

Mr. Spock, two leading characters in the first *Star Trek* TV series. The “slash” in slash fiction refers to that in “K/S,” a code indicating that the stories, artwork, etc. appearing in the fanzine will be concerned with same sex relationships. There are other slashed couples, but K/S pornography/erotica is still by far the most extensive and prolific. Perhaps the most striking finding to emerge from research on the subject is that K/S fiction is overwhelmingly written not by gay men but by women, many of them quite conventionally heterosexual (Jenkins 1992). As Penley (1997) concludes, these “amateur women writers” are writing their own “sexual and social utopias” through the materials to hand; in short, they are poaching actively, creatively, and subversively.

SEE ALSO: Fans and Fan Culture; Popular Culture; Popular Culture Icons (*Star Trek*); Post humanism; Postmodernism

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soap operas

Adrian Franklin

Soap operas originated in 1930s American radio and are so named because they were programs sponsored by soap companies such as Proctor and Gamble who were seeking a means of advertising their domestic products to housewives (or, more precisely, women in the 18-49 demographic who combined bought a lion's share of the market). The format they chose (and many of the companies were owned by them) was similar to opera in that it was melodramatic, larger than life, and about the universal human condition. Allen (2005: 1) also argues that the American press who coined the phrase suggested “an ironic incongruity between the domestic narrative concerns of the daytime serial and the most elevated of dramatic forms.” Their radio format was highly restricted: they were only of 15 minutes duration, their casts were very small, and the themes were largely those surrounding domestic life and romance.

The structure of soap operas is based on seriality, and here the link between maintaining a

continuous narrative and brand loyalty is made: the audience is hooked into a storyline that has no obvious end in sight and so inadvertently exposes them to the sponsor's continuous advertising message. Various devices emerged in the history of soaps to make this arrangement more secure. Over time and especially as they made the leap from radio to television in the mid 1950s, they created more elaborate and numerous plot lines between the more finely crafted characters, they left multiple loose ends between episodes, and they left cliffhangers at the end of the week to entice audiences back at the beginning of the next. Soap operas were also long lived, so in addition to the fact that characters changed over time and could come and go, the audience developed a knowledge of and intimacy with them. In the time between episodes, soaps engendered the practice of imagining possible configurations and futures, guessing the resolution of cliffhangers, and being drawn into moral and ethical debates. Soaps not only developed an audience, therefore, they also developed an interacting community of viewers and their plots provided the content for a considerable amount of discussion at workplaces, meal times, and pubs (Brown 1984; Allen 1995).

Soap operas have been a very significant element of popular culture since the 1930s onwards. By World War II there were 64 daytime soap operas in the United States and in recent years there have been approximately 50 hours of soap operas on the main US TV networks (NBC, ABC, and CBS). In the UK there were fewer but the intensity of interest was no less. Whereas advertising and ratings were the key driving force among the main US networks, a fact that produced a bland, spatially and culturally Middle American feel, in the UK locality and culture were key. The radio audience was dominated by *The Archers*, in its archetypal rural setting and themed around the vicissitudes of country life. However, much of UK commercial television was regionally and popularly based and so each regional station produced its own culturally specific version. These were largely working class, gritty, realist, and culturally authentic formats that echoed the successful genre of working class films from the 1950s. Thus, the Manchester based Granada TV made the most successful of them all, *Coronation Street*, while *Crossroads* hailed from the Midlands, *Brookside* from Liverpool, and *EastEnders* from the BBC's base in London.

Coronation Street is a nationally significant program, however, mostly topping the ratings during its very long life, and it was mirrored in the US by *Dallas*, *Hill Street Blues*, and *St. Elsewhere*. These formats were very different from the earliest soaps in that they had expanded their demographics to include the very widest range of people possible to their new slots in primetime. By the 1970s women were no longer at home to provide an easy advertising target, nor were they the mainly responsible agents of retail spending.

Although soaps had their critics in the past, who argued that they were artless and exploitative, in recent years sociologists and cultural scholars have noticed their cultural significance and value. Fiske (1987) argues that as key, if not exclusive, viewers, women draw some benefit from the strong female characters, particularly in affirming the sexual power of middle aged women and questioning "traditional family values" in relation to bad relationships and marriages.

This relates to another finding, that in using *social* themes to drive interest and appeal and in being set in everyday space and culture, soaps provide a moral discussion forum that might otherwise not exist. It is now an everyday occurrence to see reported in the British tabloid press the latest scandals and incidents screened by the soaps. The articles report these events as news, and, just as with all news, they add comment and solicit collective responses from readers.

This is not as bizarre as it sounds. British and American society does not properly correspond to the contrived communities that the soaps construct; rather, it is the opposite. Most people live relatively isolated, individualized lifestyles where the continuity and solidarity of the soap communities have all but vanished. We do not, in fact, have the opportunity to discuss at great length in a number of community settings the various issues that come our way, nor are we taken care of by a maternal, caring state. We have to make the most of the many lifestyle choices alone, but we have come to rely increasingly on advice and information from the media and the soap is, arguably, one of the more important ways in which individuals share in a collective conscience.

When *The Archers* first began, it was explicitly a tool of state government designed to feed valuable information to rural communities about new agricultural technologies. The contemporary soaps are now commercial affairs, but their place

in educating individuals in the techniques of lifestyle is not dissimilar.

SEE ALSO: Celebrity and Celestoid; Celebrity Culture; Mass Media and Socialization; Media; Popular Culture; Television

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ZOOS

Adrian Franklin

The number of zoos ("zoological gardens") around the world grew dramatically during the twentieth century from 120 in 1920, to 309 by 1959, to 883 by 1978 (Mullan & Marvin 1987: 113), though according to recent work by Nils Lindahl Elliot

their visitor numbers peaked in the 1960s. By the 1980s, however, zoos still rivaled most other leisure attractions. San Diego and Washington Zoos are both visited by over 3 million people annually, London Zoo by over 1.3 million, Berlin Zoo by 2.5 million, Ueno Zoological Gardens in Tokyo by 7.2 million, and Beijing Zoo by 8 million.

ANIMALS AND THE CARNIVALESQUE

From the sixteenth century onwards, Europe expanded in all directions after having been more or less confined to its old borders. New explorations and discoveries encouraged interest in all manner of natural and cultural phenomena. A market for exotic animals emerged by the seventeenth century and although some were bought for private collections, others were bought for public display. Up until the mid nineteenth century, the pattern of leisure in Europe was quite different. The most significant feature or highlight of the leisure calendar was local festivals, or revels—survivals or remainders from the medieval carnivals. The various activities that comprised such events were carnivalesque, a series of inversions of normal day to day life. While much of the content was specifically local, professional traveling entertainers introduced exotic novelties. Many of these traveling entertainments were based on the brief gaze: customers paid for a fleeting glimpse of such exhibits as human freak shows, historical or religious artifacts, and exotic animals. Only in London were menageries open to the public for most of the year.

It was a characteristic of these menageries that a large number of animals were crammed into a very small space. This was partly to do with the logistics of a traveling show, but the concentrated nature of the exhibit was related to its purpose as spectacle. The public could get quite close to the animals and were guaranteed a good view. Cages were made of iron bars, they were very small and of uniform rectangular shape, and they gave the animal no respite from the public gaze. The public were to be roused into a pleasurable delight based on strangeness, grotesqueness, dangerousness, and otherworldliness. The gaze was frightful, exciting, hideous. Because the animals were little more than monsters, the idea that they should have restricted movement and that their accommodation was prison like was perfectly consistent and sensible.

In any case, the audience had no idea whatsoever about the animals' natural habitat, other than that perhaps this too was dangerous and probably unpleasant. Animal menageries were typical of the carnivalesque: they created a liminal zone or space where, upon entering, people stepped out side their normative day to day world and were suspended in a halfway space. Crudely speaking, this space might be described as between culture and nature, or this worldly and otherworldly, Britain and darkest Africa, or "home" and the "frontier." Nothing distracted the gazer from this dark, sensory pleasure. The brevity of the glimpse prevented, perhaps, the opposite (possible) realization of familiarity, sameness. The structure of the menageries as buildings or frames for the gaze was plain, purely functional, and non-distracting. There were no extraneous, decorative embellishments to detract from the full impact of otherness, or to domesticate it, to render it more acceptable and normative. Indeed, it is characteristic of the carnivalesque, rooted as it was in the social permanency of the feudal regime, that social inversions and the return from liminal experiences were functional to the reproduction of social order.

The experience of the menagerie reinforced, through a look into the terrible specter of the other side, a sense of belonging to a superior, civilized, and ordered society. It positively confirmed the civilizing force and European ordering of the New World. It maintained a sense of superiority which was based on an inflexible, ordered social hierarchy. This was the zoological gaze before social progress and egalitarianism became a powerful driving force of modernity. Up until the late eighteenth century and into the nineteenth, this was how the majority of people experienced exotic wild animals (see Anderson 1998 for a "colonial zoo" perspective).

During the French Revolution the revolutionaries took liberation itself seriously: they liberated all of the animals, dangerous and otherwise, from the king's magnificent menagerie. The transformation from menageries to recognizably modern zoos did involve major changes in the zoological gaze. The royal menageries in France, for example, had been opened up to the scientific as well as the public gaze before the Revolution, and clearly, from then on, the zoological gaze could be not merely spectacular but also educational. Moreover, the world was smaller and the colonial discoveries became less the object of wonder and spectacle as

they became more routinized in the content of education and scientific investigation. Widespread familiarization was achieved in the French royal menageries, and the inclusion of exotic animals in highly stylized, extensive, decorative gardens, complete with picturesque oriental architecture, highlights how they also became ornate and domesticated. These spacious, decorative, domed, and familiar spaces in which to view animals encouraged a leisurely, relaxed form of gaze, with an emphasis on recreation. Although the building of private parklands and gardens and an interest in the educational benefits of zoology were more or less confined to the social elite in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, both were to feature in the approved leisure pursuits recommended to the working class in the nineteenth century city. Modern zoos were going to be different because they were oriented to a *popular* market.

MODERN ZOOS

The scientific foundation of modern zoos such as the first one in London emphasized zoological science and exploring "useful purposes" to which animals may be put, but this was only part of the project. Apart from training zoologists, a general knowledge of animals was to be encouraged in the general public. The object of the popular zoological gaze, then, was instruction or improvement, an activity entirely consistent with rational recreation. The model or medium for this instruction was clearly the museum.

Zoos were about social progress; they were safe diversions, rational recreation, approved leisure. Being amused by the "antics" of animals was harmless, clean fun. The educational gloss was not completely bogus, people could become aware of zoological diversity and minimal other data about exhibits. But zoos were more like gardens than museums, more artifice than nature, and the information about animals was scarcely more than the labels on plants or trees. Indeed, they soon got back into entertainment to pay their way.

Zoo animals were *set up* to be infantile, amusing, and entertaining. There was certainly nothing inevitable about the chimpanzees' tea party, which was the main attraction at London Zoo from the 1920s to the 1970s. The tea party was a set piece of comic theater. As the former curator of mammals at London Zoo explained, the chimps had to

learn this role: “they had to learn to misbehave” (cited in Bostock 1993: 34). This was not a one off: zoos in this period gave plenty of cues as to the appropriate manner in which humans, especially children, their main clientele, were to relate to their animals. They were there to provide fun and games; elephants and camels were made to give rides; cheetahs were made to go on walks; llamas were made to pull carts. According to Bostock (1993: 34), “the ‘wolf man’ in London zoo . . . used to take wolves for walks and wrestle with them.”

For the most part, zoological gardens of the nineteenth century used cages with iron bars or wire, and some animals, such as the big cats, were no better off than they had been in the traveling menageries according to Bostock (1993: 29), their average life expectancy in the early years of London Zoo was two years. There was also an emphasis on having a large collection rather than a healthy, happy collection. Short lived, single, sulking specimens in small cages were the norm in the nineteenth century.

From their inception, modern zoos differed from the earlier commercial menageries in their middle class institutional approval and educational and scientific gloss. The object of the gaze was also different. Zoos were less about spectacle and more about entertainment. There was nothing particularly liminal in the setting and archeology of the zoo; it recreated an ideal (affluent) domestic setting and animals were in various ways either ornamental or domesticated. No attempt was made, for example, to simulate natural habitat gardens in zoos, despite the considerable knowledge and ability of the Victorian gardener. Instead, the lavish, eye catching gardens were formal and concentrated on shows of blooms, merely superior versions of most people’s house gardens.

Under Hagenback’s influence, zoos of the first half of the twentieth century drifted away from lofty ideals about instruction and improvement. Zoos were in the children’s entertainment business and as the century progressed they faced stiffer competition from new sources, particularly the cinema. The new “sets” and the theatrical routines performed by the animals made zoos closer to circuses than museums. Like theaters and circuses, zoos had to generate new attractions, new acts. Under the secretaryship of Chalmers Mitchell in the 1930s, London Zoo introduced a

long sequence of new attractions. First, in 1931, it introduced the concept of larger scale enclosures and wider, open spaces on a par with deer parks in stately homes, or parkland farms. Whipsnade in Bedfordshire was set in 500 acres in an attractive rolling landscape, with buildings designed by Berthold Lubetkin. Second, in 1938, it introduced the penguin pool into the main zoological gardens. The pool, another Lubetkin design, has been vaunted as a twentieth century design classic, even significant in “widening the acceptability of modern design.” This project had a strong sense of humanism, which was evident in its brief and choice of architect.

From the 1970s onwards the entertainment spaces of zoos began to be influenced by the postmaterialism of the times. Animals as well as environments became the subject of the new biopolitics. At first zoos suffered from being labeled as unedifying prisons for oppressed species and their mid century visitor numbers crashed. However, zoos were able to use this decentered, rights oriented, and environmentalist attitude to animals and turn it to good advantage. Several innovations took place, earning them the title of new zoos.

NEW ZOOS

New zoos emphasized conservation and animal rights. New private zoos such as Howletts Zoo in England were expressly set up to breed a few endangered species, and their specialist knowledge of these led to spectacular successes. When Howletts finally opened to the public, it was on the animals’ terms. The visitor’s gaze was not privileged over the needs of the animals and many went unseen.

The new zoos made life more interesting for the animals, with things to do such as *finding* their food, more life like habitats, and more interaction with their human keepers (prior to that it was felt that such interaction would denature the animals, whereas in fact mostly they became isolated and depressed).

At Sea World several accounts (e.g., Mullan & Marvin 1987; Desmond 1999; Franklin 1999) tell how the three manifestations of the killer whale *Shamu* exhibit demonstrate shifting relations to animals. In the first, *Shamu Take a Bow* of the

early 1980s, the whale is pure spectacle and its athletic body and power is on display for a sports like audience. By *Celebration Shamu* of 1986, the whale is admired by an audience not as a spectacle but as an animal that needs our understanding and care. Then, by 1996, with the new *Shamu Back stage*, the *distance and distinction* between audience and animal are canceled. The audience are now “guests” and Shamu plays “host” in a theatricalized space clearly modeled on ethnic tourism. The three manifestations chart the progress of animals from distant, exotic others to more proximate fellow travelers in the world, a significant reduction in the distinctions hitherto made between humans and animals.

SEE ALSO: Anthrozoology; Childhood; Human Non Human Interaction; Leisure; Leisure, Popular Culture and; Nature; Popular Culture

popular culture icons

All of the points made in the introduction to the entry on popular culture forms apply here, as well, to popular culture icons. However, the focus in this entry is on people (Bob Dylan, Jimi Hendrix, Michael Jackson, Bob Marley, Frank Sinatra, the Grateful Dead and Deadheads), ideas (Myth of the American Frontier), and programming (*The Simpsons*, *Star Trek*) that have achieved iconic status in popular culture; that is, they have become important symbols to large numbers of people around the world. – GR

Dylan, Bob (b. 1941)

Peter Beilharz

Robert Zimmerman was born in Hibbing, Minnesota. Unlike Jimi Hendrix, who peaked and died young, Dylan has become a kind of weathervane as well as leader of musical taste since the 1960s. Influences on Dylan included Woody Guthrie, Ramblin Jack Elliott, John Koerner and Tony Glover, Dave Van Ronk, and the whole folk blues scene in Greenwich Village in that period. His earliest persona was that of the folk player, the pioneer singer songwriter then poet and protestor, protesting as much against the absurdity of life as anything else, and helping to transform lyrics in popular music in the process. In the earlier period his persona was that of a singer with a harmonica in a rack and a guitar. Dylan revolutionized this

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image in 1965 when he appeared with an electric band at the Newport Jazz Festival. Heckling ensued from purists who could not abide electricity, but Dylan's creative phase opened into hallmark albums such as *Highway 61 Revisited* (1965) and *Blonde on Blonde* (1966). If Dylan helped to lead a revolution in lyrics, he also paved the way indirectly for punk by legitimating the practice of singing off key, chanting, almost, with a kind of infectious drone, hitting the listener so hard with dense lyrics that many with the patience would endeavor to transcribe and decode them, a practice often aided by the ingestion of hallucinatory substances.

Dylan's life subsequently includes moments of mystery, including his 1965 motorcycle crash and much later conversion to Christianity. His musical tastes shifted through to country and western, as in *John Wesley Harding* (1968) and *Nashville*

Skyline (1969), and this was later continued in a rediscovery of Nashville and the tradition of the Grand Old Opry. Dylan became a journeyman, always willing to surprise by changes in style, but nevertheless reclusive, even playing with his back to the audience. His personal silence was broken by the publication in 2003 of *Chronicles*, widely applauded for its prose as well as its rumination. At this point, the remaining image is of Dylan as a family man, a Nashville cowboy, fancy shirt, snakeskin boots, guitar, no rack.

The extent of Dylan's influence is difficult to imagine. Its material results included major contributions to electric music, including the work of the Byrds, Manfred Mann and The Band, later the Weathermen and the Zimmermen. Its broader results included the confirmation of the sense of sea change in popular music from its more innocent and sweet inflexion to realms of social critique, sarcasm, and irony. After Dylan, rock and roll had bite, but fewer illusions.

SEE ALSO: Popular Culture Forms (Rock 'n' Roll); Popular Culture Icons (Grateful Dead and Deadheads; Hendrix, Jimi)

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Grateful Dead and Deadheads

Rebecca G. Adams

The Grateful Dead is usually described as a psychedelic rock band, but its improvisational music cannot be neatly categorized as rock or, for that matter, as folk, blues, jazz, or country, though each of these types influenced it, as did classical and other genres as well. Deadheads, as the fans of

the Grateful Dead call themselves, followed the band from venue to venue from 1965 through 1995, when Jerry Garcia, the band's lead guitarist, died and the members of the band stopped playing together as the Grateful Dead. Many of these fans remain committed to this community and continue to gather at performances of cover bands and of bands featuring one or more of the Grateful Dead, including the recently reconstituted band, The Dead. The Grateful Dead were almost always on tour and played different songs, in a different order, in different ways, each night, which encouraged Deadheads to attend many shows in a given tour and to travel large distances to hear the band play. The Deadhead community is not only remarkable because of how long it has survived and for how intensely committed its members are, but also because of how large and geographically dispersed it is. At least a half million Deadheads live in every state and province in North America, as well as in more than 20 countries elsewhere.

The roots of this migrating community are in the hippie culture which grew up in the Western US during the 1960s. Known as the Warlocks for a spring, summer, and autumn, the band became the Grateful Dead in December of 1965. They were the "house band" for the Acid Tests, public psychedelic celebrations held in 1965 and 1966 before LSD became illegal in the US. By late 1966 the Grateful Dead were headquartered in San Francisco at 710 Ashbury, near its intersection with Haight Street, the symbolic heart of the hippie community. From this address it was a short walk to Golden Gate Park, where they often gave free concerts for their increasing crowd of fans.

The Deadhead community continued to grow in size after its inception in the 1960s, but the band did not become a commercial success until "Touch of Grey," a single on their 1987 album, *In the Dark*, hit the charts. By the 1990s the Grateful Dead was considered the most successful touring band in concert history. It was the top grossing touring act in 1991 and 1993 and finished in third place in 1995, despite having completed only two of a typical three tours. The Grateful Dead played 2,314 shows during their career, often to sell out crowds of more than 50,000 people.

Deadheads did not attend shows merely for entertainment or to socialize with like minded people; many of them reported having spiritual experiences. Although the spiritual experiences of

Deadheads varied widely and included feelings of déjà vu, out of body sensations, connections with a higher power, and living through the cycle of death and rebirth, the most commonly mentioned ones were self revelations and feelings of unity with others. Although dancing and psychedelic drugs contributed to these experiences for some Deadheads, others attributed their occurrence, at least in part, to the power and trajectory of the music. "Getting it" is an expression Deadheads use to describe the process of learning to perceive shows as spiritual experiences and to understand these experiences as inseparable from the music, the scene, and a cooperative mode of everyday existence.

The scholarship on the Grateful Dead and Deadheads is interdisciplinary and has largely been produced by Deadheads themselves, sometimes while they were college or graduate students, but often after they had established themselves as scholarly experts in a relevant field. Each year since 1998, Deadhead scholars have gathered at the Annual Meetings of the Southwest/Texas Popular Culture Association, which provides a home to this vibrant intellectual community. Although many Deadhead undergraduate papers, master's theses, and dissertations remain unpublished, two collections of such scholarly works are in print (Weiner 1999; Adams & Sardiello 2000). Other papers on the topic have appeared in various disciplinary journals and edited volumes, as well as in *Deadletters*, a scholarly magazine developed by Deadheads as an intellectual outlet for their work. Deadhead scholars and journalists have also produced a great deal of source material, including magazines (e.g., *Golden Road*, *Relix*, *Dupree's Diamond News*, *Unbroken Chain*, *Spiral Light*), a bibliography (e.g., Dodd & Weiner's *The Grateful Dead and Deadheads: An Annotated Bibliography*, 1997), a dictionary (Shenk and Silberman's *Skeleton Key: A Dictionary for Deadheads*, 1994), documentation of set lists (Scott et al.'s *DeadBase XI: The Complete Guide to Grateful Dead Song Lists*, 1999), interviews with key members of the band and community (e.g., Gans's *Conversations with the Dead: The Grateful Dead Interview Book*, 1991), an insider's history (McNally's *A Long Strange Trip*, 2003), an annotated historical timeline (Jackson et al.'s *The Illustrated Trip*, 2003), and a collection of annotated lyrics (Dodd's *The Complete Annotated Grateful Dead Lyrics*, 2005).

The sociological scholarship on Deadheads focuses mainly on three interrelated themes: the trajectory and functions of the show ritual, the development and management of Deadhead identity, and the complexity and diversity of the Deadhead community. Perhaps because the music and show experience are so central to the Deadhead phenomenon, the most commonly studied topic in this literature is the ritual in which Deadheads participate while they listen to the music play. Drawing and building on the theoretical insights of such scholars as Joseph Campbell, Mircea Eliade, William James, and especially Victor Turner, Deadhead scholars such as Pearson (1987), Sardiello (1994), and Sutton (in Adams & Sardiello 2000) have described Dead shows as rituals, agreeing that they have profound spiritual meaning and transformational consequences for the participants and disagreeing only over whether they should be considered secular or religious. Freeman (in Adams & Sardiello 2000), in his case study of a Dead cover band, describes how both the musicians and the audience contribute to the feelings of community that result from the show experience. Other scholars such as Carr and Goodenough (each in Weiner 1999) have emphasized the interconnections between these ritual occasions, the myths that unite Deadheads, and Deadhead identity.

Alternative approaches to the subject of Deadhead identity are illustrated by Jennings's discussion of "becoming a Deadhead," which is guided by and contributes to Howard Becker's social learning theory; David's discussion of the development of Deadhead identity over the life course, which is written in the tradition of Erik Erickson; and Lehman's application of Morris Rosenberg's discussion of self concept and ego extension to Deadheads (all in Adams & Sardiello 2000). In addition, Adams and Rosen Grandon (2002), Dollar (2003), and (Jeremy) Ritzer (in Adams & Sardiello 2000) discuss the identity challenges facing Deadheads. Using Erving Goffman's notion of tribal stigma, Adams and Rosen Grandon discuss the issues that Deadheads have when they marry non Deadheads and argue that the stigma associated with being a Deadhead is stronger because the identity is a voluntary one. Similarly, Dollar describes how Deadheads must decide whether to identify themselves as such in public and in the presence of strangers. Their choices are to blend into the main stream or to abide by community norms requiring

that they communicate their Deadhead identity by the way they talk and act. Using John Fiske's perspective on popular culture to frame his discussion, Jeremy Ritzer (in Adams & Sardiello 2000) chronicles the way in which Deadheads choose between the characteristics of the dominant society and those of their community in constructing lives that suit their needs. Furthermore, he discusses the diversity of Deadhead culture, noting that there are "preferred" ways Deadheads interpret their culture, but also a range of possible other interpretations as well.

In addition to Ritzer's descriptions of Netheads (one of many online Deadhead communities) and tourheads (those who followed the band from venue to venue), scholars have described some of the many other groups of Deadheads as well. For example, Hartley (in Adams & Sardiello 2000) provides an insider's portrayal of the lifeworld of a group variously known as "The Family," "The Spinners," and the "Church of Unlimited Devotion," a religious group that developed out of the show experience whose theology combined elements of Catholicism and Krishna Consciousness. Spinners, as Deadheads commonly called them, whirled like Dervishes at shows, using their dance to help them focus on the music. They viewed the members of the band as channels for God's energy. Similarly, Sheptoski (in Adams & Sardiello 2000) describes the contingencies facing the parking lot vendors who comprised the underground economy on tour, including challenges posed by life on the road and by security guards and police. He also described the vendors' business philosophy, which eschewed many of the mainstream values of competitiveness and profit in favor of Deadhead values of cooperation and satisfaction of community needs. Elsewhere, Epstein and Sardiello (1990) discuss the Wharf Rats, the Deadhead community's version of a 12 step program, and Gertner (in Weiner 1999) addresses the question of why there are so many Jews who are also Deadheads. The existence of these two latter groups often mystifies tourists who visit the Deadhead community. They are surprised that people who are trying to stay straight and sober choose to affiliate with Deadheads, let alone to attend shows where illegal substances are frequently imbibed. They are equally intrigued to notice Jews celebrating their Sabbath or even Rosh HaShanah.

Studying the Deadhead community always presented a methodological challenge, mainly because

not all Deadheads identify themselves as such, Deadheads are not always forthcoming about their experiences, and no complete sampling frame is available (Adams 1998). Despite the continuation and survival of the Deadhead community since Jerry Garcia died (Pattacini 2000), its fragmentation and the retirement of many Deadheads from "the scene" (Irwin 1977) have posed further challenges to Deadhead researchers seeking new data. Fortunately, however, Deadheads were conscientious about documenting the community's experience and so many sources of primary data are available in addition to media coverage and other documents (see Paterline's analysis of newspaper coverage in conjunction with US Census data in Adams & Sardiello 2000). Furthermore, the proliferation of so called "jam bands," most of which were influenced by the Grateful Dead at least to some degree, provides an opportunity for Deadhead scholars to compare and contrast their community to other similar ones.

SEE ALSO: Community and Media; Fans and Fan Culture; Identity, Deviant; Identity: Social Psychological Aspects; Music; Popular Culture Forms (Rock 'n' Roll); Ritual

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Hendrix, Jimi (1947-70)

Peter Beilharz

James Marshall Hendrix was born in Seattle, Washington and died in London. He became the guitar icon of the modern period and helped to make electric guitar itself iconic of modern popular culture. Hendrix began playing in soul and rhythm and blues bands, including Curtis Knight, B. B. King, and Little Richard's band. His many influences included blues showman T Bone Walker, Muddy Waters, and Bob Dylan. Hendrix's rise to fame began in the backwash of the British rock and roll invasion. Chas Chandler, lapsed bass player in the Animals, saw Hendrix play in New York in 1966 and persuaded him to come to London. There Hendrix joined with bass player Noel Redding and jazz influenced drummer Mitch Mitchell to form the Jimi Hendrix Experience. The Experience released three epoch making albums *Are You Experienced?* (1967), *Axis: Bold as Love* (1968), and *Electric Ladyland* (1968) and left period visual classics on film at concerts from Monterey to Woodstock. Into the edge of this period, Hendrix formed the Band of Gypsys, with a more conventional rhythm section. The Experience was the peak of his musical innovation.

The extraordinary achievement of Hendrix was to encounter existing guitar technology and revolutionize its creative scope. Hendrix became identified with the image of the Fender Stratocaster, often white and played upside down (he was a lefthander) and the Marshall stack of amplifiers mediated by technological transfer devices like the wah wah pedal. Hendrix made

the electric guitar sound like nobody had heard it before: weird, electronic, experimental, but also stunning in the steely beauty of songs such as *The Wind Cries Mary* or later, *Little Wing*. His sound was unmistakable, his writing or song construction memorable, as in *Purple Haze* or *Foxy Lady* (Hendrix could not read music, but he certainly could create it). His influence is extraordinary, and ubiquitous, but perhaps is best witnessed in the period case of his friend, Eric Clapton, whose parallel work in Cream represents, together with that of The Experience, the height of blues rock innovation in the 1960s. Hendrix's sociological significance may be even more powerful than that of Clapton, however, for Hendrix was perhaps the first black rock star and the greatest 1960s African American crossover. Unlike the great black blues players associated, say, with Chess Records in Chicago, Hendrix broke through into a majority white audience and market, anticipating later figures such as Prince. Where a figure like Elvis took black music to a white American audience, Hendrix invented, went avantgarde and in a sense mainstream, for better and for worse.

SEE ALSO: Popular Culture Forms (Rock 'n' Roll); Popular Culture Icons (Dylan, Bob; Grateful Dead and Deadheads)

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Jackson, Michael (b. 1958)

Ellis Cashmore

During the last 20 years of the twentieth century, Michael Jackson was one of the supreme icons of popular culture. Few performers and certainly no

African American performer have ever commanded a following like Jackson's: in one remarkable decade, Jackson sold 110 million records (over 75 million as a solo artist). *Bad*, his follow up to *Thriller*, was considered a virtual failure, selling 20 million copies. The tour to promote it in 1987 was watched by a total of 4.5 million people. The video of his single "Black or White" was simultaneously shown to an estimated 500 million television viewers in 27 countries in 1991. A six album deal with Sony was worth up to \$1 billion. Jackson's rare public appearances, though fleeting and uneventful, were accorded a status akin to a royal visit. The word enigmatic is overused when describing taciturn pop and movie stars, but, in Jackson's case, it fits. He was truly an enigma and this played no small part in deepening the public's interest in him. Of all the questions asked of Jackson, the most perplexing concerns his physical transformation: was he a black man trying determinedly to become white?

Seven years separated the ages of the Jackson 5, Michael being the youngest. By the time he was 10, he had featured on two singles released on a small independent label, Steeltown Records. The band consisted of five brothers, managed, often dictatorially, by father Joe. In 1969, Berry Gordy, the head of Motown Records, spotted the potential of the band. Influenced by the success of the assembled for TV band the Monkees, Gordy initially wanted to create a black version, complete with cartoon series and a range of merchandise. He launched the Jackson 5, using established stars such as Diana Ross and Sammy Davis, Jr. as endorsers. In fact, the band's first Motown album was *Diana Ross Presents the Jackson 5*.

A white compeer of the band, the Osmonds, flickered briefly, but the Jackson brothers went from strength to strength with Motown in the early 1970s, Gordy cleverly issuing single releases by Michael independently of the band, while keeping the unit together. Like all artists in the Motown fold, the Jackson 5 was given the full grooming treatment: no detail was ignored. As such, Michael was a seasoned showbusiness professional by the time he was a teenager.

Father Joe, however, was dissatisfied with Gordy's handling of his son's career and, in 1976, negotiated a deal with CBS's subsidiary label, Epic. For contractual reasons, the band became known as the Jacksons, its first album being released in 1977. While both the band and Michael

continued to sell records, progress was unspectacular until 1979 when a collaboration with producer Quincy Jones yielded Michael's *Off the Wall*, which sold 6 million copies and continues to sell. The album spawned four hit singles. Around this time, the facial changes that were to become the stuff of myth began: two rhinoplasty operations followed an accident in which Jackson broke his nose.

Despite his commercial success, MTV was impervious to Jackson for a long while. In 1983, the 24 hour all music cable TV channel rejected Jackson's "Billie Jean," giving rise to the suspicion that the station wanted only "safe" acts that appealed to white youth; and, for this reason, concluded that black artists were not good for business. CBS threatened MTV with a boycott by all its artists, forcing a change of heart. In a way, MTV's decision may have been a historic one, providing a black artist with a genuine mainstream showcase. The track was taken from Jackson's album *Thriller*, which turned him into the bestselling recording artist of his time. It became the top selling album in history. The title track's video was made into an extravagant TV event, receiving a premiere in December 1983 and going on to sell 48 million copies independently of the album.

As the world's leading artist, Jackson had to contend with the attendant publicity. This was intensified by the fact that consumers' fascination with celebrities, the gossip about them, the stories surrounding them, and the minutiae of their personal lives, had begun in earnest. Jackson's response was to become a virtual recluse, giving interviews sparingly and making infrequent public appearances. Perversely, this promoted even greater interest in him; and hearsay proliferated.

Throughout his career, the questions that contributed so fulsomely to his enigma were rarely answered. Did he really sleep in an oxygen tent? Why did he want to buy the bones of the Elephant Man? Was he so obsessed with Diana Ross that he actually tried to look like her? Did he seriously believe, as suggested in an *Ebony* interview, that he was a messenger from God? And, how come he always seemed to be in the company of young boys? This last question was asked time and again and eventually turned into one scandal too many.

In 1993, Jackson was accused of child molestation by a 13 year old boy. Jackson agreed to talk about the charges on a "live" satellite hookup from his Neverland ranch in California. He

complained that the police had subjected him to a humiliating inspection and taken photographs of his genitalia. In 1994, Jackson agreed to pay Jordy Chandler, then 14, an undisclosed sum, thought to be more than \$25 million, to stop a sex abuse lawsuit ever reaching court. Jackson was never put under oath for a civil deposition, which could be used in a criminal trial. The deal was negotiated on Jackson's behalf by his lawyer, Johnnie Cochrane, Jr., later to represent O. J. Simpson, and Larry Feldman, who was retained by Chandler's parents. Part of the agreement reached was that the payment did not constitute an admission of guilt by Jackson. After the charges, Jackson was forced out into the open and made to defend himself, whether he liked it or not. In the process, the qualities that were once integral to his appeal became implements of immolation. Was he weird unusual, or weird sicko?

The answers were forthcoming. Further legal action ensured that Jackson stayed in the public consciousness, though less for his music, more for his apparent sexual proclivities. In 2003, he was charged in California for child molestation. His acquittal in June 2005 brought to a close the first genuinely global *cause célèbre* of the twenty first century.

Meanwhile, a business drama unfolded. In the early 1990s, Jackson had bought the rights to the Beatles music and added them to his own vast catalogue of more than 3,000 songs, valued (in 2004) at \$650 million. In 1995, he merged his ATV company with Sony to create a joint venture, which, by 1999, capitalized at \$900 million, yielding an income for Jackson and Sony of about \$80 million per year. Yet, by the end of the 1990s, Jackson's profligacy had led him to seek a series of loans totalling over \$200 million from the Bank of America. Disappointing record sales and legal bills combined to exacerbate Jackson's financial position.

Jackson epitomized a perfect confluence of personality and history. A black male, precociously talented as an entertainer, he emerged as a child star in the 1970s, a time when America's dilemma had become a glaring paradox. The land of opportunity had finally granted civil rights to all citizens, yet continued to deny whole portions of the population access to the kinds of jobs, goods, and other resources germane to an egalitarian society. As the rioting of the 1960s subsided and African Americans poured their fury into more cultural

expressions, Jackson came to the fore, sporting an Afro hairdo and a clenched fist salute. He was a young man who looked like he had all the trap-pings of black power.

In reality, he was an innocent, a child who could be admired paternalistically, living proof that black people had gifts that were uniquely their own. For some, he was testimony to the continued self hatred that beset African Americans. For all his success, Jackson seemed ill at ease with his blackness and his transformation might be seen as proof of this. In a 1991 interview with Oprah Winfrey, Jackson said that he suffered from a skin disorder called vitiligo, which causes discoloration, but few accepted that Jackson had not undergone some sort of treatment. His face seemed to be in a state of perpetual alteration, giving rise to the suggestion that he was actually trying to rid himself of his blackness. Certainly, his blanched complexion, small pointed nose, and thin lips lent substance to this theory, though Jackson himself remained silent on the subject and was famously prickly about unflattering descriptions. Speculation about his motives fueled the abundant mysteries surrounding Jackson.

It is not necessary to impute motives: no one will ever know whether Jackson actually wanted to rid himself of his blackness. But, he certainly gave many precisely that impression. He was a black man so successful that he could have almost anything in the world. In one stroke, he convinced America that it was truly the land of opportunity, while emphasizing that whiteness was still the most valued commodity in that land. Don King, who promoted a world tour for Jackson and his brothers, once said of Michael: "He's one of the megastars in the world, but he's still going to be a nigger megastar" (Taraborelli 1991).

SEE ALSO: Celebrity and Celestoid; Celebrity Culture; Charisma; Consumption of Music; Fans and Fan Culture; Popular Culture; Whiteness

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Marley, Bob (1945-81)

Ellis Cashmore

While his putative remit was to produce music, Marley's status extended far beyond, embracing that of a prophet, sage, and emissary for Ras Tafari, a cultural movement that attracted acolytes wherever there were black people. In common with other charismatic leaders who have been attributed by their followers with divine qualities, Marley never explicitly denied that he was some sort of holy messenger. He was sincere: the credo of Ras Tafari included the assurance that God's presence was a uniting force within all believers—a principle captured in the expression "I and I." (In Rastafarian grammar, "I" is often substituted for "you" to affirm the oneness of people.)

Marley was not exactly chosen to represent Ras Tafari: his emergence as a prominent and globally popular singer/songwriter in the 1970s allowed him to disseminate the messages of the hitherto cultic religious group of the Caribbean to an international audience. He popularized the tenets, theological directives, and political values of Ras Tafari not by proselytizing but by performing his music. By the late 1970s his influence was pervasive and, though he never expressly proclaimed his role as a *de facto* leader of Ras Tafari, he seemed at ease with the ascription.

Born Robert Nesta Marley on February 6, 1945 in Nine Miles, Jamaica, he was brought up by his mother in the ghetto area of Trenchtown in Kingston. Like many prospective Jamaican musicians, Marley began writing and playing reggae and in 1961 recorded one of his own compositions, "Judge Not." He later formed a band called the Wailers for whom he wrote most of the material.

In 1971 the Wailers signed a record deal with Island Records and produced two albums, *Catch a Fire* and *Burnin'*, both of which alluded to the combustible nature of a world where black people were habitually oppressed and subjugated. The albums contained frequent references to "Babylon," which described the post-imperial condition. The commercial success of both albums prompted a name change, Marley becoming a more prominent figure in the line up. As Bob Marley and the Wailers the band had more success with the next album, *Natty Dread*, which included the iconic "No Woman, No Cry."

Marley's reputation was enhanced by his image: his hair was a wild Medusa-type shock of dreadlocks; he dressed in the red, black, green, and gold favored by Rastas (as devotees of Ras Tafari are known), and he would often carry a spliff of ganja. The ambiguity of his lyrics, many of which were couched in Old Testament imagery, added mystery. But the more Marley mystified, the more he seemed to reveal. His followers were fascinated enough to explore his songs and interpret their logic and meaning rather than simply listen to them. By 1977, when he released the album *Exodus*, Marley's reputation had become global. His songs about captivity, oppression, and redemption seemed to have resonance almost everywhere in the world.

Marley's death was untimely. He injured a toe while playing soccer and the toe became cancerous. Rastafarian beliefs prevented his having surgery to remove the affected areas and Marley died from cancer on May 11, 1981, aged 36.

Many singers have fans; Marley had disciples. His death did little to dampen their zeal and, for a while, many refused to accept that he had died, suspecting he had gone into hiding or been captured by the repressive forces of Babylon.

SEE ALSO: Celebrity and Celestoid; Charisma; Counterculture; Diaspora; Ethnicity; Millenarianism; Popular Culture Icons (Dylan, Bob); Social Movements

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Myth of the American Frontier

Richard Slotkin

The Myth of the Frontier is the oldest and most durable of American national myths. Like all nation state mythologies, its function is to provide a historical account and an ideological justification of national development, and a repertoire of exemplary fables based on historical events which offer plausible precedents for dealing with contemporary crises. The myth recognizes that the US developed as a settler state, which grew geographically and increased in political and economic power by advancing European settlements into the territory of Native Americans and the "wilderness." It builds upon that historical basis a set of historical fables which explain and justify the development of American nationality as the product of this perennial advance into the wilderness, or the "virgin land."

The Frontier Myth addresses simultaneously two central and persistent problems of American development: the problem of nationality (which subsumes the concepts of race and culture), and the problem of capitalist development. The Myth answers the perennial question, "What is an American?" by creating a virtual genealogy. Americans are the descendents (by blood or acculturation) of those heroes who discovered, conquered, and settled the virgin land of the wild frontier. Only a small minority of Americans ever had actual experience of frontier life; but through history texts and the media of mass culture, generations of Americans who had no ancestral tie to the West nonetheless came to see the frontier as the symbol of their collective past, the source of such "American" characteristics as individualism, informality, pragmatism, and egalitarianism. The Myth also asserts that American capitalist development has been exceptional (part of a unique nationality), especially in its successful combination of economic growth with liberal democracy; and finds the material basis of that unique developmental history in America's continual expansion to new "natural" or "wilderness" frontiers.

The Myth combines two ideological themes into a single powerful fable: the themes of "bonanza economics" and "savage war." The first is an economic mythology, implicitly a theory of economic development; the second is a political and

social myth, which defines the rights, powers, and roles of different classes and races in the making of American society.

"Bonanza economics" holds that the key to American development is the continual discovery and exploitation of cheap and abundant resources *outside* the metropolitan center of society. It is critical to the myth that the New World, the virgin lands of the West and their wealth, come to Americans *as if out of nowhere*: unlooked for, a windfall. Nature, not labor, gives such resources their value, and hence they come to Americans free of the social costs that burden development in metropolitan Europe. In the Old World (so the story goes), persons or classes could only better their conditions by undergoing the deprivations of primitive accumulation, by exploiting scarcity and need, or by engaging in social warfare against more established classes. In the New World, on the Frontier, resources are so superabundant that prosperity can be enjoyed by all, without prejudice to the interests of any — except the natives who, as savages, are outside the limits of civil society and public concern.

It is important to note that although illusion and falsification figured prominently in the economic myth of the frontier, the myth remained credible because it had some basis in reality. For most of US colonial and national history, geographical expansion went hand in hand with economic development. In the century following the Revolution, the 13 coastal colonies expanded across the continent and beyond to Alaska and the Pacific basin, while at the same time the country grew from an agrarian adjunct of the European economic system to a leading industrial and financial world power. It was perhaps inevitable that these two dramatic expansions be linked in American historical mythology. But it took mythopoetic imagination to see the westward movement of population as a *cause* rather than a *consequence* of American economic development.

Over the course of 300 years, from 1600 to 1900, through the myth making labor of preachers, novelists, publicists, and promoters, westering became a metaphor — or rather, the objective correlative — of the motives that drive economic behavior in capitalist societies. Pioneering presents the profit motive in its most appealing form, as the basis for heroic action and the creation of a unique new nation that somehow manages to be both

arcadia and imperium. As the national economy developed, and American territory incorporated new regions, the specific form of the frontier bonanza changed. Agriculture and land speculation gave way to "bonanzas" based on agricultural commodities (cotton, wheat, cattle ranching), mining (gold, silver, iron, coal), and railroad building (especially after 1865).

But according to the Myth, the American bonanza can only be achieved through "savage war": the violent conquest, displacement, or subjugation of non white races or peoples of "primitive" cultural development. Like the virgin land and bonanza myth, the myth of savage war is also rooted in historical fact. Every stage of westward expansion, from Jamestown on, was marked by Indian wars. Moreover, to exploit the cheap land frontier to the West, Americans exploited cheap labor frontiers to the East and South: at least half of the land seized from the Indians before 1850 was exploited by means of African slave labor; and the railroad frontier of the Gilded Age was built on cheap immigrant labor from Europe and Asia.

Crucial to the creation of a national myth is the conception of an Enemy. Because the US developed as a settler state, it has always defined itself against two kinds of enemy: the Native American to the West, who is seen as savage, close to nature, non Christian, non white, anarchically free in lifestyle; and the European to the East, excessively civilized, rigidly hierarchical, bound by custom and ideological creed—the triumph of the letter over the spirit. The American hero, the frontiersman or "The Man Who Knows Indians," holds a moral balance between these ideological extremes, defining and defending an American nation which blends the best of both extremes. However, according to the myth, that balance can only be achieved through the violence of warfare.

The "savage war" theme mystifies politics in a way that complements the mystification of economics in the virgin land/bonanza myth. In the Old World (so the story goes), social violence is directed inward, deployed by one class to subjugate or overthrow another in the struggle for scarce resources, with the result that Europe is both unstable and resistant to genuine democracy. But in America, the social costs of development are externalized—in effect, symbolically exorcized. Social violence is projected outward against "them that are not a People" (as the Puritans liked to

say) against tribes of alien race and culture, living beyond the geographical borders of civilization (in the case of Indians and Africans) or beyond the margins of civil society (in the case of domestic slaves and other, non naturalized immigrants).

As the virgin land/bonanza myth sanctifies the territorial boundaries of national society, the savage war myth defines and sanctifies a concept of national identity and character. In each stage of its development, the Myth of the Frontier represents progress as achieved through a scenario of *regeneration through violence*: a heroic departure from the limits of existing society; purification through a regression to a more primitive or "natural" state; and redemption, through triumph over the wilderness and its native people, which makes the West safe for civilization (symbolized by white women). The hero of the myth is a figure, "The Man Who Knows Indians," modeled on historical figures like Washington (who began as an Indian fighter), Boone, Crockett, Buffalo Bill, and Custer and fictional heroes like Hawkeye and The Virginian. The hero embodies, and so is able to deal with, the central conflict of values that marks the frontier. He knows both savagery and civilization, is at home in both; and what he knows is that (with noble exceptions) "Indians" as a race cannot be trusted or lived with. The savage enemy kills and terrorizes without limit or discrimination, in order to exterminate or drive out the civilized race. To achieve victory in such a war, Americans are entitled and indeed required to use any and all means, including massacre, terrorism, and torture. This logic has found explicit expression in certain characteristic forms of American social violence, including vigilantism and lynching. Any class which can be likened to the mythic savage as an enemy to civilization and progress becomes eligible for treatment according to the savage war scenario: becomes a candidate for subjugation, segregation, or even extermination; becomes the legitimate object of violent, perhaps military, coercion, rather than a fellow subject and citizen of the democratic polity.

At the end of the nineteenth century, as the US was making the transition to a modern industrialized nation state, two versions of the Myth were formally codified as major interpretations of national history. Frederick Jackson Turner's "Frontier Hypothesis" held that America's democratic culture and politics had been shaped by the

existence of a cheap land frontier, which provided a social safety valve for class conflict and a reservoir of unappropriated wealth available for the fulfillment of the American Dream. Turner thought that the closing of the Frontier deprived American democracy of its material basis, and threatened the US with Europe's fate of concentrated wealth and class conflict. Theodore Roosevelt offered a contrary hypothesis: that the Frontier had been a Darwinian laboratory in which a new class or "race" of masterful executives and entrepreneurs had emerged triumphant; and that a corporate America could now undertake the conquest of an imperial frontier in Asia and Latin America. Both versions of the Myth still influence both popular culture and political thinking in the US: the Turnerian (or "Populist") strain speaks in our nostalgia for the free, innocent, and abundant past that we have "lost"; the Rooseveltian (or "Progressive") strain, for our determination to find or fabricate "new frontiers" (new natural resources, new technologies, outer space, etc.) to replace the ones that have closed.

SEE ALSO: Myth; Mythogenesis

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Simpsons, The

Jeremy Ritzer

The Simpsons, an American animated television show, has transcended the position of a mere popular cultural artifact to the status of a bona fide sociological phenomenon. Instead of just entertaining the masses, the show devotes a significant amount of time to addressing social issues.

The Simpsons first appeared as very brief (30 seconds-2 minutes) animated segments as part of the *Tracey Ullman Show*, a variety show that aired on Fox from 1987 to 1989. The popularity of these shorts led to a Christmas special in the fall of 1989 (a Christmas special entitled *The Simpsons Roasting Over an Open Fire*, which first aired December 17, 1989), and then the official introduction of the Simpsons family to the American public as the stars of their own weekly series beginning in 1990 (with the airing of *Bart the Genius*, on January 14).

The Simpsons family consists of Homer, the boorish father, Marge, the moralistic and worrying mother, Bart, the oldest child, a modern version of Dennis the Menace, Lisa, the family nerd and the moral compass of the family and of the show, and little Maggie, the baby of the family, with only one word expressed over the course of 15+ seasons ("daddy," in *Lisa's First Word*, which first aired on December 3, 1992, a word that went unheard by everyone except for the viewers).

In addition, the Springfield community is populated by an assortment of caricatures and larger than life figures such as Ned Flanders, the Simpsons' hyper religious neighbor, Reverend Lovejoy of the First Church of Springfield (whose marquee has read "Every Sunday is Super Sunday" and "We Welcome Other Faiths (Just Kidding)"), Barney Gumble, Homer's drunken friend, Moe Czyslak, the proprietor of Moe's Tavern, Principal Seymour Skinner, of Springfield Elementary, and C. Montgomery Burns, the evil owner of the Springfield Nuclear Power Plant, among many others. Each comes and goes throughout the episodes, and often each plays a key role in highlighting the moral of the episode.

This one television show manages each week to address serious contemporary social issues, from religion, to the role of the family, to child abuse and endangerment, to gay marriage. *The Simpsons* has always been very responsive to, and willing to

remark, social change. In some cases, this has caused some controversy. A couple of examples can highlight the sociological perspective found in *The Simpsons*.

First, the show has always had a significant religious component. The Simpsons family attends church regularly as a family. Some have argued that *The Simpsons* is virtually alone in primetime television in its representation of a family that is truly dedicated to attending church. However, in one classic episode (*Homer the Heretic*, which first aired on October 8, 1992), Homer chooses to forego church. While his family is stuck in church because of a snowstorm, Homer has the best day of his life. When God confronts him for forsaking religion, Homer responds, "I'm not a bad guy! I work hard, and I love my kids. So why should I spend half my Sunday hearing about how I'm going to Hell?" God's response is, "Hmm . . . You've got a point there," agrees that the sermons are really tiring, and promises to give the reverend a canker sore.

The episode concludes when Homer almost perishes in a fire. He is saved by his dedicated churchgoing neighbor, Ned Flanders, and other volunteer firefighters of faith. In a conversation between Homer and God, God accepts Homer back into the flock with the statement, "Don't worry Homer. Nine out of ten religions fail in their first year" (*Homer the Heretic*).

This episode highlights the complicated relationship that *The Simpsons* has with religion, as well as with other social institutions. While the show contains much more religious content than most of the rest of what appears on American television, it is content that is willing to test the boundaries of what is acceptable. Further, the criticisms found in *The Simpsons* are often criticisms of blind obedience or dogma, not of religion or religious belief.

In a more recent example, *The Simpsons* waded into the gay marriage controversy with an episode entitled *There's Something About Marrying*, which first aired on February 20, 2005. In this episode, which was preceded by a parental advisory message, Lisa encourages Springfield to legalize gay marriage in order to attract tourists. Homer starts his own church to cater to same sex couples who come to Springfield to get married, but are turned away by Reverend Lovejoy. Patty, Homer's sister in law, asks Homer to officiate at her marriage to

a professional golfer, who is exposed as a man posing as a woman. However, Patty is a lesbian, and refuses to marry her fiancé, now male.

Despite the widespread use of stereotypes, this episode of *The Simpsons* can be seen as a very tolerant approach to an area of social change. The moral of this episode is more about love and tolerance, not a judgment as to whether gay marriage is appropriate in the United States. However, the fact that the show chose this topic as its focus, and was slapped with a parental advisory, indicates how *The Simpsons* is still willing to comment on issues that affect society.

Each week *The Simpsons* can be counted upon to wrestle with timely social issues. And a careful analysis of the range of episodes and topics would likely show that no single ideology is expressed. Instead, *The Simpsons* actively works to bring humor to America's sacred cows, often hiding a pointed social commentary within ludicrous situations and characters. This combination of humor and relevance is what has made *The Simpsons* the longest running animated series, the longest running sitcom of any kind and, when its current contract ends in 2009, after its nineteenth season, perhaps the longest running prime time series of any kind.

SEE ALSO: Culture; Media; Popular Culture; Religion

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Sinatra, Frank (1917–98)

Chris Rojek

Frank Sinatra was a popular singer, actor, and night club entertainer who dominated American popular culture for nearly six decades. Born in Hoboken, Sinatra was the son of Italian immigrants who first gained attention on a popular talent radio show as part of a singing ensemble called the *Hoboken Four*. After the group folded Sinatra worked as a singing waiter in New Jersey, where he was discovered by Harry James and invited to become lead vocalist with the *Harry James Orchestra*. Sinatra's success led to him being poached by the *Tommy Dorsey Band*.

A dedicated technician rather than a naturally gifted vocalist, he developed his trademark *bel canto* legato singing style, which enabled him to enunciate more words than other singers, by building up lung capacity through swimming and track work. He also copied Tommy Dorsey's method of breath control. During the war years, Sinatra became the greatest popular performer since the days of Charlie Chaplin, Rudolf Valentino, Al Jolson, and Bing Crosby. His boyish appearance and slight figure made him a surrogate for American troops fighting in Europe and Asia.

Sinatra went solo in 1942 and played a series of concerts at the Paramount Theater in New York that became legendary for the unprecedented mass female hysteria that they generated. Sinatra became the prototypical pop idol, with a string of hit records, popular films, and successful concert appearances. He also became a figure of controversy and even notoriety for gossip columnists. His involvement with the Left and Civil Rights Movement led to insinuations that Sinatra had sympathies with communism. At this time, too, unsavoury allegations were published about Sinatra's violence and connections with the Mafia.

Sinatra began to acquire a reputation for perversity which, combined with some uninspired film and music choices, the divorce from his wife Nancy, the highly public courtship of the film star Ava Gardner, and the antagonism of some returning American troops who resented Sinatra for avoiding the draft, sent his career into a tailspin. He referred to the period between 1947 and 1953 as the Dark Ages. It was a 6 year slump marked by declining record sales and box office catastrophes. Capitol cancelled its record contract with him and MGM followed suit by terminating his film contract.

The tailspin in his career was reversed by his performance as the victimized infantry man, Angelo Maggio, in the film *From Here To Eternity* and an Oscar for the role. The renewal of public interest in his career prompted Columbia Records to offer him a recording contract. The punitive terms would be a source of tension between Sinatra and the record company for a decade and a half. However, the inspired teaming of Sinatra with a series of brilliant music arrangers, notably Billy May, Gordon Jenkins and, above all, Nelson Riddle, resulted in a series of classic popular recordings. Albums like *Songs for Swingin' Lovers*, *In the Wee Small Hours*, *Only the Lonely*, and *Where Are You?* provided the soundtrack for the affluent society of the 1950s and early 1960s. In contemplative recordings like *Only the Lonely* and *The Wee Small Hours* Sinatra has some claim to have invented the concept album. This material can be read as providing consumer culture with a poetic vernacular in which popular romance and the collapse of relationships were addressed.

Sinatra combined a resurgent recording career with a revitalized movie career. He starred in a string of successful light comedies: *The Tender Trap* (1955), *Guys and Dolls* (1955), *High Society* (1956), and *Pal Joey* (1957). But he also tackled more challenging roles in *Suddenly* (1954), in which he is a would be assassin; *The Man With the Golden Arm* (1955), which deals with drug addiction; *The Joker Is Wild* (1957), which explores victimization in the entertainment industry and mob violence; and, above all, in *The Manchurian Candidate* (1962), which focused on political corruption and Cold War intrigue.

During the 1950s Sinatra refined the image of a priapic, whisky marinated, free wheeling playboy, especially through his association with the Rat Pack (Dean Martin, Sammy Davis Jr., Peter Lawford, and Joey Bishop). The Rat Pack

provided an antidote to Cold War anxieties. However, the image of masculinity which they cultivated was deplored by many sections of the media and popular opinion. Rat Pack hedonism and cool became an object of censure as protest artists became prominent after the 1960s.

In 1961 Sinatra founded Reprise Records as a venture designed to give recording artists maximum artistic control. He sold the company to Warner Brothers in 1963, but retained a significant share holding. The venture into successful business, and the release of the successful Rat Pack films in the 1960s, reinforced Sinatra's popular image as the king of cool.

Sinatra was a powerful male symbol of *parvenu* success. His best film and recording work captured a romantic fatalism and the tendency of modern life to provide a strain of psychological and social isolation. In the 1950s and 1960s he was omnipresent in American popular culture, dominating popular music, film, stage shows, and even politics. He was closely involved with John F. Kennedy's successful presidential campaign and even aspired to hold public office. But he was rejected by the Kennedys after they judged that his Mafia connections would be an electoral liability. Sinatra turned to the Right in the 1970s and became publicly associated with Ronald and Nancy Reagan. The Reagans were instrumental in helping him regain his casino gambling licence, which had been stripped from him in 1963 following allegations that he had entertained the notorious Chicago Mafia boss Sam Giancana at his gambling casino. He retired in the early 1970s, but was coaxed back to recording, concert tours, and some limited film roles. In his declining years he bestrode the stage with poignant Lear-like intensity, a living legend from the free-wheeling heyday of post-war Hollywood.

SEE ALSO: Cool; Popular Culture

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Star Trek

Andrew Milner

Star Trek is the most successful "brand" in the history of American television science fiction. The first version ran from 1966 to 1969; an animated children's series followed in 1973 and 1974; *The Next Generation* ran from 1987 to 1994; *Deep Space Nine* from 1993 to 1999; *Voyager* from 1995 to 2001; and *Enterprise*, launched in 2001, reached its fourth season during 2004-5. A movie spin-off, *Star Trek: The Motion Picture*, was released in 1979, with nine further movie sequels following between 1982 and 2002. Both TV series and films acquired a worldwide fan base. Sociological interest has concentrated on three main topics: the ideological meanings at work in *Star Trek*; the more specific interplay between the program's fictional Starfleet and the real National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA); and the sociology of its fan base.

Commentary on ideology tends to situate *Star Trek* in relation to 1960s American liberalism. So its quasi-utopian optimism about technological and social progress is reminiscent of the official enthusiasm for the space race and social reform under the Democratic administrations of Presidents Kennedy and Johnson. *Star Trek* is set in the twenty-third and twenty-fourth centuries, at a time when technological innovation has effectively solved the practical problems that confound humanity. People travel the galaxy in starships, their food and drink supplied by replicators, their fantasies enacted out and fulfilled in holodecks. Their collective social life appears similarly unproblematic. On Earth, poverty, inequality, and social conflict have been eliminated, so that both genders, all races, and (in the later versions) various sexualities are all equal. In the wider universe, humanity lives at peace with neighboring alien species in a United Federation of Planets.

Early commentary tended to stress the positive significance of the show's optimism and its liberalism. The original series featured the first "inter-racial" kiss between Kirk and Uhuru to appear on American television. Its non-American officers included the half-alien Spock, the Russian Chekov, and the Chinese Sulu, as well as the African Uhuru. But the limitations were also apparent: there were more humans than aliens on the bridge of the starship *Enterprise*, more Americans than

non Americans, more whites than blacks, more men than women. Uhuru might have been a black woman officer, but she did little more than answer the interplanetary phone. Later versions included more non Americans (a French captain, Picard, in *The Next Generation*), more non whites (a black station commander, Sisko, in *Deep Space Nine*), and more women (a female captain, Janeway, in *Voyager*). But Starfleet and the United Federation of Planets remained as subordinate to white American men as the real world international organizations of the late twentieth and early twenty first century.

Such limitations prompted critics to question the show's liberalism. Worland (1988) stressed its cold war militarism, Blair (1983) and Cranny Francis (1985) its sexism, Bernardi (1997) its racism. But these criticisms could easily be leveled at Kennedy liberalism itself. Indeed, the program replicated the strengths and weaknesses of its home culture with precision. And it responded, more or less creatively, to such criticism and to the increasingly postmodern character of American culture. So later commentators would see *The Next Generation* as seriously questioning existing gender stereotypes (Roberts 1999) or even as placing "the project of humanity . . . center stage" (Barrett & Barrett 2001: 204).

Star Trek's initial successes and those of the NASA space program were roughly contemporaneous. NASA's funding had been dramatically increased in 1961, when Kennedy approved the Apollo mission to send astronauts to the moon within a decade. As the decade proceeded, the Agency's status was enhanced by the show, the show's by the Agency. Eventually, what began as temporal overlap evolved into institutional symbiosis: the first NASA space shuttle was named after the *Enterprise*; and the fourth *Star Trek* movie was dedicated to the astronauts killed in the shuttle *Challenger*. Penley describes how the Agency and the TV show merged symbolically to "form a powerful cultural icon . . . 'NASA/TREK,'" which "shapes our popular and institutional imaginings about space" (Penley 1997: 16).

Star Trek's fan base is exceptionally active. When the NBC network threatened to cancel the series in 1967, a "Save Star Trek" campaign produced over 114,667 letters of protest and finally secured its renewal (Tulloch & Jenkins 1995: 9). This mass "movement" of "Trekkers" has since become a semi permanent accompaniment to the

franchise. For *Star Trek*, as for SF more generally, the convention, where fans meet with each other and with actors, directors, and writers, has become a crucial fan institution. But the Trekker conventions are both more numerous and typically much larger. The 4th official Las Vegas Star Trek Convention, scheduled for August 2005, catered for thousands of fans, at prices ranging from \$35 to \$239 for a weekend package, and featured no fewer than 35 *Star Trek* actors as "guests." Much commentary has seen the "Trekkie" phenomenon in quasi Adornian terms as manipulation by the culture industry. But Jenkins casts Trekkers and other fans in a much more positive light as "consumers who also produce, readers who also write, spectators who also participate." "In each case," he concludes, "fans are drawing on materials from the dominant media and employing them in ways that serve their own interests and facilitate their own pleasures" (Jenkins 1992: 214).

SEE ALSO: Fans and Fan Culture; Popular Culture; Popular Culture Forms (Science Fiction); Postmodernism

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popular religiosity

Manuel M. Marzal

Religion refers to a system of beliefs, rites, forms of organization, ethical norms, and feelings about the divine which help human beings to transcend and make sense of life. Popular religiosity is the equivalent of the religion of the common people, or popular piety, the way common people live their religion. It contrasts with official religiosity, which characterizes the specialists and the elites. There are several differences between these two kinds of religiosity (see Dupront 1987).

The first difference is that official religiosity considers the foundational hierophany, or manifestation of the sacred, to be very important. The more complex religious systems have specialists who analyze the contents of the original sacred mysteries and consider them as something to be preserved and protected. On the other hand, popular religiosity pays attention to ritual practices and how to obtain help from divine beings. For example, in Buddhism, specialists discuss Buddha's thoughts on nirvana and the value of religious silence to assure transcendence, while the common people take part in rites honoring Buddha in order to obtain favors in day to day life.

The second difference is that official religiosity is transmitted by the mechanisms of socialization within each religious institution, such as formal instruction or catechesis. Popular religiosity, on the other hand, is transmitted by cultural forms that are received in the process of socialization. The third difference is that while official religiosity contains the five elements mentioned above – beliefs, rites, forms of organization, ethical norms, and feelings about the divine – it does not give each the same value. Popular religiosity, especially in syncretic religions, adapts the inherited religious system to its own interests and cultural reality. It preserves some elements of the system and eliminates others. It reinterprets certain elements, adding new meanings or changing the original meaning. This process is different in different contexts, although there are some similarities. Thus there is no popular religiosity strictly speaking in denominations that practice some

form of excommunication for members who do not observe the established norms. Such is the case for Adventists, Mormons, and many confessions of North American evangelism. Finally, the relation between official and popular religion is marked by the complex history of a religious tradition.

Social sciences analyze popular religiosity in Buddhism, Islam, Catholicism, and other Christian denominations. The focus here, however, will be on Catholic popular religiosity, which has been studied extensively in recent decades and is very widespread. It is the religion of the majority in Latin America and of large sectors of Catholic Europe and its former colonies in Africa and Asia. It also exists in the United States with the increasing Hispanic immigration. Much of what is said about Catholic popular religiosity can be applied to the popular religiosity of other traditions.

Catholic popular religiosity is a complex social and religious fact which has been described rather more easily than it has been interpreted. Social scientists, depending on their different disciplines (anthropology, sociology, psychology, history, philosophy of religion), analyze this religiosity as "people speaking to God," in other words, as people communicating with a divine mystery that is beyond them. Theologians, however, analyze it as "God speaking to people," in other words, they consider popular religiosity to be an expression of Christian revelation. In attempting a definition, six key questions will be considered here. How should Catholic popular religiosity be defined? How do human societies function? What is the founding experience and what are the key concepts in the vocabulary of popular religiosity? What are the common traits? How is popular religiosity different from magical behavior? How does popular religiosity influence social and political change?

DEFINING CATHOLIC POPULAR RELIGIOSITY

The concept is not easy to define because, despite its apparent uniformity, there is a great diversity of popular religious forms, and also because a definition frequently involves a value judgment. Indeed, some consider popular

religiosity to be an expression of true faith and proof of the strong roots of the Catholic Church in two regions that formed medieval Christendom and modern American Christendom, respectively (Brading 1991). Others see it as a refuge of ancient syncretism and modern religious alienation. However, many students of Catholic popular religiosity consider it to be the way that the great majority of people express themselves in order to give a sense of transcendence to their lives. This is the case in Latin America and the other areas mentioned above where the people define themselves as Catholics despite their very limited institutional formation. This results from the limited attention given by the church because of a shortage of clergy, while in other sectors of society it is due to the growing secularization of public life. It is a case of the great majority not seeking more religious attention and being content with "being religious in their own way."

There are three other characteristics in defining Catholic popular religiosity. Firstly, popular religiosity is a culture in the anthropological sense of the term. This means that it is a way of seeing life and constructing the world. Like any other culture, it is transmitted from generation to generation, but in this case transmission takes place not so much by catechesis as by a socialization process full of popular devotions.

Secondly, popular Catholicism forms different subcultures according to the social, economic, and historical framework of the human group experiencing it. These human groups include indigenous and African peoples, who retain characteristics of their ancestral cultures. Other such groups are small rural farmers and fringe populations of cities that resulted from recent rural to urban migration. There are also middle class sectors and the bourgeoisie. From this it is obvious that such religiosity is not the prerogative of the poor, but of poorly catechized majorities. If the majority of these people are poor, it is because the majority of Latin Americans are poor; and the poor find in popular religiosity their own way to live their faith and to express their social solidarity.

Finally, popular Catholic religiosity, like any other religious system, is formed by a group of beliefs, rites, organizational forms, ethical norms, and feelings about the divine. Indeed,

popular Catholics believe in God, the saints, and demons. They go to church for baptism, first communion, funeral rites, and marriage. Matrimony is a cultural ideal even though many do not get married in church. People participate in the feasts of patron saints, the most common celebrations in the whole of Latin America. There are also massive pilgrimages to sanctuaries of Christ, the Virgin Mary, and the saints. Popular Catholics, as censuses reveal, are conscious of belonging to the church. They participate in associations and other traditional forms of religious organization. They usually respect priests and religious. In the majority of Latin American countries there is no anticlericalism, despite the church's importance in public life. Finally, popular Catholics have deeply religious feelings and accept Christian values in spite of the absence of doctrinal instruction.

POPULAR RELIGIOSITY AS A CULTURE

Anthropology has always asked three big questions about religion. How is religion born and how does it develop? What does religion do for society? What does religion mean for the believer? Anthropologists of religion have usually asked the first two questions because of their obsession with origins and because of the functional interest that developed after the failure of the study of origins. However, the third question is the most important and the one that has produced the most studies. Evans Pritchard (1956) was the first to pose the question, later restated and answered by Geertz (1973) in a systematic form. For him religion works as a "perspective," i.e., as a way to see life and construct the world. There are different perspectives (commonsense, scientific, aesthetic, and religious), which are complementary and can be used simultaneously to study a single event. Each one studies a different aspect of reality.

Popular religiosity acts like a culture, not only because it transmits socialization and communicates subjective certainty about the majority religion in Latin America, but also because it generates in the popular Catholic states of mind and peculiar motivations, and because it

offers an answer to the problem of the meaning of life. Indeed, such religiosity provides its followers with psychological strength to accompany them and motivation to guide them in what they do. These dispositions are deep, penetrating, and lasting. They give stability to popular experience and form what is usually called the religious feeling of the people. This feeling seems to be based on faith in a just, provident, and nearby God, and also in the saints who manifest themselves in difficult moments, in dreams or otherwise, to save the situation.

The religious feeling also seems to be based on the concept of the world as cosmos, where everything is wisely ordered by God, and on the necessity to worship with prayer, feasting, and so on. This religiosity provides its followers with an appropriate worldview. Such religiosity may seem to have little value because it gives an important place to certain rites, like the sacramentals or secondary religious symbols such as crosses, crucifixes, holy cards, statues, rosaries, holy water, and blessings, and to religious symbols which are marginal for the church, and also because it preserves residues of indigenous and African traditions that are somewhat incoherent. Its real importance lies not in its beliefs or rites but in the role that these play in helping to solve the problem of the meaning of life. With this popular Catholic worldview, many Latin Americans convert the daily threat of chaos – the unexplainable, the unendurable, and evil in general – into cosmos – the whole universe which is beautiful, ordered, predictable, friendly, understandable, God's masterpiece. Thus they develop a basic social personality that is more secure than that of higher social classes or of more developed countries that have lost the religious meaning of life.

FOUNDING EXPERIENCE AND KEY CONCEPTS

One of the principal elements of popular religiosity is the experience that founds it and that in some way orders all its beliefs, rites, organization, feelings, and ethical norms. Every religion and every spirituality within a religion starts from a manifestation of the sacred (hierophany),

which conditions it. Although popular Catholics, like other Catholics, admit the Bible, the sacraments, the healing of the Holy Spirit, and so on, they consider the saint, such as the visible image of Jesus, the Virgin Mary, or a saint from the Catholic calendar, to be their founding hierophany, and this image explains all their popular religious behavior. All over Latin America and especially in the lower economic sectors, people learn from their earliest childhood that the saints venerated in the local church, in their own houses, and in strategic places in the city or in the countryside are somehow alive. They listen to prayers directed to them, and are pleased by feasts and promises. They give blessings, perform miracles, and send punishments. Such early socialization usually has its concrete manifestation for each person in one particular saint to which that person is devoted. It might be the local patron saint or some other image of Christ or the Virgin Mary in the region he or she visits on a pilgrimage. Thus eight concepts – devotion, saint, miracle, blessing, punishment, promise, feast, and pilgrimage – make up the “generating words” of popular religious experience.

Devotion to the saint is a form of faith, not intellectual but trusting. It establishes a deep relationship between the saint and the person devoted to the saint. The person devoted to the saint is confident that the saint will always be there to help when needed. This relationship starts almost always for cultural reasons; for example, the saint has been venerated for many years in the family or the saint is the patron saint of the town. The relationship becomes more personal as the saint blesses or performs miracles for the devoted person. This devotion leads to familiar expressions such as “Mi Negrito” (Saint Martin de Porres) or “Mi Santa Rosita” (Saint Rose of Lima). This familiarity is made possible because the image is visible and the devoted person can and frequently does touch the image. But there is also an aura of respect because the saint belongs to the realm of the sacred and can punish.

How the devoted person sees the *saint* is a reinterpretation of what a saint is for in Catholic theology. In Catholic theology, saints are Christians who have died and have been canonized by the church because of their heroic virtues. Canonization is a long process, after

which the saint can be honored publicly in the Catholic liturgy and considered to be an intercessor. He or she is also a model of good conduct. However, for the popular Catholic, the saints are visible representations (statues or paintings) of canonized saints, people who are not canonized, and people who probably never will be canonized. The saints also include representations of the Virgin Mary, Jesus Christ, and the cross of Jesus in their different avocations. Many popular Catholics venerate the saints, choosing them from the calendar to be intercessors with God, but they do not take them as models to imitate because they are unaware of their history. A survey conducted in different towns revealed that people were ignorant of the biographies of the saints represented in baroque panels before whom they prayed or placed flowers and candles. But that does not detract from the importance of the saint. Even though the saint does not provide a role model for conduct, he or she still acts as a myth and represents Christian virtues (help for the needy, goodness, closeness to God, kindness and compassion for those who are suffering). Thus the saint is an inspiration and motivation to live a good Christian life.

Many popular Catholics live in a world of *miracles* narrated in pious literature. The miracle is visibly represented in votive offerings in churches and shrines. The people devoted to the saint claim that the saint continues to perform miracles today. However, they are not referring to miracles in the strict theological sense of a wonder that can be explained not by science but only by the direct intervention of God. Miracles in the popular sense do not go beyond the laws of nature, only beyond the people's limited possibilities. The people are limited by their low level of formal education, poor medical and sanitary conditions, structural poverty, and lack of savings for emergencies. In such cases people approach the saint and ask for a miracle. For a person devoted to the saint, it is not so important to know the cause that produced the event considered miraculous. The people know that God governs through created things and through the free actions of other people. People give a religious interpretation to the events that occur, and that is where they find the action of the saint. This religious interpretation denies neither the commonsense

interpretation nor the scientific interpretation. It is an interpretation on another level of reality where God acts and uses natural forces and the free actions of others to obtain the desired results. Each miracle strengthens the faith of the devoted person and multiplies the possibility of further miracles.

Saints do not always perform miracles. Sometimes they give simple *blessings* which give security and peace to the devoted. In this there is another reinterpretation of Catholic theology. In Catholic theology a blessing is a sacramental, a sacred sign established by the church, somewhat like the sacraments established by Christ. To ask for a blessing is to implore divine help in different moments of life. Holy water is a sacramental that is very common in Latin America. For the secularized world, holy water borders on superstition. For popular Catholics, holy water is an easy way to get close to God and to be free from life's dangers. A blessing is a frequent religious resource which, when used, charges the religious images and other religious symbols with sacred energy. Although the blessing usually expresses faith in the providence of God and in the intercession of the saints, it is quite possible for it to degenerate into a manipulation of the sacred independently of personal faith.

Paradoxical as it may seem, *punishments* attributed to the saint increase the devotion of the people just as much as miracles and blessings. Through these punishments, the saint ceases to be a simple benefactor and becomes a demanding and jealous friend who does not like to be forgotten. These punishments are the reverse of miracles. If they are considered to be fair, a religious interpretation is given to the misfortune. Some social scientists think that punishments have their roots in pre-Hispanic religions whose gods demanded human sacrifices in some extreme cases, and also in colonial preaching that insisted on the punishments of God as described in the pages of the Old Testament (e.g., Genesis 19, Isaiah 26 and 40). Even though some popular Catholics have this Old Testament vision of misfortune, many say that they deserve it for their sins. Thus punishments reinforce the relationship between the saint and the people devoted to the saint, more than the "silence of God" in the secular world. In spite of the masochistic interpretation of

punishments by scholars who reduce religion to its psychological aspects, the popular devoted person seems to prefer punishments because they prove that the saint is watching over them. They show the saint's concern just as much as miracles and messages in dreams.

A counterpart of devotion to the saints is found in *promises*. They may seem interesting because they are often associated with requesting favors. Thus many popular Catholics promise to wear a habit, make a pilgrimage to a shrine, fast, or make some other sacrifice if the saint grants them some favor. They may seem to be transferring to a religious world the social relationships of human societies. But such interpretations forget that the promises of devoted people do not always have a utilitarian motive. Many studies and surveys among different groups of popular Catholics attest to this. Promises express the sacred character of the commitment, something like religious vows in institutes of consecrated life. They are one of the most consistent forms of expressing devotion to the saint.

The most frequent form of expressing devotion to the saint is celebrating the saint's *feast* day. The patron saint's feast is an opportunity to venerate the saint, ask for the saint's intercession, and give thanks. But functional anthropology discovers other functions. The first is integration. The feast brings everybody together: the inhabitants of the town and the rural farmers who are relatively scattered outside the town. It also brings back those who were forced to leave the area to seek their fortune elsewhere. Dead ancestors, who are more alive in the popular mind than in more modern circles, are also part of the feast. They started the feast and kept it going during their lifetime. The second function is that of social prestige accorded to those who take care of the different tasks related to the feast. This prestige is present in the more traditional communities which maintain the "system of jobs" (a progression in which people ascend to jobs that are more costly and have more responsibility) in a way that redistributes power and riches. The jobs tend to impoverish the richest members of the community, because they pay the expenses out of their own pocket (the food is free for the people). This tends to create a more egalitarian society. In any case, if the jobs are assumed by

very rich people who spend a lot of money for the benefit of everyone, it legitimates economic differences in the town in the eyes of the poor. The third function is that of collective relief from the harsh life of the town, an imaginary return to "the beginning of time" when everything was festive. All this happens in a world that seems to have preserved the genuine sense of what a feast is.

Quite similar to the feast is the *pilgrimage*. According to Eliade (1959), for a religious people time and space are not homogeneous. There are hierophantic moments and places. Feasts are based on sacred time, holy moments, the liturgical cycle that recalls the events of the history of salvation, or the cycle of the feasts of the saints that recalls the triumph of the saints over death. In a similar way, the pilgrimage is based on sacred space, holy places. All over Latin America there are sacred places where Jesus Christ, the Virgin Mary, and the saints have manifested themselves in different ways. This manifestation is then narrated in a legend or myth which becomes part of the oral tradition of the place. The structure of these myths is very similar: a critical situation, especially of a very poor person, then the miraculous intervention of the saint who comes to the rescue. Then the word gets around and people start coming to see the miraculous saint. Pilgrimages in Latin America have elements that are pre Hispanic and others that are Spanish. Pre Hispanic elements are taken from the developed cultures of Mexico and Peru and from other cultures in search of "the land without evil." Spanish elements include "the road to Saint James" to visit the tomb of the apostle who is said to have evangelized Spain and to be buried in Galicia, despite dying in Jerusalem. This pilgrimage is a sign of collective identity. In general, a pilgrimage is full of religious symbols, beginning with the long walk to a place that is difficult to access. This is a kind of exodus to get to a promised land. Then there are the other religious symbols such as springs to purify the soul and body, the multiplication of miracles, the wearing of habits, the promises that are being kept by making the pilgrimage, making the pilgrimage in the form of a procession, religious songs and dances, tears, and deep emotions. In addition to all this, like the feast, the pilgrimage is a focal point of social,

political, and economic relations in the region where the shrine is located.

COMMON TRAITS IN CATHOLIC POPULAR RELIGIOSITY

Despite its great diversity of beliefs, rites, and organization, popular religiosity is fairly similar throughout Latin America. Hispanic immigrants to other places have brought their saints with them and have common traits that can be summarized as follows.

Sociological. Catholic popular religion is transmitted by the process of socialization more than by catechesis. It is part of Latin American culture. There are highly visible examples of such Catholicism, such as the devotion to Our Lady of Guadalupe in Mexico. This sociological character is a strong point of Latin American Catholicism and proof of the success of the first evangelization in an era when religion was a public rather than a private affair. Such Catholicism influences many Latin American cultural patterns in transition rites, feasts, and even in mentality, which can be observed in the way people talk.

Sacral. Popular Catholicism, especially in the lower classes, involves a vision of reality that is sacral, not secular like modern technical civilization. According to this sacral vision, the saints and other sacred beings are felt directly in the life and history of human beings. As a result of this way of seeing reality, many popular Catholics occasionally adopt a somewhat fatalistic attitude toward certain social problems and seem more interested in preserving a world they see as "cosmos" than in making "history."

Syncretic. Popular Catholicism often reinterprets official Catholicism, adding to or changing its meaning according to the experience of the people in its different subcultures. Adding to its meaning implies that popular Catholicism, besides its religious functions, has other functions in the sociological, psychological, economic, or political orders. This is observable in the patron saint's feast with its systems of jobs. Changing its meaning implies, especially for indigenous people, attributing to certain Catholic rites the meaning of their ancient beliefs. An example would be the way some rural farmers in the Andes and in Central

America offer mass for the dead, not to "free" the dead from punishment for their sins but to "free themselves" from the return of the dead to bother the living ("leave us in peace" instead of "rest in peace"). Another way of changing the meaning of official Catholicism is to make it magic.

Emotive. Many popular Catholics have a deep religious lived experience even though they know little about the dogmas, rites, and norms of the church. Such experience is related to the religious practice of calling on God and the saints in extremely difficult situations. Its principal moments are the feast, the pilgrimage, and the life cycle of one's own family (birth, marriage, and death). In addition, the harsh economic conditions of many popular Catholics in Latin America often make religious beliefs and practices an emotional "sedative," instead of being a moment to question and adjust one's own attitudes.

Ritualist. Popular Catholicism gives much importance to rites, because religious socialization is carried out mainly through rites. This explains why the religious lived experience of popular Catholics is so rich in emotions and activities, and so poor in theological formulas; so rich in mythical content, and so poor in historical content. This ritualism in popular Catholicism can lead the less educated to see the rites as absolutes. This requires an effort to remove their magic element and ensure that the rites are seen as means and not ends. But this should not involve eliminating rites, as has been done in certain sectors of the church following secularist lines. No religion can exist without rites.

Mythic. Popular Catholicism contains myths about the origin and end of humanity and about different hierophanies, especially the apparition of patron saints and historical events that are rationalized in a religious way. In addition, there are certain popular Catholic rites, such as the "payment to the Pachamama" performed in August in the Andes of Southern Peru, Bolivia, Chile, and Argentina, which is a rite to thank Mother Earth for her harvests (*pacha* means "earth," *mama*, "mother," in the Quechua language). This ceremony is based on mythical knowledge and expresses a view of reality that is not so much scientific or historical as symbolic of the personal and cultural

experience of the Andean farmers. However, when the true meaning of myth is lost, certain rites and beliefs can assume a false historical or scientific dimension.

POPULAR RELIGIOSITY AND MAGICAL BEHAVIOR

One characteristic of certain forms of popular Catholicism is its ability to change into magic or superstition. So far anthropology has not found definite criteria to distinguish magic from religion. But there have been some efforts in that direction, such as manipulation versus petition (Frazer 1959 [1922]), utilitarianism versus celebration (Malinowski 1954 [1948]), the individual context versus the communitarian context (Durkheim 1961 [1912]), and environmental control versus social control (Aberle 1966). These theories provide indicators that do not completely explain the magical or religious character of an event. But they line up on a continuum between a magic pole and a religious pole, and thus help to analyze the practices of popular Catholicism. According to these indicators, magic involves the following: practices to manipulate the sacred, practices that have only utilitarian objectives, practices that are conducted by a specialist who is marginal to the group, and practices that try to control certain moral or cosmic forces without any reference to personal behavior. On the other hand, religion involves the following: practices that express a petition to sacred powers, practices that are an end in themselves and are celebratory instead of being utilitarian, practices that are performed in union with the community, and practices that demand ethical behavior on the part of the people. But in analyzing a concrete phenomenon using these indicators, one cannot forget the symbolism of the events nor the analogy of their languages.

POPULAR RELIGIOSITY AND SOCIAL CHANGE

The social sciences have established several correlations between religious conduct and the socioeconomic category of social groups and have formulated some macro theories about

the influence of religion in social change. For example, for Marx and Weber, religion could be a trap or a springboard for change. However, the relation between religion and social change so far has not been studied sufficiently. It is a question that has come into vogue since the fall of the regimes of Eastern Europe and the role that religion may have played in it.

As for popular religion, it seems to contain a certain political ambiguity. On the one hand, it appears apolitical because of its disincarnated spiritualism and because it maintains the status quo in its rites and beliefs, and without doubt the dominant groups have influenced its assimilation. Geertz (1973) observed that the religious perspective, which serves to resolve the problem of the meaning of life, can infiltrate and "color" other fields of human conduct. This is a result of religion being called to mind frequently. This seems to be the case for minority groups that offer a religious explanation for the socioeconomic differences in Latin America. But, on the other hand, popular Catholic religion has a real political dimension. This is because it helps people maintain their identity in transition rites and in the feasts of the patron saints. It also helps them preserve their own forms of organization, religious associations, brotherhoods, sisterhoods, and so on, as well as labor unions and spontaneous organizations founded by external and internal emigrants. They find strength in the election of a patron saint, without forgetting that the associations and brotherhoods and sisterhoods usually stand in opposition to the vertical structure of the church. Popular Catholicism cultivates in the people values of fraternal solidarity and equality of opportunities for all before God, in spite of the existence of structures of domination and marginalization in the Latin American world. Popular Catholicism has often been a source of mobilization and even of armed rebellion, as happened in the Cristero war in Mexico and other incidents in Latin America.

SEE ALSO: Buddhism; Catholicism; Christianity; Church; Denomination; Folk Hinduism; Islam; Magic; Myth; Primitive Religion; Religion; Religion, Sociology of; Religions, African; Rite/Ritual; Sacred; Secularization

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population and development

Peter McDonald

While development can include a wide range of meanings, here development is taken to mean economic development defined to refer narrowly to economic growth, and then more broadly to the economic transformations leading to the emergence of modern economic institutions and practices and the disappearance of traditional forms. The processes of development are associated, both as cause and consequence, with population processes.

The relationship between population and economic development is highly contested and

has been so for centuries. Adam Smith saw population growth as a stimulus to economic growth because it enlarged the size of the market and provided opportunities for economies of scale, and hence more efficient production. This was contested by Thomas Malthus and David Ricardo, who argued that there was a law of diminishing returns to scale. Their view was that population growth would eventually lead to natural resource constraints, especially a shortage of cultivable land. This would lead to inflation, unemployment, and absolute scarcity. The Malthusian conclusion was that population growth should be reduced through "moral restraint," a postponement of marriage that leads to a decrease in the birth rate. For a time, the preponderance of poverty-stricken landless agricultural laborers in Malthus's England in the 1830s and the Irish famine in the 1840s provided strength to the Malthusian argument, and the Irish married at much later ages following the famine. Subsequently, however, the advance of technology and the associated rise in human capital through education evidently changed the equation. On a global scale, according to Angus Maddison, gross production rose considerably faster than population and has continued to do so until today.

Concern about the negative effects of rapid population growth on economic development arose again in the postcolonial era. In 1958, Coale and Hoover argued that a reduction in fertility would reduce the number of children that a country needed to support while, at the same time, having little or no impact on the size of the labor force for the following two decades. This reduction in dependency would reduce consumption and increase savings and investment, and hence stimulate economic growth. In addition, greater emphasis could be placed on the education and development of each child so that the country's pool of human capital would be enhanced. An implicit assumption in the argument was that this country-level argument could also be applied at the level of the individual household. Fewer children in a family would mean a higher standard of living for the family – fewer mouths to feed. Families would come to have higher aspirations for each child and have greater opportunity to educate each child. This relatively simple argument

took on great force because it was accepted by persons and organizations of considerable influence in both developed and developing countries. In 1967, 30 heads of government signed a *Statement on Population* that included the following assertions:

- Too rapid population growth seriously hampers efforts to raise living standards, to further education, to improve health and sanitation, to provide better housing and transportation, to forward cultural and recreational opportunities – and even in some countries to assure sufficient food.
- The population problem must be recognized as a principal element in long range national planning if governments are to achieve their economic goals and fulfill the aspirations of their people.

The result was the funding and implementation of government family planning programs in many developing countries from the 1960s onwards. The economic rationale for this approach was challenged later in academic and policy circles, but these challenges did little to change the policy direction already established. Government family planning programs have contributed to dramatic decline in fertility rates in most developing countries: the projected population of the world in 2050 has fallen from around 16 billion as projected in 1960 to around 9 billion as projected in 2003.

At the beginning of the 1970s, in the writings of Paul Ehrlich and the Club of Rome, a more sophisticated Malthusian argument arose around the theme of “limits to growth.” Population and economic growth were projected to lead to the depletion of the global supply of non renewable resources, particularly oil and various minerals. This resources argument was associated with the argument that population and economic growth led to environmental degradation. Zero population growth (ZPG) was advocated as a solution along with a slowdown in economic growth. This was a message directed mainly at developed countries that, ironically, were beginning to experience declines in fertility to rates that were *below* zero growth of population in the longer term. Developing countries in the 1970s reacted to both the family planning approach and the

limits to growth approach by reemphasizing the importance of development and economic growth to their populations. Their view was encapsulated in the catch cry from the 1974 World Population Conference: “development is the best contraceptive.” This was an assertion that the causal direction was from development to fertility control, not the reverse.

Largely in reaction to the new Malthusian argument, several economists in the 1970s and 1980s, including Simon Kuznets and Julian Simon, reasserted the eighteenth century view of Adam Smith that population growth stimulated economic growth. They argued that a growing population leads to increases in the supply of labor, preventing wage inflation and promoting mobility, productivity, and innovation. Notably, Ester Boserup argued that population growth provided a stimulus to technological progress through the innovative character of a young labor force, through increased competition in the labor force, and through economies of scale in technological research and development.

The pendulum swung again in the 1990s with the revitalization of the 1960s argument that a fall in fertility reduced dependency while having no impact on the size of the labor force. The ensuing fall in the “burden of dependency” was labeled as a demographic dividend or demographic bonus to the economy. Countries that still have relatively high fertility rates are invited to take advantage of the demographic dividend that awaits them if they reduce their fertility. Of course, countries are only able to take advantage of this dividend if their economies are able to expand to absorb the large cohorts of young workers who were born in the past period of high fertility. If this is not the case, the result is not a demographic dividend but high unemployment among young people and frustration of aspirations that can be politically explosive. Frustration of aspirations can also result in emigration of the country’s best and brightest young people.

The environmental argument for reducing population growth has also reemerged in recent times. Of principal concern at the local level is land degradation. While the root cause may be poor regulation and planning policies, in the absence of environmental protections, rapid population growth is associated with

deforestation, overcropping, use of marginal lands and watersheds for farming, and excessive fertilization and irrigation. These result in erosion, floods, subsidence, salinity, and desertification, leading potentially to deterioration of economic development in rural areas. Another major concern is the growth of megacities induced by migration from overpopulated rural areas. Where the growth of cities outpaces city planning, the ensuing congestion, poverty, and poor health consequences arising from inadequate sanitation and air pollution may slow the rate of economic development and channel funds into housing and away from other more productive capital investments.

As more empirical evidence has been examined on the relationship between population and economic development, conclusions have become increasingly indefinite. This is evidenced by the progression across three nationally commissioned reports from 1971 to 1995. The US National Academy of Sciences Report of 1971 concluded, in keeping with the conventional wisdom of the time, that, in general, rapid population growth had a negative impact on economic development. By the time of the 1986 Report of the US National Academy of Sciences, the conclusion was consistent with the 1971 Report but was couched in caveats that left the conclusion in heavy doubt. A report commissioned by the Australian government in 1994 was almost totally agnostic, concluding that population growth is likely to produce both positive and negative impacts on economic development and the size of the net effect can not be determined from existing evidence.

As academic researchers have debated the population–development relationship, fertility rates have fallen almost everywhere and a major new debate has emerged. Many countries today, including all economically advanced countries, have fertility rates that are below the long term level that replaces the population, many well below this level. The combination of longer life expectancy with very low fertility produces very rapid population aging. There is a concern about the future capacity of countries to support an aging population when labor supplies are projected to fall. For example, Peter McDonald and Rebecca Kippen have shown that, given current trends, Japan is facing a fall in the size of its labor force of around 20 million

workers over the next 40 years, while, at the same time, its population ages rapidly. Very low fertility increases old age dependency, the reverse of the 1950s increase in child dependency. As old age dependents are generally more expensive to the public purse than children, the current problem may be more serious.

Very low fertility also leads to a reversal of the notion of a demographic dividend arising from shifts in the age distribution of the population. If fertility has been higher in the recent past, the size and organization of the economy will have become contingent upon a growing labor supply of young workers in the period of the demographic dividend. If there is a sudden fall in the availability of young workers, as will be the case in many countries in the immediate future, considerable economic adjustment is required. It is possible that labor shortages will provide a stimulus to technological development and to higher productivity resulting from increases in capital per worker, as argued by Yutaka Kosai et al. However, it is also possible that the high wages of young people in labor scarce economies will induce capital to move to lower wage economies. This is feasible given that today's technology is owned by firms rather than by countries, and is highly transportable. At the same time, emerging economies today have an abundant supply of highly skilled young workers. In a future world in which financial capital, human capital, and technology are all highly mobile and skilled human capital is the vital resource, the outcomes for specific countries are unpredictable. Nevertheless, it can be concluded that the extent of economic adjustment required is reduced where there are smooth transitions in age structure. From this perspective, the boom–bust effects of very low fertility on age structure are an undesirable population feature. This opinion is widely shared; every country in the world with a fertility rate lower than 1.5 births per woman reported to the United Nations in both 1997 and 2003 that it considered its fertility rate to be “too low.”

SEE ALSO: Demographic Techniques; Economic Development; Fertility: Low; Fertility and Public Policy; Malthus, Thomas Robert; Population and Economy; Population and the Environment; Population Projections and Estimates

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population and economy

Edward M. Crenshaw

From the inception of the social sciences, population variables have been recognized as crucial determinants of economic development and organization. From the start, two competing schools of thought vied for predominance, one a pessimistic view of population's role in economic change derived from Thomas Malthus, the other a far more optimistic view of population as the wellspring of prosperity.

Neo Malthusianism came to dominate the social sciences after World War II. Derived from Malthus's dictum that increases in agricultural surplus are outstripped by geometric population growth, many social scientists became convinced that demographic growth and economic growth are antithetical processes. Coale and Hoover (1958), for instance, theorized that rapid population increase forces the consumption of savings, adversely affecting both capital formation

and investment rates. High youth dependency ratios force nations to divert scarce capital to activities with few *immediate* economic multipliers (e.g., education), thereby underinvesting in the existing labor force. Such theorizing led quite naturally to the view that rapid population growth and dense habitation cause habitual poverty.

Ironically, this pessimism stood in sharp contrast to the pronatalism of western philosophy (e.g., Cicero, Machiavelli), an optimism reflected in the theories of several founders of the social sciences (e.g., Smith, Spencer, Durkheim). In classical models, increasing population size and density encourage economic complexity, a dynamic Smith and Spencer attributed to market opportunities and Durkheim to competition. As individuals and groups vie for resources in crowded environments, they innovate and specialize to realize new markets, thereby reducing competition. These processes lead to a more complex division of labor – the sine qua non of economic change. For these population optimists, organizational specialization and technological innovation are emergent properties springing from population pressures.

Since the mid 1980s, this optimism has made gradual inroads into neo Malthusian intellectual terrain. Owing to the ambiguity of empirical research on the relationship between population growth and economic growth, as well as to a few contemporary (lone wolf) optimists (e.g., Julian Simon), the pessimism of the “population bomb” era (i.e., the 1960s through 1980s) has gradually been replaced with a more balanced view of population's role in economic change.

This new demography of development has focused primarily on the influence of age structure on economic development. In a nutshell, population growth does affect economic growth, but this effect differs depending on the age segment that is growing. As dominant economic actors, working adults compete for jobs, specialize to avoid competition, start enterprises, and consume the lion's share of products and services. Growth in the adult working population therefore boosts economic growth. Conversely, rapid growth in the population of children or the elderly has far fewer immediate multipliers and some substantial costs (e.g., education, medical care) (Bloom & Freeman 1988). Put

bluntly, working age adults are an immediate economic asset, whereas children are necessary investments in the future and older people constitute (inevitable) overhead.

These countervailing effects of age structure create demographic windfalls and ratchets (Crenshaw et al. 1997). Demographic transitions are characterized by rapid adult population growth unmatched by growth in the child and elderly populations. Demographic transition is therefore a unique situation, providing a society with a demographic windfall – a generation long increase in economic activity driven by labor force expansion that is unhindered by population growth in other age segments. In time, of course, and all else constant (e.g., immigration), these relatively childless cohorts retire and place heavy demands on the greatly diminished labor force left in their wake. Yet, as Easterlin (1968) notes, undermanned labor markets boost wages and provide opportunities that could translate into earlier marriage and increased fertility. If so, a demographic ratchet results – rapid economic growth during baby busts followed by slower growth during subsequent periods of higher fertility. On the other hand, should a shrinking domestic labor force not translate into higher fertility (via the overabundance of immigrant labor or the burden of a rapidly aging population), population contraction and social decline are likely.

Health has also been linked to economic growth. As Bloom and Canning (2000) note, longevity is related to lower rates of morbidity and thus higher economic productivity. Moreover, longevity promotes higher investment in human capital, greater savings for retirement, and the demographic windfall described above (i.e., lower mortality encourages lower fertility). While the link between health and economic growth is plausible, more empirical work is required to differentiate this effect, typically represented by life expectancy, from the overall effect of falling fertility (given that the two are strongly correlated via infant mortality).

Population density also affects economic development. Urbanization has garnered by far the most attention in this area. Although disagreements continue about the appropriate balance between urbanization and economic activity (Henderson 2003), there is broad agreement that the level of urbanization and economic

development are positively correlated because the concentration of labor, firms, and consumers allows efficiencies of scale and distance (Kasarda & Crenshaw 1991). Nonetheless, negative externalities associated with rapid urbanization such as pollution, crime, and poverty are also well represented in the literature (Brockhoff & Brennan 1998). Whether we view urbanization as boon or bane may depend on our theoretical assumptions. For instance, the common view that urban economies are strained by unprecedented immigration encourages a negative evaluation of rapid urbanization. On the other hand, if density is *required* for economic growth, we might conclude that rapid urbanization (with attendant social problems) is just the necessary first phase in building the type of agglomerations required by the global economy, and this phase will be particularly painful for poor, sparsely populated countries experiencing rapid rural population growth (Crenshaw & Oahey 1998).

Following classical theorists, the broader population density of countries may be viewed as a telltale indicator of historic differences in social and physical environments (i.e., climates, disease regimes), differences that influence a nation's struggle to modernization (Crenshaw & Oahey 1998; Burkett et al. 1999). Proto-modern societies, for instance, are countries where historical population pressures forced advanced agrarianism and institution building (e.g., political development), thereby easing today's transit into "developed" status. That is, population induced multicrop plow agriculture produced sufficient economic surplus for urbanization, written language, monetized economies, complex divisions of labor in the economy and government, and many other hallmarks of "advanced" societies (Lenski & Nolan 1984). Because of this institutional homophily with already developed societies, historically dense societies are thought to transit into modernity more rapidly.

Ascribed status (e.g., ethnicity, race) is also an integral (if controversial) part of the new demography of development. Recent research emphasizes the economic benefits of ethnicity based social capital. Ascribed statuses provide axes of organization such as phenotypic markers, tight social interdependencies, and common cultural understandings which create

effective social order and control (Hechter 1987: 176). Nonetheless, economic miracles dependent on such “bounded solidarity” have a darker side that involves “outgrouping,” delayed diffusion of information and technology, and even interethnic violence, none of which optimizes economic activity. In theoretical terms, sociocultural diversity may truncate social interactions and stymie economic interdependence, impeding cross cultural social ties and complicating the development of property law and public policy in general (Easterly & Levine 1997).

This brief overview of population’s influence on economic change highlights the need for more precise theory. The influences of population age structure, health, density, and composition on economic behavior, organization, and change are possibly non linear, conjunctural, and sometimes path dependent, but understanding them holds out the hope for a more complete understanding of demography’s role in social change. The principal contribution of the current literature is to remind us that *people* create and distribute wealth, and so the macro and microstructures of population will always be pertinent for economic sociology.

SEE ALSO: Age, Period, and Cohort Effects; Demographic Transition Theory; Development: Political Economy; Durkheim, Émile and Social Change; Economic Development; Income Inequality, Global; Industrial Revolution; Malthus, Thomas Robert; Population and Development; Spencer, Herbert

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population and the environment

Sara R. Curran

The relationship between population and environment is a topic that has garnered attention from many disciplines, including sociology, economics, ecology, history, anthropology, demography, and geography. An early and important essay, which continues to serve as an intellectual starting point for characterizing the population and environment relationship, is T. R. Malthus’s “First Essay on Population” (1798). In it, Malthus draws a direct link between population and environment, stressing that the growth of human population tends to outstrip the productive capabilities of land resources. However,

Malthus also argues that growth rates will change in response to reduced natural resource quality and quantity. *Malthusian theory* predicts that changes in population growth occur because famine increases mortality or decreases fecundity or social behavior shifts to decrease family sizes, through delayed marriage, non marriage, or reduced fertility. Although this framework has undergone significant challenges, it remains one of the central paradigms within the field.

For most scholars, the population and environment relationship is a dynamic one with assumed reciprocity, which is affected by the quality, amount, and regenerative or resilient capacity of the environmental resource at stake. Environmental change can induce population change and population change can also induce environmental change, but some environmental resources, once depleted, may be irreparably transformed and unable to return to their original character, quality, or quantity. Empirically disentangling results to account for reciprocal causation is one of the key methodological dilemmas in the field.

Within sociology, population and environment research has focused upon the social institutions (e.g., families or households, social movements, governance structures, markets) and social processes (industrialization, development, innovation, or globalization) which mediate population and environment relationships (e.g., famine, deforestation, land use and land cover change, environmental values, environmental refugees, environmental racism, air pollution, and climate change). Research sites have varied from micro level analyses of individual and household behavior in both developed and less developed settings to macro level, longitudinal, and cross national comparisons.

Population as a concept and variable is understood and measured in different ways, depending on the level of analysis and the research question. For cross national studies (as well as cross community level studies), measures have included population size, population density, population growth rates, fertility rates, dependency ratios, and rates of immigration or emigration. For household level or individual level studies of population and environment, measures of population have included household size, number of children, dependency ratios,

contraceptive prevalence, and migration experience. In fairly equal measure, there have been studies that examine how these population characteristics are predictors of environmental outcomes and studies that have used environmental conditions to predict population outcomes.

Environment as a concept and variable has also been measured and understood in many different ways by population and environment scholars. Environmental resource quality and quantity measures include forest area, rates of deforestation, air quality, water quality and quantity, emission rates of air and water pollutants, biodiversity, the quality and quantity of agricultural land, productivity of agricultural, fisheries, and forestry resources, and landfill or toxic waste sites. Other proxy measures include observing the amount and rate of consumption of resources, such as energy, hydrocarbons, fresh water, and land for human activity (e.g., industrial, urban, and suburban sprawl). The focus on the consumption of these particular resources derives from the concern that some natural resources are renewable and others non renewable. Non renewable resources such as coal and oil reserves, land, water, or species are not easily replenished. Thus, patterns of consumption of non renewable resources are viewed as particularly troubling for the future well being of humans or the earth's resources.

One of the main challenges for scholars and policymakers is that environmental resources are frequently characterized as *common pool resources*. Common pool resources are bundles of goods that are defined by the following characteristics: (1) exclusion of beneficiaries through physical and institutional means is especially costly and (2) exploitation by one user reduces resource availability for others. These two characterizations are typically summarized as the problems of exclusion and subtractability, respectively. Population and environment relationships that pertain to common pool resources challenge scientists and policy because it is difficult to precisely pinpoint the linkage between human activity and environmental outcomes. Theoretical predictions about the relationship between human behavior and environmental resources in a common pool resource context present methodological challenges for study design, sampling, and measurement. One of the most productive areas of research on

population and environment has focused upon land use and land cover change because of the easily bounded character of land resources, allowing scholars to overcome some of the methodological challenges presented by other types of common pool resources.

Along with Malthus's relatively pessimistic account of humans' relationship to food resources, Garrett Hardin (1968), in his classic essay on the tragedy of the commons, also identifies the inability of human nature, at the individual level, to restrain consumption of common pool resources at the expense of the common good. Hardin's essay followed upon Rachel Carson's profoundly galvanizing book, *Silent Spring* (2002 [1962]), capturing the mood of the time to fuel a scientific and social movement that would argue for limiting population growth, provide greater understanding of the intricacies and delicacies of the biotic world (including human interactions), and lobby for substantial government regulation of social and economic behavior in the interests of the environment.

Approaches that continue to derive significantly from the Malthusian paradigm have invested in the concept of *carrying capacity*, which has spawned research modeling and projecting how many people can be supported on a given amount and quality of ecological resource (e.g., agricultural land or fresh water). This research has incorporated a variety of conditions (or mediating variables) within its models (e.g., governance, distribution, population age structure, wealth, consumption) to simulate a variety of scenarios (see Cohen 1995; Lutz et al. 2002 for recent examples). A related line of research proposes that understanding the impact of population on the environment requires a multiplicative perspective that identifies an interaction between population, affluence, and technology. Frequently referred to as the $I = PAT$ or *IPAT model*, it has been extensively evaluated (see Dietz & Rosa 1997 for an early attempt to estimate this model; York & Rosa 2003; York et al. 2003, 2004). The underlying assumption of these models is that the impact of population size or growth upon the environment is dependent on how many resources per person are consumed or used, which is a function of wealth and technology.

Alternative approaches emphasize mediating conditions and the reciprocal and dynamic

character of the relationship between population and environment. Importantly, some argue that innovation, whether behavioral, institutional, or technological, mediates the population and environment relationship, sometimes reversing the negative impact of population size on environmental resources. Kingsley Davis's (1963) *multiphasic response theory* proposes that a population can respond in a number of ways to reduce the resource pressures induced by population size and resource constraints (e.g., by migrating out of resource limited regions to resource rich destinations or by reducing fertility). Empirical evidence supporting this claim has been found in a variety of agrarian settings, including Africa and Latin America. Other, alternative approaches employ political economy, dependency theory, or systems theory to propose institutional factors that either mediate the relationship between population and environment or structure both population and environment outcomes. These institutional factors might include modes of migrant incorporation, laws regulating the movement of people, international relations, trade imbalances, internal governance, and the formation of values and preferences, for example.

The wealth of competing and complementary theoretical models in the field of population and environment has spawned significant empirical work that has examined micro level patterns, as well as macro level, cross national comparisons. Technological innovations, especially the application of geographical information systems to link social and physical data, have yielded intense, information rich investigations of a number of sites from around the world. Because much of these data include historical or longitudinal information, scientists are now able to simultaneously elaborate the more nuanced aspects of both population dynamics and ecological systems. For population scientists this means going beyond simple measures of population size and growth.

Recent research that draws upon evidence derived from long term studies or geo referenced data using sophisticated analytic techniques in the field of population and environment has yielded particularly fruitful endeavors that have begun to uncover the relationship between population and climate change, particularly CO₂ emissions, population and energy

consumption, and population, environment, and health. Findings from much of this research suggest that it is not so much population size that affects the environment as the growth in the number of households. The physical size of households and the location of residences relative to workplaces appear to have a greater impact on the environment than the number of people. In addition, several research initiatives have yielded insights on distributive concerns that emphasize the reverse relationship, such as environmental refugees (migrants fleeing environmental deterioration) and environmental racism (the siting of toxic or hazardous sites near minority residences). Studies of famine have also produced insights on the population and environment relationship, frequently revealing the political, economic, and social institutions that mediate the relationship. Land use and land cover change studies have also been a productive source of research in the field. Since 1994, this field of research has received significant investment from a number of national funding sources and is likely to lead to improvements in our knowledge base during the first two decades of the twenty first century.

Future research in the field of population and environment will begin to tackle other elements of the environmental equation, including biodiversity, air pollution, and water quantity and quality. Also, increasing interest is being paid to how health and epidemiology link population and environment, from food security concerns to disease vectors. In addition, urban environments have recently received some scrutiny with regards to how they can concentrate ill effects on people and the environment and how they can ameliorate a negative relationship between population and environment. Finally, recent work in ecology has begun to elaborate upon the resilience of ecosystems and the valuation and maintenance of ecosystem services, foci that draw closer connections to the human interface and the population and environment research of social scientists.

SEE ALSO: Consumption, Green/Sustainable; Davis, Kingsley; Demographic Techniques: Population Projections and Estimates; Demographic Techniques: Population Pyramids and Age/Sex Structure; Demographic Transition Theory; Ecology and Economy; Households;

Hyperconsumption/Overconsumption; Life style Consumption; Malthus, Thomas Robert; Migration: Internal; Migration: International; Nature; Population and Development

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population and gender

Sunita Kishor

Gender represents the different roles, rights, and obligations that culture and society attach to individuals according to whether they are

born with male or female sex characteristics. Gender is often described as being socially constructed since gender specific roles, rights, and obligations, with the exception of giving birth and breastfeeding, are ascribed, not biological, correlates of the sex of an individual. Gender is not just a characteristic of individuals, however; it is fundamental to the organization of societal institutions, including families, communities, laws, religion, and labor markets. While the specific manifestations of gender vary by culture, class, and, for individuals, life cycle stage, the common dimensions of gender critical for understanding the why and how of the gender–population link include the following:

- Gender is not “value” neutral. Although the roles that males and females are assigned are both valued, male roles and rights are valued more highly than female roles and rights socially, culturally, economically, and often, legally. In some societies this translates into a greater value being placed on the health and survival of males than of females. Examples of population indicators that are affected by gender driven differences in the perceived worth of males and females include population sex ratios and sex ratios at birth, infant and child mortality by sex, maternal mortality, sex preferences for children, age at marriage, and contraceptive choice.
- Gender involves differences in power, both “*power to*” and “*power over*.” “*Power to*” encompasses legal and informal rights and the ability to access household and societal resources and act in ways that help in the pursuit of knowledge and personal goals. “*Power over*” speaks to issues of control, including control of household and societal resources and decisions, cultural and religious ideology, and one’s own and others’ bodies. In general, men have greater power than women in most domains, and in some domains even have power over *women*. In recognition of this dimension of gender, demographers use indicators of women’s relative empowerment or disempowerment to study the relationship between gender and demographic outcomes at household and societal levels. Gender driven

differences in power have consequences for the basic building blocks of any population, namely fertility, mortality, and migration, as well as for the quality of life of the population, including its health, ability to meet its aspirations, and freedom from all forms of violence.

- Gender is not static or immutable; being socially constructed, gender roles, rights, and expectations change as societal needs, opportunities, and mores change. Changing gender norms affect and are affected by changes in population – its mobility, growth rate, and composition.

Together and individually, these dimensions of gender dynamically affect and are affected by the overall size, composition, distribution, and quality of life of populations.

Two fundamental determinants of a population are its fertility and mortality rates. Fertility is affected by age at marriage of women, since, in most societies, this marks the initiation of sexual activity for women, family size and composition desires, and knowledge of, access to, and use of contraception. Gender norms that value women mainly in the role of mothers and men in the role of providers, value sons more than daughters, and emphasize women’s dependence on men encourage high fertility. Under such gender regimes, parents have little to gain from educating daughters and delaying their marriage, and both women and men, though for different reasons, have few incentives to limit their number of children. For men, the non substitutability of gender roles ensures that most of the non economic costs of rearing and not just of bearing children are largely borne by women; for women, children are a major source of status and sons, additionally, are a form of insurance. Moreover, with limited education and exposure, women are unlikely to have the knowledge, the means, or the authority to control their own fertility. Many institutions also reinforce such gender regimes and provide an indirect support to high fertility. These include polygamy, marriage payments such as dowry (which reflects and perpetuates the devaluation of women), and bride price (which perpetuates the commodification of women’s productive and reproductive capacities), laws that require a husband’s

permission for fertility related medical decisions, and the social and legal condoning of gender based violence against women, particularly by husbands. Women's limited economic and social power implies that even the potential for violence or polygamy can act as implicit controls on women's sexuality and behavior.

Alternative gender regimes that permit greater flexibility in gender roles, provide support to women for non maternal roles, and allow men to share in childrearing are often associated with low fertility. Since changes in gender norms can precede, result from, or accompany other economic and societal changes, the direction of causality for the fertility-gender association need not be the same across time or country.

Gender affects mortality by modifying biologically determined sex differences in mortality in many different ways. A vast literature attests to the importance of gender preferences for the sex specific survival rates of children. For example, strong son preference underlies the higher rates of female than male child mortality in India. In addition, the advent and easy availability of low cost technologies that can distinguish the sex of a fetus early in pregnancy permit couples to meet their family size and sex composition goals through sex selective abortions. The use of sex selective abortion to eliminate female fetuses is reflected in sex ratios at birth that are much higher than the expected 103 to 106 males per 100 females observed in most populations. Gender also plays a role at other times in the life cycle. Gender regimes that encourage very early ages at marriage contribute to higher mortality rates, since both maternal and infant mortality rates bear a U shaped relationship with maternal age. Maternal mortality is also higher where women's access to proper nutrition, effective means to space births, and timely and appropriate antenatal, delivery, and postnatal care are limited. While poverty severely curtails the overall availability of resources, the amount that societies and households invest in keeping women and girls alive is reflective of the roles, rights, and perceived worth of women.

Gender roles and expectations also affect men's health and mortality, particularly because the social construction of "manhood" is often consistent with male risk taking and violence.

For example, fighting in wars, going down into mine shafts, or engaging in other high risk occupations has traditionally been the role of men. In fact, the gendered expectation of much greater risk taking by males than females, particularly when young, is codified in the higher auto insurance rates for young men than for women of the same age in the United States.

Epidemics of different diseases can also have longlasting effects on the size and composition of a population. Whether men or women are more likely to survive a given epidemic depends not just on the availability of appropriate health care and the sex specific susceptibility to the disease, but also on gender: gender can affect both who gets sick and who can access available health care. A case in point is the Human Immunovirus/Acquired Immune Deficiency Syndrome (HIV/AIDS) epidemic that has sharply increased mortality rates in affected countries. Gender plays a central role in both the heterosexual spread and the containment of HIV infection. Physiologically, women are more vulnerable to HIV than men, and the disease transfers more easily from men to women than the other way around. Women's greater vulnerability is further enhanced by the expectation that women, particularly wives, should be subservient to the sexual needs of their husband; that men will and can have multiple sexual partners; and the widespread acceptance of very young women being married to much older, sexually experienced men, including men with multiple wives. Gender based violence, including physical and sexual abuse, and practices such as female genital cutting contribute to and reinforce the control of female sexuality by males, while also directly increasing women's risk of acquiring the infection. Further, women's limited access to knowledge and resources, the understanding that women's social status stems largely from their roles as wives and mothers, their economic dependence on men, and the acceptance of norms that support the use of violence by men against women all combine to reduce the likelihood that women will seek counseling or testing for HIV infection, leave a partner who is infected, insist on condom use, or be in a position to protect themselves effectively against infection in other ways. The much higher rate

of HIV infection among women than men in high epidemic countries, particularly at younger ages, attests to the cogency of both sex and gender in the epidemiology of HIV/AIDS.

Gender affects migration as it does fertility and mortality. At the household level, the need to migrate as well as migration decisions, including who should leave and what the destination should be, are all gendered. The gender context of the living conditions, as well as the availability of jobs and occupational sex segregation, in both the sending and the receiving areas also affect who migrates. In keeping with their traditional gender roles, women can be the ones less likely to migrate (since they are seen as better able to care for children and the elderly) or more likely to migrate (if the demand for receiving areas is for jobs seen as more suited to women, such as domestic help or nursing). Similarly, men more often than women are the ones who migrate for purposes such as professional jobs, the military, or education. More recently export oriented industries in several developing countries have created a demand for female labor. This has led to women's migration and entry into what might appear at first glance to be non traditional female jobs. However, this sex specific demand is itself driven by a gendered understanding of female labor as being more docile and undemanding, patient with work that can be very repetitive and tedious, and generally cheaper than male labor. The sex composition of voluntary migratory streams has been changing with changing gender roles, the increasing importance of education, delays in marriage and childbearing, the gradual whitening down of occupational barriers, equal pay for equal work movements, and the raising of the glass ceiling for women. The sex composition of involuntary migration has traditionally tended to include more women than men. For example, the gendered traditions of female exogamy and patrilocal residence give women little choice but to move at the time of marriage from their paternal homes to those of their husbands, and trafficking of women for the sex trade appears to be increasing over time.

With the 1994 landmark United Nations International Conference on Population and Development (ICPD), gender gained explicit recognition as an essential ingredient of

national level population and development policies. In particular, the conference brought reproductive rights to the forefront of population policy and emphasized that the elimination of gender inequities in education and employment and all forms of violence against women would contribute to, not detract from, the twin goals of sustainable population growth and development, while also improving human rights. Despite the fact that most of the world's countries were signatories to this and related agreements, progress toward the agreed upon goals of enhancing reproductive rights and gender equity has remained slow and inconsistent.

SEE ALSO: Differential Treatment of Children by Sex; Family, Men's Involvement in; Gender, Development and; Gender, Health, and Mortality; Gender Ideology and Gender Role Ideology; Gender, Work, and Family; Infant, Child, and Maternal Health and Mortality

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populism

Myriam Brito

In general terms, the concept of populism aims to describe sociopolitical movements, forms of government, political regimes, and/or ideological formulae that focus around the idea of the *people*, understood as a “virtuous” social ensemble that carries values that are considered to be “superior.” Populism is also characterized by the action of charismatic leaders, the use of a rhetoric discourse, a particular relationship between the leaders and the social groups that give them support, and different types of social mobilizations. Populism is nevertheless a problematic concept for both political science and political sociology since this notion has been used and is still used to describe a multiplicity of phenomena that have important differences.

The word populism was initially used to refer to the movement of intellectuals organized in Russia toward the end of the nineteenth century. This movement proposed the establishment of a new society based on the model of Russian peasant communities (the *mir*). It was an anti tsarist and anti capitalist movement that idealized the values and traditions of the *people* projected onto the peasants of those days. On the other hand, this notion of populism was also applied to the movement of farmers and small independent producers organized in the Central West of the United States at the beginning of the twentieth century. Those participating in this movement demanded the intervention of the state in order to control the trusts, monopolies, and economic organizations that affected their interests as producers and consumers. As Worsley (1969) explained, both movements took place in rural areas where the vast majority of the population lived in those days. *Russian populism* by the end of the

nineteenth century was nonetheless a movement of intellectuals where peasants were not involved, whereas *North American populism* at the beginning of the twentieth century was a movement where different sectors of the rural population participated without an important intellectual point of reference.

The notion of populism has also been used to characterize different political regimes and social movements that developed in Latin America from the 1920s to approximately the 1970s. In the case of Latin America, this concept makes reference to a broad spectrum of widely different social phenomena. De la Torre (1994) sets forth that the notion of populism has been used to characterize: forms of mobilization where the “masses” are manipulated by charismatic leaders; multi class social movements with a middle class leadership or a workers and/or peasant basis; a historical phase in the development of the Latin American region or a stage of transition toward modernity; redistributive or nationalistic public policies; a political party with a middle class leadership, a strong popular basis, a nationalistic rhetoric, a charismatic leader, and an undefined ideology; and an ideological discourse that divides society into two antagonistic fields.

It is important to note that social sciences in Latin America have conducted important studies on populism since some of the most representative cases have appeared in this region. Populism, however, has been studied from different approaches and forms of analysis coming from different traditions of thought. The most representative studies can be classified into three groups: those that explain populism from the perspective of “modernization,” those that link populism to the “development” question, and those that analyze populism from a Marxist perspective.

Germani (1977), Di Tella (1977), and Ianni (1977) represent the modernizing perspective. For these authors, populism in Latin America emerged under the form of mobilizations of broad social sectors that are explained as resulting from the transition from a traditional to a modern society. In this transition, the processes of industrialization, urbanization, formation of a predominantly capitalistic economy, consolidation of nation states and their institutions, and the impact these processes have had on

the traditional values and customs have all generated important changes in the social structures and the sociopolitical forms of action and participation. From this perspective, all these elements make broad sectors of the population incorporate en masse into different fields of a nation's life, thus saturating the institutional channels of absorption, control, and participation. On the other hand, these authors give great importance to the role the elites play in heading and leading these mobilizations. According to the theorists of modernization, populism would thus be but a specific way in which the popular masses express themselves politically in situations where they have not been able to develop an autonomous ideology and organization (Bobbio & Matteucci 1985). For this reason, the charismatic leaders or political elites in turn have the conditions to lead and control popular mobilizations. For the theorists of modernization, populism is an undesirable phenomenon resulting from social, economic, and political maladjustments in societies that have a low level of development in comparison to other more advanced societies.

Cardoso (1992) and Faletto (Cardoso & Faletto 1979) are among the authors who have linked the emergence of populism in Latin America to *development*. For Cardoso and Faletto, populism also emerged in a moment of transition intimately related to economic processes and the alliance between different social classes. The events and the international economic changes that took place between the 1930s and the 1940s affected the economic development of Latin American countries to such an extent that they triggered the development of a form of industrialization based on the substitution of imports and the strengthening of domestic markets. This process in turn caused a redistribution of income that favored the social groups that had generally been marginalized from national development and generated the conditions for the different social classes to establish alliances between each other and produce social mobilizations. Populism was thus explained as the result of a coalition of classes that had traditionally been excluded from social and political participation. Cardoso and Faletto see populism as a positive phase in Latin American history since it encouraged economic growth, industrial development, income

redistribution, and the participation of broad social groups.

Based on Althusser's main theses on ideology and taking up some of the proposals of Gramsci's thought, Laclau (1977) studied populism from a Marxist perspective. Laclau criticized both the authors of the modernization school and the categories that they use to explain the phenomenon of populism, such as "traditional and modern industrial society," and considers that populism can be explained neither as part of a transition process in a society nor as an expression of a specific elite or social group. According to Laclau, rather than being a sociopolitical movement, a particular type of organization, a political party or state regime, populism is an ideological phenomenon that can be present in different types of movements, organizations, or regimes. Laclau thus considers populism an ideological phenomenon that not only calls on the *people*, but also specifically places itself as antagonistic to the ruling ideology. This does not imply that all forms of populism are revolutionary, since any social group or class fraction can become hegemonic and thus consolidate a populist experience. In this sense, Sala de Tournon (1983) explains that there is a populism of the ruling classes that develops when a fraction that attempts to impose its hegemony is unable to do so and calls upon the masses to develop its antagonism vis à vis the state. This form of populism will always be more repressive than parliamentary. The main critiques to Laclau's theoretical proposal point to the fact that he considers populism only as an ideological issue, which implies a serious oversimplification of a more complex phenomenon that does not consider other elements and dimensions that a more complete explanation would demand.

On the other hand, the notion of populism has also been used to conceptualize certain political movements in Europe, particularly those movements considered to be "right wing." This notion fell out of use shortly after the 1970s, only to reemerge in the 1990s with the appearance of certain *populist* phenomena. This also renewed the interest in studying and analyzing populism. In a different historical context of worldwide processes of change, such as globalization, under a different economic scheme and with democratic regimes that were either consolidated or in the process of consolidation,

some authors started to use the notion of *neo populism* to describe certain events in which the political actors had once again begun to use a discourse addressing the people, strategies based on a direct relationship between leaders and groups, and popular mobilizations, but with a new element: the notion of neo populism as opposite to neoliberalism. It should be noted that in the implementation of neoliberal policies that were claimed to aim to correct the excesses committed by preceding populist governments, populist strategies were used in the application of certain policies geared to specific social groups. Instead of applying the technical criteria the neoliberal theory indicated, strategies considered to be populist were resorted to, such as clientelist manipulations and the use of a rhetorical and anti political discourse.

According to Hermet (2001), there are important differences between earlier populisms and the populisms that have appeared since the 1990s, which is why – paraphrasing Benjamin Constant, the illustrious French philosopher – Hermet marks a distinction between “old” and “modern” populism. In an attempt not to fall into generalizations, it can be said that “old populism” is characterized by challenging the established order or the political regime in turn, showing hostility toward those who exercised power, mobilizing marginalized groups, and denying politics as an art of governing. On the other hand, “modern populism” is characterized above all by not opposing the whole logic of politics and is multi class, including the participation of social groups that are well off. Furthermore, what is observed is not a mere repetition of this phenomenon but the appearance of a new populist logic that coexists with earlier populism at the same time as it contradicts it. Modern populism is a sui generis variety that in the end could well be given another name.

SEE ALSO: *Caudillismo*; Democracy; Faletto, Enzo; Germani, Gino; Nation State and Nationalism; Political Leadership; Popular Culture

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pornography and erotica

Simon Hardy

The terms “pornography” and “erotica” are often defined in opposition to each other and are best treated together. As a minimal descriptive definition we may say that both refer to mediated communication that depicts sexually explicit subject matter. But beyond this the two terms part company in a variety of ways. “Erotica” was coined in the 1950s to designate something more elevated and exclusive than pornography. Social scientists have drawn up typologies for categorizing sexually explicit material. These usually oppose the “ideal” character of erotica, in which no power relations are discerned, with the degrading and sexist nature of “standard” or “violent” pornography. Today the term erotica is often used in reference to material produced by and for women and gays as opposed to (male) pornography. There is also a range of distinctions made in terms of intentions and outcomes; pornography is designed to sexually arouse the producer and/or audience, whereas erotica is whatever a given individual finds arousing; pornography induces a purely sexual response, whereas erotica combines sexual with emotional and aesthetic responses; pornography stimulates solitary male masturbation whereas erotica provides an aphrodisiac for interpersonal sex.

Another approach is to see the category of pornography as a function of censorship: that to which the social elite bars popular access by means of administrative or legal exclusion. Here we must introduce another important distinction: that between “hard core” and “soft core.” What must be excluded is the pornographic hard core: namely, whatever is left once erotic material with any artistic or scientific value has been redeemed. Another way of drawing the distinction between soft core or erotica and hard core is to class the former as the creative *representation* of sexual subject matter, using literary, graphic, photographic, and filmic techniques, and the latter as the direct *documentation* of sexual acts, which by definition is confined to photography and especially to the moving image (via film, video, and

digital technology). There is, in short, no universally accepted way of defining either term.

Although the words “pornography” and “erotica” hark back to classical antiquity, it is safest to assume that in Greco Roman culture the sexual was not separated from other themes of representation as it is now. The segregated categories of pornography and erotica are therefore modern constructions. Sexually explicit images and writing intended to be arousing appeared during the Renaissance, most notably the work of Pietro Aretino. From then until the end of the eighteenth century the shock of the sexual was usually harnessed to satirical attacks on religious or political authority, a tradition that culminated with the French Revolution and the writings of the Marquis de Sade. During the nineteenth century pornography became an increasingly popular item of consumption for its sexual content alone. Devoid of satirical ramifications, pornography was now subject to regulation solely for its *obscenity*: its offense against what were held to be universal values. Yet even by the 1850s the application of the word “pornography” was still largely confined to specialized scientific discourses, designating either a category of antiquarian classification or a genre of medical writing concerned with prostitution and social hygiene. It was not until the late nineteenth century that “pornography” came to be widely applied to, and synonymous with, obscenity.

For a hundred years from the 1860s the concern of political and moral authorities with pornography/obscenity was that it was likely to deprave and corrupt what they regarded as the more susceptible parts of the population, such as the young or the uneducated. Yet an important consequence of the cultural exclusion of pornography was that the old association with political radicalism was revived in new ways. By the 1960s left wing political theory had absorbed enough psychoanalysis to conclude that sexual de repression would be an integral part of any future revolution. Pornographic obscenity came to be seen by some as an expression of the “collective unconscious.” In the context of what Michel Foucault, in *The History of Sexuality* (1976), called the “incitement to discourse” about sexuality, pornography, which was about nothing else, acquired a certain intrinsic value. At this time many

western societies began to ease restrictions on pornography. The liberal trend culminated in the *Report of the United States Commission on Pornography and Obscenity* (1970), which contained a major series of empirical studies and drew the majority conclusion that the social effect of pornography was benign. Although the report was rejected by President Nixon, it marks the end of the effort to control pornography on the grounds that it "depraves and corrupts." The liberal view was broadly reproduced in Britain by Bernard Williams's *Report of the Committee on Obscenity and Film Censorship* (1979).

Yet during the 1970s a new concern about the effect of pornography began to be expressed with increasing stridency by members of the women's liberation movement. Feminist thinkers, such as Andrea Dworkin in *Pornography: Men Possessing Women* (1981) and Susan Griffin in *Pornography and Silence* (1981), saw the genre as dedicated to the objectification and dehumanization of women, so as to make them seem legitimate targets of sexual violence. In 1983 Dworkin and Catherine MacKinnon began to introduce city ordinances in the United States, which sought to control pornography by providing legal remedy to women who could prove that they had been harmed as a direct result of its production or consumption. Eventually the ordinances were ruled unconstitutional by the Supreme Court on the grounds that they infringed the First Amendment right of free speech. By this time the analysis of anti-porn feminism had been assimilated into the anti-permissive rhetoric of Pope John Paul II and Christian fundamentalists in Reagan's America. These ideas also underpinned a new Commission on Pornography overseen by US Attorney General Edwin Meese, whose *Final Report* (1986) disavowed any moral agenda, while condemning pornographic imagery as the cause of harm to women. Its conclusions, however, were generally disregarded, except by those who vigorously disputed their evidential basis.

In response to these developments other feminists, such as those contributing to the celebrated volume *Pleasure and Danger*, edited by Carole Vance (1984), began to organize anti-censorship campaigns in defense of free sexual expression. Many of these feminists agreed that

much existing pornography was sexist but argued that the best way to bring about change was through a diversification of erotic representation. This would involve the production of new forms of erotic material by lesbians, gay men, and straight women. Lesbian erotica, in particular, is often self-consciously designed to subvert conventional gender roles and identities. While gay male products have been accused of imitating the worst excesses of "objectification" found in heterosexual pornography, the very fact that the female object is replaced by a male one is a radical change in itself. Linda Williams, in *Hardcore* (1989), analyzes the development of heterosexual pornographic film from its early history as a highly exclusive male genre to one that begins to acknowledge a female audience in the couples' films of the 1980s, especially those directed by women. Yet it is this very process of diversification that many saw as being most threatened by extensions to the definition and control of pornography advocated by Dworkin-MacKinnon and the Meese Commission.

The intervention of anti-porn feminism has meant that since 1970 most social science research has been framed in terms of the harmful effects of pornography upon men's conduct toward women. The large body of research data generated during this period can be divided fairly neatly into three categories: survey, experimental, and testimonial. Survey research has used quantitative statistics to find correlations between the availability of pornography and levels of sex crime at given social locations. The results have been mixed, and even where correlations appear we cannot safely infer a *causal* relation. Experimental research carried out by social psychologists has sought to measure the behavioral or attitudinal effect of various degrees of exposure to pornography on men of various predispositions. This type of research is open to the charge of behaviorism, because it seeks a direct causal relation between stimulus and response, and thus ignores the fact that in real life the relation between the consumption of pornography and subsequent conduct is mediated by meaning and the subjectivity of the social actor. Testimonial evidence linking pornography to sex crime has been provided by both victims and convicted offenders. This is the type of evidence most

valued by feminists and which has carried most weight in legal deliberations. However, even though pornography may be found at the scene of the crime, we should not rush to conclude that *it*, rather than the offender, is the causal agent in the commission of the offense. In short, in spite of a huge effort over many years, no hard evidence that pornography causes sexual violence has been produced.

During the 1990s both the political debate and the research effort concerning the effects of pornography petered out, while existing restrictions were further relaxed and the Internet extended access to unregulated material. At present the only serious concern of either the police or the public is with the abuse of minors in the production of child pornography. The porn industry has continued to grow and now operates on a massive scale (the American industry alone is variously estimated at between \$5 billion and \$10 billion a year). Yet this huge part of modern mass culture, which must have a significant impact on contemporary social life, now goes virtually unnoticed by the social sciences.

The current scope for research can be divided into two broad and often overlapping areas: questions about the industry and production, and questions about audiences and cultural impact. As far as the porn industry is concerned, there are issues about the health and exploitation of performers. HIV and other sexually transmitted diseases (STDs) are perennial problems. There is anecdotal evidence that female performers are routinely pressured to indulge the gonzo porn obsession with anal penetration. While particular types of pornographic text are highly formulaic, it is also true that the genre as a whole caters to a wide range of tastes and preferences, so we must ask: to what extent does porn reflect the full gamut of human sexual diversity or simply the commercial homogenization of desire? How far is the content of porn changing? Has the development of porn/erotica produced by and for women disrupted the old pattern of male ownership and female objectification?

As regards audiences and cultural impact, in light of the costly failure of the "effects" research, a more interpretive approach might be fruitful. Qualitative data can greatly enhance our understanding of the diverse experiences

and subjective responses of those who view pornography. In this way we can begin to evaluate neglected questions about the impact of pornography. For example, what influence does it have on contemporary sexual mores? What role does it play in the development of young people's sexuality and erotic imaginations? Finally, there are questions about the impact of pornography as a medium in late modern society. To what extent have new media technologies of visual reproduction and distribution broken down the old division between producer and consumer, viewer and performer? What contribution are these developments making to the growth of radical new pornographies, which challenge the conventions of the genre? What is the significance of so called "virtual communities" of shared sexual preference in the context of recent social trends toward the isolation of the individual and the breakdown of traditional forms of association and identity?

SEE ALSO: Audiences; Masturbation; Psychoanalysis; Sexual Markets, Commodification, and Consumption

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positive deviance

Druann Maria Heckert and Daniel Alex Heckert

Positive deviance remains an intriguing concept with potential to foster new areas of research inquiry (Ben Yehuda 1990). The roots for the

idea are not new; in fact, West (2003) maintains that the theoretical roots of positive deviance are contained in the seminal works of Durkheim, Simmel, and Weber. He contends, moreover, that these theorists recognized the synergies in deviance in that both positive and negative deviance occupy a “shared symbolic form.” For example, Weber analyzed charisma and argued that this type of legitimate authority can produce positive and negative deviants.

The contested quality of positive deviance reflects the controversial nature of the sociology of deviance itself. Many deviance theorists claim that positive deviance is oxymoronic or a concept that is not viable or possible (Goode 1991; Sagarin 1985). Even among its defenders, positive deviance has been variously conceptualized, although most definitions have been developed within the two major perspectives in deviance: normative and reactivist. Guided by a normative perspective, positive deviance has been defined as behaviors or characteristics that exceed normative expectations. Negative deviance, on the other hand, describes that which under conforms or fails to meet normative expectations. For example, Wilkins (1965) was an early proponent of the normative perspective, advocating the idea of a continuous distribution ranging from good to bad. Normal acts constitute most of the continuum. At the negative end of the normal curve are bad acts, such as serious crimes. At the other end, are good acts, such as saintly acts. He concluded that geniuses, reformers, and religious leaders are also deviant. Influenced by the labeling perspective, positive deviance has also been identified as behavior or characteristics that are positively evaluated or labeled. Dodge (1985) has synthesized these two definitions as that which is positively valued that both violates norms and generates positive reactions in others. Finally, some researchers have developed their own unique ways to explain positive deviance; for example, Palmer and Humphrey (1990) propose specifically that innovators, in realms of culture such as science and art, are positive deviants.

Various actions or characteristics have been specifically cited as examples of positive deviance. The diversity of that list is impressive. A few examples include Congressional Medal of Honor winners, Gandhi, Darwin,

altruists, Nobel Prize winners, and movie stars. To categorize these divergent examples and to suggest potential types of positive deviance, Heckert (1998) has created a non exhaustive typology to include the following: altruism, charisma, innovation, supraconformity, innate characteristics, and the ex deviant. Altruism describes behavior that seeks to help another or others and that is not based on a need for reciprocity. Examples would include saints and heroes who sacrifice themselves. Charisma – a type of legitimate authority – refers to individuals believed to possess an extraordinary gift by a group of followers. Religious leaders and Gandhi constitute examples. Innovators create innovations, or new cultural elements, by combining previously existing cultural elements. These changes can occur in various areas of culture ranging from science to literature to religion. Examples would include reformers and creative individuals like Darwin. Supra conformity includes individuals who achieve at the idealized level, or what people believe is better but few can achieve, rather than the realistic level, which is believed to be what normally can be realized by most people. Examples include zealous weightlifters and runners. Innate characteristics suggest individuals that possess beauty, intelligence, or talent. While culturally defined, movie stars and superstar athletes possess characteristics that are partially innate and partially the product of environmental factors. The ex deviant is another potential type that describes how previously stigmatized individuals overcome their negative deviance to become conformers, through purification or transcendence. Ex alcoholics and rehabilitated criminals are examples. The typology has since been extended. In her study of elite tattoo collectors and tattooists, Irwin (2003) adds two categories to this typology. High culture icons refer to the creators of phenomena such as ballet and opera and other cultural elements, sponsored by the economically powerful in society. Those creators – such as artists – are positively evaluated. She also suggests popular culture celebrities are elevated based on their status of popularity in mass culture. Examples include actors, athletes, and popular musicians.

Recently, to further clarify the concept of positive deviance and embed it more fully in

the context of deviance, Heckert and Heckert (2002) have proposed a typology that cross classifies the normative and reactivist perspectives. Thus, negative deviance denotes under conformity that is negatively labeled, deviance admiration refers to under conformity that is positively evaluated, rate busting describes over conformity that is negatively labeled, and positive deviance refers to over conformity that is positively evaluated. This typology accommodates the complexity of deviance, acknowledging that there are both norms and social reactions and that there is not always consistency between them.

A fascinating possibility is the potential of utilizing – or modifying – existing deviance theories to illuminate positive deviance. For example, anomie fosters the creative as well as negative deviation. Differential association theory and social learning theory should be capable of providing insight into positive deviants, as well as negative deviants. Furthermore, new theories to foster explanation of positive deviance may need to be developed to account for the unique acquisition of positive deviance. While this would benefit social scientists as they attempt to explain positive deviance, it would also potentially augment social scientific understanding of negative deviance and, perhaps, conformity as well. Sorokin (1950) argued that social science concentrates on negative behaviors; by examining positive deviations, negative deviations would be more fully understood. In support of Sorokin's contention, the concept of positive deviance has taken root in various disciplines, including nutrition, health, and business. Researchers in the area of nutrition, for example, find that examining "positive deviance" children (and their mothers' behaviors) who thrive in situations of nutritional inadequacy facilitates understanding of children who do not fare so well. According to Dodge (1985), the field of medicine has advanced from examining the positive, as preventive medicine emerged in the context of focusing on the healthy and not just the ill. He recognized similar potential for sociology when he contended the discipline would thrive from examining positive deviance, as well as negative deviance. Sociology, and the substantive area of deviant behavior, will benefit from positive deviance becoming a core, rather than marginalized, concept.

SEE ALSO: Deviance, Constructionist Perspectives; Deviance, Normative Definitions of; Deviance, Reactivist Definitions of

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positivism

Steve Fuller

Positivism is the name of a social and intellectual movement that tried to learn from the mistakes of the Enlightenment project that eventuated, first, in the Reign of Terror following the French Revolution of 1789, and second, in the irrationalism of the Weimar Republic following Germany's defeat in World War I. While it has been customary to distinguish between the quasi political movement called

“positivism” originated by Auguste Comte in the 1830s and the more strictly philosophical movement called “logical positivism” associated with the Vienna Circle of the 1930s, both shared a common sensibility, namely, that the unchecked exercise of reason can have disastrous practical consequences. Thus, both held that reason needs “foundations” to structure its subsequent development so as not to fall prey to a self-destructive skepticism.

The history of positivism can be neatly captured as a Hegelian dialectic, the three moments of which are epitomized by the work of Auguste Comte (thesis), Ernst Mach (antithesis), and the Vienna Circle (synthesis). However, these moments have historically overlapped, occasionally coming together in figures such as Otto Neurath, more about whom below. The career trajectories of positivism’s standard bearers help explain the direction taken by their thought.

Comte was an early graduate of the *École Polytechnique* who believed that its Napoleonic mission of rendering research a vehicle for societal transformation had been betrayed, once he himself failed to achieve a permanent academic post. Mach was a politically active physicist on the losing side of so many of the leading scientific debates of his day that his famous chair in Vienna, from which the logical positivists sprang, was awarded on the strength of his critical historical studies, *not* his experimental work. Finally, the intellectual leader of the Vienna Circle, Rudolf Carnap, had to abandon physics for philosophy because his doctoral dissertation topic was seen as too “metatheoretical” for a properly empirical discipline. For Carnap and others who came of age in World War I, physics had devolved into another specialized field of study, rather than – as it had still been for Einstein – natural philosophy pursued by more exact means.

Taking the long view of western intellectual history, positivism incorporates a heretofore absent empiricist dimension to the risk-averse orientation to the world historically associated with Platonism. More specifically, positivism inflects Plato’s original philosophical motivation through a secularized version of the Christian salvation story, in which Newton functions as the Christ figure. This captures both the spirit of Auguste Comte’s original project and its residual effects in twentieth-century logical

positivism, which dropped the overt historicism of Comte’s project while retaining the fixation on Newton as the model for what it means to express oneself scientifically and a vague belief that greater scientific knowledge will deliver salvation. Indeed, positivism’s core conceptual problem has been to define a scientific vanguard capable of both offering guidance to the unenlightened and itself changing in light of further evidence and reflection.

Positivism’s relationship to democracy has been checkered. Where Plato had hoped to produce implacable philosopher kings who would rule as absolute monarchs, positivists have typically envisaged a more differentiated but no less authoritative (authoritarian?) rule by experts, each an oligarch over his or her domain of knowledge. In this respect, positivism is bureaucracy’s philosophical fellow traveler. Like Plato, positivists have feared protracted public disagreement most of all and hence have tended to demonize it as “irrational” and “non-cognitive.” Their image of “plural” authority presumes non-overlapping competences, such that legislative questions are reduced to judicial ones concerning the expertise to which one should defer.

Thus, there is a fundamental ambiguity in positivism’s appeal to organized reason, or “science,” in the public sphere. Sometimes this ambiguity is finessed by saying that positivists regard science as the main source of political unity. At the very least, this implies that it is in the interest of all members of society to pursue their ends by scientific means, as that may enable them to economize on effort and hence allow more time for the fruits of their labor to be enjoyed. Ernst Mach comes closest to defending this position in its pure form. He is normally credited (or demonized, in the case of Marxists) with having removed positivism’s politically subversive implications, reducing the movement to a purely “instrumentalist” approach to scientific theories. But in its day, Machian positivism fitted comfortably with the libertarian idea that democratic regimes should enable maximum self-empowerment.

However, many positivists have drawn a further conclusion that can thwart this libertarian impulse. From Comte onward, it has been common to argue that science can unify the polity by resolving, containing, or circumventing

social conflict. Here a well established procedure or a decisive set of facts is supposed to replace more “primitive” and volatile forms of conflict resolution such as warfare and some times even open debate – all of which supposedly compromise the integrity of opposing viewpoints in the spirit of expedience. Accordingly, a scientific politics should not merely satisfy the parties concerned: it should arrive at the “correct” solution.

To be sure, even this mentality admits of a democratic interpretation, as positivist social researchers have been in the forefront of presenting “data” from parties whose voices are unlikely to be heard in an open assembly. Typically, this has occurred in surveys designed to represent the full empirical range of a target population. Nevertheless, the question remains of exactly who reaps the political benefits of these newly articulated voices: the people under investigation; the investigators themselves; or the investigators’ clients? Moreover, once a target population has been empirically registered, do its members remain “objects of inquiry” or are they promoted to full fledged inquirers capable of challenging the original investigators’ findings and methods? Probably the most sophisticated treatment of these questions in the context of positivistically inspired US social policy research is to be found in Campbell (1988).

These delicate questions arise because ultimately positivism turns Plato on his side by converting a static hierarchy into a temporal order. Where Plato imagined that authority flowed downward from the philosopher king in a caste based social structure, positivists have envisaged that all of humanity may pass (at a variable rate) through a sequence of stages that retrace the socio epistemic journey from captivity to autonomy. In the positivist utopia, it is possible for everyone to be an expert over his or her own domain. Moreover, there is a recipe for the conversion of Platonism to positivism. It proceeds by isolating a domain of inquiry from the contingencies surrounding its manifestations so that its essential nature may be fathomed. Whereas Plato reserved such inquiry to philosopher kings, positivists have more often turned to state licensed professional bodies. And instead of Plato’s intellectual intuition (*nous*), positivists attempt to gain epistemic

access by comparative historical and experimental methods.

This recipe can be illustrated in the work of Otto Neurath, an organizer of the Vienna Circle. He wanted to isolate the essence of the “war economy” so that its efficient central planning mechanism could be transferred to environments where it would have more socially salutary consequences. Here Neurath anticipated what Alvin Gouldner would call the Janus faced character of the “welfare warfare state,” whereby the same organizational structure (in this case, a concentration of resources in the nation state) can have radically different consequences, depending on the supporting political environment. Nevertheless, as Neurath’s many critics pointed out, positivism seems to have inherited Platonism’s political naïveté, which confuses the fact that, say, the “war economy” can be identified analytically as a feature of many societies and the analyst’s ability to transfer it to new social environments – barring the imposition of sufficient force to hold all other environmental factors constant. If any thing deserves the name of the “positivist fallacy,” it is this too easy assimilation of the forum to the laboratory.

After the leading members of the Vienna Circle migrated to the US in the 1930s, logical positivism seeded that country’s analytic philosophy establishment for the second half of the twentieth century. However, this is the only context in which positivism possibly dominated an established discipline. For the most part, positivism has been embraced by disciplines that have yet to achieve academic respectability, even in the natural sciences, where Mach found his strongest support among chemists, biomedical scientists, and psychologists – not physicists. (It is often overlooked that positivism’s reliance on Newtonian mechanics as the model for all science was not generally appreciated by a physics community jealous of guarding its guild privileges.) Unsurprisingly, positivism’s most ardent supporters have been social scientists, not for the Comtean reason that sociology is the pinnacle of all science but for the more mundane reason that positivism seemed to offer a strategy for rendering one’s activities “scientific.”

These matters came to a head with the publication of Thomas Kuhn’s *The Structure of Scientific Revolutions* in 1962, which Carnap

enthusiastically endorsed as the final installment of the logical positivists' International Encyclopedia of Unified Science. It provided an account of scientific change based largely on the history of physics that was quickly embraced by social scientists, as Kuhn stressed science's self organization over its larger societal impact. However, unlike previous positivist accounts, Kuhn's was explicitly a model of knowledge production within particular scientific disciplines (or "paradigms") that did not presume that science as a whole is heading toward a unified understanding of reality. By implication, then, all scientific standards are discipline relative. Kuhn's approach suited what is now called the "postmodern condition." Indeed, in retrospect, the popularity of Kuhn's book is better understood as signifying positivism's decadent phase than, as it was originally seen, a fundamental challenge to positivism.

If positivism has a future, it lies in rekindling a sense of "Science" that transcends the boundaries of particular scientific disciplines. This is how Comte originally thought about the discipline he called "sociology." He claimed that it was the last to develop, not simply because of the complexity of its human subject matter, but more importantly, because sociology had to reconstitute the (natural) sciences that historically preceded it. Too often the history of positivism's quest for unified science has been interpreted as exclusively a matter of applying the methods of physics to the less developed sciences. The reciprocal movement is actually more important, namely, the application of sociological findings to the future direction of science as a whole. Such interdisciplinary projects as "social epistemology" and the "science of science" have tried to fulfill this side of the Comtean promise, which, unless the present intellectual climate changes, is unlikely to be redeemed.

SEE ALSO: Comte, Auguste; Kuhn, Thomas and Scientific Paradigms; Postpositivism; Science; Social Epistemology

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postcolonialism and sport

C. Richard King

Although subject to much conceptual and political debate, postcolonialism simultaneously refers to a range of sociohistorical conditions associated with empire, its aftermath, and reconfiguration, and a set of theories designed to question the naturalness of the categories and practices central to such contexts. Significantly, both have implications for the sociology of sport, because athletics almost invariably has animated colonial cultures.

Increasingly, the study of sport and society interrogates colonialism and its consequences. Bale and Cronin (2003: 4) identify seven specific relationships of note: (1) the introduction of sports that were adopted without change, like soccer and cricket; (2) colonial sports modified in settler states, such as Australian football; (3) local and regional adaptations, for example, Kenyan running; (4) hybrid cultural forms incorporating western games, including Trobriand cricket; (5) indigenous pastimes that were institutionalized as modern sports, most notably, lacrosse; (6) precolonial sporting activities that have remained relatively unaltered, like Rwandan high jumping; and (7) novel sports created in settler states, such as baseball. In addition, an eighth and final relationship deserves attention, namely, neocolonialism, or

the intersections of media, commercialization, and globalization in the dissemination of sports, particularly basketball.

Postcolonialism also has introduced novel concepts and questions to the sociology of sport. Closely related to postmodernism and post structuralism, and deeply associated with thinkers like Edward Said, Gayatri Spivak, Homi Bhabha, and Franz Fanon, it took root first in literary studies before impacting work in history, anthropology, and sociology. Postcolonialism encourages the study of representation, power relations, alternative readings of texts written by, for, and about the colonized, and the social construction of cultural difference, social meanings, and ethnic identities. In the sociology of sport, postcolonialism has prompted scholars to investigate the eight connections between sport and empire previously outlined. Specifically, they have posed novel questions about the cultural work of play: the relationships between the colonized and the colonizers, imperial accounts of sport and sporting, uses of sports to further and unsettle imperial ends, colonial representations, revivals and survivals of sport.

The rapidly expanding and increasingly sophisticated literature on sport, society, and (post)colonialism directs attention to the entanglements of power, the body, identity formation, processes of social change, racial stratification, and representation. On the one hand, it underscores the centrality of sport to imperial projects designed to transform non western societies. Playing civilized games was thought to offer a unique opportunity to teach colonized societies the values, rules, and discipline prized by the colonizers. On the other hand, sport has proven to be of fundamental importance in efforts to challenge imperialism as well. It has facilitated resistance to empire. The Black Power salute at the 1968 Summer Olympics and the more recent refusal of amateur athletes to rise for the American national anthem in the wake of the war in Iraq offer clear examples of anti colonial defiance in the sport arena. At the same time, sport has afforded indigenous peoples an occasion to reclaim traditional practices, glimpsed in the formation of the Iroquois National Lacrosse team and the staging of the World Indigenous Games. And sport allows the (formerly) colonized (like West Indian

cricketers) a space in which to make powerful statements of equality, humanity, and changing global order.

SEE ALSO: Colonialism (Neocolonialism); Globalization, Sport and; Identity, Sport and; Nationalism and Sport

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posthumanism

Adrian Franklin

Posthumanism is a fast growing area of ontological debate and research that has emerged from broad currents of poststructuralist thought. In particular it gathers together the work of important scholars such as Donna Haraway (her "Cyborg Manifesto," for example, and her more recent work on companion species), Bruno Latour (his development of actor network theory and its aftermath and his work on the "pasteurization" of France, for example), John Law (his work on relational materialism, orderings, and complexity), Andrew Pickering (his book *The Mangle of Practice* is a methodological masterpiece of post humanist studies), and Nigel Thrift (his non representational geography project has opened up "human" geography to a much wider range of agency and forms of being in the world). Posthumanism is characterized by its opposition to humanism, as well as moving beyond it. It rejects the notion of the separability of humanity from the non human world, as is suggested by the very idea of sociology, and the division of knowledge into separate domains. Rather, it seeks to recover the complex ways in which humans are entangled with non humans. Latour and Law promote the idea of a symmetrical approach to all objects, human and otherwise, without giving humans the central organizing position and the only source of agency. Instead they advocate

the idea of distributed cognition and a radical extension of semiotics. As Latour says:

But a semiotics of things is easy, once one simply has to drop the meaning bit from semiotics. . . . If one now translates semiotics as path breaking, or order making or creation of directions, one does not have to specify whether it is language or objects one is analyzing. Such a move gives a new continuity to practices that were deemed different when one dealt with language and “symbols” or with skills, work and matter. This move can be said either to elevate things to the dignity of texts or to elevate texts to the ontological status of things. (Latour 1997)

For these reasons they dismiss the idea that truth and explanation are hidden in human made structures or semiotic fields and instead seek to build explanation from material connectivity. Those who follow their approach look less for what things mean (to humans) than what things *do*. Law captures it well when he says he wants “a sociology of verbs not nouns” (Law 1994: 15).

Hayles defines posthumanism in a suggestive rather than a prescriptive way, as a view that makes the following assumptions. First, consciousness and cognition have been a wrongly elevated or privileged aspect of human identity and human constructions of agency in the world. Second, posthumanism privileges “informational pattern” over “material instantiation” and considers the latter accidents of history rather than naturally given. Third, because posthumanism considers the body to be like a prosthesis that we all learn to manipulate and control in relation to the world around us (Haraway 2003 talks of “graspings” and “prehensions” in this regard), adding further prostheses or replacing body parts with prostheses is only adding to human experience, not replacing it with something else (this is an important element in Haraway’s “cyborg manifesto”). Finally, and related to the last point, Hayles argues that “in the posthuman there are no essential differences or absolute demarcations between bodily existence and computer simulation, cybernetic mechanism and biological organism, robot teleology and human goals” (Hayles 1999: 2–3).

Scholars have been trying to grasp at post humanism, unsuccessfully, for a very long time. Pickering suggests that C. P. Snow’s

“two cultures” of the humanities and sciences in the 1950s and the “Great Divide” they described demanded reconciliation in a world where it had become imperative to understand both, simultaneously: “[T]he world was changing more rapidly than ever, but no one could see the picture whole; no one could grasp the social and the scientific at once; events had escaped traditional democratic forms of control” (Pickering 2001: 3).

Pickering argues that over the past 30 years or so, his subfield, science and technology studies (STS) (and this includes all of the key scholars noted above), has been the only movement to bridge the divide that focuses on humanism and anti humanism. For him, the humanities are humanist because they pose the possibility of studying and knowing a world of humans among themselves. By contrast, the sciences are “anti humanist” in that they pose the possibility of studying and knowing a material world from which humans are largely absent. In contrast to these two impossible ontologies, STS poses a world in which the border between humans and the material world is unstable and where “much of the interesting action in the world occurs at or across the interface – that the human, say, needs to be studied in relation to the nonhuman, and vice versa” (Pickering 2001: 4).

However, their efforts have not extinguished the Great Divide; instead there is a new one, with established humanities and science on one side and STS/posthumanism and its growing band of converts on the other. For Pickering, “posthumanist” denotes a decentered perspective in which humanity and the material world appear as symmetrically intertwined, with neither constituting a controlling center.

New empirical studies inspired by post humanism are coming in thick and fast and have been applied, for example, to the city (Gandy 2005); agriculture/postcolonialism (Gill & Anderson 2005); human relations with trees (Clove & Jones 2001; Franklin 2006); and domesticity and water (Kaika 2004). Rather than extinguish sociology, posthumanism probably represents a rare opportunity for major expansion and development.

SEE ALSO: Actor Network Theory; Actor Network Theory, Actants; Cyberculture;

Humanism; Poststructuralism; Technology, Science, and Culture

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post-industrial society

Michael R. Smith

From its beginnings sociology has used evolutionary typologies. The industrial capitalism of the nineteenth century provided the background and preoccupations for the writings of the principal early theorists. Consequently, much of the writing of Comte, Marx, Durkheim, and Weber

was concerned to distinguish industrial capitalism from what preceded it. *Key dramatis personae* in their accounts, couched at varying levels of generality, were capitalists controlling ever larger enterprises, male manual workers and their trade unions, and the political instruments through which these competing groups expressed their interests. In one way or another, class conflict was present in the analyses of each. It was the core in Marx’s analysis.

As it progressed, the twentieth century posed problems for these analyses – especially for the Marxist version. If not disappearing altogether, class conflict seemed to settle into a distinctly muted form. Small business proved resilient. Union membership stopped growing, settling in at 50 percent or less of employees in most countries. In the US it withered. The political space taken by the old male dominated union–management issues that seemed to set industrial capitalism’s political agenda was increasingly encroached upon by apparently new issues: feminism, environmentalism, nationalisms expressed within nation states, and sexual liberation, including gay rights. The idea of post industrialism was developed to make sense of this apparent shift away from the dominant forms of industrial capitalism, while retaining the interpretive structure provided by an evolutionary typology.

The changes described above have provoked three sorts of response:

- 1 Marshal evidence that suggests that the working class and trade unions remain important forces shaping societies. This is the “class power” approach (e.g., Korpi & Palme 2003).
- 2 Assert the continuing centrality of class conflict but argue that the protagonists are different. In Touraine’s (1971) version, interlocking government agencies and large corporations (the technocracy) confront the more educated: technicians in the private sector, employees in research agencies, and students and faculty in universities.
- 3 See conflict as dispersed over a wide range of arenas. In Bell’s (1973) seminal statement the central political problem of post industrial societies is the aggregation of widely disparate preferences.

These positions are not necessarily mutually exclusive. What is at issue is *emphasis*.

The “class power” approach mainly rests on cross national evidence. The Scandinavian countries, in particular, have large, relatively traditional, labor movements. Despite substantial service sectors they have less inequality and more employment security than the US. It is possible to maintain a strong union movement. Doing so makes a difference. Nonetheless, the proportionately enormous union movement in Scandinavia and its smaller counterpart in the US are certainly different from their predecessors. Women now make up a significant part of the membership and influence union policies. The conciliation of family and work is higher on union agendas than it would otherwise have been. Even in Scandinavia, non standard issues emerge. A good example is the Swedish 1980 referendum that banned nuclear power plants – against the preferences of much of the political establishment. Classes may still matter, as they did 50 and a 100 years ago. Still, some things have changed.

Living standards have increased spectacularly. There is evidence that this has caused a shift in preoccupations from issues of survival to broader quality of life concerns, a tendency that has perhaps been reinforced by the *form* taken by economic growth. The mass market often involves strip malls and mass advertising. Growth is associated with waste and pollution. Rich people can afford to worry about the environment and some aspects of growth provide them with reasons to do so. At the same time, over the long haul, educational standards have risen. Most jobs now require some degree of literacy. There is a large set of jobs that requires very high educational levels indeed (Brint 2001). The same *generalized* requirement for education was absent in the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. There is, then, a population that might be expected to want to go beyond bread and butter issues, and that may be equipped to participate in political debate in an informed way.

Jobs in manufacturing and extractive industries – the traditional recruitment bases for unions – have been replaced with service sector jobs. This has been a problem for many union movements. And, it is often argued, many service sector jobs are inferior, providing less

security and lower wages than the jobs they replaced. This, it is said, produces increasing income inequality (Sassen 2003). The distributional outcomes of the process of economic restructuring add to the problems that set the political agenda in post industrial societies.

Has protest been transformed by the changes listed above? “New social movements” are said to display novel features: a concern with quality of life and lifestyle; a preference for participative organizational forms; the use of non standard political channels; an over representation of middle class participants. These characterizations distance new social movements from the bureaucratic, trade union mastodons thought to have represented the manual working class at the high point of industrial capitalism. These contrasting models of protest are, however, overdrawn. There are new social movements that pursue their objectives using participative structures and that act outside standard political institutions. Others may be about as bureaucratic as the Teamsters, and are drawn into standard politics – lobbying, getting out the vote, court cases, etc. (Pichardo 1997). By the same token, it turns out that there was considerable variety in nineteenth century social movement fauna (Tilly 1988).

None of this is to suggest that conflict and protest were the same in the second halves of each of the last two centuries. Technology makes a difference. It took the development of nuclear weapons to make anti nuclear demonstrations possible. Using a demonstration to attract media attention required content hungry mass media. It is hard to imagine nineteenth century feminist groups displaying the same vigor, ambition, and size as their late twentieth century equivalents, in their recent incarnations addressing issues ranging from terms of employment to access to abortion. There are, then, differences between nineteenth and late twentieth century protest.

Even if the organization of employers and labor may suggest the continuing relevance of class conflict in Scandinavia (modified in response to the more active participation of women), that sort of organization of employers and employees is much less present in other rich countries. Is what happens in those countries best understood as class conflict along different (from the nineteenth and early twentieth) axes?

Or is class conflict being replaced by struggles between many different interest groupings, pursuing a wide range of objectives, as Bell suggested? The answer to this question tends to hinge on rather sterile issues of definition. With enough ingenuity some common characteristics can be found that allow the assignment of large numbers of people to the same class. It is not clear that the exercise is worthwhile, though a strong prior theoretical commitment to class analysis may require it.

The literature on post industrialism has served to identify some important characteristics of protest that have been more prevalent in the last part of the twentieth century than they were before. It also points in the direction of factors (higher living standards, some of the problems of growth, the expansion of the service sector) that provide at least some explanation for the shifts that are observable in the character of protest. What may well be a problem with the literature is that it rests on the premise that it is useful to construct large, aggregate, typologies of societies. It was probably not useful to construct the monolithic concept, "industrial society." In fact, during the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries there was very considerable variation across countries and over time in living standards, industrial structure, and in the pattern and magnitude of protests. A concept of "post industrial society" that is equally monolithic is at least as implausible.

SEE ALSO: Deindustrialization; Fordism/Post Fordism; New Social Movement Theory; Social Movements, Participatory Democracy in

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postmodern consumption

Alladi Venkatesh

The origins of postmodernism cannot be traced to a single source or set of circumstances. At first glance, the different trails may appear diffused, disparate, and disconnected. A closer look might reveal a common pattern woven by those different threads. Postmodernism is generally viewed as a reaction against or rejection of modernist tendencies in philosophy, social and cultural theory, literature, and politics (Featherstone 1991). Postmodernism is closely related to poststructuralism, whose origins are slightly different but whose arguments are very similar – so much so that in the eyes of many, postmodernism subsumes poststructuralism and therefore they are treated interchangeably. The last quarter of the twentieth century witnessed the most intense excursions into postmodern ideas. Among the many key figures are Derrida (deconstruction and the decentered subject), Foucault (regimes of truth), Jameson (cultural logic of late capitalism), Kristeva (language and construction of identity), Deleuze and Guattari (desiring machines), Cixous (*l'écriture féminine*), Butler (queer theory), Rorty (questions of representation), Gehry (postmodern architecture), Baudrillard (the economy of signs and simulacrum), Lyotard (the problematic of science and legitimation), Greenblatt (new historicism), Said (Orientalism), Haraway (cyborgs and posthumanism), and Featherstone and Bauman (consumer culture).

In architecture, where postmodernist tendencies were first noticed, there was a reaction against modernist definitions of form and style, questioning the emphases on universalism, functionalism, and rationalism. Postmodern architecture considered the modernist approach to be too rigid and argued for greater fluidity of design, the mixing of styles, and local variability. In literature, postmodernism was a reaction against the entrenched notions of the "western" canon. It has given rise to the poststructuralist movement away from the signifier to the signified, and toward displacement, difference, and dispersal instead of rigid origins and representations of human nature. In politics, postmodernism rejected neoclassical liberalism and triggered intense debates on gender and ethnic issues. At the global level, it has induced the postcolonial discourse.

Postmodernism can be considered a rejection of what Lyotard (1984) terms metanarratives of modernism and (equally importantly) products of the Enlightenment. These grand themes of modernism include rationalism in philosophy; the pursuit of science as the only path to ultimate truth and human advancement; and the individual subject as the most powerful and universal self, whose destiny is to conquer and establish decisive superiority over nature. Postmodernism argues that for all its claims of enlightened humanism and progress, the results of modernism are hardly salutary. The realm of science has become a hegemonic regime of dogma and is dismissive of alternative sources of knowledge; human progress has been equated with oppressive industrialism; individualism has become basically a phallic ideology; and western/European narratives have become the master discourse. Once postmodernism gained the necessary momentum and provided the umbrella under which marginal(ized) discourses could take refuge, other submovements followed in its footsteps. These groups consisted mainly of feminists, (multi)cultural anti essentialists, and postcolonial critics. Postmodernism pointed out that there is a world beyond science and instrumental rationality and that human experiences are embedded in culture, language, aesthetics, art, symbols, and visual forms.

During the 1990s postmodernism came under attack from various quarters. The criticism can

be summarized as follows: (1) it promotes a spurious relativism and an anything goes philosophy; (2) it is anarchic and self indulgent; (3) it incites anti science thinking and throws the baby out with the bath water; (4) it is intentionally blind to scientific contributions to human health and happiness; and (5) its claims are false and unsustainable within any reasonable discourse. Such criticism reached extraordinary levels of intellectual insecurity when a (panic stricken) physical scientist under the name of Alan Sokal (1996), unable to face legitimate criticisms of science, published a parody in *Social Text* that was dubbed by his admirers as a successful hoax, but in actuality vindicated the postmodern critique.

There is no question that there has been a slowing down of postmodernist writings in the last five or six years. Does it mean that postmodernism has become less relevant or is it the case that postmodern ideas have met with success and is being slowly absorbed into the mainstream? It is probably a bit of both. In cultural studies and derivatively in the study of consumer culture, postmodernist ideas may have had the greatest impact.

Modernist thought tended to privilege production as the handmaiden of the capitalist industrial machine, for production meant the creation of value within the social order. Correspondingly, consumption was viewed as a value destructive function serving no useful purpose in the industrial economy. Postmodernism exposed the absurdity of this position (Firat & Venkatesh 1995) by simply pointing out that production and consumption are two sides of the same economic coin and by asking what was the value of production if what is produced is not consumed. Postmodernism elevated the discourse on consumption critically and analytically as an inevitable and highly significant condition of modern societies. Postmodernism views consumption as a complex social phenomenon and the postmodern vocabulary includes such wide ranging topics as aesthetics, sign value, cultures of consumption, fragmentation, hyperreality, everyday life experiences, consumer identities, liberatory consumption, and the like – terms that were either non existent before or remained at the margins of social science discourse. In the face of these developments, traditional theories of

consumption based on positivist psychology and economic utility theories were found to be quaint and inadequate. Even the Frankfurt School – with its scathing attack on culture industries – seems to have misdirected its analysis, for it failed to recognize the critical and essential role of consumption in the formation of modern societies. Postmodernism was the first to recognize that consumption is a positive social activity despite the fact that marketers exploit consumers to gain economic advantage, while Marxist economists and feel good patronizing sociological critics consider consumption as wasteful. For postmodernists, consumption could be a liberatory force if consumers were allowed to pursue their consumptive goals as part of their everyday life experiences.

Postmodernism affects consumerism in two ways: first, by creating a sense of pastiche which involves an “ironic mixing of existing categories and styles,” and second by rendering the “consumer lifestyle itself as a kind of work of art” (Solomon et al. 2002: 561, 563). Recent works on postmodernism suggest that modernistic and mechanistic notions of aesthetics have given way to paradoxical sensibilities in aesthetic experiences, including the juxtaposition of opposites, a lack of quest for unity, and a search for hybridity, theatricality, and a mixing of aesthetic objects. While modernity does allow for mixing and blending, the aim of such activities is unification or convergence to a central idea. The postmodernistic ideal would look for mingling without unification, or as Jameson (1983) calls it, pastiche. The ultimate goal of art (and therefore aesthetic experience) in modernism is to attain some sort of (Kantian) sublime, while under postmodernism it is closer to what Bourdieu (1984) calls “both transgression and an element of personal/social distinction.” Thus “high art” and “low culture” can co-mingle in popular consumer imagination and reach their substance in consumption objects. One of the driving ideas of postmodernism is that instead of (or in addition to) looking for universal and objective standards of aesthetic taste, consumers look for personal perspectives that may run counter to such standards.

Our notions of everyday life rely on the seminal ideas of Lefebvre (1971) and Certeau (1984). These authors, in their own way,

distinguish “the space of experience and its everyday life with its embodied interactions” from more abstract and impersonal notions of economy and culture. They are mainly concerned that life in modern industrial cultures can become very structured and devoid of human content. In such a culture, the rational order is represented by the industrial structure and the non rational order is oriented toward the private non work life (Habermas 1984). The structures of work environments are such that they are stripped of humanistic appeals, while individual workers or consumers need to escape from such an oppressive environment. Perhaps the individual can find relief by directly participating in such endeavors and by seeking experiences in everyday consumption practices. To meet consumers’ needs, the marketing enterprise provides opportunities for sensory consumption through everyday products. Sometimes, as the critics of market culture argue, this is done with excessive zeal rather than appropriate sensitivity. The question is, do consumers buy into the marketing system to meet their aesthetic and emotional needs?

Kozinets (2002) suggests that consumers resort to some sort of Bakhtinian carnivalesque type escapism, as depicted in his work on “burning man.” On the other hand, Mackay (1997) takes a more inclusive view, arguing, for instance, that consumption activities can be studied as part of everyday life, as being integral to consumers’ identity construction and creative pursuits. “Rather than a passive, secondary, determined activity, consumption is increasingly seen as an activity with its own practices, tempo, significance, and determination” (p. 4). While everyday life refers to “routine activities and control of ordinary people as they go about their day to day lives,” he also sees consumers as being “endlessly creative in the appropriation and manipulation of consumer goods” (p. 5).

Numerous writers on the postmodern have advanced the idea that everyday life in western consumer culture has become aestheticized, as boundaries between high art and popular culture and between different styles (of art, architecture, etc.) have been effaced (Debord 1983; Featherstone 1991; Baudrillard 1995). Research on aestheticization processes occurring in

consumer culture has focused largely upon aesthetic principles integral to the design of products and corporate images (Schmitt & Simonson 1997) and has not paid sufficient attention to the aesthetic nature of the consumption experience itself. Nevertheless, some exceptions can be found: (1) Holt's (1995) classification of consumption practices into experience (i.e., an aesthetic or emotional reaction to a consumption object), integration, classification, and play, using the game of baseball as exemplar; (2) Peñaloza's (1999) work on the experiential and spatial dimensions of consumption in a particular retail setting (Nike Town); (3) Schroeder's (2002) perspective on visual consumption as a means of sensory communication and experiential system; and (4) Brown et al.'s (2001) exposition of contemporary aesthetics as a postmodern condition.

Although the marketing and consumer literature on aesthetics is somewhat limited, it is not insignificant. On the firm side, Schmitt and Simonson (1997) focus on brand images and identity issues through the management of product and/or corporate aesthetics. Their main arguments are related to how strategic branding can be employed to interact with product attributes and what impacts they have on customer sensory experiences, and how this system of interaction creates brand appeals and ultimately brand differentiation in the marketplace. Thus, the emphasis is on the aesthetic appeal of ad presentation; that is, its creative execution.

From the consumer side, as everyday objects become commodified through mass production and lose their aura, a natural tendency appears to be to elevate them from ordinary to extraordinary status, or to (re)aestheticize objects. This point has been made compellingly by Heilbrun (2002). According to Heilbrun, aestheticization becomes a defense against the "impoverishment of sensory experience."

In the 1980s consumer research began to move away from a cognitive paradigm to an interpretive one. People started to introduce such terms as consumer experiences, meanings, symbols, images and cultural categories, and a host of other similarly evocative terms which stood in stark contrast to product attributes, brand loyalty, lifestyle marketing, and other analytical categories that are measurable and quantifiable. A major move in this direction

came in the mid 1980s when authors began to examine how postmodern culture influences consumption patterns. In fact, consumption systems were themselves viewed as culturally coded systems. Research has begun to address how consumers' understanding of products and brands derives from the meanings that consumers attach to them. A question that is asked is where do the meanings come from and how are they attached to consumable objects and consumer environments. The fact that any given culture forms the basis of relevant symbolic systems and aesthetic representations means that these symbolic systems transcend into sensory experiences – which is the basis of postmodern consumption.

SEE ALSO: Commodities, Commodity Fetishism, and Commodification; Consumption, Mass Consumption, and Consumer Culture; Disneyization; Hyperconsumption/Overconsumption; Media and Consumer Culture; Postmodern Culture; Postmodern Social Theory; Postmodernism

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postmodern culture

Victor E. Taylor

Postmodern culture is a far reaching term describing a range of activities, events, and perspectives relating to art, architecture, the humanities, and the social sciences beginning in the second half of the twentieth century. In contrast to modern culture, with its emphasis on social progress, coherence, and universality, postmodern culture represents instances of

dramatic historical and ideological change in which modernist narratives of progress and social holism are viewed as incomplete, elastic, and contradictory. In conjunction with the end of modernist progress narratives, an insistence on coherence gives way to diversity and the dominance of universality is subverted by difference within a postmodern condition. Additionally, postmodern culture stands for more than the current state of society. Postmodern culture is characterized by the valuing of activities, events, and perspectives that emphasize the particular over the global or the fragment over the whole. This reversal of a modernist ideology necessitates a valuation of variation and flexibility in the cultural sphere. Primarily through the writings of Jean François Lyotard, whose seminal book *The Postmodern Condition: A Report on Knowledge* (1984) remains the definitive exposition of the term and its significance to society, postmodern culture has come to be identified with a radical critique of the relationship between the particular and the universal in art, culture, and politics.

The most visible signs of postmodern culture appear in art, architecture, film, music, and literature after the 1950s. The most prominent stylistic features that unite these diverse forums are pastiche, non representationalism, and non linearity. In the art and architecture of postmodern culture, collage and historical eclecticism are emphasized. The American painter Mark Tansey depicts historical scenes and figures in anachronistic situations. His 1982 painting *Purity Test* positions a group of "traditional" Native Americans on horseback over looking Smithsonian's 1970 *Spiral Jetty*, a temporal impossibility. In architecture, Robert Venturi combines classical and modern architectural features, juxtaposing distinct historical styles. Art and architecture within postmodern culture celebrate collage and do not symbolize historical, thematic, or organic unity. Their postmodern quality can be found in the artist's or architect's desire to abandon the constraints of temporal, stylistic, and historical continuity.

In film, literature, and music representative of postmodern culture there is an emphasis on non linearity, parody, and pastiche. Post modern film, such as the Coen brothers' *Blood Simple* or *Fargo*, disrupt narrative timelines and emphasize the work of parody. Quentin

Tarantino's *Pulp Fiction*, for instance, "begins" at the end and continually recycles crime scene clichés throughout the plot. Similar aesthetic principles are at play in postmodern literature in which the "realist mode" is thwarted in favor of the seemingly nonsensical. The Canadian writer Douglas Coupland epitomizes this departure from realism. *All Families Are Psychotic* (2001) depicts the surreal life of the Drummond family – a disparate familial group brought together by the daughter's impending launch into space and the financial woes of the father. In film and fiction the everydayness of life is shown to be complex, parodic, and undetermined. The division between the so-called "real" and "unreal" is collapsed and vast excesses of postmodern society are allowed to spiral out of control. Postmodern culture "adopts a dedifferentiating approach that will fully subverts boundaries between high and low art, artist and spectator and among different artistic forms and genres" (Best & Kellner 1997: 132).

Music in postmodern culture shares a great deal with the previous artistic forms. The discontinuity that one associates with John Cage's atonal compositions is taken to another level. Contemporary postmodern musicians mix and match different musical styles and traditions, adding a cultural pastiche to Cage's theory of improvisation. Bubba Sparxxx's (a.k.a. Warren Anderson Mathis) "Dirty South," "Southern Hip Hop," or "Hip Hop Country" style mixes the sound and theme of traditional hip hop music with a Country nuance. His lyrics, especially in his 2001 song "Ugly," address issues of identity and the hybridity and similarity that one finds among urban and rural youth as they attempt to attain stardom within the entertainment industry. Along the same lines, Rapper Kanye West combines hip hop music with Caribbean styles, including the reggae sound and motifs one would associate with Ziggy Marley. West, in addition to his political and cultural messages, offers a "Christian Rap" testimony in his music. His 2004 "Jesus Walks" integrates a heavy, military urban sound with gospel themes drawn from direct references to biblical passages. In popular music, figures such as Paul Simon and Sting utilize non-Western (primarily African and Middle Eastern) sounds and style in their recent albums.

Music in postmodern culture is heterogeneous, stylistically mixed, and international in influence.

While postmodern culture can be illuminated by reference to specific cultural products, it is important to keep in mind the underlying philosophical logic driving the phenomenon. Postmodernity as a reaction against a modernity, as Lyotard observes, is grounded in the Enlightenment, with its confidence in the faculty of reason to ascertain philosophical "truths" and its dedication to the progress of science and technology to enhance and improve the human situation. Taken together, this confidence and dedication to a particular intellectual framework produces monolithic accounts of the nature of reality and humankind's place within it. The "postmodern condition," therefore, is a disruption in the claim of totality found in these Enlightenment-generated accounts. According to postmodernists, the western worldview, with its commitment to universality in all things related to being human, gives way under the weight of its own contradictions and repressions. The comprehensive grand theories or grand narratives, as Lyotard describes them, subsequently fail in a postmodern era insofar as the plurality of human existence emerges within a wider cultural space. Postmodern knowledge of the world, as Lyotard explains, must take into account the multiplicity of experience or "phrasings" and the possibility of new, unanticipated experiences or phrasings that will assist in making sense of reality in ways either not permitted or not imagined by a modernist ideology. The content of knowledge we presently possess is continually being transformed by technology and "the nature of knowledge cannot survive unchanged within this context of general transformation" (Lyotard 1984: 4). Culture, as it pertains to postmodernism, is more than a repository of data; it is the activity that shapes and gives meaning to the world, constructing reality rather than presenting it.

Postmodern culture, as a valorization of the multiplicity found in "little narratives," exhibits anti-modernist tendencies, with art and politics rejecting calls to narrative totalization. Jameson (1984), referring to the social theorist Jürgen Habermas, states that "postmodernism involves the explicit repudiation of the modernist

tradition – the return of the middle class philistine or *Spießbürger* (bourgeois) rejection of modernist forms and values – and as such the expression of a new social conservatism.” While an emphasis on the particular over the universal captures the revolutionary impulse found in the political and aesthetic sentiments of Lyotardian postmodernism, it runs counter to a lengthy critique of postmodernism by social theorists, mainly Marxists, who view this turn to the particularity of “little narratives” as a symptom of late capitalism, with its valuation on proliferating commodities and flexible corporate organizational models. The characteristics of multiplicity, pastiche, and non linearity, while viewed as offering new aesthetic, epistemological, and political possibilities by postmodern artists, architects, writers, filmmakers, and theorists, are understood by those who reject postmodernism as examples of the “logic of late capitalism” (Jameson 1984) in which commodities and consumers enter into rapid, undifferentiated exchange in ever increasing and diversified markets.

Harvey (1989) argues that postmodernism is the ideological ally of global capitalism, which is characterized in part by decentered organizational modes, intersecting markets, and hyper consumerism. While social theorists such as Daniel Bell, Philip Cooke, Edward Soja, and Scott Lash see postmodern culture as a symptom of global capitalist ideology, others view it as an extension or completion of the modernist project. Bauman (1992) notes that “the postmodern condition can be therefore described . . . as modernity emancipated from false consciousness [and] as a new type of social condition marked by the overt institutionalization of characteristics which modernity – in its designs and managerial practices – set about to eliminate and, failing that, tried to conceal.” In this account, postmodern culture is viewed as having a continuity with modernism and not necessarily an affiliation with a late capitalist mode of production. Although the features of postmodern culture are similarly described and agreed upon by social and literary theorists from across the ideological spectrum, the meaning of postmodern culture remains largely in dispute, with its advocates seeing it as a new condition and its detractors seeing it as an accomplice to late capitalism and conservative ideology.

In the few decades since its inception as a critical concept in the arts, architecture, humanities, and social sciences, postmodern culture remains controversial. Artists, architects, writers, philosophers, social theorists, and film makers continue to explore its vast possibilities, however. Whether it is a new condition, an emancipation from modernist false consciousness, a subsidiary of late capitalism, or a indefinable *Zeitgeist*, the debate over postmodern culture will be a central feature of intellectual life for years to come.

SEE ALSO: Art Worlds; Barthes, Roland; Capitalism; Cultural Critique; Culture; Culture: Conceptual Clarifications; Globalization, Consumption and; Postmodern Consumption; Postmodern Social Theory; Postmodernism; Poststructuralism

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postmodern feminism

Kristina Wolff

Postmodern feminism is a body of scholarship that questions and rejects traditional essentialist practices, as established in and by modernity.

The general premise of postmodern social theory is a rejection of the western ideal of establishing universal grand narratives as a means of understanding and explaining society. Postmodern theory directly challenges claims of a unified subject, which is then presented as representing an objective point of view, in essence, a "view from nowhere." Postmodern theory and practices recognize differences, making room for all to contribute and thus having a "view from everywhere" and eliminating the practice of positing one way or one understanding as representing or being "truth." The combination of postmodernist theory and feminism allows for a questioning of essentialist approaches within and outside of feminism, an expansion of feminist scholarship as well as contributing the lens of "gender" and other issues inherent to feminism to the body of postmodern scholarship.

Postmodern thought follows early feminist challenges to dualistic concepts, such as modernist practices of objectivity being favored over subjectivity, belief in rational over irrational thought, and the strength of nature over cultural constructions. Generally, this body of scholarship can be divided into three areas, *postmodernity*, *postmodernism*, and *postmodern social theory*. Postmodernity represents a specific political or social time period that follows the modern era. Some theorists believe that modernity has ended and that we are currently in a postmodern era. Postmodernity stresses the importance of recognizing specific cultural, political, and historical moments connected to "who" or "what" is being studied. Postmodernism represents the cultural products that differ from modern products. These consist of a variety of things including architecture, movies, art, poetry, music, and literature. Lastly, postmodern social theory is a distinct way of thinking which is open to a range of possibilities, consisting of different approaches that move away from the constraints of modern thinking.

Early postmodern studies focus on language and discourse as sites of analysis. This practice emerges out of *poststructuralism*. While there is debate as to whether or not poststructuralism is a postmodernist project, it is recognized as the precursor of postmodernism. Poststructuralism seeks to uncover and understand general structures guiding all forms of social life. Early

scholarship primarily emerged out of France with the work of Derrida, Foucault, Irigaray, and Kristeva. It focused in the areas of language, particularly linguistics and semiotics. Similar to postmodernism, it posits that subjectivity is not something that is fixed or variable; simply, it is socially constructed, therefore creating social reality. This field quickly expanded to include literary studies, philosophy, history, and the social sciences. Both poststructuralism and postmodernist approaches work to bring the margins into the mainstream as well as to deconstruct and decenter society, as a means to discover where and how power operates. *Deconstruction* posits that language is itself a social construction, therefore to understand its meaning we need to examine language in relationship to culture and society, in relationship to language itself. This process provides a means to uncover and understand the power connected to language, the ways in which language is used as a means of oppression. The concept and practice of deconstruction has been expanded beyond language, to understanding various complexities of human society as a means to uncover inequality. Postmodern feminism also examines the same academic areas and "traditional" feminist subjects including gender and sexuality, as well as the development of science and our conceptions of knowledge.

Gender is the core foundational piece of feminism. Recognizing the various roles of gender within society is also one of many strong contributions and accomplishments of feminism. Postmodern feminist theory challenges the very notion of gender, recognizing that it is socially constructed, fluid, and conceptualized within a specific historical, political, and cultural context. One of the critiques of feminism and feminist thought is the reliance upon essentialist beliefs of gender, the assumption that all "women" are the same based on biological as well as cultural understandings of what is defined as "female." Women of color, women from non industrialized nations as well as lesbian and socialist feminists often challenge the assumption that "woman" alone is a unifying category, and its usage often excludes the complexities and differences of race, ethnicity, nation status, social class, and sexuality. Theorists such as Susan Bordo, Judith Butler, and

Jane Flax criticize the traditionally fixed binary structure of gender. Their early work within postmodern feminism called for new narrative approaches to gender, ones that recognize the multiplicity of gender. Using postmodernist approaches, constructions of “woman” (as well as “men”) were now viewed through a variety of lenses at the same time, thus widening the scope to include issues of race, ethnicity, class, sexual orientation, and other differences that women face (Nicholson 1990; Butler 1999). Included within this analytical shift is the acknowledgment that the category of gender is simultaneously used as a means of oppression as well as a source of liberation.

Entangled with conceptions of gender is an assumption of heterosexuality. The combination of gender and sex is also intertwined with personal and public identities. Butler the orizes the interplay of these things as *performativity*, that gender and sexuality exist as a performance. Gender and sexual identities are layered, emerging in manifest and latent ways based on the individual as well as the cultural moment that she or he is in. For example, the manner in which a woman presents herself in public as well as the ways in which “she” is conceptualized in society is reliant upon cultural assumptions as well as her actual gender performance. There are layers of illusion in and on her exterior as well as interior levels of her body and soul. The repercussion of this is that societal norms are reified while other parts of us, our gender and sexual identities, remain hidden. The aspects that remain out of view as well as what is performed illustrates what is “right” or “true,” thus reinforcing essentialist ideologies of gender and sexuality (Nicholson 1990; Butler 1999).

Therefore reality is a fabrication, what is seen on the exterior satisfies societal expectations, what resides on the inside remains hidden. Yet, our understandings and conceptions of sex, gender, and identity are social constructions. This then raises the question of what is real, demonstrating that the boundaries between what “is” and what is expected become blurred. Our concepts of what gender and sexuality are, are based on these constructions, therefore, there is no true meaning. Critics argue that this results in fragmentation between one’s consciousness and idea of self. If people keep

changing from moment to moment and our understandings of components of our identity continually are in flux, then how do we determine a sense of self? This split challenges not only understandings of male and female but also the distinction between public and private lives and identities. The combination of postmodernist theory with feminism expands the investigation and analysis of gender, looking at the relationships with other characteristics, differences, and identities, and thus the scholarship is reflective of the complexities of identity.

The shift from dualistic approaches to multifaceted examinations directly challenges the subject/object split existing in essentialism. The postmodern project of deconstructing and decentering understandings of “subject,” in essence, creates the “death of man” as “man” ceases to be the center subject and therefore “woman” is no longer the object. Some feminists are opposed to this, fearful that women will lose their sense of agency in the process and that the foundation of “woman” will be erased. However, women have rarely been recognized or held in the subject position. One of the overarching tasks for postmodern feminists is to reconstruct conceptualizations of the subject/object split, recognizing it as a recreation of self, as a constituted self that has endless revolutionary potential. This shift is representative of one of the core purposes of feminism, to combine theory with practice.

One result of the challenge to and change in defining the relationship of subject and object is the reconception of understandings and practices of science. Certainly, the structures of western science consist of dualistic approaches, theories that are used to explore and explain the complexities of human life, our physical and social worlds. The emergence of postmodernist thought pushes science to move beyond a singular, individual focus to an all inclusive one, recognizing and containing multiple voices and viewpoints. Feminist theory recognizes the foundations of science as inherently masculine in structure, and while it includes essentialist, dualistic approaches to understanding the complexities of gender, feminism also inherently contains postmodernist practices as well. Feminist scholars such as Sandra Harding, Seyla Benhabib, Nancy Fraser, and Linda Nicholson explore philosophy, science,

and western understandings of knowledge. While some scholars argue that science cannot exist without its grounding in essentialism, without “objectivity,” these feminist theorists directly challenge this belief. They call for feminist approaches that remove women and other marginalized groups from the position of subject, that which is being studied, to more central positions, where they are advancing knowledge in a variety of ways.

Sandra Harding’s argument for the establishment of feminist epistemologies is one example of postmodernist feminist thought. Early approaches to questioning western science and scholarship focused on bringing women to the center of analysis and calling for the establishment of feminist science. This is grounded in cultural feminist approaches, which focus on the differences between women and men. Therefore, by shifting the lens of inquiry away from a male viewpoint and instead stemming from and onto a female viewpoint, we can gain new insights, develop new bodies of knowledge, and use this as a means of eliminating gender inequality. Postmodern feminists directly challenge this approach due to its singular focus on understanding gender from a biological essentialist position. Simply changing the center does little to challenge the masculine, patriarchal structures used in western scholarship. Harding argues for feminist science through the development of new feminist theories, methods, and epistemologies. She continues to utilize *feminist standpoint* as the cornerstone of developing new scholarship. Feminist standpoint recognizes that women’s understanding of the world is different from that of men due to their experiences and knowledge (Smith 1987; Hartsock 1997). Postmodernist, postcolonial, and feminist scholars expand this concept to an inclusive standpoint, one recognizing the multiplicity of difference. This change becomes the foundation of developing feminist epistemologies, bodies of knowledge that do not reinforce existing hierarchical structures, that seek to expand scholarship, moving away from essentialist approaches.

Harding conceptualizes feminist epistemologies as justificatory strategies, challenging dominant understandings of knowledge, science, and scholarship, providing an alternative to traditional procedures grounded in hollow claims of

objective, value free research. These various “ways of knowing” add a richness, an opportunity to expand and enhance bodies of knowledge rather than focusing on the “self” of a particular powerful group or speaker. Feminist scholarship brings a diversity of women’s work, which recognizes the complexities of difference and the ways in which these differences contribute to the quest for knowledge without privileging one type, approach, understanding, or interest (s) over another. The development of these strategies also provides methods, specific procedures that guide feminist research, theories, practices, and policies that advance knowledge and work to eliminate oppression and domination.

Inherent to feminism is the analysis of and challenges to existing power structures as well as how power and resistance operate. Postmodernist thought and practice ushers in new understandings of the ways in which social structures, boundaries, and power itself have changed. Donna Haraway’s work illustrates these shifts in viewpoints. Utilizing the metaphor of a cyborg, she explores the complexities between modern and postmodern worlds, noting that women are no longer dominated by traditional means such as through the control of male expectations of mothering to beliefs of the purity and submission of all women. Haraway also uses discursive examples of the emergence of a postmodern world, noting that the term “women of color” represents an identity constructed out of difference and otherness (Nicholson 1990).

The focus on the role(s) and impact of discourse, particularly as a site of power, is another common theme in postmodernist feminist scholarship (Nicholson 1990; Fraser 1995; Hartsock 1997; Butler 1999). The idea of a “female subject” is constituted in and by discourse. Resistance to this concept also exists within discourse; as Foucault theorizes, where there is power there is also resistance. Postmodern approaches disrupt discourse, particularly in relation to what the state produces and transmits to the whole of society. Traditionally, marginalized groups have created counterdiscourses as a means of resisting power and as an attempt to enter into mainstream discourse, but these directly fought against dominance in modernist ways that kept them on the outer

boundaries. With the shift and widening of focus that postmodernism brings, boundaries are blurred between public and private spaces, discourse and critiques of dominant discourses stemming from marginalized groups become part of the larger public debate. Therefore the complexities of gender, the inclusion of difference across race, ethnicity, nation, sexuality, age, and so on, become part of the conversations. Discourse is a site of power as well as a tool for social change. The creation of postmodern feminist methodologies allows for a deconstruction of texts, of discourse, which provides means to follow and understand the ways in which power flows through discourse and also creates vehicles for revolutionary change through the use of discourse.

There are critiques of postmodern feminism, which include the lack of the development of a critical political agenda, of a realistic means of social change beyond theorizing. Concerns center on the issue of social location, identity, and difference. Postmodernist approaches need to be mindful of recognizing and celebrating difference simply because it exists. Social location, particularly based on difference, is a site of negotiation and conflict. Some theorists define differences merely as illusion, disregarding real life experiences due to difference. By universalizing all differences as inherent to all women, in turn women become marginal and united due to the status of "difference." This concentration on difference reproduces the "all or nothing" situation that is being critiqued with essentialist approaches. Cultural feminism unites women due to sameness of gender, whereas postmodern feminism unites women due to their differences. Both are viewed as extreme positions.

Scholars such as Paula M. L. Moya explain that categories such as race and nation status invoke specific experiences and identities that are often deconstructed or displaced within postmodernist scholarship. The result of this is a dismissal of women's identity and experiences as well as an erasure of characteristics inherent to their sense of identity, of self, and of commonalities that bind people together. Theorizing changes in identity is important, but there must be some integration with the realities of the real world, with actual experiences. Connections need to be made between

conceptualization and feelings. The concern over the outright rejection of essentialist understandings of gender also results in the concern felt by many feminists about the erasure of woman as well as conceptions about gender overall. Can there be feminism, feminist thought, without the concept(s) of "woman," without a feminist standpoint? This also brings in concerns about the elite nature of postmodernist thought, particularly in relation to rejecting modern understandings of race, gender, class, and so on, as it has a different impact on white women with privilege than on women of color, women from non western nations, women who do not fall into the same categories as the elites.

One answer to the apparent limits of postmodernist feminism is the need to clearly situate it within specific historical, cultural, and political frameworks. This helps to avoid false generalizations and the development of similar situations that are being critiqued in essentialism. As Harding noted through defining feminist epistemologies as strategies, postmodernist practices can be strategically used. Linda Alcoff points out that women's position in society is continually changing, it is not static. Postmodern feminism can be successful through shifting approaches to combating oppression and domination, as women's statuses change. This includes working on collaborations and building coalitions across differences while also recognizing these differences.

SEE ALSO: Cultural Feminism; Deconstruction; Derrida, Jacques; Feminism; Feminist Standpoint Theory; Foucault, Michel; Postmodern Sexualities; Postmodern Social Theory; Postmodernism

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postmodern organizations

Stephen Linstead

Postmodern organizations are organizations that have broken with the traditional principles of organization as defined by modernist theory dominated by rationalism; they are also characterized by having developed new and original forms and practices in response to the changing environmental conditions of postmodern society. Such organizations can be identified

both by the extent to which they are not epistemologically modern and by the extent to which they adopt and create new and different patterns of operation and regulation. Nevertheless, the continued persistence of modern methods of organizing is not to be doubted. Postmodern organizations, then, may themselves be hybrids of modern and postmodern modes of organizing, and coexist in mixed populations that include organizations that still run on predominantly modern lines. Furthermore, just as there was a variety of versions of modernism, there are different responses to the challenges of postmodernity, which display radicalism on both the right and the left. Boje and Dennehey (1999) follow Pauline Rosenau in distinguishing between *skeptical* and *affirmative* versions loosely based on Nietzsche's passive and active nihilisms, and there is also a fertile and heterogeneous middle ground. This said, we can attempt a broad and cautious typology of the familiar features of each, as shown in Table 1.

The break between modernism and postmodernism in organizational forms is not a clean one. Table 1 provides an indicative inventory of possibilities, not all of which can be found together empirically, nor should they be considered to be either necessary or sufficient for an organization to be considered postmodern. Early contributions to the question of postmodern organizations were divided (Parker 1992) into those that reflected on postmodern organization as a process (Hassard & Parker 1993; Cooper & Burrell 1988) and those that reflected on postmodern organizations as a phenomenon (Clegg 1990; Boje et al. 1996; Boje & Dennehey 1999). Hardt and Negri (2000) offer an illuminating account of postmodernization as a process and its effect on both economic organization and individual subjectivity. They identify three historical economic paradigms: tradition, modernization, and postmodernization or informatization. It is significant that rather than focus on defining an epoch (e.g., premodern, modern, postmodern (as Boje and Dennehey and others do), Hardt and Negri concentrate on its characteristic animating process. Tradition was dominated by processes of primary production, such as agriculture and the extraction of raw materials (e.g., mining). Modernization saw a shift to secondary production, with industrialization and the manufacture of

Table 1 Modern and postmodern forms of organization

	<i>Modern organizations</i>	<i>Postmodern organizations</i>
<i>Mission, strategy, and goals</i>	Producer-led specialization	Customer-led diffusion
<i>Structures</i>	Hierarchy Bureaucracy Functions Product management	Flat, lean, internal market Heterarchy Networks, meshworks Matrix, project teams Brand management
<i>Orientation to size</i>	Growth-driven, mergers	Downsizing, glocalization, alliances
<i>Decision making</i>	Centralized, determinist	Devolved, collaborative
<i>Planning orientation</i>	Short-term calculability	Long-term sustainability
<i>Relation to market</i>	Unresponsive	Responsive/flexible
<i>Relation to state</i>	Externally regulated	Deregulated or internally regulated
<i>Relation to stakeholders</i>	Financial, economic, profit maximization	Ethical, socially conscious
<i>Mode of competition</i>	Resources/competencies/economies of scale	Speed/information/managing knowledge
<i>Means of production</i>	Differentiated/dedicated	Dedifferentiated/dedicated
<i>Means of delivery/consumption</i>	Dedifferentiated/standardized	Differentiated/customized
<i>Mode of operation</i>	Mass production Fordism	Mass customization Toyotism
<i>Mode of communication</i>	Vertical	Horizontal, network
<i>Means of control</i>	Supervisory micro-management	IT-led and peer-led surveillance
	Panoptic control	Chimerical control
<i>Cultural orientation</i>	Exchange, social, material	Symbolic, virtual
<i>Leader archetype</i>	Heroic	Post-heroic
<i>Worker archetype</i>	Mass production worker	Knowledge worker
<i>Employee relations</i>	Collective, dialectical, mistrust	Polyphonic, dialogical, trust
<i>Reward systems</i>	Individually based, collectively negotiated	Collectively based, individually negotiated
<i>Skill formation</i>	Deskilling, inflexible	Multiskilling, flexible
<i>Jobs</i>	Simple	Complex
<i>Roles and accountability</i>	Rule governed	Empowered
<i>Managers</i>	Supervisors	Coaches
<i>Performance achievement</i>	Measured activities	Negotiated key results
<i>Careers</i>	Planned, internal capital	Portfolio, social capital

durable goods. Yet agriculture did not disappear – it remained an important part of even the most advanced manufacturing economies; indeed, it remained the dominant sector well into the nineteenth century. But it did change its nature – it became industrialized agriculture,

dominated by the demands of industry, financial and social pressures, automated and focused on the development of agricultural products. Yet not only agriculture was transformed along with industrialization, for as Hardt and Negri (2000: 284–5) argue, society itself was industrialized in

the transformation of human relationships. The nature of being human and what it meant to be human were changed utterly as the machine metaphor came to dominate how human subjects began to think of themselves – as human machines.

Hardt and Negri argue that modernism has not ended and its elements will be with us for some time to come, but modernization as a process has ended. They argue that in the advanced economies there has been a shift to those areas where higher value can be more easily extracted, which means a move to the provision of services: finance, health care, education, transportation, entertainment, advertising, and tourism all being growth industries. These industries require highly mobile flexible skills emphasizing knowledge, information, affect (emotionality), and communication. Just as modernization transformed agriculture, Hardt and Negri argue that these processes transform industry, as manufacturing becomes more like a service. Manufacturing does not in these circumstances die; rather, it is rejuvenated in a different form. The dominant metaphor of the industrial age gives way to information metaphors, as we think of ourselves not as machines, but as computers – and learn to act accordingly. We might consider the difference as being represented by the contrasting predicaments of the characters played by Charlie Chaplin in *Modern Times* and Keanu Reeves in *The Matrix*.

The shift in manufacturing processes has moved away from the dominance of mass production familiar in Fordism, which was characterized by a high degree of differentiation at the point of production (specialized technologies dedicated to one particular product) and dedifferentiation at the point of consumption (limited product choice or provision for customer individual or market niche requirements – Henry Ford's famous dictum "any color as long as it's black"). Postmodern production arrangements, sometimes labeled Toyotism, provide faster communication and response between production arrangements and consumer requirements. There is increasing dedifferentiation at the point of production (with dededicated and flexible technologies that can produce a variety of products with minimal set up times) and higher differentiation at the

point of consumption (a wide range of options and choices available to the consumer, some times called mass customization). This proliferation of choice is not without its down side and can lead to confusion marketing, where consumers are inundated with such a variety of apparent choices that they are unable effectively to sift through the information and make their choice based on recidivistic characteristics such as aesthetics or availability rather than performance or content. In an information rich environment competitive advantage may be achieved by communicating to customers and clients in ways that help them to discriminate effectively between products, via the service and support given to them, rather than by the technical features of the product or service itself. Such service led manufacturing Hardt and Negri term the immaterialization of labor.

Immaterial labor occurs where information and communication combine in producing a service, cultural product, knowledge, or communication. There are three types of immaterial labor. *Informed* labor occurs when the production process is enabled by information technology to allow humans simply to push buttons rather than operate machines or work directly on the product. *Analytic* or *symbolic* labor is of two subtypes: the creative and intelligent labor done by analysts, problem solvers, consultants, programmers, artists, copywriters, and other knowledge producers; and the routine tasks performed by data entry workers, call center operatives, and similar. *Emotional* labor involves the production and manipulation of affect or feelings and in contrast to the other types requires the full involvement of human bodies.

The processes of modernization resulted in the geographical centralization of production into industrial centers such as Manchester in the UK, Detroit in the US, and Osaka in Japan. Postmodernization allows manufacturing to be globally networked – as long as the required information can be transferred, products can be designed in one country, their components manufactured in several countries depending on skill availability and the cost of labor, assembled in another country, and sold in a variety of markets. Models of collaboration and cooperation in both modern and traditional systems are transformed as a result – in the

context of global communication, industrial and social relations are no longer grounded in local conditions. It also allows manufacturers to collaborate on one product or service while competing on others, simultaneously sharing and protecting vital knowledge. Networks of organizations replace the tiers of hierarchy with the flatness of heterarchy, yet the equitarian appearance of such arrangements may be only illusory. Organizations now simulate team meetings in virtual team meeting rooms using the Internet, and project teams may be formed, carry out their duties successfully, and disband without ever meeting face to face; organizations themselves may be simulated in the “virtual organization,” that usually involves a core of a few full time people enjoying high levels of benefits (the netocrats), coordinating, controlling, and exercising power over contractors, part timers, and net slaves (telecommuters) who often receive no benefits at all (Boje and Dennehey 1999).

Gilles Deleuze and Felix Guattari through out both volumes of *Capitalism and Schizophrenia* use the concept of deterritorialization to understand the way that capital, in particular, can have an abstract quality that allows it to move freely around the world. Capital itself has to be territorialized – that is, attached to a concrete value such as a pound of gold – in order to be realized. The value of a commodity that may be attached to a currency varies from place to place. Currencies that are transferable such as the dollar or sterling can be realized or territorialized in a variety of settings and can be deterritorialized – that is, hoarded – played on the money markets, or moved around from one country to another as investment in order to maximize returns. Other weaker currencies, such as the Brazilian *real* or the Chinese *renminbi*, cannot be transferred out of their home and have no value outside it, thus being completely territorialized. The removal of regulations that limit currency movements into local financial and commercial markets has enabled the rapid deterritorialization of capital. Indeed, the international financial markets are built on capital that may move in a virtual space on a stock exchange monitor without much prospect of being territorialized, which enables catastrophes of the magnitude of Barings Bank and Enron to escalate. Coupled with the

removal of other limiting legislation such as labor law and corporate regulations and the dedifferentiation of technology, the rapid transfer of jobs from one country to another, such as the relocation of financial industry call centers from the UK to India in the first decade of the twenty first century, becomes possible. Paul Virilio in *The Lost Dimension* calls this *hyper modernity* rather than postmodernity, as there has been little evidence of an epistemological break with modernity – the society hooked on speed has replaced bureaucracy with dromocracy, the organizational form of rapid circulation whose model is the velodrome. Yet as both Castells (1996–8) and Bauman (1998) have pointed out, labor is not similarly deterritorialized – only a very small and privileged section of the managerial population is empowered to follow capital around the globe, and where labor seeks to move to follow demand (although labor generally is more mobile across state borders now than it has been since World War II) it poses problems of social order for the host states, which has led to the black market in human beings becoming more valuable globally than that for drugs.

Along with the shift in processes, the nature of necessary control has changed. Traditional control was direct and personal, based on close supervision and actual or perceived presence. Modern control shifted to a more impersonal basis, to rules, regulations, and requirements that were inspected more periodically rather than constantly supervised. Movements toward organizational structures and processes of greater complexity, often requiring greater skill and judgment in informed systems, require organizational subjects to be self governing and self policing at the same time as they are empowered. The work of Michel Foucault documents these shifts at societal levels and also at the level of institutions, including medicine, mental health, and prisons. Foucault’s ideas on the development of governmentality have been taken up widely in organization studies. Sewell (1998) looks at the ways in which team working has been developed to create teams that police themselves through peer control, which combined with late modern methods of electronic surveillance produces a hybrid or chimerical control in which active supervision is not required. Additionally, interventions

into the development of corporate culture are attempted by organizations to ensure that employees espouse and enact common organizational value sets, and use these as a template to self regulate their behavior against that of the archetypical committed organizational member.

Baudrillard (1983) regards this emphasis on the creation of corporate culture as more evidence of the society of simulation obvious to any observation of consumer behavior – what Scott Lash and John Urry call an “economy of signs and space” in their eponymous book. A simulacrum is a copy of an imagined original that does not exist. For example, in Las Vegas, simulated New York, simulated Paris, simulated Egypt, and simulated Venice are on offer to entice consumers and gamblers to part with their money while enjoying a special simulation of authentic experience. Such is the extent of belief engendered in these simulacra that Ritzer (2005) terms them “cathedrals of consumption.” Not only are these simulations conveniently located whereas the originals are several hours’ flight apart, they are also safer, cleaner, easier to get around, and more user friendly than the real places – which are full of natives going about their everyday lives, laid out with the random hand of history, dirty, untidy, rude, crude, and with plumbing problems. People are often disappointed with the real thing after visiting the simulacrum. In Disneyworld, the simulacrum clearly does not have an original to copy, yet the millions of visitors annually are happy to pretend that it does – while the management of the company itself is conducted on highly modernist disciplinary lines. Here Baudrillard identifies the difference between the society of the spectacle of Guy Debord, where the alienated spectator, like Marx’s alienated worker, watches the world go by, and the society of the simulation, which requires the spectator reflexively to take up a role within it and actively reproduce it. Jean François Lyotard has commented that McDonald’s is a postmodern organization, while Ritzer’s *The McDonaldization of Society* (2004) considers it to epitomize the unfolding of Weber’s modernist principle of bureaucracy – and they are both right. Ritzer emphasizes the material elaboration of rationalization and efficiency in the production line fast food model of McDonaldization, where Lyotard appreciates that the key to McDonald’s’ success over its

competitors lies in its immateriality – the simulated world of characters, events, toys, and films that seduces its customers into participation in an experience that involves purchasing, rather than the simple purchase of a product.

The greatest source of debate regarding post modern organizations is whether they could be said to exist at all, given the emphasis in post modernism on process and multiplicity and the continued persistence of modernist organizational forms and practices. There is an increasing amount of empirical evidence for emerging organizational forms, but it remains possible to analyze these with either a modern or a postmodern lens. Current research tends to emphasize the significance of image and signification less, and concentrates on three areas in particular: new patterns of relationships and network forms; new non deontological ethical approaches; and the possibilities of new forms of power and resistance. There is also a trend towards the exploration of postmodern alternatives to the Protestant work ethic, centered on play (Kane 2004). In a more expansive vein the recent work of Hardt and Negri (2005) looks at possibilities of counter organization by the multitude to resist the global spread of empire, which entails new forms of political, social, and even anti capitalist organization.

SEE ALSO: Deindustrialization; Disneyization; Empire; Fordism/Post Fordism; Foucault, Michel; McDonalidization; Management Networks; Post Industrial Society; Postmodern Culture; Postmodern Social Theory; Post modernism; Simulacra and Simulation

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postmodern sexualities

Ken Plummer

Sexuality is often located within various epochs – classic, premodern, modern, and the like – and the most recent stage has been controversially identified as “postmodern.” Here human sexualities are not seen as well fashioned patterns, solid identities, grand truths, or essential natures. In contrast, new social accounts of sexualities usually offer up more modest, constructed, and fragmented narratives of sexualities. For example, those found in the modern sexological world – from Freud to sexuality – try to develop scientifically a knowledge of sexuality. Such views have haunted much of the modern world’s analysis of sexuality, seeing it as an autonomous sphere of reality. For postmoderns this is a deeply flawed idea: “sex” is no longer the source of a truth, as it was for the moderns with their strong belief in science. Instead, according to William Simon in *Postmodern Sexualities* (1996), human sexualities have become “destabilized, decentred and

de essentialized.” Sexual life is no longer seen as harboring an essential unitary core locatable within a clear framework with an essential truth waiting to be discovered; instead it is partial and fragmented, with little grand design or form. Indeed, it is “accompanied by the problematic at every stage” (Simon 1996: 20). As he argues: “all discourses of sexuality are inherently discourses about something else; sexuality, rather than serving as a constant thread that unifies the totality of human experience, is the ultimate dependent variable, requiring explanation more often than it provides explanation.”

Human sexualities, then, are always more than “just human sexualities.” They overlap with, and are omnipresent in, all of social life. At the simplest level, the proliferation of fragmented and diversifying sexualities is marked by rapid changes and fluidity. It is also marked by a high level of openness, or as Anthony Giddens, in *The Transformation of Society* (1992), calls it, a “plastic sexuality” in which it is no longer tied so strongly to biology. Sexualities are fluid; in the words of Zygmunt Bauman (2003), there is “liquid love.”

In a fairly straightforward fashion, Ken Plummer’s *Telling Sexual Stories* (1995) looks at the narratives of postmodern sexualities and suggests a number of ways of identifying such stories. First, there are no unitary cores with an essential truth waiting to be discovered; they focus more on fragments and slices of competing realities. No one story can be found. Secondly, the stories are often borrowings, reassembled into pastiche; they can even be old stories told in new and ironic ways. Third, they are indeterminate: there are many more choices available – classic ways of telling sexual lives (for example, as linear) break down and sexual actions become much more open ended. Fourth, sexual identities become more blurred and changing. Thus whilst being “homosexual” or “gay” became relatively clear and stable identities in the modern world, they become much more fluid and ambiguous in the postmodern world. Fifth, there is a loss of belief in one Grand Story of sexuality (such as that of biology, religion, or psychotherapy). There is an incredulity toward major stories, and an openness to a plurality of (often rival) stories. Sixth, a language of excess and hyperbole develops around the sexual – as discussed in the Kroker’s

(1987) ideas of panic sex, excremental sex, and indeed “unproductive sex.” Seventh, many of the stories become high tech and consumerist. At their most inventive, sexualities now become fluid through new technologies – as worlds of cyborgs, cyborg sex, and virtual sex. “Pomo sexual” is sometimes seen as both noun and adjective in describing this new field. Yet although these changes are in the air, the modern still dominates.

For some, postmodern sexuality is used in a relatively straightforward fashion. But others take the position potentially to more extremes, sometimes harking back to the work of de Sade in the eighteenth century, and to others like Georges Bataille (1897–1962) (and *The Story of the Eye*) in the twentieth. In the work of writers like Jean Baudrillard, the sexual comes to live in a world of simulacra and signs: it is everywhere – in media, fashion, advertising, and engulfing bodies – making it more visible and more perverse compared to the local and limited ways sexuality was lived in the past. “Everything,” he says in *Forget Foucault* (1987), “is sexuality.” For Judith Butler, any idea of stable, essentially inner gendered identity is fragmented and indeed lacks any foundation. In her words, “there is no gender identity behind the expressions of gender . . . identity is performatively constituted by the very expressions that are said to be its results” (1999: 33). Arthur and Marilouise Kroker see sexualities as hyperreal and fictional, as if sexuality no longer exists outside “an endless labyrinth of media images.” Indeed, the rise of cyber worlds has brought complex new patterns of sexualities – cybersex – which are also closely allied to the postmodern. Likewise, Michel Maffesoli, in his *Contribution to the Sociology of the Orgy* (1993), sees the orgiastic and Dionysiac as a ubiquitous challenge to the banal. Further, some theorists (queer theorists amongst them) attempt to seriously untie and weaken any binaries or polarities that link to gender (male and female) and sexuality (homosexual and heterosexual).

The rapidity of these changes around sexualities has also brought a backlash, where countermovements (especially the family and the religious movement) have reasserted traditional, tribal, and fundamentalist views and critiques of postmodern sexualities.

SEE ALSO: Cybersexualities and Virtual Sexuality; Foucault, Michel; Plastic Sexuality; Queer Theory; Sexual Identities

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postmodern social theory

J. Michael Ryan

Postmodern social theory is a field which is both difficult to define and rejects being defined. It is, in fact, a field that struggles against definitions, against norms, against protocols. Instead, it seeks to deconstruct, decenter, and delegitimize scientific claims to universal truths. With these characteristics in mind, it is easy to understand why defining such a field would be a difficult, if not counterproductive, task. Various authors have sought to overcome this difficulty by relying on common characteristics of various postmodern theories, others have defined the field by those who work in it, and still others – particularly those who work in the field itself – have avoided any attempts to define it at all. Regardless of which of these approaches one takes, however, there is no denying that something called postmodern social theory was at one time a flourishing presence in sociology (and elsewhere). There is also little denying that that

time has passed and that now postmodern social theory is little more than a memory of a past epoch in social thought. Despite this “death” of postmodern theory, however, its short life has had profound effects on the way social theorists do theory, and will, no doubt, continue to have such an effect for a long time to come.

It should be noted that this entry does not deal with the postmodern as a broad reaching academic and/or cultural phenomenon, but instead considers its effects on social thought and theory. While the effects of the postmodern have touched most, if not all, subjects in the academy, they have done so in different ways and to varying degrees. So while some fields – notably art, architecture, and literature – are still being heavily influenced by the postmodern, other fields – notably many of the hard sciences – have remained largely unaffected by it. This analysis, therefore, will remain limited in scope to the field of social thought and theory.

Postmodernism grew out of many strands of thought, including poststructuralism. During the 1950s and 1960s, the linguistic turn occurred in many fields in the academy. Set off in large part by the revolutionary work of linguist Noam Chomsky, the linguistic turn prioritized language and helped spark the cognitive revolution that prioritized mental structures over the previously dominant behaviorist ideologies. The work of Saussure, Bourdieu, Foucault, and Barthes was key in establishing this fledgling field. Postmodernism also shifted attention from language and communication to a broader concern with theory, culture, and society. Thus, particularly during the 1970s and 1980s, postmodern thought and thinkers began to occupy a more prominent place within academia.

Postmodern social thought shifts thinking from the center to the margins. It seeks to decenter, deconstruct, and delegitimize the center. Rather than seeking answers and the Truth, it seeks to keep the conversation going and denies the possibility of Truth. Above all, it represents the death of the grand narrative. It opposes theory (thus to speak of postmodern social theory is a bit paradoxical), is irrational, anti science, and anti essentialist. It directs attention toward consumption, the body, and signs. There is a loss of history, a disorienting

sense of geography, and a breakdown between nature, culture, and society. Postmodernism emphasizes pastiche, the ephemeral, and play. Although not completely antithetical to modern social theory, postmodern social theory does present a radically different way of looking at the world.

In many ways the methodological ideas of the postmodern theorists were more important than their substantive contributions. Many of these methodological ideas were posed in critical terms. That is, the postmodernists were critical of the modernists’ propensity to think in terms of truth, of “grand (or meta) narratives,” to offer totalizations, to search for origins, to try to find the center, to be foundational, to focus on the author, to be essentialistic, to be overly scientific and rationalistic, and so on. Many of these things went to the heart of modern theorizing and, after reading the critiques, it became very difficult to theorize in that way, at least unself consciously. But the postmodernists went beyond critiquing modern theory: they developed a variety of more positive ideas about how to theorize, including keeping the conversation going (instead of ending it with the “truth”), archeology, genealogy, decentering, deconstructing, pastiche, *diffrance*, and so on. Involved here were new ways to theorize, and these had a more positive impact on social theory. Thus, in both positive and negative ways, postmodern thinking affected and continues to affect social theorists.

Then there are thinkers associated, some times loosely, with postmodern social theory. The list reads like a Who’s Who of major contemporary (especially French) theorists and includes Jacques Derrida, Jean François Lyotard, Jacques Lacan, Michel Foucault, Jean Baudrillard, Fredrick Jameson, Judith Butler, and Paul Virilio. Beyond that, every major contemporary modern social theorist has had to confront postmodern social theory, either directly (most notably Jürgen Habermas) or indirectly, including developing alternatives to the idea that we live in a postmodern world. Included in the latter category are Anthony Giddens, Ulrich Beck, and Zygmunt Bauman.

A good way to get at the impact of postmodern social theory more concretely is through the work of Bauman. Bauman is sometimes thought of as a postmodern theorist, and some

of his works have postmodern in the title and focus on issues relating to postmodernity. Yet Bauman is better thought of as a modern social theorist who has been profoundly affected by postmodern thinkers and the postmodern era in which we live. He developed a well known distinction between postmodern sociology and a sociology of postmodernity, the former being a new type of sociology and the latter being sociology as usual but with postmodernity as the topic. While Bauman has been more affected by postmodern ideas than most modern theorists, and while he is far more sensitized to the realities of the postmodern world, he is still a modernist. In that sense, he epitomizes the point that while in one way postmodern social theory might be dead, in another it lives on in the work of contemporary modern (or "late modern") theorists. Those who fail to understand the critiques of the postmodernists, and who fail to at least think through some of the alternatives they offer, are doomed to repeat the mistakes of the modern theorists.

The analogy here is to the Holocaust and to Bauman's (1989) analysis of it, not as a failure of modernity but as an expression of it, especially Weberian rationality. To avoid repeating such egregious crimes against humanity, we need to understand the negative lessons of modernity. While few, if any, were killed in its name, the same point applies to modern social theory. To pursue theoretical alternatives, we need to understand that the failures of modern social theory are traceable to its modern roots and orientation. Postmodern social theory points us in the direction of such an understanding and provides us with ideas and orientations for theorizing differently.

Postmodernism has given rise, or at least has significantly helped to pave the way for, a number of other theoretical orientations. The newly privileged periphery that found itself center stage with postmodern considerations allowed for the meaningful development and academic institutionalization of feminist studies, queer studies, multicultural studies, and postcolonial studies, among others. It did this by decentering the traditional academic focus and privileging those things traditionally thought of as feminine or irrelevant under traditional modern guises. Concerns with the body, leisure, consumption, and space and place were closely aligned with

the considerations of many long left out in the cold of academic discourse. Thus, the growing power and privilege of postmodern social theory and its associated ideals gave corollary power and privilege to other theoretical engagements that took off from similar standpoints. The issue of standpoint itself became a central concern for many.

Postmodernism quickly came under several attacks. It was argued that the theory itself represented the kind of grand narrative that it sought to oppose. It was argued that its methods failed to live up to scientific standards and that it offered critiques without a normative basis for judgment. Its lack of alternative visions for the future made it highly pessimistic, and a sense of agency is difficult to uncover. Perhaps most troubling for modern thinkers were the unresolved questions and ambiguities postmodernism left in its path.

Few theories have had as meteoric a rise and fall in sociology as postmodern social theory. While it had various antecedents, it burst on the scene in sociology in the 1960s and within two or three decades observers were writing its obituary. In a sense it *is* dead because there have been few, if any, major contributions to it in the last few decades. The statement that postmodern social theory is dead is simultaneously controversial, clichéd, and meaningless. It is controversial because there are still a few who believe themselves to be doing work in this area. It is clichéd because it has been a taken for granted assumption by many for years, even among those who never realized it was born or what its life was like. It is also meaningless because many of those associated with postmodern thinking – Foucault, Baudrillard – would argue that such a theory has never existed to die.

In other ways postmodern social theory is alive and well. For one thing, many of the basic ideas and concepts (consumer society, simulation, implosion, hyperreality, hyperspace, governmentality, panopticon, schizoanalysis, dromology, etc.) associated with postmodern social theory have made their way into the heart of contemporary social theory. Many theorists, and some empiricists, work with, and on, these ideas. For another, the practice of sociology in general, and social theory in particular, was greatly affected, or at least should have been, by the methodological ideas associated with

postmodern theory. It is certainly the case that theorists who familiarized themselves with postmodern ideas found it difficult, if not impossible, to theorize as usual. This should also have been true of empiricists, but the fact is that few of them had the time or interest to work their way through the often arcane work of postmodern thinkers. Had they done so, they too would have found it nearly impossible to work in anything like the same way that they had before.

SEE ALSO: Foucault, Michel; Modernity; Postmodern Consumption; Postmodern Culture; Postmodern Feminism; Postmodern Organizations; Postmodern Sexualities; Postmodernism; Poststructuralism; Reflexive Modernization

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postmodernism

Julie M. Albright

Postmodernism is an orientation toward knowledge that encompasses a wide range of theories and theorists, drawing from the fields of philosophy, sociology, linguistics, and others. The word “postmodernism” may suggest an important historical shift (“after modernism”), but this is a misnomer, since the precepts of modernism are still alive and well.

To contextualize the development of postmodern theory, one can view the history of the western world as comprising three major eras: the premodern, the modern, and the postmodern. The premodern era took place before the Renaissance in Europe (pre fifteenth century) during the period including the Dark Ages. During this time, religion played a key influence in terms of providing a cohesive epistemology or worldview. The Catholic Church was the main source of “Truth” at this time, with the authority for that truth being God and God’s laws. Later, religion began to lose ground in providing a coherent worldview, as scientific discoveries challenged the Church’s version of Truth. Technical discoveries such as the compass made world travel possible. Copernicus challenged the Church’s contention that the sun revolves around the Earth, and thus that man is the center of the universe. His ideas were so heretical that he kept them to himself until on his deathbed at the end of the 1500s.

Galileo Galilei in 1609 heard about the Dutch invention of a telescope and subsequently built one himself, which he later demonstrated in Venice. The telescope allowed him to “prove” that the Copernican idea of the sun being the

center of the universe was correct. He went to Rome to try to convince Church leaders of his findings, but his ideas were labeled heretical and he was ordered to keep them quiet. He was later placed under house arrest by the pope after continuing to disseminate this idea. The printing press allowed Galileo's book and other such scientific discoveries to be disseminated and discussed more widely, loosening the Church's hold on the production of Truth in Europe.

Modernism thus challenged the worldview provided by the Church, moving an understanding of Truth to a more rational, scientific explanation of reality, beginning in the seveneenth century. A key progenitor of this shift was Francis Bacon, who promoted a systematic approach to understanding the world through observing reality, not just by reasoning, thereby rejecting the legacy he inherited from such thinkers as Plato. René Descartes was another key figure in the development of modernism. He possessed a deep Catholic faith, yet was fascinated by "scientific" rational ways of understanding the world. His main contribution was the idea to "doubt every thing." He believed that through doubting, one could arrive at certainty. He said: "Cogito, ergo sum" – I think, therefore I am. Descartes viewed the world as a machine and believed that by applying the principles of mathematics, one could solve the puzzles and mysteries of the world. He is credited with the creation of the Cartesian split – the gap between knower and known – which serves as a cornerstone of scientific objectivity. After Descartes, science, with its reliance on neutrality and objectivity, became the dominant worldview, ushering in the modern era.

Social and scientific/technological developments continued through the 1700s into the early twentieth century, ushering in the modern capitalist industrial state and bringing about great social change in its wake, such as industrialization and the rise of the factory system, urbanization, and the development of weapons of war. Weber, Tönnies, and Simmel theorized the impact of increasing economic and bureaucratic rationalization on the social world. With the development of nuclear physics as a scientific endeavor came Heisenberg, whose Uncertainty Principle stated that the act

of observing changes that which is observed. This principle shook the foundation of certainty and objectivity upon which the scientific method and the Cartesian split are based.

Scientific progress continued through the twentieth century, with the social penetration of radio, television, and the Internet creating new marketing vehicles and mass culture. Weapons of war continued to develop through the nuclear age, culminating in World War II. The devastation left in its wake in Europe led to an era of great change as rebuilding began, alongside increasing urbanization. As a result, much postmodern social theory came out of post World War II Europe, particularly France, as philosophers and social theorists there tried to grapple with the rapid social change occurring around them.

Postmodernism as a theoretical school encompasses many disparate ideas. It embodies a shift in sensibility, particularly evidenced in the arts, music, and architecture. Changes included a shift from concern with form to a concern with artifice, from structure to surface, from purity to pastiche, and from substance to image or simulation. The shift from modernism to postmodernism is best exemplified by two quotes. The first is from Mies Van der Rohe, the definitive modernist architect: "Less is more." This encompasses the modernist sensibility of form following function, stripping to essences, simplification and lack of ornamentation in architecture. The second quote, from postmodern architect Robert Venturi, is "Less is a bore." It captures the spirit of postmodern architecture and, indeed, postmodernism itself, which revels in playfulness, irony, ornamentation, and a pastiche of styles.

Postmodern social theory includes a wide variety of views lumped together under the rubric of postmodern theory. Postmodern theorists include the poststructuralist Michel Foucault, as well as philosophers François Lyotard and Gilles Deleuze, sociologist Jean Baudrillard, the neo Marxist Fredrick Jameson, and the deconstructionist Jacques Derrida. Many of these theorists have never claimed to be postmodern, yet each has been labeled as such. Though each is very different in his approach, they share a perspective that theorizes a break in social development, calling into question notions of knowledge, Truth, and reality.

Baudrillard, born in 1929, completed a doctorate in sociology at Sorbonne University in Paris, where he worked under Henry Lefebvre. From 1966 to 1972 he worked as a graduate assistant and later an assistant professor. In 1972 he became a professor of sociology at the Université de Paris X Nanterre. Currently, he is a professor of philosophy of culture and media criticism at the European Graduate School in Saas Fee, Switzerland. Baudrillard was influenced by Marx and his work on commodity fetishism, and wrote about how value has moved from “use value” to a “fractal point of value” where there is no connection to any use or exchange value at all. We have come to a point in time where things are purely simulated – a simulacra of pure fantasy.

Baudrillard is considered among the extreme avant garde in terms of postmodern theorists. His work sometimes is playful, ironic, and fanciful. He became fascinated by American culture, particularly consumer culture and the media, opinion polling, and environmental design as embodied by Disneyland and Las Vegas. Baudrillard was interested in simulation and simulacra, as in Disneyland’s Main Street. He also coined the term hyperreality to describe a condition that he describes as “more real than real,” and for which there is no natural referent. It is, as he puts it “always already reproduced.” Examples include video taped workout routines and suburban tract housing. In each case there exists no original, only endless reproduction. Baudrillard’s theorizing was concerned with the end of postmodernism, the rise in simulation and simulacra, and the erosion of boundaries between high and pop culture, between appearance and reality, and between other such oppositions.

Gilles Deleuze (1925–5) was born in Paris and lived most of his life there. He received his doctorate in philosophy in 1948 from the Sorbonne, where he later taught beginning in 1957. In 1969 he took a teaching position at the University of Paris VII. There he met Félix Guattari, with whom he co authored a number of influential texts, including *Capitalism and Schizophrenia*, *Anti Oedipus*, and *A Thousand Plateaus*. Deleuze suffered health problems in his later years, and took his own life in 1995. Pierre Félix Guattari (1930–92) was born in Villeneuve les Sablons, France, and pursued

studies in psychiatry, influenced by Jaques Lacan among others. He took up practice at the psychiatric clinic La Borde. In their collaborative work, Deleuze and Guattari were concerned with medical discourses as part of a system of domination and social control. Their main contributions to postmodern theory include an analysis of desire in society. As outlined in *Anti Oedipus* it was essentially a poststructuralist Foucauldian critique of modernity via a scathing critique of Marxism and Lacanian psychoanalysis, as well as an attack on representation, the modern subject, and “the tyranny of the signifier.” In *Anti Oedipus* Deleuze and Guattari attempt to reconstitute the modern subject as “schizo subjects” who become “desiring machines.” A suggested alternative to psychoanalysis – “schizo analysis” – centers on a deconstruction of binaries and an emphasis on the postmodern concepts of multiplicity, plurality, and decenteredness. Both Deleuze and Guattari were very interested in politics and saw their theorizing as a way of creating new forms of political thought and action. They viewed desire as revolutionary and as a productive force; as such, desire becomes the centerpiece of control in modern societies. The process of repressing desire they term “territorialization” and the process of freeing desire from these repressive social forces is “deterritorialization” or “decoding.” These ideas were developed further in their book *A Thousand Plateaus*, where they elaborate the concept of the rhizome, by which they mean deterritorialized movement. Rhizomatics attempts to uproot traditional modes of thought in order to pluralize and disseminate new ideas, to make new connections, and to produce difference and multiplicities. Rhizomes are lines which connect with others in a decentered way, and rhizomatics is meant to provide an alternative to traditional Marxist structural analysis.

Born 1926 in Poitiers, Michel Foucault attended the prestigious lycée Henri IV in Paris, followed by the École Normale Supérieure, where he studied philosophy under Merleau Ponty. He received his license in philosophy in 1948, in psychology in 1950, and in 1952 earned his psychopathology degree. He went on to teach French in the universities of Sweden, Warsaw, and Hamburg, finally returning to France to chair the department of philosophy at

the University of Clermont Ferrand. Foucault later headed the philosophy department at the University of Paris VIII at Vincennes during the time of the student uprisings of May 1968, an event which affected him deeply. His influential books *An Archeology of Knowledge* and *Discipline and Punish: The Birth of the Prison* came out after that time. He died of AIDS in 1984.

Foucault's contributions began with the notion of an "archeology of knowledge" from his book by the same name. Through such an archeology, Foucault hoped to uncover the underlying rules which constituted an epistemology of various discourses which were particular to specific cultural and historical contexts. For example, he looked at the history of confinement related to madness, including notions of sane and insane, normal and abnormal, and traces the changes in these discourses from the premodern to the rational scientific modern era. Later, in *Discipline and Punish*, Foucault turned his attention to the connection between discourse and power, which he called "power/knowledge." He traced how the technologies of surveillance and information gathering are used to make "normalizing judgments" used to shape and discipline identity, desire, and the body. Later, in *The History of Sexuality*, he continued to explore how discourses are used to inscribe the body and produce normal versus abnormal sexualities. Foucault implicated the fields of psychiatry, sociology, and criminology in the refinement and proliferation of new techniques of power.

Fredrick Jameson (1930–) trained in the tradition of Marxism and developed his own neo Marxist analysis of the postmodern era. Like Foucault and others working in Europe in the 1960s, Jameson was very influenced by the anti war and New Left political movements. He integrates many disparate theories into his work, from Marxism to psychoanalysis, and from structuralism to poststructuralism. In his key text *Postmodernism, or the Cultural Logic of Late Capitalism*, Jameson outlines the development of postmodernism in a vein similar to Marx's model of the stages of capitalist development.

François Lyotard was born in 1924 in Versailles and enjoyed a long and illustrious career. At the time of his death in 1998 he

was University Professor Emeritus of the University of Paris VIII, and Professor at Emory University, Atlanta. Like Jameson, although Lyotard had his theoretical beginnings based in Marxism, he later moved away from the Marxist approach to develop his theories of the postmodern. Unlike some social theorists, Lyotard clearly connected himself to postmodern theory, as evidenced by the title of his well known text *The Postmodern Condition: A Report on Knowledge*. In it, Lyotard examines the connection between knowledge, technology, and science in societies. He theorized that the postmodern era as a time in which what counts as knowledge will be that which can be translated into binary code and stored in computerized databases. He postulated that society is losing its faith in science and grand metanarratives such as Marxism, and that society now finds itself in a state of incredulity toward legitimating metanarratives. Rather than creating more metanarratives, we need knowledge which he terms *petit récit* – those which are small, local, and specific.

New developments coming after postmodernism include Gilles Lipovetsky's argument that we have entered a new phase he terms hypermodernity, characterized by hyper consumption and the hypermodern individual, who is characterized by movement, pleasure, and hedonism, yet who is also filled with tension and anxiety, since belief systems which previously brought comfort have been eroded.

SEE ALSO: Foucauldian Archeological Analyses; Foucault, Michel; Hyperreality; Implosion; Postmodern Culture; Postmodern Feminism; Postmodern Organizations; Postmodern Sexualities; Postmodern Social Theory; Poststructuralism; Simulacra and Simulation

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postnationalism

Mabel Berezin

Postnationalism as an analytic frame articulates with a hypothesized decline of the nation state in the face of globalization and reterritorialization (Berezin 2003; Ansell 2004). The increasing presence of immigrants on the territories of established nation states, particularly but not exclusively in Europe, has pushed the discussion of postnationalism to the forefront of social science research. Soysal (1994) describes immigrant organizations in six European nation states. Soysal identifies four types of “incorporation regimes” and argues that a new form of postnational citizenship has emerged that decouples territory from legal membership. Trans territorial membership is based upon human rights – the rights of persons as persons, rather than persons as citizens of nation states.

Scholars have contested the postnational argument – Soysal’s variant as well as other

articulations of it (e.g., Jacobson 1996; Tambini 2001). Postnationalism as theory is based on a paradox that squares poorly with political reality (Eder & Giesen 2001). Postnationalism upholds the autonomy of national cultural difference at the expense of political membership. By privileging culture and nature, nationality and humanity over territorially based institutional ties, postnationalism as concept leaves itself open to criticism that it is utopian and, that in practice, it may actually threaten the legal rights of migrants.

Empirical research based on Europe under scores the point that a European is only European, as defined by the European Union, if he or she is a citizen of one of the member states. Koopman and Statham (1999) tested the post national hypothesis by examining immigrant claims in Britain and Germany. They found that minorities structure their claims in the language of citizenship and rights prevailing in the national territory in which they find themselves and not in terms of the national identities and cultural practices of their homeland. Bhabha (1999) demonstrates, using data from cases before the European Court of Justice, that residents of a territory who are not legally incorporated members of the territory (i.e., citizens) have little recourse to the full array of constitutionally protected rights. Many of her examples focus on marriage. Citizens of non member states, even if married to naturalized citizens, face the threat of deportation.

Legally, transnationality within Europe is a tightly bounded concept. Indeed, the juridical evidence makes postnationalism appear moot. The continuing hegemony of the nation state, even in the presence of an expanding European Union, suggests why “transnational” is a better descriptor of the contemporary European political culture than “postnational.” “Transnational” captures the hybrid potential implicit in the “postnational” without attenuating the difficulties of a rapidly diversifying Europe (Kastoryano 2002).

Despite the scholarly discourse on postnationalism, compelling counter arguments exist from a purely structuralist and normative perspective that suggest that the territorially defined nation state is hardly withering away (e.g., Evans 1997; Mann 1997; Paul et al. 2004; Waldinger & Fitzgerald 2004). The continued

legal and cultural importance of the national state coupled with a resurgence of ethnic nationalism throughout the world suggest that we are a long way from a postnational political or cultural universe.

SEE ALSO: Citizenship; Culture; Migration: International; Nation State and Nationalism; Nationalism

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postpositivism

Thomas J. Fararo

In the twentieth century the heritage of positivism as a philosophy of science underwent major changes. Earlier intellectual developments in the century led to logical positivism (and, with some variation in ideas, logical empiricism). The continuity with classical positivism was maintained in terms of opposition to metaphysics, but other and more specific doctrines were elaborated. A scientific theory, for instance, was said to be a formal deductive system with an empirical interpretation that enabled verification by appeal to observations.

However, Popper (1959), while not disputing the deductive system formulation, argued that the universality of theoretical statements made them impossible to verify. Rather, a theory was credible to the extent that it “proved its mettle” by surviving falsification efforts. But Kuhn (1970) noted that scientists usually worked within a paradigm and resisted efforts to revise it until anomalies that could not be resolved led to a revolutionary change of paradigm. By the late 1970s there was consensus that a post-positivist era had emerged in the philosophy of science, in which the “received view” was replaced by a variety of critical reformulations concerning the nature of scientific knowledge and, in particular, the structure of scientific theories (Suppe 1977).

These developments have had ramifications for sociology. Sociological theory, in the view of theorists who favor a scientific approach, has been and largely remains deficient both in its structure and in its empirical testability. Earlier, logical empiricism was looked to for guidance about science, but more recently such theorists have favored postpositivist ideas that emphasize models and mechanisms in scientific explanation.

Other theorists have made quite different postpositivist proposals in support of general theory or metatheory in contrast to empirically testable theoretical model building. For example, Alexander (1982) formulates an explicit contrast between postpositivism and positivism in the history and philosophy of science. Contrary to the positivist standpoint, for instance, postpositivism denies any radical break between empirical and non empirical statements: all scientific data are theory laden. Also contrary to positivism, postpositivism accepts the legitimacy of general intellectual or metaphysical issues in science.

Based on these and related ideas, Alexander argues that social science has institutionalized what is an aberration in natural science, namely, presuppositional debates about the most general conceptual problems in the field. The function of theoretical logic in sociology, he maintains, is to make explicit the fundamental choices or issues around which such enduring debates will continue, such as rational versus non rational action principles. One example that supports this view is the continuing debate between advocates and critics about the use of rational choice theory in sociology. Although Alexander's approach leads him to a useful critique of theorizing in sociology, it also may lean too far in a non empirical direction. One can accept a good part of Alexander's argument while also favoring the construction and empirical testing of theoretical models that embody generative rules or mechanisms (Fararo 1989).

SEE ALSO: Metatheory; Positivism; Theory Construction

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postsocial

Karin Knorr Cetina

Postsocial theory attempts to develop an understanding of current changes of sociality and social forms. Human beings may by nature be social animals, but forms of sociality are nonetheless changing; the term postsocial refers to contemporary challenges to core concepts of human interaction and solidarity that point beyond a period of high social formation to one of more limited sociality and alternative forms of binding self and other. Postsocial analysis assumes that social principles and structures as we have known them in the past are emptying out in western societies and other elements and relationships are taking their place. It assumes that new forms of binding self and other arise from the increasing role non human objects play in a knowledge based society and consumer culture and from changes in the nature of objects and the structure of the self.

One of the great legacies of classical social thought is the idea that the development of modern society involved the collapse of community and the loss of social tradition. Yet what followed was not an asocial or non social environment but a period of high social formation – a period when the welfare state was established, societies became societies of complex organizations and structures, and social thinking took off in ways captured by the idea of a social imagination. Central to our experience today is that these expansions of social principles come to a halt. In western societies we experience a “second break” with earlier forms of sociality and solidarity manifest in the retraction of the welfare state, a shift in the collective imagination from social and political concerns to topics fueled by the life sciences, and changes in patterns of relationships, etc. (Lasch 1978). What sociologists have posited, accordingly, is a further boost to individualization (Beck 1992). This interpretation is not wrong, but it is nonetheless one sided in looking at current transitions only from the perspective of a loss of human relationships and received forms of the social. What postsocial theory offers instead of the scenario of

“desocialization” is the analysis of alternative forms of binding self and other, changes in the structure of the self that accommodates these forms, and forms of social imagination that subordinate sociality to new concerns.

One focus of postsocial theory is the role non human objects play in the contemporary remaking of societies. The argument starts from the massive expansion of object environments in the social world: we live in environments full of technological objects, consumer goods, and objects of knowledge. Postsocial arguments point out that object environments can situate and stabilize selves, define individual identity just as much as communities or families used to do, and they promote forms of sociality (of binding self and other) that feed on and supplement the human forms of sociality studied by social scientists. Objects may also become the risk winners of the relationship risks that many authors find inherent in contemporary human relations. A condition for understanding this role of objects is that we break with the tradition of seeing objects as abstract technologies that promote the alienation of the worker (Berger et al. 1974), as fetishized commodities as in the Marxian tradition, or simply as instruments that serve particular ends. Postsocial theory conceptualizes objects as they are understood in science, where their “hooking power” and relational potential lie with their indefiniteness of being (Rheinberger 1992).

A second condition for understanding object relationships as part of how we live and understand sociality is that we also reconsider our models of the self, a further focus of postsocial theory. The dominant model of the self in the social sciences dates back to the beginning of the twentieth century and captures the social self of a bourgeois society. Mead, Freud, and others saw the self as composed of an ego and an inner censor that represents society as an “internalized other” (Wiley 1994). This model can be contrasted with a second based on Lacan that understands the self not as a relation between the individual and society but as a structure of wantings in relation to continually renewed lacks stimulated by images of the perfected self and the apparent wholeness of others (Knorr Cetina 2001). This second model fits with a consumer society in which ever tempting

new images lure persons into continued searches for new objects (Ritzer 1999). The liberalization of partnership and family life (Lasch 1978), the detraditionalization of education, and the individualization of choice also conspire to prevent a strong social self founded on the internalization of a censor. A media, image, and knowledge culture that continually reactivates a lack wanting dynamic may describe contemporary selves better than the Meadian system and may be in the process of reshaping it. In this sense, a media, image, and knowledge culture is also a postsocial culture that stimulates and sustains postsocial selves.

The expansion of a social imagination had involved, since the Enlightenment, hopes for the perfectibility of human society in terms of equality, peace, justice, and social welfare, with the high point being Marxist visions of a socialist revolution. These ideas have not disappeared with the retraction of social principles and the collapse of Marxism. But the excess imagination that went into visions of social salvation is now extended to other areas where it finds progressive inspiration – and this is a third focus of postsocial analysis. What has become thinkable today is the perfectibility of life – through life enhancement on the individual level, but also through the biopolitics of populations, through the protection and reflexive manipulation of nature, through the idea of intergenerational (rather than distributional) justice. The notion of life can serve as a metaphor and anchoring concept that illustrates a cultural turn to nature and how it replaces the culture of the social. One massive source of life centered thinking is the life sciences themselves. They produce a stream of research that inspires imaginative elaborations of the human individual as enriched by genetic, biological, and technological supplements and upgrades. The ideas suggest the perfectibility of individual life, but they also strongly implicate unrelated populations, those sharing particular genes, exposures, or histories of adaptation to environmental conditions, and benefiting in the aggregate from genetic measures and drugs. The “biosociality” (Rabinow 1996) that arises from collective structures forming around biological concepts further illustrates a postsocial culture.

Postsocial systems include sociality, but in reconfigured, specialized, more mediated and

limited ways, as liminal forms of sociality. Post social relations are human ties triangulated with object relations and forming only with respect to these relations. A postsocial system may be one where information structures have replaced previous forms of social coordination, as when sophisticated hardware and software systems substitute for social networks and enable expanded, accelerated, and intensified global financial markets. Postsocial is what one might call a level of intersubjectivity that is no longer based on face to face interaction and may in fact not involve interaction at all, but rather “communities of time” formed by the joint observation of common, electronically transmitted content. Postsocial systems may arise around the sort of relatedness enabled by the Internet, for which the characteristics that have traditionally defined human relationships (feelings of obligation and trust, etc.) are not constitutive or even relevant. Postsocial forms are not rich in sociality in the old sense – but they may be rich in other ways, and the challenge is to analyze and theorize these constellations.

SEE ALSO: Actor Network Theory; Individualism; Posthumanism; Post Industrial Society; Postmodern Culture; Scientific Knowledge, Sociology of; Social Identity Theory; Theory

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poststructuralism

Charles McCormick

Like postmodernism, this relatively recent coinage encompasses a wide range of intellectual schools and levels of analysis. These approaches tend to cluster around two somewhat overlapping camps: the “literary” theorists interested in describing the structure of language and culture, and the “sociological” camp consisting of sociologists and anthropologists interested in describing the structure of society and human agency.

MICROSYSTEMS OF MEANING

Linguistic and cultural uses of poststructuralism draw from linguistic and philosophical debates regarding whether the essential nature of language, and by extension human consciousness, is rooted in constantly shifting systems of meaning. The founder of linguistic structuralism, Ferdinand de Saussure (1857–1913), deviated from linguistic thinkers of the time who generally were interested in tracing universal systems of meaning within diverse languages, for example through the study of historical philology. Saussure founded the school of semiotics when he argued that language only has meaning in relation to a specific cultural framework. He argued that the system of meaning that underlies language or *signifiers* is always shifting and can only be studied synchronically (at a given moment in time). Signifiers only make sense in relation to other signifiers and have no fixed relationship to the real world they represent at a given time. To illustrate, consider how the terms “gay” and “queer” have shifted from their conventional meanings, to pejorative terms for people with

alternate sexual orientations and, more recently, to a more contested positive connotation for identifying the same group.

While Saussure was primarily interested in studying the system of meaning that underlies language itself, the literary strain of poststructuralist thought argues that other human creations such as film, advertisements, and other cultural forms can be studied as systems of meaning that only make sense within a specific cultural framework and time period. Members of this camp agree with Saussure's assertion that language, and by extension culture, exists as a system of signifiers with no relation to the signs they represent, while rejecting his belief that this system of signs forms a well defined and cohesive system of meanings that can be mapped through semiotics.

The first step towards literary poststructuralism was taken by Roland Barthes in his analysis of French popular culture. Barthes is notable for developing Saussure's link between the signified and signifier into the study of culture. In *Mythologies* (1972) he explored the meaning underlying many forms of popular culture, including the characters and performances that made professional wrestling meaningful to spectators of the time who, he argued, were more interested in the way that culturally meaningful dramas and characters such as "the clown" and "the traitor" interacted than they were in the athleticism involved. Barthes explained that myths acted to naturalize a society's values while cloaking this form of socialization behind entertainment or objectivity. His science of semiotics involves looking at various forms of literature and popular culture to uncover the social values they communicate and the practices they encourage.

Barthes was also interested in *intertextuality*, the idea that a work of art, such as a novel or performance, has a meaning that shifts according to the audience experiencing it and its relationship to other works of art. This meaning shift can be seen in, for example, the "rereading" of Shakespeare's *The Tempest* and Samuel Richardson's *Pamela* as feminist texts. The search for the myths that underlie texts and other forms of culture has been expanded into feminism by Julia Kristeva and Judith Butler, among others, and into the studies of race and ethnicity, and into lesbian, gay, and

queer theory. While Barthes is generally identified as a member of both the structuralist and poststructuralist schools of thought, more recent theorists have built upon his ideas to develop the literary camp of poststructuralism.

Barthes's ideas were further expanded by thinkers such as Derrida and Baudrillard who emphasize the constantly shifting nature of any system of signifiers. Signifiers only make sense as they are interpreted by a reader, viewer, or participant, and since the experience and interpretations of cultural systems vary widely between individuals and across time, there is a constant shifting of cultural meanings. Baudrillard and Derrida, among others, examine the effect that this uncertain mapping between signifiers and the signified has for systems of meaning.

Through his concept of *différance*, Derrida explains that any given signifier only makes sense in relation to its opposition to other signifiers. Because these relationships are not linked to any specific real world referent and shift across different works and the interpretation, the true meaning of a text is always "deferred." By extension, Derrida argues that attempts to close systems of meaning within literary or philosophical texts under the guise of accurately described real world experiences, or providing a system of "ultimate truths," are power games masked as objectivity. Derrida's attempt to seek inconsistencies within these texts, to *deconstruct* the contingency of an author's belief system, parallels postmodernism's rejection of metanarratives which describe the world as a whole.

THE "MICROPOWERS" OF SOCIETY

The sociological usage of the term poststructuralism refers to a shift from structuralist models of agency, society, and power to a more general understanding of the way that social structures influence our behavior and identity. Like Derrida and other poststructuralists in the literary camp, these poststructuralists borrowed many of the methods of structuralism while reaching very different conclusions. Durkheim and Parsons were two prominent structuralists whose ideas and methods were appropriated by the social poststructuralists.

Structural functionalist anthropologists and sociologists such as Durkheim, Parsons, and Lévi Strauss labored to understand the underlying utility or “function” of social institutions, practices, and beliefs. While these ideas provided an important foundation for the disciplines of sociology and anthropology, they also provided a limited view of human agency, which was viewed as a function of the internalization of social values.

Durkheim did much to articulate and popularize social structuralism. He argued that despite the fact that the machinations of society are invisible, they can be studied as objectively as any other realm of the natural world by examining the effects that social forces have on human beliefs and actions. For example, his empirical study *Suicide* (1997) explained that an individual’s decision to commit suicide is best explained by their level of internalization of social values, with suicides occurring both when people were over and under socialized. Similarly, sociologist Talcott Parsons argued that social institutions primarily exist to condition individuals to internalized social roles and to adapt psychological and biological needs to fit within a larger social order.

Social poststructuralists extended these ideas, arguing that human agency is shaped but not determined by a wide variety of social structures and cultural forces, including systems of belief and knowledge, disciplines of the body, and other systems of thought and action. This camp of poststructuralists is primarily interested in the way that culture and other “ideologies” shape human identities and act as unconscious systems of power over individuals. This group of thinkers also developed a more nuanced approach towards explaining human agency. Several social postmodernists, including Bourdieu and Foucault, attempt to describe the “microstructures” internal to every socialized person, which mediate any decision we choose to make, that (like Freud’s concepts of the Id and Superego) remain invisible without extensive sociological analysis. Bourdieu’s concept of *habitus* provides a notable example of an approach that builds upon the structuralist approach to explaining society and human behavior. Like Parsons, Bourdieu argued that social control is implanted upon individuals through mutually

reinforcing interaction between individual psyche and social institutions.

While Bourdieu accepts many of the structuralist assumptions of this view of human agency and social structure, he provides two major additions that place him within the poststructuralist camp. First, he argues that any society wide conception of the social forces or structures that shape our lives ignores the diversity of practices and beliefs that exist within a society across different occupations and other social groupings. He explains that as a person enters any one of these *social fields* she is immersed within a different cultural and value system that affects her behavior. Bourdieu’s second deviation from the structuralist approach toward human agency occurred with his development of the concept of *habitus* – the collection of tastes (e.g., in hobbies, occupations, and music) and proclivities towards behavior and beliefs that we develop as a result of the social sphere we grow up in, and which act as forms of *symbolic capital* which are valued or denigrated within various social fields.

Bourdieu argues we are not simply socialized or not socialized into society, as structuralists argue. Instead, we are brought into a specific *habitus* that leads us to see and interact with others in a way that feels natural and correct. At the same time, our *habitus* unconsciously encourages us toward activities and individuals that, in the long run, return us to a similar level of social status as our parents and lead us to act in scripted ways towards others. In short, *habitus* provides an explanation for a reproduction of power differences within society while providing individuals with the belief that they are making free decisions and interacting “naturally” with the world.

Similarly, Foucault provides detailed expositions of how *discourses* or ethical systems and ways of describing the world (including academic disciplines) became prominent within modern societies primarily because they provide more effective applications of social power while at the same time appearing to solve newly identified social problems. In *Discipline and Punish* (1995) Foucault explores the paradox of how punishment has become more human as we shifted our focus from punishing the body of a criminal to reforming their soul and then psyche, while at the same time these

new powers became more difficult to rebel against.

Foucault uses the term *discourses* to emphasize that in modern society, power most often takes a moral form. New systems of moral control develop as a result of a compulsion to discuss and scientifically study issues that have been problematized. As a result, the academic disciplines, classifications, and practices that emerge from these discourses become systems of power. In *The History of Sexuality* (1990) Foucault explains how a compulsion to discuss and classify sexuality is not a sign of liberation from the sexually repressive Victorian era, but rather a foundation for developing more pervasive systems of control over sexuality. Although the practice of confession has become less popular in modern societies, Foucault explains that psychology and other forms of public discourse such as talk shows have risen to fill this need for us to discuss and internalize new ethical systems. In turn, we internalize new “disciplines” because they also provide us with new pleasures and advantages.

IMPLICATIONS FOR SOCIAL RESEARCH AND PRAXIS

Critics of both camps of poststructuralism provide two objections to these ideas: (1) a scientific study of culture or society is nearly impossible if these forces are viewed as situational and constantly shifting, and (2) there is little or no opportunity for resistance against social forces if they are internalized and invisible to individuals.

In response to the first objection, literary and social poststructuralists have developed research methods that they argue provide them with an indirect approach to understanding the invisible and ever shifting forces of culture and society. Barthes’s method of semiology provided a foundation for the methods of content analysis, which attempts to use scientific methods to measure the systems of meanings or “myths” that underlie texts and other cultural creations. Similar methods have been adopted within the school of cultural studies. For example, content analysis of the presentation and description of women in advertising provides an indication of cultural expectations around

gender and how these expectations have changed over time.

Foucault’s method of *genealogy* (also known as *discourse analysis*), a second research method based on the ideas of poststructuralism, is in effect a widening of the methods of semiology. Foucault studied the history of academic disciplines and “discourses” to uncover the genesis of systems of knowledge such as psychiatry that are taken for granted as descriptions of reality but were in fact contested systems for defining and controlling human experience, with implications for which people and behaviors are rewarded or problematized. Similarly, Bourdieu explains that the microstructures that drive human decisions can be studied scientifically by observers who work to fully understand the ways that specific social fields interact with the *habitus* of individuals who enter a field. For example, in *Homo Academicus* (1988), his study of the French academic system, Bourdieu uses extensive interview and survey methods to understand the interaction between the cultural capital of academics and their resulting level of status within a given department and the academic system as a whole.

The second objection to the poststructuralist approach is that it does not allow for an individual’s resistance to micropowers and ideologies that they have internalized. As a result, it is argued that poststructuralist research and theory have no value for improving society because they cannot tell individuals how to escape from the yoke of social power. This criticism of poststructuralism has led many reform minded readers of Foucault and other poststructuralists to conclude that their theories have little use in improving the lot of those living within oppressive systems because the systems of power they describe are internalized and all pervasive.

Poststructuralists conceive of power as the interaction between systems of meaning and action, such as Foucault’s discourses and disciplines, Bourdieu’s social spaces, or Barthes’s mythologies. They contend that we accept these descriptions of the world due to previous conditioning in the form of *habitus* or other microstructures and the pleasures and advantages that these new yokes of power provide. As Foucault (1980: 98) explains, power is “never in anybody’s hands [and individuals] are always in

the position of simultaneously undergoing and exercising this power.”

While social poststructuralists generally provide no direct challenge to these systems of power because there is no direct way to rebel against the micropowers, several theorists believe that understanding the workings of social power can provide a limited degree of resistance and reform. For example, Certeau (2002) explores how mundane practices such as the use of language and cooking can provide temporary forms of resistance to the internalized systems of cultural power described by poststructuralists.

SEE ALSO: Barthes, Roland; Bourdieu, Pierre; Certeau, Michel de; Cultural Studies; Deconstruction; Derrida, Jacques; Discourse; Foucault, Michel; Foucauldian Archeological Analysis; Habitus/Field; Postmodern Social Theory; Postmodernism; Saussure, Ferdinand de; Semiotics; Structuralism

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Poulantzas, Nicos (1936–79)

Wendy A. Wiedenhoft

Nicos Poulantzas was born in Athens, Greece. He was active in the Greek student movement of the 1950s and participated in various communist and leftist organizations throughout his career. After completing a degree in law in Greece, Poulantzas moved to France, where he received a doctorate in the philosophy of law in 1965. His first major work, *Political Power and Social Classes*, was published in 1968. Poulantzas held a number of academic appointments in France, and at the time of his suicide was professor of sociology at the University of Vincennes.

Poulantzas was a structural Marxist who attempted to advance Marxist theory by emphasizing the role of the state in constituting and reproducing class struggle. Poulantzas argues that the state mediates all class relations, specifically economic, political, and ideological relations. Class relations are determined at the economic level by whether or not one produces material goods that create surplus value. Thus, wages or ownership of the means of production do not define class. Poulantzas's emphasis on the production of material goods excludes many workers from the proletariat, including state employees and service workers. Workers engaged in “non productive” labor constitute a class that Poulantzas calls the new petty bourgeoisie, which may or may not form a

class alliance with the capitalist class. At the political level class is determined by relations of authority, while relations of knowledge determine class at the ideological level. Poulantzas differentiates between manual and mental laborers at the ideological level, positing that those with technical expertise should also be excluded from the proletariat.

According to Poulantzas, the state does not dominate through repression, but by consent of both the dominant and subordinate classes. Critical of instrumental Marxists who view the state as a mere tool of the dominant capitalist class, Poulantzas suggests that the capitalist state is relatively autonomous from the economy, even if it does function to benefit the interests of the dominant class much of the time. The notion of a unified dominant class or working class may itself be a misnomer, as Poulantzas argues both classes are often divided. The capitalist state, however, functions as a unifying force to provide cohesion. This cohesion may appear contradictory, as it is a consequence of what Poulantzas calls the isolation effect. Instead of recognizing capitalist relations in terms of class struggle, individuals experience competition as isolated citizens or factions of a particular power bloc. Thus, the hegemonic power of the state rests upon a “false” notion of unity and the fact that, while the state itself constitutes class struggle, it appears to exclude class struggle from its center.

The rise of fascism and military dictatorships in Southern Europe and South America influenced Poulantzas’s theory on state power, especially his advocacy of democratic socialism. He was concerned with how the hegemonic power of authoritarian statism grew as the state apparatus was able to incorporate resistance into its dominant ideology and use technocratic discourse to espouse liberalism. Poulantzas came to view all forms of statism as suspect, including Leninism. He feared that a party that followed a Leninist path, obliterating the capitalist state and the political liberties it provided, could hijack the long road to democratic socialism. According to Poulantzas, the Leninist transition to socialism rested upon the fallacies that the capitalist state functioned solely in the interests of the bourgeoisie, that the capitalist state was repressive, and that the working class

was unified. Poulantzas did not view the working class as unified, therefore it could not claim to represent the interests of the masses, especially the interests of the new social movements that were beginning to emerge. Poulantzas saw no point in replacing one dominant discourse with another, and argued that “socialism will be democratic or it will not be at all.”

SEE ALSO: Class Conflict; Marx, Karl; Marxism and Sociology; State

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Pound, Roscoe (1870–1964)

Michael R. Hill

Roscoe Pound, sociologist, ecologist, and noted jurist, originated and promulgated the legal movement known as the American school of sociological jurisprudence. This revolutionary perspective remains the single most consequential application of sociological thinking in American society. Pound’s sociological theories and empirical methodologies fundamentally transformed the prosecution and administration of US law for a full half century.

Widely remembered as the dynamic and authoritative Dean of Harvard’s Law School (1916–36), Pound was also a creative and insightful plant ecologist as well as a pioneering and innovative sociologist. Albion W. Small,

writing privately in 1916, observed that Pound is central to our understanding of the development of American sociology after 1906, concluding – with regard to sociology and law – that Pound was “not merely *magna pars* but practically the whole thing.” Pound’s integration of sociology and law began after 1901 at the University of Nebraska where Edward A. Ross’s groundbreaking theoretical work in *Social Control* (1901), *Foundations of Sociology* (1905), and *Social Psychology* (1908) set Pound “in the path” that became the American school of sociological jurisprudence. Later, as Dean of Harvard’s prestigious Law School, Pound inculcated sociological ideas into cadres of legal students destined to positions of power and influence, resulting in a widespread, sociologically infused legal perspective that dominated decision making in the US Supreme Court for 50 years during the mid twentieth century. A prodigious scholar, Pound wrote hundreds of legal, sociological, and botanical articles and published several well received books, including *The Spirit of the Common Law* (1921), *Law and Morals* (1924), and *Social Control Through Law* (1942). Frequently cajoled by E. A. Ross to write a short monograph on sociological jurisprudence per se, Pound’s five volume *Jurisprudence* finally appeared in 1959.

Conceptually, Pound’s sociological perspective holds that law is a social creation – an astonishing and deeply heretical idea for most lawyers at the beginning of the twentieth century. In 1906, Pound fired his first major salvo on behalf of sociological jurisprudence in an address to the American Bar Association, baldly painting American lawyers and judges as harmful conservatives (*Report of the 29th Annual Meeting of the American Bar Association*, 1906, Vol. 29, I: 395–417). Rejecting concepts of absolute legal “rights” (*Journal of Ethics*, 1915, Vol. 26: 92–116), Pound’s sociological “theory of interests” defines law as an institutional mechanism for balancing the complex and often competing claims of individual, public, and social interests (*Publications of the American Sociological Society*, 1920, Vol. 15: 16–45). In the modern world of rapid technological and social change, sociological jurisprudence mandated the “reshaping of our institutions of public justice to the requirements of the times.” When established legal

precedents fail to illuminate the intricacies of current situations, according to Pound, up to date sociological data become fundamentally important to jurists who must adjudicate conflicting claims lodged by divergent interests. Pound’s theory thus made empirical sociological research “a presupposition of the work of the lawmaker, judge and jurist.”

Leading by example, after co founding the American Institute of Criminal Law and Criminology (1909), Pound – together with Felix Frankfurter – organized and directed the first full scale interdisciplinary empirical survey of crime in America (*Criminal Justice in Cleveland*, 1922), a project immediately cited as a methodological exemplar by Robert E. Park and Ernest W. Burgess in the second edition of their influential *Introduction to the Science of Society* (1924). Pound’s subsequent sociological synthesis appeared as *Criminal Justice in America* (1930). At Harvard, Pound championed the Survey of Crime and Criminal Justice in Boston (1934–6) and sponsored Sheldon Glueck’s *One Thousand Juvenile Delinquents* (1934). As a commissioner working largely behind the scenes on Herbert Hoover’s National Commission on Law Observance and Enforcement (popularly known as the Wickersham Commission, 1929–31), Pound framed much of the massive final *Report* (1931), lauded the meticulous work of Chicago’s Edith Abbott, his former Nebraska student, in her *Crime and the Foreign Born* (1931), and successfully blocked the persistent tendency of Chicago’s Clifford Shaw and Henry McKay to overreach their ecological data in *The Causes of Crime* (1931). Pound undertook his last empirical study at age 75: the Survey of Criminal Justice in China (1946–8), personally conducting site visits and interviews on mainland China. The results remain today embedded in Taiwan’s legal code. Within the social sciences, Pound’s welding of sociology and law is most often compared to and contrasted with the decidedly anthropological interpretation of law adopted by Karl Llewellyn.

Pound died in Cambridge, Massachusetts, still an active scholar, on July 1, 1964.

SEE ALSO: American Sociological Association; Law, Criminal; Law, Sociology of; Park, Robert E. and Burgess, Ernest W.; Small, Albion W.

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poverty

John Iceland

While poverty generally refers to material deprivation, it is a multifaceted experience for those who are struggling to get by. It can certainly involve economic hardship, such as difficulty in paying food bills or living in housing in severe disrepair. For some, poverty means lacking some of the basic consumer items that their neighbors have, such as telephones and cars. The term poverty can be used to describe a lack of other types of goods, such as education or human rights. The focus here, however, is more narrowly on the economic dimensions of poverty.

There are several reasons why poverty is considered a critical social issue. First, the hardship that often accompanies poverty can have adverse effects on individuals' physical

and psychological well being. A number of studies have shown that children raised in poor families are worse off in terms of their cognitive development, school achievement, and emotional well being. Poor individuals are also more likely to have health problems and shorter life expectancies. Many people would also agree that it is morally troubling to have poverty amidst relative affluence.

Second, poverty has broader economic consequences. Economies thrive in societies with vibrant working and middle classes. For example, much of the strong economic growth in the United States in the twentieth century was fueled by the expansion of consumer markets. As the demand for new products increased, so did technological innovation, productivity, and wages and benefits. Thus, declining levels of poverty contribute to a healthy economy by increasing the number of people who can produce and purchase goods and services; that increase, in turn, stimulates economic growth and raises average standards of living.

Third, high levels of poverty can have serious social and political consequences. Poor people often feel alienated from mainstream society. Poverty can provoke social disorder and crime and reduce public confidence in democratic institutions if people do not feel their needs are being addressed by the prevailing system. The unequal distribution of resources can contribute to a fragmentation of society, both nationally and globally.

There are a number of measures one could use to estimate the prevalence of poverty in society. *Income* poverty measures are perhaps the most common. They usually involve comparing a household's income to a poverty threshold to determine whether that household is poor. Two basic types of income poverty measures are *absolute* and *relative* measures. Absolute measures, such as the current US official measure, are ones that typically attempt to define a truly basic – absolute – needs standard that remains constant over time and perhaps updated only for inflation. Relative measures, which are more commonly used by researchers in Europe, explicitly define poverty as a condition of comparative disadvantage, to be assessed against some evolving standard of living.

The most common poverty thresholds used in developing countries are absolute ones. The

World Bank, for example, uses a poverty standard of \$1 to \$2 per person per day, or \$1,095 to \$2,190 per year, for a family of three in developing countries in Africa or Latin America. The World Bank measures are actually *consumption* rather than *income* poverty measures, as families are considered poor if they consume goods with monetary values below the thresholds, rather than whether they have incomes below those thresholds.

The main theoretical criticism of absolute poverty measures is that what people judge to be poor varies across both time and place. Applying the World Bank measures, for example, to developed countries would be fairly meaningless. Even within the US, as standards of living have changed, so have people's perceptions of what poverty means (Fisher 1997). Economists describe this phenomenon as the income elasticity of the poverty line – the tendency of successive poverty lines to rise in real terms as the real income of the general population rises.

Poverty remains pervasive in all societies for several reasons, including the way we understand and define poverty, the features of the global market system, social stratification across “status” groups (such as racial and ethnic groups), and policy responses to these issues. Because views of what it takes to avoid poverty increase as standards of living rise, as described above, achieving inroads against poverty over the long run is difficult. Poverty is also a common, if not endemic, feature of most economic systems, and the market system, whose principal goal is the individual accumulation of capital, is not one of the exceptions. On the one hand, as the engine of economic growth and technological change, the market system contributes to increases in wages and overall standards of living. On the other hand, the market economy often exerts a contrary effect; to maximize profits, businesses usually seek to pay low wages to workers, and this can serve to increase inequality and poverty.

While economic forces determine overall levels of economic growth and inequality, social stratification across social groups determines who becomes poor. Status groups in today's society are commonly defined by the intersection of ethnic, gender, and class affiliations. Social stratification across status groups occurs

when social groups seek to maximize their rewards by restricting others' access to resources and opportunities. The process of stratification is usually a cumulative one. A person may begin life at a disadvantage, and disadvantages accrue through the stages of people's lives, such as during schooling, then in the labor market, and so on.

Policy could reduce (or increase) the harmful effects of inequality. The rise of the welfare state in the US in the 1930s, for example, was a response to the hardship of the Great Depression. Policy, however, has limits within the context of the market system. It is not always used as an instrument for promoting equality because it is thought that pushes for broad based economic equality of outcomes may serve to reduce, if even by a modest amount, incentives to work. Supplying a guaranteed income runs contrary to the central ethos of the market system. Thus, policies devised to address poverty often differ according to how societies prioritize competing values and goals.

SEE ALSO: Family Poverty; Family Structure and Poverty; Feminization of Poverty; Great Depression; Poverty and Disrepute; Poverty and Free Trade; Urban Poverty

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poverty and disrepute

David L. Harvey

On the face of it, the association of poverty and disrepute seems obvious. Poverty's material misery is to be avoided, just as is the diffuse sense of shame that attaches to those who "never had what it took," or "should have made it, but didn't." Indeed, the commandment to succeed is central to Merton's (1968: 185–214) theory of deviance. His "Anomie and Social Structure" posits an endorsement of success among all classes and an equal aversion to failure. Hence, his "anomic adaptations" Conformity, Innovation, Ritualism, and Retreatism (Rebellion is another matter) revolve around achieving success or in finding an alternative route to success.

Modern poverty, then, carries with it a *moral stain* as vexing as material uncertainty itself. Our understanding of poverty's disrepute is further complicated by the fact that poor persons are labeled disreputable even as disrepute has become increasingly associated with today's ruling elites (Lasch 1995: 25–49). Moreover, nostrums describing the poor as "good and hard working" merely confuse the issue. Too often, these shibboleths shield contempt for the poor and our own fear of falling.

David Matza has cut through this casuistry by defining the disreputable poor as being those who for extra economic reasons remain unemployed even during periods of high labor demand and who, by dint of that fact, become objects of moral censure (Matza 1966). Guided by this definition, he identifies several "disreputable fractions" of the poor: the *Dregs* whose occupational careers deviate from the normal

trajectories of their cohort; the *Newcomers*, strangers in a strange land, segregated and victimized by nativist prejudice; the downwardly mobile *Skidders*; and, finally, the *Infirm*. These categories echo Marx's (1979) *Lumpenproletariat* and Jack London's "people of the abyss."

POVERTY AND DISREPUTE AS PROCESS

Like all sociological entities, poverty's disrepute is ontologically stratified. It is structured by the complex interaction of six elements. First, modern poverty originates in the objective contradictions of capitalism: in the dictum that industrial efficiency requires the continuous generation of *superfluous populations*. The production of these surplus populations is a *systemic requirement* of capital's political economy. That is, the structure of commodity production requires some portion of the workforce to be held in reserve in order to accommodate sudden increases in market demand. Failure to maintain this standing army of unemployed or sub employed workers risks a breakdown of both market equilibrium and its integrative pricing function. And, to the extent that markets are free (i.e., their pricing mechanisms operate independently of moral imperatives), this economic superfluity generates perduring poverty amid material plenty.

Second, viewed *sociologically*, modern poverty's disrepute manifests itself as a social exclusion of the poor from full civic participation (Townsend 1962, 1970; Byrne, 1999). While the degree of exclusion varies, its legitimation requires the moral marginalization of the poor. This second element – the moral exclusion of the poor – lies at the symbolic core of modern poverty's disrepute. Indeed, it sets modern poverty off from historically prior poverties. As Polanyi (2001) reminds us, because pre capitalist markets were embedded in analgesic social institutions, poverty, no matter how grinding, provided a social nexus that guaranteed the poor a legitimate claim to social inclusion (Block 2001). Unabrogated access to these embedded rights formed a "social contract" protecting the poor. That social contract came to an end, though, with the triumph of self regulating markets. The commodification of life's necessities

stripped the poor of those cultural buffers that had insured them their social personage. No longer shielded by traditional ties of kinship, communal fealty, or Christian charity, the utilitarian cast of bourgeois culture and self-regulating markets paved the way for socially excluding the economically superfluous.

Third, modern poverty has an ideological component: a set of indispensable accounts that either justify or deny the legitimacy of excluding the poor. Exclusionary accounts are invariably class based. They center upon naturalistic accounts of poverty that justify existing inequalities. They are situated within a reified penumbra of pejorative judgments hierarchically ranking classes and their subcultures. Standing over and against such stigmatic labeling are those subterranean ideologies that debunk the accuracy and fairness of such labeling.

Taken together, these opposed constructions form the core of “ideological space.” This space is composed of rhetorics of exclusion fabricated from above and communicated downward through the class system, and subaltern arguments for inclusion manufactured from below and communicated upward. This double flow is integral to the class struggle. It morally partitions the superfluous into “deserving” and “undeserving” factions and, thereby, morally anchors the class system.

The fourth aspect of this process underscores the historically conditioned nature of disrepute’s social construction. Both hegemonic justification and subaltern pleadings of defeasibility draw their rationales from the immediate historical situation as they morally anchor the class system. Fifth, how an excluded group acts out its moral stain is “ecologically and locally conditioned.” That is, the shifting terms of moral exclusion depend upon the *community’s concrete situation and past experiences*. Sixth, the “wild card” of *human agency* allows individuals and collectives to negotiate “special terms” by which their ritual segregation from the community’s moral paragons is played out.

These six factors form a plausible starting point for grasping the dynamic link between poverty and disrepute. This link can best be seen by comparing the exclusionist ideology promulgated by Thomas Robert Malthus (1766–1834) and the inclusionist alternative Karl Marx (1818–83) offered, especially as they relate to

- (1) the origins of economic superfluity and
- (2) the assigning of moral responsibility for that superfluity.

THE IDEOLOGICAL CONSTRUCTION OF DISREPUTE

The opposed paradigms of Malthus and Marx have remained paradigmatic of the modern poverty debate for more than 150 years. The ideological power of Malthus’s *An Essay on the Principle of Population* (1798) lies in its contention that poverty is rooted in the natural order of things and is, moreover, part of the Divine design. Superfluous populations are generated by two demographic tendencies characteristic of all life forms. Animal populations, inclusive of humans, naturally reproduce at an ascending geometric rate while their means of subsistence increase at a slower, “arithmetic” rate. In a specific ecological setting, the incommensurate increase of the two ratios eventually precipitates a demographic catastrophe. During such catastrophes “excess populations” outstrip their resource base and are subsequently winnowed until their numbers once more conform to environmental capacity.

Malthus goes on to note that these “winter kills” occur less frequently than one might expect. This is because the “positive checks” of war, famine, plague, and misery (poverty) continually keep human populations below the catastrophic breakpoint. His religious training allows him, moreover, to move effortlessly from science to moral philosophy and theology by suggesting these positive checks have their final cause in Divine intention. Poverty, famine, etc. are, in the last analysis, trials for testing moral fiber and faith. As part of God’s grand design, positive checks should not be eliminated by Enlightenment reform, but endured as annealing devices of Christian virtue.

In a revision of his original essay – sometimes called *The Second Essay* – Malthus provides an exit from this dire scenario by giving “negative checks” – reason, foresight, and free will – a countervailing role. Together, they form the basis of disciplined self constraint and the cultivation of moral habits that limit family size. He argues that if the poor are schooled in moral self discipline, most will willingly diminish

their numbers and thereby command wages capable of lifting themselves from poverty. Moreover, the costs of church or state based poor relief, once reduced, can lead to increased capital investment and new job creation. Hence, in his *Second Essay*, Malthus shifts the liberation of the poor from their squalor squarely on the shoulders of the poor, while simultaneously making their refusal to rationally limit family size a moral failure. That is, if bourgeois society magnanimously underwrites the education of all classes, the lower orders must reciprocate. Failure to do so would be tantamount to an act of free choice and, hence, of moral perversity.

Malthus's line of reasoning not only blames the poor for their poverty, but in good conscience relieves society and Christian conscience of any further concern with these incorrigibles. Malthus can only make this argument, however, by reifying poverty on three levels: (1) by locating the origins of surplus populations in two natural ratios; (2) by defining poverty as part of God's benevolent plan; and (3) by locating the continued causes of economic malaise outside the political economy of capital. Indeed, this triad of reifications is the prototype of all ideologies designed to "blame the victim."

Marx's approach is diametrically opposed to Malthus's. While granting the validity of the latter's "laws of population" in pre-capitalist formations, Marx argues they no longer apply in modern industrial societies. These latter have technologically superseded Malthus's demographics of wealth and poverty. Indeed, the mechanized, mass production of commodity wealth has produced a new crisis: "over production," not over population, now threatened the new industrial order.

In the early stages of industrialization, the production of commodity wealth hinged on the number of workers employed and on how effectively they could be sweated. Mechanization, however, largely resolved this problem. Labor's productive powers were so effectively enhanced that workers now risked being replaced by their machines. This substitution of machines for men created a new economic entity: industrial reserve armies of unemployed and sub-employed workers. Indeed, superfluous populations existed, as Malthus claimed, but not because of undisciplined natural

increase. Instead, superfluous populations were a product of capital's rational pursuit of ever increasing rates of capital accumulation. Competing for an ever diminishing number of occupational slots, Marx's industrial reserves formed the *demographic core* of the new poverty. Only a thoroughgoing reform of capitalist relations could eliminate poverty.

Malthus's and Marx's accounts still ideologically bracket debates over poverty's enduring enigma. The former's naturalistic doctrine, while cognizant of the contradictions of capital, nonetheless defends entrepreneurial capitalism by holding the poor accountable for their own misery. By contrast, Marx avoids victim blaming by locating modern poverty's roots in the structural contradictions of industrial capitalism itself.

THE HISTORICAL EVOLUTION OF IDEOLOGICAL SPACE

Despite its evolution from entrepreneurial capitalism to monopoly capitalism, and from monopoly capitalism to globalization, today's capitalism still requires industrial reserve armies to sustain itself. It is little wonder, then, that debates over the disreputable poor have added but little to Malthus and Marx's original parameters – accounts that "blame the victim" and proposals for reforming capital's anti-social tendencies.

Following Phillips (2004), we can go a step further in suggesting that at any given moment the plausibility of these opposed accounts is a function of capital's ability to maintain its hegemony over the warring class subcultures composing capital's *Lifeworld*. In surveying the recent history of the US, Phillips identifies three periods of "capitalist blow outs" – eras in which the equilibria of class power so necessary for democracy have been shattered by a rampant "plutography." These eras of America's anti-democratic excesses occurred during the Gilded Age, the Roaring Twenties, and in our own era. During each blow out, the differences defining capital's class hierarchies intensified and victim bashing of the poor flourished.

These asymmetrical blow outs were punctuated by periods of economic crisis in which an

egalitarian “contraction” of the class hierarchy and a relative restoration of political balance between classes ensued. These periods of contraction witnessed the agrarian revolts and Populist movements of the 1880s and 1890s; the Midwestern Progressivism of the last century; and, finally, what Phillips calls the Great Contraction of the New Deal. With each contraction, the personal stain of poverty diminished, the working class and the poor were celebrated, reforms were implemented, and, in several instances, social banditry in the name of the poor was given folkloric treatment in the arts.

The history of the social sciences in America shows parallel cyclic variations. Hence, the antithetical sociologies of William Graham Sumner (1840–1910) and Lester Ward (1841–1913) continued the debate between social Darwinians and socialist reformers while remaining within the boundaries first set by Malthus and Marx. Baltzel (1987: 87–142) demonstrates that Malthusian inspired social Darwinism scientifically buttressed the xenophobic sentiments and racist doctrines that legitimated the WASP establishment’s stigmatizing of foreign workers and agrarian populists alike. Opposing this misappropriation of science, the “New Social Science Movement” used a nature/nurture paradigm to explain the alleged racial differences dividing rich and poor. For them, these differences resided neither in biology nor in temperament. They were seen, instead, as originating in the caste like monopolies in the education and economic systems that perpetuated the hegemony of the WASP establishment. Developing this line of thought, social science scholarship celebrated the self redemptive powers of the poor and effectively refuted the Malthusian reifications of the upper class establishment. In time, the New Social Science became an intellectual linchpin of the social reform programs of the New Deal.

In the 1960s the War on Poverty extended New Deal entitlements to previously by passed populations. When that movement foundered on the fiscal shoals of the Vietnam War, conservative counterattacks freely marshaled Malthusian inspired “victim bashing.” Edward Banfield’s *The Unheavenly City* (1968), for example, argued that anti poverty reforms had hit a point of diminishing returns beyond which uplift and reform could not move. Striking a

Malthusian stance, he argued that the impoverished residue remaining in America’s cities were moral incorrigibles. Their “present oriented” culture and their preference for the excitement of “street life” placed them beyond redemption. Indeed, the growing number of poor suggested reformers themselves had become part of the problem. Advances in public health and poor support programs were now blunting the beneficial power of Malthus’s positive checks that in times past had limited the reproductive life spans of the incorrigibles.

Some 15 years later, Charles Murray’s *Losing Ground* (1984) appropriated these same Malthusian motifs, taking Banfield’s work several steps further. Murray now contended poverty was caused by the welfare system itself: by the dependencies transfer payments induced among the poor. In the grand fashion of Malthus’s *Second Essay*, Murray suggested poverty could be ended not only by eliminating government welfare programs, but also by ending all federal transfer payments *tout court*. Rhetorically parodying the closing pages of the *Second Essay*, Murray leads the reader through a “thought experiment,” asking what would happen if all such programs suddenly ended. He concludes little would change: legitimate programs would be continued by local agencies or private welfare groups; the remainder would deservedly die on the vine.

It would now appear that as capital’s global reach expanded into the twenty first century, poverty and its disrepute have also become globalized. Not surprisingly, the debate over poverty’s global origins and its amelioration has developed along the lines discussed here. In *Globalization and Its Discontents* (2002), Nobel Laureate Joseph Stiglitz suggests that anti poverty policies at the World Bank and the Import Export Bank have divided in accordance with the paradigms discussed here: neoliberal “market fundamentalism” and “neo Keynesian” interventionism. The former has cloaked itself in a Smithian adulation of the free market, arguing that if free markets are allowed to operate without societal interference, they will “naturally” eliminate both poverty and unemployment. For many neoliberals, unemployment is created largely by the individual “deciding” not to work (i.e., to engage in activities more pleasurable than disciplined wage

labor). Beginning with this assumption, neoliberal anti poverty strategies move away from Adam Smith and assume a distinctly Malthusian cast. When a given national economy falters due to lack of fiscal restraint on the part of those managing a nation's economy, neoliberal cures move directly to "restructuring" that economy: restricting as much as possible the latitudes of those traditional institutions impairing the impersonal mechanisms of the free market. In short, "market fundamentalists" seek to enhance the power of self regulating markets by negating the buffering effects of the institutions that embed the economy.

Neo Keynesians do not share this faith in untrammelled markets. They assume market processes are, a priori, imperfect and hence periodically invite temporary intervention if poverty is to be eliminated. Hence, efforts to ameliorate poverty often begin with strengthening those institutions embedding markets and protecting the social personage of the poor. Once these embedding agencies are stabilized, enforcing market discipline can follow. This approach is, of course, anathema to the neo liberals. And just as neoliberalism is ideologically isomorphic to Malthusianism and Neo Darwinism, so the Neo Keynesian paradigm remains isomorphic to a Marxist critique of capital. The former moves directly to place "disreputable traditions" on the Procrustean bed of market fundamentals, while the latter pragmatically repairs the embedding institutions themselves before proceeding.

THE STRANGER AND THE VANQUISHED

If modern poverty lies at the very heart of the capitalist mode of production and its exploitive social relations, then the stigma of its disrepute resides in the vastness of the differential distribution of wealth and power marking class society. This axiom holds for the burgeoning system of global capital and its by passed Fordist Keynesian constellation, just as much as it held for nineteenth century entrepreneurial capitalism. In each sociohistorical formation class differences must be technically reproduced each generation, just as they must be morally vindicated. Because class warfare has

been, historically, a pandemic possibility, rendering the poor morally suspect stabilizes capitalist society in two ways. First, the stigma of poverty sustains the morale of ruling groups by legitimating their belief that they are naturally endowed with the moral capacity to rule. Second, the disreputable label has a *preemptive* function. It communicates to the "dangerous classes" both their social incompetence and the inferiority of their class subculture. This preemptive degradation thus becomes a powerful mechanism of social control, educating the poor and the near poor into a grudging acceptance of the moral correctness of their social exclusion.

Given these functions, there is still the issue of who among the poor get labeled "disreputable." In addressing this question, one turns from the *systemic* issues of superfluity to the concrete communal processes regulating the assignment of disrepute. Matza (1966: 291–292) bundles these processes under the rubric of "pauperization." Pauperization can occur at two sociohistorical junctures. First, a community or a society can be momentarily swamped by waves of unassimilated "newcomers." This produces an institutional anomie that requires the social order to defend against social disorganization. Pauperization is one such defense. It allows the community to distance itself from the recent arrivals by treating them as anathema – as morally disreputable.

However, the label of disrepute can also be applied to already assimilated members of a community. This second type of pauperization usually occurs when traditional modes of production and their occupational cultures are suddenly displaced by new technologies and new productive protocols of efficiency. Under these conditions, traditionally validated norms of care and craftsmanship are suddenly defined as dilatory, undisciplined, and indolent.

Hence, depending on pauperization's sociohistorical nexus, disrepute can assume one of two social forms: the "Stranger" or the "Vanquished." Following Simmel (1965; Hvinden 1995), the Stranger role emerges when migrants possessing a viable way of life resist immediate assimilation. Like Simmel's Stranger, they walk *among* a people, but are not *of* them. In time, most Strangers will either move on or accommodate to the host order. There will be a residue, however, that does not adapt

occupationally and that continues to resist acculturation. They are soon relegated to the ranks of the disreputable poor.

The Vanquished, by contrast, belong to families that were assimilated long ago. They are descendants of those who earlier challenged the reigning hegemony and failed. These families or kin groups are subsequently folded into the life of the community, often as a distinct caste. In accepting their subaltern status such groups are asymptotically assimilated, even as certain differences are tolerated and even nurtured by the reigning orthodoxy. As occupants of a circumscribed social niche, the Vanquished learn how to play to the vanity of their betters and, in time, wrest from them special dispensations. In time, such exemptions can mature into long term indulgences so that the Vanquished are paternalistically exempted from living up to the standards of social and moral competence expected of the rest of the citizenry. As part of a longstanding system of patronage, the Vanquished are seldom "dangerous," only disreputable. Indeed, their periodic failures at self improvement are tolerated since their failures testify to the metaphysical rightness of the existing hegemony. Moreover, having "learned their place," they can often form cross class coalitions with communal elites by forming united fronts against the latest wave of Strangers. Indeed, in particularly stable communities disrepute can pass from one generation to the next as part of a symbolic family estate. In America, poor white Southerners and various persons of color have played the role of the Vanquished. When enlisted in reactionary alliances, they are labeled by self described progressives as "Red Necks" and "Uncle Toms," or worse.

SEE ALSO: Economic Sociology; Classical Political Economic Perspectives; Global Economy; Gramsci, Antonio; Labeling Theory; Malthus, Thomas Robert; Marx, Karl; Merton, Robert K.; Neoliberalism; Polanyi, Karl; Poverty; Simmel, Georg; Social Exclusion; Spencer, Herbert

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poverty and free trade

Christoph Henning

The relation of poverty and free trade is not obvious. Exactly for this reason it needs scientific clarification in order to be able to come to terms with it. From a sociological point of view, free trade is one of the cures of the poverty of nations, yet at the same time it must be named as one of the main sources of global poverty.

Among the reasons for poverty *within* a society are economic inequalities with regard to initial endowments. Though modern society is normatively based on equal opportunities, the unequal endowments that can be found in real life may worsen in trade. Both parties might benefit through trade, yet the richer party in many cases benefits more than the poorer party (even though that is not pictured in the “perfect” world of economic models), so inequality can and in many cases will grow. This is one of the reasons why trade is regulated from time to time. Yet poverty is measured in relative terms here: as the total wealth in industrialized countries is growing, so is the average standard of living within those countries, even for the disadvantaged groups. So in spite of increasing inequality, the standard of living of the poor can be lifted in absolute terms. Standard political philosophy, following John Rawls, considers this as just.

This theoretical win win scenario (though in detail some gain a little, others gain a lot) looks different from the global perspective. The amount of global poverty is growing not only relatively, but absolutely. There are whole countries that are becoming poorer and poorer. According to the United Nations Development Report 2003 this is true for more than 50 nations in the last few decades. Hunger is the number one global problem, followed by diseases that are equally widespread. Technically, the means to avoid these diseases have in many cases long been established. However, some nations cannot afford to buy such medical remedies on the global market. Usually, they are not even allowed to produce generic drugs themselves, although there are exceptions, such as in the case of AIDS in South Africa. There

are other problems intrinsically related to poverty. Worldwide migration, for example, is most often caused by poverty. Disasters caused by global climate change, as another example, usually hit the poorest regions the hardest, as poor regions cannot afford to protect the environment. Finally, civil wars often break out where people are hopeless due to their poverty. In other words, poverty is an urgent global problem itself, and indirectly it is the source of many other global problems. Global poverty calls for an explanation.

Worldwide poverty goes along with growing wealth in some regions. This obviously is a paradox. In search of explanations, pre sociological theories sometimes turned to morality: those that are well off *deserve* to be well off because they are virtuous and diligent. Likewise, the poor *deserve* to be poor because they are corrupted, not able to work, or not willing to work. Sociology cannot take such value judgments at face value. The science of society instead has to find social forces and structural reasons for this paradox. Among such explanations are political and economic approaches. Both deviate from the orthodox textbook image of free trade.

The standard economic explanation from undergraduate textbooks, following Ricardo’s theorem of comparative advantage, is that all partners automatically benefit from free trade. If one country has disadvantages in the production costs of every good, it will still benefit from free trade if it finds another country that agrees not to produce the goods where the first country has a comparative advantage in production costs. Comparative advantage means that the opportunity costs for producing a certain good are expressed in the cost of production for another good: it may take Canada 4 units of beer to produce one unit of wine, whereas in Mexico the relation may be 2 to 1. This does not mean that it is actually cheaper to produce beer in Mexico. A comparative advantage can go along with an absolute disadvantage. If we follow this theory, Canada is expected to focus on beer and Mexico on wine, even when absolute costs for *both* products are lower in Canada. This is a strong assumption and resembles a planned economy more than a market. Another assumption is that the richer country will in the end exchange the goods

produced in the poorer country for their own products. Parties benefit from trade only if these strong assumptions are met. Let us say, instead of Canada producing 100 units of wine and 400 units of beer and Mexico producing 50 units of wine and 100 units of beer with half of their productive powers for each good and for their own use, we now have Canada producing beer only and Mexico producing wine only, which they exchange afterwards. Instead of 500 units of beer, we now have 800 units of beer in total, and instead of 150 units of wine we have 100 units of wine. The total wealth has increased from 650 to 900 units, even though the cost of wine goes up (but this will only benefit Mexico). Because it would cost Canada 4 units of beer to produce 1 unit of wine, Canada is assumed to exchange 50 units of Mexican wine for 200 units of Canadian beer (or even more). After this "international trade," Canada ends up with 600 units of beer and 50 units of wine; that is, 50 units of wine less, but 200 units of beer more. Mexico ends up with 50 units of wine and 200 units of beer; that is, the same amount of wine, but double the quantity of beer. In this example, both parties benefit in total. Yet it is very clear that there are many theoretical flaws in this harmonious picture.

The first one is that there are often political barriers to trade, and this is what recent theories of international trade have stressed. Every time a party starts to lose its gains from trade, it will try to introduce tariffs in order to protect its industry. Yet only strong countries will have the power to do so. A weaker party will often not have the means to introduce such measures, even where economic reasons would recommend them. Secondly, there are various economic arguments that cast doubt on this perfect picture, as for example dependency theory or the theory of unequal exchange. Many of these schools have a Marxist background, yet one can read in Adam Smith that countries with an absolute disadvantage can hardly gain from trade. Why should a country that has an absolute advantage in one good abstain from producing it? Besides, this story only works under the assumption of the quantity theory of money, which says that momentary gains from trade will lead to inflation (more money imported and more goods exported result in higher

prices, and these in turn level the advantage from trade). As soon as another, more realistic theory of money is used, the theory of comparative advantage is no longer convincing. Money can not only be used to purchase goods, it can also be used to invest in better production technologies or in order to lend it to other countries. If these other countries do not gain from international trade but experience a worsening of their "absolute disadvantage," this can result in a crisis of international debt. And this is what can be perceived during the last few decades.

SEE ALSO: Capitalism; Colonialism (Neocolonialism); Dependency and World Systems Theories; Globalization; Inequality, Wealth; Neoliberalism; Poverty

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power

Jason L. Powell

Power is an “essentially contested and complex term” (Lukes 1974: 7) that cuts right across social science disciplines. The literature on power is marked by a deep disagreement over the basic definition of power. Some theorists define power as getting someone else to do what you want them to do (power over), whereas others define it more broadly as an ability or a capacity to act (power to). Thomas Hobbes’s (1985 [1641]: 150) definition of power as a person’s “present means . . . to obtain some future apparent Good” is a classic example of this understanding of power, as is Hannah Arendt’s definition of power as “the human ability not just to act but to act in concert” (1970: 44). Feminist theorists of power Stacey and Price (1983) define power as the more or less one sided patriarchal ability to position women’s lives through the actions of men over them. Conversely, Michel Foucault (1977) suggests that power itself is “relational” in that whilst one social actor may exercise power with other individuals, we also need to be aware that all other individuals have “power” in their social relationship that can be expressed through “resistance.”

The historical emergence of sociological discussions of power has been crystallized in the work of Max Weber. In Max Weber’s famous work, *Economy and Society: An Outline of Interpretive Sociology*, he clarifies his typology of power. Weber highlights the distinction between coercive power and power based on various types of authority: charismatic, traditional, and legal rational. People obey charismatic leaders because of the personal qualities of the person doing the telling. Well known charismatic figures include Jesus Christ and Hitler. However, charismatic figures may arise in any social grouping and such people assume positions of authority over others on the basis of personal qualities of leadership perceived in that individual by other group members. Traditional authority involves acceptance of rules that symbolize ritual or ancient practice such as religion. By contrast, Weber also focused on the power of modern bureaucracies, such as civil

service, whose formal rules of procedure are legitimized by legal rational authority.

Pluralist theories see power being held by a variety of groups in society (some of which are more powerful than others) that compete with each other. Since no one group or class is able to dominate all other groups (because of checks and balances built into a democratic system of government), a “plurality” of competing interest groups, political parties, and so forth is seen to characterize democratic societies.

Elite theory involves the idea that rather than there being a simple plurality of competing groups in society, there are instead a series of competing elites – powerful groups who are able to impose their will upon the rest of society. The theory of “circulating elites” is a conservative form of theorizing associated with writers such as Mosca and Pareto (Lukes 1974). C. Wright Mills’s analysis has been termed as elite theory as well, but stems from the idea that certain elite groups arose to control various institutions in society. Since some institutions were more powerful than others (an economic elite, for example, is likely to be more powerful than an educational or religious elite), it followed that the elite groups who controlled such institutions would hold the balance of power in society as a whole – they would dominate politically on the structural level of power and involve the creation of a “power elite.”

The Marxist tradition elaborated the role of cultural hegemony in ideology as a means of bolstering the power of capitalism and the nation state. This is a Marxist form of theorizing that argues that power is fundamentally lodged with the owners and controllers of economic production (the bourgeoisie). Political power is seen to derive from economic ownership and, in this respect, we can identify a ruling class which not only controls the means of production, distribution, and exchange in capitalist society, but also dominates and controls the institutions of political power. There are two variations of Marxist views on power. Instrumental Marxism, associated with the work of Ralph Milliband and especially *The State in Capitalist Society* (1969), attempts to demonstrate empirically the nature of ruling class domination in society. Structuralist Marxism, associated with the work of writers such as Nicos Poulantzas, especially his *Classes in*

Contemporary Capitalism (1975), and Louis Althusser, concentrates more upon the structural arrangements of capitalist society. It attempts to show how a ruling class is able to dominate the rest of society economically, politically, and ideologically without the need for its members to personally oversee the workings of the state.

Finally, Michel Foucault's analysis of power has arguably been the most influential discussion of the topic over the last 30 years. Foucault's (1977) work analyzes the link between power and knowledge. He outlines a form of covert power that works through people rather than only on them. As he puts it, "power is everywhere, not because it embraces every thing, but because it comes from everywhere" (1978: 93). Foucault endeavors to offer a "microphysics" of modern power (1977: 26), an analysis that focuses not on the concentration of power in the hands of the sovereign or the state but instead on how power flows through the capillaries of the social body. For Foucault, "experts" such as medical doctors are key interventionists in societal relations and, in the management of social arrangements, pursue a daunting power to classify, with consequences for the reproduction of medical knowledge. At the same time, Foucault also recognized that power itself lacks any concrete form, occurring as a locus of struggle. Resistance through defiance defines power and hence becomes possible *through* power. Without resistance, power is absent.

SEE ALSO: Feminism; Foucault, Michel; Ideology; Marxism and Sociology; Mills, C. Wright; Power Elite; Power, Theories of; Weber, Max

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power-dependence theory

Linda D. Molm

Power dependence theory is the name commonly given to the social exchange theory originally formulated by Richard Emerson (1962, 1972a, 1972b). As the name suggests, the dynamics of the theory revolve around power, power use, and power balancing operations, and rest on the central concept of *dependence*. Mutual dependence brings people together; that is, to the extent that people are mutually dependent, they are more likely to form exchange relations and groups and to continue in them. Inequalities in dependence create power imbalances that can lead to conflict and social change.

The publication of Emerson's theory in 1972 marked a turning point in the development of the social exchange framework in sociology. Power dependence theory departed from earlier exchange formulations by Peter Blau, George Homans, and John Thibaut and Harold Kelley in three important ways. First, Emerson replaced the relatively loose logic of his predecessors with a rigorously derived system of propositions that were more amenable to empirical test and the development of a strong research tradition. Second, Emerson established power and its use as the major topics of exchange theory – topics that would dominate theory development and research for the next 30 years. Third, by integrating principles of behavioral psychology with social network analysis, Emerson developed an exchange theory in which the structure of relations, rather than the actors themselves, became the central focus.

These distinctions influenced not only the character of power dependence theory, but also the continued development of the social exchange tradition.

The theoretical program of research conducted by Emerson, his colleague Karen Cook, and their students further developed the theory's character and logic while testing its basic tenets. After Emerson's untimely death in 1982, Cook's work with Toshio Yamagishi continued to modify and expand the theory. In addition, other established scholars who were not students of Cook or Emerson used the theory as a framework for developing related theories of power and power processes.

BASIC CONCEPTS AND PRINCIPLES

Power dependence theory shares with other exchange theories the basic concepts of actors, resources, rewards, and costs, but places greater emphasis on the form, rather than the content, of exchange relations. The participants in social exchange, called *actors*, can be either individual persons or collective actors such as groups or organizations, and either specific entities or interchangeable occupants of structural positions. This insight, along with the use of network concepts, allowed the theory to span different levels of analysis more successfully than earlier exchange theories. Resources are tied to relations rather than actors. That is, possessions or behavioral capabilities that are valued by other actors are *resources* in an actor's relations with those others, but not necessarily in other relations.

Power dependence theory also shares with other exchange theories the basic assumption of self-interested actors. Emerson's original formulation deliberately eschewed cognitive assumptions of rationality or conscious calculation of benefits, however, in favor of a theory based on operant psychology. Emerson avoided the problems of tautology and reductionism that plagued earlier behavioral approaches by recognizing that the core concepts of operant behavior, reinforcer, and discriminative stimulus form a single conceptual unit. Furthermore, their relation to each other is defined only across repeated occurrences of behavior and stimuli. By maintaining the integrity of this

conceptual unit, Emerson established the *social relation*, rather than the individual actor, as the basic unit of power dependence theory.

Although Emerson and others would later bring more cognitive concepts into the theory, the initial absence of assumptions about cognitions or motives helped build a theory that emphasized structure rather than individuals' thoughts or needs. This emphasis on structure is evident in the theory's analysis of both power-dependence relations – its theoretical heart – and exchange networks and groups.

Social exchange relations develop within structures of mutual dependence, in which actors control resources valued by each other. An actor's dependence on another is defined by the extent to which outcomes valued by the actor are contingent on exchange with the other. B's dependence on A increases with the *value* to B of the resources A controls, and decreases with B's *alternative* sources of those resources. The theory's title derives from the basic insight that actors' mutual dependence provides the structural basis for their *power* over each other. A's power over B derives from, and is equal to, B's dependence on A, and vice versa. Thus, power is a structural attribute of an exchange relation, not a property of an actor. *Power use* is the behavioral exercise of that structural potential.

Power in dyadic relations is described by two dimensions: *cohesion*, actors' absolute power over each other, and *balance*, actors' relative power over each other. Cohesion is equal to the average dependence of two actors on each other. If actors are equally dependent on each other, power in the relation is balanced; if B is more dependent on A, power is imbalanced, and A has a *power advantage* in the relation equal to the degree of imbalance.

Over time, the structure of power has predictable effects on the frequency and distribution of exchange as actors use power to maintain exchange or gain advantage. A's initiations of exchange with B increase with A's dependence on B. Also, the frequency of exchange in a relation increases with cohesion and, in imbalanced relations, the ratio of exchange changes in favor of the more powerful, less dependent actor. One of the theory's most important tenets is that these effects are produced even in the absence of intent to use power. That is, they are

determined by the structure of relations, not the cognitions of actors.

Emerson also argued that imbalanced relations are unstable and lead to *power balancing* processes. These processes reduce imbalance by decreasing the value of exchange to the less powerful actor ("withdrawal"), increasing value to the more powerful actor ("status giving"), increasing alternatives available to the less powerful actor ("network extension"), or decreasing alternatives available to the more powerful actor ("coalition formation").

Emerson was the first to link exchange theory with the growing field of social network analysis, a move that fundamentally changed the nature of exchange research. He began by distinguishing between groups and networks as different structural forms. *Groups* are collective actors, such as teams or organizations, that function as a single unit in exchange with other actors. *Exchange networks* are sets of *connected* exchange relations among actors. Two relations are connected if the frequency or value of exchange in one relation (e.g., A–B) affects the frequency or value of exchange in another (e.g., B–C). Network connections are *positive* to the extent that exchange in one relation increases exchange in the other, and *negative* to the extent that exchange in one decreases exchange in the other. Mixed networks consist of both. Emerson linked these processes to his conception of an *exchange domain*, a class of functionally equivalent outcomes.

The concepts of exchange networks and corporate actors allowed power dependence theory to bridge the gap between micro and macro levels of analysis. With these tools the theory could explain the emergence and change of social structures, including network expansion and contraction, coalition formation, and norm formation.

CONTEMPORARY DEVELOPMENTS

To test power dependence theory, Emerson, Cook, and their students constructed a laboratory setting that was to become the prototype for studying power in exchange networks. In contrast to the reciprocal exchanges envisioned by Homans and Blau and implicitly assumed in Emerson's original formulation, subjects in

Cook and Emerson's setting *negotiated* the terms of exchange, through a series of offers and counteroffers, to reach binding agreements. In conjunction with the negotiated exchange setting, the theory itself came to take on more of an economic flavor, with more emphasis on rational actors and comparison of alternatives. At the same time, however, Cook introduced concerns with commitment and equity that were not part of the theory's original formulation and that increased the motivational complexity of actors.

Cook and Emerson's (1978) work supported key tenets of the theory, showing that networks imbalanced on structural dependence produce unequal distributions of benefits, in favor of the less dependent actor, and that these effects occur even in the absence of actors' awareness of power. Later studies showed that disadvantaged actors can improve their bargaining position by forming coalitions – one of Emerson's power balancing processes – and demonstrated the critical importance of the distinction between negatively and positively connected networks (Cook et al. 1983). In positively connected networks, centrality yields power because central actors can serve as "brokers" in cooperative relations. But in negatively connected networks, centrality is less important than access to highly dependent actors with few or no alternatives.

Early tests of power dependence theory also displayed its inadequacies for analyzing complex networks. Although the theory takes account of the larger network in which actors are embedded, it predicts the distribution of power within dyadic relations, not the network as a whole. The need for new algorithms for measuring power in exchange networks stimulated a flurry of new, competing theories. In response, Cook and Yamagishi introduced a new algorithm in 1992, the *equi dependence exchange ratio*, for predicting the distribution of power in negatively connected networks. This algorithm determines the exchange ratios that will produce "equal dependence" of actors on each other in all relations throughout a network, based on iterative calculations of the value of actors' exchanges relative to the value of their best alternatives.

At the same time that Cook and Emerson were developing their research program, other

scholars, particularly Edward Lawler and Linda Molm, were drawing on concepts from power dependence theory to develop their own theories of power and related processes. Their work introduced ideas and concepts that were not part of Emerson's original formulation: greater attention to cognition and affect in exchange, consideration of punitive as well as rewarding actions in exchange, and analysis of different forms of exchange.

In the late 1970s and early 1980s, Bacharach and Lawler (1981) integrated power dependence theory's analysis of structural power with bargaining theories' analyses of tactical power. Traditional work on bargaining neglected the power structure within which parties negotiate; Lawler and Bacharach used ideas from power dependence theory to fill that gap. Their approach differed from Cook and Emerson's in important ways, however. They were concerned not only with the terms of agreements (the measure of power use), but also with whether and how actors reach agreement and the tactics they use. In contrast to Emerson's strongly structural approach, they argued that actors' perceptions of power affect their choices of tactics, and they envisioned the use of power as a more conscious choice.

Molm's (1997) work on coercion in exchange also focused more attention on strategic power use and expanded the theory to include punishment and coercion. While power dependence theory originally addressed only reward based power, Molm argued that both reward power and coercive power are derived from dependence on others, either for obtaining rewards or avoiding punishment, and potentially can be explained by the same principles. Unlike reward power, however, the use of coercive power is not structurally induced by power advantage (as Emerson argued), but strategically enacted as a means of increasing an exchange partner's rewards. To explain strategic power use, Molm introduced concepts of decision making under risk and uncertainty.

In contrast to the focus on negotiated exchanges in the experimental work of Emerson, Cook, Lawler, and others, Molm's work on coercion examined *reciprocal* exchanges, in which actors individually provide benefits for another without negotiating the terms of an exchange and without knowing whether or when

the other will reciprocate. Her later work showed that the form of exchange affects how structural dimensions of alternatives affect power use (Molm et al. 1999).

The most recent development among power dependence researchers is the shift from the study of power and inequality to the study of integrative outcomes: commitment, trust, emotions, and solidarity. Cook, Yamagishi, Lawler, and Molm have all turned their attention in this direction. Most recently, Lawler (2001) has proposed a new affect theory of exchange that – in sharp contrast to Emerson – makes affect and emotion the driving force underlying commitments in exchange relations. The theory still incorporates a number of concepts from power dependence theory, but focuses on the emotions produced by social exchange and their attribution to social units.

SEE ALSO: Blau, Peter; Emerson, Richard M.; Exchange Network Theory; Homans, George; Power, Theories of; Social Exchange Theory

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power elite

Jason L. Powell

As a concept, "power elite" can be defined as a small group of people who control a disproportionate amount of power, wealth, and privilege and access to decision makers in a political system. In a pathbreaking book, Mills (1956) claims that the US power elite consists of elite members of society characterized by consensus building and the homogenization of viewpoints. This power elite has historically dominated the three major sectors of US society: economy, government, and military. Elites circulate from one sector to another, consolidating their power as they go. Mills rejects pluralist assertions that various centers of power serve as checks and balances on one another – the power elite model suggests that those at the top encounter no real opposition and it implies a concentration of power, wealth, and prestige in the hands of the wealthy and powerful in American society. Mills wrote that the power elite refers to "those political, economic, and military circles, which as an intricate set of overlapping small but dominant groups share decisions having at least national consequences. Insofar as national events are decided, the power elite are those who decide them" (Mills 1956: 18).

According to Mills, the governing elite in the US draws its members from three areas: (1) the highest political leaders (including the president) and a handful of key cabinet members and close advisers; (2) major corporate owners and directors; and (3) high ranking military officers. First, the elite occupies what Mills terms the top command posts of society. These positions give their holders enormous authority over not just governmental, but also financial, educational, social, civic, and cultural institutions. A small group is able to take fundamental actions that touch everyone. Decisions made in

the boardrooms of large corporations and banks affect the rates of inflation and employment, for example. Secondly, the influence of the chief executive officers of large corporations often rivals that of the secretary of commerce. Thirdly, the military play a key role in positioning themselves to address "threats" that require resources to be mobilized, as in the case of war.

Having seen how the governing elite derives its strength, it is important to consider how this power is exercised in the political arena. What roles are played by the three parts of what Mills called the "pyramid" – the elite, the middle level, and the masses – in politics? Mills suggests that the power elite establishes the basic policy agenda in such areas as national security and economics. Of course, since it only sets the general guidelines, the middle level has plenty to do implementing them, but the public has been virtually locked out. Its main activities – writing campaign posters, expressing opinions to pollsters, voting every two or four years – are mostly symbolic. The people do not directly affect the direction of fundamental policies. Power elite theory, in short, claims that a single elite, not a multiplicity of competing groups, decides the life and death issues for the nation as a whole, leaving relatively minor matters for the middle level and almost nothing for the common person. It thus paints a dark picture. Whereas pluralists (e.g., Dahl 1961) are somewhat content with what they believe is a fair, if admittedly imperfect, system, the power elite school decries the unequal and unjust distribution of power it finds everywhere (Lukes 1974). These "top positions" encompass the posts with the authority to run programs and activities of major political, economic, legal, educational, cultural, scientific, and civic institutions.

The presence of the power elite in the political, economic, and military bureaucracies is obvious in America's recent "War on Terror" and the Middle East crisis. The oil interests (economic) are involved with President G. W. Bush and Vice President Cheney (political) through their past connections in that field. These interconnections make the triangle complete in interconnecting war, business, and politicians.

One criticism of Mills is that there are many wealthy people in the US, but they are not all members of the power elite. Advantageous positions for power, prestige, and wealth

include the uppermost administrative positions in the three top bureaucratic organizations: the Pentagon, corporate America, and the executive branch of the US government. President Clinton had a lot of power when he was the president of the US, but as a retired president his power has been diminished. Similarly, the power of Richard Nixon eroded when he resigned as president after the Watergate affair in 1974. Indeed, the position or office holds the privilege of power, not the person. Holding these positions or offices enables the elite to gain administrative control of the main bureaucratic organizations, so they are able to maintain their own wealth, power, and privilege.

For Mills, the power elite has ensured the demise of the public as an independent force in civic affairs. Mills suggests that instead of initiating policy, or even controlling those who govern them, men and women in America have become passive spectators, cheering the heroes and booing the villains, but taking little or no direct part in the action. Citizens have become increasingly alienated and estranged from politics, as can be seen in the sharp decline in electoral participation over the last several decades. As a result, the control of their destinies has fallen into the hands of the power elite.

SEE ALSO: Elites; Marxism and Sociology; Mills, C. Wright; Pluralism, American; Pluralism, British; Politics; Power, Theories of

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power, theories of

Shane Thye

In contemporary sociology, the term power is used in two distinct but interrelated ways. In the broadest usage, power refers to a *structural*

capacity for an actor A to cause any change in the behavior of another actor B (Weber 1968). This meaning of power captures the potential for power to be exercised or not in social interaction. The second meaning refers to a *concrete event* in which one individual benefits at the expense of another. Modern theorists refer to such events as *power use* or *power exercise*. Importantly, both meanings imply that power is a relational phenomenon. Thus, theories of power take as their focus the relationship between two or more actors, and not the characteristics of actors themselves. Although the terms are sometimes conflated, power is theoretically distinct from other relational concepts such as *influence* (which is voluntarily accepted), *force* (wherein the target has no choice but to comply), and *authority* (which involves a request from a legitimate social position). French and Raven (1968) recognized these distinctions over four decades ago, and they remain useful today.

Theories of power cross many ideological and epistemological lines. As a result, this literature has seen many debates. Theorists have contemplated whether power is best conceptualized as (1) a potential or something that must be used; (2) “forward looking” calculated actions or “backward looking” responses to reward and punishment; (3) intentional or unintentional behavior; (4) benefit or control, and so on. These early debates generated much heat, but very little light. They did, however, stimulate efforts to develop more formal theory. The majority of this work occurred within behavioral psychology and the exchange tradition of sociology.

Perhaps the first formal theory of power was proposed by Thibaut and Kelley (1959). They asserted that individuals evaluate their current relationship against some standard, or comparison level (CL). The theory also claims that actors assess the attractiveness of a relationship by comparing their focal relationship to benefits expected from others (CL_{ALT}). The power of actor A over B is defined as “A’s ability to affect the quality of outcomes attained by B.” There are two ways that this can occur. *Fate control* exists when actor A affects actor B’s outcome by changing her or his own behavior, independent of B’s action. For example, if regardless of what B does, B receives \$1 when

A chooses behavior 1 and \$10 when A chooses behavior 2, then A has fate control over B. *Behavior control* exists when the rewards obtained by B are a function of both A and B's behavior. To illustrate, when A can make rewards obtained by B contingent on B's actions (A dictates that behavior 1 yields \$2 for B, while behavior 2 yields \$4 for B), then A can control the behavior of B. In either case, whether A has fate control or behavior control, B is dependent on A for rewards and thus A has a source of power over B. Other power theories that emerged during that same timeframe echoed the importance of dependence.

A major theoretical shift occurred in the early 1970s with the development of Richard Emerson's power dependence theory (Emerson 1972a, 1972b). Unlike previous theorists, Emerson cast power processes in broader terms. He put forth the notion that relations between actors are part of a larger set of potential exchange relations (i.e., an exchange network). Thus, in analyzing a dyad, he asserted it is important to consider its broader connection to other dyads – the larger network in which it is embedded. Emerson considered two kinds of connection. A *negative connection* exists when interaction in one dyad reduces interaction in another. A *positive connection* exists when interaction in one dyad promotes interaction in another. The attention to dyadic connectedness gave Emerson's theorizing a decidedly structural theme: his were network embedded dyads.

Power dependence theory is anchored in operant psychology and relies heavily on the principle of satiation. The theory claims that power emerges because individuals in different network locations are satiated at different rates. The implication, as with previous theories, is that some individuals are more dependent than others for the exchange of valued goods. Dependence is the centerpiece of the theory. The theory asserts that the power of actor A over actor B is equal to the dependence of B on A, summarized by the equation $P_{AB} = D_{BA}$. In turn, dependence is a function of two key factors: the availability of alternative exchange relations and the extent to which the actors value those relations. To illustrate, imagine an auto builder (A) who must purchase specialized parts from a supply dealer (B). When auto parts are not widely available from other suppliers,

but auto builders are in high supply, then A is more dependent on B than B is on A, ($D_{AB} > D_{BA}$), due to availability. When the auto maker values parts more than the supplier values customers, then A is more dependent on B: ($D_{AB} > D_{BA}$). As such, the theory predicts B has power over A.

Since the original formulation, power dependence theory has given rise to numerous other branches of theory. For instance, Molm (1990) has expanded the power dependence framework to include both reward based power and punishment based power. She finds punishment based power is used less often than reward based power, due to the potential cost it entails. Lawler (1992) has developed a theory of power that includes both dependence based power and punitive based power. This work shows how structures of interdependence can promote either punitive or conciliatory bargaining tactics. Bargaining tactics, in turn, are theorized to mediate power exercise in negotiations. Both lines of work extend the basic power dependence framework, and affirm the importance of dependence in generating power.

An alternative approach to power is found in David Willer's *elementary theory*, which is based on classical understandings of power from Marx and Weber. Elementary theory opposes the notion of satiation as the basis for power, and instead anchors power in the ability of some actors to *exclude* others from valued goods. The theory identifies three kinds of social relations, defined by the kinds of sanctions found in each. A *sanction* is any action transmitted from one individual and received by another. *Exchange* occurs when A and B mutually transmit positive sanctions (e.g., I mow the yard, you do the dishes). *Coercion* occurs when a negative sanction is transmitted for a positive sanction (e.g., as when a mugger threatens "your money or your life"). *Conflict* exists when A and B each transmit negative sanctions (e.g., when two countries engage in bombing). The majority of research has centered on power in exchange.

Within exchange, the theory identifies three kinds of power structures. *Strong power* structures are those that only contain two kinds of positions: high power positions that can never be excluded and two or more low power positions, one of which must always be excluded.

The classic example is the 3 person dating network, in which B can date A or C but not both on any given night (A—B—C). B is powerful because B is always guaranteed a partner, while either A or C must be excluded. Strong power networks promote extreme power exercise. *Equal power* networks contain only one set of structurally identical positions, such as dyads or triangles. In *weak power* networks no position is necessarily excluded, but some may be. The simplest weak power structure is the 4 actor line (A—B—C—D). Note that when B and C exchange, A and D are excluded. Studies find that this produces a slight power advantage for the positions who need not be excluded.

At the heart of the theory is a resistance model that relates the distribution of profit when two actors exchange to the benefits lost when they do not. An actor i 's resistance to exchange is defined using the following equation:

$$R_i = \frac{P_i \max - P_A}{P_A - P_{Acon}}$$

$P_i \max$ represents i 's best hope from the exchange, P_A represents the payoff if the exchange is complete, and P_{Acon} represents the payoff when exchange is not complete. The numerator captures how far away the current offer is from one's best hope. The denominator represents the benefit of consummating exchange relative to no exchange at all. The model assumes that actors balance these motives when negotiating exchange. The theory predicts that when two actors i and j exchange, they do so at the point of equi resistance. That is, exchange is predicted when the resistance is mutually balanced for i and j . Tests find that the resistance model predicts power exercise in a range of settings.

The ability to predict powerful positions in exchange networks was an important methodological issue that occupied the attention of the theorists during the late 1980s and early 1990s. Competing solutions were offered from power dependence theory (i.e., vulnerability), game theory (i.e., the core), utility theory (i.e., an expected value model), and network exchange theory (i.e., a graph theoretic power index). Each index offered unique predictions for power, and in 1992 an entire issue of *Social Networks* was devoted to comparing and

contrasting these approaches. In retrospect, the significance of this competition was to promote rapid theory growth, increased formalization, and the discovery of new phenomena.

Perhaps spurred by these advancements, modern theorists have identified numerous links between power and emotion, cohesion, and status. For instance, Lovaglia finds that power exercise often produces negative emotional reactions. In contrast, Lawler and associates have identified conditions under which equal power networks promote high exchange frequency, positive emotion, and a sense of relational cohesion. Thye (2000) offers a *status value theory of power* that anchors power, not in the structural conditions of networks, but in the culturally valued status characteristics that individuals possess. The theory claims that when exchangeable goods are relevant to the status (high or low) of actors, those goods acquire the same status value. That is, goods relevant to high status actors become more valued than they otherwise would be; goods relevant to low status actors become less valued. As with virtually all theories of power, the theory predicts that actors who possess less valued goods (i.e., the low status individuals) are at a power disadvantage. Tests find that high status actors have a power advantage over lower status actors, and that status value plays a crucial role.

SEE ALSO: Class, Status, and Power; Elementary Theory; Emerson Richard M.; Exchange Network Theory; Power Dependence Theory; Social Influence

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practical knowledge

Nico Stehr

The assertion about the unique “complexity” or the peculiarly intricate character of social phenomena has, at least within sociology, a long, venerable, and virtually uncontested tradition. The classical theorists make prominent and repeated reference to this attribute of the subject matter of sociology and the degree to which it complicates the development of sociological knowledge. More specifically, the complexity of social reality has, it is widely argued, a most inhibiting effect on the production of powerful *practical* social science knowledge.

The assertion that social phenomena happen to be complex phenomena is designed to sensitize social scientists, from an epistemological perspective or in a more mundane sense, for the purposes of practicing their craft, to the kind of explanatory and methodological devices that are equal to the task of adequately capturing social reality. Thus, complexity means that a particular social process (e.g., exchange rates, unemployment, deviant behavior, etc.) are set in motion, reproduced, or changed by a multiplicity of interdependent factors and that it is most difficult to make a detailed and precise forecast about price changes, employment trajectories, or crime rates.

Any empirically valid representation, and therefore any effective and manageable *control*

of such a complex process, requires, according to this conception, a faithful and *complete* understanding of all the intricate factors involved and their interconnections. The alternative is to reconsider the notion of complexity, as an obstacle to practical knowledge, in quite a radical fashion.

Weber and Popper are among a few philosophers of (social) science who appear to be quite unimpressed with the familiar assertion about the intricate complexity of social phenomena. Popper is convinced that the thesis actually constitutes a subtle form of prejudice which has two origins. First, the judgment is a result of a meaningless and inaccurate comparison of circumstances; for example, of a comparison of limited and controlled conditions found in a laboratory and real social situations. Second, the thesis is the result of the orthodox methodological conception which demands that any adequate description of social phenomena requires a complete account of the psychological and material circumstances of all actors. Since humans behave in most situations in a rational fashion, Popper maintains, it is possible to reconstruct social interaction with the aid of relatively simple models which assume such rational conduct among the participants.

Weber, in his essay “Objektivität sozialwissenschaftlicher und sozialpolitischer Erkenntnisse” (1922), emphasizes that social science can only portray a fraction of the complexity of social reality and therefore cannot grasp it fully: “Every knowledge of infinite reality achieved by the finite human spirit is therefore based on the tacit assumption that only a finite *part* of it should be object of scientific inquiry and ‘essential’ in the sense of ‘worth knowing.’”

In addition, there are two further questionable premises of the orthodox position about the significance of capturing the full complexity of a specific social context in order to generate powerful practical knowledge. First, “mastery” and change of social conditions are not under all circumstances identical with and possibly based on the *complete* intellectual control of the complex origins and processes of social situations. Whatever control may be possible under given circumstances, such control likely is restricted to a few attributes of the context. Second, efforts to raise the theoretical complexity of social science knowledge may therefore

have the unanticipated effect of propelling such knowledge to an even greater distance to social action and its possibilities. Put bluntly, it is not the “scientificity” of social science knowledge (i.e., knowledge that captures the full complexity of social reality, conforms to specific methodological rules, or is expressed in a quantitative language) that ensures that such knowledge is practical.

Reflections about the conditions or constituents of practical knowledge have to start from the assumption that the adequacy (usefulness) of knowledge, produced in one context (*of production*), but employed in another context (*of application*), pertains to the *relation* between knowledge and the local conditions of action. Within the context of application constraints, conditions of action are apprehended as either *open* or *beyond the control* of relevant actors. Given such a differentiation, practical knowledge pertains to open conditions of action which means that theoretical knowledge, if it is to be effective in practice, has to be reattached to the social context in general and to those elements of the situation that are actionable in particular.

A brief example may serve as a first illustration. A rather common knowledge claim (at least, it appears to be central to a number of theoretical traditions within sociology) states that the degree of urbanization is closely related to the birth rate or the divorce rate. But such a knowledge claim clearly does not pertain, in all likelihood, to conditions that are open to action. Even very powerful politicians in a centralized state, concerned about a decline in the birth rate or an increase in the divorce rate and ways of affecting either rate in the opposite direction, would consider such a claim as highly irrelevant knowledge, since the degree of urbanization cannot be effected within their context of action. But that is not to say that the same context of action is void of attributes and conditions which are, in some sense, open and may in fact influence the rates under discussion.

Yet there is another way in which social science knowledge becomes practical, namely as knowledge that represents the becoming of social worlds. That is, a powerful but largely invisible effect of social science (as Michel Foucault and Helmut Schelsky among others remind us) is the impact it has on *interpretations*

of reality in everyday life and therefore the extent to which the self understanding of actors and the media in terms of which such convictions are expressed are shaped by social scientific conceptions.

Whether one is prepared to describe this process as a “social scientification” of collective and individual patterns of meaning may be left open. However, one might suggest that many of the current problems the social sciences face in practice are related to the fact that the self understanding of many groups and actors is affected, often in ways difficult to trace, by elements of social science knowledge. The empirical analysis of social problems by social science research then evolves into a form of self reflection or doubling of social scientific conceptions.

SEE ALSO: Knowledge; Knowledge, Sociology of; Knowledge Societies; Literacy/Illiteracy; Scientific Knowledge, Sociology of; Speaking Truth to Power: Science and Policy; Weber, Max

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practice

Richard Biernacki

Practice is a rich if contested term on which sociologists converge when they endeavor to portray human action in its cultural and institutional settings. Concepts of practice highlight the influence of taken for granted, pre theoretical assumptions on human conduct.

Such covert assumptions embrace everything that is left out of economists' standard portrayals of intellectual calculations based on personal goals and known facts. For example, theorists of practice highlight the influence of bodily experience, practical know how, and institutionalized understandings of self and agency. Among the diverse theorists whose research has sustained this turn to practice are Garfinkel, Bourdieu, Foucault, Swidler, and Giddens. Their practice centered views of social life share three major themes.

First, thinking as situated activity. Thinking and feeling are not preparations for action, they *are* action – just as public, material, and situationally conditioned as other goings on. Classical social and economic theory once viewed thinking and feeling as mental processes separable from observable action. An invisible mind inside the person orchestrated in advance the actions to be observed from the outside. But as sociologists from the 1960s onward plumbed the life of science labs, hospitals, and other theaters of coordinated action, they concluded that individuals' thoughts are indefinable apart from the public protocols in which they come to expression. For example, the psychologist can scarcely define or reflect upon deviants without recourse to the routines for classifying and controlling them. Action is bound to the observable tools and tactics of a cultural setting.

Second, know how as the glue of actions. From the perspective of practice theory, it is not transcendent goals and values that link an individual's discrete acts together in a coherent life trajectory. As we know, a dancer cannot carry out the steps of a ballet by choosing each step as a means to an end. Instead, ingrained know how and routines for getting things done merge the steps from the very start into a coherent flow. Analogously, theorists of practice emphasize how know how anchors coherent lines of action across the career of an individual, or, for a group, across whole civilizations – even when the ends of action change for the individual or group. For example, after the religious ends of Protestant discipline faded in eighteenth century Europe, the ingrained know how of self asceticism continued to steer a whole style of life, from accounting to science and art. Practices define "truth." The implicit assumptions by which we execute practices set

up a ground for ideology that is difficult to bring to awareness or to critique rationally. Practice theorists therefore emphasize how that implicit ground of knowledge comes to define the natural and real, including forms of selfhood. For instance, the practices of free market exchange in capitalist society seem to make the individual the ultimate unit of intercourse and consecrate the free will of the individual self as a reality of its own kind.

Third, what makes the operative assumptions of practice implicit and what keeps them that way? For practice theorists such as Bourdieu, who underscore our physical emplacement in the world, the answer is in part the nonverbal but a priori quality of corporeal experience. For practice theorists who highlight the uncertainties of any setting, such as Garfinkel, the answer is the inability to articulate fully how one puts general rules of the game to work in a particular setting. For practice theorists who emphasize the routinized qualities of much of our everyday life, such as Giddens, the answer is unreflective habit. Of these answers, that based on habit is perhaps least adequate, since it does not explain why custom remains implicit. With help from those outside sociology, practice theorists are reaching beyond study of the habitual. Historians such as Michael Baxandall have shown how unpredictable revolutions in the arts emerge from artists adapting old routines for new settings of action.

SEE ALSO: Agency (and Intention); Bourdieu, Pierre; Ethnomethodology; Foucault, Michel

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pragmatism

David L. Elliott

Pragmatism began in the United States of the 1870s, in the wake of the intellectual revolution touched off by Darwin, as a term for a method designed to clarify disputed, abstract intellectual concepts by defining them with reference to their concrete behavioral consequences. It later took on a broader meaning as the name for a comprehensive philosophical perspective which became widely known and influential from 1898 to its waning during the period of the Cold War. Nevertheless, the perspective continued to influence sociology throughout the twentieth century and into the twenty first, especially in the tradition of symbolic interaction.

A resurgence of research and interest in pragmatism, beginning in the 1980s and accelerating since 1990, has been seen in general sociology in the work of such authors as Hans Joas, Mustafa Emirbayer, Dmitri Shalin, and David Maines. The perspective's assumption of the social phylogensis and ontogenesis of humans, together with its antifoundationalism, fallibilism, meliorism, its view of nature as processual and relational, and its dissolution of the need for dualistic thinking, fit well with contemporary sociological concerns. Nevertheless, Eugene Halton's observation that symbolic interactionism (not to mention sociology in general) has not yet fully tapped the riches of pragmatist thought describes equally well the situation today.

A group of six Harvard graduates and scholars, having common intellectual interests in British philosophy and in the recent evolutionary work of Charles Darwin, organized themselves in 1871 into a discussion group that met regularly for about two years and came to be known as the Metaphysical Club. Three had

experience in experimental science (Chauncey Wright, Charles Peirce, and William James), and the other three were lawyers (Nicholas St. John Green, Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr., and Joseph Warner, of whom Holmes and Warner were less active). Pragmatism was born out of the thoughts developed and shared by this group (Fisch 1986).

Peirce and Holmes, who would be the first to publish pragmatism inspired papers, were agreed that they learned the most from their senior associates Wright and Green. Wright taught them to think of the universe as contingent and indeterminate (later expressed by Peirce's concept of tychism), and Peirce referred to Green as the grandfather of pragmatism (with himself as the father) because of Green's persistence in arguing for the importance of applying Scottish psychologist Alexander Bain's theory of belief to their own work.

Bain had defined a belief as that for which a person is willing and committed to act, even in the face of considerable risk. For Bain, the opposite of belief was doubt, a state of confusion, uncertainty, anxiety, or frustration about how to act next. Peirce expanded on this theory of belief in his doubt belief theory of inquiry. Peirce maintained that belief breaks down and doubt ensues when the requirements of human organisms and those of their environment fall out of step with each other. Human doubt triggers inquiry, the goal of which is the "fixation of belief." In Peirce's hands, belief became defined as habit, or a disposition to act in a certain way under certain circumstances.

According to Peirce's pragmatic maxim, as expressed in its 1906 revision, the best definition of a concept is "a description of the habit it will produce" (quoted in Short 1981: 218). Concepts defined in this way are empirically testable, and a concept can be tentatively considered true so long as it passes all such testing. Hence, Peirce's pragmatic maxim is a part of his theory of inquiry. The maxim is also part of his semeiotic or general theory of signs, which was Peirce's crowning achievement and which became the linchpin of his entire philosophy.

Although Peirce was justified in calling himself the father of pragmatism, William James was the first to use the term publicly, in an 1898 lecture (published the same year) at the University of California. It would also be James whose

lectures and publications would popularize pragmatism and cause its wide dissemination throughout the world (Fisch 1986). However, James had already made his greatest contribution to the perspective in his 1890 *Principles of Psychology* because of the major influence this work would have on John Dewey and George Herbert Mead. In his *Principles*, James replaced traditional introspective, faculty, and associationist psychologies with a functional and processual psychology, in which the self and consciousness are seen not as entities but as functions that are actively engaged with the world (Sleeper 2001 [1986]).

John Dewey combined James's theory of the process by which logical forms emerge and change as products of concrete experience with Peirce's doubt belief theory in developing his own theory of inquiry. Henceforth for Dewey an empirical and critical method of inquiry (also referred to as the experiential method, the experimental method, the method of intelligent behavior, or the logic of experience) would provide the general model for philosophy and science. The foundation provided by traditional metaphysics, whether a priori, transcendental, or supernatural, is replaced by the test of experience in contexts of concrete problem solving. With Dewey and Mead, pragmatism as a procedure for clarifying the meaning of intellectual concepts expands into a general theory of inquiry that is applicable to all specialized areas of inquiry (including ethical inquiry and artistic work) and that explains how meaning in the broadest sense emerges (Sleeper 2001 [1986]).

Dewey undertook a special inquiry to discover the most general and irreducible traits of the natural world experienced by living organisms in and of that world. The resulting theory could serve as background assumptions and guiding principles for inquiry. Dewey identified five generic traits: the stable, the precarious, qualities (or the qualitative), ends, and histories. These traits and their interrelations are combined in the concept of the situation (or context), which always involves a transaction between an organism and its environment (Gouinlock 1972).

The use of the general term organism highlights the continuity of human behavior with that of other living forms and the continuity of the systematically reflective intelligence of

human science with human common sense as well as with the trial and error intelligence of the behavioral responses plants and animals make to their environments. Nevertheless, pragmatism focuses mainly on situations of the human organism and its cultures.

Dewey did not claim that the generic traits he identified make an exhaustive list. Instead, Dewey said that they are ones the neglect of which resulted in the principal dualisms of western thought, such as mind/body, fact/value, theory/practice, analytic/synthetic, a priori/a posteriori, art/science, affective/cognitive, individual/social, etc. Since the specified traits are drawn from an analysis of experience and are subject to experiential or empirical testing, social scientists as well as philosophers and all systematically reflective persons are called upon to test, critique, refine, and add to the list as the results of inquiry warrant.

The members of the trio Dewey, Mead, and Jane Addams (sometimes called the Chicago pragmatists) influenced each of the others significantly, and they shared a mostly common perspective. To date, Mead has received much more attention from sociologists.

RACE, GENDER, AND CLASS

Nancy Fraser (in Harris 1999) argues that Alain Locke, a student of James most widely known for his theories of multiculturalism and of the Harlem Renaissance, made a significant contribution to critical race theory in 1916 lectures published in 1992 as *Race Contacts and Interracial Relations*. According to Fraser, Locke offers "another pragmatism" through the greater role he gives to power, domination, and political economy in a sociological race theory that is pragmatist through and through.

Locke's analysis of race proceeds through three connected steps. The first step concerns so called scientific theories of race, usually biological or anthropological. These theories posit fixed, static, and "pure" races. They overstate variation between races while understating variation within races.

Locke's principal refutation of scientific racialism occurs in the second step of his analysis on the practical and political conceptions of race. Locke argues that the political and economic

domination resulting from such imperialist practices as colonialism and slavery led to notions of racial superiority for which pseudo scientific explanations were formulated.

After having refuted the inherited race concept and having shown the invidious results of white supremacist practices, Locke argues in the third step of his analysis that the race concept should be reconstructed rather than being discarded. Locke's reconstruction of race consisted of two aspects. The first aspect was a civilization type with the characteristics necessary for a group solidarity that is not based on blood or ethnicity along with the characteristics required by modern institutions. The second aspect was a secondary race consciousness as a strategy for African Americans to promote racial pride and to use cultural means as part of the struggle to overcome racism.

In a more recent argument that Cornel West considered the finest defense for maintaining the concept of race, Paul Taylor (in Lawson & Koch 2004) laid out what he calls a pragmatic racialism. According to Taylor, pragmatism's practicalism, contextualism, pluralism, experimentalism, and social ontology allow us to think more productively about race.

Like Locke, Taylor describes race as a socio historical construction arising from the practices of white supremacy. Without the race concept, Taylor says, we would likely miss populations for which a common bloodline, identified through socially defined racial markers, is connected with a common social location and opportunity structure. The suggested conceptual substitutes for race, such as ethnicity, culture, and national origin, cannot be relied upon alone to identify such patterns of common outcomes. Despite the general, wide spread character of racial markers and outcomes, Taylor insists that race is the outcome of a particular history and that solutions to race problems must be tied to the conditions of individual situations.

While Dewey and Mead supported the work of their women students and freely acknowledged their intellectual debts to women, the acknowledgments were mostly made in prefaces, footnotes, popular journals, or privately. In the text of their major publications, they followed the professional convention of recognizing and discussing only male philosophers

and scientists. This was one type of sexist practice that led to the marginalization of women's contributions to pragmatism, a marginalization that Charlene Haddock Seigfried (1996) has worked to correct.

The very limited opportunities for women professors in early twentieth century American universities contributed to a gendered division of labor between theory and practice in early pragmatism. Most of the early women pragmatists wrote theory, most notably Hull House founder Jane Addams, but their major contribution was to put the theories of Dewey and the other male pragmatists to the test of practice and, through their practice, to influence male theory construction. For example, the women's practice in Dewey's Laboratory School had influenced and inspired Dewey's early theory of education as well as other areas of his thought. In turn, some of these women later founded and ran progressive, experimental schools designed around Dewey's theory. The women pragmatists exemplified the ideal expressed by male pragmatists of a unity of theory and practice, an ideal also widely shared by sociologists.

Addams, perhaps because of the high value she placed on inclusiveness, multiculturalism, pluralism, and what Mead called international mindedness, did not often theorize in explicitly feminist terms. Yet, she anticipated the thesis of Friedan's *The Feminine Mystique* (1963) in a more socially conscious way, and she also anticipated aspects of feminist standpoint theory (Seigfried 1999). Recently, Sullivan (in Seigfried 2002) argued for a pragmatist feminist standpoint theory that seeks to use Dewey's conception of objectivity to improve upon Sandra Harding's. In a related discussion, Gatens Robinson (in Seigfried 2002) drew similarities and differences between the respective ecological conceptions of objectivity of Donna Haraway and John Dewey.

The central and frequent use in classical pragmatist texts of such terms as scientific method, experimentalism, and instrumentalism has often led to interpretations of pragmatism as scientific and instrumental in the narrow sense. However, the early women pragmatists, recognizing the emancipatory potential of experimentalism, embraced it. For them, pragmatist experimentalism offered a justification to trust their own experience and their own judgment as well as a

means to evaluate problems and possible solutions without relying on the prescriptions of oppressive traditions and authorities.

Pragmatist experimentalism is democratic, including the values, ideas, and experiences of all parties affected by the problem prompting inquiry. The working methods of the women of Hull House exemplified the notion of experimentalism as community problem solving. These methods contrasted sharply with the growing detachment of social scientific methods and the top down, paternalistic practices of other burgeoning institutions of expertise. By living together in Hull House, amidst a mainly poor and immigrant neighborhood, the settlement workers were participant experimenters. Besides solving the particular problem at hand, a more general goal of the community engagement of the mostly upper middle class Hull House residents with the mostly lower class neighbors was to enlarge the selves of all parties through an enlargement of their experience. This goal reflected the core of the social ethical theories of Addams and of Mead.

Meera Nanda (2001) argued for the emancipatory potential of science in its broader pragmatist sense as a tool for improving the lot of India's untouchables by helping to overcome the cultural hold of India's caste system. She discusses in particular B. R. Ambedkar, a student of Dewey and a critic of Gandhi and the Congress Party for their paternalism and tacit Hindu acceptance of the caste system as natural. Ambedkar wrote on the parallels between pragmatism and the original Buddhist texts in terms of their naturalistic ontologies and their method of submitting knowledge to the test of experience. Toward the end of his life, Ambedkar led close to a million untouchables in renouncing their Hinduism and converting to Buddhism.

SEE ALSO: Addams, Jane; Dewey, John; Game Stage; Generalized Other; James, William; Mead, George Herbert; Play Stage; Role Taking; Semiotics; Symbolic Interaction

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praxis

Susan Wortmann

Praxis is a term most commonly associated with the ability of oppressed groups to change their economic, political, and social worlds through rationally informed reflection and deliberate social action. As advocated and critiqued by contemporary theorists, the term itself is often loosely associated with the melding of theory to liberatory human action.

In classical sociological theory, praxis is connected with Karl Marx and his emphasis on the revolutionary potential of the proletariat. Interpretations of Marx's usage of praxis vary (see, for instance, Gouldner 1980, who discusses Marx's dual treatment of the term), but most associate a Marxist based praxis with societal transformation that involves a concomitant change in the proletariat's material activity, consciousness, and social relations. Hence, Marx is frequently quoted: "The philosophers have only *interpreted* the world, in various ways; the point, however, is to *change* it" (1978

[1844]: 145). Moreover, Marx and Friedrich Engel's *Communist Manifesto* lays out this theory and plan of praxis: the dual abolition of class and class exploitation in the forms of private property, the patriarchal nuclear family, traditional religion, and country and nation. At issue for Marx is holistic human and social transformation.

Contemporary theorists advocate praxis based solutions to end the subaltern status of many oppressed groups, including, but not limited to, the colonized, the poor, women, people of color, and gays and lesbians. For many, the institution of education is fundamentally linked to praxis. For instance, Paulo Freire's (1972) theory of praxis specifically offers Brazilian *campesinos* as a mechanism that combines reflection and action to transform a psychological, social, political, and economic legacy of imperialism and colonialism. For Freire, praxis is the act of creativity and social change achieved through the oppressed's own experience and the creative process of education: that is, acquiring and developing literacy and reactive responses to the ruling social and political structures. Freire's model of educational praxis is not realized in a "banking model," wherein students merely memorize and repeat "expert" knowledge. Instead, it is accomplished through a dialogic problem posing process in which the oppressed use their experiences and education to create new understandings. Hence, praxis and its ends are not preordained, but are, instead, a creative process of becoming. Like Freire, feminist bell hooks identifies the potential for active and transformative processes of education. It is hooks's declared oeuvre to interrogate and to critique systems of what she calls "Imperialist White Supremacist Capitalist Patriarchy," and to change them.

The above described renditions of praxis have their critics. For some postmodernists, for instance, praxis is solidly tied to a flawed Enlightenment project that erroneously connects liberation with rationality, thereby suggesting that a transcendent critic's body of knowledge should be privileged. Such critics question how enlightening happens, who facilitates it, and what actually changes as a result.

Contemporary sociologists continue to debate what role sociology and sociologists play in praxis. For instance, in 2005, both *Critical*

Sociology and the *British Journal of Sociology* devoted issues to international scholarly responses to American Sociological Association President Michael Burawoy's 2004 call for sociology as a critical public endeavor.

SEE ALSO: Feminist Activism in Latin America; Marx, Karl; Social Change; Social Movements

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prejudice

Laura Jennings

Prejudice is the judging of a person or idea, without prior knowledge of the person or idea, on the basis of some perceived group membership. Prejudice can be negative, as in

the case of racist or sexist ideology, or positive, as in the case of a preference for a particular ethnic food, and can thus either help or harm a person so judged. Some writers, in defining prejudice, stress an incorrect or irrational component; others maintain that it is incorrect to do so because prejudice is often rooted in a quite rational self or group interest. Prejudice is often used synonymously with such terms as discrimination and racism.

Social scientists began to show great interest in prejudice in the early to mid twentieth century when anti immigrant sentiment was wide spread and often erupted in violence. Later concerns over fascism and the Holocaust fed scientific interest in prejudice. Psychologist Gordon Allport, in his seminal work *The Nature of Prejudice* (1954), described prejudice as the result of a normal – albeit emotion laden and faulty – psychological process of categorizing people into in groups and out groups. In groups are considered desirable and in possession of positive attributes, while out groups are seen as possessing negative or undesirable attributes and, thus, as appropriate targets for abuse. Allport noted the role of stereotyping in prejudice and discussed the acquisition of prejudice, its dynamics, personality types thought to be prone to prejudiced thinking, and possible ways to reduce prejudice, including legislation, education, and therapy.

Other works investigated further the idea of a prejudiced personality type, commonly known as the authoritarian personality, linking it with a tendency toward overly rigid thinking, acceptance of stereotypes, excessive conformity and submission to authority, discomfort with ambiguity, and highly conservative and/or fundamentalist beliefs. Uncomfortable with the linkage of prejudice and authoritarianism with right wing beliefs, other researchers attempted to show that those on the political left, too, could possess overly rigid thought patterns that might predispose them to prejudiced thinking.

STEREOTYPING

Stereotyping is thought to play an important role in the formation and maintenance of prejudice. Like prejudice, stereotyping involves the attribution of certain characteristics to a

person based on her or his membership in a particular group. Experimental and survey based studies have shown variously that prejudice and stereotypes are both remarkably resilient and subject to change over time in response to changes in social norms, that stereotypes can be based in either illusion or reality, and that stereotypes and prejudice can either overrule or be overruled by evidence to the contrary. Some research suggests not only that people seek with their behavior to confirm the prejudices to which they subscribe, but also that this behavior can actually elicit responses consistent with the prejudiced belief. For example, students believed by their teachers to be gifted begin to display greater ability in their subject than their fellow students, even if the students identified as gifted are so identified randomly by researchers. Similarly, people who believe that they are talking via telephone with attractive, outgoing members of the opposite sex speak with greater warmth and humor to their phone partners than do people who believe their fellow conversant to be unattractive and socially backward. The phone partners, in turn, respond accordingly, with those perceived to be attractive, humorous, and confident actually displaying those traits, and those perceived to be unattractive and introverted responding coolly and with reservation.

Prejudice and stereotyping have been shown to influence not only current behavior but also memory of past events; holders of stereotypes are prone to selectively remembering information consistent with the prejudices they hold. Furthermore, people are more likely to view negative behaviors as internally caused (i.e., through some personal or cultural flaw) if performed by those against whom they are prejudiced and externally caused if performed by members of their own group. Conversely, people credit positive behaviors by members of their own group to inner positive qualities, and positive actions by those against whom they are prejudiced as rare exceptions to the rule.

FORMATION OF PREJUDICE

Early theories on formation of prejudice in children stressed the importance of personality characteristics of parents, hypothesizing that

prejudice is the result of being reared in an overly strict and harsh home environment. Research, however, has shown that this is not necessarily true. Children from a very early age show an ability to categorize people into groups; they also show marked preference for some groups – especially the groups to which they themselves belong – over others. Moreover, children’s attitudes do not appear to be entirely determined by the attitudes of their parents, which suggests that children are far from being passive receptacles for their parents’ prejudiced views.

Herbert Blumer advanced the notion of racial prejudice as “a sense of group position” in which the words and actions of influential public figures establish a public perception not only of social group hierarchy but also of the positioning of one’s own group relative to that of others. Blumer emphasized that feelings of superiority and identification of intergroup difference alone cannot account for prejudice; these must be accompanied by a sense of entitlement to certain resources or privileges and also by a sense that this entitlement is threatened by other groups. Attempts by oppressed groups to improve their social conditions are thus seen as threatening by the dominant group, which views these attempts as a rejection of the proper social order. Dominant groups are acutely aware of – and protective of – their superior social status, and prejudice flares when this status is questioned. Prejudice is thus not merely an individual ideology but a social phenomenon rooted in intergroup relations and arising from specific historical contexts. Blumer stressed that the formation of group identity, and thus of prejudice, does not take place in individual interactions but at an abstract level in the public sphere and is articulated most forcefully by widely respected figures in the public eye.

Blumer points out, as do other scholars, that prejudice is not only a way of identifying and denigrating out groups but also a powerful means of self definition of the in group in opposition to these out groups. Important qualities thought to be lacking in out groups are thus by definition thought to be possessed in abundance by in groups. Negative qualities attributed to members of out groups are overlooked or viewed as rare exceptions when exhibited by in group members.

As social scientists began to uncover the structural foundations of racism and sexism, interest in prejudice as a research topic began to wane. Focusing attention on the individual ideological aspects of prejudice was thought to divert attention from its even more harmful structural counterpart: institutionalized racial and sexual discrimination and violence. The uncovering of the racist and sexist practices of the state, of business, of the legal justice system, of commerce and real estate and employers, of science and systems of higher education, seemed to render the beliefs and behavior of individual racists and sexists trivial and insignificant. More recently, however, scholars are reemphasizing the importance of prejudice and the severity of its consequences; several prominent sociologists have urged that cumulative daily encounters with prejudice not be discounted in the rush to study structural factors. These writers encourage scholars to consider the impact of repeated experiences with prejudice at an individual level in conjunction with experiences of institutional racism and sexism. Both, they argue, are crucial in the formation of group and individual identity and in determination of the response – or lack of response – of victims of prejudice.

SUBJECTS OF PREJUDICE

Another current debate within sociology concerns new versus old forms of prejudice. Since the civil rights and women’s movements of the 1960s, levels of racial and sexual prejudice have shown a decline by traditional measures. Some theorists maintain that this is evidence signaling that society is becoming less prejudiced. Others argue that the overt behaviors and vocabularies of racism and sexism have simply been driven underground by social pressures to be politically correct and that prejudiced ideology still flourishes in a more publicly acceptable new form. In terms of racism, this new form is sometimes described as aversive prejudice, in which people who score low on traditional measures of prejudice and antipathy toward out groups nevertheless display fear or discomfort at contact with members of out groups and so seek to avoid this contact. Another theory of a new form of prejudice is colorblind racism; colorblind

racists are those who view racism as a thing of the past and not something with which society ought to concern itself now. Proponents of a colorblind approach insist that those who wish to succeed can do so on their own merits and that to acknowledge race at all is to be racist. In this way of thinking, attempts to redress historical wrongs against non whites and females amount to current "reverse" discrimination against white males. Yet another theory, that of *laissez faire* racism, suggests that the new racists of today are characterized by protectiveness of their own group interest, their antipathy toward any kind of race targeted social programs, and their willingness to publicly condemn those who fail to achieve the American Dream. The *laissez faire* theory grew out of an earlier theory of symbolic racism; symbolic racism involved the substitution of ostensibly non racial vocabulary and symbols for the overtly racist rhetoric no longer considered acceptable.

All of these new theories are presented in contrast to old fashioned prejudice (often called Jim Crow racism), which had its roots in beliefs of the biological inferiority of non whites. The new forms, in contrast, are grounded in beliefs and rhetoric about the cultural inferiority of non white groups. Holders of the newer version of prejudice maintain that the unfortunate situation of the non white poor is their own fault. In these forms of prejudice, poverty and misfortune are viewed as pathology and the natural result of a failure to accept and conform to mainstream values. Those who do not succeed fail because they have simply not tried hard enough. The implication of such a view is that the dominant group has no responsibility to do anything to try to help members of less fortunate groups because the less fortunate are refusing to help themselves.

Because of the research linking prejudice to stereotyping and to various other traits such as conformity and lower levels of education, some social scientists have suggested education as a cure for prejudice. Others have suggested that prejudice arises from ignorance about the group(s) in question and hence that the remedy lies in increased contact between members of various groups. The theory in both cases is that access to new and better information can replace a flawed and harmful prejudiced thought process.

This contact theory, with its hypothesis that intergroup prejudice can be reduced by increasing the levels of contact between members of different groups, has been tested repeatedly, with mixed results. One such test was Sherif's 1966 summer camp study in which researchers first stimulated intergroup antagonism and then attempted, with some success, to reduce it. Other studies monitored the effects of school or neighborhood desegregation on levels of prejudice. In some cases, increasing contact between groups actually results in higher levels of prejudice, especially when the quality of contact is negative or when the contact situation is competitive in nature. Those situations in which contact does seem to result in lower levels of prejudice are those in which members of different groups have ample opportunity to interact in positive ways and to work together on cooperative tasks. Another essential element of successful contacts is that the participants are of equal status in the social situation(s) under study. The mixed success of this theory has left researchers seeking new and better ways to reduce levels of prejudice.

There is some evidence that, because stereotypes often have widespread social support, people's attitudes and prejudices are not likely to change unless positive individual interactions occur in a climate which encourages prejudice reduction. A vital component of such a climate is leadership support for change, and the willingness of authority figures to impose rewards and sanctions to further change. This suggests that leaders who adopt a color or gender blind approach, insisting that prejudice and discrimination are no longer problems, may actually help to preserve prejudice.

SEE ALSO: Adorno, Theodor W.; Authoritarian Personality; Blumer, Herbert George; Discrimination; Homophobia and Heterosexism; In Groups and Out Groups; Race; Race (Racism); Sexism; Stereotyping and Stereotypes

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preparatory stage

D. Angus Vail

While George Herbert Mead never explicitly mentions this stage of development, many contend that he implies it in several of his seminal writings on the social, not biological, root of the self. According to Mead, the self arises from a process of interaction among one's consociates. As an individual develops a facility for language, he or she begins to understand the symbolic meanings of social objects and eventually develops the capacity to make him/herself into a social object. In Mead's model, children begin to show signs of developing a self when they learn how to play at the roles of important people in their lives. At this *play stage* they show elementary understanding of role taking, but their understanding of complex rules and subtle differences of individual positions in social settings is limited. As they develop more sophisticated understandings of social settings, they enter a *game stage* where they learn to take account not only of individual roles, but also of the abstract rules that make those divergent roles make sense in a given situation. Mead calls this set of rules the *generalized other*. The *preparatory stage* precedes these phases in the social genesis of the self, representing a stage of mimicry where a child, in essence, is preparing him/herself for the more complex, subtle, and sophisticated social tasks that are starting to become a part of his or her routine.

Children in the preparatory stage develop a capacity for mimicking the behavior of those with whom they come in contact on a regular basis. Thus, in this stage a child may "read" the Sunday newspaper with her parents even

though she knows neither how to read nor why the activity is important to her parents. Since the child has yet to develop the linguistic and social capacities for assigning meanings to social objects and/or activities, most would claim that this mimicry is not meaningful. It does, however, suggest a growing capacity to take account of social objects. While the child may not understand what a newspaper is, let alone why reading a Sunday newspaper is so ritualistically complex, she is showing that she understands that the activity is somehow important.

While preparatory stage behavior is not considered meaningful, it does lay the foundation for understanding role taking and the development of meaning. Children at this stage begin to learn that their activities generate responses from other people. While they are a long way off from being able to predict those responses, their behavior – and the reactions it generates – soon will lead to their developing a sense of their own independence and eventually to their own ability to make a social object of themselves.

In spite of the fact that Mead never explicitly discussed the preparatory stage in his essays on the sociogenesis of the self, the concept has become a staple in introductory texts and sociological social psychology texts as the first of the three stages of self development.

SEE ALSO: Game Stage; Generalized Other; Mead, George Herbert; Play Stage; Role; Self

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prevention, intervention

Franz Xaver Kaufmann

The terms “prevention” and “intervention” are used in many social sciences, from international politics to social work. They concern certain classes of intentional behavior by collective actors which are considered as interfering with given situations. Prevention means measures or actions to reduce potential risks, i.e., to hinder the future happening of certain kinds of damage, e.g., accidents at work, deviant behavior, or the spreading of contagious infections. Intervention, by contrast, means the interference with some actual situation or process in order to change the course of an ongoing problematic event “to its best.” From an analytical perspective, both terms are rather equivalent: prevention in the ordinary sense means an interference in earlier stages of an assumed causal process than intervention.

Given the pervasive character of both kinds of actions, it is impossible to discuss here their implications with respect to specific fields of action. This is rather an attempt to specify their sociological character as a tool for reflecting on the operation of applied social sciences. Therefore, both terms are used here as concepts of a sociological observer interpreting actions of an actor pursuing defined goals in social situations defined by herself as problematic. The task of social science consists first in working out the implications of that very widespread form of social action. It has then to demonstrate the utility of such an inquiry.

There are three main fields of sociological inquiry related to the subject, namely, research and discourse about social problems, evaluation research, and political governance. For a long time, applied social science took for granted the definitions of social problems by certain (“focal”) actors themselves and discussed only the means to influence or solve the problem. Meanwhile, the sociology of social problems has worked out the implications and contingencies of processes of the definition of social problems. In order to contribute valid knowledge for action, applied social science has to reflect the multiple perspectives of actors involved in a

process of intervention and to reconstruct itself the problem at stake and its issues.

Evaluation research began as the measurement of outputs and moved then to program evaluation. This paradigm supposed a technological understanding of intervention: the program was considered as a causal process introduced by an external authority pursuing certain goals. Evaluation then had to measure program effects, i.e., the changes observed in consequence of the introduction of a program were attributed to the program alone. This causal model of intervention makes sense in a laboratory, where the researcher has control over the whole situation and possesses standardized knowledge about the operation of intervening factors.

This model is not applicable to intervention in real life social situations, as the development of evaluation research has shown (Guba & Lincoln 1989). Compared to, for example, biochemical interventions, the bulk of social interventions are poorly standardized, and their “technological kernel” remains weak. The operator of the intervention cannot be left outside the conceptualization of the intervention process. Social intervention implies focal actors, their aims, resources, and relationships to the field of intervention, not only their action. Social intervention is directly or indirectly a process of interaction between the intervening actor and selective, reacting persons, whose perceptions and interests are mostly unknown to the former. Moreover, the target persons of an intervention live in circumstances and opportunity structures which can never be wholly controlled or kept constant by the intervening actor. The measurable changes of, for example, the behavior of target persons may be attributed to the intervention or to other changes in their situation.

Research on social intervention becomes therefore a more complicated task than the measurement of program inputs and outputs, the operation of the program remaining a “black box.” The research design has to include:

- 1 *Relevant properties of the intervening (focal) actors:* What is their authority? Their problem? How do they define the situation? What are the resources and instruments at

their disposal? In short, what are their programs or models of problem solution? Moreover, focal actors are usually not individuals but collective, especially corporate, actors. In the case of corporate actors, a division of labor takes place so that intervention becomes a multistep process coordinating diverse operations, i.e., a process of governance.

- 2 *Relevant properties of the target persons or addressees:* How do they perceive the intentions of the program? Does it meet *their* problems? Have they competencies to resist the intervention or to use the operations of the program for other purposes than those intended by the focal actor?
- 3 *Relevant properties of the field of intervention:* What other factors contribute to the situation deemed problematic by the intervening actor? To what extent does the focal actor depend on third parties for affecting her program? Are the target persons isolated or may they interact? Are there in the field institutions shaping opportunity structures which may divert the operation from the aims of the program? To what extent is a program in accordance with value orientations shared by institutions and actors in the field?

Though not every one of these and related questions may find clear cut answers in a research situation, the different approach to an experimental design is evident. Especially in the case of complex multistep interventions (such as the introduction or modification of a policy), this kind of inquiry sensitizes researchers to the pitfalls of naïve quasi technological programming. The aim of intervention research is then not only the evaluation of outputs but also the inquiry into the processes of governance operating a program, as well as into the conditions for its implementation.

Such a program of research is not very promising for generalized knowledge. If each problematic situation and the operation of social intervention is unique, how can professional knowledge emerge? In fact, the results of evaluation research and of implementation research have not thus far proved to be particularly suitable for establishing generalized knowledge.

Professional knowledge is related not to the concept of intervention but to the institutionalized fields of action. For economists, the tools of economic policy are rather well known, and they may even be able to distinguish among the conditions under which such tools are promising. Nevertheless, even the practice of economic policy is not a science but an art in the Aristotelian sense. Its success depends on a capacity of diagnosis and a feeling for the peculiarities of a situation. This is even more true for fields of action where the impact of institutional structures and the functions of utility are less clear and where there is less “technological” knowledge available than in the economic field.

“Prevention” and “intervention” are useful as sensitizing concepts. They reconstruct political or social action so as to make us aware of their intricacies. To be sure this may not be helpful for quick decisions, but this has never been the task of social science. Applied social science may become useful in this context insofar as the sociologist is involved in the processes of planning and implementing an intervention as a kind of participant observer using tools of sociological observation and continuously providing evidence about the operation of a program. Social interventions are seldom effective without continuous processes of learning.

Though intervention may be openly hostile (e.g., in foreign affairs or in a criminal situation), discourse about social or sociopolitical intervention normally presumes it to be in the primary interest not of the intervening actor but of the “beneficiaries” of the intervention. From a humanistic point of view, this “reformist” cultural orientation merits being taken seriously. The “goods” which may be provided through sociopolitical intervention are of four kinds, and it is possible to organize “technological” knowledge about intervention following these four dimensions of social participation or inclusion:

- *Status, especially rights:* The basic condition of social inequality consists in the inequality of rights or of the opportunities to claim one’s title. Legal intervention aims at securing the rights of the weaker actors. This may happen on different levels of social action, from governmental initiatives to the legal aid by social work.

- *Resources, especially money*: In capitalist societies, self sufficiency has become marginal; everyone depends on income. Economic intervention aims at securing the means of life for those excluded from sufficient market income. Again this form of intervention begins with governmental institution building and ends with cash in the hands of the needy.
- *Opportunities, especially infrastructure*: Social inequality has not only a socioeconomic and cultural but also a spatial aspect of access. Opportunities (e.g., for work and leisure, for health and education, for mobility and administrative access) are distributed unevenly in space, usually favoring those who are better off in the other three dimensions. Interventions to improve local settings follow their own rules and depend particularly on local organizations and the given circumstances in place.
- *Competencies, especially personal services*: It is well known that competent persons tend to succeed in adverse circumstances. The enabling of persons is therefore the most promising way out of problematic situations. "People processing" operates mainly on the level of interaction and depends on both professional knowledge and empathy.

To be sure, improvements of the situation of socially disadvantaged people need interventions in several or all of the dimensions just mentioned.

Prevention intends to ban risks before they become actual. From an action point of view, one may distinguish two kinds of preventive measures: those influencing conditions and opportunity structures in order to minimize the frequency of risk, and those influencing persons, their resources and competencies, to cope with risky situations. From the actor's point of view, preventive seems preferable to corrective intervention. From the perspective of a sociological observer, the situation is more complicated, however.

Preventive action presupposes the idea of a coherent chain of events which can be interrupted at various points. One can prevent a risk or damage only if one can control its causes. In the physical world, appropriate knowledge is often available and follows the laws of simple

or probable causality. In the social world, such knowledge is – if available at all – incoherent and fuzzy. Normally, several factors, not just one, may influence the emergence of risk with unknown probabilities. The contingency is higher as potential risk is more remote from actual damage. The preventive control of specific factors therefore remains uncertain and may have additional undesirable side effects. Preventive measures thus have to be assessed for alternative consequences. A somewhat general improvement of the situation may often be preferable to targeted measures.

SEE ALSO: Actor Network Theory; Evaluation; Intervention Studies; Knowledge; Political Process Theory; Political Sociology; Risk, Risk Society, Risk Behavior, and Social Problems; Social Integration and Inclusion; Social Policy, Welfare State; Social Problems, Concept and Perspectives; Social Problems, Politics of; Social Work: Theory and Methods

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primary groups

David L. Elliott

Cooley (1909) coined the term primary group to denote intimate, comparatively permanent, and solidary associations of mutually identifying

persons, and a century of sociological research has increased our understanding of primary groups in their variety of forms and multifaceted, contingent functions. According to Cooley, primary groups are primary in the sense of providing the first and (because of the greater openness and pliability of children) the most important socialization. The most important examples he cited in this sense are the family, children's play groups, and the neighborhood or village community.

Primary groups are also primary in the sense of being the source out of which emerge both individuals and social institutions. Cooley agreed with George Herbert Mead that the self and its ideals emerge out of such primary relations. As examples of social institutions, Cooley cites democracy as an outgrowth of the village community and Christianity as an outgrowth of the family.

These groups are primary in the additional sense of providing primary human needs such as attachment, security, support, and recognition. Since these needs persist in some forms and to some degree throughout the life cycle, primary relations never cease to be important. In Cooley's conceptualization, a primary group instills feelings in its members of sympathy and identification with the group, its goals, values, and members. All that is distinctively human is a product of this feeling of a "we," which constrains but does not eliminate people's animal passions of greed, conflict, and so forth.

Classical sociologists (in the period roughly from 1890 to 1920) focused most of their attention on the rise and consequences of modernity, which they theorized as a general historical trajectory moving from the predominantly primary relations of primitive and feudal communities to the predominantly formal, rational, secondary relations of modern, urban, industrial societies. For example, Tönnies contrasted *Gemeinschaft* (or village community) relations with *Gesellschaft* (or societal) relations, Durkheim contrasted mechanical with organic solidarity, and Weber saw modern western history as a process of ever increasing rationalization.

The problem that engrossed the classical sociologists was how to maintain or recreate the recognition, solidarity, and support provided by primary relations and required for the health and flourishing of individuals within the increasingly

impersonal, formal, and rationalized environment of modern societies, while at the same time preserving the instrumental advantages of modern institutions. Some of these concerns have been resolved by subsequent research (e.g., Granovetter 1983; Freudenberg 1986).

In a number of organizational, political, and community studies of the 1940s and 1950s, primary groups were not the intended object of study, but were found to provide the intervening variable required for an adequate explanation of the phenomena behind the data. In their "Yankee City" studies, Lloyd Warner and colleagues expected income, neighborhood, and family variables to explain social mobility in the town. They found that the process of social mobility was largely mediated through membership in face to face primary groups they called cliques. The cliques were second only to family (another primary group) in explaining social mobility in the town.

Stouffer and colleagues' 1949 study of American soldiers and Shils and Janowitz's 1948 study of German soldiers in World War II found that soldiers' morale and motivation to fight were explained more by the loyalty, solidarity, and mutual protection and identification they felt for their fighting unit than by personal loyalty to national symbols or national war goals.

Lazarsfeld and colleagues in 1948 found individuals were influenced in their voting decisions by members of their primary groups that the researchers called "opinion leaders." Katz and Lazarsfeld (1955) found that the mass media influenced individuals through the mediation of opinion leaders belonging to one of an individual's primary circles. These mid century studies led to the widely shared proposition that a formal organization's effectiveness depended on the integration of its informal (primary group) structure with its formal structure.

Eugene Litwak was the primary user in sociology of the traditional primary group concept from the 1960s to the 1990s. According to Litwak, technological changes such as in communications and transportation lead to structural changes in existing primary groups and to new, more differentiated forms of primary groups. Litwak and colleagues expanded upon organizational contingency theory in their task specific model of social support, in which the task requirements of the whole variety of

primary human needs are matched to the specific primary group structure or formal organizational structure able to satisfy a particular need most effectively and efficiently. Litwak's research and analysis illustrates when and how tasks traditionally performed by primary groups can be performed by formal organizations and vice versa.

From the 1970s to the present, social network theorists such as Mark Granovetter and Barry Wellman have contributed significantly to the sociological understanding of the interrelations and functioning of primary and secondary relations. Granovetter (1983) conceived of a social tie (within one or more social networks) as varying in strength as measured by the tie's duration, its emotional intensity, its degree of intimacy, and its type and intensity of reciprocal services. Strong ties are characteristic of primary groups or primary relations, and weak ties are characteristic of formal organizations and work relations in less formal settings. Granovetter asserted that weak ties are important for social integration. Strong ties alone lead to societal fragmentation.

SEE ALSO: Cooley, Charles Horton; Intimacy; Secondary Groups; Significant Others; Social Influence; Social Network Theory; Social Support; Socialization, Primary; Weak Ties (Strength of)

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primate cities

Michael Timberlake

A primate city usually refers to a city that is disproportionately large in terms of population size relative to other cities contained within a given geographically bounded area, such as a region, a nation, or even the globe. Occasionally, other qualities of cities than relative population size are used to identify primacy, for example, indicators of the relative concentration of important organizations, such as headquarters for leading corporations. While the term is often applied to cities considered excessively (and pathologically) large, this is not technically appropriate. In fact Jefferson (1939), who first used the term, argued that primate cities play an important generative role with respect to national development.

The closely related concepts of primate city and urban primacy are rooted in theoretical approaches to urbanization in geography and sociology's human ecology that are about "central places" and "city systems." From these perspectives, a system of cities emerges historically when economic relationships among locales are first established and then elaborated. For example, once isolated locales may become interlinked through trade. Over time, such exchange relations lead to increasing interdependence among the locales as economic competition induces specialization. Locales specialize by providing a home for producers of the goods and services that are in demand and that they can produce and deliver more efficiently than those in other locales within the system. Cities that host the most efficient producers of the most desired goods and services become relatively dominant economically and politically, and this should be reflected in the relative population sizes of cities in a given system of cities. Hawley

(e.g., 1981) argued that cities in which were located the “key functions” of the particular territorially circumscribed economic system become the dominant cities in that system.

Urban primacy is operationally defined variously by comparing the population size of the largest city to the population in one or more other cities in the same system. Often it is measured in terms of the shape of the size distribution of cities which are included in a purported system of cities, with an understanding of what constitutes a normal distribution. The notion of normalcy in a city size distribution is based on the same theoretical approaches to systems of cities. These assume that in an economically “healthy” system of cities, exchanges among cities will be relatively free, and this will lead to a lognormal distribution of the cities’ population sizes. Clearly underlying this understanding, but almost always remaining unstated, is the assumption that capitalist markets, including labor markets, operate relatively unfettered, and, therefore, the benefits of development will “trickle down” the urban hierarchy from the primate city to the other, subdominant cities that are spread across the region in question.

In a lognormal city size distribution, the second largest city will be half the size of the primate city, the third largest city will be one third the size of the primate city, and so on. (Though at some point down the hierarchy, there may be many cities of about the same population size.) This definition of normalcy is known as the “rank size rule,” and was put forward by Zipf (1941). Scholars have proposed different measures of the degree of urban primacy. One, proposed by Davis (1976), uses the ratio of the size of the largest city’s population to the total of the sum of the population sizes of the four most populous cities. Walters (1985) uses the assumption of lognormalcy to propose a measure of urban primacy that is tied to deviations from lognormalcy, where increasingly positive numbers indicate increasingly high levels of urban primacy, i.e., the primate city is increasingly more primate relative to the standard of a log normal city size distribution. Increasingly larger negative numbers indicate flatter city size distributions; these are city systems in which the leading cities are more similar to one another in terms of population size (or whatever other

attribute is being used as a standard of urban primacy) than would be predicted on the basis of the rank size rule. Yet most empirical studies use cruder measures. A rare recent study of the causes of urban primacy uses the proportion of the urban population living in the most populous city of a country as a measure of the degree of urban primacy (Ades & Glaeser 1995).

Most research on urban primacy has defined the city system at the national level. Studies have shown that, in general, higher income countries tend to have city size distributions that are closer to the rank size rule than lower income countries, and in many of the latter, abnormally large primate cities are not unusual. For example Bangkok, Thailand is many times larger than the second largest city in the country, and Mexico City is nearly nine times more populous than Guadalajara. However, London and Paris are also significantly larger than the rank size rule would predict, while the city size distribution in the United States is less primate than the lognormal standard. Nevertheless, most cases of extreme urban primacy are in the low and moderate income countries of the periphery and semiperiphery, most prevalently in South American countries, rather than in wealthy, core countries. Thus, in the context of development studies, high levels of primacy are thought to be indicative of poorly integrated systems of cities, which means poorly integrated national economies – a form of socioeconomic “dualism,” or disarticulation, that not only signifies developmental problems for the national or regional economy, but also serves as an impediment to successful socioeconomic development. Abnormally large primate cities – cities far more populous than would be expected on the basis of the lognormal distribution – are said by scholars to indicate a poorly integrated national or regional economy, one in which developmental advances in the primate city lack mechanisms to “trickle down” the urban size hierarchy and across the country or region. In fact some scholars have argued that such primate cities are “parasitic” with respect to the national economy, sucking resources from the rest of the country and providing little in return. It is this apparent correlation between excessive urban primacy and underdevelopment that is responsible for the preponderant pejorative view of the primate city.

Geographers and sociologists have suggested several possible contributing factors underlying the emergence and persistence of such primate cities at the national level. These include political, economic, geographical, technical, historical, and global factors. For example, some have argued that in many low income countries state policies are biased in favor of urban areas in general, and the leading city in particular. Thus the largest city in the country, often the capital city, receives a disproportionate share of central government expenditures for social and economic infrastructure. This results in greater opportunities for employment, housing, education, and health care, creating a "city lights" effect and making these cities more attractive destinations for migrants from rural areas as well as from other, smaller cities than they would otherwise be. This understanding emphasizes the role of demographic factors in sustaining the primate city, and relates urban primacy to the broader phenomenon of "hyperurbanization" or "overurbanization." In some cases the primate city represents a relatively modern enclave in an otherwise "backward" economy, isolated from the rest of the country by poor transportation and communication linkages with the rest of the country, which, in turn, keeps it from developing the kinds of healthy economic exchanges that would occur in an integrated economy. Thus, in the extreme, the primate city is seen as a hallmark of the disarticulated national economy. Along these lines, some have suggested that the primate city is often a concomitant of internal social and political inequality, particularly in countries in which geographically distinct ethnic groups are the winners and losers in struggles for political power, with the winners implementing policies that favor "their" region and the leading city therein. This may exacerbate these cities' levels of primacy by making them more attractive destinations for migrants from rural areas and from relatively disadvantaged secondary cities.

On the other hand, some scholars have identified the primate city as an outcome of colonial and neocolonial economic and political relations. This seems evident when the primate city was the administrative headquarters of a former colonial power, maintaining, after independence, stronger ties with the former imperial country than with its own national hinterland.

Dependency theorists argued that such cities served as siphoning points in the asymmetrical flows of wealth out of former colonies or neocolonies back to the "metropole," thus contributing to the "development of underdevelopment" (Frank 1967). This approach to the primate city led to framing other aspects of urbanization in terms of theoretical perspectives sensitive to international or global relations of power, such as the world system perspective on social change. Since the mid 1980s there has been considerable research relating various aspects of urbanization, including primate cities, overurbanization, and world cities, to what is sometimes called world system theory.

The bulk of the research and theorizing on the effects of urban primacy has focused on excessive urban primacy relative to "normal" urban primacy (e.g., the rank size rule). Few have discussed the implications of unusually "flat" city size distributions in which the leading cities are similar to each other in terms of population size. An exception is Chase Dunn's (1985) very long term study of the global city size distribution, which shows that it has become alternately flatter and more hierarchical (i.e., more lognormal) in response to historically conditioned changes in the world system. For example, when the capitalist world system emerged in the seventeenth century, the city size distribution became more hierarchical with consolidation, integration, and the emergence of a hegemonic core power. But during periods of declining hegemony and corresponding increased rivalry among core powers, the world city size distribution became flatter.

In spite of considerable theoretical conjecture about the causes and consequences of excessive urban primacy, systematic research has provided little in the way of conclusive evidence in support of a particular approach. A fair conclusion from the research seems to be that excessively primate cities emerge from a variety of conditions associated with disarticulated or uneven development in nations (or regions), and that cases of extreme primacy serve as obstacles to achieving balanced regional economic development. Policy solutions have focused on creating alternative "growth poles," where investments in social and economic infrastructure are to be redirected in an effort to boost development in locales other than the primate city but at the

same time providing integration (e.g., by improving transportation and communication linkages) with each other and with the primate city. Such policies can be seen as efforts to create balanced development by attempting to build a healthy system of cities.

There has also been a tradition of scholarship on primate cities emphasizing their problematic qualities as places to live, particularly with respect to low income countries. Rapid population growth, overcrowding, strained infrastructure (including health, education, housing), and even political instability have been themes in the literature on the primate city. However, in recent years, with the remarkable growth in the population sizes of many of the world's largest cities, some within the same country, this line of scholarship has been subsumed under the rubric of "megacities." The megacity literature considers the livability and sustainability of the world's largest cities quite apart from the consideration of systems of cities in which the study of the primate city is embedded theoretically.

Also in recent years, the study of systems of cities has gone global. Scholarship on urbanization has produced a spate of work on "world cities" and "global cities" that theoretically frames the study of the world's great cities as an interrelated system of cities. Some of this research has involved ranking cities in terms of attributes that are theoretically related to their relative importance in the world system of cities. These attributes include indicators of the extent to which each city is an important site for operations of globally powerful firms, such as the top firms in finance and insurance. Similar studies, using formal network analysis, have identified global city hierarchies over time on the basis of each city's role as destination or point of origin in air passenger travel.

The recent research on the primate city per se seems to be primarily about managing urban growth so as to achieve balance across a region or nation, with the goal of implementing policies that promote growth in relatively lagging areas of a nation or region, whereas many of the other concerns that originally gave rise to interest in primate cities are addressed under new rubrics, including megacities, world cities or global cities, and world city systems.

SEE ALSO: Development: Political Economy; Economic Development; Global Economy; Global/World Cities; Megalopolis; Migration and the Labor Force; Modernization; Population and Development; Uneven Development; Urbanization

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primates and cyborgs

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Where the figures of the primate and the cyborg appear together, they are ineradicably associated with the work of the American historian of consciousness Donna Haraway. Representing utterly different clusters of form, meanings, and demonstrations, the two images share at least one distinct function: they are literally literal figures, to be found on the category edges, both enacting and transgressing the boundary between nature and culture, body and machine,

human and animal. But their significance is not merely to be found in their presentation as a persistent reproach to the philosophical dualisms that have characterized western culture. Both figures invoke politics as well as philosophy, exhibiting and intimating the ways in which politics is implicit in one's philosophical position, and one's political philosophy represents the active choice and creation of a sense of social and cultural identity. In some ways, the primate and the cyborg represent opposite ends of the range of Haraway's understanding of the thematic and practical possibilities for humanity's imagined future, and as such, a consideration of layered meanings that underlie these iconic emblems can be used as a means of accessing and interrogating her wider theoretical project.

The figure of the cyborg came to wider public notice in the "Manifesto for Cyborgs," which appeared in the *Socialist Review* in 1985. This piece was produced and published during the early Reagan years, a period in which American political attitudes toughened both internationally, with the intensification of the Cold War, and internally, with the introduction of hardline neoconservative social and economic policies. The "Manifesto" was an attempt by Haraway to tell a number of different stories, a series of fables or legends, that could allow for an escape from the politics of dualism and would enable socialist feminists to develop new ways of thinking about society, politics, science, and war. At the heart of this ironic parable was the figure of the cyborg. Haraway did not invent the term: according to her account, the neologism originated with the work of Manfred Clynes and Nathan Kline, who used it to refer to the "*cybernetic organism*" that would have to be created if humanity was to explore and to colonize extra-terrestrial environments. At the moment of the word's inception, then, it was profoundly implicated not just in the nature of the boundary between "man" and "machine," but in the wider politics of the Cold War era and the persistent and profoundly non-prescient presumption that the coming decades would see the unproblematic adoption of technoscientific strategies as the key elements in the pursuit of human happiness and security. For Haraway, the cyborg was the figure that could stand as a symbol of her critique of contemporary politics.

A being that was both animal and machine, but neither bisexual nor gendered, neither innocent nor guilty, would enable one to demonstrate the nature of the breakdown of identity and identity politics and the realignment of both globalized and domestic social relations as a result of technoscience revolutions – and in particular, to demonstrate the consequences of these developments for women. Having shown the extent to which situated identities had shifted as high technology made it harder to maintain the old dichotomies of hierarchical domination, replacing them with the authoritative informatics of the command–control–communication intelligence characteristic of the developed military industrial society, she further developed her account of the meanings and significances of the cyborg in a 1992 article, "The Promise of Monsters."

Far more than the "Manifesto," this article represented a sustained attempt to show how the figure of the cyborg could be used to illuminate different networks of social, political, and technological relationships. "Promise of Monsters" is presented as a mapping exercise and as a series of demonstrations that the power to speak, or to speak out, is not restricted to particular positions or roles, but can depend on the destabilization of such positions. In this article, Haraway uses the notion of the cyborg as a means of moving through art and literature, science and advertising, protest and practice, to show how presumed analytical border lines can become front lines in the struggle to understand and so to avoid the structures and technologies of domination that underlie much that is taken for granted in the cultures that surround us. Much of this work turns on the idea that contradiction and confusion are in fact the only safe places from which to begin the reconstructions of identity that would enable the escape from the dialectics of dichotomy. Only by attending to the chaotic, enculturated circumstances of each border crossing – each encounter between the individual and the Other, nature with culture, body with machine – can one hope to move beyond dualisms and approach an understanding of a much messier, context-laden, contradictory version of biopolitics, where the nature of authority and the authority to speak of nature are simultaneously intertwined and in opposition.

Similar themes within a different series of perspectives are illuminated by the figure of the primate, which appeared within Haraway's work at much the same time, and sometimes in similar places, as did the cyborg. Unlike the cyborg, however, the primate was much more evidently situated within particular examples of scientific practice – specifically, the history of primatology, or of human encounters with the non human primates. Haraway cast her explorations of primate convergences firmly within the context of the interrogation of the relationships and boundaries that could be shown to exist between nature and culture in the late twentieth century, using primate investigations as a means of illuminating the ways in which the broader themes of western culture – race, gender, ethnicity, class, nationality, and sexuality – had been and were being written into and onto nature. Primates, known to be the closest living relations of humanity, could be shown to occupy the trading zones, the transit zones between nature and culture, and depending on the location of the observer, could reveal either the naturalness of culture, or the enculturation of nature. It all depended on which standpoint one looked from, in which direction, and where one chose to focus one's gaze.

When the scientific investigations of the lives, the societies, and the psychology of the non human primates began in the early twentieth century, they were explicitly presented as a means by which humans could come more closely to apprehend the nature of their own biological history and the capacities and limitations of human nature itself. That is, the non human primates were not necessarily being studied for their own sake, but in order to advance our understanding of humanity itself. Some elements of human behavior that appeared central to the definition of humanity itself were difficult, if not impossible, to study in humans. The origin of language or of social life could not be directly observed in the laboratory, and to attempt to produce them in the laboratory using human subjects was clearly impossible – both the ethical and the practical problems were formidable. Additionally, since human relationships simply did not exist in the absence of a shared culture, it was deemed difficult to

investigate human nature in a way that would not be confounded by such cultural expectations. Initially, some scientists had turned to what were considered to be more primitive versions of human cultures – those societies that had come under progressively greater European imperial control during the nineteenth century – but decolonization and a more historicized understanding of the development of, for example, hunter gatherer society made this approach difficult, if not impossible, to sustain. However, the close relationship between humans and non human primates, which had been recognized long before it was possible to measure the amount of DNA shared between species, meant that the behavioral strategies and mental capacities of the other primates would probably be similar to our own – but would be expressed in a much simpler way, since the biological signal would be free of the cultural noise.

Since this was the intention, it is ironic in the extreme that the work of Haraway and other writers such as Pamela Asquith, Shirley Strum, and Linda Fedigan should so effectively have demonstrated the extent to which the study of primatology and the image of the primate are hopelessly impacted with encultured expectations of the human, the non human, the natural, and the social. Asquith's work was based on a comparison of the Japanese and the western styles of studying primates, and she was able to show that the accounts of primate social life emerging from these distinct traditions bore a close resemblance to the cultural expectations of appropriately socialized behavior in the different national contexts. Strum and Fedigan, primatologists themselves, successfully illustrated the ways in which the concerns of westernized primatology shifted over the decades following World War II in accordance with wider cultural shifts concerning the role of women, the practices of politics, and the shifting line being drawn between human and animal intelligences over the course of that half century. Haraway's impressive survey of the field (*Primate Visions*, 1989) allusively and elusively indicated the ways in which the study of primates over the course of the twentieth century was thoroughly embroiled and implicated in attempts to define and to demarcate something that was shaped by so

many dimensions as to refuse distinction: nature both produces and is itself produced by culture, and the attempt to resist the imposition of this fundamental natural/cultural duality is what lies at the heart of Haraway's wider project.

Like the cyborg, the primate is used by Haraway to demonstrate the extent to which the dichotomies, the demarcations, and the distinctions that have been at the heart of the western apprehension of the world have either become, or are becoming, unsustainable. Whether the perspective is philosophical, political, or personal, if one is to reach a fuller understanding of the range of relationships that can potentially exist within the world, then nature cannot be opposed to culture, female cannot be opposed to male, society cannot be opposed to science. Primates in particular are used to illustrate the ways in which science and society are categories artificially imposed on an incoherent cultural landscape: understanding primatology requires attention and sensitivity to the role of gender, the specificities of the animal-human relationship, the politics of science, of art, culture, practice, and institution. It can be understood as trading zone, a hybrid zone, an implosive zone, especially perhaps a transitory zone – but simultaneously as a place where real events occur, where practice becomes theory as theory is enacted.

The primate and the cyborg are not the only creatures (real and chimeric) to play these roles on Haraway's analytic stage. She has alternatively adopted such figures as the coyote, the modest witness, the vampire, the white rabbit, the trickster keyboard, and the metaphorical mirror – but in the recent past, the concept of the companion animal has come to loom large in her work, and to bear comparison with the earlier boundary figures. Like the primate and the cyborg, the companion animal represents a blending of nature and culture, lying on and therefore crossing the boundary that is so elemental to the socialized westerner's understanding of the world. In a sense, dogs have replaced cyborgs in Haraway's work, since where cyborgs represented individual beings, the idea of a companion animal requires that beings must by definition be in a relationship. Rather than humans domesticating dogs for

protection, for hunting, and for herding, it is possible to regard the relationship as co constitutive: dogs and humans evolved together, and each had a role to play in the creation of each other. We specify breeds of dog in the same way that humans used to specify race, with a similar lack of genetic support for the idea of purity or separation – dog breeds, like human races, represent both morphological reality and historical contingency and consequences. Although Haraway's account remains fragmentary, like the earlier primates and cyborgs, companion animals – or companion species, which is an even wider acknowledgment of potential moral community – demonstrate the analytical fluidity of categories thought to be concrete.

SEE ALSO: Anthrozoology; Body and Society; Feminism and Science, Feminist Epistemology; Feminist Methodology; Science and Culture

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primitive religion

Peter B. Clarke

The evolutionary character of theories of primitive religion is present in the sociological literature from the beginning. It is evident, for example, in the writings of the so called founding father of sociology, Auguste Comte (1798–1857), who believed that religion originated in fetishism or the worship of inanimate things, then developed into polytheism which in turn developed into monotheism (Comte 1853). The view that religion evolved from polytheism to monotheism is, of course, much older than the formal beginnings of sociology and anthropology as academic disciplines. It is present in the Scottish philosopher David Hume's *The Natural History of Religion* (1759). The nineteenth century theorists – they would today be classified as armchair anthropologists and sociologists – most closely associated with the construction of the concept of primitive religion were less concerned about religion per se and its nature and more about finding proof with which to discredit the so called higher religions and in particular Christianity. Their intention was to discover the origins of primitive religion or religion in its most basic or elementary form in order to show that it was profoundly mistaken and arose from ignorance or some emotional need and that the so called higher religions which derived from such erroneous ideas and behavior did not therefore merit the assent and commitment of rational and emotionally mature and balanced people. In fact, religion held society back.

Among the better known of the nineteenth century theorists of primitive religion was the Orientalist and authority on mythology Max Müller (1823–1900) who claimed (1893) that religion was grounded in an intuitive sense of the divine which everyone possessed and which was awakened by the wonder and power of nature. Religion began in this way as metaphor and symbol and eventually the natural objects that evoked thoughts and feelings of the infinite were personified as gods in their own right. Others like the sociologist Herbert Spencer (1820–1903), who defined progress and the development of the heterogeneous out of the

homogeneous, maintained that religion began with ancestor worship, or more precisely with belief in the continued existence of the souls or ghosts of remote ancestors which in time were deified (Spencer 1901–7). The process of deifying ancestors exists in many societies, including the Yoruba society of southwestern Nigeria, but there is no evidence that the religion of these people began in this way. Spencer then asserts that the notion of soul or ghost developed into that of god or divinity. Thus, it is assumed without any supporting evidence that the notion of ghost is the first ever notion of divinity devised by humans.

The anthropologist Edward Tylor (1832–1917), whose main interest was in the evolution of society and its institutions, opposed theories of religion that reduced the phenomenon to the psychological immaturity of early human beings, and sought to base his own theory on reason, hence the description of his approach as intellectualist. Like Spencer, Tylor also traces the origins of religion to the development of the idea of the soul, which he contended originated in dreams. So called primitive people were alleged to believe that the soul left the body during sleep and actually experienced what they had been dreaming about while asleep, and inferred that this behavior would continue after death. Hence also the idea of immortality. Tylor went further, however, claiming that such people not only personified all other beings like themselves, but also natural phenomena, and endowed the latter also with souls. Tylor's use of the term soul in preference to ghost or spirit led to his being regarded as the founder of the animist theory of the origins of religion. As for his approach to the question of religion's origins, this is described as intellectualist principally for the reason that it insists on offering a rational basis for the belief in the soul, which it argues did not derive from fear or superstition or psychological immaturity on the part of the primitive, but resulted instead from a deductive and logical process, even if the reasoning was mistaken. While, as Evans Prichard (1965: 25) has pointed out, it is possible that the notion of the soul developed in this way, there is no evidence to say it did.

Tylor's successor at Oxford, the barrister and anthropologist Robert Marett (1866–1943), is credited with being the father of the pre animist

theory of religion (Marett 2001). He argued that in terms of its beginnings, a rudimentary religion, a form of supernaturalism consisting of awe of the mysterious, existed prior to ideas of soul, ghost, and spirit. It was this attitude of mind that provided religion with its raw material and could exist apart from animism and indeed might well have been the basis for animistic beliefs. This theory was based on Marett's interpretation of studies on Melanesian religious life and in particular its concept of *mana*. Religion, he insisted, was something that was lived or acted out: it helped the primitive to live, it provided the necessary assurance of being in touch with a higher power, and it offered hope and induced fear. Marett reduces both magic and religion to psychological states and suggests that they function most effectively in situations of emotional stress.

Sir James Frazer (1854–1941), author of the monumental and widely known work on primitive superstitions *The Golden Bough* (1920), also differed from Tylor in propounding a developmental theory of religion in which he introduced a pre religious stage in the form of a magical phase. His theory bears a striking resemblance (in the way it describes religion's evolution from magic to religion and religion to science) to Auguste Comte's three phases of intellectual development: the theological, metaphysical, and positive. Relying on ethnographical data of poor quality, Frazer, the last of the great armchair evolutionists, was to claim that magic characterized simple societies, and as they became more complex they also became less superstitious and more scientific and rational, a line of argument for which there is no proof worthy of the name. Moreover, like Lucien Lévy Bruhl, he wrongly viewed magic as an elementary form of modern science, but differed from the latter by mistaking ideal for real connections between things.

Intellectualist theories of the kind advanced by Tylor and Frazer were in turn opposed by thinkers concerned to locate the origins of "primitive" religion in social structure rather than logic and emotion. The best known and most influential theorists to adopt this approach were Robertson Smith (1846–94) and Émile Durkheim (1858–1917). According to Smith, the clan cult or totemism was the earliest and most elementary form of religion

and was best accounted for and understood by reference to its social character, an idea for which he was indebted to Fustel de Coulange (1830–99) and in particular to his major work *The Ancient City* (1980), a work that also influenced Durkheim.

Durkheim was unimpressed by the kind of animist, intellectualist, emotionalist, and action based theories of primitive religion advanced by Spencer, Tylor, Frazer, Marett, and others, and indeed by any theory that suggested religion was false or an illusion. Primitive religion was the earliest in the sense of simplest form of religion. It was the form that was practiced when human society was passing through its simplest form. Moreover, far from being an illusion, it was as much a thing or social fact, in the sense that it was a reality external to the individual, as any other thing or social fact. It enjoyed the same degree of reality as any material thing. It rested on a permanent underlying reality that could be uncovered if studied objectively: that is, society. Religion belonged, Durkheim argued, to the class of social facts that includes established beliefs and practices that were the product of the collectivity and/or a group within society. By treating religion in this way Durkheim believed he had given it a foothold in reality and made it accessible to scientific analysis. As to its earliest, most elementary or primitive form, Durkheim maintained that this was to be found in totemism, an idea he borrowed from Robertson Smith. He used the available ethnographic material on the Australian aborigines and in particular the Arunta to demonstrate his thesis, published as the *The Elementary Forms of the Religious Life* (1915). What bound clan members together, he argued in this study, was that each and every one of the members had the same totem, which in several senses was regarded as sacred, including the sense that it symbolized the totemic principle in the form of an impersonal religious force which he referred to as *mana*.

In Durkheim's evolutionist understanding of it, religion would regress – regression was also a notion used by Spencer in respect to civilizations and their institutions – as social institutions developed. As an example he pointed to religion's loss of control in modern society over men's (*sic*) minds compared with primitive society (where he contended religion dominated

everything) and went on to argue that to become intensely religious again it would be necessary for society to return to the beginning. In his own words religion could not regain its domination over people's minds as in primitive society "unless the great societies crumble and we return to small social groups of long ago, that is unless humanity returns to its starting point, religion will never be able to exert deep or wide sway over consciousness" (Durkheim 1952: 430).

Although Durkheim's highly speculative account of the origins of religion has been heavily criticized on methodological, logical, ethnographic, and other grounds, it nevertheless contains many valuable insights and remains one of the most thought provoking and influential studies of the sociological character of religion, particularly that part of it that treats the purposes and functions of ritual.

An almost exact contemporary of Durkheim, the German sociologist Max Weber (1864–1920), regarded as one of the founders of modern sociology and most widely known for his thesis linking Protestantism to the rise of modern capitalism and his comparative sociology based on the principle of *verstehen* or empathic understanding, also began his analysis of religion from an evolutionist perspective by looking at its most elementary forms. These, he believed, were to be found in the religions of tribal societies in which, he contended, questionably, people were so preoccupied with meeting their everyday needs that they had little alternative but to practice magic rather than religion. Such people were largely concerned with attempting to manipulate and coerce the gods, whom they conceived as being part of this world and immanent, rather than as in religion, which has a more transcendental conception of their status, with worshipping them. Thus, according to Weber (1965), elementary or primitive religion tends toward the magical and out of this emerges religious conceptions, as human society evolves. Magic begins to develop into religion when the extraordinary qualities or mystical powers (referred to as *mana* by Durkheim, Marett, and others, and as *charisma* by Weber) that are believed to inhere in objects are attributed less to the objects themselves and increasingly to a reality behind them, as it were, such as a soul, spirit, or demon. Thus, once the source of this

power came to be perceived as being outside the material world, and the spirits behind it came to be regarded as being more and more removed from this world, the way was open, Weber maintained, for ethical rationalization to begin to dominate religious attitudes. At this stage of religious evolution the gods become increasingly bound up with ethical considerations, and values and principles replace self interest as the core concerns of religion. Thus, Weber suggests, religion only truly begins with the appearance of ethical rationalization, and coterminous with this development is the demise of the central role of the magician and the rise of a priesthood that concerns itself with intellectual matters such as the formulation of doctrinal and ethical systems.

PRIMITIVE RELIGION AS MONOTHEISTIC

Andrew Lang (1844–1912) and the Catholic priest Wilhelm Schmidt (1868–1954) challenged the traditional understanding of the content of primitive religious belief. The latter contended that primitive monotheism predated the technological advances some believe led to it. Schmidt, founder of the journal *Anthropos* (1906), sought to establish a chronology of primitive cultures from circumstantial evidence. Like Lang, he maintained that people who were on the lowest rung of the ladder of social and cultural development were monotheists. Schmidt, though he was concerned to discredit the evolutionary kind of ethnography and ethnology prevalent in his day, did not escape their influence. He also believed he had been able to identify the ethnologically oldest people whom he claimed belonged to the most primitive culture. However, this was a culture in which totemism, fetishism, magic, and belief in ghosts or spirits were absent. Instead, these were a people who, by observation and inference, had come to believe in one, eternal, all knowing, all powerful, beneficent God who satisfied all their desires and wants. Once again, no strong evidence is supplied in support of this thesis on the origins of religion and primitive thinking about God and the supernatural order. As a theory, however, it was not without influence, shaping as it did the thinking of some missionaries

working in various part of the world about the beliefs of so called primitive people.

LÉVY BRUHL AND THE PRELOGICAL PRIMITIVES

The notion of primitive religion is closely linked not only to that of primitive society but also to the concept of primitive mentality, especially as it was developed by the French philosopher Lucien Lévy Bruhl (1857–1939), who in his *La Mentalité primitive* (1922) set about describing its attributes. He was not convinced by the theories of Tylor and Frazer, which assumed that the only difference between primitive and more advanced people was not one of intellect but of ignorance, the former being more ignorant than the latter. In terms of intellect, both were the same.

Lévy Bruhl saw things differently. Starting from the assumption that each type of society has its own distinctive mentality he contended that, broadly speaking, there were two types of society: primitive and civilized. He then proceeded to argue that there existed two types of mentality: primitive and civilized. These modes of thought, Lévy Bruhl maintained, were collective in the sense of being all pervasive, taken for granted ways of thinking to which there were no exceptions. The primitive mode he characterized as essentially prelogical and/or mystical, and the civilized as logical. The primitive mentality is prelogical and/or mystical in the sense that primitive people do not make the distinctions between the natural and the supernatural order that so called modern, civilized people make. The latter are capable thus of seeking the causes of things in natural processes and explaining them scientifically. Primitive thought is guided by what he termed the law of participation and does not concern itself with contradiction or the rule of logic, but is rather held together by links or connections that do not conform to the logical thought patterns of more advanced peoples.

Lévy Bruhl is not suggesting by this that primitives are innately incapable of reasoning or thinking logically or that they are a logical, illogical, or anti logical. He is describing the categories in which they reason, their collective representations and the mystical realities in

which they move and which shape their thought. It is for this reason that primitives reason incorrectly and not because, as Tylor and Frazer suggest, their logical processes were mistaken. However, like the rest of the above mentioned theorizing about primitive religion, there is no evidence to support Lévy Bruhl's argument that "primitive thought" differs in quality from "civilized thought." Neither is there any basis for classifying en bloc whole peoples who differ so much from each other socially, culturally, and economically as either primitives or civilized, nor can it be automatically assumed that there is a contradiction between a scientific, causal explanation and a mystical one, or that because something is thought of in mystical terms it cannot also be understood scientifically (and the converse).

MODERN USAGE

While realizing its limitations and controversial character, some scholars have nevertheless offered a robust defense of their use of the term primitive religion. Douglas (1966: 81–2) considers her use of the term in the more general context of a discussion of the distinguishing features of the notion of primitive worldview, which she suggests be characterized by non differentiation. She also describes this worldview as subjective and personal, one in which different modes of existence are confused, and one in which the limitations of man's (*sic*) being are not known. It is anthropomorphic and resembles, Douglas maintains, a pre Copernican worldview. The belief of the !Kung Bushmen of the Kalahari Desert in N!ow provides a good example in her view of belief in anthropocentric powers.

Regarding the question of the use of the term primitive and whether it should be abandoned, Douglas expresses the hope that its use will not be discontinued, on the grounds that if this concept can be given a valid meaning in art and technology, and possibly economics also, then presumably it can also be given a similar sense when used of a certain kind of culture. While accepting that it can have a pejorative sense when used of religious beliefs, she is not convinced that because of this the label should be abandoned and suggests that to do

so could well amount to an inverted form of superiority.

Evans Pritchard (1965) defends his use of the term primitive on the following grounds: that he uses it in a value free sense, is obliged to use the language of those he is critiquing, that it is too firmly established to be dropped, and that etymologically it is unobjectionable. He also points out that the term primitive can be used in both a chronological sense (as it is used by him) and a logical sense, both of which should be kept distinct.

Others do not go to such lengths to defend their use of the term. Bellah (1964) in his treatise on religious evolution – in which one of the categories used is that of primitive religion – is more anxious to make clear what he means by evolution in this case. Evolving religion as he understands it is a symbol system that develops from a compact or primitive form or state to a more differentiated or modern one, the latter not necessarily being better or truer or more beautiful than the former. Thus, religious evolution involves a process of increasing differentiation and complexity of organization. The outcome of this process is to endow the particular system in question, in this case religion, with the greater capacity to adapt to its environment, thus becoming more autonomous in relation to that environment than was the case in its less complex stage. This is the underlying assumption on which Bellah constructs his evolutionary scheme of religion, which begins with primitive religion and evolves into archaic religion, followed by historic religion, early modern religion, and modern religion. These types are not seen as completely distinct, nor does Bellah suggest that this kind of evolution is either inevitable or irreversible.

Confining comment to Bellah's primitive religion, this owes much to Lévy Bruhl's (1922) notions of the mythical world and to research on the mythical world of Australian religion – in particular, anthropological interpretations of the core concept of Dreaming. Bellah's world of primitive religion is a world in which the actual and mythical worlds are closely related to each other, and one which – in terms of its organization – is extremely fluid. He characterizes primitive religion itself in language reminiscent of Marett: it is given over

not to worship or sacrifice, but is characterized by identification, participation, or acting out. It is ritual based. As to primitive religion's social implications, Bellah suggests in line with Durkheim that they consist in reinforcing social solidarity and in socializing the young into the norms of tribal society. These goals and the fluidity and flexibility of primitive religion militate against any kind of radical change.

Stark and Bainbridge (1987) construct a general theory of religion that is also evolutionist after a fashion. Again, it suggests that religion develops from more compact to more differentiated forms. It is argued that when societies reach a certain size and level of complexity specific social organizations emerge, including religious organizations. While in its early stages religion was closely related to magic, Stark and Bainbridge suggest that as society becomes more complex they become increasingly differentiated in terms of specialists and organizations. With increasing complexity the idea of gods emerged, who, though considered to be supernatural beings, were believed to share with humans the attributes of consciousness and desire and come to be seen as supernatural exchange partners who bestow upon humans rewards in return for the fulfillment of certain obligations. As society became even more complex the number of gods decreased – in other words polytheism has tended to give way to monotheism – and religious specialists have emerged to provide explanations of how rewards can be obtained, or if not the actual rewards themselves then how general "compensators" of a supernatural kind can be guaranteed and the costs involved assessed.

Prior to all of this in a simpler, less differentiated world people had resort to magic, which in the opinion of Stark and Bainbridge differs from religion in that it offers very specific compensators that are easily disconfirmed. Therefore, unlike religion, it does not have the capacity to foster long term exchange relationships and as a consequence does not develop into an organization such as a church.

CONCLUSION

The reasons behind the largely pointless search for the origins of religion in the nineteenth

century and first part of the twentieth century have been outlined above. We have also seen that well into the late twentieth century some scholars – in their attempt to construct a refined evolutionist theory of the development of religion – have continued to apply the term primitive to what they consider to be its earliest form. Despite the caveats and qualifications offered for the continuing use of this term, the question whether it should be retained remains. It is such a highly controversial term as to suggest that there is a strong need for a replacement, such as *traditional* or *early forms* of religion, although these two terms also have their limitations. While the label *early forms* is virtually free of any pejorative meanings, the limitations associated with the term primitive are especially evident in relation to the term traditional, which can convey the sense of stagnation and imply that a society where this type of religion is the norm is a society that is unchanging and lacking in dynamism and creativity. Although the term traditional is hardly value free either and raises serious methodological problems, it is less pejorative than the concept of primitive and of greater value analytically. As Evans Pritchard (1965) pointed out, the term primitive as used of religion creates only confusion and is likely most of the time to generate in the mind of the reader a negative stereotype about the religious beliefs, worldview, and practices to which it is applied and by implication about those who adhere to them.

SEE ALSO: Belief; Durkheim, Émile; Magic; Myth; Positivism; Religion; Religion, Sociology of; Sacred

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print media

Dan E. Miller

Print refers to the production of text and images by applying inked types or plates with direct pressure onto paper. The process of printing, reproducing a manuscript in printed pages, allows the rapid production of multiple copies of books, pamphlets, periodicals, and newspapers that can be distributed to a reading public. A *medium* (pl. *media*) refers to the materials and format through which significant symbols are arranged, formatted, presented, and delivered from one person to others. The printed page is a medium of mass communication. Words, visual images, and other symbols are arranged on printed pages as discrete units, most often in linear sequences that cumulatively construct observations, ideas, arguments, and stories.

Produced in large numbers, printed pages are bound together and dispersed to people who, if literate, read the same text. In this way, the medium of print binds people together into a larger community.

Print media include books, pamphlets, periodicals, newspapers, and typewritten or photocopied manuscripts. A book is any printed publication of substantial length. Books are distinguished from pamphlets by their length, with pamphlets having fewer than 96 (or 64) pages. Books are distinguished from periodicals and newspapers not only by their length, but also because they are issued as a single unit whereas periodicals and newspapers are available with new content on a regular basis. Also, books are considered more important, requiring preservation, whereas periodicals are most often discarded after a short period of time. Books preserve information, knowledge, and narratives of enduring relevance, while newspapers and magazines are more constrained by events of the moment. Books preserve timeless information; newspapers present timely information.

Print media meet several needs for a complex society. These include the following functions.

- 1 *Information function*: the public learns about significant events and government actions.
- 2 *Surveillance function*: the public learns about dangers and opportunities.
- 3 *Solidarity function*: community identity and cultural continuity are developed.
- 4 *Agenda setting function*: social, political, and economic priorities are set by leaders.
- 5 *Community forum function*: through print important issues are discussed.
- 6 *Entertainment function*.

In addition to these positive functions, Merton and Lazarsfeld (1948) have identified a troubling process – the *narcotizing dysfunction* – wherein the inundation of information about an issue or event tends to make the reader complacent, comfortably numbed by the overcoverage. Aware but tired of the issue, people fail to act even if the issue is highly compelling.

Reading the history of print leads to the conclusion that the printing press was a key agent of social change (Eisenstein 1979), but only in those places in which the printing press developed in a marketplace context (Couch 1996).

The general principle concerning the development of print and subsequent social change was first articulated by H. A. Innis and Marshall McLuhan. Both offered a soft technological determinist argument that new forms of information technology undermine established media and traditional authority, ultimately establishing a new dominant medium and a new form of authority. The development of the printing press, the mass production of books and pamphlets, and the subsequent development of mass literacy undermined the authority of prior written texts and their interpretation by church officials. The Protestant Reformation and the emerging rational logic of the Enlightenment led to massive social, political, and intellectual change in Europe.

Developed in China in the first century CE, papermaking techniques were introduced into Europe via Spain by Arabs in the thirteenth century. Manuscripts became far less expensive to produce, and paper allowed writing on both sides. Collected sheets of paper were then bound into books. Most early books were reproduced by scribes affiliated with the Catholic Church. The majority of books written and reproduced were ecclesiastical. Ownership of books and literacy were restricted to a small, elite minority. Collections of books often were stored in monasteries. Readers of books, writers, and those who copied them settled near the collections, forming communities of scholars.

In Europe, the first mechanical printing press was invented around 1450 by Johannes Gutenberg (ca. 1397–1468), a goldsmith and merchant, in Mainz, Germany. Gutenberg was not the first to reproduce manuscripts onto paper via moveable type. This process was first accomplished in eleventh century China. Gutenberg's method of printing with moveable type was developed without knowledge of printing being done in Asia. To make the printing process more efficient, Gutenberg converted a winepress into a mechanical printing press, and using cast metal moveable type he was able to reproduce books quickly and inexpensively. Gutenberg's masterpiece, the 42 line Mazarin Bible, was published in 1455. Gutenberg's printing press was the first mass production technology. The publication of an increasing number of books created the potential for mass literacy, particularly in societies where written language

was composed using a phonetic alphabet – the visual representation of sounds (phonemes) which could be sounded out in sequence to form words (morphemes), sentences, and so on.

The European printing industry grew slowly at first, with only ten cities having printing presses in 1471. By 1481 over 100 printing presses were spread throughout Europe. By the end of the fifteenth century nearly every city in Europe had commercial printing presses. While printing presses proliferated, the number of books published grew slowly. Only 219 books were published in 1580 in England. That number grew to 600 books in 1800 and nearly 14,000 books in 1990. Some of the earliest population centers to adopt a printing press were university cities, where a symbiotic relationship was established between scholars and printers. The scholars both wrote and purchased books, while the printers reproduced and sold them.

In the early decades of the printing press neither state nor religious authorities attempted to control the growing print industry. Those authorities did not feel threatened. Before 1500 most books were printed in Latin and were much the same as those reproduced by scribes. However, within a few decades most books were published in the vernacular, the language spoken by the people. In the 1520s Martin Luther published the German Bible, believing there should be no mediation between the common man and the Bible, proclaiming that every Christian was a priest and every citizen was able to read the word of God. By 1550, over 30 vernacular translations of the Bible were in circulation.

Church authorities took little note of the printing industry until criticisms of the church began to be published and distributed in the early sixteenth century. Papal edicts did little to stem the flow of criticism. That criticism grew to major proportions when Martin Luther nailed his 95 theses to the door of Wittenberg church in 1517. With printing presses as commercial enterprises and printed materials increasingly oriented to public concerns, the Catholic Church could not contain the spread of alternative definitions of reality offered by Protestants and other reformers. As more people became literate, nearly every home became a school where the Bible and other books were

studied without the interference of a priest or other authority.

McLuhan's famous aphorism, "the medium is the message," suggests that each new medium of communication creates new symbolic and perceptual environments, making possible new forms of consciousness, thought, and knowledge as we adapt to the new environments. For example, the print medium and the act of reading formed the foundation of critical and reflexive thought. Access to books without direct surveillance and accountability allowed people to read, interpret, stop, think, write, and begin reading again. Inherent in the social form of reading is an absence of immediate reciprocity. Rather, the reader is alone with the text and his thoughts. Consequently, individual identities developed. A culture of individual thinking in a world of ideas was born. Readers tend to have an active life of the mind, full of knowledge, imagination, and a heightened awareness of the world and the possibilities it holds – a form of consciousness that was threatening to the traditional ecclesiastical authority of the church and to the uncritical obeisance demanded by the state.

In those societies where the printing press was controlled by state or ecclesiastical authorities, large scale social change did not occur. For example, shortly after manuscripts were first printed in China, the state took control of the printing and distribution of those manuscripts. Print technology spread from China to other Asian nations, but always as a state controlled activity. While a great many books were published, only a few of each were printed and very few were circulated. The printing process, libraries, and literacy were tightly controlled. Standing authorities were not threatened. Similarly, a printing press was not established in a Muslim country until 1727 and then for only a few years. The first permanent printing press was established in Egypt after Napoleon's conquest in 1798. Nearly all printing presses were and continue to be controlled by Islamic authorities.

As printing developed, an interest in accuracy and correct interpretations emerged. Scholars began to note inconsistencies between traditional writings and their own observations. Removing or correcting inconsistencies in texts grew increasingly common. For example, Roger

Bacon called for the correction of the calendar because Easter was no longer being observed after the vernal equinox. By the sixteenth century, secular books began to outsell religious books. At the same time, secular intellectuals began to replace the clergy as sources of knowledge. Both secular scientific and pragmatic knowledge received greater attention and was increasingly accepted as valid knowledge. As the Enlightenment expanded in the eighteenth century, reason and science trumped faith as rationalizations for action. The printed page had undermined religious authority and teachings. Print media had altered society and the minds of those who read.

As printing continued to grow as a commercial enterprise, an increasing number of people began reading for pleasure – *ludenic reading* – which requires solitude and an expansive period of time. Ludenic reading is not always a trivial pursuit. It, too, can lead to significant social change by fostering a sense of injustice and desire to correct that injustice. Published in 1776, Thomas Paine's *Common Sense* sold 100,000 copies in two months and went through 25 editions. It is estimated that half the adult population in the American colonies read Paine's incendiary pamphlet and, in doing so, redefined the colonies' relationship to Great Britain and the British monarchy. Another example of this process involves the success of Harriet Beecher Stowe's *Uncle Tom's Cabin*, published in 1850. Several million people read this book, and within a year of its publication strong public sentiment in opposition to slavery had arisen in the Northern states, culminating in the abolitionist movement. These books provided an awareness of injustice, of alternative arrangements, and they provided a vocabulary for change. By the end of the nineteenth century, books had become the dominant sources of entertainment, valid information, and knowledge. Citizens consulted books and not people when they were searching for information. Knowledge became significant in and of itself – worthy of being preserved.

The spread of information through a community predates newspapers. Town criers, visitors with information from elsewhere, and rumors all reported information about current issues and events. However, "the news" as the regular reporting of significant daily events emerged

along with the establishment of the printing press, particularly in cities. In order to capture a large share of the reading public, the news as a regular forum of information was dependent on the gathering, rapid production, and dissemination of desired information and ideas. For this a printing press was required.

The first news sheet, the *Notizie Scritte*, was published in 1556 in Venice. This irregular paper reported on the arrival of ships, items for sale, and happenings from abroad. It was called a *gazetta* for the coin it cost to purchase it. By 1605, newspapers appeared in Germany, France, and Belgium. These newspapers typically carried stories about the happenings in a community, including economic and political activities, and hijinks involving the ruling elite. Governmental authorities, who had been slow to react to books, responded quickly to newspapers, particularly those critical of the government and the aristocratic elite. In 1632 the monarchy banned all "news books" in England. However, nearly all newspapers were profitable commercial enterprises and governmental acts to suppress or destroy them proved to be ineffective. Some editors and publishers were jailed and their presses destroyed, but as soon as one was suppressed another newspaper appeared. In 1644 John Milton advocated the concept of "the marketplace of ideas" and opposed the practice of censorship. His position was based on the notion that from the free flow of ideas came truth which would free us.

Most early newspapers were fiercely partisan, competing to establish a consensual definition of reality. The term "public opinion" emerged early in the eighteenth century as newspaper reading increased and those who regularly read the news began to develop a reflective standpoint toward authorities and the issues of the day. Those who regularly read the same newspaper tended to form a shared standpoint toward political and religious authorities. Regular reporting on and criticism of the actions of government authorities rendered those authorities mundane and profane, their actions often a source of ridicule, their authority compromised.

Newspapers and pamphlets not only can solidify public opinion, but also can move people to action. In the American colonies many newspapers were critical of the British control. Unjust actions were criticized – particularly

the Stamp Act of 1765. As the governmental authorities increased their controlling actions, a great increase in newspaper and pamphlet publishing ensued. Well read newspapers and pamphlets, such as Tom Paine's *Common Sense*, justifications for rebellion not only against particular acts and officials, but also against monarchy itself as a valid form of government. Phrases like "freedom of the press" and "no taxation without representation," first introduced in newspapers and pamphlets, along with the positions articulated by Milton and Paine, became the rationale behind the freedom of the press provision in the first amendment to the United States Constitution adopted in 1791.

The emotional response to reading newspaper accounts differs from that of reading books. Newspaper readers often show anger or pride as they read. Also, they are inclined to enter into agitated discussions about the stories they have read. On the other hand, book readers express far less emotional response. Cooler and more analytical, book readers more often enter into detached, intellectual discussions about the ideas they have read in books.

Beginning in the early twentieth century newspapers transformed. Prior to this time they had been highly partisan, representing the interests of labor unions, political parties, and ethnic groups, making money largely from newspaper sales. Increasingly, newspaper profits were realized through the sale of advertisements. In order to maintain a steady flow of advertising revenue, a style of reporting and editorial policies developed that did not alienate the business community. The principle of "objective reporting" most likely was derived from the non-partisan approach to reporting the news that became the norm after newspapers grew increasingly dependent on advertising revenue. The values of advertising and business became intertwined with news. Newspapers changed, offering fewer news accounts while adopting more sports, fashion, entertainment, and family stories, which often corresponded to the ads. Newspapers became advocates for businesses.

Early in the nineteenth century, public schools were established in the United States with the democratic intention that all children should learn to read and compute mathematics. Textbooks began to be written and published in a format that began with simple ideas and

progressed to increasingly complex ideas and operations. Prior to the printing press school instruction was conducted by a teacher reading from a solitary text, often with students repeating what had been spoken in order to memorize the material. With the advent of printed texts distributed to each student, public reading was replaced by silent reading. Similarly, with the increasing availability of printed material in general, people began to read silently. In North America reading was not an elitist activity. Instead, because print media had developed as a commercial enterprise, the content of print tended to serve the diverse interests of the reading public. A classless, democratic reading culture evolved.

Periodicals (journals and magazines) are published regularly at greater intervals than newspapers – weekly, monthly, or quarterly instead of daily. The content of periodicals ranges from technical and scholarly journals whose content has some longevity to mass circulated, highly illustrated magazines focusing on celebrities and entertainment whose reading life is very short. The first periodical, the *Journal des savants*, was published in France from 1665 to 1792. A literary, scientific, and art weekly, it has been widely imitated. Even today, many contemporary magazines are similar in appearance and content. By the end of the eighteenth century periodicals targeted to special identity groups appeared. Journals for lawyers and scholars were introduced, as were magazines targeted to women. In the nineteenth century, novels began to be serialized in magazines. For example, many of Charles Dickens's novels first appeared in popular magazines. A common theme of popular magazines was comedy, particularly political and cultural satire. In the United States, *Mad* magazine survived for decades. Today, the *Onion*, an Internet "publication," is a popular source of political and cultural satire, as are the stories and cartoons found in periodicals such as the *New Yorker*.

Magazines intended for women have been in existence for 200 years. However, since the development of modern advertising in the early twentieth century, women's magazines have changed. Increasingly, women's magazines are filled with advertisements – often much more than text. The ads are intended to promote consumerism. Stories, advice columns, and

reports of current trends illustrate how beauty, sexuality, health, happiness, career success, cooking skills, and social status are available, if not quite affordable. A superficial reading of these magazines may lead a reader to believe that such magazines equate status with consumerism. Ironically, women's magazines set the foundation for the women's movement by illustrating how women can gain control of their lives and find happiness through education and by entering into the professional and business worlds formerly dominated by men.

Increasingly, social scientists and historians are concerned over recent trends in the print media. While books continue to be published in record numbers – about 75,000 new titles in 2004 – book sales have stagnated and even decreased slightly in recent years. Similarly, newspapers continue to be published and continue to be profitable, but with less competition due to the fact that most cities have only one major daily newspaper. The number of daily newspapers has dropped only slightly since mid century – 1,763 in 1946 and 1,534 in 1994. As with books, newspapers in the United States are losing readers. It is rare to find a regular reader of a newspaper under the age of 40. The culture of print has ceased growing and is showing signs of significant decline.

Another concern is an increasing concentration of ownership of the print media by large corporations. About 75 percent of all newspapers are owned by corporate chains. Fewer corporations own and control an increasing number of newspapers, magazines, and book publishing houses. Many of these corporate entities are media conglomerates with print media constituting only a part of larger business empires that include radio, television, movies, and music industries. With conglomeration, a synergy develops wherein the different components of a corporate conglomerate work together to produce benefits for each other in a way that would not be possible without the interlocking connections that define this form of social organization. Thus, book publishers may favor the publication of books that can be made into movies, which subsequently are made in the conglomerate's movie studios and distributed by the conglomerate to the public. Magazines owned by the conglomerate featuring stories and photographs of celebrities who have just made a movie are

distributed to coordinate with the release of the movie in the theater chain owned by the conglomerate. The movie's stars and director appear on the conglomerate's television network talk shows to discuss the movie between commercials advertising the conglomerate's material products. The fear is that with this process fewer "good" books will be published.

Conglomeration, the concentrated ownership of the media, and the increasing reliance on advertising revenue strongly suggest a significant decrease in investigating and reporting corrupt business and governmental practices, a paucity of valid information, and the demise of competing views of reality. Social scientists and historians fear that these trends may lead to a single, dominant, uncritical, business friendly worldview – a condition of *ideological hegemony*, of ideas and values and little awareness of alternatives. Certainly, this condition does not yet exist in the United States, although the trend does fall in that direction. Recent research indicates that the content of print media has not yet become homogenized, that vast amounts of information and multiple perspectives on reality are readily available, and that the readers of print media continue to determine the types of articles and books that are written.

SEE ALSO: Ideological Hegemony; McLuhan, Marshall; Media; Media and Globalization; Media Literacy; Media Monopoly; Media, Network(s) and; Media and the Public Sphere; Media, Regulation of; Social Change

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prisons

Melvina Sumter

Prisons are secure institutions which house juvenile and adult felons with sentences that range from one year to life who are remanded to the custody of a state or federal correctional agency for incarceration. These facilities have the task of carrying out the sentence imposed by the courts as well as protecting the public by preventing escapes through maintaining custody and safe and secure institutions. As well, these facilities are charged with the responsibility of providing all of the programs and services necessary to care for the inmate population remanded to their custody.

Prisons are operated by all 50 states and the District of Columbia, the federal government, and the military. Each of the 50 states and the District of Columbia operates its own correctional system; as such, there is considerable variation in terms of the organization, administration, operation, and management of these facilities as well as the programs and services offered. However, in the majority of state systems the administration of the prison is the function of the executive branch of state government in which the governor appoints a state director (also known as commissioner or secretary) to oversee the administration and operations of the state prison system (Clear & Cole 2003).

The Federal Bureau of Prisons is responsible both for juvenile and adult offenders who have

been convicted of federal crimes and for managing and operating federal facilities in the United States. Although the first federal prison was opened in 1790, it was not until 1930 that Congress created the Federal Bureau of Prisons to serve as a centralized administration to manage and regulate the 11 federal prisons in operation at that time (Bartollas 2002; Champion 2005). Today, the Federal Bureau of Prisons is headed by a director who oversees eight centralized divisions, an Office of the General Counsel, an Office of Inspections, six US regions in which federal prisons are located, and the National Institute of Corrections.

The US Army, Navy, Air Force, and Marine Corps manage prisons for military personnel who have been turned over to the military for trial, sentencing, and imprisonment after committing crimes in military or civilian jurisdictions (Stinchcomb & Fox 1999). Military prisons are also responsible for individuals who have been convicted of violations of the Uniform Code of Military Conduct or being Absent Without Leave. As well, military prisons house prisoners of war whose freedom is deemed a national security risk by military or civilian authorities (Stinchcomb & Fox 1999).

The Walnut Street Jail is considered to be the first penitentiary used exclusively for the correction of convicted offenders in the United States (Stinchcomb & Fox 1999). Moreover, in 1790, a portion of the Walnut Street Jail was converted to a wing called the penitentiary house to use imprisonment as an alternative sanction to the widespread use of corporal and capital punishment. As such, solitary confinement with labor inside the cell was viewed as a mechanism to provide inmates time for contemplation, repentance, and reformation in hopes that the introspection process would allow them the opportunity to reflect on, and thereby atone for, their crimes, and place themselves on the right path (Friedman 1993; Stinchcomb & Fox 1999; Clear & Cole 2003). The Walnut Street Jail served as the model for what became known as the Pennsylvania and Auburn Penitentiary Systems. While both systems included solitary confinement in separate cells and enforced silence at all times to prevent inmates from communicating, there were distinct differences in the operation of the two models. The Pennsylvania system was designed to isolate each inmate for

the duration of confinement; therefore, inmates remained in their cells during the entire period of incarceration. Conversely, the Auburn system developed a congregate system of prison discipline whereby inmates were held in isolation at night but congregated in workshops during the day with enforced silence at all times (Clear & Cole 2003). Because the inmates did not need large cell space to work and were able to generate productive labor, since they worked in a factory during the day, the Auburn system proved to be more financially practical than the Pennsylvania system. As a result, the Auburn system eventually prevailed in becoming the dominant penal model for maximum security prisons in the United States (Champion 2005).

TYPES OF PRISONS

After being sentenced to prison, inmates are transferred to a reception and evaluation center where they are assessed in order to determine the appropriate level of physical barriers and degree of staff supervision needed inside the prison to prevent escapes and maintain safe and secure correctional facilities. During the diagnostic phase, a classification instrument is used to evaluate the risk and dangerousness of the inmate and to match the inmate's programming needs and need to protect the community with a facility commensurate with the appropriate custody and security level (Champion 2005). As such, prisons are classified and designated by security levels that identify the type of institution required to house inmates based on their final classification score. This score is determined by factors such as the severity of the current offense, history of escapes or violence, sentence length, and number of prior convictions or commitments. Although there is administrative and operational variation among the three jurisdictions, inmates are generally assigned to a minimum, medium, or maximum security prison from the reception and evaluation center.

Minimum security prisons, also called open camp correctional institutions, or camps, house the least restrictive, low risk, non violent first time inmate. Inmates with violent offenses or long sentences who have clean disciplinary records and good behavior, and who have thus advanced through the classification system from

a more restrictive facility, may also be housed in minimum security prisons. These facilities have a minimal amount of external control, therefore generally possess only a single fence, with grounds and physical plant features resembling a university campus rather than a prison. There is a relatively low staff to inmate ratio and housing is often of dormitory style. Since a primary focus of these institutions is reintegration of the inmate back into the community, a significant portion of the department of correction's educational, vocational, and treatment programs are allocated to these facilities.

Medium security prisons, also called correctional facilities or institutions, house a wide variety of inmates who are less dangerous and escape prone than inmates housed in maximum security, but not of a sufficiently low enough risk to be entrusted a minimum level of security. These facilities are generally surrounded by a double chain link fence, topped with barbed or razor wire and electronic devices, and often use congregate housing or dormitory style living arrangements, which contain a group toilet and shower. These facilities also have a higher staff to inmate ratio than minimum security facilities, inmates live in cell type housing, and a wide variety of work, educational, vocational, and treatment programs are provided.

Maximum security prisons, also called penitentiaries, house inmates who have long sentences and pose a severe threat to society. These facilities were traditionally surrounded by tall thick walls, usually 30 to 50 feet high and several feet thick, topped with barbed or razor wire, with gun towers that are strategically placed in corners with armed correctional officers. As a result of cost, however, modern structures are more likely to be surrounded by chain link fences bounded by electrified wire than by thick walls (Clear & Cole 2003). The inmates generally live in small cells that contain their own sanitary facility. These prisons have a significantly higher staff to inmate ratio than medium security prisons, inmates live in multiple and single occupant cell housing, and there are fewer work and treatment opportunities offered than at medium security prisons.

Super maximum prisons are independent correctional facilities or a distinct unit within an existing prison that provide for the management and secure control of inmates who are

generally reassigned from a maximum, medium, or minimum security prison because of disruptive behavior. Moreover, super maximum prisons house inmates who have been officially designated as exhibiting aggressive or violent behavior, and therefore are unmanageable when housed with the general inmate population or placed in administrative segregation. The inmates placed in super maximum facilities often have assaulted other inmates or staff, are believed to be members of a security threat group, or have incited riots or other disturbances. These inmates eat and exercise alone and are not allowed contact visits.

Since the 1980s, some correctional facilities have been run by private corporations. Here the total operation and management of a correctional facility is transferred to a private corporation that operates the facility for a profit. Although the concept of private prisons emerged during the 1980s, correctional agencies have long contracted with private corporations for a variety of services to include providing medical and dental care, school programs, counseling, nursing homes, halfway houses, juvenile facilities, and alcohol and drug treatment services (Bartollas 2002). In addition to contracting with state and federal government for the total operation and management of a correctional facility, private corporations also finance, site, and build prisons.

PRISONS TODAY

Prison populations have more than tripled during the past several decades as a result of “get tough” policies such as the war on drugs, mandatory minimum sentences, habitual offender statutes, truth in sentencing and three strikes you’re out legislation, and the abolition of parole. All of these were designed to provide inmates longer sentences as well as keep them in prison for longer periods of time. As a result of the escalation in the prison population, current inmate populations exceed cell capacity in almost all state and federal prisons; therefore, many prisons are overcrowded. Prison crowding presents several challenges for correctional personnel. Overcrowding makes it difficult to manage safe and secure correctional facilities by placing more stress on correctional staff, who

are expected to maintain order within a facility holding more inmates than it was designed for (Mays & Winfree 2002). Likewise, prison overcrowding increases the propensity for violence among offenders, results in more serious injuries and assaults of inmates and staff by inmates, facilitates more disciplinary infractions, leads to more inmate lawsuits challenging conditions of confinement, and decreases access to programs and services (Clear & Cole 2003).

In addition to an influx of inmates, the composition of the prison population has also changed. More specifically, today there is an increase in the number of African Americans, females, juveniles, and geriatric offenders. Similarly, there is a substantial growth in the number of special needs offenders to include mentally ill and retarded offenders, offenders with AIDS, and alcohol and substance abusing offenders. As such, correctional administrators are tasked with the responsibility of supervising an increasing influx of diverse inmates without corresponding increases in funds, facilities, and/or other resources (Mays & Winfree 2002). Consequently, funds barely cover the programming and treatment needs of inmates or the increasing health costs because of the rise in the special needs population and offenders with AIDS. Hence, although correctional budgets have increased substantially, these funds are used primarily to build more prisons and for operational expenses. As such, prison administrators are limited to providing minimal treatment programs, educational and vocational programs, and health and medical services to the inmate population.

SEE ALSO: Corrections; Courts; Crime; Criminal Justice System; Criminology; Law, Criminal

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privacy

Gary T. Marx

Privacy, like the weather, is much discussed, little understood, and difficult to control. It is a multidimensional concept with fluid and often ill defined, contested, and negotiated borders, depending on the context and the culture. Along with its opposite *publicity*, it is nonetheless a cornerstone of modern society's ideas of the person and of democracy.

As the impacts of computerization on society (and the reverse) become ever more apparent, issues of privacy and publicity are vital for understanding society and for the creation of the good society.

Privacy and *publicity* are nouns. For purposes of explanation, they can be seen as polar ends of a continuum. This perspective draws attention to the moral or normative aspects of withholding and disclosing of information and asking or not asking for information. Depending on the context, social roles, and culture, individuals or groups may be required, find it optional, or be prohibited from engaging in these activities.

These in turn involve a broader area called the sociology of information. Governing rules here vary from situations where information must be kept private to those where it must be made public (or perhaps better, must be revealed – whether as part of a confidential relationship or to the public at large). There is considerable subjectivity with respect to expectations about how information is to be treated.

In contrast, *private* and *public* are adjectives that can tell us about the status of information. They describe whether or not the information is known. This has an objective quality and can be relatively easily measured. For example, the gender of persons we pass on the street is generally visible and known. The information is

“public.” In contrast, the political and religious beliefs of pedestrians are generally invisible and unknown.

Of course, normative expectations of privacy and publicity do not always correspond to how the adjectives public and private are applied to empirical facts. Thus the cell phone conversations of politicians and celebrities that have privacy protections may become public. Information subjected to publicity requirements such as government and corporate reports and disclosure statements may be withheld, destroyed, or falsified. Information not entitled to privacy protections, such as child or spouse abuse, may be unknown because of the inaccessibility of the home to broader visibility. Confidential or classified information may be leaked, hacked, or mistakenly released.

Privacy and publicity can also be thought of in literal and metaphorical spatial terms involving invisibility–visibility and inaccessibility–accessibility. The physical privacy offered by a closed door and walls and an encrypted email communication share information restriction, even as they differ in other ways. Internet forums are not geographically localized, but in their accessibility can be usefully thought of as public places, not unlike the traditional public square.

Privacy needs to be separated from related terms. *Surveillance* simply involves scrutiny (often using technical means that extend the senses) for a variety of goals such as control, protection, management, documentation, and entertainment. It is a way of discovering information. It may involve obvious invasions of privacy, as with selling the results of DNA and other testing to insurance companies, or illegal wiretapping or spyware placed on a computer. Yet surveillance can also be the means of protecting privacy. Consider biometric identification and audit trails required to access some databases or defensive measures such as a home security video camera.

Privacy is inherently social. The term was irrelevant to Robinson Crusoe when he thought he was alone on the island. It is social in the sense that it implies an “other” from whom information is withheld, or to whom it is supplied and who may, or may not, be under equivalent expectations to reveal and conceal.

Social roles structure the treatment of information and this often involves issues of power.

Thus, close friends in an equal relationship are expected to reveal parts of themselves that they would not reveal at the mall or at work. Sharing one's inner thoughts and feelings is expected to be reciprocal. A relationship of intimacy is partly defined by the mutuality of revelation. This contrasts with the more impersonal roles of doctor and patient. Thus the revelations of a patient to a doctor are not likely to be reciprocated.

Rules regarding who can collect personal information, what is collected, the conditions under which it is gathered, and how it is used (and by whom) are very much connected to social stratification. Rose Coser (1961) uses the felicitous phrase "insulation from observability" to describe the norms and resources that protect the actions of higher status roles in bureaucratic organizations.

Many contemporary concerns over privacy invasion involve large organizations and their employees and customers or police and suspects, professionals and clients, as well as interpersonal relations such as parents and children. In these contexts the rules are relatively clear about who can ask or observe and who is expected to reveal (or is entitled to conceal). Situations involving power differences with respect to gender and ethnicity may also reflect information inequality. On the other hand, maids, valets, butlers, chauffeurs, and personal assistants often know a great deal about the private lives of those they work for and this tends to be unreciprocated.

Confidentiality often accompanies expectations of privacy. It reminds us that information issues are fundamentally social. It refers not to the initial revelation or creation of information but to an expectation that personal information, once legitimately known by others, will be treated appropriately. This may involve sharing it according to established rules (e.g., as in medical treatment involving several specialists who discuss a patient), but otherwise keeping the information *secret* (as with social security numbers that must be given to an employer).

Secret is an adjective like private which can be used to describe the status of information. In restricting information, *secrecy* overlaps privacy. But it goes beyond it to characterize the information protecting activities of organizations as well as individuals. It generally has a

culturally and morally more ambiguous status than privacy.

When personal privacy is viewed as a *right*, it calls attention to the individual's ability to control the release of information. This does not mean that it cannot be shared, but that the individual has a choice. The 5th Amendment, for example, does not prohibit individuals from offering information, it simply prohibits this information from being coercively obtained.

In contrast, the rules applying to secrecy are more likely to involve an *obligation* that prohibits the release of information. This is often accompanied by sanctions for violation. In principle, individuals and organizations don't have a choice about divulging information appropriately deemed to be secret. Such protective rules, along with the fact that the very existence of the secret may be unknown to outsiders, can protect untoward behavior. As Georg Simmel (1950) suggested, the secret, whether legitimate or illegitimate, can also be a factor contributing to group solidarity.

SOME TYPES OF PRIVACY

In the age of new surveillance, we increasingly see techniques that break through borders that previously protected personal and organizational data, whether involving computer databases, Internet monitoring, videocams, drug testing, RFID chips, or DNA analysis. As a result, questions of *informational privacy*, or the ability of individuals to choose what information about themselves will be offered to others and how this will be treated, are important social issues. Rights to freedom of religion and thought, association, and speech are fundamental here.

Another form of privacy which calls more explicit attention to behavior itself (rather than information about it) involves *decisional privacy*. Consider, for example, personal choices involving reproduction and the refusal of medical services, as well as lifestyle issues such as sexual preference. The right to liberty is fundamental to this.

A concept encompassing both of the above involves privacy as *access* to the person. The metaphor of a border or wall surrounding the person can be applied. Is it (and when should it be) impenetrable or porous? To what extent

can the individual, in principle and in actuality, control information flowing *outward* involving telephone or computer communication, credit card and other transactions, beliefs and feelings, location, facial appearance, or biometric data such as DNA, voice print, heat, and scent?

Conversely, to what extent can the individual control information and stimuli going *inward* sent from others? This goes in the other direction – entering rather than leaving the person. The desire for solitude, often viewed as an aspect of privacy, may be seen here. Individuals seek to screen out undesirable sounds, smells, and sights, whether these involve propaganda and advertisements, or unwanted music and cooking smells from an adjacent apartment. This is part of an expectation to be left alone.

The telescreen in George Orwell's novel *1984* illustrates both forms. It transmitted the person's image and communication to Big Brother, while simultaneously broadcasting propaganda to the individual. There was only one channel and it couldn't be turned off.

A more descriptive definitional approach simply looks at the institutional setting. Thus we can speak of privacy as it involves consumption, finances, employment, medical, religious, political, and national security arenas. We can also consider a particular means used or activity (e.g., locational privacy, communication privacy – whether involving computers, telephones, or television). Distinct types of data may be involved – e.g., financial, genetic, or beliefs – and these can be expressed in different forms – e.g., as numbers, narratives, images, or sound. While there are commonalities, expectations and practices vary depending on the setting, means, activity, content, and data form. Social science and philosophy have only begun to disentangle these.

SOME CROSS CULTURAL ASPECTS

While information control is a factor in all societies and some activities such as procreation and elimination are generally shielded from others, there is enormous historical and cultural variability (Moore 1984). The Greeks, for example, placed the highest value on public life. One's sense of identity was found there. Privacy, being the realm of slaves, women, and children who

were restricted to the home, was not valued. To be private meant *deprivation*. In traditional communal societies where life is lived in close proximity to others, the distinction between privacy and publicity has little meaning.

We also see differences in how contemporary societies protect privacy. With respect to personal information issues, in the United States there is greater emphasis, relative to Europe, on the liberty to choose behavior and less government regulation, whether of monitoring in the workplace or of organizations that buy and sell personal information. Large organizations warehouse and sell vast amounts of personal data on the most intimate of subjects, generally without the consent of, and with no direct benefit to, the subject.

In contrast, the secondary use of information in Europe generally requires the informed consent of the subject. In much of Europe, citizens are offered general protection from new, potentially privacy invasive technologies through constitutional guarantees involving (a rather unspecific) right to personhood or personal dignity. Europe, Canada, and many Asian societies also have privacy commissions charged with protecting privacy and anticipating future problems.

The approach in the US is to regulate technologies on a case by case basis as they appear, rather than on the basis of a broad inclusive principle. This is particularly the case for new forms that are dependent on judicial review or legislation specifically crafted for the technique. This in turn is often dependent on some indignation raising misuse becoming public and a drawn out political process. Individuals also have greater responsibility for protecting their own privacy, whether through using protective technologies or suing privacy invaders (assuming the invasion can be discovered).

Conceptions of privacy (and publicity as well) are relatively new and are related to the emergence of the modern nation state and the economic and political rights associated with capitalism and democracy. Rules requiring privacy and publicity are very much a part of the modern state and, while going in opposite directions, developed in tandem.

Private property, particularly the home, suggested a location to be protected from outsiders. A *laissez faire* marketplace where participants

pursued their self interest required strategic control over information and the idea of information as property. The metropolis, with its social and geographical mobility and larger scale, offered a kind of anonymity unknown to the small village and new means for validating the claims of strangers. Larger living quarters meant more physical privacy as societies became richer. Most homes now have more than one bedroom and individuals have the possibility of their own bed.

Political democracy required both openness in government as a means of accountability and public discussion of issues. The latter required citizens with the liberty to form associations that were free to express their views in the public forums of civil society and that needed protection from government interference. Yet government was also given limited powers to cross personal borders to gather information relevant to health and safety, criminal justice, and national security in an increasingly complex and interdependent world.

Privacy is usually thought of as something belonging to individuals. The ability to control information about the self is central to the personhood and dignity implied in the notion of the modern citizen. However, the ability to control information is also significant to group and organizational borders. Privacy is a social as well as an individual value (Regan 1995). For example, a legal oppositional political group (or indeed any group) needs to be able to control information about members, resources, and plans and to feel that freedom of expression within the group is respected. To the extent that a group's borders are porous – punctured by informers and intensive surveillance – its ability to act strategically is weakened and, of course, democratic ideals are undermined.

Privacy can be seen either as a commodity or as a right to which individuals are entitled. The social implications of the view taken are quite different. As a commodity, individuals may sell, trade, or be coerced into giving away their private information (e.g., for frequent flyer miles or the convenience of using a credit card). They may pay for privacy protection, as well as purchase personal information on others – note the large number of Internet sites offering this service.

The US Constitution is seen by many scholars to imply a right to privacy, although this is not explicit. Justice William Douglas in *Grismold v. Connecticut* (1965) used the term “penumbra” in identifying various places where “zones of privacy” were guaranteed (e.g., the 1st, 3rd, 4th, and 5th Amendments to the Constitution). Some state constitutions (particularly in the western states) guarantee a right to privacy, as do the constitutions of most European countries. Privacy is also protected by organizational policies and privacy protecting technologies (e.g., encryption, shredders, and devices to discover bugs).

The notion of unrestrained, all powerful privacy invaders with ravenous and insatiable information appetites waiting to pounce on the unsuspecting individual is too one sided. Most organizations are inhibited by values and by concern over negative publicity should they go too far in crossing personal information borders. Furthermore, as the work of Erving Goffman (1956) suggests, through manners and rituals we also cooperate to varying degrees with each other to maintain individual privacy and self respect.

SEE ALSO: Bureaucracy and Public Sector Governmentality; Celebrity and Celetoid; Censorship; Civil Society; Goffman, Erving; Information Society; Media; Public and Private; Public Sphere; Surveillance

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privatization

Burkart Holzner

Privatization is a transfer of public services provided by various levels of governments in national states to the private sector of business. It is a relatively recent transformation of governance and markets in countries worldwide. In fact, it is an extraordinary, rapidly expanding phenomenon that is rising in global waves, transferring ownership from governments to private enterprises.

Rendering public services via private businesses creates important political, economic, and cultural changes. The actual methods for privatization are manifold; they can be outright purchases, leases, subsidies or other cooperative partnerships, or yet other approaches. However, they put the privatized public service into the hands of private managers. The concept of privacy is not identical with privatization, but it is a part of the cluster of values linked to other changing values for governance and for markets. Privacy of enterprises emphasizes autonomy, independence, secrecy, and profit for the owners; both governance and markets demand transparency, accountability, and benefits for the public good. Democracy can be benefited by the efficiencies of privatization if the provided service responds to public needs and sensitivities, but it may be harmed where the private owners of a function are alien to the public.

The history of privatization begins relatively late in the western industrial nations. Monarchical nations were less differentiated than modern democratic institutions. Much of common (rather than public) property was that of the monarch, encompassing the functioning of government. The differentiation of modern societies includes now multiple institutions in government, such as foreign affairs, the military, health, education, justice, and markets. This growth of institutions gave room for the distinction of private versus public ownerships.

The Great Depression in the 1930s raised doubt about the viability of capitalism. Citizens were inclined to trust national states rather than risky markets. At the end of World War II the major industrial nations turned to the task of state rebuilding and reconstruction. This effort focused on the importance of state owned enterprises (SOEs) and on strategic sectors of the national economy. The reliance on the state was predominant, especially in "statist" Europe. The US, however, was and remained more flexible in encouraging enterprises as well as government. The role of the federal government was also strengthened, for example, by establishing social security and regulations. Yet private and public partnerships occurred well before strong efforts at privatization in the US.

Early efforts to reduce the economic role of the state included Churchill's "denationalization"

of the British steel industry and Adenauer's withdrawal of the West German government's major investment in Volkswagen in 1961. However, denationalization at the time was not very popular. The major movement toward privatization was energized much later by Margaret Thatcher. She also coined the concept of privatization. At that time (the early 1980s) a number of privatization goals were pursued by the British government: (1) provide new revenue through privatization of public enterprises; (2) improve economic efficiency; (3) limit the government's role in the economy; (4) encourage broader share ownership; (5) encourage competition; (6) require SOEs to aspire to market discipline. In the US Ronald Reagan won a landslide victory in 1980 and easily won his second term in 1984. His policies were to reduce taxes, cut government programs, and finance an astounding defense buildup, resulting in a large budget deficit. Privatization in various forms was encouraged by Reagan. Reducing the role of government (except the military) was a high priority.

The collapse of the Soviet Union was completed in December 1991, but the breakdown had begun with the dismantling of the Berlin Wall in November 1989. The 1980s and 1990s saw a revitalization of capitalism and the rapid expansion of democracy, especially among the East European countries as well as in many other parts of the world. During this period a great sense of urgency arose to transform communist centrally planned economies to free markets. There was also a demand to reduce the powers of governments and make the building of democratic institutions possible, resulting in experiments in privatization, lawmaking, and institution building. In many ways the transition included an enormous wave of corruption in governments, but also in the rising private sector.

The ideology of freeing the citizenry from the constraints of government grew in the US, Britain, and to a much lesser degree in Europe. Some politicians in these countries believed privatization might eliminate government altogether in significant ways. However, the experience of "shock privatization" in the Russian Federation and difficulties in many of the transforming East European countries led to recognition of the necessity of the rule of

law, the creation of democratic institutions, and effective regulations for a functioning market.

After the expansionist enthusiasm for privatization in the 1990s, a more balanced approach is now emerging, increasingly based on the empirical experiences of successes and failures. Privatization of certain public services has actually proven to be efficient and workable, but this cannot be assumed to be generally true. However, great differences exist in cultural values, legal frameworks, regulations, and commitment to transparency and social responsibility. Some countries may be without workable institutional frameworks to support effective and ethical privatization. Where these conditions allow mismanaged or secretive measures, serious harm can occur. Unfortunately, such conditions prevail in several privatized military functions, certain privatized prisons, and in many other fields.

Public services have to be assessed for their mission, efficiency, ethics, and freedom from corruption. The idea that privatization can always reduce government effectively has to be questioned – it is likely to be very limited. There are other risks: privatization can reduce citizens' participation in democracy and may indeed be harmful to democracy (e.g., in the case of a public service carried out by a global corporation at a great distance). The emerging research literature will make it possible to reduce the ideology of "freedom from government by privatization" and provide the needed empirical knowledge to use privatization positively for the public.

SEE ALSO: Capital: Economic, Cultural, and Social; Capitalism; Change Management; Development: Political Economy; Labor Movement; Neoliberalism; Outsourcing; Political Economy; Public and Private; Public Sphere; Unions; Welfare State, Retrenchment of

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privilege

Deana A. Rohlinger

There is a historical and cultural tendency for dominant groups to institutionalize discrimination against subdominant groups. Discrimination is justified by arguing that members of the subdominant group are deficient in some way when compared to members of the dominant group. The idealized characteristics of the dominant group are intertwined in social, cultural, and legal institutions and ultimately work to advantage, or privilege, members of the dominant group and disadvantage those of the subdominant group. Sociologists most often discuss privilege in terms of gender (how women are subordinated to men), race/ethnicity (how people of color are subordinated to those with white skin), and sexuality (how homosexuals, bisexuals, and transsexuals are subordinated to heterosexuals).

In the United States, gender roles and expectations have been governed by the doctrine of the separate spheres. This ideology holds that women are virtuous, nurturing, and frail and therefore unable to contend with the demands of politics and commerce. Men, in contrast, are aggressive, competitive, and strong and, thus,

better suited for public life. Even as these beliefs were challenged throughout the twentieth century, the inequities between men and women persisted. Sociologists identify male privilege as being both embedded in the structure of complex organizations and reproduced in social relations.

Sociologists analyze the ways in which male dominance in the public sphere affects complex structures such as the workplace and school. Scholars argue that gender stratification in the workplace (with women largely confined to low level jobs at the bottom of the organizational hierarchy) and the use of male characteristics to define the ideal worker diminishes the career mobility of women by shaping hiring and promotion practices, employee performance assessment, and the distribution of work tasks. Moreover, when women break through unacknowledged barriers to their advancement, or the "glass ceiling," they are treated like "tokens" rather than capable employees who possess the skills and wherewithal to do the job. Gendered expectations about the kinds of skills women and men possess and the kinds of jobs they are best suited for are learned in school. Textbooks and the courses targeted to girls (home economics) and boys (wood working) reinforce stereotypes about the fields in which boys and girls are likely to excel.

Sociologists note that male privilege also is reproduced through interactions in these structures. At work, women's jobs often require deference to and caregiving for a male authority. For example, secretaries, paralegals, and nurse assistants tend to the schedules and well being of their (male) bosses. In school, teacher interactions with students often reinforce gender stereotypes about the fields in which boys and girls excel by giving boys more attention than girls in science and math classes and by differently praising their work (commending boys for content while commending girls for being neat).

Race and ethnicity, like gender, are social concepts. While race and ethnicity have different sociological meanings, they are often used interchangeably. Race and ethnic categories are given meaning through the social relations and within the historical context in which they are embedded. For example, in colonial America, class and whether one was native born were more important than skin tone in determining

status. The American Revolution, which was based on the premises of equality and freedom, threw the institution of slavery into question, and an ideology that justified slavery and kept African Americans out of the increasingly competitive labor market for unskilled labor formed. The obvious characteristic was skin color, and the idea that non white groups, particularly African Americans, required supervision, education, and guidance quickly took hold.

While much of the early research on race and ethnicity tried to justify the subordination of people of color by citing biological and cultural differences, sociologists argue that white privilege, like male privilege, is embedded in institutional structures and interactions. Scholars specifically examine how institutional racism, or the system of beliefs and behavior by which a racial or ethnic group is defined and oppressed, affects the opportunities and realities of people of color. For example, many scholars have shown that the lack of access to decent jobs, adequate housing, high quality education, and adequate health care in the US has resulted in higher rates of poverty among African Americans.

Sociologists discuss two additional dimensions of institutional racism. First, scholars make distinctions between intentional and unintentional racism. After World War II, the federal government intentionally supported white privilege by refusing to combat racial segregation in social institutions that are instrumental for upward mobility (education, housing, and employment). For example, the Federal Housing Administration supported segregation and only underwrote loans in white neighborhoods, which prevented African American veterans from taking advantage of the suburban boom and locked them into urban areas. Racism may also be unintentional. White privilege becomes invisible to those who benefit from it. In the above example, the white veterans that took advantage of the suburban boom probably did not think about how the color of their skin enabled them to do so. Just as today, those with white skin think little of the fact that a "flesh colored" bandaid most closely resembles their skin tone.

The second dimension scholars analyze is the hierarchical organization of race and ethnicity.

Because the white ideal is the standard by which race and ethnic groups are evaluated, this creates a hierarchy both within and among racial groups. Within a racial or ethnic group, those with lighter skin and Caucasian features are considered closer to the white ideal, better positioned to succeed in a white world, and are at the top of the hierarchy. Race and ethnic groups are also hierarchically organized and evaluated against a white ideal. Asian Americans fall just below whites in the racial hierarchy and often are labeled a "model minority" because of their ability to immigrate and achieve relative financial and social success in a white world. This becomes a source of racial division as politicians and pundits compare groups to one another and offer insight into the relative success and failure of different groups, while ignoring the invisible white ideal and the differing historically embedded experiences of racism.

Sexuality too is rooted in privilege. Sociologists have followed two different analytical threads in the study of sexuality. Some scholars linked research on race, ethnicity, gender, class, and sexuality together. These scholars conceptualize race, gender, class, and sexuality as interlocking systems and argue that an individual's location in the system determines the kinds of privilege and oppression he or she will face. For example, beliefs about African American sexuality are important to maintaining institutional racism. The stereotype of the "welfare queen" ignores white privilege and attributes the inability of African Americans to pull themselves out of poverty to promiscuity and laziness.

The second analytical thread conceptualizes sexuality as a system of oppression comparable to race, class, and gender. These sociologists argue that heterosexism, or the institutionalized structures and beliefs that define heterosexual behavior as normative, privileges heterosexuality and subordinates alternative definitions of sexuality and sexual expression. Thus, like gender and race, sexuality is a historically rooted social concept that privileges one set of social relations between the sexes. The presumed inborn sexual instinct for a member of the opposite sex is a relatively recent phenomenon. The increased prominence of doctors as a professional group in the 1880s positioned them to scientifically contribute to discussions of gender

differences and to define and medicalize the ideal male–female relationship.

Research on heterosexism has been fairly limited. While the movements of the 1960s served as a catalyst for talking about sexuality and sexual oppression, meaningful discourse in research was stymied by the focus on AIDS in the 1980s. This “epidemic,” which was framed as a problem in the gay community, caused the medicalization of homosexuality and reinforced traditional notions of heterosexuality as natural and ideal. To date, sociological research has examined three aspects of heterosexism. First, scholars analyze how gay and straight identities are performed, maintained, and managed in different arenas (Connell 1995). Second, scholars examine how gender and sexuality categories are reproduced in cultural productions such as mass media texts (Sender 1999; Hart 2000). This line of work “deconstructs” cultural products and illuminates how privilege is embedded in texts. Finally, scholars have examined how heterosexism and homophobia work together to reproduce and buttress economic privilege and patriarchy (Pharr 1997). The literature on the repercussions of heterosexism is growing and sociologists are increasingly exploring how heterosexism is embedded in institutions, such as the workplace, and reinforced through practices (such as intentional and unintentional discrimination) and legal institutions.

In sum, beliefs about gender, race, and sexuality are embedded in social, cultural, and legal institutions and affect the realities and opportunities of dominant and subdominant members of these groups. Those in the dominant group (male, white, and heterosexual) are privileged and reap the benefits from their membership, while those in the subdominant group (female, non white, and homosexual, bisexual, or transsexual) are disadvantaged and are intentionally and unintentionally discriminated against. That said, it is important to recognize that gender, race, ethnicity, and sexuality are interlocking systems, and that one’s privilege varies according to one’s status within these systems.

SEE ALSO: Discrimination; Gender, Development and; Gender Ideology and Gender Role Ideology; Homophobia and Heterosexism; Homosexuality; Race (Racism); Racism, Structural and Institutional; Sex and Gender

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Pro-choice and Pro-life Movements

Tracy A. Weitz and Carole Joffe

Abortion is one of the most contested social issues in the US. Despite its recognized status as a polarizing force in politics, a relatively small number of sociologists have studied the social movements that sustain the abortion debate.

As a result, the topic of abortion social movements, while widely written about by journalists, is often under theorized. The following review summarizes the study of movements supporting and opposing abortion rights as studied by sociologists and other social scientists, predominantly in the US, with some attention to the changing international dimensions of this debate.

Social movements that take up the issue of abortion are often thought of as resulting from the 1973 Supreme Court decision *Roe v. Wade* (410 U.S. 113) recognizing a constitutional right to abortion. However, social contestation over abortion predates this decision with two periods of high social movement activity: the physician anti abortion movement of the mid 1800s and the abortion rights reform/repeal movement of the 1960s.

A number of scholars, most notably Mohr (1978) and Luker (1984), argue that the early physician anti abortion movement was part of a larger professionalizing project within organized medicine. Formally trained physicians sought to rid the profession of practitioners without such training, as well as lay midwives who were the main providers of abortion to women. In opposition to abortion regular physicians could distinguish themselves from other unregulated practitioners. Because of its capacity to both control and distinguish the profession, abortion became a high priority for the American Medical Association (AMA), formed in 1847. In many ways the AMA can be thought of as the first abortion related social movement organization in the US. In large part due to the anti abortion campaign of the AMA, abortion became illegal in every state by 1900. (For a Foucaultian analysis of the early physician opposition to abortion, see Stormer 2002.)

Smith Rosenberg (1985) examines the cultural context in which the medical profession's crusade against abortion occurred. In the mid 1800s the transition to smaller family size evident among society's most affluent and influential groups contrasted with the more prolific childbearing of recent immigrants. That white, married, Protestant, middle and upper class women used abortion to space and limit their number of children concerned the elite class that comprised the medical profession. The need for social and ideological

control over reproduction helped justify a medical crusade against abortion.

There was no organized counter movement to the first anti abortion social movement. Although the dates of the anti abortion movement coincide with those of "first wave feminism," the early women's movement sought to articulate disparate male-female relationships in alternative language and sexual imagery rather than support for abortion rights (Smith Rosenberg 1985). They endorsed "voluntary motherhood," not through abortion but through abstinence and control of men's sexual activity.

Abortion did not reappear on the larger public agenda until the 1960s, when both the medical community and the general public became increasingly frustrated with the inability of most American women to obtain a legal abortion. The works of historians Garrow (1998) and Hull and Hoffer (2001) provide details of the development and tactics of the reform/repeal abortion rights movement. Initially, efforts sought to reform laws by allowing more conditions under which a physician could perform an abortion (e.g., when the pregnancy was the result of a rape or when the developing pregnancy suffered from a genetic anomaly). Although these claims had widespread public appeal, they comprised only a small number of reasons why women sought abortions and thus few women qualified for abortions under these reform conditions. Eventually the limitations of the reform agenda would give way to a demand for the full repeal of abortion laws.

Two medical crises appeared in the 1960s that reengaged physicians in the debate over abortion: The use of the drug thalidomide by pregnant women (as in the Sherri Finkbine story) and the exposure of pregnant women to German measles (rubella) (Hull & Hoffer 2001). Thalidomide was never approved for use in the US, but it was used by many American women as a tranquilizer. When used in early pregnancy thalidomide causes gross fetal deformities. Similarly, women exposed to German measles in early pregnancy were also at higher risk of genetic abnormalities. An epidemic of German measles in the mid 1960s resulted in many physicians being asked to perform abortions. Joffe's (1995) work on physicians who practiced prior to and at the time of *Roe* illuminates the reasons for physicians' additional engagement in the

efforts to fully repeal abortion laws rather than simply reform them. Both the witnessing in hospital emergency rooms of the disastrous results of illegal abortion and the lack of clarity regarding the legal status of the few in hospital abortions that physicians were providing served as motivation for social movement action.

In addition to the role of physicians in the reform/repeal efforts, feminist scholars highlight the role of the 1960s “second wave” women’s movement in the pressure for full abortion law repeal. The claim was that women deserved the right to have an abortion for the reasons of their choice. Women engaged in both political action geared at changing the laws as well as in directing women to safe illegal abortion providers and in some cases performing safe illegal abortions themselves. The history of both the Society for Humane Abortion and the Jane Collective contribute to an understanding of the efforts of feminist activists at this time.

The efforts to repeal abortion laws through the states’ legislative processes experienced increased resistance, in part due to rising opposition from the Catholic Church. As such, the leaders of the reform/repeal movement began to prefer a judicial strategy challenging the constitutionality of abortion laws. The path of the case that would become associated with the right to legal abortion, *Roe v. Wade*, is discussed in several books, most usefully by Garrow (1998) and Luker (1984).

The *Roe* decision served as a catalyst for two new umbrella social movements: supporters and opponents of the right to legal abortion as articulated in *Roe*. The titles for these movements are contested between the movements, but they are commonly referred to as the Pro life Movement and the Pro choice Movement.

Within social movement literature, the Pro life Movement can be understood as a counter movement developing in response to success of the abortion law reform/repeal movement culminating in *Roe*. In the 1970s changes to the tax code facilitated the formation of political action committees (PACs) and thus the opportunity for the Pro life Movement to actively engage in the political arena. Pro life PACs were formed to target vulnerable abortion rights supporting politicians using single issue voting, thereby aligning the growing Pro life Movement with the newly developing Christian Right. The

merger of the Pro life Movement and the New Right resulted in the adoption of a pro life platform by the Republican Party and the election of Ronald Reagan as a pro life candidate for president in 1980.

In addition to seeking to affect national politics the Pro life Movement maintained a state based strategy to limit access to abortions through the passage of laws in state legislatures. The first regulations to be upheld by the Supreme Court (1977) were state based restrictions on the use of Medicaid funding to pay for abortions for poor women; the court would eventually uphold the federal prohibition on Medicaid funds known as the Hyde Amendment in 1980. Until 1989 further restrictions were struck down at both the state and the district court level, based on the *Roe* decision. In 1989 the Supreme Court heard *Webster v. Reproductive Health Services* (109 US 3040) challenging the constitutionality of Missouri’s restrictions on abortion. When *Webster* was announced, the court fell short of overturning *Roe*, but a slim majority upheld every restriction of the law.

With the green light from the court that some state based restrictions might be acceptable, the Pro life Movement increased its efforts to pass more restrictive state legislation. In 1992 the Supreme Court heard a challenge to the Pennsylvania law which included compulsory anti abortion lectures by doctors, a 24 hour waiting period, a reporting requirement, spousal notification, and parental consent in *Planned Parenthood of Southern Pennsylvania v. Casey* (505 US 833). In *Casey* the majority opinion upheld most of the abortion restrictions, articulating a new standard whereby state based restrictions on abortion would be found constitutional if they did not represent an “undue burden” on women. No definition of undue burden was provided.

In the mid 1980s some opponents of abortion began to take direct action against abortion providers. The most written about group of the direct action wing of the Pro life Movement is Operation Rescue. Breaking with the focus on simply limiting the legality of abortion, Operation Rescue sought to stop the actual provision of services. Initial tactics included blockading entrances to abortion clinics. These sit ins were billed as “non violent” and often referenced the work of civil rights activists. Operation Rescue’s most successful action occurred in 1991 with

what would be called the Summer of Mercy, in which Wichita Kansas was under siege for 42 days as thousands of pro life protesters converged on the city to blockade its clinics. A federal judge eventually issued an injunction ordering Operation Rescue to call off its demonstrations.

Although Operation Rescue claimed to be non violent, harassment, bombings, arson, vandalism, invasions, and picketing became routine tactics of direct action activists. Blanchard (1994) argues that the adoption of violence as a tactic was fueled by feelings of alienation from the agenda of the more mainstream Pro life Movement which had begun to focus its efforts to restrict abortion at the state level rather than to seek a full ban. The perceived failure of traditional lobbying tactics and executive regulation to bring about the level of change required to stop abortion led many in the movement to adopt a more aggressive and violent stance. The apex of violence was the actual killing of abortion providers.

In comparison to the Pro life Movement, the Pro choice Movement receives less scholastic attention. Staggenborg (1991), who studied the social movement organizations that comprise the Pro choice Movement, provides the most comprehensive sociological discussion to date. According to Staggenborg, no demobilization of the abortion repeal movement occurred after the passage of *Roe*. Rather, the growing strength of the counter movement required the institutionalization of the Pro choice Movement and the use of tactics geared at maintaining abortion legality through legislative and judicial processes.

Although the Pro life Movement had successfully elected Reagan as president there remained insufficient support for the pro life agenda in Congress. Despite numerous attempts, the Pro life Movement failed to pass a constitutional amendment banning abortion. These attempts, however, raised concern about the right to abortion among the pro choice public. The Pro choice Movement was additionally concerned with the ability of the counter movement to forward its agenda by changing the composition of the courts. In 1987 open warfare broke out over the nomination of Robert Bork for the Supreme Court. The Pro choice Movement galvanized opposition, eventually defeating Bork,

resulting in the appointment of an abortion rights moderate who, while not willing to overturn *Roe*, accepted new restrictions on abortion in the *Webster* decision.

The Pro choice Movement experienced its greatest successes in the early 1990s. As the court heard *Casey* in 1991, the Pro choice Movement sponsored the March for Women's Lives, drawing between 500,000 and 700,000 marchers to Washington, DC. The momentum of the Pro choice Movement culminated with the election of President Bill Clinton in 1992. Just two days after his inauguration, President Clinton issued several executive orders overturning five abortion restrictions put in place by the prior Reagan/Bush administrations. During his term he appointed two pro choice judges to the Supreme Court. In March 1993 Dr. David Gunn was shot and killed, shocking the nation and prompting a call for federal legislation to protect women from clinic violence. As the Freedom of Access to Clinic Entrances Act (FACE) was being debated in Congress, two additional physicians were shot (one wounded and one killed). These killings prompted the quick approval of the federal FACE legislation.

Like the Pro life Movement, however, the Pro Choice movement lacked the votes to pass national legislation to codify in law their position on legal abortion. Efforts instead focused on challenging state laws to restrict access to abortion. No large national efforts of the Pro Choice movement were undertaken until the legal right to abortion was again threatened by the election of a pro life president, George W. Bush. In 2004 a repeat of the March for Women's Lives drew over 1,000,000 abortion rights supporters to Washington, DC. Despite this showing, a majority pro life Senate was elected along with the reelection of President Bush. Although the Pro choice Movement has sought to galvanize grassroots support for its cause, two new Pro life Supreme Court justices received confirmation in 2005 and 2006.

Saletan (2003) examines the overall successes and failures of the Pro choice Movement strategy in his work on how conservatives allegedly "won the abortion war." His particular interest is the adoption by the Pro choice Movement of the "who decides" frame – a frame in which support is sought not for abortion rights but for keeping the government out of the decision.

(For a more detailed discussion of how discursive formations are used to forward a particularized understanding of abortion, see Condit 1990; for a discussion of how the fetus has been used, see Petchesky 1987.) Saletan argues that while the “who decides” frame is successful in maintaining abortion as legal, it fails to gain actual support for abortion rights as women’s rights. With a few exceptions, most observers of social movement activity and abortion have failed to deal with issues of race. In her work on the subject, Nelson (2003) helps connect the reproductive rights movement with resistance to the eugenics movement and efforts to address sterilization abuse.

In addition to studying the political histories of the movements, sociology is interested in the people that actively join the two movements and in particular the meaning of abortion to those activists. The first major study in this arena was Luker’s (1984) landmark work on activists in California. Luker found that differing views of motherhood explained women’s engagement in abortion social movements. For those on the pro life side, legal abortion was a referendum on the value of “stay at home” motherhood. Ginsburg’s (1989) study of the battle over the opening of an abortion clinic in Fargo, North Dakota reached a similar conclusion – that those engaged in oppositional movements saw the meaning of abortion differently. Her work concludes that abortion is a symbolic focus for the assertion of mutually exclusive understandings about the place of women in society.

In her work on pro life activists, Maxwell (2002) uses social movement theory to focus on the individualized meaning of abortion for pro life activists; she argues that many activists view their efforts as fulfilling a personal obligation to God. Other women use activism as a means to resolve personal conflict with their own abortion experiences. Mason’s (2002) work on the apocalyptic narrative of pro life politics seeks to locate the extremist position which justifies “killing in the name of life” within the Pro life Movement as part of a larger effort to reestablish the US as a Christian nation.

The rapid decline in the number of abortion providers in the US requires a renewed attention to the role of abortion within US medicine. In addition to driving some physicians away

from providing abortion care, the rise in violence is understood to have prompted the activation of a new pro choice physician counter movement. The creation of the organization Medical Students for Choice is seen as a turning point in the reengagement of physicians as a social movement player in the current fight over abortion. The uneasy alliance between physician led activism and feminist led activism, which historically was critical of physician power and dominance, is discussed by Joffe et al. (2004). Another development within medicine that receives some attention is the 12 year political battle over the approval by the US FDA of mifepristone, known as RU486 in France and most commonly as the “abortion pill.” Although widely adopted by the health care providers already offering abortion services, medication abortion is not routinely offered by regular physicians as originally projected when RU486 was thought to be a solution to the “abortion war.”

While the debate regarding abortion in the US is not mirrored throughout the world, a growing globalization of the Pro life/Pro choice struggle is underway. This tension was played out at both the International Conference on Population and Development in Cairo in 1994, and the Fourth World Conference on Women held in Beijing in 1995, where disagreements regarding abortion dominated many efforts to build an international agenda. Opposition to international recognition of abortion rights was initially raised by a small group of countries (some Muslim, some Catholic, including the Vatican delegation), but is now led by the US. In 2000 newly elected President George W. Bush reimposed the “global gag rule,” a measure which stipulates that no US foreign aid funds for family planning services could go to organizations which use their own funds for abortion services or referrals. This ban also precludes organizations that wish to receive US funds from engaging in advocacy related to abortion, thereby silencing many pro choice voices within developing nations. Delegations from the US to recent international convenings have mandated that opposition to abortion be a central component of any agreement to which the US would take part. Within many developing nations as well as former republics of the Soviet Union, anti abortion

efforts are receiving substantial financial support from US based Pro life Movement organizations (for case examples, see Kulczycki 1999).

Within other developed nations little attention has been paid to the existence or non existence of abortion social movements, in part due to the lack of extreme polarization within electorates and the absence of violence. Francome (2004) briefly discusses the existence of abortion social movements within the UK, while Ferree et al. (2002) expose those groups working within Germany.

SEE ALSO: Abortion as a Social Problem; Family Planning, Abortion, and Reproductive Health; Feminism, First, Second, and Third Waves; Gender, Social Movements and; Marriage, Sex, and Childbirth; New Reproductive Technologies; Women's Health; Women's Movements

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professional dominance in medicine

Donald W. Light

Professional dominance is a theory about professionalization and a profession's relation to society that implies that this relationship is out of balance. It thus opens up issues of trust, exploitation of patients and society, suppression of competing groups, subordination of allied professions, and escalation of costs. The term is inherently less neutral than "professionalism" or the study of professions in society. It is largely used in literature on the medical profession in modern times.

ORIGINS AND HISTORY

Eliot Freidson developed the concept and theory of professional dominance in 1970 in a book of that title. He also detailed its dynamics and pathologies in a second 1970 book, *Profession of Medicine*. His overall argument is that an occupation with valued and complex esoteric knowledge and skills strives to get special legal and institutional privileges from the state and society more generally, so that it can become a profession. This gives it critical powers, such as exclusive rights of licensure and control over its domain of work, which it tries to define as broadly as possible.

Other exclusive rights and powers include prescribing controlled substances, admitting patients to hospitals, ordering tests and procedures, putting patients into a death like state, cutting into their bodies, excusing people from work, enabling people to receive service and financial benefits, and exempting people from criminal prosecution in the case of insanity. In the twentieth century, professions typically were granted control over the content and execution of training, certification and licensure, defining whether other providers were practicing medicine without licensure, defining the standards of care, assuring good quality of care and ethical standards, and disciplining members who violated professional standards.

These powers reflect a tacit social contract between society and the profession: Because you have highly valued skills and address critical social needs (to heal, to cure, to stave off death), we will grant you autonomy over these powers with the understanding that you will serve patients' needs first and behave in an altruistic manner.

In his early seminal work, Freidson emphasized the ways in which the medical profession had parlayed autonomy into dominance by exploiting this kind of social contract. The American health care system in the 1950s and 1960s offered considerable evidence, as hospitalization, subspecialization, surgery, tests, other procedures, and charges rapidly escalated. Complaints of unnecessary tests, procedures, hospitalization, and overcharging proliferated in the 1960s. Without the constraints of a national health care system that most other countries had in some form, these pathologies

of professionalism flourished. Many other studies and books on the pathologies of professionalism soon followed. One of Freidson's observations was that the organized profession cannot police or discipline its members very strongly without alienating them.

Subsequent to Freidson, Larson (1977) wrote an influential history of the rise of professionalism as a form of monopoly, where a profession charges rents (fees) on its capital (exclusive expertise), which it can expand through specialization and control over health care institutions. Ivan Illich, a Jesuit priest with a worldwide audience for his wide range of incisive critiques of modern society, wrote *Medical Nemesis* in 1975. Just by extrapolating from clinical studies, Illich documented the ways in which the medical profession was poisoning patients with toxic drugs, mutilating them with bad surgery, making patients increasingly dependent on them, and medicalizing more and more of human life. *Medical Nemesis* was professional dominance gone mad. Wherever Illich spoke in the western hemisphere, there was standing room only.

Paul Starr's landmark history, *The Social Transformation of American Medicine* (1982), built on a body of historical work to detail how the American medical profession parlayed its professional powers into institutional, legal, and financial dominance. Of particular note are the ways in which physicians incorporated their practices, started corporations for hospitals, clinics, and other services, formed strong alliances with medical supply and pharmaceutical corporations, and started hospital chains in the 1970s. A short, more analytic update has been written by Donald Light (2004). In other countries, professional dominance was evident in different forms. Light and Alexander Schuller (1986) led a team that documented a similar rise from autonomy to dominance that occurred in Weimar Germany and led to private physicians strongly supporting Hitler's rise to power. He quickly gave them new legal powers to destroy early models of community based, inexpensive, patient run clinics; strip the licenses of doctors who worked in them; and institute a professionally dominated model of medical services that formed the basis of the West German health care system after World War II. Most of its problems of escalating costs and fragmented services can be traced to this history. This is one of many

examples of how the medical profession came to control the central regulatory, financial, and institutional bodies in countries with universal health insurance or services.

CHALLENGES TO PROFESSIONAL DOMINANCE

Soon after the relentless ascent of professional dominance was declared, it started to face challenges. One challenge came from the logical extension of professional dominance itself – the development of hospital and other corporate chains by investors who saw that the profession's economic and legal autonomy meant that it could make a lot of money with almost no downside risk. Even mistakes were billable. This led a great spokesman of the profession, Arnold Relman (1980), to write about “the new medical industrial complex.” Relman and thousands of other physicians were appalled at the corporate takeover of American medicine. What he ignored was 30 years of increasingly commercialized practice by the physicians themselves. Also overlooked were the ways in which dedication to good practice and altruism were easy because they paid. The more thorough and careful one was, the more money one made. The health care corporations simply dropped the altruism and said they wanted to make money. Their size and power, however, constituted a new dominant force.

Meantime, Congress and employers became increasingly restive about the escalating medical bills they had to pay, and studies kept coming from top clinical researchers that showed much care was unnecessary. Other studies documented large variations in how physicians treated patients with the same medical conditions. These constituted deep pathologies of professional dominance and even autonomy. A stream of studies up to this day shows unmonitored autonomy results in continued use of outmoded or discredited tests and procedures; under and over diagnosis of conditions; careless mistakes with dangerous consequences; incomplete work ups and treatment plans; and unnecessary exposure of patients to risks. Was professional dominance based on a false pretense at its core?

In response to such evidence, institutional payers began to behave like buyers, what Light

(2004) calls “the buyers’ revolt.” A new constellation of corporate middlemen arose in the later 1970s to help them contain costs and buy better value. Institutional buyers started to hire corporations to review costly tests, procedures, and hospitalizations. They hired other teams to identify which physicians and hospitals practiced more cost effective medicine and rewarded employees or beneficiaries to use them. Congress funded long range programs to assess different ways to treat common problems in order to identify which were more cost effective. Still other corporations specialized in managing the small percent of costly, chronic cases. These and other elements came together in the late 1980s to be called “managed care.”

Physicians began to feel like the proletariat (the exploited workers of capitalists) and proletarianization arose as a competing theory to professional dominance. The benchmark article (McKinlay & Arches 1985) regarded all infringements on autonomy as forms of proletarianization, even government prohibitions against practices that discriminated by race and gender. A few years later the Marxist framework was dropped and the same analysis was called corporatization.

On another front, as early as 1973, Marie Haug identified several ways in which deprofessionalization was developing. Alternate and paraprofessionals were proliferating; lay people increasingly challenged professional authority; and computers were enabling people to become expert patients. Haug and Bebe Levin summarized their work in *Consumerism in Medicine* (1983).

FROM DOMINANCE TO COUNTERVAILING POWERS

In a review of these competing theories, Light and Sol Levine (1988) faulted each as identifying one trend and one part of the whole. Each lacked a sense of historical development and could not explain change. In particular, professional dominance as a theory was unable to explain decline, because dominance begets further dominance. The authors called for a new framework. Some years later, Light developed a theory of countervailing powers that allows one to analyze historical changes in professional dominance

or decline within or between countries. The theory, depicted in Figure 1, looks at the medical profession as one of several countervailing powers that pursue their agendas with varying intensity from era to era (Light 2000).

Particularly notable is the historical, comparative study by Elliott Krause (1996).

Future developments seem to center on two issues. First, the medical profession is still reeling from the revolt of the buyers and the




Figure 1 Countervailing powers in health care.

<i>Traditional professionalism</i>	<i>The new professionalism</i>
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ● Based on individual autonomy, accountable to self. ● Quality focused on process and determined individually. Thus effectiveness and quality variable. ● Subspecialization and hospital care as the center of power and prestige. ● Physician-based practice and authority. Nurses and others are delegated what doctors don't want to do. ● Aimed at treating the ill, heroic salvaging. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ● Based on evidence-based accountability to patients and payers. ● Quality focused on outcomes established through clinical research. Guidelines, protocols, care pathways, with discretion. ● Focus on primary care, prevention, and management. Subspecialization and hospital care as the last resort. ● New technological and administrative elite set evidence-based standards and manage services. ● Team-based practice and collaboration based on interprofessional teams. ● Aimed at prevention in communities and individuals. Maximize functioning and manage chronic problems.

Figure 2 The new professionalism.

Source: Light (2000).

challenges to its core, autonomy and control over its work. Yet the uneven quality of professional services when left to autonomous providers is well documented, and autonomy at the individual level leads to fragmentation at the organizational level. In the journal *Academic Medicine* and reports of the Association of American Medical Colleges, one can follow the struggles by the American medical profession to reaffirm altruism, dutifulness, and autonomy as core values of a renewed professionalism. A basic problem, however, is that one cannot expect a profession to behave much differently than the institutional and cultural framework in which it works. If the health care system is based on the corporate practice of medicine, if selection of more profitable patients and procedures is rewarded, if elaborated care and “defensive medicine” pay well, how much differently can one expect professionals to behave? More promising is a reconceptualization of professionalism centered on accountability, as illustrated in Figure 2. Second, Stefen Timmermans and Emily Kolker (2004) point out that clinical guidelines and protocols have not affected professional behavior much and argue that it would be more useful to stop focusing on professional dominance or decline and study the specific forms of professional power and knowledge. That focus, in turn, opens up the question of whether there are, in practice, not a profession but multiple professions, and even made up forms of professionalism to carry out the dominant interests of governments or corporations like the pharmaceutical industry.

SEE ALSO: Deviance, Constructionist Perspectives; Deviance, Medicalization of; Deviance Processing Agencies; Health Professions and Occupations; Patient–Physician Relationship; Ideology; Illness Behavior; Managed Care; Medical School Socialization; Professions, Organized; Schools, Professional; Science and Culture

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professions

Keith Macdonald

Professions have been of interest to all the main schools of sociology, both in their own right and in relation to such topics as capitalism, the

state, social stratification, patriarchy, power, and knowledge.

Contemporary studies broadly agree that the professions are those occupations based on “advanced, or complex, or esoteric, or arcane knowledge”; or on “formally rational abstract utilitarian knowledge” (Murphy 1988), whose associations, in order to protect their knowledge and the market in services based on it, have entered into a regulative bargain with the state. These features usually enable an occupation to achieve good economic rewards and relatively high social status; this leads other occupations to try to emulate them.

The regulative bargain typically includes the means of controlling members of the occupation, and the obligation to adhere to ethical standards and to act with probity in relation to their clients and to the public. These features drew the attention of functionalist sociologists, from Émile Durkheim in the late nineteenth century to Talcott Parsons in the 1950s and 1960s, and led them to see professions as the bearers and defenders of important social values in modern society. This emphasis on the eufunctional value of the professions led some sociologists to adopt the “trait approach,” whereby they devised ways of deciding which occupations were professions or semi professions and which were not.

This rather sterile exercise provoked Everett C. Hughes (1963) to write that he “passed from the false question ‘Is this occupation a profession?’ to the more fundamental one, ‘What are the circumstances in which people in an occupation attempt to turn it into a profession and themselves into professional people?’” This symbolic interactionist stance stimulated much fruitful work on the professions. Eliot Freidson’s notable work on the medical profession in the 1970s provided the stimulus for what became known as the “power approach” to the study of the professions. Freidson himself considered that to examine power alone was not the way forward and in his own work took a broader and more nuanced position. This was developed further by M. S. Larson’s seminal work, *The Rise of Professionalism* (1977), which extended the interactionist analysis by drawing on Marxian ideas of production, market, and social class, and Weber’s concepts of social closure and qualifications as a basis for both

economic advantage and social status. Larson sees professionalization as an attempt to translate one order of scarce resources – special knowledge and skills – into another – economic and social rewards. Maintaining scarcity helps to achieve a monopoly of expertise in the market, and to enhance status in a system of stratification. Larson’s work emphasizes that social mobility and market control are not merely straightforward reflections of skill, expertise, or ethical standards, but that they are the outcome of the collective efforts of members in pursuit of the “professional project.”

The concept of “professional project” is seen as much less important by Andrew Abbott in another important analysis, *The System of the Professions* (1988). Instead he emphasizes the importance of studying the actual work that an occupation does, the extent of its “jurisdiction,” and its competition with other occupations. One may draw many distinctions between the work of Larson and of Abbott but there is an affinity between the two approaches in the sense that they both have added structural elements to an interactionist theme, to provide an eclectic but coherent theorizing of professions. An important element was added by Anna Witz’s study, *Professions and Patriarchy* (1992), which elucidates the practices of those occupations, one of whose original defining features was that they were fit for gentlemen. Macdonald, on the other hand, in *The Sociology of the Professions* (1995), takes the professional project as his starting point, and elaborates and contextualizes it in an effort to show its applicability to a number of aspects of the professions in a variety of cultural contexts.

Marxian sociology of the professions, in contrast to the interactionist theme, is one of structure and system, whose “processes,” such as state formation, polarization of social classes, and monopolization of the means of production, are the consequences of the capitalist mode of production. The professions are seen as integral to these processes, which are depicted not as the consequences of the actions of individuals and collectivities but as part and parcel of the exploitative relations of capitalist production. Any control that a profession has of its knowledge, any gain it might achieve in its class position, would be regarded as merely contingent on the advantage that global capital derived from such

circumstances. There is also a Marxian flavor to one version of the power approach, that of Terry Johnson, which, in contrast to Freidson, is more concerned with the relative advantages that an occupation could derive from its market position and relationship with the state.

Michel Foucault has also studied the power of professions and their relation to the state, focusing on the connection between knowledge and power. He sees the modern state as developing the science of the right disposition of all things leading to the welfare of all. Professionals (as the experts in these new scientific disciplines) are crucial to modern government, and their professional associations, in which expertise is institutionalized, are integral to the governance of the modern state. Foucault's originality has stimulated many studies of the professions but some writers fail to find a connection between that originality and the sociological tradition, while others regard his work as opaque and devoid of flesh and blood actors.

The study of the professions has the virtue not only of providing an insight into one particular segment of society, but also, as Freidson demonstrates in *Professionalism: The Third Logic* (2001), of linking up with the wider sociological themes referred to above.

SEE ALSO: Knowledge; Occupations; Power, Theories of; Professions, Organized; Stratification and Inequality, Theories of

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professions, organized

Chris Carter

Professions are one of the main forms of institutionalizing expertise in western societies (Giddens 1991). The term "profession" is a curious one. It immediately conjures up images drawn from television shows featuring lawyers or medical doctors. Such representations point to the hold that certain professions have on our imagination. In *Bleak House*, Charles Dickens's celebrated novel, Richard Carstone considers which profession he wants to take up. The realm of possibilities – according to the definitional criteria of the age – is the military, the clergy, the law, and medicine. Professions such as law and medicine have successfully maintained both their power and status across several centuries and are seen as quintessential exemplars of what constitutes a profession. In the late nineteenth century and throughout the twentieth, a raft of new professions emerged. Some, like accountancy, have accrued considerable power.

While the dazzling array of different professions renders a definition of a profession difficult (Friedson 1986), the legacy of structural functional research suggests that features of a profession include: a body of abstract and specialized knowledge; a professional's autonomy over the labor process; self regulation by the profession; legal rights restricting those who can practice; control of the supply and licensing of practitioners by the professional body; altruism; and the enjoyment of high status within society. Such characteristics form an "ideal type" of professional labor – one which is rarely observed in professions themselves.

The professional associations of many so called "new" professions, such as marketers and human resource specialists, have expended considerable effort in trying to emulate the traits of the more established professions. Professions are complex and variegated and there are crucial distinctions in their relative status, the length of their history, and power (Friedson 2001).

THE SOCIOLOGY OF THE PROFESSIONS

The early influential thinkers on the professions included Durkheim (1957), Parsons (1951), and Tawney (1921). Their views held sway for much of the twentieth century and saw professions in a benign way, representing them as the bearers of a neutral and technocratic logic. Being experts in a specific area, professions came into being because there was a functional need for them and they used their skills and knowledge toward the betterment of society. This was particularly so in their role in mediating between individuals and society. Parsons did not regard professionals as selfless; rather, he saw their interests as being non pecuniary and directed toward enjoying high status and reputation in society, which in turn ensured the provision of the best possible services to society. Structural functionalist research was generally directed to ascertaining the characteristics of a profession in contrast to a non profession (Etzioni 1969). This research did much to establish the trait approach to understanding professions – something that has been influential to many occupational figurations seeking to establish themselves as professions.

Resonant with structural functionalism was the developmental approach to studying professions over time. Wilensky (1964) argued that increasing numbers of occupational groups were laying claim to professional status. This had the effect of stretching the definition of professions to the point where it was meaningless. In his seminal study of the professions, Wilensky analyzed 18 different occupations. He developed a sequential model of the development of professions, which highlighted the stages in the development of a profession. Wilensky concluded that many of the aspirant occupations would fail in their quest to achieve professional status as many of the stages took considerable time.

The Parsonsian orthodoxy was subject to radical critique from the 1960s onwards. A generation of writers theorized professions through looking at the prevailing relations of power. Many writers, coming out of the Chicago School tradition, sought to debunk the notion of professionals as disinterested and altruistic. Instead they sought to understand

the means through which professions organized themselves, how they were able to uphold their privileges and status, how they managed their relations with the state, and the effects they had on other groups (Friedson 1970). British sociologist Terry Johnson (1972) analyzed professions from a neo Marxist perspective, seeing them as mechanisms of control where a profession is able to control its own members. For Johnson, the state had an important role to play in upholding the power of professions. In the late 1970s, Margali Larson's *The Rise of Professionalism* (1977) integrated both Marxist and Weberian perspectives and argued that professions are interest groups whose objective was a "collective mobility project" aligned to the class system of capitalist societies. Achieving professional status allowed occupations to ameliorate both their economic and their social standing. Similarly, MacDonald and Ritzer (1988) argued that professional groups seek to establish monopoly control over a particular jurisdictional area. They then seek to control the related activities, while keeping a distance from subordinate groups.

The critique of functionalism shifted attention to the means through which professions achieve and retain power. Andrew Abbott (1988) developed this work further by outlining a dynamic theory of professions. According to Abbott, competition ensues between aspirant groups, thereby creating stratified professions which vary markedly in their levels of jurisdiction. He argued that expertise became institutionalized through this jurisdictional competition, which established who controlled which domain, which in turn determined relative status and prestige. Abbott's analysis emphasizes that there is an ongoing process of competition among different groups, which means that over time the relative power of a profession might change dramatically.

PROFESSIONS, ORGANIZATIONS, AND MANAGEMENT

Many professions have changed dramatically over the last 20 years with the economic restructuring that had its genesis in the election

of Margaret Thatcher in the UK and Ronald Reagan in the US. Welsh sociologist Mike Reed (1996) argued that the experience of professions differs markedly. According to Reed, it is useful to draw a distinction between three distinct forms of profession. They are the “liberal,” “organizational,” and “entrepreneurial” professions, respectively. Liberal professions are those such as law and medicine. Their characteristics are that they are independent, work for fees, and enjoy autonomy over their work organization. Organizational professions owe their status and professional warrant to the organization in which they work. Many organizational professions are employees of the state. They are typically a product of the great expansion of the state experienced during the twentieth century. Schoolteachers, social workers, government scientists, and the utility engineers would count among the ranks of the organizational professionals. “Entrepreneurial” professions exploit opportunities offered by markets, such as IT and management consultants.

Liberal professions such as law, chartered accountancy, and medicine have encountered many changes. Research carried out at the University of Alberta in Canada identified two archetypes within professional service work, which were titled “professional partnership” and “managed professional business.” The former emphasizes collegiality, serving the client and the public interest, while being dismissive of managerialism. In contrast, the managed professional business (MPB) embraces the market and is resolutely corporate in its approach to the conduct of the profession. MPB professional service firms have developed corporate brands in their own right and their interpretive schemes owe as much to the discourse of strategic management as to law or accounting. Hanlon (1994) has characterized this broad shift as the commercialization of the service class, which involves large law and accounting firms being engaged in capital accumulation strategies. In a fascinating study of the socialization of trainee accountants, Grey et al. demonstrate that commercialization has redefined what constitutes professional conduct. Broader civic concerns have been displaced by “pleasing the client,” which in the case of accounting firms is the

company that pays for the audit. The wave of accounting scandals – such as Enron, Parmalat, and WorldCom – are for many the consequence of the commercialization of the accounting profession.

In contrast to the expansionary climate experienced by many liberal professions, the last 20 years have witnessed organizational professions encountering hostility from new right governments and attacks in the media. State sponsored professions such as teachers, social workers, and utility professionals have seen their status and autonomy eroded. This has led to speculation as to whether we are seeing the twilight of some professions – mainly those that expanded through state support in the twentieth century. In some cases the decline is for material reasons. In the United States, the high cost of higher education combined with the relatively low economic rewards make many professions unattractive to newcomers. Throughout the western world, industries have been privatized. In some cases this has led to a managerialist assault on established organizational professions. Carter and Mueller (2002) report the removal of a previously dominant cadre of professional engineers from a British electricity utility in the years following privatization. More generally, new public management or managerialism has challenged the autonomy and self governance of professions throughout the public sector. Professions such as nursing have been much changed in an attempt by western health authorities to respond to the challenges of the increasing demand and costs of health care. Nurses’ responsibilities have been expanded greatly. The needs of western health care systems cast a long shadow over developing world countries as nursing staff are lured to the West by the promise of relatively good wages and conditions.

Entrepreneurial professions are those that have gained the most over the last 20 years. For purists, they do not constitute professions at all, yet occupational figurations such as management consultants and IT consultants have experienced unprecedented growth in both their turnover and their influence in civil society. The commercialization processes discussed above led many of the large accounting firms away from core accounting activities. For instance, Arthur

Andersen billed Enron for \$25 million for consulting services and \$27 million for the audit in their final year of trading. Of course, consulting does not fall into any neat categories of professional work. Many have characterized the activity as knowledge work or immaterial labor, whereby “symbolic analysts” manipulate signs, symbols, and images. Lacking an obvious “right answer,” knowledge work is inherently ambiguous. Consequently, Mats Alvesson has suggested that technical expertise – whilst important – is becoming increasingly secondary to image and rhetoric intensity, which help persuade a client of the efficacy of a knowledge worker’s proposed course of action. In short, it is not so much a case of being an expert as *appearing* to be an expert. Entrepreneurial professions do not typically possess the institutional pillar of a strong professional body and it will be interesting to see how such groups develop. In time will they emulate the traditional liberal professions, or do they represent a new form of professional organization centered on brand, image, and reputation?

It is a fascinating time for analysts of the professions, especially those with a management focus. Managerialism, commercialization, and privatization have radically changed the context in which professions operate. Professions are likely to remain important means of institutionalizing expertise, although how professions organize and what it is to be a professional are likely to be fruitful areas for research.

SEE ALSO: Labor Process; Management Consultants; Professions

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professors

Joseph C. Hermanowicz

Professors are people with academic appointments at institutions of higher education. Compared to just a half century ago, higher education is differentiated on many counts, including the professorial role. While definitions delimit boundaries, they are sometimes ambiguously drawn. Professors in the American context typically hold advanced terminal degrees in the specialty in which they hold rank as assistant, associate, or full professor, those ranks composing an ascent in an institutional career. Yet vast numbers of people with academic appointments occupy roles, often without advanced terminal

degrees, as lecturer, instructor, or, increasingly, as a temporary or part time adjunct or affiliate of a unit within colleges and universities. Thus one can be more liberal or restrictive in the application of the term, but this complexity raises core theoretic questions about the very topic of professors in contemporary society: Who are they? What roles do they perform? What is the academic profession to which these individuals purportedly belong? How has the profession changed over time in its form and function? Answers to these questions become even more complex when extending them across national boundaries, perhaps explaining why little systematic comparative work on higher education faculties has been attempted. A total of 138 national systems of higher education, involving most countries of the world and employing nearly all professors across the globe, are described over the four volumes of *The Encyclopedia of Higher Education* (Clark & Neave 1992).

There are over 560,000 professors (i.e., full time instructional faculty and staff) employed in over 4,000 accredited institutions in the US. The size alone of such a population speaks of variety, but when dimensions of institutional type, field, individual age, and career stage are added it is little wonder that scholars of higher education have alternatively referred to the landscape of small worlds or different worlds, each of which exhibits its own characteristic form of variety and constraint.

Professors – normatively performing roles of disciplined free inquiry through teaching, research, and other professional activities – have been studied as an object of inquiry unto their own. At root, the reasons for treating professors as an object of study are twofold. First, professors extend culture and civilization. As teacher, researcher, and scholar, professors transmit to their audiences knowledge that has, in principle, been socially certified by their professional disciplinary community. In this sense, they extend culture by both transmitting and building upon knowledge. In another sense, they extend culture by passing along a set of generalized values, attitudes, and beliefs to new generations who learn institutional patterns of life through the process of education.

Second, professors guard culture and civilization. Their profession writ large is uniquely

situated in society as the profession that trains people for all other professions and numerous other lines of work requiring certified education. In this sense, they guard culture by upholding cognitive and behavioral standards that have been created by their professional disciplinary communities to ensure competent role performance. In another sense, they guard culture by upholding a set of generalized ideals: as masters in their various roles, they seek precision and excellence, cogent and articulable thought – and seek to inculcate these characteristics in their student clientele – so as to produce a higher learning and more advanced civilization.

For these reasons, professors assume a privileged place in the social organization of modern societies. But while professors may be viewed as central to society, the development of the study of them has been erratic, and less central to the core disciplines that can arguably yield major insights into the social organization of professors, sociology chief among them. One can find a sociology of higher education within which professors are a subject of study, but it is a nascent and thus small specialty area within sociology proper, and an area of inquiry that emerged and developed apart from what some take to be a kind of specialty cousin, the sociology of education, which customarily takes schools and schooling in grades K–12 as its province. While it would seemingly make sense for sociologists of education and sociologists of higher education to be nearly one of a kind, in regular contact and exchange with one another, attending the same professional meetings, and reading and publishing in the same journals, they are not, and instead inhabit different universes that rarely coincide. This has occurred much to the loss of higher education specialists. It is conceivable that a sociology of higher education would have developed sooner and with greater theoretic grounding had a boundary between it and the sociology of education – where concept and theory development has proceeded more swiftly – not been drawn so heavily. But the divide developed and has become institutionalized, more so for intellectual than political reasons. Sociological theorists turned their attention in the early twentieth century – to the extent they turned to education – to early schooling, since this was where, in Durkheim's terms, "real life

began.” Higher education involving and affecting the masses, and thereby inspiring interest in its systematic study, would not reach that stage until roughly a half century later.

The bulk of work on professors has been completed by higher education specialists working outside the discipline of sociology. This body of work tends to be more descriptive than theoretic, and thus less focused on such core sociological concerns as the organization of the academic profession and professionalization, or selection, recruitment, and socialization. Nevertheless, this body of work has yielded significant findings pertaining to professors. Topics of inquiry run a gamut, from the educational background of professors, their demographic profile, their attitudes and values about faculty roles and rewards, to their teaching strategies and goals and their allocation of time among work roles.

If, though, one is interested in a bona fide sociology of professors, rooted thereby in key sociological concepts and theory, one has to turn to the sociology of science. Save for a small handful of sociological classics on the professoriate – all of which now bear a heavy patina – beginning with Logan Wilson’s *Academic Man* (1942) and including such works as Lazarsfeld and Thielens’s *Academic Mind* (1958), Caplow and McGee’s *Academic Marketplace* (1960), and Jencks and Riesman’s *Academic Revolution* (1968), a sociology of professors proceeded under the rubric of the sociology of science, concerned as it is with the production and organization of socially certified knowledge. Because many of the studies on the sociology of scientists are based on the functioning of the academic reward system and its consequences, they often have general applicability – in theme, substance, and significance – to professors outside of the natural and social sciences. Evocative discussion by Braxton and Hargens (1996) suggests framework works for the study of academics within and across various fields.

Robert K. Merton, often taken to be the “father of the sociology of science,” is typically credited with having inspired this tradition of research through his own vastly productive work in the field. Among his more central contributions to the sociology of science – and to a social organization of the roles of scientists

in particular – is his articulation of four norms said to undergird an “ethos” of science (and academe more generally). The norm of *universalism* stipulates that when scientists contribute to knowledge, the science community’s assessment of the merits of the contribution should not be influenced by personal or social attributes of the contributor; and scientists should be rewarded in ways that are commensurate with their contributions. The norm of *communism* (later called *communalism*) stipulates that knowledge must be shared, not kept secret, for it is only by placing knowledge in the public domain that others can build upon it. The norm of *disinterestedness* stipulates that scientists should engage in scientific work with the motive of extending knowledge, free of any biases or other motives that compromise the integrity of the scientific role. The norm of *organized skepticism* stipulates that scientists must suspend judgment about conclusions to be drawn from research until all available evidence is on hand to render qualified assertions about the contributions of a piece of scientific work.

While these four norms are understood to carry equal weight in the performance of scientific/academic roles, one of them – the norm of universalism – has been the object of disproportionate inquiry, perhaps because it is the norm that most centrally governs scientific output, an avenue by which to assess productivity and, ultimately, a stratification system of scientists. Thus, researchers have investigated how the reward system in science operates and what consequences its functioning has on matters such as the job placement of PhD graduates, promotion, tenure, productivity, recognition, and other foci of participation and attainment in a systematically stratified system of science.

The norm of universalism, however, emphasizes research productivity. Other research finds that clear majorities of professors across many institutional types are inactive in research. Consequently, assessing role performance – and the organization of scientific roles more broadly – on the basis of this norm becomes problematic.

Hermanowicz (1998) proposed an alternative to conceptualizing the academic profession. Instead of focusing on compliance with the norm of universalism in the operation of the

scientific reward and stratification system, the focus shifted to accounts scientists (and, in principle, other academics) provide of their careers. Here the “subjective career” becomes the object of study. Professors – and the profession that socially organizes them and their work – are understood through narrative: how people account for what they do, how and why they do it, and the ways in which they envision their roles and the evolution of such understandings over the time spent in an academic career.

Hermanowicz advanced a view of the academic profession as consisting of three social worlds, each organized by specific patterns in the way academics account for their careers. The *elite* world consists of professors who place the highest premium on research. “Elite” uniformly describes the members who work in this world and the external definition of them and their academic departments. It also expresses the aspiration of its members – “to be among the best” – and the key collective goal that brings them together and establishes their membership in universities that are also elite.

The *pluralist* world answers to considerably more varied demands, those of mass teaching as well as research and service to the wider community and state. A pluralist department includes some members as eminent as those found in elite departments, but the pursuit of still more eminence is not what holds members together, nor does it provide a standard that all members unhesitatingly adopt. This type of department answers to considerably more varied demands, those of mass teaching as well as research and service to the wider community and state. Often, this results in a blend of people who exhibit radically different affinities, talents, and motivations: plurality thus conveys the essence of this type of world. As a division of labor, departments of this type mirror something of a “multiuniversity” of which they are a part.

The *communitarian* world, like that of pluralists, answers to many demands, but the fundamental basis of comparative worth is within the institution itself. “Good citizenship” is demanded of all and is a primary basis on which individuals are accorded honor and esteem. Commitment to and identification with science is varied and uneven. Scientists in these

departments are heterogeneous in their beliefs and practices about what defines a legitimate career. Those who lead essentially teaching careers, or careers in which research has been sporadic over the course of time, are most likely found here. In accounting for the way in which individuals establish legitimacy here, this is a world in which scientists believe that the person comes before the work: individuals are respected on the basis of their human virtues.

While each of the three prototypical academic worlds possesses central tendencies, they each also contain variety and partially overlap with each other. Consequently, one may speak of and find empirically professors who individually represent hybrids: elite professors employed in pluralist or communitarian departments; communitarian professors employed in elite or pluralist departments. This work makes an explicit attempt to reveal and conceptualize the profession’s internal differentiation, attending to the ways in which its diverse membership construes the professorial role and its unfolding in an academic career. If research on professors is to advance, it must more firmly locate itself within disciplinary traditions, so that it may break new ground by building upon foundational concepts and theory.

SEE ALSO: Colleges and Universities; Deviance, Academic; Education; Scientific Productivity; Teachers; Teaching and Gender

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progress, idea of

Bernd Weiler

The idea of progress, commonly considered one of the most influential and multifaceted ideas in the philosophy of history, states that material, political, social, intellectual, and moral conditions have continually and by necessity improved throughout human history and that such an improvement will continue in the foreseeable future (Nisbet 1980: 4–5). Since the Enlightenment the idea of progress and the controversies concerning its validity and ideological connotations have played a crucial role in modern social science discourse. The idea has not only been employed as a powerful conceptual framework to explain social change and the emergence of a new type of society, but also as a means to legitimate the entire endeavor of social science itself. By discovering the mechanism of societal progress and by identifying possible obstacles to progress, social scientists have claimed an authoritative role for themselves in the management of society's affairs. This socio-critical promise, encapsulated in the Comtean positivistic formula *savoir pour prévoir, prévoir pour pouvoir*, has drawn and continues to draw its strength from the fact that knowledge of nature's laws has been accompanied by an increased control over nature.

Regarding the question of the intellectual origins of the progressivist idea, four ideal typical positions can be distinguished. According to one line of thought the idea of progress is rooted in human nature and presents the ever-present chasm between the real and the ideal. As a societal force the idea is seen to ebb and flow, gaining momentum in specific social and historical contexts. A second school traces the origins of the idea of progress back to the anti-metaphysical disenchantment and to

the scientific worldview of a group of classical Greek and Roman thinkers, often citing the words of the Ionian philosopher Xenophanes from the late Archaic period that “not from the beginning did the gods reveal everything to mortals, but in course of time they discover improvements” as the birth certificate and Lucretius' poem *De Rerum Natura* as the fullest embodiment of the idea of progress. A third position holds that the idea of progress is religious in origin and that it represents a special variant of the Judeo-Christian eschatological tradition. The last school, following Walter Bagehot's dictum that “the ancients had no conception of progress,” emphasizes a rather recent origin of the idea and its intimate linkage to the project of modernity (Bury 1955). In this context it is argued that by seeing the future as intrinsically dynamic, open, and indefinite the idea of progress, in fact, marked a sharp break with the belief in a timeless and unchanging heaven which formed a crucial element of the Judeo-Christian notions of millenarianism and redemption. As in Pascal's argument about increases in knowledge being proportional to the awareness of one's ignorance, expectations of future progress are seen to rise in accordance with the perception of past and present progress. The idea of progress, according to this interpretation, accompanied the rise of modern science and technology in the seventeenth century, gained force throughout the Enlightenment, and peaked in the second half of the nineteenth century. Despite disagreement concerning origins, the last three views concur in the opinion that the idea of progress originated in the West and that it has been one of its driving forces.

Within the modern social sciences the progressivist doctrine that all societies are bound to follow the same path of development and that the differences between societies merely reflect different temporal stages of development was firmly established by the middle of the eighteenth century and figured prominently in the works of French and Scottish theorists such as Turgot and Smith (Meek 1976). Condorcet's unfinished and posthumously published *Sketch for a Historical Picture of the Progress of the Human Mind* (1795), in which he even pondered the possibility of scientific progress abolishing illness and death, is often regarded as

the epitome of the Enlightenment's belief in societal progress. The progressivist idea of the eighteenth century rested on the widely held belief that contemporary society was on the brink of far reaching changes in terms of its political, economic, technological, and cultural structure, on the trust in the human potential to emerge from one's "self incurred immaturity," and the emphasis on the "psychic unity of mankind," as well as on the rich ethnographic accounts of "savage nations" which came to represent the starting line of the triumphant march of civilization. *Cum grano salis* one might generalize by saying that the French tradition viewed progress primarily as the result of the conscious and rational workings of the mind that is increasingly freed from tradition and religion, whereas the Scottish social theorists tended to see progress as the unintended result of intentional action. In the first case progress was often equated with the moral betterment and enlightenment of individual actors, in the second with the evolution of an institutional framework that enhanced the chances that individuals who pursued their self interest also contributed to the commonweal.

With the increasing dominance of western civilization, the rise of technology (especially the spread of railways, steamships, and telegraphs), and the concomitant transformation of everyday life, the progressivist doctrine flourished throughout the nineteenth century and became part and parcel of the social scientific worldview. The idea of progress can be seen as the missing link between such diverse concepts and theories as Hegel's idealistic philosophy of history, Comte's law of the three stages, Marx's materialist conception of history, Buckle's conjectural history of civilization, Spencer's law of social differentiation, Bachofen's evolutionary scheme of the family, Durkheim's distinction between two forms of solidarity, and Ward's doctrine of social telesis. The two world wars in the "age of extremes" weakened, but could not stop, the idea of progress from exerting a strong impact on social thought throughout the twentieth century. In this context it might suffice to point to the various modernization theories, popular in the 1950s and 1960s, that argued for the existence of a unilineal, lawful pattern of development for all countries, to the contemporary "liberal minded" discourse

on globalization, with its focus on the convergence of traditions and the emergence of "one world," and to recent military attacks against "backward" regimes justified in the name of democracy's and the free market's inevitable success in the near future.

Like all great ideas the idea of progress has had its great enemies ever since. Critics of progressivism are commonly of a conservative, pessimistic, or skeptical bent, arguing either that there is nothing new under the sun or that what is new is worse than what was there before. In the eighteenth century the main ethical and intellectual arguments that have made up the anti progressivist tradition until today were deeply entrenched in social theory. By emphasizing the unchanging nature and the indomitable passions of humans, as well as the irrational and a rational side of social interactions, the idea of human and societal perfectibility is discarded as naïve. At the same time the technological optimism that nature could be controlled and harnessed by science and human ingenuity is rejected. When technological progress is admitted, it is either seen as insignificant or as harmful to the true values of human existence. Throughout the centuries the question regarding the relationship between knowledge and moral conduct has remained the essential element of the debate on progress. In modern anti progressivist social discourse the loss of tradition, family life, and religion is usually lamented, the past glorified, and the future feared. Since the Enlightenment anti progressivist thinkers have criticized the idea that all societies develop along the same path and that all non western societies necessarily follow the footsteps of the West as repugantly Eurocentric, falsely teleological, and as resting upon an erroneous dichotomy of tradition versus modernity. Severe criticism of the various aspects of the idea of progress can be found, for example, in the social thought of Herder, Burke, and Malthus in the eighteenth century, the sociological writings of Weber and the Italian elitist theorists Pareto and Mosca in the late nineteenth century, the cultural anthropology of Boas and his school in the early twentieth century, and the German tradition of *Kultursoziologie* and *Kulturphilosophie* in the inter war period. After World War II the Popperian epistemological critique of historicism, the emphasis on "multiple modernities" by Eisenstadt, the

ideology of the environmental and the anti globalization movement, and recent postmodernist crusades against “grand narratives” can be seen as continuing the different strands of the anti progressivist tradition. If the power of a doctrine is to be judged also by the vehemence of opposition, the idea of progress has certainly been one of the most stimulating ideas in intellectual history.

SEE ALSO: Comte, Auguste; Cultural Relativism; Eurocentrism; Malthus, Thomas Robert; Spencer, Herbert

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propaganda

Randal Marlin

The term propaganda arouses considerable interest and apprehension in modern society, conjuring up in the minds of many Orwellian images of totalitarian control. Any survey of contemporary popular usage is likely to find it used in a pejorative sense, as for example when labor and management call each other’s information packages “propaganda.” But there also exists a more neutral sense of the term, tied to its derivation from the Latin word *propagare*, meaning “to propagate.”

In this neutral sense propaganda means spreading messages, conveying information, getting the word out through some means of communication. The means may or may not be devious, deceptive, and underhanded. The message itself, and any goals sought in spreading the message, may also be good or bad, but in this usage, no moral evaluation is conveyed by the word propaganda.

Many attempts have been made to define propaganda in a way that brings out the negative connotation. Propaganda in this sense essentially involves communicating in artful and manipulative ways with the aim of getting one’s audience to think, feel, and eventually act in a way desired by the propagandist. The motivation may be self interested or it may be to promote a specific cause, such as universal free medical care, or a more abstract ideology. Typically, truth is valued only insofar as it contributes to the end sought. Where it does not, then lies, deceptions, appeal to emotions, or other tactics may be employed. A defining feature is the bypassing or suppression of a recipient’s ability to evaluate properly the message that is imparted. One important way of doing this is by disguising the true source of a given message, for example by funding seemingly disinterested bodies to do

one's advocacy. Another is by selectively presenting factual material. G. K. Chesterton once drew attention to the hugely mendacious possibilities available to those who report only truths, but select them so as to present a false picture, as when one reports only misery, corruption, and hardship from a country that is no worse than others overall. Discourse as dialogue, open ended, and with respect for the freedom and autonomy of the other is the opposite of propaganda so defined.

Recent efforts have been made to rehabilitate the term by distinguishing between "old" and "new" versions. "Old" propaganda would be deceptive and constraining, whereas "new" propaganda would be enlightening, empowering, and respectful of its audience's autonomy. One difficulty with this proposal is that supposedly new propaganda is not all that new, and supposedly old propaganda is still very much alive today. An alternative to talking about new and old propaganda would be to speak of good and bad propaganda. Here it is important to bear in mind two components in the moral assessment of propaganda. One relates to the ends promoted by the messages, which can be good or bad; the second relates to the means chosen, which can be good or bad independently of the ends sought. It is possible to use morally disreputable means to promote a worthy cause, for example.

The impetus to study propaganda comes from many sources and sometimes for opposing reasons. Propaganda has proven highly successful as a route to totalitarian power, for Nazis, communists, and liberal democrats alike. It is understandable that a new generation of power seekers wants to know how to use it. But there are others who object to propagandistic (in the negative sense) methods for attaining power. These others would like to expose bureaucratic, political, and commercial propaganda techniques whereby a powerful few dominate the large majority. The aim of such exposure is to enable people to resist their influence. The effect of exposing propaganda is to negate its influence.

LANDMARKS OF MODERN PROPAGANDA

The French Revolution led to a mass oriented culture, which Napoleon exploited through

tight control over opinion, seeing this as the foundation of political power. Carl von Clausewitz in the nineteenth century knew about the need in wartime to maintain morale on one's own side, undermine the morale of the enemy, and seek the good opinion of neutrals. Theorists such as Vilfredo Pareto, Georg Simmel, Albert Venn Dicey, and Gustav Le Bon have pioneered, from diverse standpoints, the study of opinion and mass behavior. British propaganda in World War I set a new benchmark for the extent and thoroughness of its worldwide reach. As the war progressed British propaganda became more hard nosed, and demonized Germans by concocting and widely disseminating a story about corpse factories in which the Germans supposedly boiled their own dead soldiers down to make glycerine, fertilizer, and suchlike. The aim of atrocity propaganda was to fuel hatred and enhance recruitment, but when the war ended it made peacemaking more difficult.

Woodrow Wilson brought the US into World War I with the help of government sponsored propaganda, and the experience provided some lessons for business. But much of the pioneering public relations work of Ivy Lee in the US actually predated the war.

Harold Lasswell's sustained review of British World War I propaganda was an early milestone of propaganda analysis. Walter Lippmann paid close attention to those biases in communication that derived from wishful thinking rather than deliberate intent. The success of both Nazi and Leninist propaganda seems to suggest the vindication of V. I. Bekhterev's ideas about how crowds can be manipulated through developing reflex responses. But as regards media influence such a "hypodermic needle" concept has been much criticized by subsequent research. Studies, notably by Carl Hovland and others, revealed that people's beliefs and attitudes are shaped in more complex ways than the Pavlovian, including reliance on others whose opinions they trust. Noam Chomsky exposed dubious assumptions underlying analysis of verbal behavior in terms of stimulus and response mechanisms. Nevertheless new methods of catching message recipients off guard are continuously being devised. Product placement in film and television gained support from the reported

marketing success of the candy Reese's Pieces in the widely viewed film *E.T.*

Jacques Derrida and Michel Foucault revealed much about the framing of discourse and how this framing can shape opinion in the interests of an existing dominant group. Martin Buber, Karl Jaspers, Gabriel Marcel, and Emmanuel Levinas have sought to make discourse more open to the personhood of the other, in contrast to treating others as means to one's own ends. George Orwell, who engaged in propaganda for the British in India during World War II, was well versed in the deceptive use of language, and exposed not only Soviet and fascist but also Tory imperialistic propaganda.

In the US alarm bells have sounded, from both right and left, at the way governments and corporations have manipulated opinion, concealing conflicts of interest, using shoddy accountancy practices and the like. During the Vietnam War, Senator Fulbright exposed some of the Pentagon techniques for getting the public to acquiesce to its plans, including installation of ballistic missiles. George H. W. Bush got support for his war against Iraq in 1991 through use of the atrocity story about Iraqi soldiers supposedly dumping babies out of incubators in Kuwait hospitals. Later, the story was discredited. Despite this revelation, misleading information aimed at gaining support for the US led coalition in the build up to the war against Iraq in 2003 still found wide acceptance among the US public.

SCOPE OF RESEARCH

The scope of propaganda research today is very broad. The kind of study undertaken by the Institute of Propaganda Analysis in the late 1930s has continued, as new techniques of deception, intimidation, and co-optation are discovered and exposed. Researchers in linguistics, informal logic, cognitive science, and media studies continue to shed new light in these areas. More recently, philosophers have taken up the challenge of ethical examination of propaganda, and Stanley Cunningham (2002) has begun the task of reconstructing the idea of propaganda for useful academic service, linking the concept to its epistemic deficiencies. A different challenge relates to the conundrum of controlling hate

propaganda while trying to preserve freedom of expression. The massacre of Tutsis in Rwanda in 1994 was preceded by intense feelings of hatred and fear generated by radio broadcasts in which Tutsis were dehumanized by referring to them with words such as "cockroaches."

French theorist Jacques Ellul's seminal and provocative work in the early 1960s continues to inspire researchers today. While his form of expression is often dogmatic and seemingly exaggerated and contradictory at times, there is no doubt about his profound understanding of the modern day propaganda phenomenon, reflecting his exposure to it in France under Nazi occupation. Ellul's central theme is that human technique in industrial society has turned into a leveling process that always seeks the most cost effective results, oblivious to artistic expression and humanistic values. He sees propaganda as an essential component of this new technological world, as advertising and public relations contribute to the self augmentation of technology to a point where means take precedence over ends and control over human destiny is lost. From Ellul's point of view the differences between Soviet, Nazi, and US propaganda conceal a basic similarity, which is acceptance in each case of a world in which the needs of technological society take precedence over all else. Propaganda has to be all encompassing, he writes, or it is not propaganda. To be effective, propaganda must not be contradicted and all different sources of information and perception need to be controlled. A propagandist builds on existing myths and presuppositions of a given audience, and may spend time preparing these background beliefs so that on an appropriate occasion they may be harnessed. Hitler made obvious use of racial myths in this way, but Ellul characterizes beliefs in the hero, in work, in democracy, in the nation, etc. as sometimes having the character of myth, in the sense that they are capable of motivating action and at the same time are treated as above questioning. When democracy is invoked to justify installing a subservient and repressive government in another country, the word democracy has passed into that mythical realm.

Ellul's categories of propaganda reach beyond the political, top down, agitative and irrational model, to include propaganda which is *sociological*, meaning diffuse as to source; *horizontal*,

meaning spread among people of the same socio-economic level; *integrative*, meaning binding people together as a nation or other group; and *rational*, meaning the use of polls, figures, and statistics in ways and contexts where there is no opportunity for scrutiny of their methods and premises, so that the scientific appearance is illusory.

Finally, Ellul's enduring contribution to propaganda study includes his important focus on individuals actually needing and wanting to be propagandized. Wanting to seem knowledgeable and responsible, citizens in a democratic society will not wish to reveal the many conflicts and gaps in knowledge that result from confusing news accounts. They are inclined therefore to latch onto a simplified, moralized view of current affairs when it is available to them (which may partly explain Fox News's success). For most people, the simplified account is also more likely to be entertaining. The lesson Ellul would have us draw is that our freedom and autonomy come at a price; namely, a struggle against the passivity and laziness that make us easy targets for propaganda.

A strong counter culture opposing domination by corporate controlled media has developed through alternate media and the Internet. Noam Chomsky, Jeff Cohen (of FAIR: Fairness and Accuracy in Reporting), Sheldon Rampton, and John Stauber (of PR Watch), along with many other academics such as Robert W. McChesney, have worked for many years to alert people to the often subtle ways in which their minds are influenced by selective presentation of news and opinion in the mainstream media, particularly with convergence of the media under fewer owners, and owners with other commercial interests. Under US President Ronald Reagan, and again under President George W. Bush, there has been a deliberate and concerted attempt to gain more control over public opinion at home and abroad, and to prevent a recurrence of the kind of groundswell of opposition over the Vietnam War. Conservative think tanks have flourished, supported by private corporations, supplying "expert" facts and arguments to the mass media. Public funding has existed for public interest groups that favor a liberal and left of center stance, but since the Reagan era the mainstream media have paid

more attention to conservative voices than previously. Chomsky and Edward Herman introduced a "propaganda model" detailing filters that operate on the mass media, skewing the process of news reporting that would be determined by journalistic values alone. When well financed think tanks produce elaborate content analyses claiming to show that "liberal" news papers are biased, it may be hard to refute such studies even when they are off the mark. They put pressure on the media to tilt more towards a conservative vision of what is fair and balanced. Other filters that Chomsky and Herman describe are the ownership and profit orientation of the mainstream media; the need to satisfy advertisers' interests; the need to rely on information provided by government and business and their approved "experts"; and lastly, the use of anti communism as a means of control. By depicting communism as an absolute evil, an effect is to scare commentators from supporting measures that benefit labor, for fear of being labeled "pinko." Since the events of September 11, 2001 anti terrorism has been similarly exploited, as those who protest infringements on civil liberties and the rule of law are treated as "soft on terror."

FUTURE PROSPECTS

Future analysis of persuasion and propaganda can always benefit from a study of Aristotle's *Rhetoric*, the principles of which still apply even when the means of communication differ. Source credibility continues to be a paramount consideration, and it can be confidently predicted that the ingenuity of propagandists at disguising their (and their paymasters') hands in manipulative communications will constantly be seeking outlets, and the propaganda detectors will have no shortage of work to detect them. Watchdogs are proliferating on both ends of the political spectrum. For example, while FAIR's perspective tends to be left oriented, that of AIM (Accuracy in Media) monitors the media from a rightist standpoint.

While the Internet has provided previously undreamt of opportunities for pooling the information resources of scattered counter culture practitioners, the problem of reaching the wider

public still remains, and activist groups have recently been exploring the possibilities of communicating through short range radio.

Orderly society presupposes a minimum of shared beliefs among the general population, at least regarding procedures to resolve conflicts in interests and ideologies. Some believe that resolution of conflicts will require a measure of “bamboozling” the public into accepting measures in their own interest, in other words, making use of propaganda. Others, having more faith in the public’s ability to think through the merits even of complicated policy matters, put their energies into exposing deceitful communications and making complex matters more intelligible to wider audiences. It will be an interesting job for sociologists and philosophers to trace the impact of these conflicting approaches, and to argue for a suitable communication ethics in the light of contemporary and historical experience.

SEE ALSO: Hegemony and the Media; Ideological Hegemony; Media Monopoly; Media and the Public Sphere; Politics and Media; Public Opinion

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property crime

Heith Copes and Crystal Null

Property crimes are defined as those offenses where offenders take money or property from victims without the use or threat of force. They include a long list of offenses such as burglary, larceny theft, motor vehicle theft, arson, shoplifting, fraud, embezzlement, and forgery. The Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) defines the first four of these offenses as Part I property crimes. These crimes make up the property crime index published yearly in the Uniform Crime Report (UCR). The majority of data collected by the FBI on property crime is concentrated around Part I offenses. The remaining offenses are classified as Part II property crimes in the UCR (FBI 2003).

By far the largest number of crimes committed in the United States in any given year are crimes against property, which make up about three quarters of all crime in the United States. Trends from the UCR and the National Crime Victimization Survey (NCVS) indicate that property crime rates have varied considerably over the past few decades. However, since 1992, property crime rates have begun to steadily decline to their current level. The estimated rate of property crime offenses known to the police in 2001 was 3,656 per 100,000 inhabitants, which is the lowest the rate has been since 1972. According to the NCVS, the rate of households victimized by property offenders has been steadily dropping from 544 in 1977 to 159 in 2002.

With such high numbers of property crime it is not surprising that the financial loss from these crimes is enormous. In 2002, the estimated loss attributed to property crimes (excluding arson) was \$16.6 billion. Although excluded from estimated property crime tabulations, arson had an average dollar loss of \$11,253 for the offenses in which monetary values were reported. Crimes against businesses and institutions are excluded from the NCVS, so losses from property crime are much higher than reported. For example, it is estimated that shoplifting alone costs retailers an estimated \$10 billion each year.

Despite the prevalence and cost of property crime, clearance rates for property crime are considerably lower than those of violent crimes. A crime is considered cleared when at least one person is arrested, charged with the commission of an offense, and turned over to courts for prosecution. Property crime clearance rates have been relatively stable since 1971, fluctuating from 16.1 percent to 18.5 percent with an average clearance rate of 17.5 percent.

The majority of property crimes are committed by occasional or amateur offenders who engage in a variety of offenses to supplement their incomes. Typically, these offenders do little in the way of planning, have few technical skills, and rely on found opportunities when choosing targets. Although the low clearance rate of property crimes makes profiles of offenders suspect, researchers have compiled a general view of property crime offenders that suggests they are disproportionately male, young, and non white. Historically, males commit twice as many property crimes as females. In 2002, for example, males accounted for 69.6 percent of property crimes and females accounted for 30.4 percent. However, property crime accounts for a larger percentage of the total crime committed by females.

Property crime offenders are disproportionately young. Almost one third of property crime offenders are under the age of 18 (30.4 percent). The peak age of property crime offenders is between 16 and 18. After this age, offending rates by age steadily decrease until around age 60, when property crime offenses level off at 0.4 percent.

The majority of property offenders are white (66 percent), followed by blacks (31.4 percent), Asian and Pacific Islanders (1.5 percent), and American Indian and Alaskan Native (1.3 percent). While the majority of property offenders are white, victims of property crime are disproportionately non white.

Although property crime has dropped in the previous decade, this drop has not affected all citizens equally as some groups continue to be at a higher risk than others. Both race and ethnicity of the head of the household are important factors when determining risk factors for victimization. The rate of victimization in households headed by a white person is 157.6, by a black person is 173.7, and by a Hispanic person is

210.1. These patterns of victimization have been relatively consistent for the past decade.

Household income, location of residence, and homeownership are also important predictors of the likelihood of property crime victimization. It appears that property offenders are more likely to victimize households with annual incomes below \$7,500. Offenders are also more likely to victimize households that are located in an urban area. Target households are usually rented, not owned.

Victims of property crime are often hesitant to report their victimization to police. Less than half of all victims of property crime report their victimization to law enforcement agencies. There is tremendous variation in reporting rates by types of property crime, however. For instance, 86.1 percent of victims of motor vehicle theft reported the theft, whereas only 32.8 percent of victims of larceny theft reported it. Not surprisingly, the main reason that victims reported the offense to police was to recover their lost property. The most common reasons for not reporting the offense were because the objects were recovered, the offender was unsuccessful, or there was a lack of proof.

SEE ALSO: Crime; Crime, Hot Spots; Criminology; Index Crime; Law, Criminal; Robbery; Violent Crime

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property, private

Jack Barbalet

Property implies ownership, to which rights attach. These rights may take usurpatory, moral, or legal form. The types of things that

can be owned as property, and therefore subject to property rights, are enormously varied. Depending on the particular circumstances, they might include, for instance, a human person, a person's capacities (especially for labor), the products of another's labor, any material of use or exchange, land, options, patents, ideas, and so on. The structure of ownership is also variable. In ancient societies, classically described as the "indian village community" in Maine's *Ancient Law* (1861), co ownership or communal property prevailed. In peasant societies, on the other hand, the household rather than the community is typically the unit which exercises controlling rights over productive possessions. From early capitalist societies private property arose as the dominant form of ownership in which individual persons exercise rights over their objects of possession. In late capitalist societies corporate and public property forms emerge, combining elements of both communal and private property. Corporate property is communal insofar as ownership rights are shared by a number of proprietors, each of whom can exercise or dispose of their rights as they choose as individuals without collective constraint, and similarly use the benefits of their ownership as they individually see fit. Public property excludes private ownership and only nominally involves co ownership, as various forms of statutory authorities exercise such property rights, putatively on behalf of the public, subject to legal and political controls.

The concept of private property, at least since the seventeenth century in Europe, is central in political and social theory. This is because the issue of private property is fundamental to moral, political, psychological, and social principles and outcomes. Private property is closely associated with the concept of individual freedom, for instance, where other forms of property may curtail such freedom. Economic and industrial efficiency is also frequently regarded as optimized under conditions of private property and compromised – if not undermined – by communal or public property. Psychologically, however, private property is more than other forms of property held to promote an unhealthy regard for material possession and corrode ethical orientations, as well as undermine respect for the natural and social environment

experienced in common. Similarly, private property is regarded as the source and consolidator of inequitable and unjust distributions of earnings and wealth.

In liberal theory property rights have a distinctive role insofar as they attach not just to possession of land and movable objects but also to a human being's own person and the capacities of that person, especially the capacity to labor. In the chapter on property in his *Treatise of Government* (1690) John Locke famously declared "every Man has a Property in his own Person." The notion of a person's proprietorship of their own capacities has become foundational in liberal theory to other rights of the person, including civil and political rights. In this sense private property is the institutional basis of the entire edifice of liberal thought. The vexed question of ownership of the products of the exercise of a person's own capacities in the context of capitalistic labor is classically dealt with by John Stuart Mill. Factory operatives produce an object that they are legally prevented from claiming as their own property. This is no contradiction, says Mill, because "the labour of manufacture is only one of the conditions which must combine for the production of the commodity" and all the other conditions are the private property of the employer (*Principles of Political Economy*, 1848).

Marxism, on the other hand, focuses not on rights but on the productive relationships constitutive of private property. In this sense private property is understood in terms of power relations rather than rights. Marx holds that ownership or possession of property is the principle of organization within relations of production and distribution. Those who possess private property have direct access to means of consumption; those who do not must offer their labor services to owners, who pay wages in exchange for activating their property productively. In this exchange the reciprocity between property owners and property less workers is asymmetrical, with the material benefits being greater for owners and the opportunity costs being greater for non owners. This relationship Marx characterizes as exploitation. In this manner Marx holds that there is a characteristic endogenous dynamic within each form of property, corresponding to historical stages of societal development, including

primitive communism, Asiatic society, feudalism, and capitalism.

Sociological treatments of private property adopt elements of liberal or Marxist accounts. Private property, for Weber, results from appropriation and closed social relationships or closure (*Economy and Society*, 1921). The appropriation of economic opportunities, from which others are excluded, is the basis of an advantage, according to Weber, which may take the form of a right. If this right is enduring and can be transferred between individuals, then the appropriated advantage is property. Weber goes on to discuss how appropriation and property have taken different forms under different historical conditions and in different economic settings. Durkheim argues that inheritance of private property is responsible for a forced division of labor, resulting in anomie, through distortion of a natural distribution of talents (*The Division of Labor in Society*, 1893). He provides a historically insightful descriptive account of property rights in *Professional Ethics and Civic Morals* (1950), but without developing a theory of private property.

Frank Parkin (*Marxism and Class Theory: A Bourgeois Critique*, 1979), following Marx, distinguishes between two forms of private property: personal property and property as capital. Property as capital, he argues, following Weber, is exclusionary closure. Out of these relations arises class exploitation. The difficulty here is Parkin's exclusive focus on distributional relations and competition for resources; while addressing the production of life chances this account fails to treat the production of the means of production of life chances. Marx achieves this by understanding property as a productive relation. For Parkin, property is an essentially political facility. But practically all accounts of private property acknowledge in different ways its connection with power. It is also recognized, from Adam Smith (*Theory of Moral Sentiments*, 1759) to Thorstein Veblen (*Theory of the Leisure Class*, 1899), that private property as personal possession confers status or social standing on its owner.

SEE ALSO: Capitalism; Capitalism, Social Institutions of; Communism; Enterprise; Exploitation; Money; Political Economy; Property Crime; Robbery; Socialism

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prosocial behavior

Nancy Wisely

Social psychologists invented the concept of prosocial behavior to characterize a range of voluntary actions that benefit the welfare of others. Because prosocial behavior is socially defined, its specific nature may differ across societies or by situations. For example, the widespread norm, "Thou shall not kill," does not apply on the battlefield where killing may be rewarded with praise and medals. Prosocial behavior is consistent with social norms and provides a convenient antonym for antisocial behavior, or non normative behaviors such as crime and most forms of aggression. *Helping* is a prosocial subtype and refers to any behavior that has positive consequences for another. The helper's motivation may be altruistic or egoistic. Altruism is a special form of helping. The altruist is motivated by the ultimate goal of improving another's well being regardless of possible personal costs. Although the altruist may garner rewards in the act of helping, this does not preclude the altruistic intent. In contrast, egoistic responses are self serving and motivated by the desire to improve one's own welfare. The connection between altruism and prosocial behavior varies. Prosocial behavior will not always be altruistically motivated, and altruistic motivation will not always generate prosocial behavior (Batson 1991).

Prosocial activity includes emergency intervention, charity, donation, cooperation, volunteering, comforting, sacrifice, and sharing.

These behaviors require investment of time, energy, or material goods and often feature a single helper. Cooperation, or coordinating activities for mutual benefit, is a cornerstone of every society but is not considered helping because it implies intent to benefit the actors. Because all of these behaviors involve positive consequences, they can be classified as prosocial, but to determine whether they meet the criteria for altruism requires knowledge of helpers' motives.

Interest in prosocial behavior dates from the Greeks and is embodied in the Judeo Christian directive to "love thy neighbor." In the eighteenth century, Scottish pragmatists David Hume and Adam Smith separately advanced the radical notion that human nature includes a capacity for benevolence and compassion for others. This possibility continues to challenge the conventional model of egoistic human actors.

Within early social science, Comte is credited with coining the term altruism to describe the motivation to help others. By the early 1900s, McDougall recognized an altruistic instinct, but the idea faded as academic interest shifted from internal factors to the behaviorist focus on observable phenomena. In the 1930s and 1940s, Kurt Lewin set the guidelines for contemporary social psychology by proposing that behavior is the result of both the person and the environment (situation). Lewin summarized this then revolutionary idea in social psychology's most famous formula: $B = f(P, E)$, signifying that behavior is a function of the person and the environment. Lewin's conception of the person includes individual hereditary attributes, skills, and personality. The environment refers mainly to the situation and others who are present. Later researchers have debated which of Lewin's variables best explains prosocial behavior – personality traits or social situations.

It fell to George Herbert Mead, a modern pragmatist, to perhaps unwittingly rekindle interest in altruism. In developing symbolic interactionism, Mead proposed that role taking (taking the other's perspective) is integral to the development of the self as empathy enables the child to act reflexively. Current theories linking cognitive development and altruism are indebted to the observations of Piaget, while Kohlberg identified stages of moral development. Within

the social problem centered discipline of sociology, Sorokin risked his reputation by dedicating part of his later career to the examination of altruism and love. He conducted an empirical study of "good neighbors" and headed the Harvard Research Center in Creative Altruism. Prosocial study again received attention when Gouldner (1960) concluded that the neglected norm of reciprocity is a universal component of moral codes. This norm of social obligation makes two simple demands: people should help (and not harm) those who have helped them.

Until the 1960s, scientific study of helping was sporadic and only loosely connected. But in 1964, 39 witnesses failed to help Kitty Genovese, a murder victim, in Queens, New York. The brutal incident and the onlookers' apparent callousness captured national attention and generated concern about urban apathy and alienation. The public outcry awakened social psychologists and legitimated the relevancy of prosocial research. The puzzle of why so many bystanders had the same unexpected reaction to this crime spurred an investigation by Bibb Latané and John Darley. Their book, *The Unresponsive Bystander: Why Doesn't He Help?* (1970), is considered a classic in the field. Since then, prosocial behavior and altruism have been studied continuously and comprise a routinely recognized subfield of social psychology. Although the bulk of empirical work has investigated helping by strangers in emergencies, researchers have recently extended their studies to include the more mundane activities of volunteering, donation, and everyday helpfulness.

Philosophers, theologians, economists, and biologists have analyzed altruism and prosocial behavior for centuries. Current debate within social psychology and beyond is moving away from the established belief that behavior is ultimately and universally egoistic. A related issue is whether altruism is genetically transmitted and manifests itself as a personality trait.

THEORIES: ALTRUISM AND HELPING BEHAVIOR

Helping theories address internal motives and personality characteristics as well as external situations and social contexts.

Evolutionary theories apply the Darwinian principle of natural selection to explain helping motives. Thus, any trait that helps an organism survive will be genetically transmitted to the next generation. Under this rule, a gene for altruism seems contradictory because altruistic responses can require self sacrifice over self interest. Evolutionists emphasize that group survival depends on survival of the gene pool, not the individual organism. The major mechanisms for genetic transmission of altruism are group selection, kin selection, and reciprocal altruism. Kin selection implies that altruistic parents will save their children. This process, along with a reciprocity gene for mutual help, would enhance group fitness over time. Research confirms that people tend to help others who are genetically similar. Generally, successful groups should have a higher proportion of altruists than groups who die off. Applied to humans, this perspective is controversial. While it does show how self sacrifice can be consistent with natural selection, the theory reveals nothing about human goals. However, evolutionists have added fuel to the possibility of an altruistic personality.

Social learning theory posits that socialization, not heredity, is why people help. Learning to be altruistic occurs through instruction, reinforcement, and imitation. For individuals who internalize the altruistic tendency, self reward (self approval) and self cost (guilt, shame) can serve as reinforcements or punishments for helping or inaction. Exchange theory extends the reinforcement principle by viewing humans as rational actors who assess the ratio of costs to benefits in helping situations. Helping is less likely if costs predominate. Equity theory emphasizes fairness and distributive justice – helping should be reciprocated.

Developmental theorists observe that cognitive skills and capacities increase in complexity and sophistication in sequential stages as humans mature. Older children develop cognitive empathy and then learn to make internal self attributions. Eventually, they see their own helping as personality driven. Internalizing the belief that they are helpful persons sets a standard for self judgment of future behavior. Kohlberg's (1985) model shows how moral reasoning evolves. Martin Luther King, Jr. is often given as an example of one of few who

reach the highest level where moral decisions are based on concern for universal justice and personal ethics even if they contradict social norms.

The most sociological theories of helping, or normative theories, stem from symbolic interactionism and its dramaturgical metaphor. A theatrical analogy compares the social world to a stage where actors give scripted role performances for an audience. Thus, individuals are regulated by norms that prescribe the appropriate behavior in a situation. Conformity to three norms encourages helping: the norm of giving; the norm of social responsibility, or helping dependent others; and the norm of reciprocity or mutual help. "Mind your own business" is one of several norms that inhibit helping.

RESEARCH AND DEBATES

Bystander Intervention Studies

Early research studied intervention in emergency situations and produced several decision making models to understand when people will help. Latané and Darley identified steps that lead to action. Failure at any point cancels the possibility of helping. Researchers repeatedly find a counterintuitive bystander effect – as the number of bystanders increases, helping tends to decrease. Three explanations have been tendered. First, pluralistic ignorance occurs when bystanders seem to be unconcerned. Also, multiple bystanders diffuse responsibility whereas lone individuals carry full responsibility. Finally, bystanders may be unsure of their competence in a situation and find inaction preferable to failure or criticism.

By the 1980s, prosocial research had revealed that most people's behavior varies by situations, and evidence of behavioral consistency across situations was scant. This climate of preference for situational variables spurred personality theorists to demonstrate the impact of individual differences. Thus, empirical support for Lewin's original formula holds; the environment and person together explain behavior. Recently, Penner et al. (2005) suggested a multilevel approach (meso, micro, and macro) to understand helping.

Altruism

For centuries the image of egoistically motivated humans prevailed. Self interest was thought to be the ultimate goal of all behavior, and altruism was rarely mentioned. In this intellectual milieu, Daniel Batson (1991) initiated a 25 year crusade to demonstrate that empathy motivated altruism is an ultimate goal for some people some of the time. His research program is a classic example of scientific revolution. Batson systematically tested his empathy–altruism hypothesis against three alternatives. In two of the models, empathy motivates helping, but the goals differ: in one case, social and self rewards are the ultimate goal (Cialdini et al. 1987); in the second, avoiding punishment is the ultimate goal. In the third and most popular model (aversive arousal reduction), helping is the best way to relieve empathic distress (Dovidio et al. 1991). Dozens of empirical challenges have failed to refute the empathy–altruism hypothesis.

Demographic Variables

Generally, small town residents are more helpful than urbanites. Milgram identified information overload as the underlying cause of supposed urban apathy. City dwellers use several strategies to cope with the bombardment of urban stimuli: they identify high priority information, selectively attend to it, and limit some interactions to superficial involvement, all of which would reduce helping. But not all cities are the same. Experiments in 36 US cities show population density (not size) to be the strongest predictor of helping. Internationally, Hispanic cultures, where *simpatico* is the norm, rank highest in helping.

In the 1980s, researchers focused on gender differences. They found the kinds of help given to be consistent with gender role expectations. Men are more likely to help strangers in emergencies, or in situations of danger or requiring physical strength. Women are more likely to provide routine help and ongoing commitment to care for children and the elderly or support a friend. Gender differences peak when an audience is present, there is potential danger, and the recipient of help is female. Overall, men are more likely to give help, and women are more likely to ask for it.

Planned Helping

Recently, researchers have studied long term helping as in giving blood, charitable donation, and volunteering. Social factors (norms) combine with psychological factors (empathic feelings) to produce altruism in volunteers. Conceptualizing helping behavior as role behavior reveals how repeat blood donors experience role person mergers (blood donation becomes a core part of their identities) (Callero et al. 1987). Others view volunteering as productive work and analyze the capital inputs required (Wilson & Musick 1997). A third approach identifies six functions of helping. Volunteers can express humanitarian values, increase their understanding of the world, enjoy personal growth, acquire career experience, enhance social relationships, and address personal problems. Generativity or commitment to the welfare of future generations is another possible motive. This research has yielded practical results for volunteer recruitment.

SEE ALSO: Aggression; Comte, Auguste; Crime; Evolution; Gender Ideology and Gender Role Ideology; Lewin, Kurt; Mead, George Herbert; Norm of Reciprocity; Role Taking; Social Learning Theory; Social Psychology; Society and Biology; Symbolic Interaction

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prostitution

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The term prostitution is popularly used to refer to the trade of sexual services for payment in cash or kind, and so to a form of social interaction that is simultaneously sexual and economic. This makes prostitution a difficult cultural category, for in most societies sexual and economic relations are imagined and regulated in very different ways. Prostitution therefore straddles two quite different symbolic domains. Since these domains are highly gendered, the female prostitute has long represented a troubling figure, disrupting what are traditionally deemed to be natural gender binaries (active/passive, public/private, etc.), and stigmatized as unnatural, immoral, and polluting. Yet prostitution is often simultaneously viewed as an inevitable feature of all human societies, for it is held to meet the supposedly powerful and biologically given sexual impulses of men. Thus it is some times described as a “necessary evil” and considered to protect the virtue of “good” girls and women by “soaking up” excess male sexual urges which would otherwise lead to rape and marital breakdown.

This traditional view of prostitution found sociological expression in a classic article by Kingsley Davis (1937), which explained the institution of prostitution as a necessary counterbalance to the reproductive institutions of society (such as the family) that placed a check upon men’s sexual liberty. Furthermore, Davis

argued, because prostitution enables “a small number of women to take care of the needs of a large number of men, it is the most convenient sexual outlet for an army, and for the legions of strangers, perverts, and physically repulsive in our midst” (1937: 754). This line of analysis was widely accepted by sociologists until Mary McIntosh subjected it to devastating critique in a seminal essay titled “Who Needs Prostitutes? The Ideology of Male Sexual Needs” (1978). Prostitution had been an important focus of feminist thought in the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, and McIntosh’s essay, alongside Kate Millet’s *The Prostitution Papers* (1980), marked a renewal of feminist interest in the topic.

This interest has subsequently grown, not least because prostitution is part of a wider market for commercial sex that has expanded and diversified rapidly in both affluent and developing nations over the past two decades. Old forms of sex commerce, including prostitution, are taking place in more and different settings; new technologies have generated possibilities for entirely new forms of commercial sexual experience; women are now amongst consumers of commercial sex; the boundaries between commercial sex and other sectors, such as tourism, leisure, and entertainment, have shifted. But there are also continuities with the past. Female prostitution in particular remains a hugely stigmatized and often criminalized activity. Even where certain forms of prostitution are either legal or tolerated, female prostitutes are still frequently subject to forms of surveillance and social and legal control that are not applied to non prostitute citizens (or, very often, to male prostitutes).

There are also continuities as regards the strong relationship between colonialism, imperialism, nationalism, militarism, and war on the one hand, and prostitution on the other. The presence of international peacekeepers and police, civilian contractors and aid workers in post conflict settings has acted as a stimulus for the rapid growth of a prostitution market in many regions. Very often, working conditions and employment practices in these newly emerged markets are abysmal. Historically, links between prostitution and migration, and children’s presence in prostitution have both

attracted intense public and policy concern. Such concerns recently resurfaced, for there are still children present in the sex trade, and in many places the majority of prostitutes are now undocumented migrants from poorer countries or regions.

Prostitution has commanded much attention from feminists in recent years, but has also highlighted deep theoretical and political divisions within feminism. On one side of the divide stand “radical feminists” or “feminist abolitionists” who foreground the sexual domination of women by men in their analyses of gender inequality, and view prostitution as the unambiguous embodiment of patriarchal oppression. All prostitution is a form of sexual violence and slavery that violates women’s human right to dignity and bodily integrity, and buying sex is equivalent to the act of rape. This account rests on the assumption that no woman freely chooses or genuinely consents to prostitute. It leaves little room for women as agents within prostitution, and provides what critics deem to be a gender essentialist, totalizing, and reductive analysis of prostitution. Although grounded in a critique of patriarchy, the feminist abolitionist account emphasizes sexual experience as a source of individual and collective moral harm, and privileges sexual acts that take place in the context of intimate, emotional relationships. It thus shares a certain amount of ground with moral conservatism. For this reason, critics point to uncomfortable parallels between contemporary feminist campaigns for the abolition of prostitution (and especially those against “sex trafficking”) and the moral purity and race hygiene movements that flourished in the early twentieth century.

On the other side of the divide stand those who might loosely be described as “sex work feminists.” They reject the assumption that prostitution is intrinsically degrading and, treating prostitution as a form of service work, make a strong distinction between “free choice” prostitution by adults and all forms of forced and child prostitution. Whilst the latter should be outlawed, the former can be an economic activity like any other, and should be legally and socially treated as such. This perspective emphasizes women’s capacity (and right) to act as moral agents within prostitution. Within this, there are sex radical theorists who celebrate sex

commerce as a practice that potentially subverts the legal and social binaries of normal/abnormal, healthy/unhealthy, pleasurable/dangerous sex, as well as of gender itself. Though some sex work feminists pay attention to the impact of global economic and political structures and processes on sex commerce, others have been criticized for their failure to engage seriously with questions about the sex industry as a site of labor exploitation.

Because the term “prostitution” embraces a diverse range of experience, and because “prostitutes” are not a homogeneous group, diametrically opposed positions on prostitution can each be partially supported by empirical research. Thus, feminist abolitionists refer to studies showing, for example, that entry into prostitution can be precipitated by the experience of rape and/or incest, and that prostitution can be associated with drug abuse, various forms of sexual and physical violence, and suicide. Yet sex work feminists can also back their claims by citing studies in which women describe themselves as having actively chosen prostitution, either for positive reasons or as preferable to other employment opportunities open to them.

Male sex workers rarely feature in such debates on the rights and wrongs of prostitution, and this may partly reflect an (untested) assumption that sexual transactions between men are inherently less exploitative than those involving a female seller and a male buyer (Altman in Aggleton 1999: xiv). Research on male prostitutes’ experience has largely been driven by concerns about sexual health and HIV/AIDS prevention, and to a lesser extent by interest in the relationship between male sex work and gay identities. However, this research also reveals that male prostitution, like female prostitution, varies enormously in terms of social organization, working conditions, and earnings, and that men’s and boys’ motivations for trading sex are as diverse as women’s and girls’. Questions about agency, choice, labor exploitation, and violence are thus just as relevant to the analysis of male prostitution as they are to that of female prostitution, even if they have to date been largely overlooked.

As sellers of sex, men may often have been ignored in research and debate on prostitution, but they have received attention as buyers of sex. So, for example, radical feminists have argued

that buying sex is an act of aggression, equivalent to rape, but this has been challenged by a number of researchers who have demonstrated the highly differentiated nature of demand for commercial sex and the diversity of male clients in terms of their social identities, motivations, and practices, as well as by researchers who have examined the phenomenon of female demand for the services of male sex workers (for instance, Sánchez Taylor 2001).

As the sex industry has expanded and diversified in recent years, so the literature (popular and policy as well as academic) that variously describes, criticizes, or celebrates it has also proliferated. This literature is increasingly an object of analysis in its own right, and a growing number of works are devoted to deconstructing historical and contemporary discourse on prostitution, revealing its basis in deeper anxieties about – or desires for – social change, especially as regards sexuality; relations of gender, class, and race; imperial decline, national identity, and migration patterns; the nature and boundaries of childhood; and/or public health. Yet prostitution continues to serve as a symbolic battleground for broader disputes about such issues, and there is still no consensus on how best to define, theorize, or respond to the phenomenon.

Although debates on prostitution are intractable in the sense that they are disputes about the moral and normative values that *should* inform sexual and economic life, they also hinge on claims about the empirical reality of prostitution in the contemporary world. For this reason, the existing body of research evidence on prostitution is important. However, the existing body of research evidence is patchy, incomplete, and unreliable, for the study of prostitution presents many methodological difficulties. First, there are definitional problems. “Prostitution” does not always involve a simple, anonymous, and instantaneous commodity exchange. It can also be organized in less explicitly contractual and more open ended ways, and so shades off into more diffuse, longer term relationships that are not always easily distinguished from conventional and legally sanctioned relations between spouses or partners. By the same token, the exchange of sex for some economic benefit is not legally defined as prostitution where it takes place within a marriage, or, in many countries, between people who are dating each other.

Sexual and economic life are not easily disentangled, for in most societies “sex is a resource with both symbolic and material value” and so also an exchange value (Zalduondo & Bernard 1995: 157).

Even when research focuses on sexual economic exchanges that are organized as commodity exchanges, methodological problems persist. Much prostitution takes place in an illegal and/or hidden economy, so that official statistics on the size and earnings of the sex trade in any given country are not available and it is extremely difficult to gather accurate unofficial data. Female prostitution has received much more research attention than has male prostitution. Within this, female street prostitution has been studied more extensively than other forms of prostitution, and it is sex workers rather than their clients who have received the lion’s share of research attention. Few studies of prostitution use control samples, so that claims about its unique properties remain difficult to substantiate empirically. More generally, the existing body of evidence on prostitution is unsatisfactory because it is an amalgam of information from different sources, collected in different ways, at different times, using different definitions of the phenomenon, by different agencies for very different reasons. Different political concerns about prostitution lead to very different research agendas – the questions that preoccupy policymakers, feminist abolitionists, HIV/AIDS prevention activists, and sociologists, for example, are not identical.

Though some commentators remain embroiled in the debate on whether prostitution should be viewed as a form of work or a form of male sexual violence, most sociologists now recognize the need to develop analyses of prostitution that can embrace its diversity and its particularity as both a sexual and an economic institution. This will require dialogue with scholars working on broader theoretical and substantive topics, for example with sociologists who study work, migration, and globalization, such that theoretical insights into the diversity and complexity of the power relations that surround human labor in the contemporary world can be applied to prostitution. And since the metaphor of slavery is frequently invoked in relation to prostitution and “trafficking,” there is room for much closer engagement with historical and

theoretical analyses of slavery, and more particularly the work of theorists who address questions about gender, property, and slavery (e.g., Brace 2004). Such scholarship highlights the fact that the lines between tyranny and consent, domination and freedom, and objectification and moral agency are not and never have been clear cut, and thus may help prostitution theorists to move beyond simple forced/free dichotomies. The social and political construction of the market for commercial sexual services is another area requiring development. Here, it will be important to draw on theories of consumption to explore the consumer market for commercial sex as a site in which status relations and hierarchies along lines of class, race, nation, age, and gender are expressed and reproduced. Finally, with some notable exceptions (e.g., Kulick 1998; Aggleton 1999), little research attention has been paid to questions about male and transsexual/transvestite prostitution, and it is to be hoped that work in this area will contribute significantly to theorizing on commercial sex.

SEE ALSO: Globalization, Sexuality and; Sex and Gender; Sex Tourism; Sexual Markets, Commodification, and Consumption; Sexuality, Masculinity and; Sexuality Research: Methods; Traffic in Women

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protest, diffusion of

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The term diffusion as it is used by social scientists refers to the spread or flow of some innovation, through direct or indirect channels, across actors in a social system (Rogers 1995). Diffusion of protest, then, implies that social protest (or some element thereof) is spreading across (or flowing between) some set of actors in a social system.

There are several components of this core definition of diffusion that are worth highlighting (Rogers 1995). First, implicit in this definition are four different types of actors. First, there are *innovators*, who are the very first actors to adopt an innovation. Innovators are said to be adventurous, willing to take risks (and incur losses at times), and connected to actors outside of the social system. Second, there are the *early adopters* of the innovation who, by adopting it, help to legitimize the innovation in the eyes of other actors who have yet to adopt. Third, there are the *later adopters* who come slowly to the process of adoption, but who nonetheless choose to adopt the innovation after careful deliberation. Finally, there are the *non adopters*, or those who have not, and presumably will not, adopt the innovation.

Thinking about the different types of actors relevant to the diffusion process has been of central importance to scholars of protest cycles (Tarrow 1998). A cycle of protest is a period of increased conflict, across many sectors of a social system, characterized by the diffusion of new tactical forms, identities, frames, and so on. Work on protest cycles distinguishes between "early riser" movements (which help to set a protest cycle in motion) and movements that are sparked by these earlier movements via processes of diffusion within the protest cycle.

In addition to the importance of the different actors in the diffusion process, this core definition also emphasizes that there is some *innovation* or object that is perceived as new and that spreads across these actors (Rogers 1995). Research in social movements has found that innovative protest tactics, frames, and ideology may all diffuse between actors and organizations.

Finally, this core definition emphasizes the channel or conduit along which the innovation spreads. As such, work in the area of social movements has emphasized the importance of both direct (or network) ties and indirect (or socially constructed) ties (Soule 1997).

Early work in the social movement literature was a product of the intellectual and social climate of the 1950s and 1960s. Early treatments of diffusion, like much of the social science in this era, were framed by an interest in psychology and micro level processes. As such, these tended to view diffusion as motivated by contagion between individuals in groups or crowds, for example when individuals react to stimuli from others. Maladaptive and aggressive impulses were to be feared, since they were thought to spread from person to person and drive collective action. Observers of race riots, lynching, Nazism, fascism, McCarthyism, and Stalinism viewed individuals as non rational and susceptible to the diffusion of these movements.

With the development of the resource mobilization tradition in the 1970s, and its focus on social movement organizations, it became possible to consider diffusion as a function of connections between different organizations. Thus, more recent treatments of diffusion recognize that the boundaries between movements and movement organizations often overlap, leading to a web of connections (both real and imagined) between actors and social movement organizations.

Most recent work on the diffusion of protest has gone beyond merely noting the existence of diffusion and has instead tried to better specify the mechanisms by which an innovation diffuses. As such, there are two broad categories of diffusion studies: those which focus on how *direct network ties* facilitate diffusion and those which focus on how *indirect ties* facilitate diffusion.

One of the earliest examples of the role of direct network ties in the diffusion of protest is

Rude's (1964) examination of the diffusion of information about rebellions along transportation routes in England and France between 1730 and 1848. Similarly, Bohstedt and Williams (1988) show that dense community networks formed through market transactions facilitated the imitation of food riots across communities in Devonshire in the late eighteenth century. Finally, and more recently, Hedstrom et al. (2000) found that the diffusion of the ideas of the Swedish Social Democratic Party between 1894 and 1911 followed the travel routes of political agitators at that time.

In addition to examining trade and travel routes, other studies have focused on additional types of direct ties. Petras and Zeitlin (1967), for example, found that the propensity of an agricultural municipality to vote for Salvadore Allende in the Chilean elections of 1958 and 1964 was directly related to the number of mining municipalities to which the agricultural municipality was connected. In their study, the mining industry spawned high levels of Marxist ideology and activism, which spread to agricultural municipalities via direct ties.

In another historical account, Gould (1991) argued that overlapping enlistment in the National Guard (i.e., people belonging to battalions outside their own districts) produced interdependencies across districts in the commitment to resistance of the Versailles army in Paris in 1871. More specifically, insurrection against the impending Versailles army in one district depended on the levels of resistance in other districts to which the district was directly linked.

Direct network ties have also been found to facilitate the diffusion of rioting behavior. Singer (1970), who interviewed 500 African American men about their sources of information on the Detroit riot of 1967, found that the chief source of information, according to his informants, was personal communication. This finding is similar to those reported in other studies of riots.

Finally, direct network ties can facilitate the diffusion of innovative protest tactics. Morris (1981) shows that the sit ins associated with the Civil Rights Movement were not spontaneous and uncoordinated activities, but rather that preexisting organizational and personal ties facilitated communication necessary for the emergence and development of this then innovative protest tactic.

In addition to direct connections between individuals and/or organizations, indirect ties can also facilitate the diffusion of protest. One type of indirect tie is the shared cultural understanding of similar activists or organizations in different locales. While not directly connected, activists who define themselves as similar to other activists may imitate the actions of others. An example of this process is the imitation by activists at Seabrook in 1976 of a mass demonstration at a nuclear site in Germany in 1974 (McAdam & Rucht 1993). In related work, Soule (1997) shows that innovative student protest tactics diffused among educational institutions which were similar along certain dimensions. The construction of categories of similarity served as indirect channels between colleges and universities in the mid 1980s, leading to the diffusion of the shantytown protest tactic during the student anti apartheid movement.

The mass media is another important type of indirect channel of diffusion. Noting that the urban riots of the late 1960s appeared to cluster in time, Spilerman (1976) hypothesized that riots diffused throughout urban black areas and were facilitated by television coverage of civil rights activism, which helped to create solidarity that went beyond direct ties of community. To Spilerman, then, the media served as an indirect channel of diffusion by creating a cultural linkage between African Americans in different metropolitan areas. Television, he argues, familiarized individuals all over the country with both the details of riots and the reasons why individuals participated in riots. Singer's (1970) aforementioned work on the Detroit riot of 1967 points to the media (as well as interpersonal or direct communication) as a leading source of information on the riot in that city. In more recent treatments, Myers (2000) finds evidence for the claim that riots that received national media attention increased the subsequent national level of riots, while smaller riots that received only local media attention increased riot propensities only in their local area.

In the literature on the diffusion of protest, there are at least three unanswered questions worthy of consideration. First, most of the empirical work on diffusion of protest has not adequately conceptualized which actors are truly at risk for adopting an innovation. When we

consider the previously discussed types of actors essential to the definition of diffusion, it is clear that some of these actors (in particular, the non adopters) are likely not really at risk of adopting the innovation to begin with. In Soule's (1997) work on the student divestment movement in the United States, she defines campuses as "at risk" of experiencing a shantytown event if the college/university had investments in companies doing business in South Africa. At one level, this is perfectly adequate and logical, especially from a methodological point of view. However, in thinking about the set of colleges and universities which at that time had investments in South African related companies, it is quite plausible that some of them would not *truly* be at risk for a shantytown event because, for example, they had no history of student activism. The difference may be a minor one: *technically* a university may be at risk for experiencing this type of protest because it is guilty of investing in South African related companies; however, in *actuality*, a university may not really be at risk simply because a good predictor of student activism is a history of activism. Diffusion scholars should carefully consider the "risk set" of potential adopters of an innovation so as to adequately discern between non adopters who were at risk of adoption and non adopters who were never really at risk to begin with.

A second consideration relates to the concept of *theorization* as advanced by diffusion scholars (Strang & Meyer 1993). Theorization is the development of abstract categories and hypotheses about patterns of, and relationships between, these categories. It is a way for individuals to make sense of the world around them. In many ways, the concept of theorization is similar to the way in which *collective action frames* are used by scholars of social movements. For example, consider the way in which an innovation (e.g., tactic, ideology) is framed strategically to improve its chances for adoption. In many ways, this is similar to the diffusion literature's focus on the role of theorization in helping to document the virtues of a particular innovation. Drawing connections between theorization and framing would be an interesting area in which social movements and diffusion processes might be advanced.

Finally, thus far scholarship on the diffusion of protest has not compared the relative

effectiveness of indirect and direct channels of diffusion for spreading elements of social movements. In the literature, there is an often overlooked distinction between *communication* and *influence* (Soule 2004). Both processes convey information, thus both have the potential to impact the actions of others. However, communication is less likely to change opinions than is influence. The former of these is exemplified by the mass media and may be parallel to indirect ties, while the latter is exemplified by direct, interpersonal ties. Thus, we might expect that, at least in certain contexts, direct ties may be better or more effective channels than are indirect ties. Most studies of diffusion in social movements have tended to focus on either direct or indirect ties and their role in the diffusion process; however, there is a need to carefully examine the differences between these two conduits of diffusion.

SEE ALSO: Contention, Tactical Repertoires of; Crowd Behavior; Framing and Social Movements; Resource Mobilization Theory; Social Movements, Networks and

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Protestantism

Jean Paul Willaime

Of the 2 billion Christians in the world today, Protestants make up about a quarter, while Roman Catholics represent a little over a half. If Protestant Christendom appeared in the sixteenth century within European Latin

Christianity and represented a number of fractures within it, then it would be wrong to associate modern Protestantism with western society (especially with North America). Protestantism has become a world phenomenon, present in Asia (more than 25 percent of South Korea's population is Protestant), Latin America (at least 10 percent of its population), and Africa (17 percent of the population). In the year 2000, out of every 100 Protestants, 31 were in Africa, 25 in Europe, 17 in North America, 12 in Asia, 12 in Latin America, and 3 in Oceania (where they represent 42 percent of the population, the highest proportion in any continent) (Hillerbrand 2004).

Protestantism has its origins in a number of key reformations within European Christianity in the sixteenth century: the Lutheran Reformation in the Germanic world, the Calvinist Reformations in France, Switzerland, and Scotland, the Anglican Reformation in England, and the Radical Reformation of the Anabaptists and Spiritualists. Even if the Protestant world includes branches which appeared later (Baptism in the seventeenth century, Methodism in the eighteenth, and Pentecostalism in the twentieth), it was these reforms which laid the doctrinal foundations for Protestantism and gave it shape. The Protestant world constitutes an extremely diversified and complex religious situation. It is polycentric – Geneva is not Rome – pluriconfessional, and multifaceted. A Lutheran church service in Sweden is quite different from a Pentecostal assembly in Brazil, or from a Baptist service in the Southern US. It is, in each case, one of the number of different faces of Protestantism. Although the Protestant world is uniform neither in its doctrine nor its organization (it is characterized by its theological and ecclesiastical pluralities), three fundamental principles give it a certain unity: (1) reference to the Bible, (2) religious individualism, and (3) a sense of Christian duty in the world.

Whatever the Protestant confession – whether it be Reformed/Presbyterian, Lutheran, Baptist, Methodist, or any other – great importance is given to the Bible within individual and collective piety, and reference to the holy scriptures is considered a fundamental source of religious truth and Christian behavior. From there, the ecclesiastic institution and its authorities have

been relativized. They are fallible and their faithfulness is measured according to the given scriptures (*sola scriptura*, “only scripture”). Luther's heirs felt freer to found other ecclesiastic organizations when they realized their church had become disloyal: there has been, throughout the course of history, a number of reforms among the heirs of the Reform itself. In certain respects, it can be stated that the desacralization of ecclesiastic institutions favored the development of free enterprise in religious spheres, as was the case of denominationalism in North America. This stance is thought to be the cause for the strong division between clergy and laity, which has contributed to “the universal ministry of the faithful” and the calling for each believer.

The second point which the Protestant world has in common is the concept of religious individualism (not to be confused with being isolated within religion; such individualism, on the contrary, nurtures all facets of sociability, including a sense of community centered sociability). Durkheim (1951) found that the highest incidences of suicide in Protestant populations were linked to such individualism and to a low level of collective integration. This depended on the community, whether Lutheran, Baptist, or Methodist, although it is primarily the concept of personal suitability of religion which is of primary importance in the Protestant interpretation of Christian living; whether this suitability be intellectual or emotional, whether it subscribes to the psychosocially “liberal” branches of the church (those which are pluralist and care little for monitoring the beliefs and practices of their faithful), or whether it subscribes to the psychosocially “orthodox” branches of the church (aimed at a society of believers sharing a common model and having the necessary means for control).

The third major characteristic deals with fulfilling one's Christian duty. The reformers, while criticizing monasticism, valued worldly saintliness rather than non worldly saintliness; that is, an inner rather than external monasticism being the source of an intramundane asceticism within the puritan posterity of Protestantism. The Protestant world is active in contributing to education (through schools and youth organizations), society (a variety of activities, the “social gospel”), and culture (philosophy, literature, music, etc.).

These three principles – reference to the Bible, religious individualism, and religious vocation, practiced in the secular world – have generated a particular religious culture and have shaped certain modes of behavior. From a sociohistorical point of view, Protestantism represents the beginning of a new way of living Christianity individually and collectively and which has not only endured but also grown. Far from being a historical digression, the Protestant Reforms of the sixteenth century were able to accomplish a lasting institutionalization of new religious societies as well as new individual attitudes. The result is a sociology of Protestantism which must not only research all branches of Protestantism and their inner dynamics, but also analyze the relationships within its environment and see where such relationships stand in the modern world.

STRICT IDEOLOGICAL CONTROL OF RELIGIOUS GROUPINGS

The domains of ritual, ideology, and charisma are present within every religious group, but in differing ways. Above all, they are hierarchically different according to religious tradition. One can immediately notice the importance of ritual in an Orthodox church service (the main role being the liturgy), the importance of charisma in Pentecostalism (the main role is played by the preacher prophet), and the importance of ideology in a Reformed service (the main role is played by the preacher theologian). In Protestantism, ideology is important owing to the strong emphasis on the Bible and its interpretation. The question of faith in the Protestant perspective is no longer an institutional one, but rather a question of hermeneutics. The objective is the interpretation of the Bible, and the debate about the truth of Christianity becomes a debate for exegetes and academics. The claim that religious truth is a question of interpretation leads straight to the heart of religious organization – a permanent debate on religious truth. The world of Protestantism is one of debates and controversies, divisions and unifications, based on disagreements and agreements of doctrine. Ritual is by no means absent, as it is emphasized quite heavily in certain spheres of Lutheranism and Anglicanism,

but within the symbolic economy of this religious world, in general, it takes second place. Charisma is equally important, but it is only in certain Pentecostal assemblies that it tends completely to relativize its ideology. Protestantism is a religion of the senses, of sound more than vision, expressed particularly through music and song (from Huguenot psalms and Lutheran choirs to Afro American spirituals and Gospel music). Protestantism is overall a religion centered on the senses just as much as the intellect.

Protestantism is beset by a tension between church and sect, so it is unsurprising that the sociology of Protestantism still accords attention to the classic Weberian/Troeltschian distinction between church and sect. Within this religion, the notion of church is also interpreted as being that body which administers what is required for salvation and whose function it is to exercise authority. It embraces everyone irrespective of their religious qualification, whereas the concept of sect is seen as a grouping unifying only people who are religiously qualified on the basis of their voluntary approach to religion. Within Protestantism there is constant tension between the religious group perceived as coextensive with society and delivering its requirements for salvation to all, and the religious group perceived as an association of militants making up a particular subculture within society. This tension is constitutive of Protestantism and is also constituted by established and liberal churches whose criteria are more flexible with regard to religious inclusion and religious practice (such as the Lutheran church) and those churches regarded as local voluntary assemblies where the faithful are qualified believers (as is the case for the Federations of Baptist Churches).

The Reforms of the sixteenth century are linked with the emergence of a new type of clergy (in the sense of religious profession): a clergyman/theologian allowed to marry, yet enjoying the state of being a lay person. The emergence of the pastorate represents a certain secularization of the clergy, a secularization marked by the passing of sacred power to intellectual and moral power (Willaime 1986). With the Protestant pastor, in effect, the clergyman is no longer considered to be a holy figure who enjoys a peculiar ontological position. On the contrary, he is a man like any other. Protestant ministers are ordained, but their ordination is

not a sacrament; they are not intermediaries bound to the religious lives of the faithful. This first secularization contributed to the reintegration of the clergy into society and everyday life. But the important intellectual and moral magisterium practiced by the pastor, added to the fact that all sacred authority had not disappeared – notably by means of the monopoly to administer the sacraments of baptism and communion – was limited to the effects of this first secularization. The priest dispenser of rites was substituted with the Protestant pastor doctor and preacher of holy scripture, thereby placing great importance on theological knowledge within access to religious legitimacy.

The concept of the ordered ministry was not very ecclesiastic and facilitated the admission of female pastors, who are nowadays accepted by the majority of Protestant and Anglican churches. Consequently, with the Protestant figure of the clergy, women having access to theological knowledge constituted a decisive step for Protestantism. If in effect it considered theological qualifications fundamental to exercising religious authority, then the fact of women holding qualifications in theology would only seriously weaken the argument of those opposed to female pastors. The admission of women into the pastorate can be seen as a second secularization of the role of the clergy, a second secularization marked by the loss of power by the clergy and the dissolution of its status. The acceptance of women into the pastorate serves to reinforce a functional concept of the ministry (women pastors placing on hold their pastorate when on maternity leave). The feminization of the pastorate is partly a broader transformation of pastoral practice and moves quickly in the direction of secularization, and toward a type of declericalization distinguished even more than the pastoral ministry.

PROTESTANTISM, ECONOMICS, AND POLITICS

From a sociohistorical point of view, religions could not be confined to the religious sphere, but must be considered as sociocultural facts that have exerted some influence in the various spheres of social life. Whether dealing with work, economics, family life, education, or

politics, people's behavior in these fields is linked to the way they represent the world and humanity. These representations, arranging social activities in a hierarchy and giving them meaning, influence people's attitude towards them, positively or negatively. Religious cultures played a role in shaping thought and people because of a system of representations that determines a certain kind of behavior in one sphere of activity or another. From this perspective, social sciences study the influence of Protestantism on economic and political domains.

Weber (1998), in his famous thesis on the Protestant ethic and capitalism, established a relationship between some Protestant concepts and the spirit of enterprise. Disclosing some affinities between the behavior of the Protestant Puritans and the spirit of capitalism, he wanted only to show that some forms of Protestant religious thinking encouraged the rationalization of business and its development: it is a matter of considering, says Weber, "how the contents of the religious beliefs biased the emergence of an 'economic mentality' or 'ethos' of economics." A more precise title for Weber's study could have been "The Contribution of Puritan Work Ethics in Shaping the Ethos of Western Capitalism." As Weber's friend Ernst Troeltsch, theologian and sociologist, quite rightly wrote in a 1923 text, "religions are not economic ideals, no more than economic structures and financial interests are religious laws. Their relationship is thus only indirect" (Troeltsch 1991: 138).

It is undeniable that the Calvinist perspective and its Puritan posterity developed a strong religious legitimization of work. From the Calvinist point of view, not to work means not to honor God. Since people do not own their possessions but only "administer" them, they should act as good administrators of worldly goods. Money is not evil in itself – it is how it is used that makes the difference. Such a view of work answered the needs of the petit bourgeois – craftsmen and farmers – who totally devoted themselves to production and who were about to become entrepreneurs. As Hill (1962: 223) points out, they needed a conceptual system which "would attribute full dignity to their work and bring into question at the same time the wealthy, the negligent and the squandering, and the poor, the lazy and the irresponsible. They found both these things in Puritanism."

According to Weber, the importance given to work and economic success by religion does not explain all. In order to devote themselves to business completely, people needed a psychological drive. It is at this level that Puritan Protestantism, acting like a “spiritual motive power,” positively influenced economic development. There are various examples supporting this point of view: Baptists, Congregationalists, Quakers, and Methodists have all excelled in business. John Wesley himself, who deplored the rise to the bourgeoisie of his flock, remarked: “The Methodists become industrious and frugal everywhere they are, and as a consequence their wealth increases.”

Weber’s thesis was very controversial and led to a great number of studies and critiques. Troeltsch, whose line of thinking followed the direction of Weber’s, insisted very much on the difference between “old Protestantism” (sixteenth and seventeenth centuries) – especially characterized by the ecclesiastic culture of the Middle Ages – and “modern Protestantism” (eighteenth and nineteenth centuries), which fully accepted the emancipation of the secular world from religious protection: “In so far as Calvinism applied to the capitalistic production, that it had tolerated, its methodical and permanent zeal, contributed notably to the emergence of the capitalistic mentality which rewarded work for work. As was the case for both sects and Pietism” (Troeltsch 1991: 163). As long as the religious factor is considered as just one among many others that played a role in the development of western economic rationality; as long as it is kept in mind that influence on economic activity was exerted in an indirect and temporary way through certain individuals; and as long as there is an awareness of its shortcomings (as Weber was aware), then it is justifiable to give Weber credit for his thesis. It is undeniable that a kind of work based religion is present in the Puritan consciousness, a work based religion where work is conceived as regular and dutiful practice of an activity. This practice has a link partly with a worldly ascesis and partly with the growing importance of efficiency (and thus with the development of the activity and its results).

Protestantism, in some respects and through some of its components (especially Calvinist and Baptist ones), made a contribution to

democracy. By provoking a new division within Christianity, and being divided in itself, Protestantism first of all promoted the secularization of politics. In the political sphere, this is the consequence of the secularizing effects of pluralism: “The fragmentation of Protestantism represented an important element in the development of religious tolerance” (Bruce 1990: 48). In desecrating religious authority, Protestantism contributed to desecrated political authority and asserted the willingness that it should be controlled by people (although Lutheranism increased the princes’ power over the church). The ecclesiastical organization of Protestantism had some political elements which were in line with the process of democratization: synodal assemblies and the importance of the local church (Congregationalism). In France, during the reign of Louis XIV, Protestantism had “republican” features that threatened absolute monarchy. In the US, although some Puritans were theocratically oriented, others, such as the Baptist Roger Williams (1603–84) and the Quaker William Penn (1644–1718), experienced some elements of democracy before their time. The US was founded by immigrants who brought a “democratic and republican” Christianity, remarked Tocqueville, who was impressed by the relation in the US between the “spirit of freedom” and the “spirit of religion.”

Although Protestantism influenced democracy through some of its principles, it does not mean that its relationship with politics was just one way. Three main attitudes characterized the connection between Protestantism and politics: conformist passiveness, radical conviction, and an ethic of responsibility. Thus, there were two extreme attitudes – withdrawal due to indifference and radicalism due to an ethic of conviction – in which one can distinguish a third: that one which, originating in the ethic of responsibility, induces a kind of mistrust of power and commitment in public matters. From a historical point of view, conformist passiveness was fostered inside Lutheran Protestantism and inside Evangelical and Pentecostal Protestantism. Since, in contrast to indifference, it is religious approval of sociopolitical commitment that is rewarding, the politician will often be inspired by an ethic of conviction, inciting radicalism in any given domain (e.g., abortion laws,

military installations, the environment, education, and civil rights). Whether it deals with fundamentalist theologies or theologies of freedom, political commitment is thus a categorical imperative and a religious duty. This radicalism can be either “conservative” or “progressive.” The third attitude, inspired by an ethic of responsibility, consists in being a “good administrator” of the worldly issues promoting both individual and collective responsibility and never trusting power and its appeal.

PROTESTANTISM WITHIN CONTEMPORARY ULTRAMODERNITY

Since Protestantism embodies a process of deinstitutionalization, declericalization, and deconfessionalization of Christianity, it represents a secularization of Christianity from within. Making tradition relative, Protestantism also introduced a permanent principle of transformation that enabled it to go with modernity and adapt to changes, notably in the area of the family ethic. The Reformed Churches have since been quite permeable to social and cultural change. And because of this permeability, they evolved together with global society, despite the strong opposition of fundamentalist groups to change. But the social paradox is that Protestant churches did not take advantage of their comparatively positive adaptation to modernity. As shown in various studies (Kelley 1972; Bruce 1990; Willaime 1992), those liberal churches that were more open to their secular environment often declined before the more conservative churches with a strong identity. If, as Gauchet (1985) put it, Christianity is the “religion of the *sortie*/end of religion,” is Protestantism the denomination of the end of Christianity? Its comparatively good adaptation to modern societies carries with it the risk of dissolution into the secular environment and a lack of visibility.

At the same time, in secularized and pluralist societies, the Protestant way of living Christianity is in accordance with developments pointing to identity reassertion and religious revitalization in the shape of groups of militant converts. Protestant sensibilities that insisted on personal conversion are in line with this context, where religion is no longer inherited but made by conversion. In secularized societies where religion is

no longer an objective dimension of society but a subjective dimension of the individual, Protestant religious individualism is a sign of the exhaustion not only of Christianity (Christianity with respect to political structures) but also of Christianness (Christianity with respect to global culture). Underlining the fact that the church is not a geographical space, nor something coming from tradition, but a regularly called local meeting of converts, the Protestant movement, especially in its Evangelical and Pentecostal expressions, witnesses in particular the dissolution of Christianity as an all inclusive culture in synchrony and as an inherited culture over time. Evangelical Protestantism, in its social expression of religion, is an example of the recomposition of religion within ultramodernity. Evangelical churches formed reference groups with a social importance for their members. In these groups, individuals, strongly symbolically structured and supported by a worshipping milieu, learned how to operate in a complex and uncertain secular universe. In societies where Christianity does not have the same cultural strength and capacity to organize society, it finds a way to reassert itself through some minor and militant forms, which – in Protestantism as in Catholicism – question and can sometimes destabilize ecclesiastic institutions accustomed to the quieter mass Christianity.

SEE ALSO: Catholicism; Christianity; Church; Pietism; Religion; Religion, Sociology of; Secularization

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psychoanalysis

Siamak Movahedi

Freud defined psychoanalysis as a form of therapy, a mode of observation and inquiry, and a theoretical system. However, his passion lay primarily in psychoanalysis as a mode of scientific investigation. Psychoanalytic theory is based on Freud's image of the individual and his notion of psychic reality. The individual is presented as profane, irrational, self-deceptive, narcissistic, power hungry, and the slave of the most primitive desires. This is the image of the decentered man, and is perhaps one reason for Freud's popularity among postmodernists.

According to psychoanalytic theory, the ground on which the individual stands is paved with uncertainty, and the reality to which he or she appeals is highly suspect. The past is a reconstruction, the memory is a perception, and the perception is a fantasy. The person's conviction of the validity of recall is much more important than its factual authenticity. The patient's beliefs or fantasy about the experience of a sexual seduction have greater impact than the seduction itself. If one defines a seduction fantasy as real, it will become real in its

consequences. As with symbolic interaction theory, Freud was concerned not with the situation but with the individual's interpretations of it. Deconstructing such interpretations is the goal of psychoanalysis. Although psychoanalysis has gone through profound changes since Freud, it continues to remain an elegant mode of listening to a patient or reading a text. Contrary to other psychotherapeutic techniques, the analyst does not ask the patient to change, to give up his symptoms, to be normal, to adapt or behave in a particular way. The analyst is not to have any desire or plan for the patient but to help him discover his own desires rather than being the slave to others' demands.

Psychoanalysis is concerned primarily with the patient's mind rather than the patient's life. Reports of life activities in the analytic situation are understood as symptomatic of the patient's state of mind, or of her experience of the analytic relationship. Inference about the mind is to be made through the narrative activities in the psychoanalytic situation. The analyst focuses attention not so much on the content of life narratives as on their communicative functions and on what is omitted, disowned, avoided, and unintended. Although mind is not clearly defined in operational terms, it is assumed to reflect the joint analytic activities in the session. The patient comes to analysis with a conscious expectation that the analyst will help her search for the sources of her trouble. The analyst's sources of trouble are presumed to be unconscious. Their manifestation through symptoms is part of the individual's defensive system of keeping sources of trouble out of conscious mind. Thus a sharp distinction is made between the manifest (explicit) and the latent (implicit) meanings of the individual's communications.

Psychoanalysis unfolds through three critical processes: *transference*, *countertransference*, and *resistance*. Transference is what the patient brings to the analytic situation. It is the patient's characteristic mode of conflict, perception, expectation, object relation, or definitions of situations. These internalized patterns of conflict, object relation, and expectation tend to constrain the individual's external relations and to create problems that must be worked through. Transference also entails an emotional involvement with the analyst, not as a real object but as a projected figure from the past. Transference

is highly ambiguous and paradoxical. On one hand, almost everything that the patient reports in the analysis is addressed by the analyst. On the other hand, the patient's reports of positive or negative feelings *toward* the analyst are presumed to be in reference to the analyst as a fantasy figure of some sort.

Countertransference is what the analyst brings to the psychoanalytic situation. It consists of all of the analyst's subjective states, blind spots, and attitudes toward the analysand. Here a rough distinction is made between two kinds of countertransference feelings: (1) feelings that are evoked or elicited by the analysand and as such are grounds for valid inference about the analysand's state of mind and (2) feelings that are evoked by the analyst's own unresolved conflicts and that have to be kept in check.

Resistance is any defensive interpsychic activity that interferes with the analytic process. Working through resistance is critical, as its resolution entails new paths to memories. When Freud found hypnosis ineffective in ridding the patient's resistance to talk or recall, he created the psychoanalytic situation. The analytic situation is intended to be an inherently ambiguous situation, an intermediate state of experience between reality and illusion, where ideally there are no clear boundaries between fantasy and reality, past and present, and self and others. The goal is to bring about a partial suspension of the analysand's sense of reality in a safe mode where his unexamined assumptions, delusions, expectations, and self deceptions may be explored.

To be analyzed is a contract into which the patient enters by showing up for the first appointment and lying on the couch. Although many patients, as part of their pathology, unwittingly try to defeat the analyst, they also try to put their best foot forward and help the process get started. It is in this sense that, for an analysis to unfold meaningfully, the patient has to come of her own will and has to incur the cost personally rather than through a third party.

The methodological debates in psychoanalysis today are reminiscent of those in psychology and sociology almost a half century ago. A lively debate is in progress in psychoanalysis between those who call themselves "natural" scientists and those who maintain that psychoanalysis is inherently interpretive and hermeneutic and

should be studied with that fact in mind. Those adopting the natural science position are hopeful that, by reducing meaning to some form of brain functioning, they can become the biologists of the *mind* rather than the analysts of the *soul*. In turn, members of the hermeneutic circle reduce psychoanalysis to textual analysis, subject only to the requirement of internal coherence. There are also those who agree with the interpretive tradition, but maintain that psychoanalysis goes beyond the hermeneutic method in that interpretation of the text in psychoanalysis changes the text itself. Since psychoanalytic data consist of emotional exchanges in the analytic situation, the primary method of investigation in psychoanalysis remains participant observation and case study. The analytic situation is considered to be both a laboratory and an operation room for scientific and clinical work. The emotional climate of the analytic situation is of critical importance in interpreting any exchange in the analytic hour. Yet, for the analysis of emotional communication in a session, some researchers are increasingly experimenting with more standardized methods that may lend themselves to replication by other researchers.

SEE ALSO: Definition of the Situation; Frame; Freud, Sigmund; Intersubjectivity; Lacan, Jacques; Mind; Patient-Physician Relationship; Postmodernism; Psychoanalytic Feminism; Symbolic Interaction; Text/Hypertext

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psychoanalytic feminism

Kristina Wolff

Psychoanalytic feminism is a theory of oppression, which asserts that men have an inherent psychological need to subjugate women. The root of men's compulsion to dominate women and women's minimal resistance to subjugation lies deep within the human psyche. This branch of feminism seeks to gain insight into how our psychic lives develop in order to better understand and change women's oppression. The pattern of oppression is also integrated into society, thus creating and sustaining patriarchy. Through the application of psychoanalytic techniques to studying differences between women and men as well as the ways in which gender is constructed, it is possible to reorganize socialization patterns at the early stages of human life. Societal change, or a "cure," can be developed through discovering the source of domination in men's psyche and subordination in women's, which largely resides unrecognized in individuals' unconscious.

This type of feminism emerged out of *cultural feminism*, which investigates the differences between women and men to understand women's positions in society. Psychoanalytic feminists concentrate on early childhood development, primarily before the age of 3, examining how gender is constructed and practiced on societal, familial, and individual levels. Through understanding how the conscious aspects of personality evolve at the infant stages of life, we better comprehend identity formation and gender roles including expectations surrounding what is deemed "feminine" and "masculine." Freud's theories of the human psyche, including psychosexual development, as well as Lacan's reworking of Freud's theories provide a foundational framework for this body of feminism.

Psychoanalytic feminism addresses a variety of issues related to gender in society, concentrating on explanations as to why men continue

to repress women. There are two main sections. One branch focuses on examining differences between women and men, on a micro level, particularly on women's psychology as well as the environment in which the personality of a child develops. This includes childhood learning and formation, relationships with parents, and early sexuality traits. It also explores the establishment of femininity and masculinity and the relationship with identity and personality.

The other branch concentrates on investigating the construction of gender. This encompasses examinations of masculinity, femininity, the emergence of adult sexuality including recognition of the female libido, and the continual reinforcement of patriarchy (Mitchell 1974; Irigaray 1985; Kristeva 1987; Benjamin 1988). While continuing the use of psychoanalytic techniques on the micro level, this section also utilizes macro level analysis through studying societal institutions such as the economy and employment, science and knowledge, arts and language. From a psychoanalytic viewpoint, the first branch represents man's need for an heir, to create something that outlasts him, largely due to fear of mortality, while also providing a means of domination over women and his children. The second section also fulfills this need to create permanency such as through the establishment of business, wealth, science, art, and architecture. These larger structures and social systems organize society, creating a patriarchal system that serves to oppress and dominate women.

The exploration of women's roles as mother and daughter is a central topic in both branches of psychoanalytic feminism. Early theorists such as Jessica Benjamin, Jane Flax, Dorothy Dinnerstein, and Nancy Chodorow view mothering as a means for understanding the continual reproduction and production of the status quo, and therefore a place where social change can occur. Utilizing Freud's techniques as starting points of analysis, many psychoanalytic feminists examine people's pre Oedipal and Oedipal experiences in relation to gender and identity formation. It is at these stages, from birth until their third year, that children learn gender roles. Freud theorized that children develop their understanding of their gender due to their natural tendency to identify with the same sex parent. Some psychoanalytic feminists align with

this theory, examining gender formation at the Oedipal stage for boys and pre Oedipal stage for girls. Others, such as Chodorow, begin the analysis of gender acquisition at the pre Oedipal stage. Utilizing Freud's object relation theory, Chodorow examines the relationships of mothers and their children.

During infancy children are symbolically attached to their mothers. For women, the role of mother represents a dual identity, one of mother and the other as a child who was raised by a mother. Therefore her relationship with her daughter differs from that with her son. When raising a daughter, the mother imagines her life as a child and her own experiences being raised by her mother. This results in a deep bond with her daughter. This is also where the baby learns her identity as well as gender, through her mother, through representations of sameness. Theoretically, this creates less individuality in girls and as a result they develop more flexible egos and only feel a sense of completeness when closely connected to another person.

For sons, their identity becomes formed in a similar manner, yet it is through representations of difference. He signifies the "other" to the mother, defined by her expectations of him. This creates more individuality in boys and a sense of completeness through achievement and competition. In order for boys to develop their masculinity, they must separate from their mothers, just as girls need to be connected to their mothers in order to develop their femininity. This split from the mother creates a dualistic relationship between the two, making femaleness the polar opposite of maleness, distancing sons from mothers and giving rise to "abstract masculinity." As the children grow into adulthood, their gender identities can become threatened by challenges to these early practices. For men, they develop feelings of vulnerability when dealing with intimacy and women feel threatened by separation.

These varying levels of intimacy, of "relatedness" between children and their mother, create a different sense of self for girls and boys, solidifying femininity and masculinity as distinct, opposite categories, which maintain close relationship with one another. Femininity is representative of a strong tie to the mother; masculinity manifests itself as distance from both mother and father. Another theory posits

that the relationship between parents and children is a symbolic process. Masculinity and femininity are constructed on the basis of castration, which consists of a splitting that occurs with the desire for unity between genders, but this desire is repressed. Therefore, masculinity represents the possibility of gratification and femininity signifies the impossibility of union.

Gender roles are based on the household practices of the parents as well as how the children are socialized on conscious and subconscious levels. Children witness power imbalances between mother and father due to their roles within and outside of the household. This reinforces boys' desire to dominate girls and girls' willingness to cooperate and compromise their agency. The key to changing gender construction and, therefore, the practice of men dominating women can be achieved through altering parenting practices within each family. Men need to take a more active, personal role in caregiving and raising the children. This shift would significantly transform the structures of masculinity and femininity that provide the foundation for the sexual division of labor. This then leads to changes in gender construction, diminishing men's domination over women and women's subordination and increasing women's independence and men's relatedness to others.

The development of a person's sexuality and romantic desires also begins at an early age. Many theorists recognize that children have the potential for bisexuality during the pre Oedipal stage of their lives. Through the combination of parenting and the development of boys' masculinity and girls' femininity, they are socialized to be heterosexual. A young girl's relationship to her father is an essential element in her heterosexual development. In essence, she is competing with her mother for her father's attention. Due to her father's emotional and often physical absence, she remains emotionally attached to her mother, never completely leaving her. As boys move from the pre Oedipal to the Oedipal stage, they develop a sense of sexual or romantic love for their mothers, partially due to her physical otherness. As they enter the Oedipal stage, there is a realization that they cannot compete with their father for their mother's attention, therefore they begin to emotionally separate from their mothers. This draws them closer to males, thus making the separation

less painful and important to their male identity. This process reinforces the sexual and familial divisions that the children witness from birth. Boys and girls adopt their father's and mother's roles. Thus, boys join a larger collective group of males, who in turn dominate women, whereas girls remain close to their mothers, remaining on the margins of society, being ruled by men.

When entering into romantic and/or sexual relationships, men and women seek different things, often due to the separateness created from the construction of masculinity and femininity. Women desire completeness, intimacy, an end to emptiness, and therefore they seek men for completeness; men remain uncomfortable with intimacy, often criticizing women for their emotions, thus reinforcing their position as dominant and separate from women. Both Freud and Lacan provide a valuable framework for understanding the mechanics of sexual desire. Freud focused his analysis on the biological foundations of sexuality and placed the phallus as central to sexual desire and sexual difference, rather than constructions of masculinity and femininity. Therefore men and women place the phallus at the symbolic center of sexual behavior and leave their own personal understandings and desires for themselves to a level of internal fantasy. Lacan concentrates on sexual behavior as the desire for unity between men and women, moving beyond biological understandings of sexuality. Men and women are sexual together in order to fulfill fantasies that are culturally produced but not a result of being "male" or "female" due to essentialist definitions. This concept is then extended to understanding society as constructed as a phallogocentric patriarchy which represses female sexuality, particularly female desire, thus reinforcing women's position as "other," remaining defined in opposition to men's desire. Irigaray challenges Lacan's theory and his central focus on the penis and definition of the clitoris as a "little penis." Instead, she notes that women experience pleasure everywhere, forcing a shift in the analysis and placing women in an equal position to men, rather than remaining defined in relationship to men (Irigaray 1985; Kristeva 1987).

The centrality of the phallus extends to the organization of society. Psychoanalytic feminism describes society as representative of men's

egos, their sense of self importance and desire for immortality. Therefore structures such as buildings, machines, bridges, and towers are made to outlast them while also replicating shapes that are most pleasing to them. Social systems are patriarchal, maintaining maleness and masculinity as central to their structures and operations. Some areas of examination by psychoanalytic feminists include the division of labor and economic systems, science and philosophy, as well as symbols and language. They seek to understand these systems while also using psychoanalytic techniques as a method for examining the reproduction of the status quo and as a means for social change.

The division of labor begins in the home, with women operating as the primary caretakers in society. Men are propelled into the work world due to their sense of independence, competitiveness, and desire to achieve, which developed during early childhood. This process produces the ideology and psychology of male dominance and denial of their dependence on women to help maintain the home, raise the children, and provide support for their needs. Male behavior is the norm of success, therefore if women have a desire to be successful in the paid work world, they are expected to act and often dress like a man. Often there is some deviation from this, but usually with unfavorable circumstances. Utilizing Marxist theory with psychoanalysis, the reproduction of mothering is viewed as the basis for the reinforcement of women's responsibilities in the domestic, largely unpaid work, sphere of society. As wives and mothers, women contribute to the continual production of people. Girls are socialized as caretakers, responsible for supporting their husbands and families. Boys are socialized as workers who are responsible for activities outside of the domestic arena and therefore for continual support of capitalistic production.

Experiences from the pre Oedipal and Oedipal stages of life shape our conceptions of science and philosophy. Western approaches to knowledge are founded on a male worldview, a male understanding of the world where there is a desire for separation and individuation. Early psychoanalytic feminist studies sought to reveal the male bias in academics, art, philosophy, and science (Gilligan 1982; Irigaray 1985; Kristeva 1987; Flax 1989; Elliot 1991). For example,

Carol Gilligan studied the work of Lawrence Kohlberg and his theory of moral development in which he concluded that girls were morally inferior. Gilligan exposed the bias in his work. Kohlberg used only boys' stories in his model. She argues that both cognitive and developmental psychology are biased due to their use of male subjects to establish a standard of normality. Gilligan reformulated the theory, concluding that morality is a negotiated path where people balance self needs and interests while caring for the "other" (Gilligan 1982; Dimen 1995). Within this body of research, of uncovering the male biases inherent within the practices and structures of science, philosophy, and the overall quest for knowledge, these scholars offer a solution through the reformulation of epistemology and metaphysics in our society. Dualistic thinking, the split between subject/object and mind/body, must be replaced by thinking that accepts differences without creating a hierarchy of superiority. This can be achieved by studying and reshaping early childhood experiences which create and reinforce the existing system of patriarchy and dominance.

Certainly, there are critiques about psychoanalytic feminism and the approaches used by its scholars. Due to the focus on early human development, the few strategies offered for creating change primarily concentrate on this period and are reliant upon parents raising their children in different ways. The theories that provide the foundation for a large portion of this body of feminism rely on scholarship by Freud and Lacan. While this classical body of work is valuable in that it illustrates that masculinity and femininity are achieved and that women have sexual desires and needs, many of these theories are also misogynistic and place men in positions of superiority over women. Some question the use of basing psychoanalytic feminism on theories created by men, particularly since they are often presented as "truth claims" and "cures" for those who are subject to psychoanalysis. Additionally, psychological theory interpreted the feminine experience largely in relation to masculinity, which is one of the critiques of science and knowledge offered by psychoanalytic feminism.

While there is an acknowledgment of the need to change dualistic thinking, by framing the examination of women's subordination on the

differences between genders, the either/or split that is being challenged by psychoanalytic feminism is actually being reified. Women are assumed to naturally want to have and raise children and men are assumed to be satisfied being away from their families, both physically and emotionally. There is no accounting for ambiguity in gender or that sexuality and sexual differences are not necessarily related to gender. Within this type of feminism, there is no space for sexuality other than heterosexuality. Other assumptions including those of race/ethnicity, class, nation status, ability, and other issues that affect family structure, childhood, and parenting also largely remain unacknowledged and unexamined. Also, by primarily placing the focus of change on individuals, either in the realm of parenting or in that of creating knowledge, larger societal institutions and systems that create, produce, and reproduce oppression continue without question. There are scholars within psychoanalytic feminism who are actively working to answer these critiques and therefore expand this body of feminism. This includes integrating concepts of gender that are more fluid, ambiguous, and expansive. Through the incorporation of postmodernist perspectives, understandings of gender, particularly "female," are no longer defined in relationship to and from what is "male" (Weedon 1987; Dimen 1995). By widening the approach beyond dualistic definitions and assumptions of gender and sexuality, this work seeks to encompass the influence of history, politics, and cultural influences shaping understandings and experiences of gender and women's multiple locations in society.

SEE ALSO: Cultural Feminism; Feminism; Freud, Sigmund; Lacan, Jacques; Patriarchy; Postmodern Feminism; Psychoanalysis

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psychological social psychology

Joel Powell

Psychological social psychology is concerned with social influences on individual behavior. In its century of modern history, psychological social psychology has addressed issues of attitude, perception, memory, prejudice, personality, emotion, conformity, learning, socialization, persuasion, and cognition. In topics, methods, and theory there has been minimal overlap with sociological social psychology primarily because of psychology's persistent emphasis on the individual as the most important unit of analysis.

Social scientists made no significant proprietary claims on early modern social psychology. Anthropologists and sociologists were investigating small groups and large populations. Psychologists had already staked out productive areas of research and debate in learning, memory, motivation, and animal behavior. Before the twentieth century, psychological experiments in human social influence had been

conducted, notably Norman Triplett's 1897 study of the effects of competition upon performance. But social context was seen as a given feature of the environment and psychologists seemed content to share the study of social life with other disciplines.

The first systematic attempt in psychology to account for human group life was William McDougall's *Introduction to Social Psychology* in 1908. McDougall argued that group behavior was innate, instinctive, and modified in experience. A popular text primarily for its unique subject matter, McDougall's *Social Psychology* was influential for a short time until it fell from favor along with most instinct theories. The more foundational work was accomplished by Floyd Allport in his 1924 *Social Psychology*. Allport identified social psychology as an exclusive subfield of psychology, and as an experimental science of the individual, dismissing what he saw as sociology's reliance on imaginary social forces to explain human behavior. In casting social psychology as an experimental science, Allport invited the control and predictability of the laboratory. His desire for clear, scientific results precluded the study of face-to-face transactions in favor of scenarios involving individuals behaving in the presence of others. By insisting on a social psychology of the individual, Allport liberated the new science from merely speculative social mechanisms like LeBon's crowd contagion or Durkheim's collective conscience. Instead, social psychology would observe and explain the influences that individuals exert upon one another.

These central features of early social psychology created a divide between psychological and sociological social psychologies that has lasted to the present. The division becomes sharper in consideration of how Allport set the direction of causal analysis. Phenomena for sociology – contexts, conditions, or structures – in psychological study became relevant only insofar as they influenced individual behavior. Moreover, features of the individual could be formulated as dependent variables. So while sociologists were struggling with the self as dependent upon and determined by social relations, psychologists were able to investigate the impact of social variables on stable entities like personalities. Comte's description of the individual as both cause and consequence of society was

inapplicable to the elegant and controlled psychology that made independent variables of sociology's subject matter.

It is widely acknowledged that social psychology surged forward shortly after Allport's bold initiatives. To some extent this is because Allport's construction of social psychology as a science of the individual conformed to the discipline to conventional topics and methods, making social psychology more competitive with differential (individual) psychology. Survey research and psychological testing found places in social psychology as new, sophisticated tools were invented. Thurstone proposed attitude scaling measures by 1929 (the first publication year of the *Journal of Social Psychology*), and by 1932 Likert had perfected the simple 1 to 7 continuum of agreement and disagreement. The most memorable stagecraft in experimental social psychology was also a product of this era. A classic example of laboratory experiments in social influence is Sherif's study of group convergence in judging the movement of a light. Although the light in his laboratory was stationary, autokinetic effects produced the illusion of movement, and Sherif found that individuals tailored their reports about the distance a light moves to fit a group norm. This study was modeled by many researchers over the next 40 years, and the famous conformity studies of the 1940s and 1950s by Solomon Asch and the obedience studies of the 1960s by Stanley Milgram are often mentioned in tandem with Sherif's work.

Increasingly complex instances of social influence were managed in laboratories throughout the middle decades of the twentieth century. The acclaimed creative champion was the gestalt psychologist Kurt Lewin, whose influential field theories and group dynamics characterized psychology as a social science. Lewin felt that psychology should consider the total situation of an individual's "life spaces" by attending to environmental and social variables. Although Lewin produced elaborate, geometrical descriptions of individuals moving through systems, these were upstaged by his provocative laboratory simulations of leadership groups. Lewin and his associates created different leadership conditions for small groups of boys who were assigned to produce crafts. In an authoritarian leadership condition, adults made decisions, concealed the

ultimate goals of projects, acted aloof, and freely rewarded and punished individual group members. Democratic leaders encouraged group decision making and the free discussion of alternatives, and stated goals clearly. Boys in the democratic leadership condition were more productive and cohesive. They were also more adaptable than their authoritarian counterparts, as was evidenced by their superior ability to adjust when placed in the opposing condition.

These and similar experiments inspired by Lewin led many to credit him with moving social psychology away from a purely individualistic effort toward more transactional studies of group phenomena. However, the balance of Lewin's work (and subsequent investigations built upon his systems) consistently privileged individual responses to social stimuli. Lewin's legacy is pervasive in virtually all areas of psychological social psychology, not because he moved psychology away from its study of the individual, but because he encouraged the integration of creative experimentation and holistic gestalt principles of perception and form.

The energizing work of Lewin and the influence of gestalt principles fostered a new family of cognitive social psychologies. These perspectives are linked by the observation of a basic urge to see consistency in and between thoughts and feelings. Fritz Heider's balance theories were the first in this generation of contemporary influences. Heider asserted that individuals confronted with incomplete information about others will pattern beliefs, attitudes, or motives of others in consistent and sensible ways. These can be familiar processes such as friends assuming they share attitudes, beliefs, or tastes about things they have not discussed. They can also be complex, as when an individual attributes motives to a stranger. Regardless of the relative accuracy of assumptions and attributions, people will try to balance their elements. It completes a pattern in a balanced way, for example, when friends assume that they share interests and attitudes. Ideas about consistency in attributions continue to be refined and elaborated, and have grown to include research on how people associate positive traits, motives, actions, and other qualities of people they encounter. Topics such as personal attractiveness have generated an immense number of studies revealing that people tend to associate many positive traits with

physical beauty. More important than these intriguing studies is the channeling of social psychology toward the study of individuals making mental representations of social reality. The social cognition theories that dominate psychological social psychology are still developing from these basic ideas.

The touchstone for cognitive social psychology is cognitive dissonance theory. As interest in the processing of conflicting information grew, Leon Festinger's observations of the consequences of holding contradictory thoughts and feelings were among the most discussed, cited, and developed findings in all of modern psychology. Festinger's initial assumptions were simple: two cognitive elements in relation to each other will produce consonance or dissonance. Opposing thoughts or feelings produce uncomfortable dissonance in individuals. They will try to reduce it. The areas of interest for experiment and observation are in the strategies for reducing dissonance, and studies have yielded surprising cognitive and emotional responses. Festinger's own real world study in 1956, *When Prophecy Fails*, details the behaviors of members of a UFO Doomsday cult whose predicted day of apocalypse came and went without incident. Rather than abandon their beliefs and activities, believers intensified group activities including efforts to recruit new members. In laboratory experiments Festinger found that participants asked to describe a dull task as exciting rated their own enjoyment of the task differently according to how much they were paid. Festinger confirmed the presence of dissonance reduction when lower paid (high dissonance) participants expressed more enjoyment than higher paid (low dissonance) participants. There are supportive findings from studies of behaviors that spring from the production of consonant thoughts and feelings. Eliot Aronson (Aronson & Mettee 1968) produced a typical instance of this work. Aronson lowered the self esteem of laboratory participants by telling them they had tested as immature, uninteresting, and shallow on a personality inventory. Given opportunities to cheat later in a card game, participants whose self esteem had been manipulated cheated significantly more than participants in a control group.

Experiments, theoretical refinements, formalizations, and debates about cognitive dissonance

continue into the twenty first century. By the middle 1980s, much of this work had explicitly acknowledged that consistency theory and research had pulled together many threads of mental representations of social reality into a greater understanding of social cognition. As a theory of how social and individual realities are represented in thought, contemporary social cognition is perfectly situated to address key conceptual and theoretical areas in social psychology, including attitude formation and change, attribution, judgment, personality, and self. Its level of abstraction and its status as the most cumulative and integrated of psychological social psychologies has allowed social cognition to infiltrate and influence virtually all topical areas of modern psychology.

In its present incarnation, psychological social psychology is mostly in the business of formalizing and mathematizing theories, and making incremental refinements in perspectives through controlled experimentation. Along with long term adherence to the study of individuals and to strict scientific protocols, this provides a contrast to sociological social psychology – seen as absent controls, struggling with methods, and grappling with many versions of its basic unit of analysis. It is therefore not surprising that cross fertilization is minimal between the two social psychologies and that the majority of contributions flow from psychology to sociology. At present, social psychological research in the traditions of analyzing individual behavior has had the most impact on exchange, rational choice, and expectation states perspectives – the most psychological of the sociological social psychologies.

SEE ALSO: Cognitive Balance Theory (Heider); Cognitive Dissonance Theory (Festinger); Exchange Network Theory; Expectation States Theory; Social Psychology; Symbolic Interaction

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public broadcasting

Stuart Allan

Precisely what counts as public broadcasting varies from one national media system to the next across the globe. Common to most definitions, however, is the understanding that it revolves around a public service ethos that may be contrasted with the economic (profit oriented) priorities of private or commercial broadcasting. A continuum of sorts exists between the model of public broadcasting introduced in the US, on one end, and that developed in countries such as the UK, Germany, Japan, and Australia, on the other. In the US this type of programming constitutes a small proportion of audience share in television and radio, and is perceived to be of marginal significance in public life. The reverse is the case in the UK, for example, where public service broadcasting – led by the British Broadcasting Corporation (BBC) – is the predominant institutional

arrangement wielding considerable influence. Public broadcasting systems around the world can be situated within the parameters of this continuum.

Several contentious issues – and conflicting philosophies – have informed the historical evolution of public broadcasting, all of which remain pertinent today. In the US, broadcasting was defined from the outset as a business enterprise, raising concerns about the quality and diversity of its provision – especially in public service terms – as well as its relationship to government regulation. Most of the emergent radio stations in the 1920s were commercial, with a small number of public stations appearing in association with educational institutions on an ad hoc basis. By 1925 the Association of College and University Broadcasting Stations (ACUBS) was campaigning to ensure frequencies remained open for educational purposes (it would evolve into the National Association of Educational Broadcasters (NAEB) in 1934). The Radio Act of 1927 created the Federal Radio Commission (FRC) as the body responsible for regulating the radio spectrum as a public resource, although critics – such as the Broadcast Reform Movement – challenged its commercial orientation. No provision was made available by the state to establish a national network, which meant that non-commercial stations struggled to endure financial hardship, many of them succumbing to the dictates of the marketplace. Fewer than 50 such stations were broadcasting by the early 1930s.

The Roosevelt administration's Communications Act of 1934 replaced the FRC with the Federal Communications Commission (FCC), the remit of which included coordinating the use of radio (as well as the telegraph and telephone). It possessed the powers to revoke, or refuse to renew, a license where it determined that a station's policies and programs were inconsistent with "the public interest, convenience and necessity" (fines could also be imposed). Such action was extremely rare, however, leading to charges that the FCC was little more than a "paper tiger." In the eyes of broadcast reformers fearful about the growing network control of radio in commercial terms, the FCC was failing to meet its public responsibility to ensure access to the airwaves for those groups who felt that their right to free speech was being

denied (they included educators, agricultural interests, the labor movement, civil libertarians, and religious groups). Any notion of public service broadcasting, they maintained, was incompatible with the conformity of opinion represented by an advertising dominated commercial system.

Such claims were countered by organizations such as the National Association of Broadcasters (NAB), a powerful lobbying group capable of bringing formidable pressures to bear on the FCC in order to protect the interests of commercial radio. NAB sought to discourage the airing of “controversial” viewpoints by imposing on its membership what it considered to be a new ethical code of practice. This code prohibited the discussion of issues deemed to be divisive outside of those news and related programs specifically devoted to the expression of opinions. In this way, NAB argued, it was ensuring that radio stations would be self-regulating so as to reduce the likelihood of the federal government intervening to monitor the content of programming. Although the code was legally unenforceable, it succeeded in severely restricting the diversity of voices being heard. Most broadcasters were content to interpret the code in such a manner as to virtually rule out the exploration of any subject which even had the potential to upset program sponsors.

Critics of NAB argued the values endorsed by the code affixed broadcasting’s proclaimed commitment to public service within strictly commercial imperatives. Members of radio’s audience were being defined, they argued, not as citizens in need of a public forum for argument and debate, but rather as consumers in search of entertaining diversions from everyday life. Under pressure, the FCC began to set aside high frequency band radio channels for educational broadcasting prior to the start of World War II. While the number of non commercial radio stations slowly increased in the years following the war, few were broadcasting beyond a narrowly defined target listenership. It would take the arrival of television to propel these developments forward.

The impetus to establish an educational television network in the US was made feasible by a grant from the Ford Foundation in 1952. The first station went on the air in 1953, slowly

joined by 43 others over the course of the decade (many of which broadcast for only a few hours a day). National Educational Television (NET) facilitated the exchange and distribution of programs – criticized by some for their “highbrow” content – between local television stations. By 1954 it was airing 5 hours of programming per day, frequently covering topics otherwise marginalized or ignored altogether by commercial stations. News and current affairs programming on the main television networks – ABC, CBS, and NBC – were becoming increasingly ratings driven due to the high sponsorship revenues they could demand. In general, network newscasts did their best to avoid controversy for fear of offending either advertisers or government officials. Such apprehensions routinely led to self censorship, thereby calling into question the networks’ provision of impartial journalism consistent with the public interest.

Meanwhile, the FCC sought to ensure that the networks observed the tenets of what would eventually evolve into a fully fledged “Fairness Doctrine” as part of their license obligations. Attempts had been made by the FCC even before a statutory basis for the doctrine was established in 1959 to enforce a principle whereby the right of stations to “editorialize” on the air would be strictly limited. These attempts at regulating fairness, promoted under the FCC’s 1949 report “In the Matter of Editorializing by Broadcast Licensees,” revolved around a declaration: “Only insofar as it is exercised in conformity with the paramount right of the public to hear a reasonably balanced presentation of all responsible viewpoints on particular issues can such editorialization be considered to be consistent with the licensee’s duty to operate in the public interest.”

In general, the FCC’s efforts met with little success throughout the 1950s, partly due to its inability to adequately police agreed requirements. A further contributory factor was the Commission’s internal confusion over how best to delimit a balance between advocacy on the part of the broadcaster, on the one hand, and the rights of those expressing opposing views, on the other (these issues were clarified to some extent in the Communications Act (1960), although not to the satisfaction of any of the parties involved). The net effect of the fairness

requirements was to encourage the makers of news and current affairs programs to avoid items likely to attract the attention of the FCC even if, as was likely the case, its strictures would lack sufficient bite to be meaningful.

By the early 1960s public opinion surveys were routinely indicating that television was beginning to displace both radio and the news paper press as the principal source of news for audiences in the US (and likewise in countries such as Britain). Many commentators were asserting that the capacity of broadcast news and current affairs programming to shape the “public agenda” signified that the electronic media were providing a progressive, even democratizing function with regard to public enlightenment about social issues and problems. Other commentators were far more pessimistic, arguing that the lack of democratic accountability over broadcasting institutions was ensuring that public service would always be rendered subordinate to their financial interests.

Against this backdrop, President Kennedy signed the Educational Television Facilities Act in 1962, which provided the first substantive federal aid package (some \$32 million) to build new stations. Three years later the Carnegie Commission on Educational Television was formed to provide a blueprint for public broadcasting as a national service. Following its report, President Johnson signed into law the landmark Public Broadcasting Act on November 7, 1967. The Act established the Corporation for Public Broadcasting (CPB) to coordinate a national system in support of both radio and television. However, the Commission’s recommendation that a tax be affixed to the sale of television sets to generate revenue for the CPB was not implemented, nor was its commitment to establishing a relationship of relative autonomy to government upheld. Nevertheless, the Act required a “strict adherence to objectivity and balance in all programs or series of programs of a controversial nature.”

In 1969 the CPB oversaw the founding of the Public Broadcasting Service (PBS), the first national network of non profit television stations. Launched in October of the following year, PBS initially pulled together some 128 television stations into a centralized organization. PBS is effectively operated by its individual member stations, many of which are

associated with local educational institutions and community organizations. Programming is provided from these stations in the main – ranging from news and current affairs to the fine arts, science, entertainment, and children’s genres – although material from independent producers and international sources (such as the BBC) rounds out the provision. This emphasis on distribution (a role set down by its predecessor, NET) means, in turn, that PBS does not produce its programs centrally. The Service’s income is derived from private donations made by viewers (the principal source), as well as from fees paid by member stations and funding from the CPB. Some member stations are also able to draw on other sources – government and corporate – to help underwrite their costs. Today, PBS is owned and operated by 346 public television stations and reaches some 99 percent of US homes with televisions.

Also in 1970, National Public Radio (NPR) was created by the CPB as a non profit coordinator for national program distribution. Its remit, in contrast with PBS, included program production, making it the center for news, information, and cultural programming for the service. At the time of its launch with 90 stations as charter members, NPR’s role as a producer and distributor of programming was funded primarily from government. However, the relative share of such support was sharply reduced over the 1980s, to the extent that funding today is derived mainly from fees member stations pay for programming (funds from listeners via on air pledge drives, charitable foundations, and corporations are also important sources of finance). In 2003 NPR received \$200 million from Joan B. Kroc, philanthropist widow of McDonald’s founder Ray Kroc – reportedly the largest single donation bequeathed to a US cultural institution (the amount was almost twice NPR’s annual operating budget at the time). NPR is widely respected for high quality news and information and the diversity of viewpoints it brings to bear on issues of public concern. Its programming is currently heard on over 750 independent stations by an audience of some 22 million listeners each week (stations can be members of NPR and also affiliates of either American Public Media or Public Radio International, both competing public radio networks, selecting content from each).

Highlighted in this historical overview is a range of longstanding questions which continue to be the subject of considerable debate. In its appraisal a decade after the launch of PBS and NPR, the Carnegie Commission on the Future of Public Broadcasting concluded that “public broadcasting’s financial, organizational, and creative structure [is] fundamentally flawed.” In the course of investigating why the system is “out of kilter and badly in need of repair,” the Commission argued that the “power of the communications media must be marshaled in the interest of human development, not merely for advertising revenue. The outcome of the institution of public broadcasting can best be understood as a social dividend of technology, a benefit fulfilling needs that cannot be met by commercial means.” In this way the Commission neatly pinpointed the key source of tension between the values of business and the ideals of public service before outlining, in turn, a detailed strategy for introducing a system free of commercial constraints. Its vision of public broadcasting as “a forum for debate and controversy,” providing a “voice for groups in the community that may otherwise go unheard” so as to “help us see America whole, in all its diversity” was all but ignored in Washington.

Little has changed over recent decades. Most appraisals concur that the future for public broadcasting is far from assured. For some critics, the privatization of public broadcasting is overdue. They have long maintained that government involvement in broadcasting is an inappropriate use of taxpayers’ monies and, moreover, poses a threat to freedom of expression that only a market based system can adequately preserve. Some claim to detect a “liberal bias” in its programming, which they insist is out of step with popular opinion. Still others contend that the relatively small audience figures for public broadcasting – there is an average audience rating of about 2 percent of households for PBS in primetime, for example – constitutes evidence that commercial television more than satisfies public demand.

Advocates of public broadcasting, in sharp contrast, highlight what they perceive to be the shortcomings of ratings driven commercial media. Many believe that it caters to a wider spectrum of interests than those which

advertisers are inclined to support, thereby addressing important gaps in programming – news and documentary being regularly cited in this regard, as well as children’s programming (the award winning *Sesame Street* being one example). While conceding that audience figures are small, they nevertheless point out that a high percentage of viewers and listeners are decision makers in corporate, political, scientific, and educational realms whose perceptions of program quality contrast with the “lowest common denominator” orientation of the commercial networks. Hence the calls made for new types of support to be introduced so as to offset both political pressures and the influence of corporate financing, and thereby better reflect the values, tastes, and preferences of diverse communities.

Looking beyond the US model, the term public service broadcasting is typically employed to describe those systems which share its educative aims as a means to redress market failure. From its origins in the 1920s the BBC has pioneered a conception of public service broadcasting that is free of commercial advertising and, in principle, political influence. Its mission statement, as expressed by John Reith, the Corporation’s first director general, is to “inform, educate, and entertain.” Funded primarily through a license fee system, the BBC is currently the largest public broadcaster in the world. Its annual budget (£3.8 billion in 2005) enables it to offer a comprehensive provision of programming – news, current affairs, arts, and entertainment – across radio, television, and the Internet. Facing intensifying pressures from commercial rivals (both nationally and globally), it strives to balance its public service remit with a commitment to attracting wide audiences to its services. In addressing these audiences as citizens, as opposed to prospective consumers, the BBC’s preferred definition of the public interest is privileged over and above what interests the public.

The BBC model has proven to be considerably influential, with several of its main tenets closely emulated in a variety of national contexts. The social and moral ideals of the Reithian conception of public service, thrown into sharp relief by profit led alternatives, informed broadcasting’s development throughout the Commonwealth from the 1930s onward

(examples include the Australian Broadcasting Corporation and the Canadian Broadcasting Corporation). The BBC model has similarly served as an exemplar for some countries in Europe, Scandinavia, and Asia, and more recently in the former Soviet bloc. It is recurrently the case, however, that these systems have evolved to the point where they have come to rely, to varying degrees, on commercial revenue to meet operating costs. This trend appears to be accelerating, with powerful business interests acting in concert with “market friendly” regulatory authorities.

New challenges are emerging for public broadcasting across its varied inflections in different national contexts. The era of interactive digital and high definition technologies poses important questions about its continued viability. The growing competition for viewers, together with contending demands on governmental support, raises concerns about how best to sustain a public service ethos for a type of broadcasting increasingly being fragmented into narrowcasting. While some insist that public broadcasting is no longer relevant or necessary in a multi channel universe, others believe that its daily reaffirmation of common values and traditions underscores the vital contribution it makes to enhancing mutual understanding and dialogue among a citizenry in accordance with the public trust.

SEE ALSO: Community and Media; Media; Media and Globalization; Media Literacy; Media Monopoly; Media and the Public Sphere; Media, Regulation of; Public Sphere; Radio; Television

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public housing

D. Forbes Edelen and J. Wright

Public housing policy in the United States did not emerge in response to the social needs of citizens but more out of economic necessity. Its development has been shaped by ideological, economic, sociopolitical, and demographic forces that emerged from the Great Depression. Some of these forces and their associated controversies include: ideological differences about whether it is the business of government to provide housing for needy citizens or whether this is better left to the private business sector; discriminatory practices among real estate, mortgage, and banking interests whose actions created concentrations of poor, segregated, African American ghettos; demographic changes that led to the suburbanization of America; an increasingly conservative fiscal and political climate, which has contributed to chronic underfunding of public housing initiatives, depletion of the public housing stock, and deterioration of existing units; and the unintentional effects of housing policies intended to help the poor but that functioned as disincentives for escaping poverty.

The first Housing Act of 1934 established the Federal Housing Administration (FHA) and was designed to resuscitate the real estate and finance markets during the Great Depression. The FHA and later the Veterans Administration (VA) accomplished this by restructuring housing market practices and financing, including introducing homebuilding and homeowner ship subsidies. These federal interventions put homeownership within the reach of middle income families and within a few years transformed America from a nation of renters into a nation of homeowners. These early successes encouraged further governmental interventions in the housing market. One important new intervention was the effort to provide temporary housing for working families (the working poor) who aspired to middle class status and homeownership but who required short term housing subsidies in order to accumulate sufficient capital. This was the animating vision of the nation's first true public housing law, the Housing Act of 1937.

This 1937 Act signaled the beginning of efforts to address the housing needs of the working poor. Local public housing authorities were established and given power of eminent domain to condemn and redevelop privately owned land for use as rental housing for working low income families. The Housing Act of 1949 introduced urban renewal to the overall effort, that is, the removal of old, decaying housing and its replacement with improved new homes. Urban renewal was founded on the principle of "a decent home and suitable living environment for every American family." This principle reflected the post war thinking that good housing (like other essential services regulated by government such as drinking water, highway development, and public safety) was in the national interest and so was the government's responsibility, especially for those Polton (1996) describes as the "deserving poor," the "suppressed middle class," and the nation's veterans.

Between 1949 and 1968, however, numerous factors combined to create a public housing system that was far from the temporary refuge for the working poor that was originally envisioned. Among the more important were discriminatory practices by local housing authorities who steered African Americans into inner city housing units far from affluent white neighborhoods; opposition of business and real estate interests to any government intervention in housing markets, which was seen as a threat to the free market system; and the unintended consequences of legislation like the Brooke Amendments which put caps on earnings of public housing residents, resulting in eviction of many upwardly mobile poor. Instead of temporary housing for the working poor, public housing rapidly evolved (certainly by the 1960s) into the housing of last resort for the poorest, neediest, and most dependent sectors of the urban population.

Today, public housing is populated almost exclusively by young, African American women with children, typically two or more. This population is characterized by high rates of welfare dependency, low skills, limited or non-existent labor force experience, and limited educational credentials and literacy skills. In short, the public housing population has become the chronically impoverished, welfare dependent,

female headed household that is the principal object of welfare reform.

Recent research presented by Sams Abiodun and Sanchez at the National Poverty Center Conference (2003) has refined our sense of the female headed household in impoverished public housing communities. They found that although women are usually the leaseholders of record and are not formally married, they often cohabit with men "in relationships of greater and lesser reciprocity and dependency." Many of these men, it was found, are attached to multiple households, to each of which they contribute either financially or in other ways (e.g., by caring for children, stepchildren, elderly mothers, nieces and nephews). These officially invisible cohabitating black males were also found to be "persistently unemployed or under employed and the victims, and perpetrators, of violence"; and they often had drug and alcohol issues as well. So while the pecuniary value of their contributions to the households with which they are attached may be limited, they are, nonetheless, present in a surprisingly large fraction of public housing families.

Many citizens and elected officials tend to blame (or perhaps want to blame) the deplorable conditions in many public housing developments on the undesirable characteristics of the people who live there. At best, this is simplistic. The problems of public housing are the combined result of failed policies, social and spatial isolation of residents in these racially and economically segregated communities, and the discriminatory practices of powerful business and real estate interests. For example, the isolated locations of many public housing dwellings limit access to job opportunities, restrict social networks, and lead to civil disengagement. This creates a climate where many residents view dealing drugs as an economic necessity, appeasing drug dealers as the only way to ensure personal safety, and taking drugs as medicine to numb the feelings of inadequacy and indignity they experience daily.

By the end of the 1970s, reform programs such as Section 235 and 236 were developed by the Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD) to address some of the problems of public housing through public-private partnerships aimed at urban renewal and revitalization. These programs provided

subsidized loans, market insurance, and low interest rates to encourage private sector partnership in achieving the urban renewal goals of increasing public housing stock and redeveloping deteriorated units. These programs generally failed to accomplish their goals largely due to mismanagement and fraud. Another factor contributing to failure was the economic pressures exerted by the stagnant wartime economy of the mid 1970s. These ushered in a fiscally conservative political climate, which continues today, and in the 1970s led to a moratorium being placed on public housing spending. This moratorium brought urban renewal to a standstill. Housing that had been demolished to make room for urban renewal was never replaced, other housing slated for redevelopment fell into disrepair, and without the promised capital expense subsidies and tax abatement incentives provided by Section 235 and 236, private homebuilding and mortgage lending partners retreated from the now unprofitable public housing market.

These fiscal and economic pressures of the 1970s coincided with growing ideological shifts in national values in which any government involvement in public housing came to be viewed as problematic (housing and everything else is better left to private market forces, according to this view). These shifting values reflected the emerging belief that the poor were no longer *deserving* people who had fallen on hard times, but were to be blamed for their own conditions largely because they were lazy, undisciplined, drug addicted, and welfare dependent. This view continues to prevail today and has led to a zero tolerance climate: basically a one strike and you're out standard that has proven a very useful public housing policy tool for evicting public housing tenants judged to be undesirable. These ideological biases drive the public housing debate and shape national housing policy to this very day.

Interestingly, many people on the left have also concluded that government must disengage from managing public housing and cede management, administration, and ownership to the private sector, a process known as privatization, not because they are ideologically opposed to governmental intervention in the housing market, but because the records of the past three decades can be taken as evidence that

government lacks the ability, commitment, or vision to satisfactorily address the problems of public housing. The commitment to privatization has recently become the cornerstone of federal and local housing policy, although the origins of the policy can be traced to Jack Kemp's tenure as HUD secretary during the first Bush administration.

Privatization of public housing has also become the trend in European countries since the 1970s, primarily out of economic necessity. For example, the increasing cost of fully subsidizing new public housing construction has resulted in a shift from solely federal government financing of public housing in the Netherlands, Germany, and the United Kingdom. Each of these countries has devised various partnership and funding strategies for sharing the financial burdens of providing housing for their poor with the private and non profit sectors and local municipalities represented in each country.

Germany uses private landlords or institutions willing to adhere to certain conditions, including rent controls and minimum building standards established by the government, to provide housing for its lowest and just below middle income populations. These investors receive incentives in the form of low interest loans, operating cost subsidies, and interest adjusted loans, and are allowed to make a profit as long as they accept tenants who meet the income qualifications for public housing need. Although the federal government largely withdrew from direct financing of these public housing subsidies in the early to mid 1980s, leaving it solely to the states and local authorities, reunification and other social changes have dramatically increased the need for public housing and the federal government has responded by tripling its public housing budget allocations throughout the 1990s. The result is that the rate of public housing construction in Germany rebounded to only about 7 percent lower in the early 1990s than its peak 1970s rates.

By contrast, the rate of public housing construction in the UK has dropped sharply, about 34 percent, since the 1970s, largely due to strict government controls over local authorities' borrowing of public money for public housing construction and cuts in federal subsidies. The UK also uses what Smith and Oxley call a *rebate element* and *housing element* system to

award local authorities their subsidies based on market values of public housing property. Because the UK system does not use rent controls, rent increases are set each year according to assumed increases in property values. From these estimates, local public housing authorities are provided with increases or decreases in their subsidies (the housing element) to make up for any deficits due to anticipated increases in housing costs or to control for any overages expected due to lower anticipated costs. As for the rebates, these are provided to lower income tenants who cannot afford any rent increases; in essence, as Smith and Oxley (1997) point out, the tenants who are financially better off subsidize their less well off peers.

Hence the move toward privatization is not unique to the United States, although the political, fiscal, and social forces that drive the trend, and how it is implemented, are unique to each country. In the US, the move toward privatization has been strongly influenced by shifts in perceptions of the poor; it has been fueled by the persistent tendency to disfavor the poor, which has shifted the focus of public housing reform away from social structural causes and toward holding public housing residents accountable. HUD has freed local housing authorities from the mandate to function as the housing of last resort and has encouraged zero tolerance policies. At the same time, HUD has shown its renewed commitment to market interventions by expanding the Section 8 voucher program and the newer HOPE VI housing reform program, staples of public housing policy since the 1990s.

The Section 8 program is meant to promote privatization by allowing low income families to rent apartments from private sector landlords at market rates. Local housing authorities in essence provide vouchers that pay the difference between the market rent and what these families can afford to pay for housing (stipulated in the Brooke Amendments as no more than 30 percent of gross monthly income). HOPE VI in turn intends to deconcentrate poverty by demolishing densely populated public housing complexes and replacing them with mixed income, low rise apartments and townhomes.

The evidence so far suggests that Section 8 programs have achieved mixed results, and that the HOPE VI program, while doing a fairly

good job of meeting its deconcentration goals, still falls short of fully achieving the goal of eliminating the concentration of poverty in public housing. For example, a 2003 study by Kingsley, Johnson, and Pettit of 73 housing developments in 48 cities, published in the *Journal of Urban Affairs*, found that Section 8 recipients who were relocated from HOPE VI developments did indeed show lower poverty rates than their public housing peers who remained behind, but there was still "significant clustering" of the poor in some neighborhoods in most of the 48 cities in this study.

In an earlier Housing Policy survey study prepared for the American Sociological Association's annual meeting in 1998, Wright and Devine examined the potential impact of welfare reform on public housing tenants of a New Orleans public housing development. Interestingly, more than half of the respondents felt that welfare reform would not impact their personal lives substantially. A majority also felt it would have no effect or a positive effect on welfare recipients in particular, and on African Americans in general, as well as on New Orleans and American society as a whole. It is, of course, too early to tell whether the optimism of these public housing tenants is well founded because solid, broad based empirical evidence of the consequences of welfare reform and other recent devolutionary federal policy changes on public housing residents remains quite scarce.

Similarly, an innovative trend, one being used in developing countries like Bangladesh, Egypt, Ghana, and Zimbabwe to increase public housing supplies and reduce the public costs of maintaining them, is to transform public housing occupants into owners of their housing units. With the help of government subsidies that are shifted from private investors and non profit housing authorities, public housing tenants are allowed to purchase their public housing units and to add extensions on them for a variety of personal uses. These uses can include providing rent free housing for poorer family members; earning income as landlords, by renting the extra rooms to other low income tenants; or engaging in other business ventures that can range from operating nursery schools to night clubs and food stores. These ventures are seen as a way to encourage employment and

income generating opportunities in economically deprived areas, and to allow these residents to earn self employment income providing services in their own communities that are usually not readily available, to other residents in these areas, at costs that are affordable to their low income peers. While hopes are high, it remains to be seen whether the goals of this innovative approach will lead to decreases in poverty, economic revitalization of public housing communities, and a reduction in the burdens of providing housing for low income and poor residents in these countries. The results of several studies, now underway, will soon tell us more about the impact of this emerging public housing policy.

Other key areas for future research include studies of the impact of HUD's abandoning its role as the provider of last resort for the most vulnerable members of society. Where will homeless people, the mentally ill, disabled veterans, women who have exhausted their welfare eligibility, and other vulnerable groups find housing if not in the public housing developments? Will these policies create even more homelessness? Or will the new emphasis in HUD and elsewhere on self sufficiency make it possible for the excluded and dispossessed to obtain their own housing? Only time will tell.

As this body of research grows, it will allow social scientists to assess the true impact of welfare reform, zero tolerance, devolution, privatization, and deconcentration interventions on public housing residents and the nation. It will also provide insights into the long term effects of Section 8, HOPE VI, and other tax credit and block grant programs passed during the 1990s to facilitate these shifts in public housing policy. Research of the next decade will tell us whether it was a good idea or not to abandon a principle expressed in the 1987 Stuart B. McKinney Homeless Assistance Act: that it is the fundamental duty of good government to provide decent housing for its most vulnerable citizens.

SEE ALSO: Class, Status, and Power; Family, Men's Involvement in; Family Poverty; Family Structure and Poverty; Ghetto; Homelessness; Hypersegregation; Marginality; Poverty and Disrepute; Residential Segregation; Steering, Racial Real Estate; Welfare Dependency and Welfare Underuse

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public opinion

Connie de Boer

The concept of public opinion is widely used in the social sciences: psychology, sociology, political, and communication science. Three distinct perspectives emerge from the many

different definitions of the concept: individual, collective, and process.

The most general and inclusive approach is that which conceives of public opinion at the individual level as an aggregation of the preferences of a group of individuals. Scholars with a more holistic view describe public opinion at the collective level as an emergent product of debate and discussion that cannot be reduced to individuals. Within this perspective, the public is not just a group of individuals but a dynamic collectivity. Public opinion refers to a group of people who are confronted by an issue, are divided in their ideas as to how to meet the issue, and engage in discussion over the issue (Blumer 1946). Public opinion is also defined as a communication process that allows people to organize into publics within which opinions are formed and which enable them to exercise their influence. In this perspective, the individual and collective aspects of public opinion are more integrated (Price 1992).

There is a tendency for social scientists to emphasize in their definitions those dimensions of the concept that are related to their own academic discipline. Thus, psychologists are mainly interested in the process of opinion formation and focus on the factors that influence individual opinions. Political scientists draw attention to the role of public opinion in the political system by limiting their definitions to opinions, which governments find it prudent to heed, or to opinions about public affairs. By observing public debates or opinion polls, politicians and other government officials come to know what the public thinks and in that way public opinion can have a political impact. Moreover, politicians may be influenced by their expectations of the opinions of the public. Such latent or unvoiced opinions do not have to be expressed to be deemed to have an effect.

Public opinion is structured, which means that not all opinions have the same value: the opinions of those in powerful positions will always matter more than those of common citizens. And, because not everybody in the public is equally informed or equally active in the public debate, the extent of information and deliberation on which opinions are based varies among members of the general public.

Sociologists have a preference for definitions of public opinion at the collective level, and

they emphasize the role of public opinion in a social system as a form of social control. Communication scientists emphasize that public opinion is confined to opinions that are made public, and hence they limit their accounts of public opinion to opinions that are expressed. Given the linkage with the public debate and discussions about issues, they see public opinion as a communication concept.

Social scientists from all disciplines thus acknowledge that public opinion is closely related to the notion of public debate. In the rational model of public opinion, people are understood to develop their opinions during a public debate by listening to and presenting arguments in which their opinions are rationally sound judgments based on thoughtful consideration. Public opinion is also conceived, however, as a form of social control, where its role is to promote social integration and to ensure that there is a sufficient level of consensus on which actions and decisions may be based. These two models differ from each other as to the mode of opinion expression, the effort required for opinion expression, and the conceptualization of the public. The rational model emphasizes the verbal expression of rational arguments and opinions. Opinions are formed as a result of a process of deliberation. For participation in rational discussions, the ability and motivation to acquire information and to discuss the issues are prerequisites. When public opinion is viewed as social control, various forms of opinion expression are possible, ranging from rational debates and casual talks to facial expressions, gestures, and publicly visible symbols. In the latter forms, participation in the process of opinion formation is interpreted as requiring much less deliberate effort than in a rational debate. In the rational model, the term public refers to a group of politically interested and knowledgeable citizens, as, for example, they are described in Blumer's classic account, whereas in the model of social control the notion of public involves everybody (Scheufele & Moy 2000).

Public opinion emerges in and through the mass media, where people play the role of actors and spectators in the public debate. The media are interpreted as carrying out a surveillance function when they alert publics to problems, and they provide the principal mechanism for

allowing the public to monitor the social and political environment. The mass media are also the carriers of public opinion by reporting the views and arguments on an issue. Exposure to the media and participation in discussions allow people to assess the extent of consensus and controversy. It is this mutual awareness of the extent of consensus and controversy which ensures that public opinion can act as a social force, whereas the aggregation of individual opinions that are not expressed does not have such power. The media provide the means by which members of a public communicate. Elites use the media to influence public opinion, and at the same time those media provide elites with an impression of the views of the public on the issue at stake. Perceptions of public opinion matter not only because individuals attend to their social environment, but also because these perceptions potentially influence the behavior and attitudes of individuals and officials in political, social, and commercial organizations.

Ideas about public opinion can be found in eighteenth century philosophy, in Renaissance literature, and even in the works of Plato and Aristotle. Up to the mid nineteenth century, the bulk of writings dealing with public opinion were normative and philosophical in nature, being studies in political theory rather than studies of public opinion itself. Toward the close of the nineteenth century, public opinion came under increasingly systematic analysis in the empirical manner, characteristic of the developing social sciences. In tandem with the growth of the social sciences within the academy, twentieth century works on public opinion more clearly reflected sociological and psychological rather than political and philosophical concerns. Analysts increasingly turned their attention to the problem of understanding the social and behavioral aspects of public opinion, but considerations of the underlying normative questions concerning public opinion have continued throughout the twentieth century.

Over the course of the late seventeenth and early eighteenth centuries, a variety of novel social institutions came to prominence: the coffeehouses of England, the salons of Paris, and the table societies of Germany. In these gatherings public opinion emerged as a result of a free exchange of information and arguments about political issues. This emerging public opinion,

which was closely followed by those in power, became a new form of political authority. In contemporary politics, legislators, interest group leaders, politicians, and journalists have multiple means for gauging the public mood. They attend to the mass media, communicate (in many different ways) with colleagues and citizens, conduct focus groups, and monitor the behavior of voters. Yet the opinion poll is the most ubiquitous and authoritative measurement instrument.

Earlier analysts were far more likely to frame public opinion as an inherently collective, supra individual phenomenon. As survey research and opinion polling got underway in the 1930s, the daunting task of empirically observing the public as a fluid and complexly structured group, consistent with the sociological model of public opinion, led to its replacement with a far more tractable approach – essentially, an aggregate “one person, one vote” conception. The advent of opinion polling redirected attention toward social psychological as opposed to broadly sociological concerns, and it placed problems of individual level opinion measurement at the top of the research agenda. The combination of advances in measurement and sampling techniques placed researchers in a position to study opinions and attitudes in large populations and also to gather what were increasingly believed to be very accurate readings of public opinion on matters of political and social significance. Opinion polling has changed the essential nature of public opinion itself. The assumption implicit in all polls that everyone might have an opinion and that all opinions are equally important creates an impression of public opinion as the aggregate of opinions of individuals who are also uniformly informed. In some situations one might even say that opinion polls have replaced public opinion. When heeding public opinion, politicians increasingly turn to opinion polls in order to validate and defend their positions on the issues of the day.

Since the inception of public opinion research, great emphasis is placed on questions concerning how to conceptualize individual opinions and how to measure them accurately. Studies of public opinion attempt to describe and account for the preferences and beliefs of citizens, and to assess the (political and social) impact of these preferences and beliefs.

Researchers have tried to explain individual opinions using concepts such as values, attitudes, and ideologies. Converse (1964) showed that survey respondents rarely make use of systematic ideological concepts. The opinions expressed by respondents are often inconsistent and unstable (non attitudes). After the abandonment of the role of ideologies as a central variable in the 1960s, this topic has reappeared on the research agenda, but the focus of the research has shifted from how many citizens think ideologically to what impact ideology has on the political beliefs, opinions, and actions of citizens.

Theories about schematic information processing have improved our understanding of the process of opinion formation. Schemas, understood as cognitive structures that represent one's general knowledge about a concept or stimulus domain, provide shortcuts in thinking about an issue. Schemas are used as heuristics, simplifying the task of evaluating objects. Another such heuristic is the elite cue, which refers to the practice of individuals making decisions by considering not the details of the issue but rather the positions taken by trusted elites.

Subjective estimates of the climate of opinion, or perceptions of public opinion, are also recognized as having an impact on the process of opinion formation. Such perceptions of public opinion do not necessarily reflect the objective reality of aggregated opinion, but may be distorted by pluralistic ignorance, false consensus effects, and by overestimating the impact of events or media messages on the opinion of others ("the third person effect").

The process of opinion formation is heavily influenced by the context in which the opinion is expressed, in that it depends upon the situation and on which attitudes, values, schemas, group identifications, or perceptions of public opinion come to mind. Thus, the same person may well express different views about an issue in different situations. This also explains why slight changes in the way opinion questions and response choices are formulated in a survey produce different results.

There are recurring concerns in the writings about public opinion. First of all, it is suggested that the public at large lacks the competence to be active and involved in all the pertinent issues of the day. Although in simpler societies rule

by public opinion might be a possibility, the modern world has become too large and too complicated. Second, attention is drawn to the lack of resources available to the public. The necessary information to form rational opinions is not adequately disseminated by the public communication system. Despite a lack of detailed information about ideologies, policies, and candidates, people nevertheless make sense of the political world, but they do so using information shortcuts and gut reasoning.

A third enduring concern is the danger that a kind of mediocrity in opinion will prevail created and maintained by the pressure of the majority. The notion of conformity to majority opinion has been a persistent theme, both in social criticism and in social science. A fourth theme centers on the public's susceptibility to persuasion and to highly emotional and non rational appeals, nourished by the growth of and developments within the mass communication system. Fifth, it is also suggested that, as a correlate of the domination of government and corporate elites, sections of the public are increasingly passive.

Normative concerns about the quality of public opinion have led to the development of "deliberative polling," designed to combine the efficiency and representativeness of conventional opinion polls with the informative and deliberative aspects of a town meeting. Respondents are brought together with policy experts, public officials, moderators, and one another to consider political issues in depth. With deliberative polling the aim is to find out what the public would think if it was fully informed and if it had time and opportunity to think and talk about the issue. There is a considerable difference between the opinion which people produce in an artificial situation such as a survey and the opinion they produce in a situation closer to the daily life situations in which opinions are challenged and/or confirmed.

Analysts of public opinion continue to face the challenge of trying to understand large scale social and political processes: the constitution of publics around shared problems, the negotiation of competing policy proposals, the emergence of issues, and the formation of coalitions among political elites, shadowed by broader coalitions among their supporters or detractors in the spectator public. In studying

these processes the researcher is confronted by the need to understand individual phenomena: the attention given to particular issues, the determination of which issues are personally or socially relevant, the acquisition of information, the formation of opinions in people's minds, and the translation of those opinions into political action.

There has been a growing interest in the deliberative aspects of democratic politics. The theory of deliberative democracy, in which public opinion is interpreted within the rational model, assumes that egalitarian, reciprocal, reasonable, and open exchanges among citizens about public issues will lead to a number of individual and collective benefits. Mendelberg (2002) argues that existing research shows that while deliberative processes in and of themselves are no guarantee of a more participatory, communal, and rational democracy, there is enough evidence in support of these ideals to make further research worthwhile. Research focusing on the communicative processes within the model of public opinion as social control is still scarce (de Boer & Velthuisen 2001).

SEE ALSO: Mass Media and Socialization; Media and the Public Sphere; Politics and Media; Propaganda; Ratings

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public order crime

David Huffer

Complex, collective actions, people adjusting, cooperating, accommodating, and compromising in social intercourse, are the constituent elements of civil societies. Binding societies are social meanings and expectations of acceptable behavior, a social fabric. This tacit understanding, shared by residents and users of public spaces, reflects a pervasive sense of civility, mutual responsibility, and morality as well as desires for a pleasurable life and a safe environment. Public order crimes threaten, prevent, or otherwise interfere with these pursuits.

Laws maintaining public order focus on physical acts and their residual effects. Physical acts span a menagerie of petty crimes and inappropriate behavior. These include soliciting alms; aggressive panhandling; loitering; obstruction of streets and public spaces; vandalism; unlicensed or unsolicited vending, peddling, or services; public drinking; public intoxication; public urination and defecation; street prostitution; and illegal drug sales. Residual effects of these acts include the presence of graffiti; abandoned cars, homes, and buildings; sustained disrepair; unsupervised, rowdy teens; open prostitution and drug sales; and vacant, trash filled lots. Though clearly among the least extreme of crimes, such collective victimization has consequences for both real and perceived quality of life that, left unchecked, can spiral communities into a sequence of decline.

Disorder and order maintenance are not new concepts. Disorder has plagued communities since their inception and, from their beginnings, policing agencies were charged with its prevention. This model was, by most accounts, effective through the 1950s when crime rates were consistently low. Rocketing crime rates in the 1960s spurred national concern, reshaped political thought, and diverted policing focus from its roots. Attention drifted as police instead began to favor making arrests, solving crimes, and gathering evidence to quell serious crime. This shift from an order maintenance into a crime fighting model was essentially pandemic by the early 1970s when, in reflecting contemporary social and political emphases,

policing agencies increasingly responded to escalating crime rates by gradually narrowing the scope of their work. Order maintenance gave way to the sole pursuit of fighting serious crime.

Research in the 1970s renewed interest in disorder. Seemingly inconsistent findings began emerging mid decade both from analyses of the National Crime Victimization Surveys (NCVS) and from independent policing studies. Research indicated fear of victimization greatly exceeded what would be expected given local crime patterns. In grappling with this disjunction, theorists attempted to identify causes and sources of fear perceptions and began exploring its effects once it became pervasive. Aside from actual crime levels, they noted community characteristics such as disorder influenced resident fear of crime. Early work focusing exclusively on the psychological effects of disorder reasoned that higher than expected victimization fear was an experiential consequence of exposure to widely occurring disorder. Conceptual elaborations to this purely micro level process were introduced beginning in the late 1970s that both increasingly recognized the significance of human agency and broadened the theoretical scope. Theorists incorporated a greater respect for cognition, conceptually freeing residents to perceive, reason, and judge disorder, and they introduced broader, contextual effects into a system linking disorder, fear, and neighborhood decline.

While early models held that fear of crime was simply an evaluative reaction to disorder, elaborations asserted instead that residents observed disorder, ascribed it meaning, and subsequently reacted to these ascriptions. The ascriptions rather than the observations shaped fear and, further, residents attributed concentrated, unregulated disorder to a community wide inability to protect the social fabric, which thus engendered a general sense of uncertainty and left residents questioning whether order could be maintained, and, if not, how then crime could be controlled. Individual responses to this uncertainty theoretically ushered in gradual, practically inescapable community decline.

Wilson and Kelling (1982) likened this declining process to that unfolding given persistent, unkempt community physical features.

The metaphorical broken window signals to observers there may be little social investment in improvement, and for some, like delinquent groups and petty offenders, this provides opportunity. More windows are broken and if these too remain unattended, it further substantiates perceptions of disinvestment, and thus observers reason there is little regulating the area. It neither is the window alone, the building, nor the street; rather, observers ascribe meaning to the sign inferring that, as a whole, there is little community interest in mobilizing resources – particularly those responsible for public safety. This concern sparks dissatisfaction, selective migration, and inhibits effective informal social control.

Minor, disorderly behaviors needle at, potentially unraveling, the social fabric. Satisfaction sinks, solidarity collapses, and mutual responsibility vanishes while fear of victimization grows larger. This stimulates withdrawal among all but opportunists and those unable to flee, leaving informal social controls otherwise curtailing minor breaches of order virtually disabled. Able law abiders take flight and, over time, serious offenders, capitalizing on available opportunities, take their place. Further, area avoidance and compositional shifts negatively affect the local housing market and economy, increasing inequality and instability. Those able avoid commercial and residential areas perceived as unsafe. They move, market elsewhere. Businesses close, housing prices plummet, neighborhoods fall into ruin, and entire communities decline. This impairment is dynamic, developmental, and creates a context favorable for persistent, serious crimes.

SEE ALSO: Crime; Crime, Broken Windows Theory of; Property Crime; Social Control; Social Disorganization Theory; Violent Crime

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public and private

Charles Turner

The analytical distinction between public and private life has proved to be a useful tool for charting long term social change and in particular for understanding modern society. In classical Greece the equivalent distinction would be one between participation in the (public) life of the polis and the management of one's (private) household, within an ethical framework which saw the political life as higher and more self sufficient (Aristotle) than the life devoted to meeting mere material needs. In this world, privacy implies privation, the lack of something required for a full human life. This ideal of the polis, of politics as the highest form of human activity, has hovered over modern social and political thought since Machiavelli. But it has appeared ever more ethereal with the emergence of modern industrial society. For if in feudal society political power is the source of wealth, mature industrial society (or what Tocqueville calls "democracy") makes possible the pursuit of wealth without recourse to politics, and the putting of self interest before the public good. The modern state becomes either the minimum framework necessary for the pursuit of individual self interest (liberalism) or a mechanism for the maximization of collective wealth (a possibility utilized by modern welfare states and by state socialism). In either case politics loses its status as the most self sufficient activity and becomes a means with which something else can be achieved. The most sustained intellectual assault on this

development – in which, for instance, liberalism and Marxism are seen as two sides of the same coin – is found in the writings of Arendt, Oakeshott, and Wolin. Against this judgment stands the claim, popular with eighteenth century political economy, that it is precisely the pursuit of private gain in commercial society which opens individuals to the variousness and nuance of human affairs and which indirectly fosters the moral sentiments consistent with public virtues (Pocock 1985).

If classicist political theory equates public/private with politics/economics and laments the triumph of privacy, sociology, social history, and philosophy introduce new distributions. For instance, for sociology, the release of the energies required for the pursuit of individual self interest brings with it a more complex division of labor, the growth of new forms of refinement, and a greater variety of marks of social distinction. Privacy begins to be equated not with the household economy but with the family as a source of individual labor. This process of visible individualization is accompanied by a new organization of domestic space. The growth of the city, too, gives rise to new possibilities of distance, reserve, and inwardness (Simmel's blasé attitude), which fuse with already existing ideas about the inwardness of the self borne by (especially) Protestant Christianity. Public/private is equated with external/internal to the self.

The tradition of philosophy which begins with Kant provides another sense of public and private. The fusion of eighteenth century rationalism with German pietism led Kant to what is now called the "deontological" view of the self, in which individuals have the capacity to abstract from all of their determinate social and political relations. The fruit of such abstraction is not melancholy introspection or personal brooding, but the discovery of the individual's capacity for reason and judgment; at their most inward and private, individuals discover not their own uniqueness, but the moral law, a principle of duty which is the same for all. Individuals are also equipped with the capacity to make use of their unaided, autonomous reason in public. Indeed, the public use of reason is Kant's definition of enlightenment. "Public" here cannot be equated with politics in the classical sense, but exists as a republic of

letters between the private (both economic and intimate!) sphere and that of government and administration. For Habermas, the story of the twentieth century is that of the loss of the public sphere's distinctiveness as a result of the interpenetration of state and society under modern welfare regimes and political democracy. A series of partial publics emerges instead, pervaded by large organizations representing sectional interests, overlain with a thin veneer of publicity in the form of "public opinion," to be mobilized for demagogic as well as democratic purposes.

The idea of a loss of the public as polis, and of the public as republic of letters, lies at the heart of theories of European modernity. Alongside them, a third theme emerges in theories of American modernity: the loss of civility. Whether it be a culture of narcissism, the triumph of the therapeutic (Rieff 1966) or the fall of public man (Sennett 1977), American individualism is held to have developed to such a degree that individuals now view public questions in private terms, see the world as a mirror for the self, and fail to display the requisite distance from self which makes possible civil behavior between strangers. New forms of collectivity can arise out of this imbalance, but they are forms of community based upon the private principle of resemblance to self rather than forms of sociality based upon the public principle of commonality of purpose.

Curiously enough, in the 1960s this plea for civility, self distance, and a clear distinction between private and public matters was counterbalanced by the feminist slogan "the personal is political." This has been interpreted in two ways. According to the first, the neglect of the operation of power mechanisms in the sphere of personal relations is a major lacuna in modern social and political thought, to be filled both by consciousness raising and by new forms of empirical research; according to the second, the very tradition at the heart of which is a concern for the fate of the polis, or the public sphere, or civility, is itself pervaded by a masculinist reason. Both have had far reaching consequences for public and private life and for scholarship.

SEE ALSO: Aron, Raymond; Households; Politics; Public Realm; Public Sphere; Welfare Fraud

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public realm

Lyn H. Lofland

While widely used in the contemporary discourse of such diverse fields as philosophy, political theory, sociology, art, media studies, architecture and urban planning, and gender studies, as well as in everyday speech, the concept of public realm has no consensual definition and definitions that are proffered are often both imprecise and enigmatic. What all the diverse usages do agree upon is that their referent is some sort of non private arena of social life and most judge that arena to be both critically beneficial and unappreciated; what they disagree about is its exact character. To add to the confusion, the non private arena may also be discussed under other names such as public sphere, public order, public domain, public world, and civic space.

Arendt's (1958) usage is at once among the most enigmatic, evocative, and, perhaps, influential. She traces the term back to the Aristotelian and Roman distinctions between the private world of the household and the public world of the *bios politikos* (for the Greeks) or the *polis* (for the Romans). And although the meanings attached to each realm shift somewhat through time, the dyadic distinction remains and is, for her, of considerable philosophic import.

The public realm is that arena where “every thing that appears . . . can be seen and heard by everybody and has the widest possible publicity . . . [and] appearance – something that is being seen and heard by others as well as by ourselves – [is what] constitutes reality” (p. 50). The public realm is also the world common to all of us and is “distinguished from our privately owned place in it. This world, however, is not identical with the earth or with nature, . . . it is related, rather to the human artifact, the fabrication of human hands, as well as to affairs that go on among those who inhabit the man made world together” (p. 52). In contrast, “To live an entirely private life means above all to be deprived of things essential to a truly human life: to be deprived of the reality that comes from being seen and heard by others” (p. 58). Interpreters seem to agree that what Arendt is talking about here, despite what her words may seem to imply, is not all publicly visible human social life outside of the household, but political activity – especially political speech – the goal of which is to exchange views about and to formulate shared purposes and to take action on them. Other areas of non household social life like government, administration, and economic activity seemingly are excluded.

Habermas’s (1964) discussion of what he calls the public sphere is somewhat similar and may rival Arendt’s in its influence, and it too has an elusive quality. In his conceptualization, the public sphere is a “realm of our social life in which something approaching public opinion can be formed[, a]ccess is guaranteed to all citizens[, and a portion of it] comes into being in every conversation in which private individuals assemble to form a public body . . . Today newspapers and magazines, radio and television are the media of the public sphere” (p. 49). He also differentiated among the political public sphere and other arenas of discourse, such as the literary, his own interest being primarily in the former. Unlike Arendt, Habermas saw the political public sphere as not emerging until the eighteenth century, when the distinction between opinion and public opinion developed, but similar to Arendt he viewed this arena as centrally important, not just to a fully human life, but especially to democratic governance. Some readers of Habermas have equated the political public

sphere with government and with electoral politics, but his interpreters insist that this is a misreading, that the state and the public sphere are in opposition to one another, the latter being “the sphere of non governmental opinion making” (Hohendahl 1964: 49). Because he insisted that the requisite discourse in the sphere be reasoned and critical, Habermas was not sanguine about its post World War II character or future. He argued that it was being undermined by such forces as advanced industrial capitalism, the social welfare state, and a mass media which tended to translate public communication into public relations.

Movement toward a more limited, technical, and precise definition can be seen in the work of four sociologists: Richard Sennett, Claude Fischer, Albert Hunter, and Lyn Lofland, although three of the four (Fischer excepted) also carry on the larger tradition of attempting to remedy what they see as an unfortunate disattention. Sennett (1977) equates the “public domain” with “the world of strangers, the cosmopolitan city” and he contrasts it with the private arena of intimate relationships. Though still retaining the historic private–public dichotomy, the word “public” here shifts somewhat from the difficult to locate realm of political talk and action to the more ordinary and mundane intercourse between urban people who do not know one another personally. This public domain, Sennett argued, is tragically undervalued in the contemporary West, primarily as a result of the rise of privatism and its overvaluation of intimacy. And this is dangerous because “the notion of a civilized existence [is one] in which people are comfortable with a diversity of experience and indeed find nourishment in it . . . In this sense, the absorption in intimate affairs is the mark of an uncivilized society” (p. 340).

Fischer (1981) explored the longstanding assertion that urban life is necessarily alienating and is the locus for interpersonal estrangement. In doing so, he distinguished between the “public world” (or sphere) and the private world (or sphere) of city life, and like Sennett he defined the public world as the “world of strangers,” a “world of people who are personally unfamiliar to one another” (p. 307). He concluded (using survey data) that in the public world, alienation and estrangement from others

could be discerned, but that in the private world of city life composed of close associates and other familiar people such as neighbors, it could not.

Hunter (1985), pursuing his interest in the issue of social control, also grounded his definitions in everyday interactions, but made a break from the traditional divide of public and private to suggest the utility of understanding these everyday interactions in terms of the specific normative “orders” in which they are embedded. He identified three of these: the *private order* is “found in both informal and more formal primary groups where the values of sentiment, social support, and esteem are the essential resource”; the *parochial order* is “based on the local interpersonal networks and interlocking of local institutions that serve the diurnal and sustenance needs of the residential community”; and the *public order* is “located preeminently in the formal, bureaucratic agencies of the state” (pp. 233–4). And like Sennett, Hunter’s concerns are also moral ones: “The private, the parochial and the public social orders cannot maintain social order throughout a society without a mutual interdependence . . . A civil society, that provides both for safety from strangers and safety for strangers, requires an acknowledgment of the intrinsic limits [of each order] and a recognition of the need for better articulation among [them]” (p. 240).

Borrowing freely from prior work, especially that of Sennett and Hunter, but also extending and altering them, Lofland (1998) contrasted both the private realm (the world of the household and friend and kin networks) and the parochial realm (the world of neighborhood, workplace, or acquaintance networks) with the public realm (the world of strangers and “the street”). Specifically, she defined the *private realm* as “characterized by ties of intimacy among primary group members who are located within households and personal networks”; the *parochial realm* as “characterized by a sense of commonality among acquaintances and neighbors who are involved in interpersonal networks that are located within ‘communities’”; and the *public realm* as “the non private sectors of urban areas in which individuals in co presence tend to be personally unknown or only categorically known to one another” (pp. 9–10). Despite the hint of geographical concreteness

in the last definition, Lofland conceived of the three realms as social psychological rather than territorial spaces. They come into existence when one or another of the three relational types reaches a proportion and density in some territorial space such that it dominates that space. And while each realm may be most “at home” in its associated territorial space, each may also exist in “alien” space (e.g., a wedding in a public park, an “open” house in a private residence, a neighborhood bar in a “downtown” location). Like Sennett, Lofland’s special focus is on the public realm and for a similar reason: she argues that it is a realm of immense social value which offers, among other benefits, a rich environment for learning, a site for needed respites and refreshments, a locus of communication, an opportunity for the practice of politics, a stage for the enactment of social arrangements and social conflict, and assistance in the creation of cosmopolitans (pp. 231–46).

These more extended discussions of “public realm” and related concepts probably represent only a fraction of contemporary usages. More frequently, the term is employed loosely, with little attempt at definition, although the author’s meaning is usually implied by the context and bears some resemblance to one or another of the meanings developed in the longer treatments. In discussions of architecture and urban planning, for example, public realm seems primarily to mean legally public space – specifically, outdoor public space, as in parks, plazas, and promenades. Among those interested in the Internet, the public realm translates as cyberspace, where non corporeal interactions blossom. For some artists, it is identified with sites of public art, and for some media scholars and/or defenders of the public ownership of media, it refers to government sponsored enterprises like the BBC in Britain or the ABC in Australia. To some students of higher education, the public realm finds embodiment in the institution of the university, and in gender studies treatments it often refers to that social arena where laws, contracts, and other civic agreements are reached and which has traditionally been considered “off limits” to women.

SEE ALSO: Goffman, Erving; Interaction; Primary Groups; Public Sphere; Secondary Groups; Simmel, Georg; Spatial Relationships

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public sphere

Gerard Delanty

The concept of the public sphere has become a key term in sociology since it was introduced by Jürgen Habermas as a sociologically pertinent concept. The public sphere refers to the space that exists in modern societies between the state and society. It concerns a domain that is generally related to civil society, but goes beyond it to refer to the wider category of the public. The public sphere comes into existence with the formation of civil society and the forms of associational politics to which it led. But it refers essentially to the communicative content of political modernity. Although the English

term public sphere suggests a spatial notion of the public, the German term *Öffentlichkeit* conveys a stronger notion of a realm of communication, suggesting a discursive condition of "publicness."

The public sphere can be seen as a modern approach to the older question of "public man" or the public realm that Hannah Arendt believed came into existence with the Athenian polis and political relations based on citizenship. The turn to the public was originally a development within political theory, as reflected in the writing of de Tocqueville and Arendt. Although Arendt saw a decline in the public realm in modernity, de Tocqueville believed it was one of the key features of modernity. Habermas's major work *The Structural Transformation of the Public Sphere*, originally published in German in 1962, has generally provided the main point of reference for recent debates on the public sphere (Habermas 1989). The work can be seen as a combination of de Tocquevillian and the Arendtian stance.

According to Habermas, modern society from the seventeenth century to the early nineteenth century saw the emergence of a social domain distinct from court society, on the one side, and the absolute state, on the other. This was the space of the public, which was formed in new spaces such as the coffee house, public libraries, a free press, and wherever public debate took place outside formal institutions. One of its main features was public opinion. Initially, the public sphere was defined by opposition to the court society, but it also increasingly became defined by opposition to the private domain of domestic life. In Habermas's early theory of the public sphere, it was characteristically associated with the political and cultural world of the European Enlightenment. So the structural transformation occurred when the culture of the Enlightenment declined and the public sphere was absorbed by capitalism. The decisive event in this was the commercialization of the press, which was originally an organ of public debate, but with the rise of commercial newspapers that came with the consolidation of bourgeois society and intrusion of the market into civil society the public sphere went into decline. In an approach that reflected Arendt's pessimistic view of modernity and one that was influenced by the cultural critique of modernity by the Frankfurt

School, Habermas saw only the decline of the public sphere with modernity. The rise of modern mass society in the twentieth century with the manufacture and control of public opinion by political parties completed the structural transformation of the public sphere that had begun in the previous century.

By the time of the translation of Habermas's book into English in 1989 he had moved on to a new theory of the public sphere which no longer concentrated on the decline of the Enlightenment model. However, the English translation opened up a huge debate on the public sphere (Calhoun 1992). The point of departure for many of these new approaches was a critique of Habermas's earlier model. The new theory of the public sphere that emerged in the 1980s can be summed up under four points.

The first was a rejection of the idealization of the historical model adopted by Habermas. Many critics argued that there was not a single historical model, but several, and the notion of a pure domain of public space opposing power was a romanticization of historical reality. Indeed, much of what Habermas called the public sphere occurred within the broader category of the state and cannot so easily be accounted for in terms of a domain of free communication.

Second, any account of the public sphere must consider the existence of alternative or counter public spheres. In this regard, what many critics drew attention to were alternatives to the bourgeois public sphere. Negt and Kluge (1993) wrote about the "proletarian public sphere," which did not figure in Habermas's model. In addition to this there is the feminist charge that the early conceptualization of the public sphere assumes a too strict separation of the public and the private, whereby the latter is reduced to a non political condition (Landes 1988).

Third, more recent debates on the public sphere concern the existence of the public sphere in non western societies (Hoexter et al. 2002). In contrast to the Eurocentric bias of Habermas's early theory, the public sphere was not a condition peculiar to eighteenth century Europe and North America and does not consequently require an "Enlightenment."

Fourth, a question that has been at the forefront of much of the recent debate on the public sphere is whether there is a cosmopolitan

public sphere (Kögler 2005). Where Habermas largely assumed the existence of discrete national public spheres, the idea of a global or cosmopolitan public sphere has contemporary relevance as a result of globalization. One important application of this is in the idea of a European public sphere (Eriksen 2005).

In sum, the notion of the public sphere is today generally seen as a plural condition: there is not one single or ideal public sphere, but many. The public sphere is the space of debates and the ongoing contestation of power.

SEE ALSO: Modernity; Privatization; Public and Private; Public Realm

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purdah

Hasmita Ranjji

Purdah literally translated from its Persian origins means veil or curtain. It is a concept that is used as a synonym for social practices that

isolate or separate different groups in society. Although purdah can refer to many different social practices of isolation, the term is most immediately associated with a practice of gender segregation in mostly although not exclusively Muslim societies.

There are various forms and degrees of purdah that may be observed in Islamic societies. Purdah, for instance, can refer to the use of high walls, curtains, and screens erected within the home as well as public places to keep women separate from men or strangers. However, the most widespread practice of purdah refers to the seclusion of women from public observation by wearing concealing clothing. This form of purdah is also seen in other religions such as Christianity and Judaism – it is not unknown for certain Christian and Jewish denominations to require women to be “covered” whilst worshipping (if only by a hat or similar symbolic object). The practice in Islam is traced to both the Qur’an and the Hadith. The usual garment worn to accomplish this form of purdah in Islamic societies is termed a *chador* (all enveloping black mantle), which may or may not include a veil to conceal the face, a *yashmak* (De Souza 2004).

The limits imposed by this practice vary according to different countries. Purdah, for example, was rigorously observed under regimes such as that of the Taliban in Afghanistan, where women had to observe complete purdah at any time they were in public. Only their husbands, fathers, siblings, children, and other women were allowed to see them out of purdah. In other societies, purdah is often only practiced during certain times of religious significance.

The practice of purdah has become increasingly controversial in recent times. Feminists, for instance, have perceived the practice of purdah to be an extension of men’s control over women in patriarchal society (El Guindi 1999). Purdah suffocates the rights of women and is used as an instrument that enables men to dominate the family structure, resulting in a gendered division of labor that leaves women extremely dependent upon them.

Others, mostly believers in Islam, see purdah as a practice that liberates women, by enabling them to be judged not by their physical beauty but by their intellect, faith, and personality (Ahmed 1992). By covering themselves, women are prevented from being viewed as sex objects that can be dominated, enabling them to enjoy equal rights with men.

Purdah, however controversial, still remains an integral part of everyday life for many people as it is practiced to greater and lesser degrees in most contemporary Islamic cultures.

SEE ALSO: Feminism; Feminism, First, Second, and Third Waves; Fundamentalism; Gender Oppression; Islam; Patriarchy; Racialized Gender; Religion; Women, Religion and

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qualitative computing

César A. Cisneros Puebla

Qualitative computing refers to the ensemble of technology and methodology for qualitative data analysis. Its development is rooted in qualitative sociology and the tradition of symbolic interactionism and is embedded in the evolution of computers. It goes beyond simple data management, incorporating features such as criticism of traditional approaches to data analysis, searching for new logical strategies for theory building, and innovative ways to visually represent multiple realities. Some criteria to differentially assess the software programs, among others, are ease of integration of all research process stages, type of data, process of searching units of analysis to read and review, memo writing managers, categorization and code book access, analysis inventory and assessment, capability to export and import quantitative data, and options to merge data from different projects.

At the beginning of the 1980s, researchers from the US, Australia, and Europe developed prototypes of different computer programs to work with qualitative data, called CAQDAS since 1989, which stands for Computer Assisted Qualitative Data Analysis. Similar to computational sociology, it seeks to deal with data complexity but its aim is not to model an “artificial society” as the former does. Qualitatively driven strategies of handling digital data provide a relational and dynamic model for conceptually mapping all research project components. Qualitative data are analyzed in inductive, iterative, and recursive traditions. Therefore, qualitative computing is composed of epistemological assertions of using computational devices to study language and meanings; methodological claims about using Boolean tools and algorithms to

create new data; and ontological arguments on the computer’s role in interpretive inquiry. There is no more debate about the implications of “computer aided methods” in qualitative analysis because qualitative social scientists know using software is not synonymous with incontestable research design, methodological rigor, validity, or objectivity.

Qualitative computing is very often recognized as a computerized tool for grounded theory. Beyond applying the constant comparative method linked to this qualitative approach, there is increasing interest in understanding analytical induction strategies to theory building, and the related cognitive process of abduction. As a consequence of this concern, there have been some attempts to apply artificial intelligence tools and machine learning strategies. Qualitative computing also has features useful in conducting ethnographies, narrative research, phenomenological inquiry, and case studies. Data mining, knowledge representation, and knowledge discovery databases are also related areas of computational investigation. The emerging interest on hypermedia ethnography, visual narratives, fuzzy logic and natural language, large scale video projects and hypertextual analysis is moving qualitative computing in new directions in advanced technological sophistication, which demands more creativity and researchers’ imagination.

Qualitative computing is basically associated with the analysis of text, images, video, and audio. A seminal book on this field is Tesch’s *Qualitative Research: Analysis Types and Software Tools* (1990), but Weitzman and Miles’s *Computer Programs for Qualitative Data Analysis: A Software Sourcebook* (1995) is also important despite its now outdated format. As in other fields applying digital technology, any book attempting only to describe computational applications easily becomes useless as a result of the

constant updating of programs. Of historical interest are the special issues prepared by David Heise for *Sociological Methods and Research* (titled “Microcomputers in Social Research,” 1981) and by Conrad and Reinhartz for *Qualitative Sociology* (titled “Computers and Qualitative Data,” 1984). Another special issue by Mangabeira for *Current Sociology* (1996) portrays the worldwide diffusion of CAQDAS.

If the social sciences’ “quantitative revolution” in the 1970s was associated with a technological transformation in the means of querying and handling numbers and statistical analysis, the increasing advance of qualitative computing in the ensuing “post positivist” period has represented a kind of quiet revolution common to diverse social disciplines in the means of querying and handling words and qualitative data analysis as a consequence of the digital avalanche. A relevant impact on doing hybrid or mixed methods is noticeable in research design as a result of the application of qualitative computing strategies. In depicting the processes of qualitative data analysis by means of relationships among codes, categories, subcodes, textual, video, or audio files and memos, some metaphorical concepts have been built, hence there are analytical approaches from hierarchical trees, semantic networks, or case based thinking. The promise and perils of the new frontiers in qualitative computing remain on the limits of researcher–computer integration given that such technological devices have superior abilities for processing patterns, although humans remain superior at interpreting meaning in patterns. Technology is a medium to transform traditional ways of inquiry and is a powerful tool to enhance our creative and qualitative thinking.

Even though qualitative computing has influenced fields and subfields of social and behavioral sciences such as psychology, education, nursing, public health, sociology, women’s studies, anthropology, communication and market research, among others, its total integration into curricula and schooling practices is incomplete, just as qualitative methods are in the current state of the art over the world. The future of qualitative computing is connected to the deepest and most thoughtful analysis of the mathematical basis of qualitative inquiry and is related to the soft sociology legacy and reflection about soft data analysis. Computing with

words appears as a discipline in the neighborhood of qualitative computing, although in its present stage there is no large collaboration in progress; some skepticism is around, just as in the case of using artificial intelligence to improve some features of particular software programs.

SEE ALSO: Analytic Induction; Computational Sociology; Computer Aided/Mediated Analysis; Grounded Theory; Methods, Mixed; Validity, Qualitative

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qualitative methods

Jeffrey Michael Clair and Jason Wasserman

Methodological debates in sociology are longstanding and pervasive. The tension between qualitative and quantitative methods is at the heart of much discourse about the state and direction of the discipline (see Blumer 1956; Denzin & Lincoln 2003, Hesse Biber & Leavy 2006; Karp 1999). This article (1) provides a definition and explanation of qualitative methods; (2) elucidates its contrast with quantitative

methods; (3) explains underlying epistemological considerations that are at the heart of methodological disputes; (4) suggests that the fundamentally different pursuits of these methodologies nullify conflict; and (5) concludes by suggesting some future challenges that qualitative methodologists should attempt to address.

Suppose a researcher wishes to study death in a certain population of people. There are numerous possible ways to approach this broad topic, and various possible research questions that could be asked. One researcher may wish to know how the mortality of the population is affected by poverty. To answer this question, the researcher might collect data on the two variables, mortality and poverty, and see if there is a statistical correlation between them. If there is a strong positive correlation – if, as the rate of poverty increases among that population, the mortality rate also increases – then we may have good reason to assert that mortality is predicted, at least in part, by poverty. However, another researcher may want to understand how death is perceived among that population. In that case, the question is not what *predicts* mortality but, rather, what does death mean, how is it understood, how is it dealt with, and so on? In order to address these types of questions, one must gain an intimate knowledge of the people in that population and their culture. While collecting data on poverty gives us a good prediction of mortality, understanding what death and dying *mean* to people requires us to reach for a deeper understanding of who they are and how they view death in particular and the world around them in general. While quantitative methodology works well to answer the first question, qualitative methods better address the second (see Balshem 1997).

PRACTICES

Qualitative methodology refers to ways of conducting sociological inquiry using empirical practices such as observation and interview. Qualitative researchers typically use in depth interviews or participant observation in order to get a detailed picture of the populations they are investigating. They are interested in understanding and describing the people and

phenomena that they observe, whereas quantitative research is typically focused on *prediction* rather than description (Becker 1970, 1998). Thus, the quantitative researcher most often uses highly structured survey techniques that can be efficiently administered to large numbers of people from a given population. By contrast, the qualitative interview tends to be less structured and delves deeper into the lives of subjects. The fundamentally different pursuits at which these methodologies are adept produce a number of practical differences in their use. Some of these differences are summarized in Table 1. It is important to keep in mind that these classifications are by no means definitive. For example, the depth of understanding that qualitative researchers pursue typically means that researchers spend a great deal of time with their study population and, in turn, their sample sizes often are smaller than those in quantitative studies. However, this is not always the case.

Practical differences between quantitative and qualitative methods are most clearly expressed in their differing uses of the interview as a research instrument. In the typical quantitative interview, participants select responses from a predetermined set of choices, such as a Likert scale. For example, a researcher measuring poverty may pose a statement such as, “I have trouble paying bills.” Respondents might be asked to select one of the following

Table 1 Qualitative and quantitative techniques compared

	Qualitative	Quantitative
Research goal	Description	Prediction
Sample sizes	Smaller	Larger
Research instruments	Semi-structured or non-structured interviews, participant observation, etc.	Structured surveys, data from census and government records, etc.
Perceived logic	Inductive, interpretive	Deductive, objective
Epistemology	Interpretivist	Positivist
Benefits	Depth, fluid and adaptable to various cultures and individuals	Efficiency, formalized and comparable results

four answers that best applies to themselves: (1) Never, (2) Not very often, (3) Often, (4) Always. The qualitative researcher would typically use a less structured interview to attempt to understand a respondent's financial situation. Respondents would be allowed to answer the question in their own words and often encouraged to expound on their answers. For example, suppose the qualitative researcher asks, "Do you ever have trouble paying bills?" and the respondent answers, "Yes, sometimes." The researcher would probe for further discussion by saying, "Tell me about that," or "Tell me about the last time you had trouble paying bills." It is at this point where the qualitative interview significantly diverges from quantitative instruments. For qualitative research, the interview is a meaning making *partnership*, a knowledge producing *dialogue* (Hesse Biber & Leavy 2006).

The notions of dialogue and partnership highlight an important aspect of qualitative research: the researcher is a fundamental part of the research, not just the proctor of a questionnaire. A good interviewer listens and helps the respondents flesh out their stories, encouraging them as experts on their own lives. Beyond the ostensible subject matter of the interview, the researcher must constantly pick up on *markers*. Markers are important pieces of information that respondents offer as they are talking about something else – a passing reference made by respondents to important events or feeling states. These may be significant pieces of information themselves, but also they suggest other lines of inquiry for the researcher to pursue. The ability to follow these lines of inquiry that emerge *during* the interview is partly what enables qualitative research to achieve depth and rich description, whereas quantitative research is constrained by the instrument at the time of the interview.

Of course, there are benefits and drawbacks to both quantitative and qualitative methods. By giving respondents four choices to select from, the responses of various individuals can be easily and directly compared. In other words, it can be decisively said that those respondents who selected "never" in regards to having trouble paying bills are better off financially than those who selected "always." Quantitative methodology is able to summarize

efficiently and compare large numbers of people using these sorts of structured research techniques. Qualitative research is not usually able to make these sorts of efficient comparisons. Instead, the financial situation of each respondent must be interpreted by the researcher. But the qualitative researcher is able to learn more about the financial situation of the respondent than the quantitative researcher. The open ended nature of the qualitative interview allows respondents to give more information, for example, to explain *why* they had trouble paying bills or how they felt about it. This depth and the complex variation between different individuals cannot be easily captured by the highly structured quantitative interview.

Since the qualitative researcher uses less structured research techniques, and thus must interpret the results, qualitative research is typically seen as an inductive practice. That is, there is nothing concrete that tells the researcher what the data mean. Instead the researcher must decipher a meaning. In the quantitative example above, respondents who reply that they "always" have trouble paying bills are assigned number one and those who mark that they "never" have trouble paying bills are assigned number four. Four is greater than one, i.e., respondents who never have trouble paying bills have higher socioeconomic status (SES). The nature of this type of concrete data makes interpreting results less nebulous. Some assert that this minimizes or even eliminates the biases of the researcher, something that remains problematic for qualitative methodologists. However, there is much to suggest that quantitative research is not, in fact, a deductive practice, at least in the social sciences. This is particularly true with questions of causality. Data in quantitative social research tend to identify tendencies, but not certainties. The complexity of social phenomena means that quantitative researchers cannot control for all confounding factors. The proper specification of a model in quantitative research decidedly is an inductive practice, and means also that the researcher must induce (not deduce) causal relationships, since the correlation between two variables does not decidedly entail that one causes the other. At an even more primary level, the construction of a

questionnaire involves the operationalization of the concepts to be investigated. There is nothing that deductively links a concept to its measurement in a questionnaire. In other words, the issue of construct validity (external reliability) calls into question the objectivity of quantitative practices. The inductive/deductive dichotomy as a difference is included in Table 1 because these methodologies are often perceived in these terms, but caution is needed because deeper inquiry calls into question the accuracy of this perception.

EPISTEMOLOGICAL FOUNDATIONS

A key difference between qualitative and quantitative methodologies concerns the varying epistemological foundations on which they are seen to rest (see Denzin & Lincoln 2003). While not a definitive distinction, qualitative methods are currently conceived as founded on interpretivist notions of reality, whereas quantitative methods are conceived as founded on positivist notions of reality. Interpretivism asserts that everything in the world is the product of human conceptualization (see Foucault 1965; Kuhn 1962). Reality, then, is a human construction and, thus, it can vary from culture to culture, or even person to person. The *sine qua non* of interpretivism is a commitment to seeing the world from the point of view of the actor.

Positivism asserts that there is a reality independent of human conceptualization. Human beings can learn about reality, but reality does not depend on humans to construct it (see Archer 1995; Bhaskar 1979; Popper 1994). Positivist approaches typically view events from an outsider point of view. Positivists assert or imply that if researchers employ scientifically legitimized procedures and properly apply methodological rigor, the subjectivity can be contained and an accurate, objective depiction of the subject rendered (Smith 1987; Smith & Deemer 2003). Qualitative researchers often see the quantitative application of empirical directives and concerns as being imposed upon social reality with little reference to the meaning of the subjects, viewing people as inert and unchanging. The most critical, contrary to the logic of this kind of methodological quest, would sum it up as quixotic.

The interpretivist–positivist dichotomy does not neatly overlay the qualitative–quantitative one. For example, early ethnographic work (e.g., Malinowski, Evans Pritchard) was based on decidedly positivist epistemology (Marcus & Cushman 1982). Moreover, there is nothing about an interpretivism that precludes the use of quantitative methods, given that meanings are widely shared, even if they do not have absolute truth correspondence to the world. This notion is echoed by a variety of philosophers of science who take on middle ground epistemological positions such as contextual objectivity or Richard Rorty's notion of neopragmatism (Kincaid 1996; Logino 1990; Rorty 1991).

The positivist assumptions of quantitative research typically are implied rather than explicit. For example, collecting quantitative data on poverty assumes that there is such a thing as poverty, and, more importantly, that people roughly share the same idea about what it is. Certainly this may *not* be the case. Thus, the conceptualization of a variable – e.g., what constitutes poverty – is ultimately an interpretive process (see Blumer 1956; Fox 2004; Whyte 1955). Poverty in one culture may mean having little livestock, whereas in another it may mean having few monetary assets, and in another the concept could be nonexistent, for example, in highly egalitarian societies. Of course, quantitative researchers can be adequately sensitive to cultural differences as explicit as this, but subtle variations within or between populations may be more difficult to detect using structured research techniques, which do not allow the researcher to pursue the meanings and implications that lie behind an individual's responses.

Working from the notion that the way a particular group or culture views the world may be significantly different from others, qualitative work seeks to understand a particular population by using techniques such as the open ended interview that can be adapted to varying populations and contexts (see Denzin & Lincoln 2003; Hesse Biber & Leavy 2006; Lofland, Snow, Anderson, & Lofland 2006; Robben & Sluka 2007 for a full discussion of epistemology and qualitative methods). Being able to alter research plans to accommodate serendipitous occurrences is a sharp contrast

to fixed measurement and typical hypothesis testing (Bryman 1984). Within this paradigm, the study of poverty would be up close, local, and an act of searching for the culture of different sites. This is perhaps the best justification of ethnographic work, legitimately witnessing the local sufferings that distant powers generate and then disregard (Agar 1996; Bourdieu et al. 1999; Katz 2004).

CRITICISMS OF QUALITATIVE METHODS

The interpretivist foundations of qualitative methodology and its subsequent lack of structured research techniques form the primary point at which it is criticized (see Denzin & Lincoln 2003; Hesse Biber & Leavy 2006). Because the data collected cannot be easily compared between respondents in the study or between various different studies, nor can they be deductively generalized, critics of qualitative methods have accused them of being overly subjective and, thus, scientifically problematic. Detractors charge that the results from qualitative work amount to little more than the researcher's subjective impressions and opinions. Qualitative research findings are not verifiable or falsifiable since they rely on the interpretation of the researcher.

Responses to these criticisms have been varied. Some qualitative researchers have responded by aspiring to a positivist model. They have attempted to quantify qualitative data, for example by counting up references to particular concepts. While this provides comparable data for analysis, it does little to address the subjectivity that exists in the interview process, the coding process, or in the interpretation of the subsequently quantified data. For example, the initial and follow up questions that a researcher asks in a less structured interview may be affected by a number of subjective considerations such as rapport between the interviewer and the respondent. This, of course, also may be problematic in the face to face quantitative survey. Another response has been to use an experimental design for qualitative studies (Sherman & Strang 2004). The essential goal is to create comparable sub groups within a study, for example one group

who participated in a program and one group who did not. In depth qualitative research might then be used to identify thematic differences between these two groups.

Other qualitative researchers defend their practices by asserting that understanding the complex meanings that various populations ascribe to their social world is not quantifiable and thus will always be interpretive (Denzin 1999; Gans 1999; Gubrium 1988; Thorne 1980). Further, they assert that quantitative research is equally plagued by the cultural and personal biases of the researchers at a number of levels, such as constructing the survey instrument and inducing causality from the statistical correlations embedded in the data (Blumer 1956). The idea of conducting a random sample to generalize also can be seen as absurd, because even if generalizations are qualified with the probabilities of quantitative logic, the composition and biographical reality of the population is never the same as the one from which data are extrapolated (Katz 2004).

However, even if the subjective biases of the researcher (both qualitative and quantitative) cannot be eliminated, perhaps they can be overcome by exposing the audience to them (Denzin 1999; Denzin & Lincoln 2003). Some researchers have attempted to explicate their own biographies and the roles they play in the research situation in order to elucidate potential biases. This is the thrust of reflexive ethnography, a tradition of qualitative fieldwork where researchers actively analyze themselves as a fundamental part of the research (see Salzman 2002). If these biases can be exposed, not only do they become less problematic from an investigative standpoint, they can actually be informative. Some work even locates the researcher as the central object of analysis, an approach labeled by Hayano (1979) as autoethnography (also see Ellis & Bochner 2003).

FUTURE DIRECTIONS FOR QUALITATIVE RESEARCH

Combining formality and fluidity in qualitative research seems to be its foremost challenge (Sanders 1999). Scientific inquiry is characterized by taking a structured approach to analysis of a problem. Since qualitative methodology is

perceived as being unstructured, it is often perceived as being unscientific, as an extension of the humanities rather than a social *science*. But while there is not necessarily a structure to qualitative methods, in general, there most often is a conceptual framework in which particular researchers operate. If explicated, this can provide structure for particular studies, if not qualitative research over all. Further, there has recently been a move toward formalizing qualitative research without aspiring to positivist models of scientific inquiry (see, for example, Harrington 2003). This has occurred at two levels: interacting with participants and interpreting data.

Addressing issues of access in fieldwork, Harrington (2003) asserts that various issues of population access and researcher–participant interaction can be organized under conceptual frameworks of social identity and self presentation. Researcher narratives about gaining access and interacting with a population can be embedded in broader theoretical paradigms such as symbolic interaction and understood in terms of the identity and self presentation of the researcher and the participants. These frameworks can provide structure to qualitative research and even allow researcher narratives to be compared to one another.

In terms of interpreting data, grounded theory as detailed by Glaser and Strauss (1967), Clarke (2005), and Charmaz (2006) provides a formalized method for analyzing qualitative data, which does not rely on quantification. Grounded theory is a method for generating theory rather than testing it, which is the thrust of quantitative work (Charmaz 2006; Strauss & Corbin 1997). The grounded theory technique works by coding data into concepts in a hierarchical fashion. The coding of qualitative data is thus different from quantitative coding where the data must be located in an a priori coding schema. In other words, for grounded theory coding categories are created from ongoing interpretations of the data rather than being conceptualized prior to their collection. The goal is for the data to speak to the researcher, rather than for the researcher to mold the data to fit preconceptions (Glaser & Holton 2004). The process is as follows: (1) develop categories; (2) saturate these categories by gathering data and coding them until no

new codes are emerging; (3) note and develop links between categories and pursue investigation of these with more data collection; (4) consider the conditions under which the links hold; and (5) make corrections, where relevant, to the theoretical models. This allows for a thematic analysis of the data.

The initial text on grounded theory was a polemic work. The modes of theorizing then predominant in sociology were directed toward speculative and deductive forms of theorizing, in which theories were first dreamed up, so to speak, before being tested against research evidence (see Dey 1999). The emphasis was on verifying, not generating, theory. Verification becomes irrelevant for grounded theory because ideas are induced from the data (Glaser & Holton 2004). This hierarchical process of grounded theory allows for more transparency in the interpretation of data.

Finally, while grounded theory provides a transparent way to link individual concepts to the data, through the coding process, theory building requires the linking of concepts to other concepts. We can have the concepts of health and poverty, but we do not have meaningful theory until we assert a relationship, for example, that poverty is related to health. Grounded theory provides a systematic method for deriving concepts, but not conceptual structures. This highlights a future challenge for qualitative research in the area of formalized complexity, that is, how to systematically and/or transparently build conceptual models from the transparently emergent conceptual pieces.

CONCLUDING REMARKS

Sociologists explicitly engaged in assessment of sociological methodology largely recognize that the split between qualitative and quantitative methodologies is dogmatic and somewhat arbitrary. Although we may argue about the degree to which research is subjective, clearly both quantitative and qualitative work fail to achieve absolute objectivity. Most would acknowledge that no such thing exists. But rather than accept the legitimacy of both methods, academic departments, journals, and all sorts of various professional circles seem to accept this division as real and important. The benefits

and drawbacks of each method have been outlined in an attempt to explain the important role of qualitative methodology, a role that cannot be filled by quantitative work, no matter how methodologically rigorous. Moreover, future challenges for qualitative methodology have been detailed that will make it increasingly potent in the decades to come. However, sociology is more generally faced with the future challenge of overcoming its methodological divide, a goal often talked of in methodological and epistemological writing, but just as often neglected in action and attitude within the discipline of sociology.

SEE ALSO: Action Research; Autoethnography; Content Analysis; Critical Qualitative Research; Ethics, Fieldwork; Ethics, Research; Ethnography; Grounded Theory; Observation, Participant and Non Participant; Quantitative Methods; Reflexivity

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quantitative methods

Julie Lamb

Quantitative methods are those that involve numerical data resulting in statistical analysis. The quantitative approach relies on the stance that an overall view of society (or the gathering of social facts) is preferable to in-depth information provided by a few individuals. In other words, data on social facts can be collected from a sample of individuals and applied to the

societal level. This idea of generalization from a sample to the population of interest is of key importance in any quantitative method – data collected must be shown to be able to represent the population under study.

Data for use in quantitative methods have to be collected in an objective manner, usually taking the form of a survey interview or postal questionnaire which is highly structured to be sure to collect the same information from each individual. Using these data collection techniques, one ends up with a large collection of individual variables which can be coded into categories before being analyzed. In this manner, data collected can be tested for reliability (if the same instrument was used again by a different person would it give the same results?), validity (how true is the data to the real population?), and representativeness (how does the information apply to the population under study?) using statistical techniques. The measurement of variables in social research (social measurement) is of key importance to data quality and is a topic in its own right.

Statistics enable us to see a very large amount of information in a summary format, making it easier to understand. Statistics also make it possible to see the world in a structured way outside of the individual level so that theories and policies can be made in a reliable way on account of facts gathered to represent the whole population rather than individuals. One example of this are the labor force statistics gathered on a continuous basis from a sample of the population in the UK (other countries also routinely collect labor force information). These data are then analyzed using statistical methods to produce, for example, numbers of unemployed people in the country, which go on to inform policy decisions and sociological theories.

Quantitative methods do not have to involve a large element of mathematical reasoning. Descriptive statistics can be used as a basic way of backing up an idea or showing the basis for new research. For example, if one is interested in studying unemployment, statistics describing the basic situation at the time of the research can be used to show why the subject is of importance. This can be done from looking at materials already produced, such as reports on the labor market situation without any math involvement. It is when one is creating and testing theories that

statistical techniques involving formulas can be used to test hypotheses.

“Doing” quantitative methods can be broken down into three stages: defining the research problem, data collection, and data analysis. Choosing a method of research is largely determined by the research topic and the researcher’s own view on the world. Some research problems will be much better suited to quantitative methods than others; for example, it would be extremely difficult to gain a representative sample of homeless people. A survey of students’ views of the university beer provision would be more feasible as there are already established lists of students attending the university which could be used for sampling.

Quantitative data collection is usually carried out using a survey method – a structured questionnaire or interview with predetermined response categories. Carrying out such surveys and sampling techniques can be extremely cost prohibitive, both in terms of money and time. Secondary analysis using the quantitative techniques outlined here of existing survey data is a cost and time effective strategy for researchers wishing to use quantitative methods. Data archives exist in many countries where data from existing large scale surveys can be downloaded and reanalyzed by individual researchers.

Once data have been gathered and coded, statistical techniques can be used to analyze the variables. This is usually carried out using a software package such as SPSS or STATA. These packages allow basic and advanced statistical manipulation of data. Basic quantitative analysis of variables involves describing the data using frequencies (e.g., 35 percent of the sample were unemployed and of these 67 percent were male). These are descriptive statistics. The mean, median, and mode can also be used here. The standard deviation and tests of significance are used to describe the reliability and validity of the data. If the result of the analysis is significant above a certain threshold, then the findings of the research are not due to chance and the hypothesis can be seen to be proven.

Quantitative methods can go much further than this basic level. Why are people unemployed? How do they differ from others in the sample? Do they have a longstanding illness? Answering these questions can be achieved by using techniques of regression. Regression

analysis can show whether there is a relationship between a dependent variable (unemployment) and one or more independent variables (health), and how strong (or weak) that relationship is. In this way we may see that if health is poor then the risk of unemployment rises or falls by X percent.

This is a gross summary of an extremely large field. More details of these techniques and how to perform them can be found in the suggested readings.

SEE ALSO: Descriptive Statistics; Statistical Significance Testing; Statistics; Survey Research; Variables; Variables, Dependent; Variables, Independent

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queer theory

Chet Meeks

Queer theory is an interdisciplinary approach to the study of sexuality. Queer theory’s insights derive from multiple sources: feminist scholarship, gay and lesbian studies, cultural studies, social constructionism, deconstructionist and poststructuralist social theory. In general, queer theory takes account of the cultural products (e.g., knowledges, films, television shows), social practices (e.g., dating and marriage), and institutions (e.g., the state) which together bestow on heterosexuality a sacred status and make it into a compulsory requirement. The origins of queer theory are themselves ambiguous; while

as an academic movement queer theory is typically associated with the 1990s, its earliest articulations can be traced to the 1970s in the work of Michel Foucault (1978) and the 1980s in the work of scholars like Teresa de Lauretis (1987) and Gloria Anzaldúa (1987). As forerunners of queer theory, these scholars interrogated the way in which western social orders deploy rigid standards of gender and sexual intelligibility as a method of social regulation.

Many scholars commonly associated with queer theory have been trained in disciplines such as philosophy (Judith Butler) and English (Michael Warner), but the basic impulse of queer theory has a substantial history in social science disciplines. Before there was a distinct area of study called queer theory, sociologists criticized the conventional notion that society is divided between individuals who are, by birth, either heterosexual or homosexual, and that such a division is a constant feature of all societies across time and space (see, e.g., Weeks 1977). Contrary to this notion, social scientists have argued that “homosexuality” and “heterosexuality” are socially constructed. A social constructionist approach to sexuality argues that we must distinguish between “behaviors” and “identities.” While homosexual or heterosexual behavior might be a constant throughout history and in different cultural settings, it is only in a specific historical and cultural context that something like homosexual behavior comes to be culturally codified as deviant and pathological, and where such a codification is used to ensure widespread social conformity to a heterosexual norm (MacIntosh 1968; Sagarin 1971). As well, it is only under specific social conditions that something like same sex desire becomes the focal point of personal fulfillment, community building, and politics (D’Emilio 1983).

Queer theory shares the basic impulse of the social constructionist project – to illustrate the social underpinnings of homosexual and heterosexual difference, and to critique the idea that heterosexuality and homosexuality correspond to opposite natures. Queer theory, though, also criticizes two specific problems with the social constructionist approach. First, social constructionist approaches, while they recognize that sexual identities are social in origin and not natural or culturally universal, nevertheless often assume that once sexual identities *are*

established, they exist as relatively stable empirical facts, and as valid ways of representing populations of people. Gay identity, though social in origin, and limited to a distinct time period and culture, is thought, once established, to refer fairly unproblematically to a delimited minority group. Queer theorists have argued that, although it is at times necessary and useful to refer to gays and lesbians using such an analytical lens, we must also attend to the ways differences among gays and lesbians complicate the representative and empirical validity of homosexual identity. The place of gay identity in one’s life can vary dramatically, for example, depending on one’s race.

Second, social constructionists, in viewing homosexual and heterosexual identities as stable, help to solidify the notion that heterosexual and homosexual worlds are separate and distinct. Heterosexuality is thought to correspond to a specific set of cultural meanings (family, romantic love, marriage, virtue), whereas homosexuality is thought to correspond to an alternative, even if positive, set of meanings (communal values, the positive affirmation of sexual pleasure, etc.). Queer theorists have argued that rather than being thought of as culturally separate, as referring to distinct worlds, communities, and meaning systems, heterosexuality and homosexuality are part of the same unstable system of cultural and linguistic signification. “Heterosexuality” and “homosexuality” do not refer to anything empirical, but rather, as signs in a language system, they refer to and derive their meaning from each other. Heterosexuality, in order to be articulated in any meaningful way, must make reference to homosexuality while also repudiating it. Consider the way heterosexual rituals such as the wedding ceremony work. During the “I now pronounce you” moment at a heterosexual wedding, homosexuality represents the unspoken, invisible, yet ever present Other which makes such a pronouncement possible (Butler 1997). The wedding, as a cultural ceremony, betrays the usual claim that heterosexuality is natural; it illustrates, on the contrary, that heterosexuality has to be continually enacted and performed. That heterosexuality can only derive its cultural intelligibility from the invocation and repudiation of homosexuality in this way means that both heterosexuality and homosexuality are inherently unstable.

Queer theory is also closely related to queer politics. Gay and lesbian minority politics focuses on gaining expanded rights and positive recognition for gays and lesbians. The underlying claim of gay and lesbian minority politics is normalizing: gays and lesbians are normal and homosexuality represents a positive, morally equivalent counterpart to heterosexuality; homosexuals are no different than other American minorities. Queer politics, emerging in the 1990s in America out of groups like AIDS Coalition to Unleash Power (Act Up), moved away from a normalizing, minority based politics and focused instead on the way a heterosexual/homosexual binary operates to make heterosexuality superior, and to exclude more ambiguous and queer forms of sexual difference that threaten both heterosexual and homosexual intelligibility (see Berlant & Freeman 1993). Queer politics is anti normalizing in that it contests not only the social dominance of heterosexuality, but also the mainstream of the gay and lesbian community, which makes a certain version of gay minority identity (white, middle class, usually male) into a representation of gay "normality." Gays and lesbians of color, transgender people, bisexuals, intersex peoples, gay people with AIDS, and working class gays and lesbians argue that this identity excludes their experiences and political priorities. Sexual justice, from this point of view, cannot be achieved simply by arguing that gays and lesbians are "normal," because this sort of political rhetoric only solidifies the outsider status of queer, different others. Queer politics is critical of the minority logic of gay identity because it is exclusionary and reproductive of the "regime of normality" that is inherent in the western compulsion to classify, evaluate, and regulate desires, pleasures, and bodies.

In recent years, two developments have begun to change the shape of queer theory. First, in addition to theorizing heterosexual dominance, some scholars have begun to extend queer theory's critical insights to new areas of social analysis and political struggle. The social subjugation of homosexuality is taken to be part of a broader system of power, control, and discipline which privileges and makes normal some types of bodies while marking other bodies as other – as deviant, abnormal, unattractive, or disabled. New endeavors in the arena of disability studies,

for example, bear the mark of queer theory. As a recent volume of *Gay and Lesbian Quarterly* (McRuer & Wilkerson 2003) makes clear, the challenge today is not so much theorizing the social machinery responsible for the subordination of homosexuals, but rather theorizing the possible coalitions between gays and lesbians and a wider variety of subjugated bodies. What sort of common politics could be forged between queers, people with HIV/AIDS, the uninsured, women, the elderly and the young, and third world victims of the first world pharmaceutical industries? All of these individuals, one could argue, occupy bodies that have been classified and then acted upon as weaker, less abled or disabled, less powerful or less attractive by a disciplinary order that makes hegemonic masculinity, strength, and virility into the most socially desirable mode of embodiment.

Second, some have argued that queer theory has been, perhaps, too overreaching in its critique of identity (see, e.g., Kirsch 2000; Green 2002). The tendency in queer theory has been, in a way, to dismiss identities due to their minoritizing, exclusionary, and normalizing consequences. Many queer theorists reduce identity to a "signifier" in a language sign system, and in doing so, contribute to the erasure of homosexual actors and limit our understanding of the way that identities come to be embedded in institutions, social roles, and daily practices. Homosexuality is more than the effect of a linguistic or textual system; it is an identity that informs the practices of individuals in their daily lives, practices that vary depending on the contingencies of different institutional settings and the complexities of other social roles. "Queer" identity is often more present in theory than in actual politics, and can be written about in ways that pay little attention to concrete institutional dynamics and lived experience. The second trend in queer theory, then, has been to move away from a metatheoretical critique of identity and toward empirically rich and concrete analyses of lived sexualities (e.g., Seidman 2002).

The future of queer theory and politics will likely consist of continued attempts to think beyond the limits of a gay and lesbian minority model of sexuality and politics, beyond the analytical foci of social constructionist approaches, and to theorize the potential coalitions with

others struggling against a variegated range of bodily and sexual norms. Alongside such work, future scholarship will likely consist of an endeavor to be more concrete, empirical, and sociological about the contribution of the social to the sexual, and about the way sexual identities come to be embedded in social institutions and roles. If the major contributors to queer theory in the 1990s were mostly literary scholars and philosophers, the future of queer theory – at least a large portion of it – belongs to sociology.

SEE ALSO: Body and Cultural Sociology; Body and Sexuality; Compulsory Heterosexuality; Constructionism; Foucault, Michel; Gay and Lesbian Movement; Heterosexual Imaginary; Homophobia and Heterosexism; Patriarchy; Plastic Sexuality; Poststructuralism; Sexual Identities; Sexual Politics

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R

race

Mikaïla Mariel Lemonik Arthur

To sociologists, race is a system of stratification based on physical differences (“phenotypes”) that are seen as essential and permanent. These differences may be real or they may be imagined. Though individuals can and do come to identify in racial terms, race is most important as a system of categorization which is externally imposed. The fact that race is imposed externally is the major difference between it and the concept of ethnicity.

HISTORY OF RACE AS AN IDEA

While people have always found ways to stratify and differentiate in groups from out groups, the concept of race emerged relatively recently in human history. Many historians of race believe that the concept of race emerged with modernity and was in particular the consequence of two major developments in European society: first, the development of a capitalist ethos which blamed those who did not progress for their own fate; and second, the British experience of colonizing (and “othering”) the Irish, which lay the ground for future experiences in colonization and racial hierarchies (Smedley 1999). Other analysts point to the important role of Christian religious thought in developing conceptions of race. In particular, these analysts point to the Myth of Ham, a biblical tale which tells how Noah’s son Ham and his descendants were condemned to servitude because Ham “looked upon the nakedness of” his father (McKee Evans 1980). This story was used by some Christian religious authorities to justify the enslavement of black Africans, since they were seen as the racial descendants of Ham.

With the arrival of the Enlightenment and rational scientific thought, people turned to scientific methods to seek an understanding of racial differences and to justify their conceptions of racial hierarchies. One of the first scientific projects for racial scholars was the development of comprehensive taxonomies of racial difference. First attempted by Carl Linnaeus in 1758, many European men of science followed behind with classification schemes which specified the number and variety of human races, ranging from a low of 3 (African, European, and Mongolian) to a high of over 30. It was not uncommon for racial taxonomists to divide Europeans, for example, into 4 racial groups: Nordic or northern, Alpine or central, Mediterranean or southern, and Slavic or eastern. These taxonomies were generally based on ideas of the physical, but also included some attributes which we would not today think of as biologically based, such as clothing and cultural behavior.

As the modern scientific method developed, scientists who studied human variation came to believe that it was not sufficient to label races based on classifiers’ superstitions or beliefs. Instead, they pushed for the development of scientific techniques and experiments that were carefully designed to measure the degree of racial difference and inferiority. The earliest techniques, called craniometry, involved measuring skull capacity and other dimensions of the head. However, by the late 1800s most of these techniques had been discredited or were in doubt. After the IQ test was invented in 1905, it was used to demonstrate racial difference and inferiority. IQ tests were successful at producing results that lined up with people’s expectations about race and intelligence.

While most contemporary social and biological scientists do not believe that there is any biological or genetic evidence for racial

difference, some geneticists have turned to the field of population genetics to look for patterns of genetic expression among supposed racial groups. These geneticists believe that the differences they find may be useful in medical and forensic applications. However, new evidence about the degree of mixing between people from different continents over time casts doubt on this conclusion. In fact, some researchers have suggested that as many as 80 percent or more of American blacks may have some white ancestors in their family tree.

INTERNATIONAL CONTEXT

The contemporary image of racial difference varies across national and cultural contexts. In particular, the conception of the dividing lines between racial groups is not the same everywhere. For instance, in the US, race has traditionally been perceived through the lens of the "one drop rule," meaning that anyone with any demonstrable degree of black ancestry (even so little as one 32nd of one's ancestry, and even when the individual appears phenotypically white) is seen as black. This racial ideology is related to a history in the US of cultural and legal barriers against miscegenation, or marital and sexual relationships across the color line. Though the increase in multiracial marriages and births has caused this "rule" to decline in force somewhat, as recently as 1985 the Louisiana Court of Appeals declared that Susie Guillory Phipps could not have her race on her birth certificate changed from black (or "colored") to white because she could not "prove" that fewer than one 32nd of her ancestors were black.

Not all nations and societies stick to such a rigid system of racial classification. For instance, in many Caribbean and Latin American societies there are gradations of race between black and white. Individuals' own places on these scales can vary according to class, education, and skin color, not just ancestry. In many of these countries, miscegenation was not considered to be an especially big problem. In fact, in Brazil, interracial unions were considered to contribute to a "unique Brazilian mixture" of racial backgrounds (Lesser 1999). It is important to remember, however, that mixing between races and a less rigid color line do not mean that race

is any less important in regulating the life chances of individuals (Twine 1998).

Another variation in the conception of racial difference can be found in South Africa during the time of Apartheid. South Africa's racial order was, like that of the US, predicated upon restricting the mixing of races. However, instead of declaring all of those of mixed racial backgrounds to simply be black, in South Africa a new racial category called "colored" was created to take in those who were considered to be neither black nor white (Dubow 1995).

CONSEQUENCES

Though as noted above race is not a biological reality, as W. I. Thomas said, "if people define a situation as real, it is real in its consequences." Race continues to play an important role in individuals' daily lives. According to the American Sociological Association's 2003 statement on race, the effects that it has can be classified into three major categories: sorting people into categories on the basis of which they choose appropriate family members and friends; stratifying people in terms of their access to resources; and organizing people into groups through which they seek to challenge or maintain the racial status quo.

People often take race into account when choosing whom to count as potential family members or friends. Until 1967, when the Supreme Court declared them unconstitutional in *Loving v. Virginia*, laws in some US states prevented miscegenation, or interracial marriage. Though interracial marriage is now legal and occurs with some frequency, it remains rare between blacks and whites. Similarly, when individuals or couples choose to adopt, they continue to choose children who are phenotypically similar to them. In fact, until 1978, the National Association of Black Social Workers defended the practice of refusing to place black children with white parents.

Friendships and other social interactions also continue to divide along racial lines. In large part this has to do with the continuing presence of residential and educational segregation. While it has not been legal to engage in *de jure* since the *Brown v. Board of Education* decision in 1954 or in *de jure* residential segregation since

the passage of the Fair Housing Act in 1968, schools and neighborhoods remain segregated. Schools remain segregated first and foremost because most children are assigned to public schools based on where they live. Residential segregation is more complicated. One important factor in residential segregation is the wealth disparity between blacks and whites, as discussed below. In addition, real estate brokers and mortgage lenders continue to engage in racial steering, redlining, and other discriminatory practices so as to maintain the racial “stability” of particular neighborhoods. Finally, because of both stereotypes about blacks and the reality of falling property values in neighborhoods undergoing a transition in their racial makeup, whites continue to be likely to move away as black families move in (“white flight”).

Race continues to play a significant role in dictating individuals’ life chances in terms of financial, education, and general well being. Most striking is the wealth gap between blacks and whites. The 2000 US Census data show that white families on average own almost 11 times the assets of black families. Though the disparity in income is not as significant (since income is earned by an individual, while wealth is compounded across generations), black men still earn only three quarters of what white men earn, while black women earn almost 90 percent of what white women do. Black families are also more likely than white families to live in poverty or experience unemployment.

While the picture in terms of education is more hopeful, racial disparities have not been erased. Blacks graduate from high school and start college in numbers nearly comparable to whites’. However, the gap between blacks and whites on the SATs remains at about 200 points, limiting the access of black students to the most selective colleges. And blacks remain significantly less likely than whites to graduate from college or graduate school.

There continue to be racial disparities in other areas of life as well, such as in terms of health and imprisonment. For instance, blacks continue to live fewer years than whites, have higher infant mortality rates, and have less access to good health care. Blacks are also more likely than whites to be arrested and imprisoned.

Because racial disparities have such significant effects on individuals’ lives and are so

important in sorting people into groups, many social movements have formed around racial interests. Movements like the US Civil Rights Movement and the anti Apartheid movement in South Africa were formed to create change in the racial status quo. Other social movements, such as the American Indian Movement, La Raza Unida, and Black Power, have been formed to promote solidarity among and advance the perceived interests of members of particular racial groups.

Similarly, majority group members have organized on racial lines to defend the racial status quo. These organizing activities are not limited to far right groups or extreme nationalists like the Ku Klux Klan or neo Nazis. There are also much more mainstream groups who attack affirmative action, welfare, immigration, and other social practices and policies based on the effects that these have on the privileges that whites are accustomed to exercising in society.

Organizing around race is not limited to the social movement sphere. In fact, much of conventional politics is affected by the organization of race in society. Perhaps most importantly in the American case, voting districts have often been drawn in ways that disperse or concentrate voters of a particular racial group in an attempt to alter the electoral outcomes in that region (“racial gerrymandering”). Similarly, political candidates can target racial groups through their campaign in an attempt to influence voting blocs to support them.

SEE ALSO: Discrimination; Ethnicity; Eugenics; Health and Race; Interracial Unions; *Minzoku*; Race (Racism); Race and Crime; Race and the Criminal Justice System; Race and Ethnic Politics; Race and Schools; Race/Ethnicity and Friendship; Racial Hierarchy; Racism, Structural and Institutional; Racist Movements; Scientific Racism; Slavery; Stratification, Race/Ethnicity and

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race and crime

Roland Chilton and Ruth Triplett

The importance of race in the production of criminal conduct has been an issue in American criminology for decades. The fact that minority groups, particularly African Americans, are disproportionately involved as offenders in the criminal justice system in the US is not in dispute. However, there is little agreement among criminologists on what this means. Some argue that the relationship between race and crime is largely the result of the conduct of African American men and boys. Others argue that the relationship between race and crime suggested by official statistics is the result of discrimination in the various systems of justice in the US.

Official arrest, incarceration, and public health data all point to a disproportionate involvement of black people, especially black men and boys, in predatory crime in the US. In 2003, the FBI's Uniform Crime Reports (UCR) indicated that blacks accounted for 37 percent of all arrests for violent crimes though blacks account for only about 13 percent of the

population. Black men are also overrepresented as victims. US public health statistics consistently show homicide is a leading cause of death for black males (Anderson 1999). In addition, the FBI's Supplementary Homicide Reports suggest that black offenders are responsible for most homicides involving black victims. Black males have been over represented in both victimization and offender figures for over 35 years.

The over representation of minorities as both offenders and victims is found in victimization surveys as well. National crime victimization surveys published by the Bureau of Justice Statistics from 1973 through 2003 have consistently shown higher victimization rates for black respondents. While the information on offenders in the victimization surveys is limited to assault, rape, and robbery, it generally suggests higher black than white or other rates of offending. Hindelang (1978) found that victimization data were generally consistent with data on arrestees and that "most of the racial disproportionality in arrest data is shown by victimization survey data to be attributable to greater involvement of blacks in rape, robbery, and assault."

National Crime Victimization Survey (NCVS) and UCR data for 1996 to 2002 provide less support for this statement than do the numbers for 1974 that were used by Hindelang. The NCVS average percentage of robbery offenders described as black for this 7 year period was 46. In the UCR data, about 55 percent of those arrested for robbery during this period were black. For rape, the NCVS figure is 23 and the UCR figure is 37. Even taking into account the absence of reports of commercial robberies in the victimization data and the failure of many victims to recall and report victimizations by family members and friends, the NCVS percentages suggest the possibility of "over arrest" of black people for these offenses.

Early self report studies suggested little difference in the number of black youths reporting involvement in criminal conduct in comparison with the number of white youths reporting such conduct. However, many of the early self report studies focused on social class rather than race, with one important study dropping all black respondents because of a belief that the black respondents lacked the verbal skills needed to complete the surveys.

In addition, early self report studies generally captured trivial offending rather than the serious predatory crimes captured by official data. However, in a review of later self report studies, Hindelang et al. (1981) found that while there was little difference by race in the proportion of youths who reported having committed trivial offenses, race differences were found for serious offenses and in the *rate* of offending. These later self report studies found that black youths were more likely to report having committed serious offenses and reported doing so at a higher rate.

In general, then, most official data and many independent studies suggest that black Americans, especially black men, are over represented as both offenders and victims. But it would be misleading to present a discussion of race and crime without noting that it has become almost traditional when discussing murder rates to say that the high homicide offending rates for black males are a function of social class. Some recent studies provide support for this position. For example, Parker and McCall (1999), using race specific independent variables for about 100 US cities, concluded that economic deprivation affects the intraracial homicide rates for whites and blacks. In a study of the impact of poverty and deprivation on black murder rates, Ousey (1999) reported black murder arrest rates that were five times as high as white murder arrest rates. Although he found that measures of poverty and deprivation had an impact on both black and white murder arrest rates, the effects of these variables were stronger for whites than for blacks.

Explanations for these differences have ranged from biological to sociological. At least one recent theory has attempted to explain the rates in purely biological terms. Although anthropologists have abandoned the notion of distinctive racial categories, Rushton (2000) suggested that the lower IQs, higher testosterone levels, and smaller cranial capacities of black people explained their high rates of criminality. This kind of biological explanation is clearly a racial theory of crime because the conduct being explained is attributed to what are called racial differences. Wilson and Herrnstein (1985) came close to presenting a racial explanation for differences in crime rates by race in their focus on intelligence as a "constitutional" cause of

crime and in their subsequent conclusion: "The one factor that both seems closely associated with offending and appears disproportionately among blacks is a low intelligence score."

Today, however, most people trying to explain the differences in black and white arrest and incarceration rates focus on social, cultural, economic, or political factors. For these theorists, patterns of homicide rates by race suggest that the rates are primarily linked to exclusion and segregation – economic, racial, and ethnic – but especially to the separation and isolation of large segments of urban populations based on income and assets. This view is supported in part by a number of city level analyses, such as Peterson and Krivo's (1993) analysis of homicide victimization rates for 125 US cities, which found that black homicide victimizations were linked to racial segregation.

One recent explanation which takes an Afrocentric approach focuses on the historical role of slavery in the US as a cause of high black crime rates. King (1997) argues that much of the violence today must be seen as an indirect result of enslavement and violence directed against African slaves combined with the impact of a violently discriminatory system of justice. He sees the net effect of this history accompanied by limited opportunity and mass media images that undermine appropriate value systems as the cause of high rates of violent conduct by black male teenagers and adults.

Other theorists focus more specifically on the cultural impact of isolation, while still others focus on the social structure. Ousey (1999) suggests that extensive and long term disadvantage may have produced cultural and normative adaptations that have produced this gap in the rates. Anderson (1999) argues there exists a "code of the streets" in largely poor, inner city black neighborhoods. The code is a set of informal rules for interpersonal behavior that describe when violence is acceptable. He argues that the code is a cultural adaptation that developed from alienation from mainstream society and the belief that the police and the criminal justice system cannot protect them from others.

Recently, Sampson and Wilson (1990) paid careful attention to both cultural and structural effects of segregation by race and class. They note the existence of neighborhoods highly segregated by race, class, and level of family disruption,

isolated from mainstream culture. They argued neighborhood characteristics were the result of policies of racial segregation, structural economic transformation, black male joblessness, class linked out migration, and housing discrimination and suggested that the result of the segregation and isolation was structural and cultural disorganization.

Not every criminologist believes that the differences by race found in official data are the result of real differences in behavior. These criminologists tend to argue that the numbers reflect the racial bias of those operating the system of justice. Historically, racial bias in some state systems of justice was clear and obvious. The law itself was biased. Examples include the use of the legal system to take American Indian lands, the creation and use of opium laws in response to Asian immigration, and the use of Jim Crow laws to disadvantage African Americans. Many scholars see the sharply higher punishment for the possession of crack cocaine in comparison with the punishment for possession of cocaine in its powder form as a recent example of discriminatory law. Although it would be hard to show discriminatory intent, the impact of this legislation has been hardest on poor, inner city, African Americans.

Although official definitions of crime are legislative, crime is also defined by administrative policies and enforcement practices. The police, for example, have wide discretion in decisions to arrest. Given the history of race relations in the US, it would be surprising to find that race does not play a role in some decisions to arrest. In a review of race and police discretion, Walker et al. (2000) found a number of explanations for the disproportionate arrest of black Americans, only one of which was that they commit more crime. They found research suggesting that situational factors, especially the type of crime committed and the attitude of the suspect, played an important role in decisions to arrest. They also found reports suggesting that African Americans commit more serious crimes and are more likely to have a disrespectful attitude toward the police, both of which are factors found to shape the arrest decision. Other studies in their review suggested that African Americans are often arrested on less stringent evidence than whites.

Reviews of court studies prior to the 1960s for sentencing disparity by race since suggest the

evidence is inconsistent. Today, researchers in this area examine context, asking "When does race matter?" In their review of this literature, Walker et al. (2000) suggest there is evidence that race matters when the crime is less serious, when the victim is white and the accused is not, and when the accused is unemployed. In a recent example of researchers examining the context in which race matters, Steen et al. (2005) found that it is important to examine the factors that may indicate dangerousness and blameworthiness among felony drug offenders. They found that both black and white offenders who fit the criteria for "most threatening" were likely to be incarcerated. However, whites who fit the "less threatening" criteria were less likely to be incarcerated than African Americans who fit the same description. Their research suggests both a need to examine context and that most incidents of bias are found among less serious cases.

The ways and extent in which race is linked to specific criminal conduct remain unresolved issues in criminology. There is a strong indication that the relationship is different for serious and minor offenses and for predatory and non-predatory offenses. Young black males may be "over arrested" for minor offenses and offenses involving drug possession or sale. And a disproportionate number of young black males may be involved in murders, rapes, robberies, and other forms of predatory crime. However, in the light of the sad history of race relations in the US it is hard to identify the reasons for the differences in any of these arrest and offending rates. Nevertheless, careful and sustained studies of questions about the linkages of race and crime are long overdue. As in many areas of criminology, there is no shortage of theory, assertion, and speculation. But there is a serious shortage of well focused, dependable research on the relationship of race and crime.

SEE ALSO: Class and Crime; Crime; Measuring Crime; Race; Race and the Criminal Justice System; Race (Racism)

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race and the criminal justice system

Laurie Samuel

The criminal justice system is a system of social control designed to regulate the behavior of citizens. Through the creation and enforcement of the law, it defines what behavior is and is not

acceptable. The criminal justice system is made up of several components, which include the police, courts, corrections, probation, and parole. Lawmakers guide the movements of these units and define those behaviors considered criminal. The process begins, however, with the police, who detect lawbreakers and arrest them. The process then moves to prosecution where arrestees are formally charged. Once a charge has been determined, arrestees may or may not go to court for a formal trial. In those cases where there is not a formal trial, offenders may admit guilt. Once guilt is established, the offender is either sentenced to a period of incarceration or may be given a sentence of probation, community service, or ordered to pay restitution to his or her victim(s). These less serious forms of punishment are usually reserved for first time non serious offenses and sometimes for juveniles. Though mechanisms exist for the structuring of discretion, the existence of discretion means that at each stage in the processing of individuals through the criminal justice system, the possibility for disparity in treatment exists. For example, decisions by the police on lawbreakers are sometimes based on personal biases and stereotypes. Researchers have long been interested in the factors that shape discretion. Race is a critical part of the discussion of factors that shape discretion as many of the decisions made by police, prosecutors, and judges are based on this factor.

Race is a socially constructed term designed to categorize groups of people based on certain physical qualities. The problem with the existence of varying socially constructed racial categories is that they are often accompanied by stereotypes. When one thinks of the color white, for example, one thinks about goodness and purity. On the other hand, the color black is often associated with things that are dark, predatory, and negative. Due to the enormous power of the media, these stereotypes are foremost in our minds and often taken as facts. Crime, then, is often linked with blacks and other minorities. Any discussion of race within the criminal justice system must acknowledge these biases.

The criminal justice system is responsible for detecting criminals and meting out punishment when crimes are committed. The term "justice," however, can be somewhat misleading as it implies a sense of fairness. When the

system is applied unevenly, it negates the justice it claims to protect. Thus the same system that is supposed to restore order manifests itself as a dysfunctional entity needing reform. Over the last 20 years notable criminologists such as Coramae Richey Mann, Jeffery Reiman, and Michael Tonry have analyzed the historical relationship between race and the criminal justice system. They have found, for example, that throughout time blacks are routinely arrested, convicted, and incarcerated at rates far higher than their representative numbers in the general population. At no other time has this been more pronounced than with the enacting of stringent drug policies in the 1980s, often referred to as the "war on drugs." Aimed at reducing drug use, these policies imposed mandatory minimums for the possession of certain drugs. These guidelines, however, impose stiffer penalties for the possession of crack cocaine than for powder cocaine. Whether this was a purposeful move on the part of lawmakers to incarcerate a large number of the black community is debated, but the fact remains that crack cocaine is most likely sold by blacks and powder cocaine by whites. Furthermore, the visibility of black drug dealers who sold their product out in the open streets of disorganized neighborhoods made it very easy for them to be detected and arrested. White users and dealers, on the other hand, usually come from middle class neighborhoods and therefore their behaviors are confined indoors.

Not only have these drug laws contributed to the increasing arrest rates of minorities, but also, unlike their white counterparts, minorities often lack the financial resources to secure superior legal representation and must therefore settle for a court appointed public defender. Public defenders normally have large caseloads, leaving them little time to devote adequate attention these cases often need. Given these disadvantages, minorities are more likely to be denied bail and detained. Today, black men are being arrested, convicted, and sentenced at rates far greater than their white counterparts (Reiman 2001). The result has been a "warehousing" of minorities.

The discriminatory treatment of minorities is only part of the story, however. It is not only that minorities are treated more harshly, but also that the crimes of the majority are often

ignored. In his well known book *The Rich Get Richer and the Poor Get Prison*, Jeffrey Reiman (2001) provides a convincing and compelling argument that criminal justice officials overemphasize street crime, although many of the actions and behaviors of the ruling class cause far more widespread damage and impact. Corporate and white collar crime, the crimes most likely to be committed by the ruling class, cause overwhelming financial and human cost to society. For example, white collar crime has been estimated to cost the United States approximately \$388 billion a year. However, one rarely hears about the fraud, death, and environmental destruction caused by large corporations. It is through the combined processes of the criminal justice system, which overemphasize the street crimes of minorities and ignore the white collar crimes of the ruling class, that myths about race and crime are promulgated in society.

The issue of the differential treatment of minorities by the criminal justice system has become all the more important because of recent evidence regarding the level of crime relative to the use of imprisonment. Recently, criminologists have demonstrated that crime rates (particularly violent crime) have been steadily declining over the last few years (Tonry 1995; Reiman 2001), yet formal interventions (i.e., punishment) are increasing. For example, in 1993 the rate of violent crime was 747.1 per 100,000 and the rate of imprisonment was 359 per 100,000. In 2001, the violent crime rate dropped to 504.5 but the rate of imprisonment rose to 470. Punishment is not increasing equally for everyone, however. Whites represented 60 percent of violent crime arrests in 2001 whereas blacks accounted for approximately 37 percent. When violent crime arrests are compared to incarceration rates, blacks are clearly disproportionately imprisoned. Whites were incarcerated at a rate of 138 per 100,000 in comparison to 703 per 100,000 for blacks.

Over the years, politicians have created law and order platforms rooted in the menacing figure of crime. This get tough approach plays on citizens' fear of crime and racial minorities have been typecast in the role of the criminal. Skin color is a paramount issue within the criminal justice system. For example, at every criminal justice system stage from arrest

through incarceration, “blacks are present in numbers greatly out of proportion to their presence in the general population” (Tonry 1995: 49). Even with the decline in crime rates, blacks are “seven times more likely” to be incarcerated than whites (Tonry 1995). There is an overemphasis on blacks as perpetrators of violent crime in the criminal justice literature. African Americans and other minorities thus are stereotyped as violent, which excludes other groups from the discussion.

It has been argued that the study of race and the criminal justice system suffers from faulty, slanted research designs and poor operationalization. Much of the literature uses official records, which include arrest and incarceration rates, to measure crime. Official records may paint a false picture, often revealing more about police and criminal justice system practices than criminal behavior. For example, they do not tell us about people who are committing crimes but are not getting caught. The aggressive nature of police toward minorities contributes to overstating their involvement in crime. Therefore, other techniques such as self reports (interviews and questionnaires) should be used to fill in the blanks left by official records.

Researchers in this area are interested in documenting not only the existence of discriminatory treatment but its effect as well. They argue convincingly that the effect of discrimination by the criminal justice system goes beyond the effect on the individual. According to Hagan and Coleman (2001), war on drugs crime policies from the 1980s aimed at controlling the crack epidemic have negatively impacted the inner city black community. The war on drugs has caused an alarming rate of imprisonment among young black males and has had dramatic and devastating effects on the African American family. In addition to racism, discrimination, and lack of opportunity, these policies have worsened an already desperate and bleak situation. The criminal act should be put in context of the cultural and structural factors affecting the offender and the response to the offender as criminal is “a reflection of something larger and deeper” (Radosh 2002: 300). This approach has alienated, ostracized, and further pushed minorities to the bottom of the barrel and has made it exceedingly more difficult for them to claw

their way back to a status that often still is inferior to the dominant class.

In 1904, African American sociologist W. E. B. Du Bois declared that “Negroes came to look upon courts as instruments of injustice and oppression and upon those convicted in them as martyrs and victims.” Although these words were penned over 100 years ago, they are just as meaningful in the twenty first century as the criminal justice system is a site of racism and oppression for racial minorities. Inequalities are now subtler, but disparities still exist. The criminal justice system was created to establish law and order and to ensure the proper functioning of society. Over time, however, it has become a system of power that serves the interest of the dominant class. While crime rates are decreasing across the nation, rates of incarceration for blacks and other racial minorities are increasing. It is vital that practitioners, scholars, and politicians alike further address the nexus between race and the criminal justice system and devise alternatives that ensure equity, fairness, and survival.

SEE ALSO: Class and Crime; Criminal Justice System; Criminology; Race; Race and Crime; Race/Racism

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race and ethnic consciousness

Steven J. Gold

Race and ethnic consciousness refers to the awareness of membership in a racial or ethnic group by both group members and the larger society in which they reside. The concept embodies both popular and social scientific understandings of classification and membership. Popular perceptions often attribute race and ethnicity to biological origins. In contrast, social scientists insist that these categories are the consequence of a social construction process. Despite the social basis of race and ethnicity, social scientists acknowledge that they are real in their consequences. Race and ethnicity shape social stratification, underlie individual and group identities, determine patterns of social conflict, and condition life chances. In fact, so important is the notion of consciousness to the comprehension of race that eminent scholar George Fredrickson defines race as "*consciousness of status and identity based on ancestry and color*" (1988: 3; emphasis added).

Fredrickson traces the concern with race and ethnic consciousness to the 1970s debate between neo Marxists and Weberians on the origins of American racism. Prior to that time, racism was interpreted in light of psychological constructs including ignorance, prejudice, and the projection of hostility onto low status groups. Rejecting the causal importance of these factors, Marxist scholars like Eugene Genovese emphasized the economic benefits acquired by slave owners in exploiting African origin people. They contended that anti black ideologies were determined by the relations of production, and reflected the class consciousness of slave owners who imposed these outlooks on non slave owning white workers. While admitting the importance of class in racial inequality, Fredrickson and colleagues countered Marxist contentions about the economic basis of racism by reviving a polemic first made in the 1940s by W. E. B. Du Bois. They cited the many ways that poor whites, who had little economic interest in exploiting the labor of African Americans, were nevertheless passionate white supremacists. Race and ethnicity were meaningful determinants of social differentiation in their own right. Paraphrasing Marx, Fredrickson utilized the term *race consciousness* as an alternative to class based identities in shaping identification and solidarity.

Research by Van Ausdale and Feagin reveals the primacy of race consciousness in constructing identity by demonstrating that children as young as 3 years are well aware of racial and ethnic classification and deploy invidious distinctions based upon their comprehension thereof.

Much sociological knowledge about the nature and functioning of race and ethnic relations is rooted in the analysis of the highly structured situation of the American South prior to the Civil Rights Movement. However, recent research conducted within the highly diverse, multicultural, and globalized contemporary social environments, wherein migrants account for a significant fraction of the local population and explicitly racist statements are taboo, yields a much more intricate and varied array of racial and ethnic situations than in an earlier time. While race and ethnic consciousness remains a powerful force in such contexts, its codification is much more complex. As Winant,

Bonilla Silva, and others argue in their theories of racialization, racism has multiple bases, impacts groups in different ways, and changes according to time, place, class, and gender (Bonilla Silva 2001: 41).

Migration has the potential to radically transform the prisms and boundaries through which race consciousness is formulated. Accordingly, systems of racial and ethnic classification and consciousness defy general principles and must be studied at the local level. For example, a growing literature on African origin immigrants in North America shows that despite the pervasive, phenotypically based ideology of racism that exists in the US, dark skinned newcomers often reject the US system of racial classification and use language, social practices, and selective patterns of social interaction to exempt themselves from it.

In a large body of research on the children of immigrants in California and Florida, Portes and Rumbaut found that the more assimilated immigrant youth are, the less likely they are to call themselves American and the more likely they are to identify with their country of origin. As such, their self proclaimed foreignness is "made in the USA" (Portes & Rumbaut 2001: 188). In contrast, the children of immigrants in the United Kingdom downplay national identities and instead emphasize their parents' religion, preferring to be classified as Hindus, Muslims, or Sikhs in their interactions with the native British, even if they do not practice their faiths any more assiduously than most British people practice Christianity (Banton 1997: 121).

In multi ethnic societies, groups come to be seen, and to see themselves, as members of broadly inclusive pan ethnic categories that were unknown in the country of origin. People who had thought of themselves as members of families, regions, religious groups, or nationalities learn to identify with labels such as Asians, Latinos, or Ukies (short for Ukrainians, this term denotes various Eastern European groups in Ontario) in the host society. Such categories can be influenced by language, class position, neighborhood, popular music taste, gender ideologies, and patterns of consumption.

Despite the merging of groups with common regional origins or phenotype into a single category, awareness of difference remains. The

greatest rivalries sometimes occur among populations that the larger society believes to be members of the same race or ethnicity. In New York City, West Indians report conflicts with Haitians and African Americans, while South Americans collide with Dominicans and Puerto Ricans (Kasinitz et al. 2004).

In his study of white identity in black majority Detroit, John Hartigan found that working class whites attribute the declining quality of life in their neighborhoods not to African Americans – as popular stereotypes about urban whites might suggest – but rather to the racialized category of "hillbillies," relative newcomers who entered the Motor City from Appalachia in search of industrial jobs. Finally, some groups with a strong minority identity, such as Jews from the former Soviet Union, who arrive in the US and Canada are surprised to find themselves regarded as members of the white majority, albeit with a foreign accent.

Sociologists Jennifer Lee and Frank Bean have explored the changing nature of the color line in the US as the country incorporates a growing mixed race population and numerous immigrants who are neither black nor white. The authors review theories and data that suggest that increasing racial and ethnic diversity will make American society either less concerned with such distinctions (yielding a color blind society) or will result in a shift of the color line. Citing low rates of residential segregation and high rates of intermarriage between Asians and Latinos and native whites, as compared to lower rates of black–white interaction, the authors conclude that a new color line that sets off blacks from all others may be coming into existence, leaving African Americans in disadvantaged positions that are not qualitatively different from those perpetuated by the traditional black–white divide.

Since the 1960s, social scientists have increasingly understood race and ethnic consciousness as the basis for the evaluation of group status and the concomitant formation of collective action. Herbert Blumer's theory of race relations as a sense of group position contended that this feeling was critical to the relations between the dominant and the subordinate groups in society. It provided the dominant group with its perceptions, values, sensitivities, and emotions (Blumer 1999 [1958]: 101). More recent

scholarship sees group position as applying to subordinate as well as dominant groups.

Theorists concerned with ethnic mobilization, ethnic economies, and social capital assert that shared notions of ethnic and racial membership underlie forms of trust, political and economic cooperation, and mobilization. In their pivotal work on social capital, Portes and colleagues identify mutual racial or ethnic consciousness as fostering the achievement of common goals. Among these are raising investment capital, encouraging academic achievement, fostering political activism, and stimulating self help philanthropy. At the same time, however, they remind us that social capital can have a downside, such that members of an ethnic or racial group will sometimes disdain assimilation, achievement, and upward mobility as violating group norms. Those engaging in sanctioned behaviors will be seen as disloyal and barred from accessing group based resources.

Race and ethnic consciousness is strongest in societies where populations are clearly divided and scarce and valued resources are unequally distributed on the basis of highly visible racial or ethnic characteristics. Often, the process is initiated as an elite group – such as white slave owners in the antebellum South – unites to dominate a minority population – Africans – using state power to legitimate the social and economic structures that underlie inequality. This, in turn, heightens the consciousness of the oppressed group, leading to conflict.

From the 1960s until the 1990s, several states undertook policies to reduce race and ethnic consciousness and, hopefully, dampen the associated resentment and conflict. This frequently involved the engagement of two pronged policies that encouraged assimilation and minimized racial, ethnic, and gender differences in the distribution of jobs, education, and other social goods, while simultaneously fostering group consciousness through affirmative action and the implementation of multicultural programs that advanced the maintenance of language, identity, political incorporation, and religious practice. Michael Banton (1997: 65) offers an interpretation of this apparent paradox, asserting that individual goal seeking reduces group consciousness and promotes assimilation, but certain goals (like public goods) can be attained only by collective action.

However, following the downfall of the Soviet Union in 1990, which resulted in the obsolescence of state socialism (a major alternative to ethnic and racial bases of identity), the outbreak of terrible ethnic conflicts in the Balkan region, and the events of September 11, 2001 a decade later, many states became much more cynical about their ability to manage the negative manifestations of race and ethnic consciousness through tolerance and moderate state support. Instead, majoritarian movements from the US and the Netherlands to Zimbabwe and Iran asserted that major social conflicts are best resolved by privileging an idealized version of these states' cultural, religious, racial, and national roots, while restricting immigration and making few concessions on behalf of the cultural dispositions of religious, ethnic, and racial minorities.

In her provocatively titled book *World on Fire* (2003), legal scholar Amy Chua argued that, at least for the short term, the correlates of western modernization – the expansion of free markets plus democratization – will amplify rather than reduce ethnic conflict. This happens because under economic liberalization, the enhanced affluence of ethnically distinct minorities contrasts dramatically with the dire circumstances typically encountered by the local majority. As a result, entrepreneurial “outsiders” including South Asians in Fiji, Chinese in Malaysia, Jewish “oligarchs” in Russia, and whites in Zimbabwe and Bolivia have been subject to the vengeance of impoverished but politically empowered majorities. Consciousness of the differences between haves and have nots activates retribution and may provoke the exit of highly visible targets.

Given the multiform nature of ethnic and racial identities in a globalized world marked by economic transformations, transnational ties, border crossing social and religious movements, and increasing access to communication and travel, it appears likely that forms of ethnic and race consciousness will continue to be both complex and volatile social forces in the coming years.

SEE ALSO: Balkanization; Boundaries (Racial/Ethnic); Color Line; Conflict (Racial/Ethnic); Double Consciousness; Transnationalism

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race and ethnic etiquette

Charles Jarmon

Forms of etiquette exist in nearly every society where different racial and ethnic groups are separated by extreme differences in economic wealth, political power, or social status. They

are most developed in caste or caste like societies, in which the lower status racial or ethnic groups are enslaved or belong to economically exploited or subjugated groups. In these situations the patterns of etiquette regulate interpersonal relations between the higher and lower status groups, functioning as codes of behavior designed to maintain the status quo (or a state of harmony within it) within which the more privileged groups benefit. Sociologists and other social scientists have studied the emergence, practice, and impact of these codes on population groups in countries around the world, including the US, India, Brazil, South Africa, Spain, Germany, Australia, and the countries of the circum Caribbean (Dubois 1899; Reuter 1927; Park 1928; Doyle 1937; Myrdal 1944; Cox 1948; Frazier 1957; Sowell 1983; Bell 1992; Marable 2005). In any given society, the unique complexity and changes in the codes must be understood in terms of its own history and the currents of broad social and cultural change affecting it both from within and without.

Blacks have lived in the US for nearly 400 years, and for most of this period were enslaved. When freed after the Civil War the approximately half million freemen were unprepared educationally and economically to compete in a society still inclined to continue their subjection. The majority remained in the South, living in small towns or on farms as tenants along the rural black belt. They were forcefully united, to use a term from van den Berghe (1967), into an “exploitative symbiosis.” Others migrated to the ghettos of Northern cities. This is the historical context from which broad patterns of racial and ethnic etiquette developed. This relationship appeared to have been more important after slavery, reflecting a state in which blacks had to struggle against economic dependency and subservience. Because it fostered mutually restricted associations on personal and professional levels between blacks and whites, the racial etiquette prevented free communication between the groups and so created an illusionary world within which both claimed to understand one another, despite their different interests and expectations within the status quo. Thus, some times, when protests over adverse circumstances disrupted the peaceful environment in the community, leading white citizens would often

express their amazement. For many of them, blacks on their own would naturally not feel offended by not having the privilege to vote, to sit on local councils, to be able to run for political office, to be treated equally in social intercourse and in places of public accommodation, or to have their stories told in the local newspaper in a dignified manner. Outside the exceptional personal relationships, some of which are well documented in the literature, etiquette prevented discussion of such matters.

Whatever friendliness blacks possessed towards whites, and vice versa, was constrained by deeply institutionalized codes. Again, exceptions existed. Certain relations were taboo (e.g. dating and marriage) and these taboos were enshrined in ideology and protected by custom and law. This is clearly evident in their development in the Southern slave states as well as in the apartheid system of South Africa, which in many instances began on egalitarian terms between Native Americans and Europeans in the former, and between Africans and Europeans in the latter. The doctrine of racial supremacy provided the white slave owners in the US with a rationalization for enslaving Africans, after the experiment failed with Native Americans. In post Reconstruction America, it provided a basis for perpetuating a legal system of discrimination against the freed African Americans.

Major court decisions before and after the period of slavery established in law the anti-democratic practices that inveighed against the humanity of the slave and ex slave. The role played by custom, as a basis for regulating and controlling black-white relations, centered on how the two groups got along together under the circumstances of both situations – slavery and legal and *de facto* segregation – in that they were often forced, out of economic necessity, to live and work in close physical proximity, but socially isolated one from the other. Just as the formal legal decisions were established to repress blacks and to keep them submissive, the patterns of etiquette emerged as an informal system to keep them in their place; they were embodied in the rituals and ceremonials of everyday life and reflected the accommodation between blacks and whites.

If one had grown up in a Southern city during the 1940s and 1950s, one would have witnessed the patterns of etiquette practiced in enforced

segregated churches, schools, workplaces, homes, and on buses and trains; the proscriptions against personal relationships and sexual unions and marriage; the submissive and deferential manners of contact in public places; and in the injustice rendered by the legal system. The institution of the patterns of etiquette fundamentally derived from the strategies of the ruling class of whites to maintain the economic and political dependency of blacks, and they were prepared to invoke the force of the law or to resort to extra legal means to punish violators.

The patterns of deference symbolized in much of the behavior of blacks towards whites depended on the nature of the relation involved. For example, black males interacted deferentially with white males and avoided close personal contact with white women (this latter patterned behavior is denoted in the 1955 case in Mississippi involving the murder of Emmett Till, who allegedly whistled at a white woman); white males avoided working under black male supervisors, but would pursue personal relations with black women; and black and white children played together until the age of puberty, but avoided one another as adults. Black communities, however, developed ways of mitigating such experiences, one of which was by developing parallel social systems apart from those established by whites. These were found in black churches, schools, lodges, dance halls, music, art, literature, and humor. However, this does not represent the totality of the reaction of blacks to the codes supporting slavery and discrimination. Many rebelled in slavery by escaping with the Underground Railroad and emigrating to the North as far as Canada, with many joining the abolitionist movement against the system of slavery; others refused to remain in the country and escaped to Haiti; and many died in failed insurrections protesting against the dehumanizing system. Much of the scholarly literature on the subject of etiquette has generally focused narrowly on the psychological trauma, or on adaptive ways to prevent it, through examining the various forms of accommodation by blacks in subservient positions in the black-white relationship (Johnson 1943; Aikiss 1944; Frazier 1957; Grier & Cobbs 1968). There are notable exceptions to this approach (Morris 1986; Scott 1997). The popular media tended to highlight stereotypes depicting the

acceptance by blacks of their position in the system. Neither has devoted sufficient attention to their protests and struggles against living under such debasing conditions.

In the US today the traditional patterns of etiquette are breaking down in the wake of enormous changes, including the urbanization of blacks; the *Brown vs. Board of Education* desegregation case; the Civil Rights and Black Power movements; the social reorganization of workplaces, where many blacks perform similar work as whites and interact with them as peers; and in other public places, where, through daily association, different attitudes and perceptions have helped to redefine black–white relationships. The new generation of African Americans has not learned the old patterns of deferential behavior and the younger generation of whites do not expect it. We are observing similar patterns of change associated with recent protest movements in such countries as Brazil and France. In the broadest sense, this suggests that the traditional patterns of etiquette, as means of social control, have lost social and political legitimacy. Sociologists must develop new conceptual approaches to explain a different set of circumstances in racial and ethnic relations.

SEE ALSO: Accommodation; Immigration; Race and Ethnic Consciousness; Race and Ethnic Politics; Racial Hierarchy; Segregation; Slavery

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race and ethnic politics

Mario L. Small

The sociology of race and ethnic politics examines the impact of political factors on the status of racial and ethnic minorities, and the impact of ethnicity and race on politics and public policy. The field has investigated political movements, voting rights, immigration laws, internal migration patterns, the judicial system, citizenship, and, recently, ethnic identity.

Throughout American history the struggle over the political rights of racial and ethnic minorities has been intertwined with the nation's economic and demographic growth, and neither can be understood without the other. Through the nineteenth century, legal slavery guaranteed the US a large, unpaid labor force that established the country's economic superiority. In the nineteenth, twentieth, and twenty-first centuries this economic strength has been sustained by large waves of low-skilled immigrants accepting very low wages for hard labor, from building railroads and canals, to fitting pipes and erecting steel and concrete buildings, to

gardening, caring for children of middle class families, cleaning toilets in hotels and office buildings, and washing dishes and delivering meals in restaurants. As the country has shifted from an agricultural, to a manufacturing, to a service economy, the labor of ethnic minorities has been central at every turn. Many of the political conflicts of the nation have emerged as these ethnic and racial minorities demand equal protection under the law and equal political participation.

NINETEENTH CENTURY FOUNDATIONS

After the Emancipation Proclamation of 1863 the presence of free African Americans threatened the political and economic superiority of white Southerners. The end of Reconstruction brought the beginning of the Jim Crow era, as disgruntled white Southerners sought to retain the separation between blacks and whites. State legislatures throughout the South enacted laws requiring racial segregation in public facilities such as restaurants, theaters, and buses. Legal and illegal methods were employed to keep blacks from voting, such as the poll tax and the imposition of literacy requirements for a population that had been legally denied education for centuries. This era also saw the emergence of the Ku Klux Klan, a clandestine political white supremacist group that, through public lynching, fire bombing, cross burning, and death threats, terrorized the black population. The result was a widespread disenfranchisement of African Americans.

During this period the rest of the country was in the midst of a major industrial expansion, spurred by technological innovation and fed by the western expansion. Immigrants from Asia and Europe flocked to the country for work in the railroads and other industries and to search for higher incomes. Soon, anti Chinese sentiment throughout the country, and especially in California, grew to the point of motivating legislative action. The Chinese Exclusion Act of 1882 suspended immigration of Chinese laborers for 10 years, and later, in 1904, suspended it indefinitely. This was the first major law to restrict immigration on a large scale. It also targeted a single ethnic group, not only

restricting immigration but also establishing ineligibility for naturalization.

By the turn of the century it was clear to sociologist and essayist W. E. B. Du Bois (2003) that “the problem of the twentieth century” would be “the problem of the color line.” Du Bois was referring to conflicts between people of all ethnic backgrounds, whom he saw in a persisting conflict over political and economic rights as the country faced unprecedented levels of racial and ethnic diversity. These conflicts inevitably involved questions of immigration and citizenship, which were often inextricably linked with questions of race.

By the 1920s the racial anxieties of the country were codified into law. The Immigration Act of 1924 restricted immigration based on national quotas aimed explicitly at maintaining a racial balance tilted toward whites of Western European heritage. The Act restricted the number of immigrants each year, favored immigrants from Western Europe, limited the number of immigrants from Eastern and Southern Europe and from Africa, and barred immigrants from Asia. Germany, for example, had a quota of more than 50,000 immigrants a year; Greece, 100 immigrants; the entire African continent (excluding Egypt), 100.

While Du Bois’s predictions about inter racial political conflict had proven increasingly accurate, his greatest concern as a sociological researcher was the status of African Americans. His theory about the conditions of African Americans was both a framework for understanding the present and a prescription for improving their future. For Du Bois, political disenfranchisement of blacks and their economic deprivation went hand in hand. Blacks who were segregated were unable to use the political system to secure the resources required for their education and economic development. In this, he famously disagreed with Booker T. Washington, former slave turned educator, who believed that the best way for blacks in the South to overcome poverty and destitution was to ignore the question of racial segregation and focus on self education and building their own institutions from the ground up. Du Bois argued that resisting segregation and fighting for their political rights were indispensable; for him, economic development without political incorporation was impossible.

THE TWENTIETH CENTURY

The combination of the South's dwindling sharecropping economy, segregation, institutional discrimination, and political disenfranchisement prompted many African Americans to begin to look north for greater opportunities. The industrial expansion of Northern cities began to look extremely attractive to a population that had always been concentrated in the South. This was especially true given that factories, now significantly deprived of low wage immigrant labor, clamored for laborers. The first half of the twentieth century saw the Great Migration of blacks to the industrial centers of the Northeast and Midwest, to cities such as Chicago, New York, Detroit, Philadelphia, and St. Louis. This decades long migration produced high concentrations of African Americans in the inner cities of the North.

It also laid the foundation for the most significant moment in race and ethnic politics in the US of the twentieth century, the Civil Rights Movement. This movement was the largest and most sustained civil rights collective mobilization in the nation's history, aimed at eliminating legal segregation and enforcing the constitutional rights that guaranteed equal political participation. The movement took many forms, including collective protest in the form of sit ins, boycotts, lawsuits, and non violent civil disobedience, which often resulted in violent repression by the state.

Several key events marked the successes of the movement. Racial segregation had been upheld by the Supreme Court in *Plessy v. Ferguson* (1896), which held that "separate but equal" facilities for members of different races were constitutionally acceptable. After a series of challenges by lawyers from the National Association for the Advancement of Colored People, the Supreme Court in *Brown v. Board of Education* (1954) ruled that separate educational facilities were inherently unequal. Segregation suffered an additional blow with the passing of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, which outlawed discrimination in hotels, restaurants, theaters, and other public accommodations, or segregation on the basis of race, color, religion, or national origin. Finally, the Voting Rights Act of 1965 enforced the guarantees of the 15th Amendment that no person shall be denied a

vote because of race or color, outlawing Jim Crow disenfranchisement tactics such as literacy requirements for voting.

That year also saw the passage of a law that radically altered the nation's approach to immigration. The Immigration Act of 1965 eliminated the quota system in place since the 1920s, such that the main factor in determining selection for admission was occupation. In addition, a central clause in the Act gave preference to those who had family in the US. This clause precipitated the large wave of immigration of Latin Americans, Asians, West Indians, and others, which continues today.

RACE, CLASS, AND POLITICS

The 1960s were pivotal. According to Wilson (1987), the Civil Rights Movement and Affirmative Action policies had succeeded in opening opportunities for African Americans during the 1970s and 1980s. The most resourceful African Americans were able to attend better educational institutions, work at better jobs, earn higher salaries, and move to the suburbs. In effect, the Civil Rights Movement contributed to the creation of a large African American middle class.

However, this growth also left a concentration of poor, low skilled blacks in segregated inner cities. Many of the African Americans who first migrated to the Northern cities had found work in manufacturing industries, such as car companies. By mid century, the large employers in the manufacturing sector had started to move to the suburbs in search of cheaper land and greater profits. The cities had begun major shifts from manufacturing based economies to service based ones, developing high concentrations of low skilled blacks unable to find work. Limited occupational opportunities, increasing crime and incarceration, and financially strapped school systems reliant on a weaker tax base only worsened the prospects for this group. Wilson called this group the underclass.

Scholars debated the relative significance of race and class extensively. Wilson argued that economic factors, demographic shifts, and the political success of the Civil Rights Movement led to the creation of an underclass. However,

Massey and Denton (1993) argued that this theory, based on the political economy, ignored the impact of persistent racial discrimination and residential segregation. They argued that by focusing on class, Wilson had ignored the persisting significance of race. Discrimination by lenders, steering practices by real estate agents, legal covenants restricting home sales to minorities, and poor enforcement of anti-discrimination legislation made it difficult for blacks to find homes in neighborhoods with good schools and low crime rates. In fact, they argued, despite the important political gains of the Civil Rights Movement, segregation has persisted over the last half of the twentieth century.

Despite their disagreements, theorists of both political economy and residential segregation agreed that without intervention the problems of the underclass were likely to perpetuate themselves. So did lawmakers. The last decades of the twentieth century saw determined efforts by both conservatives and liberals to address inner city poverty, and especially to reform the welfare system. Though these arguments were about public policy and the status of the poor, they were couched in explicitly political and racial terms, as images such as the "welfare queen" were used to discredit the welfare system. Conservatives tended to argue that the inner city poor remained in this condition due to a weakened value system and absence of work ethic, or because the welfare system discouraged work. Liberals tended to argue that racial discrimination and poor labor market prospects were at fault. This debate culminated in the Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Act (PRWORA) of 1996, which toughened eligibility requirements. Women with children seeking government or welfare aid faced time limits and work requirements in order to receive assistance.

PRWORA, riding the most recent wave of anti-immigrant sentiment, also denied public assistance to legal immigrants, who were now in a position of paying taxes to support government benefits for which they were not eligible. Later laws allowed limited assistance to immigrants who had entered the country before 1996. Anti-immigrant sentiment persisted through the end of the twentieth century. In California,

voters in 1994 approved Proposition 187, which denied education and medical attention to undocumented immigrants, though the measure was later deemed unconstitutional.

This period also brought about the rapid growth of identity politics and a heightened discourse around immigrants, ethnic minorities, and national identity. On college campuses this was evident in the proliferation and growth of ethnic studies programs, modeled on the black studies programs started in the 1960s. Debates over the definition of an American, and over the identity of immigrants, and their children, have been ubiquitous in the media, books, theater, and the arts. Individuals increasingly claim more than one racial identity, and the 2000 Census for the first time allowed respondents to mark more than one race. In addition, immigrants increasingly live a transnational existence, sending large remittances to their home countries and participating in home country politics. Countries, in turn, have increasingly allowed immigrants to claim more than one nationality, such that many may vote in the US and in their home countries.

IDENTITY POLITICS WORLDWIDE

Throughout the world the interaction of race, economics, and politics has become intertwined with the problems of immigration and citizenship, as ethnic identity continues to shape political struggles. In some countries, particularly in Western Europe, rapid immigration from Africa and the Middle East has produced reactionary opposition in the receiving countries and organized mobilization for political and citizenship rights among immigrants. Recently in France, after a small incident in which two immigrant youths died electrocuted in a subway station after being chased by the police, the country experienced the most serious and extended period of civil unrest since the 1960s. The unrest was concentrated in the poor suburbs of the city among politically disenfranchised, primarily immigrant youths with high unemployment rates. In other countries the colonial legacy of placing traditionally distinct and opposing ethnic groups under a single rule has resulted in violent, long lasting strife as former colonies

became nation states. In Rwanda, the genocide of 800,000 Tutsis in the mid 1990s can be traced directly to the efforts by majority Hutus to wrest control from Tutsis of the resources of the new nation state after its independence from Belgium in the 1950s. Many of the continuing political struggles have been both ethnic and religious, as fundamentalist religious movements, particularly among conservative Christians and Muslims, enter the political fray in increasingly organized fashion, whether through the media, through grassroots political organizations, or, in extreme cases, through violent attacks. Despite the heterogeneity of these ethnic political conflicts, rarely can they be understood independently of the large and small scale economic issues surrounding them, whether it is the supply of labor, the control of natural resources, or individuals' yearning for stable employment at home or abroad.

SEE ALSO: Identity Politics/Relational Politics; Immigration; Race; Race and Ethnic Consciousness; Race and Ethnic Etiquette; Race (Racism); Social Problems, Politics of

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race (racism)

Pierre L. van den Berghe

The term "racism" widely entered the social science vocabulary in the 1930s, as part of the Boasian reaction against the social Darwinism of the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. Ruth Benedict, a student of Franz Boas, was one of the prominent early users. By the 1950s and 1960s, a broad consensus developed as to what racism meant, namely, an attitude or theory that some human groups, socially defined by biological descent and physical appearance, were superior or inferior to other groups in physical, intellectual, cultural, or moral properties. It was clearly understood that "races" were socially defined, differently in different societies, but according to physical phenotypes, such as skin color, facial features, or hair texture.

Racism, so defined, was differentiated from ethnocentrism, also a belief or theory of inequality between human groups, but where that inequality was ascribed to some aspect of culture, such as moral values, religion, language, or "level of civilization." Ethnocentrism, i.e., a preference for one's own cultural group, was held to be universal, but not so racism. The latter was generally ascribed to European expansion, imperialism, colonialism, and chattel slavery in the nineteenth century, and associated with Fascism and Nazism in the twentieth century.

During this earlier social science consensus, racism was also clearly kept analytically distinct from discrimination, segregation, and other features of systematic inequality between ascribed groups. Racism was defined as an attitude, a prejudice, a theory, in short, an ideational system held in individual human minds. Discrimination, segregation, ostracism, and so on, were treated as forms of behavior which included or excluded certain groups, and which were frequently, but not necessarily, associated with the racist beliefs of their practitioners. One could be an unprejudiced discriminator, or, conversely, a prejudiced non discriminator. Behavior was held to be a function not only of beliefs, but also of sanctions. Unprejudiced discriminators could be found in racial caste

societies, like apartheid South Africa. Conversely, where discrimination is punished, prejudiced individuals often refrain from discriminatory behavior.

This state of conceptual clarity did not last long. It gradually disintegrated under repeated attacks, mostly from the left, starting in the 1970s, and continuously escalating until the present. In a first stage, the distinction between race and ethnicity was increasingly confounded. Since race was socially, not biologically, defined, and since ethnicity was often based on a theory of common descent, the distinction between the two was held to be spurious. Explicitly or implicitly, authors began to use the two terms interchangeably, to the detriment of analytical rigor. Often, race was defined away as ethnicity, but, conversely, ethnocentrism was frequently denounced as racism. The term "racism" was increasingly used as an invective of ever widening scope.

On a second front, the distinction between belief and behavior, between prejudice and discrimination, came under growing assault. The key moment here was the rapid acceptance of the concept of "institutional racism," hailed by many as a great analytic advance, when, in fact, the only advance was in an ideological agenda. Institutional racism referred to the structural inequalities between racial and/or ethnic groups, in short, to the consequences of behavioral discrimination. These were said to be independent of individual attitudes, indeed, to have a self-perpetuating institutional life of their own. Attitudes were asserted to be irrelevant to the existence of institutional racism.

In brief, the double distinction between race and ethnicity, and between attitudes and behavior, was now defunct, so that almost any statistical difference between any two ascribed groups could now be termed "racism." Intention did not matter. (By analogy, any structural difference between men and women was now labeled "sexism.") The stage was now set for the transformation of racism from a relatively precise analytical concept to an elastic term of opprobrium applied to almost anything one disapproved of. Lucid analysis of complex multicultural and/or multiracial societies all too often yielded to ideologically inspired mush.

The ultimate extension of the concept of racism occurred during the last 10 or 15 years. Explicit refusal to take race into account, and profession of an ideology and practice of "race blindness," are now often held to be a novel and subtle form of racism. If you say race matters, you are, by definition, a racist. If, however, you say race does not matter, you are a racist as well, because race really does matter. Thus, for instance, opposition to race based "affirmative action," on the ground that it uses a racial criterion to produce racial discrimination, now qualifies as neoracism. Racism and anti racism are neatly equated. The latter is merely a cryptic form of the former.

What are we to make of all this sociologically constructed confusion? Underlying the evolution of the concept of racism is a deeply contradictory "liberal" ideology. On the one hand, statistical differences between ascriptive groups based on race or ethnicity are declared illegitimate, or, at least, suspect, and therefore subject to remedial action, including policies based on the very criteria which constitute the foundation of the differences. One seeks to abolish or reduce differences by reinforcing and entrenching the criteria of group membership that underlie these differences. On the other hand, liberal ideology in multicultural and/or multiracial societies extols and celebrates "diversity." On the face of it, it would seem that one can not simultaneously eradicate differences between ascribed groups and extol them. At best, one can try to destigmatize existing differences and reduce their adverse consequences.

That said, social science theory and ideology – the two, by the way, are often hard to distinguish – must face two stubbornly persistent realities.

First, whenever two or more ethnic and/or racial groups have formed a common society (by conquest, slavery, or voluntary immigration), the result has, with few exceptions, been some degree of hierarchy and social differentiation between groups. Some groups are more powerful or affluent; groups tend to aggregate spatially; and an ethnic division of labor often sets in. Try to imagine a US society, for instance, where diamond cutters, taxi drivers, and basketball players would each have a proportional representation of Jews, Sikhs, and African Americans.

The elusive search for proportional group representation in every aspect of education, employment, residential distribution, and so on, often brings massive state intervention. The latter is not only doomed to failure in most cases, but frequently boomerangs. Such attempts have often consolidated group distinctions and exacerbated conflicts. This is not to say that ethnic or racial hierarchies are immutable. They can be rapidly overturned by revolution, for instance. But the proportional representation society is a utopia.

Second, one of the greatest human universals is that most people show a strong preference for others who are like themselves, and that the main fault lines of these preferences have largely followed the social boundaries of race and ethnicity. Indeed, these fault lines have been formed by these preferences. Whenever a phenomenon is universal in our species, it begs for an explanation that is not purely based on social constructionism.

Sociobiology has provided an answer for the universality of preference for one's "own kind," and for resistance to sharing scarce resources with unrelated others. Evolution by natural selection has predisposed us (as well as countless other species) to favor others to the extent that we are biologically related. By doing so, we have maximized our "inclusive fitness," i.e., the representation of our genome in successive generations. We are predisposed to favor kin over non kin, and close kin over distant kin. Ethnic or racial groups are simply extensions of kinship. Ethnocentrism and racism are nepotism writ large.

Almost all cultures have normatively *reinforced this genetic predisposition*. They have regarded familism, nepotism, and ethnocentrism as normal, expected behavior, even if a few cultures have sought to control and limit them. Any culture that seeks to counteract nepotism faces an uphill battle. Perhaps the best social policy would be one that accepts the reality of nepotism, ethnocentrism, and racism, but seeks to contain them as preference for one's own kind, and to prevent their extension into hatred of others. *The latter does not follow from the former.*

Any sociology that claims to be a science of human behavior cannot continue to ignore the

biological bases of that behavior, and explain it purely in social constructionist terms. Of course, we constantly construct and reconstruct our social reality, but not in a biological vacuum. Genes and culture complexly interact to produce behavior and social structure.

SEE ALSO: Boundaries (Racial/Ethnic); Conflict (Racial/Ethnic); Discrimination; Ethnic Groups; Ethnic and Racial Division of Labor; Ethnicity; Ethnocentrism; Race; Race and the Criminal Justice System; Race/Ethnicity, Health, and Mortality; Racial Hierarchy

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race and schools

Thomas F. Pettigrew

Race and schools become a social issue when educational opportunities are differentially available to members of diverse racial groups within a society. Educational discrimination has a variety of effects that often lead to interracial conflict. Since education is a major means of social mobility, discrimination in this domain forces the less favored racial groups to occupy lower status jobs and receive less income. Such results form a vital component in a wider system of racial oppression, as in South Africa during apartheid and the state mandated segregation in the American South.

Racially segregated schools are the hallmark of racial discrimination in education. As under South Africa's apartheid and the South's segregation, separate schools allow for vastly fewer resources to be provided for the oppressed race. Indeed, racially separate schools are so central to systems of racial oppression that they are tenaciously maintained in the face of efforts to end them. The protracted and only partially successful efforts to end segregated schools in the US provides a striking illustration.

Public schools did not emerge in the American South until late in the nineteenth century, and these early schools were for whites only. Black schools came later after formal Southern state laws for racial segregation had been sanctioned in 1896 by the US Supreme Court in *Plessy v. Ferguson*. Homer Plessy, who had one black great grandparent, had been arrested for riding in a rail car reserved for whites under a new Louisiana law. He sued and claimed the law unconstitutional. The High Court rejected his plea. Only Justice John Harlan, a former slaveholder, dissented with his famous assertion that "our Constitution is color blind." While it involved railroad seating, this decision was promptly translated by the white South into separate schools as well. Although *Plessy* established the formula of "separate but equal," Southern schools became very separate and unequal.

It took 58 years before the High Court would overturn *Plessy*. By 1950, in two graduate education cases, the meaning of "equal" went beyond mere parity in brick and mortar terms to include such intangibles as faculty reputation and general prestige. The decisions prepared the ground for *Brown v. Board of Education* four years later to hold separate facilities to be inherently unequal. But implementing this unpopular decision in the hostile Southern US proved difficult.

Critical to the acceptance of mandated social change that runs counter to dominant public opinion is the perception of inevitability. The responses of the white South to the varying firmness of the High Court's rulings illustrate the point. With an uncompromising, nine to nothing decision in *Brown*, the Court in 1954 generated a strong sense of inevitability even in the Deep South. But in 1955 the Supreme Court retreated in its implementation order to

a vague "all deliberate speed" formula (*Brown II*). This formula returned the enforcement of desegregation back to Southern federal district courts without guidelines. Only when this weak order undermined the sense of inevitability did Southern politicians become uniformly defiant and pro segregationist organizations gain momentum. The opposition now believed *Brown* could be effectively opposed. *Brown II* is not solely responsible for the violent opposition that followed. But its vagueness contributed to the resistance by eroding the strong sense of inevitability that had prevailed.

Consequently, the region's school desegregation did not take hold until the federal courts lost patience between 1968 and 1973 (Orfield 1978; Orfield & Eaton 1996). This brief period saw court orders achieve sweeping gains – especially in the recalcitrant South, but also in the cities of the North and West. By the 1970s the South had more racial desegregation in its public schools than any other region. But this process ended abruptly in 1974 when the Supreme Court reversed direction. In *Milliken v. Bradley* the Court by five to four struck down a metropolitan solution ordered by a district court to remedy the intense racial segregation of Detroit's public schools. What makes this decision so regressive is that such remedies are the *only* means available to desegregate the public schools of many of the nation's largest cities (Orfield & Eaton 1996; Pettigrew 1981). More over, between district segregation is now by far the major component today in metropolitan school segregation (Clotfelter 2004). Decisions of the High Court from 1974 into the twenty first century continued this trend, and allowed racial segregation of the public schools to return not only in the South but also throughout much of the US.

In short, *Brown* was largely reversed without the High Court ever stating that it was overturning the famous decision. By 2000, black children were more likely to be attending majority black schools than at any time since the 1960s; 70 percent went to predominantly black schools and 37 percent to schools with 90 percent or more black students. The greatest retrogression during the 1990s occurred in the South, the region that had previously witnessed the greatest gains (Orfield 2001). And Latino school children became more educationally segregated

from white children than African American children (Orfield & Eaton 1996).

Supporting this retreat from desegregated schools, the sociologist James Coleman claimed in a highly publicized speech that urban interracial schools were impossible to achieve because desegregation causes massive "white flight." It led, he claimed, to whites fleeing to the suburbs and leaving minority concentrations in central city cores. This research had serious weaknesses and its policy recommendations ignored metropolitan solutions (Pettigrew 1981).

The white flight thesis is actually far more complex than Coleman claimed (Pettigrew & Green 1976). Some whites did move from large cities when school desegregation began. However, this movement was neither universal nor permanently damaging. Some cities without any school desegregation also experienced widespread white suburbanization. Other cities experienced little such movement at the time of desegregation. And where so called white flight to the suburbs did occur, it constituted a "hastening up" process; within a few years the loss was what would have been expected without desegregation (Farley et al. 1980).

But does school desegregation improve the life chances and choices of African Americans? From the 1970s to the 1990s, black high school completion rates rose sharply. While less than half finished high school at mid century, by 2000 the figure approached that of white Americans. During these same years, the mean difference between black and white achievement test scores steadily narrowed. White scores were improving, but blacks who entered school during the late 1960s revealed especially strong gains – when extensive school desegregation began. But these positive trends stalled and were even reversed by the late 1990s once the federal courts allowed resegregation. Yet these trends are only suggestive, since other factors were also influential – notably, rising black incomes and such effective national educational programs as Headstart.

More to the point, did school desegregation expand opportunities for African Americans in the long term? An array of sociological studies tracked the products of desegregated schools in later life to find answers (Pettigrew 2004). With social class controlled, black children from desegregated schools, when compared with

black children from segregated schools, are more likely later (1) to attend and finish majority white colleges; (2) to work with white co workers and have better jobs; (3) to live in interracial neighborhoods; (4) to have somewhat higher incomes; and (5) to have more white friends and contacts and more positive attitudes toward whites. Similarly, white products of desegregation have more positive attitudes toward blacks than comparable whites from segregated schools. In short, desegregated education prepares black and white Americans for an interracial world.

These positive lifetime effects of desegregation do not primarily reflect test score gains. More important is the fact that desegregation enables African Americans to break through the monopoly that white Americans have traditionally had on informational flows and institutional access. Sociologists have identified several interrelated processes underlying this phenomenon (Pettigrew 2004). These processes mirror the harsh fact that life chances in America flow through white dominated institutions.

Desegregation involves interracial contact. Intergroup contact is one of social psychology's best established theories. A comprehensive meta analysis found that 95 percent of 714 independent samples with 250,000 subjects show that intergroup contact reduces prejudice (Pettigrew & Tropp 2006).

Desegregation teaches interracial interaction skills. Given the nation's racist past, neither black nor white Americans are skilled in interracial interaction. The products of desegregated schools have the opportunity to learn these skills. Their anxiety about such interaction is reduced. This is highly useful for both blacks and whites, for it contributes to their willingness to enter biracial environments and their acceptance in these situations.

Desegregation erodes avoidance learning (Pettigrew 1964). After facing discriminatory treatment, some black Americans learn to avoid whites. But this reaction has negative consequences. It closes off for ghetto dwellers the better opportunities that exist in the wider society. And, like all avoidance learning, it keeps one from knowing when the situation has changed. Desegregated schooling overcomes such avoidance.

Desegregated blacks gain access to formally all white social networks. Information about colleges

and jobs flows largely through formally all white networks. This process does not require personal friendships. Weak interpersonal ties are the most informative, because close friends are likely to possess the same information (Granovetter 1983). Interracial schools allow black students to gain access to these networks.

Thus, although not popularly recognized, the racial desegregation of American's public schools has led to positive outcomes. But the resegregation of the nation's schools in the twenty first century threatens to retard and even reverse these beneficial processes.

While America's racial scene has many unique features, social research in other nations suggests that similar intergroup processes operate in schools throughout the world. Additional research is needed, but the separation of groups in schools and other societal institutions, whether the groups are racial or not, appears to have comparably negative effects. In addition to thwarting beneficial intergroup contact, intergroup separation triggers a series of interlocking processes that make group conflict more likely. Negative stereotypes not only persist but are magnified, distrust accumulates, and misperceptions and awkwardness typify the limited intergroup interaction that does take place. The powerful majority comes in time to believe that segregated housing, low skilled jobs, and constrained educational opportunities are justified, even "appropriate," for the minority.

Intergroup schools have proven to be one of the needed antidotes for combating these negative processes – from Northern Ireland to the Republic of South Africa.

SEE ALSO: *Brown v. Board of Education*; Education; Education Inequality; Massive Resistance; School Segregation, Desegregation

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race/ethnicity and friendship

Will Tyson

Race and ethnicity are important factors in friendship formation. People tend to form friendships with others who live near them and who occupy similar social positions, belong to the same organizations, and are like themselves in terms of attitudes, values, and behaviors. Race and ethnicity are often cues of these similarities; therefore, race and ethnicity structure friendship formation (McPherson et al. 2001). People are likely to associate with others of their own race if the racial composition of the populations and distribution of members of a race throughout substructures of the population provide opportunities for same race friendships to form.

Researchers have found evidence that race and ethnicity influence various types of relationships, ranging from marriage to workplace relationships to friendships to mere discussion networks (McPherson et al. 2001). These studies show that interracial relationships occur less often than would be expected given the available opportunities for them. Structures such as families, workplaces, organizations, and neighborhoods bring people together as kin, co workers, members, and neighbors, but they do not ensure the formation of strong ties or close friendships (Feld & Carter 1998).

A recent Brown University study finds that interracial friendships are no more common in the United States than they are in post apartheid South Africa, probably because elements of apartheid are found in America. Massey and Denton (1993) coined the term "American apartheid" to describe the unique residential hypersegregation of blacks across large metropolitan areas in the United States. Scholars have referred to residential segregation as the "structural linchpin" of race relations in America (Bobo & Zubrinsky 1996). People of different races generally do not live close to each other, so interracial interaction and interracial friendships are not as common as they might be otherwise.

Lack of proximity contributes to social distance between people of different races. Zipf (1949) asserts that people are willing to expend little effort toward establishing ties outside their local area. People with low interracial contact in their local area are more likely to be attracted to those they perceive to be similar to themselves, probably through racial cues. Growing up in predominantly white neighborhoods can teach blacks and other minorities to forgo racial cues and choose friends based on similarity to themselves on more attitudinal dimensions (Korgen 2002: 73). Interracial contact within neighborhoods is often a result of racial preferences. Blacks prefer to live in mixed neighborhoods, but few whites accept living in a neighborhood that is more than 20 percent black (Massey & Denton 1993). In fact, whites generally do not want to live near blacks, even when controlling for socioeconomic status (Steinhorn 2000).

Those who form interracial friendships may face social sanctions from same race friends. Blacks with a white close friend overwhelmingly report disapproval from black friends, family, or

acquaintances. Whites with a black close friend report generally positive reaction to their interracial friendships, but these reactions seem to imply that black-white friendships are a novelty and provide false evidence of harmony between blacks and whites in America (Korgen 2002).

Black-white racial tension in America has led to the current research emphasis on black-white friendships, but interracial tension between white, black, Latino, and Asian people in society is an emerging area of scholarship to complement research on black-white conflict. Classic research by Bogardus (1959) and consequent follow up studies continue to suggest that the social distance between whites and blacks is greater than the distance between whites and people of other ethnicities. When given an option, whites prefer to associate with Latinos and Asians instead of with blacks (Bobo & Zubrinsky 1996). A Latino or Asian person with a third grade education is more likely to live among whites than a black person with a doctoral degree. With higher intermarriage rates with whites compared to blacks, native born Latinos and Asians are assimilating while blacks have not been able to integrate fully (Steinhorn 2000). Blacks often face social pressures to end interracial friendships with white peers, but black peers typically accept friendships with Asians and Latinos (Korgen 2002).

Few social arenas promote social interactions between people of diverse racial and ethnic backgrounds, so a great deal of research on multi ethnic interracial friendship takes place in educational contexts, specifically in colleges and universities. Fifty years of desegregation in American education since *Brown v. Board of Education* has provided researchers with social settings in which to study how diverse people interact and form friendships. Multicultural universities emphasize the importance of diversity in bringing people together to encourage positive interracial contact. Administrators believe that positive contact in cooperative environments leads to positive attitudes and positive interracial relationships. Critics of increasing diversity claim that it leads to conflict, while its proponents claim that the university plays an invaluable role in promoting interracial friendships among students who bring their own individual friendship experiences and expectations to the college setting.

Research shows that interracial interaction in an egalitarian setting such as a university can both promote and discourage interracial friendship. Administrators seek to increase racial and ethnic diversity in hopes that positive interactions among young people of similar age, intelligence, and academic background in residential, social, classroom, extracurricular, and co-curricular settings will lead to interracial friendship. Critics of affirmative action and other policies that seek to increase diversity often emphasize self segregation among college students as evidence of negative consequences of multicultural universities. Minority students may feel marginalized in their campus surroundings and seek out friendships with other students of their own race (Tyson 2002). The term "self segregation" implies that minority students segregate themselves from their white classmates despite sufficient opportunities for contact and friendship formation with white students around campus. Critics of affirmative action and other programs that promote diversity often do not recognize that white students also fail to take advantage of opportunities to form friendships with minority students.

Current and past research suggests that people will form friendships with others with similar behaviors and characteristics. Future research should continue to explore interaction among people of different races and ethnicities in situations in which friendship development is possible. This research should examine the similarities among these people across multiple dimensions such as proximity, psychological characteristics, background, and experiences and how these similarities contribute to friendship formation despite racial and ethnic differences.

SEE ALSO: *Brown v. Board of Education*; Cultural Diversity and Aging: Ethnicity, Minorities, and Subcultures; Friendship, Social Inequality, and Social Change; Friendship: Structure and Context; Gender, Friendship and; Race and Schools; School Segregation, Desegregation

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race/ethnicity, health, and mortality

Parker Frisbie and Robert A. Hummer

Few issues are of greater importance for a society than the health of its members. And, based on the US Department of Health and Human Services Healthy People 2000 and 2010 reports, few issues are of greater concern than race/ethnic differentials in health and mortality in the United States. Any discussion of this topic places us squarely at a crucial interface of sociology (especially social demography) and social epidemiology. Although health (or morbidity) and mortality clearly are biological phenomena, one point of general agreement across these disciplines is that race/ethnicity is properly conceived as a sociocultural construct, not a genetic one. That is, we assume that if all race/ethnic compositional differences could be

controlled, race/ethnic disparities in health and mortality would vanish – or at least be greatly reduced. A useful definition of an ethnic group is “a collectivity within a larger society having real or putative common ancestry, memories of a shared historical past, and a cultural focus on one or more symbolic elements defined as the epitome of peoplehood” (Schermerhorn 1970: 12). It is from this vantage point that the American Sociological Association (ASA) has endorsed and encouraged the continuation of research on race disparities across a wide range of topics (ASA 2003, as cited by Takeuchi & Williams 2003).

The current race categories (self reported) most often found in US data are white, black (or African American), Asian, Pacific Islander, and American Indian/Alaska Native. More specific identifiers may be reported. For example, Asians may identify as Chinese, Japanese, Filipino, etc., and Pacific Islander individuals may identify as Hawaiian, Samoan, etc. Although the small size of many of the subgroups often makes it necessary to collapse data into a broader category, finer grained distinctions are useful because of the well documented heterogeneity within the larger categories. Hispanic identity is treated separately, so that the “race” categories become non Hispanic white, non Hispanic black, and so on, and Hispanics (or their component subgroups) are treated as one of a larger set of “race/ethnic” categories. Data may be retrieved and reported for certain Hispanic subpopulations (e.g., Mexican, Puerto Rican, Cuban). Definitional matters have become even more complex since the Office of Management and Budget began to allow respondents to identify with more than one racial category.

INTELLECTUAL CONTENT AND ANALYTIC DIMENSIONS

The health of groups that are disadvantaged socially, economically, and/or politically is often compared to non Hispanic whites, which means a comparison of minority groups with the majority. This body of work becomes closely linked with social stratification in that group specific disadvantages and advantages are described and then attempts are made to understand the factors

that explain them. A voluminous literature throughout the twentieth century compared the health and mortality of the black and white populations (or, in the earlier, more limited data, whites and non whites). With few exceptions, this research reported excess mortality and poor levels of health among blacks in comparison to whites. More recently, research on Hispanic groups, particularly the Mexican origin population (i.e., both Mexican immigrants and US born Mexican Americans), has been greatly expanded, and increasing attention is being paid to Asian and Pacific Islanders (APIs) and American Indians. In general, morbidity and mortality rates are highest for blacks. Puerto Ricans and American Indians also have poorer overall health and higher mortality rates than do non Hispanic whites. The same is true for Pacific Islanders, including Hawaiians. The health and mortality profiles of most Hispanic groups are similar to those of non Hispanic whites, while most, but not all, Asian groups have superior health and higher life expectancies compared to all other race/ethnic populations.

Differential access to socioeconomic (SES) resources has been found to be critical in helping to explain health and mortality differences between race/ethnic groups, although in most cases residual differences between groups remain even after SES factors are taken into account. Further, certain Hispanic groups, particularly Mexican Americans, were found to have overall mortality rates similar to those of the non Hispanic white majority. This near parity has been termed an “epidemiologic paradox” due to the disadvantaged risk profiles of the former populations (Markides & Coreil 1986). A number of other risk factors, including disparities in access to preventive and curative care, stress produced by discrimination, behavioral differences, nativity, and religiosity have also been linked to the health and mortality differences between the majority and race/ethnic minorities and continue to be a major focus of theory and research.

The study of race/ethnic variation in health and mortality encompasses a broad spectrum of health and mortality outcomes, beginning with the analysis of race/ethnic patterns of fetal loss all the way through investigations of disability and mortality among the oldest old. Throughout the life course, the topics of investigation

vary depending on the outcomes most relevant by age group. During infancy, research often revolves around differential birth outcomes (i.e., birth weight and gestational age), as well as age and cause specific infant mortality. Throughout childhood (when mortality rates are at their lowest), research typically analyzes health and development outcomes such as differential levels of asthma, childhood obesity, exercise patterns, and even academic outcomes across groups. During adolescence and young adulthood, the focus often shifts to health and sexual behavior patterns, as well as the accidental and violent causes of death that characterize this age group and that have been shown to be higher among most minority groups in comparison to non Hispanic whites. Studies during adulthood are often geared toward patterns of chronic disease, the development of disabilities, and premature mortality. Finally, older adult studies typically focus on active life expectancy, disability, and cause specific mortality.

As with much empirically based research in sociology, investigations of these topics have become more and more complex over time with the development of sophisticated individual level surveys, record linkage across surveys, and heightened computing power. Much early work dealt with aggregate units of analyses (e.g., county rates), but with the advent of richer vital statistics data sets and specialized surveys, micro level comparisons of race/ethnic variation in health and mortality moved to center stage. Currently, considerable emphasis is being placed on multilevel research in which the effects of both individual risk factors and contextual (e.g., neighborhood) variables on race/ethnic disparities are explored. Changing patterns across time is another major analytic dimension – one that has been given impetus by the increasing diversity of the US population as immigrants come to constitute an increasing share of the total US population.

CURRENT SUBSTANTIVE EMPHASES

Perhaps the most prominent conceptual model for health inequalities among race/ethnic groups is based on the premise that social inequities give rise to disparities in health and mortality. Specifically, the ability of individuals

to reduce the risk of disease and death “is shaped by resources of knowledge, money, power, prestige, and beneficial social connections” (Link & Phelan 2002: 730).

Research has begun to focus on the implications of dramatic advances in the treatment and prevention of disease guided by the proposition that, as improvements in health care and technology lead to overall diminution of the risk of morbidity and mortality, relative disparities between race/ethnic populations will tend to widen. For example, while the overall levels of infant mortality have dropped, the relative gap between white and black infants (as indicated by the black–white rate ratio) has grown over the past two decades. This perspective follows directly from the fundamental social causes paradigm, as some substantial portion of this growing black–white inequality appears to have resulted from the greater survival benefits that accrued to white infants in the case of two of the five leading causes of infant death: respiratory distress syndrome (RDS) and sudden infant death syndrome (SIDS) after the introduction of perinatal care innovations designed to reduce risk of infant death from these conditions (Frisbie et al. 2004).

It has long been known that the health and mortality outcomes of immigrants and of infants born to immigrant mothers from virtually every country of origin tend to be more favorable than those of their US born co ethnics (e.g., Hummer et al. 1999) – even though immigrants are typically disadvantaged with respect to access to the formal health care system and often in terms of SES. The most frequently offered explanations for the superior health and survivorship of immigrants include positive selection of migration for the most robust individuals and cultural buffering. Some authors have suggested that the paradox is a data artifact (as described below). In any event, the health and mortality advantages of immigrants appear to erode as individuals spend a longer period of time in the United States, a finding consistent with the notion of “negative acculturation,” although the relative lack of access by immigrants to the formal health care system represents a plausible alternative explanation.

While a number of social factors are associated with race/ethnic disparities in morbidity and mortality, a central question continues to

be: what are the mechanisms through which race/ethnicity is related to health and mortality outcomes? As an example, consider the effects of SES. Compared to their more affluent counterparts, persons of low income will often lack the resources to access high quality medical care, healthier residential environments, and occupations that involve a low risk of illness and injury. Even so, race/ethnic disparities in health and mortality often persist even after rigorous controls for individual level measures of socioeconomic status. One potentially fruitful avenue involves the study of differential accumulation of stress for race/ethnic populations created by discrimination and residential segregation.

METHODOLOGICAL ISSUES

One set of methodological challenges revolves around the identification and measurement of race/ethnicity itself. Issues such as changing race/ethnic identities over time by individuals (e.g., as in the case of the growing number of individuals in the US who have identified as Native Americans since the 1960s), inconsistent reporting of race/ethnicity for individuals depending upon who reports the information, and the growth of multiple race/ethnic reporting make even seemingly simple descriptions of race/ethnic patterns of health and mortality a major methodological challenge.

Studies in which immigrant characteristics are featured face the problem of a rapidly changing race/ethnic composition and increasing group diversity of the US population that is associated with a series of changes in immigration law since 1965. Circular migration between the US and other nations, particularly Mexico, poses a related methodological difficulty. To illustrate, longitudinal studies of mortality in the US often “statistically follow” individuals who were interviewed in sample surveys through matches to identifying information on death certificates. If sampled individuals leave the country, they become “statistically immortal” because their deaths will never be recorded in the US vital statistics. Some recent investigations of this issue report that Mexican immigrant adult mortality in the US is probably underestimated. However, even the most careful

adjustments show favorable Mexican immigrant mortality patterns in light of their disadvantaged social and economic status (Elo et al. 2004).

Differential reporting, as well as misreporting, of health on social surveys by race/ethnicity can also create analytical difficulties. There remains concern about the extent to which the often used respondent reports of health reflect clinical reality, but a number of evaluative studies indicate that self reported health is closely related to both morbidity and mortality.

Analysts that hypothesize socioeconomic based differences to be the root of many race/ethnic health and mortality disparities regularly adjust for available measures of SES, such as education and income. However, such conventional measures, while helpful, are limited in that they fail to tap into many other dimensions of SES, such as wealth, quality of education, and access to health insurance.

FUTURE DIRECTIONS

Fruitful future directions for research in this substantive area include at least the following. Additional research is needed that sheds light on the mechanisms through which social attributes and characteristics “get into the body” and lead to higher risks of morbidity and mortality. Some important findings have emerged regarding the effects of stress associated with race/ethnic disparities in SES and quality of life, but a greater degree of collaboration between social science and public health/medical researchers should be encouraged. In sum, both the “social” and “medical” models seem clearly necessary, but neither alone is sufficient.

A fair degree of progress has been made through multilevel (or contextual) research in which the effects of both micro and macro level variables on race/ethnic differences in health and mortality are explored, but considerable expansion of this research agenda is needed. This will require more data sets constructed specifically with multilevel analyses in mind.

Additional studies are needed regarding the explanation for the superior health and survival of immigrant members of most race/ethnic groups. Those who embrace “negative assimilation” as an explanation must confront the fact that, while we have some useful measures of

cultural attachment (e.g., continuing to use language of place of origin), there is a virtual absence of measures of cultural content. To illustrate, the culture of Hispanics is not the same as that of Asians, which, in turn, is not the same as that of European immigrants. The most likely explanation may well be positive selection of migration, but demonstration of the validity of this interpretation would seem to depend on development of data sets that capture important characteristics of immigrants at both origin and destination – as has been accomplished by Landale and associates in the study of Puerto Ricans (Landale et al. 2000).

The importance of panel surveys and the leverage that such data sets provide for inferring causality are well known. Perhaps less obvious is the importance of temporal effects that occur over the life course and intergenerationally. For example, morbidity and mortality risk in adulthood may be affected both directly and indirectly by birth outcomes and later child well being. Policies designed to enhance child health can be expected to have beneficial effects in adulthood (Hayward & Gorman 2004: 87).

Finally, a greatly expanded research agenda is needed that explores the relationship between advances in health care and a widening gap between race/ethnic groups. It is ironic and unacceptable that relative (and in some instances, absolute) race/ethnic disparities in health and mortality have followed in the wake of overall advances in health care. Thus, race/ethnic health and mortality differentials remain a pressing cause of concern.

SEE ALSO: Health and Race; Infant, Child, and Maternal Health and Mortality; Social Epidemiology; Socioeconomic Status, Health, and Mortality; Stratification, Race/Ethnicity and

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racial hierarchy

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Racial hierarchies are systems of stratification premised upon the belief that some racial groups are either superior or inferior to other racial groups. A racial hierarchy in which white Europeans were deemed innately superior to all other “races” in virtually every respect was crucial for imperialist expansion in all parts of the world, as well as for the creation and practice of slavery. Without the stated belief that white people are superior – intellectually, spiritually, artistically – than non white people, it would not have been possible to subordinate and dehumanize conquered peoples.

Sidanius and Pratto (1999) argue that the means by which group based hierarchies,

including racial and ethnic hierarchies, are established and maintained, are similar across social systems. Nevertheless, there is no one definition or indicator of racial hierarchy (or inequality) which is used consistently in different countries.

Systems of ethnic and racial stratification have differed historically, not only in terms of the groups involved, but also the complexity and the magnitude of the distinctions made between them. Racial hierarchies in societies with a relatively high degree of intermarriage, such as in Brazil or other countries in Latin America, can be subtle or denied to exist altogether. By comparison, the workings of formal institutionalized systems of racial stratification, as existed in South Africa prior to 1990, or under slavery and Jim Crow in the US, were clear cut and transparent. In the former South Africa (though this is only the most paradigmatic and contemporary historical example of racial hierarchy), Africans were deemed inferior to both “coloreds” and whites, and they lived in segregated townships as lesser beings. In all aspects of their lives – economically, politically, and socially – whites were indisputably at the top, Africans at the bottom, and the “colored” population comprised a formal intermediate category.

In the US today, there appears to be a fairly widespread view, both among many academics and the wider public, that white Americans are at the top of a racial hierarchy, African Americans at the bottom (with sporadic reference to Native Americans as an equally oppressed group), and groups such as Asian Americans and Latinos somewhere in between (Bashi & McDaniel 1997). Many analysts in the US believe that the historical legacy of slavery is fundamental in explaining the relatively disadvantaged status of many African Americans today. Feagin (2000) argues that white Americans have simply expended much less time and energy in exploiting and oppressing other groups such as Asian Americans and Latino Americans. In addition to arguments about their distinctive historical treatment and experiences, African Americans have fared badly according to various socioeconomic indicators, such as educational attainment, housing, and income. In the US, black families earn about 60 percent of what white families earn and survive on roughly 12 percent of the wealth of average

white families. As individuals, their life spans are 6–7 years shorter than whites. Both in the past and in the present, African Americans have often been the victims of horrific racial attacks.

Most conceptions of racial disadvantage and oppression in the US have to date relied upon a rather unitary (i.e., anti black) understanding of racism and racial disadvantage – though there is now significant research into the class differentiation of African Americans. In recent years, a growing number of studies have begun to investigate the specific racialized experiences of other minority groups. For example, social psychologists researching the effects of racism have begun to question whether models of racial identity based on the experiences of African Americans (the group most studied regarding the effects of racial prejudice in the US) are adequate to understand the racial and ethnic identities of other groups, such as Latino and Asian Americans.

Although forms of both overt and covert discrimination and prejudice are still all too prevalent in the US and Europe, many countries are no longer characterized by rigid sociopolitical constraints, but rather by a gradual modification of the social and economic parameters dividing white and non white peoples. While there is considerable agreement about the persistence of white power, privilege, and racism, the question of which groups do and do not constitute disadvantaged ethnic minority groups is now more contested than ever. Among other factors, significant demographic changes, such as intermarriage, as well as diverse flows of immigration, are unsettling longstanding understandings of hierarchy in many western contemporary societies.

The ways in which debates about racial inequality get framed in the first place depend a great deal upon the specifics of each national context, with their distinctive histories of colonization and settlement, the specific mix of various minority and majority populations, discourses about racial inequality and minority experience, and state policies concerning “integration” or multiculturalism. Particular racial paradigms are associated with specific national contexts and cultures.

In Britain, unlike the US, most research has (until recently) stressed the *commonality* of

experience of ethnic minorities in relation to the white majority, suggesting a common disadvantaged status in relation to the housing and labor markets, racial abuse, and certain forms of social exclusion and marginalization. This may be because, in Britain, many South Asians and African Caribbeans have shared in common the history of British colonialism in the Indian subcontinent, the Caribbean, Africa, and South Asia and came to Britain in the post war period to work in predominantly unskilled or semi skilled jobs as disadvantaged minorities.

Turning to France, Silverman and Yuval Davis (1999) note that Jews and Arabs have long been central to theorizations of racism in France, and this model has tended to eclipse the black/white paradigm more commonly found in Britain and the US. Furthermore, the political culture in France militates against the specification of ethnic difference and origins, based upon the orthodoxy that, in France, one does not question a single and indivisible republican citizenship.

In contrast to the US situation (in which a predominantly anti black conception of racism is employed), it is much more common in Britain for analysts to identify a variety of racisms which are flourishing in contemporary Europe, such as anti Jewish, anti Muslim, anti Turk, anti African, and anti Gypsy racism (Cohen 1996). While many British analysts acknowledge that each of these racisms has its own specific history and characteristic features, the implication of such a wide ranging list of racisms, discussed together, is that they are equivalent and comparable.

While some analysts (especially in North America) believe that the concept of a top down racial hierarchy should be retained, pointing to significant differences in the life chances and well being of disparate racial groups, others argue that this concept is simply divisive, contributing to assertions about a "hierarchy of oppression" (Hickman 1998). Rather than argue that some minority groups are more racially oppressed or disadvantaged than others, British analysts such as Mary Hickman and Phil Cohen argue for a complex and pluralistic cartography of racism which would recognize anti Semitism and anti Romany racism alongside the racism experienced by African Caribbeans and South Asians.

Why do claims about racial hierarchy still matter today? Because a great deal is at stake. Groups which successfully claim an oppressed status can gain both moral and material capital. Belief in the existence of a top down hierarchy can also shape group relations, public policy formation, and political alliances. The question of whether some groups are worse off than others is highly pertinent at a time when there is growing recognition of multiple forms of racisms and racial oppression.

The concept of racial hierarchy is suggestive of a "big picture" of how disparate groups fare. In both the US and Britain, analysts' references to a wide range of indicators of disadvantage and privilege can make it difficult to assess the *overall* positions and experiences of groups in relation to each other. One of the key difficulties encountered in scholarship about racial hierarchies is the fact that analysts privilege certain indicators of racial disadvantage or well being over others in making claims about the positions of groups in a top down hierarchy. The identification of specific criteria means that we privilege certain social indicators as fundamental, while rendering other markers, problems, and people relatively invisible to public concern and public policy.

Thus there is a lack of consensus in discussions about the criteria one applies in constructions of racial hierarchy, as well as the *methodological* difficulties of measuring and comparing different forms of racial oppression across disparate groups. In comparison with racial prejudice (e.g., in various public places), how relevant are factors such as a group's average family income, the nature of their representation in the popular media, or their participation in politics, for the overall assessment of how a group fares? There are many and different (though in many ways related) dimensions of a group's status and experience. While it is possible that some groups are consistently disadvantaged across a whole range of indicators, it is also possible that a group may fare badly according to some indicators, but may be relatively privileged according to others.

Differential levels of material resources possessed by various ethnic minority groups (including different subgroups of "Asians" and "blacks") surely make a difference to these groups' overall sense of well being and social status. But in recognizing the centrality of

material resources, we must not overlook other areas of social experience which truly give meaning to the idea of “belonging” and social inclusion in the wider society (Song 2003). Nor do material resources guarantee a group’s ability to participate fully in society. For instance, the Chinese in Britain have virtually no public presence in the arts or popular culture of Britain, and there is hardly any Chinese participation in political parties in Britain. In this sense, while they are “successful” according to some socioeconomic measures, the Chinese are very much at the margins of British society.

Thus, taking a broader view of social inclusion and exclusion complicates the neat, top down picture one might derive from reliance on socioeconomic indicators alone. The issue of which criteria or indicators are used in claims about the existence of a racial hierarchy is also complicated by the fact that distinctive yet simultaneous hierarchies can occur along various dimensions of experience, whether these be based upon race, class, or gender locations.

Unfortunately, claims about the ordering of groups on a top down hierarchy can encourage politically divisive comparisons between groups. Amid the scramble for scarce group resources, and against a backdrop in which disparate groups may know very little about each other, there can be little room for empathy. Members of disparate minority groups may believe that they are more disadvantaged than others, and these competing beliefs can contribute to inter ethnic tensions.

Given the difficulties that can arise in assertions about racial hierarchies, should we simply jettison this concept in scholarship about “race” and racial inequalities? Most analysts, especially those in the US, would say no – though they point to the need to qualify and refine this concept. We need to remember that the ethnic and racial landscapes of many multi ethnic western societies are undergoing vast and significant change. We are certainly moving towards societies in which the meanings of “race” and ethnicity, the assertions of ethnic and racial difference and experience, and the manifestations of inequality are increasingly complex and varied.

The state, and its national political leaders, also play key roles in the adjudication of conflicts and competing claims among racialized

minority groups. In the US, despite the prevalence of an official multiculturalist discourse which suggests an unproblematic ethnic and racial diversity, major demographic changes have brought blacks, Latinos, and Asian Americans into direct conflict (Kim 2004). According to Claire Kim, through their espousal of multiculturalist discourse, political leaders in the US have actually discouraged Americans from addressing these intergroup tensions. In the course of discussing the notion of racial hierarchy (as a counter narrative to official multiculturalist discourse), Kim argues instead for the notion of “racial positionality” – a concept which allows for the recognition of disparate forms of racial disadvantage, as well as the reality of interethnic tensions.

As stated earlier, a key difficulty in arguments about racial hierarchies is that, given the numerous indicators of well being and disadvantage which can be used (and their potentially complex combination in relation to specific groups), it can be difficult to summarize groups’ overall experiences along a monolithic, top down hierarchy. Therefore, in addition to applying the concept of racial positionality, more delimited hierarchies which position groups on the basis of specific indicators of well being or disadvantage (such as poverty or entrance into higher education) are a useful way forward.

SEE ALSO: Apartheid and Nelson Mandela; Boundaries (Racial/Ethnic); Caste: Inequalities Past and Present; Endogamy; Multiculturalism; Race; Race (Racism); Racism, Structural and Institutional; Racist Movements

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racialized gender

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Racialized gender is a sociological concept that refers to the critical analysis of the simultaneous effects of race and gender processes on individuals, families, and communities. This concept recognizes that women do not negotiate race and gender similarly. For instance, white women's oppression has been linked with their privilege as white people, but they have not escaped the bonds of sexism. Black women's and First Nation women's oppression has been linked to the struggle of self definition, agency, and collective empowerment. Latina and Asian women's oppression has been linked more to sexism emerging from immigration and multi generational experiences. Historical, social, and geographic context influence the expression, interpretation, and performance of gender relations over the life span of an individual. Multi racial feminists and ethnic scholars have written extensively about racialized gender particularly as it relates to social constructions of family and sexuality.

Racialized gender concerns the study of the influence of socialization practices on the individual. Social environments such as the family, communities, and institutions provide the frame in which experience is interpreted and communicated and the self (e.g., identity) is defined in relation to difference. Social environments impose or limit culturally appropriate cues, scripts, behaviors, and outcomes for individuals through hierarchical raced, gendered, and classed systems of privilege and domination. The development of gender and racial identities

is an important milestone, as an individual's self identity perception has been shown to be instrumental in overriding the effects of harmful, external, stereotyped messages. The family is the primary site for the racial socialization of children and socialization of gender identity. For this reason, scholars have focused on the extent to which ethnic families have performed traditional gender norms (as defined by the majority discourses) and used those norms to organize family responsibilities and to socialize children.

The sociohistorical frameworks of race, ethnicity, gender, class, and sexual orientation are embedded in how the sexuality of ethnic women has been created, reproduced, and disseminated for public consumption. Racialized gender can be observed in the study of sexual images and scripts and body image as it relates to perception of beauty. Multiracial feminists and womanists have identified various sexual scripts and the distinctive identity processes women negotiate due to historical and economic circumstances. For instance, sexual stereotypes for black women in the US have been "transformed" from one context, American slavery, to the current sub context of Hip Hop. Black feminists and womanists have traced how the Jezebel, Mammy, Welfare Mother, Tragic Mulatto, and Matriarch stereotypes have "evolved" into more sexually explicit images and scripts such as the Diva, Gold Digger, Freak, Dyke, Gangster Bitch, Sister Savior, Earth Mother, and Baby Mama (Collins 1991; Stephens & Phillips 2003). A close examination of these stereotypes reveals racialized and sexualized colonial tropes of African primitivism and hypersexuality. Theracist imagery and expectations embedded in these narrowly defined stereotypes of black female sexuality have been constructed deliberately to constrict black women's ability to replace or eliminate negative images of black womanhood.

The concept of racialized gender is also found in comparative research concerning physical attractiveness and body image. Physical attractiveness stereotypes have been found to be the dominant component of gender stereotypes, consistently implicating other components of gender stereotypes. For instance, scholars have observed that white women seem to have a uniform notion of what "beauty" should be, and

their conception of beauty tended to match the culturally popular images of women in the mainstream media. Black women, however, have been found less likely to hold uniform notions of beauty, and far more likely to describe beauty in terms of personality traits rather than physical ones. Parker et al. (1995) conducted a study of African American, Asian American, Mexican American, and white female high school students. They found that white adolescents' conceptions of beauty were much more rigid, fixed, and uniform than those of African Americans, who were much more flexible and fluid in their notions of beauty. The African American girls' perceptions of beauty focused on personality traits and a personal sense of style, rather than a certain "look." Poran (2002) argued that beauty must be reconceptualized as a race experience in order to understand and explore fully the diverse experiences women have in relation to, and within, cultures. She believed that images that convey beauty may hold different meanings for different women. In her study, she found that white women seemed to respond to cultural standards of beauty on the basis of what was attractive to western, white men. Black women initially reported that there was a white defined standard, but then reported Afrocentric characteristics as a beauty standard to pursue. Latina women seemed to have a less straightforward, more complex response to dominant imagery.

There is a need to conduct more empirical research that examines racialized gender. For example, more research is needed to determine how institutions transmit and define "appropriate" gender relations. Second, more research is needed to analyze how class diversity and mobility among different ethnic groups influences the expression, reproduction, or termination of specific gender ideologies and behaviors.

SEE ALSO: Black Feminist Thought; Multi racial Feminism; Intersectionality; Race; Womanism

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racism, structural and institutional

Mikaila Mariel Lemonik Arthur

When most people think about racism, they think about the concept of individual prejudice – in other words, negative thoughts or stereotypes about a particular racial group. However, racism can also be embedded in the institutions and structures of social life. This type of racism can be called structural or institutional racism (hereafter, institutional racism) and it is significant in creating and maintaining the disparate outcomes that characterize the landscape of racial inequality.

The term institutional racism was first used by Carmichael and Hamilton in 1967 with the intent of differentiating individual racist acts from what we can describe as policies or practices that are built into the structures of various social institutions and which continue to

operate even without the active support and maintenance of individuals. Institutional racism has probably been with us for as long as human societies have been formally or legally divided into races. There are two main types of institutional racism. The first, which can be called “direct,” occurs when policies are consciously designed to have discriminatory effects. These policies can be maintained through the legal system (such as in the case of apartheid in South Africa or Jim Crow in the US) or through conscious institutional practice (such as redlining in residential real estate or underfunding urban public schools). The second type, “indirect” institutional racism, includes practices that have disparate racial impacts even without any intent to discriminate (such as with network hiring in workplaces).

Institutional racism continues to affect many areas of life, in particular education, housing, economic life, imprisonment, and health care. Indirect institutional racism also continues to affect the lives of people of color, and because it is unconscious, those who maintain institutional structures and policies may not be aware of its existence unless it is challenged by activists or lawsuits. For instance, the Rockefeller drug laws in New York State, enacted in 1973, include very heavy penalties for those selling or possessing narcotics. These laws were enacted with the intent of protecting communities from the scourge of drug sales, but have led instead to disparate imprisonment of young black men. This is because though individuals of all races use drugs at similar rates, young black men are disproportionately likely to use the particular drugs targeted by the Rockefeller drug laws.

Institutional racism affects people of color in many aspects of their lives. Sociologists and other researchers continue to seek empirical evidence of institutional racism as they study such questions as the black–white test score gap and its effects on college admissions. However, it is much harder for researchers to find evidence of institutional racism than of individual discrimination. This is because it is possible for a set of guidelines to disadvantage a particular racial group while being consistently and fairly applied to all individuals. One of the most powerful tools used to uncover evidence of institutional racism is the audit study method, where testers are matched on all characteristics

except for race and sent to apply for jobs or housing. These studies present powerful evidence of the continued effects of institutional racism. For instance, Pager (2003) showed that white men with prison records and black men without prison records who are matched on other characteristics such as education and prior work experience are about equally likely to be hired for entry level jobs. Similar research has shown that black applicants for home loans or rental apartments are much less likely to be approved, and that people searching for residential real estate are likely to be steered to neighborhoods which match their skin color.

While civil rights legislation banning discrimination both in the public sphere (voting and *de jure* segregation) and the private sphere (universities and housing developments) was passed in the 1960s with the aim of outlawing direct institutional racism, lawsuits are of limited utility when it comes to enforcing such legislation in the absence of concrete evidence of harm to specific individuals (Crenshaw 1995). Another limitation of strategies designed to combat institutional racism is that they may be coopted. For instance, affirmative action was designed as a program to combat institutional racism in education and employment. Lawsuits targeting affirmative action programs, such as *Gratz v. Bollinger* and *Grutter v. Bollinger*, have suggested instead that affirmative action policies themselves are direct institutional racism, since they supposedly provide an advantage to particular racial groups. However, as Justice O'Connor pointed out in her majority opinion in *Grutter v. Bollinger*, institutional racism still limits the access of students of color to selective higher education institutions. Though these difficulties make it hard to find ways to combat institutional racism, analysts suggest that becoming conscious of its existence is the first step. Brown et al. (2003) then suggest that the best steps to take include setting up a formal regulatory apparatus to challenge institutional racism when it exists and to develop policies to deal with the “legacy of disaccumulation” in communities of color.

SEE ALSO: Apartheid and Nelson Mandela; *Brown v. Board of Education*; Health and Race; Occupational Segregation; Race and Crime; Race and the Criminal Justice System; Race

and Schools; Redlining; Residential Segregation; School Segregation, Desegregation

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racist movements

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Racist movements are organized, collective efforts to create, preserve, or extend racial hierarchies of power and privilege. Such movements explicitly espouse the ideologies of white supremacy and/or anti-Semitism (anti Judaism or hatred of Muslims or Arabs) that were consolidated in the western world in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. Manifestations of intergroup antagonism in earlier times, even conflicts that cross what later would be regarded as racial lines, generally are not considered racial movements because these are not based in modern

ideas of race as an essential, biological, polarized, and unchanging attribute of social groups. Denoting as racist only social movements that take place in western societies is a common practice in sociological research, as most scholars regard white supremacy and anti-Semitism as the legacy of ideologies by which European colonists sought to exonerate their brutal conquests and occupations. However, this restriction has been challenged by studies that use the concept racist (or racial) movements to describe subnational intergroup antagonisms in a number of non-western societies, including China, India, Indonesia, and Russia.

Racist movements take a variety of forms over time and in different places. Some arise in response to political opportunities for asserting enhanced racial superiority; others as counter-movements organized to oppose perceived gains by other racial groups. Some recruit sizable proportions of the population, thereby accruing significant influence over state policy or even the ability to elect candidates to political office. Such large racist movements often are linked, overtly or covertly, to right-wing political parties, nationalist efforts, or fascist groups. In other contexts, racist movements are small and politically marginal. These tend to shun mainstream politics, relying instead on violence or terrorist tactics to achieve racist goals.

Racist movements also vary in their ideologies and agendas. Some favor the creation or preservation of racially homogeneous societies, generally through exclusion, expulsion, or extermination of those they regard as racially different. Others promote racial supremacy or separatism within heterogeneous societies. Although movements that promote racial superiority or separatism such as black nationalism or black separatism in the US are some times referred to as racist, scholars generally reserve this term for collective efforts that promote white or Aryan dominance because these seek to bolster established racial systems of subordination and superordination. White supremacist, Nazi and neo-Nazi, white power skinhead, Aryan supremacist, and white/Aryan separatist movements are types of modern racist movements.

The ideologies of racist movements typically are quite complex. All have a core belief in racial supremacy or racial separatism, but

this may coexist with philosophies that seem quite antithetical, such as environmentalism, women's rights, atheism, or anti colonialism. The ability to embrace beliefs from widely differing ideologies and social contexts while retaining racism as a central agenda is described as the "scavenger" aspect of modern racism. Racist movements are generally adept at recruiting members by presenting racial solutions to a wide range of non racial social concerns, including anxieties about crime, the quality of children's education, the global economy, or national pride. Such ideological flexibility is why some racist movements with very extreme racial views manage to attract a wide base of adherents.

Until the late twentieth century, racist movements tended to be fervently nationalistic. Racist leaders identified the interests of whites or Aryans as what was best for the nation as a whole and advocated national purges of other races. In the twenty first century, a number of racist movements have rejected narrow nationalist appeals in favor of global racist politics, what some term a movement of "pan Aryanism." The waning of nationalism in these racist movements is due to a variety of factors. Opportunities to spread the influence of racist movements through transnational venues such as the Internet have proven attractive. Also compelling is the global circulation of racist mercenary soldiers and terrorists, as well as a global trade in armaments and other contraband that presents the possibility for enhanced funding of racist movements. Equally important has been the declining support for national governments by racist movements. Many racist movements in the US, Canada, and Europe embrace extreme anti Jewish philosophies, often based on variants of Christian Identity, a racist philosophy that regards Jews as the powerful and literal descendants of the devil. These movements describe western governments as under the control of a Jewish elite, or, in racist terminology, as "Zionist Occupied Governments (ZOG)" and thus as obstacles to racist agendas.

The penchant for secrecy about strategies and future plans that is characteristic of virtually all modern racist movements makes it difficult to predict their future course, but it is likely that they will be small and very violent. In the aftermath of the atrocities of World War II,

particularly the extermination of millions of European Jews through deliberate policies of racial supremacy, overt racist appeals became less legitimate in many parts of the western world, making explicitly racist mass movements less likely. Also, racial hierarchies of privilege and subordination were sufficiently institutionalized in much of the West in the post war period that there was little impetus for mass racist mobilization to challenge existing arrangements. Racist movements that mobilized in the latter half of the twentieth and early twenty first centuries thus tended to be small groupings of white power advocates, neo Nazis, and Aryan supremacists. Except where they allied with political parties in some European and Southern African nations, these movements have had little direct impact on the policies of the nations in which they are located. Instead, some of the most influential racist movements have turned to strategies of violence and terrorism, seeking to disrupt the social order and provoke social chaos, a strategy they describe as instigating an apocalyptic "race war" to eradicate Jews and non whites.

WHY DO RACIAL MOVEMENTS ARISE?

Theories of why racist movements begin and how they attract adherents generally use frustration–reaction or intergroup competition frameworks. Frustration–reaction theory is based in older scholarly understandings of racist movements as collective and irrational expressions of anger by members of one racial group toward members of another. According to this theory, racist movements might accurately target groups that are responsible for their perceived problems, but, more often, they displace anger from the antagonist to a more vulnerable group that serves as a scapegoat and target of collective aggression. The case of Nazism in Germany – especially before the Nazi seizure of state power – often is used as an example of how racist movements emerge as a response to collective frustration. The Nazis, in this formulation, took advantage of the discontent evoked by economic turmoil and the national humiliation of Germany in World War I to build a popular movement. Jews, Roma (Gypsies), and others became scapegoats for collective anger

over Germany's national distress. When the Nazi movement took control of the German state, such sentiments made it possible to unleash a "final solution" of racial extermination, with catastrophic consequences.

A competing and later theory regards racist movements as the product of antagonisms that stem from competition between racial groups for social, economic, cultural, or territorial advantages. Competition theory has been used to explain the rise and fall of such racist movements as the Ku Klux Klan (KKK), a series of largely unconnected white supremacist movements that have appeared and collapsed in the US from the 1870s to the present. The first KKK emerged in the Reconstruction era South. This Klan was a small, loosely organized grouping of rural white men who used terror to bolster Southern white male privileges and combat what they feared to be the growing strength of African Americans and Northern politicians after the Civil War. This Klan collapsed in the 1870s in the wake of federal sanctions and, perhaps more importantly, because whites perceived political or economic competition from African Americans to have waned as the result of racist legislation and renewed white control of the Southern economy. In the mid 1910s, a new Klan emerged in the South, but this KKK movement grew strongest in the cities of the Midwest, East Coast, and West Coast. Competition theory explains the shift in the Klan's base as the result of changes in patterns of interracial rivalry. White Protestants in Northern and coastal states turned to the Klan when they felt threatened by large numbers of Catholic and Jewish immigrants and the migration of African Americans from the South. The second Klan thus used economic boycotts and electoral politics to curb competition and maintain the privileges of white native born Protestants. After the collapse of the second Klan in the late 1920s, subsequent eruptions of the KKK were small and concentrated in the South, emerging largely in response to racial integration of schools.

Competition and, less commonly, frustration–reaction theories are widely used in the study of racial movements, but there are problems with each theory. Frustration–reaction theory has been criticized for reducing social phenomena to individual psychological states, making it difficult to account for the varying

appeal of racist movements in times or places in which people are likely to experience similar levels of anger or distress. Moreover, research on racist movements, even German Nazism, finds that factors other than intergroup hostility are significant in mobilizing people toward racist collective action, and that racist activists are no less logical or rational than others in a similar social context. Frustration–reaction theory also can be circular, using the presence of racist movements as evidence of antecedent collective anxiety. Competition theory is generally more robust for explaining racist movement. This theory suggests that racist movements emerge as the result of economic and political competition among racial groups. The spike in racist movements and racial violence in late twentieth century Europe that accompanied the influx of migrants from former colonies in Northern Africa and South Asia is an example, as is the racist backlash that occurred with post communist economic and political uncertainty in Russia and Eastern Europe. However, counterexamples suggest that competition theory might not be universally applicable. The largest racist movements in the twentieth century US occurred in the 1910s–1920s, 1950s–1960s, and 1980s, times of relative economic prosperity for many whites in which racial competition for jobs and social benefits was relatively low; in contrast, the serious economic depression of the 1930s, with its severe competition for jobs and economic benefits, witnessed comparatively fewer racist movements.

DATA AND METHODOLOGIES

Racist movements pose complicated problems for researchers. Most evident is the danger of studying groups in which violence is common and directed not only at those perceived to be enemies of the movement, but also at allies, even members. Researchers may find it difficult to avoid becoming a target of a violence that tends to suffuse organized racism. Moreover, since racist groups generally seek to avoid public scrutiny and are particularly concerned about infiltration by government authorities, researchers face danger if they are perceived as disseminating negative information about racist groups or as potential government informants.

Another problem for the study of racist movements is that these tend to operate illegally or on the margins of legality. Except in the rare cases where racist movements operate in the political mainstream, visible racist activists also face sanction from family, friends, and employers. Most racist movements thus operate in ways that are difficult for anyone – including authorities and researchers – to trace, creating few documents and attempting to obfuscate the identities, intentions, and activities of their members.

Concerns about researcher safety and the inaccessibility of racist groups have had a pronounced effect on the methodologies used in racist movement studies, especially by shaping the techniques of data collection. Much research on racist movements is based on information made publicly available by racist groups, such as group propaganda, evidence from rallies and protests, and interviews with racist spokespersons. These have proven useful in detailing changes over time in the ideological direction of racist groups and their ability to mobilize adherents for public events. However, the validity of such data is questionable since these reflect what racist leaders deem useful to be disseminated and reveal little about how racist groups actually operate. Such important questions as how racist movements are funded, what alliances exist among racist groups, and how organized racists formulate strategies cannot be addressed with information garnered from racist movements themselves. Moreover, such data tend to overemphasize the importance of self-designated leaders, making it difficult to understand the composition and activities of their overall memberships, which increasingly are composed of substantial numbers, even majorities, of women and teenagers who are almost never regarded internally as leaders or spokespersons for racist groups.

A second source of data on racist movements is government intelligence and information from private anti-racist monitoring agencies such as Searchlight (England) or the Southern Poverty Law Center (US). These agencies collect and disseminate information from the public events of racist groups, as well as information acquired through arrests and criminal and civil prosecutions of racist members and groups, and from infiltrators or defectors from the racist movement. Such data have been used effectively

to analyze the strategic and tactical operations of racist movements across the world. Yet the validity of such information too can be questionable since it is often collected to meet the needs or enhance the political advantages of monitoring agencies rather than for purposes of social scientific research.

A third and much less common source of data on racist movements is ethnographic observation of the inner workings of racist groups or interviews with their members. To get access to accurate information while protecting the safety of a researcher requires lengthy and delicate negotiation with racist activists, so these data have only been collected on a small number of racist groups, limited geographical areas, and subsets of racist activists such as women or teen-aged white power skinheads. Conclusions derived from analyses of these data may have limited generalizability.

GAPS IN RACIST MOVEMENT RESEARCH

There are large gaps in what is known about racist movements. The difficulty of collecting valid data on secretive and dangerous groups, as well as widespread scholarly aversion to studying loathsome social movements, has resulted in a paucity of research on racist social movements relative to social movements that advocate progressive social change. There is a need for additional research on four important aspects of racist movements.

First, there is virtually no data on global circulation of ideas, strategies, resources, or members of racist movements. It is unclear whether or how racist movements in various parts of the world have coordinated their efforts, or even how the notion of pan-Aryan unity has been received across different racist movements.

Second, scholars do not fully understand how and why people are attracted to racist ideas and movements. The theory that adherence to racist groups is a product of individual pathologies or irrational emotions is clearly inadequate, but a clearer understanding of the mechanisms and motivations of racist movement recruitment has not been formulated.

Third, there is only fragmentary evidence about the range of outcomes that are associated

with different types of racist movements. It is unclear, for example, whether the adoption of Christian Identity precepts is likely to precipitate strategies of terrorist violence. It is also unknown whether small, secretive racist groups will prove to be more durable than larger racist movements.

Finally, the connections between racist movements and the social contexts in which they emerge and are sustained needs additional study. It is not enough to assert that racist societies provide the social environment in which racist movements can develop, as there is considerable variation in the extent to which this occurs. Rather, researchers need to explore the mechanisms that link the extreme ideologies of racist movements with the normative and institutionalized racist practices of their societies.

SEE ALSO: Anti-Semitism (Social Change); Conflict (Racial/Ethnic); Ethnic, Racial, and Nationalist Movements; Race; Race and Ethnic Politics; Race (Racism); Racial Hierarchy; Scapegoating; Separatism; Social Movements; Terrorism

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Radcliffe-Brown, Alfred R. (1881–1955)

Bernd Weiler

Alfred Reginald Radcliffe Brown and Bronislaw Malinowski (1884–1942) are generally considered to be the “founding fathers” of British social anthropology. Born into a poor family in Sparkbrook, Birmingham, Radcliffe Brown attended King Edward’s School and worked in a library in Birmingham before being awarded a scholarship for Trinity College, Cambridge, in 1902. At Cambridge Radcliffe Brown, whose interest in the social sciences was allegedly stimulated by his acquaintance with H. Ellis and P. Kropotkin, took his undergraduate work in Mental and Moral Science. Toward the end of his formal education he turned to anthropology, studying with, among others, W. H. R. Rivers, A. C. Haddon, and C. S. Myers, all veterans of the famous Torres Straits Expedition (cf. Kuper 1989: 36–49; Stocking 1996: 306). In 1906, after one year of preparation, Radcliffe Brown went to do fieldwork among the Andaman Islanders, who in the evolutionist framework were supposed to be among the “lowest” peoples on earth. Upon his return in 1908, Radcliffe Brown became a fellow at Trinity College and, as he

wrote in a letter to M. Mauss in 1912, found himself “in complete agreement with the view of sociology put forward in the *Année sociologique*” as well as being “the first person to expound . . . [Durkheim’s] views in England.” Between 1910 and 1912 he conducted further ethnographic research in Western Australia. After World War I Radcliffe Brown, whose ethnography on *The Andaman Islanders* (1922) appeared in the same year as Malinowski’s work on the Trobrianders, led a nomadic academic existence, teaching anthropology at Cape Town, Sydney, Chicago, Yenching, Oxford, São Paulo, London, Manchester, Alexandria, and Grahamstown, South Africa. From the late 1930s, when Malinowski left for the United States and Radcliffe Brown returned to England, to the early 1950s, Radcliffe Brown’s (structural) functionalism dominated British social anthropology. Social scientists influenced by Radcliffe Brown’s teaching in and outside Great Britain include (the early) E. E. Evans Pritchard, M. Fortes, S. F. Nadel, M. Gluckman, I. Schapera, A. P. Elkin, M. N. Srinivas, F. Eggan, R. Redfield, S. Tax, and W. L. Warner.

As a theorist Radcliffe Brown, together with Malinowski, is generally credited for having led the “synchronic and nomothetic revolution” in anthropology, thereby discarding at the same time the theories of social evolutionism and diffusionism. Radcliffe Brown defined social anthropology as the comparative sociology of “primitive societies.” He concurred with F. Boas and his school that the schemes of social evolutionism had often been highly speculative based upon flimsy facts and that anthropology had to employ thorough methods of observation and data collection. In contrast to the Boasians, however, who sought to reconstruct the history of a particular culture or culture area, he argued that the objective of anthropology was to find social laws. The discovery of these laws required generalizing about a particular society’s “social structure,” which was amenable to direct observation, and to bring to light its “structural form,” its recurrent patterns of relationships. In a second step of generalization, one was to compare the “structural forms” of different societies. Radcliffe Brown hoped that this comparative analysis would eventually yield social laws akin to those that had already been found in the natural sciences (Barnard 2001: 70–9).

Radcliffe Brown’s theoretical work is commonly subsumed under the heading of functionalism or structural functionalism. Rejecting the idea that societies are mere agglomerates of fortuitous elements and relying upon the “organic analogy,” Radcliffe Brown emphasized the fact that all communities had to have a certain level of interconnectedness and unity in order to survive. In contrast to Malinowski, who argued that culture was “functional” to the extent that it satisfied individual biopsychological needs, Radcliffe Brown followed the sociological approach of Spencer and Durkheim and defined the function of a recurrent activity, for example a funeral ceremony, as “the part it plays in the social life as a whole” (Radcliffe Brown 1952: 180). Denouncing the search for origins as futile, Radcliffe Brown argued that in order to understand a typical activity or an institution, it was not necessary to know its history and how it had developed over time but to know how it contributed to the continuity of the structure in the present. Despite the later critique of Radcliffe Brown’s work, especially of his anti-historical bias, his disregard of social change, his “oversocialized conception of man,” his all too harmonious depiction of society, the colonialist ideology implicit in functionalism, and the vagueness of his central concept of “structural continuity,” his ideas were formative not only for modern kinship studies and for political and legal anthropology, but also for subsequent functionalist and structuralist theory building in anthropology and sociology. In histories of anthropology, Malinowski is often portrayed as the “culture hero” of fieldwork, whereas Radcliffe Brown is seen as the first truly scientific theorist of British social anthropology whose enduring legacy lies in his emphasis on comparative and generalizing analyses.

SEE ALSO: Anthropology, Cultural and Social: Early History; Culture; Durkheim, Émile; Function; Functionalism/Neofunctionalism; Malinowski, Bronislaw K.; Parsons, Talcott

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radical feminism

Eve Shapiro

Radical feminism arose in the US, Canada, and Britain out of young women's experiences within the civil rights, New Left, and anti war movements of the 1960s. Drawing on de Beauvoir's concept of "sex class" from *The Second Sex* (1952), radical feminism – emerging from what was known in the late 1960s as the women's liberation movement – developed an analysis of women's inequality at the social structural level and was a revolutionary (as opposed to reformist) movement that called for fundamental institutional and cultural changes in society. There were three key beliefs guiding radical feminist analysis and activism. First and foremost, radical feminism argued that gender was the primary oppression all women face in

society. Second, it asserted that women were, either essentially or due to social construction, fundamentally different from men. Third, it held that social institutions and norms rely on women's subordination, and consequently are constructed to maintain and perpetuate gender inequality in all aspects of life, including around deeply personal facets like sexuality and reproduction.

Radical feminism was distinct from the surge in liberal feminist activism committed to fostering change within existing institutions that also emerged in the late 1960s. As Sara Evans documented in *Personal Politics* (1980), during the 1960s women gained experience as activists and were simultaneously faced with sexism within progressive movements. Out of these experiences women formed radical feminist groups such as the Chicago Women's Liberation Union, the London Women's Liberation Workshop, and the Redstockings, seemingly overnight in 1967 and 1968. Within a year there were hundreds of radical feminist groups across the US, Canada, and Britain that combined personal education, public protests, and cultural development. Radical feminism was the most dominant force in the development of feminist activism and scholarship through the mid 1970s and has continued to influence offshoots including cultural feminism and lesbian feminism, and academia in the form of women's studies.

A REVOLUTIONARY MOVEMENT

In her article "The Women's Rights Movement in the US: A New View" (1968), Shulamith Firestone argued that the women's liberation movement has historically been a revolutionary movement. Firestone retold the story of first wave feminist activism as a radical movement, drew historical connections to anti racist and anti capitalist movements, and asserted that the emerging feminist movement was the continuation of this legacy. It was this belief that equality demanded a drastic transformation of social institutions that made radical feminism revolutionary.

Radical feminists theorized that sex class (women as a distinct class unto themselves) was a social phenomenon maintained through violence and social sanctions, and advocated

women's autonomy from men in all aspects of society. Out of this ideology developed critiques of all social institutions, including language, science, capitalism, family, violence, sexuality, and law. These radical critiques examined how institutions maintained inequality and oppressed women. For example, Susan Griffin and Susan Brownmiller both argued that rape was not about sex but about the enforcement of patriarchal control and misogyny. Activists such as Ti Grace Atkinson argued that patriarchal oppression pervaded all aspects of women's personal and public life and that the only path toward equality was a fundamental restructuring of all social institutions.

PERSONAL IS POLITICAL

One of the most important concepts to come out of radical feminism was the idea that the "personal is political." What radical feminists meant by this was that women's intimate experiences of oppression (e.g., within the family) were not isolated experiences, but rather products of institutional inequality. Out of the analysis that oppression affected all facets of life came a number of social movement tactics.

Consciousness raising (CR) groups – small gatherings where women shared their experiences of sexism and developed a collective feminist critique – were a fundamental part of radical feminist organizing. Originating with the New York Radical Women, CR groups quickly became a staple of radical feminism. They were aimed at helping women understand their own experiences through the lens of radical feminist ideology and politicizing them around gender oppression in the process. It was through these groups that issues such as rape, abortion, and sexuality (both heterosexuality and homosexuality) became politicized issues for feminist movements.

Radical feminism also created new movement structures and organizational forms. In an effort to eradicate what were viewed as patriarchal power relations, radical feminist groups developed non hierarchical, consensus based structures and processes. Radical feminist organizations often developed numerous subcommittees to address the many arenas of

social change women's liberation groups saw as central. The Chicago Women's Liberation Union, for example, had more than 20 working groups, including daycare, an abortion referral service, a prison project, a graphics collective, and a newspaper. Radical feminism utilized a number of new social movement tactics, including "zaps," or action oriented protests, guerrilla theater, and the creation of alternative institutions such as women run health care centers, music labels, and mechanics shops.

DEMANDING STRUCTURAL CHANGE

One of the first radical feminist protests was held at the opening of Congress in January 1968. The "Jeanette Rankin Brigade," named after the first woman elected to Congress and led by Rankin herself, brought 5,000 women affiliated with women's peace groups to demonstrate against the Vietnam War. At this protest the New York Radical Women staged a guerrilla theater piece titled "Burial of Traditional Womanhood," and it was at this protest that the phrase "sisterhood is powerful" was first used.

A much more highly publicized protest was held a few months later on the Atlantic City boardwalk during the Miss America Beauty Contest. Joining forces with members of the New York chapter of the National Organization for Women, a liberal feminist organization, radical feminist groups disrupted the Miss America pageant and demonstrated on the boardwalk. Drawing on radical feminist ideology, the street theater performed on the boardwalk drew connections between capitalism, patriarchy, mass media, and beauty myths and catapulted the burgeoning women's liberation movement into the public spotlight. It was out of this protest that the myth of "bra burning" arose, even though no bras were burned. A similar protest was staged in Britain in 1970 at the Miss World competition in London. Radical feminist protesters interrupted the competition shouting "We're not beautiful, we're not ugly, we're angry" and throwing tomatoes and flour bombs at the emcee Bob Hope.

While radical feminist activism was decentralized with no national leadership or organization

as part of empowering all women to be feminist activists and leaders, groups did work together. In 1971 British women's liberation groups held a conference at Ruskin College in Oxford to discuss movement goals and strategies. In the US on August 26, 1970 radical feminist groups across the country participated in "strike for equality" marches to commemorate the 50th anniversary of women's suffrage. Reflecting the exponential growth of feminist movements between 1967 and 1970, 50,000 women marched in New York City, 3,000 in Chicago, 2,000 in Boston, and countless others in cities and towns across the country.

Some of the most significant legacies of radical feminist organizing are the service organizations that grew out of women's liberation groups. Domestic violence shelters were founded in the early 1970s, as were rape crisis centers, feminist bookstores, and women's studies programs. Canadian radical feminists worked through the Women's Legal Education and Action Fund to argue and win a Canadian Supreme Court obscenity case. Echoing the radical feminist analysis that "pornography is the theory, rape is the practice," the 1992 Butler decision ruled that the potential harm pornography could inflict on women was more significant, legally, than freedom of expression. US scholar Andrea Dworkin and lawyer Catherine MacKinnon, who worked to introduce anti-pornography legislation in the US, influenced this legal approach to institutional change.

"GAY-STRAIGHT SPLIT" AND CULTURAL FEMINISM

As Nancy Whittier explored in *Feminist Generations*, an in depth study of the radical feminist community in Columbus, Ohio, by the end of the 1970s, differences between radical and liberal feminisms became less clear as liberal groups radicalized and radical feminism moved toward self help and service organizations. Similarly, Suzanne Staggenborg documented how radical feminist organizations became more centralized and hierarchical in structure over time. Radical feminists criticized this shift toward what came to be called cultural feminism as a diversion from revolutionary change. But

as Taylor and Rupp argued in "Women's Culture and Lesbian Feminist Activism: A Reconsideration of Cultural Feminism" (1993), the development of women focused institutions, community, and culture was a successful means of perpetuating feminist activism in an increasingly hostile environment.

As part of the development of cultural feminism, there was a split within radical feminist communities around sexuality. Sparked by homophobia within feminist movements, nascent lesbian centered feminist theorizing such as Adrienne Rich's "Compulsory Heterosexuality and Lesbian Existence" (1983), and sexism within the gay liberation movement, lesbian identified feminists developed a separate branch of feminism. Lesbian feminism extended radical feminist ideology and argued that gender and sexuality are inexorably linked and work dialectically to reinforce patriarchal power.

SCHOLARSHIP

Guided by radical feminist ideology, scholars such as Kate Millett and Anne Koedt created a body of feminist research that emerged in the 1970s and has continued to the present. Early anthologies documented the emergence and ideological development of feminist movements. This early scholarship focused on reclaiming contemporary and canonic theories from a woman centered viewpoint. For example, drawing on and elaborating Marx's concept of historical materialism, Shulamith Firestone developed a theory of women's oppression and the primacy of sexism in the *Dialectics of Sex* (1970). Other authors focused on substantiating claims about the structural norms that maintain gender inequality. Gayle Rubin's 1975 article, "The Traffic in Women: Notes on the Political Economy of Sex," asserted that kinship and marriage norms functioned to trade women as property in the service of men's social relationships. Similarly, Mary Daly argued in *Gyn/Ecology: The Metaethics of Radical Feminism* (1978) that language itself was patriarchal and that women needed to create new words to replace oppressive language. Much of this research supported the radical feminist belief in fundamental differences between men and women. For example,

Carol Gilligan's controversial book *In a Different Voice* (1981) argued that women make different moral judgments than men, and radical feminists used this to support arguments that women were, indeed, morally superior.

Other feminist scholars documented feminist activism and elaborated ideological tenets. Books such as *The Politics of Women's Liberation: A Case Study of an Emerging Social Movement and Its Relation to the Policy Process* (1975), by Jo Freeman, and Alice Echols's groundbreaking *Daring to Be Bad: Radical Feminism in America, 1967–1975* (1989), helped bridge feminist academic research and activism. More recently, scholars like Belinda Robnett and Verta Taylor have examined radical feminist movements in more detail from a social movement's perspective. Benita Roth argues in *Separate Roads to Feminism: Black, Chicana, and White Feminist Movements in America's Second Wave* (2004) that while earlier case studies have erased or dismissed the involvement of black and Chicana women in radical feminism and other second wave movements, significant numbers of women of color participated in feminist movements.

CRITIQUES

The central critique of radical feminism, which emerged alongside organizing and scholarship, was that theorizing women as a sex class obscured differences between women, especially in terms of race, class, and nation. In *Black Feminist Thought: Knowledge, Consciousness, and the Politics of Empowerment* (1990) Patricia Hill Collins described the interrelationships of oppression as a "matrix of domination" and argued that radical feminism marginalized women of color and poor women and perpetuated classism and racism in the process. This marginalization happened within activism, scholarship, and theorizing. In one of the first and most important anthologies by women of color feminists, *This Bridge Called My Back* (Moraga & Anzaldúa 1981), women of color wrote about the intersections of race, class, gender and nation, feminist movements, and marginalization. Over time, more specific anthologies about Chicana, Asian/Pacific Islander, and black women also appeared, such as

Homegirls: A Black Feminist Anthology (1983), edited by Barbara Smith.

The second significant critique of radical feminism has been the focus on identity and women's difference. Post modern and queer theorists such as Judith Butler and Elizabeth Grosz have asserted that radical feminist ideology essentialized differences between men and women, and in so doing reinforced and reified gender roles and indeed gender itself. Transgender activists have developed similar critiques of radical feminism and argued that attributing traits to essentialist notions of womanhood and manhood reinforces the naturalization of both gender and sex.

Regardless of these critiques radical feminist theorizing has continued to influence feminist activism and scholarship. The institutional legacies, in the form of rape crisis centers, women's studies programs, and community political organizations, continue to thrive, and radical feminist ideology continues to shape contemporary feminist movements.

SEE ALSO: Black Feminist Thought; Cultural Feminism; Essentialism and Constructionalism; Feminism; Feminism, First, Second, and Third Waves; Feminist Activism in Latin America; Lesbian Feminism; Matrix of Domination; Personal is Political; Pornography and Erotica; Social Movements; Socialist Feminism; Women's Movements

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radio

Tim Crook

Human social life depends upon the constant development and varied uses of modes of communication. Social existence also relies on shared and contested understandings of the world. This necessitates the systematic study of communication and culture, and of their mediation through a variety of channels. The sociology of radio concentrates on the role of the radio medium in this process. Radio is now embedded in a complex intermedia world. It is not a medium that has been substantially substituted by the subsequent development of alternative modes of communication. But the changing nature of communications technology has led to a change in style of content and social function of radio in human communities.

In most societies radio enjoyed a paradigmatic status in the electronic arena prior to the establishment of television. During this time radio content contained a significant amount of speech programming. Following the assertion of television as the dominant form of electronic entertainment and information, radio formats became dominated by music programming. In the post industrial age speech and cultural affairs programming now tends to be underwritten by public/state broadcasting institutions.

The sociological approach investigates the regional, national, and global order in which the radio cultural and communications industries have played an increasingly central role, and the way radio media forms and practices participate in social and political organization and creative expression. It concentrates on understanding the role of radio in contributing to symbolic structures in human interaction, and the specific tasks involved in addressing their changing role in contemporary societies.

The sociology of radio is an interdisciplinary and multidisciplinary process that draws from the arts, humanities, and social sciences. As such, it involves the mapping and testing of concepts and theories in a cartographic intellectual arena marked by many locations of academic contestation. Both quantitative and qualitative methods of inquiry have been employed. In simple terms, the subject oscillates between

qualitative analysis of radio texts, a discourse on the relationship with social, cultural, political, and economic contexts, and social scientific measurements of quantifiable data so that there is an inductive background to deductive assertions.

The sociology of radio is an academic process that is central to the modern subject of media or communication studies. Indeed, it could be argued that an intellectual sociological investigation of radio was a key starting point for studying the nature of human communication in society in the twentieth century.

Qualitative textual analysis borrows from "rhetoric" (the study of oral and written communication), an academic discipline stretching back to the time of ancient Greece and Rome. It was a key subject in the Middle Ages and during the European Renaissance and Enlightenment. The sociology of radio is also influenced by the development of academic disciplines over the last three centuries that interrogated concepts such as public opinion, mass audience, propaganda, information war, and communications media. The paradigmatic age of radio stimulated academics to see the links between radio broadcast content and oral and written communications of social, political, and aesthetic discourse. The study of the electronic medium of radio appeared to stimulate a much more complex interdisciplinary analysis of media and linked sociology with psychology, anthropology, and other subjects.

T. H. Pear of Manchester University appears to have undertaken the first serious academic investigation of the social psychological impact of radio. In research conducted between 1927 and 1931 he focused on the relationship between voice and personality. His methodology would be considered crude by contemporary standards, but it was qualitative and quantitative and conducted in accordance with the prevailing notions of scientific and laboratory discipline. He even had the cooperation of the BBC in broadcasting special performances so that listeners could fill out questionnaires distributed by the BBC's listings magazine, *Radio Times*. He wanted to explore the process of listening to radio drama on the BBC. He approached the project by exploring radio drama from the listener's end, the psychological problems of listening to radio drama, imagining the unseen through experiments connected with radio drama, a discourse

on the issue of radio and talking films, and whether radio broadcasting and listening had any role in the construction of the radio personality. He published his research in *Voice and Personality* in 1931.

In the US, Hadley Cantril and Gordon W. Allport followed up Pear's work in Britain. Again, they concentrated on the social psychology of radio. However, they extended the inquiry with wider sociological concerns. As a result they contextualized radio listening not only from the point of view of radio as a psychological novelty, but also to include issues such as the influence of radio upon mental and social life, the nature of the American radio industry, its institutions, the process of "fashioning the listener's attitudes and opinions," censorship, propaganda, the sponsorship and content of programs, and listeners' tastes and habits. They also conducted experiments concerning voice and personality, sex differences in radio voices, the differences between human speaker and electronic speaker reception, listening versus reading, and whether there were effective conditions for broadcasting. Their approach was practical as well as abstract. They wanted to assess the sociological implications of broadcasting technique, entertainment, advertising, education, and the argument that radio could extend the social environment. This research was published in *The Psychology of Radio* in 1935.

In Britain, Hilda Matheson published a book called *Broadcasting in the Home* University Library of Modern Knowledge series in 1933 that appears to be one of the first sociological discourses on radio's role in twentieth century society. Matheson had been head of talks at the BBC, had commissioned the development of an independent news section, and had background expertise on the role of propaganda as a result of her career in the Security Service (MI5) during World War I. Matheson analyzed the role of radio historically and its social context from the point of view of living speech, public opinion, literature and drama, music, entertainment, education, and its relationship with the state. Her approach was logical and pioneering: "When we talk of the effects of broadcasting, we usually think in the first instance of the effects upon the body of actual listeners – upon

their tastes in music, their general interests, and their social habits. It is obvious, however, that the ripples in the pond reach much further than this." Despite her modest avowal that the text was a mere "brief sketch of broadcasting," Matheson had set out a sociological agenda with an appreciation of the cultural and aesthetic role of radio broadcasting.

One of Matheson's colleagues at the BBC, Charles A. Siepmann, emigrated to the US and took up the sociological baton of analysis with the polemical *Radio's Second Chance* in 1946 and the more academic *Radio, Television and Society* published in 1950. Siepmann declared that his primary purpose was to outline "the history of a cultural revolution and to show what has been discovered by research concerning the effects of radio and television upon our tastes, opinions, and values. The second purpose is to deal with broadcasting as a reflection of our time and to throw light upon the problems of free speech, propaganda, public education, our relations with the rest of the world, and upon the concept of democracy itself" (Siepmann 1950: v). Siepmann widened Matheson's international analysis between UK and US broadcasting and he divided his study between systems and institutions of broadcasting and the social implications of radio in terms of propaganda and public opinion, freedom of speech in theory and practice, radio and education, and world listening. His engagement with television was somewhat peripheral, as by 1950 it was still a somewhat inchoate medium, though expanding exponentially in its social and cultural role in American and British societies.

Among the more influential thinkers who have linked sociological approaches with other disciplines are Harold Innis (1894–1952), associated with the "bias of communications"; Marshall McLuhan (1911–80), who wrote about the concept of the "global village"; and Jürgen Habermas, the German post Frankfurt School sociologist who has highlighted the role of the public sphere as a social zone for the discourse of ideas and expression of a public view. Each of them lived during the so called Golden Age of radio when it was the dominant electronic medium of communication. All three touched on, though did not prioritize, the social role of radio in their writing.

Radio has been both an origin and a bridge for distinctive genres and forms of storytelling across the timeline of human communities. Thus, the television serial was derived from the radio serial, which was derived from the serialized novel published in magazines during the nineteenth century. The use of speech balloons in twentieth century cartoons and comic books was present in Renaissance religious art. The newspaper strip cartoons were both based on and inspired radio serials as an established popular genre of entertainment and comedy.

Moral panics and condemnation of new media forms have followed the popularity of charismatic public poetry in the age of Plato, plays performed in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, published romances, “penny dreadfuls,” the “yellow press,” and “muck raking” pamphleteers in the nineteenth century. In the early days of radio there were fears that transmitters could change the weather, make women pregnant, host the souls of the deceased, and induce insanity. States were quick to ration, control, and censor radio broadcasting and reception and there were debates, as was the case with film, television and the Internet, that radio broadcasting could be a causal factor in generating social delinquency, sociopathy, and sexual deviance.

The groundbreaking social science research project into the link between radio broadcasting and social action, perhaps the first mass media moral panic inquiry, was conducted by Hadley Cantril with the assistance of Hazel Gaudet and Herta Herzog between 1938 and 1940. They investigated, quantitatively and qualitatively, the impact of the Halloween broadcast by Orson Welles’s CBS Mercury Theatre of the Air in October 1938. The radio broadcast of the dramatization of H. G. Wells’s *War of the Worlds* appeared to have been a causal factor in wide spread panic and anxiety. Thousands of listeners were unable to distinguish its fictional content from the reality of a news broadcast. The *War of the Worlds* study stemmed from the setting up of the Office of Radio Research with Paul F. Lazarsfeld as director, and Frank Stanton and Hadley Cantril as associate directors. The Rockefeller Foundation made the office’s first grant to Princeton University in 1937. The *War of the Worlds* study was funded by a special grant from the General Education

Board. The field HQ of the research office had been based in New York City, and when it was felt that the project should be relocated to a more local university, it transferred to Columbia University in the spring of 1940. The Office of Radio Research became the most significant center for sociological analysis of radio as a mass medium in the history of the subject and its record of research output is unrivalled. It had the opportunity of investigating radio during its primacy as a mass medium and so historically it is the laboratory control phase without the competition from television that emerged after World War II. Furthermore, the studies centered on the largest and most complex and powerful capitalist society. The research also occurred during a period of extraordinary social human catastrophe. Lazarsfeld and his wife Herzog and many of the researchers associated with the office were German/Austrian Jewish exiles. It is likely their background of Nazi persecution heavily influenced their intellectual and cultural approach. Their study and analysis of US society was dominated by a Marxist critical framework.

The office’s first significant publication was *Radio and the Printed Page* in 1940. The premise of the study was that in less than 20 years radio had just about reached the goal toward which print had been working for 500 years: to extend its audience to include the whole population. The researchers wished to pose these questions: Will radio displace reading? Is the average man as much affected, moved to action, by what he hears as by what he reads? And most important of all, who listens to what? The office based its findings on thousands of detailed interviews held with radio listeners of every type all over the US. The study focused on the conflict of radio and the press and its economic, educational, sociological, and political implications.

Radio Research 1941 published a rich range of sociological analysis. Rudolf Arnheim and Martha Collins Bayne investigated foreign language broadcasts over local American stations, Duncan MacDougald, Jr. analyzed the role of radio and the popular music industry, Theodor Adorno studied “The Radio Symphony – an experiment in theory,” Edward A. Suchman turned his attention to the study of the creation of new music listeners by the radio, and

Frederick J. Meine concentrated on radio and the press among young people. Meine focused on answering three questions: Where do young people get most of their news? What are the factors which influence news consumption? What are the factors which influence knowledge of the news?

William S. Robinson's work on radio and the farmer constituted a complex sociological study. He started with the phenomenon of radio and the rural individual, ways of studying individual effects, interest in national and international affairs, radio as an educational instrument, and the effect of radio and migration from the farm. He extended his study to investigate the issue of controlling rural opinion and action via radio, some social effects of radio in terms of unorganized social intercourse, organized social intercourse, deliberateness of decisions and the social effects of radio, and radio and church attendance.

Rudolf Arnheim had published a qualitative discussion of radio aesthetics in *Radio* published in 1935. His writing was primarily poetic and philosophical and progressed from discussion of issues such as the imagery of the ear and the world of sound, to practical production techniques of direction and distance, spatial resonance, sequence and juxtaposition, and the necessity of radio film. He did touch on sociological questions when analyzing "In Praise of Blindness: Emancipation from the Body," the relationship between author and producer, the art of speaking to everybody, wireless and the nations, and the psychology of the listener.

By 1941 Theodor Adorno had completed a masterful qualitative study of the phenomenon of neo fascist charismatic US radio broadcasters such as Father Charles Coughlan. Adorno focused on the broadcaster called Martin Luther Thomas. *The Psychological Technique of Martin Luther Thomas's Radio Addresses* was not published until 1976 in German and 2000 in English. His study represents a seminal textual analysis of the cultural technique and sociology of using radio to propagandize the listener into social action. Adorno concentrated on the personal element in self characterization of the agitator, Thomas's broadcasting method, the religious dimension of broadcasting and reception, and Thomas's engagement with ideological bait.

Radio Research 1942-43 marked a significant expansion of the center's sociological work on radio in the US. Herta Herzog and Rudolf Arnheim investigated the textual content and reception of daytime serials that constituted the primary form in the talk broadcasting of the time. Charles A. Siepmann began an important study on the role of radio in wartime. This involved looking into the relation between government and industry, the dissemination of information, and the use of radio in furthering understanding.

The head of radio audience research at the BBC, Robert J. E. Silvey, made a contribution on studying radio listening in Britain. Ernst Kris, Hans Herma, and Howard White presented a substantial analysis of German radio propaganda. Radio in operation was represented by studies in program profiling and the industry's use of a system called the Program Analyzer. John Gray Peatman explored radio and popular music. Progress in listener research was represented by Boyd R. McCandless's study on why people did not listen or stopped listening to radio. Alfred Udow and Rena Ross investigated the role of bias in radio broadcasting and Ernest Dichter presented a paper on the psychology of radio commercials.

The Office of Radio Research became a division of an expanded Bureau of Applied Social Research at Columbia University and radio's role in the 1940 presidential election was represented in the substantial quantitative and qualitative project *The People's Choice* (Lazarsfeld et al. 1944). Chapter 14, "The Radio and the Printed Page," investigated the concentration of exposure to radio compared to print publication during the election, and whether radio had a key role in decisions taken by voters. Quantitative analysis indicated people highly exposed to one medium of communication also tend to be highly exposed to other media, there are relatively few who are highly exposed to one medium and little exposed to the other, and people highly exposed at one time also tend to be highly exposed at another time of the campaign. The study sought to pose the question: Which is more influential: radio or newspaper?

The People Look at Radio (1946) and *Radio Listening in America* (1948) involved collaboration between nationwide surveys conducted by the National Opinion Research Center at the

universities of Denver and Chicago and analysis by the Bureau of Applied Social Research at Columbia University. Both these studies investigated the listener's attitude to radio broadcasting, including the content and process of advertising. The research was critical and complex in its conclusions. Lazarsfeld reported in 1946 that "for different groups of the population radio has quite different functions: group tastes and their expectations vary much more than the ordinary listener, and very often the individual broadcaster is aware" (Lazarsfeld & Field 1946: viii). *Radio Listening in America* extended the analysis and confirmed that tastes in radio content differed widely in terms of social and economic status, education, age, sex, and urban or rural existence. Persons in upper income groups, for example, tended to favor serious music and radio forums more often than did people lower on the economic scale. Far more men than women regularly listened to news broadcasts. City dwellers preferred classical music, whereas rural residents were partial to plaintive western music.

Sociological examination of radio became subsumed into a wider communications approach with television becoming paradigmatic from the early 1950s. The key landmarks in the social history of broadcasting are the five volume series *The History of Broadcasting in the United Kingdom* by Asa Briggs and the three volume series *A History of Broadcasting in the United States* by Erik Barnouw. Paddy Scannell and the late David Cardiff began an elegantly written *A Social History of British Broadcasting*. However, this project did not progress to subsequent volumes and it is understandable that Briggs and Barnouw transferred their focus to the social history of television in later volumes.

In recent years there has been a promising development in "radio studies" which is primarily grounded in the disciplines of sociology and cultural studies. The *Journal of Radio Studies* (US) and *Radio Journal: International Studies in Broadcast and Audio Media* (UK) provide an opportunity for peer reviewed papers. Goldsmiths College, University of London offers a defined postgraduate course in "Radio Studies: A Cultural Enquiry," and there is evidence of increased interest in continuing significant research into both the textual form

and contextual social topography of radio broadcasting.

SEE ALSO: Adorno, Theodor W.; Mass Media and Socialization; Media; Media and the Public Sphere; Moral Panics; Public Broadcasting; Public Opinion

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random sample

Roger E. Kirk

A census, which is a survey of every unit in a population, is rarely used to gather information in the social sciences because it is often costly, time consuming, or impracticable. Instead, researchers gather the information from a sample that is assumed to be representative of the population. Such a sample can be obtained by using a *simple random sampling procedure*. The procedure selects a sample of size n without replacement from a finite population of size $N < n$ such that each of the $N!/n!(N-n)!$ possible samples is equally likely to be selected. The resulting sample is called a *simple random sample*. Simple random sampling is a type of *probability sampling*. Probability sampling procedures have three common characteristics: (1) the units that compose the population and the units that are excluded from the population are explicitly defined; (2) every potential sample of a given size that could be drawn from the population can be enumerated; and (3) the probability of selecting any potential sample can be specified. In the case of simple random sampling, each sample has the same probability of being selected and the probability of selecting a particular sample is $1/\{N!/n!(N-n)!\}$. Non probability sampling procedures do not satisfy one or more of the three characteristics. A familiar example of a non probability sampling procedure is *volunteer sampling*. As the name suggests, people volunteer to be in the sample. Television viewers, for example, are frequently encouraged to express their opinion about an issue of the day by calling a 900 number. Those viewers who choose to call the number are a non random sample. Such callers typically have stronger opinions about the issue than non callers.

Simple random sampling has two interrelated advantages over non random sampling. First, randomness avoids bias, that is, a systematic or long run misrepresentation of the population. Second, randomness enables researchers to apply the laws of probability in determining the likely error of sample statistics. A particular random sample rarely yields an estimate of the population characteristic that equals the

population characteristic. However, the expected value of the sample estimate over an indefinitely large number of samples will equal the population characteristic. Furthermore, for any random sample, it is possible to estimate the magnitude of the error associated with the estimate.

Four other sampling procedures also are used to obtain a probability sample: systematic random sampling, stratified random sampling, cluster sampling, and multistage sampling. A *systematic random sampling procedure* is one that (1) selects a unit randomly from the first $k = N/n$ units in a list of the population and (2) selects every k th unit in the list after the initial selection. A *stratified random sampling procedure* divides the population into separate groups, called strata, and then selects a simple random sample from each stratum. The sampling is called *proportional* if the proportions of the sample chosen in the various strata are the same as those existing in the population. The sampling is *disproportional* if the sampled proportions differ from the population proportions. A *cluster sampling procedure* divides the population into a large number of groups, called clusters. A number of clusters are selected randomly to represent the population, and then all units within the selected clusters are included in the sample. The procedure differs from stratified random sampling in that all units within the selected clusters are included. A *multistage sampling procedure* is similar to cluster sampling, but has at least two stages. For example, in the first stage, a random sample of clusters is chosen. In the second stage, units are randomly chosen from the selected clusters.

One of the earliest serious efforts to apply statistical theory to random sampling procedures was made by A. L. Bowley (1913). It remained for J. Neyman to solidify the role of statistical theory in random sampling procedures. In a landmark paper published in 1934, Neyman emphasized, among other things, the importance of random rather than purposive selection of units and extended stratified simple random sampling to the sampling of clusters.

A simple random sample can be obtained in a variety of ways once a list of the units in the population has been made. The list is called the *sampling frame*. To obtain a sample that contains half the units in the sampling frame, a researcher

can flip a fair coin. If the coin toss yields, say, a head, the unit is in the sample. Alternatively, a researcher can record the name or identifying code for each unit in the sampling frame on a slip of paper. The slips of paper are placed in a container and thoroughly shuffled. The first n slips drawn without bias from the container compose the sample. The most common method of obtaining a simple random sample uses random numbers. Tables of random numbers can be found in most statistics textbooks. Computer packages such as SAS, SPSS, and MINITAB and many hand calculators have routines that produce numbers that in every observable way appear to be random. Tables of random numbers contain a sequence of random digits whose terms are chosen so that each digit is equally likely to be 0, 1, . . . , 9 and the choices at any two different places in the sequence are independent. For convenience, the digits in a random number table are often grouped with two digits, four digits, and so on in each group. To use a table to select a simple random sample of size, say, $n = 20$ from a population of size $N = 895$, assign the numbers 001, 002, . . . , 895 to the units in the sampling frame. Select a starting point in the table by dropping a pointed object on the table. Choose three digit numbers beginning at the starting point until 20 distinct numbers between 001 and 895 are obtained. The sample consists of the units corresponding to the 20 numbers selected. This procedure is called *sampling without replacement* because once a number has been selected, the number is ignored if it is encountered again.

SEE ALSO: Chance and Probability; Convenience Sample; Experimental Methods; Statistical Significance Testing

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rape culture

Joyce E. Williams

Rape culture is a concept of unknown origin and of uncertain definition; yet it has made its way into everyday vocabulary and is assumed to be commonly understood. The award winning documentary film *Rape Culture* made by Margaret Lazarus in 1975 takes credit for first defining the concept. The film's narration relies heavily on jargon such as "rapism" and "phallogocentric society" and is more illustrative than definitive in dealing with rape as depicted in movies, music, and other forms of entertainment. Authors of the popular *Transforming a Rape Culture* define the phenomenon as "a complex of beliefs that encourages male sexual aggression and supports violence against women . . . a society where violence is seen as sexy and sexuality as violent" (Buchwald et al. 1993: v). An earlier definition was offered by Herman (1984), who characterized the US as a rape culture because the image of heterosexual sex is based on a model of aggressive male and passive female. At the other end of the continuum of definitions are efforts to define a rape culture empirically, such as are found in the work of Baron and Straus (1989) and Ellis (1989). Some empirical works on rape theorize its emanation from a subculture of violence, for example societies with high homicide rates also tend to have high rape rates (Amir 1971; Baron & Straus 1989). Other researchers have stressed that social settings such as created by some male gangs or fraternities produce rape prone subcultures (Boswell & Spade 1996; Sanday 1996). Clearly, rape is more common and acceptable in some environments than in others. However, the concept of rape culture inextricably connects rape with the cultural fabric of the *whole* of society.

All indications are that the term rape culture emerged simultaneously from a number of

sources in the 1970s as a part of the anti rape crusade of the women's movement. The concept of a rape culture is socially constructed as a result of feminist consciousness raising over the past three decades. This makes the phenomenon no less real but suggests that the activities and public rhetoric of the anti rape feminists raised public awareness to the point that a large segment of society, and certainly the media, intuitively know what is meant by rape culture. Social scientists, however, still struggle to define the term and most resort to dealing with it operationally or as a cluster of characteristics or variables. The linkage of rape and culture is an interesting one if dissected grammatically. Rape, a noun or verb transitive, is used as an adjective modifying culture, suggesting a deliberate inseparability: all of rape is linked to culture and all of culture is permeated by rape. To link the two words has the intended effect of linking learned behavior and attitudes (culture) in a causal way to non consensual sex (rape). Use of the word rape as descriptive of culture suggests a pattern of behavior created, organized, and transmitted from generation to generation as part of the expectations associated with being male and being female. Rape culture is not an either/or phenomenon but exists in varying degrees, from the institutionalization of rape to its perfunctory punishment as crime. In the most strident form of rape culture, women are the property of men who deny them respect and the right to control their own bodies (Brownmiller 1975).

Although the concept of a rape culture is somewhat murky in meaning, its popularization helped to shift the causal paradigm of rape from psychology to sociology and, cross culturally, to anthropology. Until the 1970s, rape was viewed not as a social problem but as the act of predator against victim, and the "sick rapist" was the most facile explanation. A cultural or societal explanation of rape moved causation from a micro to a macro level. The underlying assumption is clear: rape is not just the problem of individual rape victims who were accosted by sex crazed rapists. Rape is a socially and culturally produced problem and it must be addressed at the societal level. A rape culture is a product of behaviors and attitudes as well as of the institutions supporting those behaviors and attitudes. While the United States is not

the only society to have a rape problem, rape is not a universal problem (Mead 1963 [1935]; McConahay & McConahay 1977; Sanday 1981a), nor is the term rape culture or even rape a meaningful concept cross culturally.

Feminists theorize a direct cause and effect between women's empowerment and rape – societies where women are empowered politically and economically will be characterized by low incidence of rape and the opposite will be true in societies where women lack empowerment. Most feminists contend that rape culture is generated and maintained by a social structure of gender inequality: political, economic, and social. Such a structure allows and enables men, as arbiters of power, to exploit and abuse women – consciously and unconsciously. By contrast, a society where women are strong or equal to men in positions in government and in the financial world, and have been for some time, is a society where women are less likely to be exploited in pornography or by demeaning stereotypes and where rapes against women are infrequent.

Gender equality is more complex than can be represented by drawing a direct inverse relationship between the status of women and rape, as evident in the fact that rape rates sometimes go up even as the status of women improves (Baron & Straus 1989). At least two other variables may intervene: the status of women vis à vis men and the temporal dynamics of male–female gender roles. First, the status of women is meaningful only in relation to that of men. For example, it is not how much women earn but how much they earn in comparison with males, and the same is true of the number of women in positions of decision making power, or of their legal/statutory equality. Second, it is essential to look at the dynamics of the status of women vis à vis men and to know how these dynamics have changed over time or if they are currently in a state of change. It is in the latter case that rape rates will often increase even as the status of women is improving – that is, things will get worse before they get better. There are two explanations for this phenomenon. According to the "backlash theory," as the status of women begins to change, it represents a disruption of traditional male authority and female subordination and men become more aggressive toward women in an attempt to retain their

control, and in the short term rape rates will increase (Baron & Straus 1989; Austin & Young 2000). As Sanday (1981b: 163) put it, “when the cup of life that defines the male world is broken, men organize to protect their traditional rights,” but she goes on to cite examples of women doing the same thing when their traditions are threatened. An alternative but related explanation is that as women become more equal, their social and work related activities and movements are less restrictive and they become more vulnerable to a male population whose roles and attitudes have not changed to keep pace with new female sex roles. The activities of the “liberated female” may simply make her more accessible or signify to a traditional male that she is “asking to be raped.” Cross culturally, McConahay and McConahay (1977) found a significant positive correlation between sex role rigidity and violence (including rape).

Rape is historically a product of women’s lower status and at the same time works as a mechanism to keep women unequal (Sanday 1981a; Baron & Straus 1989). This circularity is no doubt the reason that empirical data fail to show a consistent inverse relationship between rape and women’s equality. The concept of a rape culture also represents something of a contradiction in the culture and social organization of the United States: rape is culturally produced and maintained by a culture that then makes it illegal. On the one hand, rape is encouraged if not condoned by popular representations of sexuality and of socially scripted male–female behaviors. On the other hand, rape is a culpable crime although its handling by police and the judiciary is selective and leaves much to be desired (Williams & Holmes 1981). Rape and other forms of sexual assault are legally defined by a governmental entity as (in the case of the US) one of the 50 states. Due in large measure to the success of the anti rape movement, many states have replaced rape laws with more gender neutral and inclusive sexual assault laws. While there are many variations, in general these laws prohibit sexual penetration when it is carried out by force or without consent of the victim (male or female). The exception is statutory rape, where age rather than consent is the determining factor. The old rape laws defined unwanted and forced sex as between a man and a woman and also included a spousal exemption,

which meant that a man could not (by legal definition) rape his wife. Feminists lobbied for and succeeded in changing these laws on the basis of their being designed more to protect women as the property of men than women for their own worth.

A rape culture is characterized by a high frequency of rape and other forms of violence against women, the full extent of which is unknown. Incidents of rape are the lowest when measured by police reports, about 65 per 100,000 females in 2002 (Uniform Crime Reports 2002). A victimization survey, based on a 2002 sample of households, recorded 80 rape victims per 100,000 population over age 12, with just over half of the self reported victims having reported the offense to the police (Rennison & Rand 2003). Other research studies among samples or populations of women put self reports of rape or some form of sexual abuse over a lifetime as still higher (Russell 1984; Koss 1992). Cross cultural and international statistics on the incidence of rape are also available, although comparisons are difficult because of varying definitions and methods of reporting. Using any of these reports, however, the US, compared with other industrialized nations, is characterized by a high incidence of rape and sexual assault (Mayhew & van Dijk 1997; Austin and Young 2000).

A rape culture is characterized by female moral and social responsibility. Women are socialized to assume responsibility for controlling the “naturally aggressive” behavior of men in interpersonal relations and by restricting their own movements and behavior. Failure to meet this responsibility leads to victim blaming of women who are raped if they are deemed of questionable reputation or engaged in activities such as hitchhiking or drinking alone in a bar (Williams & Holmes 1981). This element of a rape culture links the perception of women as the moral guardians of society with a kind of supermacho syndrome, or what Baron and Straus (1989) termed “hypermasculinity.” Both females and males are socialized to believe that men are by nature sexual predators. Sexual limits and restraints are to be set by the female because men will “do what men do.” When coupled with the all too common myth that women like the aggressive approach from males and even need such aggression to overcome their inhibitions about sex, the outcome is often women who

feel violated and men who are surprised when accused of rape. In the same context, males who hold traditional gender roles frequently see females who violate these roles by the way they dress or behave or the kind of work they do as “asking to be raped” (Malamuth 1981).

A rape culture is a culture of fear for women, one in which girls at a very early age internalize fear and a sense of restriction simply because they are female. As Brownmiller (1975: 15) put it, rape serves as “a conscious process of intimidation by which all men keep all women in a state of fear.” Before they have a name for it, girls are socialized to know that something terrible could happen to them. Gordon and Riger (1989) label this as women’s “special fear” that limits mobility and, in general, restricts the way they lead their lives. To grow up female in the United States and in some other countries is to internalize a fear unknown to males – knowledge that you can be raped. There is also the knowledge, constituting a part of the fear, that if you are raped you will be subjected to character scrutiny and perhaps blame from others and from the criminal justice system that should be your advocate (Williams & Holmes 1981). This is not to say that men cannot be and are not raped, but they are not socialized to expect it whereas women are. For women rape is part of the “natural environment” (Gordon & Riger 1989). Women are taught to protect themselves against unknown sexual predators by avoiding provocative dress, “unlady like” behaviors and activities, and even association with the “wrong” people, or being in the wrong place at the wrong time. If males fear for their safety, it is not (except perhaps in prison) because of sexual predators.

A rape culture is one in which the media defines and depicts women as secondary and subordinate to males. These negative images range from the most pernicious form of pornography to seemingly innocuous “dumb blond” stereotypes. Research about the influence of the media on rape has focused largely on pornography and, to a lesser extent, on violence in general (Baron & Straus 1989). Perhaps equally important are the more socially acceptable entertainment venues such as magazines, movies, television, and videos that fail to distinguish between the passion of love, the passion of sex, and the passion of power in rape. Even television and radio commercials, music, and print

advertisements still perpetrate stereotypes that women are, at best, weak and, at worst, manipulative. They are portrayed as unable to make decisions, as in need of direction, and as using sex appeal to exploit males. Such images make their way into the popular subconscious and continue to keep women vulnerable and rapeable. Baron and Straus (1989) established a linkage between the circulation of non violent pornographic materials and state by state rape rates. However, they rejected a direct cause and effect relationship in favor of pornography’s indirect effect on rape in that it is symbolic of a macho or hypermasculinity culture. On the other hand, feminists such as Brownmiller (1975) link pornography to denigration of women and to the Freudian myth of a woman’s rape fantasy that many men choose to believe.

A rape culture includes a spillover impact from other forms of violence – illegitimate and legitimate or institutional. Some researchers report a positive association between homicide rates and rape rates (Amir 1971; Austin & Young 2000). Sanday’s (1981a) cross cultural research found that where violence is a way of life, it frequently achieves sexual expression. One example of institutionalized violence is war. Whether preemptive or defensive, war is historically and inevitably linked with rape. Brownmiller (1975) documented this linkage from the crusades through the Vietnam conflict. Rape is a “hallmark of success in battle,” a method of retaliation or reprisal against the enemy. Another example of the spillover effect of institutional violence is that of slavery, where rape of black slave women by their white masters and other males associated with the master was routine, and even expected. In fact, slave masters sometimes offered young black girls to their guests or business associates as a favor or part of the household hospitality (Brownmiller 1975).

The major criticism of the concept of rape culture and of the feminist and social learning theories from which it draws is its monolithic implication that ultimately all women are victimized by all men (Ellis 1989). In reality, of course, all men are only potentially rapists. All women are not victims of rape or sexual assault in a physical sense. Symbolically, however, freedom for women will come only when rape is no longer a common element of the culture in

which we live. Women will be free of their “special fear,” and the need for labels such as rape culture will disappear when females and males are equally empowered, when a woman’s safety is no longer her responsibility alone, and when masculinity is not equated with aggression and passivity with femininity. The concept of rape culture will lose its rhetorical usefulness when violence is a last resort rather than the preferred method of problem solving, when the media find female exploitation no longer profitable, and when rape as a criminal incident and as a personal tragedy becomes rare or unknown. In Sanday’s (1981a) research of 95 tribal societies, almost half were categorized as “rape free,” that is, rape was rare or unknown. Such societies are characterized by sexual equality, gender role complementarities, and an absence of interpersonal violence. Sanday used Minangkabau, a matriarchal tribal society in Indonesia, as her prototype, although in later research (1996) she expressed concern that Minangkabau was losing its rape free culture to modernization. Non-violent, egalitarian, and rape free societies may exist in the present largely as an ideal type. It is, however, an ideal type that represents a goal for the obliteration of rape culture.

SEE ALSO: Consciousness Raising; Culture, Gender and; Gender Oppression; Gendered Aspects of War and International Violence; Inequality/Stratification, Gender; Male Rape; Pornography and Erotica; Rape/Sexual Assault as Crime; Sexual Harassment; Sexual Violence and Rape; Sexualities and Culture Wars; Sexuality; Socialization, Gender

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rape/sexual assault as crime

Dawn Beichner

Prior to the mid 1970s, the crime of rape was defined by most state statutes in terms of the British Common Law and involved the “carnal

knowledge of a female, not his wife, forcibly and against her will” (Bienen 1983: 140). Legislative reforms, designed primarily to reduce rape case attrition, redefined the crime of rape in sex neutral language and replaced the single offense of rape with a series of calibrated sexual offenses and commensurate penalties (Largen 1987). Definitional changes resulted in an expansive category of sexual offenses, relabeled in such terms as “sexual battery,” “sexual assault,” or “criminal sexual conduct” (Bienen 1983).

Although there are jurisdictional variations in criminal statutes, the crime of rape is typically categorized as a first degree sexual assault or battery. *Rape* refers to completed or attempted sexual intercourse with another person by the use of forcible compulsion. The concept of *forcible compulsion* may refer to physical force or psychological coercion. The act of forced sexual intercourse may involve vaginal, anal, or oral penetration by the offender, using either his/her body or an inanimate object. This crime may involve heterosexual or homosexual intercourse, as well as male or female victims.

Second and third degree sexual assaults incorporate a wide range of completed or attempted sexual victimizations that are distinct from the crime of rape. These assaults include unwanted sexual contact with another person and may or may not involve the use of force on the part of the perpetrator. Some behaviors that are common in these categories are inappropriate fondling or grabbing; however, these crimes may also involve the perpetrator’s lewd or lascivious behavior or speech while in the presence of the victim.

Regardless of statutory classification, sexual victimizations are among the most highly underreported crimes. Thus, given that victims may be unwilling to report their victimizations to strangers – police officers and researchers alike – determining the actual rates of sexual victimizations is highly problematic (Belknap 2001). Although there is no way to determine the exact number of sexual victimizations that are not reported to researchers, the most recent National Crime Victimization Survey data suggests that nearly half (46 percent) of all victimizations are not reported to police (Bureau of Justice Statistics 2003).

The issues surrounding underreporting notwithstanding, there are two primary sources for data on sexual victimizations in the United States: the National Crime Victimization Survey (NCVS) and the Uniform Crime Reports (UCR). Whereas the NCVS is a collection of information from US households for all victims – male and female – age 12 and older for sexual victimizations reported and not reported to the police, the UCR provides data on all completed and attempted forcible rapes and sexual assaults against female victims that have been reported to the police. The NCVS data suggest that there were an estimated 247,730 completed and attempted rapes and sexual assaults in 2002, resulting in a sexual victimization rate of 1.1 per 1,000 persons age 12 or older (BJS 2003). Comparable data from the UCR indicate that 95,136 sexual victimizations against female victims were reported to police in 2002, yielding a rate of 64.8 forcible rapes per 100,000 females (Federal Bureau of Investigations 2003).

A number of noteworthy trends emerge in the NCVS data related to disparities in sexual victimizations based upon victim sex, race, and age. Females are victimized at much higher rates than males; the rate of female victimization is 1.8 per 1,000, compared to the male rate of .3 per 1,000, respectively (BJS 2003). A second trend that emerges in comparisons of female and male victimizations is that females are more likely to be assaulted by non strangers than their male counterparts; sexual crimes against females are generally committed by friends/acquaintances (40 percent), intimate partners (20 percent), or other relatives (7 percent). With respect to victim race, the NCVS data indicate that blacks are more likely to be victimized than whites; the black victimization rate (2.5 per 1,000) is significantly higher than that for whites (.8 per 1,000). Similarly, there are important differences in victimization rates related to age; victims aged 16–19 years have the highest victimization rate (58.2 per 1,000), compared to other categories (i.e., 12–15 years – 44.4; 20–24 years – 47.4; 25–34 years – 26.3; 35–49 years – 18.1; 50–64 years – 10.7; and 65 years or older at 3.4 victimizations per 1,000).

A number of scholars, in a variety of social and natural science disciplines, have attempted to explain what compels perpetrators to commit

sexual victimizations. Generally, rape and sexual assault theories may be partitioned into three main categories: evolutionary/biobehavioral, feminist/sociocultural, and integrative. *Evolutionary or biobehavioral* explanations of sexual assault are derived from the core principles of biology, and more specifically, the process of natural selection (Jones 1999). Basically, evolutionary theorists consider rape as an aggressive copulatory tactic in response to natural selection pressures for males (Ellis 1989: 15). *Feminist or sociocultural* perspectives, on the other hand, posit that sexual gratification is not considered the prime motive for action; rather, sexual assault is seen as the use of sexuality to establish or maintain dominance and control of women by men (Ellis 1989: 11). Major proponents of this perspective acknowledge gender differentials in power and emphasize the role of socialization and culture in perpetuating sexual assault, asserting that sexual violence is learned and reinforced by societal themes which posit the male role as dominant over the female (Stock 1991: 68). *Integrative theories* of sexual assault posit explanations that encompass components of both evolutionary/biobehavioral and feminist/sociocultural theories, usually emphasizing one perspective over another.

SEE ALSO: Male Rape; Measuring Crime; Rape Culture; Sexual Violence and Rape

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rapport

C. Richard King

Rapport is best understood as a set of practices and problems in qualitative research describing how simultaneously to get along with one's informants and get information from them. Specifically, it refers to the establishment of good relationships between interviewers or ethnographers and their research subjects. Rapport covers a range of moral and methodological concerns at the heart of the social inquiry, including empathy, immersion, participation, friendship, honesty, collaboration, trust, exploitation, negotiation, and loyalty.

Rapport should not be read as a synonym for friendship, though researchers may become friends with those with whom they work and play. Certainly a means to deeper understanding, it is not, however, an instrumental circuit under the control of the researcher, but something informants, in part, must give (up). And while terribly desirable, even ideal, it is not an end, but a beginning. At root, rapport is a social relationship, an achieved outcome and continuous process emerging from human interaction. It describes a context or connection that makes people feel comfortable enough to open up, be themselves, and share unknown aspects of their lives. In this light, ethnographers and interviewers often conceive of rapport as an ineffable bond, the trust and intimacy they share with their informants. Ideally, this bond binds the two together, granting researchers the capacity

to capture the humanness of the other and render it in empathetic, if not internal, terms, while creating a safe space in which informants may set aside pretension and confide hidden truths and unappreciated experiences. Far from selfless, then, rapport remains a pathway to information and the foundation for interpretation. Qualitative researchers regularly talk about establishing rapport as a means to gain access, a way to get into a community, and subsequently get better, truer, more authentic accounts from informants.

Rapport demands reciprocity, risk, and responsibilities. Qualitative research, rather than an extraction of information or one way transfer of data, hinges on sharing and collaboration, human interactions and meaningful, if always unequal, exchanges of knowledge and affect. In this context, rapport emerges when scholars and subjects give of themselves, committing one to another. Informants contribute stories, experiences, commentary, and connections with others, while interviewers and ethnographers affirm, validate, and give voice. Rapport demands, moreover, that both researchers and their informants take risks. To create safe spaces, they must make themselves vulnerable, opening themselves, reaching beyond expected boundaries, and exposing parts of themselves often kept hidden. Finally, rapport takes shape and persists only in contexts in which participants remain accountable to one another, at once honest and forthcoming. The notion of commitment acts (Feldman et al. 2003) captures each of these elements. In the field or the interview session, a researcher must join, ally, or commit to her informants. These might be small gestures such as hanging out and completing mundane tasks unexpectedly. These might be grander endeavors, for instance refusing to cooperate with the police. Or these might be more long term, as when a black urban community over time comes to welcome a white ethnographer because she lives with them in poverty. Big and small, spontaneous, unspectacular, and daring, such displays and deeds make real and material a researcher's commitment to his subjects, binding one to the other and ultimately contributing to the establishment and maintenance of rapport.

As a consequence of intersubjective and instrumental elements, rapport has long presented qualitative researchers with a series

of dilemmas. These might be productively grouped together under the headings of distance, difference, and deceit.

Many scholars have struggled with how close to get to their informants. Researchers have long been warned about the dangers of going native – that is, of losing the detachment essential for balanced and penetrating insights. They once struggled with how to immerse themselves in a community while remaining objective and how to be intimate and alive in the field without threatening their subsequent analyses. For a time, perhaps for many still, rapport has encouraged scholars to get close, to get along, and to get information, but not confuse these processes with relationships that might alter or distort their findings. Hence, rapport mediates the troubling tensions some locate at the heart of qualitative inquiry.

At the same time, the ideal of rapport has forced researchers to reflect upon the promise and limitations of difference for social inquiry. Specifically, they have argued over whether alterity or identity is more important for the cultivation of rapport.

Until quite recently, difference between scholar and subject was preferred in qualitative research. Not only was it held that encountering the unfamiliar would foster enhanced objectivity, and hence more reliable findings, but it was also posited by many that the gap between self and other could actually facilitate the establishment of rapport, unfettered by conventional assumptions and social arrangements. Perhaps most importantly, uniting these arguments was the belief that strangeness fostered greater insight because informants will reveal more to an interested and empathetic outsider. As a black informant told Rhodes (1994) during her work in Britain: "I wouldn't have had a talk like this with another black person. I can discuss these sorts of things more easily with you. With a black person, you would just take it for granted." Nevertheless, critics have countered that being an outsider can limit access and empathy, making intimacy and analysis more challenging, unless or until scholar and subject find a common ground of experience or circumstance, often through acts of commitment.

In the wake of struggles for racial, sexual, and gender equality and reflective of a broader postmodern trend in social inquiry, researchers

increasingly have championed the importance of similarity and identity to the establishment of rapport. This perspective asserts that if scholars and subjects share one or more cultural attributes or social locations, such as gender, sexual identity, race, or spirituality, it will be easier for them to build an open, honest, and empathetic relationship. Researchers can more easily enter into and gain acceptance in such contexts, while also understanding their informants and making them more comfortable. Consequently, they have an advantaged position that enhances their access and understanding. Critiques of the matching of scholar and subject on the basis of race, gender, and other socially ascribed features have highlighted a number of weaknesses with this position. First, it assumes that trust is established through rather superficial qualities, such as skin color or language, when in fact the connections between researchers and informants is much more complex and processual. Second, it essentializes experience and identity, suggesting, for instance, that women will bond with women because they are women, when in fact issues of class, education, age, sexuality, or race might individually or collectively work to make it harder for specific women to trust a female interviewer or ethnographer. Third, and worse, for many researchers striving to establish rapport from the inside, there are greater expectations and in turn heightened pressure on them to act in accordance with local norms. Perhaps what the personal struggles and professional debates about difference and identity reveal most fundamentally about rapport is that there is no secret formula or sure way to achieve it. Instead, as the concern over getting inside and being inside illustrates, establishing trust, fostering openness, and gaining access always emerge out of the expectations, interactions, and interpretations of researchers and their informants.

Even if one can find comfortable ways to negotiate questions of difference and distance, rapport poses a third, arguably more vexing, problem: to what extent does the cultivation of trust and the maintenance of productive connections with informants mandate that researchers deceive them? Scholars routinely hide aspects of themselves from the people whom they study. Keeping one's sexual identity, religious values, or political views hidden can be crucial as

researchers seek to secure access and intimacy. Such lies of omission make it possible for their informants to talk openly and honestly, and if they were told it is likely that the kind and quality of research conduct would suffer. Less frequently, but not uncommonly, researchers have opted to lie about their objectives, background, and everyday lives to foster trust, honesty, and openness. While such falsehoods may be productive, granting scholars access to individuals and information, they unsettle the ethical compact at the core of social inquiry.

In many respects, rapport posits that it is desirable for researchers to bond with those they study, cultivating compassionate understandings of their beliefs and behaviors. Indeed, rapport remains productive as long as ethnographers approach the people they study empathetically, sharing political and social commitments, no less than interpersonal attachments. Once researchers begin to think critically, to study up, to disagree with, or even dislike the people they study, rapport begins to lose its luster. The emotive and intellectual bonds facilitating trust, collaboration, and identification at the core of rapport become uneasy when one focuses on relationships of domination and dehumanization or studies those who participate in or benefit from hurting other informants in a social field. Researchers have rightly asked how they can and should approach repugnant others. Several alternatives have been suggested as a means to get beyond the limitations of rapport. Some have insisted that critique replace compassion at the heart of social inquiry, making rapport less attractive or feasible, while encouraging novel points of departure and forms of engagement (Springwood & King 2001). Others have proposed that scholars confront their subjects, forcing them to engage individuals they belittle, demonize, or harm (Wieviorka 1993).

Undoubtedly, rapport will continue to anchor qualitative inquiry, even as technological innovations, such as the Internet, and novel questions encourage sociologists to rethink it. Indeed, rapport will continue to matter to scholars and subjects precisely because it mediates moral and methodological concerns, as well as the tensions between intersubjectivity and interpretation, central to qualitative research and the social worlds it struggles to comprehend.

SEE ALSO: Ethics, Fieldwork; Ethics, Research; Ethnography; Interviewing, Structured, Unstructured, and Postmodern; Key Informant; Naturalistic Inquiry; Objectivity; Observation, Participant and Non Participant

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ratings

Geoff Lealand

Ratings is a term with wide currency, used in activities as diverse as judgments about standards of hotel accommodation to judgments of the economic health of corporations or nations (such as the Standard & Poor's Financial Strength Ratings). In contemporary media, however, the term ratings has more specific meanings, especially in respect of television, radio, and film, but there is also considerable ambiguity and confusion in its use and application.

Movie ratings, placed on films by regulatory bodies or industry self regulation, are widely used across the globe to determine parameters for admission or guidance about content. They

do not measure audiences (as in the box office), but guide or control Motion Picture Association of America (MPAA) and the national audiences according to their eligibility to see sexual, violent, or language content. In the United States, for example, the movie rating system, jointly administered by the Association of Theater Owners, assigns movie ratings ranging from G (General Audience) to NC 17 (No Children 17 and Under).

Such American ratings cannot be legally enforced; they are strictly voluntary and carry no force of law. Nevertheless, it can be argued that they have acquired quasi legal status in that they provide movie theaters with a premise to restrict admission. In other countries, they have clearer legal power. In the United Kingdom, for example, the ratings provided for films by the British Board of Film Classification (BBFC) can be enforced by local authorities, and there have been cases where local councils have attempted to contest BBFC ratings. BBFC ratings for videos are legally binding. In Singapore, all films to be distributed and exhibited are subject to ratings imposed by the government controlled Media Development Authority (MDA), with no intermediary rating between PG (Parental Guidance) and NC16 (No Children Below 16).

The different application of movie ratings across the world means that in countries where there is significant government control of the circulation and exhibition of film, ratings are equivalent to direct censorship; in other cases, they are formal or informal guidelines. It can be argued, however, that even when ratings are not legally enforceable, they are still instrumental in encouraging industry self censorship in film production and distribution. The imperatives of obtaining a box office friendly MPAA rating can determine funding decisions, shape film content and marketing, and define the eventual audience. Shaping a film project to receive a G rating, for example, will mean that least objectionable content will be privileged, plot and narrative will follow an established and safe formula, and marketing is shaped to match the film to a broad, cross generational audience of adults and children.

Conversely, a film with an NC 17 MPAA rating is regarded as box office poison as it effectively excludes the highly prized teenage

market. Producers and distributors put great effort into avoiding such a rating. In 1999, for example, Paramount Pictures, as the distributor of the animated feature *South Park: Bigger, Longer, and Uncut*, successfully appealed the original NC 17 rating, in favor of a more box office friendly R rating.

Because, in the United States, movie ratings operate as a system of classification rather than as formal censorship, there is a long established and continuing tension between social norms and artistic and/or commercial freedoms. In July 2004, for example, a study conducted by the Harvard School of Public Health pointed to a decade long "ratings creep," which had "allowed more violent and sexually explicit content into films, suggesting that movie raters have grown more lenient in their standards" (Waxman 2004). Other commentators have argued that the presence of such content merely reflects broader social changes or attitudinal shifts.

Newer media technologies such as the Internet and electronic gaming have embraced ratings. The Entertainment Software Rating Board (ESRB) has designed games ratings information for video and computer game content, which provide ratings symbols (recommended age appropriateness) and content descriptors (indicating elements in a game which may trigger a particular rating). Rating symbols range from EC Early Childhood to AO Adults Only, and content descriptors describe content such as Alcohol Reference and Sexual Violence (www.esrb.org). A World Wide Web consortium (W3C) determines standards for rating systems and rating information through the Platform for Internet Ratings (PICS), to counter the problem of minors accessing adult content on the Internet (msdn.microsoft.com/workshop/security/rating/ratings.asp).

Radio ratings, gathered through annual or half yearly surveys of radio markets, are instrumental in constructing league tables which set advertising rates. In television, ratings have two major applications. The January 2000 compulsory insertion of the content blocking V chip in all new TV sets sold in the United States enables a TV Parental Guidelines system modeled after the MPAA rating system. Programs are encoded by broadcasters and are detected by the V chip. Championed as a government response to a perceived problem (television

violence), this technological fix appears to be little used and largely ineffectual.

Television ratings provide the primary source audience measurement, assigning value to audience demographics (factors such as age, gender, economic class, and area). Such measurement is carried out by global, specialist research companies, with Nielsen Media Research (owned by the Dutch conglomerate VNU) dominating the North American market. Given the imperatives of contemporary television ("delivering audiences to advertisers" in respect of commercial television; justifying broadcasting fees or sponsorship in respect of public service or non commercial television), reliable audience measurement is critical. Peoplemeters (electronic diaries) are placed in a representative sample of television viewing homes. The cumulative, self reported viewing of these homes constitutes the official television audience, determining popularity of programming and channels as well as modifying the television audience. There have been challenges from academic critics (Ang 1991; Lull 1998) who argue, for example, that observed behavior often contradicts the claims of ratings measurement. There have been industry criticisms of measurement distortions, viewer exhaustion (or "button burnout"), and the difficulties of measuring viewing in an increasingly fragmented and diversified media environment. Nevertheless, ratings continue to prevail, for they provide a continuous and viable means of providing tidy measurement, packaging, and institutional control of audiences.

SEE ALSO: Audiences; Film; Mass Media and Socialization; Media; Media Monopoly; Media Network(s) and; Media Regulation of; Public Broadcasting; Public Opinion; Radio; Television

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rational choice theories

Brent Simpson

Rational choice theories explain social behavior via the aggregated actions of *rational* or *purposive* actors. The actors are rational in the sense that, given a set of values and beliefs, they calculate the relative costs and benefits of alternative actions and, from these calculations, make a choice that maximizes their expected utility. Rational choice models assume that the range of alternatives open to actors is constrained by the environment or by institutions within which they make their decisions. In their purest form, these theories also assume that actors possess complete information about their values and the various courses of action through which they can pursue them. Actors collect, organize, and analyze this information prior to making a decision. Thus, rational choice theories are means–end theories. That is, they describe the means or rational calculus through which actors go about obtaining their desired ends, or values.

Rational choice theory received its first formal treatment in economics, where it has long been the dominant paradigm. More recently, rational choice theory has become one of the dominant approaches in political science and has made a number of inroads into psychology and sociology.

RATIONAL CHOICE SOCIOLOGY AND LEVELS OF EXPLANATION

The introduction of rational choice into sociology has generated a fair amount of controversy, and debates about the place of rational choice approaches in sociology are ongoing. The position sociologists take in these debates is determined in part by whether they subscribe to *methodological individualism* or *methodological holism*. For methodological holists and the majority of methodological individualists, the objective of sociology is to explain macro level social systems. (Other methodological individualists seek to explain the workings of micro level social systems.) The two disagree on whether these social systems can be explained solely with

other social systems (the holist position), or whether the theorist must “come down” to the micro level to explain the effects of one social system on another with reference to individual actors that comprise these systems (the individualist position).

All rational choice sociologists subscribe to some form of methodological individualism. The methodological individualist position holds that a theory must begin by stating how a social system (e.g., law or religion) affects the options available to individuals and how this (limited) range of options, in turn, affects individuals’ decisions. The theory must then build back up to the macro level by describing how individuals’ choices “aggregate” to impact a second system level variable (e.g., economic development).

Much of the individualism/holism debate – and, by extension, the debate surrounding rational choice theory – is set against the backdrop of sociologists’ attempts to clearly distinguish the discipline from other social sciences, especially economics and psychology. Advocates of methodological individualism and rational choice theory claim that obscured in these debates is that most ostensibly holist approaches actually incorporate individual level assumptions (Heckathorn 1997). Because these micro assumptions are left implicit, however, the theories only give the appearance of being holist. From this point of view, these explanations could be made more precise (and the individualist–holist debate resolved) if holists simply stated their individual level assumptions more explicitly.

While all rational choice theorists subscribe to some form of methodological individualism, not all methodological individualists are rational choice theorists. That is, some maintain that sociology needs a model of the actor, but oppose models based on rational choice principles. Others claim that rational choice theory is currently the most explicitly stated model of the actor, thus making it the best choice for a scientific sociology. These scholars often point to the success of rational choice theory in other social sciences as evidence that it should be adopted by sociology. While proponents of this position may concede that there remain important problems with the application of rational choice

models, they maintain that the model simply needs refining.

There are important overlaps between the issues that lead some scholars to view rational choice theory as in need of a tune up and those who view it in need of a complete overhaul. Some of these problems concern the *means* assumed in the rational choice approach (the rationality component), while other problems have to do with the *ends* typically assumed in applications of rational choice theory, i.e., that individuals are motivated by self interest. Broadly speaking, research on the means assumptions is most closely associated with the work of psychologists and decision theorists. Sociologists have contributed much more to debates and research on the ends assumed in rational choice explanations.

MEANS

One of the main criticisms of rational choice theory (from all corners of social science) is the extensive cognitive and computational demand it places on actors. Decision scientists have shown that rather than judiciously gathering data about all possible courses of action, as rational choice theory assumes, humans greatly simplify their social worlds. For instance, instead of calculating the implications of all possible courses of actions, we generally consider a much smaller range of possible actions than are actually available to us, or simply act out of habit. When we do collect information about alternatives, we do not organize and process that information according to the dictates of rational choice theory. Instead, the organization and processing of information is subject to systematic cognitive biases. For instance, we often exaggerate the likelihood of events consistent with our beliefs and downplay inconsistent information. Similarly, we generally assign higher subjective probabilities to desirable outcomes than is warranted by a prudent assessment of the facts. That is, wishful thinking often short circuits rational deliberation.

Decision scientists have directed attention to developing more realistic models of decision making. *Bounded rationality* models recognize that humans are only capable of gathering, organizing, and processing a finite amount of

information, and that much of this activity is subject to cognitive biases. Thus, these models replace the complex calculations assumed in traditional (unbounded) rational choice models with heuristics or rules of thumb.

One of the best known bounded rationality approaches is Simon's (1982) *satisficing* model. In contrast to the maximizing principle assumed to guide decision making in unbounded rationality approaches, the satisficing model assumes that an individual sets an aspiration level and then surveys various courses of action one by one. Once the individual happens upon a course of action that meets or exceeds the aspiration level, she stops surveying and selects that course of action.

Various learning and reinforcement models are also included under the bounded rationality rubric. These models eschew the optimization assumption of rational choice models in favor of reinforcement principles. Thus, these models assume that actors repeat choices that were rewarded in the past and avoid those that were punished. Like other bounded rationality approaches, learning models have been successfully applied to phenomena that do not readily lend themselves to traditional rational choice explanations. For instance, it is difficult to explain why a rational actor would shoulder the costs entailed in casting a vote in a large national election when the likelihood that the vote would be the deciding one is not significantly different from zero. Yet many do vote in these elections. Satoshi Kanazawa has used a learning model to explain voter turnout. The model assumes first that a citizen perceives a link between her decision (to vote or abstain) and the outcome (the preferred candidate wins or loses). That is, these outcomes are experienced as *reinforcers* or *punishers*. Thus, whether a person votes in a given election depends on whether the person voted in the previous election, and whether the person's preferred candidate was elected. Under specified conditions, this learning model is a good predictor of voter turnout patterns.

Successful applications notwithstanding, there are problems with bounded rationality models. For example, while there is little doubt that learning models more accurately reflect recurrent decisions than unbounded rationality approaches, they are generally silent about

decisions made in novel situations. This is because actors have no past actions from which to make choices in new situations. Similarly, some contend that bounded rationality models are often left underspecified. For example, to make predictions, the satisficing model must specify the point at which the actor will suffice (the actor's aspiration level) and exactly how the actor selects among alternatives to consider. But many contend that the specification of these parameters depends on the type of decision being made, and is context specific. Thus, a common criticism is that the increased realism of bounded rationality models is too often accompanied by a decrease in precision.

Some rational choice proponents argue that it does not matter whether the rationality assumptions closely match human behavior. The most important issue to these scholars is predictive power. If the rational choice model generates more precise predictions across a wider range of situations than alternative approaches, rational choice is the preferred theory. More generally, those taking this position contend that actual behavior need not coincide with rational choice axioms, so long as it results in outcomes similar to those that would obtain if it did.

Summing up, behavioral decision theorists have made much progress toward understanding the nuances of human decision making, and how it differs from the assumptions of rational choice theory. The question for many is whether these understandings can be developed into models with the level of specification and generality of unbounded rationality approaches.

ENDS

At least since Weber, sociologists have been interested in the study of values. Although an explicit focus on values waned when functionalism fell out of favor, sociology has recently witnessed renewed interest. This can be attributed in part to debates about the place of rational choice theory in sociology.

Rational choice theory is officially silent on what actors value. In practice, however, rational choice theorists almost always assume actors are motivated by self interest, narrowly defined to include only material wealth (and, less commonly, power and prestige). In fact, the

assumption that actors seek to maximize their wealth and nothing else is so common in rational choice approaches that many mistakenly believe narrow self interest to be axiomatic, rather than a "default" auxiliary assumption.

Some justify the assumption that actors pursue only material wealth by noting that wealth can be exchanged for valued immanent goods. When it can, these scholars contend, rational choice theory can safely use wealth as a proxy for these other ends. Others justify the typical value assumption on the grounds that it works well when predicting macro level outcomes. For instance, Hechter (1994) notes that while there is generally variation in what actors value in a specific situation, this (micro level) variation cancels out when decisions are aggregated to predict systemic outcomes. If so, under certain conditions, the typical value assumption may be sufficient for predicting aggregate outcomes.

Although some lines of research in rational choice sociology have fared well by employing the typical value assumption, many see a need to develop more realistic models of values. But the introduction of values into rational choice theory faces two hurdles, one measurement related and the other theory related.

Measuring values. At first glance, measuring values seems straightforward: simply ask people what they value. But such surveys pose a number of problems. First, people often conceal their true values in order to give off particular impressions to researchers or to others. Additionally, research shows that people may not always know what they value. Because of these problems, some researchers have focused on developing inferential approaches to ascertaining values.

One inferential approach, the *revealed preference method*, asks respondents to choose between pairs of goods. Assuming values are stable (which is not always the case), these revealed preferences can then be used in conjunction with the means assumptions of rational choice theory to predict outcomes in future choice scenarios. While such inferential methods are an improvement over survey measures of values, they can be much more expensive. Further more, inferential methods may sometimes be subject to some of the same problems as survey measures. For example, a respondent may make choices that are not consistent with his or her value sets in order to make a good impression.

Explaining values. Sociologists generally trace values to some combination of natural selection, ecological conditions, and a person's memberships in various groups and social categories. These various sources are assumed to create a hierarchy of values. At the base, natural selection generates values essential to reproduction and survival (e.g., securing food and shelter). While evolutionary logic typically leads us to expect common values, other evolutionary theorizing leads us to expect, for example, sex differences in values. For example, Kanazawa (2001) has argued that males value wealth, power, and prestige more than females, tracing this difference to the different reproductive strategies males and females have evolved to pursue. He notes a rare point of agreement between evolutionary logic and feminist sociologists' critiques of rational choice theory – that the “typical value assumption” in rational choice sociology is more applicable to males than females.

At the next level, ecological conditions are expected to generate societal differences in values. As societies respond to unique historical and environmental conditions, sets of values are likely to emerge that are relatively similar within and different between societies. For example, sociologists have pointed to trust differences between Japanese and Americans. On average, Americans place a higher value than Japanese on trusting strangers, while Japanese prefer to stick to lower risk, long term relations. Toshio Yamagishi and his associates have traced these different values to societal differences in social networks and group organization.

Finally, at the highest (and most personal) level are those values that result from a person's membership in a unique set of groups and social categories. As suggested by Georg Simmel, because every person is affiliated with a unique set of groups, each can be expected to subscribe to a unique set of values. From this perspective, *ceteris paribus*, the fewer overlapping group (or category) memberships two persons share, the more distinct value sets will be.

While persons undoubtedly select group affiliations based on existing values, sociologists have demonstrated how groups and categories influence the values to which people subscribe. For example, Melvin Kohn and his colleagues showed that the different occupational roles of working class versus middle class persons

tend to generate different value systems. Compared to the middle class, working class persons tend to place greater weight on values such as neatness and obedience. Middle class persons, on the other hand, tend to place greater weight than members of the working class on values such as happiness and curiosity. Moreover, Kohn showed that these different values get passed down from one generation to the next. The effect of these values, once transmitted, can be to channel offspring into occupations similar to their parents.

Research by Frank et al. (1993) demonstrates how social categories such as college major can influence values. Specifically, they found that economics majors seem to satisfy the typical value assumption (i.e., place greater weight on self interest) better than non economics majors. They traced this difference to economics majors' continual exposure to rational choice theory and its typical value assumption. These results, like Kohn's, have important implications for how institutions and organizations pass on certain values.

An important question for rational choice sociology is how to synthesize such disparate findings from values research into a formal, coherent model of values. Only a few efforts have been directed toward this end. For instance, Lindenberg's (1992) *social production function theory* distinguishes universal goals (physical and social well being) and the instrumental goals that humans pursue to achieve these ultimate ends. For example, actors may pursue status and affection as means to social well being. At a higher level, the theory specifies alternative routes to each instrumental goal.

The alternative routes (or higher order goals) through which a given individual can pursue instrumental and ultimate goals are determined in large part by the groups and institutions to which she belongs. For instance, Kohn's research shows us that those in working class occupational roles adopt values instrumental to success in working class jobs and, ultimately, to their physical and social well being. Members of the middle class, on the other hand, adopt values more conducive to success in their occupations.

Social production function theory and related approaches give us a picture of humans as rational agents who pursue various (socially

sanctioned) routes to ultimate and instrumental ends in a cost effective (optimizing) manner. While such models are certainly a step in the right direction, much work remains in effectively integrating theory and research on individual differences into a formal model of values.

APPLICATIONS

As noted earlier, much rational choice sociology has focused on explicitly theorizing multiple levels of analysis. This is especially evident in two lines of sociological work that have strong roots in rational choice theory, network exchange theories (Willer 1999) and social dilemmas research (Kollock 1998). Thus, these two areas are offered as illustrations of rational choice sociology.

Network exchange theories predict interpersonal power from actors' locations in exchange networks. Exchange networks are special cases of social networks in which ties represent exchange opportunities. It is these differential exchange opportunities that generate power differences. A key insight of network exchange approaches is that power differences are not simply a function of the number of potential exchange partners a person has. Rather, exchange networks have important distal properties, such that an individual's power may be determined not only by her number of partners, but also by her partners' partners, her partners' partners' partners, and so on. While network exchange theories give special attention to these structural level variables, they also incorporate micro level assumptions about individual preferences and bargaining strategies.

The network exchange approach provides a clear illustration of multilevel theorizing for the following reasons. First, it demonstrates the important role of structural constraints on individual choices, thus clearly linking down from the macro to micro level. Second, it accounts for individual preferences and bargaining processes that occur at the micro level. Finally, it explains how bargaining and negotiations at the micro level aggregate back up to the macro level to generate power differences. In so doing, it provides a guide for explicitly modeling both structural and individual levels of analyses (Markovsky 1987).

Rational choice theory also has had a major impact on sociological research on social dilemmas. Social dilemmas are situations that pose conflicts between individual and collective interests. Several features of rational choice theory make it a useful theoretical tool for analyzing such problems. First, rational choice theory explicitly focuses on actors' interests. In so doing, it commits the analyst to a careful distinction between the interests of individuals and the interests of the groups to which they belong. By extension, rational choice theory's focus on the aggregation of individual choices makes clear how the rational pursuit of individual interests can lead to disastrous outcomes at the system level. Well known examples of how individually rational outcomes produce collective disasters include overfishing and nuclear armament buildups. Because social dilemmas pose such important social problems, and because rational choice theory is well equipped to model such situations, many rational choice theorists consider the study of social dilemmas and how actors solve them the central task of sociology.

THE FUTURE OF RATIONAL CHOICE SOCIOLOGY

While rational choice theory has made important inroads into a number of areas of sociology, its status in the discipline as a whole remains uncertain. One indicator of sociologists' disparate views on the status of rational choice theory is its treatment in introductory texts. There, statements on rational choice theory and its place in sociology run the gamut: some texts contain no mention of rational choice theory in any of its variants (Macdonis's *Sociology*); others mention rational choice approaches to specific topics but omit the general rational choice approach (Lindsey & Beach's *Sociology*); others maintain that rational choice theory is the unifying theory in sociology (Stark's *Sociology*).

In short, there is currently very little agreement about the status of rational choice theory in sociology, and about what it should be. Heckathorn (1997) suggests that the reluctance of many sociologists to embrace rational choice theory is paradoxical because the approach differs very little from traditional mainstream sociology. To the extent that there is a

difference, he suggests, it is that rational choice theory makes explicit what much of sociology leaves implicit: a model of the individual.

Others praise the precision of rational choice theory for a different reason. They suggest sociologists should view rational choice principles not as accurate reflections of reality, but as explicit baselines against which to measure more realistic alternatives. This position is illustrated by research described earlier that refines the means and ends typically assumed in rational choice models. More generally, it is doubtful whether so much progress could have been made on departures from rationality if social scientists did not have an explicit model of rationality. Similarly, the ubiquitous simplifying assumption that humans are wealth maximizers has provided a convenient baseline against which to measure the conditions under which human behavior is guided (however rationally) by a broader range of values. If present trends continue, we can expect psychologists and decision theorists to work on further refinements to the means component of rational choice models while sociologists will proceed with developing richer models of the ends to which boundedly rational actors aspire.

SEE ALSO: Exchange Network Theory; Game Theory; Mathematical Sociology; Metatheory; Micro–Macro Links; Power Dependence Theory; Rational Choice Theory: A Crime Related Perspective; Rational Choice Theory (and Economic Sociology); Social Exchange Theory; Structure and Agency; Theory

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rational choice theory: a crime-related perspective

Jeffrey A. Bouffard and Kelly Wolf

As an explanation of crime, the rational choice perspective in essence argues that would be offenders consider the potential costs and benefits before deciding whether to engage in crime. To be accurate, there is not a single, well defined rational choice theory, but rather a series of models that attempt to explain criminal events and/or criminality. The rational choice perspective in criminology has evolved largely from two previous and complementary explanations of human behavior. One of these is the classical school of thought characterized by the Enlightenment scholars Cesare Beccaria (1764) and Jeremy Bentham (1789). These early philosophers proposed that individuals would refrain from offending out of fear of the potential punishment that would result from such behavior (this is also the conceptual basis for the deterrence perspective in criminology). The rational choice perspective on crime also has more recent roots in a second explanation of human behavior, specifically, the attempts of economists to explain consumer purchasing decisions based on a consideration of the perceived potential utility of a product.

Both perceptual deterrence (focused on the perceived rather than objective likelihood and severity of punishment) and the rational choice perspective share several assumptions about

human nature. Specifically, both agree that individuals have “free will,” they are hedonistic and utilitarian, and they will be dissuaded from offending by a consideration of potential costs. Unlike the deterrence perspective, however, rational choice includes a specific focus on the rewards of crime. Thus, while deterrence considers only potential sanctions, rational choice draws attention to the weighing of costs and benefits within the offending decision. Because of their shared assumptions, some have suggested that rational choice is simply an expansion of the deterrence perspective, while others see rational choice’s focus on benefits as a substantial divergence from deterrence.

Rational choice explanations of crime also have more recent roots in the field of economics. During the 1960s and 1970s, economists became interested in expanding their work on decision making to include a consideration of criminal behavior. The most noted proponent of this view of rational choice in criminology is Gary Becker, who proposed a “subjective expected utility” model of rational choice. This “economic” approach to offender decision making assumes that individuals strive to maximize their gains (i.e., utility) from crime while minimizing their costs and other efforts/risks. It also proposes that would be offenders engage in relatively complex deliberations involving their perception of the certainty (likelihood) and severity (utility or value) of the costs and benefits of crime. This approach also attempted to assign monetary values to all relevant costs and benefits of crime, comparing the dollar values of these consequences in modeling the offender decision making process.

Overall, the rational choice perspective on crime conceives of would be offenders as more or less rationally weighing the expected costs and benefits of criminal conduct before acting. The rational choice perspective has also assumed that individuals were at least minimally rational and able, for the most part, to make these types of calculations. Most models of decision making from this perspective, however, seem to acknowledge that individuals possess “bounded rationality.” That is, individuals are not “purely” rational, but rather only seek generally to maximize their gains, even though their behavior may not appear overtly “rational” to others. The bounds on the extent of this

rationality are imposed by factors such as the availability of information on potential consequences, the individuals’ cognitive abilities, time pressures on the decision itself, and other factors that have an impact on the ability to adequately consider various consequences.

TWO RATIONAL CHOICE MODELS

Most of the research and theorizing to date has focused on one of two main rational choice models of criminal decision making. The subjective expected utility (SEU) model proposed by Becker (1968) suggests that crime will be more likely if the individual’s perceived expected utility (expressed in monetary terms) for criminal behavior is greater than the expected utility of some legal alternative. This model is often represented mathematically with the following formula:

$$EU = pU(Y - f) + (1 - p)U(Y)$$

where EU represents the expected utility from the behavior; p = the probability of punishment (the certainty of the costs); Y = the anticipated benefits of the behavior; f = the anticipated punishment; and U = the “utility” (the severity) of costs or benefits.

Other criminologists have taken issue with the complex mathematical nature of the SEU model for several reasons, including the deliberative approach to decision making it implies. According to Cornish and Clarke (1987), would be offenders are unlikely to go through such a deliberative, calculating mental process when making a decision. Instead, they propose a more “informal” model of rational choice in which offenders evaluate costs and benefits in a manner described as “rudimentary” and “cursory” (Cornish & Clarke, 1987: 935). This model of decision making is based on “decision diagrams” in which various individual (e.g., temperament, past experience) and situational factors (e.g., needs, available alternatives) influence the evaluation of potential courses of action.

This informal rational choice model, originally developed to aid thinking about situational crime prevention, is also presented as an explanation of both criminality and criminal events.

In fact, proponents of this informal rational choice model suggest it can explain several components of criminality, including the decisions to become involved in crime, to continue such involvement, and eventually to desist from crime. The informal model is also used to explain several aspects of the criminal event decision, including the choice of particular crime targets, offense types, and offense methods. In addition, the informal model takes into consideration the impact of several other individual and situational factors that may impact the offending decision itself. Supporters of this model point out that this type of flexibility is needed because the content of offending decisions is crime and individual specific, and that inclusion of these influences on decision making allows rational choice to explain multiple types of crimes, including those more “expressive” crimes which may appear irrational and even unplanned to others. They also point out that these crime types are not well explained by economic versions of rational choice.

RATIONAL CHOICE RESEARCH

Most criminological research on rational choice has examined the effect of various costs and benefits on offending decisions, commonly using one of three methodologies. First, ethnographic approaches have been employed that involve interviewing known offenders about their past decision making processes. This line of research has discovered various facts about offender decision making, for instance, that residential burglars attend to such factors as the ease of entry to a house when considering where to commit their crimes. Second, some longitudinal studies have examined self reported offending and related that offending to perceptions of costs and benefits assessed at another time period. Finally, a large amount of research has used either simple hypothetical offending questions (e.g., how likely is it that you would commit a burglary?) or more detailed hypothetical scenarios depicting brief, fictional stories about potential offending situations to elicit intentions to offend and relate those intentions to the perception of various consequences. The detailed hypothetical scenario design has been relatively commonly employed, at least

partly because it avoids the issues of incorrect temporal ordering that plague some longitudinal studies while providing more consistent context for the would be offender’s decision than the simple hypothetical offense question design, thus minimizing measurement error. Research using all three of these design types has generally found support for the rational choice contention that the perception of various costs and benefits impacts the decision to offend.

The potential costs of criminal conduct commonly proposed by rational choice authors as relevant to criminal decision making include, among other things, the possibility and severity of formal legal sanctions, lost legitimate opportunities forsaken by criminal behavior (like the loss of a job or being removed from school), and various informal costs, such as social censure, loss of the esteem and emotional support of loved ones, and any potential loss of self respect. The benefits which have typically been considered by rational choice researchers are somewhat more limited but include such considerations as perceived material or financial gains, acceptance by peers or any enhancement of respect that may accrue from others as a result of engaging in criminal behavior, and even an individual’s emotional state such as feelings of excitement, pride, or satisfaction from committing a crime. Several studies have looked at feelings of anticipation, excitement, thrill, and arousal state as benefits of crime. Jack Katz (1988), in particular, has written about the “sneaky thrills” that some individuals may perceive as benefits of crime, engaging in the behavior simply for the “thrill” of getting away with something deviant rather than for material gain.

CRITICISMS AND FUTURE DIRECTIONS

Some critics have suggested that rational choice theories have essentially added nothing new to the field of criminology, as other theories, such as social learning and social control theories, already suggest that individuals are responsive to the consequences of crime (e.g., censure from family or friends). However, proponents of rational choice theories argue that the perspective offers several advantages over other theories, including that it calls needed attention to

the issue of “choice” in crime, it focuses attention on the decision making process itself, it attempts to explain several crime decision points, and anticipates that many other factors may have an impact on the offending decision. The rational choice perspective also recognizes that crime is not a unitary concept and that explanations of crime must take into account the offense specific and individualized nature of offending decisions.

Finally, despite its advantages, some authors have recently criticized the hypothetical scenario design commonly used to test rational choice propositions because researchers using this design present a potentially limited set of researcher derived consequences to participants. Bouffard (2002) proposes that individuals be allowed to develop their own consequences in response to hypothetical offending scenarios, so that researchers can more accurately determine the full range of individually relevant and crime specific consequences that influence offending decisions.

Additional challenges to those testing the rational choice perspective remain. For example, research is needed to examine the factors that may contribute to “bounded rationality,” in addition to emotional states and substance abuse, which have been examined to date. In addition, research using the hypothetical scenario design has typically used student samples and has not yet demonstrated that what is known about decision making generalizes to actual offenders.

SEE ALSO: Beccaria, Cesare; Criminology; Decision Making; Deterrence Theory; Deviance, Theories of; Rational Choice Theories; Routine Activity Theory; Theory

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rational choice theory (and economic sociology)

Thomas J. Fararo

Two major themes are part of the tradition of sociological analysis as it relates to economics. One theme concerns the sociology of economic phenomena, while the other concerns the relationship between economic theory and sociological theory. The first theme is the central focus of economic sociology, and the second has been a central focus of sociological theory in its phases of development. The two themes are closely connected. In recent decades, economists have endeavored to apply their theoretical approach to a wide variety of social phenomena very much in the domain of sociological research, such as religion and the family. Such “economic imperialism” has been met with some controversy and with opposition that includes a kind of reverse

invasion, in which economic sociologists delve into the details of economic phenomena traditionally within the purview of the discipline of economics, e.g., the behavior of markets. In this mutual invasion of territories, economic sociologists criticize economic theory for postulating a “hyperrationality” on the parts of actors that is unreal and therefore misleading in its derived consequences even in regard to economic phenomena. Thus economic sociology itself is a major domain in which the controversial interplay of the disciplines occurs.

In the classical phase of sociological thought, both Pareto and Weber migrated from economics to sociology. Both were trained in and produced contributions to economics before they each arrived at the conclusion that the approach of economic theory was too narrow to contain their aspiration to develop a more generalized analysis of society. Each accepted the idea that a sociological approach required a foundation in what we can call, following Parsons (1949 [1937]), “the action frame of reference,” including the idea that human action is purposive and involves normative elements. But each theorist moved beyond the idealized rational action of economic theory. As Parsons later put it, the task was to provide an analysis of the residual category of non rational action. Pareto invoked sentiments that motivate behavior that is then rationalized after the fact. Weber set out a very useful roster of four types of action, only one of which corresponds to the postulated action of economic actors in neoclassical economic theory. First, he distinguished between two types of rational action: instrumental rational action, as in consumer or producer choices, and ultimate value rational action, in which an actor’s choice results from some inner sense of duty that must be undertaken regardless of the costs. In addition, Weber noted the empirical significance of two other types of action: traditional (or habitual) action and affectual (or emotional) action. He was not unaware that the instrumental rational type could play an important baseline role in social analysis, but cautioned that the other types could not be neglected in sociology.

When Parsons elucidated these and other shifts from the “utilitarian” type of theory in which he embedded the economics that Pareto and Weber had transcended in their respective theoretical approaches, he went on to define

“the rational unit act” as a *special case* of a more general concept of the unit act, a basic unit of action as a process in which actors attempt to realize their ends in situations that include constraints. In his later writings, as well, Parsons treated economically rational action as a mode of action that he characterized as “institutionally motivated,” i.e., as linked to social roles in a social structure defined in normative cultural terms. This differs from the logically more primitive desire to optimize gratification that already occurs in infancy but that is channeled through social processes into various forms – such as those of Weber’s typology. Similarly, firms and customers are not fundamental entities of social theory but rather types of collectivities and roles that are characteristic of a modern economy with its particular historically emergent institutions. So economic theory, as it had developed in the last few centuries, was a scope restricted branch of the general theory of action, both in regard to its rationality postulate and in regard to its assumptions about the social environment of economic action.

In short, it is fair to say that for most contemporary sociologists, “rational choice theory” is the theory of instrumental rational action (Weber) employing a rational unit act special case of action (Parsons) that excludes non rational sentiments (Pareto).

Parsons also combined his general action framework with functional analysis based upon systems thinking. The culmination of this approach was a study in the integration of sociological and economic theory (Parsons & Smelser 1956) that formed one phase of the development of economic sociology. The key theme in the book is that economic theory is a special case of the theory of action, with the economy as a special type of social system.

However, later theorists such as Coleman (1986) argued that in taking the path of functional analysis, Parsons had not really followed up on the logic of generalizing economic theory. The basis for Coleman’s critique is that microeconomics, the home base of rational choice theory, is actually a *micro–macro* theory. Its aim is not a detailed and accurate analysis of individual choices. Rather, its goal is to explain the behavior of market phenomena, especially the price system that allocates goods and services in modern societies. Rational choice is a

postulated property of the individual or collective actors at the micro level of households and firms whose aggregated behavior leads to the market outcomes. The theory in microeconomics consists of logical derivations of the macro level outcomes from postulates about acting units, idealized as instrumental rational actors. Parsons's theory, whatever its merits, did not proceed in this manner and therefore failed to truly explain the macro level phenomena of concern in sociology on the basis of a presumed generalized action theory. While Parsons was appreciative of the role of mathematics in science, he did not attempt to emulate the mathematical methods of economic theory in its representation of mechanisms that enable the micro-macro linkage to be explicitly made.

In contrast to Parsons, some more recent sociologists have adopted a mode of theorizing that is inspired by rational choice theory. Lindenberg (1992) has defined and defended a methodological strategy of gradual movement from initial simplicity to more complex models that extend the realism and scope of the simpler starting models, employing actor models of the type employed in economic theory. This extension of scope aspect of sociological rational choice theory, along with the methodological features of idealization and approximation in the construction of theoretical models, are key aspects of rational choice theory as employed in economic sociology and more widely within contemporary social science. In this type of theoretical strategy, the key problem shifts from the nature of the act to the nature of the mechanism that combines the numerous acts into the eventual social outcome. Perhaps in some cases it is simply a surface feature of social life, as in elections in which votes are counted by some authorized agency. But in other cases, social interactions and social relationships among the actors mediate the outcome, e.g., as in a social exchange process of vote trading among legislators.

More or less explicitly, Coleman (1990) has followed the strategy outlined by Lindenberg. Purposive action is the key assumption and rational choice is the idealized form of it for the sake of analytical tractability. For instance, purposive action is represented as based upon a maximization of expected utility. This is part of Coleman's effort to employ the mathematical approach that Parsons bypassed. For instance,

what is called general equilibrium theory in economics is a mathematical theory of a system of interdependent markets in terms of the simultaneous determination of prices on all markets. Coleman employs the theory as a generalized exchange model for use in sociology. This effort can be reconstructed as having two phases. The first phase simply employs the same mathematical theory used in economics but with a more generalized vocabulary, e.g., *actors* instead of firms and households and *resources* instead of commodities. Two types of relations link actors and resources: *control* (generalizing ownership) and *interests* (as parameters of the utility function). In the second phase, the formal apparatus is scope extended by including representations of such features of real exchange systems as barriers to trade and social relations among actors.

Subsequently, in an overview of rational choice theory in relation to economic sociology, Coleman (1994) argues for the superiority of the theory in comparison with other sociological perspectives on grounds of its explanatory strategy of methodological individualism, its principle of optimization at the actor level, and its explicit and refined concepts dealing with macro level outcomes such as social equilibria. Referring mainly to his own work, he adds to features inherited from neoclassical economics some further developments of the ideas in a social direction, including the concept of social capital and the analysis of conflicts over rights in the formation of constitutions, and he goes on to discuss some applications of the theory in economic sociology. One of these applications is the theory of the design of economic organizations with sensitivity to emergent informal social systems that may act to support or to counter the objectives of the design. Other applications include the use of the concept of social capital to explain how immigrants build and expand specialized niches of economic activity and the analysis of collective behavior in the economy, such as panics, "bubbles," and crashes, by reference to the same type of mechanism – concatenation of rational choices – that explains other market phenomena.

Nevertheless, most economic sociologists are not committed to the application of rational choice theory. Rather, the tendency is to view rational choice theory as based upon a defective

vision of society insofar as it presupposes a set of independent actors, each with a given utility function. Where do these utility functions come from? How independent are the choices? What economic culture is presupposed? These sorts of questions about the transport of the economic method into sociology express a deep skepticism about the use of rational choice theory as a foundation for research in economic sociology. If actors are socially located in positions in social structures, the very meaning of social structure as pertaining to social relationships suggests research to investigate the *connections* among actors as significant features of the explanatory task of economic sociology. For instance, in a certain production market, firms may be closely studying each other's behavior for clues as to volume and quality of production they should plan upon in order to survive and prosper in the market, as in the treatment of markets as social structures in the sense of network analysis (White 2002). To be sure, at least to some degree – although never with complete information – acting units may make rational choices, but the patterning of relationships among the firms is part of the explanation of the choices.

In response, the advocates of rational choice models as parts of an overall explanatory micro–macro theoretical strategy would point out that their approach involves not just a micro–macro link, but also a macro–micro link. The latter “locates” actors in situations within a given macrosocial context, providing a basis for postulating their relative control and interests in various resources as well as institutional constraints on their action. Thus, they would argue that the focus on social networks and other forms of social structural relationships between actors is not excluded by the sociological rational choice approach; on the contrary, it is very much a part of the overall explanatory strategy. Contributions that aim to reconcile rational choice theory and structural analysis in sociology as a whole, and in economic sociology in particular, are on the agenda of research in this area.

It should be noted that sociologists who adopt the rational choice theoretical strategy are not exclusively or even mainly concerned with economic phenomena, and this is one aspect of the cross purposes that may account for the current situation. Theorists such as Hechter (1987) are

interested in the general problem of social order as understood within a tradition that goes back to Thomas Hobbes with his Leviathan solution in the form of a central authority as a necessary condition for order. In this context, rational choice theorists in sociology have emphasized an important obstacle to the translation of social values into social order, namely, the free rider problem, and proposed mechanisms that overcome the problem.

SEE ALSO: Coleman, James; Economy (Sociological Approach); Micro Macro Links; Parsons, Talcott; Rational Choice Theories

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rational legal authority

Dirk Bunzel

According to German sociologist Max Weber, rational legal authority represents a form of legitimate domination, with domination being the “probability that certain commands (or all

commands) from a given source will be obeyed by a given group of persons” (Weber 1947: 324). While this probability implies a certain interest on the part of those obeying in the effects of their compliance, such interest can be diverse, and individuals may act upon calculated self interest, habituation, affection, or idealistic orientations. For domination to endure, however, it depends on the belief in the legitimacy of the command and its source. Accordingly, Weber distinguishes three types of legitimate domination. Charismatic authority rests upon a belief in the extraordinary, sacred, and/or exemplary qualities of the person commanding, while traditional authority calls for submission to those who are privileged to rule by historical convention. In contrast, rational legal authority differs in its unique combination of impersonality, formality, and everyday profaneness (*Alltaglichkeit*). It rests upon “a belief in the ‘legality’ of patterns of normative rules and the right of those elevated to authority under such rules to issue commands (legal authority)” (Weber 1947: 328).

Significantly, Weber conceptualized legitimate domination ideal typically, thus producing a theoretical idealization that simplifies or accentuates those aspects of social evidence he deemed significant, regardless of their concrete empirical correspondence. Existing modes of authority will therefore most likely constitute hybrids, with one of the three forms of domination prevailing. It is precisely its status as an ideal type, however, that allowed Weber to place rational legal authority at the center of his theory of capitalist development and occidental rationalization.

Historically, rational legal authority unfolded from the medieval monasteries and evolved along with capitalist production, the administration of growing populations within defined territories, and reformist religious movements in late Renaissance Europe. Inspired by these developments, a new mode of governance emerged that was founded on general and formal systems of rules and regulations and on a systematic conduct of life. At the societal level, such governance derived from the implementation of positive rational law (*Satzungsrecht*) and rational administration within a bureaucratic state apparatus. The impersonal rule of formal and universally applied law – a law that was

systematically created (*gesetzt*) by professionally trained jurists – replaced arbitrary rule and privileges and thus established the equality of contractual parties as a legal basis of capitalist market economies. Simultaneously, administrative rights and duties were delegated to public officials. These would neither inherit nor own their hierarchically regimented offices, would comply with formal rules and regulations, would produce and act upon written documents, and would be recruited according to expertise. In so doing, they would put an end to the personal, arbitrary, and more haphazard conduct of patriarchal or patrimonial rule and would constitute a more efficient form of administration: bureaucracy. Hence, rational jurisdiction combined with governmental bureaucracy would render the modern state into an archetype of rational legal authority. At an individual level, the *vita communis* practiced in medieval monasteries instigated a systematic conduct of life that would culminate in the doctrines of Calvinism, which commanded thrift, duty of work, and inner worldly asceticism. This methodical approach to life generated both the entrepreneurial attitude of early capitalists and the work ethic demanded of free laborers. Consequently, economic, political, and ethico religious elements formed an “elective affinity” to bring about a rationalization of production, government, and life conduct that was unique in its occidental roots and that has since become imperialist in tendency.

The innate ambivalence of the principles that constitute rational legal authority provoke ambiguous and, occasionally, conflicting consequences. In Weber’s conceptualization, rational legal administration is most effective and efficient the more it operates along the lines of formal rationality, thus excluding any substantive values and eradicating personal emotions, sentiments, or ideals. While such impersonal procedure promotes impartiality and equality, it may also advance rigidity and aloofness. Similarly, the loyalty shown toward rules and regulations discourages developing personal integrity and responsibility as opposed to reliance on an external framework of rules – a fact that tends to provoke rampant formalization and dependence on written evidence, thus compromising efficiency. Formalization, in turn, supports routinization and homogenization. While the latter

promote calculability and predictability, they are also notoriously prone to rigidity. Finally, the coalescence of impersonality, adherence to rules and procedure, and formalization subjects virtually all spheres of life to an anonymous but stringent order of formal rationality. However, this process of rationalization has looted modern society of its magic, amazement, and intimacy.

Not surprisingly, then, rational legal authority and its archetypical materialization, occidental bureaucracy, have stimulated much debate. Most commonly, they have been charged with ethical poverty and with provoking irrational consequences. Weber himself was well aware of potential dangers, and in a rather dystopian vision he predicted that ongoing rationalization would create an “iron cage” of obedience (*Horrigkeit*) to imprison the modern individual. Others went even further, identifying overexposure to instrumental rationality, the blind following of rules, and the disregard for substantive values such as empathy or compassion as producing a “bureaucratic personality” that – inspired by a perverse sense of duty and obedience – was capable of partaking within the greatest crimes against humanity. Finally, the very efficiency Weber ascribed to bureaucratic administration has been questioned in the wake of recent neoliberal campaigns that prescribe private ownership and markets as antidotes to “red tape” and inflexibility. Against such criticism, other authors have pointed out that privatization and marketization have not increased efficiency but, instead, have created a politicization of civil service and a prioritization of measurable short term gains at the expense of integrity, loyalty, and fairness. Refuting the moral absolutism and romanticism of the critics, they stress the significance of bureaucratic administration for the development of democracy, long term sustainability, and social equality.

While state bureaucracies and hierarchical organizations may have given way to informational networks and embryonic industries, while sovereign subjects may experience a “corrosion of character,” and while the diversity and contingency of “life orders” are increasing, rational legal authority has changed its face, but it has not withered away. Rationalization of production, consumption, and life pursuit is still prevalent, as cathedrals of consumption, supranational institutions, and lateral careers demonstrate. In

fact, where rational legal structures have retreated – be it in international disputes, in ethnic and religious affairs, or in industrial relations – brute power or even violence seems to prevail. Perhaps McDonaldization rather than bureaucratization is the dominant form these days; yet still, our saturated selves rely upon “civilization” within somewhat more “fancy” iron cages.

SEE ALSO: Bureaucratic Personality; Charisma; Civilizations; Consumption, Cathedrals of; Elective Affinity; Ideal Type; Legitimacy; McDonaldization; Neoliberalism; Weber, Max

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rationalization

Zeynep Atalay

It is likely that the concept of rationalization is most often linked with the work of Sigmund Freud on psychological defense mechanisms. However, while such usage is not unknown in sociology, the concept is most often associated with the work of Max Weber and his followers. For Weber, rationalization occurred only, at least to its fullest extent, in the modern West. Other parts of the world, for example India and China, failed to rationalize to any great extent because of barriers there such as basic idea systems and structures that were antithetical to rationalization. On the other hand, there was a series of factors in the West that expedited the development of rationalization in that region of the world. The best known of these factors is the role that the Protestant ethic played in the rise of rational capitalism, but Weber made it clear that this ethic was but one of many distinctive characteristics in the West that made rationalization possible. Furthermore, the rise of capitalistic society was only one of many manifestations of rationalization that also included the rise of the bureaucracy as an organizational form, and of the modern state, corporation, military, university, and church. While Weber saw all of these, and more, as undergoing a process of rationalization, he was careful to avoid a general model of rationalization and to outline the ways in which each of them rationalized.

Weber's thinking on rationalization is based on his analysis of the basic types of rationality,

only one of which – formal rationality – emerged in the modern West. In Weber's terms, *practical* rationality involves the utilization of pragmatic, calculating, and means ends strategies in order to pursue mundane ends and overcome the obstacles to their pursuit that exist in everyday life. *Theoretical* rationality refers to the employment of abstract ideas and conceptual schemes to describe, elucidate, and comprehend empirical reality. *Substantive* rationality is involved in decision making that is subject to the values and ethical norms of the particular society. *Formal* rationality, which became ubiquitous in the modern West, involves decision making in accordance with a set of universal rules, laws, and regulations. It is only in the West that formal rationality emerged and became predominant. And it is that type of rationality that lies at the base of the rationalization process.

Rationalization constitutes the centerpiece of Weber's general sociology, as well as his sociologies of religion, law, bureaucracy (rationality also lies at the heart of his methodology for the social sciences), the city, and so on. Everyday life is rationalized, and while that brings with it great advantages such as increased efficiency, it also leads to a variety of negative consequences such as disenchantment and alienation. Most generally, Weber feared the development of an "iron cage" of rationalization that would increasingly enslave people and from which it would be increasingly difficult to escape.

In the domain of authority systems, rationalization involved the replacement of traditional and charismatic authority by rational legal authority in which rulers' legitimacy stems from achieving their position on the basis of following a series of legally prescribed steps such as an election. In the religious realm, the process involved, among other things, the professionalization of the clergy and the production of a systematic body of religious knowledge. Law also involved professionalization, this time of lawyers, and it was transformed from a system dominated by the traditions of common law into a systematized, generalized, and codified set of universally valid legal principles.

Bureaucracy plays a key role in Weber's sociology and can be seen as the paradigm of the rationalization process. The bureaucracy is an organizational form that is rationally designed to perform complex tasks in the most efficient

way possible. The critical features of bureaucracy, according to Weber, are specialization of work, hierarchy of offices, technical competence in decision making process, rationally enacted rules and regulations, the impersonal character of the administrative staff, and the recording of any decision making in writing in a filing system. The task oriented character of the western bureaucratic organization promotes efficiency. Specifically, it limits the unpredictable and partial nature of personal decision making and levels social and economic differences by offering an impersonal and impartial mechanism for decision making.

Although Weber saw the ideal typical bureaucracy as an efficient system, he did not fail to note the substantial irrationalities that are inherent in it. Weber was unmistakably conscious of bureaucracy's dehumanizing and alienating potential, as reflected in his view that formal organizations reduce the human being to "a small cog in a ceaselessly moving mechanism" (1978: 988). Bureaucracy, which is all but indissoluble once it is established, applies the same set of abstract rules to individual cases and limits the autonomy of the individual. Therefore, the domination of bureaucracy is likely to result in injustices given the fact that the particularity of cases is not taken into consideration in rendering decisions. Another of the irrationalities associated with the bureaucracy is that while it is supposed to operate efficiently, the fact is that it often suffers from inefficiencies and, as a result, often fails to accomplish the tasks that it exists to perform. Finally, of course, the bureaucracy can represent a clear case of the kind of "iron cage" Weber feared and that was described brilliantly in the novels of Franz Kafka, especially *The Trial* and *The Castle*.

Overall, Weber offered a world historical theory of rationalization in which he attempted to account for why that process emerged in the West and not elsewhere, as well as for its great advantages and numerous disadvantages in comparison to less or non rationalized systems.

Weber's German colleague Georg Simmel also theorized about rationalization, although it has a far more limited role in the latter's work. In *The Philosophy of Money*, Simmel (1978 [1907]) sets out to deal with money as an abstract and universal system that provides a fundamental model of the rationalization

process. Money, as the symbol of abstract social relations, exemplifies the declining significance of the individual (and subjective culture) in the face of the expansion of objective culture, which is associated with intellectual rationality, mathematical calculability, abstraction, objectivity, anonymity, and leveling. Furthermore, the impersonal nature of exchange relationships, which are facilitated by the monetary system, imposes a progressively more rationalized system on individuals. As is true in Weber's work on rationalization, Simmel emphasizes the importance of quantitative over qualitative factors, as well as growing intellectuality, in the modern rationalized world.

Also of note is Karl Mannheim's thinking on rationalization. Mannheim borrows heavily from Weber (and Simmel), and develops a similar view about the rationalization of society. Resembling formal rationality in his work is the concept of functional rationality, which he sees as growing increasingly ubiquitous and coercive over people. Instead of substantive rationality, Mannheim deals with substantial rationality, which fundamentally involves people's ability to think intelligently. He sees the latter as being undermined by the former. Mannheim develops a rich set of ideas about rationalization, as well as an elaborate and useful set of concepts to deal with it. For example, he sees an increasing trend toward self rationalization and self observation in which people are seen as better able to control themselves rationally rather than being controlled by functionally rational systems.

Inspired by the work on the rationalization of the modern western society, especially that of Weber, critical theorists associated with the Frankfurt School criticized the consequences of the growth of rationality, or instrumental reason, for modern society. In response to early Marxian theorists who accorded the economy centrality in their analysis of the modern world, neo Marxists of the Frankfurt School were committed to the analysis of culture, especially cultural repression and the decline of individual autonomy in modern society. In this perspective, the repression produced by rationality replaces economic exploitation as the dominant social problem. As elaborated by Adorno and Horkheimer, the rationality of capitalism is consolidated through the decline of individualism, and that has made it more difficult to achieve the

goals of the Enlightenment. Marcuse (1964), in *One Dimensional Man*, inspired in part by Weber's rationalization theory, focused on the relationship between technology and rationalization. Marcuse contended that formally rational structures have replaced more substantially rational structures and that capitalist society has become one dimensional, in the sense that it is dominated by organized forces that restrict opposition, choice, and critique. Although there appears to be democracy, liberty, and freedom, society prevents radical change since it is able to absorb criticism and opposition, and to render these criticisms futile.

Habermas agrees with Weber that the development of modern society is driven by an underlying logic of rationalization. However, he maintains that this has a dual quality. In his view, Weber fails to distinguish between instrumental and communicative rationality, which corresponds to different patterns of development in modern society: technological and moral progress, respectively. Rejecting the pessimism of Weber, Adorno, and Horkheimer, Habermas argues that the concept of the "iron cage" gives too much weight to the importance of instrumental rationality in modern society. Rather, in his view, the development of both instrumental and communicative rationality can produce not only unprecedented technical achievements, but also the kind of humanity that can utilize those advancements to better itself rather than being enslaved by them.

The concept of rationalization has profoundly affected the direction of social theory, perhaps most notably theories of state formation, governmentality, organization, politics, and technology. The concept has also triggered debates regarding the central issues of the contemporary world such as the culture of consumption. Ritzer's McDonaldization thesis, in particular, illustrates the continuing importance of the Weberian notion of rationalization as it extends it into many new domains, especially consumption, popular culture, and everyday life.

SEE ALSO: Bureaucracy and Public Sector Governmentality; Critical Theory/Frankfurt School; McDonaldization; Mannheim, Karl; Marcuse, Herbert; Modernity; Rational Legal Authority; Simmel, Georg; Weber, Max

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Ratzenhofer, Gustav (1842–1904)

Bernd Weiler

Besides Ludwig Gumplowicz, the Viennese born Gustav Ratzenhofer is the best known representative of the so called Austrian Struggle or Conflict School. After only a few years of formal schooling and an apprenticeship as clock maker (his father's business), Ratzenhofer entered the Austrian Army in 1859. In a highly successful military career he rose to the position of a lieutenant field marshal and, a few years before his retirement, was also appointed president of the military supreme court in Vienna. During his time in the army Ratzenhofer acquired a first hand knowledge of the national struggles which were increasingly besetting the Austro Hungarian Empire. His political world view was marked by a tension between the commitment to the liberal ideals of the revolution of

1848 and the conviction that a strong, centralized state was needed to counteract the centrifugal forces in the Habsburg monarchy. Before Ratzenhofer turned to sociology he had written numerous treatises on military history and strategy (e.g., Ratzenhofer 1881) and had also provided an in depth analysis of the peculiar political nature of the Habsburg monarchy (Renhr 1877–8). In 1893 he published his first explicitly sociological work, the three volume *Wesen und Zweck der Politik*, followed shortly thereafter by *Die sociologische Erkenntnis* (1898) and by the posthumous work *Soziologie: Positive Lehre von den menschlichen Wechselbeziehungen* (1907), which contains a number of anti Semitic and racist remarks. Ratzenhofer was mainly self taught and remained on the margins of Viennese academia throughout his life. One of his few scientific allies in Austria was his fellow countryman Ludwig Gumplowicz, who assumed the role of a mentor and made his name known in the international sociological community. Ratzenhofer died in 1904 on his return trip from the St. Louis Congress of Arts and Sciences where he had presented a sociological paper.

The major intellectual influences on Ratzenhofer were the French Enlightenment, with its emphasis on the universal and inevitable progress of humanity, British empiricism, and the writings of cultural historians such as H. T. Buckle (Oberhuber 2002). Above all, Ratzenhofer was heir to the time honored tradition most famously associated with Heraclitus that “war is the father of all and king of all.” Like many of his contemporaries, Ratzenhofer was impressed by the success of the natural sciences and emphasized that human history was not beyond or above, but part of, nature. Sociology’s prime task was to uncover the universal laws governing social life (Ratzenhofer 1904). In his late writings Ratzenhofer refined this idea of the unity of nature and history and of the iron regularity of social phenomena into a grand systematic, monistic worldview with metaphysical overtones. Even though he clung to the idea that society was a natural product evolving out of necessity, he still shared the Comtean sociocratic optimism that an understanding of the laws could be used for society’s reorganization.

At the core of Ratzenhofer’s sociology lies the idea that from the very beginning social life had been inherently antagonistic, “absolute

hostility” marking the starting point. In a highly conjectural scheme of social evolution he sketched the various stages through which society had developed, paying (like Gumplowicz) particular attention to the formation of the state through conquest. At each stage the antagonistic character of social life assumed a peculiar form. In contrast to Gumplowicz, with whom he shared many key ideas, the units of analysis in Ratzenhofer’s conflict theory were not the concrete, empirically given groups competing against each other but the diverging “interests” that the sociologist had to abstract from real life. Society was the battle field of “interests,” understood as social forces manifested in groups. Of particular importance were the “general interest,” the “kinship interest,” the “national interest,” the “creedal interest,” the “pecuniary interest,” the “class interest,” the “rank interest,” and the “corporate interest” (Ratzenhofer 1967: 161–85; Small 1905: 252). By introducing the category of “interest” Ratzenhofer, unlike Gumplowicz, was able to argue that within an empirically given group there could be more than one “interest” at work, allowing for more intragroup dynamics, that individuals could partake in more than one group, and that not all potential social forces were always necessarily manifested in the competing real groups. Ratzenhofer’s ideas exerted a great influence on the early American sociologists A. W. Small, L. F. Ward, E. A. Ross, and F. H. Giddings, and especially on the American political scientist and so called founder of pluralism, A. F. Bentley (1967).

SEE ALSO: Comte, Auguste; Conflict (Racial/Ethnic); Conflict Theory; Gumplowicz, Ludwig; Pluralism, American; Pluralism, British; Positivism; Small, Albion W.

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Rawls, John (1921–2002)

Mark R. Rank

John Rawls is generally considered the most significant moral philosopher of the twentieth century. His work has had a profound influence upon political philosophy, as well as political science, sociology, economics, social work, theology, and law. For much of his career he was a faculty member in Harvard's department of philosophy.

Rawls's major work was his 1971 book entitled *A Theory of Justice*. In it he details the basic components of a just or fair society. He begins with what he refers to as the original position. Imagine, Rawls states, that “no one knows his place in society, his class position or

social status, nor does anyone know his fortune in the distribution of natural assets and abilities, his intelligence, strength, and the like” (p. 12). Behind such a veil of ignorance, Rawls asks, what would be an acceptable social contract for most people? He argues that individuals in this original position would invariably choose two fundamental principles.

The first is that each of us would want to be guaranteed access to the most basic liberties. These would include “political liberty (the right to vote and to be eligible for public office) together with freedom of speech and assembly; liberty of conscience and freedom of thought; freedom of the person along with the right to hold (personal) property; and freedom from arbitrary arrest and seizure as defined by the concept of the rule of law” (p. 61). Consequently, all citizens, no matter where they fall in society, should be entitled to these rights.

The second principle chosen would be to allow social and economic inequalities to exist, but only under two conditions: (1) “if they result in compensating benefits for everyone, and in particular for the least advantaged members of society” (pp. 14–15); and (2) that offices and positions in society are open to all. The reason that inequalities would be tolerated in the first place is because such inequalities often provide incentives to greater production, which can benefit all citizens. According to Rawls, a just society therefore does not necessitate that the distribution of income or wealth has be equal, but rather that an unequal distribution is to everyone's advantage, particularly those at the lower end of the income distribution. For example, from a Rawlsian perspective, a just society would be one that provides a strong social safety net to protect the economically vulnerable, with the funding for such programs coming through a redistribution of some of the gains earned by those at the middle and upper ends of the income gradient.

These two principles, referred to as the “liberty principle” and the “difference principle,” form the core of Rawls's conception of “justice as fairness.” In his later work, Rawls elaborated and extended the ideas laid out in *A Theory of Justice*. In particular, his 1993 book *Political Liberalism* dealt with addressing how the liberty and difference principles can exist and be applicable within democratic societies,

given the wide variety of ideological and religious viewpoints within such societies. He argued in *Political Liberalism* and in his final book, *Justice as Fairness: A Restatement*, that his principles of justice should be understood as a political guideline rather than as a moral doctrine. Consequently, the plurality of religious, philosophical, and moral viewpoints within democracies can successfully coexist under a political interpretation of justice as fairness.

SEE ALSO: Civil Society; Distributive Justice; Nozick, Robert; Social Justice, Theories of; Social Policy, Welfare State; Welfare State, Retrenchment of

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realism and relativism: truth and objectivity

Andrew Tudor

Although the doctrine of relativism has a lengthy pedigree in philosophy – conventionally traced to the 5th century BC sophist Protagoras and his “man is the measure of all things” – it was only in the twentieth century that its full force was unleashed. The “linguistic turn,” the “cultural turn,” and the “postmodern turn” all brought with them profoundly relativistic claims. Late twentieth century thought sought to relativize aesthetics, ethics, and even that last bastion of Enlightenment certainty, natural science. But relativism takes many forms, and relativists do not speak with one voice. This is

especially apparent where conceptions of science are concerned, for a very wide variety of relativistic arguments have been marshaled against the conviction that science provides privileged access to the independent, objective, external reality of nature. These range from the various perspectival relativisms that increasingly undermined philosophy of science orthodoxy from within, right through to the far reaching social constructionist relativism of the sociology of scientific knowledge and the so called science wars to which it gave rise.

It was apparent from the Greeks onward that relativistic claims all too often led to paradoxes, regresses, and to problems of self reference. These can take various forms, although the general pattern can be typified by this simple variant of the well known truth paradox. Consider the statement “all truth is relative to cultural context.” In what sense can this statement be true? If it is an absolute truth, as the “all” suggests, then it is its own refutation. But if its truth is (only) relative to cultural context, then there may be cultural contexts in which it is thought false and is, therefore, true. Much energy has been expended over the centuries in dealing with the consequences of such circularity, and while this has been entertaining enough, it has not served to undermine the appeal of relativistic claims. Nor should it, of course, since few serious relativistic positions on matters of truth and knowledge deal in these kinds of absolutes. They tend to recognize, rather, that how we know the world is dependent on both the nature of that real world itself and the conceptual systems through which we seek to understand it. Since Kant, it has been impossible not to recognize the constitutive character of concepts in forming our knowledge. But to what degree are they constitutive? And if they are strongly so, how – if we should and if we could – are we to stop the perspectival regress from theory to meta theory to meta meta theory, and so on? For Kant, of course, the resolution lay with the a priori transcendental categories – the preconditions for all thought. But if we cannot make that transcendental move, how then are we to conceptualize the relation between the terms in which (we think) we know and the real world about which we presume to know, but only from within the terms, languages, and perspectives available to us?

The relativistic issues that arise here – those of alethic, epistemic, and even ontological relativism – are central to radically changing views of science in the modern period. But to assess the impact of these ideas requires some attempt at classification. What is it that is relativized? And relative to what? Such questions have often been the starting point for those concerned to impose order on the somewhat inchoate world of relativistic thinking. Only equipped with, at least, rudimentary answers to such deceptively simple questions is it possible to begin to assess the impact of relativistic thinking on our understanding of science. To commence, then, with the most general, post Kantian classification of the “what” that is relativized, we may distinguish between cognitive, aesthetic, and ethical relativism. Although questions of aesthetic relativism may not be irrelevant to science (at least some scientists are given to speaking of theoretical models in aesthetic terms – the double helix was “pretty,” as Watson famously described it), and although ethical issues clearly cannot be dismissed, it is primarily the family of cognitive relativisms that are of most interest in relation to science. Here we find variously far reaching relativistic accounts of knowledge, truth, objectivity, and the constitution of “reality” offered from a range of relativizing perspectives. Let us consider four such clusters: limited theory based conceptual relativism; radical language based conceptual relativism; cultural and “worldview” relativism; social constructionist relativism.

In the domain of conceptual relativism, the most straightforward, and least problematic for those seeking to defend science from relativistic doubt, are the conventionalist arguments which arose from within the logical positivist tradition. Here, the major relativistic frame was “theory,” and the initial questions raised were most notably those of “theory laden” observation and the consequent necessity for methodological conventions to prevent perspectival regress. As the mid twentieth century “received view” in philosophy of science moved away from the apparent certainties of the distinction between observation and theory languages – at least in part because of the difficulties of drawing that distinction systematically – it increasingly embraced conventionalist solutions to its conceptual problems. Thus, for example, Popperian

falsificationism openly recognized that decisions about the falsificatory significance of experimental results irreducibly involved methodological conventions, even though Popper sought to draw a critical rational line beyond which at least some “conventionalist stratagems” were scientifically unacceptable.

However, the space opened up by this need to incorporate conventionalist decision making was to prove something of a black hole into which more radical relativistic arguments were drawn. Once science’s thoroughgoing reliance on its conceptual schemes was admitted, it became increasingly difficult to prevent the slide toward the more powerful conceptual relativisms. Thus, for example, Quine, having famously rejected the familiar halt to that slide offered by the analytic/synthetic distinction, and having also argued that contradictory evidence could always be dealt with by making adjustments to some other part of the conceptual system, then further extended his thesis in terms of the indeterminacy of translation. Taken together, these arguments appear to lead toward relativistic conclusions, and Quine’s image of knowledge as a “web of belief” which relates to experience only “at the edges” lends force to that interpretation. In a much quoted passage, Quine (1960: 24–5) himself denies that we must therefore “settle for a relativistic doctrine of truth,” claiming instead that “within our total evolving doctrine, we can judge truth as earnestly and absolutely as can be; subject to correction, but that goes without saying.” That may be so, but as the qualification “within” suggests, Quine is clearly espousing a radical conceptual relativism which is consonant with his view of science as “self conscious common sense.”

Although Quine’s conceptual relativism is primarily language based, it is not a great leap from his “web of belief” to the more overtly culture and “worldview” based relativisms. The best known of such approaches to science, of course, is that of Thomas Kuhn in his influential 1962 study, *The Structure of Scientific Revolutions*. At the heart of Kuhn’s analysis lies the “paradigm,” a concept which – whatever Kuhn’s original intentions – has subsequently come to refer to the body of presuppositions, concepts, methods, and acculturated practices which make up “normal science” at any given

moment. The paradigm defines the fundamental terms within which scientists operate – their culture – and all scientific knowledge is in that sense relative to the paradigm. Change, when it comes, is revolutionary change: the entire paradigm shifts when anomalies are perceived to be too important to be ignored and when there is a changing balance of power relations within the scientific community. Paradigms are therefore “incommensurable” in as much as there exists no independent position from which knowledge claims within one paradigm can be assessed in relation to those within another. Much debate has followed on this issue, not least with Feyerabend, but it seems clear that, as far as Kuhn is concerned, lack of direct translation between paradigms does not necessarily mean that they are entirely incomparable. Any attempt to compare them will entail what has been called “Kuhn loss” but, just as we can achieve some level of translation between cultures, so there will still be areas of meaningful overlap between the theories generated within different paradigms.

However one assesses the strength of Kuhn’s own relativism – and commentators do not agree on this – there is no question but that *The Structure of Scientific Revolutions* significantly helped to open up the study of science to more socially and culturally oriented empirical analysis. Prior to the 1960s sociological research into science had ring fenced scientific knowledge itself. However, where Kuhn had led, later sociologists of science were more than willing to follow, a development accelerated by growing interest in social constructionist perspectives within sociology. From this context emerged the sociology of scientific knowledge (or SSK as it likes to refer to itself), the so called strong program in the sociology of knowledge and, in their wake, what became known as the science wars. The strong program aimed to examine the social and cultural grounds for knowledge claims, and is most briefly characterized by its four basic principles as advanced by Bloor (1976). It was to provide causal explanations; to be impartial in explaining both successful and failed knowledge claims; to be symmetrical in using the same kinds of causal explanations for both true and false beliefs; and to be reflexive in as much as it could be applied to sociology itself. Quite how relativist is this perspective

(and, indeed, SSK more generally) is open to some debate. From the point of view of a hard line scientific realist, the strong program is an affront to rationality and to demonstrable scientific achievements in comprehending and manipulating the real world. “No one is a social constructionist at 30,000 feet,” as Richard Dawkins vividly, albeit misleadingly, claimed in a typically vitriolic contribution to the science wars. But many proponents of SSK (including the founders of the strong program) profess at least some degree of realism in their views of science, even if the excessive rhetoric of the “debate” on this issue has too often forced the various parties into untenable positions. It is a measure of how foolish the science wars became that the mildly entertaining Sokal hoax (Sokal had a parody article published in the journal *Social Text*, apparently drawing on relativistic and constructionist approaches to science) has been paraded as somehow undermining relativist and constructionist arguments. Whatever failings may be exhibited by the editorial policies and methods of a journal can hardly count as clinching arguments for or against any intellectual case.

What the Sokal hoax and its aftermath did demonstrate, however, is the antagonistic confusion that has been characteristic of the guerrilla warfare between naïve relativist and naïve realist positions. Boudon (2004) has suggested that relativism more generally is in the process of becoming the new “secular religion,” a development of which he does not approve. Whether that characterization turns out to be accurate remains to be seen, but, in any case, in the science wars we have already seen its fundamentalists at work on both sides.

SEE ALSO: Kuhn, Thomas and Scientific Paradigms; Objectivity; Science, Social Construction of; Scientific Knowledge, Sociology of; Scientific Revolution; Strong Program

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reception studies

Sonia Livingstone

Reception studies derives primarily from the application of literary theories of textual interpretation to the everyday activities of mass media audiences. Drawing on ideas from the interpretation of the literary texts of high culture, reception studies argues that media texts must also be interpreted, made sense of, worked on by their audiences. Reception studies began in the 1980s in reaction to the predominant conception of audiences as passive and – in tandem – of media texts as moving wallpaper occasioning little or no effort of interpretive activity. For, ever since the advent of mass media over a century ago, the major theories of the audience have been strongly influenced both by sociological theories of ideology and hegemony and by social psychological theories of media effects and attitudinal or behavioral change. The result has been an image of the audience as homogeneous, vulnerable, and easily manipulated in the face of a powerful and all pervasive mass media. Reception studies has sought to critique each element of this image, proposing instead that audiences are active, heterogeneous, resourceful, motivated, and even resistant in their responses to mass media texts.

Since its inception, reception studies has mapped out a theoretical and empirical program of research on the “active audience” for mass media, establishing an influential strand of audience research, together with a series of innovations in both theory and methodology (Livingstone 1998).

Most importantly, in media and communication research emphasis shifted from the structuralist analysis of meanings “in” the text to an analysis of the process of reading a text, where the meanings which are activated on reading depend on the interaction between text and reader. Reception theorists (from both the American reader response and European reception aesthetic traditions) argue that an implied or model reader (i.e., an ideal decoding strategy, inscribed in the conventions of medium, genre, or address) is encoded into the text. This “model reader” is an implicit set of assumptions detectable within the structure of a text which render the meaning of the text fundamentally open or unstable, depending on the actual interpretive contribution of “real readers.” This in turn depends on what Eco (1979) termed the “textual competencies” required to decode the text. However, as the empirical reception context may not meet this specification of the ideal reader presumed in the construction of the text, and, moreover, it may provide alternative interpretive resources, reception studies became an empirical project focused on audiences, linking their interpretive activities to both text and context.

In retrospect, the success of reception studies in challenging and changing dominant theories of audiences merits a more complex explanation than simply the extension of a theory from high to popular culture, although this innovation gave reception studies its conceptual starting point. But the literary approach is not primarily an empirical one, and what was striking about the early reception studies was the enthusiasm with which researchers began conducting empirical projects on audience’s reception of mass media (mainly television) texts, rather, that this was the response of social science to a new idea, it being strongly felt that one could no longer simply assume that audiences would automatically interpret media texts as either their producers or their critics blithely supposed. Hence, the ways in which audiences

interpreted media texts was recognized as an empirical question, one that demanded the combined analysis of media texts with media audiences (e.g., see readings in Brooker & Jermyn 2003). This in turn required the development of new methods of research – not just looking for measures of impact or effect, but rather seeking to uncover the interpretive processes of diverse audience members in particular cultural and social contexts, and so methods such as focus group interviewing, discourse analysis of audience talk, and ethnographic observation have become particularly prominent.

Within social science approaches to media audience, several distinct strands of research seized on the potential of literary approaches to interpretation, resulting in what is variously termed “reception studies,” “audience reception studies,” or work on the “active audience.” These include, perhaps most importantly, the cultural studies interest in the production and reproduction of mass produced meanings, centering on the twin analysis of encoding and decoding of media texts, with decoding taking place in specific yet influential social contexts of everyday life (Morley 1992). But the uses and gratifications perspective, which asked not what media do to audiences but what audiences do with media, also found resonances in reception studies, as did the social cognitive and social constructivist approaches in social psychology, concerned with the micro analysis of people’s interpretive processes. Two approaches gave a more politicized welcome to reception studies – one, critical mass communications research, was interested in the possibilities of audience critique and resistance to dominant ideological messages; the other, feminist media studies, was concerned to challenge the typically gendered image of the passive audience as housewife by reevaluating audiences in more active and critical terms.

In integrating these different strands, reception studies has taken a range of approaches over recent years, while developing further as researchers respond to new empirical challenges, particularly those posed by different cultural contexts (resulting in a comparative, cross national program of research for reception studies), and by new forms of “audiencing” (Fiske 1992) resulting from changing texts and technologies (e.g., public participation in talk

shows, reality shows, and media events; audiences as fans joining in and acting out, rather than simply watching, the text; engagement with emerging or hypertext genres online or across multiple media). In so changing, reception studies has both gained in strength and encountered some problems. One problem has been the temptation to overclaim audiences’ abilities to resist or rework the text so as to avoid the dominant message. Also problematic has been the ethnographic turn evident across much of the social sciences, for reception studies has expanded the focus on the reception context to the point where audiences’ interpretive engagement with the text itself has become more marginalized; thus reception studies merges with audience studies more generally, and the specific strength of reception studies which stressed the empirical reception of specific textual features, conventions, genres, or codes receives less weight in current studies of audiences.

Nonetheless, the key arguments of reception studies have now become paradigmatic in sociological studies of mass media, namely: (1) that audiences must interpret what they see even to construct the message as meaningful and orderly, however routine this interpretation may be; (2) that audiences will diverge in their interpretations, generating different understandings from the same text; and (3) that the experience of viewing stands at the interface between the media (and their interpretations) and the rest of viewers’ lives, blurring into the everyday so that watching television is no longer to be denigrated or neglected as an automatic, passive, standardized phenomenon.

SEE ALSO: Audiences; Critical Theory/Frankfurt School; Cultural Resistance; Encoding/Decoding; Fans and Fan Culture; Popular Culture Forms

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recidivism

Paula Smith

Recidivism refers to reoffending, or the repetition of criminal acts by a convicted offender. The term is derived from the French word *récidiver*, and based on the Latin word *recidivus*, “back,” to denote a relapse into prior criminal habits. Recidivism is an important consideration for modern penologists as a large proportion of incarcerated offenders in most countries are classified as recidivists. Studies in several countries across North America and Europe, for example, indicate that between one half and two thirds of inmates have served previous sentences (Bonta et al. 1992; Farrington 1992). According to Langan and Levin (2002), a recidivism rate as high as 70 percent has been reported within three years of release for inmates in the United States. Research also indicates that recidivists tend to have lengthier criminal histories, and the recidivism rate appears to be highest for those convicted of property offenses (Bonta et al. 1992; Langan & Levin 2002). Women are much less likely to recidivate than men (Bonta et al. 1992).

The measurement of recidivism is plagued by a number of conceptual and methodological issues that affect how statistics are interpreted. Recidivism is most often defined as an official record of reoffending behavior (e.g., rearrest, reconviction, reincarceration, technical violation of parole or probation condition, readmission to secure hospital, etc.). Official records are impacted by a number of factors, however, and inconsistencies in the interpretation of results have culminated in much misunderstanding and controversy. Several commentators (see Skogan 1977; Bartol 2005) have noted

that official records tend to underestimate the incidence of criminal offenses as many crimes are unreported, or undetected, by law enforcement agencies. As an alternative, self report studies (e.g., respondents are asked what offenses they have committed and how often) as well as national and regional victimization studies have been used to estimate recidivism rates. Moreover, recidivism rates also depend on how and when reoffending is measured. At the most basic level, certain measures of recidivism (e.g., reconviction, reincarceration) provide a more conservative estimate of reoffending in comparison with others (e.g., rearrest, technical violation of parole or probation condition). To illustrate, not all individuals who are rearrested are reconvicted, and not all individuals who are reconvicted are reincarcerated. Thus a measure of recidivism based on reconvictions would give a more conservative estimate than a measure based on rearrest. In addition, the severity of new convictions may or may not reflect the severity of the offenses actually committed (e.g., consider the effects of plea bargaining). Other methodological issues that limit the comparative value of statistics on recidivism include differing post release follow up periods (i.e., lengthier follow up periods generally produce higher estimates of recidivism than shorter periods), varying data sources (e.g., official records versus self report data), unrepresentative or small samples, regional disparities in legal and procedural codes, as well as the discretionary decision making practices of law enforcement agencies. All estimates of recidivism should be interpreted in light of how and when reoffending was measured.

A variety of statistical methods are used to calculate recidivism rates. Two of the most common are: (1) the *frozen time method*, or the calculation of the cumulative percentage of offenders who have recidivated after a specified follow up period; and (2) *survival rate analysis*, or the estimation of the probability and rate of recidivism (i.e., time to reconviction) for different cohorts of offenders (Lievore 2004).

Reducing recidivism is, arguably, the primary goal of correctional agencies that aim to rehabilitate offenders. As such, recidivism is often the criterion of interest in assessing future risk, and in evaluating the effectiveness of correctional interventions. Several meta analyses

have identified numerous causal or functional variables as robust predictors of recidivism. These variables are referred to as *risk factors* and are subdivided into two categories: (1) *static*, or immutable, risk factors (e.g., age, gender, criminal history); and (2) *dynamic*, or malleable, risk factors (e.g., pro criminal associates, substance abuse). Research indicates that high risk offenders (i.e., those with an increased likelihood for recidivism) can be reliably distinguished from low risk offenders through actuarial assessments of both static and dynamic risk factors. Furthermore, dynamic risk factors are prime treatment targets given their amenability to change, and the likelihood of future criminality is substantially reduced when such offender characteristics are altered. Several meta-analyses (e.g., Gendreau et al. 2000) have identified the following dynamic risk factors as the most robust predictors of recidivism: (1) pro criminal attitudes, values, beliefs, and cognitive emotional states; (2) pro criminal associates; (3) personality and temperamental factors, including weak self control, impulsivity, and adventurous pleasure seeking; (4) problematic circumstances in the domains of marital/family relationships, education, employment, and leisure/recreation; and (5) substance abuse. Meta analyses have also demonstrated that other attributes once regarded as important treatment targets (e.g., low self esteem, personal distress, depression, and anxiety) are relatively weak predictors of recidivism (Gendreau et al. 2000).

SEE ALSO: Crime; Criminal Justice System; Criminology; Criminology: Research Methods; Deviant Careers; Measuring Crime

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recognition

James J. Chriss

One of the more notable trends in the human sciences of late is a growing concern with reflection, reflexivity, and reflexive or reflective practice (Sandywell 1996). Wilhelm Dilthey is most directly linked to the concept of reflexivity as it has developed in hermeneutics, phenomenology, existentialism, and other interpretive theories in sociology. Dilthey's thought is located within the line of German idealism beginning with Kant and especially Hegel, the latter of whom is famous for the dialectical method. Hegel had attempted to overcome the dualism of subject/object by conceptualizing Spirit (*Geist*, or mind) as a triadic structure composed of *subjective Spirit* (thesis, or Spirit *in* itself, i.e., the pure subjectivity of the individual); *objective Spirit* (antithesis, or Spirit *for* itself, the subject projecting onto the outer world itself, for itself); and *absolute Spirit* (synthesis, or Spirit *in and for* itself, whereby Spirit returns to itself) (Tolman 2001: 184).

From Mead and later as codified by Blumer, the symbolic interactionist perspective posits reflexivity as an essential human capacity, one that is vitally important to the development of the self and the sustenance of everyday social interaction. Consistent with this position, Vaughan and Sjöberg (1986) argue that the capacity for social reflexivity is the most essential characteristic of our humanity. The human ability to reflect on ourselves and our social location and situation gives us all, potentially,

the power to shape social reality even as we are being shaped by it. This is in essence our humanness: the ability, through a mindful and reflective consciousness, to transcend particular settings.

Vaughan and Sjoberg value subjectivity as a moral good and suggest conversely that oppressive social conditions which treat persons as objects reduce them to subhuman or non human status. It is interesting to note, however, that from another theoretical perspective, under specifiable conditions it is actually necessary to render persons as objects *before* they can become subjects. This, of course, refers to the Hegelian dialectic. It seems here we have a fundamental contradiction between the hermetic approach, which suggests that self and self consciousness arise only under liberative social conditions in which reflexivity is assured, and the Hegelian or dialectic approach, which suggests that the self and subjectivity arise just as readily out of oppressive conditions whereby, for a period of time at least, selves are treated as objects. On its face, this contradiction or disagreement is traceable to the split between Kant and Hegel over transcendental reason, or the ultimate grounding of understanding and interpretation.

For Kant, the universality of judgments acts as the transcendental ground of reason. In making this move, Kant limited knowing to the objects of possible experience, shared collectively, and declared that noumenon, the thing in itself, behind appearances was unknowable. Hegel's main objection to this line of thinking is that by separating the appearance from the thing in itself, Kant was in effect imbuing reason with too much power. In essence, reason has no limit, because it is reason and reason alone that is able to discern the presumed distinction between appearances and things in themselves. But what makes a limit always includes knowledge of what is on both sides of it. As Gadamer (2000: 343) explains, "It is the dialectic of the limit to exist only by being superseded." Like the dialectic of master-bondsman, subjectivity arises out of the limits imposed by objectification; it does not emerge necessarily in and for itself. Kant's separation between appearance and the thing in itself makes transcendental reason the arbiter of reality. But rather than absolute reason, self consciousness for Hegel

arises only out of the difficult battle to be recognized by the other.

This issue of recognition has come to the fore especially within political and social theory over the conceptualization of social justice or the "good life" more generally. Indeed, over the years across modern western society and increasingly among the so called developing and less developed nations, social movements have arisen based upon group demands for recognition of the unique identity or cultural attributes such groups are claiming for themselves. Further, these demands for recognition are grounded in the claim that the dominant culture and major social institutions of society (especially the polity and economy) have systematically ignored and injured members of these groups through their failure to provide mechanisms for assuring members' full participation in society.

Charles Taylor (1994: 25) argues that groups that perceive that they are being misrecognized or not recognized at all are suffering real damage insofar as persons in the wider society are routinely mirroring back to members of these groups confining, demeaning, or contemptible images of themselves. This distorted image of the self leads to a host of problems in the living conditions and life chances of members of misrecognized or unrecognized groups. For example, feminists claim that patriarchal societies operate in such a way as to socialize women into internalizing a depreciatory image of themselves. Likewise, for centuries whites have projected a negative image onto blacks, and these powerful cultural scripts and practices have made it virtually impossible for blacks to resist adopting a deleterious self image.

With the rise of the modern welfare state, citizens' demands go beyond those based on economic hardship or political injustice. Now, above and beyond claims being made on the basis of "citizen" or "worker," within constitutional welfare states persons are making identity or recognition related claims on the basis of gender, race, ethnicity, age, disability, sexual orientation, marital status, and so forth. This progression in the change of western politics could be interpreted as a slow but inexorable move toward incorporating greater reflexivity into law and policy. Many things "taken for granted" in earlier times are being looked at in

different ways and are subject to reflective critique or appraisal pertaining to the treatment of persons, objects, other living entities, and the environments within which they are situated. Examples include “green politics,” the animal rights movement, and economic reparations to African Americans for American slavery.

The idea that the development of the welfare state, as well as more recent claims for recognition by a growing number of persons and groups, is spurred on by a growth in reflexivity and heightened awareness about the plight of the other, is made explicit in John Rawls’s (1971) theory of justice. Through the process of reflective equilibrium, that is, by reflecting on their own situation and placing themselves in the shoes of the less fortunate in society, persons come to an understanding of the justness or goodness of welfare as institutionalized and enacted within government policy.

We must be cautious, however, in equating too easily the notions of rightness or goodness on the one hand, and justice on the other. As Nancy Fraser (2001: 22) points out, questions of distributive justice and rights are typically aligned with Kantian *Moralität* (morality), while questions of recognition and “the good” are aligned with Hegelian *Sittlichkeit* (ethics). Norms of justice are thought to be universally binding, thus consistent with Kant’s categorical imperative, while claims for recognition of difference involve qualitative assessments of the relative worth of various cultural practices which cannot be universalized, thereby maintaining consistency with Hegel’s dialectic. Fraser attempts to bring these two divergent impulses together in a more comprehensive theory of justice that incorporates both redistribution and recognition. Specifically, she suggests that recognition ought to be treated as a question of *social status*. Here, what is required is not recognition of group specific identity – which tends to cause difficulty insofar as such claims of identity get entangled in ethical considerations of the various claims made by various groups – but rather the status of group members as full participants in social life. Hence, misrecognition or non recognition is no longer seen as distorting group identity, but rather is seen as causing the social subordination of group members to the extent that they do not enjoy full participation in ongoing group relations, as peers alongside

those not similarly misrecognized. Fraser’s (2001: 24) “status model” aims, then, to overcome subordination “by establishing the misrecognized party as a full member of society, capable of participating on a par with other members.”

From the perspective of the status model, misrecognition arises wherever social structures or cultural norms or practices distort interaction so as to impede parity of participation. In many ways this is similar to the position of Vaughan and Sjoberg (1986). To reiterate, Vaughan and Sjoberg assert that the right to human status is fundamental, and that to achieve human status social conditions must be present that facilitate social reflexivity. Lacking such social conditions, persons would be cut off from self actualization or their own subjectivity, in essence being treated merely as subhuman “objects” within the social system.

There is seemingly good evidence of a growth in claims for recognition among various groups in society, and these recognition claims go beyond the more longstanding strategy of seeking economic reparations for the historical harm done to these groups (whether because of slavery, colonialism, internment, racism, classism, heterosexism, sexism, and so forth). The ongoing waves of juridification culminating in the modern welfare state and beyond, as outlined by Habermas (1987), seem to point to an opening up of reflexive awareness on the part of legislators and citizens about past and current mistreatment of certain groups and persons. With regard to recognition claims per se, the recognition or acknowledgment of this mistreatment amounts to a new view that persons deserve respect and should be assured full participation in society as fellow human beings (Honneth 2001; Walby 2001).

Even as we move seemingly toward a “one world order” under globalization, there is evidence of powerful countermovements – resembling something like a new tribalism – as more and more groups are making claims of collective identity based upon any number of attributes or statuses, for example, gender, religious affiliation, sexual orientation, citizenship status, ethnicity, and so forth (Gamson 1995: 2; Bendle 2002: 8). There appears to be a proliferation of social movements in which members seek recognition for identities that are disvalued or

overlooked by legislators and/or the general public. This is the essence of current political and sociological concern with recognition, reflexivity, and identity (Douzinas 2002).

SEE ALSO: Existential Sociology; Hegel, G. W. F.; Human Rights; Identity Politics/Relational Politics; Phenomenology; Reflexivity; Social Justice, Theories of; Social Movements

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reconstructive analyses

Phil Carspecken III

Reconstructive analysis refers to a specific method of analyzing qualitative data based primarily on principles from universal pragmatics and critical theory, but employing adapted insights from hermeneutics and structuralism as well. It is used to study meaning and symbolically structured forms of experience at many different substantive levels: from analysis of singular meaningful actions to the analysis of themes and discourses that distinguish an entire culture or subculture. It is a non empiricist, interpretive method because its object of inquiry – meaning – is not objective in nature. Participants' intuitive knowledge is first grasped tacitly by the researcher through some combination of maueitic interviewing, participant observation, and/or stimulated recall. Analysis then proceeds based on hermeneutically guided understandings of the tacit knowledge routinely employed by participants, in order to reconstruct (put into explicit discourse) what was formerly implicit. The standard by which to determine successful or unsuccessful reconstructions resides in the intuitive knowledge of one's subjects, who should recognize the researcher's formulations as being accurate.

The historical roots of reconstructive analysis can be traced to Habermas's use of the expression "reconstructive sciences" during the 1970s for distinguishing a methodology that had already been in use within subfields of linguistics, logic, analytic philosophy, and developmental psychology (Habermas 1976, 1979, 1982). Inferences used to move from data to research findings are neither deductive nor inductive in these sciences, but rather use a process called "explicitation" by Brandom (1994). The term "explicitation" is roughly synonymous with "reconstruction," though the former refers to everyday processes of making

implicit understandings explicit while the later emphasizes the more theoretically guided efforts of a researcher. The researcher learns the underlying “structures” (generative rules, interpretive schemes, cognitive or moral schemes, logical relations) intuitively and implicitly in the way her subjects understand them through a process resembling the “hermeneutic circle,” though theoretically informed by a concept of “cultural typifications” (Carspecken 1996, 1999), and then moves the implicit understandings into explicit, reconstructed formulations with the help of universal pragmatics, structuralist semantics, and empirical contingent pragmatics.

The reconstructive sciences identified by Habermas differ from “reconstructive analysis” partly because of the effort of the former to seek out universal structures, rules, and normative orders. Reconstructive analysis makes use of universals in the pragmatics of communication to do research on particular and contingent structures of meaning, though nothing in principle bars reconstructive analysis from making contributions to the quest for structures universal to human communication. The universal structures of pragmatics include the internal relation of criticizable validity claims to meaning and the division of validity claims into objective, subjective, and normative categories – each of which is intrinsic to all meaningful acts (Habermas 1976, 1979, 1982). Reconstructive analysis makes use of this pragmatic theory of validity in the development of the concept of a pragmatic meaning horizon (Carspecken 1996, 1999), which includes a validity horizon, an identity claim, and an empirical contingent pragmatic shell as structures of every meaningful act. For meaningful acts that employ language, a level of semantic structure is also part of the pragmatic meaning horizon. The researcher uses this theory of meaningful action to build from analyses of micro level actions to cultural themes, discourses, and other macro and meso level sociological phenomena. Results of such analysis can then be further analyzed with the use of systems theory to examine the relation between macro and meso level cultural themes and non cultural features of society such as economic systems, formal legal organizational structures, and political orders and laws.

The theory of meaning central to universal pragmatics and reconstructive analysis alike takes implicit, pragmatic structures to be fundamental, with semantics and empirical contingent pragmatic structures having a secondary status, reducible to pragmatics. This means that the reconstruction of meaning is most closely achieved through the explication of validity horizons. All representations of meaning semantically, symbolically, artistically, and so on never reach a full one on one correspondence with the meanings represented. In other words, all representations of meaning resulting from reconstructive methodology will implicate additional implicit and holistic understandings to make any sense. Though these also may be reconstructed this results in an unending chain of representations and meta representations, each still dependent on an implicit horizon of understandings to make sense. The precision of reconstructive analysis can be continuously refined in this way without an end ever being possible to reach. The implicit understandings chronic to meaning are intersubjectively constructed and ultimately rooted in expectations of how others will understand an act and act next themselves. Such expectations are within culturally normed boundaries. This has consequences for reconstructive analysis that are explained below.

MEANING, CONTEXT, SETTING, AND CULTURAL TYPIFICATION

Reconstructive analysis employs a model of meaningful action that includes a number of key elements. People interact meaningfully through a process of taking the position (with or without much awareness) of other subjects in the situation. Meaning is therefore constituted intersubjectively. Other subject positions have an assumed status enabled through cultural typifications and a normative infrastructure referred to as the interactive setting. This means that position taking need not be (and often is not) accurate. The researcher will have an interest in attaining both accuracy in taking the positions of others in an interaction and in grasping and then articulating the typification and setting infrastructures that her participants use to position take with each other. The first goal of the

researcher, then, is to position take as her subjects do.

Meaningful acts are therefore always contextually dependent, in that they build features of cultural typifications and specific normative infrastructures into their constitution. A meaningful act is understood in this approach to deliver a holistic meaning that is analytically divisible into many various components. Components are distinguished along a temporal dimension pertaining to the assumptions made by actors regarding shared understandings about actions just gone by as well actions likely to come next. This pertains to interactive syntax in relation to the setting infrastructure.

A paradigmatic dimension also distinguishes components of meaning with the major divisions pertaining to a culturally contingent pragmatic structure through which the act is delivered, a semantic level of structure, an existential identity claim, and a validity horizon. The concept of "structure" here refers to many levels of implication between categories and rules having a variety of inference relations between them (similarity and contrast relations, metaphor, analogy, homology, binary, hierarchy, material implication). These are instantiated as claims by the meaningful act. Thus, structures can vary from act to act because they are reproduced or slightly altered by ongoing action.

MEANING FIELDS

Actors in everyday life do not understand each other simply and straightforwardly, but rather understand a bounded field of possible meanings with every act. The researcher learns to understand fields of meaning as the subjects do, and the boundaries of such fields. Thus, the concept of meaning field is another tool key to reconstructive analysis. Meaning fields are implicit to understanding and cannot be exhaustively formulated, but central themes of interpretation can be articulated so as to specify the boundaries of possible meaning. Central interpretations within a single field will display a conjunctive/disjunctive structure and are formulated with "OR," "AND," and "AND/OR" connectives between them.

VALIDITY HORIZON

Because meaning ultimately depends upon implicit, pragmatic understandings, there is no way to represent it directly and completely. Hence the most direct way to reconstruct meaning is to specify the horizon of criticizable validity claims constituting it. This is because the validity claims constituting a meaningful act pertain directly to the implicit intersubjective assumptions used by actors to try to make themselves understood and to respond to each other. Reconstructing the validity claims results in what is called the validity horizon in reconstructive analysis. A validity horizon is the most precise articulation of meaning, but because it is a semanticization of something that is at root pragmatic and implicit, it is a fallible interpretation and must be supported by the responses of one's subjects to it.

A validity horizon articulates claims along two dimensions: a dimension of discrete distinctions between Habermas's three fundamental validity claims plus a category for identity claims, and a dimension of continuous distinction from foregrounded portions of meaning to backgrounded portions. The "identity claim" is added to Habermas's three validity claims. Identity claims are chronic to all acts though often not foregrounded, and they consist of claims to being a certain type of person and not other types of persons, given a cultural repertoire of possible identities (which itself will have reconstructable structure). In general, the foreground of the validity horizon consists of the validity claims emphasized by the actor, while the mid regions and backgrounds of validity horizons are assumptions that must be understood for the foreground to make sense. Mid and back regions of the horizon are often not within the full awareness of actors, but can be drawn out with maeutic techniques.

SEMANTICS

One can examine semantic structures unique to a culture or discourse by focusing on key lexical items and the structures of implication necessary to understand these items as one's subjects do. Lexical structures have terms that implicate

each other in various ways: through homologies, oppositions, relations of similarity, analogies, hierarchies, and metaphors. Reconstructing both the terms and the relations of implication between them is necessary. Semantic structures are ultimately understood to deliver meaning through delivering validity horizons.

CULTURALLY CONTINGENT PRAGMATICS

Meaningful acts also employ culturally contingent pragmatics, which include such things as (giving a list at diverse levels here): roles, intonations, gestures, facial expressions, pacing, power relations between actors, interactive infrastructures pertaining to the sequencing of acts, and many other things. Pragmatic features of meaningful action also implicate structures. For example, the contribution of something like intonation to meaning depends upon implicitly understood differences and similarities with other intonation patterns. Pragmatic structure is claimed with each act and involves relations of exclusion, complementarity, and contrast to characterize them. There are even pragmatic metaphors and allusions. But pragmatic structures are all implicit and para linguistic, in contrast with semantic structures. Once again, the bottom line for an analysis of meaning, in this case with a focus on pragmatic structures distinguishing a discourse, culture, or subculture, is the validity horizon.

USES

Mastery of the validity horizon method of analysis is used for many purposes, including the reconstruction of general cultural themes, ideologies, discourses, small group cultures, and dyadic normative infrastructures. It is a method helpful in analyzing culture at many diverse levels and in many diverse contexts. Findings then allow for further analysis of the relation between the cultural forms revealed and non-cultural features of social life.

Because reconstructive analysis emphasizes the criticizable validity claims of everyday life, it is an appropriate method for critical inquiries. Validity claims typical to one's participants can be examined and critiqued in their own terms

because validity claims always include, necessarily, certain claims to universality (Habermas 1982) and bear a relation to the existential identity claims of actors which put validity claims of all types in relation to ontological needs for valid social identities, self actualization, autonomy, and freedom (Carspecken 1996, 1999).

SEE ALSO: Critical Theory/Frankfurt School; Hermeneutics; Structuralism; System Theories

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redlining

Rachel Dwyer

Redlining is a form of discrimination in credit markets where banks and financial institutions identify entire neighborhoods as too "high risk" for financial investment in both residential and commercial property. Financial institutions "redline" neighborhoods for a number of reasons including the physical characteristics of the housing stock and undesirable location, but most important has been the presence of minority, especially black, residents. Racial redlining occurs not only because of the correlation of

race with indicators of financial risk, but also because investors interpret the racial category itself to signal risk apart from the quality and prosperity of the neighborhood on other measures. In short, redlining is a critical form of community disinvestment that occurs when resources (e.g., home mortgages, insurance, home improvement loans) are made unavailable to residents because of the high proportion of ethnic or racial minorities living in their neighborhood, regardless of objective socioeconomic characteristics (e.g., wealth, income, age of housing).

Social historians argue that while discrimination against minority neighborhoods occurred throughout US history, redlining became standard practice in the 1930s. The collapse of the housing market during the Depression and the development of new financial instruments led to increased concern with assessing neighborhood risk. Jackson (1985) found that government agencies were crucial in the institutionalization of redlining during this period. A New Deal agency created to halt widespread foreclosures by giving loans, the Home Owners Loan Corporation (HOLC), developed detailed "Residential Security" maps that categorized neighborhoods by risk and interpreted any minority presence to increase hazards for investment, placing all black neighborhoods into the highest risk category. HOLC coded the highest risk category red on the maps, originating the term redlining. While the HOLC maps represent some of the most striking evidence of redlining in the 1930s, Hillier (2003) argues that the practice predated the maps, and many other housing market actors were actively creating their own rating systems and maps at the same time (both in dialogue with HOLC and separate from it), including the financial services industry, which used them to decide where not to invest, and the Federal Housing Administration (FHA), which used them to decide where not to insure investments.

Neighborhood risk assessments profoundly influenced the post war housing boom. In fact, the well documented suburban bias of the FHA derived in some measure from the agency's judgment that almost any central city neighborhood – even if inhabited by whites – could potentially become minority and thus was higher risk than suburban areas ("protected"

by restrictive covenants and other forms of racial discrimination). The disadvantages of US cities in the post war political economy can thus be interpreted to be in part a form of redlining on a large scale.

Routine use of redlining by both industry and government persisted until the 1960s and 1970s, with devastating consequences for cities and minority neighborhoods. Starved of commercial and residential capital, the physical stock in redlined neighborhoods declined and urban areas were disinvested. Redlining thus created the conditions it supposedly merely identified, degrading the financial health and quality of properties in minority neighborhoods regardless of their starting position. Redlining not only resulted from racial segregation, it also worsened it by blocking wealth accumulation among minority households, contributing to persistent poverty by foreclosing job creation, and making integration against the financial interests of white households.

Civil rights activism in the 1960s and 1970s resulted in laws that made redlining illegal, including the Equal Credit Opportunity Act in 1974. These laws (combined with community action to ensure their enforcement) increased access to credit and investment in some minority neighborhoods in the 1980s and 1990s (Immergluck 2004). Study and monitoring of redlining were facilitated by the passage of the Home Mortgage Disclosure Act (HMDA) in 1975, which required annual reports from lenders, producing an invaluable source of data for researchers.

Despite progress made since the civil rights legislation, there remains substantial disparity in the level of investment in minority compared to white neighborhoods. Yet there is debate over the degree to which the credit disadvantage of minority neighborhoods is due to ongoing racial redlining, or whether instead it is simply the result of the correlation of race with reasonable, objective measures of risk used by financial institutions (Goering & Wienk 1996). In an exhaustive review of this literature and analysis of the methodological issues raised, Ross and Yinger (2002) conclude that both individual mortgage discrimination and racial redlining did still occur in the 1990s, even if financial institutions were not as blatant in their methods as in earlier decades.

Others have challenged the terms of the debate over whether the assessment of risk in neighborhoods involves racial discrimination. First, scholars point out that even if minority neighborhoods receive less investment as a result of poor performance on objective measures of risk and not overt racial discrimination, policies of risk assessment are discriminatory in their *consequences*. This “disparate impact” can not be ignored, not least because it is in large part the legacy of past redlining that makes many neighborhoods higher risk on objective measures.

Second, an even more ambitious critique draws on economic and organizational sociology to question the very conception of “objective” risk used within financial services companies. Stuart (2003) argues that risk assessment cannot be interpreted solely as an objective matter, determined through rational analysis. Instead, he argues that risk is socially constructed within particular organizational structures with particular histories and imperatives. In the taken-for-granted practices of institutions and industry conventions, policies perpetuate racial discrimination and redlining even when not explicitly framed in racial terms. Stuart demonstrates that because they subscribe to a fundamentally flawed (and outdated) theory of economic organization, regulations and studies that define racialized policies only as the most overt differential treatment miss the many more subtle ways that real estate practices are racially discriminatory (see Gotham 2002 for a related argument).

Another important area of recent scholarship is study of alternative and new forms of redlining in financial services. Squires (2003a) has detailed the prevalence of “insurance redlining,” where properties in minority neighborhoods are denied insurance, a prerequisite for obtaining a mortgage. Predatory lending is also increasingly interpreted to be a form of redlining where minority neighborhoods are targeted for investment, but on highly unfavorable terms that drain resources from communities perhaps even more effectively than denial of credit (Squires 2003b). Changes in the financial services industry and its regulatory framework made predatory lending much more prevalent in the 1990s, and other changes (including the rise of electronic banking and automated underwriting, industry consolidation, and the

proliferation of lending instruments) may significantly impact the incidence of redlining in ways social science has only begun to explore.

Analysis of redlining has become increasingly difficult, however. Because of changes in the industry since the passage of the reporting legislation, HMDA collects fewer data from a smaller percentage of lenders than in the past (Holloway & Wyly 2002). In addition, whole segments of industry like property insurance have never been required to report. Thus, just as the institutional terrain has become more complex, the data have become less reliable.

Even with the data difficulties, social science must keep pace with the industry and push for better government data collection as well as seek new sources of data on the financial services market. It is important that redlining continues to be studied, against the tendency in the literature to focus more on individual discrimination than on the geographical dimensions of credit inequality. Despite some progress toward integration, the profound link between race and space in US metropolitan areas will persist into the foreseeable future, including in the historical legacy and continuing incidence of redlining.

SEE ALSO: Blockbusting; Hypersegregation; Inequality and the City; Invasion Succession; Restrictive Covenants; Steering; Racial Real Estate; Urban Renewal and Redevelopment

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reference groups

Kristine J. Ajrouch

The term reference group denotes a cluster of social psychological concepts pertaining to the relationship between individual identities, social norms, and social control. Reference groups may constitute a group into which individuals are members, as well as those groups to which one does not belong. The utility of the term lies in its ability to provide an explanation as to how social groups influence individual values, attitudes, and behavior.

Muzafer Sherif articulated early applications of reference group theory in the 1940s. At the time, understanding of human behavior focused on subjective interpretations and classic behaviorism regarding the relationship between the individual and his or her environment. Sherif instead started moving away from subjective interpretations by introducing the concept of “frames of reference” to highlight the significance of the individual actively striving to gain acceptance into a group. Sherif’s work challenged prevalent thinking; his contribution included emphasis on relationships between people, underscoring group dynamics for understanding individuals. One important aspect of Sherif’s thinking for reference group theory is the notion that reference groups do not

automatically constitute membership groups. The link between individual identities and reference groups is determined by the context within which individuals interact with groups. Perhaps his most significant contribution is that Sherif presented a way to understand social group influence on the individual as well as to discern those situations when such influence does not shape the individual.

Reference groups have also been useful in understanding the development of identity boundaries, particularly concerning ethnicity and adaptation among children of immigrants. Many scholars interested in second generation immigration highlight the tensions that exist between the ideals of two conflicting reference groups, that of the immigrant culture and that of dominant American society. The values and behaviors of each reference group provide powerful socializing forces on the children of immigrants. Thus, inquiries into identity development often seek to determine to what extent each group serves as an audience in front of whom the second generation acts to achieve acceptance. For instance, in a recent study focusing on adolescent children of Lebanese immigrants living in an ethnic community, Ajrouch discovered the usage of two terms representing reference groups – boater and white. A boater is the term second generation adolescents ascribe to immigrants. It signifies that the immigrant has not yet acquired the “American” cultural habits with which the adolescents identify, including fluent, unbroken English and clothing that reflects current American fashion trends. A white represents members of dominant American society, and has both positive and negative aspects. The positive dimensions include access to education and privilege. The negative dimensions include a lackadaisical attitude and no sense of obligation, commitment, or responsibility. As adolescents describe themselves, defining their identity, they reference these groups to designate who they are not, and portray themselves as somewhere in between. Attitudes about who one is stem from comparison with those one would like to emulate as well as comparison with those with whom one does not want to associate.

The use of reference groups has had enormous impact on the development and use of measures in the social sciences. Self report measures of social, psychological, and biological

phenomena including attitudes, behaviors, and physical well being invariably are influenced within a context, by social comparison. For example, inequalities in society may be as much a product of subjective interpretation involving an individual comparing his or her situation to a group or category as they are a consequence of objective, observable differences. The reference group concept has furthermore served to highlight the potential confounding effects of group comparison research, especially concerning cross cultural studies. Building off the awareness that most people's self understanding results from how people compare themselves with others around them, and in particular others similar to them, the suggestion emerges that different groups have diverse standards by which evaluations are made. Moreover, shifting evaluations may occur depending on the context. Thus, analyses that seek to compare mean scores from different cultures (who invariably have different referents) risk the threat of misleading results.

The areas in the social sciences to which the concept reference group applies have expanded over the years, demonstrating its utility for understanding a variety of social phenomena. Initially developed as a theoretical concept by which to illuminate the effect of social context on human attitudes and behavior, the term has recently shown its value as a means by which to explain social processes ranging from identity development to methodological fallacies. The application of the reference group concept will continue to illuminate the ways by which context influences the individual.

SEE ALSO: Generalized Other; Group Processes; Interaction Order; Interpersonal Relationships; Looking Glass Self; Role; Role Taking; Social Control; Social Psychology

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reflexive modernization

Jens Zinn

Ulrich Beck introduced the term reflexive modernity (also called second modernity) by explicitly demarcating himself from postmodern approaches which would imply that current developments go beyond modernity (Beck et al. 2003).

He first outlined his argument in *Risk Society* (published in German in 1986 and in English in 1992) and later developed it further. The central thesis is that modernity has transformed itself by the radicalized application of the core concepts of modern industrialized society (also called first modernity or simple modernity). Central principles (e.g., the distinction between nature and culture or science and politics), as well as basic institutions (e.g., the gender division of labor, the traditional family, the normal model of the life course), have been transformed into a new modernity.

Since "reflexive" often causes misunderstandings Beck has repeatedly emphasized that it does not mean that people in today's society are more self-conscious than in the past. It indicates rather a heightened awareness that mastery of nature, technique, the social, and so on is impossible.

Originally, Beck (1992) developed the concept of reflexive modernization referring to the

occurrence of a risk society and growing institutional individualization. New risks would occur as unexpected side effects of industrialization that take place in nature (e.g., climate change, depleted ozone layer) and as technical catastrophes (e.g., accidents in Bhopal, Chernobyl, *Challenger*). They would erode the belief in the managability of nature by science and thereby politicize risk decisions. Additionally, individualization processes would release people from traditional institutions, which at the same time erode and became supplanted by secondary institutions (e.g., the labor market, the welfare state, mass media). Individualization demands individual decisions where routines and traditions prevailed before.

Reflexive modernization resonates in the discourse on social change in Britain. Beck et al. (1994) critically discussed social change in modernity. While Lash emphasized the cultural aspects of these changes (“risk culture”), Giddens prefers the expression “institutional reflexivity” and emphasizes growing individual self awareness and self responsibility, which lead to more political considerations regarding a “Third Way” in politics. Beck developed his theoretical considerations in the direction of a general theory and tried to specify the changes more empirically. He broadened the concept of social change from “risk” and “individualization” to a general change of central institutions and principles of first modernity into a reflexive modernity.

The multiplication of boundaries (or attempts to draw boundaries) is introduced as a central criterion to identify the change from first to reflexive modernity (Beck et al. 2003). For example, instead of one identity linked to a specific cultural background there is the possibility of several identities referring to different (often contradictory) backgrounds without the necessity to decide for one or the other. The result is in many respects a change from a so called either/or society to a this as well as that world. Boundaries between nature and culture, life and death, knowledge and superstition, us and others, expert and laymen, for example, become blurred.

Although many of Beck’s observations are acknowledged, the theory itself is still untested. It is criticized as often being too general to explain concrete behavior. It is faulted for a

lack of empirical evidence and whether it can be empirically tested at all.

SEE ALSO: Individualism; Modernity; Risk, Risk Society, Risk Behavior, and Social Problems; Uncertainty

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reflexivity

Mats Alvesson

Reflexivity can be broadly defined to mean an understanding of the knowledge making enterprise, including a consideration of the subjective, institutional, social, and political processes whereby research is conducted and knowledge is produced. The researcher is part of the social world that is studied and this calls for exploration and self examination. A reflexive researcher “intentionally or self consciously shares (whether in agreement or disagreement) with her or his audiences the underlying assumptions that occasion a set of questions” (Robertson 2002: 786).

The recent interest in reflexivity has been linked to the influence of postmodernism and poststructuralism whose insights have drawn attention to the problematic nature of research, the dubious position of the researcher, the crisis of representation, and the constructive nature of language, as well as an admission of the fact that there is no “one best way” of conducting either theoretical or empirical work. Reflexivity is about dealing with “a sense of uncertainty and

crisis as increasingly complex questions are raised concerning the status, validity, basis and authority of knowledge claims” (Mauthner & Doucet 2003: 417).

Leading philosophers of science and intellectuals have struggled with issues similar to those brought forward by the “reflexive turn” for a long time. The work of Kuhn (1970) has been vital in raising questions around the limits of scientific rationality and progress. Popper (1969: 95) cast doubt on the objectivity of the single researcher, whom he described as “often very biased, favouring his pet ideas in a one sided and partisan manner.” Popper declared his faith “upon a critical tradition which, despite resistance, often makes it possible to criticize a dominant dogma.” Much work on reflexivity expresses similar interests, but tends to be skeptical of Popper’s belief in the community of scholars jointly producing scientific objectivity. Instead, this work typically takes ideas of constructionism and the linguistic turn(s) seriously, and rejects or downplays the possibility or ideal of objectivity.

Postmodern thinking, critical studies, feminism, and interpretive and other qualitative work more generally all cast doubt on the idea that “competent observers” can “with objectivity, clarity, and precision report on their own observations of the social world.” They also challenge the belief “in a real subject” who is “able to report on his or her experiences” (Denzin & Lincoln 1994: 11–12), and typically go much further than writers such as Popper by problematizing the pillars of the scientific project. Informed by the linguistic turn, such researchers have increasingly stressed the ambiguous, unstable, and context dependent character of language; noted the dependence of observers and data on interpretation and theory; and argued that interpretation free, theory neutral facts do not exist but, rather, that data and facts are constructions that result from interpretation.

VARIETIES OF REFLEXIVITY

There are reasons to draw attention to the varieties of reflexivity: rather than talking about reflexivity, we should perhaps refer to *reflexivities*. Most texts emphasizing reflexivity seem to propose one – possibly “The” – form of

reflexivity as different authors favor a particular approach. For some, it is the researcher self and the personal experiences of the research process: “reflexive ethnographies primarily focus on a culture or subculture, authors use their own experiences in the culture reflexively to bend back on self and look more deeply at self–other interactions” (Ellis & Bochner 2000: 741). For others, it concerns the cognitive aspects around construction processes in research (Glaserfeld 1991). For still others, reflexivity revolves around language, inviting the investigator “into the fuller realm of shared languages. The reflexive attempt is thus relational, emphasizing the expansion of the languages of understanding” (Gergen & Gergen 1991: 79). Other versions of reflexivity revolve around the research text and authorship (Richardson 1994), theoretical perspectives and vocabularies and what they accomplish (Rorty 1989), or the empirical subjects “out there” and how their voices are being (mis)represented (Fine et al. 2000).

For some authors, reflexivity is intimately connected to the broad intellectual stream of postmodernism and/or radical social constructionism. This may imply a broader set of considerations, for example, postmodernism is frequently associated with the indecidabilities of meaning, fragmented selves, power/knowledge connections, the problematic nature of master narratives, and problems of representation, providing an ambitious set of themes for reflexive work. Again, for others, reflexivity means the breaking of the logic associated with a particular stream – reflexivity involves confronting dataistic, interpretive, critical, and postmodern lines of reasoning and challenging the truths and emphasis following from each of these (Alvesson & Sköldberg 2000).

The spectrum for reflexivities is probably endless. Five major versions – these can be referred to as positions or practices – indicate the most common ones and are described below.

Destabilization. This form of reflexivity is inspired by the work of Derrida and Foucault and emphasizes the “negative” or “dangerous” aspects of knowledge claims.

In different ways, Foucault and Derrida encouraged the exploration of the shortcomings and limitations of claims to knowledge, creating rather than revealing the truth. The production of knowledge, particularly positive versions that

try to establish “the truth,” leads to a certain, in a sense, arbitrary version of the social world, with associated power effects, that neither reveals nor distorts the truth but, rather, creates it. All knowledge projects are thus dangerous, insofar as any version of truth carries with it a particular configuration of political privileges and should therefore be closely interrogated. The means to do so lie with postmodern theoretical and epistemological assumptions that see social reality as ambiguous, fragmented, and contested, and temporarily held in place through the operations of certain discourses (Rosenau 1992). Accordingly, reflexive researchers try to undermine the idea that research is ultimately a progressive path toward universal “truths.” Reflexivity means keeping a skeptical eye on how the phenomenon under study is being ordered by the researcher’s use of discourse – or the discourse’s use of the researcher.

Combining alternative perspectives. Instead of treating epistemological positions as manifestations of metaphysical principles, as some people taking the paradigm idea seriously tend to do, using the paradigms reflexively involves seeking out anomalies among them “in a way that is mindful of the historically and politically situated quality of our reasoning. By becoming more practically reflexive about the conditions of the theorizing, we move away from an external and seemingly authoritative form of analysis and towards an immanent, self consciously situated form of critique” (Willmott 1993: 708). Accordingly, researchers use tensions among different perspectives to expose different assumptions and open up new ways of thinking.

Rorty (1989) warns about being convinced of the superiority of a final vocabulary, and suggests what he refers to as an ironic way of reasoning – where the researcher is highly aware that the vocabulary in use is not the only one possible or not necessarily the superior one. The reflexive researcher can draw upon a set of alternative perspectives – transcending a strictly paradigm bound position – to draw attention to the limitations in using a single frame of reference and, in so doing, provide new insights about limitations as well as possibilities in the use of a specific perspective or sort out which is “best.” It is the *accumulation* of these perspectives that amounts to reflexivity, not the adoption of one to undermine another. In this regard,

reflexive practice is more a matter of bricolage, where different perspectives help to understand otherwise “incomplete” research.

Voicing and representation in fieldwork. Rather than just going out there to find out what is going on – and go through the seemingly linear route of planning the study, collecting data, and then analyzing data – the precarious, messy, political, subjective, and basically non rational process of fieldwork is viewed as calling for reflexivity. Struggles to speak authentically about the “Other” call for careful consideration of what is happening here and what the researcher is doing in relationship to the Other (and vice versa). A focus on the researcher as subject recognizes that the researcher is part of the research project, a subject just like any other that is constructed in and through the research project: we do not simply “bring the self to the field” so much as “create the self in the field” (Reinharz 1997: 3). As a result, it is incumbent on the researchers to present the details of their particular experiences and interests – to declare the authorial personality and to acknowledge their participation. Another element is that, being reflexive, researchers tend to divulge the steps they have taken in order to present their work as respectable research – to confess their sins by way of extensive personal disclosure.

Narration and representation in textwork. A key theme for many “reflexivists” is a change of emphasis in research from fieldwork to text work. Over time, the researcher has become less of a neutral, objective social scientist who reports faithfully and accurately on the activities of research subjects, and instead has taken on a more “modest, unassuming style” while struggling “to piece together something reasonably coherent out of displays of initial disorder, doubt and difficulty” (Van Maanen 1988: 75). The resulting crisis of representation weakens researchers’ voices and, especially, their claims to report reliably on the experiences of research subjects. In short, “writing up the results” is viewed as an extremely difficult and contested enterprise. This calls for reflexivity.

One key theme here concerns the self critical questioning of how the researcher convinces, how literary tropes, seductive narratives, and rhetorical devices are used to show how, by hiding behind the cloak of science, researchers take steps to produce authoritative accounts.

Another theme relates to how to produce “better” representations or narratives, by being more creative and experimental in writing. Reflexivity is here associated with how various literary techniques are employed to open up space for the Other in research accounts through the self-conscious use of writing techniques by using fiction, drama, narrative, and metaphor (e.g., Richardson 1994). As a result, an array of practices such as reflexive ethnographies, literary autoethnographies, narratives of the self, first person accounts, and lived experience have been employed. These devices have been used in particular in feminist work.

Sociopolitical contingencies. Another version of reflexivity views the problematic relationship between the knowledge creating process and the produced knowledge in terms of the socio-political context of research. It is thus not the individual researcher – as a subject ordering the world, using a particular perspective or theoretical vocabulary, doing fieldwork or textwork – nor the relationship between researcher and research subject but the societal context that imprints the researcher as well as the research outcome. Relativism is not necessarily a matter of researcher subjectivity, but can be seen as the outcome of a social and highly intersubjective theoretical, methodological, or cultural position (Bernstein 1983).

Social processes shape knowledge through control embedded in the research process, meaning that the researcher can construct “knowledge” only in the context of a particular research community and society. The norms and conventions of the research field, the struggle for position and resources, the adaptation to the criteria of prestigious journals and publishers are all seen as elements shaping research and calling for reflexive scrutiny (Hardy et al. 2001). Such is also the case with societal cultures and traditions, with fashions and other macro elements exercising a directive force on research. One can here see how the reflexive project is not an outcome of progression and added insights in social science, but is associated with the trendiness of postmodernism and the linguistic turn, which are perhaps contingent upon the developments of capitalism into a system less concerned with the production of “substance” than with the free flow of signifiers and images around marketing and consumptions.

Reflexivity as a theme, then, can be understood in the context of career options and moves associated with new fashions in social science as well as with broader societal trends toward deobjectivization, providing space for a reflexive turn.

CRITIQUE OF REFLEXIVITY

Some commentators believe that reflexivity may encourage narcissism and self-indulgence. Critics worry about excessive reflexivity turning the self “into a fieldsite” (Robertson 2002: 786), and making the text and author maneuvers the key issue at the expense of the research subjects. Reflexivity may become a dead end rather than a route to more thoughtful and interesting social studies. As such it may fulfill more ceremonial purposes of legitimation – similar to the methods section in academic papers where quantitative and qualitative research is disciplined by neopositivist templates and (mis)represented as highly rational, linear, coherent, controlled, and based on a clear (but fundamentally misleading) division between framework, researcher, and data. There are other risks and costs associated with practicing reflexivity – it takes time, brain power, and text space, and perhaps leads away from conventional theoretical and/or empirical work.

Whether reflexivity encourages more thoughtful and realistically assessed and framed research or leads to ceremonial exercises, whether it makes researchers more sensitive and creative in theory, field, text, and political work or takes attention, energy, and time away from what has traditionally been seen as the core activities in research will, of course, vary. Possible outcomes and tradeoffs between ideals are among the worthy themes of acts of reflexivity.

SEE ALSO: Autoethnography; Constructionism; Journaling, Reflexive; Knowledge; Knowledge, Sociology of; Methods; Poststructuralism

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refugee movements

Courtland Robinson

Refugee movements are defined as the involuntary migration of people across international borders as a result of generalized conflict and disorder, or of more particularized threats of persecution and physical insecurity. The concept of "refugee" generally is treated as one category within a broader typology of forced migration, which includes involuntary movements both within and across international borders and encompasses other categories such as internally displaced persons, development displaced persons, and trafficked and smuggled persons.

While, in common usage, refugee may refer to people fleeing their homes due to any number of threatening situations, the prevailing international legal definition of refugee, endorsed by 145 member states of the United Nations General Assembly, is an individual who, "owing to a well founded fear of being persecuted for reasons of race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group or political opinion, is outside the country of his nationality and is unable or, owing to such fear, is unwilling to avail himself of the protection of that country." In 1969, the Organization for African Unity adopted the UN definition but added that a refugee is also a person who has fled his or her country "owing to external aggression, occupation, foreign domination or events seriously disturbing public order."

Related to the definition of a refugee as a person crossing an international border to escape persecution or conflict is that of the asylum seeker, an individual who has a claim to be a refugee. Whether that claim is real or fraudulent, and whether it is accepted, rejected, or ignored by a state authority, it is the claim to refugee status, and the protection thus entailed, that distinguishes the asylum seeker from other categories of migrants.

In 2003, the number of refugees was estimated at 11.9 million people, the majority of whom were from the Middle East (4.4 million), Africa (3.2 million), and South and Central Asia (1.9 million). Of these, about half are female and about 45 percent are under the age of 17. More

than 80 percent of refugees are from developing countries and more than two thirds have sought refuge in developing countries. More than 7 million have been living in camps and settlements, “warehoused” for at least 10 years or more.

Asylum seekers, who numbered 600,000 in 2003, are primarily from developing countries though they principally are seeking asylum in Europe and North America. While most refugees and asylum seekers find themselves in limbo for extended periods, some manage to find a more durable solution in the form of permanent resettlement or voluntary repatriation. In 2003, however, only 54,000 refugees were offered permanent resettlement in another country. A much larger number – at least 925,000 in 2003 – voluntarily returned home, although more than 50,000 were forcibly repatriated.

In describing his “kinetic model” of displacement, which borrowed the “push” and “pull” factors of traditional migration models and adapted them to refugee movements, Egon Kunz (1973) said that he used the term kinetics rather than the more general term dynamics because refugee movements lacked inner direction but were instead propelled, like billiard balls, by external forces and frictions. More recent conceptualizations of refugee movements, and forced migration in general, largely reject the notion that refugees are like billiard balls and, instead, emphasize that their paths reflect complex patterns of volition and choices made in the face of often poor information and worse odds.

While theories and concepts of migration previously described types of movements in dichotomous terms – push versus pull, “distress” versus “livelihood,” voluntary versus involuntary – more recent approaches promote the idea of a continuum, proactive at one end and reactive at the other end, between which varying degrees of choice and coercion are involved.

Even the distinction between international and internal migration, one involving movement between nation states and the other within a state, has been blurred in two ways with respect to concepts of forced migration in general, and “refugeehood” in particular. The first is that growing attention is being paid to populations

who are internally displaced by conflict, disasters, and development projects. In 1998, the UN Commission on Human Rights agreed to define internally displaced persons (IDPs) as “persons or groups of persons who have been forced or obliged to flee or to leave their homes or places of habitual residence in particular as a result of or in order to avoid the effects of armed conflict, situations of generalized violence, violations of human rights, or natural or human made disasters and who have not crossed an internationally recognized State border.” It further noted that the right to protection from arbitrary displacement extended to those displaced by development projects. The number of people internally displaced by armed conflict, generalized violence, and human rights abuse has been estimated at more than 23 million in 2003. Development projects displaced an estimated 10 million people per year in the 1990s.

The distinction between refugees and internally displaced persons, for some, is not of conceptual significance, however much it matters from a legal or policy perspective. Whether a person is displaced internally or externally may be of issue to a state, but in terms of the experience of those displaced, the commonalities outweigh the differences. For others, crossing an international border in flight from conflict, persecution, and insecurity is a definitive event, compounding the physical vulnerability of displacement from home and familiar surroundings with displacement into a foreign jurisdiction within which the refugee has no rights and protections as a citizen.

Several definitions of refugee attempt to bridge this gap between internal and external displacement. Matthew Gibney (2004) defines refugees as people who need a new state of residence because returning home or staying where they are would subject them to persecution or physical insecurity. Emma Haddad (2004) suggests that the main criterion for refugee status is the breakdown in the state–citizen relationship, while crossing an international border should not be a defining factor.

There is another way in which national borders have become increasingly blurred. Decolonization in the 1960s and 1970s led to “imperial” diasporas – the Portuguese from Africa, the French from Algeria and Indochina,

and the Dutch from Southeast Asia – and to the movement of non European peoples, including Indians and Chinese, originally imported as “colonial auxiliaries” or “middleman minorities.” Waves of labor migration, as well as refugee populations and internally displaced persons, have experienced repeated expulsions and migrations to the point where they have come to form transnational communities, defined by Stephen Castles (2003) as groups based in two or more countries that engage in recurrent, enduring, and significant cross border activities, which may be economic, political, social, or cultural in character.

The formation of transnational communities or networks has been spurred by the forces of globalization, which seek to open borders for the movement of goods and a regulated flow of labor migration while closing borders to irregular and unwanted migration flows. The demand for labor in the North, coupled with restrictive entry policies, has stimulated new forms of organization in the “migration industry,” which rely on transnational companies, communities, and networks to move people by whatever routes prove most efficient. The development of trafficking and smuggling networks has given rise to a \$6 billion industry moving an estimated 4 million people per year, the majority of whom are women and children.

The definition of the term “refugee” will always be shaped by those who use it. The perspective of governments will emphasize a narrower, legalistic definition in value of security at the borders and state sovereignty within them. The perspective of institutions like the United Nations will emphasize a definition that recognizes state sovereignty while valuing protection for persecuted individuals. Academics will value a definition that is at least adequate to the task of distinguishing who is a refugee from who is not, in such a way as to promote better understanding of the phenomenon.

How would refugees define themselves? The answer may be nearly as varied as the millions of people who, depending on the circumstances, might call themselves or be called refugees. The plurality of experiences and the evolving forms and dynamics of displacement make the pursuit of a comprehensive approach or a unitary definition ever more elusive.

Richard Black (2001) notes that the study of refugees and other forced migrant populations is always intimately connected with policy developments. This practical orientation can be a strength, by focusing on humanitarian consequences and avoiding overly abstract theorizing, but it can also be a weakness, leading to research that is ahistorical, reactive, and narrow. New, more holistic approaches to the study of refugee movements seek to build interdisciplinary and comparative understandings of such topics as the political economy, gender dimensions, and causes of refugee movements, as well as the dynamics of mobility and of settlement.

SEE ALSO: Diaspora; Disasters; Migration, Ethnic Conflicts, and Racism; Migration: Internal; Migration: International; Migration: Undocumented/Illegal; Refugees; Traffic in Women; Transnational Movements

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refugees

Steve Loyal

In international law “refugee” refers to individuals who are residing outside of their country of origin and who are unable or unwilling to return because of a well founded fear of persecution on account of race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group or political opinion.

The term derives from the Latin *refugere* – to flee – and is believed to have first been applied to the Huguenots who fled France in the seventeenth century. Its modern legal usage follows the UN General Assembly’s establishment of the United Nations High Commission on Refugees (UNHCR) in 1950. Within a system of nation states with fixed borders, and a burgeoning Cold War rivalry, the UNHCR’s principal aim was to guarantee and provide international protection and assistance to individuals who had become displaced by World War II. By becoming signatories to the 1951 UN Convention, nation states agreed to grant special protection on an international basis to citizens of a state that could not guarantee their human rights and physical security. This remit for protection was later extended beyond Europe to encompass refugees from all over the world, as the problem of displaced people became more global, with the signing of the 1967 Bellagio Protocol. There are currently 137 states that are signatories to both the 1951 Convention and Bellagio Protocol.

The Convention defines a refugee as any person who, “owing to a well founded fear of being persecuted for reasons of race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group or political opinion, is outside the country of his nationality and is unable or, owing to such fear, is unwilling to avail himself of the protection of that country; or who, not having a nationality and being outside the country of his former habitual residence . . . is unable or, owing to such fear, is unwilling to return to it.”

There are, however, a number of conceptual distinctions within refugee discourse. People who are forced from their homes for reasons outlined in the 1951 UN definition of a refugee, but who remain within the borders of their

own country, are known as internally displaced persons (IDPs), of which the UN estimates the number to be 25 million. By contrast, those who seek refugee status outside of their own state of origin must make an application to the country where they arrive and are referred to as asylum seekers. Hence, an asylum seeker is a person who is seeking asylum on the basis of his or her claim to be a refugee. Refugee status may be granted to asylum seekers following a formal legal procedure in which the host country decides whether to grant refugee status or otherwise. Although those who are not accepted as refugees may be deported, in some cases they may be given leave to remain on humanitarian grounds. If, however, the applicant is successful in gaining refugee status, he or she is granted certain rights that are often similar to the citizenship rights of indigenous nationals. These include freedom of movement, the right of refoulement, which outlaws the forcible return to the country of origin from which persons have sought refugee status, and basic social and economic rights. Refugees are in turn expected to obey the laws and regulations of the host country. This in turn raises questions concerning their assimilation or integration within the host nation.

The 1970s witnessed both a shift from the post war inter European migration and a rise in the number of asylum seekers and refugees from Asia, Africa, Latin America, and the Caribbean. According to the UNHCR, the number of refugees has grown considerably over the last 20 years. In 1984 it is estimated that there existed 10.7 million refugees. This figure almost doubled to 20.6 million by the end of 2002, reaching a peak in 1994, with 27.4 million refugees. The causes of this increase in numbers are diverse. Coinciding with increasing restrictions on labor migration and a global recession in the 1970s were improved travel and communication, which facilitated migration generally. However, more specific factors included the instability of developing or third world states following decolonization, and a rise in civilians fleeing civil wars or ethnonational, tribal, and religious violence. Thus the breakup of the Soviet Union and the former Yugoslavia engendered protracted ethnic conflicts, the latter producing over 2 million refugees, with over 400,000 going to Europe. However, the single largest ethnic group remains the 2.7 million

Palestinians, who are not designated as refugees but fall under the United Nations Relief and Works (UNRWA) agency.

Although some governments have remained tolerant of refugees and their plight, the majority, especially within Europe, have reacted to the increase in numbers of asylum seekers and refugees by enacting a series of restrictive policies and practices aimed at their deterrence. Such measures have often been reinforced, if not engendered, by negative media portrayals of refugees as “bogus” and as responsible for increasing unemployment, housing/health crises, or rising crime levels. This, in turn, as part of a vicious cycle, has fueled xenophobic public opinion. The restrictive measures of states have included the tightening of border surveillance and narrower definitions of refugee status – often placing the burden of proof on the asylum seeker. Together with the disappearance of borders within Europe, allowing the free movement of various European citizens, the enactment of stricter coordinated policy to prevent the entry of non EU nationals – such as that effected by the Schengen Agreement (1995) – has been referred to as part of an attempt to create “Fortress Europe.” However, despite these actions, migration continues to occur to Europe.

The rising numbers of asylum seekers and refugees, as a specific type of migration, has also raised problems concerning how to conceptualize processes of migration. In contrast to the dominant rational choice theories of migration, which postulate individuals rationally weighing the costs and benefits of leaving one area for another in order to maximize their utility, refugee movement is often conceptualized as “forced” or “impelled.” Discussions concerning refugees refer to involuntary migrations that distinguish between the forced movements of refugees and the free movements of economic migrants. They also look to the political sphere rather than to economic forces as explanatory factors. Such conceptualizations raise questions concerning agency and structure, as well as the very accounting practices that determine what is “chosen” or “forced.”

SEE ALSO: Assimilation; Boundaries (Racial/Ethnic); Diaspora; Immigration; Migration, Ethnic Conflicts, and Racism; Refugee Movements; Transnationalism

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regression and regression analysis

Stephen E. Brown

Regression is a statistical technique for writing an equation to predict the values of a dependent (y) variable from values associated with one or more independent (x) variables. An important caveat, however, is that predictive success does not imply causality, as prediction is only one of the criteria for establishing causality. The most rudimentary regression form is ordinary least squares (OLS) linear regression. In addition to estimating the association with the independent variable(s), such an equation also incorporates a constant (alpha), or value of y when x is equal to 0, and an error or disturbance term (epsilon) comprised of variation in y not accounted for by the remainder of the equation. The better the fit of the equation, the more variation in y is explained, as reflected in the value of R squared. As the explained variance of the equation increases, ability to predict values of y associated with any particular values of x (or sets of x in multiple regression) is enhanced. That is, as the explained variance in y increases, the prediction error of the equation is reduced until an equation that explains all variance in y (R squared = 1.0) would perfectly predict y for any set of x values and

have an error term of 0. Conversely, as prediction error of the equation increases, explained variance declines until the prediction of the equation offers no improvement over the mean of y as the best predictor of values of y for any level of x . A regression or slope coefficient (beta) is calculated for each x variable and represents the predicted change in y values for each unit change in the value of x . This coefficient may be positive or negative and is multiplied by the level of x for which y is being predicted. The greater the absolute value of the regression coefficient, the steeper the angle of the line (right angle for positive; left angle for negative) that best describes the relationship between x and y . Thus the generalized form of the regression equation is as follows:

$$Y = \text{alpha} + \text{beta}(X) + \text{epsilon}$$

In multiple regression the equation is extended to incorporate additional x variables.

Regression is closely wedded to correlation, but is more useful to the analyst because the correlation coefficient is limited to the statistical significance and strength of the relationship, while the regression coefficient facilitates prediction. Both coefficients are typically examined in conjunction with one another, however, and cannot be understood in isolation from the other. Unfortunately, neither establishes causal direction which is required for drawing causal inferences. The coefficients are bivariate when one dependent variable is regressed on one independent variable. The immense value of regression in analyzing social data, however, lies in the multivariate relationship that entails one dependent variable that the equation defines as a function of two or more independent variables. Such a multiple regression equation allows scrutinizing social factors by estimating coefficients that simultaneously control for the effects of all other independent variables entered in the equation. This serves as a tool for identifying spurious relationships and allows the researcher to sort out the relative association of the independent variables. Moreover, all of this can be accomplished with modest sample sizes.

There are several forms of regression, each resting on certain assumptions that are reasonably met in some research scenarios, but not in others. The OLS regression model is appropriate for analyzing data comprised of

one continuous and normally distributed dependent and one or more continuous independent variables, as well as resting on several other assumptions. It is considered a quite robust technique, meaning that it is such a powerful statistical model that the various assumptions can be relaxed to a considerable degree without appreciably distorting estimates of the coefficients. It is widely accepted, for example, that categorical variables may be included as independent variables through dummy coding schemes (1 = member of the category, 0 = not a member of the category). The OLS regression model also assumes linear relationships between the independent and dependent variables. Similarly, the assumption of a linear relationship between the independent and dependent variables is often addressed by undertaking transformations of the independent variables to fit the data to a straight line.

Not only is regression a very useful statistical technique in its own right, it is also at the center of a family of statistics referred to as the general linear model. These techniques all explain variation in the dependent variable as a function of the distribution of values at different levels or categories of the independent or predictor variables. Thus principles of regression are important to fully comprehend simpler techniques such as analysis of variance and correlation. In addition, multiple regression lies at the foundation of most contemporary advanced statistical techniques such as logistic and probit regression models that accommodate binary dependent variables, survival models that assess time to an outcome, and poisson models to study non normally distributed rare events and a variety of other specific scenarios.

SEE ALSO: ANOVA (Analysis of Variance); Correlation; General Linear Model; Statistics; Variables

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regulation theory

Bob Jessop

Regulation theory is a distinctive paradigm in critical political economy. It originated in Europe and North America in the 1970s in response to the emerging crisis of the post war economy and it has since been applied to many other periods and contexts. Its name derives from its French originators, who describe it as *la théorie de régulation* or *l'approche en termes de régulation*. Similar ideas were also developed by other schools. The core concern of all such work is the contradictory and conflictual dynamics of contemporary capitalism considered in terms of its extra economic as well as economic dimensions. In highlighting the extra economic aspects of accumulation, regulation theorists draw on, and provide links to, other social sciences. Regulation theory was influential in economic, urban, and regional sociology in the 1980s and 1990s. This was partly because of its Marxist roots and partly because of its general heuristic power in organizing research on a wide range of sociological themes.

Regulation theory has many intellectual precursors. Nonetheless, as it is conventionally understood in economics and also became influential in sociology, this approach was developed in the mid 1970s by a few French heterodox economists whose work is collectively identified as the Parisian School (Aglietta 1979; Lipietz 1987; Boyer 1990). Two less well known and relatively minor French regulation schools date from the 1960s and 1970s and analogous approaches, based on different theoretical starting points, emerged elsewhere (Jessop & Sum 2006). Thus, regulation theory is not so much a single, unified paradigm as a broad research program in economics with major implications for other social sciences. Its several schools examine the role of extra economic as well as economic factors in securing, albeit for limited periods and in specific economic spaces, what they regard as an inherently improbable and crisis prone process of capital accumulation. Overall, while well aware of the invisible hand of market forces in this regard, regulation theorists also explore how extra economic factors embed profit oriented, market mediated

capitalist production in the wider society and help to tame, displace, and defer its contradictions and class conflicts. This process is associated with alternating periods of relatively stable expansion and crisis induced restructuring, rescaling, and reregulation. For, precisely because capitalism's contradictions and conflicts can never be fully mastered, crises will provoke a trial and error search process to find new ways of regularizing capitalist expansion.

Starting from real social relations in specific historical periods rather than from the abstract, transhistorical, rational economic man (*homo economicus*) favored in orthodox economics, different regulation schools share four goals: (1) describe the historically specific institutions and practices of capitalism; (2) explain the various crisis tendencies of modern capitalism and likely sources of crisis resolution; (3) analyze different periods of capitalism and compare their respective accumulation regimes and modes of regulation; and (4) examine the social embedding and social regularization of economic institutions and conduct through their articulation with extra economic factors and forces.

The dominant Parisian School introduced four key concepts to analyze different forms of capitalism. First, an *industrial paradigm* is a model that guides the development of the technical and social division of labor (e.g., mass production, flexible specialization). Second, an *accumulation regime* is a specific pattern of production and consumption that can be reproduced over a long period. For example, Fordism, which derives its name from Henry Ford, who is generally acknowledged as the pioneer of the moving assembly line and high wages, is based on a virtuous circle of mass production and mass consumption. Third, a *mode of regulation* is an ensemble of norms, institutions, organizational forms, social networks, and patterns of conduct that can stabilize an accumulation regime. Parisian theorists generally analyze it in terms of five dimensions: (a) the wage relation includes topics such as labor markets, individual and collective bargaining, welfare rights, and lifestyles; (b) the enterprise form includes corporate organization, the main source of profits, forms of competition, interfirm linkages, and links to banking capital; (c) the dominant form of money, the banking and credit system, the

allocation of money capital to production; (d) the state, considered in terms of the institutionalized compromise between capital and labor, forms of state intervention; and (e) international regimes, including the regulation of trade, investment, and monetary flows and the political arrangements that link national economies, nation states, and the world system. Fourth, when an industrial paradigm, accumulation regime, and mode of regulation reinforce each other enough to promote continued expansion, the resulting complex is analyzed as a *model of development*.

Regulation theory originated to explain a chronic economic crisis in advanced capitalism that emerged in the 1970s. This was unexpected because it followed “30 glorious years” of post war economic expansion when policies based on an institutionalized compromise between big labor, big business, and big government seemed to have abolished savage economic crises, to have routinized class struggle, and to have moderated ideological antagonisms. Regulation theorists described this system as Fordist and offered various explanations for its crisis. For example, it was attributed to the exhaustion of the growth potential of mass production, to satiated demand for mass consumer durables, to a tax and expenditure crisis of the post war state, and to growing levels of internationalization, which allegedly undermined the scope and effectiveness of national economic and political regulation. Depending on how the main cause(s) of this crisis were identified, regulation theorists proposed different solutions. These included *neo Fordism* based on intensification of the Fordist labor process; *flexible accumulation* based on increased flexibility using flexible equipment; and an initially ill specified *post Fordism* marked by a new industrial paradigm, accumulation regime, and mode of regulation. This implied the need for changes not only in economic organization but also in extra economic institutions and behavior, including education and training, the science and innovation system, lifestyles, spatial organization, and state forms and functions. Some early work had assumed a quasi automatic transition from a crisis ridden Fordism to an effective post Fordist accumulation regime and mode of regulation. Later work explored the difficulties involved in the search for solutions to the crisis within the existing

Fordist model and/or for alternative models of post Fordism and also described the obstacles to consolidating post Fordist accumulation regimes and modes of regulation. More recently, it seems agreed that post Fordism has, as its positive content, a globalizing knowledge based economy that is being realized on many different scales of economic, political, and sociocultural organization.

Regulationist analyses of Fordism and its crisis appealed to many critical social scientists in the 1980s and 1990s. They used regulation theory to explore the social as well as economic dimensions of the Fordist labor process, new forms of class conflict, stages and varieties of capitalism, new social movements, the distinctive economic geography of Fordism, urban forms and urban crises, and changes in the state. The loss of taken for grantedness of the national economy and the national state associated with the Fordist period has allegedly led to three interrelated changes in economic policy: (1) a shift from the primacy of national states in determining economic and social policy to a multi scalar approach based on multiple supra national, national, regional, and local political actors; (2) a shift in the primary mechanisms to coordinate the economic and extra economic conditions for capital accumulation from the typical post war bifurcation of market and state to new forms of network based forms of policy coordination that cross cut previous “private public” boundaries and that involve “key” economic players from local and regional as well as national and, increasingly, international economies; and (3) a shift from policies concerned with full employment and social welfare to a stress on full employability and personal responsibility. All three changes are reflected at local or regional level in the development of “entrepreneurial” cities and regions.

Regulationists also argue that the crisis of Fordism leads to spatial restructuring (Amin 1995; Lauria 1997). They assume continuing mutual adaptation between accumulation regimes and urban development. For example, Fordist cities were marked by (1) single storey production facilities, which are well suited to mass production and depend on cheap fuel and road transport; (2) low density (sub)urbanization based on mass private and public transport – enabling the normalization of nuclear family

households, which consume many consumer durables, buy bigger ticket items on credit, and depend on automobility; (3) municipal reformism and urban planning designed to promote the role of cities as centers of consumption as well as production; and (4) regional policy concerned to secure even economic development based on spreading mass production industries and their growth dynamic. Unsurprisingly, then, the crisis of Fordism also had a big impact on cities. This is said to include growing fiscal problems that made it harder to sustain the infrastructure needed for Fordism; the hollowing out of cities through a flight to the suburbs; a new spatial division of labor with low cost jobs moving abroad or to more peripheral regions; and increasing social problems due to deindustrialization, rising inner city unemployment, and racial tensions. It is claimed that the Fordist economic and political regime has failed and, if cities and regions are to escape the effects of this failure, they must modify economic strategies, economic institutions, modes of governance, and state forms. These must be redesigned to prioritize “wealth creation” in the face of international, interregional, and intraregional competition because continued growth is necessary for social redistribution and welfare.

One response to these problems is the rise of entrepreneurial cities and public private partnerships to replace the Fordist pattern of municipal socialism and managerialism. “Entrepreneurial cities” actively promote the competitiveness of their respective economic spaces in the face of intensified international, inter and intraregional competition. This may involve little more than a defensive, deregulatory “race to the bottom,” but it can also involve offensive, supply side intervention to upgrade a wide range of extra economic as well as economic conditions considered essential for cutting edge competitiveness. One effect of these varied policies is that, in contrast to Fordism, post Fordist policies tend to promote uneven development and growing polarization between prosperous and crisis ridden cities. Los Angeles was once regarded as the archetypal post Fordist city on the basis of its supposedly post industrial economic profile, spatial organization, social heterogeneity, and patterns of social exclusion (Scott & Soja 1994). But other types of post Fordist city have also been explored (Brenner 2004). In any case, there are

major continuities between Fordist and post Fordist cities, thanks to the impact of the built environment, automobility, and single family households.

Regulation theory remains a progressive research program (for Parisian work, see Boyer & Saillard 2002). Some early critical historical and econometric work challenged the validity of the initial analyses of Fordism and its crisis and criticized the whole approach on this basis. Mainstream social scientists criticize its one sided concern with the economic logic of capital accumulation and neglect of other dimensions of social life. Conversely, fundamentalist left wing critics have claimed that regulation theory implies that capitalism is inevitable (because crises are always eventually overcome) and thereby supports reformism rather than acknowledging the need for the overthrow of capitalism. Regulationists have responded to these and other lines of criticism by refining their concepts, developing new analyses, and reasserting the contradictory nature of capitalism (Boyer 2004; Jessop & Sum 2006).

SEE ALSO: Capitalism; Consumption, Mass Consumption, and Consumer Culture; Economy (Sociological Approach); Enterprise; Information Technology; Labor Markets; Labor Process; Mass Production; Post Industrial Society; Urban Political Economy

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Reich, Wilhelm (1897–1957)

Ken Plummer

Wilhelm Reich was a controversial theorist of the early and mid twentieth century who attempted to wed the ideas of Freud and Marx through a radical theory of the “sexual revolution” (a term he coined in the 1920s). His Marxism led him to the Communist Party in Austria, and to being a member of the Psychoanalytic Society. These organizations were at mutual odds, and Reich was soon expelled from both.

Reich’s theoretical work combined a social theory of sex economy – an economy which may hinder, gratify, regulate, or promote sexuality – a theory of characterology, and an account of both personal and social change due to orgasmic liberation. He provided a critique of the contemporary society, which he saw as creating a fascist, authoritarian character, machine like and subservient to the existing social order. For Reich, political analysis was equated with sexual liberation.

At the core of his hydraulic theory, Reich argued that it was “sexual energy which governs the structure of human feeling and thinking . . . it is the life energy *per se*. Its suppression means disturbance of fundamental life functions” (1969 [1935]: xxv). From the working of the libido, Reich stressed the development of character analysis. His most famous (notorious) theory stressed the existence of the orgone, a pale blue liquid that needed regular discharge through sexual relations. For societies and individuals to function well, all individuals should have regular orgasms. His ideas spiraled out of

control, and eventually took off into wild fancy. For instance, Reich produced a famous box, something like an original, old fashioned wooden telephone box lined with metal, that could capture orgasms: the orgone energy accumulator. This could improve “orgiastic potency” and mental health. Despite these eccentric views, much of Reich’s work is seen as providing a useful, critical, and synthesizing social theory.

Reich analyzed *The Mass Psychology of Fascism* (1931) through a consideration of Polish field anthropologist Bronislaw Malinowski’s *Sexual Life of Savages* (1930) (indeed, Reich and Malinowski became friends). Malinowski’s fieldwork had suggested the existence of societies that were largely matriarchal, where adolescents were allowed to be sexually free. Sexual pleasure was encouraged. By contrast, Reich suggested that much of history had been dominated by sex repressive, patriarchal societies. Societies had moved from sex affirming (with a matriarchal, natural, genital love life and little social hierarchy) to sex negating (predominantly patriarchal with a compulsory marital bond and strong social division).

In a sex repressive society (which Reich saw as widespread), a character armor was formed that was characterized by rigidity and control, represented in physical muscular rigidity which needed breaking down. The family and socialization were themselves a “conveyor belt” of “authoritarian personalities.” In *The Invasion of Compulsory Sex Morality*, Reich outlines armoring through marriage, childhood subservience, the creation of the mass individual, and the lack of rebellion, backed by every reactionary institution. As he says: “All this, taken together, means the ideological anchoring of the existing, authoritarian system in the character structure of the mass individual, thus serving the suppression of life” (1971 [1932]: 165). The character armor revealed itself in muscular tensions and gestures; through the wider therapy of “vegetotherapy,” the orgasm reflex could break out.

For Reich, adult neuroses could be found via compulsive, monogamous, bourgeois marriage. Humans were naturally polygamous. When there was polygamy, concerns such as rape, sadism, prostitution, pedophilia, and sado masochism would be replaced by true orgiastic potency.

Reich was born in 1897 in Dobrzynica, Galicia, part of the Austro-Hungarian Empire. Much of his life was lived in the shadows of psychoanalysis and Marxism. He published *The Function of the Orgasm* in 1927, moved to Berlin in 1930, and subsequently fled from Germany in the 1930s, living briefly in Denmark, Norway, and Scandinavia before settling in the US in 1939. Here, some of his more extreme ideas came to fruition and led him to be seen in his last years as variously a genius, criminal, madman, and eccentric. He died in 1957 at Lewisburg Penitentiary, serving a sentence for the distribution of orgone accumulators in violation of the US Food and Drug Administration.

Parts of Reich's theory can be found in the works of philosophers such as Marcuse, Fromm, and Adorno (the Frankfurt School), who saw how repression may well lead to a restrictive and authoritarian society. In the 1960s, for a short while, Reich was a guru of both the student and countercultural movements on account of his advocacy of the need for full orgasmic sex for good functioning and for the slogan Make Love Not War. He features in the writing of Alan Ginsberg, Jack Kerouac, and William Burroughs; is mocked somewhat by Woody Allen with his "orgasmotron" in the film *Sleepers*; and had a serious film made about his life and work, Makavejev's *W: Mysteries of the Organism* (1968).

SEE ALSO: Adorno, Theodor W.; Critical Theory/Frankfurt School; Freud, Sigmund; Marx, Karl; Repressive Hypothesis; Sexuality; Sexuality Research: History

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reification

Rob Beamish

In general, reification refers to the act (or its result) of attributing to analytic or abstract concepts a material reality. Through reification people regard human relations, actions, and ideas as independent of themselves, sometimes governing them. People frequently reify the abstraction "society" into an entity and give "it" the power to act. Society does not act – people do. Reification is an error of attribution; it is corrected by eliminating the hypostatization of abstractions into things or agents.

For phenomenologists, reification is a potential outcome of the social construction of reality. To enter the lifeworld, human expression and subjective intention are externalized through "objectivation" where they become part of a socially constructed reality. Language is the common vehicle, although objectivation occurs through various symbolic forms.

Reification occurs when people understand objectivations as if they were non-human or suprahuman things and act "as if they were something other than human products – such as facts of nature, results of cosmic laws, or manifestations of divine will." Reification indicates we have forgotten our "own authorship of the human world" (Berger & Luckmann 1966: 89). A reified world is a dehumanized one.

In Marxist sociology, reification is conceptualized differently. Reification is created by the "fetishism of commodities" where "the social character of labor appears as the objective (*gegenstandliche*) character of the products themselves." To the producers, "the social relations of their private labors appear as what they are, not as the immediate social relations of people in their labors but as thingly (*sachliche*) relations of people and the social relations of things" (Marx 1922: 39). The producers' own social movements "possess for them the form of a movement of things (*Sachen*) under the control of which they stand rather than the producers controlling it" (p. 41).

Here, reification – *Verdinglichung* (ver connoting a process; *dinglich* "thingly" – thus "thingification") – is a real social process whereby the social relations among producers

do become “thingly.” Their social relations really are those of commodities (and their value). Human characteristics matter little; one’s “properties” as the bearer of commodities, especially labor power, do. This thing like relation of commodity production dominates the workers actually engaged in production.

Reification links to Marx’s early concern with alienation, where the products and production process under private property are separated from and stand against their human producers. It is a real social process that must be overturned to put social production under the control of its immediate producers.

Lukács (1971) argued that reification created false consciousness, thwarting a spontaneous, workers’ class consciousness, supporting Lenin’s argument for a revolutionary, vanguard party. Other Marxists, like Gramsci and Korsch, argued that workers would, amid the contradictions of commodity production, break through reified, commodity fetishism and force social change.

SEE ALSO: Alienation; Commodities, Commodity Fetishism, and Commodification; Marx, Karl; Phenomenology

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relational cohesion theory

Omar Lizardo

Relational cohesion theory was designed to explain when and how people involved in exchange relations become committed to their

relationship. This extensive research program was developed by Edward Lawler, Jeongkoo Yoon, and Shane Thye and has become one of the most cumulative research programs in sociological social psychology (Lawler & Yoon 1993, 1996, 1998; Lawler et al. 2000). The theory predicts that dyads embedded in equal power relations within exchange networks are more likely to engage in repeated exchange relations than dyads embedded in more unequal power arrangements. These frequent successful exchange episodes are, in turn, predicted to lead to a higher frequency of experience of positive emotions. When individuals attempt to ascertain the source of positive and negative feelings, relational cohesion theory predicts that these positive feelings are interpreted as a product of the relationship by way of an attribution process. This serves to make the relationship a cognitively salient object (“setting it off” as distinct from other alternative relations) and to imbue it with positive affect. Thus the relationship becomes an independent object of emotional attachment for the individual, which helps create perceptions of their relation as a cohesive unit. This perceived *relational cohesion* is thought to result in a host of behavioral outcomes associated with relational *commitment*, such as staying in the relationship even when alternatives of equal value become available, starting new ventures with the current partner, and expressing positive regard for the partner in the form of unilateral gift giving.

Relational cohesion theory began (Lawler & Yoon 1993, 1996) as an attempt to establish the conditions under which repeated exchange within dyads would lead to higher (or lower) rates of commitment. The initial insight of the theory at this stage consisted of the connection between the relative power differential within dyads and the probability of successful completion of exchange opportunities, which, in turn, led to more instances of commitment (answering the *when* question). Lawler and Yoon theorized that if agreements are more likely to occur when partners are more open to making concessions and when they are not subject to terms of agreement that they consider unfair, then equal power dyads should be able to complete more exchange opportunities than dyads in which one partner has an overwhelming power differential in relation to the other. Following Emerson

(1981), the theory conceptualizes and operationalizes power in terms of power-dependence theory: A is more powerful than B if A is less dependent on B than B is on A. Dependence is a function of the number of alternative exchange opportunities made available to A and B in the exogenously given network of connections between all of the actors and the distribution of resources throughout the network. Thus, A is more powerful than B if (1) she has a larger number of alternative exchange partners or (2) given an equal number of partners, A's partners are able to offer more valuable resources than B can offer. In this theory, power is conceptualized in structural terms, as a potential *capability* (i.e., the capacity to exclude a given number of potential partners from an exchange in a negatively connected network) inherent in the network, and is distinct from specific instances of *power use* (i.e., the actual act of exclusion). Thus one position may have a lot of power but display very few instances of power use. Equal power is more likely to lead to commitment due to the higher likelihood of completion of successful exchange. Exchanges between equal power dyads are less likely to exhibit concessions and more likely to feature satisfactory terms than unequal power exchanges.

STRUCTURAL COHESION

While initially (1993) using a simple equal power/unequal power distinction to predict frequency of exchange and relational commitment, Lawler and Yoon (1996, 1998; Lawler et al. 2000) later generalized this classification by introducing the concept of *structural cohesion*. In contrast to relational cohesion, structural cohesion is defined as the structural potential for instrumental cooperation in an exchange relation. Instrumental cooperation exists in an exchange relation when each actor is more likely to benefit from achieving agreement in that relation than by resorting to one of her alternatives. Lawler and Yoon further differentiate between the total power inherent in a dyad (the *sum* of the power of actor A and actor B) and the relative power of the dyad (the *ratio* of the power of actor A over that of actor B). In Lawler and Yoon's formulation, structural cohesion is a positive (curvilinear) function of the total power

of the dyad and a negative function of the relative power of one actor over the other. Thus, maximum structural cohesion should exist on equal power dyads with high total power. Lawler and Yoon (1996) reason that agreement is easier to reach when power inequality is low (one actor is prevented from taking advantage of the other, which results in refusals to reach agreement) and total power is high (which results in greater expected benefits for both parties). Further repeated mutual agreement increases actors' mutual dependence.

Commitment in relational cohesion theory is defined as the attachment that the individual feels to a collective entity, such as a relationship, a group, or an organization. Attachment in this sense can involve a wide variety of interests, from purely instrumental interests (when the actor is interested in an inflow of valued material resources that the relationship makes possible) to emotional and normatively mediated attachment. When the actor is committed to the collective due to the perceived costs of leaving the relationship, she is said to be instrumentally committed. When the actor remains in the relationship largely due to an emotional attachment, she is said to be affectively committed to it. Finally, when the actor remains in the relationship because such membership is normatively sanctioned and perceived by the actor as an obligation that she must fulfill, she is said to be normatively committed to the collective. Relational cohesion theory highlights the role of emotional commitment as an explanatory mechanism that sheds light on why actors are likely to stay in certain frequently activated exchange relations. The theory highlights a process whereby a relationship initially based on purely instrumental motives and commitments comes to acquire expressive value and is transformed into one founded, at least partially, on emotional and cathectic sources of commitment. A common behavioral indicator of commitment is based on Kanter's concept of "stay behavior" or forgoing forming new partnerships even when these become available. More recent empirical tests of the theory have come to highlight other more expressive indicators of commitment (i.e., gift giving).

In order to tackle the *how* question, relational cohesion theory posits an affective mechanism: the completion of a joint task (such as an

exchange agreement) is seen as a mutual accomplishment which makes the participants feel good, by giving them an "emotional buzz." Frequent successful interactions result in a consistently generated stream of mild and shortlived positive emotions. These positive emotions unleash an attribution process, which culminates in the relationship being considered the source of the positive emotions. Lawler and Yoon (1993, 1996, 1998) draw on a psychological model of emotions known as the circumplex model. The circumplex model distinguishes between two principal dimensions of emotional experience: pleasure and arousal. Arousal can be positive or negative, while pleasure can be present or absent. Lawler and Yoon treat interest/excitement as a positive form of arousal that is distinct from pleasure. Interest/excitement is a motivational state of curiosity and fascination; it is equivalent to feeling energized, while pleasure is closer to feeling satisfied. Interest/excitement is based on expectation of future rewards, while pleasure/satisfaction is a product of rewards received. Experimental evidence has shown that pleasure/satisfaction is a more consistent product of exchange frequency and predictor of relational cohesion than interest/excitement. Lawler and Yoon see these two emotions as representative of different attitudes to social exchange, one backwards looking and focused on rewards already obtained (pleasure) and the other forward looking and focused on anticipated accomplishments (interest). They theorize (1996) that it is a possibility that pleasure is more strongly connected to routine, less complex joint tasks, while interest is a more consistent product of complex, non routine exchange contexts.

Relational cohesion theory is built on an impressive empirical record, which has repeatedly confirmed its basic premises. Laboratory studies have shown that structural cohesion leads to higher frequency of exchange, and that the effect of exchange frequency on relational commitment is primarily mediated by positive emotions and the effect of the latter on the perceived cohesiveness of the relationship by the participants. Empirical tests of the theory have also uncovered new findings, such as a possible alternative pathway toward commitment by way of the reduction of uncertainty (the traditional explanation of commitment in

exchange theory), and a small residual direct effect of frequency of exchange on commitment that does not operate through the affective pathway (interpreted as an operant conditioning effect). A recent refinement and empirical assessment of the theory (Lawler 2001) showed that indeed two alternative pathways toward commitment do appear to exist, but the uncertainty reduction path toward commitment *does not* operate by inducing greater relational cohesion, and does not affect the more expressive forms of commitment behavior. Further, positive emotions lead to higher levels of cohesion which result in more commitment even after the effect of predictability (as a measure of uncertainty reduction) has been held constant. However, predictability of the relationship does have a direct effect on the most risky indices of commitment (such as engaging in a new joint venture with a high probability of defection on the parts of other participants), indicating that predictability might have a basis in trust. Thus, there appears to exist a *dual process* which leads to different forms of commitment: a trust based cognitive process that goes from frequency to predictability to willingness to engage in risky new ventures, and an emotion/cohesion based process that produces stay behaviors and expressive forms of commitment behavior.

Relational cohesion theory goes beyond the standard view in exchange theory that commitment is a direct effect of uncertainty reduction processes (Emerson 1981). In the traditional view, actors are motivated to search for stability and predictability in exchange relations, since exchange contexts are characterized by the basic trust dilemma where actors cannot be sure of the motives of their exchange partners, and thus leave themselves open for potential malfeasance on the part of their partners at every exchange opportunity. To this largely cognitive non emotional account of the process of commitment, relational cohesion theory adds an emotional component (Lawler & Thye 1999): the completion of successful exchanges, beyond serving to reduce uncertainty, is an independent source of positive emotions which come to be attributed to the exchange relation itself. Thus, from the actor's point of view, the exchange relation comes to be an independent source of emotional gratification, and thus becomes a valued object in itself.

The theory has its classical roots in the work of George Homans, and in the power–dependence exchange theory of Richard Emerson (1981). From Homans, relational cohesion theory draws its key insight connecting rates of interaction and positive sentiments. From Emerson, the theory takes its specific form as an *affect theory of social exchange* (Lawler 2001), which conceives of the network of exchange opportunities (the initial setup determining who can exchange with whom) as the primary exogenous factor which brings certain pairs of actors to interact more frequently than others. The theory draws on another wing of the classical tradition, the social constructionist work of Berger and Luckmann on the conditions that produce “incipient institutionalization.” In relational cohesion theory, the process that results in the relationship acquiring an objective standing from the individual’s viewpoint is analogous to the process of institutionalization from repetitive behavioral patterns outlined in Berger and Luckmann. Finally, the connection between affect and the process through which social relationships come to acquire an objective, constraining force on the individual harks back to Durkheim’s pioneering connection between joint ritual activity, emotional arousal (“collective effervescence”), and the emergence of the group as an overarching, independent social reality. This connection between affect, arousal, and emotional energy is also present in Collins’s neo-Durkheimian theory of interaction rituals, which see these repeated sets of affect-producing interactions as the microfoundation of larger social orders.

The theory has a host of implications and explanatory utility in terms of accounting for real world phenomena. The most obvious application of the theory is to the explanation of the stickiness of transactions in real world markets, which, in contrast to the neoclassical image of disconnected actors that come together for one shot transactions and which have equal probabilities of interaction with any exchange partner, show instead that exchange transactions tend to increase the probability of future transactions, and that actors become involved in exchange relations and come to regard them in terms that go beyond the purely instrumental benefits that they bring in. Further, the theory can also be used to explain when and how people

become attached (and disengaged) from real groups, organizations, and networks (Lawler 2001), thus forming the basis for a general theory of group commitment and affective attachment to collectivities.

SEE ALSO: Emerson, Richard M.; Homans, George; Power Dependence Theory; Social Exchange Theory; Social Psychology

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reliability

Robin K. Henson

Reliability refers, at a general level, to *consistency* of measurement. Consistency can be conceptualized somewhat differently for different forms of reliability estimation, but in all cases reliability is focused on whether a measurement yields consistent results.

Such consistency is critical to research practice, where variables must be operationalized

and measured in some fashion. For example, the measurement of socioeconomic status can be operationalized as average family income, whether a child receives a reduced lunch rate at school, education level of parent, or by other variables. Regardless of the way in which the variable is defined, however, it must be measured with consistency within the research study such that the scores obtained reflect dependable characterizations of the units of observation (e.g., people, families) on the variable of interest. In the example above, if a head of household does not know his or her average family income, he or she might simply guess at an estimate. Conversely, another head of household in the same study may give an accurate average family income. In such a case, the variable is not being consistently measured across the units of observation.

There are three dominant measurement theories that can be used to conceptualize reliability of scores: *classical test theory*, *generalizability theory*, and *item response theory*. In research practice, however, it is much more common for researchers to employ the classical test theory framework than the other two methods, at least in part due to ease of use and historical precedence (Hogan et al. 2000).

In classical test theory, sometimes called *true score theory*, a score is perfectly reliable only when the obtained score is measured without error. A practical ramification of this idea is that variables in the social sciences are seldom, if ever, measured without error. The assessment of socioeconomic status, as noted above, can have inconsistency (i.e., error) in how family income is reported. Researchers investigating parenting self efficacy must wrestle with how to measure this construct, with full knowledge that their measurement will not be perfect.

Theoretically, however, there is a reliable measure of both of these variables, and therefore, the true score is a function of the obtained score and some degree of error, as indicated by

$$X_T = X_O + \text{error}$$

where X_T is the theoretical true score and X_O is the obtained score from a given measurement. Of course, within a given study, only the obtained score is available, and the true score is not directly known.

An observation's true score can be thought of as the theoretical average obtained from an infinite number of independent assessments of the same person with the same assessment (Allen & Yen 1979). Therefore, for any measurement occasion that is less than perfect, an obtained set of scores will contain variance that is true score variance (measuring the trait of interest) and variance that is due to error (factors inhibiting trait measurement, e.g., randomness in responses due to fatigue). These two variances (σ^2) yield the total score variance of the observed scores, such that

$$\sigma_{\text{OBSERVED}}^2 = \sigma_{\text{TRUE}}^2 + \sigma_{\text{ERROR}}^2$$

In classical test theory, non systematic errors (e.g., fatigue effects, random guessing) lower the reliability estimate because they increase the amount of variance in the observed scores that is due to factors other than trait measurement. However, systematic errors (e.g., consistent fatigue effect across the sample such that similar errors are made) are not considered measurement error and can increase the reliability estimate because of their systematic nature.

In this framework, then, reliability (r_{XX}) can be conceptualized as the ratio between the true score variance and the observed score variance:

$$r_{XX} = \sigma_{\text{TRUE}}^2 / \sigma_{\text{OBSERVED}}^2$$

If all of the variance in the observed scores is due to true score differences, then the reliability would be perfect (1.00). Unreliability is introduced to the degree that the observed score differences are due to factors (i.e., error) other than true differences.

In generalizability or G theory, analysis of variance methodology is employed to partition the variance of the observed scores into more than just two portions. The primary advantage of G theory lies with its ability to determine more specific sources of measurement error and the interaction between sources of measurement error. Once these sources of error are determined, then the researcher has a better idea on the degree of error in his or her data, and the potential reasons for that error. This is much different than the classical test theory perspective, where error is not simultaneously differentiated as originating from different

sources (e.g., error due to test items, error due to time of measurement).

In item response theory (IRT), focus is not on the true scores or what constitutes the variance of the observed scores, but rather on the latent trait of interest. That is, it is the unobserved trait that theoretically causes the responses of a given person on a given test, and therefore the estimation of this latent trait is more central to the concept of reliability than the observed or even the true score.

IRT has significant advantages over classical test theory through its advancement of item and test information functions as a replacement of classical concepts of reliability. These information functions speak to reliability of measurement based on the ability of an item or test to discriminate among test takers along various levels of the latent trait of interest. In general, greater levels of information on the functions indicate greater precision of measurement, and by extension, greater reliability.

Generalizability theory and item response theory notwithstanding, reliability continues to be most often conceptualized using the classical theory, and there are several ways to estimate reliability in this framework, including test retest, alternate forms, internal consistency, and interrater reliability. Each of these methods attempts to separately account for measurement error due to different sources. It should be noted, however, that this is not the same as the ability of G theory to account for multiple sources of measurement error (and their interactions) simultaneously.

Test retest reliability assesses the consistency of measurement across time, or stability. This estimate is obtained by giving the same sample of subjects the same measure, with the two assessments separated by some period of time. The amount of time that is needed between the measurement occasions depends on many factors, and it can vary from as little as a week to as long as multiple years. Most often a few weeks is the time interval used. The test retest coefficient is obtained by simply correlating the two sets of scores using a correlation coefficient such as Pearson r . If the measurements are consistent across time, then this correlation should be strong and positive. The degree it is not is the degree of measurement error due to time of assessment.

To estimate *alternate forms reliability*, two different assessments which presumably assess the same trait of interest are given to the same group of subjects. The resulting scores are then correlated to determine the degree of equivalence between the alternate forms.

Internal consistency reliability is the most common form of reliability estimate, and it can be computed based on a single administration of a measure to a single group of subjects. There are various formulas for its estimation, but the most frequently employed of these is Cronbach's alpha (α). Internal consistency assesses the degree that a test's individual items are consistent within themselves and therefore are an appropriate sampling of items from the domain of all possible items that could be used in the assessment. Because of this focus, Cronbach's alpha tends to increase (greater reliability) when (1) the items responses are highly correlated, (2) the total score variance is large, and (3) there are a large number of items on the test. An alpha coefficient of 1.00 would indicate perfect reliability due to item sampling, and a coefficient of 0 would indicate a lack of reliability.

Interrater reliability addresses whether multiple judges can rate subjects consistently between themselves. Again, there are multiple ways to compute interrater reliability, ranging from the simple correlation between raters' scores to more complex statistics such as *Cohen's kappa* or the *intraclass correlation* (ICC). The ICC can also be employed for other reliability situations.

Regardless of the method of estimation or the measurement theory used, reliability is best considered as a function of obtained scores rather than as a function of the test itself. This is because the same test, when administered to different samples, can yield reliability estimates that vary. To some degree IRT overcomes this sample dependence by placing focus on the latent trait of interest and the item information functions. However, even with IRT, it is the obtained scores on items that are assessed for reliable information, not the test itself.

The meta analytic approach of *reliability generalization* (RG) makes this point explicit and also has great value for evaluating how reliability can change from sample to sample. Originally developed by Vacha Haase (1998), RG explores how reliability can change from study

to study and attempts to determine whether certain study or sample features can predict this variation. Reliability generalization studies have also served to highlight the great frequency with which research authors fail to report reliability estimates for their obtained scores, which represents a noteworthy flaw to a research study (Vacha Haase et al. 2002). Instead, many authors rely on reliability estimates from prior studies or the test manual (a process called *reliability induction*), which unfortunately may not be applicable to the current data. In sum, reliability is a critical element to any research study, and therefore its estimation is central to the research outcomes of interest.

SEE ALSO: Correlation; Descriptive Statistics; Effect Sizes; General Linear Model; Reliability Generalization; Validity, Qualitative; Validity, Quantitative

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reliability generalization

Tammi Vacha Haase

Reliability generalization (RG) is a measurement meta analytic method proposed by Vacha Haase (1998) characterizing score reliability across multiple administrations of a measure as well as identification of study features predictive of measurement error variation. RG identifies (1) the typical score reliability for a given measure, (2) the variability in score reliabilities across administrations of a given measure, and (3) which features of the measurement protocol do and do not explain or predict these variations in score reliability. Reliability generalization is similar to the theoretical concepts of validity generalization. Meta analysis of validity coefficients were the precursors to validity generalization, which began in the late 1970s to test whether the validity of scores for a given measure or set of related measures was generalizable. Meta analysis was the testing of the hypotheses of "situation specific validity."

In validity generalization inquiries, studies are used as the unit of analysis, and means, standard deviations, and other descriptive statistics are computed for the validity coefficients across studies. The validity coefficients across studies may also be used as the dependent variables in regression or other analyses. In these analyses the features of the studies (e.g., sample sizes, types of samples, ages of participants) that best predict the variations in the obtained validity coefficients are investigated. The same premises and methods utilized in validity generalization studies can be applied to explore score reliability – that is, reliability generalization.

Unfortunately, it is all too common to read about "the reliability of the test" or hear statements such as "the test is reliable" (Thompson 2003). Such statements contribute to the confusion and misunderstanding of reliability. Many have written about the confusion, attempting to clarify that scores, not tests, are reliable. For example, Pedhazur and Schmelkin (1991: 82) write: "Statements about the reliability of a measure are . . . inappropriate and potentially misleading." Thompson (1992: 436) summarizes: "This is not just an issue of sloppy

speaking – the problem is that sometimes we unconsciously come to think what we say or what we hear, so that sloppy speaking does some times lead to a more pernicious outcome, sloppy thinking and sloppy practice.” Thus, RG is based on the suggestion that scores, not tests, are reliable or unreliable. In addition, RG assumes that the reliability of scores on the same instrument will change from study to study, and characteristics of participants and other study features will influence reliability coefficients. This is in contrast to the classic test theory (Lord & Novick 1968) that stated increases in observed score variance result in increases in score reliability, and the assumption that the error variance remains constant in the two populations or, equivalently, that changes in observed score variance are caused solely by changes in true score variance. RG studies address this issue directly as attempts are made to explain variation in the scale dependent error variance in addition to, or instead of, attempting to explain variation in the scale free reliability coefficient.

Thus, reliability refers to the results obtained with an evaluation instrument and not to the instrument itself, as an instrument itself is neither reliable nor unreliable. The same instrument can produce scores which are reliable and other scores which are unreliable, as reliability is dictated by scores on a test for a particular group of examinees at a specific time. As an example, use the Beck Anxiety Inventory (BAI). This instrument lists 21 symptoms of anxiety, including descriptors such as feeling hot, unable to relax, dizzy, and face flushed. Individuals rate how much they have been bothered by each symptom during the past week by checking a 4 point likert scale, from “not at all” to “severely.” In research study 1 and 2 the dependent variable is anxiety, as measured by the BAI. In the first study, all participants, who are all currently being treated at an inpatient facility for anxiety, complete the BAI. All scores were 3s or 4s; reliability analyses of these scores indicate the alpha coefficient is 0.6961. In a second study, participants are from an outpatient clinic; some are being treated for anxiety, others are not. The BAI scores vary, with some participants indicating a high degree of anxiety, others moderate, and still others reporting little or no symptoms of anxiety. The alpha coefficient for this group of participants is 0.9975.

This example illustrates – using the same instrument – that there were very different reliability coefficients. In this particular example, the instrument, number of participants, and even type of study were similar. What changed was the population or setting of the participants – and even that was only changed from an inpatient to an outpatient setting. That is, the participants themselves will have an influence on the score quality. “The same measure, when administered to more heterogeneous or more homogeneous sets of subjects, will yield scores with differing reliability” (Thompson 1994: 839).

This example also illustrates that a large total score variance led to high alpha coefficients. The more heterogeneous the group (outpatients in this example), when compared to a more homogeneous group (inpatients being treated for anxiety in this example), led to a higher alpha coefficient (0.9975 versus 0.6961). This has implications for individual studies, as reliability of the data actually being analyzed directly impacts results and interpretation. The practical effects of low score reliability may include underestimated effect sizes and less power to find statistical significance.

RG studies have been conducted in which the standard error of measurement (the square root of the error score variance) was employed as a primary dependent variable (Yin & Fan 2000). Alternatively, Shields and Caruso (2003) presented a new methodology in which the true and error variance in each sample were partitioned prior to analysis. Then the study and sample characteristics are allowed to have their effect on score reliability through their differential relationships with true and error variance. Thus it can be determined not only which study and sample characteristics affect score reliability, but also to what extent they do so by affecting the amount of true score variance, or the amount of error variance, or both.

Since the original article (Vacha Haase 1998), more than 30 RG studies have been published. Scores on instruments such as the Meyer’s Briggs Type Indicator, Coopersmith Self Esteem Inventory, Career Decision Making Self Efficacy Scale, Revised Children’s Manifest Anxiety Scale, Alcohol Use Disorders Identification Test, and MMPI, as well as concepts such as teacher self efficacy and the “Big Five Factors” of personality, have been explored.

Future directions include the continuing use of RG methodology to explore score reliability of a multitude of instruments and constructs. This opens the door for the potential for completing meta meta analyses (i.e., the meta analysis of RG studies), as described by Vacha Haase et al. (2002).

SEE ALSO: Reliability; Validity, Qualitative

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religion

Roberto Cipriani

The concept of religion is based on an idea of reality which goes back to the beginnings of humankind and provides an explanation for

the existence of itself as well as the world surrounding it. Since the beginning of history, the idea of religion has manifested itself in diverse forms, across human societies. These forms, which constitute bodies of knowledge, beliefs, and social institutions, form an ordered, operative system. In Durkheimian terms, a religion gradually emerges as the members of a particular tribe or society build a system of beliefs and rites that bind them.

From barely conceived ideas, beliefs and practice proceed toward more elaborate systems (there are many "sacred" scriptures or oral traditions that are accepted, orthodox, and acknowledged), and, from informal interpersonal relationships, toward collective events (ceremonies which are more or less fixed at ritual level where it is possible to experiment and to reinforce the agreement between individuals, cognitive attitudes, and subsequent behaviors).

It would be misleading, however, to begin with just one definition of religion as it would be far too recent with respect to the birth of religions in general, and those which are considered historically organized (dating back many millennia before the beginning of the Common Era). However, the main reference is Marcus Tullius Cicero, who lived in the first century BCE. In his *De Natura Deorum* (*The Nature of Gods*) (2, 72), the concept of religion was linked to the Latin verb *relegere*, to reread, read over, to read repeatedly; to consider something with diligence; to check constantly what is important for the correct veneration of the gods.

The ancient Romans carried out their rituals with great precision and accuracy and their gestures and rites were consolidated in tradition. It could be said that their rituals had great respect for the law, and orthopraxis, to create a bond of loyalty with the past and not because of any predisposition of the soul. It is for this reason that religion was seen as a necessary response and reaction to unfavorable signs from the gods. Substantially, it was necessary to ingratiate oneself with the gods by carrying out the right actions that would win their favor. Not surprisingly, the art of divining was well developed and its practice was used to obtain the necessary information to understand which way the gods were oriented with respect to an individual or to a particular action.

Another variant, again of Latin origin, of the meaning of the term religion goes back to the original interpretation of the word *religare*, that is, to tie, attach, unite, or conjoin. This meaning suggests a relationship, a bond, but also an obligation, a commitment, or a submission. Evident in this relationship is the position of superiority assumed by the divinity, who functions as the obliger with regard to the human subject, who is consequently the obliged. Additionally, one of the strongest bonds between people and gods is created when making a pledge, that is, when a person makes a promise to a divinity upon the realization of a wish. If, then, after the pledge has been made the wish comes to fruition, the obligation toward the divinity is then fulfilled and the connection between the person and divinity is canceled out (although there will be further occasions where the pact can be renewed). The real effect though is a continued association: when a pledge is respected, there is concrete evidence of the human demonstrating faith, that is, loyalty and hope.

As mentioned, the etymology of the term religion can be traced to the Latin *religare* and has been attributed to the Christian writer Lactantius, who lived in the fourth century CE. According to this African writer, the bond between humans and God exists because humans recognize their creator and therefore obey, follow, and express *pietas*, that is, a sense of duty, devotion, and respect which is then duly returned by God in the form of justice, clemency, and divine benevolence. The central problem nevertheless persists, and it is that of fine tuning a sociological definition of religion, one that is metaconfessional, universalistic, scientific, and whose results in theoretical and empirical research in the field of the social sciences of religion are precise. In this sense, and in order to maintain a scientific non judgmental attitude, it appears useful to opt for an approach that is not instrumental (in Habermas's terms). Therefore, it is useful to begin from some of the empirical data which embody the various contemporary religions.

THE PRINCIPAL CHARACTERISTICS OF RELIGIONS

In the so called primitive religions, the religious relationship is essentially manifested

between humans and nature, and consists of forms of pantheism (which means that divine presence is found in every part of the human environment). God is seen to be operating in every facet of reality. A different approach can be seen in the modern form of Hinduism, which, with its Vedas tradition, has its beginnings probably in the third millennium BCE, if not earlier, and has developed a more universalistic outlook compared with its past form. There have been tendencies toward embracing all believers in God, irrespective of their faith.

With *Mahatma* (the great spirit) Mohandas Gandhi (1869–1948), violence, solidarity, and tolerance became paths toward truth and ethical and political commitment. Central to the concept of Hinduism is faith in Brahman, the supreme being who is also seen as Vishnu, and Shiva, who make up the sacred Trimurti. Brahman is one and all. In every individual there exists the divine and eternal breath, *atman*, and the *karman*, which administers retribution for all acts committed, and deals with the cycle of life and rebirth. In order to free oneself from the vicissitudes of reincarnation, one is to practice self denial, meditate, or be so devout as to embrace the essence of oneness between the infiniteness present in each being, *atman*, and the absolute which is Brahman, the only truth, beginning and end of everything.

In Judaism (originating in the nineteenth century BCE), the core trait is community affluence. Its main reference is the Torah, passed on from generation to generation and which makes up part of the Pentateuch (the five books relating the teachings of God to Moses). Judaism places emphasis above all on one's actions and relies on the alliance with God.

Buddhism (whose beginnings date back to the sixth century BCE) is surrounded by a controversy as to whether it is a religion or whether it should be considered merely as a philosophy. In reality, there are many elements which lead one to consider it a form of religion like any other. Initially Buddhism stemmed from Hinduism and the writings of the Indo Aryan "holy sciences," unlike the Vedas. There was no system of sacrifice nor any concept of a personal God. Later developments in Buddhism led to the beginnings of monastic experiences, the search for perfection, the universalism of the *bodhisattva* (that is, "one whose essence is

bodhi, enlightenment”), to principles of wisdom and compassion for human suffering, as well as a variety of kinds of worship and devotion, together with the pain of existence, detachment from earthly illusions, and the attainment of illumination. For Buddhism nothing is permanent, not even joy or suffering, so that even a moment of joy will only intensify the state of illusion of well being. Buddhism denies the principles of Hinduism: both Brahman as god and *atman* as individual reality. The ultimate objective is to eliminate that which causes pain by creating an awareness of both the transience of reality and the frailty of the human condition. Only by detaching oneself completely can there be freedom from suffering and the cycle of birth–death–rebirth. Morality, meditation, and wisdom are the only roads to control strength of mind along the *eightfold paths* of right faith, right purpose, right speech, right conduct, right means of livelihood, right effort, right mindfulness, and right meditation. This is the way of attaining *nirvana*, a state of being which is beyond good and evil.

Confucianism, which also had its beginnings in the sixth century BCE, involves more of an earthly quest based on human relationships. According to Confucius, divineness was present in the background: the search for God was through humans and their virtues; searching for the answers to the questions regarding the meaning of life, fate, and the question of good and evil. In fact, in Confucianism, human nature is essentially good, so, to maintain this state, one need only keep one’s passions at bay.

In Taoism (whose beginnings date back to the sixth century BCE) the main principle is the *dao* (as with the Buddhist *nirvana*, it goes beyond the notions of good and evil). It is immanent in the universe and in humans and so it is evidence of the identity between absolute and relative. Taoism, a people’s religion, was distinct from Confucianism as the latter was practiced by the elite of the Chinese government. Complementing the *dao* are the concepts of *yin* and *yang*: female and male, darkness and light, passive and active, potentiality and action, within and without. The world is born in five stages which combine with *yin* and *yang*: wood, fire, earth, metal, and water.

In Shintoism (whose beginnings go as far back as the sixth century BCE when the term

shinto was adopted) there is a combination of thought, rites, and institutions which operate at a local level, within villages, as well as at a national level, within a sovereign state, represented by the emperor of Japan. The origins of Shintoism lie within the primordial dualism between male and female represented by the figures of Izanagi and Izanami, who create a number of other beings thus making this a polytheistic religion with a plurality of gods. There is no real difference between God, humans, and nature. The differences between them are barely perceptible. Shintoism is founded on a variety of doctrines, ceremonial practices, places of worship, and hierarchies of priests. Gods (*kami*) are present in mythology (legends dealing with divinities) and appear very powerful and mysterious. The popular *kunitsukami*, earth spirits, are veritable tutelary deities and enjoy greater familiarity and closeness with people. Shintoism also boasts a great number of rituals within the community of its followers.

In Christianity, which was born more than 2,000 years ago, there is one God in three persons: Father, Son, and Holy Spirit. Christ, the Son of God, came to earth, became human, and died on the cross to redeem humankind from original sin, inherited by each human being, according to Christian theology. Over the centuries there have been schisms and separations, and different Christian churches have arisen: Catholic, Orthodox, and Protestant.

In Islam (founded by Mohammed, who died in 632 CE) religion is conceived as *din*, an Arabic term (though Persian in origin) meaning “custom” but also “tribunal.” Islam embodies a sense of faith (*iman*), customary practices (*islam*), and behavior (*aklaq* or *ihsan*). Also fundamental to Islam are the notions of testimony, prayer, fasting during *Ramadan* (the sacred month of Islam), contributing to the social taxation system (*zakat*) and the pilgrimage to Mecca (*hadj*).

In the so called new religious movements (both in the West and the East), which, in reality, are based on practices and beliefs rooted in a variety of ancient religions, there is a tendency toward the esoteric, toward looking internally (with a certain amount of secrecy). These emphasize the individual needs of followers but without having to deny a universalistic outlook, one expressed through pacifism. There

are, of course, movements of a different nature modeled on magic, therapy, and mysticism.

SOCIOLOGICAL THEORIES OF RELIGION

According to Durkheim, “a religion is a unified system of beliefs and practices relative to sacred things, that is to say, things set apart and forbidden – beliefs and practices which unite into one single moral community, called a church, all those who adhere to them” (Durkheim 1995 [1912]: 44).

In paragraph 1, chapter 5 of Weber’s *Economy and Society* (1978 [1922]) the author assures his readers that he will provide a definition of religion but fails to do so because it would merely describe a “peculiar form of behavior within a community.” In his writings on the sociology of religions, however, he refers to the “economic ethos of world religions” and describes “systems for regulating human existence” capable of “grouping around themselves a large number of faithful.”

The difficulty Weber experienced in defining religion is common to many other authors, who prefer to avoid any involvement that might be evaluative or might risk bias toward a particular view regarding the essence of religion (with reference to Christianity, this was an issue already subject to strong debate between Feuerbach and Marx). The problem consists primarily in finding agreement on the specific contents of religion and these cannot be, from a sociological point of view, those established by the religions themselves given that they are, in their view, the standard and thus come into conflict with the others. Nor can the contents be those defined by sociologists given that any such definitions are necessarily expressed on the basis of their own theoretical and methodological stances. In both cases such a defining operation would seem unnecessary. This debate stems from the actual sphere of study of the discipline itself: some prefer to talk about the sociology of religion and others about the sociology of religions. The latter opt for the expression in the plural in order to avoid their scientific approach being limited to a single religious confession. But, on the other hand, if one talks about religion in the singular, meaning

every religious manifestation and not merely that which is historically dominant in a given geographical context, the use of the expression sociology of religion aims to comprise all those religions which are empirically recognizable in the field of sociological research.

If anything, the most significant and discriminating point is another: whether to take into consideration every experience bearing similarities to those traditionally conceived as religion, that is, recognized as classic religions (including Buddhism, notwithstanding the reservations put forward by some scholars regarding its more philosophical rather than religious characteristics). The issue is important given that the consequences that depend on it are also of importance, that is, whether or not to classify as religion those movements whose religious nature is somewhat more metaphoric than substantial. This, however, does not mean having to search for the essence of religion; rather, it implies picking out those minimal elements which make a social phenomenon a religious fact based on its content, motivations, and customs.

Within contemporary societies there exist metaphorical forms of religion which, especially by way of their reference to values, seem to substitute traditional religious systems: these could, in fact, be defined as “religions of values.” We are led to believe that they can replace historical religions. Thomas Luckmann (1967) shares the same view and his *The Invisible Religion* is based on the new “modern religious themes” of individual autonomy, the mobility ethos, self realization, self expression, sexuality, familism, and private life. This series of reference values recalls in some measure the Weberian concept of the “polytheism of values” where variety and sacredness of values are the result of ethical individualism.

Once the way has been opened to include new expressions of religion in the category of what is considered a religion, the number of possible alternatives increases but these all depend very much on the diverse sociological theories of religion. In this context it is important to define as secular religions those ways of experiencing politics, economy, art, science, and so on, as if they were a religion with their respective beliefs, relevant rites, and specific structures. Therefore, a funeral intended to be non religious will actually follow and reiterate those patterns and

procedures of a service in a religious temple; when a political appointment is made, the ceremony takes on the characteristics of a religious liturgy; a street protest has the semblance of an open air religious assembly; and even the opening of new company headquarters has its propitiatory inauguration ceremony.

In order not to confuse and overlap religions, metaphoric religions, secular religion, and other para religious forms, it seems correct to establish some common references, which point out the differences in such a way as to also recognize the affinities. Lambert (1991) rightly made the distinction between a substantive definition and a functional definition of religion where the former refers to the contents of a religion (according to Durkheim, for example, these relate to its beliefs and rituals), and the latter emphasizes the role and the function of religion in society (as is the case for Luhmann, who considers religion useful in facing life's uncertainties). However, within the substantive definitions, the functional aspect is not completely absent and, moreover, elements pertaining to the content of the functional definition cannot be completely expunged. All things considered, the substantive and functionalist perspectives tend to converge in the practical aspects of social life. A careful reading of Durkheim reveals functional aspects of religion while in Luhmann (and even Luckmann) it is possible to find substantive elements of religion. All in all, the belief in God, acts of devotion, the eschatological attitudes (relative to the final destiny for humanity and the universe), and the meaning of life are recurring themes within the religious experience, but none of these represents just one condition without which (*conditio sine qua non*) there can be a religious fact.

In other words, neither the *substantive content related* nor the *functional finalistic* represent the efficient cause (that is, the single determinant which directly and actively produces the effect) and/or the exclusive criterion necessary to recognize the religious feature of a sociological phenomenon. Here is where Aristotle made the clear distinction between material cause (the material of which something is made), formal cause (that by which matter is formed), efficient cause (that which produces a certain outcome), and final cause (the end of the process of development by which something becomes what it is).

The Aristotelic schema provides an answer to the need to both adapt and contemplate, that is, to include aspects of substance and scope both formal and content based.

Classical sociology of religion has opted for more of a substantive stance on religion, whereas modern sociology of religion has broadened its horizons to embrace a functional stance to the extent that it has lost sight of the reference point needed to identify the usual indicators of religious phenomena. Perhaps a less dichotomous solution, one which maintains the contents and does not exclude the objectives, might be considered more adequate for an approach to the research of religion and religions.

From their tasks, sociologists correctly should strive to: identify the religious actuality from within other aspects of social structures; distinguish possible varieties pointing out any connections or divergences; discover any for mutations which share consensus as to what is definable as religion; and always bear in mind what is real and not be influenced by ideological and/or personal presuppositions.

Simmel (1997), in the beginnings of the twentieth century, defined the boundaries between the kind of religion which is founded on history and organized as a product of culture, and religiousness seen as an openness to being religious, experienced by the individual as an internal human experience and necessary requisite for a union with God. Equally similar, however affine, is the position put forth, almost coevally, by William James in his reflections on *Varieties of Religious Experience: A Study in Human Understanding* (1902), in which he outlines a fundamental distinction between institutional religion and personal religion. The first is characterized as being ritualistic, well established, corporative, exterior, regulative, theological, organized, and ecclesiastic; the second, however, is oriented more toward interiority, the conscience, sentiment, the non ritual, individuality, experience, the human dimension, mysticism, a direct rapport between souls, between humans and their creator, and lastly, communion from within and dialogue with the divine power.

It is debated whether it is worthwhile proceeding with an empirical analysis of religion when starting with a specific definition of religion in mind, or whether it is better to arrive at

postulating a definition only upon completion of the research. Actually, it is the same problem of having to choose between an approach which presupposes the existence of a preformulated theory with respect to field research and an option which allows the researcher to come up with elements useful in the construction of a theory only after having collected the data. Perhaps the most effective solution is that which sees an initial conceptualization of the theme in question in order to be guided (but avoiding any constraints), and which ought to "sensitize" (in the way proposed by Herbert Blumer). It might be preferable, then, to opt for definitions which are not too rigid, which are open and possibilistic with regard to the outcomes of any empirical work.

If behind a religion there is a history dating back centuries, if not millennia, it would be difficult to deny its status. Such a religion would be acknowledged and accepted to the point of there not being any hesitation to accredit it sociologically. Consequently, in the case of phenomena that clearly belong to a historically rooted religious context, their nature as a religion is therefore accepted beyond any doubt. Even those marginal, dissenting, and minor forms of the great religions of the contemporary world are to be counted as religious forms in their own right.

The problem becomes more complex when qualifying as religious or not those manifestations with no historical precedent and which diverge significantly from the more accredited and accepted religious systems. Obviously, no judgment of a theological or confessional nature can impede these being considered as religious if they exhibit aspects which are commonly accepted as particular to a religion.

Even so, as Émile Poulat sustains (in *Le Grand Atlas des Religions*, 1992), "being able to say what is or what is not religious is not an academic problem: it is a question of politics, a continually renewed social debate, and one which produces countless answers and is divided into two extremes: the theocratic regime and the atheist regime." Undoubtedly, defining that which is religious also assumes a political nature, though this does not solve the basic scientific problem of whether or not to at least produce broad boundaries of the *proprium* of religion. Such boundaries cannot have an

absolute or definitive meaning forever. In fact, religion is part of culture and therefore changes with it and the context in which it develops.

THE SOCIOLOGICAL CONCEPT OF RELIGION

A first criterion for defining religion is derived largely from a metaphysical, meta empirical reference, which recognizes from within some thing (a divine form or superior being with divine characteristics which cannot be subjected to rational or scientific proof) the origin and control of the fate of humankind. Such a criterion, as it stands, is not sufficient as there can be attitudes and behaviors which present themselves as religions though they are not inspired by a God and which find from within nature strength and ubiquitous and creative power equal to that of the divine. Furthermore, even without presupposing the presence of a God, one's existence can be lived in a religious and metaphysical manner by a commitment to oneself, to others in a spirit of profound alterity, and a commitment to the problems of humanity.

A second criterion could be constituted by beliefs and convictions, irrespective of how deep they might be, based largely on spiritual and not material content. A third criterion sees the significant contribution of rituals deeply inspired by faith, and surrender to a divinity or, at any rate, a supernatural being. In a fourth criterion it is possible to contemplate behavioral norms as dictated by a charismatic leader and by its followers and/or on the basis of a series of written texts and the observance of commandments. As a fifth criterion there are the various actions which denote subscribing to defined religious views professed in a clear manner. The personal effort in observing the major principles of a faith, in identifying the coherent religious orientation which should be lived out, more or less, as a basic point of reference and as an ethical principle: this is the sixth criterion.

Religion can be expressed on a level of emotions and feelings. This seventh criterion was widely developed in, and is the fruit of, recent research, both theoretical and empirical, and recalls specifically the new religious tendencies, the so called new religious movements, which are based on the peculiar emphasis of a subject's

aspect. In some cases, as with the eighth criterion, there is a reverential attitude with respect to the divinity and generally that which is sacred. The ninth, a qualifying criterion, is one where even principles, dogmas, and official teachings represent a significant corpus which cannot be disregarded. A tenth criterion is based on the observance of norms and rules considered fundamental and demanding much attention, so much so that oaths are made with respect to these rules.

As can easily be concluded from this simple list of criteria, it is in no way possible to disregard – in the abstract – specific cultural situations. The idea of *religare*, that is, of maintaining a link, is about obligation toward laws, traditions, praxis, but also toward belonging, content of faith, and confessional orientation. At the same time, it can mean belief in God but also rendering service to God.

There still remains a principle for which none of the above criteria completely satisfies the requisites for recognizing something in terms of religion. Otherwise stated, for a group, organization, or movement, it is not necessary to have a precise concept of God, nor to take part in any rites, nor observe dogmas of faith, and not even to respect ethical norms.

The sociolinguistic weight of the term religion should not be forgotten: it originates from the defined framework of the Latin language but it can be applied indiscriminately to every kind of ethnicity. The relationship with the divine, the holy, is undoubtedly a widely accepted notion and has the intent of attributing the characteristics of religion to a specific social phenomenon. It should be noted that its origins are also a limitation: its beginnings and its christianocentric disposition have ideological repercussions which privilege the existence of God, the belief in an immortal soul, and the existence of a universal ethic – prime indicators of a religious fact. If adding to the natural, almost spontaneous characteristics of a religion the preponderant weight of a supernatural religion revealed by God, any scientific activity would be hindered and forced to stop before prerequisites that are loaded with mystery, filled with unfathomable, divine will, and which can not be subjected to any attempt at corroboration through information gathered in fieldwork.

If talking of natural religion as the result of an action of human reason, it belongs more to the realm of theology than that of sociology, even if Hume (fundamentally a deist) is credited with extracting religion from the control of religious institutions, favoring a less conditioned approach.

Unlike the philosophy of religion, the sociology of religion does not attempt to seek out the essence of religion, it does not question whether a spirit exists or not, nor does it assess the justness of any religious aspirations; it simply records its effects in a social context. Moreover, this does not imply that sociology need espouse the idea of necessary atheism, nor that a direct and operational involvement of a religiously militant nature is desirable. It can also be said to be true for any forced choice which is agnostic, indifferent, areligious, as if it were the unavoidable condition necessary to carry out scientific research on religious phenomena. However, any other option would give rise to atheistic religion which is not at all mandatory for scientific research inasmuch as it would lead to the idea of a slide of the unknowability of the divine absolute toward the unknowability of a religious fact purely because it is linked to the divine. Schleiermacher sustained, philosophically, the feasibility of a religion without a God.

But it was another philosopher, Henri Louis Bergson, who, in his work *Two Sources of Morals and Religion* (1932), favored a distinction between static religion and dynamic religion. The former was considered a reduced historical version of the view regarding the survival instinct humans opt for in order to solve the problem of death by inventing divine figures, with a human likeness, and which serve as tutelary deities. The latter, on the other hand, was regarded as not being the work of humans but of God, where humans enter the realm of God in a mysterious way, and allow themselves to be led by their God toward forms of institution and dogma. The characteristics of static religion are more human, earthly, and natural, whereas those of dynamic religion are more metaphysical, superterrestrial, and divine. Bergson is far from the idea of humankind's concerns about the numinous. For him, humans are directed toward a God who is far more than human inasmuch as it is a mysterious superior being,

majestic, irascible, *tremendum* (frightening), and *fascinans* (enchanting).

Indeed, little do these philosophical perspectives influence sociological thought, which tends not to subscribe to a transcendental explanation, does not question objective truth, and excludes itself from any salvific implication of religious activity. That which truly interests sociology is the socioreligious activity humans are involved in within their community and society. Needless to say, a sociological definition of religion cannot be restricted or limiting. It does, however, open itself to every possible aspect within the variety of phenomena that can be identified empirically. It is because of this that it is deeply interconnected with many other forms of social experience, ranging from family to economic life, from political choices to moral choices, from ideology to the meaning of symbols, and from art to technology.

The starting point, hence, is that a sociological definition of religion should be an observation which brings about a necessarily comparative approach between similar religious systems in different societies. This is possible by perhaps identifying connotations which corroborate the idea of a natural religion that is more human than divine in its origins, divided and channeled into different eras and into different societies. In the second half of the nineteenth century, Max Müller pointed out, and not by chance, that the Indo European roots of religion go back as far as the Vedas traditions, and date back even further than the beginnings of Hinduism. He emphasized how the personification of gods was the result of the human tendency to anthropomorphize every phenomenon. Tylor (1871) followed the same line of thinking, stating that the religions of the so called primitive peoples created the roots for every expression of religion that followed, which moved toward animism, then polytheism, and finally monotheism.

Monotheism, in its contemporary forms, bases itself on unicity and the truth of a single God. It offers an opportunity to so called rational choice (or the "new paradigm," tied to Peter Berger's idea of the religious market), applied to the economic model in order to prove that the "one true God" theory works convincingly in the context of the religious market. This happens because it is privileged by the

"exclusive exchange relationship" accompanied by a kind of lifetime guarantee. Hence, the only true God is to be seen as a successful product also because it is a common affair related to groups. But such a point of view necessarily presupposes a supernatural dimension, and this, inevitably, is not applicable to all religions in their manifestations.

In addition, the one, true, convincing explanation would exclude other evidence: religion is able to explain but it also mystifies; it creates peace but also conflict; it consoles and strikes fear; it is governed by an elite few but practiced largely by the masses (this is the point from which the continual contrast between official and popular religion stems). This is not to mention the continuing dialectic between religion and culture, which shapes the attitudes and behavior of social actors.

After all, the two prevailing perspectives are those which compare religion to a relationship between human subjects and a divine being or, contrarily, which insist that the religious dimension is an "earthly" social construct created by social actors in response to needs which are by no means metaphysical but totally human.

From magic to pre animism, from animism to totemism, from fetishism to polytheism, and from mythology to monotheism, the religious processes are many, overlapping, and not necessarily linear or evolutionary, but in general they produce beliefs, rites, symbols, and institutions. The formations which come as a result appear so distinct from one another that every sociologist of religion attempts to give a personal definition of the contents and forms of religion. The result, however, is almost always incomplete, vague, or circumscribed. Therefore a sociological definition of religion is, at most, applicable to a limited context and to a short time frame.

From Kant's social morality to the conception of the universe as seen by Hegel, to the emotions referred to by Schleiermacher, and to the search for security analyzed by Fromm, religion nevertheless constitutes a desire in one way directed to the divine, and yet in another it is addressed to humankind and sometimes toward both. For this reason, one of the most convincing definitions appears to be Geertz's (1973), which explains religion as a system of symbols that provide humankind with an ongoing, realistic, and factual justification through concepts

pertaining to a general order of existence. This final attempt at a definition put forth by Geertz seems to end the diatribe between substantive and functional definitions and that between restrictive and more open perspectives.

Peter Beyer (2001) also searched for a solution by proposing an ideal typical typology (and therefore not empirically verifiable) organized into three meanings: analytical, theological, and popular/official. He rightly observed that the formation and development of some religions (such as Christianity, Judaism, Islam, Sikhism, Buddhism, and Hinduism) are clearer and more noticeable than others (such as Taoism, Shintoism, and Confucianism), although they all share an unquestionable social concreteness. The analytical approach strives to discover similar institutions and attributes in the various religions even when they belong to different periods in history. This approach therefore attempts to identify universal elements in all societies but cannot exclude the fact that there are other forms of religion which do not have such aspects in common. On the other hand, the theological approach, which concerns a universal ontological truth, postulates something which in itself escapes empirical observation in that it deals with a metaphysical reality, but this does not hinder the existence of different kinds of knowledge and forms of communication. Finally, it appears to be quite similar to the religious model within the popular/official views of religion, given these views are not characterized by universality but by what the members of a religious movement or religious organization ask to be considered as religion. In other terms, it deals with a specific form of religion which has its own distinctive institutional traits as well as a series of human experiences. It is no coincidence, then, that religion is a personal affair, which is practiced in groups, but often it is done so independently compared to organized religious manifestations (as proved by pilgrimages or large gatherings, communal liturgies, or local or domestic religiousness).

The different degrees of religiousness, that is, the amount of fervor and commitment in a religion, depend on historical and personal factors which, sociologically, are not easily identifiable and interpretable, for the following reasons: the vast extent of possible religious manifestations; sociocultural influences; economic, political,

and ideological relationships; and emotional, sentimental, and psychological interaction. This web of interferences and relationships does not allow for an aprioristic definition of religion, but nevertheless – as Assad (1993) notes – “there cannot be a universal definition of religion, not only because its constituent elements and relationships are historically specific, but because that definition is itself the historical product of discursive processes.”

On the other hand, Talcott Parsons has seen a number of answers in religion: an answer to humanity’s desires (in the sense of salvation versus suffering), to the need for values (in the sense of justice versus injustice), to the affirmation of ideas (truth versus fallacy).

One of the most accredited Chinese scholars of religion, Lü (1998), is of a very different opinion, stating that “religion is a kind of social consciousness regarding superhuman and supernatural forces, and its consequent believing and worshipping behaviors toward such forces; it is the normalized and institutionalized social cultural system that synthesizes this consciousness and the behaviors.” Lü’s definition, coming from a non western sociocultural framework, is worthy of particular attention also “for its scientific nature and liberating effect” in an environment, such as China’s, which until fairly recently did not favor the development of scientific study of religion (Yang 2004).

Not so easy is that sphere which includes religions and para religions or quasi religions, those which include therapies, systems for healing the body, diets, martial arts, methods of self help, sports, and many more phenomena which describe themselves as religious and which may share some of the characteristics typical of a religion. A distinction can be made between para religion and quasi religion. Para religion possesses some religious features and thus resembles a religion (without giving itself that definition). A quasi religion only barely manifests any affinity with religion. The real problem is not whether to establish what share of religion is present in these phenomenologies, but to ascertain whether any relationships have been established with the entire belief system (including religious beliefs) that each individual controls and manifests.

The variability of religion does not allow for steel cages, peremptory definitions, or inescapable

criteria: "far from being a fixed or unitary phenomenon, religion is a social construct that varies in meaning across time and place" (Beckford 2003). A formulation such as "a patterning of social relationships around a belief in supernatural powers, creating ethical considerations" (Gustafson & Swatos 1990: 10) might be considered efficient: it is synthetic and allows for a great number of scholars from every cultural and intellectual background to share its content. In this case as well, it is also obviously necessary to avoid unfounded empirical absolutes. Intrinsic to this definition is the suggestion not to confuse religion with faith (an individual issue) or morals. In addition, the supernatural is distinct from the transcendent in that the former may possess a characteristic which could be also immanent (in nature, for instance, as strength or as entity), whereas the latter refers to a God. Indeed, religion has a characteristic indicative of action. It possesses its own conceptual vocabulary common to all those who belong; it furthermore involves subjective experiences which may or may not be extensive or intense. It is clear that no firm, dogmatic definition can be given to religion because of the extreme variability of its manifestations. These can be evaluated and interpreted taking into account the definition of a situation as given by the social actors. In short, a possible operative definition should be "grounded," that is, based on data. A possible starting point for such a definition may even make use of a "sensitizing" (Blumer) characteristic in order to approach the actor's point of view.

The procedure with which a definition of religion is constructed begins with the collection of empirical data, some indicative concepts are put forth, and then strategies for research are established. Accordingly, it would be preferable to have the individual express its orientation. By so doing, both pure descriptivism and theoretical prospectivism can be avoided. And so the researcher operates within the framework arranged contemporarily by the social actors, who create their religion, hence their experiences of religion, and by the sociologist, who constructs her analytical points of view in order to make her observations of religion and religions. There is, in effect, a return of the social actor to the field of religion. The actor is no longer governed by confessional concepts or

concepts that may be irrelevant to the object of scientific research. Both concepts are destined generally to cancel out the social individual's point of view. Also, in order to avoid any impediments and misinterpretations, it is useful for the sociologist of religion to declare explicitly not only personal religious tendencies, but also basic values, choices of behavior, and underlying attitudes.

Within many sociological definitions of religion there is a significant amount of overinterpretation, that is, interpretation that disregards the facts. On the other hand, self definition given by social actors is not the only possible point of reference in that it should be compared with other definitions put forward by other subjects and within different contexts and with different emphases. The task of the sociologist, then, is to scientifically coordinate and recompose the different concepts observed.

To this it is possible to add as a fundamental premise the careful and thorough study of practice, and the value influences which guide it. The most difficult question to solve concerns the distinction (if any) between belief and experience. Nevertheless, it should be taken into account that there are ways of interpreting religion without referring to either: belief without experience and experience without belief, or as Davie (1990) put it, "believing without belonging," or contrarily, "belonging or experiencing without believing."

At this point it should be clear that sociological analysis of religion does not aim to confirm the plausibility of what is metaphysical, transcendent, or supernatural, but rather how men and women of the contemporary world live their personal and social experience of religion. According to his scientific solution, Beckford (2003) suggests experimenting with a socioconstructionist approach to religion, thus tending to analyze "the ways in which human beings express what they regard as religious ideas and sentiments in social and cultural forms," independent of whether or not religion is a socioanthropological need to be gratified in order to solve existential problems (according to Luhmann's indetermination reduction, or Berger and Luckmann's social construction of meaning). Hence, definitions of religion which appeal to common sense would be of little use; indeed, it would be more effective to observe the processes of

the social construction of religion as they happen. If not, any attempts to define what religion is would be destined to fail because they would find no adequate scientific consensus. Nonetheless, typological attempts should be made, with the intent of at least being indicative, sensitizing, and creating awareness. After all, the field is not entirely empty, much has already been sown, while some areas left fallow, it has yielded good fruit, and, with the fertility of cumulative knowledge, research can then begin with an essential point of reference in mind. So, for religion, the following approaches to research can be considered, either separately or combined with other approaches, according to the logic dictated by the individual's experience and chosen method of analysis.

First, religion is composed of interpersonal experiences with other humans and/or with one or more divinities. Such relations are made up principally of convictions (beliefs), sentiments (emotions), principles (values), and practice (rituals, i.e., cultural acts and also actions, whether they occur daily or on specific occasions), all of which are more or less coherently interconnected. The subject's freedom to be unpredictable produces unexpected events as well as one off conjunctions. In the meantime, however, the traditions of historically recognized religions continue to reaffirm their most significant features through notions, precepts, ceremonies, and according to the circumstances of the time and their environment. What does not pertain to sociological research are the questions of whether or not God exists, the immortality of the soul, the cycle of reincarnation, rewarded or sanctioned behavior, life beyond death, or divine revelation to humanity, but each of these elements can be used as a qualifier for whatever religion and can therefore be part of a defining framework (accurately contextualized) although not subject to empirical proof. It goes without saying that none of the religions appears to be a religion par excellence, thus removing any doubt from the use of the wording sociology of religion rather than sociology of religions.

Second, religion is expressed as a connection with the divinity, which gives humans unity, in the universal sense, by means of devotion toward a God, and the respect due to it. Moreover, the object of such veneration becomes sacred, something significantly different,

untouchable, and superior; and great care is taken to observe with deference and reverence every correct rule and praxis according to pre-established precepts.

Third, religion is the manifestation of profound belief; it is professing one's faith; it is not necessarily critical, compared with those concepts of life which have a feature that is cogent and paradigmatic, and accepted almost unconditionally. Faith is expressed indeed by entrusting the values one considers fundamental and unfaltering, and these preside over almost all decisions, however small.

Fourth, religion is fervor, dedication, ongoing practice, devout behavior, and piety; it is religiousness outwardly expressed through recollection, repentance, meditation, reflection, and silence.

These distinctive features of religion are simply a dialogic and open path to be used as a guide for theoretical and empirical research, and not further tokens to add to the great cemetery of definitions of religion.

SEE ALSO: Animism; Asceticism; Atheism; Belief; Buddhism; Catholicism; Charisma; Christianity; Church; Civil Religion; Confucianism; Fundamentalism; Globalization, Religion and; Hinduism; Islam; Jehovah's Witnesses; Judaism; Laicism; Magic; Millenarianism; New Religious Movements; Orthodoxy; Pietism; Popular Religiosity; Primitive Religion; Protestantism; Religion, Sociology of; Religions, African; Religious Cults; Rite/Ritual; Sacred; Sacred, Eclipse of the; Scientology; Sect; Secularization; Shintoism; Taoism; Televangelism; Theology; Totemism

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religion, sociology of

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The sociology of religion is a core component of the discipline, having a critical place in the classical theorizing of Max Weber and Émile Durkheim and comprising one of the more researched areas of interest among contemporary sociologists (for an introduction to sociological theory and religion, see Cipriani 2000). The sociology of religion is concerned with the multiplicity of ways in which religion is part of human society and thus it focuses on its institutional, cultural, and individual expression across varying social, geographical, and historical contexts. A common typology is to differentiate between substantive and functional approaches to studying religion. The former is concerned with the symbolic contents or meanings contained within a religious worldview and the latter with religion's purposes or functions in society. Following Weber's (1958) analysis of

the doctrinal tenets of the Calvinist ethic, substantive approaches focus on delineating particular religious beliefs, defined in terms of concerns about transcendence and other worldly salvation, and how these beliefs are understood and give meaning to everyday life.

Functionalist definitions, by contrast, give attention to the social implications of religious belief and behavior. Following Durkheim's (1976) analysis of how religious affiliation and commitment serve purposes of social integration and belonging, there is a long tradition in sociology of not paying too much attention to the doctrinal content of belief and its associated meanings, but to how such beliefs impact other aspects of social life ranging from national identity to political, health, and sexual behavior. Unlike for Weber, the content of religion is seen in substantially broader terms and this too follows from Durkheim's definition of what constitutes "sacred things": any things so defined by society or by particular communities, whether they be Episcopalians, Buddhists, pagans, yoga practitioners, or fans of a particular sports team. Clearly, how broadly or narrowly one defines religion matters to the sorts of theoretical questions and research projects sociologists of religion deem relevant.

In practice, however, drawing too sharp a line between substantive and functional definitions of religion runs the risk of missing out on the multifaceted ways in which religion seeps through everyday life. As indeed Weber elaborated, Calvinists' beliefs were instrumental – or functional – to the development of capitalism, and as intimated by Durkheim (in *Suicide*), the content of doctrinal tradition differentiated levels of social integration; although Catholicism and Protestantism were equally opposed to suicide, Catholics were less likely than Protestants to commit suicide, a fact that Durkheim traced to the greater emphasis on social ties emanating from Catholic doctrine as reflected in its structures (e.g., the mediating sacramental role of the priest).

INTELLECTUAL AND SOCIAL CONTEXT

The directions taken by the sociology of religion reflect both the intellectual context in

which the discipline of sociology itself emerged, as well as differences in the national contexts in which sociologists have studied religion. Because sociology grew out of the Enlightenment it took on many of its philosophical assumptions and values. Most specifically, although the Founding Fathers rejected Enlightenment thinkers' emphasis on man as the primary unit of society in favor of a perspective that emphasized the individual's relationality to other people as well as to history and social processes (e.g., capitalism) and institutions, they embraced the Enlightenment values of rationality and scientific method. One consequence of the Enlightenment – and of sociology's scientism – was that it regarded religion as crystallizing the nonrational elements in society and thus delegitimized it as a domain of knowledge and of experience. This had two important and interrelated consequences for the study of religion. One, it led to an elitist and dismissive attitude toward the relevance of religion, a view that regarded religion as the vestige of pre Enlightenment times: a coercive, anti democratic, and hierarchical force that fostered inequality and unenlightened ways of being.

Second, it nurtured the view that even if religion persists as an individual or social phenomenon, it is not a domain of knowledge that is accessible to scientific investigation. Sociology was not alone in cultivating this view; while some cultural anthropologists paid attention to religion as part of their interest in primitive or traditional societies, psychology essentially ignored the place of religious belief in child and adult development, personality, and psychological functioning. In essence, the thesis of religion's inaccessibility to scientific investigation argues that because the existence of God cannot be ascertained, therefore it is of little use for social scientists to dabble in the study of any thing pertaining to religion and that those who do so must surely have a regressive ideological or dogmatic bias. Clearly, this is a remarkably blinkered view of both social science and of religion. While it is generally a good thing for a social scientist, as indeed for the ordinary citizen, to bring a "hermeneutic of suspicion" to what counts as knowledge, expertise, or common sense in society, this hermeneutic should not be directed a priori toward sociologists studying religion as opposed to some other topic.

Religious belief is about belief in a transcendent presence that cannot be verified, but the essence of a lot of the phenomena that sociologists study is equally invisible. Longstanding scholarly debates about how social class can be reliably measured, or how micro–macro linkages should be assessed, point to the complexity of the sociological task as a whole. The sociology of religion is not interested in speculating about or studying the existence of God. It is concerned, rather, with how individuals, social institutions, and cultures construe God or the sacred (following Weber), how these ideas penetrate public culture and individual lives, and with the implications of these interpretations for individual, institutional, and societal processes. Thus, similar to their peers who specialize in other areas of the discipline, sociologists of religion develop conceptually and methodologically valid indicators that they use to investigate theoretically informed questions about religion's meaning and place in society. Standardized indicators include finely differentiated measures of religious affiliation and beliefs, frequency of church attendance, private prayer and religious reading, the self-perceived importance of religion in an individual's life, and personal images of God. A reliable and fairly comprehensive selection of questions is asked in the General Social Survey (GSS), an annual cumulative survey conducted since 1972 by the National Opinion Research Center at the University of Chicago; other useful resources are survey data gathered by the International Social Survey Program (archived at the Zentralarchiv, University of Cologne) and by the Gallup and Pew polling organizations.

At a broad level of generality, the research undertaken by sociologists of religion has been shaped by the societal contexts of the researchers. Specifically, there is a discernible difference in the kinds of overarching questions that have informed European in contrast to American sociology of religion. Reflecting their very different national histories as well as the Enlightenment concern with church–state alliances, European researchers have paid a lot of attention to examining the intricacies of church–state institutional relations and how these impact national cultures and laws and public policies. In the American context, by contrast, with its very different history – religious pluralism and

its associated emphases on religious freedom and voluntarism – much attention has been given to investigating the institutional and cultural dynamics of denominationalism, a defining characteristic of American society (e.g., Herberg 1955).

Another way in which the influence of social context is apparent is in the greater tendency of Europeans to apply a critical neo-Marxist perspective in their analyses of religion (a concern, for example, with the hegemony of the church in society), whereas American scholars reflecting on a very different societal context (of denominationalism and ethnic and religious pluralism) and more strongly influenced by Parsonian functionalism than neo-Marxism, discuss the culturally unifying possibilities and implications of a civil religion – how a nation's founding values and ideals are sacralized in political and public discourse (e.g., Bellah 1967). In sum, scholarly work in the sociology of religion, as is true of all knowledge, is contingent on the particular social and historical context in which it is conducted and the attendant prioritization of research topics and questions is related to the realities of the sociologists' social and institutional environment (e.g., Davie 2003).

SECULARIZATION AND RATIONAL CHOICE THEORY

A dominant theme in the sociology of religion and vigorously engaged by scholars on both sides of the Atlantic is secularization. The term is conceptualized differently by various scholars (for an extensive review, see Tschannen 1991), but for the most part refers to the constellation of historical and social processes that allegedly bring about the declining significance of religious belief and authority across private and public life. The secularization thesis has its roots in the writings of both Weber and Durkheim. Weber predicted that the increased rationalization of society – bureaucratization, scientific and technical progress, and the expanding pervasiveness of instrumental reason in all domains of everyday life – would substantively attenuate the scope of religion, both through the specialization of institutional spheres (of family, economy, law, politics) and as a result of disenchantment in the face of competing

rationalized value spheres (e.g., science). Durkheim, although a strong proponent of the centrality of the sacred to society, nonetheless predicted that the integrative functions performed by church religion in traditional societies would increasingly in modern societies be displaced by the emergence of differentiated professional and scientific membership communities.

The secularization thesis, especially its Weberian understanding, was highly influential in the paradigm of social change articulated by Talcott Parsons and subsequently by modernization theorists in the 1960s who theorized religion's loss of institutional and cultural authority. Most notably, in Peter Berger's (1967) language, religion would lose plausibility and its power as an integrative sacred canopy, or as argued by Thomas Luckmann (1967), become socially invisible. The modernization secularization thesis was widely accepted by western sociologists and though there were some exceptions (e.g., Greeley 1972; Martin 1978), many assumed a priori that religion had lost its significance in modern societies despite the ongoing empirical evidence that secularization was not as all encompassing as theorized by its proponents. Various societal factors (e.g., the increased public visibility of religious social movements, such as the Moral Majority in the United States, Solidarity in Poland, and the religious roots of the Iranian Revolution), intradisciplinary theoretical challenges to modernization theory, and greater scholarly attentiveness to the critical importance of nonrational sources of meaning and authority in everyday life (including religion, emotion, and tradition), converged in the late 1970s and has resulted in a more complex and nuanced sociological assessment of secularization.

Contributing to this paradigm reassessment, the application of rational choice theory to religion has resulted in an intense debate about the ways in which competitive religious environments (religious economies) produce religious vitality and church growth (e.g., Finke & Stark 2005). This approach rejects the assumptions of secularization theory as being more appropriate for the historically monopolized religious markets found in Europe, but at odds with the American context of religious pluralism (cf. Warner 1993). In view of the cumulative body of empirical knowledge that exists on religion,

secularization should be understood in terms of a balance between extensive empirical evidence in favor of the continuing sociological significance of religion in the public domain and in individual lives, and the coexistence of these trends with equally valid empirical evidence indicating selectivity in, and reflexivity toward, the acceptance of religion's theological, moral, and political authority. Both sets of trends must necessarily be interpreted with a cautious and differentiated understanding of the nature and place of religion in earlier historical eras and across diverse social contexts, and with greater attentiveness to how the contextual meanings of religion and of religious belief, affiliation, and commitment change over time (Gorski 2003; Hout & Fischer 2002).

CONTEMPORARY RESEARCH

Much of the contemporary research on religion documents the complexity and multidimensionality of religion as it is lived out across diverse contexts (see the contributions to Dillon 2003). Many studies document trends in the continuing significance of religious beliefs and practices, especially in the US (e.g., Greeley & Hout 1999), but also in Europe (e.g., Davie 2000), where the institutional presence of churches is weaker (with the exception of Ireland) than in the United States. It is also apparent that the symbolic vestiges of religion matter even in countries where various indicators would suggest a comparatively greater deinstitutionalization of religion (e.g., Quebec, Italy). Many individuals still value the presence of church rituals in marking significant life transitions (e.g., marriage, death), and participate in pilgrimages and other forms of religious tourism and consumption (e.g., the popularity of Christian rock music and religious theme books and movies), while not necessarily adhering to a denominational identity or to any specific doctrinal teachings.

The cultural hold of religion is also documented in research on the increased prominence of global religious movements (e.g., Pentecostalism, Islam), the continuing attraction of participation in (socially marginalized) New Religious Movements, the increased political legitimacy of faith based social movements, the

significant impact of religion on individual voting behavior independent of other social factors (e.g., ethnicity, social class), and in shaping public policy debates. In many western countries, religiously derived values frame the prioritization of activism on particular issues (e.g., abortion, gay rights, stem cell research) and how they are debated in the public sphere. In some countries, debate centers on the extent to which religious heritage should be formally acknowledged (e.g., the recent European Union debate about its new constitution) and given visibility in institutional settings (e.g., the debate in France about the wearing of Islamic veils and other religious icons in schools).

Much research engages diverse theoretical questions in sociology to address the complexity of religious identity and particular attention has been given to investigating the multifaceted role played by religion in mediating the assimilation patterns of transnational immigrants (Ebaugh & Chafetz 2000). Relatedly, a lot of current research focuses on congregations (local churches/parishes) and the varying impact of this core social unit in building social networks, mediating political activism, and enriching the everyday lives of members (e.g., Ammerman 2005; Chaves 2004). There is also a rapidly expanding body of research documenting the relations between religious behavior and various aspects of social and psychosocial functioning, including social support and physical and mental health (e.g., Ellison & Levin 1998). This research tends to show that there is an overall positive relation between religion and health and social functioning, though the precise mechanisms involved and their life course patterns are still relatively underdeveloped areas of inquiry.

One of the newer areas of study is the attempt to understand the nature of deinstitutionalized religious practices, customarily referred to as spiritual seeking (e.g., Roof 1999; Wuthnow 1998). While there is concern among some sociologists that spiritual seeking may undercut individuals' commitment to others (long a staple of church involvement), longitudinal studies spanning life course and cultural changes suggest that traditional religious participation and newer spiritual practices provide individuals with different but equally positive ways of

carving socially engaged lives (Dillon & Wink 2006).

The overarching methodological challenge in studying religion involves the ongoing monitoring of the validity of existing measures of religious behavior across all levels of analysis (individual, institutional, and societal). In view of the dynamic interplay between religion and society, and the way that changing sociohistorical and cultural contexts impact how religion is construed and practiced, it is important to have conceptually and empirically sound measures that can apprehend the presence and significance of the full range and multidimensionality of public and private religious activity that may characterize a given context. This approach should be sufficiently sociological so that it enables attention to the substantive content of religious spiritual belief, as well as to the mechanisms of how different aspects of religion impact social outcomes (e.g., voting, health, concern for others, violence), while also being sensitive to the comparative geographical and historical breadth necessary to evaluating secularization/religious vitality theses.

At the same time, however, the theoretical challenge is to move beyond the lens clamped on scholarly inquiry by the intellectual legacy of the secularization frame. In this regard it would be fruitful if systematic meta-theoretical analyses could result in theoretical generalizations that would point to the micro-macro social conditions and contexts in which different types of religious behavior and social outcomes could be identified. More broadly, contemporary sociological theorists (with the exception of Pierre Bourdieu) give little attention to the continuing significance or complexity of religion. Consequently, a challenge for sociologists of religion is to show persuasively that an understanding of a society's religious practices must necessarily be part of any theory that seeks to have relevant explanatory power in today's global, multicultural, risk society.

SEE ALSO: Culture; Denomination; Durkheim, Émile; Identity: The Management of Meaning; Identity: Social Psychological Aspects; Knowledge, Sociology of; Modernization; Religion; Ritual; Secularization; Social Movements; Structural Functional Theory; Weber, Max

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religions, African

Bernardo Bernardi

African religions are based on oral cultures. They represent the old tradition surviving within a context deeply influenced by monotheistic religions, mainly Christianity and Islam, not only through their various denominations but also by supporting the attack of modern secularism.

To propose a definition of religion with reference to the oral African cultures is no easy matter. Within those cultures, religion does not exist as a distinct domain. Indeed, it is part and parcel of normal culture, i.e., the mode of life implying both the ideological perception of the world and a practical kind of social organization. In such situations, religion possesses a denomination of its own, but it may be only conceived as that particular aspect of any culture including beliefs and rituals. In such a perspective, it would be possible to describe religion as that part of culture, or of social life, connected with beliefs and rituals.

Field research, in direct contact with the people, is the only method that can afford the possibility of obtaining reliable information on the theoretical ideas and the actual practices of the local people. As is known, such a method implies a fluent knowledge of the local languages and dialects so as allow for an intense observation of people's behavior and personal participation in their mode of life. Cosmological ideas are fundamental, but in order to acquire a proper knowledge of their content, patience and time are required so as to gain the confidence and trust of local people. Every informant is to be

trusted, but in order to gain an acceptable degree of reliability, several other informants are to be approached in order to compare the information received. Field research is considered to be the initiation into the anthropological profession. In other words, it demands a previous theoretical apprenticeship and subsequent practical experience in the field. Such a method is required for every aspect of human culture, but when religion is the matter of research a deeper attention is certainly required, since it involves not merely external ritual practices but intimate and personal involvement as well.

The idea of a divinity, i.e., of some being above nature upon whom life and death are thought to depend, constitutes a common element of religious belief. However, there is no homogeneity in this kind of belief. Normally it is conceived in terms of each mode of livelihood. In order to describe the variety of such a concept, the term *theism* will be used in its ethnological sense. According to this view, it is possible to distinguish a Sylvester theism, a pastoral theism, and an agrarian theism.

Sylvester theism. This may be better explained by reference to the Bambuti Pygmies of the Ituri forest, who have been studied by Paul Schbesta and Colin Turnbull. The forest is also symbolically conceived by the Bambuti in its global entirety as their protector. If anything goes wrong, if a child is sick or game is scarce, or whether any other malaise occurs, it is a sign that the forest has been offended and is displeased, and therefore the forest must be placated. The *molimo* ritual is then performed in the silence of night, by playing a bamboo flute, normally kept in running water.

Pastoral theism. Shepherds are nomads who, following their herds, take an interest in observing the sky. Not only do they consider the sky as the abode of God, but they identify it with God himself; they even do so with regard to certain atmospheric phenomena. Thus, for the Oromo of Southern Ethiopia, *maq*, the sky, is also *Waq*, God. For the Masai of Kenya and Tanzania, *en kai*, the rain, is also God, *En Kai*. For them, clouds are regarded as a manifestation of God. Thus, black clouds, heavy with rain, a blessing for the pastures, are a symbol of God's bounty; white clouds, which do not produce rain, are regarded as a sign of God's anger;

thunder and lightning are interpreted as a sign of some of God's displeasure.

Pastoral people practice collective kinds of rituals. They gather together, when they need to pray, asking for God's blessing for their children and their cattle as well as for their pastures. The headman or the oldest elder takes the lead. Whilst everyone else in the congregation takes a crouching position, the headman stands up and he leads the prayers, to which the entire assembly responds in one voice, in a mystic atmosphere, *En Kai ai*, my God.

Agrarian theism. Agriculture is the main trait of the Bantu peoples. The Bantu are primarily distinguished as a linguistic family; while they are organized in a variety of social and political systems, they all practice agriculture as their form of livelihood. From the religious point of view, their idea of God is strongly related to creation.

However, it is commonly believed that, after completing creation, God somehow retired, ceasing to take an interest in creatures. As a consequence, he has been defined as a *Deus otiosus*. God's names are normally connected to the idea of creation: *Mungu*, *Mulungu*, *Mumbi*, *Nzambi*, and so forth. Théophile Obenga, a Congolese scholar, has defined Mulungu as an Engineer God.

The idea of *Deus otiosus* is related to the preponderant cult of the ancestors. Ancestors are normally defined as *the living dead*, because they take an interest in their descendants. Every kind of malaise is attributed to their influence, and therefore ancestors are most frequently prayed to. But the main reason that may offend the ancestor is anger or even hatred among relatives and their descendants. How may the latter expect the ancestors' protection if the latter are offended by their behavior? Casting out anger is a necessary presupposition before invoking the ancestors' aid. Notwithstanding the extension of the ancestors' cult, too much emphasis, perhaps, has been given to the idea of God's otioseness. There are times, in fact, especially during severe social crises, when the ancestors are prayed to join with their descendants in prayers to God, for the situation is such that only God's help will be effective.

In the face of mounting secularism, the question "why religion?" is to the point. The first answer that comes to mind recalls the fact that

every religion is essentially therapeutic. Peace of mind is the deepest effect of proper religious practice. But the curing of the body may also be important. If properly conceived and properly practiced, religion may produce an equilibrium of forces, or in case of disease it may give support and even acceptance of a state of suffering. Finally, religion may be a source of inspiration for every aspect of human life. Personal education may be inspired by religion, public life might be sustained by religious inspiration. It is true that, in the past, religious wars for centuries stressed different states' relations. Even today the effects of religious fundamentalism, a phenomenon entirely opposed to religious ideals, are felt.

SEE ALSO: Belief; Civil Religion; Globalization, Religion and; Religion; Religion, Sociology of; Rite/Ritual; Ritual; Secularization

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religious cults

Giuseppe Giordan

The cult is intended to be the concrete form through which man expresses his veneration for a superhuman entity or force whom he believes superior and deems worthy of honor and devotion. With this term, one usually makes a reference to the relationship of dependence and adoration between man and the divine, be it a personal entity, a force of nature, or an ancestor's spirit. The cult therefore is placed in the

center of every religion and carries across the ritual behaviors, which are usually presided over by a special individual believed to be particularly competent for the job: he can be a priest, a wizard, a shaman, or even a member of the group who is believed to be in possession of special gifts.

It is interesting to note, especially for the consequences within the fields of the social sciences in general and of sociology in particular, that the term *cult* shares the same Latin root as the term *culture*: the recognition of man's dependence upon the divine, which he expresses in acts of adoration, supplication, and thanksgiving, forms, develops, and is an expression of different social and cultural contexts. It is precisely the different cultures that create and give meaning to the various ways of structuring the time and space of the cult, hence establishing which cult actions are most appropriate, which times are most opportune to celebrate the feasts, and which significant places to erect temples. The expression of the cult therefore depends upon the conception of man and the deity typical of each social and cultural system; the mutual dependence and penetration of a cult and culture not only allows for mutation of the cult in correspondence of the different historical moments, but also highlights how the expressive forms of a given culture, both at a semantic and symbolic level, give the essential frame of reference to elaborate the cult's actions. In this way a circular process is created, on one hand linking the cult to the expressive forms of a concrete social and cultural context, and on the other underlining how the different forms of a cult influence the development of the social and political life of society.

The semantic passage from religious cult to religious cults testifies to just such a deep bond between religion and the evolution of a social and cultural context in which it is inserted. The expression religious cults tries to describe certain aspects of contemporary beliefs, characterized by the relative loss of influence of traditional religious institutions, which according to Michel (1994) lose the monopoly of meaning, and by the progressive liberty of the subject in building his own itineraries of meaning in a syncretic manner, according to the logic of the *bricolage*.

THE CULT IN THE SOCIAL SCIENCES

The notion of cult has always been at the center of scientific studies of religion, both in an anthropologic and ethnographic setting, as even within sociology its use has often been the source of disputes, especially regarding its relationship, and at times its opposition, to the concept of rites. For some exponents of the historical cultural school, such as Robert Will and Sigmund Olaf Plytt Mowinckel, the cult represents the clearest manifestation of the religious experience, and as opposed to the magical experience that results in rites: if religion manifests man's acceptance of a radical dependence on the divine, magic is man's attempt to control and dominate superhuman forces. Gerardus Van der Leeuw, from a phenomenological point of view, goes beyond the opposition cult religion and rite magic, introducing an equilibrium, represented by the cult, between the human dimension and that of the divine. With Adolf Jensen the superimposition and the identification of the two terms can be seen: the cult and the rite coincide in ritual actions, which are defined as the renovation of a myth of foundation through the experience of being taken by the primordial strength that gives the basis of existence to human culture.

For Durkheim (1965), the cult represented the traditions and the social conditions of a community: the subject of the cult is always the community, and therefore not the individual who finds in the cult the concrete manifestation of his aspirations and religious intentions. Durkheim defines the cult as a system of rites, and differentiates it from the latter because, on top of being a collective experience, it is systematic and stable, while the rite can be individualistic and sporadic, not bound to periodic events of life, such as birth, marriage, or death. According to Durkheim, the peculiarity of religious phenomena resides, other than in their explicit or implicit obligatory aspect, in relation to particular representations that make reference to the sacred, which are nothing more than an allegory of society itself: it is the social world that reproduces the actual symbols, imposing them upon the individual conscience through actions of the cult, which unify the strength of religious beliefs, especially reviving social structures, strengthening the social bond between its members.

The notion of the cult, in anthropology as much as in ethnology and sociology, is strictly connected to the concept of symbol and of belief. According to the intellectualism of E. B. Tylor, magical and religious beliefs are theories which, introducing explanations based on supernatural elements, overcome the limits of empirical explanations offered by observation and common sense. From this perspective, religious beliefs are the intellectual activities that do not differ from man's other intellectual activities within the sciences; if there is a difference, this consists not in the content, but in the attitude towards the theories: while the scientist is open to criticism in the matters of scientific theories, since he is conscious of the possibility of alternative theories, the religious person is instead closed to every type of criticism, because every questioning of the established beliefs is perceived as an error, as a risk of chaos and of sin. The cult is therefore reduced, according to an intellectualistic approach, to a simple instrumental activity without proper value.

In Durkheim's symbolistic approach, religious belief and the cult are not simply theoretic constructions of natural and abstract reason that remain the same through time, then becoming modified only from the quantity and quality of data made available to it: for this school of thought, the general idea and the religious idea in particular are social facts that have social motivations, and therefore are historically determined. Therefore, religious beliefs and the actions of the cult receive their strength and legitimation from their social function: they are constructed by society itself because they are socially shared. Religious beliefs are ultimately a symbol of society, and the power of such symbolic acts that become tangible in the cult is the strength of the society itself, which shares and imposes them on successive generations.

Weber's (1963) contribution goes beyond Durkheim's symbolistic approach, too rigidly sociocentric, to give space, together with social meaning of religious beliefs and of the cult, even for individual interpretation of the subject, who for its own nature is hard to codify and cannot be reduced in an exclusive way to the logic of a functioning society. According to Weber, religious phenomena even have origins in the attempt, on the part of man, to give meaning

to life's tragic events, such as illness, pain, and death. Therefore, the cult and its creed also have the function of controlling and rendering bearable the anxiety that arises in suffering and unexplainable occurrences.

The two attitudes, of Durkheim and Weber, far from being contradictory, show two useful perspectives on interpreting religious beliefs and the cult: these are the fruit of a dynamic that reciprocally integrates both collective and individual meanings. Religion therefore cannot be reduced to an exclusively obligatory and coercive dimension. According to Valeri (1996), it is above all a system of communication, a place where individual interpretations and social structure meet, and it is exactly this communicative role of religion that finds substance mainly in the practices of the cult. The cult can also be thought of in terms of communication between men, the social structure, and the sacred entity. Only within the cult can the relationship between men and the gods become a true relationship, restrained by rules and by most juridical norms, resulting in transformations that are verifiable either on the material or spiritual level. In order to exist the gods need man's continual participation in the cult, so much so that without the cult the gods become insignificant and die. On the other hand, if they are the objects of the cult, the gods are capable of rewarding those who worship them with devotion. Prayer, sacrifice, divination, possession – all make up a complex circulation of messages that constitute a complex communicative structure, which, in the specific space of Jewish and Christian traditions, is the liturgy.

ELEMENTS OF THE CULT

The history of religions, and in particular ethnology and phenomenology, have revealed the multiple forms of the cult where the diverse religious experiences become tangible, highlighting both specific characteristics and common aspects. The religious man, to whichever culture he may belong, chooses precise places and times to enter in relationship with the divine world as well as people and objects that seem particularly suitable for expressing his religiousness with; he separates them from the daily aspects and from the profanity of life to give

them a symbolic value, which is fully expressed in cult and ritual forms.

Both time and space, meaning the feasts and the temples, as well as the people who preside over the cult, become symbolically transfigured once they enter into the religious sphere: such change depends on the fundamental distinction between the sacred and the profane. Durkheim and the French sociology school are credited with the definition of religion based on the division/opposition between the sacred and the profane. Such a dichotomy goes beyond to prove the characteristic absoluteness of the sacred and its complete independence from other types of phenomena, thus reintroducing the distinction between the individual and society. The sacred is in fact a collective representation that classifies and orders the material world not based on natural elements, but on social and cultural conventions. Starting exactly from this dichotomy leads to understanding the various aspects that constitute the cult: temples, feasts, prayers, ministers of the cult, and the rites.

The temple is a privileged place, even if it is not exclusive, where the divine manifests itself; it is a sacred space, separated from profane space, where the cult celebrates. These special areas or religious structures are separate from ordinary space with barriers which can be physical, ritual, or psychological. Sacred enclosures – synagogues, mosques, churches, temples – manifest a discontinuation of space. The same distinction between the sacred and the profane structures time as well, creating the feasts. The religious interpretation of time that is expressed in cultural forms moreover determines the direction and attitude of the believers regarding the meaning of existence. Time can be conceived in a linear way, as a succession of equal instants, or it can be conceived as a progression. Some religions believe time to be circular and therefore static, while other religions perceive it as a degenerative process. The emphasis in the distinction between relativity of historical time and absoluteness of eternal time also differentiates the religious concept of time from the non-religious one. The social distinction between sacred and profane defines the role and functions of the people who can get in contact with the sacred universe. Ministers, according to Weber's indications, are only one of the sacred figures that are appointed for a magical sacred

function; specialists legitimized to perform the acts of cult and with a mediating role between gods and men. The role of ministers, however, is not enclosed inside the religious sphere but, as Douglas (1986) observed, also has a noteworthy relevance in the public scene, since it operates as guarantor of stability in social institutions.

FROM CULT TO CULTS

In recent years it is possible to record a shift from the term cult to cults. Such grammatical passage from singular to plural is the sign of how, in the last few decades, the religious dimension is changing deeply and, at times, in a contradictory manner. On one hand, the secularization process, which many thought to be inevitable and irreversible, was supposed to bring forth a progressive irrelevance of religion. On the other hand, the dynamism of certain religious movements calls for a return of the sacred, although in a very different way if compared with traditional society. The various characteristics of traditional cult, as synthetically described in the previous paragraphs, are creatively reinterpreted and often liberally reinvented.

Weber's renowned thesis, which speaks of society's disenchantment followed by its re-enchancement with religion, is utilized by various authors, such as Peter L. Berger and Niklas Luhmann. For them, religion in contemporary society, far from disappearing, has instead taken on new roles and is fulfilling new functions. It is an evolution which leads the faithful not to refer exclusively to traditional religions, to their coded and immutable heritage of beliefs and symbols, but to undertake a quest founded on the individual's freedom of choice. This transition is defined by Thomas Luckmann in terms of moving from religion to religiousness, while other authors such as Wuthnow (1998), Roof (1999), and Flory and Miller (2000) prefer to use the dichotomy of religion–spirituality. Such a transition of legitimation of religious beliefs from the institution to the individual brings with it changes even on an organizational level. Traditional churches are overcome by small groups, whose variety mirrors the extreme diversity which characterizes religious phenomena in the contemporary era, putting together apocalyptic tensions with mysticism and

spiritualism, or occultism with theosophy and new age.

As Terrin (2001) has observed, starting from World War II, and with a particular acceleration at the beginning of the 1960s, there is a progressive process of religious destructuralization, which led the great traditional religions to lessen their hold over the symbolic boundaries of their belief systems and in the end to the birth of new religions. Such increased circulation of religious symbols, outside their traditional contexts, created a market – a very differentiated market of requests and offers of religious goods. In this context, on the one hand, new figures of religious entrepreneurs arise, such as founders of new cults, spiritual gurus, charismatic leaders, and television evangelists. On the other hand, a new kind of follower was born, who, freed from the control of traditional institutions, constructs his own system of belief, according to the syncretistic logic of *bricolage*.

The new forms of religiousness that have developed in the western world in the last few decades, among which even new cults are found, give evidence of a deep coherence with the typical features of postmodernity. Individualism and pragmatism become the backbone, which guides the way one believes and belongs to a group. This brings forth a great variety in the kinds of adhesion, a personalization of beliefs which are chosen according to their efficacy, an acceptance of belonging to several groups which answer to the need of authenticity, and to the predominance of experience above the objective truth that one is obliged to believe. Immediate needs, arising from perceptions of one's emotions, together with a pluralist and tolerant vision of beliefs, are the testing field for today's various religious options, be they traditional or modern.

The term cults, which usually has a marked negative connotation, is utilized in sociology to designate some of the new religious movements, which embody the characteristics described above. For Robert Wallis, cults are distinguished from other religious organizations by their epistemological orientation and by their more or less difficult relationship with the social contexts in which they are found. While traditional churches and sects ascribe to themselves the exclusive truth of their beliefs, cults are characterized by an epistemological individualism,

which is perfectly in tune with the tolerant pluralism of postmodernity. Hence, followers can exercise freedom of conscience in adhering to (or not) the moral and doctrinal contents, and they consider such freedom as legitimate even for the followers of other religious movements. Both cults and sects find themselves in a controversial tension with society, but while sects demand an exclusive faithfulness and exercise a certain amount of control over their members, cults do not request such exclusiveness, and their tension with their surroundings can be seen mainly as alternative therapeutic practices.

Even Stark and Bainbridge (1985) have distinguished between sects and cults on the basis of the fact that the social organization of the latter is very weak and in some cases completely absent. Further, while sects are born from opposition to, and a break with, the traditional church, cults do not have origins in this contrast. And, from the beginning, cults are independent of any reference or bond with the ecclesiastic world. This total freedom and independence from any reference to the traditional religious organization even raised doubts about whether cults could be considered proper religious communities. Stark and Bainbridge describe some cults that never organized according to any model of a formal group. One such example is the "audience cult," whose members are connected to each other and with the spiritual guide through the media alone.

Reference to the concept of religious cults within the sociology of religion, however, has not yet found a consensus which would allow an appropriate and agreed upon use. It describes phenomena ranging from forms of paganism to druidism, from Wicca to a variety of movements which put together psychosomatic therapeutic practices with techniques that enhance personal potential. As Pace (2001) has noted, all these movements of renewal and religious revival, sometimes labeled as cults and at other times as new religious movements, strongly solicit the traditional institutions of beliefs, which no longer seem to be able to control the continuity and coherence of their belief systems. It will be the task of the social sciences to find the conceptual instruments able to describe both theoretically and empirically the new situation of contemporary beliefs and, therefore, to offer

a more refined and precise definition of the concept of religious cults.

SEE ALSO: Charismatic Movement; Consumption, Religion and; Cults: Social Psychological Aspects; Emotions and Social Movements; Fundamentalism; New Age; New Religious Movements; Popular Religiosity; Primitive Religion; Religion; Rite/Ritual; Ritual; Sacred; Sacrifice; Science and Religion; Symbolic Interaction; Televangelism

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reparations

Rutledge M. Dennis

Reparations refer to the actions of an aggrieved nation, group, or individual to seek redresses and compensations for the loss of land, money, works of art, jewelry, or other valuable objects, due to the actions of a country, group, or another individual. The claim of those seeking redresses or reparations is that their property was knowingly and willfully stolen and they now seek a just payment for their loss. In the United States the major demands for reparations have been made by Native Americans that they be compensated for the loss of land given them by treaties, but subsequently taken by whites. As a result of the many broken treaties, there are now dozens of claims against the federal government by Native Americans relating to many square miles of land now a part of the urban corridor in the Northeast and New England.

In modern Europe, the first major reparation demand occurred after the defeat of Germany in World War I. As punishment for initiating the war, Germany was forced to compensate the countries devastated by German militarism. This was reparation, which many believe, in its harshness, resulted in Germany's economic collapse, which contributed, partially or totally, to the rise of Hitler and Nazism. During the early stages of World War II, before he entered the "final solution" phase, Hitler launched a national program to deny Jews employment in major institutions and organizations, and seized their land, artworks, jewelry, money and bank accounts, stocks, and other tangible properties. Many of these items and properties were placed in vaults, presented to museums and art galleries, and tagged as possessions of the German government. In some cases the items were sold

to other individuals, kept as family heirlooms, smuggled out of Germany, and sold to museums and art galleries abroad. As the Holocaust became a major Jewish cultural reference point beginning in the 1970s, lawyers were hired to reclaim stolen property, and claims were made against governments and state institutions which sanctioned the theft by knowingly possessing property known to belong to those victimized by the Nazis. The German government has paid billions of dollars in reparations both to German Jews whose lands were confiscated and to the Israeli government.

World War II also precipitated reparation claims by many Japanese Americans against the American government for the confiscation of property after many were placed in internment camps in Oregon, Montana, Washington, and Oklahoma. Though many Japanese Americans were opposed to suing the government for fear of resurrecting latent anti Japanese feelings among the American population, a small group decided to pursue the claims, and in 1983 a nine member Commission on Wartime Relocation and Internment awarded the claimants \$1.5 billion, of which \$20,000 would be given to each internment survivor.

A more contemporary, and even more controversial, reparation issue centers on the desire of a few black American organizations to seek reparation from the United States government for the enslavement of the black population from the early founding of the nation until its demise with the defeat of the South during the American Civil War. Unlike the Native American claim of land stolen or the Jewish claim of reparations for stolen houses, land, artwork, bank accounts, money, and so on, at the heart of the slavery reparation claim is the demand for just compensation for the free labor that contributed greatly to the birth of America's surging worldwide economic power throughout the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. Moreover, the reality of having been kept in bondage for generations, and later having been "freed" without land or money, placed the black American population in a greatly disadvantaged position vis à vis other individuals and groups in the society. The thrust of the slavery reparations claims does not focus only on claims against the American government. There are also claims against banks, insurance companies, stock

companies, and other private corporations which profited from the slave trade.

Given the fact that the overwhelming proportion of black Americans can trace their ancestry from slavery, it would not be difficult to make the claim for such a connection. Any serious discussion of the issue must confront the moral question of the relative difference between the theft of land and other tangible property against the theft of one's body and person. There is a point at which property and bodily theft coincide with both Native Americans and Jews: for the former, the theft of land and the forceful imprisonment of Indian "bodies" on federally sanctioned reservations; for Jews, it was both in the theft of tangible property and ghettoization and later imprisonment in concentration camps.

Lacking property as slaves, black Americans had only their imprisoned bodies as objects of commodity in the exchange reparation formula. But the claim cannot be ignored which views the human body as an object in itself, in a way an object more important than land and other tangible properties. Hence, if the body is required to perform free labor, there should be ways of arriving at monetary solutions, for free labor resulted in the production of cotton, rice, tobacco, and other products that were crucial to the economy of the South and the entire nation. Like many Japanese Americans who opposed the Japanese American claim against the US government for compensation for their internment, many black Americans are divided on the issue of reparation. Many, associating it with compensation given European Jews and Native Americans, believe the demand for reparation is just. Others view it as a non issue, a futile effort in light of the overwhelming opposition of white Americans to any idea of reparation. In fact, many white Americans view the idea of reparation as closely linked to the idea of affirmative action, which they oppose.

SEE ALSO: Affirmative Action; Ethnic Groups; Ghetto; Holocaust; Marginality; Slavery

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replicability analyses

Bruce Thompson

Researchers have traditionally but erroneously presumed that statistical significance tests evaluate the replicability of results (Thompson 1996, 2006). But p values evaluate the probability of the sample, assuming the null hypothesis perfectly describes the population, and *not* the probability of the population. Therefore, p values do not bear upon questions of replicability. As Cohen (1994) noted, the statistical significance test "does not tell us what we want to know, and we so much want to know what we want to know that, out of desperation, we nevertheless believe that it does!"

Because isolating relationships that replicate under stated conditions is the ultimate objective of social science research, methods that *do* evaluate result replicability become fundamentally important. Thompson (1996) suggested that result replicability evaluation methods can be grouped into two classes: "external" and "internal" methods. *External* replicability analyses involve true replication via data collection with an independent sample. External replication is the ultimate, best method for evaluating result replicability. However, researchers may not have the luxury of external replication of every study they conduct. *Internal* replicability evaluation methods attempt to approximate real replication studies in various ways. "Internal" evidence for replicability is never as good as an actual replication, but certainly is better than

incorrectly presuming that statistical significance evaluates result replicability. Three internal replicability analyses have been identified: cross validation, the jackknife, and the bootstrap (Thompson 1994). These combine the study participants in hand in different ways to determine whether results are stable across sample variations. Thus, the methods address the extent to which the idiosyncracies of individuals impact results. Individual differences are what make generalization in social science so much more challenging than generalization in the physical sciences, where personality does not impact results.

Cross validation involves randomly splitting the sample into two groups, and then separately repeating the analyses (e.g., regression, analysis of variance) in both groups. If the resulting weights (e.g., regression beta weights) and effect sizes (e.g., R^2) are both identical, the results replicate perfectly. However, if the weights are not identical, replicability must then be empirically investigated by applying the group A weights to the group B data, and the group B weights to the group A data, and quantifying the shrinkage in estimated effect sizes. Thompson (1989, 2006) provides a primer on these methods. Cross validation methods are applicable for all parametric methods, because all these methods (e.g., analysis of variance, analysis of covariance, regression, descriptive discriminant analysis) are correlational (Thompson 2000). However, it must be emphasized that the sampling splitting is the basis for evaluating replicability, and *not* the basis for result interpretation. The analysis for the total sample is most stable and therefore is always the focus of interpretation.

Jackknife methods require that the analysis is conducted using all participants. And the analysis is then repeated when k participants at a time (usually $k = 1$) are omitted from the analysis. Then some additional computations are performed to test for result stability. The jackknife is particularly useful for identifying outliers.

Bootstrap methods create repeated resamples (usually several thousand) in each of which the analysis is repeated. In each resample, exactly n participants are randomly drawn *with replacement* from the original sample, where n is the sample size in the original sample. Thus, participant Kelly's data might all be drawn three

times in the first resample, not at all in resample two, and once in resample number three. Then parameter estimates (e.g., R^2 , beta weights, factor pattern coefficients) are averaged. The standard deviation of the estimates of a given parameter is an empirically estimated standard error for a given parameter. Replicability is suggested when these standard errors are small.

Diaconis and Efron (1983) provide a very readable, non technical explanation of the bootstrap. The bootstrap can be applied with both univariate and multivariate analyses. However, when multivariate bootstrap analyses are conducted, solutions in each resample must be rotated to best fit position with a target solution, so that resamples results can be compared apples to apples (Thompson 1988).

The three internal replicability analyses have different advantages and disadvantages. Only cross validation can be implemented without specialized software. Cross validation is conceptually simple, but different and even contradictory replicability results may emerge for the same data because numerous different random splits are possible for a given data set.

Both the jackknife and the bootstrap are computer intensive methods. Because both are complex and require specialized software, many researchers conducting these analyses will select the bootstrap because it is elegant and combines the participants in so many different ways to evaluate replicability. Software is widely available for implementing the bootstrap on modern personal computers in a matter of minutes.

SEE ALSO: Effect Sizes; General Linear Model; Methods, Bootstrap; Statistical Significance Testing

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representation

Rex Butler

Although popularly associated with postmodernism, the idea that the world is a representation goes back to the origins of western thought. In Plato's allegory of the cave, it is said that we cannot see the truth but only a reflection of it. In Descartes's hypothesis of the Evil Demon, it is argued that all we know is merely an illusion produced by another, alien intelligence. And after Descartes there are a variety of philosophical Idealisms, in which it is claimed that the world comes about only as an effect of our will or that the world exists only insofar as it is perceived. In postmodernism, however, these essentially metaphysical speculations are seen to be socially embodied through such mass media as the movies, television, advertising, and the Internet. Thus, a film like the Wachowski Brothers' *The Matrix* is understood at once as a revival of the old Platonic fantasy and a powerful metaphor for our contemporary society of the spectacle. Indeed, in the now celebrated catchphrase of the film, uttered by the leader of the resistance, Morpheus, to the newcomer, Neo, "Welcome to the desert of the

real," the filmmakers even acknowledge the prominent postmodern theorist Jean Baudrillard and his theory of simulation, which is often taken for an argument that the world has become its own representation.

However, as revealed by his own repeated distancing of himself from the film, Baudrillard is not simply to be identified with the condition he analyzes. If he does perceive a world in which all is – or soon will be – representation, his fundamental question is how to think something real outside of this, or how to think this at all. (The same might be said of Jacques Derrida's notorious and much quoted aphorism, "There is nothing outside of the text." Here, too, Derrida's real concern might be understood precisely as the attempt to think that "nothing" outside of the text.) In other words, to generalize and to make a connection between Baudrillard and Derrida and others, we might say that what defines postmodernism is the attempt to think critically about this mass mediated world in which all is representation. How to take a distance on it – the traditional aim of criticism – when the analyst necessarily participates in the same regime of representation as what they analyze, when they can only employ representation against representation? We seek to answer these questions here through an examination of three writers whose work is extremely influential upon philosophically derived accounts of sociology: Jean Baudrillard, Slavoj Žižek, and Fredric Jameson.

Let us begin with Jameson, who for a long time – against its progressive disappearance from the academic scene – has attempted to put forward a Marxist analysis of culture and society. In such early works as *Marxism and Form* (1971) and *The Political Unconscious* (1981) he dealt essentially with problems of literary criticism, as much as anything wishing to make that tradition of cultural critique that comes out of Marx and Engels available to American readers. But in such essays as "Postmodernism and Consumer Society" (1983), eventually expanded to book length as *Postmodernism, or, The Cultural Logic of Late Capitalism* (1991), he sought to apply those arguments originally developed in the context of literature to society as a whole, or what he called "totality." Coming out of the long problematic within Marxist thought of the relationship of the base

(the economic) to the superstructure (the social or cultural), it is in these writings that Jameson first spoke of the various elements that make up contemporary society – in a description that would become extraordinarily influential – as reversible, commutable, exchangeable. That is to say, the problem Jameson is grappling with in these later writings is that there is no “finally determining instance” of the economic, no underlying truth of society, but only a series of free floating, seemingly independent elements that on closer inspection each turn into the other, as in a Möbius strip. As he writes in *Postmodernism*: “So it would also seem in the postmodernist debate, and the depoliticized bureaucratic society to which it belongs, where all seemingly cultural positions turn out to be symbolic forms of political moralizing, except for the single overtly political note, which suggests a slippage from politics back into culture again” (Jameson 1991: 64; see also 152). Every thing in this sense is representation, or to use the German word Jameson often takes up, *Darstellung*; although it would be, as Jameson admits, not the representation of any original, but rather the endless deferral or displacement of any original.

It is this conception of society as a series of linkages and encodings, of translations between the most apparently disparate fields, that licenses some of Jameson’s more spectacular readings of well known cultural objects: in the essay “Modernism and its Repressed” he reads the French New Novel in terms of European colonialism; in the last chapter of *Marxism and Form* he reads 1950s sci fi as a fantasy of alienated labor; in “Historicism and *The Shining*” he reads Stanley Kubrick’s *The Shining* as treating class in Jazz Age America. The crucial thing to remember in each instance here is that, if it is always in fact a reading of a cultural phenomenon in terms of an underlying social or economic force, absolutely implicit in Jameson’s argument – and the question, finally, is whether this applies just to our postmodernist societies or it is true of all societies – is the possibility of this going the other way. However, to understand this properly – and Jameson is very clear on this – this is not merely to say that we can also read the economic in terms of the cultural, but that we can only grasp the economic in the first place because of the cultural

(and vice versa). It is this Jameson calls the *figural*: the fact that any part of society can only be comprehended by means of its comparison with another. In what looks at first sight like an overturning of the Marxist model of base and superstructure, we would say that no particular category comes first, but only the very relationship between them. In a sense, all the previously constituted fields that are understood to make up society henceforth become metaphors, representations of one another, but without some literal or original that is being metaphorized or represented.

However, to give the argument a final twist, we would say that, if the economic is reduced to merely another in a series of equivalents, it is also what they all have in common. That social force Jameson is trying to put his finger on – postmodernism as capitalism – is both what induces this endless series of exchanges between disparate areas and can be seen only in the momentary connections formed between them. This is again Jameson’s rejection of any kind of homology between preconstituted areas, which inevitably proceeds for him along the lines of biblical typology (and hence also his distaste for allegory and its modern equivalent for him, structuralism). As he argues in *Marxism and Form*: “The task of dialectical criticism is not indeed to relate these two dimensions: they are already related . . . Rather, such criticism is called upon to articulate the work and its content in such a way that this relationship stands revealed, and is more visible” (Jameson 1971: 406). In other words, it is in these connections themselves and not in what is connected that Jameson believes he can capture the assimilative power of capital, show the process of value being formed and not value as product. (And the value of Jameson’s own work lies in the relationships he makes between different fields, which allow us to see them as though for the first time – say, Robbe Grillet’s novel *Jealousy* and European colonialism, Kubrick’s *The Shining* and American history – beyond any notion of speaking their truth or “reading off” these cultural products against any underlying instance.)

It is again this process of representation that is to be seen in the chapter “How Did Marx Invent the Symptom?” of Žižek’s *The Sublime Object of Ideology* (1989). In this chapter, as its title indicates, a parallel is drawn between the

analysis of the dream by Freud and the analysis of the commodity by Marx. In both – hence the possibility of a certain Freudo Marxism – there is observed a kind of “symptom,” something that is constitutively repressed in order to allow the formation of a system of meaning or representation. That is, with regard to psychoanalysis, Žižek stresses that in Freud’s dream analysis it is not at all a matter of seeing some original latent thought that is then expressed in a manifest content. This would be exactly that deciphering of dream symbolism in terms of preexisting symbols or archetypes that Freud objected to (like that biblical typology Jameson similarly rejects). Rather, what must be thought is the very passage from the latent to the manifest, the refiguring of words and symbols that gives to an often perfectly innocent thought the particular form of the dream. It is this translation itself – which at once is on the surface and deeper than even the most latent thought – that *is* the unconscious. And the same goes for Marx’s analysis of the commodity form, where it is not a matter of the labor force being exploited insofar as it is not adequately compensated, but of economic exchange producing a certain surplus value, which is the exploitation of labor. It is not some objective value of labor that is subsequently commodified; it is the commodity form itself that retrospectively gives rise to the value of labor in the form of its economic exploitation. As Žižek insists, what must above all be analyzed is not the “secret behind the form but the secret of this form itself” (Žižek 1989: 15). In other words, the “symptom” here, as in the dream, is not some reality that precedes translation or exchange, but is the enigma of exchange itself: what must be excluded from it insofar as everything is to be given a value, a “value” that cannot be accounted for insofar as labor is to be given a value. Or, as Žižek will elsewhere write, what is at stake is the “foreclosing” of the impossible origin of such an all encompassing system of signification or value, in which everything – as in the symbols of psychoanalysis or the commodity in capitalism – is differentially defined by everything else (Žižek 1991b: 197–8). What is at stake is precisely the unrepresentable origins of a system in which all is representation.

We see something like this in Žižek’s well known pop cultural analyses (e.g., his reading

of Alfred Hitchcock’s *The Birds* in *Looking Awry* or Stephen Spielberg’s *Jaws* in *Enjoy Your Symptom!*). In both, Žižek begins by canvassing a number of different interpretations of the films: with regard to *The Birds*, the idea that the birds represent either the fundamental disorder of the cosmos, an imbalance in nature or unspoken family tensions; with regard to *Jaws*, the idea that the shark represents either repressed sexuality, unbridled capitalism, or the threat of the third world against America. That is, in a manner akin to cultural studies analyses, the films are read as bringing out certain tensions and tendencies within contemporary society. But Žižek does not leave it at this, for this apparent state of society can only be seen through these films. Or, to put it the other way around, we undoubtedly have the feeling that in most cultural studies analyses the author already has a certain image of society and simply seeks to illustrate it by means of a film. In fact, in each case here what Žižek wants to do – just as with his analysis of the genesis of value in Marx – is show how this circle of representation actually begins. Ultimately, he suggests, such cultural objects as the birds of *The Birds* and the shark of *Jaws* exert their power – this is the exact meaning of the fetish that he is trying to develop – by hiding through their sheer physical presence the vicious circle implied in the generation of value, by their ability to create the illusion that these various readings really do start with something, that there is something that precedes representation (Žižek 1991b: 106; Žižek 1992: 134). In a sense, even though everything is representation – or, to use Lacan’s expression, symbolic – what Žižek is trying to do by means of these examples is think how this synchronic system of representation, in which each term is defined by its relationship with all others, first comes about.

And for all of his obvious differences from Jameson and Žižek, we see the same thing in Baudrillard. Baudrillard is, of course, well known for his critique of Marxism and the idea of any stable referent behind representation, but in fact he still remains profoundly “Marxist” and, for all of his seeming to do away with reference in his theory of simulation, this is only to mistake the situation he analyzes for his own critical position (the error he condemns in the makers of *The Matrix*, who fail in attributing to

him both the idea that there is no outside to simulation, that there is only the illusory world of the Matrix, and the idea that there is some simple outside to simulation, the counter world of the insurgents led by Morpheus). Indeed, there is a certain “outside” to representation in Baudrillard, which we might call the “Real,” but it is the very form of illusion itself. In the same way as we saw with Jameson and Žižek, it is the fact that all is illusion, that everything can be seen in terms of something else, that necessarily implies some point outside of this, which is at once its origin (the impossibility of explaining how this system of representation began in its own terms) and its end (the possibility of us being able to think the fact that all is representation).

Let us take, for example, the opening chapters of Baudrillard’s *The Transparency of Evil* (1993), entitled “Transaesthetics,” “Trans sexuality,” and “Transeconomics.” Baudrillard’s idea here, as with Jameson’s similar idea of transcoding – although, in truth, it is Jameson’s “Postmodernism and Consumer Society” that is indebted to Baudrillard – is that none of these areas (not even economics) is any more fundamental than the others, that none can be grasped outside of its relationship with the others. Rather, each is only already those others: economics is aestheticized; aesthetics is only to be seen today in the form of economic speculation, etc. And yet, for all of this loss of external standards – and this is the kind of “limit” Baudrillard plays on throughout his work – there is still something at stake in pointing this out. There is a certain critical power brought about in remarking upon this equivalence or exchangeability between hitherto disparate areas; it is a kind of perpetual collapse and not a simple equivalence between them that Baudrillard speaks of. In other words, as with Jameson and Žižek, it is the exchange between things and not what is exchanged that is the real subject of Baudrillard’s work, an economy that his own criticism necessarily participates in. It is representation or more precisely representation that is at once the problem to be analyzed and the possible solution to this problem, in an ambiguity that, as Derrida points out, goes all the way back to Plato. And this is to say that postmodernism is not at all a new period, a sudden fall into the world of representation (and certainly

none of the thinkers discussed here make this mistake); the same paradox of representation stretches all the way back to the origins of western philosophy. If anything, we would say that the originality of postmodernism lies precisely in this realization – and that henceforth all thought or critique is bound by this double limit: that it is necessary to think the limits of representation within representation itself; that it is not a matter of thinking what is outside of representation, but of thinking what is outside of it to ensure that nothing is outside it.

SEE ALSO: Deconstruction; Marxism and Sociology; Mass Culture and Mass Society; Postmodern Social Theory; Postmodernism

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repressive hypothesis

Christian Klesse

The publication of Michel Foucault’s first volume of the *The History of Sexuality* thoroughly transformed theoretical thinking around

sexuality. A range of Foucault's longstanding concerns around power, knowledge, discourse, truth, and subjectivity culminate in this text about the genealogy of sexuality in Christian western societies. With this book, Foucault attempted to write the history of sexuality "from the viewpoint of the history of discourses." In Foucault's work, the concept of discourse is intrinsically interwoven with what he perceived to be distinctively modern forms of power. The insistence that modern power is *productive* rather than simply *repressive* is one of the central assets of his novel theory of power. Premodern forms of power were based on the idea of *power sovereignty* or *power law*. They were derived from monarchical techniques of government and drew upon the binary ruler/ruled. From within this paradigm, power is conceived as *negative*. It works through measures such as censorship, prohibition, prevention, exclusion, or spectacular forms of punishment. In contrast, power as a modality of discourse is *positive* in that it is productive of social relationships, forms of knowledge, and modes of subjectivity. Moreover, it is more difficult to pin it down clearly or to identify its origin in any particular agent, institution, or social space. Foucault describes discursive power as having a dispersed, contradictory, and all pervasive character.

Foucault (1990) applies this understanding of power to the subject of sexuality in order to challenge what he calls the repressive hypothesis. By questioning the dominant historical narrative of sexual repression, he undermines commonsense views about the interrelationship between power and sexuality. Whereas in the traditional understanding, power is exerted to repress, silence, censor, or erase sexuality, Foucault starts to conceive of sexuality as being an immediate effect of power. From this point of view, the most significant strategies of power in modern societies are not the exclusion of sexuality from discourse, but its regulation through the production of public discourses on sexuality. Foucault identifies an institutional incitement to speak about sex at the heart of western culture (s). It is in the multiplication of discourses on sexuality and the assumption that sex would reveal the truth of our innermost selves that the power–sexuality relation is realized. Thus, Foucault speaks of "confessional power" to designate this "putting into discourse" of sex

in the Catholic tradition of confession or the secular discourse of psychoanalysis.

With his insistence that power is productive of sexuality rather than repressive, Foucault attacks the basic assumptions of sexual liberationism that had a strong hold in the New Left, the counter culture, and the feminist and lesbian and gay social movements throughout the 1960s and 1970s. Foucault suggests that it would be naïve to assume that it is possible to revolutionize society by fighting off sexual restrictions and freeing our repressed natural sexual selves. Discussing the repressive hypothesis, he occasionally refers to the "Reichians" in order to characterize the discourse that he wishes to challenge. The German psychoanalyst and communist Wilhelm Reich emphasized the instrumentality of sexual repression through state, churches, and authoritarian family structures for class domination in capitalistic societies. As a theorist and activist, Reich was a core figure in organizing the so called *Sexpol* movement, a working class (youth) movement for class struggle and sexual liberation in the late 1920s and early 1930s. *Sexpol* had a short history. It was allowed to work within the ranks of the GCP only until 1932, when Reich was excluded from the party and some of his controversial publications were banned. The ideas of Reich gained an enormous popularity in the revival of sexual liberationism in the 1960s and 1970s, when the Freudo Marxist theories of Herbert Marcuse were widely endorsed in progressive social movement contexts.

Like other historians of sexuality, Foucault emphasizes the enormous relevance of medico psychiatric discourses for shaping modern thoughts on human sexuality throughout the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries (Weeks 1990). The notion of sexuality was produced in this period through an engagement of early sexologists with sexual deviance or "perversion." What was previously seen as a sin or temporary aberration in Christian canonical law became reinterpreted as a matter of character or mental pathology. In sexological discourse the sexual norm was carefully defined in a process of increasing specification of sexually perverted types. This provides the backdrop to Foucault's famous thesis of the "invention of homosexuality." The "homosexual," according to Foucault, came into existence as a form of being through

the self affirmative appropriation of these sexological knowledges in a kind of “reverse discourse.” Sexuality, consequently, presents (nothing more than) a discursive formation, a power/knowledge configuration, or an apparatus in the service of power.

Foucault coined the term bio power to conceive of the strategies of modern nation states to regulate human life through expert techniques. He describes the working of bio power on two levels: the “anatomopolitics of the body” (i.e., disciplinary power governing sexual identities and acts) and the “biopolitics of the population” (the regulation and control of the life of the population, through statistics, eugenics, demographics, etc.). In light of the concept of bio power, sexuality can be understood as a “technology of government.” Since Foucault ascribes a wide range of meanings to the concept of government, he also applies it to phenomena not directly linked to political and bureaucratic processes. In its most generalized meaning, government designates the “conduct of conduct.” This definition does not only refer to the conduct of others, but also the regulation of our own conduct in the “relation to ourselves.” At this point, Foucault’s writing on sexuality conjoins with his critical work on subjectivity.

While Foucault’s work on sexuality chimes in well with the historicizing and anti essentialist arguments advanced within social constructionist scholarship, it also points beyond it. His method of critical genealogy opens up a set of new and different questions aiming to explore the (historical) context of the emergence of certain social and sexual phenomena. In that he conceives of the sexual subject as an effect of discourse and power his work further contains an anti identitarian element that has fueled the deconstructive endeavor of recent queer theorizing (Halperin 1995).

The pathbreaking influence of Foucault’s thought notwithstanding, a range of criticisms has been leveled against his work on sexuality. Although being primarily concerned with the complexity of power, he failed to address the centrality of gender and race to the biopolitics he studied. Some have further complained that his thesis of the ubiquity of power would not be helpful to theorize agency or resistance and that his claim that “there is no relation of power without resistance” would at best be

tautological. Foucault tried to address the latter issue in his work on ethics in volumes 2 and 3 of *The History of Sexuality*. Here he claims that the imperative within classical Greek ethics to “take care of yourself” would bear the potential for a non prohibitive ethics based on the “techniques of self stylization” or an “aesthetics of existence.” Foucault labels these practices alternately “practices of freedom” or the “government of self.” It is an issue of contention in how far this work stands in an unbridgeable tension with his earlier claims. A high degree of ambivalence certainly remains.

SEE ALSO: Discourse; Essentialism and Constructionism; Foucault, Michel; Homosexuality; Poststructuralism; Queer Theory; Reich, Wilhelm; Sexual Identities; Sexuality Research: History

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republicanism

Peter Murphy

Republicanism presents an idealized version of a republic. This is a state where no single person (such as a monarch) rules. Usually, this means a written or unwritten constitutional order that distributes the power of the state among different persons and offices, and then organizes those persons and offices into a functional whole. Republics ideally combine the power of the one, the few, and the many with the aim of minimizing personal rule. Republicanism seeks to replace the unchecked personal authority of an arbitrary or despotic ruler with the carefully balanced impersonal authority of a city state or federal legal system.

The term republic is Roman. The Roman Republic began its history when the city state expelled its kings. Kingship was equated with despotism, and republicanism signified opposition to tyranny. In order to rule without a king, Rome instituted a set of balances of power between executive office holders, classes, and councils (the Senate, the People) in the state. Council type rule depended on public debate about common matters. It replaced rule by fiat or diktat. The concept of a balance of powers prefigured the modern idea of a constitutional separation of powers.

The ancient Greek city states did much the same things as Rome, beginning around the same time in the eighth century BCE. The Greeks, though, invented the idea of federalism, unfamiliar to the Romans. The Greek idea of a federation of states became the basis for the great modern republic, the US. The Greeks theorized extensively about their innovations – notably in Plato's *Republic* and Aristotle's *Politics*. These theories had their roots in pre Socratic ideas of the equilibrium and

proportionality of powers – the key idea of any republic. The great Roman statesman Cicero later synthesized these theories in his *Republic*, a canonical text for republicanism for 2,000 years.

The Roman Empire and Christianity eclipsed ancient republicanism, though republican ideas like the rule of law survived for centuries in late antique administration and urbanism and in Christian natural law. Republican ideas reappeared with the rebirth of Italian city states by the twelfth century – notably Florence and Venice. These cities were based on forms of collective rule. The Florentines Leonardo Bruni and Machiavelli produced important theories of the Italian city republic, in part stimulated by their reading of ancient sources.

The Dutch revolted against Spain in the seventeenth century, and created a republic based on a federation of seven provinces. Although this period produced some brilliant thinkers (Grotius and Spinoza), no great treatise on republicanism was written, though key ideas – of the freedom of the seas and of states based on the natural rights of life and liberties of movement and property – were added to the republican corpus. The Dutch pioneered liberal republicanism.

When the American colonies rebelled against the English Crown, American thinkers ransacked history for models of republics. They were intimately familiar with Sparta, Athens, Rome, Venice, and the Dutch Republic. They also drew on Commonwealth ideas (James Harrington, Henry Neville) and Whig ideas (Shaftesbury, Burke) circulating in England. Whig and Commonwealth ideas were pararepublican – models of regal republics in which the Crown was a limited element in a constitutional state. In the thought of the Americans Thomas Jefferson and James Madison, multiple threads of historic republicanism coalesced into a new model that combined familiar features (opposition to despotism, rejection of monarchy, constitutional balance, free speech, rule of law) with startlingly new elements, including a written constitution enforced by an independent court and an ambition to build a republic on a massive scale.

Republicanism originally was the worldview of individual city states. The Greeks experimented with federations of cities. The Dutch

developed the idea as a federation of provinces. The Americans were more adventurous still: they thought of their union of states as an “empire of liberty” that regularly enlarged itself by adding new states and by making treaties and alliances with other states. The greatest treatise produced on the American republic was Hannah Arendt’s *On Revolution* (1973).

In the modern age, many countries toppled their monarchies and replaced them with elected or unelected presidents and called themselves republics. But these republics bore little resemblance to the models of historical republicanism whose practical expression was limited to the US and Whig Commonwealths like Australia.

SEE ALSO: Democracy; Empire; Federalism; Sovereignty; State

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reputation

Gary Alan Fine

Reputation, as a social scientific concept, refers to the existence of a socially recognized persona: an organizing principle by which actions of a person (or group, organization, or collectivity) are linked into a common assessment. On one level a reputation constitutes a moral gestalt that is linked to a person – an organizing principle for person perception. However, reputations are more than this social psychological claim: they are collective representations, enacted in relationships. In this, the opinion that one

individual might form of another often differs from a shared, established image. Reputations are embedded within social relations, and, as a consequence, reputation is connected to forms of communication, tied to a community.

Social identification and reputation operates in several domains: personal, mass mediated, organizational, and historical. While reputations often begin within circles of personal intimates, they spread outward. First, people create and share the reputations of those who exist within their social circle – friends and consorts. Personal reputations are of immediate consequence, because the actions of those in our social world have the potential to shape our lives and interaction outcomes. People are concerned with the repute in which they are held because of the options that reputations open and close, and because reputations permit us to evaluate our selves in particular ways: those identities that we are given channel those identities that we can select. Further, these public reputations directly affect how we come to see ourselves: a reason we attempt to shape our behavior when with those whose opinions matter to us (Vinitzky Seroussi 1998). People engage in forms of self presentation and impression management to modify their images in the eyes of others. As a result, “status” has been a central concept of sociology from Max Weber on, whether personal standing or group position.

Second, the media help to determine who we should know and care about. In addition to individuals who are famous by virtue of their formal institutional roles (e.g., political leaders), this space is populated by “celebrities”: figures that by virtue of their prominence in the central institutions of society are deemed worthy of shared attention (Gamson 1994). Even if we recognize the thinness of our knowledge, the celebrity of these figures connects us to each other and provides an unthreatening space to converse about vital social matters. We feel that we know these celebrities (O. J. Simpson, for instance) and can speculate on their motives. The discussion of the sexual appetites of former President Clinton, and whether he suffers from a “sexual addiction,” is part of this personalizing of “great men,” as is the debate over whether these intimacies matter as to his performance of affairs of state. This discussion results from media choices, an enlarged emphasis that is a

function of what Daniel Boorstin (1961) has labeled the “graphic revolution,” referring to the increased visual displays of public figures, emphasizing their immediacy.

Public figures are legitimate topics of conversation among audiences who have never met them, but who consider them “known.” Their reputations are used in interactional transactions among strangers: strangers to them and often strangers to each other. We have the right to judge these figures, even though we are not familiar with them personally. This is a form of “parasocial interaction” (Caughey 1984).

Not only do individuals have reputations, but so also do organizations. Organizations develop reputations that influence their effectiveness (Fombrun 1996). Even if not always known to the wider public, CEOs characterize their companies in the business community. What we know of Apple, Disney, General Motors, and Time Warner parallels in important ways what we know of persons. The dramatic growth of the public relations profession since the 1920s testifies to the need for reputation specialists to shape organizational images. Ratings of professional schools or consumer product evaluations are part of this process.

Finally, history, constituting narratives of linked biographies, serves as a more formal and sedimented version of reputation work. Citizens learn of the reputations of others through institutionally sanctioned knowledge. History represents “settled” cultural discourse about the past, determined by experts as important for people to be culturally literate. This knowledge is acquired through the social institutions of the school and the media. Reputational history provides lessons necessary for citizenship. Historical knowledge is not merely a technical skill, but a moral aptitude, necessary for public involvement. History is narratives as taught; collective memory is how such narratives are recalled. When reputations are too hotly contested by rivalrous parties, schools and other institutions simply ignore the battles or attempt to pacify them, creating non controversial versions of the American Civil War, segregation, or treatment of American Indians.

In one sense, a person without reputational knowledge could function well in social domains; yet, this individual would not really “belong” to the polity. Whether or not people

choose to embrace the consensual moral evaluation of great figures, as revolutionaries and progressives often refrain from doing, they should at least be aware of what they are rejecting.

Reputations attempt to teach how citizens should think about those issues that confront them. People share memory by virtue of what they have been taught about others, and by what these others are supposed to “mean.” As sociologist Charles Horton Cooley (1966 [1918]: 342) asserted, “Fame may or may not represent what men were, but it always represents what humanity needs for them to have been.”

The analysis of reputations is closely linked to the examination of collective memory or social mnemonics (Olick & Robbins 1998; Fine 2001), and builds on cognitive sociology, social movements research, and the sociology of knowledge. Major figures in this tradition include Charles Horton Cooley, Maurice Halbwachs, Karl Mannheim, and more recently Barry Schwartz, Kurt and Gladys Lang, and Pierre Nora. As research questions become more sophisticated, other linkages will be explored with political science, psychology, organizational studies, as well as extended historical and comparative analyses.

SEE ALSO: Celebrity and Celestoid; Celebrity Culture; Collective Identity; Collective Memory; Halbwachs, Maurice; Political Leadership; Politics and Media; Status

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residential segregation

John Iceland

Residential segregation refers to the differential distribution of groups across space, and is usually thought of in terms of the degree to which various groups reside in different neighborhoods. People are residentially segregated across a number of dimensions, including age, socioeconomic status, and (the focus here) race and ethnicity. It is commonly thought that differences in residential patterns across racial and ethnic groups reflect social distance.

Residential segregation, particularly when resulting from discrimination, has negative consequences for minority group members. Residential segregation limits residential choice, constrains economic and educational opportunities by limiting people's access to good schools and jobs, serves to concentrate poverty in disadvantaged neighborhoods, and contributes to social exclusion and alienation. Residential segregation also affects the nature and quality of intergroup relations in society: segregation reduces contact between groups and both causes and reflects polarization across communities.

HISTORICAL TREATMENT OF RESIDENTIAL SEGREGATION ISSUES

The residential patterns of minority groups in the US have been the object of study for many decades. W. E. B. DuBois, for example, documented the residential patterns of blacks in Philadelphia's seventh ward in his 1899 book, *The Philadelphia Negro*. Another example is Louis Wirth's *The Ghetto* (1928), which compared the similarities between the Jewish ghettos in Europe and those in New York and Chicago. Taeuber and Taeuber (1965) note that new immigrants to the US in the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries were by and large

poor and poorly educated. They often lived in ethnic enclaves in low rent districts. As the immigrants and their children accumulated financial resources and knowledge of opportunities, many left ethnic enclaves, often to be replaced by new immigrants.

This process of residential assimilation, however, did not apply to the large waves of black migrants from the South to the North in the early and mid twentieth century. African Americans faced a range of social, economic, and residential barriers that were higher than those that immigrants faced. In the South, segregation was enforced by whites with the Jim Crow system. In the North, segregation developed because of white dominated real estate practices and because of the violence directed toward blacks who entered formerly white neighborhoods.

With the decline in immigration in the 1920s and 1930s, studies on segregation in the decades after World War II tended to focus on the segregation of blacks from whites. Studies such as Taeuber and Taeuber's (1965) volume on *Negroes in Cities* provided an impressive and thorough examination of general patterns of black-white segregation and the role of social and economic factors in producing these patterns. Throughout the first six decades of the twentieth century, segregation between blacks and whites in metropolitan areas actually increased, largely due to continued racial polarization and white suburbanization over the period.

Massey and Denton (1993), among others, built upon this tradition, and discussed the extreme levels of racial stratification in American metropolitan areas, and described how racism and discrimination perpetuated high levels of segregation. *American Apartheid* focused on black-white segregation, though other work by Massey and Denton examined the segregation of other groups from whites as well.

With the rapid growth of the Hispanic and Asian populations in the US since the 1960s, in response to changes in immigration policy, there has been growing attention paid to the residential segregation of these groups in American society. It is likely that future research on racial and ethnic residential segregation will increasingly focus on the residential patterns of multiple groups.

RECENT PATTERNS AND TRENDS IN SEGREGATION

While Taeuber and Taeuber (1965) and others described how black–white segregation increased through the early and middle part of the twentieth century, trends in subsequent decades have been characterized by moderate declines in such segregation. A 2002 Census Bureau report (Iceland et al. 2002) examined the residential segregation of various groups across all US metropolitan areas using a variety of measures and found that declines in African American segregation over the 1980 to 2000 period occurred across all dimensions of segregation. Despite these declines, residential segregation was still higher for African Americans than for the other groups. Hispanics were generally the next most highly segregated, followed by Asians and Pacific Islanders, and finally American Indians and Alaska Natives. Asians and Pacific Islanders, as well as Hispanics, tended to experience increases in segregation over the period, though results varied by measure used. Increases were generally larger for Asians and Pacific Islanders than for Hispanics.

Residential segregation tended to be higher in larger metropolitan areas and in those with large minority populations. While the Census Bureau report thoroughly documented various basic patterns and trends in residential segregation, it did not discuss the factors causing these trends.

INTERNATIONAL RESEARCH

Residential segregation has been receiving greater attention in countries around the globe, in large part due to continued high levels of international migration (and improvements in data, methods, and computational resources for studying segregation). Europe and Canada, for example, have been experiencing growth in their minority populations, and this has been accompanied by concerns about the assimilation (social, economic, and residential) of these groups in society. Thus, we are likely to see a growing body of research on residential segregation in a comparative international perspective in the coming years (e.g., White et al. 2003).

CAUSES OF RACIAL AND ETHNIC RESIDENTIAL SEGREGATION

Two broad theoretical perspectives have been used to explain patterns and trends in residential segregation in the US: spatial assimilation and place stratification. According to the spatial assimilation model, which is often used to explain settlement patterns of immigrants or migrants, newcomers settle in fairly homogeneous racial/ethnic enclaves within a given metropolitan area. This may be due to migrants feeling more comfortable with and welcomed by fellow co ethnics and the fact that minority members may simply not be able to afford to live in the same neighborhoods as more affluent whites. According to this model, individuals eventually convert socioeconomic gains over time into better housing, and this leads to higher levels of integration with whites.

In contrast to the spatial assimilation model, the place stratification perspective holds that a group's residential patterns and integration into society depend on the group's position in the social hierarchy. The dominant group (non Hispanic whites) is at the top of the hierarchy, and other groups follow in some order, depending on prejudices and preferences of society at large. Negative stereotypes, for example, reduce openness to integration with certain groups, and blacks tend to be perceived in the most unfavorable terms.

Thus, many have argued that the spatial assimilation model simply does not hold for all groups, especially blacks, in part because prejudices lead not only to avoidance of particular groups but also to racial discrimination. Discriminatory practices include racial steering by real estate agents, unfair mortgage lending patterns, and even in some cases physical attacks when moving into white neighborhoods.

Both theoretical perspectives have received some support from past research. For example, Iceland (2004a) has found that higher socioeconomic status blacks, Hispanics, and Asians are less segregated from non Hispanic whites than their lower socioeconomic status counterparts. Immigrants also have higher levels of segregation than the native born of a particular race group. Nevertheless, findings also indicate that race still plays a large role in determining

residential patterns, especially for African Americans.

METHODOLOGICAL ISSUES

Residential segregation has been studied extensively with a variety of measures. The main methodological issues involved in analyzing racial and ethnic segregation revolve around the definition of racial and ethnic categories, geographic boundaries, and segregation measures.

Race and Ethnicity

The way in which racial and ethnic groups have been defined has changed over time. Residential segregation indexes generally rely on official government definitions, given that the data needed to calculate indexes come from the decennial census. In 1790, the first decennial census of the population, information was collected about whites and blacks only. Over time, data on other groups were collected, often reflecting changing social views of race. In the 2000 census there were five race categories: White, Black, American Indian and Alaska Native, Asian, and Native Hawaiian or other Pacific Islander. Individuals could also identify with more than one race, in contrast to previous censuses. Hispanic origin was gathered in a separate question.

In practice, the minority groups most studied today are African Americans, Hispanics, and Asians. Examining the segregation of the American Indian population, and particularly trends over time, is challenging due to the relatively small population of this group, as well as changing patterns of self identification among American Indians.

Geographic Areas

Residential segregation typically describes the distribution of different groups across smaller areal units within larger areas. Thus, to measure residential segregation, one has to define both the appropriate larger area and its component parts. The most common larger geographic unit chosen is the metropolitan area, which is a reasonable approximation of a housing market.

They generally contain at least 50,000 people, and in 2000 there were 331 of them in the US. The smaller unit chosen is typically the census tract, which was originally designed to represent neighborhoods. Tracts typically have between 1,500 and 8,000 people, with an average size of about 4,000. Using smaller component units, such as census defined blocks, tends to yield higher segregation scores, as smaller units tend to be racially more homogeneous than larger ones.

Segregation Measures

The two most common measures of segregation are the dissimilarity and isolation indexes. The dissimilarity index is a measure of evenness, and it ranges from 0 (complete integration) to 1 (complete segregation). It describes the proportion of a group's population that would have to change residence for each neighborhood to have the same race ethnic distribution as the metropolitan area overall. The isolation index is a measure of exposure, and also ranges from 0 to 1, with 1 indicating the highest level of isolation. It basically indicates the probability that a typical minority group member would come into contact with another minority group member in a metropolitan area.

Many other segregation measures have been developed and used by researchers. In 1988, Massey and Denton compiled 20 existing measures and identified five dimensions of residential segregation: evenness, exposure, concentration, centralization, and clustering. *Evenness* describes the differential distribution of subgroups of the population. *Exposure* measures potential contact between groups. *Concentration* refers to the relative amount of physical space occupied by a minority subgroup. *Centralization* indicates the degree to which a group is located near the center of an urban area. *Clustering* measures the degree to which minority group members live in contiguous areas. A more thorough discussion of these dimensions and various issues related to measuring segregation can be found in Massey and Denton (1988) and Iceland et al. (2002).

Finally, other measures of segregation are continually being developed, such as *multigroup*

measures that allow researchers to consider multiple racial and ethnic groups, geographic levels (e.g., metropolitan area or regions), or dimensions (race, class, age) simultaneously. It is likely that these measures will become more popular in the coming years.

SEE ALSO: Chicago School; Ethnic Enclaves; Hypersegregation; Inequality and the City; Invasion Succession; Migration: Internal; Red lining; Restrictive Covenants; Steering, Racial Real Estate; Urban Ecology

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resocialization

Linda Morrison

Resocialization is a process of identity transformation in which people are called upon to learn new roles, while unlearning some aspects of their old ones. The need to learn new roles may result from voluntary or involuntary changes in status. When the role requirements of the new status conflict with an individual's earlier or primary socialization, the process of resocialization may be necessary. This process often requires an unlearning of internalized norms, values, beliefs, and practices, to be replaced by a new set which is considered appropriate to the new role.

Resocialization most often occurs when an individual is called upon to adopt a new specialized status, often in adulthood. Thus it is sometimes referred to as adult socialization. Examples include joining the military or a religious order; training to become a doctor, lawyer, or police officer; becoming a prisoner; or being hospitalized for mental illness. In each case, a person is required to take on a new identity as a professionalized or institutionalized self, and must adopt new ways of relating to both self and others. Behaviors and values that were considered normal in ordinary society are seen as deviant and undesirable in the new situation and must be unlearned. In addition, many of the new behaviors and values are considered deviant on "the outside." For these reasons, the person's previously socialized self becomes an obstacle to achieving the new identity and status. In order to make this transition, role and identity transformations are required.

In the classic formulation, the resocialization process occurs within the context of "total institutions." Goffman (1961) describes the features of these special environments (e.g., prisons and mental hospitals), in which a person is removed from the ordinary everyday world and resocialized in a social context which encompasses all or most of an individual's daily life. In this controlled environment, individuals are stripped of their social identities through "mortification processes" and socialized into new relationships with their peer group and a complex hierarchy of ranking and power.

Ordinary social practices are no longer valid. People are ridiculed and punished for acting like their normal selves, and are rewarded for adopting new behaviors and attitudes that are appropriate to the new social setting.

Within total institutions, various forms of mortification practices and degradation rituals operate to break down accustomed realities and weaken the boundaries of existing identities. The inmates or initiates may be stripped, shaved, punished, and humiliated; subjected to painful, stressful, and disorienting events; given new clothing, tools, and responsibilities; and assigned new identities or labels based on membership in a particular group within a strictly hierarchical structure. New practices and values are introduced and enforced in an environment of extensive surveillance and social control. The norms, values, and behaviors of the institutional setting are most successfully reinforced by keeping the incarcerated individuals totally separate from their ordinary environment (the outside) and retraining them into the distinct new role system of the inside. As with childhood socialization, resocialization of an individual occurs in relationship to the status and roles of others. Through relating to these others, in an ongoing process of rewards and punishments, the inmate or trainee will learn the responses and behaviors required by the new social environment, internalizing its acceptable norms, values and beliefs.

Goffman's ideal type of resocialization in a total institution can be used to understand the process occurring in other, less total institutional settings. Settings can vary in relation to their voluntariness, their purpose and goals, their degree of separation from the outside world, the active or passive role of the individual in the process, the level of surveillance and control, and the permanent or temporary nature of involvement. Resocialization in the interest of professional training such as a medical school or police academy, while it involves degradation and subordination of initiates, also holds the promise of an enhanced future status when training for membership is complete. A person in training is socialized into new responses to people and their bodies, to sickness, to crime, to danger, to death. The challenges and humiliations of socialization into a professional identity are difficult but carry substantial rewards. Upon

completion, the person will carry a new identity and will be differently socialized.

Individuals experiencing drug rehabilitation programs, imprisonment, and psychiatric treatment may not experience actual transformation of identity, but may resist and maintain their core identity, especially when contact with the outside is maintained or eventual return is promised. Active reconstruction of the self in certain contexts may be contrasted with a more passive or receptive condition. The amount of personal initiative, privacy, and choice can also be seen to vary according to setting and individual. Brainwashing of cult members or prisoners of war could be seen as the extreme case of resocialization and loss of the original self in transformation to the new status and role.

In a non voluntary therapeutic environment, the individual may gain permission to leave the facility only when his or her identity has been sufficiently transformed by being there. This includes rehabilitative treatment for substance abuse, as well as psychiatric treatment. The person who enters the facility is defined as deficient; denial of this definitional reality is proof of continued deficiency. Through the mortification, deculturation, and rebuilding process described by Goffman (1961), the therapeutic milieu is designed to shape inmates into a new status/role combination, including incorporation of a prescribed set of preferred norms and values. When their behaviors and beliefs are deemed acceptably transformed, including display of sufficient respect for the rules and the status hierarchy, then release may be secured. The new social role of reformed addict, or psychiatric patient, will define their status upon release back into society. In such circumstances, it is possible to maintain one's core identity to varying degrees, and undergo a process of change in combination with a newly reconstructed presentation of self in order to meet the requirements of the program and gain release to the outside. This is a form of resocialization, learning new roles, without a true transformation of identity.

In a training environment, the new identity is acquired through modeling the behaviors of those who are superior in status, though subservient and submissive behaviors must be maintained for an appropriate length of time.

After showing adequate preparation at appropriate intervals, the deserving initiate will go through a status enhancement ritual to reach the next level, and corresponding changes in role behaviors will be learned, always in relation to others in higher, lower, or peer status positions. In turn, the individuals moving through this pathway assist in shaping the behaviors of others entering the statuses below them. Eventually, the graduation or credentialing ritual will reward the long period of degradation, subversion, and obedience to authority with a full status transformation, and ultimately an identity transformation as well. To become a doctor rather than a medical student, an officer rather than a cadet, or a priest rather than a seminarian, is to transform one's identity in relation to others as well as to the self. To fully enter the new status and associated roles, a person must experience the self in a new way and relate to "ordinary" persons (their own former status) differently, as well as to others in related statuses. One's core identity has been transformed and enhanced, or transformed and degraded.

For individuals in environments designed to treat or punish, the basic value of the self is diminished as a result of entering the status of prisoner, patient, or addict. As noted above, the goal of the institution is to transform the deviant self, participation is less voluntary, and the object is to produce conformity or reduce deviance. Once resocialization occurs, when return to society is gained, the individual still carries a stigmatized identity on re entry: that of ex mental patient, ex con, or ex addict. Ritual reincorporation into the community is rarely attained, and the new position is seldom celebrated. This is an important distinction between forms of and outcomes of resocialization.

Clearly, the purpose of resocialization helps to determine its nature. Whether a suspension of previous identity or a transformation to a new identity is achieved, or something in between, will depend on multiple factors. Oversimplification of the resocialization process leads to a misunderstanding of its complexity, and of the complexity of human beings in relation to themselves and to one another.

Identity construction involves individual and contextual factors of agency, resistance, and choice; awareness of these factors in the context

of resocialization allows a more nuanced understanding of the process.

SEE ALSO: Goffman, Erving; Identity Theory; Organizations as Total Institutions; Self; Socialization; Socialization, Adult; Status

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resource mobilization theory

Bob Edwards

A renaissance of social movement research occurred in both North America and Europe during the 1970s as a then younger generation of scholars sought to understand the emergence, significance, and effects of the social movements of the 1960s (see Jenkins 1983; McAdam et al. 1988; Dalton et al. 1990). On neither side of the Atlantic did the received academic wisdom of the 1950s and 1960s view social movements in a

favorable light. In the US, the most hospitable theories treated social movements as temporary disequilibria soon to be reintegrated into smoothly functioning social systems. In Europe, “new social movements” theory formed around the core problematic of explaining the origins, identity, and cultural significance of newly emerging social change constituencies (Melucci 1980). By contrast, resource mobilization theory tended to take the existence of such constituencies for granted in order to explain how they mobilized effectively to pursue desired social change. Both resource mobilization and new social movement theories are variants within the broader conflict paradigm in sociological theory. Resource mobilization predominated in the rapidly growing sociological subfield of social movement research (Gamson 1968, 1975; Oberschall 1973; Freeman 1975; McCarthy & Zald 1977; Tilly 1978; McAdam 1982; Morris 1984; Zald & McCarthy 1987; Staggenborg 1988; Tarrow 1994).

The organizational entrepreneurial branch of resource mobilization theory (RMT) reoriented social movement analysis by taking the analytical insights of organizational sociology and extending them by analogy to social movements. More recent exemplars of this perspective include Minkoff's (1995) analysis of women's and race/ethnic organizations, Smith et al. (1997) on transnational social movement organizations, Andrews's (2005) study of the impact of the Civil Rights Movement, and a special issue of *Mobilization* edited by Caniglia and Carmin (2005). From this perspective a social movement is a set of preferences for social change within a population. Individuals who share those social change preferences are called *adherents*, while those who contribute resources of various kinds to help the movement mobilize are *constituents*. Those who watch from the sidelines are *bystanders*. A key analytical issue for RMT is understanding how social movements turn bystanders into adherents and subsequently adherents into constituents, and ultimately mobilize constituents to active participation. Such tasks of mobilization are undertaken most often by *social movement organizations* (SMOs).

In their classic formulation, McCarthy and Zald identified a trend in US social movements toward the increasing significance of large, formally organized SMOs deploying professional

staff to pursue the broad social change goals of their constituents. Early RMT was closely associated with the trend toward professionalization and debates over its impact were a focus of much research (Staggenborg 1988; Andrews & Edwards 2004). Yet, while many SMOs are quite large with professional staffs and substantial resources, most are small, less formally organized groups operating at the local level (Edwards & Foley 2003). At a minimum, an SMO is a named group that undertakes actions to further the social change goals of the social movement.

All SMOs pursuing the goals of the movement comprise a *social movement industry* (SMI). SMIs vary in size, and the capacity of a movement to engage in collective action is influenced greatly by type, amount, and distribution of resources within its SMI. RMT expects that the greater the mobilization capacity of an SMI, the greater its potential for achieving some of its social change goals. The broader *social movement sector* (SMS) is composed of all SMIs and their component SMOs. In leaning on organizational sociology to reorient the study of social movements, RMT holds that SMIs and SMOs differ from governmental and market sector organizations because of watershed differences in goals, their structural location in civil society, and in the varied resources and power they wield. Nevertheless, the SMS has grown dramatically over the last 30 years and has contributed to the increasing social change potential attributed to “civil society” worldwide.

Early formulations of RMT focused on broad patterns of resource availability and paid disproportionate attention to the mobilization of material resources from external sources. By contrast, recent RMT analysts emphasize more explicitly the uneven distribution of resources in a society, and seek to understand how individual and collective actors endeavor to alter that distribution in order to direct resources to social movements. In other words, RMT is becoming more explicitly a partial theory of overcoming resource inequality. Thus, questions of general resource “availability” have shifted toward questions of specific means of resource access.

Two longstanding debates about resource access center around whether social movements obtain their support primarily from internal or external sources and the closely related question

about the extent to which external supporters constrain movement goals and activities. Recent developments in RMT seek to reframe this debate in several ways. Research has made it clear that social movements and individual SMOs generally obtain their resources from a combination of internal and external sources. All but the very smallest SMOs gain access to resources by multiple means. Four mechanisms of resource access are particularly important: self production; aggregation from constituents; appropriation/cooptation; and patronage (see Edwards & McCarthy 2004).

Self production. A fundamental mechanism by which social movements gain access to resources is to produce those resources themselves through the agency of existing organizations, activists, and participants. Movements produce social organizational resources when they launch SMOs, develop networks, and form issue coalitions. They produce human resources by socializing their children into the ways and values of the movement, or by training participants and developing leaders. Movements like those for civil and human rights have produced out of their struggle a moral authority that is a powerful resource. Social movements also produce items with movement symbolic significance like T shirts, coffee mugs, posters, art, and even cakes and cookies for bake sales which can be sold to raise money or used directly to promote the movement.

Aggregation. Resource aggregation refers to the ways a movement or specific SMO converts resources held by dispersed individuals into collective resources that can be allocated by movement actors. Social movements aggregate privately held resources from beneficiary and conscience constituents in order to pursue collective goals. Monetary or human resources are aggregated by soliciting donations from broadly dispersed individuals in order to fund group activities, or recruiting volunteers to help with an activity. Yet, social movements also aggregate other types of resources as well. For example, moral resources held by others can be aggregated by compiling and publicizing lists of individuals and organizations that endorse group goals and actions, as is common in the global justice movement currently.

Cooptation/appropriation. Social movements often utilize relationships they have with

existing organizations and groups to access resources previously produced or aggregated by those other organizations. Resource cooptation generally carries the tacit understanding that the resources will be used in mutually agreeable ways. In the US context, churches and church related organizations have probably produced resources most often coopted by social movements from buildings, members and staff, social networks, rituals and discourses or moral authority.

Patronage. Social movements also gain access to resources through patronage. Patronage refers to the provision of resources to an SMO by an individual or organization that often specializes in patronage. Foundation grants, private donations, or government contracts are common in financial patronage. In monetary patronage relationships patrons external to the movement or SMO provide a substantial amount of financial support and usually exert a degree of control over how their money can be used. Patrons may even attempt to influence an SMO's policy decisions and day to day operations. Human resources can be acquired through patronage relationships as when one SMO loans staff to another for a set period of time, as is common in issue campaigns or coalitions.

Despite the obvious centrality of resources to RMT, analysts were slow to develop a clear conceptualization of resources. Analysis and often heated debate focused on a narrow range of material and human resources. Yet, resources important to social movement mobilization are more varied. In recent years RMT analysts have benefited from broader developments in social science and made considerable gains in specifying and differentiating between different types of resources. Five distinct types of resources will be discussed below: moral, cultural, social organizational, human, and material (see Edwards & McCarthy 2004).

Moral resources. Moral resources include legitimacy, integrity, solidary support, sympathetic support, and celebrity. Of these, legitimacy has received the most theoretical attention, and celebrity perhaps the least. Collective actors who most closely mimic institutionally legitimated or "mainstream" expectations gain advantages over groups that fit those expectations poorly. Similarly, celebrity endorsements of an issue campaign can increase media coverage, generate

public attention, and open doors to policymakers and resource providers alike. Moral resources tend to originate outside of a social movement or SMO and are generally bestowed by an external source known to possess them, as in a celebrity lending his or her fame, the receipt of awards like the Nobel Peace Prize by a prominent activist, or the certification by an external credentialing body like the Internal Revenue Service. Nevertheless, some movements succeed in the difficult task of creating moral resources, as was clearly the case with the US Southern Civil Rights Movement or more recently the international human rights movement. Because moral resources can often be retracted, they are both less accessible and more proprietary than cultural resources.

Cultural resources. Cultural resources are artifacts and cultural products such as conceptual tools and specialized knowledge that have become widely, though not necessarily universally, known. These include tacit knowledge about how to accomplish specific tasks like enacting a protest event, holding a news conference, running a meeting, forming an organization, initiating a festival, or surfing the web. This category includes tactical repertoires, organizational templates, and technical or strategic know how required to either mobilize, produce events, or access additional other resources. Specific cultural resources are widely available in a given society, but neither evenly distributed nor universally available. In other words, not every member of a society or social group possesses specific competencies or knowledge that could be valuable to a social movement or SMO. This points to a key difference between cultural and moral resources. Cultural resources are more widely accessible and available for use independent of favorable judgments from those outside a movement or SMO. Cultural resources include movement or issue relevant productions like music, literature, magazine/newspapers, or film/videos. Such cultural products facilitate the recruitment and socialization of new adherents and help movements maintain their readiness and capacity for collective action.

Social organizational resources. There are three general forms of social organizational resources: infrastructures, social networks, and organizations, each varying in its degree of organizational formality. Infrastructures are the

social organizational equivalent of public goods like postal service, roads, or the Internet that facilitate the smooth functioning of everyday life. Infrastructures are non proprietary social resources. By contrast, access to social networks and especially groups and formal organizations can be limited by insiders. Thus, access to resources embedded in them can be hoarded by insiders and denied to outsiders. Such differential access only intensifies existing inequalities among groups in their ability to utilize crucial resources of other kinds. This resource category includes both resources intentionally produced by social movements to further their aims, like SMOs, and those produced by others for non movement purposes but coopted by social movements, like churches, schools, service organizations, occupational groups, or more broadly civil society. The ease of SMO access to resources produced by others for non movement purposes will vary depending on the perceived compatibility of the groups involved.

Human resources. Human resources are both more tangible and easier to appreciate than the three resource types discussed so far. This category includes resources like labor, experience, skills, expertise, and leadership. Human resources are characteristics of individuals rather than of social organizational structures or culture more generally. Individuals typically have control over the use of their labor and human resources and make them accessible to social movements or SMOs through participation. Yet, not all participants offer the same mix of capabilities. SMOs often require expertise of varying kinds and having access to lawyers, web designers, dynamic speakers, organizers, or outside experts when the need arises can be vitally important. Yet, the use value of expertise often depends on the situation. For example, a prominent scientist may have little more to offer than a high school intern if an environmental group needs to restore its web page after a crash. Similarly, a celebrated musician participating in a blockade contributes no additional human resource to the blockade, yet, from the standpoint of the moral resources contributed by the celebrity's presence, the evaluation would be much different.

Material resources. The category of material resources combines what economists would call financial and physical capital including

monetary resources, property, office space, equipment, and supplies. The importance of monetary resources for social movements should not be underestimated. No matter how many other resources a movement mobilizes, it will incur costs and someone has to pay the bills. Material resources have received the most analytic attention because they are generally more tangible, more proprietary, and in the case of money more fungible than other resource types. In other words, money can be converted into other types of resources while the opposite is less often the case.

Combining the four means of access with the five types of resources discussed above specifies 20 specific exchange relationships through which social movements or SMOs acquire the resources they use to pursue their social change goals. The RMT perspective encourages analysts to consider the range of exchange relationships through which specific SMOs, coalitions, issue campaigns, or event organizers mobilize resources. By contrast, the long debate among social movement analysts over the extent to which acquiring resources from external sources constrains the actions of SMOs has been cast very narrowly. From the RMT perspective sketched here, that debate focused almost exclusively on a single exchange relationship – monetary patronage. Yet, the typical SMO, much less SMI, simultaneously manages numerous exchange relationships. Each exchange relationship that makes resources accessible also carries a set of expectations and obligations between the parties, giving each relationship varying potential for social control. For example, the exchange relationship involved in an SMO aggregating small donations from a dispersed list of external conscience constituents will not constrain the group's actions as much as if they received the same amount of money through the monetary patronage of a single large donor, everything else being equal.

SEE ALSO: Collective Action; Collective Identity; New Social Movement Theory; Oligarchy and Organization; Political Opportunities; Political Process Theory; Social Change; Social Movement Organizations; Social Movements; Social Movements, Networks and; Social Movements, Relative Deprivation and

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restrictive covenants

Jerome Kruse

Restrictive covenants are deed restrictions on particular kinds of real estate. For example, they may restrict use of land in a subdivision to residential purposes only and define the maximum and minimum square footage of homes to be built. They might also place restrictions regarding construction of other buildings on the property, as well as control activities that take place within its boundaries, such as rentals. Real estate professionals argue that such legal restrictions give a development a more standard appearance and when enforced, protect property values. Racially restrictive covenants were legally enforceable contractual agreements between property owners and neighborhood associations that prohibited the sale, occupancy, or lease of property and land to certain ethnic and racial groups. While now unenforceable by the courts, racially restrictive covenants had been one of the primary ways by which access to housing had been blocked for racial and ethnic minorities.

During the long history of housing discrimination in the US there have been many ways by which access has been blocked for racial and religious minorities. In the past the major pillars of segregated neighborhoods such as racially restrictive covenants were *de jure* or legal. Since Fair Housing in 1968 even the publication of a real estate ad that indicates preferences, limitations, or other discrimination based on race, color, religion, sex, handicap, familial status, or national origin has been illegal. That is not to say that *de facto* segregation and discrimination no longer exists. "Gentlemen's agreements," informal networks, and other voluntary agreements between realtors and homeowners, and among owners themselves, make it possible for housing discrimination to continue. *De jure* discrimination which is not overtly racial or ethnic for example may also continue in the form of zoning, and in residential developments which are limited to specific incomes, ages, and family status. In this way builders and developers can also perpetuate *de facto* class and racial segregation through the use of non racial restrictive covenants.

Prior to the turn of the twentieth century, legal restrictions on the transfer of and sale of property to people of color were usually contained in individual deed restrictions. After 1910 the use of restrictive covenants became more widespread through the promotional efforts of large "community builders," local real estate boards and national real estate associations, especially the National Association of Real Estate Boards created in 1908. During the 1910s and 1920s, state courts upheld and enforced these racially restrictive covenants and argued that they did not violate the due process rights of non white citizens. Ironically, racial discrimination in housing was also supported by liberal reformers who equated black neighborhoods with crime and other social pathologies. Therefore, it was agreed that the presence of non white residents would decrease property values. Racially restrictive covenants were the primary mechanism used by the emerging real estate industry to create and maintain racially segregated neighborhoods in response to the Great Migration of rural Southern blacks to the urban North as well as the 1917 *Buchanan v. Warley* US Supreme Court ruling that made racial zoning ordinances unenforceable.

By 1920 it was unethical for real estate firms and land developers *not* to restrict certain ethnic groups, especially blacks, to specific areas of the city through the use of racially restrictive covenants. These stigmatizing ideas further contributed to the “racialization of urban space” by linking race and culturally specific behavior to place of residence in the city. It could be argued that the rise of the modern real estate industry was crucial in the creation of segregated neighborhoods beyond the South through the use and enforcement of racially restrictive covenants. Other significant groups who were victims of racially restrictive covenants were Asians, Jews, and Latinos. It was estimated that until 1948 racially restrictive covenants were in place in more than half the new subdivisions built in the US. As a result, these discriminatory practices influenced the shape of entire subdivisions and metropolitan areas.

Another powerful example of institutionalized racism was the Federal Housing Administration, established in 1934, which instructed in its manual that blacks were adverse influences on property values and therefore homes should not be federally insured unless there is a racially restrictive covenant. Although the agency removed the racially explicit language in the 1950s, it found expression by private insurers, as well as in codes of ethics for realtors, until the 1970s.

In 1948 the Supreme Court held that restrictive covenants were illegal, and more importantly, that government could not help enforce them (*Shelley v. Kraemer*). Shelley, an African American family, argued that racially restrictive covenants in deeds violated their constitutional rights. Specifically, the petitioner contended that the racially restrictive covenant violated the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment and the court ruled in its favor. However, it is important to note that the Supreme Court did not specifically renounce racially restrictive covenants. It held that the covenants alone did not violate constitutional rights. Rather, the judicial enforcement of racially restrictive covenants violated the petitioner’s rights because it was an action of the state. This decision helped other challenges as courts throughout the nation cited Shelley in racially restrictive covenant cases, so that today they are no longer legal.

SEE ALSO: Blockbusting; Hypersegregation; Redlining; Residential Segregation; Social Exclusion; Uneven Development; Urban Policy

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retirement

Angela M. O’Rand

Retirement has traditionally been defined as an age related and permanent transition from an income status based on employment to one based on transfers and assets at the end of the work career. The relationship of retirement to age has been defined more by state and market institutions that have provided age based incentives to exit the labor force than by the physical aging process itself. These institutions developed since the late nineteenth century to replace income from earnings with pensions and to support access to health care systems through public and private insurance systems, although they vary across countries in their eligibility criteria and share of public funding support. However, all countries now confront major fiscal challenges associated with population aging, economic restructuring at a global level, and

changing family and household arrangements that are motivating the reorganization of income and health support policies. As such, the institution of retirement is changing.

RETIREMENT IN US HISTORY

The major demographic trend over the twentieth century associated with these institutions in the US was the decline in labor force participation of the elderly, and especially of elderly men (Costa 1998). Early in the twentieth century, ill health and unemployment were factors in this decline. However, the spread of pensions across the public and private sectors contributed increasingly to older men's labor force exits. The passage of the Social Security Act in 1935 established 65 as the age of eligibility for worker retirement. Thirty years later, age 65 was the most common age of retirement. This legislation also accelerated the spread of private pensions whose benefit calculations – based on age, years of service, and salary levels – became strong inducements for pension covered workers to remain with their employers until eligibility for their private pensions or for both Social Security and their pensions. However, these private pensions were available in only the most advantaged labor markets, including manufacturing, communications and transportation, and financial and professional sectors. Service and trade sectors offered far less pension coverage.

By the 1960s two contrasting patterns associated with retirement emerged. The first was the “discovery” of poverty among the elderly; one in three elderly persons fell below the poverty line. Medicare, an array of community level programs under the rubric of the Administration on Aging, and early reduced benefit retirement at age 62 were implemented over the years following this discovery to respond directly to the needs of this subgroup. The Supplementary Security Income program was also enacted in 1972 to add a final safety net for the poorest retirees without eligibility for normal worker Social Security benefits.

Since the implementation of these programs, lower income groups comprised largely of minorities and women have tended to retire earlier (at age 62). Longitudinal studies of their retirement experiences have revealed that the

disadvantages among these groups accumulate after retirement, placing them at higher risks of poverty and institutionalization in old age (Haveman et al. 2003). Moreover, a significant portion of this group moves onto Social Security retirement benefits from disability rolls and from years of under employment and unemployment (Flippen & Tienda 2000). Current trends related to escalating medical costs and out of pocket expenses among the elderly have added to the deteriorating life conditions of these elderly groups.

The other pattern that was observable by the late 1960s was the emergence of a “pension elite”: a subgroup of retirees who benefited by the spread of generous pensions, some of which were linked to retiree health insurance. After 30 years of tenure with the same employer, pension covered workers began to retire earlier than the age of Social Security eligibility. Higher pension wealth coupled with access to early Social Security spawned the trend towards “early retirement,” which persisted among men until the 1990s. Figure 1 displays the trend towards acceptance of early (and reduced) worker benefits among men and women between 1970 and 2000. In 1970 a very small portion of retired men's benefits were being distributed at aged 62 (about 19 percent). This portion more than doubled by 1985, then rose slowly and finally reversed by 2000. Women have had higher rates of early retirement than men, historically. However, their pattern somewhat parallels men's: the trend in women's early retirement rates peaked in 1985 and has fallen since.

What happened between the 1980s and 1990s to slow (and perhaps reverse) these trends? First, structural changes that altered the relationship between employers and workers steadily accumulated over this period. Long term employment relationships, once the hallmark of industrial and related sectors, were abandoned and replaced by outsourcing, offshore labor markets, and contingent arrangements as global market competition and economic restructuring increased (Levy 1998). This shift was especially evident in new forms of pensions that were offered to replace the traditional defined benefit plans. The new plans moved the responsibility for pension saving to workers, whose sheltered contributions were allocated to a mix of stock, bond, real estate, and related holdings




Figure 1 Percent Social Security distributions to early retired worker benefits by gender between 1970 and 2000.

Source: Social Security Administration (2004) *Annual Statistical Supplement to the Social Security Bulletin*, Table 6.B5.

selected and managed by workers themselves. Pensions can no longer be expected to provide predictable lifetime benefits easily calculated from pre retirement earnings, years of service, and age. Rather, the pensions that now predominate in the workplace are account balances accumulated through workers' voluntary contributions and affected by their risk preferences for investing these accounts. The stock market bubble of the 1990s influenced workers' behaviors, leading them to exit work at the peak of the boom and to delay their retirements when the bust occurred (Gustman & Steinmeier 2002). Moreover, some scholars argue that this structural change will be pivotal in extending the trend away from earlier retirement among the baby boom cohorts born between 1946 and 1964 (Hughes and O'Rand 2004).

Second, demographic changes have amplified the impact of structural change. Chief among these changes are the extension of life expectancy, women's increased labor force participation over the life span, and changing family and living arrangements across age groups. Life expectancy in the US has increased more than 60 percent over the twentieth century, from 47 years in 1900 to 77 years in 2000. A significant trend underlying these aggregate figures is the

more rapid growth of those aged 85 and older, termed the "oldest old" and comprised primarily of single women (Himes 2001). Consequently, the number of years between early and normal retirement and average life expectancy are increasing and rapidly feeding concerns about the future fiscal health of pension and health insurance systems to support growing dependency.

Accompanying these life expectancy projections are increases in the heterogeneity and inequality of the older population. Ethnic, class, and gender differences stratify the older population to be among the most unequal in advanced industrial societies. Married couples persist as the most advantaged in income and benefit receipt, while single individuals (especially divorced and widowed women) are at high risk of poverty, in part as a result of their more limited earnings histories and in part as a result of pension policies that privilege traditional marriage and penalize nontraditional living arrangements. The demographic diversity of the baby boom cohorts in these regards (i.e., higher levels of income inequality, higher rates of divorce, and greater ethnic heterogeneity than earlier cohorts) have combined with structural changes in the workplace and reforms of the

Social Security Act to alter future patterns of retirement in ways that will increase the variability in retirement timing with such diverse patterns as the delay of final labor force exits or the combination of retirement with continued labor force participation (Hughes & O'Rand 2004).

CROSS NATIONAL PATTERNS

Other advanced industrial societies have preceded the US in both population aging and early retirement. Fertility rates decreased in Europe earlier than in the US. In addition, efforts to control the age composition of the labor force to make more room for younger workers encouraged early retirement in European countries (Kohli et al. 1991). These trends in Europe are challenging their more publicly based pension and health insurance systems (Esping Andersen 1999). At the same time, less advanced countries are also facing population aging and are being forced to confront the challenges of population aging and global restructuring in the development of their policies.

Most advanced countries have been proposing and/or implementing changes in their policies in order to discourage early retirement

behaviors. Figure 2 compares the differences between average life expectancy and statutory early retirement ages for workers in six countries as of 2002. The disparities between life expectancy and the earliest pensionable age of men and women varied slightly from country to country. The gender differences in life expectancy were generally consistent, but gender specific versus gender neutral policies related to retirement timing varied. In the case of the US, age 62 is the earliest pensionable age for all workers and 65 the normal age – at least until the baby boom cohorts begin to retire; then full benefits will be extended to age 66 for the early boomer cohorts and continue to shift upward to age 67 for the later boomers and younger cohorts. In addition, the levels of early benefits at age 62 will be cut for these groups to discourage early retirement further.

Other countries are shifting their gender related policies and also changing tax and benefit schedules. The United Kingdom and Germany have adopted gender neutral policies since 2002, to be implemented over the future, that raise statutory retirement for all to age 65 with no earlier option for future cohorts. Austria and Japan have retained early retirement options, but made full retirement the same for women and men at age 65. And Sweden, which has been among the most socially democratic




Figure 2 Comparison of early retirement age to life expectancy by gender across six countries.

Sources: Life expectancy data from the Population and Statistics Divisions of the UN Secretariat (unstats.un.org/unsd/demographic/socials/health.htm). Pension data from Social Security Administration (2002).

welfare systems, has shifted towards policies to discourage early retirement by linking benefits to individual contribution levels, while still retaining gender neutral early and late age thresholds (Social Security Administration 2002).

In short, retirement policy is on the table throughout the world (Social Security Administration 2002). Some developing countries (like Spain and China) have moved to gender neutral policies, while others (like Brazil) have not. Key concerns of these countries are centered on economic development and the inclusion of larger proportions of their populations in the formal economy. But above and beyond economic development issues, the demographic pressures of population aging and the changing roles of women in the marketplace are relevant to the development of retirement policies.

SEE ALSO: Aging, Demography of; Aging and Social Policy; Aging and Work Performance; Gender, Aging and; Retirement Communities

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retirement communities

Gordon Streib

Retirement communities are residential areas designated by federal law requiring, for the purpose of excluding younger residents, that at least 80 percent of their occupied dwelling units must have at least one person of 55 years of age or older living there, and that the communities must publish and follow policies and procedures that demonstrate an intent to be 55 and older housing. This legal definition does not describe the wide range of communities housing older persons. There are two major kinds of retirement communities: (1) Planned Leisure Oriented Retirement Communities, and (2) Continuing Care Retirement Communities (CCRCs). A third type is called Naturally Occurring Retirement Communities. These do not need to meet the precise legal requirements, but their age dense populations qualify them as a type of retirement community. In addition, public housing projects primarily restricted to low income older persons are mostly for retirees, although some projects permit younger disabled persons to live there.

Demographic and political economic social forces have shaped the context for retirement communities. The gradual increase in life expectancy in the US and the related increase in the older population has provided the base for specialized housing of many varieties. The political economic factors are complex and provide basic economic security for many older persons. The economic fundamentals include public programs, notably Social Security and Medicare, public and private pension plans, plus savings and a high amount of home ownership. The

latter is important for those older persons who move permanently to a retirement community and also for seasonal residents ("Snow Birds") who have a second home in the Sunbelt.

The major components of the retirement housing industry involve available land and real estate developers who recognize there is a market for specialized housing for older persons. The high amount of occupational and residential mobility experienced by many Americans makes them amenable to both seasonal and permanent moves to warmer climates.

Retirement communities are labeled correctly because the overwhelming majority of residents have left the labor force. The possibility of an early retirement made possible by Social Security has undoubtedly added to the interest in retirement community living. The exploration of residing in a new setting leads many older persons to consider the services and amenities provided by developers for this new "leisure class."

The retirement community industry has grown and changed over the past half century. After World War II mobile home parks and modest homes (both for rent and for purchase) developed for the growing cohort of retirees. Over time these early communities have provided very economical housing for the lower end of the retirement community market. In recent years the kind of housing, the amenities, the services, and the ambience have become more upscale. Some older communities have now become economically stratified. In the older growing communities, like the Sun Cities, neighborhood stratification can be easily identified by the type of housing, lot size, and adjacent leisure facilities. However, it must be noted that in these larger communities there is a broad array of programs and activities that involve residents with a wide range of income. Some communities are income differentiated, but that is not always the case in large, older, class integrated communities.

CCRCs are a burgeoning aspect of the industry involving both profit and not for profit sponsorship. The CCRCs developed from the concept of life care or continuum of care that provides a full range of services to meet changing needs as older persons become functionally impaired. A CCRC usually has three levels of living: independent housing, assisted living,

and 24 hour nursing care. The leadership for CCRCs emerged primarily from the not for profit sector as some religiously affiliated homes adapted services to changing needs. Providing housing and care for members, clergy, and their widows has a long history in different religious traditions. The typical CCRC today is controlled by a complex set of federal and state regulations to protect residents who usually must pay a sizable up front fee in addition to monthly service charges.

Another growing segment of the industry is retirement communities of various kinds that are now being built in or near major metropolitan areas. These communities may be either leisure oriented or CCRCs and often serve higher income persons who choose to remain in the area where they have lived in order to continue contact with family, kin, and friends, and also to enjoy the cultural, social, and recreational opportunities that are available in metropolitan areas.

CCRCs affiliated with universities are also a growing part of the market. Signed agreements spell out the reciprocal arrangements in which schools and colleges (e.g., nursing, physical education, music) have staff and students working at or studying the living environment of the CCRC. The residents have opportunities to attend programs, lectures, musical events, galleries, or sports events at the affiliated university.

Retirement communities may be located in terms of theory and research in the fields of sociology and gerontology. The proliferation of specialties in these fields and the complexities of modern society result in a diffused agenda. There is an opportunity for integration of theoretical approaches and research methods. As one surveys sociology and gerontology, one notes different models, paradigms, and perspectives. Various qualitative and quantitative methods are adapted and employed, but most research has been descriptive.

A theoretical grounding for studying age dense communities based on Durkheim's concept of social integration, as well as the later concept of age segregation derived from the racial integration segregation arguments, was developed by social gerontologists. Although some earlier writers viewed the age segregation inherent in retirement communities in a negative light, Rosow (1967) and Osgood (1982)

provided theoretical and empirical support for their socially integrating capacities.

A useful orientation to age dense housing in general and specifically to retirement communities is the work of Charles Lindblom (1977): "In all the political systems of the world much of politics is economic, and most economics is political" (p. 8). This orientation has been adapted to studying the linkages of retirement communities to local, state, and national political and market structures. Political economic embeddedness provides the context for retirement communities with attention to the specifics of locality, and research has shown that retirement communities generally have a positive economic impact on the surrounding area.

Another theoretical orientation is socio historical or evolutionary. Although retirement communities are of recent historical vintage in the US, there are older evolutionary developments in some European countries. Great Britain and the Scandinavian countries have evolved unique retirement communities that are contextually congruent with their cultures and climates. Social democracies have been adaptable and more systematic in meeting the housing needs of older persons than the market driven US.

Suzanne Keller (2003: 215) concludes her 30 year study of a planned community reflecting on "the territorial community as an anchor of human existence." Her research is based on a nuanced adaptation of community (*Gemeinschaft*) and society (*Gesellschaft*) originated by Ferdinand Tönnies. The concepts are analytically distinct, but in real life they interact, and the boundaries must be determined empirically in retirement communities.

Much research has shown that the residents of retirement communities are overwhelmingly satisfied with their choice of this living environment. Research on conflict in retirement communities, however, indicates that a few residents view participation in community conflict as a form of "recreation." Conflict is socially constructed by a few individuals and some groups. Most of the residents stay out of community disagreements or stay on the margins. Unless their economic interests or basic style of life are threatened, or a major change is involved, the residents generally will attempt to avoid situations resulting in conflict. Residents generally are sensitive and concerned that they not

give offense. Conflict with administration is minimized if the management is perceived as benign. Democratic procedures are valued, but decision making is usually left in the hands of management.

A considerable literature on retirement communities has concentrated on the internal structure and activities that take place. There are persons who practice an active lifestyle and they are a visible minority who are highlighted for marketing goals. A less visible majority practices a more sheltered and passive lifestyle, with television and reading occupying their time. CCRCs provide some transportation services for their residents, but most retirement communities expect that residents will drive a car. When physical limitations make driving difficult, the loss of independence is felt keenly, although caring neighbors may offer help. Travel to places outside the community to shop or visit family and friends provides an occasional break for many.

Activities are an important, opportunistic way to create new acquaintances and friendships. Some relationships could be described as friendship with social distance. Participation in the life of the community is a way to avoid being marginalized. Personality and sociability skills are important factors in participating and making new friends. Widows, widowers, singles, and newcomers may live on the margin unless they exercise some initiative. The aging in place of the populations evolves slowly into a decline in community participation and the activists are challenged to find new leadership and participants for programs.

Theoretical ideas derived from sociology of consumption could provide future research directions for students of retirement communities. Older persons deciding to move are making decisions that go beyond buying a home because the structure and functions of retirement communities are different from the typical housing subdivision. The prospective residents are concerned not only with costs, quality, and location, but also with lifestyle, services, amenities, safety, and community spirit. Some of these aspects may be involved in the purchase or renting of a home by younger persons, but the potential retirement community residents are asking new questions related to community involvement from an older person's perspective.

Rational choice may enter the consumer's decision making in different ways because the final choice is not a housing move related to employment, and the time pressures are less stringent. The prospective retiree often personally visits many communities for several years before deciding on his or her choice. Family relationships, finances, legacies, and health status are involved in intricate ways. Moving to a CCRC considerably reduces dependency on children, kin, or friends. However, rational choice theory does not explain why so many older persons do not choose to move to a retirement community. Only about 5 percent finally move. Economic considerations are only part of the answer, for ageism may be more important. Some older persons are repelled by the idea of living in an age dense community. How a person defines his or her personal aging requires research in terms of consumer theory.

The future direction of retirement communities in terms of theory, research, and methodology lies in part in the adaptation of perspectives outlined above. However, the future sociology of retirement communities will also be strongly influenced by the realities of the political economic context and on how incoming cohorts (e.g., baby boomers) individually and collectively make decisions about home ownership, financial security, migration patterns, and residential preferences. The Golden Age of Retirement their parents experienced will probably be an uncertain template for their decision making.

SEE ALSO: Aging, Demography of; Friendship During the Later Years; Retirement

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revolutions

John Foran

Ever since the French Revolution of 1789, revolutions have helped define the modern age. Though rare events, they have been associated with the emergence of, and transitions to, democracy, capitalism, and socialism. They are significant as often inspiring, human directed attempts to refashion the world for the better; they have also typically fallen far short of the goals of their makers. Their complexity has challenged scholars and revolutionaries alike – just as consequences have been unforeseen and outcomes uncontrollable by actors, prediction has proven next to impossible for scholars, and even the more modest goal of explanation has opened up extensive debates about the causes, makers, and outcomes of revolutions.

Currently, the study of revolutions has flowed into ever more ambitious theoretical syntheses, comparative studies, and new topics, including the roles played by emotions, culture, race/ethnicity, gender, and social class. As the world enters further into the twenty first century and the era of globalization, the issue of

the continued relevance of revolutions, and the possibility that they are changing in nature, will challenge the sociological imaginations of some of the best students of social change, as well as pose crucial tasks for the practical application of strategies of radical social change among activists seeking solutions to some of the world's most acute social problems.

DEFINITIONS AND METHODS OF STUDY

Among many definitions of *social revolutions*, or the great revolutions of history, Theda Skocpol's remains the most widely cited and in many ways is still unsurpassed: "Social revolutions are rapid, basic transformations of a society's state and class structures; and they are accompanied and in part carried through by class based revolts from below" (1979: 4). This definition stresses the conjuncture of deep political and socioeconomic change with the mass participation of social forces. It has the virtue of leaving violence – a commonsense element of revolutionary change – to the side, allowing us to consider non violent paths to revolution, as in Chile 1970, Iran 1979, Eastern Europe 1989, and in Chiapas since 1994. It does not specify how much social change qualifies an event as a social revolution, nor how rapidly the process must occur, which means that scholars will argue over whether particular cases merit inclusion.

We can also use this definition to distinguish the more thorough going social revolutions of France 1789, Mexico 1910, Russia 1917, China 1949, Cuba 1958, and Iran 1979 from *political revolutions*, where the holders of state power change through mass participation but without deep social transformation, such as the "People's Power" movement that toppled Ferdinand Marcos in the Philippines in 1986, the fall of dictators like Mobutu in Zaire in 1996 and Duvalier in Haiti in 1986, the collapse of the Manchu dynasty in China in 1911, and the end of apartheid in South Africa in 1994. Mass participation by revolutionaries that fails to change either government or social structure is classified as a *failed or attempted revolution*; examples include El Salvador, Guatemala, and Peru in the 1980s, or China's Tiananmen Square uprising in 1989. When power is seized by the

army or an elite movement and then turned somewhat surprisingly in the direction of radical social transformation, we speak of a *revolution from above*, such as those of the 1868–73 Meiji Restoration in Japan, Atatürk in 1920s and 1930s Turkey, Nasser in 1952 Egypt, or the revolutionary armed forces of Peru between 1968 and 1975.

Two other sets of cases also qualify as social revolutions: one set consists of the *anti colonial* revolutionary movements that achieved relatively deep social change in Algeria in the 1950s, Angola, Mozambique, and Zimbabwe in the 1970s, and Vietnam's long struggle for independence from 1945 to 1975. The main difference of these cases when compared with the classical social revolutions is the overthrow not of an internal regime but of a colonial power – France, Portugal, England, or (indirectly in Vietnam) the United States. Many such movements of national liberation do not, however, result in the degree of social transformation that would earn them the title of social revolution, as in most of Africa after World War II, or in India in 1947. A final set of cases might be termed *reversed revolutions*, instances of social revolution where revolutionaries achieved power and embarked on a process of social transformation but could not hold onto that power more than a few years, usually falling to a combination of external intervention and its internal right wing and military allies, as with Iran from 1951 to 1953, Guatemala 1944–54, and Chile's elected socialist government from 1970 to 1973, or Nicaragua's Sandinistas who governed from 1979 to 1991 when they lost elections, and Grenada's New Jewel Movement which overthrew the dictator Eric Gairy in 1979 but self destructed in a power struggle that opened the door to US invasion in 1983.

These typologies are important for distinguishing different phenomena that can be grouped under the general rubric of revolutions. For most sociologists of revolution, the focus has been on the set of fewer than 20 instances of social revolution, whether these be classical, anti colonial, or reversed revolutions. It is noteworthy that with the exceptions of France, Russia, and Eastern Europe, all the rest have occurred in the third world regions of Latin America, Africa, Asia, and the Middle East, with the most in any one region coming from

Latin America. The reasons for this will be explored below.

The methods of studying such complex phenomena are diverse: we have many fine archival based histories, some excellent ethnographic based work, and a few notable quantitative studies (Paige 1975; Goldstone 1991), but leaving aside single case studies, the vast majority of sociological work on revolutions has been comparative historical in nature, with sets of cases ranging from two or three to several dozen, and sources ranging from archival and other primary documents to the secondary scholarship of historians and social scientists. The most common methodologies for comparing cases have been John Stuart Mill's methods of agreement and difference, brought into the study of revolutions by Skocpol (1979), and more recently Boolean or qualitative comparative analysis, as developed by Charles Ragin (1987) and first used by Timothy Wickham Crowley (1992), which is suitable for studies involving more than a half dozen cases. Some studies combine these methods with each other, and with such approaches as regional/ecological analysis, demography, content analysis, or interviewing. A younger generation of scholars is doing more intensive fieldwork, inspired by new theories of agency, culture, and race, class, and gender.

A BRIEF HISTORY OF THEORIZING ABOUT THE CAUSES OF REVOLUTIONS

Given the multiple possible determinants of these rare, large scale events, it should come as no surprise that theories about their causes have been offered by successive generations of historians and social scientists, and that there has never been general agreement among them. The French Revolution put this question on the agenda, and one of its first and most insightful interpreters was Alexis de Tocqueville, writing 70 years later, who noted the importance of the state and elites, village autonomy, and ideology in bringing about the revolution, arguing that the moment of greatest danger for an autocratic regime was when it started granting reforms, for this only encouraged people to demand more: "For it is not always when things are going from bad to worse that revolutions break out. On the

contrary, it oftener happens that when a people which has put up with an oppressive rule over a long period without protest suddenly finds the government relaxing its pressure, it takes up arms against it" (Tocqueville 1955 [1856]: 176).

Another influential theorist of the French Revolution was Karl Marx, who stressed the role played by class struggles as structured by the mode of production (the unequal social relations that arise from a particular labor process) found in societies undergoing economic transition. For Marx, the key to understanding revolution was the tensions generated by vast economic transformations, resolved only when exploited social classes organized to take possession of political power. Thus the French Revolution as well as the earlier English Civil War (1640–88) were considered products of the rise of capitalist economic forms in the midst of feudal societies, and their success spelled the end of feudalism and led to the consolidation of capitalism in the two countries.

The Marxian idea of a socialist revolution was first enacted in Russia in 1917, and that experience gave powerful impetus to one of its organizers, Leon Trotsky, to offer his own theory of its causes. Trotsky lays emphasis on what he calls the peculiarities of Russia's development to explain the paradox of why a largely peasant society was the first to have a working class revolution, making use of a concept called "combined and uneven development," that is, the uneasy mixture of older and more recent forms of social organization, such as the vestiges of feudalism and the emergence of large scale factory production, respectively. He also identifies elements which would become popular much later in the works of Skocpol and other theorists who lay great emphasis on the state: "In the historic conditions which formed Russia, her economy, her classes, her State, in the action upon her of other states, we ought to be able to find the premises [or causes] both of the February revolution and of the October revolution which replaced it" (1959 [1930]: xii). In another memorable line, he anticipates the latest wave of interest in human agency, warning: "Let us not forget that revolutions are accomplished through people, though they be nameless" (1959 [1930]: 249).

Scholarly theorizing in a formal sense took wing in the 1920s and 1930s when comparative historians such as L. P. Edwards (*The Natural*

History of Revolutions, 1927), Crane Brinton (*The Anatomy of Revolution*, 1938), and G. S. Pettee (*The Process of Revolution*, 1938) searched for common patterns among such major revolutions as the French, American, English, and Russian cases. They developed a “natural history” of revolutions to describe their course, emphasizing a sequence of events that started when intellectuals cease supporting the regime, forcing the state to undertake reforms in the face of a crisis it cannot resolve, thus opening a space for a revolutionary coalition to come to power, which in its turn fragments as first moderate reformers are overturned by radicals who often take extreme measures to implement their program, and who in their turn yield power to military leaders before more moderate pragmatic leaders once more return to power.

More descriptive than explanatory, the natural history school led subsequent social scientists in the 1960s to develop models derived from the then dominant paradigm in US sociology of Parsonian structural functionalism, and its relative, modernization theory. The aim of Ted Robert Gurr (*Why Men Rebel*, 1970) and James Davies (1962) was to develop theories of political violence based on aggregate psychological states, notably relative deprivation, a thesis that echoes Tocqueville in arguing that regimes were most vulnerable when a period of growing prosperity raises people’s expectations for improvements in their lives, but leads instead to revolt when these expectations are not met. As structural functionalists, Neil Smelser (*Theory of Collective Behavior*, 1962) and Chalmers Johnson (*Revolutionary Change*, 1966) looked for imbalances in the political, economic, or cultural subsystems (arrangements) of a society which disoriented people and made them more prone to embrace radical ideologies. While critics have found these theories wanting because of the difficulty of measuring such aggregate psychological states or the pitfalls of tautological reasoning in knowing whether structural subsystems are in disequilibrium, the value of these approaches lies in their attention to human agency and culture.

This was definitely not the emphasis of a new generation of theorists in the 1970s and after led by Theda Skocpol, probably the single most influential scholar of revolutions, who insisted that “Revolutions are not made; they

come” (1979: 17). She argued that revolutions should be studied in terms of the relations between nations, between the state and the economy, and between social classes, and applied this structural perspective to the French, Russian, and Chinese revolutions, where a common pattern emerged: political crises arose when the state could not meet external military or economic challenges because of a limited agricultural base. In France, foreign wars led to fiscal crisis and efforts to tax nobles led to elite revolts; peasants then took advantage of the crisis and were able to mobilize due to communal solidarity structures. In Russia, collapse in World War I led to state crisis; in China the Japanese invasion and World War II created an opportunity.

Charles Tilly (*From Mobilization to Revolution*, 1978) took the renewed interest in the political causes of revolution in another direction by advancing a “resource mobilization” perspective that draws attention to the organizational and other resources available to contending groups (states, elites, challengers). More recently, he and collaborators Doug McAdam and Sidney Tarrow have elaborated a political process theory stressing the role of such factors as broad socioeconomic processes, expanded political opportunities, and “cognitive liberation frames,” the ideas that motivate people into action (McAdam et al. 1996).

Skocpol’s emphasis on the state has been extended by Jeff Goodwin (2000), who finds that repressive dictatorships and colonial regimes were most vulnerable to revolutionary challenge across the third world after World War II, a model he extends to the Eastern European revolutions of 1989. Jack Goldstone (1991) used a state centered approach, combined with a demographic analysis of blocked opportunities for marginal elites, to explain why states broke down in early modern Europe and Asia. Tim Wickham Crowley (1992) also followed in Skocpol’s footsteps with a structuralist theory of Latin American revolutions looking at the repressive state type he terms “mafia-cracies,” the ability of guerrillas to attract peasant support, and the absence of intervention from outside to prevent revolutions from coming to power in Cuba and Nicaragua.

As critiques of state centered structuralism’s one sided approach to revolutions emerged in the 1990s, a renewed interest in culture,

agency, and ideas came to the fore, in the work of Eric Selbin (1999) and others who insisted that structural factors could not by themselves bring revolutions to power in the absence of broad coalitions of motivated actors. A new and growing group of theorists, sometimes referred to as the “fourth generation” of scholars of revolution, has attempted to integrate structure and agency, and the political, economic, and cultural dimensions of causality, in a variety of multicausal models of revolution that draw on the insights of many of the theorists who preceded them. An early exemplar is John Walton (1984), whose study of failed revolutions in the Philippines, Colombia, and Kenya takes into account uneven economic development, the role of the state, cultural nationalism, and an economic downturn. Farideh Farhi’s (1990) study of Iran and Nicaragua combined Skocpol’s emphasis on the state and social structure with a Gramscian analysis of ideology. In a comparative study that covers Eastern Europe, China, Vietnam, Cuba, Nicaragua, Iran, and South Africa, James DeFronzo proposes a model of five factors, including mass frustration, dissident elites, “unifying motivations,” a crisis of the state, and “a permissive or tolerant world context” (1991: 10). Misagh Parsa’s (2000) study of Iran, Nicaragua, and the Philippines integrates economic factors (particularly the degree of state intervention in the economy) with the ideology of state challengers and the political vulnerabilities of repressive regimes. John Foran’s (2005) study of three dozen third world revolutions synthesizes the effects of dependent development, the vulnerabilities of both repressive, exclusionary states and truly open democratic polities which may permit the left to come to power through elections (as in Chile in 1970), political cultures of opposition, an economic downturn, and a world systemic opening, referring to the disruption of supportive ties between the regime and first world powers.

The consuming question, then, of what particular combination of causes is most likely to explain revolutionary success and failure has produced a number of suggestive answers, but is still not settled. What we do know is that a balance must be sought between structure and agency, internal and external factors, and the proper weight and roles of economic, political,

and cultural causes must be addressed. This seems a fitting challenge for those who wish to contribute to the theorizing sketched in above.

THE ISSUE OF ACTORS

A second set of debates revolves around the question of who, precisely, makes revolutions, and why. Until recently, the answer has usually been couched in terms of social class, with some stressing a single key class: classically, for Marx, industrial workers; more recent candidates have been peasants (Wolf 1969), or even, to some degree, elites. Others have seen this in terms of peasants or workers providing the mass base of revolutions plus dissident intellectuals, including students, playing leadership roles. Much recent work has identified the significance of broad coalitions of actors, since it requires the collaboration of many social forces to overthrow an absolutist monarchy, an entrenched dictator, or a colonial occupier, or to elect a radical government where the system is open enough to permit this (among others, see Parsa 2000). John Foran (2005 and in earlier work) has spoken of this kind of tactical alliance of lower, middle, and even upper class elements as a multiclass populist coalition, since it pits actors drawn from all social classes, representing “the people,” and each contributing its own part to the making of a revolution, against the government and its dwindling set of supporters. This kind of alliance has been prominent in all the great revolutions of the twentieth century, although the degree to which a given percentage of the population has participated actively has varied across cases.

Recent work on the roles of women and diverse ethnic and racial groups in the making of revolution has forced consideration of what we might call the “race/class/gender” dimensions of such populist alliances. Karen Kampwirth (2002) and Julie Shayne (2004) have done much to sensitize us to the crucial and complex ways in which revolutions have been shaped by the contributions of women. Kampwirth’s study of Latin American cases accounts for the increasing mobilization of women through an astute synthesis of personal factors such as birth order for daughters, family traditions of resistance, access to school, and age cohort with such

cultural developments as the rise of liberation theology, and structural causes including male work migration and land concentration. Shayne's work on a similar set of cases has given us the concept of women as "gendered revolutionary bridges" who use the advantages of their closeness to the population and relatively less threatening appearances for bringing "ordinary" people into the ranks of revolution in a variety of capacities crucial for success in protracted guerrilla and civil wars. Such roles can be instrumental (male revolutionaries making use of women's unique abilities for their own purposes) or strategic (women deploying their femininity consciously in the cause of revolution), and they may result in feminist outcomes where women organize around their own issues either during or after the revolution.

Race has been studied far less, yet it too is now coming into clearer focus as a significant factor in the rise and fall of revolutions. The historical record shows people of color at the forefront of some of the great revolutions, such as the Haitian Revolution around 1800, in complex, more tenuous alliances with whiter revolutionaries as in the Mexican or Cuban cases, and in mixed roles in such revolutions as Nicaragua's, where the Sandinistas possessed significant indigenous support in certain cities on the Pacific coast but alienated the English speaking Afro Nicaraguan communities of the Atlantic coast (see Foran et al. 1997 and McAuley 1997 for consideration of these cases). The growing weight of indigenous revolutionaries has been marked across Latin America since the 1980s, and in the twenty first century it has become preponderant in the various struggles in Bolivia, Ecuador, and most dramatically in the Zapatista insurgency in Chiapas, which has centered demands for indigenous rights and autonomy.

This raises the question of why people, often at great personal risk, choose to become involved in revolutions that shatter the fabric of their everyday routines. Perhaps the most common view is that "misery breeds revolt" – that poverty and oppression and exploitation lead people to participate in revolution. While this may well be true in some cases, and is possibly at the root of virtually all revolutions to some degree, it has to be pointed out that given societies produce different reactions to situations of poverty and oppression. Sometimes people do not feel that

revolt is possible, sometimes they protest in more private ways, or only in their local areas. If poverty alone caused revolutions, we would see more revolutions than we have in the third world. While the existence of exploitation may be necessary to impel many groups into revolutions, it does not seem to be sufficient by itself. This "why" question has been addressed by scholars whose interests lie in the intersection of culture and agency. Eric Selbin (1997) has laid stress upon collective memories – the stories, folk tales, songs, plays, myths, and symbols that circulate in societies about past or present resistance to oppression – as indispensable to the making of revolutions, indeed, turning Skocpol's aphorism on its head: revolutions do not come, they are made by people. Jean Pierre Reed and John Foran (2002) have developed the concept of "political cultures of opposition" to suggest the connections among people's lived and shared experiences of political and economic oppression, the collective memories identified by Selbin, revolutionary ideologies such as socialism and liberation theology, and the networks that draw these together. Sometimes a single powerful political culture is forged, as with Sandinismo in the Nicaraguan Revolution; at other times, diverse political cultures appeal to different strata in society as in the Iranian Revolution, where several strands of Islam and secular political cultures brought particular groups to the demonstrations that toppled the shah. Emotions are now being recognized as further factors that compel people to participate in revolutions. All of this work has strengthened what we know about who makes revolutions, and why, opening the way for future scholars to bring fresh energy to this question.

THE OUTCOMES OF REVOLUTIONS

With all of the attention that has been lavished on the causes of revolutions, it is surprising indeed that relatively little systematic theorizing or comparative study has been done on their outcomes. A few pointers and leads may be advanced here, with much work ahead for others.

In assessing the positive side of revolutionary outcomes, Theda Skocpol has noted that the great revolutions of France, Russia, and China

succeeded in terms of creating stronger, more centralized states capable of competing economically with their main rivals than had the pre-revolutionary monarchies in each case. Many of the twentieth century's third world revolutions have delivered a degree of material improvement in people's lives, at least for a time, as in Chile and Nicaragua.

Cuba in particular, the longest lived revolutionary society on the planet, has registered some impressive gains that are remarkable and unprecedented in the history of revolutions: unemployment was virtually wiped out; income distribution became the fairest in Latin America; high quality medical care and education through the university level were afforded the population at no cost. Cubans came to consume more food on the average than citizens anywhere in Latin America except Argentina; infant mortality fell to 6.2 per thousand, compared with 126.9 in Haiti, and was lower than the 18.1 per thousand among African Americans in the US. After 1958, life expectancy rose from 57 years to over 77 years.

But considered from the viewpoint of meeting the expectations they have unleashed about human liberation, the outcomes of revolutions to date have generally been disappointing in nature. The Russian Revolution achieved heavy industrialization and the creation of a military that proved capable of contributing massively to the defeat of Nazi Germany in World War II, but devolved into the murderous excesses of Stalin and ultimately the sclerosis of the communist state, which fell to a popular reform movement in 1989–91. The 1949 Chinese Revolution raised the living standards and dignity of the peasant majority tremendously, but went through many changes of political and economic direction under Mao, leading to much persecution before the Communist Party moved away from socialism altogether in the 1980s while retaining its own unquestioned power. In Cuba, Fidel Castro held onto power unchallenged for almost 50 years, during which many basic freedoms – of the press, of expression, of religion, of sexual orientation, and of party and trade union organization – were rigorously controlled by the state. Other revolutions, more promising in terms of a potential for democratically directed change, have ended in foreign intervention: Nicaragua, Chile, and a host of others. For Val

Moghadam (1997), all modern revolutions have featured either a patriarchal outcome for women which returns them to traditional family roles, as in France and Iran, or, in the case of the socialist revolutions, fallen short of real emancipation for women. The same mixed results have been experienced by people of color and ethnic minorities across many revolutions. Looking at the overall record, one might ask whether there is some kind of inevitable tradeoff between economic gains and political rights after a revolution, with virtually no case having been able to deliver both.

What might explain these disappointing, or at best, highly mixed outcomes? Two key ideas may be suggested: the pressure put on revolutionary societies by powerful external enemies (in most cases in Latin America and the Middle East, the United States has opposed and tried, with some notable successes, to reverse revolutions), compounding and compounded by the fragmentation of the broad coalitions that are required to bring about revolutions. Such coalitions, so effective in opposing the military power of the state, have typically broken into competing factions after taking power themselves. This is logical, given the differing interests and political cultures that the diverse social groups involved may possess. This process narrows the scope for democratic participation, as one faction typically gains the upper hand, often with much bloodshed, as in Iran. When foreign intervention or wars follow the seizure of power, this further concentrates authority in the state and military and is used to justify curtailment of social and political justice. This in turn makes economic improvements harder to realize, already difficult in the poorer, dependent societies where most revolutions have occurred (these arguments are found in Foran & Goodwin 1993).

THE FUTURE OF REVOLUTIONS

All of these topics will likely be explored by the next generation of scholars, as they continue the search for a grand synthesis of economics, politics, and culture, get deeper into the race/class/gender stories of revolutionary actors, and attempt to understand outcomes with more sophistication. The study of revolutions offers

great scope for the development of ideas and theories about all of these matters, touching on some of the most fundamental and seemingly intractable problems of understanding how societies are structured and how they change.

A final dimension to this discussion must be the future of revolutions themselves. The end of the Cold War, the inexorable rise of globalization, and the crushing turning points of September 11, 2001 and the 2003 US invasion of Iraq all raise questions about where revolutions are heading. The Cold War removed the hand of the Soviet Union from the revolutionary equation, with mixed consequences: the USSR could no longer subsidize the Cuban Revolution or provide aid and cover to would be socialist revolutionaries, but its fall also freed a space for creative new political cultures drawing on more democratic and non violent means of change to emerge, and it removed one of the main explicit justifications of US intervention against revolutions in the third world.

Globalization followed quickly on the heels of the end of the Cold War, and it, too, has deeply impacted world politics in economic, political, and cultural terms. It increasingly appears that the neoliberal capitalist globalization favored by both transnational corporations and institutions like the World Trade Organization, the International Monetary Fund, and the World Bank creates new forms of dependency, inequality, and poverty that may fuel national revolutions. A new global movement for change – the global justice movement – has also arisen to bring together activists from across the globe into “a movement of movements” encompassing demands for deep economic reform, the expansion of political and human rights, gender and racial justice, and efforts to mitigate the looming perils of global climate change and the coming shortages of fossil fuels. The rise of the Internet and other communications technologies has both aided this movement and at the same time given new tools for governments’ efforts to contain them. The global justice movement’s diversity, size, and decentralization present similar opportunities and challenges, raising the possibility of global forms of revolution on the one hand, and on the other presenting daunting problems of organizing its many constituent parts into an effective vehicle for deep social change. The World Social Forum

gatherings held in Brazil and India from the year 2001 on have provided spaces for sharing experiences and working toward a common set of goals and strategies. The potential of this movement to counter the juggernaut of capitalist globalization remains unclear, and offers a vital research agenda for those interested in the future of revolutions.

A more localized revolutionary movement that has been shaped by the end of the Cold War and driven in part by the impact of neoliberal globalization is that of the Zapatistas. Since 1994, this movement has attempted to achieve indigenous rights in Chiapas and elsewhere in Mexico, to expand popular participation throughout the country, and to reject the prevailing national and global models of capitalist development in favor of new forms of community and economy that have inspired activists well beyond Mexico. These goals have been explicitly framed in terms of *not* taking state power in any direct sense, either through elections or armed struggle, but rather opening up spaces throughout society for democratic discussion of, and work toward, their goals. The end of the 70 year reign of the ironically named Party of the Institutionalized Revolution in 2000 was due in part to the Zapatistas’ principled critiques. What the movement can ultimately achieve will only become more apparent as time passes; meanwhile, there are rich lessons to be learned by scholars from the Zapatista experiment.

After the terrorist attacks on the World Trade Center in New York and the Pentagon in Washington on September 11, 2001, the attempt of the US Bush administration to create a new type of global war against Islamic terrorism also altered the picture for the future. Upsetting the smooth operation of globalization from above by its militarized approach to foreign policy in Iraq has made for a more unstable US and global economy and increased the risks of terrorist attacks on the West, with uncertain implications for the revolutions of the future, which scholars must assess.

There may well continue to be national revolutions since the conditions that fuel and enable them do not seem to be disappearing. These may take democratic routes to power through elections, especially in Latin America, where radical reformers came to power in Brazil, Venezuela, and Uruguay in the first years of

the twenty first century. Whether such peaceful strategies can bring about deep and lasting social change on a national basis given the constraints posed by globalization remains to be seen. The Zapatistas in Chiapas offer a non violent, non electoral path to deep social transformation and a less authoritarian, more inclusive approach to building coalitions to confront social powers. As in Iraq and Palestine, there will also continue to be both armed and peaceful resistance to foreign occupations. The global justice movement holds out the possibility of a new form of world revolution across borders that may bring the old revolutionary dream of social justice closer to reality. Revolutions – in whatever form – are likely to be with us to the end of human time, and present ever hopeful possibilities for humanly directed social change as well as rich opportunities for scholarly understanding of the processes of this type of change.

SEE ALSO: Collective Action; Culture, Social Movements and; Emotions and Social Movements; Global Justice as a Social Movement; Political Opportunities; Political Process Theory; Resource Mobilization Theory; Revolutions, Sociology of; Social Change; Social Movements; Social Movements, Non Violent; Social Movements, Political Consequences of; Social Movements, Relative Deprivation and; Transnational Movements

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revolutions, sociology of

John Lie and Nicholas Hoover Wilson

What distinguishes revolution from riot or rebellion, collective action or collective violence, or *coups d'état* or just plain old regime change? Historical records are replete with instances of sudden, violent, extra constitutional, and consequential regime change. However, the modern concept of revolution is the product of the French Revolution of 1789–94. The events that came to be known as the Revolution denoted and dominated modern politics. Henceforth, revolution referred to a sudden, violent political change that leads to consequential extra political transformation. The French Revolution generated a new class of political actors – revolutionaries – and a new political ideology – the possibility and desirability of intentional, mass uprising to achieve sudden, extra constitutional political change. In the modern political imagination, revolution came to denote the possibility of a better – indeed, utopian – future through the seizure of state power and the construction of a new revolutionary order.

Before the French Revolution, the concept of revolution was used in a radically different way. Though today we may speak of the Roman Revolution or the English Revolution, contemporary observers employed other categories. Thus, the English Revolution was usually called the Great Rebellion, while what we would call restoration was called the Great – and later the Glorious – Revolution (the first such event to be called revolution by contemporaries). When the “world turned upside down” in seventeenth century England, rebelling or revolting referred to the fall of the powers that be (Hill 1972). Overturning the overthrow was then the revolution. True to the Latin etymological root of *revolutio*, revolution referred to circling back to the status quo ante. The older vocabularies of betrayal, treason, and rebellion were replaced by revolution only *after* the French Revolution.

After the late eighteenth century, however, revolution became inextricably intertwined with the events of late eighteenth century France. Concurrently, revolution became a modular keyword to describe rapid, qualitative, significant, and positive change. Thus, all manners of radical, progressive change became known as revolution. The War of Independence, for example, became the American Revolution. The industrial revolution, along with the French Revolution, was said to define the nineteenth century. Popular and scholarly discourses employed the language of revolution, whether the scientific revolution or the military revolution, the democratic revolution or the information revolution.

The “echoes of the Marseillaise” reverberated for two centuries after 1789, and defined and sometimes dominated the nature and discourse of modern politics (Hobsbawm 1990). The self-conscious revolutionaries sought to replicate the Revolution in their own countries, overthrowing the old regime in favor of the new order. Almost immediately after 1789, the 1791 “revolution” in Haiti augured many later instances of anti colonial movements and revolutions. Yet by far the most consequential event was the second, “October” revolution in Russia in 1917. The Bolshevik Revolution colored radical politics in the twentieth century. The vanguard party, often identified as socialist or communist and allied with the Soviet Union, became the dominant technique and imaginary of the revolutionaries. Indeed, the French Revolution in particular and revolution *tout court* came to be seen retrospectively from a Marxist Bolshevik perspective (Furet 1986).

Given the significance of the Bolshevik Revolution, Karl Marx – or, more accurately, Marxist theory through Lenin’s lens – established the broad parameters of understanding and explaining the causes, courses, and consequences of revolution. In terms of cause, the dominant mode of explanation stressed the role of social classes. Hence, the French Revolution was said to be caused by the rise of the bourgeoisie. Moore’s (1966) classic study, for example, analyzes the class relations between the existing ruling class, the bourgeoisie, and the peasantry. While Marx expected socialist revolutions to emerge in capitalist societies, Moore’s study stressed the revolutionary outcome in

“backward” societies. Certainly, the twentieth century revolutions belied the Marxist Leninist expectation and occurred largely in agrarian societies (Wolf 1969). In terms of consequences, revolution was believed to be progressive, pointing to a socialist or a communist future. Counter revolution, in turn, referred to those defending the capitalist present that was soon to be moribund.

The geopolitics and the ideological conflicts of the Cold War inflected the scholarly and popular understanding of revolution. Modernization theory sought to counter Marxist explanation by employing functional analysis. Yet functional analysis was often tautological (e.g., revolution happens because the existing regime was not working). In retrospect, however, both Marxist and modernization theorists held highly normative and politicized understandings of revolution. The Marxist Leninist view regarded the Bolshevik Revolution as the paradigmatic revolution: a conscious vanguard party inspires mass mobilization, seizes state power, and creates a revolutionary (socialist) future. Concrete analyses would have cast doubt on the certitudes, but any sudden, qualitative political change came to be called a revolution, whether agrarian based revolts, such as Mexico in 1910, or urban, religious based upheavals, such as Iran in 1979. In fact, very few cases – if any – fitted the Marxist Leninist imaginary of the revolution (and certainly not the French Revolution). Revolution turned out to be a nominal term without much substantive content. Dunn (1989) trenchantly exposed the wide diversity of phenomena that are usually classed unproblematically as revolutions. In this regard, consider that the Nazi seizure of power was almost never regarded as an instance of revolution when in fact the regime was revolutionary in almost every way: a vanguard party, mass mobilization, the seizure of state power, and the construction of a revolutionary order.

The political palatability of actually existing revolutions faded with the recognition of the politically authoritarian and economically destructive nature of the Soviet Union and other revolutionary societies. By the very late twentieth century, scholars questioned the desirability and even the very possibility of revolution. In a sense, they echoed the first sustained analysis, Edmund Burke’s *Reflections on the Revolution in*

France (2001). That is, scholars stressed its human costs, both during and after the upheaval, and questioned whether it denoted anything more than a *coup d’état*. Skocpol’s (1979) influential study followed Tocqueville’s (2004) pioneering analysis in stressing that revolution is not “made” but “come” because of the corrosion of the state apparatus. Her attention to state power and geopolitics also pointed to the significance of military struggle, which is in fact crucial to any successful revolutionary upheaval (Chorley 1943). Revolution, after all, is a form of civil or internal war. Moreover, the survival of a revolutionary regime depends profoundly on geopolitics. US intervention, for example, accounted in large part for the failure of Latin American “revolutions” beginning with Guatemala in 1944 and Bolivia in 1952 (Grandin 2004).

In the early twenty first century the very study of revolution has become unpopular. In part the earlier consensus on the necessity or the desirability of revolution has withered away, reflecting the perceived failures of the actually existing revolutions. In part the very focus on regime transformation and the state apparatuses seems outmoded. Certainly, few political groups today are committed to a violent seizure of state power to create a revolutionary future. The “echoes of the Marseillaise” have softened to the point of silence. The very dominance and diffusion of the terminology has obfuscated the description and explanation of concrete political transformations. Not surprisingly, then, no one has yet to predict the coming of revolution because we encounter an order of distinct entities and events about which our theories remain impotent.

SEE ALSO: Collective Action; Marx, Karl; Political Sociology; Revolutions; Tocqueville, Alexis de; Violence

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Riesman, David (1909–2002)

Craig D. Lair

David Riesman was not a formally trained sociologist. Nevertheless, his 1950 book *The Lonely Crowd: A Study of the Changing American Character*, written in collaboration with Nathan Glazer and Reuel Denney, has earned a unique distinction in American sociology: excluding textbooks and “classical” works, it is the only book by an American sociologist to sell over a million copies (Gans 1997). This means that the all time bestselling work in American sociology was written by someone who never earned a degree in this discipline.

Riesman was born in Philadelphia and studied biochemistry at Harvard as an undergraduate. Later, he attended Harvard Law School, where he received his law degree in 1934. After graduating from law school Riesman both taught and practiced law. For a time, he served as a clerk to Supreme Court Justice Louis Brandeis. During World War II Riesman took an executive position in the private sector, working at the Sperry Gyroscope Company. It was not until 1946 that Riesman took an academic post in the social sciences, first as a visiting lecturer, then, three years later, as a full professor, at the University of Chicago. In 1958 he

would return to Harvard as a faculty member, where he would stay until the end of his career.

However, it was during his early years at Chicago, and in collaboration with Glazer and Denney, that he wrote what was to become his most famous work: *The Lonely Crowd*. The subject of this work is a historical exploration of what Riesman et al. call “social character,” or that part of an individual’s personality that is shared in common with other members of a social group. This common element of personality is the result of individuals living in similar social and material environments and also a means by which a society generates a degree of conformity from its members. As such, Riesman et al. use the terms “social character” and “mode of conformity” interchangeably.

Riesman et al. argue that there have been three distinct social character types that have existed over time. These character types are: tradition directed, inner directed, and other directed. The shifts between these social character types were linked by Riesman et al. to demographic changes that roughly correspond to a three stage demographic transition: tradition directed societies are in a state of “high growth potential”; inner directed societies are in a state of “transitional population growth”; and other directed societies are seen to be in a state of “incipient population decline.” However, Riesman et al. note that the linking of population factors to changes in social character is “shorthand” for many other social, technological, institutional, and informational changes that took place at the same time as these demographic shifts, such as industrialization, the birth and expansion of capitalism, urbanism, rationalization, and the growth and expansion of various media.

The historically first social character type identified by Riesman et al. is the tradition directed personality. This character type is formed in “family and clan oriented” societies where much of life is socially institutionalized, stabilized, and lived in accordance with collective mandates and rules. Accordingly, levels of individuation and innovation in tradition directed societies are low, as the motivation for individual thought and action are rooted, not in individual motivations, but rather in the collective practices and norms that have been transmitted over the ages. This conception of

the tradition directed personality is similar to Durkheim's conception of mechanical solidarity and Tönnies's conception of *Gemeinschaft* as the collective that flows through and guides individuals throughout their lives.

Riesman et al. see the tradition directed monopoly upon personality being broken by the emergence of the inner directed character, who began to surface in the social, political, and economic upheavals of the seventeenth century, particularly the Industrial Revolution and the Protestant Reformation. This social character has a very different mode of orientation than that of his or her traditional counterpart. For the tradition directed person, most features of life were socially regulated. Riesman et al. argue that this personality type was not flexible enough to cope with the expanding populations and production systems of this time that led to an increase in both social and geographical mobility, and new forms of work. It was in response to an expanding social environment that the inner directed person emerged.

The inner directed person's source of direction comes from general yet forceful goals that are instilled early in the child by parents which he or she comes to internalize (e.g., goals such as to be a good person, to be successful or productive, to do God's work). While not as encompassing and detailed as the social dictates found in tradition directed societies, these internalized goals are still powerful enough to give inner directed people guidance throughout their lives, even if they are in new, different, or changing social environments. That is, once instilled, inner directed people are not directed by what is outside them, but rather, they are guided by their inner convictions. As such, Riesman et al. conceive of these early implanted goals as a kind of "psychological gyroscope" that gives individuals clear direction wherever they may be. Riesman et al. offer Weber's description of the Protestant work ethic as being emblematic of this personality type, with its emphasis on morality and industriousness despite the surrounding environment.

However, as population growth steadies, as work moves from a more entrepreneurial mode to a more bureaucratic one, and as material scarcity fades in the face of abundance, Riesman et al. see a new mode of orientation coming into

being. If the tradition directed character was anchored to the past and custom, and if the inner directed person followed the directions set in his or her internal gyroscope, then the other directed personality, which Riesman et al. see developing in the "new middle class" of bureaucratic and salaried employees, is controlled and corralled by the thoughts and evaluations of others that he or she picks up on his or her "radar." That is, the prime mode of orientation for other directed persons is to live in harmony with others. In this regard, the other directed personality is very much a socialized one, in that their overriding goal is to please those around them. However, this socialization lacks the stability found in tradition directed societies, being more akin to changes in fashion than to time honored customs. Moreover, this personality is more flexible and open than either the tradition or inner directed person, as each other directed person looks to others for cues of how they should act in certain situations. Indeed, "others" are the central problematic for other directed people.

Ironically, though, Riesman et al. see the other directed person as a lonely personality who tries to overcome loneliness by flocking into groups. However, the authors argue that "they no more assuage their loneliness in a crowd of peers than one can assuage one's thirst by drinking sea water" because what they try to escape to is exactly what they need to escape from: others. What individuals really need in order to quench their thirst is not to be surrounded by more people, but rather something which transcends others' thoughts and evaluations altogether: autonomy.

Riesman et al. see three possible modes of adaptation open to the individual in response to the prevalent mode of conformity at the time. People can either be adjusted (i.e., live in proper accordance with their social character type), anomic (i.e., be either under or overly adjusted to the prevalent mode of conformity), or they can live a life of autonomy. Autonomy for the authors is seen as the ability of an individual to decide whether or not to live in accordance with a social character without, in the process, slipping into an anomic state. The key to autonomy is self consciousness and as other directed persons are more self conscious

than the inner directed, just as the latter are more self conscious than the tradition directed, Riesman et al. see the increased self consciousness of the other directed as opening the door to the possibility of living an autonomous life. In part this self consciousness is tied to changes in the material environment: as scarcity is overcome via increased production, more attention can be devoted to developing one's self. However, Riesman et al. see the most promising space for this development not in terms of work or "species being" as classical Marxism would argue, but instead in terms of consumption and leisure. As such, it is the abundance of modern society that allows for individuals to be exposed to a greater diversity of goods and lifestyles, while also offering them more free time to enjoy these things that allow for a greater sense of self consciousness to be formed. Riesman would later modify these ideas by noting that work was a more important sphere of life than he gave it credit for in *The Lonely Crowd* and that the levels of production needed to satisfy a consumer style autonomy were formed in an "era of innocent optimism" (Riesman 1998) that could not be sustained into the future.

Nevertheless, Riesman et al.'s cry for autonomy struck a chord in the time of the "organization man" and other forms of conformism. In this regard, *The Lonely Crowd* is often lumped together with other critiques of "mass" society (e.g., the work of Fromm and Mills). While undoubtedly critical of aspects of other directedness, Riesman et al. did not see the emergence of this character type as a wholly negative development. In fact, one positive development to come out of an other directed attitude was a greater tolerance for, and sensitivity to, others and their concerns. This made the possibility of living an autonomous life even greater than in the past. However, Riesman also took great pains to point out that inner direction was not a universally good character type whose passing we should mourn and whose reemergence we should strive for (for example, the inner directed person could be intolerant of others and too single minded in nature), nor should inner direction be equated with autonomy, as some who misread this work did. In the end, it was autonomy and the ability to live a self directed life that these authors pinned their hopes on, even if this was a "utopian" thought.

The Lonely Crowd was later supplemented by *Faces in the Crowd: Individual Studies in Character and Politics* (1952), which presented transcripts of some 20 interviews that were used, in part, to make the case of *The Lonely Crowd*, and also some of the individual essays put forward in *Individualism Reconsidered* (1954). Later in his career, however, Riesman was to modify, sometimes greatly, some of the claims made in *The Lonely Crowd*, calling some of them "wrong," claiming others to be based on an "ethnocentric" perspective, and saying that others were based on notions of American "exceptionalism." In particular, he abandoned the linkage made between character types and demographic shifts (Riesman noted this was an issue of concern even before the book was originally published) and even questioned the adequacy of the tradition directed and other directed character types. Riesman was also dismayed at how the ideas he put forward were to his mind misappropriated in radical calls for social change while he himself advocated a more reformist approach.

While undoubtedly his most popular work, *The Lonely Crowd* and related works were far from his only interests. In 1953 Riesman published *Thorstein Veblen: A Critical Interpretation*, a psychological biography of this thinker, and in 1976 he published *Adam Smith's Sociological Economics*, which argues, as the name implies, for a more sociological reading of Smith's economics. In 1964 Riesman published *Abundance for What? and Other Essays*, a collection of works ranging from Veblen and de Tocqueville, to suburbanization and the Cold War, and essays which reformulate and revise some aspects of what was said in *The Lonely Crowd*. In 1967 Riesman and his wife Evelyn Thompson Riesman published a book on Japan: *Japan: Modernization, Politics, and Culture*. Riesman also founded and edited the antinuclear journal *The Correspondent*, which sought to be a forum through which intellectuals could influence government policy on this and other issues. However, much of Riesman's later career was focused on higher education, particularly how academic institutions were becoming standardized, how intellectual diversity was being squeezed out, and how some disadvantaged groups were being excluded from the meritocratic promises of the educational system. Riesman's works on

education include *Constraint and Variety in American Education* (1956), *The Academic Revolution* (1968; co authored with Christopher Jencks), *The Perpetual Dream: Reform and Experiment in the American College* (1978; co authored with Gerald Grant), and *Education and Politics at Harvard* (1975; co authored with Seymour Martin Lipset), as well as a contributed field report to Lazarsfeld and Thielens's *The Academic Mind* (1958).

There have also been two volumes of critical commentary on Riesman's work. One is Seymour Martin Lipset and Leo Lowenthal's edited book *Culture and Social Character: The Work of David Riesman Reviewed* (1961). The other is an edited volume by Herbert Gans, Nathan Glazer, Joseph Gusfield, and Christopher Jencks entitled *On the Making of Americans: Essays in Honor of David Riesman* (1979).

Though Riesman was never formally trained in sociology, his influence on the discipline is beyond question. His thoughts captured the imagination of a generation and continue to influence sociological discussions to this day (see Wolfe 2001: 72).

SEE ALSO: Demographic Transition Theory; Fromm, Erich; Mass Culture and Mass Society; Social Change; Solidarity, Mechanical and Organic

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Riot Grrrls

Pamela Aronson

Riot Grrrls are participants in a social movement focused on a radical female youth culture. The movement was originally formed as a reaction to a male dominated punk rock music scene. With mostly male performers, girls often felt that the issues that concerned them were not reflected in their music. Before Riot Grrrl, girls who listened to this type of music were commonly perceived as connected to punk rock culture through their boyfriends rather than their own interests. The Riot Grrrl movement originated as punk rock feminism, which had two main goals: demarginalizing women in punk rock and providing a critique of patriarchy. Later in its history, the Riot Grrrl movement expanded to include participation in other cultural and political outlets. Ideas spread through the Internet and zines, which are inexpensive newsletters with individual reflection, and political and feminist commentary. Riot Grrrls themselves produced the zines and they were shared with other girls to raise awareness about feminist issues and help create a network of activists. Many women active in Riot Grrrl situate their activism within the "third wave" feminist movement.

Riot Grrrl was founded in 1991 in Olympia, Washington, when a group of girls set out to expand girls' and young women's involvement in predominantly white, male punk rock. The International Pop Underground Festival, organized by K Records in Olympia, designated the first night as Girls' Night with the goal of demarginalizing the role of women in punk rock. In 1992 a Riot Grrrl convention took place in Washington, DC. Bands such as Bikini Kill, Bratmobile, and Heavens to Betsy provided a critique of patriarchy, as well as role models for young women to get involved in the production of their own music. Zines such as *Girl Germs* and *Jigsaw* provided girls with an alternative perspective, and helped create a network of Riot Grrrls in diverse locations. Riot Grrrl chapters began across the country, and, later, in other countries like Britain. There have been a number of Riot Grrrl conventions, where girls and young women meet to perform music, exchange zines, and attend workshops on topics such as

sexual assault, abuse, self defense, and eating disorders. Eventually, the mainstream media began to report on Riot Grrrl, although engagement with the mainstream press has been controversial within the movement.

The Riot Grrrl philosophy is pro girl and separatist, as it seeks to establish a distinct female youth culture apart from boys and adults. Riot Grrrls express themselves angrily and frankly, as they reclaim the power of girlhood with “an added growl to replace the perceived passivity of ‘girl’” (Rosenberg & Garofalo 1998: 809). As a girl active in the movement put it, it is “loud, aggressive, and in your face” (p. 837). This social movement emphasizes empowerment, the “do it yourself” philosophy of punk rock, and anger at mainstream and patriarchal culture. In fact, Riot Grrrls frequently reclaim derogatory terms used to describe women to call attention to the objectification of women. As they seek a “Revolution girl style now,” they make visible through their music and zines often unspoken topics like rape and abuse. Their cultural productions also serve to create a network of girls who have felt isolated from others who share similar beliefs.

Riot Grrrl culture is also an explicitly youth culture that rejects the concerns of adult women. Reacting to the second wave feminist movement of the late 1960s and 1970s, Riot Grrrl seeks to provide a critique of patriarchy based on the concerns of girls. For example, while the second wave feminist movement was concerned with opening up workplace opportunities and equal rights, these issues are not viewed as central for many Riot Grrrls, who are too young to feel the effects of workplace discrimination. Instead, the Riot Grrrl movement works to make cultural and personal changes, such as seeing their own concerns reflected in their music and raising awareness about issues like sexual assault and incest. Riot Grrrl is often viewed as a white, middle to upper middle class movement, which may result from the largely white punk rock audience from which it emerged.

Riot Grrrl represents an important space for girls and young women to develop and voice their own experiences, as well as to articulate an alternative feminist vision. Riot Grrrl meetings and conventions are frequently compared to the consciousness raising groups of the second wave women’s movement, where women could

connect with each other and become aware of the ways that personal concerns are actually political issues. Those who are involved stress the importance of community and the development of mutual emotional support.

In 1993 Riot Grrrls began a press blackout, in which they refused to talk or be photographed by the popular media. The blackout followed what many considered to be a trivialization of their community in outlets such as the *New York Times* and *Newsweek*. The blackout was motivated by a concern that the mainstream media would continue to commodify and misrepresent Riot Grrrl culture.

Several writers pinpoint the heyday of the Riot Grrrl movement as occurring in the 1990s. Since Riot Grrrl was never a movement with membership lists, others have argued that the decline of the movement is largely an interpretation by the media.

SEE ALSO: Consciousness Raising; Consumption, Girls’ Culture and; Feminism; Feminism, First, Second, and Third Waves; Gender, Social Movements and; Personal is Political; Radical Feminism

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riots

Daniel J. Myers

A riot is an unruly collective act of violence that is temporary, discontinuous from everyday routines, and results in damage to persons or

property of either the participants or targets of the collective actor. Although most social scientists have an intuitive sense of what constitutes a riot, the edges of the definition are fuzzy and it can be difficult to determine whether or not some events are actually riots. For example, it is agreed that a riot is a collective act. That is, more than one individual must be involved and at least minimally coordinate action in order for a riot to occur. Two people acting together, however, would not constitute a riot, even though it is a collective act of violence. Thus, the lower limit for participation, damage, and duration to define a riot is difficult to establish and has led many sociologists to analyze events more ambiguously referred to as civil disorders or collective violence. For most, however, unless there are at least 30–50 people involved, the events last more than a few moments, and there is action that could result in property damage or injury requiring medical attention, a riot has not occurred.

Even those events that consensus would label as riots are a diverse lot. The American sociologist's vision of rioting is heavily influenced by the race related urban riots that occurred in the 1960s, including the infamous Watts 1965, Newark 1967, Detroit 1967, and Washington, DC 1968 riots. These riots were typically ignited by a confrontation between police and African American citizens and, although injuries occurred, the activity in the riots was dominated by attacks on property and looting. Injuries most typically resulted from attempts by police and military officials to prevent damage and contain or extinguish the riot. These kinds of riots have been echoed in other urban environments over the years, including riots in Britain in the early 1980s, in Los Angeles following the Rodney King verdict, in Cincinnati, Ohio following accusations of police brutality, and most recently in the Parisian suburbs of France, as immigrants from North Africa took to the streets and burned thousands of cars in protest of perceived police brutality and poverty.

While these kinds of events are important, there are many other kinds of collective events that have been treated as riots, including food riots, machine breaking raids, murderous ethnic purges, lynching, brawls at sporting events, and even victory celebrations. Horowitz (2001), for example, documents what he calls "deadly

ethnic riots," which are collective lethal attacks of one ethnic group on another and include events ranging across the globe from Hindu attacks on Muslims in India, anti Catholic violence in Northern Ireland, and attacks on Ibo citizens in Nigeria. In practice, these different types of riots are not completely distinct. Rather, riots are complex events in which different kinds of people with different motivations participate in a variety of ways in the larger riot. For example, the celebration riots that followed the string of National Basketball Association Championships in Chicago and later in Los Angeles took on many of the characteristics of the urban street riots of the 1960s.

Concern with riots, and crowd behavior more generally, has a long history in sociology, reaching back to the founding moments of the discipline when thinkers such as Gustave Le Bon and Sigmund Freud produced a view of crowds as unanimous, crazed, criminal, anonymous masses whose constituent individuals had ceded control of themselves to the mob and/or a hypnotically suggestive leader. Although subsequently debunked in sociological scholarship, this view of the crowd and of rioters lives on in the popular mind, in journalistic accounts of riots, and even in introductory textbooks. Empirical research on crowds, however, indicates that riot participants are certainly not of unanimous mind and in fact their participation and behaviors reveal diverse motivations, actions, and experiences of the event. Furthermore, individuals in crowds are not anonymous, as they typically attend the event in small groups made up of friends and family members. These small groups remain intact throughout the event, move through the larger crowd together, and are the fundamental unit in which decisions about what to do are made. Nor do individuals in crowds become hypnotized by the situation or cede control of themselves to crazed irrationality. In fact, even when engaging in some of the most extreme and heinous atrocities (such as genocidal purges), riot participants retain an extraordinary level of rationality, going to great lengths, for example, to ensure they are killing the right kind of person (Horowitz 2001). Rioters, for example, may stop rioting to actually interrogate those suspected of being on the wrong side. Horowitz relates one such instance in which Sinhalese

rioters in Sri Lanka questioned a man once, held him as a prisoner while they proceeded to kill other Tamils, later questioned him further, and eventually (mistakenly, since he was a Tamil) released him.

Because of this unfortunate history of thinking about riots and crowds, care must be taken when using the riot label – not just because it is not always clear if an event is a riot, but also because the term has inherently pejorative connotations. For some, the riot label invokes images of mob psychology, hooliganism, opportunism, and criminality and thereby immediately marginalizes the participants. Rather than being seen as political actors with a legitimate protest agenda, rioters are viewed as dangerous criminals that must be controlled. The riot label, therefore, reflects the views of social control agents and the act of labeling is itself inherently political. Once the riot label has been applied, it leads authorities and observers to focus on controlling rioters with heavy handed repressive tactics rather than attending to the social conditions and political concerns that underlie the unrest. As a result, some scholars prefer to refer to these events as rebellion or revolt. Others disagree, believing that most incidents labeled riots fall short of the kind of politically revolutionary agenda necessary to be a rebellion.

RIOT PARTICIPANTS

Based on historical thinking about rioting and crowds, scholars also developed expectations about what kinds of persons would be more likely to participate in a riot. Criminals, socially marginalized, isolated, unemployed, and uneducated were all stereotypes portrayed in earlier writing on riots. As has been the case with mob psychology notions more generally, these ideas have been proven false by empirical research. When the characteristics of riot participants have been compared to those of non participants (particularly to those living in geographic proximity to riots), few differences have been detected (Mason & Murtagh 1985). Even though, for example, unemployment in a city predicts rioting, the unemployed are not disproportionately represented among the actual rioters: their rates of participation are virtually identical to those who are employed. Nor do

rioters tend to be more psychologically frustrated with their circumstances or feel more deprived than non participants. Thus, rioters do not fit the image of marginalized societal refuse held by early crowd theorists.

What can be said about rioters? First, as with most violence, the participants are considerably more likely to be men than women. Second, rioters tend to be younger than the average person living in the area where a riot occurs, although rioting is clearly not just an activity of the young. More important, however, is simple biographical availability, which in part accounts for the presence of the young at riots. Those who happen to be spatially close to a riot are more likely to join in. Those who are not at work, watching children, or attending classes are more likely to be able to break free from their routines and become part of the crowd. There is, for example, a clear daily pattern of riot activity that peaks after usual work hours and then dies down when people have to return to their jobs and schools (McPhail 1994). Third, rioters tend to have higher senses of personal efficacy than those who do not participate. They are more likely than those who stay at home to believe that their actions matter and will make some kind of a difference (Snow & Oliver 1995).

ECONOMIC HARDSHIP AND RIOTING

Sociological research and theorizing about riots has focused on the causes of rioting. What conditions contribute to its emergence? Many factors have been posited as important contributors to, or preconditions for, rioting. Economic factors such as unemployment and poverty have been cast as both absolute and relative deprivation conditions that produce what is essentially a violent protest about these conditions. This theoretical argument seemed more than plausible and the emergence of so much rioting in poor, urban areas disproportionately involving racial and ethnic minorities buoyed the notion. The research, however, has been less than definitive. Research attempting to explain the variation among cities in riot frequency and riot severity based on relative and absolute deprivation measures as well as other indicators of social and economic well being has been hard pressed to find any consistent relationship supporting the

basic theoretical notions (Spilerman 1970, 1976). Related concepts, such as the pressure that rapid changes in population place on the provision of social services and the notion that poor political representation prevents the opportunity to redress grievances through conventional means, have not fared any better.

More recently, competition theory has been used somewhat more successfully to predict rioting. Here, analysts propose that battles over economic (and to a lesser degree, residential) turf escalate into collective violence as one group attempts to improve its position or maintain relative advantage over another advancing group. After all this research though, economic factors, however they may have been cast, still remain a fairly weak predictor of rioting. Economic hardship is too ubiquitous and rioting is too rare for economic conditions to produce rioting directly. Thus, economic conditions may be seen as providing fertile ground for rioting and other collective violence, but are not, by themselves, a sufficient explanation for the emergence of violence.

SOCIAL CONTROL AGENTS

The role of state authorities, especially local police, in producing, escalating, and quelling riots has been a major topic of research, not only because interaction between police and citizens so often seems to ignite rioting, but also because state authorities have a responsibility to maintain order and therefore are expected to wield repressive forces to bring riots under control, to return the social environment to a state of calm, and to protect the persons and property that might be targeted by rioters.

These two dynamics have produced different hypotheses about the roles of police in riots. On one hand, if confrontations with citizens and heavy handed policing tactics provide the sparks that set off riots, then increases in police presence ought to increase rioting. Likewise, if police engage rioters with escalated engagement as they attempt to quell the riot, they may inflame rather than extinguish the riots. On the other hand, repression can actually stop or slow rioting, and although police intervention can lead to more discontent and grievances,

police presence, especially if early and formidable, can prevent or reduce rioting by raising the anticipated costs of participation.

The quantitative empirical evidence on the role of policing has been inconsistent. Some scholars have found that larger police forces are related to more and more severe riots, while others have found no relationship or just the opposite. Qualitative and historical studies, however, have demonstrated that it is not just the strength of the police in terms of number and firepower that matters, but rather, it is how they wield their power and what kinds of relationships exist between the police and the community that matter most. Those communities that have a history of antagonism between the police and some segment of the citizenry seem much more likely to erupt after a publicized instance of heavy handed police behavior.

DIFFUSION, MASS MEDIA, AND EFFECTIVENESS

The mass media are another key player in understanding the origins and trajectory of rioting, particularly as rioting spreads and becomes a wave of unrest rather than a single or a few isolated events. When the National Advisory Commission on Civil Disorders published its report on the US riots of the summer of 1967, it put substantial responsibility for the spread of riots on the mass media and how it handled reports of the riots, as had the McCone Commission's report on the Watts riot of 1965. Since then, scholars and politicians have routinely criticized mass media for their conduct during and after riots. The mass media contribute to riots in two main ways. First, they can fan the flames of a riot while it is happening by live broadcasts of the action on the streets. These reports immediately draw the attention of potential participants, who can be drawn out into the street and increase the size of the crowd, the complexity of the situation, and the chances for further inflammatory confrontations as police try to control the situation. The pressure for immediacy can also contribute to inaccurate and inflammatory reporting as reporters rely on hearsay and rumors as they quickly attempt to piece together the story. Second, media reports of

riots spread information about riots and their outcomes and seem to suggest rioting as a behavioral tactic to potential actors in other locations. Thus, in modern times, mass media distribution has become the key network structure that provides a conduit for the diffusion of collective violence.

Rather than the mindless imitation posited by early crowd theorists, however, modern takes on the diffusion of collective violence are inherently rationalist. These approaches to diffusion understand the imitation process as involving transmission of information about the actions of rioters, the reactions by social control agents, and the outcomes of the riot to other potential rioters in other locations. The potential rioters then evaluate the outcomes of the prior act and then, individually and collectively, make decisions about whether they will be likely to adopt the behavior, should the opportunity arise. When an opportunity does arise, such as when a crowd gathers around to observe an arrest, rioting is then more likely to develop.

Because media distribution areas and the cultural salience of actors are both geographically concentrated, information flows that could inform further rioting are geographically concentrated as well. In addition, the salience of past events wanes quickly as the riots become old news, and thus the chances of imitations are concentrated in brief periods, thereby inducing short lived bursts of action or mini waves of rioting reflected in the relatively jagged pattern of rioting most often observed in riot waves.

The rationalist logic requires that riots are observed and evaluated positively so that the evaluation would lead to imitation. A negative appraisal would presumably dissuade diffusion. Contrary to what might be expected by an outsider viewing the sometimes devastating effects of riots on neighborhoods and businesses, surveys conducted by social scientists after urban riots in the 1960s repeatedly demonstrated that many African Americans viewed the riots positively. Even in the very neighborhoods where the riots caused the most damage, the residents often believed that the riots were necessary to call attention to the problems of the area and would ultimately do more good than harm (Feagin & Hahn 1973). Many of those who participated in the riots and later testified

before congressional committee expressed a sense of pride and efficacy for both their own actions and of others they observed (US Senate 1967–70). Likewise, in 2005, many French Muslims often expressed supportive attitudes toward the actions of rioters, believing that these destructive protests were finally calling attention to the problems of a population that had been systematically neglected by French policymakers. These positive evaluations of rioting are consistent with and lend support to rationalist, diffusion based explanations for the spread of rioting.

Whether riots actually do produce positive outcomes is an open question. There is little doubt that riots draw attention to the community in which they occur and invite speculation about the causes of the riots and what might be done to correct them. Government commissions are formed and legislative bodies investigate and sometimes introduce policy and allocate resources to address the posited problems. Because riots seem to appear in relatively impoverished areas, for example, policy interventions have been targeted toward improving the economic conditions in these areas. The Model Cities program in the late 1960s was one key federal program that was developed at least in part as a response to the riots of the era (Gale 1996). Thus, riots can produce attention to problems in a community as rioters often seem to expect. Whether this attention and the resulting programs ultimately have any positive effect is a different question and one that has been harder to demonstrate. Often, the programs are underfunded or dismantled before any effect has been felt. Furthermore, the long term effects on the economies of riot stricken areas are difficult to overcome – some areas never seem to recover from the devastation (Collins & Margo 2004).

SEE ALSO: Collective Action; Crowd Behavior; Protest, Diffusion of; Urban Poverty

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risk, risk society, risk behavior, and social problems

Alfons Bora

Modern society is undergoing a deep rooted structural change. This change concerns both the internal relations between all parts of society and external relations with nature. During the nineteenth century, the industrial and technological revolution shook up the structures of a society that had been shaped traditionally by crafts and agriculture. In the same dramatic way, the "second modernity" or "risk society," as Ulrich Beck (1992) calls the period at the end of the second millennium, transforms the nucleus of the industrial society. New technologies confront society with problems that are connected to the term "risk" (Perrow 1987). This is not so much because the quantitative amount of dangerous situations has increased – this amount might have been relatively higher in earlier societies. However, what has significantly changed is the fact that social actors and institutions are being made accountable for those dangers. The new quality of the risk society consists of socially generated risks – or, at least, of the increase in assigning dangers to social behavior. Socially caused dangers will regularly produce more social conflict than inevitable natural disasters. In this sense, science and technology contain risks for each individual, for social groups, for contemporary society as a whole, and for future generations. The examples for this diagnosis are numerous. One may think of nuclear energy, IT technologies, biotechnology, or nano technologies, for instance. All these technological innovations are embedded in rapid social change, entailing growing individualization, patchwork biographies, significant changes in employment structures and occupational situation, and an accelerating transformation of many established institutions of the welfare state. They make clear that the issue of "risk" is a central category in societal self observation and self description.

RISK AND INFORMATION THEORY

Generally, the risk of a certain event ($R_{(E)}$) is defined as the probability of a dangerous event ($p_{(E)}$) multiplied by the amount of the expected damage (D) connected to this event: $R_{(E)} = p_{(E)} \times D$. We can call this concept of risk an information theoretical concept. Insurance companies usually work with this approach. Law courts and administrations make use of it when deciding cases. In this conception, risk is a question of complete or incomplete knowledge. Risk management, in this perspective, has the task of dealing with an information problem, namely, the problem of acquiring as much information as possible about probability and damage. Therefore, in the information theoretical perspective, risk management is mainly information management, trying to shift an imaginary border between knowledge and non knowledge. In the best case, this shift will dissolve non knowledge.

The information theoretical approach has historical roots. The idea of risk was born in the emerging seafaring and long distance trade, where shipowners and traders tried to secure their investments by the first insurances calculating probability and estimated damage. Until today, this connection with information is constitutive for the understanding of risk. It also has coined risk research from its early stages (Knight 1921). In addition, newer risk theories are influenced by information theory (Elster 1993).

However, the information theoretical concept brings with it certain problems. One critical issue in many cases is the quantification of possible benefits and damages. What if they are qualitatively different? It is often impossible to compare both sides on the same scale. Often there is no clear indicator for the estimation of the damage. This holds true for "catastrophic" damage, as for instance in the case of a nuclear catastrophe. Therefore, many situations in technological decision making, as well as in everyday life, make it difficult to establish a uniform risk measure. The socially contested cases are often those in which, owing to a lack of empirical experience, an exact calculation of probabilities is not feasible. Last but not least, commercial calculations in many cases lie across the risk perceptions of individual actors and of the political public. In summary, the information theoretical risk concept can be said to be closely related to a

concept of knowledge that is rather static and which treats the relation between knowledge and non knowledge as a zero sum game. Complementary to this approach, it can therefore be argued from a sociological point of view that new knowledge in every case instantly creates new non knowledge. It is, for epistemological reasons, impossible to eliminate non knowledge. Risk theory can try to take profit from this insight.

RISK AND DECISION THEORY

Risk research has turned its attention toward all forms of social knowledge and non knowledge. From this sociological perspective, the distinction between specific and unspecific non knowledge (Japp 1997) is of great importance. Specific non knowledge describes the case in which an actor explicitly knows that she lacks knowledge in a certain aspect. Specific non knowledge, therefore, is a reason to start an inquiry and to try to produce new knowledge. It is the characteristic condition of scientific research: we try to expand our knowledge in an area where we still do not have (enough) knowledge. From the point of view of risk research, positively knowing about the existence of our non knowledge is decisive. This form of specific non knowledge has to be sharply distinguished from any kind of unspecific non knowledge. Unspecific non knowledge describes a case of categorical ignorance, a case in which an actor cannot know that she lacks knowledge in a certain aspect. Unspecific non knowledge transcends the barriers of our epistemic capacities in a given moment.

Social forces produce all kinds of damage, danger, and catastrophe. The causes for risk, therefore, are social, and not primarily natural. Under such a condition, the question of causation and accountability gains increasing importance. Consequently, the distinction between the social roles of decision maker and those affected by the decision come increasingly to the center of interest. Accordingly, a growing amount of social protest can be expected from those who are (even potentially) affected by decisions. Insofar as events are understood as consequences of social decisions and not as effects of natural processes, the category of

decision becomes relevant for the analysis and understanding of risk. For these reasons, decision theory becomes relevant for a sociological analysis of risk.

The central characteristic of a risk decision consists of a situation arising from the need to select between different options, which may all entail negative consequences for third parties and therefore will provoke the issue of responsibility (Luhmann 1991). The risk of decision making expresses a specific form of what Luhmann calls "temporal coupling" (*Zeitbindung*). A decision becomes risky insofar as three aspects are intertwined. These are (1) the knowledge that non decision is impossible; even inactivity contains a decision; (2) the knowledge that unspecific knowledge is unavoidable; this knowledge makes us aware that consequences will appear later that are epistemologically unknown when the decision is taken, and that they will bear negative effects for others; and (3) the knowledge that future consequences will be attributed to the decision and to the decision maker's responsibility. In the co occurrence of these three aspects, some fundamental dilemmas become apparent. Firstly, we observe the control dilemma that Collingridge (1980) mentioned. The term indicates that at a time when it is still possible to control a new technology, our technological knowledge goes far beyond the knowledge about social factors and consequences. The social effects of a given technology are not visible at the moment of the decision. However, when they are detected, the technology is often very deeply embedded in the social practice, so that it is usually almost impossible to control it. This dilemma clearly points to the temporal structure of decision making. At the same time it leads to a second dilemma, what we call the risk dilemma, which consists of the constitutive connection between the pressure to decide and the impossibility of holding the necessary knowledge. This aspect of uncertainty entails a paradoxical moment, which Clausen and Dombrowsky (1984) called the warning paradox. According to this paradox, warning against possible dangers does not help to decide risky cases. The reason is that we can learn whether the warning was reasonable only if we fail to heed it. If we follow the warning, we will never know whether it was well founded or not.

RISK AS A SOCIAL PROBLEM

The notion of risk, as formulated in the decision theory of risk, is sharply distinguished from the notion of danger. Whether an event will be perceived as risk or as danger mainly depends on the question of whether it can be attributed to the decision in the social dimension. Risk – in contrast to a natural disaster, for instance – is caused by social decisions, and is therefore related to the decision making actor or institution. Danger, on the other hand, relates to those who are affected by the consequences of the decision. This differentiation not only helps to describe the historical trend from danger to risk, it also indicates a change in social attitude toward the future. A greater number of far reaching consequences have to be taken into consideration. Very distant futures are relevant to our contemporary decisions. The effects of acting as well as of not acting are equally complex and uncertain. Modern societies are fundamentally characterized by the difference between decision makers and those affected by their decisions. Every individual may occupy either side of this distinction in various social contexts.

Looking at those affected by a decision and threatened by the danger of a negative consequence, we can see that this side of risk decisions is related to social inequalities. These inequalities can be conceived under the terms inclusion and exclusion. The distinction between inclusion and exclusion describes a very general form of social inequality (Stichweh 2000). This inequality can be realized in different gradual forms and modalities. Social regions of exclusion, which may be highly integrated internally but are characterized by strong differentiation from all central political and legal institutions, usually show a dramatic potential for social dangers. Absence of health care, low levels of education, high rates of criminal victimization, as well as a high level of environmental damage and poor nutrition, are significant indicators for social exclusion. It is in this area that social movements find cause to protest, pointing out the dangers for the excluded that stem from social decisions taken elsewhere. Social communication about risk becomes politicized under these conditions.

RISK THEORIES IN THE SOCIAL SCIENCES

Scientific concern with risk theory reaches from medical epidemiology via mathematics and economic theory to the legal and social sciences. Within the realm of the social sciences, three groups of risk theory can be distinguished.

Psychology and cognition theory. Approaches from psychology and cognition theory refer to the difficulties resulting from the dilemma of risk decision. Given that in a fundamental sense we never have sufficient information to make an *ex ante* assessment of risks, the question rises as to how decision making actors (individuals as well as organizations) empirically arrive at their decision (Jungermann & Slovic 1993). Psychological risk analysis is interested in analyzing individual and collective attitudes to risk behavior and risk management under given situational conditions. In this respect, it has produced numerous valuable insights into the mechanisms of risk behavior (see, e.g., Jungermann & Slovic 1993). It shows that risks which are undertaken voluntarily are viewed as much more acceptable than those which are not voluntarily assumed. Moreover, the acceptance of a given risk depends on the amount of perceived control over the risk and/or over the source of the risk. Risks from new technologies will usually be estimated as much higher than those from older or "well known" technologies. The fairer the possible consequences seem to be, the lower the risk of a decision will be judged. Risk acceptance in particular depends on the perceived reversibility of the decision.

Cultural theory. Whilst the cognitive approaches are mainly concerned with individual perceptions, cultural theory looks at social groups as the decisive factor. This approach understands risk as a collective social construct (in the sense of an interpretive pattern, or *Deutungsmuster*). The particular form of this construct depends on the properties of the social group in which it occurs. Cultural theory categorizes social groups along two main dimensions, namely, "group" and "grid" (Douglas & Wildavsky 1982; Thompson 1999). Group stands for the external boundaries of a social collective and describes the extent of the group's differentiation from its social environment. Grid refers to the social distinctions within the group

that regulate its internal behavior. By cross tabulation of these two dimensions, four types of social groups (cultures) can be found, each with a specific concept of risk:

- 1 Hierarchical culture has high values in both dimensions. It is characterized by high differentiation against the external world and by high internal integration. In this culture, risks are treated as manageable.
- 2 Individualistic market culture bears low grid and low group values. It attributes risks to the sphere of individual action frames and generally accepts them as calculable issues.
- 3 Egalitarian culture (sometimes also called "sectarian" culture) has low grid and high group values. Usually it is highly risk averse and very sensitive to every kind of danger.
- 4 Fatalist culture is characterized by high grid and low group values. Risks are conceived as imposed by others. They provoke passive reactions rather than active avoidance or risk management.

Based on these differentiations, cultural theory analyzes social categorizations of risk. It explains these categories from the structures of the different risk cultures (for an overview see Thompson 1999). In contrast to psychological theories, cultural theory allows an understanding of risk as a social (i.e., socially constructed) phenomenon and thus as a social problem.

Systems theory. The new (or autopoietic) sociological systems theory also looks at risk as a social phenomenon. It describes the characteristic features of risky decisions (Luhmann 1991; Japp 2000). Risk is the result of a tension between temporal and issue dimensions. In modern society, the increasing use of risk as a category of social observation and interpretation indicates a change in the relation of society and its environment:

- 1 Risk communications show that dangers increasingly are attributed to decisions. This holds true even for phenomena that until recently had been understood as inevitable natural disasters, such as flooding, for example.
- 2 The future increasingly becomes a relevant dimension with respect to the legitimation

of decisions, and is no longer seen as constitutively incalculable. The issue of risk assessment becomes pervasive for all social systems.

- 3 Social differentiation between decision makers and those affected by the consequences of decisions helps to explain why social movements mobilize protest through risk communication and why they politicize decisions with respect to risk.
- 4 At the same time, social systems tend to externalize risks and to shift responsibility for risky decisions to other functional systems. This process can be observed, for instance, in the relation between politics, law, and economy (Luhmann 1991).

These three types of social risk theory refer to decision making processes in different aspects. They are distinguished from each other by their central term of reference – individual behavior, rational calculus, group identity, social systems. Thus, they differ from each other with respect to their level of generalization. It is doubtful whether approaches related to individuals and groups can cover the general (sociological) aspects of risk decisions. Nevertheless, they offer highly developed tools for the description of particular strategies in decision making. Systems theory, in contrast, focuses on the general sociological problems of risk decisions.

RISK PERCEPTION, TRUST, AND EXPERTISE

Individual assessment of risk depends on a large number of factors, such as the opportunity for control. Besides the individual perspective, public opinion about risk and risk regulation is of great importance for the understanding of modern society. Public opinion, as numerous studies show, is far from being averse to modern technology in general. This holds true for all countries and regions (Durant et al. 1998; Hampel & Renn 1999; Gaskell & Bauer 2001). With regard to certain issues, such as different applications of biotechnology (e.g., plant biotechnology, human stem cells, to mention two prominent examples), public opinion is ambivalent. However, what is more relevant than the attitude toward the technological issue at stake is the fact

that public opinion does not depend on the level of information about a particular technology. A common hypothesis contending that more information and enlightenment would raise acceptance (the so called “deficit hypothesis”) must be considered inadequate from a sociological point of view. On the contrary, a higher level of education probably leads to a more critical attitude toward risk and technology, as other studies report (Levidow & Marris 2001). Obviously, public opinion is strongly influenced by very general patterns of interpretation and often by a generalized suspicion toward misapplications of any kind. The options for regulating risk and technology that modern society provides for are usually estimated as too low or insufficient (Durant et al. 1998; Hampel & Renn 1999). A significant number of people think that the possibility of controlling and regulating risk through the law and legal institutions is inadequate. More than 80 percent say that existing laws are not applied and that surveillance is not strong enough. As a result, political and legal instruments of regulation can be said to be one – if not *the* – factor for explaining public opinion toward risk: risk perception is a question of trust in institutions. The role of the mass media in this process is important, but not as decisive as might be supposed (Durant et al. 1998; Hampel & Renn 1999). At the European level, for instance, no significant correlation could be observed between media coverage and public perception (Durant et al. 1998).

Historically, the first answer to the perceived weakness of regulatory means has been expertise (control by knowledge, in Max Weber’s formulation). The assumption is that the relevant knowledge for the control of risks can best be produced by scientific expertise. Law and politics have made use of this model from the very beginning of regulatory activities in technology and risk. However, as debates over the last few decades have shown, the expert model is burdened with some serious difficulties. Experts are, for epistemological reasons, not able to eliminate risk. Their status is embedded in what has been called “mode 2” of knowledge production (Gibbons et al. 1994). Mode 2 means that the process of knowledge is not linear but undirected, more like a large reservoir to which many different institutions have an input. Expertise is often contested and uncertain. Society itself

becomes a large laboratory, in which “real world experiments” are conducted (Groß et al. 2003). On the other hand, on the basic level of cognition, there is no way out from expertise, because it is only scientific knowledge that aims to deal with our questions about truth and reliable information. No delegitimization of expertise could destroy its basic function for society. One may even speak of an increasing importance of expertise in politics and law (Weingart 1999, 2001).

The crisis of expertise mentioned above has led to an increase in participatory decision making. Participation is usually understood as a form of dialogical process shaping technology and managing possible risks. It can be observed in areas where research, regulation, and public opinion overlap. In most political contexts, participation is a relevant tool for decision making. It is conceptually based on a critique of expertise and on a discourse of “democratizing expertise” (Liberatore & Funtowicz 2003). Participatory procedures, according to a common hypothesis, are more likely to evoke the motivation to engage in decision making, to broaden the basis of knowledge and values involved, to initiate learning processes, to produce new possibilities for conflict resolution, to realize common interests, and to increase acceptance and legitimacy of a decision (Durant 1999; Fischer 1999; Joss & Bellucci 2002). The term “participatory procedure” describes instruments and methods aimed at the inclusion of laypersons and/or stakeholders. Scientific expertise is a relevant feature in participatory procedures, but is usually embedded in concepts of deliberation among laypersons and stakeholders. This combination results from the fact that the function of such procedures is to integrate the issue dimension (e.g., information, facts, truth) and the social dimension (e.g., acceptance, trust, legitimacy, values, preferences). With respect to risk decisions, such procedures represent an important mechanism of risk externalization. The broad inclusion of those people potentially affected by a decision may help to absorb protest. Some one who has participated in the decision making process will find it difficult to blame decision makers for any negative effects.

In addition to the possible advantages of participation, its weaknesses should be considered. Participatory procedures will not develop

sufficient commitment from all parties unless they lead to a real win win solution. Participants’ loyalty to their organizational background may even force them to leave the procedure if serious conflicts arise. The functional differentiation of society may create insurmountable barriers to communication. Furthermore, these procedures often provoke questions such as their political representativity, imbalance of power, or lack of political mandate for those involved. One cause of such problems may be seen in their lack of embeddedness in the institutions of representative democracy. Participation, therefore, is a means to cope with risk decisions and their problems. At the same time, it creates new problems.

The regulation of risks challenges science and practice in modern society. The concept of decision theory sheds light on the fact that every regulatory approach entails new consequences, which can be found in the realm of unspecific non knowledge. They consequently provoke effects that cannot be known in advance and that will raise serious problems of risk and danger, thereby leading to social protest and conflict. The value of this theoretical approach for political, legal, and scientific practice could lie in its ability to reduce expectations about social capacities for eliminating risk from social life to a realistic amount.

SEE ALSO: Autopoiesis; Benefit and Victimized Zones; Expertise, “Scientification,” and the Authority of Science; Luhmann, Niklas; Reflexive Modernization; Science and the Measurement of Risk; Science and the Precautionary Principle; Science and Public Participation: The Democratization of Science; Technological Determinism; Technological Innovation; Trust

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rite of passage

Rodanthi Tzanelli

The term rite of passage was first used in anthropology to encapsulate rituals that symbolize the transition of an individual or a group from one status to another, or to denote the passage of calendrical time, but soon it was embraced in other disciplines. The concept was developed by the Durkheimian anthropologist Arnold Van Gennep in *Les Rites de passage* (1909), in which he explored the nature of ceremonies that mark personal or collective changes of identity (childbirth, puberty, marriage, motherhood, and death), as well as collective celebrations of seasonal change (Easter,

harvest). Van Gennep identified three phases in these rites: (1) separation, when the individual or the group is distanced from their former identities; (2) liminality, the phase in between two conditions (the one from which the individual/group departs and the one which they will enter); and (3) reaggregation (or incorporation), the final stage in which the individual/group is readmitted to society as bearer of new status. Because rites of passage belong to sacred time (not the profane of everyday life), their performance is formalized. The initiate(s) are placed in a symbolically subordinate position vis à vis those who have been initiated (elders, married, mothers) and have to go through elaborate "trials" (isolation, humiliation, fasting) before they are accepted back into the community.

The flexibility of Van Gennep's theory led to its implementation and use in a vast array of contexts in different human sciences (anthropology, sociology, history). Van Gennep influenced two of the most important twentieth-century symbolic anthropologists, Victor Turner and Mary Douglas. In *The Ritual Process: Structure and Anti Structure* (1966), Turner illustrated the significance of liminality as a dangerous phase for the initiate(s) and the whole community, which both challenges and sustains social order. This idea reappeared in Mary Douglas's *Purity and Danger: An Analysis of the Concepts of Pollution and Taboo* (1966) in a more structuralist fashion. Douglas regarded liminality as a point that negotiates two opposing structural situations: her analysis of "dirt" as a moral sign that enables societies to establish boundaries between social categories (e.g., clean and unclean, good and evil, dangerous and safe) echoes Van Gennep's tripartite schema of the rite of passage.

One of the problems highlighted about the concept is its inherent vagueness, because it invites social scientists to construct almost every transitional stage as a rite of passage. Van Gennep also stressed that not all rites of passage retain their tripartite structure: one phase may be ritualistically exaggerated at the expense of the other two (e.g., baptism as incorporation into society). Again, this led to confusion concerning the classification of transitional rituals as rites of separation, liminality, or incorporation (e.g., marriage can be all three). The concept of liminality, however, found extensive use in

sociology, especially in tourism and leisure studies. Unfortunately, its association with ambiguity, indeterminacy, and displacement also invited its abuse by "cultural theorists" who are often not informed of its origins.

SEE ALSO: Consumption, Tourism and; Durkheim, Émile; Rite/Ritual; Structuralism

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rite/ritual

Aldo Natale Terrin

The field of ritual studies has expanded dramatically over the past 20 years. Rituals are analyzed in anthropology, sociology of religion, religious studies, and theology, and also in the study of literature, philosophy, theater, political science, and education, especially from the perspective of performance theory (Schechner 1977). Many disciplines have taken different theoretical approaches to this broad and complex topic, and thus a great variety of definitions have been proposed, no single one of which is adequate. For present purposes ritual will be defined as a formal and symbolic behavior that leads to the creation or recreation of

an emotion in order to obtain or maintain a correct balance between persons and the world.

“Formal and symbolic behavior” speaks of the particular behavior included in ritual. Certain acts, gestures, utterances, and so on seem to be of a particular kind that sets them off from acts performed in other contexts and situations. This intuitive demarcation from other behaviors is the first step in any consideration of ritual. Analyses of ritual should begin by describing what is distinctive about it, rather than what makes it similar to other forms of social interaction. Symbolic behavior is generated from the word “ritual” itself, which derives from the Indo European root *ri* – like “rhyme,” “rhythm,” and “river” – and signifies some thing like an ordered flow, governed by rules, repetitions, and conventions. As rule governed behavior, ritual is collective, repetitive, and stylized. It normally follows a pattern established on earlier occasions or by tradition and has since become “holy,” having been instituted by the ancestors or ordered by a deity. Ritual is also formal in the sense that it distances participants from their spontaneous selves and their private motives. Formal gestures are fewer in number than informal ones and are more prescribed and impersonal. During the practice of ritual, participants observe rules, conforming themselves to what is prescribed for them. Bloch (1989) argues these formalized ways of behavior and communication normally have to be considered as a complex of primitive behavioral modes, like dance, song, and formulaic speech. These stylized behaviors tend also to be closely connected with traditional forms of social hierarchy and authority. In other words, using standardized forms of speech in which vocabulary, syntax, and intonation are reduced to a minimum, ritual reinforces power and the status quo. The most highly formalized of such behavior is perhaps religious ritual.

It is very difficult to discuss the sense of the symbolic in ritual. Ritual is particularly symbolic when it evokes a foundational myth. For instance, Turner’s (1967) *mudyi* tree and Rappaport’s (1999) *rumbim* each bring together in ritual multiple significations, ranging from the physiological to the ideological and the cosmic. The contemplation of representations in which ideological significations are emotionally present in association with the physiological constitutes

an attempt to integrate and unify the whole of reality. This is capable of arousing great emotion.

The repetition, the invariance, and the formalization of ritual – producing rhyme, rhythm, *phoné*, and music – allow a new interpretation of ritual as having an unconscious force from which an ancient emotion can emerge. Ritual’s strong link with the physiology of the body is important here. Ritual behavior is in fact a performance in which the value of the body is manifested through a multifaceted sensory experience. Like any other performance, ritual communicates on multiple sensory levels, involving imagery, dramatic sounds, and tactile, olfactory, and gustatory stimulation. All the communicative codes are involved. In this sense ritual is constructed in order to prioritize the body and to valorize knowledge through the performance of the body.

Why should ritual action accord primacy to bodily techniques in this way? We know in the first place that bodily movements can do more than words can say. It is through the ritual itself that one understands this, both phylogenetically and ontogenetically. Thinking and communicating through the body precede and to a great extent always remain beyond speech. In this sense we can understand ritual as not opposed to rationality, but as inhabiting another level of rationality, constructed not by semantic truths, but established by experiential and expressive truths and emotional constructs. Indeed, the practical understanding and deep knowledge demanded by ritual operate best without concepts (e.g., through the gestures and emotions of the body and in the body). For instance, we understand the language of facial expressions, postures, gestures, and involuntary bodily changes first and best, just as a child understands the facial expression of its mother long before it understands verbal language (Vygotsky 1962). And this type of knowledge is in any case the deepest knowledge. Another example stems from the common experience we have when our familiar environment is disrupted: we feel suddenly uprooted, we lose our footing, we collapse, we fall. This experience is not solely metaphorical. Rather, the shock and disorientation occur in the body and the mind, and refer to a basic physiological and ontological structure – to our

“being in the world” (Binswanger 1963). In the same manner, in dance and music we may obtain the best knowledge of ourselves and we may recognize ourselves, for instance, as members of a community: we become emotionally a common body.

From this perspective, we arrive at the most important expression of the proposed definition of ritual: “behavior that leads to the creation or recreation of an emotion.” Above all, ritual must be seen in its relationship with the “emotional body.” Such emotion probably derives from the hypothalamus and the amygdala, the most ancient part of the brain. Newberg and D’Aquili (2000) reviewed a number of studies that apparently established links between sustained attention associated with the practice of ritual or meditation and electroencephalography (EEG) theta waves above the prefrontal cortex. The two authors confirmed these data and enlarged them using single photon emission computed tomography (SPECT). Results demonstrated significantly increased blood flow to the inferior frontal and dorsolateral prefrontal cortical regions when subjects were engaged in intense meditation or ritual.

The definition of ritual suggested here is therefore partly dependent upon this result. The expression “correct balance between persons and the world” is the most interpretive part of the definition and provides the *sine qua non* for social life and survival. This interpretation is very broad in content and therefore not in contrast with other definitions, but it is also very narrow in the sense of a physiological and emotional experience. By stressing this fundamental data of ritual it is possible to surmount all the difficulties associated for instance with the so called “meaninglessness” of ritual (Staal 1975), which is the negative outcome of previous studies made by ritologists and anthropologists, who asked which type of functionality, communication, and expressivity were included in ritual.

In Durkheim, for instance, we find both a passive and an active notion of the relationship between religion and society: while religion is a system of ideas with which individuals represent to themselves the society of which they are members, rituals really strengthen the bonds between individuals and society. But is this reciprocity between society and religion all we

can say by means of the concept of function? And is the concept of symbolic function sufficiently clear? We have gone from social functions and instrumental/non instrumental theories of ritual, to communication theories based on the idea that ritual is a particular form of social action with its own modalities of communicative and meta communicative framing; from expressive performative theories for which ritual is symbolic drama, to those based on the simple semiotic value of rite. In this perspective ritual is regulated only by formal rules and is comparable to syntactic or musical structures. This would mean that ritual actually is not a language, but something “like” a language. In this sense the inner structure of ritual is not a structure based upon meanings, but constructed only on a complex of signs. Ritual, says Staal (1975), is like a bird song.

The most recent theories are no less important and problematic. “Cognitivist” theories of ritual that turn to the psychological aspects of the representation of action ask whether the religious meaning of ritual can be reformulated in terms of the connections established by participants between representation of the ritual sequence and other types of religious assumptions. Meanwhile, “ecological” theories, for instance, examine the new space time relationship in which ritual appears as the ground for anthropological spatial direction and bodily division. The construction of time in ritual is important because ritual provides grounds for the creation and recurrence of time as well as space. Further, such ecological theories posit an essential adaptive function of rite as a type of “sanctification” of the environment in connection with the ecosystem. Burkert (1996) suggests that “through manifold forms as functions of ritual behavior and cultural interpretations, religion can still be seen to inhabit the deep values of the landscape of life.” What should be stressed here is that religion – through ritual – not only relates to the social sciences, but also connects with the ecosystem, with naturalism, and with life and biology itself.

All these contributions can be understood in a renewed epistemological context if we suppose that in the beginning religion was not a matter of reflection and consciousness, but one of simple biological and physiological *arousal* of human nature in front of the varieties of events

and situations. If we consider the links between ritual and the autonomous nervous system, it is clear that by means of (especially) repetition and formalization the system is driven unconsciously to maintain or recreate a very particular "primitive emotion." Rite stirs up an emotion that does not really reach consciousness and self awareness, but reaches deeper, into the most ancient and original point of consciousness, leading to an emotional balance, a *habit* that is not an emotion derived from a situation or routine. This is also the way to understand the "serious" or non empirical aspect of ritual.

In other words, language and consciousness are functions that are too developed for the subcortical structure of the brain. Ritual belongs to the primitive structure of humanity, dominated not by language but by physiological emotion. In this sense Langer (1969) was right to think about the "presemantic" and "preverbal" dimension of ritual. She suggested that rite belonged to a prelinguistic world and carried out a dramatic emotional logic.

Can an emotion exorcise the fear of death? Using the definition of ritual advanced here, it is easier to see the "synthetic" value of ritual and to write a new history of ritual in which it is possible to stress without contradiction its connections with social, religious, functional, biological, adaptive, and ecosystemic dimensions. This multimodality is explained by the fact that ritual arouses a deep, primitive emotion in which all is convergent.

SEE ALSO: Emotion; Cultural Aspects; Myth; Performance Ethnography; Ritual; Sacrifice; Society and Biology

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ritual

Philip Smith

Ritual involves conventionalized and stylized human actions. These are often organized with reference to overarching cultural codes, have a communicative intent, and generate powerful emotional responses among participants. Historically marginalized as a concern for anthropologists, since the cultural turn became institutionalized in social theory in the 1980s the concept of ritual has become more and more central to the sociological enterprise. The core debates revolve around the following themes: (1) whether priority should be given to analyzing rites (embodied actions, doing) or beliefs (cosmologies and symbols, thinking); (2) how a model conceived in functionalism can be adapted to include understandings of power and domination; (3) whether we should understand ritual in collectivistic or more microsocio logical ways.

The canonical text for the study of ritual in social science is Durkheim's *Elementary Forms of Religious Life*. Here, Durkheim drew upon ethnographic material about Aboriginal Australia to argue that societies needed periodically to renew social bonds and solidaristic ties. Tribal gatherings involving ritual activity – the corroboree – performed this function. They involved

the manipulation and invocation of symbols, totems, and supernatural forces; coordinated bodily motions and expressive actions, feasting and sexual activity, the enactment of myths and legends. The result was a heightened emotional sensibility and sense of excitement that Durkheim called *collective effervescence*. Durkheim emphasized the interplay of such socially integrative rites with underlying systems of belief and classification that marked out the sacred from the profane. He understood religion as this complex of cultural codes and ritual actions, and society as being founded upon this religious core. The history of ritual theory in sociology can be broadly understood as the story of elaborations upon, challenges to, and creative readings of *The Elementary Forms*.

Although he drew his material from what he thought of as a "primitive" society, Durkheim explicitly intended his insights on the characteristics and social functions of ritual to have universal relevance. Yet sociologists were slow on the uptake. When Marcel Mauss, Durkheim's nephew, wrote about *The Gift* in the 1920s, he gave more attention to theorizing exchange relationships and economic life than the ritual qualities of gift giving. In the 1930s France Bataille and the College de Sociologie were seemingly more interested in elaborating the qualities of the sacred and the ways this could be immanently experienced without the mediation of collective social activity. For this reason W. Lloyd Warner's application of the ritual model to "advanced" societies in his study of American small town life marks an important intervention. Although rather simplistic in retrospect, his analysis of America's Memorial Day ceremonies as a "cult of the dead" attempted to validate Durkheim's broader thesis. Likewise the attempt by Edward Shils and Michael Young to interpret the 1952 coronation of Queen Elizabeth II as a ritual of national communion stands out from this period. Subsequent work in the 1960s by Robert Bellah on civil religion, Edward Shils on center and periphery, and Mary Douglas on purity and pollution saw the leading Durkheimians focus once more on classifications and cosmologies rather than ritual activity. In Durkheim's own terms, scholars were looking at beliefs rather than rites, even if they bought into the general proposition that society had a quasi religious foundation. The most important

exception was the work of Victor Turner. Although Turner rarely cites Durkheim, his theorizing of the solidaristic, egalitarian, and creative social relations he called *communitas* owes a clear debt to the strand of *The Elementary Forms* concerned with ritual practices.

The period extending through the 1970s and 1980s saw the consensual normative functionalism of Durkheim and Talcott Parsons come under attack. New visions of ritual as an instrumental strategy fell into place. These directly or indirectly challenged what was seen as a cognitive and integrative bias in Durkheim's thinking, arguing instead for ritual as a form of political practice. In a seminal article, Steven Lukes (1975) argued that we needed to understand rituals as events with sponsors and as attempts at domination. David Kertzer agreed, suggesting that rituals were a medium of contestation and mobilization that could work even in the absence of an overarching consensus or set of shared beliefs. Pierre Bourdieu's analysis of gift exchange, unlike the work of Mauss, put strategy and reflexive calculation center stage. Scholars like Stuart Hall in the emergent area of cultural studies spoke of youth subcultures as "rituals of resistance" characterized by stylized critique of the dominant social order. Michel Foucault spoke of the "spectacle of the scaffold" and the ways this reproduced systems of power.

A second front against the Durkheimian mainstream emerged out of Erving Goffman's work on face to face interaction. This microsociological approach drew as much from Arnold van Gennep's (1960) early study of the "rite of passage" as from *The Elementary Forms*. Van Gennep had argued that ritual interventions were ways in which societies conferred legitimate and recognizable identities on subjects, especially at times of status transition. What Goffman (1967) called *interaction rituals* were everyday encounters between people in which appropriate displays of deference and demeanor were expected. These offered mutual confirmation of the value of the self, of social status, and of role expectations, thus providing a sense of ontological security and allowing interactions to be successfully accomplished by more or less reflexive social agents. The work of Randall Collins combined this line of thinking on ritual with that of conflict sociology, asserting that

collective identities and solidarities are built from the bottom up through *interaction ritual chains*. These not only generate pro social emotions, such as enthusiasm and esprit de corps, but also play a role in the formation of stratification hierarchies and exclusionary cliques.

The contemporary sociology of ritual continues to debate these themes, often through reinterpretations of *The Elementary Forms* itself (see Alexander & Smith 2004). Some focus on what Durkheim had to say about the sacred and profane, and see rituals as the enactment of deeply held beliefs. Others see this as idealism, point to the weak, incoherent, and inchoate nature of many belief systems, and suggest that rituals are really all about embodied and practical actions. Some look to the solidaristic, universalist, and egalitarian outcomes of rituals and others to their uses as a tool for domination; some focus on ritual and ritualization as an emergent property of action and others on ritual as the social fact that constrains and motivates action in the first place. Such underlying controversies are being played out currently in a number of established and emergent empirical domains where the concept seems to pay dividends: studies of political scandals, controversies and contests; investigations of play, sport, tourism, and pilgrimage; accounts of collective memory and commemoration; the literature on bodies, emotions, and everyday interactions; research on revolutions, protests, and collective mobilization; discussions of punishment, regulation, and control; and last but not least, of course, in the sociology of religion itself.

SEE ALSO: Durkheim, Émile; Goffman, Erving; Religion; Religion, Sociology of

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Rizal, José (1861–96)

Syed Farid Alatas

José Rizal, Filipino thinker and activist, may be considered the first systematic social thinker in Southeast Asia. While the bulk of his writings were not in the social sciences, it is possible to extract a sociological theory from his works. This would be a theory that explains the nature and conditions of Filipino colonial society, and the requirements for emancipation.

José Protasio Rizal y Alonso was born in Calamba, Laguna, the Philippines, on June 19, 1861, to a wealthy family. His father ran a sugar plantation on land leased from the Dominican Order, while his mother was a highly educated woman. Rizal was educated at home till he was 11 years of age, after which he attended the best schools in Manila. He went on to study at the Ateneo de Manila University and then the University of Santo Thomas. He was known to be a well rounded student, having studied medicine and the humanities simultaneously. In addition to being a qualified ophthalmic doctor, Rizal was also a writer, poet, ethnologist, sculptor, cartoonist, fencer, sharpshooter, and linguist (Coates 1978: 1905–6). In 1882 Rizal left for Spain where he continued his studies in medicine and the humanities at the Universidad Central in Madrid. At the same time, he became familiar with liberal movements and modern constitutions and began to draw lessons for the analysis of Spanish rule in the Philippines. Within a few years, Rizal's activities with a group of Filipino students in Madrid led to his being acknowledged as the leader of the Philippine reform movement (Coates 1978: 1906).

His first novel, *Noli Me Tangere* (*Touch Me Not*), was published in Berlin in 1887, the year that Rizal returned to the Philippines. The novel was a reflection of exploitative conditions under Spanish colonial rule and enraged the Spanish friars. Fearing for his safety, Rizal left the Philippines for Japan, the United States, and Britain in 1888. At the same time in Spain, the nationalist movement started a fortnightly newspaper, *La Solidaridad*, to which Rizal contributed. His second novel, *El Filibusterismo* (*The Revolution*), was published in 1891 in Ghent, Belgium, and thematized the

possibilities and consequences of revolution. As Rizal's political ideas became known to the authorities, he and his family suffered many hardships. His parents were dispossessed of their home and the male members deported to the island of Mondoro (Coates 1978: 1908). Rizal himself was finally exiled to Dapitan, Mindanao, from 1892 to 1896, implicated in the revolution of 1896, tried for sedition, and executed by firing squad on December 30, 1896, at the age of 35. Although he lived such a short time, his productivity remains unsurpassed by anyone in Southeast Asia, perhaps even Asia. He wrote several poems and essays, three novels, and conducted studies in early Philippine history, Tagalog grammar, and even entomology. Rizal's achievements were all the more remarkable when it is realized that great obstacles were put in the way of the educational and intellectual advancement of the Filipinos during the colonial period.

Rizal lived in colonial Filipino society and was deeply affected by the colonial exploitation of the Filipinos. The early Filipino nationalists were priests who pressed for reforms. For example, an 1826 royal decree required that parishes previously in the hands of Filipino priests be gradually returned to Spanish friars. Several Filipino priests worked for the revocation of this anti Filipino decree. Their political activities led to the execution of three Filipino priests, Mariano Gomez, José Burgos, and Jacinto Zamora in 1872. Rizal dedicated his *El Filibusterismo* to them.

Rizal also lived at a time when there was little critique of the state of knowledge on the Philippines among Spanish colonial and Filipino scholars. Rizal was well acquainted with the world of Orientalist scholarship in Europe (Mojares 2002: 54). Rizal himself took an interest in this, as can be seen in his annotated reedition of Antonio de Morga's *Sucesos de las Islas Filipinas*, which first appeared in 1609. Prior to producing this work, Morga served eight years in the Philippines as Lieutenant Governor General and Captain General as well as a justice of the Supreme Court of Manila (Audiencia Real de Manila) (Morga 1991 [1890]: xxxv). Rizal believed that Spanish colonization had virtually wiped out the precolonial past from the memory of Filipinos and presented the reedition in order to correct what he

saw as false reports and slanderous statements to be found in most Spanish works on the Philippines ("To the Filipinos," in Morga 1962 [1890]: vii). This includes the destruction of pre Spanish records such as artifacts that would have thrown light on the nature of precolonial society (Zaide 1993: 5). Rizal found Morga's work an apt choice as it was, according to Ocampo (1998: 192), the only civil history of the Philippines written during the Spanish colonial period, other works being mainly ecclesiastical histories. The problem with ecclesiastical histories, apart from the falsifications and slander, was that they "abound in stories of devils, miracles, apparitions, etc., these forming the bulk of the voluminous histories of the Philippines" (Morga 1962 [1890]: 291 n4). For Rizal, therefore, existing histories of the Philippines were false and biased as well as unscientific and irrational. Rizal's interests were thus to reform Filipino society in both sociopolitical and intellectual terms.

If we were to construct a sociological theory from Rizal's works, this would be a theory of colonial society, one that explains the nature and conditions of colonial society and the meaning and requirements for emancipation. The outline of Rizal's perspective is as follows. A corrupt Spanish colonial government and its officials oppress and exploit the Filipinos. Rizal's novels, political writings, and letters provide examples such as the confiscation of lands, appropriation of farmers' labor, high taxes, forced labor without payment, and so on (Rizal 1963a). Rizal's *Noli Me Tangere* is a diagnosis of the problems of Filipino society. This novel is a socially descriptive text in which the various characters represent the social malaise and wrongs of his time (Majul 1999: 3). Rizal was tireless in pointing out the hypocrisies of the Spaniards. He was critical of the "boasted ministers of God [the friars] and propagators of light (!) [who] have not sowed nor do they sow Christian morals, they have not taught religion, but rituals and superstitions" (Rizal 1963b: 38).

Rizal noted that the Spaniards blamed the backwardness of the Filipinos on their indolence. The Spaniards charged that the Filipinos had little love for work. Rizal, however, made a number of important points in what was the first sociological treatment of the topic (Alatas

1977: 98). First of all, Rizal noted that the “miseries of a people without freedom should not be imputed to the people but to their rulers” (Rizal 1963b: 31). Secondly, that the Filipinos are an inherently lazy people was not true. Rizal admits that there was some indolence but does not attribute it to backwardness. Rather, it was the backwardness and disorder of Filipino colonial society that caused indolence. Prior to the colonial period, Filipinos were not indolent. They controlled trade routes and were involved in agriculture, mining, manufacturing, and so on. But when their destiny was taken away from them, they became indolent. Rizal’s approach to the problem is interesting in that he made a distinction between being “indolent” as a reaction to climate, for example, and indolence in terms of the absence of love for work or the avoidance of work. The second kind of indolence was a result of the social and historical experience of the Filipinos under Spanish rule. Rizal examined historical accounts by Europeans from centuries earlier which showed Filipinos to be industrious. Therefore, indolence must have social causes and these were to be found in the nature of colonial rule (Rizal 1963c).

The backwardness of colonial society is not due to any inherent defects of the Filipino people but to the backwardness of the church. Emancipation could only come from enlightenment. Spanish colonial rule was exploitative because of the backwardness of the church in that the church was against enlightenment, the supremacy of reason. The European Enlightenment was good for Filipinos, while the church was against it because it established reason as authority, not God or the church. Thinkers such as Marx, Weber, and Durkheim were products of the Enlightenment but recognized that reason had gone wrong. Modernity, which was a creation of reason, was unreasonable because it was alienating, anomic, and ultimately irrational. It is interesting to note that Rizal, who was also writing in the nineteenth century, had a different attitude to the Enlightenment and to reason (Bonoan & Raul 1994). His writings do not show disappointment with reason and he was not dissatisfied with modernity in the way that Marx, Weber, and Durkheim were. This is probably because for Rizal the Philippines was not

modern enough and was kept backward by the anti-rational church.

This results in the emergence of the *filibustero*, the “dangerous patriot who should be hanged soon,” that is, a revolutionary. Revolution, in other words breakaway from Spanish rule and church, is inevitable and the only means of emancipation. Rizal’s *El Filibusterismo* is a prescription for revolution. His *Noli Me Tangere* of 1887 gives the impression of Rizal merely being in favor of breaking the friars’ civil power. This can be seen from the characters in the novel. The villains were the Franciscan *padres*. But the civil and military power exercised by the Spanish Captain General, a colonial officer, is rational and progressive. Elias, a noble, patriotic, and selfless Filipino, dies in the novel, while the egoist Ibarra survives. The sequel, *El Filibusterismo*, implies a shift in Rizal’s thinking. The villains are the Dominican priests as well as the Captain General, who turns out to be a mercenary. The revolution fails, reflecting Rizal’s assessment of the readiness and preparedness of the Filipinos for revolution. He saw those who would lead a revolution as working out of self interest rather than on behalf of a national community (Majul 1999: 19). Rizal was reluctant to join a revolution that was doomed to failure due to lack of preparation, the egoism of the so-called revolutionaries, and the lack of a cohesive front. Nevertheless, his very actions and writings were revolutionary and he was executed for treason against Spain.

While a serious assessment of Rizal’s studies of Filipino history and colonial society would reveal the extent to which his claims were true or exaggerated, it is important to note the contra Eurocentric significance of his works. This suggests a redefining of classical social theory, recognizing that another context of the rise of sociological theory is the historical fact of European political and cultural domination from the fifteenth century onwards, and colonization. Looking at colonized peoples as part of the process of the rise of modernity would lead to a consideration of the ideas of the contemporaries of Marx, Weber, and Durkheim in colonized areas as classical social theorists.

SEE ALSO: Colonialism (Neocolonialism); Decolonization; Eurocentrism

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robbery

Scott H. Decker

Robbery is the use or threat of force to take another's property and ranks among the most serious crime problems in the US. Robbery is one of the four crimes of violence (murder, rape, robbery, and aggravated assault) and is the second most prevalent of the four. Robbery is also a central component of the fear of crime, magnifying its impact particularly for women, the elderly, and suburban residents. As Conklin (1972: 4) has observed: "Although the public certainly fears murder and rape, it is probably fear of robbery . . . which keeps people off the street, makes them avoid strangers, and leads them to lock their doors."

Data reported to the police indicate that victims and offenders in most robberies are strangers. Robbery is a crime committed disproportionately by drug users, is more likely than other violent offenses to involve black offenders, and seldom nets large sums of money. Robbery rates are highest in urban areas. Many inner city neighborhoods experience high rates of robbery. Robbery poses a serious risk of injury or death. One in three robbery victims sustains at least minor injuries during the offense (Reaves 1993), and more than 10 percent of all homicides occur in the context of a robbery (Cook 1991).

The findings from interviews with armed robbers underscore the versatility of offending patterns among robbers, their high levels of victimization, and the role of lifestyle pressures among this group of offenders.

Jacobs (2000) conducted research among drug robbers (offenders who robbed drug dealers) in St. Louis, Missouri, a city with high levels of violence. Jacobs notes that while robbery is the "purest" of offenses with regard to motive and intent (cash), robbers engage in a variety of other offenses. The robbers interviewed by Jacobs were involved in both legal and illegal activities that involved them in a variety of contingencies that they could not escape. These individuals also had very high rates of victimization.

Wright and Decker (1997) studied 85 active armed robbers in St. Louis, Missouri, conducting interviews and "ride alongs" with

these individuals. This group of armed robbers committed a large number of diverse offenses, including burglary, drug sales, auto theft, and assault. Wright and Decker found that offenders engaged in minor forms of offending, would be victimized, and would then retaliate by engaging in a robbery. This pattern increased their level of offending, both in terms of frequency and seriousness. Not many of these offenders reported their victimization to the police. Lacking legal recourse, many offenders take the law into their own hands, circumventing legal means, and thereby increasing the odds of engaging in additional crime.

The research with armed robbers found a strong link between their lifestyle and their patterns of lawbreaking. This research has examined the separate steps in robberies: motivation, target selection, and confrontation, documenting their key components.

Most armed robbers report in interviews that the primary goal of their offense was a pressing need for cash. However, the majority of robbers report that the proceeds of their crimes did not go to pay for necessities. Rather, most indicate that they used the cash to initiate or sustain various forms of illicit street action (e.g., drinking, drug taking, gambling). Other robbers indicated that they committed robberies to ease financial burdens that were largely of their own making, such as gambling debts or other personal obligations.

Target selection among street robbers seldom matches the rational, well planned target selection process that might be imagined. Two key factors seem to be most important: the availability of good hiding places and getaway avenues. The primary goal in selecting potential victims is to select someone who appears to be carrying a good deal of cash. Often this means someone involved in criminal activities, such as a drug dealer, a customer of prostitutes, or gamblers. As Jacobs (2000) found, drug dealers can be particularly attractive targets for robbery. Other robbers may search for potential victims in environments where there is plenty of cash, such as areas around check cashing places, entertainment or restaurant districts, or automatic teller machines.

Robbery of commercial establishments takes a somewhat different form requiring considerably more planning and expertise. Only a small

proportion of the offenders in Wright and Decker's sample targeted commercial establishments. Most of these offenders targeted small local businesses such as liquor stores, taverns, or pawn shops. They claimed that they liked robbing commercial targets because they could count on the ready availability of a reasonable amount of cash – something that could not be taken for granted with many street robberies. Few of the commercial robbers could be classified as sophisticated, high level, or “professional” criminals.

The confrontation between perpetrators and victims is the final step in the robbery process. This stage of a robbery is likely to be the briefest, often taking no more than a few seconds. While robbers generally may prefer not to inflict harm, the ability to convince potential victims that they are willing to do so is an important part of being successful as a robber. Another key element of the confrontation between robber and victim is to frighten victims into compliance. This is done most effectively when a convincing illusion of impending death can be conveyed.

SEE ALSO: Crime; Index Crime; Insecurity and Fear of Crime; Property Crime; Urban Crime and Violence; Violent Crime

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Robert E. Park, Ernest W. Burgess, and urban social research

Barbara Ballis Lal

The style of social research associated with the Chicago School of American sociology owes much to the determination of Robert E. Park and his younger colleague, Ernest Burgess, to understand city life. (Park was a faculty member in the department of sociology/anthropology at the University of Chicago between 1913 and 1934. Burgess was a faculty member in the department between 1916 and 1952. In 1929 sociology and anthropology became separate departments.) Other scholars who aided them in this endeavor included W. I. Thomas, Louis Wirth, Everett Hughes, Clifford Shaw, Donald Cressey, Frederick Thrasher, St. Clair Drake, and Horace Cayton. Economic growth, industrialization, population increase, immigration, and rural-urban migration, including the large scale movement of African Americans from the South, contributed to the emergence of Chicago as a city in which diversity of occupation was complemented by differences having to do with race, ethnicity (whether or not foreign born), religion, and language. Chicago, and cities like it, differed profoundly from the rural towns that had hitherto shaped American social life and politics. What, asked Park in an essay published in 1926, is to be the basis of a “moral order” which supposes communication and obligation between individuals and groups, in an urban environment characterized by “physical propinquity” and “social isolation”? The monographs *The Crowd and the Public* (1904), *Old World Traits Transplanted*, in the most part the work of W. I. Thomas but with authorship attributed to Park and H. A. Miller (1921), and *The Immigrant Press and Its Control* (1922), along with numerous essays, reflect his concerns.

Park and Burgess enjoined faculty and graduate students to view the city of Chicago as “a social laboratory.” With this in mind, investigations proliferated of the ongoing group life of hobos, gangs, the Jews of Maxwell Street,

criminals, denizens of the gold coast and the slum, taxi hall dancers, the preachers in Bronzeville, and participants and onlookers involved in the 1919 race riot in Chicago. Each of these small scale studies was a contribution to a larger “mosaic” representing the urban context of which each was a part. Both Park and Burgess edited collections of essays suggesting future lines of research in cities (Park 1967; Burgess 1926).

Urban ethnography and the analysis of “human documents” such as newspapers, life histories, letters, and court records combined theory and empirical data. These strategies of research, although preferred, especially in the period before 1927, existed alongside of quantitative procedures based upon surveys and mapping the changing distributions of demographic and occupational statistics, land use, real estate values, vice, juvenile delinquency, and other phenomena of interest to social scientists investigating city life. Urban ethnography, that is to say, social research in a “natural setting,” directed sociologists to document and interpret the nature of social life in cities as lived experience in a specific locality. The “narrative, case study approach” insisted that the subjective point of view of the actor and the collective representations made possible by language and local narratives be collected in an effort to find out what gives meaning and purpose to the life of those groups that sociologists study. The examination of “culture as process” (Matthews 1989) animated studies such as *The Ghetto* (1928), *The Gang* (1927), *The Gold Coast and the Slum* (1929), and *The Jack Roller* (1930), *Taxi Dance Hall* (1932), and *Black Metropolis* (1945). Later sociological monographs continue to reflect the development of the tradition of urban ethnography originating at Chicago. Current emphasis on fieldwork as “a way of knowing” as well as “immersion” in the ongoing activities of a group (Emerson 2001) complements rather than diminishes Park’s injunction that sociologists study urban life and culture in much the same spirit as anthropologists study unfamiliar people in premodern settings.

Urban sociology at Chicago also developed the perspective of human ecology as a way of approaching city life. Human ecology charts the changing spatial distribution of groups, institutions, and activities, as well as examining the

distribution of a population in an occupational order. Spatial and occupational distributions result from competition among individuals and groups for both living space and an economic niche. Competition in turn results in "symbiosis," defined by Park as "the living together of distinct and dissimilar species, especially when the relationship is mutually beneficial." Symbiosis is a condition in which there is cooperation sufficient to maintain a common economy, but lacking sufficient consensus to sustain collective action. Competition is a type of "non social" interaction because there is neither communication nor the reciprocal adjustment of activity in pursuit of a common goal.

Ecological processes such as competition, "succession, and "dominance" describe observable, aggregate properties of a group. Ecological explanations are not concerned with the actor's point of view.

Human ecology made use of maps and graphic representations based on the collection of numerical data. Burgess's influential essay "The Growth of the City: An Introduction to a Research Project" (1967) displayed the physical growth and expansion of the city as a dynamic process in which a central business district "invaded" encircling zones of transition, work ingmen's homes, residential areas, and commuter suburbs. Burgess pointed out that the processes and rate of expansion of cities "may be studied not only in the physical growth and business development, but also in the consequent changes in the social organization and in personality types." He further depicted zones of the city in terms of "natural areas" which are differentiated from one another on the basis of social organization and disorganization as indicated by the occupations and mobility of residents, type of housing, land values, and the rates of crime, vice, poverty, and homelessness. Burgess's model of the growth of cities was an "ideal construction" which he thought would capture the nature of urban growth generally.

Park never confused sociology, whose objective is to study culture and communication, with human ecology. Human "society" as opposed to plant and animal "communities" exists on two levels: the "biotic" and the "cultural." These levels can be presented analytically as a "spatial pattern" and a "moral order" (Park 1952b). Human ecology deals with the "biotic" (e.g.,

the biological and the geographical) aspects of group life, while sociology investigates "culture" and the subjectively motivated activities of "persons." Human ecology is of interest because social relations are so often reflected in spatial patterns and because "social distances" are frequently expressed as physical distances. As Park's student Louis Wirth (1945) pointed out, human ecology "is not a substitute for, but a supplement to, other frames of reference and methods of social investigation." The "cultural order" is imposed upon and modifies the "ecological order."

Park, Burgess, Wirth, and other colleagues at Chicago thought that the problematic features of urban life were amenable to social reform at the local level. In this spirit these scholars participated in local political activities and joined civic organizations. They were confident that increased communication between educated urbanites informed by expert knowledge could be directed towards ameliorating social problems such as ethnic conflict, race discrimination and race riots, juvenile delinquency, vice, labor strikes, unfair employment practices, and political corruption.

SEE ALSO: Chicago School: Ecology; Ethnic Groups; Ethnography; Life History; Observation, Participant and Non Participant; Park, Robert E. and Burgess, Ernest W.; Race; Race (Racism); Social Control; Symbolic Interaction; Urban; Urbanization

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role

David D. Franks

Social role is a critical analytical tool for sociology and social psychology because it provides the nexus between social structure and individual behavior. The term role is a metaphor that comes from the theater and Shakespeare's famous statement about people playing roles

with entrances and exits throughout their lives. Social structures consist of roles or performance parts that provide vehicles for the organization of selves and social relations. People have many different sides, and different roles can produce very different behaviors from the same person. In the past century, role theory has evolved from a framework wherein "causation" flows down from preexisting roles shaping individual behavior, to a theory wherein "causation" also flows upward from social interaction to establishing a constant recreation of structure.

STRUCTURAL APPROACHES

The macro level notion of role was first presented by Park and further developed by the anthropologist Ralph Linton, and adopted by the mid century functionalists. In structural formulations a person occupies a social position. A position is a person's placement on a larger organizational map. The position has a status and one plays a behavioral role attached to the position. A status is a ranking on a continuum of invidious distinctions in social regard, importance, and privilege. Linton used status as synonymous with position and role, blurring these three meanings. Linton explained role "as the dynamic aspect of status that puts the rights and duties that constitute the status into effect." Roles usually involve a number of supporting roles referred to as *role sets*.

Role strain and role conflict illustrate two fruitful elaborations of structural role analysis. Since selves play many roles, contradictions within and between role expectations can present challenges to self formation. Persons feel *role strain* when a role important to their identity demands contradictory identities. For example, some professors feel a strain between the demands of teaching and publishing. *Role conflict* occurs when pressures arise between the demands of several roles, such as those of career and family (see Hochschild's *Commercialization of Intimate Life*, 2003). Here again, the degree to which both roles are important to the individual will determine the amount of stress felt. Insofar as adolescents care equally about what their parents and peers think of them, they are vulnerable to role conflict. Balance between

determinism and agency is maintained by considering the coping abilities of the person.

INTERACTIONAL APPROACHES

A very different micro level meaning of role comes to us from the pragmatist philosopher G. H. Mead. His conception of *role taking* stems from the insight of the Scottish philosophers that humans have the reflexive capacity to see themselves as others see them. Role taking involves imagining the other's responses to one's behavior and using this anticipation to guide one's line of conduct. Here role refers not to a theatrical part but to the *perspective* people will have towards the actor's emerging talk and gestures. This is very different from "taking on" a preexistent societal role and passively enacting its prescriptions.

Mead's formulation of role taking still remains the only thoroughly social theory available of the flexible and voluntary *self control* of behavior. In this perspective self control is also social control because the anticipated response of the other shapes the way actors manage their own oncoming behavior. It is thoroughly social because a preexistent pool of *shared* meanings must exist if actors are to respond to their oncoming behavior as would the other. Thus, role taking is decidedly more tentative and flexible than Linton's script like conception of role playing (i.e., playing out role expectations). Depending on others' overt reactions, one can change one's tone or original intention in the middle of a sentence.

Structural roles can be *played* with only minimal role taking. The teacher telling a high school class that a fact is an "empirically verifiable statement about phenomena in terms of a conceptual scheme" is surely playing the role of teacher in contrast to role taking. Role taking is thus episodic, and sociologists have inquired into those social situations that trigger role taking and those that make it relatively unnecessary (Thomas et al. 1972).

Frequently, one must role take with whole groups rather than individuals. A speaker may need to decide what Republicans would be interested in hearing in contrast to Democrats, or what freshman students can be expected to

understand rather than seniors. This is referred to as taking the role of the "generalized other." As Mills (1939) originally argued, this process allows for impersonalized, objective reflection. When people attempt to write in clear logical sequences, or to carefully follow rules of due process, they are taking the role of the generalized other. Mead associated the generalized other with taking the role of one's community. However, as communities become broader and more complicated, unified responses become problematic, as does self formation.

OTHER CONTRIBUTIONS TO INTERACTIONAL APPROACHES

Znaniecki and Lopata rejected the "confused and static image" of Linton's approach, especially his assumptions about the direction of causation where "social role is somehow a consequence of its status." According to Znaniecki and Lopata, the Lintonian model confused status with position and failed to see that the meaning of a given role could only be determined by specifying its part in the larger social placement system. She also stressed what Turner (1962) had referred to as "self other" roles (i.e., roles that are only meaningful in relation to other reciprocal roles). One actor's duty is the other actor's right.

Rather than taking roles as reified "givens," Gross and Stone suggested that roles arise out of the need for actors to be poised and readied for *relevant* interactions. Relevancy and readiness is achieved by establishing identities – placing each other on the social map in regard to the situation at hand. What is relevant in one self other role is irrelevant in another. Gross and Stone "speak of role as consensual attitudes mobilized by announced and ratified identities." Following Mead, attitudes are seen as incipient acts and meaningful discourse requires incorporating each other's incipient activities into one's emerging actions. When announcements and ratifications go awry embarrassment ensues, role performances suffer, and interactions break down. This offers another important explanation of how causation flows upward from social interaction to maintain and recreate role expectations and structure.

RALPH TURNER'S RECONCILIATION BETWEEN STRUCTURAL AND INTERACTIONAL APPROACHES

R. Turner's (1962) critical contribution to role theory offers a reconciliation of the partisan structural and interactional views of social roles. Currently, leading theorists such as Ritzer (1992) and J. Turner (2002) have stressed the importance of integrating the macro and micro levels in sociology. "Role analysis" is an important part of such integration.

For many functionalists, the motivation for role behavior consisted of three elements: the actor *conforms* to the *expectations* of others in order to gain their *approval*. While this simplification may be true in many cases, it is hardly adequate to explain the whole range of role behaviors. Therefore, R. Turner replaces *conformity* with "the efficient accomplishment of an objective." For example, a person may conform to another's linguistic style, but only as a deliberate means to enhance communication. *Expectations* are broadened to "a preparedness to interpret behavior as consistent with the role." The teacher lecturing a class from underneath the table is presumed to be making some academic point to be explained later in the lecture. The president who misnames his staff in public is seen as "being preoccupied with more important matters." Finally, rather than seeking *approval* per se, we are more usually "confirming an identity," as with the delinquent who is trying to demonstrate what a "bad actor" he or she is by being as offensive as possible.

For R. Turner, a role is a loosely shared mental set or gestalt. The actor's task is to act in a way that can be plausibly interpreted as congruent with the role. The audience's contribution is a willingness to interpret behavior as congruent with the role. As the ethnomethodologists have shown, actors will go to extremes in order to explain away inconsistencies in roles, thus rendering others' behavior intelligible.

In regard to transcending the overconformist implications of the old role theory, Turner has made it possible for a normal person to act in a way contrary to social expectations and simultaneously be effective socially. The role playing scheme in functionalism placed such novel behavior outside of normality because

conformity and the approval motive formed the exclusive explanation for routine social behavior.

ROLE MAKING

R. Turner's broader and more "agentive" analysis allows him to talk about role *making* as well as role playing, wherein two people interpret each other's behavior within the loose framework of very general roles, and make their own unique relationships within that role. This allows more room for creativity, spontaneity, and authenticity in role behavior. Formal situations limit role making, but it is fostered in everyday informal situations. Role making stresses the importance of the other person's anticipated response rather than merely playing out a self sufficient script that is independent of the other persons involved in the role. In replacing *expectations* with "preparedness to interpret behavior as consistent with the role," much depends on the ability to "take each other's meanings." This puts a premium on role taking because the confirmation of one's identity is contingent on others. Role taking is thus at the heart of R. Turner's analysis of role making.

OTHER USES OF ROLE THEORY

Baker and Faulkner focus on roles as resources strategically used to gain access to other beneficial roles. Stryker (1980), McCall and Simmons (1978) and Peter Burke have emphasized the human tendency to identify more strongly with roles congruent with important self conceptions and to show "role distance" in roles contradicting these self conceptions. This "role identity" framework articulates in detail the close connection between roles and self. The self conception is comprised of the differential emotional attachments to the various roles played. Generally, performance is better when role and self concept are congruent.

CURRENT ASSESSMENT

The broader contribution of Ralph Turner's movement from oversimplified, fixed scripts to

self other processes is that he avoids the old parochial split between micro and macro level thinking. Currently, the aim of role analysis is simultaneously to handle the reality of constraints in social structure as well as the more "processual" character of the production of action by individuals engaged in self other roles. Scheff warns that macrostructural concepts are certainly necessary, but to the extent that they are not related point by point to micro processes, they become reifications hovering detached from empirical grounding in the activities of real people. The history of role theory shows consistent movement toward demonstrating how micro and macro levels are inseparably implicated in each other.

Among those most dedicated to moving role analysis towards an empirically testable theory are Stryker (1980), R. Turner (1962), and J. Turner (1989). They have consistently contributed to isolating "if/then" statements of general tendencies in role behavior into a more tightly integrated whole.

SEE ALSO: Gender Ideology and Gender Role Ideology; Generalized Other; Interaction Order; Interpersonal Relationships; Mead, George Herbert; Reference Groups; Role Taking; Role Theory; Self; Status

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role-taking

Steven P. Dandaneau

Role taking refers to social interaction in which people adopt and act out a particular social role. If, adapting Shakespeare, society is a stage, then people may be thought of as social actors performing roles, each the other's fellow player. Rendered more clinically, and following Ralph H. Turner, role taking is a process of anticipating and viewing behavior as motivated by an imputed social role. From the child playing at being "a mother" to the adult playing at being "a police officer," role taking is a ubiquitous feature of social life. This initial definition belies, however, considerable theoretical and, even more so, empirical complexity.

The original impetus to conceive role taking as an elementary feature of social life is found in the pragmatist social psychology of George Herbert Mead. In Mead's view, society is best understood not as any sort of organic or mechanical object but as an open ended symbolic universe created and recreated through ongoing, emergent, and ultimately indeterminate symbolic interaction. This constantly (even though usually subtly) changing symbolic universe mediates all major facets of human experience, as in the title of his most famous collection of lectures, *Mind, Self, and Society* (1934).

For Mead, the process of "taking the role of the other" is, however, no simple process. From one perspective, Mead theorizes the growing complexity of role taking as roughly corresponding to stages in the development of perceived "Otherness." In the "play stage," the initial and most rudimentary, the roles that are taken, so to speak, are simple, derived typically from proximate experience, and discrete. Children who play at being "a mother," for example, at first typically model their own mother's expected and routine behavior. Whether or not this "mother" bore the child, is a woman, or contributed genetic material to the children's biological origin are equally beside the point. The child's general notion of a symbolically defined mothering role is initially derived from imitation of a specific instance of mothering, and is only later expanded, conceptually abstracted, and complicated on the basis of additional social experience.

The “game” stage follows. In game, the roles taken are multiple and related systematically by rules. Mead employs the example of “ball nine,” or baseball, to illustrate this stage of role taking competence. If a batter strikes the ball to the short stop and all the short stop’s fellow defenders, from the third baseman to the right fielder, join her in charging the ball, evidence would be had of a team not yet having mastered role taking at the game level of interactional skill. People who have witnessed children clumped together around a soccer ball as it makes its way up and down a pitch have observed an exactly similar phenomenon. If, however, the same batted ball leads the short stop to charge the ball and the first baseman to retreat to her own bag in anticipation of a successful catch and throw from the short stop, or if a soccer team’s players space themselves across a pitch in order better to deploy a strategy to maintain possession of the ball, and only ultimately direct it toward the opponent’s goal, then there is evidence of these teammates taking one another’s roles as though toward themselves and, thus, of the game stage of role taking.

Implied in the above is an expansive view of role taking, which is typical of Mead and of great significance to sociology. Indeed, Mead’s final stage of role taking, the so called generalized other stage, implies that humans can and must come to see their actions as more than simply behavior aligned with the rule governed actions of others as these same others present themselves through narrowly defined roles. Taking the role of the generalized other means taking the attitude of some abstract community toward oneself. The boundaries of community are conceptually indeterminate. Even though he never traveled from his hometown of Königsberg, Immanuel Kant imagined life on other planets and, not incidentally, conceived a universal humanity. Whereas in game, then, one might say to oneself, “if I were the short stop who was mindful of the rules and game situation, I would respond to the ball being struck in that direction by . . .,” today’s social actors who take the role of the generalized other would typically need to position themselves in a symbolic universe that is ever more integrated and independent on a planetary scale and therefore requiring each actor to relate her action and attitudes to those of her fellow six plus

billion earthlings. “If I were a slave on a coca plantation in Côte d’Ivoire, how would I view Tiger Woods’s notable success at the annual golf tournament in Dubai?” In this view, critically discussed by Walter Coutu as a psychological rather than a sociological phenomenon, role taking is but a narrow version of attitude taking, but from attitude taking worlds are won and lost.

Mead is the first but far from the last influential social theorist to place role taking at the center of their social view. Mid century luminaries as divergent as Talcott Parsons, on the one hand, and Hans H. Gerth and C. Wright Mills, on the other, also regarded role taking as elemental to a general theory seeking to trace the linkages between social institutions and individuals. In *The Social System* (1951), Parsons construes roles as component parts of group structure, where groups are then incorporated schematically into the functionally differentiated institutional subsystems of the social system itself. Parsons conceptually divides role from “status,” the latter defined as a social location or position and the former a set of actions generally prescribed for those who occupy a particular position. He also elaborates on such basic sociological concepts as role differentiation, role expectations, and role conflict. Even though Parsons’s exposition is decidedly weighted in the direction of stressing the objective, constraining properties of the social role, his sociology is necessarily drawn to role taking as a means for explaining socialization in particular, and societal reproduction generally.

In *Character and Social Structure* (1953), Gerth and Mills use the concept of “role” as the chief mediating concept between character structure and social structure. As these authors stress, roles are inherently interpersonal. Role taking always occurs in relation to the expectations of others and with respect to shared understandings of given social situations. And more than does Parsons, Gerth and Mills are wont to stress the constructed nature of roles, that is, that actors possess the power not only to enact roles but also to alter them by their actions, recast them altogether, or, as Ralph H. Turner also emphasized with his notion of *role making*, create new roles out of whole cloth. This attention to agency is also reflected in Gerth and Mills’s relatively historical approach

to role taking. Whereas Parsons's social system is typically understood *in abstracto* and in stasis, Gerth and Mills are interested in the relationship between an open ended role taking and an equally open ended history making.

The enigmatic "dramaturgical" sociology of Erving Goffman provides a third and, to some extent, synthetic mid century approach to role taking in sociology. In Goffman's view, people do not play roles so much as roles play people. That is, for Goffman, there is no moral substratum providing a transcendent basis for humanity lying beyond role playing itself. We are what we make ourselves to be on the stage of life and no more (and no less). To rid sociology of its humanistic metaphysics, Goffman attended scrupulously to such phenomena as that highlighted by the title of his first and perhaps most famous book, *The Presentation of Self in Everyday Life* (1956). Thus, Goffman no less than Parsons is interested in carefully mapping a detailed, complex social world of roles, stages, and scripts, but he is also, as with Gerth and Mills, keenly attentive to the creativity and critical historical significance of social actors.

One superb if perhaps also ironic contemporary application of Goffman's approach to sociology is found in Bogdan and Taylor's (1989) study of "the social construction of humanness," a process they studied with respect to people who are severely disabled. Bogdan and Taylor's focus is not disabled persons per se but those who interact with them, such as family members and medical personnel. When these people act toward persons who are disabled in ways that attribute thinking, highlight individuality and reciprocity, and incorporate the disabled person as a player in the life of the larger group, they are, for Bogdan and Taylor, actively creating humanness. These efforts are often necessitated because, as Goffman (1964) himself had shown, persons with disabilities are typically the victims of "stigma" or "spoiled identity," which, by definition, is dehumanizing. Bogdan and Taylor's is a critical social psychology that presents empirical evidence of ongoing efforts to challenge the prevailing yet harmful stigmatization of the disabled role, and as such demonstrates the duality of roles as both constructed and constraining.

Another important contemporary application of role taking theory is given in Arlie Russell

Hochschild's *The Managed Heart* (1983). Hochschild studies what she terms "the commercialization of human feelings" through a close up examination of flight attendants and, to a lesser extent, bill collectors. Would be flight attendants and, in a converse way, bill collectors are required to engage in workplace role playing that drains them of their emotional energy, whether in politely providing face to face service for airline passengers or in aggressively creating alarm among debtors interacted with via telephone. Hochschild's study stimulated considerable research on role taking with respect to human emotions, the construction of gender, and the distinctive characteristics of workplace alienation in post industrial economies.

As Clifford Geertz once observed, social science often "blurs genres" by using borrowed metaphors such as text, game, and drama. Role taking is a prominent example of the last. While the concept of role has been subjected to sustained criticism for over 50 years, including especially by feminist scholars (see Connell 1987, but also Komarovsky 1992), it is perhaps more the case that it has been so criticized due to its elemental standing among sociology's most basic concepts than for essential reasons deriving from inherent limitations or necessarily adverse consequences that follow from its use. It is, after all, a concept, and a heavily metaphorical one at that. As such, its value to sociology is very much dependent on its use and abuse by practicing sociologists and their readers. Criticism aside, then, the concept of role taking has the advantage of emphasizing the interactional nature of social order and, equally as well, disorder, and of linking contemporary sociology in the postmodern world to its not so distant origins in what C. Wright Mills called the classical tradition of sociology. The critical empirical question remains as to whether or not role taking is an everyday occurrence in societies the world over. Evidence seems to suggest that it is; that children are, as Mead put it, wont to "play at some thing," even if that something might involve a hand held video game that offers up a cyber stage on which fictional characters carry out fictional interactions, replicating the old fashioned world of face to face human interaction such as one still occasionally finds in a game of ball nine.

SEE ALSO: Dramaturgy; Game Stage; Generalized Other; Goffman, Erving; Interaction; Komarovsky, Mirra; Mead, George Herbert; Mills, C. Wright; Parsons, Talcott; Play Stage; Role; Role Theory

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role theory

Michelle J. Hindin

Role theory is designed to explain how individuals who occupy particular social positions are expected to behave and how they expect others to behave. Role theory is based on the observation that people behave predictably and that an individual's behavior is context specific, based on their social position and situation. Role theory is often described using the metaphor of the theater.

There has been substantial debate over the meaning of the key concept in role theory: that of role. A role can be defined as a social position, behavior associated with a social position, or a typical behavior. Some theorists have suggested that roles are expectations about how an individual ought to behave, while others consider how individuals actually behave in a given social position. Others have suggested that a role is a characteristic behavior or expected behavior, a part to be played, or a script for social conduct. Although the word role (or roll) has existed in European languages for centuries, as a sociological concept the term has only been around since the 1920s and 1930s. It became more prominent in sociological discourse through the theoretical works of Mead, Moreno, and Linton.

Two of Mead's concepts – the mind and the self – are the precursors to role theory. The mind emerges through communication with others during childhood. Children develop the capacity to extrapolate from communications with others and eventually learn how and when to respond to others. Mead's concept of the self includes three stages of development. In the initial stage, infants interact or "play" with others and eventually are able to empathize with or take on the role of others. In the second stage, referred to as the "game," the child becomes sophisticated enough to play multiple roles, first consecutively then playing several roles at once.

The child must be able to understand and anticipate the behaviors of other people, and then cast herself into their roles in order to play her own role. Once the child is able to understand and internalize the roles of multiple others, the child is able to interact with groups or the society. In this third stage, Mead refers to the ability to take on the role of the “generalized other.” Individuals take on the values, norms, and beliefs of a group or society. Moreno used a dramaturgical approach of role playing to learn how taking on different roles is related to changing behaviors. Linton also contributed to the concept of a role by making the distinction between a status or position and a role. Linton considered a status as a collection of rights and duties, while a role is the dynamic aspect of a status.

In summary, theorists have used the term role to connote characteristic behaviors, social parts to be played, or social conduct, depending on the theorist’s definition. While some agreement exists that the basic concerns of role theory are with characteristic behaviors, parts to be played, and scripts for behavior, theorists differ on whether roles are norms, beliefs, or preferences. Because the term is used in everyday language, imprecision in the sociological definition has led to misinterpretations of role theory itself and some disagreement concerning key aspects of role theory (e.g., whether expectations about behaviors associated with social positions are based on norms, beliefs, or preferences).

TYPES OF ROLE THEORY

Depending on the general perspective of the theoretical tradition, there is a range of “types” of role theory. For example, there is a more functional perspective of role theory, which can be contrasted with the more micro level approach of the symbolic interactionist tradition. The type of role theory will dictate how closely related individuals’ actions are to the society, as well as how empirically testable a particular role theory perspective may be.

Functional role theory emerged out of Linton’s perspective on roles, as well as functionalism as described by Parsons. Under functional role theory, roles are considered to be prescriptive and based on a shared understanding of

expectations. These roles are learned and individuals are expected to conform to roles and sanction others who deviate from their roles. One of the key aspects of functional role theory is that the social system is considered stable. Individuals within this perspective learn roles which are normative expectations that dictate appropriate behavior. With the general decline of functionalism starting in the mid 1970s, the functional role theory perspective has faded in importance. As with functionalism in general, functional role theory is limited by the fact that social positions and roles are not necessarily clearly delineated or fixed and that most social systems are not stable.

Symbolic interactionist role theory is based on Mead’s development of the mind and self. Roles are learned through social interaction, and unlike functional role theorists, symbolic interactionist role theorists suggest that norms are developed through social interaction and are therefore less prescriptive. This perspective on role theory is the one most closely linked with the theater and the writings of Simmel and Goffman’s “looking glass self.” Theorists coming to role theory from the symbolic interactionist tradition consider how roles are played out and how this playing out of roles impacts on both the actor and others. There is often little attention to actors’ expectations for other persons or to structural constraints on expectations and roles. For this type of role theory, the research tends primarily to be ethnographic and of limited generalizability.

Structural role theory is the perspective most related to the dramaturgical tradition. Structural role theory considers roles as parts played by actors in scripts written by society. The social structure or script is relatively fixed, much like in the functionalist perspective. Society is described as a system of functional substructures and actors learn their roles through repeated interactions. Individuals generally interact in groups delineated by people with shared goals and who are therefore willing to cooperate. Despite shared goals, not everyone has the same role within a group. It is unclear from this type of role theory how social change is accomplished and what happens to actors who choose not to conform to the groups’ shared goals.

Organizational role theory is concerned with the role of formal organizations and how

individuals interact with these organizations. Roles are associated with social positions and come from normative expectations generated by the organization. An individual's roles are based both on normative expectations from a given social position as well as from informal groups within the organization. This perspective on role theory allows for role conflict and role strain. Organizational role theory has often been used for business applications, as well as among psychologists and sociologists interested in organizational theory. This perspective has been used to do empirical analyses more often than some of the other perspectives.

Cognitive role theory has most often been applied by social psychologists. This perspective focuses on the relationship between the individual, role expectations, and behaviors. It is one of the perspectives that has generated more empirical research. There are several subfields of cognitive role theory. The first looks at role playing along the lines of the work of Moreno. A second subfield considers the roles of leaders and followers within groups. A third branch considers the relationship between an individual's beliefs about behavior and the beliefs of others. A final branch emerged out of Mead's work on role taking. This perspective, with its emphasis on individual behavior and roles, minimizes the importance of social positions and social structures.

KEY CONCEPTS

Consensus is used by role theorists to denote agreement among expectations that are held by various people. Underlying consensus or "disensus" is the question of under what conditions are the individual and others likely to agree or disagree about role definitions. Consensus is most likely to occur when individuals have been socialized in a similar way or when individuals have experience in similar types of interactions. Social psychologists view negotiation as a key way to overcome disagreements about role definitions.

Role strain refers to the difficulty of meeting the normative expectations of the roles that an individual either chooses or is pressured to play.

Role strain or role pressure may arise when there is a conflict in the demands of roles, when an individual does not agree with the assessment of others concerning his or her performance in roles, or from accepting roles that are beyond an individual's capacity. An individual may have limited power to negotiate away from accepting roles that cause strain because he or she is constrained by the societal norms, or because the individual has limited social status relegating him or her to having a poorer hand for negotiation. Role strain is often described as a conflict within a role. For example, in the role of a professor, strain may be caused by the demands of teaching a course well and the demands of submitting research grants. Within role strain there are two commonly used subtypes: role overload and role conflict.

Role conflict occurs when people experience contradictory or incompatible expectations based on the roles they occupy. For example, parents may experience role conflict when an employer requires overtime hours while their young children need their attention. This is a conflict across two or more roles rather than within a role. Another type of role conflict occurs when there is a mismatch of expectations, poor communication of the demands of the role, or conflicting demands within a role. For example, the principal of a school may need to cut after school activities due to limited funding for such programs and the demands of the school board. However, cutting after school programs would be harmful for the students and parents. The concept of role conflict may bridge the experiences of individuals in particular roles with the societal or cultural expectations for those roles. The concept of role conflict is generally attributed to the functionalist perspective on role theory.

Role overload occurs when an individual is unable to perform all of his or her expected roles. For example, a woman who occupies the roles of a full time employee, mother, and daughter may feel she has too many roles and therefore does not have the time, energy, or resources to perform all of them to the satisfaction of others or the society. An area of growing empirical research considers whether the benefits of multiple roles outweigh the stress caused by them.

SEE ALSO: Goffman, Erving; Mead, George Herbert; Simmel, Georg; Role; Role Taking; Social Psychology

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Rosenberg, Morris (1922–92)

Elena Fazio and Kim Nguyen

An American social psychologist, Morris (Manny) Rosenberg was a leading scholar in the study of the self concept and a significant contributor to the intellectual and scientific advancement of the broader discipline of sociological social psychology. Over the course of his long and prolific career, Manny advanced sociological inquiry theoretically, methodologically,

and substantively by critically addressing a host of social psychological issues; pioneering methodological practices with the use of large scale samples and codifying the logic of survey data analysis; and carrying out an impressive range of research efforts. While his scholarly interests spanned a wide spectrum of sociological concerns, including political ideology and behavior, occupations and values, class stratification, social distance, and mass communication, it would ultimately be his intellectual engagement with self concept research – particularly the dimension of self esteem – for which he would become best known.

Rosenberg received his masters and doctoral degrees from Columbia University where he studied under the guidance of C. Wright Mills, Paul Lazarsfeld, and Robert K. Merton – eminent sociologists whose careful attention to the oretical and methodological issues would later influence his own work. After graduating in 1953, Rosenberg spent the early part of his career teaching at Cornell and Columbia universities before moving on to the Laboratory of Socio Environmental Studies at the National Institute of Mental Health, first as chief of the Section on Social Studies in Therapeutic Settings and subsequently as chief of the Section on Social Structure. During this period – which would span nearly two decades – Rosenberg also held visiting professorships at various universities, including Stanford University and the London School of Economics and Political Science. In 1975 he went on to become professor of sociology at the University of Maryland, where he stayed until his death in 1992.

Over his lifetime Rosenberg also authored or edited numerous books, including *The Language of Social Research* (1955) with Lazarsfeld, *Occupations and Values* (1957), *Society and the Adolescent Self Image* (1965), *The Logic of Survey Analysis* (1968), *Conceiving the Self* (1979), and *Social Psychology: Sociological Perspectives* (1981), co edited with Ralph Turner. Rosenberg's characteristic imprint is evident throughout these endeavors, with their rigorous wedding of theory and research, application of suitable methodology, and incorporation of interdisciplinary research.

Of particular importance was his research and writing on the self and self processes. Through

these efforts, Rosenberg became a leading figure in reviving scholarly interest in the self concept that had been lying fairly dormant for the larger part of a half century. Despite the fact that Cooley had laid out the conceptual groundwork for the sociological study of the self concept as early as 1902, sociological publication on the self concept did not emerge until the mid 1950s. Scholarship on the self has since flourished as an area of sociological inquiry and Rosenberg's work on the self concept remains at the forefront of social psychological research, serving to explain the importance of self esteem, and more generally, the importance of research on the self concept in the theoretical and empirical work of the discipline.

In his groundbreaking book *Society and the Adolescent Self Image*, Rosenberg undertook the first large scale systematic study of the self concept. Employing a sample of over 5,000 adolescents, he examined the influence of social structure, culture, context, and interpersonal relations on shaping self esteem and how self esteem affects social behavior. Defined as a positive or negative attitude toward oneself – an overall evaluation of one's self worth – self esteem was viewed as an important determinant of well being but one that had received little sociological attention until that time.

For the study, Rosenberg developed a 10 item global self esteem scale. Today, the Rosenberg Self Esteem Scale remains the most widely used self esteem measure in social science research. Its popularity, Rosenberg suspected, was attributed in part to the conciseness of the research instrument and, consequently, its easy adoption by interested investigators. While retaining the reliability and validity of comparable but more elaborate measures previously developed by psychologists, Rosenberg's self esteem scale was constructed with an economy and conceptual appropriateness amenable to social survey research. His accomplishment helped bridge the gap between the disciplines of sociology and psychology and renewed research on the self and self processes.

In a later classic of the self concept literature, *Conceiving the Self*, Rosenberg expanded the theoretical framework for thinking about the self concept that has remained central to the study of self within sociology as well as related

disciplines. Conceptualizing the self as “the totality of the individual's thoughts and feeling having reference to himself as object” (1979: 7), Rosenberg set forth a detailed cartography of the self concept, mapping out its motives and structure (forms, content, dimensions, boundaries) and delineating four fundamental principles underlying the process of self concept formation – reflected appraisals, social comparison, self attribution, and psychological centrality.

Drawing on three survey data sets, Rosenberg identified the conditions under which these self processes operate and analyzed how larger social forces, such as social structural position and institutional context – through their bearing on self formation processes – exercised their influence on the self and are in turn shaped by it. A central theme throughout Rosenberg's analyses is this idea that the self concept is not merely a social product but also a social force.

With respect to the larger discipline, Rosenberg co edited with Ralph Turner an authoritative reference on the field, *Social Psychology: Sociological Perspectives*. Commissioned by the Social Psychology Section of the American Sociological Association (ASA), the book was an official effort to offer a sociological perspective on an emerging discipline in need of theoretical and empirical synthesis. At the same time, the volume was notable for its attention to interdisciplinary work, especially its attempt to unite contributions from psychology. For this undertaking, Rosenberg and Turner organized a broad and diverse set of topics around five parts – theoretical orientation, socialization, social interaction, society and social behavior, and society and personality – with each capturing various styles and approaches to the subject area from outstanding authorities in the field. The handbook has since become a landmark collection in social psychology.

Beyond these contributions, Manny's scholarship touched upon other areas as well, although these interests have received relatively less attention, such as his inquiries into other aspects of the self such as mattering, his reflection on the relationship between reflexivity and emotions, and his turn toward a more symbolic interactionist position at the end of his life, apparent in his last book, *The Unread Mind* (1992).

A dedicated sociological social psychologist, Manny's enduring contributions to sociology rest with his innovative study of methodology, values, and self and self processes. These achievements – particularly his conceptualization of the self concept and his extensive work on one component of the self concept, self esteem – stand as permanent legacies to the field. His theoretical, methodological, and substantive efforts, furthermore, have left behind a remarkable body of work that has influenced generations of subsequent scholars within and outside the discipline in their intellectual pursuits. Inquiries about Rosenberg's self esteem scale regularly flow into the Foundation that bears his name. Questions and correspondence about research based on his self esteem measure come from scholars in child and adolescent health research, sociology, occupational therapy, nursing, social work, psychology, and beyond. The sheer volume of research produced outside the field of sociology, based on his work, is a true testament to Rosenberg's broad reaching ideas and his emphasis on interdisciplinary scholarship.

SEE ALSO: Cooley, Charles Horton; Merton, Robert K.; Mills, C. Wright; Self; Self Concept; Self Esteem, Theories of; Social Psychology

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Rosenfeld, Rachel (1948–2002)

Stephanie Moller

Rachel Rosenfeld established herself as a leading figure in sociology through groundbreaking research on the diversity of occupational mobility patterns. Rosenfeld's interest in diversity emerged during her youth when she witnessed the effects of institutionalized school segregation in Little Rock, Arkansas. Her interests expanded during her undergraduate studies at Carleton College and graduate studies at the University of Wisconsin at Madison, where she learned more about the women's movement and gender scholarship (during the late 1960s and early 1970s).

Rosenfeld began studying sociology during a period of social change and unrest; a period when diversity and difference influenced public discourse. Yet, only a small segment of the sociological community had embraced such an orientation to diversity. Indeed, among mobility scholars, substantial research focused on intergenerational mobility among white men, with little attention to variations based on race, ethnicity, or gender. To the extent that researchers had examined women's mobility, they only examined the link between fathers' and daughters' occupations. Thus, Rosenfeld was poised to profoundly influence the discipline through her interest in difference and her exceptional understanding of quantitative methods.

In 1976, under the advisement of her esteemed mentor Aage Sørensen, Rosenfeld earned her PhD in sociology, with a concentration in economics and statistics. She began her career as an assistant professor at McGill University. During her first three years at McGill, she published research on women's career and mobility patterns in the top sociology journals, including the *American Sociological Review*, *Social Forces*, *Social Science Research*, and *Demography*. This marked the beginning of a productive and influential career. Rosenfeld's research illuminated the diversity of mobility patterns by showing that mothers' employment patterns are important determinants of women's intergenerational mobility

(Rosenfeld 1978); that occupational sex segregation impacts women's mobility and wages (Wolf & Rosenfeld 1978; Rosenfeld 1983); and that mobility patterns vary by gender and race (Rosenfeld 1980).

Early in her career, Rosenfeld left academia to work for the National Opinion Research Center (1978–81), where she conducted research on farm women (Rosenfeld 1985). After this brief divergence, Rosenfeld returned to the academy as an Assistant Professor of Sociology at the University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill, where she continued her research on careers and mobility. Later in her career, Rosenfeld broadened her influence to the cross national literature through collaborative research on comparative income inequality and job shifting patterns (Rosenfeld & Kalleberg 1990; Trappe & Rosenfeld 1998).

In addition to her outstanding research, Rosenfeld influenced the discipline through exceptional mentoring of future scholars that culminated in numerous mentoring awards. These awards included the Sociologists for Women in Society Award for Outstanding Mentoring in 1992 and the first Graduate Student Association Award for Excellence in Mentoring at the University of North Carolina's Department of Sociology in 1998. These awards acknowledged Rosenfeld's efforts to embrace the differences among her students and colleagues. In essence, Rosenfeld's mentoring style reflected the goals of her research: to uncover difference and diversity.

At the time of her death, Rachel Rosenfeld was a distinguished professor and the chair of the Sociology Department at the University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill and recent president of the Southern Sociological Society. Rosenfeld's presidential address to the society in 2002 was published in *Social Forces* (Rosenfeld 2002). This address allowed her an uncanny opportunity to discuss her life, her research, and the state of gender scholarship. Rosenfeld's legacy is lasting because she demonstrated how sociological processes work differently for different groups in society. Her research helped pioneer a burgeoning subfield in sociology, entitled *race, gender, and class*.

SEE ALSO: Difference; Doing Gender; Inequality/Stratification, Gender; Intergenerational

Mobility: Core Model of Social Fluidity; Occupational Mobility; Occupational Segregation; Stratification, Gender and

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routine activity theory

Sharon Chamard

Routine activity theory is a theoretical approach that explains the components of a criminal incident. It breaks down a crime into three basic elements: (1) a likely offender, (2) a suitable target, and (3) the absence of a capable guardian. It is only when these three elements converge in time and space that a crime occurs. Despite this focus on the crime event, routine activities is considered a macro level theory, as it concerns how broad changes in society lead to alterations in community life that create new opportunities for crime.

Routine activities is one of a constellation of theoretical approaches generally referred to as environmental criminology. These approaches include rational choice, crime pattern theory, situational crime prevention, and explanations for victimization that focus on lifestyles. Routine activities draws upon the work of early human ecologists such as Amos Hawley and members of the Chicago School (such as Parks and Burgess) who looked at the relationship between humans and the environment.

Unlike many theories attempting to explain criminal behavior, routine activities does not spend much time trying to explain why offenders do what they do in terms of motivation or preexisting factors that predispose a person to break the law. The assumption is that there is a large group of persons who have the potential, or the likelihood, to be offenders, and crime only occurs when the likely offender comes into contact with a good target and there is no capable guardian around to prevent the interaction. Routine activities is thus a theory of crime, not a theory of criminality.

A suitable target can be a person or an item. What makes a target attractive or desirable to likely offenders depends on four things included in the VIVA acronym: value, inertia, visibility, access. More valuable items are typically more attractive to thieves because they can be converted to more cash than can less valuable objects. The idea of value applies to persons as well. Certain people may be targeted because they have a characteristic that is appealing to the offender. Rapists tend to prefer younger women. Armed robbers victimize those who would be expected to have money or other valuables. Inertia refers to how easily an item can be carried away. Small, light items are ideal theft targets, while heavy objects generally have a low risk of theft, unless they have wheels. If the target is visible, it will more easily capture the eye of a potential thief, hence the good advice to keep valuables in your trunk and close your curtains at night. Items that are accessible are more suitable as targets than those that are locked up or in an area that cannot be easily entered.

Routine activities differs from many approaches to explaining crime because it mentions the absence of something as a contributing factor to crime events. When guardians are

not present, there is nothing to protect the target from the predations of the likely offender. Crime can be the result. It is explicit in routine activities that a capable guardian is seldom a police officer. Rather, a capable guardian is most probably a property owner, friend, family member, employer, or passer by.

Like other theoretical approaches with a connection to the Chicago School and environmental criminology, routine activities emphasizes the importance of temporal and spatial factors. It recognizes that crime cannot be explained solely in terms of characteristics of offenders, but that environmental factors are as, or more, important. It is intuitively obvious that patterns of criminal behavior vary from place to place – your car is much more likely to be stolen or broken into if it is parked in a public parking lot than in your residential garage – and across different time periods. Why an area might be safe during the day but dangerous at night has a lot to do with who is using the space at particular times. During traditional business hours, a downtown park might be filled with lunching office workers, food vendors, and elderly people feeding pigeons and so on. While there may be plenty of suitable targets, there are also many capable guardians. The same park at night might be populated with drunks staggering home from the taverns, youth hanging out, and a few straggling commuters. There may be fewer targets compared to the day when the park is bustling with activity, but capable guardians are in short supply.

The routine activities approach was developed by Lawrence Cohen and Marcus Felson, and was proposed in a 1979 article in the prominent journal *American Sociological Review*. Cohen and Felson (1979) attempted to explain the paradox of dramatic increases in crime from 1960 to 1975, while during that same 15 year period the social factors that supposedly cause crime had changed for the better: in urban areas there were reductions in poverty and unemployment, and increases in income and average education level. The traditional criminological theories seemed of little use to account for the increases in violent crime or property crime.

Cohen and Felson, then, looked at how crime rates might be related to broader social and technological patterns. They observed that the *routine activities* of people had changed.

Routine activities refer to “recurrent and prevalent activities” that people do to meet their needs. These activities can occur at home or away from home, and include going to work or school, shopping, socializing, and playing. Cohen and Felson argued that during the 1960s, more women entered the workforce or post secondary education, and there were more households comprising one person. People also traveled out of town more. These changes pointed to what Cohen and Felson termed a “dispersion of activities away from households.”

As more people’s routine activities took them away from their homes, there was less guardianship of those homes, and hence more burglary. As mothers moved into the workplace, there was less supervision of children and teenagers. This did two things: it increased their risk of victimization (because no adults were around to protect them) and also increased the chances they would become involved in criminal activity.

In addition to changes in daily life on the home front, the movement of women into the workplace and college created more targets for opportunistic offenders in public life. Commuting places people and their property, especially their vehicles, at high risk for victimization, relative to staying at home. People coming together in schools and in work settings likewise create new criminal opportunities.

Beyond these demographic changes, routine activities also considers technological changes with respect to crime rates. Positing that aspects of a physical item are strongly related to its “attractiveness” to motivated offenders, Cohen and Felson (1979) found that the supply and characteristics of “durable goods” (such as television sets and cars) were strongly associated with levels of property crime. Over the years 1960 to 1970 there was a dramatic increase in the number of motor vehicles and electronic household appliances sold, and hence an increase in the number of potential targets. These targets also became more *suitable* because they became lighter and, in many cases, smaller. During this period, products with relatively high “values per pound” (e.g., home entertainment items) and those that have low inertia, meaning they are easily transportable (e.g., motor vehicles and bicycles), comprised a large and hugely disproportionate majority of stolen items.

Also during the 1960s the amount of goods sold increased, even as the number per person of business establishments selling durable goods remained fairly constant. Businesses themselves were busier, but a smaller proportion of the workforce was employed as salespeople, so there were fewer employees to keep an eye on customers. This, coupled with changes in retailing practice that made shopping a largely self service activity, contributed to an increase in shoplifting.

A significant change in the routine activities approach was the explicit addition of concepts from Travis Hirschi’s control theory. Felson (1986) summarized the four components of control theory – attachment, commitment, involvement, and belief – with one word: *handle*. Society controls people, argued Felson, by making them fear the consequences of bad behavior (their future will be jeopardized or they will damage their relationships with friends and family) and placing practical limitations on behavioral options by encouraging involvement in conventional activities and by manipulating belief systems to make people feel guilty when they are bad. The social bond we have to others is the “handle” that can be used to informally control our behavior. The “intimate handler” became a fourth element of the routine activities approach. This element is closely linked to the offender, as the handler is someone who knows the potential offender well enough to act as a curb on criminal behavior.

A more recent incorporation into routine activities is the “place manager.” First suggested by John Eck (see Felson 1995), this is someone who controls or monitors places. Examples are doormen, receptionists, janitors, security guards, and building superintendents. With this addition and that of the intimate handler, the original conception of routine activities (a likely offender and suitable target converging in time and space in the absence of a capable guardian) can be thought of in terms of two triplets. The likely offender is supervised by the intimate handler, the suitable target is protected by the capable guardian, and the time and space where the convergence occurs is monitored by the place manager (Felson 1995).

Criticism has been leveled at routine activities (and other theories of crime as well) for their apparent neglect of the “root causes” of

crime, such as poor parenting, poverty, blocked opportunities, and the like. In addition, opponents argue that these theories fail to take into account differences in disposition, as it is assumed that motivation is irrelevant. The latter point is specifically addressed by Felson (1986). He notes that while “some people are inclined to break laws . . . others are inclined to protect their own person and property [and] others are inclined to keep their children out of trouble” (p. 120). The routine activities approach is not concerned with why some people are likely to be motivated offenders while others are more prone to be capable guardians or intimate handlers. This is not to say the approach assumes that we are all equally disposed to be offenders, just that the differences in levels of motivation are not a focus.

The routine activities approach is used in studies of victimization patterns. The observation that victims and offenders often have similar characteristics has led to use of the routine activities approach and related lifestyle theories to explain violence. Richard Felson (1997), for example, found that routine activities associated with having an active “night life” were a good predictor of involvement in violence as an actor, witness, or victim. Some research on shoplifting refers to aspects of the theory that concern target suitability and attractiveness. Other researchers have used the routine activities approach to account for differences in burglary rates, particularly repeat victimization. Routine activities only partially explains the difference, perhaps because it only addresses initial target selection (because of target attractiveness and guardianship factors) and does not account for why offenders chose the same target repeatedly (Tseloni et al. 2004).

SEE ALSO: Environmental Criminology; Rational Choice Theory: A Crime Related Perspective; Social Control; Victimization

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ruling relations

Marjorie L. DeVault

The term ruling relations is associated with the feminist thought of Dorothy E. Smith, who came to prominence in the academic movement that arose from women’s activism in the 1960s and 1970s. Her work takes up the project of locating lived experiences of oppression within the social contexts that produce those experiences. Ruling relations identifies the institutional complexes (emerging from the development and elaboration of capitalist economies) that coordinate the everyday work of administration and the lives of those subject to administrative regimes.

Smith wrote in the early days of feminist scholarship and explains that she drew insights from her location as a single mother and the awareness that she and her children were seen, institutionally, as a “defective” family (Smith 1987; Griffith & Smith 2005). She began to write about women’s “bifurcated consciousness” in the mid 1970s (Smith 1974) and produced an extended account of her approach in *The Everyday World as Problematic* (1987). Drawing from Marx a materialist mode of analysis and the analytic of “social relations,” she noted that developments since Marx’s time have produced an expansive “ruling apparatus” encompassing not only state and economy, but also academic, professional, and bureaucratic

knowledge and associated practices. The categories and concepts of these institutional complexes textualize lived experience, so that people's circumstances can be "worked up" to fit administrative and managerial schemata (that is, they come to be seen and treated as "mentally ill," for example, or as "defective" in relation to the "ideological code" of a "Standard North American Family") (Smith 1999).

Smith sketches an experience and knowledge associated with single motherhood in her early writing: the experience of sole responsibility for children and the capacity to shift from an embodied consciousness tied to caring work to an abstracted professional outlook tied to the conceptual frames of administration. She indicates, however, that her aim is not to identify a determinate womanly "experience" with specific content, but rather to direct thought to actual sites of everyday living as "points of entry" for empirical inquiry, with the experiences of single mothers providing one example. Smith's formulation of ruling relations is also meant to direct attention to actual practices; it is not only a heuristic device, but is also meant to refer to the complex web of discourse and practice that constitutes an expansive, historically specific formation of power that arose with the development of corporate capitalism in developed nations and which supports its operation. In later writings, Smith discussed the historical emergence and trajectory of "the ruling relations" (Smith 1999) and those who have adopted her "institutional ethnography" approach pursue inquiries that locate embodied and particular experiences within the institutional complexes identified with those relations (Campbell & Gregor 2002; Smith 2005).

SEE ALSO: Bifurcated Consciousness, Line of Fault; Consciousness Raising; Feminism and Science, Feminist Epistemology; Feminist Methodology; Feminist Standpoint Theory; Matrix of Domination

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rural aging

B. Jan McCulloch

Rural aging is an area of scholarship focusing on issues affecting quality of life for older persons living in areas of low population density. Rural versus urban (or metropolitan versus non metropolitan) conceptualizations are rooted in characteristics of folk or traditional societies versus contemporary or urban societies. Elders living in rural areas are portrayed as valuing independence and self sufficiency, having strong family and religious ties, mistrusting "outsiders," and giving and receiving help through informal networks of families and neighbors (Shenk 1998; Lawrence & McCulloch 2001).

Rural areas have significant proportions of elders (14.4 percent compared with 11.5 percent in urban areas). In addition, three trends suggest that this proportion will increase in the future: (1) the overall US population is aging; (2) young adults are migrating from rural areas in search of better economic opportunities; and (3) some rural areas, especially those with recreational amenities and planned retirement communities, are relocation destinations for retirees (Longino & Haas 1993).

Rural aging envelops the study of aging within a contextual focus. Increasingly, the diversity found within rural areas is recognized. The experience of aging is also quite different in

the more populated rural areas of the East – rural Appalachia or the Mississippi Delta, for example – as compared to that in the West where specific areas remain quite isolated, with some having as few as six persons per square mile (Coward & Krout 1998).

Inherent in the majority of research addressing rural aging has been the comparison of rural elders with their urban counterparts. Topics consistently of interest include health, informal social support, formal support services and issues focusing on barriers to health and service delivery, and persistent poverty. When social structural measures are assessed, rural elders are portrayed as being disadvantaged – they have poorer health, more chronic health conditions, fewer formal social services, greater difficulty assessing existing health and social services, higher rates of poverty, and more limited lifelong opportunities to accrue financial resources for later life. They also live in small communities that have limited economic bases and suffer from the political and economic biases toward urban areas.

Perhaps the most disconcerting result of over five decades of research focusing on rural aging is that researchers have continued to investigate the same topics for a long period of time. Early comparisons with urban older adults outlined the poorer income, health status, and social life of rural elders, and the disadvantage they faced in having access to public transportation and health care (Youmans 1967, 1977). Later Youmans (1977) addressed the “triple jeopardy” of rural elders who “have extremely small incomes, inadequate transportation, a restricted social life, and poor physical and mental health.” More recently, Coward and Krout (1998) introduced their edited volume on this topic with similar comments including individual as well as community level disadvantages. It is encouraging that recently researchers have recognized the complexity of identifying rural issues; the variation in the experiences of rural older adults must be acknowledged if progress is to be made concerning the historic and persistent identification of disadvantages for persons aging in these areas.

The most longstanding and dominant methodological issue relating to “rural aging” is the definition of this concept (Friedland 2002). Historically, residence has been operationalized

as a dichotomy (i.e., rural versus urban). Several scholars have noted that this approach is too simple. The need to address the complexity of rural aging, however, has led to a number of different proposed conceptualizations – a result that, while improving operationalization, makes comparisons across studies difficult. For example, at least three definitions of “rural” are provided by the federal government (Dibartolo & McCrone 2003). In addition, Halfacree (1993) promotes a three part rural definition including an overall assessment of “rural” across descriptive, sociocultural, and locality characteristics. Continued attention is needed to bring consistency to the ways in which rural is operationalized.

Also needed is the application of theoretical approaches that link the micro processes related to individual aging with the macro structures that affect the probability of “a good old age” within the context of residence, including aging in rural areas. Success will require a consistent definition of residence that will capture the diversity of what a rural context is. This work is particularly relevant if policies are to be developed that adequately address the persistent disadvantages that examinations of rural aging confirm – disadvantages in personal health status and income as well as more limited access to health care and formal social services.

SEE ALSO: Aging and the Life Course, Theories of; Aging, Mental Health, and Well Being; Aging, Sociology of; Elderly Poor; Health, Neighborhood Disadvantage; Life Course Perspective; Older Adults, Economic Well Being of; Rural Sociology; Socioeconomic Status, Health, and Mortality; Urban–Rural Population Movements

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rural sociology

William W. Falk and Thomas A. Lyson

Like nearly all major concepts in sociology, *rural sociology* has come to mean a variety of things and like all things social, there is a historical context for understanding what rural sociology is. Intellectually, rural sociology grew out of the same historical era and ferment as sociology more broadly, but whereas the discipline from whence it sprang was rooted heavily in liberal arts colleges, rural sociology – in America – was heavily indebted institutionally to the rise of the land grant university. This was a uniquely American initiative, deeding land to states specifically for establishing universities that consciously sought to link teaching, research, and service – in this latter case, in the form of another institution, the Cooperative Extension Service. The federal legislation which began this was the Morrill Act of 1862. This was a time when racial segregation still ruled the land. Ironically, in the South, all of the original land grant universities were black, but white universities quickly became the dominant ones in all states, including the Southern ones. The Morrill Act of 1890 provided the enabling

legislation for a system of historically black colleges and universities, virtually all of which were Southern (for a wonderful source on rural sociology's history, see this web page: www.ag.ohiostate.edu).

In the late 1800s and on into the early 1900s, it was also true that America was still a decidedly "rural" place, with most Americans living in the countryside and working directly or indirectly in production agriculture. Many land grant universities recognized this with "A&M" (Agricultural and Mechanical) as part of their name and legacy. While some states established an "Ag" school as the comprehensive university, others established a companion university more oriented toward traditional liberal arts; examples abound – the University of Texas and Texas A&M; the University of Virginia and Virginia Polytechnic Institute and State University; the University of Oklahoma and Oklahoma State University; the University of Idaho and Idaho State University; the University of Washington and Washington State University; the University of Mississippi and Mississippi State University, and so on. Interestingly, some historic "ag" schools can hardly be identified by their names (e.g., Rutgers, Clemson, Auburn, and Purdue). In time, all states had land grant universities and many (but not all) had departments of rural sociology.

Rural sociology's foci historically and contemporarily have followed closely what is generally meant by "rural." This is a term written and debated about by rural sociologists (Bealer 1966; Falk & Pinhey 1978; Miller & Luloff 1981). In general, the term was thought to have three meanings. First, "rural" often was a short hand for areas with relatively low population density; this placed it in sharp contrast with "urban" areas notable for their high population density. The population emphasis was also true in US census categories, where people were sorted by such residential distinctions as farming, open land; small town, less than 2,500 total population; population 2,500–25,000 (or sometimes 50,000); and so on up to and including large cities. In time, this kind of categorization changed to be called non metropolitan and metropolitan (among other schemes). Regardless, the overriding issues were (1) the population density and (2) where people lived. A second way of characterizing rural areas was

by occupation. This usually meant giving great emphasis to farming both as activity and as industry. Rural areas not only had more of this activity, but as one consequence they had comparatively less of many other occupations and industries which were more likely to be found in urban areas. This was especially true at the turn of the twentieth century, when millions of Americans migrated from rural areas to urban ones to work in the emerging “industrial” America. A third way of thinking about rural areas was one based on values; in this case, “tradition” was paramount, often thought of in sharp contrast to urban areas. Where urban areas were heterogeneous (in all ways), sophisticated, hip, progressive, and modern, rural areas were homogeneous, unsophisticated, unhip, unprogressive, and traditional. Early sociologists, including Redfield and Tönnies, among others, captured this difference with terms such as “folk” and “urban” or *Gemeinschaft* and *Gesellschaft*. While this is primarily a stereotype, there is no question that in many people’s minds (according to public opinion data) this sense of contrast still holds. Indeed, in American politics, “red” states and “blue” states follow somewhat this same distinction.

The first department of rural sociology was established in 1915 at Cornell (Larson & Zimmerman 2003: 13). Subsequently, many state universities developed similar programs, often merged with other programs, usually agricultural economics. Rural sociology, because it was so much smaller than the larger discipline, has always had a more limited intellectual vision as well as a much greater emphasis on application. This is easily understood when considering its place in the “mission” oriented land grant university and, again, given its size. For example, while the American Sociological Association had about 14,000 members in 2005, the Rural Sociological Society had about 1,000.

Despite its size, rural sociology has had considerable impact. This is partly because its work has been more narrowly focused – on issues such as population, community, family, stratification, development, and more recently the environment. For much of its history, rural sociology research often responded to a sense of local need and as a result had considerable application; this was facilitated by many rural

sociologists having appointments funded in part by the Cooperative Extension Service. Many early rural sociologists were former or currently practicing ministers, something that helps to explain rural sociology’s historical penchant for being relevant to any given era’s social issues and problems. As with all sociologists, their “sociological imaginations” were grounded in the eras in which they were living.

Again because of its size, the full range of sociological “theories” has never been found in rural sociology. For much of the twentieth century, rural sociology was nearly monotheoretical with its use of structural functionalism (Falk & Zhao 1989). It flirted some with more Marxist ideas but, in part, because so much of its institutional base was in state funded land grant universities (again, with mission driven principles and usually supported by federally funded research dollars), Marx – no matter his prominence in the sociological pantheon – was cited and employed rarely by rural sociologists (for a notable exception, see the “political economy” approach of Friedland et al. 1991). More broadly adopted were the apolitical principles of social psychology, often coupled methodologically with social surveys.

Rural sociology has always been heavily empirical and data driven. Indeed, to say that it was often atheoretical would be accurate (thus making it much like demography, a prominent style of scholarship in rural sociology throughout its history). In the early years, rural sociologists did considerable fieldwork and helped to pioneer social surveys (for a good overview, see Bertrand 1958). And some of the early rural sociologists (e.g., Dwight Sanderson, Charles Loomis, and William Sewell) were elected as president of both the Rural Sociological Society and the American Sociological Association. Rural sociologists also did a series of “community” studies and while the study of community faded from much of mainstream sociology for nearly a generation (essentially the 1970s and 1980s), it was always a staple of rural sociology (see especially Luloff & Kranich 2002). Indeed, one of rural sociology’s best departments – Penn State’s – was famous in part for training community scholars.

Coming out of World War II, rural sociology entered a period of both institutional and

organizational growth. States and federal funding for rural sociological research, along with funding for the social sciences in general, grew throughout the 1950s and 1960s. Substantively, rural sociologists continued to study rural institutions such as the family, religion, education, and governance. The units of analysis were generally communities, regions, and states. These studies were undertaken as the US farm sector saw the number of producers fall from nearly 6 million at the end of the war to just over 2 million by 1980. Rural to urban migration and non agricultural economic development strategies attracted the attention of the rural sociological community in the post war years.

During this same period the federal government began to pour resources into area studies and international development programs. The imperatives of the Cold War meant that the US needed to know as much as possible about the lives of the people living in the third world to combat the spread of communism and ensure that western models of economic development prevailed. Universities like Cornell, Wisconsin, and Michigan State became centers of international rural sociology scholarship. Many rural sociologists changed their research foci from domestic to international topics and cadres of rural sociology graduate students, often fresh out of the Peace Corps, were recruited to expand scholarship and build intellectual capacity on the international front. At the same time, rural sociology programs saw an influx of graduate students from the developing world.

Organizationally, after World War II, virtually all states had either a department of rural sociology ensconced in their land grant universities or a strong rural sociology unit nested in their departments of sociology. Many universities awarded PhDs in rural sociology and jobs were plentiful in the land grant system, in government, and in an expanding network of non governmental organizations.

During the 1970s the organizational fabric of rural sociology came under scrutiny as states began to withdraw support from higher education in general and agricultural programs in particular. Funds for international development work stagnated. To be sure, the changes affecting rural sociology varied from state to state, often depending on the economic viability of agriculture in the state. States with strong

constituents of family farmers and/or large rural populations maintained economically viable colleges of agriculture and usually strong rural sociology programs. States in which agriculture diminished in economic importance and in which rural interests waned experienced a downsizing of programs and staff. Rural sociology programs that developed expertise in international development in the previous decades were more likely to be maintained. At the same time, paralleling work in the larger discipline, some scholars engaged in sociology of rural sociology inquiries, spurred on, in part, by a famous Rural Sociological Society presidential address in which James Copp (1972) asked about the discipline's "relevance." Not long after, studies had been done on rural sociology theory (Gilbert 1982), methods (Stokes & Miller 1985), paradigms (Picou et al. 1978), and future (Friedland 1982).

In the 1980s the field of rural sociology experienced a resurgence of sorts, in part to accommodate scholarship in the area of the environment. Many of the key debates in what has become the subfield of environmental sociology were inspired by work undertaken by rural sociologists (Field & Burch 1988; Buttel 1996). And while environmental sociology has entered the mainstream of sociology, rural sociology still maintains both organizational capacity and scholarly depth in this area. Also during the 1980s, rural sociology rediscovered rural poverty; in fact a task force was formed to pursue this topic which led to both academic and policy related work and activity (Summers et al. 1993).

As the twentieth century ended and the twenty first began, the sociology of agriculture and food systems emerged as a burgeoning area of scholarship and outreach in many rural sociology programs around the country (Lyson 2004). Partly in response to the globalization of the food system and partly in response to the economic decline of rural areas, rural sociologists have begun looking at local agricultural and food systems as engines of economic and community development. The agriculture and food foci has also developed an ancillary health component, which links agriculture, food, nutrition, and health.

Unlike conventional or mainstream sociology, rural sociology has always been more

driven by the needs and concerns of a client base. In the early years of the discipline the client base was the farm sector and rural communities. Today, rural sociologists are responding to broader constituencies, ones concerned about environmental problems, food safety, and health. However, rural sociology's longstanding focus on rural people and communities has remained a staple, and it is easy to find rural sociologists working on topics related to these things, especially population, family, social capital, and various forms of inequality, including some of the dominant variables found in many sociological analyses – race, class, and gender (for a notable essay on gender and rural sociology, see Tickamyer 1996).

In the contemporary era, rural sociology has struggled to keep its competitive advantage – both broadly (in sociology) and narrowly (in ag schools). Much of the funding for ag school rural sociology projects has been based on what are called formula funds. These are federal funds based on a state's rural population, provided from the US Department of Agriculture to the Agricultural Experiment Station (always housed with colleges of agriculture on land grant university campuses). Since the rural population has become smaller and smaller over the years, so, too, have these funds. Rural sociologists, almost always the smallest cadre of scholars in colleges of agriculture (where they have usually been housed), have seen their proportion of the research pie shrink along with other recipients of these funds. But since rural sociology programs were small to begin with, many have been merged with other departments or been eliminated altogether. It is notable and increasingly normative for rural sociologists to seek outside funding to support their work, a kind of entrepreneurial activity which may help to secure their longevity in the years ahead.

While much of what has been said thus far applies primarily to the American experience, some of the general intellectual emphases of the discipline are also found overseas. There, agriculture and all things related to it – farming as both activity and industry, farm families, social change in all its manifestations related to the changing importance of agriculture, and the impact on natural resources and the environment – have been dominant. This has been

especially true among scholars examining less developed societies, where modernity (and all things related to it) has received considerable attention. Indeed, this is one part of rural sociology – in and out of the US – where more Marxian informed theoretical views are likely to be found. It is also true, however, that while an emphasis on agriculture, food systems, and related issues has received considerable attention, nearly anything related to population studies and demography has long been a staple of rural sociology as done overseas.

As rural sociology enters the twenty first century, especially in the US, its research funds and, importantly, undergraduate students have continued to decline. Consequently, it is likely to see its autonomy diminished along with its sense of itself as a coherent organizational and institutional discipline. Some programs may remain essentially intact as traditional rural sociology departments (e.g., Wisconsin, Penn State) and award PhDs in rural sociology. Other programs will reorganize themselves into speciality niches that emphasize some key aspect of rural sociology (e.g., development sociology at Cornell; community and leadership development at the University of Kentucky). In some cases, rural sociology will be folded into “hybrid” departments (e.g., human and community resource development at Ohio State) or either remain with or become part of the usually much larger departments of agricultural economics (e.g., Auburn, Louisiana State University, Texas A&M University). In most cases, it is likely that rural sociology programs will maintain their status as subunits or cognate areas in larger programs (e.g., Michigan State University, Iowa State University). This parallels what one usually finds overseas, where rural “sociologists” are often trained in fields other than sociology; what unites them is not the name of their academic departments but their substantive focus on rural issues which in some cases, especially in Great Britain, may be called more inclusively “rural studies.”

When considering the discipline's future, we are certain about one thing: by whatever name, there will be scholars whose work will focus on rural people and places, and this will remain true both in the US (where nearly one quarter of the population lives in rural areas) and abroad.

SEE ALSO: Community; Environment and Urbanization; Globalization; Rural Aging; Tradition; Urban–Rural Population Movements

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Rustbelt

John M. Hagedorn

The Rustbelt historically refers to the Great Lakes and Northeastern regions of the US that had been hardest hit in the 1970s by the decline in manufacturing. The term uses as metaphor the "rusting" of the physical plants of factories to represent the economic and social decay of the older industrial cities and their attendant social problems.

A Rustbelt city is one that experiences population loss, rising crime rates, loss of union jobs (particularly in manufacturing), white flight to the suburbs, and a generally declining urban environment. Cities like Gary, Indiana, Detroit, Michigan, and Milwaukee, Wisconsin saw a steady stream of manufacturing jobs leave to lower wage regions of the country, Mexico, and overseas. Massive but abandoned factories rusted away and scarred the landscape of once vibrant cities.

The Rustbelt was contrasted in the 1970s to the rise of the "Sunbelt," or cities in the South and Southwest characterized by high rates of immigration, low wages, retirement communities, and new defense, oil, and high tech industries. The Sunbelt also corresponded with the rise to power of the Republican Party in the 1980s, as electoral votes shifted to the South and Southwest states, adding political to economic advantage.

Theoretically, the term Rustbelt is associated with some of the major trends of thought in urban sociology. While popular thinking saw the rusting of the industrial centers and the rapid growth of the Southwest as a natural process, some social scientists disagreed. Perry

and Watkins (1977) posited the Rustbelt–Sunbelt dyad as one outcome of uneven capitalist development. Rejecting “convergence” theories that saw such processes as an inevitable consequence of the “invisible hand,” these urban political economists attributed the decline of the Rustbelt to conscious decisions by political and economic actors.

The crisis of the Rustbelt was seen as a crisis of the state, and particularly its redistributive policies. Sunbelt cities were dominated by private capital while the Rustbelt poor were dependent on public works or welfare. As the political spectrum swung to the right during the Reagan years, budget cuts further undermined the income and well being of workers, the unemployed, and the “underclass” in Rustbelt cities. Investment in aerospace and other defense industries and later the information economy enriched the Sunbelt as the Rustbelt declined.

Wilson (1987) looked more closely at the social consequences of the deindustrialization for the “truly disadvantaged” or black urban poor. In the 1970s and 1980s, Chicago was a prime example of a Rustbelt city with a corresponding growth in African American concentrated poverty. Chicago also saw sharp population losses, increases in rates of single parent families, high unemployment, a persistent violent gang problem, and an overall decay in African American social institutions.

While Wilson (1978) had earlier pointed to the “declining significance of race,” the Rustbelt led to work disappearing precisely in those cities, like Chicago, that African Americans had concentrated on in order to get high wage manufacturing jobs. Thus the “spatial mismatch” of jobs and workers made Rustbelt cities’ African American population the “truly disadvantaged.” No other ethnic group, Wilson and Sampson (1995), Massey (1990), and others pointed out, suffered from such high rates of concentrated poverty.

In recent years, the Rustbelt concept has diffused internationally. For example, China describes its northeastern provinces of Heilongjiang, Jilin, and Liaoning as its Rustbelt. Saskia Sassen, Manuel Castells, and other urban sociologists have subsumed the Rustbelt concept into explanations of various processes of globalization and the new economy. In Sassen’s terms, some cities and regions are “valorized” in the

global era, while others are marginalized. The strength of former industrial cities like Manchester, Mumbai, or Detroit turns into a disadvantage as cities seek to become major players in the information economy.

Some US cities appear to have rebounded from Rustbelt to information city status. Pittsburgh, for example, has shed its dependence on steel to become a center of software and finance. Boston’s maze of universities and electronics industries provided it with an entrée into the new economy as it shed its textile and other light industry past.

Other cities failed to find a niche in the information era, and have stagnated. Detroit saw its auto industry relocate and has continued to experience major population loss, including nearly all of its white residents. Gary’s steel mills lie darkened in a row on the banks of Lake Michigan, interrupted only by the bright lights of Harrah’s gambling casino. Rustbelt cities have looked to gambling, tourism, and entertainment venues to try to provide jobs and keep their more affluent population from leaving. When old factories are not torn down, some are refurbished as shopping malls. Rustbelt cities today continue to lose population and have high rates of urban violence.

The term Rustbelt is used less in the twenty first century, as cities look to define themselves more in terms of the new economy than to be held captive to nineteenth and twentieth century labels. Research, like the reputation of cities, has moved from looking at the nature of urban transitions from the industrial era, to the challenges of confronting the inequalities of the new global order.

SEE ALSO: Global/World Cities; Sunbelt

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S

Sacks, Harvey (1935–75)

Martin M. Jacobsen

Harvey Sacks was a sociologist who developed the methodological subdiscipline called conversation analysis. It conceptualized conversation as a means of social action rather than as an indicator of cognitive or psychological intent. Conversation analysis examines the surface structure and sequencing of linguistic exchanges as social acts rather than as indications of a speaker's intent, as is the case with speech act theory, pragmatics, or sociolinguistics. Sacks's focus on the surface structure of language use as an end in itself places him alongside such modern thinkers as Harold Garfinkel and Noam Chomsky.

Sacks's interest in conversation grew from his experience in legal studies. After earning an LLB (Yale Law School) in 1955, Sacks turned his attention to developing analytical approaches toward the analysis of conversation as a behavior that accomplishes social ends. Most of this early work emerged while a graduate student at MIT and the University of California system, where he earned a PhD in sociology (UC Berkeley, 1966) and rose through the ranks to full professor at UC Irvine in 1974, one year before his death in an automobile accident.

Sacks occupies an important position in the interdisciplinary field of discourse analysis. He is contemporary with the generation of scholars who, after adapting sociological, anthropological, and philosophical methods to analyze linguistic behavior as a social phenomenon, became interested in language itself. Sacks's publications (whether submitted by him before his death or by his intellectual heirs after it) focus primarily on methodology, and both his

publications and his collected lectures privilege real world data as opposed to the created or literary examples of many of his contemporaries. By concentrating on the act of conversation as a thing in itself, Sacks took a radical step away from the mainstream view of sociology as mass psychology. His preference for examining the work done with language rather than using language as a way to examine the mentality of the speaker placed him as firmly in the discipline of linguistics as it did in the discipline of sociology.

SEE ALSO: Conversation Analysis; Discourse; Emic/Etic; Ethnography; Facework; Frame; Goffman, Erving; Interaction; Intersubjectivity; Intertextuality; Language; Lifeworld; Orality; Reference Groups; Semiotics; Stratification, Distinction and; Symbolic Interaction

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sacred

Stephen Hunt

The Latin word *sacer*, from which the term sacred is derived, denotes a distinction between what is and what is not pertaining to the gods. In not a dissimilar fashion, the Hebrew root of *k d sh*, which is usually translated as “Holy,” is based on the idea of separation of the consecrated and desecrated in relation to the divine. Whatever the specific expression of the sacred, however, there is a fairly universal cultural division where the sacred constitutes phenomena which are set apart, revered, and distinguished from all other phenomena that constitute the profane or the mundane. However, in Hinduism there has long existed the belief that the sacred and the unclean both belong to a single linguistic category. Thus, the Hindu notion of pollution suggests that the sacred and the non sacred need not be absolute opposites; they can be relative categories; what is clean in relation to one thing may be unclean in relation to another, and vice versa.

The interest of sociologists in the social significance of the sacred is largely derived from the concerns of the subdiscipline of the sociology of religion. However, considerable disagreement exists as to the precise social origins of that which is designated sacred. Hence, an understanding of the sacred is frequently intimately bound up with broad definitions of religion itself, the categorization of certain social activities as religious, and particular sociological approaches to the subject. Such concerns have subsequently ensured that sociological perceptions of what constitutes the sacred as a social manifestation are subject to constant change and have led to a divergence of thought as to its nature.

The exploration of the cultural perception of the sacred is by no means limited to the discipline of sociology. Psychoanalytical theory and anthropology have also brought their own unique reductions and these have not infrequently informed past sociological speculations. In terms of psychoanalytical accounts, the sacred is discussed in Freud’s theory of totemism and is central to his famous analysis of religion in *Totem and Taboo* (1938). For Freud, the link between totemism and the sacred is

evident in certain aspects of the development of religion which have left their traces in historical myth and legend. In Freud’s account the Oedipus myth symbolizes a son’s desire to possess his mother and murder his father. Freud interpreted sacred animal sacrifices in “savage” tribes as partly a reenactment of the original parricide and partly an expiation of it and where the totemic animal is the symbolic substitute for the father or the dominate male. However, in more civilized communities where in the totemic feast the totem animal is slaughtered and eaten, Freud believed that sacrifice loses its sacredness and becomes an offering to the gods rather than a representation of the gods.

In anthropological terms, Robertson Smith (1889) identified the principal difference between primitive taboo and rules of the sacred as the difference between friendly and unfriendly deities. The separation of sacred and consecrated things and persons from profane ones, which is an integral part of the religious cult, is basically the same as the separation which is inspired by fear of malevolent spirits. Separation is the essential idea in both contexts, only the motive is different, since friendly gods are also to be feared on occasion. Robertson Smith maintained that distinguishing between the holy and the unclean marks a real advance above savagery. In this way he produces a criterion for classifying religions as “advanced” or “primitive.” If primitive, then rules of sacredness and rules of uncleanliness are indistinguishable; if advanced, then rules of uncleanliness disappear from religion.

While early anthropological accounts of the nature of the sacred have informed sociological theorizing, it was in turn heavily influenced by the work of Durkheim. In the opening chapter to *The Elementary Forms of the Religious Life* (1915) Durkheim summarized and rejected earlier definitions of religion. He dismissed Tylor’s (1903) “substantive” definition of religion, namely “belief in spiritual beings.” This definition was bound up with Tylor’s account of the origins of religion in a system of thought which he referred to as “animism” – the belief that all things, organic and inorganic, contain a soul or a spirit which infuses them with their particular sacred nature and characteristics. Durkheim insisted that this emphasis was erroneous since it ignored practices, the real essence of religion,

which are more important than beliefs. Durkheim likewise dismissed Marett's (1914) conjecture that the essence of religion is the experience of a mysterious, sacred occult power or force that was associated with deep and ambivalent emotions of awe, fear, and respect of natural phenomena which predated conceptualizations of spirits, deities, and the like.

Durkheim then proceeded to adopt two criteria which he assumed would be found to coincide: the communal organization for the community cult and the separation of the sacred from the profane. For Durkheim, the sacred was the object of worship. The rules of separation between religion and the secular are the distinguishing marks of the sacred, the polar opposite to the profane. The sacred, according to Durkheim, is frequently projected as abstract religious entities, but these are merely collective ideas and expressions of collective morality. Moreover, the sacred needs to be continually enforced by prohibitions. The sacred must always be treated as contagious because relations with it are bound to be expressed by rituals of separation and demarcation and by beliefs in the danger of crossing forbidden boundaries.

Durkheim's advanced his own "functional" definition of religion which amounted to a distinction between the sacred and profane, so that religion was "a unified system of beliefs and practices relative to sacred things, that is to say, things set apart and forbidden – beliefs and practices which unite them into one single moral community called a church of all those who adhere to them" (Durkheim 1915: 47). Thus, beliefs and practices in relation to the sacred are the defining factors of all religions.

Durkheim's deductionist approach gave way to an examination of what he perceived as the most simple and primitive religion, that of the Australian aborigine, which he believed would provide insights into the origins of religion that are predominantly social in cause. Durkheim described the clan organization of aboriginal society and the association between each clan and a sacred totem animal or plant species. These totems are represented by stylistic images drawn on stones or wooden objects called *churingas* which, since they bear the representation of the sacred totem, are also sacred. In aboriginal collectives *churingas* are surrounded by taboo and treated with the utmost respect. These

totemic symbols, Durkheim insisted, are emblems of the clan in much the same way as a flag of a country. The *churingas* are the most sacred objects in aborigine ritual – the outward and visible form of the totemic principle or god.

Durkheim argued that by sacred things we should not understand simply those things which are called gods or spirits – a rock a tree, a river, a pebble, a building – which are frequently held as sacred, as displaying inherent sacred qualities. The totem is the emblem of the clan, but more than what the *churingas* represents. The *churingas* are at once the symbol of the sacred and society, for the sacred and society are one. Thus, through worship of god or the totem, human beings worship society – the real object of religious veneration. It is a relationship of inferiority and dependency. Durkheim argued that it is easier for human beings to visualize and direct feelings of awe towards a symbol than such a complex thing as a clan. This is what gives the totem, hence society, its sacred quality.

Durkheim also explored how human beings partake of the sacred. At one level social members express their faith in common values and beliefs. In the highly charged atmosphere of collective worship, the integration of society is strengthened. Members of society express, communicate, and acknowledge the moral bonds between them. At the same time, as members of clans with sacred totems and who believe themselves to be descended from such totems, they too are sacred. Through totemic representation to which they belong, they are in some sense of the same essence as the totemic species and consequently, sacred. In the same way, in the totemic system of ideas, since all things are related with one or another clan totem, natural phenomena such as rain, thunder, and clouds become sacred. As totemic clans partake of a universal principle they are part of an anonymous impersonal force which constitutes society as a whole greater than its parts and which has a sacred quality. This impersonal force has a particular mysterious quality related to the totem and the social consciousness and unity which it represents. This force may be understood by the Polynesian term *mana*, which has parallels among some North American Indian tribes with the notion of *orenda* and in ancient Persian, *maga*.

There are a number of problems frequently identified with Durkheim's definition of the sacred. Firstly, such a definition is derived from a western context that is not readily appropriate to the worldviews of a number of non western societies, since it carries various culture bound connotations. Thus, Durkheim's assertion that religion is related to the sacred and that this is a universal conception in human society has been disputed by anthropologists: Evans Prichard (1937), for example, found that the distinction was not meaningful among the Azunde tribe he studied. The idea of the sacred, therefore, is one which exists in the mind of the observer and not necessarily of the believer or social agent. It might nonetheless be argued that the distinction remains a useful analytical conception by which sociologists can operationalize the study of religion. However, there remain difficulties with such a methodology even as an analytical distinction that focuses on the criteria by which the sacred is distinguished from the profane. Anthropologists point out that this is not useful in distinguishing a sacred from a profane sphere in at least some societies. While many cultures do have a category of things set apart and forbidden, these things are not always those that feature in religious belief and ritual and, on the other hand, things which do figure in religious belief and ritual may not be set apart and forbidden.

Durkheim also speaks of the sacred as commanding an attitude of respect. This does not, however, provide a consistent criterion because, in many religious systems, religious objects and entities do not necessarily receive reverence. Idols, and the gods and spirits they symbolize, may be punished if they do not produce the benefits they are called upon to bring. Such difficulties have led Goody to abandon the attempt to define religion in terms of the sacred. Goody (1961) maintains that it is far from legitimate for the observer to establish a definition of religious activity on a universal perception of the sacred world – no more than is the actor's division of the universe into a natural or supernatural sphere.

Despite such critiques of Durkheim's distinction between the sacred and profane, his work inspired important schools of anthropological thought. Radcliffe Brown, for instance, saw the nature of the sacred as a communal cult. In his

classic study *The Andaman Islanders* (1933) Radcliffe Brown was heavily influenced by Durkheim in asserting that ritual provided a socially integrative force which compensated for a lack of unitary political structure. Ritual is a symbolic action regarding the sacred and essentially expressed social sentiments, although Radcliffe Brown recognized that not all rituals are sacred rituals. Taboo rituals related to the sacred express, for example, the value of child birth taboos among Andaman Islanders – emphasizing the value of marriage and maternity, alongside the danger to life in the birthing process.

There are aspects of Mary Douglas's work which also developed some of the themes of Durkheim's thesis, although she also departed significantly from a number of his basic tenets (Douglas 1966). Like Durkheim, Douglas identified the sacred and the impure as opposite poles, but noted that in some primitive cultures the sacred is a very general idea meaning little more than prohibition. In that sense the universe is divided between things and actions which are subject to restrictions and others which are not. Among such restrictions some are intended to protect the divine from profanations, and others to protect the profane from the dangerous intrusion of the divine. Sacred rules are thus merely rules hedging divinity off, and uncleanness is the two way danger of contact with the divine.

Douglas established the sacred as the polar opposite of uncleanness, although what constitutes either she understood as socially defined and thus varied between cultures. For Douglas, religion often sacralized boundaries related to food, sexuality, dress, etc., as integral to caste systems, gender relations, or distinguishing communities. This is exemplified by a number of the rules of pollution in the "abominations" as outlined in the Judaic scriptures of the book of Leviticus, which are associated with ambiguities such as animals which part the hoof but are not cloven footed and the stipulation that those who touch them are likewise polluted (Leviticus 11).

A rarely observed perspective on Durkheim's work is that it also constituted a study in the sociology of knowledge. For Durkheim, the basic social concepts and categories of thought, time, space, and causation, in addition to the

distinction between the sacred and the profane, are born in religion as a community enterprise. Through the shared beliefs and moral values which form the collective conscience, social order is made possible and the social and natural world understood and given meaning by those who comprise the "sacred" community. Durkheim proceeded to show how the totemic system was also a cosmological system and how such basic categories had origins within totemism and the clan structure.

A more stringent phenomenological approach to the sacred was offered by Peter Berger in a series of influential works written since the late 1960s (e.g., Berger 1967). In Berger's account religion is essentially derived from a subjective interpretation of reality from which meaning is given to the world (including the social world) and, indeed, the entire cosmos. Religion is thus one of the most important means by which human beings categorize and make sense of their existence. Such an enterprise is a collective one and, in constructing a universe of meaning, human beings perceive a "plausibility structure" of understanding which, in turn, feeds back to inform and sustain the social order. According to Berger, this plausibility structure constructs a "sacred canopy" which includes not just religious belief systems but also philosophical notions about how the world is and enforces everyday taken for granted knowledge. In doing so, the sacred canopy upholds the precariousness of human existence. Therefore, in most historical societies religion helped build, maintain, and legitimate a universe of meaning and provided ultimate answers to ultimate questions. This was achieved through beliefs in supernatural powers that created all things and further functioned to legitimate social institutions through a sacred and cosmic frame of reference. Since the sacred canopy is derived from a social base, that which is regarded as "true" and legitimate is only so in the minds of the human actors who have conceived it. Hence, through notions of the sacred, as an ultimate frame of reference, any given social order comes to see itself as the center of the world and the cosmos.

In a more recent account, in which he makes a contribution to the secularization debate, Demerath (1999) differentiates the concept of religion from that of the sacred. Demerath

argues that the sociological study of religion has long labored under the constraint and misleading premise of concepts of religion, and has not sufficiently dwelt on the sacred. He thus argues that religion should be defined "substantively" and the sacred "functionally," thus resolving the longstanding tension in earlier definitions of both. Religion, according to Demerath, is a category of activity, and the sacred a statement of function. Demerath observes that religious activities do not always have sacred consequences. This is very often because religion frequently displays organized expressions and bureaucratic encumbrances. Nonetheless, the substantive definition of religion does suggest an orientation towards the supernatural world and "externally" imposed moral systems. By contrast, "the sacred" is a category of social phenomena which is not religious in conventional terms even though sacred phenomena may display some aspects of religion. Demerath therefore sees "folk," "implicit," "quasi," and "para" religions as part of the "sociology of the sacred," conceptions which hitherto had the disadvantage of using a conventional image of religion with unfortunate consequences, one of which has been to narrow the search for the sacred to include those things which are religious in character. There are sacred entities and symbols which have a compelling power without necessarily being religious. Since any social activity has potentially sacred functions there may be a large inventory of any society's cultural stock which constitutes the sacred.

SEE ALSO: Durkheim Émile; Primitive Religion; Religion; Religion, Sociology of; Sacred, Eclipse of the; Sacred/Profane

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sacred, eclipse of the

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The thesis of the eclipse of the sacred, which is built on psychological experience of the sacred and measures of its decline, moves in a different space than many other theories of secularization that – according to the scholars who defend the eclipse – give less importance to the problem of the level of experience and therefore to the presence of the sacred and instead concentrate on cultural and structural analysis. The theory of the eclipse proceeds from the definition of the sacred as experience (which nearly all individuals have). Sacred experience exists when an aspect of the real is recognized as “radically other” compared to natural reality. In different cultures and societies there are different hierarchies of sacred experience. This experience, lived as individual psychological reality and as the central nucleus of religiousness and religion, is considered to be the center around which religiously significant social acts and facts orbit.

The sacred, which is present (a quantifiable presence) in various ways ranging from individual psychology to social life, is in decline if there is a progressive retreat from the forms of the sacred in individual and social experience.

This approach has been challenged by the claim that an invisible religion exists that transcends the practical data on religious practice and the religious value of social events and so the eclipse of the sacred then is merely an apparent phenomenon. This approach attempts to refute the most widely accepted theories of secularization by claiming that we cannot ignore (or must adequately take into consideration) individual experience of the sacred as an expression of the biological and psychological characteristics of men and women.

The basic theoretical hypothesis of the theory rests on the fact there is a strict relation between religious experience (or the sacred) and human needs. Analysis of the system of needs and the ways in which they are sublimated when they are unsatisfied is thus fundamental to the theory: the genetically based need of immortality, the need to love and to be loved (by considering God or the gods as both objects and subjects of love it is possible to satisfy the genetic and psychological need to love and to be loved), the need to know (the so called exploratory instinct), and the need to give meaning. The lack of satisfaction of these and other biological needs stimulates the mechanisms of sublimation, including religious sublimation.

For those who espouse the theory of the eclipse of the sacred, conventional theories concerning the crisis of religion move predominantly within the analytical space of religious and cultural systems that lie behind the sublimations, which are then translated in a series of interpretations of the phenomenon that often contradict each other. For this reason a methodological turn is necessary.

In its first phase, the theory of the eclipse accounted for psychological components, but perhaps not adequately because of a lack of experimental data. Its initial formulation, developed in 1960–1, was exposed to criticism. After several years of debate in response to some of these critiques, a distinction between experience of the sacred and magical use of the sacred was introduced. However, further analysis (carried out within the psychology of religion) seems to validate the fundamental thesis of the theory of the eclipse of the sacred. This is especially true for Europe, but it is less so for other continents to the extent that they were shielded from the changes that are the expression of the consumer

and technical scientific revolution. The situation changed during the 1970s and 1980s as great improvements in the experimental psychology of religion made it possible to verify the hypothesis. Experimental findings allowed it to be established that a vast area of religious experience exists outside the church, but also that – data in hand – the presence of religious experience is quite high among practitioners, is lower among non practicing members of a religion, and is even lower among agnostics and atheists. In society today – especially in Europe and China – practitioners have decreased dramatically, and non practitioners and agnostics have increased, and thus, generally, the presence of experience of the sacred has seriously declined. In conclusion, the supporters of the thesis of the eclipse of the sacred claim that it can be demonstrated that the crisis discussed in the early 1960s continues along the same trajectory.

The experimental methodology of the psychology of religion has made possible the measurement of the presence of religious experience and has led to a logical and methodological transformation in the formulation and the analysis of the problem. This methodology, according to many, is a sound analytical tool capable of verifying theories, data, and tendencies that otherwise would be difficult to understand and define, and it is able to confirm the (growing) size of the eclipse of the sacred. It is a pity the experimental application of the theory to Islamic religiousness is inadequate at present, even if some minor findings seem to make plausible the emergence of similar phenomena to that which has been found in Europe and other developed countries.

SEE ALSO: Atheism; Cults: Social Psychological Aspects; Materialism; Modernization; New Age; New Religious Movements; Religion, Sociology of; Religious Cults; Sacred; Sacred/Profane; Secularization; Spirituality, Religion, and Aging

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sacred/profane

William H. Swatos, Jr.

The significance of the sacred/profane distinction in sociology is to be most directly credited to Durkheim's *The Elementary Forms of the Religious Life* (1915), first published in France as *Les Formes élémentaires de la vie religieuse* in 1912. The distinction had an enormous direct effect in the sociology of religion, but also powerfully influenced the broader sociological theoretical paradigm of functionalism, since in the *Forms*, which was published at the culmination of a distinguished career, Durkheim saw religion as the bearer of the sacred and the sacred as maintaining social order or equilibrium. As *Forms* was the capstone work of Durkheim's career, "sacred" became the capstone of social structure. Hence, although the sacred/profane distinction is the device that Durkheim used to make his point, in fact *sacred* is the crucial concept within the distinction; that is, it is the concept of the sacred that makes the sacred/profane distinction theoretically powerful within functionalist sociology. Crucial to the widespread influence of Durkheim's specific paradigm was its integration into Talcott Parsons's *The Structure of Social Action* (1938), which became the foundational theory text for a generation of sociologists from the end of World War II until the mid 1960s – although when Parsons came to reformulate Durkheim in his own writings he substituted "supernatural"

for sacred, something Durkheim consistently avoided because of its theological bias.

THE SACRED AND SOCIETY

The sacred/profane distinction lies at the heart of Durkheim's definition of religion in *Forms* (which was actually his second attempt at a definition, his first being generally unwieldy, and quickly discarded): "A religion is a unified system of beliefs and practices relative to sacred things, that is to say, things set apart and forbidden – beliefs and practices which unite into one single moral community called a Church, all who adhere to them" (Durkheim 1915: 47). The sacred thus involves *things set apart and forbidden*. Everything else is profane. As a result, "profane" is always easy to define: it is anything within a society (or social system/institution) that is not sacred. To come to this conclusion about the sacred and its role in establishing a "single moral community," Durkheim read anthropological works, specifically on the Australian aborigines and particularly the role of totems among clans or tribes of what were considered "primitive" peoples. This is the significance of the word *elementary* in the title of his book. He wanted to study what was generally considered in his day the simplest (or least complex) societies in existence anywhere in the world. Durkheim, like many other early sociologists, believed that by studying the maintenance of social organization among these peoples significant insights could be obtained about core processes that enabled societies to develop and maintain themselves – and, as a corollary, what changes in the transition to modernity might explain the emerging social problems of his day. Durkheim thus saw the sacred object as a symbol of society: in this totemic sense, "God" was really society. Religion was simultaneously a human social product, hence essentially false, and the producer of social order, hence powerfully true. "Education" was the process by which the symbolic realities contained within this "truth" were passed from generation to generation so that social structure could be maintained, hence function.

In the Parsonian synthesis that popularized and standardized Durkheim's definition for an

especially formative generation of sociologists, the notion of "church" in the original Durkheimian formulation of the definition of religion was gradually secularized into "society" – that is, whereas Durkheim spoke quite specifically of a moral community "called a Church," later generations came to identify the moral community with society or in other cases with virtually any other ongoing social group. Rather tautologically, in fact, social scientists began to look for "the sacred" in all groupings and structures that one would not normally associate with religion – ranging as widely, for example, from the flag and related patriotic paraphernalia in the US, the tombs of Lenin and Stalin in the Soviet Union (where there were no formal state churches), to Babe Ruth's bat as sacred to baseball. This also led to some groups trying to create rituals and symbolic centers, as evidenced by various halls of fame or signs of identification – the flags of the Confederacy and Nazi Germany having particular significance at this writing. Regardless of the specific items or ceremonies of veneration, the underlying logic is the same: there must be some set apart and forbidden object or objectifiable process both to create and maintain the structure and function of any social group.

This understanding of sacrality had a twofold effect on the study of both society and religion. On the one hand, it made religion an essential social institution: no religion, no society. On the other hand, it also said that while religion was good (functional), it was not true. That is, it reduced the end point of religion (the divine, in whatever name or form) to a social construction. One might almost say that at the level of society Durkheim served as religion's funeral director: embalming the corpse or providing an urn of ashes that sustained family unity as if the loved one were really there.

OUTCOMES AND CRITICISMS

The Janus faced character of Durkheim's sacrality proposition led in at least two directions in the study of religion. The positive outcome was a significant corpus of work on political religion that flowed freely and broadly from an initial seminal essay by Parsons's former student Robert Bellah, "Civil Religion in America"

(1963). In this use, the concept refers to a “transcendent religion of the nation” and resonates well with the functionalism of both Durkheim and Parsons. Bellah’s definition of American civil religion is that it is “an institutionalized collection of sacred beliefs about the American nation,” which he sees symbolically expressed in America’s founding documents and presidential inaugural addresses. It includes a belief in the existence of a transcendent being called “God,” an idea that the American nation is subject to God’s laws, and an assurance that God will guide and protect the US. Bellah sees these beliefs in the values of liberty, justice, charity, and personal virtue and concretized in, for example, the words *In God We Trust* on both national emblems and on the currency used in daily economic transactions. Although American civil religion shares much with the religion of Judeo Christian denominations, Bellah claims that it is distinct from denominational religion. Crucial to Bellah’s Durkheimian emphasis is the claim that civil religion is definitionally an “objective social fact.”

Hence, although the civil religion thesis claims that civil religion exists *symbolically* in American culture, such symbols must be perceived and believed by people within the society if the symbols are to be said to have meaning. Several studies by Ronald Wimberley and others (1976) developed statements on civil religious beliefs and obtained responses on them from various public samples. Their findings show that people do affirm civil religious beliefs, although most would not know what the term “civil religion” means. These large surveys and factor analytic studies give credence to Bellah’s conceptual argument that civil religion is a distinct cultural component within American society that is not captured either by American politics or by denominational religiosity. The result of both Bellah’s initial conceptual foray and these empirical studies has not only established the validity and usefulness of the civil religion concept in understanding important cultural and social dynamics within American society, but also spawned comparative studies around the world – Crystal Lane’s studies of the former Soviet Union being particularly significant.

Ironically, a move away from functionalism generally in sociology beginning in the late 1960s brought in its wake first secularization

theory, and then a reaction against the Durkheimian (or Parsonian Durkheimian) formulation as an adequate understanding of religion. The term *secularization* was coined quite apart from Durkheim by Max Weber, who used it as a way of conceptualizing the process by which the world was “robbed of gods.” In many respects Weber would have seen Durkheim as part of that process, since Durkheim himself was influenced by an ongoing French tradition that looked toward a “religion of Humanity.” Parsons, however, attempted an integration of Durkheim and Weber in the *Structure of Social Action*, hence secularization became integrated into a neo Durkheimian framework. C. Wright Mills (1959: 32–3), one of Parsons’s most trenchant early critics, critically summarizes Parsons’s religious historiography: “Once the world was filled with the sacred – in thought, practice, and institutional form. After the Reformation and the Renaissance, the forces of modernization swept across the globe and secularization, a corollary historical process, loosened the dominance of the sacred. In due course, the sacred shall disappear altogether except, possibly, in the private realm.” Although many social scientists had come to accept this analysis, which implies his torical description, it is in fact based on almost no historical evidence. Rather than systematic studies of the past, it draws from commonsense generalizations about history related to systematic studies of the present. Put differently, the aborigines of 1900 were just as “contemporary” as the French of 1900.

Secularization theory hence led to anti secularization theory, which amounted to a rethinking of both religion and sacrality in the Durkheimian context. Runciman (1970: 98) has raised three specific issues regarding the Durkheimian approach, the most telling of which is that Durkheim’s “explanation” of religious beliefs in a this worldly terminus (society) does not actually “explain” them at all (except to explain them away): “Why, after all,” Runciman asks, “is the worship of society any more readily explicable than the worship of gods?” Intimately connected with this “explanation,” however, is Durkheim’s search for the source of social solidarity, and behind this is his *presumption* of solidarity. The integrating power in society of religion is *not*, in fact, what Durkheim would call a “social fact,” but a largely unsubstantiated

social anthropological *belief* stemming from Durkheimian sources. This belief underlies the “religion” of secularization; that is, contemporary secularization theory is based on the view that religion is defined by religion’s “function” of social integration or the maintenance of social solidarity. Not only is the notion of solidarity as definitive of society now suspect (Beyer 1989), but even if we do accept some concept of solidarity into our sociological arsenal, there is no reason to presume an integrated wholeness that certainly is now difficult to see, and may well have never existed. On the one hand, this may be evidenced by the observation that many so called primitive societies do not, strictly speaking, have a linguistic equivalent for the word “religion” (our “way” or “culture” being both better translations), while people in advanced industrial societies increasingly express a preference for describing themselves as “spiritual” rather than religious. What is especially missing in this shift is the relative absence of Durkheim’s hope that the “sacred” would become a “religion of humanity” (viz., morality), which is an increasingly rationalized and bureaucratized civilizational element associated with formal boards of ethical review, hence more a matter of the sociology of law and industrial/work relations than of religion and culture.

SEE ALSO: Asceticism; Durkheim, Émile; Ideal Type; Jehovah’s Witnesses; Networks; Primitive Religion; Religion, Sociology of; Sacred; Sacred, Eclipse of the; Scientology; Weber, Max

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sacrifice

Simone Ghiaroni

Sacrifice is a ritual practice that includes the removal of goods (objects, vegetables, animals, human beings) from profane use or their destruction in relation to a supernatural sphere, but not necessarily with an offer or dedication. Sacrifices that involve the killing of a victim and the shedding of blood are called blood sacrifices.

The issue of the definition of sacrifice, a focal point in contemporary debate, went so far as to deny the empirical existence of a ritual identifiable as a sacrifice. Marcel Detienne (Detienne & Vernant 1986) criticized the concept, claiming that it was an arbitrary category built on elements drawn from the Christian tradition and adopted in order to lump different phenomena together. The study of sacrifice should therefore be based on a historical analysis of the rituals within their own contexts. Thus, for instance, Grecian sacrifice turns out to be nothing but a culinary practice; there does not exist any ritual designated as a sacrifice, but simply a meat eating mode of a historically determined human group. In Detienne’s view, the concept of sacrifice should be dropped because it is a “category of yesterday’s thought” that has no interpretive or descriptive value. Detienne hit the mark when he recognized the Christian inheritance underlying many theories of sacrifice, but many scholars felt that the dissolution of the concept of sacrifice was an interpretive impoverishment. Seeking refuge in historical particularism is not the solution to the problem of definition: the concept of sacrifice still has a heuristic value and is an excellent instrument for interpreting some social facts. The solution consists rather in replacing a rigid, clear cut definition with a more flexible, inclusive family of notions. The concept of sacrifice turns out to be a modern

theoretical construction that is useful for analysis but has been devised artificially in order to interpret a category of phenomena interconnected by family resemblances (Valeri 1994). The noun "sacrifice" does not correspond, in the real world, to any unequivocally defined substance: it denotes a group of social facts among which it is possible to trace analogies based on some common criteria. As Ivan Strenski (2003) pointed out, the modern study of sacrifice cannot be founded on theological bases, identifying an ideal central concept that is essential in all types of sacrifice, for instance offer or abnegation: it is necessary to analyze the formal characteristics of the rites that can be interpreted as sacrifices. In this sense, Strenski recognizes the study of sacrifice by Durkheim's followers Hubert and Mauss (1964 [1899]) as a scientific attempt to achieve emancipation from an ethnocentric and Christian outlook.

Among the phenomena that are subsumed into the category "sacrifice," three main types can be distinguished: *firstfruit offer*, *gift sacrifice*, and *communion*. Firstfruit offer consists in leaving to the supernatural sphere a part of the goods obtained from hunting or collecting, concentrating sacrality on that part and thus desacralizing the remaining part so it can be eaten by men and women without any danger. Gift sacrifice consecrates and offers to the supernatural world a part of the goods produced by human labor. Communion sacrifice, finally, is the sacrifice rite that stresses the communal consumption of the sacrificial victim. From a formal point of view, a sacrifice rite comprises four main stages: the obtaining and preparation of the sacrificial object, its destruction or removal from the human sphere, renunciation, and consumption. Within the ritual, it is possible to isolate and analyze three types of relationships: between human beings and the superhuman world, between human beings and the victim, and among human beings. The combination and emphasizing of different stages and relationships, and of the kind of object that is sacrificed, determine the type of sacrifice.

Various theories of sacrifice have been produced within the analysis of religious practices. On the whole, they are aligned with distinct theoretical lines: some are based on utilitarian ideas; some emphasize emotional and religious aspects; some highlight the symbolic

and communicative nature of the rite; some neglect the social and cultural aspects and stress the importance of attention to pure violence; and others underscore the ecological function of rituals. Moreover, in the history of theories there is a constant intertwining of themes such as the idea of reciprocity between the human world and the supernatural one; offer and gift; debt and credit between humankind and deity; self sacrifice and abnegation; and, finally, the themes of the scapegoat, the symbolic replacement of the sacrificer with the victim, violence, consecration, and desacralization.

One of the first theories of sacrifice was proposed in 1871 by the evolutionist anthropologist Edward B. Tylor in his work *Primitive Culture*. Tylor interpreted sacrifice on the basis of the utilitarian principle of *do ut des* ("I give that you may give"): "primitives," in his view, offer gifts to the extrahuman powers in order to gain their benevolence, in the same way as gifts are offered to high ranking people. This practice was included in the general evolutionary scale: a *self interested gift* aiming at a reward was followed, at a more "civilized" evolutionary stage, by a *free gift* that did not hope for a reward, and, finally, by *abnegation*, self sacrifice, the highest expression of the moral evolution of humankind. Tylor did not seek an explanation of the mechanism of sacrifice, and failed to recognize the symbolic aspects of the offer, regarding it only as "material goods." Moreover, since he concentrated entirely on the ideal content of the rite, he did not account for the widespread custom of partly or totally eating the sacrificial victim. This was attempted by the Scottish scholar William Robertson Smith by supplying, in his *Lectures on the Religion of Semites* (1894), an early "sociological" explanation of sacrifice, based on the theory of totemism. In Smith's opinion, the function of the sacrificial rite was to reinforce the bonds within the totemic community through the sharing of a sacrificial meal. The latter was the only occasion in which it was possible to kill and eat the totemic animal, symbol of the community, regarded as the common ancestor. The commensals, by eating this animal, strengthened the social bonds among themselves and the ideal ones between them and the deity. Within the evolutionist area, another contribution was contained in James G. Frazer's monumental work *The Golden Bough* (*editio*

maior published in the period 1911–15). In sacrifice, Frazer picked out the intertwining of two themes: that of the scapegoat and that of the ritual killing of the “divine king.” Sacrifice is based on the analogy between the health of the king and that of his community: when the king’s health begins to decline, he must be killed, in order to ensure the stability of the kingdom. All the evil, guilt, and sins of the subjects are conveyed into the sovereign’s body and atoned for by the king’s sacrifice. Moreover, Frazer, focusing on the sphere of agrarian sacrifices and beginning from the idea of the totemic relationship with the victim and of its sacred character, analyzed the “killing of the Corn spirit.” According to him, the gods are killed because they take on the role of scapegoat, sweeping away disease, death, and sin from the community, and are eaten in order to be assimilated. Frazer’s theory does not add much to Smith’s contribution, except for a Christian sense of atonement and purification of the human world through the sacrifice of the god.

Dissatisfied with these idealistic theories, in 1899, Durkheim’s followers Henri Hubert and Marcel Mauss published their fundamental contribution to the study of sacrifice, entitled *Essai sur la nature et la fonction du sacrifice (Sacrifice: Its Nature and Function)*, which decisively broke away from the evolutionist approach of the previous theories. They defined sacrifice as a religious act that – through the consecration of the victim – changes the state of the person who performs it and the sacrality state of certain objects involved in the ritual. This definition immediately reveals the difference between this theory and the previous ones: here sacrifice is no longer a mere oblation performed in the hope of a reward or with the purpose of reinforcing social relationships, but a process of consecration and transformation of the people who take part in the rite. Moreover, the victim takes on the role of a mediator between the sacred sphere and the profane one, and the entire sacrificial process is therefore interpreted as a process of communication between the sacred and the profane through an intermediary that is destroyed during the ceremony. The mediation and subsequent destruction of the mediator are made necessary by the dangerous, “untouchable” character of the sacred sphere in Durkheim’s

view: no human being can come into contact with any sacred entity without undergoing harmful consequences. As Valeri (1985: 64–5) remarks, the mediation does not logically make it necessary for the sacrificed commodity to be interpreted as an offering: the concept of sacrifice as communication is broader than that of sacrifice as a gift to the supernatural world. In addition, referring to Mauss’s celebrated *Essai sur le don (The Gift)* (1990 [1923–4]), there is a much more complex vision of the meaning of an offer of goods. The gift must be interpreted in its social and symbolic dimension in “primitive” societies, that is, as a social fact consisting in the obligation to *give, receive, and requite*, and as if each gift metonymically implied a self-offering of the sacrificer. Within this theory, there appears a new conception of the sacrificial offer: in relation to this idea of gift and as a result of the fact that the victim becomes a mediator between the sacred and the profane, the sacrificial offer becomes a symbolic substitute of the sacrificer. Moreover, Hubert’s and Mauss’s study is the first one that undertakes a formal analysis of the “pattern of sacrifice,” implements used, and ritual procedures. This attention to the technical and formal procedures leads the two sociologists to include the ritual stages of the sacrificial process in a parabola of sacrality. At the top of this parabola is the killing of the victim, preceded by a period of increasing consecration and followed by relative desacralization, important for enabling the human utilization of the victim’s flesh and the reintroduction of the participants into the profane world. In a similar way, this interest in the material aspects leads to an analysis of the ritual space, outlining a pattern of concentric circles that correspond to different levels of sacrality, with the altar or sacrificial pole at the center. This study, finally, has the merit of stabilizing the terms that define the participants in the rite. According to this classification, the person who benefits from the sacrifice and undergoes its effects, and who usually supplies the victim, is called the *sacrificer*, while the officiant (some times a priest) who guides or materially carries out the sacrifice is called the *sacrificer*.

Besides Hubert’s and Mauss’s sociological reaction, there were other theories of sacrifice that aimed at removing from this concept the

utilitarian ideas introduced by Tylor. Among them, the most significant were those of the philosopher Georges Gusdorf, the Protestant theologian Jan van Baal, and the scholar in the nomenclology of religions Gerardus van der Leeuw. Gusdorf, in his book *L'Expérience humaine du sacrifice (The Human Experience of Sacrifice)*, published in 1948, reversed the traditional perspective of *do ut des*, contending that the sacrificial offer was the recognition of an unrepayable preexisting debt toward the divine sphere: human beings, perpetually indebted to the gods who sustained their existence, were forced to give, without ever completely discharging their life debt. Van Baal, on the contrary, argued that the sacrificial gift was a disinterested expression of submission to the divine sphere, without any expectation of a reward: thus he included all sacrifices in the third stage outlined by Tylor, that of abnegation. The development of the Tylorian theme of *do ut des* by van der Leeuw, in his book of 1933 entitled *Phänomenologie der Religion (Religion in Essence and Manifestations)*, advanced the idea that in sacrifice the gift always consisted in the offer of oneself, thus bringing something of the sacrificer in the sphere of the sacred. This took place in relation to the law of participation – detected in pre logic thought by Lucien Lévy Bruhl – whereby a person's possessions were an integral part of his or her personality, so any sacrificial offer was always an offer of oneself.

Referring to Hubert's and Mauss's idea of sacrifice as a rite that is significant in all its parts and not only in a special aspect such as the offer, gift, or communion, Alfred Loisy, in his *Essai historique sur le sacrifice (Historical Essay on Sacrifice)* of 1920, regarded sacrifice as an efficacious representation, a symbolic action that produced some effects on social reality. The rite is allegedly a representation of the result that the sacrificer wishes to achieve, performed by means of the manipulation of icons and symbols. The meaning of the sacrificial victim, therefore, does not consist in its value as a commodity for exchange or communion, but in the symbolic semantics it exhibits. In other words, it is not so much a gift as an icon that represents the extrahuman powers, the human beings, the sacrificer, and their interrelationships. This theoretical line was followed also by the British

anthropologist Godfrey Lienhardt (1961), who argued that sacrifice controls and solves situations of conflict or uncertainty by manipulating the symbols involved in the ritual. In his opinion, these symbols, like the gods, are representations or reified images that reflect the experience of social life.

The social anthropologist Edward E. Evans Pritchard (1956) proposed a criticism of the social and communal visions of sacrifice like those of Smith and of Hubert and Mauss, starting from a perspective of communication between the individual and the superhuman powers. Evans Pritchard focused on personal and expiatory sacrifices. The need for expiation, in his view, depends on the danger resulting from the intervention of the spirits in the human world: this is a criticism of the totemic origin theories that regard sacrifice as a union between the supernatural world and the human one. The function of the gift is to separate these two worlds through the symbolic replacement of the sacrificer with the victim, which is accepted by the extrahuman powers in the sacrificer's stead. In Evans Pritchard's view, sacrifice always has an apotropaic (that wards off evil) and prophylactic function (that defends and protects), expressed through the polysemanticity of the sacrificial victim, which acts as a substitute of the sacrificer, a scapegoat and a mediator between the gods and humankind. Thus the sacrificial rite is celebrated in case of diseases or other negative events caused by an intervention of the gods due to a misdeed. Evans Pritchard's vision, which emphasizes the concepts of guilt, sin, remorse, and purification, seems to be strongly influenced by Christian theology.

In the opinion of the Belgian anthropologist Luc de Heusch (1986), on the contrary, even the sacrifice of the Nuer, to which Evans Pritchard refers, should not be understood in terms of individual guilt or expiation, but in terms of the restoration of cosmological order. De Heusch, as a matter of fact, maintains that a structured thought (similar to that outlined by Claude Lévi Strauss about myths) underlies the various sacrificial systems. For this reason, any sacrifice must be deciphered on the basis of the symbolic and mythological structure it postulates, produces, and reproduces. As regards the African

sacrificial systems, de Heusch attempts a structural reunification of them by making use of the notion of sacrificial debt and of reproduction of the cosmogonical myths from which humankind's life debt began.

The anthropologist Valerio Valeri (1985) advanced a theory of sacrifice that referred directly to the tradition that interpreted sacrifice as an efficacious symbolic action. In Valeri's view, sacrifice is a cognitive and communicative instrument that makes it possible – within the framework provided by the ritual context – for the sacrificer and the overall society to obtain information about their position in the social world. This position is defined by the contact with the supernatural sphere, regarded as a paradigmatic model of the ideal social order. Sacrifice, therefore, is allegedly a symbolic process having a dialectic nature: the subjective *self* of the sacrificer, through the sacrificial substitution, takes on the value of its antithesis, that is, of the extrahuman powers; thus, at the end of the rite, a synthesis is achieved that amounts to a *process of objectification of the subject in the social world*. Sacrifice as *dialectics of the subject* makes it possible to “tune in” the social properties of the subject to the ideal properties of the transcendent subject. The result of the sacrifice is thus the recovery of the sacrificer's awareness of his/her position in the social world. Moreover, Valeri (1994) maintains that in the sacrificial exchange, what must be highlighted is not the renunciation but the benefits and the symbolic or material enjoyment that issue from it.

Other theories regard the violence of the sacrificial killing as the central element of sacrifice. According to René Girard (1977), every sacrifice is a mechanism of expulsion of the violence inherent in social life. Mutual, widespread violence, introduced by a primeval “society founding lynching” committed on an innocent victim, is allegedly concentrated on a single object, the victim of the sacrifice, which always appears as a scapegoat. In Girard's theory, the sacrificial violence does not mean anything more than itself: he inverts the theory of consecration by arguing that the victim is not killed because it is sacred, but is sacred precisely because it must be killed. The violence of the sacrifice must be kept distant from the level of consciousness, and, for this reason, the expelled violence is, at the same time, an unacknowledged violence. This

theory assumes that the psychological datum can be attained transcending any cultural form; the latter is thus treated like a false motivation or hypocritical rationalization. The Hellenist Walter Burkert (1987), too, places violence at the center of his interpretation of sacrifice. He maintains that humankind's phylogenetic heritage, formed during the Paleolithic hunting and collecting period, involved the development of a violence between individuals that was expelled and transcended through hunting. When sedentary agriculture set in, the inherited violence was transferred to the killing of farmed animals in specific ritual settings that ensured the peaceable perpetuation of human society: this was the origin of sacrifices.

Besides these theories, there are others that emphasize the material aspect and ecological function of sacrifice. According to Marvin Harris (1977), the sacrifice of human beings or animals followed by the sharing of the victim's flesh is correlated with the availability of noble protein in the diet and with the examined population's technical and environmental possibility of breeding animals. In Roy Rappaport's (2000 [1968]) view, on the contrary, the sacrifice of a great number of pigs by a population of New Guinea took on a homeostatic function in the ecological balance between the population and the resources. Rappaport endeavored to evaluate the capability of that particular ecosystem to sustain the human population and a growing pig population, with reference to a periodic sacrificial feast during which the number of pigs was drastically cut down, bringing the ecological system back to a state of equilibrium.

Besides the interpretation of sacrifice as a ritual, it is possible to regard sacrifice as a special case within a broader system of practices pertaining to symbolic classification, manipulation, and consumption of living creatures (Douglas 1966; Lévi Strauss 1968). In sacrifice, the symbolic correlations by which the natural and social world is regulated become evident: for instance, the relation between dietary prohibitions, the animal offered in the sacrifice, and the division of the victim's flesh, understood also as a practice that reproduces the social hierarchy. It is important, moreover, to highlight the relation between sacrifice and divination, not only as an examination of the body of the victim or of some of its parts, but also as a divinatory practice

based on the observation of the progress of the rite (interpreting, for instance, the victim's movements). Finally, it is useful to draw attention to the question of the discontinuation or survival of the sacrificial themes. Blood sacrifice does not survive only in "exotic" religions, and the sacrificial themes – though subjected to transformation and abstraction – are still present in the great monotheistic religions, for instance in the Catholic sacrament of the Eucharist, which reintroduces the salvific death of a divine victim with an expiatory function.

SEE ALSO: Durkheim, Émile; Religion; Rite/Ritual; Ritual; Sacred; Sacred/Profane; Symbolic Classification

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sodomasochism

Gert Hekma

The word sodomasochism refers to sexual pleasure in physical or psychic pain or humiliation. The psychiatrist Richard von Krafft Ebing coined the word in 1891. It stems from the names of the philosopher Marquis Donatien Alphonse François de Sade (1740–1814) and the novelist Leopold von Sacher Masoch (1836–95). Both men were primarily masochists. Sociological research on sodomasochism, its practitioners and their subcultures, is rare. In the arts, the subject is abundantly available and both literary historians and philosophers have discussed it more than have social scientists. The life and work of the men who lent their names to this sexual variation have been the subject of many studies, especially the Marquis de Sade.

Although there can be little doubt that earlier generations erotically enjoyed violence, for example in the Roman arenas, at scaffolds, for martyrs depicted in Christian art, and with religious and medical flagellations, the specific articulation of feelings of sexual pleasure in pain goes back to the eighteenth century, when Jean Jacques Rousseau and the Marquis de Sade expressed such emotions. In the *Psychopathia Sexualis* (1886) of Krafft Ebing, the desire for giving and receiving real or imaginary pain is put on a scale. This psychiatrist found it normal

when such pleasures were an addition to sexual play, but they became an abnormality when they were its central element. The prevention and therapy of “perverted” sexual identities was the work of psychiatrists. The Greek neologism “algolagnia” (pleasure in pain) was an alternative word, while later psychiatrists created new terms for the many specific forms of sadomasochism (whipping, bondage, hanging, slavery, military or police uniforms, use of excrement). Objects of this psychiatric interest welcomed the handbooks of sexology that offered the rare possibility of identification and excitement (Oosterhuis 2000). Nineteenth century England had bordellos for the spanking of men who learned to enjoy this pleasure as boys at boarding school.

Oosterhuis (2000) explains the invention of the various perversions as a result of growing self reflection and individualism and of the anonymity in the quickly expanding metropolises. Noyes (1998) has argued that s/m became visible in this liberal era at the end of the nineteenth century also because this sexual practice so completely contradicted liberal ideals of free will and self determination. The issue of consent of the masochist partner remains an essential point of discussion in s/m circles, as his or her dependent position flatly contradicts modern ideas of erotic equality and free choice. The answer of the aficionado has been that the submissive partner consents beforehand with the choreography of the erotic scene and can stop its continuation with code words or signs. While many abhor the real or imaginary violence of s/m, few practitioners have dared to take pride in its transgressiveness, certainly not when it gets beyond liberal issues of consent. Notwithstanding restrictive sexual ideologies, modern sexual citizens continue to believe in a liberal ideology of free choice and erotic equality that feeds their unrealistic, romantic ideas of love and pleasure.

Specialized s/m subcultures developed first in Germany from 1900 and later in other places after World War II. Bordellos took a central place in this world. The sexual revolution saw a further rise in organizations and in representations of s/m in novels, movies, and porn. The subcultural imagery of leather and sex toys made a breakthrough in the 1980s in the punk scene and in the 1990s in fashion and music.

Notwithstanding its cultural popularity, psychiatric handbooks such as the latest editions of the *Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders* (DSM) continue to consider sadism and masochism to be psychic disturbances. Nowadays its best known expression is the gay and straight leather scene, while the Internet has many sites and chat rooms for the manifold variations of s/m desire. Its followers see no reason why psychiatrists and psychologists declare them insane. Their fantasies are obvious examples of the social construction of sexual pleasure, as their contents always refer to concrete external stimuli such as soldiers, bikers, slavery, rape, child beating, and medical care, while unpleasant, cruel, and humiliating scenes are transformed into excitement. Sociologists have rarely taken up this fascinating topic of how the social has become so deeply embedded in the individual psyche.

The contemporary literature on sadomasochism takes most often a psychological stance, discussing its individual manifestations and issues of consent (Phillips 1998). Most surveys of its practitioners were made some time ago (Spengler 1979). The work of Gosselin and Wilson (1980) relates the great variety of sadomasochistic desires. These authors were sympathetic to this world while others took a negative stance. General surveys asked few questions on sadomasochism, but the data indicate that some 10 percent of the respondents admit having kinky fantasies. Historical studies focus on the nineteenth century history of perversion and discuss the invention of sadomasochism or specialized kinky tastes (Noyes 1998; Oosterhuis 2000). Vandermeersch (2002) researched the path of flagellation from religious practice and medical therapy to sexual specialty. More sociological works studied kinky scenes and desires in relation to spaces (Rubin 1991). Most literature includes both personal and emancipatory perspectives or discussions on politics (Thompson 1991; Thompson 1994; Califia 1994).

Methodological issues are similar to those regarding other sexual variations. Additional problems concern the sometimes criminal and often pathological status of sadomasochism. Research may endanger the safety and privacy of respondents, while many practitioners feel ashamed, guilty, or insecure on their

preferences. Most literature still stems from psychiatry and psychology and follows the dated ideas from the DSM. It means that researchers of kinky sex have to be particularly sensitive to the social discrimination that their subjects are facing.

As few studies have been done on sadomasochism, the terrain is open. Main issues will be the roots of these sexual preferences in their social context and their subcultural, historical, and spatial development. Sadomasochism is interesting for sociology because it mixes sexuality and violence and eroticizes social inequality, going against a trend that promotes non violent and equal sexual relations. It shows as well through its many variations the specificity of sexual pleasures that sociologists in general neglect. The research on sexual scripts, stories, or narratives should take kinky variations as its topic because they are a concrete example of the connection between individual desires and social worlds. The social and historical backgrounds of s/m preferences and organizing are still hidden in the dark and offer interesting themes for further research in their connections to liberal politics, the rise of individualism and self reflection, the belief in consent and equality, and the denial of violence in sexual relations.

SEE ALSO: Liberalism; Plastic Sexuality; Scripting Theories; Sexual Practices; Sexuality Research: History; Violence

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safer sex

Benjamin Shepard

Safer sex emerged as a strategy to prevent the spread of disease with the advent of the AIDS epidemic in the early 1980s. Richard Berkowitz and Michael Callen, two gay New Yorkers, first outlined the theory and application of safer sex in their 1983 tract, "How to Have Sex in an Epidemic." As an alternative to the confusing, all or nothing early approaches to HIV prevention, safer sex offered a practical strategy. People were going to have sex. As such, it was best to do it in a safe, mutually satisfying, caring manner. Berkowitz and Callen presented a harm reduction approach now recognized around the world as a model that allows for both intimacy and protection.

The third key inventor of safer sex was Dr. Joseph Sonnabend, a gay friendly doctor working in a Greenwich Village health clinic who treated Berkowitz, who was working as a hustler at the time. In the course of frequent appointments for antibiotics to battle VD, Berkowitz and Sonnabend developed a frank relationship. When Berkowitz developed a case of hepatitis, swollen lymph nodes, and a bump behind his ear that got in the way of his cruising, Sonnabend counseled him to stop "screwing around." It was not a welcome piece of advice for someone whose livelihood depended on sexual commerce. In 1982, as the health crisis mounted, Sonnabend engaged Berkowitz and

another patient, the late Michael Callen, to write a call for gay men to protect themselves. "You must celebrate gay sex in your writing and give men support," Sonnabend counseled (Berkowitz 2003: 121). At first, Berkowitz and Callen borrowed from the "just say no" rhetoric of the early 1980s, but the response was negative.

One day Berkowitz received a knock on his door from one of his former clients, begging for services. Berkowitz pulled out two gloves to create a safe seal between himself and his client. This led to a eureka like recognition. It dawned on Berkowitz that prohibition is more dangerous than acknowledgment, careful expression, and prevention. Before this, it had never occurred to Berkowitz, Callen, or Sonnabend that latex offered the necessary life saving compromise. Berkowitz and Callen drew on the lessons of gay liberation to draft "How to Have Sex in an Epidemic." The result was a revolution allowing for personal and political protection, both for sex and for the movement that liberated it. With time, safer sex practices spread around the globe as a theoretical and practical approach to preventing the spread of HIV. Safer sex became the model for sex positive discourses that rejected the politics of sexual shame, temperance, and prohibition.

For more than 20 years, safer sex has been a key element in debates about effective HIV prevention. Queer theorist and activist Douglas Crimp (1988) argues that gay people invented safe sex based on an implicit understanding that sexuality comes in many forms. Sex, after all, is not limited to penetration. For Crimp, the lessons of queer "promiscuity" can be understood in terms of multiple understandings of the possibility and multiplicity of pleasures. Thus, the gay public sexual cultures of previous decades resulted in a sort of "psychic preparation" and appetite for experimentation, which cultivated a culture which was capable of absorbing wide ranging changes in sexual norms and practices.

Crimp's words suggest that safer sex can be understood as a cornerstone of a harm reduction approach to sexuality. Harm reduction sets out to "meet people where they're at" instead of where others want them to be. Advocates of safer sex argued that messages that promote prohibition without offering alternatives push people into unnecessarily high risk behavior.

HIV prevention could be most effective through community based approaches that built on personal connections.

The safer sex message is that practices – not places – cause HIV transmission. While prohibitionists sought to close down spaces where gay men congregate to have sex, safer sex advocates promoted these spaces as sites for education. Prevention activists and peer outreach workers could reach people where they were having sex and establish healthy community norms and grassroots models of peer based HIV prevention and mutual protection. In 1997 Allan Bérubé argued: "These activities, sex outside the home, I call it – they need to be preserved and used to eroticize safer sex, and to take advantage of the fact that men are already congregating." As such, HIV prevention work should take place in tearooms, parks, bath houses, theaters, bookstores, and other places where people meet for sex.

A decade after the invention of safer sex, reports suggested that many men who "knew better" continued to have unsafe sex. Walt Odets, a clinical psychologist who has a private practice working with gay men in Berkeley, California, reported that many men he saw reported that practicing safer sex for a lifetime was not sustainable. Odets contended that the standard "100 Percent Safe All the Time" AIDS prevention message was ill conceived and needed to be reconsidered. For Odets, unsafe sex had to be viewed as a response to ambiguous feelings in an environment saturated with death, crisis, guilt, and depression. Unlike advertising campaigns, Odets sought to embrace the complexities of queer sexuality. Prevention activists and therapists across the country called for new approaches to HIV prevention (Patton 1996). "HIV prevention requires taking into account the diversity of people's sex lives, that prevention should be grounded in people's desires and pleasures," Michael Warner argued (Smith 1998). The result was a wave of discussions in the late 1990s referred to as the Sex Panic debate or the Gay Men's Sex Wars.

Future research will need to contend with the problems of safer sex and explore alternative technologies, such as microbicides, which can serve as substitutes for latex. In the two decades since the birth of safer sex, new practices of safer

sexual activity have emerged. These include community based approaches such as “jack off” clubs, where men meet to have the safest type of safe sex – mutual masturbation – and more distant approaches such as telephone sex and cybersex. As Waskul (2003) elaborates: “In outercourse, images and/or words fully replace the corporal body as they are crafted among participants to represent the whole of sexual and erotic interactions between them.” Thus, while corporal sexual pleasure takes place between bodies, Waskul concludes, “the pleasures of outercourse are encapsulated in dislocated and disembodied erotic communication where participants latently rearrange taken for granted relationships between bodies, selves, and situated social interactions” (p. 73).

SEE ALSO: AIDS, Sociology of; Oral Sex; Queer Theory; Sex Education; Sex Panics; Sexual Practices; Sexual Health

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Said, Edward W. (1935–2003)

Syed Farid Alatas

Edward W. Said was born to an Arab Christian family in Talbiyeh, Jerusalem when it was under British control, but spent most of his teenage years with his family in Egypt and Lebanon. The creation of the State of Israel in 1948 resulted in Said living in exile from Palestine for most of his life. He attended high school and college in the US, obtaining degrees at Princeton and Harvard and then beginning his career in English and Comparative Literature at Columbia University, where he became University Professor in 1992.

Said is best known as a literary critic as well as a political activist. His political activism for the Palestinian cause was provoked by Golda Meir's infamous statement in 1969 to the effect that Palestinians did not exist. This motivated Said to undertake “the slightly preposterous challenge of disproving her, of beginning to articulate a history of loss and dispossession that had to be extricated, minute by minute, word by word, inch by inch.” Said's political interests are not to be distinguished from his literary concerns, which also dealt with the critique of received knowledge and the generation of alternative discourses. This is where Said's work is most relevant to sociology; that is, where it concerns the study of Orientalism as an ideology conditioned by colonial and imperial interests. Said's works most relevant in this regard are *Orientalism* (1978), *Covering Islam* (1981), *Culture and Imperialism* (1993), and *Representations of the Intellectuals* (1994). Said died in 2003 after battling leukemia for 12 years.

An important aspect of Said's background that greatly influenced his intellectual concerns and political activism was the formation of the State of Israel, the resulting displacement of masses of Palestinians, and the emergence of a discourse that distorted these realities. To a great extent this was simply a specific case of the more general phenomenon of colonization, decolonization, and the accompanying European and American discourses that

attempted their respective constructions of the Arab and Muslim worlds. In any case, there was the problem of loss and dispossession and the need, as felt by Said, to resist such discourse.

Although Said's main field was literary criticism, he brought to it a sociological dimension by bringing in the context of colonialism and empire. In *Orientalism* Said argued that there was a lack of correspondence between what was said in *Orientalism* and the Orient itself and that *Orientalism* was a discourse that functioned to systematically manage and produce the Orient politically, sociologically, militarily, ideologically, scientifically, and imaginatively during the post Enlightenment era. *Orientalism* seeks to expose this function. Herein lies the sociology of knowledge in Said's work. He studied *Orientalism* as a reflection of a "whole series of 'interests' which, by such means as scholarly discovery, philological reconstruction, psychological analysis, landscape and sociological description, . . . not only creates but also maintains" (Said 1978: 12). In sociological terms, therefore, Said was interested in the critical study of the ideology of *Orientalism* and its connections with colonialism and imperialism. The problem of the objectivity of knowledge was raised in Said's critique of *Orientalism*, a theme not unknown in the sociology of knowledge. What Said did, however, was to give this theme its Islamic and Middle Eastern content. His analysis of media representations of Islam in the Middle East in *Covering Islam* was also along these lines, but of a more polemical nature. These interests also led Said to be interested in the role of intellectuals, another issue of sociological relevance. Thus, in *Culture and Imperialism*, the focus shifts to discourses that attempt to resist *Orientalist* ones. Said noted the presence of resistance discourse among Europeans as well; that is, those who wrote in sympathetic alliance with non Europeans (Said 1993: 259). On the latter, Said discusses the work of intellectuals from the colonies or ex colonies who used the ideas and techniques of western scholarship to critique western discourses. He discusses four texts as examples of such resistance discourse: C. L. R. James's *The Black Jacobins*, George Antonius's *The Arab Awakening*, Ranajit Guha's *A Rule of Property for Bengal*, and Syed Hussein Alatas's *The Myth of the Lazy Native*.

A project that Said did not have time to engage in but which he regarded as important was the undertaking of studies of contemporary alternatives to *Orientalism*, studying societies and cultures from non repressive and non manipulative perspectives (Said 1978: 24). In sociology, this has yet to be recognized as an important task as far as the future development of the discipline is concerned.

SEE ALSO: Captive Mind; Eurocentrism; Islam; *Orientalism*; Theory

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Sainsaulieu, Renaud (1935–2002)

Norbert Alter and Dominique Martin

Renaud Sainsaulieu was born in Paris on November 4, 1935 and died there on July 26, 2002. After secondary studies in a Jesuit school, he went on to obtain advanced degrees in law and psychology from the Sorbonne. It was

there that he committed himself to sociological studies and wrote his doctoral dissertation, with Michel Crozier as his adviser. Named Professor of Sociology at the Institut d'Études Politiques de Paris in 1975, he managed the Laboratory for the Sociology of Institutional Creation (LSCI). Renaud Sainsaulieu was also one of the main European promoters of sociology outside academia. He created a specific master's program for that purpose, as well as the Association Professionnelle des Sociologues d'Entreprise (APSE), a professional association for in house sociologists. He also served as an active member and president of the Association Internationale des Sociologues de Langue Française (AISLF).

With *L'Identité au travail (Identity at Work)* (1977), Renaud Sainsaulieu revived the French school of the sociology of organizations by integrating into it an analysis of the cultural dimension of work; power does not directly define the rationality of actors, who act according to the representations, norms, and values that they carry with them. Furthermore, power is not divided equally in a company. Based on these two premises, social experiences are sufficiently differentiated that one can distinguish specific "actor logics." For the mass actor, in a large group of unskilled workers, relations are marked by fusion: power is inaccessible and the collective is valorized as a refuge and as a form of protection. On the other hand, if access to power is made possible through a professional or hierarchical status, negotiation of interpersonal relations is characterized by a rich affective and cognitive dimension, with the possibility, for the strategic actor, of coping with differences. The self promoting actor, who privileges social advancement, carefully cultivates selected affinities with a few colleagues, to the detriment of groups, which are perceived as threatening. Finally, retreat is the stance of the actor for whom work is above all an economic necessity and the means to achieve other goals.

This cultural approach is also original because of the importance it gives to the idea of social change: "cultural apprenticeship" occurs and can subsequently recur in relation to changes in the division of labor. This apprenticeship is not, however, systematic: in certain cases the actors withdraw and resist because they do not have the resources to project themselves into a new frame of action.

The approach that Renaud Sainsaulieu developed under the term *sociologie de l'entreprise* (sociology of the company) extends these observations and opens new fields of investigation. This theoretical approach defines the company as an object of analysis and puts the concept of culture at the center. It does not limit its space of observation to the workshop or to specific professional groups or to relations of power, and thus privileges analysis of the relationship between the company and the global society, understood as the cultural, economic, and political environment of the firm's activity. The analysis of contingencies that is centered on the relationship of the company to these environments is complemented by two other types of analysis: strategic analysis, which studies informal relationships of power, and cultural analysis, which is concerned with what "cements" the identities by which the subjects cope with the trials of their daily working lives.

While the company is usually criticized in the sociology of labor as a place of domination, it is here understood as an "institution," as a place of integration and collective dynamics. The major management issue for companies is, according to Sainsaulieu, to put the "social at the heart of the economic," in order to provide them with an efficiency and meaning that conventional methods have failed to generate. This research approach is also "interventionist" in that sociology is conceived not only as a tool for analysis but also as a means of action. The goal of researchers is thus to participate in the functioning and transformation of companies by making their expertise available to the actors, and also by defining programs of action based on empirically and theoretically grounded diagnoses. The boundary defying idea, formulated in terms of the "social development of the company," is that companies can move from a defensive and bureaucratic logic to a creative and democratic functioning through change and innovation, and that this evolution requires the mobilization of all the actors, whatever their importance, whether they are institutionalized or not.

SEE ALSO: Organization Theory; Organizational Contingencies; Organizations; Work, Sociology of

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salary men

Tomoko Kurihara

In contemporary Japanese society the term salary men refers mainly to white collar elites in multinational corporations (who represent approximately 20 percent of the total working population). As described in Beck and Beck's *A Change of a Lifetime* (1994) salary men constitute a managerial class that occupies the top stratum of the business community and is accorded high status in society. Its members have almost exclusively obtained degrees from Japan's most prestigious universities. However, in practice, a wider use of and flexible self identification with the term is common. The term can therefore refer to both non elite white collar and occasionally blue collar workers. Such flexible usage is made possible by Japan's industrial structure – the *keiretsu* system – which links large corporations to medium sized and small subcontracting firms. The combination of English terms is used to signify, literally, a worker whose firm guarantees him a salaried income.

The reference to salary men as a category of workers in society arose in parallel with the concept of the nation state, and industrialization and urbanization, which can be traced to the Meiji period in the late nineteenth century. In the twentieth century, salary men are most strongly associated with the post war economic boom. This period in Japanese history is also associated with the emergence of the nuclear family (often headed by the salary man), a large new middle class (of which the salary man was a member) associated with a consumerist life style, and the rise of corporatism or corporate centered society. In this context, they came to signify the economic and social development of Japan.

Western sociological and anthropological writing on salaried workers developed in parallel to the growth and strength of the Japanese economy, which in the post war period became a powerful player in the international market. Writers have explored notions of development (Dore 1987), the structure of the economy, the Japanese management system (such as the life time employment and seniority based wage and promotion system, *nenkojyoretsu seido*), and the harmonious characteristic of interpersonal relationships within firms (Nakane 1970; Rohlen 1974; Clark 1979; Cole 1979). Contemporary scholars are critical of contributions made before the late 1970s (the early period) for applying a culturalist approach (i.e., the discredited *nihon jinron* perspective) to understanding Japanese working culture. Nonetheless, the detailed studies by early scholars of the meaning and significance of emic terms continue to serve as essential referents in much of contemporary literature, for any level of analysis – interactional, organizational, theoretical – on changes in contemporaneity and the critical development of theoretical perspective is impossible without reference to these native concepts. Mouer and Kawanishi (2005) provide a comprehensive guide to the history and future orientation of research into working life in Japan.

In the best known study (albeit grounded in the *nihonjinron*) of Japanese society based on white collar organizations, Nakane (1970) examines the internal structure of firms while suggesting a correlation to the functioning of society. The most significant relationships that constitute the core of the organization's structure are vertical relations, which are experienced between senior (*senpai*) and junior (*kohai*) workers, and, horizontal relations, which are experienced between individuals of the same rank or horizontal stratum (*doryo*). These relations bring a sense of cohesion and stability to the organization: this is important to a consensus based society which values the ethos of collectivism. Ties between individuals within an organization are strong by nature of the fact that individuals belong to a particular group (or "frame"); because membership to a group is the essential basis of Japanese social structure; and also because contact between individuals lays stress on the emotions and morals of belonging to the group which breeds loyalty,

dependency, and affection between individuals within vertical ties. It is in this sense that the operation of a strong consciousness of ranking order effectively exerts control over individual behavior and thought.

Salary men are known as corporate warriors (*kigyō senshi*), as their lifestyles (daily commutes, transfers to subsidiaries, and the ability to support non working wives) is said to resemble the lifestyle of samurai warriors of the pre Meiji (1868) class system (Vogel 1963; Ueno 1987). However, whereas the samurai ideology upholds qualities of courage, boldness, and capacity for individual action, the salary man is bound to the organization, unable to make independent choices (Plath 1964). For example, the culture of large corporations requires salary men to work long hours, at times doing overtime without pay, and reporting to work or being available for consultation on work related emergencies during holiday time. However, salary men experienced benefits from the lifetime employment and seniority based wage and promotion system, such as financial stability and security, which was a return for the loyalty shown to the company. This in turn enabled the salary man to provide an identity for his family. Salary men, in essence, reflect a certain cultural ideal of masculinity, both at the level of corporate discourse and by individuals who uphold these moral values and work very hard (Morinaga 1995; Ueno 1995; Dasgupta 2000). These values are also expressed via specific physical and personal attributes typically exemplified by a sombre and conservative dress code, politeness and deference to senior workers, and sensitivity to social codes. Moreover, work for salary men does not end when they leave the office. Work continues, only it shifts to a different venue – bars, restaurants, or clubs – where socializing with co workers and clients is obligatory for the salary man who wants to keep ahead of his game. An exchange of vital information about projects and people takes place in an informal atmosphere and deals might be sealed with clients (Allison 1994).

Furthermore, during the bubble economy, salary men became the vehicle by means of which economic and political tensions in international relations were articulated. This is due to the association between salary men and the ideals which foster notions of nationalism, as

salary men come to embody the economic strategies and goals of the Japanese government and corporations for which they work. While the ideology behind salary men can be seen to support part of the national discourse that perpetuates the myth of Japanese uniqueness, conversely, the opposite holds true whereby militaristic and gendered connotations are often used to extend the general discourse of Orientalism about Japan. Particularly, in western media in the 1980s, parallels were drawn between an image of Japan's ruthless and savage wartime activities and the corporate infiltration of western markets to near saturation while pursuing isolationist economic strategies, despite British and Dutch corporations having a similar high degree of foreign investment in the US. This parallels the general discourse of Orientalism directed against the non West.

In the period of decelerating economic growth, an internal critique of Japan's characteristically hierarchical and male dominated corporate culture became prominent. During the 1980s and 1990s Japanese companies faced two notable problems: a downturn in the economy which forced a strict reassessment of labor costs, and the aging of their personnel, corresponding to aging of the Japanese population as a whole. Personnel policy has been the main point of focus for revision in companies, whereby the lifetime employment system, and seniority wage and promotion systems, are being abolished or altered. Furthermore, the greater acceptability of transfers and job changes even among the managerial elite of large corporations has followed on from economic necessity and has been greeted with greater cultural acceptability.

Overall, however, the social and structural effects of restructuring have been negative as well as positive (Kurihara 2007). In the late 1990s and early 2000s the unemployment rate was high, as was the rate of unemployment accounted for by redundancies, which is a direct result of companies engaging in restructuring through job cuts. Under the lifetime employment system companies are bound by non contractual agreement to provide jobs for life to their employees; therefore, companies have responded by creating redundancies either by encouraging older employees to retire early, or by asking volunteers to take early retirement or

temporary leave. The greatest number of job losses are among middle aged male workers, and also suicide rates and divorce rates are increasing. To aid this growing body of retrenched salary men, the government proposed to extend financial support to new small and medium sized ventures because of the likelihood that these will soak up these individuals.

The changing economy also has had implications for new graduates. As a result of companies cutting back on recruitment in the late 1990s, a smaller proportion of new university graduates was able to find employment within the same year, as opposed to the early 1990s, during the tail end of the economic bubble. As a flexible and relatively lower cost response to the drop in levels of intake of new recruits, the larger and traditional companies have set up internship programs. Internship schemes provide university students summer work experience and help to develop creativity and inspiration among them, while creating a smoother flow in the transition between university and the work place. The future trend points to small companies incorporating internship schemes into existing recruitment methods.

Alongside the structural changes in the economy, labor markets, and management practices which took place in the post bubble period, cultural changes to the lifestyles of salary men have also been subject to much debate. The critique of corporate centered society by Osawa (1994) best exemplifies the cultural side of the debate. One recognition in this has been the need for freedom among corporate men that will enable them to have a richer private life free from the constant demands of the corporation. The ethic guiding the conduct of the salary man – enforcing a strict division between private and public roles and insisting on sacrificing life at home – is generally seen to be outdated. The salary man, called a *kaisha ningen* (company person) who would be proud to be seen acting out his appropriate role, was a positive and desirable image for men during the rapid growth period. But in the late 1990s and early 2000s the self identification that is common among salary men is of a man of principle, committed to hard work, but equally to his family, which is called *mai homu shugi*. The term salary man has (in a loose sense) lost its former hard image of workaholics.

SEE ALSO: Enterprise Unions; Japanese Style Management; *Shushin Koyo*

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same-sex marriage/civil unions

Brian Heaphy

Same sex marriage refers to a union by two people of the same sex that is legally sanctioned by the state, where identical rights and responsibilities are afforded same sex and heterosexual married couples. The term "gay marriage" is popularly used to refer to same sex partnerships or cohabiting relationships that are formally registered in some way as a "civil union" (variously known as civil partnerships, registered partnerships, and registered cohabitation), although the latter are in fact legally distinct from marriage. The term is also sometimes employed to talk about unregistered same sex couple cohabitation or partnerships acknowledged through commitment ceremonies. Few states currently afford same sex couples the opportunity to participate in marriage (those that do include Belgium, Spain, the Netherlands, and Canada, but see the following web sites for detailed information on changing status in different countries: www.marriageequality.org; www.samesexmarriage.ca; www.stonewall.org.uk). Civil unions, civil partnerships, and registered cohabitation, which include some exemptions from the automatic rights and responsibilities afforded heterosexual married couples, are the most common forms of legal recognition. They offer some of the symbolic and material advantages associated with marriage, but with more limited legal status. At a global level, most same sex partners must currently rely on "do it yourself" affirmation and commitment ceremonies, or seek religious blessings where available.

Same sex marriage and civil unions have become high profile political issues in many countries since the early 1990s. In Europe the number of states that have extended, or are planning to extend, legal recognition to lesbian and gay relationships through civil unions has increased steadily since the first civil partnership legislation was passed in Denmark in 1989. Elsewhere, Australia, Argentina, Brazil, New Zealand, South Africa, and other countries have either nationwide or regional legal facilities for

the recognition of same sex partnerships or cohabiting relationships. In the United States, the issue of same sex marriage has been an especially contentious one. While some states have introduced legislation to recognize same sex marriage or civil unions (e.g., Massachusetts, Connecticut, Vermont), other states have enacted constitutional amendments that explicitly forbid same sex marriage, or have passed legislation that bars civil union type recognition. This points to the strength of support and opposition that the issue of same sex marriage can generate in the US and most other countries where the issue is debated. On the one hand, some constituencies see same sex marriage and civil unions as an ultimate marker of social and political tolerance. On the other hand, some groups view the issue as indicative of the decline in religious and moral values in an increasingly secular world. Amongst conservative religious and social groups especially, same sex marriage is often interpreted as an attack on the primacy and "naturalness" of the heterosexual married bond that is assumed to underpin a stable society.

Same sex marriage and civil unions therefore touch on important sociological themes to do with sexuality, family life, and social change, and raise questions about social "rights" and responsibilities, sexual politics, and citizenship. The topic features highly in debates on the demise of the "traditional" family, the legitimacy of new family forms, and the blurring of the "public" and "private" in contemporary social contexts. Existing theory and research has focused on the social, cultural, and political forces that have brought the issue to the fore; the extent to which same sex marriage represents full "sexual citizenship"; the meanings afforded partnership recognition by lesbians and gay men; and the implications of recognition for couples and their "blood" or "chosen" families (Weston 1991).

A number of social developments have influenced the current focus of lesbian and gay politics on same sex marriage. AIDS, some theorists argue, was a catalyst in mobilizing a new lesbian and gay relational politics in the 1980s. This was initially focused on the recognition of same sex partners' caring commitments, and protecting "rights" in relation to property and next of kin issues. Community responses to

AIDS facilitated the institution building and political confidence that made same sex marriage seem like a realizable political objective. Since the 1980s new possibilities have opened up for lesbian and gay parenting (through self and assisted insemination, surrogacy, fostering, adoption, and so on) and a growing number of same sex couples are choosing to parent. Same sex marriage is seen as a crucial strategy for recognizing and protecting co parenting commitments.

Another social development is the changing nature of heterosexual marriage itself. The separation of marriage from the needs of reproduction and women's increasing economic independence from men are transforming the meanings of heterosexual marriage. Some theorists cite statistics on divorce, cohabitation, single parenting, and solo living as an indication of the fragility of the institution of marriage. For others, these statistics are indicative of how processes of detraditionalization and individualization make marriage a "zombie" institution (Beck 2000). The recognition of same sex marriage can therefore be interpreted as an attempt to reinvigorate or reinvent an ailing institution. A different perspective suggests that the changing role of welfare states can explain the political support that same sex marriage has received from unexpected quarters. Some argue that as welfare states seek to shift social and care responsibilities back onto individuals and their families and communities, the recognition of same sex marriage makes sense as it formalizes the responsibilities of lesbians and gay men for their partners and families.

The tendency is for sociological analyses of same sex marriage to reflect broader political and social debate, and to be framed around dichotomies of accommodation and resistance. The core debate is the extent to which same sex marriage represents a radical challenge to heteronormativity or a triumph of heterosexual norms. This is sometimes referred to as the "Sullivan versus Warner" debate. On the one hand, marriage is viewed as the legitimate aim of lesbian and gay politics, and as the most appropriate strategy for non heterosexual citizenship (Sullivan). This position understands the marriage contract as symbolizing an emotional, financial, and psychological bond and highlights the economic and social advantages of marriage.

Some analyses suggest that the legalizing of same sex unions can reshape and modernize the institution of marriage in keeping with gender and sexual equality.

On the other hand, feminist, liberationist, and queer critics have argued that same sex marriage represents the dominance of heterosexual values and undermines the distinctiveness of lesbian and gay cultures. This views the extension of marriage to same sex couples as a form of social regulation, with profound normalizing implications for same sex relationships and queer identities (Warner). The political desire for marriage, it is argued, is based on outmoded notions of commitment. Ultimately it may lead to normative constructions of socially responsible and irresponsible homosexuals, and to the imposition of rules which may stifle the creativity of same sex partnerships. Feminist critics have further argued that the valorization of marriage as "full citizenship" for lesbians and gay men is a naïve political strategy. They point to the historical role of the institution of marriage in the reproduction of patriarchal structures and its grounding in gendered inequalities.

Some researchers have explored the dilemmas that marriage poses for lesbians and gay men. Opinions about the value of same sex marriage range from enthusiasm to outright rejection, and many individuals and couples are ambivalent about the issue. Lesbian and gay research participants generally endorse the principle of equality with heterosexual relationships. They desire social validation, and feel that same sex couples should be entitled to the legal benefits, rights, and responsibilities that are traditionally associated with marriage (such as medical decision making, child support, inheritance, and so on). However, individuals' ambivalence is underscored where research suggests that while most lesbians and gay men feel that they *should* have the right to marry, only a small minority *would* marry given the opportunity. While lesbians and gay men appear keen to take up some of the entitlements and responsibilities traditionally associated with marriage, in comparing heterosexual marriage to their own relationships they often perceive the latter to offer greater opportunities for creativity and equality.

Some researchers suggest that lesbian and gay ambivalence about same sex marriage is indicative of the legal and cultural privileging

of the institution. This leaves individuals with “no choice” but to see it as a crucial marker of social inclusion and citizenship – irrespective of their personal or political reservations. Others have argued that this ambivalence is rooted in the tensions between the desire for validation and participation in the existing traditions that marriage represents, and the desire to retain choice and creativity in “doing” and affirming relationships. A number of studies suggest that the lack of institutional supports and cultural guidelines for same sex relationships enables the development of distinctly creative partnerships and family practices. Studies also indicate that same sex relationships tend to be underpinned by a friendship ethic that generally promotes a commitment to equality. Monogamy as the basis of commitment, and the primary significance of the couple, tend to be open to negotiation and are rarely assumed. This has led some theorists and researchers to argue that same sex relationships are creative “life experiments.” Such creativity is also noted in the research on commitment affirmation, where the playfulness of “do it yourself” traditions and rituals is highlighted. While elements of conformity are evident in how same sex relationships are celebrated and ritualized, couples often challenge or go beyond traditional ways of doing things. Research has further illustrated how commitment ceremonies simultaneously indicate conformity to wider values and introduce “queering” messages at crucial points.

Same sex marriage and civil unions are distinctly contemporary phenomena, and they offer fertile ground for theorizing and new research. Several dimensions and questions could be explored. Established themes that warrant further exploration in different national and local contexts include: the ways in which same sex marriage challenges heterosexual norms or otherwise; the motivations for accepting or rejecting same sex marriage at state, political, couple, and personal levels; and alternative strategies for recognizing and validating same sex relationships and identities, such as the individualization of “rights” and responsibilities. Other areas for research open up as the availability and take up of marriage and civil unions increase. These include the implications for supporting same sex couple commitments; for a sense of connectedness to family and

community traditions; and for a sense of couple and familial security. Research might also explore the implications (normalizing or otherwise) of legal and symbolic recognition for how couples structure and “do” their relationships. What, for example, are the implications for sexual exclusiveness and longevity? Studies could also examine the implications for non heterosexual identities. Does recognition enhance a sense of individual security or otherwise? Are individuals judged (by themselves and others) on their capacities or willingness to marry? Finally, there is limited research on the breakup of same sex relationships. What are the implications of legal recognition for this? What are the implications of “divorce” and deregistration?

These topics and questions require creative research strategies and methodologies, an area where sexualities research has particular strengths and weaknesses. One obstacle is the “hidden” nature of lesbian and gay populations. This often means that particular experiences (white, middle class, and urban) are taken to represent *the* lesbian and gay experience. As the possibilities offered by same sex marriage and civil partnerships are likely to have profound implications for lesbians and gay men, future research should attempt to capture a fuller range of voices, experience, and opinions than has previously been the case.

SEE ALSO: Cohabitation; Family Diversity; Gay and Lesbian Movement; Intimate Union Formation and Dissolution; Lesbian and Gay Families; Marriage

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sampling, qualitative (purposive)

Michael Quinn Patton

Perhaps nothing better captures the difference between quantitative and qualitative methods than the different logics that undergird sampling approaches. Qualitative inquiry typically focuses in depth on relatively small samples, even single cases ($n = 1$), selected *purposefully*. Quantitative methods typically depend on larger samples selected randomly. Not only are the techniques for sampling different, but also the very logic of each approach is unique because the purpose of each strategy is different.

The logic and power of random sampling derives from statistical probability theory. In contrast, the logic and power of *purposive sampling* lies in selecting *information rich cases* for study in depth. Information rich cases are those from which one can learn a great deal about issues of central importance to the purpose of the inquiry, thus the term *purposive sampling* (or alternatively, purposeful sampling). What

would be “bias” in statistical sampling, and therefore a weakness, becomes intended focus in qualitative sampling, and therefore a strength. Studying information rich cases yields insights and in depth understanding rather than empirical generalizations. For example, if the purpose of a program evaluation is to increase the effectiveness of a program in reaching lower socioeconomic groups, one may learn a great deal more by studying in depth a small number of carefully selected poor families than by gathering standardized information from a large, statistically representative sample of the whole program. Purposive sampling focuses on selecting information rich cases whose study will illuminate the questions under study. There are several different strategies for purposefully selecting information rich cases. The logic of each strategy serves a particular purpose.

Extreme or deviant case sampling involves selecting cases that are information rich because they are unusual or special in some way, such as outstanding successes or notable failures. The highly influential study of high performing American companies published as *In Search of Excellence* (Peters & Waterman 1982) exemplifies the logic of purposeful, extreme group sampling. The sample of 62 companies was never intended to be representative of US industry as a whole, but rather was purposefully selected to focus on innovation and excellence. In the early days of AIDS research when HIV infections almost always resulted in death, a small number of cases of people infected with HIV who did not develop AIDS became crucial outlier cases that provided important insights into directions researchers should take in combating AIDS.

In program evaluation, the logic of extreme case sampling is that lessons may be learned about unusual conditions or extreme outcomes that are relevant to improving more typical programs. Suppose that we are interested in studying a national program with hundreds of local sites. We know that many programs are operating reasonably well, that other programs verge on being disasters, and that most programs are doing “okay.” We know this from knowledgeable sources who have made site visits to enough programs to have a basic idea about what the variation is. If one wanted to document precisely the natural variation among programs, a random

sample would be appropriate, one of sufficient size to be representative and permit generalizations to the total population of programs. However, with limited resources and time, and with the priority being how to improve programs, an evaluator might learn more by intensively studying one or more examples of really poor programs and one or more examples of really excellent programs. The evaluation focus then becomes a question of understanding under what conditions programs get into trouble and under what conditions programs exemplify excellence. It is not even necessary to randomly sample poor programs or excellent programs. The researchers and intended users involved in the study think through *what cases they could learn the most from* and those are the cases that are selected for study.

Examples of other purposeful sampling strategies are briefly described below.

Maximum variation sampling involves purposefully picking a wide range of cases to get variation on dimensions of interest. Such a sample can document variations that have emerged in adapting to different conditions as well as identify important common patterns that cut across variations (cut through the noise of variation).

Homogenous sampling is used to bring focus to a sample, reduce variation, simplify analysis, and facilitate group interviewing (focus groups).

Typical case sampling is used to illustrate or highlight what is typical, normal, average, and give greater depth of understanding to the qualitative meaning of a statistical mean.

Critical case sampling refers to certain cases that can make a point quite dramatically or are, for some reason, particularly important in the scheme of things. A clue to the existence of a critical case is a statement to the effect that "if it happens there, it will happen anywhere," or, vice versa, "if it doesn't happen there, it won't happen anywhere." Another clue to the existence of a critical case is a key informant observation to the effect that "if that group is having problems, then we can be sure all the groups are having problems." Looking for the critical case is particularly important where resources may limit the inquiry to the study of only a single site. Under such conditions it makes strategic sense to pick the site that would yield

the most information and have the greatest impact on the development of knowledge. While studying one or a few critical cases does not technically permit broad generalizations to all possible cases, *logical generalizations* can often be made from the weight of evidence produced in studying a single, critical case.

Physics provides a good example of such a critical case. In Galileo's study of gravity he wanted to find out if the weight of an object affected the rate of speed at which it would fall. Rather than randomly sampling objects of different weights in order to generalize to all objects in the world, he selected a critical case: the feather. If in a vacuum, as he demonstrated, a feather fell at the same rate as some heavier object (a coin), then he could logically generalize from this one critical comparison to all objects. His finding was both useful and credible because the feather was a convincing critical case.

Critical cases can be found in social science and evaluation research if one is creative in looking for them. Identification of critical cases depends on recognition of the key dimensions that make for a critical case.

For a full discussion of these and other purposeful sampling strategies and the full range of qualitative methods and analytical approaches, see Denzin and Lincoln (2000) and Patton (2002).

SEE ALSO: Action Research; Evaluation; Methods, Case Study; Methods, Mixed; Paradigms

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Sanskritization

Vineeta Sinha

It is crucial to make a distinction between the word Sanskritization and its conceptualization as a tool of sociological analysis. The word itself, having been derived from the root “Sanskrit,” labeled the sacred language of Hindus and Hinduism, together with related terminology such as “Sanskritic,” “Sanskritized,” and “Sanskritizing,” is already present in nineteenth and twentieth century European Indological literature. These terms are used variously, but predominantly describe either elite based, Brahmanic, “Hindu” culture or note its influence on the diverse, non Brahmanic, non Hindu elements of Indian society. As a point of historical interest, it is notable that although the conceptualization of the term is rightly attributed to the late eminent Indian social anthropologist M. N. Srinivas, it (and associated descriptions) was already in use by sociologist, historian, and economist Benoy Kumar Sarkar in the 1930s and by linguist Suniti Kumar Chatterjee in 1950.

As formulated by Srinivas, the word Sanskritization sometimes connotes a perspective, a theory, a concept or a cluster of concepts, all relevant for theorizing social change in India and firmly embedded in an anthropological model of Indian society. The concept has had a checkered history, but is probably the single most important contribution to social science scholarship from India, and a good candidate for the title of a culturally specific and “indigenous” category of analysis. It is first named and appears in Srinivas’s *Religion and Society Amongst the Coorgs of South India* (1952), but the germ of the idea was present in his earlier work on *Marriage and Family in Mysore* (1942). Already at this time, the concept was criticized by such Indian social science luminaries as Datta Majumdar, Karve, and Raghavan (Bopegamage & Kulahalli 1971). Despite this early challenge, the term was welcomed by a section of Indian and western sociologists and anthropologists (Bailey 1957; Singer 1959; Gould 1961; Sahay 1962), and viewed as a concept that addressed the uniqueness and peculiarity of the Indian social structural situation. Yet, in the mid 1950s, Srinivas himself agreed that the term

was “ugly,” although it was nonetheless valuable in analyses of social change in India.

In his first book published in 1942, Srinivas had already observed a process that he would subsequently name and define in his 1952 book on the Coorgs. According to Srinivas’s first definition, the process of Sanskritization referred to a low caste, over a few generations, rising in the community “to a higher position in the hierarchy by adopting vegetarianism and teetotalism, and by Sanskritizing its ritual and pantheon,” by taking over not only the customs and rites, but also the beliefs of the Brahmin. Srinivas acknowledges here that the adoption of the Brahmanic way of life by a low caste, although forbidden theoretically, occurred regularly in practice.

In *Caste in Modern India* (1965), his argument is expanded to include the realm of values and ideas as well as ritual practices, “which have found frequent expression in the vast body of Sanskrit literature, sacred as well as secular” (p. 48). Finally, in *Social Change in Modern India* (1967), Srinivas provided an integrated definition of the term. Sanskritization “is a process by which a ‘low’ Hindu caste, or tribal or other group, changes its customs, ritual, ideology and way of life in the direction of a high caste” (p. 6). The term also carried notions of upward social mobility and prestige, a central feature of the process.

Srinivas acknowledged that this process is not to be viewed as a singular, monolithic whole but that empirically many models of Sanskritization could be identified, noting that regional variation is a crucial, determining factor. For example, he listed the Brahmanic, Kshatriya, Vaishya, and Sudra variants, the nature of caste hierarchy being determined by the dominant caste groups in question. He further acknowledged that the process may be occurring amongst tribal, non Hindu groups as well, thus placing Sanskritization well outside the “Hindu” framework. In fact, he even holds open the possibility of “de Sanskritization” amongst all these groups as a reverse process.

Srinivas’s career as a social anthropologist and analyst committed to theorizing Indian social structure, through the impact of modernizing and westernizing forces, can be viewed as resting on his sustained intellectual engagement with the process of Sanskritization, which

continued well into the 1990s. Thus, one observes an evolution in Srinivas's thinking about the concept, as he strived to refine, justify, and modify it in an effort to demonstrate its relevance as a meaningful instrument of investigation for Indian society. This makes it impossible to "define" the term Sanskritization briefly. It is more valuable to undertake a historical perspective to see its shifting nuances and constitutive elements within the context of Srinivas's own thinking.

Scholars have applied the concept of Sanskritization to a variety of diverse sociocultural, religious phenomena, in both Indian and diasporic settings, some with greater success than others. Despite objections, the concept has been embraced and applied by Indian and western social scientists alike, while remaining controversial. One prominent example of such application is the association of village deities with Sanskritic deities and the requisite elevation of folk ritual practices to a higher, Sanskritic, and more legitimate status. The term continues to be popular and is subject to a variety of usages and interpretations. The downside is that it is often somewhat loosely applied to a variety of substantive domains (Staal 1963), to the extent that it seems to have little conceptual rigor and coherence, for which Srinivas cannot be held responsible. But the point remains that one continues to see rather awkward applications of the term, in ways that Srinivas himself would have found problematic. One line of critique notes problems in expanding the term beyond a highly specific and localized analytical frame to a theory of grand, all encompassing proportions, presented as relevant for making sense of social change and mobility in all of India. This claim to universal reference as an "all India" category has been contested for failing to acknowledge regional variation across the Indian landscape. Another noted shortcoming is that the concept tends to gloss over, erase, or veil the many complexities, contradictions, and nuances of castes and their relations at the level of practice. In a self-critical stance Srinivas himself admitted, in later reflections on the concept he devised and popularized, that it was too broad and too loose conceptually in its original formulation, suggesting that it should be discarded if necessary.

Through these moments of reflection, which have culminated in a reworked concept, Srinivas

avoids defining it substantively, that is, it is not delimited by content. Rather, it signifies a generic process by which lower caste groups (or other subordinate groups) attempt to raise their status (ritual or otherwise) by imitating, emulating, or adopting the behavior and thinking of groups with higher status. The concept is inevitably rooted in Brahmanic tradition, the Sanskrit language, and Brahmins as guardians of the former, and carries an implicit statement about the superiority of Sanskritic tradition. Despite varied challenges to the concept, Srinivas continues to reaffirm its value, albeit in altered modes and suited to contemporary problems, reiterating the cohesive, integrating, and unifying role of Sanskritization in the plural context of sovereign, secular India. He writes in *The Cohesive Role of Sanskritization and Other Essays* (1989) that independent India's heterogeneous population can be unified, even while adhering to "what is valuable in Sanskrit thought and culture," and that to ensure this it would be "necessary for Hindus to accept the entire Indian tradition to which all sections of the population have contributed, and for the latter (i.e., non Hindus) to regard the Sanskrit heritage as their own."

Such grounding brings into sharp focus several interrelated categories and dichotomies upon which the logic of Sanskritization rests, and which have structured social science analyses of Indian society well into the 1990s. Examples include the "Great" and "Little" traditions, the "folk-urban" divide, and "non Sanskritic Hinduism" and "Sanskritic Hinduism." Several other observations in Srinivas's explication of Sanskritization are pertinent. To begin, the term carries explicitly religious overtones. Next, it selects Hinduism and caste as the twin structural pillars of Indian society. This rendering connects the term "Sanskritization" explicitly (perhaps unintentionally) to both Indological and Orientalist discourses which read India as defined by caste and Hinduism, and a classical, textual, Brahmanic and Sanskritic variety of Hindu religiosity. In this, one can see the role of Sanskritization and its inventor as perpetuating the image of India as distinct from the West, in being defined exclusively by caste principles and by Hindu religiosity – central in Orientalist imaginings of India – critiqued by postcolonial and postorientalist scholarship. In this context, the concept of Sanskritization

has neither been historicized sufficiently nor received rigorous, intellectual attention, but instead continues to be accepted rather uncritically by its proponents. At least some of this has to do less with assessment of ideas and more with reservations against contesting and refuting one of the most eminent researchers India has produced, a man who is justifiably still considered an intellectual giant and an icon amongst Indian social scientists.

In recent years, a section of Indian social scientists has wondered about the continued relevance of the notion of Sanskritization. Despite being regularly contested since its formulation in the 1950s, it persists in analyses of Indian and Hindu domains, including amongst diasporic communities. It is a tribute to its potency, prestige, popularity, and malleability that in a 1996 volume on caste in India, edited by Srinivas, there are several pieces that return to the idea of Sanskritization, but now with a different meaning and intent. For instance, here one encounters the idea of Sanskritization as an "ideology," a word that Srinivas had used in his 1989 publication to refer to the spiritual ideas carried in Brahmanic ritual practices, but importantly without the tone of control, domination, hegemony, and oppression current in later renditions. This transformation occurs in the aftermath of decades of challenges to Brahmanical orthodoxy in India and the initiation of policy, legislative, and institutional measures that acknowledge, and thus attempt to ameliorate, the socioeconomic status of non Brahmin castes therein. The practice, motivation, and consequences of "Sanskritization" are now confronted, particularly by the Dalit and non Brahmin social movements launched and active in both northern and southern parts of India. Consequently, one has to ask if the concept of "Sanskritization" has been attentive to possible deleterious effects of the transformative process, or does it assume its effects to be desired, desirable, and beneficial, or is there silence on the subject?

The concept is further important in contemporary discussions amongst proponents of alternative discourses, especially in the realm of concept and theory construction. One strong critique of mainstream social science wisdom is the overwhelming reliance on "western" and "European" cultural experiences and traditions

as the exclusive source and origin of concepts and categories of analysis, which are then presented as being of universal relevance. A suggested corrective is the search for "indigenous" concepts, from non western traditions. Sanskritization has been popularly cited as an example of such a category, which is independently derived and thus autonomous. This is ironic, for as we have seen, as originally constructed the appeal of the concept was precisely its cultural boundedness and specificity as well as its capacity to explain a uniquely Indian situation, thus viewed as a particular, indigenous concept tied to Indian realities. The present quest for indigenous categories in alternative discourses is precisely the reverse, in seeking categories that may have a broader, generic, universal relevance beyond their context of origin. However, distance from the substantive dimensions (and Indian/Hindu grounding) of the concept allows one to consider the general viability of the notion, given that it refers to a process which potentially has universal implications. For instance, it might be possible to use the concept to understand the process of gentrification occurring amongst rural peasant communities in Eastern Europe, or the rise of the *nouveaux riches* in many parts of the world. It is a pity that, to date, there has been little attempt to abstract from this concept any universal validity or see it as relevant for comparative, cross cultural analysis.

SEE ALSO: Folk Hinduism; Gentrification; Hinduism; Popular Religiosity; Religion; Religion, Sociology of; Sarkar, Benoy Kumar

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Saraswati, Pandita Ramabai (1858–1922)

Vineeta Sinha

Pandita Ramabai Saraswati was born in the forest of Gungamal in the Indian state of Maharashtra. Her father, Ananda Shastri Dongre, was a learned Brahmin and a social reformer, who at the age of 44 had taken a second wife, Lakshmi bai, of 9 years, in keeping with the custom of child marriage at the time. Shastri educated his wife in Sanskrit, a highly unorthodox move for the times, as girls were denied formal education and learning of sacred Hindu texts, the exclusive right and privilege of males. His unorthodox beliefs and practices led to his ostracization from the community. Consequently, he led a rather nomadic and secluded life, delivering religious lectures and sermons to support his young family. It was in such a context that Ramabai was born, the youngest of six children, but of which only three ultimately survived. Her formative years were spent in this rather drifting and atypical setting. She received early education in the Hindu scriptures from her mother, learnt Sanskrit, and could recite the Puranas proficiently from a young age. She was not married off as a child, but remained unmarried beyond age 10 and continued her learning. After the death of her parents between 1874 and 1877, she sustained their lifestyle and traveled across India with her brother, giving lectures in Sanskrit and engaging religious experts on a variety of social and spiritual matters. At the end of her travels, she arrived in Calcutta and spent a significant part of her adult creative life

in this city. It was here that she was honored by Brahmins of Calcutta with the title “Pandita,” which translates as “eminent scholar and teacher,” on the basis of her command and knowledge of sacred Hindu texts. She was also seen as a modern day incarnation of Saraswati, the Hindu goddess of learning. The inclusion of these two titles produced the name by which she was to be subsequently remembered. In 1880, at the age of 22, Ramabai broke all conventions in marrying by choice a friend of her brother’s, a man of a low caste and a non Brahmin of Shudra background. She had a daughter, Manorama, in 1881, but lost her husband to cholera the following year. She led a full life, intellectually and spiritually, and died in 1922, but has left a legacy of works that warrant closer academic attention than has so far been forthcoming.

In 1883, she left for England with her 2 year old daughter and enrolled at the Cheltenham Women’s College to study the natural sciences, mathematics, and English. She had also decided to join the Episcopalian Church. She had raised part of the travel fare to England through the sale of her book, *Stri Dharma Neeti (Morals for Women, 1882)*, in which she urged women to become self reliant and take charge of their own lives. To support herself in a foreign land, she taught Sanskrit and Marathi to women missionaries who were planning to work in Maharashtra, India. In 1886 she sailed to the United States to attend the graduation of her cousin, Dr. Anandibai Joshi, who is considered the first Indian woman medical doctor. She wrote another book, *The High Caste Hindu Woman (1886)*, to pay for her travel expenses to the US. This was primarily to secure support for funding a school for child widows in India. Back from her travels in February 1889, Ramabai was at the forefront of educational reform for women and strived to provide institutional alternatives for abandoned women and widowed women/girls. In April 1889, “Sharada Sadan,” the first home for widows in Maharashtra, was established in Bombay. But Ramabai’s conversion to Christianity created much controversy, and unfortunately her social reform initiatives were received with suspicion, given her connection with missionaries and her own religious conversion, which was viewed as a rejection of her Hindu identity.

Ramabai was a woman ahead of her times, living in an age that was not ready to accept her radicalism and critique of society. She overtly confronted both patriarchy and British imperialism. She was a staunch nationalist and her opposition to British colonial presence was publicly articulated. She was distinctive amongst her contemporaries for her direct critique of patriarchy, its ideologies and institutions. She challenged long held discriminatory social and cultural practices and their debilitating effect on girls, i.e., the institution of child marriage for girls, enforced widowhood, and restrictions on education of girls. Her rallying call encouraged women to be self-reliant, urging them to lead autonomous, self-reliant, and independent lives. In terms of concrete contributions, Ramabai was instrumental in establishing schools for girls, an act that was opposed by male and female reformers of her time. She also founded institutions that provided food and shelter to homeless widows and other needy women, to reduce their dependence on often hostile and non-supportive families. Being an exemplar, she encouraged women to participate in public life and take an interest in political issues, taking the lead herself in running large organizations and addressing public gatherings on issues of social and political relevance. Apart from her activism, Ramabai was a prolific writer, producing numerous books, pamphlets, brochures, and newspaper articles. Some prominent examples include the following: *Stri Dharma Neeti* (1882), *The High Caste Hindu Woman* (1886), *The Peoples of the United States* (1889), and *My Testimony* (1907).

This profile reveals Ramabai as a complex and multidimensional personality. She has most often been described in the literature as a social reformer, educationalist, feminist, and activist. In making a case for viewing her as an independent social thinker, it is crucial to abstract her intellectual thought from her activism, which in her case sharply intersect. Ramabai's life shows an explicit and engaged social reformist tone and in particular a strong concern with the status of high caste Hindu women of India, a cause to which she remained committed till the end of her life. Her primary concern was the status of women, in particular the status of high caste Hindu women, whose lives she demonstrated and argued were most constrained by a highly

rigid and patriarchal social arrangement. She was not thus speaking of the condition of all Hindu women in Indian society. Of all her publications, *The High Caste Hindu Woman* (henceforth *hchw*) is probably the most successful and has made the most impact, even during her lifetime. It sold 10,000 copies and did much to promote and raise public consciousness about her mission and agenda, particularly outside India. Sociologically too, this book is salient. Scholars have argued that on the basis of this text, Ramabai should be considered the first sociologist of kinship and family in India (Shah 1977; Kosambi 1988). The book takes the reader through the various crucial moments in the life of high caste Hindu women, from childhood to married life and widowhood, with a view to outlining their place and status in society. Using simple, direct language, Ramabai communicates the everyday life of a Hindu girl/woman and reflects on the consequences this carries for men, women, and society in general. Interestingly, the final chapter is entitled "How the Condition of Women Tells Upon Society," a theme that carries huge sociological significance. What is particularly striking here is Ramabai's insight that women's status and their societal treatment are an index of the broader structural ethos. She argues that a society cannot progress until it acknowledges the unjust and inhumane treatment doled out to the most vulnerable and oppressed members of society, including women. She also makes a powerful statement in the text about how the "degradation of women" affects not just women but also men, since their existence is mutually interdependent and shapes the future of that society. According to Kosambi (1988: 43), there is in her work a "causal connection between the condition of women and the state of the nation." A strong case has also been made to view her as a pioneering figure who directed scrutiny to the domain of kinship, family, and women's status in Hindu society, a call that has not been seriously pursued. For instance, in *hchw*, she questioned the ascription of women's roles exclusively through marriage and the institution of the family, and their confinement to the domestic domain. She encouraged women's move into the public domain, applauded their greater political participation, and worked to raise women's self-awareness about these issues. Scholars have

identified a strongly feminist stance in such thinking, which challenged patriarchy and discrimination against women, calling for their emancipation and equal treatment.

Ramabai was quite a prominent public and international figure in her lifetime. Her intellectual output was focused and committed to particular social and political agendas. Her activism was daring and effective, and grounded in a body of social and political thought. She was not just an armchair critic, but strived to translate into concrete terms her condemnation of outdated and non progressive practices vis à vis the treatment of Indian women, by initiating relevant structural changes. Additionally, as a result of her overseas travels, we also have access to Ramabai's reflections about the places she visited and the cultures and peoples she encountered, including her important critique of religion and Christianity. One such document is *The Peoples of the United States*, a text Kosambi describes as an "ethnography of American society," which carries Ramabai's account of its religious and political domains. Ramabai openly admires the anti colonial ideology, liberal democratic principles, and feminist thinking she finds here. This is in stark contrast to her anti British sentiments, negative appraisal of the style of governance, the rigid hierarchical ordering of society, and the ideology of colonialism in England (Kosambi 2003). This is an important text for a number of reasons. Substantively, it is comparative in looking at societal forms in England, the US, and India; it also carries her critique of, and resistance to, colonial subjugation and oppression. Historically, it stands out as a rare commentary by a colonized subject – a woman – on a "western" society in the nineteenth century. But it has also been noted that her positive assessment of American society is somewhat idealistic and polemical, and that she only reluctantly mentions its inherent problems, such as slavery, racism, and the non political participation of women (Kosambi 2003).

According to the prominent historian A. B. Shah (1977), Ramabai was "the greatest woman produced by modern India and one of the greatest Indians in all history . . . the one to lay the foundations for a movement for women's liberation in India." Despite this high acclaim, others have noted that Ramabai has "a surprisingly

hazy presence in contemporary consciousness – if she is indeed a presence at all" (Tharu & Lalitha 1995: 243). Consulting numerous historical social science dictionaries and encyclopedias does not produce too many entries about her. Those that do include her merely notice that she worked for women's education and widow remarriage, but seldom mention her in an independent capacity as a social thinker or reformer. This neglect continues despite the fact that there is no dearth of contemporary knowledge and evidence of Ramabai's intellectual and activist contributions. Neither Ramabai nor her "work" (broadly defined to include her writings and activism) have to date received serious scholarly attention, either in the history of Indian social reformist discourse or as a social thinker, theorist, or sociologist in her own right. A variety of reasons for such neglect can be cited, ranging from androcentric social science scholarship to plain ignorance and apathy. We do have some good biographical accounts of her life, and a few stalwarts who plod on, producing the raw material (translations of Ramabai's writings) so necessary for other practitioners (educationalists and researchers alike) in the field to begin to direct intellectual and academic attention to this marginalized and forgotten figure for future generations.

SEE ALSO: Discourse; Eurocentrism; Feminist Pedagogy; Khaldun, Ibn; Rizal, José; Sarkar, Benoy Kumar; Theory

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Sarkar, Benoy Kumar (1887–1949)

Vineeta Sinha

Benoy Kumar Sarkar was born in the district of Malda in the then Indian part of Bengal. At the young age of 13, he distinguished himself by coming top of the entrance exam for Calcutta University. He was educated at the Presidency College in Calcutta, where in 1905 he topped the undergraduate cohort with a double honors degree in history and English, and completed a master's degree in 1906. Apart from his solid academic credentials, he was a prominent public figure and well regarded in Bengali academic and intellectual circles. Sarkar was committed to nationalist, socialist, and social service agendas, embedded in the patriotic stance of securing for India political freedom from British colonial rule. To this end, Sarkar was active in both the Swadeshi (self rule) and the National Education movements in Bengal.

The years 1914 to 1925 saw Sarkar spending a considerable period of time outside India. He visited Egypt, England, Scotland, Ireland, the United States, Japan, China, Korea, Germany, Austria, and Italy. In these countries he was based in universities and research institutes and lectured to academics and other communities of intellectuals. He spent a significant period of time in Germany and Italy and was able to acquire linguistic competence in several European languages, such as French, German, and Italian, in addition to already having mastered English, Bengali, and Hindi, a truly impressive linguistic feat. He delivered lectures in German and Italian, and also published in these languages. He doubled up as an ambassador for India (and, more broadly speaking, Asia) and tried to facilitate greater understanding on

both sides of the East–West divide. He returned to India in 1925 and was appointed lecturer at the Department of Economics at Calcutta University, where in 1947 he was promoted to professor and head of department. In 1949 he traveled to the US, a trip arranged by the Institute of International Education, New York and the Watanull Foundation, Los Angeles. During this trip, he lectured in various American universities (including Harvard) and research institutes and addressed business organizations and political centers on the subject of East–West relations, amongst other issues. This hectic tour took its toll on his health. In October 1949 he suffered chest pains, and died a month later at the Freedman's Hospital in Washington, DC (Mukhopadhyay 1979).

Sarkar was not an armchair intellectual, and his thinking was very much grounded in concrete issues facing Bengali society, India, and “Asia.” He was an institution builder. His early interest in pedagogical issues saw him establishing schools and at least nine research institutes in Calcutta, including: the Bengali Institute of Sociology, Bengali Asia Academy, Bengali Dante Society, and Bengali Institute of American Culture. He trained and supervised the research of innumerable postgraduate students, emphasizing the importance of mastering knowledge from a “world perspective” in addition to the value of learning at least one European language other than English and the mother tongue. Sarkar was fully aware that institutional and infrastructural changes were necessary before any intellectual shifts could occur in the various social science disciplines. He was at the forefront of instituting curriculum and disciplinary reform in tertiary institutions, introducing changes with the intention of producing a generation of Indian social scientists with a global and cosmopolitan outlook, but also with a firm awareness of Indian problematics.

Sarkar's published writings are vast and his scholarship can only be described as encyclopedic. He was a prolific writer, with tremendous intellectual output, straddling a range of social science perspectives from economics to political philosophy, history, sociology, literature, demography, political science, and anthropology (Mukherjee 1953), which would make his work “interdisciplinary” in contemporary language. Sarkar published predominantly in English and

Bengali. He wrote 53 books in English (many of which were published in Europe and the US) and countless articles in leading Indian, American, and European journals and periodicals. Some examples of the latter include: the *Calcutta Review*, *Modern Review* (Calcutta), *Political Science Quarterly* (New York), *American Political Science Review*, *International Journal of Ethics*, *Indian Historical Quarterly*, and *Insurance and Finance Review*. It is impossible to name all his writings here, and only a selection of books in English is offered (see Bandyopadhyay 1984 for a comprehensive list): *The Positive Background of Hindu Sociology* (Books 1 and 2, 1914/1921), *Chinese Religion Through Hindu Eyes* (1916), *The Futurism of Young Asia* (1922), *The Sociology of Population* (1936), *Villages and Towns as Social Patterns* (1941), *Political Philosophies Since 1905* (Vols. 1 and 2, 1942), and *Domination in World Perspectives* (1949). He also translated several social science books by European authors into Bengali. It is notable that Sarkar's intellectual interests were not confined to an "Indian" problematic. His substantive focus was often on issues concerning "Asia" in addition to providing critique and analysis of social, economic, cultural, and political issues in European settings. In no sense did he see himself narrowly as an "Indian social scientist," qualified to speak exclusively to "local" concerns. He did not shy away from engaging ideas of prominent American and European social scientists of his time, critiquing and challenging their theorizing. Some examples include his critique of Oswald Spengler's "urban-rural" and "culture-civilization" dichotomies and Pitirim Sorokin's progress theories.

He was unorthodox and revolutionary in his thinking and challenged conventional mainstream wisdom about everything, often providing his own original theorizing on the subject. The term "Sarkarism" was coined by his peers to refer to his unique intellectual stance, but is invoked as a metaphor, a perspective, or an orientation. Here is a sampling from his vast intellectual contribution to social science thinking. While Sarkar's works are infused with a strong historical perspective, he was not a historical determinist. The concept of "creative disequilibrium" is an original contribution to ongoing debates about the source of historical change and societal human progress. While he

acknowledged the role of history (and the past) in shaping the future, he also held open the possibility of forces independent of past events and processes, thereby highlighting the role of chance, accidents, unpredictable events, and uncertainties, and thus assumed a different position from Bankimchandra, Sorokin, Spengler, Marx, and Hegel. He avoided a stage theory of change and saw the "disequilibrium" (between the forces of "good" and "evil") as creative, in constructively moving humanity toward an improved, more perfect state, and as the basis for change. Unlike Bankimchandra's view, he held that "history less groups and classes have often by sheer energism and self determination succeeded in changing the face of the world" (Sarkar 1942: 112).

In *The Positive Background of Hindu Sociology*, Sarkar argues for the basic universalism of the human species, despite a recognition of "pluralities" at individual and national levels. This work is an early critique of Indological and Orientalist thinking, predating by decades Said's *Orientalism* (1979). As a theorist of modernity, he addressed the problematics of the Industrial Revolution, both for "Eur America" and the "East" (including India and China) in the encounter with forces of industrialization and modernization, but for the latter within the context of colonialist and imperialist experiences. Sarkar refuted the assumption of fundamental and irreconcilable differences between Asia and Europe, a view that was pervasive in popular thinking, political and international relations discourses, and in much of social science scholarship of the time, both Indian and European. Through historical research, he demonstrated overwhelming similarities between India and Europe vis à vis scientific, material, and technological developments. In so doing, he challenged the definition of India as a predominantly mystical and spiritual society (and superior), in contrast to the "West," which was defined as material, scientific, and industrial. He thus provided an alternative and contrary reading of India, one that was at odds with current opinion, fortified through the works of Max Muller, Rudyard Kipling, Max Weber, Vivekananda, and Sri Aurobindo, to name a few. These premises were debunked as myths and rejected by Sarkar as offering an analytical frame for explaining India's "backwardness" and Europe's

“progress.” Sarkar located the reasons for India’s underdevelopment elsewhere – in the domination, control, and hegemony of colonial experience(s) and their debilitating effects on material advancement.

While it is possible to abstract evidence of sociological and political thought from the huge corpus of Sarkar’s writings, this task has yet to be undertaken systematically. In particular, Sarkar’s political thought needs to be fleshed out, given that he was a pioneer in calling for an objective analysis of political institutions, values, and ideologies (Bandyopadhyay 1984), and highlighting the secular nature of politics. He was a nationalist, a liberal, and a firm believer in social democracy with a strong place for the individual and the state, in a culturally and politically plural social context. He was a staunch supporter of socialist and communist thought and was a firm advocate for the rights of the less privileged groups in society, such as the lower classes and lower castes of Hindus, Muslims, and tribals. In this context, Sarkar made an important contribution to the debates about such concepts as “culture,” “intelligence,” and “civilization.” He argued that literacy and formal education were recent, modern phenomena, and that illiteracy could not be correlated with lack of intellect, morality, or culture. His socialism viewed the natural intelligence and practical experience of illiterate members of the community as “valuable intellectual assets” (Mukherjee 1995: 55). In a related vein, he challenged the patterns of social differentiation in Spengler’s urban–rural dichotomy. He also rejected in this discourse the romanticized (non political and soulful) image of the village community, and the more negative portrayal of the average city dweller. He writes: “The milk of human kindness does not flow more frequently in the inter actions of the village ‘community’ than those in the town ‘society’” (Sarkar 1941).

Despite such credentials and achievements, Sarkar’s students and supporters note that he is a nonentity amongst contemporary social science students, even in India. In the historiography of the social sciences, knowledge about this talented social thinker is indeed dismal. What little information – biographical and intellectual – that does exist has been documented by a few of his colleagues, friends, and students (Dutt 1932, 1939; Dass 1939; Ghosal

1939; Chaudhury 1940; Mukherjee 1953, 1995; Mukhopadhyay 1979; Bandyopadhyay 1984). The most recent of this material can be dated to the 1980s, with little new secondary work on Sarkar coming in the following two decades. In his lifetime, Sarkar enjoyed tremendous public visibility (perhaps more outside India) and popularity, but his genius was probably unrecognized by his peers.

As a social scientist, Sarkar operated with a cosmopolitan, trans Asian frame of reference and recognized unifying forces in the space labeled “Asia” despite the diversity and complexity within, more so than in the present, where a fragmented view of Asia prevails. Sarkar’s pioneering status as a social thinker and a theorist of modernity, speaking at the turn of the twentieth century from a non western locale but deeply and critically engaged with social science concepts, theories, issues, and problematics current in the “West” (where social science disciplines were institutionalized), marks his distinction. He is a perfect candidate (in alternative, counter Eurocentric and counter Orientalist discourses) for the title of a social thinker whose ideas and activities transgressed given boundaries, making his ideas modern, universal, and relevant.

SEE ALSO: Discourse; Eurocentrism; Khalid, Ibn; Orientalism; Rizal, José; Saraswati, Pandita Ramabai; Sorokin, Pitirim A.; Theory

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Sartre, Jean-Paul (1905–80)

Eric Margolis

The introduction to Sartre's monumental *Critique of Dialectical Reason* (1960) was published in English as *Search for a Method* (1963). Sartre saw the social sciences as in deep crisis arising from a basic contradiction: "We are not only knowers, in the triumph of intellectual self-consciousness, we appear as the known" (Sartre 1963: 9). Sociologists also remarked upon the discipline's state of arrested development. For instance, at the time Sartre was writing, C. Wright Mills (1959) had characterized sociology as a split between an "abstracted empiricism" and "grand theory." This is a similar notion to the Sartrian criticism of sociology and Marxism as an unprincipled empiricism on one side and pure fixed knowledge on the other. *Search for a Method* is a critical comparison of Marxism and sociology by the existential philosopher who defined his goal as "revisionism," the ongoing process in any living philosophy which takes place in thought but is also part of the "movement of society" (Sartre 1963: 7). Sartre is critical of sociology for being "an idealistic static knowing, the sole function of which is to conceal history," and a "practical empiricism in the hands of the capitalists which supports human engineering" (pp. 67–8); and critical of Marxism for no longer knowing anything: "Its concepts are dictates; its goal is no longer

to increase what it knows but to be itself constituted a priori as an absolute knowledge" (p. 28). Sartre castigated "lazy" Marxists who, "stand(ing) in their own light," transformed Marxism into determinism through the a priori application of Marx's theory (pp. 38–3), and the mechanical materialism of sociology that reduced persons in the world to a system of objects linked by universal relations (see Sartre 1955: 200).

In keeping with existentialism's philosophy of free will, Sartre rejected all determinisms. In *Being and Nothingness* he had remarked: "The historian is himself historical . . . he historicizes himself by illuminating 'history' in the light of his projects and of those of his society" (Sartre 1971: 643). Destroying the possibility of an objective "social physics," the statement opens the possibility for a social science based on praxis. Unifying theory and practice, asserting with Marx that people not prior conditions make history, Sartre sought to revise Marxism, which he saw as salvageable if it approached the social heuristically: "its principles and its prior knowledge appear as regulative in relation to its concrete research" (Sartre 1963: 26).

The praxis of "historical structural anthropology" Sartre termed the progressive regressive method. He borrowed LeFebvre's (1953) approach, which had three moments. First is the way Sartre conceived of sociology, a horizontal enterprise aimed at uncovering social structure in all its relations and functions (demographic, family, religion, etc.). Noting that at different times there have been other structures, the second, vertical, moment describes the history and genesis of social structures. The third moment calls for dialectical totalization – seeking to understand the "principle of the series." Sartre added the reservation that method itself must be subject to "modifications which its objects may impose on it – in all the domains of anthropology" (Sartre 1963: 52). This is because "the foundation of anthropology is man himself, not as the object of practical knowledge, but as a practical organism producing knowledge as a moment of praxis" (p. 179). Research is a "living relationship" in which "the sociologist and his 'object' form a couple, each of which is to be interpreted by the other; the relationship between them must be itself interpreted as a moment of history" (p. 72). Sartre argued

that a structural historical anthropology must “devise its concepts from the new experiences which it seeks to interpret”: “the particular man in his social field, in his class, in an environment of collective objects, and of other particular men. It is the individual, alienated, reified, mystified, as he has been made to be by the division of labor and by exploitation, but struggling against alienation with the help of distorting instruments. And, despite everything, patiently gaining ground” (p. 133).

SEE ALSO: Dialectic; Dialectical Materialism; Existential Sociology; Lefebvre, Henri; Marx, Karl; Marxism and Sociology; Materialism; Paradigms; Praxis

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Satanism

Massimo Introvigne

While organized Satanism includes quite small groups, social scientists have studied Satanism mostly as the subject matter of juvenile deviance and social panics. Satanism may be defined as the adoration of the figure known in the Bible as the Devil or Satan. Its first incarnation was in the circle operating at the Versailles court of Louis XIV (1638–1715) around Catherine La Voisin (ca. 1640–80) and the defrocked Catholic

priest Father Guibourg (1603–83), who invented the so called “Black Mass,” a parody of the Roman Catholic Mass. La Voisin was burned at the stake in 1680 and Guibourg died in jail in 1683. Small rings imitating what they had read of the group were subsequently discovered in France, Italy, and Russia in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries.

In the 1880s, reporter Jules Bois (1868–1943) and novelist Joris Karl Huysmans (1848–1907) explored the French occult underworld, and in 1891 Huysmans published his bestselling novel on Satanism, *La bas* (Down There), which included one of the most famous literary descriptions of a Black Mass. Public opinion overreacted and sensational revelations of a worldwide Satanic conspiracy were offered to the French public by journalist Léo Taxil (1854–1907). Taxil, claiming to be an ex-Freemason converted to Catholicism, revealed that a Satanist organization called Palladism was behind Freemasonry and anti-clericalism. Eventually, in 1897, Taxil confessed that both his revelations and conversion to Catholicism had been a hoax conceived in order to convince the world just how gullible the anti-Masonic Catholics of his time actually were.

Although a body of literature inspired by the Taxil fraud continued to be published well into the twentieth century, anti-Satanism was largely discredited until British magus Aleister Crowley (1875–1947) shocked his contemporaries by styling himself “the Beast 666” and “the wickedest man in the world.” Crowley made use of Satanic imagery and is still regarded by many as the founding father of contemporary Satanism. The British occultist, however, was a “magical atheist” who did not believe in the actual existence of Satan; and, although he has been influential on later Satanic movements, he cannot be regarded as a Satanist in the most technical sense of the term. On the other hand, it is true that Crowley enthusiasts, including movie director Kenneth Anger, were instrumental in creating the Church of Satan.

The latter’s founder, Anton Szander LaVey (1930–97), joined a Crowleyn group in 1951, and through this milieu he came into contact with Anger. In 1961 they founded an organization known as the Magic Circle, which gradually evolved into the Church of Satan, founded on April 30, 1966. The Church of Satan did not

literally believe in the existence of the Devil. It was more an idiosyncratic and militantly anti-Christian human potential movement, devoted to the exaltation of human beings who, having been freed from religious superstitions and the false Christian notion of sin, would eventually become able to enjoy life and flourish.

In 1968 LaVey met Michael Aquino, an officer and intelligence specialist in the US Army with an academic education, who gradually became the main organizer of the Church of Satan. During the early 1970s, however, a contrast developed between LaVey and Aquino, since the latter believed in the real, physical existence of a character known as Set or Satan, and became increasingly disillusioned with LaVey's "rationalist" Satanism. In 1975 Aquino left LaVey and went his separate way into the newly established Temple of Set, probably the largest international Satanist organization still active today.

Currently, after LaVey's death in 1997, the Church of Satan is largely a mail organization, and has generated several splinter groups, including the First Satanic Church led by LaVey's own daughter, Karla. The current combined active membership of all organized Satanism does not reach a thousand.

LaVey's notoriety certainly played a role in the early stages of the anti Satanist campaign of the 1970s and 1980s. The McMartin case began in 1983, when the principals and a number of teachers of a respected California preschool were accused of operating an underground Satanic cult, which ritually abused and tortured children. Mental health professionals involved in the case were later accused of having "planted" the stories in the children's minds, based on their own theories about Satanism. The McMartin trial ended in 1990 with no convictions. It had an enormous media impact, however, and undoubtedly had something to do with the hundreds of subsequent similar accusations of Satanic ritual abuses in both day care centers and in family settings. Although complete statistical data are lacking, it is possible that as many as 2,000 cases of Satanic ritual abuse of children were investigated in the decade 1983–92, with only a handful of convictions. Sociologists and other academics emerged as the most vocal critics of the theory of a secret Satanic network. In 1994 two official reports, one by the US National Center for the Prevention of Child Abuse and Neglect, and one

by sociologist Jean S. La Fontaine on behalf of the UK government, concluded that stories of Satanic ritual abuse were largely figments of the accusers' imaginations. In subsequent years, the number of court cases involving allegations of Satanic ritual abuse sharply decreased.

The debate on the alleged Satanic ritual abuse of children should not be confused with discussions of adolescent Satanism. There is little doubt that there are gangs of teenagers performing some sort of homemade Satanic ritual (copied from comics, books, or movies), often also involving drugs. These teenagers are often guilty of minor crimes such as vandalism or animal sacrifice. In fewer than a dozen cases over the last two decades, more serious crimes appear to have been committed, including a handful of murders, some of them uncovered in northern Italy in 2004. In these cases, it is difficult to determine whether drugs, gang related violence, or Satan worship are mostly responsible for crimes which do not appear to be related to organized Satanism.

SEE ALSO: Millenarianism; New Religious Movements; Religion, Sociology of; Religious Cults; Sect

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Saussure, Ferdinand de (1857–1913)

J. I. (Hans) Bakker

Ferdinand de Saussure is an important linguist and, along with C. S. Peirce, one of the two main contributors to semiotics (Sebeok 2001; Sanders

2004). His distinction between the signifier and the signified is central. The theory of signification, the idea that a sign is an entirely arbitrary verbal or written phonemic and phonetic device, is attributed to him. The word “cat” and the word “chat” are different only linguistically; the signified “object” remains the same (Koerner 1973). The standard view of Saussure is based on posthumous publication of his lecture notes (Saussure 1967, 1968, 1989 [1916]). Like work by Weber and Mead, the *Course in General Linguistics* (1916) is the product of other hands. Between 1906 and 1911, Saussure taught three courses on general linguistics. Student notes have now been published separately (Saussure 1993 [1910–11], 1996 [1907], 1997 [1908–9]). Bouissac (2005) argues that the standard view of Saussure is incorrect; he did not reach any definitive conclusions concerning general linguistics or semiology. Indeed, Saussure (2002) found many ideas in linguistics problematic epistemologically. He linked “signology” (*signologie*) to psychology. He poses epistemological questions, but there is debate concerning his answers. His emphasis on evolutionary change can be thought of as sophisticated neo-Darwinian theory (e.g., cognitive neuroscience). This makes it possible to think of an “algorithmic” version of semiotics (Bouissac 2005). Saussurean scholarship (*Cahiers Ferdinand de Saussure*) has questioned some of the poststructuralist critiques (e.g., Roland Barthes, Jacques Derrida) of Saussure’s structuralist linguistics.

SEE ALSO: Barthes, Roland; Derrida, Jacques; Epistemology; Language; *Langue* and *Parole*; Semiotics; Signs; Sociolinguistics

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scapegoating

Evans Mandes

Scapegoating is the process of unjustly accusing or blaming an individual or a group for the actions of others not of their own doing. It is derived from the tendency to displace aggression toward a minority group. Typically, innocent individuals or groups receive the displaced aggression when others feel threatened by them. These targets of aggression are often perceived as “safe” targets because they are victimized and often powerless to fight back. They are frequently vilified, criticized, and rejected. In a non-pathological sense, scapegoating may also be perceived as the natural outgrowth of stereotypes associated with race, religion, sex, gender, and ethnicity. This point of view, sometimes referred to as the exaggeration hypothesis, is based upon perceptual contrasts or cognitive processing limitations. The group conflict model, however, sees scapegoating in

more motivational terms, where exaggeration grows out of individual or group conflict. Scapegoating can also be seen as the outgrowth of prejudice, which develops either in the personal sense where some group is perceived as a threat to one's own interests, economically, socially, or as a group endeavor where conformity becomes an issue. In order to conform, one's group expects you to express and support the view of the collective group.

"Scapegoat" originates from the Hebrew practice of transferring ritualistically and symbolically the sins of individuals to goats. The chosen goat was driven into the desert by the Hebrew priests to atone for guilt, thus absolving individuals and groups from their individual or collective sins. The most horrific example of scapegoating in modern times was that of the Jews by the Nazis in World War II. Prior to the war, Germany had undergone a period of economic and political upheaval. The economic failures of the Weimar Republic after Germany's defeat in World War I produced a period of economic depression, unprecedented inflation, and social unrest. These conditions set the stage for Adolf Hitler and his followers to blame Germany's social and economic problems on the Jews, thus heightening to new levels the anti-Semitism already present in the country. One Nazi leader, explaining the need for the convenient scapegoating of the Jews, noted: "If the Jews did not exist, we would have invented them" (quoted by Koltz 1983).

Other researchers have used scapegoating as a descriptive term to explain racial tensions during periods of social and economic unrest. The negative correlation between the number of lynchings of blacks by Southerners and economic conditions in the South is often cited in the popular literature on race relations. These studies have led to the promulgation of the frustration aggression hypothesis in social psychology. In this hypothesis, tensions associated with frustrated needs often are associated with violence and aggression.

Current research using scapegoating as an explanatory tool is varied and interdisciplinary. Psychoanalysis, for instance, views scapegoating in group therapy as an example of projective identification. The scapegoat is the source of hostility because she or he demonstrates traits that group members care to reject or wish

to repress, deny, or otherwise remove from their conscious experiences. Bullying or victimization is seen in this context; the bullies tend to think others are attacking them. They tend to interpret relatively neutral interpersonal relations as attempts to dominate others aggressively. Their worldview is commonly seen in terms of polar opposites – winning or losing, domination or subservience, triumph or shame. Studies examining family values show similar results. Men who display aggression toward their families often misinterpret the behavior of family members. Neutral acts or words by family members are seen as deliberate attacks, again an amplification or exaggeration of events due to underlying pathology.

Risk behavior is another contemporary area of research by sociologists interested in drug behavior and risk denial. By studying the cannabis use of French adolescents, researchers have found that the cannabis users often scapegoat other "hard drug" users. They deny their own addictions, thereby challenging the "risky" label for them and convincing themselves of their ability to control their own addictions (Peretti Watel 2003).

In social psychology, studies performed on the scapegoating mechanism tend to take a similar form. Using students as subjects, the paradigm introduces some element of failure. Failure is ensured either by employing extremely difficult tasks or by setting up unrealistic competitions among rival peer groups. Attitudes toward individual racial groups falsely associated with these failures or competitions were taken before or after the induced exposure to failure/competition. The data showed predictably lowered attitude scores after the subjects were frustrated by induced failure or competition. The researchers consider these results as evidence of scapegoating.

Most recently, research on scapegoating has examined attitudes toward family values and political attacks against the Muslim world. Both use scapegoating as descriptive mechanisms for understanding the human process. During recent campaigns, studies of the political rhetoric surrounding the issue of family values tend to identify the family as the absolute site for social change (Cloud 2001). In these studies minorities and economically disadvantaged Americans are scapegoated for social problems.

In a similar vein, attacks on the Muslim world are seen as attempts to heal the humiliation suffered by the United States due to the destruction of the World Trade Center and the Pentagon. The Muslim world is regarded in this analysis as the collective scapegoat of US frustration, which can be assuaged only through direct military action.

A history of the use of the term scapegoat can be found in Victor (2003).

SEE ALSO: Authoritarian Personality; Discrimination; Pogroms; Scientific Racism; Slurs (Racial/Ethnic)

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school choice

Scott Davies

School choice refers to the use of public funds that give parents more discretion in their children's education. It usually entails making available to parents a wider variety of educational options beyond a standard, local public school. Examples of choice initiatives include charter schools, home schooling, voucher programs, tax credits for private schools, and the formation of magnet schools. While many parents exercise a "hidden" form of school choice via their selection of residential location, choice programs stir most controversy when they

entail privatization, that is, the redirecting of governing authority from a public body to parents and/or school staff.

In North America the impetus for choice needs to be understood in the context of the mass expansion of public education. The achievement of universal enrolments at elementary and then secondary levels over the twentieth century gave rise to large, bureaucratic schools. Known somewhat derisively as the "one best system" approach to education, large urban schools grew to be characterized by standardized offerings and a bureaucratic governing structure (Tyack 1974). While perhaps administratively efficient, such schools disenchanted many educators, students, and parents in the 1960s and 1970s. A variety of actors, including minority advocates and experimental pedagogues, portrayed mass public schools as dehumanizing, inequitable, and unresponsive to children's needs. In response, they initiated a flurry of educational alternatives, including "Free" and "Open" schools, often mandated to serve collective goals and notions of minority rights. Though most of these innovations were short lived, they brought to the public system a more "progressive" curriculum, and a greater concern with educational equity.

A very different type of choice movement emerged in the early 1980s, marked by rationales of providing avenues for individual status striving and for the benefits of school competition. Declaring public schools to be substandard, many policymakers began to seek initiatives to boost the quality of education. Some reasoned that if public schools faced competition for clients from new schools of choice, the quality of both would necessarily rise. Simultaneously, many middle class parents acquired preferences for more intensive education, looking to prep their children for prized slots in higher education, or to provide them an experience tailored to their needs. Choice was seen as a solution to both of these concerns.

This type of choice resonates with policymakers who embrace a "market" approach to schooling. A resounding theme among these proponents is that markets can be an antidote to the "one best system." They see public bureaucracies as too slow to adapt to a world in which parent, student, and teacher preferences for pedagogy are increasingly specialized and

varied. According to Chubb and Moe (1990), the most renowned market theorists, markets can free schools from the grip of central administration. Regular public funding arrangements, they argue, encourage schools to conform to legal conventions rather than provide effective service, and thus make public schools unresponsive to their clients. In contrast, many choice arrangements force schools to attract fee paying parents in order to survive. This is said to make their educational decision making more entrepreneurial and attuned to boosting student achievement. Markets are thus hailed by their advocates as the optimal medium for linking the preferences of parents to educators, and delivering a more personalized, customized education.

This theory of market based choice has spawned one of the most polarized debates in contemporary education. The intensity of this controversy is rooted in enduring philosophical issues. Many defenders of public schools see choice initiatives as threatening the common school tradition, in which schools draw students from the immediate area and bind them into a vibrant local citizenry, creating the grounds for grassroots democracy (see Fuller 2000). Choice, some warn, can only further decay the populace's common experience and their participation in collective endeavors. Further, many fault the choice movement for equating the value of school with individualistic status striving rather than collective goals, thereby further diluting the public spirit of education.

Beyond these philosophical disputes, sociologists commonly address empirical dimensions of choice, and in so doing have made some advances. Much of the choice literature in the early 1990s was highly polemical, due partly to the absence of adequate data and the novelty of most choice initiatives. The past decade, however, has produced a sprawling interdisciplinary literature, with an extensive stockpile of studies conducted by educationalists, sociologists, political scientists, and, increasingly, economists. This corpus of research has four major themes.

One theme examines how choice affects the sorting of students among schools. Advocates claim that choice can effectively reduce race and class segregation by allowing poor and minority families to escape substandard institutions. In contrast, critics claim that such policies will only "cream off" the best students from mediocre

schools, resulting in a renewed form of segregation. Interestingly, research to date suggests that choice neither lessens nor worsens existing levels of segregation. While relatively few minority parents take advantage of choice initiatives, charter schools appear roughly to reflect the composition of their neighborhoods, since they are often bound to regulations that ensure minimal levels of diversity (Goldhaber 1999).

The second theme has received the greatest attention in the US: the impact of choice on performance outcomes, particularly standardized test scores. While students in private schools have higher aggregate scores than their public counterparts, private schools can select more affluent and motivated students. The core issue is therefore whether or not choice mechanisms boost student performance net of the composition of students. A body of research has emerged that attempts to sort out those effects. While there is little consensus, and while disputes usually entail statistical intricacies, there is not any clear data that choice indeed provides a net increase in test scores. Evidence suggests that parents of students in such schools report high levels of satisfaction, and that choice can allow schools to be responsive to the vagaries of parental demand. But such evidence has led some to conclude that public schools would perform similarly given the same resources and ability to select students (Witte 2000).

A third issue deals with organizational characteristics. A central claim by choice advocates is that market forces spark innovations in school pedagogy, curricula, and personnel. Yet research to date on this issue is mixed. American studies suggest that innovation among charter schools is limited (Lubienski 2003). Canadian research similarly suggests that new private schools are rarely innovative in their instruction and structure, though many form niches and specialized identities (Davies & Quirke 2005). One provisional conclusion is that market style choice can trigger more specialized schools, but that such schools rarely deviate from the "fundamental grammar" of schooling that has been institutionalized over the past century.

A fourth issue involves whether the presence of market competition motivates local public schools to improve, presumably by threatening those schools with the risk of losing students to rivals. For instance, after making a series of bold

statistical assumptions, Hoxby (2003) claims that public school test scores indeed climb when they face greater competition. Others acknowledge this broad finding, but attribute it to the greater resources available to public schools in areas with large private enrolments (Arum 1996).

Much of this research is embroiled in methodological disputes. A core issue among quantitative researchers is how to isolate differences in school performance that are attributable to student versus school characteristics. To better sort out these effects, many researchers use measures of achievement growth instead of cross sectional data, but these longitudinal data are sometimes beset by attrition effects and by limited measures that fail to fully capture differences in motivation and academic preparedness among students. Qualitative researchers face the challenge of exploring emerging types of choice, such as home schooling, private tutoring, and the variety of charter schools. Such studies can potentially contribute to the choice literature by addressing holistic issues such as how parents and educators understand and experience choice, as well as its impact on less quantifiable outcomes like citizenship and community cohesion.

Choice movements will likely continue to thrive as long as competition for prized slots in post secondary education continues, and as families continue to embrace “intensive parenting,” a practice that values intimate educational experiences tailored to children’s unique needs (Davies & Quirke 2005). It will probably thrive best where public education is not strong, creating niches for schools with small classes and/or special curricular themes, or in cities with atrophied public offerings. While public schools will continue to cater to the vast bulk of students, choice will be sought by those who are most advantaged, and sometimes by those who are most disadvantaged.

SEE ALSO: Schooling, Home; Schools, Charter; Schools, Magnet; Schools, Public

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school climate

Robert Crosnoe

School climate refers to the general tone of social relations in and around schools: how people in the school relate to each other, the culture that emerges among these people, the norms that they construct. Quite simply, it represents the general “feel” of the school. This aspect of school context taps the informal processes that occur within schools. Like the more formal processes (e.g., instruction, delivery of curricula), these informal processes affect a wide variety of student outcomes and are important ingredients in the general functioning of schools themselves.

More than other aspects of education, the theoretical and empirical research on school climate bridges multiple disciplines – sociology, psychology, education – and integrates qualitative and quantitative methods. The late James Coleman played a major role in this development. His pioneering study *The Adolescent Society* (1961) vividly captured the intense

dynamics of peer cultures in a group of Midwestern high schools, depicting how the social climate of a school can undermine its formal educational mission. More recently, his formulation of the social capital framework drew explicitly on the positive aspects of school climate, such as supportive intergenerational networks between young and old that form in and around schools (Coleman 1990). These social aspects of schooling, he argued, could actually facilitate the educational mission of schools. This basic argument was also a major theme in the effective schools movement of the 1970s (Lightfoot 1982), which emphasized that the social psychological, interpersonal, and political aspects of school cultures and surrounding communities were the building blocks of successful teaching and learning.

The concept of school climate in general and Coleman's discussion of social capital in schools in particular have served as both foundation and foil to sociologists. Some have pursued a more thorough understanding of the linkage between the formal and informal processes of school or the role of the school as a context of human development, while others have objected to the lack of precision in social capital concepts, the apparent lack of amenability of the cultures that arise in schools to policy intervention, and the overgeneralizations of schools and students that arose from early studies in this field. Still, this back and forth has ultimately resulted in a rich body of empirical research on school climate, which can be broken down into three general areas: peer culture in the school, intergenerational relations in the school, and the school community.

First, schools, especially middle schools and high schools, serve as the most concrete, identifiable, bounded site of peer culture in the early life course. They group together – in a specific physical location under a common institutional identity – large numbers of young people for extended periods of most days in the majority of weeks in the year. At the same time, class enrollment patterns and curricular assignments further differentiate these larger groups of young people into smaller subsets characterized by sustained interaction. The work of Maureen Hallinan and her colleagues has demonstrated how, on both of these levels, schools affect the formation of friendships and the construction of

peer networks (Kubitschek & Hallinan 1998). In effect, schools organize systems of social relations, which have their own distinct norms, values, and behavioral patterns. These diverse peer cultures, in aggregate, affect the general climate of the school. This peer dimension of school climate can range from positive (e.g., prosocial, academically focused) to negative (e.g., oppositional). The type of school based peer climate to which students are exposed, in turn, influences their academic progress and general development. On a more macro level, this aspect of school climate can effect larger patterns of inequality.

Numerous ethnographies, such as *School Talk* (Eder et al. 1995), have illustrated how these cultural patterns constructed among young people in a school can make that school an incredibly difficult – or alternatively, supportive – place to be. The ability of schools to teach and transmit knowledge is intricately related to what goes on among students. Indeed, quantitative analyses have revealed that students' social psychological functioning is highly reactive to the general norms of the student body and its subgroups and that this social psychological functioning is a major factor in their academic functioning. Also related to these in school cultures is the integration of diverse student populations and the magnitude of race and class inequality. Research has consistently shown that the ease with which school integration proceeds is, in part, a function of the cross pollination of the peer networks of different racial populations (Moody 2001).

Second, schools are a primary point of contact between young and old, in that schools serve children and adolescents but are operated by adults. The degree to which teachers and other school personnel connect to students is a crucial element in school climate. Whether conflict or cordiality reigns is important to students' trajectories through their years in that school. The nature of the intergenerational climate in the school can be thought of according to different dimensions, including support, warmth, and mutual respect. Students tend to do better academically in schools with climates that encompass all three, but, importantly, they are also happier in these schools. In other words, positive intergenerational climates foster better mental health as well as better academic

performance. Indeed, as seen in the research of Bryk et al. (1993), as well as others interested in school size and sector, the relative costs and benefits of attending a large or small school, a Catholic or public school, are often predicated on the type of intergenerational climates that characterize each. At the same time, Alexander and Entwisle's (1988) seminal research on the early school years has demonstrated the central role of student-teacher relations in race and class differences in academic achievement and learning, patterns that have been replicated on the high school level. Teachers and students are the two primary populations in schools, and so the distance between them helps to determine if a school climate is good, bad, or essentially inequitable.

Third, the climate of schools is a function of factors nominally outside the school as well as those that occur on school grounds. In short, the school is part of a larger community. On one level, this community refers to the actual neighborhoods surrounding the school. In its simplest form, the school is a building that rests in a certain area. That area is an ecology in which the school "lives and grows." Certainly, a wealth of evidence has demonstrated that the characteristics of the community in which the school is situated can affect what occurs in the school. Criminal activity and poverty in the surrounding area, for example, complicate the educational mission of schools – students have more trouble learning, and teachers teaching, when they are distracted, distressed, and frightened. The climate of education suffers in these areas, despite the best efforts of schools. The case for the significance of this aspect of school climate has emerged from both detailed ethnography, such as *Ain't No Making It* (McLeod 1995), and demographic analysis of neighborhood effects. On another level, the school community refers to the collection of families whose children attend the school; how closely connected students' parents are to the school and to the other families in the school matters. Parents are better able to manage and monitor their children's education – and stay involved in their children's lives in general – when they feel welcomed at school, when they feel support from other parents, when they have teachers or other parents to whom they can turn. Likewise, strong bonds between the adults who have ties

to the school provide a dense protective cover around children as they grow and develop. Coleman was a leader in stressing the value of this aspect of school climate, but the field of inquiry around it has, in effect, taken on a life of its own. Certainly, the idea of the school community is one of the driving forces in contemporary school reform and educational policy. Children go to school, but, in schools with a positive climate, they do not leave their families behind when they do.

The centrality of school climate to both education and developmental research has increased considerably in recent decades. It is a true growth field in sociology and related disciplines. Interest in the climates of school and their significance continues to be spurred on by new theoretical perspectives, such as human ecology; by new educational philosophies, such as the ethos of caring advocated by educational researchers like Nel Noddings; improvements in data collection, such as Add Health's large in school samples, which allow the creation of summary measures of the behaviors, beliefs, and adjustment of the student body; and, unfortunately, by public events, such as Columbine, that drive home the importance of making schools good places to be as well as centers of learning.

SEE ALSO: Cultural Capital in Schools; Friendship: Structure and Context; Networks; Parental Involvement in Education; Race/Ethnicity and Friendship; Schools, Common; Social Capital and Education

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school discipline

Sandra Way

School discipline refers to a system of rules, monitoring, sanctions, and rewards implemented by school personnel with the intent of shaping student behavior. Commonly associated with teachers and principals imposing order in classrooms and corridors by exerting control and maintaining student compliance through supervision and punishment, school discipline also plays a role in educational and moral development. There is general agreement that discipline in school is necessary. The extent and nature of that discipline, however, is variable and, at times, controversial.

School discipline has two main goals: maintenance of order and socialization. First, discipline is associated with the need to maintain a safe environment conducive to learning. Misbehavior can distract from the educational function of the school, and particularly disruptive behavior, such as violence, harassment, and theft, victimizes teachers and students. Discipline is also a mechanism of socialization. In addition to teaching academic subjects, schools help inculcate the values that turn children into productive citizens. Discipline is a tool for teaching students socially appropriate behaviors and attitudes.

The most influential theoretical writings related to school discipline come from the sociologist Émile Durkheim, the progressive education scholar John Dewey, and the postmodern

philosopher Michel Foucault. Durkheim and Dewey were particularly interested in how discipline, defined as restraint placed on human behavior, is related to how individuals internalize the principles that guide attitudes and behaviors. Both theorists viewed the school as an important location for childhood socialization. In contrast, Foucault's discussions on discipline focused primarily on prisons with only a cursory look at schools. His work is more important for how it has informed recent critical analyses of school discipline than for any concrete theory of schooling.

Durkheim and Dewey claimed that discipline, or behavioral restraint, is beneficial for both the individual and society. In *Moral Education* (1961 [1925]), Durkheim argued that discipline is an essential element of morality, while Dewey argued in *Democracy and Education* (1966 [1916]) that discipline is important for the development of individual character and social democracy. In both cases, the goal is the development of internal, or self, discipline. The two scholars diverge, however, on their views of school discipline, which instead of being *internally motivated* tends to be *externally imposed* upon children.

Durkheim recognized external discipline as an instrument of socialization and a means for inculcating moral authority; a respect for social rules. He believed that respect for school rules helps children develop self control. He also approved of punishment as a mechanism for preserving disciplinary authority, although he questioned its usefulness as a deterrent. The role of the teacher is to inculcate the belief in the moral authority of social rules and to provide the external sanctioning needed to maintain it.

In contrast, Dewey was critical of teacher directed discipline and acknowledged external discipline only as an instrument of control. He claimed that traditional authoritarian disciplinary practices worked against the socializing goal of the school by alienating students. Self discipline develops from students' active engagement with the curriculum and task completion; teacher imposed discipline subverts this process by serving to dull initiative. According to Dewey, the teacher should not impose ideas or habits on children but rather assist them in selecting and interacting with their environment.

On further analysis, the difference between the two positions narrows. Dewey acknowledged that some external discipline may be necessary to control chaotic environments and Durkheim suggested that excessive regulation can lead to resistance or extinguish initiative. From both perspectives, as internal discipline develops there should be less need for external discipline. For Durkheim, as individuals rely on an internalized respect for the authority of rules, or moral authority, they need less external pressure to behave in a moral manner. For Dewey, when students are engaged, active learners there is less disorder to control.

Foucault approached discipline through the lens of power. In *Discipline and Punish* (1977), he argued that discipline imposes a diffuse will on individuals with the aim of controlling individuals to efficient and productive ends. Disciplinary power relies on ubiquitous monitoring and the process of normalization, where individuals are controlled through constant comparisons with those who are “normal.” In schools, examinations, grades, and rules serve normalizing functions. Foucault’s approach also stimulates critical discussions about student resistance and how enactments of school discipline may help produce “troublemaker” identities. While Durkheim viewed the power of the social over the individual as moral, Foucault’s aim was to uncover these power relations so that they could be recognized and questioned.

Regardless of whether the focus of discipline is order or socialization, student behavior is usually the measure of effectiveness. Disciplinary systems that lead to less misbehavior and more orderly environments are viewed as effective. In some cases, however, sociologists have gauged discipline by examining academic achievement, such as grades, test scores, or graduation rates.

Social scientists have found that discipline is generally most effective when schools establish and communicate clear expectations, consistently enforce rules, and provide rewards for compliance and punishments for violations. Children appear to respond better to fair disciplinary guidelines that are not overly strict or lenient and are enforced by authority figures perceived as legitimate. Parental reactions to school discipline can also influence its effectiveness. When parents are involved and supportive

of the school, legitimacy is reinforced. When parents and communities are in disagreement with schools, however, policies and practices tend to be less effective.

Various political, cultural, and institutional forces have helped shape school discipline. Changing perceptions of children, challenges to institutional authority, and fear of violence and crime are three of the most important influences.

Historically, society has vested school personnel with in loco parentis authority. Teachers were expected to assume the parental duties and responsibilities, including discipline, on the absent parents’ behalf. As society and in turn schooling bureaucratized, schools were transformed. The school became a custodial institution responsible for managing large numbers of children. As such, the control of student behavior became important for the smooth functioning of the organization. Instead of substitute parents, school personnel began acquiring more of their disciplinary authority from their professional position. Although more bureaucratized, school authority remained strong until the 1960s. At this time, a general climate of discontent with the established social order was developing and would give birth to student, civil rights, and feminist movements. These movements, along with changing public attitudes, expanded individual rights and social equality. Within this context, traditional school discipline came under scrutiny.

In the United States, the clearest blow to school based authority came from a series of court decisions that limited discipline practices. One of the most important and best known cases was the 1969 Supreme Court decision in *Tinker v. Des Moines Independent Community School District* in which Justice Fortas, writing for the majority opinion, states that students are persons under the US Constitution and do not “shed their constitutional rights to freedom of speech or expression at the schoolhouse gate.” While this case was about freedom of speech, other rulings limited activities such as the ability to dictate student appearance and conduct locker searches. School guidelines and sanctions were only legitimate to the degree they could be shown to be directly relevant to the functioning of the school. Another influential US Supreme Court decision, *Goss v. Lopez*, established

students' right to due process. The court concluded that because long suspensions and expulsions denied students access to public education, it was necessary to implement procedural safeguards. Consequently, students currently have the right to a disciplinary hearing before being expelled or suspended for longer than 10 days. The discretionary prerogative of the school to control student misbehavior had been curtailed.

Schools also faced challenges from outside the legal arena. Similar to other institutions, schools were accused of maintaining discriminatory policies and practices. Discipline systems in racial and ethnically integrated schools in particular became strained under racial and ethnic conflict. Critics pointed out that disciplinary actions were differentially applied to minority and lower socioeconomic students and argued that race and class based discrimination in education was reproducing social inequalities in the larger society. For example, neo Marxist sociologists argued that working class children were subject to more authoritarian discipline with the goal of producing a submissive, obedient, and disciplined workforce. Today, some children are still more likely to be disciplined than others; boys, children from lower socioeconomic families, racial or ethnic minorities, and low achievers are all more likely to be subject to authoritarian control and punishment.

Instead of directly challenging authoritarian discipline, some parents and educators established alternative models. Based on Dewey's educational theories, "free" schools were developed in the United States and Great Britain that minimized teacher direction and control. These schools purposefully deemphasized or attempted to eliminate hierarchical relations between students and teachers. Although a few of these schools have survived, in general the free school movement did not provide a widespread alternative to traditional school organization. More modest attempts at restructuring classroom discipline appear to have been more successful. Today, there are a variety of "classroom management" approaches available to educational practitioners.

In the United States, increasing crime rates and a shift to political conservatism in the 1980s corresponded with changing views on school discipline. In contrast to the anti authoritarianism of the 1960s and 1970s, public

sentiment began to favor stricter school discipline as "get tough" approaches gained popularity not only in the United States but also in countries such as Britain, Canada, and Australia. Even in the late 1960s there was some indication of concern. Respondents in the US annual Gallup Poll of attitudes toward public schools have ranked lack of school discipline as a top problem since 1969. There is evidence of similar concern in many western countries where formal government inquiries have been made into the matter. In addition, discipline is increasingly being defined as a problem in Asian countries such as Japan.

Images of violence and disorder in chaotic urban schools and later school shootings in several US suburban schools reinforced this trend by spurring concern for teacher and student safety. Policy began to reflect these changes as governments passed tighter controls and schools implemented zero tolerance policies. Under zero tolerance policies, certain punishments are mandatory for designated offenses, leaving little flexibility for circumstance. Proponents of zero tolerance claim that these policies hold students accountable for inappropriate behaviors and serve to deter other students from similar behavior. Opponents of zero tolerance argue that these policies disproportionately affect poor and minority students, are overly harsh and unfair, and alienate students without any clear evidence that they effectively reduce misbehavior. While strict controls are generally targeted at serious misconduct, more mundane behaviors are also increasingly being restricted. Drawing on arguments that general "disorder" is at the root of more serious disorder and violence, some schools have implemented stricter codes of conduct and dress.

Stricter discipline and policies providing teachers with the explicit authority to remove students from their classrooms have not reinstated the teacher as the primary school disciplinarian. Teachers continue to have the most interactions with students in the classroom but much of the responsibility for formal sanctioning resides elsewhere. Teachers often send misbehaving students to the principal and larger or more disorderly schools designate an administrator to handle disciplinary issues. Mandatory punishments in zero tolerance policies take authority away from educators. In some schools, the

punitive control of the justice system has replaced the authority of teacher and administrators as schools increasingly employ police officers, fences, security cameras, and metal detectors.

Although the meaning and purpose of school discipline are variable, in popular and political contexts “discipline” often refers to the sanctioning of children who disobey school rules. What is defined as misbehavior may be different from school to school and classroom to classroom and can range from chewing gum and talking in class to more serious criminal behaviors. Some regulations are codified into school or classroom rules but others may be unwritten and subject to interpretation. Similarly, while most schools have formal sanctions for rule violations, sanctions also occur informally and can be idiosyncratic. Because schooling in the United States is decentralized, disciplinary policy can vary significantly between states and school districts. Where schooling is more centralized, such as Europe, policies tend to be more consistent.

At the most mundane level, teachers and administrators frequently correct behavior by asking or demanding that students alter their behavior. Punishments for misbehavior may take many forms, including verbal reprimand, humiliation, the removal of privileges, lower grades, corporal punishment, and permanent or temporary discharge. At the primary school level, sanctions often include such actions as scolding, placement in “time out,” or withholding play time. Some schools also apply corporal punishment in which school personnel strike misbehaving children with a hand or object such as a paddle or cane. At the secondary school level, school discipline tends to take a different form. Detention and suspension are common disciplinary measures for adolescents. Students in detention are required to spend additional time at school, usually before or after the official school day or on the weekend, studying or performing a task assigned by the teacher. In some schools, administrators may impose formal removal from the classroom by placing offenders on suspension for a designated amount of time. For in school suspension, students spend time in a segregated room within the school. Out of school suspension requires that students stay home from school. Schools also sanction

students by barring participation in extra curricular activities such as athletic events, clubs, or field trips. For serious infractions, schools are increasingly referring the situation to law enforcement. Students may be expelled or transferred to an alternative educational institution.

Corporal punishment is the most controversial type of sanction. Reflective of discipline in the home, prior to the nineteenth century corporal punishment was common. Supported by the Christian ideology that to “spare the rod” was to “spoil the child,” teachers were free, and often encouraged, to physically punish students. While there were limitations to the amount of force that could be used, physical force was common and severe according to today’s standards. In the early 1800s, the United States witnessed successful efforts to limit corporal punishment and by the end of the nineteenth century some urban districts had banned its use. In the third quarter of the twentieth century, a concentrated challenge to corporal punishment resurfaced. Since then a little over half of all US states and several school districts have banned its use. Today, all industrialized countries, except Australia and the United States, as well as many developing countries have eliminated the official use of corporal punishment in schools. The current trend is toward restricting corporal punishment, with countries such as Canada, India, and South Africa only recently banning its use. Consistent with the “get tough” approach, some areas in the United States, however, have actually seen an increase in the use of corporal punishment.

Corporal punishment remains controversial. Opponents argue that corporal punishment should be eliminated on the grounds that it is inhumane and teaches children that the use of violence is acceptable. Proponents argue that corporal punishment is an effective tool for controlling misbehavior and teaching authority and self control. While the empirical evidence is mixed, the majority of research suggests that physical punishment is ineffective. Some studies even suggest that corporal punishment may possibly lead in the long term to alienation and increases in antisocial behavior.

SEE ALSO: Dewey, John; Disciplinary Society; Durkheim, Émile; Foucault, Michel; Juvenile Delinquency; Parental Involvement in

Education; Race and Schools; School Climate; Social Control; Socialization; Urban Education

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school segregation, desegregation

Roslyn Arlin Mickelson

The United States has a long history of providing racially segregated and unequal public education to its children. Racially separate and unequal public education was not an accident; it was created by public laws and policies enacted and enforced by state governments and local school systems. After a series of Supreme Court decisions eliminated the formal legal foundation for segregation, it was recreated through racially discriminatory practices in federal housing policies, lending for home purchases, employment, wages, and school assignment practices.

Desegregation is the process that removes the formal and informal barriers preventing students from diverse racial and ethnic backgrounds from learning in the same classrooms and schools. Since the middle of the twentieth century, various desegregation policies have been widely used to remedy *de jure* (by law) and *de facto* (by practice) segregation. Among the policies employed were mandatory and voluntary busing, pairing of white and minority schools, using magnet programs to attract diverse students to segregated schools, redrawing of school attendance boundaries, and siting new schools in areas between minority and white neighborhoods. Desegregation also involved creating racially diverse faculty and staff, employing multicultural curricula, and nurturing diversity in extra and cocurricular activities. These processes ensure that, once in desegregated schools, all children have equitable opportunities to learn.

The still unfinished process of school desegregation commenced with the landmark 1954 *Brown v. Board of Education* decision, in which the Supreme Court declared that "separate educational facilities are inherently unequal" and "a denial of the equal protection of the laws." The 50th anniversary of the Supreme Court's *Brown* decision offered the opportunity to reflect upon the meaning of the decision and to assess what has and has not been accomplished in its name.

The *Brown* decision was a sea change, overturning the essence of the infamous *Plessy v.*

Ferguson case, which had legitimized racially “separate but equal” public spheres. However, *Brown* only addressed public actions, not private behaviors. This tension between legal mandates for racial justice in education and private actions to preserve white educational privileges slowed effective school desegregation for decades. Arguably, the most enduring legacy of the *Brown* decision is not desegregated public schools – especially in light of nationwide trends toward resegregation and the continuing struggle for educational equity. Rather, *Brown* enshrined in US law the concept that all people are citizens of this nation and that state enforced racial segregation is unconstitutional.

Southern schools remained segregated well into the 1960s and northern schools until the 1970s. Nevertheless, since the *Brown* decision, some regions of the United States were more successful in desegregating their schools than others. Southern and border states eventually experienced the greatest degree of desegregation. In some southern school systems the percentage of blacks attending extremely segregated minority schools dropped from 78 percent in the late 1960s to 25 percent at its lowest in the mid 1980s. Other regions of the country, where *de facto* segregation was the norm, also desegregated to a large degree. In the middle of the 1980s the national trend toward greater interracial contact in public schools stalled and began a slow reversal by the decade’s end (Clotfelter 2004; Orfield & Eaton 1996).

There are a number of reasons that the significant strides toward desegregated public education began to reverse in the late 1980s. The convergence of white interests in economic growth through interracial tranquility with black interests in educational and occupational mobility that permitted desegregation in the first three quarters of the last century (Bell 1980) did not survive through the 1990s. Other reasons for resegregation trends include the lifting of federal court orders mandating desegregation, demographic shifts in the US population – especially the explosive growth in ethnic minority populations – and the suburbanization of US communities. As a result, school systems that were once relatively desegregated are now becoming resegregated. Much of current segregation is between districts – especially central cities and their metropolitan area

suburbs – rather than among schools within a single district, as was historically the case. Some observers estimate that the levels of interracial contact in public schools will soon return to pre *Brown* levels of racial isolation.

WITHIN SCHOOL SEGREGATION

A nuanced discussion of desegregation must begin with the acknowledgment that segregation exists both between and within schools, a distinction often discussed in terms of first and second generation segregation (Wells & Crain 1994). First generation segregation generally involves the racial composition of schools within a single district or between adjacent districts and has been the focus of national desegregation efforts since *Brown*. Second generation segregation involves the racially correlated placement of students within schools typically brought about by ability grouping (in primary grades) and tracking (in secondary grades).

Some form of tracking or ability grouping is an organizational feature of most US public education (Oakes 2005), even though most school systems no longer have rigid tracks for vocational, college preparatory, or commercial courses of study (Lucas 1999). Black, Latino, and Native American students are disproportionately assigned to lower level classes, or tracks, compared to their comparably able white and Asian peers. Blacks, Latinos, and Native Americans are relatively absent from the accelerated tracks (Mickelson 2001; Oakes 2005). Racially stratified tracks create a discriminatory cycle of restricted educational opportunities for disadvantaged minorities. This cycle leads to diminished school achievement and, in turn, contributes to race and social class differences in school outcomes. Ability grouping and tracking often resegregate students even in school districts operating under court mandated desegregation plans. In these ways, first and second generation segregations intersect in ways that often subvert the goals of desegregation.

DESEGREGATION EFFECTS

Effects of desegregation typically fall into two categories: long term effects, which refer to adults’ educational and occupational attainment

trajectories that are influenced by their intergroup experiences during elementary and secondary school; and short term effects, which refer to what happens to students' academic achievement and racial attitudes as a result of intergroup contact (Braddock & Eitle 2003; Wells & Crain 1994). The evidence showing that desegregation has a positive effect on minority students' long term outcomes is well documented and rarely controversial: minorities who attended desegregated schools have greater educational and occupational attainment and are more likely to work and live in integrated environments than those who went to segregated schools. Both majority and minority adults who attended desegregated schools have lower levels of racial fears and antagonisms than those who attended racially isolated schools.

Most of the scholarly and policy debates concern the short term effects of desegregation on achievement. Earlier research on short term effects on achievement was equivocal. Some social scientists found that desegregated education modestly benefited minority students' academic outcomes (especially in language) without harming whites' achievement; other studies found no systematic effects. But most early empirical studies of desegregation suffered from limitations in their design and samples (Cook 1984). Another reason for the mixed results of earlier research on short term desegregation effects was the high correlation between social class and race. Some researchers contended that desegregation could not address racial inequality in educational outcomes caused by social class differences among students (Rossell, Armor, & Walberg 2002). Other social scientists concluded that desegregation policies were essentially ineffective in raising minority achievement because the larger societal problems at the root of racially correlated school outcomes are left untouched by school desegregation (Bankston & Caldas 2002).

A growing body of newer research demonstrates desegregation's significant positive effects on the achievement of minority and majority students, even after controlling for social class differences among the groups. Recent analyses of large, representative samples permit researchers to control for family background and prior achievement when they examine the effects of desegregation on achievement. US military

schools, for instance, are thoroughly desegregated, highly effective for all students, and have very small racial gaps in achievement compared to civilian schools. Black students' National Assessment of Educational Progress test scores in reading, science, and math rose during the years between the 1970s and the 1980s when desegregation was at its peak. Scores have not increased since the trend toward resegregation began in the 1990s (NCES 2001). Many social scientists attribute these gains in achievement to desegregation.

Whites and Asians benefit from desegregation as well. NAEP scores rapidly rose for whites and Asians between the 1970s and the 1980s, but the rise leveled off since desegregation peaked in the 1980s (NCES 2001). Using the 1990 National Educational Longitudinal Study, Brown (2004) found that high schools with enrollments that are almost entirely white do not necessarily produce the best academic outcomes for all students. Schools with a racial mix of 44–75 percent white and/or Asian American, and 25–54 percent black and/or Hispanic show the highest average academic achievement for all racial groups and the smallest gap between the races in test scores. Mickelson (2001) found whites as well as blacks in Charlotte, North Carolina benefited from attending racially integrated schools and classrooms. Borman and Dorn's (2004) analysis of Florida achievement data indicates students from all ethnic groups in integrated (compared to racially segregated) schools performed better on Florida's standardized tests. Muller and her colleagues (2004) used the Adolescent Health data set to examine opportunities to learn across ethnic groups in schools with varying levels of desegregation. They found greater opportunities to learn in integrated schools and that minorities performed better in them than in segregated schools.

The likely explanations for the positive effects of desegregated learning environments on student achievement point to greater human and material resources and more rigorous school climates. Desegregated schools are more likely than racially isolated minority schools to have highly qualified teachers instructing in their field of expertise, stable teacher and student populations, smaller class sizes, and modern equipment. In addition, students in

desegregated schools are more likely to have peers who are motivated, and who value achievement, and encourage it among their classmates. Parental involvement is higher in desegregated schools. In desegregated schools, students have greater interracial contact in classrooms, in extracurricular activities, and in peer groups. Such diversity stimulates higher order thinking among all students (Gurin et al. 2002). Taken together, these factors create an academic climate with higher expectations and greater opportunities to learn for all students (Hallinan 1998).

Braddock and Eitle (2003) propose a logical and empirical connection between short term and long term effects of desegregation. Their conceptual framework links desegregation's short term effects of enhanced achievement, socialization, and positive intergroup relationships and attitudes to its long term effects of greater social inclusion and social mobility. Attending desegregated schools has a positive effect on minority students' interracial attitudes, aspirations, self esteem, locus of control, standardized tests, grades, and class rank. These academic credentials and socialization experiences, in conjunction with broadened social networks, directly influence post secondary educational and occupational attainment that, in turn, enhance minority adults' income, job status, and the diversity of the institutions in which they participate. These adults are then better able to facilitate their own children's educational success and social mobility.

THE FUTURE OF DESEGREGATION

Since the withdrawal of vigorous federal efforts in pursuit of desegregation and the disappearance of the political consensus supporting it, a number of school districts are pursuing student diversity using strategic school siting in integrated neighborhoods, or socioeconomic status and/or test performance diversity as criteria for pupil assignment. Their goal is to avoid creating schools with concentrations of low income and poor performing students. Because socioeconomic status and race are highly correlated, SES diversity generally results in racially desegregated schools as well. Socioeconomic status diversity is not merely a back door to racial

desegregation; concentrating poor, low performing students in the same schools makes improving educational outcomes extremely difficult and very expensive.

The use of racial criteria to diversify public schools has not been eliminated by court rulings, just restricted. The 2003 University of Michigan Law School's affirmative action case, *Grutter v. Bollinger*, may provide an impetus for desegregating public K 12 schools. In *Grutter*, the majority of the Court held that because diversity in higher education is a compelling state interest, the law school may use race, among other criteria, in a narrowly tailored admission policy. In 2004, two post *Grutter* appeals court decisions addressed voluntary public school desegregation plans with explicit race conscious assignment strategies. A decision by the First Circuit Court of Appeals explicitly agreed that public schools have an educational rationale – that is, a compelling state interest – in promoting diversity. However, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals rejected a high school assignment plan that relied on this argument (Johnston 2004).

CONCLUSION

School desegregation was launched 50 years ago by a judicial decision of extraordinary simplicity and moral clarity (Clotfelter 2004). Yet once school systems actually began the process of dismantling racially segregated school systems, white parents seized opportunities to circumvent integration through practices such as tracking and school choice (then called freedom of choice plans). The willingness of school officials and other state actors to accommodate white parents seeking ways to retain their race privileges within public schools, and the weakening resolve among federal officials to carry out court mandates to desegregate, made it increasingly difficult to fully implement the policy during the last twenty years of the twentieth century.

During the second half of the twentieth century, *de jure* segregation was dismantled and for a period between the 1970s and the late 1980s *de facto* segregation was markedly reduced. The regions of the country that were once the most segregated became the most highly desegregated. At the time that the nation's public

schools were the most racially balanced, achievement levels improved for all students and the racial gaps in academic achievement narrowed considerably. By the end of the 1980s, the nation's will to continue school desegregation faltered and public schools began a slow retreat from the policy of equality of educational opportunity through desegregation. As schools became resegregated, the earlier national trends toward greater minority achievement and smaller racial gaps in school outcomes began to plateau.

In light of the dismantling of much of the legal framework for desegregation and the recent trends toward resegregation, the future of desegregated public education is uncertain. Even some minority citizens who once supported desegregation have expressed doubts about the policy. They have grown weary of continuing political struggles and are disappointed by the results of the policy's implementation for their children's academic outcomes. Moreover, they have been wounded by the costs of desegregation to their communities' cohesion, cultural identity, and by the loss of minority educators' jobs.

Over time, these social forces have eroded the nation's capacity to fully realize the potential social and academic benefits from diverse public education, and ultimately have resulted in a retreat from desegregation as the keystone to equality of educational opportunity. Ironically, this erosion is occurring at a time that research increasingly indicates diverse learning environments are essential for preparing students to be citizens of a multi ethnic, democratic society and successful workers in the globalizing economy.

SEE ALSO: *Brown v. Board of Education*; Educational Inequality; Race and Schools; Schools, Magnet; Schools, Public; Social Capital and Education; Tracking; Urban Education

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school transitions

Michelle L. Frisco

School transitions signify students' entries into new schools. They are important milestones that lead to both positive and negative events that affect young people's lives. There are two broad categories of school transitions: (1) normative school transitions (e.g., the transition into elementary school, from elementary to junior high school, from junior high to high school); (2) non normative school transitions or school transfers.

This entry discusses the causes and consequences of school transitions. Schools are one of the primary social institutions in which young people spend time. Therefore, changes in school life can be particularly disrupting, both academically and socially.

NORMATIVE SCHOOL TRANSITIONS

The types, number, and levels of schools in a district vary markedly and are primarily determined by a district's physical size and the number of students that it serves. In rare instances in the US, a student remains in the same school from kindergarten through grade twelve, and some students only make one school transition. Most students today, though, experience two transitions – from elementary to junior high school and from junior high into high school.

Normative school transitions lead to many physical, social, and academic changes. Students begin attending school in a new location and building, which is usually much larger than their original school. In addition, peer relationships become more complicated, students become the youngest rather than the oldest students within the school's hierarchy, and the racial and ethnic composition of a school's students may change (French et al. 2000). Young people's interactions with school officials also change and often become more anonymous. Finally, the level and difficulty of coursework increases. Therefore, normative school transitions can be high risk periods when students are vulnerable to negative academic and social consequences.

The educational consequences include declining academic achievement (Seidman et al. 1996; Reyes et al. 2000), lower school attendance (Seidman et al. 1996), and lower school engagement and attachment (Barber & Olsen 2004). In addition, the likelihood of school dropout and stop out rises during the transition from junior high to high school (Roderick 1993).

Negative social consequences include lower levels of overall student functioning (Barber & Olsen 2004), decreased self esteem (Reyes et al. 2000), and less rewarding and more impersonal interactions with school personnel (Barber & Olsen 2004).

There is some evidence that school transitions can be positive (or at least neutral). For instance, students who were "nerds," unpopular, or isolated can reinvent themselves (Kinney 1993).

A host of factors can influence how easy or difficult normative school transitions are for students. Gender, race and ethnicity, academic ability, school location, and students' ages all influence how well students make normative school transitions. In addition, teachers, peers, and parents can all provide valuable support to students as they make school transitions. This helps to minimize the negative consequences of normal school mobility.

SCHOOL TRANSFERS

School transfers are not a common event when compared to normative school transitions. This is one reason why researchers posit that transfers are more disruptive to students' academic and social lives than normative school transitions. Students usually experience this transition without peers and often also undergo other changes – such as a residential move or change in family structure – simultaneously. Transfers also result from school choice programs, which may or may not decrease the amount of isolation adolescents experience as they change school environments.

There is less sociological research on school transfers than on normative school transitions, most likely because transfers are often viewed as an unavoidable consequence of residential mobility or family structure change. Nonetheless, transferring has been associated with negative

academic and social consequences, including behavioral problems, decreased mathematics test score gains, and an increased risk of school dropping out and stop out (Astone & McLanahan 1994; Swanson & Schneider 1999). Transferring also changes the composition of students' friendship networks and may lead them to lower status positions within these networks (South & Haynie 2004).

In recent decades, one specific type of school transfer has become its own area of study: school choice. It is a relatively new type of school mobility and there is great variability in school choice policies from school district to school district. There is also no clear answer as to whether school choice programs lead to positive or negative social and academic consequences for American students.

CONCLUSION

Sociologists who study education are beginning to understand school mobility. Nonetheless, we know far more about school transitions earlier as opposed to later in students' educational careers. Researchers must continue to investigate the causes and consequences (both negative and positive) of school mobility, the support systems that help students make these transitions, and the best ways to meet the educational needs of students who undergo abrupt changes in schooling experiences.

Greater investigation of school transfers is particularly needed. For instance, sociologists still only have limited knowledge about complex relationships and interactions between school mobility, residential mobility, and changing family structure. The effects of transfers that result from different forces (e.g., school choice versus a residential move) are also not well understood. Findings from these areas of inquiry will help policymakers develop programs that help students cope with changing school environments that disrupt their lives academically and socially.

SEE ALSO: Dropping Out of School; Family Structure and Child Outcomes; School Choice; Schools, Magnet; Transition from School to Work

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schooling and economic success

David B. Bills and James E. Rosenbaum

The empirical association between schooling and economic success is one of the most secure findings in the social sciences. With rare exceptions, across societies and historical periods those with more schooling or particular types of schooling have held significant material advantages over those with less schooling. While not perfect, the empirical associations

between schooling and economic success are high, persistent, and according to many accounts, increasing. Schooling in many societies is now generally regarded as the key to both individual and collective social mobility.

Educational attainment is consistently associated with virtually every standard measure of socioeconomic success. For example, in the United States only a little more than three out of five individuals who have not completed high school are in the labor force. This number rises steadily as educational attainment rises, with nearly nine out of ten college graduates participating in the labor force. Similarly, as educational attainment goes up, unemployment rates unambiguously go down. This does not mean that providing high school dropouts with diplomas will suddenly provide adequate opportunities for them, but it does mean that when jobs are scarce, the least educated have the least access to them.

The relationship between education and socioeconomic success goes beyond whether or not people are working, to the types of work they do and the rewards associated with that work. Level of schooling is consistently and strongly related to occupational status, worker autonomy, earnings, employment stability, access to learning opportunities at work, and job benefits.

The good life afforded by schooling is not equally accessible to everyone. For example, at all levels of education, African Americans and Hispanics are more likely to be unemployed than are whites. The difference is especially great for African Americans. Further, women earn less than men at all levels of schooling.

Precisely why schooling is such a consistent predictor of economic success is less certain. Human capital theory (Becker 1964; Mincer 1989) maintains that schooling provides marketable skills and abilities relevant to job performance. This makes the more schooled more valuable to employers, thus raising their incomes and their opportunities for securing jobs. In this view, employers act rationally by selecting on educational credentials (although this need not be the only hiring criterion) because schooling has prepared the more educated to be better workers. Similarly, job seekers (in their prior role as students) act rationally by investing in their own human capital.

Credentialism offers a different vision of the association between education and work (Berg 1971; Collins 1979). This view holds that educational credentials are little more than arbitrary and exclusionary means of preserving socioeconomic advantage across generations and socioeconomic groups. Rather than indicating job skills, credentials are the ways in which gatekeepers restrict access to privileged positions. By using such putatively objective indicators of merit as educational credentials, elite classes can reproduce themselves in what appears to be a fair and equitable manner (Bourdieu & Passeron 1974).

Credentialism can refer to two very different processes that may or may not be directly related. For some, credentialism describes *credential inflation*. This position describes a system of job assignment in which employers demand more and more education for the same work. As evidence, analysts point to a rate of expansion in educational enrollments that is much more rapid than technologically induced growth in the demand for skills. Of course, economies can and do experience skill shortages and skill surpluses at the same time. Credential inflation may well operate in some sectors and not in others.

A second way to think about credentialism is as “sheepskin effects.” These are usually defined as disproportionate increases in returns to schooling after the completion of a year that usually is associated with a degree (Park 1999: 238). In other words, people are economically rewarded simply for holding a given degree. (One could as easily say that they are economically penalized for not completing a degree.) The difference in earnings between, for example, someone with four years of postsecondary education but no degree and someone with the degree (the sheepskin) is in effect the “rent” one collects for being credentialed.

Other theories of the relationship between schooling and economic success lie closer to the human capital theory, while incorporating aspects of the skepticism of credentialist theory. These include theories of screening, signaling, and filtering (Bills 2003). While there are important differences between these theories, they are unified by the claim that the importance of schooling is not so much that it enhances ability but rather that it reveals it. Because

employers cannot know which potential hires are most likely to be productive, they need to identify and gather trustworthy labor market information (Rosenbaum 2001). Educational credentials provide this information. More able job seekers can thus signal their market value by acquiring educational credentials, which in most societies have attained the status of legitimate indicators of the kinds of ability valued by employers.

Both analysts and policymakers show recurrent concern for *overeducation* (variously referred to as overqualification, surplus education, or educational mismatch, but rarely, strangely enough, overskilled). The idea behind overeducation is that some workers, usually considered to be a growing number, have more education than is “needed” for the jobs they hold (Halaby 1994). Determining the criteria for how much education is “needed” is far from self evident, and there is no uniform definition about what counts as overeducation. Some see overeducation subjectively, as workers’ own assessments of the adequacy of their educational backgrounds for the demands of the jobs they hold. Those who see their own credentials as significantly higher than those needed to either secure or perform a job are held to be overeducated. Others measure overeducation more in terms of the objective characteristics of jobs. One might, for example, compare the educational level of a given worker to the educational level of the typical worker in that occupation or to some “job level requirements” of the occupation. In objective conceptualizations, workers who are significantly more highly educated than other workers in the same occupational category (regardless of their self assessments) are considered to be overeducated.

The evidence on overeducation and its social, political, and economic consequences is less than definitive. Empirical findings differ quite substantially across societies, and different conceptualizations of overeducation often produce different results. Most analysts believe that overeducation is both fairly common (some times held to be nearly a third of the workforce) and increasing (Green et al. 1999). Others believe there may have been some decline in the incidence of overeducation (Groot & van den Brink 2000). Some data suggest that women are more likely to be overeducated, and men

more likely to be undereducated. In general, the returns to overeducation (typically taken as “years of surplus schooling”) are lower than the returns to “matched” schooling, but are positive nonetheless.

Theory and research on the relationships between schooling and economic success should continue to develop. The emergence of several integrated efforts to conduct cross societal comparative studies of social stratification, the development of high quality nationally representative data sets for an increasing number of countries, and solid methodological and conceptual apparatuses provide a solid foundation for further progress.

SEE ALSO: Capital: Economic, Cultural, and Social; Dual Labor Markets; Education and Economy; Educational and Occupational Attainment; Income Inequality and Income Mobility; Life Chances and Resources; Mobility, Intergenerational and Intragenerational; Transition from School to Work

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schooling, home

Mitchell L. Stevens

Home schooling, the practice of educating one's own children, has seen dramatic growth in the last three decades, and has transformed from a peculiarly American innovation to a truly global movement. An estimated 15,000 US children were home schooled in the late 1970s; by 2003 the number was over a million, and the practice had won adherents throughout the industrialized world (National Center for Education Statistics 2004; Stevens 2003). Parent directed education was almost entirely eclipsed with the accomplishment of universal compulsory schooling in the early twentieth century. But as part of the "anti Establishment" cultural ferment of the 1960s and 1970s home schooling reemerged as a social movement, championed by advocates across a wide ideological spectrum.

Even while all racial groups and socioeconomic levels are represented among them, home school families are disproportionately middle class, well educated, and white. The vast majority of home schooling work is conducted by mothers; most home school households are headed by married couples and supported by a sole, male breadwinner (National Center for Education Statistics 2001). Home schooling enables women with traditionalist conceptions of motherhood to incorporate some of the status of professional teaching into their full time domesticity. This is part of why the practice is particularly appealing to conservative religious women (Stevens 2001).

What may at first appear as an individual, quixotic educational choice has from its beginnings been a collective one. Home school families have long cooperated with one another in order to lobby for the legality of the practice

and to build often elaborate home school communities. Home schooling is best understood as a social movement, one with a distinctive dual history. One branch began in the left liberal alternative school movement of the 1960s, a cause which sought to radically democratize teacher–student relationships and give students greater discretion over their own educations. John Holt, long a prominent advocate of alternative schooling, began to promote home education (which he called "unschooling") in the 1970s. Before his death in 1985, Holt had successfully nurtured a national grassroots network of home school converts. Another branch comes out of the conservative Protestant day school tradition, specifically through the work of Raymond and Dorothy Moore, whose several books and national speaking tours advocating home education reached an audience of religious families already skeptical of public schools.

Despite these cultural differences the early home school advocates shared a conviction that each child has an essential, inviolable self, and that standardized methods of instruction are harmful to children's self development. Both Holt and the Moores, for example, frequently invoked factory metaphors to derogate conventional schools and to contrast them with the educational customization home education makes possible. But to this shared conviction about children's essential individualism these leaders added rather different ideas: Holt conceived of children as essentially virtuous beings with innate abilities to educate themselves; the Moores tended to view children as essentially good but also sinful, and thus in need of discipline and direction from wiser adults. This mix of commonality and difference in early home school philosophy presaged subsequent organizational conflict between the two branches of the cause.

One of the first tasks of the fledgling movement was to secure the legality of home education nationwide. Spurred by a remarkably well organized home school lobby, judicial and legislative activity throughout the 1980s rendered home education legal throughout the US by the end of the decade (Henderson 1993). The process of legalization was facilitated by the distinctive jurisdictional structure of American education. Because authority over schooling is

largely in the hands of state and local governments in the US, activists were able to wage localized battles and win victories in piecemeal fashion.

While the two branches of the home school movement cooperated amicably through the 1980s, the differences in their organizational sensibilities split the cause in the subsequent decade. From their different cultural traditions home school advocates had inherited contradictory organizational ideas: some of them favored highly democratic, consensual organizational forms and were wary of excluding families from their associations on the basis of religion or educational philosophy; by contrast, conservative Protestants preferred hierarchical organizational forms and often were eager to define their associations as distinctively “Christian” in character and membership. Home schoolers’ different ways of thinking about collective action ultimately divided the movement into two organizational worlds: one officially “diverse” and non sectarian, the other officially “Christian.”

This turbulent political history was largely hidden from public view by the movement’s very success. By the mid 1990s home schooling had shed much of its countercultural stigma and had become an acceptable educational choice for families with a wide range of lifestyles. Interested parents could choose from an array of support and advocacy groups at the local and national levels, and shop in a vital sector of small businesses supplying varied curriculum materials to the growing home school market.

Because quantitative research on home schooled children’s academic outcomes has been piecemeal, at present researchers lack the kind of systematic data that would enable them to say definitively if the practice confers a net advantage or disadvantage relative to conventional schooling. Nevertheless, the preponderance of available evidence indicates that the average home schooled child performs at least as well as her conventionally schooled peers on nationally normed standardized tests. While not all home schooled students are academic stars, research to date has yielded no cause for alarm regarding home schoolers’ basic academic aptitudes and rates of school completion (Stevens 2001).

In both its history and its character, home schooling is an American invention. The

jurisdictional boundary between parents and the state has always been especially blurry in the US, a cultural reality which made the basic logic of home schooling initially more palatable in this country than it might have been elsewhere.

Nevertheless, home education has diffused globally over the last two decades. The national homes of the movement’s earliest adherents are telling: England, with its long tradition of private schooling; and Japan, where an extremely competitive, exam driven education system has fostered novel means of educational advancement and exit. Home education is now practiced throughout the industrialized world, even in nations such as Germany, where it is technically illegal (Spiegler 2003), and we might predict that it will further flourish internationally as a neoliberal logic of citizens as discretionary consumers of state services continues its ascendancy (Stevens 2003).

The home school movement teaches three general sociological lessons. First, it reminds us of the inherent tensions at the boundary between family and school. Few would dispute that schools and families have very different functions, timetables, and emotional valences; often overlooked, however, are the problems that arise from the simple fact that these two institutions share the same children. Even while the personnel requirements for the two spheres are radically different, we tend to presume that people can easily transit from one to the other on a regular – indeed daily – basis. But at this formidable institutional intersection things are bound sometimes to go awry: parents will dispute the extent to which schools adequately honor the specialness of particular children; schools will be skeptical or dismissive of parent opinions; school and family priorities will conflict. Home education represents one, particularly radical response to the chronic contradictions between these very different spheres of social life. Evidence for this is the frequency with which parents explain their decision to home school their children by referencing obstacles and problems they experienced in public schools.

Second, the popularity of home education highlights the importance of individualism as a contemporary pedagogical ideal. Home schooling shares with other currently fashionable

pedagogies (e.g., the Montessori and Reggio Emilia methods) the presumption that children are best served by highly customized instruction, and that standardized curricula are harmful to young people's self development. These ideas neatly reverse the ideal of uniform curricula common among educational leaders a century ago (Tyack 1974). While it is difficult to trace the causes of such a cultural shift definitively, it seems reasonable to posit that one driver of the change was the growing fascination with self actualization that characterized American culture in the 1960s and 1970s, and the simultaneous critiques of large bureaucratic institutions popular during this time (Bellah et al. 1985; Clecak 1983). Indeed, many early advocates of home education describe their effort as part of this broader cultural ferment (Stevens 2001). In any case, evidence from multiple studies suggests that the highly individualized instruction so valued by home schooling parents is becoming the presumed best practice in upper middle class households throughout North America (Lareau 2003; Davies et al. 2002).

Third, the emergence and endurance of home schooling is appropriately seen as part of the growing importance placed on parental choice in education generally. In the contemporary US, education is increasingly understood as a private good that families appropriately consume in the manner of their own discretion (Labaree 1997). A common corollary is the notion that educational services are best distributed through market mechanisms, which are thought to ideally match educational "products" with parents' and students' "preferences" (Chubb & Moe 1990). Within this market framework home schooling appears as but one of many potential options among which parents can choose as they see fit. The contrary idea that helped give rise to mass public schooling a century ago – namely, that education is a public good best distributed universally to all citizens – has become increasingly marginalized even while home education has moved toward the mainstream.

SEE ALSO: Childhood; Collective Action; Culture, Social Movements and; Motherhood; Neoliberalism; New Left; New Religious Movements; Parental Involvement in Education; School Choice

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schools, charter

Amy Stuart Wells

In 1991, Minnesota passed the first charter school law in the United States, allowing state funds to support schools that operate autonomously from the public educational system. The charter school idea caught on quickly, with

40 states and the District of Columbia passing charter school laws between 1991 and 2006. By fall 2005, there were approximately 3,600 charter schools enrolling about 1 million students across the country.

The basic premise of charter school reform is to allow educators, parents, and/or entrepreneurs to receive per pupil funding to run schools that are exempt from many rules and regulations of the public system, including student assignment policies. Thus, charter schools not only have a great deal of autonomy in terms of their daily operations, they also have greater control over their enrollments than most public schools. They are schools of choice, enrolling students through an admissions process that often, but not always, involves a lottery. In exchange for this greater autonomy, charter schools are supposed to be held accountable for student outcomes. Each school's chartering agreement with one of various charter granting institutions – a school district, a state board of education, a state charter school board, or a university – describes its educational philosophy and goals. If a charter school fails to achieve these goals, the charter granting authority has the right to revoke the charter.

Beyond these similarities, each state charter school law is slightly different. Some laws are far more lenient than others in terms of the number of charters that can be granted or the number of charter school authorizing organizations. Furthermore, some states allow private schools to be converted into charter schools. Others allow charter schools to serve home schooling families or students who want to finish school via independent study. (These are known as non classroom based charter schools.) As a result of these differences in state laws, as well as demographic distinction in the K 12 populations, there is wide variation in the number of charter schools and their enrollments from one state to the next. For instance, in the 2005–6 school year, California claimed almost 600 charter schools serving about 200,000 students. In the same year, Mississippi had only one charter school serving 380 students.

In fact, charter school reform, as a national movement, is fairly lopsided, with only six states – Arizona, California, Florida, Michigan, Ohio, and Texas – housing nearly two thirds of the charter schools and students (see Ziebarth

et al. 2005). On the other end of the spectrum, 12 of the 40 states with charter school laws have fewer than 20 charter schools, accounting for only 3 percent of all the schools and less than 3 percent of all the students.

Thus, the popularity of charter schools is widespread but uneven, as different states and local officials embrace the reform to different degrees. This diversity across state and local lines also reflects the varied political roots of the charter school reform movement, as various supporters of charter schools jumped on the bandwagon for divergent reasons.

Charter school reform was born in the late 1980s and early 1990s, when there was growing frustration with many of the equity based policies of the 1960s and 1970s, particularly with programs such as school desegregation, compensatory education, and bilingual education, which were seen as overregulated. Policymakers were bent on trying to improve the quality of the overall educational system via an emphasis on higher educational standards – i.e., “excellence” – as well as an infusion of choice and competition.

The argument was that a rising tide would lift all boats and that both standards based accountability systems via systemic reform and a strong dose of market forces, namely competition and choice, would force all schools to respond to the needs of all students. All of this coincided with a growing demand for greater decentralization of educational governance and control. Charter school reform was in sync with all three of these efforts and is grounded in the ideology of each (see Wells et al. 2002).

CHARTER SCHOOL REFORM AFTER 15 YEARS: WHAT WE HAVE LEARNED

Despite charter school reform's political origins in both systemic reform and decentralization movements, in many ways it has been the free market advocates who have most directly shaped charter school policies. Given that 90 percent of the charter schools in the US exist in states with more deregulatory laws, much of the research on charter school reform conducted thus far provides insight into how effective the market model of school change is in the real world of schools and children. The results are not

optimistic, especially in light of the many claims attached to charter school reform at the birth of the movement. Proponents claimed that charter schools would promote achievement through their more autonomous structure. They also expected that charter schools would have greater accountability for student outcomes and public dollars, because of the possibility of losing their charter as a consequence of poor performance. Finally, charter school advocates claimed that these schools would provide choice for families and competition for public schools, improving the educational marketplace. Below, the research to date on each of these claims is summarized.

Student Achievement

Efforts to summarize and synthesize studies conducted on charter schools and student achievement have produced inconclusive but fairly negative results. In studies of national data and studies of specific state assessments, there is no evidence that charter schools are consistently outperforming regular public schools; in some cases, they are doing worse.

In Levin's (2005) review of the research on charter schools and student achievement, he concludes that although charter school advocates and opponents each choose particular studies that favor their points of view, overall there is no reliable pattern of difference between charter and public schools.

Another comprehensive review of the literature on charter schools and student achievement by Carnoy et al. (2005) examined separately those studies that drew upon the National Assessment of Educational Progress (NAEP) test scores across states and those that examined charter schools within the context of particular states by drawing on state test data. The vast majority of state level studies conclude that charter schools do not outperform public schools, even when charter schools have become well established. Carnoy et al. (2005) conclude that even when strong measures are used to control for selection bias, the effect on students of being in the charter schools appears to be negative.

Another review of literature on charter schools and student achievement by a more pro charter reform researcher demonstrates that

of 35 charter school achievement studies conducted since 2000, only 15 show positive results for charter schools (Hill 2005: 23). The 35 studies reviewed in this analysis include those conducted by politically conservative think tanks that are outspoken proponents of charter schools and vouchers.

Finally, a study conducted by the Rand Corporation (2003) found that in California, only the start up charter schools – those that, on average, over enroll white students – had slightly higher test scores than comparable public schools. Meanwhile, the charter schools that had been converted from regular public schools and enrolled a higher percentage of black and Latino students had test scores that were comparable to demographically similar public schools. And worse yet, the non classroom based charter schools – e.g., the online and independent study charter schools that enroll larger numbers of low income and/or low achieving students at a very low per pupil cost – had lower test scores than public schools with similar enrollments (see Wells & Holme 2005).

Accountability

As evidence mounts that current charter school laws have done little to improve student achievement, additional research suggests that they are rarely held accountable for student achievement. The lack of serious academic accountability for charter schools was documented in a US Department of Education study, which found that more than half of the charter school authorizers surveyed said they had difficulty closing charter schools that were failing. In fact, only 12 percent of those surveyed said they had ever revoked a charter or denied a renewal of a charter. And in those instances when an authorizer enforced a formal sanction, it was almost always due to financial problems with the charter school and rarely because of enforcement of the academic accountability provisions of the charter school laws (Finnigan et al. 2004).

Charter school reform in Dayton, Ohio, provides an example of the lack of academic accountability within the movement. Dayton experienced a proliferation of charter schools, despite evidence that the existing charter schools – many of which were operated by the

same management companies that were requesting the new charters – were performing at a lower level on state exams. A full 26 percent of students in Dayton are enrolled in charter schools, a much higher rate than in any other American city, but few of Dayton's charter schools perform better than its public schools (Dillon 2005).

In addition to the lack of academic accountability, there is also growing evidence that charter school reform opens the door for fraud and misappropriation of funds. In other words, public funding for these schools is deregulated to the degree that opportunists can make money at the public's expense. And while charter schools are more likely to be shut down because of fiscal as opposed to academic accountability issues, numerous examples of charter school closures suggest that it often takes a long time before fiscally questionable schools are closed (see Dillon 2004).

While solid research on charter school accountability – academic or fiscal – is lacking, there is no evidence that these publicly funded schools are being held *more* accountable than the regular public schools, especially in the states with the more deregulated charter school laws.

Choice and Competition

The claim that charter schools would provide students and parents with greater choice in education certainly speaks to the experiences of some of the students some of the time. Yet, research on charter school enrollments suggests that charter schools are more racially and socioeconomically segregated at the school level than the already highly segregated public schools. Further distinctions appear when researchers examine factors such as parent education and parental involvement.

Charter school proponents tout the fact that overall, when aggregated national data only are examined, charter schools serve a slightly higher percentage of students of color, if not more poor students. But more careful analyses of the data broken down by state, district, and surrounding communities demonstrate that charter schools disproportionately serve less disadvantaged students within their contexts. In other words, charter schools may well be located in

low income neighborhoods and enroll low income students of color, but oftentimes we see that the students enrolled in charter schools are less poor, have more involved and/or better educated parents, and are less likely to be labeled special needs or English language learners than their peers in nearby public schools. These data suggest that within each state, charter schools create more stratification at the school level (Cobb & Glass 1999; Fuller et al. 2003; Carnoy et al. 2005).

Furthermore, there are major differences across states in terms of the demographics of charter schools. In some states – especially Illinois, Ohio, and Michigan – charter school reform is a mostly urban reform designed to serve predominantly low income students of color. In other states, such as California, Arizona, and Colorado, it has appealed to a much wider range of people and communities, including many that are predominantly white and well off (Wells et al. 2000). Those states in which charter school minority enrollment is lower by more than 5 percent from the district enrollments house more charter schools overall than the states in which minority enrollment in charter schools is greater on average than district demographics by at least 5 percent (Ziebarth et al. 2005).

Roy and Mishel (2005) compare charter school demographics to the nearest public schools and demonstrate that in several states with the largest charter school enrollments, including Arizona, California, and Florida, charter schools enroll higher percentages of white students than their nearby public schools. They also find that charter schools in these states enroll a much lower percentage of students eligible for free or reduced price lunch than their nearby public schools.

Even when the racial/ethnic makeup of charter schools is similar to other nearby public schools, the students enrolled in charter schools are often “advantaged” in other ways. For instance, minority students attending charter schools in states where minority enrollment in charter schools is higher than in public schools tend to be socioeconomically advantaged compared to minority students in public schools (Carnoy et al. 2005). Of course, an argument could be made that even if the students enrolled in charter schools are slightly less

disadvantaged than those who attend nearby public schools, the mere fact that these public schools down the street operate within a competitive educational market means they will respond to the competition for students by improving. In reviewing this literature, Levin (2005) argues that the available results from a variety of charter school and voucher settings suggest only a modest competitive response by public schools at best.

Overall, there is little evidence that charter schools and the policies that create and support them have delivered on their promises of raising student achievement, making schools more accountable, or providing choices that the most disadvantaged students can take advantage of within a given community or context. Still, they remain a popular reform effort in great part because they are steeped in popular beliefs about the free market and competition. Researchers must continue to ask hard questions about whose interests are being served by this reform.

SEE ALSO: Education; Educational Attainment; Parental Involvement in Education; School Choice; Schools, Public

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schools, common

Ann Owens

The rise of a common school system in nations around the world provides some evidence for a sociological theory of educational origins and expansion focused on socialization and social organization. While more functional arguments often point to the need for a well trained work force as the driving force in the rise of public education, a more sociological interpretation argues that modernizing countries, facing increased social differentiation, must transfer the socialization task from families to an institution like schools (Dreeben 1968). Another aspect of this argument is that with modernization, increased individualism also occurs, and a common school system is needed to promote national citizenship and induction into a general collectivity (Ramirez & Meyer 1980).

Current empirical evidence does not provide conclusive support for any one theory of why developing nations promote a free education system. However, in countries where this ideology of minimizing social differentiation and creating good citizens exists, this theory appears plausible. In France, for example, public education was first proposed by Enlightenment philosophers in the late 1700s in line with goals of universal citizenship and order (Alexander 2000). In the United States, common schools were established to provide a free,

state controlled education system for all citizens in line with the ideological goals of these theories. The creation of the common school system in the nineteenth century drew on the ideology of the developing republican government in that a republic depends on having a well educated and morally trained populace to direct the decisions of the government and monitor its actions. A free, state controlled education system would also alleviate political and social stratification based on education level by providing all citizens with equal opportunity to obtain a basic education, and therefore to exercise an equal vote in the new government and be competitive in the economy. Schooling became centrally controlled and organized and provided universal education.

THE NEED FOR COMMON SCHOOLS

The goal of socialization into one national collectivity was particularly salient for the US as it developed into an independent nation. In the US during the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, education was the responsibility of parents and local communities. Demand for uniform, compulsory education grew from both pragmatic and ideological needs. First, citizens wanted a basic education to eliminate the disparate literacy levels between native colonists and British immigrants and between North and South; second, literacy was necessary to study the Bible, essential for salvation to Calvinists and Protestants; and finally, the growing economy in the colonies demanded the ability to read and do basic math for trading and planning purposes (Kaestle 1983). Availability and quality of schools, teachers, and curriculum were unregulated and unequal across towns and states, producing educational differences across regions. Low quality and limited availability of elementary schooling were reasons enough for the education system to be reformed; however, it was the political and ideological climate of the time that gave rise to the development of the common school system in the nineteenth century (Kaestle 1983; Tyack et al. 1987).

As the US government developed, political theorists began to see education as a key tool in maintaining the republican ideals on which the country was founded, with education acting as

“the fourth branch of government” (Tyack et al. 1987). The republican system of government depended on an enlightened general populace that understood what was in their best interest. Additionally, citizens needed to be well informed to be able to prevent some of the corruption that the Americans saw and eschewed in the European governments. Therefore, common education would serve as a training ground for citizens: citizens could be taught basic literacy and numeracy skills, but also receive “moral training” consistent with Protestant ideals and be informed on political and economic issues (Kaestle 1983, 2000). Further, with a country as big as America, republican government would not work without a well ordered population, and education was seen as a way to produce this orderly public. Common education would protect the government from having to act on an uninformed will, and also give the people power to protect themselves from a corrupt government. Education became a tool to distribute power more equitably among the populace.

In addition to maintaining republican goals, the common school system was seen as a way to reduce social and political stratification. At this time, the “haves” and “have nots” were distinguished by their levels of literacy and education, as education was necessary to be successful in trading and business and also necessary to be considered an appropriate choice for government office. Because there was no free school system, only those with money were able to send their children to school, and this system of education resulted in social reproduction wherein power stayed in the upper class. There were marked disparities in education by gender, race, nativity, and region. Women were rarely educated, nor were blacks or Native Americans. Northern states, New England in particular, had developed a more widespread system of education since the region was organized around highly populated towns compared with the less densely populated South (Kaestle 1983). European immigrants had often attended better schools in their home countries than were available to native colonists. Common schools were seen as a way to allow all citizens to have an equal chance to be qualified to hold positions of power, and education began to be seen as a mechanism for social mobility.

THE CREATION OF A COMMON SCHOOL SYSTEM

The earliest attempts to establish a common school system were by individual states, with New York, Massachusetts, and Connecticut leading the way. These early attempts often resulted in states using taxes from land or land grants to partially fund schools, but tuition was still charged to cover remaining expenses. From the late 1700s through the 1830s, the types of schools supported by state funds were not uniform; for example, New York state money went toward supporting existing private schools rather than supporting free schools (Ravitch 2000). In states where state funds were not allocated for education, particularly in the South, schools continued to be funded entirely by tuition payments, doing little to alleviate knowledge stratification among the classes. Apprenticeship and charity church education programs also existed.

In the early nineteenth century, the population and economy of America were booming, and these social changes helped pave the way for educational reform. While the economy prospered, the rewards to individuals were unequal, with the more educated generally being more successful. Also, with the population boom, America was experiencing higher rates of crime, a more diverse population, and more crowded cities. While the ideology of common schools had existed for some time, education now began to be seen as a pragmatic solution for decreasing stratification and cultural conflicts and maintaining social order. Schools could be designed as “factories” that could teach moral discipline (an increasingly popular movement in the early nineteenth century) and arm American citizens with basic education so that everyone had an equal chance for upward mobility in the thriving economy (Tyack et al. 1987). Also wanting to protect citizens’ power from the growing government, the public began to more vocally support the idea of a common school system, treating it as a necessity rather than rhetoric. The environment was ripe to implement reforms.

From the 1830s through the 1860s, reformers worked to pass legislation to establish a compulsory free schooling system. Two of the most prominent common schools reformers were

Henry Barnard and Horace Mann. In the late 1830s, each pushed through reforms in their respective state legislatures (Barnard in Connecticut, Mann in Massachusetts) similar to those being supported across the country and modeled after reforms in Europe. The basic demands of the common school supporters were that states should provide “free schooling, improved facilities, better classification, longer school years, better teacher training” (Kaestle 1983). Reformers also attempted to pull support from private schools by depicting them as non-republican institutions that reproduced social stratification, and states were encouraged to provide entirely free, high quality schools to reduce the appeal of private schools.

While the South considerably lagged behind the North in initiating changes, most states had established common schools by 1860. More students were attending school, and for longer periods of time. Schools became more highly organized, with a system of high schools serving as an umbrella under which to organize district schools. The concept of teacher training was debated, and the earliest education schools were set up, although few teachers attended them (Kaestle 1983). At the urging of reformer John Philbrick, schools were organized under a principal who had 10 to 12 usually female teachers. Major changes occurred with respect to centralizing control. In the early nineteenth century, schools were under the control of local community governments, which many argued allowed for inconsistent teaching and facilities standards. During the 1840s and 1850s, schools in most states were reorganized into larger districts and became state controlled and supervised. The office of school superintendent was created at the state level and was often combined with the secretary of state position. Schools became an organization run by this state superintendent, and large cities began to create school boards with officials elected by the public to work with the school leaders (Tyack 1974).

The reformers had made progress, but a minority in the population did not support the creation of a common school system. One major dispute was over the centralized control of schools as an organization. Some citizens felt that centralized control was too bureaucratic and would turn schools into a “mindless machine” directed by the state superintendent

(Tyack 1974). Also, a centralized school governing body could ignore local actors and regional and cultural differences (e.g., factory towns wanting more vocational education for their children), and individuals would not have a choice in how schools were run. However, supporters argued that centralized control would equalize school spending between rich and poor by providing free and regulated schools, and schools would also regulate discipline and offer all citizens the same basic curriculum. Political lines were drawn, with Democrats favoring local control of schooling and less government intervention and Whigs favoring state controlled systems and a more uniform training for all. Individual ethnic and religious groups wanted to keep elements of their culture and teachings in the school curriculum, and they too opposed state regulated schools and curricula. Eventually, the push for state controlled schools succeeded largely because of the strength of the republican rhetoric regarding the need for equal education and thus an equal voice for all, and because of the appeal of free, high quality schools open to everyone (Kaestle 1983).

The success of school reform required spending, and some citizens were reluctant to pay increased taxes. Some argued that common schooling supported by general taxation favored the rich. The working class resented having to pay the same taxes for schooling as people who could readily afford to send their children to private schools. These opponents of the free common schools argued that states should not require poor communities to support free schools if they were not able to. Additionally, those citizens who did not have children who were attending school resented having to pay education taxes. When higher taxation was proposed, poor communities rejected these proposals, while other communities felt compelled to support the ideals of common schools by paying what their superintendents required. Because of the economic boom in America, many states had sufficient funds to finance school initiatives, and increased taxation could be avoided. In states and communities that had fewer financial resources, ways to cut costs were proposed, including the hiring of female teachers, who, while not readily received or respected, were cheaper than male teachers. This early use of women as cheap labor, some argued, established

a gender hierarchy in education and other institutions that remains today (Kaestle 1983). By the 1870s, reformers were for the most part able to assuage opponents of tax supported schools by developing appropriate local tax formulas and by persuading the public that everyone benefited from a well educated populace because of the social order it facilitated, and therefore everyone should pay.

By the 1860s, a common school system had been set up in America with public access to state funded education under the control of state governments. Rural schools were still often heavily influenced by local taxpayers rather than state legislation, few teachers were properly trained, and disagreements over the curriculum and religion's place in it still persisted. However, the reformers had created a common school system based on ideology that still pervades the American educational system today. First, education for all is a republican ideal which allows everyone an equal chance; providing everyone with an equitable foundation will allow for social mobility for all racial, ethnic, and socioeconomic groups. Second, by centrally controlling education, equality and uniformity of instruction are guaranteed. This nascent common school system provided the foundation for the system of schooling that is in place today.

The origins of education systems vary across the world, and one factor in this variation is the ideological goals of each country. The economic system and degree of industrialization as well as the development of the nation state also influenced the rise of education systems around the world, but in countries where increasing social differentiation was seen as a threat to stability and where democratic ideals needed to be taught to a mass citizenry, common schools arose in part to serve these needs.

SEE ALSO: Education; Educational Attainment; Schools, Public; Schools, Religious; Socialization

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schools, magnet

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Magnet schools are public schools defined by three principal characteristics: a distinctive curriculum or instructional approach, enrollment of students from outside the designated neighborhood attendance zones, and desegregation as their explicit purpose. Magnet schools have been used for desegregation since the mid 1970s. However, the concept of magnet schools is based on district specialty schools which have been present since the 1900s. Currently, there are two major national studies of magnet schools.

Blank et al. (1983) conducted a study in 1973 which found a significant increase in magnet schools since being accepted as a voluntary strategy for desegregating schools, from 14 to 138 districts during the first five years. Second, Steel and Levine conducted a nationally representative study of 600 multischool districts in

1992 and found magnet programs offered in at least 230 public school districts, serving 1.2 million students mostly in districts with a court ordered desegregation plan. Most magnet schools emphasize a particular subject area, and one fifth offer a distinctive instructional approach. Magnet schools are not homogeneous. Instead, magnet programs are offered at the elementary, middle, and high school level and function as Programs Within Schools (PWS) or whole school magnets (Steel & Levine 1994). For simplicity, PWS and whole school magnets will be referred to interchangeably unless otherwise indicated.

HISTORY AND DEVELOPMENT OF MAGNET SCHOOLS

The concept of magnet schools comes from district wide specialty schools such as the Bronx High School of Science in New York City. Magnet schools are also historically linked to school desegregation efforts. Court decisions of the civil rights era outlawed segregation in schooling and required school districts to produce racially mixed schools, such as the 1968 Supreme Court case of *Green v. Board of Education* in Virginia and *Swann v. Charlotte Mecklenburg* in North Carolina (see Steel & Levine 1994 for a review). Faced with the challenge of integrating schools and whites' hesitancy to voluntarily transfer their children to majority minority schools, districts began forced busing. Violent protests and the exodus of many white families from the public and urban school system ensued (Meeks et al. 2000). Therefore, in 1975, magnet schools were allowed as a voluntary strategy for desegregation. Since that time, magnet schools' prevalence has grown enormously. In 1996, 85 percent of magnet schools were in court ordered districts (Steel & Levine 1994).

However, the connection of magnet schools to desegregation is only the initial reason for their growth in the US educational system. The report *A Nation at Risk* (1983) spurned education reform for more high quality and locally controlled public schools, the goal being to develop a stronger sense of community and increased parental involvement in their children's education (Steel & Levine 1994;

Gamoran 1996). In addition, federal funding has facilitated the growth of magnet schools.

Desegregation efforts have been funded principally through two federal programs, the Emergency School Aid Act (ESAA) from 1975 to 1981 and the Magnet School Assistance Program (MSAP), which began funding the start of new magnet programs or adding to current magnet programs in the mid 1980s. Funding from MSAP is conditional on schools' mission of reducing minority isolation, eliminating minority isolation, or preventing minority enrollment from rising above the district levels (Steel & Levine 1994). Funding for staff development, curriculum planning, supplies, and outreach contributed to 80 percent of the \$739 million spent between 1985 and 1991. Magnet programs are more extensive in districts that received MSAP funding; schools without funding have fewer outreach programs to recruit new students and provide limited transportation to students. MSAP funding affects the broader district as well. Districts without MSAP funding but with magnet programs can strip other public schools in that district of funding (Estes et al. 1990). For example, when compared to other public schools in the same district, magnet schools have additional staffing allowances, smaller classes, and more expenditure per pupil (Steel & Levine 1994).

PREVALENCE OF MAGNET SCHOOLS

Part of the difficulty in studying the effects of magnet schools, despite their increasing prevalence in urban school districts, is their heterogeneity. Typically, magnet schools have a distinctive curriculum, attract students from outside the neighborhood attendance zone, and have desegregation as their goal (Steel & Levine 1994). Fifty eight percent of magnet schools are in elementary schools and 38 percent are PWS magnets. Whole school magnets are more common in elementary schools while PWS magnets are more common in middle and secondary schools. Among magnets, instructional approaches are broken down as follows: 37 percent have an emphasis in a specific subject area, 27 percent offer a particular instructional approach, 14 percent have career vocational emphases, 12 percent are gifted and talented

magnets, and 11 percent have specific arts programs.

Even with their increase in urban districts, all schools in Steel and Levine's study maintain waiting lists for student attendance. To attract students to their schools, a typical district uses a variety of outreach strategies such as recruiting students from surrounding schools. Approximately one third of magnet schools are "dedicated" magnets, where there is no attendance zone and all students must choose to attend. The rest of the magnet schools have a neighborhood attendance zone and attract additional students from other attendance zones. Typically, those non dedicated magnets are comprised of white students attending magnet schools in minority neighborhoods (Steel & Levine 1994). About one third of magnet schools use program specific selection criteria; this practice is most common at gifted and talented magnet schools. In addition, the use of selection criteria is more common at magnet high schools.

Much of the research on magnet schools has been concerned with desegregating urban schools. Within magnet schools, the racial balance of students has been shown to differ from their schools' racial composition. For example, 71 percent of the students in PWS magnets are minority but only 61 percent of the students in the magnet program are minority (Steel & Levine 1994). In addition, magnet enrollment in white districts is predominantly minority, while minority district enrollment is predominantly white. Overall, most magnet schools are in predominantly minority urban school districts. Given this, researchers have debated the validity of magnet schools as true indications of desegregation. In addition, low income, special education, and limited English proficient students are underrepresented in magnet schools. Desegregation is a central theme for research on magnet schools: whether they contribute to desegregation efforts, if they increase educational quality in the district, and the types of magnets that are more or less successful in attaining these goals.

EMPIRICAL RESEARCH ON MAGNET SCHOOLS

Besides the two large reports referenced above, most empirical research on magnet schools

consists of district and school case studies. Partly, this is because the goals of desegregation for magnet schools are largely dependent on the type of magnet programs and minority trends of enrollment in a particular school or district. Many researchers find that tailoring magnet schools to needs of communities is more responsive to students' needs and makes a greater impact.

Much research on magnet schools involves the definition and measurement of desegregation. Desegregation can be measured by the simple racial composition of schools, which is often called a reduction of minority isolation. This is a prevalent measure for regional magnet schools. On the other hand, PWS magnets could "reduce isolation" at the school level but still have classrooms with very little interracial exposure (Estes et al. 1990).

Although most magnet schools' mission is desegregation, they are still voluntary. This creates a challenge for school districts. While court ordered magnet schools have been found to increase interracial exposure more effectively, these are also more likely to re-segregate once the court directive period has ended (Rossell 1990). Researchers have hypothesized why this might occur; magnet schools can only attract white students into minority areas if the district puts additional funds and a special curriculum into that school, whereas minority parents have been found to transfer their children to white schools categorically.

Concerning their quality, magnet schools have been found to offer a high quality of education, with higher levels of student achievement in certain areas (Gamoran 1996) and more teacher/student satisfaction with the learning environment (Estes et al. 1990). Magnet schools also improve the quality of education in their district by creating models of parent/school communication as well as raising the bar for non magnet schools to compete for students. At the same time, researchers conclude that magnet schools must be considered as separate entities from other public schools (Gamoran 1996). Minority students attending magnet schools are a selective group, with well informed parents and often passing an entrance exam. White students attending magnets often have parents who are dedicated to interracial exposure for their children. In addition, magnet

schools are typically better funded than other public schools.

Future research of magnet schools needs to be conducted, particularly research concerning the impact of magnet schools on long term desegregation efforts. Currently, there is a heavy reliance on magnet schools for efforts of desegregation. In addition, magnet schools are most widespread in urban districts, more often attracting white students into high quality magnet schools in the minority district than vice versa. This serves a relatively small percentage of students within the district (Estes et al. 1990; West 1994). To determine the impact of inter racial exposure on the problem of minority isolation and the race/ethnic achievement gap, research should focus on two aspects of magnet schools: for whole school magnets, comparing magnet schools to other schools in the same district, and for PWS magnets, comparing student performance of magnet students and non magnet students. Research examining equity of access for parents and students to other public school choice policies is relevant for the study of magnet schools as well (see Coleman et al. 1993 for an example).

Many scholars agree that magnet schools are high quality public schools with a targeted goal of reducing or eliminating minority isolation. They keep white students and students from higher socioeconomic groups in the public school system when they might otherwise opt for a private school. Perhaps most importantly, magnet schools use the goal of desegregation to enhance students' education through a diverse student body. Critique of magnet schools rarely focuses on their quality. Instead, researchers are concerned about magnet schools' ability to function as a broad based solution of school desegregation. Future research on magnet schools is needed in areas such as the local context of successful magnet schools, magnet schools' ubiquity in reaching the goal of desegregated public schools, and the extent to which student learning is improved.

SEE ALSO: *Brown v. Board of Education*; Diversity; Race and Schools; School Choice; School Segregation, Desegregation; Schools, Public; Stratification, Race/Ethnicity and

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schools, professional

Elizabeth McGhee Hassrick

Professional schools play an important role in socialization and stratification processes in modern societies. The credential process for professions, in which a person trains to become a legitimate practitioner, is currently dominated by universities. Universities established certification programs during the late 1800s, successfully outcompeting the guild based apprenticeships and mentorships of earlier centuries (Stevens 1983). Before World War II, most professional schools were located in elite

private universities, accessible only to the wealthy, but enrollment in professional schools dramatically increased post World War II, shifting participation from an elite arena to one more accessible across social class. Sociological researchers have explored the social and psychological effects of participation in professional schools (Becker et al. 1961; Hughes et al. 1973; Fox 1979), and sorting processes have been identified that influence the stratification of people from different classes, races, and genders as they seek to gain entrance and successfully complete professional school programs (Spaeth 1968; Spangler et al. 1978; Stolzenberg 1994; Schleef 2000). Much of the research about professional schools has been conducted within specific professions, in the service of practitioners. Cross disciplinary studies investigating the connections among professional schools, professions, and larger social processes have been neglected.

PROFESSIONALS IN TRAINING

Sociological evaluation of professional school programs began when enrollment dramatically increased during the late 1950s and early 1960s. Research debates over the role of professional students brought social and psychological considerations to the forefront. The Columbia group (Merton et al. 1957) argued that professional students were practitioners in training, participating in social processes and curricular content that prepared them for their future careers as professionals, able to “live up to the expectations of the professional role, long after they have left the sustaining value environment provided by the school” (p. 138). Such things as vague descriptions of expectations and clinical opportunities to observe physicians dealing with the inconsistencies of pharmaceutical outcomes and the experimental aspects of diagnosing provided medical students with exposure to the limits and uncertainties of their chosen profession (Fox 1979). The Chicago group (Becker et al. 1961) claimed that professional students gained mastery at being students, not professionals. Becker et al. focused their studies on the interactions students had with each other when faced with the day to day problem of being successful students. The conduct of

the “boys in white” was significantly shaped by situational constraints placed on students by institutions that emphasized their role as temporary and interchangeable subordinates. Both approaches were focused on socializing processes that occurred during professional school training.

PROFESSIONAL SCHOOLS AND SORTING PROCESSES

Educational processes greatly influence the positions people occupy in a stratified society. Determining what part professional schools play in the stratification process requires attention to the stages of participation (entry, progress through, and placement after completion) as well as to the differentiation found within as well as between professions and their related schools.

Enrollment

Modern stratification research has revealed that parents play a significant role in high school and college enrollment, but what about graduate schools? Studies on the effect that parents have on graduate school enrollment have produced mixed findings, once types of graduate schools were disaggregated. Parents were found to have no effect on student enrollment into MBA programs (Stolzenberg 1994) and little effect on master’s programs. However, a strong parent effect was found for first professional and doctoral programs. The effect was indirect, related to student undergraduate institutions, academic performance, educational expectations, and career values. The academic achievement of students was determined as having a strong independent effect on enrollment in all kinds of professional studies. Students sometimes choose to enroll in a professional school, not to become a particular kind of professional but to maintain their lifestyle and social status. Schleef’s (2000) study about law and business school choice found that students expressed ambiguity about a specific preference between law or business, and were most interested in being intellectually stimulated and maintaining their lifestyles and social status.

Achievement

Identifying the processes that influence achievement during professional school attendance has been a highly segregated project, implemented by each separate profession in the service of improving its own professional schools. Academic progress through law school has been shown to be affected by the concept of tokenism. When women were a small minority of the student body, factors such as role entrapment and social isolation had a negative effect on women's achievement (Spangler et al. 1978). More recent studies reveal a lessened effect on women enrolled in law schools after 1991, but a sustained negative effect on ethnic minorities (Clydesdale 2004) that diminishes achievements and increases academic differences between majority and minority groups. While research about law schools centers around issues of equity, business school critics struggle over the divide between research and practice. Recent business school critics complain of excessive "pure" research at the expense of messy multidisciplinary practice (Zell 2005). More research about achievement across different professions is needed.

Placement

Placement after completion of professional school has been associated with prestige. Graduates from elite graduate programs win jobs with higher professional prestige. Each kind of professional work commands different levels of intraprofessional prestige. For example, the surgeon commands more professional respect than the family doctor, or the tax lawyer as compared with the labor lawyer. Abbott (1981) attributes the intraprofessional status hierarchy to the amount of "pure" professional work that each role demands, meaning, for example, that a surgeon is able to exclude more non medical tasks than the family doctor. In contrast, Heinz and Laumann (1982) assert that the status of different kinds of professional work is tied to the client base that pays for the work to be done. Corporate lawyers who negotiate complex legal contracts have high levels of intraprofessional prestige because their clients are wealthy. In

both formulations, generalists command less prestige within professions as compared with specialists. Professional schools reflect task and prestige hierarchies differently across professions. For example, in medical school, students compete for the chance to receive extended specialized training, whereas in law school, students from elite programs win placement in firms that practice specialized work that is considered more prestigious (Heinz & Laumann 1982). Graduates from prestigious law schools are more likely to be employed by elite firms with corporate clients, whereas "local" school graduates are more likely to have solo practices or be employed by small firms that serve individuals.

Differentiation

The differentiation found between professions impacts the status, quality, and quantity of professional schools. The number and types of colleges and their related professional training programs have diversified post World War II, and occupational categories have aligned themselves accordingly. Hughes et al. (1973) identified a task hierarchy where mundane and easily routinized tasks were relegated to various sub professions, for example, lab technicians, dental assistants, and paralegals. These trades are most often learned in vocational and two year community schools, whereas related professionals, such as dentists and lawyers, are trained in professional schools situated in four year universities. The resources necessary to establish and sustain professional schools at four year universities are related to the status and power of particular professions. Competition between occupations vying for secure professional standing has been understood both as a systemic process (Abbott 1988), where historically situated, interdependent professions combine, expand, change, and die, and as a market driven process (Larson 1977), where professions seek to monopolize markets to retain power. Sociologists have also sought to identify the essential features of professions, citing specialized knowledge, shared standards of practice, and strong service ethics (Freidson 1994) as characteristics of well established professions. Professions most aligned with the "ideal type" have the

greatest amount of public support. Research about how struggles between professions impact professional schools has been neglected.

In conclusion, professional schools remain the final frontier in educational research across school types. Most often, professional schools are grouped as a subcategory in higher education, but the close connection they share with the professions and the important role that they play in socialization and stratification processes in modern societies merit closer examination and theory development across professions. Research conducted within each profession regarding professional school performance does not provide the kind of analysis that will reveal how professional schools impact social processes.

SEE ALSO: Colleges and Universities; Education, Adult; Educational Attainment; Expectations and Aspirations; Medical School Socialization; Schooling and Economic Success

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schools, public

Ann Owens

For most nations, a free school system exists to provide all citizens with the basic skills needed to function successfully in society. Public schools teach basic literacy and numeracy skills and also socialize students into the incentive structure and power hierarchy of industry (Tyack 1974). From a functionalist perspective, many industrializing nations depended on workers with a basic education, requiring a universal system that could educate the workforce.

Industrialization also required more specialized workers, and highly organized public schools were necessary for advanced curricula and training. In addition to the pragmatic need for public education in maintaining an ordered society of viable workers, some nations' ideological goals also pervaded the creation and evolution of the education system. Public education is considered a tool for social mobility, a way for all children to obtain a common foundation for advancement, improvement, and success in society despite the background of their parents (Coleman & Hoffer 1987). Public schools teach a common curriculum and singular value system that allows students to effectively function in society and the economy. By equalizing the basic education all students receive, differences between community and family background characteristics can be minimized, alleviating stratification based on race/ethnicity or background resources. Education is also seen as fundamental investment in one's human capital (Becker 1993). Human capital is defined as investments one can make in oneself by pursuing training, knowledge accumulation, and health or medical care that will improve later well being and outcomes. The public school system provides a strong and universally available foundation for training and education, which serves as human capital that improves later financial gains and success.

Public schools do not have the same origins in all nations, however. The functional argument that industrialized nations drove the creation of schooling because of their need for educated workers does not ring true in places like Scotland, Prussia, France, and Japan, where schooling systems were developed before industrialization in those countries (Ramirez & Meyer 1980). Perhaps because of international pressure from the global community, many developing countries have also offered free and compulsory education to students from all social backgrounds, such as systems in Hong Kong, Malaysia, and even such highly stratified places as South Africa (Buchmann & Hannum 2001). Other empirical evidence points to the importance of a strong nation state in developing an education system; for example, the concurrent development of the education system and nation state in France and Prussia, although this theory does not hold in places such as

Britain and the US (Ramirez & Meyer 1980). While theories about the origins of a public education system have not converged around a singular conclusion, education is generally seen as a fundamental part of society, and its creation in various nations often coincides with the creation of other major institutions like government and the economy or in line with ideological goals of equality.

ORGANIZATIONAL CHANGES IN US PUBLIC SCHOOLS

Practical and ideological demands for free and compulsory schooling developed in the nineteenth century in many western countries. In the US, as in many European countries, societal changes of an economy increasingly dependent on industry and a booming population demanded an education system that could teach citizenship, social order, and standards for employment (Tyack 1974). Public education moved from being provided by families and churches to a highly organized, freely accessible system designed to prepare students for the modernizing world of work. In addition, a focus on social issues such as worker rights and equal wages also amplified the ideological debate on equal opportunity. Throughout the late nineteenth and twentieth centuries, movement toward free public education in the American school system was paralleled in other western countries, i.e., England (the Educational Act of 1870), France (the creation of the Republican schools), and Germany (whose eight year program of free schooling precedes most other countries, as it was established in the eighteenth century). The organization of public schools in the United States was tightened compared with the earlier common schools. Public schools needed to be reorganized to serve an increasingly stratified society, create effective workers, and to ensure that social control was maintained. Despite efforts by common school organizers in the late 1800s, disparities in curriculum, resources, and teacher training existed in schools. Public schools were to give all citizens an equal base in education, and therefore standards needed to be more uniformly established.

The main changes in the US public school system in the first half of the twentieth century

were with respect to control. Common schools were run by a superintendent and a large city school board. There was often conflict between the superintendent, viewed as a “professional” educator, and the members of the board, who were general citizens. The board and general public often saw the superintendent as a professional living off public tax money, and the superintendent saw a large, untrained, and meddling school board. In contrast to common school reformers, public school reformers argued for professionally controlled, more bureaucratically structured schools based on a science of education rather than community ideals. School boards were overhauled to be comprised of a small number of businessmen and professionals: schools were mimicking the organization of industry, where corporate board membership was entrusted only to the most highly qualified professionals. Schools now operated under a professionally trained superintendent, who, in conjunction with a professionally trained school board, advised and governed the school principal, who in turn oversaw teachers.

Aside from reorganization, progressive reformers were able to pass legislation mandating state standards for teachers with respect to training and hiring policy, thus increasing the professionalization of teaching as a profession, compulsory attendance, health and sanitation requirements, building standards, and regulated curricula like physical education (Tyack et al. 1987). Another change was the legal requirement of children to attend school, with parents eligible for punishment if their offspring were truant, emphasizing the organizational and socialization functions of public schools. Because of high costs for these reforms, new initiatives to supply federal aid to education were proposed in the late 1940s and early 1950s. Federal funding was often contested because of fears of centralization and disregard for local traditions or needs, and Catholic schools were outraged at the prospect of being cut out of funding, which would only serve public schools. To compromise, federal aid was offered to “federally impacted” communities whose schools were overcrowded because of an influx of federal workers; over the decades, increasing numbers of districts were able to qualify themselves as “federally impacted” to receive aid. However, the majority of funding still comes at the state and local level (Ravitch 1983).

CONTROVERSY AND REFORM IN US PUBLIC SCHOOLS

Several of the most controversial changes in public education have stemmed from the goals of social mobility and equal opportunity for all. The racial integration of schools is perhaps the most major and significant reform. In 1896, the *Plessy v. Ferguson* decision guaranteed “separate but equal” facilities for blacks and whites. However, equal education was rarely provided to blacks and whites in the first half of the twentieth century, when a dual school system existed wherein public funds, teacher training and pay, and facilities were far better for whites than blacks (Ravitch 1983). Along with the rising Civil Rights Movement and campaigns by the National Association for the Advancement of Colored People (NAACP), the *Brown v. Board of Education* decision in 1954 resulted in the Supreme Court declaring that separate schooling on the basis of race was inherently unequal. This decision set the stage for the slow and often opposed process of school integration.

Despite the legal sanctions, school integration happened very slowly and was examined in the Equality of Educational Opportunity Report, which was commissioned by the Civil Rights Act of 1964, and led by James S. Coleman (1966). The Coleman Report concluded that few schools were actually significantly racially diverse, and that family background and social composition of the school were more important predictors of academic success than school resources. This controversial report resulted in the idea that racial integration was key to academic success, and integration programs were developed which often involved busing lower resource or minority children to wealthier schools. This solution, however, led to further problems, with Coleman among others arguing that forced integration contributed to white flight, with white families leaving large urban districts that included lower resource families to create all white districts.

The equality of public schools has been examined again and again, on different bases. The establishment of Head Start preschool programs was influenced by research indicating that poor children were culturally or educationally “deficient” at the beginning of schooling.

Head Start was intended to be geared specifically toward the culture of impoverished children to give them not only academic preparation but also cultural skills to be competitive with middle class children. Head Start was partially funded by the 1965 passage of the Title I program of the Elementary and Secondary Education Act, which was designed to “meet the special educational needs of educationally deprived children” (Ravitch 1983: 159).

The 2001 No Child Left Behind (NCLB) Act signified the movement in educational reform toward accountability and standards testing. This movement draws on the ideology of schooling as a tool for social mobility and the pragmatic goal of readying all children for viable employment. By pushing for more stringent evaluations and standards, reformers are attempting to ensure that the quality of instruction between schools becomes more uniform, arming children with equal foundations. Standards testing provides an opportunity to gather data about students and schools, opening performance in public schools to parents, educational reformers, and policymakers. By closely evaluating students and identifying substandard teachers, NCLB attempts to strongly couple federal guidelines to curriculum and teaching to results, with consequences for schools who fail to improve test scores (i.e., requiring supplemental free tutoring and eventual reconstitution of a school that continually does not meet standards). Reform efforts have been constant since the establishment of an organized school system, with mixed results. However, the intention of the US public school system remains unchanged today: to provide all citizens with access to a basic education necessary for employment and success in society, and to provide equal opportunity for future advancement to all.

GLOBAL PATTERNS IN PUBLIC SCHOOL SYSTEMS

Public schools (often called state (in England) or free schools abroad) in other countries are similar in that they are government funded and offer free education for some compulsory length of time; however, systems across the globe vary with respect to degree of centralization or

decentralization of schooling and the existence of a national curriculum. France, for example, is considered to be highly centralized regarding curricula, but teaching methods are not strictly controlled (Alexander 2000). India is also fairly centralized, with policy changes and interventions occurring at the national level, although state and local governments influence some matters of expenditure and day to day functioning (Alexander 2000). In England, where the origins of the state school system occurred later than many other industrialized countries (not until the late nineteenth century), control of the public school system is in the hands of the central government, and schools and teachers have little autonomy (Alexander 2000). While national assessment standards, much like NCLB, are in place in England, the ideology of the English system does not reflect this centralization; since 2003, the focus has been on differences between children and serving individual needs, as outlined in the “Every Child Matters” green paper published by the Department for Education and Skills (2003). In contrast, Russia has moved toward a more decentralized system, focusing on an ideology of individualism and differentiation among students and developing a system (since the early 1990s) wherein the local government is responsible for financial, pedagogical, and professional development matters (Alexander 2000).

Most countries have established a national curriculum that is taught with little variation throughout districts. Language, mathematics, natural science, social science, the arts, and physical education are the subjects most often included in national curricula (Benavot et al. 1991). Regionally, there are some differences in the national curricula: for example, Latin American countries tend to spend less time on language instruction and more time on natural and social sciences, while countries in the Middle East or North Africa are more likely than other countries to include religious instruction in their national curricula (Benavot et al. 1991). Examining curricula globally, researchers have argued that stable patterns in curricula type can be seen across countries and over time, and that the rise and fall of certain curricula in different countries depend on the world political and historical climate at the time of their adoption,

rather than economic, political, or social factors at the national level (Kamens et al. 1996), implying that public education systems are moving toward a convergence around curricular choices. Public school systems around the world have responded to different reform movements as the national ideology, centralization of government power, and economic system have demanded, but the goal of providing free basic education for all citizens has persisted.

SEE ALSO: *Brown v. Board of Education*; Coleman, James; Early Childhood; Education; Massive Resistance; School Segregation, Desegregation; Schools, Common; Schools, Religious

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schools, religious

Jaap Dronkers

Religion and education have a long common history, dating back to prehistoric times. Religion and religious practices require structures for the preparation, initiation, and training of new members and of priests and teachers. For that reason, religious groups in premodern societies sooner or later took the responsibility of organizing the socialization of their new members and of their religious specialists. This does not mean that all education in premodern societies was organized by religious organizations. Non religious authorities, including kings, lords, cities, and guilds, organized a part of the socialization of the new societal members (for instance, warrior schools, apprenticeships, and academies for the training of bureaucrats), but in most premodern societies the major part of education outside the family was organized by or on behalf of religious organizations. One can argue that most schools in premodern societies were religious schools. Education was organized and financed by religious organizations, the content of education was controlled by religious authorities, and, in most cases, teachers were incorporated into these religious organizations, e.g., as monks or members of rank. This was true not only for schools at a basic level, but also for higher levels of education.

The transition from premodern to modern societies in Europe and North America between the sixteenth and nineteenth centuries led in most societies to a struggle between the state and the established church over the organization, financing, and content of education. This struggle was inspired by growing skepticism regarding religious teaching during the Enlightenment, by the increasing need for knowledge and skills not related to the needs of the

churches (growing technological sophistication, modern languages), and by the need of states, instead of a partly hostile church, to define the content of citizenship. It is important to note that this struggle between the state and the established churches took a different path in Anglo Saxon countries than in continental European societies (Archer 1984). In those European societies that were influenced by the French Revolution (including the United States), a legal and often constitutional separation between church and state was introduced at some point. Depending on the conditions of this separation and on the political parties involved, public and religious schools were allowed and sometimes partly or fully funded by the state. Although *de facto* separation between church and state emerged during the nineteenth century in many Anglo Saxon societies, with the exception of the United States, there was no constitutional separation between church and state in these societies. This made the distinction between public and private schools less clear. One consequence of the distinction between public and religious schools was the growing need of churches for the direct socialization of their new members, for which there had become less room in the public schools. Sunday schools, Qur'an schools, and the like emerged beginning in the nineteenth century in modern societies, but they were set up purely for religious socialization and no longer for the general education of their pupils. Although these institutions for religious socialization are often called schools, they should not be confused with religious schools, which are schools with mainly the same educational goals and programs as public schools, but which are organized and maintained by a private body that also has religious goals.

As a consequence of the struggle between the church and the state in many European societies, modern religious schools have different relations with the state. Within the educational systems of western industrial societies, schools can be roughly categorized on two dimensions. On the one hand, the issue is who makes decisions concerning the organization and curricula that schools provide; on the other hand, the source of funding for this education is key. In relation to the first issue, two types of religious

schools have emerged in most western countries. As a result of the struggle between the state and the established church, states have taken on the responsibility of organizing education. Here lies the root of public education that is fully governed and financed by public agencies (Archer 1984). At the same time, religious schools have been established or maintained by the efforts of churches and other religious institutions. However, it is important to note that non religious ideological and commercial organizations have also established private schools. Although schools of this type often still have to comply with government regulations to a certain extent, partly depending on the amount of financial support received from the government, the crucial decisions regarding the schools' affairs are made by private entities. Within this private sector, religious schools can again be classified as either government dependent or government independent by the extent to which they are subsidized by the state. Governmental subsidization of religious schools is secured by law in many countries, either in the constitution, as in The Netherlands and Germany, or in common law, as in France and Hungary. In many cases, this right results from claims of mostly religious groups to education based on the values and ideologies of the parents who are members of these groups and who are considered to be responsible for the way their children are raised. Alongside these religious government dependent schools, there exist in a number of countries, including Italy and the United States, religious schools that do not receive any government support. These schools finance themselves by means of pupil fees, donations, private sponsoring, and the like. Again, the two dimensions – governance and financing – cannot be considered to be completely independent of each other. When the amount of governmental financial support of private schools becomes larger, these governments will also demand a higher degree of influence on the programs that the schools offer. However, even schools that are completely independent financially will generally not be entirely free to determine the contents of their programs and will have to comply with minimal requirements on quality and safety. Moreover, the social context will also place constraints on schools' freedom. For

example, diplomas that meet generally accepted standards have become indispensable in modern societies.

Public and religious schools can be seen as the result of two different approaches to schooling. According to one point of view, schooling is an instrument of society as a whole (as represented by the central state) to prepare individuals for a life within society, independent of their social background, and in which religious convictions are considered to be a private matter. Public schools result from this point of view. The competing standpoint states that schools are an instrument not just of society but of parents and the social and cultural groups to which they belong. The aim of schooling according to this point of view is to offer young people an education that is in accordance with the religious way of life of their parents and their environment. Religious schools, more or less subsidized by the state, are the consequence of this approach (Coleman & Hoffer 1987; Godwin & Kemerer 2002).

Catholic schools are not the only examples of religious schools. Depending on the religious history and composition of a society, religious schools can also be Protestant, either related to a specific Protestant denomination (Lutheran, Evangelical, Baptist) or more general. The same holds for the *de facto* degree of orthodoxy of religious schools; it can be quite strong in some religious schools, while hardly existing in others. Religious schools are not only Christian. Depending on the history of a society, religious schools can also be Hindu, Islamic, Jewish, or other religions. "Parochial school" is therefore a misleading phrase, because it refers only to schools organized within the Catholic tradition. Despite the increasing irrelevance of church and religion in the everyday lives of most Europeans, religious schools have not dwindled. On the contrary, the religious school sector in societies with relatively religiously inactive populations is growing or is strongly overrepresented. This is true not only for societies that traditionally have had such schools, but also for those in which religious schools were abolished under communist regimes (Hungary, the new German Länder). One possible explanation is that the teachings of religious schools are generally more effective than those of public schools

because religious schools, although they no longer strive for the religious socialization of students, still try to attain other non cognitive goals, such as tolerance, social cooperation, and discipline, that are valued by unreligious parents. There also are other explanations for the rise of religious schools in the former communist societies, including distrust of the state as provider of collective goods like education, the lower effectiveness of public schools as a consequence of malfunctioning state bureaucracies, and a lower level of community building by parents and teachers around public schools than around religious schools.

Empirical evidence of the higher effectiveness of teaching in religious schools is increasing although not yet conclusive. Differences in school success and cognitive outcomes clearly exist between public and religious schools in modern societies on both sides of the Atlantic, but these differences are not very large and are not always found when comparing individual schools. However, these differences cannot be explained by the different social composition of the student populations or by other obvious social characteristics of pupils, parents, schools, or neighborhoods. Given the high level of state support for religious schools in European societies and the relatively low school fees, differences in school effectiveness of religious and non religious public schools cannot be explained by large financial contributions from parents whose children attend religious schools. In various continental European countries the law forbids large financial contributions from parents as a condition for obtaining state grants. Spending levels are mostly equal across the public and the state funded private school sectors because, in most cases, that is an essential element of the compromise between the state and the churches.

However, significant differences in non cognitive achievements, often the main argument for the existence of state funded religious schools, are hardly found in modern societies. There also exist a number of indications in multiple societies that children often attend religious schools for academic or social – not religious – reasons, whatever the policies of the schools. The two last points contradict the *raison d'être* of state funded religious schools,

because the right of parents to determine the moral and religious education of their children has always been more or less explicitly the basis of state recognition and funding of religious schools. The higher cognitive effectiveness of state funded religious schools also contradicts the *raison d'être* of religious schools, which maintain throughout that they do not want to compete with state schools for better academic outcomes.

The best explanation of the higher cognitive effectiveness of religious schools involves the different school climates in public and religious schools. A school climate (or culture) specifies different patterns of behavior for teachers and students. These patterns, which form the basis of a school climate, indicate shared beliefs about what students should learn, the proper norms of instruction, and how students and teachers should relate to each other. They affect the effectiveness of teaching and learning within schools and may also affect teacher morale, which can also influence teaching effectiveness. The school climate argument shows some resemblance to Coleman and Hoffer's social capital explanation (Coleman et al. 1982; Coleman & Hoffer 1987). They distinguish between two types of communities as related to schools: functional communities and value communities. The members of functional communities constitute a structural system of social interaction; they encounter each other in different kinds of social situations and know each other personally. In contrast, value communities are communities in which members (parents and teachers) share values and expectations regarding education but which are not functional communities; outside the school, there is no structural interaction or social network between the members. According to Coleman and Hoffer, functional communities like religious schools can be beneficial to their members because of the social capital they offer. Because there is interaction between parents inside and outside the religious school, norms can be maintained that create a stable and positive school climate, improving the pupils' scholastic achievement.

SEE ALSO: Economy, Religion and; Educational Inequality; Religion; School Choice; School Climate; Social Capital and Education

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schools, single-sex

Cornelius Riordan

Single sex schools refer to education at the elementary, secondary, or post secondary level in which males or females attend school exclusively with members of their own sex. Alternatively, males and females may attend all classes separately even though they may be housed in the same facilities, a phenomenon referred to as a dual academy. A related though different phenomenon is single sex classes, whereby schools that are otherwise coeducational provide separate classes for males and/or females in selected subjects.

Most people take coeducation for granted. Typically, their own schooling has been coeducational; often, they have little awareness of single sex schools. Our political culture reinforces the taken for granted character of American coeducation. It implies that schools reflecting the variety of society exemplify what is best about democratic societies. Many people also take for granted that coeducation provides

equality of educational opportunity for women. Like racial and ethnic minorities, women have long been excluded from the educational process. Thus, many people regard coeducation as a major milestone in the pursuit of gender equality. Single sex education, by contrast, appears regressive.

Coeducation, however, began not because of any firm belief in its sound educational effect, but rather because of financial constraints (Riordan 1990). Historically, mixed sex schools were economically more efficient. In America, boys and girls have usually attended the same public schools. This practice originated with the “common” school. Of course, at one time throughout all society, only boys received an education. At other times, the only education for either boys or girls was single sex schooling, either public or private. Even today, single sex schooling remains the dominant form of school organization in many countries.

In most western, democratic countries, however, once mass and state supported public education had been established, it was clearly the exception for boys and girls to attend separate schools. By the end of the nineteenth century, coeducation was all but universal in American elementary and secondary public schools (Tyack & Hansot, 1990; Riordan 1990). Recently, however, there has been a resurgence of interest in single sex schools in western modern societies across the globe, both in the public and private sector (Riordan 2002).

EMPIRICAL RESEARCH ON SINGLE SEX SCHOOLS

There are very few formal reviews of the relative effects of single sex and coeducational schools or classrooms. Of course, all researchers have conducted their own literature reviews, but these are often incomplete. Moreover, research on single sex classrooms is not systematic or rigorous since there are many varied forms of this type of structure.

There are two exhaustive reviews of research on single sex schools. The first of these was conducted by Moore et al. (1992) for a US Department of Education report. This review concluded that the empirical evidence clearly

supported the proposition that single sex schools may produce positive outcomes, especially for young women. In the most recent and thorough review employing What Works Clearinghouse standards, Mael et al. (2005) concluded that the preponderance of studies supports the view that single sex schooling has positive benefits for both sexes in terms of both academic short term achievement and socioemotional development.

The academic and developmental consequences of attending single sex versus coeducational schools are typically insignificant for middle class or otherwise advantaged students (Riordan 1990). By contrast, the consequences appear to be significantly favorable for students who are historically or traditionally disadvantaged – minorities and/or low and working class and/or at risk students (Riordan 1990, 1994a; Salomone 2003). The major factor which conditions the strength of single sex effects is social class, and since class and race are inextricably linked, the effects are also conditioned by race, and sometimes by gender.

Specifically, disadvantaged students in single sex schools, compared to their counterparts in coeducational schools, have been shown to have higher achievement outcomes on standardized tests of mathematics, reading, science, and civics. They show higher levels of leadership behavior in school, do more homework, take a stronger course load, and have higher educational expectations. They also manifest higher levels of environmental control, more favorable attitudes towards school, and less sex role stereotyping. They acknowledge that their schools have higher levels of discipline and order and, not surprisingly, they have a less satisfactory social life than students in coeducational schools. In the long term, women who attended a girls’ school continue to have higher test scores than women who attended coeducational schools (for an opposing conclusion, see Marsh 1989, 1991).

It is important to note, however, that single sex school effects are fairly robust even when social class or race is not partitioned. In their Catholic school study, Lee and Bryk (1986, 1989) analyzed the data by statistically controlling for social class, race, and other background characteristics and applied the results to students generally (assuming that there were no

differences in social class, race, or background variables). They found 65 of 74 separate dependent variable effects to be in favor of single sex schools. Thirty of 74 effects obtained an effect size (ES) of .18 or higher favoring single sex schools, equally distributed among boys and girls and the mean effect size was .13 favoring single sex schools.

The results for students attending women's colleges parallel and substantiate the secondary school results. They manifest higher levels of environmental control, greater satisfaction with school (though not social life), and they achieve higher occupational success despite the fact that there is no difference in educational achievement when compared to women who attended a coeducational college (Miller Bernal 2000; Riordan 1990, 1994b). This latter finding strongly suggests that their schooling has been of a higher quality since ultimately they have the same level of educational achievement as women attending coeducational schools. Amazingly, women who attend a women's college for even a single year and then transfer still obtain a significant gain in occupational success (Riordan 1994b).

These positive effects, however, are not universal. In a cross national study of four countries (Belgium, New Zealand, Thailand, and Japan), Baker et al. (1995) have shown that single sex schools do not have uniform and consistent effects. The effects appear to be limited to those national educational systems in which single sex schools are relatively rare. They argued that the rarity of a school type may enhance single sex effects under certain conditions. When single sex schools are rare in a country, the pro academic choice making by parents and students will result in a more selective student body who will bring with them a heightened degree of academic demands. In turn, rare school types are better able to *supply* the quality of schooling *demanded* by these more selective students. Being less normative, these schools are likely to possess greater autonomy.

Despite this array of positive effects, it is important to note that the most common finding in the systematic review by Mael and his colleagues (2005) was null or mixed results. The mixed results reflect the fact that often the effects are for females but not for males,

or for at risk students but not for middle class students. Furthermore, these significant effects for at risk students are small in comparison with the much larger effects of socioeconomic status and type of curriculum in a given school. This basic social science finding that school effects are small has been shown to be true since first identified in the famous Coleman Report, and data persistently confirm this educational fact over the past four decades (for a full review of studies, see Riordan 2004).

It is important also to emphasize that white middle class (or affluent) boys and girls do not suffer any loss by attending a single sex school (they are not better off in coeducational schools). Moreover, there does exist the possibility that they do acquire small gains that are undetectable. This is consistent with the large number of null effects noted above. There are, in fact, very few studies reporting more favorable results of any sort for students attending coeducational schools (see Mael et al. 2005).

As with most studies of school effects, the problem of "selection bias" always lurks in the shadows. All researchers acknowledge that students attending each type of school vary in a number of ways, including socioeconomic status, previous academic achievement, family structure, etc. And everyone agrees that it is critical to statistically control (and thereby equate) these preexisting characteristics in order to sort out the effects of the school from the effect of the home. Some researchers believe that the appropriate strategy is to control or equate exhaustively. Others argue that this strategy might control on some of the very characteristics that drive the entire success of single sex schools; namely, making a pro academic choice (see below).

WHY ARE SINGLE SEX SCHOOLS MORE EFFECTIVE THAN COEDUCATIONAL SCHOOLS?

There are at least a dozen theoretical rationales that provide support for the contention that single sex schools are more effective academically and developmentally than mixed sex schools, especially for minorities and at risk students. Single sex schools provide more

successful same sex teacher and student role models, more leadership opportunities, greater order and discipline, fewer social distractions to academic matters, and the choice of a single sex school is a pro academic choice. Students also gain advantages because of significant reductions in gender bias in both teaching and peer interaction, and via access to the entire curriculum. Single sex schools allow greater sensitivity to gender differences in learning, maturation, and school readiness. They provide safety from sexual harassment and sexual predatory behavior and have been shown to aid in spiritual and moral development.

IMPLICATIONS

Single sex schools are places where students go to learn; not to play, not to hassle teachers and other students, and not primarily to meet their friends and have fun. Aside from affluent middle class communities, private and alternative schools, coeducational schools are not all about academics. This has been noted often with alarm by respected and distinguished investigators across a variety of disciplines using a variety of methodologies (Goodlad 1984; Steinberg et al. 1996).

Given their rarity in western culture, single sex schools are likely to require pro academic choice that is made by parents and students. This choice sets into motion a set of relationships among teachers, parents, and students that emphasize academic and de-emphasize youth culture values, which as suggested above dominate coeducational schools. Thus, single sex schools provide a set of structural norms conducive to academic learning. This pro academic single sex school environment operates in concert and harmony with the choice making process that is made by students who attend single sex schools. In this regard, it is entirely different from a set of structures or programs that are put into place by educators. In single sex schools, the academic environment is normative in a true sociological sense. It is a set of rules established by the subjective reality (definitions) of participants which takes on an objective reality as a set of social structural norms. This idea is similar to that proposed by Bryk et al. (1993) of a "voluntary community" for public school

policy, which would resemble Catholic schools in every respect except for religion.

These academic definitions of school contradict the non academic definitions that students will otherwise bring to school and which come to constitute a youth culture. In effect, single sex schools mitigate the single largest obstacle which stands in the way of effective and equitable schooling, and it does this by using a fundamental sociological principle of how real social structures are created. Structures that are imposed and which contradict deeply cherished beliefs (regardless of how wrong headed and problematic they may be) will be rejected out of hand by any group with substantial power in numbers such as students in schools.

The challenge of effective and equitable schooling in the next century is to overcome the resistance and the recalcitrance of youth cultures in and out of the school. This is not a new problem and undoubtedly predates the modern school. But the intensity and the complexity of the problem is new, and it is the most important obstacle in schools today. Single sex schools provide an avenue for students to make a pro academic choice, thereby affirming their intrinsic agreement to work in the kind of environment that we identify as an effective and equitable school. Single sex schools should not be expected to correct the gender equity problems that exist in society and in coeducational schools. Moreover, students do not automatically do better in single sex schools. The important thing is the selection of a type of school that best suits each individual student.

SEE ALSO: Gender, Education and; School Choice; School Climate; School Discipline; Schools, Religious

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Schumpeter, Joseph A. (1883–1950)

Yuichi Shionoya

Joseph Alois Schumpeter is generally acknowledged as one of the first rank economists of the twentieth century, along with John Maynard Keynes. Schumpeter was born in Teš', a small Moravian town in the Austro Hungarian Empire. (The town, once called by the Germans Triesch, today belongs to the Czech Republic.) His father, a textile manufacturer, died when Schumpeter was 4 years old. Blessed with opportunities owing to his mother's remarriage to a high ranking army officer, Schumpeter was able to enter the high society of the empire and was educated at the Theresianum in Vienna and at the University of Vienna.

Although Schumpeter's principal teachers were Eugen von Böhm Bawerk and Friedrich von Wieser, the major figures of the Austrian School of Economics, he was not accepted among the Austrian School because he was critical of its essentialism and psychologism. In his early academic years, he taught at a number of provincial universities (Czernowitz, Graz, and Bonn), and for a short period after World War I he held the posts of finance minister under the Austrian socialist government and of president of a private bank in Vienna. In 1932 Schumpeter moved to Harvard University, and stayed there until his death in 1950.

His outstanding distinction was his broad erudition, his wide ranging and large scale work, combining economic theory with history and sociology, and his grand vision of synthesizing conflicting schools of thought. His intellectual background primarily consisted of neoclassical economics (represented by Léon Walras), Karl Marx, and the German historical economics (represented by Gustav von Schmoller). His central concern was the formulation of the evolution of the capitalist economic system. When he explained the nature of his theory of economic development, he referred to Walras and Marx, to whom he had been indebted. According to him, Walras provided "a pure logic of the interdependence between economic

quantities,” and Marx “a vision of economic evolution as a distinct process generated by the economic system itself.” Schmoller taught him the method of approach to historical process in which all aspects of social life will change interdependently.

The wide ranging work of Schumpeter can be interpreted as consisting of a system of substantive theory, i.e., (1) economic statics, (2) economic dynamics, and (3) economic sociology, and a system of metatheory, i.e., (4) the philosophy of science, (5) the history of science, and (6) the sociology of science, and is called a three layered, two structure approach to mind and society (Shionoya 1997). Substantive theory is addressed to society including economy, while metatheory is addressed to mind, knowledge, and theory including economics. The two systems are parallel in viewing the economy on the one hand and theory on the other from the viewpoint of, first, static structure, second, dynamic development, and third, their activities in a social context. They are linked together by the sociological dimension where economy and knowledge or mind and society are interrelated. The ambitious aim Schumpeter cherished throughout his academic life was a “comprehensive sociology,” an approach to social phenomena as a whole, which is supposed to be a synthesis of interaction between every single area and all others in a society. Its core idea is the *Soziologisierung* (sociologizing) of all social sciences. What he actually accomplished was the interaction of two sociologies, economic sociology and the sociology of science. Economic sociology is an analysis of the economy institutionally embedded in a society, and the sociology of economic knowledge concerns economic views (or the *Zeitgeist*) as social phenomena. Schumpeter’s two structure approach was intended to replace Marx’s social theory based on the economic interpretation of history concerning the relationship between the substructure and the superstructure of a society.

Schumpeter defined economic sociology as “a sort of generalized or typified or stylized economic history.” Economic sociology is the concept of an institution that can generalize, typify, or stylize the complexities of economic history. In his view, the concept of institution is intended to achieve the synthesis of theory and history in that, while it is a means of generalizing

historical events, it is limited due to its historical relativity and specificity. This is a compromise between the generality meant by theory and the individuality meant by history. He identified economic sociology as the fourth basic technique of economic analysis besides theory, statistics, and history.

His first book (Schumpeter 1908) covered the branches of economic statistics and the philosophy of science. While the book was a recapitulation of neoclassical economics on the line of the general equilibrium theory of Walras, it was essentially a methodological work that aimed to make a contribution to the solution of the *Methodenstreit* (debate on method) between theory and history in economics, or between Carl Menger and Gustav von Schmoller. Schumpeter ingeniously adapted the philosophy of science of Ernst Mach to economics and developed the methodology of instrumentalism.

Among his various accomplishments, his theory of economic development (Schumpeter 1926 [1912]) is best known. He defined economic development by reference to innovation (the cause of development), entrepreneurs (the carriers of development), and bank credit (the means of development). His concept of entrepreneur was a special case of the leader as the carrier of innovation in a wider area of social life. He also established an enduring reputation in his work on the history of economics (Schumpeter 1954). For him, the development of economy and society, on the one hand, and the development of thought and science, on the other, are two aspects of the same evolutionary process. Thus, economic dynamics and the history of science are the essential coordinates in the two structure approach to mind and society.

The general idea of Schumpeter’s economic sociology was first described in chapter 7 of the first edition of the development book. Although this chapter was eliminated in the second and subsequent editions, he kept the idea. Specifically, he developed a theory of social classes (Schumpeter 1927) that would serve as the crucial link between the concept of leadership in various areas of social life on the one hand, and the overall concept of civilization or the *Zeitgeist* on the other. In other words, social classes mediate the relationship between the economic and the non economic areas, between

the mind and society, or between economic sociology and the sociology of science. This idea, combined with the sociological investigation of the collapse of the tax state (Schumpeter 1918), was finally developed to *Capitalism, Socialism, and Democracy* (1942), in which he presented his famous thesis on the demise of capitalism as the result of its success. For Schumpeter, this does not mean pessimism from the perspective of a society as a whole because a locus of innovation and social leadership would shift from economic pursuits to other areas.

The relevance of Schumpeter's idea of economic sociology is its impact on the growth of institutional economics and evolutionary economics after World War II with a focus on innovation in technology, industry, and institution.

SEE ALSO: Capitalism; Economic Development; Leadership; Technological Innovation

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Schütz, Alfred (1899–1959)

John R. Hall

Alfred Schütz was best known for his work on the sociological approach known as *phenomenology*. His first book provided a critique of Max Weber's interpretive sociology of meaningful action. He subsequently wrote a series of phenomenologically inspired essays as well as a second book, *Structures of the Lifeworld*, with Thomas Luckmann. Over the years of his life and beyond, Schütz influenced diverse sociologists. Social phenomenology remains an important stream of sociology and Schütz's insights and the analysis that he advanced have percolated through wider currents. The discipline as a whole has become more "phenomenological" as a result, most notably through the social constructionist approach and emphases on the concepts of lived action and embodiment.

Born in Vienna as the only child of well to do Austrian Jewish parents, Schütz completed his gymnasium education there in 1917, and immediately served for a year and a half in the Austro Hungarian Imperial Army on the Italian front. He returned to Vienna in 1918, where he pursued studies in law, the social sciences, and economics at the University of Vienna. He received a doctorate in law in 1921, and participated, both as a student and after, in intellectual circles that included economist Ludwig von Mises and Frederick von Hayek. He married Ilse Heim in 1926. In 1927 Schütz was appointed executive officer for Reitler, the Vienna based international banking firm. In the years to come, he would continue to support his family and intellectual pursuits with one or another high level "day job" in banking.

Schütz's initial intellectual interests in Vienna included economic theories of marginal utility, musicology (he played piano), language, and jokes. His core analytic pursuits emerged from his effort to criticize and ground the interpretive sociology of Weber, whom Schütz had heard lecture in Vienna in 1918. In the mid 1920s this ambition led him to Henri Bergson's writings. By the latter 1920s Schütz concluded that Bergson's *Time and Free Will* would not prove

an adequate point of departure for the philosophical theorization of social meaning, and he turned to the work of Edmund Husserl, whose analysis of the temporal flow of events as experienced in the mind itself became the basis of Schütz's critique of Weber. After this analysis was published in 1932 (later translated into English as *The Phenomenology of the Social World*), Schütz developed a close personal intellectual relationship with Husserl, visiting him occasionally in Freiburg up until Husserl's death in 1938.

In the shadow of Hitler's rise in Germany, other Jewish intellectuals emigrated from Austria beginning in the 1930s. Schütz himself was in Paris on business when the Nazi annexation of Austria took place on March 13, 1938. He worked to arrange the migration of his wife and children, and helped other Austrian intellectuals escape. On July 13, 1939, with war widely anticipated in France, Schütz and his family emigrated to New York. In the United States he aided other immigrants and worked with the US Bureau of Economic Warfare by providing economic analyses of Germany and Austria. He continued working with the Reitler firm in New York but, like a number of other European expatriates, began teaching on the Graduate Faculty of the New School for Social Research, where he became a full time professor in 1956. His health began to decline within only a few years, and he died on May 29, 1959 with his second major book still only in outline and draft form. Three volumes of his *Collected Papers* on philosophical, epistemological, and sociological topics were published posthumously, as was *Structures of the Lifeworld* (1973), completed by Thomas Luckmann on the basis of Schütz's schema.

In the political upheavals of his times, Schütz played his role as a citizen, even a world citizen. He was resolutely apolitical in his own work, however, and his phenomenological sociology contains no significant consideration of power and authority. Yet social phenomenology clearly has utility for political analysis, as fruitful extensions of Schütz's analysis of the "well informed citizen" have demonstrated. In the long term, Schütz's greatest legacy may be his critical analyses of modernity and its mediations of consciousness.

Schütz's central contributions to sociology are based on his development of a phenomenology of the social world. He came to this project through his engagement with Max Weber's methodology of *Verstehen*: analytically rigorous interpretive understanding of meaningful action. Schütz agreed with Weber that the human sciences both could and should employ *verstehende* analysis, since meaning is an intrinsic basis of action, and action is a core element constitutive of social phenomena. Weber used ideal types to describe meanings (e.g., inner worldly asceticism), social actions (e.g., rational action), and culturally inscribed patterns of social interaction (e.g., patrimonialism). Thus he could theoretically link action with broader social patterns and history – something that eluded numerous other theorists who either ignored meaning and action altogether, or analytically distinguished structure from action in ways that make meaning inaccessible.

Schütz praised Weber's achievements, but criticized his discussion of subjective meaning. For Schütz, Weber treated the problem of meaning from an *observer's* point of view without considering how meaning is constituted *subjectively*. Such a project would require an analysis of unfolding mental events of a social actor as a person – an Ego consciousness. Initially, Schütz sought such an account in Henri Bergson's idea of duration as the flow of conscious experience. But Edmund Husserl had a more richly developed account of consciousness and temporality. His "transcendental phenomenological reduction" sets aside ("brackets") the *contents* of cognition (e.g., an idea, visual image, or words) to examine the *acts* of consciousness by which contents are mediated in the flow of inner time. Drawing on transcendental phenomenology, Schütz characterized subjective meaning by connecting it to the flow of mental experience in (1) the vivid present, (2) its sedimentation in memory (and recollection), and (3) its anticipation of the future. Meaning thereby becomes located in specific acts of consciousness – pleasure, pain, nostalgia, remorse, anticipatory excitement or anxiety, and so forth. Out of an array of such possibilities, Schütz emphasized meaning associated with the "in order to motive" that imaginatively anticipates the future completion of a project, and the "because

motive” that an actor might deploy retrospectively to account for a given set of events. He demonstrated that the meanings a person gives to actions shift according to the actor’s temporal relation to them; that is, meanings of actions are not always “the same,” even for the actor herself. Weber’s typologies of meaning and action represent observers’ interpretations, whereas (various) subjective meanings themselves are situated within streams of unfolding individual consciousness.

Despite the power of transcendental phenomenology as the basis for understanding meaning, Schütz recognized its limitations as a basis for a phenomenology of the social world. Specifically, intersubjectivity – the social relation between an Ego and others in the vivid present – cannot be accounted for within the transcendental reduction, because the reduction deliberately brackets the content of any perceptions. The internal time consciousness that structures formations of meanings is a basic feature of the individual acting in the lifeworld, but the lifeworld – specific subjective meanings, other people, and cultural meanings – is only perceptible within a mundane “natural attitude” in which the individual does not doubt the “world given to me as being there,” and interprets the world on the basis of built up social and cultural frameworks of meaning (Schütz 1967: 43).

Building from his critique of Weber, Schütz (esp. 1962–6, 1970; Schütz & Luckmann 1972) concentrated on developing a mundane or lifeworldly phenomenology of the social world that would describe its transhistorical and transcultural structures. The result is a formal description of Ego consciousness, time, accents on reality, Others, intersubjectivity, meaning, horizons of life and death, and operations of meaningful action. These are described in terms of events of consciousness in relation to thematic issues that come to the fore, and motivational and interpretive structures of “relevance” that frame constructions of meaning.

Like Husserl, Schütz faced a basic difficulty: a transcendental phenomenological description must itself depend on socially based features of the lifeworld (e.g., language) available only within the natural attitude. Schütz came to terms with this dilemma by keying his phenomenology of the natural attitude to existential conditions of embodiment and historicity.

Critics of Schütz wonder whether his ego based phenomenology has any adequate basis for moving from consciousness to society, especially as a phenomenon *sui generis*. However, intersubjectivity is central to his analysis, and his phenomenology describes the epistemological status not only of Schütz’s own analyses but of actors’ typifications and knowledge more widely. It thus accounts for the situated character of meaning construction both for people in general and for observers with particular analytic interests (e.g., in social and other sciences, history, and other “finite provinces of meaning”) (Hall 1999: 16–19). In turn, Schütz’s more descriptive phenomenological essays on the character of particular types of actors and forms of interaction (e.g., the man on the street, the stranger, making music) are important in their own right. They also serve as exemplars of applied phenomenology (Hall 1977), and participant observation research demonstrates that Schütz’s critique of Weber can be extended to specify relationships between Weberian typifications of social structure and alternative constitutions of the lifeworld described in Schützian terms (Hall 1978).

Like certain other twentieth century social theorists (e.g., Vilfredo Pareto), Schütz has been underutilized relative to the power of his ideas. Nevertheless, his influence has been substantial, and the broad currents of sociology have moved in his direction. The major direct influences are telling. Schütz sought to engage the pragmatist interactionists. Talcott Parsons and Schütz engaged in a lively interaction, and Parsons’s student, Harold Garfinkel, drew on core Schützian ideas in his *Studies in Ethnomethodology*, which examines the actor’s situated methods of knowledge construction. John O’Neill (*Making Sense Together*, 1974) and Kurt Wolff (*Surrender and Catch*, 1976) also have built on everyday epistemology themes in Schütz’s work. Peter Berger and Thomas Luckmann centrally invoked Schütz in their pathbreaking book, *The Social Construction of Reality*. Pierre Bourdieu used a phenomenologically centered analysis of situated meanings in *Outline of a Theory of Practice* (1977) to challenge atemporal and ahistorical features of structuralism in its semiotic and social anthropological dispensations. And critical theorist Jürgen Habermas’s 1987 *Theory of Communicative Action, Volume 2* employed

Schütz's key concept of the lifeworld in describing the modern tendencies of rationalized systems to colonize and subordinate everyday social life by defining, circumscribing, and organizing its meaningful options.

More generally, after structural functionalism and systems theory reached their points of maximum influence in the 1960s, sociology has moved in a Schützian direction. Neither logical positivism nor a presuppositionless transcendental phenomenology holds up philosophically any more, and postfoundational social epistemologies, including the feminist epistemology of Dorothy Smith, as well as social studies of science, confront precisely the existential conditions of embodiment and knowledge that Schütz described. Although quantitative sociologists have rarely sought to accommodate social phenomenology in their research, a wide range of sociological theories – including those of a structuralist bent – now incorporate formulations about the social construction of reality. Explanatory and interpretive empirical work – both in historical sociology and using qualitative methods – also has become highly sensitive to the issue of multiple social realities and the play of situated meanings. Most generally, sociologists now typically want to specify mechanisms of social processes on the ground, rather than simply delineating abstract factors and their causal relationships to one another. All these developments are foreshadowed by the phenomenological sociology of Alfred Schütz. However, they do not yet consolidate a fully developed phenomenological analysis of society. Thus, Schütz's work remains an important resource in sociology, the full potential of which remains unrealized.

SEE ALSO: Everyday Life; Lifeworld; Phenomenology; Pragmatism; Symbolic Interaction; Weber, Max

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science

Ian Varcoe

Sociological frameworks used in the study of science move between two epistemological extremes. First, it is held that nature is recorded by science provided that the latter is in a fit state as a social institution to do so. Second, it is held that science is a social construction and in this sense in principle no different than any other part of culture.

If one is convinced of the first proposition, one's interest will be directed towards: the "goal" of science; the institutional norms that regulate the activity of the community of scientists; competition; the reward structure of science operating through "recognition" (citation practices, Nobel prizes, peer review); and similar topics. If one is convinced of the second proposition, one will be interested not so much in the institution and community of science, but rather in scientific knowledge and the question of how scientists reach a point where it can be said to have been "made." One will be interested in the "negotiation" through which a stable order of scientific objects is arrived at. In this "negotiation" there is included writing practices and the empirical study of "talk" (or discourse).

The great American sociologist Robert K. Merton was certain that science had social underpinnings. It was not the product of timeless individual curiosity. In its modern form – as understood by historians of science – it had its roots in seventeenth century European society. Twentieth century experience showed that it could be affected by political ideology (the Nazis’ “Aryan physics,” the Bolsheviks’ “bourgeois” versus “proletarian” science). In the West, however, science seemed to retain its “autonomy.” While located within capitalist society it was insulated from it, to a certain extent, by a set of distinctive norms the upholding of which cemented the community of scientists, and functioned to allow the pursuit of reliable (or certified) knowledge to go on. Priority disputes demonstrated how important recognition was to scientists as their only reward. Scientists are expected to share their findings, to subject the claims of others to rigorous critical tests, to be disinterested, and to judge claims not by persons but by universal criteria. Merton’s norms suffered from two basic criticisms: (1) empirically, the evidence for them actually working was thin; and (2) the suggestion was made that this was the “public face” of science, ritually evoked for public consumption and infinitely flexible as a rhetorical resource. Evidence showed that scientists were not open minded universalists. They condemned unconventional “science” without testing it and hung on to cherished ideas in the face of apparently disconfirming evidence. To his enduring credit Merton was concerned with the distinctiveness of science. He founded the sociology of science and initiated a program of research carried out mainly by American followers.

A second research tradition grew up in opposition to the Mertonian, known generically as the sociology of scientific knowledge. This movement was catalyzed by Thomas Kuhn’s *The Structure of Scientific Revolutions* (1962), which challenged the philosopher’s picture of science as demarcated by a method and put in its place a historical one in which scientists placed their faith in a paradigm and proceeded to solve fairly routine “puzzles” within it until such times as crisis set in and a “revolution” ensued consisting of a mass change of allegiances. Following this encouragement to create a realistic – in Kuhn’s case, a historical – rather

than a philosophical account of “science,” sociologists in Britain (based in Edinburgh University and other centers) issued manifestos declaring their intention to carry through Mannheim’s sociology of knowledge to its logical conclusion, not exempting scientific beliefs from its injunction to study the social bases of all beliefs (Mannheim, however, had equivocated over science and mathematics). The aim should be to open what Merton and his followers had left as a “black box”: why it was argued should sociological analysis halt at the threshold of scientists’ beliefs as if these could not be socially influenced (because *the* scientific method applied to Nature was assumed to be fully responsible for them). The sociology of scientific knowledge was avowedly relativist in its approach to scientific knowledge. Two broad schools are identifiable.

The first to appear was the “interests” approach. Owing to “interpretive flexibility,” replication is not a sure, decisive way to close down uncertainty about the “results” of experiments; and the closure which stabilizes “knowledge” is brought about by a range of social factors rather than something in the data: the struggle is to define the data (or the “phenomenon”). Numerous interview based case studies “showed” this.

To critics of this approach the idea that social interests cause interpretive behavior represents a failure to carry the “interpretive” perspective through to its full logical conclusion, namely that there is *only* interpretation in scientific life and social life generally. Causal analysis has no place anywhere. This point of view, inspired by the ethnomethodology of Harold Garfinkel, was backed up by the offering of an alternative: the ethnographic study of the laboratory through usually prolonged participant observation to see how science is “made” from the messy materials to be found therein. A second alternative was the analysis of scientists’ discourse to see the devices by which they sustain their sense of a reality “out there” and their own access to it, against their competitors. Both approaches call for a thoroughgoing reflexivity – more thoroughgoing than the interests approach, despite advocating it, practiced in reality. On this view, sociological analyses must be recognized as interpretations; they cannot be anything else.

These approaches came in the wake of the “strong program” in the sociology of science. It desired an approach that was symmetrical (as between “true” and “false” belief), causal, reflexive, and impartial. Arguably, interest type studies fail in full reflexivity (by claiming to be authoritative) and are not based on the empirical testing of deductive theory, but rather on the *post hoc* interpretation of the interview data. Interview material is used to construct a “story” of what was “really going on” in disputes (i.e., such material is taken at face value as a faithful account rather than rhetoric and some of it is favored over the rest by the sociologist as being closer than other parts to “what really happened”). Ethnographic study has also been criticized for failing to meet its own requirements: (1) by drawing on theory and thus not truly letting the discourse “speak” as far as possible without interpretation; (2) by having no way of recognizing the basis of differential authority in science, the *effect* of which the approach brings out; and (3) through acknowledging the role of rhetoric, allowing implicitly causal forces while denying them programmatically. It was noted that “forces outside of the laboratory” were drawn on to provide tacit explanations and that full blown discourse reductionism is as debilitating a dogma as the denial of language and social construction of reality, for here reality is collapsed into language.

To the discourse analyst the “interests” researcher can be seen applying empiricist *rhetoric* in claiming to provide a causal account of beliefs. Both approaches run into difficulties in that neither can in practice do entirely without reference to wider social realities beyond the research setting itself. The interests approach cannot examine these to a sufficiently high empirical standard (i.e., the rigorously high empirical standard it has set itself through the use of interviews and other forms of direct observation) and the ethnographic and discourse approaches find reference to these wider factors beyond the research setting simply unavoidable, although here again they cannot in practice be treated as the approach requires (i.e., as discourse). It might appear that both approaches, in being methodologically purist programmatically, are mirror reflections of the dogmatism about science that they reject, namely that it straightforwardly records nature. Strong

antidotes to naturalism were needed at the start of sociological research, but these commitments – while directing the focus of research – failed to permit the handling in full of the complexity of the phenomenon of science as a social enterprise.

In the twentieth century, particularly following 1945, “scientific research and development” became increasingly organized on a large scale. It attracted financial support from the state and consumed a significant proportion of GDP in the developed societies of the world. The pre war debate over whether science should be planned was settled willy nilly in terms of some form of planning following the Physicists’ War, which showed the indispensability of scientific investment to state power. Research and development became an institutional complex formed of the universities, industrial laboratories, and government research establishments. With state funding attention came to focus on a policy for science and technology. The institutions of organized science and science policy became an object of study and the latter began to be assessed by rational criteria. Recently, a theme in this assessment has been “science and the public,” the public understanding of science as a goal and a reality, and a “science for the people” with the regulation of science and technology came to the fore. Merton’s liberal view of science’s autonomy in democratic societies was not shared by J. D. Bernal, who between the two world wars argued that the benefits that science could bestow on humankind were not being realized. The direction of scientific research and the application of its results were being dictated by capitalism. A question raised by Bernal was whether a people’s science would be a different science from the one existing under capitalism. Analysts of the “social function of science” have divided on this issue, with some like Bernal (who later drew back from it) adopting a relativist position. The philosopher Herbert Marcuse took this position. Freed from existing relations of domination, human society would generate a new kind of science, different from the existing one, geared to emancipation. The alternative view to this one is that scientific knowledge is effectively neutral knowledge of nature, but the direction research takes and the uses fostered of results are influenced by the social, political, and economic relations of

capitalism. Profit and military needs dictate the use to which a basically neutral science is put. This view tends to share with Merton the belief that nature speaks through science (or to use a phrase of Norbert Elias's, that it is relatively more "object adequate" than say religion and magic; or as Ernst Gellner put it, science "works" in producing a powerful technology even though we cannot root it in a secure epistemology, ungrounded in society and history). It is critical of the sociology of scientific knowledge for its failure to connect its detailed case and ethnographic studies to the larger social structures in which science and technology have come to be embedded, and for its provisional relativist standpoint. The "interests" approach has so far mainly promised to establish connections between science and the wider society, while discourse analysts are engaged in a campaign to revolutionize sociology, making it an interpretive and reflexive discipline, so that it is difficult to see the categorical ground for any rapprochement. These, however, would find Marxist models, either of the use/abuse or "science as ideology" kind, empirically unsound, the tradition lacking a record of the scrupulous empirical inquiry needed to "read" science successfully in the locales where research is actually done. Micro versus macro and external versus internal analyses are divides that still tend to dog the social study of science.

Everyone in this field is agreed that science is a product in some form of social processes. "Science," however, is a contested terrain, academically and socially. Disciplinary boundaries are insecure and contestation takes place to define them. Social study of science today is an interdisciplinary area involving historians, philosophers, sociologists, and others, who often have indistinct, hybrid professional identities.

Science has become an arena of social contestation too, as the risk society thesis, postmodernism, and the sociology of expert knowledge have recently tended to confirm. Increasingly, experts confront other experts in the public domain where high consequence risks are debated before an often apprehensive and sometimes skeptical public. The authority of science appears to be in crisis, while its involvement in the reproduction of everyday life appears to grow. Everyday life appears increasingly hazardous, at least to those in the developed world

who face man made risks in which science and technology are implicated as cause and proffered aids to solutions. The social constructivist approach in the sociology of science is playing and has played a role in the study of "risk" (e.g., environmental and latterly social issues arising from the new genetics, to which Marx inspired sociology has also contributed).

Social movements such as the animal rights, environmental, and anti capitalist ones are preoccupied with "science issues," as formerly were the peace and socialist movements mainly from the 1960s onwards. Feminism, seen as scholarship, moreover, has been intensely preoccupied recently with the study of science. Its divisions can usefully be drawn parallel – but only partly so – to those familiar in the social studies of science. Broadly, a liberal feminism is concerned with and about the under representation of women in science and their position within a male dominated profession. A second strand is devoted to examining representations of women in science, historically and in contemporary terms, with particular attention having been given recently to *in vitro* fertilization and embryo research (the so called new reproductive technologies). A third approach mirroring in certain respects the sociology of scientific knowledge is epistemologically oriented. However, unlike the latter, it does make connections to the structural fact of gender relations and discrimination in the wider society, and it is not reflexive (applying its relativism consistently to itself). In this respect it resembles the idea of an emancipatory science yet to be born, found in places in the Marxian tradition.

This "standpoint feminism" raises the question of whether the science made by men is androcentric and oriented to domination of nature. It suggests that a feminine science would be likely to engage feeling, empathy, and listening as distinct from "cold," rational, detached observation. Such a science, it is suggested, subsumes its predecessor, completing knowledge in a higher synthesis. Against this view it is protested (1) that it may in fact be in the process of attempting to replace one gender biased approach with another; and (2) related to this, that, inconsistently, it applies its relativism to "male science" but not to itself. The negotiation which is such a central part of the findings of sociology of scientific knowledge studies does

not seem apparent in this approach. It may, it is suggested, be reifying the masculine and the feminine. There are other feminist approaches, however. These seek to avoid these alleged pit falls (e.g., postmodern feminism). There are also less uncompromising, more meliorist assessments of what currently constructed science might have to offer women that is of benefit to them.

The arena in which science is practiced, studied, and fought over today is not likely to change from its current divided, complex character in the immediate future. The certainties of the Enlightenment have indeed collapsed. The faultlines that divide research traditions continue to define those traditions as some what separate. Parallel positions can be found between them, dividing them internally but establishing wider sympathies (e.g., between anti relativist philosophers, Mertonians, and liberal feminists; between Marxists and stand point feminists; and between postmodern feminists, ethnographers, discourse analysts, and postmodernists). Wider political commitments, which are themselves the distillation of political traditions, continue to affect attitudes towards science and the “social world.” The question of the relation between them, and how it should be conceptualized, is still unresolved. As the boundary between research institute, university department, industrial laboratory, and defense establishment and the surrounding network of social relations – often extending globally – becomes ever more permeable, sociologists of science are forced to adopt ever more inventive methodologies. These transcend the entrenched positions of the past, pointing to a new flexibility, the beginnings of which are visible.

SEE ALSO: Epistemology; Feminism and Science, Feminist Epistemology; Science, Commercialization of; Science across Cultures; Science, Proof, and Law; Science, Social Construction of; Scientific Knowledge, Sociology of; Scientific Norms/Counter norms; Scientific Productivity

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science, commercialization of

Daniel Lee Kleinman

Neither science based industry nor university involvement in commercially relevant science is a new phenomenon. In certain sectors, US firms employed scientists in the late nineteenth century, and examples of university–industry collaboration in the United States can be found in the early twentieth century. That said, the advent of the biotechnology industry in the late 1970s and 1980s prompted sustained policy and scholarly attention to the place of science in the economy.

The standard recent history of the commodification of science highlights several pieces of US legislation that analysts suggest altered the

landscape in which science is undertaken. Most prominent among these is the Bayh Dole Act of 1980. A central aim of this law was to encourage university–industry collaboration by permitting universities and small businesses to retain title to inventions produced with federal funding. Indeed, at the center of virtually all discussions of the commodification of science is the blurring boundary between academia and industry and the possibilities for transforming scientific research into marketable products.

Scholarly discussion of the commercialization of academic science can be divided into two waves. Early work focused on the threat to traditional academic norms of autonomy and openness posed by industry support for academic research and the array of university–industry relationships that flourished with the development of the biotechnology industry. Much of the early research was anecdotal and highlighted egregious cases of conflict of interest and industry pressure to keep academic research findings secret. During this period and subsequently, researchers have undertaken surveys in an effort to capture the extent to which traditional academic norms have been eroded by industry involvement in the university. This research has found academic scientists torn by conflicting pressures, but also shows that many factors besides connections to industry prompt scientists to restrict the flow of information (Blumenthal et al. 1986; Campbell et al. 2002).

If early research on the place of the academy in the knowledge economy focused on erosion of norms, the second wave has been more interested in understanding the social organization of the knowledge economy and the place of the university in it. Some such work explores networks of interdependence between industry and academic science (Powell 1998). Other scholarship suggests the emergence of a new mode of knowledge production in academia and industry that tends to be collaborative, non hierarchical, interdisciplinary, and organized through work teams and networks (Gibbons et al. 1994). Still other work sees a movement toward what the proponents call “academic capitalism” in which those university fields, departments, and faculty members who are closer to the market have greater access to resources and status than those further from the market (Slaughter & Leslie 1997). Finally, theorists of “asymmetrical con-

vergence” (Kleinman & Vallas 2001) contend that a process is underway in which the norms and practices characteristic of industry are increasingly, if unevenly, found in academia, while academic norms are in increasing and surprising ways found in science based industry.

SEE ALSO: Economy, Networks and; Economy (Sociological Approach); Fordism/Post Fordism; Knowledge; Knowledge Societies; Political Economy of Science; Science; Science and Public Participation: The Democratization of Science

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science and culture

Daniel Breslau

Philosophers of the European Enlightenment defined science in opposition to culture or humanistic knowledge. Science was truth based

on verifiable observation and certain logical procedures, and thus stood opposed to all traditional beliefs. Francis Bacon, who initiated the philosophical tradition of elaborating “demarcation principles” to distinguish science from non science, differentiated science from all knowledge that is based on tradition and all humanistic knowledge, thus defining it in opposition to most of what we think of as pertaining to culture (Bacon 2001). Science was distinct from culture due to both its method, which followed transhistoric, universal rules, and its results.

The Enlightenment distinction between science and culture has been thoroughly eroded since the late twentieth century. It is one of the major transformations in western intellectual life that science and scientific knowledge are now legitimate objects of study for the human sciences.

While classical sociological writers provide some of the tools for the analysis of scientific knowledge, they observed the Enlightenment science/culture distinction, and only subjected the latter to sociological analysis. When supposedly scientific knowledge was subjected to a critical sociological gaze, as in the young Karl Marx’s critique of political economy, the term *ideology* allowed him to distinguish the object of his criticism from science. Durkheim and Mauss argued that systems for classifying the natural world originate in social classifications, but maintained that scientific knowledge, through the use of pure logic, had become independent of its socially based origins.

Twentieth century sociology of science refrained from sociological analysis of the content of scientific thought, taking as its task the description of the social conditions under which knowledge is liberated from social determinants. Joseph Ben David’s historical sociology of the role of the scientist examined the historical emergence and institutionalization of the scientist’s role, which Ben David assumed to be a necessary condition for supporting and motivating inquiry that would be interested solely in truth as such. After careful consideration of the possibility of social influences on the content of scientific knowledge, Ben David concluded that such influences were marginal at best, and that therefore “the possibilities for either an interactional or institutional sociology of the conceptual and theoretical contents of

science are extremely limited” (Ben David 1971).

Robert Merton’s functionalist analysis of science approached the same issues in a synchronic manner. Merton was interested in describing the particular features of the social subsystem of science that allowed for the continuous production of validated knowledge. Scientists internalize an ethos that enables them, or constrains them at pain of social sanction, to detach their scientific judgments from any personalistic social considerations (Merton 1973). Both Merton and Ben David were therefore describing the social determinants of the freedom of science from social determination.

While the functionalist sociology of science is neglected today, it should be credited with transposing the question of the basis of scientific efficacy from the rules of method to the social conditions under which it is practiced. It retained much of the traditional demarcation of science from culture, but restated the demarcation criteria in social, rather than moral, psychological, or methodological terms.

In the mid twentieth century a number of philosophical developments challenged the absolute divide between science and culture, suggesting that scientific knowledge is inseparable from a broader culture, which is specific to a social group and historical period. Wittgenstein’s arguments about the insufficiency of formal rules and the impossibility of drawing a necessary course of action from them without reference to a specific “form of life” demonstrated that the formalism of mathematics and logic do not free science from its broader cultural horizons. Quine, like Wittgenstein treating science as composed of linguistic elements, insisted on the dependence of observation on theoretical assumptions, and of hypotheses on a fabric of often unstated, often conventional, assumptions. Others, such as Michael Polanyi and Thomas Kuhn, attacked the assumption that scientific knowledge is independent of a specific historical, and cultural, context. Polanyi emphasized personal judgment based on connoisseurship and tacit knowledge, while Kuhn emphasized the dependence of scientific work on shared traditions of scientific communities. Both argued that these cultural dimensions were not obstacles to scientific knowledge, but were indeed among its necessary conditions.

Licensed by the new philosophical understanding, a number of sociologists of science located at the University of Edinburgh in the late 1970s initiated a program of theoretical statements and case studies that aimed to extend the sociology of knowledge to science. David Bloor's *Knowledge and Social Imagery* (1991) is the best known of these works. It is ironic that Bloor's work has been classified among so called postmodernist studies of science, since Bloor could not have been more explicit in his modernism, calling for a causal science of science. Bloor argued that the sociology of science harbored a contradiction, and a betrayal of a thoroughgoing social scientific treatment of science. Only false or rejected knowledge was assumed to have social causes and a sociological explanation, while validated knowledge was assumed to be caused only by the objects to which it refers. By subjecting only discarded knowledge, or error, to sociological analysis, and assuming that validated knowledge did not have social causes, the sociology of science was inconsistent, and engaged in explanations by final causes. Arguing that both rejected and validated knowledge should be explained in terms of the same kinds of causal antecedents, Bloor proposed a "strong program" for the sociology of science, also known as the sociology of scientific knowledge (SSK).

While the Edinburgh School did not elaborate a detailed sociological theory of scientific knowledge, the works of its adherents share what might be called a neo Mannheimian or conflict sociology of knowledge. Following Mannheim's "perspectival" method, the Edinburgh studies of scientific controversies relate opposed positions on scientific questions to opposed positions in a social structure, with opposed interests. For instance, Shapin's (1979) study of the phrenology controversy in early nineteenth century Edinburgh based its explanation on the opposed interests of the middle class proponents of phrenology and its opponents among the traditional academic elites. Opposed views on the structure of the brain and the interpretation of variation in human skulls were related to opposed interests in cultural authority.

While members of the Edinburgh School and SSK built their sociology of scientific knowledge around the classical tradition of the sociology of knowledge, with sources in Durkheim,

Marx, and Mannheim, others approached the question of science as the phenomenological question of the genesis of facts as such. While the SSK approach sought social explanations for given beliefs, these studies made the very existence of knowledge a problem for explanation. Also phenomenological in their methodology, researchers in what came to be called the laboratory studies approach sought to observe first hand the work involved in stabilizing scientific facts. Studies by Lynch (1979), Latour and Woolgar (1979), and Knorr Cetina (1981) treated facts, and indeed the existence of a taken for granted external reality, as tied to the instruments, procedures, and social arrangements of scientific work.

The most influential approach to emerge from this phenomenological tradition is that associated with Bruno Latour, Michel Callon, and John Law, and known as actor network theory. It begins with the principle of generalized symmetry articulated by Callon, by which one should not make an a priori metaphysical divide between humans and all other entities, attributing agency only to the former. There is no prior basis to presume that the social world is real while the natural world is constructed, any more than the opposite. To attempt to explain scientific knowledge in terms of social factors is to commit prematurely to a social realism. What is real and what is relative should be an outcome of the processes we examine. Actor network theory therefore allows for a proliferation of agents, which are all both constructed and constructing.

The objects of science, and indeed the world, are constructed through the linking of heterogeneous agencies in a network. All entities are located on a continuum from nebulous, poorly defined, controversial facts or artifacts to "black boxes," facts or artifacts that can be put to use without reference to the circumstances of their production. The difference between an incontrovertible fact and an uncertain claim is a function of the difference in the scope and strength of the network connections.

Actor network theory was presented as a comprehensive challenge to social science. It contained a principled rejection of the social explanation of scientific knowledge and of any explanatory priority of the social. The actor network theorists argued that there is no ground for an a priori distinction between the social and

the natural, and the presumption that the social can be used to explain the natural (as described by science). A sociological reduction of science would impose the product of the researcher's own network on an object in which the social is itself an outcome. It rejects an a priori distinction between science and culture, but not by collapsing science into culture. Rather, culture and science both refer to the mutual construction of the world through the elaboration of networks.

North American interactionist traditions have yielded yet another variant of sociological study of the content of science. With some sources in the "social worlds" research of symbolic interactionists such as Howard Becker and Anselm Strauss, scientific knowledge is here regarded as part of the local world that scientists construct. Sociologists such as Adele Clarke and Joan Fujimura applied this perspective, as it had been applied to work in cultural, industrial, and professional organizations, to the work of scientists. The work of scientists is then viewed as a process of negotiating a social order and its boundaries.

Philosophical challenges to the universality of scientific knowledge also resonated with feminist studies. While women's marginalization in scientific fields had been a topic of historical and sociological study, feminist research now argued that a historically specific form of gender domination was in fact built into scientific knowledge, and into the official definition of scientific method. Evelyn Fox Keller (1985) examined the history of the British Royal Society, and argued that the scientific method pioneered by Francis Bacon and his followers was based on a definition of masculinity. Male attributes of rationality, objectivity, and affective detachment were elaborated into the qualities of a scientist, with the use of an explicitly gendered metaphor. The relationship of the scientist to nature was described in terms of the male conquest of female sexuality. With this thesis of the gendered origins of scientific method, was the argument that a method based on detachment was in fact unnecessary, and was used to suppress equally valid ways of knowing, based on aptitudes more likely to be rooted in women's experience. The field of feminist epistemology has elaborated ways of knowing that are rooted in the experience and "standpoint" of women.

While there are now many approaches that treat science and scientific knowledge as cultural

endeavors, linked to the historically specific culture in which it is produced, these approaches as a whole have been the subject of continuing controversy. In a series of debates known as the science wars, some have objected to efforts to understand the content of science in terms of the culture and social structure of the society in which it is produced. Challenges to the independence of scientific truths from social and cultural conditioning have been regarded as challenges to science as such, and as relativistic (Gross & Levitt 1994).

SEE ALSO: Actor Network Theory; Feminism and Science, Feminist Epistemology; Knowledge, Sociology of; Mannheim, Karl; Science, Commercialization of; Science across Cultures; Science and Public Participation: The Democratization of Science; Scientific Knowledge, Sociology of; Scientific Revolution; Social Worlds; Technology, Science, and Culture

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science across cultures

Amanda Rees

Science is often thought of as a western invention, a way of thinking about the world that originated in Europe during the “Scientific Revolution,” and which proved to be such an effective means of manipulating nature that its techniques and practices were readily adopted by the rest of the world, once other societies had had the chance to consider science in action. However, this version of events depends on the assumption that science and technology are objective, culturally neutral, ahistorical, apolitical, and asocial elements in society. The reality, however, is rather more complicated. Rather than being a neutral aspect of relationships between different cultures, science has had an active role to play in intercultural engagement, both historically and at the present day. Rather than being the sole product of European ingenuity, science emerged out of the relationships that existed between Europe and the rest of the world; instead of simply being communicated to other societies as a more effective tool set for controlling the natural world, science was a key element in the processes whereby Europeans were able to dominate and to control other societies, both historically and at the present day.

There were at least two crucial historical contributions made by other societies to the European Scientific Revolution. The first was that made by Islamic scholars and natural philosophers. When the Roman Empire split into two halves in the third century CE, many if not most of the books and writings of the ancient Greek philosophers were lost to the western part of the empire, and remained so until the beginning of the European Renaissance. However, they were not lost to the eastern half, where they made crucial contributions to the self consciously Islamic society that grew up there after the death of Mohammed. Islamic scholars translated Greek natural philosophy into Arabic, creating a language of science for Islam, and developing cultures of Islamic natural philosophy, medicine, and mathematics that built on and expanded the knowledge acquired from the original Greek texts. When the works of

Aristotle, Euclid, Ptolemy, and others were rediscovered by Europeans, they were written not in Greek but in Arabic. The versions of Greek philosophy that were available to the scholars of the Renaissance were those that had been created by Islamic philosophers.

The second major contribution came several hundred years later, at the beginning of the nineteenth century. Science in Europe was in the early stages of professionalization, and increasingly, expeditions of scientific discovery were being sent around the world. They brought back specimens of plant, animal, and human life, measurements of temperature, height, and pressure, maps and histories – but rarely credited the local observers and informants from whence they had obtained these specimens and data. For example, Michael Bravo’s work on the “geographical gift” is based on the observation that huge areas of the globe were being mapped by a relatively small number of observers, and shows how many such maps were in fact drawn by local people at the behest of the “explorer.” Crucially, these voyages were not just voyages of scientific discovery, but were also closely tied to empire. They were conducted by the same men – colonial officials, military officers, naval captains, missionaries, and commercial speculators – who were at the same time building empires. Expeditions were used to claim sovereignty and to assess resources, and the voyages of ships such as *The Beagle* around the world were determined as much, if not more, by geopolitical and national issues as by purely scientific questions.

Sciences such as anthropology, medicine, geology, and natural history were deeply implicated in the imperial project. To survey the land and to record the distribution of plants and animals ultimately meant to assess an area’s natural resources with regard to future exploitation. The creation of the discipline of anthropology was inseparable from empire building, since anthropologists actively sought to link their work in with that done by nascent colonial administrators – learning more about how the societies of the colonized worked would improve the ability of the colonizers to govern them. The discipline of tropical medicine was invented to deal with the illnesses white people fell prey to in hot countries, and the offering and occasionally the withholding of medical aid and equipment became a critical element in

both the practice and rhetoric of empire. As such, in the postcolonial period, disciplines such as anthropology have had to seriously reconsider their place and role in public life.

However, the postcolonial period has also seen a reconsideration of the impact that science, medicine, and technology had on the colonized cultures. The work of the subaltern studies program (the work of Ranajit Guha and others) in relation to the history of the British in India has continuously demanded the recognition of the existence of a series of fundamentally different ways of perceiving the world, and this has been taken a step further by other postcolonial writers such as Homi Bhabha and Gyan Prakash. Prakash in particular has studied the use of science in colonial India, and has shown that the role of “science” as part of the civilizing mission of the British in India was not used in precisely the way the British administrators expected. Western science was explicitly used to educate sections of the Indian population, to make them more “western” in their outlook, through the establishment of museums, the deployment of periodic exhibitions, and so on. However, when Prakash examined the responses of the audience, it was possible to demonstrate that what was appropriated by these various Indian groups was no longer quite “science,” and no longer quite “western,” but had become much more ambivalent and chimeric in nature.

Currently, there are few extensive sociological studies of what could be called “postcolonial science,” or science carried out in the developing world or by scientists from the developing world in the latter half of the twentieth century. More are desperately needed.

SEE ALSO: Decolonization; Empire; Eurocentrism; Islam; Science and Culture; Scientific Racism; Scientific Revolution; Technology, Science, and Culture

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science, ethnographic studies of

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Ethnographies of science have their origins in the interdisciplinary field of science and technology studies (STS) that emerged out of the Civil Rights Movement, feminism, and environmentalism of the 1960s. STS research illustrates that science and technology are a human achievement, composed of actors, social systems, and social processes. Or, in other words, science and technology are social constructions created in a sociocultural framework with social institutions, actors, and networks, social practices, material culture, and worldviews. STS scholars use ethnographies of science to contextualize science, to study the culture of science, to provide alternative perspectives of science, and to help science and its publics to design new research questions, programs, and policies.

The 1970s saw the entrance of laboratory studies into the STS repertoire for analyzing the “institutional circumstances of scientific work,” technical content, and the production of scientific knowledge (Knorr Cetina 1995: 140). In the laboratory, STS scholars studied “unfinished knowledge” or the process of knowledge creation. These early laboratory studies were done by Bruno Latour and Steve Woolgar (1979), Karen Knorr Cetina (1981), Michael Lynch (1985), and Michael Zenzen and Sal Restivo (1982). They represented

diverse methodological approaches from actor network theory to ethnomethodology and constructivism and showed the products of science to be cultural entities. Scientific knowledge was not simply “discovered” but was co created by the scientific practitioners and reconfigured within scientific practice. Ultimately, laboratory studies were able to explain how scientific knowledge production occurred in terms of social factors, and thus began the process of demystifying science.

The primary methodological tool of these early laboratory studies was fieldwork based participant observation, and David Hess (1997: 134) has named them the “first wave of ethnographic studies in STS.” This first generation of science ethnographers (mainly Europeans) focused primarily on the social processes that created objective, pure, neutral, descriptive science and the politics within the scientific community. Their work paved the way for the second wave of science ethnographers, who used social constructivism as a given to detail the cultural and political influences shaping knowledge and, thus, allowing the ethnographers and their work to contribute to and intervene in the dialogue of knowledge production (Hess 2001).

Sharon Traweek’s (1988) ethnographic and comparative study of a US high energy physics lab and a Japanese high energy physics lab symbolizes the shift from laboratory studies to a more complete ethnographic description of science that included actors, spaces, artifacts, descriptions of scientific practice, and the ethnographer’s reflections. More recent ethnographies of science (done primarily by American researchers) have followed in this genre while also addressing the roles of science and technology in the everyday/night world of not only scientists but also users, recipients, policy makers, activists, administrators, educators, and ethnographers. Recent STS ethnographic studies are moving beyond simply situating the ethnographer in the study and are seriously questioning how their theorizing might be applied or intervene in the process (Downey & Dumit 1997).

Medical anthropologist Rayna Rapp (1999) focused on the “geneticization of lives” through genetic counseling and technology that illustrated how the contemporary US reproductive process is embedded in language, religion,

ethnicity, class, gender, sexuality, age, and education. Her ethnography was structured not by chronology or ecology but by the technology as it moved through lived lives. She documented the ripples of genetic technology and the response and resolution of its passing. This form of ethnography highlighted the social spaces of reproductive technologies and the multiple, diverse, and varied perspectives that need to be considered within the culture of genetic science. These types of “findings” echo the roots of STS in 1960s social movements and contribute to the discussion and role of researcher and/or activist.

Another ethnographer of science, Joe Dumit (2004), focused on the virtual community of PET scans in US culture to create an “ethnography of images.” He “followed” the images from their inception in experimental design to “everyday notions of personhood.” Dumit’s work is a thick description of the images evolving in a crisscrossed space inhabited by actors from popular, forensic, activist, and neuroscience culture. It is a culture/artifact in creation, still being defined, that maps out gaps in expertise, knowledge, and consequences. Ethnographies of science are more than a description of a culture. They are an active contribution to the culture that the informants read, use, critique, and participate in. Laboratory studies and ethnographies of science have matured quickly into a dynamic tool that ethnographers are using to document culture and formulate applicable theory.

SEE ALSO: Anthropology, Cultural and Social: Early History; Civil Rights Movement; Culture; Environmental Movements; Ethnography; Ethnomethodology; Feminism; Science; Science and Culture; Science across Cultures; Technology, Science, and Culture

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science and the measurement of risk

Claire Haggett

The definition and measurement of risks is controversial and much in debate, with risk assessments made by scientists often differing from those of the lay public. Scientific measurements are based on logic and rationality. They tend to ignore or invalidate lay understandings of risk, not taking into account social, experiential, or perceptual influences. However, sociological work has highlighted that responses to risk are governed by a huge number of

interrelated factors and have to be considered as part of the social context from which they arise. Lay people also have their own knowledge and expertise to draw upon when making assessments of the immanency and impact of any risk. It is not necessarily the case, therefore, that the public is being “irrational” in its decision making, but that it uses a different rationality to that of scientists. These differences can lead to conflicts over risks, and resistance from the public to the measurements, and subsequent recommendations, imposed upon them by scientific research.

Risk assessments carried out by scientists are based on technical rationality. Risks are determined by experts, founded on evidence and logic, and described in terms of statistical probabilities. Results are depicted as objective, universal, and value free. They are designed to improve decision making, and are presented as a means for human advancement. The focus is on identifying risks and people’s responses to them in order to build prescriptive models for their avoidance. Such prescriptions often note a divergence between the public fear of a risk and the actual incidence of the danger; the controversy over genetically modified foods is often cited as an example of where the risk does not warrant the public alarm caused by it. Indeed, scientific rationality about risks is intended to counter any public irrationality. The public is often considered to be unable to decide accurately and realistically about the existence and magnitude of the risks that it faces. It is deemed to use non scientific factors and base its judgments on emotions or misinformation. Scientific assessments may characterize the public as ignorantly or willfully disregarding the neutral, objectively derived facts, and there is often a focus therefore on how to overcome this ignorance – or how to act in spite of it. Reassurances may be given about the “real facts” of a risk, and attempts made to educate the public about its true likelihood. This is based on a view that educating people will win their support, and that if they knew the facts, they would behave accordingly – the “public deficit” model, whereby problems arise because people misunderstand or are unable to grasp the facts being presented to them. Any continued public concern is then often dismissed as hysteria or hype.

While scientific risk assessments are designed to make people appreciate the irrationality of their position, what they overlook is that people may simply be drawing on another form of rationality; one that is not any more or less irrational, but just different from that employed by scientists. This "sociocultural rationality" is based on experience, social values, and the social context in which an individual lives. Assessment of the impacts and implications of a risk are shaped by the circumstances in which that risk is anticipated. Moreover, rather than being ignorant of the methods and results of risk assessment, lay people may draw on their own expertise, definitions, and meanings, and use these to reflect upon the validity and credibility of the technical information they are given.

Debates and assessments of risk are rooted in the context from which they arise. It is not possible to separate the likelihood and impacts of any particular risk from the broader social situation and the everyday social reality in which they are experienced. For example, researchers examining the effects of pollution from petrochemical factories in the northeast of the UK found that people tolerated the discharge from the smoke stacks because the factories were an intrinsic part of the local community. They were the main source of employment and had been for several previous generations. The factories were central to the identity of the area, and had been the reason for the economic boom and prestige accorded to it. The impacts of the pollution were known about, accommodated for, and were adopted into patterns of life (see Phillimore & Moffatt 1999). The scientific risk assessments of the distribution and effects of the pollution did not reflect anything of the social context in which the risks of the emissions were perceived.

As well as the influence of the wider social context, people may also bring their own knowledge and experience to bear in assessing risks. The hierarchical scientific "top down" model of informing the public about the facts does not incorporate any notion of a two way relationship between people and scientists, or any negotiation between them. Sociological work, however, highlights the potential validity of a public response to a risk. Williams and Popay (1994) describe the situation in the town of Camelford in Cornwall, UK, where toxic substances were accidentally tipped into the local water

reservoir. Residents were concerned about both the short and long term risks to their health, but a committee of government scientists convened to look into the issue stated that chronic symptoms were not associated with the toxic dumping. However, in the light of continuing ill health, local residents continued to campaign for recognition of their claims, in what was to become a long running and contentious battle. At the heart of this dispute is the notion that the shared experiences that formed local knowledge could not be invalidated by reference to standards of objectivity derived from abstract scientific knowledge.

Considering local experience also highlights problems with the presumed universality of scientific assessments of risk. Technical information in any communications about risk is simplified in order for people to be able to understand it and to reassure them. While risk assessment and prediction may incorporate a great deal of uncertainty, this is rarely discussed in any public communications. However, understating any uncertainty can antagonize rather than reassure, and damage credibility when such standardization may not fit with normal experience. The invalidity of idealized and universal versions of "laboratory science" is highlighted when contrasted with "real world" experience and expertise. For example, Wynne (1989) documents differences between scientists' and farmers' knowledges in the aftermath of the Chernobyl accident. Concerns about the spread of radiation led to controversial restrictions being placed on farming practices and the movement and sale of livestock in the UK. However, the abstract knowledge applied by scientists in determining the levels of radiation and subsequent restrictions did not take account of local variations in the distribution of radiation, ignored local farming realities, and neglected the local knowledge and expert judgments of farmers. For the farmers, the supposedly universal scientific knowledge was out of touch with the practical reality and thus of no validity. It ignored factors that were obvious to them but invisible to outsiders, and made no attempt to accommodate (or even communicate with) their understandings and knowledge of the situation.

What universal risk assessments also overlook is that the nature of a risk affects the

response to it. Sociological research has documented increased public concern over risks perceived as unfamiliar, unfair, invisible, or involuntary. This is not necessarily “irrational,” but rather highlights the contingent nature of risk assessment that technical analyses ignore. For example, people may accept risks many times greater if they are voluntarily assumed rather than forced upon them. Research has found that when people willingly engage in “risky behavior,” they report greater knowledge, less fear, and more personal control over the risks. Examples include engaging in extreme sports, or taking recreational drugs. The imposition of a risk, as well as the perceived degree of risk and likelihood of danger, is an important factor, and people are therefore less likely to accept a risk imposed upon them, with consequences they have no control over. The outcry over safety on the railways is an example of this. Risk assessments based on rationality outline the statistical likelihood of being involved in a train crash or car accident, and the latter is much higher. But traveling by train means handing over the control and responsibility for the journey, and powerless passengers thus demand to be kept safe and free from risks.

Finally, differences in the definitions of risks relate to issues of trust in experts and scientific decision making. As well as any divergence between public and expert understanding of risks, the knowledge that the public receive from those experts is increasingly being met with skepticism. Accordingly therefore, individuals faced with a risk consider not only the probability of harm but also the credibility of whoever generates the information. The controversies over nuclear power, waste incinerators, and even renewable energy are all examples of this. Assurances from scientists and engineers that the noise from a windfarm will not disturb people living nearby, however authoritative and objective they seem, will be disregarded if the information is presented on behalf of the developer, or if it does not take into account the particular contingencies of the local area. Increasingly, scientific risk assessments are discounted and discredited by people who use their own knowledge and experience to determine the risks they face.

The disjuncture between scientists and lay assessment of risk has therefore led to increased

public resistance of both the procedures and results of expert measurement. Indeed, as discussed above, the notion of the division between local and scientific knowledge can be seen as part of a trend challenging scientific work more generally. Public resistance of technical assessment arises because people’s experiences, meanings, and knowledges are not expressed in this definition; and are often ignored, ridiculed, and contradicted. When the control of the basis for which assessments about risk can be made is claimed by scientific experts, there may be little similarity between perceptions of risk embedded in lived experience and those based on ideals of rationality and logic. In the light of risk, divisions are opened up between lay and scientific knowledge and those who have access to and expertise of these seemingly opposing epistemologies. Scientific definitions tend to exclude those without access to the technical knowledge needed to understand them, and preclude any negotiation between experts and the public. They are intended to educate and inform, not empower, and are imposed upon a context in which they may be seen to have little validity. What sociology has done is to highlight the differing rationalities that scientists and lay people use in their risk assessments, and shown how conflicts arise because of these. Work in the tradition of the sociology of scientific knowledge (SSK) demonstrates that the “public deficit” model of understanding has little validity, and serves to problematize the public rather than the operation of science. Instead, a more symmetrical view of different knowledge and expertise is required.

SEE ALSO: Risk, Risk Society, Risk Behavior, and Social Problems; Science and the Precautionary Principle; Scientific Knowledge, Sociology of; Scientific Literacy and Public Understandings of Science

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science/non-science and boundary work

Yuri Jack Gómez Morales

The problem of demarcation – how to identify the unique and essential characteristics of science that distinguish it from other intellectual activities – has been addressed both as an analytical matter mainly by philosophers and epistemologists, and as a practical matter by sociologists and historians.

The philosophical quest for demarcating science has advanced along different avenues. It has been claimed that science is recognizable by its results, by its methods, and more often by the way in which statements claimed to be scientific are evaluated. Early in the twentieth century a philosophical school of thought known as logical positivism (the Vienna Circle) advanced an answer for demarcating science: demarcating science from religion and metaphysics was mainly a matter of semantics. Only statements about empirical observations are meaningful. Verification was then espoused as a safe criterion to decide whether or not one is dealing with a scientific statement. However, although any generalization can be tested by verification, it guarantees little, since the status of such generalizations is always uncertain, in that any follow-up observation may counter it.

Correcting verificationism, Popper's falsificationism starts by noticing that meaningfulness may not necessarily serve to demarcate science since a theory might well be meaningful without being scientific. By contrast, if the analysis starts by asserting under which conditions a theory can prove to be false (falsificationism), this serves better the quest for demarcating falsifiable scientific theories from unscientific (non-falsifiable) ones. Popper argued that scientific knowledge cannot be *proven* to be true; all that science can do is *disprove* theories. And to do so, criteria of refutation have to be laid down beforehand. Falsificationism is then an effort at producing instances which may counter a generalization. The failure to verify such instances, the failure to falsify a theory, generalization, or statement, gives credence to them as scientific. Alternatively, the failure to assess under which conditions the theory could be proved false is a clear sign of its unscientific nature.

But much that would be considered meaningful and useful in science is not necessarily falsifiable. Non-falsifiable statements have a role in scientific theories themselves, as in the case of cosmology, for example. If the acceptance or failure of scientific theories relied simply on falsification, no theory would ever survive long enough to be fruitful, as all theories contain anomalies. Besides, falsificationism does not provide a way to distinguish meaningful generalizations from meaningless ones. And more importantly, since falsificationism is based on factual propositions serving as instances to counter scientific claims, it implies a controversial observational theory. This last statement is the departure point of Lakatos's reassessment of falsificationism. The difficulties inherent in Popper's theory led Lakatos to propose a more subtle theory of falsification. His view, which he calls "sophisticated falsification" to distinguish it from Popper's, can be summarized thus: no experiment, experimental report, observational statement, or well-corroborated low-level falsifying hypothesis alone can lead to falsification. There is no falsification before the emergence of a better theory. Thus, Lakatos argued that no factual proposition can ever be proved by experiment; propositions can only be derived from other propositions, they cannot be derived from facts. Therefore, if factual propositions are unprovable then they are fallible, and if they are

fallible, clashes between theories and propositions are not falsifications but merely inconsistencies. Evaluation on Lakatos's view should be practiced, then, over a series of theories "in the long run" rather than one at a time. Both falsification and verification and the idea of a scientific method are useful demarcation criteria, but only within the temporal confines of an established scientific *paradigm*. This is a familiar line of argument associated with Kuhn, who went further than Lakatos in pointing out that sophisticated falsification sidesteps the fact that numerous preliminary decisions are involved in Lakatos's criteria. In order to decide whether a theory is indeed a better theory than another, scientists must, for example, decide which statement to make "unfalsifiable by fiat" and which not. Or dealing with a probabilistic theory, they must decide on a probability threshold below which statistical evidence will be held "inconsistent" with that theory; they have to decide what is going to be called "facts," "new facts," and so on.

Both Kuhn and Feyerabend's contributions to the problem of demarcation push it forward by opening up its subjective and sociohistorical dimension. Both argued that the sorts of decisions scientists take are made in the light of shared ideological commitments within a given paradigm. The questions of truth and falsity and correct or incorrect understanding are not uniquely empirical (as the analytical approach held) and many meaningful questions surrounding the problem cannot be settled this way.

Despite the fact that at the analytical level there is no full agreement on what it is that distinguishes science from other kinds of intellectual activities, at the practical level there are many examples of temporary and localized agreements about such a distinction, achieved on a daily basis in scientific practice. From academic curricula in schools and colleges to the design of public or private organizations for the funding and management of scientific research, from ideas of science and scientific practice disseminated throughout the news and media entertainment industries to the process of peer evaluation in specialized journals, the existence of tacit agreements on what is science accounts for practical decisions that must be taken in these various contexts: defining curricula content for a discipline, allocating resources for

research, announcing a new discovery, keeping the record of science, and even to tell someone a science fiction story involves a degree of tacit agreement on what science looks like. These practical dimensions of demarcation in science are what the notion boundary work attempts to describe. Boundary work is about an *ideological* style found in scientists' attempts to create a public image for science by contrasting it favorably to other intellectual or technical activities in order to advance their interests or resolve their inner strains (Gieryn 1983).

The capacity to create convincing distinctions between science and exemplars of non sciences or pseudo sciences serves a variety of goals pursued by scientists for the advancement of their professional careers: acquisition of intellectual authority and career opportunities as much as the denial of these resources to others (supposedly pseudo or non scientists), and the protection of the autonomy of scientific research from external interference.

From a boundary work standpoint, the authority of science is a result of its successful claim to autonomy, its expansion into areas previously claimed by others, and its successful rejection of other claimants to cognitive authority. Thus, boundary work comprises at least three kinds of strategies: expansion, expulsion, and the protection of autonomy. The work of expulsion operates when scientists seek to marginalize competing claims, to distinguish between orthodox and fringe, and to keep out specific social practices (e.g., magic, alchemy, witchcraft). Expansion occurs when scientists seek to extend their claim over areas previously claimed by others (e.g., religion, folk knowledge, craft expertise). Autonomy protection occurs when scientists seek to minimize interference in their domain by politicians or managers. On these grounds, cognitive authority turns out as the result, rather than the source, of successful boundary work and the novelty that this point of view brings to the fore is the extension of this argument from particular claims to scientific knowledge to the claims making surrounding the institution of science itself.

Because of the considerable material opportunities and professional advantages at stake, demarcating science is not merely an academic matter. Epistemologists and philosophers of science draw demarcations between types of

knowledge without mentioning that these demarcations mean borderlines between people. They construct hierarchies in the realm of knowledge without making explicit the claims of domination which can be based on them. They separate “true reality” from the merely phenomenal world of sensation and fantasy as if these differentiations were given by truth itself and not expressions of a social struggle about what the decisive facts are.

Boundary work has wider applications since expansion, monopolization, and protection of autonomy are generic features of professionalization. Thus, it is not surprising that the notion is useful for describing ideological demarcations of disciplines, specialties, or theoretical orientations within science as well. Content analysis of these ideologies suggests that science is not one single thing. Characteristics attributed to science vary widely depending upon the specific intellectual or professional activity designated as non science and the particular goals of the boundary work. The rich argumentative repertoire detected in scientific ideologies often results in inconsistency. In the public domain science is at once presented as theoretical and empirical, pure and applied, objective and subjective, exact and estimative, democratic and elitist, limitless and limited. These inconsistencies can be explained, however, when considering that scientists build boundaries according to the kind of obstacles they find in their pursuit of authority and resources. In their quest scientists may find themselves competing with each other and needing to erect boundaries that ground identical aims on different bases. By the same token, variability may result from a simultaneous pursuit of separate professional goals, each requiring a boundary to be built in a different way.

Boundary work, based as it is on relatively unstructured observation of relatively unstructured ideological activities, has been considered insufficient. Further scholarly work on this topic has focused attention on crucial and more structured activities performed by boundary workers. This is how boundary work – a notion initially formulated to explain how scientists maintain the boundaries of their community against threats to its cognitive authority – has found useful policy relevant applications. One example is studying the strategic demarcation

between political and scientific tasks in the advisory relationship between scientists and regulatory agencies. In this context, derivative notions such as boundary objects, boundary organizations, and even co production have been advanced. Boundary objects stand between different social worlds and they can be used by individuals within each world for specific purposes without losing their own identity as members of a specific community of practice. In some cases entire organizations can serve as boundary objects, as did many of the public interest organizations created by scientists in the mid twentieth century to facilitate political goals while protecting scientific ones (Guston 1999, 2001). Yet boundary organizations are also involved in co production, that is, the simultaneous production of knowledge and social order. Boundary organizations co produce society as they facilitate collaboration between scientists and nonscientists, and they create the combined scientific and social order through the generation of boundary objects (Jasanoff 1996; Bowker & Star 1999).

SEE ALSO: Expertise, “Scientification,” and the Authority of Science; Ideology; Positivism; Stratification: Functional and Conflict Theories; Stratification: Technology and Ideology

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science and the precautionary principle

Saul Halfon

The precautionary principle is a regulatory approach, under conditions of scientific *uncertainty*, requiring that a new chemical or technology be regulated or banned until it is proven safe. This principle was developed in opposition to the dominant regulatory standard, which requires affirmative evidence of harm before regulatory action can be taken. These two approaches designate a central conflict in environmental and food regulation, particularly related to chemical release and use of genetically modified organisms.

Precautionary approaches to regulation have existed for much of the past century. For example, the United States Food and Drug Administration works on a precautionary model for drugs and food additives. Thus, pharmaceutical companies cannot market a drug in the United States until it is explicitly approved following affirmative evidence of safety.

Precaution as an explicit principle of policy making has more recent origins. It arose out of 1970s German environmental policy, particularly the *Vorsorgeprinzip* (foresight principle). In international regulation it was first codified in the 1984 First International Convention on Protection of the North Sea. Its most important articulation may be found in the Rio Declaration of the 1992 UN Conference on Environment

and Development, which states in Principle 15 that the “lack of full scientific certainty” should not prevent environmental protection. Other influential statements on precaution can be found in the 1998 “Wingspread Statement on the Precautionary Principle” and a 2000 “Communication from the Commission of the European Communities on the Precautionary Principle.” Several countries have explicitly endorsed the precautionary principle, most notably the European Union in the 1992 Treaty of Maastricht.

While naming an approach to scientific evidence, the precautionary principle is associated with a general orientation toward regulation that is directly counter to the “risk paradigm” or “sound science” approach. It is a crucial feature of what Martin Hajer calls the “ecological modernization” discourse coalition, and Joe Thornton treats it as part of the “ecological paradigm” of regulation, thus supporting a particular orientation toward scientific uncertainty, risk, expertise, proof, regulation, responsibility, public participation, and progress. As such, it is tied up with the politics of modernity and the culture wars: precaution is often favored by environmental, health, and consumer activists and advocates who support greater regulation; risk is often favored by corporations and free trade advocates who prefer minimal regulation.

Most proponents of precaution favor prevention rather than management (control and remediation) of pollution, are skeptical of scientific claims and standards in arenas of extreme complexity, respect democratic input as an important adjunct to technical knowledge, seek to regulate classes of phenomena rather than individual chemicals or products, question the assimilative capacity of the environment, prefer known to unknown risks, and would require proof of safety from the producer of a new product (often called a reversed onus of proof). They also favor Type I errors (false positives for harm) rather than Type II (false negatives).

By contrast, the risk paradigm generally takes a “command and control” approach to regulation, which focuses on defining “acceptable discharge” rates. This paradigm admits a relatively narrow set of quantifiable and measurable risks for consideration; that is, risks to human health and the environment rather than economic, cultural, or community risks. It thus

supports expert driven and technocratic modes of regulation. The refusal to regulate based on uncertain knowledge derives from a *positivist* stance toward science that buttresses their claim that this is the only “sound science” approach to regulation.

Proponents of precaution reject the “sound science”/“anti science” designation. Neither formulation is inherently more scientific than the other, although they do understand regulatory science differently – as either positivistic or as inherently uncertain. Precautionary approaches also tend to treat science policy as a science/politics hybrid, whereas risk based approaches appeal to the separation (purification) of science and politics into separate realms.

These paradigms are discursive packages rather than logical constructions, and as such can be reconstructed. Ongoing attempts at harmonizing these approaches seek to recombine various elements in a number of different ways. Some proponents of the precautionary principle fear that it will be coopted as it is thus separated from its historical entailments.

Both risk based and precautionary approaches have logical extremes, which would make the policy untenable in practice. Positive proof of harm is very rare, and thus an absolutist risk perspective effectively undermines regulation. Critics of risk based regulation claim that this is currently the case for persistent, bioaccumulative, and synergistic chemicals and those with complex or non linear modes of action in human and environmental systems. Ecosystem theories and theories of endocrine disruption in particular raise such concerns (the endocrine disruption hypothesis posits that many synthetic chemicals have powerful hormonal effects at extremely low doses). Likewise, positive proof of safety is very difficult, suggesting that no new chemical or genetically modified organism could be approved under precaution. Proponents of strong precaution suggest that most synthetic chemicals have historically proven harmful to human health and the environment, so such an approach is warranted. Critics suggest that this approach is completely untenable and would ultimately stall all innovation, costing many more lives than it would save. Most proponents of precaution reject such extremes, suggesting instead that precaution shifts the calculus of regulation rather than providing a

specific legal rule against innovation. Some suggest that precaution should be invoked only when there exists a prima facie case for the danger of a new substance and that priorities for precautionary regulation should be based on the degree of scientific uncertainty in combination with degrees of possible harm.

SEE ALSO: Genetic Engineering as a Social Problem; Global Politics; Knowledge; Positivism; Risk, Risk Society, Risk Behavior, and Social Problems; Science and Culture; Science and the Measurement of Risk; Science, Proof, and Law

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science, proof, and law

Stephen K. Sanderson

Science seeks to describe, explain, and predict features of the natural and social worlds. Scientists try to develop theories or explanations of

phenomena by means of producing bodies of empirical evidence that play a major role in determining whether theories are accepted, modified, or rejected. In general, scientists seek theories that are logically consistent, empirically testable, well supported by available empirical evidence (and not too severely contradicted by other available evidence), parsimonious or simple, and that continue to be a source of new ideas and lines of research. Scientists also generally seek to produce theories that yield a unified understanding of the phenomena they study. For example, Wilson (1998) talks of *consilience*, and some physical scientists claim they are moving very close to a “theory of everything” (Barrow 2001).

In the early decades of the twentieth century the Vienna Circle of logical positivists insisted that science consisted only of those propositions which could be verified by facts drawn from experience. However, Popper (1959) responded by arguing that theories could never be verified because a scientist can never possess all of the possible facts bearing on a theory. Popper’s solution to this problem was that the scientist had to proceed in a sort of reverse manner, by trying to *falsify* rather than verify a theory. In fact, for Popper, whether a theory was falsifiable or not was the line of demarcation between science and non-science: science consists of falsifiable statements, and theories are retained so long as they survive these falsifying tests.

Popper recognized that a theory could rarely be falsified by a single disconfirming instance. There are degrees of falsification. In this regard, he spoke of the *corroboration* of theories. Theories are corroborated by being submitted to the most, and the most severe, falsifying efforts possible, and by withstanding them. But corroboration is not “truth.” It simply means that a theory is provisionally accepted pending further testing. Better theories are those that are logically stronger, that contain greater empirical content, that have greater explanatory and predictive capabilities, and that have been more severely tested. Any newly proposed theory should also be independently testable, have new and testable consequences, and must predict the existence of phenomena thus far unobserved. And, in the end, Popper admits *verification* back in, because he contends that, just as science would stagnate if it fails to

produce refutations, it would also stagnate if new theories failed to produce verifications (i.e., supportive evidence).

Popper’s philosophical model is not without its problems, yet his notion that no theory can ever really be “proved true” stands, as does his notion that statements that are unfalsifiable are not to be regarded as scientific. For Popper, science was perhaps the only epistemic activity in which errors can be identified and corrected over time (Harris 1979: 27). This is what allows science to progress toward greater *verisimilitude*, or increasingly accurate approximations to the truth.

Lakatos (1970) argued that Popper’s falsificationism was highly inconsistent with actual scientific practice and that it was so strict that it would make scientific advance impossible. Literally applied, Popper’s falsificationism would bring science to a halt because virtually every scientific theory that has ever been proposed has *anomalies*, or facts that are inconsistent with it. Indeed, Lakatos contended that every theory is born in an “ocean of anomalies,” and that scientists often retain theories for decades or even longer even though they know there are many inconsistencies.

However, Lakatos’s critique applies largely only to the very early Popper, who was a *naïve falsificationist*. Later, Popper became more nuanced in adopting a far less restrictive, or *sophisticated*, falsificationism in admitting degrees of falsification (or corroboration). Lakatos regarded sophisticated falsificationism as an improvement on naïve falsificationism, but thought it was still limited in the sense of conceiving of scientific testing as simply a comparison between a single theory and a body of evidence. What is needed is a three way comparison in which one not only compares a theory to evidence, but at the same time judges it *with respect to its main rivals*.

Moreover, Lakatos argued, it is not really theories that scientists test, but series of theories or research programs. Even if individual theories end up being decisively refuted, the research programs of which they are a part can still stand. Lakatos then went on to identify what he called theoretically progressive problem shifts. These are research programs that can explain everything their rivals explain, and at least some additional content. They can make

novel predictions not made by their rivals. Lakatos's own philosophical model of science he called the methodology of scientific research programs. Every research program contains a *negative heuristic* or "hard core" of fundamental assumptions or principles, around which scientists build a "protective belt" of auxiliary hypotheses. And it is the auxiliary hypotheses, rather than the hard core, that is subjected to empirical test.

There is also a *positive heuristic*, which consists of suggestions, hints, and insights that help the scientist to modify the protective belt in order to save the irrefutable hard core, and it is this positive heuristic that "saves the scientist from being confused by the ocean of anomalies" (Lakatos 1970: 135). The anomalies are acknowledged but temporarily shoved aside in hopes that they will eventually be shown to be explainable in the basic terms of the research program. Progress in science, for Lakatos, is therefore a matter of theoretically progressive research programs. However, progressive programs seldom last forever. They often become theoretically degenerating research programs, or programs in which too many (or too severe) anomalies accumulate that can no longer be explained away. Such a research program will then give way to one or more rivals that are theoretically progressive.

Following somewhat in the Lakatosian tradition is Laudan (1977), who agrees that science is a matter of evaluating research programs, and also that one can only evaluate them comparatively. However, Laudan points out that scientists do not consider only empirical evidence when evaluating theories. They also use conceptual problems, which may play at least as large a role in scientists' acceptance or rejection of the theories as empirical evidence. Moreover, scientists are rational to consider such conceptual problems if they have been a reliable guide to past knowledge. Conceptual problems are problems that arise from either the internal inconsistencies or ambiguities of a theory, or from conflicts between a theory and another theory (or non-scientific doctrine) that is thought to be well founded.

One type of conceptual problem is methodological disputes. For example, Laudan avers that much of the opposition to psychoanalysis and psychological behaviorism turned

on methodological concerns, and many of the arguments over quantum mechanics also involved methodological questions. Another type of conceptual problem is worldviews, which are moral, theological, or ideological stances. Examples abound. After Darwin published *Origin of Species* in 1859, biologists fairly rapidly came to accept the reality of evolution, but there was great resistance to the mechanism he proposed to explain how evolution occurred – natural selection. This was because natural selection eliminated the concept of purpose, to which scientists were deeply attached as a worldview. It was only after about 1930 that an empirical foundation was developed that was capable of convincing scientists to abandon their entrenched concept of purpose and accept natural selection. Worldviews play a particularly crucial role in the acceptance or rejection of theories in the social sciences. For example, there has been great resistance to sociobiology, especially among sociologists, because it clashes with the entrenched Durkheimian worldview – "explain social facts only by relating them to other social facts" – and is seen as a threat to the discipline's identity. Sociobiology has also been resisted because it is widely viewed as promoting a conservative view of society, which clashes with sociologists' strong left leaning political views.

An important difference between Laudan on the one hand and Popper and Lakatos on the other concerns the debate over realism and anti-realism. For Popper and Lakatos, who were scientific realists, science is truth seeking and is progressive in the sense of producing cumulative knowledge. Laudan, however, advocates antirealism, which means that, as Kuhn (1962) famously argued, science only solves puzzles or problems. Laudan emphasizes that in scientific change there is genuine progress (something Kuhn denied), but this change is not cumulative because new theories (or research traditions) cannot explain all of the phenomena explained by their predecessors. There are losses as well as gains when new research programs replace old ones.

In the 1970s there emerged a whole subfield of sociology, the sociology of scientific knowledge (SSK), which has grown and expanded by leaps and bounds. (For citations to the very large literature, see Laudan 1996: 183–209;

Kincaid 1996: 37–43; and several essays in Segerstrale 2000). Although its proponents vary in the degree to which they hold it, the essential premise is that the content of scientific knowledge is influenced much more by social and cultural factors than by canons of scientific rationality. This is one of the legacies of Kuhn. In addition to his argument that science is a problem solving rather than a truth seeking activity, Kuhn also contended that scientists operate within paradigms that are regularly overthrown by the advocates of rival paradigms, and that scientific progress only occurs *within* paradigms, not *between* them. Kuhn often spoke as if commitment to a paradigm is more a matter of group psychology or sociology rather than the rational weighing of evidence, and that paradigmatic change is much like a type of Gestalt switch. Many philosophers of science regard Kuhn's views as highly problematic because of what they see as their subjectivism and relativism.

More recently, science has come in for enormous criticism at the hands of postmodernists and other “antiscientists,” who regard science as undeserving of its epistemically privileged position and as just one way of knowing among others. This is one of the legacies of the “epistemological anarchism” of Feyerabend (1975), whose views were considerably more radical than Kuhn's. For Feyerabend, all modes of knowledge are essentially on the same plane, whether science or witchcraft, and thus his basic methodological rule was that there should be no methodological rules – “anything goes.” The postmodern attack on science has emphasized its alleged “Eurocentrism” and claimed that commitment to science as a superior epistemology is rooted in western cultural values rather than objective criteria (since, for postmodernism, there can be no such criteria). (For excellent summaries and commentaries, see Segerstrale 2000.) Those philosophers and sociologists who see science as a mere social construction seem to be engaged in a completely self refuting argument, since they do not “think *their own work* is only a social construction with no claim on evidence and truth as traditionally understood” (Kincaid 1996: 41).

Sociology is a very immature science, and most sociologists have an impoverished understanding of real science. For example, the

majority of sociologists study only one society (usually their own) and no general theories can be built on the basis of one case. (It would be like trying to build biological science by studying only penguins.) Many sociologists resolve the acrimonious debates among rival theoretical camps by settling for an eclectic position, but eclecticism as it is understood by sociologists is a strategy rarely if ever favored by natural scientists. Eclecticism violates the principle of parsimonious and highly unified explanation – one of the most fundamental of all scientific goals – and it makes the comparative evaluation of theories impossible (Sanderson 1987). Many sociologists who do highly quantitative survey research build unwieldy models that contain a large number of variables, but real science does not work that way. What results is a kind of “multivariate chaos” that is the antithesis of parsimonious explanation.

Sociology today lacks a highly cumulative body of knowledge, and there is very little agreement on key epistemological, methodological, and theoretical questions. Conceptual problems are particularly acute in sociology, especially in the form of political ideology and its role in settling theoretical debates. From the standpoint of the enormous successes of the natural sciences, sociology is an extremely immature discipline in terrible disarray. At the most general theoretical level, the vast majority of sociologists continue to adhere to the standard social science model, which assumes that human behavior is overwhelmingly determined by the social environment. However, this is a massively degenerating research program, for the accumulated anomalies are extreme. Sociologists cling to it for conceptual, not empirical, reasons.

Although the overall picture in sociology and social science more generally is not an impressive one, the social sciences do have some genuine research programs that may be regarded as at least mildly to moderately progressive. In anthropology, there is the cultural materialism of Harris (1979), which is coherent and unified and has made some impressive accomplishments. In psychology, anthropology, and to some extent sociology, there is a very coherent research program that now goes under the name of evolutionary psychology (Barkow et al. 1992; Crawford & Krebs 1998). Thus far it has proven to be a highly progressive research program.

A closely related research program in anthropology is evolutionary ecology (Smith & Winterhalder 1992). And in sociology a good example of a coherent research program is rational choice theory. This program has been attached to the study of early modern and modern states (Kiser et al. 1995), to the study of human sexuality (Posner 1992), and to numerous other substantive areas. There are also dependency and world system approaches to economic development, which have the merit of being research programs that have been subjected to extensive empirical testing, even though, unfortunately, the anomalies have become severe and in many ways these approaches are now degenerating programs (Sanderson 2005a). There is also the state centered approach to revolutions (Wickham Crowley 1992; Goldstone 1991; cf. Sanderson 2005b), which is something like a research program and seems to be a highly progressive one.

So the situation is by no means totally bleak. Natural scientists do not really need to study the history and philosophy of science, and few do. Indeed, scientists are often highly antagonistic toward philosophy of science. The reason natural scientists do not need philosophy of science is that they have a keen sense of what they are doing, and they generally do it extremely well. Social scientists, by contrast, very badly need to study the history and philosophy of science because they need to gain a much better understanding of how real science actually works and try to emulate it.

One major barrier to success in social science is the complexity and relative unpredictability of the phenomena being studied. The other major barrier is conceptual, and mainly ideological. Ideology is an enormous barrier to scientific objectivity, and indeed to the very practice of science at all. Sociologists and other social scientists can do nothing to alter the nature of the phenomena they study, but they are entirely free to embark along the path of objective social science if they choose to recommit themselves to doing so.

It should be clear that proof is not really possible in science, if by proof we mean "establishment with certainty." It has long been noted by philosophers of science of many stripes that theories will always be "underdetermined" by empirical evidence. (This is the famous Duhem-Quine underdetermination thesis, which has

often been used by postmodernists and other relativists to attack science. However, such conclusions are complete non sequiturs.) There is only disproof or, lacking that, provisional acceptance. Proof must be restricted to the domains of logic and mathematics. As for laws, these certainly exist in the physical sciences and to some extent in the biological sciences, but they rarely exist in the social sciences. Social scientists still have enough work to do to bring themselves up to minimal scientific standards. The development of widely agreed upon laws of social behavior, organization, and change are far off into the future.

SEE ALSO: Fact, Theory, and Hypothesis: Including the History of the Scientific Fact; Falsification; Induction and Observation in Science; Kuhn, Thomas and Scientific Paradigms; Paradigms; Science and the Precautionary Principle; Science, Social Construction of; Scientific Knowledge, Sociology of

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science and public participation: the democratization of science

John Forrester

Thomas Jefferson, quoted in Fischer's *Citizens, Experts, and the Environment* (2001), said that wherever the people are well informed, they can be trusted with their own government. But, nowadays, who can claim to be well informed enough about science to govern it except the scientists themselves? In 1959, Sir Charles Snow put forward the thesis in the Rede Lecture that there was what amounted to an opposition between literary intellectualism at one end, and proficiency in the physical sciences at the other. Snow dated his realization of this

distinction to the 1930s. What we can say for certain is that there was a coming into common understanding that a reasonably well educated or cultured person could not, now, be expected to be normally able to comprehend both the sciences and the arts. This state of affairs is not by any means all the scientific community's fault, although science is guilty of creating, along with other forms of knowledge and understanding, elites. Elitism fosters disciplinization and subdisciplinization, and has given rise to mistrust and lack of understanding between the members of different disciplines and of science and scientists in general. The term "lay" was commonly used until the 1990s to describe those untutored in science, thus emphasizing the idea of a scientific priesthood or elite. For various reasons not dealt with here, this state of affairs is seen as being iniquitous, and so public participation in science, also known as public engagement in science, is seen as a means whereby that balance can be redressed.

This broad generalization of why science "needs" to be democratized hides several distinct rationales as to why the public should engage with science or vice versa. Before dealing with these rationales, there is one distinction that needs to be introduced: who or what "the public" or "publics" are engaging in or with. In many "western style" democracies, members of the public are engaging and being engaged in the governance of science, but not in knowledge creation itself. In contrast, in some continental European countries and in a few developing countries, citizen participation in science is seeing citizens more as co creators of new knowledge alongside traditional experts, new knowledge that is both "reliable" (after Gibbons 1999 – i.e., knowledge that is scientifically correct) and also "socially robust" (i.e., that overcomes the elitism of traditionally generated scientific knowledge). These two major dimensions to public engagement may be distinguished as public engagement *with* science on the one hand, and public engagement *in* science on the other. Stirling (2005) characterizes the first more exactly as "participation in the social appraisal of science and technology," while the other is also about knowledge production, as is illustrated by the title of the book *The New Production of Knowledge* published in 1994 by an international team of scholars including

Michael Gibbons and Peter Scott from the UK, Camille Limoges, Simon Schwartzmann, and Martin Trow from the Americas, and Helga Nowotny from continental Europe.

Since the end of World War II, there has been an almost logarithmic increase in the number of initiatives to open up new spaces for science and the public to interact. In 1985 in the UK, the Bodmer Report (see Miller 2001 for a fuller history) introduced the phrase “the Public Understanding of Science” (PUS) into the English language and also the idea that the public suffered from a deficit of knowledge about science. This thesis – that if only the public knew more about science and how it worked then they would be happier to allow science more funding, more control over science to scientists, and so on – can be seen to fit firmly into the dimension of public engagement with science. In the US during this period, science and scientists were engaged in a much more polarized debate sometimes referred to as the Science Wars (see Rose 1997), where the scientific elite defended itself against all critiques which it characterized as “anti science.” The Sociology of Scientific Knowledge (SSK) often found itself on the receiving end of attacks and rebuttals, particularly for its social constructionist stance. Yet, in the US, the American Association for the Advancement of Science (AAAS) has, over the years, had little more effect in generating public engagement in or with science than has its UK counterpart(s): the Royal Society, the Royal Institution, and the British Association for the Advancement of Science, who jointly formed the Committee on the Public Understanding of Science (CoPUS) after the Bodmer Report. The deficit model informed much of the early work of CoPUS and the AAAS. The deficit model, and projects based upon it, proved powerless to assist in improving science literacy.

SSK really did not engage with PUS as the former’s social constructionist thesis suggested that increasing scientific literacy was not going to serve any useful purpose except to science itself. UK SSK practitioners (see Irwin & Wynne 1996 for one collection of their works) were suggesting that science needed to be, at the very least, studied in context. Still using the terminology of elites, they made the argument

that “lay knowledge” should be considered alongside expert knowledge as epistemologically different but no less valid. The deficit model was moribund. However, the application of social constructionist ideas needs to be handled carefully, as while the governance and application of science – what Stirling called science’s “social appraisal” – is clearly open to public engagement and participation, the inclusion of the public’s (and publics’) knowledge in the creation of “new knowledge” is still a largely uncharted territory. Nonetheless, we have now moved from PUS to PEST (Public Engagement with Science and Technology), and PEST seems to be able to attract the interest of SSK practitioners and scientists alike. The UK Economic and Social Research Council has its *Science in Society* program, as does the Royal Society, CoPUS is to be reformed and renamed, and the influential House of Lords Select Committee on Science and Technology Third Report (2000) was entitled *Science and Society*. With the change from PUS to PEST, the mood has changed from edification to dialogue. Science is now expected to seek to democratize itself through engagement. The form that this engagement takes is still largely undecided.

In the last decade, many rationales have emerged for encouraging public participation, particularly with environmental policymaking spurs such as global climate change and, in particular, sustainable development (see Forrester 1999). Some have adopted the pragmatic argument that public involvement will assist with the effective implementation of policy; when members of the public are consulted and engaged with, they are more likely to lend their support to (or, at least, not oppose) science based policy measures. Others have argued that in democratic societies, people simply have a right to a participatory role. Further, the argument has been made that people may have access to knowledge that is unknown to experts; local people may themselves count as experts about their own localities. Such participative initiatives have been further spurred and legitimated by the participatory emphasis within Local Agenda 21. This was important in that it encouraged people to participate in the issues affecting their localities. Stirling (2005) has characterized these three rationales as:

- Normative democratic – in other words, the motive is the engagement. It is simply people's democratic right to be involved in decision making in society and in an increasingly technocratic society this involves increased involvement in science policy.
- Instrumental – this rationale is different in that it has a purpose related to an output or outcome. Citizens are engaged in order to change their behavior, or to inform the creation of new knowledge. PUS was clearly instrumental.
- Substantive – this is the most complex in that this rationale almost subsumes the other two, but at its most naïve it can be described that substantive engagement leads to a “better” decision. It can be argued that the move toward PEST sets the scene for substantive engagement to occur.

There will remain times when the public will be engaged “only” in the governance of science; engaged in making decisions about science funding, research priorities, and so on. There will also be times when what is required is engagement in the creation of new knowledge. The major methodological issues with science governance include: redefining the “norms” of science (after Merton's 1973 *The Sociology of Science*), deciding on the funding of science, the transparency of decision making within the governance of science and science research, and also the application of scientific knowledge (see Ziman 1996). Thus, this level of engagement concentrates upon science itself, its outworkings in the policy sphere. The major methodological concepts or issues involved in public engagement in the creation of [new] knowledge are to do with the nature of that knowledge itself – what the concept's authors call “mode 2 knowledge production” (Nowotny et al. 2001) – and where and how the conditions necessary for the growth of a “socially distributed expertise” (ibid.) may be fostered.

As science becomes increasingly answerable to a range of publics including both funders and users, sociology has begun to suggest that “new spaces” are needed to fulfill a new contractual arrangement between science and its primary constituency, society. Policymakers (see House of Lords *Science and Society* referred to above) warn against creating new institutions to

provide these spaces, instead emphasizing the need for trust and transparency in existing institutions. The focus, however, is on the need for transparency and trust; science still needs to reestablish relations of trust between science practitioners and members of different publics. One area where this is particularly critical is where science is deemed to suffer from a lack of certainty. The idea that under certain conditions of uncertainty (to wit, “post normal” science) there should be extended peer review was one put forward by Silvio Funtowicz and Jerry Ravetz in a series of papers (see Yearley et al. 2001 for a fuller exposition). They sought to develop a theoretical framework for understanding on what grounds and under what conditions the public should be involved. Put simply, they said that where the scientists had no firm evidence on what to base a decision, then the non scientist's view was just as valid, but they also made the point that where there were high “decision stakes” – in other words, when the outcome of the decision might impact upon a large number of people – then under those conditions the public too should have a voice. This framework was particularly influential in the 1990s. It has fed into the underlying PEST principle that science itself should no longer be controlled by a restricted corps of insiders.

One attempt to produce “mode 2 knowledge” was made by an interdisciplinary team of researchers from the UK (see Yearley et al. 2003) using a form of participatory mapping (see Cinderby & Forrester 2005): the idea was to create a common understanding as a basis to bring together the technological assessment or “evidence based knowledge” about local air quality with the experience and concerns of local stakeholders and residents. In the City of York (UK), local authority officers were sufficiently impressed with the technique that they supported the running of mapping groups to generate maps of local perceptions of problem areas (of air quality). A political decision was made to use these maps rather than those based on technical assessment alone in the designation of the city's air quality management area. Thus, it can be argued that the “new” knowledge superseded the technical assessment, but there is little evidence for this experience in York being replicated elsewhere in the UK, even in

this area of air quality, a “common good” where technical and “lay” understandings are so close. Thus it may be argued that, for the moment, the democratization of science is actually the democratization of the use – and governance – of science with little associated democratization of expertise.

SEE ALSO: Expertise, “Scientification,” and the Authority of Science; Peer Review and Quality Control in Science; Realism and Relativism: Truth and Objectivity; Science and the Measurement of Risk; Science and the Precautionary Principle; Science, Social Construction of; Scientific Knowledge, Sociology of; Scientific Literacy and Public Understandings of Science; Social Movements, Participatory Democracy in

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science and religion

Steve Bruce

It is commonly held that the declining power and popularity of religion that we see in almost all modern industrial societies owes much to the rise of science; science and religion are competitors in a zero sum game, with the former being vastly more persuasive.

As US sociologist Robert Merton pointed out, many of the pioneering natural scientists in the seventeenth century (e.g., Robert Boyle) were pious men who saw their work as demonstrating the glory of God’s creation. Yet science has challenged what were once taken for granted elements of theistic belief systems (such as the idea that the earth was the center of creation and that God created the variety of life forms). In 1633 the Catholic Church tried, condemned, and imprisoned Galileo for continuing to promote the Copernican view that the earth moved around the sun after he had been instructed to desist. In the nineteenth century, leaders of the Church of England tried to refute the evolutionary theories of Charles Darwin and his followers. In the contemporary United States, conservative Protestants try to use the courts to force schools to give equal time to “creation science” as an alternative to naturalistic evolution.

This zero sum game view of the relationship between science and religion is largely misleading as an explanation of change. That many highly educated people whose standard of living depends very directly on natural science can continue to hold traditional supernaturalistic beliefs shows us that there are a number of ways

in which the disconfirming effect of science can be deflected. One successful way of responding is to rewrite theistic religious beliefs so that they accommodate new knowledge. In the second half of the nineteenth century, the mainstream Christian churches reconstructed their belief systems: heaven and hell were changed from being external realities to being psychological states. Heaven became a sense of contentment; hell became alienation, loneliness, and so on. Miracles were explained away. For example, events described in the Bible as miraculous (such as Noah's flood or the parting of the Red Sea) were taken to be misunderstandings of natural phenomena. Faith healing was explained not as divine intervention but as the workings of a placebo effect. By such trimming an omnipotent deity was preserved, not as an alternative to the causes of phenomena discovered by scientific explanation but as the author of the complex processes which natural science was discovering.

An alternative to rewriting the faith is to turn science against itself. Those who wish to continue to believe in divine creation, for example, can cite the Popperian view of the logic of scientific discovery to the effect that the findings of science are only ever hypothetical. In natural science properly understood, nothing is ever firmly proved to be the case. The cautious claim that our current state of knowledge is only the best we have at this point in time is, judo like, used to throw any scientific proposition that threatens religion.

More generally, the idea that scientific discoveries undermined religion requires that believers were aware of the conflict and of the weight of evidence behind the problematic findings. That may not often have been the case. Even in those societies with extensive compulsory schooling, very many people have little or no understanding of physics, chemistry, or medical science. For example, very many consumers of alternative medical therapies are unaware that they are implicitly subscribing to models of causation for which the best science offers no empirical support. It is difficult to see how homeopathy, with its central idea that a chemical agent can be so watered down that no trace of it can be detected and yet retain the ability to stimulate in the body a curative response, can be sustained within conventional notions of causation. Yet some trained medical scientists

use homeopathy and many patients seem satisfied that such cures are legitimately "scientific."

What this suggests is that while the battle between specific findings of natural scientific and religious ideas engaged the experts on each side, it probably played little part in the long term decline of religion. Too many people are simply unaware of the ideological clashes or were insulated by the sorts of rhetorical strategies listed above. To explain secularization, we must identify the social changes associated with industrialization that weakened the ability of ideological communities to reproduce themselves; the rise of individual freedom and the increase in social and cultural diversity are much more powerful agents of change than any particular naturalistic idea.

But science does threaten religion in two rather subtle ways: it alters our images of the world and our images of ourselves. Religions assume that there is a supernatural realm: a world beyond the material. Although most modern scientists are careful not to stray beyond their competence and hence do not directly challenge such beliefs, the general assumption of the scientific community (and of the wider culture informed by it) is that the material world is to be understood in its own terms and that those terms are wide enough to encompass most of what interests us. For example, natural disasters are just that; they are not divine interventions. Personality defects are the result of biological or psychological, rather than spiritual, problems.

Science has also given us unprecedented technological power, which has two sorts of effects on religion. Firstly, the occasions for resort to religion have been much reduced. In pre industrial societies, appeal to God or the gods often provided the only response to uncertainty and risk. Without accurate weather forecasting and self righting boats, the best a fishing community could do to ensure the safe return of its crews was to pray and to placate a possibly wrathful God. When effective solutions to problems are devised, it is possible to continue in the old ways – to suppose that the chemical that will kill worms in sheep only works if we pray before we administer the dose – but it soon becomes apparent that the worm dose works as well for the ungodly as for the godly. In 1349, when the Black Death ravaged England, the national church instituted weeks of special

prayers and fasting. When AIDS (at first dubbed the “gay plague”) appeared in Britain in the early 1980s, the Church of England’s response was to call for the government to invest more money in scientific research. And the second response was more successful than the first: systematic research provided first the explanation for AIDS, and then the technology that allowed HIV positive people to live relatively normal lives. The rise of effective technologies reduces God from being omnipotent to being the much lesser “God of the gaps.” Gradually, the number and range of occasions on which people resort to religious activities to solve problems are reduced and the authority of the churches is correspondingly reduced. Religious authorities can no longer claim to validate all knowledge and are left with the much reduced role of safeguarding religious doctrine and trying to maintain control over sociomoral issues.

Technology has also produced a fundamental change in human self images. It is characteristic of most religions that they present humankind as tiny and powerless in the face of divine providence. Like the tormented Job of the Old Testament, people are expected to put up with whatever God or the gods inflict on them and hope that their obedience will eventually be rewarded, in some future life if not in this one. Although there is an obvious dark side to technology, it has made us considerably more powerful than we have ever been before. Instead of having to work within the natural world, we can hope to dominate it. A people that can extract oil from the depths of the North Sea and use it to vastly increase the comfort and lengths of our lives is a people of power and significance. Right or wrong, and for good or ill, we differ from our ancestors of the pre industrial world in being able to imagine ourselves masters of our fate.

SEE ALSO: Diversity; Individualism; Industrialization; Religion; Science; Science and Culture; Secularization; Technology, Science, and Culture

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science, social construction of

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In its simplest form, the claim that science is socially constructed means that there is no direct link between nature and our ideas about nature – the products of science are not themselves natural. This claim can be taken to mean different things and a distinction is often made between strong and weak interpretations of social constructivism. The stronger claim would not recognize an independent reality or materiality outside of our perceptions of it, or at least dismiss it as of no relevance as we cannot access it. This stance is, however, not a very common one. A weaker social constructivism tends to leave ontological queries to one side and instead focus on epistemological matters – how we gain knowledge about the world. What we count as knowledge is dependent on, and shaped by, the contexts in which it is created. Knowledge is thus made by people drawing on available cultural material, not preexisting facts in a world outside of human action, waiting to be uncovered.

The philosopher Ian Hacking has discussed and criticized different uses of the concept social construction. Hacking (1999) takes apart and analyzes the many and varying meanings of social construction. According to Hacking, the concept is routinely used in a way that makes it devoid of meaning. “The phrase has become code. If you use it favorably, you deem yourself rather radical. If you trash the phrase, you declare that you are rational, reasonable, and

respectable” (p. vii). Furthermore, the concept often comes with an inbuilt value judgment that implies that things should ideally be constructed differently.

When teasing out different meanings that different authors have given to social construction, Hacking found three main types: contingency, nominalism, and external reasons for stability (Sismondo 2004). The first kind of social constructivism essentially comes to mean that things could have been different – there was nothing inevitable about the current state of affairs and it was not determined by the nature of things. The second kind of social constructivism focuses on the politics of categories and points to how classifications are always human impositions rather than natural kinds. The third kind of social constructivism points to how stability and success in scientific theories are due to external, rather than evidential, reasons.

Whereas the idea of science and scientific knowledge as socially constructed can be traced to many a scholar, the very concept of social construction was introduced into mainstream social sciences by Peter L. Berger and Thomas Luckmann in their influential book *The Social Construction of Reality. A Treatise in the Sociology of Knowledge* (1966). In it, the authors combine ideas from Durkheim and Weber with perspectives from George Herbert Mead, to form a theory of social action. This theory would not only deal with plurality of knowledge and reality – for example what counts as knowledge in Borneo may make little sense in Bath and vice versa – but also study the ways in which realities are taken as known in human society. How is it that a concept such as gender is taken to be “natural” and “real” in every culture, while at the same time it is perceived and performed very differently in different cultures? Knowledge about the society in which we live is “a realization in the double sense of the word, in the sense of apprehending objectivated social reality, and in the sense of ongoingly producing this reality.” An objectivated social reality is a reality that is not “private” to the person who produced it, but accessed and shared by others. As humans we are continuously creating and recreating reality, and the role of the sociologist is to analyze the process of how reality is constructed, that is, how knowledge becomes institutionally established as real.

One way of understanding science as socially constructed is to point to obvious and “external” social factors, such as funding structures or political influences. These affect the way in which science develops; business interests can determine which projects are pursued, policy decisions can effectively close down entire avenues of research, and so on. The way in which research is institutionally organized is another much cited example of “external” social shaping of science – for example how heavy bureaucracy and strict disciplinary boundaries render the pursuit of trans disciplinary science difficult. Another variety of this brand of social constructivism is the argument that only scientific knowledge deemed to be “relevant” or interesting will be pursued. Social theorists such as Helen Longino and Evelyn Fox Keller have pointed to how male dominance in society in general, and in the scientific profession in particular, has resulted in certain kinds of scientific knowledge. The definition of scientific problems and framing of hypotheses come with an inbuilt gender bias. Male contraception is an under researched area because reproductive responsibilities are firmly placed with women in our society and it is thus assumed that it is the female body that is to be manipulated. Such social values are also reflected in the very methods that scientists will use – most human trials of medicines are performed on young men between 18 and 20 years of age. The generic “human” is thus a young man, whereas elderly women are the more likely consumers of the medicines that are being trialled.

Theorists such as Sandra Harding have argued that certain social positions – such as gender, race, or class – will render particular epistemological perspectives. A science conducted and shaped by black women would not contain the same knowledge as a science created by white men. What we call the collective body of knowledge in our society is really the knowledge of a dominant group – in this case men. This is not only due to “female” questions falling outside the framework of what is perceived to be “real science,” but because our entire view of knowledge is a (male) ideological construct. A Cartesian dualism such as body/mind is a construction built on the male experience of nature and culture as separate entities, as men tend to be free to engage in intellectual activity without

having to take responsibility for their own or others' bodies. The precondition for this male focus on matters intellectual is that women take care of the shopping, cooking, childrearing, laundry, cleaning, and other tasks that subsequently are not included in men's abstract conceptualizations of reality.

Other prominent feminist thinkers, notably Donna Haraway, instead view (scientific) knowledge as fragmented and physically anchored (but not necessarily the epistemological perspective of a particular social group). A knowing subject's perspective can always be located to a specific field – there is no objective “view from nowhere.” The arguments above differ both in their conceptualizations of the subject and of society, but have in common that they see scientific knowledge as dependent on the social frameworks in which they are produced. Science is not a neutral activity, but instead reflects institutional values.

Scientists tend to insist that their *way* of arriving at knowledge makes their claims more true and more valuable than other groups' knowledge claims (who arrived at their conclusions by different means and on different grounds). They argue that while it may be the case that certain types of knowledge – such as ideas about morality – are socially constructed, scientific knowledge should be exempt from such a mode of analysis. Scientific knowledge has a special authority and status because of the way in which we arrive at such knowledge. The “scientific method” – rigorous and systematic examination, testing, and replication – thus guarantees the veracity of scientific claims. “Truthfulness” is taken to mean that the claim in question is a direct representation of a reality that exists outside of, and independent from, our perceptions of it. A social constructivist view of science instead holds that scientific knowledge is as “social” as other types of knowledge.

A social constructivist perspective of science common in the field of science studies emphasizes the social influence at the very core of technical judgments. Scientific theories, it is argued, are always underdetermined by empirical data – there are a potentially infinite number of hypotheses that could serve to explain the same set of data. Despite this, scientists manage to “gel” around a limited number of possible explanations and eventually agree on

which one they consider to be true. This process of “truthmaking” is a social activity where the meaning of data is continuously being negotiated and renegotiated.

Sociologists of science have shown that scientific work in practice is rather more messy than in theory (Knorr Cetina 1981; Collins 1985; Fujimura 1988; Pickering 1992) and that data always require interpretation, that machines are continuously calibrated to generate information that “makes sense” (i.e., fits into a given frame of meaning), and that tests and models build on the assumption that the circumstances correspond precisely to “real world” circumstances. Furthermore, experiments routinely go wrong and scientists spend a substantial amount of their time attempting to discipline wayward material and tweak variables until they work (Knorr Cetina 1981; Latour & Woolgar 1986). The success of an experiment is determined by its outcome and thus measured against a host of prior assumptions about what “nature” looks like and whether the result at hand corresponds with that nature. If the result is deemed to fit into that framework it will eventually become a fact and taken to be not only a good model of nature, but part of nature itself.

Social constructivists of all extractions also tend to argue that the success of science in claiming to be the highest form of knowing in part rests on its ability to appear as though it lacks both temporal and spatial location. Harry Collins uses the metaphor of a ship in a bottle – once in place, science, like the ship, appears to have a timeless quality, as though it has always been there and always will be. The processes by which science and scientific knowledge are produced tend to disappear from later narratives when scientific “discoveries” or “facts” are presented. A scientific fact is like a ship in a bottle; it is near impossible to conceive of how the ship was ever outside the bottle, because the bottle neck is far too narrow for the ship to have been pressed through it. At one time it was, however, a mere pile of sticks outside the bottle (Collins 1985: preface). The mistake we make is to assume that the ship has always been a ship, and, in the case of science, that the fact has always been a fact.

Another common source of scientific authority is the notion of “objectivity.” The “human factor” – that is, the scientist(s) who produced

the knowledge – is made invisible, as are the circumstances under which the work was conducted. Porter (1992, 1995) has suggested that an inherently social relationship such as “trust” has taken the shape of objectivity by means of the apparent removal of individual, and therefore subjective, assessments. Porter (1995) argues that objectivity has nothing to do with truth and nature, but that it is instead the effort to exclude subjectivity – the “struggle against judgment.” As scientific communities are growing increasingly larger and span several continents, trust has to be achieved at a distance, without personal contact (Luhman 1979; Giddens 1989; Porter 1995). Trust relations, previously negotiated in direct interaction or via a personal contact, have been institutionalized – the checkpoints are no longer embodied in scientists but rather located in seemingly impersonal sets of procedures. One of the most successful examples of this is quantification, an almost ubiquitous feature in today’s natural sciences.

The interesting question to pursue is then – to speak with Berger and Luckmann – how knowledge becomes reality. Other theorists prefer not to speak of reality in such relativist terms, but still seek to study the genesis and development of facts. The task of the social scientist is to unpack so called black boxes (i.e., unproblematic givens that we no longer question) and analyze the processes that went before this fact, or set of facts, became taken for granted knowledge. In order to study how knowledge claims come to be established as facts, when they were once merely one of many competing theories, analysts need to go “upstream” and examine a time when these claims were more contentious (Latour 1987; Sismondo 2004). Latour and Woolgar (1986) show how an initially “nonsensical” statement gradually becomes a reasonable claim, to then be labeled “false,” only to retrieve its air of probability, to finally take on the status of a fact. This is done through a series of operations that aim to mobilize and “hook up” with other facts, scientists, and artifacts (Latour 1987).

So why is science a social construction, rather than just a construction? Woolgar has criticized the inherent asymmetry in the so called interest model, where scientific knowledge is explained by reference to social interests held by individual stakeholders or groups, but the social interests themselves are taken as

“real” and stable entities. Latour (2005) purports not to be a social constructivist, but “certainly a full blooded constructivist.” The first edition of Latour and Woolgar’s seminal work *Laboratory Life* had as its subtitle “the social construction of scientific facts,” which in the second edition was changed to merely “the construction of scientific facts.” According to Latour, an ideal subtitle would have read “the practical construction of scientific facts.” He has sought to clarify this position by arguing for a “constructivist realism.” The notion of construction must, according to Latour, be reconfigured altogether if science in action is to be understood. The trouble with the social constructivist view is that it builds on a false dualism – objects are taken to reside in nature, whereas subjects dwell only in society. Latour’s alternative actor network theory (ANT) is a materialist theory which puts “social” and “natural” on an equal footing – studying scientists’ practices should reconfigure what we traditionally think of as “social” just as much as it challenges our traditional views of “science” or “nature.” Latour does not want to talk about nature in the way it is commonly understood, but equally he does not want to talk of society. “Society” has been ruined by sociologists and social constructivists, as they have made sure that it has been purged of what Latour calls not objects, but “nonhumans.” If the social constructivist is to be believed, says Latour, only social relations exist in society. Furthermore, as nature is not awarded a reality status in its own right, but is simply a series of social inscriptions, the entire project becomes tautological. Latour thus disputes what he calls a dualist paradigm and seeks to avoid a subject–object distinction altogether. As “society” has become tainted, he prefers instead the notion of “collective.” This collective is extended to include nonhumans as well as humans. Latour’s society is constructed, but not socially constructed.

SEE ALSO: Actor Network Theory; Classification; Constructionism; Feminism and Science, Feminist Epistemology; Nature; Science across Cultures; Science/Non Science and Boundary Work; Science, Proof, and Law; Scientific Knowledge, Sociology of; Strong Objectivity; Strong Program; Women in Science

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scientific knowledge, sociology of

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The sociology of scientific knowledge (SSK) is a field of sociology that started to take form in the early 1970s. Sociologists, historians, and philosophers who shared a common interest in

studying the social underpinnings of science took as a joint focus the very *content* of scientific knowledge. Previously, a division of labor had existed between philosophy and sociology. Philosophers' role was to analyze and define norms of science, discussing and drawing up demarcation criteria between science and non-science. Sociologists were to study the structure of scientific institutions and provide explanations when science went wrong. Thus, the only type of knowledge qualifying for sociological attention was knowledge perceived to be somehow faulty. SSK, however, approached all scientific knowledge claims – regardless of whether they were held to be true or false – as material for sociological investigation (Bloor 1991 [1976]).

The intellectual roots of SSK are many and varied. Definite influences are philosophers and sociologists such as Weber, Durkheim, and Marx with their ideas about social construction, Wittgenstein's argument about the extension of rules, and Mannheim's writings about ideas as socially located. Later scholars, such as Robert Merton and Thomas Kuhn, are also recognized as predecessors to a field that started to take a more definite form with the publication of the Strong Program in the mid 1970s. The Strong Program was a programmatic statement from a transdisciplinary group of academics based at the University of Edinburgh, the so called Edinburgh School. It proposed that scientific knowledge should not be treated as a special case of knowledge, but instead be analyzed and explained in terms of its social origin and causes. A sociological account of the emergence of scientific knowledge should be causal, impartial, symmetrical, and reflexive.

Around the same time, a similar approach to the study of scientific knowledge was being developed elsewhere in Britain. EPOR, the Empirical Program of Relativism, formed the basis for the Bath School and was led by Harry Collins. As the name suggests, EPOR proposed that scientific knowledge production should be studied empirically and that a relativist approach should be taken to the object of study. It was, however, emphasized that the relativist stance should be deployed as a methodological tool and not necessarily reflect an ontological position. Sociological studies of science should demonstrate the “interpretive flexibility” of

knowledge claims, describe the institutional and network based mechanisms that would achieve “closure,” and, finally, connect such closure mechanisms to wider social and political structures.

One assumption underlying the SSK approach is summarized in the Duhem Quine hypothesis, which states that a theory always is underdetermined by data. No one theory can ever singularly explain a specific set of data; there are hypothetically an infinite number of theories that could be supported by the same data set. Therefore, a theory can never be tested on its own, and with reference to nature, e.g., the data themselves. Instead there tends to be a whole weave of interconnected assumptions being tried. The pertinent question for the sociology of scientific knowledge is that if theories are underdetermined by data – that is, if “truth” cannot be determined by reference to nature – how is it that scientists still manage to gather around more or less stable theoretical constructs?

One commonly used model in SSK has been to analyze different positions in a given debate in terms of what wider interests they represent. Interests are invoked to explain how closure and consensus can be achieved in science despite the inherent potential for innumerable developments.

Interest explanations are often macrosocial and “interests” are, for example, the interests of the professional middle class in attaining or retaining moral and intellectual legitimacy for power and influence (Shapin 1975; Barnes & MacKenzie 1979), interests linked to investments in certain kinds of skills, models, or technologies (Fujimura 1988), or the interests of a professional group to claim or to maintain the cognitive authority over an issue or area (Gieryn & Figert 1986).

Stability can also be explained on a more microsocal level, as the result of negotiations between different scientists who achieve local agreement (Knorr Cetina 1981). Such a microsocal approach represented a new trend in SSK, often known under the label of “laboratory studies.” In early SSK studies there had been a focus on scientific controversies. Typically, such analyses would encompass two or more competing “sides” of scientists arguing over a given theory or result. One of the perceived

methodological advantages of such an approach was that in times of contentious science, “normal” rules and practices in scientific every day life tend to be questioned and are thereby made visible to the analyst. The proponents of laboratory studies, conversely, wanted to study such “normal” scientific practice and the every day production of knowledge.

In 1979, Bruno Latour and Steve Woolgar published a landmark book called *Laboratory Life*, an ethnographic study of the Salk laboratory in San Diego. The authors took an anthropological approach to their objects of study and chose to “make the familiar strange,” thereby not taking anything for granted – so, for example, one of the drawings at the beginning of the book describes in detail the air conditioning system in the laboratory. Two years later, Karin Knorr Cetina published another important ethnographic study in which she described how successful laboratory work required a vast amount of “tinkering.” Like her French colleagues, Knorr Cetina noted the “messiness” of science in practice and how much of scientists’ time is spent making difficult objects behave properly so as to get a desired or acceptable outcome. Laboratory studies dispelled the popular belief that scientists go into the laboratory with a hypothesis to test, set up the experiment, test it, and then accept whichever result they get as the answer to their query. Instead, only certain kinds of outcomes will count as a “result” – most anomalies will fall under the category of experimental failings and only result in the scientist calibrating his or her equipment, or changing the parameters of the experiment.

During the 1980s, a new perspective gained ground among social scientists who studied science and technology. Actor network theory (ANT), developed by Michel Callon and Bruno Latour in Paris, and John Law in Britain, proposed that successful scientific work was a result of successful networks. ANT made no difference between science and technology, but instead used the term “technoscience.” To build a large, strong, and successful network, a given actor needs to enroll allies and translate their interests so that they aim toward the same, or a compatible, goal. In that respect, ANT networks and the activities of actors within them are similar to what one would traditionally think of as politicking. However, ANT networks

include not only human actors but also so called actants – non human objects or phenomena. Actants do not differ from their human counterparts in important ways – they, too, have interests and agency. Actants can be proteins, scallops, doorstops, or referendums, and anything in between.

ANT thus took issue with the traditional SSK way of explaining the emergence and shape of natural science knowledge. Actor network theorists wanted to extend the concept of symmetry so as to include nature, a generalized or so called supersymmetry. There is, it was argued, an inherent asymmetry in the SSK approach because of its insistence on only allowing social explanations, thus imputing that the social world is more “real” than the natural world. Scientific knowledge is explained by reference to social interests, but the social interests themselves are taken as “real” and stable entities.

ANT also took a radically different approach to “interests.” With an actor network approach, interests are regarded as both cause and consequence. These co produced interests are both a resource that can be used when enrolling actors and a result of that enrollment activity. If one actor manages to translate the interests of others and thereby successfully align them, this transform and enroll strategy will increase the actor’s possibilities of creating and defining reality. This creates a self perpetuating movement, as the abilities to define and translate are co produced. An actor who successfully translates will gain ever more interpretive power. In Michel Callon’s famous study of the fishermen in St. Brieuc Bay, the question posed by the marine biologists – “How do scallops anchor?” – served to simultaneously translate the interests of the fishermen, the scientists, and the scallops, making it a question of survival for the scallops, of future livelihoods for the fishermen, and the pivotal question that needed to be answered – the obligatory passage point – in the scientists’ field of research (Callon 1986).

SSK critics of actor network theory have pointed to how agency appears to be unevenly distributed among actors and actants, in two different ways. Firstly, it appears that the initiative to network building always has to come from human actors. Secondly, it is the privilege of the analyst to decide which non human object will enjoy the role of “actant” – in Callon’s

St. Brieuc Bay study, only the scallops are assumed to have agency. The ships, test tubes, etc. are treated as “normal” objects.

Other critics have highlighted a focus on scientific “heroes” in ANT studies, a tendency to take rationality to be unproblematic and disconnected from cultural understandings of “rational,” and a failure to account for cultures or practices in their analyses. ANT was thus not unreservedly accepted into the realm of SSK, but provoked a long running debate on matters ontological, methodological, and epistemological – perhaps best summarized in the so called “chicken debate” between the Paris School, championed by Michel Callon and Bruno Latour, and the Bath School, represented by Harry Collins and Steve Yearley. Points of contention were, in particular, the role and status of actants and, thus, the role and status of “nature” versus “the social.”

Some 20 years after the emergence of the Strong Program, the field of SSK had grown in so many disparate directions that it no longer had its firm 1970s identity as one distinct perspective. Many other approaches, such as discourse analysis and symbolic interactionism, had gathered their own followings and developed discrete methodological tool kits and theoretical frameworks. In the present day, SSK has taken its place as one of many perspectives in the larger field of science studies.

SEE ALSO: Actor Network Theory; Durkheim, Émile; Knowledge, Sociology of; Kuhn, Thomas and Scientific Paradigms; Laboratory Studies and the World of the Scientific Lab; Marx, Karl; Merton, Robert K.; Science/Non Science and Boundary Work; Science, Social Construction of; Scientific Literacy and Public Understandings of Science; Strong Program

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Robert Merton's classic work in the 1950s posited, with the identification of the CUDOS norms of communism, universality, disinterestedness, and organized skepticism), but it is also a social activity in the respect that it plays an instrumental role in the construction of every day life.

Science is perhaps one of the most demarcated and professionalized human activities because it argues to have a different evidential basis for its knowledge claims. This evidential basis is largely the product of the scientific method that collects bits of information from the observation of a phenomenon in the form of induction, then operates in the deductive fashion by the creation of hypotheses to explain the phenomenon, the conducting of experiments in attempts to confirm and/or falsify the said hypotheses, and the building of a theory based on the results of experiments. Without elementary training and education in the fundamental aspects of science, the operations and products of the scientific community can become almost unintelligible to the outsider. This convolution is partly due to the increasing complexity of new specializations emergent within disciplines, coupled with the transformation of theories and the evolving nature of understanding. As a result, there is often a break, or chasm, between what the scientific community claims it is doing and what "the public" – those who find themselves outside of the scientific community – understand of the processes and products of science. Attempts at comprehending and explaining this break have become the work of sociologists, and other related fields of social science, who are interested in the public understanding of science (PUS).

Early quantitative surveys in the PUS found that there is "a tendency for better informed respondents to have a more positive general attitude towards science and scientists" (Durant et al. 1989). It was consequently argued that any public opposition to science and technology policies, decisions, and/or advancements was largely due to the fact that the public did not understand the arguments and reasoning behind the science in question. This view of the public understanding of science came to be known (largely by its critics) as the "deficit model" (Wynne 1991; Ziman 1991). Proponents of this deficit model of PUS feel that if the public were

scientific literacy and public understandings of science

Conor M. W. Douglas

Scientific literacy, and more so the public understanding of science, have recently become areas of study in their own right within the sociology of science and science and technology studies (STS). This emergence is partly due to the increased focus on science as an inherently social activity, but more specifically it is due to the mounting challenges that the scientific community has faced in dealing with this fact. Science is not only a social activity in that it is governed by a set of norms and values (as

simply better informed about science, then they would generally be more supportive of it. Glossing the work of Alan Gross, Sturgis and Allum (2004) put it like this: "in this formulation, it is the public that are assumed to be 'deficient' while science is 'sufficient' . . . lacking a proper understanding of the relevant facts, people fall back on mystical belief and irrational fears of the unknown."

Much focus in PUS has therefore been paid to one of the central problematics within the communication of information from scientists to the public: the role of the media. Based on the assumption that all information is mediated by the source from which it emanates, many of the investigators have taken up the media as a sight of examination and queried the effects that it may have on the public understanding of science. Some have argued that the media are responsible for misconstruing the message of the science and perpetuating misconceptions, while others have sought to explain the use of expert scientific testimony within the media.

Other central concerns in the PUS are the notion of "the public" as well as the notion of "science." Different people experience different aspects of science in very different ways, and thus studies that have made reference to "the public" as a homogeneous group, or ones which have tried to comprehend levels of understanding in "science" in general, have largely worked to cloud the picture of PUS. Consequently, much of the work carried out in the late twentieth and early twenty first centuries has focused on national contexts and case studies.

After considerable work done on the PUS in the West, more recent investigations have sought to open up the area of study to other countries and cultures that have traditionally been located outside of the dominant discourse. Such work includes a focus on PUS in ex Soviet countries, the contextualization of differences in PUS within European peripheral states, and international comparisons between PUS in oriental and western countries.

Not only have the more recent works been increasingly contextualized to specific national perspectives, but also much of the work done in PUS is case specific. Such investigations do not concentrate on the public understanding of science in general, but rather the public's understanding of a particular scientific advancement.

Examples include cases from around the world (e.g., East Asia, Oceania, Europe, and ex Soviet countries) and cut across technoscientific specializations (e.g., medical gene technology, genetically modified foods, nuclear sciences, and xenotransplantation). Traditional sociological categories such as gender, political affiliation, and socioeconomic status have also been areas of concentration within the PUS in an attempt to further contextualize "the public" within the PUS.

While the work carried out in the PUS is vast and diverse, some take for granted the assumption of the deficit model and continue to operate on the belief that a more informed public will necessarily lead to an increasing amount of support for scientific endeavors. Debate and controversy remain around this assumption of the deficit model, and contestation is not new to PUS, as it is an area of investigation that has altered and changed throughout the years.

In the early post war years in the US and the UK, the scientific community took very little interest in engaging the public with its processes, content, and (social) structure. Conversely, the popularization of science was high on the agenda for various social groups and institutions who worked in and around scientific areas, but as Lewenstein (1992) argues, this did not mean critical engagement with science as, "the term 'public understanding of science' became equated with 'public appreciation of the benefits that science provides to society.'" This era of science policy in 1940s and 1950s America is what Sarewitz (1996) has called the "myth of infinite benefit." Sarewitz's historical treatment shows how this myth posited that increasing state funding for scientific research would lead directly to increased public good and thus public support. Heavy state involvement in the promotion of science for the public good was championed by the likes of Vannevar Bush – the chief research adviser to President Roosevelt and one of the central figures in mobilizing science for use to the state and military, particularly during and after World War II. During this period new universities and research institutions were established, and existing ones witnessed an eruption in state funding for scientific activities. Dreams of flying cars and homes operated on nuclear energy filled the imaginations of the uncritical public until the 1960s.

In the US some attempts to gauge the concepts of scientific literacy (SL) and to distinguish them from PUS began around 1979 when social scientists working in these areas were commissioned to overhaul the *Science Indicators*. The goal of these social scientists was to

significantly expanded the scope of the surveys and begin to focus more attention on attitudes, knowledge measures, and expected participation measures for specific issues and controversies, such as nuclear power. Measures of policy preferences were expanded beyond spending preferences to specific regulatory areas. New measures concerning the individual's sources of scientific and technical information were added, allowing the formation of scales reflecting adult participation in informal science education activities. (Miller 1992)

In constructing this self-professed "first measure of scientific literacy," Miller also created a construct to divide "the public" into subgroups:

individuals who report a high level of interest in science and technology policy issues and a sense of being very well informed about those issues (called the attentive public ...), those individuals who report a high level of interest in science and technology policy issues but who do not classify themselves as being very well informed about those issues (called the interested public), and those individuals who report that they are not very interested in science and technology policy issues (called the residual public). (Miller 1992)

In Britain, initiatives were taken up around the same time in an attempt to gauge the public's relationship with science. In 1985 the Bodmer report was published by the Royal Society, which called into question the degree of public support for science. As a response to the Bodmer report a body was established called the Committee for Public Understanding of Science (or COPUS) that was jointly founded by the Royal Society, the British Association, and the Royal Institution.

In both the US and the UK these reports, surveys, and indicators produced results that suggested that while there might be interest in science, knowledge about process and content was seriously lacking. In other words, findings suggested that the public was largely scientifically illiterate, which acted as the basis for the deficit model.

Predictably, the deficit model led to a major backlash from some of those within the constructivist school of STS and the social sciences more broadly who were interested in the PUS. The constructivists argued that it was shortsighted to assume that the public simply lacked an understanding of science, and it was rather that the public experienced science within their own specific social contexts and consequently sometimes chose to question the authority or validity of scientific claims (Wynne 1991). The debate boiled with such fervor and the research and interest in the area grew with such intensity that the journal *Public Understanding of Science* was created in 1992, dedicated solely to its namesake.

Constructivists and those supporters of the deficit model converge and diverge at interesting points within the PUS. For instance, both sides seem to agree that PUS entails an understanding of some of the formal content of science, the methods and processes of science, alongside a crucial third factor that differs for each party. For those of the deficit school this third factor is the "awareness of the impact of science and technology on individuals and society" (Miller 1992), whereas for constructivists like Wynne this third factor is the understanding of the "forms of institutional embedding, patronage and organizational control" of science (Wynne 1992). This third differing factor is paramount because in the constructivists' understanding the authority of science can legitimately be called into question.

According to constructivists like Wynne and Steven Yearley, scientific knowledge and expert claims are "always mediated by knowledge of the institutional arrangements under which expertise is authorized. Claims of expert knowledge are always contestable, depending on what one knows of the relevant institution" (Sturgis & Allum 2004, discussing Yearley). Consequently, the "scientific" advice of daily intake of "the four basic food groups" provided by the scientists from the American Food and Drug Association can be mediated by the knowledge that this institution has had a close working relationship with the National Dairy Council, and that years before the four basic food groups existed there were indeed twelve basic food groups in which dairy played a much smaller role (Haughton et al. 1987).

Constructivists assert that if a problem exists in the communication of science's content, processes, and structure, then the responsibility for the problem of PUS must swing both ways. This argument represents a flat rejection of the claim of the deficit model that the blame for the problem of PUS rests solely on the shoulders of the public (or even the media for that matter), and instead asserts that responsibility for the PUS must also be located within the scientific community.

Comprehending how the public integrates its knowledge about the "existing political culture of science and its social relations" (Wynne 1992) should not be taken for granted when analysts are attempting to gauge the public's understanding of science. Constructivists argue that it is not ignorance that leads the public to contest scientific claims and to be hesitant with support for the scientific community; rather, in some situations, scientific claims appear inconsistent, irrational, and/or contradictory to pre-existing knowledge. Some of the constructivists' reasons as to why a member of the public might choose to contest scientific knowledge are "when the reasoning behind the information is not made plain (often because of concerns about 'alarming' the public)"; "when it contradicts local experience (reassurance about safety when incidents have previously occurred)"; "when it is conveyed in unreasonable categorical terms (e.g., concerning the precise course of the envisaged emergency)"; and "when it seems to deny accepted social norms" (Wynne 1991).

For better or for worse, scientific literacy (SL) only enjoys a marginally more conceptual clarity than the PUS, which is perhaps counter intuitively due to its relatively lesser degree of treatment in the literature. Like most conceptual categories, including PUS, SL is a fluid and dynamic area of study, which "has changed somewhat over the years, moving from the ability to read and comprehend science related articles to its present emphasis on understanding and applying scientific principles to everyday life" (Burns et al. 2003). Evidently, not only has the topic of SL changed over time, but it also has had to be broadened through time. As a consequence, nailing down a single contemporary definition for SL is also problematic. In accord with this position, academics such as B. S. P. Shen and later J. D. Miller (who has

been immersed in this area in one way or another for nearly three decades) have been forced to contextualize the concept of SL. For Shen (1975), SL was more clearly understood once broken into three subcategories: practical scientific literacy, civic scientific literacy, and cultural scientific literacy. Practical scientific literacy, he conceptualized, is the application of scientific concepts, skills, and ideas for the resolution of everyday and concrete problems. In this case practical scientific literacy might mean understanding the chemistry of how to balance the acidity/PH level in your garden, or pregnant parents being able to understand statistical significance and the concept of inheritance when the doctor explains an inheritable disease. Cultural scientific literacy, on the other hand, is the recognition of science as a major human achievement, and thus might entail a respectful understanding of the complexity of physical laws of gravity and engineering that landed humans on the moon.

Miller has taken pains to elaborate on the third of Shen's subcategories of scientific literacy: civic scientific literacy. Those who would be considered to exhibit civic scientific literacy would, for instance, be able to engage critically with the science content of a daily newspaper. This critical engagement would be done for constructive purposes so that the individual could more readily be involved in the processes by which science emerges within a democratic society. A good example of civic scientific literacy might be those people who constructively and open mindedly participated in the public debate over the integration of genetically modified foods in the UK in 2003. For Miller, civic scientific literacy involved not only the content dimension (i.e., being able to read and understand the science section of the newspaper or magazine), but also having an understanding of the process of scientific inquiry (i.e., construction of theory, hypothesis testing, and the experimental method), as well as some degree of understanding of the impact of science and technology on individuals and society (e.g., carbon emissions from automobiles get trapped within our atmosphere and lead to a greenhouse effect that warms our planet).

At the turn of the millennium the British House of Lords, a body firmly rooted outside of academic discourses, rather vaguely defined

the public understanding of science as “the shorthand term for all forms of outreach (in the UK) by the scientific community, or others on their behalf (e.g., science writers, museums, event organizers), to the public at large aimed at improving understanding” (Burns et al. 2003: 187). In the vast expanses of literature on the topic of PUS within academic discourses there exists no single clear cut definition. As one of the central commentators on the topic stated: “PUS is an ill defined area involving several different disciplinary perspectives” (Wynne 1995), including sociology, political science, science and technology studies, communication studies, and psychology, to name a few. SL does not present any clearer picture, as similar qualities have been used in its and PUS’s definitions, which include understanding science content, understanding methods of inquiry (or process), and understanding science as a social enterprise. Clearly, there is still much conceptual confusion around and between these terms. With that in mind, contestations over formless terms such as “the public” and “science,” and constructivist debate about the authority of science, have opened up the discourse within the PUS and moved it away from the rather vague definition offered by the British House of Lords. As science and technology continue to grow in terms of their pervasiveness in all aspects of society, PUS will surely continue to be a site of important academic discussion.

SEE ALSO: Media; Public Opinion; Science and Culture; Science and Public Participation: The Democratization of Science; Science/Non Science and Boundary Work

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scientific models and simulations

Mikaela Sundberg

The term model is used in multiple ways in science and there are several different kinds of models. The most basic scientific models are material and conceptual analogues. They are copies that stand in for more opaque systems. Cloud chambers and cell cultures are examples of material models, whereas conceptual models are more abstract analogies that seek to render theories more comprehensible. Mathematical models are typically applications, approximations, or specifications of theories and principles that cannot be applied in their original form.

Computer simulations tend to be more obvious analogues than models, aptly characterized as virtual copies of systems. Simulations employ a generative mechanism to imitate the dynamic behavior of the underlying process that the simulations aim to represent. Simulation is an ambiguous term, but in all cases of scientific simulations they are based on some form of model. However, simulation models can be divided into two overall types, both of which tend to be used for representations of complex dynamics. The first type is based on mathematical models, which aim to represent established theoretical statements or physical laws. Simulations in physically based sciences usually exemplify this type of simulation. The second type of simulation model is based on simpler models, which consist of a few assumptions about leading mechanisms. This is generally the case in simulations of social phenomena using so called agent based models.

Although models and simulations are increasingly used in science, studies of them remain rare compared to the extensive studies of experiments that have taken place in the sociology of science since the 1970s. Models and simulations that represent the application of theoretical knowledge have also received less attention in the philosophy of science, where the traditional line of inquiry has mostly been in the theoretical domains.

From the perspective of the philosophy of science, models and simulations tend to be discussed in relation to theories. In the classic contribution *Models and Analogies in Science* (1966), Mary Hesse sees models as heuristically essential to the development and extension of theories, and also essential to the explanatory power of theories. However, the epistemological characteristics of models and simulations are less clear than those of theories. Models do not have the same epistemic tradition as theorizing and do not have transparent object domains. This is perhaps most significant in the case of simulations and it has thus been argued that simulation has its own epistemology (Winsberg 1999). In constructing simulation models, the theoretical structures are transformed into specific knowledge of systems and further into computational models that are implemented in a computer in the form of an algorithm. This is what makes simulations produce data sets. Because

simulation modeling produces these types of results, a standard for deciding whether the results are reliable is required. For this reason, results of simulations are often compared to observations. In this respect modeling and simulations share similar relations to experimentation as does theory. However, models and simulations are often seen in more pragmatic terms and therefore evaluated in relation to the purpose of modeling. This approach differs clearly from the epistemological view on theories, where theories are judged according to their being true or false.

A different way to approach modeling, not limited to epistemic questions such as the truth of models and how they should be verified, is to consider the instrumentality and autonomy of models. As partly dependent on theories and experiment, and partly independent, models can serve as bridges between theory and the world. This is suggested by Mary Morgan and Margaret Morrison in their influential book *Models as Mediators* (1999), where models are conceptualized as autonomous mediators. However, to only see models and simulations in the space between theories and the world assumes that theory and the world are stable entities, at the same time as it directs the attention toward a philosophical focus on what a model essentially is. From a sociological perspective, it is more appropriate to address the character of models in relation to the role that models and simulations play in scientific practice.

The characterization of the role of models and simulation models has often been based on the idea of models and simulation models as tools or objects for knowledge. The use of models and simulations as tools is most evident in applied science, where models are used to predict the development of various dynamic processes. Thus, in those cases where empirical data exist, the correspondence of outcomes with data becomes an important indicator of the performance of the model or simulation.

Because of their character as analogues, models and simulations can also themselves be studied the same way as natural systems are studied in empirical research. By acting as objects of knowledge in their own right, simulation models are explored to answer questions about how and why certain processes develop. In this situation, both the inner theoretical structure of the model

and how well its results correspond to data are important to the evaluation of the performance of the simulation model itself.

Some models and simulation models are constructed and used for only one of the above mentioned purposes. However, in principle, a particular simulation model can serve multiple purposes, depending on its role in practice and which questions it is being asked to address. Consequently, some models and simulations may serve as tools like technical artifacts or objects of knowledge depending on the setting where they are used.

Another line of research focuses on what people who model and simulate do, and how they work. While simulations can be described as both experimenting and theorizing depending on what aspects researchers talk about, the use of simulations as “virtual laboratories” in fact makes working with models very similar to experimenting (Dowling 1999). Models tend to integrate a broad range of ingredients such as, for example, metaphors, theoretical notions, and mathematical concepts and, not least from this point of view, the construction of models requires much experience and hard work (cf. Boumans 1999). In simulation modeling, questions related to the role of researchers are fundamental because the construction of simulation models and the interpretation of simulation results primarily depend on the researchers, their research areas, and their experience (Becker et al. 2005). In short, the role of human agency needs to be taken into account in developing the sociological understanding of how models and simulation models are constructed and used.

What appears as a particularly useful and important way to approach the practice of modeling and simulation is to acknowledge the materiality of modeling and simulations. Models are objects that have their own construction and ways of functioning that constrain interpretation and use (Knuuttila & Voutilainen 2003). What makes the materiality of simulation modeling even more evident is the transformation of a theoretical model into a computer program, and this intertwining is indeed a fundamental aspect to attend to in understanding simulation modeling practice (cf. Sundberg 2005).

However, further exploration is needed in terms of how the practices of modeling and

simulating can be conceived of in different ways rather than only in relation to theorizing and/or experimenting. In addition, an important question for future research concerns whether the concepts, metaphors, and methodologies developed on the basis of studies of experiments and experimental work can be successfully applied to and used in studies of modeling and simulations. For example, the participant observation approach, which has been the basis of many so called laboratory studies, is more difficult when studying modelers. Compared to the traditional work in a “wet laboratory,” it is more difficult for an observer to follow activities like writing equations or programming computers. To conclude, there is a growing but limited interest in, and knowledge of, the practices involved in modeling and simulations, but a more rigorous sociological approach remains to be developed.

SEE ALSO: Epistemology; Experiment; Practice; Scientific Knowledge, Sociology of; Science; Simulation and Virtuality; Theory

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scientific networks and invisible colleges

J. I. (Hans) Bakker

The notion that scientists and other scholars constitute a kind of community of scholars has frequently been asserted and discussed (Godfrey Smith 2003). The “invisible college” of natural philosophers is a seventeenth century idea (Price 1963). The phrasing is reminiscent of Adam Smith’s later “invisible hand,” except that the scientists are real persons and it is only the “colleges” that are sometimes invisible. It stems from Robert Boyle’s allusion to the importance to the founding of the Royal Society of Freemasons. An early driving force behind the society was Sir Robert Moray, a Mason who was not himself a natural philosopher (Lomas 2002). Jonathan Swift satirizes the Royal Society as “Laputa” in *Gulliver’s Travels* (Toulmin 1961), but the general consensus is that frequent communication among specialists is one of the hallmarks of modern science. A “scientometrics” approach makes it clear that the exponential growth in scientific fields and discoveries has resulted in various kinds of networks, including “networks of scientific papers” (Price 1986). It was only gradually over the course of the seventeenth century that the brief scientific paper replaced the book and Newton might well not have written his *Principia Mathematica* had there not been controversy about his papers on optics; “afterward he did not relish publication until it could take the [then] proper form of a finished book, treating the subject from beginning to end and meeting all conceivable objections and side arguments” (Price 1963: 64).

Of course, there have also been very visible ties among natural philosophers and scientists. Merton’s (1968) study of the origins of science stresses the close personal relationships among many of the members of the Royal Society in England. Whether they were aesthetically inclined Puritans or perhaps more hedonistic in their outlook (Feuer 1963), they were in any case part of the same collectivity. Other scientists across Europe corresponded with the Royal Society. When scholars sympathetic to logical positivism met at Harvard in 1939 they

articulated a concept of science as members of an illustrious community, but they were also individuals (Wilson 1999). Recent interest in network theory has prompted the idea of a scientific network.

The sociological study of science by early pioneers like Price (1963) and Merton (1968) has given way to science and technology in society (STS), a subdisciplinary field devoted to empirical research on the actual way in which research is carried out (Godfrey Smith 2003). Latour and Woolgar (1979) have studied the social construction of empirical findings in lab work. Sociological study of Nobel Prize winners in science indicates that those who study with Nobel Prize winners are themselves the most likely recipients of the Nobel Prize, presumably because they have first hand information about the cutting edge topics and techniques.

In hermeneutics the idea of a “hermeneutic circle” or “spiral” in science (Føllesdal 1994) is associated with “interaction between agents” and close ties among theorists and empirical researchers. In semiotics the notion of an interpretive community or network has been postulated as an aspect of Peirce’s (1998) more abstract notion of a recursive “interpretant.” Collins (1998) has stressed the general importance of networks. His theory holds that there is a “law of small numbers” and that the half a dozen or so major “philosophers” in any particular time and place are very likely to know one another. Each thinker searches for a niche. Full comprehension of the theory requires an understanding of the network of ties that cross over several generations.

Scientific networks are not just limited to physical or natural sciences. In classical and contemporary mathematics, statistics, arts, humanities, and social sciences the importance of such affiliations is sometimes made transparent through commemorative volumes. The *Festschrift* for Herbert Simon (Augier & March 2004) is a good example. The list of contributors reads like a “who’s who” of noteworthy thinkers on topics like bounded rationality (Arrow 2004) and “Hawkins Simon conditions” (Samuelson 2004). The history of economics is replete with cross fertilization within scientific networks, including the German Historical School that influenced Max Weber (Pearson 2002).

The analysis of science from the standpoint of its internal organizational structure in terms of

networks of affiliation and communication has not gone unchallenged. Steinmetz (2005) points out that emphasizing the idea of the scientific community as a kind of cultural system can lead to a failure to notice outside influences and forces. Moreover, the “communal” qualities of a network are not always a matter of egalitarian values; they often involve gate keeping and personality conflicts (Abbott 1999). There is a sense in which all those who can participate in a “culture” larger than that of a gathering and hunting community are part of a largely invisible network (Robbins 2005). At the same time, the existence of invisible colleges (of at most 100 or so members) also brings problems of cooperation within and among such communities (Price 1986). The question of “incommensurability” among invisible colleges holding different paradigmatic positions, even within recognized subdisciplinary fields, continues to interest a broad interdisciplinary group of scholars (Kuhn 2000). Once scientific theories have become widely accepted by members of a network they are then no longer as directly linked to a specific subset of all scientists and become the common property of “science” in general, often influencing individuals and groups who are working on quite different sets of empirical problems.

SEE ALSO: Big Science and Collective Research; Culture; Hermeneutics; Networks; Science and Culture; Science across Cultures; Signs

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scientific norms/ counternorms

Stephen Turner

The classic sociological formulation of the “norms of science” was given by Robert K. Merton, in an article originally published as “A Note on Science and Democracy” (1942) and reprinted as “Science and Democratic Social Structure” in his *Social Theory and Social Structure* (1968 [1949, 1957]) and as “The Normative Structure of Science” in *The Sociology of Science* (1973). The formulation is sometimes known by its initials, CUDOS, which stands for the four norms: communism, universalism, disinterestedness, and organized skepticism. Merton’s representation of the normative character of science has proved to be one of the most enduring of all sociological analyses. It has been discussed at length by both critics, who proposed the concept of counternorms, and sympathizers, and in the late 1960s and early 1970s became emblematic of the “Mertonian” approach to the social study of science. Nor has it remained static. “Replication” is sometimes called the fifth norm. John Ziman suggested that “originality” be added as a norm, and in many recent explanations of the acronym CUDOS the O is used for originality.

THE ORIGINS OF THE NORMS

Merton wrote two papers on the norms of science, both concerned with a political problem: the autonomy of science. The first was “Science and the Social Order” (1938, in Merton 1973). This paper was presented during a period of intense political activity, a response to the political crisis over Nazi science, and in particular to the publication in the journal *Nature* of a translation of an article by J. Stark, originally published in Germany in a Nazi journal, that attacked “Jewish” science. This translation caused a large outcry at a time when scientists in Britain and the United States were largely supportive of peace in Europe, but recognized the threat of Nazism and were coming to recognize the threat that science in Germany would be forced to conform to Nazi

ideology. At the time of Merton’s first publication on this topic, there was a movement among scientists to respond to the Nazi threat to science politically. A series of resolutions and petitions was circulated, and scientists became politically active in defense of the autonomy of science, that is, the freedom of science from political control and direction (Kuznick 1987). The norms repeat ideas expressed in the petitions. The original title of the paper in which the CUDOS model appears, “Notes on Science and Democracy,” written during the war, reflected Merton’s anxiety over conflicts that might arise between science and religion that might be given political expression in democracies.

Merton’s paper was preceded in the sociological tradition by another deeply influential work, a speech by Max Weber entitled “Science as a Vocation.” Weber asks a question on behalf of the students who were the audience for his speech: how does one know that one has a calling for science? The answer is given in terms of the personal qualities that enable one to properly fulfill the role of the scientist (or scholar). Much of the essay is devoted to explaining the limitations of science, and that science cannot provide a worldview. Weber does not give a simple list of personal qualities but speaks of “the plain duty of intellectual integrity” (1946 [1921]: 155, cf. 146, 156), denounces the idea of “personality” in science (p. 137), and says that “the primary task of a useful teacher is to teach his students to recognize ‘inconvenient facts’” (p. 147). Weber’s comments may be compared to the list of virtues in the first of Merton’s papers, “Science and the Social Order.” Here, Merton’s list of the special virtues of scientists was “intellectual honesty, integrity, organized skepticism, disinterestedness, impersonality” (1973: 259).

Merton’s point about these virtues, however, was that they formed an “ethos.” This fact was relevant to the autonomy of science. Merton characterized “a liberal society” as one in which “integration derives primarily from the body of cultural norms toward which human activity is oriented” in contrast to a dictatorial structure, where integration is produced through formal organization and centralized social control (1973: 265). Science, because it was governed by an ethos, was already akin to “a liberal

society” and thus in effect already autonomous or self governed. The notion of ethos reappears in the more famous 1942 paper, but the list of virtues changes and the emphasis shifts to the norms of science understood primarily as external constraints, or, as Merton puts it, an “affectively toned complex of values and norms that is held to be binding on the man of science” (1973: 268–9), which the scientist is at least partly socialized into.

THE FOUR NORMS

The list of norms begins with universalism, which Merton explains in terms of “the canon that truth claims, whatever their sources, are to be subjected to preestablished impersonal criteria” (1973: 270). Acceptance of claims is not to be based on personal or social attributes of the claim maker, such as race, as the Nazis were encouraged to do by Stark (1938). Universalism is thus rooted in the impersonal character of science. Universalism is potentially a source of conflict with the larger society, particularly when the ethnocentrism of the larger society comes into conflict with science. But there are also cases in which the norm is breached by scientists, for example in wartime, when nationalism leads scientists to denounce the science of other nations for patriotic reasons, as occurred in World War I. Universalism also means that science should be open to talent, whatever the ethnic or status properties of the talented are. In this respect the values of science are similar to, and supported by, the values of democracy.

The second is communism. Merton says that the “substantive findings of science are a product of social collaboration and are assigned to the community. They constitute a common heritage in which the equity of the individual producer is severely limited” (1973: 273). The “property rights” of the scientist to his ideas are limited to that of recognition and esteem. Scientists compete for recognition and are consequently greatly concerned with priority claims about discoveries, a concern which reflects the importance of originality in science. But “the products of competition are communized” (1973: 274). Merton’s evidence for this norm includes the mild disapproval given to scientists

who fail to communicate their discoveries, and by the fact that scientists acknowledge “standing on the shoulders of giants.”

It is sometimes claimed that this norm has nothing to do with communism in the political sense, but this is not true. Merton was influenced by J. D. Bernal, a British scientist and communist who wrote an important book on the social character of science, in which he said that science was already a kind of communism, because scientists “have learned consciously to subordinate themselves to a common purpose without losing the individuality of their achievements,” that “each one knows that his work depends on that of his predecessors and colleagues, and that it can only reach its fruition through the work of his successors,” and because scientists understand the necessity of collaboration which they accept without the blind following of leaders (1939: 415–16). Bernal, like many of his contemporaries on the left, wrote about the “frustration of science,” the idea that capitalism was an obstacle to the application of science to human welfare. Merton alludes to these writings with the comment that the “communism of the scientific ethos is incompatible with the definition of technology as ‘private property’ in a capitalistic economy” (1973: 275), and notes that one response to the conflict by scientists has been to advocate socialism. His discussion of this and other conflicts produced by this norm points in the direction of his later discussions of the conflicting feelings or ambivalence which norms produce.

“Disinterestedness” is a feature of the professions in general that was important to Talcott Parsons, who related it to the dealings of professionals and clients. Merton observes that scientists do not have “clients” in this way, but do have the problem of fraud and the problem of pseudosciences. Merton observes that fraud is rare in science, and explains this, in a remarkable passage, by saying that “the activities of scientists are subject to rigorous policing, to a degree perhaps unparalleled in any other field of activity” as a result of the public and testable character of science (1973: 276). Socialized sentiment combines with this “rigorous policing” to make this norm especially stable.

Organized skepticism requires the “temporary suspension of judgment and the detached scrutiny of beliefs in terms of empirical and

logical criteria" (1973: 277). This is a source of potential friction with religion, and occurs especially when science extends into new topics previously covered by other institutions.

THE COUNTERNORMS AND THE CRITICS

The literature on the norms expanded in the 1950s, with various clarifications and additions, many of which related to the central fact of the passionate, personal commitment of scientists, one of the features of Weber's discussion of science that Merton had omitted. It loomed larger as a result of such influential works as Michael Polanyi's *Personal Knowledge* (1958). Bernard Barber (1952) had suggested that "emotional neutrality" was a separate norm and an important brake on the passions. But Merton and Barber moved away from this image of science. Merton noted that priority disputes were an example of the affective involvement of scientists with their own ideas, and Barber observed that the problem of resistance of scientists to discovery was intrinsic to science. This new view fit better with a functionalist account of science in which both the norms and the passions they contained were functional for science. But it also fit with Merton's developing sense that norms typically involved conflicting feelings or "ambivalence."

The idea that the norms had counternorms was developed by Ian Mitroff, whose study of elite moon scientists showed that tenacity in support of one's own idea was an accepted part of science and a condition for its progress. On the basis of this research, Mitroff proposed counternorms for each norm. The counternorm to organized skepticism, for example, was "organized dogmatism," which he formulated in this way: "The scientist must believe in his own findings with utter conviction while doubting those of others with all his worth" (Mitroff 1974: 592). Michael Mulkey expanded on this discussion, and turned it in a radically different direction. He argued that there were no strongly institutionalized norms of the Mertonian sort in science, and treated the Mertonian norms as an "ideology," asking what purposes this ideology served, suggesting that we understand science "not just as a community with special

professional concerns and with normative components appropriate to these concerns, but also as an interest group with a domineering elite and a justificatory ideology" (1976: 654).

This line of argument drove the discussion toward the question of whether the norms were applicable to the new situation of science, which was understood to be more commercialized and "private." The norms came to appear to some critics as the idealization of a previous form of science that systematically distorted the present understanding of science. New models of transdisciplinary research with specific practical goals also seemed to fit poorly with the norms, which now could be seen to relate primarily to competition for prestige in a disciplinary setting.

SEE ALSO: Ambivalence; Communism; Merton, Robert K.; Nobel Prizes and the Scientific Elite; Norms; Science and Culture; Science and Public Participation: The Democratization of Science; Science and Religion

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scientific productivity

SooHo Lee

Scientific productivity refers to the productivity of scientists in their research performance. In other words, the term concerns how much output scientists produce within a certain time period, or compared to the inputs that are utilized for the research. The major outputs from research are publications, patents, inventions, and product developments. However, especially in research institutions, productivity more directly refers to publication or publishing productivity since most research results are reported as forms of publication. Therefore, being “more or less productive” simply indicates that a scientist produces more or fewer publications than do others. Scholarly journal articles, books, conference papers, and monographs are included in publication counts. Among the publication forms, peer reviewed journal articles are most frequently used as a productivity measure.

Three different methods are used for counting publications: normal count (also called *standard* count), fractional count (also called *adjusted* count), and first author count (also called *straight* count). In normal count, each of the co authors is given full credit for the multi authored publications regardless of how much each contributed to the publications. This counting method is most often used due to the convenience of data collection. However, inflating the number of publications is a major disadvantage. In contrast, in a fractional count, each publication is counted as one divided by the number of co authors. The main purpose of using fractional count is to remove an overestimation of normal count and estimate the individual contribution to a publication. But the process of fractional counting is very tedious since all the co authors are not always identified. First author count is another way to remove the

inflated credit by normal count and to determine the individual’s major contribution to publications. This method only recognizes publications in which the individual has contributed as the main author.

While publication counts deal with the quantity of research performance, citation counts, on the other hand, address the quality of publications. It is often said that the more qualified the publication, the greater the number of citations. However, citation count is less frequently used for measuring productivity because it is not a direct output but shows the impact or influence of publications.

Since scientific productivity is of interest not only to academics but also for public policy in more recent times, what determines scientific productivity has been extensively studied in many disciplines. The literature identifies many determinants including psychological characteristics, demographic characteristics, environmental characteristics, cumulative advantages, and reinforcement. Psychological characteristics indicate that motivation, inner compulsion, capacity to work hard, cognitive and perceptual style, and work habits all affect the productivity of scientists significantly. It is almost always true that productive scientists have strong motivation and orientation for research.

Among the demographic characteristics, age is an important predictor for productivity. Early studies found that a productivity peak occurs in scientists’ late thirties and early forties and thereafter declines steadily. By contrast, some recent studies identify another productivity peak around age 50. Although there are many different life cycle models of productivity, they should be interpreted appropriately in the context of a specific discipline. For example, the productivity cycle in physics is different from that in sociology. In most cases, scientists become less productive as they age, especially after 50. It is also often pointed out that the age effect is attributed to age and not to the possibility that older scientists have different attributes, values, or access to resources than younger members. Like age, gender is also an important variable affecting productivity difference. Early studies commonly pointed out that women tend to have somewhat lower publication rates than men. But more recent studies do not agree with this proposition, rather believing

that sex differences in publication productivity are negligible, with the exception of women with young children. In a similar vein, one recent study found that sex differences in the number of publications increase during the first decade of the career, but are reversed later in the career.

Environmental and organizational factors also play a significant role in determining scientific productivity. For example, prestigious institutions tend to have more research resources and many “star” scientists in more specific research fields. The advantages are likely to help their scientists to collaborate more easily with experts inside the organization and also to attract more joint research and research grants from outsiders. Especially when research projects require more expensive equipment and infrastructure (not only physical but also human capital), the institutional capacity and external supports significantly affect research performance.

Cumulative advantage and reinforcement theories explain the difference of scientific productivity among scientists by using a concept of “feedback” processes. They propose that prior exceptional performance is conducive to later performance. The ideas are largely based on Merton’s so called “Matthew effect” in science: once scientists receive recognition from their colleagues, they accrue additional advantages as they progress through their careers. The advantages typically begin with doctoral training in a prestigious department. The training, in turn, leads to a position in a major research university amply supplied with adequate resources for research. The initial appointment has a major impact on later productivity, and in turn, the prestige of second department and subsequent productivity. Cumulative advantage deals with resources and prestige of institutions, whereas reinforcement addresses the feedback one receives from successful publication of works, works being cited, and formal and informal praise from colleagues. Reinforcement theory typically explains that when scientists publish, the recognition they receive for the contribution stimulates further publication.

Although publication productivity measures scientists’ research performance efficiently, it still loses many aspects of scientists’ research performance. In particular, the outputs of teaching and mentoring as important research activities are often neglected in measuring scientific

productivity. So a better measurement needs to be developed to include broader aspects of scientific activity.

SEE ALSO: Matthew Effect; Peer Review and Quality Control in Science; Science; Scientific Networks and the Invisible Colleges

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scientific racism

Jessica Blatt

Science has a long and fraught history of entanglement with the social myth of biological race. The modern sciences of biology and physical anthropology were founded on the conviction that racial difference was real, fundamental, and key to understanding the proper relationships between human groups. Advances in these very sciences, however, have shown that race is in no way an objective, natural category. While there are certainly biological differences among human populations, these differences are both relatively trivial and impossible to

map onto conventional racial divides. Genetic research, similarly, has yielded no statistically significant patterns of variation by race (Marks 2002). However, this is not a simple story of scientific progress, in which bad ideas are systematically displaced by better ones. The rise and (incomplete) retreat of scientific racism is an eminently political story.

In general terms, scientific racism is characterized by two central fallacies: a classificatory fallacy (race formalism) and a fallacy of reductionism and determinism in which complex phenomena such as intelligence or the capacity for self restraint are reified and explained as resulting straightforwardly from apparently simple causes, such as genes. Race formalism is the idea that humanity can be subdivided into groups that form “real,” objective, natural units, sharing significant biological, and usually cultural and behavioral, characteristics. Originating in the rage for classification in Enlightenment science and philosophy, this idea reached a peak of scientific respectability in the decades around the turn of the twentieth century.

In *Systema Naturae* (1740), Carolus Linnaeus, the father of zoological classification, proposed four subdivisions of humankind: Americanus, Europaeus, Asiaticus, and Afer, or African. In a 1795 revision of his seminal work *On the Natural Variety of Mankind*, the German naturalist Johann Friedrich Blumenbach elaborated on this scheme, identifying five “races,” the first and most perfect being, in his coinage, “Caucasian.” Along with his invention of the Caucasian race, Blumenbach is remembered for introducing an explicit hierarchy into the Linnaean scheme. Nevertheless, Blumenbach recognized clearly that boundaries between races are artificial, and in fact his classification reflected the widely shared Enlightenment belief in the essential unity of humankind, with any variations explained in environmental terms.

As debates over slavery heightened during the nineteenth century, however, this view of humanity’s natural history was rejected by many who argued that human races were in fact unrelated, hierarchically ranked species. Known as polygenesis or “multiple creations,” this theory reached its height of popularity around the time of the American Civil War. Polygenetic theories spurred the collection of reams of physical data, particularly relating to skull size and form,

meant to define race differences. (This data and its uses have been effectively critiqued by Gould 1996.)

After the publication of Charles Darwin’s *Origin of Species* (1859), polygenesis was largely displaced in scientific discourse by notions of races as groups sharing a common origin but occupying distinct rungs of an evolutionary ladder (though many scientists persisted in labeling these groups as separate species). The late decades of the nineteenth century saw intense interest both in using evolutionary frameworks to understand social reality and in racial classification specifically. (This was particularly so in the United States following the abandonment of Reconstruction era attempts to establish civic equality for freed slaves.) These trends were most prominently expressed in attempts to explain social hierarchy in terms of relative evolutionary fitness (social Darwinism, associated with Herbert Spencer), to measure and quantify racial difference (ethnology), and to reconstruct the evolutionary history of Europeans through study of living groups of “savages” (an enterprise known as the “comparative method”).

Efforts to systematize racial classification, however, proved elusive. The 1911 *Report of the Dillingham Commission on Immigration to the US Senate* illustrates this difficulty. The report’s “Dictionary of Races or Peoples” (even the title is indecisive) follows a racial classification recognizing 5 races, 6 “stocks,” and 64 “peoples.” At the same time, it acknowledges five distinct, competing schemes, proposing as few as 3 and as many as 29 races. However, the difficulty of imposing racial boundaries on human diversity, while it frustrated many biologists and physical anthropologists, did not by itself lead many to abandon the attempt. This required the confluence of external, political events with the efforts of scientific activists.

Throughout the nineteenth century, the physical characteristics of race were generally seen to be associated with behavioral characteristics as well, almost universally in ways that favored Europeans over other races, with “Negroes” or “Africans” at the bottom. The dissemination, just after the turn of the twentieth century, of Gregor Mendel’s theories of heredity lent support to the idea that these behavioral traits were fixed, hereditary, and determined by what eventually came to be called “genes.” These

reductionist and determinist notions fueled the American eugenics movement, which defended the regime of racial segregation and advocated (with considerable success) anti miscegenation laws, immigration restriction, and compulsory sterilization of the “unfit,” all in the name of racial purity and “betterment.” They were also linked to a series of attempts to quantify (and map the racial distribution of) human potential, as with the development of IQ and other mental tests. The emerging discipline of industrial relations also used racial classifications, attempting to determine which groups were best suited to particular kinds of work. To be sure, such ideas were not confined to the United States. Arguments about the biologically determined inferiority of non white groups figured in justifications of European colonialism broadly and helped to legitimize the regime of segregation that would come to be known as apartheid in South Africa, for instance.

Eugenics would see its most complete and horrific expression in Germany, where “race hygiene,” as the movement was known there, helped to justify the Holocaust. Nonetheless, American scientific racism was particularly virulent and influential. (The first compulsory sterilization law promulgated by the Nazi regime was in fact copied from a model drafted by American eugenicist Harry Laughlin.)

Widespread revulsion provoked by revelations of Nazi atrocities helped fuel an international reaction against scientific racism in the post World War II era. The United Nations Education, Scientific, and Cultural Organization (UNESCO) issued a series of “statements on race” signed by leading social and natural scientists beginning in 1950 (Montagu 1972). These statements, while not entirely unambiguous, were generally understood as a collective statement by the scientific community declaring racial doctrines to be harmful ideology without basis in natural science. They were the long delayed fruit of lobbying efforts by activist, anti racist scientists, led to a significant degree by anthropologist Franz Boas, to combat scientific racism (Barkan 1992). These efforts largely discredited scientific racism within the mainstream science and larger academic communities. More broadly, over the ensuing decades the US civil rights revolution and decolonization in Asia and Africa worked to delegitimize

popular racism to an extent, decreasing the appeal of scientific racism in and outside the academy.

Nevertheless, scientific racism is far from gone. Even in the immediate aftermath of the first UNESCO statements, white supremacists continued to try to turn racist theories to political advantage, for example in a series of lawsuits aimed at overturning *Brown v. Board of Education* (1954), the landmark Supreme Court decision outlawing racial segregation in American schools. More recently, a number of attempts to explain racial stratification in biological terms have surfaced since the 1980s, probably the best known of which is Richard Herrnstein and Charles Murray’s *The Bell Curve* (1994). While widely criticized and largely discredited within mainstream science, scientific racism continues to tap into widespread folk ideas about racial difference and hierarchy.

SEE ALSO: Apartheid and Nelson Mandela; *Bell Curve, The* (Herrstein and Murray); Eugenics; Holocaust; Immigration; Industrial Relations; Race; Race (Racism); Racial Hierarchy; Racist Movements; Spencer, Herbert; Stratification, Race/Ethnicity and

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scientific revolution

J. I. (Hans) Bakker

To summarize the scientific revolution in one phrase: it was the time when a new way of studying the natural, physical world became widely accepted by a small “community of scholars,” although not necessarily by nonscientists. But the specific status of that “new way” is hotly disputed and the precise historical steps involved in that development are extremely complex. Standard histories are those by Dampier (1966) and Cohen (2001). Cohen stresses the stages involved from initial creative insight to dissemination (orally or in letters, later on in print) and then widespread acceptance. For example, Descartes’ theory of inertia of 1633 was held back when the Inquisition condemned Galileo’s theological interpretations and Descartes decided it was not a good time to publish. In the seventeenth century there was a significant qualitative transformation in the approach to the study of natural philosophy and that major change is now often called the “scientific revolution,” but it is clear that small scale “revolutions” took place before and have happened since. It was at that time that the transition from undifferentiated “astronomy/astrology” and “alchemy/chemistry” first really got under way. Moreover, great advances were made in mathematics. The story of the rise of modern science begins even earlier, however, with the Arab contacts with Greek science, and modern science eventually led to Enlightenment philosophy (Hellemans & Bunch 1988: 58–188). Different natural philosophies changed at different rates and in different ways. For example, empirical and theoretical progress in astronomy and physics was different from progress in other physical sciences like chemistry (Goodman & Russell 1991: 387–414). However, it was between circa 1500 and 1800 that the distinction between true science and proto science or pseudo science (Shermer 2001: 22–65) became somewhat clearer. Many thinkers have seen the essence of the intellectual revolution as a leap beyond the tradition inherited from Aristotelianism and rationalism. But the notion that simple inductive empiricism, often identified with Francis Bacon’s New “Organon” (*Novum*

organum) of 1620, is the basis of the scientific method has been rejected. It should be remembered that the introduction of Aristotle’s *Organon* concerning “categories” and “interpretation,” and his physics, astronomy, and biology transferred into Roman Catholic theology by Thomas Aquinas, was considered a radical step and indeed did open a window to the study of the actual order of nature and the universe (Funkenstein 1986). The idea of the importance of nuances of general theoretical assumptions concerning ontology and epistemology has been widely shared ever since the early 1960s, when Kuhn’s (1970) history of paradigmatic changes in physical science became widely accepted. Indeed, the social sciences now also regularly use Kuhn’s general theory of an oscillation between “normal science” and “paradigmatic revolutions.” The link between Kuhn’s theories and earlier views concerning a dialectic of reason – views primarily associated with Hegel’s critique of Cartesian dualism (Russon 1991) – should be noted. However, the seventeenth century paradigmatic revolution associated with Descartes, Galileo, Copernicus, Kepler, von Helmont, and many others was extremely important, since it laid the foundation for what was considered to be true science for the next four centuries. Newton’s laws of gravitational attraction, motion, and force (i.e., inverse square law) in the *Principia Mathematica* (1687 manuscript) led to British Newtonianism, which was widely exported throughout Europe (e.g., the Low Countries), but Cartesianism in France was a rival for many years (Russell 1991). In the eighteenth century botany and zoology became more systematic with the use of binomial nomenclature, although Linnaeus’s theories of nature and of society were deeply flawed (Koerner 1999). It was only at the beginning of the twentieth century that a series of new ideas constituting a general change in worldviews made a radical shift in scientific thinking possible. Einstein’s theory of relativity did not reject Newtonian mechanics, but did make it clear that Newton’s assumptions about space and time were too limited and that a true explanation of gravity required postulating “space time.” Similarly, discoveries in mathematics and statistics, particularly the invention of non Euclidean geometry, revolutionized science in the twentieth century in somewhat the same way they had

in earlier times (Newman 1956). The same can be said for Boolean and Fregean mathematical and symbolic logic (Bartley in Dodgson 1986: 3–42). Comte (1957) wrote that scientific thinking moves only gradually, but inevitably, from the study of distant objects, such as stars, to that which is closest to human life – society itself. His positivism had a profound impact on logical positivism and the quest for “consilience,” a unified general science of all of the natural world (Wilson 1998). In English the distinction between science and social science is more rigid than in many other languages. In German the term *Wissenschaft* encompasses not only physical and natural sciences, but also social sciences and other disciplines such as history and jurisprudence.

SEE ALSO: Comte, Auguste; Hegel, G. W. F.; Kuhn, Thomas and Scientific Paradigms; Science

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scientology

Peter B. Anderson

Scientology, or officially the “Church of Scientology,” was founded by adherents of Lafayette Ron Hubbard (1911–86) in 1954, but the movement behind Scientology dates back to Hubbard’s publication of the book *Dianetics: The Modern Science of Mental Health* in 1950. Dianetics was a therapeutic system which Hubbard claimed could cure psychosomatic illness. Dianetics can be described as an attack on what Hubbard considered to be the materialistic position of psychiatry. Hubbard stressed that he wanted to overcome the unspiritual therapeutic strategies he saw in psychiatry and to deliver the techniques for everyone to reach mental whole-ness. In his anthropology, man is basically good and strives for survival of various collectives termed “dynamics,” in Dianetics from the individual level to that of humanity, and in Scientology he added further levels up to the “urge towards existence as infinity,” termed the “God Dynamic.”

Dianetics assumes that a person receives and stores impressions, the so called “engrams,” painful memories from this or earlier lives, leading an individual to irrational acts. The aim of Dianetics was that man should reach the state of “clear” – completely rational. The Dianetics therapy is based on “auditing,” which involves an auditor who listens to the statements of the “pre clear,” as the person in an auditing session is termed. Besides the principles underlining the early steps of the auditing, the contents up towards and above clear are not known to outsiders, as it is considered dangerous knowledge for people who have not acquired it through proper auditing.

After a number of conflicts – including conflicts with the established psychiatric and psychological therapeutic system – economic crisis, and the fact that he lost the copyright to his own book, Hubbard formed a new organization and the first Church of Scientology was founded in 1954. From an organizational point of view the Church of Scientology appears to be in contrast to Dianetics. Dianetics was loosely organized, public, and impossible to manage for Hubbard, whereas the Church of Scientology is hierarchic, with control systems making sure that all employees act in accordance with the wishes of the organization. This has been reshuffled and strengthened a number of times. The Sea Organization (Sea Org) was founded as an elite group of Scientologists committing themselves up to a billion years in 1967. In 1981 the religious activities were collected in the Church of Scientology International and since 1982 the religious activities have been overseen by the Religious Technology Center, which holds all the trade and service marks of Hubbard's work since his death.

The organizational development has been identified as one of the rare transformations from a so called cult to a sect. The cult consists of open minded seekers in a cultic milieu, whereas the sect claims to have a unique way of salvation which the adherents have to follow (Wallis 1977).

In its belief system, influences from theology, Eastern religions, and interplanetary activity can be seen, and Scientology emphasizes that members may sustain other religious memberships as well. As a consequence it is difficult to determine the exact number of Scientologists. In many countries Scientology does not keep central membership files, and beyond an active core many Scientologists have little or no contact with the church, even if they consider themselves Scientologists. World based estimates vary from about 1 million to the official figure of 8 million in 2004.

Hubbard's utilitarian ethics led him to investigate a number of social phenomena and based on his findings there are now separate organizations for the improvement of education (Association for Better Living and Education (ABLE) and Applied Scholastics) and drug habilitation (Narconon). Other organizations include the Way to Happiness Foundation, and the Citizens

Commission for Human Rights (CCHR). Apart from general human rights activities, the CCHR continues Hubbard's fight with the psychiatric system, where it tries to document abuses in medication and links to Nazi medicine.

Whereas social activities have been kept within the general frame of Scientology, there have recently been attempts to disseminate techniques to improve the situation of individuals beyond the lines of Scientology. This is a reaction to the events following the attack on the Twin Towers in New York in 2001. Scientology considers the "War against Terror" dangerous for humanity, and thinks that it has set the world on a course towards destruction. The attempt to disseminate techniques to improve individuals has been accompanied by a general recruitment campaign, to "clear the world."

Scientology's widespread activities have been difficult to fit into classificatory frameworks of health science, psychiatry, religion, and social activities in general. Scientology insists that auditing is a primary religious activity, and has faced problems being recognized as a full fledged religious body in countries (e.g., Great Britain) where religious activities are deemed to be collective. Many countries have allowed Scientology to register as a religious body due to the general religious content of the system (e.g., in the USA, Australia, Sweden, Germany). In some places the related social activities are considered religious, and in others charitable, independent of whether Scientology is recognized as a religious body in the country or not.

SEE ALSO: Charisma; Cults: Social Psychological Aspects; New Religious Movements; Religion, Sociology of; Sect

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scientometrics

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Scientometrics is a methodological discipline and an administrative practice. In the first case, its major concern has been the identification of patterns of communication among scientists supporting theoretical models of cognitive and institutional development of science. In the second case, its concern is the identification of patterns in science and technology activities conceived as an input/output productive system. In both cases the identification of patterns is quantitative oriented and the interpretation of data has relied heavily on economic and sociological models and in recent times, on informational models, too.

SCIENTOMETRICS AS AN ADMINISTRATIVE PRACTICE

The integration of science and technology into national account systems became a necessity when the activity reached financial prominence after World War II. Science and technology activities constitute so large an enterprise that nowadays they employ hundreds of thousands of scientists and engineers all over the world, requiring significant proportions of GNP. Thus, countries have felt the need to render these activities accountable for scientists themselves, the general public, the state, and for those engaged in the administration, funding, and execution of science and technology activities.

The official history of scientometrics as an administrative practice often signals J. D. Bernal's *The Social Function of Science* (1939) as its inaugural work. Bernal's contribution set the quantitative study of scientific literature and personnel and the utilization of mathematical models as the foundations of objective examination and deliberation on science policy and management. Yet, as the developmental age that followed the war took off, scientometrics also began to be considered among the developmental sciences (Anderson & Buck 1980).

Due to its potential for empowering actors in controlling science and technology activities by scientific means, scientometrics developed greatly, in contrast with earlier and more encompassing proposals such as the *Science of Science* program proposed by Price (1964), which gradually went into decline. If this program once comprised the "history, philosophy, sociology, psychology, economics, political science, and operations research (etc.) of science, technology, medicine (etc.)," the development of scientometrics has been more decidedly oriented towards the making of metrics for the measurement of relevant social variables that would make possible the study of science and technology activities from the plethora of theoretical perspectives just mentioned.

Through quantification, scientometrics is at first glance prone to and easily integrated into economics, and through it to developmental policies for science and technology. Indeed, at different times economists have seen science, technology, or both (depending on the underlying model) as the missing factor or the key element explaining economic growth and socio-cultural development. In a broader sense, scientometrics as an administrative practice involves the construction and use of a wide range of measurements and models employed in prospective studies (i.e., the assessment of future trends in science and technology within plausible socioeconomic scenarios, in technical change studies, demographic studies on human resources for science and technology, technology choice, science and technology planning, and more recently, knowledge management within commercial and private organizations) (Tisdell 1981).

SCIENTOMETRICS AS A METHODOLOGICAL DISCIPLINE

As a methodological discipline scientometrics is conceived in a more restrictive sense limited to the study of scientific communication processes (Borgman 1990) and more often than not to the identification of quantitative patterns found in scientific literature. Despite the fact that there is no real agreement about this reduction of scientometrics to bibliometrics, nor about the identity between scientometrics and *informetrics* (Scientometrics 1994), from this bibliometric viewpoint scientometrics has been more often associated with the sociological understanding of science, both as a social system and as a socio technical network.

As regards the literature there is a clear set of contributions starting from the 1960s that might be grouped as belonging to scientometrics as a methodological discipline. One of the most significant is *Little Science, Big Science* published in 1963 by the physicist and historian of science Dereck de Solla Price. The significance of this contribution is that it brought together previously published isolated results into an all encompassing model for the quantitative study of science based on its formal communication patterns. The three main problems this model addresses are the growth, structure, and consumption of scientific literature.

The logistic model of scientific growth states that if any sufficiently large segment of science is measured in any reasonable way, this measurement will show that at any time in history, science's rate of growth is proportional to its size, whatever the index chosen for measurement. In the first mathematical approach, the empirical law of growth (as Price named it) can be represented by an exponential function with a doubling period of about 10 to 15 years, depending on how stringent are the criteria used for defining the chosen index. It is evident that such sustained growth, starting in the sixteenth century, cannot continue indefinitely. Eventually, exponential growth will reach some limit, when the process must slacken and stop or, as a result of substantial contextual changes, science will undergo a redefinition so that further growth can be achieved. Price's exciting conclusions about the future of science once it reaches

saturation were not subject to further investigation or monitoring.

As to the structure of scientific production, the model resumed investigations undertaken as early as 1874 by Galton's inquiries into social elites developed in his *Hereditary Genius* (1884) and Lotka's empirical work on *The Frequency Distribution of Scientific Productivity* (1926). Having defined science in terms of the time series of scientific papers obeying a particularly fast pattern of growth, a further characterization of this growth can be made by showing that a relatively small and stable core of authors is responsible for a large fraction of scientific papers, and that the bulk of the population contributing the rest flows through rapidly.

Finally, the model integrates studies concerned with the consumption of scientific literature. Although Price was aware of its importance, it was the technical and conceptual contributions of Eugene Garfield (1955) that made possible the development of empirical research on this parameter. He introduced *citation indexing*, a method that revolutionized the way in which published knowledge (previously arranged by subject matter) was organized, using the relationships between documents established by authors themselves when referencing other papers. Garfield implemented this new form of bibliographical control using 1960s state of the art technology (computing) in order to process massive bibliographic data. Thus, by contrast to previous quantitative studies of the literature (including Price's) that were developed from the production side of the communication process using traditional bibliographic control, Garfield's development, which focused on the consumption side of the communication process, yielded an entirely new arena for bibliometrics whose results were consistent with Price's previous conclusions regarding the structure of scientific literature.

Scientometrics as a methodological discipline has developed many more important concepts and techniques, such as invisible colleges, the citation cycle, the Price Index, the co citation analysis, and the impact factor. However, the three notions of logistic growth, distribution of productivity, and citation of scientific literature constitute the heart of bibliometrics and have been the departure point of scientometrics as an

administrative practice, as any input/output analysis of science and technology takes into consideration bibliometrics as part of its battery of indicators.

Most interesting, however, are the interpretations and uses sociologists have made of bibliometrics. The very idea of bibliometrics as a specialty research method for the sociology of science is due to Merton and it was put into practice by his pupils when empirical investigations of the *normative structure of science* took off by the mid 1960s. At its outset the empirical program of the sociology of science focused on the problem of *stratification* within the social system of science (i.e., how to explain the social standing and value assigned to individuals within the community and the mechanism of social mobility within this community). Functionalists focused on the formal communication system of science – the scientific journals – as a privileged field for studying stratification, in as much as this system embodied, via peer reviewing, the complex of values and technical norms practiced by the scientific community when evaluating the originality, significance, and ultimately the quality of a contribution. Social standing within the community is then a result of rewards and other *cumulative advantages* conferred to a scientist on the basis of the significance of his or her contribution to the advancement of science and the fulfilment of the code of practice in achieving it. From this point of view, the basic reward a scientist may receive for his or her contribution is a citation to it. So it was that citation started to be considered as an indicator of scientific quality which, together with data on the productivity and growth of scientific literature, reveals a clear correlation between consumption, productivity, and social standing within the community. Moreover, soon after the introduction of the Science Citation Index, the range of applications of bibliometric data for the study of science was rapidly enhanced to include the history of scientific discoveries, cognitive maps of research fronts, and differentiated patterns of development among the sciences (natural and applied) and between these sciences and the humanities.

There is another bibliometric strand associated with actor network theory (Callon et al. 1986). According to this view, publishing scientific results is part of a more comprehensive

strategy scientists use in the social making of scientific facts. Indeed, publication is an important part of the strategy, for it is by that means that the socio technical network required for supporting a knowledge claim is constructed. Thus, if scientists' performance is guided by interests rather than values, the methodological question was to develop means for following those interests and their textual translations as they are performed in the scientific paper via referencing. The starting point of qualitative scientometrics is the indexicality of words like problems used by scientists in their texts. Actor network theorists focused on the way in which an author indexes a bibliographic reference within a line of argument that a paper develops. For analytical purposes, then, an article may be reduced to a network of powerful words that can be represented as a simple graph linking all of them. Each point on the graph represents a word, while a line indicates that the words linked in this way co occur in the article. The graph that summarizes an article can be read, like the original article, as a structured network of claimed equivalences. Such claimed equivalences between heterogeneous elements represent an author's strategy of translation. Thus, an author's socio technical network can be described to an extent through the equivalences and linkages between problems like words and through the measurement of the number of times such an equivalence appears in the total body of literature in which it might occur. The co word approach allows successful translations to be traced and distinguished. This visualization makes possible a departure from the network of textual translations to the network of socio technical problems, interests, and actors.

SEE ALSO: Actor Network Theory; Citations and Scientific Indexing; Matthew Effect; Scientific Norms/Counternorms; Scientific Productivity

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scripting theories

David Knapp Whittier

To articulate a sociological approach to human sexuality, William Simon and John Gagnon drew upon Kenneth Burke's dramatism and view that it is inappropriate and inaccurate to apply physical models to social phenomena. The "sexual script" concept (Gagnon & Simon 1973) summarizes their approach and their fullest articulation is known as "sexual scripting theory" (Simon & Gagnon 1986). The theory stresses three major areas of social life as significant for the production of sexuality: (1) cultural scenarios for sexuality, (2) interpersonal sexual scripting, and (3) intrapsychic sexual scripting. "Cultural scenarios" refers to definitions of and instructions for sex which can be

found in social institutions and cultural materials. "Interpersonal scripting" refers to the social arrangement of actual sexual interactions. "Intrapsychic scripting" refers to the activity and content of the mind, like sexual thoughts, fantasies, beliefs, and emotions. Sexual scripting analysis is the examination of the separate roles and interrelationships of these three areas of social life as they help produce sexuality.

Sexual scripting theory was built up out of the application of sociological ideas to sexuality. Gagnon and Simon's book, *Sexual Conduct: The Social Sources of Human Sexuality*, was revised and reissued in 2005. It is an important and prescient conceptualization predating Foucault's postmodernist position on sexuality and presaging queer theory approaches. Perhaps its greatest impact has been its conceptual theoretic contribution to the field – although it is rarely acknowledged. Even more rarely have empirical studies explicitly used sexual scripting theory.

When the theory has explicitly guided research the analyses have tended to emphasize one level only, most frequently that of cultural scenarios. For example, Laumann et al. (1994) correlate sociocultural contexts with sexual behaviors. Analyses which only match cultural scenarios with behaviors do not relate the mechanisms by which individuals acquire, and social life helps to create, sexuality. The attention to culture, interaction, and mind in sexual scripting theory is similar to that found in symbolic interactionism (Longmore 1998). However, there exists little work proclaiming guidance by both symbolic interactionism and sexual scripting theory. Only a couple of studies of interpersonal sexual interaction claim sexual scripting theory parentage (e.g., Escoffier 2003). Similarly, all but a few social psychological studies (e.g., Whittier & Melendez 2004) of sexuality embrace sexual scripting theory. Carr's (1999) cognitive sociology contribution notably implicates interrelationships of sexual scripting levels.

Sexual scripting theory also engages broad sociohistorical analysis and theorization of the self in pointing to a relationship between sexuality and modernity in helping to bring about individuation. Simultaneous specification of sexual change and forms at all three sexual scripting levels may require an extremely wide

range of data and substantial cross disciplinary abilities. The ambitiousness of this theory may deter use and even result in misunderstandings of it. Sexual scripting theory sincerely asks for depictions of the emergence of sociosexual facts like sexual intercourse and titillation. It is a bold framework for specifying how, in time and place, social life forms sexuality.

SEE ALSO: Constructionism; Self; Social Psychology; Symbolic Interaction

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second demographic transition

Ron J. Lesthaeghe

The first or "classic" demographic transition refers to the historical declines in mortality and fertility, as witnessed from the eighteenth

century onward in several European populations, and continuing at present in most developing countries. The end point of the first demographic transition (FDT) was supposed to be an older stationary and stable population corresponding with replacement fertility (i.e., just over two children on average), zero population growth, and life expectancies higher than 70 years. As there would be an ultimate balance between deaths and births, there would be no "demographic" need for sustained immigration. Moreover, households in all parts of the world would converge toward the nuclear and conjugal types, composed of married couples and their offspring.

The second demographic transition (SDT), on the other hand, sees no such equilibrium as the end point. Rather, new developments bring sustained sub replacement fertility, a multitude of living arrangements other than marriage, the disconnection between marriage and procreation, and no stationary population. Instead, populations would face declining sizes if not complemented by new migrants (i.e., "replacement migration"), and they will also be much older than envisaged by the FDT as a result of lower fertility and additional gains in longevity. Migration streams will not be capable of stemming aging, but only stabilize population sizes. Nonetheless, the outcome is still the further growth of "multicultural societies." On the whole, the SDT brings new social challenges, including those associated with further aging, integration of immigrants and other cultures, less stability of households, and high levels of poverty or exclusion among certain household types (e.g., single persons of all ages, lone mothers).

HISTORY OF THE CONCEPT

The idea of a distinct phase stems directly from Philippe Ariès's analysis of the history of childhood and his paper on two successive motivations for low fertility (Ariès 1980). In his view, during the FDT, the decline in fertility was "unleashed by an enormous sentimental and financial investment in the child." Ariès refers to this as the "Child king era," and the fertility transition was carried by an altruistic investment in child quality. This motivation is no

longer the dominant one. Within the SDT, the motivation for parenthood is adult self realization, and the choice for just one particular lifestyle in competition with several others. The altruistic element focusing on offspring has weakened and the adult dyadic relationship has gained prominence instead.

The second element that sparked the SDT theory was the conviction that the cyclical fertility theory as formulated by Richard Easterlin would no longer hold and that sub replacement fertility was to become a structural, long term feature in western populations. In Easterlin's theory, small cohorts would have better employment opportunities and hence earlier marriage and higher fertility, whereas large cohorts would have worse economic life chances and display the opposite demographic responses. The cyclical reinforcement then stems from large cohorts of parents giving birth to small cohorts of children and vice versa. The SDT does not expect cyclical effects that would be strong enough to determine the fertility trend. Rather, it advances that other effects, both economic and cultural, have an overriding capacity in conditioning these trends.

The third element that conditioned the SDT theory is the major role given to the ideational factor and to the dynamics of cultural shift. The SDT theory fully recognizes the effects of macro level structural changes and of micro level economic calculus. As such it is not at odds with the core arguments of neoclassic economic reasoning. However, the SDT view does not consider these explanations as sufficient but merely as non redundant. By the same token, the cultural factors involved are non redundant elements and not sufficient ones. The SDT is therefore an "overarching" theory that spans both economic and sociological reasoning. And it does not do so by taking value orientations as endogenous or by considering culture as a form of addiction, but by treating ideational changes as exogenous influences that add stability to trends over and beyond economic fluctuations. The SDT furthermore links cultural shifts to dynamic processes of cohort succession, and to a recursive model of values based selection and individual values reorientation as a function of paths followed during the life course.

Fourth, a major stepping stone of the SDT theory has also been Abraham Maslow's theory

of changing needs. As populations become more wealthy and more educated, attention shifts away from needs associated with survival, security, and solidarity. Instead, greater weight is attached to individual self realization, recognition, grassroots democracy, and expressive work and education values. The SDT theory is therefore closely related to Ron Inglehart's concept of "postmaterialism" and its growing importance in political development. The direct consequence of this is that SDT also predicts that the typical demographic outcomes (sustained sub replacement fertility, growth of alternative living arrangements) are likely to emerge in non western societies that equally develop in the direction of capitalist economies, with multilevel democratic institutions, and greater accentuation of Maslowian "higher order needs."

FIRST DEMOGRAPHIC TRANSITION– SECOND DEMOGRAPHIC TRANSITION CONTRASTS

Having pointed out the intellectual origins of SDT, more attention can be given to the FDT–SDT contrast. Originally, SDT was viewed as the mere continuation of FDT, but such a "single transition" view obscures major differences of both a demographic and a social nature. The major contrasts have therefore been listed in Table 1.

Opposite Nuptiality Trends

The FDT transition in the West is characterized by the gradual weakening of the old Malthusian "preventive check" located in late and non universal marriage. Ages at first marriage are lowered and proportions marrying increased during the FDT. Furthermore, the areas where cohabitation and out of wedlock fertility had survived until the twentieth century, join the mainstream characterized by low illegitimacy and low incidence of unmarried partnerships. The earliest age at marriage is reached in the 1960s. Thereafter, all trends are reversed and rapidly so: ages at first marriage increase, more single persons start living alone or start to cohabit prior to marriage, long term cohabitation replaces marriage, and ultimately fertility outside marriage becomes much more frequent.

Table 1 Overview of demographic and societal characteristics respectively related to the FDT and SDT (Western Europe)

<i>FDT</i>	<i>SDT</i>
A. Marriage	
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Rise in proportions marrying, declining age at first marriage • Low or reduced cohabitation • Low divorce • High remarriage 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Fall in proportions married, rise in age at first marriage • Rise in cohabitation (pre- and postmarital) • Rise in divorce, earlier divorce • Decline of remarriage following both divorce and widowhood
B. Fertility	
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Decline in marital fertility via reductions at older ages, lowering mean ages at first parenthood • Deficient contraception, parity failures • Declining illegitimate fertility • Low definitive childlessness among married couples 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Further decline in fertility via postponement, increasing mean age at first parenthood, structural subreplacement fertility • Efficient contraception (exceptions in specific social groups) • Rising extra-marital fertility, parenthood within cohabitation • Rising definitive childlessness in unions
C. Societal background	
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Preoccupations with basic material needs: income, work conditions, housing, health, schooling, social security. Solidarity prime value • Rising memberships of political, civic, and community-oriented networks. Strengthening of social cohesion • Strong normative regulation by state and churches. First secularization wave, political and social “pillarization” • Segregated gender roles, familistic policies, embourgeoisement • Ordered life course transitions, prudent marriage and dominance of one single family model 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Rise of “higher order” needs: individual autonomy, self-actualization, expressive work and socialization values, grassroots democracy, recognition. Tolerance prime value • Disengagement from civic and community-oriented networks, social capital shifts to expressive and affective types. Weakening of social cohesion • Retreat of the state, second secularization wave, sexual revolution, refusal of authority, political “depillarization” • Rising symmetry in gender roles, female economic autonomy • Flexible life course organization, multiple lifestyles, open future

A similar turnaround also takes place with respect to remarriage. During FDT, divorce (or widowhood) is often followed by remarriage, and even by continued childbearing. During SDT, post marital relationships are channelled into cohabitation or living apart together (LAT) relationships rather than remarriage. In parts of Central and in Eastern Europe, where the historical Malthusian late marriage pattern did not exist, SDT is equally characterized by a new trend toward later marriage and more cohabitation after 1990. Also, out of wedlock fertility now follows the western trend. Moreover, such features are now also emerging in the western part of Southern Europe (Italy, Malta, Spain, and especially Portugal).

Opposite Timing of Fertility

During FDT, fertility became increasingly confined to marriage, contraception mostly affected fertility at the older ages (stopping) and higher marriage durations, mean ages at parenthood declined, but childlessness among married couples remained low. There are examples of below replacement fertility during FDT, but these correspond to exceptional periods of deep economic crisis or war.

SDT starts in the 1960s with a multifaceted revolution. First, there was the contraceptive revolution with the introduction of hormonal contraception and far more efficient IUDs. Second, there was the sexual revolution, with

declining ages at first sexual intercourse. Third, there was the gender revolution that questioned the sole breadwinner household model and the gender division of labor that accompanied it. These three “revolutions” fit within the framework of an overall rejection of authority, the assertion of individual freedom of choice (autonomy), and an overhaul of the normative structure. The overall outcome of this with respect to fertility is postponement: mean ages at first parenthood rise again, opportunities for childbearing are lost due to higher divorce, the share of childless women increases, and higher parity births (4 +) become rare. The net result is structural and long term below replacement fertility.

Social Contrasts

With the exception of the very early fertility decline in France and a few other small European regions, much of FDT was an integral part of a development phase during which economic growth fostered material aspirations and improvements in material living conditions. The preoccupations of the 1860–1960 era were mainly concerned with increasing household real incomes, improving working and housing conditions, raising standards of health, improving human capital through mass education, and providing a safety net for all via the gradual construction of a social security system. In Europe, these goals were shared and promoted by all major democratic political parties, their organizations, and by churches as well. In this endeavor solidarity was a central concept. All such political or religious “pillars” had their views on the desirable evolution of the family. For the religious organizations, these views were based on the holiness of matrimony in the first place, but their defense of the closely knit conjugal family also stemmed from fears that urbanization and industrialization would lead to immorality and atheism. The secular pillars, such as socialist or liberal parties, equally saw the family as the cornerstone of society. Both moral and material uplifting would be served best by a sharp gender based division within the family: husbands assume their roles as devoted breadwinners and women as guardians of all quality related issues (order and neatness,

health, education, etc.). In other words, all religious and political factions – including the communist one – contributed to the “*embourgeoisement*” of the family.

SDT, on the other hand, is founded on the rise of the higher order needs. Once the basic material preoccupations are satisfied, further income growth and educational expansion jointly lead to the articulation of more existential and expressive needs. These are centered on a triad: *self actualization* in formulating goals, *individual autonomy* in choosing means, and claiming *recognition* for their realization. These issues emerge in a variety of domains, and this is why the SDT is related to such a broad array of indicators of ideational or cultural shift (Lesthaeghe and Surkyn 2004a). SDT occurs in tandem with the growth of “postmaterialism” (Inglehart 1990) and political or religious “depillarization” (Lesthaeghe & Moors 1995), the disengagement from civic, professional, or community oriented associations, a critical stand vis à vis all forms of authority, the stress on expressive values in socialization and in work, and, of course, a quest for far more egalitarian gender relations. Also at the individual level, the choices for new types of households (premarital single living, cohabitation, and parenthood within cohabitation) are all linked to such individualistic and non conformist value orientations in a great variety of spheres. Furthermore, these associations between household types and value orientations not only hold for Northern and Western Europe but, by now, equally for Southern, Central and Eastern Europe.

CRITICISMS

Several criticisms have been launched against the SDT view. First, some argue there is no “second” demographic transition, but just the continuation of a single one. Second, some suggest that SDT is typical only of Northwestern Europe. Third, SDT does not envisage a “new equilibrium” at the end, unlike the original FDT. In addition to these objections, others dislike the strong “cultural” interpretation. A reply to these criticisms argues that SDT correctly predicted the trends in Central, Eastern, and Southern Europe, and that all correlations

at the micro level between household type and value orientations emerge there as well.

SEE ALSO: Cohabitation; Demographic Transition Theory; Secularization; Values

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secondary data analysis

Russell K. Schutt

Secondary data analysis is the method of using preexisting data in a different way or to answer a different research question than that intended by those who collected the data. The work of the secondary data analyst begins where the survey, experiment, or qualitative method that generates the data ends. The most common sources of data used in secondary analyses are social science surveys and data collected by government agencies, often with survey research methods, but it is also possible to reanalyze data that have been collected in experimental studies or with qualitative methods. Even reanalysis by researchers of data that they collected previously qualifies as secondary analysis if it is for a new purpose or in response to a methodological critique.

Secondary data analysis has been an important social science methodology since the earliest days of social research – Karl Marx reviewed government statistics in the Reading Room of the British Library; Émile Durkheim analyzed government records for his study of suicide rates. However, it is only with the advent of modern computers and, even more importantly, the Internet that secondary data analysis has become the most popular and accessible social research method. Literally thousands of large scale data sets are now available for the secondary data analyst, often with no more effort than the few commands required to download the data set; a number of important data sets can even be analyzed directly on the Web by users who lack their own statistical software.

There are many sources of data for secondary analysis within the United States and internationally. The most traditional source is data compiled by governmental units. The decennial population census by the US Bureau of the

Census is the single most important governmental data source, but many other data sets are collected by the Census and by other government agencies, including the US Census Bureau's Current Population Survey and its Survey of Manufactures or the Bureau of Labor Statistics' Consumer Expenditure Survey. These government data sets typically are quantitative; in fact, the term "statistics" – state istics – is derived from this type of data.

There are many other readily available sources: administrative data from hospitals, employers, and other institutions; records of transactions or other business conducted in government offices; both cross sectional and longitudinal social surveys conducted under many different auspices, ranging from university based researchers to international organizations like the Organization for Economic Development (OECD) (Hakim 1982: 6).

In the United States, the University of Michigan's Inter University Consortium for Political and Social Research (ICPSR) archives the most extensive collection of social science data sets outside of the federal government: more than 9,000 data sets from 130 countries, particularly from government units, social survey projects, and international organizations are made available online to individuals at more than 500 colleges and universities around the world that have joined ICPSR.

Far fewer qualitative data sets are available for secondary analysis, but the number is growing rapidly. The Human Relations Area Files at Yale University, established in 1949, currently contain over 800,000 pages of information on more than 365 different groups (HRAF 2005). More recently, multistudy qualitative archive projects have been developed by the Murray Research Center at Harvard's Radcliffe Institute for Advanced Study, and by the Economic and Social Data Service of the Universities of Sussex and Manchester in England, although these data sets are not available for direct public access. However, the ICPSR archives now include close to 100 data sets that have a qualitative component and the University of Southern Maine's Center for the Study of Lives makes life interview data available for reanalysis.

There are fundamental differences between a secondary and a primary analysis of social science data and there are unique challenges

faced by the secondary data analyst. What is most distinctive about the method of secondary data analysis is that it does not allow the progression from formulating a research question to designing specific methods that are best suited to answer that question. The secondary data analyst also cannot test and refine the methods to be used on the basis of preliminary feedback from the population or processes to be studied. Nor is it possible for the secondary data analyst to engage in the iterative process of making observations, developing concepts, making more observations, and refining the concepts that is the hallmark of much qualitative methodology.

These limitations of secondary data analysis mean that it may not be possible for a researcher to focus on the specific research question of original interest nor to use the most appropriate sampling or measurement approach for studying it. Secondary data analysis inevitably involves a tradeoff between the ease with which the research process can be initiated and the specific hypotheses that can be tested and methods that can be used. If the primary study was not designed to measure adequately a concept that is critical to the secondary analyst's hypothesis, the study may have to be abandoned until a more adequate source of data can be found. Alternatively, hypotheses or even the research question itself may be modified in order to match the analytic possibilities presented by the available data (Riedel 2000: 53).

Data quality is always a concern with secondary data, even when the data are collected by an official government agency. Government actions result at least in part from political processes that may not have as their first priority the design or maintenance of high quality data for social scientific analysis. For example, political opposition over the British Census's approach to recording ethnic origin led to changes in the 1991 Census that rendered its results inconsistent with prior years and that demonstrated the "tenuous relationship between enumeration [census] categories and possible social realities" (Fenton 1996: 155).

The basis for concern is much greater in research across national boundaries, because different data collection systems and definitions of key variables may have been used (Glover 1996). Census counts can be distorted by incorrect answers to census questions as well as by

inadequate coverage of the entire population (Rives & Serow 1988: 32–5).

Reanalyzing qualitative data collected by someone else also requires setting aside the interpretive research principle of letting the researcher's evolving understanding of a setting shape the focus of data collection efforts (Heaton 2004: 30–1). Instead, the secondary analyst of qualitative data must seek opportunities for testing new conceptualizations with the data already on hand as well as, when possible, by carrying on a dialogue with original researchers.

These problems can be lessened by seeking conscientiously to review data features and quality before deciding to develop an analysis of secondary data (Stewart & Kamins 1993: 17–31; Riedel 2000: 55–69) and then developing analysis plans that maximize the value of the available data. Replicating key analyses with alternative indicators of key concepts, testing for the stability of relationships across theoretically meaningful subsets of the data, and examining findings of comparable studies conducted with other data sets can each strengthen confidence in the findings of a secondary analysis.

In an environment in which so many important social science data sets are instantly available for reanalysis, the method of secondary data analysis should permit increasingly rapid refinement of social science knowledge, as new hypotheses can be tested and methodological disputes clarified, if not resolved, quickly. Both the necessary technology and the supportive ideologies required for this rapid refinement have spread throughout the world. Social science researchers now have the opportunity to take advantage of this methodology as well as the responsibility to carefully and publicly delineate and acknowledge the limitations of the method.

SEE ALSO: Demographic Data: Censuses, Registers, Surveys; Descriptive Statistics; Social Change and Causal Analysis; Survey Research

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secondary groups

Patrick J. W. McGinty

A secondary group is a unique form of social group that tends to be formally organized or highly structured and based on predominantly impersonal or role based instrumental (task oriented) interactions that are of a nonpermanent nature. Examples of secondary groups include the impersonal relationship between salesclerk and customer in a department store; large lecture courses at popular universities; and complex organizations such as the American Sociological Association.

Despite its centrality in the sociological perspective and its being an omnipresent theme as well as an ongoing interest of sociologists in a

variety of forms, the concept of a secondary group is rather poorly conceptualized. This problematic status of the concept and its usage within the discipline is further conditioned by a unique confluence of understandings regarding the concept. First, it is deemed of central significance to the discipline, but is generally relegated to little more than a concept that students in "Introduction to Sociology" courses need only memorize and be able to identify. Second, the concept is widely understood in practice, and where it appears in the sociological literature it is consistently applied with little variation in meaning or definition. At the same time, however, the development and usage of the concept as a central concern in sociological research has declined significantly over time. Third, as a result, where the concept of secondary group is discussed in the contemporary sociological literature it is generally defined or treated only in relation to one or more sociological concepts – the most common referent concepts being community, social organization, and primary group.

This relational and yet dualistic conceptual definition and operationalization of secondary groups has its origins in the history of sociology and classical sociological theory. This is particularly evident in the historically and theoretically contextualized understanding of the relationship between community and society. It is common for the work of both Émile Durkheim and Georg Simmel (which sought to explicate the relationship between social groups and the organization of society) to be referenced in this context. However, it is the work of Charles Horton Cooley (1909) and Ferdinand Tönnies (1963) that continues to drive the historically and theoretically relational understanding of the concept.

In *Social Organization* (1909) Cooley provides in great detail the forms, functions, and attributes of the social units he called "primary groups." However, what Cooley did not do was develop a term for those social units which were not primary groups. Thus, the conventionally accepted set of attributes and characteristics of secondary groups were simply extrapolated from Cooley's understanding of primary groups. Or in other words, knowing what primary groups are, secondary groups by corollary must

be anything or everything that primary groups are not. Accordingly, it follows that for over a century sociologists have defined the concept of secondary group simply in relation to the associated (and similarly limited) conceptualization of primary group. To Cooley's credit, both his explicit definition of primary groups and the associated implicit definition of secondary groups have withstood the test of time. Ironically, Cooley's intent in *Social Organization* was to develop a processual and non dichotomous understanding of the relationship between community and social organization, the conceptualization of primary groups being only one aspect of the larger argument.

In addition, Ferdinand Tönnies's (1963) work regarding the dualistic conception of *Gemeinschaft* and *Gesellschaft* also sought to explain the relationship between community and social organization. Accordingly, Tönnies's explanations and assumptions regarding the forms, attributes, and characteristics of *Gesellschaften* – including but not limited to short term and impersonal relationships – have become closely associated with the conventional definition of secondary groups.

Despite the contemporary limitations regarding the conceptualization of secondary groups, there are a couple of theoretical developments that stand to alter significantly the manner in which secondary groups are conceptualized and defined. The more dramatic of the two developments is founded on a relational understanding of human interaction. Lyn H. Lofland (1989) reviews an extensive literature which shows how the emergent and informal but role based "unpersonal" relationship blurs the boundaries between forms of interactions generally shown as typical of both primary and secondary groups. However, in a more recent iteration, Lofland (1998) proposes an end to the unreflective use of the concept of secondary groups. Although suggesting that the ideal typical understanding of secondary groups does have its benefits, Lofland instead posits the need for a more dynamic set of concepts that can better capture the variety of forms of human relationships. Among the concepts Lofland proposes are the "fleeting relationship" (Davis 1959), "routinized relationships," "quasi primary relationships" (Stone 1954), and "intimate secondary relationships." The continued development of

these and similar insights stands to clarify as well as further our collective comparative understanding of social groups and their organization and processes.

Second, although still overwhelmingly understood in terms of the ideal typical conceptualizations similar to those now used, other practitioners are calling for the replacement of the concept of secondary groups with that of the seemingly more explanatory concept of "complex groups." Such a change in conceptual label seeks to shift explanatory focus of the concept from its current gaze – which highlights concerns such as the role and/or function of the social group – to that of the size, scope, and forms of relationships within the group and the associated forms of intergroup and intragroup relations. The underlying logic associated with this proposal is based on analyses of interaction networks. While it is the issue of complexity that drives this proposal for changing the conceptual label, it should be noted that such a change in conceptualization could provide greater theoretical synchronicity by narrowing the conceptual gap between our conventional understanding of secondary groups and micro/macro linkages, particularly with regard to one of the concepts' more widely accepted expressions: the complex organization (for the treatment of similar concerns in terms of weak and strong ties, see Granovetter 1973, 1983).

While the complex organization is one form of secondary group, it is the bureaucratically organized form of complex organization that is commonly held up as the classic epitome of the secondary group – being a large, impersonal organization based on a network of complex status relationships which maintains a set of instrumental goals and processes, and in which the length of individual associations varies. The expression of the bureaucratic organization as an ideal typical example of a secondary group should serve to heighten our awareness of the importance of the study of secondary groups. This same expression should then, by corollary, serve to heighten our sensitivity to the study of the variety of forms of human interaction and relations in contemporary social life. This is the case not only because of the increasing significance of secondary groups to our general social

welfare, but also because of their implicit relationship to the ever increasing growth and development of rationalized forms of organizing (Ritzer 2004), as well as expressions of individualism and unbridled self interest in human social life (for related but differing perspectives on the result of said forms of organizing, see also de Tocqueville 1966; Michels 1966).

SEE ALSO: Community; Cooley, Charles Horton; Primary Groups; Role; Tönnies, Ferdinand; Weak Ties (Strength of)

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secrecy

Laurence Moss

George Orwell's celebrated novel, *Nineteen Eighty Four*, presents a haunting and horrific account of how the thought police in a totalitarian world can monitor the private thoughts and uproot the deepest emotional sentiments held by individuals. Keeping secrets has become a capital offense. The "Party" has reduced the sphere of individual autonomy and privacy to practically nothing at all. According to Orwell, in this dystopia it became "intolerable [to the Party] that an erroneous thought should exist anywhere in the world, however secret and powerless it may be" and "in the eyes of the Party there was no distinction between the thought and the deed" (Orwell 2003 [1949]: 250, 263). Either one resulted in immediate arrest and eventual execution.

Orwell's prose frightens us because private thoughts and personal secrets are profoundly important to our sense of personhood and to the expression and development of human personality. A world without the possibility of personal secrets is a world that is intolerable.

SOCIOLOGY AND ECONOMICS

Orwell's world is not our world. Most people possess secrets about themselves that they intentionally prefer to keep to themselves and share with only a few. According to Miller, most of us fake things about our roles, our dispositions, emotions, our commitments, and even our entire identity. We intentionally persuade others about things that are simply not true (Miller 2003; see also Goffman 1963). The origins of these insights date back to the canonical writings in modern sociology and especially to the work of Georg Simmel (Ritzer 2000: 282–6).

According to Donald Levine, the nineteenth century sociologist Simmel was one of the earliest to advance the view that "sociology should describe the ideal types of forms of social interaction abstracted from their contents" (1971: lii). Simmel's search for the *forms of human interaction* and how they help illuminate the most interesting real life examples of people at

work and at play has earned him a reputation as one of the most insightful of the German sociologists at the start of the twentieth century.

In 1906, Simmel's "The Sociology of Secrecy and of Secret Societies" appeared in the *American Journal of Sociology* in which the phenomenon of the intentional misrepresentation of information by one individual or a group of individuals gives rise to the rituals and customs of the "secret society," such as the legendary Carbonari in Italy and the multitude of religious sects that spring up to practice a faith that the powerful state tries to stamp out. According to Simmel, "the secret society emerges everywhere as correlate of despotism and of police powers. This is true, not alone in political relations, but in the same way within the church, the school, and the family" (1906: 472). Simmel's idea that one strategy for coping with the demands and pressures of modern society involves camouflaging oneself with lies and falsehoods has spawned an enormously fertile field of analysis within modern sociology (cf. Goffman 1963; Bergmann 1993 [1987]).

Simmel pioneered several novel forms of analysis in the study of secrecy that still have influence today. For example, when an individual lies to another, that other person is not only deceived but also has a "misconception about the true intention of the person who [has told] the lie" (Simmel 1906: 445). These misconceptions are much less threatening to the persistence of the group in simple societies than they are in modern credit economies where the entire civilized structure is based on thousands of presuppositions about individuals and their intentions. A modern credit based economy in which money and its electronic forms permit myriad secret transactions right under the nose but out of the sight of the governing authorities has turned out to be an important and still unappreciated form of modern social life. The twenty first century terrorists finance their nefarious deeds by transferring funds from one currency area to the next and, as a result, the current "war on terror" is fought not only on the ground but also in the abstract financial world of electronic transfers and banking.

In modern business, "white collar crime" and the enormous magnitude of selected corporate crimes have become central to popular media reporting. At the heart of many of these

criminal enterprises is the notion of “secrecy” and the intentional presentation of false and misleading information, both to the victims and to many others. And so we can read Simmel as warning more about the potency of secrecy and dissimulation in modern complex financial network societies than in less developed and perhaps more primitive societies.

There is a geometry of social relations that we find in Simmel (Ritzer 2000: 268). As early as the seventeenth century, Thomas Hobbes recognized that groups of individuals who assemble for their defense against a threatening enemy need large numbers to succeed, but large numbers of individuals are prone to quarreling and intrigues as one individual faces off against another, revealing the antagonistic side of human nature. Certainly, after the danger of invasion has passed, their cohesion is apt to splinter and large numbers end up bickering, quarreling, and worse. Collective action would not succeed unless there were a strong central kingly power to keep the individual egos in check (Hobbes 1928 [1650]: 78–9). The idea that small groups of agents are capable of some forms of social action of which large groups are not resurfaced in Simmel’s writings more than two and half centuries later.

Simmel discussed the differences between the dyad and the triad and emphasized, as Hobbes had done, the importance of the “impact of numbers of people on the quality of interaction” (cf. Ritzer 2000: 268). With two individuals there is not much of a group structure to appreciate and study, but add merely a third individual and the structure and form of the interaction undergo fundamental change. For one thing, a genuine social structure finally comes into existence. Emergent structures are certainly present in the case with secrecy and secret dealings.

According to Simmel, in small groups it is difficult to keep and maintain secrets. Just about everyone is too close and there are repeated temptations to “slip” and tell all. In large groups, secrets can more easily emerge and be maintained. In large secret societies, a secret is shared by all members of the group but there is the constant tension “caused by the fact that the secret can be uncovered, or revealed, and thus the entire basis for the existence of the secret society can be eliminated” (Ritzer 2000: 283).

The contrast between secret keeping in small and large groups and the social structures that emerge somewhat spontaneously to improve the likelihood of success in secret keeping are grist for the mill of the sociologist. In his 1906 article, Simmel broke new ground when he carefully outlined the methods secret societies use to conceal their size and their leadership through the use of decentralized methods of information and control.

THE COSTS OF MAINTAINING SECRETS

It is a well established principle in the social sciences, and especially in economics, that the costs and difficulties of keeping *certain types of secrets* increase exponentially with the number of individuals sharing the secret. This is the large group problem that fascinated Simmel, but in economics seemingly opposite conclusions emerge.

Many business conspiracies to secretly set prices or restrict output, and in that way monopolize markets, fall apart of their own accord. This unraveling is quicker the larger the number of businesses trying to coordinate their business strategies. In the study of industrial organization and especially the study of cartels, it is often found that conspiracies to “fix” prices or rig contract competitions are often unraveled by dissenting members of the conspiracies who complain that their production quotas are unfair (i.e., “too low”). Former conspirators try to gain a private advantage for themselves by going their own way by only pretending to be a member of the cartel.

A different sort of problem may arise when one individual knows that one or more other individuals knows something important but may lie about it to the first individual. Some experts claim that this situation establishes the fundamental condition for secrecy itself. According to Ritzer, “secrecy is defined as the condition in which one person has the intention of hiding something while the other is seeking to reveal that which is being hidden” (Ritzer 2000: 282). Indeed, the holders of the non public information know that the others with whom they deal know that they know something they do not. In this way, a complicated strategic

problem of move and countermove begins. The subfield of economics known as “game theory” has gone a considerable distance investigating these forms of social interaction and the actual geometries involved.

For example, a physician knows whether his or her patient is mildly ill rather than seriously ill. Still, that doctor may prescribe additional expensive tests expecting the “kick back and special considerations” that may come his way from enriched colleagues who get paid to perform those unnecessary tests. This physician has a conflict of interest. He has been hired to diagnose and to heal. Instead, he lies and steals.

When the patient worries that he or she may be defrauded by the strategic use of “asymmetric information” by an unscrupulous expert, we have the conditions under which market structures evolve to permit the authentication of information and the creation of “good reputation.” The professions are often governed by emergent structures of “professional ethics and responsibility” that help dampen rapacious individual behavior that make up secrecy and lying to enhance fees and revenues. This was the claim of American sociologist Talcott Parsons in numerous writings (Parsons 1937). Modern sociologists often criticize economists for not considering the regulative role norms play compared with raw self interest.

When a number of persons share a secret, and keep that secret in absolute silence, we have another social phenomenon of special interest. Sociologist Eviatar Zerubavel summarizes what is known about silence and denial. His thesis follows the insights of Sigmund Freud and Carl Jung in psychology (Bok 1982: 8). Many jointly held secrets grow more difficult to keep over time. It is like an elephant in the room that the co-conspirators ignore, but as a result the elephant keeps growing larger and larger until the secret can be bottled up no longer. The co-conspirators suffer together in icy silence until all hell breaks loose and the elephant has shattered the conspiracy of silence. This phenomenon wreaks havoc on individual conscience and personality.

During the Nazi war against the Jews, there were homeowners living in close proximity to the death camps but no one discussed or even mentioned what everyone knew was going on over there right in front of their eyes. A “social

norm” emerged that limited what perceptions were permissible and what had to be ignored (Zerubavel 2006: 23). Other examples include child abuse in a family that is covered up by a shared secret held among family members.

LAW AND ECONOMICS

The common law defines a trade secret as any sort of formula or procedure that gives one seller a competitive advantage over another. For economists, a valuable trade secret means that one seller can score more profits than his or her rivals. Furthermore, it may allow that seller to price the product above its marginal cost of production, and that form of pricing results in “allocative inefficiency” in the sense that resources are not being allowed to move to what the market prices indicate are the most valued uses.

But allocative efficiency is not all that is important to economic welfare. The evidence suggests that regions are richer or poorer according to how much investment is taking place. While some of that investment is replacing worn out equipment and updating skills, other investment is part of entrepreneurialism and the creation of new products and services. That means a capitalist economy is constantly changing what is produced, how it is produced, and when it comes to the market in sometimes novel and unexpected ways. If the prospect of discovering a formula or recipe that will result in financial success is what motivates discovery and innovation, then a different type of efficiency argument can be made and has been made for “trade secrecy.” We speak of *dynamic efficiency* and identify this type of efficiency with the revolutionary and unexpected changes in the ways we work and live with one another. Many entrepreneurs and their backers try to maintain secrets so that they can generate “first mover” advantages before a large number of competitors get wind of the innovation and start to imitate and reduce the value of the secret.

In some specific cases, a trade secret might qualify for a patent award. The patent gives the owner the exclusive right to use his or her invention for a limited period of time. But not all information that is valuable in a market system is eligible for patent protection. Certain

secrets such as marketing methods, pricing for mulae, customer lists, and knowledge about supply chains unknown to competitors constitute valuable information that cannot be patented because it does not come within the “subject matter” of the patent system as set down by the legislature. In these instances, patenting is not an option at all. Keeping secrets is the only business option.

PROFESSIONAL MAGICIANS

It is a myth that magicians cherish their secrets and zealously guard them from prying eyes and public disclosure. Magicians are theatrical entertainers with their own associations and journals and increasingly receive academic attention and stature. If magicians were ever part of secret societies with Simmel like rituals of admission and inclusion, that is certainly no longer the case. Magicians are often erudite, scholarly, and instructive and they share their novel art in books, films, and seminars.

During the Vaudeville period in the history of the American theater, many magicians actually *patented* their major illusions. Since a patent requires that all the secrets that are necessary to the use and replication of the invention be disclosed, it is puzzling that magicians would actually patent their magicians' secrets. Of course, magicians did this not because they wanted to “keep the secret.” Instead, they wanted to monopolize the presentation of a magic illusion and have the legal right to prevent other magicians from replicating that illusion (Steinmeyer 2003: 73–113).

CONCLUSION

Secrecy is an intentional act that gives rise to many interesting social phenomena. It is consistent with individual autonomy and dynamic entrepreneurial capitalism. It is an area of sociology brought to our attention by the pioneering work of Georg Simmel and is today capable of spawning many areas of research and insightful analysis.

SEE ALSO: Goffman, Erving; Magic; Public and Private; Simmel, Georg; Sociometry

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sect

William H. Swatos, Jr.

Although the term sect has played a role in both political sociology and the study of social movements at the hands of many Marxians as well as such early sociologists as LeBon, Sighele, Park, and Simmel, its primary continuing application has been among sociologists of religion in the context of church sect theory. The

dominance of this use has led to its virtual abandonment in other sociological subfields. In this context, a sect may be defined as a voluntary religious association whose members enter it as a result of a personal decision to join, which decision is then subject to confirmation by the existing members of the association. It contrasts with a church, whose members are said to be “born” into it, either by nationality or ongoing familial commitment.

In its many permutations and combinations as an explanation of religious organization and religiosity, church sect theory may be the most important middle range theory that the sociology of religion has to offer. It is also the case that, though termed church sect theory, a more accurate phrasing for actual usage of the construct would be sect church theory, since the preponderance of research and debate has been directed toward the sect type and changes that do or do not occur in religious organizations from sectarian origins into other sociological types.

Although the terms church and sect have a long heritage in the writings of church historians, credit for their first attachment to sociological concepts belongs to Max Weber. Their popularization among scholars of religion in the modern sense, however, was through ethicist H. Richard Niebuhr’s adaptation of the work of Weber’s sometime associate Ernst Troeltsch, himself a historical ethicist. To understand much of the debate and confusion in contemporary sociological usage, it is necessary to review how the concepts fit into Weber’s sociology of religion and how the Troeltsch–Niebuhr synthesis introduced corruptions into that use that impaired their analytical power.

WEBERIAN SOCIOLOGY AND TROELTSCHIAN ETHICS

Weber’s sociology is united by the overarching thematic element of the processes of the rationalization of action. Weber was attempting to answer the question of why the universal historical rationalization disenchantment process had come to fruition most completely in the Anglo American “spirit” of capitalism. As part of this project Weber wanted to employ an analytical method that would allow him to

maintain his commitment to the principle that sociology was a scientific discipline while dealing with historical data, wherein heretofore empathic *verstehende Soziologie* had failed to achieve conclusions that could in any way be compared to the accuracy of the experimental method. Weber’s answer was the comparative method using the tool of the ideal type: a hypothetically concrete reality, a mental construct based upon relevant empirical components, formed and explicitly delineated by the researcher to facilitate precise comparisons on specific points of interest. The conceptualizations of “church” and “sect,” like an inch in the measurement of length, serve to enable two or more religious organizations to be compared to each other. Church sect theory in Weber’s usage was not a standard *to* which religious organizations were compared but *by* which they were compared. The critical differentiating variable for Weber was “mode of membership” – whether the normal method of membership recruitment of the organization was by “birth” (church) or “decision” (sect).

In the transition from Weber to Troeltsch’s *The Social Teachings of the Christian Churches* (1912), the church sect typology underwent significant alterations. Troeltsch was not a social scientist but a theologian attempting to relate types of religious experiences with the varieties of social teachings to which they might be correlated. In doing so, he parted company with Weber’s work in two critical ways. First, he shifted the emphasis of the type from social organizational to behavioral. Second, he stressed the notion of “accommodation” or “compromise” as differentiating between the different religious styles. The first departure is most clearly seen in Troeltsch’s positing of *three* types of religious behavior: churchly, sectarian, and mystical. The third of these is now generally dropped from consideration by church sect theorists – in Weber’s work it occurs in a separate bipolar typology of behavioral orientation, namely that of asceticism mysticism. Nevertheless, the presence of the mystical type within Troeltsch’s formulation suggests that he was actually using the terms in a conceptually different operation from that to which church sect is usually put in organizational analysis. The “dichotomy” of church sect that has been attributed to Troeltsch must be understood

within both his three way scheme and the instrumental context of Weberian ideal typical method. Troeltsch shared with Weber primarily method, partially content, and peripherally project. Weber and Troeltsch were working on different, although related, questions. Troeltsch understood Weber's concept of the ideal type, capitalized on what Weber termed its "transient" nature, and hence reformulated the concepts of church, sect, and mysticism to work for his own purposes.

Subsequent church sect debates have largely been the result of an overemphasis upon the Weber–Troeltsch association that assumes that because the two men were colleagues (and even lived in the same building for a number of years) and Troeltsch used Weber's method and to some extent his content, the *intention* of Troeltsch's work was the same as Weber's, which it was not. What Troeltsch himself calls a "sociological formulation" of a theological question has been misidentified with Weber's attempt to solve a sociological problem. The difference between the two projects is clear in the critical distinguishing elements that form the focus for each one's work. Whereas Weber uses mode of membership, Troeltsch adopts accommodation or compromise. While mode of membership can be ascertained relatively directly, accommodation has a more mediated character: what is and is not accommodation is more perspectival. A theological rather than organizational – hence sociological – focus comes to frame the theory.

The basis for the shift in usage and concomitant confusion lies in the way in which the sect construct was introduced to the English speaking audience, with the corresponding void created in German scholarship as a result of the two world wars. The first major English language publication to use the types was the work of another sociologically inclined theological ethicist, Yale professor H. Richard Niebuhr's *The Social Sources of Denominationalism* (1929). Although at times possessed by a rather naive evolutionism and narrow perspective, Niebuhr's work contributed a significant element that was lacking in earlier treatments. He used church and sect as poles of a continuum, rather than simply as discrete categories. Niebuhr did not merely classify groups in relation to their relative sect likeness or church likeness, but analyzed the dynamic process of

religious history as groups moved along this continuum. This approach found its down side, however, in that taken by itself it tended toward the reification of the types and the hypothetical continuum that he posited. It thus contained powerful seeds for church sect theory to grow into an evaluative device, quite outside the "value free" comparative sociological frame of reference in which it was conceived. Sect to church modeling not only turned the word order around, it also turned church sect theory from an analytical device to a quasi ethical evaluation. This disjuncture was compounded by the fact that Troeltsch's *Social Teachings* was translated in 1931, providing a kind of "classic" legitimation for Niebuhr's approach, whereas Weber's methodological work was not available in translation until 1949. Many of the subsequent difficulties that have attended church sect theory can be traced to the strange movements of this framework and its methodological base across the Atlantic.

ELABORATION, REACTION, AND REVISION

Subsequent elaborations of church sect theory have been clearly dependent upon the work of Troeltsch via Niebuhr. The original church sect dichotomy became generally interpreted as a continuum having a multicriteria basis for its analyses.

Howard Becker was the first American trained as a sociologist to use and extend church sect theory. Attempting to facilitate increased specificity, Becker delineated two types within each of the original two types, resulting in a cult sect denomination ecclesia model. In thus developing the typology, Becker abandoned the ideal type method for that of "abstract collectivities," ideal realities rather than constructs. J. Milton Yinger in his *Religion and the Struggle for Power* (1946) increased the limitations for specific points along the continuum, extending Becker's four types to six: cult, sect, established sect, class church/denomination, ecclesia, and universal church – the latter most clearly evidencing the increasingly theological focus of the usage.

Yinger subsequently went further in his specification, however, by subtyping sects in terms

of their relationship to the social order – whether they were accepting, avoiding, or aggressive. This development began a wave of interest in the sect type within church sect theorizing, with numerous writers offering contributions on the best way of treating this possibility, the most lasting of which is Bryan Wilson’s “An Analysis of Sect Development” (1959). The results of this strategy were, on the one hand, to shift the focus of church sect theory away from *both* comparative and evaluative analyses toward a classificatory system of the bases and outcomes of religious organizational development in the wake of social systemic variables; and on the other hand, it invited a focus on religious movements that were relatively marginal to mainstream society, hence prepared the way for the emergence of the subfield within the sociology of religion known as New Religious Movements (NRMs) beginning in the 1970s.

An exception to this general tendency to focus on societally marginal religious organizations (first “sects,” later “cults”) was the publication in the *British Journal of Sociology* of a seminal essay by David Martin in 1962 simply titled “The Denomination.” Although it did little to stem the tide of interest in marginal groups at the time, Martin’s article would bear fruit in various ways in new typological formulations that appeared in the late 1970s. The action sociology models of both Roy Wallis and William H. Swatos, Jr., as well as the rational choice models of Rodney Stark and his colleagues, emphasize the importance of denominational religiosity as the typological alternative to sectarianism (and cultic forms).

On the heels of these developments also came criticism of the framework. A number of critics denounced the orientation as meaningless or, at best, woefully inadequate to systematic investigation of the empirical world. Church sect theorizing has been criticized as ambiguous and vague, lacking precise definitions, unsuited to tests for validity and reliability, merely descriptive rather than explanatory, less informative than other possible approaches, historically and geographically restricted, and unrelated to the rest of sociological theory. Despite all of these criticisms, however, the theoretical framework into which church sect has evolved has allowed a tremendous amount of data to be organized and reported.

In response to these criticisms, a number of scholars made revisions within the church sect framework, making it a more viable theoretical orientation for the sociological study of religion. Yinger, Wallis, Swatos, Paul Gustafson, and Roland Robertson, for example, have each suggested the value of an explicit visual scheme for modeling and analyses. Wilson, whose work on sects spanned over 40 years, came increasingly to accept a Weberian approach and was among the first to attempt to take aspects of sect analysis outside the orbit of Western religions and societies in his *Magic and the Millennium* (1973). Stark and colleagues have reached back into earlier empirical work by Glock and Stark to use pieces of church sect theorizing in their “rational choice” modeling, demonstrating that it is possible to tie the framework to large data sets.

NEO WEBERIAN ANALYSES

Particularly significant to the process of rethinking church sect theory was the work of Benton Johnson. As early as 1957, Johnson critiqued the Troeltschian approach to church sect. In subsequent work, he returned to Weber – not directly to Weber’s discussion of church sect, but to his distinction between emissary and exemplary prophets. From this perspective, Johnson focuses upon the single universal variable property of a group’s relationship to the social environment in which it exists. “Church” is employed as the polar type of *acceptance* of the social environment, whereas “sect” is the polar type of its *rejection*. Wilson thereafter also embraced “response to the world” as the principal basis for classification of sects in an ideal typical (rather than taxonomic) way. Johnson contends that the sociologist should strive toward the discovery of universal properties at a high level of generality that vary in such ways that typologies might be constructed. He sees “acceptance/rejection of the social environment” as a single variable around which empirical church sect distinctions may be grouped and asserts that this typological approach is superior to one that simply adds “types” as historical circumstances alter. These are in fact not types at all, in the Weberian sense, but categories. Johnson’s work has significantly affected such

differing streams as Swatos's situationalism and the rational choice modeling of Stark and his colleagues.

Although Johnson's distinction possesses enormous advantages in terms of conceptual parsimony, its lack of integration of the historical differences in the various sociocultural systems in which religious organizations function produces potential difficulties in macrosociological analyses. Whereas the microsociologically based rational choice model focuses primarily on the effects of the organizational experience of the decision maker and only secondarily on the organization system component, a more culturally oriented analysis would note that different system contexts produce different styles of organizational response that cannot be entirely comprehended by a single universal variable component. Thus, Swatos cross cuts Johnson's acceptance-rejection dichotomy with the sociocultural system polarity of monopolism-pluralism. Following on the work of David Little, Swatos contends that the nature of the sociocultural system shapes the patterns of acceptance and rejection that become expressed in specific religious organizational forms and rationales. In related work, following leads from Martin and Wallis, Swatos has criticized the use of "cult" in Stark's church sect modeling; Swatos argues that from the Weberian point of view out of which church sect theorizing sprang, "cult" is properly contrasted to "order" as polar organizational manifestations of the mysticism-asceticism typology, rather than incorporated into church sect theory. Cults in turn have charismatic leaders, while orders have virtuosos. Patricia Wittberg's analysis of the dramatic decline of Roman Catholic religious orders in the western societies during the second half of the twentieth century, *The Rise and Fall of Catholic Religious Orders* (1994), particularly illustrates the appropriate use of the order/virtuoso combination and then deploys it within an explanatory structure that suggests the systemic characteristics that lead not only to that decline but also to the corresponding rise of charismatic types of religious experiences and organizations.

Building on these foundations, Michael York's study of New Age and neopagan movements, *The Emerging Network* (1995), demonstrates the continued value of church sect

typologizing as a conceptual tool within a larger analytical framework through which these phenomena may also be studied profitably. The concept of *network* which York introduces in his work has been further elaborated by Hizuru Miki in a church sect schema as a polar type to *organization*. These advances facilitate both cross cultural comparisons and the analysis of both new religious movements and quasi religions, some of which have heretofore been treated under the now ideologically loaded concept of cult. Thus, church sect theorizing continues to be a part of ongoing sociological scholarship, well beyond its initial foundations, but also more closely linked in analytical style to those foundations than it was in the period from the 1930s to the 1970s.

SEE ALSO: Asceticism; Denomination; Ideal Type; Jehovah's Witnesses; Networks; Religion, Sociology of; Scientology; Weber, Max

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secularization

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Secularization is a term used by sociologists to refer to a process by which the overarching and transcendent religious system of old is reduced in modern functionally differentiated societies to a subsystem alongside other subsystems, losing in this process its overarching claims over these other subsystems. This is the original meaning, but this process has consequences for the organizational and individual levels, which suggests that secularization needs to be analyzed on the societal (macro), the organizational (meso), and the individual (micro) levels.

The concept was introduced by Longueville in the negotiations that led to the Peace of Westphalia in 1648 when he used the term *séculariser* to describe the change in statute of certain ecclesiastical territories that were being added to Brandenburg as compensation for its territorial losses. The emergence of the term is linked to the notion *securaris* that had already been in use for centuries, not only to distinguish the secular from the sacred, but also especially to indicate the former's subordination to and dependence on the latter. However, the connotation associated with the term secularization has reversed this relationship: it expresses the advancing "emancipation" of the secular from the sacred. For the religious, however, it means rather the "confinement" of the religious to the religious sphere. The concept has a long history (which will not be analyzed here), and many authors have emphasized that it has always retained the ambiguous and consequently controversial meaning that it had from the start.

If the founding fathers rarely used the term, concepts and views related to theories of secularization were nonetheless canvassed, e.g., generalization and differentiation (Durkheim), and Weber (1920) used the term to typify the way in which, in the United States, membership in distinguished clubs and fraternal societies replaced membership of sects in guaranteeing moral rectitude and creditworthiness. Later generations of sociologists continued to employ the term, but attached different meanings to it (Shiner 1967). Not until the late 1960s and 1970s were several theories of secularization developed, most prominently by Berger (1967), Luckmann (1967), Wilson (1976), and Martin (1978). These theories subsequently led to discussions concerning their reliability and validity (e.g., Hammond 1985). In similar vein, others have suggested an alternative, i.e., rational choice theory (Young 1997), to explain the religious situation in the US, which they considered to be radically different from that of Europe, where secularization theory emerged. Finally, Tschannen and Dobbelaere have systematically analyzed the existing theories, since some discussions failed to scrutinize the ideas, levels of analysis, and arguments of those being criticized. Tschannen (1992) has suggested treating secularization theories as a paradigm and has described different "exemplars," or shared examples, typical of the paradigm. Dobbelaere (2002 [1981]) has stressed the need to differentiate the different levels of analysis one from another, suggesting convergences and divergences between existing theories. To describe the core of secularization theory, the different exemplars will be discussed here according to the levels of analysis.

THE MACRO LEVEL: SOCIETAL SECULARIZATION

Modern societies are primarily differentiated along functional lines that overlay the prior forms of segmentary and social class differentiation, and have developed different subsystems (e.g., economy, polity, science, family, and education). These subsystems are similar in the sense that society has equal need of them all, but dissimilar since each performs its own particular function (production and distribution of

goods and services; taking binding decisions; production of valid knowledge; procreation and mutual support; and teaching). Their functional autonomy depends of course on their communication with other functional systems and the environment. To guarantee these functions and to communicate with their environment, organizations (enterprises; political parties; research centers and academies; families; schools and universities) have been established (the meso level). Each of these organizations functions on the basis of its own medium (money; power; truth; love; information and know how) and according to the values of its subsystem and its specific norms.

Regarding religion, these organizations affirm their autonomy and reject religiously prescribed rules, i.e., the *autonomization* of the subsystems – e.g., the emancipation of education from ecclesiastical authority; the separation of church and state; the rejection of church prescriptions about birth control, abortion, and euthanasia; the decline of religious content in literature and arts; and the development of science as an autonomous secular perspective. Consequently, the religious influence is increasingly confined to the religious subsystem itself. Thus, the sociological explanation of societal secularization starts with the process of functional differentiation and the autonomization of the so called secular subsystems; as a consequence, religion becomes a subsystem alongside other subsystems, losing in this process its overarching claims over those other subsystems. On the global level, one could of course point to countries that are not secularized because “church and state” are not functionally differentiated – Iran, for example. But as Pace (1998) has pointed out, this is not typical of all Muslim countries; there are many where politics progressively asserts itself to form an independent sphere of action, which is the start of the secularization of these countries. In fact, societal secularization is only the particularization of the general process of functional differentiation in the religious subsystem and is a purely descriptive concept.

Berger and Luckmann stressed a consequence of the process of functional differentiation and the autonomization of the secular spheres, to wit, the *privatization of religion*. According to Luckmann (1967), the validity of

religious norms became restricted to its proper sphere, i.e., that of private life. Berger (1967) stressed the functionality of this for the maintenance of the highly rationalized order of modern economic and political institutions, the so called *public sphere*. This dichotomy, private/public, carries with it at least two shortcomings. First of all, it suggests that secularization was limited to the so called public sphere, which is incorrect: family life has also been secularized. This became very clear in the reactions of lay Catholics who objected to the rules enunciated in the papal encyclical *Humanae Vitae* (1968). Married couples rejected the claim of the church to define the goals of the family and to dictate the acceptable means by which these goals might be achieved. In other words, they defended the functional differentiation of family and religion. Secondly, it is the adoption in sociological discourse of ideological concepts used by liberals and socialists in the nineteenth century to legitimize functional differentiation and the autonomization of so called secular institutions: “religion is a private matter.”

It is clear that the private/public dichotomy is not a structural aspect of society. It is not a societal subsystem with institutionalized roles (professional versus public), as, for example, is the case in the economy (producers versus consumers), the educational system (teachers versus students), the polity (politicians versus voters), and the judicial system (magistrates and lawyers versus clients). It is, rather, a legitimizing conceptualization of the secular world, an ideological pair used in conflicts between opponents. For example, to defend their political, religious, or family options against possible sanctions and eventual dismissal by the management of Christian organizations, e.g., schools or hospitals, employees used this dichotomy if they failed to behave according to ecclesiastical rules in matters of family life, politics, or religion. They defended their private options, their private life, in what the managers of ecclesiastical organizations called the public sphere, since, according to the managers, these private options were publicly known. The outcome of such conflicts in court was that managers had to accept employees’ right to privacy. Of course, sociologists should study the use of this dichotomy in social discourse and conflicts, to analyze its strategic application by groups wanting to promote or to

retard the secularization of the social system. The private/public dichotomy is not a sociological conceptualization. In sociological discourse, this ideological pair might better be replaced by Habermas's (1982) conceptual dichotomy: system versus life world, used in a purely descriptive sense.

HOW ARE FUNCTIONALLY DIFFERENTIATED SOCIETIES INTEGRATED?

Pluralization, or the segmentary differentiation of the subsystem religion, was only possible, according to Parsons (1967), once the Christian ethic was institutionalized in the so called secular world: in other words, once the Christian ethic became *generalized*. Consequently, pluralization may not be considered an indicator of secularization – quite the contrary. However, the relationship is not unidirectional, since a growing pluralization may augment the necessity of generalization. Indeed, together with Bellah (1967), Parsons stressed the need for a civil religion which, to legitimize the system, overarches conventional religions. Martin (1978) suggests that when religion adapts to every status group through every variety of pulling sectarianism, then there is a need to preserve the unity of the nation by a national myth which represents a common denominator of all faiths: one nation under God. Indeed, civil religion generalizes the different notions of God present in the various denominations: the God of the Jews, Catholics, Unitarians, Calvinists, and so forth. National myths sacralize their prophets, martyrs, and historical places: they have their ritualistic expressions and may also use biblical archetypes (Bellah 1967). Such myths and legitimations are not always religious: civil religion is one possibility; there are also secular myths, such as the French myth based on *laïcité*, which legitimizes the French state, its schools and laws. One may also consider the need for secular laws overarching divergent, religiously inspired mores in religiously divided states.

How might the emergence of such a myth – religious or secular – be explained? Fenn (1978) has suggested that this is possible only when a society conceives of itself as a “nation,” as

“really real” – typical examples are the US, Japan, and France. On the other hand, the myth is rather seen as a cultural “fiction” to the extent that a society views itself as an arena for conflicting and cooperative activities of various classes, groups, corporations, and organizations. What explains the emergence of a “religious” rather than a “secular” myth, or vice versa, and what accounts for the secularization of a religious myth? For example, the “religious” civil religion of France, “la fille aînée de l'Église,” was progressively secularized after the French Revolution and anchored in *laïcité*. Another issue for inquiry is how and to what extent in certain countries a conventional religion may function as a civil religion in a religiously pluralistic society, and at what price, e.g., Anglicanism in England, Lutheranism in the Scandinavian countries, and Calvinism in the Netherlands. What degree of pluralism is congruent with a church fulfilling the role of civil religion?

Not all sociologists suggest that modern societies are integrated by common values, a point long since made by Durkheim. In a functionally differentiated society, the grip of the total societal system on the subsystems has changed, argues Luhmann (1977). A subsystem belongs to a societal system not because it is guided in its structural choices by requirements, values, and norms that apply to *all* subsystems. Integration is mediated by the fact that all subsystems are an inner societal environment for one another, they have to mutually accept one another's functions – which does not preclude “performances,” i.e., that a given subsystem intervenes in another subsystem if this subsystem is unable to solve some of its problems, as long as the intervening subsystem applies the values and norms of the subsystem in which it is intervening. Secondly, they have to prevent their own operations from producing insoluble problems in other subsystems, hence church leaders should not intervene in political elections by giving guidance to their flock about how to vote, since this would diminish the degree of functional differentiation. If such interventions are still acceptable in some countries, which was the case up to the 1980s in the Republic of Ireland and in Belgium until the 1950s, this would indicate a limitation of the differentiation of church and polity, and ipso

facto a lesser degree of secularization. However, the system cannot prevent private individuals from failing to differentiate some functions and, for example, voting according to their religious beliefs or choosing a school for their children appropriate to their religious views. A structural equivalent is, therefore, according to Luhmann (1977), built into the system to prevent the dedifferentiation of the system: the "Privatisierung des Entscheidens" (the individualization of decisions), which may cancel out some individual combinations by other combinations owing to the law of great numbers. This means that our societies function according to the principle of the *individualization* of decisions and actions, which implies that this principle is a *structural* component of modern societies. Publicity campaigns by industrial firms and political parties point to the individualization of decisions.

THE MESO LEVEL: ORGANIZATIONAL SECULARIZATION

The autonomization of the so called secular sub systems allowed the development of *functional rationality* within organizations. The economy lost its religious ethos (Weber). Goals and means were evaluated on a cost efficiency basis. This typical attitude implying observation, evaluation, calculation, and planning – which is based on a belief that the world is indeed calculable, controllable, and predictable – is not limited to the economic system. The political system was also rationalized, leaving little room for traditional and charismatic authority, as modern states developed their rational administration. Since these economic and political organizations needed ever greater numbers of people trained in science and rational techniques, the educational curriculum had to change. A scientific approach to the world and the teaching of technical knowledge increasingly replaced a religious literary formation. The development of scientifically based techniques also had its impact on the life world: domestic tasks became increasingly mechanized and computerized. Even the most intimate human behavior, sexuality, became governed by it. This is also the case with the so called *natural* method of birth control

proposed by the Catholic Church. It is based on the basal temperature of the woman registered when waking, which has to be plotted on a chart. On the basis of the temperature curve, the fertile and infertile periods can be calculated. Thus, it was on the basis of observation, calculation, and evaluation that sexual intercourse could be planned to prevent pregnancy. Another example in the field of sexuality was the Masters and Johnson research to "enhance" sexual pleasure. It was based on experimentation with couples and involved observation, calculation, and evaluation, by which means the researchers sought to produce guidelines to ensure and augment sexual pleasure: sexuality became a technique that could be improved by better performances according to the published "technical rules." The consequences of such developments were the *disenchantment* of the world and the *societalization* of the subsystems.

First, the disenchantment of the world. The growing propensity to consider the natural, material, social, and psychological world and the human body as calculable and human made, the result of controlled planning (e.g., in vitro fertilization and plastic surgery), engendered not only new roles but also new, basically rational and critical attitudes and a new cognition. These were replaced by hypotheses, the Bible by the encyclopedia, revelation by knowledge. According to Acquaviva (1979), this new cognition has been objectified in a new language that changed the image of reality, thus eliminating "pre logical," including religious, concepts. The mass media, using this new language, have radicalized this development and made it a social phenomenon. This suggests a possible impact of these changes on the micro level, i.e., the consciousness of the individual. Having internalized this new language, which produced a certain vision of the world, people may to some extent have lost the vision of a sacred reality. For example, when artificial insemination is discussed on television, technical interventions produce life and the issue is debated in a secular, technical language, reducing life's sacredness.

Second, it is in the systemic relations that societalization occurs, and these relationships became secondary: formal, segmented, utilitarian. By contrast, in the life world – family, friends, and social networks – primary relations

are still the binding force, they are personal, total, sympathetic, trustful, and considerate. The trend toward societalization or *Vergesellschaftung* is very clear in the distribution sector: neighborhood stores are increasingly replaced by large department stores, where interactions between customers and employees are limited to short, informative questions and exchanges of money for goods. Economic production developed large scale economic organizations in which Taylorism, which is based on the specialization of tasks and the elimination of unnecessary movement, was extensively applied. This innovation led to the development of the assembly line. The organized world is based on impersonal role relationships, the coordination of skills, and essentially formal and contractual patterns of behavior, in which personal virtue, as distinguished from role obligations, is of small consequence (Wilson 1982). In such systems, control is no longer based on morals and religion but has become impersonal, a matter of routine techniques and unknown officials – legal, technical, mechanized, computerized, and electronic – for example, speed control by unmanned cameras and video control in department stores. Thus religion has lost one of its important latent functions: as long as control was interpersonal, it was founded on religiously based mores and substantive values. In Wilson's view, there is another argument to explain why secularization is a concomitant of societalization: since religion offers redemption, which is personal, total, an indivisible ultimate that is not susceptible to rational techniques or cost efficiency criteria, it has to be offered in a "community" (Wilson 1976), and the *Vergesellschaftung* has destroyed communal life.

RELIGION ON THE MESO LEVEL

How did the organizations within the religious subsystem react to the secularization of the subsystems? The scientific approach to the world and the teaching of technical knowledge that replaced a religious literary formation in the schools distressed, for example, the leaders of the Seventh Day Adventist Church, who stimulated the expansion of their own religiously oriented educational network. In the Christian world, especially in the Catholic world, the

secularization of state schools, culture, and social life gave rise to the process of pillarization at the end of the nineteenth century. This was a deliberate attempt by the church to recover as much as possible of what was lost by secularization. It emerged in a context in which a separation was progressively being made – not only in principle but also structurally – between religion and other functional spheres, and to the extent that non Christians became a "fact," i.e., acquired real power to implement their secular views. The procedure for such recovery was the establishment of a multiplicity of organizations in which Catholics, *casu quo* Protestants, could be insulated from the secular environment – e.g., schools and universities, hospitals, old people's homes, youth and adult movements, cultural associations, sports clubs, mass media, trade unions, health insurance funds, and political parties. Pillarization was a defensive reaction and a typical process of segmented differentiation.

The emergence of new religious movements (NRMs) is related to the process of globalization and intercontinental mobility, and to the secularization that undermined the credibility of the "Christian collective consciousness." Pluralism had undermined its "objectivity," and the slowly perceived lack of impact of Christian religions on the societal level, expressed in the loss of its representatives' status and power, allowed exotic religions to improve their position on the religious market. Some NRMs, such as the Unification Church, the Family, and ISCON, wanted to resacralize the world and its institutions by bringing God back into the different groups operating in different subsystems such as the family, the economy, and even the polity. Wallis (1984) has called these "world rejecting new religions." However, the vast majority are of another type, "world affirming." They offer their members esoteric means for attaining immediate and automatic assertiveness, heightened spirituality, recovery, success, and a clear mind, e.g., Mahikari provides an "omitama" or amulet; transcendental meditation (TM) a personal mantra for meditation; Scientology auditing with an e meter; human potential movements offer therapies, encounter groups, or alternative health and spiritual centers.

Luckmann (1990) suggested that in many NRMs, the level of transcendence was lowered and has become "*this worldly*" or *mundane*. The

historical religions, to the contrary, are examples of “great transcendences,” referring to something other than everyday reality, notwithstanding the fact that they were also involved in mundane or “this worldly” affairs. However, the reference was always transcendental, e.g., the incantations for healing, for success in examinations or work, or for “*une âme sœur*.” Most world affirming NRMs appear to reach *only* the level of “intermediate transcendences.” They bridge time and space and promote intersubjective communication, but remain at the immanent level of everyday reality. Consequently, some, like TM, claim to be spiritual rather than religious movements. Whether we call NRMs spiritual or religious is not important, what matters is that we register a change: the ultimate has become “this worldly.” If one were to employ a substantive definition of religion, referring to transcendent beliefs and practices, to the supernatural, many NRMs would not be considered as religions. Even when we use a functional definition of religion, we may come to the same conclusion. Luhmann (1977) stated that the problem of simultaneity of indefiniteness and certainty is the typical function of religion. Indeed, most of these world affirming new religions are not concerned with the problems of *simultaneity* of transcendence and immanence since they focus only on the immanent, on everyday life, on the secular. They have adapted to the secular world.

These mundane orientations of religion are not new. Berger (1967) and Luckmann (1967) have suggested that the higher church attendance in America compared to Europe might be explained by the mundane orientation of religion in America. Luckmann called it internal secularization, a radical inner change in American church religion: the secular ideas of the American Dream pervade church religion today. In asserting that American churches were themselves becoming highly secularized, these authors sought to reconcile empirical findings at the individual level, i.e., church attendance, which appeared to conflict with secularization theories, by pointing out changes at the organizational level, i.e., within the churches. The point of interest for our argument is that the idea of organizational secularization is not new: the concept of internal secularization was its predecessor.

SECULARIZATION AND LAICIZATION

The processes of societal and organizational secularization may be the consequence of a latent and/or a manifest process. In Belgium, pillarization was a reaction against a manifest policy, starting in the second part of the nineteenth century, by the radical liberal faction and, later, supported by the socialists to subvert the Catholic Church's control in matters of education, culture, and charity. This *manifest* process of secularization is called *laicization*. France is a very good example of the laicization of schools, and the 2005 law prohibiting ostentatious religious signs in state schools underlines this. Marx, Lenin, and the Marxist parties also propounded a deliberate policy of laicization of the state. According to Marx, the state that presupposes religion is not yet a real and genuine state, and even in his first articles in the *Rheinische Zeitung* he upheld the autonomy of politics. This position was later affirmed by Lenin and implemented in the USSR with the January 1918 decree on the separation of church from state and school from church. Other examples of the “logic of laicization,” most typical of Catholic European societies, may be found in Champion (1993). In Belgium and the Netherlands, recent governments have laicized laws on life and death by legalizing abortion and depenalizing euthanasia, and they have extended marriage to homosexual couples, changing, according to a religious view, a so called God given law. These examples also clearly indicate that secularization is not a mechanical, evolutionary process but a consequence of divergent definitions, the outcome of which is dependent upon the balance of power. Such manifest conflicts do not occur only on the national level but may be situated on the city level and linked to so called secular issues such as homelessness and black neighborhood development, as pointed out in a study by Demerath and Williams (1992).

However, secularization may also be the result of a *latent* process. The secularization of the medical subsystem was a consequence of the development of medical science and professionalization: medical rationality reduced the place of religion. Even in Catholic hospitals, the organizational structure is based on medical specialisms and the development of administrative rationality, which marginalized religion

and, in the second half of the twentieth century, confined it to a small optional service – the chaplaincy. In Catholic schools, the professionalization of teachers stressed the scientific approach of the so called profane branches and reduced religion to a specific class, taught by a special teacher: it became one class among others. These are examples of a latent process of secularization: the secularization of Catholic hospitals and schools was the manifest purpose neither of medical doctors nor of teachers.

It is not only professionals who may secularize the world, as is evident from a study undertaken by Voyé (1998) on Christmas decorations in a Walloon village in Belgium. Isambert (1982) underscored the slide from the scriptural and liturgical basis of the nativity, which is oriented toward the incarnation and redemption, toward the Christ child. Indeed, the Christ child is placed at the center of familial Christmas celebrations and also in the decorations displayed by the city authorities. In this Walloon village, however, the decorations evoke a further sliding away: signboards several meters square, erected on lawns in front of houses and illuminated at night, represented Walt Disney cartoon characters. Here, Christmas is not only child oriented but, as Voyé rightfully underscores, with the Disney characters we are no longer in the realms of history but in a fairytale, peopled with fictive beings. These decorations convey implicitly the idea that Christmas is a marvelous fairytale, far removed from the original incarnation–redemption idea that the religious message of Christmas carries. By putting up these decorations, people latently secularize the Christian message.

THE MICRO LEVEL: INDIVIDUAL SECULARIZATION AND COMPARTMENTALIZATION

Luhmann's contention that the social structure is secularized but not the individual is controversial. Most sociologists will not challenge the first part, although some will question the second part. Berger, Davie, Martin, and Stark point out the religious fever in the United States, which is contested by other sociologists (e.g., Demerath 2001), and in the world, and

they reject the universal pattern of individual secularization, while accepting that Europe is to a large extent secularized on the micro level. For this reason they call Europe the exception, although Davie (2002) relativizes this by highlighting the persistence of religious beliefs and "religious sensitivity," and by referring to what she calls "vicarious religion": people drawing on religious capital at crucial times in their individual or collective lives, e.g., for the celebration of rites of passage. Her interpretation is based on data from the European Values Study referring, among other indicators, to belief in God. However, it may be remarked that the content of belief in God has greatly changed: the number of people believing in a "personal God" is shrinking and is replaced by a growing number of agnostics and persons believing in "a spirit or life force." Although sociological research in Belgium shows that a certain percentage of the unchurched still pray and define themselves as religious, a more detailed analysis reveals that, among those who have been at least two generations unchurched, fewer people define themselves as religious and fewer maintain a private practice than among the first generation unchurched. Does this not suggest that it is difficult to remain religious the longer one is severed from a religious congregation?

Recent qualitative research in Belgium has also revealed that for those unchurched persons and marginal church members who still ask for a religious rite of passage, the meaning of these rites has changed: it expresses for them more of a cultural and family tradition than a religious one. Hiernaux and Voyé led a study of Catholics in French speaking Belgium who intended to have a religious burial. The study revealed important changes. When Latin was used in ritual and hymns, the priest had the central role and used standardized formulae, which he knew and understood, creating a distance between daily life and the afterlife. Formerly, the ritual was centered on the life to come and the mystery surrounding it, whereas now the ritual centered upon the deceased: his life, loves, friendships, and accomplishments: the texts read and the songs and music played were chosen by the family with reference to the deceased. If religious texts and hymns were used, they were chosen to express the qualities of the deceased

and not because they refer to God. Quite often God was not brought in except in the rare sacramental words pronounced by the priest (Voyé 1998). Studying the motivations of the unchurched and marginal church members who had their children baptized, it was found that both the cultural tradition of the country and familial tradition were important elements in the motivation. By being baptized, the children would later be socialized in the basic values of their culture during the catechism preceding their first and solemn communion, and this was considered by parents to be important in giving their children a “good start.” The evaluation of religious changes at the individual level as secularization is in fact based on a substantive definition of religion in reference to institutionalized religion. Researchers who question individual secularization use terms like religious sensitivity, spirituality, religious metamorphoses, or the changing contours of religious matters (for a discussion see Beckford 2003). On the micro level, secularization is here defined as declining religiosity and a change in motivation in the use of religious rites: from a traditional religious reference to a secularly motivated use.

How is such a decline in religiosity to be explained? There are no comparative studies between countries that allow us to link the mean degree of individual secularization to the level of societal secularization in these countries (Dobbelaere 2002 [1981]). Several other factors also play a role, including individualization as a *structural* component of modern societies, and migration and the mass media, which bring individuals in contact with other religions and undermine the taken for granted certainties of their own religion. Studies in the western world have highlighted religious bricolage resulting from individuals shopping on the religious market, as on other markets, and building their own meaning system (Dobbelaere et al. 2003). Pace (1998) has pointed out that in Muslim countries the conflict between country and city – the latter having created new social classes with different attitudes to religious traditions and a greater willingness to accept new choices and values – and emigration, which has affected the religion not only of emigrants but also of those who stay behind, as they compare themselves with their emigrated children, relatives, or friends, have had an impact on individual secularization.

However, on the micro level, secularization could also be defined as “*secularization of mind*” or *compartmentalization*: to what extent do people *think* in terms of separation of the religious subsystem and the juridical, educational, economic, family, scientific, medical, and political subsystems? In other words, do they think along the same lines as the secularized society is structured, i.e., that religion should *not* inform the so called profane subsystems, that these are autonomous and that any interference of religion in these subsystems should be eradicated and disallowed? In a study in Western and Central European countries, researchers were able to measure the degree of compartmentalization and to establish that the unchurched and members of the Protestant and Catholic churches with the lowest degree of church commitment think most in terms of compartmentalization (Billiet et al. 2003).

If researchers want to study the effect of societal secularization on individual secularization and on compartmentalization, then there should be international surveys that allow the measurement of these concepts in countries with different levels of societal secularization. Researchers should first establish the degree of societal secularization using a comprehensive *secularization index*. This will allow them to distinguish between countries according to their degree of societal secularization. Then they should be able to build an *individual secularization index* and a comprehensive *compartmentalization index*. Studying the association between societal secularization and compartmentalization, and between compartmentalization and individual secularization – defined as level of church commitment – should allow researchers to study the impact of societal changes on individual thinking and behavior.

In the United States an alternative theory to secularization, which was not considered applicable in the US context, was developed: rational choice theory (RCT). Are both theories mutually exclusive? RCT holds that a religious pluralistic situation may promote church commitment. This theory makes three important points (Young 1997). It postulates a *latent religiosity* on the demand side, which should become manifest by *active competition* between religious firms on the supply side. However, this is only possible in a *pluralistic religious situation*

where religious firms compete for customers, and to the extent that the supply side is not limited by state regulations, suppressing or subsidizing religions. Stated thus, RCT only works in states that are secularized on the societal level. State and religion should be deregulated to allow competition between religious firms; in the opposite case religious firms are “lazy,” since there is no need for competition. Consequently, there is no opposition between secularization theory and RCT: both theories are complementary. Sociologists of religion should combine both theoretical approaches and integrate them (Dobbelaere 2002 [1981]).

SEE ALSO: Civil Religion; Globalization, Religion and; Humanism; Laicism; New Religious Movements; Rational Choice Theories; Religion; Religion, Sociology of; Sacred, Eclipse of the; Sacred/Profane; Structural Functional Theory

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segregation

Kristina Wolff

In 1906, W. E. B. Du Bois wrote that the “problem of the twentieth century is the problem of the Color Line” (Du Bois 1995: 42). This statement has come to represent the perpetual effects of racism in US society. It also is often used as a precursor to discussing the social phenomenon of segregation. While segregation in US society largely focuses on issues of race and ethnicity, it is more complex than this. Segregation is both the formal and informal separation of one group from another. Often this division is based on markers of difference, where race, ethnicity, gender, social class, sexual orientation, or religion is used as the foundation for justifying a split between groups and populations. The repercussions of these separations are vast, creating and supporting structural inequality within societies.

The most common form of segregation is de facto, which consists of divisions between groups of people in specific areas of their social lives such as in the workplace, housing, and schools. Historically, this often occurred as the result of immigration; people tend to move to where they know other people or where there is a population similar to them. The effects of this are visible today as many cities have neighborhoods that have large concentrations of people of the same ethnicity and/or religion. This type of segregation is shaped by a host of systemic influences such as nationwide discriminatory hiring policies and unfair practices in the banking, insurance, and real estate industries. Historically, these institutions practiced redlining, which determines what neighborhoods are not eligible for mortgages, loans, or other services due to their deteriorating conditions. Often these decisions were influenced by the religious, racial, ethnic, or gender characteristics of residents.

Segregation may also be de jure or required by law. Often these regulations determine access to public services and accommodations, housing, education, employment, and property ownership. Limits are placed on individuals’ rights to inheritance, ability to adopt children, or “who” they may marry. Examples of this

practice include “male only” jobs, the creation of the Jewish ghettos in Nazi Germany, the separation of Catholics and Protestants in Northern Ireland, miscegenation laws as well as barriers to same sex marriage in the United States. These formalized practices provide the foundation for de facto segregation. While some nations have eliminated de jure segregation, isolation and discrimination continue on informal levels.

Sociologists have focused on a variety of reasons why de facto segregation continues to exist in society. Conscious self segregation, such as residential segregation where groups of immigrants or lesbians and gays choose to live in the same geographical location, can foster a spirit of community while maintaining common cultural practices. However, residential segregation is heavily influenced by race/ethnicity and/or economic class. Early research, such as the work by Glazer and Moynihan, sought to understand the relationship of inequality with what they identified as ethnically organized neighborhoods in New York City (Glazer & Moynihan 1963). They concluded that as each group became more assimilated into US society, the less likely they were to face issues related to inequality. A limit to this research is Glazer and Moynihan’s treatment of people who are labeled “black” as an ethnic rather than racial group. The effects of race and racism play out differently than ethnicity in US society.

Scholarship by Wilson and by Massey and Denton represents two major debates surrounding segregation in US society. They have demonstrated that racism and classism, often perpetuated by segregation, are structural barriers to success (Massey & Denton 1993; Wilson 1987, 1991). Wilson recognizes the relationships of race and class in maintaining poverty, particularly in urban ghettos. His overarching conclusion is that due to structural economic issues such as loss of job opportunities, the flight of the middle class out of inner city neighborhoods, geographical location, and inadequate social policy reinforce segregation. Massey and Denton complement and challenge Wilson’s conclusions. While recognizing that economic opportunities and physical location contribute to the inability of the urban underclass, particularly impoverished black communities, to rise out of poverty, they demonstrate that residential

segregation is based on racial segregation. Inequality will continue as long as racism exists, creating barriers to adequate education, employment, and other services people need to have thriving communities.

Current research has shown that while society has become more integrated on some levels, inequality due to practices of segregation remains a significant factor in the areas of work, education, and health. Racial and ethnic groups, particularly blacks and Latinos/Chicanos, continue to have low high school and college graduation rates. Proportionally, they make up a larger percentage of people residing at the bottom of the economic ladder and black Americans have consistently higher mortality rates (Collins & Williams 1999; Charles 2003). This is heavily influenced by lack of access to adequate health care. Studies have also shown that residential segregation is increasing rather than decreasing.

Glazer and Moynihan's vision of integration based on assimilating into US society has not materialized due to a variety of factors including the strength of "isms," particularly racism, sexism, and heterosexism in society. Combined with classism and increasing economic disparity, social isolation is on the rise. While more whites are facing economic hardship, studies have shown that they continue to live in better neighborhoods than blacks who are at the same economic level. Research has shown that integration of neighborhoods, on race, ethnic, and economic class levels, significantly reduces crime and violence, improves academic performance and economic opportunities, and reduces bias and discriminatory practices.

SEE ALSO: Assimilation; Class, Status, and Power; Color Line; Culture of Poverty; Du Bois, W. E. B.; Homophobia and Heterosexism; Migration, Ethnic Conflicts, and Racism; Race; Race (Racism); Redlining; Residential Segregation; School Segregation, Desegregation; Sexism

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seikatsu/seikatsusha

Wolfgang Seifert

Seikatsu and *seikatsusha* are expressions in colloquial Japanese as well as technical terms in the discipline of sociology. As the meaning of the words differs widely, depending on their usage, a translation into any western language is difficult, although a very basic translation of *seikatsu* would be "everyday life" and *seikat susha* a person who pursues it. To understand the use of these terms in Japanese sociological research, one must know their historical background and intellectual context.

Seikatsu originates in classical Chinese texts and in ancient times had the meaning of "life/to live" or "existence/to exist." In modern times the word is most frequently used in the sense of "livelihood" or "everyday life," in contrast to

biological and physical aspects of life or its philosophical interpretations. Finally, the word *seikatsu* serves in an accentuated and positive sense as the fundamental category of an integrative science, developed in Japan and called *seikatsugaku* (“lifology”).

Surprisingly, most Japanese encyclopedias and dictionaries of social sciences do not include the term *seikatsusha*, although its use is widespread nowadays. *Seikatsusha* also defies precise translation into a western language. Therefore, a whole range of meanings has to be kept in mind, reaching from “consumer” on the one hand to “a man, who actively organizes his own life” on the other hand. One of the rare definitions, coined in the 1970s after the first oil crisis, maintains: “*Seikatsusha* is used in the sense of an existence within which one is independent as an individual, freed from being a mere *company man*, not biased by rigid ideas of gender specific divisions of labor. A man who is concerned about global environmental problems as well as recycling, and being committed to local affairs and voluntary work” (Hamashima et al. 1997). In the early 1990s, *seikatsusha* became a fashionable word in politics and the media, but was often used without its critical implications. For instance, when the Japanese government announced its “Five Year Plan for Making Japan a Leading Nation with Regard to the Quality of Life” in 1992, it used *seikatsusha* almost synonymously with “consumer.”

In addition, many words combined with *seikatsu* are used as specialist terms in sociology: *seikatsu jikan* = time use, *seikatsu kikai* = life chances (Dahrendorf), *seikatsu taido* = *Lebensführung* (Weber), *seikatsu no shitsu* = quality of life, *seikatsu sekai* = lifeworld/*Lebenswelt* (Husserl, Schütz, Habermas).

MAJOR DIMENSIONS OF SEIKATSU AND SEIKATSUSHA

In Japanese economic science the term *seikatsu* traditionally is related to consumption (*shôhi*); the consumer (*shôhisha* or *seikatsusha*) is seen in opposition to the producer. To cover theoretically and empirically the economic tasks and functions of everyday life, the subdiscipline of home economics (*kaseigaku*, *katei keizaigaku*) was developed. Furthermore, the attempt to

establish domestic science (*seikatsu kagaku*) is worth mentioning. Its subject is everyday life, basically covering all aspects of food, clothing, and housing. This interdisciplinary approach also includes sciences such as physics, chemistry, and biology.

Even before 1945 some scholars tried to separate the area of everyday life and material conditions of living from economics in order to establish it as a subject of sociological research. Kon Wajirô and sociologists who picked up his ideas rejected the understanding of *seikatsu* prevalent at the time (i.e., that everyday life was to be seen in relation to production). According to Kon, *seikatsu* is not limited to the reproduction of working power, but means the active shaping of one’s conditions of life. The new interpretation of *seikatsu* led to a complete reversal of the emphasis put on life (*seikatsu*) and labor (*rôdô*) in research. The research object of the new interpretation was how people actively shaped their living conditions, such as food, clothing, and housing. Therefore, individual sources such as life histories and life documents are of prime importance for this kind of research.

Partly connected to this ethnographic approach and partly independent of it, the sociological concept of “life structure” (*seikatsu kôzô*) aims at specifically and systematically covering all spheres of the *seikatsusha*. While this concept is not yet fully established, what has to be done in research has been unanimously identified as follows: (1) research on life activities in relation to its material aspects; (2) grasping the outer shape of everyday life and its temporal and spatial structure; (3) including everyday social relations. When the Institute of Journalism and Communication Studies of Tokyo University started researching political consciousness and life consciousness (*seikatsu ishiki*) as early as 1959, the latter term covered (1) the interests in everyday life and the conditions supporting them; (2) lifestyle; and (3) consumers’ consciousness. A second school in Japanese sociology that emerged around 1980 refers to the term “world of everyday life,” as Schütz developed it following Husserl in his phenomenological sociology. Habermas’s theorem of the *Lebenswelt* his *Theorie des kommunikativen Handelns* (Theory of Communicative Action, 1981) and its critical dimension of the “colonization of the lifeworld” were also employed.

From the early 1990s, political science started to analyze women's power in politics, partly based on Consumer Club Coops (*Seikatsu kurabu seikyō*). This new social movement and its political influence at regional levels are widely viewed as a symptom of a more mature stage of civil society in Japan.

Coping with everyday life demands a kind of pragmatist philosophy that is barely researched in academia. Intellectuals centering around the journal *Shisō no kagaku* after World War II realized the importance and potential of the "philosophy" of ordinary people, and tried to explore the thought and imagination of the common man.

INTELLECTUAL AND SOCIAL CONTEXT

Contemporary sociological research on *seikatsu* was stimulated by the three discourses on *Lebenskultur* (*seikatsu bunka*), consumer society (*shōhi shakai*), and new social movements (*shin shakai undō*).

In 1926 dramatist Kurata Hyakuzō used *seikatsusha* for the first time as an independent expression for man struggling for truth and peace of mind. In 1940 this religious coloring of *seikatsusha* was criticized by philosopher Miki Kiyoshi. Miki pointed out that the "cultural life," which had become gradually accepted in Japan after the opening of the country in 1853, was in fact western consumer culture. Miki instead advocated a "culture created by humans" – "life culture" (*seikatsu bunka*). This "ordinary culture" was rooted in the "language, food, social contacts, and customs" of Japan (i.e., in "our ancient traditions"). With this, Miki connected the idea of an "individual actively shaping his everyday life" (*seikatsusha*). Since then, Japanese intellectuals have been able to write on "low" culture or offer practical advice on coping with everyday life. Even before 1945, the architectural historian and sociologist influenced by ethnology, Kon Wajirō, began to record the everyday culture of his compatriots. According to Kon, *seikatsu* covers the four sectors of work, recreation, entertainment, and education, and therefore includes the whole of life activities. Kon related to an earlier criticism by welfare economist Kagoyama Takashi on the

restriction of those in work to their function as wage earning producers. In contrast, labor and social economist Ōkōchi Kazuo used the term *seikatsu* as the sector of reproduction of working power. He analyzed the connection between productivity and poverty, as well as reasons for fluctuations in living expenses.

Kon, on the other hand, focused on the concrete shape of everyday life and its changes in food, clothing, and housing. After 1945 he opposed the so called "modernist" theories which viewed the democratization of Japan as solely related to politics and law. He saw the range of possibilities offered by democracy in the organization of everyday life (*seikatsu no shikata*) and did not oppose the Japanese traditional lifestyle (*kurashikata*), but positively stressed its simplicity, plainness, and reason, and advocated integrating it into the changing environment of everyday life. The Japan Society for Lifology (*Nihon seikatsu gakkai*), founded in 1972, refers to Kon's concept of *seikatsujin*. Influenced by American pragmatism, after 1945 philosophers such as Kuno Osamu and Tsurumi Shunsuke felt compelled to study the "philosophy of ordinary people." In 1959 the journal *Shisō no kagaku* pointed out the importance of "nameless *seikatsusha*" (*mumei no seikatsusha*) for society. Such ideas later were integrated into the objectives of consumer cooperatives.

The discourse on the consumer society evolved in times of rapid economic growth and was started by Ōkuma Nobuyuki. As an economist, Ōkuma enhanced the appreciation of the term *seikatsusha* as early as 1940. According to him, economic sciences attributed all activities of preserving human life to the two sectors of production and consumption, while mainly focusing on matters of production. Consequently, the existence of human beings, as well, was subsumed merely under these two categories. Thus, we lost sight of our own "life activity" (*seikatsu*). Ōkuma's criticism of economic sciences was based on a new definition of *seikatsu* and *seikatsusha*: *seikatsusha* was not used as a synonym, but as a counterpart of consumer (*shōhisha*). As skepticism towards industrialism, mass production, and consumption emerged in the 1960s and 1970s, some scholars once again took up Ōkuma's concept of *seikatsu*.

In the 1960s and 1970s, political and social movements of a new type used the expression

seikatsusha in a positive sense, as well, and caused sociology and political science to broaden to some extent their analytical approach to society. The Citizens' Alliance for Peace in Vietnam (*Beheiren*) – active since 1965 – was based on a loose union of individuals, neither affiliated to political parties nor any other political organizations. Its participants considered themselves to be citizens (*shimin*) and “ordinary people” living in their personal circumstances (*seikatsu*), claiming a sphere of decision making which was autonomous from government and state. On the other hand, the new consumers' movements emerging from 1965 onwards tried to distance themselves from the previous consumers' cooperatives that had a large membership in Japan. They named themselves *Seikatsu kurabu seikyō* (literally, livelihood cooperatives; the translation “Consumers' Club Coops” slightly misses the meaning). These coops openly tried to gain political influence, to some extent succeeding in local and regional elections. In view of the globally widening gap between the rich and the poor they aimed ideologically at altering their lifestyle and organized the communal purchase of healthy food. To these, three goals were added: first, developing from a consumer (*shōhisha*) to an individual which actively shaped its everyday life (*seikatsusha*); second, establishing a political power independent from parties by freeing oneself from the conception of being an abstract national citizen (*kokumin*) by not electing representatives (*daihyōsha*) but deputies (*dairimin*); and third, connecting the “consumer” to the “productively shaping” being. Starting from this point, the political scientist Takabatake Michitoshi developed his idea of *seikatsusha citizen*. Thus, new perspectives for civil society in Japan were emphasized.

CURRENT DEVELOPMENTS

Today, research on the material circumstances (culture) of life (*seikatsu*) of the Japanese is multifaceted. Research on marketing and consumption examines the selling potential of certain products or services, as well as the behavior of the consumer. Numerous surveys are conducted on time budget and leisure behavior. On the other hand, education to conduct responsible

consumption and to strengthen the consumer's independence is attempted. Economic studies starting from the consumer's point of view are numerous.

Recently, works on the relation between social welfare and poverty that argue in favor of social politics based on economic reasoning have gained importance. The reason for this is that social cleavages have become more apparent and the problem of different life standards (*seikatsu suijun*) of different strata of society is being discussed again. New approaches to the relation of social security systems and *seikatsusha* are taken, and the relation between health and *seikatsusha* as wage earners is still being examined. Sociological works often relate to the concept of lifeworld, while many studies belong to the ethnographically influenced school of Kon. In political science and in sociology, the discourse on the perspectives for civil society in Japan is continuing. However, there seems to be a marked disillusionment with the potential of consumer goods associations, in particular the Consumers Club Coops, to change society in general (Hartmann 2003).

SEE ALSO: Civil Society; Consumer Movements; Everyday Life; Lifeworld

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seken

Tomoko Kurihara

The Japanese script for *seken* combines the two Chinese characters meaning “world” (pronounced as either *yo* or *se*) with “space between” (pronounced as either *aida*, *ma*, *kan*, or *ken*). The core features of the concept are as follows. *Seken* refers to the appearance of the total network of social relations that surround an individual. It conveys the corresponding cultural norms and values that function to regulate social behavior, and hints at how such relations and behavior are maintained. *Seken* is thought to be a concept native to Japan that has existed since the seventh century. It corresponds roughly to *shakai*, the translated word for “society,” derived from the West, which came into circulation in the Meiji period (1898–1920) as western concepts, ideals, and values became popularized by politicians and intellectuals. “The public” is at times used as *seken*'s English equivalent. However, the two terms are by no means synonymous; a conceptual lacuna exists between “the public,” with its universalistic connotations, and *seken*, which, by comparison, when referring to one of its meanings – network – points rather more specifically to a social context or *aidagara*. Hamaguchi (1985) discerns how interrelations that constitute *aidagara* include encounters which are functional as well as unintentional and non transactional. Thus *seken* can be described as the sum of interrelations

as a result of the accumulation of subnetworks of *aidagara*.

A diagrammatic depiction of *seken* clearly embodies the two core features given above. The model represents the interrelations between individuals as a stratified concentric structure: the individual in the center, the people known to the individual (or friends, work colleagues, neighbors) in the adjacent ring, and people in society that the individual does not know (or strangers) in the outermost ring. *Seken* points to the body of people who fall in the mid region between the two. This model also accounts for the *breadth* of relations which surrounds the individual in everyday life; this mirrors a macro level reality that extensive networks sustain many aspects of Japanese social and economic life.

Seken is a relational term with a spatial reference, and the relation between the self and *seken* is ambiguous and precarious because the boundaries of the term are flexible, relatively arbitrary, and dependent on context. This situationally determined feature of *seken* poses three practical implications for its use. First, there is no singular or set way of identifying who – friends or strangers – fits these positions at any one time. For example, a particular individual, say, *x san*, might include another individual, *y san*, among the *seken* category on one occasion, but depending on how *x san* feels toward *y san* the following day, *y san* might no longer be considered *seken*. Second, the term *seken* does not necessarily correspond to a particular individual; it can also be applied, as in most cases, to refer to a group of individuals who are neither close nor other. In this way, *seken* is highly sensitive to the shifting positions of individuals within social interaction, and in *seken*, therefore, positioning is interchangeable and inconsistent. Third, the substance of *seken* can differ, dependent on sex, age, social origin, occupation, level of education, region, and marital status. The *seken* referent is therefore constituted either by the relations between these properties, each of which has its specific value, or by a single pertinent one.

Seken is a relational concept which entails a comparison between self and social norms and ideals in the context of daily practice. *Seken*'s presence regulates the thought and hence behavior of individuals which brings them in

alignment with society's standards. Japanese people on the whole take seriously the implications of deviating from *seken's* standards and they continually and minutely adjust the inconsistency arising between self and *seken*. The term *seken* is in frequent daily usage in contemporary Japan, where it can be experienced by the individual as an omnipresent force, constantly serving to judge and regulate behavior in a collectivist society. This sense is conveyed well by anthropologist Takie Sugiyama Lebra: "In parallel to the 'face' focused self, the *seken* other is equipped with its own 'eyes,' 'ears,' and 'mouth,' watching, hearing and gossiping about the self. This body metaphor contributes to the sense of immediacy and inescapability of the *seken's* presence" (Lebra 1992: 107).

As *seken* expresses a type of obligation and conformity to the group, it can be related to the dyadic concept of *tatemae* and *honne*, which mean, respectively, rules that are natural or proper, that have formed on the basis of group consensus, and, in spite of a display of conformity to the group, the individual's true intentions (see Doi 1986). *Tatemae* is also an essential technique in the presentation of the self. It is acquired by individuals through the learning and judging of social codes, thereby used to survive in society by reducing the potential for conflict. In this sense of technique *tatemae* differs from *seken*, which refers either to people or to a controlling force. Furthermore, insofar as *seken* indicates social norms which induce the conformity of individuals, the concept can be related to the western sociological and psychoanalytical notions of habitus, social fact/collective conscience, and the superego.

It is not entirely clear, even in practice, how the notion of *seken* operates: it is equally relevant to understand that the individual is somehow regulated by *seken* as much as the individual can regulate his or her own behavior in accordance to *seken's* standards. *Seken*, insofar as it can be construed as a disciplining force, can be interpreted as functioning similarly to the sociological concept of habitus (see Kurihara 2006). The concept of habitus is a "structuring structure" that shapes the practice of people at the level of the unconscious through a process of implicit pedagogy (Bourdieu 1977, 1990). Habitus is an internalized concept. The operation of

habitus and *seken* is similar in the way socially appropriate norms of conduct become internalized by individuals whereby their practice becomes shaped implicitly. Yet the difference between habitus and *seken* is that individuals are conscious of the presence and pressures of *seken* to a relatively greater extent than Pierre Bourdieu claims about habitus: *seken* seems to have a greater force of control. Furthermore, the boundary of the term habitus seems more stable than *seken*.

The concept of *seken* is often defined as being unique to Japanese society, but similar accounts of forces of control that regulate the body exist cross culturally. As discussed, it appears to fit descriptions of habitus, a French sociological concept, applied both to its provenance (Bourdieu 1984) and to Kabyle society (Bourdieu 1977, 1990). Marcel Mauss (1979 [1935]), who originally described habitus as an encultured bodily way of behaving, indeed intended the concept to apply cross culturally, and his examples of habitus were developed based around his observations of French and American society. Parallel examples of forces operating like *seken* are also found in ancient democratic Athenian society and in Victorian England. For example, Allen (2000) writes that the practice of naming and shaming, gossip, and the close scrutiny of others functioned in ancient Athens to keep people in their place. In the absence of any official punitive system possessing concrete techniques of control, order in Athenian society was produced by such discourses concerning punishment and the substance of the law. Discourse about order tended to have the desired ordering effect whereby such discourses functioned to perform an endless maintenance of distinctions, values, and meaning in society. In these examples, public opinion sanctions behavior.

Ultimately, *seken* refers to the relation between the individual and society. As *seken* regulates the behavior of individuals in relation to norms, an understanding of the way *seken* functions can be compared to the functioning of group norms and ideals outlined in Émile Durkheim's deterministic model of society, in his concept of social fact. To be precise, the relation between individual action and society is the object of theorization. For Durkheim, social facts, which consist of ways of thinking

and behaving, are coercive forces that penetrate the individual without the individual perceiving that they do. The social fact becomes part of the individual's thought and behavior in a way that transforms the individual by somehow tying him/her to the group by providing norms and ideals. By believing in the externality of social facts, Durkheim treated norms as properties of collectivities, which functioned to constrain. Combined with his view that social facts are moral phenomena, he explained how adherence to moral ideals incites action. By connecting the three spheres of morals, norms, and action, Durkheimian sociology offered an explanation for how sanctions/constraints regulate individuals' behavior.

At the level of an individual's psychic structure and processes, the psychoanalytic work of Sigmund Freud provides a comparable explanation of how *seken* regulates an individual's behavior. According to Freud's model, the repository of social norms within individuals called the superego functions by holding the individual's desires within the bounds set by society. The superego includes two subsystems: an ego ideal and conscience. The ego ideal is the child's conception of what his parents will approve; conscience is the child's conception of what his parents will condemn as morally bad. Both are assimilated by the child from examples and teachings provided by his parents. The ego ideal is learned through rewards; conscience is learned through punishments. Freud's explanation of how these social restraints become internalized to form the superego contain a European, middle class bias; however, it is possible to infer from this how the internal psychic process might work in adults when they are faced with social norms to which they should conform. In the case of *seken*, the role of the parents in Freud's model would pass on to the social body as a whole.

The theoretical proximity between *seken* and western sociological and psychological concepts – habitus, social fact, superego – would appear to illustrate the extent of commonality in the human condition. It is also clear that the concepts are by no means commensurate with one another due to inevitable cultural specificities rising from the regional scale of observation and conditions of analysis. Our understanding

of *seken* and similar phenomena would profit from a body of future research which applies in depth ethnographic methods to explore more comprehensively how *seken* works and impacts on individual daily lives in all spheres of social life.

SEE ALSO: Collective Consciousness; Durkheim, Émile; Freud, Sigmund; Habitus/Field; Self; Social Fact; *Tatamae/Honne*

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self

Kathy Charmaz

The concept of self is simultaneously social and subjective; the self exists in social life. Common definitions of the self, however, accentuate its subjective side: all those qualities, attributes, values, feelings, and moral sentiments that a person assumes to be his or her own. The social sources of self make subjectivity possible because the person's experience of feelings, images, and interpretations emerges and takes on meaning through social interaction.

The concept of self lacks a coherent history; however, its intellectual antecedents appear throughout the history of philosophical and theological reflections about essential qualities comprising human nature and consciousness. A concept of self emerged in Renaissance European philosophy as transcending social and corporeal existence. As industrialization progressed, conceptions of the self became embedded in social life, rather than separate from it. The industrial age recast social relationships in new forms that vitiated prior assumptions. The classical theorists placed the self in society but did not explicitly theorize it. Marx theorized an inherently social conception of self without adopting a language of self. An implicitly theorized but explicitly social conception of self also emerged in Émile Durkheim's contrasting analyses of transformations wrought by the emerging industrial order.

A fundamental shift in the concept of self occurred when the early pragmatists resituated the self in ordinary experience. The pragmatists cut remaining ties to transcendental values and wove a *theoretical concept* of self from its social fabric. William James (1890) initiated a tradition of theorizing the self that has continued relevance today. He differentiated the "I," the self as subjective knower, from the "me," the object

of consciousness. James's concept of the "empirical self" developed in practical existence. For James, the number of a person's selves equaled the number of individuals who knew him or her. James contended that the self relied on its realization through experience and, moreover, brought communication into the forefront of theorizing the self. James viewed the self as inseparable from communication of its experience.

Charles Horton Cooley (1902) also emphasized communication and meanings of personal pronouns observed in everyday life. Building on James's empirical self, Cooley's concept of the "social self" brought the self into interaction. Cooley observed how children learn to distinguish between self and other, me and you, mine and yours. Moreover, Cooley brought sentiments and reflections into theorizing the self. In his concept of the "looking glass self," Cooley gave a central position to introspection and imagination: we first imagine how we appear to others; then, we imagine their judgment of our appearance, followed by "some sort of self feeling, such as pride or shame." Later textbook authors sometimes misunderstood Cooley's point here despite his emphasis that the judgment eliciting this self feeling is an "imputed sentiment," not a mechanical reflection.

George Herbert Mead (1929) criticized Cooley's introspective method as asocial and solipsistic; Mead believed that Cooley's view of self relied too heavily on biological explanations and gave too little attention to its fundamentally social nature. The criticisms of Cooley's concept of self that began with Mead continue to the present. Nonetheless, Cooley made sentiments central to the self and spawned a nascent sociology of emotions. Relationships between the self and emotions remain evident in Erving Goffman's (1956) analysis of embarrassment and mortification, Arlie Hochschild's (1983) portrayal of feeling rules and emotion management, Norman Denzin's (1987) analysis of the alcoholic self as living in a dis ease of emotions and time, and Thomas Scheff's (1990) argument that pride and shame are basic human emotions.

In the major statement of sociological theorizing of the self, George Herbert Mead (1934) advanced the most explicit theory of a socially structured reflexive self. Mead's social self is cognitive and embedded in communication. It

arises within and remains a part of interactional processes. For Mead, the self is both social process and social object. It is contingent upon “minded activity” that emanates from social existence. As we participate in social life, we learn to envision our group’s activities and to anticipate possible future actions – our own as well as other people’s. To accomplish this minded activity, we learn symbols, understand meanings, and converse with ourselves. Therefore, Mead and his intellectual descendants, Herbert Blumer and Anselm Strauss, argue that language plays a pivotal role in the development of self. Language gives us tools to view ourselves as objects for scrutiny. Through using language we invoke terms to make nuanced distinctions about ourselves as well as our worlds. We can envision, evaluate, and act toward ourselves as objects like we treat any other object. Furthermore, we mediate our responses during interaction because we can imagine the view of the other person.

Mead (1934) adopted James’s terms, the “I” and the “me,” to portray the self. The “I” is the creative part of the self that initiates action. It is spontaneous, immediate; the self enters the act without deliberation. The socialized “me” then monitors and directs the act because it assesses the “I” through a conversation with and about self. This conversation takes into account the internalized views and values of the group. Thus, the self is a social structure; it differs according to the social situation. Mead said that the situation calls forth a response from the self. More accurately, a situation calls forth *a* self because people’s varied situations lead to possessing different selves.

Mead wrested the concept of self from behaviorism. His concept of a social self counters portrayals of people as stimulus response creatures or as beings determined by social, cultural, or economic forces. Mead’s self develops in active response to what occurs around it. This response may consist of internalization, adaptation, innovation, or resistance. Much of social life is routine; however, when we reflect on new or problematic situations, we can choose how to respond, rather than react, to them. In short, Mead’s concepts of mind and self mean that we have agency: we can choose and control our actions.

Symbolic interactionist social psychology made the Meadian concept of self a cornerstone

of its perspective. As a result, symbolic interactionists kept the idea of an agentic self alive throughout mid century structural functionalist disciplinary dominance. The functionalist perspective ignored the self in favor of a static concept of roles and disregarded the interactive and interpretive features of socialization. More recently, theorizing about agency has brought interactionist conceptions of an acting, interpreting self into the mainstream of the discipline, although its pragmatist antecedents often go unrecognized (Maines 2001).

Throughout the later part of the twentieth century, Blumer’s (1969) Meadian view of the self and Goffman’s (1959) dramaturgical self sparked a vibrant dialogue about the self among symbolic interactionists and some structural social psychologists. Dramaturgical analysts view the self as constructed in action in response to concrete situations and settings in which people find themselves. Action, not individual reflection, becomes the distinguishing feature of self. Thus, dramaturgical analysts assume that what people do reveals more about their selves than what they say.

Erving Goffman (1959) observes that whenever we are in the real or imaginary presence of others, our behavior has social meaning and a promissory character. Subsequently, our actions express ourselves and give an impression of self to others, whether favorable or not. Goffman argues that people intend to bring about a certain impression of self. How we approach other people derives from the nature of the shared situation. Yet they realize that we try to make favorable impressions on others. Thus, our audience looks for cues we give off as well as what we say. Despite intentions and staged performances, social actors give off unwitting messages about self.

The dramaturgical perspective brings the occasion and its structure into theorizing the self. If the interaction order of the occasion produces selves, can the self be a unique personal possession of its holder? Might it not be a mask to cover a role? Learning the interaction order of an occasion requires only a minimal model of the actor – and self – who could behave sensibly in it.

The empirical study of the self has gained momentum over the past fifty years. Manfred H. Kuhn’s (1960) Twenty Statements Test

(TST) advanced the empirical study of the self by asking people to state how they see themselves. A major strength of the TST is that research participants give their own definitions of self without the researcher's preconceptions or suggestions imposed on them. A weakness is that the TST treats the self as stable attributes and does not take situations and processes into account.

The identity theorists have advanced connections between quantitative empirical studies and theoretical conceptions of the self. In Stryker's (1980; Stryker & Burke 2000) statement of the structural approach to identity theory, he asks how social structure affects the self and how the self affects social behavior. For identity theorists, the self is constituted by an organized set of identities (Burke 1980; Serpe 1987). Serpe's (1987) study of college freshmen supports the major premise of stability of self in identity theory and makes the significance of choice explicit. Serpe finds that identity change is expected in those identities in which choice is structurally possible. Burke (1980) not only emphasizes the relational aspect of identities, but also points out that their salience takes hierarchical form and that potential identities can motivate individuals. Burke calls for quantitative testing to measure the theoretical properties of identity, which he and Franzoi (1988) aim to do in their study of experiential situations. They used an innovative sampling method of signaling research participants with a timer to respond to a questionnaire about their direct experience, including their identities and roles. Burke and Franzoi found that how participants viewed their immediate situations shaped how they viewed themselves and, in turn, their behavior depended on how they viewed themselves.

Late twentieth century sociologists restored the self to its central place in theorizing. When using the term "self," however, they sometimes blur distinctions by reifying a single, static notion of self, rather than theorizing the multiplicity of selves and their processual nature. Following Mead, Viktor Gecas (1982) answers this problem. He distinguishes between the self as process from the self as stable structure, the self concept. Selves are built on processes; the stability of self concept is built on consistent processes; meanings about self last. Interaction processes constitute human existence. Thus the

self is continually in process. Yet human beings often display remarkable consistency of self over time. If the self is continually in process, why are selves not more mutable? People learn ways to define themselves. They take some things as mirroring their "real" selves, but do not claim their other enacted behaviors as reflecting them. Ralph Turner's (1976) notion of the self concept indicates why. Turner defines the self concept as an *organized* set of definitions of self, sentiments, values, and judgments, through which a person describes himself or herself. Enduring self concepts typically develop when people receive consistent responses from others. The self concept has boundaries, whether firm and impenetrable, or flaccid and permeable. Once a person's self has congealed into a self concept, it becomes more or less enduring.

The narrative turn of recent decades locates the self in stories people tell about themselves and how they tell them. The self becomes accomplished through active processes of self construction that entail rhetorical skills and occur within social contexts. Bjorklund (1998) shows how cultural discourse about the self speaks through autobiographies. Authors of autobiographies invoke historically and culturally situated vocabularies of the self to make sense of their lives and to present them to readers as moral performances.

Narrative analysts take literary forms as a point of departure and ask how people adopt and improvise on these forms. Thus their interests include plots, narrative coherence and logic, narrative sequence, composition of the story, and its specific content. Conversational analysts account for the production of self in the structure of ordinary conversations, but note that certain situations invite a self story and others require entitlement, negotiation, or cooperation for a story to ensue at all. They attend to the linguistic and interactional practices which make selves discernible in conversations. Both approaches foster placing primary focus on the texts in which discourse and conversation occur. Paradoxically then, these analysts may garner stories of the self produced under special conditions such as the research interview rather than those developed in everyday practices.

Most sociologists agree on the centrality of the self for understanding human existence, but views of its relative coherence and methods of

studying it remain contested. The postmodern self is tenuous, mobile, provisional, and fragmented. The self stands on shifting ground and thus shifts and becomes inconsistent, fragmented. Thus, contemporary life strips the self of its once coherent core and weakens the attachments on which this core was based. Despite its fragmented incoherence, these depictions of a postmodern self rely on a conception of society and cannot be divorced from it. Moreover, Gubrium and Holstein (1991; Holstein & Gubrium 1999) argue that if we reframe postmodern discourse and examine it empirically in everyday interpretive practices, then researchers can retrieve the concept of self for traditional sociological theory and research.

The concept of self in its many forms and varied emphases has inspired research that spans numerous substantive fields, such as occupations and professions, health and illness, aging, emotions, deviant behavior, race and ethnicity, and gender, as well as social psychology. These literatures contribute to an emphasis on development and change throughout the life course. Themes of reconstruction, development, and sometimes transformation of the adult self pervade studies of life changes, whether through experiencing losses or gains. Through these studies, sociologists have challenged assumptions of an asocial, reductionist, and static self. In sum, the self, and its attendant concepts, self image, self concept, and identity provide sharp tools to understand how, why, and when people develop, change, or retain a stable self throughout their lives.

SEE ALSO: Agency (and Intention); Cooley, Charles Horton; Dramaturgy; Goffman, Erving; Identity Control Theory; Identity: Social Psychological Aspects; Identity Theory; Looking Glass Self; Mead, George Herbert; Narrative; Rosenberg, Morris; Self Concept; Self Esteem, Theories of; Symbolic Interaction

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self-concept

Scott Schieman

Sociological interest in the self concept, rooted in the early writings of Cooley and Mead, has evolved into a multifaceted quest to describe the connections between social contexts and personal functioning. In his classic work, *Conceiving the Self* (1979), Rosenberg defines the self concept as all of the thoughts and feelings that individuals maintain about the self as an object. Gecas and Burke (1995) have expanded on the definition: the self concept “is composed of various identities, attitudes, beliefs, values, motives, and experiences, along with their evaluative and affective components (e.g., self efficacy, self esteem), in terms of which individuals define themselves” (p. 42). These processes involve reflexivity and self awareness; that is, a level of consciousness or awareness about one’s self that emerges from the distinctly human capacity to be an object and a subject to one’s self.

A substantial core of the content of the self concept involves identities – the meanings that individuals attach to the self. Identities embody the answer to the question: “Who am I?” Often, but not always, identities are connected to the major institutionalized social roles of society such as “spouse,” “parent,” “worker,” “student,” “church member,” “Muslim,” and so on. In many respects, identity is the most “public” feature of the self concept because it typically describes one’s place or membership in structural arrangements and social organization. At a social event, for example, individuals will ask each other about their work, their interests, their neighborhoods, and other pieces of information that typically peel back the layers of their identities. However, there may be a cost to the public nature of identities. Goffman illustrated the “spoiled identity” as socially undesirable or stigmatized aspects of the self concept. Spoiled identities contain discredited elements of the self concept that the individual is encouraged to conceal or “manage.” Failure to do so often exacts social costs. Collectively, these ideas underscore the highly *social* nature of the self concept: other people have substantial influence

on the form, content, consequences, and revelation of the self concept.

Some of the most widely known research on the self concept has focused on its evaluative and affective components, especially self esteem and self efficacy. Self esteem is “the evaluation which the individual makes and customarily maintains with regard to himself or herself: it expresses an attitude of approval or disapproval toward oneself” (Rosenberg 1965: 5). Survey researchers have sought to measure self esteem with responses to statements that include: “I feel that I have a number of good qualities,” “I feel that I’m a person of worth at least equal to others,” “I am able to do things as well as most other people,” “I take a positive attitude toward myself,” and so on. By contrast, self efficacy – also referred to as the sense of mastery or personal control – involves the extent to which one feels in control of events and outcomes in everyday life. Measures of the sense of mastery ask about agreement or disagreement with statements like: “I have little control over the things that happen to me,” “There is really no way I can solve some of the problems I have,” “What happens to me in the future mostly depends on me,” “I can do just about anything I really set my mind to,” and so on. Sociologists are interested in mastery and self esteem for several reasons: because they are socially distributed, because their absence may erode well being, and because of their potential as psychosocial resources that help people avoid or manage stressors. That is, what groups have higher or lower levels of self esteem than others? How does a low sense of mastery influence psychological well being? And, do people who possess more favorable self evaluations have a different capacity to cope with the presence and consequences of stressful adversity?

The complexity of processes involving self dynamics has also provided researchers with terrain for theoretical and empirical developments about the self concept. For example, actors are often motivated to protect the self concept from external threats. In broader terms, an array of socialization forces and social structural arrangements shape the formation and content of the self concept; thus, it is a *social product*. In terms of self concept formation, the notion of personal or self investment evokes the

ideas of identity salience and the centrality of achieved statuses, such as education, for the emergence of positive self evaluations. Analyses of the structural determinants of personal qualities, especially with respect to achieved statuses and dimensions of social stratification, have a long tradition in sociology, from Marx's broad portrait of estranged labor to more specific occupational sources of alienation and powerlessness. Marx asserted that, although individuals may strive for self fulfillment, the physical quality and organization of many work environments can thwart self enhancement and lead to personal misery. Thus, Marx provides some of the earliest pieces of evidence about "structural social psychology" because he traced linkages among objective social economic conditions and the subjective, inner lives of individuals. Since then, sociologists of mental health and others have followed his efforts by documenting and describing the role of the self concept in the connections between structural strains and psychological distress. For example, a typical sequence of hypotheses about the distressing effects of poor work conditions is as follows: (1) poor work conditions elevate unfavorable self evaluations; (2) unfavorable self evaluations increase the risk for undesirable mental health outcomes; and (3) unfavorable self evaluations explain why poor work conditions increase the risk for undesirable mental health outcomes.

Building off the early sociological traditions of Marx, Cooley, and Mead, social stratification theory and research has sought to identify in detail the links between features of social structure (e.g., education, income, occupation, and work conditions) and self concepts. For example, individuals in higher status jobs with more authority and autonomy and more creative, stimulating, and challenging tasks tend to experience higher levels of self esteem and sense of mastery. Autonomous and non routine work, especially in higher status positions, reflects arrangements that contain greater chances for mobility and achievement. Such arrangements often include responsibility for vital operations that can shape the course and success of the organization. Individuals whose work has such qualities may feel more devoted to their jobs as a source of identity and feel a greater sense of

confidence, causal importance, and relevance. It may also enhance another evaluative aspect of the self concept: the sense of mattering. Individuals who feel a sense of mattering believe that their actions are acknowledged and relevant in the lives of other people. It is easy to understand the importance of mattering as a socially determined self evaluation by reflecting on the dreadful notion that one does not matter to any one or anything. Here, there are roots to other classical notions about the powerful effects of social integration versus social isolation – and their ultimate implications for the self concept.

In sum, the self concept reflects a multidimensional and complex set of processes that contain numerous overlapping parts. Sociological social psychology has sought to document and describe the ways that social contexts influence and are influenced by the self concept. Numerous domains of study of the self concept provide fertile grounds for advances in knowledge, including: the structure and organization of self conceptions; the internal dynamics of self concepts; the relationship between social structure and self conception; and the ways that self concepts influence the effects of social stressors on health and emotional well being. Long ago, Cooley and Mead laid the conceptual and theoretical groundwork for the sociological study of the self concept. More recently, Rosenberg (1992) asserted that "although the individual's view of himself may be internal, what he sees and feels when he thinks of himself is largely the product of social life" (p. 593). One of the main quests for sociological analyses of the self concept, then, continues to involve the documentation and description of the ways that fundamental sociological variables – especially those that designate one's location in the social structure – impress upon the self concept across the life course. While this "social product" side of analysis is critical, it is important to underscore the "social force" role of the self concept; that is, the ways that the self concept impresses upon social structures and arrangements.

SEE ALSO: Cooley, Charles Horton; Identity: The Management of Meaning; Identity: Social Psychological Aspects; Identity Theory; Mead, George Herbert; Rosenberg, Morris; Self; Stress, Stress Theories

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self-control theory

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Self control is a concept used by sociologists to explain differences among people in the frequency of engaging in a wide variety of acts that cause harm to others (Gottfredson & Hirschi 1990). It is defined as the tendency to avoid acts whose long term costs exceed their momentary advantages. The costs include penalties from institutions such as schools and the criminal justice system, the loss of affection from family and friends, loss of jobs and advancements in employment, and bodily injury and physical pain. Individuals with relatively high levels of self control tend to have low rates of crime, delinquency, and substance abuse because these behaviors entail potential long term costs. They tend to have relatively high rates of school and employment success and lasting interpersonal relationships.

In criminology, the concept of self control derives from the branch of sociological theories known as control theories. These theories are distinguished by the assumption that people are rational actors, seeking pleasure and avoiding pain. Basic human needs and desires are seen as fairly uniformly distributed among people (even if access to the means to satisfy these needs and desires is far from uniformly distributed). They include the desire for affection from others, material goods, and pleasurable physical and psychological experiences. In general, people pursue these wants in everyday life; controls are established by social groups (including parents, communities, and states) to channel the pursuit of these wants in ways that cause the least harm to others. Because these controls are exerted or not in the social environment, and because individuals experience different environments related to these controls, the extent to

which individuals are “free to deviate” varies. When these controls need always be present in the environment to be effective, they are often referred to as external or social controls. When the process of socialization during the early years of life establishes concern about others and the long term costs of behaviors, the form of control is referred to as self control.

The concept of self control was created to account for the fact that many delinquencies, crimes, and other problem behaviors seem to “go together” and therefore must have some thing in common. Behavioral research has consistently found that those who engage in high levels of delinquency, crime, and other social problems do not tend to specialize in the acts they commit. Interpersonal violence, stealing, drug use, accidents, and school misbehavior are commonly found in association. The acts associated with these problems all provide some immediate benefit for the actor (money, pleasure, the end of a troubling dispute), as do many other behaviors. But each also carries with it the possibility of harmful consequences to actor or to others. What is problematic for control theorists is not the idea that such acts may provide benefits to the actor, but rather that some people can disregard these benefits most of the time. Thus, self control theory is sometimes called a “restraint” theory or a theory that focuses on why people do not engage in crime and delinquency rather than why they do (Hirschi 1969). Self control theory does not focus on crime as defined by the legal system. Rather, self control theorists have argued that sociologists should create their own dependent variable for theories about crime and delinquency, drawn from empirical studies of what harmful behaviors seem to cluster together, regardless of the legal definitions present at any one time or legal system.

Self control theory is influenced by the observation that differences among people in the tendency to disregard long term costs appear to be established in childhood and, once established, tend to persist throughout life. Criminologists have long observed that the single best predictor of delinquency or crime is the prior history of delinquency or crime.

Self control theory begins with the assumption that human nature includes the general

tendency to pursue satisfaction of individual needs and desires. Left unregulated, the pursuit of these needs and desires causes inevitable conflict with others and, because of that, potentially harmful consequences to the actor. As a result, those who care about the child seek to train the child to restrict the pursuit of self interest by attending to the needs and wants of others. For self control theory, this process is what socialization entails. As the child develops, caregivers (parents, other relatives, friends and neighbors, and schools) sanction behavior harmful to others and harmful to the child. Children are taught to pay attention to the longer term consequences of their action. When a caring adult is present in the developing child’s environment, and takes an active role in socialization, high levels of self control are established and appear to become a fairly stable characteristic of the individual over the life course. But sometimes such early caregiving is not present in the child’s environment because an adult who cares about the long term interests of the child is not around or because the caregiver who is around lacks the skills necessary to create self control in the child. Furthermore, there are differences among groups and even nations in the level and duration of this socialization process. These differences are thought by control theory to produce the differences in levels of crime, violence, and other problem behaviors among individuals and communities and in different time periods.

Differences in self control are not the only cause of delinquency and crime according to this theory, but they consistently play an important role. Another feature of self control theory is a focus on the concept of opportunity as an additional cause of crime. Self control theory was influenced by developments in opportunity or routine activity theories which themselves focused attention on situational elements of crime as it typically occurs (Hindelang et al. 1978). This perspective studies the common features of delinquencies and crimes that occur, such as the times, places, and circumstances of crime, and attempts to infer how and why people interact with these features. These studies have suggested that crimes, delinquencies, and other problem behaviors do have many things in common. They seem to be overwhelmingly

opportunistic events, in the sense that they are not typically planned much in advance, but seem to happen as opportunities “present themselves.” Most often the delinquencies or crimes do not result in much gain for the offender – a little cash or stolen property, momentary excitement or fun, a temporary high, or a physical end to an argument. They tend to take place in the absence of “capable guardians” (Cohen & Felson 1979).

Self control theory assumes that differences among people in self control are also associated with the distribution of people in settings that vary in the opportunities for crime and delinquency. Thus, being among adolescent males in unsupervised settings, especially at night and in the presence of readily available drugs or alcohol, enhances opportunity for delinquency and is also a function of low self control. Similarly, persistence in school is a characteristic of those with higher levels of self control and also with reduced opportunities for delinquency. Throughout the life course, self control influences friend and family associations, employment patterns, and many other life experiences (essentially the opportunities for crime), which in turn are related to levels of crime and related behaviors.

Researchers have found self control theory to be a fruitful object of study. The theory has been applied to a wide variety of topics, ranging from white collar crime to genocide, and from motor vehicle accidents to victimization. Other research has focused on using the theory to help explain patterns in crime and delinquency, such as gender differences, peer effects, and between country variation in crime (for examples, see Britt & Gottfredson 2003; Hirschi & Gottfredson 1994). Most studies have found the measured level of self control to usefully predict the problem behavior under study. Internal to the theory, attention has focused on the proper measurement of self control, with some scholars finding attitudinal measures suitable and others preferring behavioral indicators.

Critics of self control theory have argued that the theory is merely a tautology, that it invokes an overly simplistic view of human nature, and that it is best regarded only as one form of social learning theory. Considerable debate has

centered on the assumption that, once established in early childhood, differences among people in self control are stable. Some theorists argue instead that there are important life experiences that can elevate the level of self control in adulthood, such as marriage. A persistent, but still very active, research dispute centers on the influence of peers on delinquency. Self control theory would predict that the correlation between the delinquency of an individual and the delinquency of his or her friends is due to the selection of friends and associates that is heavily influenced by self control and its determinants, whereas other perspectives argue that delinquent peers themselves cause delinquency to increase by supporting alternative norms or beliefs about the acceptability of delinquent conduct (for an excellent review of these issues, see Warr 2002).

The socialization idea in self control theory is itself subject to controversy and alternative explanations. That is, the view that people begin life similarly situated with respect to the imperative to seek self interest, and differ as adolescents largely as a consequence of differential socialization in childhood, is actively debated. Some argue that there are heritable predispositions that effect both variation in motivation for crime and amenability to socialization. Self control theory takes the position that the benefits of delinquencies and crimes are obvious and ubiquitous such that no special motivation or learning is required to explain why individuals may engage in them. Furthermore, the socialization required for self control is relatively easily achieved and is so effective that individual predispositions are likely to have minor effects in the generation of delinquency and crime. This debate will very likely shape future research and be increasingly active as techniques to establish predisposition and the studies necessary to examine the sources of self control are undertaken.

Self control theory has strong implications for public policies about delinquency and crime. Because the important causes of crime are thought to originate in early childhood, there is considerable promise in programs that focus resources for childcare among high risk populations. A body of research has been created showing that such programs do indeed

have important effects in reducing the level of delinquency and other problem behaviors and improving the life chances of children who otherwise would not benefit from self control (Greenwood 2002). On the other hand, the theory predicts that efforts to control crime by targeting adolescents or adults by policing and incarceration will be ineffective, since they inevitably come too late in the developmental process. As control theory predicts, the evidence appears to support the notion that variation in the practices of the criminal justice system has only negligible effects on individual criminal tendencies and on the crime rate over all (Gottfredson & Hirschi 2003).

SEE ALSO: Crime, Life Course Theory of; Crime, Social Control Theory of; Criminology; Juvenile Delinquency; Social Learning Theory

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self-determination

Daniele Conversi

Self determination is a principle in international law that a people ought to be able to determine its own future and political status free from external interference. It hence embodies the right for all peoples to decide their own political, economic, and cultural development.

The principle was first implemented on European soil following the post World War I collapse of the dynastic Central European empires (Russian, Austro-Hungarian, and Ottoman). It was zealously fostered by the president of the United States, Woodrow Wilson (1856–1924), thus becoming the cornerstone for the entire post World War I order heralding the beginning of the “American century.” Accordingly, the boundaries of newly formed states had to be made congruent with “existing” ethnonational divisions. In order to achieve this goal, each self-determined unit had ideally to be conceived as an internally homogeneous entity. On the other hand, wherever possible, oppressed minorities should be granted the same right. Although the original idea was to establish a more stable world order, the effect was just the opposite, to increase European disorder, since all newly created entities included numerous minorities in their midst. The resulting convulsions became propitious for the consolidation of the United States as the hegemonic power at the global level.

Some of the new states, like Yugoslavia and Czechoslovakia (both established in 1918), lacked clear majorities. Subsequently, incipient fascist movements began to use this principle to exploit the presence of “stranded” minorities in what had suddenly become “foreign lands.” German, Italian, and Hungarian irredentists wished to apply the very Wilsonian principle of self-determination to their “unredeemed” kin minorities on strict nationality lines. They strove to reunite entire ethnic diasporas within their respective *Heimaten*.

Among other things, Woodrow Wilson’s 14 Points mandated that “the peoples of Austria-Hungary . . . should be accorded the freest opportunity of autonomous development,” while the “nationalities . . . under Turkish rule

should be assured an undoubted security of life and an absolutely unmolested opportunity of autonomous development.” All these changes threatened to undo the tattered fabric of European and Ottoman pluri ethnic and multireligious societies, indeed, that is what they achieved.

Given the later rise of aggressive nationalism, particularly irredentism and Nazi fascism, the failure of this project was global in terms of international security, human rights, and the maintenance of peace. Like all attempts at “reordering the world” characteristic of totalitarian ideologies, it entailed tragic human costs, even though these had been largely unanticipated. However, while the Ottoman and Austro-Hungarian empires were being dissolved, Russia could save part of its territorial integrity by adopting the political praxis of Marxism-Leninism. The Constitution of the Soviet Union formally recognized the right to self-determination of its constituent Republics. This was a move initially envisioned by V. I. Lenin to capture the support of regional elites and hence assure the continuation of the “empire,” although with a different name. Lenin had theorized about the need to use self-determination as an avenue to integrate the empire’s nationalities into the new socialist order (Connor 1994 [1967]). But this legal principle was never fully put into practice due to the extremely centralized character of Soviet party politics.

After World War II, decolonization unleashed a second wave of self-determination claims, spreading the doctrine further. When the UN Charter was ratified in 1951, the signatories included a clause on the right of peoples to self-determination. Accordingly, all former colonies, that is, those which were already on the map prior to 1939, should be allowed to achieve sovereignty within their existing boundaries. Indeed, the doctrine of *uti possidetis* (from late Latin, “as you now possess”) mandated that the states emerging from decolonization had to inherit the colonial administrative borders that existed at the time of independence. This term originally referred to a militaristic principle of international law allowing a belligerent to retain the captured territory it occupied at the termination of hostilities. In its decolonization form, the doctrine of *uti possidetis* was first applied in

Latin America in the 1820s when the Spanish empire began to crumble.

Imperial powers, emerging elites, and “realist” politicians wished to restrict the concept to existing colonial possessions and fiercely opposed its application to entire nationalities. In this way, fully fledged UN member governments could uphold the principle of “non-interference” in their internal affairs together with a strenuous defense of their state’s territorial integrity. Their main rationale was provided by the supposed threat emanating from secessionist movements and epitomized by the ill-fated partition between India and Pakistan in 1947. But the major obstacle to a wider implementation of the principle was the Cold War’s freeze on all conflicts beyond the logic of mutually opposed blocs. The unchallenged dogma was then that self-determination should never apply to ethnic groups or stateless nations. This consensus was only broken by the secession of Bangladesh (1971), when India succeeded in attracting the support of the international community. On the other hand, the Federation of Malaysia willingly allowed Singapore to secede in 1965. The right to self-determination is solemnly upheld by the United Nations Declaration on Human Rights (1970), the International Covenant on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights (1966), and the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (1976).

A third wave of self-determination spread by the end of the Cold War, with German unification (1990), the breakup of former socialist “federations” (1990–3), and, finally, the independence of Eritrea (1993) and East Timor (1999). More recently, the concept has been used throughout the world by indigenous peoples, stateless nations, minorities, and sovereign states alike, but in a looser and more flexible way.

The principle of self-determination is rooted in British liberal thought, particularly in John Stuart Mill’s idea of representative government (Connor 1994 [1967]). Mill notoriously argued that in a country which consists of several nationalities, free institutions of a representative government are “next to impossible” (Mill 1977 [1861]: 361). In this way, the door was left open for the advent of modern-day ethnic intolerance. The western liberal principle of “one nation, one state” deeply influenced Eastern European

political thought during the period of state building, just at a moment when German ethnicism and French Jacobinism were providing the inspiring models for national mobilization. Both liberals and Marxists had failed to deal with the issue of ethnic dissent because the European nation state provided the unique empirical referent for their political theories.

The principle indicates the aspiration of a group (the “self”) to freely “determine” its own political structure. But in order for the “self” to be “determined,” someone must first determine who the “self” is – or establish who are the people to be “determined.” The exercise of this right presupposes a previous process of “boundary definition” and “group recognition” (Conversi 1997). As Ivor Jennings (1956: 56) pointed out: “On the surface, it seemed reasonable: let the people decide. It was in fact ridiculous because the people cannot decide until somebody decides who are the people.” This is referred to as the concept’s paradoxical *indeterminacy* (Moore 1998). The principle remained often impossible to implement and, when attempted, it frequently led to further chaos and conflict.

The concept of self determination is often placed in opposition to that of *territorial integrity*, with which it is thought to be incompatible. However, self determination does not necessarily imply political separation, sovereignty, or secession. Many movements for national liberation, regional autonomy, and indigenous rights refer to self determination as a broad umbrella term which allows for a vast array of possibilities based on the recognition of collective rights. Calls for self determination can often be settled relatively easily with concessions of regional autonomy and/or cultural rights. Secession would work as a practical tool with high moral value if it could provide an avenue for ethnic or religious minorities to escape their persecution by dominant elites. However, the achievement of statehood through political separation does not always result in an improvement in either economic or human rights. Less drastic tools, short of independence, are available and can be implemented to address calls for self determination.

Contrary to self determination, *secession* is considered a capital sin in international politics. It is sternly resisted by states and governments

worldwide for obvious reasons. In the US its prejudicial connotation also derives from the negative myth of the Civil War, when 11 Southern states attempted to secede by forming the “Confederate States of America” (1861–5). This myth still reverberates in US foreign policy’s general hostility to secession. The initial refusal to recognize the independence of Slovenia and Croatia as they came under attack from the Yugoslav army (1991–2) and George Bush’s condemnation of Ukraine’s secessionist drive in 1990 stem both from *realpolitik* and from this anti secessionist legacy. However, this attitude was tempered by the US support for the independence of Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania, which had been illegally annexed by the Soviet Union in 1943 as a consequence of the secret Hitler–Stalin Pact (Ribbentrop–Molotov Pact, August 23, 1939).

The right to self determination of peoples remains a cardinal principle in international law. On the one hand, denying this principle would flagrantly violate the companion principle of democracy – a contradiction disregarded in the early 1990s when the West failed to couple the two concepts as Yugoslavia disintegrated. On the other hand, the capacity of every people to take advantage of this concept is minimized by the unprecedented invasiveness of sweeping “external” forces, such as global law, consumerism, Americanization, and ecological disaster. The unbridled power of multinational companies often exceeds that of supposedly “sovereign” states. In an increasingly interdependent world, where megacorporations command greater resources than many single countries, the concept of self determination might become irrelevant for human development unless it can contain the most destructive aspects of globalization.

SEE ALSO: Boundaries (Racial/Ethnic); Decolonization; Diaspora; Indigenous Movements; Mill, John Stuart; Nation State and Nationalism; Nationalism

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outcomes can also influence higher order ones. (Note that *identity* and *ideal self* are listed to acknowledge that self concept is composed of more than self esteem, but the former, and related concepts, are beyond the scope of this entry.)

Self may be defined sociologically as an organized and interactive system of thoughts, feelings, identities, and motives that (1) is born of self reflexivity and language, (2) people attribute to themselves, and (3) characterizes specific human beings. Psychologists tend to conceptualize the self as a set of cognitive representations indicating a person's personality traits, organized by linkages, across representations created by personal experience or biography. It is sometimes extended to include things besides trait attributes, such as social roles and even identities. In this case, the self is a cognitive structure incorporating such elements as intelligent, persistent, excitable, and truthful, or middle class, Jewish, female, and Canadian.

Self concept is how we imagine and perceive our self. It is inextricably tied to the "I-me" dialectic expounded by James and Mead. Self concept may be defined as the totality of an individual's thoughts and feelings about a particular object – his or her self. It includes cognition and emotion, since it is both an object of perception and reflection and an emotional response to those perceptions. As a product of its own objectification, self concept entails a particular person (i.e., subject, "knower," or

self-esteem, theories of

Timothy J. Owens

Self esteem refers to the overall positive or negative attitude an individual takes toward himself or herself. Understanding self esteem also requires awareness of related terms, especially *self* and *self concept*, along with an appreciation of their similarities and differences. Figure 1 illustrates how self, self concept, and self esteem are causally related, and the outcomes typically associated with self esteem. Although hierarchical in terms of abstractness and general causality, lower order concepts and




Figure 1 Outcomes associated with self-esteem.

“I”) figuratively standing outside himself or herself, and perceiving and reacting to the self as an object of consideration (i.e., object, the “known,” or “me”). Accepting that the self may be both subject and object serves as the rationale for conducting studies of the self concept, and consequently self esteem.

Historically, theologians and philosophers were the first to delve into the nature of the self, that presumably quintessential characteristic of the human animal. Over the millennia, scholars have been acutely interested in such questions as: Who am *I*? What does *my* life mean? Am *I* a good person? Am *I* loved? Can *I* love? And what makes me, *me* and you, *you*? All of these questions imply a self, and self concept.

While philosophers and theologians still grapple with these questions, the bulk of contemporary research on the self is done by sociologists and psychologists. The key to the social science research perspective on the self is human reflexivity. This entails not only being able to view oneself as others might (self as object), but also labeling, categorizing, evaluating, and manipulating one’s self (self as subject). Reflexivity hinges on language, whether emanating from a broader culture’s written or non written language (e.g., Arabic and Ojibwe, respectively) or a subculture’s argot (e.g., military idiom). In short, the reflexive self allows people to view themselves from a putatively external point of view, just as others do. Additionally, since the self can reflect back on itself, it is an integral part of many features we associate with being human: the ability to plan, worry about personal problems, ruminate about past actions, lament present circumstances, or envy others.

There are many theories of self esteem development in sociology. Most are embedded in symbolic interaction (especially labeling theory) and Festinger’s theory of social comparisons. James presented the earliest social scientific formulation of self esteem. He regarded self esteem as a balancing act between an individual’s perceptions of his or her success in some realm of life (e.g., sports) versus one’s pretensions (i.e., aspirations) of success (e.g., wanting to be the top seeded tennis player in college sports). James used the equation $\text{Self esteem} = \frac{\text{Success}}{\text{Pretensions}}$ as illustration. Changing the numerator or denominator can increase or decrease self esteem. When aspirations

substantially outweigh perceived success, for example, the imbalance drives self esteem down.

Contemporary research on self esteem has been codified into four basic principles of self concept formation: reflected appraisals, social comparisons, self attributions, and psychological centrality. The principle of reflected appraisals is central to the symbolic interactionist’s insistence that the self is a social product derived from the attitudes that others have toward one’s self and that one eventually comes to see himself or herself as others do, à la Cooley’s idea of the looking glass self and Mead’s notion of role taking, both products of symbolic interaction. The contemporary literature recognizes three basic kinds of reflected appraisals or feedback. *Perceived selves* are the most important aspect of reflected appraisals for the self. Here, ego speculates on how he or she *believes* specific alters perceive him or her. One’s *perception*, whether accurate or not, is the vital element. *Direct reflections* are the actual and direct responses that alter has toward ego, regardless of how subjectively ego perceives and thus assesses them. The *generalized other* is ego’s composite sense of what others think of him or her.

Through social comparisons, people judge and evaluate themselves in comparison to particular individuals, groups, or social categories. The main function of this process, according to much contemporary research, is to test reality, especially when knowledge about oneself is ambiguous or uncertain. Two aspects of social comparisons are worth noting: criteria bases (i.e., superior/inferior, better/worse) and normative bases (i.e., deviance/conformity, same/different). Self attributions, the most intrinsically psychological of the four principles, hold that individuals draw conclusions about themselves (e.g., funny, popular, attractive, bookish) by observing their own behaviors, the outcomes they produce, and then making some kind of inference about themselves. Finally, psychological centrality, perhaps the most understudied of the four principles, holds that the self is an interrelated system of hierarchically organized components, with some identities and attributes being more important or more central to the self than others. Since psychological centrality is the weight or importance individuals assign to their various personal attributes, identities, and abilities, it serves to protect self esteem by pushing

potentially damaging self attributes and identities to the periphery of the self system, while holding enhancing attributes closer to the center.

Theories of self esteem as a *motive* hold that individuals desire to protect and if possible enhance their self concept. The motives of self esteem and self consistency are crucial in this regard. The self esteem motive goads individuals to think well of themselves. Many self theorists from James to the present regard this motive as universally dominant in the human motivational system. The self consistency motive asserts that people struggle to validate their self concepts, even when they are negative. To do otherwise requires revising one's self concept, a daunting task (Lecky 1951).

Self esteem is both a social product and a social force. As a social product, the social origins of the self concept and self esteem are investigated. It is taken axiomatically that the self arises out of society. Self esteem theory helps explain how this occurs. As a social force, self esteem serves as an important sociometer by which a population's general health and well being may be gauged. Self esteem has thus been linked to a variety of positive and negative outcomes, such as mental health and well being, prosocial behavior, participation in social movements, and deviant and risky behavior.

Self esteem may be usefully divided into two broad categories: specific self esteem and global self esteem. Each tends to be associated with different outcomes (see Fig. 1). Specific self esteem is tied to a person's roles, identities, activities, contexts, or attributes (e.g., academic, physical, social, moral, family). It is multifaceted and hierarchical, depending upon the importance one places on particular attributes. Global self esteem refers to overall characterizations of one's self as good or bad, worthy or worthless, acceptable or unacceptable, moral or immoral, likeable or dislikeable, and so on. It is imperative to recognize that global self esteem is a general portrayal of one's state or trait with respect to the self, without reference to an individual's particular roles, identities, or social contexts. A parallel viewpoint sees global self esteem as an amalgamation of one's many specific self esteems. Specific self esteem tends to predict behavioral outcomes (e.g., school grades) better than global self esteem, whereas global self esteem tends to

be more predictive of emotional and psychological outcomes (e.g., depression).

Attaining or maintaining high self esteem and avoiding low self esteem are perennial interests of social scientists and the lay public alike. People with high self esteem (HSE) possess self respect and feelings of worthiness. Aside from extremely arrogant HSE people, most possess other positive attributes such as humility and a willingness to acknowledge, though not dwell on, their personal faults and shortcomings. In contrast, people with very low self esteem (LSE) lack self respect and see only their faults, weaknesses, and unworthiness, coupled with a belief that they are seriously deficient people. In reality, very low LSE is fairly rare, probably no more than 15 percent of the population and perhaps much less. Most people have medium to high self esteem. Still, LSE is an important social problem. To have LSE is to live a life of misery. However painful and discomfiting LSE may be, it is not a mental illness. Rather, it is a form of psychological distress characterized by such unpleasant subjective states as depressive affect, anxiety, general dissatisfaction with life, resentment, enmity, and suspicion.

Cognitively, self esteem theory and research shows that LSE people, in contrast to HSE people, tend to be more cynical, negative toward institutions, to harbor disapproving attitudes toward other persons and groups, and to be harshly critical of themselves. With these emotional and cognitive orientations, a LSE person's general approach to life is frequently twofold: avoid risk and a "moat" or defensive mentality. LSE people feel more threatened by others and believe personal failure or a misstep is right around the corner. Trying to avoid risk pushes LSE people into protective styles of life (in contrast to acquisitive styles) focusing on avoiding damage to one's feeling of self worth, regardless of how meager that may be. LSE people see their chief risks as interpersonal, thus making a moat mentality appealing. This allegorical barrier entails restricting interaction with others, marginalizing oneself in groups, being reticent about expressing one's thoughts and feelings about other people, actively concealing one's ideas and feelings, and putting up fronts or pretenses.

Investigating the origins of and consequences for high and low self esteem continues to be vigorously researched. To date, the vast majority

of research and theorizing on self esteem has been focused on children and adolescence. More research is needed on adult self esteem, especially as it relates to change and stability over the life course and the wide variety of adult roles and social contexts which influence and are influenced by self esteem. Specifying the link between macro structures and processes (i.e., social stratification, organizations and networks, and collective behavior) and self esteem awaits further sociological analysis. Accepting the truism that self and society are twin born also indicates the need for additional research on the reciprocal effects of self esteem and a variety of social problems.

SEE ALSO: Culture; James, William; Language; Looking Glass Self; Rosenberg, Morris; Self; Social Psychology; Socialization; Symbolic Interaction

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self-fulfilling expectations

Alison J. Bianchi

A self fulfilling expectation (or as it is often referred to, a self fulfilling prophecy) is a person's anticipation about how a situation will end that prompts the person to behave in ways that cause the anticipated ending to come true. Individuals often have a sense that a situation's outcome is a foregone conclusion, even if the outcome is not necessarily inevitable. A person with this sense may be compelled to act in ways that encourage the presumed conclusion to happen in actuality. Hence, what the individual expects to occur often does occur because the individual has had a hand in producing the event. Thus, the self does indeed fulfill the promise of the expectation.

Consider, for instance, a professor in an engineering college who has very stereotypical views about the performance of males and females in his classes. He (wrongly) believes that men always perform better than women because they possess the genetic predisposition to be naturally better at mathematics. During this professor's classes, he tends to call on male students more than females; he non consciously grades males' exams more gently than females; and he spends more time with male students during office hours than with his female students. Due to these very biased behaviors, the male students get more academic attention and help while taking this professor's classes. Not surprisingly, the male students do tend to perform better than the female students in his courses. The professor expects them to perform better, and has had a hand in producing this outcome, despite his feelings that this is just the natural order of things!

Robert K. Merton first posited the concept of the self fulfilling expectation in 1948. He based this concept on the "Thomas theorem," named for W. I. Thomas. A summary of the Thomas theorem was: if an individual defines a situation as real, then it is real in its consequences. Merton reasoned that rather than relying completely on the objective elements presented by circumstances, persons often construct their own

meanings about a situation, and then respond to these subjective understandings. Actors' definitions of the situation also included notions about its outcome. Hence, if subjectively constructed expectations were part of actors' understandings of the situation, then they would play a role in how actors behaved. The actors' behavior would also influence the situation's objective outcome.

An interesting facet of self fulfilling expectations is that actors who experience them seldom consciously recognize their part in causing outcomes to occur. Instead, actors view situational conclusions as inevitable, and non consciously take steps to produce the inevitability. Another interesting facet of this phenomenon is the reaction of other persons to an actor's self fulfilling expectations. An actor's expectation of another person's behavior tends to educate that behavior from the other person, even if the expectation was erroneous. Thus, the other person's behaviors that are elicited by an actor's expectation will be interpreted as confirmation of the actor's definition of the situation and its concomitant outcome. The self fulfilling expectation is realized, yet again, as the focal actor's speculation about the other person's reaction to him or her comes true.

Merton believed that persons often had false definitions of the situation, and these false understandings evoked behavior that made the false conception come true. The classic example Merton used, for which he is often quoted, is the run on a bank. If rumors are spread that a bank is suffering from financial difficulties and will collapse, then those with savings in the bank may try to withdraw their money en masse, causing the bank to collapse in fact. Note how the original rumors about the bank's fragile pecuniary state may have been false; nonetheless, the resulting behavior of the bank customers fulfills the predictions of the gossip concerning the bank's financial health.

Sociologists have since disputed Merton's original conception of self fulfilling expectations. They have noted that an individual's anticipation of how a situation would end could not be truly false if it could in fact happen. Sociologists have theorized that the impetus behind the behavior that realizes the predicted outcome could be any understanding of the situation that the individual feels is real, and

could indeed become real, despite others' judgments of the anticipation as true or false.

Another aspect of Merton's discussion about self fulfilling expectations is their functionality for maintaining social inequalities through cultural beliefs. He asserts that cultural beliefs about who is and who should be the "haves" and "have nots" in a society must be shared and perpetuated to maintain social disparities. Members of a society who internalize these beliefs about the social order may behave as if they were true. Thus, Merton argued, the purpose of cultural beliefs regarding unequal distributions of power, status, or other valued social markers is to prod societal members into experiencing self fulfilling expectations.

Consider, again, the example of the biased engineering professor. How did he learn that women are not expected to do well in math oriented classes? He learned this from cultural stereotypes that women are not as adept at mathematics as men are. By internalizing these beliefs, the professor came to feel that women were less competent than men in the subject of engineering, and then he behaved as if women were, in fact, incompetent. If women then do perform less well in the professor's class, and this outcome is reproduced by many other biased professors, women may not obtain good jobs in this field, and probably will not rise to positions of influence in it; or, women may not get jobs in engineering at all. Thus, the disparity of power between men and women in engineering would be maintained by the mechanism of internalized cultural beliefs, and perpetuated by the poor performance of females experiencing the results of professors' self fulfilling expectations based on those beliefs. Note, too, that men in this discipline also experience the bias of professors' self fulfilling expectations, except the cultural beliefs about them are positive: professors may believe that men are good in math, and as a result the male students may receive more attention from these professors and do very well in college and in the field. Merton would have argued that it is no accident that men receive higher grades in engineering classes. The explanation for the phenomenon involves a cultural stereotype stimulating self fulfilling expectations.

Sociologists who have pondered the problems presented by self fulfilling expectations

include methodologists who specialize in causal modeling. One of the predicaments they face is the reaction of the population under study to their causal model. Researchers may formulate a cause and effect relation between variables measuring some aspect within a group. The research participants for whom this relation is hypothesized to hold may suspect, or even learn about, the posited relation. They may then take this relation into consideration when they act. As a result, the posited relation may be rendered false, since the group members may change the outcome of the situation. In other words, predictions of causal relations could themselves turn out to be a part of the interconnected social conditions that result in future outcomes. If these predictions factor into group members' subjective meanings of the situational outcome, and the group members disagree with the predictions, then these disagreements become beliefs about the situation, and could become self fulfilling expectations.

To provide an example of this dilemma, suppose citizens of a town are having a political race to elect the next mayor. Candidate A, a very handsome man, is running against candidate B, a very unattractive man. A sociologist studying the election suggests that gender is related to predicting the outcome in the race because females are more likely to vote for an attractive man than an unattractive one. The sociologist forecasts that candidate A will win the election. This forecast is based on her causal model that gender is related to voting behavior. The sociologist then publishes this supposition in the local newspaper. After reading about this, the women in the town become quite offended, feeling that the sociologist has portrayed them as focusing on shallow concerns about the candidates rather than the candidates' opinions about the issues. To prove that they are not superficial, the town's females overwhelmingly vote for candidate B, and the sociologist's causal relation is rendered false. The disagreement about the supposed portrayal of women by the sociologist becomes a belief about how the town's women should vote, and they in fact vote in this manner.

Another problem that self fulfilling expectations present for causal modeling has to do with the temporal ordering of causal and outcome variables. One of three necessary conditions for claiming causation between a cause and an

effect is that the cause must occur prior to the effect. For example, a researcher might posit that students' effort during the semester is one of the causes for getting a good grade at the end of the semester. This causal claim, that "effort is related to grades," would be acceptable as long as the sociologist made it clear that she was measuring effort during the course and prior to the assignment of grades at the end of the semester. In the case of a self fulfilling expectation, however, it is difficult to claim that the cause of the outcome clearly occurs prior to the outcome. The nature of a self fulfilling expectation is that an actor anticipates the outcome (or effect), behaves in a way to produce the outcome (the cause), and then the outcome is produced. In this chain of events, the anticipated effect becomes the real effect, with the cause being the mediating behavior. Without the anticipation of the effect, the real effect would not happen. And, in fact, the anticipated effect actually leads to the cause. Some would consider this phenomenon a violation of the temporal order condition required to claim causation. Therefore, when a self fulfilling expectation is modeled as a causal relation, researchers suggest that the person conceiving the model must declare it to be a weak causal claim.

In current sociological social psychological theories, self fulfilling expectations are rarely studied explicitly. An exception is a research program on the relation between expectations and attraction. More often, self fulfilling expectations are assumed to be operating as part of the process being explained. Two examples of this type of theory are status characteristics theory, a branch of expectation states theory, and stereotype threat theory. Both theories explain how cultural stereotypes affect performance, and use the concept of self fulfilling expectations to describe the group and individual level processes they examine.

In conclusion, despite this concept's recent relative neglect, it still has a great deal of potential to explain social behavior; there is much to gain, both theoretically and empirically, by incorporating the concept more rigorously into studies that attempt to tease out "processes" of interaction. Subjects ranging from interpersonal dynamics (e.g., couples' communications) to the persistence of discriminatory evaluations could benefit from using the concept, as

its theoretical versatility has yet to be fully realized.

SEE ALSO: Expectation States Theory; Merton, Robert K.; Self Fulfilling Prophecy; Social Psychology; Stereotyping and Stereotypes

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self-fulfilling prophecy

Takako Nomi

The self fulfilling prophecy is the process by which one's expectations of other persons or groups lead those persons or groups to behave in ways that confirm those expectations. An influential and controversial idea in education,

the concept of the self fulfilling prophecy is used to illuminate the ways that teacher expectations influence students' behavioral and achievement outcomes. The self fulfilling prophecy predicts that positive teacher expectations lead to positive student outcomes, while negative expectations lead to negative student outcomes.

The term "self fulfilling prophecy" was coined in 1948 by Robert K. Merton, who drew upon W. I. Thomas's well known dictum: "if men define situations as real, they are real in their consequences" (see an excellent review by Wineberg 1987). The Thomas theorem suggests that the meanings of human actions are not inherent merely in their actions. Rather, people attribute meanings to those actions, and the meanings have consequences for future actions. Merton (1948) illustrated the concept with the example that a groundless rumor of a bank's insolvency could cause bankruptcy when enough customers believe in the rumor and rush to withdraw their deposits. The idea is simple: a false prediction could become true if it is widely believed to be true. Certainly, the self fulfilling prophecy is a unique social concept that has no application in the physical world. A false prediction about a hurricane does not bring gusty winds and torrential rain. However, the prediction of human actions may have a powerful effect on their outcomes.

At the micro level, the self fulfilling prophecy has theoretical roots in social phenomenology. The notion of the social construction of reality implies that reality is produced through social interactions among actors, who use symbols to interpret one another and assign meanings to perceptions and experiences. From this perspective, the self fulfilling prophecy is understood as reciprocal processes whereby cultural beliefs and human consciousness create and recreate social life.

At the macro level, self fulfilling prophecies serve the function of maintaining the existing social order and social relationships. Patterns of self fulfilling prophecies mirror structural arrangements in society as well as social beliefs that represent those structural arrangements. For example, social relationships between dominant and minority groups are defined and redefined through self fulfilling prophecies. Expectations for minority groups' behaviors are defined according to their social status, and

the interpretation of their behaviors by dominant groups justifies what is being defined.

The self fulfilling prophecy is also known as the Pygmalion effect after the publication in 1968 of *Pygmalion in the Classroom* by Richard Rosenthal, an educational psychologist at Harvard University, and Lenore Jacobson, an elementary school principal in South San Francisco. In 1964 they initiated an experiment in a low income elementary school where they created different teacher expectations and examined how such expectations influenced students' academic progress. At the beginning of the school year, an IQ test was administered and teachers were given false information about students' IQ scores. At the end of the school year, the IQ score gains were compared between students in experimental groups and those in control groups. Rosenthal and Jacobson found that students who were falsely identified as "spurters" – those who were predicted to "show an academic spurt" (Rosenthal & Jacobson 1968: 66) – made significantly greater gains in IQ scores than did those who were not so identified. Thus *Pygmalion* established a positive relationship between teacher expectations and students' intelligence, confirming the existence of the educational self fulfilling prophecy.

Soon after the publication of *Pygmalion*, Ray Rist (1970) began in 1967 to collect sociological data to test the self fulfilling prophecy in a ghetto school. By examining student-teacher interactions in an all black elementary school, Rist was able to answer questions about the mechanisms through which the self fulfilling prophecy in the classroom was manifested. One of the most striking findings in this study was that the teacher formed expectations during the first days of kindergarten. The teacher then assigned her students to three ability groups based on students' socioeconomic backgrounds, rather than their academic ability, and treated each ability group differently. She gave more freedom and encouragements to students in the highest ability group, but gave more criticisms and restrictions to students in the lowest ability group. Students in the highest ability group could get physically closer to the teacher than could students in the lowest ability group. Eventually, students in the highest ability group received more instruction and showed better

performance than did students in the lowest ability group.

Based on such observation, Rist (1970) described the self fulfilling prophecy in the classroom as a process of several steps. First, a teacher forms expectations about students' potential to achieve based on non academic factors. Then the teacher acts on these expectations and applies differential treatments. When the teacher's treatment is consistent, and if students do not resist, students will internalize and respond to the teacher in a way that confirms his/her expectations. Students' differential responses reinforce the teacher's differential treatment. The vicious cycle is then complete. Teacher expectations become "true" because the teacher acts as though they are true.

Both *Pygmalion* and Rist's ethnographic study sparked controversies during the years after their publication, as researchers searched for evidence to support or refute the prophecy. By the late 1980s, there were about 400 experiments and meta analyses on the self fulfilling prophecy in education. Critics have raised important issues about the validity of the tests and the lack of significant results beyond the second grade in the Pygmalion study, the lack of representativeness of Rist's study sample, and the leap from the classroom to the broader society in Rist's conclusions (Wineberg 1987). More importantly, many researchers failed to replicate the effect of self fulfilling prophecy. Such failure did not stop other researchers, policymakers, and the mass media from hailing these two major studies as providing a model for social science research and for teacher training. Educational self fulfilling prophecy even played a role in the courts' decisions over equity issues in education, including testing, desegregation, busing, and ability tracking (Wineberg 1987). More recently, the concept of the self fulfilling prophecy was applied to settings other than classrooms. These include work organizations, judicial settings, substance uses, delinquency, and health care, to name a few.

In the field of sociology of education, researchers have applied the concept to critique functionalist assumptions on the role of schools in social stratification. They challenged the earlier view that education is a meritocratic vehicle for social mobility and began to see schools as

institutions responsible for reproducing existing social inequalities. Since the publication in 1969 of James Coleman's report on the *Equality of Educational Opportunity*, which revealed greater achievement inequalities within schools than inequalities between schools, a focus has been placed on in school processes to understand how educational inequalities are created and reinforced. An area of research where educational self fulfilling prophecies are actively applied is in school organization. Sociologists have turned their attentions to ability grouping and tracking in K 12 schooling to examine if and how students' race and socioeconomic status affect student assignment to different ability groups or tracks, and how teacher expectations impact instructional practices in different ability groups or tracks, which, in turn, shape student learning. Students in different ability groups or tracks may be exposed to different hidden curricula and opportunities to learn, which mediate the relationship between teacher expectations and students' achievement outcomes. Another area of research related to the educational self fulfilling prophecy is the study of racial and gender stereotypes. This research seeks to better understand race and gender disparities in students' educational outcomes in post secondary levels. Most sociological findings support the notion of the educational self fulfilling prophecy in the US, as well as in other countries, including England, New Zealand, Australia, and South Korea, among others (Tauber 1997).

Today we have more information about the mediating mechanisms of the Pygmalion effect. A four factor theory (Rosenthal 1974) explains how teachers convey expectations to students in classrooms. These four factors are climate, feedback, input, and output. Climate refers to the tendency for the teacher to create a warm socio emotional climate, communicated both verbally and non verbally (e.g., smiling, nodding, and eye contacting), for high expectancy students but not for low expectancy students. Feedback refers to the tendency for the teacher to give more positive feedback to high expectancy students than to low expectancy students for the correctness or incorrectness of their responses. Input is the tendency for the teacher to teach more and harder curricula to higher expectancy students than to lower expectancy students.

Finally, output is the tendency for the teacher to encourage greater responsiveness from high expectancy students but not from low expectancy students. Teacher expectations are translated to student behavior in a two stage process. First, differential teacher expectations lead to differential teacher behavior. The teacher is likely to create a warmer climate, give more positive feedback, and display greater inputs and outputs for high expectancy students than for low expectancy students. Second, differential teacher behavior leads to differential student outcomes. Warm climate, positive feedback, and greater inputs and outputs lead to more positive student outcomes.

Not only is the study of the self fulfilling prophecy a good example of cross fertilization of academic disciplines, e.g., psychology and sociology, it is also a good example of how quantitative and qualitative methods are integrated. Rosenthal and Jacobson, as well as many other researchers, used experimental designs, whereas Rist applied ethnographic methods in his study. Rist's ethnography helps to advance the self fulfilling prophecy by illuminating the mechanism through which teacher expectations shaped learning opportunities. Both qualitative and quantitative studies have received methodological criticisms, however. Ethnographic studies were often based on observations in a small number of classrooms or schools and thus were criticized for non transferability of research results to other settings. Early replications of Rosenthal and Jacobson's experimental study also failed to confirm the findings of the Pygmalion effect. While these experimental studies also received methodological criticisms, such criticisms led researchers to investigate *why* these studies failed to observe the teacher expectancy effects. Later studies, using teacher interviews, revealed that the teacher did not believe the false information about students given by the experimenter when he/she already knew about the student. Meta analyses also supported the hypothesis that the timing of "expectancy induction" was critical for the formation of teacher expectation in experimental studies (Raudenbush 1984).

In the past 35 years, our knowledge about the self fulfilling prophecy has greatly increased. That said, more work is needed to recognize the positive force as well as the negative implication of the prophecy for education policies.

In the US, schoolteachers today are trained to avoid talking about problem students for fear of creating a self fulfilling prophecy. Similarly, school counselors' professional ethics emphasize the need to keep important student information confidential. This division of labor between teachers and school counselors leads to organizational secrecy, preventing school personnel from detecting and building a case regarding a troubled student. Outside of the US, we know relatively little about the self fulfilling prophecy and how it varies across countries. Cross national comparisons may illuminate how cultural beliefs about student ability influence the ways in which teachers form expectations, organize instruction, and adopt certain pedagogical practices. These factors may, in turn, affect the processes by which schools alter achievement inequalities. The investigation of such questions offers many directions for future fruitful research.

SEE ALSO: Coleman, James; Educational Inequality; Expectations and Aspirations; Hidden Curriculum; Merton, Robert K.; Self Fulfilling Expectations; Stereotyping and Stereotypes; Tracking

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semi-domestication

Hiroyuki Torigoe and Yukiko Kada

The notion of semi domestication originated to refer to a kind of plant that is in between wild plants and domesticated crops and has been extended to refer to a particular mode of interaction between humans and animals. Botanists and archeologists have been very interested in semi cultivated plants for their potential to reveal origins. Anthropologists, in contrast, have begun to accumulate field data that show the usefulness of such plants to local communities. For example, research in a village in the foothills of the Himalayas has analyzed the use of a particular kind of grass root called *Namitoo* which grows in semi cultivated areas. Although there are wild roots growing in the same area, these semi domesticated roots grow larger in size and produce more seed roots. According to the anthropologist, the semi cultivated roots are "gathered" rather than "harvested," but in contrast to the cultivated roots that are planted in prepared fields, these semi domesticated roots do not grow as well under human control. It is also well known that in various regions of Asia, numerous semi cultivated plants are relied upon in times of pending famine.

Thus, in contrast to botanists and archeologists, anthropologists do not consider semi cultivated plants to be in a "developmental" process from wild to domesticated plants, but instead regard them as having their own specific cultural roles and meanings; they are good as they are (Matsui 1989). Among the positive meanings of semi cultivated plants is the fact that they require less work than fully domesticated plants. Although human societies cannot survive on semi cultivated plants alone, they add variety to the diet and are useful in times of scarcity.

These anthropological findings led Japanese environmental sociologists to explore the idea of semi domestication for clues to developing environmental policy. They have interpreted the phenomenon as evidence of the interaction between nature and humans. In Japan and other regions of Asia with high population densities, people often live in close proximity to mountains, rivers, and the sea. In such areas, attempting to preserve pristine “wilderness areas,” untouched by humans, as an ideal of environmental policy is unrealistic. This leads to accepting the fact that extracting numerous resources from forests, rivers, and the sea toward people’s basic subsistence is a prerequisite to conserving nature while making environmental policies effective and realistic.

Japanese environmental sociologists identified one of the motivations for utilizing semi domesticated plants without any substantial changes as nature conservation. Environmental sociologists have focused on two aspects of semi domesticated plant usage. One is ownership. For example, when someone plants bamboo, the ownership is clear and widely acknowledged in the community; but the bamboo will multiply each year without anyone’s care. Under these circumstances, researchers are interested in who has ownership rights to either use or dispose of the bamboo. Another question concerns ownership of lands or spaces where such plants grow. Semi cultivated plants often grow on riversides, in glades or vacant lots where ownership is ambiguous. Normally, however, there are hidden and shared community rules concerning these areas. By revealing these community rules, which are often closely related to the people’s involvement in nature and space, analysis of the ownership of semi cultivated plants is meaningful for developing environmental policies appropriate to each local community.

Extending from this research, a new field of study is emerging that considers the interactions between animals and humans from the perspective of semi domestication. Monkeys, wild boars, and deer, for example, live in close proximity to or in the community, and they are certainly influenced by humans; but people do not appear to have any intentions of fully domesticating these animals (and that may be impossible). Humans eat wild boar and deer, and may derive other benefits from monkeys

(some types of which are also eaten), but these animals might also inflict damage on crops. Studies that attempt to analyze these “give and take” interactions are being conducted by environmental sociologists and have something in common with the concept of life environmentalism developed in Japanese environmental sociology. This is a different approach to conventional ones that consider such animals simply as pests that can ruin crops as well as the natural environmental approach that attempts to minimize contact with these animals as much as possible in the interests of protecting nature.

SEE ALSO: Ecological View of History; Ethnography; Knowledge; Life Environmentalism; Lifeworld; Nature; Plural Society; Tradition; Values; Yanagita, Kunio

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semiotics

E. Valentine Daniel

From the perspective of one who surveys the ever shifting and ever expanding field of modern semiotics/semiotic, the long shadows of two dominant thinkers span the landscape: Charles Peirce and Ferdinand de Saussure. The history of the identification and use of signs as appropriate to certain culturally specified

domains of knowledge and practice is, however, far richer and deeper. Such a history has been traced to divination and medicine in ancient Mesopotamia, extending to philosophy as well as in Greek antiquity, and by the first century BCE to aesthetics and semantics in India (*Nyaya Sutra*). St. Augustine was the first thinker, however, to identify the sign (*signum*), in *De Doctrina Christiana* (ca. 397–426), as a universal that functions in any and all contexts where significance (including information and meaning) of any sort is communicated from one living being to another. That is, he proposed a point of view that enabled us to see things exclusively in terms of their signs' signifying function. By defining the sign, however, as "a thing, which, over and above the impression it makes on the senses, causes something else to come into thought as a consequence," he made sense perception into a necessary component of the sign. In its application, he chose to narrow the sign's compass even further, to sacramental theology. Both choices served to limit the full analytic power of the sign right through the Latin period and well into the Renaissance.

Augustine's definition excluded ideas from being signs because they were unavailable to sense perception. This unwarranted limitation troubled several post Augustinian Latin "semeioticians." Given the awesome power of tradition, even the most independent thinkers tried to accommodate Augustine by proposing several dichotomous sign types in which at least one half would represent continuity with tradition and only the other half, change. For example, for instance, suggests distinctions such as formal vs. instrumental, conventional (social) vs. natural, internal vs. external, and mind dependent vs. mind independent signs. In the end he too is forced by tradition to concede that the first in each pair was not a sign as such, for to do otherwise would have gone against customary usage of the term, traceable not just to Augustine but to the Aristotelian dichotomies of substance and accident, *semeion* and *symbolon*, nature and culture. The Portuguese Dominican philosopher John of Painsot (1632) was the first to critique and systematize what Augustine had thematized, by removing the sense perception requirement from the sign's definition, thereby clearing the ground for a truly general semeiotic that included words

and ideas in its perspective. The message of Painsot's magnum opus was drowned in the Cartesian heralding of epistemological and solipsistic conundra that would keep modern philosophy preoccupied for another 300 years and more.

Some 58 years later, at the very end of his purported anti Cartesian *Essay Concerning Human Understanding* (1690), in which he made his case for empiricism, John Locke part hoped for, part prophesied, and part proposed a new field of inquiry called *semiotic*. In this "doctrine of signs" that he characterized as "aptly enough also, logic," we were invited to "consider the nature of signs, the mind makes use of for the understanding of things, or conveying knowledge to others." His *Essay* bequeathed us two ironies. Locke was totally unaware that an Iberian philosopher monk had already done his bidding the very year that he, Locke, was born. This was the first irony. Apart from giving it the name *semiotic*, he was also the first, in the non Latin world, to set the sign free from the tether of sense perception by which Augustine's definition had bound the sign. "For since the things, the mind contemplates are none of them, besides itself, present to the understanding," he argued, "'tis necessary that something else, as a sign or representation of the thing it considers, should be present to it." These he called *ideas*. Ideas were not directly available to the senses and needed "articulate sounds" to convey them to others, fit to be understood. Ideas and signs of ideas – words – could be "seen as the great instruments of knowledge" in which lay "the seeds of an overthrow" of his own purported anti Cartesian labor contained in the rest of the *Essay*. This was the second irony.

TWO TRADITIONS?

Locke's proposal lay idle from the seventeenth century until the American logician philosopher mathematician Charles Sanders Peirce picked up its charge in his writings from 1866 onward, in which he plumbed its depths and spanned its breadth to extents unimagined by Locke. Nevertheless, following Locke and in keeping with what he considered the "ethics of terminology," Peirce named his effort *semeiotic* (in keeping with its Greek origin, *semeion* for

“sign,” and emphatically preserving the diphthong “ei” of *semeion* in its pronunciation) and at times *semiotic*. Peirce’s writings on *semeiotic* are conspicuously and not so conspicuously distributed among the totality of his life’s work, an ever evolving architectonic philosophical system, which fills almost 100,000 (mostly unpublished) manuscript pages. A shift in philosophical fashions in the years following his death, the disarray in which his papers were found more than a decade later, the decision by the editors of his *Collected Papers* to publish his already published papers rather than select from among the unpublished versions of the same (which Peirce himself had considered better for not having had to be trimmed to suit various editors’ tastes), his not having had an academic position or students to disseminate his ideas, and his pithy style of writing had collectively conspired to put his work relatively out of reach of the average scholar and impenetrable to a novice, until quite recently.

Independently of both Peirce and Locke, the Swiss linguist Ferdinand de Saussure had determined to study the “life of signs in social life” and named his “new” science *semiology*. His ideas survived thanks to his students’ lecture notes, published posthumously in 1916 as *Cours de linguistique generale*. In contrast to Peirce’s writings, *Cours* had caught the attention of several leading linguists and “signophiles” of the twentieth century. As for nomenclature, in addition to *semiology*, *semeiotic*, and *semiotic* there were also available *significs*, *signology*, and *semiotics*. But the struggle for recognition was between *semiology* and *semiotics*, and *semiotics* won, as it were, the popular choice. Apart from their deliberated extension of their inquiries into extra linguistic sign systems and their choice of label to describe their work, most *semioticians* were *semiologist* by another name and the *Cours* remains their foundational text. Of the rest, *semeiotic* and *semiotic* were to become associated with those whose research followed, more or less, Peircean lines. Nevertheless, there is considerable cross over in choice of label, and, more rarely, mixing up of theoretical orientations. Many Peirceans use *semiotics* and non Peirceans *semiotic* (though more as an adjective than a noun) in their writings. *Semeiotic* is never used by Saussurians; and Peirceans who use this form do so in order to mark the difference of their

own approach to the sign in contradistinction to the Saussurians.

SAUSSURE AND SEMIOTICS

The rock upon which Saussure chose to build his *semiology* was *langue*. *Langue* is the linguistic system, which is but one component of *langage* (language or the language faculty). To get to and isolate *langue*, one strips away one half of each of two hierarchically ordered pairs that constitute language itself. The first half of language to go is diachrony (i.e., the history of a language) of the synchrony–diachrony dyad. The synchronic dimension of language – the structure of language at any given moment in time – consists of two aspects, *parole* (speech) and *langue*. Of these two, the one to be stripped away as irrelevant to the analysis of structural linguistics is *parole*: the idiosyncratic, contingent, pragmatic functions of language. *Langue* is an analytic construct, an abstraction from language as a means of explaining the regularities and typical patterns of a language that are normally hidden from the consciousness of individual speakers in a community that uses that language; it is not an ontological reality. And it is in *langue* that one locates the dynamo of not only the linguistic system, but also the generator of wider, non linguistic sign systems or *semiotics*, the sign. Structuralism, the earliest and the most ambitious extension of semiology into non linguistic systems of signs, goes even further by exploiting the dichotomy concealed within *langue* itself: paradigm and syntagm (also called the selective and combinatorial axes, respectively.) Lévi Straussian structuralists go on to disregard the syntagmatic dimension of *langue*, saving the paradigmatic dimension as the basis of structural analysis.

A linguistic sign, as defined by Saussure, is one and the same two sided phenomenon, a relationship that links an acoustic image and a concept, or a signifier and a signified. The link is not between a thing and its name, but between a concept and a sound pattern. The concept–sound pattern relationship is internal to language, internal to the mind, and is independent of external reality. Thus, the linguistic sign does not “stand for” an external world but construes it: a tree that is signified by the word “tree” is

not an actual tree, but the concept “tree.” Nor does a signifier “stand for” the signified but rather construes it. The signifier and the signified are “functives” that are co present or co-occurrent albeit on different strata, the first more abstract than the second. In their respective strata they “exist” in a context of other signifiers and signifieds, respectively. Each is held together with and held apart from the other signifieds and signifiers in their respective strata by similarities and differences, which is what makes them part of a system or structure. Which signifier pairs with which signified is a matter of convention, arbitrary from an empirical point of view. How then is the external world brought into a relationship with the internal structure? The semiologically structured internal relationship of the signifier–signified analogically structures, organizes, and orients sign users to the flux of percepts they receive from the external world. This is a totally nominalistic view of both language and world.

There are many reasons why the semiological model of the sign – dyadic, non material, confined to a hermetically sealed system called language – came to assume paradigmatic power over semiotics generally. The foremost reason is structural and its reasoning unfolds more or less in the following manner. Only human beings have culture. Not all the features that constitute culture are, however, uniquely human. But language is uniquely human. What makes human language unique is *langue*. The linguistic sign is the defining element of *langue*. The defining feature of the linguistic sign is its binary structure, in which the elements of the dyad are held together by a relationship that is arbitrary or conventional (as opposed to natural). From this it is hypothesized that even though the uniquely human institution called culture is not identical to language, since its only assu redly human feature is language, the elementary form of culture must be structured along the lines of the elementary form of language, the linguistic or semiological sign.

The popularity of Saussurian *semiology* is made transparent by its inspiration of so many *semioticians* and schools of *semiotics*: Roman Jakobson of the Prague school of linguistics, Yuri Lotman of the Tartu/Moscow school of semiotics and culture, the A. J. Greimas and lexicology, Louis Hjelmslev of the Danish

school of glossematics, and Roland Barthes the literary critic, who is best known for teaching us how to read literary and sociocultural texts semiologically. Some scholars see the Saussurian quest for the elementary structure of language as paralleling Durkheim’s quest for the elementary form of the religious life. There is no doubt, however, that Lévi Strauss (who introduced French structuralism into anthropology) self-consciously patterned his quest for the elementary structure of kinship along Saussurian lines that converged with Durkheim’s quest for the elementary forms of the religious life. Indeed, the most successful application of the extension of the linguistic sign beyond linguistics was in French structuralism, which made its appearance around 1929, maturing into its most powerful and best known form in the anthropological writings of Lévi Strauss in the post-war years. His pioneering application of Saussurian structuralism, read through Jakobson and N. S. Troubetzkoy’s phonology, to the study of kinship, mythology, and food had a profound effect on sociocultural anthropology. Structuralism spawned structuralist novelists like Alain Robbe-Grillet. It provided new ways of rereading sociological classics such as the writings of Weber, Simmel, and Marx. Structural Marxism came into being mainly through the writings of Althusser in social theory and Sahlin in anthropology. Structuralism’s popularity spread to literary study and criticism and peaked in the late 1960s before it was gradually overshadowed by poststructuralism. The impress of the Saussurian sign, however, persists indelibly in both poststructuralism and postmodernism, not to mention the semiotic/semiotics of Kristeva and the post-Freudian psychoanalysis of Lacan.

Among those who came to Saussure via Lévi Strauss, the most prominent was the philosopher Merleau-Ponty, who believed that in structuralism he had found the way of resolving the subject–object impasse. The fact that even Saussure’s critics continue to base their own research on essentially Saussurian epistemology and assumptions is a further testimony to the compacted power of Saussure’s general theory of (even if mostly linguistic) signs. The Russian Marxist critic V. N. Volishinov, and those like Derrida, Eco or Jakobson, who consider Peirce to have had a deeper and keener understanding of *semiosis* than Saussure, in the

final analysis, despite their disclaimers, also remain Saussurians.

PEIRCE AND SEMEIOTIC

Robert Marty found 76 definitions of the sign in Peirce's published and unpublished writings; Alfred Lang found 12 more or its equivalents. Peirce defined and adjusted the definition of the sign to a range of contexts, a short list of which includes mathematics, logic, philosophy, pendulum experiments, chemistry, psychology, language, history, realism–nominalism debates, scholasticism, metaphysics, theories of mind, and discussions of truth. He bent his definitions for the benefit of his interlocutors and correspondents' comprehension. In his correspondences he discussed signs with his life long friend William James, with the like minded correspondent and exponent of *significs* Lady Welby, and with uncomprehending editors who wanted him to pitch his definitions to a general readership. He often obliged them with what he called "sops to Cerebrus," describing those Cartesians who were cognitively incapacitated by their mind body dualism. For Peirce had a pan semeiotic view of the sign. The sign easily transgressed such dichotomies as mind body, nature culture, human animal, and matter spirit. The cosmos, for him, was perfused with signs. He considered thought as semeiotically active signs. He held that thought signs existed in crystals as much as they did in the brain; he considered the view of the mind being confined to the brain as far too nominalistic.

Many are the differences between Saussure and Peirce's concepts of the sign. One could begin with the fact that Saussure's is a dyadic sign, which originates in linguistics. The semeiotic sign is based on logic, and logic as semeiotic is a normative or formal science, in contrast to empirical sciences such as linguistics that Peirce classified as special sciences. As a formal science, semeiotic is concerned with the necessary conditions for what makes something a sign as such, with what bases one may determine its truth, and with the conditions that are required for the communication and growth of signs.

From the very start, Peirce determined that the sign was irreducibly triadic. The proof for the sign's triadicity he derived from logic,

mathematics, and phenomenology. With a certain amount of familiarity with a number of his scattered definitions of the *semeiotic* sign one could gradually build up one's understanding of it, by additions and refinements, until one comes nearer to grasping the sign in all its complexity that Peirce intended for us to grasp. After appreciating the fact that the sign is triadic, the first step would be to know that the first correlate of the triad is the *sign* (at times called the *representamen*), the second correlate is the *object*, and the third the *interpretant*. So the *semeiotic Sign* (upper case) is constituted by an irreducible triadic correlation in which a *sign* (lower case) stands for an *object* to an *interpretant*. The *sign* mediates the object and interpretant by representing the object to the interpretant; the object mediates the sign and the interpretant by grounding the sign; the interpretant mediates the sign and object by interpreting or translating the sign. Remove any one of the three correlates and the *Sign* as such will not be an actual *Sign*, but a mere potential sign.

It should be noted, however, that the *sign* represents the *object* to the *interpretant* only in "some respect or capacity" – not in every respect and capacity. The sign is not arbitrary and open. Peirce speaks of *signs* themselves having or not having the "fitness to represent" a given object. Such a fitness to represent a given object may be amply present, sparsely present, or not present at all in a sign, making it respectively quite appropriate, less appropriate, or inappropriate to represent the object in question. In other words, signs have built in limits to what they can and cannot represent or are likely or not likely to represent. What is being introduced here is the notion of a certain measure of motivation or tendency constitutive of the sign to represent something. Saussure denies such motivation, with a very few exceptions, to signs.

As for the *object*, Peirce tells us that it may be a:

single known existing thing or a thing believed formerly to have existed or expected to exist, or a collection of such things, or a known quality or relation or fact, which single object may be a collection, or a whole of parts, of it may have some other mode of being, such as an act permitted whose being does not prevent its negation from being equally permitted, or something of a general nature desired, required, or invariably found under certain general circumstances.

This is a wide understanding of an object indeed. The *semeiotic object* is of two types: *immediate* and *dynamic*. The *immediate object* is the *object* represented to us in the *sign* itself. The sentence “It is snowing downtown” will bring before my mind the idea that the word “snowing” represents. That idea or image is an *immediate object*. When one opens the window and sees cars coming from downtown with snow on them, then one sees the dynamic counterpart of the immediate object. The dynamic object is not necessarily a “real” or existing object. A “possible” one daydreams about can be the dynamic object that exerts an inner force in you that makes you seek for the possible. The same holds true for an idea. Insofar as it draws one towards it, it is *dynamic*. So an existent like a falling bookcase can be the *dynamic* counterpart of the warning that your friend shouts out (“Watch out! The bookcase!”), which would be the *immediate object*.

The *interpretant* is not the same as an *interpreter*, though an interpreter may be a species of interpretant. Peirce defines the *interpretant* as the “proper significate effect” of the sign on a third. At one point Peirce says that “a sign is not a sign unless it is translated into another sign in which it is more fully developed.” In this case the translation or the meaning is the interpretant; it is the sign’s “significate effect.”

What is the motivating force of a sign based on? It is what Peirce calls the *ground*. The *ground* is the basis on which the sign “picks up” an object to represent. There are three common *grounds*. First, a *sign* may represent an *object* by virtue of the property or quality it shares with the object, or its similarity up to identity with the object. Such a *sign* is called an *icon*, provided there is an *interpretant* to interpret or be significantly affected by the representation of the object as such. When an icon is identical to an object, information is concealed rather than conveyed. Such is the case in protective coloration in nature where, for example, the color of a chameleon that is identical to that of its back ground is iconic; and so is the impeccable con artist. And as long as there is no interpretant to “read” the icon, it remains a potential sign. Second, when a *sign* represents an *object* on the grounds of its regular contiguity with the *object*, the sign is an *index* – again, assuming the

existence of an *interpretant*. Thus, the gathering darkness over the landscape indexes the setting of the sun to “something or somebody in some respect or capacity.” Thus, to both human and beast, it would indicate the end of the day and the beginning of night. To an informed human being (a human being who is predisposed to interpret it one way rather than another) it could also signify the beginning of a solar eclipse, an omen, a god, an ancestor’s presence. Whereas to most animals – inferring from their fixed response – it would appear that it indicates, as always, the day’s end. Third, when a sign and object are related to each other by convention, the sign is a symbol – once more the existence of an interpretant is assumed. The cultural interpretation of an eclipse is such a symbol and so are most words. But some words, such as demonstratives (that! there! they! etc.), also known as *deictics* (from the Greek: to point), serve as indexes. Deictic indexes poke holes, as it were, through the symbolic cocoon or the hermetically sealed view of Language or linguistic signs as a world unto itself, attributed to Saussure, and touch the external, extralingual world or reality. For a “there!” to make sense, that has to be a there there. There are also iconic symbols such as metaphors and symbolic icons such as onomatopoeia. In fact, Peirce cautions us that, neither in nature nor in culture are there pure symbols, pure indexes, or pure icons. Every sign is a blend of all three, with one or more type being accentuated to the *interpretant*.

Despite his numerous attempts to fix the sign in a definition, Peirce’s fundamental conception of semeiotic was that of “signing” activity or *semiosis* rather than the sign per se. This is evident in the following definition: “The *sign* is anything which determines something else (its *interpretant*) to refer to an object to which itself refers (its *object*) in the same way, the interpretant becoming a *sign* in turn, and so on *ad infinitum*.” The sign so defined brings out the open and dynamic nature of sign activity or *semiosis*. *Semiosis* is the very life of the sign. When *semiosis* ceases, the sign either dies or goes into hibernation until an interpretant sign predisposed to receiving its representation of the object arrives. Thus, a potsherd from an antique goblet would “hibernate” until a knowledgeable archeologist finds it and is able to represent it as

a sign of an antique goblet to his student. She would, as the next interpretant sign along the chain of revived semeiosis who is fit to receive (by training) the representation, translate and communicate the object to yet another interpretant sign (her own students, say) as her professor's representation of the potsherd as representing the original goblet, which will then be represented to . . . *ad infinitum*.

The very structure of the semeiotic sign establishes it as fundamentally dialogic. If we were to anthropomorphize the three correlates of the Sign triad, *sign*, *object*, and *interpretant*, we could imagine a Mr. (S)ign's representation of Mrs. (O)bject to Mr. (I)nterpretant as being "determined by" – that is, constrained or delimited by – Mrs. (O)bject. And Mr. S "determines" Mr. (I) to represent Mrs. (O) "in the same way as" and "stand in the same relation to" Mrs. (O) as he, (Mr. (S)), himself had represented and stood in relation to Mrs. (O).

First, it is very unlikely that the Mrs. (O) that Mr. (S) represented to Mr. (I) is the Mrs. (O) as such, but rather, Mr. (S)'s Mrs. (O). In other words, no S(ign) is a *tabula rasa* upon which an O(bject) can impress or reproduce itself perfectly. Every S(ign) contains its own prior semeiotic genealogy and its attendant prejudices, and therefore the O(bject) represented will be the (S)ign's O(bject). For semeiosis to continue, Mr. (I) has a dual role to play: (1) he receives Mr. (S)'s Mrs. (O) in his role as Mr. I and (2) he represents what he has received, and in receiving inevitably modified, to Mr. I^a in his new role as Mr. S^a. It is equally unlikely that the Mrs. (O) whom Mr. (I) in his role as S^a will represent in his turn to another Interpretant, Mr. I^b, will be identical either to the Mrs. (O) prior to Mr. (S)'s representation of her or to the Mrs. (O) as represented to him by Mr. (S). That is, every "interpretant is an equivalent (not identical) or a more developed sign of the object" than the preceding sign. In other words, a subsequent interpretant sign need not necessarily be less revealing of the "original" object than an earlier sign of the same object. Rather, by having a greater interpretive fitness, and a more conducive interpretive context, be a more developed interpretant sign, providing us with greater knowledge of the said object than the earlier representation.

At the most abstract level there are three types of *interpretants*: the *immediate*, the *dynamic*, and the *final*. Peirce describes the *immediate interpretant* as "the immediate pertinent possible effect in its unanalyzed primitive entirety." A *dynamic interpretant* is the actual manifestation of a significant effect. And a *final interpretant* is the teleological growth of a sign that ends in an interrelated system of signs. The three *interpretants* that correspond in human experience to these abstract interpretants are the *emotional*, the *energetic*, and the *logical interpretants*. The feeling of *deja vous* would be an example of an *emotional interpretant*; the bodily reaction of one at whom the command "halt!" is barked out by a soldier after the declaration of a curfew would be an example of an *energetic interpretant*; and the habitualized mode of conditional reasoning such as "if the light turns red I will not cross the road" would be a *logical interpretant*. The *dynamic interpretant* does not possess meaning, it is a brute reaction; neither does an *emotional interpretant* that remains at the level of a mere feeling, before being put into words. A logical interpretant is meaningful. The path a river takes is a *final interpretant*: a habit carved into the earth. There are many other triadic sets of sign types and other triadic phenomena that one is likely to encounter in Peirce's writings. They are generated by the logic of Peirce's phenomenological categories of Firstness, Secondness, and Thirdness. In Peirce's semeiotic there are no impermeable or unmovable boundaries between internal and external, cultural and natural, mind and body, organic and inorganic that signs cannot cross and connect. Ecology is as amenable to semeiotic analysis as economics, music, or literature would be.

In semiology and semiotics there linger questions that have been at best inadequately answered and at worst not answered at all. How does the sound pattern/concept relationship take form in the mind of an individual or in the understanding of a speech community in the first place? How is the sign in one mind communicated in the first instance to another in the absence of the a priori of a shared language? Is incommensurability the only answer? How does the hermetically sealed internal linguistic sign precisely engage with the non linguistic external world and make such an engagement

warrantable and workable? Can we assign a truth value to any such engagement or is it all relative? How does a sign that is objectified in such an ideational abstraction have a bearing on concrete social intercourse (Voloshinov)? How does a synchronic structure theoretically accommodate both habit and change? (This question was most effectively posed by Bourdieu.) And finally, how does one account for the comparatively rapid and successful dissemination of semiology/semiotics in analyses of other domains of sociocultural life and how did it come to figure so much more prominently in so many disciplines than has semeiotic?

Other than the early discovery of Saussure's thoughts, the compactness and brilliant simplicity of his theory, the sparseness of his writings, the modesty of his aims, and the *Cours's* accessibility have facilitated its dispersal. Its inherent Cartesianism is hidebound with the Cartesian categories that are ubiquitous in the modern West and make his ideas easily assimilable. This is also why even self-professed anti-Cartesian warriors that one encounters in deconstruction, postmodernism, and poststructuralism are shot through with Cartesian thinking. Justifiably or not, both admirers and detractors of Saussurian semiology and semiotics are convinced that they understand Saussure well enough and therefore are ready and able to raise jugular snipping questions.

Most questions that are justified in semiotics are either anticipated and answered or become irrelevant in semeiotic. Peirce's semeiotic is non-dualist, incorrigibly diachronic, and inherently trans-disciplinary. The semiological sign which is constrained only by convention can by convention be made free and available for redeployment in hermeneutic play. This is not so with the semeiotic sign, whose accountability to place, time, and purpose is far more exacting. For those wishing to understand Peirce, his voluminous writings and the state of disarray that his papers are in, however, create forbidding hurdles to scale. His project was anything but modest, and any topic that might engage the reader is spread out widely over time and contexts. His ideas grew and changed, and not always for the better. He aimed to connect the three large areas of his philosophy – realism, semeiotic, and pragmatism – with debatable success. This forces

anyone who wishes to explore only one area into exploring all of them, which is not a task for the hasty or the weak-willed. For these and similar reasons, Peirce scholars find themselves raising questions in one place only to find them already anticipated and answered elsewhere in his writings. Questions are posed but not from a place of confidence of having full control over his ideas; they are raised only for the sake of working through his texts for the answers, and sooner or later they do find them. Perusers of semeiotic tend to conclude prematurely that semiotics and semeiotic cover the same area of inquiry and then revert to the friendlier semiotics. Some make selective use of Peirce's ideas, as do Derrida and Deleuze, or stop short of accepting his semeiotic along with his realism, as does Eco, or are discouraged by the apparent anachronistic language and style of the author. Attempts to borrow from semeiotic into semiotic piecemeal either do not work or dangle like a graft that does not take. The conflation of semiotics and semeiotic is not helpful. As for whether the two approaches to the sign can be combined at all, the decision is split. French philosopher Gerard Deledalle denies such a possibility and discourages the search for one; but Joseph Lizka, an American philosopher, says that it is possible, arguing that Saussure's concept of value is the equivalent of Peirce's *logical interpretant*, thereby completing the incomplete *signifier–signified* dyad. But then, Peirce's sign and object are not the same at any level as the signifier and the signified. Despite these difficulties, much of Peirce's semeiotic has begun to make inroads into a range of fields and has even managed to introduce both complexity as well as simplifications into semiotics as well.

Peircean ideas entered sociology indirectly through Dewey, who was Peirce's student for a brief while, during which time he was introduced to Peircean pragmatism and logic, and would later modify these to suit his theoretical needs. The symbolic interactionism of George Herbert Mead had many semeiotic elements in it. C. Wright Mills was Mead's student and wrote in his dissertation a chapter each on James, Peirce, and Dewey. Charles Morris, another of Mead's students, and also part of the Chicago School's logical positivists, was the one who brought Peirce to center stage in his debate with

Dewey about the status of the “interpretant.” Morris, it is widely believed, misrepresented Peirce’s realist semeiotic by transforming it into a behaviorist theory of signs. More recently, Habermas and Apel have drawn heavily from Peirce for their own theories of pragmatism and communication. But, on the whole, relative to its sister discipline anthropology, sociology has been untouched by either semiotics or semeiotic, even though the writings of Bourdieu seem to have independently discovered some of Peirce’s seminal ideas, such as habitus.

SEE ALSO: Barthes, Roland; Cultural Studies; Culture; Derrida, Jacques; Durkheim, Émile; Habitus/Field; James, William; Language; *Langue* and *Parole*; Logocentrism; Mead, George Herbert; Mills, C. Wright; Pragmatism; Saussure, Ferdinand de; Sign; Structuralism

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separatism

Rutledge M. Dennis

The concept of separatism refers to the idea that racial, ethnic, cultural, religious, political, and linguistic differences, when accompanied by a legacy of oppression, exclusion, persecution, and discrimination, are justifications for groups to terminate their political and legal ties to other groups. Generally, the ultimate aim of the termination is the establishment or reestablishment of control over a specific territory in order to establish or reestablish sovereign control. The separatist claim is accompanied by intense feelings of rage, anger, hurt, and humiliation which often fuel the flames of revolts and revolutions. Above all, the claims of separatists are premised on a desire to erect an impenetrable social distance and barrier between themselves and the people, state, or territory against which they have grievances. We may distinguish between two general types of separatism: external separatism and internal separatism.

External separatism is rooted in the historical expansionism of nation states. As nation states expand and become imperial powers, they annex large areas which include diverse people, religions, and cultures. This process is seen in a review of ancient empires (Roman, Holy Roman), and the more recent empires (Ottoman, Russian, Austrian, Spanish, Portuguese, French, and British) from which contemporary nation states emerged in Europe, Asia, Africa, and the Middle East.

Empires are created when strong political, economic, and military powers wage war, and/or threaten, surrounding or distant political units. The resulting conquest often ends in the annexation of defeated nations, states, and societies, which then extends the political and military boundaries of the conquering power. This annexation process will include, against their will, numerous culturally, ethnically, and racially diverse groups. The imperial or colonial power is an external, distant, and occupying force because the gravitation of power lies not in the land or people occupied, but in the “mother country” or the political and economic center of the imperial power. The external separatist impulse, therefore, is the conquered

people's quest to reconnect or to sustain a loyalty to the myths and symbols of their past, real or imagined, and to validate a claim for their pre conquest independence. Even if they lacked complete independence prior to their colonial conquest, they now wish to assert such an independence. This desire for freedom and independence is even more overwhelming if a large number of the conquered people are old enough to have had the legacy of their way of life embedded in their social consciousness. For these reasons, the separatist desire is one of escaping foreign and external domination and to rebuff rule by the "other." In external separatism the separatist is engaged in a battle to separate and disconnect the interlocking external web of control, within which the imperial and colonial powers have engulfed a distant population. Though time (the 1920s as opposed to the 1950s and 1960s) and situational variables (world wars and regional wars) would be intervening factors in any discussion of the various empires and colonial countries mentioned earlier, the establishment of independent nations which greatly accelerated from the 1960s to the present era speaks volumes for the reasons this could not have been true in the period before 1960: prior to the 1960s many currently independent nations were integrated, partially or totally, within existing empires and colonial powers.

Internal separatism is the separatist impulse within groups occupying the same land mass, though they may occupy a special and recognizable region of the nation state or society where their relationship to the land is deeply rooted in their legends, myths, and history. In internal separatism, relations between the divergent groups traditionally alternate between harmony and conflict. The aspirations leading to a claim for internal separatism stem from the fact that the groups have different languages and cultural or religious backgrounds. More crucial to the separatist impulse, however, is the feeling, among the less dominant or smaller group, that it is the object of domination, discrimination, suppression, oppression, and persecution. Unlike the countries or areas of the world which successfully waged a war or negotiated their freedom, internal separatists are often less successful and many political entities are currently

engaged in a struggle to assert their freedom from a federation or nation state of which they are currently a part. There is often an ebb and flow in this internal separatist conflict and it may involve ultimately a case for total or partial separation from an existing nation state. Among this group one finds Kashmir, the Kurdish section of Iraq, Tibet, the Basque provinces, Kosovo in the greatly reduced Yugoslavia, the southern part of Sudan, Spanish Sahara, and the off and on position of Québec. We might also mention, though they differ from the others just mentioned, Wales and Scotland in Great Britain, in which there are periodic cries for independence, though very few will view this as a possibility. Finally, there are provinces and groups which opted for total or complete separation from countries within which they were the smaller and less dominant groups. In this category one finds Slovenia, Croatia, Bosnia Herzegovina, Serbia, and Macedonia, which separated from Yugoslavia. Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, and Moldavia separated from the Soviet Union. There are also the countries which chose to become separate republics after the collapse of the Soviet Union. Then there was the peaceful separation of the Czechs and the Slovaks from Czechoslovakia, Eritrea's peaceful separation from Ethiopia, then the two countries' almost three year war to adjust their border boundaries, and the more recent independence of East Timor from Indonesia after a brief war.

In the United States the main separatist impulse was generated over the issue of slavery: the Southern desire to maintain and even extend slavery, and the Northern desire to limit and abolish the practice. Among African Americans the major separatist desire was created and sustained by Marcus Garvey from 1916 to the 1920s. Garvey's separatism entailed a version of Black Nationalism in which black Americans would emigrate to Africa. Though Garvey created a government in exile, with duly appointed cabinet members, a highly developed infrastructure, and purchased five ships to aid in the emigration, in the end he failed, and his movement died long before he did in England. Later, in the 1920s and 1930s, communists and socialists asserted that blacks in the South constituted a "nation within a nation" as an oppressed people. However, given the class position advocated

by both groups, and given the fact that blacks themselves did not rally behind that cause, separatism, which many blacks would have viewed as another form of segregation, was not considered a viable solution. In the 1950s and 1960s, the Nation of Islam sought to resurrect Garveyism, but instead of emigration their separatism called for the creation of a black nation within the seven Southern states with large black populations. There was no support among the black population for such a venture, especially as the massive Civil Rights Movement was slowly evolving at the time.

The separatist impulse presents an enormous challenge to nation states, especially democratic nation states, with diverse racial, ethnic, religious, and linguistic populations. The greatest challenge is that of creating the social and cultural institutions and organizations which will provide opportunities for groups to participate in the body politic and freely engage in cross racial, ethnic, cultural, and religious relationships in neighborhoods and communities, at work, in religious institutions, and in educational institutions. A test for democratic nations entails their ability to mix and blend and to incorporate divergent people and cultures. If this is possible, democratic and free societies would move toward constructing a new core culture. Lacking this, the separatist impulse will continue to loom large over the twenty first century just as it did over the twentieth.

SEE ALSO: Accommodation; Colonialism (Neocolonialism); Ethnic Cleansing; Indigenous Movements; Melting Pot; Nation State; Nationalism; Plural Society; Racial Hierarchy

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sex-based wage gap and comparable worth

Juanita M. Firestone

An extensive body of empirical literature has addressed the issue of sex based wage differentials in the United States. The fact that this gap persists over time means that a large body of literature exists on the topic. Most recent research suggests that while the gap may vary based on a variety of factors including type of job, years of experience, economic sector, etc., sex based wage differences remain. Comparable worth is a process that is supposed to address the sex based wage gap by objectively comparing dissimilar jobs in order to determine relative worth to the objectives of a particular organization. The process involves a complex system of fine tuning an entire compensation structure. The information required to engage in comparable worth is considerable: jobs must be ranked according to the worth to the employer. This implies measuring the value of each job and calculating degrees of difference between the values of different jobs. Thus, if two jobs require equivalent levels of skill, education, responsibility, etc., the two should also have equivalent salaries.

Within this research tradition much attention has been paid to the impact of the sex composition of an occupation on the wages of men and women. Findings consistently report that lower hourly wages are associated with those occupations having a larger proportion of women. Many researchers contend that this difference in wages is based on discrimination rather than the actual contribution of the jobs to the goals and objectives of the organization. Comparable worth has been discussed as one means of addressing this problem, and narrowing, if not eliminating, wage disparity based on sex.

COMPARABLE WORTH AS A SOLUTION TO THE SEX BASED WAGE GAP

The phenomenon of sex based wage differentials is a fundamental and persistent social problem in the US and in countries around the world. Common approaches to studying the

problem are rooted in both sociological and economic research. Sociological explanations include socialization processes that dichotomize men's and women's roles and reward men for instrumental activities focused on accruing wealth, power, and status, and reward women for relational activities focused on providing love and care within family contexts. Economic explanations include human capital differences, rational choice, and organizational or bureaucratic theories of labor pattern formation. These efforts are further distinguished by their specialized focus on any of the following areas: the effects of job market competition, the systematic segregation of minorities and women into low paying jobs, the devaluation of female dominated professions, and within occupation wage discrimination. Depending on the focus of the explanation, the recommendations to solve the problem also differ widely. One such recommendation, which was more popular in the past, was a focus on comparable worth.

REASONS FOR THE SEX BASED WAGE GAP

Many economists argue that differences in wages are due to the fact that individuals may come to their job with greatly different talents/ability levels (human capital). These individuals typically oppose comparable worth because they contend that in a free labor market, fair wages will follow efficiency. Thus, differences in wages are attributed to the differences in human capital, which impact the efficiency with which an individual contributes to the organization's goals and objectives. Any differences in human capital obtained by men and women are then attributed to their individual choices, which are presumed to be free from constraints.

In any case, focusing exclusively on the economic analysis of the sex based wage gap disregards the historical and social context that could produce differences in choices by men and women. It seems clear that women's primary responsibility for housework and childcare affects the types of jobs many women prefer, since flexibility in terms of hours and turnover (entry/exit/re entry opportunities) can help women combine job and family responsibilities. Most agree that those occupations that are female typed are more flexible in terms of hours

and turnover. What is unclear is whether the flexibility associated with female typed jobs emerges because employers prefer to hire women in these jobs, or whether these jobs become female typed because of sex stereotyping. For example, women (and men) could be "guided" into certain jobs by social expectations about what is appropriate work. The processes used to guide women into female typed jobs might include implicit signals that women don't belong in men's jobs or explicit harassment or intimidation. In any event, as individuals we may have choices, but those choices do not occur in a vacuum, but occur within the complex social context in which we live.

CURRENT STATE OF RESEARCH

Among research focusing on wage differentials between men and women, most suggest that occupations with a larger proportion of women have lower hourly wages than those with a larger proportion of men. For example, studies that use data from the US Census detailed occupational categories as units of analysis have found that controlling for occupational characteristics (work demands, education level, supervisory capacity, etc.), occupations with a larger percentage of females have lower average hourly earnings. In other words, even with extensive controls for the amount of human capital an individual brings to the job included in the model, both men and women earn less if they work in a female dominated occupation.

Firm or organization specific studies also confirm that even after controlling for unique job skills, female jobs pay less. A few studies have documented that as the proportion of women increases over time in an occupation, the wages for men and women decrease, and that as the proportion of men increases, the wages for men and women increase. Results of this type of research have been unable to ascertain whether the change in the sex composition of the occupation impacted wages, or whether a change in wages altered the sex composition. Regardless, the data support the claims that (1) on average, women earn less than men, (2) men and women are segregated into different occupations, and (3) female typed occupations (sometimes referred to as pink collar jobs) earn lower wages.

On the one hand, there is support for the idea that men and women still have different types/levels of human capital. For example, men are more likely to have engineering and science degrees, and women are more likely to have degrees in elementary education and social work. On the other hand, evidence suggests that human capital and/or individual preferences cannot account for occupational segregation and the sex based wage gap. In fact, at the individual level we are likely to find enormous amounts of overlap in the abilities and preferences of men and women. It is also clear that the majority of female typed occupations reinforce stereotypical female traits such as nurturance and cooperation, suggesting that socialization processes impact occupational choices.

ARGUMENTS FOR AND AGAINST COMPARABLE WORTH

Opponents of comparable worth argue that implementing policies which focus on equalizing women's wages would be engaging in reverse discrimination against men. They further contend that it is an environment free from comparable worth that would allow women and men to choose jobs based on extrinsic factors such as pay and promotion and intrinsic factors such as challenge, variety, and compatibility with co workers. However, if women's wages were raised to a level where there would be no evidence of discrimination then the process would not discriminate against men.

In addition, opponents worry about the negative impact of holding over compensated wages (which are typically male dominated) frozen until pay equity adjustments and other increases (cost of living, etc.) create sex equity in wages. The argument is that comparable worth can be accomplished in theory, but is unlikely to work in practical applications. Proponents argue that comparable worth provides fairness in the job market by removing any residual discrimination, and that both men and women will benefit because neither men nor women would be guided into choosing jobs based on social stereotypes about what is acceptable. Finally, individuals would earn wages commensurate with the effort and value of their work, rather than the proportion of men and women who hold the job or the flexibility associated with a specific job.

CONCLUSION

The supply of labor is more than an economic process – it is also the result of sex based socialization. It seems unlikely that a vibrant and strong economy can exist if the labor market continues to undermine the productive contribution that women are capable of making. The issue is how to overcome the unfair and degrading practices of occupational segregation in which female typed jobs earn less primarily because the workers are women. Comparable worth is only one of several policies, which have been discussed as means to this goal. Since wage equity between men and women has not yet been attained, perhaps researchers should reinvestigate old ideas with new eyes and updated tools.

SEE ALSO: Gender Bias; Gendered Enterprise; Inequality/Stratification, Gender; Occupational Segregation; Stratification, Gender and; Stratification and Inequality, Theories of

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sex and crime

Ruth Triplett

Sex is one of the strongest correlates of crime. Researchers using a variety of ways of measuring crime find that females are less likely to be

involved in crime than males. Beyond the amount of crime, there is evidence that though there is some similarity in the types of crimes males and females commit, sex is related to the nature of offending as well. Despite the strength of the relationship of sex to crime, criminologists have historically ignored it, with a result that criminology's ability to explain this relationship is limited.

SEX AND THE EXTENT OF CRIME

Females are less likely to be involved in crime than males. Looking at data from the Uniform Crime Reports, clear evidence of this difference is readily seen. In 2000, for example, only 20 percent of all those arrested in the US were female. The rate of arrests for all crimes in 2000 was 9,752 out of 100,000 for males and 2,366 out of 100,000 for females.

The greater involvement in crime by males is consistent across time. Arrest data demonstrate that females offend at a rate across time that is consistently lower than that of males. This can be seen by a comparison of the percent of those arrested and the arrest rate for 2000 given above to that for 1965. The UCRs shows that in 1965, females accounted for 10 percent of all arrests and offended at a rate of 942 per 100,000. This is in comparison to males who, in 1965, accounted for 90 percent of all arrests and offended at a rate of 8,612 per 100,000.

Despite the consistent difference over time by sex, there is evidence that, in recent years, the involvement of females in crime is on the increase. In a careful analysis of arrest data from 1965 to 2000, Steffensmeier and Schwartz (2004) report that females moved from accounting for 10 percent of total arrests to 20 percent. At first glance these statistics might indicate the rise of a new "breed" of female offenders, but Steffensmeier and Schwartz's analysis reveals that this is not the truth. First, much of the increase in arrests for females overall was in minor property crimes, in particular larceny theft and fraud. Second, there are a number of crimes for which the female percent of arrests went down. For example, females accounted for 17 percent of all arrests for homicide in 1965 and 11 percent in 2000. Third, there has been a rise in the share of arrests for some violent crimes for

females. As Steffensmeier and Schwartz point out, the percent of arrests for aggravated assault and misdemeanor assault for females has risen. Between 1965 and 2000 the percent of female arrests for aggravated assault rose from 13 to 18 percent and for misdemeanor assault the percent rose from 9 to 20. The increase in some types of violent crime for females has raised the alarm among some. However, there is evidence that much of the increase in arrests for females for some violent crimes is caused more by a change in societal tolerance for these crimes than a real change in the behavior of females.

SEX AND THE NATURE OF CRIME

The relationship of sex to crime is found not only in the extent of offending but also in the nature of offending. Arrest data from the UCRs shows the difference is greatest in the violent and serious property crimes. For example, in 2000, females comprised only 11 percent of all those arrested in the US for homicide and 18 percent of those arrested for felony assault, while they accounted for 10 percent of all robbery arrests and 13 percent of all arrests for burglary. Females come closer to males in percent of arrests for minor property crimes, however. In 2000, females accounted for 33 percent of all larceny theft arrests and 48 percent of all arrests for embezzlement. The only crime for which females accounted for a greater percentage of arrests than males in 2000 was prostitution.

The difference in the nature of offending by sex is seen best in the difference between arrests for youths. Evidence suggests that the types of crime in which girls are involved are quite different from those of boys. Many of these differences parallel those between males and females overall: girls, like females overall, are much less likely to be involved in violent crimes. Arguably, the most significant feature of female involvement in juvenile crime, however, comes in the arrest rates for status offenses.

Status offenses are behaviors which are illegal for youths, but not for adults. They include such behaviors as running away from home, skipping school, violating curfews, the use of alcohol or tobacco, and incorrigibility. Since the development of the juvenile court, status offenses have been an important part of girls'

offending. Further, if we compare the nature of the offenses of female delinquents with those of males, it is clear that girls are considerably more likely to be arrested for status offenses. In 2000, for example, 21 percent of the arrests of females were for status offenses, while only 10 percent of the arrests of boys were in those categories. Girls comprised more than half of the arrests for running away from home (58 percent) – one of only two offenses recorded by the FBI for which females are more than half of the arrests (the other being prostitution).

Running away from home was, in fact, the third most likely offense for which girls were taken into custody in 2000 (larceny was the most common and “other offenses” were second). The top three offense categories for boys were “other offenses,” larceny, and drug abuse violations – running away ranks tenth in the arrest categories of boys in 2000. This difference in arrest rates for status offenses is striking because self report data suggests that boys and girls commit these offenses at similar rates. This strongly suggests that girls are more likely than boys to be arrested for behavior such as running away from home and incorrigibility.

There is also evidence that when they are arrested for status offenses, girls are likely to be dealt with more harshly than boys by the juvenile justice system. In spite of the fact that the 1974 Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention Act specifically recommended the deinstitutionalization of status offenders, a significant number of girls continue to be sentenced to public or private juvenile institutions for these acts. In 1997, for example, 23 percent of all girls in residential placement within the justice system had a status offense as their most serious violation. Only 4 percent of boys in residential placement were there for status offenses. In 1997, almost half of the girls placed in private institutions were charged with status offenses, compared with 11 percent of privately placed boys. Overall, girls are a small minority of the juveniles in the US who are in residential placement (about 14 percent in 1997); however, they are quite close to a majority of youths who are incarcerated for status offenses. Clearly, the nature of the offenses that bring girls to a residential placement is different from that for boys. Girls are more likely to be institutionalized for a minor offense.

SEX AND CRIMINOLOGICAL THEORY

Despite its strength, historically, criminology has paid little attention to the relationship between sex and crime, spending much of its efforts focused on the criminality of males. In the 1960s, feminist criminologists began to develop a critique of mainstream criminology that focused on this neglect. They argue that, in the past, females have been neglected in the theory and research, and that when they are present they are viewed in a stereotyped manner. The result is that criminology has been, and continues to be, unable to explain why it is that males offend at such higher rates than females.

SEE ALSO: Crime; Crime, Biosocial Theories of; Feminist Criminology; Juvenile Delinquency; Masculinities, Crime and Measuring Crime

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sex education

Debbie Epstein

The term sex education covers a multitude of approaches, meanings, and pedagogical strategies.

It is highly contextual, with localized cultures and understandings making significant differences both to the purposes and practices involved. It is also often highly politicized.

Sex education in both the UK and US has its origins in what Frank Mort (1987), among others, has termed the “medico moral” dis courses of the second half of the nineteenth century. However, as Pilcher (2005: 154) points out, the inclusion of sex education in the British school curriculum was controversial, since children were seen as simultaneously innocent and easily corruptible (a theme that has persisted into the twenty first century). Pilcher describes how serious concerns about the prevalence and spread of syphilis and gonorrhea, especially during World War I, propelled sex education into the school curriculum. The UK government subsequently began to provide funding for the National Council for Combating Venereal Disease (later the British Schools Hygiene Council) to carry out sex education in schools and also encouraged the introduction of lessons about sex hygiene and reproduction in biology lessons. This direct funding was with drawn and discretionary funding for sex education devolved to local education authorities in the late 1920s. Often, they chose not to provide such instruction, particularly after the Chief Medical Officer to the Board of Education questioned “whether direct class instruction in this subject is either advisable or practicable” (Board of Education 1930: 48).

World War II brought new moral panics about “dangerous ignorance” and the likelihood that sexual knowledge might be acquired in “ways which are likely to distort or degrade” (Board of Education 1943: 4). The 1950s marked a change in beginning to debate what the content of sex education should be rather than whether it should be taught at all. As Pilcher (2005: 160) points out, in the relatively short period between 1939 and 1956 sex had moved from a position of conspicuous absence in the health education curriculum to being rated as “the single most immediate problem” within it.

In the settler colonies (Australia, Canada, South Africa, and New Zealand), the development of sex education followed similar lines to those of the UK. Although little attention was paid to the formal education (let alone sex education) of indigenous people in these or

other colonies, there was a concern within the Colonial Office to prevent both “excessive breeding” by “natives” and “miscegenation.”

Similarly, in the United States, social purity activists in the nineteenth century called for women to teach their children about sex and argued for the introduction of sex education in schools in order to combat venereal disease in the early twentieth century. The actual introduction of sex or sex hygiene lessons into schools varied from state to state, depending to some extent on the relative strength of vice crusaders and social purity activists. While both these activist groups had the regulation of sexuality at the core of their campaigns (D’Emilio & Freedman 1988), they had very different approaches to this. Vice campaigners opposed sex education, believing that it would encourage “corruption” amongst the young. Social purity activists, in contrast, believed that the regulation of sexuality could best be achieved by the expansion of sex education (Irvine 2002).

Sex education curricula, practices, and theorizations in western Anglophone countries, as they have developed in the last years of the twentieth and first decade of the twenty first centuries, may be broadly divided into three categories:

- those taking, as their starting point, the promotion of sexual abstinence;
- those which, while not specifically promoting abstinence, nevertheless focus mainly on sexual reproduction and danger;
- more emergent approaches which are rooted in the sociological, psychological, and historical study of sexuality more generally.

The promotion of sexual abstinence (“abstinence only”) education is particularly strong in the US. The view underlying these approaches is that sex education is directly responsible for increases in sexual activity, the growth of sexually transmitted diseases, and an increasing number of unwanted teenage pregnancies. “Abstinence only” education avoids discussion of sex, sexual relationships, or contraception, focusing instead on the idea that sexual intercourse should be delayed until after marriage and, in some programs, getting young people to pledge that they will remain virgins until they marry. Strictly speaking, therefore, “abstinence only” education is not a form of

sex and relationships education at all (Sex Education Forum 2004). However “abstinence only” education has a long tradition and has been promoted in at least some US states for at least two decades. Despite this, there is no evidence that “abstinence only” education has the desired effects. Indeed, a number of researchers argue that it places young people at risk through their ignorance and the fact that if they expect to remain virgins, they are unlikely to be prepared to use contraception if and when they decide to become sexually active (Bearman & Bruckner 2001; Swann et al. 2003).

Despite the promotion of “abstinence only” education in the US, the dominant approach to sex education in most Anglophone countries is much more embedded in the teaching of sexual reproduction (e.g., in biology lessons) and the transmission of messages about danger and disease. Such approaches have been extensively described and critiqued by major theorists of sexuality and education. Michelle Fine (1988) was one of the first writers from a sociological perspective who engaged critically with sex education. Fine identified a number of discourses of sexuality in sex education lessons: “sexuality as violence,” “sexuality as victimization,” and “sexuality as individual morality” were the most common. She also identified a “discourse of desire,” which she found to be present only as a “whisper” – or even missing completely from sex education. Fine argues strongly that a language of desire is critical in allowing young women in particular to explore sexuality. She concludes that: “the absence of a discourse of desire, combined with the lack of analysis of the language of victimization, may actually retard the development of sexual subjectivity and responsibility in students” (Fine 1988: 49).

Research on sex education in the US (Trudell 1993), the UK (Thomson 1994; Measor et al. 2000), and Australia (Harrison & Hillier 1999) has shown that the mainstream approach to sex education in these (and other) places continues to focus mainly on sexual danger, moral imperatives, and sexual reproduction. With this fairly narrow focus this could be regarded as “sex education” in the strict sense. In this context, young people may be taught about the biology of sexual reproduction, the importance of, as the UK government stresses, “marriage for family life, stable and loving relationships” (DfEE

2000, 5: para. 9), and the dangers of pregnancy and sexually transmitted diseases. As Fine (1988) showed, this approach excludes discussion of pleasure or desire.

Peter Redman (1994) has suggested that we should differentiate between “sex education” and “sexuality education,” and proposed the development of the latter to supplant the former. Epstein et al. (2003) define sexuality as encompassing the “sexual cultures and sexual meanings [that] are constructed through a range of discursive practices across social institutions including schools” (p. 3), and argue that sexuality education in schools should be part of the humanities and social sciences curriculum rather than, as currently, included in biology and/or personal, social, and health education (in the UK), life skills education (in South Africa), or taught as a separate subject. They propose that young people should study the history and sociology of sexualities at different times and in different places, enabling them to question their own assumptions around, for example, heterosexuality, race and sexuality, and the stability of legitimated sexual forms.

Because sex education must be understood contextually, attention must also be paid to what happens in poor to middle income countries, especially those with severe problems due to the high prevalence of HIV/AIDS. There have been two primary approaches in these contexts. The first, as promoted particularly by supra and international organizations such as the World Bank and the OECD, sees education for women generally, and sex education in particular, as a means of limiting population growth in poor countries. This approach has been described as analogous to a “silver bullet” (Jeffery & Jeffery 1998; Jeffery & Basu 1996), which will act as a kind of contraceptive for women in these countries. Thus sex education in “developing” countries is often seen very instrumentally and, with its emphasis on biology and danger, is similar to the mainstream approach outlined above (see Pattman & Chege 2003).

Second, with the advent of the HIV/AIDS pandemic, there has been a further urgency added to the need for sex education and changing behavior in countries particularly affected by the virus. One of the key problems identified by those who are researching sex and HIV/AIDS education in the context of the

pandemic is that the burden of prevention of the spread of HIV/AIDS has, to a large extent, been placed on women. One of the key points made by such researchers is that any sex, sexuality, or HIV/AIDS education programs need to pay much greater attention to promoting gender equality if they are to have any chance of success (see, e.g., Abdool Karim et al. 2002; Unterhalter et al. 2002; Campbell 2003; Morrell 2003).

SEE ALSO: Childhood Sexuality; Education; Gender, Education and; HIV/AIDS and Population; Sex and Gender; Sexuality Research: History

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sex and gender

Barbara Ryan

Often confused or used as if the terms were the same, sex and gender are in actuality different designations of human behavior based on physical capabilities and social expectations.

Sex is related to the biological distinctions between males and females primarily found in relation to the reproductive functions of their bodies. Biological sex is usually stated as if there are two, and only two, distinct bodies: male and female. But, in fact, there are gradations between male and female accounting for at least five sexes (Fausto Sterling 1999). In the past called hermaphrodites, and today intersexual, these are people with a mixture of male and female genitalia. In addition, there are those who feel they are encased in a body of the wrong sex, some of whom take hormones and even undergo surgery to become transsexuals. Another classification is transgender, which is often used in the same way as the word transsexual, but also indicates people who cross the barrier of gender without physical change.

Sex is not a clear cut matter of chromosomes, hormones, and genitalia that produce females and males. All humans have hormones, such as estrogen and testosterone, but they are found in varying and changing levels (Fausto Sterling 1999; Kimmel 2004). Men as well as women have breasts. Some men have bigger breasts than some women and some men get breast cancer. Women have facial hair. Indeed, some women have more facial hair than some men.

Gender is a social definition of how to be or the ways of "being" considered appropriate for one's sex category. Because gender can be enacted in an infinite variety of ways, and indeed is, we know that gender is a social construction and, therefore, learned behavior.

Other terms closely related and often confused with sex/gender are sexual orientation and sexuality. Sexual orientation is descriptive of who you desire to have sexual relations with; that is, who is the object of your desire. Same sex desires indicate homosexuality; opposite sex desires indicate heterosexuality; sexual desire for both men and women indicates bisexuality (Ryan & DeMarco 2003).

Depending upon where and when you live, these classifications can affect your life in multiple ways. Thus, there is a long history, as well as ongoing processes, of differential treatment based upon one's sex, gender, and sexual orientation. What this leads to is privileged groups, those having access to the goods of society and those who are prohibited from such things. The casual dismissal of people who are different

from the powerful and dominant group carries with it a superior/inferior connotation that permeates every aspect of social life and, beyond that, can also lead to internalized oppression.

Most people live their lives with unquestioned assumptions about men and women based on an overemphasis of the role of biology in shaping human behavior (Rosenblum & Tavris 2000). This tendency is called biological reductionism (or essentialism) and is often justified as the work of nature or God. Although it is doubtful that Freud believed the differences between men and women were reducible to naturalistic thinking, the term he coined – "anatomy is destiny" – has been used as a justification for keeping women out of work deemed unfeminine (and typically higher paying) or to expect men to display masculine behavior at all times. Defining human designed categories as the result of biology or "intelligent design" is meant to remove that categorization from debate and, even further, to deny questioning of the concepts at all.

The fact is, the effects of social interaction on human behavior far override biological differences (Kimmel 2004). It is a western tendency, particularly American, to embrace a binary and biologically based perspective rather than one focusing on social forces as an understanding of how we think, talk, and otherwise behave and that this early determination is unchanging – that it is fixed for life. It is a belief that has been reinforced and promoted through the mass media, law, religion, and other social institutions.

For some time now, scholars, researchers, and activists have challenged perceived differences among people, such as race and gender. Research has shown a profound social influence on sex, gender, and sexuality (Connell 2000; Fenstermaker and West 2002; Glenn 1999; Seidman 2003). This new emphasis is a social constructionist perspective rooted in the understanding that reality is created in everyday interactions (Berger & Luckmann 1966). From a social construction perspective, differences among people emerge through interaction and the social processes of institutions such as religion, politics, economic positioning, and work relations.

Babies do not develop on their own into adult human beings. Socialization is the process

by which we learn the ways of society and our place in the social world. It is how we become "human." Society is around and within us. We learn from others how we are expected to live in our culture, our subcultures, and in accordance with our gender. That is, we are taught to have attitudes and behaviors based on our designation of male or female. Gendered messages are everywhere and constant, beginning with the family.

Family interactions are pivotal in the construction and the maintenance of gender ideologies and roles. As children grow, their agents of socialization broaden. They go to school and learn new ways of defining gender distinctiveness. They also begin interacting with peer groups that have an influence on their sense of self. This peer influence increases as the child progresses towards adolescence when the peer group becomes more powerful than family expectations.

A powerful influence on how gender is socially constructed comes from the mass media, particularly television. Gender socialization does not end with childhood; it continues throughout our life. Traditional stereotypes of men and women are perpetuated because women are still cast as younger, supportive counterparts to men, and older women are still the most underrepresented group (Gahahl et al. 2003). Likewise, movies provide scripts for how to live our lives while "doing gender." From the time of the earliest films, they have shown us the stereotypical gender roles we are meant to play on the stage of life.

Sex and gender are related yet distinctive terms, both heavily imbued with definitions, restrictions, privileges, and misconceptions based on the ways they have been socially constructed in different societies around the world. Sex, the biological component, is often used as a justification to privilege men over women. Gender, which has the widest and deepest applications, is often treated as if it were a biological condition rather than a social categorization that can and is used for placement in stratification systems.

SEE ALSO: Doing Gender; Intersexuality; Sexism; Sexuality; Socialization; Stratification, Gender and; Transgender, Transvestism, and Transsexualism

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sex panics

Benjamin Shepard

The concept of a sex panic builds on the idea of moral panic – a term first coined within British sociology and Stuart Hall's cultural studies. Sex panics are a distinct form of moral panic. The term moral panic builds on themes from American sociology of deviance, theories of collective behavior, social problems, French structuralist theory, and Frankfurt School social theory. Moral panics about youth have been assessed as studies of subcultures, while other inquiries have adopted social and psychological perspectives borrowed from disaster studies. As theorists grappled with the meanings of the AIDS epidemic and public policies aimed at alleviating

social problems, conceptions of moral panics overlapped with debates about “the under class.” A frequent theoretical approach to studying representations of moral panics about sexuality is to analyze “discourses” that regulate sexuality and demarcate hierarchies of what is and is not normal and moral, worthy and unworthy. Thus, panics have been analyzed from a range of different perspectives. In *Moral Panics*, a reader on moral panic as a “key idea” for sociological inquiry, Thompson (1998: 72) counsels: “It may be a sensible tactic to adopt insights from each of these in an eclectic manner or to combine them where appropriate, depending on the particular type of moral panic being studied.”

The first reference to the term moral panic was by sociologist Stanley Cohen in 1972. His point was that to the extent that cultural institutions draw parameters around deviance, they create moral panics. The process can be described through an escalating cycle. The cycle begins as a distinct group – perhaps a youth gang, gay men, or teenagers on welfare – engages in distinct acts, such as having sex in public or being on public assistance. These acts are viewed as a threat to traditional values and society at large. Once the threat is identified, it is presented in a highly charged, black and white manner in the media (Cohen 2002). This reduces the understanding of the complexity of the group or circumstances (Bourdieu 1998). From here, “right thinking” moral entrepreneurs such as state officials, police, social workers, bishops, psychologists, and other licensed experts establish diagnoses which pathologize and punish. These solutions tend to assert social control over activities and groups.

For Cohen, the moral panic scapegoat becomes a “folk devil” onto whom cultural anxieties are projected. Cohen focuses on the symbolic controls, the mythologies, and the labels at play as folk devils inspire widespread reaction. Thus, studies of panic consider the highly charged symbolic functions generating collective behavior, the stereotypes which from time to time inspire profound widespread hysteria.

Weeks (1985) suggests that the mechanics of these moral panics are quite familiar. They start with a threat from a youthful event or gathering. Those involved are stereotyped as demons; discourse about the threat escalates; this leads to

a simplified view of the problem and a draconian policy solution; anxiety wanes while the victims, the “folk devils,” are left to withstand often brutal legal penalties.

At its core, the concept of moral panic considers the role of political demonology: the labeling of opponents as threats to moral and social order. These are the folk devils Cohen describes. Stereotyping often has the effect of establishing power of one group over another group of people, in favor of a status quo. For this reason, people generally do not like to be categorized, labeled, or attributed with certain common characteristics. The process of being labeled limits freedom of movement and self-determination. Labeling is used to scapegoat – blame – and therefore control other people (Fisk 1993).

This process only escalates in the case of sexual panic. Historian Allan Bérubé suggests that the term sex panic refers to a moral crusade which results in “crackdowns on sexual outsiders” (Gaywave 1997). Duggan (1995) notes that such panics, red scares, and even witch hunts can be witnessed throughout countless chapters of US history. They are generally advanced by vocal interest groups with animosity toward cultural difference. In their most dangerous expression, these panics have been championed by crusaders hoping to establish one distinct brand of orthodoxy on the majority. These panics tend to deflect public discourse away from social problems involving race, sex, or poverty, which if addressed might shift social arrangements. Thus, panics can be understood as distractions.

For this reason activists have consistently sought to challenge these structures. By the mid 1980s, queer activists recognized that panic over the AIDS crisis impeded an effective response. From 1987 through the 1990s the AIDS Coalition to Unleash Power (ACT UP) enjoyed great success in its struggle against a panic over the AIDS epidemic. Much of the winning strategy involved the use of colorful, theatrical, playful, inventive, and aesthetic interventions which changed hearts and minds. Art critic and former ACT UP member Douglas Crimp suggests ACT UP’s work helped transform public discourse about the epidemic away from blame and hysteria toward a recognition that AIDS was a public health issue which

required an assertive government response (Takemoto 2003). Yet, panic was never far away.

In the summer of 1997 an ad hoc group of activists and scholars declared: *J'accuse*. They suggested that the policies of New York Mayor Rudy Giuliani's Quality of Life crusade fit a distinctively American political schema. The group noted this was not the first time government has advanced repressive policies around sexuality in the name of the larger public good. The group noted that since the ante bellum days of labor unrest and Anthony Comstock's social purity crusade (Gilfoyle 1992; Beisel 1997; Wagner 1997), attacks on sexuality have emerged within a distinct, recurrent pattern: morals are invoked; folk devils are found in gay people, prostitutes, and other sexual outsiders who function as scapegoats; and finally, a fantastical notion of social purity, which few live up to, is presented as a social norm. "Historians have come to call this pattern a 'sex panic,'" the group noted. Thus, they borrowed the term as the name for their group in order to highlight their view that with the mid 1990s effort to clean up New York City they were witnessing yet another sex panic (Crimp et al. 1997).

With that, SexPanic! was born. SexPanic! led the struggle against Giuliani's war on public sexual culture taking place under the auspices of his Quality of Life Crusade. Their work included a struggle against panic in private spaces where communities of sexual outsiders converge; it compared Giuliani's struggles with those of anti vice crusader Anthony Comstock. The group utilized a politics of play and pleasure to challenge structures of panic. These struggles can be understood as part of a lineage of protest against prohibition dating back to the days of the Temperance Movement (Wagner 1997).

The concept is useful in that it helps explain collective behavior – including periods of "hysteria," "red scares," and "prohibition." Yet Cohen (2002) is frank to acknowledge that just because something is stirred by irrational behavior does not necessarily mean it is a panic. Future research on the topic must work to make sense of these elements of collective behavior, which create panic. Hence, it must do more than name and acknowledge that panics exist. It must identify and highlight best practice approaches to combat periods of panic.

SEE ALSO: AIDS, Sociology of; Moral Panics; Queer Theory; Safer Sex; Sexualities and Culture Wars

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sex tourism

Susan L. Wortmann

Sex tourism is a multibillion dollar global industry wherein individuals (sex tourists) from industrialized, developed nations travel abroad with the distinct purpose of purchasing a variety of sexually associated services. Destinations vary, but most sex tourists seek the services of

individuals from developing nations. Sex tourists' travel and consumption, facilitated by technology and an unequal and increasingly interconnected world system, have raised the profitability of this industry to a historically unprecedented level. Blending global race, ethnicity, class, gender, and age inequalities with capitalist consumption, sex tourism creates and perpetuates a range of problems for sex workers and host countries. A growing body of interdisciplinary studies reveals a complex blend of exploitation and agency involved in sex tourism, the links between local and global, the need for inclusive and further study of homosexual, transgendered and bisexual, as well as heterosexual sex tourism, and the importance of understanding rather than stereotyping workers and experiences.

Worldwide, tourism itself is a major business. According to Williams (2002), 83 countries list tourism as one of their top five export categories. Economically vulnerable developing countries with exploitable resources often welcome the revenue that tourism brings. Indeed, because it can be a country's largest revenue source, there is also a tendency to uncritically associate all types of tourism with economic advancement. International organizations such as the World Bank and the International Money Fund (IMF) have provided loans for tourism as a mechanism to end poverty in developing nations. Many scholars question the impact of these loans, however, illustrating that because of devalued currencies, immigration, urbanization, and gendered labor markets, tourism is, especially for women of developing nations, a likely entry to service and sex work.

Fun, sun, adventure, and consumption of an affordable exotic Other are internationally associated with sex tourism's allure. This appeal is a commodity manufactured and maintained by technologies of developed countries. For example, foreign consumers have ready access to information and services from afar: through the Internet, chat rooms, e diaries, blogs, Internet promotional videos, and guidebooks. Readily accessible is advice on how to arrange a sex tour, how to bargain with submissive sex workers, best sites, and best workers. Some Internet sites allow tourists to arrange and customize complete packaged sex tours online. Importantly, sex tourists' destination countries have

little control over how their citizens are represented. For example, a number of sex trade brochures and magazines are produced in Europe. Additionally, cyberspace sites often feature stereotypical "sexy, willing, and submissive natives," and charter services advertise "exotic scenery" counterpoised against nearly naked bodies. Entire populations, in effect, become sexually commodified.

Air travel facilitates access to a number of developing countries with warm climates. While popular destinations include Thailand, the Philippines, the Dominican Republic, Costa Rica, and Brazil, sex tourism is not limited to locations in Southeast Asia and South America. Specific cities and regions are often associated with sex tourism, e.g., Holland's Amsterdam, Kenya's coast along the Indian Ocean, Cuba's Havana, and Thailand's Patpong region. While some locations have established cultural patterns of prostitution (for instance, brothels are traditional in Thailand), the influx of tourists looking specifically for sex associated services, along with developing nations' poverty and lack of jobs, have increased the local sex economy to a historic high. In some cases, this increase can be directly traced to deliberate intervention by governments and financial organizations. For instance, the sex trade in Thailand grew substantially during and after the Vietnam War when the governments of the US and Thailand negotiated a contract for American soldiers to be sent there for rest and relaxation (R&R). Both governments were thereby indirectly responsible for an increase in brothels.

While gay, lesbian, bisexual, transgendered, and heterosexual individuals engage in sex tourism as buyers and sellers, statistics and studies of the demography, psychology, experience, and motivations of tourists and workers are limited. Most, for example, explore the sex tourism of heterosexual middle/upper class males from industrialized nations such as Japan, Germany, or the US who seek young, submissive women for sex and companionship. The most commonly researched sex worker is a poor, young woman of color who has often migrated from a rural to an urban setting or to another country to support herself and/or her family. Accounts suggest that she may have found the sex trade much more lucrative than factory and domestic related trades, she may have found it the only

job available, or she may have been tricked or forced into sex work. Buyer and seller fantasy, according to many narratives, is an important industrial feature. Ethnographies reveal that, in addition to sex, some heterosexual male tourists seek submissive companionship, while some heterosexual women sex tourists seek romance or racialized exotic Others. Homosexual, bisexual, transgendered, and heterosexual sex workers alike appear to fantasize that their clients will offer more than money. For example, in overtly patriarchal countries, female sex workers may seek men who can provide them with more egalitarian gender relations, extended relationships, a visa that allows them to travel abroad, or even marriage. Gay sex workers appear to be motivated by gifts, money, promise of travel, and migration. Sexual identities are not necessarily stable among buyers and sellers – several accounts note that some male sex workers who service primarily men continue to have women as intimate partners, and that male tourists who are married to women purchase services from male and transgendered sex workers.

Sex tourism is credited with both the creation and intensification of micro and macro social problems including, but not limited to, violence against individuals (workers and tourists); disease and morbidity; child prostitution; and social/environmental destruction. Sex workers often suffer abuse and exploitation from clients, including refusal to wear condoms, physical or emotional violence, and failure to pay. They are likely to experience harassment by club operators and law enforcement. In most countries the sex trade is illegal and sex workers are unlikely to be legally protected. AIDS and sexually transmitted diseases (STDs) are prevalent and can impact buyer, seller, or future and present sex partners and children. Paradoxically, the threat of AIDS is reported to appeal to some sex tourists who regard it as adventure and high risk sport. Child prostitution, reported in many areas, has attracted international attention. International actions, such as passing legislation to make those who engage children as prostitutes liable abroad and in their own countries, may deflect attention and resources from adult workers and may make them scapegoats for the sex trade. Furthermore, all types of tourism

strain developing countries' environments, increase demands for natural resources, and produce additional pollution and waste.

Feminist scholars such as Enloe (1989) were instrumental in bringing academic attention to sex tourism. Interdisciplinary engagement has revealed a complex portrait of a range of issues that problematize earlier understandings of sex tourism as solely exploitative, that seek to broaden the focus to all types of workers and tourists, and that point to the importance of academics understanding their own positionality and tendency to "other" sex workers and tourists. Some challenge traditional definitions of sex tourism itself. For instance Ryan (2000) defines sex tourism merely as "sexual intercourse while away from home." Research emphases differ; some explore sex tourism on the macro level of global economic, social, and historical factors, while others emphasize the importance of inequalities of race, ethnicity, class, and gender separately, or together, and how these impact workers and tourists. Still others emphasize micro levels of interaction by stressing that the sex trade involves negotiation, agency, and opportunity for buyer and seller. Each of these conceptualizations impacts research emphases, findings, the resultant local and international policies, and, ultimately, the lives of individuals engaged in the global phenomenon of sex tourism.

SEE ALSO: Child Labor; Consumption, Tourism and; Gender, Consumption and; Globalization, Sexuality and; Imperialism; Prostitution; Sexual Markets, Commodification, and Consumption; Traffic in Women

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sexism

Amy Lind

Sexism is discrimination on the basis of sex and/or gender. It occurs at various levels, from the individual to the institutional, and involves practices that promote gender based prejudice and stereotyping of social roles. Most commonly, sexism refers to inequalities that exist among men and women, particularly where women are treated as unequal or inferior to men. Like other forms of discrimination, sexism can occur through blatant or covert actions, including outright displays of hatred or disdain for an individual or group; the privileging of one gender over another; or tokenism, where, for example, a woman is hired only because she is a woman, rather than because of her skills and experience. How sexism plays out varies according to the social location of the individual or group

involved, particularly in regard to racial, ethnic, class, sexual, and/or religious background.

Beginning in the 1960s, sexism became a commonly used term by participants in second wave feminist movements in the US, Britain, Canada, and Europe and elsewhere. In the US, the National Organization for Women (NOW, co founded by Betty Friedan) fought for an Equal Rights Amendment (ERA) which, had it passed, would have provided full equality to men and women under the law. Affirmative action policies (a type of positive discrimination) also became an important strategy for reversing historical gender inequalities. In Britain, Europe, and other regions, legislation was proposed to end gender discrimination in the workplace, educational system, and political system. In the 1990s and 2000s many developing countries began to propose affirmative action policies to reverse gender discrimination as well (IWRAP 2005).

Beginning in the 1960s, US feminists organized widely against sex segregation in the labor market and workplace and introduced notions of unequal pay and comparable worth to address the unequal value assigned to “feminine” vs. “masculine” types of employment in US society (England 1992). Several studies address the gender wage gap in earnings among men and women; some break these figures down according to race/ethnicity (Jacobsen 1998). Comparable worth advocates have argued that increasing women's wages is not enough; rather, it is also necessary to rethink how certain types of jobs or employment sectors are viewed as “feminine” and therefore as inherently less economically worthy than those jobs viewed as “masculine.” For example, physicians, astronauts, and attorneys tend to be paid more than nurses, teachers, and secretaries (Lindsey 1997: 76). Men who provide administrative assistance are “office managers” whereas women are “secretaries.”

In relation to this, sociologists have also addressed how sexism is inherent in language: in the structure of language and in everyday communication. They have pointed out how male pronouns are used to define all of humanity, as in the phrases, “all men are created equal,” “we need the right man for the job,” and “we live in a manmade society.” Just as “man” is assumed to refer to both men and

women, “he” is assumed to refer to “she.” Similarly, many titles and occupations are biased toward men, as in “businessmen,” “newsmen,” or “mailmen,” despite the fact that women work in these professions (Lindsey 1997). Advocates of gender equality have worked to create more gender neutral language and one may now hear references to “business people,” “news reporters,” and “mail carriers.” Scholars have also pointed out how, in everyday communication, informal exchanges, gossip, or jokes may reproduce stereotypical gender roles and identities. Verbal sexual harassment at work or on the street is one example of this.

Sexism has been challenged in the courts in many countries, as in the case of the US with the passage of the 1972 Educational Amendment to the Civil Rights Act. Typically referred to as Title IX, this legislation mandated that schools, colleges, and universities that received public funds must provide equality in funding for male and female students at all levels. This allowed female students equal opportunity in their academic pursuits and athletic activities for the first time in history. Gender based affirmative action policies, based on the racial model proposed originally by civil rights leaders, were introduced in the early 1970s, particularly in the areas of employment and education to ensure that women “enjoyed the same opportunities for promotions, salary increases, career advancement, school admissions, scholarships, and financial aid” as men (Brunner 2005). An example of positive discrimination, these policies were seen as temporary and remedial rather than permanent. During the 1990s, critics challenged the constitutionality of gender based and race based affirmative action policies in the courts, arguing that they were a form of reverse discrimination. Defenders contend that such policies are necessary in societies where gender (and racial) inequality is institutionalized and ongoing. Discrimination against women, sometimes referred to as sexual discrimination in legal discourse, is now illegal in many countries, although these laws are difficult to uphold. The United Nations Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women (CEDAW), adopted in 1979 by the UN General Assembly, urged governments around the world to adopt legislation that promotes gender equality. As of

2005, 90 percent (180 member countries) have ratified the Convention.

The definition of sexism has changed over time, reflecting contemporary sociological debates on sex vs. gender and nature vs. nurture. During the early stage of second wave feminism, sexism was typically defined as unequal treatment on the basis of sex. Later social theorists emphasized gender, rather than sex, as the appropriate level of analysis, since, they argued, discrimination is based on cultural, rather than biological, difference (Lorber 1994). Some went even further to argue that how a given society defines sex difference in human anatomy is also a product of culture and not a predetermined, natural given.

To the extent that sexism is based on the assumption that there are essential differences between men and women (be they biologically or culturally based), then it is an *essentialist* notion. Postmodern scholars have emphasized how individuals of both dominant and marginalized groups reproduce sexism, pointing out, for example, that women themselves reinforce structures of domination by engaging in sexist jokes and competing unfairly with other women. While the nature–nurture debates continue, many feminist scholars would continue to agree that the social context, rather than any assumed biological difference between men and women, is crucial to understanding how and why women are viewed as the “weaker sex” and therefore subject to sexism.

Critics have argued that sex/gender difference does not imply sex/gender discrimination per se, and that by blaming men, feminists are promoting reverse sexism. Other critics argue that sexism alone is not enough to understand gender based discrimination, particularly for non European, non white women; rather, one needs to assess gender inequality in conjunction with, for example, racial, ethnic, sexual, or class inequality (Collins 1998). Most feminist scholars would agree that the most pervasive type of sexism is that which continues to exist in people’s belief systems and cultural attitudes – beliefs and attitudes which cannot be changed immediately through legislation.

SEE ALSO: Discrimination; Feminist Activism in Latin America; Gender Bias; Gender Ideology and Gender Role Ideology; Gender

Oppression; Sex Based Wage Gap and Comparable Worth; Sex and Gender

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sexual citizenship

David T. Evans

All sociological analyses of human sexualities contain implications of differential social exclusion, and social movements such as Gay Liberation, feminism, and Queer activism fight for sexual "rights" employing the rhetoric of equality. However, only in the last decade have such issues been explicitly theorized and researched under the rubric of sexual citizenship, focusing on the political, legal, and economic construction of sexualities through the institutionalized principles and processes of heteronormative

liberal democratic citizenship, though precisely how has remained open to considerable disagreement.

In earlier micro and middle range sociological accounts, hegemonic heterosexism was invariably acknowledged, but as an implicit ideological, rather than explicitly structural, dominant presence. Discussion and analysis of the patterned discriminatory consequences of hegemonic heterosexism on aspects of mundane citizenship, such as taxation, life insurance, health care provision, home ownership, inheritance rights, conditions of employment, use of "public" and "private" spaces, etc., were thereby absent. Given the institutionalization of the family as the natural "dominant regime of (heterosexual) truth" (Mort 1980), these omissions were unsurprising and unrecognized. As one result, the early sociology of sexuality commenced its critiques of naturalist explanations by responding to the latter's focus on discrete forms of "deviance" requiring explanation, as heteronormative forms did not. During the 1980s the impact of postmodernist and "queer" perspectives further discouraged macro analysis of sexualities deemed to be increasingly fragmented, fluid, and unstable. However, during the same decade, citizenship in general excited new social scientific interest. The conceptual and interpretive origins and disagreements in sociological accounts of sexual citizenship derive from these differences in academic and political provenance, at the heart of which reside contested accounts of late modernity and citizenship in general.

Citizenship has had a sustained presence in British sociology due to the lasting influence of Marshall's (1950) classic account of civil, political, and social rights, the development of the modern British welfare state as part of post World War II regeneration and, since the 1950s, the growing impact of conditions of "disorganized" capitalism: fragmentation of economic interest groups with greater industrial flexibility in economies increasingly consumption driven; breakdown of neo corporatist state regulation; growing contradictions between state and capital; growth of new, seemingly fragmented and discrete, social movements, and active citizens as reflexive consumers. "Capital, culture, technology and politics merely came together to roam beyond the regulatory power

of the national state" (Urry 2000), which of necessity retreated from moralist to causalist principles. Rather than appraising sexual behaviors as "immoral" and interfering in the private lives of citizens "to seek to enhance any particular pattern of behavior," the law became primarily concerned with proven deleterious effects on "victims," the preservation of "public order and decency," protection of the citizen from "public" offense and injury (Wolfenden 1957), and the restriction of tolerated sexual deviance to "private" spaces. This reformulation of regulatory principles inevitably impinged on those of citizenship. While justifications for partial or complete citizenship exclusion are to be found in classic accounts such as Marshall's (1950) specification that social rights include "all . . . rights which accrue from the fundamental right to share to the full in the social heritage and to the life of a civilized being according to the standards prevailing in the society," their implicit heteronormative (dis) qualifications remained largely unrecognized and unaddressed until post Wolfenden legal reformulations began to have a concrete impact.

Under these new social conditions of disorganized capitalism, the citizenship space in civil society opened up between criminality (sexual murder, rape, pedophilia, etc.) and heteronormativity became occupied by conditionally "legal" but relatively differentiated "immoral" and thus partial sexual citizens, with their own specific rights and duties, which in turn underpinned the development of associated niche markets of leisure and lifestyle consumption. Inevitably, traditional forms of governance were strained by the structural disjunction between growing amoral market pressures on such "private" urban sexual spaces and "moral" state authority, leading to heightened pressure on key normative distinctions such as "morality," "legality," "public," and "private." By the 1980s this underlying disjunction resulted in a political hiatus in which New Right free market liberalism encouraged the expansion and expression of "private" sexual lifestyles, amid strident reaffirmations of family values in the face of AIDS, child sex abuse, and other moral panics.

Liberal democratic citizenship had apparently reached a breaking point, but the crisis was "resolved" in Britain by the Citizen's Charter (HMSO 1991), which gave due regard

to citizens' "privacy," "dignity," and diverse "cultural beliefs," still exemplified by such references to "citizens, especially as parents." The citizenship balance shifted from welfare rights and the relationship between individual, community, and state, to rights of informed choice by autonomous individuals as consumers. Rather than citizenship being conditional on conformity to "standards prevailing in the society," it became "that set of practices (juridical, political, economic, and cultural) which define a person as a competent member of society, and which as a consequence shape the flow of resources to persons and social groups" (Turner 1993a), competence being defined as responsible self regulation. Liberal democratic citizenship was thus revitalized as an "inclusive" status regardless of class, ethnic, gender, and sexual difference, in which competent "legal" but "immoral" minorities regulated themselves into forms of "privacy," but still leaving the "ideal citizen" as a married, white, male, heterosexual property owner.

Only during the early 1990s did mainstream academic discourses begin to acknowledge this economization and sexualization of citizenship, hesitantly noting, for example, that some citizenship tensions "appear to be centered around . . . the struggle for homosexual rights" (Turner 1993a). Homosexual and lesbian citizenship has dominated subsequent sexual citizenship concerns, though other forms of citizenship tension, conflict, and even chaos have emerged concerning the citizenship status of, for instance, sex workers and their clients, users of pornography, transsexuals, children, claimants for access to reproductive technologies, surrogacy and adoption, sex tourists, and unmarried heterosexual partners.

The sociology of sexual citizenship emerged out of the political and intellectual hiatus of this period. It did so through two perspectives which, despite common and complementary elements, differ markedly in their basic conceptualizations. Both agree that citizenship rights are not "natural" and inalienable," but forged out of social activities built into notions of community and identity. Their disagreements hinge on the always vexed relationship between dominant power structures and actor sovereignty, disputes over the extent to which dominant political and economic forms have become increasingly

compromised, and the state's adaptive capacity to sustain fundamental heterosexist patriarchal principles and practices of citizenship despite ostensibly making "liberal" concessions, by enforcing differential forms of unequal and partial sexual citizenship.

Though not always using the term, Plummer (1992, 2003), Giddens (1992), and Weeks (1998) explore alternative "pure" and "intimate" forms of sexual citizenship, outside the civil, political, and social dimensions of convention. In contrast, Evans (1993) concentrates on a materialist exploration of the inherent heterosexism of conventional citizenship, and on the increasingly overt sociosexual consequences of late modern reformulations, and these analytical distinctions are reflected in their different political prognoses.

Plummer (1992) hailed the emergence of the "culture of sexual citizenship" out of the 1980s "uncertainty over politics": the rise and decline of the New Right, failure of socialism, the rise of new utopian social movements, etc. He asked: "where does the lesbian and gay politics which flourishes in the latter part of the twentieth century in the Western world sit in all this end of century change?" The tone is of optimism and empowerment of diverse sexual citizens beyond traditional formal citizenship control, enabling "a radical, pluralistic, democratic, contingent, participatory politics of human life choices and difference . . . in the making" (Plummer 2003). While older sexual minorities discoursed in terms of civil, political, and social rights, this new regime is distinguished by the emergence of a fourth citizenship dimension: intimate citizenship, manifest through new communities of discourse, sexual stories and identities, diverse alternative rights and responsibilities, pleasures, bodies, visibility, and relationships. "Such stories play a prominent role in understanding the workings of the political and moral life of late modern societies . . . and carry potential for the radical transformation of the social order" (Plummer 2003). This new "culture of sexual citizenship" is dependent on new cultural intermediaries (mass media, advertising, Internet technologies, markets for "symbolic goods," etc.), which facilitate "imagining," "vocalizing," and "invention" of identities and cultures of shared problems. Similarly, Giddens (1992) refers to the emergence of "pure relationships,"

sexual relationships based on equal vulnerability, mutual trust and respect, "relationships of social and economic equality." For Weeks (1998), the "sexual citizen" "could be anyone . . . (who) exists or . . . wants to come into being – because of the new primacy given to sexual subjectivity in the contemporary world.

In contrast to this culturalist emphasis, Evans (1993), drawing on similar symptoms of 1980s political crisis, concentrates on the crisis management of the late modern state to maintain its "moral" authority through reformulations of heteronormative citizenship to incorporate and depoliticize "competent" sexual and other "partial" citizens, through the extension of single issue "rights" (fetishized as "equal"), while using examples of sexual "incompetence" to reaffirm dominant heterosexist values. Given "disorganized" conditions, it is acknowledged that periodic crises in governance enable the emergence of intimate alternative claims on citizenship, but these in turn are defused through further citizenship readjustments. Thus, while for Plummer (1992) "'rights' campaigns around 'being gay' and 'lesbian' have had some remarkable payoffs in the western world . . . (in which) being gay and lesbian . . . has become a positive experience bringing no more problems than any other way of living and loving," for Evans such claims demonstrate how effectively bourgeois citizenship adapts and incorporates, as evidenced by the extent to which sexual political movements "now talk in the language of citizenship – rather than of liberation as in an earlier generation" (Richardson 2000). Thus, new forms of sexual citizenship, behind the rhetorical facade of "liberty" and "equality," provide the means whereby the state fragments, neutralizes, and distracts sexual dissidence to sustain and protect its own "moral authority" and the greater capitalist and heteronormative good.

Disagreements at the heart of both versions extend to a range of key structural and political elements. While sexual communities exist as central to the emergence and sustenance of intimate citizenship, for structuralists they are fetishized "communities," riven by internal divisions of class, ethnicity, age, and gender, etc. Numerous studies of the differential impact of HIV and AIDS on "the gay community" reveal deep inequalities between such constituencies and access to sexual health care, information, and

treatment. Uncritical references to “the gay community” thus in effect sustain the gay political dominance of white middle class males. Furthermore, “gay” media, advertising, and consumption of “symbolic goods” reflect not empowered intimate citizenship, but effective consumer exploitation and self regulatory cultural and structural ghettoization.

Despite these fundamental disagreements, ultimately these two approaches do provide complementary perspectives on the macro dynamic structuration of sexualities in late modernity, facilitating detailed comparative research and analysis, not only in sociology but in such cognate disciplines as political theory, geography, and social policy. The strengths of the paradigm are many: hitherto discrete sexualities are grounded in the same material conditions of disorganized capitalism; all aspects of conventionally desexualized citizenship rights and duties are revealed as heteronormatively discriminating between sexually differentiated populations; and perhaps most important of all, hegemonic heteronormativity itself, so often left as an all powerful but nebulous organizing principle, is revealed in all its concrete complexity, inconsistency, and duplicity.

Inevitably, areas of tension, uneven development, and omission remain. Culturalist perspectives can underemphasize or even ignore the importance of materialist influences on the construction of sexualities. Structuralism can be too reductionist and (given its primary focus on formal citizenship principles and processes) can give less attention to sexual constituencies ignored by the latter. Corrective responses have been forthcoming, however, with, for example, an expansive literature on distinctive forms of lesbian citizenship ranging from the gendered general (because all citizenship formulations ignore structural processes of gendered power) to the politically specific: “Why should we attempt to further rights within a system whose very operation depends on logic that defines lesbians as ‘deviant outsiders’ in order to confirm the ‘normality’ of heterosexuality?” (Jackson 1996–7).

Reference here to “further rights” highlights the need for sexual citizenship studies to resist fragmentation into specific “equal rights” such as “same sex marriage” and thus lose sight of the wider citizenship context. Same sex

marriage may initially be a dissident challenge, but it is the first step of incorporation into citizenship compliance with heteronormative standards of “husband”/“wife” gendered roles, “monogamy,” economic interdependence, and, however achieved, “parenthood,” which leaves the “dominant regime of truth” intact. Similarly, advocations of “queering” the state from within – in education, adoption, fostering, and health care, etc. – are effectively neutralized by institutional practice. Meanwhile, with the institutionalization of rights through the United Nations charter and the European Court of Human Rights, attention now moves to “transnational” arenas of sexual citizenship, in which, however, current evidence suggests, the “right to family life” still takes precedence over all others.

SEE ALSO: Capitalism; Citizenship; Gay and Lesbian Movement; Queer Theory; Sexual Identities

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sexual cultures in Africa

Suzanne Leclerc Madlala

Sexual cultures throughout the world comprise the socially and culturally created experience of human sexuality, including shared norms, values, beliefs, attitudes, and knowledges that shape and give meaning to behaviors related to sex. In Africa, a continent that is exceedingly diverse, patterns of sexual culture can be expected to exhibit considerable variation. In terms of religion, language, culture, topography, climate, economy, and governance, Africa presents a rich tapestry of distinctive ways of life. While Islamic cultures predominate in the semi tropical and desert regions north of the Sahara, extending southwards along both the east and west coasts, Christianity pervades in much of the forest and savannah regions south of the Sahara. Life in most all African societies today resonates with an infusion of traditions derived from these major religions plus more indigenous aspects of culture such as animism and matrilineal descent (western and central Africa), or ancestor honoring and patrilineal descent (eastern and southern Africa). The large cattle keeping pastoral societies of the east and south such as the Masai, Buganda, Shona, and Zulu present a stark contrast to the much smaller agricultural and foraging societies that inhabit the central rainforest belt. Africa is also home to the San people (often termed Bushmen), one of the world's longest surviving hunter gathering groups. Perhaps what is most common to all these societies is their rapid integration into national

cash economies and global networks of trade and industry. Modern scholarship on African sexual cultures gives recognition to the great diversity of Africa and seeks to accurately reflect this diversity through empirically grounded studies of people's experiences of sexuality.

As a specific area of academic inquiry, the study of African sexual cultures is fairly recent. In many of the early writings by western explorers, missionaries, colonial administrators, and academics, descriptions of particular aspects of sexual culture were most often alluded to with reference to marriage and kinship (e.g., Radcliffe Brown & Forde 1950). Thus, a major point of departure for modern scholars is the previous silencing of African subjectivity during the colonial encounter followed by the employment of tropes of excess, unrestrained carnality, irrationality, and violence when describing African sexuality. In addition to perpetuating negative stereotypes, much of the previous literature did little to portray the variegated nature of the African continent and its people. Thus, while studies by McClintock (1995), Stoler (2002), and Nagel (2003) have contributed much to our understanding of the intersections between African sexual cultures and the historic experience of oppression, erstwhile representations of a "hypersexed" African and persistent ignorance of the continent's diversity continue to dog the study of this important topic.

NEW DIMENSIONS

How are sex and sexuality played out, performed, constituted, interrogated, and reconfigured in the context of a modernizing Africa? How have the legacies of colonialism, Christianity, Islam, and apartheid as well as the ongoing effects of poverty, civil war, and racism contributed to the construction of sexual cultures and the norms that guide sexual relations? What is the impact of globalization on sexual identities and people's ideas and behaviors related to sex? These are amongst the most significant questions guiding contemporary studies of African sexual cultures. A major approach to the topic involves the application of modern theoretical frameworks such as gender and "queer" theory to issues that have long been of interest to scholars of African culture more generally, for

example bridewealth, wife inheritance, polygamy, and customary systems of power and authority. Of recent significance is a collection of works dedicated to exploring sexuality in the context of Africa edited by Signe Arnfred (2004) entitled *Rethinking African Sexualities*. Various contributors to this volume explore a range of contemporary sexualities and the multiple ways in which they are being addressed. Included is work by Haram that examines the meanings that women attach to “survival sex,” which involves having children with several men and maintaining sexual relationships with them as a way to meet their own and their children’s material needs. Using the term “polyandrous motherhood” (as theorized by Guyer in the mid 1990s), Haram raises a perennial question of the applicability and universality of western derived notions such as prostitution.

Of particular theoretical importance to the study of African sexual cultures are two opposing arguments. Firstly, that traditional African arrangements of sexuality and gender have allowed for a far richer diversity than is suggested by western terms of sexual identity; and secondly, that traditional African morality did not allow for sexualities beyond heterosexuality. Lending support to the first argument are scholars such as Amadiume (1987), Teunis (1996), Murray and Roscoe (1998), and more recently Tamale (2003) and Wieringa (2005). Teunis’s description of the *gordjiguene* of Senegal, literally translated as man woman, reveals a long acceptance of “feminine” men who have sex with other men and today are referred to as homosexual. For the *gordjiguene* the label of homosexual is too limited and misleading. There is a way of life that betrays a certain institutionalized bisexuality with the concurrent maintenance of heterosexual identity. Blackwood and Wieringa (1999) have reported similar examples of flexible sexualities from across the continent. Others, such as Zimbabwean President Robert Mugabe, continue to argue that homosexuality and anything other than peno-vaginal intercourse are the imported practices of western decadence and inherently “un-African.” Yet, ongoing research consistently suggests otherwise. What appears to be a long history of cultural tolerance for multifarious and unfixed sexualities is currently at odds in

many African states with conservative public discourses and “denialism” about alternative sexualities. According to Reddy (2004), this discordant situation encourages homophobia and the silencing of local voices on matters of sex. While modern constitutional laws in many African countries provide for freedom of expression and protection from sexual discrimination, present day same sex relationships are often denounced and not uncommonly subject to acts of violence. Political sensitivities around issues related to sex are doubtless a factor in both the paucity of African scholars writing about sexual cultures and a result of that same paucity. Increased participation by African scholars in the study of and reporting on the continent’s sexual cultures should help to obviate some of the prevailing inconsistencies, stereotypes, and sexual prejudices that currently exist.

AIDS AND DEMOCRACY

The entrenchment of the HIV/AIDS pandemic and the consolidation of democratic systems across the continent over the past few decades have given a certain urgency to the topic of sexual cultures and have informed the nature of much recent research. Work by Schoeph (1991), Ankomah (1992), Caldwell et al. (1992), McGrath et al. (1993), and Orubuloye et al. (1993) amongst others defined a subfield of African studies in gender and AIDS during the early phases of the pandemic. Analyzing how hegemonic sexual cultures tend to lend support for various forms of sexual discrimination, or how such cultures (especially those where marriage customarily entails a large bridewealth) tend to subordinate women and contribute to their vulnerability to HIV infection, emerged as crucial areas of study in the 1990s. Ongoing debates around practices such as female circumcision which persists in many African Islamic societies continue to point up the tensions between tradition and modern democratic notions of gender and sexual rights (Shell Duncan & Hemlund 2000). A recent collection of work edited by Ouzgane and Morrell entitled *African Masculinities* (2005) highlights the need for more research on social constructions of manliness and the role these play in the

production of sexual cultures. A contribution here by Silberschmidt demonstrates how shrinking employment opportunities for East African men in the past two decades, accelerated by structural adjustment programs, have eroded men's ability to be breadwinners and contributed to increased violence toward women and multipartnered casual sex. These behaviors in turn have had, and continue to have, a direct bearing on the consistently high rates of HIV/AIDS in that part of the world. Morgan and Wieringa's (2005) work on female same sex practices addresses the issue of applying universal norms of freedom, human rights, and sexual identity to societies with very different social and cultural structures from those which produced dominant constructs such as "gay" or "lesbian." These authors consider the institutionalized practice of women marriages amongst groups where the continuity of the patrilineage and royal statuses are of prime concern. In these societies (reported to be customary in some 40 African societies), women paid bridewealth for another woman who was expected to bear children as heirs to the bloodline of the female husband. While various scholars have suggested different sociological reasons for women marriages in Africa (e.g., Herskovits 1937; Amadiume 1987), it is only recently that scholars such as Morgan and Wieringa (2005) have attempted to discern elements of sexual attraction or other qualities that would invoke a western understanding of lesbianism.

GLOBALIZATION

According to Altman (2001), a leading scholar on the impact of globalization on sexual cultures, many non western societies including those in Africa can expect to see the rapid emergence of new "hybridities," that is, where old forms of acting out sexuality increasingly coexist with new imported identities. Amongst younger, better educated, and more urbanized African women, there is an emerging lesbian identity with links to global movements and networks. In societies long familiar with customs such as women marriage, a major dimension of current research involves discerning the extent, if any, new globalized forms of sexuality are rooted or shaped by past local practices.

The sexual cultures of all human societies are based on complex norms, values, and moral codes. Traditionally in many African societies, notions of respect, restraint, and avoidance were key notions related to sexual behavior. As African societies have become more modernized and increasingly subjected to the forces of globalization with greater exposure to foreign media, traditional ways of regulating sexuality have declined while new forms of sexual behavior and norms have arisen. In South Africa for example, the practice of older age mates instructing youth on how to avoid pregnancies through the use of non penetrative "thigh sex" known as *ukumetsha* amongst the Xhosa and *uku soma* amongst the Zulu virtually disappeared by the 1950s with increasing Christianization and rapid urbanization (Delius & Glaser 2002). Scholars have argued that contemporary patterns of sexual culture in Africa that often include multipartnered casual sex, high levels of sexual violence, teenage pregnancy, and HIV/AIDS are not so much a result of traditional permissiveness as a result of the breakdown of traditional norms and regulations surrounding sex (e.g., Standing & Kisekka 1989; Ahlberg 1994). Reflecting on the rapid pace of change in the developing world, Altman (2001) reminds us that for many people sexual desire coexists with a "desire for modernity," that is, a desire to be part of the affluence and freedom associated with images of the rich world. With reference to Africa, Leclerc Madlala (2003) suggests that one way to understand contemporary practices of "transactional sex" or sex for gifts exchanges is as an "updated" version of "survival sex," with the new pressures of consumerism having replaced the former pressures of survival in communities with growing wealth and growing wealth disparities.

As the study of African sexual cultures expands, there is an increasing awareness of the need for more sensitive, ethically sound, and accurate methodologies for collecting data on one of the most private and complex of all human behaviors. The future direction of study on this topic will be shaped by efforts to develop these methodologies along with theories that more accurately explain the linkages between sexual behaviors and the economic, material, social, cultural, and political forces that are active in the environment. With increasing intellectual input by African scholars, it is likely

that there will emerge more Afrocentric perspectives to challenge not only dominant discourses and current interpretations of sexual desire and performance, but also the structural conditions that play a role in promoting sexual practices that have dire consequences in the context of AIDS. In many ways we are just beginning to gain knowledge on the vast array of sexual cultures and subcultures in Africa; those that once existed, those that currently exist, and those that are still in the making.

SEE ALSO: AIDS, Sociology of; Apartheid and Nelson Mandela; Essentialism and Constructionism; Female Genital Mutilation; Globalization, Sexuality and; Islamic Sexual Culture; Kinship; Postmodern Sexualities; Prostitution; Religions, African; Same Sex Marriage/Civic Unions; Sexual Practices; Transgender, Transvestism, and Transsexualism

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sexual cultures in Asia

Travis S. K. Kong

Sexual cultures in Asia refer to the ways of sexual life – the shared beliefs, values, meanings, and practices – that are common to members of Asian societies.

The sexual cultures of a society refer to its sexual belief systems, usually stemming from folktales, myths, and religions, which provide a framework for what we should think and how we should feel and behave in terms of sexuality. These sexual belief systems in turn give impetus to the forming of a hierarchy of sexual value systems that define what is sexually right or wrong, normal or pathological, honorable or shameful. Sexual belief and value systems, governed by sexual norms and manifested in customs and laws, are shared meanings and practices that are common to different segments of a society and historical periods. Different sexual cultures exist within a society and change over time.

Sexual cultures in Asia refer to many different and somewhat conflicting sexual value systems, as Asia is not a unified entity but a collective term that refers to many countries with divergent and even contradictory social, cultural, economic, and political values and systems.

Studies on sexuality are relatively a new area in sociology. Studies of Asian sexuality have been limited as sociologists have focused overwhelmingly on Anglo European countries. As anthropologists have the tradition of studying “other” cultures (with the earliest studies having been based mainly on travel reports from missionaries, traders, and seamen), anthropological texts and ethnographic materials provide some discussion of non western sexuality. Early key scholars such as Bronislaw Malinowski, Ruth Benedict, and Margaret Mead touched upon the issues of gender and sexuality.

With the affirmation of gender and sexuality studies by feminists and gay and lesbian scholars, the rise of postcolonialism, and the growing force of Asian (diasporic) academics, studies on non western sexual cultures, including Asia, are now being taken seriously (e.g., Herdt 1997; Jackson & Cook 1999; Altman 2001; Ruth 2002). The scholars who carried out these studies tend to charge former scholars with being

Eurocentric, pointing to the fact that they exoticized/crotized the “other” and overemphasized such “differences” between Asian and European cultures as sexual “excess,” “promiscuity,” largely ritualized or visible homosexuality and transgenderism, and so forth. They also point out that the sex/gender system in Asia seems to be different from the systems found in Anglo European countries, in that terms such as male/female, man/woman, or masculine/feminine are not easily distinguished in Asia and are believed to be a modern invention, heavily influenced by western biological and medical discourses. Thus, studies of gender, sex, and sexuality in Asia tend to show a picture that does not necessarily reflect Anglo European knowledge.

Recent studies on modern sexual cultures in Asia, as part of studies on Asian cultures and modernity, usually focus on various factors such as colonial histories (if any), traditions and religions, the growing affluence of most Asian countries, and the (de)colonialization strategies of the states, which play crucial roles in shaping ideas about gender, sex, and sexuality and which liberate or regulate possible forms of sexual expression (e.g., on dating, romance, premarital sex, virginity, abortion, divorce, birth control, homosexuality, pornography, prostitution) under the whole process of globalization and decolonization. They also focus on how the emergence of new sexual identities, cultures, and communities simultaneously shapes and reshapes the social life of a particular country or even the global processes of change. Common features of Asian sexual cultures seem to be an interplay or coexistence of indigenous sexual traditions with post modern western aestheticism, rhetoric, and outlooks.

CHANGES IN MARRIAGE, LOVE, AND SEXUALITY

It is argued that traditional Asian sexual cultures were largely governed by patriarchic structures (rituals, religions, family) that legitimized the power of men (e.g., polygamy or a lineage structure organized around fathers and sons in China, South Korea, Japan) and marginalized women in various ways such as female infanticide (China, India), footbinding (China), chastity

(wife burning, *Sati*, in India; chastity shrines in China), reproduction, birth control, and so forth. This discourse of dominance seems to have been less prevalent in Southeast Asia (where women tended to attain a higher status) and has been challenged by other studies that emphasize the subversive power of females (e.g., chastity – abstaining from (re)marriage could be read as female control of sexuality, independence, or hidden lesbianism) (e.g., Ong & Peletz 1995; Manderson & Jolly 1997).

The modern capitalist era has witnessed a profound transformation in the spheres of sexuality and intimacy in Asia, whereby traditional sexual values and practices coexist with modern sexual thoughts of individualism and libertarianism.

The monogamous marriage that is based on personal choice, love, and fulfillment has gradually become the norm, overtaking the traditional arranged marriage which was based on social and economic considerations, although arranged marriages are still practiced in South Asian countries such as India, Pakistan, Bangladesh, and Sri Lanka. There is an increasing variety of traditional extended family patterns such as non marital cohabitation, voluntary childlessness, never married singlehood, stepfamilies, and single parenthood, which in turn might lead to problems in caring for the young, the old, and the sick.

Although the traditional gender split in which men are regarded as breadwinners and women as housewives is still maintained in poor countries or in poor/rural regions of a country (e.g., China, India), it has also been challenged as women have become better educated and have come to participate in the job market, especially in developed countries (e.g., Hong Kong, Singapore, Taiwan). Economic achievements and individualistic libertarian ideas have given women a large degree of freedom to create their sexual spaces. Sexual relations between men and women have shifted, and egalitarianism between the sexes seems to have emerged with regard to initiating sex, demanding sexual satisfaction including orgasms, and in patterns of marital, extramarital, and post marital sex.

The state still has strong control over issues involving sexuality (e.g., the one child policy in China), but there has been a liberalization in attitudes toward such issues as birth control,

abortion, divorce, premarital sex, cohabitation, and homosexuality. Sex and love are increasingly commercialized or commodified. Commercial establishments that facilitate sexual or intimate liaisons (e.g., bars and clubs, massage parlors, saunas, sex shops, dating services, prostitution, etc.) are abundant, which legitimates sex as a domain of pleasure in contrast with the family as the confined site for intimacy.

HOMOSEXUALITY

The dominant discourse describing modern Asian homosexuality tends to assume that most countries in Asia had a longstanding tradition of tolerating men who had desired other men (lesbianism has always been underrepresented). The stories of *yu tao* (the peach remainder) and *tuan hsiu* (the cut sleeve) were two famous euphemisms among the literati for male homosexuality (*nanse*, *nangfeng*) in Chinese history, dating back to as early as the Zhou period (1122?–256 BCE) (Hinsch 1990). Likewise, Buddhist monasteries and samurai societies (*Shudo*, a young samurai who is befriended by an older man) were believed to be centers for homosexual activities (*nanshoku*) in ancient Japan from the medieval period to the end of the nineteenth century (Leupp 1995).

Social or religious systems of thought such as Confucianism, Taoism, Buddhism, and Hinduism, which are prevalent in most Asian countries, are not concerned with the gender of sexual activity or the object of sexual desire, and thus do not strongly condemn homosexuality in the way that Abrahamic religions (e.g., Christianity) do. As a result, traditional Asian literature does not generally refer to same gender desire as an innate essence (indicating an identity) but rather as an action, tendency, or preference. Correspondingly, a man who engaged in homosexual acts did not cause much trouble so long as he conformed to or did not challenge the patriarchal family (lineage) structure (e.g., by getting married and bearing children). Homosociality, or same sex friendships, were largely condoned.

Civic religions and customs tend to encourage sexual and gender ambivalence. In some countries, the presence of a “third gender” is evident. For example, a *hijra* (in India) is a person who is

born biologically male or born with ambiguous genitalia but identifies himself as belonging to a "third sex," "neither man nor woman," although he usually picks up a female gender identity. Or in Thailand, a male to female transgendered person is called a *katheoy* (or lady boy). Likewise, *bakla* and *bantut* are terms referring to a transgendered person in the Philippines, with the corresponding terms being *banci* in Java and *maria* in Indonesia. The case of Asian homosexuality thus provides a new understanding of the debate over essentialism/constructionism that raged throughout the 1980s in the West.

This relatively tolerated homosexual tradition seemed to come to an end with the advent of modernity and colonialism. For example, homosexual activities in Hong Kong and India were tolerated prior to British colonization but then became a criminal act after the introduction of British laws and legal codes. While male homosexual acts were decriminalized in Hong Kong in 1991, India still has penal laws against homosexual acts.

The present situation regarding homosexual identity in Asia seems to be a mixture of state intervention (which can be reflected through penal sanctions against anal sex), large visible and commercial gay scenes (bars, clubs, saunas, etc.), annual gay pride walks or festivals (e.g., South Korea, Bangkok, Manila, Tokyo, Taipei, Phnom Penh, Nepal), and the rise of gay and lesbian organizations.

Countries that have laws penalizing homosexuality include India, Bangladesh, Pakistan, Sri Lanka, Nepal, Malaysia, and Singapore, while countries such as China, Taiwan, Hong Kong, Japan (some cities), South Korea, Thailand, Indonesia, and Cambodia have decriminalized homosexual acts. The legal status of homosexuality does not necessarily refer to a fair or positive attitude from the government. For example, although male homosexuality is not illegal in China, gay men and lesbians are easily arrested (and charged with hooliganism) and gay bars and clubs are frequently raided.

Studies tend to suggest that national political and cultural characteristics play a crucial role in the creation of modern gay and lesbian identities and in the development of national lesbian and gay movements (Adam et al. 1999). Although many modern Asian countries refer

to homosexuals as gays and lesbians, each country seems to have its own terms of reference. The creation of a new sexual self is not necessarily a repetition of the gay and lesbian liberation movement in the West. Non politicized identities and non political social interactions seem to be dominant in Asian countries. It seems that gay identities have been reconciled within a family oriented culture and that gay rights have been subsumed under the notion of social harmony. Coming out is not a common way of asserting one's gayness, and desires do not seem to be framed in terms of political interests. There has been a division between personal identity and community politics (e.g., Jackson 1995, on Thailand; Kong 2002, on Hong Kong; McLelland 2000, on Japan).

Moreover, the scale and activities of gay and lesbian organizations depend very much on their economic resources and the political situation in a specific country. Some of these organizations have been quite shortlived. Although gay and lesbian groups in Asia tend to be more inward looking and to focus on the building of identity, some (e.g., Hong Kong, Taiwan) take on a more visible and confrontational approach to fighting against discrimination and for human rights (e.g., same sex marriages).

Popular culture has, on the one hand, created a discourse about homosexuality that presents a biased or one dimensional image of gay men and lesbians (e.g., gay men as sissy fashion queens and lesbians as tough women). On the other hand, it has led to the making of many movies (e.g., *Wedding Banquet*, 1992; *Happy Together*, 1997; *Iron Ladies*, 2001; *Arisan!*, 2003) that directly address the issue of homosexual love, which can be seen from the various lesbian and gay film festivals that are held in Asia (e.g., Hong Kong, Thailand, Tokyo, the Philippines).

Recent studies have not just examined the dynamics between straight and gay communities, but have also discussed the diversity within the gay and lesbian communities, in which differences and marginalization can occur along the lines of gender, class, race, age, and body (Kong 2004), and the Internet as a new way for gay men and lesbians (especially young people and those who live in a homophobic Asian society) to identify one another through sexuality, language, and values (Berry et al. 2003).

THE SEX TRADE

The sex industry is an important economic sector in most countries of Asia. It not only provides sexual services to local people, but also attracts foreign tourists from western and nearby countries.

Sex work can broadly refer to any exchange of sex for money, with or without sexual contact, from striptease shows, live performances, peep shows, telephone sex, sex shops, pornography, and prostitution. Sex work in Asia takes many different forms, ranging from the "standard" forms such as street prostitution, brothels, saunas, and massage parlors to bars and nightclubs. Particular forms can also be found in certain countries. For example, in Taiwan betel nut beauties refer to young girls who dress in fancy clothes, sit in a glass booth, and sell betel nuts to lorry and truck drivers. Live shows in Thailand refer to women injecting objects in their vaginas. And in South Korea, Filipino women work in military bases.

In Asia, the legal status of prostitution varies from one country to another. For example, prostitution is illegal in Vietnam, Indonesia, Japan, and Korea, but not in Hong Kong, Macao, and Singapore (only legal in designated red light areas). However, the legality of prostitution does not necessarily mean that sex workers in those countries receive better treatment. For example, although prostitution is illegal in Japan, female sex workers are rarely prosecuted, while in Hong Kong, prostitution is legal but sex workers are usually arrested for committing other crimes (e.g., soliciting in a public place for "immoral" purposes). There are many loopholes in the law as well as different interpretations of the law which usually discriminate against workers rather than clients or other parties. The punishments for sex workers usually range from being put in jail (e.g., Indonesia), being forced to join labor camps (e.g., China), simply being punished by having to stand up for hours (e.g., Macao), being deported back to one's place of origin if the worker is a foreigner, and/or being fined (Zi Teng & AMRC 2001).

Women who engage in prostitution should be seen not as a unified entity but as a highly stratified group of women whose life experiences vary greatly according to their income, the amount of control and autonomy they have

over their work, their impact on the community, and so on. These women differ in age, education, marital status, race, and ethnicity.

The overwhelming reason why women enter prostitution seems to be economic, i.e., they simply need money for their own survival, for their parents and/or their own families, to help their siblings to pay tuition fees, to pay debts that may have been incurred by misfortunes in the family or by a husband addicted to drugs or gambling, and so forth. However, studies also show that some of these women also use prostitution as a way to escape from their families, from unhappy marriages, abusive husbands, and to gain sexual pleasure, economic freedom, and independence. Moreover, there are many women who are forced to engage in prostitution (e.g., women who have been trafficked or under age girls who are beaten up, raped, and locked up by pimps and/or owners of brothels), but there are also women who choose to work in prostitution (e.g., Wang 2002; Ho 2003). This reflects the feminist debate on prostitution, which centers around the issue of the sexual victim (e.g., Catharine MacKinnon, Andrea Dworkin) versus the sexual agent (e.g., Annie Sprinkle, Pat Califia) with the focal point being choice, consent, and autonomy (see Chapkis 1997).

Child prostitution and the trafficking of children and/or women have received a great deal of attention from academics as well as policy makers. Mobility is a salient feature of the sex industry in Asia which can occur internally (from rural areas to big cities) or externally (to other countries). The sex industry in most Asian countries is a mixture of local and transient migrant workers, forming a "circuit of desire." Although sex workers suffer from many forms of legal discrimination and societal prejudice, a large scale, visible, and confrontational labor movement is rare. A notable example is when the Taiwanese government decided to abolish licensed sex workers in 1997, and sex workers and supporters protested for days.

Male prostitution is understudied in both Anglo European and Asian countries (Aggleton 1999). Male prostitution also takes many different forms such as hustling in public places, working in bars and clubs and in massage parlors, and providing escort services. Male prostitution complicates the debate on prostitution:

male prostitution (serving women) challenges that it is the woman – as a customer – who holds economic power and pays for her own pleasure. Male prostitution (serving men) poses a greater challenge as it recognizes the inequalities among members of the same gender, reinforces the logic of desire and consumption, and upsets the egalitarian ideal of the gay liberation movement (Kong 2005).

HIV/AIDS

HIV/AIDS has spread in Asia in diverse ways. It seems to be most extensive in Cambodia, Myanmar, Thailand, and parts of India, while there has been a sharp increase in China, Indonesia, Nepal, and Vietnam; although Bangladesh, Laos, and the Philippines have reported some of the lowest HIV rates in the world. As Asia comprises nearly 60 percent of the world's population, the epidemic in Asia has huge implications for the globe (www.unaids.org).

In contrast to Africa, where the major route of transmission is through casual heterosexual relationships, the key risk populations in Asia include drug users who inject drugs, men who have sex with men, sex workers and their clients, and the immediate sexual partners of these three populations. In Asia, the HIV epidemic has tended to be multiple and interrelated in nature. For example, drug users might make use of commercial sex services or even sell sex, sex workers may use drugs, and men who have sex with men may also visit female sex workers.

Tackling HIV/AIDS seems to be an urgent issue for most governments, but the problem is difficult to combat as it is not just a medical disease but a social problem involving issues of social stigma, morality, and control. Although ignorance or lack of knowledge might be a significant reason for HIV infection especially in poor countries, sexual cultures and values seem to be far more important in influencing safer sex practices than the transmission of information or even the availability of condoms.

For example, drug users who inject drugs play an important role in the spread of the virus in many countries (e.g., China, Vietnam, and Malaysia). However, in certain parts of China, drug users have been known to deliberately inject infected blood into themselves in order

to avoid being admitted to reeducation centers for drug users. Men who have sex with men (MSM) are a largely ignored group in certain countries (e.g., India, China) that do not officially recognize the existence of such people. Most sex workers might be serious about using condoms with their clients but are ambivalent about using them with their non paid affective partners, with whom they might not be in a monogamous relationship. Unprotected penetrative sex in the context of an affective relationship has a significant symbolic meaning for sex workers.

SEE ALSO: AIDS, Sociology of; Coming Out/Closets; Drag Queens and Drag Kings; Essentialism and Constructionism; Globalization, Sexuality and; Homosexuality; Postmodern Sexualities; Prostitution; Safer Sex; Same Sex Marriage/Civic Unions; Sexual Identities; Sex Tourism; Sexual Identities; Sexual Practices; Transgender, Transvestism and Transsexualism

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sexual cultures in Latin America

Salvador Vidal Ortiz

A definition of “sexual cultures in Latin America” necessarily rests on a series of assumptions that need to be unpacked, thereby offering productive ways of thinking about what “sexual cultures in Latin America” means – and how to empirically engage with them in related research. First, the notion of “Latin America” is based on the disparate unification of many

countries (from the rest of the Americas) through a perceived cultural homogeneity that ignores language variability, rival historical relations, economic and political differences, and national distinctions (including nationalistic discourses of difference between many of these countries). As well, Latin Americanist and ethnographic scholars debate what fits within the notion of “Latin America,” since there are often a variety of linguistic, geographic, and political reasons given in such scholarship to exclude or include nations or regions, as exemplified by the challenges in placing or excluding countries like Puerto Rico, Brazil, Spain, the English speaking Caribbean, and even the Southern cone.

The second assumption is that using “Latin American” negates the relationship between Latin Americans in Latin America, Latin Americans in the US, and US Latinos, and it inherently erases racialization processes for those that migrate to the US. Third, like any other definitions containing the word “culture,” it presupposes anthropological colonization strategies that situate such culture in oppositional frameworks. And last, the framing of “sexual cultures” in Latin America (often meaning “not here”) presupposes a distinction between some of the theoretical frameworks through which social scientists understand culture and regions all over the world, which is often using the US as a referent. Views of gender and sexuality systems that are not US or western based tend to be labeled as premodern (Decena 2004), without in turn exploring how in US or western contexts alternative ways of looking at the gender/sexuality relationship are taking place within these borders, whether by Latinos or *United States* alike. Linked to this last assumption is a bias: framing sexual cultures, like any other framing of cultural elements, has the potential to foreground a culturalist argument that hides political economic relations between countries and regions in other parts of the world facing similar relations to that of “Latin American” countries – a key example is the Pacific Islands and their relationship to US militarization and colonialism to countries like Puerto Rico (Vidal Ortiz 2004). As well, it ignores how the US is as much a Latin American region as any other country, given the demographics of US society.

These assumptions notwithstanding, the available social science literature today does provide several crucial issues inherent in this scholarship's currency. Issues like how sex, gender, and sexuality are conceptualized in "Latin America," HIV/AIDS (Carrillo 2002), sex tourism (Cantú 2002), the impact of Latin Americans' migration to the US (and the migration back and forth between rural and urban contexts in Latin American countries, and between those countries and the US) (Decena 2004; Peña 2005), ideas about bisexuality in Latin American culture (Cantú 1999), and heterosexual sexuality research discussions (González López 2005) are important and central to such scholarship. For reasons of space, the discussion here focuses only on the sex/gender system implicit in Latin American studies (including masculinity and sexuality studies), sex tourism, and finally migration and sexuality.

SEX/GENDER AND POWER

Most of the "sexual cultures" scholarship in Latin American societies engages the relationship between sex(uality) and gender, namely, the assumption that links gendered expectations to that of oppositional sexual acts and identifications (Almaguer 1993; Guzmán 2006). Almaguer (1993) argued that unlike western countries, where sexuality and gender are distinct aspects of the "self" enacted through different vectors, in Mexico, and by extension Mexican families and in other Latin American countries, the distinction of gender and sexuality has been notoriously marked by an understanding of the (male) actors' positioning in sexual activity. Succinctly, a heterosexual man is still considered such in the event of having sex with another man, if he is the *activo*, relegating the homosexual stigma to the penetrated, or *pasivo* person (see also Lancaster 1992; Carrier 1995; Murray 1995). It has been this system, linked as it is to the inequalities faced by women, that many scholars have discussed as *machismo* in Latin American societies. Further sociological and anthropological writings have expanded and contested Almaguer's work, stating how this is simplifying Anglo sexualities, noting how sexual identity and sexual behavior do not have to be congruent (Cantú 2002), that this typology ignores the

mutual influence of migration (Carrier 1995), and that indeed partial sexual identities emerge out of this *activo/pasivo* notion, and are "part and parcel of the culture itself" (Guzmán 1997: 217), and not merely an incision or segment of political movements.

Specific anthropological research has tackled the question of how sexuality and gender apply to other countries, regions, or different configurations of culture, such as *travestis* in Brazil (Kulick 1998). Kulick notes that research before his looked at homosexual roles in Latin America, and such research has perceived a relationship to sexuality and gender, but, he qualifies, has mistakenly conflated sex and gender, thus not theorizing those links to cultural understandings of the interplay of sexuality, gender, and sex. As Guzmán (1997) and Kulick (1998) have both argued (in the US and in Brazil), the "man/non man" categorization of sexuality and gender offers us possibilities to reconceptualize the relationship between sexuality and gender, sexual desire, and notions of sexual actors in gendered terms. (Using this "man/non man" categorization helps understand the relationship of homosexual men and all women into what may be understood as "sexual minorities.") Research by these two scholars has suggested that the "man/non man" categorization through terms such as *mayate*, *bugarrón*, *loca*, or *travestí* offer possibilities to reconceptualize the relationship between sexuality and gender.

In addition, as Guzmán (2006) has recently suggested, racial difference might be interpreted in the US as different sexual identificatory practices among "Latin American" "sexual minorities." Notions of "Latin American" identities are often used as a foundation to "racially" distinguish between North Americans and "Latin Americans." (Even though "Latinos" are ethnicized in US society, these frameworks create a difference in racialized terms [Urciuoli 1996], as will be seen in the sex tourism section.) As recently discussed by Lancaster (2005), this difference of *homology* (fusing the sexual activity of men with men into a homosexual identity, supposedly common in US society) and *heterology* (a consideration not only of the sexual actors, but also of the acts themselves and how those are read in gendered ways, credited to Latin Americans) is then discussed as "sexual culture." While these differences are "intriguing"

anthropologically speaking, if we are not careful, we are only one step away from claiming them as oppositional to those of US culture, reifying the meaning of culture altogether.

Taking this literature in general, comparisons between Latin America and the US indicate that these sexualities and sexual cultures are more complex than previously argued. As well, the relationship between sex and gender as theorized until now greatly misses women, and lesbians in particular (for a recent, refreshing exception offering a great history of lesbian organizing in Latin America, refer to Mogrovejo 2005), and, to a lesser extent, transgender, transsexual, and *travesti* Latin Americans in Latin America or the US.

SEX TOURISM

Sexual tourism feeds into this US/Latin American opposition often posed by social scientists. Countries like Cuba, Puerto Rico, Mexico, Panama, Colombia, the Dominican Republic, and Brazil are considered sex tourist destinations by foreigners (Perlongher 1999; La Fountain Stokes 2002; Hill 2004). This sex tourism exists in great part due to local economic needs and individual obligations to one's family. Herein the issue of seeking, for instance, gay male tourists by non self identified gay men is recurrent in the literature. (While there is limitation to migrate outside of these Latin American countries, Parker 1999 and Agustín 2003 have discussed the migration of Latin American sex workers to Europe.)

Because of notions of hypersexualized "Latin American" women and men, many of these destinations flourish in terms of their local supply of sex workers. And because many of these countries have a hybrid racial classification (and offer various African, Asian, and indigenous phenotypical readings of race), often a sexualized racialization takes place where those tourists have an idea of racial difference that is highly eroticized. Add to that mix the reading of heterosexually identified men who have sex with men and there is a significant system of sexual racial difference that feeds in those oppositions – both by the tourists and by the locals. Another significant element is the international debt in

which many of these countries are involved, and the often lower socioeconomic and educational status of sex workers, forcing a serious class distinction to exist between a European or US tourist whose money will be exchanged and the cost of a sex worker that will be a fraction of the type of escort and sex work services in many US cities (see Perlongher 1999; Hill 2004).

SEXUAL MIGRATION AND SEXUAL IDENTITY

In social scientific literature, terms like *sexual migration* (see, e.g., Carrillo 2004) help us to understand the seemingly strong pool of "sexual minorities" that come to the US for support and a space that presumably is missing in their Latin American country of origin. This notion of sexual migration, however, begins in the US. "Canonical" works on "gay and lesbian" migration have argued for the formation of such enclaves as a departure from an oppressive home to a more open space where communities have formed (D'Emilio 1983; Rubin 1993 [1984]). An assumed rupture from one's family of origin was the basis for massive migratory patterns that created "gay cities" all over the US. Rubin's and D'Emilio's work has been critiqued for its inability to address the supposedly "better" place – the urban center (Cantú 1999; Decena 2004; Guzmán 2006). This sexual migration has also been discussed internationally – in this particular case, Latin America – where it depends on linearly articulated ideas of oppression of "gays" that migrate from rural to urban places, and it uses the notion of a Latin American tight familial control as its axis. Decena, for instance, in his work on Dominican homosexual men and migration, brings out the capitalist tendencies of such scholarship in opposing a "gay" identity and lack of familial ties when he states that: "the sexually liberated capital is exciting and attractive because it allows one to break away from the bonds of patriarchal family relations" (2004: 4). Cantú's work is also helpful: he signaled that a similar "urban" migration to that of gays and lesbians of European descent was taking place, by homosexual Mexican men – in his research,

from Mexico to metropolitan areas in Southern California. Cantú troubles the relationship between political economy and culturalist arguments by asking: "If the literature on the social construction of a Western gay identity is correct in linking sexual identities to capitalist development, then why should our understanding of sexual identities in the 'developing world' give primacy to culture and divorce it from political economy?" (2002: 141). His answer is that among US scholars, and specifically in the anthropological literature cited by Almaguer, "culture became the mechanism that reified difference and reproduced the imagined distance of 'the others' in academic discourse itself." Additional answers to these questions are also being currently produced by a number of academic scholars.

Other terms have furthered this notion of migration caused by sexual oppression; in particular, the concept of the *sexile* (coined by Guzmán 1997) serves us well in recognizing the trajectory of "sexual minorities" who have left their countries of origin *because of* their sexuality and/or atypical gendered behavior. "Sexual migration" and "sexile" both indicate an interplay between culture, sexual agency, identity, and transnational flows, but say little about the economic and social characteristics of life in Latin American society, or the reasons for seeking to move to the US (or Europe for that matter – see, e.g., Pichardo Galán 2003). Even though it may seem logical to think that most migration by "sexual minorities" from Latin America involves travel to the US because of their sexual identity, no evidence can support this as a central reason for migrating. Instead, economic factors continue to be a leading reason for the migration of "sexual minorities" (see, e.g., Cantú 1999). To complicate matters somewhat, whereas in US social movements and identity politics the lesbian, gay, bisexual, and transgender (LGBT) acronym is representative of different, if related, "sexual minorities," scholars and lay folk outside such a community (and outside the US) might simply locate all within the same category: *gay*. Whatever "gay" means, it often means "non man," where man is understood as heterosexual and with a particular (hegemonic) masculinity. We see an increasing exportation of human rights based on

neatly defined categories in the advocacy for political asylum for gay, lesbian, bisexual, and transgender identified people (refer to the work by Cantú 2005; Miller 2005; Randazzo 2005), partly in order to sustain a dichotomy that establishes the US as a more developed and accepting society.

CONCLUSION

Unfortunately, sexuality research tends to focus on Mexico, and then attempts are made to generalize such findings to the rest of Latin America. In addition, the abundant research on gender/sexuality and race conducted in Brazil focusing on *travestis* (Kulick 1998) and sex/gender and masculinities (Parker 1999) is often utilized to compare Latino US based populations to Latin American ones. This is, we have been told, because in the "American" imaginary, "Latin Americans" are simply just like each other. But perhaps that perception actually covers another one: some groups under that "Latino" or "Latin American" umbrella are much more exotic, or those sexualities are labeled much more based on gender constructs in premodern societies, or inadvertently converted into sexual machines, in some places than others. Thus this sexualized racialization is selective in terms of how gendered it is: some may see people from countries such as Brazil as ultra masculine and heterosexually identified, and simultaneously see men from Mexico as smaller and more feminized. Sexual desire may follow the racialization at hand. In this sense, "Latin American" itself is a construct that does no justice to the sexual variability within those countries – nor to the consumption of those sexual actors in "Latin America." Instead of oppositional cultural arrangements where "Latin American" is simply read culturally – not in terms of racialization – a newer analysis may hold a conversation with such scientific frameworks and force them to acknowledge alternative analyses besides binary systems.

SEE ALSO: Culture; Feminist Activism in Latin America; Globalization, Sexuality and; Hegemonic Masculinity; Sex and Gender; Sex Tourism; Sexual Identities; Sexual Practices; Transgender, Transvestism, and Transsexualism

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sexual cultures in Russia

Dan Healey

Russia's hybrid condition, combining European and Asian geography, cultures, and histories, makes it a complex national tradition to study, and sexuality in Russia reflects that complexity. At the same time, the country's often violent historical experience and its significant divergence from the familiar currents of European religious, cultural, and intellectual life have marked Russian approaches to sexuality.

The leading religion of the Great Russian ethnic majority is the Russian Orthodox faith, and this church's conception of sexuality was inherited from Byzantium during Christianization in the tenth century. Orthodoxy distinguished itself from western Christianity by an extremely ascetic view of human sexuality, denying the sanctity of sexual intercourse even between married partners, and hailing celibate marriage as the purest form of conjugal life. Proclaimed frequently, but seldom adhered to, the wholesale rejection of (or call to sublimation of) sexuality is an enduring feature of Russian intellectual life, characteristic of thinkers as diverse as Leo Tolstoy and Vladimir Lenin. If sexuality was to be suppressed for the benefit of the soul in the opinion of generations of Orthodox confessors and sermon writers, by the nineteenth century radicals and socialists believed the energy diverted from sexuality could be channeled into political action.

Until Stalin's first Five Year Plan (declared fulfilled in four years, 1928–32), about 80 percent of Russian society consisted of peasants. Peasant sexual culture had both Christian and pre-Christian elements, a reflection of the weak influence of Orthodoxy in a vast and poor country. Thus the Orthodox wedding ceremony and

all its rituals formed a key stage in the lives of virtually all peasants, yet the courtship rituals that led up to it encouraged sexual intimacy with prospective partners and even with the wider peer group. Information about sex might be suppressed in formal public speech, especially religious discourse, but peasants shared jokes, songs, and limericks (*chastushki*) that gave the genitals ribald personalities and celebrated the comedy and pathos of human sexuality. Obscene, sex-themed speech in elaborate and linguistically productive formulations (a sublanguage of Russian known as *mat*) offered young men the opportunity to entertain peers and compete for attention while establishing their masculine credentials. Crude prints (*lubki*) and chap books recording sexual images and stories were in circulation by the early nineteenth century, Russia's peasant version of the beginnings of a modern pornography.

Scholarly study of Russian sexuality began in the second half of the nineteenth century with medical, legal, and ethnographic works. Inquiry focused on peasant customs and legal concepts regarding marriage and the family, on the medicolegal understanding of sexual crime, and on the medical policing of legalized prostitution. Gynecologists defining sexual maturity conducted massive surveys of the onset of first menstruation in various ethnic groups. Doctors investigated and deplored the early marriage patterns of the "primitive" peoples of Imperial Russia's south and eastern periphery, an internal Orient.

Nihilists and socialists developed a stringent critique of Russian middle class mores, supposedly derivative of Western European bourgeois capitalist values. An alternative tradition of "fictional marriage" (to liberate intelligentsia women from oppressive parents), of "free love" (unchained from property and religion), and a demanding cult of sublimation for the good of the coming revolution grew up. Jealousy in personal relations was seen as petty bourgeois selfishness. These values were projected by gentry and middle class intellectuals on to a romanticized "politically conscious" proletariat. Liberals absorbed much of this alternative tradition and added to it with a focus on the emancipation of women from legal and professional restraints, and campaigns to end regulated prostitution.

Most public discussion about sexuality, until the 1905 Revolution brought an end to censorship, took place in the form of literary fiction. Tolstoy's story of adultery and murder, "Kreutzer Sonata" (1891), set the pattern: a tale initially banned by the censor circulated in educated society and aroused passionate debate about the nature of sexuality inside and beyond marriage. After 1905 an explosion of discourse about sexualities erupted. Sexological terminology acquired extensive purchase on public consciousness, and not only in the urban, educated population, as cheap novels and newspapers proliferated and a commercial leisure culture used sensational sexual themes to sell publications. Soviet commentators later viewed the era from 1905 to 1917 as a "decadent" period when quickening capitalism animated a deplorably sexualized bourgeois public culture. It was a moment when new voices emerged: Mikhail A. Kuzmin's *Wings* (1906) celebrated a young man's acceptance of his homosexuality in an unapologetically optimistic key that was unique in European literature, and Lidiia Zinov'eva Annibal's *Thirty Three Monsters* (1907) explicitly portrayed lesbian love, albeit with less optimism and more French inspired "decadent" gloom. Mikhail Artsybashev's bleak novel of ideas, *Sanin* (1907), depicted a generation disillusioned by the failed revolution and turning instead to predatory sexuality. Russia's emerging cinema explored sexual themes with enthusiasm, especially in the films of Evgenii Bauer. The year 1905 also accelerated the development of scholarly sexology in Russia, with surveys of student sexual behavior (especially that of Moscow medical expert M. A. Chlenov, published in 1909), psychiatric theorizing about the origins of perversion, and a deepening commitment to sexual "enlightenment" among educators in military and civilian life.

Between 1914 and 1921, war, revolution, and civil war brought death, famine, and violence that disrupted family ties, sent 2 million "bourgeois" Russians into emigration, and established the world's first anti capitalist state, Soviet Russia (later united with republics on the old imperial periphery as the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, 1922). Revolutionary Bolshevik (communist) legislation secularizing marriage and greatly relaxing divorce (1918, 1926), legalizing abortion on demand

(1920), and decriminalizing sodomy (1922, 1926) seemed to fulfill the radical dream of love unchained from constraints of religion, property, and petty bourgeois prejudice. A People's Commissariat (ministry) of Health was inaugurated, with Bolshevik physician Nikolai Semashko at its head. As the key state patron of medical research, he encouraged the development of a socialist sexology under the revealing rubric of "social hygiene." Sexological knowledge would serve the building of socialism by offering scientific solutions to humanity's most perplexing difficulties. Such nostrums were hailed internationally by reformers like Germany's Magnus Hirschfeld; communist parties in Europe and elsewhere paraded their sex radicalism as a component of the march to social revolution. Official prescriptions at home, however, favored a profoundly rationalist program of sublimation, deferral, and sexual enlightenment that owed much to the pre-revolutionary radical credo putting politics before the personal.

Nevertheless, during the mixed economy era of the New Economic Policy (1921–8), Semashko was by no means the sole manager of sexual discourse. Private doctors published sex advice pamphlets, hot headed Communist Party youth and women's leaders debated the meaning of sexual revolution avidly, psychiatrists and criminologists explored some of Soviet society's sexual underworlds, and literature and cinema continued to probe the "accursed questions" of sexual life in a revolutionary setting. The Bolsheviks' chief exponent of radical sexual revolution, Aleksandra Kollontai, published theoretical and literary portraits of the new sexual freedom and its positive and negative consequences. Non party novelists succeeded in publishing gritty fiction about the sex problem that aroused consternation in the conservative ruling elite. "Free love" became a tag that acquired a negative, "petty bourgeois" political value, often tied to oppositionist inclinations more generally. Leader of the Communist Party Vladimir Lenin branded the so called "glass of water theory" (the notion that under socialism sexual desire would be slaked as easily and naturally as thirst) "antisocial" and "un Marxist." Sexual atrocities later in the 1920s aroused revulsion at the persistent street level attitude that women who refused sexual favors were

indulging in “petty bourgeois” prejudices; the rape of a young student by a gang of “conscious” workers and young communists in Leningrad in 1926 was Russia’s first modern sex scandal. In the face of the negative consequences of sexual revolution, communists, the inheritors of Russia’s nineteenth century radical ethos, continued to preach restraint for the good of the cause and a scientific approach to all sexual activity, while calling for increasingly stern punishment for irresponsible sexual behavior.

The roots of a Stalinist approach to sexual questions thus predated Joseph Stalin’s consolidation of power (1929) and the launch of the first Five Year Plans. The 1930s saw the end of any remaining state sponsorship for sexual radicalism. Official attempts to articulate a sexual value system emphasizing stability of heterosexual family relations and parental responsibility for offspring gathered pace during the decade. Male–male sexual relations were recriminalized in 1934, apparently in response to secret police observation of male prostitution and fears that the “caste like nature” of homosexual circles would facilitate espionage. The Party made conservative, patriarchal pronouncements about the psychology of married life, a topic previously evaded as unworthy of ideologists’ attention. As war approached, the regime worried about the birthrate and banned abortion in 1936, while divorce was simultaneously made much less accessible. Birth control devices were removed from sale by a secret decree. Literature and cinema, now under the ideological control of “socialist realism,” promoted fecundity and made a striking attempt to revive feminine makeup and hairstyles, fashion and allure, all previously marked as “degenerate” and “capitalist” but now revalued as appropriate for a prosperous socialist way of life. Science was starved of funds to investigate what ought to come naturally in a well organized socialist society; thus sexological studies came to a virtual standstill, not to be revived until Stalin’s death in 1953.

The Great Patriotic War (1941–5) resulted in the loss of 27 million Soviet lives, and an enduring gender imbalance, with 10 percent more women than men in the population well into the 1960s. After the war as soldiers returned from the front, sexually transmitted disease was a major concern. The abortion ban was

proving difficult to enforce as restive doctors argued behind closed doors against having to denounce women who tried to terminate their own pregnancies. Measures to increase the birthrate included a “bachelor tax” on less prolific couples and unmarried persons of fertile age. Censorship made sexual topics even more taboo than they had been in the 1930s. Pent up expectations for reform, the pressures of reconstruction and famine (1946–7), and worker migration in search of better working conditions regardless of the state penalties fueled a volatile social context. Stalin’s successors legalized abortion on demand in 1955 and opened public debate on the “sexual question” (marriage, women’s roles at home and at work, morality, sex education). Ruler Nikita Khrushchev’s housing reforms gave the majority of urban households a flat with its own front door, an innovation that increased privacy and created intimate settings for the development of both officially approved domestic heterosexual monogamy and less orthodox arrangements.

Research on sexuality in the late Soviet era was characterized by a plumbing and mechanics functionality that evaded questions of psychology, tabooed pleasure as a goal in itself, and confined the study of sex to branches of gynecology, urology, and endocrinology. The discipline of “sexual pathology” (*seksopatologĭia*) acquired independent status by promising medical fixes for technical problems (frigidity, infertility, impotence). As Igor Kon explains, there was no need for a Soviet sexology since mature socialism provided the material conditions in which nature was free to assert an unproblematic heterosexual normality; only the abnormal, the deviant, and the perverse needed scientific attention. Medical or sociological interest in “normal” sexuality was regarded in academic circles as prurient and unsound. Much of the Soviet trained medical and academic establishment retains this view, and even today sex counselors in the Russian Federation call themselves “*seksopatologi*,” i.e., sexual pathologists.

Despite this rather bleak picture, less orthodox approaches to sexuality appeared in the “era of stagnation” (1965–85) associated with the rule of Leonid Brezhnev. Freudian psychology made a limited revival after half a century of official suppression. Some jurists called for the decriminalization of sodomy, citing examples

from the socialist satellite regimes. Neuroendocrinologist Aron Belkin, the father of the Soviet sex change operation, began working on transsexual patients in his Moscow clinic. He also began “correcting” the sex of intersex patients, who often journeyed from the far corners of the Soviet Union seeking help. His work was greatly influenced by developments not only in socialist countries but also in the US and other capitalist states. Attention to the diverse international sources of sexological knowledge was also evident in the sexual pathology textbooks of G. S. Vasilchenko (1977, 1983). During Mikhail Gorbachev’s reforming tenure (1985–91) and the collapse of communist rule, even more liberal approaches to the study of sexuality emerged. The leader of this tendency was and remains Igor Kon, a member of the Russian Academy of Sciences, whose training was not as a “*seksopatolog*” but in philosophy and sociology. Kon’s work has promoted ideas that remain very much at odds with the medical mainstream: Scandinavian style sex education, an acceptance of teenage sexuality as normal and healthy (a view denied by vociferous Russian experts in a host of disciplines), a relaxed attitude toward same sex relations, and a view of human sexuality predicated on the individual’s rights rather than on the demands of the nation state.

Beyond medicine, Russian sexuality studies have developed impressively in history, sociology, and other humanistic disciplines long suppressed or distorted by Marxist–Leninist ideology. The Boris Yeltsin Russian presidency (1991–9) saw the establishment of new liberal universities and the adaptation of some older ones to liberal humanist scholarly traditions. The opening of previously sequestered library and archival collections resulted in a wave of new publications of documents, reprints of pre-revolutionary monographs, and new studies of tabooed topics like pornography and swearing. Natalia Pushkareva’s (1999) work on medieval Russian sexual culture, A. L. Toporkov’s (1995, 1996) document collections of Russian erotic folklore and essay collection on pornography (with M. Levitt 1991) demonstrate how historians of sexuality are freer to explore the topic and to collaborate with foreign Russianists as well. There has been a mini boom in gay and lesbian historical studies, of varying quality; the

most influential single work is an anecdotal guide to the gay history of St. Petersburg by a curator under the pseudonym Konstantin K. Rotikov (1998). Prostitution under tsar and commissar has found its historians.

Sociological explorations of contemporary sexualities are well advanced, and apply methodologies previously impossible for Soviet academic researchers, such as interviews about intimate relations, and discourse analysis of sexual memoirs and of the mass media. A noteworthy trend has been the rapid translation of canonical feminist and queer texts into Russian and their reflection, adaptation, and rejection in the work of a generation of younger scholars. Two monographs on hazing culture and sexuality in the Russian army (2002, 2003) show that even this conservative national institution cannot resist scrutiny of its sexual secrets; in fact, these studies hint at a return to a pre-revolutionary tendency for the tsarist army to license the new sexological discourses of the late nineteenth century to resolve problems of cadet education. Recent collections of essays from the European University of St. Petersburg (2001, 2002) demonstrate the range of work typical of post-Soviet sociology with its exploration of the Soviet legacy of “official and unofficial norms” of sexual culture, of youth sexuality, of sexuality among disabled people, of women’s alienation from their bodies and from pleasure, and of methodological dilemmas associated with the study of sexuality. The most ambitious critical work shows a healthy skepticism for models received from canonical western texts and a questioning of the ways in which they might be applied to Russia’s specific historical and social experience. While politically a conservative nationalism remains on the ascendant and the sexual liberalization associated with Igor Kon and the Yeltsin years is in the shade, academic studies of sexuality are likely to prosper if only because a large cohort of energetic scholars now work in this field in Russia’s universities.

SEE ALSO: Globalization, Sexuality and; Hirschfeld, Magnus; Intersexuality; Marx, Karl; Revolutions; Sexual Identities; Sexual Politics; Sexuality and the Law; Sexuality Research: History; Transgender, Transvestism, and Transsexualism

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sexual cultures in Scandinavia

Jan Lofstrom

Scandinavia as a social and cultural entity comprises the Nordic countries – Denmark, Sweden, Norway, Iceland, and Finland – plus the autonomous territories of Greenland and the Faroe Islands, which belong to Denmark, and the Åland Islands, which are part of Finland. The social and cultural distinctions of the countries notwithstanding, it is often justified to consider them in aggregate. For example, in terms of prevailing values and ideals the Nordic societies are more secularized and less traditional than most other western societies, and values pertaining to “self expression” (tolerance, post materialist values, etc.) are also relatively speaking very prominent in Nordic societies (Inglehart & Baker 2000). This has a bearing on various issues of sexual life and sexual norms.

The Nordic countries have often been regarded as in the global vanguard in endorsing and promoting gender equality and progressive sexual politics. There are good grounds for this view, though it is clear also that in the Nordic countries a lot of work still remains to be done on these issues. They have also been seen as paradigmatic welfare states, where the public power (state, municipality) provides extensive public social security schemes plus education and health care services to the citizens on a universalist basis. The liberalist critique argues that the Nordic style welfare state has intruded too much into citizens' private lives, but the counter argument has been that the interventions of public power can be conducive to the sociopsychological well being of individual citizens, including the delicate area of sexuality.

One of the outcomes of the Nordic welfare state ideology has been women's improved access to social and economic independence. This, naturally, also impinges on the form that sexual cultures have in these societies. From a global perspective the women in Scandinavia have been well represented in politics, higher education, and full time paid labor. The reasons for this are varied and include for example

the cultural notions of gender that have accommodated the idea of female active subjectivity. These notions are a legacy of a rural cultural mode that survived in Finland and in Norway for example well into the twentieth century. Women's large scale participation in paid labor entails a degree of economic independence from male breadwinners, be they husbands or kinsmen; thus it is likely to support also female sexual subjectivity. Moreover, welfare state policies such as provision of extensive child daycare and parental leave have also often aimed to help women be better able to combine motherhood and career. This applies to single mothers in particular, whose poverty rate has been low in global comparison, largely because of a supportive social policy which indicates an absence of social stigma for single mothers.

Like single motherhood, cohabitation, abortion, and divorce generally lack any social stigma in contemporary Nordic societies. Pre-marital sex is not an issue and a clear majority of people choose to live in a marriage like arrangement before they marry – if they marry at all. Living as a single has become all the more common in the last 10–15 years, and also in these cases it is mostly taken for granted that the single (if not a senior citizen) has long term or casual intimate relations. The divorce rate is fairly high, but divorce is often followed by a new marriage or cohabitation and it does not usually entail public opprobrium or other social costs. Some may deplore this as a “decline of the family,” but in fact family like formations clearly still have a strong appeal – it is only that they have become highly varied (e.g., registered partnerships). This can be seen as a vindication of the late modern pure relationships that Anthony Giddens outlined in *The Transformations of Intimacy* (1992): the norm of unbreakable marital ties has faded, in Scandinavia perhaps more than elsewhere in the West. The safety nets provided by the welfare state have probably made it more feasible for individuals (women in particular) to discontinue unsatisfying relationships and to consider, for example, cohabiting or single parenting as real options in life. It is also worth emphasizing that – the reality of frequent divorces and “serial monogamy” notwithstanding – the ideal of lifelong relationships has endured in younger

generations, and marital fidelity may now rank somewhat higher than a few decades ago as an ideal.

In the Nordic welfare state ideology there has often been at least an implicit equation between individual citizens' sexual health and national well being. The memorandum that a state committee prepared on “questions of sexuality” in Sweden in 1936 put it very clearly: in modern society sexuality would serve not only as a spring of personal pleasure, but would also propel the progress of society generally. The memorandum embodies the kind of ideal of social engineering that Sweden has often been considered to exemplify, but which has also existed in the other Nordic welfare state regimes – the ideal of a society designed according to rationalist scientific principles for the good of all citizens. The aspiration to benign social engineering has been visible, for example, in family planning and in sexual education.

One of the key texts in shaping the policy of family planning in Scandinavia (and also more widely) is the 1934 *Kris i befolkningsfrågan* (Crisis in the Population Issue) by the Swedish social scientists Alva and Gunnar Myrdal. In the long run this positive interest in issues of procreation and sexuality has generated arrangements like the provision of public marital advice services and sex education in schools. Indeed, institutionalized sex education has been one of the hallmarks of Nordic sexual politics, compulsory sex education being often part of the school curriculum. Here as well the aim has been to promote the social sexual health of individuals and society in tandem, recognizing that children mature sexually at an earlier age than before. Against the argument that extensive sex education is an invitation to early sexual experimentation, the Nordic experience rather suggests that professional sex education, including information on contraception, is conducive to adolescent sexual health and well being (e.g., there are comparatively low rates of teenage pregnancy and abortion). There are, however, distinctions between the Nordic countries that modify this picture and would need to be explained in more detail; for example, in Norway, the rate of teenage abortions has been much higher than elsewhere in Scandinavia.

Issues of contraception, sex education, and adolescent sexuality and abortion have thus been of little concern in Nordic societies in the last few decades. Likewise, both attitudes and legislation regarding the sexual content of films and other cultural products are very liberal. Pornography is easily available to (adult) consumers, the major exception being child pornography, which is banned by law. This overall sexual permissiveness notwithstanding, there has been discussion on the potential problems of pornography and prostitution from the perspective of gender equality, most notably in Sweden where there is in fact a law (since 1999) against sex purchase (i.e., buying sexual services). The rationale is that prostitution might be best curtailed by way of reducing demand for it. The efficacy of the law can not yet be assessed.

The status of sexual minorities, most notably homosexuals, is often considered to be one of the hallmarks of Nordic sexual liberalism. In fact, homosexual relations were decriminalized in some European states in the nineteenth century, whereas the first Nordic countries to take that step were Denmark–Iceland (1930) and Sweden (1944), whereas Finland (1971) and Norway (1972) followed much later. In the last 20–30 years, however, Nordic societies have been at the forefront of expanding institutional rights for gays and lesbians, for example in legislating against discrimination on sexual grounds and in introducing registered partnership laws (“gay marriages”). The laws on registered partnership conferred on lesbian and gay couples a legal status similar to that of married and cohabiting heterosexual couples, with the exception of not being allowed to adopt children. Parental rights remained a differential line between “first class” and “second class” citizens when heterosexual and non heterosexual life styles in other respects were set on equal terms in civil law. However, this difference has partly disappeared in more recent legislation (e.g., in Sweden since 2003). The registered partnership laws seem to show that the “modern homosexual” has lost most symbolic power as the paradigmatic social misfit, yet it would be an overstatement to say that gays and lesbians – and transsexuals – are always treated on an equal basis in everyday encounters. One can argue that the early introduction of partnership laws in the Nordic countries was an offspring of the welfare

state doctrine of social equality, rather than any “gay friendly” sentiments as such. It is noteworthy that some gay and lesbian critics have regarded the partnership laws as a token gesture that opens up the empty institution of marriage to homosexuals and allows them to be as ordinary as straight people, whereas the heterosexual patterns of lifestyle and intimate relations have become similar to what used to be the modern homosexual form of existence, as sociologist Henning Bech has called it.

The Nordic countries have been ethnically, linguistically, and religiously homogeneous societies until recently; it was in the 1960s that Denmark and Sweden began to receive greater numbers of non European immigrants, and in Norway and Finland similar developments have taken place even more recently. The ensuing cultural diversity has also entailed an increasing variety of sexual cultures in society, and on some occasions the cultural distinctions have resulted in frictions. The pattern of gender relations and male and female social roles in Scandinavian societies may often look bewildering not only to non- but also to western observers, and the norms and practices of family arrangements and sex relations in the migrant groups sometimes stand in stark contrast to those prevailing in Nordic cultures. Such differences are present in any multicultural society of course, but what is perhaps characteristic of Nordic societies is that historically there is a powerful thrust toward cultural assimilation that does not easily allow much space to sub-cultural communities and cultural enclaves. Whether we speak of migrants or lesbians and gays, it is also a demographic fact that Scandinavian societies are small in population. Consequently, any “subgroups” within society are also small; hence, the preconditions for discrete sexual (sub)cultures are limited from the outset.

SEE ALSO: Globalization, Sexuality and; Same Sex Marriage/Civil Unions; Sexual Citizenship; Sexual Identities; Sexual Politics; Sexual Practices

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sexual deviance

Richard Temksbury

Sexual deviance, and what is defined as sexually deviant, is culturally and historically specific. This concept refers to behaviors that involve individuals seeking erotic gratification through means that are considered odd, different, or unacceptable to either most or influential persons in one's community. As with most forms of deviance, sexual deviance is something that is defined differently by persons of different backgrounds, beliefs, morals, and locations. However, sexual deviance is also an idea about which most persons hold very strong views, and react in stigmatizing and ostracizing ways.

Sexual deviance is a term that refers to behavior that has a sexual aspect to it and is considered a violation of either general societal norms or the expectations and/or limits of behavior for specific cultural settings. Defining some sexually oriented behavior as deviant means that the action meets at least one (or a combination) of four criteria: (1) degree of consent, (2) the nature of the persons/objects involved in the action, (3) the actual action and body parts involved, or (4) the setting in

which the behavior is performed. Generally speaking, sexual behavior that is not fully consensual by all persons involved is considered deviant. Rape and exhibitionism (where the persons to whom sexual images are presented are unwilling recipients) are obvious examples of sexual deviance defined by degree of consent. Sexual behavior with children, animals, or "odd" objects (vegetables, firearms, kitchen appliances, etc.) would be considered deviant by most people because such persons and objects are not generally considered sexual. When we speak of sexual deviance based on the action or body parts involved as the defining elements we could think of individuals who receive sexual gratification from violence, setting fires, wearing opposite gender clothing, or even for some people, masturbation. This category would also include sexual acts that include body parts not typically considered sexual, such as individuals' feet, ears, or noses. Finally, some settings, such as a courtroom, church, or an open field in a public park would be thought of by most people as inappropriate for sexual activities. Therefore, sexual acts performed in these locations (regardless of how "normal" the acts may be) would be considered deviant, simply because of where they were performed.

It is important to keep in mind that sexual deviance, as with all types of deviance, is not usually something that is inherently "wrong." Instead, sexual deviance is so determined by one of two approaches, both based on social conditions. The easier to see of these two approaches is the idea of statistical definitions. This means that sexual behaviors in which only a minority of persons engages would be considered deviant. In this view, behaviors in which a majority of persons participate would be normative, and those actions that only a "few" people do would be "different" (i.e., deviant). A more purely sociological approach to defining sexual deviance is to focus on the ways that society members react and respond to particular acts. In this approach, when others learn of an individual's sexual activities with farm animals and react by showing their distaste for the act and stigmatization of the persons involved, we know that sex with farm animals is considered deviant.

Sexual deviance includes behaviors that are deemed to be violations of all degrees of social

norms. Some sexually deviant behavior is a violation of only regular social expectations/norms. This would include premarital sex, sexual activities performed on one's desk at work, or perhaps the exchange of money for sexual acts. Other forms of sexual deviance would be considered violations of social mores; a more is a strong social norm that is usually considered to carry with it a moral aspect. Examples of sexual deviance that violate morally infused, strong social norms would be sexual activities between a supervisor and an employee when the employee is told their job may depend on their "consent," homosexual activities, and the exchange of sexual behavior for illegal drugs. Taboos are our strongest form of social norms and indicate activities that are so extreme that people may have a hard time even imagining that such actions ever occur. Sexual deviance that is a violation of social taboos might include sex with children, sex in a church, or sexually sadistic acts where individuals are forced to endure humiliation, extreme pain, or serious injury/death.

What this clearly points to is the fact that it can be difficult at times to define what is and is not sexual deviance. Individuals have different moral standards based on different cultures and subcultures that may vary in their views of acceptable and unacceptable sexual behaviors, and whether one has/does participate in certain activities will also influence their views and definitions. From the examples given above, it is easy to see that while we may refer to the exchange of sexual acts for money or drugs as deviant, clearly a significant number of persons do such actions. And many such persons do not necessarily see their actions as "deviant." Others with strong moral and religious beliefs might say sexual activities between same sex persons are wrong (and therefore deviant). However, many other persons (both those who do and do not engage in same sex sexual activities) do not hold moral or religious objections to such actions. Similarly, some people may believe that it is wrong to engage in sexual acts with persons to whom they are not legally married, while others may in fact believe that it is acceptable, important, or even imperative to become sexually experienced and skilled prior to marrying. This example can be clearly seen

in the beliefs and practices of many tribal societies where individuals are expected to enter into marriage with a high level of sexual skill/experience. Other cultures, obviously, do not condone such approaches.

And, finally, it is also important to recognize that definitions (and responses to) sexual deviance may change and vary over time. Consider, for example, the widespread changes in definitions of sexual deviance in the last fifty years. In the mid twentieth century issues such as premarital sex, homosexuality, oral genital contact, and even masturbation were considered extremely deviant, and rarely spoken of. Today, television shows, popular magazines, the Internet, and many persons' everyday conversations are filled with graphic, humorous, and clearly endorsing references to such previously "deviant" forms of sexual behavior. Or some acts that at one point in time may have been considered normative and expected may evolve to being seen as deviant. A good example here is the idea of marital rape. For most of known history, at least in western societies, wives were not viewed as having the right or ability to say no to sexual advances/requests from their husbands. A man who desired to have sex with his wife could, and often did, force her to do sexual acts. However, as an outgrowth of the feminist movement in the mid to late twentieth century, such actions have come to be viewed as wrong, and in many jurisdictions even illegal. Historical shifts occur in both directions, moving some acts out of the category of deviance and shifting others toward a designation as deviant.

Research documenting and explaining sexual deviance is something that is not overly abundant. Most of the research related to sexual deviance has come from the psychological or psychiatric perspectives. This body of research takes for granted that the behaviors and actors being studied are deviant, and seeks to identify both a cause/motivator for the behavior, and ways to intervene and either control or eliminate the behavior. In part, this can be explained by the fact that psychologists and psychiatrists tend to conduct their research with individuals who are either in therapy/treatment seeking to change their behaviors or who have been compelled to participate in therapy/treatment (often

as a result of legal processing). Sociological research on sexual deviance is available, but is not as numerous or readily available as that coming from psychologists and psychiatrists. Sociologists, with a focus on understanding the experiences, supporting social structures, and both contributing factors and experienced consequences of sexual deviance, tend to conduct their research with participants in sexual deviance in the free world, often in the environments where the sexual deviance is performed. Sociologists are less inclined than many psychologists and psychiatrists to study sexual deviance because the qualitative nature of such work takes the researcher to places they may not wish to frequent. As a result, many sociologists – even those who specialize in the study of deviant behavior – choose not to do research on sexual deviance.

Speaking in a sociological sense, we can think of sexual deviance as constituting three main varieties of deviance: normal, sociological, and pathological. These designations, like those discussed above, are also fluid and can introduce controversy over where a particular type of behavior may best fit. However, as analytic tools, thinking of sexual deviance as normal, sociological, or pathological can help to better understand if/how, when, where, by whom, and even why certain aspects of sexual behavior are defined as deviant and others are not.

Normal sexual deviance is sexual behavior that is relatively common, although not something that is widely discussed, acknowledged, or admitted. In fact, according to statistical ways of defining deviance, many acts that would be considered normal sexual deviance would not be deviant – a majority of society members may in fact engage in some normal sexual deviance behaviors. Some types of normal sexual deviance may be viewed as positive by many/some people – such as abstinence – yet also be widely considered deviant. These tend to be behaviors that are individually based and do not have any type of supportive social structure or organization associated with them. This is a key factor distinguishing normal sexual deviance from that which is sociologically defined.

Sociological sexual deviance includes behaviors that violate some type of social norms, but is associated with some variety of social group, structure, or organization that endorses,

practices, encourages (at least for members), and therefore sustains activities. Pornography, prostitution, and swinging are examples of sociological sexual deviance. Each has recognizable groups and organizations (or corporations) that promote and keep the activity going. Sustaining the activity may mean active recruitment/marketing for new participants and social support for encouraging individuals already involved to remain involved.

Pathological forms of sexual deviance are those that come to mind most quickly and easily, and that would be likely to most easily produce widespread agreement about the deviance of the acts. Pathological sexual deviance is illegal in nature (usually) and is associated with imposing harm on others. The participants of this type of deviance are seen as psychologically challenged. Examples of pathological forms of sexual deviance include sexual violence, pedophilia, and incest.

Clearly, definitions of sexual deviance vary, and may include a wide range of behaviors. Sexual behavior is largely unknown, but when it is known and deemed deviant many forms of sexual deviance are likely to cause an individual to retreat into hiding. However, when “outed,” these individuals are likely to be stigmatized. Obviously, as a social construct, definitions of sexual deviance are powerful and important forces in the structure and process of social settings and groups.

SEE ALSO: Deviance; Pedophilia; Sadomasochism; Sexual Practices; Sexual Violence and Rape; Stigma

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sexual harassment

Kathrin Zippel

Sexual harassment refers to unwelcome sexual advances, requests for sexual favors, or other forms of unwanted attention of a sexual nature, in a workplace or elsewhere. Legal definitions distinguish between *quid pro quo* sexual harassment, where putting up with these behaviors is a condition of work, and behaviors that create an intimidating, offensive, hostile environment for the victim. Its forms can be physical, verbal, gestural, visual, or graphic. Behaviors that can be perceived as sexual harassment include unwelcome (sexual) jokes, remarks with sexual connotations or about private lives, gossip, repeated requests to go out, and any form of unwanted touching or invasion of personal space, as well as sexual advances or assault.

The overwhelming majority of victims are women; adolescent and young workers especially report sexual harassment experiences. Perpetrators are most often individual men or groups of men. Men, in particular those who are financially vulnerable, can experience sexual harassment as well (Uggen & Blackstone 2004). Same sex harassment has also received attention, in particular, gender and sexual harassment among men.

Besides consequences such as loss of a job or not being promoted, victims experience psychological effects. Reactions cover a range of emotional and physical responses, including confusion, discomfort, anxiety, anger, and stress. Cultural representations of sexual harassment, however, often suggest an innocent flirt gone wrong, or that victims "asked" for it by dress or behavior. These representations may depict victims as revengeful, tapping into cultural repertoires similar to those around sexual violence.

Empirical research on the prevalence of the phenomenon has faced several methodological difficulties, partly because of its conceptualization, since the experience of sexual harassment depends on contextual factors. It usually includes related behaviors and several events, and hence is a dynamic or process rather than an isolated occurrence. Surveys have been

conducted using the Sexual Experiences Questionnaire (SEQ) developed by Louise Fitzgerald and her colleagues; however, these studies tend to rely on self reports, which raises the problem of subjective versus objective measures, including underreporting.

In the 1970s, second wave feminists in the US criticized the social, legal, and cultural norms of behaviors and organizational practices concerning men's sexual advances toward women and the unwanted eroticization and sexualization of relationships in the workplace and elsewhere. Feminists questioned the conditions under which women "consent" to these behaviors in the context of unequal power relations.

While US law has defined sexual harassment primarily as discrimination based on sex at work and in education, sexual harassment also occurs between people in other hierarchical positions, for example, in the unequal power relationships between doctor and patient, psychologist and client, landlord and tenant, or between colleagues/peers.

Feminist theories view sexual harassment primarily as rooted in unequal gender relations and the abuse of power of men over women. Sexual harassment is the product of a gender system that maintains a dominant, (hetero)normative form of masculinity. In this view, sexual harassment is a problem because of different "sex roles," or assumptions about male sexual aggression and female passivity, that spill over into the workplace.

Organizational theories view sexual harassment as a problem perpetuated through gendered organizational and institutional structures. For example, the occupational status of the victim and supervisory authority of the perpetrator influence the perceptions and interpretations of sexual harassment. Women's lower status at work, sex segregation, gender gaps in authority, and other organizational factors contribute to and are perpetuated by sexual harassment.

Sociolegal and political approaches explore the relationship between emerging sexual harassment laws and individual and societal perceptions, for example, by asking questions about legal consciousness, sensitivity to gender issues, and interpretations of sexual harassment.

The experiences, interpretations, and perceptions of sexual harassment vary not only

by gender but also by age, social class, and race. Research has recently begun to examine cross national differences in individual, organizational, social, political, and legal interpretations of sexual harassment. For example, in several European countries sexual harassment is considered in the context of bullying, mobbing, or moral harassment, as a violation of workers' dignity or a form of violence against women.

SEE ALSO: Femininities/Masculinities; Gendered Organizations/Institutions; Sex and Gender; Sex Panics; Sexual Politics; Sexual Violence and Rape; Sexuality and the Law

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sexual health

Laura M. Carpenter

Sexual health is both a lay expression and a technical term defined in national and international legal and public policy documents. As employed by social scientists, sexual health generally refers to a state of physical and emotional well being in which an individual enjoys freedom from sexually related disease, dysfunction, coercion, and shame, and thus the ability to enjoy and act on her or his sexual feelings.

The concept is widely used in the United States, Canada, Australia, Europe, and Latin America.

Although scholars and policymakers have treated sexuality as a public health issue since the mid 1800s, few sociologists explicitly used the expression "sexual health" to describe their work before the mid 1990s (many still do not). In fact, the formal definition of sexual health dates only to 1975, when the World Health Organization (WHO) convened an international panel of human sexuality experts for the purpose of addressing a perceived shortage of sexuality educators and research opportunities. At that time, the youth counterculture, second wave feminist, gay rights, and women's health movements were helping to transform understandings of gender, sexuality, and health in the West. Previously, reproductive health and sexual health had been treated as a single issue, with the emphasis on reproduction; the advent of highly effective contraceptives, along with increasing secularization and social acceptance of nonmarital sexuality in many societies, made a sharper distinction possible.

The 1975 WHO panel delineated the basic elements of sexual health as the "right to sexual information and . . . pleasure," the "capacity to . . . control sexual and reproductive behaviour," "freedom from . . . psychological factors inhibiting sexual response and . . . relationship," and "freedom from organic disorders, diseases, and deficiencies that interfere with sexual and reproductive functions." This definition bears the imprint of the WHO's 1946 definition of health as "a state of complete physical, mental, and social well being and not merely the absence of disease or infirmity." It represents a fundamentally social rather than strictly biomedical understanding of sexual health, going beyond a narrow focus on disease, physiology, and reproduction to consider the social contexts in which sexual feelings and activity occur.

Pleasure, agency, and freedom from physiological and psychological disorders have been central components of all subsequent major definitions of sexual health. These elements also appear in lay definitions, as when the (US) Boston Women's Health Collective's *New Our Bodies, Ourselves* (1984) glossed sexual health as "a physical and emotional state of well being that allows us to enjoy and act on our sexual feelings."

Definitions of sexual health have since evolved in response to broad social trends. In 1987, during a period marked by intense debate over social diversity and cultural relativism, the WHO Regional Office for Europe released a report (*Concepts on Sexual Health: Report on a Working Group*) contending that the culturally and temporally contingent nature of sexual health precluded a universal definition. The authors' concern that a single definition could be used to label some individuals or behaviors as unhealthy has informed subsequent definitions, which have recognized the importance of factors such as religion, age, disabilities, socioeconomic status, and sexual identity.

In the early 1990s an international coalition of women's health and development NGOs emerged as a major force in a series of population and development conferences sponsored by the United Nations. Coalition members were concerned with a broad range of issues related to sexuality, health, and human rights, including preventing mass rape and female genital mutilation (FGM) and ensuring women's ability to control their fertility, choice of partners, and sexual identity. The coalition succeeded in placing sexual health, framed as an aspect of reproductive health, on the international policy agenda and incorporating it into such documents as the 1994 International Conference of Population and Development (ICPD) Program of Action. The 1990s also saw a concerted effort to frame health as a human right and the development of the concept of sexual rights. Efforts to incorporate sexual health and sexual rights into international law and policy have consistently met with vigorous opposition by a Vatican led alliance of religious/moral conservative governments and organizations.

The exact relationship between sexual health, reproductive health, and sexual rights is contested. ICPD delegates found it politically expedient to categorize sexual health as an aspect of the less controversial reproductive health. Other influential reports, such as that produced by the 1995 (US) National Commission of Adolescent Sexual Health, treat reproductive health as a component of sexual health. Definitions of sexual rights typically include access to sexual and reproductive health care and sexuality education as well as sexual and reproductive autonomy, bodily integrity, and the pursuit of sexual

pleasure. The link between sexual health and sexual rights was made explicit in a 2000 joint report by the Pan American Health Organization (PAHO) and WHO (*Promotion of Sexual Health: Recommendations for Action*), written largely by Latin American sexologists: "Since protection of health is a basic human right, it follows that sexual health involves sexual rights." These widely publicized conferences contributed to a dramatic increase in the number of sociologists and demographers framing their research in terms of "sexual health."

In 2002, the WHO issued a revised definition of sexual health as "a state of physical, emotional, mental, and social well being related to sexuality . . . Sexual health requires a positive and respectful approach to sexuality and sexual relationships, as well as the possibility of having pleasurable and safe sexual experiences, free of coercion, discrimination, and violence." The task force further declared that the attainment of sexual health depended on having the "sexual rights of all persons . . . respected, protected, and fulfilled."

National governments have also sought to define and incorporate sexual health into public policy. In 1999 and 2001, respectively, the Canadian and US governments, prompted by a host of similar concerns – including population aging; increasing social diversity; health and social welfare system restructuring; new reproductive technologies; and "unacceptably high" levels of sexually transmitted infections (STIs), infertility, sexual violence, and teen pregnancy – issued reports addressing sexual health. Health Canada's *Report from Consultations on a Framework for Sexual and Reproductive Health* and the US Surgeon General David Satcher's *The Surgeon General's Call to Action to Promote Sexual Health and Responsible Sexual Behavior* both explicitly acknowledged the importance of sexual health to children and older adults (previous definitions imply reproductive age adults) and stressed the need for sexual responsibility at the individual and community levels (the latter referring to ensuring community members' access to sexuality education and health services and freedom from discrimination and violence). By contrast, a 2001 report from the British Department of Health (*National Strategy for Sexual Health and HIV*), produced as part of a wider health

system reform initiative, construed sexual health in relatively narrow terms, reiterating the basic tenets of previous definitions, but focusing chiefly on reproductive issues and the prevention of HIV/STIs and unintended pregnancy, and avoiding reference to responsibility and pleasure. That said, the British framework resembles its Canadian counterpart in treating sexual health as a fundamental human right, whereas the US guidelines tend to frame it as an individual choice – a difference consistent with broader cultural tendencies.

The social trends that have influenced definitions of sexual health have also shaped the nature of sociological research. Historically, due to prevailing codes of morality, beliefs about the purpose of sex, and understandings of social problems, most studies of sexual health topics focused on married couples of reproductive age or heterosexual adolescents (whose sexuality is presumed to be problematic). Furthermore, although definitions of sexual health are nominally gender neutral, in practice the bulk of research on sexual health has centered on women – largely due to the physiology of pregnancy, gendered assumptions about family responsibilities, and the sexual double standard. For much of the twentieth century, studies tended to focus either on white middle class people – typically cast as paragons of health and normalcy – or on economically disadvantaged people and/or members of racial/ethnic minorities, frequently framed as deviant or unhealthy. Study populations have become increasingly socially diverse since the 1970s, with scholars paying more attention to the effects of intersecting identities from the 1990s onward.

Despite the broad range of issues encompassed by leading definitions of sexual health, in practice, the vast majority of academic research on the topic focuses on STIs (including HIV/AIDS) and reproductive health. In developed nations, male and female sexual dysfunction are also common subjects; in the developing world, FGM and sexual violence are frequently studied. Researchers' preoccupation with the negative aspects of sexual health may stem from worldwide cultural and political difficulties in agreeing on a common definition of positive sexual health. With the advent of globalization, sociologists interested in sexual health have

become increasingly aware of the need for a global approach to many sexual health issues, such as the relationship of global sex tourism to STI transmission.

Early sociological work on sexual health topics was generally motivated by concern with family and population dynamics. Approaches to many issues changed markedly starting in the 1970s, as second wave feminism gave rise to new understandings of sexuality and gender, inspired the increasingly global women's health movement, and influenced two generations of feminist sociologists to direct attention to gender, sexuality, and bodies. From the 1930s onward, sociologists studied "sexual adjustment" – encompassing compatibility in sexual desire, preferred activities, and frigidity/impotence – as an aspect of "marital adjustment" or emotional well being in marriage. The term "sexual adjustment" has largely fallen out of favor, and studies now consider these issues among same sex and cohabiting couples and attend more closely to power and gendered expectations. Sociology's rich tradition of research on reproductive health and politics likewise began to cover new territory in the 1970s, especially the critical policy issues of childbirth, episiotomy, abortion rights, and menopause. Feminists, along with gay rights activists, have also helped to direct scholarly attention to stranger, acquaintance, and marital rape and rape culture, as well as sexuality related hate crimes.

As scholarly interest in masculinity expanded from the 1990s onward, researchers have increasingly recognized the importance of attending to men's sexual health, beyond sexual dysfunction, both in its own right and in terms of its effects on female and male partners. Major foci to date include men's role in reproduction and birth control, STI transmission, male infertility, and sexual violence.

Gay rights activism, the increasing visibility of lesbian/gay people, and an increasing number of openly lesbian/gay sociologists have also influenced sexual health research agendas. Prior to the 1974 removal of homosexuality from the American Psychiatric Association's *DSM III*, sexual desire for and contact with same sex partners was largely studied as a sign of mental illness. Research addressing the relationship of sexual health to sexual identity/orientation has burgeoned since. The emergence of HIV/AIDS

in 1982 prompted extensive research on gay men's sexual health, albeit much of it narrowly focused on HIV/AIDS. Lesbians' sexual health has received less attention because lesbians have not been a major risk group for HIV; however, sociologists have recently begun to explore lesbian and bisexual women's use of sexual health services. Research on social factors affecting the transmission, prevention, and diagnosis of STIs other than HIV/AIDS has continued throughout this era, with several recent studies offering compelling analyses of the ways gender and race intersect to shape the experience of living with, and seeking treatment for, STIs.

The aging of western populations, along with the unprecedented growth and deregulation of the pharmaceutical industry that began in the 1990s, have prompted increasing attention to sexual health after the menopause/climacteric. Analyses of the social causes and effects of sexual dysfunction – an umbrella term including erectile dysfunction (formerly called impotence) and premature ejaculation in men and dyspareunia (painful intercourse), sexual aversion, and lack of desire in men and women (formerly called frigidity, in women) – have proliferated since the 1970s, due to new understandings of sexuality as essential to human happiness. From the late 1990s onward, researchers have charted the increasing medicalization of male and female sexual dysfunction and the pharmaceutical industry's role in setting research and treatment agendas. Over the same period, increasing scholarly interest in the lives of people with chronic illnesses and physical and mental disabilities has prompted a small but growing body of research on the sexual health of women and men with disabilities and/or chronic medical conditions.

Other aspects of sexual health examined by sociologists include:

- Sexual pleasure and desire, other than as related to dysfunction. Such research is relatively rare, especially among youth and people past reproductive age, and is seldom framed in terms of sexual health.
- Formal and informal sexuality education and the politics surrounding it. Comparisons of European and US approaches to sexual health education are especially interesting.
- The medical treatment of people born intersexed, especially genital surgery, as well as lay and medical opposition to that treatment.

Sociological studies of sexual health employ both quantitative and qualitative methods, with the former being somewhat more common, especially for issues deemed relevant to public health. By and large, research on sexual health is subject to the same methodological difficulties as research on sexuality in general (e.g., study participants' desire for privacy). However, the social and political climate in which scholars work may pose additional challenges. For example, since the late 1980s, conservative governments and grassroots organizations in the US and Britain have sought to impede and censor sexuality research by reducing and restricting funding and interfering in already funded projects. In fact, the increasing popularity of the term "sexual health" may reflect an attempt by researchers worldwide to circumvent conservative opposition, under the assumption that research on sexuality is more likely to be deemed justifiable if it concerns health. Sociopolitical factors may also affect the implementation of public policy grounded in social scientific research. In the US, for example, conservative presidential administrations have overseen the removal of accurate contraception information from official websites and the promotion of "only abstinence until marriage" sexual health education programs, despite evidence of their ineffectiveness. Policies in one nation may have global effects, as in the case of legislation forbidding international population programs that receive US funds from mentioning abortion.

SEE ALSO: AIDS, Sociology of; Family Planning, Abortion, and Reproductive Health; Female Genital Mutilation; New Reproductive Technologies; Safer Sex; Sex Education; Sexual Practices; Transnational and Global Feminisms; Viagra; Women's Health

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sexual identities

Ken Plummer

The term identity is derived from the Latin root *idem*, implying sameness and continuity, and helps to provide a sense of who we are and of who other people are. It serves as a crucial bridge in social life between human beings and wider cultures; it implies a sense of meaning and a sense of categorization and differentiation; and it marks out differences – between ourselves and others. The idea of identity speaks of locating a person within a personal and social category. It suggests answer to the question “who am I?” placing one’s self and life within a framework of past (what kind of person I was and how I became it), of present (of who I am now), and future (guiding the sense of who one will be and how one is different from others). Sexual and gendered identities help to locate people within sexual and gender cultural frameworks.

In some (usually more traditional) societies, identities are often assumed (they may be ascribed) and there is little debate about the nature of identities. Gender and sexuality may

be taken for granted as a given identity. In other societies (usually modern ones prone to individualism), just who one is becomes a greater problem, and there is much discussion on the nature, origins, and impact of different kinds of identities. Some suggest that identities are more or less fixed and given from within – they are essentialist. They serve as an inner core of who one is. Much of biological, psychological, and psychotherapeutic thought is of this kind. Others suggest that identities themselves are historically and socially contingent, and that they are hence socially constructed. In this latter sense, people have to invent who they are – there is no inner core. Much of Meadian interactionist thought is of this kind. The analysis of identities covers a wide range of concerns from gender and sexual identities to ethnic identities, from occupational to nationalistic identities. Very often there are “hierarchies of identity” with master identities becoming key and conflicts being developed between them.

In recent times, with the emergence of post modern culture, identities have increasingly come to be seen as highly unstable and precarious. For theorists like Anthony Giddens, Ulrich Beck, and Zygmunt Bauman, identities are destabilized and have to be worked at. Giddens, in his *Modernity and Self Identity* (1991), suggests that identity becomes part of a “politics of life style” which has emerged to ask “how should we live?” in a post traditional order and against the backdrop of existential questions. Lifestyle choice is increasingly important in the constitution of identity and daily activity. “Reflexively organized life planning becomes a central feature of the structuring of self identity” (Giddens 1991: 5); self identity is “the self as reflexively understood by the person in terms of her or his biography” (p. 53). For Bauman, “if the *modern* ‘problem of identity’ was how to construct an identity and keep it solid and stable, the *postmodern* ‘problem of identity’ is primarily how to avoid fixation and keep the options open” (1996: 18). Kenneth Gergen (1991) depicts a journey which he describes as “from the Romantic (via the Modern) to the Postmodern.” For him, the post modern means “the very concept of personal essences is thrown in doubt.” The source of this change is “the technologies of social saturation”

(low tech and hi tech), leading to a “multiphrenic condition” and new patterns of relationships (“fractional,” “microwave,” etc.). All of this could mean that lifestyle choices have to be made around gender (how to be a man, what kind of man, how to see oneself as a man), or as a sexual being (how to be gay, how to identify oneself, etc.).

LESBIAN AND GAY IDENTITY

Ever since its arrival in academia during the 1970s, lesbian and gay studies have been haunted by the identity problem (Plummer 1981). From early studies such as Carol Warren’s *Identity and Community in the Gay World* (1974) and Barbara Ponse’s *Identities in the Lesbian World* (1978), through Richard Troiden’s *Gay and Lesbian Identity* (1988) and William H. DuBay’s (neglected) *Gay Identity: The Self Under Ban* (1987), the themes of classification and identity have been extremely prominent. In the now voluminous and magisterial compendiums, textbooks, readers, and handbooks that have been reproduced for lesbian and gay studies, identity always plays a prominent part. And articles on the field continue to multiply, though nowadays usually with increasing complexity. Without doubt, it has consistently been one of the big themes for understanding “lesbian and gay lives” historically, comparatively, and contemporaneously.

Broadly, research on gay identity has highlighted six questions:

- 1 What is the nature of the lesbian and gay identity? – the essentialist/phenomenalist question.
- 2 How did the identity of lesbian and gay emerge? – the historical question.
- 3 How do people come to acquire the lesbian/gay identity? – the question of stages and processes.
- 4 How do people manage the lesbian and gay identity? – the coming out/outing/passing problem.
- 5 How is the identity changing?
- 6 What are the political uses of lesbian and gay identities? – which highlights the politics of identity and the issue of citizenship rights.

This concern with identities is all part of a wider zeal to classify and order our identities and sexualities. In all this earlier work, there was a clear tendency to locate a fairly clear gay identity and a fairly identifiable pattern of coming out through stages (the popular coming out models of the 1970s and 1980s). It was usually linked to a community – identities became the bridge between the gay or lesbian person and the gay or lesbian community. Over time, the notions of identity became more complex as stage models of identity were challenged, variations of ethnicity and sexualities were confronted, and a politics of identity was developed. In all of this, boundaries were clearly being drawn, but in complex ways.

During the 1970s, a social science literature emerged which suggested the processes in which a person came to build up different kinds of sexual identity. These writings often delineated stages. Plummer (1975) suggested the stages of sensitization, signification, subculturalization, and stabilization. Troiden (1988) extends this and suggests a similar model: sensitization, identity confusion, assumption of a gay identity for oneself, and commitment to homosexuality as a way of life. Vivienne Cass (1979) suggested five movements: identity confusion, identity comparison, identity tolerance, identity acceptance, and identity pride. Nowadays, such models are seen as perhaps having relevance for the 1960s and the 1970s when homosexuality was heavily stigmatized; however, these days younger people are experiencing much more flexible ways of relating to the category of homosexual.

From at least the 1960s the idea of “coming out” became more and more significant as an aspect of gay and lesbian identity construction. Coming out has multiple meanings. In the earlier twentieth century, Delaney suggests that it seems to have meant “having one’s first major homosexual experience.” Subsequently, it meant primarily self identification as homosexual. But toward the end of the twentieth century it came increasingly to mean disclosing who one is to family, friends, and indeed the wider world. In 1970, Barry Dank suggested how central this process was. Likewise, the gay and lesbian movement of the 1970s saw “coming out” as a political act: the making of homosexuality into a public event became a major force for change.

Times have changed. Ritch C. Savin Williams suggests in the early twenty first century there has been much greater complexity and variability in the complex process of gay identity formation. He suggests a much wider range of terms available within which to locate oneself, with many refusing, resisting, and modifying sexual identity labels.

THE POLITICS OF IDENTITY AND ITS CRITICS

Identity politics became increasingly prominent from the late 1960s onwards, and is particularly associated with ethnic and religious minorities as well as with feminist and lesbian and gay movements. There is a clear move here from a class based politics to a broader set of alliances. Experiences such as those of black, gay, or women's oppression become highlighted as the focus for creating a separate group identity – as blacks, gays, or feminists. By the 1980s it became clear that many sexual and gender identities were coming to be political categories. With reminiscences of Marx's dictum of a class becoming a class in itself – of the rise of political identity – and the model of black consciousness and black identity becoming more and more an issue, increasingly both the women's movement and the gay and lesbian movement came to center around a pivotal (and usually essentialized) identity. Indeed, without such identities becoming extant, much of the politics of the new social movements would not be possible.

A telling article by Steven Epstein (1985) on ethnic identity and gay identity suggested the parallel between black identity as a political and personal tool, and the gay identity as working in similar ways. The gay community, and indeed contemporary gay politics, require a clear identity around which to mobilize. This has remained the case for the vast majority of gays and lesbians since that time: there is a clear and strong identity. The notion of gay identity of true lesbians not only brought clarity to (an often unclear) life, it also firmly focused on a politics and galvanized action.

What was happening, though it may not have been clearly seen initially, was the development of a politics of identity. Gay identity became a

political tactic. It also allowed rights to be attached to the identity. The new social movements (NSMs) have consistently been seen as generating a politics of identity which claims recognition as one of its main goals – collective, public, and political identities.

But there have also been a number of counter movements to this. First, critics suggest that actual sexual or gender identities are themselves much more complex than such simple terms suggest. Whilst we used to have rather simple terms of “passive” or “active” gays and “butch” and “femme” lesbians, increasingly these have become fragmented into many kinds: lesbian boys and male lesbians (Zita 1998), MSM (men who have sex with men), “female masculinity” (Halberstam 1998), or the range of “intersex” and “trans” identities (Preves 2003) – as well as broader ones such as “LGBT” (lesbian, gay, bisexual, and transgender identities). In general, though, critics suggest that the categories have oversimplified – even stereotyped and essentialized – complex experiences. Sexual and gender identities, for example, lie at the intersections of many other axes: ethnicity, nationality, age, disability. These can readily hyphenate identities into “Asian gay identity” or “working class, Native American lesbian identity.”

Second, critics suggest that postmodern times have brought very different and largely unstable identities, as we have seen above: there is no fixed way of being sexual or gendered. They critique identity, and suggest instead that it is much more fluid, often characterized by narratives (Holstein & Gubrium 2000), seriality, performativity (Salih & Butler 2004), and hybridity. Stuart Hall (1997) talks of the diasporic experience as defined not “by essence or purity, but by the recognition of a necessary heterogeneity and diversity; by a conception of identity which lives with and through, not despite, difference; by *hybridity*.”

QUEERING IDENTITY

“Gay identity,” then, like all other identities, can presume too much. It is indeed usually an essentialist idea and cannot begin to capture the full complexities of what we might provisionally sense as “same sex experience,” which may be youthful or old, black or white, disabled or

non disabled, to engage in just a few of the most simplistic variations. So our notions of identities from which we speak have to become more varied, pluralized, and open than this, whilst indeed having to acknowledge some kind of continuities and boundaries (except in the most extreme, transgressive, and postmodern cases). Fixed clear voices seem now to have become weakened, identities ebb and flow, and voices now speak from a multiplicity of shifting and unsettled positions, constructing diverse narratives (stories of the lives of our lives) (Holstein & Gubrium 2000). These voices are always in dialogic process, and people speaking from various identities and positions may well find that these have to shift in the very processes of argumentation. But they cannot speak at all if they do not recognize the categories, however humbling and inadequate they may be. We need what might be called a *thin essentialism*. We need our identities, even as we change and modify them on a daily basis, and they are surely part of the continuing politics of citizenship. (And at times there may even be a need to “risk essentialism” to sense a strong, shared “we.”)

These more radical tendencies in identity theory have since the late 1980s (in North America, largely as a humanities/multicultural based response to a more limited social psychological approach classically found in “lesbian and gay studies” as indicated above) been linked to “queer.” “Queer” is most definitely meant to take us beyond the boundaries and borders of heteronormativity. The roots of queer theory (if not the term) are usually seen to lie in the work of Eve Kosofsky Sedgwick in *Epistemology of the Closet* (1990). She argues that the central classifying device of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries – the overarching borders of society – is composed of the hetero/homo binary divide: “many of the major nodes of thought and knowledge in twentieth century Western culture as a whole are structured – indeed fractured – by a chronic, now endemic crisis of homo/heterosexual definition, indicatively male, dating from the end of the nineteenth century” (1990: 1).

Identity is thus seriously questioned. Like wise, Judith Butler’s *Gender Trouble* (1979) is interested in deconstructing the sex/gender divide (and hence less concerned with the deconstruction of the homo/heterosexual

binary). For Butler, there can be no claim to any essential gender: it is all “performative,” slippery, unfixed. If there is a heart to queer theory, then, it must be seen as a *radical stance around sexuality and gender that denies any fixed categories and seeks to subvert any tendencies toward normality within its study*. Queer theory, then, is a stance in which sexual categories are seen to be open, fluid, and non fixed: both the boundaries of heterosexual/homosexual identities and sex/gender identities are challenged. Indeed, categories such as gay, lesbian, and heterosexual identity become “deconstructed.” There is a decentering of identity.

Whether we can live with deconstructed identities in the future remains to be seen.

SEE ALSO: Class Consciousness; Coming Out/Closets; Essentialism and Constructionism; Female Masculinity; Freud, Sigmund; Gay and Lesbian Movement; Heterosexuality; Homosexuality; Hybridity; Identity: The Management of Meaning; Identity Politics/Relational Politics; Intersexuality; Lesbianism; Mead, George Herbert; New Social Movement Theory; Plastic Sexuality; Postmodern Sexualities; Queer Theory; Sex and Gender; Transgender, Transvestism, and Transsexualism; Women’s Movements

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capitalist markets (Altman 2000). This is no minor observation, although it is a much neglected one.

In one sense there is little new about this. There are several long term historical institutions which have regulated sex through economic mechanisms. Prostitution, for example, has – rightly or wrongly – been commonly called the “oldest profession” and involved the financial supply of and demand for sex, among much else. In the twentieth century, this wider “sex industry” involves many workers and could properly be seen as an aspect of the sociology of work. Thus there are

business owners and investors, independent contractors and non-sexual employees (waiters, cashiers, guards, drivers, accountants, lawyers, doctors) and middlemen who facilitate business processes (some travel agents, guides, estate agents, matrimonial agents, newspaper and magazine editors, Internet entrepreneurs). Sites involved include bars, restaurants, cabarets, clubs, brothels, discotheques, saunas, massage parlors, sex shops with private booths, motels, flats, dungeons for bondage and domination, Internet sites, cinemas and anywhere that sex is offered for sale on an occasional basis such as stag (men only) and hen (women only) events, shipboard activities or modeling parties. Products and services included erotic phone lines, escort and matrimonial services, films and videos, souvenirs, toys, clothes, equipment and live and virtual spectacles via web cameras. (Agustin 2005)

Likewise, many marital arrangements – from the bride dowry to family inheritance – are not new and have involved the regulation of sexuality through monetary means. But these have not typically involved the turning of sex into commoditized markets, such as “mail order brides” (Constable 2003), as is found today.

The contemporary ecology of sexual markets suggests looking at the workings of five major interlocking markets through which sexuality is consumed. These are:

- 1 The sale of sexualized corporeal bodies, in many versions of real live sex acts (Chapkis 1997): “prostitution” and sex work, trafficking of bodies, stripping, table dancing/lap dancing (Frank 2002), sex tourism (Ryan & Hall 2001), and sex parties. “Real sex” is on sale. Much of this is global, and

sexual markets, commodification, and consumption

Ken Plummer

Modern sexualities have become constituted through massive markets. Consumption has become a key social characteristic of the late twentieth century (see Robert Bocock’s *Consumption*, 1993), and in parts of the world we are “born to shop.” Consumption has played a growing role in the lives of individuals around the (wealthier) world, and one aspect of this is the deep and pervasive ways in which human sexualities have come to be marketed, commodified, distributed, and consumed across the world. In contrast with what Foucault, in the first volume of *The History of Sexuality*, called *ars erotica* (and the presumed spontaneity of sex though influenced by religion), contemporary sexualities are structured increasingly in global

in rich/first world countries large numbers of men are purchasers of sex.

- 2 The sale of sexualized representations, through images and texts – in erotica, pornography, and Internet messaging. Not only is there a huge industry of pornography for men (straight and gay), but there are also now substantial markets for women. The widespread nature of this has been called the “pornographication” of culture (McNair 2002).
- 3 The sale of sexualized objects: most prominent here are “sex toys,” from S/M costumes, nitrate inhalants (“Poppers”), and whips/harnesses to dildos, vibrators, inflated blowup dolls, and lingerie, organized through shops like Ann Summers (Storr 2004). Parties are organized; the “circuit party” organizes sex parties (usually gay) on a national and international scale (e.g., Westhaver 2005).
- 4 The sale of sexualized technologies: much of sex is also marketed through medical aids, from Viagra to contraceptives and transgender surgery, as well as cosmetic surgery (Haiken 1997).
- 5 The sale of sexualized relationships, including marriage (such as mail order brides), and meeting places, such as gay bars (Chasin 2000; Sender 2005), singles bars, or indeed almost any bar which can facilitate sexual relationships. Likewise, relationships can become subject to expensive therapy and standardized self help books which can sell, for example, the 12 steps needed for a perfect relationship. Increasingly, relationships can be found in the marketplaces of cyberspace.

Some of these markets involve the explicit and direct selling of sex; others are more covert and indirect. Thus, the most conspicuous consumption is through direct markets where sex itself is the direct commodity for sale. By contrast, covert or indirect markets are those which use sexualities to sell something else – the massive worlds of advertising, entertainment, and sport are often sold through their sexual iconography. Thus stars from singers (Elvis Presley, Madonna) to film stars (Valentino in the 1920s to Tom Cruise) and sports stars (George Best to David Beckham) command

large sums while extracting “desires” from their audiences. Many objects are also sold that depend on an erotic connection: perfumes, clothes, holidays, music, dance, and so on, are linked to sex.

There is a landscape of erotica as a background to everyday life through film, television, advertising, video, and pop music – and indeed, even the city becomes a sexualized space. Web sites, too, can provide online sexual pleasures, all neatly coded and organized according to a catalogue that transcends Krafft Ebing’s wilder taxonomies where consumers may find just what they desire, order and pay for it online, and subsequently meet their desires. It often parallels the McDonaldization of society (Ritzer 2004) as the McDonaldization of sexuality, being rendered rational, calculable, efficient, and predictable.

Sexual markets also span across the whole life cycle. Children enter systems of consumption and sexuality, even if they are not clear about them. Adolescents become saturated with sexual consumption, in the process developing desires of all kinds. In later life, the daily routines of sexual markets are unmistakable.

Tim Edwards in *Contradictions of Consumption* (1996) has suggested five fundamental meanings of consumption to consumers. These ideas are indicative of what could be developed in relation to sexuality. The first sees the consumer as king: sexual consumption indicates a kind of victor over the producer and retailer. The second sees sexual consumers as victims – as cultural dopes who cannot help but be persuaded about the latest sexual fashions. Third is the sexual consumer as criminal: the purchasing of illegal goods, and the many markets that sell sex against the law. Fourth is the anti sexual consumer: someone who ostensibly rejects the increased dehumanization and crass commercialism of the consumer world. This type of consumer may turn to alternative and more spontaneous versions of sexuality (although paradoxically, such sexualities are also often sold in therapeutic markets, for example). Finally, the sexual consumer may also be a voyeur or pleasure seeker: a *flâneur* engaging with the proliferating erotic environment of images.

Consumption usually plays a symbolic role and may help to establish group boundaries, such as between men and women, gay and

straight. It is not surprising that much of sexual consumption is linked to matters of gender: what it is to be a sexy man, or a sexy woman. There is growing research that suggests that what the symbols and culture propose for the sexuality of women are different from those for male sexuality. Thus women's consumption of sexuality and their desires can be shaped by the media: television's *Sex and the City*, advertising, women's magazines, websites, pop music, and, of course, fashion. Some feminists have argued this plays a key role for women and men. Notably, this is bound up with bringing back sexuality for women – sometimes a domesticated version, sometimes as an overstated self expression (women become “self made,” autoerotic, choosing sexual display, seeking breakthrough sexual pleasure), as being desired, being sexy, feeling empowered (Storr 2004). Others see it as a sad reflection of shopping. The body is increasingly objectified, sex acts are more and more open to being sold, allied goods like underwear become sexualized, and the entire body is reconstructed as thin and beautiful through expensive cosmetic surgeries.

The commodification of sexuality, then, is seen as a rapidly expanding (and expensive) global market. Sexual consumption suggests the widespread growth of sexual pleasure and its accessibility where sex becomes “liberated.” By contrast, sexual consumption may also be seen as a mechanism of dehumanization and disenchantment, a multibillion dollar industry which provides huge profits for organized crime, medical empires, and commercial companies that trade in a wide array of “sex.” Desires are turned into markets and shaped and reinforced by them.

SEE ALSO: Consumption and the Body; Consumption, Girls' Culture and; Consumption, Masculinities and; Female Sex Work as Deviance; Sex Tourism; Gender, Consumption and; Globalization, Sexuality and; Homosexuality; Pornography and Erotica; Sex Tourism; Sexualities and Consumption; Viagra

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sexual politics

Matthew Waites

“Sexual politics” refers to the contestation of power relations with respect to sex, gender, and sexuality. The concept originates in the

second wave feminist movement which emerged in the late 1960s and 1970s in western societies. Its definitive textual origin is Kate Millet's *Sexual Politics*, first published in 1970, one of the founding works of the emerging women's liberation movement which provided a social and political analysis of "patriarchy" – the social system of rule by men. For Millett, "sexual politics" expressed the idea that "sex is a status category with political implications," and this implied challenging the distinction between public and private which reproduced inequality between men and women by consigning concerns about sex and sexuality to a non-political private realm. The concept is now widely used in academia and in popular culture to refer to a range of struggles over sex, gender, and sexuality, although the scope and implications of sexual politics remain highly contested.

The idea of sexual politics was revolutionary for sociology. Power relations between men and women which had previously been interpreted as the appropriate expression of biological differences (e.g., in the work of Talcott Parsons) were acknowledged as the products of society, history, and culture, and hence as politically accountable. Feminists sought to distinguish sex, understood as biological difference, from gender, understood as socially defined – as in Ann Oakley's *Sex, Gender, and Society* (1972). Gradually, knowledge generated in feminist social movements began to challenge sociological orthodoxy.

One of the central concerns of Millett's *Sexual Politics* was with power and domination in relation to sexual activity itself, and indeed Millett argued that "coitus" "may serve as a model of sexual politics on an individual or personal plane." However, "sexual politics" as a phrase used in mainstream politics and culture sometimes became associated first and foremost with a focus on power inequalities relating to biological sex and gender rather than sexuality. During the 1970s, the emerging sociology of "sexual divisions" sometimes continued to neglect sexuality in its focus on work and the family. Sexual politics tended to imply that the politics of gender could be equated with the politics of socially defined relationships between two biologically given sexes. This assumption has more recently been challenged, however, in the context of developing technologies of body modification and surgery, by radical

transgender theorists and poststructuralist feminist theorist Judith Butler (1990), whose contestation of conceptions of sex as presocial and immutable defines what she now describes as the "new gender politics" (2004). Sexual politics today, then, has become a concept used to describe a wide variety of forms of intellectual work, social movement activity, and cultural politics contesting sex, gender, and sexuality by women, men, and transgender people, lesbian, gay, and bisexual people, queer people and heterosexual people, sadomasochists, pedophiles, anti pornography campaigners, and many others.

Sexual politics politicized sociology with respect to gender and sexuality. Yet sexual politics also challenged traditional conceptions of the scope of politics as a discipline, pushing its research beyond the institutions of government and the public sphere to interrogate power structured relationships in "private" life. Sexual politics thus tended to suggest the necessity of interdisciplinary analysis, yet political sociology – preoccupied with sophology and the sociology of government institutions – was initially ill equipped to serve as a forum for the necessary cross fertilization. Over time, however, the idea of sexual politics has fostered interdisciplinary scholarship, and recently has contributed to the reinvention of political sociology as a more open and innovative field (Nash 1999).

Feminism in the United States, and to a lesser extent in the West more generally, became divided by "sex wars" between radical feminists and self defined "pro sex" feminists during the late 1970s and 1980s. Pornography was a central issue, for example in the radical feminist analysis of patriarchal oppression produced by Catharine MacKinnon and Andrea Dworkin (cf. Dworkin 1981); but such analyses were rejected by other "pro sex"/"anti censorship" feminists such as Carole Vance, who organized the Barnard conference on female sexuality in 1982 in response, placing greater emphasis on possibilities for women's sexual pleasure within heterosexuality (Vance 1992). Feminists remain divided over issues such as pornography and prostitution.

If, as is widely agreed among sociologists, the emergence of gay liberation and women's liberation movements from the late 1960s marked an important new phase in sexual politics, then

it can be argued that contemporary sexual politics has again entered a new phase during the 1990s and in the new millennium. In the developed world, feminism has achieved a fundamental shift from the assumed model of the heterosexual nuclear family with a male “bread winner” and corresponding gender norms of femininity and masculinity, to a situation in which it is assumed to be legitimate for both male and female partners in heterosexual relationships to engage in paid employment, and where diverse heterosexual masculinities and femininities are more acceptable, though still policed. Gay and lesbian movements have achieved a shift from a world structured by “the closet,” as suggested by Eve Sedgwick in *Epistemology of the Closet* (1990) – one of the founding texts of “queer theory” (see below) – to a world now moving *Beyond the Closet* – the title of a study published in 2004 by US sociologist Steven Seidman. Transgender people have also experienced a significant shift toward public visibility and toleration, accompanied in some states by crucial legal reforms granting recognition of a change of gender, such as the 2004 Gender Recognition Act in the United Kingdom, though the state continues to institutionalize problematic forms of medicalization (e.g., the Act makes provision for “gender recognition” to be granted to individuals only where they are determined by a “Gender Recognition Panel” to have experienced “gender dysphoria” according to a report from a registered medical practitioner or psychologist; and also to be “living in the other gender” with the intention to continue doing so until death. In certain respects, such laws thus legally entrench, rather than destabilize, biomedical and binary conceptions of sex and gender).

Overall there have been significant changes, but contemporary developments do not suggest the future direction of social and political change will necessarily continue to be defined by the advance of these movements. Contemporary sexual politics in western states is marked, for example, by the emergence of men’s movements campaigning on issues such as fathers’ rights, which have a relationship to feminism that is frequently hostile. The contemporary cultural politics of sexuality has shifted profoundly, particularly in youth culture.

The issue of children’s relationship to sexuality has come increasingly to the fore. Pedophile organizations and movements were able to emerge in the 1970s liberal climate in many western states to argue for the legitimacy of consensual relationships between adults and children. But with child sexual abuse emerging as a major public issue since the 1980s, such organizations and movements have increasingly gone underground. Libertarian critics such as Judith Levine in *Harmful to Minors* (2002) now warn of “the perils of protecting children from sex,” emphasizing instead the need for sex education and openness. In this context, “age of consent” laws regulating young people’s sexual behavior are increasingly subject to international comparison and contestation (Waites 2005).

The early 1990s witnessed the emergence of “queer politics,” and relatedly “queer theory,” in western states. “Queer” is a profoundly contested label: for some, queer has simply served as a rhetorically assertive synonym for “gay” or “gay, lesbian, and bisexual,” but for others “queer” is fundamentally associated with a project of destabilizing the prevailing heterosexual/homosexual dichotomy. Queer theory is characterized by the influence of the French poststructuralist Michel Foucault, and associated above all with a challenge to “heteronormativity.” Such a politics is critical of what is perceived as the liberal assimilationist politics of prominent lesbian and gay organizations discerned in demands for “lesbian and gay marriage” and “gays in the military” (see Warner 1999).

Meanwhile, in the “developing” world sexual politics is equally dynamic and fraught with conflict. In India, for example, where conceptions of national identity are structured by gendered signifiers such as “Mother India,” Chetan Bhatt has discussed how women nevertheless obtain forms of political agency within Hindu nationalist movements. In Zimbabwe, as Oliver Phillips has documented, homosexuality has become politicized and labeled as an un-African “white man’s disease” by President Robert Mugabe in the context of postcolonial struggles over national identity; and research by Jacqui Alexander has discerned similar postcolonial dynamics in the Caribbean (for extracts from all these, see Weeks et al. 2003).

Probably more than any other factor, HIV/AIDS has played a huge role in transforming global sexual politics, forcing governments to address the most intimate areas of people's lives, and challenging deeply embedded cultural and religious traditions. Responses to HIV/AIDS have been analyzed in the context of globalization, with attention to the political economy of the crisis (Altman 2001). Research such as that of Ros Petchesky and the International Reproductive Rights Research Action Group demonstrates that the battles of sexual politics remain to be fought in much of the world, particularly Africa, but also criticizes the imposition of prescribed western agendas and solutions (Petchesky & Judd 1998).

SEE ALSO: AIDS, Sociology of; Coming Out/Closets; Feminism; Feminism, First, Second, and Third Waves; Femininities/Masculinities; Foucault, Michel; Gay and Lesbian Movement; Gender Ideology and Gender Role Ideology; Globalization, Sexuality and; Heterosexuality; Inequality/Stratification, Gender; Patriarchy; Queer Theory; Sex and Gender; Sexual Citizenship; Sexualities and Culture Wars

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sexual practices

Stephen K. Sanderson

Sexual practices have varied widely across time and space. In the broadest terms, societies are either *sex positive* or *sex negative*, with the majority the former (Bullough 1976). The Trobriand Islanders of Melanesia were described by Malinowski as unusually sexually permissive. Sex life may begin for young boys as early as age 10 and for young girls as early as age 6. Polynesian societies were also renowned for their high levels of sexual permissiveness. For example, among the ancient Hawaiians, "a little girl's clitoris was stretched and lengthened through oral stimulation. The penis received similar treatment so as to enhance its beauty and prepare it for sexual enjoyment later in life" (de Waal 2005: 107).

Homosexual relationships have also been common in a number of preliterate (and in modern) societies. In some North American Indian societies, a man known as a *berdache* dressed as a woman, performed women's roles, and engaged in sexual relations with other men, all with social approval. Other societies (e.g., India, Polynesia, Oman) have had the local equivalent of a *berdache*. Among the Azande of the Sudan, man-boy homosexual relations were common, and institutionalized homosexuality has been widespread throughout Melanesia. For example, among the Etoro of New Guinea, men and young boys sleep together in men's houses, and man-boy homosexual relations are common.

In agrarian civilizations, outside of western civilization, with its sex negative Judeo-Christian tradition, sexual permissiveness has usually far exceeded restrictiveness. The Greeks were a fairly permissive culture, and are famed for their institutionalized form of homosexuality between older men and young boys. India was perhaps the most sex positive of all the historical agrarian civilizations. Hindus thought that women enjoyed sex at least as much as men, and a wide range of sexual practices was considered acceptable. The Chinese were also quite open about sex and had a form of man-boy homosexuality that resembled the Greek pattern (Bullough 1976), and the same was true in Japan (Leupp 1995).

Freud and the Freudians dominated the study of human sexuality for many years. For Freud, sex was an overpowering biological drive that was repressed by society in varying ways and degrees. The Freudian tradition was kept alive in altered form by such thinkers as Reich and Marcuse. Kinsey emerged onto the scene in the late 1940s, and Masters and Johnson in the 1960s. Their work had little theory and has been referred to as a kind of "radical empiricism" (Brake 1982).

The currently dominant approach to explain sexual practices seems to be *social constructionism*, which downplays the biological nature of humans and emphasizes that sexual practices are socially and culturally created. Among the earliest sociologists to take this approach, specifically in the form of symbolic interactionism, were John Gagnon and William Simon, as well as Ken Plummer. Social constructionists oppose "essentialism," or the notion that sexuality is largely a matter of biologically pre-given drives. For the constructionists, sexual practices are less biologically given than determined by society through complex webs of social interaction and social definition. Gagnon and Simon emphasized the importance of "sexual scripts"; for them, sexual conduct "is acquired and assembled in human interaction, judged and performed in specific cultural and historical worlds" (Gagnon 1977: 2). And, as Plummer tells us, "Sexuality has no meaning other than that given to it in social situations. Thus the forms and the contents of sexual meanings are another cultural variable, and why certain

meanings are learnt and not others is problematic" (1982: 233).

Outside the symbolic interactionist tradition, social constructionist views of sexuality start with Foucault (1978). Foucault not only challenged biological essentialism, but also linked sex with power. Foucault was particularly interested in the development of a new science of sexuality in the nineteenth century, which he saw as part of the rise of a "disciplinary society" in which the state was increasingly trying to bring its citizens under control. Knowledge of sexuality was central to this control (Seidman 2003). Social constructionists in the Foucauldian tradition include Jeffrey Weeks and Steven Seidman. In Seidman's words, "We are born with bodies, but it is society that determines which parts of the body and which pleasures and acts are sexual. Also, the classification of sex acts into good and bad or acceptable and illicit is today understood as a product of social power: the dominant sexual norms express the beliefs of the dominant social groups" (2003: 39).

The leading alternative to social constructionism today is the *Darwinian* approach of socio-biologists and evolutionary psychologists. Donald Symons (1979), for example, has sought to show how Darwinian sexual selection has acted on human sexual desires by looking in particular at universal or extremely widespread sexual attitudes and practices. He points to such things as the overwhelming tendency of males everywhere to be aroused by visual sexual stimuli; to the apparently universal desire of men to mate with younger females; to copulation as primarily a service provided by females to males; and to the universal desire of males for a wide variety of sexual partners. Such preferences, when acted upon, help males to achieve higher levels of reproductive success than would be possible by a preference for older, less fecund females, or by being indifferent to the sight of naked females. Research in the Darwinian evolutionary tradition has also emphasized the widespread existence of sexual jealousy in both males and females. For males, sexual jealousy is seen as a way to avoid having one's mate inseminated by another man, whereas for females it is a way of holding onto mates who otherwise might abandon them for other females (Buss

2000). The Darwinian approach has made little headway in sociology, but it has been highly influential in psychology and anthropology (cf. Sanderson 2001: 177–94).

Two other recent approaches to human sexuality are Collins's (2004) interaction ritual theory and Posner's (1992) rational choice theory. Collins argues that sexual practices can best be understood as Goffmanian interaction rituals. If humans are hard wired for anything it is "for the kinds of pleasure in emotional entrainment and rhythmic synchronization that make humans pursuers of interaction rituals" (2004: 227). Posner's rational choice theory is based on the notion that "the balance of private costs and private benefits determines the relative frequency of different sexual practices" (1992: 116). For example, in societies in which there is a high ratio of men to available women, opportunistic homosexuality and prostitution will be more frequent than in societies with an approximately equal ratio of men to available women.

The study of sexual practices has become an especially vigorous subfield of sociology, but is also of great interest to psychologists, anthropologists, and even historians. Despite major theoretical disputes, there has been a great deal of progress in this subfield and continued progress is likely to be both substantial and rapid.

SEE ALSO: Compulsory Heterosexuality; Globalization, Sexuality and; Heterosexuality; Homosexuality; Lesbianism; Oral Sex; Pornography and Erotica; Sadomasochism; Safer Sex; Sexuality

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sexual violence and rape

Liz Kelly

Rape attracted limited attention across the social sciences and humanities until it emerged as a key issue for feminists in the early 1970s. Most scholarship on the subject dates from this time, with the highest concentration appearing during the 1970s and 1980s. The first sociological study – Menachim Amir's *Patterns in Forcible Rape* (1971) – addressed the victimology of rape. But it, along with most previous work, was subjected to intense feminist critique, including in Susan Brownmiller's prescient *Against Our Will* (1975), which, in "giving rape its history," explored rape two decades before it became widely recognized. Rape was relatively invisible in feminist, policy, and research agendas during the 1990s outside the context of war/conflict. As we enter the twenty first century, shoots of renewed interest are evident with a series of books and major research reports addressing theory (Cahill 2001), reporting and belief (Jordan 2004), rape in diverse contexts (Barstow 2002), and prevalence and attrition (Kelly et al. 2005).

CONTESTED CONCEPTS

Defining sexual violence and rape continues to vex social scientists, legal scholars, and practitioners, as debates about the boundary between consent and non consent remain unresolved. The undisputed criminal status of rape lends the definitional issue a strong legal component, made more complex by the presence internationally of at least three competing conceptual frames: rape as forcible intercourse; rape as intercourse without consent; rape as intercourse in coercive circumstances. Albeit somewhat minor differences, they have significant implications for “what counts” in prevalence research and the evidential requirements to prove a case in court: in both instances, the requirement of force constitutes the narrowest definition. Alongside these foundational matters have been additional questions, including: whether all forms of penetration should be included; whether men can be raped; and whether rape is possible in marriage. Reformed legal definitions have tended to expand to encompass men and other forms of penetration, with the most contested issue remaining marital rape. Whether and how far legal definitions are echoed in research, not to mention shared by those experiencing unwanted sex, are recurring themes in empirical studies and commentaries. A key challenge from research has been to expand the concept of “real rape” (Estrich 1987), and feminist theorists (see, e.g., MacKinnon 1989) have problematized the consent/non consent binary, suggesting continuities or, in one formulation, a continuum (Kelly 1987) of non consent, only part of which is criminalized.

The issue of language has also proved thorny, with some seeking to reframe the issue as a crime of violence, replacing the word rape with “sexual assault,” narrower and wider meanings of the word rape, and some using “sexual violence” to frame all forms of violence against women (Kelly 1987), while others limit its reach to explicitly sexualized assaults. How to refer to those who have been raped is also contested, with the term “victim” widely criticized yet remaining a legal status where crimes are reported, and “survivor,” whilst preferred, taking on an increasingly therapeutic meaning.

FROM UNUSUAL TO EVERYDAY MATTERS

The wellspring for the creation of a knowledge base on rape was (re)discovery within feminist praxis of how often women and girls had had sex against their will. The critically important concepts of “silencing” and “naming” emerged from the practices of consciousness raising and public “speakouts,” practices which have strong correlates in the emphasis in feminist epistemology on qualitative approaches, on enabling and recording personal accounts in sociology and criminology, and on “reclaiming” testimonies (and activism) from the past through historical research (see, e.g., Kumar 1993; Somerville 2004).

Viewed in retrospect, many early feminist texts reproduced the “deviant” construction of rapists. However, as feminist discourse became more nuanced, connections between rape and the construction of heterosexuality, masculinity, and femininity were increasingly explored (MacKinnon 1989; Lees 1993), and the limited progress made in terms of young women’s belief in their right and ability to say no to unwanted sex documented (Holland et al. 1997). This issue has taken on even more profound implications as new research from Africa, and especially South Africa, demonstrates how difficult it is for women to negotiate safe sex in cultural contexts where force and coercion are commonplace and HIV infection an ever present risk (Jewkes & Abrahams 2000). Brutalization through conflict has been increasingly addressed as a context in which levels of sexual violence increase, even at times encouraged by combatants (Barstow 2002). These studies highlight the continuing barriers to achieving the feminist goals of sexual freedom/agency for many women. However, rape research and more optimistic postmodern feminism do connect through the theoretical and material importance given to concepts and practices of sexual autonomy and its most recent variant, sexual sovereignty. Increasingly, legal reform attempts to build sexual offense statutes around these foundations for adults (see, e.g., recent legislation in South Africa and England and Wales). Law professor Stephen Schulhofer (1998: 9, 132) points out that a premise of the

right to sexual autonomy problematizes behaviors currently outside the reach of criminal law.

[The law] still refuses to outlaw coercion and abuses of trust which prevent a woman from deciding freely whether to choose or refuse a sexual relationship. And when she does refuse, the law still fails to ensure that her clearly expressed preferences will be honoured and enforced. . . . Conduct that forces a person to choose between her sexual autonomy and any of her other legally protected entitlements rights to property, to privacy, and to reputation is by definition improper; it deserves to be treated as a serious criminal offence.

A more specific theoretical and practical literature has emerged within sociolegal studies, and especially feminist jurisprudence, exploring the content, success, and, all too often, failures of legal reform (Rowland 2004). The courtroom has proved a rich resource for exploring the social construction of rape, heterosexuality, and gender (Matoesian 1993; Ehrlich 2001), and rape law, with its unique evidential requirements, is a paradigmatic example of the "hidden gender of law" (Graycar & Morgan 2002). Within these detailed explorations are unresolved debates as to whether emphasizing the sexual element in the name and construction of rape is a form of essentialism, whether it is a unique form of crime/assault, and most recently through notions of embodiment, whether law can ever recognize and address the sexualized elements and harms involved (Cahill 2001).

PREVALENCE, CONTEXTS, AND RESPONSES

Empirical research on rape began documenting its nature, contexts, and consequences, moving on to assess incidence and responses, especially by the criminal justice system. More recently, evaluative research has focused on rape crisis groups, Sexual Assault Referral Centers, and innovations such as forensic nursing. The knowledge base overall, and with respect to prevalence, is considerably weaker than that on domestic violence or sexual abuse in childhood (Hagerman White 2001). Women's heightened fear of crime is in large part connected to fear of sexual attack in the public sphere; this

"phenomenology of fear" (Cahill 2001) was documented in the 1980s in many studies on women's safety.

Most women experience the fear of rape as a nagging, gnawing sense that something awful could happen, and angst that keeps them from doing things they want and need to do, or from doing them at the time or in the way they might otherwise do. Women's fear of rape is a sense that they must always be on guard, vigilant and alert, a feeling that causes a woman to tighten with anxiety if someone is walking too closely behind her, especially at night. (Gordon & Riger 1989: 2)

Similar constraints only pertain for men and boys if they are located in contexts where sexual assault is rife, such as prison or living on the street.

Methodological innovation has been primarily through the development of surveys of violence against women, and the recognition that not using the term "rape" and providing more than one route into more detailed questions on assaults increased disclosure. US college students have high reporting rates for victimization and perpetration (Schwartz 1997). The Canadian Violence Against Women Survey (Johnson & Sacco 1995) heralded what has been termed the "third generation" of prevalence research (Walby & Myhill 2001), although many who have drawn on it subsequently have entirely excluded or limited the questions on sexual assault, prioritizing the more popular/acknowledged issue of domestic violence. Using telephone interviews, a national random sample of 12,300 women took part. The key findings with respect to sexual assault were: over a third had been sexually assaulted; for almost 60 percent this involved more than one assault; four in five (81 percent) were committed by known men; only 6 percent (1 in 19) were reported to the police (in comparison, a quarter of those who had experienced domestic violence reported at least one incident). These data raise critical issues about the perception of rape as a single, discrete event. The only recent prevalence study to include male and female respondents took place in the US and reported prevalence rates for rape of 17.6 percent for women and 3 percent for men (Tjaden & Thoennes 1998).

The extent of unwanted sex that prevalence research revealed, especially within samples of US college students, led to several widely reported challenges, disputing the methods and analysis and referring to the findings as “advocacy numbers” (Gilbert 1991). An unfortunate legacy has been the inaccurate, but preferred, media concept of “date rape.” Interestingly, surveys on male rape, using the same methodological tools, are seldom berated for “biased” findings and are more likely to meet comments as to the extent of underreporting.

The conventional orthodoxy about differential rates – both over time and across societies – of reported and recorded rapes has been that they reflect levels of (dis)trust in agencies and the state, rather than differences in levels of rape across societies. Some emerging data suggest more complex processes may be at play: for example, the very different societies of Australia, South Africa, and Sweden having high reporting rates per head of population. The Swedish data are especially intriguing since Sweden invariably heads global indexes on gender equality, suggesting that sexual (and domestic) violence does not decrease automatically as women’s employment and political representation increase. Two recent studies (see Regan & Kelly 2003) revealed variable reporting patterns over time across Europe. The latter revealed at least three patterns: year on year increases for two decades across the UK and Scandinavia; flatter levels across the German speaking countries; and sharp declines for many Central and Eastern European countries during the 1990s. Whilst some observations can be confidently made – such as the obvious impact of decreased capacity of, and trust in, state infrastructures in Central and Eastern Europe in the 1990s – more complex methodologies and theorization are needed to explain the variations in Western Europe.

Few contemporary studies explore questions central in early studies – the experiential realities of rape and/or its short and long term consequences (Kelly 1987) – and interest in the possibility of avoiding rape (Bart & O’Brien 1985) has also waned. In their place is a more therapeutic, “self help” literature drawing heavily on psychological work on trauma and the practices initially developed in women’s groups. Of particular interest, and in contrast

to the above, is philosophy professor Susan Brison’s (2002) reflection on her own experience of rape and how it changed not just her own sense of self, but her philosophical understanding of the self. In a rewarding combination of testimony and intellectual engagement, she echoes Judith Herman in noting the critical importance of the simultaneous disconnections from one’s body, place in world, and relationships to others. For her, reconnecting to others and the embodied practice of women’s self defense (Seith & Kelly 2003) were critical in her remaking of her self.

TAKING STOCK, MOVING ON

From a marginal issue, the topic of rape has had an uneven intellectual trajectory over the last three decades. A number of substantive studies have established that it is much more common than previously thought, happens primarily in the context of routine interactions, and is more mundane than the media preoccupations and representations imply. In the research literature there are now detailed studies of rape in varying contexts, such as marriage, confinement in prison, mental hospital, or other residential setting, and coercive/deceptive sexual encounters with a range of professionals/authority figures, including therapists and religious leaders (Schwartz 1997). There are also emerging discussions of the ways in which culture and context can affect the meaning and consequences of sexual violence, such as in the context of codes of honor.

The stereotype of “real rape” (Estel 1998) continues to undermine the intent underpinning legal reform. More recent attention to the attrition process reveals rates of prosecution and conviction are falling (Kelly et al. 2005). Thus, as the profile of reported rapes comes to more accurately reflect the realities established in social research, fewer and fewer cases result in a conviction. For example, in England and Wales in the mid 1970s, one in three reported rapes resulted in a conviction; in 2003, the conviction rate dropped to an all time low of 1 in 19 (Kelly et al. 2005).

Whilst statute and theory may have moved on, attitudes and practices with respect to female and male sexuality retain many of the

elements that prompted initial feminist critique. The dominant heterosexual culture continues to be one in which young women's ambivalence and uncertainty are viewed by young men as a challenge to be overcome, and women's sexual autonomy – not to mention sexual pleasure – is secondary. Thus the conditions in which coercive sex is commonplace are reproduced (Holland et al. 1997). Whilst young women undoubtedly aspire to be sexual subjects, and like their fore Sisters do resist sexual coercion, the context in which they act continues to be defined through powerful and essentialist notions of men's needs and desires. Whilst young women have greater space for action, some of these freedoms – such as being alone in public spaces, drinking alcohol – can be used to question their credibility should they be assaulted.

New challenges are evident in the emergence of attrition data, especially concerns about the failure of the criminal justice system to deal effectively with rape between persons who know each other. In this context the application of restorative justice practices (in particular the dropping of a criminal charge where the acts and harms are admitted) – currently being experimented with in South Australia and Tucson, Arizona – raises complex questions. Support from service users for “proactive” follow up by agencies questions a number of orthodoxies in feminist practice that require more detailed research. In addition, how perpetrators/rapists are categorized and understood deserves revisiting, especially whether it is appropriate to refer to men who have met their victim only hours before the assault as “acquaintances.” Does someone buying you a drink constitute “consensual contact”? Perhaps the context in which rapists target has changed with contemporary gender and sexual mores. The street and public places may simply be less successful “hunting” grounds for predatory men than clubs and pubs: and the latter may also provide a foundation for the most effective defense should they ever be charged – consent.

SEE ALSO: Compulsory Heterosexuality; Feminist Criminology; Gender, Social Movements and; Gendered Aspects of War and International Violence; Male Rape; Rape Culture;

Rape/Sexual Assault as Crime; Sexuality, Masculinity and

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for sexual practices and identities. For example, in terms of western gay male practices and identities, Kath Weston (1995) shows how US metropolitan centers were (and still are) constructed as places more open to male homosexuality, stimulating “the great gay migration” in the post war United States. For other groups labeled as “deviant” the city may also be constructed positively, in terms either of its liberal atmosphere or of the possibility of anonymity. But this association can lead to the city itself being considered “deviant” or dangerous, and therefore as an unsafe place. This connection is forcefully articulated in relation to two issues: prostitution and (sexually transmitted) disease (STD). In nineteenth century England, for example, moral panics about prostitution centered on city streets as danger zones, and moral regulation served to limit women’s access to urban public space. In terms of disease, similar moral panics over STDs, most notably HIV/AIDS, have brought about policies to “clean up” parts of the city associated with certain sexual practices – perhaps most famously in New York City during Mayor Giuliani’s administration.

A second important area of work is concerned with ideas about spaces within the city. In the first half of the twentieth century, researchers in the Chicago School of Urban Sociology investigated the urban geography of non normative sexualities, mapping the varied “sex zones” used by different groups (Heap 2003). Later work also used the tools of urban ethnography to research the practices of “deviant” sexual cultures – most controversially in Laud Humphries’s *Tearoom Trade: Impersonal Sex in Public Places* (1975), which utilized covert techniques in a study of male same sex activity in public toilets. One issue both the Chicago researchers and Humphries discussed that has continued to be central to research on the city’s sexual spaces is the distinction between public space and private space. Private space – usually thought to exist in the home – is often constructed as the only appropriate space for sexual expression. In contrast, public space is subject to intense scrutiny and regulation, and anything other than the “safest” forms of heteronormative sexual expression may be subject to formal or informal policing. This powerful divide has led to public space being seen as a crucial battleground in

sexualities, cities and

David Bell

As part of a broader investigation of the connections between sexuality and space, researchers in a number of disciplines have explored the relationship between particular sexual practices and identities and urban space – either at a generic level or in terms of particular cities around the world. There are a number of intersecting strands to this work. First, there is research that explores the cultural construction of the city – the city as it is imagined and portrayed in popular culture – and that investigates how this construction shapes possibilities and limitations

struggles over sexual politics. Some gay rights groups, for example, argue for the right to express their sexuality in public, staging protests to highlight discrimination. Moreover, the safety of the domestic home might not provide opportunities for sexual expression, if that expression is considered taboo within the moral economy of the family or household, so other spaces become centers of sexual practice and identity, including commercial spaces such as bars and clubs, and public spaces such as parks and streets. In the case of western gay male culture, for example, public spaces have historically played an important role, offering opportunities for men to meet away from the regulatory gaze of home and family – a role they continue to play today in western and non western cities.

Related to the issue of public and private space comes the broader question of the politics of space. Access to space in the city is regulated in all kinds of ways, making claims on space an important political tactic. For marginalized sexual minorities, the symbolic and material claiming of space has been a central component of rights struggles. From the temporary claiming of space in a protest march to the permanent establishment of residential or commercial spaces, there are many manifestations of this aspect of the relationship between cities and sexualities. Some critics argue that *all* space is fundamentally constructed and coded as heterosexual, and that there are also normative “genderings” of space; these dominant codings and orderings of space limit possibilities for women and for sexual minorities. However, spaces of resistance to the dominant order can be carved out, and although some are highly ephemeral, others can become more permanently rooted in the city. In some large western cities, for example, particular neighborhoods have come to be associated with lesbian and gay communities – either as places where gay bars and clubs are concentrated, as in Manchester’s gay village, or where there is a marked residential concentration of lesbian and gay households, supported by gay owned or “gay friendly” services, as in the Castro district in San Francisco. Other sexual minorities are not equally able to make such claims on cityspace, and have been unable (or unwilling) to develop neighborhoods or villages of their own. Nevertheless, districts like the

Castro have historically been very important, in terms of making the lesbian and gay community visible, and also politically powerful (at least as regards local politics).

While claims on space in cities have been seen as important political markers, the spaces claimed are themselves seen by some people as contradictory. Marking out one neighborhood as “gay,” for example, implicitly marks all other neighborhoods as “straight.” Residential concentration also ghettoizes those who live there, and excludes those who do not. A visible gay neighborhood might be attractive not only to gay men and lesbians, but also to homophobic “queer bashers,” or may be subject to excessive policing and regulation. Nevertheless, gay neighborhoods or villages have developed in a large number of cities (although their scale and scope vary considerably); in some cities this development has been encouraged by policy makers, especially since the so called pink economy came to their attention. According to pink economy discourse, gay men (in particular) are affluent and like to spend their sizable disposable incomes on high status lifestyle commodities. Attracting these high spenders into the city therefore promises financial dividends. While the pink economy has been thoroughly debunked as an overhyped myth, there is still considerable commercial interest in some sexual minorities, gay men in particular – though this is considerably less than the commercial interest shown in heterosexuality.

The development of gay spaces in cities is only one of the many relationships between cities and sexualities. As Pat Califia famously wrote in *Public Sex: The Culture of Radical Sex* (1994), echoing the foundational work of the Chicago School, the city is a patchwork of “sex zones,” some legitimate and dominant, others constructed as deviant or marginal. Considerable work has focused on exploring these sex zones, revealing the complex sexual ecology of the city. Part of that complexity comes from acknowledging specificity – moving away from generic discussions of “The City” to explore how particular sexualities relate to particular cities and cityspaces. This kind of attention to specificity has been tremendously important in highlighting that very different sexual spaces and cultures exist in different cities (and parts of cities); each city has its own map of sex zones.

While studies of the sexual life of cities have to date been dominated by work on large metropolitan cities and by a focus on particular sexual identities and communities – mostly homosexual – important work is increasingly exploring smaller cities (not to mention the rural) and other types of sexual expression, identity, community, and politics. One area of neglect has been an explicit and sustained investigation of the relationships between heterosexuality and the city – while there has been lots of work on gender, there has been much less explicitly about sexuality in this regard.

An area of growing interest and importance, in terms of more specific and situated studies of the relationship between cities and sexualities, concerns cities outside the contemporary West. Different times and different places have produced very different interconnections between urban space and sexual cultures. Historical studies, such as those collected in Higgs's *Queer Sites: Gay Urban Histories Since 1600* (1999), have much to teach us about these interconnections in the past, revealing long forgotten urban sexual habits and habitats. Studies outside the West also reveal a multiplicity of distinct relationships between cities and sexualities, often in spite of the supposedly homogenizing forces of globalization. The study of globalization in relation to sexuality is also important for bringing issues of movement into focus: cities are spaces of flows, where people, goods, ideas, and images intersect as they circuit the globe. There is a growing interest in sexuality and movement, whether temporary or permanent, forced or elective. Rather than totalizing and fixing "The City" in space and time, therefore, work on cities and sexualities must necessarily be pluralistic, reflecting the full diversity of cities and sexualities.

SEE ALSO: Globalization, Sexuality and; Moral Panics; Prostitution; Sexual Citizenship; Sexual Identities; Sexual Politics; Sexual Practices; Sexualities and Consumption

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sexualities and consumption

Yvette Taylor

Sexuality and consumption are interlinked in powerful and significant ways, perhaps even more so in contemporary, even "postmodern," times, shaping various material and subjective possibilities and impossibilities, as sexuality is displayed and regulated via consumption. Consumption refers to a wide variety of spending patterns and behaviors and is typically equated with "choice"; what we choose to buy, where and when, and how we choose to use purchasable commodities, ranging from mundane everyday goods and services to extravagant "one off" specials, which seemingly reinforce the uniqueness of our own individual consumer choice. Crane (2000) explores fashion and its various and shifting meanings, symbolically, culturally, and economically, across time and place, drawing on data from England, France, and the United States. Crane claims that class has become a less salient aspect of identity, with less effect upon clothing practices, consumption, and signification, which she describes as a shift from classed practices to those based around "life styles." The concept of "subcultural" affiliation is invoked as a way of capturing the proliferation of clothing styles and choices, which, it is claimed, mark the changes from industrial class based societies to "postmodern," "post industrial" societies. The manifestations of class and gender are seemingly replaced by an erasure of fixed hierarchies, a blurring of certainty which these categories once represented, and a diffusion of meaning across and between other axes of "difference," particularly that of sexuality.

Yet to consume also implies a potential restriction in terms of what is being offered and to whom. Other market activities, such as employment, leisure activities, and citizenship, are related to consumption insofar as these afford possibilities for participating in certain markets, create and foreground certain “choices,” while restricting and regulating individuals within multiple social domains. Heterosexuality is privileged, even expected, within many consumer spheres, but lesbian, gay, and bisexual sexualities are also increasingly affecting, and indeed affected by, marketization, as the notion of a ready, waiting, and willing “pink pound” implies (Chasin 2000; Hennessy 2000).

Sexuality, as an innately private and individual concern, has been interrogated and problematized by many feminist researchers, who have revealed its profoundly social and public regulation. While there has been longstanding attention to compulsory heterosexuality, as socially structured and institutionalized, others point to the increasing complexity, even fluidity, of sexual practices, identities, and regimes. The dichotomy existing around materialist versus queer conceptualizations of sexuality is strongly expressed through polarized critiques of sexuality and consumption (Jackson 2001). Here sexualities become either cynically commodified and thus inseparable from interconnecting inequalities, such as gender and class, or exist as evidence of potentiality and (market) possibility, affording diverse sexualities much cultural visibility.

Whether thought of as a resource or as a constraint, an equalizing force or a divisive battleground, it is difficult to ignore the ever increasing spaces of sexual consumption, as manifest in the media (McRobbie 2004), in commercialized scene spaces, and even in the realm of citizenship. The interconnection between sexuality and consumption provides for a series of inclusions and exclusions, in the market and in the state itself, which has been a dominant theme in the literature on sexuality studies.

Chasin uncovers the linkage between the development of the “lesbian and gay movement” in the US and the growth of lesbian and gay “niche markets” that promise inclusion into the marketplace and the nation itself – but at a price. Within her account, social recognition is dependent on ability to consume as

identity becomes branded, commodified, and consumed. Lesbians and gays are integrated, even assimilated, as consumers rather than as citizens. Money then represents the prerequisite for participation as well as the boundary. Chasin’s catchy (and cutting) title *Selling Out* conveys notions of failure and possible fraudulence, hinting at the ways in which sexual identities have been depoliticized, as they become only another consumer possibility. The skepticism aired resonates with many other critiques (Warner 1993; Hennessy 2000). Many theorists have examined consumption in relation to the construction and reconstruction of identity; Warner (1993) looks at the pivotal role of the market in the construction of queer sexualities and notes its exclusionary tendencies. Here the “institutions of culture building” are market mediated and include bars, discos, newspapers, magazines, phone lines, resorts, and urban commercial districts, which are only accessible to those with the requisite social, cultural, and economic capital (Bourdieu 1984; Skeggs 1999, 2001).

While popular discourses on the “pink pound” signal a new, consumer based potential inclusion, many researchers have highlighted entrenched and compounded inequalities within this. Seemingly celebratory discourses on lesbians’ and gay men’s spending power invoke what Binnie (2004) describes as the “myth of the pink economy,” which compounds the idea of a “special,” even privileged, group who can more than afford their rights: here rights are equated entirely with spending power, which is a highly gendered phenomenon. Lesbians have rarely been addressed as consumers, which may be set to change as they are identified as potentially profitable, whether that is in terms of “new” leisure pursuits, fostered by improving incomes, or in the commercialization of, for example, civil partnerships. Nearly half of the countries in the European Union offer some legal recognition to same sex couples, ranging from full civil marriage to domestic partnerships. An array of legal and commercial services has sprung up in response to this demand.

As sexuality becomes marketed and commodified as a “lifestyle option,” many note that not all lifestyles are equally visible or validated. Similarly, the existence of commercialized scene spaces, thought of as refuges and “safe spaces”

for sexual minorities, is not unproblematic and various theorists have given attention to inequalities operating within such commercialized space. Skeggs (1999, 2001) has shown that inequalities operate within leisure space, controlling entitlements to that space and affecting the appropriate “performance” (Taylor 2007b). Appearance in particular becomes the mechanism for inclusion and exclusion; a resource through which claims for legitimacy and entitlement are made whereby sexuality, gender, and class affect embodied presentations and a sense of entitlement versus a sense of exclusion. Having the money can buy access – having the right clothes, right style, and taste can indicate that entitlement to be there – but displaying sexual identity, and receiving affirmation, may require unaffordable presentations. Hennessy (2000) has critiqued discourses of consumer choice and the necessity to display a “designer identity” given that it may only be accessible to those materially poised to occupy the position, those with the ability and opportunities to engage in lesbian or gay male “chic.”

Scene spaces are increasingly becoming leisure spaces of consumption, where the claiming of a lesbian or gay identity is no longer necessary to “consume” such leisure space, but where the “intrusion” of a heterosexual presence into scene space is still far from unproblematic. Such intrusion, like the commercial scene space itself, appears to be highly gendered. Drawing upon longitudinal ethnographic research (1997) and research on violence, sexuality, and space in the UK, Skeggs (1999, 2001) highlights the contrast and tensions existing in scene spaces between a group of white working class heterosexual women, whose identity is based on “disidentification” (from being working class), and a group of lesbians who form their identity through visibility, recognition, and territorialization. Skeggs suggests that heterosexual working class women enter commercialized scene venues in order to be safe from the male gaze, while their straight presence, or “lesbian masquerades,” have negative consequences for others, namely lesbians and gay men.

Queer theory has been associated with the pursuit of a queer lifestyle, an “aestheticization of daily life” constructed through a “post modern consumer ethic” (Hennessy 2000).

Fraser (1999) argues that queer theory’s stance on visibility and recognition further marks a connection between identity and aesthetics, whereby queer becomes a brand name, an identity project assuming the form of aesthetic, consumer based lifestyles (Featherstone 1991). The queer body, in displaying and signifying, is, from a queer perspective, seen to bestow a political value (Butler 1993). But within this are important ramifications for escalating class inequality, given that appearance can be another signifier upon which to denigrate working class bodies and tastes, in which they (again) become “flawed consumers” who cannot pay and display in “proper,” “tasteful” ways (Bourdieu 1984; Bauman 1998; Skeggs 1999, 2001). Aesthetics, and identity constructed via consumption of cultural goods, may mark the self as tasteful, authentic, and thus entitled (for example, to occupy queer space), or it may exclude and mark as wrong, unentitled, and inauthentic. When considering intersections between consumption and sexuality, materialist feminists would suggest that it has been difficult to fully utilize and appropriate the theoretical readings of queer. Although Judith Butler may usefully illuminate aspects of the operation of queer identity, this reading of performance and performativity may mean little to the everyday enactment of sexuality.

In contrast, Roseneil (2000) charts the cultural valorizing of the queer in popular culture, fashion, magazines, and television, which is taken as evidence of the “aspirational status of queer” rather than as the class exclusive “aestheticization of everyday life,” which materialist thought would name as a perpetuation and extension of current inequalities (Fraser 1999). Culturally, there is a proliferation of films and literature where femininity is fetishized and naturalized as objects of female desire (McRobbie 2004), while women can now choose the commodities and costumes from which to perform femininity, as part of their repertoire of self identification. The burden faced is one of “having it all” whereby having it all, good career and good sex, becomes an imperative rather than a “choice.” Pic ’n’ mix relationships and “identity umbrellas” become necessities in building an experienced, endlessly adaptable, and refashioned self and multisexualism another sought after and purchasable

commodity. "Metrosexual" is becoming a new buzzword, apparently describing urban, fashion conscious men who are not afraid to express an interest in fashion or beauty, areas typically thought of as the preserve of women and gay men. Nonetheless, multiplicity or "metrosexuality" does not necessarily translate into equality, and again choices are not equally available or validated on the (sexual) market. As one form of (male) sexuality is celebrated, other forms of (female) sexuality are problematized as excessive and simply wrong.

Romanticized representations seeking to reaffirm traditional femininity exist alongside representations that problematize and pathologize women's sexual behavior, appearance in public, especially leisure, space, and their uptake of a "laddish" drinking culture as resolutely "unfeminine" (McRobbie 2000; Harris 2004). A classed polarization between new celebratory (white and middle class) femininities and sorrowful, pitiful, and excessive working class sexuality, embodied in the pathological representations of the "teen mum," is articulated in the literature. Celebrations and denigrations of "new" femininity are challenged and resisted by the realization that gender, class, and sexual inequalities remain embedded within economic and social structures, something which materialist feminist approaches have been adept at highlighting.

Many feminist writers have explored young women's consumption of lifestyle magazines. McRobbie (2000) argues that contemporary femininity and masculinity are being reappraised with representations of sexuality now breaching traditional gendered boundaries of acceptance, whereas Tyler (2004) claims such "resources" bring managerial imperatives, such as efficiency and effectiveness, which must be incorporated into self management of sexuality. Sexual pleasure may well be subject to rationalization, through a process of sexual "modernization," whereby issues of efficiency and outcome again come to the fore in the "sexual mode of production." Tyler (2004) maintains that the focus on and overinvestment in "good sex," weighted toward success, entitlement, and mobility, deflects attention away from gendered inequalities, such as women's continued familial dependence and exploitation in family and work realms, potentially separating out

interconnections between sexuality, gender, and the household, emphasized in feminist research.

The restructuring of flexible global capitalism offers new research directions. Binnie (2004) unravels the links between sexuality, the nation state, and globalization, critiquing previous studies for their heteronormative assumptions and attentions and instead choosing to "queer" globalization, providing a queer perspective on the subject. The prevalence of class inequalities contests the link between globalization and inevitable and progressive mobility, movement, and liberation. Not only are there enduring citizenship and immigration restrictions, perhaps felt less by the monogamous, high earning couple, but the process of transnational movement is itself a highly gendered phenomenon. Maybe, as Binnie (2004) claims, we are all "sex tourists," tourism being a sexualized process, but gay men's tourism is often particularly problematized and pathologized as overtly, and deviantly, sexual. Thus a crucial reminder against collapsing important material and subjective differences and inequalities is highlighted in theorizing sexualities and consumption.

SEE ALSO: Advertising; Aesthetics; Consumers, Flawed; Consumption; Globalization, Sexuality and; Homophobia and Heterosexism; Postmodern Sexualities; Queer Theory; Sexual Markets, Commodification, and Consumption; Sexualities, Cities and; Shopping

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sexualities and culture wars

Glenn Lucke

The term "culture wars" came to prominence in the early 1990s, referring to conflicts in US society over abortion, religion in schools, acceptance of homosexuals, pornography, the

judiciary, and the arts. Many of the flashpoints in the culture war derive from competing cultural assumptions about the body, particularly various aspects of sexuality. Activists in the culture war struggle to define what Americans believe a human to be and how human life is to be rightly ordered.

The origin of the term traces to German Chancellor Otto von Bismarck, who used *kulturkampf* in 1878 to launch a values campaign against Catholic and Jewish minorities in newly united Germany. Sociologist James Davison Hunter (1991, 1994) appropriated the concept as a tool for understanding the nature of contemporary cultural conflict in the US. In Hunter's work, culture wars concerns the activities of loosely clustered groups of elite knowledge workers who seek to impose their competing understandings of reality – both the way things are and the way things ought to be – on the rest of society.

Hunter's theory reflects the confluence of several strands of classical sociological theory, particularly the synthesis of Weber and Durkheim forged by Peter Berger (1967) regarding the sociology of knowledge and the sociology of religion. Humans construct reality in their social relations and productions, and this constructed reality becomes internalized "knowledge." Berger's key contribution was the concept of plausibility structures, social groups in which humans are embedded, that govern which ideas we find plausible or implausible. Thus, while humans experience reality as taken for granted, it is in fact socially constructed by the plausibility structures people inhabit.

Which social constructions will dominate society? Whose ideas and values will become plausible for the most people? These questions introduce the issue of power that is largely absent from Berger's synthesis. Thus, Hunter's culture wars theory also draws upon the insights of conflict sociology in the Marxist tradition to understand how power structures and relations affect the social construction of reality. In particular Hunter uses the work of Italian Marxist Antonio Gramsci, whose work in the sociology of knowledge contributed the idea of knowledge workers (elites) who have a disproportionate role in supplying the ruling ideas of a society. If in Marx's day the bourgeoisie were the ruling class

by dint of their ownership of the means of production, Gramsci realized that knowledge workers were increasingly the ruling class by dint of their credentials and their relationship to the production of knowledge.

Hunter applies this understanding of elites as knowledge workers in trying to make sense of conflict in the US in the late twentieth century. Hunter notes that the old cultural cleavages – Christian versus Jew, Protestant versus Roman Catholic – no longer hold sway. In the contests over abortion, gay sexuality, and religion in the public sphere, he detects a realignment that has taken place as Christian and Jewish, Protestant and Roman Catholic elites form new, competing alliances. These new alliances of elites cut across the previous historic cultural cleavages.

The sociological questions of what has changed and why led to Hunter's signal (and much disputed) insight: that underneath the public contests about different aspects of sexuality are deep structures of moral authority. On the surface the conflict appears to be political: conservative versus liberal. Hunter contends that below the surface the knowledge worker activists generally cluster toward two poles: the orthodox and the progressives. The worldview of the orthodox moral universe is based on commitment to an external transcendent Being and the worldview of the progressives entails a tendency to recast values and historic faiths in light of prevailing cultural assumptions. While multitudes of viable positions exist between the two poles, Hunter suggests that many elites involved in contests over culture generally share either the orthodox or the progressive moral orientation. Those associated with the orthodox impulse include conservative Protestants, conservative Roman Catholics, and Orthodox Jews. Those associated with the progressive impulse include liberal Protestants, liberal Roman Catholics, Reform Jews, and secularists.

Debates between orthodox and progressive elites over aspects of sexuality, particularly abortion, homosexuality, sex education in schools, and pornography, generate significant controversy. The orthodox broadly enunciate principles found in their understanding of a Supreme Being, sacred texts, and historical church/synagogue teaching. These traditionalist religious perspectives largely militate against gay marriage and abortion rights, seeing the progressive

efforts as assaults on the nature of the family and a moral society. The progressives contend that the freedoms guaranteed by the US Constitution, not to mention enlightened thinking generally, mean extending full civil rights to gays and lesbians and maintaining a woman's right to choose in dealing with a pregnancy. Because these arguments are rooted in ultimate concerns, Hunter's account suggests that the competing elite knowledge workers do not appear to share much common ground. Given the stakes – defining how Americans will order society – the activists resort to inflamed rhetoric and power politics in a winner take all mentality.

Though Hunter's culture wars theory focused on elite knowledge workers and explicitly denied that most everyday Americans were involved in contests over culture, soon the media became fascinated with the notion that average citizens were combatants in the war. The perception that average Americans were caught up in the culture war was crystallized by a speech at the 1992 Republican National Convention by former presidential candidate Patrick Buchanan. He declared, "There is a religious war going on in our country for the soul of America. It is a cultural war, as critical to the kind of nation we will one day be as was the Cold War itself."

Increasingly, the media came to understand culture wars to refer to the opinions and/or values of everyday Americans. This impelled social scientists to investigate this notion as well as Hunter's claim that the cleavage was between two poles of moral authority. Three significant criticisms of the culture wars thesis emerged from various research initiatives: (1) public opinion really is not very polarized; (2) the orthodox/progressive dichotomy is too simplistic to account for the diversity of positions in contested culture; (3) the metaphor of "war" is overstated, sensationalistic, and thus inappropriate.

DiMaggio et al. (1996) use data from the National Election Survey and the General Social Survey (1972–94) to interrogate the notion that American public opinion is polarized. They find no increased polarization in American public opinion since the 1970s. Examination of between group and within group variance showed surprising convergence of opinion on most issues. The one exception to this was the

central battleground of abortion, where opinion was polarized along the lines of the culture war concept.

Another project (Smith et al. 1997) engaged 128 evangelicals in two hour in depth qualitative interviews. Smith's team found that most evangelicals are oblivious to a host of culture war terms, issues, and personalities. Those respondents who were aware either believe such contests are wrong headed or the respondents indicate that aspects of both orthodox and progressive positions/reasoning appeal to them.

Alan Wolfe's *One Nation After All* (1999) depends on 200 qualitative interviews and he finds that most middle class Americans not only are not culture wars combatants, but also they believe much in common with other middle class people. However, Wolfe agrees with the culture wars theory with respect to elite knowledge workers.

The culture wars thesis appeared to suffer cracks under the weight of these and other critiques. However, the 2000 presidential electoral map revived media discussion of culture wars. The election, so close that it came down to a few hundred votes in Florida, revealed a significant divide among the Red states (Bush supporters) and Blue states (Gore supporters). For the most part the Blue areas of electoral strength were in the vast population centers on the West and East coasts, with other centers near the Great Lakes. Bush's strongest support came from the South and Midwest, and predominantly suburbs, small towns, and rural areas. Election survey data revealed that the most robust variable for predicting voting behavior in Red and Blue states was frequency of church attendance: those who were most religious overwhelmingly voted Republican and those with the highest indicators for secularity voted overwhelmingly for Democrats.

However, social scientists began to point out that the presidential electoral results did not map onto cultural divides neatly or consistently. For example, politically liberal states like Massachusetts contain significant numbers of "orthodox" citizens, particularly Roman Catholics. Outside of a handful of states on either side, the rest of the states tilted Red or Blue by a small margin. Morris Fiorina et al. (2004) conducted an exhaustive review of the

culture wars literature, available polling data, and election returns to demonstrate that the US was emphatically not polarized. Fiorina's findings show that Americans are clearly divided, but *closely divided*. The largest cluster of citizenry lay near the middle, with a combination of orthodox and progressivist views. Fiorina contends that if a culture war means a polarized or polarizing public, then the culture wars thesis is false.

Culture war proponents point to 2004 as exemplary of the cultural conflict between orthodox and progressive activists. Not only were moral values the top issue cited by voters in the 2004 presidential election, but also issues of sexuality dominated the news. First, the Massachusetts Supreme Court and later the City of San Francisco legalized gay marriage for the first time, and hundreds of couples took advantage of their new right. Traditionalists swung into action, proposing a marriage amendment to the Constitution that would permanently ensure that marriage was between a man and a woman. Eleven states had similar amendments to their state constitutions on the ballot and the pro traditional marriage side prevailed in all 11. Further, the Congress passed and the president signed a law that banned "partial birth abortion."

How does one make sense of the non polarized opinion findings, yet still make sense of the remarkable cultural and political ferment in 2004 over sexuality battles? Most sociologists concur with Hunter's original statement that average citizens are not involved in these fights. A powerful minority of credentialed elites, many (but not all) of whom fit the generalizations about orthodox and progressive moral authority, are the key actors. Furthermore, where there is disagreement on most cultural issues, the divide is not large, except on sexuality issues like abortion and homosexuality. Some commentators see the common ground in popular opinion, coupled with the basic acceptance of abortion and increasing acceptance of homosexuality, as evidence that the progressives won the culture war a long time ago. In this view the skirmishes in which the orthodox prevail are last gasps of the once vibrant traditional culture.

The methodology used to examine the culture wars thesis has unfortunately mostly

focused on popular opinion, when the thesis explicitly specified that elite knowledge workers were the combatants. Furthermore, most of the popular opinion research employs data sets collected for other projects. While sophisticated techniques (DiMaggio et al. 1996) can improve the utility of the existing data sets, the best way forward would be a research design that operationalized the culture wars thesis directly. Smith et al. (1997) did test moral questions directly, but their qualitative interviews with ordinary evangelicals did not test credentialed elites. A survey of knowledge workers in culture producing institutions, coupled with in depth qualitative interviews of the same, would allow sociologists to explore the moral universe of these elites and ways in which moral authority impacts their work on cultural issues.

SEE ALSO: Abortion as a Social Problem; Culture, Production of; Culture, Social Movements and; Moral Panics; Power Elite; Sex Panics

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sexuality

Ann Cronin

A variety of different approaches to understanding sexuality have emerged over the last 150 years. One way of categorizing these approaches is to distinguish between essentialist and social constructionist models of sexuality. Essentialism prioritizes a biological explanation for sexuality and hence limits its definition of sexuality to the individual expression of human desire and pleasure. In contrast, social constructionism prioritizes the relationship between the individual and society to show that the meaning attached to sexuality is embedded in specific historical, political, and social practices. Attention is paid to the culturally and socially diverse ways in which sexual desires, practices, identities, and attitudes are conceptualized, categorized, deployed, and ultimately regulated through the social institutions and practices of different societies. Although sociology's historical silence on sexuality served to reinforce an essentialist and normative understanding of sexuality, contemporary sociologists of sexuality, while acknowledging the importance of biology, produce socially situated accounts of sexuality. Furthermore, sociology offers a critical analysis of essentialism. A diverse range of approaches are used to account for the social organization of sexuality, including the sociology of homosexuality, feminist understandings of sexuality, queer theory, and an examination of the relationship between masculinity and sexuality. While each approach highlights different aspects of the debate on sexuality, there are many similarities and connections between the different perspectives. Furthermore, attention is paid to the interaction of sexual identity with other salient social identities, such as gender, race and ethnicity, class, age, and nationality.

HISTORY OF SEXUALITY

The social construction of sexual identity based on a dichotomy of heterosexuality and homosexuality can be traced to processes that began in the nineteenth century. Foucault's (1979)

historical account of the social construction of sexuality in modern western societies challenges essentialist conceptualizations of sex and sexuality as transhistorical and stable categories. Foucault argues that since the eighteenth century the discursive invention of sexuality as a biological instinct has resulted in individuals and populations becoming subject to a new form of power: biopower, which assumes that sexuality is the key to understanding an individual's health, pathology, and identity. Initially directed at population control through the development of statistics and demography, the development of sexology – the science of sexuality – in the nineteenth century led to a separation of the “medicine of sex” from the “medicine of the body,” which resulted in the construction and administration of scientifically based therapies. Within these therapeutic discourses, sex denoted the sexual act, while sexuality symbolized the true essence – the core identity – of the individual. Furthermore, distortion or perversion of the natural sexual instinct would lead to sexual abnormality and deviance. The task of sexology became one of developing schemes and categories of anomalies and perversions that were, in turn, applied to people's identities. Thus, for the first time, sexual behavior was discursively constructed to represent the true nature and identity of an individual. Same sex sexual behavior was indicative of a homosexual identity; opposite sex sexual behavior was indicative of a heterosexual identity. For Foucault, this resulted in the connection of the body, the new human sciences, and the demands for regulation and surveillance, so that power and pleasure (knowledge and sex) meshed with each other. Within this, homosexuality was regarded as a perversion, thus legitimating its regulation and surveillance, whether overtly as in the case of legal sanctions against male homosexuality, or covertly as in the invisibility of lesbianism and the promotion of marriage and motherhood.

While the sexologists favored a biological explanation for sexuality, it was Freud's psychoanalytic theory of sexual development that led to the psychological construction of different sexual identities in the first half of the twentieth century. Freud proposed a sequential systematic model, in which an individual progresses from an initial bisexuality, or polymorphous sexuality, in early childhood through to the development of

mature sexuality, which is viewed as the achievement of a stable heterosexual identity. Within this, homosexuality is viewed as a temporary stage of development (usually occurring during adolescence) on the path toward heterosexuality. This implies that those who identify as homosexual in adulthood have “fixated” on an early and hence immature phase of sexual development; alternatively, they have, due to psychological disturbance, “regressed” to this early phase of sexual development. Either way, homosexuality is located within a discourse of deviance, psychopathology, and illness.

SOCIOLOGY OF HOMOSEXUALITY

In 1948 Alfred Kinsey and his colleagues published *Sexual Behavior in the Human Male* and in 1953 *Sexual Behavior in the Human Female*. Kinsey's large scale study of human sexual behavior highlighted the discrepancy between the number of people who engage in same sex behavior and the number who identify as homosexual. Kinsey developed a six point continuum designed to encompass a variety of sexual behavior and feelings, ranging from exclusively heterosexual (1) to exclusively homosexual (6). In between are a range of feelings and behaviors that cannot be categorized as either exclusively heterosexual or homosexual, with bisexuality, a desire for both sexes, somewhere in the middle. Kinsey argued that individuals move between categories throughout their life, thus rendering invalid the use of discrete sexual identities. For Kinsey, the development of an exclusive homosexual identity was the outcome of society's rejection of the homosexual.

The birth of the Gay Liberation and Black Liberation movements, alongside the reemergence of the Women's Movement, in the 1960s signaled both a new form of political action and protest and provided the political stimulus for the academic research of oppressed groups in society (Plummer 1981). The Kinsey Reports and the development of the labeling perspective provided the theoretical catalyst for a sociology of sexuality, although initially it was focused mainly on sexual deviance, with a particular interest in prostitution and homosexuality.

Although Kinsey was a zoologist, his work resonates with sociologists using labeling theory

and symbolic interactionism to challenge essentialist normative explanations of homosexuality. Starting from the premise that all sexual behavior is socially constructed, sociologists suggest that people who engage in same sex behavior are labeled deviant due to the reactions of a hostile society; thus there is nothing intrinsically deviant about a homosexual identity.

McIntosh (1968) stated that the very concept of homosexuality as an individual condition should come under sociological scrutiny because labeling an individual "homosexual" acts as a form of social control. Firstly, it acts as a deterrent for possible newcomers and secondly, it acts as a device to segregate and reinforce difference in those identified as deviant, thus leading to the formation of a homosexual subculture, with its own rules, norms, and values. While not without its critics, McIntosh's work is generally regarded as a landmark in sociology for its introduction of the "homosexual category," which served as a basis for further work.

Gagnon and Simon (1973), broadening the debate to a general discussion on sexuality, used the concept of sexual scripts to explore how people internalize the sexual norms and values of society. The sociology of homosexuality, while remaining on the margins of the discipline, has made a major contribution to the understanding of the social organization of homosexual identity, culture, and community.

GENDER AND SEXUALITY

While feminism represents a diverse body of theory, radical feminist theorists have concentrated on the relationship between sex, gender, and sexuality to argue that women's sexuality and their reproductive capabilities are controlled and regulated by men through a system of patriarchy. Sex refers to the biological differences between women and men, while gender refers to the social construction of male and female roles. Although the two are interlinked, sex was regarded by early radical feminists as a biological given and hence unalterable. However, gender, the social meaning of femaleness and maleness, ensures the continuation of a patriarchal sex/gender system, which is reliant on male supremacy. Fundamental to this is the construction of a naturalized, passive,

female heterosexuality in opposition to an active male heterosexuality. Radical feminism deconstructs this "natural" relationship and through the slogan the "personal is political" highlights the relationship between women's personal lives and the patriarchal society they inhabit.

Both lesbianism and heterosexuality are theorized as political institutions aimed at regulating women's sexuality and contributing to their subordination. While for some feminists this ensures the continuation of unequal gender relations, others argue that sexuality actually constitutes gender; thus it should be viewed as a singular concept where the subordination of women is eroticized in sexuality. However, this neglects other forms of male power that are not expressed through sexuality.

Faderman (1985) examines the relationship between the nineteenth century sexological constructions of lesbianism as pathological with the demands of an emergent Women's Movement; while Rich (1980) argues that the compulsory nature of heterosexuality ensures that men retain their physical, economic, and emotional control over women. For feminists like Rich and Faderman, the institution of heterosexuality is dependent upon ensuring that the experiences of lesbians either remain invisible or are associated with disease and illness, thus limiting women's identification with this category. Feminists argue that the development of scientific theory and practice was used to maintain existing gender relations and deny women access to the public world. Rich proposes a new definition of lesbian existence: a lesbian continuum encompassing a wide range of women identified experience, which moves beyond the clinical definition to deepen and broaden lesbian experience. Through deconstructing divisive labels of sexuality, women can unite to fight for women's liberation, regardless of the sex of the person they choose to have sexual relationships with.

The radical feminist understanding of sexuality sparked fierce debate among feminists, leading to the "sex wars" between "pro sex" feminists who regarded radical feminists as being both essentialist in thinking and anti sex. Lesbians argued that radical feminist theory desexualized lesbian relationships or impeded the formation of lesbian identity and community building; other feminists questioned the distinction between sex and gender. Some argue that

heterosexuality is a “political regime” based on an artificial biologically based distinction between women and men, and is oppressive to both women and homosexuals. This analysis undermines the traditional understanding of the category of sex as being biologically defined and hence immutable and enables the examination of how sex difference contributes to the existing social order. Essentialist categories of woman, man, heterosexual, and homosexual are reconfigured as political categories to become critical sites of gender deconstruction.

While radical feminism urges all women to become lesbians in order to fight male domination, recent feminist work has argued that being heterosexual does not automatically mean women are being complicit in their own oppression. Some distinguish between the institution of heterosexuality and heterosexuality as individual practice and identity, in which women are able to operate agency and control. This distinction between the levels of structure and agency enables women to identify as heterosexual yet resist the institution of heterosexuality.

Partly as a result of both feminist and gay writing, some male sociologists have begun to examine the social construction of masculinity and its links to the social organization of sexuality. While diverse in its exploration of masculinity, a key focus has been the examination of the relationship between power and masculinity, which has been theorized under the concept of “hegemonic masculinity” and the related concepts of “subordinated” and “complicit” masculinities. Heterosexuality is regarded as being central to hegemonic masculinity, while homosexuality is regarded as being a subordinate masculinity.

QUEER THEORY

Queer theory emerged in the US in the 1980s, due firstly to the emergence of new political movements such as Queer Nation and ACT UP, which initially developed in response to the failure of the right wing American government to respond appropriately to the emerging AIDS epidemic; and secondly, the development of lesbian and gay studies programs in humanities departments. Epstein (1994) notes the following uses of the term: a linguistic

reclamation; a gesture signaling anti assimilationist politics; a politics of provocation in which liberal boundaries are contested; reference to a more fully “co sexual” politics between women and men; a way of moving beyond homosexuality/heterosexuality. That is, it is inclusive of all sexualities opposed to heteronormativity. Queer theory signals a social constructionist politics, which is characterized by a resistance to all sexual labels and categories; instead, it argues that there exists a fluidity of sexual expression.

Initially regarded with suspicion by sociology, partly due to its poststructuralist origins, sociologists have begun to examine the benefits of a mutually interactive relationship between queer theory and sociology (Seidman 1997). While sociology has concentrated on the construction of homosexual identities and communities, queer theory, through the work of Foucault and Derrida, has developed a radical agenda that concentrates on the dynamic relationship between the dualism homosexuality/heterosexuality. By focusing on the importance of this relationship it is possible to remove the sociological study of homosexuality from the “deviant ghetto” and permit a sociological examination of the heteronormative nature of all knowledge and social structures. Heteronormativity refers to the way in which the social organization of western societies is predicated on the belief that heterosexuality is biologically, psychologically, and sociologically superior to other forms of sexuality. Thus, heterosexuality does not simply refer to opposite sex relationships but represents an axis of power and dominant mode for conducting intimate relationships, which in turn is linked to ideas concerning gender appropriate sexual behavior. Heteronormativity as ideology and normative principle dominates both the legal system and the cultural system, thus legitimating differential treatment of those who stand outside of the heterosexual regime. The concept of heteronormativity increases our understanding of both the structural disadvantages of those who stand outside the heterosexual regime and the way in which institutionalized heterosexuality limits and constrains those who identify as heterosexual.

A theoretical concern with the borders that exist between sexual identities and communities has resulted in the deconstruction of all sexual identities, including politicized ones. For

example, while recognizing that the very construction of the homosexual enabled the struggle for civil rights, claiming the label homosexual simultaneously reinforces the centrality of heterosexuality. This makes it impossible to locate oneself “outside” of dominant discourses, for to define oneself as standing outside the sexual norm means first placing oneself within dominant definitions of sexuality. Thus, many queer theorists examine how claiming a homosexual identity contributes to reinforcing the hetero/homo split (Namaste 1994).

Queer theory does not attempt to move beyond this “double bind” in current conceptions of sexuality. Instead, it concentrates on the creation, regulation, and resistance of sexual borders to show that sexuality and power are present in all aspects of social life and structures. Queer theory and practice signal important theoretical shifts, resulting in a critical distancing from the terms lesbian and gay; the term queer has become a catalyst for people disaffected by earlier work on sexual identity, which homogenized the experiences and interests of lesbian and gay men and assumed that sexual identity is both visible and static. Queer theory’s poststructuralist approach challenges the foundationalist assumptions present in existing understandings of identity and uses this as a basis to question current notions of sexual identity, leading to a rejection of unifying concepts and an increasing emphasis on difference and plurality.

THEORY AND PRACTICE

Explanations for sexuality, whether they are biological, psychological, or sociological in origin, have a direct consequence on the way in which individuals understand and practice their own sexuality, as well as the laws, regulations, norms, and values that govern gender appropriate sexual behavior. The stigmatization of homosexuality and its association with disease and deviance in the first half of the twentieth century had a detrimental effect on people who found themselves attracted to members of the same sex, a situation that was exacerbated by the social and legal sanctions surrounding same sex lifestyles. In the UK, despite nearly two decades of active campaigning, the decriminalization of private homosexual acts between two men over the age

of 21 did not occur until 1967. This was reduced to 18 in 1994 and finally achieved parity with the age of consent for heterosexuals (16) in 2001. Same sex behavior between women has never been criminalized in the UK. Globally, lesbian and gay men have been subjected to both formal and informal discrimination in the workplace, educational institutions, military establishments, and health care, as well as being denied the benefits and rights accorded to heterosexual individuals. While there has been local or national reform over the last 30 years, many countries still discriminate against homosexual behavior and in some places it remains punishable by imprisonment or death. Likewise, while feminist campaigns have partially succeeded in exposing the complex relationship between gender and sexuality, women in many parts of the world remain in a subordinate position to men, and this is enacted either through the legal system or through the informal rules and regulations that govern the practice of sexuality. This includes the double sexual standard that still operates in many parts of the world, the high incidence of sexual violence against women, and sexual harassment in the workplace. Sociological interest in sexuality has helped to expose the discrimination and stigma faced by homosexuals, as well as providing a broader analysis of the social organization of sexuality in society.

SEE ALSO: Femininities/Masculinities; Hegemonic Masculinity; Heterosexuality; Homosexuality; Kinsey, Alfred; Labeling Theory; Lesbian Feminism; Queer Theory; Radical Feminism; Sex and Gender; Sexual Deviance; Sexual Identities; Sexual Politics; Sexual Practices; Sexualities and Consumption; Sexuality and the Law

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in the move away from a preoccupation with criminal law in particular sexual offenses and the emergence of a more expansive exploration of sexuality across a wide range of areas of law, from property relations to access to fertility treatment, from taxation to hate crime, from domestic violence to international law, from the regulation of kinship to the regulation of business. Long dominated by work focusing on law in anglophone western liberal democratic states the agenda is expanding to include wider national and international contexts. For example, Carl Stychin and Didi Herman's edited collection *Sexuality in the Legal Arena* (2000) includes work on law in South Africa and Zimbabwe and studies of sexuality in international laws such as the European Convention of Human Rights and the UN's International Convention on Civil and Political Rights. Robert Wintermute and Mads Andenaes's edited collection *Legal Recognition of Same Sex Partnership: A Study of National, European and International Law* (2001) includes essays that explore the impact of sexuality in the legal regulation of kinship relations in a wide range of national contexts (e.g., France, Germany, the Netherlands, Brazil, South Africa), as well as through a consideration of international law.

A search of electronic legal literature data bases such as Hein online for material dealing with sexuality reveals that this body of work is dominated by material focusing on lesbian and gay sexualities. A much smaller body of work appears to focus on heterosexuality, with little appearing to examine bisexuality in a legal context (Moran 2006). Exploration of work on heterosexuality and the law reveals that much of that work focuses on lesbian and gay sexualities. For example, in Alison Young's *Femininity in Dissent* (1990), which studies the criminalization of female anti nuclear protesters at Greenham Common in the UK, heterosexuality appears in an exploration of the media and criminal justice representation of the women protesters as lesbians. Andrew Sharpe's monograph *Transgender Jurisprudence: Dysphoric Bodies of Law* (2002) engages with heterosexuality in a series of judgments from the UK, Australia, and the US concerned with the struggle for legal recognition of transgender claims to establish their gender identity. A key finding of his analysis is the importance of heterosexuality in the

sexuality and the law

Leslie J. Moran

Reference to sexuality in the day to day operation of the law is coterminous with the emergence of sexuality as a category in the wider society. However, its explicit appearance in the official texts of law such as constitutions, codes of law, and statutes is relatively recent. For example, some of the most familiar legal terms associated with sexuality (e.g., buggery, sodomy, and indecency), phrases such as age of consent, or other key legal terms (e.g., justice, equity, marriage, spouse, parent, contract, libel, slander, property interest, and the right to privacy) make no explicit reference to sexuality. Sexuality is read into these legal concepts. An example of the emergence of sexuality as a legal term of art is the phrase sexual orientation. This phrase made its first formal appearance in the official texts of law in 1973.

One sign of an awareness of the pervasive significance of sexuality in the law is reflected

jurisprudence of transgender and central to that heterosexuality is homosexuality and homophobia. Janet Halley's pioneering studies of the US Supreme Court decision of *Bowers vs. Hardwick* (1986) dealing with the constitutionality of state prohibition of consensual sex between adult males offers some of the best work using techniques of deconstruction to examine the constitution of heterosexuality through homosexuality as "other" (Halley 1993).

The dominance of work on gay and lesbian sexualities in studies of sexuality and the law is far from being a state of affairs unique to work on sexuality in law. As Jonathan Katz notes in his study *The Invention of Heterosexuality* (1995: 12), "talk of heterosexuality so often and so easily glides off into talk of homosexuality, leaving heterosexuality – once again – forgotten." Here Katz points to the difficulties of making heterosexuality as the norm an object of critical inquiry. But as Kitzinger and Wilkinson suggest in the introduction to their edited collection *Heterosexuality: A Feminist and Psychology Reader* (1993), the norm of heterosexuality is always present while, at the same time, it is that which most resists appearance. Work on gay and lesbian sexualities in law not only explores these particular sexualities in law, but also offers the most sustained scholarship on heterosexuality to date in that field. A key component of this work is its engagement with the nature, form, effects, and institutions of heterosexuality. Terms in this work that point to the relationship between heterosexuality and these other sexualities include homophobia, heterosexism, and more recently heteronormativity. However, the danger remains that through the focus on "lesbian" or "gay," critical reflection on "heterosexuality" may slip out of the frame. The challenge is to keep both the norm and the exception in the frame of analysis in order to expose and critique the (re)production of sexuality in law.

Scholarship on sexuality and law may take many different forms. The dominant mode of legal scholarship is known by the phrase "the black letter tradition." While it is an approach to law that has its roots in the western legal method, it also has wider global significance. The methodological preoccupation is with the language of the official texts of law and with an exposition of the "true" meaning of these texts.

Formally, this "truth" can only be established by reference to other official texts of law. These texts range from constitutions and other founding texts of the nation state, such as a bill of rights, to legislation that flows from these founding texts. The latter may take the form of pieces of legislation, either created from time to time or introduced as codes of law offering a single catalog of the rules. In addition to establishing the true meaning of the language of law scholarship within, the black letter tradition also offers commentaries on the text of law: discovering meanings that appear to be formally absent from the text, finding endless consistencies and continuities of meaning, and explaining distinctions. This is a mode of legal scholarship that represents itself as being hermetically sealed from other scholarly disciplines and intimately associated with professional training for lawyers and formally devoid of politics. The methodology of this tradition of scholarship has been used to promote as well as deny legal recognition based upon a person's sexuality. Robert Wintermute's *Sexual Orientation and Human Rights: The United States Constitution, the European Convention and the Canadian Charter* (1995) is a good example of this type of legal scholarship. Wintermute offers an analysis of various legal terms such as equality, sexual orientation, and sex discrimination in several jurisdictional settings, including the US, Canada, and Australia. He explores the judicial interpretation given to these terms with a view to determining which legal category may best promote civil and human rights.

Other schools of legal scholarship (law in context, the law and society movement, socio-legal studies, critical legal studies, law and culture, legal history) and law related scholarship such as criminology draw upon a wider range of methodologies, mainly (but not exclusively) associated with the social sciences and have a more interdisciplinary approach. They include a more expansive approach to legal phenomena, an interest in the wider operation of law in different institutional and everyday locations, and an explicit interest in the interface between law and economics, politics, psychology and the social, and cultural dimensions of law. The interdisciplinary dimensions of this work also draw attention to the fact that the study of law is not the exclusive preserve of legal studies,

but may also be found in scholarship in other disciplines such as history, politics, psychology, literature, sociology, cultural studies, and so on (Moran 2002).

Davina Cooper's monograph *Sexing the City: Lesbian and Gay Politics Within the Activist State* (1994) provides a good example of work focusing on sexual politics in local government in the UK. Aileen Stein's *The Stranger Next Door: The Story of a Small Community's Battle Over Sex, Faith and Civil Rights* (2001) is a study of sexual politics in a small community in the Northwest of the US. This study explores sexuality and the law by way of the daily activities of individuals, in their relations with the central or local state and private institutions and in their everyday interpersonal interactions. Other work, such as Stephen Tomsen's *Hatred, Murder and Male Honour: Anti Homosexual Homicides in New South Wales, 1980–2000* (2002), with its roots in criminological scholarship, explores sexuality through a study of police data on gay related murder and examines not only the causes of violence in this context, but also the context in which it takes place, challenging a range of heterosexist assumptions that inform understandings of the nature of murder and the processes of investigation and criminal prosecution. Studies of the representation of law, laws, and legality in high and popular cultural contexts such as fine art, literature, music, film, television, video games, and so on are a new context in which work on sexuality in law has begun to emerge. Didi Herman's study, "Juliet and Juliet Would Be More My Cup of Tea": Sexuality, Law and Popular Culture" published in a collection of essays, *Law and Popular Culture* (2004), edited by Michael Freeman, explores the governance and regulation of sexuality in and through popular culture, in this instance television.

Some legal scholarship explores sexuality by reference to theories of law drawing upon a wide range of philosophical and metaphysical traditions. Here law is taken to be a repository of the founding ideals of human society, of its ethical and moral substratum. Morris Kaplan's study *Sexual Justice* (1997) is an example of this type of scholarship, using the work of philosophers such as Hegel, and Nietzsche and the more recent scholarship of Judith Butler to examine a range of legal issues

concerning sexuality. Nicholas Bamforth's *Sexuality, Morals and Justice* (1997) offers a sustained analysis of sexual equality by particular reference to moral philosophy. Ruthann Robson's *When Sappho Goes to Law School* (1998) draws extensively on the insights of feminist scholarship.

Some of the most exciting work on sexuality and the law is scholarship informed by queer theory, exploring the materiality of sexuality and challenging the essentializing dimensions of sexual identity politics in law. At best, queer theory offers a multidisciplinary set of tools drawing upon poststructuralist and post-Marxist political theory and cultural and literary studies. Margaret Davis's essay "Queer Property, Queer Persons: Self Ownership and Beyond" (1999) is a brilliant example of the potential of queer theory. Her essay explores the nature of sexual identity by way of an analysis of themes of personality and property. Her work exemplifies queer theory's ability to expose the fundamental instability of what appear to be fixed categories of sexuality and to challenge and disrupt the sexual and gender hierarchies through which heterosexuality is given shape and form. Her analysis provides an example of work that challenges identity as the essence, core, or foundation of the subject. She reveals not only how deeply embedded these ideas are in western legal culture, but also how identity is implicated in and draws upon other fundamental legal ideas which might seem to be remote from it, such as property. Another important dimension of this essay is the way Davis explores the limits of queer theory, in particular the way it has rapidly been transformed from a technique of radical and progressive critique into just another (albeit new) identity category.

Other work drawing upon queer theory and its poststructuralist sources includes Carl Sty chin's *Law's Desire* (1995), which offers a series of case studies of sexual politics in US legal disputes and one of the first engagements with queer theory in legal studies. Leslie Moran's *The Homosexual(ity) of Law* (1996) and Derek McGhee's *Homosexuality, Law and Resistance* (2001) offer a poststructuralist analysis of sexual identity in law, this time in the context of English law, developing a Foucauldian analysis. The former also has a strong historical focus

and engages with the criminological literature on deviance and sexuality.

A different but related line of critical engagement within current legal studies of sexuality has focused on critiques of identity politics as “a politics of recognition.” Susan Boyd’s (1999) feminist inspired work offers an example of legal scholarship exploring the challenge to identity politics raised by the “politics of redistribution.” Her work also questions the point of departure that sets recognition and redistribution as two categories that are in a relation of either/or. Her exploration of these issues takes place in relation to debates within feminism and the politics of kinship recognition, more specifically struggles over women’s rights in heterosexual and lesbian domestic relations.

The problematic reification of identity categories is another theme to be found in current work on sexuality in law. Here the concern focuses on the totalizing assumptions at work in sexual identity in general and “lesbian” or “gay” in particular as separate, distinct, and complete categories. Current work has examined the interface between sexuality and gender, race and ethnicity (Moran 2006). The impact of class, age, and disability on sexuality in law remains a neglected area of study. A new and exciting development has been an exploration of these issues in a postcolonial context (Kapur 1999; Hiu 2004).

Much remains to be explored, as the study of sexuality and the law is in its infancy. More research specifically examining the heterosexual norm needs to be undertaken in all contexts. In other respects, the future direction of research will in part be influenced by the context and location in which the research is being undertaken. For example, in several African states the preoccupation remains the impact of the criminal law, and sexual offenses in particular, on the lives of citizens and the absence of any civil and human rights relating to sexuality. In many western capitalist democracies sexuality in the arena of civil and human rights remains a dominant and still expanding theme. Sexuality in the context of kinship relations is another popular emphasis that is likely to grow in importance. In locations in which sexual citizenship has become more of a reality, studies of the impact of these changes not only upon the lives of individuals but on all aspects of society

will be important. As these reforms take effect, new agendas for empirical and critical work that explore the impact of these changes will emerge. For example, Shane Phelan’s *Sexual Strangers: Gays, Lesbians and the Dilemmas of Citizenship* (2001) explores some of the problems associated with the emerging concept of sexual citizenship. Leslie Moran and Beverly Skeggs’s *Sexuality and the Politics of Violence and Safety* (2004) explores some of the more troubling aspects of the sexual politics of criminal justice responses to the pervasive and damaging effects of sexual violence.

Another emerging agenda focuses on sexuality and law in a global context. One dimension of this is the global spread of sexual politics in relation to law. Carl Stychin’s *Nation by Rights* (1998) and *Governing Sexuality: The Changing Politics of Citizenship and Law Reform* (2003) begin an exploration of the globalization of sexual politics and the impact of sexuality on civil and human rights in both national and international contexts. A second dimension of this global turn is the emergence of a body of work on sexuality in law that brings new theoretical insights into play, such as work influenced by postcolonial scholarship (Kapur 1999).

While the work on sexuality and law is methodologically diverse, much work remains preoccupied with the analysis of texts. While the type of texts is now more diverse (ranging from media reports of legal activities, to law reports and case files, to literature and film), work that has a strong empirical focus using both quantitative and qualitative methods or ethnographic work is less common. More empirical work needs to be undertaken to examine the rapidly changing sexual landscape of law and legal relations.

SEE ALSO: Globalization, Sexuality and; Heterosexuality; Homosexuality; Law, Sociology of; Queer Theory; Same Sex Marriage/Civil Unions; Sexuality, Religion and

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sexuality, masculinity and

Rebecca F. Plante and Michael S. Kimmel

Nowhere in our intimate lives is there greater expression of gender difference than in our sexual relationships. “She” may make love “just like a woman,” as Bob Dylan famously sang, but “he” would make love just like a man. Though we often think that sexual orientation is the great dividing line in our sexual expression – that being gay or straight is all we need to know about a person’s sexuality – the evidence points decisively the other way, toward an understanding that gender, not sexual orientation, is the dividing line along which sexual expression, desire, and experience is organized. Gay men and straight men think and act in sexually similar ways, as do lesbians and straight women. In that sense, sexually speaking, gay men and lesbians are *gender conformists*.

How do we explain the different sexualities of women and men? How different are men’s and women’s sexualities? Have men’s sexualities changed over the last 100 years?

BEYOND BIOLOGY

Many people believe that the differences between male and female sexuality are the simple reflection of biological differences. Some point to different evolutionary imperatives, brain chemistry and organization, or endocrine differences to explain these differences. And while these are no doubt important, biological differences tend to *assume* the very questions we might seek to answer. For example, hormone levels may influence the intensity of the sex drive, but they do not predict its direction or the object of sexual desire. Evolutionary imperatives can be just as easily employed to find the opposite of contemporary US stereotypes. And biological models assume a uniformity *among* males and *among* females that is illusory; indeed, the really interesting variations are among women and among men, not small, sometimes barely perceptible, average differences between women and men.

To sociologists, sexuality is less the product of these biological drives and more a set of experiences constructed within a social, cultural, and historical context. Sex has a history and it varies not only between women and men, but across cultures and over time, and over the life course. Sexual identities and sexual behaviors occur within these sociocultural parameters, and normative constraints and cultural expectations guide the individual experience and expression of sexual life. Most significantly, sexuality is constructed through the lens of gender. We tend to believe that sexual expression is gender expression; we imagine that gay men and lesbians are gender nonconformists.

THEORIES OF SEXUAL DEVELOPMENT

There are several explanations of how men learn hegemonic expectations; these theories could ostensibly be applied to most cultures. Gagnon and Simon’s theory of *sexual scripting* argues that cultural, subcultural, and interpersonal standards for sexual and gendered conduct are socially constructed. Ideas about proper conduct and attitudes are gathered from prescriptive and proscriptive “scripts,” the shoulds, ought to’s, and don’ts of sexuality.

Social learning theory suggests that sexuality is learned through observation, modeling, and positive and negative reinforcement. So men's sexuality would be learned by observing models (family, friends, and mass mediated images) and coming to understand which behaviors and attitudes are culturally rewarded. This is in direct contrast to sociobiological theories, which posit that behavior is hormonal, innate, or essential. Therefore, men's sexuality would be ordained by non social sources. This view contributes to the belief that men's sexuality is natural, simple, and easy to decipher.

Psychoanalytic theories, derived from Freud, argue that sexuality is a major force, or drive (*libido*), and that the ego functions to translate social mores for the irrational, pleasure seeking id. Ego strength is the ability of the ego to channel sexual energies (sublimation) and redirect them toward culturally constructive outlets. These theories would suggest that the social elements of sexuality and gender are created from or result from the natural aspects of biologically based sex.

However, most sociologists would agree that western societies privilege binary, dichotomized, gendered roles and distinctions; the sexual arena is an ideal place in which to exemplify and magnify differences. Research suggests that in the West and in much of the rest of the world, action, autonomy, competition, and aggression are thought to be desirable masculine qualities. When these values are linked to beliefs about biology, the groundwork is laid for the creation of masculine sexuality that expects men to take the initiative, be aggressive, and be knowledgeable.

SEXUALITY AND GENDER INEQUALITY

Theories of sexuality must not only account for the differences between women and men, and the variations among women and among men, but also must explain sexual and gender inequality. In addition to other predictors of social inequality (age, race, class, ethnicity), gender and sexual orientation provide both the grounding for identity and the basis for inequality.

Patriarchy, which refers to a society in which social power rests mostly in men's hands, can

create a gender hierarchy in which men dominate or exploit women. The cultural value attributed to assertive, initiating, knowledgeable men is consequential. Rape, sexual assault, and child molestation are the darkest aspects of patriarchy, sexism, and gender inequities. Regardless of sexual orientation, men are expected to take charge and direct the action and interaction (but especially in heterosexual contexts). Certainly, in popular culture, men's sexuality is thought to be driven by efficient and irresistible forces and therefore resistant to social control.

Homophobia, defined as the fear of anyone or anything defined as gay or lesbian, is implicated in the construction of masculine sexuality. Conceptually, it can be better understood as a complex element of patriarchy and sexism, combined with hatred and fear of homosexuality. Homophobia disables intimacy for men. Masculine sexuality is organized around the underlying belief that women are inferior to men. The unfortunate misperception that gay equals feminine can result in the "sexual prejudice" that to be gay is to be "less than a man" (Herek 2005). Thus, some men's sexuality appears to be primarily organized around behavior and attitudes that prove heterosexuality. Many men suffer from the sociocultural contradictions of increasingly masculinized sexuality, which encourages risky and emotionally circumscribed interactions. Active pursuit of heterosexual and overt sexual prowess confer status, particularly for young men.

ELEMENTS OF THE MASCULINE SEXUAL SCRIPT

With genitalia outside the body, men can feel as if their emotions and sexualities are wholly *externalized*, suggests Gergen (2001). In this way, bodies become mechanized, tool like, exemplified by the occasional practice of referring to the phallus as an object (e.g., "The little head thinks for the big head," implying that phallic "behavior and logic" supersedes the brain). This can enhance a disjuncture for mind, body, feelings, and fantasies. Language and slang highlight this, such as "Little General," "love torpedo," "Herman the One Eyed German," and "Woodrow." The crucial element of masculine sexuality is the penis, a

visible and thus formidable symbol of *desire* and arousal. Men are expected to separate emotion from sexual action.

The mind/body separation, along with expectations of assertiveness and aggressiveness, can combine in volatile ways. Some men (and women) engage in “recreational” and/or risky sex. Recreational *sex* often requires a mind/body split so that feelings of intimacy, love, and tenderness can be dissociated from sexual encounters. This requires its participants to believe that sex is “just sex,” and can be pleasantly enjoyed without emotional fallout, dashed expectations, and differences in participants’ perceptions.

Sexuality for men has long included visual and written representations of people, positions, and practices, dating back to Greek and Roman eras. Pornography – materials that are sexually explicit and intended to cause sexual arousal – serves to eroticize particular cultural stories about sexualities. In modern western pornography men are depicted as powerful, lusty, sexual initiators with enormous phalluses that always perform reliably.

With the phallus as the largely undisputed focus of men’s sexuality, sociocultural scripts assert that it is natural for the penis to be the main “tool” of men’s sexuality. The corollary is that coitus (penile vaginal intercourse) is the most natural sexual behavior. Coitus is “real sex,” the only valid way to achieve pleasure. This taken for granted notion also reinforces the dominance of heterosexuality. This limits the cultural acceptance of non genital and some times solo forms of expression, though masculine sexuality includes many such examples, including watching erotic dancing (stripping), going to sex/swing clubs, and many bondage/dominance (or sado/masochism) activities.

Men are expected to master their bodies and sexualities. A spoof of the *Joy of Sex* (a popular sex how to manual) depicted men as the workers of sex, wearing hard hats and wielding jackhammers (McConnachie 1974). The “job” of sex asserts that sex is performative, an opportunity for men to demonstrate their prowess. (Thus, men experience “performance anxiety” when they “can’t get the job done.”) Men are especially responsible for controlling all aspects of heterosex, from flirtation and first meeting to foreplay and everything else. Combined with

the seemingly overt nature of his desire (symbolized by an erection), a man is particularly expected to labor to arouse his female partners, whose desire is thought to be more hidden and mysterious.

Masculine sexuality, as natural and organic, is thought to encompass more knowledge of sex than does feminine sexuality. Men “naturally” know not only how to control their own orgasms but also their partners’. The taxonomy of what the *Diagnostic and Statistical Manual* (1994) calls *male sexual dysfunction* includes at least two orgasm related issues: premature ejaculation and male orgasmic disorder (formerly “retarded ejaculation”). Both diagnoses rely on vague perceptions of what “normal” orgasm and ejaculation should be like – that it should be happening at just the right time. Masculine sexuality requires a man to be in control of his body at all times, moderating his arousal and responses so that he can orchestrate pleasure for his partner and/or display his skill.

Diagnoses of sexual dysfunction are not limited to orgasm issues – *erectile dysfunction* (ED) has powerful resonance for most men. The global market for erectile dysfunction pharmaceuticals is about US\$3 billion. Given the expectation that masculine sexuality is focused on the penis and heterosexual coitus, it requires an erection under a man’s control. ED challenges the belief that men’s bodies are purely external, devoid of contextual, relational, or health related influences. The popularity of erection control measures, including drugs, pumps, and implants, is testimony to the taken for granted assumptions that underlie masculine sexuality.

Masculine sexuality is especially thought to be subject to “the heat of the moment,” a powerful force of libido and desire that inhibits rationality and planning ahead. Lust and desire combine with the cultural belief that sex should be spontaneous and powerful, in the moment, and free from restrictions imposed by prophylaxis and contraception. Heterosexually active men can counteract the heat of the moment by reassuring themselves, independently of specific sexual encounters, that female partners use contraception. This logic supports the argument that condoms interfere with the lusty, spur of the moment impulses thought to be the most natural aspect of sex.

“Normative” male sexuality is therefore non relational, objectifying, and phallogentric, more prone to various paraphilia, multiple partners, recreational sexuality, and a strict separation of sex and love. Normative male sexuality is thus an expression of gender inequality, a mechanism for its reproduction, rather than a resistance to it. Happily, as with all such normative constructions, norms are more fungible in practice, and individual men still have large latitude in negotiating and developing different (and individual) sexual expressions.

SEE ALSO: Femininities/Masculinities; Hegemonic Masculinity; Homosexuality; Male Rape; Patriarchy; Pornography and Erotica; Viagra

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sexuality, religion and

Melissa M. Wilcox

Long perceived as major sources of social, political, economic, and even esoteric power, sexuality and religion are logical partners for sociological study. Although each is individually the subject of a significant subfield within sociology, in combination they have received less scholarly attention to date than they are due. Nevertheless, there is a significant body of work already in place on their many and varied connections – enough to point innovators in several fruitful directions. The key connections between these two powerful social institutions

lie in religious ritual, social structure and social control, and boundary creation and maintenance.

RITUALS

Although much of the study of religion has focused on belief, to individual members of a religion practice is often most central. This holds especially true in the context of sexuality, which is generally practiced – or not – depending on the teachings of a religious group and the practitioner’s position within that group.

Most salacious, though least common overall, are religious rites that involve sexual practice in some central way. Though many minority religious groups have been falsely accused of such ritual activity as part of attempts to discredit them, religions also exist that do make ritual use of human sexuality. In some cases these ritual practices are well within the social norm. Some cultures, for example, include sexual practices in their rites of passage from childhood to adulthood. It is worth noting that interpretations of such practices vary enormously; thus, sexual rites of passage are generally not viewed (primarily, at least) as a source of sexual pleasure but rather as a symbolically important part of social role transformation.

Socially normative sexual rites may also function metaphorically, on the time honored esoteric principle that activities in the microcosm are echoed in the macrocosm. Some ancient Mediterranean cultures practiced a form of so called “temple prostitution,” in which a practitioner had sexual intercourse with a deity in the form of that deity’s earthly representative – usually a priestess. Such intercourse, again, was not (primarily) for pleasure, and it was sometimes more symbolic than physical. Its purpose, rather, was to strengthen the bond between worshippers (or an entire people) and their deity, to encourage the fertility of the land, or to reenact a creation story. Within more esoteric traditions, such as Kabbalah (medieval Jewish mysticism), the sexual union of a married couple was interpreted as uniting the male and female aspects of the divine.

Other ritual uses of sexuality are intentionally transgressive. Perhaps the best known (and the most misunderstood) of these in the West today

is Tantra, a set of religious beliefs and practices that arose in India as early as the seventh century CE and eventually came to influence sectors of Hinduism, Buddhism, and Jainism (White 2003). Over the course of the past century western esotericists have imported aspects of a fairly garbled understanding of Tantra into their own mystical teachings and marketed the result as “sex magic,” “Tantra,” or “Tantric sex” (Urban 2004). In its South Asian context, however, the sexual aspects of Tantra are but one part of a larger structure in which direct contravention of social norms is held to be the key to advanced religious practice.

More common than sexual rituals are ritual restrictions on and purifications of sexuality. These include the restrictions on sexual practices and practitioners so famously analyzed by Mary Douglas in *Purity and Danger* (1966). Many religions consider sexual activity and often sexual fluids to be extremely powerful; some interpret this power as a kind of pollution and some as a source of ritual power, whereas others see it simply as a potential source of interference in the ritual. Since religions concerned with pollution are usually also concerned with purity, special sexual regulations for religious practitioners are quite common. These may include engaging in purifying practices before religious rituals if one has had sexual intercourse, menstruated, touched one’s genitals, given birth, masturbated, had nocturnal emissions, or, at the extreme, even thought about sex.

A number of important rituals regulate sexuality in the broader culture as well as within a religion. Marital rites are nearly ubiquitous, and often represent the social and religious sanction of sexuality between the people being married. Most religions treat sex within marriage and sex outside of marriage differently (such treatment also varies significantly by gender), and most see at least some forms of sexual activity as beneficial. A few, however, view human sexuality as a detriment to spiritual advancement, and enjoin either temporary or permanent celibacy on their most devout practitioners. Some, such as certain branches of Christianity, connect sexuality to evil, whereas others, such as renunciant strains of Hinduism and Buddhism, see it as a weakening of one’s spiritual powers (Hinduism) or an

unnecessary tie to an illusory and oppressive material world (Buddhism). A number of religions consider either women or (more commonly) men to be better suited to abstinence and therefore to advanced spiritual development; religion thus becomes an important determinant and carrier of gender roles as well as attitudes toward sexuality.

SOCIAL STRUCTURE AND SOCIAL CONTROL

Because religion concerns itself with ultimate reality, it is especially well suited as an agent of social control, but also as a locus for the deconstruction and reconstruction of the social order. Religious beliefs and practices shape sexual practices, beliefs, roles, identities, and norms; in essence, they are a key factor in the social construction of desire. Consider, for example, the stringent restrictions placed by many branches of Buddhism on contact between a nun or monk and a member of the opposite sex – or even, in the case of monks, certain types of men (Faure 1998). Catholic monastic orders warn against “special friendships” between members of the same sex; Orthodox Jewish synagogues and Muslim mosques keep the sexes separate; and many religions expect “modest” dress (however defined) during religious ritual. Each of these examples constructs desire implicitly, and suggests that sexuality and religion, while not necessarily enemies, are not quite compatible.

On the other hand, religion can also provide a site for powerful challenges to an existing social sexual order. The symbolic deployment of the *hijab*, or headscarf, by Muslim women is one example of this. Worn in different styles – or not at all – depending on the country, the culture, and the individual woman, the polysemic *hijab* has come to represent simultaneously male repression, anti imperialism, sensible fashion, and a feminist rejection of the male gaze. Other forms of social resistance that bring sexuality and religion together include new religious movements that experiment with sexual norms and family structure. In the US in the nineteenth century a flurry of new religious movements included the Shakers (founded in

the eighteenth century), who practiced celibacy and lived in sex segregated communal settings; the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter Day Saints, which experimented with polygyny for several decades; and the Oneida Perfectionists, who practiced *coitus interruptus* as a form of birth control, experimented with eugenics, and considered non procreative, heterosexual intercourse between members of the community to be a beneficial form of social interaction. Mid twentieth century new religious movements in the US included The Family (Children of God), who practiced for a number of years an evangelical method known as “flirty fishing”: using sex (usually between a female member and a male potential convert) as a recruitment tool.

An equally contested intersection of religion and sexuality is that of same sex eroticism – particularly gay, lesbian, or bisexual identity – and the Abrahamic religions of Judaism, Christianity, and Islam. The status of same sex eroticism in these religions has varied both across gender and over time. With contemporary western understandings of sexual orientation came a medicalized approach that removed same sex eroticism from religious discourse. As scientific and public opinion shifted during the 1960s and 1970s, homosexuality returned to being an important subject of moral and therefore religious concern. Simultaneously, self identified gay, lesbian, and bisexual Christians and Jews began organizing their own religious communities and demanding inclusion in heterosexually dominated organizations (Wilcox 2003). In response, efforts to resist the deconstruction and reconstruction of “tradition” have come not only from conservative, heterosexual dominated organizations but also from a new set of organizations often run by self identified “former homosexuals”: the ex gay movement, which argues that people with same sex desires can be healed or can at least learn to live “as God wants them to” – that is, in procreative, opposite sex marriages (Moon 2004).

In a number of societies sexual and gender norms are closely intertwined, with deviation from expected gender roles – especially on the part of men – implying an accompanying deviation from expected sexual roles. In most cases this has little to do with religion, but especially

in cultures where religion is diffuse, there is often overlap. Early Muslim cultures, for example, knew of *mukhannathun*, “effeminate men,” some of whom were associated with passive homosexuality, and this association strengthened in later centuries, though not without significant social and religious stigma (Rowson 1991; Murray & Roscoe 1997). In India, when a man assumes the identity of a *hijra*, he becomes a member of a third sex known to be sexually attracted to men but to live as women. Once a part of royal courts, *hijras* today are considered auspicious, especially on the occasion of a wedding or a birth, but are also social outcasts. Western cultures, lacking an auspicious model of gender crossing or same sex eroticism in their own dominant religion, have tended to romanticize the *hijras* in recent years while forgetting the social stigma and often the poverty that attends their lives (Nanda 1990). Also romanticized, as well as appropriated and misunderstood, is the “two spirit” person in indigenous North American cultures. Dubbed “berdache” (a derogatory term meaning male prostitute) by white anthropologists, two spirit people in traditional cultures adopted the gender roles of the opposite sex and were referred to by a variety of terms in their respective cultures. Some indigenous traditions recognized this phenomenon only in the male born, while several recognized it in those born female as well, and many did not recognize it at all. In some cultures a two spirit person would also adopt the sexual role normative to the opposite sex, pairing with a same sex but opposite gender partner; in other cases the expected pairing for a two spirit person was heterosexual (but homo gender). Furthermore, while some indigenous traditions assigned a special religious status to the two spirit person, this was not nearly as ubiquitous as contemporary gay and lesbian cultures have often implied. Today, traditional two spirit identities appear to be relatively rare, although there is a pan Indian two spirit movement that includes both the same sex attracted and the gender diverse (Jacobs et al. 1997).

In addition to sexual orientation, other forms of sexual identity may also be combined with religion. In religions where celibacy marks an advanced practitioner, the absence of sexual

practice may itself be an important identity factor. Conservative Christian teens may find a part of their identity in the True Love Waits movement, which encourages celibacy until marriage. And as Hardacre (1997) and Underwood (1999) have convincingly demonstrated, a spate of tabloid articles and spiritualists' advertisements about "spirit attacks" from aborted fetuses may have played a complex role in women's identity negotiations amid changing gender norms and sexual standards in Japan during the 1980s. Marriage also brings up a number of identity issues surrounding religion and sexuality. The most prominent in most western countries at the moment may be the legalization and religious recognition of same sex marriage, but questions of religious intermarriage and spousal conversion have been of concern in a number of religions for quite some time.

The topic of same sex marriage points to the intersection of religion, sexuality, and politics – three social spheres whose overlap is particularly explosive and contested. Political organizing by religious groups in the US has increasingly focused on sexuality issues since the 1960s. Conservative religious movements were appalled by the 1973 Supreme Court decision in *Roe v. Wade*, which legalized abortion. Liberalization of divorce laws, the legalization and public availability of a variety of contraceptives, the decriminalization and demedicalization of homosexuality, sex education in public schools, pornography, and prostitution have all been issues that have drawn religious conservatives in the US and elsewhere to band together for political purposes. Religious liberals have also organized in recent years; one interesting example in the US is Soulforce, which uses direct action tactics to protest policies that discriminate against lesbians, gay men, bisexuals, and transgendered people in religious groups. Also of concern globally is the rise of religious nationalism as a powerful political force, of which more below.

BOUNDARIES

Sexuality and politics intersect not only in secular spheres but also within religious organizations – and that intersection is increasingly

global. As women, lesbians, gay men, and bisexuals demand inclusion and rise to leadership positions within an increasing number of religious groups, those groups with international membership are forced to grapple with questions of human sexuality whose answers are often culturally bound. Further complications are introduced by the recent history of western colonialism and the ongoing tensions of postcolonial and neocolonial relationships. Within Buddhism, debates over women's roles and sometimes over same sex eroticism have been furthered by the differing perspectives of a growing population of western converts (some of whom are themselves religious leaders) and Buddhist leaders in historically Buddhist countries. The situation is even more complicated in the Anglican Communion, which began to evangelize in the southern hemisphere during British colonial rule and now includes a sizable and thus highly politically influential number of bishops from Africa and Southeast Asia. At recent conferences of the Anglican Communion, the ordination and episcopate of women, gay men, and lesbians have been central – and divisive – issues on the agenda (Rubenstein 2004).

Religion and sexuality played important roles in the formation of individual, group, national, and international boundaries long before gay and lesbian ordination, or even women's ordination, became a central topic of religious discussion. The creation and violation of personal sexual boundaries becomes a religious issue not only when religions are responsible for defining those boundaries, but also when religious leaders use their power and prestige to gain illicit sexual access to followers. Since both sexual harassment and rape are crimes of power, it stands to reason that some religious leaders, like other figures whose social standing is relatively unassailable, would be prone to such abuse. Examples abound across religions and time periods: medieval Japanese Buddhist texts praise the "love of boys," and describe not only secret communication codes between monks and novices but also strategies for coerced sex (Faure 1998). And despite the veneration of the female consort in South Asian Tantric texts, in practice the sexual rituals of Tantra can sometimes be more exploitive than enlightening for the women involved.

In 2002 sexual abuse scandals shook the Roman Catholic Church in the US. Of particular interest in this case are not only the allegations of sexual abuse, but also the intense interest of the media in sexual abuse committed on boys by celibate priests. A century and a half earlier, non Catholics in the US had been horrified and titillated by false reports that Catholic priests were abusing young girls; that contemporary allegations of abuse of women, and allegations against religious leaders outside Catholicism (i.e., non celibate leaders), fail to capture the public imagination in the same way says far more about sexual and religious preoccupations in the US than it does about the Catholic Church. Further analysis of representations of Catholicism and of the Vatican's draconian, homophobic response to the scandals would be immensely fruitful (Jordan 2003).

Religion and sexuality have conspired in the creation of boundaries and the construction of Others in ways that fundamentally shape the processes of colonialism, decolonization, and globalization. At the height of European colonialism many branches of Christianity worked hand in hand with colonial powers, not only accompanying military forces or in some cases paving the way through their evangelistic efforts, but also providing part of the justification for colonialism through their constructions of colonized peoples as religiously – and therefore culturally and intellectually – inferior. Important here is the religious and, later, academic construction of colonized peoples through sexual and gendered metaphors and stereotypes. A central aspect of missionary work in many colonies was the socialization of converts and schoolchildren into European sexual norms – a process that was integral to Christianization – and colonial laws often directly forbade sexual or related practices of which Christians of the period disapproved.

As countries around the world gained independence from European colonial powers, another important sexual and often religious symbol came to the fore: the use of the human body, and especially the bodies of women, as a metaphor for the nation (Friedland 2002). Religious nationalists in some former colonies decry western fashions for women (even as some nationalist men themselves sport western clothing) and insist on the careful control of women's

sexual behavior as a way of regaining and maintaining the country's strength (impregnability?) and independence. A classic example of this phenomenon is the rhetoric produced by both India and Pakistan (but especially India) in the wake of widespread kidnappings and sexual violence following the partition of India in 1947 (Menon 1998). In the US, too, sexual and religious imagery intertwine in national metaphors. A particularly instructive case is the aftermath of the September 11 attacks. "God Bless America" became a frantically repeated invocation while news reports bemoaned the "traumatic penetration" of the country and conservative Protestant leader Jerry Falwell blamed abortion doctors, feminists, and homosexuals for the attacks.

Under conditions of globalization, the cultural tensions that arise between immigrant communities and their hosts also link religion and sexuality. Concerns over western sexual mores and sexual identities sometimes attend the immigration of westerners into non western countries, and every immigrant community struggles some way with the differences in (often religiously based) sexual morality between the home culture and the host culture. Several European countries have recently become embroiled in what could be called "Muslim panics," fearing conservative Muslim influences on their societies and political systems. Many of those anxieties center around stereotypical perceptions of Islamic sexual and gender norms, driven in part (like some colonial sexual laws) by intense scrutiny of fairly rare events: in this case, especially "honor killings" and acid attacks directed against women believed to be threatening the family's honor, generally through a violation of strictly conservative sexual and gender norms. Some non Muslim Europeans use the brush of honor killings to tar all of Islam, forgetting that, like any other world religion, Islam is widely culturally diverse. Sexualized Muslim panics are only the most recent case in which gender, religion, sexuality, globalization, and postcolonial/neocolonial dynamics intertwine; religion and sexuality are so often integrated that a complete analysis of either often requires attention to both.

SEE ALSO: Globalization, Sexuality and; Islamic Sexual Culture; Sex and Gender; Sexual Identities; Sexual Politics; Women, Religion and

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sexuality research: ethics

Moira Carmody

Sexuality research and sex research differ in a number of important ways. Sex research focuses on the mechanics of sex and is dominated by biomedical discourses and most often framed from an "objective" stance. Sexuality research, on the other hand, recognizes power relations between women and men, between heterosexual and homosexual, and between cultures, and therefore is inherently political (Connell & Dowsett 1993). Sexuality and the research of sexuality are embedded in cultural and historical contexts. Both are embodied experiences that consider the complex dynamic meanings and activities, cultural signs, politics, and ethics that impact on its realization or repression.

Power relations are embedded in every aspect of sexuality research. As Denzin in *The Research Act* (1989) has argued, when sociologists do research they inevitably take sides for or against particular values, political bodies, and society at large. This argument includes sexuality researchers, who focus on the most intimate aspects of people's lives. Within the divergent research traditions of sociology there are a number of approaches that reflect particular forms of knowledge about sexuality and ethics. These include functionalists such as Talcott Parsons, symbolic interactionists such as Gagnon and Simon, and Plummer, feminist theorists as diverse as Dworkin and Rubin, masculinity theorists such as Connell, and poststructuralist theorists such as Foucault. While each of these perspectives varies in how it conceptualizes sexuality and gender, they all reflect particular configurations of values, ethics, and society. How sexuality researchers frame their research projects will be influenced by their commitment to or rejection of these or other social theories.

Ethical considerations include the way the research question is constructed, the topic to be studied, and the people or issue being explored, the biography and relations among researchers, the values of the funding body and other actors, and the methodology chosen by the researcher. Laud Humphreys was strongly criticized for the use of deception in his methodology when following up men who engage in

impersonal sex. Ethics also includes which individuals or groups are excluded from research and whether they represent marginal or more powerful groups. Lee, reviewing research on sensitive topics, highlights how sexuality researchers may experience "stigma contagion," coming to share the stigma associated with those being studied. Citing a range of authors, he highlights how researchers may experience stereotypical expectations about sex researchers or have their work and their advancement in the academy trivialized or seen as marginal to mainstream disciplines. Sexuality research therefore raises a diversity of ethical challenges for researchers in this field.

There are several ways that sexuality researchers can seek guidance to resolve research ethics. The benchmarks for guiding research with humans has a long history within medical sciences after the Nuremberg trials. Increasingly, social sciences are paying attention to this issue. Reference to codes of ethical practice such as those of the British Sociological Association (2002) or the American Sociological Association (1999) may provide a general overview. However, much of the academic surveillance of research is carried out by university ethics committees or internal review boards (US). It appears to vary significantly between disciplines, universities, and countries. The overriding concern in deciding what is ethical research is the balance between perceived harm to an individual involved in a research project and the perceived benefits to the individual and society in general. While as a guiding principle this is worthy, the operation of this principle can create particular difficulties for sexuality researchers. As Beck in *The Risk Society* (1992) has indicated, western societies are increasingly focused around a discourse of risk and risk management. When this is combined with ethics committees dominated by a positivist and biomedical model, sexuality researchers often find worthy projects questioned. This may include challenging the "objectivity" of qualitative methodology and sampling "bias" when sexual cultures or networks are the focus of study. Regulation may extend to a focus on reporting adverse impacts of research on participants rather than balanced reporting on both positive and negative outcomes. Underpinning these challenges is the conflict between different research paradigms or attempts to silence the voices of sexual minorities through assumptions

of heteronormativity and institutionalized homophobia or sexism. These challenges and how sexuality researchers and ethics committees resolve them will significantly impact on the kind of research that gets funded and the construction of knowledge. A risk management model of research, while possibly protecting individual institutions against future litigation, does little to help sexuality researchers in developing transparent ethical research practices.

There is danger in researchers feeling that all the ethical issues have been dealt with once ethics committee approval is obtained. Codes of practice assume a fixed position and deny the dynamic nature of research and a conception of ethics where meanings are subject to negotiation and redefinition. However, ethical issues confront researchers in a number of areas, including relationships in the field, informed consent, use of the Internet, representation of data, and support for researchers.

Boundaries between the researcher and the researched may be blurred when exploring sexual cultures if the researcher is a member of that culture. This occurs in many aspects of sexuality research and is a continuing issue in HIV research. Disclosing personal details to enhance a connection with an informant could result in either feeling vulnerable or being exposed to harm. The erotic subjectivity of anthropologists in the cultures they study is explored in depth in an edited collection by Kulick and Wilson (1995). Interestingly, they had great difficulty finding heterosexual male anthropologists who were willing to write about how they resolve the ethics of these contacts. Feminist critiques of research have challenged the gender blindness of much research and some have argued for attempting to equalize the power relationships as a framework for shared political struggle. This can present ethical difficulties when researchers universalize the meaning of gender and how this relates to sexuality for other women within their own or other cultures.

Regulation of sexuality research may vary between institutional settings and countries and can raise significant risks of the researcher imposing first world research processes and interpretation of findings in a less developed setting. Sensitivity to cross cultural differences may be acknowledged intellectually by research teams, but this may not provide ethical guidance

in relation to personal and research relationships with participants. It may also result in a failure to recognize the ways in which sexuality and sex practices are understood in these settings and may “spoil the field” for future research efforts. There are positive and negative possibilities of participant observation in a range of settings where sex occurs, for example, if a researcher is investigating sex work, commercial sex venues, or sadomasochism (SM) communities. What ethical code do they call on to guide their relationships with other people in the setting or their own behavior? The risks are significant, not only physically but also professionally if not handled well, as Harry Wolcott recounts in *Sneaky Kid and its Aftermath* (2002).

Gaining informed consent from research participants is central to ethical research to ensure there is no coercion and that participants understand the meaning of consent. Some ethics bodies require written consent, but this can raise particular dilemmas for sexuality researchers. Participant observation research is a case in point. It may not be appropriate to pull out a consent form in a sex venue or when interviewing sex workers or young homeless people. In situations where people are justifiably suspicious of authority figures or “outsiders,” the demand for written consent may work against gaining important knowledge from informants. Longitudinal studies may also present other dilemmas. Consent given at the beginning of a project may need to be revisited further into the project as participants’ circumstances or researchers change.

Sexuality research using the Internet extends ethical issues into the virtual world. As this is a relatively new domain for sexuality research, there are to date only limited guidelines to assist researchers. Given the anonymity of cyberspace, it may be that respondents are less cautious in this context than in a face to face setting. Consent is complex in this setting and there needs to be a mechanism to ensure who is actually consenting and some way to verify their “identity.” Privacy issues may also need to be addressed given the problems of computer hacking and software sharing programs. The Internet may provide increased opportunities for researching individuals and groups who may be hard to recruit, for example, same sex attracted young people or groups with specific

fetishes. Research with under age young people is often contentious. Yet important research with young people about sexuality could significantly add to community knowledge and lead to improvement in services targeted to their needs. However, fears of the sexual exploitation of children and young people make this an area that many ethics committees are reluctant to support without parental approval (Binik et al. 1999).

The interpretation of data and their dissemination raises another set of challenges for all researchers, including those in the field of sexuality. Decisions about what methodology will be chosen to analyze data not only impact on the rigor of the project but also highlight “the crisis of representation” facing all social science. Ethical decisions are reflected in the choice of theoretical approach, which part of the data to include and exclude, and what interpretation is made of findings. Postmodern approaches have challenged the “truth” claims of positivist research. This suggests the need to be very transparent about the partial nature of the stories told and to locate findings from the point of view of the “historically and culturally situated individual.”

Sexuality researchers enter the field from a range of disciplines, including sociology, anthropology, criminology, psychology, history, cultural studies, and political science. The interdisciplinary nature of current sexuality research means that researchers often come to the issue with a range of expectations and experiences shaped by age, gender, sexuality, culture background, and (dis)ability. Their disciplinary background may provide some frameworks for guiding their behavior in relation to sexuality research. Research teams may provide an important context for ethical issues to be debated and resolved. However, many researchers work alone, or may be inexperienced or a long way from their home base. In addition, even experienced researchers may find themselves facing ethical and personal difficulties once the research project has commenced. While most ethics committees are focused on ensuring no harm is done to research participants and ensuring they have phone numbers for counseling or follow up support, there is less formal acknowledgment of the need to prevent harm to researchers. This is relevant

during fieldwork or afterwards when findings are published and they may come under intense scrutiny from disaffected individuals or organizations. Developing mechanisms of support during fieldwork, including debriefing and after the completion of projects, is fundamental to ethical research practice and necessary for new and inexperienced researchers, including postgraduates.

The development of ethical practice in relation to sexuality research requires a much more dynamic and complex process than a purely regulatory approach. The sensitive and intimate nature of sexuality research and the multiple sites and cultural contexts in which it is carried out suggest the need to encourage ethical subjectivity in researchers. Central to this would be a focus on reflexivity. Ethical subjects, following Michel Foucault, *Ethics: The Essential Works*, reflect on how we constitute ourselves as moral subjects of our own actions, and essential to this subjectivity is caring for others. Jeffrey Weeks proposes a sexual ethics based on radical pluralism. This approach moves away from an absolutist model of ethics. Instead, it suggests ethics need to be developed based on the social production of sexualities and the complex ways in which they are embedded in diverse power relations. Zygmunt Bauman (1993) argues for a postmodern ethics in which there is a greater awareness of making ethical choices in every part of life and the profoundly ambivalent nature of these choices. Plummer (2001) argues for a much clearer discussion of these issues amongst researchers that does not always rely on abstract principles but takes seriously the stories researchers provide of their own situated ethical problems and decision making.

SEE ALSO: Ethics, Research; Observation, Participant and Non Participant; Sexual Practices; Sexuality Research: History; Sexuality Research: Methods; Survey Research

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sexuality research: history

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Research on sexuality began as a complex and interdisciplinary endeavor. Although it was, like so many of today's fields, a product of the nineteenth century belief in the power of rational scientific investigation, it was very much a latecomer. F. H. A. Marshall commented in his 1910 synthesis, *The Physiology of Reproduction*, that physiologists had made comprehensive studies of all other bodily functions, but reproduction had not been the object of sustained research. Marshall was thus obliged to bring together scraps of evidence from diverse sources, from anthropology via medicine to animal husbandry. Research on sexuality was similarly affected by a scarcity of materials and taboos against investigation, and the threat of prosecution for publication.

The lack of institutional and financial support, and the general unacceptability of the subject, meant that large projects using the research protocols emerging in medicine and the social sciences were an impossibility. Thus research into sexuality initially tended to be based in the analysis of phenomena brought to the investigator's attention (cases encountered by doctors, legal trials, self observation, reports from friends and colleagues, letters from readers), and the

collation of evidence gleaned from a wide variety of fields – history, literature, medicine, and the growing field of anthropology and ethnography. Theories might be engendered from impressionistic, limited, biased, and unrepresentative empirical materials. The subject was marginalized and stigmatized and did not lead to any of the usual professional rewards. Such research, therefore, was most often conducted by those who had some kind of personal motivation to pursue it.

The wider roots of the desire to investigate sexuality were several. The rise in urbanization and consequent opportunities for social mobility had led to the breakdown of traditional forms of control over sexual behavior. Prostitution was on a larger scale and much more visible in such conurbations. They also enabled previously isolated individuals, such as men who desired other men, to meet one another and to create subcultures based on identity. Darwin's theories of the role of sexual selection in evolution provided an important legitimating as well as analytical device for thinking about the subject. Venereal diseases were widespread and incurable. The rise of a social purity movement aimed at improving both the morality and the health of society made powerful representations for the benefits of talking about sexual matters rather than concealing them under a cloak of taboo. To provide proper knowledge of the workings of the body required that these should be understood, with healthy scientific information replacing old wives' tales and furtive smut. A developing women's movement destabilized accepted ideas about marriage and sexual morality and current notions of gender. All these elements were turning sexuality into something with social, rather than purely individual, resonances, while undermining assumptions about "the natural."

PRELIMINARY APPROACHES

Initially, specific problems were considered more or less in isolation. Concern over prostitution, and its concomitant of sexually transmitted diseases, led to interest in how and why women became prostitutes. Facilitated by the existing French system of regulation, sanitarian Jean Baptiste Parent Duchâtelet made a study of Parisian prostitutes, based on incarcerated

women registered with the police, excluding casual and clandestine prostitution and the higher echelons. This major study was not published until after the author's death (1836). The British surgeon William Acton, in his own work on the subject (1858), deplored the fact that, because of both the differing organization of the trade and greater moral prudery, such a detailed study could not be undertaken in Britain. The American Abraham Flexner, in *Prostitution in Europe* (1919), revealed that covert, clandestine, and casual prostitution flourished even in countries which imposed regulatory systems of control and medical inspection.

Such studies were undertaken by men and focused on women, or a particular class of women, as a "problem," on whom they could turn a scientific and pathologizing gaze. The idea that the consumer of prostitution might also be a problem to be addressed was only raised later in the nineteenth century, by the feminist wing of the developing social purity movement, in a political, not merely moral, critique of social acceptance of male promiscuity. However, as studies on the subject continued to comment into the final decades of the twentieth century, the male purchaser of sexual services remained shadowy.

A rather different situation pertained in the case of men defined by the term coined by the Hungarian Kertebeny in 1869, "homosexual." While there were sporadic medical reports on cases involving men desiring other men, and a medico forensic literature on "sodomy," the debate on homosexuality was generated, initially, by men trying to understand their own stigmatized desires, in many countries subject to brutal criminal penalties. Among the resources drawn upon were changing scientific understandings of the body and of anatomical development. The pioneering figure Karl Heinrich Ulrichs, initially under the pseudonym "Numa Numantius" and then in his own name, published a series of monographs on same sex love in which he posited a theory of gender inversion (the female psyche in the male body, and vice versa) of congenital origin. He endeavored to gain medical allies, and influenced later work by the psychiatrists Richard von Krafft Ebing and Carl Westphal, although he considered that their views were distorted by seeing an undue proportion of criminal or insane, rather than healthily

functioning, homosexuals, leading merely to replacing concepts of homosexuality as sin or crime with a disease model.

While the evolution of ideas about the homosexual was a major concern in discussions of sexual “deviation” in the late nineteenth century, and has been the main focus of scholarship in the area, other phenomena which could not be assimilated to a post Darwinian evolutionary model of the role of sexual selection in reproduction were also analyzed. French psychologist Alfred Binet invented the term “fetishism,” given more extensive currency by Krafft Ebing, who himself defined “sadism” and “masochism.” Oosterhuis in *Stepchildren of Nature* (2000) reveals a significant subgroup of male masochists among Krafft Ebing’s patients and informants. A group generally marginal to these discussions was women (possibly because being a woman was already considered deviant or at least problematic). There was some discussion of the lesbian, though there were far fewer cases reported in the growing literature on homosexuality, but “masochism” was seen as innate to the female nature and thus only a problem when it manifested in men.

THE FIELD DEVELOPS

Around the turn of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries several writers began to pull together the various strands within which sexual matters were being analyzed – the public health and morality concern with prostitution and venereal diseases, the legal and medical debates on homosexuality, concerns over marriage and reproduction (inflected by the theory of eugenics adumbrated by Darwin’s cousin Francis Galton), anthropological reports on other cultures, arguments for the desirability of general sexual enlightenment, medical cases, historical data – into broader syntheses. A leading figure in this new development was the British doctor and literary figure Havelock Ellis, who between 1897 and 1927 produced his massive seven volume study, *Studies in the Psychology of Sex*, the first volume of which, *Sexual Inversion*, was prosecuted for obscenity, a traumatic event leading Ellis to have the rest of the series published in the US. Although Magnus Hirschfeld began as a homosexual rights activist anxious to repeal

or moderate the German laws on the subject, over his lengthy career as researcher, educator, and campaigner his copious writings covered a much wider range of sexual issues. He also created connections between isolated individuals in different countries working in the field by establishing journals, setting up an Institute for Sexual Science in Berlin (destroyed by the Nazis in 1933), and facilitating international networks through holding congresses. Iwan Bloch took a similar broad and deep view, in particular emphasizing the importance of historical understanding. Such figures laid a necessary foundation for further work by synthesizing materials from a diversity of sources to establish a picture of what was known about sexuality. A very different approach to the study of sex, emphasizing the depths of the psyche rather than the broad sweep of societies in time and space, was that evolved by Sigmund Freud and the early psychoanalytic movement. Freud made the significant observation that understanding the process by which heterosexuality developed was just as problematic as discovering the “cause” of homosexuality and that the relation between desire and its object was by no means a given.

Well behind investigation into the other endocrine secretions, work was undertaken on the sex hormones. The topic had been cast into some disrepute as a result of the Franco American Brown Sequard’s sensationalized “rejuvenation” treatments of the 1890s, and respectability was further compromised by similar promises from Steinach and Voronoff in the interwar years. For several decades research remained predicated on the assumption that gender specific ovarian and testicular hormones influenced sexual identity and functioning: this was discovered not to be the case by the late 1920s. With the development of biochemical assaying techniques, research moved into the realm of chemists in the laboratory – a degree of removal from the messy processes of the body and direct connection with sexual functioning which doubtless influenced the increasing scientific respectability of the field and its access to resources, but also led to a loss of connection with research into sex within its social context.

In the United States, the issues vigorously debated and discussed within American sex radical and reform movements of the mid nineteenth century had been, if not silenced,

seriously muffled by the rise of the movement for aggressive censorship of sexual materials embodied in Anthony Comstock. Thus initiatives such as Clelia Mosher's 1890s survey of women's experiences of and attitudes toward sex, unpublished until the 1970s, had no influence and established no tradition. For several decades Robert Latou Dickinson privately accumulated detailed information on the patients in his gynecological practice, including drawings (later photographs) of their genital anatomy. Prince A. Morrow brought European debates on the venereal disease (VD) problem and the ineffectuality of policing prostitutes to the US and tied these in to concerns over marriage. Research became legitimized by the arguments of improving marriage and reducing disease: studying what went wrong with sexual lives would assist in working out how to ensure things went right. A number of surveys were undertaken and several published: G. V. Hamilton's *A Research in Marriage* (1929), Katharine Bement Davies's *Factors in the Sex Life of 2200 Women* (1929), Robert L. Dickinson and Lura Beam's *A Thousand Marriages* (1931) and *The Single Woman* (1934).

It was in this context of the concept of strengthening marriage through better understanding of sex that Alfred Kinsey was able to inaugurate his mammoth enterprise of researching the sexual life of the human male and female. Focusing on behaviors rather than on emotions or attitudes, he collected a huge amount of material through face to face interviews with unprecedentedly huge numbers of men and women. The fruits of his researches were published as *Sexual Behavior in the Human Male* and *Sexual Behavior in the Human Female* (1953). There remained questions about how representative they were, a factor of which Kinsey was well aware. He tried to obtain 100 percent responses from any group or community studied, made particular attempts to gain access to groups that might otherwise be underrepresented, and designated certain areas as necessitating future research projects. Kinsey's work remains controversial, but also still profoundly influential.

Kinsey and his team undertook, among other things, some direct study of sexual intercourse, but the researchers who fully broke this final

barrier were William Masters and Virginia Johnson, who undertook extensive mapping of the processes of arousal and satisfaction using human participants in the laboratory, assisted by technological developments. Their work has been critiqued for its attempt to ignore context and social aspects of sexual interaction by selecting specifically for participants who were capable of functioning in the laboratory milieu, and, in the case of women, were readily orgasmic, and on this basis creating a one size fits all model of the process of arousal, orgasm, and resolution.

Research into sexuality followed a path from the specific to the very general synthesis, succeeded by a branching out into new separate paths concentrating on distinct aspects (the physiological, the social, the psychological). Lack of coordination between different approaches has remained a problem.

SEE ALSO: Ellis, Havelock; Fetishism; Freud, Sigmund; Hirschfeld, Magnus; Homosexuality; Kinsey, Alfred; Krafft Ebing, Richard von; Prostitution; Sadomasochism; Sexual Deviance; Sexuality Research: Ethics; Sexuality Research: Methods; Survey Research

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sexuality research: methods

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As Kinsey and others discovered to their cost, sex research is fraught with problems for researchers and must be managed carefully. In the US, Congress has cut or threatened the funding in recent decades for two national surveys of sexual behavior: a study of massage parlor workers and a study of sexual risk taking, among other topics. And those who publish research invite trouble, as the University of Minnesota Press found when it published Judith Levine's *Harmful to Minors*.

Although researchers have been concerned about this problem for over 100 years, Kinsey was the first to discuss it explicitly. Worried about guarding the confidentiality of the thousands of respondents who agreed to share their sex histories, he trained his hand-picked interviewers to learn the questions and write the answers in carefully guarded code, and he kept locks on all the materials in his institute. Even so, in 1954, when Congress investigated the Rockefeller Foundation to punish it for opposing the House Un-American Activities Committee, the only issue raised was their funding of Kinsey's research. As a result, the funding ceased.

While sociologists argue that we become sexual just like we become anything else, those who engage in sexuality research recognize that their work differs from that of others, for the reasons outlined above. These researchers have

responded to the perceived dangers by careful management. Many sociologists of sexuality write theoretical articles, or use small numbers of qualitative interviews with carefully selected volunteer respondents, or undertake historical research using texts as their data source. Such studies cannot usually be generalized to the population of interest. Researchers who undertake quantitative work justify their carefully picked topics by citing compelling social reasons.

In addition, researchers have ignored methodological problems associated with asking sensitive questions for fear of inviting criticism discrediting their results. For example, there has been an enormous amount of research on voting behavior in the United States in response to the difficult problems associated with getting an accurate account of the vote and with predicting who will vote and how in forthcoming elections. Until recently, there has been no comparable body of research on sexual behavior surveys.

In the last decade or so the picture has changed, and major research centers have begun to undertake methodological research on sex surveys. In spite of Foucault's declaration that talk about sex led to self-policing, not to liberation, and even in the face of much discourse intended to control sexuality, most would agree that attitudes towards sexuality are more liberal and facilitate more open discussion of sexual behavior than previously. Surveys are one kind of open discussion about sex. In addition, the devastation caused by AIDS has provided ample justification for prying into the private lives of individuals.

Much of this research has been undertaken in the United States, and this is the focus of our discussion. However, a few examples of important research elsewhere should be mentioned. Here too, much of the impetus has been HIV transmission. When Congress cut the funding for a national survey of adults, the researchers at the University of Chicago were able to field a survey without support from the Robert Wood Johnson Foundation, but it was much smaller than originally planned. When the British government cut the funding for a similar survey, the Wellcome Foundation funded a large national survey and a decade later the government funded a repeat. From the beginning, one of

the researchers, Kaye Wellings, took an interest in data quality. A major research focus was behavioral change over time, so she used a series of techniques to ascertain whether reported changes in socially disapproved of behavior between 1990 and 2000 resulted from actual behavioral change. And at the Australian Research Centre in Sex, Health and Society, researchers interested in HIV transmission have explored such topics as how to measure sexual behavior in high risk venues and the validity of self reported condom use.

What follows is a brief description of some American research on some of the problems identified in sex surveys, and examples of attempts to solve these problems.

SELECTING THE POPULATION TO INTERVIEW

Kinsey refused to use probability sampling, even after its efficacy was explained to him, because he believed he could not interview respondents who were not volunteers and because he did not understand that the greatest variety was not the same as a representation of the population. Researchers now understand and use modern sampling techniques with great success. Survey response rates have declined as a result of caller ID and increased consumer weariness over telephone abuses, but they are not higher on sex surveys than other surveys. For example, the Chicago survey (the National Health and Social Life Survey) undertaken by Edward Laumann and colleagues at the National Opinion Research Center (NORC) in 1992, reported a 79 percent response rate, which compares favorably with between 75 percent and 79 percent for NORC's General Social Survey (GSS).

There are still major sampling issues, particularly in the lack of a national probability sample of men who have sex with men, because it is difficult and time consuming to sample rare populations, especially when the selection factor concerns behavior that is not always admitted to.

PROBLEMS WITH THE INTERVIEW

Several interviewing problems continue to challenge researchers. Kinsey believed erroneously

that respondents would be more willing to unburden themselves to middle class white men with "non ethnic" names. Today, most interviewers are women, and most experts regard women as better interviewers than men. With sex surveys, however, some argue that accuracy improves with interviewers of the same gender as respondents, particularly when asking about sensitive topics such as rape or anal intercourse. When AIDS first appeared, surveyors of gay men argued that self identified gay male interviewers were more successful than women or heterosexual men.

The mere presence of an interviewer may affect response accuracy. When Laumann and colleagues (1994) asked respondents for the number of lifetime sexual partners, women reported an average of 3 male partners and men an average of 12 female. Both of these averages cannot be correct. One problem with asking this question is that it places a burden on respondents. For people with many partners, this question is difficult to answer. They may estimate rather than enumerate, particularly given interview time constraints. Those who enumerate may forget some partners, especially when constrained to give an answer quickly. Brown and Sinclair (1999) asked college students their total number of sexual partners, and then asked how the number was derived. When men and women used the same technique the distribution of number of partners was similar by gender, but enumeration produced lower tallies than estimation and men were more likely to estimate than women. Thus the authors concluded that the difference in results is not a product of intentional deception.

Not all researchers agree. Many recognize that reputational issues for men and women push the genders in opposite directions, such that some men deliberately overestimate their lifetime sexual partners and some women deliberately underestimate. If so, the more a respondent feels anonymous and unknown to even the interviewer, the more accurate the data should be. This was shown by Tourangeau and Smith (1996) in a comparison of computer assisted personal interviewing with computer assisted self administered interviewing. Men using self administered questionnaires reported fewer sexual partners than men listening to interviewers, and women reported more.

QUESTIONNAIRE DESIGN

Researchers recognize that respondents have to complete a number of tasks in answering a question. In addition to the issues of retrieval discussed above, they must comprehend the question. Since questions about sexual behavior are not part of everyday polite conversation, there may not be general agreement about the word meaning. When Bill Clinton stated that oral/genital sex did not constitute "having sex," about half the American population agreed with him. Furthermore, there are social class and educational variations in sexual terminology. Kinsey realized that less well educated respondents would not understand "masturbation," so he used terms like "jerk off" instead. However, since "jerk off" would offend the better educated, he used masturbation where he deemed it appropriate.

Researchers today want to use the same words for all because wording changes affect answers, but problems of comprehension remain. Lauermann et al. (1994) approached the masturbation problem with a written definition: "By masturbation, we mean self sex or self stimulation, that is, stimulating your genitals (sex organs) to the point of arousal but not necessarily to orgasm or climax." Thus, in order not to offend by using "jerk off," they used several difficult words, one of which even got its own additional definition. And those who cannot understand such terms tend to be demographically concentrated. Binson and Catania found that although only 4 percent and 5 percent, respectively, said they had difficulty understanding "vaginal intercourse" and "anal intercourse," 20 percent and 25 percent of those with less than 12 years of schooling reported difficulty.

With sensitive questions, researchers may list alternative responses to a question so that the respondent can pick a category rather than reveal their actual answer. However, when social desirability is an issue, respondents may pick one of the central categories, on the grounds that this is going to appear average or normal. And the respondents may not volunteer information needed to understand their responses. For example, opinion questions on controversial topics may not record strength of the opinion. Schuman and Presser (1996) showed the importance of this in a study of

attitudes towards abortion. In the GSS most respondents (58 percent) favored legal abortion for married women, but those opposing this right were much more likely to consider it to be a very important issue (49 percent) than those in favor (21 percent). In a follow up study, 65 percent said they agreed with abortion on demand in the early months of pregnancy, but 70 percent of those opposed described their views as very strong or extremely strong, compared to only 25 percent of those in favor. Finally, almost 20 percent of women against abortion on demand had given money and/or written a letter for the cause, compared to just over 5 percent of those in favor. Even though most Americans support a woman's right to choose, activists are to be found substantially in the opposition.

Finally, researchers are sometimes unclear as to the question they want answering. When Kinsey asked questions about homosexuality, he asked about desire as well as about behavior because he assumed some people wanted to engage in same gender sex but lacked the courage to act on their desires. Based on the result of these questions he placed each respondent on his scale from 0 (exclusively heterosexual) to 6 (exclusively homosexual). He assumed that desire could be added to behavior to provide an estimate of "natural" homoerotic behavior in a non repressive society. Laumann and colleagues asked separate questions about behavior, about desire, and about identity and found differences in the incidence and distribution of each. Identity – that is, self identifying as gay, lesbian, or bisexual – proved less frequent than the report of same gender desire or behavior. Just over 10 percent of men and slightly fewer women reported any same gender sexual activity or interest. Of these, only one quarter of the men and 15 percent of the women reported same gender desire, behavior, and identity. Most women reported only desire, with some reporting desire and behavior and some reporting only behavior. The pattern was the same for the men, although men were less likely to report only desire and more likely to report only behavior. This becomes important when we consider that in studying AIDS, we should want to know which men have sex with other men, not which men consider themselves to be gay.

DATA ANALYSIS

Researchers now understand that their biases can influence the outcome of their data analysis, and they use sophisticated data analysis techniques to be more certain of their conclusions. Yet the questions they ask of the data reveal a point of view. Laumann and colleagues were careful to present their findings as evidence of the conservative nature of American sexual behavior, pointing out, for example, that the modal number of lifetime sexual partners was one and that married individuals reported the highest rates of sexual satisfaction. In doing so, they chose to emphasize the conservative sexual behavior of the majority of Americans instead of the libidinous minority. This was reassuring to researchers who had been accused of attempting to promote sexual hedonism in Americans by normalizing extreme behavior.

This brief description of modern practice suggests that a history of sexual behavior surveys is a history of the growing sophistication of researchers and the increasing certainty of their conclusions. In order for this to be the case, researchers would have to be neutral observers of sexual behavior, an unlikely proposition in a world where no one escapes pressure to monitor personal sexual standards and desires. In addition, sexual behavior would be independent of history and culture, and questions such as the proportion of gays in the population would be technical, not political, and they would not be historically specific. While survey improvements have produced more accurate reflections of historical moments, surveys do not divulge universal truths, only those relative to their time and place.

Surveys teach us not only about sexual behavior in America and elsewhere, but also about the beliefs shaping sexual behavior, and about the concerns driving researchers to ask questions. And as survey practice has improved, the ensuing descriptions of sexual practice not only provide a behavioral control, but they also normalize the desires of those who learn there are others like them.

SEE ALSO: Abortion as a Social Problem; AIDS, Sociology of; Health Risk Behavior; Interviewing, Structured, Unstructured, and Postmodern; Kinsey, Alfred; Methods; Random

Sample; Sexuality Research: Ethics; Sexuality Research: History; Survey Research

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sexuality and sport

Caroline Fusco

Michel Foucault (1978), one of the most influential historians of sexuality, argued that sex and sexuality became a pivot for the organization and control of life in the modern world, and that sex and sexuality are increasingly central to human affairs to the extent that much of contemporary life has been organized around these concepts.

Although the relation between sexuality and sport serves as a central structure for body/identity/gender meanings, sexuality was

a neglected area of inquiry in sports studies until the mid 1990s. Sport has long been a site for the reproduction of difference, particularly the naturalization of sexual differences, but sexuality occupied a somewhat “absent presence” in sport sociological research until the late 1980s, when sports sociologists explicitly addressed this topic. Since that time, scholars in the sociology of sport have figured prominently in the critique of historical and cultural forms of sexuality and the ways that sport serves as a site for constructing and policing sexualities and both reproducing and resisting heterosexism and the heterosexualization of sport related forms (Birrell & Cole 1994).

Although there are many sexual orientations (heterosexual, homosexual, bisexual, transgendered, transsexual, queer, etc.), the study of sexuality in physical education and sport has been characterized by the assumption that “sexuality” is non normative; that is, the study of sexuality and sport has historically (and some times in the contemporary moment) been understood as the study of homosexuality or other “deviant” sexualities and sport. Such an approach assumes that heterosexuals do not have “a sexuality,” and it has interfered with developing a fuller theoretical and empirical understanding of sexuality and sport.

Prior to the late 1980s, research on sport and sexuality was primarily framed within a socio-psychological framework and focused on the role conflict that women athletes experienced while participating in sports and the strategies they used to cope with the contradictions that arose between competing in sport – historically and socially constructed as a masculine practice – and their feminine gender role. Critics argued that all of this social psychologically oriented scholarship was based on the faulty assumptions that all women athletes were heterosexual, and that “feminine” always implied heterosexuality. These assumptions led researchers to overlook the experiences of women athletes who did not define themselves as heterosexual and identified as gay or lesbian. Lesbianism was thereby erased from women’s sports. This “conspiracy of silence” meant that lesbian athletes were ignored, shunned, and constrained to remain invisible in sports, and the lesbian label was used to intimidate lesbians and heterosexual

women. As a result, attempts by women athletes to challenge socially constructed gender relations in sport were undermined and sports continued to valorize heterosexuality.

Feminist theorists in the 1990s disrupted the conspiracy of silence by exposing homophobia in women’s sport and physical education, and making visible the experiences of athletes, coaches, and physical education teachers who identified as gay or lesbian. Research identified the heterosexual and homophobic discrimination inherent in women’s sports and validated a proliferation of accounts from lesbian athletes, coaches, and physical education teachers in North American schools that revealed how they are demonized and the identity management strategies they must use to survive and resist systemic discrimination (Fusco 1998). Historical research has documented longstanding tensions between lesbians and heterosexual women in sport, and demonstrated that the institutionalization of homophobia in sport and physical education is grounded in sexology discourses popularized in the 1930s (Cahn 1994): these discourses heterosexualized women’s physical activity by identifying beauty, sexual attractiveness, and male companionship as necessary affirmations of womanhood.

No single theory has informed scholarly work on sexuality and sport. Theoretical and methodological diversity has led to multiple questions about sexuality and sport. A combination of qualitative research strategies, surveys, and in depth interviews has been used to present rich and often painful descriptions of the multiple realities of lesbians in sport. Theoretically, much of the early work on sexuality was based on liberal or radical feminist perspectives. *Liberal feminists* reported the oppression lesbians experienced; documented their feelings of being threatened, silenced, and excluded; and suggested that lesbian athletes, like other women athletes, wanted only to play and be recognized as athletes, not as lesbians. *Radical feminists* continue to critique this approach because it depoliticizes sport at the same time that it reproduces heterosexuality, gender normativity, and patriarchy in women’s sport. Radical feminists document the links among sport, sexuality, and gender politics and make explicit the relationship between individual discriminatory

behavior and institutionalized homophobia and heterosexism, which they argue maintains traditional gender roles, and bolsters masculinity while maintaining male privilege and control in sport. Most radical feminist scholars use a social constructionist framework (where sexuality is interpreted as socially and historically contingent) rather than an essentialist one (where sexuality is interpreted as a phenomenon common to all humans of every culture and time), and focus on the voices of lesbian athletes and their stories of oppression, silence, and marginalization. This approach has been informative, but it often ignores stories of lesbian agency, disruption, and radical resistance to the systemic heteronormativity of the sports world.

While the lesbian experience in sport has been thoroughly examined, little attention is paid to the experiences of gay men in sports. Pronger's *The Arena of Masculinity* (1990) remains the most comprehensive and theoretically rigorous examination of homosexuality in sport. Pronger reveals that the presumed masculine and heterosexual world of sport is also a potentially homoerotic world for gay men. Yet, because sport is an arena where male aggression and violence is encouraged, this homoerotic potential is stifled and violently suppressed. Masculinity in sports is solidified through the marginalization of homosexuality, which is vilified and mocked in songs and "drag" performances, while heterosexuality is confirmed in locker room banter that glorifies "heterosexual conquest." While silence surrounds lesbians in women's sport, there is near complete denial about the presence of gay men in sport. The pervasive expectation that male athletes are heterosexual makes it almost impossible for gay men to come out in sports, and legitimizes threats of homophobic violence. The assumption that gay men do not participate in aggressive male sports confirms the two sex/gender classification system, which codes lesbians as masculine and gay men as effeminate. Therefore, men who compete in aesthetic sports are denigrated and labeled as gay, and this has led to a remasculinizing of these sports by emphasizing strength and power.

The two strands of theorizing that have emerged from initial investigations of homosexuality in sports are (1) sport as a site for reproducing aggressive hyper heterosexual masculinity

(Messner & Sabo 1994; Burstyn 1999) and (2) the erotic potential of men's sports and the ways that homophobia regulates the homosocial heterosexual milieu of men's sports and prevents them from slipping into homoeroticism (Pronger 1999).

Contemporary theorizing about gender, sex, sexuality, and sport demonstrates an increasing awareness and application of postmodern, poststructuralist, queer, postcolonial, and cultural geography theories to the study of sexuality and sport. Although each of these "new" theories provides a unique approach to the study of sexuality and sport, all of them are based on possibilities for rethinking sexuality and sport. Scholars using them are interested in the social, historical, and political discourses that produce sexuality and the ways that sexuality has consistently been marked as white, middle class, and able bodied. Liberal interpretations of sexuality as an essential, monolithic, homogeneous or fixed identity category are widely discounted as more scholars focus their attention on the intersectionality of gender, sexuality, race, and class (Collins 2004). Poststructuralists in sport studies deconstruct the discourses that organize sexuality, the body, and the sex/gender dimorphic system. Queer theorists explore the borders of sexual identities, communities, and politics and how categories such as heterosexual, gay, lesbian, and queer emerge, while also working to destabilize and disrupt the heterosexual/homosexual binary. While earlier scholarship incorporated certain epistemological and ontological assumptions about the categories "lesbian," "gay" and "heterosexual," queer theorists now question these essentialisms and suggest that all sexual identities are continually performed. According to Butler (2004), a democratic sexual society requires that people *undo gender*. While it is now recognized that a universal "homosexual" identity does not exist, early studies in the sociology of sport, which examined "lesbian" and "homosexual" experiences in sport, provided an important step in the analysis of sexuality and sport. They served as strategic and anti oppressive scholarship that brought the experiences of lesbian and gay athletes out of the sports closet.

More recently, scholars using cultural geography have examined how heteronormative

spaces of sport are a determinant of homosexual experiences. This research demonstrates that normative sport spaces can be disrupted through lesbian and gay presence. Scholars have particularly focused on the Gay Games as a potential site for queer disruption, despite some concern that the forces of commodity have coopted and normalized them. Likewise, recent decisions by the International Olympic Committee (IOC) to allow transsexual athletes to compete in the Olympic Games have garnered the attention of sports sociologists. The IOC's decision appears to acknowledge the continuum of sexualities espoused by queer theorists, and might be heralded as a move forward in human rights in relation to sexuality and sport. However, scholars are closely examining the regulations and requirements concerning transsexual athletes with respect to how this discourse remains embedded in the two sex/gender classification system. While the IOC appears to be recognizing transsexuals' rights to participate, scholars are skeptical that these policies will disrupt heterosexualized international sports.

While the homoerotic potential of men's sport has been explored, there is relatively little work on the homoerotic potential in women's sport. This is not surprising given that women are usually represented as objects of desire rather than desiring subjects. Overall, scholarship on lesbians and sport has de-eroticized lesbian desire by presenting a non-threatening image of lesbians to promote full inclusion as athletes and coaches. However, scholars increasingly recognize that this approach misses an important opportunity to challenge the constant affirmation and production of heterosexual desire in women's sports. At the same time, queer theorists call for new approaches that celebrate the body and acknowledge that sport is inherently erotic and sexual. However, sport as a cultural and social institution has set limits on the body and its desires and established boundaries that close off the possibility for pleasure and erotic desire (Pronger 1999). Scholars are exploring how these boundaries can be disrupted to create a physical culture in which Eros, rather than rationality, is celebrated. Currently, they are aware that the sexual objectification of women in sports; the sexual harassment of women, girls, and young boys in

sport; the shame associated with homosexual abuse in men's sport; and the use of sexual games in ritualistic team hazing have been profiled in the media in ways that make people fearful of sexuality and the sexual and erotic potential of sport.

Despite the contentiousness of these issues, researchers continue to analyze the ways in which all forms of sexuality and gendered performances can be celebrated in sport in ways that do not ethically exploit, oppress, or cause harm to other beings.

SEE ALSO: Foucault, Michel; Gender, Sport and; Sex and Gender; Sexualities and Consumption; Sexuality; Sexuality, Masculinity and; Sport and the Body; Sport and Social Resistance

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Shadow Work (Ivan Illich)

Nicholas DeMaria Harney

Shadow Work (1981), written by the polymath ex Catholic priest Ivan Illich (1926–2002), critiques what Illich sees as the contrived structures of desire present in modern commodity intensive society. Shadow work refers to the “unpaid servitude” modern people tolerate to satisfy the desires that experts suggest they need. *Shadow Work* extends his earlier critiques of the way institutions and professions in the modern industrialized world dehumanize by creating needs and controlling the satisfaction of those needs. In a series of polemical books written in the 1970s, Illich argued that there was a tendency for institutions to develop in ways opposite to their original intent. For example, in *Deschooling Society* (1973) he argued that contemporary educational practices discouraged learning, and in *Medical Nemesis* (1976) care was neglected by the organizational imperatives of medical experts and institutions. He developed the principle of counterproductivity to label the transformation of a potentially positive ideal into a negative institutional arrangement because of the undesired externalities that came with the process of institutionalization. Illich was concerned with how technological advancement and “development” might work to destroy convivial human relationships, the human spirit, and the environment. In addition to critiquing modern institutions, experts, and expert knowledge, Illich critiqued the commodification of activities, transforming, for example, knowledge and learning into a possession rather than a way of being in the world.

Shadow Work followed on from *Towards a History of Needs* (1977) to evaluate how powerful groups created a “radical monopoly” over the satisfaction of human needs that these professionals defined for the public. *Shadow Work* connects the historical development of the commodification of speech by the standardization of a mother tongue at the expense of vernacular language and the destruction of the real, experiential learning inherent in everyday

communication and speech with the emergence of a shadow economy. The professionalization of language for Illich opens up a realm of unpaid contributions that people make to manage society at the expense of vernacular domains, domains of subsistence and mutual self help. This shadow work includes students cramming for exams, housework, commuting to work, shopping, and the myriad ways people prepare for, consume, and comply with professionally mediated services.

Illich’s critique of the modern commodity intensive society’s substitution of exchange values for use values echoes Marx, Carlyle, and Polanyi in that he argues against any sense of the market or scarcity as “natural,” rather that they are the result of choices. For him, commodity intensive societies transfer people’s autonomy and independence to rights guaranteed by techniques, tools, and arrangements offered by professionals and the desires they create for society. To combat this alienation, Illich suggests that people develop “vernacular values” based on reciprocity outside the market, subsistence, pragmatic restraint, conviviality, and autonomy to use technology and organize society to encourage greater liberty. Perhaps because much of Illich’s work is polemical and he draws on a remarkable range of sources, he is not much cited today. Nevertheless, his work has relevance for the hypermediatized twenty first century and contemporary research on non monetized and non commodified spaces in the globalizing world.

SEE ALSO: Commodities, Commodity Fetishism, and Commodification; Education; Institution; Language; Modernity; Professions, Organized; Technological Determinism

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Shariati, Ali (1933–77)

Bryan S. Turner

Born in Mazinan, a desert village in the north eastern province of Iran, Ali Shariati was a leading Iranian sociologist and Muslim intellectual, who published a number of influential books and a great volume of lectures, talks, and occasional articles. He contributed to the sociology of religion, but apart from his *On the Sociology of Islam* (1980a), his work is not widely known in western social science.

Shariati, who was greatly influenced by his father, a scholar and religious teacher, attended a teacher's training college and came into contact with young people from poor social backgrounds. As a student he became active in the nationalist movement of Mohammad Mossadeq, and, having received his bachelor's degree in 1959 from Mashhad University, he pursued graduate study in France, receiving his doctorate from the Sorbonne in 1964. On returning to Iran, he was briefly imprisoned on charges relating to his political activities in France. He began teaching at Mashhad University as an assistant professor of Islamic history, where his original interpretations of problems facing Muslim societies gained him a wide student audience. In 1967 at the invitation of Ayatollah Motahhari, he transferred to Tehran where he lectured at the Housseiniye Ershad Religious Institute, attracting even larger audiences. He was again imprisoned but popular and international pressure eventually secured his release in 1975. He remained, however, under close surveillance by SAVAK (the Iranian Security Agency). Shariati had many enemies but he was supported by Ayatollah Khomeini, and consequently he had a significant impact on the

Iranian Revolution. Because his movements were severely restricted, he migrated to England, but he was found dead in his apartment three weeks later in June 1977. It was generally assumed that he had been murdered by SAVAK agents (Rahnema 2004).

Along with Ayatollah Khomeini and Ayatollah Motahhari, Shariati was one of the principal architects of Islamic revolutionary thought as a direct response to the ideology of modernity, and as a challenge to the modernization policies of the Pahlavi dynasty (Chehabi 1990). During the reign of Mohammad Reza Pahlavi (1941–79), the overwhelming ambition to suppress communism meant that there was relative tolerance of Islamic discourse. In the 20 years before the Islamic Revolution, Islamic associations flourished among intellectual groups, and the urban population tripled and religious societies among the urban poor provided an important political network.

Shariati was intellectually influenced by both Marxism and radical Shi'ite theology. He was a critic of modernization, which he believed was a sinister means of seducing non western communities into modernity. In order to export their own commodities, western powers have to destroy the self sufficient domestic economy of traditional societies, and hence western modernity destroys traditional patterns of consumption. Although there are many critics of western imperialism, Shariati developed a deep and sophisticated understanding of the alienation of the self, or in his terms the "emptying" of the self, in which consumerism under neocolonial conditions brings about the eradication of cultural traditions and produces the authenticity of the self.

Shariati placed a substantial emphasis on the revolutionary role of intellectuals in defending culture against western consumerism, but he also criticized them for their distance from the mass of the population. In his book *Fatimah is Fatimah* (1971), he supported intellectuals in their quest for freedom and equality for the masses, but he condemned them for departing from their traditional religious roots, excoriating them for becoming "modernized pseudo intellectuals." In his *The Intellectual and his Responsibility in Society* (1972), Shariati rejected secularism as a philosophy of the intellectual

class, because religion, outside the West, is a bulwark against imperialism. Although the West had achieved modernity as a result of the Enlightenment, each society must find its own enlightenment in terms of its own culture and tradition. The West had imposed the Enlightenment without respect for the integrity of other cultures and its universalism had become a form of cultural imperialism. Intellectuals had to recognize the problem of living in what Shariati called a “dual society” in which only a small elite became modernized, leaving the mass of society in a state of poverty and disempowerment. For Shariati in *Whence Do We Begin?* (1975), only the religiously motivated intellectuals could bridge the gap between the educated, secularized elite and the masses.

The analysis of the self and subjectivity was central to Shariati’s philosophy (Vahdat 2002). Shariati’s sociotheology exhibited a tension between insisting that human free will is the defining characteristic of humanity and arguing that human subjectivity presupposes submission to God. Shariati tried to solve this dilemma by interpreting human existence as a journey away from material existence to a spiritual life. Humans are alienated in nature rather than from nature, and the spiritual life requires the radical subordination of the body to a spiritual purpose. The natural body is a “desolate abode” or a prison from which human beings must escape in order to realize their true essence. Contempt for the body is a precondition of the journey toward authentic subjectivity. Shariati recognized that this solution would always be partial and that human existence was a perennial conflict between autonomy and submission that he described as a condition of human bewilderment.

While Shariati was critical of Marx’s sociology in his *Marxism and Other Western Fallacies* (1980b), he also borrowed extensively from Marx’s vocabulary to describe this human bewilderment. Shariati was, like Marx, opposed to the liberal notion of individualism, and emphasized collective, not individual, agency. Islam recognized the agency of the mass of ordinary people, and Shariati developed the revolutionary proposition that the voice of the people is God. It was through this revolutionary theology that he came to affirm the needs of the “disempowered” – the mass of the population who suffered directly

from colonial exploitation and marginalization. It was to the salvation of the disempowered and the cancelation of the forces of oppression that the message of the Qur’an was directed. Although Shariati emphasized the moral responsibility of the individual, the revolutionary role of Islam, the political responsibility of the intellectual, and the sovereignty of the people, he did not in his major political text, *Community and Leadership* (1979), advocate popular democracy, but instead he adumbrated the role of the charismatic imam who is neither elected nor selected.

Shariati’s thought was a major intellectual contribution to one of the most significant revolutions of modern times. The originality of his thought was to combine existentialism, Marxism, and Islamic thought to produce a comprehensive criticism of western imperialism. Shariati developed a normative critique of modernization that emphasized the negative consequences of consumerism on an agrarian society under the control of an authoritarian government.

SEE ALSO: Colonialism (Neocolonialism); Globalization, Religion and; Islam; Religion

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Shintoism

Tsuyoshi Nakano

Although there is no widely accepted definition of Shintoism even among Japanese scholars, the term could be defined tentatively as a Japanese traditional religious system based on so called "Shinto." Shinto is generally believed to be indigenous to Japan. The term was coined by the combination of two words from Chinese – *shin*, originally from the Chinese character for "divine beings" or "gods" (*shen*), and *to*, originally from "way" (*tao*). Therefore, the literal meaning is "the way of the gods," which corresponds to the native Japanese reading of the term, *kami no michi*, or *kannagara no michi*. The term Shinto (*kami no michi*) first appeared in *Nihon shoki* (Chronicles of Japan compiled 720 CE), together with the term "Buddha's law," *hotoke no minori*. This was done in order to consciously designate traditional forms of worship of the emperor, which were inherited from ancestors, as these related to *kami* (god or gods; the same character as *shin*) and not to Buddhism. This indicates the large influence that rivalry with Buddhism had in the creation of the Shinto tradition from the outset.

Nevertheless, there are various theories concerning the establishment of Shintoism as a relatively independent religious system. One suggests the establishment of a centralized system of governance based on the legal codes of ancient Japan in the seventh or eighth century (Inoue 1998), and another holds that the idea of Shinto as an independent religion scarcely existed before the Meiji Restoration (Hardacre 1989). In any case, the Shinto tradition became an important religious source that was connected to agricultural rituals and festivals at the community level, and rites of passage at the personal level. Shinto is understood to have been a major religious and cultural influence that has provided a unique value orientation for the Japanese people. Therefore, in order to understand the divergent and yet uniquely Japanese sensitivities, attitudes, and mentalities of people and communities, a recognition and understanding of Shinto is essential.

According to statistics compiled every year by the Division of Religious Affairs of the

Japanese Ministry of Education and Science based on reports from each religious body, at the end of 2001 the number of religious corporations (officially certificated and registered under Japanese law) related to Shinto was about 85,000, 46.7 percent of the total figure (Buddhist temples numbered over 77,000, 42.5 percent of the total; Christian churches 4,337, 2.4 percent of the total). Shinto adherents accounted for about 106,000,000, i.e., 49.7 percent, of the total number of religious adherents in Japan (Buddhists 95,000,000, 44.5 percent; Christians 1,800,000, 0.4 percent). The total number of religious adherents was twice that of the actual population of Japan, which means that most people are counted twice, by a Shinto shrine and by a Buddhist temple in each area. This kind of mixing of Shinto and Buddhist religious traditions is indicative of the traditional religious life of many Japanese people.

The National Police Agency also reported that nearly 90,000,000 Japanese visited a shrine on New Year's Day in 2004. According to more detailed public opinion surveys conducted by scholars and various newspapers, the percentage of respondents who said they visited a shrine on New Year's Day was 56 percent in 1979 and 61.7 percent in 1994. However, the rate of those who "believe" in Shinto was only 3.3 percent in 1979 (*Yomiuri Press*), and 4.4 percent in 1995 (*Jiji Press*). This indicates that Shinto in general is a religion of participation in traditional rituals and festivals at shrines, and is not a religion that constitutes an articulated system of beliefs, doctrine, and ethics.

The shrine (*jinja*) precinct is a sacred area with a gate (*torii*), ablution area, and sacred buildings, including the main sanctuary, which houses the symbol of the *kami* (*shintai*) and a worship area (*haiden*). At special times through the year, shrines become the focal point for community festivals (*matsuri*), which are held according to the tradition of each shrine in honor of its own *kami*. Nevertheless, there are also many common festivals, such as the Spring Festival (*Haru matsuri*), Autumn Festival (*Aki matsuri*), and the like. As individual rites of passage, family members sometimes visit the local shrine. After birth, for example, an infant is taken to the local shrine in order to be acknowledged and celebrated as a new member of the village or the community by its tutelary

deity (or the local guardian god). Further celebrations include the Seven, Five, and Three Festival (*Shichigosan*), at which boys of 5 years of age and girls of 3 and 7 years of age are brought to the shrine. In addition, marriage rites are performed at shrines, though they are becoming less popular among the younger generation. Shinto is a “this worldly” religion in the sense that it is interested in tangible benefits which will promote life in the human world.

The origin of basic forms of Shinto worship of gods is obscure. There is no founder, no sacred scriptures, nor any fixed system of doctrine. Instead, Shinto seems to originate from simple worship of *kami gami* (gods), with rituals developing when people began to settle down to grow rice in the Yayoi era from 300 BCE to 250 CE. At least by the early historical period (third century CE), the clan (*uji*) system formed a certain ancestral worship, which was worship and rituals performed for gods of personal clans (*ujigami*). People also believed in other spiritual powers and beings which had the *kami* nature. Some *kami* were connected to specific geographical areas or lands; others were believed to reside within living beings and phenomena such as the sun, the moon, mountains, trees, thunder, fire, and wind. This religious culture was based on a kind of animism that prevailed in various parts of the world since ancient times. Shamans and diviners were regarded as important figures in operating and controlling these divine powers. The imperial (*tenno*) clan eventually gained power over other clans, especially in terms of rites and festivals that were connected with rice growing. Its supremacy could be attributed to a kind of shamanistic power, and following the famous work of Sir James Frazer, Japanese anthropologists agree that the Japanese emperor could be regarded as a shaman king or “priest king” in origin.

Although each clan continued to maintain its own forms of ancestor worship and myths of origin, as the imperial clan gained greater supremacy its myths also gained ascendancy. These provided the dominant motifs into which the myths of the other clans were integrated. By the eighth century, these myths were collected and edited as two well known volumes, *Kojiki* (Records of Ancient Matters)

of 712 CE and the above mentioned *Nihon shoki*. These volumes laid important foundations for various ideas and themes of the cosmological view in Shinto. The universe was divided into three levels: the Plain of High Heaven (*Takama ga hara*); this Manifested World on the Earth (*Nakatsu kuni*); and the Netherworld (*Yomotsu kuni*). Moreover, beliefs in the creation of the world by *Izanagi* (male *kami*) and *Izanami* (female *kami*), the dominance of the sun goddess *Amaterasu Omikami* and the descent of the imperial line from *Amaterasu*, and in forces of life, fertility, pollution, and purification were established. The basic Shinto practices, dances, and chanting of *norito* (prayers) were formed in accordance with these myths as well. While the details of these themes are unique, they share a common structure with other typologies found in the Andromeda, Perseus, Oedipus, and Orpheus myths from ancient Greek mythology.

These records also indicate the hegemonic position of *Amaterasu Omikami*, and the myth that the imperial line directly descended from the sun goddess gradually became prominent. In addition, although the indigenous nature of Shintoism is often emphasized, it is obvious that Shintoism has transformed and hybridized with other religious traditions throughout history. This was particularly evident with its amalgamation with Buddhism and Confucianism, which became the ideology that legitimized the ruling of Japanese feudal societies by the imperial family. According to *Nihon shoki* and other sources, Buddhism was first officially introduced from Korea in the sixth century CE, and Empress Suiko declared she would adopt Buddhism as the principle of governing the country in 593. This was partly because it was regarded as having magical religious powers that would help govern the people and guard the nation. In this process of introduction, opposition, and amalgamation with Buddhism, Shinto itself became conscious of its own originality and tried to describe and develop its myths, forms of ritual, and certain doctrinal themes. The making of Shintoism as a religious system in Japan was formed through this process.

At the folk or community level, this syncretism is deeper and more intricate. In festivals and celebrations in traditional villages, a

division of religious functions developed, with Buddhist temples usually taking charge of rituals relating to death such as funerals, while Shinto shrines were responsible for festivals, rites of passage, and agricultural rituals.

In spite of the National Seclusion policy in the Edo period (1603–1867), knowledge and information about western scholarship and science gradually filtered into Japan, especially after 1720 when Tokugawa Yoshimune (the shogun) lifted the ban on the importation of foreign books. By the early nineteenth century, Dutch studies (*rangaku*) and western studies (*yogaku*) were widely read throughout Japan.

At the beginning of the nineteenth century, as the School of National Learning (*Kokugaku*) emerged and then developed into Revival Shinto (*Fukko Shinto*), Shintoism was given more social importance not as a religion but rather as a political ideology. In the works of Hirata Atsutane, who emphasized a return to Shinto's original traditions, most religions such as Buddhism and Christianity were thought of as foreign. He and his contemporaries sought to discover an "original" Japanese religious tradition. As some of their ideas derived from other religious traditions, however, "original" tradition in this context should be understood as a result of cultural contact with other traditions and not as a purely original Japanese idea. Revival Shinto asserted that Shinto should return to its former position as the fundamental principle guiding the nation. Nevertheless, Revival Shinto can be seen as an expression of, or a reaction to, a cultural and colonial crisis brought about by the increasing influence of the West. This laid the foundation of a sweeping conservative anti foreign movement, which gathered under the slogan "revere the emperor, expel the barbarians" (*sonno joi*).

By the Meiji Restoration in 1868, the Tokugawa shogunate was dismantled and replaced with a limited representative and monarch system under the Meiji Constitution (promulgated in 1889). Japan began building a modern nation state partly to counter the colonizing threat posed by the West. The state's involvement in Shinto affairs increased and the formation of so called State Shinto began. State Shinto was in a sense different from Shinto as it had originally developed. Although it included aspects of Shinto mythology and

incorporated Shinto institutions and practices, the newly established Meiji government essentially invented State Shinto as a means to legitimize governmental authority and unify the people. The government incorporated all Shintoist rituals and observances and ordered all citizens to observe them, thus utilizing Shinto ceremonial events to promote nationalism. Thus State Shinto was a type of new national religion introduced by the government after the Meiji Restoration. However, the government itself did not regard State Shinto as a religion but as the Japanese "national cult" – one that included religious ideology and rituals and surpassed all other religions.

In addition, the qualifications of the emperor as head of state and his rights as sovereign did not have their source in the Constitution, although the form of government was a kind of constitutional monarchy according to its provisions (Chap. 1, Art. 4). The Imperial Precept on the Promulgation of the Constitution declared: "The rights of sovereignty of the State, We have inherited from Our Ancestors." It was stressed that these rights had been derived neither from the people nor from the Constitution, but from an institutional charisma of a "lineal succession unbroken for ages eternal." Moreover, the stipulation in Article 3 of the Constitution that "the emperor is sacred and inviolable" granted the emperor a sacred, transcendental character. Thus the emperor possessed a mystical authority as a kind of divine king, or as the highest priest of the state, as well as possessing secular powers as sovereign of the state and as supreme commander of the military forces.

This politico religious ideology was derived from an extreme interpretation of Shinto mythology, according to which the emperor was regarded as having descended from the supreme ancestral deity, the sun goddess *Ama terasu*, and was regarded as its manifest deity (*Akitsu kami*). This idea was based on, first, the assertion that the emperor, the land, and the people of Japan constituted one sacred invisible entity, and second, a system of related teachings, Shinto institutions, practices, and rites known as State Shinto, or National Shinto as it was called by the Allied Powers (Bunce 1948), or, as designated by W. P. Woodard (1972), a national cult.

Thus, the structure of the Japanese state as a whole was signified mystically or religiously by the ideology of the emperor system, and the government sought unification of the people in the nation and sought to control even their everyday religious life by utilizing this mystic ideology through State Shinto.

SHINTOISM SINCE 1945

On August 15, 1945, the Japanese government accepted the Potsdam Declaration of the Allied Powers and surrendered unconditionally. This defeat in World War II and the reform of the whole Japanese society through the Occupation by the Allied Powers led to radical changes in Japanese religions, especially in Shinto and its relation to the state.

The first directive relating to reform of the religious system, issued by the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers (SCAP), was the so called Civil Liberties Directive of October 4, 1945. In order to realize the objectives of freedom of thought, speech, religion, assembly, and respect for fundamental human rights, it required the abrogation and immediate suspension of the operation of all provisions of laws establishing or maintaining restrictions on those rights. However, the more important directive was the so called Shinto Directive of December 15, 1945, which ordered clearly and in a shocking way the "abolition of State Shinto" and the "complete separation of religion and state."

The purpose of this directive was clear, namely, "to separate religion from the state, to prevent misuse of religion for political ends, and to put all religions, faith, and creeds upon exactly the same legal basis, entitled precisely to the same opportunities and protection." It forbade "affiliation with the government and the propagation and dissemination of militaristic and ultra nationalistic ideology not only to Shinto but to followers of all religions, faiths, sects, creeds, or philosophies" (Shinto Directive, Article 2a). It therefore forbade "the sponsorship, support, perpetuation, control and dissemination of Shinto" by the state, abolished the Shrine Board (*Jingiin*) of the Ministry of Home Affairs, which was the representative agency of State Shinto within the administrative

structure of the government, and prohibited all Shinto education and rites in educational institutions supported wholly or in part by public funds, the attendance of public officials in shrine worship or any other Shinto observances, and the use in official writings of terms with State Shinto, militaristic, and ultra nationalistic connotations. In short, this meant in a very direct way the abolition of State Shinto and the disestablishment of state religion.

According to the policy, the Peace Preservation Law, in accordance with which many leaders of new religions had been thrown into prison during the war, was abrogated. The Religious Organizations Law (*Shukyo dantai ho*), which had been another instrument designed to restrict religious freedom, was replaced by the Religious Juridical Persons Ordinance (*Shukyo hojin rei*, Imperial Ordinance No. 719), promulgated on December 28, 1945. This ordinance set out working rules for the free establishment of religious corporations by mere registration with the appropriate government body. The laws obstructing religious freedom of religious groups were abolished, and by the amendments of this ordinance on February 2, 1946, even Shrine Shinto, now separated from the state and liberated from its control, was given the opportunity of continuing its existence as an ordinary religious corporation. Thus "equality of all religions before the law," which was one of the objectives of the Shinto Directive, became a reality. Finally, on November 3, 1946, the new Constitution of Japan was promulgated, coming into effect on May 3 of the following year. It codified "freedom of religion" and "separation of religion and state" in Articles 20 and 89.

The reform of the religious system by the Occupation administration effected great changes in Japanese society and religion. First of all, it brought about secularization of the Japanese state. Although the imperial system was retained, the emperor was no longer the head of the state nor the source of legitimacy for political rule, but was now regarded as a symbol of the unity of the whole nation. The new Constitution became the source of law and authority. For the first time, Japan became a constitutional democracy. The religious or mystical character of the state was disposed of, and

freedom of religion was established as a “basic human right.” In this free and democratic society, Shintoism continues to exist in several different forms:

- 1 Shinto of the Imperial Household (*Koshitsu Shinto*) focuses on rites for the spirits of imperial ancestors and is observed at imperial institutions. It is distinguished from other forms of Shinto partly because the emperor himself performs its ceremonies, and partly because it is believed that it retains the most archaic style of Shinto worship. But this Shinto is not open to the public.
- 2 Shrine Shinto (*Jinja Shinto*) is presently the form of Shinto that embraces the vast majority of Shinto shrines and adherents in Japan, administered by the Association of Shinto Shrines (Jinja Honcho). It is the most popular system of Shintoism now in Japan, which is upheld in a great many and varied local shrines with seasonal rituals and festivals held in honor of kami. It continues to emphasize the traditionally close relationship between Shinto and Japanese life and the need for national regeneration.
- 3 Sect Shinto (*Kyoha Shinto*) refers to 13 religious organizations which originated from new Shinto movements that arose from the social and economic distress toward the end of the Tokugawa period and the beginning of the Meiji period. They were mostly founded by charismatic figures and promised worldly benefits, such as wealth, success in life, and cures for sickness. Because the Meiji government did not want to incorporate these groups into the structure of State Shinto, it created a new classification of Sect Shinto, eventually recognizing them as offshoots of the mainstream Shinto tradition. Groups such as Kurozumi kyo, Fuso kyo, Ontake kyo, Konko kyo, and Tenri kyo belong to this category.
- 4 Folk Shinto (*Minkan Shinto*) is a designation for the wide ranging groups of superstitious, magico religious rites and practices of the common people, embracing conceptions of spirits and souls, good and evil kami, divination of lucky or evil direction, and unlucky days. Folk Shinto does not

stand in opposition to Shrine Shinto or Sect Shinto but might be considered as the substratum of those more organized forms.

PROBLEMS INVOLVING SHINTOISM

The post war reforms established the principles of freedom of religion and the separation of religion and state. These principles have been widely accepted, for people remember how freedom was suppressed under State Shinto before and during the war. But with regard to their interpretation, questions have arisen as to whether “separation” is an absolute or relative term, to be understood as an end in itself or as a means of affirming religious freedom. There are a number of issues concerning the relationship between the state and religion, especially relating to Shintoism, in the post war period.

State Support for and Official Worship at the Yasukuni Shrine

Before and during World War II, the Yasukuni shrine was an important national institution particularly for promoting hero worship and strengthening the fighting spirit of the nation. Enshrined within it are the spirits of many soldiers who died in war for the emperor or for the state since the Meiji period. Occupation policies dictated that the shrine be stripped of its militaristic elements and completely separated from the state. Consequently, the Yasukuni shrine was forced to sever its ties with the state yet it continued to exist on the same legal basis as other religious bodies, as one religious organization among others.

But with the peace treaty and the restoration of independence at the end of the Occupation in April 1952, a movement calling for state support to reestablish a special status for the Yasukuni shrine began. By the end of 1974 a bill supporting public funding of the shrine had been submitted unsuccessfully to the Diet on five separate occasions. Proponents of the movement eventually changed their strategy, and they began to lobby for the emperor and state officials to worship (*sanpai*) at the shrine in their

official capacity, for foreign envoys to pay their respects, and for representatives of the Self Defense Forces to offer formal worship there. In these and other ways, proponents sought to give people the impression that the shrine was already a de facto public institution, that is, a religious institution with special ties to the state. It was in this context that the movement for “official visits” (*koshiki sanpai*) emerged.

The event that particularly drew people’s attention to the issues occurred on August 15, 1975, the thirtieth anniversary of the end of the Pacific War, when the then Prime Minister Miki Takeo visited the Yasukuni shrine. Although some of his predecessors had visited the shrine while in office, this visit was especially important as it highlighted two crucial issues: (1) whether it constituted a religious action by a government official that violated the Constitution, and (2) the complex problem of evaluating the war. Prime Minister Miki emphasized that he visited the shrine in a private capacity, but it is undeniable that his action opened the way for subsequent official visits. Thus it was that a later prime minister, Nakasone Yasuhiro, who was emphasizing the “end of the post war period,” made the first official visit to the shrine on August 15, 1985. He signed the register as “Prime Minister of the Cabinet” and made a donation of 30,000 yen from public funds.

Nakasone’s visit provoked an unexpectedly strong barrage of protests from China and other Asian countries, and official visits to the shrine ceased for a time. However, Prime Minister Junichiro Koizumi reestablished this practice again on August 13, 2001, and since then has visited each year. Needless to say, a loud chorus of criticism against these visits arose from many Japanese people as well as other Asian countries, especially from China and Korea. It was even judged to be unconstitutional by the Fukuoka district court on April 7, 2004.

Although these visits ignited disputes over the distinction between the prime minister as a public figure or a private citizen and whether donations to the shrine’s coffers constituted a religious act or were simply a matter of conventional etiquette, the more pressing issue is whether these visits give preferential treatment to one religion over others and serve to accord the shrine the status of a national institution. Moreover, these actions by leading conservative

politicians are closely associated with the rise of religious nationalism in Japan, particularly when the Japanese Self Defense Forces were being sent to Iraq and other areas.

The Emperor and Shinto Rituals

The post war system that assigned a purely symbolic status to the emperor gave rise to yet another type of debate and lawsuit. In connection with the mourning service (*taiso*) held for Emperor Showa on February 24, 1989, questions arose as to the degree to which this ought to be a state ceremony. In order to forestall constitutional misgivings, it was finally decided that the *Taiso no gi*, a Shinto service of mourning for the emperor, would be carried out as an Imperial Household ceremony, but that the *Taiso no rei*, a separate Shinto rite, would be carried out as a secular state ceremony. A similar division was employed on November 12, 1990 when the new emperor’s *Sokui no rei*, or Enthronement Ceremony, was handled as a state ceremony and the subsequent *Daijosai*, or Great Food Offering, as a private ceremony based on the Shinto of the Imperial Household. The central question in all these matters was the extent to which a rite could be a state ceremony without violating the principle of separation of religion and state.

A closely related question giving rise to intense debate was whether the *Daijosai* should be paid for with private funds from the Imperial Household’s internal budget (*naiteihi*) or with public funds from the Imperial Palace budget (*kyuteihi*). The government, recognizing the religious character of this rite, decided that it would be an Imperial Household ceremony. But the government also recognized the “public character” of this rite and chose to use public funds from the Imperial Palace budget. This decision struck a balance between upholders of tradition, who wanted it to be a state ceremony, and public opinion, which called for strict application of the principle of separation of religion and state.

There are many other lawsuits that contest allegedly unconstitutional action on the basis of the principle of separation of religion and state. Most of these lawsuits, however, have to do with issues that grew out of pre war and

wartime State Shinto. One issue concerns the extent to which a religious organization is autonomous and the extent to which it is subject to judiciary intervention. The lawsuits mentioned above show clearly that the principle of separation of religion and state introduced by the Occupation has not taken firm root in Japan, and has yet to find a harmonious balance with traditional Japanese culture.

SEE ALSO: Animism; Buddhism; Civil Religion; Confucianism; Nation State; Nation State and Nationalism; Taoism

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shopping

Sharon Zukin

As the public face of consumption, shopping includes an array of social, economic, and cultural activities connected with consumers' selection and procurement of goods and services. In contrast to consumption, which, historically, is synonymous with satisfaction of basic biological needs, shopping is a distinctly modern ensemble of actions, perceptions, and emotions. Shopping develops in a money economy, on a sophisticated industrial base, along with the integration of local places into larger markets providing a range of innovative, and often exotic, product choices. Choice is, indeed, a keyword of shopping, for the process of identifying needed or desired products and selecting among them magnifies the role of individual decision making and taste. But collective norms and pressures are equally important. Whether the parameters of a man's, a woman's, or, increasingly, a child's shopping are set by money, access to information, or the example set by their peers, shopping expresses both individual desires and collective dreams.

Since Walter Benjamin (1999) wrote about the Parisian arcades, or mid block shopping galleries, of the 1840s, social and cultural theorists have understood shopping to be an experience that envelops individuals in dreams of commodities. The physical sensation of being surrounded by goods, with their evocation of exoticism and novelty, suppresses criticism or rebellion; the design of the shopping space is calculated to impress and overwhelm. But

shopping also provides an experience of sociality – being together with other people – in an apparently public space. Although the main point of shopping is to make purchases for individual use, families and friends do shop together, and age or peer groups meet – and examine each other – in shopping spaces. Shopping for necessities expresses solidarities among family members (especially mother and child) and intimate friends, while shopping in a local community – even among strangers – strengthens bonds of interdependence and place identity. But shopping also poses an implicit conflict. Increasingly under non local, standardized, corporate control, shopping creates a public sphere in which consumers struggle to create an experience that they, themselves, value (Zukin 2004).

Only recently have scholars paid attention to shopping as a serious form of social action. Aside from marketing studies about what people buy and how they respond to the layout of stores, few researchers have suggested an institutional theory of how shopping develops, how it relates to both economy and culture, and how shoppers integrate their shopping experiences with overall ideology.

HISTORY OF SHOPPING

The earliest shopping dates back to ancient empires, when the density of residents, division of labor, and economic surplus in towns enabled them to establish marketplaces for exchanging the products of local farmers, urban artisans and craftspeople, and long distance traders. Merchants gradually became a separate occupation from either traders or craftspeople; they kept a fixed stall at the market and, eventually, an indoor shop. After centuries of providing a limited range and number of products, some merchants used the emerging industrial system of mass production and access to bank credit to offer many different kinds of merchandise under one roof. Like the increasingly complex organization of the state, the nineteenth century department store integrated a variety of specialized functions, and offered shoppers a world of goods.

Historically, shoppers have gone out to markets or stores, and come into direct contact

with displays of goods to buy, as well as with merchants and other shoppers. But since the mid nineteenth century, technological innovations, often supported by the state, have made it possible to view goods or images of goods at home, purchase them, and arrange for their delivery, all without going out in public. Beginning in the 1870s in the United States and Western Europe, mail order catalogs connected retailers and warehouses in cities at the hub of transportation networks with consumers who lived in remote rural areas. Although individual entrepreneurs established these companies, and were closely linked to both manufacturers and banks, they depended on the state run postal service to ship catalogs and on the railroads to transport goods. In the early 1900s regular parcel post deliveries throughout the USA encouraged the expansion of the mail order business, while the widespread use of telephones enabled shoppers to place orders by calling, rather than visiting, local stores. By the 1970s, another pair of innovations – bank issued credit cards and toll free “800” telephone numbers – set loose an explosion of long distance shopping, although it also increased consumer debt. And, by the 1990s, the diffusion of personal computers and public access to the World Wide Web allowed shoppers and stores to form a truly virtual, global market.

Even with “bricks and mortar” stores, the diffusion of automobile ownership and the construction of roads and highways during the twentieth century decentralized shopping as never before. Cars permitted shoppers to travel longer distances and transport a larger number of purchases on each shopping trip. Because new, post World War II homes had modern refrigerators and roomy kitchen cabinets, shoppers were freed from the necessity of daily provisioning. By the same token, most postwar housing was built in suburbs that were zoned only for residences, which made shoppers dependent on automobile transportation for weekly shopping trips. These trips became family outings, and although they offered relief from the monotony and lack of public interaction that were typical of suburban life, they subjected family members to the routinization of supermarkets, chain stores, and ever larger shopping malls. Malls became, in effect, the most widely used public space in suburbs – even though they were privately owned and

controlled, separated from streets by parking lots, and usually located in places accessible only by car.

Just as stores are compelled to respond to shoppers' changing needs and wants, so they also respond to rising costs of labor. For this reason, the clerks who served shoppers in traditional stores were gradually replaced, from the early 1900s, with self service. Although steady customers in exclusive stores may still expect to be served by a salesperson who keeps track of their preferences, shoppers in most stores see all the merchandise displayed on shelves, racks, or counters before their eyes, feel and try on products without either help or interference from the staff, and carry their intended purchases, themselves, to central checkout lines. In some ways this makes shopping a more democratic experience, but it results in shoppers' frustration when they can't find what they want or need information. Transparent packaging, universal bar codes, and automation have also helped to reduce stores' labor costs while further routinizing the shopping experience.

TYPES OF STORES

From the earliest times, marketplaces have been bazaars of commercial display, theaters of social interaction, and even carnivals of transgression where men and women assume roles that may be unrelated to their everyday lives. Partly this reflects the magic that one perceives in desired objects to transform our lives, and partly it reflects the magic of a special place – the market – where strangers mingle, exchange information, and seek entertainment. By the late nineteenth century, the more carnivalesque or raucous aspects of markets had been tamed; not only did most shopping occur indoors, in stores, but corporate ownership, policing, and a greater number of middle class women shoppers contributed to a more rigorous, though implicit, regime of social control. At the same time, the emergence of fixed prices, introduced by F. W. Woolworth's five and dime stores, eliminated the need to bargain and, in a sense, defined modern shopping. Elements of older market places nonetheless survived in specific forms: public or farmers' markets, flea markets, and fairs.

During the nineteenth century, department stores, five and dimes, and mail order catalogs created paradigmatic forms of shopping. Each brought an unprecedented array of products to large numbers of consumers and made shopping something of a universal experience. Unlike previous kinds of stores, including general or country stores, from which rural residents – mainly farmers – bought supplies, department stores, five and dimes, and mail order catalogs catered to all social classes and ethnic groups, and treated them entirely as consumers rather than as producers. But the face to face interaction in stores did enforce social distinctions – often with terrible cruelty. Before the civil rights laws of the 1960s, department stores, especially in the South of the United States, would not permit black shoppers to try on clothes, and five and dimes restricted seats at their lunch counters to whites. Even now, salespeople in high status stores may snub men and women of lower social classes. To avoid these everyday kinds of discrimination, some shoppers have always preferred to use mail order catalogs or, these days, they shop on the Internet.

From the late nineteenth century, department stores expanded, modernized, and democratized the sense of luxury that shoppers had earlier experienced in small, custom shops and arcades (Leach 1993). They were the first big, multi floor stores, and were usually located in the busy centers of cities' commercial districts, close to mass transit lines. Department stores borrowed theatrical techniques to heighten the aesthetic and emotional experience of shopping, dramatizing both window and interior displays with electric lights, colorful décor, mannequins, and tableaux. They also sought the collaboration of art museums in devising model rooms and special exhibitions. Not only were department stores visual feasts, they also kept shoppers in motion. Escalators brought them up to less traveled departments, giving them a view of merchandise on each floor as they passed by. And in some department stores, shoppers descended to a "bargain basement" where especially low priced goods were sold.

Department stores established special amenities to welcome women shoppers and to keep them longer in the store – from non alcoholic tearooms and spacious rest rooms to fashion shows and infants' clothing departments. While

women pressed for greater independence and the right to vote, department stores offered them a safe public space that they could use without being accompanied by men. This was especially important for women of the middle and upper classes.

The feeling of being surrounded by goods that could be bought and owned played to shoppers' imaginations. But if department stores were "dream worlds," as Rosalind Williams (1982) calls them, they relied on a strict, hierarchical business organization, with well paid male merchants and managers at the top and low paid, usually female sales clerks and African American elevator operators at the bottom (Benson 1986). The five and dime store reproduced the same hierarchy – and the same dream like experience – for an even broader public of shoppers. Five and dimes featured products that rich as well as poor could buy, all displayed on counters, and all priced at only five or ten cents. These stores helped to create the age of mass consumption for everyone.

The patterns set by department stores and five and dimes were expanded in the twentieth century by supermarkets, which sold many different kinds of food, as well as other goods, under one roof, and shopping centers, which featured an array of specialty shops as well as one or two department stores. By 1960, most Americans regularly drove to shop in these large places that were dominated by national chains, rather than walking to traditional, individually owned, local or corner stores.

During the 1950s, however, a new kind of store altered the shopping experience. To capture shoppers who were concerned about inflation, discount stores offered no frills displays, few services or amenities, and guaranteed lower than usual prices. Dedicated, at first, to only a single category of merchandise – often, household appliances and electronics goods – discount stores soon branched out to include a wide range of products. Wal Mart, which emerged by the 1990s as the largest, most successful discount chain, and, eventually, the largest private employer in the world, built upon the model of both the supermarket and the five and dime. Wal Mart stores charged "low prices always" by holding their expenses down and pushing suppliers to do the same. For the first 20 years, discount stores sold only generic or no name

brands, until Wal Mart changed its strategy and offered nationally advertised brands at very low prices, often because these products were manufactured by low wage workers in China. This shift changed the shopping experience, bringing rich and middle class shoppers into the discount store alongside Wal Mart's middle income base, and made "aspirational" shopping for brand name goods accessible to people of modest means. It is no wonder Wal Mart expanded rapidly through the United States and into Mexico and China, though not without provoking serious complaints about its labor and environmental practices.

In the 1960s a different type of new, small store catered to an emerging group of teenage and young adult consumers. Copied from shops in London and Paris, *boutiques* soon spread to the United States and around the world. In contrast to department and discount stores, boutiques sold only a small range of products, beginning with fashion, and used these products to set out a definite, style conscious point of view. Some boutiques specialized in the expensive clothing of a single, famous, international designer – and were among the first multinational chain stores. But many more boutiques just concentrated on a single kind of product or style, and were especially attractive to the young. During these years of cultural ferment, shopping became a vehicle for differentiating age groups and developing and diffusing "life style," at least in the form of commodities that could be grouped together to suggest a common approach to life. Not just buying the products, but shopping in different kinds of stores became a form of peer groups' self expression.

Reflecting the needs of consumer products companies rather than of consumers, another kind of store – the branded store, selling the various product lines of a single corporation – emerged during the 1980s. The model was set by The Gap, a national chain of moderate price jeans and T shirt shops, which, since the 1960s, had sold products of different suppliers under the manufacturers' labels. A corporate makeover defined a coherent visual identity for Gap stores, and unified all products that they sold under The Gap's own label. At the same time, the chain revised contracts with suppliers, so that all goods sold at The Gap were now identified with the chain rather than with independent

or competing producers. Other stores followed The Gap's example, with Nike developing some of the most elaborate stores to showcase their athletic shoes, clothing, and equipment. Shopping then became an experience of communing with a specific brand, because of either the reputation of its products and designers, or the magic of its name.

Viewing individual consumers as the center of shopping focuses attention on need, desire, and identity as wellsprings of the willingness to shop. Yet every aspect of shopping – from places where people shop and displays of goods to buy, to the status cues of advertisements and the convenience of easy financial credit – is calculated to appeal. Abundance, novelty, low prices, and exclusive styles lure shoppers to loosen their self control and engage in shopping more (Underhill 1999). Branding and creating an emotional experience in the store are bids to get shoppers' loyalty. From stores' and manufacturers' point of view, there is profit to be gained by prolonging shoppers' stay in a "buying mode." For this reason, modern retailers continually develop new amenities and amass a larger assortment of merchandise to engage shoppers and keep them involved. This is the strategy of every shopping site, from activity filled malls to "sticky" retail websites. If shopping is reputed to be an entertainment experience, or promoted as a way of saving time, it is nonetheless exhausting, requires an increasing amount of attention, and intrudes into the privacy of our home. It intrudes as well into public spaces like art museums and Internet search engines, that have been, until recently, a refuge from creeping commodification.

SHOPPING AS A CULTURAL FIELD

Clearly, shopping is more than just an economic exchange of goods, and different from an individual effort to find commodities that express identity, achieve a higher status, or satisfy desire. It is really a cultural field in Pierre Bourdieu's sense (Ferguson 1998), including a range of cultural texts and social institutions. This cultural field is the interface between production and consumption, which helps to create both producers and consumers. Although the shopping experience centers on specific kinds

of stores (or websites), where goods are displayed and bought, the entire field translates the product cycles of manufacturers, messages in magazines and advertisements, and credit policies of states and banks into individual cultural practices. Consumer guidebooks and product reviews play an important mediating role because they present authoritative judgments that legitimize and set rules for shopping, voicing the rational as well as the aesthetic values shoppers pursue. The individual is both socialized to shop and socialized by the activities, places, and texts that make up shopping.

Shopping, then, brings together the micro level construction of individual identity and the macro level development of modernity. This suggests future research focusing on questions that have already emerged about the modern public sphere: implications of shoppers' mobility and fascination with commodities; the uses of shopping in different societies to exclude social groups from, or create common access to, public space; the integration of shopping into rituals of solidarity in families, communities, and localities. As an attitude toward goods that, in a rich society, often emphasizes sensual pleasure and escape from everyday concerns, shopping is often interpreted as a behavior of excess, showing a lack of self control bordering on narcissism. But this judgment neglects the anxiety that accompanies many shoppers' choices: keeping within the rigid limits of a budget, finding a comfortable store, and making the *right* choice.

Psychologists report that an abundance of choices – of products, services, and means of consumption – increases shoppers' anxiety (Schwartz 2004). For sociologists, the issue of choice should suggest research focusing on how the public is formed by the social practices of stores and by the consumer guides and magazines that play the role of cultural intermediaries, as well as on how public policies in a shopping culture are formulated and received.

SEE ALSO: Advertising; Commodities, Commodity Fetishism, and Commodification; Consumer Culture, Children's; Consumption, Cathedrals of; Consumption and the Internet; Consumption, Mass Consumption, and Consumer Culture; Consumption Rituals; Department Store; Shopping Malls; Supermarkets

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shopping malls

Lauren Langman

The shopping mall is one of the most important social locations and symbols of contemporary consumer society and its cornucopia of goods. It is typically a “self contained” social environment with an assembly of stores and shops, carts and kiosks, and surely various eateries located in food courts. Shopping malls are the points of intersection between a vast globalized system where the production of highly advertised goods is distributed to individual consumers. They are sites of practices that mediate between the globalized factories and stores that sell the merchandise and individual interactions and identities that are today

ever more dependent on the consumption of “branded” goods (Klein 1999).

Insofar as mall shopping is more frequent than church attendance in the United States and consumerism has taken on a religious hue, malls have often been termed “temples of consumption” (Kowinski 1985). As special places apart from the “ordinary world,” people celebrate the “superior power” of the globalized commodity system through rituals of consumption that affirm their identities and lifestyles, as they pursue beliefs that the “goods life” offers access to simulated heavens on earth.

HISTORY

From the earliest prehistoric times, people have traded goods with each other. With the rise of permanent settlements and merchant and artisan classes, certain times and social places were designated for trade, such as fairs, markets, and celebrations, making commerce spatially situated. Village squares and marketplaces were places where people might not only trade goods, but also exchange socially relevant information (aka gossip). Traditional markets were as much concerned with maintaining social ties and relationships as commerce.

This pattern of trade began to change after the Crusades, when silks, spices, and porcelain from the East became more readily available to Europe. When Marco Polo returned with tales of the Middle Kingdom, as trade with the Levant (Eastern Mediterranean) began to flourish, a series of events would lead to one of the most significant social transformations in history: the rise of a rational, industrial, market society that would culminate in a now globalized, capitalist modernity.

In the Paris of 1822, following industrialization and urbanization, arcades (covered passages of shops) came into being. Glass roofs create a new permutation of the “built environment”: protection from the weather. Arcades catered primarily to the growing affluent middle classes and created what Benjamin (1999) called “phantasmagorias” of commodities. These new “dream worlds of the city” became backgrounds for the urban dandy with the conspicuous

leisure to stroll through the city, and create the new experiences of urban life.

Later in the nineteenth century, throughout Europe, with a growing middle class working in urban centers and mass transportation improvements, came the department store, with its vast collections of goods from fashions to household items. The latest fashions were elegantly displayed on mannequins. Magnificent “rooms” of furniture were displayed with careful attention to the new forms of electric lights, colors, and arrangements (Leach 1989).

Following World War II, shopping malls began to sprout up throughout the US. Although some malls had been built in the 1920s, with the federally financed expressway system, stores went to the suburbs, where the people were. There were four central features of the new shopping malls: (1) huge parking lots, (2) established department stores became “anchors” for the mall, (3) many tried to develop a particular theme to make them “different” from other malls and make customers feel special shopping there, and (4) malls were private property that attempted to recreate nostalgic forms of “main streets” replete with casual interactions.

With globalization fostering certain kinds of urban based jobs in finance, law, etc., there came the gentrification of many cities and their transformation into shopping/entertainment centers in the late twentieth century. High rise urban malls began to emerge, such as Water Tower Place in Chicago. Concurrently, mega malls such as the Edmonton Mall and the Mall of America were on the rise. Further, malls are now likely not only to consist of shops, but some may also have casinos, movie theaters, chapels, amusement parks, nightclubs, or even hotels for those who might travel long distances just to shop at some of the hundreds of stores – most of which are available everywhere.

SOCIOLOGY OF THE MALL

It is often surprising that there has been very little sociological research and theory about shopping malls and mall specific behavior. One of the first sociologists to study malls was Gottdiener (2001), whose work influenced many other sociologists, such as Crawford (1992), Ritzer (1999), and Zukin (2004).

Functions of Malls

Malls are primarily places where consumer goods made anywhere in the world can be distributed to people according to their social locations (real and imagined) and membership in particular cultures of taste, fashion, and sophistication – aspects of what Bourdieu has called “distinction.” Almost two thirds of the goods sold in the US are purchased at malls.

There are two faces of mall functions: social and design. Mall design functions to disguise the exchange relation of producer and consumer by stimulating consumer fantasies (Gottdiener 2001). Malls are designed to lead consumers to walk through sequences of small and anchor stores, arranged on the basis of consumer behavior studies. Halls and fancy atriums are meant to add the leisure of a mall visit to support consumption maximization. In order to create symbolic differences between malls selling more or less the same goods, they are often “themed,” given an overall motif connoting luxury, nostalgia or perhaps high tech fantasy (Gottdiener 2001). With the added symbolism provided by themes, malls now are not only about production and distribution, but also other phenomena related to goods and services: advertising, marketing, sales, individual taste, style, fashion (Ritzer 1999: 6). Despite their goal to be “different,” the motifs that are considered “successful” in attracting customers to the malls are often repeated in other malls.

Malls as Social Locations

Perhaps the Arcades Project of Benjamin (1999) remains the most comprehensive classical attempt to frame the roofed passages as a new site of consumption with new modes of experiencing oneself and others. To Kowinski (1985), malls were spiritual places. Gottdiener emphasized the extent to which malls were exemplars of produced spaces that became essential moments of consumer society, exemplars of “theming,” the creation of a coherent ambience in which symbolic differences attempt to give place a special leitmotif, and in turn loyalty to a specific place of consumption and location for the realization of the consumer based self. For Ritzer (1999), malls, as “cathedrals of

consumption,” were places where the rationality of modernity was masked by a “re enchantment of the world” to encourage consumption.

Some malls attempt to simulate public spaces for community events. For example, Christmas celebrations in shopping malls are typical, and may perhaps encourage some more shopping as well. Some malls encourage visits at Halloween by suggesting they are considered safer to do trick or treating for children rather than knocking on the door of a stranger’s house (Chin 2001). Meanwhile, the parents may happen to buy things. People wandering about in malls are perceived more positively compared to those in outdoor public spaces, since the “controlled environment” of the mall is absent from the actual downtown urban space. This keeps out “unwanted people” and/or political ideas.

Shopping Mall Selfhood

Malls are the places that can be seen as sites where consumerism “colonizes the lifeworld of the self.” One can buy the accoutrements of identity to fashion a “fantastic” subjectivity, including modes of gratifying self presentations and appearances that awaken an often moribund self, and incorporation of one into consumption based subcultures (Langman 1992), especially in a “branded” world when a “brand” is a *synecdoche* for a distinct, albeit imaginary identity and lifestyle (Klein 1999). Chin’s (2001) study found that the consumer sphere in shopping malls is an almost imaginary world for African American girls from poor families, distracting them from threat and victimization from men and their childhood vulnerability at home. Malls are the places for subjective doing, being, and becoming, serving functional, existential, and imaginary purposes for the realization of consumer based selfhood, often satisfying “needs” that are fostered by media based programming and advertisement. “Being in the mall,” a fundamental ontological moment, results in being seen as a consumer and confirmed as one who can and does shop. For some people, being recognized as one who can and does buy an RL or DKNY jacket or a Rolex watch is often the best experience they have. The amount of money spent in the mall to buy is influenced by the degree of exposure to the consumer culture and limitations of buying power.

SOCIOLOGICAL RESEARCH OF MALLS

How do people experience malls? Although the research is often impressionistic rather than systematic, it has been suggested that malls provide an adventurous rush of new experiences; there is a feeling of leisurely “timelessness” where people seem not to be in a hurry. They give a cosmopolitan feeling of being somewhere “special” rather than in a kind of fortress. An important topic has been the extent to which malls as private properties are used as “public places,” alternatives to schools or city centers, yet security guards often exclude political actions such as leafleting or petitioning and thus act to constrain free speech.

A number of research agendas have looked at specific features of malls, such as the impact of total closed circuit television (CCTV) surveillance as a disciplinary practice. Similarly, a topic that has warranted much attention has been the patterns of inclusion and exclusion. Malls generally don’t want certain kinds of people: the poor, the unemployed (thought to be there not to buy but to steal), or the political. Those who are just likely to congregate and not buy much – aka teenage mall rats seeking hangouts – are observed closely or directed to inferior merchandise. Yet, at the same time, they are the primary consumers of certain kinds of fashions, music, videos, etc.

Most research on malls has been done by developers and marketers studying the demographics and psychographics of a potential consumer base. For example, Weiss (1988) has shown how American consumer patterns readily differ by zip codes, where people live. There are some 40 or more clusters of shoppers, some, like “young suburbia,” are more likely to shop in malls than the more affluent, more educated, more urban “money and brains” or “new boomers.” Similarly, a great deal of marketing research has attempted to look at sales in terms of store location within the mall, store design, product placement, and even such things as lighting, scent, and the fashions of the sales staff as they impact consumers.

Malls present major challenges for social research, not the least of which is because of the many ways they can be studied, their historical evolution, impact on land use, class reproduction, job creation, or semiotic analyses of

their design, décor, and ambience. Much less has been charted about malls as sites for social practices. Ethnographic studies typically require a stable population; mall shoppers typically come and go.

Some elites criticize the banality and commercialization of malls, yet consumption of various goods can and does provide some people with various pleasures, such as incorporation into peer groups – especially for the many people who do work that is both necessary and undesirable (“shadow work”). Malls provide realms where shopping is fun and buying or using goods provides valorized identities with agency and creativity.

FUTURE OF MALLS

In the past decade, the dominance of the mall as the primary site for the distribution of mass produced goods has faced at least two major challenges. Foregrounded by the growing inequality and wage stagnation, the stand alone “big box” superstores like Wal Mart and Costco and Target have been growing rapidly. While such stores do not have as wide a range of goods and brands, they do offer “savings” on quantity purchases. The other threat to the mall has been the proliferation of “virtual malls” on the Internet. Most of the products available at the mall can be purchased online and often for less cost in time and money than going to the mall.

In order for malls to continue to stay in business, they will need to offer activities that cannot be easily done at home, as when movie theaters came to malls to take advantage of the empty parking lots in the evenings. Malls will need to offer people a lot more than goods to be able to sell them goods. For example, Edmonton Mall and the Mall of America include a number of amusements, such as rides for kiddies and sophisticated restaurants for parents. However, to expect malls to become full community and activity centers is probably asking too much considering their ability to exclude people, activities, and ideas. In a globalized world, the mall serves a central role in mediating advertising, fostering consumerism, and socializing the “emotion rules” and modes of experiencing the consumer self and the world.

SEE ALSO: Arcades; Consumption, Cathedrals of; Consumption, Landscapes of; Consumption Rituals; Consumption, Spectacles of; Department Store; *Flânerie*; Globalization, Consumption and; Shopping

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shushin koyo

Ross Mouer

Literally translated as “end of life employment,” *shushin koyo* is commonly rendered as “lifetime employment.” The term has often been used out of context to refer to a practice

of hiring employees at a young age and then continuously employing them until they die. This usage is associated with an emphasis on mutual commitment between the employer and the employee within a paternalistic framework. Some have argued that the employment relationship came out of the traditional sense of loyalty associated with the *samurai* in service to his master and the reciprocal obligations of the overlord to his retainers. Other factors commonly mentioned as supporting such a commitment at work include Japan's bureaucratic tradition in state run enterprises, the interests of management in retaining skilled employees, and the need felt by many ordinary Japanese males after Japan's defeat in the Pacific War to reorient their strong sense of identity which had previously revolved around the nation state.

More sanguine observers and ordinary Japanese have thought of *shushin koyo* in more practical terms as referring rather loosely to long term or career employment. Labor turnover in Japan has been significant throughout the post war period, and few think of *shushin koyo* as an actual practice, although many are cognizant that overall levels of labor mobility among Japanese firms may be lower than in many other industrialized economies (such as in America or Australia). They too will know that it is much lower in Japan's large firms than in its smaller ones. It has also been accepted that Japan's large firms have traditionally been better able to absorb the effects of economic downturns and to subsidize a certain degree of redundancy in such situations. Smaller firms have never had that margin and have had to behave in an economically more rationalistic manner. Nevertheless, recession and the further globalization of Japan's economy combined in the 1990s to increase the pressure on Japan's large firms to trim their workforce; some large firms went bankrupt and many others moved quickly to downsize and reduce fixed labor costs as a component of their overall operating costs. The unemployment rate in Japan rose from around 2.5 in the late 1980s to over 5 percent by 2000.

Debate about the actual practice of *shushin koyo* aside, many have argued that its greater importance has been as an ideal for many Japanese. Regardless of whether or not workers stayed with their firm for longer periods than workers in other countries, many argued that

the crux of the matter lies in understanding the cultural and social context in which employers would not unreasonably dismiss employees. The commitment on the part of the employer was reinforced in at least two ways. One was in the realization and belief that poverty was a serious issue in Japan immediately after the war when a consensus seemed to emerge that each standard household should be able to have at least one secure breadwinner. The other was that the shift from age to seniority as a criterion determining wages or salaries made sense if long term employment was assured.

Long term employment guarantees have tended to go hand in hand with the institutionalization of salary systems for most regular (male) employees. This tended to fix wage costs regardless of hours worked up to a point, an approach which tended to put pressure on many firms that struggled during recessionary times, and this was certainly the case since the 1990s.

It should be noted that the commitment to maintain employment for a household head did not necessarily extend to other members of the household. Before the mid to late 1980s, Japanese women were often encouraged or even pressured to resign upon marriage, or upon reaching an arbitrary age (such as 30 or 31). The practice of hiring offspring (sons or daughters) varied, but the principle in most firms offering *shushin koyo* guarantees was that entry to the firm would be based on some notion of competitively demonstrated merit. Finally, employment associated with the *shushin koyo* guarantee was to begin immediately after graduation and extend to age 55 in most firms, an age not too far removed from the average life expectancy in the late 1940s and early 1950s.

As a set of cultural expectations, the notion of *shushin koyo* was central to the emergence in the 1960s of Japan's *sarariman* (salaried employee) as the key element in the formation of a new social class, and to the concomitant development of the mass culture associated with Japan having a broadly based middle class that initially spread across blue and white collar employment in Japan's large firms, and then came to include those employed in medium sized and smaller firms (for more on Japan's middle class at that time see Vogel 1963). The stability for families that flowed from the *shushin koyo* guarantee fueled homeownership, successive waves of

consumerism, and the materialism associated with the new lifestyle. As a way of life, the *sarari man* lifestyle incorporated a kind of womb to tomb tradeoff. For the *sarariman's* offspring this involved a commitment to doing their best at school and in a series of entrance examinations (*juken benkyo*). For many students this meant extra tuition in *juku* (private schools offering supplementary instruction) or *yobiko* (preparatory schools). For the cohort it meant over time a growing percentage of students attending private high schools and tertiary institutions. The pressure on students to start their salaried careers on the highest possible wage age trajectory in the best possible firm reflected a credentialism which has over time led to decreasing intergenerational mobility and the reproduction of social class in contemporary Japan as described by Sato (2000) and others.

To obtain greater productivity at the firm level, management has over time developed a number of techniques to remove redundant employees. Most important is the fact that promotion has been more tightly linked to performance based criteria in ways that determine the trajectory that each employee's age wage curve follows. However, the major means of regulating fixed labor costs have been natural attrition through the fixed retirement age (known as *teinen*) and the freedom to decide the number of new graduates to be hired as replacements each April. In recent years there has been a tendency to hire fewer graduates as regular employees for *shushin koyo* type positions and an increased reliance on part time employees, freelancers, dispatched workers, and subcontractors. The move away from the idealized patterns of long term employment has been reinforced by the movement of educated and otherwise skilled women into traditionally male domains, a reconstituting of career paths owing to equal employment opportunity legislation, the influx of migrant workers, multiculturalization, and the overall diversification of lifestyles (and hence the needs and motivations of employees). Taken together, these changes are altering the notion of *shushin koyo* as the dominant cultural practice associated with employment for male household heads.

One final issue connected to *shushin koyo* as a practice tied to a clear idea of *teinen* has been the rapid aging of the population, with the

proportion of the population aged 65 and older increasing from 5.3 percent in 1955 to 17.3 percent in 2000. During the 1970s and 1980s this was partially accommodated in large firms by gradually moving the fixed retirement age up from 55 to 60. Since then many firms have introduced or formalized schemes for "rehiring" employees who had officially retired. Many also have informal means of redeploying retired employees in subsidiaries or subcontracting firms. While this often accommodated the needs of better performing employees, those whose performance was below average often had to struggle as pensioners. Pension schemes are varied and complex, a factor adding anxiety to many Japanese employees over the decade preceding retirement. At the beginning of the twenty first century many ideas are being discussed with regard to the financing of pensions and to their availability. One is to postpone access to pensions until a later age. Although this needs to be coupled to thinking about the fixed retirement age, it should be noted that by international standards a large percent of the Japanese population aged over 65 is still working. In 2000, 34.1 percent of Japanese men aged 65 and over (and 14.4 percent of women) were working. This compared with 16.9 and 9.1 percent in the US, 3.7 and 1.8 percent in France, and 10.7 and 2.8 percent in Italy (Japan Institute of Labor 2002: 17). At the same time, the increasing casualization of work in Japan is likely to see a growing disparity in retirement between (1) those who have been in the privileged *shushin koyo* sector as regular (male) employees in Japan's large established firms and enjoy the benefit of having a substantial component of their pension coming from a firm linked private fund and (2) those who rely heavily on the state funded component of their pensions.

SEE ALSO: Enterprise Unions; Japanese Style Management; *Nenko Chingin*; Salary Men

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sibling relationships during old age

Ingrid Arnet Connidis

A growing interest in old siblings reflects the potential increase in their importance at a time when union dissolution is high and birth rates low. For many subjects, a definition merely begins the story. In the case of older siblings, defining the term and exploring different types of sibship remain compelling research challenges. Traditional definitions refer to the category of full siblings, related to one another through two biological parents. This restrictive definition excludes those who are half siblings (related through one shared biological parent), adopted siblings (related through legal adoption), and step siblings (related to one another through subsequent marriages of one or both biological or adoptive parents). In earlier times, acquiring step siblings typically occurred after the death of one parent and subsequent remarriage of the other. Now, step siblings are more likely to result from the remarriage of one or both parents following divorce. For most old persons today, these categories cover the vast majority of siblings; the future will bring an even broader array of adult sibling types in the wake of more marriage like unions that also produce children.

Relatively little research concerns old siblings in their own right, but in recent decades research on siblings has finally extended beyond childhood. The bulk of studies tend to be psychological or developmental (Cicirelli 1995); to focus on university aged adults; to address assumed traits of sibling relationships such as rivalry; or, when extended into middle

age, to explore siblings largely in the context of caring for their parents rather than their direct relationships with one another. The variety of research on adult siblings, including cohort comparisons, suggests a general portrait of change in sibling ties over the life course and of a significant tie in later life.

The sibling bond is unique in the contradictory expectations that it include the obligations of family membership but, as a tie between relative peers, it should also be relatively voluntary (Allan 1977). This makes siblings an ideal relationship for exploring the *ambivalence* that characterizes family relationships at both the sociological and psychological levels (Connidis & McMullin 2002). Exploring sibling ties benefits from and in turn helps to extend the theoretical constructs of the life course and ambivalence (Walker et al. in press).

Sibling ties are very active in youth, then go through a period of relative dormancy, and eventually resurface once long term relationships are established or disbanded, children are raised, and paid work is either stabilized or left behind, sometimes through job loss but usually through retirement. On the way to this more active phase in sibling relationships, various life transitions may rekindle bonds between siblings, as they reach out to and for one another. Life changes such as the illness or death of parents and other family members, divorce, widowhood, remarriage, and relocation nearby, often heighten sibling contact and support. Research on the negotiation of the sibling tie in the context of caring for a parent, particularly one without a partner, indicates the dynamics of family life and its interplay with larger social forces (Matthews 2002). Structured social relations based on gender, age, class, race, ethnicity, and sexual orientation play themselves out and are evident in studies *across* families (families of different races, classes, and ethnic background negotiate sibling ties differently) and *within* families (gender and sexual orientation influence the respective positions of siblings in the family network, including their relative responsibilities for particular obligations).

Even during times of relative inactivity as measured by contact, emotional closeness persists in the shared memories and reflections of siblings. The observed significance of reminiscence on old age adds a unique quality and value

to sibling ties – typically the relationship that endures the longest in most of our lives. Women and single and childless persons have particularly involved sibling ties. Those who have fewer alternative attachments do not simply rely more heavily on their siblings; indications are that they also invest more heavily in them, directly as siblings and less directly as aunts and uncles (Connidis 2001). This means that older persons who have a sister or a single or a childless sibling are also more likely to sustain more active sibling relationships.

The greater involvement of sisters than brothers can be linked to both demographic trends and social structure. Because they live longer, women are more likely to either enjoy or require the company of someone other than a partner. This difference in availability is reinforced by socially constructed gender relations in which age remains a liability for old women who are interested in an intimate relationship (many are not). The stronger sister connections are also reinforced by a stronger culture of caring among women than men that is a further instance of socially structured gender relations.

An area of study that is likely to further our understanding of sibling ties particularly and family ties more generally is the extent to which divisions based on class occur *within* families when siblings are adults and no longer assume the same class position by virtue of their shared childhood. In the case of old persons, a related research question concerns the effect of timing – when sibling ties are acquired – on the long term relationship between brothers and sisters. As well, many adults form close bonds with their partners' siblings that carry into old age; thus, siblings in law and their equivalent are important sibling types about whom we need to learn more.

SEE ALSO: Aging and the Life Course, Theories of; Aging and Social Support; Family Structure; Family Theory; Gender, Aging and; Life Course and Family; Life Course Perspective; Sibling Ties

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sibling ties

Melanie Mauthner

Sibling ties are some of the most widespread and enduring intimate relationships. Located at the border of kinship and friendship, the sociology of siblings largely centers on childhood and old age, rivalry and social support. The role of sibling ties at other stages of the life course – youth and adulthood – and in relation to other topics such as mental illness, substance abuse, disability, and domestic violence (Sanders 2004) is neglected. Principally explored from an adult carer perspective and a policy and professional agenda rather than through a sociological lens, sibling ties are little understood. Exceptions include schooling, fostering, and adoption decisions, where the importance of sibling ties is recognized. Yet they continue to be viewed in relation to parent–child bonds rather than as relationships in their own right.

Until the 1980s the sociology of siblings was influenced by ideas from developmental psychology. Sibling ties were explored through a behavioral and cognitive lens with incest, eating disorders, aggression, and educational achievement as dominant themes. Other angles that characterized the field were the intensity and effects of sibling ties. Links between these elements and parental neglect and the endurance

of sibling ties over time received a lot of attention. As a sphere of social interaction, support, and as a network even, empirical work was in its infancy until sociologists began to explore meanings of different types of adult sibling ties (Allan 1977).

Numerous factors account for sociological neglect of sibling ties until the 1980s. One was the preeminence in family studies of issues connected to marriage, reproduction, and parenting rather than to intimacy more generally, including lesbian/gay ties, friendship, and sibship. A second factor was the pervasive emphasis on the child as individual and on the mother-child bond rather than on the child as a member of a generational sibling group. Third, psychoanalytic notions of envy and the trauma of displacement after the birth of a sibling made it difficult to challenge either the rivalry or the deviance discourses (Coles 2003). Indeed, these continue to influence everyday understandings of hostility and misbehavior as perceived in sibling ties. A fourth factor was the absence of siblings' own narratives about what it means to be a sister or brother. This invisibility mirrored that of previously marginalized relationships in studies of domestic life among stepfamilies and non heterosexual households. Fifth, there was a tendency to ignore sibling ties as constitutive of power relations and caring practices and socializing in themselves. In retrospect this silence appears ethnocentric for overlooking kin arrangements based on lateral rather than vertical connections.

Gradually, researchers instigated cross disciplinary dialogues that placed sibling ties in social life firmly on the map (Zukow 1989). Attention shifted to social context, intra household links, life events, and concepts such as negotiation and reciprocity. By the 1990s sociologists influenced by social constructionist and feminist perspectives started to investigate siblings as a social group (Walker et al. 2005). They examined the intrinsic value of their ties across the life course in order to understand patterns of transnational migration, family employment, and gendered identity. Ethnographies of sibling life and a sibling standpoint emerged (Song 1999; Mauthner 2002) as sociologists explored changing forms of intimacy in relation to residency, shared history, and belonging to familial cultures and ethnic communities.

There has been little sociological research on sibling ties, especially across the life course. Sibling ties now form part of sociological inquiry into the social relations of intimacy, care, and identity; no longer are they merely of concern in relation to instances of "clinical adaptation" (Lamb and Sutton Smith 1982). For the topic of sibling sociology to grow, there is a need for a broader range of issues to be addressed and for more diverse theories and methodologies to be used, particularly more qualitative and longitudinal approaches. There is a need to investigate the complexity of the ties, the components of their longevity, and how they shape identity in psychic life. New interdisciplinary work attempts to define multiple meanings of "sibling," of sameness and difference, agency and interdependence, and of continuity and change by drawing on psychoanalysis, post structuralism, and cultural geography.

A priority is to establish how competing discourses of rivalry, deviance, and care coexist in forming contested meanings of sibling ties. Other directions and topics ripe for investigation include more work exploring generational and historical dimensions, socio legal aspects of sibling partnership and citizenship rights, sibling representations in popular culture, sibling experiences of asylum and resettlement, and memories of mental illness, adoption, and fostering. Sibling sociology is likely to encompass work on sibling identities shaped by previously overlooked sociodemographic variables such as ethnicity, class, and dis/ability. Greater methodological diversity will reveal the particularity and cultural specificity of sibling ties rather than their universal attributes. More research employing ethnography, memory work, and biographical methods will be useful. Thus, a new body of work documenting psychosocial elements of sibling ties for understanding identity and intimacy will emerge.

SEE ALSO: Kinship; Life Course and Family; Sibling Relationships During Old Age

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sick role

Andrew C. Twaddle

The sick role was a formulation by Talcott Parsons that posited four institutionalized behavioral expectations that attached to people defined as "sick." For about three decades, from the early 1950s to about 1980, it was the central focus of many sociologists who studied medical care. It received a large amount of criticism as well as uncritical use and became passé when Parsons's theory fell out of favor and sociology turned toward a more critical and conflict oriented approach to theorizing.

On the surface, it is quite simple and straightforward.

- 1 Sick people are expected to be *exempt from normal role obligations*. That exemption is limited and conditional. It is limited in the sense that one cannot claim exemption beyond some limit on one's own authority. At some point the right to exemption will have to be legitimated by someone with authority. It is conditional on the obligations of the sick role being fulfilled and by the "nature and severity of the condition."
- 2 Sick people are expected to be "*not responsible*" for their condition in the sense that they cannot get well by an act of motivation alone. The sick person "needs help" and has a claim on the larger community for care. It is important, in the light of subsequent criticisms, to note that this right does not attach to the onset of the condition, but to its continuation. Even if the condition arose because of the actions of the affected person, she still needs treatment to recover.
- 3 Sick people are expected to be motivated toward recovery, to *want to get well*. This expectation is an obligation that is one of the conditions for the two rights just noted. If the sick person seems to be motivated by secondary gain, the legitimacy of the two rights may be rescinded. They may become defined as not entitled to care or exemption from expectations attached to "normal" people.
- 4 Sick people are expected to *seek and cooperate with technically competent help*. This obligation limits the rights of the first two expectations, in part by being evidence of meeting the obligation of the third one. At some point, varying with the "nature and severity of the condition," sick people need the legitimation of a competent treatment agent in order to continue being entitled to care and to exemptions from normal expectations. In the light of subsequent criticisms, it is important to note that Parsons did not say that the "competent treatment agent" had to be a physician, but that physicians were the most commonly used.

There are some important contexts that are vital for understanding the sick role and which, when not taken into account, have led to considerable misunderstanding of the concept. First, the sick role applies only to those defined as sick, making it important to differentiate sickness from the related concepts of disease and illness on the one hand and other forms of "deviant behavior" on the other. Second, it was developed as a small part of Parsons's life's work, an attempt to generate a "general theory of action" under an "action frame of reference" that would unify the social sciences.

DISEASE, ILLNESS, AND SICKNESS

Sickness is a social identity, a defined incapacity for normal socially expected task and role performance. It is related to, but not the same as, disease, which is a physiological malfunction – an infection, mechanical breakdown, or degeneration resulting in reduced capacity and/or life expectancy. Nor is it the same as illness, a subjective feeling of health based on body state perceptions and/or feelings of competence. Disease has an organic basis, illness is social psychological, but sickness is distinctively sociological.

Many critics have held that the sick role is more attuned to acute disease and not very appropriate for chronic disease (e.g., diabetes), on the grounds that the third expectation could not apply to people who are by definition not going to recover. Nor would it apply to trivial diseases (e.g., common cold) that do not result in professional consultations, stigmatized diseases (e.g., addiction, STDs, some mental illness) in which people are held responsible for their condition, or various permanent legitimate roles (sickly, handicapped, mentally retarded, etc.). If the focus is on incapacity as a source of nonconformity, disease and illness become contextual triggering and bargaining events. Distinctions between acute and chronic become less salient. At the same time, many characteristics of the “nature and severity” of the condition, including prognosis and the specific incapacities of individual cases, have been shown to modify behavioral expectations.

It is of at least passing interest that the biographical beginning of Parsons’s work on the sick role, in addition to having an admired physician brother, was his own diagnosis with diabetes, a chronic disease.

ACTION FRAME OF REFERENCE

The sick role was a small part of Parsons’s attempt to build a general theory of action. The most immediate context was, on one hand, his approach to the problem of social deviance and social control, which differentiated motivated and unmotivated deviance; crime and sickness as alternative forms of deviance; punishment and therapy as alternative responses to

deviance; and the criminal justice system and the medical care system as alternative systems of social control. In this context, the sick role was an illustration of how sick people were different from criminals. Sickness was a designation for the condition where people deviate from social norms not because they “want to” but because they “can’t help it.” They lack the capacity for conformity and “need help, not punishment” to come into compliance.

Another important context was Parsons’s concern with the modernization of societies along five axes he called pattern variables. He accepted the general view of sociological theorists that the rise of the business community was the hallmark of capitalism and the modern era. However, he posited that at the same time business was coming to dominance, the professions were rising to prominence. While they were also harbingers of modern society, they were distinct from business interests.

Professions and business were held to be similar with respect to the pattern variables except for one that distinguished self interest and collectivity interest. Here business was seen as self interested, while the professions manifested collectivity interest. Physicians were the prototype profession. Patients, and by extension clients of other professions, were people with problems they could not definitively identify or solve, hence they were dependent upon others with both expert knowledge and control of the means of treatment. In this state, they were vulnerable to exploitation and required a relationship in which they could trust the professional to work in their interest toward the collective goal of effecting a cure, if possible, or stabilization and control if cure were not an option. This was in stark contrast to the competitive *caveat emptor* ethos of business.

A third theoretical concern (much less developed with reference to the sick role) was the delineation of essential requirements for the continuity of societies, the “functional imperatives.” Here Parsons held that maintaining, at some level, a healthy population was required for needed tasks and roles to be performed. It was hence important to make provision for some way of bringing sick people back to a capacity level that made the work of the society possible.

Most of the sociologists and others concerned with health, sickness, and medical care were

(and are) more interested in variations within societies than in the characteristics of societies as global entities. Considerable documentation accumulated that the behavior of symptomatic and sick people varies along social class and ethnic lines and is strongly influenced by interaction patterns in families, neighborhoods, work settings, and friendship groups. From this work came an empirically based critique of the sick role along several lines; most important was that the concept did not focus on questions of core importance to most sociologists.

Another important dimension of the criticisms was the observation that most disease and illness episodes are relatively minor and self limiting. Only a small minority ever comes to medical attention. Instead, people treat themselves, generating in the US a huge over the counter trade in remedies. In addition, many people use what is now called alternative medicine. The sick role was seen as too focused on the physician and the medical encounter.

The emphasis in the sick role formulation on the helplessness of the patient and her or his dependence on the physician for knowledge, skill, and access to resources was seen as underplaying the agency of patients. Interactions involved in the treatment of chronic disease are less likely to follow an activity-passivity model and more likely to be of a guidance-cooperation or mutual participation type. The one kind of patient most likely to be passively dependent, the critically "ill" in the intensive care unit, has seldom been studied.

It is worth noting that most studies of sickness behavior have been done on hospitalized low income patients in the subsidized services of general hospitals. These are the conditions that maximize the social status and power differentials between physicians and patients, probably skewing the research toward the most insecure and deferential patients. If studies were done on the "gold coast" private services or in private medical receptions, we might see a different set of expectations operating (or not).

Work on sickness behavior has changed toward patient decision making, using variants of the sickness career model which treats the sick role expectations as a set of parameters around which considerable variation is expected and incorporates other models, such as the health beliefs model and the concept of illness

behavior. It is an example of macro micro theorizing.

People whose health status is in question interact with others who reflect the sick role expectations through the filters of their own social class and ethnic identities, as well as their specific relationship with the afflicted individual. A process of consultation and negotiation takes place around a series of questions that frame the career of the sick person: whether a change from "normal" has taken place; whether that change is significant; whether help is needed; the type of help needed; the treatment agent to be consulted; and the nature and degree of "cooperation" with treatment recommendations. With such an approach, it is possible to document the rich variety of human response to symptoms while understanding the structural impact of class and ethnicity and retaining the important insights of the sick role formulation.

In the last 30 years or so attention in medical sociology has shifted away from the social psychology of sickness and toward a focus on medical care systems and social conflict. The study of sickness, however, remains both theoretically and practically important and the sick role is still a meaningful framework for a part of that study.

SEE ALSO: Capitalism; Chronic Illness and Disability; Complementary and Alternative Medicine; Deviance; Health Behavior; Health Professions and Occupations; Health, Self Rated; Illness Behavior; Illness Experience; Illness Narrative; Metatheory; Parsons, Talcott; Patient-Physician Relationship; Professions; Role; Social Control

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significant others

Erica Owens

Significant others are those persons who are of sufficient importance in an individual's life to affect the individual's emotions, behavior, and sense of self. While in common parlance "significant other" has come to designate a romantic partner, sociologists' broader use of the term would include other relations such as family members and close friends or mentors. Through interactions with significant others, and perceptions of their responses to one's behavior, an individual gains a sense of who he or she is, and comes to understand how to act in a given context and role. Self concept is based largely on our perceptions – whether accurate or not – of who we are in the eyes of those whose opinions matter to us.

The term "significant other" was coined by Harry Stack Sullivan, who identified significant

others as those who directly socialize the person to whom they are significant. Sullivan (1940) and George Herbert Mead (1967) suggest that socialization relies upon a person's considering the other's view of himself or herself as important. Having positive feelings toward another will greatly increase the chances that this person will become significant, and thus serve as a reference for belief and behavior.

Mead was among the first to recognize the role of important others in the development and maintenance of identity. According to Mead, there is no inherent or core self present at birth. Rather, the self is a social product that develops in stages through the process of social interaction. The key to this process is the ability to take the role of the other party in an interaction, or picture what the other might do, think, or say within a given context. Taking the role of the other allows a person to make behavioral choices based upon these perceived responses, and thereby attempt to influence how he or she is perceived by others.

Very young children are incapable of this form of projection. Their first forays into social interaction involve simple imitation of others, without an understanding of the mechanics of the relationship between themselves and these others. As children develop greater understanding of the world around them, they enter the play stage of role taking behavior. During this stage a child has the ability to take the role of significant others, generally parents or caregivers. The young child has sufficient experience with these others, and sufficient emotional investment in their reactions to him or her, to make the cognitive leap required in playacting "mommy" or "daddy." To a casual observer, such play might seem unimportant. However, when a child pretends to be daddy and cautions a stuffed toy that if the toy is naughty it will be punished, this child is demonstrating the knowledge that under certain circumstances (naughty behavior) a given other (daddy) will likely react in a predictable way (punishment).

This process of understanding important others and applying this understanding to guide one's behavior is not without its dangers. The very importance of significant others magnifies the impact of their reactions toward the individual. For instance, Wiley (2003) suggests that parents who do not provide sufficient emotional

support to the infant during identity development may do lasting damage to the integrity of the adult sense of self. Primary socialization is accomplished through a child's interactions with adults closest to him or her. The quality of this interaction will have lasting impact on whether the world is seen as a safe and welcoming place.

Parents who provide adequate support during the earliest stages of identity development provide a stronger basis for the perception of self, but continuing support from later significant others will be necessary for the individual to maintain self esteem. The production of a positive self concept, or a preferred self, is an ongoing project requiring the cooperation of others. Thus, the constant implicit threat that approval from significant others may be withdrawn helps to moderate behavior.

Deviance, or the violation of social norms, is discouraged partly by this threat of loss of significant others' approval. Whether the result is decreased or increased adherence to the norms of the larger culture depends upon the normative orientations of those others a person is trying to please. According to control theory, a person working to maintain close ties to people who adhere to conventional norms will be less likely to engage in behaviors that violate said norms. Conversely, differential association suggests that a person who wants to please significant others who engage in and approve of a form of deviance will be more likely to engage in deviance themselves. For instance, stealing may be discouraged ("If I got caught shoplifting my mom would kill me!") or encouraged ("Everyone in the gang is expected to shoplift, so I had better") depending in part upon the values held by significant others.

Tamotsu Shibutani (1962) explains this process further, through his discussion of reference groups and their function in social control. Reference groups are audiences for actions, even if the group being referenced is not physically represented through a member or members present to see the action. Every actor has a number of reference groups that serve as controls for behavior because the actor will try "to maintain or enhance his standing" in front of these groups (p. 132). Unfortunately, it may be difficult or impossible for a person to meet all of the behavioral norms of various competing groups. As people tend to conform to norms of those

groups they find most compelling, and significant others tend to serve as representatives for reference groups, the closeness and sentiment felt between significant others greatly increases their influence over individual behavior.

The relationship between an individual and the persons he or she considers to be significant others is often, but not always, reciprocal. Husband and wife share a relationship that is reciprocally significant, as do mother and child. Each can reasonably be considered significant to the other. However, some relationships may be significant for one party and much less significant, or nonexistent, for the other. A popular coach may be a significant other for a large number of college athletes, none of whom need be individually significant to the coach in return.

SEE ALSO: Interpersonal Relationships; Play Stage; Primary Groups; Reference Groups; Socialization, Agents of

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signs

J. I. (Hans) Bakker

The term "sign" is used in semiotics and hermeneutics as an umbrella (portmanteau) word covering all forms of gestures, ciphers, tokens,

marks, indices, and symbols that convey human meaning. There have been many philosophical views expressed in the study of human meaning construction. Some thinkers trace the beginning of human cognition by the earliest *Homo sapiens* to the use of signs. The earliest religious thinkers emphasized some supernatural indicators of the true nature of reality; they understood “signs” in nature as messages. This led to necromancy and other forms of divination. The Chinese *Yi Ching* was initially based on the reading of tortoise shells. Victory in battle was often seen as a sign of the whim of the gods or of God’s pleasure in ancient times. That which was not understood directly had to be fathomed on the basis of conjecture. Greek physicians utilized somatic signs to diagnose disease. They called this process *semeiosis*.

The idea of semiotic signs has gradually been extended to cover more and more features of reality. At the same time, secularization since the Scientific Revolution and the Enlightenment has made the notion that signs come from supernatural forces less acceptable. Classicist and theologian Friederich Schleiermacher utilized hermeneutics to translate and interpret both Plato and the Bible. He discovered that the way he carried out exegesis was no different for the pagan, secular texts than for the Christian, sacred texts. Hence, he postulated the possibility of a *general* hermeneutics. This idea was further developed by Wilhelm Dilthey, who thought of hermeneutics as a way of developing a “critique of historical reason” that would supplement Kant’s three critiques. Dilthey’s approach helped to provide a philosophical foundation for non-positivistic social sciences based on the study of human beings as moral and ethical actors whose outlooks and motivations could be understood (*Geisteswissenschaften* which used *Verstehen*). We can understand human actors because we ourselves are human, even though we may need to bridge a chasm of time or space (e.g., China in the tenth century). All human signs are human creations and therefore can be understood by human beings.

But hermeneutics lacked a more general epistemological foundation. That came with the work of Charles Sanders Peirce, founder of pragmatism and pragmaticism, considered by some to be the greatest American philosopher.

Peirce emphasized the way in which signs mediate between that which is being represented and that which is interpreted. While few follow Peirce’s detailed arguments to the letter, the general thrust of Peirce’s critique of Cartesian dualism makes it abundantly clear that an epistemology which focuses on the individual “subject” as an interpreter of “objects” is severely misleading. Peirce’s correction of Descartes’s epistemology parallels Einstein’s extension of Newton’s physics. For many practical purposes it is sufficient to simply think in terms of the subject’s comprehension of time and space; but, for universal laws of physics, such as the law of gravity, such a limited framework will not do. Similarly, for many purposes a Cartesian dualism is adequate. It was important for the Scientific Revolution of the seventeenth century because the independent Cartesian subject looking through a microscope, eyeglass, or a telescope replaced argument based on the authority of the Roman Catholic Church’s Thomist dogma. But a still wider perspective on human knowledge can be gained by questioning the “objectivity” of empirical observations based on inductive data gathering. A broader approach to knowledge requires a more sophisticated epistemology, one that includes an emphasis on the way in which a “sign” of some sort will always mediate between subject and object. Moreover, the isolated individual never exists in reality but only as a thought experiment (*Gedanken experiment*). In reality all scientific understanding is based on communities of scholars (Cohen 2001).

By extension, the same is even true of every day, commonsense reality, although we are usually not fully aware of it. We do not see the world; we only interpret stimuli with the aid of signs. Peirce had a complex typology of signs but the most important for sociology are icons, indices, and symbols. Icons are very specific images, such as those used on computer screens to indicate the location of a software application. Indices are signs which point to a more abstract level of reality. All descriptive statistics and statistical measures of association and correlation are indices. The most complex type of human sign is the symbol. A symbol can have many different meanings, depending on the context. George Herbert Mead’s concept of

the “significant symbol” is an echo of Peirce’s general theory of signs. A symbol can only be significant to those who have learned to interpret it. It is very easy to misunderstand symbols. When a Roman Catholic sees a dove on a stained glass window he or she knows it represents the Holy Spirit; but the same Catholic seeing a swastika on a Buddha may not know that it represents good fortune. The Buddhist, in turn, may have no idea of the meaning of the dove. Our classification schemes and typologies are often highly symbolic even though we tend to assume that they are purely analytical and descriptive. This has led some philosophers (e.g., Wittgenstein) to argue that the real meaning of a sign is in its use, but others dispute that claim. To understand a “text” more clearly, we have to have an initial “vague notion” of what the key terms mean (Eco 1999: 275–9). That is, due to “intertextuality” we cannot escape a certain degree of circularity in examining signs.

The idea that we comprehend the world according to our “definition of the situation” can be extended to include the neo Kantian notion that we perceive the world through a priori categories of understanding. Simmel took that one step further and argued that all a priors are cultural. Today we would say that we are socialized into a culture. But the further specification of the true significance of any culturally constructed sign requires some awareness of the contextual mediating function of that sign. Theories put forward by Ferdinand de Saussure and C. S. Peirce have been further developed by other semioticians. But the key ingredient is awareness of the universal function in all human representation and communication of the sign. While theorists may differ concerning the precise operationalization of the concept of the sign, there has been considerable attention paid to signs in models of the process of semiosis by such divergent thinkers as Victoria Lady Welby, Mikhail Bakhtin, Charles W. Morris, Thomas S. Sebeok, Ferruccio Rossi Landi, and Umberto Eco (Petrilli & Ponzio 2005).

SEE ALSO: Definition of the Situation; Language; Mead, George Herbert; Pragmatism; Saussure, Ferdinand de; Semiotics

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Simmel, Georg (1858–1918)

Russell Kelly

Georg Simmel was born in Berlin on March 1, 1858 and died in Strasbourg in Alsace on September 26, 1918. He is generally recognized as an important sociological writer and teacher in Europe around 1900. He is less well recognized as an important philosopher of the same period. While he was a friend and contemporary of the German sociologist Max Weber, he was also a colleague and fellow teacher with the eminent philosopher Wilhelm Dilthey. Among the students and correspondents influenced by Simmel, four major figures in American sociology attended his lectures in Berlin: Albion Small, later head of department at the University of Chicago and founding editor of the *American Journal of Sociology*, George Herbert Mead, University of Chicago philosopher, W. I. Thomas, Chicago sociologist, and Robert Park, founder of the US research tradition known best as ethnography. In the famous “Green Book,” *The Introduction to Sociology*, of 1921, Park and Burgess included more separate contributions from Simmel than from any other European sociologist. Simmel’s influence from

his teaching and his published papers on the development of sociology in the USA cannot be underestimated. Only his exclusion from Talcott Parsons's seminal *Structure of Social Action* cast a shadow for the period 1937 into the early 1960s. Since sociologists of the stature of Erving Goffman, Lewis Coser, and Kurt Wolff reclaimed Simmel's sociological work during the 1960s, his influence has been extended to virtually every area of the sociological spectrum.

FAMILY, BACKGROUND, AND CAREER

Simmel was born the youngest of seven children into a family of renowned chocolate makers, Felix & Sarotti. His father Ewald died in 1874 when Simmel was aged 16. His mother, Flora Bodenstein, was officially *Hausfrau* (housewife) to her seven children. Georg married Gertrud Kinel (aka as the author, Luise Enckendorff) in 1890 and his son Hans was born a year later. His daughter Angela was born in 1904 to his relationship with his student and colleague Gertrud Kantorowicz, writer and art historian.

Although born into a Jewish family, the Simmels had converted to Evangelical Protestantism. This was not unusual among the aspiring middle and upper middle classes of respectable Prussian and Austro-Hungarian Imperial society in the nineteenth century. Access to state employment, social and professional contacts, and any form of royal patronage were all severely restricted if a person was officially Jewish. Many "modern" Jewish families took this option in Vienna, Budapest, Prague and, of course, Berlin. This is particularly relevant in Simmel's biography, as many subsequent writers have attributed his lack of recognition in Germany in his lifetime to anti-Semitism (Wolff 1950). This may not necessarily have been the case. During World War I, for example, Simmel abandoned all religious belief and any claim to a religious status.

After his father's death, Simmel's upbringing passed to the control of Julius Friedlander, a family friend and music publisher. After completing his *abitur* or college matriculation in Berlin in 1876, Simmel proceeded to study history and philosophy, and later art history, at the King Frederick William University in Berlin. Although usually described as the Berlin

University, this royal connection is particularly relevant to the son of a Jewish family. Had Simmel's Jewish background been that significant, his student career could not have been so successful. He studied history with Droysen and Mommsen, psychology with Lazarus, ethnology with Bastian, and history of philosophy with Zeller – all renowned professors of their day. In 1881, aged 23, Simmel publicly defended his first dissertation (*ordinarius*) on Kant's physical monadology (theory of substances). The success of his dissertation gave him the right to proceed to prepare his second dissertation (*habilitation*) and a requirement (and right) to teach in the department of philosophy while doing so. This dissertation was titled *On the Relationship between Ethical Ideals and the Logical and Aesthetic*. His degree was awarded on January 16, 1885.

His teaching included titles like Ethics, New Philosophical Theory, Sociology, and Social Psychology. As *Privatdozent* (associate lecturer), Simmel was paid according to the attendances at his lectures across the year, and on the balance of registered students and paying guests. His attractive style, performance, and topical content, directed towards his public rather than the registered students, maintained a regular audience of 150–200 between 1885 and 1898. Linked to his wife's daytime *salon* and his at-home tutorials, Simmel's courses became increasingly fashionable among Berlin intellectuals and their foreign visitors. Several notable sociologists of the next generation attended his lectures and tutorials. Americans on the post-graduation European tour and roving students from Eastern and Western Europe spread his influence and brought his ideas back to the USA or took them to their own country. His popularity and earnings, although not substantial, were the envy of some of his fellows and colleagues and were the source of some resentment.

Frequent attempts were made by Professor Wilhelm Dilthey and his colleagues in the philosophy department to sponsor Simmel for appointment to a full professorship. It is important to note that although universities sponsored faculty, professorships were awarded by the Prussian state and ministers were influenced in their decisions by external as well as internal pressures. The only concession was in 1900 when Simmel was awarded his

ausserordentlicher (Extraordinary) professorship. This allowed him to continue teaching and to use the title, but fell short of the full status of a professor who could recruit and supervise post graduate students.

There are two explanations for his exclusion. One suggests that a reference from Schaefer describing “an Israelite through and through, in his external appearance, in his bearing and in his mode of thought” (Frisby 1992) was influential with its clearly racist substance. Equally, however, Schaefer and others were jealous and critical of his popularity as diminishing the status of his science and heavily critical of Simmel as a representative of the emerging discipline of sociology. The personal attack (and Dilthey’s defensive references) were directed at sociology, at its radical and revolutionary potential, at its un- or anti positivist, anti empirical, and anti scientific potential in Simmel’s hands. His flamboyant appeal to foreigners and to women in attracting lecture audiences further weakened the case for Simmel as a serious academic.

Subsequent attempts to find him recognition outside of Berlin and Prussia, especially by his friend and colleague Max Weber, always stalled on the failure to secure promotion in Berlin. He was rejected for a second chair at Heidelberg and for the smaller university at Griefswald, although he was awarded a honorary doctorate in politics from Freiburg in 1911. Finally, in 1914, he was granted his full professorship at the University of Strasbourg, aged 56. Dissatisfied and unfulfilled, his health and his motivation went into rapid decline and he died of liver cancer in September 1918.

SOCIOLOGY OF KNOWLEDGE: *ERKENNTNISSETHEORIE*

Simmel’s importance to sociology lies in his answer to his own question. “How is *gesellschaft*?” was one of his first sociological essays and became the first chapter in his *Soziologie* (1908). He argued that sociology was not a science but more a method or methodology for exploring the ongoing and continuous processes of *socialization*, or what would be described today as *social interaction*. The data of social life were drawn from other disciplines like *Volkspsychologie* – a social and anthropological psychology –

and economics. Sociology’s task was to use this data to describe and explain the processes of *sociation*. Simmel sought within these processes for the essentials of sociology, *formen*, or for the core of his formal sociology. All people in all societies interact and the forms of that interaction can be categorized. Simmel saw the task of his sociology as identifying the categories or types of interactions. This concept comes very close to the notion of “ideal type” associated with Simmel’s friend and colleague, Max Weber.

Formen

Formen or *Lebensformen* are descriptions of processes of *sociation*, which allow the processes to be divided into types or categories. One example, for Simmel, was superordination and subordination, where his examples ranged from the simple leader and follower in a small nomadic or tribal group to the processes that made some relations between monarchs or princes and their people stable and some unstable. These *formen* become features of the work of others. One of the most fundamental of interactional processes still at the core of modern sociology is W. I. Thomas’s “definition of the situation.” Erving Goffman describes processes for self and identity management. Lewis Coser offers *social conflict* as another of the forms identified by Simmel under the heading of competition and conflict. But Simmel’s notion of “Form” also has philosophical implications, as it is a “representation” expressed through and appearing in the interaction between persons, in intersubjectivity. More individual and interpersonal phenomena are identified as forms by Simmel, like jealousy or distrust. Jörg Bergmann (1993) followed the guide in his example of “secrecy,” the form that underlies his studies of *klatsch* or gossip.

Form can best be recognized by the task it performs. Identifying forms involved Simmel in an extensive range of articles and papers. Each piece is in a sense a demonstration of the method at work, being a reflection on whatever the topic happened to be. How is society possible? What does art or culture do? Why is the family indispensable? Why is conflict between rich and poor inevitable? This same approach was introduced by Robert Park and W. I. Thomas as the ground for the work of the Chicago School in the 1920s

and 1930s, from the early journalistic period through participant observation studies, to the more formal ethnographies of the 1960s to 1990s. It is also the style adopted by the more radical and experimental methods to be found in Harold Garfinkel's ethnomethodology, in the unique style of Erving Goffman, and in the widening array of projects listed under the heading qualitative research. Simmel's corpus is a set of demonstrations of *forms* that outlines the potential promised by the new science of sociology, unrestrained by commitments to set theories, methods, or perspectives. He opened avenues of inquiry that would take sociology more than a century to explore (Frisby 1992).

Dyad and Triad

One particular concept and focus originating in Simmel's work is the dyad (*Zweierverbindung* – literally, two hanging or binding together) and the triad (*Verbindung zu dreien* – three associating). Dyad and triad are translations that lose another important feature – the dynamic and processual nature of these forms. The dyad is unique as the only form that cannot exist without either of the two members whose associating is the pairing. For example, I cannot have an argument with myself, nor sustain that argument if the other party leaves and I become acutely embarrassed as I shout at the receding back of my opponent, drawing the attention of complete strangers.

Triads or larger groups can establish and continue their existence as a form with a constantly changing or revolving membership. New members can join while others leave or come and go. A discussion in a bar can continue all evening, long after the original group who set the topic up have left. A local soccer game can change personnel several times without interruption, but one, alone, cannot continue a game of chess. Simmel applies these notions in both directions, explaining the persistence of groups, large and small, on the one hand, while examining the internal features, stability, and fragility of monogamous marriage, on the other. Describing the dyadic form and the actions or behavior that constitute, maintain, and sustain it was fundamental to the development of not only sociology, but also psychology, and was the

origin of the discipline that is now social psychology.

Social Differentiation

From Karl Marx onward, the agenda for sociology had been set to account for processes of social change and revolution that rested on structures of social and economic inequality. Émile Durkheim and Max Weber, following Herbert Spencer and Social Darwinism, were seeking alternative explanations of order, stability or managed change, and how to achieve progress through evolution and development. Simmel's radical alternative to both these streams was to reject theories of social inequality or difference as a given structure imposed on the powerless by the powerful, or on the peasants by the landowners, or by princes on their subjects. Instead, he argues for social difference as a form describing exchanges between individuals, the totality appearing as a fixed structure. Changing the social interactions between individuals could radically transform what had previously looked like a fixed social structure. Marx, Durkheim, and Weber took it for granted that society existed and could be studied as a whole or in the constituent parts that they identified: actions, structures and systems, social classes, or social facts. Only Simmel started from the individual in interaction and "built" society from the bottom up. It was probably this radical individualism that opponents and critics saw as revolutionary and dangerous in Simmel's writing and teaching and in the development of sociology, and which led to his lack of promotion in the university.

Superordination and Subordination

In searching for a form in social interaction, Simmel identified the relation of leader and follower as occurring in many known societies. His description notes that there cannot be a leader without followers and that it follows from this that the leader, even in a relation of domination and coercion, still depends upon the dominated or subordinated for the relation to maintain. The follower is as essential to the existence of the interaction as is the leader for that *form* of interaction to sustain itself.

He examines all the logical variations of the relationship, concluding that the universality of the *form*, for example, would make socialism – where relations of inequality had been overwhelmed and absolute equality imposed – both idealistic and unstable, even impossible.

Conflict

Simmel argued that the analysis of conflict had moved on from that of the simplistic two class conflicts of Karl Marx into the much more complex environment that was modern work in the modern city. The original relationship between early societies who had no other form of communication, interaction, or exchange had been war, direct physical conflict. More modern conflict relationships were institutionalized in contests between lawyers in courts. This brought to conflict two new dimensions. First, conflict was now bedded in a system of rules, norms, and laws that regulated conflict situations (e.g., rules of engagement in the Gulf War, Geneva Conventions on Human Rights, and International Courts). Second, conflict was a normal, expected phase or stage in any process of interaction, which could be resolved by the parties without destroying the relationship.

Lebensanschauung

Simmel's last major work, *Lebensanschauung* (Life reflections), was published after his death. It has never been translated into English, probably because few sociologists felt it merited such attention. Simmel's return in this book to the individual in interaction as "self," as an aggregate process of the *forms* of sociation in which the individual engages, presages much of the fundamental work in philosophy and the emerging discipline of sociology. George Herbert Mead takes up the same themes from William James and, like Simmel, from Bergson in his lectures that became *Mind, Self and Society*. Martin Heidegger attributes some of the fundamental themes of his phenomenological philosophy to *Lebensanschauung*. Alfred Schutz and Aron Gurwitsch take the same starting points for *Phenomenology of the Social World* and *Studies in Phenomenology and Psychology*. Although Simmel is rarely quoted in the history of the

concept of *self*, it would not be unfair to attribute the origins of the sociological version of the concept to these writings.

Otherwise, the book is a book of its times. Simmel had moved to Strasbourg, had doubts about his lack of fame as a leading sociologist, returned to philosophy, and begun to shift his position on supporting Germany's role in World War I. He abandoned all religious belief and was increasingly disillusioned with his student group, depleted by military service and with his colleagues at the university. The book reflects the spirit of pessimism that was to prove important to Germany's undoing as the twentieth century progressed. In the post World War II spirit of optimism that marked the explosion of sociology in the 1960s, the *Lebensanschauung* was thus properly neglected and overlooked. With the refocus in the new millennium on micro sociological processes, the book might receive the examination and detailed review that it warrants, if only to ensure historical accuracy.

OVERVIEW

Simmel was probably not the greatest sociologist of his generation. That tribute ought to go to Max Weber or Émile Durkheim. Nor can we claim that Simmel's writings are still key texts for the modern student. What can be said is that few sociologists at work today do not owe some methodological or theoretical debt which traces its origin back to *Soziologie*. The methodological stream known as qualitative research in sociology and across the range of social sciences was first promoted and demonstrated by Simmel in his teachings and writings. The focus on deviance, the outsider, and the stranger as they characterize urban and city life underwrite streams of work in urban sociology, the sociology of deviance, and the sociology of mental illness and its treatment. Micro sociology, however its proponents might reject the label, symbolic interaction, sociology in the natural attitude or setting – all find their initial steps in Simmel's lectures and papers. Currently, the most profound debt is from cultural studies, where the attention of sociologists turns to fashion, art, sculpture, music, and performance set in the modern or postmodern world, following Simmel's early lead.

SEE ALSO: Collective Action; Cultural Studies; Dyad/Triad; Goffman, Erving; Groups; Knowledge, Sociology of ; Mead, George Herbert; Music; Secrecy; Self; Social Distance; Sociometry; Stranger, The; Symbolic Interaction; Weber, Max

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simulacra and simulation

Lauren Langman

For a number of sociologists, media theorists, and social critics, the current era, with its global market, advanced technologies, mass media and digital information, and the all present marketing of goods and politics, must be seen

as radically different from the industrial age of machine based mass production. One of the central technological innovations of the industrial era was the capturing of visual images, sounds, and later media with both sound and picture. From the earliest photos, to records, and later movies and television, we have seen and heard endless reproductions. But, today, many argue that we live in a "postmodern" age dominated by an endless number of spectacular images, most of which are simulations, copies without an original source, imitations where the original never existed. With the proliferation of simulations, created images serve less to reproduce the reality that was seen or heard than to create various images that in turn create a new "reality" and new kinds of meanings. The "reality" of today, a world of fantastic dreams and images, is said to be largely a product of advertisers, marketers, and political consultants. They are the ones who create and disseminate the spectacles and simulations of "hyperreality." At some point in the late twentieth century, the prevalence of artificial images, staged events, and socially constructed "realities" had become so prevalent as to be considered "normal," "natural," and hardly worth more than a yawn. In retrospect, we might now call our times the age of simulation.

With the emergence of symbolic capacities and the intentional production of various grunts, groans, and sounds – distinct words – signifiers came to represent things, what was signified. Language, according to Saussure, was a system of signs through which the spoken word represented different kinds of objects, actions, and experiences. For most of history, communication has attempted to describe or "re present" reality, or at least a particular version of reality ranging from the nature of the world, religious cosmologies, histories and law, and granary records to aesthetic expressions of one's self, desires, and meanings. Printing, mass literacy, and, more recently, mass produced and mediated representations in newspapers, magazines, radio, film, and television transformed the way people experienced themselves and their world.

Classical social theory emerged before the mechanical reproduction of images and the proliferation of mass media. Marx had noted the importance of ideology in distorting and

mystifying ruling class interests to reproduce capitalist societies. Similarly, the fantastic nature of the “commodity form” hid the actual reality of class relationships. Weber saw the importance of written records for bureaucracies – the typical organizations of modern governments and, indeed, most formal organizations. But neither anticipated the world transformative properties of mass media on politics and consumption.

The neo Marxist Frankfurt School argued that mass media distorted and disguised reality to serve the interests of political elites. It argued that emotionally gratifying Nazi propaganda consisted of an endless barrage of spectacular images and simplistic slogans that mobilized support for Hitler. Meanwhile, denigrating images demonized the Jews, who were blamed by Hitler for Germany’s problems as the Nazis promised retribution.

After the crises of 1939 that led to World War II, capitalism required expanding new markets. Consumer goods would provide that market – but the work ethic and frugality needed to be tempered in order to foster consumerism as a lifestyle. Thus consumer capitalism required the existence not only of affordable goods, but also of consumers who constantly “needed” to buy things. There was an increased role for advertising and marketing that moved from describing products to creating images in order to colonize consciousness and socialize people to buy commodities that provided meanings and gratifying, lifestyle based identities. In the illusory world of crafted images, “authenticity” became a commodity to sustain consumerism.

The Frankfurt School then argued that the “culture industry” not only sold mass mediated entertainment as a profitable commodity, but also fostered “one dimensional” thought that dulled the capacity for critical reason. Dulled reason led people to accept the socially constructed versions of reality crafted by elite commercial interests or political elites. The “culture industry” provided escapism to distract people from important social issues; the shallowness of consumerism or the hypocrisy of political leaders was disguised. But for many scholars, critical theory was a “snobbish” expression of a cultural elitism that basked in pessimism.

The next generation of media/culture theorists, Guy Debord, Jean Baudrillard, Paul Virilio,

and Umberto Eco, might be called the “simulationists.” They claimed that we now live in a world where mass mediated communication and the mass production of simulations, fakes, and replicas do not so much represent and/or ideologically distort reality as “create” a new order of reality, a spectacular “hyperreality” based on images, simulations, and mythologies that have no connection with actual reality. Nor does this simulated reality hide “truth” behind appearances; rather, there are no “truths” other than the simulated images that now dominate our culture.

The French Situationists, a group of avant garde Marxists, anarchists, and libertarians, were influenced by Dada and Surrealism. Debord (1977 [1967]) became their most elegant spokesman. They felt that the Soviet models of revolution and vision of society were deeply flawed and irrelevant to a consumer society dominated by endless spectacles. They argued that by the late 1950s we lived in a world characterized by continuous spectacle, extraordinary images and events that were systematically produced. Radio, television, film, music, industrial arts, fashions, athletic events, and festivals had become an all powerful, hegemonic system sustaining elite privilege and rendering workers placid through consumption. Extraordinary representations mediated reality and the relations between people. For Debord, the spectacle had become an all pervasive aspect of modern life, but this world of images served to justify the nature of capitalist society and ignore the “more fundamental” issue of how goods were produced – typically by exploited workers. For most people, the images of the new consumer society were its truth, while its “realities” of exploitation and domination were ignored. The spectacular images had displaced underlying realities and served to sustain the system.

The endless images and meanings of consumer society engendered “pseudo needs” to consume, which, much like the drudgery of work under capitalism, fostered alienation and in turn powerlessness and passivity. The fetish of the commodity form now colonized everyday life; subjective experiences were imitations of experience. Being “human” became equated with buying and “having” things, and “having” was transformed into appearances. The domination of appearances, what seemed plausible or even

true, isolated the present from history and maintained the status quo as an eternal today (Cubitt 2000). The spectacle had become the new form of domination.

The Situationists influenced the then young Jean Baudrillard, a neo Marxist sociologist concerned with signification and consumption. But in 1972 he broke with the Marxism that he saw as a critique of now outmoded modern, capitalist, industrial production. He saw this as irrelevant to the new, postmodern, “semiurgical” society, one based on semiotics, the production and interpretations of meanings in which acts and objects served as “signs” that have relationships to each other to produce “texts.” For Baudrillard (1994), this new order of seduction by images was increasingly based on simulation where simulacra preceded and created “hyper reality” rather than representing reality – accurately or otherwise. The “real” has imploded and been replaced by codes of reality. “The simulator’s model offers us ‘all the signs of the real’ without its vicissitudes” (Baudrillard 1994). Producers of signs such as advertisers, politicians, or film stars attempt to manipulate the public by controlling the interpretive frameworks – the code. The code is an overarching mode of sign organization that influences the “correct” or widely accepted interpretation (Gottdiener 2001). The simulations or the model have become the determinant of the perception, experience, and understanding of the contemporary world.

Semiotics and simulation have displaced political economy in the postmodern era, in which there are no more “actual” events; only media events are significant. For example, wars now exist only to the extent that they are televised images of war. Charts or radar screens supplant actual blood, death, destruction, pain, and suffering. “Public opinion” has become more “real” than the people who offer it. Individuals have become simulations of self modeled after mass mediated images, films, and ads that are articulated in spectacular self presentations dependent on consumer products that convey the right images and meanings (Langman 1992). The masses are bombarded by images (simulations) and signs (simulacra) that encourage them to buy, vote, work, or play, but eventually they become apathetic (i.e., cynical) (Hawk n.d.). People are no longer concerned with knowing

the truth – the image is sufficient. This creates a world in which consumerism leads to the “goods life.” Congenial, photogenic, yet often inept leaders are elected, disastrous policies appear brilliant, while a public exposed to thousands and thousands of media images shows little concern or outrage.

Virilio’s (1986 [1977]) analysis of modern culture emphasized the history of warfare and the importance of speed in moving men, material, and information. The growing speed of media, from messenger delivered notes to watching events unfold on television, or today emails and IMs that cross the globe, has led to a growing disconnection between images and the realities they would represent. This has, in turn, led to lapses in objectivity as well as subjectivity. Indeed, the speed of the succession of ephemeral images, without mass, bulk, or truth, has led to the erosion of freedom.

For Eco (1986 [1967]), “hyperreality” is the dominant trope of our age. His view of hyperreality is much like the spectacle for Debord and simulation for Baudrillard. Like them, he was one of the earliest writers to note the proliferation of the artificial, the fake, the imitation, and the replica as the new reality, the new “hyperreality” that was especially evident in Disneyland, Los Angeles, and Las Vegas, primary realms of recreations and themed environments that produce something better than the real. The US was seen as a land of fake history, fake art, fake nature, and fake cities where imitations do not so much reproduce reality as create a “better version” of a history without oppression, art without flaws, jungles without danger, and cities without crime, dirt, or even actual people. The Disney imitations of Main Streets, castles, (animatronic) people, animals, and monsters stand as the prototypic expression of an artificial realm of replicas. In the magical realms of Disney, fantasies are mass produced. This new theme park version of “hyperreality” can be seen in cities like Los Angeles, itself a center for the production of simulation. But the ultimate in simulation must be Las Vegas with its simulations of Egypt, Paris, Italy, and New York (Gottdiener 2001).

For Eco, the defining characteristic of our age is the emptiness of communication, perhaps best seen in the banter of sportscasters who engage in idle chatter for hours on end, who talk without

there being anything to talk about. Such banter is without content or meaning – a total waste. But this style of form without substance has become the dominant trope of advertising, entertainment, and politics. Indeed, as Baudrillard suggested, there has been an implosion and the boundaries between these realms have withered.

To be sure, simulations, fantastic themes, and imaginary motifs in the service of consumerism may well provide corporations with profits by providing people with a myriad of gratifications. So too can simulation sustain political power. But there is a dark side to the proliferation of simulation – its celebrations of consumerism promise a gratifying identity, lifestyle, and even a reality that is always elusive. In the case of politics, often onerous policies can gain mass support. The use of radio and movies for propagandistic political purposes was essential to the rise of Hitler and support for his aggressive policies. Today, with television as the primary means through which most people are informed about the world, the ominous side of simulation and its capacity to dissimulate and misinform is greatly increased. Television, with its primary emphasis on the rapidly changing visual image, is especially well suited for entertainment. It does not so much represent reality as inform opinions. News and political information take the form of entertaining political spectacles and simulations. This is a major danger to freedom and democracy because of the passivity of viewing in general, the absence of counterfactual information, and the domination of the news programs by escapist distractions (Edelman 1987; Kellner 1992). With television's endless simulations and its creations of hyperreal worlds, there is a dulling of critical reasoning that fosters passivity at best, and cynicism at worst. Indeed, many question whether a free media and informed public can exist in the current world. All too often, it seems that the simulation and its realities are preferred.

A long tradition of intellectual work has been critical of representations that do not represent but instead distort and hide. Perhaps this began with Plato's critique of painting as an inferior form of representation. But in our current world, we might note that critics from the right such as Ortega, the left such as Adorno, or a democratic centrist such as Postman, have each

in their own way been critical of the ways in which media images not only seduce, but also offer massive distortions of the actual ways the world functions by providing illusory utopias whose locations in hyperreality serve the powerful who remain in control of the realities of political economy.

SEE ALSO: Advertising; Commodities, Commodity Fetishism, and Commodification; Critical Theory/Frankfurt School; Culture Industries; Debord, Guy; Disneyization; Hyperreality; Implosion; Media; Postmodern Social Theory; Postmodernity; Semiotics; Simulation and Virtuality; Situationists

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simulation and virtuality

Sean Cubitt

The term *simulation* and its cognate *simulacrum* have a venerable history as the Latin translations of the Platonic *eidolon*. This is a copy of a

copy, exemplified in Plato's *Republic* by a painting of a bed: the carpenter's bed is a copy of the Ideal; the painter's a copy of the carpenter's, and so at a distant remove from the reality of the Idea. The term *virtual* is almost as ancient, traceable to the Aristotelian distinction between potential and actual: the future is a field of infinite potential until it is realized, at which point it trades its potentiality for actuality. Both terms have double usages in contemporary social science, as theoretical tools and as descriptions of specific methods, both associated with computer modeling.

Simulation theory is most closely associated with French sociologist Jean Baudrillard. From his early work on consumerism to his first major books, *The Mirror of Production* (1973) and *Symbolic Exchange and Death* (1976), Baudrillard voiced the despair of his generation with the betrayal of the political movements of 1968. Drawing on the situationist Guy Debord's theory of the spectacle and on the renegade surrealist Georges Bataille's notion of symbolic economies, Baudrillard began to query the reality of an increasingly mediated world. Rather than a composite formation of individual or class actors, society was a self-replicating Code, a homeostatic system. In the most frequently cited statement of his position in mid-career he wrote of the simulacrum's four historical phases:

- it is the reflection of a profound reality;
- it masks and denatures a profound reality;
- it masks the *absence* of a profound reality;
- it has no relation to any reality whatsoever: it is its own pure simulacrum.

(Baudrillard 1994: 6)

By contrast with postmodern theorists of difference, Baudrillard's later work insists on a new historical condition of homogeneity from which the possibility of historical change has been eradicated: "The perfect crime is that of an unconditional realization of the world by the actualization of all data, the transformation of all our acts and all events into pure information: in short, the final solution, the resolution of the world ahead of time by the cloning of reality and the extermination of the real by its double" (Baudrillard 1996: 25). "Realization" and "actualization" indicate the Aristotelian roots of the later Baudrillard. The world as

material, and therefore as potential, has been lost in favor of an actual world composed of its transcription into data. And as data, the world acts as a homeostatic system realized "ahead of time," that is, before it could fulfill whatever other potentialities lay latent in it to evolve historically into something truly different.

Although, through its debt to Debord, simulation theory has roots in Marxism, and perhaps especially the Hegelian Marxism of Lukács, it is itself an anti-Marxism. Skeptical, even scathing, of the consumer society, Baudrillard nonetheless holds out no hope for social action to change the world. This is in part because social classes have been supplanted by their mediation in polling, leaving only silence and apathy as appropriate political strategies; and in part because, he claims, the traditional workplace core of Marxist organization has ceased to produce. Factories no longer manufacture goods, and social movements no longer seek to close them down or seize them. Instead, political groups seek to keep factories open and functioning, not for what they make, but so that they can provide jobs. People work in order to work, not to make things or to provide services. To claim a "right to work" is equivalent to demanding a "right to leisure," and both are equally simulations whose purpose is simply to reproduce the consumers of signs. Production itself, the core of Marx's *Capital*, has ceased to exist.

Other authors with an interest in simulation have shared this distrust of Marxism, especially the variants prevalent in 1968. Umberto Eco was a rigorous critic of the Italian Red Brigades as well as an ironic critic of North American consumerism in his *Faith in Fakes: Travels in Hyperreality* (1986). Urban planner and historian of warfare Paul Virilio, through his involvement with Henri Lefebvre, was a major participant in the May events in Paris in 1968, but in his career as essayist has increasingly expressed his distrust of the contemporary world in terms of radical Catholicism. Simulation theory has been particularly influential in media and leisure studies and in scholarship on contemporary warfare. It has found itself especially vulnerable to charges of monoculturalism, cultural pessimism, and an overly absolute periodization through which to distinguish the contemporary world from previous history.

The same cannot be said for the second usage of the term *simulation* in contemporary sociology, where it refers to the practice of modeling future scenarios through the use of computer programs such as geographical information systems. Typical uses consist of employing very large databases of past geographical, economic, and demographic trends from which skilled programmers can extrapolate likely future scenarios based on shifting key variables. This type of automated futurological social science is, indeed, the kind of activity which Baudrillard singles out for attention in *The Perfect Crime* as practice which reconfigures society as pure information, thus robbing it of its reality. The conflict arises over two key disagreements. Firstly, Baudrillard is a constructionist who believes that the datum is not given, while empirical social science believes that interpretation is epiphenomenal. Secondly, simulation theory is an extreme variant on the theory of representation, according to which no representation is adequate to the reality to which it refers: in the theory of representation, this results in partial representations which are open to bias, prone to agenda setting, and ideological. Simulation theory sees the inadequacy as absolute: representation depends on the absence of the represented, and thus overrides and obliterates the reality it refers to. Simulation as modeling, however, recognizes partiality as experimental tolerances or degrees of accuracy.

The term *virtuality* is often confused with simulation, especially in contexts where both are aligned with the less definite concept of hyperreality. It refers both to computer generated quasi realities and to the philosophical concept of potential existence. Although the word has attained general currency through its evocation of any connection to digital media, technically it refers to immersive systems capable of generating the illusion that the user is occupying a space which is in fact entirely or largely computer generated. Such systems include head mounted displays, virtual environments with or without 3D enhanced goggles or screens, and increasingly the domain of theme park rides. Because theme parks and other wholly designed environments (such as Forest Lawn cemetery and at least some heritage centers) are also emblematic topics in simulation theory, the confusion is unsurprising. Howard Rheingold's *Virtual Reality* (1991) and Michael Heim's *Metaphysics*

of Virtual Reality (1993) and *Virtual Realism* (1998) presented immersive audiovisual media as pathways to enlightenment. In a key essay responding to such claims, roboticist Simon Penny (1994) asserted that virtual reality systems were the fulfillment of the European Enlightenment's dream of perfected individualism in a normalized Cartesian space. Although scientific and artistic experiments with immersive media continue, research now focuses on augmented reality, in which wearable computers allow data to be mapped over real world perception, while the expected mass market in the games sector has been overtaken by the rise of network and mobile gaming as the major growth engine for the industry.

Outside research and educational and aesthetic uses, virtuality's main presence in the early twenty first century is in mass spectacle. Thus the term is applied to such phenomena as Disneyland and similar theme parks, especially attractions whose spectacle, volume, and physical movement is sufficient to overwhelm participants, to IMAX and OMNIMAX theatrical screens, to the most lavish live theater, and to such urban phenomena as Las Vegas and downtown Tokyo. For the most part these spectacular venues involve participation in crowds rather than individuated interfaces, and confused spatial orientation rather than the Cartesianism of immersive technologies. For authors like Norman Klein (*The Vatican to Vegas: A History of Special Effects*, 2004) and Angela Ndaljanis (*Neo Baroque Aesthetics and Contemporary Entertainment*, 2004), the virtuality of immersive leisure technologies no longer appears as the precursor to new rationalist enlightenment, but as the heir to the European baroque's sensuous mysticism and celebration of power. In both instances, however, what can be discerned is a movement from the domination of nature to escape from it, both as environment and as human nature. Slavoj Žižek in *The Plague of Fantasies* (1997) sees this occurring on at least three levels: immersive virtual realities put "real" reality into question; biotechnologies and other real world applications undermine the givenness of external reality; and the role play of network mediated communities disintegrates the reality and givenness of the self. This opens for Žižek two possible futures: a catastrophe in which the informational double of the world is lost and

with it the function of the Other in the construction of desire and symbolization; and a utopia in which all symbolic conflicts, chief among them wars, are played out in virtual space with no real casualties at all. Either route might result in the redemption of real life from its own vanishing. At this juncture Žižek's virtuality appears to approximate Baudrillard's understanding of the stakes of simulation, but without Baudrillard's nihilistic reworking of Leibniz (i.e., why is there nothing rather than something?).

A similarly optimistic usage of "virtuality" derives from French philosopher Gilles Deleuze, a professed anti Hegelian rather than an anti Marxist (in contrast to the profoundly Hegelian Žižek). Defining the term in *Difference and Repetition*, another book from 1968, Deleuze uses a phenomenological example that comes close to his later readings of C. S. Peirce: the confused yet distinctive sounds of the sea. Such sounds are composed of differential relations among singularities, unique events, but are not yet distinguished as separate sounds. Such sensations are virtual as opposed to identified and distinguished sounds, which become actual in the process of becoming objects of perception. The virtual-actual opposition applied to social relations implies an atomistic field of differences, relationships, and points of singularity where they intersect to form, among other things, individual sensoria, all of which constitute a virtual domain of potentiality. The actualization of one specific potential deprives the virtual plane of its other possibilities, but also generates further potentialities, further virtuality. The concept seems close to both Ernst Bloch's conception of the future as not yet existing, and to the idea of natality outlined in Hannah Arendt's introduction to her *The Human Condition* (1958).

The term has been taken up by numerous social thinkers. Hardt and Negri devote a chapter of *Empire* (2000) to the concept of virtualities as the desires of the multitudes and their productive capacity to transform them into reality. Thus defined, the virtual is both the affective motivation and the power to act "beyond measure," that is, outside the political and economic structures of dominance. Equally insistent that this virtual power is material and anti dialectical, they assert the virtual as the boundless creativity of being. A similar use

appears in Luce Irigaray's concept of the virtual feminine, for example in *Sexes et parentés* (1987), where the project of becoming feminine is asserted to be an open ended process of creation. This concept has been linked with Deleuze's virtuality in the work of Rosi Braidotti, for whom "Sexual difference, from being a boundary marker, has become a threshold for the elaboration and the expression of multiple differences, which extend beyond gender but also beyond the human" (Braidotti 2002: 261). Such virtual gender is at once immanent and embodied, singular but constitutionally articulated with multiple social relations. Like Baudrillard's simulation, such conceptualizations of virtuality deny that differences constitute a dialectic, and to that extent almost all simulation and virtuality theorists share a general anti Hegelian or anti Marxist stance, insisting on the fluidity of becoming rather than the mechanisms of conflict. Ironically, however, for two terms so frequently confused, simulation theory is strongly pessimistic and anti realist (though practical simulation is both future oriented and empiricist), while virtuality theory is equally strongly optimistic (although practical virtual reality is open to criticisms of nostalgic reconstruction of Enlightenment ideals).

SEE ALSO: Cyberculture; Deleuze, Gilles; Digital; Hyperreality; Information Society; Representation; Simulacra and Simulation

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situationists

Alberto Toscano

The situationists were a collective of anti-capitalist thinkers, active from the late 1950s to the early 1970s, who theorized the alienated character of modern consumer society and its revolutionary overcoming. Plagued throughout its history by splits and expulsions, the Situationist International (SI) was formed in 1957 from a number of tiny avant garde groups, including the Lettrist International and the Movement for an Imaginist Bauhaus. The SI published an eponymous journal from 1958 to 1969. Best known for its widespread cultural influence (from Baudrillard to punk rock) and role in the Paris events of May 1968, the SI counted among its ranks the Danish painter Asger Jorn, the Belgian writer Raoul Vaneigem, and the English art historian T. J. Clark. Its chief theorist was Guy Debord.

Undertaking a fierce critique of what they defined as the colonization of everyday life by capitalism, the situationists saw themselves as overcoming the limitations of the avant gardes of Dadaism and Surrealism. Their name derives from the idea that capitalist culture could only be undermined through a deliberate practice – simultaneously aesthetic and political – of “constructing situations”: “games of events” and “unitary ambiances” that would rupture the alienation or separation of the modern day worker/consumer from his authentic desires and potentials, terminating his subjection to what Debord termed “the humanism of the commodity.”

The project of constructing situations was both urbanistic and semiotic. In conjunction with Henri Lefebvre, whom they later denounced for his reformism, the situationists attacked the deadening effects of modernist urbanism and architecture, exemplified by Le Corbusier. They sought to counter this modernist planning of social life with the “psychogeographical” practice of *dérive*, a methodical practice of drifting through the fragmented space of the modern metropolis, experimenting with the city’s effects on the behavior and desires of individuals. The ultimate horizon of such a practice was a “unitary urbanism” that would try to reactivate

the sedimented potentials of the city and create spatial experiences freed from the domination of commodities. At the level of signs, the situationists advocated *détournement*, the subversive usage of the materials of capitalist culture. This was epitomized in the irreverent use of comic strips to communicate revolutionary messages during May ’68. These strategies were linked, especially in the work of Vaneigem, to a politicization of pleasure and play as anti systemic practices.

Relying heavily on Hegel, Feuerbach, the early Marx, and Lukács, Debord’s *The Society of the Spectacle* (1995) proposed to update the categories of ideology critique to confront the novelty of advanced capitalism. Debord argued that the hegemony of capital over life had become virtually total, as capital was accumulated not just in the guise of material commodities but in that of “spectacles.” According to Debord, the social relations underlying such spectacles were alienated in a manner far more severe than the one envisaged by Marx’s account of commodity fetishism.

In his discussions of consumption and celebrity, Debord showed how capitalism can appear as an autonomous domain, both production and the image of that production. The spectacle – both as a sector of capitalism (the “media”) and as the totality of alienated social relations – signals not just the subordination of men to the dictates of political economy, but also the simultaneous justification of such a state of affairs. In the spectacle, life itself vanishes into its separate or independent representation and capitalism perpetually celebrates its own existence. Even the most revolutionary of practices (situationist ones included) can be “recuperated” and made functional to the perpetuation of alienated life.

Reflecting more specifically on the geopolitical situation, Debord interpreted the Cold War as the complicit juxtaposition of a bureaucratic “concentrated spectacle” in the East and a consumerist “diffuse spectacle” in the West, and foresaw, on the eve of the collapse of historical communism, their unification in an “integrated spectacle.” This diagnosis was linked to the situationists’ virulent opposition not just to the Leninist and Stalinist visions of the party, but also to a host of revolutionary trends, from Maoism to third worldism. Abhorring any

notion of politics that would trade autonomy for representation (or for charismatic leadership), the situationists pledged allegiance to the tradition of workers' councils, which they regarded as the only form of organization that would not merely repeat or displace the alienation instituted by the spectacle.

The situationists' theory of contemporary society was accompanied by a bleak estimation of the human sciences. From urbanism to political science, from psychology to sociology, the situationists viewed the activity of such compartmentalized academic disciplines as, at best, a form of passivity deriving from the separation of intellectual from manual labor, and, at worst, a willful collusion with the reign of the spectacular economy. Though the situationists did make ample usage of notions originating in the human sciences, including sociology, it was only to the extent that such notions could be enlisted in a practical critique of alienation. Their aim was to identify those forms of life capable of breaking through the cultural "decomposition" and increasing "proletarianization" that affected the contemporary world. It is in this sense that the situationists focused, for instance, on the ambivalent role of leisure in contemporary society and the emergence of violent and unmediated forms of contestation (e.g., the Watts Riots of 1965). The goal was to accelerate the collapse of capitalism, not merely to interpret it. Or, as they put it in the SI editorial "Critique of Urbanism" (1961): "to envisage in terms of aggressivity what for sociology is neutral."

In line with Debord's frequent references to Machiavelli and Clausewitz, the thinking of the situationists, who repeatedly refused any fixed doctrine of "situationism," is best understood as a *strategic* critique rather than as any kind of dispassionate social analysis. The situationists sought to locate the faultlines in the ensemble of capitalist social relations and outline modes of living capable of constructing new, antagonistic desires that would resist their atomization and representation.

SEE ALSO: Alienation; Capitalism; Commodities, Commodity Fetishism, and Commodification; Consumption, Spectacles of; Debord, Guy; Everyday Life; Lefebvre, Henri; Leisure; Lukács, Georg; Marxism and Sociology; Media

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slavery

Rodney Coates

Perhaps the oldest form of human oppression is that of slavery. Slavery, with its roots in antiquity (e.g., Egypt, Babylon, Assyria, Israel, and Greece), is defined as the forced labor of one group by another. The institution of slavery, where the slave was considered merely a piece of animate property or chattel, was first developed by the Greeks. Brutality, to include whipping, humiliation, and alienation, has been part of slavery from its inception. Slaves, stripped of their human dignity and title, were forced to abandon their family, culture, and personhood, as another owned their very being. Women, doubly exploited, were subject to sexual exploitation where they could be forced into prostitution or to submit to the sexual demands of their masters or their guests. Slaves during these periods, often accorded higher status, could be

adopted and become legal heirs of the masters. Typically, these slaves were vested with special duties owing to their unique talents (such as teachers, actors, fighters, etc.). The modern system of slavery, a direct result of European imperialistic expansion, provided even harsher levels and degrees of exploitation, humiliation, and degradation.

The modern slave system beginning with the start of the Atlantic slave trade preserved many of the earlier exploitative conditions while creating unique variations of its own. Similar practices included the dehumanization and degradation of the slave in order to preserve order. Hence there were attempts to strip the slave of his identity, culture, and history, slaves were reduced to things (chattel property), and they were required to observe ritualistic etiquette and politically correct behaviors. These practices further served to reinforce the hegemonic structures of control and power. Modern slavery differed significantly in that it created race and racism to justify the institution. Slaves, not complacent, formed extensive networks of rebellion that greatly aided their attempts to revolt, escape, and contest the system.

The primary goal of modern slavery was to create a hyperexploitative system benefiting the master class. This institution is deemed hyperexploitative for it rested on the exclusive control of and the capacity to exhaust the total labor capacity of the slave. Hence, the average life expectancy of a slave was typically set at no more than 30 years of age. All of the produce, intellectual, physical, and even issue, were deemed to be the rightful property of the master. Death, escape, and the rarely utilized emancipation of the slave were the only release from this hyperexploitation. The fact that racial identity was integral to the system increased the likelihood that all persons of color, regardless of status (i.e., born free, emancipated, or escaped), were continually paranoid. Such paranoia was frequently manipulated (formally by race specific laws, bands of disgruntled whites, or caprice) to ensure continued servile behavior of both free and non free. Hence, slavery as a total institution shrouded persons of color regardless of status.

What few realize, when contemplating slavery, is the damage done to white and other forms

of labor. Essentially slavery, with its capacity to hyperexploit labor, displaced other forms of labor where it was in competition. Those of lower class position, but in the same racial caste as the dominant master class, found their positions tenuously dependent upon the good will of the master class. That is to say, their labor value was unduly suppressed by the cheaper labor value supplied by the master class. In those areas where there was a shortage of slave labor, the value of lower class white labor was lowered. Racism, in these situations, served to offset the lower value of lower class white labor both psychologically and socially. Therefore, the slave could be humiliated, brutalized, and displaced by the lowliest of white workers. Inappropriate etiquette or politically incorrect behavior on the part of the slave could result in beatings, maiming, or even summary execution. Alternatively, in those situations where labor was in surplus, then white labor was actually displaced. Such displacement only aggravated the racial divide, while those white laborers forced to relocate tended to reproduce racial exclusionary or bifurcated labor systems wherever they settled. Racism, based upon these racial exclusions, far outlasted the system of hyperexploitation that produced them.

Sexual exploitation within slavery served multiple functions to include the sadistic pleasure of the master class, increased profit owing to issue produced, and of course the further humiliation of the slave.

Within the Americas three distinct slave systems developed. The distinctions between these systems derive from different cultural, political, and economic realities. These different realities, for want of a better terminology, are best described as those under the Spanish, French, and English sphere of influence. The major distinctions between these four slave systems had to do with the form of contact situation that prevailed. The most significant reasons for the differences among the European colonies have to do with the American Revolution among the English, and the influence of the Catholic Church among both the French and the Spanish. We shall briefly describe these three systems.

Spanish imperialist goals, fueled by vague and overly hyped claims of rivers and temples

of gold, led to the first official European “settlements” in the Americas. These settlements, whose primary goal was to extract the claimed riches as fast as possible, soon led to disappointment as no rivers or temples of gold were found. Columbus and his men, undaunted, began to kidnap, imprison, ransom, and enslave the natives in their attempt to secure the illusive gold. Failing in this, the Spanish – still believing in hordes of gold just waiting for the plunder – sent more and more conquistadors to search out the prizes. With time, the only prize identified was the lush soils of the Amazon – and the Spanish colonial experience began. Maximization of exploitative goals led to, first, the enslavement of Native Americans, and later the importation of African slaves. The period of Spanish conquest, from 1519 to 1523, was characterized by extraordinary brutality and cruelty and decimated the indigenous population. Starting with a population of just over 4.5 million in 1519, the native population declined to 3.3 million in 1570 and to 1.3 million in 1646. The primary culprits for these declines were small pox and typhus, wars of extermination, forced labor, brutal work conditions in the mines and on the plantations, tribute taxes, and cultural genocide. The decimation of the native labor force increased the demands for alternative labor sources. These alternative labor sources were soon supplied by the Dutch and Spanish merchants in the form of the African slave. The Spanish, with no intent on permanent settlement, did not encourage large numbers of Spanish women to immigrate. Thus, the gender imbalance increased the likelihood of sexual exploitation, prostitution, and the creolization of the population. Under rare circumstances, the Catholic Church stepped in and insisted upon the formalization of these unions in the guise of marriage. With time, the societies that came into being reflected these blended racial origins, generated by slavery, of Spanish, Natives, and Africans.

The French, eager to fill Napoleon’s treasure chest and pay out mounting royal debt, entered the Americas with the express desire to maximize profits through trade. Their efforts in the Americas, centering in the Caribbean, Mid South and West, brought them into immediate contact with the Native Americans. Almost

from the start, they established rather friendly relationships. As with the Spanish, the French soon realized that their profits could be greatly enhanced with the creation of a colonial presence, and hence more permanent agricultural communities were established. In order to maximize these efforts, the French relied more and more heavily upon the African as the chief source of exploitable labor. Owing to the short age of French women, again there was a heightened tendency to sexually exploit the African and Native American women. Thus prostitution, rape, and sexual abuse were often the result. Some of this sexual abuse was masked under the guise of formal marriages, which also served to provide access to greater resources among the indigenous population, legitimacy among the growing Creole population, and stability for the growing social structure.

The English, under the guise of freedom, initially promoted their imperialist expansion on the backs of lower class Europeans. It is important to point out that among the English, the first group to experience slavery was not the Africans but the Irish. English rulers, beginning with Queen Elizabeth and continuing through Cromwell and King James, in a systematic attempt to destroy the Irish people and their culture forced several thousand Irish into slavery in the Americas. Thousands of other Europeans, similarly positioned at the bottom of European society, were forced to serve masters in this land of the free. Of interest is the fact that before African slavery was normalized, these individuals were collectively viewed as slaves. With the advent of African slavery, these slaves found their status significantly altered as they now became defined as servants. Still with the further passage of time, lower status Europeans were allowed entry into the racial caste of whiteness. Whiteness accorded its participants the ability to discriminate against non whites, hence we note the birth not only of racism but also of a racialized hierarchy. Both racism and this racialized hierarchy were functional in maintaining control over the slavocracy that later developed.

SEE ALSO: Apartheid and Nelson Mandela; Assimilation; Color Line; Diaspora; Holocaust; Interracial Unions; Melting Pot; One Drop

Rule; Race; Race (Racism); Racial Hierarchy; Reparations; Whiteness

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slurs (racial/ethnic)

John Moland, Jr.

A racial or ethnic slur is a remark or statement designed to defame, vilify, belittle, and insult members of a racial or ethnic group, usually by those who are not members of that racial or ethnic group (Rodale 1986: 1125). Examples of racial and ethnic slurs include expressions such as “miserly jew,” “gook,” “jap,” “red savage,” “mongrel,” “half breed,” “sambo,” “spook,” “nigger,” “coon,” and “kike.”

Racial and ethnic slurs reflect the attitudes and beliefs of individuals and groups, on both conscious and unconscious levels, to make another group, generally a group with less power, the target of the slurs. For this reason, there is for both the user and the target of the slurs a variety of psychological, emotional, and behavioral actions and counteractions. The choice of words used, and the force with which they are used, mirror the degree of animosity the users of the slurs will have toward the groups that are the targets of the slurs. Such slurs traditionally have meanings in the ideological underpinnings that buttress such slurs, for behind the use of slurs one would find beliefs in the biological, cultural, and moral inferiority of the victims of the slurs. Consequently, slurs

are used to ascribe attributes of moral weakness, intellectual and academic weakness, and physical and behavioral peculiarities to members of the racial or ethnic group.

Historically, racial slurs used by white Americans toward black Americans depict black Americans as emotionally and intellectually immature, morally degenerate, and not being fully human. This can be seen in arguments used in the defense of slavery and segregation after the Civil War. Slurs against blacks were used in the sermons of white ministers, the speeches of politicians, and the writings of academicians to describe blacks in a very negative manner so as to justify the status quo. For example, the following slur appeared in the *Baptist Courier* of June 22, 1899: “The native African is a born liar and thief” (Owens 1971: 79). Senator Theodore G. Bilbo, a white supremacist and lay minister, was outspoken as a public official in his use of slurs to express his strong concern for maintaining segregation and “the purity of white blood.” The intensity of his resentment of black Americans was demonstrated by the slur used in the title of his book, *Separation or Mongrelization* (1947). Table 1 presents examples of words used in expressing slurs against black Americans in the religious sermons, political speeches, and academic writings of white Americans.

From the perspective of *symbolic interaction*, the slur words provide qualitative data for examining the direct and indirect semantic differentials and far ranging implications in the use of the slur. Each slur word generates a dichotomy of mutually exclusive characteristics for blacks and whites, with an implied logic and a possible course of action for the user of the slur as well as for those who are the targets of the slur. The slur, therefore, functions as a tool for the formulation of ideas, emotions, and actions toward those to whom the slur is applied. From this perspective, slurs provide an outlet for expressing emotions with the potential of serving as a rallying call to action. When the slur is used to describe an individual or group in strong negative terms, giving expression to feelings of hatred, then the slur symbolizes and arouses negative images, feelings, and emotions which the user assigns to the racial or ethnic background of those involved. When these negative qualities are intensely and saliently impressed

Table 1 Words used as racial slurs in sermons, speeches, and writing by white Americans

<i>Black Americans</i>	<i>White Americans</i>
Inferior	Superior
Blood (inferior)	Blood (superior)
Bestial, mongrel	Human
Uncontrolled sexual aggressiveness	Controlled sexual aggressiveness
Uncivilized	Civilized
Childlike, immature	Mature adult, paternal
Ignorant, incapable of learning	Intelligent
Lazy	Industrious
Immoral	Moral
Evil (bad, wrong)	Good (right)
Inherent thief	Honest
Inherent liar	Truthful
Heathen	Christian
Infidel	Believe in God
Cursed by God	Blessed by God
Perpetual servitude	Master

Sources: Bailey 1914: 93; Klineberg 1944: 5 12; Bilbo 1947: 49 58, 86 7, 198ff.; Broomfield 1965: 83 102; Wynes 1965: 16 17, 96ff.; Fredrickson 1971: 57 65; Owens 1971: 76ff.; Turner & Singleton 1978; Snay 1993: 56 60; Ambrose 1998: 45; MacCann 1998: xxviii xxix.

upon the mind of the user, they become deeply internalized in the user's conduct and personal identity. The intense saliency of these features and the descriptive characteristic of the slur determine the nature and extent of interaction of the slur user with members of the targeted racial or ethnic group. The affective content of racial and ethnic slurs for the user include verbalized ideas, beliefs, and emotions. This constitutes part of the social psychological process which allows the user to maintain a coherent and meaningful view of the self and others in the context of the user's belief system, ideological perspective, and self interest. In this sense, slurs demonstrate the power of words.

Racial slurs, as verbalized expressions of racist beliefs, result in the user constructing a circular logic in which social relations and interactions of blacks and whites are perceived only from a racist perspective of black inferiority and white superiority. By addressing and interpreting reality through slurs, social relations and group interaction are consequently limited and restricted to a linguistic framework that serves the vested interests of the user, which may be direct and/or indirect in its psychological, monetary, or other advantages for the user.

From the *social conflict* perspective, racial and ethnic slurs can be seen as mechanisms for

expressing aggression toward an out group through slandering, labeling, stigmatizing, and verbally "cutting to pieces" those of the ethnic and racial out group. In this manner, the slur serves as an instrument or process for releasing aggressive hostility in in group/out group conflict situations. Such hostility is expressed in the use of slurs in anti racial and anti ethnic jokes (Middleton & Moland 1959: 61). The frequent use of racial and ethnic slurs in the rhetoric of institutional leaders and other members of the in group creates in their minds and in the minds of listeners an almost permanent fixation of negative images of those in the racial or ethnic out group. The stigma and label assigned to the out group precede and dominate any contact or relationship in group members have with those of the racial or ethnic out group. This brings into play the *social control function* of slurs for in group members. For example, white in group members are aware of the slur "nigger lover" and the ridicule and rejection that one would experience if seen in frequent association with black Americans. In this manner, the slur serves a social control function by exerting strong pressure for conformity with conventional racial norms while promoting in group solidarity. Finally, an important function of slurs for members of the racial or ethnic in group (the users) is

that of creating and reinforcing a sense of solidarity and intimacy within the group. It also provides the individual using the slur a sense of social approval and bonding with in group members.

SEE ALSO: Discrimination; In Groups and Out Groups; Majorities; Race and Ethnic Etiquette; Racial Hierarchy; Scapegoating

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Small, Albion W. (1854–1926)

Joyce E. Williams

Albion W. Small is known more for discipline building in sociology than for contributions to sociological theory. He established the first department of sociology at the University of Chicago and served as its head from 1892 to 1924, and in that role influenced several generations of American sociologists. In 1895 he established the discipline's first professional journal, the *American Journal of Sociology*. He helped to found the American Sociological Society in 1905 and served two terms as its president. As with most of the first generation of sociologists in the US, Small's formal training was in philosophy and theology, but studies in Germany turned his attention to economics and interest theory. All of his work reflects an overarching concern with ethical interests. Small wrote and spoke about methodology, but not as we know it today. His own methodology was largely historical, economic, and political analysis. Nor did he clearly distinguish theory from methods. In his "Fifty Years of Sociology" (1916) under the subheading of theory, Small wrote about years of "wrestling about methods" along with the search for a single, theoretical explanation of society.

Influenced by Gustav Ratzenhofer and Ludwig Gumplowicz in Germany, Small's major contribution to sociological theory was his conceptualization of the social process, seen as developing, adjusting, and satisfying human interests. He viewed society as a process of social conflict, ultimately transformed by socialization and cooperative behaviors (Barnes 1948). His sociology was a classification of human interests and their significance in the social process, which he saw as a struggle of interest groups even though he believed strongly in solidarity. Small's text *General Sociology* (1905) focused on human interests and the social process, but made as many contributions to economics and political science as to sociology.

Small's writings reflect his struggle with cooperation and conflict. He taught a course on "The Conflict of Classes" and wrote *Between Eras: From Capitalism to Democracy* (1913),

contextualizing class conflict in the rise of capitalism. Small's goal for sociology was to supply a secular theology for industrial capitalism. He combined a Marxian economic ethic with Christian social ethics, advocating a kind of Christian socialism based on rigorous empiricism. He saw subordination of self to society as the highest form of individual altruism. Much of his work was an attempt to unify character and social structure in an integration of self and society (Vidich & Lyman 1985). He provided a transition between systematizers such as Comte, Spencer, and Ward and subsequent generations of specialists. For Small, sociology provided the basis for an intelligent and efficient control of the social process and progressive improvement of human culture and social institutions. All of his work was about understanding the social process as a whole and about utilization of that process for social betterment.

SEE ALSO: American Sociological Association; Chicago School; Economic Development; Groups; Gumpłowicz, Ludwig; Marx, Karl; Ratzenhofer, Gustav

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Smith, Adam (1723–90)

D. A. Reisman

Adam Smith was born on June 5, 1723 in Kirkcaldy, a quiet fishing village north of Edinburgh. His father (whom he never knew) had been a Comptroller of Customs. He studied moral philosophy at the University of

Glasgow, where his teacher, Francis Hutcheson, was emphasizing “the greatest happiness of the greatest number” even in the shadow of John Knox and Scottish Puritanism. Smith then spent six years at Oxford as a Snell Scholar. A crisis of faith, possibly brought on by an exposure to the epistemological skepticism of David Hume, led him to abandon his plan to become a clergyman.

Returning to Scotland in 1748, Smith lectured on literature (student notes from his course have been published as *Lectures on Rhetoric and Belles Lettres*) and from 1751–63 was Professor of Moral Philosophy at the University of Glasgow. His *Theory of Moral Sentiments* appeared in 1759. In it he argues that there is a social consensus on right and wrong which the sensitive social actor both absorbs and replicates. His theory of the “impartial spectator” who serves as the sounding board recalls the later ideas of G. H. Mead, while his appeal to “sympathy” or empathy that give the individual a way into others’ feelings and thoughts looks forward to Weber on *Verstehen*.

Smith spent the years 1754–6 accompanying the young Duke of Buccleuch on his “grand tour” to Paris, Toulouse, Geneva, and other centers of European culture and thought. Smith met the French *philosophes* (including Turgot, Helvétius, and Rousseau) and also absorbed the great lesson of Physiocratic economics that the whole is an interdependent and a nature driven circular flow. France in the last years of the *ancien régime* must have been an object lesson to him of how liberty could be suppressed by the Bastille, economical statesmanship by Versailles, and optimal allocation by tariffs and taxes.

Smith spent the next 10 years, in receipt of a pension from the Duke, doing research in Kirkcaldy. It was then that he wrote his great work, *An Inquiry into the Nature and Causes of the Wealth of Nations*. Published in 1776, it was an immediate success. It seemed to be defending the “invisible hand” of the free market against Mercantilist politicians and incompetent bureaucrats (including, significantly, the corporate hierarchy that Weber, Schumpeter, and Galbraith were to hold in high esteem) and to be saying that the instinctual drive to “truck, barter, and exchange” would be enough to produce rising living standards for all classes even without a Poor Law or a social welfare net.

Smith anticipates Marx in that he formulates a labor theory of value, implies that the class antagonisms of post feudal industrialism would be based around the inputs of labor and capital, and demonstrates that the division of labor in the modern production line system leaves the worker debased and alienated, “stupid and ignorant.” His insights into conspicuous consumption resemble those of Veblen on the proof of status. They also demonstrate that he was envisaging a meritocratic, mobile society in which ascription would be challenged by achievement and the landed aristocracy would become increasingly irrelevant in a rapidly growing commercial society.

In 1778 Smith was appointed a Comptroller of Customs. He died in Edinburgh on July 17, 1790, aged 67, and is buried in the Canongate churchyard.

SEE ALSO: Economic Sociology: Neoclassical Economic Perspective; Ideology, Economy and; Liberalism; Mill, John Stuart; Moral Economy; Social Embeddedness of Economic Action

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smoking

Jason Hughes

The word smoking has widely come to mean “consuming tobacco,” and yet throughout history other substances – such as opium, cannabis, phencyclidine (PCP), and crack cocaine – have been smoked as a principal mode of their consumption. Equally, tobacco has been consumed in a multitude of ways other than through

smoking. For example, prior to contact with Columbus, indigenous peoples of the Americas had variously chewed, snuffed (tobacco powder up the nostrils), drunk (tobacco juice), licked (applying tobacco resin to the gums and teeth), topically applied (to the skin), ocularly absorbed, and anally injected tobacco (Wilbert 1987). What we refer to as smoking should be understood first and foremost as a historically diverse set of practices surrounding the use of a range of drugs which, at various stages, did not necessarily involve the practice of smoking itself. That said, smoking today, as in pre Columbian America, is by far the most widespread mode of consuming tobacco: the term refers to a phenomenon that has come to have enormous social, cultural, and economic significance. What follows is a broad and brief account of the sociocultural development of smoking divided into three main “stages”: pre Columbian smoking; modern smoking; and contemporary smoking. This focus on developments at the most general level serves to highlight the emergence of key themes in cultural uses and associations relating to the practice: a transition from understandings and uses of smoking as a practice to “lose control” and “escape normality” toward those in which smoking increasingly came to be used as a means of self control and to return to “normality.”

Sociocultural understandings and uses of tobacco among the indigenous peoples of the Americas in the pre Columbian period varied considerably. However, characteristically, smoking held enormous spiritual significance; was highly ritualized; and involved more pronounced effects than those we would associate with present day cigarette smoking. In formal ceremonial use, particularly shamanistic ritual, the strains and species of tobacco used and the practices surrounding consumption were such that smoking was capable of inducing hallucinogenic trances (Wilbert 1987: 134–6). Smoking was understood to offer a mode of transportation into the spiritual world through such altered states of consciousness; and in doing so it played a central role in indigenous American healing practices. Smoking marked many formal occasions: it was used to cement alliances between peoples, to symbolize peace, and to finalize agreements. Even recreational smoking was highly ritualized and involved the consumption of considerably stronger species and

varieties than those associated with contemporary patterns.

The indigenous American esteem for tobacco smoking as a medical remedy was adopted by “modern” users – i.e., post contact European smokers between the sixteenth and nineteenth centuries – with great enthusiasm. Some leading physicians of the time hailed tobacco as a panacea: a remedy for a range of ailments, from toothache to “cancer.” While only the mildest and, to early Europeans, most palatable strains and species of tobacco were brought back from the “New World,” even these, relative to those commonly in use today, were considerably more capable of producing intoxication. Indeed, concerns were expressed at the time that smoking, like drinking, may make workers unfit for labor (Brandt 1990). The practice rapidly became popular across Europe and had spread to many parts of Asia, Africa, and beyond by the end of the sixteenth century. Sociocultural uses and associations rapidly shifted from medical to recreational, and numerous treatises concerning the “abuse” of tobacco were written by physicians of the time who sought to retain tobacco as a medical remedy, rather than a drug of vice and the dissolute lifestyle with which it had by then come to be associated. Elite groups in European societies came to regard smoking as vulgar as it became “common.” Following the French court in its capacity as a model setting center for European upper classes, such groups switched from smoking to snuffing to distance themselves from what they considered to be their social inferiors. The practice of snuffing subsequently spread to all levels of society.

Contemporary patterns are epitomized by the resurgence of smoking, first in the spread of cigar smoking amongst affluent groups, and then through the emergence of the cigarette as a popular mode of consumption from the nineteenth century onwards. Smoking a cigarette, compared with indigenous American or even early European pipe smoking, involved relatively milder and more ambiguous effects. In part predicated upon such changes in its uses and effects, smoking came to be understood as a “psychological tool,” a means to return one to normal from a range of dysphoric states linked to emotional arousal or underarousal. Compared to the ritualized and ceremonial use of tobacco of pre Columbian smokers, and to a lesser

degree the practices associated with “modern” smokers, “contemporary” smokers increasingly came to *individualize* the effects and functions of tobacco such that it could be used and understood as a means of self control. The rise of cigarettes is also linked to processes involving the mass consumerization and feminization of smoking. Indeed, in the early twentieth century cigarettes became a symbol of women’s emancipation – an association seized upon by tobacco companies of the time. Issues relating to the gender and class dynamics of smoking, health inequalities, and the marketing activities of tobacco corporations remain a topic of considerable sociological interest (see, e.g., Graham & Blackburn 1998; Pampel 2002). Also, particularly since the publication of findings from high profile epidemiological studies in the 1950s and 1960s which linked tobacco consumption to fatal diseases, smoking has become increasingly *medicalized* – both understandings of smoking and, arguably, experiences of smoking and being a smoker; it has attained the status of an addictive disease in itself (Hughes 2003).

Thus, in short, the sociocultural development of smoking can be summarized as involving over the long term a series of interrelated shifts: from smoking to “lose control” toward smoking as a means of self control, from ritualized smoking to more individualized smoking, from understandings of smoking as a panacea to its current status as a pandemic.

SEE ALSO: Addiction and Dependency; Consumption and the Body; Drug Use; Drugs, Drug Abuse, and Drug Policy; Health and Culture; Health Risk Behavior

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SOCCER

Richard Giulianotti and Dominic Malcolm

The game of association football, also known as soccer, involves two competing teams of 11 players. The players attempt to maneuver the football into the opposing team's goal, using any part of the body except the hands and arms. Only the goalkeeper is permitted to handle the ball, and then only within the penalty area surrounding the goal. The winning team scores most goals over a set time period, usually 90 minutes.

Association football is to be distinguished from those "football" codes that allow general ball handling and arm tackling, notably "American football," Australian Rules football, rugby union, and rugby league. Football is sometimes known as the "simplest game": its 17 basic laws and minimal equipment (a ball) ensure that games may be improvised and played in informal settings.

Football is the world's most popular team sport in participant and spectator numbers. The global governing body, the Fédération Internationale de Football Association (FIFA), estimated in 2000 that there are 250 million registered players, and over 1.4 billion people interested in football; a combined worldwide television audience of 35–40 billion watches football's premier tournament, the World Cup finals, played on a quadrennial basis. At the time of writing, FIFA boasts 205 member states, more than the 191 members of the United

Nations, and, as a global organization, eclipsed only by the International Amateur Athletics Federation (IAAF) with 211 members.

Different kinds of football related games have been played across the world, notably in China in the second century BCE and in medieval Tuscany. However, football developed into its modern form in Britain in the nineteenth century. "Folk football" games had been played in towns and villages since before medieval times, according to local customs and with few definite rules. In the early nineteenth century, industrialization, urbanization, and legal prohibitions restricted folk football but the game was taken up in English public schools and universities, partly as a mechanism for instilling discipline into pupils. The status rivalry between Rugby and Eton public schools was central to the initial codification of the separate and distinct forms of the game in the 1840s. These subsequently became rugby football and association football (of which American football, Canadian football, and Australian Rules football are subsequent refinements). In the 1840s, the "Cambridge rules" of football were established and applied, and in 1863 the game's rules were formally codified and printed and the (English) Football Association was formed. As the title of soccer's international federation indicates, to most of the world the game is known as football (or a local translation of the word, e.g., *Fussball* in German, *fútbol* in Spanish) rather than soccer. The word soccer is thought to have originated in the late nineteenth century at Oxford University, being a corruption of the term "association," and referring to a specific way of playing football, distinct particularly from rugby football.

The social and institutional aspects of football's global spread are of sociological interest. Football's international diffusion between the 1860s and 1914 was largely dependent upon British trade and educational influence overseas. In Europe, British migrant workers would form teams and attract challenges from local sides; or young local men would return from their education or peregrinations in Britain with a ball and rulebook to teach the game to their compatriots. In Latin America, British engineers, railway workers, sailors, teachers, and pupils were largely responsible for introducing local people to football. A similar story arises in Africa, though

British soldiers also introduced football in occupied territories such as modern day Nigeria and South Africa. Thus football became more firmly established in the “informal” British Empire (and where the game was introduced by working and merchant class colonizers), in contrast with other British sports like cricket and rugby, which became popular in those countries for mainly subject to British imperial rule (and where sports were introduced by colonizers who were public school educated and held elite administrative roles in the host societies). Football was thus probably seen by non British peoples as more “neutral” culturally, less compromised by imperialistic mores, as well as the most materially accessible form of modern sport.

Football associations were established in most nations in Europe and Latin America to oversee the game’s organization. Notably in South America, these associations gradually shook off British influence, as a reflection of growing national pride and political autonomy. Driven particularly by the French, FIFA was founded by European associations in 1904, and continental governing bodies slowly followed: CONMEBOL in South America in 1916; UEFA in Europe, and AFC in Asia in 1954; CAF in Africa in 1957; CONCACAF in 1961; and the OFC for Oceania in 1965. Continental confederations organize tournaments and represent their members’ interests inside FIFA. In true modernist style, the national football associations remain the basic political units within football’s governance.

There are six dimensions of football that have attracted particular sociological interest: cultural differentiation; governance and politics; the cultural politics of race and gender; commodification; violence and hooliganism; and internationalism.

CULTURAL DIFFERENTIATION

Cultural differentiation falls into three broad domains:

- 1 Football is marked globally by intense club and supporter rivalries. At local level, particularly in major cities, heated “derby” fixtures arise, e.g., Boca Juniors versus River Plate in Buenos Aires. There are also

strong regional rivalries, e.g., Bayern Munich versus Ruhr teams in Germany, or teams from north and south Italy; and major international rivalries, e.g., Brazil versus Argentina, England versus Scotland, Germany versus Holland. These rivalries habitually reflect and energize underlying intercommunal senses of cultural opposition and enmity. Allegiance to particular clubs and nations enables supporters to construct strong collective identities vis à vis these “others.”

- 2 Neo Durkheimians would argue that football has contributed substantially to modern nation building, especially in large or ethnically diverse developing nations like Brazil, Cameroon, and Nigeria. National electronic media allow citizens in remote regions to listen to or watch their “national” team in major international tournaments, so heightening cultural nationalism.
- 3 The globalization of football provides numerous illustrations of cultural “glocalization,” whereby particular senses of cultural distinctiveness are constructed and expressed through the game. Particular clubs and nations establish favored playing styles or specific ways of administering their business. Each supporter community constructs particular “traditions” regarding its heroic players or the specific history of the club, thereby differentiating that club from its rivals.

GOVERNANCE

Governance falls into three broad domains:

- 1 Football’s governing bodies undergo critical sociological scrutiny, notably regarding power struggles and corrupt practice. Major struggles have arisen between European and Latin American football officials over the control of FIFA, amidst substantial accusations regarding bribery and vote fixing. The close ties between television networks and Latin American football associations have also attracted analysis.
- 2 Neo Marxists argued that political elites have exploited football to germinate populist

domestic support for oppressive regimes, notably among military juntas in Latin America and in the old Soviet bloc nations. These arguments too readily assume that performers and audiences can be duped by popular culture into supporting iniquitous regimes.

- 3 Sociologists in the UK have focused on the commercialization or “commodification” of football since the early 1990s. Particular attention has been paid to fan attempts to democratize club governance, such as through formation of independent supporters’ associations or the more recent advent of “supporter trusts” that have gained control of some clubs. Greater awareness has arisen of alternative models of club governance in part through increasing public knowledge of the international game.

CULTURAL POLITICS OF RACE AND GENDER

Two general issues arise, regarding formal exclusion and cultural expressions of racism and sexism.

Historically, most nations have formally excluded non white players from white controlled football clubs and leagues. Even in polyethnic Brazil, non white players were excluded until one club in Rio recruited blacks with great success in the 1920s. Post war migration and African national independence have helped in the long term to secure anti racism measures in FIFA and to promote non white players in Europe.

Football has tended to provide a key space for the construction of particular forms of masculinity, thus women have always been excluded from full participation as players and officials. Whilst national and international women’s football tournaments have been established since the 1970s, most notably in North America, and women’s attendance at professional fixtures has risen in most parts of the world, in few instances do women make up over a quarter of football spectators. What advances have been made are driven partly by commercial motives, as football related businesses tap new markets.

Overt and covert forms of cultural racism have gained greater analysis over the past 30 years. Overt racism is demonstrated through, for example, club refusals to sign players of particular ethnicity. Anti racism campaigns have been inspired by top black players, and have been subsequently backed by football’s governing bodies. Covert racism, such as not selecting non whites for key playing positions, can be highlighted statistically but such actions are harder to contest in individual cases.

Overt sexism remains very evident, as masculine football cultures tend to deploy derogatory and objectifying language regarding women and gay men. Covert sexism continues in the highly gendered stratification of employees within sports institutions.

COMMODIFICATION

Four particular issues arise here.

- 1 Up to the 1930s, many European and Latin American football nations experienced hegemonic struggles over professionalization (i.e., the direct payment of players and coaches). More aristocratic and traditionalist forces favored player amateurism, partly to minimize or prevent mass participation and partly in attempts to retain control over the game. Business minded football officials and marginalized social groups favored professionalism, eventually defeating the public school influenced defenders of amateurism in the context of late twentieth century capitalism.
- 2 More generalized concerns remain regarding social exclusion and alienation as germinated by football’s increasing commercialization. Many social justice issues arise, e.g., higher admission prices may exclude poor but dedicated supporters; running football institutions as businesses may disenfranchise supporters politically from “their” game; high prices for football equipment or renting playing fields may alienate many and reduce young people’s participation in the game; and inflated player salaries may sour the social relations between fans and players. What is perhaps most surprising is that it is only in the last 15 years that companies have

come to recognize the huge and inelastic demand for football, and sought to exploit this for economic gain.

- 3 Concerns have increasingly been voiced about the influence wielded by the media and corporations. Many argue that growing media control has led to fixtures being arranged to suit television viewers rather than fans who watch matches live, and that the media have also developed a particular kind of presentation which trivializes and spectacularizes football and thus detracts from aspects perceived to be the basis of the traditional appeal of the game. Allegations have even been made that sponsors now influence playing matters, most notably concerning Ronaldo's appearance for Brazil in the 1998 World Cup Final, and the role of Adidas in David Beckham's move from Manchester United to Real Madrid in 2003.
- 4 Intensified economic and cultural globalization generates major debates over neoliberalism within world football. The game is marked by intensified and unregulated flows in people (especially players), capital, media images, and commodities (notably merchandise). The largest and richest European markets come to dominate the world's leading football resources (notably top players), and can effectively corral the greatest corporate revenues and most numerous fans (that is, merchandise consumers) worldwide. These widening inequalities in world football are reinforced by the imposition of more general neoliberal policies in the developing world, resulting in the impoverishment of sporting clubs and leagues in Latin America and Africa.

VIOLENCE AND HOOLIGANISM

Violence and hooliganism fall into three broad domains.

- 1 "Football hooliganism" relates to a complex and culturally diverse phenomenon which in many instances is deeply rooted historically. For example, in Northern Europe, self-defining "hooligan" groups develop distinct subcultures characterized by the

pursuit of status seeking fights with similar fans that follow opposing teams. In Southern Europe and Latin America, fan violence is associated with "militant" supporters, known as *ultras* or *barras bravas*, who engage in culturally distinctive rituals of support.

- 2 The state contributes crucially to the construction of "hooliganism" through the (often violent) imposition of "security" in and around stadiums, and through juridical attempts to label and legally punish "hooligans."
- 3 Some football subcultures have ties to paramilitary movements and military conflicts. The Yugoslav civil war in the early 1990s involved several units drawn from football supporter organizations. Other violent conflicts with strong football connections have arisen in Nigeria, Mauritius, and the "Soccer War" between Honduras and El Salvador in 1969. More symbolically, fans of Glasgow's two leading teams, Celtic and Rangers, sing anthems that celebrate paramilitary movements in Northern Ireland.

INTERNATIONALISM

Internationalism falls into three main domains.

- 1 "Naïve internationalism" celebrates football's functionality in bringing peoples and nations together, promoting intercultural understanding and social harmony. This argument tends to ignore the historical evidence of conflict and violence within sport.
- 2 A "pragmatic internationalism" adopts a practical, social policy orientation toward football, notably in the developing world. Football is seen as having a positive practical function in the positive resocialization of traumatized peoples, such as former child soldiers in West Africa, and in helping to build peaceful social contact between warring communities, such as in Bosnia or Rwanda.
- 3 An emerging human rights perspective examines how the organization of sports like football in the developing world has impinged upon the personal liberties and freedoms of young people in particular. For example, coaches may enter into psychologically and

physically abusive relations with young players, in part by demanding long hours of labor from these child athletes.

Inevitably, these six sociological themes have received varied treatments by scholars from different nations and continents. In Britain, football hooliganism has been a major topic since the 1970s, with European nations (notably Italy and France) following in the early 1990s. In Scotland, religious sectarianism between supporters provokes a recurring debate. Whereas in England hostile debates between the advocates of various approaches have arisen, notably over explanations of violence in football, closer disciplinary ties exist between historians, sociologists, and anthropologists in many European nations (notably in Scandinavia, Italy, France, and Germany).

Since the early 1990s in the UK, the intensified commodification of football has received both critical and sympathetic sociological comments; the role of media corporations in advancing this process has attracted particular attention. Questions of social exclusion in football have focused particularly on ethnic minorities and, to a lesser extent, women in England.

In Latin America, anthropologists played the founding role in the social scientific study of football. Four major investigative questions have been apparent. First, how does football relate to distinctive national, cultural, and "racial" identities, particularly given the diasporic movements of players to Europe? Second, what "function" has football played in sustaining military juntas and *caudillo* style politicians? Third, through the strong influence of Gramscian theory in Latin American sociology, how do football and other popular cultural forms encapsulate the resistant identities of marginalized communities? Fourth, how might Latin American football's endemic corruption be exposed and replaced by more transparent, democratic forms of governance?

Overall, the sociological analysis of football faces several methodological problems. A lack of systematic international collaborative research is still apparent, notably among many UK based writers. Geopolitical and linguistic divisions remain between many sociologists, commonly separating Anglophone researchers, continental Europeans (North and South), and Latin

Americans. European football researchers, such as those publishing in German and French, have shown stronger commitments to international dialogue, reflecting their greater empirical and conceptual grasp of globalization processes.

Three particular, substantive issues within football remain underexamined by sociologists. First, we require serious ethnographic studies of professional football clubs, although gaining access and funding to conduct such research is certainly problematic. Second, we need a proper sociological treatment of the technical and aesthetic aspects of football. Third, we require an adequate, cross cultural analysis of the relationship between elite and grassroots football with particular attention to access and participation.

SEE ALSO: Consumption, Mass Consumption, and Consumer Culture; Consumption of Sport; Football Hooliganism; Globalization, Sport and; Nationalism and Sport; Sport; Sport and Capitalism; Sport and Culture; Sport, Professional; Sport and Religion; Sport as Spectacle; Sports Heroes and Celebrities; Sports Industry; Sports Stadia

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social accountability and governance

Crawford Spence and Chris Carter

Recent accounting scandals such as Enron, Parmalat, and WorldCom have concentrated attention on the accountability and governance of corporations. Social accounting has been described and critiqued from a variety of positions, ranging from right wing neoliberal critiques all the way through to Marxist and deep green critiques. The different positions taken on the desirability or otherwise of social accounting can be understood by considering the type of change that each theorist advocates. The majority of writing and work in the area has come from those who see social accounting as a means of bringing about evolutionary change in capitalism.

WHAT IS SOCIAL ACCOUNTING?

Social contractarian perspective: evolutionary change. Social accounting is generally understood as an attempt to investigate organizations more broadly. By scrutinizing the impact of the activities of organizations, social accountants seek to highlight the wider social and environmental costs of their operations. The rationale underpinning this approach is that corporations have a wider responsibility than merely making profits for shareholders. Social accounting has similarly been described as an "attempt to deconstruct conventional accounting, expose

some of its more unpleasant characteristics and offer new accountings predicated on values wider than making rich managers and shareholders even richer" (Bebbington et al. 1999). The key master concept underpinning social accounting is *accountability*. Whereas conventional accounting (allegedly) serves to make an organization accountable to its financial owners, social accounting seeks to discharge accountability to other stakeholders. These are groups that are influenced by or can influence the social, environmental, and economic impacts of an organization (Gray et al. 1996). The principal argument behind accountability is that stakeholders have a *right* to information regarding the social and environmental effects of corporate economic activity. These rights to information may be enshrined in law, may appear in quasi-legal or voluntary codes of conduct, or may be moral in nature (Gray et al. 1996).

Enhanced corporate accountability would ultimately require companies to temper their relentless pursuit of profit and competitiveness by considering their interactions with a wider constituency of stakeholder groups. Indeed, the rendering transparent of an organization does not set the parameters to the vision of the social accounting project. Gray (2005) has argued that social and environmental accounts are an essential precondition to a healthy and functioning democracy, warning that the absence of such accounts leaves society relatively powerless when compared with the power of modern day corporations. Thus something must happen once the accountability has been discharged. There is a radical intention in the social accounting project. The explicit intention is to increase democracy, but not necessarily as an end in itself. Underlying social accounting is a concern with the social dislocations and environmental degradation caused by organizations in advanced capitalism. Increased accountability, although morally desirable in itself, is also seen as a means to move toward a more socially and environmentally benign order.

Neoliberalism: radical change (right wing). Critiques of social accounting emanate from a variety of theoretical positions. However, it has been very rare for those on the right to engage in the social accounting debate at all. One must return to Benston (1982) to find a critique of social accounting from a right wing position.

On a practical note, Benston suggests that the measurement of “externalities” is problematic and therefore cannot be relied upon. Notwithstanding the practical considerations put forward by Benston (1982, 1984) and the logical inconsistencies therein (Schreuder & Ramanathan 1984), his arguments are primarily ideological: the primary responsibility of management is to shareholders and social accounting would impose unnecessary costs upon them. In any case, other stakeholders such as employees, customers, and creditors, Benston (1982) argues, are well served already by voluntary management reports. Social accounting may be useful with respect to corporate governance, exposing fraudulent dealings and misuses of shareholder assets by management. He holds that even the cost of an accounting standard would likely exceed the benefits to shareholders (see Benston 1984). As such, “the responsibility of accountants would be best served by their forbearance from social accounting” (Benston 1982).

Expedients: marginal change. Moving away from a radical right wing position, another conception of what social accounting is and what it may do is offered by Parker (1986). Parker falls into what Gray et al. (1996) refer to as the “expedient” camp. Parker notes that social accounting means different things to different people. To “corporate defenders,” it is a means of defense against critics of the corporation. To “corporate critics,” it provides a constraint upon socially irresponsible behavior and a positive motivation for the corporation to act in a socially responsible manner. Parker argues that standards could moderate and regulate the competing purposes of these groups, i.e., allow corporations to manage their image whilst restricting reporting bias and thereby facilitating a more informed and protected society. Whilst those of radical left wing persuasions would be horrified by the former, Parker sees the use of social accounting as an image enhancer as something that is actually good, as long as it is accompanied by the provision of substantive social accounting information. Although informed by a “suspicion of powerful private interests” (Parker 1991: 32), Parker’s view emanates from an acceptance of the current essential structure of capitalist society (see Parker 1991: 27).

Marxian critique: radical change (left wing). As long as one accepts the need for a more

sociodemocratic form of system, Benston’s and Parker’s views do little to disturb the rationale for social accounting. More shaking critiques of social accounting come from those theorists that put social justice (however this is defined; e.g., Puxty, 1986, 1991; Tinker et al. 1991) and ecological sustainability (e.g., Maunders & Burritt 1991) at the heart of their analysis. The essence of Tinker et al.’s position is that a better accounting can only come about after a change in structural conditions. The structure of society, and of capitalism in particular, is such that social accounting will be captured by vested interest groups and used to mask those vested interests. These structural inequalities, argue Tinker et al., are overlooked by Gray et al. by virtue of their commitment to pluralist thinking and “middle ground theorizing.” The middle ground is characterized by Tinker et al. as concerned with “what is pragmatic and socially acceptable; not what is socially just, scientifically rational, or likely to rectify social ills arising from waste, exploitation, extravagance, disadvantage or coercion” (1991: 29).

Tinker et al. explain how the history of social accounting shows the middle ground shifting in specific directions, in response to definite social conflicts and struggles. This swaying in the tide minimizes and mystifies the structural inequalities of contemporary capitalism (1991: 36). Social accounting thus serves a political quietism function which “mask(s) the affinities of many right wing positions and middle of the road research” (p. 37). Gray et al.’s middle of the road approach is therefore rejected. The middle ground is contested and unstable and Gray et al. refuse to examine the basic contradictions of the social system that cause this instability; Gray et al.’s approach has not been shown to be productive, Tinker et al. argue, and “the political quietism implicit in their viewpoint is empirically unsubstantiated” (1991: 47).

As an alternative, Tinker et al. advocate a critical accounting that speaks about social antagonisms and structural inequalities. The examples given by Tinker et al. are recasts of the accounting records provided by firms in terms of, in one case, the role that a mining company played in colonial exploitation and, in another, an analysis of General Motors’ use of their annual reports as ideological weapons.

If there is any role for social accounting from a Marxist viewpoint, then one infers that it would be through external social audits. These are social accounts prepared about an organization by people outside of that organization. Examples of this particular type of social accounting are evident in the work of Social Audit Ltd. (see Medawar 1976) in the 1970s who, without the cooperation of the organizations whom they were auditing, constructed a series of detailed exposés of the social and environmental impacts of those organizations in the UK. In a similar vein, though with a much more Marxist slant, Counter Information Services compiled a series of *Counter Reports* of large multinational organizations in the 1970s (see Gray et al. 1987 for examples of these). Similar exercises have been carried out recently by Christian Aid and Friends of the Earth, who have produced “alternative” versions of social accounts of organizations such as Shell and Exxon.

Tinker et al.’s (1991) critique emanates from a view of society that focuses on conflict and power struggles. A similar viewpoint on social accounting is reached by Puxty (1986, 1991), who, following Habermas, argues that it owes its very existence to the needs of the powerful within society (1986: 103). This “capture” of social accounting is inevitable given the non pluralistic makeup of society. Society has dominant interests. Social accounting does not dissolve these power relationships, as its proponents hope it might, but reinforces them: “Accounting is part of a system of distorted communication that reflects the social system. Any extension of accounting through the processes of that system can thus be no more than an extension of that systematic distortion” (Puxty 1986: 108). Puxty repeats these views through a later article where he “reject(s) the possibility of progress of society through current pluralist institutions, and corporate social information that might be generated through them” (1991: 41).

Deep green critique: radical change (ecological). Maunders and Burritt (1991) take a deep green perspective when considering how to account for the environment. They argue that any attempt to solve ecological problems through an accounting that is an extension of conventional accounting may be doomed to failure. This is because of the neoclassical ideological foundations on

which conventional accounting rests: selfishness of maximizing individual utility; contrived consumer demand (wants over needs); and anthropocentrism. It is argued by Maunders and Burritt that a much more radical accounting is needed that actively challenges these cultural values.

These “radical” critiques variously place notions of social justice (Puxty 1986, 1991; Tinker et al. 1991; Cooper 1992) or environmental sustainability (Maunders & Burritt 1991) and/or Mother Earth (Cooper 1992) at the heart of their analyses. What is common to each of them is that they see social accounting, at least corporate *self* reporting, as not a mere irrelevance but something that could actually exacerbate ecological problems and further entrench social inequality. Social accounting hides and disguises deeper structural inequalities that must be critiqued and transcended. As such, corporate social accounting is counterproductive. In seeking to disempower corporations, it actually seeks to bolster the interests of corporations. If there is any place for social accounting, then it must be through externally produced social audits. The problem, argues Lehman (1999, 2001), is in according a privileged status to corporations as the agents of change. Gray et al. seek to put corporations at the center of their theorizing as the entity that prepares the social/environmental analysis of its own operations. The radical left wing critique curiously comes to the same opinion on social accounting as the radical right wing critique. In Cooper’s ecofeminist (and Marxist) critique of environmental accounting, she concludes that “in the present symbolic order accountants should not attempt to account for the environment” (1992: 37).

In the wake of accounting scandals and increasing concern over the environmental sustainability of the current economic orthodoxy, social accounting is likely to figure more widely in policy and academic debates. The contours of the debate on social accounting are currently configured around the responsibilities of corporations and the limits of reformist pluralism in the wake of corporate power.

SEE ALSO: Democracy and Organizations; Governmentality and Control; Power; Transnationalism

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social capital

Rosalind Edwards

Social capital is a concept broadly referring to the ways people connect through social networks, common values within these networks such as trust and reciprocity, and how this constitutes a resource that equates to a kind of capital. Different theorists emphasize slightly different features within this broad definition.

Some perspectives pose social capital as a distinct form of “public good,” embodied in civic engagement and having knock on effects for democracy and economic prosperity. Putnam (2000) points to local communities in which a predominance of work poor families and/or ethnic diversity has eroded positive social capital in favor of negative forms. Fukuyama (1995) argues that engagement in the private and voluntary sectors enhances economic prosperity, whereas strong kinship allegiances crowd out other economically beneficial social connections. Thus different forms of social capital are identified. Putnam highlights self sustaining voluntary associations as generating the “bridging” form of social capital that enables people to “get ahead” – horizontal trust and reciprocal connections between people from different walks of life – as opposed to the “bonding” social capital among homogeneous people that allows them only to “get by.” Woolcock (1998)

has also added the notion of vertical “linking” social capital with formal organizations, with the state facilitating new local partnership networks.

Other work sees the family as a wellspring of social capital. Coleman (1988) argues that the family is where children have their human capital (notably, educational success) developed and are socialized into the norms, values, and sanctions of society. He argues that this nurturance is inherent in the structure of family relationships, which then affects the nature of local communities, and that social capital building is hindered where parents are “absent,” as in lone mother or dual earner families.

Another perspective highlights social capital as intertwined with other capital assets: economic, cultural, and symbolic. These are transmitted and reproduced over time, within social groups and across generations, sustaining class privilege and power (Bourdieu 1986). Dominant social capital processes are seen as also having a “dark side,” marginalizing or confining people on the basis of their ethnicity, gender, and age (Portes 1998; Morrow 1999; Molyneux 2002).

While engagement with the concept of social capital as a theoretical concept and policy instrument has been welcomed as signaling a shift towards engagement with social processes (Woolcock 1998; Schuller et al. 2000), there is some concern that this is occurring in a simplistic manner and is suffused with liberal economic rationality (Fine 2000). Other criticisms of the concept include the lack of consensus over its definition and hence difficulties in measuring it (Morrow 1999; Molyneux 2002), and the tautological nature of many conceptions of social capital processes (Portes 1998).

SEE ALSO: Bourdieu, Pierre; Capital: Economic, Cultural, and Social; Coleman, James; Social Capital and Education; Social Capital and Health; Trustworthiness

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social capital and education

Rafael Santana and Barbara Schneider

The concept of social capital has been widely used in educational research. However, researchers have yet to come to an agreement over what constitutes social capital and what its effects are on educational and other social outcomes. There are at least two distinct theories of social capital commonly used by educational researchers. The first, by James S. Coleman, conceptualizes social capital as the relational ties among individuals within a closed functional community (Coleman & Hoffer 1987; Coleman 1988, 1990). This perspective highlights the benefits of membership within a social system and emphasizes the functional form of social capital. The second, by

French sociologist Pierre Bourdieu, also emphasizes the interconnectedness of individuals within a social system but additionally highlights members' access to institutional resources as well as their consumptive behaviors that enable them to reproduce other forms of capital (Bourdieu 1986).

Coleman (1988) distinguishes social capital from human and economic capital by arguing that social capital is obtained through the relational ties of individuals in a social system, whereas human capital is increased through education and training, and economic capital is accrued through the reinvestment of capital for profit. Intangible, social capital is an abstract resource that actors use to facilitate certain actions that lead to productive outcomes (Coleman 1988). Social capital inheres in the relations among actors and is not lodged within any single individual but rather develops out of sustained interactions among actors.

Properties of social capital include (1) the degree of closure or interconnectedness of ties within a social network and (2) the density of social ties among its members. Coleman argues that a high degree of network closure enhances communication among members, thus strengthening ties. The density of social ties also facilitates the articulation of mutual expectations and obligations for network membership, which allows members to discern whether others are fulfilling their agreed upon obligations. Shared norms, expectations, mutual obligations, and effective sanctions serve to strengthen social ties and give rise to another form of social capital, trustworthiness. Network members are regarded as trustworthy when they fulfill their obligations to others within the network. Networks characterized by high levels of trustworthiness are those in which members enforce agreed upon norms through sanctioning unacceptable behavior.

For example, parents can draw on the social resources available within the network to monitor their children's behavior. The closure of the network and the density of the ties among parents and other adults in the network encourage the flow of information about their children's activities. If a child misbehaves in the presence of other adults in the community, they can be trusted to notify the child's parent of the child's behavior with the expectation that such

misbehavior will be prevented by the parent in the future.

Offering an alternative perspective on social capital, Bourdieu argues that network collectivity is maintained through investment strategies that strengthen and ensure the durability of relationships binding individuals to each other. These investments and exchanges occur through ceremonies, ritualized meetings, and other social activities (Bourdieu 1986: 250). To Bourdieu, social capital is used to accrue advantages which are ascribed to social networks by virtue of their position within a social structure rather than from the inherent qualities of the relationships between individuals within the network. In contrast to Coleman, Bourdieu views social capital within the context of social stratification and reproduction, underscoring the benefits afforded to individuals located differentially within the social structure. As Portes (1998: 3) notes, Bourdieu's treatment of social capital is "instrumental, focusing on the benefits accruing to individuals by virtue of participation in groups and on the deliberate construction of sociability for the purpose of creating this resource."

Bourdieu defines social capital both as the social ties between individuals and the sum of resources that are available as a result of those ties. He suggests that actors operate within a social hierarchy, and individuals at varying positions in the social hierarchy will differ in their associated networks and in their access to social capital. For example, individuals of low social status may have ties primarily to other individuals of low status who can contribute only limited resources to the relationship. He notes, however, that individuals can increase their access to social capital by expanding their network of social relationships to others outside the primary network. This point is also developed by Granovetter (1973) and Burt (1992), who suggest that weak social ties within the network's structural configuration allow for greater individual mobility and more diverse channels for information and resources within and between networks.

Educational research more closely aligned with Coleman's conception of social capital tends to identify the productive, or positive, outcomes associated with increasing social capital within a social system, such as raising children's educational expectations, achievement,

and attainment. On the other hand, scholars whose work relies more on Bourdieu's articulation of social capital emphasize the social structural implications of differential access to and use of social capital in reproducing inequalities in society.

SOCIAL CAPITAL THEORY AND ITS APPLICATION IN EDUCATIONAL RESEARCH

Educational researchers have examined both the various functions and forms of social capital within schools and its influence on student outcomes (i.e., achievement, attainment, and aspirations). According to Stanton Salazar and Dornbusch (1995), institutional agents, such as counselors, teachers, and other students, are gatekeepers of resources and opportunities within schools, and students with access to these institutional agents are at a distinct advantage. Stanton Salazar and Dornbusch report that Mexican American students with ties to institutional agents experience changes in their educational aspirations and expectations. Measuring social capital as the number of ties (strong and weak) students have with institutional agents (school, family, and non family ties), they suggest that students may increase access to more diverse networks through strong and weak ties by maintaining Spanish use within the school. They conclude that bilingualism plays a prominent role in determining access to social capital for Mexican American students because they experience network advantages in accessing institutional support not available to Spanish dominant immigrant students and English dominant working class students.

Maintaining one's own culture may increase the strength of ties within an ethnically or culturally determined network; however, assimilating into institutions such as schools may be necessary to develop weak ties to the institutional agents who offer guidance for academic success. For example, Portes (1998) argues that immigrants can adapt to mainstream culture while retaining positive aspects of their country of origin. He challenges the view that complete assimilation is the optimal mode of adaptation for upward social mobility in an English dominated, nationalist environment.

Although high concentrations of black and Hispanic students within urban centers have been suggested to create a negative "culture of poverty" effect on achievement, Goldsmith (2004) finds that, in racially segregated schools, denser, more cohesive ties among students and teachers lead to higher educational expectations among Mexican American students than in schools that are more ethnically mixed or mostly white. Additionally, while agreeing with Coleman's (1988) suggestion that being in a single parent family negatively affects students' achievement, Pong (1998) finds that social capital can counteract the negative effect of non intact families on mathematics and reading achievement. In schools with high concentrations of students from single parent families and stepfamilies, dense networks between single parents counteract the negative effects of these family forms on student achievement.

Scholars have taken an organizational perspective to explore the function that social capital plays in facilitating professional development among teachers. For example, Frank et al. (2004) argue that social capital within schools promotes the diffusion of teaching innovations between teachers and administrators. By observing and interacting with other teaching professionals, teachers and administrators are pressured to improve their pedagogical practices and also more easily benefit from the expertise of their colleagues. Frank et al. find that "change agents," that is, teachers who have already adopted new pedagogical techniques, should participate in local social capital processes that are related to the implementation of educational innovations and reforms. The authors recommend that change agents spend some of their professional development time interacting with other organizational members in order to share skills or cultivate new expertise.

Coleman (1988; Coleman & Hoffer 1987) argues that close relations between parents and students within the school produce increased student achievement. However, scholars have reexamined Coleman's work on the direct and positive effect that intergenerational closure has on student outcomes and found different results. Examining intergenerational closure among parents in public and private schools, Morgan and Sorenson find a negative association of closure with mathematics achievement,

despite dense friendship networks. However, public schools characterized by closure among students, teachers, parents, and administrators were shown to positively affect student math achievement.

Trust between teachers, parents, and students is one of the most fundamental forms of social capital. Bryk and Schneider (2002) argue that within the school community, individuals are interconnected through a set of mutual dependencies which make them vulnerable to sanctions from other community members. Therefore, school members build relational trust in order to ameliorate the uncertainty that arises from their mutual vulnerability to each other. Relational trust, therefore, is derived from discerning the intentionality and discrete interactions that individuals have with each other in the community. Schools characterized by high levels of relational trust are much more likely to experience sustained improvement in student academic achievement, and teachers and administrators in these schools are likely to be more committed to students' learning.

Similarly, Goddard (2003) connects trust worthiness to both the structural and functional forms of social capital. Trust, measured as the relational networks that connect parents and community members, was found to have a significant, positive effect on students' likelihood of passing high stakes standardized tests. These trusting relationships were supported by norms that encourage learning within the school environment. Trust has also been found to be a key element in the development of leadership within schools. The relationships between teachers, administrators, and instruction specialists act as sources from which teachers obtain professional development and assistance. When developing leadership within the school, teachers can draw on trusting relationships with administrators and other teachers as sources of professional assistance. Trust, therefore, acts as a fundamental institutional resource for enhancing student learning and developing teacher professionalism.

Other research has examined the dynamic aspects of social ties and the ways in which these ties are mobilized for the achievement of goals (i.e., functional specificity; see Sandefur & Laumann 1998; Kim & Schneider 2006). Within schools, parents and teachers activate network

connections to "broker" for their students. For example, Lareau (2003) demonstrates the different techniques employed by lower and middle class families in an attempt to improve student learning. These techniques vary by class and race, and produce both positive and negative student outcomes. Lareau finds that middle class parents use a technique of concerted cultivation in order to foster their children's talents in leisure and academic activities. Working class and poor parents, on the other hand, do not engage in this concerted cultivation, and instead trust the expertise and knowledge of educational professionals in directing their children's educational trajectories.

CRITIQUES OF SOCIAL CAPITAL IN SCHOOL RESEARCH: SUBSTANTIVE AND METHODOLOGICAL

Recent applications of social capital theory suggest that the formation of strong ties does not always have positive effects and can constrain the actions of network members (Portes & Sensenbrenner 1993). Intergenerational closure, for example, may promote normative behavior such as childrearing practices among working families (Parcel & Menaghan 1994), but it may also have a negative impact by inhibiting actions that could be beneficial, such as low resource parents interacting frequently with their children's teacher. In other words, one form of social capital that works for a certain type of result may not work for other outcomes. Accordingly, Portes (1998: 15) identifies four negative consequences of social capital. Specifically regarding educational outcomes, strong norms may foster an environment of lowered expectations and behavior (defined as a downward leveling of norms).

Other scholars have also examined the deleterious effect of the negative or counterfeit social capital that teachers create with students. For example, though finding that positive student-teacher relations tend to positively affect student achievement, Ream (2003) concludes that teachers who cultivate and nurture social relations in the classroom for the sole purpose of maintaining classroom harmony do so at the expense of academic content. This negative social capital is epitomized by a teacher who excuses rather

than sanctions misbehavior in order to maintain the already close relationship with a student. Although fostering positive relationships between teachers and students, this type of “defensive teaching” ultimately undermines academic achievement and serves to negatively affect academic progress.

Finally, research using social capital as a predictor of social outcomes has largely been descriptive and correlational rather than causal; causal links between social capital and its outcomes have been only weakly established. Some scholars, however, have attempted to remedy this lack of scientifically rigorous research by isolating the effects of social capital within the family on student academic achievement. Schneider and Coleman (1993) also look within the family and treat parental participation, family composition, maternal employment, and family activities as indicators of social capital. Characterizing social capital as a resource that facilitates action, these authors treat parental efforts and interventions in their child’s schooling as positive influences in student learning. Despite the deficiencies in its use and definition, social capital continues to be a useful analytic concept for understanding relational ties and how they promote norms, sanctions, and trust between parents, students, teachers, and administrators.

SEE ALSO: Bilingual, Multicultural Education; Bourdieu, Pierre; Coleman, James; Cultural Capital; Education; Family Structure and Child Outcomes; Friendships of Adolescence; Friendships of Children; Parental Involvement in Education; Social Capital; Trust; Trustworthiness

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social capital and health

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Social capital, according to the most widely accepted definition, refers to “features of social life – networks, norms and trust – that enable participants to act together more effectively to pursue shared objectives” (Putnam 1996: 56). Communities characterized by high levels of social capital have been hypothesized to benefit from lower crime rates, higher educational achievement, greater economic growth, and better health. Social capital generally incorporates the much older concepts of civic virtue and social cohesion. Research linking social cohesion and health dates back at least a century to Durkheim who demonstrated that populations with higher social integration have lower rates of suicide. Social theorists whose work serves as the foundation for the present interest in social capital include Pierre Bourdieu, James Coleman, and Robert Putnam. The appearance of social capital as a key word in research articles is relatively infrequent prior to 1980 and has grown enormously since the mid 1990s.

The core elements of social capital include measures of civic and social engagement (group memberships, political participation such as voting, community voluntarism, and time spent with friends) and indicators of trust (such as an agreement on a survey with the statement “Most people can be trusted”). The health indicators with which social capital has been shown to be correlated include both mortality data (infant mortality or life expectancy, for example) and morbidity statistics for various specific diseases. Assessments of the research evidence range from claims that the correlation is consistent and robust (Kawachi et al. 1997; Putnam 2000: 327) to reviews or studies that suggest that the relationship is both modest and variable among specific health indicators (Kennelly et al. 2003; Pearce & Davey Smith 2003; Morgan & Swann 2004).

The specific mechanisms to account for the relationship between social capital and health status remain to be established. One possible explanation is that people embedded in more intense social networks have greater access to money, transportation, home care, or other

tangible assets that improve their health status or illness outcomes. Another is that people who are more socially isolated are more likely to engage in damaging health habits such as smoking, drinking, or overeating. It may also be the case that the social connections and supports inherent in social capital trigger physiological responses that buffer stress and, possibly, even stimulate a person’s disease fighting immune system. Recent evidence suggests that social capital, broadly defined as the quality of social relations, may mediate the relationship between inequality and health status (Marmot 2004: 188; Wilkinson 2005: 125). In this hypothesis, as social inequality increases in a society, the reservoir of social capital decreases, which, in turn, negatively affects people’s health.

Broad agreement exists that research on the relationship between social capital and health is only at its beginning. Work to create greater conceptual clarity and more precise operational measures of social capital is necessary and continuing. Likewise, there is a need to search for evidence linking findings from large scale epidemiological studies at the level of countries or states with the results from studies at the community and individual levels.

SEE ALSO: Bourdieu, Pierre; Coleman, James; Durkheim, Émile; Health Risk Behavior; Medical Sociology; Medicine, Sociology of; Social Capital; Sociology in Medicine; Stress and Health

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social change

Dusko Sekulic

Change can be defined as a “succession of events which produce over time a modification or replacement of particular patterns or units by other novel ones.” Sociology as a discipline emerged in the middle of the nineteenth century as an attempt to explain not only the great waves of change sweeping Europe in the form of industrialization and democratization, but also the observed gap between European and colonized societies.

BASIC QUESTIONS

Whether something is changing or not depends on the perspective from which we observe. Recurrent fluctuations of prices or the unemployment rate do not change the nature of the market system; on the other hand, one of the characteristics of the market is constant push for changes in products, technologies, and social relations. How the market functions, the dominant actors, and the mediums of exchange evolve dramatically. However, from the more abstract perspective, we can argue that since capitalism emerged, it has not essentially changed, because its crucial regulatory institution, the free market, remains unchanged.

The second diagnosis of change or stability depends on the theoretical approach used to explain the causal mechanisms operating on the observed unit of analysis. Classical sociology was not only preoccupied with the explanation of the uniqueness of observed change,

for example the rise of capitalism in the West, but was also grounded on the assumption that some general principles and mechanisms producing all observed changes could be discovered. For Comte, such principles were the development of knowledge and ideas, for Marx, dialectics of productive forces and productive relationships, and for Lenski, development of technological capacities.

The third is the question of the tipping point. Is the change from 50 percent to 51 percent of employment in the service sector enough of a turning point that we can argue a new type of society (a post industrial one) has emerged (Bell 1973)? Or at what point has the modern era ended and the postmodern arisen if we want to believe in the postmodernists' claim that we are living in a new “post modern” era? At which point in time do the changes in the 1920s (the introduction of the assembly line, the application of “Taylorism”) indicate the emergence of a new “Fordist” system (Kumar 1995)?

THEORIES OF SOCIAL CHANGE

Theoretical approaches to the question of macrosocietal change can be divided into two broad groups. In the first are theories starting from the assumption that underlying principles, general laws of social change, could be discovered. Although they differ in the acceptance of directionality or nonlinearity of change, they have in common the belief of “basic principles.” On the other hand, we have theories rejecting this assumption and trying to explain particular historical events or configurations of factors characterizing group of events like revolutions or empires.

The first group of theories is based on the idea of evolution. According to that approach, the general mechanism of historical change can be described as going through certain stages driven by some inherent forces. These stages are the expression of some basic principle and are pointing in a certain direction. For Comte, societies go through three stages: a theological military, a metaphysical judicial, and a scientific industrial stage. This “law of the three stages” obviously reflects the prevailing thought of the time, because similar formulations can be

found earlier in Vico's *New Science* (1725): the age of Gods, the age of heroes, and the age of men.

In the two "discourses" Turgot presented at the Sorbonne in 1750, we can find the theory of three stages: religious, metaphysical, and scientific. In general, human development can be understood using the paradigm of growth; it is characterized by slow advancements from a less to a more developed state (Meek 1973). Similar formulations could be found in Saint Simon. In his *Letters from an Inhabitant of Geneva*, he formulated the Law of Three Stages, later misappropriated and announced by Comte as an original discovery. According to this law, the nature of ideas determines and limits social arrangements.

Karl Marx can also be classified within the frames of classical evolutionary thinking. His evolutionism was of a particular kind, with class conflict being the main force producing change. This conflict perspective influenced later development of historical sociology, which is no longer based on evolutionist ideas. For Marx the mode of production of material life determines the general character of the social, political, and spiritual processes of life. It is not the consciousness of men that determines their being; on the contrary, it is their social being that determines their consciousness.

At a certain stage of their development, the material forces of production in society come into conflict with the existing relations of production. The stages of development are "primitive communism," slavery, feudalism, capitalism, and communism, with socialism as its first phase. This progression model was derived mostly from the analysis of European history. When Marx looked at other parts of the world, he introduced significant changes to it. For example, in the analysis of Asia, he introduced the concept of the "Asiatic mode of production." Its long duration derives from its "presupposition that the individual does not become independent vis à vis the commune; that there is a self sustaining circle of production, unity of agriculture and manufacture" (Marx 1973 [1857–8]: 491).

Another subgroup of evolutionary theories is based on the idea of close resemblance of biological and social evolution. Herbert Spencer developed an evolutionary scheme for

explaining historical change. The evolution of society can be understood by comparing it to the growth of an organism. Both increase in size and in structure, from a few like parts to numerous interrelated unlike parts: "matter passes from an indefinite, incoherent homogeneity to a definite, coherent heterogeneity" (Spencer 1964 [1862]: 394).

Spencer was the first to systematically use the concept of differentiation that became a key idea in evolutionary and functionalist theories. Social differentiation refers to a process whereby sets of activities performed by one social institution become split up among different institutions. Differentiation represents an increasing specialization of the parts of a society. For Spencer, differentiation was a necessary accompaniment of the growth in size of both biological and social aggregates.

Following Spencer, Émile Durkheim held that increasing dynamic density, the number of people in interaction with one another, is critical in determining social change. As dynamic density increases, societies are segmented into similar units that combine to form larger units. Such primitive, segmented societies are characterized by strong mechanical solidarity based on common belief and consensus. As societies industrialize and urbanize and become more complex, the increased division of labor destroys mechanical solidarity and moral integration. A new form of order arises on the basis of organic solidarity. This comprises the interdependence of economic ties arising out of differentiation and specialization within the modern economy, a new network of occupational associations such as guilds and professional associations that link individuals to the state, and the emergence within these associations of collectively created moral restraints on egoism.

Durkheim's evolutionism is clearly visible from his introductory explanations in *Elementary Forms of the Religious Life*: "Everytime we undertake to explain something human, taken at a given moment in history – be it religious belief, a moral precept, a legal principle, an esthetic style, or an economic system – it is necessary to go back to its most primitive and simple form, to try to account for the characterization by which it was marked at that time, and then to show how it developed and became

complicated little by little, and how it became that which it is at the moment in question” (Durkheim 1947 [1912]: 3). In choosing the religion of Australian Aborigines, Durkheim assumed that he was studying religion in its most primitive and simple form. By studying the visible components, the culture and rites of primitive religion, he was able to analyze things that, in modern religions, are hidden by their complexity. Of course, underlying this scheme is an evolutionary assumption of the development of religion from simple to complex forms.

For both Spencer and Durkheim, the main mechanism producing social change is increased population density and the differentiation of society that follows. They both envisioned social change as leading to more complex social forms, but they rejected the idea that development goes through predetermined stages.

Modern evolutionary theory is less rigid in interpreting the stages of history. Nolan and Lenski in *Human Societies: An Introduction to Macrosociology* (1999) based their explanation of social change on the increased technological capacities of societies. New technologies of material production, as of information processing, send ripples of change through all aspects of social life. The evolution of societies is not predetermined but some general evolutionary patterns can be detected. Agrarian states are transformed into industrial societies but not the other way around. Lenski acknowledges that reversals are possible, but they are usually a consequence of some external cataclysm.

Cataclysmic events and environmental degradation are the topics of the evolutionary theory of Jarred Diamond. In his book *Collapse* (2005), he traces a fundamental pattern of catastrophe occurring when societies squander their resources, or ignore the signals of environmental degradation. Environmental damage, climate change, rapid population growth, unstable trade partners, and pressure from enemies are all factors producing the demise of societies. The indeterminate nature of new evolutionary theory is shown in Diamond with cases of societies that were able to find solutions for the same problems and persisted as a consequence. In his earlier work *Guns, Germs, and Steel* (1998), he shows how inequality among societies and subjugation of one society by others are rooted

in differing natural resources available to different people.

The second approach intertwined with evolutionism is functionalism. It regards change as the adaptation of a social system to its environment by the process of differentiation and increasing structural complexity. Society is viewed as a complex and interconnected pattern of functions, and change is explained as an epiphenomenon of the constant search for equilibrium. The dominant system structure is taken as the fixed point of reference against which other structures or latent consequences are seen as potentially disruptive. This means that deviance and strains of various kinds are residual in the model. They are not given full fledged status as integral parts of the system as in the conflict model of social change. In response to the widespread critique of functionalism as static and not taking into account social change, Parsons developed in the 1960s his theory of sociocultural evolution in *Societies, Evolutionary and Comparative Perspective* (1966) and *The System of Modern Societies* (1971). Parsons’s embrace of evolutionism read as repudiation of his statements from 1937: “Who now reads Spencer? . . . Spencer is dead” (Parsons 1949 [1937]: 3). For Parsons, evolution has a multidimensional character. Differentiation, the major Spencerian scheme, is the basic, although not the only, dimension of it. In Parsons’s scheme, it is complemented by adaptive upgrading, cumulative learning leading to the establishment of ever more intelligent technologies and ever more comprehensive and deeper scientific knowledge.

Through evolutionary processes, societies move from a system of ascription to one of achievement. Groups excluded from contributing to the system must be freed for inclusion. A wider array of skills and abilities is needed to handle increased complexities. Higher stages of evolution are characterized by value generalization. The system of cultural ideas is increasingly abstracted from their concrete context of a particular place and time and is thus better able to serve as a measure of legitimation and criticism of any particular norm, institution, or action. Evolution, for Parsons, proceeds through a variety of cycles, but no general process affects all societies equally. Some societies may foster evolution, whereas others may be pervaded by

internal conflicts or environmental constraints that impede the evolutionary process or even lead to the deterioration of the system. Although Parsons conceived evolution as occurring in stages (primitive, intermediate, and modern societies), he carefully avoided the impression of creating a unilinear theory of stages. For Parsons, evolution is not a linear process, although broad levels of advancement can be detected on a very abstract level with considerable variability of types.

The most sophisticated use of the structural differentiation concept in explaining social change is by Shlomo Eisenstadt (1964). His understanding of social change is based on the usage of concepts like “differentiated institutions,” “crystalized roles,” or “cultural orientations.” In spite of this general approach for Eisenstadt, the direction and nature of change are not universal or explained by general principles and first causes. Change is always tied to concrete circumstances as defined within a particular society. Structural functional analysis is the only device for discovering particular historical configurations. Although his whole work is preoccupied with social change, the nature of change is most systematically analyzed in *Revolution and the Transformation of Societies* (1978).

The third group of theories emphasizes the cycles of growth and decay. The roots of this approach are in the works of philosophers like Arnold Toynbee and Oswald Spengler. The four volumes of *Social and Cultural Dynamics* (1937–41) by Pitirim Sorokin are a sociological version of philosophers’ cyclical analysis. He saw societies oscillating among three different types of mentalities; sensate, ideational, and idealistic. The first type emphasizes the role of senses in comprehending reality, the second more transcendental or religious principles, and the idealistic type combines the two principles. Change is produced by the internal logic of these systems, which push their mode of thinking until it reaches its end point and the system is transformed into another form.

The main position of modern historical sociology, which is regarded here as the fourth major type of general theory, is that there can be no single explanation for all the important transitions in human history. “History is informative to the degree that things are not instances of general categories, but are instead

the product of causally connected series of events that produce unique configurations in each thing” (Stinchcombe 1978: ix). Historical changes must be located in their particular historical and cultural context and the main method used is historical comparison (Calhoun 1995, 1998). Max Weber was an important pioneer of this approach. He sees historical change as a concatenation of unique events and unrepeatable complexities. The rise of large scale capitalism is the result of a series of combinations of conditions that had to occur together. This makes world history and major changes like capitalism the result of configurations of events so rare as to appear accidental. Weber’s *Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism* is very often interpreted as a simple causal statement that Protestantism caused the rise of capitalism in the West. De facto it is a much more complicated argument where Protestantism is only the last intensification of one of the chains of factors leading to capitalism.

Important contemporary work in that tradition includes Barrington Moore’s *The Social Origins of Dictatorship and Democracy* (1966), which analyzes historical conditions producing dictatorships or democracies. There are three basic routes of change: the first is when feudal landowners become capitalist and ally themselves with the bourgeoisie. This route is most likely to produce democracy. When landowners enter capitalist markets but keep peasants on land, they increase their exploitation and enter into an alliance with state bureaucracy. This path leads to a fascist state. The final route is when landowners became absentee owners, which produces conflict and peasant revolts, mass mobilization, and social revolutions in different forms.

Theda Skocpol in *States and Social Revolutions* (1979) argues that revolutionary situations are the result of the emergence of politico military crises of the state resulting usually from military defeats in the international arena. State collapse is the result of a fiscal/administrative crisis of the state, conflicts within the ruling elite, and popular revolt. The same line of thinking is developed in the geopolitical theory of historical change of Randall Collins developed in *Weberian Sociological Theory* (1986) and *Macrohistory* (1999). His main explanatory variable is the success of the state in the

international arena. Internal legitimacy and external power prestige are connected.

SEE ALSO: Durkheim, Émile and Social Change; Evolution; Fordism/Post Fordism; Functionalism/Neofunctionalism; Parsons, Talcott; Post Industrial Society; Postmodernism; Social Change and Causal Analysis; Social Change: The Contributions of S. N. Eisenstadt; Social Change, Southeast Asia

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social change and causal analysis

Paul Bernard

Causal analysis means researching the processes through which causes produce their effects. This is particularly complex in the social sciences, which face challenges that do not affect the natural sciences (see Bernard with Boucher 2005). First, *social relations* are the real concern of the social sciences; variables can only indirectly represent these social relations through a characterization of the actors and objects involved in them (age, gender, or class categories, for instance, interacting in employment, family, or educational trajectories). Second, social relations are shaped in *historically* irreversible ways, at the microsocial level as well as at the meso level of institutions or at the macro level of societies. Finally, human actions depend on complex *intentions*; these largely have to be imputed when survey based, quantitative variables are used, while they are explored more directly through qualitative, open ended methods (see Bernard 1993 for a detailed discussion of how causal analysis can readily be used with both quantitative and qualitative types of data and methods).

Adapting causal analysis to these challenges in the social sciences means reformulating its basic rules. We cannot be looking for a set of necessary conditions which together form a sufficient condition for the effect to emerge; we are rather engaged in the invention of a usable *causal heuristics*. As Figure 1 indicates, the classic expression of causal rules reflects their use in the natural sciences (and to some extent in the more nomothetic of the social sciences, such as neoclassical economics and psychology), where quantities and general laws prevail. But in the more idiographic of the social sciences (such as sociology or political science), the reformulation of these rules as heuristic causality brings new meaning to the enterprise of linking causes to effects through processes.

First, researchers must identify *regularities*, quantitative or otherwise, involving the alleged “cause” and “effect”; there should be a discernible pattern linking them. Second, these

The three rules of classical causal analysis	The three corresponding rules of causal heuristics
Finding a statistically significant association between the alleged cause and effect	Observing regularities in the relation between the alleged cause and effect
Establishing a clear temporal sequence between the alleged cause and effect	Controlling for the ambient conditions of the relation between the alleged cause and effect
Introducing relevant control variables	Constructing a narrative focused on how the cause produces the effect



Figure 1 Classical causal analysis and causal heuristics.

regularities have to be checked systematically as to the contexts in which they prevail (or fail to appear). This is where relevant *control* variables are introduced, revealing such patterns as the following: both alleged cause and consequence depend on a common, antecedent “cause”; an intermediate variable serves as a “causal” conduit between alleged cause and consequence; and so called interaction effects, where the pattern of relation between alleged cause and consequence changes under various conditions specified by the control variable.

Finally, and this is the most important rule, the researcher has to come up with a *narrative*, a telling of the story of the processes through which the cause (or causes) engenders effects, under certain specified conditions. These three steps are obviously iterative: researchers go back and forth, trying to inductively make the theoretical sense of increasingly rich empirical patterns, and checking the theoretical implications of these interpretations against an ever broadening set of empirical findings (generalization); this was admirably explained by Arthur Stinchcombe (1968). Variables and their relations thus provide us with stenographic traces of social relations as they unfold through time; variables are markers for individual and collective actors and events upstream, which causally shape events, and indeed actors, downstream.

The narrative is of course key to how causal heuristics can meet the challenges of sociological analysis. Causal interpretations do rest on observed regularities and ambient conditions as

indexed by control variables; but the focus of these interpretations should be on interacting individual actors, who shape their future in the midst of constraints and opportunities offered by their past. This shaping takes place in various contexts, at the micro, meso, and macro levels, in which actors are involved at specific historical junctures, according to their birth cohort. This view of human life, based on the increasingly widespread notion of *life course* (Marshall & Mueller 2002), brings together social relations, history, and intentionality.

To illustrate the uses of causal heuristics in the study of social change, two questions will be examined in more detail below. First, how do welfare regimes affect the life course of individuals? By welfare regimes, much more is meant than a simple collection of social policies; they designate the broad set of resilient institutional arrangements through which markets, states, families, and communities divide up among themselves and organize the work of producing and distributing well being. Second, how do regimes themselves come about and change over time, partly under the influence of the mobilization of actors experiencing different trajectories?

REGIMES, LIFE CHANCES, AND THE LIFE COURSE

In a very influential book, Gøsta Esping Andersen (1990) proposed a categorization of advanced capitalist societies into three types

of institutional arrangements. These welfare regimes were: the social democratic regime, in the Nordic countries, in which the emphasis is on equality, giving the state a considerable role in sustaining universal social rights; the liberal regime, primarily in Anglo Saxon countries, in which the liberty of economic actors is put forward, making markets the key institution and confining states to a more remedial role; and the conservative regime, in most Western European countries, in which the principle of solidarity dominates, with social insurance schemes often based on occupational categories and family affiliations.

The specific contours of such typologies and the labeling of welfare regimes have been intensely debated; some even argue that advanced societies are so different from one another in this respect that their situation can hardly be summarized in such a way. The issue of producing and distributing well being is indeed closely related to that of social inequalities, and each society comes to grips with it in its own specific way, in the course of its history. This being said, typologies can be useful comparative tools under two conditions (Arts & Gelissen 2002). First, they must not be “sacralized”: they are only meant to represent essential features, and to reveal the forest rather than the myriad individual trees. In fact, it is against the backdrop of broad types that the individual features of each society will stand out. Second, a typology is only helpful if it can be used to do something else. The question thus arises of whether welfare regimes have any consequences for the life chances and the life course of individuals.

There are abundant examples that they do. Welfare regimes are even drawing attention outside the circle of specialists in social policies as such. Health researchers such as Navarro and Shi (2001), for instance, examine the impact of the major policy traditions during the period 1945–80 (social democratic, Christian democratic, liberal, and ex fascist, another set of labels for similar clusters of countries) in four areas: the main determinants of income inequalities, the level of public expenditures and health care benefits coverage, public support of services to families, and the level of population health as measured by infant mortality rates. The results indicate that countries more committed to redistributive and full employment

policies, such as the social democratic, were generally more successful in improving the health of populations, and without loss of economic efficiency. An implicit causal chain is obviously evoked here, involving the level of inequality, social programs, and the resulting level of health.

Welfare regimes also have an impact on an issue of long standing in sociology, that of social mobility. DiPrete (2003) argues that the traditional comparative analysis of occupational mobility may not accurately describe cross national differences in living standards changes over the life course. For one thing, occupational position may no longer be an appropriate index of belonging to a social class, in these times of contingent jobs and of individualization of trajectories. Moreover, industrial nations differ in the extent of labor force participation by women, stability of working hours, stability of households, and state tax and transfer policies, all factors that contribute to determining how well individuals will fare over their lifetime. Studies of living standards mobility in the liberal US, in conservative Germany, and in social democratic Sweden indeed reveal much greater similarity between the countries than do traditional studies of male occupational mobility, where the flexibility of the American society was featured. Note that the new factors brought to bear on the issue of the life course by DiPrete all reflect the influence of welfare regimes: this is obvious for taxes and transfers, but regimes also influence – as shown below – labor force participation, especially for women, the stability of professional careers, and indirectly the stability of families and households.

While both of these studies provide valuable narratives, they essentially rest their case on the broad association between regimes and typical life chances. Hicks and Kenworthy (2003) use more systematic causal modeling. They first apply factor analysis to 20 broad indicators of social policies in order to characterize 18 countries over the 1980s and 1990s. They can thus identify two dimensions along which these countries’ policies differ: a “progressive liberalism” axis, characterized at its positive end by extensive, universal, and homogeneous benefits, active labor market policy, and government employment and gender egalitarian family policies; and second, a “traditional conservatism”

axis featuring occupational and status based differentiations of social insurance programs and specialized income security programs for civil servants, as well as generous and longlasting unemployment benefits, reliance on heavy tax burdens for employers, and extensions of union collective bargaining coverage. These two factors are then used in regression analysis as predictors of aggregate national socioeconomic outcomes. Progressive liberalism leads to income redistribution and greater gender equality in the labor market, while traditional conservatism leads to a weakened employment performance.

What can be learned from these three studies (and many others that could have been cited)? Encompassing macrostructures like welfare regimes clearly influence changes experienced by individuals in their lives, for instance in their health, in the evolution of their living standards, and in their chances of access to jobs, with gender differences playing a significant role. This finding in turn raises a new causal issue: where do welfare regimes come from?

HOW DO REGIMES COME ABOUT AND CHANGE?

As mentioned earlier, regimes correspond to the broad set of institutional arrangements through which markets, states, families, and communities divide up among themselves the production and distribution of well being. They would not be regimes if they were not broad and resilient, and even self reproducing. Such stability would seem to offer limited opportunities for the study of social change. But upon reflection, this is not necessarily so: explaining stability requires attention to the processes at play in preserving existing arrangements, just as explaining change requires attention to the processes at play to disrupt and transform them.

Saint Arnaud and Bernard (2003) used an approach similar to Hicks and Kenworthy's, but they compared indicators for two time periods, the mid 1980s and the mid 1990s. They found that, for that interval at least, the clustering of advanced societies into regimes endured, in spite of the mounting pressures of globalization, which would hypothetically tend to dissolve the differences by making generous

welfare states fiscally unsustainable. In their search for an explanation of this resilience, they divided their indicators into three sets, concerning policies, outcomes, and civic participation (such as newspaper readership, voting, union membership, and trust). The same clusters of countries emerged in all three sets; this suggests that regimes, once established, so dominate the economic, social, and political scenes of the various countries that they give the same "texture" to their social situations, to their government programs, and to the civic commitment of their citizens. Why? Probably because policies influence outcomes, which in turn shape social and political mobilization, through civic literacy (Milner 2002); such mobilizations then lead to further confirmation of policy orientations and thus to the resilience of regimes. For instance, egalitarian policies would be confirmed and reinforced by a competent and mobilized citizenry, while the less egalitarian policies and situations of liberal countries would lead to less effective mobilizations in favor of policy changes.

This narrative of the processes linking policies, outcomes, and participation, while informative, is not being tested here with a specific causal analysis. Huber and Stephens (2001) take up that task in an impressive comparative effort that spans 18 advanced countries and 35 years of time series data; qualitative historical analysis is also called upon in about half of the cases, in order to confirm and enrich the interpretations coming out of quantitative modeling.

Their main thesis is that while the welfare state expanded during the 1960s and 1970s, it had to retrench in the 1980s and 1990s when austerity became the order of the day. Besides increasing economic pressures in the second period – in contrast with the continuing expansion in the first – two major factors were at play during the whole period: the political forces that dominated government, especially if they had sufficient time to put a strong imprint on the policies of the various countries, and the institutional structure, which can help or hinder discontinuities in policy directions.

The first factor is the more interesting from a causally narrative point of view. Huber and Stephens find that long term government incumbency of social democratic parties, committed to equality and solidarity, leads to the

construction of generous welfare states, with substantial entitlements, significant emphasis on the provision of public services – rather than only transfers – and redistribution through the tax and transfer system. Christian democratic parties, when they predominate, call for the support of all social classes, and this leads to substantive welfare expenditures. But they compete with the social democrats on the basis of religious appeal, and thus put forward the conciliation of various interests, not equality and redistribution. And their view of subsidiarity, where well being is produced at the lowest possible level (families, then local communities, and only residually at the state level), restricts the expansion of publicly delivered services.

Why does long incumbency make such a difference? Not only because it allows a party in power to change many policies, but also because it changes the policy agenda and the policy scene themselves. According to Huber and Stephens, there is first a ratchet effect, such that the center of gravity of the policy agenda is shifted, and indeed defined in terms of the preferences embodied in previous policy innovations. Moreover, expectations are transformed, and certain policy alternatives that social actors might otherwise have found attractive are no longer considered by them. Opportunities are also foreclosed or opened by previous policy choices, sometimes to such a point that some political players are no longer present on the scene (for instance, employers of low paid workers are absent in a country that has long had a high minimum wage). Finally, ideological hegemony sets in and makes an impression on the political ideas of most social classes.

One particular idea which has taken shape, and indeed redefined the agenda in social democratic countries, involves the labor force participation of women. Huber and Stephens point to the fact that the feminist movement, in alliance with unions and the labor movement, pushed for social and labor policies that would help women balance earning and caring roles. This has allowed an increasing number of women to join the labor force, thus further increasing their influence on the political scene, in a cycle of mutual reinforcement between policies and outcomes. The result is the development of services which at once help women participate, provide them with jobs in the

public service that are better than would be the case in private services (though not as good as men's), and help increase the overall level of education and health in the population.

When they turn to the period of retrenchment of the welfare state, Huber and Stephens show that social democratic rule and Christian democratic rule cannot produce, in the 1980s and 1990s, the sort of growth in government expenditures that prevailed in the previous two decades. They may not be paying enough attention, however, to an emerging pattern which they themselves have pointed out in other parts of their analysis: while overall revenues and expenditures no longer grow, public services may well do, and they are particularly important to women's labor force participation because they help the family care for dependents.

RETRENCHMENT OR RECONFIGURATION: FROM WELFARE REGIMES TO SOCIAL REGIMES

In still unpublished research, Bernard and Boucher (2005) extend the method of factor analyzing indicators of policies and outcomes to a broader set of dimensions and to more recent years (spanning the 1990s up to the early 2000s). They emphasize policies and outcomes having to do with services as well as transfers, and with the production of a healthy, well educated, and work ready population as well as with the coverage of traditional social risks.

The first factor in the analysis reveals an activation dimension, where policies are all aimed at making as many people as possible, and in particular women, active and productive in the labor market, with good health, basic education, and professional training. The second factor corresponds to a passive, welfare transfer dimension: programs essentially try to cover the risks of the many people who are unemployed, especially in the long run, or retiring early, voluntarily or not; and few women participate in the labor market.

At first sight, passive and active programs would seem to be polar opposites on a single dimension. But there is a third possibility: liberal countries tend to have fewer social programs of either kind. Indeed, the analysis reveals a growing competition between three models. First,

a social democratic one, where programs are oriented toward high social investments, which are expensive but paid for by a population that participates heavily in the labor market. Second, a liberal model where labor market participation is also high, but without a substantial level of social investment: in fact, the dearth of social programs forces a large proportion of the population into employment, with those who can afford appropriate education and health care faring much better than those who can only rely on lean public services and transfer programs. Finally, continental Europe is at the crossroads, with fiscally unsustainable welfare programs that are not clearly oriented toward increasing labor market activity. The way this third group of countries evolves will pretty much decide the fate of the "European social model," and determine whether welfare regimes will generally retrench or be reconfigured.

One interesting aspect of this research that also surfaced, but not as explicitly, in the work of Hicks and Kenworthy, and in that of Huber and Stephens, is that welfare regimes no longer concern only welfare and traditional social risks. The redefinition of gender roles has become part of the reconfiguration of welfare regimes, and the latter are increasingly seen as part of production regimes, that is, of how capitalist societies manage, in diverse ways, their economy as well as their social problems. Research increasingly reveals the existence of "social regimes," where all dimensions of society and the economy become relevant to one another and must somehow, through clashes and debates, assume some coherence and become sustainable.

CONCLUSION

Causal analysis of social change is about determining and narrating how the macro structures of society shape the life chances and the life course of individuals. It is also about examining how broad social categories of individuals sharing a common fate can imagine and fight for changes in the organization of society, for instance in their welfare regimes. The causal analysis of comparative international data allows researchers to identify the contours of such regimes, to examine their effects on individuals,

and to identify the actors, institutions, ideas, and processes involved in their reproduction and in their transformation. Causal analysis guides us, empirically and theoretically, in examining how, as C. Wright Mills (1976 [1959]) put it, biographies and history interact.

SEE ALSO: Life Course Perspective; Social Change; Social Indicators; Stratification, Gender and; Welfare Regimes; Welfare State, Retrenchment of

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social change: the contributions of S. N. Eisenstadt

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Social change is a major focus of S. N. Eisenstadt's sociological work. It runs as a thread that binds together many of his works, from his earliest studies on absorption of immigrants (1952) and empires (1963), through his explorations in Axial civilizations (see, e.g., 1986), up to his later works about multiple modernities (among others, 2003). A recurring theme in Eisenstadt's work is his emphasis on endemic factors – in built tensions, contradictions, conflicts, and antinomies – as accounting for changes in, and transformations of, the social reality. In early formulations of this perspective, he already states that innovation and change are not external to institutional systems. They are aspects of the process of institutionalization and the working of social institutions (Eisenstadt 1965, 1968, 1970). He carries on this principle of dialectical transformation to his analyses of the dynamics of civilizations and modernity, which indeed once led Robert Bellah to describe Eisenstadt as a “non Marxist Marxist.”

From this standpoint, Eisenstadt elaborates typologies of social changes according to their scopes and impacts. He speaks of macro socio-historical, civilizational, and epochal transformations, differentiating them from more restricted intra epochal and intracivilizational changes. When he focuses on epochal transformations, he draws the distinction between major sociohistorical breakthroughs and secondary

breakthroughs. Reflecting on Jaspers (1953), Eisenstadt argues that a major breakthrough in human history was the crystallization of Axial Age civilizations from 500 BCE to the first century of the Christian era. This worldwide transformation, he says, constituted some of the utmost breakthroughs in history, the central aspect of which was the surfacing of new ontological conceptions of a gulch between the transcendental and the mundane (Eisenstadt 2001: 1916). A most significant aspect of the dynamics of Axial civilizations was their potentiality to generate further internal transformations – i.e., secondary breakthroughs. Accordingly, the main outcome of one of the Axial civilizations in Western Europe was the development of modernity which, from there, was to expand and encompass the world (Eisenstadt 2001: 1918).

In comparison, Eisenstadt sees the great revolutions – such as the English Civil War, the American and French revolutions, and later the Russian and Chinese ones – as intra epochal and less dramatic transformations. These revolutions, he contends, by no means constitute major processes of change, whether in premodern or modern times (Eisenstadt 1992: 397). Eisenstadt's unique contribution to the study of these revolutions is their understanding as part of the social transformations of epochal changes and dynamics, which incorporates them in his general civilizational analysis. The “kernels” of these revolutions, from this point of view, can already be found in the basic characteristics of Axial civilizations, and more specifically, in the ideological and structural components of their political process. However, it is only with early modernity (the chronology of which differs in different societies) that these dynamics generated revolutionary processes and that affinities tended to concretize between political developments pertaining to the Axial civilizations and the ideological and organizational forces embedded in revolutions (Eisenstadt 1992: 394).

On the other hand, a radical change like the Meiji Restoration of 1868 in Japan cannot be seen, according to Eisenstadt, as such a revolution, since appropriate historical civilizational kernels were lacking to the extent that, historically, Japan does not belong to an Axial Age civilization. More specifically, this analysis is grounded in the observation that in Japan, one could not find any autonomous religious order,

group of intellectuals, or political party that formulated, and fought on behalf of, a universal utopian vision. This absence of such essential ingredients makes all the difference between the Meiji Ishin and the great revolutions. In practical terms, the Meiji Restoration was intended to bring about the reconstruction of the Japanese nation, and did not raise any universalistic claim requiring propagation outside Japan (Eisenstadt 1992: 396, 390).

This linking of the concept of civilization with epochal transformations, and hence with a sociohistorical periodization, represents an important contribution to both social change theory and civilizational analysis (Arnason 2001). In this respect, this approach differs from other perspectives on civilization such as, among others, Fernand Braudel's (1980) spatial synchronic analysis, which emphasizes long term continuity; or the "classical" civilizational analyses, like Oswald Spengler's (1945) and Arnold Toynbee's (1965), which tend to evince recurring cyclical stages. Eisenstadt, in contrast, privileges a temporal diachronic analysis that sets emphasis on sociohistorical epochal makeovers of civilizations. In this he also differs from approaches like Norbert Elias's (1994) that focus on sociohistorical, long term civilizing processes; instead, he emphasizes discontinuities and divisions as accounting for the generation of new phases of development.

Hence, Eisenstadt's approach to the question of directionality in macro sociohistorical transformations cannot be understood as evolutionist. Although his civilizational analysis is prone to delineate vast periodic stages, it is clearly distinguishable from a linear evolutionist approach in the vein illustrated by Rostow (1960). Against evolutionary aspects in functionalism, Eisenstadt argued that considerable social changes do not always lead to greater differentiation between institutional spheres and developments. Transformations that, at first glance, delineate what might be thought of as "similar stages" of institutional development may be leading to divergent horizons (Eisenstadt 2003: 6–7). Eisenstadt insists on the multiplicity and variety that both Axial civilizations and modernity may adopt, side by side with their common characteristics (see also Tiryakian 2005). In brief, he calls attention to potential convergence as well as divergence. Above all,

he opposes evolutionary teleological approaches that overstate directionality toward convergence, such as Parsons's (1964) thesis on "evolutionary universals in society" or Fukuyama's (1992) vision of an "end of history."

As a derivative of his basic approach that underlines the importance of human agency and creativity, Eisenstadt contributes his own view regarding the "bearers" and initiators of social change by highlighting the crucial role of elites. Accordingly, for instance, the development and crystallization of Axial civilizations were made possible, in Eisenstadt's comprehension, only thanks to the emergence of a new type of elite that deeply differed from those that dominated pre Axial Age civilizations. This new kind of elite consisted of individuals who were independent enough, intellectually, to elaborate and propose new cultural and social orientations, which they derived from new ontological conceptions (Eisenstadt 2001: 1917).

Though at a different level of analysis, this preoccupation with the influential in relation to social change was already present in Eisenstadt's early work about the absorption of new immigrants in Israel, where he insisted on the importance of elites in the construction of trust and solidarity (Eisenstadt 2003: 3). All in all, he contends, it is those groups that evince a high level of internal solidarity and trust that are best able to adjust in situations of change; elites, he pursues, play here a major role, not only in the building of cohesiveness within collectives but also in connecting this process with commitments to broader institutional and societal frameworks. This example shows how far Eisenstadt valorizes elites in connection with social change, and, moreover, that, in his mind, the very notion of social change is not bound exclusively to conflictual contexts. Change may also be bound to the building of social cohesion and it then much depends on the action of elites. Focusing on elites, and not on social classes, to be sure enables Eisenstadt to develop a more open explanatory framework for the appreciation of social change (see Eisenstadt with Curclaru 1971). This, however, does not mean that Eisenstadt can be identified, in this respect, with an elite theoretician like Vilfredo Pareto (1963), who emphasizes recurring ahistorical cycles emanating from inter elite and intra elite conflicts. Eisenstadt's own underscoring of the

importance of elites to social change remains bound to the specification of the social context of change and the historical processes wherein it takes place.

All in all, Eisenstadt's thought regarding the dynamics of social change, especially in relation to the study of civilizations and modernity, is best grasped through the concept of "program" (see also Boudon 1986, 2005). These dynamics that are grounded in basic characteristics, tensions, and antinomies inherent to the social order trace out paths of development and outcomes that cannot be known a priori and remain open to a variety of alternate trajectories. This scheme, in its general formulation, rejects any form of historical determinism and, on purpose, remains less specific than major alternate perspectives. In this latter respect, one may mention as examples the overwhelming weight granted to the relations of production and class structures in Marxism or to technology and productivity in the similarly close "technologist productionist" model (see Kerr et al. 1962). In both these approaches, changes in key factors of the social structure account for changes in all other areas of social activity. In contrast, Eisenstadt, who by no means ignores the factors evinced by those outlooks, stresses the possibility that additional areas of activity also play an autonomous role in societal development.

In particular, his civilizational analyses attach much attention to the transformative potential of culture, and especially to the circulation of ideas and perceptions of the social order and, relatedly, to the confrontation of alternative intellectual and ideological horizons. Thus, for example, he insists on the impact, in the emergence and institutionalization of Axial Age civilizations, of new ontological conceptions that elaborated on chasms between transcendental and mundane orders (Eisenstadt 2001). In another example, where he compares the dynamics of Axial (China and Europe) and a non Axial (Japan) civilizations, he insists on the significance of the combination of ideological elements and their institutional settings in the occurrence of political revolutionary processes in the former cases, while in the latter case there was a lack in universalistic missionary visions that can be traced back to its historical experience (Eisenstadt 1992: 395). Furthermore, the

"kernel" of great revolutions can be found only in Axial civilizations where the ontology of salvation was turned toward the mundane world – at least partially. In civilizations where the notion of salvation referred exclusively to the "other world," it is doubtful that the political arena might constitute a scene for struggles conveying a revolutionary significance (Eisenstadt 1992: 395).

This openness of perspective is the rule regarding all topics investigated by Eisenstadt – youth cultures, empires, systems of social stratification, revolutions, historical civilizations, or the Israeli society. It is particularly salient in his work on modernity, where he elaborates an alternative approach to more closed models. Through the autonomy of action this perspective endows to men and women in their relation to society and the world, modernity sets people in a stance of reflexivity to their acts and goals. It opens the way to new behaviors and understandings of the social order as well as to new tensions and conflicts. On the other hand, modernity, it is also Eisenstadt's contention, does not collide head on with religion and premodern traditions in every area of activity and regarding any topic of reflection. Modernity brings about radical changes in lifestyles and new challenges that may oppose religious and traditional patterns and premises, and require from them new formulations and expressions. It does not, however, necessarily combat them on essential existential questions or regarding symbolic aspects of collective endeavors. Hence, changes attached to the expansion of modernity may be derived from and be implemented through different, if not divergent, understandings of modernity, revealing the lasting traces of particular cultures, religious systems, and legacies. It is in the context, among other significant circumstances, of the diversity of such premodern traditions and the potential diversity of their influences on societies' turn to modernity that Eisenstadt speaks of the contemporary world in terms of multiple modernities. By this notion he means that contemporary modern or modernizing settings differ from each other not only by the forms that modernity takes on everywhere, but also according to foci, kinds and degrees of tensions that are endemic to those societies' experience. This opens the discussion of modernity to the widest range of possibilities, and it

is as such that it definitely belongs, in a prominent place, to the comparative sociological literature of modernity.

In forging this view of modernity, Eisenstadt actually follows in the footsteps of both Marx (see Tucker 1978) and Weber (see Gerth & Mills 1948): he is close to the former when he focuses on social change as generated by dialectical processes endemic to social reality; he is closer to the latter when he sees social change in a broad comparative perspective where culture and views of the world do play a crucial role in the development of society. Moreover, and again like the founding fathers of sociology, Eisenstadt as well is by no means *neutral* toward the object of his investigations. One cannot mistake his liberal pluralist outlook when, for example, he opposes “destructive” and “constructive” tendencies of modernity, nor when he contrasts totalistic and pluralistic societal arrangements of sociocultural divisions (see also Dahrendorf 2005). Eisenstadt stands here firmly on the ground of Weber, Durkheim, and Marx, for whom value judgments and a priori convictions never hindered scientific achievements but, on the contrary, induced them to study and re study the reality of society and the trends of its transformation (see Ben Rafael & Sternberg 2003).

And, indeed, in this immense work that is Shmuel Eisenstadt's, the concept of social change holds the role of pivotal axis; it derives from, and concretizes the very openness of, his sociological perspective.

SEE ALSO: Authority and Legitimacy; Charismatic Movement; Civilizations; Civilizing Process; Elites; Globalization, Culture and; Globalization, Religion and; Modernity; Modernization; Revolutions; Social Change

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social change, Southeast Asia

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Southeast Asia consists of the 11 countries that lie between the Indian subcontinent and China. On the mainland of Southeast Asia are Myanmar (Burma), Thailand, Laos, Cambodia, and Vietnam. Insular Southeast Asia includes Indonesia, the Philippines, Brunei, Malaysia, and Singapore and most recently East Timor. While most of Malaysia (Peninsular Malaysia) is on the mainland, it is usually considered part of insular Southeast Asia because the Malay population (the majority ethnic population of Malaysia) shares a common language and religion with much of the Indonesian population. The city state of Singapore (on an island connected by a mile long causeway to Peninsular Malaysia) was historically part of Malaysia, but because of its unique ethnic composition (three quarters of the population is of Chinese origin) it is more similar to East Asia than Southeast Asia.

While there are some common geographical and cultural features, diversity is the hallmark of the region. Incredible indigenous cultural

variation has been overlaid with centuries of contact, trade, migration, and cultural exchange from within the region and from other parts of Asia, and for the past 500 years from Europe (for general overviews of the region, see Osborne 1997; Somers Heidhues 2000; Shamsul 2001; Wertheim 1968). The common characteristic of mainland Southeast Asia is Buddhism, although there are very significant variations across and within countries. Islam is the majority religion in Indonesia, Brunei, and Malaysia, and there are significant minority Muslim populations in Singapore, southern Thailand, and the southern Philippines. Christianity is the major religion of the Philippines, and there are small Christian minorities throughout the region. Hinduism is the major religion in Bali, an island in Indonesia, and among the Indian minority populations of Malaysia and Singapore. The lowlands of both mainland and insular Southeast Asia tend to be densely settled, and wet (irrigated) rice agriculture is the predominant feature of the countryside. Rural areas are knitted together with small and medium size market towns. The major metropolitan areas of the region (Jakarta, Bangkok, Singapore, Manila, Rangoon, Kuala Lumpur, Ho Chi Minh City) are typically port cities or located along major rivers. Many of these towns and cities have significant Chinese minorities (often intermarried with the local population) that play an important role in commerce. Every country has remote highland and mountainous regions which are often populated by ethnic minorities.

In terms of land area, population size, and cultural and linguistic diversity, Southeast Asia is comparable to Europe. By the year 2000 the population of Southeast Asia exceeded 500 million – about 8 percent of the world's total. Indonesia is the fifth most populous country in the world, while the oil rich sultanate of Brunei (located on the island of Borneo) is one of the smallest. The other large countries of the region, Thailand, Vietnam, and the Philippines, are more populous than all European countries except for Russia and Germany. The sea (South China Sea, the Indian and Pacific Oceans) surrounds much of the region, especially the immense Indonesian and Filipino archipelagos. While the sea can be a barrier, the ocean and the rivers of the region are avenues that have fostered local and long distance trade throughout

history. The same oceans can also be cruelly destructive forces, as evidenced by the enormous loss of life and of entire communities from the December 2004 Indian Ocean tsunami.

POLITICAL HISTORY

The contemporary political divisions of the region are largely a product of European imperialism, especially of the nineteenth century. Prior to European intervention, there were great regional civilizations – both agrarian states and maritime empires that waxed and waned over the centuries. The remains of temple complexes at Angkor (in Cambodia) and Pagan (in Burma) rival the architectural achievements of any pre-modern world civilization. Early western observers of the city of Melaka (a fifteenth century maritime empire centered on the west coast of the Malayan peninsula) described it as more magnificent than any contemporary European city. These early polities were founded on intensive rice cultivation with complex irrigation systems and/or the dominance of regional and long distance trade. The region has also been deeply influenced by contacts with the great civilizations of India and China. The cultural influences from outside have invariably been transformed into distinctive local forms in different Southeast Asian contexts. The ease of movement throughout the region seems to have shaped cultures that easily absorbed new ideas, immigrants, and a tolerance for diversity.

European influence began in the sixteenth century with the appearance of Portuguese and Spanish naval forces, followed by the arrival of the Dutch in the seventeenth century, and then by the British and French. In the early centuries of contact, European powers were able to dominate the seas and thereby limit the expansion of Southeast Asian polities, but rarely penetrated very far inland from their coastal trading cities. All of Southeast Asia was transformed, however, in the nineteenth century, as the industrial revolution in the West stimulated demand for mineral and agricultural products around the globe. New economic organizations of plantations, mines, and markets led to large scale migration of people and capital to frontier areas and to the cities of Southeast Asia. There was an accompanying flurry of imperialist wars to grab

land, people, and potential resources. In a series of expansions, the British conquered the area of present day Myanmar (Burma) and Malaysia, the Dutch completed their conquest of the East Indies (now Indonesia), and the French took the areas that formed their Indochina empire (present day Vietnam, Cambodia, and Laos). At the turn of the twentieth century, the United States defeated nationalist forces to take control of the Philippines just as the Spanish empire was crumbling. Siam (Thailand) was the only indigenous Southeast Asian state to escape the grip of colonialism.

The political history of the region has not been stable or evolutionary. As western countries moved toward more democratic social and political institutions over the first decades of the twentieth centuries, the colonists (British, Dutch, American, and French) constructed authoritarian dependencies in the tropics based on export economies and racial ideologies. Although there were stirrings of nationalist sentiment during the first half of the twentieth century, it was only after World War II that the nationalist forces were strong enough and the international environment favorable enough to bring political independence to the region. The critical turning point was the Japanese conquest and occupation of Southeast Asia from 1942 to 1945, which permanently shattered the myth of European superiority. The colonial powers returned after World War II, but encountered popular nationalist movements that demanded the end of colonialism.

Independence was negotiated peacefully by the Americans in the Philippines and the British in Burma and Malaysia, but nationalist forces had to wage wars of independence against the Dutch in Indonesia (1945–50) and against France in Vietnam (1945–54). The interplay of nationalist struggles, class conflicts, and East–West Cold War rivalry had a marked influence on political developments in the region. In almost every country there were radical and communist movements that held the allegiance of significant sectors of the population. In several cases, communist parties were part of the nationalist movement, but then departed (or were driven out of) the political arena as domestic and international tensions escalated. Vietnam was unique in that the nationalist movement was led by communists. After the French were

defeated in 1954 and agreed to grant independence to Vietnam, the United States intervened to set up a noncommunist Vietnam state in the southern region of the country. After another 20 years of war and a million casualties, Vietnam was finally united as an independent state in 1975. Following 1975, tensions between the socialist states (Vietnam, Cambodia, and Laos) and the rest of the region were the major focus of international relations in the region, but by the late 1990s these rivalries had subsided.

Domestic political developments within individual countries of the region have been no less dramatic. Governments have oscillated between authoritarian and democratic forms with no clear linear trend. Behind the headlines of military coups, regional wars for autonomy, and “managed” elections, have been the complex political struggles among various contending groups defined by class, region, ethnicity, and kinship. These struggles have ranged from civil war to fairly open elections. Large scale violence is not the norm, but massacres in Indonesia, Cambodia, and East Timor have been among the worst of such episodes in modern times. Popular civil protests against ruling elites in the Philippines and Burma have had significant domestic and international reverberations. Neither academic scholarship nor political reporting has offered broad empirical generalizations or convincing interpretations of the postwar political change in Southeast Asia.

Evolutionary – and sometimes revolutionary – social change continued throughout much of Southeast Asia in the 1980s and 1990s. After the collapse of the Soviet Union, the socialist countries in the region, including Vietnam, Cambodia, and Laos, moved rapidly toward more market driven economies. Several other countries in the region experienced major political movements that led to changes in national leadership. The “people power” movement led to the end of the Marcos regime in the Philippines and a return of regular elections. Nonviolent mass street protests ended the string of military coups in Thailand and ushered in an era of open democratic governance. Popular protests also forced the end of the Suharto regime in 1998 and brought the first free elections in 45 years in Indonesia. The military junta continues to rule Burma in the early years of

the twenty first century, but few expect it to last for many more years. Even in Malaysia and Singapore, perhaps the most stable countries in the region, change was in the air, when after several decades of rule, first Lee Kwan Yew in Singapore and then Mahathir Mohamed in Malaysia handed over power to appointed successors. After many years of instability, Cambodia experienced consecutive peaceful elections in 1998 and 2003.

The 1990s also witnessed the creation of the new state of East Timor. After a long history of political repression by Indonesia, the people of East Timor voted for independence in a UN supervised referendum in 1999. After a period of brutal retaliatory violence from Indonesian sponsored militias, East Timor was granted international recognition as an independent state in 2002.

SOCIOECONOMIC CHANGE

Southeast Asia has been one of the most economically dynamic regions in the developing world. Economic change has been accompanied by many other attributes of modernization, including the widespread availability of education, modern transportation, and the mass media during the post Independence era. This is most evident for the original ASEAN (Association of Southeast Asian Nations) countries of Thailand, Malaysia, Singapore, Indonesia, Philippines, and Brunei (admitted in 1984). Several of these countries are often identified as second tier Asian tigers (following the earlier model of the rapidly developing countries of South Korea, Taiwan, Hong Kong, and Singapore). Progress has been slower in the remaining Southeast Asian countries of Vietnam, Myanmar (Burma), Laos, and Cambodia, which were admitted to ASEAN in the 1990s.

Many indicators of development in Southeast Asia, including very low levels of mortality and almost universal secondary schooling, are approaching the prevailing standards of developed countries. Demographic research has revealed very rapid declines in fertility in several Southeast Asian countries, particularly in Singapore, Thailand, Malaysia, and Indonesia. If the current pace of decline continues,

replacement level fertility (two children per woman) should be reached in the near future (Hirschman & Guest 1990).

At the same time, however, there is wide variation within the region and within some countries on all of these indicators. Life expectancy varies by over 20 years across some of the ASEAN countries, with a low of 55 years in Laos and a high of 82 in Singapore. While Singapore and Malaysia are competing for high tech industry jobs, the majority of the population in Burma and Laos remains in subsistence agriculture.

The reasons for the success of some countries and economic stagnation in others are a matter of dispute. The East Asian model of state sponsored export industrialization is widely discussed in policy and academic circles, but the parallels between East Asian and Southeast Asian economic development strategies are still a matter of considerable uncertainty. Although market driven capitalism is part of the story, the role of the governments in managing their economies has also been integral to economic development in the region. What is striking about economic development in the region is the degree to which it has been carried out by fairly authoritarian states. The relationship between democracy and economic growth and development, argued to go hand in hand by modernization theorists, seemed to be challenged by the experience of Southeast Asian tigers towards the end of the twentieth century, but much research is left to be done on the causes and consequences of economic development and modernization in the region.

For much of the 1990s, most of Southeast Asia experienced rapid economic growth and the development of a middle class population whose growing social and political influence has been widely discussed in the research literature (McVey 1992; Girling 1996; Embong 2001). For example, the reform political movements in Thailand, Indonesia, and Malaysia are thought to be one manifestation of the increasing role of the new middle class. The period of very rapid economic growth was halted in late 1997 by the "Asian economic crisis" that hit the region, and Thailand, Malaysia, and Indonesia in particular. The causes of the crisis are the subject of much debate, with the role of "crony

capitalism" and highly speculative financial markets widely considered to be important contributing factors.

Despite the economic crisis of the late 1990s, economic growth has resumed in the region, even for some of the poorer countries like Laos. Assuming that current socioeconomic trends continue, several countries in the region will probably follow Japan, Korea, and Taiwan along the path of development in the early decades of the twenty first century.

SOCIOLOGICAL RESEARCH

Scholarship on Southeast Asia has often reached beyond the boundaries of the region to influence debates over social science concepts, theory, and models. Perhaps most influential has been the work on Indonesia by anthropologist Clifford Geertz. His evocative concepts of the "theatre state," "thick description," and "agricultural involution" have stimulated debate and research in several social science disciplines, including sociology. His model of agricultural involution (Geertz 1968) has been one of the most provocative developments in scholarship on Indonesia over the last generation. A strikingly bold thesis, agricultural involution is an attempt to explain how Java became one of the most densely settled populations in the world within a traditional agricultural economy. To address this question, Geertz presents an ecological interpretation of the evolution (involution) of Javanese social structure in the face of rapid population growth and Dutch colonialism within the constraints (and possibilities) of wet rice economy. The colonial system prevented industrialization and the development of an indigenous entrepreneurial class. The traditional rice economy, however, could absorb a larger population because additional labor inputs in the maintenance of irrigation facilities, water control, weeding, and harvesting yielded marginal increments in rice production. Over the decades, this refinement of traditional production technology (involution) led to an increasing rigidification of traditional Javanese culture that discouraged innovation and any efforts at social change – therefore reinforcing the structural limits of the colonial system. Even after independence

when structural limits were lifted, the legacy of the past, as reflected in Javanese culture, remained.

Geertz's thesis remains highly controversial and many of its components have been confronted with negative evidence (for a review of the debate, see White 1983; Geertz 1984). For example, Geertz deemphasized social class divisions with his interpretation of "shared poverty" as the traditional social strategy. Most research has shown significant inequality of landholding and other socioeconomic dimensions in Javanese villages, although it is not clear if inequality is permanently perpetuated between families across generations. Even accepting many of the criticisms, agricultural involution is a seminal sociological model that should serve to generate empirical research on the historical development of Asian societies.

Moral Economy

A classic question in social science concerns the causes of revolution or rebellion. Neither Marxian theory, which emphasizes exploitation, nor relative deprivation theory seem to be satisfactory models to explain the occurrence of revolutions or rebellions. The most sophisticated sociological theory of peasant rebellion is based upon historical materials from Burma and Vietnam by political scientist James Scott (1976). Scott argues that peasants only rebel when their normative expectations of a minimum subsistence level are not met. These conditions are more likely to occur when capitalist market relations and colonial states erode traditional social structures and the reciprocal obligations of peasants and their patrons.

In a more recent study based upon fieldwork in a rural Malaysian village, Scott (1985) examines how class antagonisms are displayed in everyday life. Given that rebellion is a very rare event in most societies, Scott calls attention to political, social, and linguistic behaviors (weapons of the weak) that reveal the depth of antipathy and potential social conflict, but do not risk violent reaction from the state and powerful elites. In these two books and related publications, Scott has provided original interpretations of peasant political behavior in Southeast Asia and set a research agenda for

scholars of other world regions and, more generally, the development of social theory.

Status of Women

In addition to the theoretical concepts mentioned above, empirical generalizations have arisen from studies of Southeast Asian societies that have relevance far beyond the region. Empirically, the most common cultural characteristic across the region is the relatively high status of women in Southeast Asian societies, especially when compared to East Asia and South Asia. While women still face many social and cultural obstacles in Southeast Asia, the situation appears much different than the patriarchal societies of other Asian societies and the model of traditional female domesticity of many western societies. While there are a few matrilineal societies in the region, Southeast Asian kinship systems are typically bilateral, with equal importance attached to the husband's and wife's families. The patrilocal custom of an obligatory residence of a newly married couple with or near the groom's family is largely absent in Southeast Asia. The residence of young couples after marriage seems to be largely a matter of choice or dependent on the relative economic opportunities. There is no strong sex preference for children in Southeast Asia, and both girl and boy children are highly valued. Divorce, often initiated by wives, was part of the cultural fabric of several Southeast Asian societies, including Malaysia, Indonesia, and Thailand (Hirschman & Teerawichitchainan 2003).

The relatively positive status of women is also evident in earlier times. Historian Anthony Reid (1988: 146–72) reports that early European observers were struck by the active role of women in economic and political affairs in Southeast Asia. Traditional folklore also suggested that women play an active role in courtship and that female sexual expectations were as important as men's.

At present, women seem to be well represented in schools, universities, and in employment in all modern sectors of the economy in almost every country of Southeast Asia. There is only a modest scholarly literature on the higher status of women in Southeast Asia (Andaya 2001; Van Esterik 1982), and few efforts have

been made to explain the links between traditional roles of women as productive workers in the rural rice economy and their relative ease of entry into the modern sector, particularly in manufacturing industries such as textiles. The impact of modernization and economic development on gender relations and on the status of women are important topics for future scholarship.

Cultural Pluralism

Cultural pluralism has been the focus of both historical and contemporary research on Southeast Asia. Historically, one of the defining features of the region was the relatively easy absorption of peoples, ideas, and cultural practices from elsewhere. In the twentieth century, however, assimilation into Southeast Asian societies became more difficult with the creation of political and social barriers. Some of the key sources of ethnic and religious conflict in the region are illuminated in Chirot and Reid's (1997) collection of essays that compare the experiences of the Chinese in Southeast Asia with those of Jews in Central Europe. The implications of religious and ethnic diversity in the region for democratization have also garnered scholarly attention (e.g., Hefner 2001).

In particular, the relationship between politics and Islam is a topic of growing regional research interest with implications far beyond the region. Even with their majority Muslim populations, Indonesia and Malaysia have managed to maintain relatively secular states in spite of challenges from opposition parties that espouse religiously oriented politics. Hefner (2000) challenges the widely asserted stereotype that democracy is unable to flourish in the presence of Islam.

CONCLUSION

A generation or two ago there was intense discussion and debate over the question of whether Southeast Asia was a region in more than a geographic sense. The question has pretty much been settled by historical and contemporary research (Wolters 1999; Reid 2003). In spite of the great political, economic, and sociocultural diversity in the region, there are many common cultural, political, and social forms. The similarity of family systems and the status

of women throughout Southeast Asia suggest common historical and cultural roots among all the peoples of the region. The long history of migration from other regions, the ecological, cultural, and social differences between lowland and upland peoples, as well as the presence of linguistic and religious pluralism, have created multi ethnic societies in every country in the region. Colonialism created many divisions that affected variations in the political and economic developments of Southeast Asian countries during the twentieth century. The study of these processes of modernization and social changes in politics, family structure, ethnic relations, and other social spheres makes Southeast Asia an extraordinarily interesting sociological laboratory for comparative research.

SEE ALSO: Colonialism (Neocolonialism); Gender, Development and; Modernization; Plural Society; Social Change; Transition from Communism

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social cognition

Chandra Mukerji

Studies of social cognition attempt to explain how thought or cognitive problem solving takes place in groups. While scholars generally agree that learning can be a collective activity, many

are reluctant to accept that thinking itself could have a social dimension. Psychologists and cognitive scientists tend to consider thought as an internal brain activity. Sociologists generally avoid the problem by focusing on social behavior. When sociologists look at consciousness, they generally study how internal psychological processes have been shaped by external social demands. Media scholars examine patterns of persuasion, and political sociologists look at ideology and hegemonic practices. All agree that collective life proceeds through the mind as well as the body, but few consider social cognition or how thinking might take place through interaction (Scribner & Cole 1974; Longino 1990; Hutchins 1995; Turnbull 2000; Rosental 2003).

Scholars doing work in the sociology of scientific knowledge (SSK) have been the exception. Conducting fieldwork in laboratories, they have repeatedly found that ideas emerge through interaction. Researchers talk to one another about what they are seeing and how they understand their data (Bloor 1990; Longino 1990; Knorr Cetina 1999). Their thinking takes place in conversation and this fact is documented in the long list of authors in many scientific publications.

The problem for those interested in social cognition is to define the more general conditions under which such activity takes place (Latour 1993; Rosental 2003; Mukerji 2006). Ed Hutchins (1995), an anthropologist working in cognitive science, has been a leader in this field. He explains that social cognition can take place even when individuals are alone. He asks us to imagine a student sitting at a desk, doing a math problem. There is paper on the desk and a pencil in the student's hand. Where, Hutchins asks, is the thinking going on? The simple answer is in the brain. The student absorbs the problem, solves it internally, and puts the result onto the paper. But Hutchins argues that the calculations in fact take place on the paper as well as in the brain. The student uses cultural symbols to do the problem, and manipulates them in culturally prescribed ways, using techniques designed for pencil and paper. Many math problems are impossible to solve without writing them down. So, Hutchins argues, the thought is *both* in the brain and in the material world. The brain learns to do what the culture says can be done on paper, and the problem is

solved where collective and individual life meet – at the desk or in the school room. The brain is not an autonomous source of ideas, but rather another part of the human anatomy that is trained to fit a culture. Just as people learn ways of walking, forms of sexuality, emotional states, languages, and work skills, so they also learn ways of thinking. And they practice them with others. The brain itself is trained as children grow to adulthood by the physical and cultural environment in which they are raised. Individual thought is not so individual after all.

Hutchins (1995) argues that collective forms of problem solving are even more evident in group life, and he demonstrates this in a series of studies of navigation. When pilots fly planes or sailors take their ship to sea, they routinely rely on the knowledge and cognitive skills of others. They enroll maps, gauges, observations, and instruments into the enterprise, forming what Latour has called “networks of people and things.” The Pacific Islanders that Hutchins first studied, who navigate their canoes over long distances out of sight of land, determine their course collectively, watching the patterns of waves, tracking stars, watching for birds, and looking for currents in the color of the water. The measures are too diverse for any one individual to monitor effectively, so they work together to navigate the Pacific. US naval vessels with all their instruments also require distributed cognition. To determine a course, some sailors look at sonar screens while others follow wave and wind data or monitor the speed of the engine. These different but comparable actors similarly use multiple measures to solve problems of navigation, and use talk to integrate the information in useful ways.

Turnbull (2000) studies other instances and techniques of collective cognition. Like Hutchins, Turnbull is interested in the cognitive practices of indigenous people, focusing his attention on aboriginal groups in Australia. But he also studies western cartography and building practices. For example, he looks at the use of templates by medieval masons in building cathedrals. They could reproduce arches of a similar form without having to make novel measurements. With the templates, cathedrals that were erected over centuries gained continuity of form because new masons worked with the same cognitive tools as their predecessors. Turnbull looks

at maps in a similar way. Cultures may have such different mapping systems that one cannot translate information easily from one to another, but within their culture, maps help coordinate thought and sustain ways of life over time.

Mukerji (2006) also looks at social cognition and indigenous intelligence, but as part of his torical sociology of early state power. She studies the construction of the Canal du Midi, one of the first navigational canals to make extensive use of locks. She is particularly interested in a group of indigenous women engineers who lived in the Pyrenees in the seventeenth century. They managed some of the most sophisticated waterworks of the period in these remote mountains where Roman settlers once built baths. Their skills in hydraulic engineering were derived from Roman precedents, but their provenance had been forgotten. The hydraulic techniques no longer served public baths, but public laundries. Because their skills were honed against the difficult landscape of the mountains, these indigenous workers had the very rare ability to cut contours with precision, and carry water over vast distances in rough country. Because of these abilities, they were employed as laborers on the Canal du Midi. They participated in a system of distributed problem solving with military engineers, academics, and artisans.

According to Longino (1990), the reluctance to see cognition as social is grounded on the philosophical assumptions of Descartes and his followers that for centuries privileged the individual knower in the pursuit of truth. Descartes defined outside influences as a source of confusion to anyone seeking knowledge. He argued that authorities can proffer illusions rather than point to the truth, so thinking independently is necessary for the pursuit of knowledge. Longino breaks with this tradition and makes a philosophical argument in favor of social epistemology, using the laboratory from SSK as her guide. She argues that group problem solving can be just as progressive as individual thought. Individuals as well as groups can cultivate illusions, but in fact, she says, the shared professional skepticism of scientists is a better means of dispelling than individual contemplation.

This position is compatible with what the developmental psychologists Scribner and Cole (1974) have argued about culture and learning. Following the precepts of the Russian

psychologist Vygotsky, they contend that learning is a social activity, not simply a natural capacity of human brains. Literacy effects are not just abilities acquired in learning to decode and write messages, but rather effects of the schooling in which literacy is acquired. Rote memory and recitation may constitute literacy, but they do not produce the same kind of cognitive skills as critical reading. The reflexivity that psychologists usually associate with learning to read is really the product of the ways that texts are presented and interrogated in western societies. The collective practices of schools and families produce forms of consciousness that are social, not individual. Scribner and Cole argue that texts and other inscriptions are cognitive tools. They can be (but are not necessarily) used as intellectual scaffolding for developing higher forms of reasoning. Schools tell pupils how to understand and use these tools, and produce cultural forms of collective reasoning.

The notion of cognitive tools has proven particularly effective in interpreting the collective patterns of cognition in science. Scientific instruments constitute another type of cognitive tool that not only allows people to think in new ways, but to approach problems in similar fashions. Where the same instruments are used in multiple fields of study, they help to fashion a common way of working and thinking. Research that is very specialized can nonetheless contribute to collective shifts in knowledge because scientists share cognitive tools: not only types of measurements, but also mathematical models, or logics of research.

Hutchins, Cole, and researchers in the SSK tradition tend to focus on face to face interaction where people learn from one another or learn in tandem, but Mukerji, studying the Canal du Midi, also looks at how the state in this period cultivated and organized intelligence, using cognitive advantages to augment their institutional power. Military engineers, academics, and civil engineers were all cultivated and patronized by the royal treasury, and were obliged to serve on the king's projects. They came to the Canal du Midi when they were told to do so, combining their different expertise acquired as creatures of the state. The resulting social intelligence was a political asset, and used to improve the infrastructure of the kingdom.

Occupations have their own forms of intelligence that can be cultivated in seclusion or used in coordination with others. Large scale organizations such as corporations or governments combine and use them in precise ways. The American sailors described by Hutchins, navigating navy vessels at sea, have duties defined by the naval hierarchy. Their skills are a product of this system, and so are their practices of collaborating. They are trained to help navigate collectively and to have the distinct skills needed for the job. Bureaucracies are not just socially rational systems of offices, but means for managing and exploiting human intelligence.

Currently, those who study social cognition do not question whether such a thing exists or not. The evidence for it seems strong. But it is still difficult to differentiate a pattern of *social* thought from a chain of command. In the former, group members share their ideas and find common solutions to problems together. In the latter, information is fed from the bottom to the people at the top, who do the thinking. More research is needed to make more precise descriptions of this. And more precise theories are needed to distinguish social cognition or distributed thought from other patterns of solving problems.

What is most intriguing in current research are the efforts to clarify what difference it makes that human beings can talk with one another and stabilize common understandings of things. Clearly, groups can sometimes accomplish through distributed cognition what individuals could not do on their own. The question is when and how this capacity is employed and how much of social life is founded on this ability.

SEE ALSO: Ethnomethodology; Frame; Framing and Social Movements; Information Technology; Knowledge, Sociology of; Kuhn, Thomas and Scientific Paradigms; Mannheim, Karl; Scientific Knowledge, Sociology of; Scientific Networks and Invisible Colleges

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social comparison theory

Monica K. Miller and David Flores

Comparisons with other people play a significant role in social life, as they provide meaning and self-relevant knowledge. How people view their own circumstances, abilities, and behaviors varies according to the types of social comparisons they make. Although in his seminal work Leon Festinger (1954) did not offer a precise definition of social comparison, it is generally conceptualized as the process of thinking about the self in relation to other people. Individuals frequently make social comparisons because no objective comparison information is available; however, when both social and objective information is available, people are often more influenced by social information, as it is frequently more diagnostic than objective information. Further, many researchers believe that comparisons may be with real or imagined others, and do not require personal contact or conscious thought. Comparisons can also be made between one's own social group and another social group. Although comparison information can be encountered naturally in one's environment, most research has studied the types of comparisons that participants seek out intentionally.

There are many motivations for seeking social comparison information. First, comparisons

provide information for self-evaluation. In situations lacking objective standards, people often look to similar others as an indicator of how well one has performed. For example, students often want to know how their test score ranks among their classmates' scores. Second, social comparison can serve self-improvement purposes, as is the case of younger children comparing themselves with older children when learning new tasks. A third goal is self-enhancement, which allows one to feel better about the self through comparison with someone who is worse off. Social comparisons are also made to inform future behavior. Customers at a bar observe other customers tipping the bartender, and take this as a cue that they should do the same. Finally, individuals seek comparisons out of a desire to affiliate with or gather information about others.

In order to achieve the goal of the comparison, individuals can be selective in their choice of a comparison target and strategic in their interpreting, distorting, or disregarding comparison information. Additionally, the presence of varying goals may lead to different types of comparisons. For example, cancer patients typically compare their coping and health with those less fortunate (i.e., a downward comparison), promoting a need for positive self-evaluation. However, patients also seek interactions with patients who are doing better than the self (i.e., an upward comparison), promoting the need for self-improvement.

Social comparisons evoke a variety of behavioral, cognitive, and affective reactions. Such reactions are largely thought to be brought about by a threat to the self-image, a sense of injustice, or some other uncomfortable state that results from a comparison. For instance, a worker who learns that he gets paid more than another worker can justify this inequity by either working harder or by reasoning that his work is more difficult than that of the lower-paid worker. This example indicates that people often can choose between behavioral and cognitive responses.

Affective responses have also been intensely studied. In general, a comparison with someone whose abilities, performance, or attributes are superior produces more negative affect and lower self-esteem than does a comparison with someone who is inferior. This is overly simplistic, however, and several caveats to this effect

warrant consideration. First, in order to cause negative affect, a comparison domain must be important to one's self image. Abraham Tesser's (1988) self evaluation maintenance (SEM) model suggests that people want to maintain positive beliefs about themselves, and comparisons with superior others can have two different effects on self views. SEM suggests that when a comparison other outperforms the self in a domain that is *not* relevant to one's self image, the individual is not threatened and the comparison actually augments self evaluation. In such a case the individual may feel proud to be close to someone who has performed so well. Alternatively, if the comparison other outperforms the self in a domain that *is* relevant to one's self image, the individual is more likely to experience negative affect. Consequently, one option for an outperformed individual to reduce the threat of an unfavorable evaluation is to diminish the relevance of the comparison domain to his self image.

Second, Tesser's SEM model suggests that the similarity of the comparison other to the self can affect one's reaction to a comparison. Before making a social comparison, individuals often consider the relevance of the other's situation to their own. Individuals favor comparisons with others who are members of their gender and in group. This suggests that one way to avoid a negative social comparison is to alter the perceived similarity of the comparison other. By rationalizing that the comparison other is different from the self in some important way, the threat of being outperformed is reduced.

A third caveat is the perception of control that a person feels over the evaluative domain. In situations in which individuals feel a great amount of control, an upward comparison may actually lead to positive affect, as the comparison indicates that better outcomes are attainable. This is the case of cancer patients seeking companionship with patients who have recovered. If individuals feel that they have the ability to change their situation, these feelings of self efficacy are likely to increase performance; however, without the perceived ability to change the situation, a person is likely to feel helpless.

The diversity of motivations, reactions to, and characterizations of social comparison has led researchers to employ a variety of methods in their study of the topic. There are three

general methodological approaches to social comparison research (Wood 1996). The selection approach concerns what information is sought out for use in comparisons; the reaction approach focuses on the impact of provided social information; the narration approach concentrates on participants' reports about what information they use in their everyday lives.

The selection approach examines the processes involved in seeking social information. People often appear to select comparison others who are generally similar on some relevant factor, such as age or gender, though there are instances when a dissimilar other may be seen as most informative, such as when a person believes similar others may share one's own biases. As discussed earlier, an individual's motivations for making the comparison can influence selection of the comparison other. If multiple options for comparison are available, a person will strategically select a comparison other that helps reach the goal of the comparison, and might even construct a hypothetical other for comparison.

In order to study how individuals select a comparison other, researchers have employed a number of different methods. In the rank order paradigm, participants are given their relative standing (e.g., they ranked third out of seven) and are then given the opportunity to see the score associated with other ranks. Typically, participants will first ask to see the extreme scores, and then ask to see the score associated with the ranks immediately above their own. Another approach provides the opportunity for participants to examine more than just the score the comparison other achieved; for example, participants have the chance to see the actual answers that other participants gave on their tests. Researchers measure how many of the other participants' tests the participant chooses to view. A final selection research method is the affiliation paradigm, which gives participants in a stressful situation the option of affiliating with fellow participants or non participants. The choice to affiliate with other participants is seen as an interest in comparing reactions to the situation.

In addition to studying how participants select a comparison other, researchers also study how participants react to comparisons with others. In the reaction approach, social

comparison is manipulated as the independent variable, and researchers assess the effects of social information on participants. Social comparisons can affect such variables as mood, jealousy, self esteem, self evaluation, and performance. Additionally, researchers study reactions to social information that is received during the course of participants' everyday lives. In such studies, some dimension of the social environment is correlated with an outcome measure. For example, students use social comparison information such as their class ranking to shape their career goals.

The final method of study, the narrative approach, concentrates on participants' descriptions and reports of comparisons made in everyday life. Methods used include asking participants to record their comparisons in a diary, directly asking participants about comparisons they make, and observing comparisons people make spontaneously during conversations.

Given the variety of responses, methods, and measurements involved with social comparisons, it is not surprising that the topic is marked by a number of controversies. One main disagreement involves what exactly constitutes a social comparison. Traditionalists assert that only a comparison with a specific person with whom one has had personal contact qualifies as a social comparison. An opposing view proposes that personal contact is not a necessary condition, and that any social information, including information about hypothetical and fictional comparison others, qualifies as social comparison.

Another debate involves whether a comparison must change an individual's self evaluation to be rightfully considered a social comparison. Some researchers argue that a change in self evaluation is a key criterion of a true social comparison, while others contend that this prerequisite excludes many phenomena that should justifiably be included. This latter view asserts that comparisons should not be defined in terms of effect, but rather social comparison occurs any time an individual is involved in the process of thinking about social information in relation to the self, regardless of consequences.

A large portion of the social comparison research has measured the selection of information by participants, thus treating comparison as a deliberate act. The question has been raised, however, as to whether social comparison is

always intentional. Some researchers have proposed that, because people constantly face information about others, they may at times be forced to compare themselves to others, regardless of whether they desire to do so. Thus, comparisons may be encountered rather than selected. It has also been asserted that comparisons may sometimes be unconscious, suggesting that people may not be fully aware of some comparisons they make or the effects of these comparisons.

Social comparison research is also marked by controversy surrounding methodological issues. Some research methods require participants to report comparisons they make, and some researchers have questioned whether people can adequately do so. For example, people might make comparisons automatically, or may not be entirely aware of the steps taken in their comparison processes, thereby distorting self reports. Furthermore, social comparison measures may be marked by social desirability effects, as participants might not admit to making social comparisons that violate norms or have unfavorable implications. Given the diversity that characterizes the processes of social comparison and the broad expanse of topics that it implicates, the fact that research in the field is marked by a number of issues of contention comes as no surprise.

Since its inception, social comparison has affected a diverse range of areas, including equity, affiliation, and social interaction. It has been used in a variety of fields including social psychology, clinical psychology, cognitive psychology, personality psychology, and sociology. Its wide ranging application is evident in current research trends, including studies of marital and life satisfaction, and the eating behaviors and body image of adolescent girls. Researchers continue to apply social comparison theory to new topic areas, leading to an ever expanding diversity of literature in the area.

SEE ALSO: Interaction; Self; Self Esteem, Theories of; Social Psychology

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social control

Darin Weinberg

The concept of social control entered the lexicon of academic sociology in the early twentieth century. It was articulated first in the pioneering work of Edward A. Ross, and then, a short time later, by a handful of some of the most distinguished figures in the early history of American sociology, including Ernest Burgess, Charles Horton Cooley, Robert Park, and W. I. Thomas. These scholars took a rather expansive view of the matter, suggesting the study of social control covered the sum total of institutions and practices by which societies regulate themselves. Concerned as it was with the great variety of social mechanisms that maintain social order in the widest sense, the earliest sociological research on social control was sometimes difficult to distinguish from efforts to define modern society as such or to specify the proper subject matter of sociology as a whole. While this broadly encompassing view of the concept's reach has sometimes been criticized, these sociologists cannot be held solely responsible for having cast the concept so generally. For in formulating their arguments regarding the meaning and importance of the concept of social control, these early American sociologists

were responding to a much more established tradition of European social thought concerning the fundamental causes of social order in modern societies.

The conceptual problem of social order is usually traced to the English social philosopher Thomas Hobbes. Hobbes asked how individual human actors, guided by nothing but their own self interests, might cohere in the form of an orderly, law abiding society. His answer was that obedience to the law was a result of the self interested human actor coming to recognize the poor prospects of his or her own survival in a lawless world. Precisely because we possess a natural instinct toward self preservation, people produce and obey an absolute sovereign (whose sole right it is to set and enforce the law). Many have since argued that Hobbes formulated this argument in fear of the political upheaval occurring in Britain at the time he wrote and with a concern to give philosophical justification to a monarchy intent on violently subduing republican political revolt. Later social philosophers like John Locke argued, contra Hobbes, that human nature is not wholly selfish and that there is no need for the state to repress its free expression. However, as feudal Europe gave way to the industrial, American, and French revolutions it became progressively clearer to the social thinkers of the day that, quite regardless of the arguments of philosophers, the social order Hobbes defended was inevitably disintegrating. The classic sociological works of figures like Marx, Durkheim, and Weber can be understood as efforts to explain the nature of the new social order that was replacing feudalism and a specification of how this new social order cohered. Hence, for Marx, modern society cohered around what he called the capitalist mode of production; for Durkheim, it cohered due to the interdependencies introduced by a complex division of labor; for Weber, it cohered due to the emergence of large scale institutions like the bureaucratic state and modern market. For these social theorists, the orderly maintenance of complex modern societies was to be explained largely as the result of their fundamental structural properties rather than the deliberate designs of the actors who comprise them.

While Edward Ross and his American followers embraced the classic European preoccupation with the question of how social order is

maintained in complex modern societies, they distanced themselves from the structural explanations on offer from the likes of Marx, Weber, and Durkheim to posit an approach more grounded in the agency of social actors. For them, the question of social order, or social control, was a question of how modern societies might influence their members to see their own individual self interests as more or less compatible with the collective interests of their society. Hence, the question of social control was precisely the question of how modern societies might remain orderly through the rational force of persuasion, rather than the brute force or coercion condoned by Hobbes. This question became fused rather early on with questions concerning the social problems of the city in what became known as the Chicago School of urban sociology. Early Chicago School sociologists believed the traditional forms of social control found in small towns and villages broke down in the city. While they shared this premise with European theorists like Ferdinand Tönnies, they differed in their desire to keep their research firmly grounded in the empirical world. Thus, whereas Tönnies was happy to make broad generalizations regarding premodern and modern societies, proponents of the Chicago School found too much variety and nuance both in the past and the present to remain comfortable with Tönnies's famous dichotomy between *Gemeinschaft* and *Gesellschaft*. Chicago School scholar Louis Wirth, for example, called for a more precise empirical attention to three variables that he felt distinguished cities that suffered comparatively more social problems from those that suffered less: population size, density, and heterogeneity. Wirth argued that as each of these increases, the close personal relationships found in smaller communities decrease. Because urban life is comparatively anonymous, big city dwellers do not feel bound to honor each other, nor to sanction each other for breaking the law. This causes both increased social disorder and a need to delegate the work of social control to professionals in place of the self policing community found in small towns. Because they cannot be as ubiquitous, professional agents of social control cannot be as effective in maintaining social order as is fuller community participation in this effort. Similar arguments were made by W. I. Thomas in

defense of his influential theory linking what he called social disorganization, various urban social problems, and the breakdown of social control.

The early Chicago School's understanding of social control remains important to this day. However, it has been refined and rivaled by a variety of other approaches that bear discussion. In the first instance, one must note the important work done by C. Everett Hughes and his students on occupations and, more precisely, occupational socialization. Hughes departed from the emphasis early Chicago School researchers gave to the relationship between complex differentiated societies and social disorganization. Theorists like Wirth and Thomas tended to highlight the effective social controls small groups exercised over their members and the breakdown of these controls as groups grew larger. Hughes and his students noted that many of the mechanisms of social control one finds in smaller groups like families and villages were also operative in occupational groups. This insight served to introduce a higher level of empirical refinement into research concerning the non coercive social control mechanisms at work in larger social groups and usefully to blur the line between what Cooley had called primary and secondary groups.

A somewhat higher level of theoretical refinement was introduced into the study of social control by Talcott Parsons and his students. Parsons argued that large scale differentiated societies generate any number of mechanisms by which to manage the inevitable role strains and ambivalences introduced by the complexity of modern life. Parsons's structural functionalist approach maintained the early Chicago School's optimistic understanding of social control as the necessary work societies do upon themselves to sustain themselves. This line of theoretical development was radicalized considerably by ethnomethodology. Ethnomethodologists have sought to transform some of Parsons's theoretical premises regarding the regulative work that societies do upon themselves into questions for empirical inquiry. For example, in his famous "breaching experiments," Harold Garfinkel sent his students out into the world with instructions to deliberately disrupt the taken for granted meanings at work in various ordinary interactions. These experiments inaugurated

a tradition of research that has revealed just how resilient, resourceful, and creative social actors can be when called upon to manage the diverse episodes of social disorder they encounter in the conduct of their everyday lives. Ethnomethodologists have discovered a vast collection of interactional techniques by which social control is exercised in both formal and informal social settings, ranging from laboratories to family dinners. This research has effectively demonstrated that social control should not be conceptualized as a set of intermittent interventions into our everyday lives, so much as a routine, pervasive, and indispensable feature of them. While remarkably different in their respective approaches to research, the emphases of Hughes, Parsons, and ethnomethodology are aligned insofar as they each remain decidedly focused on the collectively orchestrated aspects of social control and its role in creating and maintaining consensus, equilibrium, and collaborative activity. They are not as concerned to demonstrate how social control figures in the exercise of coercion and exploitation.

Conflict theories of social control have been vehemently opposed to the claims that social control can either be defined in contrast to coercive control or that it could ever reflect the freely achieved consensus of society as a whole. In place of the idea that social groups regulate themselves in pursuit of their collective interests, conflict theorists insist that modern societies are never as integrated or as harmonious as this imagery suggests. Because subgroups within society will inevitably hold different beliefs about what kinds of things merit regulation, actual social control efforts can never reflect the beliefs of everyone. Hence, social control will always entail more powerful factions within society regulating less powerful factions, not in the collective interest but in their own self interest. Various research agendas emphasizing the coercive and self interested dimensions of social control became prominent in the 1950s and 1960s. One such agenda, broadly known as labeling theory, was popularized by sociologists like Howard Becker, Erving Goffman, and Edwin Lemert. In expounding the labeling approach, Lemert, for example, wrote that while older studies of social control had “tended to rest heavily upon the idea that

deviance leads to social control, I have come to believe that the reverse idea (i.e., social control leads to deviance) is equally tenable and the potentially richer premise for studying deviance in modern society” (Lemert 1967: ix). According to labeling theorists, it is misleading to distinguish “social disorder” or “deviance” from the particular definitions of these concepts provided by specific agents of social control. This is because the activities of agents of social control like the courts, medical clinics, mental hospitals, and police forces are very often not only *responsive* to deviance, but actually define as deviance (and as meriting social control) activities that in other societies may not be seen as deviance at all. Hence, labeling theorists have argued that activities like drug use and homosexuality come to be seen as matters deserving of social control less because of breakdowns in social order than by virtue of the definitional or “labeling” activities of what Becker dubbed “moral entrepreneurs” and other elite members of society with a stake in seeing certain activities condemned and/or curtailed. The labeling perspective also highlights the negative consequences that can flow from labeling itself. For example, the idea of “secondary deviance” was devised to signal the fact that people labeled as particular kinds of deviants may come to be socialized by agents of social control to adopt roles attendant to the labels they have received. Thus labeled as a criminal or as learning disabled, for example, people might begin to adopt dysfunctional habits associated with these labels simply by virtue of the fact they have been so labeled.

The labeling perspective tended to highlight the stake had by particular professional groups or moral entrepreneurs in defining certain behaviors as deviant and subjecting them to social controls. This rather diffuse sense of the sources of various campaigns of social control was ultimately challenged by other conflict theorists who placed greater emphasis on centralized forms of power in modern societies, like the state and/or a relatively integrated dominant class. For these theorists, social control was still more nefarious than had been suggested by labeling theorists. Social control was now seen not just to impose the moral sentiments of one faction of society upon another, but to subdue class conflict and/or to facilitate the exploitation

of the weak by the strong. Such research came in a variety of guises, but they all shared a much more sustained interest in macro structural histories of modern societies. While some researchers focused on the nostalgic yearnings of a cultural elite whose power and authority were declining in the aftermath of industrialization, most took a more orthodox Marxist view of things. According to Marxist conflict theorists, social control is best understood as a collection of measures undertaken in the interests of the dominant economic class. This can include efforts to secure their ever accumulating wealth through the use of evermore sophisticated police forces and carceral institutions; efforts to politically debilitate the working class through legislation restricting organized labor; the use of educational institutions and other approaches to disciplining the working class in order to make them at once less threatening to commerce and better suited to the labor needs of the dominant class; or efforts to diffuse the animosity and revolutionary potentials of the working class through mass cultural fare that serves to distract and pacify them and/or concessions in the form of state administered health and social welfare provisions. In short, social control is seen as a multifaceted project formulated and orchestrated by the economically powerful (or their hired minions) to ensure their retention of power and often to accumulate more.

While opposed to the reductionism evident in some Marxist analyses, the work of Michel Foucault has made immensely important contributions to our critical understanding of social control by refining our understanding of power. Marxist theorists of social control have very often been profoundly critical of the state and the multitude of other agencies through which the dominant economic class seeks to legitimate its putative stranglehold on the working class. But they have tended to preserve a distinction between the exercise of power and the exercise of knowledge. Whereas they have held that the use of power to control people is inevitably coercive, until Foucault, most Marxist theorists remained committed to the notion that the use of knowledge, or truth, to control people is non coercive. Appeals to truth are appeals to the better nature of human beings, to their faculties of reason, and their amenability to influence

through genuine persuasion rather than coercive control. According to Foucault, this conception of the relationship between power and knowledge is highly problematic because it fails to appreciate the extent to which power, when it is exercised efficiently, is seductive rather than coercive. Foucault insisted that power is not merely repressive, but eminently productive, and that evidence of its repressive tendencies must be interpreted in light of the positive goals that it has prioritized over that which it has repressed. When it is most effective, social control is impossible to distinguish from self control because those who are controlled are complicit in the control that is exercised over them and do not resist. Repression, then, ought only very rarely to be seen as an end in itself rather than a necessary cost of pursuing some putatively greater good. Moreover, power is not opposed to truth, but intimately connected to it. Foucault argued that all power is attended by a regime of truth through which its goals are formulated, and the means of achieving those goals are strategically devised and refined. This, for Foucault, was as true for science as it was for the military campaigns of powerful empires or for any other exercise of power. Finally, power and knowledge, or as Foucault wrote, power/knowledge, can be found in virtually any concrete regime of disciplined activity. In other words, the reality of power/knowledge is to be found in the endless actual practices in and for which it is summoned, consolidated, and developed. Foucault and his followers have called attention to the fusion of power and knowledge in such instances as the development of correctional facilities, formal educational institutions, the rise of professional military service, the development and rationalization of clinical expertise, public health measures, and, more broadly, the transformation of feudal courts into bureaucratic states. To highlight their role in the accomplishment of social control, Foucault referred to these various regimes as instances of what he called "governmentality," which he defined as "the conduct of conduct." For Foucault, while governmentality was certainly a form of social control exercised by governments, the scope of this concept also extended to wherever the "conduct of conduct" became an observable practice. It is something that

bosses do with employees, parents do with children, teachers do with students, and that we as individuals do with our selves – as when we diet.

Toward the end of his life, Foucault's appreciation of the extent to which we as individuals play an active, rather than passive, role in the social control that is exercised over us was increasing. Of course, he remained cognizant of the fact that we are very deeply embedded in, and affected by, historically enduring regimes of power/knowledge of which we are often scarcely aware. However, he became more interested in the fact that our lives are projects that we ourselves do, at some level, craft and steer according to our own visions of the good. While these visions are by no means uninfluenced by our sociohistorical circumstances, they do not for that cease to be our own. Moreover, the forces by which we are socially controlled are not immune to our efforts to exert some influence upon them – modest though these efforts may often be. Rather than resigning himself to the notion that our collective fates must inevitably be coerced, Foucault seemed to be moving in the direction of the early Chicago School theorists of social control, who remained cautious and critical but, nonetheless, hopeful that the regulation of society could, in principle, be accomplished democratically and compassionately rather than coercively and exploitatively. And, along with many other contemporary students of social control, he was resolutely convinced that, while necessary as such, the regulation of society is, at present, considerably more coercive and exploitative than it has to be.

SEE ALSO: Chicago School; Conflict Theory and Crime and Delinquency; Cooley, Charles Horton; Crime; Crime, Social Control Theory of; Criminal Justice System; Deviance Processing Agencies; Disciplinary Society; Ethnomethodology; Foucault, Michel; Goffman, Erving; Governmentality and Control; Labeling Theory; Lemert, Edwin M.; Marx, Karl; Marxism and Sociology; Moral Entrepreneur; Organizations as Coercive Institutions; Park, Robert E. and Burgess, Ernest W.; Police; Power, Theories of; Primary Groups; Prisons; Regulation Theory; Secondary Groups; Social Disorganization Theory; Socialization

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Social Darwinism

Bernd Weiler

Social Darwinism, a highly controversial and protean term, refers to the application of concepts and ideas to the social world which are allegedly derived from Charles Darwin's theory of evolution. Despite the fact that the so-called founding fathers of sociology tried to establish the autonomy of their discipline, the often unconscious reliance upon biological concepts and the interpretation of the social order as the outcome of a natural process were pervasive traits of late nineteenth and early twentieth century social science. The term Social Darwinism first came into usage in the late 1870s and early 1880s and is, in its classic phase, commonly – and as some would immediately object wrongly – associated with such diverse theorists as Spencer and Bagehot in Great Britain, Sumner and Fiske in the US, Gumplovicz and Ratzel in Austria, Lombroso, Ferri, and Nicoforo in Italy, Broca, Topinard,

and Lapouge in France, and Hellwald, Woltmann, Ploetz, and Ammon in Germany.

Modern historiographical debates about Social Darwinism, which date back especially to Hofstadter's seminal work *Social Darwinism in American Thought* (1944), have focused primarily on the question of the precise definition of the term and concomitantly on who should be classified as a Social Darwinist. Closely linked to this definitional issue are the methodological questions of the unit of analysis in Social Darwinism, as well as the overall significance and ideological connotations of Social Darwinism at the fin de siècle. Research has further revolved around the origins of Social Darwinism and the historical linkage between Darwinism and Social Darwinism. Finally, there remains the contentious issue whether, and in what form, the Social Darwinist tradition is still alive today.

Regarding the definitional issue of Social Darwinism, a term more often used in historiographical research than in the primary sources (Hodgson 2004), a "generalist" and a "restrictionist" approach can be analytically distinguished (Crook 1996). In the generalist definition, which corresponds more closely to the standard textbook accounts, Social Darwinism refers to the use of evolutionary, developmental, or progressivist ideas clothed in Darwinian terminology when analyzing social inequality. For the generalists, to classify somebody as a Social Darwinist it is not necessary for the person to explicitly rely upon the theory proposed by Darwin in his main works, *The Origin of Species* and *The Descent of Man* (1871). In contrast to this broad definition, the restrictionists argue that the mere rhetorical use of catchphrases and metaphors such as "struggle for existence," "natural selection," "survival of the fittest," and "adaptation" does not make a social theorist a Social Darwinist. According to the restrictionists, the label should be reserved for those turn of the century thinkers who consciously and explicitly applied the central elements of Darwin's composite theory to the analysis of social life. In this narrow understanding of the term, Spencer, the arch Social Darwinist of the generalists, is classified as a Social Lamarckist because he, like many of his contemporaries, believed in the inheritance of acquired characteristics and also because he equated, contrary to Darwin, evolution with directed progress.

Neither would the Polish born sociologist Gumpłowicz qualify as a Social Darwinist because he explicitly rejected the transference of biological concepts to the field of sociology and was also a declared adherent of Agassiz's theory of the immutability of species. One might argue, however, that by opposing the categories of Social Darwinism and Social Lamarckism, one does not capture the complex web of actual interrelationships that existed between the two currents of sociobiological thought around 1900. It also needs to be emphasized that when Social Darwinists applied the idea of natural selection to social life, they seldom defined the unit of analysis in a precise manner. Not only did the elements in the "struggle for existence" range from individuals fighting each other to rival families, ranks, classes, societies, nations, and races, but also the analysis often shifted from one unit to the next. Furthermore, the units of analysis in Social Darwinist thought vary accordingly from biological, to economic, to cultural, and to political entities.

Intimately linked with these definitional issues is the question of the overall significance and the ideological connotations of Social Darwinism as an intellectual and a policy movement around 1900. Whereas the "orthodox" historiographical school of Social Darwinism, led by Hofstadter, argued that in America Social Darwinism was the dominant intellectual current of the Gilded Age, transcending the boundaries of academia and exerting a strong influence on business and politics, the "revisionist" school, based upon a narrower definition of the term and represented especially by Bannister, claimed that the significance of Social Darwinism as an intellectual movement had been greatly exaggerated (Bannister 1988; Hawkins 1998). Furthermore, whereas the orthodox school had linked Social Darwinism to conservative and liberal ideologies, the revisionist school emphasized the ideological use made of Darwin by the collectivist oriented Left. From an ideological point of view Darwin's theory, despite emphasizing nature over nurture, has in fact proved to be quite multivalent, lending support to such diverse policy movements as liberal laissez faire economics, protectionism, restricted immigration, imperialism, Left and Right eugenics, etc.

Research on the intellectual sources of Social Darwinism and on the relationship between Darwinism and Social Darwinism has shown that key elements of Social Darwinism, such as the Malthusian idea of a “struggle for existence,” the idea of evolution, and the notion of a “survival of the fittest” (a phrase coined by Spencer several years before the publication of the *Origin*), predate Darwin’s biology. In this context it has been argued that not only is Darwin’s metaphorical language thoroughly Victorian, but also his whole theory represents – as Marx wrote to Engels in the early 1860s and Nietzsche in *The Gay Science* (1882) had already sarcastically noted – the transference of the experiences of the overcrowded, British industrial lower middle class into the realm of biology. According to this line of reasoning, Darwin’s biological theory was able to exert a considerable influence on social thought because it was social in its origin and nature. The historical context of discovery, however, does not enable us to judge the validity of Darwinism or Social Darwinism. It should also be emphasized that as Darwin’s evolutionary theory changed in the wake of the so called Modern Synthesis, the complex relationship between Darwinism and modern social analysis needs to be reconsidered and recontextualized.

Social Darwinism, a polemical label that according to Bannister had been used from the beginning to denounce one’s opponent, fell into disrepute after World War II because of its alleged connection to the ideology of National Socialism and Fascism. Reflecting upon the fact that such diverse intellectual and policy movements as the ethological work of people like Lorenz and Morris in the 1960s, Wilson’s sociobiology and Dawkins’s work on the *Selfish Gene* in the 1970s, Reaganomics and Thatcherite politics in the 1980s, Herrnstein and Murray’s *Bell Curve*, and Pinker’s evolutionary psychology in the 1990s have all been labeled or stigmatized as Social Darwinist, the ambiguity and ideological multivalence of the term still seem to prevail.

SEE ALSO: *Bell Curve, The* (Herrnstein and Murray); Biosociological Theories; Evolution; Malthus, Thomas Robert; Nature; Spencer, Herbert; Stratification and Inequality, Theories of

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social dilemmas

Jane Sell

A social dilemma is any setting in which there is a conflict between individual short term incentives and overall group incentives. Social dilemmas are pervasive and appear in all levels

of interaction, from small face to face interactions to large scale global situations. The study of social dilemmas is prominent in all of the social sciences, and investigations have involved all types of methods ranging from case studies to experiments. Common examples of social dilemmas include the provision of public goods such as public education and international treaties and the maintenance of resources such as fisheries and other ecosystems.

There are many categorizations of social dilemmas. An important distinction is between a two person (or actor) dilemma and multiperson dilemmas, termed N person dilemmas. Other distinctions relate to the timing and structure of the incentives, and the relationship between cooperation (and the reverse of cooperation, defection) and group gains.

Two statements often used to frame the issues surrounding social dilemmas are Mancur Olson's *The Logic of Collective Action* (1965) and Garret Hardin's "The Tragedy of the Commons" (1968). Olson's book concerns public goods while Hardin's article addresses common property resources. Because both types of problems have an incentive structure that pits individual against group interest, they are considered social dilemmas; however, there are social psychological differences between the public good problem, which involves "giving up" individual resources for the group good, and the resource good problem of establishing individual restraint from using the resource.

Social dilemmas are often discussed in contrast to market settings. In market settings, exchanges occur because there are different preferences (revealed by the actor's behavior by observing what she gives up to consume the good). In perfectly competitive systems, the law of demand (*ceteris paribus*, the lower the price, the higher the demand) and the law of supply (*ceteris paribus*, the higher the price, the greater the supply) interact to yield an equilibrium. In this equilibrium, a profit maximizing firm will produce the output for which price is equal to the marginal cost.

However, such market mechanisms are not present in social dilemmas. The basic reason they do not exist is that most social dilemmas are characterized by non-excludability: no member of the group can be excluded from consuming the good. Regardless of whether an

individual actor has contributed, he or she is able to use the good. So, for example, regardless of whether individuals have helped a civil rights movement, they accrue benefits from the movement's gain. Or regardless of whether a nation practices sustainable development, it benefits from other nations' adherence to sustainable practices. It is not a market phenomenon that enables the exclusion of those who have not contributed.

From the perspective of game theory, a rational choice heuristic often employed in economics, social dilemmas and the basic principle of non-excludability create a particular dominant strategy. A dominant strategy is a strategy that is the best rational, individual strategy no matter what choices other actors make. So in most social dilemmas, the dominant strategy is to consume, but not contribute. In other words, it is individually rational to "free ride" on others' contributions or sacrifices. However, if all actors are engaging in the same calculations, nobody will contribute and the good or resource will not survive. The civil rights movement will fail; sustainability will never be reached.

Given the incentive problems that are defining properties of social dilemmas, when are cooperation and solution of social dilemmas possible? We know that social dilemmas are sometimes solved. Examples include extraordinarily successful instances of the Zanjeran irrigation communities in the Philippines (first documented in 1630), cited by Ostrom (1990). On the other hand, there are many social dilemmas that have not been solved and have led to disastrous consequences. Examples include cases of genocide, and destruction of fragile ecosystems such as the Tigris-Euphrates alluvial salt marsh.

SOLUTIONS

What conditions are most likely to lead to solution of social dilemmas? Game theorists have concentrated on formal solutions that invoke mathematics involved in expected utility arguments. One very important formulation has been the folk theorem. The folk theorem (so called because it was a generally understood idea) posits a whole range of history-contingent strategies that allow for cooperation if, at some point, it is the case that an actor's cost

of contributing exceeds the cost of contribution and the discount rate is sufficiently large such that contributing remains an individually rational strategy. From this point of view, social dilemmas can be solved rationally, although it is difficult to predict exactly how. That is, the folk theorem does not rule out many possibilities.

Many solutions to social dilemmas involve changing the basic structure of the dilemma and thereby affecting incentives. Such solutions include factors such as punishment mechanisms for not cooperating (one class of which includes “trigger strategies”), and incentives for cooperating.

Individual level factors such as social motivation have been investigated and it has been demonstrated that some people, and indeed some cultures, appear more or less oriented toward cooperation (see Kopelman et al. 2002).

Other solutions to social dilemmas have focused on “social” factors, that is, factors affected by group interaction. Some of these solutions add additional costs or benefits that are social. So, for example, punishments might include the “loss of face” or shame for not cooperating. Incentives might include the acquisition of a positive reputation or honor that is bestowed upon the family. Two very powerful such factors are social identity and trust. Social identity is the sense of “we ness” that accompanies shared significant social categories that indicate some extent of common fate. Trust is a more diffuse property, which may or may not relate to social identity, but does entail a sense of predictability of others’ actions. If an actor trusts others to cooperate, and so acts on that basis, the original incentives of the social dilemma can be transformed and the dilemma solved.

Finally, there is the recognition that even if all the incentive problems associated with social dilemmas are solved, issues related to coordination remain. Clearly, coordination problems can sabotage the successful resolution of a dilemma. Ostrom (1990, 1998) details an interest in coordination by her attention to the “nested” nature of organizations or stakeholders. Communication lines among different levels of government must be clear and open. Local autonomy enables the tailoring of principles to the particular circumstances.

With such a tremendous range of interest in social dilemmas, it would seem that research accumulation would be apparent. But, it is an irony that literature on cooperation sometimes lacks cooperation. This is not a matter of obstinacy, but relates to issues of different assumptions, methods, and theories. For example, rich case study analyses are not often integrated into the formal, deductive analyses of game theory. A particularly promising suggestion for integration is the emphasis upon institutional rules and how such rules change the structure of the dilemmas and the strategies for their solution. These rules are most often used in political science, but they offer a framework by which to both conceptualize issues in a formal, mathematical sense and organize vast arrays of rich, in depth data.

SEE ALSO: Collective Action; Ecological Problems; Game Theory; Rational Choice Theories; Social Identity Theory

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social disorganization theory

Barbara D. Warner

Social disorganization theory provides an explanation of the variation in crime rates among neighborhoods. It assumes that the basis of criminal behavior lies largely within the structural and cultural conditions of the neighborhood. Socially disorganized neighborhoods are defined as those not having the capacity to regulate behaviors and activities that are inconsistent with neighborhood values. This capacity to regulate behaviors is referred to as the level of social control. Recent social disorganization theory has particularly emphasized neighborhood levels of informal social control.

Social disorganization theory was originally developed by Clifford Shaw and Henry McKay in their book *Juvenile Delinquency and Urban Areas* (1942, revised 1969). In studying the distribution of delinquency among different areas of Chicago in the early 1900s, Shaw and McKay noticed several patterns. First, delinquency rates decreased as one moved from the center of the city outward. Second, a large proportion of "neighborhoods" (square mile areas) that had high rates of delinquency in 1900 continued to have high rates 30 years later. This was particularly remarkable because many of those neighborhoods had undergone tremendous ethnic change during that time period. Further, they found that neighborhoods with high levels of delinquency also had high levels of other problems such as adult crime, truancy, tuberculosis, and infant mortality.

Their approach to understanding variations in crime rates among neighborhoods was based on an ecological model that argued that distinctive features emerged in areas as a result of

ecological differentiation arising from the growth of the city. As an end product of the process of city growth, areas within the city become differentiated in terms of physical, social, economic, and cultural conditions. Their research examined these characteristics in relation to rates of delinquency. The characteristics they found to be related to rates of delinquency were physical status (population increase or decrease), economic status (percentage of families on relief, median rental, home ownership), and population composition (percentage of foreign born and African American families). Specifically, areas with decreasing population, low economic status, and higher percentages of foreign born and African Americans were associated with higher rates of delinquency.

In explaining these relationships Shaw and McKay argued that low economic status, high levels of ethnic heterogeneity, and decreasing population led to a breakdown in the community's ability to articulate and reach shared goals. In turn, this led to weakened institutions (e.g., schools, family, and church) and therefore weakened informal social control. The inability of the community to informally control criminal behavior allowed for the development of a criminal subculture which, through cultural transmission or differential association, then led to increased rates of crime. To address these issues, Shaw and McKay argued for creating neighborhood programs carried out by local residents that would strengthen and unify the constructive aspects of community life.

From the 1940s through the 1960s there were several empirical tests of social disorganization theory that were, at least in part, supportive of the theory. However, there was also a growing recognition of problems in empirically testing social disorganization theory. These problems included the fact that studies examining social disorganization theory used official measures of crime (such as court records or arrest rates), and official measures of crime were argued to be biased in a way that would be consistent with the theory. For example, police may be more likely to make arrests in poor or ethnically diverse neighborhoods than they would in middle class or all white neighborhoods, leading to the appearance of higher rates of crime in the poorer or ethnically diverse neighborhoods. Hence, arrest rates were argued

to be more likely to be reflective of police behavior than actual levels of crime. Second, it became increasingly clear that the main theoretical concept, social disorganization, was not measured separately from crime rates. Therefore, the main concept in the theory was not really being examined. Empirical tests only measured the extent to which measures of poverty, ethnic diversity, and residential mobility were related to crime, not whether the process or mechanism through which these factors were related was social disorganization.

Not until the 1980s was there systematic progress in addressing these issues. Arguably the most important study in the revitalization of social disorganization theory at the end of the twentieth century was one done by Sampson and Groves (1989). Previous to this study the intervening process of social disorganization that is hypothesized to link the community characteristics of poverty, residential mobility, and racial/ethnic heterogeneity to crime rates had not been empirically examined with a sufficiently large sample of neighborhoods to allow for reliable aggregate level multivariate analysis. Using data from the British crime survey, Sampson and Groves conceptualize social disorganization as the inability to bring about informal social control due to weak informal (kinship and friendship networks) and formal (organizational) associational ties. In this study they examine measures of social disorganization distinct from crime measures and use an unofficial measure of crime rates – specifically, victimization rates. The results of this study showed that low levels of both friendship networks and organizational participation, as well as the inability to supervise youth peer groups, were significantly related to rates of crime. Further, these intervening measures of social disorganization mediated much of the effect of the community structural characteristics (socioeconomic status, residential mobility, ethnic heterogeneity, and family disruption) on crime rates. This focus on friendship networks and associational ties as the basis for informal social control became known as the systemic model of social disorganization theory.

Since this time the concept of social disorganization has continued to be a fertile area of research, focusing on the differential capacity of communities to carry out informal social

control, the different mechanisms of informal social control, and the different neighborhood structures that make informal social control possible. Some researchers have examined the structure and nature of friendship networks within neighborhoods as a necessary foundation for informal social control. Others have focused directly on levels of informal social control as defined by neighbors' willingness to intervene in inappropriate neighborhood behavior, or neighbors' levels of surveillance and guardianship within the neighborhood. Still other research has examined the impact of the absence of institutional resources, such as recreational facilities, or the presence of negative institutions, such as drinking establishments, on the ability of neighborhoods to exercise social control. More recently, Sampson et al. (1997) have developed a broader concept that combines the level of mutual trust among neighbors and their willingness to intervene as the mechanism necessary to bring about lower crime rates. They refer to this as collective efficacy.

While research within the systemic model has mainly focused on ties *within* the neighborhood, other researchers have addressed ties to external groups or institutions. The systemic perspective on neighborhoods views neighborhood structure as being comprised of private, parochial, and public ties. Private ties refer to intimate or kinship relationships. Parochial ties refer to friendship ties that are less intimate than private ties. These may be neighbors who participate in local organizations together or who occasionally discuss neighborhood or other issues. Both private and parochial ties refer to networks within the neighborhood. Ties within neighborhoods are viewed as essential for transmitting both expectations regarding appropriate behavior and informal sanctions when norms are violated. Public ties refer to linkages to persons, groups, or organizations, such as the police or other municipal organizations, external to the neighborhood, that can be activated to secure resources or services that affect the community's regulatory capacity. Public ties have been viewed as important mechanisms for neighborhoods to use to influence political decisions that may negatively impact on the community. For example, disadvantaged neighborhoods may be chosen for the placement of a variety of programs, such as drug treatment programs, needle

exchanges, community correction facilities, or new public housing projects that may be viewed as having the potential to further destabilize the community. To the extent that neighborhoods are able to cultivate ties with public and private agencies or groups outside of their neighborhood, they may be better able to ward off decisions such as these, as well as acquire resources to remove abandoned or condemned buildings, clean up litter strewn recreational areas, and remove prostitution hot spots or drug dealers. A study by Velez in *Criminology* (2001) finds public ties to decrease victimization, and further, that this relationship is most pronounced in disadvantaged neighborhoods.

Most of the current research examining social disorganization theory has focused on the structural aspects of social disorganization discussed above, and little attention has been paid to the cultural issues. However, with a growing number of ethnographic studies pointing to characteristics of oppositional or "street" culture in high crime inner city neighborhoods (e.g., Anderson 1999), more attention is turning to the potential role of neighborhood culture in a social disorganization model. In Shaw and McKay's original social disorganization model, culture had a prominent role. Shaw and McKay recognized the role of culture in terms of the variability among neighborhoods in the presence of delinquency values. Neighborhoods in which delinquent values were present provided conflicting value systems for youth and were viewed as an important motivation for criminal behavior. However, Kornhauser (1978) argued convincingly that such a cultural deviance model was inconsistent with the overall assumptions of a social control model of social disorganization theory. Nonetheless, Kornhauser did suggest that while the content of values did not vary across neighborhoods, the *strength* of those values within communities did vary. She referred to this as the attenuation of cultural values. This idea of attenuated culture has recently been examined by Warner (2003). Findings from this study suggest that neighborhood social ties increase cultural strength and cultural strength increases informal social control.

The availability of statistical packages that allow researchers to analyze multilevel and causal models has further enhanced the development of social disorganization theory. Because

social disorganization theory argues that the roots of crime are within the neighborhood context itself and not simply the result of the types of individuals that comprise the neighborhood, multilevel models allowing for the examination of both aggregate and individual level effects have become important tools in contemporary examinations of social disorganization theory. Similarly, because there are several posited processes through which community characteristics such as poverty, residential mobility, and ethnic heterogeneity affect crime rates, explicitly modeling the causal process, using structural equation models, has become important.

Community level studies of crime based in social disorganization theory are continuing to produce new insight into the causes and solutions to both property and violent crime. One of the biggest puzzles remaining from a social disorganization perspective is why neighborhood poverty or disadvantage continues to directly influence crime rates. While some of the effect of disadvantage is mediated by measures of social disorganization, most research also finds that a significant direct effect of disadvantage on crime remains. This finding suggests that there may be other neighborhood processes influencing crime rates that are not yet completely understood or effectively measured.

SEE ALSO: Collective Efficacy and Crime; Crime, Broken Windows Theory of; Crime, Hot Spots; Juvenile Delinquency; Social Control; Subcultures, Deviant; Urban Ecology

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social distance

Joyce E. Williams

Use of the concept of social distance dates back to Georg Simmel's discussion of the stranger in his *Soziologie* (1923). According to Simmel, the stranger represents the union of newness and remoteness as he moves out of one social circle and strives for acceptance in another. Robert Park (1924) popularized the concept of social distance as the grades and degrees of understanding and intimacy that characterize personal and social relations. Social distance is based on social norms that differentiate individuals and groups on the basis of race/ethnicity, age, sex, social class, religion, and nationality. The greater the social distance between individuals and groups, the less they influence each other.

It was Emory Bogardus (1925) who operationalized and measured social distance by first asking over 200 participants their willingness to admit members of 39 different racial and ethnic groups to the following: close kinship by marriage, as fellow club members, as neighbors, as workers in their same occupation, to citizenship in their country, as visitors only to their country, and as persons to be excluded from their country. The Bogardus Social Distance Scale is largely synonymous with the concept today. The scale is unidimensional and cumulative, assuming that at the highest level of acceptance the respondent would admit members of the designated group to all steps below that level. Although social scientists have applied variations of the social distance scale to social classes, and religious, occupational, and other groups for over three quarters of a century, it has proved a reliable measure of the

level of acceptance of one racial/ethnic group by another (Schaefer 2004). There is, however, some question as to whether it measures group status or social intimacy.

According to Bogardus, social nearness originates in favorable experiences and farness in unfavorable experiences. There is, of course, circularity in this logic: acceptance of members of another group is likely because of favorable experiences that are more likely to originate in social nearness as opposed to social farness. The concept of social distance subsumes individual characteristics in the characteristics of their group. Social nearness or farness originates with either a lack of knowledge, resulting in prejudice, about the group in question, or with knowledge that the group differs from your own in some identifiable way, such as appearance, beliefs, or behaviors. Both ignorance of a group or knowledge of their differences holds the potential for social conflict. Poole (1927) was the first to distinguish between social distance and personal distance, thereby offering an explanation of how individuals become "exceptions" to their groups. Social distance is dictated by social norms. Personal distance as in acquaintances, friendships, and love, on the other hand, is limited only by the possibilities of association between individuals or individuals and groups. While social or personal distance may not explain conflict, both can account for misunderstandings and ignorance that give rise to interpersonal and intergroup conflicts as well as social problems.

SEE ALSO: Groups; Prejudice; Race; Race and Ethnic Consciousness; Race (Racism); Simmel, Georg; Stranger, The

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social embeddedness of economic action

Enzo Mingione and Simone Ghezzi

The concept of embeddedness expresses the notion that social actors exist within relational, institutional, and cultural contexts and cannot be seen as atomized decision makers maximizing their own utilities. Embeddedness approaches prioritize the different conditions within which social action takes place. They challenge the utilitarian, “undersocialized,” neoclassical position, and the functional “oversocialized” position (where social conditions exist a priori to behaviors). The concept of embeddedness is based on several assumptions about society: the actor is not an atomized individual; immediate utility cannot explain the full meaning of social relations; logics underlying the formation of institutions and their norms of behavior cannot be removed from the contexts of social interaction within which these institutions exist; convergent trends of transformation result in diverse processes of adaptation, which evolve from specific social, cultural, and cognitive configurations.

These assumptions are present in Weberian approaches (methodological individualism) and become criteria for the ideal type reconstruction of the meaning of individual action. They are also present in structural approaches concerned with the dynamics of logics governing social behavior.

The concept of embeddedness that followed from the work of Polanyi (1944, 1957) was revisited by Mark Granovetter (1985) and has ever since been at the center of the theoretical and methodological debates within the so called “new economic sociology” (Swedberg 1997, 2003). At the core of this approach a number of important contributions illustrate the importance of social networks, social capital, the

diversity of cultural and cognitive elements, and the social construction of markets (Burt 1992; Nee & Ingram 1998; Zelizer 1988, 1994).

DURKHEIM'S CONTRIBUTION: SOCIAL TIES, INSTITUTIONS, SOCIALIZATION

Even though it was Polanyi who introduced the term embeddedness, tools for analyzing the contextual diversity of social action were already present in classic works, especially those of Durkheim and Weber. The former theorizes the relevance of social ties and socialization processes; the latter brings into relief the tensions characterizing the processes of rationalization. Both conceive of the actor not as a utilitarian and atomized *homo oeconomicus*, but as a subject inserted in diversified networks and institutional contexts, the very subject matter of sociological analysis.

For Durkheim, the advent of modern industrial society is accompanied by a profound transformation in the ties that characterize social life. The increasing and more complex division of labor, industrialization, and urbanization progressively weakens ties of mechanical solidarity that regulate cooperation in the small and stable communities typical of the pre industrial era. Durkheim opposes the idea that ties in modern society are the inevitable outcome of fragmented and diversified self interests. The mechanical interplay of interests leads to conflict and anomie, to the breakup of society, and to the loss of opportunities for cooperation. Organic solidarity is therefore a relation of cooperation socially built upon an institutional process regulated by norms and rules within which the modern nation state and labor organizations play a key role. This perspective may lead to an oversocialized position, but at the same time it may provide insights into the way in which social ties generate the institutional regulation of behaviors characteristic of different situations of embeddedness. Durkheim's contribution, to view socialization processes as a matrix of the different conditions of embeddedness, stems from this latter direction. Rules regulating social interaction are transmitted through learning, which takes place in situations of persistent diversity and ongoing change. Such situations determine not only new economic and

technological opportunities, and consequently new regulative necessities, but also allow for different levels of individual freedom to next generation cohorts.

MAX WEBER: PROCESS OF RATIONALIZATION AS A MATRIX OF DIVERSITY

To Weber, the interpretation of modern society relies on two linchpins: the notion of methodological individualism based on the motives of individual action; and the idea that modernity is characterized by complex processes of rationalization, which points to the increasing importance of rational action. Weber does not assume that social action is performed by atomized individuals maximizing utility, but rather by persons influenced by their social networks, specific habits and traditions, by shared values and culture. The diversity of social contexts produces substantial variations in “the interest of the actors as themselves are aware of them” (Weber 1978: 30). It is from this concern with diversity that Weber’s contribution to the notion of embeddedness can be drawn.

Weber singled out two different forms of social interaction affecting social behavior in different ways: one form comes into being when two or more actors are related by a shared sense of membership in a delimited social group (the community); the second arises when actors share common interests (the association). Rationalization does not entail the extinction of community ties (*Vergemeinschaftung*), but it sets off an ongoing transformation of these same ties which inevitably cause tensions with associative relations (*Vergesellschaftung*). In particular, the pervasiveness of instrumental rationality is at odds with traditional habits. Change, therefore, does not lead to a uniform process of utilitarian individualism, but is the effect of variable forms of adaptation. Such forms constitute the main basis upon which the notion of embeddedness can be closely examined.

Weber’s second major contribution regards the tensions present within rationalization processes, particularly between formal rationality and substantive rationality. The former pertains to market exchange and immediate utility, the latter may be seen as the foundation of

redistributive logics. While rational behavior emerges from the tense interplay of these two forms of rationality, values determine the need for institutional regulation, the priority of the public good over the individual’s immediate benefit.

“Formal and substantive rationality, no matter by what standard the latter is measured, are always in principle separate things, no matter that in many (and under certain very artificial assumptions even in all) cases they may coincide empirically” (Weber 1978: 108). Here, Weber indicates an important tool to empirically analyze the diversity present in the processes of social construction of regulative institutions.

The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism may be read as a pioneering work on sociocultural embeddedness. Weber notes how typical capitalist behavior – profit orientation and emphasis on the importance of professional *beruf* (calling) – can only develop and extend in favorable cultural contexts fashioned by the Protestant ethic. Therefore, he reaffirms the idea that *homo oeconomicus* is not an atomized individual removed from his or her own cultural context, but rather that different sociocultural configurations (familial, ethnic, local, and religious conditions in which any individual is socialized) keep a decisive influence in orienting his or her social behavior.

POLANYI: PROCESS OF DISEMBEDDEDNESS AND REEMBEDDEDNESS

Polanyi argues that the diffusion of market based relations is a socially disruptive process. The notion of embeddedness may thus be used to understand the logics underlying the formation and transformation of social institutions in contexts of market exchange. In market relations immediate self interest prevails over other relationships, causing diversified processes of disembeddedness – as economic relations bring about social disruption – and concomitant processes of reembeddedness (i.e., new forms of regulation).

Polanyi’s historical approach in *The Great Transformation* (1944) denounces the disruptive effects of *laissez faire* and emphasizes how serious tensions run through modern society.

Countermeasures (i.e., new regulative institutions) are established to keep at bay the negative impact of the diffusion of market relations. In particular, needs for new regulative principles occur in relation to the fictitious commodities – labor, land, and money – which are organized in self-regulating markets. For this very reason they are incompatible with social life and yet “essential to a market economy” (p. 73). It follows that capitalist societies, built upon commodification processes, are characterized by a double movement of disembeddedness and reembeddedness (the necessity to produce new social regulation in the markets of fictitious commodities). *The Great Transformation* does not contain a theoretical/methodological model to carry out sociological analysis on the various manifestations of embeddedness. Polanyi (1957), however, does outline a procedure employing the conceptual tools of anthropology, which is subsequently used to develop a sociological theory of embeddedness.

Polanyi identifies three types of exchange relations: reciprocity, redistribution, and market exchange. Reciprocal and redistributive exchanges are meaningful only in so much as they are conceived of as part of the social order. They express two diverse logics of social organization comprised of specific meanings and contents in different cultural and historical settings. The logic of reciprocity is built upon the collective interests of small groups with strong and close ties, defined as community relationships in sociological terms. In this form of exchange, rules favoring the reproduction of the social group prevail over the immediate self-interest of the individual. By contrast, the logic of redistribution stems from membership in a wider community and its internal power relations. In this setting of stable, hierarchically organized, and politically legitimated social relations resources are extracted from some individuals to benefit others.

At an abstract level market exchange is not compatible with society – the efficiency of competitive behavior occurs among atomized actors who are not enmeshed in social relations – and therefore appears to be guided by a universal logic devoid of social substance. Reciprocity and redistribution are viewed as embedded, while the market is disembedded. The problem of embeddedness in modern society is to explain

how it is possible to reconcile a growing number of market based interactions with social order. If at the abstract level it is possible to hypothesize an interactive phenomenon which exists outside of any form of social organization, in reality systematic market exchanges cannot take place outside a favorable social context.

According to Polanyi the three different logics of exchange – present always in different combinations – provide society with needed institutions, and therefore with the various configurations of embeddedness. The disembeddedness resulting from increasing individualism constitutes the driving force in ongoing transformations affecting all social institutions: those founded on reciprocity (i.e., household, kinship), those based on redistributive principles (such as the expansion of welfare programs), and those which make the markets of fictitious commodities more compatible with society. The outcomes of this process vary according to the dynamic interaction at work in different historical, cultural, and cognitive contexts.

The notion of tensions singled out by Weber and Polanyi makes it more difficult to implement interpretive parameters, yet sociology should not retreat from such a challenge. The construction of institutions governing modern societies is understood as a contextual double movement – much more difficult to construe in terms of utility and immediate functionality. The disruption of sociality caused by growing individualism and the concomitant reconstruction of social ties to limit individualism itself explains the chronically unstable equilibrium of modern society.

SOCIAL CONSTRUCTION OF DIFFERENCES: INNOVATION AND PATH DEPENDENCY

The approaches based on embeddedness show how it is possible to interpret market based societies without employing the reductive and asocial parameter of utilitarianism. It is true that utilitarian logics provide the easiest access to the atomized dimension of the individual, but these are socially meaningless because utilitarian behavior cannot occur without the concurrent presence of institutions, norms, and culture in society. Polanyi's critique of the

self regulating market, and Weber's idea of permanent tensions between formal rationality and tradition, and between formal and substantive rationality, stress this precisely.

In conclusion, an example regarding labor regulation serves to clarify embeddedness approaches. The market sets wages based on the competitive relation between the supply of the workforce and the demand of the employers within a logic of labor productivity. However, linking wages to productivity presents insurmountable difficulties when considering workers' social life. Their needs change because their life cycle and material condition change as well. For example, a working couple with small children inevitably goes through a concomitant decrease in productivity and an increase in social needs. Resorting to market self regulation is not an effective solution: if the employer were to provide parental leave as well as a wage increase to the new parents, the company's competitiveness would be compromised and its future threatened. As a response to this problem, changes have occurred within the household through the devising of new strategies of adaptation; in addition, new forms of social protection have been introduced, such as the state regulation of parental leaves and childcare services.

The market, constrained by its own logic of competitiveness, cannot solve the labor disputes that are generated within it. Such disputes are being dealt with by the arrangement of adapting mechanisms, based on cooperative logics among which we may single out reciprocity (the family) and redistribution (the welfare state). The market enters the process of reembeddedness by mobilizing logics that allow for the stability of cooperation (consider the establishment of day care programs provided by firms).

The process of adaptation changes across societies, even though they undergo similar pressures and economic trends. One of the steps suggested here to highlight the different conditions of embeddedness is path dependency analysis, that is, a historical selective process within which some embedded conditions are transformed into specific configurations of development.

Returning to the previous childcare example – as Esping Andersen (1990) shows in his analysis of the different worlds of welfare

capitalism – along different historical routes some social contexts develop a greater number of universal public services, whereas others give more importance to the private sector, and others more often resort to family care and to social network solidarity. Cultural and social diversity may be a source of social action or its very limitation. Adaptation continues to modify the various starting conditions through paths where choices and opportunities are given neither by individual utility nor by predetermined social institutions.

Path dependency suggests the historicized dimension of social analysis. The translation of such a historical dimension into research procedures is quite complex, yet essential. If the actor is not viewed as an atomized individual, he or she must therefore be located into different social, cultural, and cognitive contexts, which are the outcome of diversified historical processes of chance, innovation, and adaptation.

SEE ALSO: Community and Economy; Durkheim, Émile; Markets; Polanyi, Karl; Rational Choice Theory (and Economic Sociology); Weber, Max

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social epidemiology

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Social epidemiology lies at the intersection between the traditionally biomedical field of epidemiology, which is concerned with understanding the distribution, spread, and determinants of disease in populations, and the parts of sociology and other social sciences concerned with understanding the role of social factors, forces, and processes in the epidemiology of health and illness of individuals and populations (Syme 2001). As a field, social epidemiology has been largely created over the past half century by the combined efforts of persons trained in sociology and related social sciences to study the nature, etiology, and course of physical and mental health and illness in human populations. In some cases, they ended up more as epidemiologists than sociologists (e.g., Leonard Syme and Saxon Graham). There were also a number of pioneering physician epidemiologists, mostly from England and the British Commonwealth (e.g., John Cassel, Michael Marmot, and Mervyn Susser) who recognized the importance of incorporating psychosocial factors into the epidemiology of human health and illness.

The result has been the development and growth of a major new and vibrant interdisciplinary field and the transformation of scientific and popular understanding of the nature of determinants of physical health and illness. From a hegemonic paradigm that, for about a

century through the 1950s, viewed physical health as largely a function of biomedical factors, physical health and illness are now understood by both scientists and lay persons as equally or more a function of social, psychological, and behavioral factors. Early understanding (e.g., Freudian) of mental health and illness as being as much or more psychosocial as biomedical in nature, contributed importantly to the development of the social epidemiology of physical health and illness. Mental health epidemiology and treatment, in contrast, have headed in a more biological direction.

The 1950s have been aptly described as the high water mark of the medical profession's dominance of the health care system and the preeminence of the biomedical paradigm of physical health and illness which had developed out of the great discoveries in bacteriology of the nineteenth century (Mishler 1981). Faith in biomedical science and practice was fueled by a sense of triumph in the development of vaccines, antibiotics, and other prophylactic agents, from antiseptics to pesticides to prevent or treat, and even virtually eradicate, many forms of previously fatal or highly debilitating infectious diseases, capped by the dramatic conquest of polio in the 1950s.

Even then, however, this biomedical dominance was already being challenged by several developments. First, as the prevalence and impact of infectious diseases waned, chronic diseases such as cardiovascular disease and cancer increased to "epidemic" proportions, virtually halting, from the mid 1950s to the early 1970s, the long term increase in life expectancy in Western Europe and the US that had continued almost unabated since the eighteenth century. In contrast to most infectious diseases, the newly epidemic chronic diseases were produced by the interplay of multiple contingent "risk factors," no one of which was generally either necessary or sufficient to produce disease (House 2002). Initially, these risk factors were biomedical in nature (i.e., blood pressure, cholesterol), but they soon became environmental, behavioral, and psychosocial in nature.

Using methods similar to those used to identify biomedical risk factors, most notably the prospective cohort study, first health behaviors and lifestyles (from smoking to immoderate consumption of food and alcohol to lack of

physical activity), then the Type A or coronary prone behavior pattern, and then a broad range of psychosocial factors – social relationships and supports, acute (or life event) and chronic stress, and psychological disposition, such as control/mastery/self efficacy and anger/hostility – were shown to be consequential risk factors for morbidity and mortality from a wide range of causes (House 2002). Just over 40 years ago cigarette smoking was identified, on the basis of prospective epidemiological studies and laboratory research on animals, as a major risk factor for cancers of the lung and other sites, as well as for cardiovascular disease (DHEW 1964). Within 20 more years, Berkman and Breslow's (1983) analyses of the Alameda County Study, which Breslow had initiated in the early 1960s, combined with other research to expand the list of behavioral risk factors for health to include not only smoking, but also low levels of physical activity and immoderate levels of drinking alcoholic beverages and of food consumption/weight. The Alameda County Study also produced the first modern epidemiological evidence that lack of social relationships and support could be as risky as a cause of mortality as cigarette smoking, a finding repeatedly confirmed and generalized over the last two decades (House et al. 1988; Berkman and Glass 2000).

In the seminal decades of the 1960s through the 1980s, the identification by Friedman and Rosenman (1974) of the Type A behavior pattern and its certification by the National Heart, Lung, and Blood Institute (Review Panel 1981) as a risk factor for coronary artery disease like smoking, high blood pressure, and cholesterol, was of major importance in legitimating social epidemiology in NIH and the broader biomedical arena. Subsequently, dispositional anger and hostility have been identified as the key toxic ingredient of the broader Type A pattern (Smith 2001), and has joined a number of other psychological dispositions such as self efficacy/mastery/control, optimism/pessimism, and depressive affect as potential consequential risk factors (House 2002).

Parallel to these developments in psychosocial risk factor epidemiology were two others that reinforced the importance of psychosocial factors, and hence social epidemiology, in understanding patterns of individual and especially population health. McKeown (1976) initiated a

field of research showing that even the dramatic reduction in infectious diseases and consequent increases in life expectancy of the mid eighteenth to early twentieth centuries occurred prior to, and hence could not be due to, the development of the germ theory of disease or its application in preventive vaccination or pharmacologic therapy. Rather, the bulk of the dramatic growth in human population and life expectancy over the period was attributable to broad patterns of economic development and attendant improvements in public health, nutrition, clothing, housing, and sanitation (Bengtsson 2001). Finally, the development of stress and adaptation theory in physiology (e.g., Cannon and Selye), psychology (e.g., Lazarus), and sociology and related social sciences (e.g., Levine and Scotch), along with subsequent developments in psychoneuroimmunology, provided explanations of how psychosocial risk factors got "under the skin" to cause physical illness and even death (House 2002; Taylor et al. 1997).

By the late 1980s, social epidemiology was increasingly well established within and between the biomedical and social sciences, focusing increasingly on uncovering new psychosocial risk factors and showing how interventions could be used to modify these risk factors and hence improve health. But social epidemiology and psychosocial risk factors to health also came increasingly to share in the problems of biomedical and environmental risk factors epidemiology: tendencies to proliferate disparate and scattered risk factors, each with small to modest effects and often a limited or disputable evidentiary base.

Over the last two decades, psychosocial risk factor epidemiology has come to be overshadowed and also positively transformed by a reemergent social epidemiology of socioeconomic and racial/ethnic disparities in health. The Black Report in England startled many in the early 1980s by showing that despite the operation of the National Health Service for a quarter of a century, occupational class difference in mortality and life expectancy had not diminished and had perhaps even increased in England and Wales between the late 1940s and mid 1970s (Black et al. 1982). This finding stimulated similar research and findings and a broader rediscovery of the strength and

persistence of socioeconomic and also racial/ethnic disparities in health in the US, UK, and many other developed and developing countries.

These disparities generally outstripped those due to any single or small set of risk factors, reflecting the powerful tendency for the more health damaging aspects or levels of almost any social, psychological, behavioral, and even biomedical risk factor to be more prevalent among disadvantaged socioeconomic and racial groups, even as the major disease threats to health and risk factors for them varied over historical time and social space. Socioeconomic and racial/ethnic health disparities prior to the mid twentieth century were largely a product of differential exposure and susceptibility to infectious disease due to poorer nutrition, clothing, housing, sanitation, and other conditions of life and work. But as chronic diseases supplanted infectious diseases as the leading causes of morbidity and mortality by the later twentieth century, socioeconomic and racial/ethnic disparities in health came to be a function of differential experience of and exposure to these diseases and their risk factors. Indeed, over the course of the twentieth century, the increasingly leading cause of death – cardiovascular disease – and the major risk factor for it as well as cancer – cigarette smoking – went from being more prevalent and incident in the advantaged socioeconomic and racial/ethnic groups in the early twentieth century to being more incident and prevalent in less advantaged socioeconomic and racial/ethnic groups by the end of the century. Thus, socioeconomic and racial/ethnic stratification appear to operate as a fundamental cause or determinant of health via their influence on the experience of and exposure to virtually any and all risk factors for health in the past, present, or future (Link & Phelan 1995; House & Williams 2001).

In the first decade of the twenty first century, understanding and hence alleviating socioeconomic and racial disparities in health has been identified as one of the (arguably *the*) most important goals for public health policy and research, and the most promising avenue for achieving continued improvement in overall population health (DHHS 2000). The most advantaged portions of the human population, both within and across societies, are increasingly

approaching the biological limits of life expectancy and health, or what James Fries has termed the “compression” of mortality and morbidity against the biological limits of the human life span. Hence, the greatest opportunities for improving population health lie in bringing the health of the broad lower range of the population in terms of socioeconomic position and race/ethnicity increasingly closer to the biological optimum that the more advantaged are already starting to realize. In the case of the US, reducing socioeconomic and racial/ethnic disparities in health is also the necessary route to reversing the nation’s declining relative position in the world in terms of population health indicators such as life expectancy and infant mortality.

Understanding the processes and mechanisms that generate socioeconomic and racial/ethnic health disparities and social and economic policy, as much or more than health policy, will be central to alleviating such disparities. The increased focus on such disparities is also essential to developing a more integrative causal theory of the determinants and consequences of psychosocial risk factors for health. Major challenges at this point, both theoretically and methodologically, are (1) to better understand the causal priorities and interconnections of socioeconomic position (SEP), race/ethnicity, and other major sociodemographic factors such as gender and age, with respect to each other and to health (e.g., how much of the cause flow is from SEP to health or vice versa, or how much of racial/ethnic and differences in health are a function of differences of SEP); (2) to delineate the social, psychological, behavioral, and biomedical processes and pathways linking SEP and race/ethnicity (and also gender and age) to health; and (3) understanding how all these factors and processes are influenced by broader social contexts, forces, and policies. Multilevel, life course, longitudinal studies and methods will be central to all of these goals.

Thus, only a half century from its inception, social epidemiology has become increasingly central to broader health research and policy. All of this represents in many ways merely a reaffirmation, though on a much firmer conceptual, theoretical, and empirical base, of Rudolf Virchow’s mid nineteenth century insight that “Medicine is a social science, and politics

nothing but medicine on a grand scale.” Social epidemiological research and theory have come a long way since Virchow, and even from their more modern roots in the mid twentieth century. They will be essential to twenty first century efforts toward understanding and improving individual and population health and reducing social disparities in health.

SEE ALSO: Biosociological Theories; Disease, Social Causation; Health and Social Class; Mental Disorder

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social epistemology

Steve Fuller

Social epistemology uses the resources of history and the social sciences to address normative questions surrounding the organization of knowledge processes and products. It seeks to provide guidance on how and what we should know on the basis of how and what we actually know. The subject matter corresponds to what John Dewey called “the conduct of inquiry” and what may appear today as an abstract form of science policy. Social epistemology advances beyond other theories of knowledge by taking seriously that knowledge is produced by agents who are not merely individually embodied but

also collectively embedded in certain specifiable relationships that extend over large chunks of space and time.

The need for social epistemology is captured by an interdisciplinary gap between philosophy and sociology: philosophical theories of knowledge have tended to stress normative approaches without considering their empirical realizability or political consequences. Sociological theories suffer the reverse problem of capturing the empirical and ideological character of knowledge, but typically without offering guidance on how knowledge policy should be conducted; hence the debilitating sense of “relativism” traditionally associated with the sociology of knowledge. Social epistemology aims to consolidate the strengths and eliminate the weaknesses of these two approaches.

The phrase “social epistemology” was coined in the 1960s by the US library scientist Jesse Shera to name a field concerned with the “architecture of knowledge” in both its theoretical and practical senses, ranging from the organization of the sciences to the design of libraries and information retrieval systems. By the 1970s, in response to academia’s complicity in the emergence of the “military industrial complex,” social epistemology was traveling under the banner of “critical science” (Ravetz 1971).

However, 1987 marks the introduction of the phrase into philosophy, as the title of a special issue of the revamped logical positivist journal *Synthese*, and the start of the first journal in the field, founded by Steve Fuller. That Anglo American analytic philosophy – rather than a continental European school – formally introduced “social epistemology” is telling. Accounts of knowledge in the European traditions already presupposed a social dimension, which would have made “social epistemology” superfluous. From the nineteenth century onward, epistemologies descended from French positivism and German idealism have consistently stressed the systematic and collective character of knowledge. In contrast, Anglo American philosophy has remained wedded to the individual – be it Cartesian or Darwinian – as the paradigm case of the knower. In this context, “social epistemology” is explicitly designed to redress the balance.

Social epistemologies may be compared in terms of the presumptive answers they provide to the following research questions:

- Are the norms of inquiry autonomous from the norms governing the rest of society?
- Is there anything more to a “form of inquiry” than the manner in which inquirers are arranged?
- Do truth and the other normative aims of science remain unchanged as particular forms of inquiry come and go?
- Is there anything more to “the problem of knowledge” than a matter of *whose* actions are licensed on the basis of *which* claims made under *what* circumstances?
- Is the social character of knowledge reducible to the aggregated beliefs of some group of individuals?
- Is social epistemology’s purview limited to the identification of mechanisms and institutions that meet conceptually satisfying definitions of knowledge?

Social epistemologists inclined toward positive answers to these questions remain close to the Cartesian starting point of classical epistemology, which focuses on the individual’s orientation to the truth. They rely sparingly on historical and social scientific findings, unless these are reasonably seen as part of the individual’s stock of common knowledge, which is sometimes dignified as “folk epistemology” (e.g., Kitcher 1993; Goldman 1999). In contrast, social epistemologists inclined toward negative answers are more open to interdisciplinary and empirical approaches, often with the intention of making individuals sufficiently aware of the social context of their knowledge production that they revise their modes of inquiry altogether. An example would be to take to heart science’s historic claim to universality by treating greater race, class, and/or gender inclusiveness in the community of inquirers as itself indicative of greater objectivity (Longino 1990; Harding 1991).

As the last example suggests, social epistemology does not deny the desirability of at least some of the classical ideals of epistemology. However, these ideals remain empty words without some clear strategy for overcoming the obstacles that block their successful institutionalization. Nowadays this sociological problem is perhaps most acute with respect to the autonomy of inquiry, given the openness of universities to extramural forces. Here social

epistemology, under the influence of analytic philosophy, rightly upholds positivist strictures about the need to operationalize, proceduralize, and standardize key concepts that might otherwise have no clear meaning whatsoever.

SEE ALSO: Epistemology; Feminism and Science, Feminist Epistemology; Knowledge, Sociology of

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social exchange theory

Michael J. Lovaglia

Social exchange theory is an influential approach to the study of society, generating much recent research. Rather than a theory that explains precisely the nature of some social phenomenon, social exchange theory is an orienting strategy or perspective that shapes the way exchange researchers develop theories and conduct research (social conflict theory is another example of an orienting strategy). From the perspective of social exchange theory, society can be characterized as an exchange system in which social interaction consists of trade in valued resources. Resources exchanged can include any combination of consumable goods,

money, affection, attention, and perhaps most basically, information.

Early work that established the importance of exchange for developing social structure came from cultural anthropology that investigated patterns of exchange and gift rituals in tribal societies. The prototypical example is Bronislaw Malinowski's 1922 ethnography *Argonauts of the Western Pacific*, which documented a circular pattern of exchange (the Kula ring) among residents of a string of Pacific islands. Patterns of social exchange were proposed to enhance social solidarity and reduce intergroup conflict.

The increasing influence of social exchange theory in the twentieth century parallels the rise of utilitarian microeconomics as an explanatory framework for social development. Both approaches assume that individuals behave in ways they find rewarding. Whereas economics focuses on the exchange of goods for money in markets of equally positioned actors who have no history of previous exchanges, social exchange focuses on exchange more generally in networks of actors who may have quite different social positions and who have the opportunity to exchange with each other repeatedly. Rational choice theory has developed within sociology as a theoretical approach to individual decision making related to social exchange theory but more heavily influenced by microeconomics.

In seeking to explain the relationships between individuals and groups, social exchange theory sits between sociological and psychological approaches. An emphasis on the relationships between individuals, and ultimately how patterns of those relationships affect outcomes, allows social exchange theory to address more macro level sociological concerns. In particular, patterns of exchange relations constitute networks; thus social exchange theory has contributed to social network analysis and led to network exchange theory.

George Homans published *Social Behavior: Its Elementary Forms* in 1961, presenting a theory grounded in social exchange that is capable of explaining specific social phenomena and predicting outcomes of social interaction. Homans's theory blended ideas from behaviorist psychology and microeconomics to create foundational assumptions that could be used to generate predictions. Rewards, for example, are assumed to

increase behavior while the marginal utility of increasing rewards declines due to satiation. Through the 1990s, Louis Gray, Irving Tallman and their colleagues have continued research on individual decision making using a behaviorist approach with the development of their cost equalization model.

Homans's behaviorist approach was criticized for the basic tautology that resulted in his theory: individuals are predicted to behave in ways that result in reward, but what individuals find rewarding is determined by how they behave. Moreover, Homans's espousal of methodological individualism as the proper means of studying society was resisted by many sociologists. He argued that social structure consisted of patterns of individual behavior; thus the study of society could be reduced to the study of individual behavior. Peter Blau's *Exchange and Power in Social Life* (published a few years after Homans's book) advocated the social exchange approach to develop a more macro theory of society.

In 1962, Richard Emerson's power dependence theory continued to use behaviorist psychological principles of reward and satiation, but added ideas from John Thibaut and Harold Kelley's *The Social Psychology of Groups* about the social advantages conferred by access to alternative individuals capable of supplying valued resources. This new emphasis on exchange *relationships* was the sociological dimension that furthered theoretical progress. Emerson's theory established *power* (to acquire resources) as a central concern of social exchange theory. Power dependence theory proposed that power differences result from exchange in two ways: (1) through individual decision making as one actor placing more value on the rewards of an exchange relationship than does another, and (2) through a pattern of social relationships that gives one exchange partner greater access to alternative sources of reward.

In proposing social structure as an important source of power in exchange relationships, Emerson obviated the tautology inherent in using the internal values of individuals to explain their behavior. Instead, researchers could examine aspects of social structure that determine the distribution of resources in an exchange network. Rapid development of

sociological theory and research on social exchange followed the 1972 publication of Emerson's article on social exchange in networks. Since then, the development of social exchange theory has been carried out in research programs that coordinate theoretical advance with empirical research supporting its validity.

Karen Cook, Toshio Yamagishi, and their colleagues continued Emerson's research program to investigate patterns of exchange relations in networks that determine the distribution of power among network positions. By systematically analyzing differences in relationships among positions and experimental tests of those analyses, Cook et al. (1983) discovered that more central positions in an exchange network were not necessarily advantaged, but could be either high power or low power depending on their direct and indirect connections to other positions. Their later work established trust in exchange relationships as a major area of research (Yamagishi, Cook, & Watabe 1998).

Markovsky et al. (1988) developed an algorithm to determine the power of positions in exchange networks of any size and shape. Network exchange theory uses graph theory techniques to count relationships as paths leading away from each position to quantify each position's power as a graph theoretic power index (GPI) number. Later, with John Skvoretz, Michael Lovaglia, and others, network exchange theory continued to develop through a systematic program of theoretical development and experimental research. Two qualitatively different types of power were identified in exchange networks: strong power as quantified by the GPI, and a self-limiting variety of weak power that can be quantified by analyzing probabilities that individual positions will be included in an exchange (Markovsky et al. 1993). In 1995, network exchange theory researchers used the resistance equation from David Willer's elementary theory to transform probabilities of inclusion into exact predictions of the resources that different positions could acquire from exchange.

Beginning in the 1980s, Linda Molm has developed exchange theory to encompass coercion. Her research investigates reciprocal exchange as opposed to the negotiated exchanges often studied by network exchange researchers. In negotiated exchange, two individuals agree

to trade one commodity for another. The assumption is that both parties gain from the transaction. No negotiation occurs in reciprocal exchange; instead, one party rewards or punishes another who then has the opportunity to reciprocate. Molm's (1997) statement of the theory and its supporting research proposes that punishment is more likely to be used when power differences are great and when rewards are used unjustly or ineffectively. These and other propositions of the theory are well supported by experimental research.

Edward J. Lawler developed a non zero sum conception of power that continues to advance social exchange research. He proposed that to study power effectively, it is important to assess the total power of both individuals in an exchange relationship, as well as the relative advantage that one individual has over another. During the 1980s his work with Samuel Bacharach used a social exchange approach to investigate conflict resolution in negotiation and bargaining. Central to this approach is the idea that social exchange can reduce conflict. During the 1990s he developed a theory of relational cohesion. Working with Jeongkoo Yoon, he proposed and validated through experimental research that ongoing exchange relations can increase positive emotional bonds and thus social solidarity between exchange partners, but only to the extent that exchanges were perceived as equal. Large power differences reduced the emotional benefits of exchange relationships.

Research on social exchange continues to flourish. Social theories are influential in the discipline to the extent that they generate important research questions that are then answered through empirical investigation. For example, a longstanding question for social theory involves the intentionality of power use. Does the use of social power require that individual actors intend to use it? Willer and Skvoretz (1997) answered that question when they discovered that a passive actor in an exchange network, one who only accepts the best offer available but who makes no attempt to improve it, is capable of exercising as much power as one who actively seeks to maximize resources at others' expense. That is, the social power produced by the structure of an exchange network is independent of the intentions of those who occupy

network positions. Social exchange theory is an influential research area because it continues to raise important questions and generate research capable of answering them.

SEE ALSO: Blau, Peter; Elementary Theory; Emerson, Richard M.; Homans, George; Malinowski, Bronislaw K.; Power Dependence Theory; Power, Theories of; Rational Choice Theory (and Economic Sociology); Social Network Analysis; Social Networks

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social exclusion

Hilary Silver

Social exclusion is a rupturing of the social bond. It is a process of declining participation, access, and solidarity. At the societal level, it reflects inadequate social cohesion or integration. At the individual level, it refers to the incapacity to participate in normatively expected social activities and to build meaningful social relations.

The idea of social exclusion originated in France. It has many affinities with French Republican thought, especially the concepts of solidarity and the social bond. Its sociological pedigree is clearly Durkheimian, as Levitas (2000) has noted. However, the concept is also adumbrated in Georg Simmel's *The Stranger*, Norbert Elias's *The Established and the Outsiders*, *Stigma*, and Howard Becker's *Outsiders*. Social exclusion may also be conceived in terms of Max Weber's concepts of status groups and social closure.

Despite the concept's novelty and ambiguity, definitions of social exclusion abound. They vary by national context and sociological paradigm. Some scholars refer to an inability to exercise the social rights of citizenship, including the right to a decent standard of living. These approaches see social exclusion as synonymous with poverty and deprivation, and thus as an aspect of social stratification. Other approaches, especially in Britain, emphasize the importance of individual choice, for a person cannot be excluded if inclusion is accessible, but undersired. These perspectives emphasize exclusion from opportunities and thus conceive of the concept as one similar to discrimination. However, the original meaning of social exclusion stresses social distance, marginalization, and inadequate integration.

Social exclusion is most frequently defined in contrast to poverty. It is a relational rather than a redistributive idea. Although poverty can lead to social exclusion, as well as the reverse, one can easily imagine rich members of excluded groups. Thus, it is not strictly a question of insufficient material resources. As Touraine (1991) put it, exclusion is an issue of being in or out, rather than up or down. Because

exclusion is about broken relationships, there are always two parties to consider: the excluders as well as the excluded.

Exclusion is also multi dimensional, combining economic and social deprivation. However, analysts differ on whether exclusion is always a cumulative process of multiple, interrelated disadvantages. The UK's Social Exclusion Unit defines exclusion as "a shorthand label for what can happen when individuals or areas suffer from a combination of linked problems." Emphasizing joined up social problems, especially when spatially concentrated, resonates with the idea of an "underclass." This is even more the case when, as Vlemminckx and Berghman (2001) claim, exclusion implies entrapment or intergenerational transmission.

Certainly, research confirms that exclusion along one dimension may increase the risks of exclusion along other dimensions, but very few people are totally excluded from all social relations at once. There are many more people who are socially excluded in some respects than there are people excluded in all respects. Indeed, it is virtually impossible for human beings to exist totally outside societal influences.

Social exclusion may be considered as both a condition and a process, although it is most frequently treated in dynamic terms. Castel (1991), for example, eschews the term exclusion, preferring the notion of *disaffiliation*. Paugam (1991), another French sociologist, refers to a process of *social disqualification*. These authors consider exclusion along a continuum, with intermediate steps of vulnerability or precariousness.

There are many mechanisms of social exclusion: extermination, exile, abandonment, ostracism, shaming, marginalization, segregation, discrimination. Sometimes, even social assistance can produce exclusion. In general, groups deliberately use exclusion as a means of social control and boundary maintenance. It reinforces internal solidarity and may allow insiders to monopolize resources.

Although most scholars agree that social exclusion is multi dimensional and has different forms in different social contexts, there is little consensus over what are the most important dimensions of social exclusion. Studies have so far examined the dimensions that are easiest to measure with available data. This has first and

foremost meant extending poverty and unemployment indicators to take account of time and place. A. B. Atkinson, a British economist, proposed the initial exclusion measures for the European Union, most of which consisted of income and joblessness indicators (Atkinson et al. 2002). In the second EU Joint Inclusion Report these indicators were accompanied with education and health measures.

However, several sociological studies, especially in the UK, have tackled other social and political dimensions of exclusion. For example, Gordon et al. (2000) conducted a new *Poverty and Social Exclusion in Britain* survey for the Joseph Rowntree Foundation specifically for this purpose. In addition to income poverty and material deprivation, exclusion from the labor market and from public services, they examined four aspects of exclusion from social relations: socializing, social isolation, social support, and civic engagement. The researchers identified these aspects directly by asking Britons themselves what they considered "normal" social activities, whether they experienced constraints upon participating in them, and, if so, the nature of those obstacles. This and other studies (see Hills et al. 2002) reveal that income distribution and unemployment are weakly associated with sociability and community participation. Gallie and Paugam's (2000) research suggests material deprivation may even be positively related to social relations in Southern Europe.

The dimensions of social exclusion receiving the most recent attention concern the recognition and rights of racial and ethnic groups, especially of immigrants. This emphasis is largely due to the adoption of the 2000 EU "Racial Directive" on equal treatment irrespective of racial and ethnic origin, and the EQUAL program to fight labor market discrimination. In 2005 the British Council of Brussels and other agencies released a European Civic Citizenship and Inclusion Index that uses uniform indicators to gauge the extent to which immigrants to a country have rights and obligations comparable to EU citizens. While these attempts to measure social dimensions of exclusion are important advances, many cultural, political, and social aspects of life lack good indicators. The Joint Report on Social Inclusion called for more attention to neglected types of disadvantage,

such as access to the Internet, housing, transportation, continuing education, and language acquisition. Further methodological advances are expected in the future.

Social exclusion has expanded its meaning over time to encompass more social problems and disadvantaged groups. In France, when the term originated in the 1960s, a group of "Social Catholics," especially the ATD Fourth World movement headed by Father Joseph Wresinski, used the term to refer to the extremely poor of affluent and less developed countries living in the slums. In the 1970s, when René Lenoir (1974) used the term, the socially excluded referred to the handicapped, substance abusers, juvenile delinquents, and deviant groups. In the 1980s, as unemployment rose after the Oil Shocks, the term applied to youth and older unskilled workers whom deindustrialization displaced. As long term joblessness, homelessness, and racism all became issues in the next two decades, they added yet more complexity to the meaning of social exclusion. A coalition of social movements concerned with these many issues demanded action, leading to France's anti exclusion laws enacted in 1988, 1998, and 2005.

In the 1990s the European Union adopted the term. Leaders passed resolutions to fight social exclusion as part of the European Social Model, one that weds economic growth with job creation and social cohesion. Since 2001, member states of the EU have produced National Action Plans for social inclusion submitted to Brussels for coordination in a Joint Inclusion Report. The European Union will shortly consider the fight for social inclusion in the larger context of social protection. Already in 2005, the Joint Report on Social Protection and Social Inclusion coupled national progress reports on inclusion with benchmarks on pensions. The next Joint Report will further streamline the monitoring process, adding medical and other dimensions. As the EU expands from 15 to 25 members, new issues of social exclusion are likely to arise, such as discrimination against the Roma (gypsies) in Central and Eastern Europe. In sum, Brussels will probably determine the direction of the study of social exclusion for the near future.

Interest in social exclusion has expanded beyond Europe, although so far the concept

has not caught on in the US. International agencies working in less developed countries have found the concept useful for studying the challenges of integration in pluri ethnic societies, caste structures, religious cleavages, and indigenous peoples' rights. UN agencies and international development banks have funded programs to promote social inclusion in the global South.

Thus, political and policy considerations have been as important as sociological interests to the development of social exclusion as a subject of study. For example, Giddens (2000) discussed "social exclusion" in his book on *The Third Way* just as Tony Blair was adopting the idea. Esping Andersen referred to the challenges of social exclusion in his 2002 book, *Why We Need a New Welfare State*. And France's full fledged National Observatory for the Study of Social Exclusion produces annual research reports for the government.

Programs to fight social exclusion ideally take a comprehensive approach, progressively tackling multiple problems and tailoring solutions to a person's particular combination of needs. Solutions usually entail the participation of the excluded in their own inclusion. The European Social Funds have co funded local projects that help rebuild social relations and "reinsert" excluded people in socially useful activities. These projects might include working in a subsidized job, taking a training course, or renovating housing for the homeless. They may not lift someone out of poverty, but they do reknit the social bond. Inclusion does not rely only on having a paid job in a for profit business.

Finally, there are many critiques of the idea of social exclusion. Central among them is the argument that it distracts attention from social inequality and class conflict. The excluded have a wide range of problems and do not share interests that might cement them into a political force. In addition, inclusion is usually a euphemism for rejoining the labor force. Other critics point out the lack of a theory that identifies the causes and consequences of exclusion. There is not a zero sum relationship in which greater exclusion means less inclusion. Rather, both processes are interrelated and can occur simultaneously. These and many other controversies will ensure the further development

of the concept of social exclusion in the years to come.

SEE ALSO: Discrimination; Occupational Segregation; Outsider Within; Poverty and Dispute; Residential Segregation; Social Integration and Inclusion; Solidarity; Stigma; Stranger, The

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social fact

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The concept of social fact was defined by the French sociologist Émile Durkheim, in his book on the *Rules of Sociological Method* (1982), as ways of feeling, thinking, and acting external to and exercising constraint over the individual. Durkheim's emphasis on social facts was part of his critique of psychological theories of human behavior and society. The concept of social fact is identified with Durkheim and his school, but is also relevant to the understanding of any social theory which views society as an objective reality apart from the individuals composing it. Such approaches can be distinguished from the theoretical perspectives of such figures as Weber, Mead, and others who emphasize social action, interaction, or individual definitions of reality.

According to Durkheim, social facts are collective phenomena and, as such, make up the distinctive subject matter of sociology. Social facts can be embodied in social institutions, such as religions, political forms, kinship structures, or legal codes. There are also more diffuse social facts; for example, mass behavior of crowds and the collective trends identifiable in statistical rates of social phenomena such as suicide and crime. Institutions are an especially central concern of sociology as a social science. Durkheim insisted that social facts should be treated as things. They are realities in their own right, with their own laws of organization, apart from the ways these facts might appear to the individual's consciousness. Durkheim thought that sociology would have no distinctive subject matter if society itself did not exist as an objective reality. Thus, sociology and psychology represent independent levels of analysis.

In *Suicide* (1897) Durkheim studied suicide rates as measurable manifestations of prior social facts. He argued that suicide rates were correlated with differing social circumstances and created a theory of four social causes of suicide, two of them endemic to modern society. Egoistic suicide emerged from a lack of integration of the individual into social groups, especially

the family, the religious group, and the political community. Since familial, religious, and political ties were weakening in modern society, egoism was the most frequent contemporary cause of suicide. He suggested that the reintegration of the individual into society might be performed by strengthening the role of occupational or professional groups.

Anomic suicide resulted from the failure of another class of social facts, namely social norms, to regulate the individual's desires. It occurred especially during fluctuating economic circumstances, but could emerge in any setting where the individual's existing standards of conduct and expectations were radically disrupted. Durkheim emphasized that such social causes operated independently from the individual incidence of suicide and represented a level of social facts which could be understood only through a new science of sociology.

Durkheim and his school studied a wide range of social facts, including family and kinship, the division of labor, religion and magic, and the categories of human understanding such as time, space, and the person. Their emphasis on the factual character of society led Durkheim and his followers to examine what they called the social substratum of groups and the collective representations, or the collective psychology, shared by the average members of society. The former class of social facts, social morphology, was especially central to their work and involved the study of the number, distribution, and social organization of populations in space and over time. In this way, the Durkheimians combined the disciplines of geography, history, and demography into a holistic sociological analysis of the social substructure. Maurice Halbwachs focused especially on social morphology, although each member of the school, including Durkheim, adopted this approach to the study of social phenomena.

For example, Durkheim argued that the causes of changes in social facts must be located in historically antecedent social phenomena. In *The Division of Labor in Society* (1893) he examined the transformation of societies from mechanical to organic solidarity. Mechanical solidarity was based on a strong collective consciousness and organized around segmental groups, primarily extended kinship structures.

The result was a society based on the similarity among its individual members and social units. Organic solidarity was rooted in mutual interdependence of activities in the division of labor, where the collective consciousness became less strong and, thus, there appeared a greater individuation of thought and conduct. The cause of the change from mechanical to organic solidarity was found in social morphology; in particular, an increase in the overall population volume, an increase in society's material density (i.e., the number of people in a given territory), and an increased moral or dynamic density (i.e., communication and interaction among groups).

In a related study, *Seasonal Variations in Eskimo Society* (1904–5), Marcel Mauss used a similar approach. He found that major changes in religious ritual, law, family organization, economic life, and other features of Eskimo society resulted from the seasonal variation of population concentration and dispersion and their concomitant effects on moral density. Durkheim and Mauss argued, in their study of *Primitive Classification* (1901–2), that the main categories of thought and classification of objects in primitive societies reflected the social organization of those societies and should be understood apart from the individual's psychology. In his study of "The Preeminence of the Right Hand" (1909), Robert Hertz argued that the higher cultural value placed on the right hand was rooted in social and religious definitions of the sacred versus the profane, rather than in any biological asymmetry. Hertz's study laid the foundation for a growing literature on dual systems of classification which, in turn, gave an impetus to structuralist theories of culture and society.

Other social theories outside the Durkheimian orbit have also emphasized the role of objective social conditions or social facts. Marxist social theorists have focused on the ways in which forces and social relations of production confront individuals as objective conditions of existence. Marx argued that individuals make history, but do so under conditions independent of their individual wills. For Marx, social existence determines consciousness. Individuals are primarily to be seen as representatives of social classes or personifications of objective

economic forces. When Marx does discuss social action, he emphasizes the role of collective actors in history, namely social classes like the bourgeoisie or the proletariat. This tension between objective factual conditions and collective voluntary action presented dilemmas for later Marxists.

A variety of functionalist and structuralist approaches have emerged from this early emphasis on the factual quality of social existence. Although Talcott Parsons's early study *The Structure of Social Action* (1937) developed an action frame of reference, he soon developed a macro sociological, structural, and functional theory which muted his earlier emphasis on actors and social action. For example, in *The Social System* (1951) Parsons developed a general theory of social systems which focused on four basic functions which all social systems, including whole societies, needed to perform in order to continue as going concerns (i.e., adaptation to environment, goal attainment, social integration, cultural pattern maintenance). Parsons examined the interchanges among institutions (e.g., economy, polity, household, school, law, etc.) serving these functions and used this strategy to build increasingly inclusive theoretical systems, ones which could be applied to concrete sociological questions. For instance, in *Economy and Society* (1956) Parsons and Neil Smelser analyzed the economy as a social system and examined its internal organization along with its relations with other non economic systems, while in *Family, Socialization and Interaction Process* (1955), Parsons and several collaborators discussed the family as a social system, including its structure of instrumental and integrative roles. On related grounds, Kingsley Davis and Wilbert Moore argued for the functional necessity of social stratification, while other functionalists such as Robert K. Merton turned to the study of social structures and their consequences. Merton distinguished between the manifest (i.e., intended and foreseen) and latent (i.e., unintended and unforeseen) functions of social arrangements. Merton's approach allowed him to examine various social phenomena of the "middle range" (e.g., conflict, bureaucracy, reference groups) which often slipped through the more holistic and systematic functionalism of Parsons.

More recent French social thought has produced a number of variations on Durkheim's sociological objectivism. These include Lévi Strauss's structural anthropology, the historical work of the *Annales* school, especially Braudel and his followers, Foucault's investigations, and the theorizing of Althusser. Lévi Strauss created structural theories of kinship, myth, and culture by combining structural linguistics with ideas drawn from the Durkheim school, Marx, and Freud. His theories pitted structure against history and argued for the centrality of enduring structures of human cognitive and social organization. Human expressions and the actions of individuals were best seen as variants operating within the confines of established social and cultural structures. The second generation of *Annales* historians such as Fernand Braudel pursued a similar agenda by rejecting the study of history in terms of actors and events and emphasizing structures of the *longue durée*, including such things as enduring socioeconomic and civilizational structures and even geography and climate. This approach is most fully captured in Braudel's work on *The Mediterranean* (1949), but is also found in the work of such *Annales* figures as Immanuel Le Roy Ladurie, who has suggested that the study of the economic and social impact of slow climatic changes opens up the possibility of a "history without people" (in this connection, it is worth recalling that Durkheim rejected the idea that climate had an impact on suicide rates). Michel Foucault's work also diminishes the role of the individual subject. His studies of madness, the clinic, the prison, and changing systems of knowledge reject the search for causal sequences rooted in the actions of individuals or groups and, instead, view actors and their actions as instantiations of the words and deeds made possible by the reigning discourses. These structuralist tendencies are perhaps most fully expressed in Louis Althusser's work. He rejects Marx's early humanistic writings in favor of his later, more objectivist scientific work, and ends by forging a structural theory of society where human agency is entirely eliminated and social change occurs through a process of internal contradictions within dynamic socioeconomic, political, and legal structures.

The emphasis on social facts in sociology is generally opposed by thinkers who see human

agency as central to our understanding of society. This latter group includes Max Weber's social action theory, the symbolic interactionist theory of Herbert Blumer, the phenomenological perspective of Alfred Schutz, and several related perspectives. For example, Weber's work rests on the principle of "methodological individualism," where objective social processes can in principle be reduced to the actions and interactions of individuals. In a similar vein, symbolic interactionists see society as a process and not an object. Schutz attempts to build scientific concepts about society by starting with the taken for granted conceptualizations of individual actors. There have been efforts by such figures as Peter Berger and Thomas Luckmann, Anthony Giddens, and Pierre Bourdieu to synthesize the positivist, objectivist study of social facts derived from the Durkheimian, Marxian, structuralist, functionalist, and related traditions with the study of social action, interaction, and agency. However, these efforts have not always been fully successful in doing justice to both the objective social reality of economy, society, and culture as well as the equally robust reality of individual social action, interaction, and response. This dilemma is probably inherent to sociology as a social and human science.

SEE ALSO: Althusser, Louis; Annales School; Durkheim, Émile; Foucault, Michel; Functionalism/Neofunctionalism; Marx, Karl; Marxism and Sociology; Parsons, Talcott; Positivism; Structuralism

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social identity theory

Peter L. Callero

Social identity theory offers a social psychological explanation of intergroup prejudice, discrimination, and conflict. Its origins lie in the work of Henri Tajfel (Tajfel & Turner 1979) and his associates who have been instrumental in the development of a distinctly European approach to psychology. This approach is broadly concerned with the relationship between self and society. For Tajfel, the key to understanding prejudice, discrimination, and intergroup conflict is found in an individual's social identity as defined by group membership. Social identity theory rejects explanations based on individual defects of physiology, personality, or attitude. In this regard, it represents a challenge to more traditional psychological theories and has generated nascent interest among sociologists. Tajfel's experimental findings on group affiliation and personal bias were first published in the 1960s and, since then, social identity theory has generated an immense body of empirical research in support of its basic hypotheses. Over the years, social identity theory has been elaborated and extended to encompass issues of group leadership, organizational psychology, deviance, and political action. Today, social identity theory stands as one of the most influential theoretical perspectives within psychological social psychology.

MINIMAL GROUP PARADIGM

The empirical starting point for understanding social identity theory is found in a series of laboratory experiments that have come to be known as the minimal group paradigm. The objective in this early research was to identify the minimal conditions required to produce favoritism toward one group and discrimination against another. In the minimal group design, subjects are randomly assigned to one of two groups that they believe were established on the basis of a trivial preliminary test (e.g., whether one underestimated or overestimated the number of dots on a screen). The conditions are such that there is no history or prior knowledge

of the group or of other group members, there is no interaction among or between group members, other group members cannot be heard or seen, no competition of any sort is ever established, and the only differentiating factor is the perception that there are two distinct groups. Results from studies using the minimal group paradigm consistently show favoritism toward one's own group and bias against another group (usually measured in terms of reward distribution to group members and member attitudes toward the in group and the out group). Thus, on the basis of a purely cognitive discrimination of groups as defined by simple category distinctions, the seeds of intergroup conflict are sown. Variations on the minimal group design have ruled out the effect of perceived similarity among group members and various other methodological artifacts. For Tajfel and his colleagues, the findings show that the mere categorization into groups can produce a distinctly consequential social identity, and that social identity based upon group membership is the psychological foundation of intergroup conflict. At the same time, Tajfel was quick to emphasize that the findings should not be interpreted to mean that material conditions, historical structures, and cultural traditions do not affect real world conflict. In fact, these sociological forces are the context within which social identity operates.

SOCIAL IDENTITY

Social identity refers to an individual's subjective understanding of group membership. It is a cognitive category that includes emotional and evaluative associations. Social identity can be as simple and fleeting as a label employed in a psychology experiment or as complex and encompassing as national, religious, or ethnic affiliations. Unlike the symbolic interactionist tradition in sociology where self, identity, and personhood are seen as inherently social at all levels, social identity theory argues that group identity is formed psychologically and in opposition to one's personal identity.

In other words, the psychology of group behavior is assumed to be qualitatively different from the psychology of interpersonal behavior. While this ontological distinction provides

social identity theory with the conceptual language needed to understand prejudice, discrimination, and conflict as ordinary, adaptive, and functional interactions of group behavior, critics have argued that it has led to the adoption of an overly restricted understanding of the social dimension of identity. Because social identity is seen as the cognitive mechanism that makes group behavior possible, understanding the motivations, contextual contingencies, and cognitive structures associated with the psychology of *groupness* has been a major focus of research.

As noted above, an enormous body of empirical research has found that an individual's commitment to a group is associated with positive bias toward the group, or in group favoritism. In addition, the same expansive body of research finds that in group favoritism is often associated with out group bias such that members of other groups tend to be viewed in a stereotypical manner. In other words, the salience of a social identity (psychological commitment to a group) leads to prejudice, discrimination, and conflict between groups. But of course these basic associations are not universal. Not all group commitments for all individuals lead to the same type of bias. Perhaps the most valuable contribution of social identity theory is that it provides a framework for predicting when and how group bias occurs. The effects are highly contingent and so the explanations can be quite detailed and complex, but three major factors affecting the process are the salience of particular social identities, the objective features of a particular situation, and the individual's beliefs about the group.

When group membership in the form of a social identity is psychologically salient, it is said to affect perception, cognition, and behavior; predictions that have received substantial empirical support. But according to social identity theory, the salience of a group identity should not be viewed as a transsituational quality of the person. Rather, it is a process whereby specific social identities come to define the self in particular social contexts. Some social settings will allow for a fit between social identity categories stored in memory and the perception of self in relation to other group members. Categories that have optimal fit, and maximize

meaning for the actor, will become salient. For example, in a setting where groups are in conflict over financial resources, such as a collective bargaining table or a picket line, we would expect a worker's union identity to be salient. This in turn would be associated with positive generalizations about union members and negative generalizations regarding management. But even in this rather straightforward and simple example, the outcome is not determined since individual belief structures also intervene.

According to social identity theory, the two belief structures most important for understanding intergroup relations are those that address social mobility and social change. Importantly, these two beliefs are related in that they are said to represent different ends of a single continuum. An individual who believes in social mobility thinks that it is possible to achieve positive social regard by moving from one group of relatively low status to another of relatively higher status. This belief is based on the assumption of a relatively free and unrestricted social structure. In contrast, a belief in social change rests on the idea that positive improvement in one's social standing requires action as a group member. It is in effect a rejection of free and independent agency in favor of a more collective approach to changing the position of one's group. Because of its emphasis on solidarity with other group members, this end of the continuum is seen as corresponding to the psychological salience of a social identity.

MOTIVATION AND SELF CATEGORIZATION

At its core, the social identity approach to group conflict is built upon the energizing forces of specific psychological motives. These include a motivation to enhance self esteem, a motivation to maintain a distinct social identity, and a motivation to reduce uncertainty. Thus, it is hypothesized that the fundamental drive to achieve a favorable view of self leads individuals to associate with groups that will enhance self regard. But since this cannot be achieved unless the group is recognizably distinct and clearly associated with positive sentiment, individuals are also motivated to affiliate with

groups that offer *positive distinctiveness*. More over, as actors attempt to define and clarify knowledge about self and others, they are also driven by a need to reduce uncertainty. The cognitive processes associated with categorizing self and other are in turn viewed as effective strategies for reducing uncertainty. Although various hypotheses and contingencies linked to these motives have been studied at length, empirical support for the self esteem motives has been mixed. This has contributed in part to a significant shift in emphasis over the last 20 years toward greater interest in developing the cognitive dimension of social identity theory.

During the 1980s Jon Turner and his colleagues (Turner et al. 1987) initiated the development of self categorization theory as an extension and elaboration of social identity theory. Self categorization theory addresses more specifically the cognitive structures and processes that define social identity and the psychology of group affiliation and commitment. For example, a key concept in self categorization theory is that of *prototypicality*, or the degree to which a category member is representative of the category as a whole. A cognitive prototype is an actor's mental representation of the core defining attributes of a group. Research suggests that this is usually constructed from qualities of exemplary members, either through a disembodied ideal type or an actual group member who comes close to the imagined ideal. These stereotyped images are stored in memory and are altered in the social context of group comparison in order to enhance meaning. For example, under the principle of *metacontrast*, attributes of the prototype will change so as to maximize the difference between the in group and the out group. In this way, the self categorization process functions to induce group solidarity, encourage social identity salience, and reduce self uncertainty by establishing shared beliefs through group membership.

SOCIOLOGICAL CONTRIBUTIONS

The distinguishing contribution of social identity theory is its explanation of the psychological foundations of intergroup prejudice, discrimination, and conflict. By assuming an ontological

break between interpersonal and group psychology, social identity theory departs from the more reductionist approaches to intergroup behavior. Since the 1980s social identity theory has seen tremendous growth and influence and must now be considered one of the most dominant theoretical perspectives in psychology. Nevertheless, at this point in time its standing among sociologists remains relatively weak. This is a partial consequence of institutional barriers, but it also reflects more basic epistemological differences between social psychologists in the two scholarly traditions. Because social identity theory assumes an ontologically independent person acting as either an individual or as a group member, its ability to provide an accounting of fundamental sociological processes is limited. Thus, the emergence of selfhood and identity from interpersonal interaction is not addressed within social identity theory, and historically situated macro forces of political economy, colonialism, and cultural imperialism can enter only as details of a specific situation. To the extent that social identity theory continues to rely primarily on laboratory experimentation focused on discovering and describing cognitive processes, it will unlikely develop a larger following among sociologists. Should, however, it begin to link these processes more directly with actual group conflict in real world settings, it has the potential to contribute to interdisciplinary cross fertilization.

SEE ALSO: Aggression; Authority and Conformity; Discrimination; Identity Theory; In Groups and Out Groups; Prejudice; Psychological Social Psychology; Self; Social Change; Social Cognition; Social Psychology; Status Construction Theory; Symbolic Interaction

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social indicators

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Social indicators are statistical time series “used to monitor the social system, helping to identify changes and to guide intervention to alter the course of social change” (Ferriss 1988: 601). Examples are unemployment rates, crime rates, estimates of life expectancy, health status indices such as the average number of “healthy” days (or days without activity limitations) in the past month for a specific population, school enrollment rates, average achievement scores on a standardized test, rates of voting in elections, and measures of subjective well being such as how satisfied individuals are with life as a whole. In addition to these specific indicators, recent work has led to the development of summary indices that combine a number of specific indicators into composite measures of the quality of life or well being for a society as a whole or for specific segments or subunits thereof.

Associated with the term social indicators is a field of research that cuts across several social science disciplines (Land 1983). Three broad questions about social indicators are addressed here:

- Where did the field of social indicators come from? What is the historical development and intellectual history of social indicators?
- Can different categories of social indicators be distinguished? What are the major types?
- How are social indicators used? What are the functions of social indicators?

HISTORICAL DEVELOPMENTS

Social Indicators in the 1960s

The term *social indicators* was born and given its initial meaning in an attempt, undertaken in the early 1960s by the American Academy of Arts and Sciences for the National Aeronautics and Space Administration, to detect and anticipate the nature and magnitude of the second order consequences of the space program, specifically the effort to launch a manned space flight to the moon and back, for American society. Frustrated by the lack of sufficient data to detect such effects and the absence of a systematic conceptual framework and methodology for analysis, some of those involved in the Academy project attempted to develop a system of social indicators – statistics, statistical series, and other forms of evidence – with which to detect and anticipate social change as well as to evaluate specific programs and determine their impact. The results of this part of the Academy project were published in a volume (Bauer 1966) bearing the title *Social Indicators*.

The appearance of this volume was not an isolated event. Several other influential publications commented on the lack of a system for charting social change and advocated that the US government establish a “system of social accounts” that would facilitate a cost-benefit analysis of more than the market related aspects of society already indexed by the National Income and Product Accounts (Land 1983). The need for social indicators also was emphasized by the publication of the 101 page *Toward a Social Report* (US Department of Health, Education, and Welfare 1969) on the last day of Lyndon B. Johnson’s administration in 1969. Conceived of as a prototypical counterpart to the annual economic reports of the president, each of its seven chapters addressed major issues in an important area of social concern (health and illness; social mobility; the physical environment; income and poverty; public order and safety; learning, science, and art; and participation and alienation) and provided an assessment of prevalent conditions. In addition, the document firmly established the link of social indicators to the idea of systematic reporting on social issues for the purpose of public enlightenment.

Generally speaking, the sharp impulse of interest in social indicators in the 1960s grew out of the movement toward collection and organization of national social, economic, and demographic data that began in western societies during the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries and accelerated in the twentieth century. The work of sociologist William F. Ogburn and his collaborators at the University of Chicago in the 1930s and 1940s on the theory and measurement of social change is more proximate and sociologically germane. As chairman of President Herbert Hoover's Research Committee on Social Trends, Ogburn supervised production of the two volume *Recent Social Trends* (1933), a pathbreaking contribution to social reporting. Ogburn's ideas about the measurement of social change influenced several of his students – notably Albert D. Biderman, Otis Dudley Duncan, Albert J. Reiss, Jr., and Eleanor Bernert Sheldon, who played major roles in the emergence and development of the field of social indicators in the 1960s and 1970s.

Social Indicators in the 1970s and 1980s

At the end of the 1960s, the enthusiasm for social indicators was sufficiently strong and broad based for Duncan (1969) to write of the existence of a Social Indicators Movement. In the early 1970s, this led to numerous developments, including the establishing in 1972, with National Science Foundation support, of the Social Science Research Council Center for Coordination of Research on Social Indicators in Washington, DC; research efforts to define and develop a methodology for the measurement of indicators of subjective well being as measures of the quality of life (Campbell et al. 1976); the commencement of a US federal government series of comprehensive social indicators books of charts, tables, and limited analyses; the initiation of several continuing data series based on periodic sample surveys of the national population, such as the annual National Opinion Research Center's (NORC's) General Social Survey or the Bureau of Justice Statistics' annual National Crime Victimization Survey; the publication in 1974 of the first volume of the international journal *Social Indicators Research*; and the spread of social indicators/social reporting to numerous other nations

and international agencies, such as the United Nations and the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development.

In contrast to the 1970s, social indicators activities slowed in the 1980s, as funding cuts or non renewals led to the closing of the Center for Coordination of Research on Social Indicators, the discontinuation of related work at several international agencies, the termination of government sponsored social indicators reports in some countries, including the United States, and the reduction of statistical efforts to monitor various aspects of society. Several explanations have been given for this turnabout. Certainly, politics and the state of national economies in the early 1980s are among the most identifiable proximate causes. Administrations that came to power in the United States and elsewhere based decisions more on a "conservative ideology" and less on current social data than had been the case earlier. And faltering economies producing large government budget deficits provided the incentive to make funding cuts. In addition, however, there was a perceived lack of demonstrated usefulness of social indicators in public policymaking. This was due, in part, to an overly simplistic view of how and under what conditions knowledge influences policy, a topic treated more fully below in discussions of uses of social indicators.

Social Indicators in the 1990s and 2000s

The 1980s ended with the question of "Whatever Happened to Social Indicators?" and the conclusion that the field had faded away. But, shortly after this conclusion was articulated, interest in social indicators revived and the field has been in an expansionary phase since the mid 1990s.

A key part in this expansion is a development that became vividly apparent in the 1990s: the widespread political, popular, and theoretical appeal of the quality of life (QOL) concept. This concept emerged and became part of the Social Indicators Movement in the late 1960s and early 1970s as doubts were raised in the highly developed western industrial societies about economic growth as the major goal of societal progress. The "social costs" of economic growth were cited, and there was increasing doubt about whether "more" should be

equated with “better.” The QOL concept which resulted from this discussion was posed as an alternative to the more and more questionable concept of the affluent society and entered discussions of social policy and politics as a new, but more complex, multidimensional goal.

As a goal of social and economic policy, QOL encompasses all (or at least many) domains of life and subsumes, in addition to individual material and immaterial well being, such collective values as freedom, justice, and the guarantee of natural conditions of life for present and future generations. The social scientific and policy uses of the QOL notion have been paralleled in the private sector by the widespread use and popularity of numerous rankings – based on weighted scales of multiple domains of well being – of the “best” places to live, work, do business, play, etc., be they cities, states, regions, or nations.

The theoretical appeal of the QOL concept as an integrating notion in the social sciences and related disciplines is, in part, due to the perceived importance of measuring individuals’ subjective assessments of their satisfaction with various life domains and with life as a whole. For instance, during the last two decades of the twentieth century, QOL became a concept that bridged the discipline of marketing research and strategic business policy with social indicators. Marketing is an important social force – with far reaching direct and indirect impacts on the prevailing QOL in a society – through consumer satisfaction and its impact on satisfaction with life as a whole. The intersection of marketing research with social indicators through the QOL concept led to the organization in the mid 1990s of the multidisciplinary International Society for Quality of Life Studies (for more information, visit www.isqols.org).

Another key development occurred in the field of social indicators in the 1990s and 2000s: the field entered a new era of the construction of composite or summary social indicators. Often these indices attempt to summarize indicators (objective and/or subjective) of a number of domains of life into a single index of the quality of life for the population or society as a whole or for some significant segment thereof (e.g., children and youth, the elderly, racial and minority groups, cities, states, or regions within the nation, etc.). They thus attempt to answer one

of the original questions motivating the Social Indicators Movement: how are we doing overall in terms of the quality of life? With respect to our past? With respect to other comparable units (e.g., cities, states, regions, nations)? Many of the pioneers of the Social Indicators Movement in the 1960s and 1970s felt that the database as well as the theoretical foundations were not sufficient at that time for the development of composite indices and that efforts should, instead, be concentrated on conducting basic research on social indicators and the measurement of the quality of life and the development of a richer social database.

Since the 1960s, however, there has been a tremendous increase in the richness of social data available for many societies. There also has been an accumulation of studies and theoretical developments with respect to subjective well being and quality of life studies. This has encouraged a new generation of social indicators researchers to return to the task of composite index construction. Some examples: (1) at the level of the broadest possible comparisons of nations with respect to the overall quality of life, the Human Development Index (United Nations Development Program 2004); (2) at the level of comparisons at the national level over time in the United States, the Fordham Index of Social Health (Miringoff & Miringoff 1999); and (3) for a specific subpopulation, the Child Well Being Index developed by Land et al. (2001). The field of social indicators and quality of life research probably will see several decades of such index construction and competition among various indices – with a corresponding need for careful assessments to determine which indices have substantive validity for which populations in the assessment of the quality of life and its changes over time and social space.

TYPES OF INDICATORS

Policy/Welfare/Criterion Indicators

Based on the premise that social indicators should relate directly to social policymaking considerations, an early definition by economist Mancur Olson, the principal author of *Toward a Social Report*, characterized a social indicator

as a “statistic of direct normative interest which facilitates concise, comprehensive and balance judgments about the condition of major aspects of a society” (US Department of Health, Education, and Welfare 1969: 97). Olson went on to state that such an indicator is, in all cases, a direct measure of welfare and is subject to the interpretation that if it changes in the “right” direction, while other things remain equal, things have gotten better, or people are better off. Accordingly, by this definition, statistics on the number of doctors or police officers could not be social indicators, whereas figures on health or crime rates could be.

In the language of policy analysis, social indicators are “target” or “output” or “outcome” or “end value” or “criteria” variables, toward changes in which some public policy (program, project) is directed. Such a use of social indicators requires that (1) society agrees about what needs improving; (2) it is possible to decide unambiguously what “getting better” means; and (3) it is meaningful to aggregate the indicators to the level of aggregation at which the policy is defined.

In recognition of the fact that various other meanings have been attached to the term social indicators, the tendency among recent authors is to use a somewhat different terminology for the class of indicators identified by Olson. For instance, Land (1983) termed this the class of *normative welfare indicators*. Building on the Olson approach, MacRae (1985: 5) defined *policy indicators* as “measures of those variables that are to be included in a broadly policy relevant system of public statistics.”

Life Satisfaction and/or Happiness Indicators

Another class of social indicators has its roots in the work of Campbell et al. (1976), who argued that the direct monitoring of key social psychological states (attitudes, expectations, feelings, aspirations, and values) in the population is necessary for an understanding of social change and the quality of life. In this approach, social indicators seek to measure psychological satisfaction, happiness, and life fulfillment by using survey research instruments that ascertain the subjective reality in which people live. The result may aptly be termed *life satisfaction, subjective well being, or happiness indicators*.

This approach led to many methodological studies exploring the utility of various survey and analytic techniques for mapping individuals’ feelings of satisfaction with numbers aspects (“domains”) of their experiences. These studies examine domains ranging from the highly specific (house, family, etc.) to the global (life as a whole). A large number of other studies and applications of these concepts and techniques have appeared over the past three decades and continue to appear – one or more studies of subjective well being indicators can be found in almost any issue of the journal *Social Indicators Research* and the *Journal of Happiness Studies*.

The principle that the link between objective conditions and subjective well being (defined in terms of response to sample survey or interview questions about happiness or satisfaction with life as a whole) is sometimes paradoxical and therefore that subjective as well as objective states should be monitored is well established in the social indicators literature. However, numerous studies of the measurement and psychodynamics of subjective well being over the past three decades have led to a better understanding of this construct. While research continues and it would be incorrect to say that the debates have been settled, it appears that this construct may have both *traitlike* (i.e., a durable psychological condition that differs among individuals and contributes to stability over time and consistency across situations) and *statelike* (i.e., a condition that is reactive to situational differences and thus potentially amenable to influence by social context and public policies) *properties*.

With respect to the statelike properties of subjective well being, Davis (1984) used an accumulated sample from several years of NORC General Social Surveys to document the responsiveness of happiness with life as a whole to (1) “new money” (recent changes in respondents’ financial status as opposed to current income level), (2) “an old man/lady” (being married or having an intimate living partner), and (3) “two’s company” (a household size of two as compared to living alone or families of three or more). Numerous other studies have found additional factors that are more or less strongly associated with variations in subjective well being. But the relevance of intimate living conditions/family status almost always is

replicated. The connection of subjective well being to income levels has been a particularly intriguing problem for social indicators researchers ever since Easterlin's (1973) finding that income differences between nations predicted national differences in happiness but that the association of happiness with income within countries was much weaker. Easterlin's study has stimulated a large literature on the relationship of income to subjective well being; for a recent review of this research literature, see Diener and Biswas Diener (2002). Suffice it to say that the last word is not in on this subject and that the theoretical and applied importance of the relationship will continue to be a focus of research interest.

Descriptive Social Indicators

Building on the Ogburn legacy of research on social trends, a third approach to social indicators focuses on social measurements and analyses designed to improve our understanding of what the main features of society are, how they interrelate, and how these features and their relationships change. This produces *descriptive social indicators* – indices of the state of society and changes taking place therein. Although descriptive social indicators may be more or less directly (causally) related to the well being goals of public policies or programs and thus include policy or criterion indicators, they are not limited to such uses. For instance, in the area of health, descriptive indicators might include preventive indicators such as the percent of the population that does not smoke cigarettes, as well as criterion indicators such as the number of days of activity limitations in the past month or an index of self reported satisfaction with health.

The various statistical forms that descriptive social indicators can take were described by Land (1983). These can be ordered by degree of abstraction from those that require only one or two data series and little processing (e.g., an age specific death rate) to those that involve more complicated processing into a single composite or summary index (e.g., years of life expectancy at age x , years of active or disability free life expectancy at age x). Descriptive social indicators can be formulated at any of these levels of abstraction. Moreover, these

indicators can, at least in principle, be organized into demographic or time budget based systems of social accounts.

FUNCTIONS OF INDICATORS

The Enlightenment Function

The Social Indicators Movement was motivated by the principle that it is important to *monitor changes over time* in a broad range of social phenomena that extend beyond the traditional economic indicators and that include *indicators of quality of life*. Many organized actors in contemporary society – including government agencies, organizations and activists interested in social change programs, scholars, and marketing researchers interested in market development and product innovations – monitor indicators in which they have a vested interest and want to see increase or decline (Ferriss 1988).

A second principle that has been part of the Social Indicators Movement from the outset is that a critically important role of social indicators in contemporary democratic societies is *public enlightenment through social reporting*. In brief, modern democracies require social reporting to describe social trends, explain why an indicator series behaves as it does and how this knowledge affects interpretation, and highlight important relationships among series.

It also is important to document the consequences that are reasonably attributable to changes in a series. This includes the systematic use of social indicators to *forecast trends in social conditions and/or turning points therein*. To be sure, the area of projection or forecasting is filled with uncertainties. Techniques range from the naïve extrapolation of recent trends to futuristic scenario construction to complicated model building with regression, time series, or stochastic process techniques. Demands for the anticipation of the future (at a minimum, for the description of “what will happen if present trends continue”), for foresight and forward thinking in the public and private sectors, and for the assessment of critical trends appear to be an intrinsic part of contemporary post industrial societies. Thus, it is prudent to expect that the “anticipation” task will become an increasingly

important part of the enlightenment function of social indicators.

As the decades of the 1990s and 2000s unfolded, the model of a comprehensive national social report in the tradition pioneered by Ogburn and Olson clearly had faltered in the United States, at least in the sense of federal government sponsorship and/or production. But the key ideas of monitoring, reporting, and forecasting were evident to greater or lesser extents in the production of continuing, periodic subject matter specific publications by various federal agencies, including *Science Indicators* (published by the National Science Foundation), *The Condition of Education* (published by the Department of Education), the *Report to the Nation on Crime and Justice* (published by the Department of Justice), and numerous Bureau of the Census publications. Special topics involving groups of federal agencies also receive attention from time to time. For instance, the Federal Interagency Forum on Child and Family Statistics began in 1997 an annual publication on *America's Children: Key National Indicators of Well Being*. In addition, the United States has numerous private research organizations, policy institutes, and scholars that continue to produce reports, monographs, and books interpreting social trends and developments in various areas of social concern.

In contrast to the situation in the United States, comprehensive social reports/social indicators compendiums continue to be published periodically in several other countries. Examples are the *Datenreport* series published biannually since 1983 by the Federal Republic of Germany, the *Social and Cultural Report* published biannually by the Social and Cultural Planning Office of The Netherlands, and *Australian Social Trends* published annually by the Australian Bureau of Statistics. Citations and summary reviews of these and other social indicators/social reports publications can be found in the quarterly newsletter and review of social reports, *SINET: Social Indicators Network News* (for access, see www.soc.duke.edu/resources/sinet/index.html).

The difference in the organization of social indicators/reporting work in the United States as compared to that in other countries is in part attributable to the lack of a central statistical office responsible for the coordination of all

government statistical activities in the former. More generally, it is indicative of the fact that, despite the invention of the ideas of social indicators and comprehensive social reporting in the United States, the nation has lagged in their institutionalization. Whether a new round of legislative effort will eventually create the necessary institutional base remains to be seen.

The Policy Analysis Function

Policy analysts distinguish various ways of guiding or affecting public policy, including *problem definition*, *policy choice and evaluation of alternatives*, and *program monitoring* (MacRae 1985). The social reporting/public enlightenment approach to social indicators centers around the first of these, namely, the use of social indicators in problem definition and the framing of the terms of policy discourse. Indeed, studies of the actual use of social indicators suggest that this is precisely the manner in which they have affected public action. But policy analysts from Olson to MacRae always have hoped for more from social indicators, namely, the shaping of public policy and planning through the policy choice process.

Land and Ferriss (2002) noted that the following *model for directed social change* emerged during the 1990s concerning policy uses of social indicators in such areas as health, education, and the welfare of children and youth in the United States:

- *Identify trends in criterion indicators*, the direction or rate of change of which should be changed.
- *Gather together intelligence* from experiments, field research, or theory that suggests what should be done to bring about the desired change.
- *Launch a decentralized program to effect change in specific criterion indicators* by specific amounts, to be attained by a target date.
- *Monitor progress* by periodically assessing trends on the specific indicators, modifying strategies as needed.
- As initial goals are reached, *set new goals* for continued progress.

Land and Ferriss (2002) developed a more complete articulation of this scheme in the

form of a sociological model that accommodates both the enlightenment and policy analysis functions of social indicators. They noted that identifying such goals and setting about altering their direction or rate of change is a process called *telesis*, which means “progress that is intelligently planned and directed; the attainment of the desired ends by the application of intelligent human effort to the means.” The further development and application of this conceptual framework may provide the foundations for the policy analytic use of social indicators in the future.

SEE ALSO: Demographic Techniques: Population Projections and Estimates; Ecological Problems; Evaluation; Population and Development; Population and the Environment; Poverty; Social Problems, Concept and Perspectives; Urban Policy; Values: Global

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social influence

Lisa Rashotte

Social influence is defined as change in an individual’s thoughts, feelings, attitudes, or behaviors that results from interaction with another individual or a group. Social influence is distinct from conformity, power, and authority. Conformity occurs when an individual expresses a particular opinion or behavior in order to fit in to a given situation or to meet the expectations of a given other, though he does not necessarily hold that opinion or believe that the behavior is appropriate. Power is the ability to *force or coerce* a particular way by controlling her outcomes. Authority is power that is believed to be *legitimate* (rather than coercive) by those who are subjected to it.

Social influence, however, is the process by which individuals make *real* changes to their feelings and behaviors as a result of interaction with others who are perceived to be similar, desirable, or expert. People adjust their beliefs with respect to others to whom they feel similar in accordance with psychological principles such as balance. Individuals are also influenced by the majority: when a large portion of an individual’s referent social group holds a particular attitude, it is likely that the individual will adopt it as well. Additionally, individuals may

change an opinion under the influence of another who is perceived to be an expert in the matter at hand.

French and Raven (1959) provided an early formalization of the concept of social influence in their discussion of the bases of social power. For French and Raven, agents of change included not just individuals and groups, but also norms and roles. They viewed social influence as the outcome of the exertion of social power from one of five bases: reward power, coercive power, legitimate power, expert power, or referent power. A change in *reported* opinion or attitude (conformity) was considered an instance of social influence whether or not it represented a true private change.

French and Raven's original research was concerned with situations in which a supervisor influences a worker in a work situation. Subsequent scholarship has examined a wide variety of other social interactions, including families, classrooms, doctors and their patients, salespeople and customers, political figures, and dating couples. Work settings also continue to be a prominent topic for studies of social influence.

Since 1959, scholars have distinguished true social influence from forced public acceptance and from changes based on reward or coercive power. Social researchers are still concerned with public compliance, reward power, and coercive power, but those concerns are differentiated from social influence studies. Current research on social influence generally uses experimental methodology and tends to fall into five main areas: (1) minority influence in group settings, (2) research on persuasion, (3) dynamic social impact theory, (4) a structural approach to social influence, and (5) social influence in expectation states theory. Each is discussed below.

Minority influence is said to occur when a minority subgroup attempts to change the majority. For example, teachers often influence their students' beliefs, and political and religious leaders frequently influence the behavior of their followers. While some previous research has characterized the process of social influence as the majority riding roughshod over the minority, many scholars interested in minority influence believe that every member of a group can influence others, at least to some degree. Studies have found this to be particularly true

when the minority group is consistent in what it presents to the majority.

In addition, the presence of minority groups within a larger group often leads to more creative thinking and better overall solutions on group tasks. Nemeth and Kwan (1987) demonstrated this in a study of four person groups working on a creativity task. Individuals were given information that a majority (3 of 3) or a minority (1 of 3) of the other group members had come up with a novel response to the task at hand. Those who were in the minority condition actually produced more correct solutions to the task, indicating the strong effect of minority viewpoints.

Current research on persuasion, broadly defined as change in attitudes or beliefs based on information received from others, focuses on written or spoken messages sent from source to recipient. This research operates on the assumption that individuals process messages carefully whenever they are motivated and able to do so. Two types of theories dominate modern persuasion research: the elaboration likelihood model and heuristic systemic models.

The elaboration likelihood model developed by Cacioppo, Petty, and Stoltenberg (1985) has been used most frequently (and very effectively) in therapeutic and counseling settings. It states that the amount and nature of thinking that a person does about a message will affect the kind of persuasion that the message produces. Aspects of the persuasion situation that have been shown to be important for this model include source, message, recipient, affect, channel, and context. Of particular importance is the degree to which the recipient views the message's issue as relevant to himself. This model has demonstrated its utility in persuading various people to make various types of healthier choices (e.g., cancer patients, those at risk from HIV/AIDS, teens at risk from tobacco use, etc.).

Heuristic systemic models propose that argument strength will be most effective in persuading an individual when she is motivated and able to attend to the message (the "systemic" route). When the target individual is not motivated or is unable to attend carefully, persuasion will take place through more indirect means (the "heuristic" route), such as nonverbal cues or source credibility. Persuasion that takes place

via the systemic route will be relatively permanent and enduring; persuasion through the heuristic route is more likely to be temporary.

Broader than persuasion, social impact theory, as developed primarily by Bibb Latane (1981), forms the basis for an active line of inquiry today called dynamic social impact theory. Social impact means any of the number of changes that might occur in an individual (physiological, cognitive, emotional, or behavioral) due to the presence or action of others, who are real, imagined, or implied. Social impact theory proposes that the impact of any information source is a function of three factors: the number of others who make up that source, their immediacy (i.e., closeness), and their strength (i.e., salience or power). Impact also may be attenuated by impediments to the operation of any of the three factors.

Dynamic social impact theory (Latane 1996) uses these ideas about social impact to describe and predict the diffusion of beliefs through social systems. In this view, social structure is the result of individuals influencing each other in a dynamic and iterative way. The likelihood of being influenced by someone nearby, rather than far away, (the *immediacy* factor noted above) produces localized cultures of beliefs within communication networks. This process can lead initially randomly distributed attitudes and beliefs to become clustered or correlated; less popular beliefs become consolidated into minority subcultures. Dynamic social impact theory views society as a self organizing complex system in which individuals interact and impact each others' beliefs.

Like dynamic social impact theory, the structural approach to social influence examines interpersonal influence that occurs within a larger network of influences. In this larger network, attitudes and opinions of individuals are reflections of the attitudes and opinions of their referent others. Interpersonal influence is seen as a basis of individuals' socialization and identity. Social influence is seen as the process by which a group of actors will weigh and then integrate the opinions of significant others within the context of social structural constraints. The structure determines the initial positions of group members and the network and weight of interpersonal influences within the group.

Social influence network theory, as described by Friedkin (1998), has its roots in work by social psychologists and mathematicians, including French. The formal theory involves a two stage weighted averaging of influential opinions. Actors start out with their own initial opinions on some matter. At each stage, then, actors form a "norm" opinion which is a weighted average of the other opinions in the group. Actors then modify their own opinion in response to this norm, forming a new opinion which is a weighted average of their initial opinion and the network norm. This theory utilizes mathematical models and quantifications to measure the process of social influence.

Expectation states theory provides another formal treatment of social influence. Rooted in the work of Bales (1950), which found inequalities in the amount of influence group members had over one another, researchers in this tradition have developed systematic models predicting the relative influence of task oriented actors in group settings. Bales discovered that even when group members were equal on status at the beginning of the group session, some members would end up being more influential than others. The group would develop a hierarchy based on the behavior of the group members. When group members were initially unequal in status, inequalities would be imported to the group from the larger society such that, for example, age or sex or race would structure a hierarchy of influence.

Expectation states theory, as described in Berger et al. (1980), was originally proposed as an explanation for Bales's finding that groups of status equals would develop inequalities in influence. According to the theory, group members develop expectations about the future task performance of all group members, including themselves. Once developed, these expectations guide the group interaction. In fact, expectations both guide and are maintained by the interaction. Those group members for whom the highest expectations are held will be the most influential in the group's interactions.

Research in the expectation states tradition has developed into a burgeoning area within sociological social psychology. Scholars are continuing to expand the theory both theoretically and substantively. On the theoretical side, developments include the status characteristics

branch, work on status creation, ideas about status interventions, and many others. More substantive or applied work has been conducted using expectation states approaches to social influence in settings such as classrooms, jury rooms, and the workplace. Status characteristics that produce influence have been identified and extensively studied, including sex, race, sexual orientation, and physical attractiveness.

Future work will need to integrate these approaches of minority influence, persuasion, social impact, the structure of social influence, and expectation states. While each approach has produced worthwhile knowledge thus far, a general model of social influence will need to incorporate group structures, the characteristics of the individuals in those structures, and the distribution of characteristics into majority and minority components.

SEE ALSO: Asch Experiments; Authority and Conformity; Expectation States Theory; Interpersonal Relationships; Reference Groups

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social integration and inclusion

Rainer Strobl

Social integration refers to the interrelation of elements in a social system. The term social system is used in a broad sense here. It describes a social unit with a relatively stable order that establishes a border between itself and its environment. In this sense groups, organizations, or even whole nation states are examples of social systems. Traditionally, actors who are members of a social unit are regarded as the elements of a social system. However, in sociological works like Luhmann's *Social Systems* (1995) the elements are conceived more abstractly as actions or communications. This theoretical development reflects a social development of increasing functional differentiation and individualization with more demanding conditions for the coordination of the elements in a social system. In tribal societies the interrelation of elements is quasi natural. It is granted by clear expectations in strict kinship systems. But already feudal societies need elaborate catalogues of rights and duties, albeit these are conceived as God given and the individual is confronted with a clear set of norms in his social environment. With increasing functional differentiation in modern societies there is a decreasing involvement of actors as whole persons with all their abilities and social and psychological needs in a single social system. As a result, social integration is no longer self evident and becomes both a social and a theoretical problem.

The pioneer in the study of social integration, Durkheim (1970) presents two ways for

linking up elements of a social system and thus two types of social integration. On the one hand, his concept of mechanical solidarity stresses the traditional coordination of the elements in a social system through common values and beliefs. It implies tendencies common to all members of the society and the urge to conform to a “collective conscience.” On the other hand, his concept of organic solidarity emphasizes a new form of integration through interdependence. It refers to the division of labor and the necessary cooperation of specialists. These two types of social integration are also known as normative and functional integration. Although Parsons (1967) approves of Durkheim’s distinction between mechanical and organic solidarity, normative integration plays the dominant role in his work. It even encompasses functional integration and comes close to the notion of social order, which is a normative order in Parsons’s theory. Although mechanical solidarity and organic solidarity are conceived as in Durkheim’s work, Parsons emphasizes that organic solidarity also depends on common values and on norms of property, contract, market relations, etc. But unlike the norms of mechanical solidarity, these norms only set a framework for actors who then follow their individual interests. Apart from the mentioned two types of social integration there is another way of relating elements of a social system yet to be discussed: *conflict*. Georg Simmel demonstrated in “The Sociology of Conflict” (1903) that actors can be intensively linked by conflict. As soon as one gets involved in an escalating conflict more and more remarks and actions of the opponent become relevant in terms of intended discrimination or harm and are integrated into the system. Contrary to common belief, conflicts are social systems with a high degree of social integration. Thus, the opposite of social integration is not conflict but social disintegration. Conflicts arise if communication and interaction chains do not simply stop and disintegrate after the acknowledgment of a controversy, but begin to revolve around this controversy. Consequently, one has to acknowledge that there can be both too much and too little social integration.

Social integration has been discussed as being close to the general issue of social order. An additional aspect is how an element

becomes part of an existing social system. In this connection *assimilation* and *inclusion* can be regarded as modes of incorporating new elements. Assimilation refers to the possibility of becoming a member of a social unit by the acceptance and adoption of a given normative system. In this way the assimilation concept is traditionally used in migration literature. In Gordon’s (1964) well known assimilation model the process starts with cultural and behavioral adaptation which opens access to cliques, clubs, and institutions on primary group level and the possibility of intermarriage. According to Gordon, this should lead to identification with the host society and finally to an absence of prejudice, discrimination, and value and power conflicts. However, Gordon concedes that a certain phase may continue indefinitely and thus the final state may never be reached. Conforming to important normative standards of cliques, clubs, and institutions on primary group level thus may grant access to functionally unspecific social systems and may fulfill the social and psychological needs of a person, but they cannot guarantee access to good jobs or good education in modern societies. In other words, assimilation refers to the sphere of the lifeworld. It involves the whole person who becomes a member of a group or community. Consequently, the person will be defined as a member of this group or community and her freedom to act will be restricted according to the normative system of this social unit. In this connection we can concede that once access is obtained there may start processes of negotiating social norms. Therefore, assimilation need not be conceived as a unidirectional process where (in the end) the minority has become a copy of the majority. But at least there is the idea of a cultural nucleus that has to be accepted (Alba & Nee 2003).

As in modern societies integration into the sphere of the lifeworld does not automatically lead to participation in function systems like the economy, science, the educational system, or the justice system, there has to be a mechanism for participation in these systems. This mechanism is called inclusion. *Inclusion* means that specific competences and actions of a person are relevant for a social system. Accordingly, no individual is completely integrated into only one function system (Luhmann 1995). The adoption of specific cultural norms

is not a precondition for inclusion. Sometimes it is even the violation of norms that facilitates inclusion. An example is rap music. Some famous rap musicians violate diverse cultural and even legal norms. However, this behavior helps to make them relevant for the music industry and to include them into the economic system. The freedom for the individual to violate norms in some social areas and nevertheless be included in function systems is a result of the fact that only specific roles of an individual, or more precisely, only particular actions and communications contribute to the processing of a function system. For the economic system, it is the crucial question if someone can pay or not, for the justice system it is the difference between right and wrong, for science it is the difference between true and false, etc. Of course, the basic norms of the particular function system have to be accepted (e.g., the norms of property and contract in economy or theoretical and methodological standards in science). However, someone from abroad can be an important business partner without accepting the moral or cultural standards of the country and someone who is disrespectful towards his wife can have valuable scientific insights. The necessary condition for relevance in a function system is the availability of the respective media, such as money, knowledge, power, etc. On the other hand, a lack of money, knowledge, or power prevents inclusion in the particular system and implies the danger of exclusion from all function systems. People in this situation (e.g., illegal immigrants, the homeless) are not relevant as taxpayers, consumers, or voters and are reduced to social problems or completely lost from sight.

As participation in function systems is essential in modern societies, there are instruments to improve the abilities and resources of disadvantaged and excluded individuals. In particular, the institutions of the welfare state can be conceived as means to safeguard against exclusion and to re-include the excluded. Efforts to integrate migrants – improvement of legal status, language courses, financial support, etc. – also aim at the chances of inclusion. Assimilation, on the other hand, cannot be achieved by institutional actors because they typically address a person in the specific role of a client. However, the change of cultural habits and personal convictions would involve the whole person.

Therefore, this is beyond their capability. It may not even be desirable to support a strong commitment to family, friends or the local, religious, or ethnic community. This form of social integration may for example prevent a person from moving to another town for a job or from attending a university and thus turn out as an obstacle to inclusion. Therefore, to improve inclusion it may be necessary to loosen social integration into primary groups and to support normative disintegration to a certain degree. On the other hand, a strong commitment to the demands of the function systems and a neglect of the lifeworld may lead to dissatisfaction, emotional problems, or even psychosomatic symptoms. As function systems dominate modern societies, there are reasons for complaints about the colonization of lifeworlds. However, as Weber pointed out in *Economy and Society* (1968), integration into a group or a community can also go along with oppression and the restriction of chances in life. In traditional societies, those who are not willing or who are not able to conform to the norms of the family and the community often have to face massive sanctions. In this respect inclusion as a new form of social integration means more freedom for the individual. But in contrast to the clear cut normative environment of traditional societies and groups, inclusion also means participation in different social systems with heterogeneous demands. In modern societies the individual is not undivided in the Latin meaning of the word, but divided into different roles and only specific actions and communications are relevant for the function systems and are included into their processing. From the perspective of the individual, there are no ready made solutions for the integration of the included and excluded facets of his personality into a meaningful identity, as from the perspective of society there is no master scheme for the integration of the different subsystems into a consistent whole. Under these circumstances, assimilation to the rigid but clear norms of ethnic, religious, or political fundamentalism can become a tempting alternative. It will be a challenging task for future research to analyze the possibilities and risks for a compromise between the demands of lifeworld and function systems and for a balance between assimilation and inclusion.

SEE ALSO: Durkheim, Émile; Lifeworld; Marginality; Parsons, Talcott; Social Exclusion; Social System

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social justice, theories of

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Justice, in its many guises, is a fundamental principle ensuring order in social groups ranging from small, intimate circles of friends to large, diverse societies. Its counterpart, injustice, arises when expectations about distributions, procedures, or interactions are unmet. Such unmet expectations stimulate the potential

for change, both trivial and profound. *Distributive justice* pertains to the fairness of the allocation of rewards or burdens to a circle of recipients. *Procedural justice* captures the fairness of the means by which distributions are made. *Interactional justice* refers to fairness in the treatment of individuals within a group. These formal definitions, however, beg the fact that what individuals perceive as fair is subjective. That subjectivity pervades the two general approaches of the sociological study of justice.

One approach analyzes the social injustices wrought by income inequality, racism, sexism, etc. Theories about differences between groups based on income, skin color, gender, etc. are addressed elsewhere in this encyclopedia. Such perspectives focus on the origins and consequences of the differences, and implicitly raise the specter of injustice in considering fairness of the distribution of resources to each group and the treatment of group members based on their (subjectively devalued or presumed inferior) characteristics. In a related vein, debates over the distribution of societal goods (e.g., health care, jobs, housing) and societal burdens (e.g., hazardous wastes, taxes) to different groups in society also constitute issues of social justice. Social movements, while caused by many factors and requiring resources and organization, may rally individuals with cries of injustice and signal changes to redress injustice.

The second approach, which is largely the focus of this entry, examines the intersection of individuals' objective circumstances, their perceived realities, and their behaviors in order to grasp what people believe is just and how they respond to perceived injustices. In pursuing this second approach, social psychologists have developed theoretical frameworks and cumulated empirical results to explain distributive, procedural, and interactional justice issues more broadly. Such explanations, in turn, may inform the study of social injustices.

DISTRIBUTIVE JUSTICE

Theoretical perspectives on distributive justice address in various ways three key questions: What is justice? Why do people differentially perceive injustice? How do people respond to

perceived injustice? Most theoretical approaches focus singularly on one of these questions. Guillermina Jasso (2001), however, offers a theoretical framework for justice analysis that includes the building blocks to address all of the key questions.

Jasso identifies the following as abstract components of determining what is just: the observer, who makes judgments about justice, and the rewardees, who are recipients of whatever is being distributed (observers may also be rewardees). The theory focuses on the observer's beliefs about the just reward and its application to the rewardees, given their characteristics. The application results in a just reward function which, when summed over rewardees, ensures the just reward distribution.

Combining these abstract building blocks reflects prior theorizing on distribution rules and allocation preferences (e.g., Leventhal et al. 1980). Distribution rules specify how outcome levels should correspond with individual characteristics (i.e., just reward functions). Three basic principles are equality, equity, and needs. Distinct from the others, the equality principle ignores individual characteristics, focusing instead on the equality of outcomes. The equity principle assumes that contributions, status, effort, etc. constitute inputs that entitle actors to commensurate levels of rewards. Equity also typically implies a comparison of outcome to input ratios across individuals. The needs principle likewise emphasizes commensurability with outcomes.

Leventhal et al.'s expectancy value perspective argues that various motivations (e.g., self interest, fairness, expedience) coupled with expectations about which principle enhances the likelihood of achieving differentially valued goals (e.g., group harmony, productivity, group welfare) predict distribution rule preference. Although the theoretical framework recognizes different motivations, what is preferred shapes what individuals believe to be fair or, in Jasso's terms, the observer's beliefs about the just reward. The theory allows that situational circumstances do affect underlying motivations and the value of goals. For example, conditions emphasizing impartiality, attention to the welfare of others, emphasis on a currently blatantly unfair distribution, open discussion

of distribution principles, and/or politeness typically produce distribution preferences that differ from those associated with self interest. Thus individuals' own concerns and circumstances influence what they believe to be just.

Recognition of variation in the social positioning of individuals is one means to explain why people differentially perceive injustice. Indeed, there tends to be an egocentric bias in what people believe is just, although situational factors (e.g., role demands, concern for others) and individual characteristics (e.g., gender, specific belief systems) may attenuate it (Hegtvedt & Markovsky 1995). In addition to objective circumstances and personal motivations, actors' subjective evaluations of what is just stem from perceptions about a given situation and comparisons invoked.

A number of empirical studies attempt to address how beliefs and perceptions affect evaluations of injustice. Drawing from attribution theory and notions about cognitive processing, individuals are more likely to weigh internally caused inputs (e.g., effort, ability), which are under the control of an actor, as a more suitable basis for deriving an equitable distribution than externally caused inputs. Schema about pay levels and pay processes also provide a standard for assessing justice.

Such standards are a form of non social comparisons, but may stem from prior social comparisons. Early theoretical work in the expectation states tradition (Berger et al. 1972) highlighted the importance of both the status value of outcomes (not simply their consumatory value) as well as various types of comparisons. This status value formulation argues that people develop stereotyped ideas of how social characteristics go with particular rewards. These ideas constitute referential structures. Thus, when an individual assesses his or her reward level or outcome/input ratio, the comparison may be to that of another individual (i.e., a local comparison) or to that inherent in a referential structure representing what people with the given characteristics generally get. The latter comparison puts individual rewards into a broader perspective and raises the possibility of the combination of comparisons. Other comparisons include those to one's past (internal comparisons) or between one's group and another group.

Jasso (1980) captures mathematically the potential for variation in the magnitude of perceived injustice (i.e., degrees of under and overreward) stemming theoretically from differences in cognitions and comparisons. The justice evaluation (J) represents the observer's judgment that someone (including self) is justly or unjustly rewarded. The formula for J defines the justice evaluation in terms of the comparison between the actual reward received and the amount considered just, which implicitly stems from the observer's motivations, perceptions, and comparisons, as discussed above. The formula includes a numerical coefficient that designates the reward as a good or as a bad, and that allows the transformation of the experience of the justice evaluation into an expressed evaluation. An array of observer–rewardee justice evaluations may create a matrix or index to capture the overall injustice in a group or society. Such an array may also distinguish variation in the experience of injustice, bolstering the subjectivity of the evaluation.

Evaluations of injustice are likely to engender emotional, psychological, and behavioral reactions. Adams' (1965) classic formulation of equity theory specifies non mathematically how individuals are likely to respond to perceived injustice, while Jasso's (2001) more recent statement offers a mathematical approach. Adams suggested that individuals who feel unjustly treated are likely to feel distress, and as self interested actors are likely to be motivated to eliminate unpleasant feelings and restore justice in the least costly manner. Homans elaborated on the concept of distress, arguing that under rewarded actors are likely to feel anger while overrewarded ones may feel guilt. Although cumulated studies document the anger responses, the guilt response remains more equivocal. Like wise, research tends to support Adams's behavioral strategies for restoring equity (e.g., increasing inputs if overrewarded, increasing outcomes if underrewarded), but few studies address psychological mechanisms (e.g., cognitively altering the value of inputs and outcomes) or compare the conditions under which one strategy or another will be chosen. Adams's formulation is focused on individual level reactions, while Jasso's further allows for the possibility of collective reactions.

Most theorizing and research in distributive justice pertains to individual level phenomena, largely because it is individuals who assess whether or not injustice has occurred. As a result, perceptions of justice are sometimes confounded with feelings of deservingness and, ironically, equated with assessments of self interest. Yet, as philosophical treatises on justice and the implicit moral underpinnings of social psychological approaches suggest, distributive justice ensures more than the welfare of an individual. Rather, it engenders beliefs that a fair distribution will benefit the collectivity more broadly by upholding consensual values and suppressing bias. The emphasis on the group, while somewhat lost in considerations of distributive justice, is the cornerstone of the key theoretical approaches to procedural and interactional justice.

PROCEDURAL AND INTERACTIONAL JUSTICE

Although the three key questions characterizing distributive justice research also apply to procedural justice, the development of this area is marked chronologically by several classic contributions. Thibaut and Walker (1975) first drew attention to the notion of procedural justice in the legal context. They argued that people are concerned about the procedures involved in decision making, especially in conflict situations, because they affect outcome levels. Certain rules could ensure procedural justice (Leventhal et al. 1980): (1) consistency of procedures across persons; (2) suppression of bias; (3) accuracy of information; (4) mechanisms to correct bad decisions; (5) representativeness of the participants to a decision; and (6) ethicality of standards. Lind and Tyler (1988), however, documented that adherence to such rules is important to people independent of outcome levels and in a variety of contexts. As an alternative to Thibaut and Walker's "instrumental" approach to fair procedures, they offered a group value approach that has become the theoretical touchstone for both procedural and interactional justice, especially in the area of organizational research.

The group value approach assumes that people want to be valued members of their group

and that they look to procedures within the group to provide them with information about their position in the group. To the extent that authorities employ fair procedural rules, such as giving individuals the opportunity to voice their concerns prior to a decision (e.g., allowing representativeness), they are likely to feel valued by the group. The use of fair procedures, moreover, solidifies the group structure and values, enhancing individuals' pride in their group. In addition, authorities who treat their subordinates in a trusting, respectful, and unbiased fashion are likely to be viewed as procedurally fair. In effect, Tyler and Lind (1992) recognize two forms of procedural justice: (1) the rules underlying the process of decision making; and (2) the polite and dignified treatment of members of the group. Some researchers (Bies & Moag 1986) contend that the second constitutes a unique form: interactional justice.

Regardless of the labeling, a great deal of research specifies what rules appear to be procedurally fair, the relationship between procedural and distributive justice, and the implications of procedural injustice (see Tyler et al. 1997). Research indicates that people perceive rules such as consistency and representativeness as key to ensuring procedural justice. Also important to procedural justice evaluations are the reasons certain procedures are invoked. Providing a rationale for a decision allows evaluators to make more accurate attributions and demonstrates respect for their ability to understand why authorities made a certain decision.

Lind and Tyler (1988) emphasize the importance of procedures for understanding evaluations of distributive justice as well. Individuals are more likely to tolerate unfair or low outcomes if the procedures by which they were produced are perceived as fair. Two theoretical frameworks detail why this is so. Folger's (1986) referent cognition theory suggests that when people receive an unfair outcome, they examine the procedures or "instrumentalities" responsible for their outcomes. Comparisons between what actually happened and what could have happened (the referent cognitions) affect the perceived severity of the distributive injustice. Also relying upon cognitions, van den Bos et al. (2001) argue that people use whatever information they have to substitute for information

that might be more relevant but is missing (e.g., other people's levels of rewards). Their "fairness heuristic theory" argues that procedural information provides an individual with knowledge of his or her value to the group, which in turn underlies feelings of inclusion that affect acceptance or rejection of outcomes. When people have more information on outcomes upon which to make their distributive justice evaluations, they are less likely to rely upon procedural information. Thus it is in the absence of information that individuals use procedures as a heuristic.

Because of the importance of procedures in and of themselves, however, the group value model specifies reactions to procedural injustice or, more generally, the implications of procedural unfairness. Like reactions to distributive injustice, individuals who perceive procedural injustice may feel angry and dissatisfied, as well as develop a dislike toward the perpetrators of the injustice. Procedural unfairness also threatens compliance with rules and with authorities in a variety of settings. For example, in dealing with law enforcement officers, individuals are more likely to comply with their requests if they are treated in a polite, respectful manner. In organizational settings, procedural justice is likely to enhance organizational commitment and organizational citizenship behaviors (Colquitt et al. 2001). The forays of procedural justice researchers into more applied areas reinforce the role of basic theory in understanding issues of social justice.

RELEVANCE OF THEORIES TO SOCIAL JUSTICE

Although varying in levels of abstract and underlying theoretical assumptions (e.g., self interest versus group value), the individual level theories of distributive, procedural, and interactional justice may inform the study of social justice issues such as income inequality, racism, sexism, etc. Indeed, in the past, many studies have focused on the fairness of distribution of income or privileges across groups (Hegtvedt & Markovsky 1995). People in western societies tend to view inequality as fair by focusing on the importance of individual contributions.

This perception varies cross nationally, however, depending upon strength of beliefs in the capitalistic economic system in comparison to beliefs in a welfare state. Similarly, justice theory has been brought to bear upon gender issues such as the fairness of the division of labor in the household. Like the role of belief systems in understanding perceptions of income inequality, gender roles attitudes tend to affect tolerance of inequality in the household division of labor. Understanding the ways in which people assess whether procedures or outcomes are fair or unfair may provide a basis for resolving conflicts occurring between different cultural and ethnic groups, especially as the demographics of these groups shift.

Theories of justice in social psychology have long assumed consensus on what is just or simply ignored the implications of different perceptions of injustice. However, as social injustices illustrate, such consensus is often illusive and the consequences profound for some groups. Several areas of research stemming from basic theoretical frameworks may contribute to a means to resolve social injustices. First, examination of social categorization processes and perceptions of similarity and dissimilarity may help to define the moral communities to which justice principles apply. Second, an understanding of the different interests and beliefs of groups may inform the likelihood and nature of conflict between groups (or individuals) and the potential role of a more general sense of justice (not simply justified self interest) in resolving competing claims. And third, a shift away from the typical predictions of what the disadvantaged are likely to perceive, feel, and do toward determining when people who benefit from current societal procedures and distributions are likely to step beyond their own self interests may inform understanding of social change and ultimately create a more consensual notion of justice.

SEE ALSO: Distributive Justice; Global Justice as a Social Movement; Globalization and Global Justice; Inequality/Stratification, Gender; Race and the Criminal Justice System; Social Movements; Stratification and Inequality, Theories of

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social learning theory

Laura Auf der Heide

Social learning theory was developed in the 1950s by Albert Bandura as a direct response to strict behaviorism as a means for explaining how individuals learn about their social worlds. Instead of solely examining the result of the outside environment on individual behavior, social learning theory is concerned with the reciprocal influence of environmental cues on an individual's behavior and the impact of the individual's behavior on the environment. In addition, social learning theory places an emphasis on individuals' cognitive processes as they decide upon future courses of action. Thus, social learning theory takes a middle ground position between social psychological theories that stress either environmental or internal cognitive processes as the sole component of learning.

BEHAVIORISM

Social learning theory posits that people learn about their social worlds in two distinct ways. First, following in the tradition of behaviorism, individuals learn through direct experience with their environments, and the rewards and consequences that follow. Behaviorism espouses a phenomenon known as operant conditioning. In essence, through operant conditioning, behaviorists believe they can predict the future probability of behavior based on two types of contingency effects associated with a particular behavior. *Reinforcement contingencies* encourage an individual to keep repeating a task. *Punishment contingencies* serve to diminish a particular behavior. Similar to theories of social exchange and rational choice, behaviorism and social learning theory assume that individuals attempt to maximize their rewards and avoid punishments. For example, Carrie may learn that hitting her brother Bill is unacceptable when she is punished by her mother for that act. According to predictions of operant conditioning, Carrie should stop hitting Bill to avoid the negative sanction (punishment contingency). Similarly, Carrie might learn that

putting her clothes in the hamper is good when her mother praises her for that act. Here we would expect Carrie to keep putting her clothes in the hamper in order to continue receiving praise (reinforcement contingency). Numerous experimental studies have shown that behavior can be effectively increased or decreased through the use of different contingencies.

OBSERVATIONAL LEARNING AND MODELING

In addition to recognizing the importance of direct experience on learning, social learning theory also stresses the importance of observational learning, or modeling, the actions of others. Social learning theory posits that individuals do not have to experience consequences directly to determine the value of a particular action if they have been able to observe the consequences somebody else has received for it. Thus, in reference to the first example above, if Carrie watches her older sister Margaret get in trouble for hitting Bill, she will learn that hitting Bill has negative consequences without experiencing the negative consequences for herself. Given this information, Carrie will likely not hit Bill in the future unless the reward for hurting him is greater than the punishment she receives from her mother. In reference to the second example, if Carrie sees Margaret get rewarded for putting her clothes in the hamper, she may model Margaret's behavior and put *her* clothes in the hamper to get a reward.

The concept of modeling is intrinsic to the discussion of observational learning. Whenever we learn by observing someone else's rewards/consequences, that person becomes a model for that behavior, whether we choose to reenact that behavior ourselves or not. In the above examples, Margaret served as Carrie's model. Bandura (1973) proposes that there are four necessary conditions for observational learning and modeling. *Attentional processes* highlight the importance of an individual's awareness of a model performing an activity. Thus, mere exposure to the model is not enough for an individual to learn from the model's behavior; one must also pay attention to the behavior. *Retention processes* refer to the individual's capacity for long term memory of a model's

behavior. It is a necessary component of the learning process that an individual be able to reproduce the model's behavior even when the model is not physically present; one primary way of retaining the learned behavior is through rehearsal. *Motor reproduction processes* occur when an individual enacts what she has learned. However, Bandura stresses that individuals can learn particular behaviors without having acted them out themselves. For instance, Carrie learned that hitting Bill had consequences for Margaret without having to hit Bill herself. Finally, *reinforcement and motivational processes* are integral to observational learning. Although individuals learn behavior from others, they are less likely to enact the behavior themselves if they have seen others get punished for the behavior. These four conditions specify *when* individuals are likely to learn from others. However, there are three conditions under which individuals may be more or less likely to imitate a model once these four conditions have been fulfilled.

DETERMINANTS OF MODELING

Bandura has identified three determinants that affect whether an individual will model what she has learned. First, the model's characteristics matter. Social learning theory recognizes that an individual's status, power, and competence at a task will greatly impact whether others choose to model her. This perspective has been developed formally as expectation states theory. In our society, people assume that individuals with high status, power, or competence must know the correct way of doing things; thus, social learning theory would predict that individuals with these characteristics will be modeled more often. Second, the attributes of the individual learning from the model (or the observer) determine whether she will be more likely to model the behavior. Research has demonstrated that those who lack confidence, have low self-esteem, and are more dependent are more often rewarded for imitating high status people. Indeed, the status, power, and competence of the observer likely interact with the characteristics of the model to determine imitation: a low status person will be more likely to model a

high status person than the other way around. For example, research has shown that children model adults, but adults do not model children, a lower status group. In addition to status characteristics, research shows that those who are more open to learning through modeling often obtain the greatest gains when learning new skills (Bandura 1977). Third, as mentioned above, the response categories associated with a model's behavior directly influence whether an observer imitates that behavior. This is especially true when an individual sees a model get rewarded or punished for a particular action. However, when a model receives a neutral response for her actions, or an observer is unsure of the response consequences for an action, then the observer will be more likely to focus on the status of the model when determining her future course of action. Thus, an observer will more likely imitate a high status over a low status model if she does not know the outcomes of the model's actions. Observers tend to continue imitating models as long as they receive rewards for that action. If they start obtaining bad reactions for their actions, then they will seek out a new model.

Adding observational learning to behaviorism's focus on operant conditioning was a great advance for social learning theory. However, both direct and observational learning still emphasize the environment when predicting the behaviors of individuals. Social learning theory extends this to include individual cognitions as part of the learning process. Given the assumption that individuals desire to maximize rewards and minimize punishments, social learning theory posits that they learn to regulate themselves in order to obtain desired rewards. Social learning theory holds that when observing the response consequences of others, individuals begin to understand the future consequences of various actions they could take. This knowledge, gained through observation of the environment, allows individuals to plan what actions will allow them to obtain desired rewards extrinsically, as well as influence them to intrinsically motivate themselves to achieve external rewards. Over the long term, research has shown that individuals are more influenced by intrinsic than extrinsic rewards (Bandura 1977).

APPLICATIONS OF SOCIAL LEARNING THEORY

Within sociology, social learning theory has been applied primarily to the socialization process, aggression, and deviance. As already detailed, social learning theory can be usefully applied to examine how children learn about their social worlds. Through processes of imitation and conditioning, children learn how to speak, how to interact with others, and how to adopt the norms and values of society. Some sociological research has attempted to extend social learning theory to learning across the life course, in such diverse areas as organizational behavior and social movements.

Perhaps in its most famous application, Bandura utilized social learning theory to study aggression. In contrast to the evolutionary perspective on aggression, which roots aggression in the individual's biological makeup and psychological functioning, and the frustration-aggression hypothesis, which posits that individuals behave aggressively when they encounter a stimulus that psychologically frustrates them, social learning theory examines how the *external* son's aggressiveness. In a series of well known experiments, Bandura (1965) showed that children who watched models behave aggressively towards a blown up Bobo doll were more likely to imitate the behavior when the model received a reward or a neutral response for the aggression. However, children who watched the model receive a punishment were statistically less likely to imitate the model's behavior. As a result of these experiments, Bandura concluded that the aggression individuals evidence in the present is directly contingent upon the amount of aggression they have learned in the past. Furthermore, Bandura posits that observational learning is more important than operant conditioning when children learn aggression. Social learning theory's views on aggression have been used to support claims that violence in multimedia outlets, especially movies, television, and video games, leads children to become more aggressive. This perspective has become more popular in the wake of children's violence in schools in the late 1990s.

Social learning theory has also been usefully applied in sociology to the study of crime and deviance in the form of the theory of differential

association (Akers 1977). Akers's theory has four parts, two of which directly originate with social learning theory. First, the theory proposes that people associate with different groups (i.e., have differential association with groups), and as a result become exposed to the norms and values of those groups. Second, the groups with whom we choose to interact also provide us with significant definitions, symbols, and meanings. Most important to deviance, groups espouse definitions either favorable or unfavorable to delinquency. Third, like social learning theory, the theory of differential association predicts that individuals will engage in deviant acts if they receive positive reinforcement for them, and desist if they are punished for committing them. Most of the time, individuals will persist in deviant acts if the group reinforces that behavior. Finally, individuals imitate the behavior of individuals in their group, based on the three contingencies to modeling behavior specified above. Thus, if we see members of our group being delinquent, we see them receive positive rewards for that behavior, and they are high status in our eyes, we will be likely to imitate the deviant behavior. Although differential association was created specifically to explain deviant behavior, it could be usefully applied to most situations involving socialization to a particular group.

Classical tests of social learning theory, including Bandura's studies on aggression, employed experimental methodologies. However, more recent work using the social learning theory paradigm has successfully utilized survey instruments and interviews in an attempt to explain theoretical principles. Given social learning theory's attention to both individual and environmental phenomena, it is uniquely suited to explaining multiple facets of human behavior.

SEE ALSO: Aggression; Behaviorism; Crime, Social Learning Theory of; Deviance, Crime and; Expectation States Theory; Psychological Social Psychology; Rational Choice Theories; Social Exchange Theory; Socialization; Status

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social movement organizations

Elizabeth A. Armstrong and Tim Bartley

Social movements organize people, resources, and ideas for social change. Many do this through formal organizations, and most sociologists recognize the social movement organization (SMO) as a key factor in the study of movements. SMOs can be defined as formal organizations that take the collective pursuit of social change as a primary goal. This concept is trickier than it may initially seem, since it relies on two concepts that are themselves difficult to define. Scholars generally define social movements as contentious forms of collective action operating at least partly outside institutionalized politics. Yet scholars disagree about how significant the desired change needs to be and what it means to work outside of institutionalized politics. Common definitions of organizations – as goal directed, boundary maintaining, and rule governed groups – are somewhat less contentious.

Many social movement groups, both past and present, are clearly identifiable as SMOs – for example, the Student Non Violent Coordinating Committee (SNCC), War Resisters League, Greenpeace, United Students Against Sweatshops, the National Gay and Lesbian Task Force, and many others. Other groups, however, are more ambiguous. Some groups

are insufficiently organized or change oriented to be considered SMOs. For instance, Gay Liberation Fronts existed in many US cities in the early 1970s, but it is unclear if they ever cohered into formal organizations. In contrast, the AFL CIO is highly organized, but at some points it has perhaps been too entrenched in “normal politics” to fit standard definitions of an SMO. Sociologists have not hit upon a simple formula for deciding what is and is not an SMO. In practice, they have often drawn on lay understandings – that is, treating a group as an SMO if its participants see themselves as building an organization that participates in a movement.

Organizations have not always been central to social movement research. Early theories saw mass activity as rooted in social *disorganization*. Studies of crowd behavior and mid century “mass society” theories treated collective action as the result of alienation, social isolation, and authoritarian tendencies. Similarly, “strain theory” argued that social movements were caused by structural shifts that produced social disintegration and the breakdown of existing organizational and institutional structures.

The Civil Rights Movement had a profound impact on the study of social movements. Sociologists' sympathies with the movement contributed to the rise of theories that treated activism as rational political activity requiring resources and organization instead of irrational, spontaneous collective behavior. This shift moved SMOs to the center of the analysis, carried by two influential theories – resource mobilization and political process. Resource mobilization theory developed in part as a response to the professionalization of social movements in the later years of the Civil Rights Movement. McCarthy and Zald (1977) argued that the rise and fall of movements is best explained by the resources available for building and maintaining organizations, not by grievances, which were seen as relatively constant. The resource mobilization paradigm, more than any other approach, put the structure and strength of SMOs at the center of the analysis. Political process theory also drew attention to organizations, viewing social movements as “politics by other means” for those excluded from the formal polity (McAdam 1982). Researchers in this tradition have shown not

only that political opportunities shape mobilization, but also that grassroots organizational infrastructures are critical, as illustrated by the important role that black churches and colleges played in the Civil Rights Movement.

Syntheses of resource mobilization and political process approaches solidified the SMO as a key focus of research. While the SMO was a novel focus in the early days of resource mobilization theory, it now occupies a central place in the sociology of movements.

INTERNAL DYNAMICS OF SMOs

Most research on the internal dynamics of SMOs engages with one of two strong theories of voluntary organizations. One strand focuses on Robert Michels's "iron law of oligarchy" (Michels 1962 [1911]), which argues that organizations inevitably evolve from democratic governance toward control by elites, from radical goals toward moderate ones, and from broad agendas for social change toward narrow dictates of organizational maintenance. Michels's critique of oligarchy inspired some new left and feminist activists in the 1960s to experiment with informal and anti bureaucratic organizational forms, but these experiments often created new organizational problems. Freeman (1972) warned against a "tyranny of structurelessness" in which power coalesces in the hands of the few even in groups with little formal structure. Researchers and activists continue to puzzle over the conditions under which the iron law of oligarchy applies and how movements can subvert this process.

Michels's theory also inspired debates about the efficiency of formal organization – particularly hierarchical and bureaucratic organization – and its effects on movement outcomes. While Piven and Cloward (1979) suggested that formal organization depresses mass mobilization, Gamson (1975) argued that bureaucracy can help movements achieve their goals. This debate posed the question in a limited way: only two organizational forms were considered (bureaucracy versus no bureaucracy) and it was assumed that organizational forms were simply vehicles for achieving particular goals. Other research has moved past these limitations. Polletta (2002) argues that participatory democracy

within SMOs is politically effective under particular conditions. Participatory democracy has three main benefits: it builds group solidarity, enhances the development of innovative tactics, and develops leadership skills. Thus, participatory democracy works when costs of participation are high, the environment is uncertain, or when there are few people with developed leadership skills.

A second strand of research on the internal dynamics of SMOs responds to Olson's (1965) influential statement on the problem of "free riding" in voluntary organizations. Olson argued that since self interested individuals will tend to free ride on the efforts of others, voluntary organizations will be doomed to failure unless they can provide excludable benefits (selective incentives) to their members. Sociologists have shown that organizations can also generate mobilization through "solidary" incentives, social networks, or the formation of a "critical mass." These studies have shed light on the determinants of movement participation, and have reminded social movement scholars that organization is a problem and a process, not merely a structure to be taken for granted.

ENVIRONMENTS AND FIELDS OF SMOs

Scholars have developed several ways of thinking about how SMOs rely on broader environments. Resource mobilization theorists see the provision or withholding of resources – funding, space, staff, technical expertise, equipment – as the primary way environments affect the emergence, form, development, and survival of SMOs. SMOs are more likely to be founded, survive, grow, and achieve their objectives in resource rich environments, and to struggle in resource poor environments. Political process scholars have focused on how the structure of political opportunities shapes the formation, growth, survival, and success of SMOs. Specifically, they have shown that the state and other elite groups enable and constrain SMOs by providing positive opportunities for some kinds of organizations and establishing legal prohibitions against other kinds – typically, those with politically radical or otherwise undesirable ideologies or strategies. As a legitimate source

of rules about what kinds of organizations are legal and will receive benefits from the state (i.e., tax exemption), the state effectively “channels” SMOs. Pressures from the state can also lead SMOs to become more bureaucratic, as tax breaks and governmental funding are often available only to organizations that can demonstrate that their internal structure is acceptable to the state. Institutional theory provides a third way to think about the relationship between SMOs and environments. Neo institutionalists argue that SMOs, like other kinds of organizations, tend to adopt organizational forms that are culturally legitimate and taken for granted as appropriate.

Scholars have also expanded the focus to consider the structure and evolution of entire “fields” or “populations” of SMOs and the consequences for social movement outcomes. Influenced by population ecology theory, some social movement scholars have analyzed the interacting forces that cause populations of SMOs to grow or decline. Minkoff (1999) shows how SMOs constitute the environment for one another, such that the fate and impact of a particular SMO depends partially on its position within a population or field organization. SMOs in a field may compete for resources, cooperate on social movement actions, develop a division of labor, or provide resources and other forms of support to each other. The conditions under which cooperation or competition prevails are not fully understood.

Examination of the structure and evolution of movement fields has also shed light on the consequences of movement diversification. It has often been assumed that ideological differences in a social movement field reflect a lack of unity and thus indicate movement weakness. Yet ideological and functional diversity may enable movements to appeal to a larger constituency and to respond effectively to complex and rapidly changing political environments. Diversity in social movement fields also enables movements to benefit from “radical flank effects” and may even generate useful strategic innovation.

BEYOND THE SMO

Research organized around the concept of the SMO has generated insight into the problem of

how actors coordinate collective action. However, scholars have also found that the process of organizing a social movement is not fully captured by a focus on SMOs. The study of SMOs (as a noun) is only a part of the larger project of understanding social movement organization (as a process). Several strands of social movement scholarship shift the SMO out of the center of the analysis.

A cultural turn in social movement scholarship has reinvigorated interest in *why* people organize. While resource mobilization and political process approaches treated grievances as relatively unproblematic, cultural approaches argue that movements cannot be understood without attention to discourse, framing, and the crystallization of collective identities. This perspective sees SMOs as a site of the cultural work of movements – framing and building collective identities.

Clemens (1997) demonstrated that it is not just the quantity of organization that assists a movement; qualitative variation in organizational form also matters for the success of movements. Scholars have also emphasized that organizational forms are often selected not merely because of their perceived efficiency, but because of activists’ ideological commitments or taken for granted assumptions.

The move beyond SMOs is also informed by the recognition that social movement activity is sometimes coordinated through networks, rather than or in addition to organizations. What we recognize as a social movement may actually be an extensive advocacy network, featuring SMOs but also including highly professionalized advocacy organizations, governmental or intergovernmental actors, and individual policy entrepreneurs. Some activists have adopted decentralized networks as an organizing principle, eschewing more traditional organizational vehicles. In the environmental movement, for instance, groups like EarthFirst!, the Rainforest Action Network, and the Indigenous Environmental Network all embrace a network model, albeit in varying ways and degrees.

Finally, scholars beyond the subfield of social movements have realized that the processes identified and described by social movement scholars are evident in other arenas of social life. Theories developed to explain SMOs are sometimes applied to other types of organizations,

including businesses, industry associations, and universities. A synthesis of “social movements and organizational theory” (Davis et al. 2005) represents a deeper dialogue between these two subfields, which has the potential to generate new insights into the processes of organizing for change.

SEE ALSO: Civil Rights Movement; Collective Action; Collective Identity; Culture, Social Movements and; Framing and Social Movements; Institutional Theory, New; Mobilization; New Left; Oligarchy and Organization; Organizations, Voluntary; Political Opportunities; Political Process Theory; Resource Mobilization Theory; Social Change; Social Movements; Social Movements, Networks and; Social Movements, Participatory Democracy in; Social Movements, Recruitment to; Social Movements, Strain and Breakdown Theories of

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social movements

James M. Jasper

Although scholarly definitions vary, common usage portrays social movements as sustained and intentional efforts to foster or retard social changes, primarily outside the normal institutional channels encouraged by authorities. *Sustained* implies that movements differ from single events such as riots or rallies. Their persistence often allows them to develop formal organizations, but they may also operate through informal social networks. *Intentional* links movements to culture and strategy: people have ideas about what they want and how to get it, ideas that are filtered through culture as well as psychology. Movements have purposes, even when these have to do with transforming members themselves (as in many religious movements) rather than the world outside the movement. *Foster or retard*: although many scholars have a Whiggish tendency to view movements as progressive, dismissing regressive efforts as countermovements, this distinction seems arbitrary and unsustainable (not to mention the unfortunate effect that different tools are then used to analyze the two types). *Non institutional* distinguishes movements from political parties and interest groups that are a more regular part of many political systems, even though movements frequently create these other entities and often maintain close relationships to them. Most movements today deploy some tactics within mainstream institutions, and non institutional protest is itself often quite institutionalized. Unsurprisingly, each of these claims about social movements has been subject to controversy and differences in emphasis.

UNDERSTANDING DISCONTENT

Theories of discontent have always reflected the historical forms protest was taking at the time, as well as each writer's own sympathies and political participation. In seventeenth and eighteenth century Europe, the collective expression of discontent was primarily understood through the lens of legitimate sovereignty. Economic and social dimensions of the emerging nation state were not yet distinguished from the political, so protest both took the form of and was seen as a political act. The concept of the social movement was not yet possible. Contract theory, a primarily normative discourse, allowed thinkers such as Hobbes to argue against the legitimacy of most resistance to the state, and others such as Locke to defend revolutionary action in the face of predatory rulers. Thinkers of the time hardly noticed the activities of the lower classes.

With accelerated urbanization in the nineteenth century, European intellectuals increasingly took alarm at the regular rebellions of artisans, developing the concept of the mob to explain and disparage them. Crowds came to be seen as a form of madness that caused individuals to act differently than they would when alone – a view crystallized by Gustave Le Bon in the 1890s. Although based on little empirical research, the crowd image remained vital to a number of thinkers in the early twentieth century, including Durkheim, Freud, Weber, and Parsons. Only revolutionaries such as Marx viewed urban mobs favorably, wrongly insisting that they were part of the proletariat who would usher in a just society in the form of socialism (instead, most were the old working class of artisans whose way of life was disappearing).

More sophisticated versions of crowd theory appeared in the mid twentieth century, largely in response to communism and fascism. Until the late 1960s, the dominant view of protest overemphasized the non institutional dimension, lumping movements together with fads, panics, and other collective behavior. Explicitly or implicitly, crowds remained the heart of this vision: the kernel on which other forms of collective behavior were somehow built. Most analysts, drawing from Le Bon, feared crowds and movements and portrayed them pejoratively, although occasional interactionists pointed to

their creativity instead (in a fruitful tradition stretching from Robert Park to Ralph Turner and Lewis Killian, and on through recent theorists such as David Snow and John Lofland). How movements were sustained and what were their goals received less attention, and only occasionally did theorists link movements to social change.

Suddenly everything changed. In the mid 1960s, social movements were everywhere, populated no longer by a dangerous working class but by familiar middle class faces. In retrospect we can see various roots of this new activism: the emergence of a British and later an American new left; increasing international attention to the US Civil Rights Movement especially after the student sit ins of 1960; the 1964 confrontation that spawned the Berkeley free speech movement; anti colonial movements and revolutions around the globe. Theories soon appeared that were sympathetic to protestors.

An organizational or structural paradigm, steeped in Marxism, dominated research from the 1970s to the late 1990s, highlighting the sustained dimension of movements by portraying them as linked to the core political and economic institutions and cleavages of society. No longer grouped with fads, social movements were now nearly indistinguishable from political parties. They were thought to reflect deep structural interests, especially class but also gender, race, and (eventually) sexual preference. Structural assumptions discouraged the asking of "why" questions, as a desire for change or inclusion was assumed. So although movements were recognized as purposive, their purposes were taken for granted rather than empirically investigated. Attitudes and grievances assumed to be ever present were dismissed as causal factors of any importance. The essential question about movements was how they could overcome repression, especially by the state, in order to further their (already existing) interests. They were seen as insurgents or challengers, outsiders trying to gain entry into existing polities. (Scholars disappointed by the failure of most movements of the 1960s focused naturally on the structural constraints that they had faced.)

An American version of the new paradigm emphasized finances, often mobilized by paid, professional activists. Organizations require financial support, and the easiest way to attract

this is by appealing to the privileged in society. Another is by gathering small donations from a large number of sympathizers, especially through direct mail. In the 1960s, a large social movement sector developed, with well developed techniques for gathering funds, organizing shows of public support, and pressuring legislators (McCarthy & Zald 1977). These developments suggested a model of movements as similar to firms in markets, competing with one another for funds, members, and attention. This research tradition is often referred to as resource mobilization due to its emphasis on funding.

Another version of the structural paradigm focused on interactions between movements and the state, on the assumption that the state was usually the opponent as well as judge (under the Marxist assumption that states are instruments of the ruling class). Often dubbed "political process," this tradition emphasized the need for elite allies, cracks in state repression, state crises, and other windows of opportunity in the political environment. This perspective especially fit (because it was largely derived from) the study of European labor and American civil rights movements: efforts at inclusion by well defined groups that lasted for decades. In Europe a more comparative version developed, highlighting ongoing state structures (Kriesi et al. 1995). Despite its healthy focus on a movement's external environment, this approach modeled that environment as a structure (open or closed, for example) rather than an arena of diverse strategic players, as relationships rather than interactions.

Alain Touraine and his many students crafted a different version of the structural paradigm, linking contemporary movements to social structure instead of concentrating on organizational forms. Whereas the central conflict of industrial societies, Touraine (1978) argued, pitted labor against capital in a struggle over the distribution of material goods, post industrial societies saw conflicts over cultural understandings, especially the direction in which society's increasing self control would take it. The technocrats of capital and government sought profit and efficiency, while protestors saw these as mere means to the deeper ends of cultural identities and political rights. Touraine's vision helped scholars recognize the

significance of new movements such as ecology, feminism, or gay rights, invisible under traditional structural models. More recently, Touraine has admitted that Europe and the United States have become new kinds of capitalist societies more than the post industrial societies he had prophesied. The technocrats won.

Alongside these macrosocial visions there emerged a more individualistic view of movements which were redefined accordingly as collective action. Rooted in neoclassical micro economic theory, Mancur Olson (1965) and others cast doubt on the sustainability of movements, precisely by emphasizing the intentions of potential participants whose rationality consisted of constantly calculating whether to participate based on costs and benefits to themselves as individuals. Olson left little room for the attractions of collective solidarity and other incentives besides material benefits. As others have filled in some of these gaps, deriving solutions to the free rider problem, the rational choice approach has become less and less distinct. Many of the solutions are the organizational challenges emphasized by the mobilization and process traditions.

At the turn of the millennium, the structural, Tourainian, and rational choice approaches faced deep problems, and appeared in articles most often as whipping boys for proffered alternatives. The main lacuna of all three was an inattention to cultural meanings, the socially constructed purposes and identities of social movement groups. Even Touraine, who emphasized struggles over cultural meanings rather than material rewards, too often derived those meanings from his theory of historical change rather than empirically from the movements themselves.

Accordingly, beginning in the late 1980s, considerable research and theory addressed the cultural dimensions of movements. Two concepts, frames and collective identity, dominated these efforts. David Snow, Rob Benson, and a series of collaborators did the most to theorize the nature of rhetorical frames, especially those used by activists to recruit others to their cause.

Inspired by identity politics in the United States, in the 1990s the concept of collective identity was increasingly used to get at cultural meanings not already covered by frames. At first, collective identities were seen as a

mobilizing rhetoric built upon a structural position or discrimination, a form of cognitive liberation (McAdam 1982). Individuals imagined themselves members of some larger community, in whose name they acted. Only later was it realized that movements themselves can foster identities without any preexisting structural similarities – and identities can even form around movements, specific tactics such as non violence, or particular organizations (Jasper 1997). It also took time for scholars to recognize that emotional solidarities are just as important to identities as cognitive categories are.

Clearly and narrowly defined, frames and identities are important tools in our conceptual repertoire for understanding social movements, but there are additional ways to get at meanings (Jasper 1997; Goodwin & Jasper 2006). Analyses of ritual or of media coverage draw on well established fields of anthropology and media studies. Narrative has also become popular, as stories are an important part of meetings and self images in social movements. Although traditional narrative theory emphasizes the structuring plots of stories, others highlight the social context of storytelling. Rhetoric, which takes off from this latter point, highlights the interplay of orator and audience, building in not only interaction but intention and emotion. Like framing, naming is a key part of making sense of the world and of persuading others.

Emotions are a central component of culture, playing a role in all social movements. Basic affects like love and hate can pull a movement together or tear it apart. Reactive emotions such as anger, fear, and shock provide raw materials that organizers must transform into moral indignation. Moods such as resignation or cynicism can discourage recruits, just as those of confidence or exhilaration can attract them perhaps through the interaction rituals Collins (2001) describes. Emotions even figure in the outcomes of movements, which frequently aim to transform sensibilities such as compassion or justice.

EMERGENCE

The initial stirrings of a social movement are poorly understood. Given the sensibilities, ideas, values, and allegiances mixed together

in different population segments, how does necessarily limited attention come to be focused on one set of issues rather than others? A news worthy event or death of a loved one may shock people into attention. The zeitgeist may shift slightly, in an enormously complex way, bringing attention and sympathy to new arenas. News coverage also influences our emotional and moral attention. Typically, a small network of would be leaders manages to set aside their normal lives to craft appeals to these understandings to recruit like minded others (or they may be movement professionals whose work is to stimulate protest). Little is known about the first stirrings of a movement.

In contrast, extensive research has examined how individuals are recruited to an emerging or ongoing movement. Early arguments, focusing on individual psychology, had suggested that alienated, insecure, or dogmatic individuals joined social movements. The structural paradigm dismissed such speculation in favor of factors like biographical availability: the lack of spouse, children, or demanding jobs that frees people for the time commitment of participation. But the most important factor in explaining who joins and who does not may be whether the potential recruit already knows someone in the movement. In many movements, a majority of participants are recruited this way (Snow et al. 1980). In a process Anthony Oberschall dubbed bloc recruitment, entire networks can be coopted for new purposes, such as the fundamentalist congregations that became part of the movement to stop the Equal Rights Amendment for American women.

Researchers also turned their attention to the messages transmitted across networks, in other words the cultural aspects of recruitment. Snow and his co authors suggested that recruiters and potential participants had to align their frames to achieve a common definition of a problem and prescription for solving it, with Snow and Benford (1992: 137) defining a frame as an interpretive schema that simplifies and condenses the world out there by selectively punctuating and encoding objects, situations, events, experiences, and sequences of actions within one's present or past environment. Although originally used to focus on the strategic and rhetorical interaction between organizers and recruits, frames have more often and

less usefully been analyzed as static bundles of meanings that either work or do not work.

Recruitment requires more than cognitive agreement between organizers and their audiences. At least as important are the moral visions and emotions that propel people into action. Fear and anger must be transformed into indignation and outrage. Moral shocks are one way that people are drawn into action: when they learn something about the world that outrages them, discovering that the world is not as they had thought (Jasper 1997). The shock may come from a public event such as *Roe v. Wade* or from private sources like the death of a child through corporate negligence. These shocks can be so strong that people seek out protest groups even in the absence of social network ties. Emotions are an essential component of culture, and culture is an essential part of recruitment, whether it operates through social networks or other media.

In addition to people (both leaders and followers), an emerging movement usually needs some infrastructure to carry out its activities. It requires basic means of communication and transportation: a bullhorn to address a large crowd, a fax machine or Internet access to reach supporters, carpools to get people to a rally. It may also need a large meeting room. Financial support allows organizers to purchase what they need. In what was perhaps the high water mark of mobilization theory, Morris (1984) demonstrated the many contributions that black churches and other institutions made to the American Civil Rights Movement, from networks of preachers throughout the South and beyond to meeting halls in which ideas could be aired. Churches also provided cultural meanings, for instance Bible stories and religious songs, that could be used to convey the movement's message to a wide variety of Southern blacks.

In the late twentieth century, transnational social movements and their organizations spread rapidly in a world of globally improving communication and transportation (Keck & Sikkink 1998). It was hard to understand these international networks through the structural paradigm's focus on preexisting interests in a relatively homogeneous and well networked population. This new work on globalization

also portrays a world of many different kinds of players – local, national, and international non governmental organizations (NGOs), assorted state agencies, international institutions such as the United Nations or International Monetary Fund, diverse funding sources, various kinds of publics in complex interaction. Some perceive a shift in conflicts from institutions whose members are nation states (World Bank, World Trade Organization, UN) to a more participatory public sphere of NGOs that cooperate directly as well as through the older organizations. The exchange of information and ideas lies at the heart of these newer networks.

DYNAMICS

But what do movements do? Tilly (1978) suggests that a society contains a repertoire of collective action, from which protestors inevitably draw, depending on local senses of justice, the daily routines and social organization of the participants, their prior experience with collective action, and the repression they are likely to face. Most social movements in a society will conduct the same activities, since that is what they have learned to do through trial and error. New tactics, outside the repertoire, may take opponents and authorities by surprise, but protestors themselves may bungle them due to lack of experience and know how. At the extreme, those who face extreme surveillance and few legal rights are restricted to weapons of the weak such as sabotage, pilfering, poaching, or even jokes and gossip (Scott 1985).

The organizational forms which movements adopt have attracted much attention, perhaps because they are central to a structural paradigm. Piven and Cloward (1977) dissented from the common view that protest groups should accumulate resources, suggesting instead that these distract attention from the best strategy of downtrodden groups, radical insurgency and disruption. An organization, they warn, can all too easily begin to view its own perpetuation and expansion as goals alongside its original purpose. Others have countered that professionalized organizations can stimulate grassroots activity, and that they can allow movement ideas

to survive long periods when they are out of favor. Jasper (2004) prefers to see the building of a stable protest organization as a dilemma, with risks and benefits to both doing it and not doing it.

What kind of organization to construct is another important strategic choice. Drawing on institutional theory, Clemens (1993) shows that organizational form is itself a message, presumably for both members and outsiders. In the American labor movement of the 1890s, fraternal forms of organizing downplayed economic interests and political confrontation, while more military forms like Coxey's Army elicited violent repression. Organizational forms, like other tactical choices, are a fundamental part of shaping a collective identity.

Most protest groups contain rival factions, which may have different goals or different tastes in tactics (Jasper 1997). Factions may develop as newcomers join a movement, demanding internal as well as external changes. Movements may grow more radical because new recruits want more action, or have identities based on being radical, although the structural account emphasizes rebuffs by the state as the key source of radicalization. Radical flanks can have advantages as well as disadvantages. Radical actions and ideas attract media attention, and some times garner quick concessions from opponents or authorities. Among disadvantages, foremost is the possibility that radicals will pull an organization or movement apart or that it will attract repression fatal to the cause.

Less research has addressed other features of what movements actually do on a daily basis: how they make decisions about tactics, seek allies, struggle with factions and unruly individuals, and balance their appeals to a number of different audiences. The structural emphasis on external allies and resources left little theoretical space to see how insurgents actually operated, especially when they had few resources. (Although Touraine, by bringing together representatives of different factions in a movement, was able to recreate their internal conflicts in his "sociological interventions.") Even the poorest can often generate internal resources, and most try to accumulate whatever resources they lack at the beginning of a conflict. Even without money and the resources it buys,

protestors can still be creative, doing things that catch their opponents off guard or take advantage of legal and political opportunities.

In a critique of classic research on organizing, Ganz (2000) derived a number of factors that made the United Farm Workers more inventive than its predecessors and rivals. These include leaders with diverse experience, salient local knowledge, personal commitment, diverse network ties (including strong ties to constituencies), and a diverse tactical repertoire. Organizations, Ganz found, were more creative when they had regular meetings open to diverse perspectives and with the authority to make decisions, had diverse resources (especially flowing up from the constituency itself), and were accountable to each other but also their constituencies. Democratic or entrepreneurial selection of leaders worked better than more bureaucratic processes.

Under the influence of recent theories of agency, organizations can be seen as strategic players in fields of conflict with a range of other players, rather than reified as a movement facing either the state or a political environment. That environment is recognized as a farrago of friends, foes, bystanders, regulators, and others, each with its own goals, means, and internal conflicts. States and movements are both fanciful metaphors covering a variety of players. A more strategic perspective has the potential to explore the boundaries between movements and other political phenomena, finding both similarities and differences across institutional spheres.

In this strategic perspective Jasper (2004) highlights the choices that individuals and groups face by naming a range of dilemmas confronting movements, indeed all strategic players. Naughty or Nice, for example, gets at the diverse effects of disruption or violence, which are often widely unpopular but may inspire a panicked response and yield a quick victory. In the Extension Dilemma, organizers must decide how large a coalition or group to build: bigger ones have more resources at their disposal, but often at the expense of a consensus around goals or a clear collective identity. An emphasis on tradeoffs or choices like these is one way to insist on the agency of social movements even in the face of structural constraints.

EFFECTS

The effects of movements on policy, society, and culture have always interested scholars, as they provide much of the inspiration for studying movements in the first place. Scholars frequently exaggerate the impact of the movements they have spent so much time studying, especially as there are so many definitions and types of success to which to turn. Research in this area has also tended to have a normative flavor, as Whiggish scholars seek sources of progressive social change.

Gamson (1975) pointed to two forms of success: benefits for a movement's constituency and recognition for the protest group itself. The latter was based on a structural image of challengers attempting to gain access to a polity closed to them. An impact on public policy is the central or ultimate goal of many movements, but this effect is often hard to observe because politicians frequently deny it even while they sometimes advance a movement's goals. And indeed, a movement's effect is often to sensitize other actors in a political arena. Kriesi et al. (1995: 212) list internal impacts of identity and organization, and external impacts of four types: procedural, substantive, structural, and sensitizing.

Many factors determine a movement's influence. Rochon (1990: 108) lists size, novelty, and militancy, oddly ignoring resources. Size matters because it may affect resources, but also because in democracies protestors are also voters. Novelty gains media attention and discomfites opponents. Militancy, for instance violence and disruption, may also catch opponents and authorities off guard, but it runs the risk that the latter will organize a repressive strategy capable of suppressing the movement. This is Jasper's Naughty or Nice dilemma. Militancy, like most risky strategies, generally succeeds when a goal can be attained quickly and irreversibly.

All strategic choices can have ramifications. Social movements borrow heavily from each other, not least because activists often move from one to another. This is one reason that movements so often appear in waves, as a frame or tactic proves useful to a number of them. (Although the stronger concept of a cycle, in which one stage leads to the next, seems to have

overreached the evidence.) Elisabeth Clemens showed that the early women's movement, by choosing one form of organization rather than another, often inspired changes in government as well. These groups introduced organizational logics from one sphere of life into another, inserting economic, charitable, and fraternal models into politics, and thereby helping to create today's pattern of interest group politics. New tactics spread rapidly.

Even when social movements have little impact on the world around them, they almost always affect their own members. A number of scholars have traced the consequences of participation in protestors' later lives, especially those active in the 1960s. Far from growing more conservative as they aged, this generation has maintained left leaning sympathies and a well documented inclination toward activism.

METHODS OF RESEARCH

Most studies of social movements, whether quantitative or qualitative, have been case studies. As with those who do area studies, scholars of movements must devote enormous time to mastering the diverse phenomena that comprise any social movement, usually composed of many diverse groups, different kinds of members, various kinds of tactics and events, interactions with a number of other strategic players, and so on. On the positive side, there is frequently a ready audience for reports on the many social movements that help compose our political landscape. On the negative, the same case is often used to develop new theories and concepts as well as to try them out empirically. For instance, every scholar who has written about political opportunities has discovered a different list of them, making it hard to discern the scope conditions of any of them.

Some scholars have tried to avoid this difficulty by looking at events instead of movements. Originally deployed in the study of riots, the use of events as units of analysis was especially helpful in the historical understanding of strikes and other contentious events for which newspaper reports but not richer information were available. Waves of events are useful for seeing the main product of organizing efforts, and for relating these activities to

other political variables. The strength of this approach lies in tracking developments over time and checking correlations of protest with other variables such as unemployment or grain prices, but it remains largely wedded to newspaper accounts.

Protest events are hardly the only unit to be studied. Individuals can be interviewed in depth or randomly surveyed. Researchers can participate themselves, gaining introspective insights not otherwise available and which may be the most effective means for understanding emotions and some strategic choices. Organizations can be studied through a variety of methods, and the interplay of organizations is especially amenable to comparative analysis. Other methods are available for examining networks of individuals or organizations. All of the above can be studied through historical archives as well as contemporary means of gathering data. Computer simulations have also been used to test a number of impressions about movement organization. Gamson (1992) used focus groups to powerfully show the raw cultural materials available for organizing, the commonsense understandings that are as important as media framings of events. Fortunately, the study of social movements has proven open to a variety of techniques rather than being wedded to any kind of methodological purity (Klandermans & Staggenborg 2002).

To conclude, research into social movements shifts focus as movements themselves develop. Nineteenth century riots inspired crowd theories. After mid twentieth century battles with fascism and communism, western analysts turned to mass society theories to explain political movements they feared. In the 1960s, sympathy for middle class movements, especially of students who would later become academics, encouraged portraits of protestors as rational. A number of culturally oriented movements in the 1970s, often labeled new social movements to contrast them with the labor movement, helped to spawn cultural theories. Global networks of activists have inspired globally oriented theories. Future transformations will no doubt give us new portrayals and theories that we cannot yet imagine.

SEE ALSO: Civil Rights Movement; Collective Action; Collective Identity; Contention,

Tactical Repertoires of; Crowd Behavior; Culture, Social Movements and; Emotions and Social Movements; Framing and Social Movements; Gender, Social Movements and; Global Justice as a Social Movement; Identity Politics/Relational Politics; Mobilization; Moral Shocks and Self Recruitment; New Left; New Social Movement Theory; Political Opportunities; Political Process Theory; Pro Choice and Pro Life Movements; Rational Choice Theories; Resource Mobilization Theory; Revolutions; Riots; Social Change; Social Movement Organizations; Social Movements, Biographical Consequences of; Social Movements, Leadership in; Social Movements, Networks and; Social Movements, Non Violent; Social Movements, Participatory Democracy in; Social Movements, Political Consequences of; Social Movements, Recruitment to; Social Movements, Relative Deprivation and; Social Movements, Repression of; Social Movements, Strain and Breakdown Theories of; Transnational Movements

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social movements, biographical consequences of

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Personal and biographical effects belong to the unintended consequences of social movements. Participation in social movements changes people's lives, while social movements aim at social change (or its prevention), and even affect the lives of those who did not get involved in movements and countermovements.

A biographical perspective on social movements makes clear that social change and personal change are inextricably linked.

Biographical consequences of social movements can be observed at the micro, meso, and macro levels. The effects at the micro level concern the impact of movement participation on activists' life courses, the individual level of participants in movement activities. As numerous studies show, activists tend to remain committed to social change goals they pursue in social movements and that this commitment has significant effects in their work lives, political attitudes, and personal relationships (Evans 1979; Andrews 1991). Based on research on participants of the New Left, Giugni (2004: 494) summarizes the effects as follows: the former activists continue to hold leftist attitudes, define themselves as "liberal" and "radical," and remain active in social movements and other forms of political activity. They tend to be concentrated in teaching and other "helping" professions, have lower incomes than their age peers, and are more likely to have experienced an episodic or non traditional work history. Furthermore, they are more likely to have divorced, married later, or remained single than their age peers. In addition, gender differences can be observed. For example, the participation in the Freedom Summer campaign of 1964 had different impacts on male and female life courses. Compared to their peers, male volunteers had jobs with less stability, prestige, and income, while female volunteers were less likely to be married or have children than their peers (McAdam 1992). Andrews (1991) found that lifelong commitment to socialism gave interviewees a purpose in life.

At the meso level, biographical consequences concern how social movements and movement organizations are shaped by the membership. Activists develop *tastes for tactics* (Jasper 1997), which have an impact on the participation in social movements and movement organizations as well as on the tactics employed and coalitions and networks formed. Roth (2003) argued that activists form bridging organizations in order to reconcile competing political identities that evolved in political socialization processes through the participation of social movements. Activists often move from one movement to the other and contribute to diffusion of strategies,

tactics, and frames and engage in coalition building (Whittier 2004). The biographies of activists account for generational change in social movements and social movement organizations. Evans (1979) described how the women's movement emerged out of the Civil Rights Movement; Whittier (2004) discusses how movements influence each other, for example through spillover processes.

The consequences at the macro level concern the impact of social movements on the general population, for example changing norms with respect to education, employment, or marital status. Economic and demographic factors, as well as the social movements of the 1960s and 1970s, led to the transformation from a materialist to a post materialist value system and changes in the life course. Consciousness raising groups, as part of the women's movement, not only changed the self definitions and worldviews of the participating women but also transformed society. McAdam (1999) argues that the links between the social movements of the 1960s and 1970s and the changes in life course patterns constitute a three stage process. Initially, only activists reject normal life course trajectories in favor of alternatives like cohabitation, childlessness, and unstable work. In the second stage, the alternative lifestyle spreads to college campuses and countercultural neighborhoods, and finally, in the third stage, reaches young people in general.

The analysis of political generations can combine micro, meso, and macro levels of the biographical consequences of social movements. A biographical perspective on historical processes, cycles of protest, and political opportunity structures draws the attention to political generations (Mannheim 1952; Braungart & Braungart 1985) which share historical moments and process the past in a specific manner. Those active in the West German student movement of the 1960s as well as those active in the peaceful revolution of 1989 see their activism as a response to the involvement of their parents in National Socialism.

Giugni (2004) provides a critical assessment of the methodological shortcomings of the study of biographical consequences of social movements. Typically, the studies employed small samples which were non representative and focused mostly on New Left activists. Further

problems include lack of control groups, small numbers of participants, and samples drawn from narrow geographical areas. In addition, often only a single point in time was measured. In order to disentangle aging or life cycle effects, cohort or generational effects, and period effects, panel designs should be employed. While aging and life cycle effects refer to various stages (youth, middle age, and old age) and different phases (education, work/career, marriage, parenthood) in one's life course, cohort and generational effects encompass sharing the experience of a historical event which has shaped this age group (e.g., World War II or the 1960s). Surveying the same group at various points in time (panel study) makes it possible to distinguish between the effects of a stage in one's life course and being born into a specific cohort or generation.

Biographical methods are especially well suited to studying the biographical impact of social movements at all three levels since they make it possible to study the process character of social action. Compared to other strategies of studying contentious politics, the life history method can assess subjective constructions and objective processes as well as developments in the private and public spheres and how they are interrelated. Life histories allow an understanding of individual developments as well as group phenomena and capture movement ideology, movement counterculture, organizational stories, and the dynamics of small networks. Instead of providing static images, life stories offer insight into processes (Della Porta 1992). Life histories enable the analysis of the sequences and patterning of life events and thereby contribute to a better understanding of the causes and effects of political affiliation as well as the interaction between the crystallization of consciousness and the mobilization of action, and social structures and networks that nourish (or fail to nourish) activist identities and beliefs during periods of political inactivity (Blee 1996: 687). Life histories provide a context for understanding the fluctuation and transient character of movement participation. Membership in a social movement organization is one practice within the trajectory of the life course; it has been preceded by former and parallel memberships and activities; it parallels developments in family and work careers. A life history

approach promises to contribute to a better understanding of the social construction of the history, collective identity, alignment with social movements, and conceptualization of social movement organizations from the perspective of the membership (Della Porta 1992).

Since the mid 1990s, social movement research has seen an increasing integration of various research paradigms as well as a renewed interest in culture and emotions. Furthermore, research on revolutions and social movements has become more integrated. Globalization processes have affected theory formation by challenging North American and Western European experiences as paradigmatic. A perspective on the biographical consequences of social movements emphasizes that activists migrate from one movement to another and sustain multiple memberships over time. On the individual level, this points to processes of political socialization; on the organizational and movement level, this points to social movement interaction and diffusion processes (Roth 2003). Frames, strategies, and repertoires of action are transported from one movement to another through overlapping memberships and coalitions (Whittier 2004). Seidman (1999) explains the fact that gender issues became prominent in South Africa's democratic transition due to the fact that South Africans visiting Europe and North America either as students or exiles were often introduced to new feminist ideas. When they returned to South Africa, the exiles introduced feminist ideas in the democratic struggle, challenging earlier assumptions about women's role in politics. A focus on biographies of social movement activists contributes to a better understanding of social movement participation and development as well as to the analysis of diffusion processes.

SEE ALSO: Biography; Civil Rights Movement; Collective Identity; Culture, Social Movements and; Generational Change; Social Movements; Social Movements, Recruitment to

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social movements, leadership in

Judith Stepan Norris and Ben Lind

Social movement leaders act and make decisions on behalf of the movements they represent and therefore wield influence on the

movement's trajectory. In this light, early scholarship addressed how leaders' personal qualities affect the character and actions of their movements. Mills (1971) notably identified union leader characteristics as telling of the distinctions between the American Federation of Labor and the Congress of Industrial Organizations. Stepan Norris and Zeitlin (2003) extended this line of research by documenting the differential success of communist and non communist leaders in collective bargaining accomplishments, union democracy, and attention to minority and women's rights. Similarly, Ganz (2000) partially credited the successful unionization of California's farm workers (1960s–1970s) to the personal biographies, networks, and repertoires of leaders in the United Farm Workers Union.

Social movements provide leaders with selective incentives, and scholars have examined how they matter. McCarthy and Zald (1977) consider paid versus voluntary service as well as positions that provide career building experience versus those that do not. Traditionally, positions that provide both salary and career experience are considered to be *professional* as opposed to *nonprofessional* leadership positions (Staggenborg 1988). Students of social movements have similarly categorized leaders according to their relationships with adherents of their respective social movements. Morris and Staggenborg (2004) proposed four types of movement leaders: (1) official title bearing leaders of social movement organizations; (2) leadership team members who work with and advise top leaders (resembling McCarthy and Zald's definition of a cadre); (3) bridge leaders – movement activists who provide an intermediary between the top leadership and mass potential constituents and adherents (see Robnett 1996); and (4) local organizers who mobilize relatively small communities, but lack direct communication with top movement leaders. Kretschmer and Meyer (2005) identify a “platform leader” who maintains her position by clearly articulating a distinct position within a larger social movement.

Although much of the research focuses on how leaders affect social movements, some emphasize a more dialectical approach. Ganz (2000), for instance, proposed a model whereby leaders' biographies, personal networks, and

collective action repertoires influence the strategic capacity and therefore the applied strategy of a movement. If their strategy utilizes effective and appropriate timing, targets, and tactics, it will produce successful outcomes for the movement that result in greater environmental effects – altering the biographies, networks, and repertoires of future movement leaders. McCarthy and Zald (1977) hypothesize that social movements that acquire increased funding have a tendency to procure professional leaders, who in turn are more likely to favor institutional tactics, coalition work, and formalization of their movement organizations. They also tend to avoid initiating new movements and introducing novel tactics when compared to social movements led by nonprofessionals (Staggenborg 1988).

In light of telling case studies regarding leadership in movements, most scholars acknowledge this topic remains under theorized and in need of further research.

SEE ALSO: Collective Action; Leadership; Mobilization; Political Leadership; Resource Mobilization Theory; Social Movement Organizations; Social Movements; Social Movements, Participatory Democracy in

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social movements, networks and

Mario Diani

Since the interest in social movements started to develop in the 1960s, networks have been analyzed from two main perspectives. On the one hand, they have been treated as important facilitators of individuals' decisions to become involved in collective action, in the context of the debate inspired by Mancur Olson's seminal work on *The Logic of Collective Action*. On the other hand, analysts have looked at social movement networks as the structure of the links between the multiplicity of organizations and individual activists, committed to a certain cause. From this perspective, movement networks have been treated as the consequence, rather than the precondition, of collective action, a specific instance of the broader processes through which actors modify social structures through agency. More specifically, looking at the configuration of movement networks has provided observers with a clue to grasp the logics by which movement actors choose their partners, thus generating broader and complex organizational fields.

In their most basic sense, social networks consist of sets of nodes, linked by some form of relationship, and delimited by some specific criteria. Analysts of social movement networks have mostly used as nodes either the individuals mobilizing or sympathizing with a certain cause, or subscribing to certain alternative life styles, or the organizations promoting collective action on such issues and/or encouraging alternative cultural practices. They have looked at both direct and indirect ties. Direct ties are present when two nodes are directly linked in explicit interaction and interdependence – e.g., two activists who know each other personally,

or two organizations that jointly promote a rally. Indirect ties are assumed to exist between two nodes when they share some relevant activity or resource – e.g., interest in certain issues or in the same campaigns – yet without any face to face interaction.

Defining the boundaries of a social movement – i.e., classifying certain actors or events as part of a social movement dynamic or not – has proved most problematic. Many social movement analysts associate with a given movement all organizations sharing an interest in certain issues (e.g., the environment, or women's rights) or all organizations willing to adopt disruptive tactics, regardless of whether they are actually linked to each other. Others include in a movement only those nodes actually connected by some kind of relation. In particular, social movements have been conceived as the processes through which informal networks between a multiplicity of actors, sharing a collective identity, and engaged in social and/or political conflict, are built and reproduced. Identity plays a crucial role here as it connects actors to longer term collective projects, thus making their relation different from that between actors engaged in purely instrumental coalitions.

In the beginning, social movement analysts mostly focused on the role of social networks as predictors of individual participation in collective action. Even in the early 1970s, many still regarded movement participants as individuals lacking a proper social integration, following the disruption of routine social arrangements brought about by radical processes of change and modernization. Interest in the link between social networks and movement participation developed precisely to challenge that assumption. By the 1980s, the notion that social movement participants are usually well integrated in dense systems of social relationships, that prior social ties operate as a basis for movement recruitment, and that established social settings are the locus of movement emergence, had become one of the most established findings in social movement research.

Social movement activists and sympathizers are usually linked through both “private” and “public” ties well before collective action develops. Personal friends, relatives, colleagues, and neighbors may all affect individual

decisions to become involved in a movement; so may people who share with prospective participants some kind of collective engagement, such as previous or current participation in other movement activities, political or social organizations, or public bodies. Individuals may also be linked through indirect ties, generated by their joint involvement in specific activities and/or events, yet without any face to face interaction. These may range from participation in the same political or social activities and/or organizations, to involvement in the same subcultures or countercultures.

The impact of individual networks on individual participation has been tested in reference to different dependent variables. These have included presence or absence of participation; participation in specific types of activities (e.g., in conservation or political ecology groups); the continuation of participation over time; and the levels of risk associated with participation. Networks may provide opportunities for action through the circulation of information about ongoing activities, existing organizations, people to contact, and a reduction of the practical costs attached to participation. They may be the source of social pressure on prospective participants (“if you go, I will go too”), although cross pressures are also possible, and so are people participating precisely because they expect others not to do anything. Networks may facilitate the development of cognitive skills and competences, and/or provide the context for the socialization of individuals to specific sets of values. They may also represent the locus for the development of strong emotional feelings.

It is disputed whether direct or indirect ties should operate differently, although in general social pressure is more likely to be exerted through direct links, while socialization to values or cognitive skills may also originate from involvement in similar organizational settings, regardless of strong involvement with specific individuals. Whether strong or weak ties should matter most is also a matter of debate: one would expect strong ties to matter more in the case of high risk activities, but weak ties may facilitate the contacts between a movement organization and a constituency with more moderate or at least diversified orientations, and/or the diffusion or the spread of a movement campaign.

Another important illustration of the networks–movements connections is the view of movements as complex fields of interactions between multiple actors. This had already been noticed in the 1970s by scholars interested in subcultural and countercultural dynamics as well as in interorganizational relationships. However, this perspective has gained momentum since the 1980s, in parallel with the growing success of the network concept as a key to make sense of contemporary society, beyond classic dichotomies such as that between bureaucracy and markets, and with the renewed interest in agency in social theory. The spread of transnational contention and coalition building has further emphasized the interest in movement networks. All this has translated into growing attention to both interorganizational fields and subcultural and countercultural communities.

Looking at interorganizational fields reflects the fact that it is actually very difficult to think of movements as consisting of one organization. When this happens, as in the instances of the Bolshevik party in Russia or the National Socialist party in Germany, it usually means that the transition from movement to organization is complete. Movements indeed consist of multiple instances of interorganizational collaboration on campaigns of different intensity and scope. Direct ties between movement organizations include most prominently the exchange of information and the pooling of mobilization resources; indirect ties cover a broad range of possibilities, from shared personnel to joint participation in specific actions and/or events, from exposure to the same media, especially computer mediated media, to shared linkages to third parties (whether private or public organizations).

Sometimes, relationships between groups and organizations are recurrent to the point that one can think, for a given social movement, of a distinctive “alliance structure” and “oppositional structure”; at other times this does not happen and ad hoc shifting coalition networks prevail. It is important to recognize the difference between a pure coalition, driven by instrumental principles, and a movement network. In both cases, networks facilitate the mobilization and allocation of resources across an organizational field, the negotiation of agreed goals, and the production and circulation of information.

However, it is the presence of a shared identity which qualifies a movement network vis à vis a coalition network, and draws its boundaries. As identity is not a given trait but is the product of incessant negotiations between social actors, which often involves ideological conflicts, movement boundaries are rarely stable. Their instability is also reflected in movement networks' internal segmentation, even though this may also depend on principles of division of labor or the diversity in issue agendas between different organizations.

At the same time, social movements, especially but not exclusively those challenging moral values and dominant cultural codes, also have a strong subcultural and countercultural dimension. Individual networks represent the backbone of broader social movement communities, where interpersonal ties involve the sharing of distinctive lifestyles or of broader cultural models. While social movement scholars have studied them mostly in reference to "new" social movements (e.g., gay and lesbian subcultures, alternative scenes, radical intellectual milieus), working class communities continue to attract considerable attention from social historians and historical sociologists. To say the least, communitarian ties strengthen the identity and solidarity among movement activists and sympathizers. At the same time, though, they provide the specific locus of social conflict in those cases where the challenge is eminently on the symbolic side, where, in other words, at stake are mainly the definition of identities and the preservation of opportunities for the enactment of alternative lifestyles.

Thinking on networks and movements is likely to evolve along at least three lines. First, social scientists need to extend their conception of nodes in movement networks to objects other than individuals or organizations. In particular, protest events should be treated as network nodes. The whole idea of protest cycles presupposes interdependence between events, and so do the techniques of event history analysis increasingly used in this area of inquiry. The application of a network perspective could generate important insights on the innumerable mechanisms whereby events become linked to a social movement process. Organizations operate as ties by promoting and/or participating in multiple events; individual activists operate in

the same way; events may also be linked through symbolic means, e.g., by narratives that underline continuity between what would otherwise be largely independent and disconnected episodes of social conflict.

The time dimension should also be introduced more explicitly into the analysis of movement networks. Most studies of networks are based on data collected at one single point in time. More information is needed on how movement networks evolve over time, and how those changes affect patterns of collective action at large. Unfortunately, the data necessary to do those analyses are hard to locate, as systematic archives of social movement activity are rare. Nonetheless, some remarkable studies have indeed drawn upon archival records. Court records are another important source of network data, and have been used to account for recruitment to contemporary terrorist groups as well as for the traits of historical examples of contention. Newspaper reports offer a possible alternative, which has not been extensively explored yet. If data obtained in this way were confirmed to be a valid measure of actual ties, this would represent a major step forward toward network analysis of movements over long time spans.

Finally, research on networks and movements has increasingly explored the impact of virtual links, in particular those originating from computer mediated communication, on collective action processes. The main question is whether "virtual," computer mediated ties may replace "real" ties in the generation not only of the practical opportunities, but also of the shared understandings and – most important – the mutual trust which have consistently been identified as important facilitators of collective action. Available evidence is too sparse to be conclusive, and much more work is required to achieve conclusions that are at least as sound as those achieved, for all their limitations, in the study of the link between movement activity and "real" social networks.

SEE ALSO: Agency (and Intention); Alliances; Collective Action; Collective Identity; New Social Movement Theory; Protest, Diffusion of; Rational Choice Theories; Resource Mobilization Theory; Social Movements; Social Movements, Recruitment to; Social Network Theory; Subculture

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social movements, nonviolent

Kurt Schock

Nonviolent social movements rely primarily upon methods of nonviolent action to promote change. Although most social movements concerned with personal transformation, lifestyle, and culture are nonviolent, those concerned with political, social, and economic change that directly challenge the interests of the elite may be violent, nonviolent, or a combination of

the two. The focus here is on social movements that directly challenge elite interests, and that do so – by choice or due to limited options – only or primarily through methods of nonviolent action, such as protest demonstrations, marches, boycotts, strikes, and civil disobedience. Of course, any social movement that directly challenges the interests of the elite, whether it is nonviolent or violent, may be met with violence.

Nonviolent action methods are actions that do not involve physical violence or the threat of physical force against human beings and that involve collective action in the pursuit of political, social, or economic objectives. Nonviolent action occurs through (1) acts of omission, whereby people refuse to perform acts expected by norms, custom, law, or decree; (2) acts of commission, whereby people perform acts which they do not usually perform, are not expected by norms or customs to perform, or are forbidden by law or decree to perform; or (3) a combination of the two (Sharp 1973). These methods bring political, economic, social, emotional, or moral pressure to bear in the wielding of power in contentious interactions between collective actors (Sharp 1973, 1990; McCarthy 1990, 1997). Rather than viewing nonviolent action as one half of a rigid violent–nonviolent dichotomy, nonviolent action may be better understood as a set of methods with special features that differ from both violent resistance and institutional politics, as well as from “everyday forms of resistance” (McCarthy 1990; Schock 2005).

Although nonviolent action has been used in struggles against oppression throughout history, it was Mohandas Gandhi who was most influential in identifying nonviolence as a unique phenomenon with power different from and greater than that of violence, and developing the first comprehensive theory and praxis of nonviolent resistance. Gandhi’s philosophy and praxis of *satyagraha*, developed in the first half of the twentieth century, prescribes nonviolent action in which people refuse to cooperate with laws and social relations perceived to be unjust and willingly suffer the consequences of noncooperation and civil disobedience. Along with noncooperation, *satyagraha* involves constructive programs, that is, building just, decentralized, non coercive,

and democratic social relations autonomous from state and market forces.

Over the course of the twentieth century, methods of nonviolent action became a deliberate tool for social and political change, being transformed from a largely ad hoc strategy – based on either moral or religious principles, or a lack of violent alternatives – to a conscious, reflective method of struggle. There was a shift from informal and unorganized nonviolent struggle to formal and organized nonviolent struggle as expressed through social movements. By the end of the twentieth century nonviolent action became a modular and global method for challenging oppression.

Major episodes of twentieth century nonviolent resistance include the Gandhi led movement that challenged British rule in India (1919–47) and the Civil Rights Movement led by Martin Luther King, Jr. that challenged racial discrimination in the US South (1955–68). Various “waves” of nonviolent social movements include a series of civic strikes against dictatorships in Latin America (1931–61); numerous protest movements in more developed countries in the late 1960s – exemplified by the student and anti Vietnam War movements in the US and Australia, and the student led insurrection in France in 1968; and a wave of “unarmed insurrections” throughout the “second” and “third” worlds from 1978 into the twenty first century that challenged nondemocratic regimes, including those in Iran, South Africa, Chile, the Philippines, Indonesia, Nepal, Burma, China, and Ukraine. Nonviolent social movements, beginning with the Solidarity movement in Poland in the early 1980s, contributed to the toppling of communist regimes in Eastern Europe. Moreover, these struggles contributed to the breakup of the Soviet empire and the end of the Cold War.

Various issue related social movements have been almost exclusively nonviolent. Throughout the twentieth century women’s movements have fundamentally been concerned with the advocacy of nonviolent methods and social relations. Women’s movements have adopted nonviolent action as both a tactical choice and a framing element, and have cultivated a social critique of violence – from domestic violence to war (Costain 2000). Labor movements in industrialized countries have historically depended on

methods of noncooperation, especially the strike, to force concessions from capitalists and the state. The “new social movements” that emerged in western industrialized countries after World War II, such as the environmental and peace movements, have been almost exclusively nonviolent. Indigenous people’s movements throughout the world have also been primarily nonviolent.

Many of the *violent* social movements of the twentieth century involved struggles for control of the state apparatus and/or struggles for self determination, national liberation, or separatism. Although such conflicts will continue into the twenty first century, many twenty first century social movements have the goal of expanding democratic relations rather than controlling territory or the state – a goal that may be better attained through methods of nonviolent action than through violence.

The beginning of the twenty first century witnessed the emergence of a “movement of movements” implementing methods of nonviolent action to expand global civil society and struggle for social justice. Globalization from below and global justice movements have relied almost entirely on nonviolent action in their struggles against state and corporate driven globalization. Throughout the Global South, land struggles have emerged that implement nonviolent action to promote a more equitable distribution of land and sustainable development. Potential growth areas for nonviolent social movements in the twenty first century include challenging polyarchic or quasi democratic relations and “manufactured consent,” and promoting economic democracy throughout the world.

CHARACTERISTICS

Methods of resistance implemented by nonviolent social movements fall into three classes: protest and persuasion, noncooperation, and nonviolent intervention (Sharp 1973). Methods of protest and persuasion are symbolic expressions with communicative content intended to persuade the opponent, expose the opponent’s illegitimacy, provide social visibility to unjust relations, illustrate the extent of dissatisfaction throughout a population, educate the

public and third parties or catalyze their support, and overcome fear and acquiescence. These methods are often the crucibles in which frames are elaborated and disseminated, solidarity is forged, and people are mobilized to participate in other methods of nonviolent action. These methods do not consist of the use of reason, discussion, or persuasion *exclusive of* direct contentious action. They include actions such as protest demonstrations, marches, rallies, public speeches, symbolic public acts, vigils, and political funerals.

Methods of noncooperation involve the deliberate withdrawal, restriction, or defiance of expected participation or cooperation. While these methods may have symbolic significance, they are also intended to disrupt the status quo and undermine the opponent's power, resources, and legitimacy. These methods may be social, economic, or political. Social noncooperation involves the refusal to carry out normal social relations, such as social boycotts, social ostracism, student strikes, stayaways, and offering sanctuary to dissidents. Economic noncooperation involves the suspension of existing economic relationships or the refusal to initiate new ones, such as labor strikes or slowdowns, economic boycotts, refusal to pay rent, debts, interest, or taxes, and the collective withdrawal of bank deposits. Political noncooperation involves the refusal to continue usual forms of political participation or obedience. A common type of political noncooperation is civil disobedience (i.e., the open and deliberate violation of laws or orders for a political purpose), such as the publication of banned newspapers or pamphlets, and the refusal to participate in the military or obey orders of state agents.

Methods of nonviolent intervention are acts of interposition intended directly to disrupt continued subjugation or to develop alternatives to oppressive relations. Examples range from sit ins, pickets, nonviolent obstructions, nonviolent sabotage, land occupations, and paralyzing transportation to developing alternative markets and creating parallel institutions during the course of contentious struggles. These methods can be subdivided into two types. *Disruptive* nonviolent intervention upsets or destroys normal or established social relations. *Creative* nonviolent intervention forges autonomous social relations (Burrowes 1996). Creative

nonviolent intervention is significant because in struggles against oppression it is not only necessary to reject participating in oppressive relations, it is also necessary to engage in positive action to build alternatives; that is, to implement constructive programs and parallel structures. The two types of nonviolent intervention are mutually supporting and reinforcing: while disruptive nonviolent intervention (and noncooperation) drains power from the oppressors, creative nonviolent intervention generates power among the oppressed.

Nonviolent social movements may produce change through various mechanisms, including conversion, accommodation, nonviolent coercion, and disintegration (Sharp 1973, 1990). Conversion occurs when the opponent, as a result of nonviolent action by challengers, adopts the challenger's point of view and concedes to its goals. Conversion may occur through reason and argumentation, or as a result of changes in the emotions, beliefs, attitudes, or morality of the oppressors. The likelihood of conversion increases the less the social distance there is between the oppressors and the oppressed. However, if the oppressors view challengers as outside of their moral order or as inferior, then they are more likely to be indifferent. Thus, gender, race, ethnicity, religion, and language may be characteristics that form the basis of dehumanizing ideologies that decrease the likelihood of conversion. In addition to social distance, physical distance or a lack of communication between the oppressors and the oppressed may also inhibit conversion. Conversion is commonly (mis)understood as the only way or the main way in which nonviolent action produces change.

Through accommodation the oppressor grants concessions to the challengers, even though it is not converted to the challenger's point of view, is not forced to concede by the challenger's actions, and has the capacity to continue the struggle. An oppressor may accommodate a challenge when it perceives that the costs of ignoring or repressing are greater than the costs of giving in to some or all of its demands, views it as more of a nuisance than a threat, or calculates that by giving in to some or all of the challenger's demands the movement will be coopted thus preempting a more broad based movement. While "coercion" is often associated with violence, coercion can also be

affected through nonviolent pressure. Through nonviolent coercion, change is achieved against the oppressor's will as a result of the challenger successfully and nonviolently undermining its power, legitimacy, and ability to control the situation. Nonviolent coercion may promote change in one of three ways: (1) the challenge becomes too widespread to be controlled through repression, (2) the oppressor loses its willingness to repress, or (3) the movement's implementation of nonviolent action creates situations whereby it is too disruptive for the opponent to function without significant alterations in its policies or structure.

Disintegration occurs when the opponent breaks down in the face of widespread nonviolent resistance. That is, the challenge undermines the sources of the opponent's power to such an extent that there is no longer any effective institutional body to challenge or resist.

TYPES

Conceptual, if not empirical, distinctions can be made between social movements that implement nonviolent action as a matter of principle and those that implement it for pragmatic reasons. Participants in principled or conscientious nonviolent social movements view nonviolence as a way of life and usually hold religious or ethical beliefs that prohibit using violence against others in most or all situations. In contrast, participants in pragmatic nonviolent social movements perceive nonviolent action as the most expedient method for promoting change. Nonviolence is viewed as a means for prosecuting conflicts and not necessarily as a lifestyle. Since conflict is viewed as a relationship of incompatible interests, conversion of the opponent's views is not expected, therefore other mechanisms of change come into play. The goal of these movements is to limit the opponent's options or undermine its power in order to promote change (Stiehm 1968; Burrowes 1996).

Distinctions can also be made between *reformist* and *revolutionary* nonviolent social movements. In reformist nonviolent social movements, particular policies are perceived as the cause of or the solution for social problems. Movements of this type tend to implement short to medium term campaigns aimed

at changing public policies within the existing political framework. Moreover, these movements do not usually involve constructive programs. In contrast, revolutionary nonviolent social movements are guided by a structural analysis, and aim to change the basic structures of society. Particular campaigns, which may have a short to medium term time frame, are conducted within the context of a long term revolutionary vision and involve the implementation of constructive programs (Burrowes 1996).

The cross classification of the principled pragmatic dimension with the reformist revolutionary dimension provides four types of nonviolent social movements: pragmatic reform, principled reform, pragmatic revolutionary, and principled revolutionary. These categories are broadly descriptive rather than definitive and are not mutually exclusive (Burrowes 1996). Examples of pragmatic reform movements include anti nuclear and environmental movements in developed countries that target government and corporate policies. An example of a principled reform movement is the American Civil Rights Movement that incorporated a religious perspective in its challenge to particular policies that upheld racial discrimination. Examples of pragmatic revolutionary movements include the Eastern European revolutions of 1989 and the Palestinian Intifada (1987–90) that used nonviolent methods against Israeli domination and occupation. An example of a principled revolutionary movement is Gandhi's struggle in India directed at liberation from British rule and the development of constructive programs aimed to fundamentally transform social relations.

UNDERSTANDING NONVIOLENT SOCIAL MOVEMENTS

A number of interrelated areas exist where research and theory building would increase our understanding of nonviolent social movements: (1) correcting misconceptions about nonviolent action; (2) rethinking history from a perspective of nonviolent struggle and understanding the processes by which violence has been glorified throughout history; (3) reconceptualizing political power; (4) developing theories

of nonviolent revolution; and (5) theorizing the role of agency and strategy in nonviolent resistance.

First, the ability to understand and explain the dynamics of nonviolent social movements has suffered from numerous misconceptions about nonviolent action. Some of these misconceptions include the inability to differentiate nonviolent action from inaction or passive resistance; the view that nonviolent action involves only actions that are legal or institutionalized; the view that nonviolent action is a middle class or bourgeois method for social change and that it can only produce moderate change; and the view that nonviolent action works solely in democratic contexts and is ineffective in nondemocracies. For social scientific research on nonviolent social movements to proceed it is essential that these and other misconceptions about nonviolent action be identified and corrected (Schock 2003).

Second, while nonviolent action has been used throughout history, it has received much less attention, relative to the exercise of violence, by social scientists, historians, politicians, and the media. An important task for research on nonviolent social movements is to rethink history from a nonviolent perspective (Sharp 1973; Wink 1992; Schell 2003). In addition to uncovering the history of nonviolent action, social scientists must also explain why violence has been glorified throughout history. This would entail an attempt to understand the “myth of redemptive violence” (Wink 1992), the “mythology of terror” (Ackerman & DuVall 2000), and the glorification of violence in national myths and the socialization processes through which they are perpetuated.

Third, correcting misconceptions about nonviolent action and uncovering the history of nonviolent resistance will lead to a reconceptualization of the sources of political power. Schell (2003) makes a useful distinction between coercive power and cooperative power. Coercive power springs from the threat or use of violence, is based on fear, and flows downward from the state by virtue of its command of the instruments of violence. Cooperative power arises from the action in concert of people who willingly agree with one another. It flows upward from the consent, support, and nonviolent activity of the people. While most political theory has

assumed that violence, or coercive power, is the final arbiter in politics, the increasing use and effectiveness of nonviolent struggle has led to a questioning of this traditional assumption.

Fourth, the failure to understand the power and role of nonviolent action in political change in the past has led to the failure to predict and understand nonviolent political change in the present. In fact, it has been argued that we lack social scientific theories of nonviolent revolution (Schell 2003). According to most social scientists, violence is one of the defining features of revolutions. Yet violence has historically been much more prevalent during the consolidation of power than in the toppling of the old regime or in the revolutionary transfer of power, and the consolidation of the new order does not necessarily have to be violent. Social scientists need to theorize more adequately the role of human agency and strategy in nonviolent social movements. Social scientists have tended to emphasize structural theories of social movements and revolution. While useful, these theories may overlook the crucial role of agency, strategy, and tactics in promoting social change. Useful starting points include the works of Ackerman and Kruegler (1994), which delineate principles of strategic nonviolent conflict, and Schock (2005), which identifies attributes of nonviolent social movements that facilitate their resilience in repressive contexts and increase their leverage.

SEE ALSO: Anti War and Peace Movements; Civil Rights Movement; Global Justice as a Social Movement; King, Martin Luther; Revolutions; Social Movements; Women's Movements

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social movements, participatory democracy in

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Participatory democracy refers to an organizational form in which decision making is decentralized, non hierarchical, and consensus oriented. It can be contrasted with bureaucracy,

in which decision making is centralized, hierarchical, and based on a formal division of labor, as well as with majority vote. Participatory democratic organizations have been a prominent feature of many progressive movements, including radical pacifism, the Civil Rights Movement, the new left, feminism, environmentalism, anti nuclear activism, and the anti corporate globalization movement.

Participatory democratic organizations today claim a diverse lineage, with precursors in ancient Athenian democracy, the New England town hall, Quaker meetings, and Spanish Civil War affinity groups. The term itself was popularized in 1962 by the new left group Students for a Democratic Society (SDS). SDS leaders intended participatory democracy to describe a polity in which citizens were involved in public policymaking, not a mode of organizational decision making. However, at the time, decision making within SDS itself was collectivist and consensus oriented, this despite the group's formal reliance on parliamentary procedure. The same was true of the militant civil rights group the Student Non Violent Coordinating Committee (SNCC). For thousands of activists, participatory democracy soon became an organizational ethos. "Collectives" run on participatory democratic principles proliferated in the radical feminist and anti war movements of the late 1960s (Rothschild 2000; Polletta 2002).

By the end of the decade, many young activists perceived the political system as intransigent, and they turned to building alternative schools, health centers, food coops, and publishing guilds, thus contributing to an enduring cooperative movement (Rothschild & Whitt 1986). With the rise of the anti nuclear movement in Europe and the United States in the late 1970s, activists put participatory democratic movement organizations to use once again in overtly challenging the state, developing institutions of "affinity groups" and "spokescouncils" to coordinate mass actions involving thousands of people. More recently, participatory democratic forms have been prominent in the anti corporate globalization and global justice movements (Polletta 2002).

For sociologists writing about the surge of collectivist organizations in the 1960s, the participatory democratic impulse reflected a youthful

repudiation of authority that was at odds with the demands of effective political reform. Participatory democratic organizations were conceptualized as “expressive” or “redemptive” in contrast to their “instrumental” and “adversary” bureaucratic counterparts (Breines 1989). Since then, many scholars have instead adopted Breines’s (1989) view of participatory democracy as animated by a *prefigurative* impulse. By enacting within the movement itself values of radical equality, freedom, and community, activists have sought to bring into being a society marked by those values. Far from anti political, participatory democracy has been an attempt to transform what counts as politics.

Still, most scholars have seen participatory democracies as fragile. And indeed, some of the most famous participatory democratic movement groups, such as SDS, numerous feminist collectives, and the anti nuclear Clamshell Alliance, collapsed after explosive internal battles about organizational decision making. However, scholars have disagreed about the source of participatory democracy’s fragility. One popular explanation centers on the form’s inefficiency. Consensus decision making takes time; decentralized administration creates problems of coordination; and a minimal division of labor sacrifices the benefits of expertise. These inefficiencies are manageable in an organization that is small or has little opportunity for political impact. But when participatory democratic groups grow in size or political stature and therefore face new demands for coordination and funding, such inefficiencies become intolerable. The result is often a battle between political pragmatists, who are willing to adopt a more centralized and hierarchical organizational structure, and purists who refuse such reforms. Ultimately, either groups bureaucratize, as did many feminist organizations in the 1970s and 1980s, or they collapse.

This account neglects the fact that participatory democracy can be efficient. Multiple lines of input facilitate tactical innovation; decentralized organization allows movements to tailor programs to local contexts; and rotating leadership can maximize political learning (see Rothschild 2000 on the instrumental benefits of collectivist forms in for profit organizations). Moreover, the battles that have racked

participatory democratic groups have usually centered not on the inefficiency of the form but on the group’s failure to live up to its professed egalitarianism. In line with this insight, some scholars have argued that participatory democracy’s vulnerability is its inequity rather than its inefficiency. Michels (1958 [1915]) maintained that democratic organizations inevitably developed oligarchical structures as those occupying positions based on their expertise acquired a stake in retaining their positions. Participatory democrats refuse those imperatives and privilege democracy over expertise. That only means that the hierarchies are informal, scholars in this vein argue. The result is what Freeman (1973) calls the “tyranny of structurelessness,” in which the elimination of formal structures of authority only makes it easier for informal cliques to rule freely. When members shut out of decision making protest their marginalization, an organizational crisis is likely since participatory democracy provides no mechanisms for holding leaders formally accountable.

A third perspective holds that as long as members’ interests are fundamentally congruent, they are unlikely to object to disparities in informal influence (Mansbridge 1983). But when members’ interests conflict, which is likely to occur in all but the most homogeneous of groups, the consensus based decision making characteristic of participatory democratic organizations offers no way of adjudicating those conflicts. If minorities are not coerced to agree with the majority, then a stalemate is likely. After a series of such stalemates, an organizational crisis may ensue.

Although these explanations for participatory democracy’s fragility have been advanced separately, one can imagine that one may be more applicable than the others depending on the circumstances, or that two or even all three dynamics may operate at the same time. For example, an influx of new members may increase organizational inefficiencies at the same time as it creates new conflicts of interest and heightens newcomers’ perception of veterans as a controlling elite. But the three explanations also assume that there is a single form of participatory democracy across movements and historical eras. An alternative perspective holds

that groups have enacted commitments to radical democracy, equality, even consensus, in very different ways. For example, Polletta (2002) argues that participatory democratic groups in the pacifist, civil rights, new left, and feminist movements of the 1950s and 1960s drew deliberative norms from relationships of friendship, religious fellowship, and tutelage. The familiarity of those interactional styles made participatory democracy fairly easy to practice but also made for distinctive organizational challenges. For example, groups that styled their democracies on friendship were more likely to encounter crises after an influx of new members than were groups that styled their democracies on religious fellowship, since the latter were more comfortable with an informal probationary period for new members. In a study of three anti-toxics groups, Lichterman (1996) found that one group solicited members' input round robin style for every decision, while another consistently deferred to the group's leader. Yet, both groups said that they made their decisions by consensus. Different versions of participatory democracy may reflect distinctive political traditions, modes of religious engagement, professional styles of collaboration, or class based norms.

These kinds of institutional influences on how democratic commitments are enacted exist alongside the pressures exercised by funders and governmental agencies to shape what participatory democratic organizations look like. Funders often require explicit job descriptions and assessment criteria (Matthews 1994). The Internal Revenue Service's complex standards for retaining tax exempt status push organizations to hire legal and financial experts (McCarthy et al. 1991). The accreditation groups that evaluate organizations' suitability for philanthropic funding encourage them to create conventional boards of directors (McCarthy et al. 1991). The result is that very few movement organizations today resemble anything like a pure form of participatory democracy (Bordt 1997). Instead, a hierarchy of offices is sometimes combined with informal consultation across levels, or decisions are divided into those requiring consensus and those not requiring it, and so on (Iannello 1992). Some research suggests that these hybrid organizations have been effective

in maximizing the tactical innovation and solidarity associated with participatory democracy while avoiding the form's inefficiencies, inequities, and potential for stalemate. Even groups whose commitment to consensus based decision making is paramount tend to accept supermajorities rather than unanimity for contentious decisions and they use a range of formal mechanisms unknown to 1960s participatory democrats, such as time limits on discussions and facilitators.

Several lines of research on participatory democratic organizations are promising. Rather than looking for the fundamental flaw in participatory democracy as an organizational form, several scholars have sought instead to identify the institutional conditions in which participatory democracies are likely to proliferate (Rothschild & Whitt 1986). Another valuable approach has been to identify the tasks that are furthered or impeded by particular organizational forms, tasks such as raising funds, innovating tactically, sustaining coalitions, and ensuring decision makers' accountability (Staggenborg 1989).

A third area of promising research concerns the impacts of participatory democratic organizational forms. During historical periods or institutional arenas in which participatory democratic organizations are prominent, do they make inroads into the repertoire of institutionalized organizational forms? For example, Rothschild (2000) argues that widespread public support for workplace democracy reflects the popular valorization of terms such as "voice" and "empowerment" by the social justice movements of the 1960s and 1970s. What are the conditions in which particular versions of participatory democracy diffuse across movements? Some evidence suggests that a popular perception of participatory democracy as white and middle class may make it less appealing to activists of color and working class activists (Polletta 2005). Finally, we know little about whether participatory democratic organizations exist in conservative movements and, if they do, if they are animated by goals other than prefigurative ones.

SEE ALSO: Anarchism; Democracy and Organizations; Global Justice as a Social Movement;

Globalization and Global Justice; New Left; Oligarchy and Organization; Social Movement Organizations; Social Movements, Leadership in; Women's Movements

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social movements, political consequences of

Edwin Amenta and Neal Caren

Scholars have increasingly turned their attention to the political or state related consequences of social movements. Making sense of the state related consequences raises specific and difficult conceptual and theoretical issues. Conceptually speaking, scholars have to address the meaning of "success" or "influence" for challengers. Theoretically, scholars need to address what, beyond some degree of mobilization and basically plausible claims making, matters in explaining the state related impacts of challengers. In comparison to mobilizing supporters, fashioning identities among them, or achieving recognition from targets, most macropolitical consequences of challengers are not as directly related to the efforts expended by challengers.

In designating the consequences of social movements, Gamson's (1990 [1975]) two types of success have been influential. Gamson considers success in new advantages, his first type, as meaning whether a challenger's goals or claims were mainly realized. Yet Gamson's concept of new advantages places limits on the consideration of possible impacts of challenges. It may be possible, notably, for a challenger to fail to achieve its stated program – and thus be deemed a failure – but still to win substantial new advantages for its constituents. This is especially likely for challengers with far reaching goals. There may also be unintended consequences that influence beneficiary groups, and challengers may do worse than fail.

To address some of these issues, other scholars start with an alternative based on the concept of *collective goods*, or group wise advantages or disadvantages from which non participants in a challenge cannot be easily excluded (Olson 1965). Collective goods can be material, such as categorical social spending programs, but can also be less tangible, such as new ways to refer to members of a group. Social movement organizations almost invariably claim to represent a group extending beyond the leaders and adherents of the organization and most make demands that would provide collective benefits

to that larger group (Tilly 1999). According to the collective benefit standard, a challenger can have considerable impact even when it fails to achieve what it is seeking. It also can address the possibility that challengers would have negative consequences or negligible ones, such as achieving a program that did not realize its intended effect to benefit constituents (Amenta 2006). Scholars working from this standard tend to refer to the consequences or impacts of social movements rather than successes or failures. From this perspective, the greatest sort of impact is the one that provides a group, not necessarily organizations representing that group, continuing leverage over political processes. These sorts of gains are usually at a structural or systemic level of state processes and are a kind of metacollective benefit, as they increase the productivity of all future collective action of the group. Gains in the democratization of state processes are perhaps the most important that social movements can influence.

Most collective action, however, is aimed at a more medium level – major changes in policy and the bureaucratic enforcement and implementation of that policy. Once enacted and enforced with bureaucratic means, categorical social spending programs, notably, provide benefits in such a manner (Amenta 2006). The beneficiaries gain rights of entitlement to the benefits, and legal changes and bureaucratic reinforcement of such laws help to ensure the routine maintenance of such collective benefits. Under these circumstances, the issue is privileged in politics, is effectively removed from the political agenda, and the political system becomes biased in favor of the group. A bureaucracy would have to be targeted and altered, if not captured, or new legislation would have to be passed rescinding benefits – a process that becomes more difficult as time passes as bureaucracies are reinforced and people organize their lives around the programs. Regulatory bureaucracies that are products of challenger mobilizations may push on their own to advance mandates in the absence of new legislation, as in the case of state labor commissions or in affirmative action. Through their policies, states can ratify or attempt to undermine potential collective identities or help to create new ones, some times on purpose, often inadvertently. Dividing

the process of creating new laws containing collective benefits into the agenda setting, legislative content, passage, and implementation of legislation simplifies analysis and also makes it easier to judge the impact of challengers.

Gamson's second type of success, the "acceptance" (1990 [1975]) or "representation" (Cress & Snow 2000) achieved by challenging organizations, can also be related systematically back to states and collective benefits. To the extent that state action recognizing challenging organizations influences their form or resources, it also influences their potential to gain future collective benefits. Gamson's idea of acceptance may, however, be too broadly drawn to capture the sorts of representation sought by challengers attempting to influence democratic states. More important and plausible for state oriented challengers is a version of Gamson's "inclusion," which would amount to the placing of challengers in state positions through election or appointment. Challengers can provide candidates for office or can stand as representatives of new political parties. As is the case for other, better politically situated groups, it is possible for social movement organizations to capture bureaucracies and run them in favor of their constituency. By gaining representation in legislative offices and bureaucracies, challengers can influence policies throughout the process, including placing programs on the agenda, helping to specify their content, aiding their passage, and supporting their enforcement. Movements may also attempt to gain recognition for altered or new movement organizations, which might include political parties, political lobbying, or educational organizations. Collective action may be intended to win or may result in winning higher order rights through the state that advantage a group in its conflicts with other groups (Tarrow 1998). Labor movements, notably, often focus on the state to ensure rights to organize and engage in collective bargaining with businesses and business associations, and the state may be used as a fulcrum in transnational protest. Challengers blocked in one country may appeal to sympathetic organizations in others.

There are four main arguments designed to explain the impact of social movements on states. The first argument is that whatever aids

a group's mobilization will lead to its making gains, as mobilization of various sorts will aid movements in whatever they do (McCarthy & Zald 2002). The mobilization of various resources is needed to engage in collective action, which is designed and expected to bring a certain amount of collective benefits. This line of argumentation is consistent with rational choice discussions of collective action problems, in that they view the main issue for social movements as overcoming free rider disincentives to participation (Olson 1965). The ability to mobilize different sorts of resources is key for the impact of movements and mobilization of resources and membership has been shown to influence some state related consequences in different research (McCarthy & Zald 2002). However, mobilization seems to be a necessary condition to have influence over states, as there seems to be no connection between size of a mobilized challenger and gaining new benefits (Kitschelt 1986; Gamson 1990 [1975]).

Second, specific strategies and goals of collective action and forms of challenger organization are more likely to produce influence. Gamson (1990 [1975]) found notably that limited goals, the use of "constraints," selective incentives, and bureaucratic forms of organization were more likely to produce new advantages. In contrast, goals and strategies aiming at "displacement" – in which a movement seeks to destroy or replace its opponent – were likely to fail. Others have advanced Gamson's argument about the importance of organization in social movement success by focusing on the sorts of social movement organizations likely to produce gains. It has been argued that resourceful movement infrastructures led to gains in policy implementation (Andrews 2001) and that innovative organizational forms can lead to gains for challengers and transformations of political institutions (Clemens 1997). Singled out for special attention are claims making and framing. Cress and Snow (2000) argue notably that for a challenger to have an impact, it is necessary for it to employ resonant "prognostic" and "diagnostic" frames; to gain results, challengers need to identify problems and pose credible solutions to those problems that play to state actors and other third parties as well as to be able to mobilize participants.

A third argument attempts to take into account contextual influences by claiming that once a challenger is mobilized, the main thing influencing its impact is the political context or "opportunity structure." This line of argumentation has both systemic and dynamic components to it, and sometimes it is also argued that systemic political contexts greatly influence or determine the strategies of challengers. Kriesi and his colleagues (1995) take the most systemic view, arguing that the openness and capacity of states largely determine whether a state related movement will have influence. When states have both inclusive strategies and strong capacities, challengers are most likely to achieve "proactive" impacts. Under weak states, by contrast, reactive impacts are more probable, as the state lacks the capacity to implement policies (see also Kitschelt 1986).

The more overarching arguments have been criticized, however, on the grounds that all manner of social movements with different strategies have developed within similar countries (Dalton 1995) and that within any country differences in impacts have varied over time. Arguments regarding systemic political contexts have also been criticized on the grounds that they take a too abstract view of states and political opportunity structures. Notably, focusing on the overall openness of politics and strength of states ignores conceptual and theoretical developments in political sociology literatures that have addressed the influence of politics and states in more fine grained ways. Important factors include the polity structure, the democratization of state institutions, electoral rules and procedures, and state policies. These aspects of states influence forms of challenger representation, as well as the tactics of challengers. These arguments tend to drop the weak/strong state and open/closed polity dichotomies and refer to specific aspects of polity and political actors.

The centralization and division of power between each branch of government also has an impact on social movement organizations (Amenta 2006). An autonomous court system with veto power over the legislative branch, for example, may lead to an emphasis on legal mobilizations, which may shift focus away from more mass based protests. Multiple points of access are a two edged sword, however, as they also

provide multiple points of veto. The level of democracy has important consequences for the forms that mobilization will take. Specifically, the greater the exclusion from the democratic process, the more likely non institutional forms of protest will take place. Electoral rules may have the greatest impact on the relationship between social movements and the party system. Winner take all systems, such as in the US, discourage the formation and legitimacy of new political parties. Initiative and referendum procedures increase the likelihood that organizations will be single focused. In addition, states can also provide a variety of resources for specific social movements that can vary from concrete items to legitimacy.

On the dynamic side, the political opportunity argument focuses on alterations in political conditions that improve the productivity of collective action of challengers. In their study of farm workers' mobilization and collective action, Jenkins and Perrow (1977) found that changes in the political context influenced their growth and impact, through the rise to power of favorable political regimes and through the support of liberal organizations like organized labor. In his study of the Civil Rights Movement, McAdam (1982) argued that favorable political conditions were necessary for its gains – which were based on tactical innovations. In short, according to the strongest form of this argument, mobilized challengers have impacts largely because they engage in collective action at the right time. This argumentation has suffered, however, in comparison with the systemic view of political contexts in being able to specify what constitutes a favorable context. The main candidates – polity openness, instability of elite alliances, the presence of elite allies for challengers, declines in capacities and propensities for repression – are drawn so widely as to be difficult to operationalize.

Finally, many scholars have developed different political mediation models of social movement consequences, which build on arguments concerning strategy, organizational form, and political contexts (Amenta et al. 1992; Skocpol 1992; Amenta 2006). The basic point of this argument is that the collective action of challengers is politically mediated. In a democratic political system, mobilizing relatively large numbers

of committed people is probably necessary to winning new collective benefits for those otherwise underrepresented in politics. So, too, are making plausible claims regarding the worthiness of the group and the usefulness of its program. Yet challengers' action is more likely to produce results when institutional political actors see benefit in aiding the group that the challenger represents. To secure new benefits, challengers will typically need help or complementary action from like minded state actors, including elected officials, appointed officials, or state civil servants. And so challengers need to engage in collective action that changes the calculations of relevant institutional political actors, and challengers need to adopt organizational forms that fit political circumstances.

Political mediation arguments do not identify individual organizational forms, strategies, or long term or short term political contexts that will always or usually help challengers to win collective benefits. Instead the idea is that certain organizational forms and collective action strategies will be more productive in some political contexts rather than others. In her examination of organized groups throughout US history, Skocpol (1992) argues that to have influence the forms of challengers and other mass based interest organizations need to fit the divided nature of the American political context, a systemic condition. US organizations need to have a wide geographical presence to influence Congress, which is based on district representation. The most extensive discussion of this sort suggests that challengers need to moderate strategies and forms to address political circumstances. The standard distinction between disruptive and assimilative strategies is dropped in favor of addressing variations in assertiveness of action (Amenta 2006), with assertive meaning the use of increasingly strong sanctions, something akin to Gamson's "constraints." If the political regime is supportive and the domestic bureaucrats are professionalized and supportive, limited protest based mainly on the evidence of mobilization is likely to be sufficient to provide increased collective benefits. By contrast, achieving collective benefits through public policy is likely to be more difficult if neither a supportive regime nor administrative authority exists.

Although this understanding of the political context is a dynamic one that takes into account changes in political contexts, it can also be related back to systemic and structural characteristics of political systems, notably political institutional conditions that make the establishment of a reform oriented regime or bureaucratic capacities difficult. When the regime is opposed to the challenger or sees no benefit in adding its beneficiary group to its coalition and when state bureaucracies in the area are hostile or absent, the sorts of limited protest listed above are likely to be ignored or have a limited effect. As political circumstances become more difficult, more assertive or bolder collective action is required to produce collective benefits. Sanctions in assertive institutional collective action threaten to increase or decrease the likelihood of gaining or keeping something valuable to political actors – often positions – or to take over their functions or prerogatives. The institutional collective action of challengers works largely by mobilizing large numbers of people behind a course of activity, often one with electoral implications. This collective action may be designed to convince the general public of the justice of the cause and influence elected and appointed officials in that manner, but may also demonstrate to these officials that a large segment of the electorate is willing to vote or engage in other political activity mainly on the basis of a single key issue.

SEE ALSO: Collective Action; Framing and Social Movements; Political Opportunities; Political Process Theory; Political Sociology; Resource Mobilization Theory; Social Movement Organizations; Social Movements; Social Policy; Welfare State

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social movements, recruitment to

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Social movements have long been an important basis of political participation in democracies and have achieved major political, social, and cultural changes. Although the influence of social movements depends largely on their ability to recruit members, it is by no means obvious why people choose to participate in them.

This question has been termed "the free rider problem." As Mancur Olson's (1965) analysis indicates, people have limited time and energy and must choose to spend these resources in ways that most benefit themselves. Individuals join social movements because they believe that the movement's goals, if implemented, would yield significant benefits to themselves and/or to the attainment of values they cherish. Although these benefits motivate participation, there is an additional problem. If a movement has few participants, people desiring these benefits might believe that the movement could not succeed unless they joined the movement. Thus, joining the movement might represent a rational investment of their time, energy, and, often, money. However, if a movement already has a large number of participants, then it is unlikely that one more person's joining the movement would increase its chances of success. In that case, why would additional people join? If the movement is successful, they, along with the participants, would enjoy the fruits of this success; they would have gained all the benefits of participation without spending their own scarce resources of time and energy. In that case, they could use these resources to gain other benefits for themselves, while "free riding" on the efforts of those already participating.

One possible response to this free rider problem is that people who join social movements do not rationally calculate the costs and benefits of their joining. Analyses of social movements in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries indeed assumed that social movements were not rational enterprises and that those who joined them were, in fact, acting on the

basis of irrational impulses. The most prominent proponent of this view, Gustave Le Bon (1897), a French theorist, said that people joined movements because they succumbed to crowd emotions and lost their ability to resist unconscious instincts. This general belief informed views of social movements well into the twentieth century, as these views stressed that movements represented an emotional and relatively unorganized response to a breakdown in social norms and social organization. Individuals were said to be attracted to movements because they were lonely and alienated owing to weak social ties and hence sought in movements a sense of belonging they otherwise lacked.

In recent years this non rational model of social movements has fallen into disfavor. Social movements are now viewed as rational enterprises in pursuit of many kinds of political, social, and cultural changes, and their members are viewed as rational individuals favoring such changes. However, the success of recent efforts to demonstrate the rationality of social movement participants has reemphasized the importance of addressing the free rider problem: if these people are rational, why do they participate at all? The contemporary literature on social movement recruitment and participation tries to answer this question.

Its dominant response derives from analogous work in complex and voluntary organizations, including labor unions. Organizations generally offer several types of resources to motivate recruitment and higher levels of participation after recruitment. These include (1) *coercion*; (2) *utilitarian incentives* such as paid income in work organizations and discounts for various goods and services in voluntary organizations; (3) *normative* (or *purposive*) *incentives* that appeal to the values, concerns, and ideologies of individuals and, in social movements, lead people to identify with a movement's goals and to believe that the movement is capable of achieving its goals; and (4) *social* (or *solidary*) *incentives* that make participation socially rewarding in terms of friendships and other personal contacts. Because social movement organizations (SMOs), like other voluntary organizations, typically lack the first two types of incentives, they must rely heavily on the latter two types to induce people to join them and to motivate higher levels of participation after joining.

In these respects, normative and social incentives act as *selective incentives* to induce self interested people to devote time and energy to participation rather than to other potentially rewarding activities. An additional category of *organizational incentives* that lead people to feel a sense of belonging to the movement is also thought to be important for levels of post recruitment participation.

In contrast to many types of voluntary organizations, normative incentives in social movements depend heavily on the movement's (or its SMOs') political ideologies and beliefs. These cognitions include the movement's grievances, goals, and strategies for change. Individuals whose own ideologies and beliefs are congruent with those of the movement are more likely to join it. In addition to these movement specific ideologies, more general cognitions may also influence decisions to join. These include a liberal versus conservative belief system, a feeling of political efficacy, and religious ideologies. Movements and organizations that are liberal tend to attract liberal individuals, while those that are conservative tend to attract conservative individuals. People who are politically efficacious, that is, who believe that citizen participation generally, and their own particularly, can make a difference, are more likely to join than those who are politically alienated. Social movements and SMOs with a religious basis for their activities attract members whose religious beliefs coincide with those of the movement or SMO.

In all these respects, a movement's set of ideologies is thought to be an important, necessary condition for recruiting members, but it is far from a sufficient condition. The reason for this is simple: many more people agree with a movement's goals and other ideologies than ever participate in the movement or help it in any other way. This recognition has led the contemporary social movement literature to stress the importance of social incentives. In this view, people join movements because they have pre existing friendship and organizational ties that induce them to join. For example, agreeing to some friends' request to join them in a protest wins their appreciation, while declining their request may win their displeasure. In this respect, recruitment into social movements is no different from the many other activities in

which social ties play an important role. Accordingly, a host of studies find that individuals with preexisting ties to movement members will be more likely to join a movement than those with fewer or no such ties. These ties appear to be especially important for recruitment into high risk activism like the Freedom Rides in the US South that were a hallmark of the Civil Rights Movement in the 1960s. By challenging the earlier, non rational model's assumption that social movements attract lonely and alienated individuals, the emphasis in contemporary work on friendship and organizational networks reinforces the rationality of social movement participation.

Turning to post recruitment participation, individuals who develop friendships after joining a movement or SMO tend to exhibit higher levels of participation than those with fewer or no such friendships. In this regard, SMOs with a national membership face particular problems because their members are geographically isolated and usually have little contact with each other or with the national organization. To deal with this situation, some national organizations have developed a "federated" structure involving many local chapters. Because these chapters enable interaction and friendships among members who live near each other, they enhance commitment to the organization itself and promote higher levels of participation on its behalf.

Organizational incentives are the final type of resource offered by SMOs and are thought to be especially important for post recruitment participation. These incentives take two forms, perceptions and communication. Members have various perceptions of their SMO. A first perception, *legitimacy*, involves members' willingness to trust SMO leaders and to support their decisions, even if the members might disagree with some of these decisions. Those with higher levels of perceived legitimacy are more likely to exhibit higher levels of post recruitment participation. A second perception involves members' beliefs in the *effectiveness* of their SMO. Post recruitment participation is generally higher among members who perceive stronger effectiveness. A final perception concerns members' *commitment*, including their sense of belonging, to their SMO and movement. Members who are more committed also exhibit higher levels of post recruitment participation.

Communication with SMO leaders and staff also matters. In particular, members who are contacted more often by their SMO's leaders and staff or otherwise communicate with them are also thought to exhibit higher levels of post recruitment participation than members with less or no such communication.

Future work on recruitment should address at least three problems in the literature. The first problem concerns potential deficiencies in the studies of recruitment. An ideal study would be predictive and would study a random sample of adults, predicting which factors would lead some of them to join a particular social movement. Because only a small proportion of adults become members of any given social movement, such a study would need an extremely large sample to have any statistical validity and would be astronomically expensive. Because of this, studies of social movement recruitment are limited in scope. Some studies are retrospective, asking current participants why they initially chose to participate. Results from these studies depend upon the assumption that current participants can accurately remember and will accurately report why they started to participate, and these studies often have no adequate control group of non participants. Other studies are predictive but only in a limited context: for example, they study who among a set of people in a particular locality who favor the goals of a social movement rally actually choose to participate in the rally. As these difficulties suggest, the recruitment literature would benefit from better designed studies, but, because of the nature of recruitment into social movements, such studies are difficult to devise.

A second problem in the recruitment literature concerns the many types of social movements. Many typologies of movements exist, but a common typology divides them, based on their goals, into political or social reform movements, religious movements, self help movements, and cultural movements. Within each category there are many types of specific movements that have existed in many different nations and localities within nations and across many different decades and centuries. Although many studies of recruitment exist, they do not begin to match in number the sheer quantity of movements, and additional work on unstudied movements may shed new light on the dynamics of recruitment.

Finally, studies of recruitment obviously imply that one is being recruited into something. But what is this something? What does it mean to be a member of a social movement? If someone takes part in just one protest on behalf of a social movement, is that person a member of that movement? As this question suggests, people do not usually sign up for a movement in the way they sign up for many other activities. To compound this problem, some SMOs are organized in a very formal manner, with clear membership rolls and criteria for membership, while others are organized much more loosely, with unclear criteria for membership and only a loose understanding, if that, of who their members are. In the most informal SMOs, members may literally come and go, and it is not at all easy to identify their members. The lack of a clear understanding in movements and SMOs, and thus in the recruitment literature, of what it means to be a member confounds efforts to achieve a comprehensive understanding of recruitment, however important such an understanding is for the study of social movements.

SEE ALSO: Civil Rights Movement; Moral Shocks and Self Recruitment; Resource Mobilization Theory; Riots; Social Movement Organizations; Social Movements, Biographical Consequences of; Social Movements, Networks and; Social Movements, Strain and Breakdown Theories of

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social movements, relative deprivation and

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The relative deprivation model aims to explain individuals' decisions to join or start social movements and is based on a certain set of psychological ideas (Gurr 1970). Relative deprivation itself refers to "the gap between what one has and what one expects" (Brusch 1996), particularly in comparison to some specific reference group. The concept of relative deprivation has its roots in the early "frustration-aggression hypothesis" of John Dollard, which suggested that when individuals respond to frustration and do not receive a response that relieves their frustration, such individuals will respond with aggression. Relative deprivation has been used as the mechanism to explain where this frustration emerges from.

Analysts of relative deprivation have specified a variety of dimensions of deprivation that individuals may experience. These include *aspirational deprivation*, or having increasing aspirations that are not realized; *decremental deprivation*, or when expectations are stable but available resources are declining; and *progressive deprivation*, or improvement in general social, economic, or power conditions which is followed by a sudden reversal of these trends. In general, in order to experience relative deprivation, an individual must not only experience desire, but also feel that she or he has a right to gain access to the sought after resources. In addition, she or he must experience a perception that the likelihood of one's access's being blocked is quite high. The contradiction between this feeling of entitlement and this feeling of stymied progress forms a type of cognitive dissonance (Morrison 1971) which becomes

activated through the appearance of a *structural strain* (McPhail 1971).

While many theorists of relative deprivation have confined their analysis to exploring when relative deprivation emerges and what form it takes, some have gone further to specify a mechanism whereby relative deprivation leads to collective action. The combination of feelings of relative deprivation with structural strain as noted above can lead individuals to come to see the sources of the blockages to their aspirations as *structural* blockages. Therefore, these individuals are led to seek structural solutions by working together as part of a similarly situated group – in other words, a social movement.

More sophisticated relative deprivation analyses include deprivation along with other factors, such as the balance of power between parties or resource mobilization. For instance, Korpi (1974) suggested that it is not only how deprived a group feels in terms of power resources that matters, it is also the rate of change in access to these resources relative to other groups, and that of the three types of deprivation, only progressive deprivation is likely to lead to situations of conflict. Similarly, Tilly (1973), while not writing specifically in the relative deprivation school, notes that violent collective action is particularly likely both when a group is gaining power relative to others and when they are losing it. Miller et al. (1977) propose another instance in which the experience of relative deprivation is likely to matter: in the case of uncertainty about the future. They note that only certain disaster is more frustrating than uncertainty. More specifically, models based on the notion of relative deprivation have been used to explain when revolution does and does not occur, how religious movements or cults come into being, and the timing of urban race riots.

The empirical evidence used to demonstrate relative deprivation is usually socioeconomic in nature and collected on aggregate levels, such as census data, even though deprivation itself is an individual experience. In addition, more recent empirical research has had difficulty confirming the usefulness of relative deprivation models. For instance, relative deprivation may be able to explain some small part of the variation in riots, but it is unable to explain why the majority of individuals who face relative

deprivation do not act on this fact. However, even some analysts who are not fully impressed by the relative deprivation approach point to the likelihood that individual members of social movement organizations may talk about their reasons for forming or joining the movement in terms that can be conceived of as relative deprivation (Wallis 1975). Others have criticized the relative deprivation model because it cannot be tested empirically without some sort of evidence of feelings of deprivation prior to the collective action episode (Kent 1982). The model, therefore, is less commonly employed in sociological analyses of social movements today, though it continues to prove popular among psychologists.

SEE ALSO: Civil Rights Movement; Collective Action; Income Inequality and Income Mobility; Inequality and the City; Resource Mobilization Theory; Riots; Social Movement Organizations; Social Movements; Social Movements, Strain and Breakdown Theories of; Stress, Stress Theories

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social movements, repression of

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The repression of social movements refers to attempts by groups, individuals, or state actors (e.g., militaries, national police, and local police) to increase the costs associated with social movement participation or otherwise limit social movement activity. Commonly studied forms of repression include police action at public protest events, such as arrests and police violence, military suppression of protest events, "disappearances" of activists, arrests and/or imprisonment of social movement participants, infiltration of social movements by government informants, covert counterintelligence programs against social movement organizations and participants, restrictions of free speech and assembly, assaults on human rights, and murders of social movement activists, among other tactics.

Recognizing that the above examples represent a wide variety of ways to suppress or control protest and social movements, scholars have sought to distinguish between different types of repressive actions. Two common distinctions that have been made are between overt and covert repression and between coercive repression and channeling. Researchers make these kinds of distinctions because they suspect that the dynamics and consequences of repression may differ depending on the kind of repressive tactic deployed.

The distinction between overt and covert is based on visibility of the repressive acts (or, at least, how visible they are intended to be). For instance, the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) ran a series of covert counterintelligence programs against selected social movements from 1956 to 1971 in the United States. These programs used methods such as tapping phone

lines, examining mail, and burglarizing dwellings and offices to gather information that was meant to affect the ability of social movements to survive and/or deploy certain tactics, without the public recognizing that the FBI was targeting these groups. In contrast to these covert tactics, other repressive actions are meant to be publicly visible (i.e., overt). An example of overt repression was the Chinese government's actions at Tiananmen Square in 1989, where the government used military tanks to crush protesters and move crowds.

The distinction between coercion and channeling is also important. Coercion involves violence, harassment, and surveillance while channeling occurs when laws, policies, or actions reward protest movements for using certain kinds of tactics (typically, more institutional and/or non violent tactics) while discouraging others (typically, more radical, non institutional, or violent tactics). Coercive repression is well known: the tanks in Tiananmen Square, South American death squads, and murders of civil rights activists in the US are all examples of coercive repression. In contrast, channeling focuses on the proverbial carrots that can lure protesters toward certain tactics and/or goals as well as the proverbial sticks that push protesters away from certain tactics and/or goals. For example, some have argued that US tax laws on non profit status encourage social movement organizations to take more institutional action and less political action. If social movement organizations were to organize the use of violent tactics for political ends, for instance, their tax exempt status could be threatened. Thus, social movements are channeled toward more conventional and less political action by the US tax code. Another well studied example of channeling involves donations to social movement organizations. Some scholars have argued that philanthropists encourage moderate protest and discourage radical protest by funding moderate social movement organizations and defunding organizations that radicalize. Although empirical research suggests that funding can be reactive, scholars have not confirmed the extent to which defunding, in particular, actually occurs.

A less frequently invoked distinction between different kinds of repression involves who is "doing" the repression. The bulk of research

on the repression of social movements has focused on the role of state actors (e.g., militaries, national police, and local police). However, this should not suggest that there are not important theoretical differences between state actors, nor should it suggest that private groups and/or individuals never repress social movements. Militaries charged with repression in authoritarian states are likely to differ from local police agencies, with respect to both how they distribute repression and the types of repressive actions they employ. In contrast to state action, groups such as the Ku Klux Klan (KKK), White Citizens Councils, universities, corporations, and the philanthropists discussed above have all been implicated in the repression of social movements. The KKK, for example, engaged in coercive repression against civil rights activists, and corporations have employed private security agents to disrupt strikes.

All three of these distinctions between various types of repression – covert versus overt, coercive versus channeling, and private versus public actors – are important because they bear on two fundamental questions that scholars have raised about repression: (1) how can researchers explain the level and types of repressive actions taken against different activists and social movements? and (2) how can researchers explain the consequences, or effects, of repression on activists and social movements?

EXPLAINING THE LEVEL OR TYPE OF REPRESSION

The vast majority of research that casts repression as a dependent variable has focused on explaining the level of particular types of repression without discussing tradeoffs between different types of repression. For instance, scholars may separately attempt to explain the number of protests at which police will be present, the number of political murders, or the severity of restrictions on free speech or free association in a country, but they have much less frequently examined how an increase in the severity of free speech and free association restrictions might affect the rate of political murders in the same country.

Scholars interested in explaining the prevalence, level, or severity of a particular type

of repression tend to focus on a small set of causal explanations. The most widely researched and supported explanation is often referred to as a “threat” model of repression because it predicts that the more threatening a social movement, a social movement organization, or a protest activity is to the government and government elites, the more likely or severe repressive action will be. Because the emphasis is on threats to regimes, this approach has largely been used to explain repressive acts by governments or actors closely connected to the state.

Scholars working within a threat perspective have differed in whether they consider objective threats or subjective threats to be most important. Scholars who emphasize objective threats to a regime have been referred to as “realists” or “realists.” Other scholars argue that governments and political elites do not always recognize existing threats, may misinterpret a non threat as threatening, or may otherwise exaggerate or downplay objective threats. Scholars emphasizing the subjectivity of threats refer to the process by which states and/or political elites recognize and/or construct threats as “threat perception.”

Whether concerned with objective or subjective threats, a range of particular factors has been identified as objectively threatening, or likely to be perceived as threatening, including: the mobilization of large numbers of social movement supporters and participants, the use of radical or violent protest tactics, and the embrace of radical or transformative ideologies, to list a few.

In addition to a threat model of repression, others primarily interested in repressive actions by states have argued that states are opportunists. That is, since scholars believe that states are interested in suppressing all challengers, weak challengers that appear vulnerable to repression will quickly become targets of repressive action. Weakness could be indicated by a range of characteristics, such as the social composition of social movement supports and/or the level of resources a social movement has available.

Still others have attempted to explain the level or severity of repression with reference to the organizations and actors that are charged with carrying out repressive acts. For instance,

recent research on the FBI’s covert counter intelligence programs in the 1960s and 1970s suggests that the organizational structure and decision making processes of the FBI influenced what groups were targeted for action, the tactics that were used against targeted groups, and the extent to which different groups were consistently and heavily repressed. Others have made similar arguments about organizational and institutional characteristics of police forces in explaining police action at protest events.

In contrast to these approaches, which view repression as an outcome of some directional causal process, others have argued for a more emergent view of repression. Specifically, some researchers interested in processes of interaction between insurgents and authorities argue that general explanations of repression are problematic because many repressive outcomes are actually the result of situational interactions and thus cannot be predicted (e.g., police interact with protesters and out of that interaction emerges a police response to protesters).

Other scholars interested in interactions between activists and repressive agents have understood interaction to be less about situational interactions and more about the relationships over time between authorities and insurgents. Framing the interaction between authorities and insurgents as a predator–prey situation, these students of social movements have argued that causal consistencies may exist. Methodological techniques, such as biological predator–prey statistical models, allow these researchers to statistically diagnose feedback processes between authorities and insurgents. For instance, a general version of one of these models would specify that the actions of repressive agents at Time 1 affect some movement characteristic at Time 2, which in turn affects the actions of repressive agents at Time 3. Some researchers have expanded these techniques to consider how repressive actors, movements, and countermovements interact over time and thereby affect the rate and/or severity of repression.

THE EFFECTS OF REPRESSIVE ACTION

Quite aside from the question of how to explain repression, or changes in repressive levels over

time, researchers have also engaged a second major research question on repression: what are the effects of repression on activists and social movements? Most of the research in this area has focused on the effects of repression on either the level of social movement activity or the tactics deployed by social movements.

Before discussing theories about the effects of repression, it is important to understand how this debate is related to major theories on social movements. Some interest in the effects of repression on the level of social movement participation has been generated by the connection of repression to arguments surrounding "political opportunities." In the political process approach to explaining social movement emergence, mobilization, and success, repression is thought to represent one type of political opportunity. Political opportunities are critical to political process theory because the theory's fundamental proposition is that favorable political opportunities have a direct (or curvilinear, according to some) relationship with movement emergence, movement mobilization, and movement success.

One could further specify, differentiating between stable and volatile political opportunities. Stable opportunities are often defined as being structural, and hence are called political opportunity structures (POS). Repressive capacities or structural controls on repressive agents (e.g., constitutional limitations on police power) are seen by some scholars as POS. Volatile opportunities vary over time and may be less structural. The prevalence of state repression at a given moment is often referred to as being a component of volatile political opportunities.

Political process theorists argue that repression dampens social movement mobilization and may encourage the use of more institutional, and less violent, social movement tactics. Sometimes framed as increasing the costs of movement participation, or the costs of deploying a particular tactic, the claim is that repression reduces the number of individuals willing to engage in protest at all, or at least the number of individuals willing to use particular protest tactics. Others interested in rational choice models of collective action, but not in political process or political opportunities, have agreed with this cost based argument, suggest ing that repression raises the costs of activism

and thus should reduce the overall amount of activism.

While supportive evidence of this claim has been found, evidence has also been found suggesting that repression radicalizes social movement participants. Thus, instead of diminishing protest or deterring the use of particularly aggressive tactics, many scholars have argued that repression encourages further protest and the use of non institutional tactics.

Still other scholars have sought to reconcile these seemingly divergent empirical findings by arguing the repression has a curvilinear (or, alternatively, an inverted U) relationship to movement participation and the use of confrontational tactics. For instance, if there was no repression, such a society might be so open to change that protest would be unnecessary. At the same time, if a society was under authoritarian control, the costs for activism might be exorbitant. Under this logic, one would expect protest where moderate repression is found, represented by an inverted U relationship between repression and protest. This dizzying array of theoretical arguments is matched by a similarly large array of discordant findings: empirical evidence exists for direct, inverse, curvilinear, inverted U, and null effects of repression on movement mobilization and tactical deployment. Thus, despite significant scholarly effort, substantial discord about the effects of repression still exists.

SEE ALSO: Contention, Tactical Repertoires of; Political Opportunities; Political Process Theory; Social Movement Organizations; Social Movements; Social Movements, Political Consequences of; Social Movements, Recruitment to

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social movements, strain and breakdown theories of

Steven M. Buechler

Strain and breakdown theories seek to explain the causes of collective behavior and social movements. They implicitly presume that when social institutions are stable, collective behavior is unlikely. It is when institutions undergo strain or breakdown that the resulting social disorganization and decreased social control are more likely to foster collective behavior in the form of fads, crazes, riots, rebellions, movements, and revolutions.

The classical sociological spokesperson for this approach is Émile Durkheim, who diagnosed modern society as insufficiently integrated and subject to grave dangers of anomie and egoism. Put differently, chronic strains and acute breakdowns in social order could foster many types of antisocial behavior, including suicide (Durkheim 1951 [1897]). European crowd theorists then seized on notions of strain and breakdown to explain both the emergence and the stereotypically excessive and irrational nature of crowd behavior. Robert Park transplanted this perspective to the United States in

the early twentieth century and laid the foundation for the collective behavior tradition.

Herbert Blumer definitively established collective behavior as a major subfield in US sociology. His work (Blumer 1951) posited strong links between strain or breakdown and a distinctive conception of collective behavior (including crowds, masses, publics, and movements) that emphasized its spontaneous, contagious, excitable, and often irrational character. Turner and Killian (1987) further developed this approach by analyzing emergent norms in collective behavior.

Several other variations of the collective behavior tradition emerged in the 1950s and early 1960s. Relative deprivation theory interpreted strain as a social psychological condition of cognitive dissonance that motivated collective behavior. Structural functionalists proposed an elaborate multistage model in which structural strain was a crucial factor facilitating the emergence of many different forms of collective behavior (Smelser 1962). Mass society theorists saw strain deriving from the lack of intermediate social groupings that fostered alienation, which in turn motivated participation in collective behavior.

From European origins in the 1890s through US sociology in the 1960s, strain and breakdown provided the preeminent explanations of the emergence of collective behavior and social movements. However, critics argued that this tradition viewed collective behavior in a distinctly negative way. While there were more differences between theorists than the critics acknowledged, the charge was that the tradition as a whole viewed collective behavior as irrational, disorganized, emotional outbursts that spread through contagion and threatened social order. This broad challenge was accompanied by more specific criticisms of strain and breakdown theories as too vague, not necessary, or not sufficient to explain collective behavior. These criticisms were part of a major paradigm shift prompted by the protests of the 1960s, the politics of younger sociologists, and their unwillingness to analyze these protests in the unfavorable terms of collective behavior theory.

Proponents of the new resource mobilization paradigm in the 1970s and early 1980s argued that the collective behavior tradition involved a priori, negative judgments of such behavior;

that collective behavior was too broad a category to be intellectually viable; that social movements required a different analysis than more fleeting forms of collective behavior; that movements were often rational, organized, enduring, and legitimate responses to injustice; and that movements were better explained in political than psychologically reductionist terms.

These critiques also rested on empirical investigation. Studies of 1960s urban riots found strain and breakdown theories to be vague and psychologistic, to obscure the political dimensions of these riots, to deny rational and strategic aspects of riots as a political tactic, and to obscure the actual roots of the associated violence. Work on European collective action also argued that violence is better seen as an interactive product of relations between authorities and protesters, and that protesters often act in a rational, purposive, political fashion when choosing tactics. In explanatory terms, these critics argued that the degree of solidarity among contenders is a much more precise predictor of the episodic nature of collective action than vague notions of strain and breakdown. These critics concluded that breakdown theories are logically and empirically flawed and that solidarity theories are universally preferable (Tilly et al. 1975).

Until the mid 1970s, strain and breakdown theories were still the prevailing explanation of collective behavior. Less than a decade later, they had all but disappeared with the paradigm shift from collective behavior to resource mobilization, and the consequent marginalization of strain and breakdown explanations.

Despite their marginalization, strain and breakdown theories persisted around the edges of this new subfield. One example may be found in studies of revolution. Working outside the mainstream resource mobilization paradigm, Goldstone (1991) identified similar dynamics in revolutions in the modern world involving state breakdown, revolutionary contention, and state rebuilding. State breakdown involves a conjunction of state fiscal distress, elite alienation and conflict, and high mobilization potential among the general populace. In this interactive model, all three elements must be present if a full revolutionary challenge is to unfold. The background causes of state breakdown are historically specific, but often involve

demographic growth and population shifts which put new pressure on state resources (Goldstone 1991). Goldstone concludes that state breakdowns from 1500 to 1850 resulted from population growth which overwhelmed agrarian bureaucratic states and prompted fiscal instability, intra elite conflicts, and popular unrest. In its emphasis on deterministic background factors and external variables, Goldstone's model is closer to the collective behavior tradition's emphasis on strain and breakdown explanations than it is to the more movement centered resource mobilization model.

Another example of the persistence of strain and breakdown approaches is Piven and Cloward's (1992) argument that social structures normally limit opportunities for protest and diminish its force when it does occur. Thus, it is social breakdowns in society's regulatory capacity and everyday routines that provide rare but potent opportunities for mass defiance. But breakdown is not enough; people must also see their deprivations as unjust and mutable. Such insights are only likely when social distress is high or institutions are obviously malfunctioning. Societal breakdown thus not only disrupts regulatory capacity and everyday routines, it also raises consciousness about alternative social arrangements. Piven and Cloward (1992) further argue that strain and breakdown are especially critical for explaining non normative protest in the form of mass defiance; the latter is a more basic challenge to power since it not merely pursues a specific agenda but does so in a way that challenges elite rule making. The distinction is critical to the debate: breakdown is not a necessary precondition of normative group action but it is a precondition of collective protest, riot, and rebellion.

A final example of the persistence of breakdown theories is a recent specification that links breakdown and the quotidian nature of social life (Snow et al. 1998). The latter refers to taken for granted practices and routines that comprise habitual social action, alongside routinized expectations and the suspension of doubt about the social world and one's role within it. Disruptions of the quotidian make routine action problematic and undermine the natural attitude. This specification of breakdown dynamics can be combined with solidarity explanations since it is not the associational

ties between people that break down but rather their taken for granted practices and beliefs. These three very different examples illustrate the persistence of strain and breakdown theories despite their marginalization by the resource mobilization perspective. For further examples, see Useem (1998).

While strain and breakdown theories have persisted in these ways, it can also be argued that they have actually returned to mainstream social movement theory under a new nomenclature (Buechler 2004). There is considerable conceptual overlap between what collective behavior theorists mean by strain or breakdown and what resource mobilization theorists mean by opportunity. What obscures this equation is the valuational bias of each set of concepts. The terms "strain" and "breakdown" inherently connote negative, problematic conditions to be prevented, avoided, or repaired. As these terms functioned in the collective behavior paradigm, they conveyed deeply embedded negative judgments about the appropriateness of collective behavior. And as Useem (1998) recently observed, breakdown theorists to this day are more likely to see social control in a positive light and protester action in a negative light. Thus, it was not just breakdown as a causal mechanism that provoked the ire of critics; it was also the halo of negative judgments that drew their fire.

The concept of opportunity was tailor made for this debate. It provided the transvaluation sought by critics that allowed them to paint collective action in a positive light. In contrast to "breakdown," "opportunity" inherently signifies something to be sought, desired, seized, enjoyed, valued, and maximized. In addition, it preserved a way of talking about changes in background conditions that facilitate collective action. By substituting opportunity for breakdown, resource mobilization and political process theorists retained a powerful explanation for collective action while reversing the valuations placed on that action.

This concept has now found its place in social movement theory in a theoretical synthesis of political opportunities, mobilizing structures, and framing processes. While opportunity and breakdown are not the same thing, they do the same work in their respective theoretical traditions. Both refer to external, variable processes

that increase the likelihood of collective action. Put more polemically, a political process theorist might argue that to whatever extent strain and breakdown are causally relevant, that relevance is captured in the notion of opportunity structures. What is jettisoned are the negative connotations of traditional strain and breakdown theories. To the extent that opportunity has become a stand in for strain and breakdown, it can be concluded that the latter never really disappeared from social movement theory.

SEE ALSO: Collective Action; Crowd Behavior; Durkheim, Émile; Emergent Norm Theory; Framing and Social Movements; Functionalism/Neofunctionalism; Political Opportunities; Resource Mobilization Theory; Revolutions; Riots; Social Movements; Social Movements, Political Consequences of; Social Movements, Relative Deprivation and; Solidarity, Mechanical and Organic; Strain Theories; Structural Functional Theory

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social network analysis

Barry Wellman

Social scientists have used the metaphor of “social network” for a century to connote complex sets of relationships between members of social systems at all scales, from interpersonal to international. Yet not until the 1950s did they start using the term systematically and self-consciously to denote patterns of ties that cut across the concepts traditionally used by social scientists: bounded groups (e.g., tribes, families) and social categories (e.g., gender, ethnicity).

Social network analysis has now moved from being a suggestive metaphor to an analytic approach to a paradigm, with its own theoretical statements, methods, and research findings. It has developed from diverse sources, including anthropological accounts of detribalized urban migrants, surveys of people’s long distance communities, political upheavals, Internet connectivity, and trade relations among nations. The Internet, inherently network like, has so popularized the approach that *Business Week* named social network analysis “the hottest new technology” of 2003, and membership in network analysis’ professional organization has doubled in four years.

Social network analysts reason from whole to part; from structure to relation to individual; from behavior to attitude. They argue that their social structural explanations have more analytic power than individualistic analyses that do not take relational patterns into account and that interpret behavior in terms of the internalized norms of discrete individuals. The structure of a network, the relations among network members, and the location of a member within a network are critical factors in understanding social behavior. Analysts search for regular structures of ties underlying often incoherent surface appearances, and they study how these social structures constrain network members’

behavior. Key concepts include network density, centrality, transitivity, tie strength, clustering, and structural equivalence.

Social networks are formally defined as a set of *nodes* (or *network members*) that are *tied* by one or more specific types of *relations*. In much research, these nodes are individual persons, but they can also be groups, corporations, households, blogs, nation states, or other collectivities. Ties consist of one or more specific relations, such as financial exchange, friendship, hate, trade, web links, or airline routes. Ties vary in *quality* (whether the relation provides emotional aid or companionship), *quantity* (how much emotional aid; how frequent the companionship), *multiplexity* (sometimes called multi-strandedness: ties containing only one relation or several), and *symmetry* (resources flowing in one direction or both). The non-random structure of ties channels resources to specific locations in social systems, fostering inequalities.

Several analytic tendencies distinguish network analysis. First, there is no assumption that groups are the building blocks of society. While social network analytic techniques can discover the empirical existence of groups, the approach is open to studying less bounded social systems. For example, researchers have mapped the structure of the World Wide Web on the Internet, showing how superconnectors shorten distances between websites.

Second, although social network data often include information about the attributes of individuals, such as age, gender, and beliefs, individuals are not treated as discrete units of analysis. Instead, analysis focuses on how the networks affect the individuals and ties embedded in them.

Third, social network analysis contrasts with analyses which assume that socialization into norms determines behavior and social structure. By contrast, network analysis looks to see the extent to which patterns of social relations affect norms and values.

Social network analysts gather data in many ways, such as ethnography, surveys, archives, and simulations. Their data collection emphasizes ties and the problematic nature of boundaries. Although analysts often visualize networks as point and line graphs, they analyze them as matrices that are more amenable to statistical and mathematical manipulation. Specialized

programs, such as UCInet and Pajek, facilitate analyses.

Network analysts often study *whole networks*, all of the ties containing one or a few kinds of relations among the members of a population. These populations can be of different scales, from the members of a small office to Hollywood musicians to the vast blogosphere on the Internet. Multilevel and two mode analyses facilitate the study of *networks of networks*, as when ties between persons also connect organizations. For example, analysts have studied interlocking corporate directorships (who sits on whose boards?) to describe ties among large organizations and to discover the structure of dominant institutions in western societies. Through manipulation of matrices representing who is connected with whom, analysts can discover densely knit clusters of heavily interconnected network members (and thus empirically identify true groups) or discover those network members whose *equivalent* relations show up in *blockmodels* as having similar roles in the social system.

Whole network studies are not always feasible because they require complete lists of all members of a population and all of their ties. Moreover, prior specification of population boundaries may not be appropriate for identifying clandestine networks or studying the diffusion of information, munitions, illicit drugs, and disease. In such situations, their interest is in tracing connections through unbounded networks and discovering clusters of ties.

Some network analysts study *egocentric* (or personal) networks, defined from the standpoints of egos (or *focal individuals*). Analysts typically use survey research to gather information about the networks' *composition* (e.g., percent gender), *structure* (e.g., the density of interconnection among members), and *contents* (e.g., the amount of support provided to egos). This is useful for studying far flung communities, the provision of social support, and the mobilization of social capital.

Social network analysis has blossomed in recent years, with the paradigm appearing throughout the social science. It has a professional association, the International Network for Social Network Analysis, and three specialized journals: *Social Networks*, *Connections*, and the *Journal of Social Structure*. Network

rudimentary Internet software has proliferated, attempting to connect people who know each other directly and indirectly. In addition to sociology, network analyses are often found in management studies (mergers; organizational behavior); anthropology (kinship, urban relocation); geography (dispersion of network members); communication science (virtual community on the Internet); information science (information flows); political science (political mobilization); psychology (small groups; social support); social history (social movements); statistics (multilevel analysis); and mathematics (graph theory).

SEE ALSO: Community; Dependency and World Systems Theories; Groups; Internet; Organization Theory; Power Dependence Theory; Simmel, Georg; Social Capital; Social Exchange Theory; Social Movements; Social Network Theory; Transnational Movements; Weak Ties (Strength of)

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social network theory

Anne F. Eisenberg and Jeffrey Houser

The idea of social networks is prevalent in everyday vernacular language, ranging from the game “Six Degrees of Kevin Bacon” where players identify how any one actor is linked to the actor Kevin Bacon through no more than six different people, to the way in which people “network” with one another as an avenue through which they gain social capital, to how we describe our computers’ ability to “talk” with other computers. The idea of social networks has an equally wide range of applications in sociology, from formal network theory to social network data analysis. The historical development of the sociological use of the idea of social networks originates with Durkheim and Simmel, and its breadth of use is reflected in contemporary theoretical and methodological developments and applications. In its different uses, from the vernacular to its historical development to its current developments, social network theory refers to the ways in which people are connected to one another and how these connections create and define human society on all levels: the individual, the group, and the institutional.

HISTORICAL DEVELOPMENT

The historical development of social networks as a sociologically important idea is represented by two main stages: its origins in the sociological work of Durkheim and Simmel, and its early development in the areas of social psychology. While Durkheim does not use the phrase social networks, it is obvious from his

writings about religion, suicide, and the division of labor that he focused on how changes in the social world, such as those brought about by industrialization and capitalism, affected the connections between people. More to the point, he aptly illustrated how connections between people serve as the basis for human society. For example, in describing the shift from mechanical solidarity to organic solidarity he focused on several criteria, including the quality and quantity of individuals’ connections to one another, as expressed by the idea of dynamic density, and by the level of the division of labor. Specifically, Durkheim argued that social relations in a society characterized by mechanical solidarity were meaningfully different from social relations in a society characterized by organic solidarity. He stated that all societies began with small communities of people who are all connected to one another in a familiar fashion. As the number of people within the community grew, social relations changed, leading to more organic forms of solidarity whereby people were connected to larger numbers of other people but in a less intimate way. This shift was also reflected in a change in the level of division of labor, with mechanical forms of solidarity having little to no division of labor and organic forms of solidarity having greater division of labor. Also, in his discussion of suicide, Durkheim focused on the role that integration played in maintaining social order. He defined integration in terms of how it allows for the interchange of ideas and feelings, as well as created shared moral beliefs and goals that prevented the excessive individualism that leads to egoistic suicide. Finally, Durkheim’s discussion of religion centered on the role that religion plays in bringing a community of people together through their shared experiences, beliefs, and rituals. It is obvious that for Durkheim it is the meaningful connections between people that allow society to survive and flourish.

Simmel’s work can generally be described as examining different aspects of individual lives and individuals’ interactions. Similarly to Durkheim, while Simmel never directly used the phrase social networks, his writings focused on how interactions were affected by the way in which people are connected to one another in terms of an individual’s social status, as well as the dynamics that occur as different people

engage in interactions with one another. For example, in discussing how group size affected interactions, Simmel examined the qualitative change that occurs in interactions when the dyad becomes a triad. In the dyad, actors are connected by their total interdependence, while in a triad it is possible for a coalition to develop between two of the three actors. Simmel's focus on the different variables that affect our connections to one another is evident in a wide range of his discussions, from exchanges as a form of interactions, to group development, through a series of interactions among people, to the social characteristics (such as whether a person is a stranger) that affect the creation of connections between people.

The second stage in the historical development of social networks as a sociological idea occurs in the early work of sociologists specializing in social psychology. Early social psychologists, similarly to Simmel, discussed exchanges as a form of interactions by building on the ideas of anthropologists such as Frazer, Malinowski, Mauss, and Lévi Strauss, as well as ideas associated with behaviorism in psychology. George Homans highlighted the basic principles of exchange theory, which focused on how connections between people were based on the need for exchanges to occur to fulfill each actor's needs. Peter Blau and Richard Emerson and his colleagues further developed Homans's ideas by explicating the conditions under which exchanges proceed (for the former) and how such exchanges might then create collective action between actors through different types of exchange networks (the latter). While Emerson was the only early social psychologist explicitly using the phrase social networks, it is evident from the work of Homans and Blau that their underlying themes examined the creation and maintenance of connections between people. These themes, and the phrase social networks, are developed further by contemporary theorists and empirical research applications.

CONTEMPORARY DEVELOPMENTS

The idea of social networks is used in a wide range of areas of study in sociology, from economic sociology to social psychology to

political sociology, as well as representing a specific form of data analysis. From its historical development in social psychology, social networks appear in a number of contemporary social psychological theories. Cook and colleagues (1993), among others, extended Emerson's original formulation of exchange theory to examine issues such as the distribution of power in social exchange networks, how bargaining in social networks is affected by power distribution, commitment formation, and coalition formations. Each of these theoretical extensions of Emerson and Blau's work focuses on some aspect of social networks in terms of how connections between actors then affect further interactions and exchanges. Willer and colleagues (2002) developed network exchange theory (NET) to focus on exchange structures and power relations. NET provides explicit predictions about exchanges that may occur based on factors such as whether or not social networks are exclusively connected, the level of hierarchy and mobility that exists in any particular social network, and the order in which exchanges occur. These factors then allow Willer and colleagues to explore how collective action develops among actors in a social network. Finally, social psychologists such as Eisenberg (2002) and Ridgeway and colleagues (1994) interested in groups and group dynamics examine how social networks structure social interactions through social norms as reflected in status characteristics and the resulting group structure.

Network theory is a broader term that represents theoretical developments in all areas of sociology by focusing on the key idea of actors and how they are connected, whereby actors can be individuals or groups or social institutions. In other words, network theory allows us to examine the objective pattern of interactions represented by how actors are connected to one another. By examining how actors are connected to one another, sociologists gain insight into the structure of social interactions on the individual level as well as the structure of groups and institutions. For example, Granovetter (1973) used social networks to explain the importance of weak ties among people and how these types of ties affected exchanges. His work served as the basis for further work in economic sociology, such as explaining organizational survival in

particular economic environments. Uzzi (1996) demonstrated how conformity to specific organizational norms increased an organization's likelihood for survival. Heckathorn (2002) used social networks to explain collective action in social movements by examining how particular networks of people developed into formal movement organizations. Additionally, social networks have been used to explain an array of social phenomena, including job mobility, the structure of groups of scientists, corporate networks, and consumer transactions.

Finally, social network also refers to a specific form of data analysis in which the researcher focuses on the ties among and between social actors. More importantly, social network analysis allows sociologists literally to draw a picture of the actors studied – from the dyad to the triad to the social movement. Social network analysis consists of basic concepts that emphasize how actors are connected to one another. For example, points and nodes identify specific actors (individual, group, organizational, or collectivities) who are then described in terms of their connections to others through either a simple graph figure or through a matrix representing particular ties. Once the social network has been so identified and described, it can then be analyzed in terms of the patterns and configurations of ties. This analysis includes examining the number of ties between any combination of actors, the direction in which resources flow for each set of ties, the strength of the ties, and the density of ties. Computer programs that provide both the descriptive and analytical are now readily available. These programs provide pictures of the social networks being studied, as well as the matrix of connections and calculations representing the patterns and configurations of ties. The reason social network analysis is becoming increasingly important in sociology is that describing and analyzing the social world in terms of objectively measured social connections allows us to avoid qualitative evaluations that lead to subjective, and possibly biased, understanding of specific social phenomena.

SEE ALSO: Elementary Theory; Exchange Network Theory; Social Network Analysis; Weak Ties (Strength of)

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social order

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Social order is synonymous with both society and social science. People do not regularly live in chaos, even when they are the denizens of postmodern societies that characteristically exacerbate the already chaotic tempo bequeathed by modernity. Regardless of whether it is edifying to accept, ritual and routine, not rebellion and revolution, absorb the lion's share of every day energies. Likewise, apart from whether society is conceived theoretically as organism or system, language game or mode of production, interaction ritual or ethereal spectacle, the essential notion of "society" is scientifically and practically meaningful only when it refers to routinely observable phenomena about which lasting statements are possible. Without social order, social science would dissolve into the ephemeral study of ephemerality.

Probably no figure in the history of sociology more clearly represents the concern for theorizing the practical achievement of social order than Talcott Parsons. Parsons self consciously built an integrated theory of social order through synthesis of previous ambitious attempts to grasp the totality of human society, including via the work of Herbert Spencer, Vilfredo Pareto, Émile Durkheim, Alfred Marshall, and Max Weber. Indeed, the last four are the principal subjects of Parsons's classic *The Structure of Social Action* (1937), which he famously inaugurated with Crane Brinton's question, "Who now reads Spencer?" And not just Spencer, but also Thomas Hobbes, Plato, and so many others. The "problem of order," as Parsons put it, is further systematized in the aptly titled *The Social System* (1951). This book outlined a model of society as a functionally differentiated set of institutions and cultural patterns. In such a society, social order is conceived as the aggregate equilibrium that is achieved when subsystems adapt to meet a priori societal needs. As determinative as this model appears, Parsons emphasized that, for him, social order was always already "precarious" and "problematical," not an "imperative" to be associated with theoretical, much less actual, "fascism."

Parsons's attention to the problem of order brought him many critics, including – as his own use of the fascism word suggests – passionate and politically motivated critics. Among these are Parsons's own students and a striking number of sociology's leading lights. Among the sympathetic critics is his student, Robert K. Merton. While Merton's "middle range" version of "structural functionalism" certainly shares Parsons's concern for social order, it recasts Parsons's theoretical focus on the societal totality in order to render it serviceable for empirical social research. Even such elementary concepts as Durkheim's anomie are in Merton's divining fundamentally revised to focus concern for the maintenance of social order away from the social totality and toward the various mid range problems of social milieu.

Another student is Harold Garfinkel, whose "ethnomethodology" pursues the problem of order, not at the middle range but from the bottom up. Garfinkel advocates empirical analysis of the myriad everyday rules (the ethno methods) that actors themselves use in creating orderly, predictable interactions. While this empirical approach differs fundamentally from that suggested by Parsons, the goal is the same. As Garfinkel stresses, his appropriation of Edmund Husserl's and Alfred Schütz's phenomenological insights is marshaled on behalf of "working out Durkheim's aphorism" that sociology's most fundamental data are concrete social facts. Thus, far from rejecting Parsons's focus on social order, both Merton and Garfinkel aim to render Parsons's problem of order amenable to empirical sociological research, although of significantly different types.

Parsons's more vociferous critics include C. Wright Mills and Alvin W. Gouldner, neither of whom were his students. Mills famously viewed Parsons's attempt to grasp an overarching social order as an instance of "grand theory," a pejorative meant to highlight the theory's ahistorical and empirically disconnected quality as well as call attention to its usefulness as ideological buttress for the specific faults of the mid century United States of America. As immersed in Marx and Weber as was Mills, he could not countenance a social theory in which Marx played virtually no role and Weber appeared as a politically defanged shadow of himself. That is, Mills could not subscribe to a theory of

social order virtually bereft of attention to power, politics, and social domination. Gouldner, for his part, pushed this criticism further, assessing the ideological roots of Parsons's theoretical system from Plato forward and announcing the need for a thorough rethinking of sociology's self-conception just as the discipline was in fact, depending on the perspective taken, decomposing through internal fragmentation or liberating itself from Parsons's theoretical straightjacket. Either way, sociology's focus on the problem of social order seemed to dissolve along with the identity of the discipline.

Although not typically conceived as such, Parsons's problem of social order remains an ongoing practical as well as theoretical problem. On the one hand, researchers' plates are full in pursuit of empirical analysis of postmodernity's acceleration, intensification, dispersal, and differentiation of social and cultural life, which may or may not ultimately facilitate the production of social order. Does the World Wide Web integrate globally, or divide humanity into disparate viewers of superficial information? Does the emergence of post-Fordist/Keynesian economic systems provide efficiency and facilitate meeting increasingly differentiated consumer demand, or globalize the crisis of overproduction without hope of an equally global Keynesian fix? Does the fact of planetary ecological crisis portend unprecedented forms of international cooperation, or will "the North" use its political, military, and economic power to suppress "the South's" demands for an equitable and democratically coordinated response? Will globalization result in genuinely pluralist societies, or will atavistic and ethnocentric responses undermine civility among culturally diverse populations? Will microtechnologies result in the further medical amelioration of disease and mortality, or will social order be subverted by viral contagions, organic or computer, endemic or laboratory synthesized, unintentionally or by menacing design? Whereas social order in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries was wracked by such massively disruptive forces as capitalist industrialization, urbanism, liberal democratic revolutions, and European colonialism, and whereas the twentieth century was dominated by such events as two world embracing wars, worldwide ecological degradation, and the threat of nuclear

apocalypse, the twenty-first century appears destined to continue to challenge the achievement of social order on terms as particular and general as human experience provides.

Thus, it is perhaps predictable that a leading contemporary social theorist such as Anthony Giddens would deemphasize his concern for social order as articulated in *The Constitution of Society* (1984) in favor of a more historically engaged reflexive modernization theory and pursuit of "third way" and, more recently, post-third way politics. Yet, it is also the case that perhaps the most influential contemporary inheritor of the Marxian tradition, Jürgen Habermas, has been profoundly influenced by Parsons and the autopoietic systems theory of another of Parsons's students, Niklas Luhmann. Additional streams of analysis of social order include those that derive from the towering achievement of Michel Foucault and his historical attention to the real world Nietzschean interplay of knowledge and power, and that has resulted in such diverse treatises as Sheila Jasanoff and her colleagues' focus on "the co-production of science and social order" and Jackie Orr's "genealogy of panic disorder," the latter, in fact, directly theorizing the historical intersections of Parsons, pills, and patriarchy.

SEE ALSO: Anomie; Autopoiesis; Ethnomethodology; Foucault, Michel; Luhmann, Niklas; Merton, Robert K.; Mills, C. Wright; Parsons, Talcott; Structural Functional Theory

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social pathology

Milena Buchs

The concept of social pathology applies the medical metaphor of pathology to describe and explain social problems. From this perspective those individuals and groups who deviate from social norms, or institutions that do not fit with core social norms, are “sick” or pathologic and a risk to the society’s “health.” Social pathology was a very influential model in nineteenth century American and European sociological writings on social problems. The concept is closely related to those of social disorganization and deviance. However, social disorganization focuses on the malfunctioning of social institutions and structures rather than on the individual. The concept of deviance became popular in the 1950s. It was strongly influenced by the concept of anomie (Durkheim, Merton) and is similar to social pathology in that it focuses on

the individual criminal. When the concept of social pathology became famous, many authors using this concept also applied Darwinist and evolutionary models to the analysis of society. They aimed to contribute to social progress and regarded every kind of behavior or social phenomenon that appeared as obstacles to social progress as pathologic and therefore inferior.

The concept of social pathology contains an inherent tension. On the one hand, it emerged at a time when sociologists such as Comte and Spencer sought to establish the field of sociology as a scientific discipline applying objective and scientific methods. This was one of the reasons why concepts from other scientific disciplines such as medicine and biology were employed to study society. On the other hand, social pathology is closely related to a nineteenth century reform movement which applied normative views to the study of social problems. The perspective of social pathology defines social problems as those social phenomena that diverge from present social norms and morals. Social pathologists assumed that norms could be defined in an objective way, for example by setting universal standards of “health” or “normality.”

One can distinguish different versions of the concept social pathology. These versions are also related to the development of the concept over time. Early versions, emerging in the second half of the nineteenth century, were closely related to the socioeconomic context of industrialization and urbanization. Many American social pathologists of that time are regarded as having held relatively moralistic and conservative values deriving from rural forms of social life (Mills 1943). Some authors used a biological or organic version of social pathology. Samuel Smith, for example, used an organic analogy in order to describe different social classes and their relationships. Smith (1911) saw phenomena such as crime and poverty as inherently related to each other and those affected by it as belonging to the “abnormal classes.” Authors such as Lombroso and Ferrero (1895) developed the concept of the deviant person as a “born criminal.” According to this concept, criminal behavior is caused by inherited mental or physical diseases. Another version of the concept regards a lack of socialization as the main reason

for deviant behavior: here the criminal becomes “infected” by the bad morals around him or her. Both versions mainly supported (religious) education and medical treatment as the right methods to “cure” criminals. These early versions of social pathology had their heyday in the period before World War I, after which they declined slowly but steadily.

In the 1960s the concept of social pathology again became more frequently used. Social parameters were quite different and the concept became more popular among liberal social scientists who regarded whole social institutions as pathologic or as causing the pathological behavior of individuals (Rubington & Weinberg 1995). At this time, the concept of social pathology was also used to explain social and political disasters such as the Holocaust by Nazi Germany, the totalitarianism of the Stalin era, and the atomic bombs dropped on Hiroshima and Nagasaki by the US (Rosenberg et al. 1964).

Some authors in the same period also intended to apply the idea of social pathology in a more objective way. This was a response to the critique of social pathology which claimed that the concept in fact supported the culturally specific norms found in rural life such as piety and social stability, but disguised this by the use of pseudo scientific methods (Mills 1943). Therefore, authors such as Kavolis (1968) developed what he called a “universal criterion” for the definition of pathologies. For him, the cross culturally acknowledged criterion of social pathology was “destructive or self destructive behavior” rather than deviance from culturally specific norms. Another difficulty in diagnosing social pathologies arises if one argues from Durkheim’s functionalist point of view that deviance serves a social function and is therefore “normal.”

Since the mid 1980s, constructivist approaches have become prominent in the study of social problems and the notion of social pathology is now rarely used. The constructivist approach does not agree that it is possible to define a cross culturally accepted criterion of “normality.” Rather, from the constructivists’ perspective, social problems are those phenomena that are regarded as problems by the public, political movements, or politicians, all of whom may strive to change the situation by political action.

SEE ALSO: Criminology; Deviant Careers; Eugenics; Social Policy, Welfare State; Social Problems, Concept and Perspectives; Social Problems, Politics of

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social policy, welfare state

Franz Xaver Kaufmann

“Welfare state” and “social policy” are generalizing concepts legitimizing political intervention to protect the weaker members of society, to reduce social inequalities, and to promote human capacities for action and self reliance. The contemporary welfare state is the institutional expression of a political system committing itself to human rights, including social rights. Social policy is the generic name for strategies to solve social problems by political intervention, as well as for an academic discipline dealing with such issues.

HISTORY

The idea that the king or the prince was responsible for the “security, welfare, and felicity” of his subjects was already part of

premodern political ideology. In some countries (e.g., Prussia) there existed also a discernible set of policies aimed at promoting welfare (Dorwart 1971). In the UK, the poor laws of Queen Elizabeth I (1599–1601) drafted some basic features of social policy, i.e., the definition of a problem (“poverty”), a classification of recipients and selective treatment (workhouse versus asylum), their entrustment to local officers, and rules of financing. The followers of John Locke, Adam Smith, and Immanuel Kant, however, opposed such a comprehensive political authority. Responsibility for security alone should remain with government or (in continental Europe) the state, whereas individuals should be responsible for their own welfare and happiness.

In the modern sense, social policies and institutions of public welfare emerged in the nineteenth century in reaction to economic liberalism and the pernicious side effects of industrialization and urbanization, with Great Britain and Switzerland being the forerunners. The terms “social policy” and “welfare state” were first coined in Germany: *Social Politik* on the eve of the revolutionary year 1848, and *Wohlfahrtsstaat* by the social reformer Adolph Wagner in 1876. The most perspicacious social scientist in these matters was Lorenz von Stein. Drawing on Hegel’s distinction between “the state” and “civil society” and inspired, like Karl Marx, by French socialists, from 1842 on he developed a dynamic theory of societal transformation leading inevitably to class struggle. But in contrast to Marx, he saw the way out not in revolution but in class compromise, mediated through a “monarchy of social reform” thought to be neutral toward class interests (cf. Stein 1964 [1850]). This class compromise should consist in the constitutional guarantee of private property in favor of the propertied class on the one hand, and in the protection and advancement of the working classes through education, free association, and “social administration” on the other.

In fact, in many European countries, things have evolved along the lines of Stein’s argument, though mostly in a more democratic and corporatist way. Beginning with the September Agreement in Denmark (1899) and followed by Germany (1918), France (1936, 1968), Switzerland (1937), and Sweden (1938), agreements

among employers’ leaders and workers’ associations have been made on a national basis with quite similar content: acceptance by trade unions of private industry and industrial authority on one hand, and acceptance by employers of obligatory collective bargaining and state intervention to protect workers on the other. These agreements proved more or less sustainable, but state intervention regulating labor protection, workers’ rights, and social insurance, i.e., social policies, thus became accepted throughout Europe before World War II.

The welfare state’s heyday came after World War II. The victorious powers were convinced that the ascendance of fascism and its atrocities was due mainly to the economic and social misery following World War I and the Great Depression. Thus the program for a more peaceful world, originating in the Atlantic Charter issued by Roosevelt and Churchill in 1941 and leading to the Organization of United Nations, included the proposal “to bring about the fullest collaboration between all nations in the economic field with the object of securing, for all, improved labor standards, economic advancement, and social security.”

The ideological shift from social policies for industrial workers to a comprehensive set of welfare policies for all members of a society is documented in the 1944 Declaration of Philadelphia by the International Labor Organization (ILO), which became incorporated into the ILO’s constitution in 1946. In this document is to be found for the first time the conviction that “all human beings . . . have the right to pursue both their material well being and their spiritual development in conditions of freedom and dignity, of economic security, and equal opportunity.” Further, the document defines the major areas of welfare state policies. These ideas are echoed in Article 55 of the Charter of the United Nations Organization. Eventually, the UN’s Universal Declaration of Human Rights in 1948 codified not only civil and political rights, but also economic, social, and cultural rights, to be promoted by national policies and international cooperation. The international implementation of the latter remained quite weak, however. The Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC) has remained a rather ineffective organ of the UN. Yet the plan of a welfare state was internationally established

by these decisions and has taken shape through various regional declarations and covenants.

SCOPE

International comparative research on issues of the welfare state focuses mainly on systems of income maintenance or social security. This is admittedly the most expensive and widespread field of public intervention. But there are two other fields in which sociopolitical intervention is common, namely, labor protection (cf. Hepple 1986) and social services (cf. Alber 1995). From a functionalist perspective, it is thus possible to distinguish social policies in the realm of production (regulating working conditions, wages, labor markets), distribution (social security, taxation), and reproduction (social services: education, health, housing, personal services) (Kaufmann 2001).

In fact, some institutional arrangements providing protection of working conditions, income security, and social services have developed in almost all industrialized countries. But countries differ as to the extent of coverage of the population, the degree of political regulation or self administration, the share of public, semi public, non profit, or private ownership, and financing from the general public budget, by specific but compulsory contributions, or by subsidized market prices. They differ moreover as to the legitimations and specific technologies of administrative intervention. All these features, which form the specific arrangement of public welfare production in a country, depend obviously on more general features of cultural orientations, the political system and the distribution of power, the structure and performance of the economy, and many other factors. So, from a comparative perspective, the object of inquiry is located in both the public and the private sphere, somewhere in between "state" and "civil society." It is much easier to describe "social policy" and "welfare state" from a specific national perspective. But these national self descriptions are far from being convergent in a comparative perspective. Similarities and differences are themselves objects of inquiry.

The welfare state is a focus of research for many disciplines, from political philosophy (Walzer 1983; Goodin 1988) and history

(Baldwin 1990; Ritter 1991) to economics (Atkinson 1983; Sen 1996) and even law. The bulk of research, however, stems from sociology and political science.

SOCIOLOGICAL APPROACHES

In the sociological discussion of the welfare state, the international context is seldom mentioned. This is one reason why concepts of the welfare state often remain rather loose and contested. Sociology mainly focuses on national developments in both national and comparative perspective, and most authors model their concept of the welfare state with respect to their own national or regional tradition. In the present context, only comparative and generalizing research is considered.

There is often an intrinsic correspondence between the choice of method for inquiry and the underlying concept of the welfare state. A widespread and very influential approach to comparative welfare state research operates with national or international statistics (Wilensky 1975). The statistical offices of the OECD and European Union (Eurostat) endeavor to standardize national figures to overcome the intricacies of comparison from heterogeneous national sources. This quantitative approach uses conventional definitions: the welfare state is often equated with social expenditure or its share in GDP. Moreover, all countries with available statistics are often included notwithstanding their institutional and ideological aspects.

A second approach starts from history and compares national developments of a limited number of welfare states in a more or less comprehensive way (Rimlinger 1971). This historical approach is quite flexible and contributes to an intrinsic understanding of various national cases, but it often lacks rigorous comparative dimensions and hence a clear basic concept of the welfare state.

More rigorous comparisons may be attained when the focus remains with particular institutional complexes of the welfare state such as the health system, old age security, or labor protection. Such studies are often quite instructive for a certain field of social policy, but again fail to account for a comprehensive concept of the welfare state. The institutionalist approach may

also focus on the impact of the political machinery upon the emergence of welfare states (Evans et al. 1985).

A thrust to more reflection of comprehensive differences of welfare states has been made by the typological approach. It began with the distinction by Richard Titmuss (1974) of the “institutional redistributive model,” the “industrial achievement–performance model,” and the “residual model” of social policy. This tripartite distinction is echoed by the welfare regime approach by Gøsta Esping Andersen (1990) which links the institutional differences to the dominance of social democratic or conservative or liberal ideologies. This typology has provoked much debate and has proved fruitful by sensitizing the professional community to the complex character of welfare states and their institutional as well as cultural and ideological differences.

The debate about systematizing differences among welfare states obscured somewhat the question of what they have in common. A convincing answer came from general sociology: the growth and functional differentiation of modern societies erode traditional forms of all embracing solidarity and lead to the emergence of increasingly selective forms of social organization and to growing individualization of life courses. It is therefore necessary to care politically for the inclusion of all individuals within the leading realms of life. This was already the underlying idea of the human rights movement. It was T. H. Marshall (1976 [1964]) who made it a sociological argument, which was then picked up under the heading of “inclusion” by Talcott Parsons and Niklas Luhmann.

This general perspective suggests that the emergence of a welfare state is a necessary concomitant of successful modernization. However, nations and political systems differ markedly in their relation to the economic system. Taking this difference as essential, one might distinguish between “state socialism” (e.g., the USSR), “welfare capitalism” (e.g., the US), and “welfare state,” the latter “European model” being characterized by a continuous tension between state intervention and market forces as well as by class compromise (Kaufmann 2003).

The progress of research has not led until now to a dominating paradigm. The subject is complex and multifarious, so substantial

approaches need to define first a specific perspective or, in a more advanced stage, the combination of a defined set of perspectives. Three overarching questions are to be found in comparative sociological and political research: (1) driving factors for the development and retrenchment of the welfare state; (2) functions of the welfare state; (3) evaluation and impact of welfare state provisions.

PROBLEMS

Historically, the emergence of welfare state institutions in Western Europe coincided with post war prosperity and full employment. Between 1945 and 1973, the terms of trade were particularly favorable for Europe, due to the Bretton Woods monetary system linking all currencies to an implicit gold standard expressed by a stable relation to the US dollar. The break down of this monetary system and the first oil price shock of 1974 brought to an end these exceptionally favorable circumstances. From then on, the language of “crisis,” stemming originally from Marxism, became common in discussions about the welfare state.

The extension of coverage and the creation of new insurances and services in the post war period not only were eased by rapid economic growth, but also profited from the Cold War. There was an overlapping consensus among left and right in Western Europe that in order to survive as an economic system, capitalism had at least to be tamed and, moreover, be restrained to the realm of market economy. People’s life chances should no longer be dependent entirely on market forces but should rely on public provision in the event of inability or impossibility of earning one’s own living. There remained ample political dissension as to the extent of public protection, but no longer as to the principle of protection itself.

There was furthermore a certain naïve trust in the wholly beneficent character of social policies on the part of their champions. The egalitarian attitude that redistribution is good in itself was backed by Keynesianism, and the strong belief in the problem solving capacities of politics remained unbroken, not only on the left. Doubts about the sustainability of this scenario then came not only from economists, but

also from social scientists. Since the 1980s the deregulation of financial markets has made for intensifying international competition and the increasing bargaining power of capital.

Discourse about the crisis of the welfare state has many issues: crisis of financing, crisis of governability, crisis of legitimation, crisis of efficiency, and crisis of loyalty (cf. Offe 1984). Despite some evidence for particular deficiencies of existing arrangements of public welfare production, the basic idea of a self-enforcing crisis of the welfare state has so far proved to be wrong. There is ample evidence that in most European countries, the institutions of social protection and political responsibility for the basic welfare of all citizens meet sustained acceptance, despite growing economic difficulties.

The “welfare backlash” began with the governments of Margaret Thatcher and Ronald Reagan around 1980. Strong opposition to spending on welfare and social security did not spread throughout the industrialized world, though almost everywhere the tightening of public budgets, growing unemployment, and the perspective of rising demand due to demographic changes made for politics of welfare retrenchment. Empirical evidence shows that the political systems of various nations were coping quite differently with the challenges of unemployment, globalization, and demographic change (Scharpf & Schmidt 2000; Huber & Stephens 2001). By and large, the cutback movement was successful only in slowing down social expenditure, but did not destroy public responsibility for social welfare.

Substantial changes in priorities and methods of welfare provision did take place, however. A general trend is the change of emphasis from a “redistributive state” to an “enabling state” (Gilbert 2002). The class issue loses centrality, while other issues (e.g., regional and generational conflicts) gain in importance. The demographic perspective of aging and decline shifts emphasis from social security to education and family policies (Esping Andersen et al. 2002; Castles 2004). A tradeoff between high standards of labor protection and unemployment is emerging in some countries. Moreover, the focus is switching from state provision of welfare to a mixed system of public, non profit, and market provision (“welfare pluralism”).

Though these shifts in emphasis are clearly against the established views of state and class centered welfare policies, it makes sense to preserve the term “welfare state” as long as political commitment to social rights for all and the power of the state with regard to the regulation of social services remain uncontested.

SEE ALSO: Poverty; Social Exclusion; Social Integration and Inclusion; Social Problems, Concept and Perspectives; Social Work: History and Institutions; State; State and Economy; Stratification and Inequality, Theories of; Welfare Regimes; Welfare State; Welfare State, Retrenchment of

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social problems, concept and perspectives

Axel Groenemeyer

“Social problems” have formed a specialized field within sociology, especially in the US, at least since the end of the nineteenth century.

The European context has always been marked by the concept of the “social question,” which was one of the principal sources for the development of sociology as a scientific discipline apart from philosophy, history, political science, and political economy. Unlike US sociology, in the European tradition the concept of social problems was not disseminated in the sociological literature until the end of the 1960s, when it appeared first in books and articles about social work. While the concept today is institutionalized in special sections of sociological associations and in some journals and textbooks, and its use has been spread in public and political discourse, European sociology has always privileged the concept of the social question, with greater emphasis on macrosociological reasoning and theory building. As a consequence, most of the literature using social problems as a theoretical concept is of US origin (Ritzer 2004; for handbooks in German and French, see Albrecht et al. 1999; Dorvil & Mayer 2001).

DEFINITIONS AND PERSPECTIVES OF SOCIAL PROBLEMS

The term social problem is used in public and political discussions and refers to very different social situations, conditions, and forms of behavior, like crime, racism, drug use, unemployment, poverty, exclusion, alcoholism, sexual abuse, and madness. However, especially in textbooks and journal articles, it also refers to premenstrual syndrome, ecological problems, stalking, exploitation of natural resources, traffic accidents, or even war, terrorism, and genocide. This diversity has been a challenge for sociological definitions and invites the question of identifying the feature that justifies classifying such phenomena under a common topic or theoretical perspective.

As a consequence, the scientific value of having the concept of social problem within sociology is contested, as it seems to be too vague and too broad to be useful for guiding the development of theories. Assessments such as those of Spector and Kitsuse (1987 [1977]) that “there is not and never has been a sociology of social problems” (p. 1) and of Best (2004) that the “social problem has not proved to be a

particularly useful concept for sociological analysis" (p. 15) could find some justification.

The sociological use of the concept of social problems is connected with at least five different perspectives, outlined below.

Textbook eclecticism of social problems. The vagueness of the term is reflected in sociological textbooks and journals on social problems that offer a nearly endless list of various topics. These articles are the product of a vast amount of specialized sociological research on social problems that very often form special fields within (but also apart from) sociology, for example criminology, public health, or the sociology of poverty. In this textbook context, the concept of social problems is used as an umbrella for a wide range of situations and forms of behavior reflecting the public and political meaning of what is problematic within society and what should be treated, ameliorated, or controlled. The problematic character of such phenomena is taken for granted. Definitions of social problems, at least implicitly, follow various kinds of formulations that refer to everything that is defined in public (or by a certain number of people) as social problems: "social problems are what people think they are." This meaning of social problems is closely linked to the production of applied knowledge for public policy.

Sociology of social problems as applied sociology. Since its origin in American reform oriented sociology at the beginning of the twentieth century and its connection to policy, the sociology of social problems is often treated as a field of applied sociology. This perspective is closely tied to the specialized fields of sociology, where the problematic character of social problems is the starting point for the production of knowledge about causes and forms of existing social evils and their social and political control. This is without doubt an important field of research within the sociology of social problems, but there is no common theoretical ground on which a theoretical concept of social problems could be justified. Nevertheless, social problems are the base for political programs, actions, and institutions evoking the fundamental problem of the relation between theory and policy and demanding a discussion of the role of values and normative theory within sociology.

Social problems as social harm and social disorganization. Whereas in these perspectives

the problematic character of social problems is taken for granted or defined by public opinion, there have always been attempts to define the object of the sociology of social problems on the basis of theoretical knowledge about the functioning of society. Social problems are those conditions and forms of behavior that undermine the functioning of important social institutions and cause harm to individuals and social groups. In this perspective – often labeled as "objectivist" – the common character of different social problems is seen in their common social structural sources, defined as social pathology, social disorganization, alienation and exploitation, unequal distribution of resources and power, or anomie. The discrepancy between cultural standards, norms, or values and the actual conditions of social life – Merton's (1976: 7) famous, quite formal definition of social problems – should be identified and analyzed by sociological inquiry, in principle without reference to "what people think" and as a "technical judgment" about the possibility of a better functioning social system.

Social problems as the social question. In the context of European sociology, the concept of social problems has never had a prominent place. Its use is very often limited to problems seen as associated with social inequality and social integration or inclusion. In the European tradition of the social question, social problems are those behaviors and conditions that should be treated by the welfare state through social policy and social work. Unlike the American perspective of social disorganization, the tradition of the analysis of social problems related to the social question privileged a perspective of conflicts rooted in the social structure of modern societies (cf. Castel 2002 [1995]). In this sense the term social problem in the singular was introduced into US sociology in the nineteenth century, but very soon changed its meaning in a plurality of unconnected "social problems."

Social problems as social constructions. While in these perspectives social problems are treated as special objects of sociological inquiry, a constructionist perspective of social problems insists that social problems are not necessarily rooted in harmful social conditions and that the only thing the various phenomena have in common is that they are labeled as social problems. Social problems exist only as cultural

definitions of public activities of grievances and claims (Spector & Kitsuse 1987 [1977]). Social conditions are dismissed as merely “putative,” and sociological research focuses on the claims making activities through which social problems become public concerns and political issues. Whereas in sociological research on causes, careers, and control of social problems their problematic character is often taken for granted, the constructionist perspective makes this question its central concern. The sociology of social problems adopts a sociology of knowledge perspective to analyze the strategies and discourses used by collective actors to bring issues onto the public and political agenda. In this perspective, sociology and scientific knowledge in general no longer have special status; their role is reduced to that of one claims maker among others. As a consequence of this radical reformulation and change of paradigm, the “social problems approach” is identified no longer by its research objects but by its theoretical and methodological perspective.

THE EUROPEAN “SOCIAL QUESTION” AND AMERICAN “SOCIAL PROBLEMS”

The history of sociological reasoning has its starting point in the problematization of social conditions linked to the capitalist industrial revolution in Western Europe. In this context, social problems such as poverty, alcohol consumption, disease, and violence were seen as direct indicators of disorder of the social structure and crises of development. The central points of reference were social movements and ideas of social justice to assure national social inclusion and integration of modern societies. Social problems as social crises or social pathologies had been linked directly to questions of social inequality, and sociological reasoning of social problems formed a privileged way to uncover the central mechanisms of functioning and development of modern societies. These ideas are best expounded in the work of the founding fathers of sociology, Marx and Durkheim.

Nevertheless, the “social question” has always been a political question of social reform or social revolution, linked to the three

dominant ideological streams: liberalism, conservatism, and socialism. Based on ideas of social justice, social integration, and social inclusion, national and collective political projects of the welfare state emerged to solve the conflicts of disintegrating capitalist economies.

This European tradition of welfare state orientation still marks an important difference from American sociological reasoning on social problems. Unlike the European tradition, American sociology was not confronted in the same way with fundamental social movements and their ideological orientations. Existing social movements were short lived and concentrated more on single issues without problematizing the social structure as a whole. As a consequence, American sociology at the end of the nineteenth century adopted a reform oriented perspective on isolated social problems (in the plural) and ideas of applied sociology to produce knowledge for treating these problems against the background of pragmatic philosophy.

The adoption of the concept of social problem and its rapid dissemination in European sociology in the 1970s from the US social context reflects a social change after World War II, marked by a rapid and extensive expansion of the welfare state and social services. In this context of economic prosperity, remaining social problems were individualized as deviant behavior to be treated by social work. The social question seemed to be solved and the idea of social problems seemed to be more appropriate for developing specialized sociological and professional knowledge to guide political reforms and interventions.

On the one hand, cultural pluralization and the development of new social movements in the 1960s and 1970s could explain the popularity of cultural relativism expressed by radical constructivist and postmodern perspectives in Europe. On the other hand, processes of globalization and internationalization, economic crises, and the spread of new poverty and growing social inequality from the 1980s on, together with an expansion of migration processes, brought back questions of social integration and exclusion to the sociological research agenda and strengthened the idea of a “new social question” as new challenges for the welfare state (Bourdieu 1993; Castel 2002 [1995]).

THEORETICAL ISSUES

Despite marked differences between the sociological traditions of understanding social problems, there are common theoretical and conceptual perspectives and problems (for an overview, see Rubington & Weinberg 1995). While typologies of theoretical positions are arbitrary and misleading, very often there can be found a differentiation between “objective” or “realist” approaches and “constructionist” perspectives. These labels are misleading because, on the one hand, they involve the danger of misinterpreting constructions of social problems as not being real social problems, and, on the other hand, they lead to the misinterpretation of “objectivist” approaches in assuming that there is still a methodological position of naïve objectivism in sociology.

Social Problems as Social Harm and Social Disorder

An early version of describing social problems as harm and social disorder is *social pathology*. This perspective, still very common in political and popular discourse, is based on the idea of society as an organism. Social problems are indicators of a pathological state of society and/or are caused by pathological individuals. This idea found its roots in nineteenth century sociology, where the success of medical treatment and hygiene formed the model for sociology as a medical profession of society. In this analogy, social problems are seen as deviance from a normal and healthily functioning society, in which there is harmonious coordination between specialized subsystems. The identification of social problems is not a problem, because the criteria underlying society as a well functioning organism are seen as evident and based on common sense normative and moral ideas (fundamentally criticized as a backward conservatism by Mills 1943). However, the central arguments against the idea of social pathology are that values and norms in society are changing and have to be different for different groups in differentiated societies. Beyond this it is clear that many social conditions that mark “social health” in one field of society automatically cause harm to other fields, which also means that the pathological

functioning of one sector has to be analyzed as the condition for the healthy functioning of another sector (Rosenquist 1995).

Nevertheless, the sociology of social problems is always confronted by the question of how to analyze values and norms that inevitably form the base for constructing and identifying social problems in public as well as in sociology. Inasmuch as the sociology of social problems takes existing definitions from public and political definitions of social harm as its starting point, it runs the risk of being normative. In a vast proportion of research in special fields of the sociology of social problems, the problematic character of the issue in this sense is taken for granted. This position very often corresponds with a perspective of applied sociology, where the problematic character of the issue has to be the starting point from which to develop and analyze political programs and interventions of social control.

A similar critique confronts the perspective of *social disorganization*, which was developed in the context of the Chicago School for analyzing deviant behavior and its spatial distribution in cities. Social problems are seen as indicators of, or as a result of, a breakdown of rules and social control in poor neighborhoods, caused mainly by processes of migration and rapid social change. Beyond criticisms of its normative base, the social disorganization perspective has been criticized for failing to specify the difference between deviance and social disorganization. Very often deviance is not a sign of disorganized neighborhoods or of a breakdown of norms and social control but is a result of a *cultural conflict* between local subcultures and the values of a majority society able to define common norms and values for the whole society. Within this perspective also, the problem of separating “normal” or even necessary and disorganizing social change is not solved.

The general form of argumentation with social disorganization also forms the base for the concept of anomie, developed by Durkheim (1902 [1893]). Here the disintegrating consequences of division of work and social differentiation in the processes of modernization result in “pathological” consequences, indicated by an extraordinarily high level of crime or suicides in modern societies. These perspectives of social disorganization and anomie experienced

a renaissance after the 1980s in European sociology, especially for analyzing conflicts and social problems in relation to processes of migration and growing social inequality.

With the supremacy of *structural functionalism*, the idea of anomic developments became one of the leading sociological perspectives on social problems in US sociology in the 1950s and 1960s. Social problems are seen as functional disturbances of social systems and as a problem of social disintegration. The functioning of social systems and their stable reproduction became the central point of reference for identifying social problems. In Merton's (1971, 1976) classic formulation of this program, this identification is seen as a "technical" analysis of the possibility of a better functioning of a social system and not one of a political or normative judgment. In principle, social problems could be identified by sociological research without depending on their public or political definitions. This allows criticisms of existing public definitions of issues and claims as being ideological misconceptions of what in effect does not result in social harm, or diagnosing social developments as resulting in "latent social problems" not yet defined as social problems in public. The separation of problematic social conditions and of publicly recognized social problems thus defines, in principle, a critical program for a sociology of social problems, even if the idea of a "technical judgment" of social dysfunctions seems to present a perspective oriented by an organic view of a normally harmonious and well functioning society already criticized in the approach of social pathology.

The differentiation of social problems as "social disorganization" and "deviant behavior" as different types of social problems has been developed in this context (Merton 1976). Social disorganization refers to the malfunctioning of the internal organization of a social system in providing stable role orientations, statuses, rules, and valid norms for the participant actors; it refers to the diagnosis of an absence or a breakdown of norms, whereas deviant behavior depends on the existence of a stable and accepted system of social norms and of actors motivated to obey them (Cohen 1959).

In the functional perspective, social disorganization is a consequence of rapid social change caused by technological, demographic,

or cultural change to which some social systems react more easily than others. It could be interpreted as a cause of deviant behavior if a state of normlessness, contradictory, or conflicting expectations in a social system results in strain for individuals. But deviant behavior could also lead to social disorganization if mechanisms of social control and exclusion fail to reestablish social order. Very often social contexts described as disorganized have developed subcultural systems of values and norms that provide members with stable orientations, but are interpreted as deviant in relation to the social environment and the dominant system of values and norms in the society. In these cases, social systems could not be interpreted as disorganized; in a functional perspective, they could be described as disintegrated since subcultural social systems result in dysfunctional conflict for the system as a whole.

This concept seems to be too vague since it has not been able to provide "technical" criteria for the healthy functioning of a social system without reference to values, interests, and power apart from the absence of conflict, faulty socialization, and deviant behavior. As a consequence, this perspective has been criticized for failing to provide criteria to judge conflicts in pluralistic societies as disorganizing or as leading to necessary social change. The idea of social disorganization follows a utopian view of a society in harmonious balance. Implicit in this view is the misconception of social problems as being conditions that could and should be solved. Obviously, societies survive quite well even if they leave unsolved their major social problems, and typically the treatment or solution of one social problem means the creation of social problems in other fields of modern societies. Beyond this, Durkheim is known for his functional argumentation of social problems. Social problems and deviant behavior fulfill important functions for societies inasmuch as they provide sources of solidarity, mark limits of morality, symbolize examples of misconduct, or indicate necessary social change.

Whereas in perspectives based on the diagnostic of social harm the difference between social disorganization and deviant behavior is often interpreted as a difference between "structurally" and "behaviorally" caused social problems, it seems appropriate to interpret them as

different kinds of social problem definition. For example, unemployment could be defined as a social problem related to the malfunctioning of the labor market, but it is also very widely seen as the malfunctioning of individuals who are either unwilling or unable to integrate into the labor market.

One central problem in the definition of social problems proposed by Merton is the identification of a “substantial discrepancy between widely shared social standards and actual conditions” (Merton 1971: 799). Even if Merton insists on identifying social problems on the basis of a “technical judgment” about the functioning of social systems, the identification of “social standards” and the diagnostic of a “substantial discrepancy” are finally based on the empirical registration of public opinion (Manis 1974). This could result in the problematic consequence of being unable to identify a social problem sociologically, for instance, if racial discrimination is found in a racist society, since in this case there is no “substantial discrepancy” between the shared racist standards and the actual racist conditions. We face the problem of having no standard beyond empirically measured public opinion to decide whether shared values in society are in fact ideological manifestations. This problem could only be resolved by stating the validity of a system of values – for instance, human rights – independently of publicly (and politically) shared social standards (Manis 1974). On this basis, the identification of “latent social problems” and the sociological critique of existing definitions of social problems remain important questions for the sociology of social problems.

This approach loses much of its power of persuasion when we ask why certain social harms or discriminations last over a long period without being identified as social problems by the public, or why definitions or interpretations of social problems change over time even if the social conditions remain nearly unchanged. Beyond this, the guidance of public interpretations of and attention to social problems fulfills important political functions and could be used as a means of achieving success in elections or to attract resources for public agencies or professional institutions. In this sense, social problems do not always have their origins in

social developments but are rooted in political strategies of symbolic policy (Edelman 1977).

Social Problems as Social Construction

The “cultural turn” in sociology of the 1970s was caused at least partly by the adoption of ideas of symbolic interactionism and other microsociological approaches as criticisms of structural functionalism. This first happened in the field of sociology of deviance and social problems in the 1960s with the development of perspectives insisting on the idea that deviance and social problems in general are not qualities of social conditions or specific forms of behavior, but instead have to be analyzed as results of interactive processes of social definition and labeling. This idea was then radicalized in constructionist approaches based on the idea that social problems exist only as public “activities of individuals or groups making assertions of grievances and claims with respect to some putative conditions” (Spector & Kitsuse 1987 [1977]: 75). This has been a radical reformulation of the problem of defining and analyzing social problems.

Whereas sociological perspectives that define and analyze social problems as social harm insist on the fact that social structures and developments could result in problematic life conditions and behavior, for constructionist perspectives these social conditions are merely “putative” and a more or less rhetorical means of “claims making activities”: social problems are constructions that successfully attract public and political attention. As a consequence, the main questions to be analyzed are no longer about causes and social conditions that might explain the existence and affection of specific groups, but concern the processes of how social problems are successful in attracting public attention and become public issues with a special quality.

The approaches that follow ideas of social structure and social change as analytical bases for defining social problems – now labeled as “objectivist” – always had to face the problem of justifying a general concept of social problems that could unify very different social phenomena. With the new formulation of

constructionist perspectives, this problem was solved in that different phenomena labeled as social problems could analytically be unified under the common question of what (and who) made them problematic and how they became public issues. The sociology of social problems consists in the reconstruction of activities and processes that explain the public mobilization for specific definitions of issues and themes within society and the establishment of social problem discourses. Social problems are specific forms of collective behavior which explain the significance given to the analysis of media representations, moral entrepreneurs, and social movements.

Whereas in so called “objective” approaches scientific, especially sociological, knowledge has given an outstanding position to the analysis of social problems and their developments, in constructionist approaches this role is limited to that of one “claims maker” among others. Constructionist perspectives insist that the role of sociology cannot be seen as criticizing existing constructions and their forms of public definition. Its role is reduced to that of a reconstruction of the processes by which such constructions became convincing for the public, and not to analyze their structural and social historical bases. In its radical form, this approach is limited to the analysis of rhetoric and counter rhetoric on public issues.

Today, especially in the US context, the sociology of social problems is identified with the constructionist perspective, and a vast amount of social problem research is devoted to case studies of many different issues that at one time or another attracted public attention (see, e.g., Best 1989, 2001; Loseke & Best 2003). But, while it is very often identified as the only valuable perspective and forms the mainstream of social problem analysis, the constructionist perspective has its critics.

The most important criticisms from within constructionism have been developed by Woolgar and Pawluch (1985). In reconstructing constructionist case studies on social problems, they argue that the underlying argumentation of these analyses is marked by a contradictory use of the perspective of social construction. In framing their question, these case studies assume that the social conditions or the behavior

in question remained more or less unchanged, while the social constructions of the problem in public have been changed. On the one hand they insist on the idea that social problems are social constructions, while on the other they base their argumentation on some “true” social conditions, what Woolgar and Pawluch criticize as “ontological gerrymandering.”

Since then constructionist approaches have become highly differentiated (Holstein & Miller 2003; Loseke & Best 2003), but at the same time the idea of constructivism has become less clear and is very often reduced to the perspective that social problems are the result of the active behavior of interested groups and collective actors, who define and produce certain issues in a specific form. This is nowadays common sense within sociology; the main point of discussion is whether these “productions” are based on cultural and social resources that are rooted in social structures and embedded in social change in modern societies. But even if social problems are social constructions – as actually all objects of sociological research are – they are no less real in their consequences and effects; it makes no sense to talk about social problems as social constructions in opposition to “real” social problems. In this sense, the opposition of “objectivist” and “constructivist” approaches within the sociology of social problems is misleading, as it assumes that “objectivist” approaches are not able to analyze social problems as processes of cultural production.

As a reaction to the sociological hegemony of structural functionalism in the 1950s and 1960s, the constructionist perspective has been developed on the microsociological grounds of symbolic interactionism, ethnomethodology, and phenomenology. The European tradition of the social question as sociopolitical and macro sociological projects concerning social conditions and processes of social integration and social inclusion seems to have been completely dismissed from the American sociology of social problems.

SEE ALSO: Anomie; Deviance; Deviance, Constructionist Perspectives; Social Disorganization Theory; Social Movements; Social Pathology; Social Problems, Politics of

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social problems, politics of

Axel Groenemeyer

SOCIAL PROBLEMS AND THE POLITICAL SYSTEM

In the sociology of social problems, surprisingly little attention has been paid to the state and the political system. Given the central importance of social problems as public issues and claims for political action and public policy, and their role in shaping social and political change, this neglect seems all the more surprising. Especially in newer US versions of constructing social problems – very often seen as the only valuable sociological perspective on social problems – they have been defined either as “claims making activities” of collective social actors (Spector & Kitsuse 1987 [1977]) or as public discourses and rhetoric narratives (Ibarra & Kitsuse 1993). If the struggle for social problems were merely cognitive and symbolic, then the conflicts about their definition would have to be understood only as a system of contested narratives that result in new narratives. In these perspectives, references to power and conflict and to the political functioning of public issues and collective

actors have attracted only little attention. But if the construction of social problems is based in the interests and values of collective actors, we have to ask how the struggle for public attention relates to the distribution of material, political, and symbolic resources. In this perspective, already the social construction of social problems by collective actors in society has to be analyzed as a social conflict, and in this sense as a fundamental political issue.

Not only in Western European democratic welfare states but also in all modern societies with a state centered political system in general, the state has the legitimate monopoly on the means of violence and is the main target of "claims making activities." Even if the treatment or claims of solutions for social problems sometimes are addressed to public associations or by private enterprises, the political system and the state are the ultimate arbiters of allocating valued goods and resources. The political system and the state are constituted by a system of organizations and institutions that shape public issues and social problems by providing opportunities for claims, by selecting and establishing administrative categories as quasi official definitions of social problems, and by giving them the cultural power or by actively producing and promoting some definitions of social problems for political means and according to criteria of political strategies. In this sense, the political system is not only the more or less passive target of social claims and protest or the neutral arbiter of conflicting social groups within society, but is also a central, powerfully organized actor in the process of production and construction of social problems.

In modern societies, state activities and interventions accompany citizens throughout life, and from birth to death their lives are regulated and controlled by the state to an extent unknown in preceding epochs of social development, which allows us to speak of modern societies as politically framed and regulated societies. Despite processes of globalization and internationalization, nation states and nationally organized political systems are still the main actors integrating societies with the claim of legitimate monopoly on the means of violence over a specified territory based on a unified system of laws and on the monopoly of taxation, which ensures the ability to make and enforce

binding decisions over citizens and social groups in the society.

This minimal definition of the state – classically developed by Max Weber (1972 [1922]) – refers to the state function of ensuring security of social and economic exchange. Ensuring social order could thus be seen as the fundamental purpose of states. If this function is not effectively fulfilled, states dissolve, as many examples of societies in civil wars show. In this context, the idea of security and of claims concerning security and safety became a central topic of claims making activities.

However, the ideas of what should be the objective of states always have been highly contested. Whereas in liberal political discourses of the nineteenth century only the task of providing public safety and security of the law to ensure economic exchange was an accepted guideline for state activities, the idea of social security was developed, especially in Western European democracies, as an institutionalized and accepted state idea in the twentieth century. Very often nowadays these fundamental state functions are supplemented by the task of preserving natural resources and international obligations.

The ideas of the state constitute a political regime, institutionalized and organized within a nation specific political system of representation, including established political parties, interest groups, and associations as well as social institutions and local organizations, with institutionalized access to centers of political decision making. These qualifications of the state and the political system provide a cultural and political frame of reference for addressing specific social problems to the political system; the national traditions of state ideas, organized in nation specific institutions, constitute a political opportunity structure for claims making activities. The analysis of these processes demands a comparative perspective on social problems (Kitschelt 1986; Kriesi et al. 1992; Jenkins & Klandermans 1995).

In a classical liberal political perspective, social problems are interpreted as "inputs" for the political system, which raises the question of influence and power of social actors to promote specific definitions of social problems and to make them political issues. The success of establishing a specific definition of social problems or

claims in this perspective depends on the capacity of mobilizing power and influence by social actors. The social issues and claims then are accepted, rejected, canalized, or redefined by specific mechanisms of selection and filters of the organizations within the political system. In this perspective, the success of claims making activities depends on the system and forms of the organizations of the political system itself (Dunleavy & O'Leary 1987; Parsons 1995). System theoretic approaches especially have radicalized this view in insisting that the political system constitutes an autonomous self referential system with one set of rules, criteria, and rationalities that directly could not be influenced from outside. The classic model of social problems as "inputs" of the political system is supplemented or substituted by the idea of "withinputs," i.e., social problems may be discussed as social issues in public, but the organizations of the political system construct and produce them according to their own political rationalities, which are not directly linked to public definitions of the social problems and most of the time are completely different from what has been claimed by collective actors in society previously.

This perspective gives way to the idea that the organizations of the political system not only are passive receivers of social inputs from the society, but also are actively engaged in producing and constructing public issues and social problems according to the criteria of the system, like election strategies, gaining public support in interorganizational or party concurrence or accumulation of resources by presenting specific problem solving capacities. In this sense, social problems are not only "inputs" or "withinputs" of the political system, but are "outputs" as well. Besides this, political interventions in social problems and their institutionalization not only produce official definitions of social problems, but also give rise to often unintended consequences for other systems and social groups as well as new social problems and opportunities for mobilization for claims in other areas. After all, it is important to notice that these consequences also appear when the politics of social problems are not directly addressed toward solving or at least treating social problems but merely follow a strategy of "symbolic politics" involving mobilizing

internal resources or political support from outside the political system.

Political theories that analyze the processes of "input" formations by social influence and power as well as the structure of the political system as "political opportunity structure" are treated at length elsewhere, so this entry will be limited to factors and explanations that are specific to the politics of social problems (see also Groenemeyer 1999; Blackman 2004).

FORMS OF CLAIMS AS POLITICAL ISSUES

The structure of the political system and its organizations influences the opportunity for collective actors in society to find support for social problems and public claims within the political system. Even if a public claim is accepted as a political issue, the political arena in which it is placed is important, as are the political actors and the strategy by which it is placed (Hilgartner & Bosk 1988). Becoming a political issue also means that the way in which the social problem has been constructed concerning its causes and effects – the "diagnostic frame" – as well as its solutions – the "prognostic frame" – are in some way compatible with the rationalities and interests of at least some organizations of the political system (Benford & Snow 2000).

There have been some attempts to develop typologies of claims and empirical hypotheses to treat these questions. One approach refers to the distributions of costs and utilities of public claims (Wilson 1973). Claims that benefit only a small group while their costs affect larger groups probably have less chance of being treated by the political system. This is one reason for the fact that collective actors are obliged to construct social problems in such a way that a significant number of people, or indeed the whole population, are affected by them.

Another classical approach developed by Lowi (1972) differentiated among "distributive policy issues," which refers to issues that demand the distribution of new resources, "redistributive policy issues" that demand a new distribution of limited resources, "regulatory policy issues" referring to claims without any distribution of resources, and "constituent

policy resources,” for which new political institutions must be established or already established institutions have to be reorganized. Each policy claim that, for example, affects an established distribution of limited resources could increase the level of conflicts with other social or political actors, whereas regulatory policies or interventions without direct distribution of resources are very often open for symbolic politics.

Another set of hypotheses, first proposed by Cobb and Elder (1972), concerns the process of political agenda building and the quality of claims: the higher the degree of specificity of an issue, its scope of social significance and its temporal relevance, and the lower its degree of complexity and the less it corresponds with preceding issues (categorical precedence), the higher is its chance of being accepted as a political issue within the political system.

However, these typologies are less clear when confronted with empirical cases of political issues and social problems. The specific form of the “diagnostic frame” of a social problem, and whether this suggests a “distributive” or a “redistributive” policy, is not a quality of the issue itself but the object of conflict about its meaning. In this sense, the form or quality of a public issue or social problem is itself the consequence of conflicts in the process of social and political constructions by the institutions of the political system.

The public construction of a social problem could intersect with other public issues resulting in a kind of concurrence on the scarce goods of public and political attention. Processes and strategies of mobilization for specific issues thus can also actively be used by political organizations to reduce the potential for conflict of other issues to ensure the capacities of the political system against public claims (Hilgartner & Bosk 1988). Besides this, it is also possible that some issues are linked together under a main topic to increase the possibility of public and political mobilization. But in general, the possibility of gaining public and political attention has to be seen as a fragile public good that has to be used with caution to avoid a “problematizing overdose.”

These typologies and hypotheses are just some examples of what the sociology of social problems has to address concerning the agenda

building of social problems in the political system. Currently, there seems to be no theory unifying this knowledge from different subfields of sociology, such as political sociology, the sociology of social movements, or the sociology of agenda setting by the media.

Whereas in these approaches the central questions are based on the idea of political opportunity structures provided or blocked for public issues and social problems by the structure of the political system, the organizations of the state and the political system also play an important role in actively constructing social problems, independently of claims making activities within society. It is important to separate the processes of gaining attention and support for claims being constructed outside the political system from those processes of constructing social problems by the political system.

THE POLITICAL USE OF SOCIAL PROBLEMS

Whereas in modern societies with a welfare state the political program of coping with social problems seems to be institutionalized, at the same time, the extent of social problems seems to increase. Obviously, the majority of the most pressing social problems in modern societies are not solved without bringing the social and political order into a dangerous instability. This is not only a problem of the political system’s regulating capacities but is also a central characteristic of pluralized modern societies. Very often, one solution for a social problem leads to other social problems and conflicts in other areas, or the institutionalization of one solution leads to increased political opportunities for new mobilizations and discourses on new problematic issues. Obviously for the political system, social problems fulfill other purposes than being solved, and political programs and intervention could fulfill other functions than those formulated in political discourses about social problems.

Modern societies and their political systems have developed a remarkable potential for survival and stability, despite the amount of unsolved problems, conflicts, and crises. If conflicts and social problems in modern societies normally are highly interconnected and

collective actors are highly organized, then one would have to question the mechanisms of the political system to handle these claims without losing its own organizational capacities of action. As regards public claims and conflict, the political system in modern societies has normally developed a flexibility that also allows it to handle conflicts and claims strategically (Nedelmann 1986).

The acceptance of a specific definition of a social problem and its institutionalization not only means the success of public mobilization, it also constitutes resources for further conflicts about social definitions and constructions of issues. In this perspective, the success of political programs and interventions with regard to solving social problems directly very often seems to be of secondary importance. Especially in times of limited resources for social problem solving, and with regard to a constant overload of public claims, symbolic and rhetorical forms of political discourse assume central importance in the political system for ensuring its autonomy and its own capacities for action.

Starting from the assumption that the construction of social problems is always embedded in changing "cultural frames" (Tarrow 1998; Groenemeyer 2001) that give meaning to public claims, then regulating meanings and interpretive frames is one possibility for the organization of the political system to react to public claims. In this sense, the cultural base and definitions of social problems could become the object of strategic politics, and the political restructuring and manipulation of the cultural and moral milieu of social problem constructions could ensure the regulation of social conflicts. This cultural control of public claims could follow different strategies: manipulating the knowledge base of problem constructions so that alternative ideas and interpretations relating to the public claim are publicly disseminated; altering the affective loading of social problem constructions by increasing the complexity of issues and placing them within a scientific or professional agenda, which allows the reframing of morally loaded issues into technical ones; depoliticization of a social problem by denying its putative negative consequences; strategic mobilization of specific moral social contexts in order to mediate potential conflicts through reputable social institutions (e.g., religion or the courts). Support of

countermovements allows political organizations to weaken public support for a social problem and to become arbitrator in a social conflict. Publicly denying the reputation of claims makers and their putative representatives also weakens public support for social problems; this could also be achieved by reframing a public claim into a private issue affecting specific interest groups. Sometimes it is also possible to decrease the public visibility of social problems to impede public mobilization.

The rhetoric and symbolic construction of politics refers to the manipulation of symbols signaling that something is done about the social problem: "words that succeed and policies that fail" (Edelman 1977; see also Gusfield & Michalowicz 1984). This does not mean that a definition of social problems and policies is possible without reference to symbols and specific cultural constructions, but these constructions are always the object of a cultural conflict before the background of specific interests, values, and strategic considerations, and the organizations of the political system and the state are at the forefront of this struggle with their own criteria and rationalities. The aim of sociological analyses always has to be the critical disentanglement of the involvement of specific interests and values in this political process of constructing social problems.

Whereas in this perspective interactions between collective actors in society and the organizations of the political system in gaining and preventing access to political decisions are at the center of sociological analyses, it is also important to mention the role of political organizations and the state in actively constructing social problems for their own purposes. The political acceptance of and support for specific constructions of social problems is not always the result of pressure from below. Very often it is the state, and not collective actors in societies, that plays the central role in promoting mobilizations and moralizations of social problems. Even in other policy areas, the integration of political organizations with collective social actors and professional associations in society has reached an extent where it becomes difficult to disentangle who is the central actor in constructing specific social problems.

Institutionalized arrangements and law based procedures of the state not only present legal

rules and patterns of resource distribution for social claims on social problems but also participate in creating a symbolic order and a system of reference for social constructions of social problems. The central aspect in this realm is the political construction of legal and administrative categories that entitle specific social groups to claims according to administrative and official definitions of the problem, or that allow the use of state power to control them. These administrative categories, i.e., of the penal law or of social benefits, create their own social reality, whose character as a consequence of a struggle over meaning and definition has become invisible. Nevertheless, they also constitute an important and powerful cultural and social frame of reference for standards of normality and reasonableness relating to alternative social constructions of the social problem. In this sense, the sociology of social problems always has to be a historical and sociological analysis of the politics of social problems and their social control.

SEE ALSO: Agenda Setting; Framing and Social Movements; Political Opportunities; Politics; Social Movements; Social Problems, Concept and Perspectives; State

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social psychology

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Social psychology is an approach to understanding human social relations that focuses on individuals and how their interactions impact social organizations and social institutions. Social psychological scholarship includes a wide range of theoretical perspectives, methodological tools, and substantive applications originating from diverse intellectual schools such as sociology, psychology, economics, education, and business. Contemporary social psychology is best understood by examining its range of theoretical perspectives, methodological tools, and substantive foci.

THEORETICAL PERSPECTIVES AND THEORETICAL IDEAS

The breadth and range of theoretical ideas in contemporary social psychology reflects the diverse intellectual origins of the various perspectives and approaches. Early discussions of social psychology focused on these distinctive intellectual origins by highlighting the differences between psychological and sociological social psychology. This representation of the field has been critiqued for its perpetuation of artificial boundaries that overlook significant connections between the shared subject matter of sociology and psychology. In 1980 Sheldon Stryker articulated three “faces” of social psychology: psychological social psychology, sociological social psychology, and symbolic interactionism. While each perspective represents unique theoretical ideas, they also inform one another and serve to create a comprehensive understanding of individual interactions and how they impact on the groups to which we belong as well as the environments in which group interactions occur. All three perspectives share a focus on the individual and individual interactions as the explanatory factor for all aspects of social life, such as the creation of stable group structures and the formation of successful social movements. The three theoretical perspectives in social psychology, known more generally as cognitive and intrapersonal, symbolic interactionist,

and structural, each represent different origins and intellectual affiliations and maintain a focus on different aspects of the individual and society.

Cognitive and Intrapersonal Social Psychology

Cognitive and intrapersonal social psychology originated with the work of experimental psychologists in Germany such as Wilhelm Wundt in the mid nineteenth century and focuses on understanding how internal processes affect an individual’s ability to interact with others. The internal processes most studied in this perspective are cognitive (memory, perception, and decision making) and physiological (chemical and neural activity). Each approach examines a different aspect of how interactions are affected by these internal processes. The underlying basis of the cognitive and intrapersonal approach centers on how individuals store information in the brain in the form of schemas. Schemas represent the way in which people identify objects in their environment by labeling them, which then allows the objects to be categorized. The use of schemas allows individuals to process billions of bits of information from the environment, which then enables them to easily engage in interactions. The more accurate individuals’ understanding of any given social situation, as determined by how well they label and categorize it based on information from the environment, the more successful and easy will be the interaction. The cognitive and physiological approaches in this perspective explore different aspects of the impact of schemas on interactions.

The cognitive approach examines how brain activity specifically associated with memory, perception, and decision making processes affects an individual’s ability to understand the information necessary for engaging in successful interactions. Additionally, this approach also explores how variations in cognitive processes lead to differences in individuals’ ability to interact. The study of memory examines how people categorize events, situations, and others they have encountered previously, helping researchers understand the type of schema constructed and used in particular groups, cultures, and settings. Studying memory allows

researchers to directly explore the connection between interactions and how they are labeled. Take as an example a person entering a room and observing two people interacting with each other. If she labels and categorizes the interaction as a romantic interlude between lovers, she is less likely to interrupt than if the interaction is labeled and categorized as a conversation between co workers. Further, if the person entering the room identifies and labels one of the actors as a close friend, her interactions with the two people will be different than if they were simply co workers. Theoretical ideas associated with understanding schemas and memory include stereotypes (the actual categories used in labeling people and situations) and self fulfilling prophecy (where we act in such a manner as to confirm our initial impressions of people). In studying perception, researchers are interested in exploring how people's interpretation of information from the environment affects their interactions with others. The study of perception examines the meanings individuals associate with the categories in which events, situations, and people are placed. Key theoretical ideas associated with this approach to studying interactions from a cognitive social psychological perspective include the attributions people make when judging others' actions and the outcomes of those actions, and the errors in the attributions people make. Finally, decision making research explores how schemas, memories, and perceptions contribute to the ways in which people make decisions ranging from what to wear in the morning to the level of risk they are willing to take in any situation. The decisions made directly impact whether or not an individual is willing to interact with one person as opposed to another, as well as the quality of the interactions that do occur.

While the cognitive approach examines those internal processes that impact on whether or not an interaction will occur as well as the quality of the interaction once it does occur, the physiological approach explores the ways that specific biological and chemical processes affect individuals' ability to create adequate and useful schemas, use their memory, perceive things accurately, and then make relevant decisions. The physiological approach in the cognitive and intrapersonal perspective is not normally

included in discussions about social psychology, as at first glance its theoretical focus does not directly relate to social interactions. However, recent developments in this approach link it much more closely with the cognitive approach, thereby warranting its inclusion in this discussion. Cognitive and behavioral psychologists, along with neuroscientists, have conducted what are called "animal studies" for over 100 years. The goal of such research is to more accurately explain how particular chemical and biological processes directly impact on cognitive functioning. Technology is now allowing physiologically based researchers in psychology, neuroscience, and sociology to measure and examine the relationship between these chemical and biological processes and associated actions and interactions in humans. Early research in this area focused on non human species due to the ethical issues associated with human experimentation. Newer technologies, such as the portable electroencephalogram (EEG) and the functional magnetic resonance imager (fMRI), allow researchers to study neural and chemical responses to individuals' actions and interactions. The implication is that such technologies will allow social psychologists to more accurately and directly measure social interaction.

Symbolic Interactionism

Symbolic interactionism originated from the work of George Herbert Mead and his students at the University of Chicago as well as the work of pragmatic philosophers. While Mead was formally associated with the psychology and philosophy departments at the University of Chicago, his classes on social psychology and social philosophy attracted a large number of students from the fledgling sociology department. One of the sociology students, Herbert Blumer, coined the term symbolic interactionism and other sociology students were instrumental in publishing Mead's ideas, after his death, concerning the individual. These ideas center on his discussions of the mind (what makes humans uniquely social creatures), self (how we become uniquely social creatures), and society (how our interactions are affected by social institutions). Mead wrote extensively about issues concerning more macro level social

phenomena such as the role of government in funding education and the role of education for socialization, but he is mainly recognized for his contributions to symbolic interactionism. Generally, the symbolic interactionist perspective in social psychology focuses on studying the meanings that underlie social interactions in terms of how they are created, how they are maintained, and how we learn to understand such meanings. Additionally, theorists writing within this perspective argue that individual interactions lead to the creation of formal social organizations and social institutions. Therefore, to understand society, it is necessary to understand the interactions that shape it and maintain it. There are three main theoretical approaches in the symbolic interactionist perspective, symbolic interactionism, phenomenological, and life course, each of which examines different aspects of these meanings and the self on which they are derived.

The symbolic interactionism approach is most closely related to Mead's original ideas concerning social psychology and focuses on exploring how meanings are created and maintained within social interactions with the self as the basis for such interactions. The underlying theme of this approach is that individuals create and manage meanings through the roles and identities they hold. It is important to note that each individual holds any number of roles and identities, depending on the people with whom they interact as well as the environment in which they find themselves. Classical symbolic interactionist studies include the work of Herbert Blumer, Charles Horton Cooley, and Manford Kuhn. Blumer elaborated on Mead's discussion of the social self examining itself as an object outside the individual, while Cooley focused on explaining the process in which the self recognizes itself as an object. Kuhn's discussions explored different dimensions of the self as a way of explaining individuals' ability to take on a variety of identities, depending on the situation and the other actors involved. Contemporary developments of these ideas are found in the work of Erving Goffman, Peter Burke, Sheldon Stryker, and their associates and students. Goffman's discussion of dramaturgy and the presentation of self, among other ideas, examined the ways in which individuals identified the role held in any particular

interaction and the expectations associated with that role. Stryker and others explored how roles are linked to individuals' identity and how meaningful these identities are to people. Burke and associates proposed a more formal theoretical explanation of how different parts of the self are associated with specific identities people hold.

The phenomenological approach originated from European sociology and philosophy, emphasizing the meanings themselves and how such meanings reflect unstated normative expectations for interactions. The underlying theme of this approach is that language, verbal and non verbal, represents the informal and formal rules and norms that guide social interactions and structure society. The early work in phenomenology, as represented by the ideas of Alfred Schutz and Harold Garfinkel, differentiated between different aspects of how people create social reality as well as operate within already existing social reality. Schutz examined how language and communication represented an intersubjective process of reality creation and maintenance, while Garfinkel explored how people managed reality through the development of ethnomethodology. Contemporary developments of phenomenology are found in the work of theorists such as Howard Becker, Peter Berger, and Douglas Maynard. Through a series of studies, Becker explored the way individuals' interpretations of social interactions and social experiences reflect their own experiences and unspoken norms for behavior. Berger, along with Thomas Luckmann, is considered the American introduction to Schutz's ideas and phenomenology. Equally important, Berger and Luckmann also clearly demonstrated how everyday interactions and language create seemingly formidable social institutions and organizations. Finally, Maynard further developed ethnomethodology by focusing on conversation analysis as a way of understanding how social talk creates and represents reality.

The life course approach in symbolic interactionism focuses on how humans learn the meanings associated with interactions throughout their lifetime and the stages that reflect such learning processes. The underlying theme of this approach is that the norms, rules, and values that guide interactions and shape society change throughout individuals' lives, especially

as they move into different social positions and environments. As a relatively newer approach in the symbolic interactionist perspective in terms of identifying a unique approach, the key ideas can be traced to Mead's discussion about socialization and Georg Simmel's ideas about interactions within and between groups. Mead explained how humans become uniquely social creatures in his lectures about the self, where he describes a three stage process (preparatory, play, and game) for humans to learn the norms, rules, and values of the group into which they are born. He argued that by the end of this process, people will have a fully developed self. Simmel's discussions concerning interactions and groups examined how individuals' interactions with one another changed as group size, group composition, and social environment changed. Contemporary theorists such as Glenn Elder, Roberta Simmons, and Dale Dannefer, and their students and colleagues, build on these ideas in similar ways. First, the contemporary approaches assume that socialization is a lifelong process that changes as individuals change. Second, theorists in the approach examine both individual level factors and societal factors that contribute to the socialization process. Elder has focused on how socialization is consistent across cohorts of people, varying only in qualitative aspects related to differences in environments and resources. Simmons has examined how the socialization process itself varies depending on individuals' stage in life, and Dannefer has explored the ways in which groups with which people are associated play an important role in their continuing socialization throughout life.

Structural Social Psychology

Structural social psychology originated with the work of economists, psychologists, and sociologists interested in explaining social interactions more formally and mathematically with the goal of creating testable hypotheses. Structural social psychology assumes that social actors are driven by rational concerns centered on maximizing rewards and minimizing punishments. Another related assumption is that interactions based on rational calculations result in formally structured individual, group, and institutional

interactions. This approach is related to cognitive and intrapersonal social psychology in the focus on developing formal theories to explain interactions and creating specific hypotheses for testing in experimental situations. More contemporary work in structural social psychology uses more diverse methods such as survey research and participant observation techniques. There are three main theoretical programs that represent this approach: power, exchange, and bargaining studies; social influence and authority studies; and status characteristics, expectation states theory, and social network studies. Each set of studies focuses on different aspects of describing and explaining the underlying structure of social interactions.

Power, exchange, and bargaining studies explore how social interactions can be described as exchanges between social actors with the assumption that individuals rationally calculate the costs and benefits associated with any particular interaction. Exchange studies began with the work of George Homans, Richard Emerson, and Peter Blau. Homans argued that interactions can be better understood as exchanges whereby actors engaged in interactions that brought specific benefits. His work also explored how the need for such exchanges leads to equilibrium between actor and the idea of distributive justice. Blau further specified this work by focusing on the social aspects of such exchanges in terms of how they rely on trust between actors that each person will fulfill his or her unspecified obligations. While Homans, Blau, and others discussed that power arises out of exchanges and that power is not necessarily equally distributed among actors, Emerson and his colleagues specifically explored the development of power, how it is managed by actors, and how power differentiation affects the possibility of future exchanges. More contemporary work building on these ideas is bargaining studies, which specifies how different types of power differentiation affect the bargaining that then leads to actual exchanges. Lawler and colleagues explored the type of bargaining that occurs prior to exchanges, as well as how differing levels of power among participants affect such bargaining. Molm and her colleagues examined how exchanges varied based on inequality of participants and the availability of other sources and actors.

The second set of studies that can be categorized under the structural social psychology perspective focuses on social influence and authority. The underlying theme of these studies is that there are several factors that encourage people to be influenced by others, including the status or position others hold in comparison to themselves and group encouragement of conformity. The classic studies in social influence include Stanley Milgram's research that examined the effect an authority figure in a position of power has on individual compliance. Milgram found that individuals overwhelmingly obeyed requests to complete a task that ostensibly required hurting another person. Seymour Asch's studies of group conformity demonstrated that individuals willingly change their answer or opinion when a majority in the group indicates a different answer or opinion. Contemporary ideas build on this base by examining the varying conditions under which compliance to authority occurs, and to what degree others can influence attitude change.

Status characteristics, expectation states, and social network studies examine how social interactions are based on socially and culturally derived expectations for behavior that people have of one another. These socially and culturally derived expectations are associated with assumed predictions concerning how successfully any individual will contribute to an exchange, or interaction, process. These predictions then determine which individuals are likely to be given the most opportunities for interaction and influence in a group. Originating with the work of Berger, Zelditch, and associates, status characteristics theory explicitly identifies two main types of social characteristics that have expectations for behavior associated with them – diffuse (such as race, gender, class, and ableness) and specific status characteristics (such as job experience, education, and relevant skills) – and it is usually associated with groups working toward achieving specific goals. Expectation states theory argues that those people who hold diffuse and specific status characteristics evaluated as more likely to successfully contribute to achieving group goals will be given a greater number of opportunities for interaction as well as greater social influence among other group members. More to the point, theorists argue, and have successfully demonstrated, that

specific and stable hierarchical group structures develop based on these expectations. Contemporary work in this area includes specifying the degree to which different status characteristics affect expectations as well as how such expectations develop and whether actors perceive that such expectations are just. Social network theory and elementary theory build on the ideas of these different approaches in structural social psychology by specifically examining how an actor's position, relative to another, affects social influence processes as well as the stability of group structure. The underlying assumption of social network theory is that social influence, power, and bargaining are all affected by the way in which actors are networked to one another. Markovsky, Willer, Cook, and their students and associates examine different aspects of how actors are connected to one another and how that affects other social processes.

As the above discussion indicates, the three theoretical approaches in social psychology all examine different aspects of individuals, their interactions, and how their interactions affect groups. Cognitive and intrapersonal social psychology focuses on internal processes that impact whether, and how successfully, interactions occur among people. The insights provided by this perspective help to explain how actors create meanings concerning interactions that then lead to the creation and maintenance of specific social institutions and organizations, as discussed by symbolic interactionists. Finally, structural social psychologists examine how the fluid interactions of symbolic life create formal group structures that then impact on people's interactions.

METHODOLOGICAL TOOLS

Social psychologists use a variety of research methods with which to explore and explain specific aspects of social interactions as well as test specific hypotheses concerning these social interactions. Each of the three different theoretical perspectives in social psychology is often associated with utilizing only one type of research method – for example, symbolic interactionists are usually associated with using interpretive methods similar to those used by anthropologists, and cognitive and intrapersonal

as well as structural social psychologists are usually associated with using experimental methods. Such a simplistic view of social psychological research does not adequately reflect the breadth and diversity of research undertaken. The diversity of methods used by social psychologists and how they are used to examine specific aspects of individuals, their interactions, and the broader social environment in which they occur highlights the development of a mature scholarly area.

Interpretive Methods

Also known as “qualitative methods,” interpretive methods are used to gain an in depth understanding of social psychological phenomena, ranging from individuals to their interactions to the groups and environments in which such interactions occur. The type of interpretive research methods used by social psychologists include participant observation, unobtrusive research utilizing archival documents as representation of individuals and their interactions, and more extensive field research similar to ethnographic research commonly used by anthropologists.

Participant observation research in social psychology ranges from purely observational research to full participation while observing in selected social settings and environments. All types of participant observation research require the researcher to actually engage the setting in which the social interactions occur. Purely observational research consists of the researcher studying interactions in the environment in which they occur without the researcher becoming an active participant in the interactions themselves. An example of purely observational research in social psychology includes Kleinman’s study of a holistic health center in which she attended all meetings, parties, and retreats as an observer only. The other way of doing participant observation research is to study interactions in the environment in which they occur with the researcher becoming an active participant on some level, ranging from engaging in interactions with the actors involved while identifying as a researcher who then exits the environment to return to her own environment, to the researcher who becomes a full

participant in the interactions and the environment without identifying as a researcher. In this approach to participant observation research, the researcher conducts short term research as a fully immersed member of the interactions and environment, and then exits the environment after having conducted the research. An example of participatory participant research includes Adler and Adler’s research with a men’s college basketball team in which Peter Adler served as the coach and was an active participant of the group.

Unobtrusive research includes a variety of methods ranging from utilizing archival documents to in depth case studies as well as personal experience, such as in autoethnography. These different methods share two commonalities; first, they focus on understanding how meaning is created and interactions are structured by examining representations of human relations and social life. Second, unobtrusive research does not require interaction with the social setting and its actors in order to understand the creation and maintenance of meanings underlying social life. Unobtrusive research is particularly useful when it is difficult to gain access to the individuals, interactions, or groups being studied. An example of such research includes Gubrium’s study of the diaries of Alzheimer’s patients and their caretakers.

Ethnographic research, typically associated with anthropological research, consists of the researcher becoming a full participant with the actors being studied in their environment for a lengthy period of time. Anthropologists argue that a minimum of one year is needed before the researcher becomes fully informed and aware of all aspects of the groups and culture being studied. Sociologically based ethnographers tend to focus on the quality of immersion in the culture and group being studied, arguing that deep immersion is possible in six months. While there are disciplinary and intellectual differences in determining what constitutes ethnographic research, identifying the purpose of ethnographic research is consistent among researchers. The purpose of ethnographic research is to gain an in depth understanding of the unspoken and unwritten norms and values that guide individual interactions and group relations. Ethnographers agree that such understanding is only possible by literally living the life of the actors

being studied. An example of ethnographic research in social psychology includes Maynard's study of prosecuting and defense attorneys.

Experimental Methods

Experimental methods in social psychology serve as a way to test specific theoretical hypotheses as well as to explore particular aspects of interactions. There are a range of experimental methods, from the quasi experimental study which has fewer strict controls to the fully experimental study with formal control and experimental groups, as well as full control of all variables associated with the study. The full experimental study includes characteristics such as pre study surveys, control and experimental groups, and post study surveys. These studies are most concerned with testing specifically derived hypotheses and thus seek to control all extraneous factors that may impact on the interactions. To do so, full experimental studies rely on random assignment of participants to the different conditions with the goal of increasing internal validity and reliability. Examples of such studies include the status characteristics and expectations studies conducted by Berger, Zelditch, Ridgeway, Hauser, and Lovaglia. The quasi experimental study is a variation of the full experimental study whose goal includes theory testing as well as exploratory research. There are a range of variations of the full experimental study, from the more naturalistic studies where naturally occurring experimental and control groups are treated as case studies to the experimental studies where control groups and pre study surveys are not used.

Survey and Interview Methods

Survey and interview methods used by social psychologists serve to test specific hypotheses as well as explore specific aspects of interactions, groups, and social institutions. Similarly to other areas in sociology, social psychologists use a range of survey tools and interview techniques including self completing surveys, those conducted by the researcher, and in depth interviews. It is worth noting that social psychologists often use surveys and interviews as

the second approach as a way of engaging in methodological triangulation. For example, pre and post study surveys are used in experimental studies where the participant will either complete the survey without the researcher present or be asked a series of questions by the researcher. Surveys are also used as the primary data collection tool for studies that examine self esteem and self concept definitions. Interviews are used by social psychologists to collect information to supplement field studies as well as to serve as the primary source of information. For example, in studying social networks of scientists, Eisenberg conducted in depth interviews with participants who also completed a sociometric survey on their own. Many of the early studies conducted by the Chicago School of Sociologists used interviews and surveys to gain an in depth understanding of issues such as inequality and racism.

SUBSTANTIVE FOCUS

Beginning students in social psychology are often surprised to learn the degree to which understanding the individual and her or his interactions allows them to also explain group dynamics, behavior in social organizations, whether a social movement will be successful, and the seeming durability of social institutions. Similar to the discussion of the methodological tools used by social psychologists, it is simplistic to describe the field as focused only on the individual. The substantive focus of social psychological theory and research ranges from individuals and their interactions to the groups in which they engage to the social organizations and social institutions that shape these interactions.

Individuals and Interactions

The study of individuals and their interactions seeks to explore, understand, and explain different aspects of the unique social quality of people. The range of topics includes understanding why prejudice and discrimination exist, the best way to persuade and influence people, and those topics typically found in social psychology texts – interpersonal attraction, helping and altruism, and aggression. The cognitive and intrapersonal perspective explains that the

schemas individuals use to process the billions of bits of information from the environment are socially and culturally determined. Therefore, individuals' understanding of their environment is going to reflect the biases they are taught and their experiences. In other words, prejudice and discrimination are the direct result of the schemas people use and their perception of these different categories. This information, also, provides some indication of how to decrease prejudice and discrimination by challenging people's schemas and perceptions. The symbolic interactionist perspective in social psychology provides useful knowledge with which to understand interpersonal attraction. To ensure that their interactions are easy, people normally associate with individuals for whom the meanings of their roles and identities are similar to their own. Similarly, it has been shown that helping and altruistic behavior is likely to occur in situations when doing so strongly reflects individuals' values without causing them any harm. Finally, aggression can be explained by studying the power structure that exists among groups of people.

Other substantive topics include examining self concept and self esteem, which can affect whether girls suffer from anorexia nervosa, as well as emotions and how they impact interactions. Whether discussing married partners' perceptions of one another or predicting who might become foreperson of a jury based on group members' status characteristics, social psychology allows people to understand the interactions in which they engage as well as others' actions and interactions. More to the point, understanding the social psychology underlying individuals and their interactions allows people to become far more effective in their own lives. The teacher who avoids comparing students on the basis of their status characteristics is going to be a more effective teacher. The manager who successfully works with all of his or her employees regardless of the power differential between them will be more successful. And, the people who actively engage with people unlike themselves are less likely to be prejudiced. Finally, interactions are important in all areas of social life and can determine the success of an encounter between, for example, doctor/patient, teacher/student, parent/child, and among friends.

Groups

The study of groups highlights that the group environment affects individuals and their interactions. The range of topics for studying groups includes group conformity, group performance, and intergroup relations. Group conformity is a compelling topic as it addresses issues such as why people are willing to engage in illegal activity as part of a gang initiation ritual, or why college students binge drink to the point of death. Symbolic interactionist theory explains how interactions become habitualized within groups, thus creating norms and values for other interactions. Structural theory explains how these habitualized interactions are based on fulfilling members' needs as well as the stable power structure that will develop in the group. The needs to be fulfilled can range from material needs, such as actually being rewarded something tangible by the group to which individuals are associated, to social acceptance by other group members. Structural theory also explains whether any particular group is going to successfully complete its task due to the types of people in the group and the skills they bring to the group. For example, Olson discussed how the factors that affect individual interactions also affect group cohesiveness and therefore group performance. The group that is more cohesive is more likely to succeed at specific tasks than the group that is not as cohesive.

The broad substantive topic of intergroup relations examines how groups interact with one another and the factors that predict whether such interactions will be successful. Specific examples of such relations are the relationship between rival gangs, or even rival sports teams at any level. Some of the factors that impact on intergroup relations include the cohesiveness of each group as well as the strength of the group's social identity. Some researchers have explored the ability of gangs to avoid violence in terms of the social networks that connect the two groups and the similarity of each group's social identity. Symbolic interactionist theory identifies the importance of understanding the meanings other groups share and how they reflect a particular group culture. Structural theory explains why groups would want to cooperate with one another in terms of the resources to be shared

and exchanged. The ability to understand group dynamics in terms of social networks, power distribution, and conformity allows individuals' to more successfully shape group interactions. Groups are important for the social psychologist because they represent the first place where we learn the meanings associated with social life as well as develop a fully developed self and self identity.

Social Organizations and Social Institutions

In understanding individuals and their interactions, as well as how group membership affects those interactions, social psychologists are able to discuss and study social organizations and institutions. Some of the topics examined include social movements and whether they are successful as well as the idea of deviance as a social institution. Studying collective behavior and social movements includes examining motivations for joining in collective behavior as well as the organizations that develop out of members' interactions. Symbolic interactionist theory explains how people are more likely to join in collective action or a social movement when their own ideology and values match those of the social movement. Additionally, structural theory argues that people become members of a social movement when it provides a benefit beyond any specific cost. In other words, people's participation in a social movement is determined by social psychological factors.

Social psychological theory also explores social organizations as a form of social network that represents the likelihood of success for the organization. Symbolic interactionist theory explains how institutionalization formalizes the patterns of interaction among members of the organization or social institution, and structural theory discusses how power is distributed within the organization or institution. Understanding the social psychological factors that create, shape, and maintain organizations and institutions allows individuals to more successfully work within them. For example, the person who studies both the informal and formal social networks of the organization is more likely to successfully obtain the necessary resources for his or her tasks. Researchers have used these ideas to explain why some organizations will

have a harder time surviving in a competitive market than other organizations. Finally, symbolic interactionists offer a compelling argument that since social organizations and social institutions are created out of individual interactions, it is possible to change such organizations and institutions.

CONCLUSION

Social psychology is an area of sociology that focuses on individuals and their interactions to explain a broad range of social relations and social phenomena. The area is diverse in terms of the theoretical ideas explored, the methodological tools used to test and explore these ideas, and the substantive foci that extend beyond individual interactions. In understanding the social psychology of everyday life, we can also create new realities in terms of ourselves, the groups to which we belong, and the social organizations and institutions that constrain our actions.

SEE ALSO: Asch Experiments; Attribution Theory; Blau, Peter; Blumer, Herbert George; Collective Action; Conversation Analysis; Cooley, Charles Horton; Decision Making; Elementary Theory; Emerson, Richard M.; Ethnomethodology; Expectation States Theory; Experimental Methods; Goffman, Erving; Homans, George; Identity Theory; Interaction; Mead, George Herbert; Microsociology; Milgram, Stanley (Experiments); Norms; Observation, Participant and Non Participant; Organizations as Social Structures; Phenomenology; Power, Theories of; Psychological Social Psychology; Role; Schütz, Alfred; Self; Self Fulfilling Prophecy; Simmel, Georg; Social Cognition; Social Identity Theory; Social Movements; Social Network Analysis; Social Psychology, Applied; Socialization; Stereotyping and Stereotypes; Survey Research; Symbolic Interaction; Values

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social psychology, applied

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As it is commonly used, the term applied social psychology refers to the application of social psychological methods, theories, principles, or research findings to the understanding or solution of social problems (Oskamp & Schultz 1998). Applied social psychology encompasses a range of theories intended to address the mechanisms of various social problems. In this regard, it can be considered a theoretically based form or praxis. One of the the most influential figures in this area is Kurt Lewin with his studies on intergroup relationships and the processes underlying intergroup conflict. But historically, applied social psychology has even deeper roots. Early applications of social psychological concepts can be traced to the experimental studies of Hugo Münsterberg (1914). Further senior pioneers of the field are Floyd Allport (1920) with his research on group influences, Muzafer Sherif's (1935) work on social norms, or Richard LaPierre's (1934) classic study on the relations between attitudes and behaviors.

The field of applied social psychology overlaps to a large extent with the disciplinary characteristics of social psychology, broadly defined as the scientific study of how people perceive, influence, and relate to other people. Notwithstanding this similarity, differences in the motivations underlying research in basic

social psychology on the one hand, and research in applied social psychology on the other, can be detected.

Usually, research in basic social psychology starts with the primary intention to solve problems of theoretical significance only. For fulfilling this purpose, studies in basic social psychology can, but by no means need to, refer to applied settings. In short, basic social psychology's primary interest aims at solving theoretical questions and thereby contributing to the general knowledge base of social psychology.

Contrary to this, the focus in the realm of applied social psychology is toward the solution or improvement of real life problems, as expressed above. Within this problem oriented framework, theoretical perspectives are first and foremost utilized in order to achieve applied social psychology's major goal to improve certain social conditions. Nevertheless, in several instances pragmatic applications of social psychological concepts have led to important new theoretical insights as well. For instance, classical social psychological concepts such as the definition of the situation, self fulfilling prophecy, or relative deprivation, or even influential theoretical approaches like dissonance theory originate from applied research settings. It is this reciprocal relationship between theory and problem orientation that Lewin (1951) emphasized: "Many psychologists working in an applied field are keenly aware of the needs for close cooperation between theoretical and applied psychology. This can be accomplished in psychology, as it has been in physics, if the theorist does not look towards applied problems with high brow aversion or with a fear of social problems, and if the applied psychologist realizes that there is nothing so practical as good theory." Even today, the hybrid character of applied social psychology as being theory based but oriented toward social problems can be seen as one of its most important features.

Studies applying social psychological knowledge address an increasingly broad range of substantive real life topics. To illustrate this point, social psychological concepts have frequently been used for improving social problems tied to intergroup conflict, pro environmental behavior, or health. More recent examples illustrating the ongoing expansion of the discipline focus on the consequences of part time work or

on the question of why some people adapt earlier to Internet usage than others. Frequently, such studies cross cut academic boundaries to neighboring disciplines like applied sociology, criminology, communication sciences, or social work, to name just a few.

Because of the broad and heterogeneous substantive areas of application, it comes as no surprise that researchers using social psychological concepts revert to a wide methodological spectrum. For example, experimental and survey research, observational studies, and – to a somewhat lesser extent – qualitative approaches rank among the commonly used methodologies in the realm of applied social psychology. However, a key methodological characteristic of applied social psychology today is its focus on field research. Within such field settings, the modal research designs utilize experimental, quasi experimental, or program evaluation approaches. The prominence of field research in applied social psychology can directly be attributed to the discipline's orientation toward real life problems and the requirements stemming therefrom. For instance, sufficient external validity of study findings will often be achieved more easily in close to real life situations as given in field studies than in the laboratory (for comprehensive overviews on the methods used in applied social psychology, see Edwards et al. 1990).

Three examples of applied social psychology follow. These examples refer to such substantial domains as the environment, intergroup relations at both national and international levels, and health behavior.

Typically, applications of social psychological knowledge with regard to environmental problems are concerned with the advancement of sustainable relations between human behavior and environmental contexts. This domain covers a broad range of issues such as common property resource management, effects of environmental stressors and problems, the characteristics of restorative environments, or the promotion of durable conservation behavior. Thus, in times of scarce resources and massive environmental pollution, using social psychological knowledge can provide answers on how to develop an ecologically sustainable society (Oskamp 2000). Many studies in this field explore environmental attitudes, perceptions,

and values as well as devise intervention techniques for promoting environmentally appropriate behavior. Commonly used social psychological theories in this area are dissonance theory, norm activation theory, or the theory of planned behavior. Methodologically, such studies often draw upon various research methods ranging from experimental designs to large scale survey studies.

A classic domain of applied social psychology is the field of intergroup relations and intergroup conflict. Several studies demonstrate the influence of social psychological concepts on programs for the improvement of intergroup relations, at both national and international levels (Pettigrew 2001). One famous illustration of the impact of applied social psychology on social change is racial desegregation in American schools. In the early 1950s, Kenneth Clark and other colleagues from social psychology drew up a social science appendix to the plaintiff's brief to the Supreme Court showing the detrimental effects of school segregation on colored children. This appendix was supported by the signature of 32 experts from different scientific fields. As a direct consequence, the US Supreme Court based its 1954 decision against school segregation explicitly on this report. Later evidence clearly showed the long term positive consequences of school desegregation, even with sometimes mixed short term effects. One particularly important social psychological concept in the field of school desegregation is the contact hypothesis (Allport 1954). Allport emphasized that intergroup contact per se would not necessarily improve intergroup attitudes and relations. Rather, only under certain conditions (e.g., equal status within the contact situation for members of all groups, cooperative rather than competitive activities) would contact lead to such positive effects. Although sometimes criticized, the contact hypothesis guided to a large extent research and practice of school desegregation. Further examples of applied social psychology in intergroup settings refer to third party intervention in intergroup conflict such as the Israeli–Palestinian conflict in the Middle East. A figure of central influence here is Herbert Kelman, who has applied social psychological knowledge and methods to the peace building process between Israelis and Arabs. For conflict resolution, he used small group

workshops in order to stress interactive problem solving (Kelman 1997). These workshops represent unofficial meetings between representatives with political influence (e.g., representatives of the parliament, journalists, and writers) from both conflict parties. The major intention of these workshops is, on the one hand, to cause individual change at the level of the workshop participants. Such processes can lead to attitude change, a more differentiated view of the other conflict party, a better understanding of the conflict dynamic, and new ideas for conflict resolution. On the other hand, in the long run, the workshops should cause structural changes at the macro level by influencing political debates and decision processes with new insights and ideas.

Another realm of applied social psychology is public health. Usually, such research focuses on people's beliefs, attitudes, and behavior that affect their health. Important social psychological concepts in the field of health are perceived control, stress and coping, social support, attribution, and self esteem. These concepts stem from a broad range of classical social psychological theories like dissonance theory, attribution theory, social learning theory, and attitude–behavior theories, e.g., the theory of planned behavior (Taylor 2002). Many applied studies in this field deal with coping with chronic illnesses like cancer or HIV/AIDS. For example, applied social psychological research has shown that different patterns of coping with a chronic illness have either positive or negative impacts on the course of the illness.

Beside the examples presented, applied social psychology covers areas such as media and the Internet, sport psychology, organizational and industrial psychology, communication, and mediation. Comprehensive reviews of the substantive areas of applied social psychology are given in Oskamp and Schultz (1998) and in Sadava and McCreary's edited collection, *Applied Social Psychology* (1997).

Another important aspect of the field refers to the question of which basic principles guide researchers' decisions on which social conditions are considered problematic or not. As Sadava (1997) notes, such decisions refer ultimately to the personal values of those engaged with the application of social psychology. Notably, this value dependency implies that chances

for a general consensus on which social situations need improvement are rather small. In modern societies, several different value systems usually exist, and often these value systems are diametrically opposed to one another. Therefore, different value perspectives might lead to opposing views on the need for improvement for one and the same topic. For instance, the desire to reduce environmental pollution by increasing the price of gasoline versus the freedom of consumers to choose the transport system they prefer, to name just one example. Applied social psychology is clearly not value free and classifications of which social conditions should be improved and which not are to a great extent contingent on the personal values of those applying social psychology.

However, the role of personal values in applied social psychological research requires further attention. Even if values might well influence the choice of a research problem, researchers need to be careful not to let them influence the objectivity of their research and the resulting findings. Clearly, this applies both to the methods to be used and to the interpretation of the empirical results.

Another aspect of the discipline refers to the normative question of on what grounds social psychology should be applied. One prominent perspective among scholars is to consider applied social psychology first and foremost as an empirical science. From this position, applied social psychology simply cannot respond to questions with a prescriptive character. But on a more general level, at least two alternative positions have been proposed. On the one hand, scholars advocate the well being of the individual as an ultimate aim of all efforts in applied social psychology. Others have criticized this perspective for disregarding the possibility that the maximization of well being for some individuals might well exert disadvantageous effects on the well being of other individuals. To overcome this dilemma, the suggestion has been made that the well being of humankind should be regarded as an appropriate goal of applied social psychology. A comprehensive approach to the question of which normative principles should guide the application of social psychological knowledge emphasizes that social psychology is most beneficial when it acts upon the recognition of every individual's dignity, when

respect, acceptance, and charity to one another are an integral part of it, and when applied social psychology likewise negates all forms of violence. This suggestion does not only refer to the purpose of applied social psychology. It also explicitly points to the process of how applied research in social psychology should be conducted. Perhaps this essentially humanistic suggestion fulfills its purpose best when it is considered as providing some form of general orientation rather than a definitive normative guideline.

SEE ALSO: Lewin, Kurt; Social Change; Social Problems, Concept and Perspectives; Social Psychology

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social services

Lena Dominelli

Social services are provisions that respond to the needs of individuals, groups, or communities to improve social, emotional, and physical well being not supplied by carers who are kin. Social services are difficult to define, but constitute part of the welfare state that is the domain of social work and its practitioners – social workers and those who assist them in their tasks, social care workers, home helpers, and a range of others who work to provide services backed by society including the state, voluntary agencies, and commercial enterprises. They cover all client groups across the life course – children, families, older people, disabled people, mentally ill people, offenders of all ages, in diverse institutional settings or local communities.

Social workers as the practitioners primarily responsible for delivering personal social services to individuals and families do so in a variety of settings. They have devised forms of practice to enable them to work effectively with service users. These have focused largely on casework, including clinical social work, psychological social work, and psychiatric social work; groupwork; and community work undertaken in a range of service settings within institutions and communities. Paying professionals to minister to individual need has its origins in the Gilbert Act or Poor Law Amendment Act of 1782, which approved of salaried “guardians of the poor.”

Service delivery involves a range of providers – the state, voluntary agencies, religious authorities, and commercial enterprise, comprising the mixed economy of care. There was little coherence amongst these providers until the Seebohm Reforms of the 1970s ended this fragmentation through the creation of large bureaucratic organizations that unified provisions in social services departments under municipal control. Statutory services today come under the auspices of local authorities, but their dominance has been undermined by the marketization of service provision under the 1990 National Health Service and Community Care Act and the more recent reorganization of social services by client groups. These developments reinforce earlier competition between health and social work for authority over the provision of social services. The 1990 Act began the modern privatization of social service provision, initially for older people requiring institutional care. However, the quasi market has now expanded to include services to children and offenders. The forces of globalization and the General Agreement on Trades and Services (GATS), which requires the privatization of health, social services, and education globally, will reinforce marketization.

Meanwhile, the number of multinational companies, especially American ones entering the British scene, has risen dramatically during the early years of the twenty first century. As the private social agencies of old, these new ones are likely to cover the entire spectrum of social service provision. But there is one change that is likely to take place in the not too distant future: private social agencies are likely to assume delivery for the bulk of social service provision rather than simply supplement public ones as they did shortly after the implementation of the Beveridge Report, 1948 and the Seebohm Report, 1968. The proposed sale of 1,100 units on the Octavia Hill Housing Estate to non state buyers in 2006 is symbolic of this move and the attendant loss of social housing for low income earners is unlikely to be covered by either private or not for profit providers. Many sales of public assets have transferred funds from the public to the private sector.

That these social services are about caring for and about people raises a number of tensions that complicate their delivery. Amongst

these are the care–control dilemmas; lack of professional status of those delivering services and authority; charitable giving or societal entitlements; state or market providers; and public or personal responsibility for their provision. Service boundaries are amorphous and constantly shifting as society changes the remit of those responsible for providing services by altering legislative fiats and social policies.

Social services provision has threads of continuity and discontinuity that can be traced back through centuries of the history of social work. This history is contested as struggles to delineate its boundaries as other professions including health claim some of the territory. Differences of opinion about causation and responsibility divide understanding of need and service provision. Commitment to interagency working means that different professionals can intervene in any one particular setting or client and without necessarily agreeing about the best way forward.

HISTORICAL CONTINUITIES AND DISCONTINUITIES

The reasons that people require social services have focused on personal inadequacies or structural causes. The former blame individuals for their plight; the latter examine social causation. Social changes rooted in economic exigencies have undermined the capacity of the family and kin to provide caring services for members requiring them. Although the monied classes have been able to purchase their social services in the marketplace, those on low incomes have done without unless kin, charities, or the state have assisted them. Charitable or philanthropic benevolence that relies on individuals and religious institutions has been meeting the needs of some in poverty for a period. This help has been predicated upon notions of personal pathologies and divided claimants into deserving and undeserving ones. The former have received stigmatized and inadequate forms of support; the latter have had to fend for themselves.

These tensions go back to the Elizabethan Poor Law, 1601, when the modern nation state first began to provide meagre services through workhouses and outdoor relief. This institutionalized residential requirements and demanded

work in return for assistance. The workhouse and living in a particular parish have been consigned to the dustbin. Expressed differently, these conditions remain while being revised to accord with contemporary structures, expectations, and language. Only citizens can expect social services provisions under legally specified criteria and bureaucratically defined procedures. Additionally, services are conditional on the claimant agreeing to train to become more employable before an application for help is considered. While unemployed people have always been required to seek work, the state under New Labour has increased surveillance on compliance. It is now planning to introduce similar requirements on disabled people on Incapacity Benefit to reduce the number of claimants. These arrangements reflect a persistent strain between family and state or community support. The failure of such policies to move large numbers of people out of poverty and into gainful employment rather than the ranks of the working poor has been apparent since the New Poor Law Reform Act of 1834.

State social workers have constantly been caught in the trap of supporting individuals by stretching inadequate resources, balancing personal pathology with social causation, apportioning multiple loyalties amongst a range of stakeholders with diverse interests, trying to ensure that individuals acquire a sense of belonging and contributing to and having a place in society. Supporting individuals and groups in a holistic way is becoming increasingly difficult in a contemporary neoliberal context.

Professionals were not the only ones who challenged the assignation of claimants into deserving and undeserving categories. Claimants demanded change. Even in the days of poor relief, those receiving assistance demanded responses to need on their terms and recognition of the interplay between social causes and personal predicament when individuals could not help themselves. For example, pressures for changes that acknowledged such analyses amongst war veterans resulted in the Speenhamland Act of 1795 that enabled receipt of relief from the then local state in their own homes. Yet, Adam Smith, author of *Wealth of Nations*, like Charles Murray later, argued cogently for a laissez faire approach to welfare to ensure that the state let the economy or market provide the

mechanisms whereby individuals met their welfare needs. Smith's view was subsequently challenged by Karl Marx, who held capitalist social relations responsible for exploiting people to such an extent that they would be unable to rise out of poverty simply by selling their labor. Thus, demands for publicly provided social services were a byproduct of an economic system that constantly yielded people in need or casual ties unable to care for themselves, and that remains the case today.

The Marxist tradition was taken forward by Christian socialists. Eventually, Marx's arguments underpinned the position of Fabian socialists, particularly Beatrice and Sydney Webb, who played leading roles in establishing the welfare state under the aegis of the Labour Party. This provided free school meals and medical care for school children, pensions to cover declining earnings in old age, and unemployment insurance to cover people lacking paid work. The commitment to social insurance retained the link between paid employment and entitlements and, based on men's employment careers, these promoted an institutional base that excluded those with different patterns of waged work and impacted badly on women, "black people," lone parents minding children at home, and those unable to work due to physical impairment or old age.

These debates continue to the present day and there is little agreement about whether individuals looking after their own welfare needs or state provisions produce the best outcomes. The American new right popularized arguments that the welfare state and social work "do gooders" who side with clients are responsible for inducing a "culture of welfare dependency" that saps claimants of initiative and motivation to look after themselves. The failure of this approach is evidenced by large numbers of Americans living in poverty, without health insurance and unable to meet their own care needs. Additionally, inadequate public social services ensure that claimants are ping ponged between different agencies as individuals go from one to another to secure services. Charles Murray, encouraged by the Thatcher government, attempted to make similar arguments in the UK. Yet, its welfare traditions and composition of claimant classes differ widely from those of the US.

The history of social work claimants shows an undying link between poverty, poor health, and individual hardship. The inability of individuals to pull themselves up by the bootstraps was exposed as far back as the nineteenth century by reformers like Edwin Chadwick, whose demands for public hygiene measures did more to enable working class people to enjoy healthier lives, survive longer, and earn more money than self help. However, the issue of low pay persists and is a key mechanism in excluding poor people from the marketplace where welfare resources can be purchased today.

The tension between personal pathological approaches and structural approaches to social services provision played a key role in the establishment of professional social work in the late Victorian era. The Charity Organization (COS) endorsed individual pathological explanations through its commitment to casework interventions that sought to establish a scientific basis to the social work profession. It was challenged by the Settlement Movement, which focused on structural explanations, particularly unemployment, low pay, and poor health amongst working class people. The latter was responsible for replacing the "lady bountiful" image of social work with one of social responsibility in which workers cooperated with poor people, and lived and worked amongst them. The efforts of Octavia Hill, Samuel Barnett, and Henrietta Rowlands (Barnett's wife) promoted structural understandings of poverty and worked to meet needs within this framework. Social researchers including Charles Booth after 1886 provided empirical evidence of the role of economic change in locking people into poverty, presenting a picture that remains familiar.

More evidence of the link between structural economic decline and poverty appeared at the beginning of the twentieth century in the Poor Law Commission Report of 1905 and was highlighted when British mines failed to compete with better equipped American ones that produced more tonnage per laborer. These arguments tally with findings made in the 1970s by Community Development Projects (CDPs), which were successors to the Settlement Movement's community based approaches to poverty alleviation. CDPs exposed the ties between deindustrialization and deprivation in working class communities throughout the UK, a debate

now reinforced by critics of the New Deal and demands for human rights and social justice based anti oppressive social services.

Social services have provided a fraught and contested area of service provision and delivery that is full of contradictions that exclude marginalized groups who have little purchasing power on the market. Today's shift toward private provisions enables a new breed of entrepreneurs, many from overseas, to make fortunes out of a sector that the welfare state had once sought to remove from its ambit. Whether it can provide for those on low incomes or who are outside of the waged workforce remains to be seen. It has been unable to do so in the past and its failure was responsible for the development of welfare state based social services in the first place. Meanwhile, as the rich enjoy the best social services the market can provide, poor people make do.

SEE ALSO: Capitalism, Social Institutions of; Caregiving; Carework; Civil Society; Gender, Work, and Family; Health and Medicine; Nation State; Organizations; Practice; Social Network Analysis; Social Pathology; Social Work: History and Institutions; Social Work: Theory and Methods; Sociology in Medicine; Welfare Dependency and Welfare Underuse

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social structure

Stephen Hunt

The term social structure denotes a more or less enduring pattern of social arrangements within a particular society, group, or social organization. Nonetheless, despite its wide spread usage, there is no single agreed concept of social structure that exists in sociology or related disciplines. An early attempt to theorize the notion of social structure was seen in the work of Lévi Strauss, the French social anthropologist, who attempted to discover the universal rules that underpin everyday activities and custom through cultural systems (Lévi Strauss 1967). Within sociology, however, the term has been employed in various ways according to the theoretical approach within which the concept is used. For instance, in one of the earliest uses of the term, Herbert Spencer related "social structure" to increasing differentiation and specialization of the biological organism as society "evolved."

Historically speaking, sociological theories exploring the concept of social structure are generally associated with macro or structural perspectives oriented to understanding the nature of social order, and in doing so stand in stark contrast to social action (or micro) approaches which seek meaning and motivation behind human social behavior. Social structural analysis has tended to be identified with two schools of thought. First, it is associated with the theoretical speculations of structural functionalists such as Talcott Parsons, for whom the major concern of the sociological enterprise was to explain how social life was possible. For Parsons (1951), the answer lay in the establishment of a certain degree of order and stability which is essential for the survival of the social system. Parsons identified cultural values as the key to stability. Value consensus provides the foundations for

cooperation, since common values produce common goals. The value system permeated social structures which, in Parsons's schemata, constituted a fourfold system of functional prerequisites which give way to universal arrangements oriented towards adaptation, goal attainment, integration, and pattern maintenance. In Parsons's structuralist theory the notion of social structure also implied that human behavior and relationships are, to one degree or another, "structured," particularly in terms of rules, social status and roles, and normative values. Social behavior and relationships are thus patterned and recurrent. It follows that the structure of society can be seen as the sum total of normative behavior, as well as social relationships which are governed by norms.

Although remaining popular among North American academic schools of sociology for some time, social structure theory as espoused by structural functionalism was subject to scathing criticism from the late 1960s, not least of all in its apparent teleology and its normative theoretical stance, as well as strong objections related to the logic of the biological analogy. One observation was that social structures do not possess the relatively identifiable boundaries that clearly exist with biological organisms, nor do they possess the precisely identifiable homeostatic processes of organic structures. Although remaining largely within the structural functionalist school, Robert Merton also challenged what he termed the "postulate of universal functionalism," in particular, that all structures necessarily have positive social functions. Indeed some, notably religion, could have neutral or even detrimental effects on the social system (Merton 1949).

In Western Europe, in particular, functionalism has long been rivaled by Marxist schools of structuralism. Marx (1964) himself considered the importance of what he identified as the two dimensions of the social structure: the overarching economic substructure (or base) which for the most part determined the social superstructure comprised of the various institutions of society. In turn, the "hard" interpretation of Marxist thought came to identify the processes of dialectical and historical materialism as forging social structures concomitant with the economic base. In this elucidation the social superstructure was transformed into

social structures that enforced class subjugation and exploitation.

The work of Gramsci, among others, weakened the hard interpretation of Marxist analysis and took it away from the significance of the economic base to the ideological and cultural superstructure, while retaining the notion of the hegemonic structural power of the state. Also further reducing the hard interpretation of Marx's structuralism was the school of thought typified by Poulantzas. In his poststructural theorizing the state is said to be "relatively" antonymous. According to Poulantzas, ruling interest is not necessarily *directly* related to the actions of the state at any given time. Rather, the state, in capitalist democracies, retains the flexibility and autonomy to sustain the politico economic order in the long term and thus preserve the semblance of pluralism.

The emphasis on "agency," as compared to the rather deterministic framework of social structuralism, provided an alternative approach to understanding social behavior. Here the emphasis was on the motivational capacity of "actors" in dynamically structuring and restructuring the social world around them. Such an approach is usually identified with the work of Weber. However, while Weber is often interpreted as opposing structuralism in his critique of Marx, he provided the channels by which structuralist theory and social action could be reconciled without the determinism and teleology of the former (Weber 1922). This is perhaps exemplified by his work on bureaucracies and their dominant position as rationalized structures in the modern world. Such structures arose out of social (rational) action and, in turn, feed back and inform the experiences of social actors across numerous aspects of human life.

Criticisms of macro level structuralist theories were to lead to the intellectual movement of poststructuralism which developed from the 1960s. Although initially derived from structuralist schools, theorists challenged assumptions concerning society and language as signifying coherent "systems." Through major exponents such as Derrida, Foucault, and others associated with schools of postmodernism, even earlier poststructuralist theory was itself "deconstructed" in order to understand how knowledge, linguistics, and centers of power came into existence in the first place.

SEE ALSO: Agency (and Intention); Economic Determinism; Functionalism/Neofunctionalism; Merton, Robert K.; Mesostructure; Post structuralism; Social System; Structural Functional Theory; Structure and Agency

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social structure of victims

Koichi Hasegawa

Nobuko Iijima, a pioneer of environmental sociology both in Japan and internationally, applied her notion of the social structure of victims to the multidimensional and multi-layered nature of the damage caused by pollution (Iijima 1976, 1979, 1984). The physical damage done to victims is relatively easy to discern, but this is only one aspect of pollution damage. Equally costly is the mental and social damage that occurs in the wake of the physical impact. Iijima attempted to describe comprehensively the complex structure of the suffering of victims, from physical suffering to worsening relationships between family members and neighbors who may be indifferent to the pollution problem or wish to keep it hidden. This approach reveals the flow on effect of the physical damage. In fact, Iijima demonstrated how such suffering affects every aspect of a family's daily life, including loss of income and an increase in medical expenses, and often leads to family breakdown or the destruction of a family's living conditions. Through her

research on Minamata disease, mercury poisoning of Canadian Indians, and drug induced Subacute Myelo Optico Neuropathy (SMON) disease, Iijima discovered that the structure of victims was very similar whether the damage was caused by a labor accident, a drug induced disease, or an environmental hazard. The source of the pollution that caused Minamata disease was a factory already known as the site of numerous labor accidents. A systematic and institutional lack of care or consideration by industry and government for the safety of people's environment and the safety of working conditions nurtured the endemic problems that led to the Minamata outbreak.

Iijima's argument regarding the social structure of victims represented both a practical and a theoretical contribution to the field. In the case of drug induced SMON disease, Iijima testified as to her research findings in court and her argument became the basis for the plaintiffs' demands for financial compensation for their sufferings, including the mental damage inflicted on them and the destruction of their daily lives.

More broadly, Iijima discussed the way that the sufferings caused by environmental damage were not evenly distributed in society, but reflected the disparities between majority and minority groups. Hence, in Japan, where small farmers and fishermen occupy the lowest strata of society, it is they who are most likely to suffer from environmental hazards. In this way, she found a kinship with US scholars of environmental justice and racism on African Americans and Native Americans, such as Bullard (1994).

In distinguishing between environmental sociology and medical and other social scientific studies of the environment, Iijima identified the description of the social structure of victims as the primary task of environmental sociologists.

SEE ALSO: Benefit and Victimized Zones; Environment, Sociology of the; High Speed Transportation Pollution

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social support

Karen D. Lincoln

Social support has repeatedly been linked to a host of diverse social, economic, and health outcomes, including mortality (Berkman & Syme 1994), depression (Wethington & Kessler 1986), a variety of physical health problems, including heart disease (Kristenson et al. 1998), rheumatoid arthritis (Krol et al. 1993), and educational attainment and success (Hagan et al. 1996).

Social support, as a field of study, rose to prominence in the early 1970s and ushered in a groundswell of articles and books dealing with this topic. The burgeoning literature resulted in a plethora of definitions of the term. "Social support" usually refers to a process of interaction or exchange between individuals and significant others. Researchers have examined different *types* of support (e.g., emotional, informational, instrumental) and different *sources* of support (e.g., family, friends, neighbors, church members), as well as *functional* aspects (e.g., emotional support, sense of acceptance or belonging) and *structural* aspects (e.g., size, density, frequency of contact). House et al. (1988) recommended that studies of social support include measures representing more than one of these components in order to better understand how they relate to each other and to different outcomes. This approach has been widely adopted; however, many papers still rely on single measures of one component without a full

understanding of the definition of support underlying their selection. Most empirical studies on this topic explore the associations between social support and health. A review of this broad literature over several decades leads to the conclusion that social support is beneficial to health. People with satisfying levels of support seem to cope better with stress and have better physical and mental health, compared to those who lack support.

Despite the volumes of research on social support, many questions of conceptual, methodological, and theoretical importance remain to be answered. This entry discusses the history, evolution, and current thinking in the field of social support, as well as directions for future research.

A hundred years ago, Durkheim's (1951) study of suicide made a significant contribution to the field of social support. He found that suicides were more prevalent among those with fewer social ties, which in turn produced a loss of social resources, a reduction in social constraints (based on defined norms and social roles), and ultimately resulted in poor psychological outcomes and increased risk of suicide. Almost a century later, extant reviews of the social support literature (Cohen & Wills 1985; House et al. 1988; Thoits 1995) conclude that social support, regardless of the way in which it is measured, is beneficial and has the potential to alleviate the deleterious effects of stress and other undesirable situations on physical, mental, and social outcomes.

Caplan (1974), Cassel (1974), and Cobb (1976) laid the foundation for work on social support and established the research issue that has since dominated the field: social support as a protective factor. They provided early definitions of the construct as well as ideas about the function of social support. Caplan (1974) and Cassel (1974) suggested that social support is feedback provided by significant others that *buffers* the adverse effects of stress and thus facilitates coping with difficult situations. Cobb (1976) was more precise in his efforts to provide a conceptual definition. He defined social support as information leading a person to believe that he or she is loved and cared for (e.g., emotional support), esteemed and valued (e.g., esteemed support), and belongs to a mutually supportive network (e.g., belonging support).

A decade later, Barrera (1981) emphasized that the term "social support" lacked adequate specificity and developed a classification scheme that has proved to be quite helpful in elaborating the diversity of definitions. Barrera identified three distinct categories of social support: social *embeddedness* (e.g., assessing the frequency of contact and connection with others), *perceived* social support (e.g., subjective evaluations of support availability and satisfaction), and *received* support (e.g., assessing the amount of tangible help that individuals actually provide).

Barrera's classification scheme contributed to the next wave of research that focused on comparing different dimensions of social support and their varied effects on particular outcomes. The consequences of perceived social support, especially emotional support, have most frequently been examined in the literature. The perception or belief that emotional support is available appears to have much stronger influence on outcomes than the actual receipt of social support.

Despite these advances, the social support literature continues to receive criticism. Many of these critiques coalesce around the definitions of social support as being too vague or too broad. Little consensus exists on how social support should be defined. This lack of consensus regarding the term is a major problem because it creates difficulty in measurement, as well as in assessing the status of research findings. The use of carefully chosen and more precise measures may help curtail the creation of more conflicting research findings about social support and have important benefits for summarizing study findings regarding the costs and benefits of social support.

Most conceptual models highlight the direct and stress buffering effects of social support on outcomes. The *direct effects model* (Cohen & Wills 1985) assumes that social support has a direct effect and serves a health restorative role by meeting basic human needs for social contact regardless of the level of stress present. Thus, social support and stressors are largely independent of one another. Stressors have deleterious effects on health and other outcomes, while certain aspects of support, especially social integration and perceived support, are beneficial. Hence, these respective influences of support

and stressors are additive and, at least partly, offset one another. This generalized beneficial effect of social support occurs because social networks provide positive interactions, support, and affirmation that lead to an overall sense of self worth, self esteem, and positive affect.

Social support has also been studied widely as a psychosocial resource that potentially mitigates or buffers the deleterious psychological effects of stress on outcomes. Cohen and Wills's (1985) *stress buffering model* proposes that social support buffers or protects individuals from the deleterious effects of stress. Many prior studies suggest that the effects of perceived support, and to a lesser extent those of received support, vary according to levels of stress. That is, support may be helpful mainly for persons who face high levels of stress, but may be much less important for others. Thus, the main role of social support in the stress buffering model is to mitigate the otherwise deleterious effects of high stress. Supporting evidence for this model has been found in a variety of studies.

Discussions of social support increasingly focus on the need for theory as a guide to understanding the *mechanisms* by which social support affects health and other outcomes. This is a crucial next step to understanding how social support operates and ultimately developing a theory of social support. To accomplish this goal, researchers must (1) understand what the term social support means, (2) determine which dimensions or types of support play an especially important role in shaping the outcomes under consideration, and (3) identify the precise social mechanisms responsible for the observed effects.

There are several interesting new directions in recent research that may facilitate the goal of developing a theory of social support. First, a thorough examination of possible intervening factors can help us understand the mechanisms whereby social support operates to influence particular outcomes. Studies that examine the influence of measures of self concept, such as self esteem, personal control, or mastery, are promising. However, study findings to date have been inconsistent. Understanding the intervening mechanisms and supportive processes is a crucial next step to building theory in this area.

Another new and promising direction examines the negative side of social relationships. Negative interaction refers to unpleasant social exchanges between individuals that are perceived by the recipients as nonsupportive, critical, manipulative, demanding, or otherwise inconsequential to their needs. Research consistently shows that negative interactions exert a greater effect on health and well being than measures of supportive interactions (for a review, see Lincoln 2000). In short, studies are beginning to show that there are important limitations on the degree to which social relationships benefit health and other outcomes. Consequently, a more complete understanding of social support requires a thorough examination of the negative as well as the positive aspects of interpersonal ties, as well as the stability, change, and effects in social relations over time.

Research designs have advanced from the cross sectional correlational research that characterized early studies (Heller & Swindle 1983) to longitudinal designs that have appeared in recent studies (Barnes et al. 2004). A number of relatively underexplored questions remain, however, concerning the effects of factors such as stress and poverty, for example, on social support over time. Stressors such as financial problems and the death of a loved one are generally assumed to result in support mobilization rather than erosion or withdrawal. However, acute stressors are more likely to result in support mobilization in the short run, whereas chronic stressors may entail serious costs to the social network and thus erode support over time.

Most studies view social support primarily as an individual level or interpersonal construct. However, community psychologists have identified the need for studies that treat social support as a system level or community level phenomenon that promotes social integration and perceptions of support. A focus on community and systems level factors is consistent with a sociological approach to the study of interactions among people and how social contexts influence these relationships. One example of this approach involves studies of social support in religious settings. Although this literature is not well developed, findings to date indicate that people who are members of formal religious organizations receive a sizable amount

of emotional and tangible assistance (Taylor et al. 2004) from their fellow congregants. In addition to this line of research, more information is needed about the role of clergy in facilitating social support among parishioners. Research findings indicate that some people are more likely to consult members of the clergy than professional helpers (Taylor et al. 2004). However, more research is needed to understand what clergy actually do to assist people, whether they act as a conduit to professional helpers, and the types of problems they confront.

Questions remain about how social support operates among different populations. For example, more research is needed to understand the characteristics of social support networks among different age, gender, ethnic, racial, and SES groups. Little is known about whether extant measures of social support have the same meaning across different groups. The dramatic increase of older adults in the United States and worldwide highlights the importance of understanding social support among this population more than ever. Little is known about the effects of negative interaction across the life course or how those with limited support availability fare in terms of health and social outcomes. More discussion of policy implications of social support is needed. The widely accepted but recently challenged belief that some groups, such as African Americans, receive more social support than other groups has major implications for policies that affect long term health care, poverty, and social insurance, particularly among populations with limited resources. For example, recent findings indicate that African Americans have a higher proportion of kin in their social networks (Ajrouch et al. 2001) and have smaller social networks compared to whites (Barnes et al. 2004). Whereas negative exchanges might be relatively uncommon among more distal network members (e.g., co workers, neighbors), where few resources are transferred, they have been found to be fairly common among family members and when extensive support is provided. Consequently, African Americans may be more vulnerable to conflict within their networks compared to those with more multiplex networks (e.g., family, friends, neighbors, co workers), as well as limitations in the availability or range of supportive resources.

Another promising new direction for future research is the use of computers and the Internet to provide and receive social support. This area of study views computer mediated support groups as weak tie networks that have the potential to provide support to those individuals who have limited or restricted opportunities to engage in supportive exchanges. Persons with functional limitations or loss of mobility, illness, advanced age, time constraints due to competing demands (e.g. caring for a disabled, aging, or ill family member), or who simply prefer social contact or discussing personal problems via cyberspace rather than face to face, may benefit from this form of support. This research is in its infancy and competing claims have been presented in the literature regarding the impact of Internet use on social support, with some studies suggesting that Internet use increases social interaction and support (Shaw & Gant 2002), while others suggest that it leads to decreased interaction and support, or has no effect (Noel & Epstein 2003). There is some disagreement as to whether the Internet has a positive or negative impact on social connection and well being for older adults, in particular. Clearly, more work is needed in this area to determine who uses, who benefits, and what are the motives for using this form of exchange, as well as whether it is a replacement or supplement to face to face interactions.

The past few decades have made strides in clarifying the theoretical construct of social support and establishing how it is associated with different facets of social life. As more systematic research continues, future research will provide a more nuanced and contextualized understanding of the promise and limits of social support.

SEE ALSO: Aging and Social Support; Conjugal Roles and Social Networks; Durkheim, Émile; Emerson, Richard M.; Interaction; Interpersonal Relationships; Networks; Social Exchange Theory; Social Network Analysis; Social Network Theory; Social Support and Crime; Stress and Health; Symbolic Interaction

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social support and crime

Ruth Triplett

In his 1994 Presidential Address to the Academy of Criminal Justice Sciences, Cullen (1994) argued that social support is an important organizing concept for criminology. Central to his argument about the importance of social support to criminological theory is Cullen's idea that social support is a concept that is actually present in many of today's criminological writings, including strain, labeling, feminist, and the works of the Chicago School. Cullen derives his definition of social support from Lin, who defines it as the perceived or actual instrumental and/or expressive provisions supplied by the community, social networks, and confiding partners.

For Cullen, there are a number of important dimensions surrounding this definition of social support. First, as one can see in the definition, two basic types of social support derive from one's relationships: expressive and instrumental. Expressive support is used to refer to the emotional support that one receives from relationships. An example of expressive support is when your spouse helps you release stress by listening to your complaints about work. Instrumental support refers to support from a relationship that leads the individual to achieve

a goal. An example of instrumental support would be when parents provide money and a place to live for their children while they attend college.

A second dimension to social support is that it involves not only what is actually given as support, but the perception of support as well. Thus there may be a difference between what someone perceives they are giving and what another perceives they are getting. Third, social support occurs at different levels. It can be discussed at the individual level, given by a friend, at the community level, with communities varying in the extent to which they offer support, or even at the societal level, with some nations offering higher levels of social support than others. Finally, social support can be given formally, by agencies or institutions, or informally, by friends and family.

Cullen next argues that social support is related to crime at a variety of levels. At the macro level, Cullen relates varying levels of social support to crime at the societal and community level. For example, Cullen argues that the lower level of social support in the US is related to its higher rates of serious crime. Cullen also sees social support as varying across families, with some offering more support to their members than others. Finally, he sees social support having a direct effect on individuals' involvement in crime through both the giving and receiving of social support, and indirectly as it conditions the effect of other factors, such as strain.

When Cullen wrote his article on social support, he argued that there was much criminological research that already lent indirect support to the importance of social support in explaining crime. Since then, Cullen and other researchers have directly tested some of his ideas. In general, the research is supportive of the idea that social support is related to crime at a variety of levels. For example, at the individual level, Wright and Cullen (2001) have examined the relationship between parental support and delinquency. They found that control and support are both important aspects of parenting that significantly affect delinquency. In addition, they found a strong joint effect of control and support on delinquency. At the societal level, Pratt and Godsey (2003) found that social support is significantly related to

national homicide rates and that the effect of inequality is stronger when social support is lacking, and diminished with its presence.

SEE ALSO: Feminist Criminology; Labeling; Social Disorganization Theory; Social Support

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social system

Stephen Hunt

There is a sense in which a “social system” may be defined as two or more people engaged in ongoing social interaction. What might be said to be the aspect of interaction which makes it specifically a “system” is that a high degree of regularity or recurrence is conducive to more or less permanent structural arrangements. This normatively defined categorization of a social system came to be largely identified with particular schools of sociology generally located within the framework of mid twentieth century structural functionalism and the speculative theories of its leading exponents.

Making an earlier contribution was Herbert Spencer (1820–1903), who drew an analogy between the social system and biological organisms. Spencer’s speculation that all social systems “evolved” led him to develop a complex threefold scheme for categorizing social systems

based on whether they displayed complex or simple structures and whether they were essentially stable or unstable. Firstly, a “simple” system is undifferentiated by sections, groups, or tribal formations. Secondly, a “compound” system amounts to an amalgamation of communities with a rudimentary hierarchy and division of labor. Thirdly, “doubly compound” systems are more complex still and united under one organized authority (Spencer 1971).

The major contributor to structural functionalism, Talcott Parsons, drew a complex blueprint of the social system applicable at all times and all places while allowing for the dynamics of complexity as societies evolved from pre industrial to industrial forms (Parsons 1951). For Parsons, the social system was constituted by a number of interacting functional “parts” that arose to deal with universal prerequisites. The fulfillment of these prerequisites ensured the survival of the social system, as did adherence by social members to an overarching value system. Also ensuring the endurance of the system was the need of its constituent parts to evolve through the differentiation that was the hallmark of modernization.

In Parsons’s schemata, a fourfold system of functional prerequisites gave way to universal structural arrangements: adaptation, goal attainment, integration, and pattern maintenance. Put succinctly, these universal social structural formations or “subsystems” realized these prerequisites through the following: economic activity (control over the environment), political arrangements (establishing goals and priorities), integration (the adjustment of potential or actual conflict), and the maintenance of value patterns (kinship structures and socialization processes). Parsons identified cultural values as the key to stability since value consensus integrates the various institutions or subsystems. Value consensus provided the foundation for cooperation given that common values engender common goals. In Parsons’s model both value consensus and subsystem formations structured patterned and recurrent human actions and relationships, particularly in terms of rules, social status and roles, and normative values. Thus a social system constitutes the accumulative entirety of normative behavior.

According to Parsons, the very task of sociology was to analyze the institutionalization of

the social system's value orientation. When values were institutionalized and behavior structured in terms of them, the result was a stable system or state of "social equilibrium." Such equilibrium was sustained by socialization, which constituted the means by which values are transmitted, alongside forms of social control, which encouraged conformity and discouraged social deviance.

Almost paradoxically, Parsons saw changes in the value system as the mechanism behind social evolution as well as the potential for disequilibrium. In short, change in one constitutive part (adaptation, goal attainment, integration, and pattern maintenance) was likely to engender change in another. Thus no social system was ever in a total state of equilibrium as it evolved toward more complex forms. Such evolution involved a general adaptive capacity as the social system increased its control over the environment. However, while economic adaptation might provide the initial stimulus for social evolution, it was changes in the value consensus that ensured that such change was forthcoming.

In identifying the evolutionary state of any given social system, Parsons outlined five key variables, which he referred to as cultural patterns "A" and "B." The former were synonymous with more simple forms, while the display of all or a majority of the latter constituted the cultural patterns of advanced societies. These patterns, for Parsons, entailed the following: (1) the change from ascribed to "achieved" status, which allowed social mobility according to merit; (2) the move from the diffuse and organic nature of social relationships toward the more utilitarian relationships of the modern world; (3) the transformation of the particularism engrained in social action into social acts according to universal principles; (4) the change from the affectivity of immediate gratification to deferred gratification; and (5) the evolution from a collective orientation toward self orientation.

The logic implicit in the concept of a social system was criticized even from within the school of structural functionalism. In attempting to develop functionalist theory, Robert Merton (1949) focused upon the alleged efficacy of a number of underlying assumptions. In particular, Merton questioned whether any given subsystem or constituent element of the social

system may be alternatively functional, dysfunctional, or non functional. Thus, he advocated the necessity of evaluating their overall contribution to system survival. Secondly, he speculated whether the functional utility of the constituent elements of a social system is particularly integrative, especially in advanced industrial society.

There arose further critiques of Parsons's theoretical framework which were to undermine its credibility. An especially damaging criticism of the paradigm of a social system was derived from what might be interpreted as the teleology inherent in structural functionalism generally. While this school of sociology advanced the view that the constituent parts of the social system existed because they have beneficial consequences, it effectively treated an effect as a cause. Hence, the reductionist analyses of the dynamics of an abstract social system are logically unsustainable. Moreover, assessing the positive effects of these elements is often unquantifiable. Subsequently, the biological analogy on which the paradigm was initially based became perceived as flawed.

SEE ALSO: Functionalism/Neofunctionalism; Merton, Robert K.; Parsons, Talcott; Social Control; Social Structure; Socialization; Spencer, Herbert; Structural Functional Theory

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social theory and sport

Jeffrey Michael Clair and Jason Wasserman

Despite acknowledgments of sport as a legitimate focus of sociological analysis from early thinkers such as Spencer, Simmel, Weber, Scheler, and Mead (Luschen 1980), the lack

of theoretical development in sport studies has been well documented (Frey & Eitzen 1991), although there appears to be increased movement toward the generation and integration of more theoretically driven work.

Washington and Karen (2001) point out that Bourdieu's "Sports and Social Class" statement has focused much of our attention with these following key observations: (1) sports is a field relatively autonomous of society with a unique historical dynamic; (2) sport represents struggles between social classes; (3) sport shifted from an amateur elite practice to a professionally produced spectacle for mass consumption; (4) sport production and administration must be understood within the industrial political economy; (5) sports participation as exercise or leisure time depends on economic and cultural capital; and (6) sport practices vary by the conscious and unconscious meanings and functions perceived by various social classes.

Sport provides unique opportunities for understanding the complexities of everyday life. Bourdieu's (1991) original argument calls for theoretical inquiry that integrates macro and micro interests, bridging social structure and social psychological processes. Macro methodologies cover, for example: (1) concerns with developing sport as a science (Luschen 1980); (2) global politics (Strenk 1979);

(3) sociohistorical labor and leisure development (Zarnowski 2004); (4) the accessibility of sport to various classes and social mobility (Kahn 2000); and (5) the role of media in generating national identities (Lowes 1997). Micro orientations will focus inquiry on (1) sport preferences and participation (Miller et al. 2002); (2) socialization (McNulty & Eitle 2002); (3) self esteem (Adler et al. 1992); (4) immortalizing the self through sport (Schmitt & Leonard 1986); and (5) sport play to display (Stone 1955).

Coakley (2004) explicitly addresses dominant theoretical perspectives and their relation to the study of sports, which are summarized in Table 1.

Still being a young field, the areas in need of theoretical attention are vast. While race, class, gender, and media studies have moved sport away from an "orphan speciality" status (Frey & Eitzen, 1991), other intriguing substantive areas remain fertile ground for development. Three areas which are particularly fruitful are the political nature of sport, sport as art, and the moral assumptions embedded in sport.

POLITICAL NATURE OF SPORT

Viewing sports as politics is not new. This connection has been referred to as "war without

Table 1 Dominant theoretical perspectives and their relation to the study of sport.

<i>Theoretical paradigm</i>	<i>Focus in sport</i>
Functionalist	Sport as producing positive social outcomes for social networks, physical and mental health, and benefits for non-sport related activities such as school, work, and family life.
Conflict	Political-economic forces that drive sport and the class-based relations that define it, such as the commercialization of sport, the influence of sport on economic inequality, etc.
Interactionist	Relations of sport participants examining the production of athlete identity, the meaning and significance of sport for athletes and spectators, and sport involvement processes from initiation of sport participation through retirement.
Critical	Power relations involved in sporting activities, such as how sport reproduces advantage or disadvantage, the relationship of sports to images of health compared to sickness or success compared to failure, etc.
Feminist	Gender relations embedded in sport, such as the construction of gendered identities within sport activity and the exclusion of girls and women in sports.
Figurational	Attempts to bridge the macro-micro divide by focusing on sports as embedded in a variety of multi-level social networks examining the evolution of sports in a historical network context.

weapons.” Strenk (1979) points out how Nazis under Hitler and Fascists under Mussolini propagandized sport. The globalization process seems to have only increased the prominence of sport in politics. Examples of the obvious intersection of sport and politics include:

- The losers of world wars have been banned for several years from the Olympic movement (the US refused visas to East Germans for two decades).
- Egypt, Iraq, and Lebanon boycotted the 1956 Melbourne Olympics in protest of the Suez war. Spain, Switzerland, and the Netherlands withdrew over the Soviet invasion of Hungary, and China pulled out in a continuing demonstration against the International Olympic Committee recognition of Taiwan.
- South Africa was barred from the 1964 Tokyo Olympics.
- The Mexican government shot and killed students protesting the 1968 Olympics in Mexico City.
- Arab terrorists kidnapped and killed Israeli athletes in Munich in 1972.
- 32 nations boycotted the 1976 Olympics in Montreal because New Zealand maintained sports relations with South Africa.
- The US, followed by West Germany and Japan, boycotted the 1980 Moscow Olympics in protest of the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan. In return, the Soviet bloc boycotted the 1984 Los Angeles Olympics.
- North Korea, Cuba, Ethiopia, and Nicaragua boycotted the 1988 Seoul Olympics.
- Gabon, Congo, Honduras, and El Salvador have gone to war over the outcome of soccer games.
- The US and Russia attempted to proclaim superiority of their political and socioeconomic systems by winning the most Olympic gold medals.
- The US used table tennis to open relations with China.

Sports have been “justified since antiquity for providing soldiers with the physical training they would require in battle” (Semenza 2001). There is always binary opposition in battle. It is one team against another, one country against another, one individual against another, one

alliance against another. Further, encounters in both sport and war are fundamentally a physical contest. Even competitors in sports where there is no direct physical contact between opponents understand their contest as one of warlike physical opposition. Finally, there are consequences for winning or losing. These may be concrete or symbolic, but they are clearly valued by competitors, as demonstrated by fierce competition and emotional reactions to winning and losing.

Gender also links sport and war. Male gendered traits tied to physicality, power, and domination underlie both the good athlete and the good soldier. Generally, sports are not simply the random assertion of masculinity; rather, they are structured expressions of it, reflecting past, dominant, institutionalized representations of masculinity (i.e., war). Social theory can further illuminate similarities in sport and war, generating insight into current international political relations as well as reaching into the social psychological production of gendered identities.

SPORT AS ART

Athletes talk about a sense of effortless competency, a flow felt while playing where it all comes together – all the training, studying, and coaching. During this experience the mind seems to stop and there is expanded vision beyond thought. This is referred to as “being in the zone” or what we call a *creative action rhythm*. It emerges from a twofold process: (1) *learning*, by first absorbing all that one can from books, practice, and coaches/teachers, and (2) *creative acting*, where one acts *out of* what was learned instead of merely imitating. This creative action rhythm is the very essence of the true athlete as artist.

The dependence of sport on rules may suggest an opposition to creativity. But suppose the rules were restrictive and it was possible for them to remove the artistic, creative element of sport and that athletes merely applied what they had learned from their coaches. Would sport still be enjoyed by spectators? Would athletes still practice their crafts with passion and dedication? Imagine going to a basketball game where the players seldom did anything new. We would only tolerate it for young

players, and then maybe only if the players were our own children. But reflect on how excited we are when a successful, dynamic, creative play occurs. These are actually the moments which give meaning to sport. These moments, when sport transcends physical mechanics and becomes emotionally salient, are what allow individuals to experience creative participation, even as spectators.

Young (1999) shares an interesting theoretical framework in this regard. Calling on Heidegger, he reminds us, “poetically dwells man upon this earth.” This means, without art, he merely exists. Sport, like art, conjures emotion in the participant as well as the viewer. This emotion pulls us away from the maze of everyday details, demands, and decisions (Goffman 1961). This emotional experience is the essence of art and it is clearly found in sport.

Attending a sporting contest is itself seeking artistic expression (Young 1999). The game setting is far from the ordinary. Our team reveals the multicultural mix of our community, but is integrated. And although we sit in hierarchical seating, we experience union with one another, a manifest integrity of our community. We share a national anthem. We see our morality in the rules (e.g., fairness, earned accomplishment, etc.). The athletic activity, although subordinated to rules, encourages equality between competitors, but yet does not get in the way of artistic expression. We can see the virtues of skills. And however well planned and rehearsed, with the final outcome, we come to grips with being mortal. Through the athletic artistic expression, we are transported from our “average everydayness” into *Augenblick*, the “moment of vision” (Young 1999). The athlete helps us see the hero that is concealed in everyday characters. Social theory, particularly in the sociology of emotions, has much to contribute and gain from studying the creative, artistic, and emotional qualities of sport, and the meanings we bring and take away from our games (Duquin 2000).

MORAL ASSUMPTIONS EMBEDDED IN SPORT

Sport both embodies and impresses particular assumptions about human nature and a moral

order. Particularly central to youth sports, the debate about the value of competition represents broader clashes over human nature itself. In a cyclical fashion, sport both assumes competition as an innate human quality and in turn teaches that this is the case. Like much western social, political, and economic theory, implicit in sport is the ideological assumption of a human will to power. The extent to which this is innate rather than cultural, if it is at all, remains unclear. There is evidence that this sort of orientation is primarily cultural (Sahlins 1972). Many traditional societies often do not overtly reflect this will to power. Thus, one might claim that it is the institutionalization and structure of sports, which most often follow a western, capitalist model of competition, that produce these tendencies. Sahlins (1972) similarly found that small, primitive societies tended to develop westernized power orientations only after being engulfed in larger, organized states. Sport is certainly one arena in which investigation into the matter may prove fruitful.

While emphasis on competition is still the pervasive ethos of sport, some youth organizations have consciously shifted away from a competitive model. For example, there are leagues in which everyone receives a participation trophy rather than just rewarding top place teams and most valuable players. Coaches may be discouraged from emphasizing winning as a value, or even from showing too much enthusiasm for “successful” play (e.g., within the American Christian Upward Program). These organizations present an opportunity for sociology to address some competing hypotheses embedded in the ideologies of these typical and counter typical models of sport. Social theory ought to be able to contribute to and gain from the study of youth development, attitudes, and mental health by comparing these different models of sport, which seem particularly polarized concerning the value of competition.

We might compare the current diversity in the world to a prism. The nature of the prism’s color spectrum is that there is no connectedness between colors, meaning there is no identifiable demarcating line that defines the end of one color and the beginning of another. It is essential to realize that one of the colors in the spectrum of global diversity is sport. Its boundaries blend and merge with the agenda and concerns of

gender, race, ethnicity, religion, family, work, leisure, economic development, politics, global relations, etc. The selected literature cited here points to the possibilities of interdisciplinary social theory development.

SEE ALSO: Globalization, Sport and; Media and Sport; Politics and Sport; Sport; Sport, Alternative; Sport and Culture

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social work: history and institutions

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From the beginning of the nineteenth century industrialization and the rise of civil society created a new framework for human welfare: the fact that poverty caused by nature was replaced by poverty caused by social deprivation brought up the need for appropriate ideas and solutions that expanded the range of regional or national welfare strategies into an international perspective. "Social welfare" is not only the old fashioned term for social work, but is also the more general term: social welfare continues to include in most parts of the world programs that promote the general welfare (e.g., social security) and involves other professions as well as social work. This entry details the main changes in the field of social welfare through the development and discussions of its international organizations.

The International Council of Social Welfare (ICSW) was founded in the context of the Conference for Social Welfare, held in Paris in July 1928. René Sand, one of the initiators of the conference and the ICSW, used to emphasize the "double origin" of the organization, pointing to the fact that it corresponds to the model of the American National Council of

Social Welfare (NCSW, founded 1874 as the Conference on Charity and Correction), as well as to organizations and networks in Europe whose activities go back to the middle of the nineteenth century – the *Congrès internationale de Bienfaisance* (1856–63) and the *Congrès d'Assistance publique et privée* (1889–1910).

Since the Enlightenment, the American Declaration of Human Rights and the French Revolution, together with the negative consequences of industrialization (e.g., poverty, slums), had given rise to public discussion about the “social question” and to new movements such as the Inner Mission of the Protestant church and the Settlements of the Social Utopians. The international peace movement, the movement for the abolishment of slavery, and the feminist movement inspired the political ideas of welfare strategies, as well as the declaration of the Geneva Convention initiated by Henri Dunant in 1864, which was the starting point for the International Red Cross. Discussions about prison reform also decisively influenced welfare discourses: the *Congrès Penitenciaire* held in Frankfurt in 1846 and in Brussels in 1847 accelerated the discourses on welfare, education, and social reform, and led to the first attempt to gather information about poverty and the needs of the working class on an international basis, in order to inform the public about the necessity of social reforms.

Although the revolutionary activities in 1848–9 made these initiatives ineffective, there was a second departure in 1851–2 when the *Congrès d'hygiène public* raised questions of welfare in the context of social hygiene in Brussels. The main topics of these conferences were the housing shortage and the state of dwellings, disease, abolition of child labor, prostitution, and venereal disease.

Probably the first international welfare conference as such took place in Paris in 1856, the *Congrès internationale de Bienfaisance*. Nearly 300 participants from 20 countries came to the conclusion that there should be regular meetings in the future to create common standards of poor relief and charity for the most serious social problems: poverty and the lack of social hygiene. Discussion was dominated by questions of social insurance and social security, as well as the principles of self help. The idea was to find a balance between the responsibilities of

the state and the resources of the clients (and the charity organizations which cared for them). Cooperation with conferences dealing with social science and statistics became closer, in order to accelerate political change in the field of social reform with “demographic evidence.”

National and international political conflicts hindered the development of international social welfare for some years. It was not until 1889 that the pioneers of social welfare met again to form a new international association: the *Congrès d'Assistance publique et privée*.

In the meantime the efforts of the first wave of international exchange in the field of social welfare began to show results. In England in the 1860s the 1834 Poor Law was reformed, while a multitude of private philanthropic activities were united under the Charity Organization Society (COS) in 1869. In the US, Buffalo was in 1877 the first city to introduce the model of the COS into its local welfare system. By the end of the nineteenth century more than 100 larger cities in the US had followed this example.

In France the *Office Central des Institutions Charitables* performed comparable work. After 1871 the Third Republic emphasized the responsibility of the state for child relief and care for the elderly and mentally ill with new legislation, together with the importance of private charity. In Germany a district oriented social system originally established in Elberfeld became influential (nationally and internationally) because it facilitated an effective relief structure based on semi professional neighborhood support. In the 1880s the Bismarck Sozial system (including social insurance against illness, invalidism, and poverty among the aged) provided protection against the most serious social risks – an important step into the future, although it was in the beginning only intended for male industrial workers.

The *Congrès d'Assistance publique et privée* turned out to be the most important precursor of the ICSW. Until 1910 it furthered progressive ideas like female participation in public welfare activities, professional training, preventive measures against tuberculosis, child protection, and eugenics.

From the beginning of the twentieth century the influence of the feminist movement all over the world had become stronger, including

within social welfare. While charity and municipal poor relief had been delivered exclusively by local authorities, priests, physicians, and other male citizens (occasionally assisted by nurses or nuns), social work was now defined as a typically female profession corresponding to “typical female attributes” like patience, compassion, and empathy. However, the “welfare takeover” by the feminist movement did not lead to more sense or sensitiveness in social work, but to more sensibility. It was obvious that the welfare system at the end of the nineteenth century urgently needed modernization, mainly in regard to the dark side of the industrial revolution and its numerous negative social consequences. Female pioneers at that time were especially interested in higher education and professional perspectives in order to take part in societal decision processes. They realized at once that social reform provided a wide area for systematic and serious activities, fitting perfectly into their ideas of public participation. Thus the feminization of welfare signaled the end of the predominance of individual charity and helped lead to the idea of social work as a profession.

The last and most important conference of the *Congrès d'Assistance publique et privée* (in Copenhagen in 1910) confirmed these ideas and focused the modern welfare system on three main principles: a balance between social insurance and social work, coordination of state and private welfare structures, and vocational training.

Although World War I furthered the processes of welfare modernization, as all countries had to cope with the welfare needs of an enormous number of widows, orphans, and disabled, international cooperation was again severely disrupted. The cancellation of a conference planned for 1915 in London was the beginning of an interruption to international welfare discourse that lasted until 1928. On the other hand, the terrible experiences of the war provided the impetus for the League of Nations (founded in 1920), the International Labor Organization (founded 1919), International Red Aid (founded 1921), the International League of the Red Cross (founded 1919) and the predecessor of the World Health Organization (the Health Committee, founded 1923), among other examples.

In this same period in the US, the NCSW became a great influence on the development of international structures in the field of social work. The main starting signal for the “great” International Conference of Social Welfare (the so called *Quinzaine Social* held in Paris in 1928) came from the US, as did financial support for the preparatory work. These incentives of the NCSW and the efforts of the International League of the Red Cross (represented by Alice Masarykova from Czechoslovakia and the Belgian physician René Sand) enabled the largest welfare conference to take place. The idea of the conference was to create a survey of the development of social work all over the world, inviting welfare experts from as many nations as possible, who were supposed to describe the social systems in their countries. Soon, however, other organizations wanted to participate and urged the planning committee to widen the range of topics. In the end, there were five conferences united in the *Quinzaine*: the International Conference of Social Welfare itself, a revived *Congrès d'Assistance publique et privée*, the International Conference of Child Protection, the International Conference of Housing and Urban Development, and an exhibition on Settlements and Social Progress. Over 5,000 participants from 40 countries attended the conferences, the reports of which (published in French, English, and German) covered nearly 2,500 pages.

The most important result of the conference in Paris was the foundation of the International Council of Social Welfare as a worldwide platform for professional development and exchange. The participants decided that all the nations present should be members of ICSW, but only Belgium, Czechoslovakia, France, Germany, the UK, and the US were also represented on the executive board. With the exception of Japan and Chile, countries from Africa, South America, and Asia, as well as Australia, were excluded.

The next ICSW conference was held in Frankfurt in 1932 and focused on just one extremely topical social problem: the consequences of unemployment for the family. The conference proceedings showed unmistakably that there were very different political and professional positions “united” in the ICSW, varying from communist ideas of partnership to the attempt of some Catholic representatives to defend

motherhood and family life against the temptations of modernization.

The third conference on “Social Work and the Community” took place in London in 1936. The most significant characteristic of these last pre war proceedings was the venture of fascist countries like Germany and Italy to functionalize the term “community” for their idea of the *Volk*, in order to create eugenic standards for its perfection. There was no agreement in respect of this question, but nevertheless there was a certain sympathy for eugenic ideas in non fascist countries.

The 1940 conference on “Youth Work and Youth Care” was prevented by World War II. In August 1946 the three former presidents of ICSW (Alice Masarykova, Mary van Kleeck, and René Sand) met to consider the future work of ICSW. Once again, they tried to reconstruct the organization so that it had close connections with the official international platform – this time, the United Nations. However, they had to take into account that other social organizations had already been established during the war to give help to refugees and other displaced persons. The United Nations Relief and Rehabilitation Administration (UNRRA) and the Intergovernmental Committee on Refugees (ICR) merged in 1948 to form the International Relief Organization (IRO). In contrast to ICSW, these organizations had adequate financial means and an enormous number of helpers. Furthermore, UNICEF and the WHO had already been instructed by the UN to develop activities in fields that had been under the direction of the ICSW before the war. Also of enormous influence was the Philadelphia Declaration of the ILO, which proclaimed that the worldwide struggle against poverty and for welfare was a human right independent of race, sex, or belief.

ICSW tried to reestablish itself within this framework of remarkable activities. Being mainly related to European traditions and networks, first attempts were hampered by the destruction of all kinds of infrastructure caused by the war and the new division between East and West. The first post war conference was held in Scheveningen in the Netherlands in 1947 to discuss “Urgent Social Problems in the War Stricken Areas of Europe” and was

attended by only 168 representatives from 18 countries. Because of this very low rate of participation, conference members discussed not only the problems of effective help for millions of people in need, but also the question of their relation to the Council of International Voluntary Agencies (IVA, including the Quakers, Oxfam, and a number of other social organizations) and the UN. They realized that they urgently needed to establish closer connections to organizations in the US. They decided to hold the next conference in Atlantic City, combining the 75th anniversary of NCSW with their proceedings.

In the short period between Scheveningen and Atlantic City (1948) many of the national committees of ICSW, as well as the board, had largely recovered from the effects of the war. Although connections with members in Eastern Europe were broken, there was general agreement to carry on because the challenges were larger than ever. After Atlantic City, two items turned out to be of great importance for the future of ICSW as an international platform of relevance. First, it became obvious that “international” meant more than Europe and the US: ICSW had to be open to members on all five continents and consider them as equal partners. The second item was related to the remarkable increase of international social organizations, which required an efficient division of labor. ICSW had to serve as a platform for international discourses about social needs and support structures all over the world – excluding the political mandate for social work (held by the UN), the representation of the profession (held by the International Association of Social Workers), and all items of education and vocational training (covered by the International Association of Schools of Social Work).

ICSW defined itself in relation to the multitude of international NGOs in the field of social welfare as a partner for theoretical and methodical discourses and as a coordinator for common incentives. Meetings of ICSW – held for example in Madras (1952), Tokyo (1958), Rio de Janeiro (1962), and Jerusalem (1978) – included representatives from all over the world and showed that this idea worked. Furthermore, ICSW was able to face the most relevant topics of social welfare in each period after World War

II, discussing “Urban and Rural Development” (1962), “Social Welfare and Human Rights” (1968), “Social Development in Times of Economic Uncertainty” (1980), “Welfare in West and East” (1992) and “Global Governance” (2004).

Nevertheless it is impossible to relate the history of social welfare exclusively to the history of ICSW after 1945. The diversification of worldwide developments in the field of social work is too large to be interpreted within the framework of just one organization, even if the reflection of that diversification is one of the main activities of ICSW. In all emergent welfare states after World War II, social work was gradually established as a key profession charged with the implementation and the fine tuning of an ever denser net of social policy measures. Its discourses reflect a polarity between universalism, which is the legacy of early international activities, and the “indigenization” of methodological orientations. Along this spectrum, international conferences and activities remain a central feature of social work’s professional orientation.

Looking back on the history of social work there is one important theme that connects the past to the present: the idea of “internationality,” which has always been one of the basic guidelines of social work since its modernization in the nineteenth century. Social problems cross borders. Although every country has to find national answers to these international challenges, the seeds of a global perspective were sown at the first international meetings on social welfare.

SEE ALSO: Addams, Jane; Social Policy, Welfare State; Social Problems, Concept and Perspectives; Social Problems, Politics of; Social Services; Social Work: Theory and Methods; Welfare State; Women’s Movements

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social work: theory and methods

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Theory construction in social work which tries to bind together theory and methods and to introduce the notion of social work as discipline and profession departs from an “open triangle” consisting of theory as an interrelated conceptual system, research, and practice, or applied social science plus social work values and skills linked in a dynamic way (Lovelock et al. 2004: 3). Thus it is a basic scientific undertaking to connect the following elements: a theory of the individual as a biological, psychic, and social being and as a member of different social systems; a theory of society and culture and the interaction between the individual and

society/culture; a policy or program as a scheme for changing problematic situations; and a set of people, among them professionals, in different forms of social organization (social services, social movements, networks, etc.) committed to carrying this change through with the help of specific methods.

Looking at the history of ideas in social work (Soydan 1999), one has to start with the contributions of two classical theorists: Mary Richmond and Jane Addams, who paved the way for the two main theoretical traditions of social work focusing on individuals and/or society. Mary Richmond focused on the individual, his or her personality and unmet needs, and the social environment upon which the individual depends for need satisfaction. Seeking the main causes of social problems within the individual, her change program was therefore oriented to the individual – as in professional casework – in order to remedy social problems. Jane Addams's theoretical focus was basically on the structure and culture of society and their influence upon the individual. She developed a normative vision of integral democracy that promoted freedom and participation, but also social care and justice for all. In addition she realized that it was essential to develop social change programs on the basis of scientific knowledge and genuine research. For Addams, the causes of social problems had to be sought in societal structures and their cultural legitimation. The work of change therefore had to be directed at these conditions. Thus one had to fight – along with political parties and other organizations and professions – for the institutionalization of new laws of social security, especially for the protection of children and women in abusive work conditions, or one had to change the actual social rules or ideologies that allowed exploitation in the workplace, discrimination against women, and legitimation of wars on nationalistic grounds that made heroes out of soldiers. This approach to individual and social change was reflected in a multilevel conception of social work activities that encompassed activities on the individual, family, community, regional, state, and international levels.

The split of theory and action between Richmond and Addams into a micro and macro approach, together with the implicit or explicit

claim of exclusiveness by both parties, is not unique in the history of human and social sciences, and persists to the present day. Yet, there are mediating positions, too, the most prominent being the internationally consensual definition of social work as follows: “The social work profession promotes social change, problem solving in human relationships and the empowerment and liberation of people to enhance well being. *Utilizing theories of human behavior and social systems, social work intervenes at the points where people interact with their environments.* Principles of human rights and social justice are fundamental to social work.”

THEORETICAL AND PRACTICAL APPROACHES: THE FOCUS ON INDIVIDUALS

After the pioneer contributions of Richmond and Alice Salomon in Germany, *psychodynamic concepts* became the first strong explanatory theory for many practice concepts (see Payne 1991).

Psychoanalytic social work. Florence Hollis adapted psychoanalytic theory for social work practice by developing the notions of a sustaining relationship and techniques to reduce anxiety, low self esteem, and lack of confidence. She added procedures of environmental work with people relevant to the client (family members, employers, landlords). The role of the social worker is as an interpreter of feelings, promoter of insights, provider or creator of resources, and mediator or protector (of children). Although there may be things wrong with society, the social worker's main task is to help the individual to cope with problems in developing a realistic – anxiety free – perspective of his or her situation and adapting to it. The professional seeks social reform here as a separate activity.

Behavioral theories and methods derive from the work of experimental behavioral psychologists which criticized the diffuse, untestable conceptions of psychoanalytic theory. The behavior of clients is seen as coping with frustration and aggression in different role settings. Action oriented concepts are classical conditioning by stimulus response, the techniques of operant

conditioning, and social learning. The social worker has to manage contingencies that affect the relationship between the behavior of an individual and its (un)desired social consequences. The main goal is adequate role behavior as parent, pupil, employee, and so on.

Cognitive theories work on the assumption that people construct their own versions of reality and problems through what they have learned. Stimuli are transformed by a process of awareness, description, and interpretation into overt behavior. There can be conflicts between self-conceptions, perceiving self through others, and intentional self. The task of the social worker is to support strategies of learning such as discrimination, concept formation, value finding, and problem solving, sustained by a diary and tasks (homework). The social worker confronts the client with her divergent thinking, pointing out inconsistencies and faulty and alternative modes of thinking, with the aim of finding a more rational way to solve problems.

Task centered social work seeks to replace psychodynamic social work based on a “time-consuming” supportive relationship with a rationally planned, “short term therapy” that has a clear time limit. It rejects any specific psychological or sociological base for its methods, because no theory can adequately explain the range of problems that social work has to deal with. Central to this approach is what the client presents or accepts as problems and what he wants to change in his life, as well as the establishing of a contract about the desired outcome, the amount of contact and time limits, and the arrangement of incentives for success.

Strength development. Strength or resilience is seen as a product of facing adverse life events and traumatic situations which can be used as a resource for actual problem solving. Strengths focused listening is the main method, i.e., observing until, through mutual discovery, events and themes can be found that mobilize the courage to try new behavior.

An integrated – systemic – view would combine these approaches in such a way that it would become clear that individuals have emotions, cognitions, values, self concepts, and so on that all influence how they cope with life tasks and social problems. The last two approaches coincide with the beginning of the

neoliberal hegemony favoring methodological “fast food versions” (James, in Lovelock et al. 2004).

THEORIES AND METHODS: INTERACTION OR NETWORKS BETWEEN INDIVIDUALS

As these theories start with a conception of the individual as a member of families, groups, communities, and organizations, it is possible to speak of the beginning of systems theory in social work. Yet, their focus is mostly on communication patterns, leaving aside an elaborated systemic theory of individual and society. Many of them focus on symbolic interaction and role expectations, especially in relation to processes of stigmatizing, scapegoating, and exclusion (Mead, Goffmann). These interaction processes describe the behavior and problems of social work clients with their social environment as a result of the possible stigmatizing effects of social workers in “people processing organizations.”

A prominent approach in family treatment is *transaction analysis*, which comes from psychodynamic theory and focuses on the ego states in one person (as child, parent, adult) interacting with those in another person. When transactions involve different ego states, problems and misunderstandings arise. The role of the social worker is to analyze and change communication patterns which make the other feel bad, incompetent, powerless, and inferior. Further techniques are reframing, family sculpting, role playing, videotaping, homework assignments, and mediation (Kirst Ashman & Hull 1993).

Social work with *groups* bases its interventions on the structure, culture, and dynamics of groups. The role of the social worker can be task oriented, more supportive/therapeutic, or action oriented. The last named role can lead to economic, social, and cultural activities in the larger community.

Another set of theories conceptualizes resources of social and cultural environments in order to construct supportive social networks or organizations in a community, e.g., for the creation of new jobs suited for long term unemployed, disabled, and minority members who have no chance of getting a job in the main stream economy.

THE INTERFACE BETWEEN SOCIAL WORK AND SOCIAL POLICY

From the 1960s to the 1980s, “radical social work” – neo Marxist, structural, feminist, anti racist, anti oppressive, or anti discriminatory – emerged as a distinctive theoretical and practice approach. It criticized psychological explanations, which privatized social problems instead of transforming them into public issues, blamed the victim, and cut service users off from collective action by treating them individually. This was accompanied by a radical critique of the social welfare system for the overspecialization of its social agencies, for sharing mainstream ideologies and bureaucratic rigidity, and for selectively working with those who were easiest to help; in short, for simply being a servant of the ruling class. The general theoretical hypothesis was that service users – the poor, unemployed, women, ethnic minorities, and so on – would act rationally in their own interests once they understood that the true origins of their problems lay not in themselves but in exploitative and oppressive social structures and cultural codes (Leonard 1975; Galper 1980). Thus, social workers should not waste their energy changing clients’ behavior to make it conform to standards of so called normality. “Structural theory” extended the approach to all forms of overlapping and mutually reinforcing injustices in relation to class, gender, race, disability, sexual orientation, and religious and ethnic minority status (Mullaly 1997). Furthermore, the power relationships between social agency, social workers, and their clients became a target of critical reflection.

The role of social work is seen in three different ways: (1) as part of the oppressive capitalist system which has to control the working class, unwed mothers, minorities, and so on and make them fit for work; (2) as advocate of social change, promoting consciousness raising and supporting community organization and collective action; and (3) as both agent of capitalist, paternalistic, and racist society and as willing or unwilling leader of change by transmitting new perspectives, knowledge, know how, and power sources to the marginalized for organizing themselves to reach their goals. Following this last line of reasoning, the role of social work is to:

- organize shelter for victims of oppression and violence, help them to regain dignity in listening to their accounts, assess their power resources, and support them to carry through their claims for social justice (for black empowerment, feminist empowerment, etc.);
- transform private troubles into public issues by building cooperatives at the community level and participating in social action;
- introduce human rights, especially social justice, into the culture and practice of social agencies according to the international code of ethics for social work (Staub Bernasconi 1991, 2003; Reichert 2003).

INTERACTION BETWEEN INDIVIDUAL AND SOCIETY: FOUR WAVES OF SYSTEMS THEORY

General systems theory. The first system theorist in social work (Hearn 1958) used biological and cybernetic concepts such as homeostasis, entropy, equifinality, and feedback. Essential for growth was the maintenance of a “steady state” between the individual and social systems, avoiding states of entropy (disorder). Critics argued that the chosen concepts reflected a mechanistic, non human nature of people, especially the concept of “steady state,” which could legitimize patriarchal domination and violence in families.

Ecosystems perspective. Germain and Gitterman (1996) used the notion of ecosystems not as a theory but as a metaphor to focus on transactions within and across systems. For them, problems arise when there is a poor fit between a person’s environment and her needs, capacities, rights, and aspirations. Change endeavors focus on transactions instead of an isolated improvement of the social functioning of individuals. The life model of social work practice (Germain & Gitterman 1996) stands for the following action principles: active partnership based on mutuality and reciprocity, assessment of life stressors in passing from one system to another (family to school, school to work), and assessment of strengths and capacities, using an “ecomap” as a pictorial representation of micro, meso, and macro systems in concentric circles and their resources, in discussion with the

client. The social worker's role is to create supportive community networks. At the organizational level (school, work, social service institutions), advocacy should be aimed at changing policies if they work against client interests. This requires skills such as coalition building, positioning, lobbying, and testifying.

Complex systems theories. Complexity theorists (Warren et al. 1998) argue that it is not stability but change – as a form of “deterministic chaos” – that is the normal feature of systems, amplified by self-reinforcing feedback with possible snowball effects and moments at which the system switches from one pattern of complexity to another. Thus social workers have to assess and use these moments to help the system to switch in the direction of social work goals. The criticism here is again that chaos theories emerged originally in math, physics, thermodynamics, and cybernetic engineering, and thus have limited application in human and social sciences. Proponents of the systems theory of Luhmann state that social problems are generated by the exclusion of people from social systems such as the family and educational, economic, political, and cultural systems; thus a new autonomous social welfare system became institutionalized which works with the excluded for their reinclusion or, if this is not successful or possible, for the management of the excluded.

The *systemic paradigm* of social work (Staub Bernasconi 1991, 1995; Hollstein Brinkmann & Staub Bernasconi 2005; Obrecht 2005) sees systems theory as a chance for a unifying (meta) theoretical foundation of social work under the general idea of “integrated pluralism.” It acknowledges that the reduction of systems theory to physics, biology, and cybernetics was a theoretical mistake, but that it paved the way to a more adequate, non-reductionist systemic view. The main focus is on understanding the structure and dynamics/transactions of and between biological, psychic, and social/cultural systems, and on building the transdisciplinary explanatory base for social work.

Social work practitioners face individuals with needs, cognitions, wants, hopes, plans, and learning capacities who are faced with (un)responsive, discriminating, and oppressive social systems and cultural environments, from the family to world society. Transactions between

individuals as members of social systems can be cooperative, competitive, conflictive, or destructive. It is the latter that lead to social problems. Social work practitioners point to vulnerable individuals and groups deprived of resources, power, justice, and dignity under the overarching perspective of unfulfilled human needs and human rights violations (Staub Bernasconi 2003). The general goals of social work are the well-being of the individual and the social reform of social systems, relying on human rights, especially social justice, as regulative ideas laid down in the UN Manual on Social Work and Human Rights and the Global Accreditation Standards for Education and Training in Social Work of 2004. Methods can comprise the theoretical base and procedures of resource identification, production, and allocation; consciousness raising; ego-strengthening; changing cognitive structures, values (i.e., self-conceptions, prejudices), interpretations, and plans; task-focused learning and behavioral training to attain specific goals; networking and mediation in relation to an unresponsive social environment; intercultural communication; empowerment, advocacy, anti-discriminatory work, and democratic participation; and finally, all the methods and techniques of influencing public and political social policy as well as legislative discourse and legislation to provide access to individuals, groups, and members of vulnerable social categories to societal resources and power.

SEE ALSO: Addams, Jane; Marginality; Marginalization, Outsiders; Social Change; Social Justice, Theories of; Social Policy, Welfare State; Social Problems, Concept and Perspectives; Social Problems, Politics of; Social Work: History and Institutions; System Theories

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social worlds

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The term social worlds is used in the social sciences in two main ways. One is as a generic reference to a specific situation or social context, and the second is explicit social worlds/arenas theory within the theoretical tradition of symbolic interactionism.

In its generic form, the term social world usually refers to the relatively immediate milieu of the individuals or collectivities being studied. It is conventionally understood as pointing at the specific contexts of the situation in which those individuals and/or collectivities are to be found. For example, reference may be made to the social world of antique collectors, professional baseball, or surfing. The usage is somewhat similar to the concept of subculture. However, (sub)cultural studies generally focus on the subculture per se (who the members are, what they do, how and why they do it, etc.), such as "Deadhead" or "Trekkie" fandoms. The generic use of social world usually points outward from the individuals or collectivities being studied to their salient contexts as a means of explicitly situating them in sociocultural space and time.

In symbolic interactionist theory over the past century, a series of concepts has been built up around the core concept of social world. Here as elsewhere, interactionists have taken a general term, elaborated it conceptually, and integrated it with related sensitizing concepts to form a theoretical/analytical framework useful in empirical research.

Early Chicago School studies focused on "social wholes": communities of different types (e.g., ethnic communities, elite neighborhoods, impoverished slums), distinctive locales (e.g., taxi dancehalls, the stockyards), and signal events of varying temporal durations (e.g., a strike). The sociological task was to make the *group* the focal center and to build up a knowledge of the whole by examining it in concrete situations. Instead of emphasizing shared culture as anthropologists of the time did, these early works in the Chicago tradition focused on shared territory or geographic space and the

encounters and interactions of human groups that occurred within these environments or ecologies.

These inventories of social spaces often took the form of maps. Many traditional Chicago School studies were undergirded by an areal field model – a “map” of some kind done from “above,” such as a city map modified to show ethnic, racial, elite, and other specific neighborhoods and/or work areas, etc. Relationality was a featured concern and the communities, organizations, and kinds of sites and collectivities represented were to be viewed both in relation to one another and within their larger contexts. Blumer (1958) was a key early paper that drew upon this framing.

In the 1950s and 1960s, researchers in the interactionist tradition reframed the study of social wholes by shifting to studies of work, occupations, and professions, moving from local to national and international groups. Geographic boundaries were dropped as necessarily salient, replaced by *shared discourses* (again, not culture) as boundary making and marking. Perhaps most significantly, they increasingly attended to the relationships of those groups to other social wholes, the interactions of collective actors and their discourses.

Sociologists Tamotsu Shibutani (1955), Rue Bucher (1962), Anselm Strauss (1978), and Howard Becker (1982) then initiated explicit social worlds theory development – the high modern version of studies of social wholes. Social worlds (e.g., a recreation group, an occupation, a theoretical tradition) generate shared perspectives that then form the basis for collective action, while individual and collective identities are constituted through commitments to and participation in social worlds. Commitment was understood as both predisposition to act and as part of identity construction. Social worlds are *universes of discourse* and principal affiliative mechanisms through which people organize social life.

Strauss argued that each social world has at least one primary activity, particular sites, and a technology (inherited or innovative means of carrying out the social world’s activities) and, once underway, more formal organizations typically evolve to further one aspect or another of the world’s activities. People typically participate in a number of social worlds simultaneously

and such participation usually remains highly fluid. Becker asserted that *entrepreneurs*, deeply committed and active individuals, cluster around the core of the world and mobilize those around them. Shibutani viewed social worlds as identity and meaning making segments in mass society, drawing on distinctive aspects of mass culture, with individuals capable of participation in only a limited number of such worlds.

Every complex social world characteristically has *segments*, subdivisions or subworlds, shifting as patterns of commitment alter, reorganize, and realign (Bucher 1962; Baszanger 1998). Two or more worlds may intersect to form a new world, or one world may segment into two or more worlds. Larger *arenas* of concern are constituted of multiple social worlds focused on a given issue and prepared to act in some way, usually in struggles for power, authority, and legitimacy within that arena and beyond. In arenas, various issues are debated, negotiated, fought out, forced, and manipulated by representatives of the participating worlds and subworlds (Strauss 1978).

What this means methodologically is that, if one seeks to understand a particular social world, one must understand all the arenas in which that world participates and the other worlds in those arenas and the related discourses, as these are all mutually influential/constitutive of that world. The *boundaries* of social worlds may cross cut or be more or less contiguous with those of formal organizations. This fluidity and the action focus fundamentally distinguish social worlds theory from most organizations theory (Clarke 1991). Society as a whole, then, can be conceptualized as consisting of layered mosaics of social worlds, arenas, and their discourses.

As part of Chicago School interactionism, social worlds/arenas theory is a conflict theory. There typically exist intraworld differences as well as the more conventionally expected interworld differences of perspective, commitment, and inscribed attributes. For Strauss, *negotiations* of various kinds – persuasion, coercion, bartering, educating, discursively and otherwise repositioning, etc. – are strategies to deal with such conflicts and are routinely engaged. Strauss (1993) also called this *processual ordering* tive and emergent aspects of interaction.

Key sociological differences emerge when researchers focus on studying the social world's work activities, organization, and discourses rather than studying individuals or organizations. Placing work-action in the analytic foreground facilitates the analysis of social worlds qua worlds. Here social worlds and arenas become the units of analysis in studies of collective action and discourse.

There can also be *implicated actors* in a social world, actors silenced or only discursively present – constructed by others for their own purposes (Clarke 2005). This concept provides a means of analyzing the situatedness of less powerful actors and the consequences of others' actions for them, and raises issues of discursive constructions of actors. There are at least two kinds of implicated actors. First, there are those implicated actors who are physically present but are generally silenced, ignored, or made invisible by those in power in the social world or arena. Second, there are those implicated actors *not* physically present in a given social world but solely discursively constructed. They are conceived, represented, and perhaps targeted by the work of those others; hence, they are discursively present.

Star and Griesemer (1989) developed the concept of *boundary objects* for things that exist at junctures where varied social worlds meet in an arena of mutual concern. Boundary objects can be treaties among countries, software programs for users in different settings, and even concepts themselves. The object is “translated” to address the multiple specific needs or demands placed upon it by each of the different worlds involved. Boundary objects are often very important and hence can be sites of intense controversy and competition for the power to define them. The study of boundary objects can be an important pathway into often complicated situations, allowing the analyst to study the different social worlds through their distinctive relations with and discourses about the boundary object in question.

Drawing upon Bucher's (1962) insights, interactionists have examined fluidity and change within social worlds and arenas by extending social movements analysis to include studies of reform movements of various kinds undertaken by segments or subworlds within professions, disciplines, and work organizations.

Such reform movements can cut across whole arenas. Fujimura (1996), who studied the molecularization of biology, called such larger scale processes *handwagons*. In many arenas, reform movements have centered on processes of homogenization, standardization, and formal classifications – things that would organize and articulate the work of the social worlds in that arena in parallel ways (Bowker & Star 1999). (This contrasts with theories of organizational isomorphism.)

Extending Strauss's work on articulation, Fujimura (1996) introduced the concept of *doable problems*. Doable problems require successful alignment across several scales of work organization. In her example in science, this included (1) the experiment as a set of tasks; (2) the laboratory as a bundle of experiments and other administrative and professional tasks; and (3) the wider scientific social world as the work of laboratories, colleagues, sponsors, regulators, and other players all focused on the same family of problems. Doability is achieved by articulating alignment at all three scales simultaneously to meet the demands and constraints imposed: a problem must provide doable experiments, be feasible within the parameters of immediate constraints and opportunities in a given laboratory, and be viewed as worthwhile and supportable work within the larger scientific social world.

The concept of *staged intersections* – one shot or short term events in which multiple social worlds in the arena come together – is Garrity's (1998) particular contribution to social worlds/arenas theory. The key feature of staged intersections is that despite the fact that the same representatives of those worlds probably will never come together again, the events can be highly consequential for the future of all the social worlds involved, for the arena, and beyond. They can be what Strauss termed turning points in trajectories.

The social worlds/arenas framework has recently been used as the conceptual infrastructure of a new mode of grounded theory for qualitative research called situational analysis (Clarke 2005). Here, making maps of social worlds and their arenas is part of the data analysis, providing portraits of collective action at the meso level. The key analytic power of social worlds/arenas theory, so rooted in Chicago

social ecologies, is the elasticity of the various concepts to analyze at multiple levels of complexity.

SEE ALSO: Mesostructure; Networks; Public Realm; Reference Groups; Symbolic Interaction

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socialism

Lloyd Cox

Socialism refers to doctrines and practices sharing a pattern of family resemblances centered on collective property, social equality, cooperation, and communal forms of economic and political association. Beyond these shared attributes, socialism as doctrine and practice is characterized by immense diversity and competing claims to authenticity, which belie the frequent eliding of socialism with Marxism. This internal diversity was already present when the term was first used in English in the 1820s and in French and German in the 1830s, as well as in earlier political and religious movements that anticipated future socialist practices.

Although it is sometimes suggested that socialist forms of organization constituted the original human condition prior to the emergence of agriculture and urbanization in the Near East (8,000–10,000 BCE), the genealogy of socialism in its contemporary senses can be traced to early modern Europe. Early Christian inspired radical movements, such as the Levelers and especially the Diggers in seventeenth century England, and the Anabaptists in sixteenth and seventeenth century Central Europe, propounded ideas that had a clear socialist resonance, as did Babeuf during the French Revolution, with his “Conspiracy of the Equals.” Socialist ideas received a more systematic elaboration, however, in the works of three early nineteenth century thinkers – Claude Henri de Rouvroy, Comte de Saint Simon (1760–1825), François Charles Fourier (1772–1837), and Robert Owen (1771–1858).

While all three have routinely been grouped under the unifying label of “utopian socialist,” this tells us more about the mid nineteenth century reception of their ideas than it does about the distinctive content of their socialism. They all shared an antipathy to individualism, a desire to replace competition with cooperation, and a belief that a positive science of society and human nature was possible, which could be a guide to social organization. But they differed significantly over the concrete detail of the social forms that they advocated, how they could be realized, and the understandings of

human nature on which they were based. Saint Simon and Fourier rejected the Enlightenment view propounded by Rousseau and others that human nature, while inherently good, noble, and rational, had been corrupted by modern society in general and private property in particular. Instead, they argued that human nature was typified by fixed personality types, which could only be brought into more harmonious coexistence by cooperative social arrangements. By contrast, Owen endorsed the view that human nature was malleable and shaped by objective circumstances. The latter could and should, therefore, be arranged in ways that contribute to the perfectibility of humankind. Cooperation and solidarity should replace competition and individualism, thus ensuring human happiness and collective harmony. This vision was given practical effect in England in Owen's New Lanark textile mill and other cooperative communities that were established according to his principles.

Socialist ideas gained a more widespread currency in England, France, and the German speaking states during the 1830s and 1840s. Accelerated industrialization and urbanization, and the social problems that they brought in their wake, gave rise to various radical movements for social reform and transformation. These included early working class organizations, cooperative movements, trade unions, and Chartism, plus a range of anti modernist groupings that sought refuge in projects for the reconstruction of premodern communalism. It was in this milieu of social and political ferment that Marx and Engels began developing their distinctive brand of what Engels would later refer to as "scientific socialism."

Marx and Engels did not begin their intellectual careers as socialists, much less communists. Their early anti clerical, radical democratic politics only gave way to a more explicitly socialist position with the elaboration of a distinctive perspective on history, capitalism, and class. According to the materialist conception of history, history involves the progressive unfolding of distinct stages, each defined by a dominant set of production relations. Revolutionary transformations of society had in the past, Marx and Engels contended, always resulted in the emergence of new class divided societies, but on a more advanced material plane. It was only with

the advent of capitalism, and its relentless drive to improve labor productivity through technological innovation and intensified exploitation of the modern proletariat, that the material and political preconditions for socialism were laid.

Marx famously declined to systematically outline any blueprints for the socialist future that he envisaged. He was not, he once wrote, in the business of writing recipes for the kitchens of the future. Nevertheless, passages scattered in his political writings offer important insights into his views on socialism and the transition from capitalism to socialism. In his reflections on *The Class Struggles in France, 1848–1850*, for example, he concluded that the abolition of capitalism would necessitate a transitional political form that he labeled as the "dictatorship of the proletariat." In the immediate aftermath of capitalism's overthrow, Marx reasoned, the new proletarian ruling class would need to exercise power ruthlessly over all other classes whose actions and interests threatened a return to the old social order. But it could not do so by simply claiming the capitalist state machinery as its own. This had to be destroyed and replaced by state institutions of a new type.

The Paris Commune of 1871 – where for over two months Parisian workers seized power in the French capital – offered Marx a rare glimpse of the institutions that might constitute such a new state type. In particular, he endorsed the Commune's fledgling efforts to overcome the capitalist division between political and economic life. This was manifested in universal suffrage and the election of workers to local and national delegations of workers' deputies, which combined executive, legislative, and judicial functions. These representatives were to be accountable and recallable at short notice, and to be paid no more than the workers whom they represented. They would contribute to the administration of a society in which the means of production was taken into common ownership, where the hierarchy of bureaucratic ranks and privileges within the state was abolished, and where the standing army was to be replaced by a national workers' militia with short terms of service.

The other main source for Marx's ideas on post capitalist society is his *Critique of the Gotha Programme*, written in 1875 but not published until 1891. In it, Marx criticized the

program that came out of the conference that unified the two main wings of German socialism. Here he made a distinction between a first (lower) and second (higher) phase of communism, a distinction that later came to be recognized as one between socialism and communism. In the first phase, society would remain stamped with its capitalist origins, including the residues of class relations and attitudes. As such, this transitional stage would be one in which a state was still necessary to ensure proletarian rule, while the distribution of the social product would be in accordance with labor expended rather than differentiated individual needs – a right of inequality given the unequal endowment and needs of individual workers. With the further development of the productive forces and the transcendence of the last vestiges of capitalism, the state would wither away and social need would become the main criterion determining distribution in the higher phase of communism. All of this could only be accomplished if an initial national proletarian revolution was internationalized.

In the decades following Marx's death in 1883, his particular brand of socialism was the subject of fierce controversies both within and outside socialist circles. From the outside, Max Weber and other liberals criticized what they viewed as the illiberal implications of socialism in general and Marxism in particular. For Weber, socialism would entail an accentuation of the worst bureaucratic features of modernity. It would remove competing sources of authority within society, concentrating all power in the hands of state officials. In so doing, individual autonomy would be severely curtailed, and the key mechanisms ensuring economic dynamism under capitalism – interfirm competition and entrepreneurial initiative – would be removed. The result would be human servility combined with economic stagnation, tendencies of socialism that many liberals after Weber viewed as being confirmed by the history of the Soviet Union and all other societies created in its image. Socialism was, as the title of Hayek's book would later assert, *The Road to Serfdom* (1944).

The nature of socialism and the means by which it could be realized were also key areas of debate within socialist movements. In Germany in the 1890s, this took the form of the so called

“revisionist” controversy between defenders of Marxist orthodoxy and those who argued that the Social Democratic Party's theory had to be revised to bring it into line with its reformist practice, and with the changed conditions of contemporary capitalism. Eduard Bernstein, the key advocate of revisionism, claimed that many of the defining propositions of orthodoxy had been falsified by economic and political developments. In particular, the increased dispersal of property ownership through the growth of joint stock companies, the rise of state led social insurance that ameliorated the conditions and insecurities of workers, and the growing parliamentary influence of organized labor all contributed to social improvements that obviated the need for socialist revolution. Rather, socialism could and should be realized through the movement of incremental reforms, pursued through parliaments, which improved the lot of workers in the present rather than through a violent revolution in search of an uncertain utopian future.

This pragmatic, social reform oriented socialism was not confined to Germany. It found its corollaries in progressivism in the United States, laborism in Australasia, the establishment of reformist socialist parties in France and Italy, and Fabianism in Britain (under whose direct influence Bernstein had come while living in England). Fabianism had emerged in the 1880s, and found(ed) an institutional embodiment and medium for its ideas through the establishment of the Fabian Society and the London School of Economics. The Fabian Society was the prototypical left wing think tank, and went on to become affiliated to the British Labour Party. Its principal early figures included George Bernard Shaw and Sydney and Beatrice Webb, for whom systematic social research provided a means of illuminating and publicizing poverty and disadvantage, which could then be addressed through state sanctioned social reforms. As such, they pioneered the traditions of sociologically informed public policy, and public policy inspired sociology, which came to inseparably link sociology and socialism in the minds of many politicians, scholars, and lay people.

During their travels around the turn of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, Sydney and Beatrice Webb had been particularly impressed

by the social reforms that they encountered in the seven British colonies that were on the verge of becoming the national states of Australia and New Zealand. They were not the only ones. The French socialist Albert Meitin had written in glowing terms of Australasia's pragmatic *Socialism Without Doctrines*, while the American socialist Henry Damerest Lloyd had espoused a "New Zealandization of the world," in reaction to industrial and social arrangements that he viewed as exemplary. Such observers were expressing an enthusiasm for institutions and reforms that in their eyes established "already existing socialism" long before that phrase had been coined. State led industrial arbitration and conciliation systems, relatively high wages for workers, early suffrage for women, and the beginnings of a social safety net in the form of invalid and old age benefits were just some of the innovations that fired the socialist imagination.

The early formation of mass workers' parties in Australasia's white settler societies contrasted with their absence in the US. It was not so much that socialism was absent in the US – Edward Bellamy, progressivism, the Industrial Workers of the World (Wobblies), and the American Socialist Party itself confirm that socialist doctrines and practice were very much present in the US in the decades before World War I – as that it failed to find expression in the formation of a mass workers' party. Consequently, Sombart's question as to why socialism fails in the US retains its relevance today. Many answers have been proffered. These include ones emphasizing the dominant individualistic ethos in the US, born of the necessity of self reliance in a frontier society; the greater opportunities for upward mobility than was the case in Europe; the damaging consequences of slavery and its political epilogue on working class solidarity; the greater religiosity of the US population, with their contempt for socialist atheism; the militancy and effectiveness of US economic and political elites in suppressing many forms of collectivism; and the association of socialism with the immigrant Central Eastern European intellectuals and workers who were early propagandists and agitators for socialism. As was often lamented, socialism failed to "Americanize." This was exacerbated by the Bolshevik Revolution and its aftermath.

The seizure and consolidation of state power in Russia by the Bolsheviks in and after 1917 was pivotal to the subsequent history of international socialism. Its consequences were several. First, the USSR came to be associated with socialism per se, by both supporters and critics of the new regime. Supporters argued that the socialization of the main means of production, the subordination of market mechanisms to central planning, and the state's monopoly over foreign trade and domestic finance were the sources of rapid industrialization from the early 1930s and a growing equality of consumption. Critics, on the other hand, suggested that this was fanciful reasoning as it ignored the basic facts of bureaucratization, continued inequality, growing political repression, and the extinction of democracy, all of which discredited the very idea of socialism. Second, the Russian Revolution was significant in that it was instrumental in establishing (in 1919) an organization ostensibly committed to world socialist revolution – the Third or Communist International. The Comintern came to dominate communist parties around the world (for which the histories of the French, Italian, Spanish, and Greek communist parties, for example, bear ample witness), with the latter being increasingly subordinated to the needs of Soviet foreign and domestic policy. This was bound up with the third critical consequence of Soviet power for socialism, namely, that the Soviet Union helped to establish a series of regimes in its own image in Eastern Europe. These came to be equated with "already existing socialism," an ideologically defined political bloc that constituted one part of the Cold War structural divide. Finally, Soviet power was significant for socialism insofar as it was the site for the elaboration and practice of "socialism in one country," which Stalin developed from the mid 1920s, and which can be viewed as a key episode in the marriage of socialism with nationalism.

During the decades of decolonization after World War II, this coupling of socialism with nationalism would become a central feature of so called third world socialism, from China and Vietnam to Nicaragua and Cuba. In Cuba, for instance, what had in the main been an anti imperialist, nationalist movement, combining sectors of the national bourgeoisie, intelligentsia, workers, and the peasantry within a popular front for national liberation (July 26

Movement), moved increasingly leftward under the pressure of internal and external circumstance. By the early 1960s, Castro had nationalized the commanding heights of the Cuban economy, implemented central planning and a radical program of land reform, and consolidated one party rule, albeit one that had greater popular support than the ruling regimes of Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union itself. This support was at least in part built on the social successes of Castro's regime. Despite a crippling US economic blockade, which has still not been lifted, Cuba established itself as a leader amongst Latin American countries in terms of health, education, and other social indicators. The 1991 collapse of the Soviet Union and hence Soviet support, however, has jeopardized these achievements.

On the other side of the Cold War divide, the Keynesian inspired welfare states of Scandinavia, Western Europe, and Australasia provided the main modernist alternatives to Soviet style socialism. Premised on Keynesian countercyclical demand management, economic nationalism, a commitment to full employment, political pluralism, and a significant degree of decommodification in the provision of social services, the welfare state blurred the boundaries between capitalism and socialism. For a time, it seemed that the five great evils of modern society that Beveridge identified in 1940s Britain – want, ignorance, squalor, disease, and idleness – could be transcended by the judicious application of social(ist) policy within what remained essentially capitalist economies. The relative economic and political success of that model, combined with its redistributive potential, was reflected in its widespread endorsement on the left and toleration on the right. Market socialism, or socialism with markets, became the dominant model advocated by a generation of democratic socialists in the three decades following World War II.

But the welfare state was not without its detractors. These became more vociferous from the early 1970s, with the emergence of stagflation and increased social and industrial unrest in the heartlands of modern welfare capitalism. Marxists argued that the welfare state contributed to the economic, political, and ideological reproduction of capitalism without significantly mitigating inequality or exploitation. At the

same time, it enhanced the state's surveillance over the working class, thus constituting a powerful instrument of social control. The "welfare" state remained essentially a capitalist state, pseudo socialism at best, despite what Marxists would acknowledge were progressive social reforms. Socialist feminists are similarly skeptical of the welfare state's socialist credentials. They point to the implicit gendered assumptions on which many welfare policies are based, not least of which are family and work policies frequently aimed at manipulating female fertility in the cause of particular demographic outcomes. Moreover, they are clear that the welfare state has had very different outcomes for middle class and working class women, typically enhancing the welfare of the former while functioning as a mechanism of social monitoring and control over the latter. For socialist feminists, socialism will only retain a progressive content and promise if it is based on an understanding of the patriarchal forms on which modern capitalism is founded.

The other main critique of the modern welfare state is as much a criticism of socialism and collectivism more generally. From the 1970s through to the new century, a resurgent economic liberalism affirmed the economic and political bankruptcy of the welfare state and socialism. Socialism in all of its variants was regarded as being inherently predisposed to economic stagnation, and restricting of human liberty. The collapse of eastern bloc state socialism in the early 1990s was presented as confirmation of this diagnosis, with an end of socialism and end of history triumphalism marking sociological and political discussion in the last decade of the twentieth century. Capitalism was now the only game in town, and debate would revolve around the forms that it should take rather than an alternative to it.

This triumphalism was the corollary of and contributor to the contemporary "crisis of socialism," which much of the left has bemoaned for the past two decades. While this crisis is real enough, being felt in the spheres of institutions, theory, and practice, there are fledgling signs of socialist renewal. Most importantly, socialist ideas and ideals have infused much of the anti globalization and environmentalist movements that have grown in recent years. Regardless, it is clear that the problems of social inequality,

injustice, and deprivation that gave rise to socialism in the first place are still with us, which makes it premature to eulogize the death of socialism.

SEE ALSO: Anarchism; Capitalism; Citizenship; Communism; Decolonization; Engels, Friedrich; Environmental Movements; Global Justice as a Social Movement; Individualism; Laborism; Marx, Karl; Nationalism; Property, Private; Revolutions, Sociology of; Socialist Feminism; Socialist Medicine; Utopia

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socialist feminism

Ann Cronin

Socialist feminism, which draws on aspects of Marxist feminism and radical feminism, emerged in the 1970s as a possible solution to the limitations of existing feminist theory. While

Marxist feminism cites capitalism as the cause of women's oppression, radical feminism argues that women are oppressed through the system of patriarchy. Marxist feminism has been criticized for its inability to explain women's oppression outside of the logic of capitalism, and radical feminism for producing a universalistic, biologically based account of women's oppression, which pays insufficient attention to pat- terned differences between women. Socialist feminism attempts to overcome these problems through the production of historically situated accounts of women's oppression that focus on both capitalism and patriarchy.

In Mitchell's (1975) psychoanalytic model, capitalism – the economic system – is allocated to the material level; patriarchy – the rule of law – is allocated to the ideological level and assumed to operate at an unconscious level. While Eisenstein (1984) retains Mitchell's conceptualization of capitalism, she reassigns patriarchy to the conscious cultural level and dismisses any distinction between the two, leading to the term “capitalist patriarchy.” In contrast, Hartmann (1979) produces a materialist understanding of patriarchy and capitalism as two distinct but interactive systems which center on men's exploitation of women's labor. Challenging Eisenstein's single system theory, Hartmann states that patriarchy predates capitalism and exists beyond its boundaries; thus, it is inappropriate to regard them in terms of a single system.

The allocation of patriarchy to either the material, cultural, or ideological level does not permit an analysis of the pervasive nature of patriarchal structures across all three levels. Simultaneously, it assumes that all social structures can be reduced to the workings of either capitalism or patriarchy, whilst assuming there is a symbiotic relationship between the two. A focus on paid work dismisses radical feminist concerns with sexuality and violence.

Walby's (1990) dual systems approach attempts to overcome these problems through a historically and socially defined understanding of patriarchy as a system of six interrelated structures (paid work; household production; culture; sexuality; violence; the state), which in contemporary society are in articulation with capitalism and racism. This model enables Walby to chart the dynamic nature of patriarchy

over the last 150 years, including the move from a private to a public form of patriarchy.

SEE ALSO: Feminism; Gender Ideology and Gender Role Ideology; Liberal Feminism; Patriarchy; Psychoanalytic Feminism; Radical Feminism; Socialism

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socialist medicine

Mark G. Field

The term socialist medicine applies to a health care delivery system designed to provide preventive, diagnostic, clinical, rehabilitative, educational, and custodial services to a designated population free of charge at the time of the service. The prototype of socialist medicine is also known as Soviet socialized medicine.

At a time when health care is being recognized as a basic human right, Soviet socialist medicine has often been cited as a model for the universal provision of health care. The nature and structure of Soviet socialist medicine reflected the ideological and political orientation of the Soviet regime. There were two major ideas underlying the health care system of the former Soviet Union. One was that illness and premature mortality were primarily the product of a flawed system (capitalism) and its exploitation of the working class. This exploitation exposed workers to a series of pathogenic

elements that affected their health and well being: poor pay, child labor, long working hours, miserable housing conditions, inadequate nutrition, and a noxious social environment (Engels 1958). Thus, capitalism was indicted as the major etiological factor in illness and early death. Only socialism (and eventually communism) would eliminate the sources of most socially caused ill health.

The second idea was that the provision of health care under capitalism meant that workers were, in most instances, deprived of access to such care because they could not afford it. The removal of that payment by the patient meant the elimination of the barrier to health care. Under socialist medicine, it was society (i.e., the polity) that would henceforth shoulder the responsibility for the provision of health services to the entire population. The Soviet Union was the first country in the world to promise universal and free health services as a constitutional right (Sigerist 1937, 1947). This would also permit physicians to stop being engaged in a "commercial" transaction and enable them to treat patients without being fettered with questions of money. By the same token, hospital and other health institutions would also offer free services at the expense of the state. The promise of gratuitous and universal (though not necessarily equal) medical care to the entire nation was one of the few redeeming factors of an otherwise bleak totalitarian regime. It was often held as an example to emulate worldwide, and served as important propaganda for use at home and abroad.

The term used in the Constitution for health care is *zdravookhranenie*, a Russian language combination of two words meaning health and protection, a duality already visible in Greek mythology. Aesculapius, the God of Medicine, had two quarrelsome daughters, Hygiea and Panacea. Hygiea was the goddess of health through healthy living (thus of prevention and preservation). Panacea was the goddess of cure, but eventually the demand for Panacea's services grew so much as to exceed her capacity to help everyone and soon outstripped many people's ability to obtain needed services.

The history of Soviet socialist medicine can be divided into two phases. In the first ten years after the revolution of 1917, the ideology of Hygiea and Marxism prevailed. The basic

assumption, noted above, was that the establishment of socialism, and eventually communism, would eliminate most sources of illness and early death through an overall improvement in the living and working conditions of the workers, and eventually the entire population. The situation changed radically after Stalin assumed total power at the end of the 1920s and launched a massive program of industrialization and militarization, domestically financed primarily through enforced savings at the expense of the population (particularly the peasantry). Under these circumstances, an improvement of the standard of living of the population gave way to the transformation of the economy. Panacea took over with the responsibility of treating the population to ensure the maximum productivity and military strength. The principle of free care at the time of service, however, remained in force. It was accompanied by a rapid increase in the number of physicians (mostly women) and an expansion of medical facilities, as well as a gradual stratification in health care according to rank, residence, or occupation (Field 1957).

Health personnel at all levels became state salaried employees. It was therefore not an insurance scheme in which subscribers paid a "dedicated" premium to reimburse physicians and hospitals. It was not an indemnity scheme, a copayment or deductible arrangement, nor a private, religious, or charitable organization. It became a state public service, just like education in most countries. Furthermore, the concept of the physician as an autonomous professional practitioner was not part of socialist medicine, nor was there a corporate body of professionals able to politically influence the state or legislation (Jones 1991). The education of health personnel, at all levels, was carried out in state funded schools, the hospitals were financed by the state, and medical and related research was carried out in state supported institutes. Health and related services became a responsibility of the polity (Field 1967).

The Soviet scheme of socialist medicine was meant to serve both the state and the population; in theory the development of the health care system was integrated with the planning of the economy. What this meant was a high degree of control over the whole area of health care, implemented through a large and centralized

bureaucratic machine headed by the Ministry of Health Protection USSR, itself under the control of the Communist Party, the supreme ruling organization of the Soviet Union. Under the national ministry, counterpart ministries in the constituent republics, and health departments down to the local levels of the governmental structure were responsible for health matters in their jurisdictional areas. Each unit of the health system was under the dual authority of the ministry (vertical control) and the corresponding governmental units (horizontal control). In general, the ministry and its units provided instructions and suggestions, and the health departments determined the tasks for their area of responsibility and received financial (tax generated) support from their corresponding governmental unit.

The health care system was so organized that, in theory, every person knew where to turn for initial or primary care. There were basically two general networks of health institutions, plus a series of departmental or special establishments to serve specific segments of the population, leading in essence to a differentiated health care system reflecting the stratification of Soviet society.

Access to primary health care was provided to the general population on a *territorial* basis in outpatient polyclinics, and an *occupational* one. In the first case, it was the individual's home address that determined the outpatient polyclinic and the physician(s) to whom he or she was assigned. That polyclinic was the portal of entry into the health care system. There was thus little or no choice of physician or facility. In the second case, industrial organizations had their own physicians and facilities (the larger the unit, the more sophisticated its medical system) and workers were assigned to health care and to a physician on the basis of their department or shop. Outpatient clinics were affiliated with hospitals where individuals could be referred. In most urban areas, a system of emergency services was established with ambulances that could be summoned with a telephone call. The population in the countryside, by contrast, was in general poorly serviced; in many instances the primary caregiver was a *feldsher*, or physician assistant, not a physician.

In addition to the two above mentioned networks, there were departmental health care

systems that serviced a specific organization, for example the armed forces, railroads, research institutes, and even department stores. Finally, there was a special set of high quality special medical institutions reserved for the members of the elites and their families, the quality and the amenities of these institutions depending on the rank of the individual, and headed by the Kremlin Medical Unit. A promotion or demotion was accompanied by a change in one's medical category.

The ideological justification (or rationalization) for inequality was that in a period of scarcity determined by the "building of socialism," medical care was universal but available on a priority basis determined by the importance of the role of the individual. Only under far distant communism would all people be treated equally, medically or otherwise.

The idea that society was responsible for the health of its members was, in itself, a progressive one, and an expression of social solidarity. The Soviet Union was, as mentioned above, a pioneer in this matter. But health care was so interwoven with the fabric of Soviet society that it suffered some of the same general problems that led to the collapse of the Soviet Union.

The provision of financial support on the part of the polity to operate and manage all aspects of health care is a double edged sword: on the one hand, it can be considered as positive, since society has the power to appropriate funds for any purposes it chooses. On the other hand, what the state giveth it also taketh away. The financing of health care then becomes part of national priorities, a "line item" that must compete with many other demands, especially, in the Soviet case, national defense. In times of crisis, or change of priorities, health care is often underfunded in the light of more pressing needs, particularly since it does not produce material wealth but, on the contrary, absorbs resources. The funding of health care was often based on what the Soviets themselves called the *residual principle*; after all the line items had been taken care of, whatever was left went to health. And that was clearly insufficient. At the time the USSR broke down, it is estimated it received about 2 percent of the gross national product, down from the 6 percent it enjoyed 30 years earlier. The impact on services and health facilities and upon vital indices was catastrophic.

Health personnel in general were poorly paid, often less than regular industrial workers. Medicine was not a prestigious occupation, and its heavy feminization in a sexist society kept its status low. There was little incentive or competition among personnel, since the rewards remained the same regardless of quality, depending primarily on seniority (Knaus 1981). Because of the poor remuneration, patients often felt compelled to bribe health personnel either before the service (particularly in surgery) or after, to show gratitude and ensure future attention. Individuals, as noted, could not make a *dedicated* contribution, such as an insurance premium, that gave them a personal stake or guarantee for better care or attention. The health care system became heavily centralized, bureaucratized, subject to corruption, and rigid in responding to emergencies (as in the case of Chernobyl). In addition, the bureaucratic element often seeped into the physician-patient relationship.

The low priority given to the rural population, as a rule, meant very poor quality of health care for the peasantry. Efforts on the part of the regime to assign doctors to the countryside were often unsuccessful because the law stipulated that spouses should not be separated, and since most doctors were women, they were able to escape the assignment.

The lack of adequate funding meant that most health facilities lacked maintenance, equipment, supplies, and in the countryside, even running water. Patients often had to bring their own food, medications, sheets, blankets, and even in some instances, X ray films. Pharmaceuticals were often in short supply or not available.

The Soviet system emphasized quantitative indices at the expense of quality. For example, hospitals were financed according to the number of beds, so that "beds" were added without the necessary infrastructure, and in buildings inappropriate for medical care.

Soviet socialist medicine broke down when the Soviet Union collapsed. Cuba is the only country that has such a system at the beginning of the twenty first century. In short, the Soviet environment did not provide the necessary support for socialist medicine as originally conceived. Verdict: noble purpose, grandiose scheme, inadequate financing, flawed execution, mixed results.

SEE ALSO: Communism; Health Care Delivery Systems; Socialism; Socialized Medicine

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socialization

Sal Zerilli

The concept of socialization figures prominently in sociology, underlying many of the discipline's major claims about the nature of society and social relations. Sociologists have

used socialization to examine the possibility of society, the nature of social order, the reproduction of social organization, the formation of personal identities, and mechanisms of social control and deviance. The concept has also played an important role in studies of families, schools, professions, organizations, peer groups, and subcultures. In general terms, socialization is a generic concept embracing the ways people acquire the general competencies required for participation in society. At the societal level, socialization helps explain how and the extent to which large numbers of individuals come successfully to cooperate and adapt to the demands of social life (Long & Hadden 1985). At the organizational level, it summarizes processes by which newcomers to social groups and organizations are transformed from outsiders to participating members. At the personal level, it refers to the social and cultural shaping and development of the mental, emotional, and behavioral abilities of individuals.

Sociology's major conceptions of socialization have shifted over time. At the turn of the twentieth century, sociologists employed the concept to address the Hobbesian question of how social order is possible given the egoistic, asocial nature of individuals (Wentworth 1980). This understanding of socialization was crystallized in prominent early conceptions of socialization as the channeling and molding of human nature into a collective unity. Socialization was seen generally at this time as the transmutation of naturally independent beings into social creatures. This way of thinking was eventually superseded by an understanding of socialization as the individual's internalization of the social and cultural constituents of the self. This dominant formula of socialization as internalization helped render questions of human nature marginal to sociological interests in the subject. Sociologists have generally come to believe that social and cultural processes permeate, even constitute, the minds and bodies of individuals. Wentworth (1980) argues that sociological thought on socialization over the last 50 years has focused almost exclusively on the social aspects of individuals, and that sociologists have tended to frame these as fully constituted by society and culture. Today, sociologists regularly argue that socialization is how the individual becomes fully human or a "person."

Sociology offers three main theoretical orientations to socialization: a functional, an interactional, and a critical perspective. Structural functionalists such as Talcott Parsons and Robert Merton view socialization as a process of role learning by which people come to adopt prescribed orientations to life which limit the ends to which they may aspire, as well as the means they can use to achieve them. Parsons claimed that role learning was society's primary mechanism for integrating individuals into the patterns of interaction that constitute the major institutions of society. From this perspective, socialization is essentially the imprinting of cultural patterns on the personalities of individuals, or how society inculcates in its members the skills and orientations required for participation in social life. As such, successfully socialized individuals learn to function in society by interacting with others in accordance with the social roles and positions they occupy. This is a deep process leading people to treat external value standards and norms as definitive and expressive of their identity. The functionalist position was heavily influenced by Durkheim's theory of society and Freud's model of internalization. This position has declined steadily in prominence since its heyday in the 1950s and 1960s. Its influence can still be detected in the tendency of sociologists to equate socialization with the internalization of elements of society and culture, and through continuing sociological interests in role learning.

Structural functionalism has been criticized for exaggerating society's control over individuals and for portraying people as utterly passive recipients of social influence. The symbolic interactionist perspective leans in the opposite direction by emphasizing the individual's active role in the socialization process. Symbolic interactionism traces its lineage to pragmatist philosophers such as George Herbert Mead and John Dewey, and sociologists of the Chicago School such as Herbert Blumer and Everett Hughes. For symbolic interactionists, the crux of socialization is the formation of self concepts in the context of social relationships mediated by shared symbols. Selves are said to emerge and develop as individuals mutually construct versions of reality through communicative processes based on shared symbols, especially language. By learning how to communicate with

shared meanings and symbols, individuals come to incorporate the responses of others into their actions and self understandings. Selves emerge and develop as individuals gain experience of (1) imagining their own demeanor from the standpoint of others, (2) interpreting and evaluating these perceptions in the light of shared attitudes, and (3) adjusting their actions accordingly. Interactionists hold that people do not automatically internalize or respond to others' perceptions, attitudes, and understandings, but rather have the ability to evaluate and select from them. There are many strands of symbolic interactionism in contemporary sociology. Taken together, they exert a significant influence on sociological understandings of socialization.

Symbolic interactionism and structural functionalism have been criticized for underplaying the role of power and inequality in social life. Though they offer different perspectives on the process, critical orientations to socialization in sociology, such as Marxism and feminist theory, are unified by deep concerns with power imbalances in society and the reproduction of structures of inequality. Proponents of these perspectives generally agree that socialization is a primary mechanism of social control. Pierre Bourdieu's critical view of socialization has gained prominence in contemporary sociology. For Bourdieu, socialization is the acquisition of "habitus," which he characterizes as individuals becoming deeply habituated to the customary ways of behaving, thinking, and feeling common to other members of their social worlds. The process is one in which members who share similar positions in society inculcate in each other deeply ingrained patterns of subjective adjustments to external social conditions. For example, Bourdieu and Passeron argue in *Reproduction in Education, Society, and Culture* (1977) that schools institutionalize, honor, and transmit the cultural values and knowledge of the dominant classes in society. As a result, the background experiences and knowledge acquired by working class students through family socialization (i.e., their habitus) do not translate easily into academic success. Many of these students adjust their aspirations and self conceptions in the light of the obstacles these dynamics present to them in school. Their resulting poor performances and withdrawal from school culture not only serve to powerfully inhibit their chances of

upward mobility, but also reinforce widespread acquiescence to economic subordination. In this way, the schools play a fundamental role in the reproduction of class inequalities. Bourdieu's ideas have found a receptive audience in contemporary sociology and exert a wide influence in many fields, most notably in studies of education in poor and working class communities.

Many disciplines share sociology's interest in socialization. Perhaps the most influential of these fields has been Freudian psychoanalysis. The classic Freudian model of socialization posits a civilizing process at odds with human nature. The process is one in which the innate sexual urges and aggressive drives of humans are tamed and channeled into socially acceptable forms of conduct and ways of thinking. For example, Freud argues in *Civilization and its Discontents* (1961) that social forces work to transform the individual's raw drive for sexual gratification into feelings of warmth and affection for others. These same forces also redirect the individual's natural aggressiveness towards others back on himself in the form of a self disciplining, guilt dispensing conscience. The individual's personality develops from the manner in which she manages the resulting internal conflict between natural drives and internalized social inhibitions. Psychological defense mechanisms (e.g., sublimation) play a critical part in socialization and personality formation insofar as they enable individuals to satisfy natural urges in socially approved ways. The classic Freudian model of socialization stresses how the locus of moral regulation of action is transferred from society to the self through the individual's internalization of external authority. Many contemporary psychoanalysts subscribe to object relations theories which shift the theoretical focus from the social channeling of natural drives to people's need for relatedness to others, as well as the manner in which people develop the internal imagery of self, other, and relationship of self to others that guide them through life.

Freudian ideas exerted a deep influence on anthropological understandings of socialization (Singer 1961). In the 1920s, anthropologists influenced by psychoanalysis began to examine the cultural antecedents of individual personalities (Clausen 1968). Prior to this period, anthropologists paid relatively little attention

to the relationship between personality and culture, favoring instead factual surveys of the characteristics of given cultures in and of themselves (Bidney 1967). The psychoanalytic impetus inspired many anthropologists to examine how culture stamps itself on individuals, how individuals internalize cultural elements, and how the personality develops from this enculturation process (Wentworth 1980). Well known examples of anthropology's culture and personality orientation include Malinowski's *Sex and Repression in Savage Society* (1927), Mead's *Coming of Age in Samoa* (1928), and Benedict's *Patterns of Culture* (1934). Many contemporary anthropologists forgo questions of personality development while maintaining the discipline's quintessential concern with how distinctive patterns of culture are preserved, understood, and transmitted across generations. Much of the work on socialization in cultural anthropology is steeped in a social constructionist paradigm that rejects psychoanalysis in favor of studying how people transmit and acquire meanings, practices, and methods of reality construction, as well as the ecological, institutional, and economic forces impinging on these processes.

Psychologists have generated an array of orientations to socialization, most of which emphasize aspects of individual development. Cognitive psychologists such as Piaget (1926) and Kohlberg (1981) envision socialization as a process of development in which new experiences spur the individual to move through qualitatively distinct stages of cognitive and moral growth. For behavioral psychologists, socialization is the learning of patterns of behavior through conditioning or through regular participation in recurring interactional activities such as observing and imitating (Bandura and Walters 1963). Blending behavioral psychology and psychoanalysis, many personality psychologists contend that the individual's personality is firmly established in early life through behavioral reinforcements and punishments (Zigler et al. 1982). Cultural psychologists such as Vygotsky (1978) and Bruner (1990) view socialization as an ongoing interplay between culture and cognition in which people internalize aspects of their sociocultural environments, giving many aspects of the mind cultural origins. Psychological thought on socialization has

generally been limited to childrearing and child development and specifically focused on direct encounters between children and major agents of socialization (Slaughter DeFoe 1994).

Sociological research on socialization is organized around substantive domains, such as families, schools, media, and work. Much of this research frames socialization as a mediating process between self, social organization, and broader social conditions.

Families, especially parents, are often framed as principal agents of socialization. Family socialization has often been conceptualized as children learning their parents' beliefs, values, worldviews, and behaviors. Some researchers argue that families serve as seedbeds of a child's basic orientations to society, and that parental social attitudes serve as powerful predictors of children's attitudes throughout life. Families are also seen as important sites for socialization into social identities. Many researchers suggest that children learn to conceptualize themselves in gendered, religious, political, racial, and class terms in and through routine interactions with parents, siblings, and members of the extended family. Feminist scholars argue persuasively that family socialization into traditional gender roles is pervasive and harmful to boys and girls, and detrimental to gender relations in democratic societies. Increasingly, sociologists are concerned with the implications of changing family forms for child development. Some researchers who compare children raised by single parents or stepfamilies to children raised by "both original parents" suggest that socialization in single parent families and stepfamilies is generally disadvantageous for children (McLanahan 1999). This is a hotly debated issue, in and out of sociology.

Studies of socialization in educational settings tend to highlight how socialization extends beyond the official academic curriculum. School settings provide many students with their earliest encounters with institutional evaluations of their competencies as people, sometimes with significant effects on their self conceptions. A prominent theme here is that teachers' expectations of students' academic growth exert a powerful influence on the intellectual gains students actually make. Schools are also known to place students into evaluative categories that affect the way teachers treat students and how

students treat each other. Such labels not only inform the self concepts of children, they also help students to draw distinctions between themselves along several lines, including racial, class, and gender lines. Scholars have shown how even routine activities in schools, such as line formations and teasing, can reinforce gender stereotypes and inequalities. A body of research influenced by Bourdieu holds that social class positions are reproduced in the way schools value or devalue the cultural and economic backgrounds of students. Some have argued that schools train poor children for low status jobs by emphasizing respect for authority, conformity, and submissiveness. The hierarchical and disciplinary nature of social relations in schools is thought to replicate the division of labor in the economy, with the effect of schools training compliant workers for job markets. Poor and working class students have also been shown to develop cultures of resistance that reflect and reinforce class inequalities. Recently, scholars have argued that race, class, gender, and culture interact in educational settings in subtle ways that lead students to reproduce in their own lives the objective conditions they face in society (MacLeod 1995).

People acquire much of their knowledge of the social world from mass media. Some theorists argue that the images and information disseminated by media overpower people's conceptions of reality to the point of obliterating distinctions between fact and fiction. People's relationship to "reality" is said to be fundamentally altered by the mediating images of television, cinema, Internet, and print media. A prominent theme suggests that consumption of television, magazines, and music reinforces unrealistic, negative, or stereotypical images of gender, sexuality, race, and ethnicity. Many scholars suggest that frequent media use leads men and women to develop distorted, often unhealthy, images of their own bodies and selves, as well as the bodies and selves of others. Research on television viewing patterns suggests that children not only learn values, attitudes, and behaviors by watching television, but that they also imitate many of these televised behaviors. Some scholars argue that images of violence lead some viewers to become aggressive and violent themselves. Alternatively, research on computer technologies suggests that they can

serve as liberating resources for self socialization, enabling children and adults to more freely experiment with alternative versions of their personal identity. Another way media affects socialization is by serving as surrogates for face to face interaction. The full implications of this apparent decentering of face to face interaction in social life remains unclear and under studied. Some scholars examining socialization and learning in complex organizations speculate that new communication technologies present “ontological barriers” to the teaching and learning of tacit and embodied knowledge.

One exception to the discipline’s tendency to focus on children in socialization studies is the research on professional socialization and work setting socialization, which focuses on adults. Research on professional socialization highlights how adults learn the skills and knowledge required for both the professional roles they hope to eventually assume and the current demands of the role of apprentice. A body of research shows how, in helping one another cope with the demands of the student role, peers undergoing professional socialization collectively regulate, even block and minimize, the influence of socialization on themselves. The research on adult socialization into work roles and workplaces emphasizes how individuals change from outsiders to participating members of organizations. This transition is often portrayed as an intense process of resocialization during which individuals are pressured not only to learn the new demands of the job, but to relinquish many of the attitudes, values, and behaviors they acquired in previous settings. This research also indicates that work has pervasive effects on the adult’s emotional, intellectual, and psychological functioning and identity. Longitudinal studies suggest that occupational experiences lead to broad changes in psychological functioning and personality over time. Sociologists also portray professional socialization as a long process connected to innovations in technology and market dynamics that push working adults to hold a variety of jobs during their careers.

Two public debates about the implications of societal change for socialization beg for more attention from sociologists. First, sociologists recognize how emerging technologies are reshaping many aspects of how people relate to

each other, but more research is needed on the affects of new media and computer technologies on child socialization. Second, although sociologists pay considerable attention to societal changes in family formations, they have conducted comparatively few studies of the long range implications of social changes in families for personal development. A more academic challenge for sociologists comes from the flood of empirical and theoretical developments in other social sciences, some of which challenges basic sociological assumptions about socialization. For example, Andrew Meltzoff’s research indicates that newborns can intentionally imitate the basic facial gestures of adults even though they cannot have taken the position of the adult on themselves to know that they have a face with which to imitate (Katz 1999). This research calls into question sociology’s longstanding cognitive bias in socialization studies, and invites phenomenological examinations of the role of the body in socialization and development. If sociologists conducting research on socialization were to engage theory and research outside of the discipline in a sustained way, they would be better able to inform public debates over the relative influence of nature versus nurture in human development.

SEE ALSO: Developmental Stages; Mass Media and Socialization; Resocialization; Socialization, Adult; Socialization, Agents of; Socialization, Anticipatory; Socialization, Gender; Socialization, Primary; Socialization and Sport

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and what it means to be an individual evolves over the life course.

Sociologists and psychologists have traditionally agreed that socialization occurs in stages. Early theories of socialization, largely reflecting cultural beliefs about development in the early twentieth century, focused on self and moral development up to what we today know as adolescence. Mead's theory of the self, for example, posited three stages: infancy, play, and game stages. The final game stage occurs during adolescence when the individual is able to learn and respond to the community's norms and standards and act accordingly in everyday life. Mead assumed that the socialized self acquired through adolescence generally remains stable throughout the remaining life span.

Symbolic interactionist thinkers following Mead have attempted to refine his theory to account for the apparent changes in the adult self concept present in modern society. Shibutani (1961) adapted Merton and Kitt's (1950) structural notion of *reference group* to interactionist thinking to illustrate how adults can be expected to be members of various groups which in turn serve as audiences to the self. In effect, the adult learns to be different selves to accommodate the multiple complex situations that mark modern life. Zurcher (1977) devised the concept of the *mutable self* to argue that contemporary adults must be able to negotiate numerous self concepts, since the requisite social skill today is being able to change who we are rapidly and gracefully.

STAGES IN ADULT SOCIALIZATION

Social psychological theories of adult socialization analytically divide adulthood itself into stages. Erikson (1982) identified three developmental stages in adult life that focus on a series of crises that must be resolved. During early adulthood (approximately age 20–40) people must manage conflicts between family life and work. They are socialized to pursue the roles of spouse and parent, yet during the same period are expected to earn a living and pursue a career. Consequently, they are faced with reconciling the conflict between spending time with spouses and children and establishing a career. In American society, traditional sex role

socialization, adult

Joseph A. Kotarba

Socialization refers to the process by which people learn and internalize the attitudes, values, beliefs, and norms of our culture and develop a sense of self. The concept of socialization is among the most important in sociology, because it attempts to illustrate and explain the tremendous impact living in society has on shaping the individual. The individual becomes a human being through socialization,

expectations have made this dilemma particularly difficult for women.

Middle adulthood (approximately age 40–60) is characterized by conflict between *generativity and stagnation*. Erikson argued that adults in this age range are aware that they are getting older and that ultimately death is in their future, yet they may want to feel a sense of rejuvenation. They may change jobs or otherwise pursue some of their youthful ambitions. If unable to do so, they run the risk of becoming depressed and stagnant and of acting much older than their chronological age. Late adulthood (from age 60 on) provides the final challenge of attempting to achieve a sense of integrity and satisfaction with one's life while not sinking into despair over impending death. Erikson contended that during this stage adults tend to wrestle with the conflict between being satisfied with their accomplishments in life and despairing over missed opportunities and could have been.

Levinson et al. (1978) identified three distinct stages in the life of an adult: early adulthood (about age 17–45), middle adulthood (approximately age 45–65) and late adulthood (age 65 on). Levinson contended that the midlife decade (age 35–45) marks one of the most crucial stages of adult development. During this period, a midlife transition occurs that involves important changes in biological and psychological functioning, as well as in social status. It marks an important turning point in which individuals reappraise their life goals, assess their accomplishments or failures, and consider the possibilities of a better or worse future. Levinson concluded that it is virtually impossible for a person to go through the midlife transition without experiencing at least a moderate crisis.

More recent thinking on adult socialization sees gender as a critical dimension to social, psychological, and moral development. Gilligan (1982) argues that men tend to rely heavily on rules and abstract ideals when determining right from wrong – what she calls a justice perspective on morality. Women develop more of a care and responsibility perspective, preferring to use personal experience and social relationships as important criteria in developing moral judgments about social situations. Gilligan argues that scholars and laypeople alike should not view women's reasoning as inferior to that of men. Sheehy (1976) proposed a set of adult

developmental stages for both men and women. Sheehy described the *trying twenties* as a time of making a break from parents, selecting mates, and starting careers: a time of high expectations, hopes, and dreams. The *catch thirties* are the years when bubbles often burst and people realize their mates and jobs are not exactly perfect. This difficult period is characterized by high divorce rates and sudden career changes. The *forlorn forties* follow, when adults enter their midlife crises. Sheehy described these as dangerous years during which the dreams of youth must be reassessed. It is common for men to become dissatisfied with their jobs and to want to stay home; it is a time when women who have not worked outside the home become dissatisfied and want to take jobs.

SOCIALIZATION EXPERIENCES

In his classic statement, Brim (1968) suggested six situations in adulthood that typically involve socialization experiences or responses. These situations do not necessarily follow a life cycle logic, although the physical and psychological effects of aging can precipitate them. First, individuals may place demands on themselves to change the people in their lives, the lifestyles they lead, and the values to which they adhere. Second, individuals may experience changes in roles or statuses, such as the movement from "church member" to "church elder." Third, individuals may experience changes in occupation, either in change or entry. Fourth, individuals may experience changes in the family, through events such as death and divorce. Fifth, individuals may experience geographic mobility, such as that related to retirement or immigration. Sixth, individuals may experience downward mobility, as a result of poor health, widowhood, and so forth.

Contemporary research has generally supported Brim's model of situations in adulthood that typically involve socialization experiences or responses. Social, cultural, economic, and political changes over time, however, have changed the content of the situational categories. As adults increasingly remain a part of mainstream society, they place increasing demands on a wide range of social institutions. For example, adult education is expanding rapidly, to the degree

education policymakers refer to *andragogy* as adult learning and *geragogy* as older adult learning (John 1988).

In summary, traditional models of adult socialization have been strongly influenced by biological models of development. Early life was posited as growth and gain, whereas adulthood and later life were posited as periods of loss and decline (Labouvie Vief & Diehl 1999). More recent thinking sees adult socialization as a very complex, non linear, and somewhat situational phenomenon involving a tradeoff between growth and decline. Neugarten's (1974) classic categories of young old and old old are less definitive today when the trend is for old old people in our society increasingly to stay at work or seek work, either to prolong a productive life or to adapt to (often negatively) changing economic conditions for the elderly.

ADULT SOCIALIZATION IN EVERYDAY LIFE

Sociologists of everyday life contend that the process of becoming an adult in our society is rich, ongoing, and worthy of detailed ethnographic analysis. Studies of adult socialization are no longer limited to traditional elderly settings. Since aging in our society no longer requires radical change in lifestyle, at least as one's health remains functional, the culture individuals acquire during a lifetime can be very functional in later adulthood. Kotarba (2006), for example, explores the many ways baby boomers continue to use rock 'n' roll music and culture as resources for refining their sense of self as they occupy the role of parents, lovers, and others. They shape and modify the musical values they acquired during adolescence to fit the needs of later adulthood, so that they may continue to attend rock 'n' roll music concerts but may prefer comfortable seating in the shade near the stage as opposed to more adventurous lawn seating. They may also convert their taste in rock 'n' roll to adult friendly styles such as country music or the blues. Fontana (1977) examines everyday life in various retirement communities in the American West to show how varied life after work can be. His basic finding is that people generally construct lifestyles in retirement that reflect their

pre retirement lifestyles. If they developed a sense of self that involved high levels of social interaction and community involvement, they will continue that way – barring inevitable health and occasionally financial problems.

Health remains a major concern for aging adults. The sources of information on what is illness, how to care for and prevent illness, and – most relevant to this entry – how to integrate issues of health and illness in one's sense of self are increasing rapidly. For example, the Internet is not only a source of information on health for those adults for whom communication at home is preferred, but also increasingly a place to locate drugs and other health materials and services (Fox & Rainie 2000).

CURRENT ISSUES

Along with scholars from other disciplines, sociological gerontologists are interested in developing new and innovative ways to conceptualize rapid changes taking place in adult socialization among the elderly. The elderly are significant because, for the first time in western history, they are the most likely of all age groups to die, as Hochschild (1978) noted when she referred to them metaphorically as society's "death lepers." The elderly are demographically elusive because they can be found in many different kinds of places – segregated retirement communities, senior centers, and nursing homes – where, incidentally, less than 5 percent reside. The elderly are socialized into being elderly from an increasing number of audiences to the self: earlier life experiences, friends and family, the mass media through portrayals of the elderly such as the immense coverage given to former president Ronald Reagan at the time of his death, and interest groups such as the AARP.

SEE ALSO: Gerontology: Key Thinkers; Socialization; Socialization, Agents of; Socialization, Anticipatory; Socialization, Gender

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socialization, agents of

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Socialization is the process whereby individuals learn and internalize the attitudes, values, and behaviors appropriate to people living in any

given society. Socialization ensures that an individual will develop a social identity (or self) and have the motivation and knowledge to perform the roles she may need throughout the course of her life.

It is a basic tenet in sociology that humans do not have "instincts." (In sociology and biology an instinct is a complex pattern of behavior that is genetically determined.) Humans have some basic reflexes (such as startling when frightened), but no real instincts. Because of this lack, people have to learn virtually everything to get along in life. We call this learning "socialization." Socialization is the process of social interaction through which people acquire personality and learn the ways of their society. It is an essential link between the individual and society.

Socialization is a lifelong process. It never really ends, not until death. At every stage of our lives, we confront new situations and have to learn new ways of doing things, new values, or new norms. The really crucial time of socialization is infancy and early childhood. That is when you learn the language of your group and come to understand the norms and values important to your family and society.

Agents of socialization enable us to become aware of all the various things we need to know. Agents of socialization are significant individuals, groups, or institutions that provide structured situations in which learning takes place. This continuing and lifelong socialization involves many different social forces that influence our lives and affect our self images. These agents of socialization include the following.

The family. Family is by far the most significant agent of socialization. It is within the family that the first socializing influence is encountered. Families teach the child the language of their group, acceptable gender roles, and important values. In addition, families give children their geographic location (northerners, westerners, rural or urban), and they determine their religion, race, and ethnic group. In modern societies, most early socialization takes place within the nuclear family. In more traditional families, the extended family may be equally important. But either way, children learn the behavior characteristics of their family members and community. A family's social class and parents' occupations also influence

the way children are reared and their gender and role expectations. It is important to acknowledge that children are not just passive recipients of socialization; they are active agents, influencing and altering the family, too.

School. In some societies, socialization takes place almost entirely within the family. But for children in modern industrial societies, school is an important, formal agent of socialization that influences most individuals for well over a decade. Schools teach not only selected skills and knowledge but also additional things, such as the importance of a good diet and exercise. There is often a “hidden curriculum” as well. This includes obeying authority, being punctual, not being absent unless you are ill or have a legitimate excuse, and following rules. Personality characteristics of self discipline and dependability are encouraged. (Business and industry prefer employees with those attributes and so they are taught in schools for the future workforce.) Mass education also promotes feelings of nationalism and the need to be a good citizen. American schools teach ideals of equality and equal opportunity. Some traditional societies do not include formal schools for everyone. If so, school is not an agent for those groups. For them, the family is far more important.

Peers. The peer group is a friendship group of roughly equivalent age and interests, who are social equals. They are an important agent all over the world, but particularly for teens and young adults. Peer groups can ease the transition to adulthood. In the modern world, peer relations are even more important than they may have been in earlier times. Peer groups often remain important throughout much of a person’s life. They tend to be more egalitarian than some of the other agents and influence a person’s attitudes and behavior. Peer groups have great influence on how children socially construct and experience gender meanings in the classroom, playground, and informal social groups.

Mass media and technology. In modern societies, these are important agents of socialization. In the United States, over 98 percent of households have at least one television set and many have several. Even in less advanced societies, the media are increasing in importance, particularly the various electronic media. Research

has investigated whether violence on television (or in movies) encourages violent behavior among viewers (particularly among children). The findings are not conclusive, but most people believe that people’s attitudes and values are affected by what they see and hear in the media. A positive influence is the fact that televisions and commercials can introduce young people to unfamiliar ideas, lifestyles, and cultures.

Public opinion. In every culture, what people think about controversial issues is an important agent of socialization. But in reality, not every one’s views are equally influential. Better educated, wealthier, well connected people often carry much clout. In societies where the mass media are important, that may greatly influence public opinion, too. This agent influences appropriate gender roles, notions of right and wrong, and beliefs about controversial topics such as abortion or gay marriages.

Religion. Religion is important and relevant for some people, but in the modern world religion is losing some of its power and influence as an agent of socialization. For those that follow religious tenets, the norms influence people’s values, the desired size of families, the likelihood of divorce, rates of delinquency, behaviors considered appropriate (or not), and a host of other things. Religion has a role in social integration, social support, social change, and social control.

Workplace. The workplace is also an agent of socialization. Among other things, it teaches us that the work women do is often valued less than the work men do. Until recently, women employees were concentrated into routine, poorly paid occupations. Women’s opportunities were often blocked by gender stereotypes. Work also teaches us appropriate values, work ethic (or lack of it), and appropriate attire. In modern societies, full time employment confirms adult status and awards us a personal identity. In a culture that has few rites of passage, that is important. Every society has “work,” but in modern societies where work and home are separate, “going to work” involves more of a transition than in traditional societies.

The state. The state has recently been added to the list of agents of socialization. We recognize the state’s growing impact on the life course. Increasingly, outside agencies like nursing homes, mental health clinics, and insurance

companies have taken over functions previously filled by families. The state runs many of these institutions or licenses and regulates them. In a sense, the state has created new rites of passage, such as the age a person can legally drive, purchase and consume tobacco and alcohol, marry without parental consent, or officially retire.

Total institutions are an important agent of resocialization for some people. Total institutions are places where residents are confined for a set period of time and kept under the influence of a hierarchy of officials (e.g., the military during basic training or officer training or a prison or mental institution). Every aspect of life is controlled, from the time you get up until you go to bed. The goal of a total institution is to resocialize individuals, to totally change them and make them into something new (and presumably “better”).

Socialization, and what the agents of socialization teach, differs from one society (or subculture) to another. These differences include such basics as the following.

Treatment of children. Do we allow them a great deal of freedom (both physically and psychologically) or are we more rigid in our demands? Some cultures (such as in the United States) give infants a great deal of space, with large cribs and perhaps the run of the house when they are old enough to crawl and toddle. Other societies swaddle and restrain infants for their first year of life.

What we consider fit to eat and drink. The human body can digest and get nourishment from many different substances, but what we consider “fit” or suitable to consume varies greatly by culture. Some cultures (such as some Native American tribes or some Asians) appreciate puppy meat, while others are appalled at even the thought of eating dog. Traditionally, the French have thought diluted wine suitable for children to drink with meals, but probably most Americans find the thought of serving alcohol to children inappropriate.

What we “see” or notice in our environment. In some societies in Africa, people “see” only two or three colors while Americans (thanks to Crayola boxes with 120 colors) can distinguish between a dozen shades of blue. Children who never have the opportunity to see photos, movies, or television often cannot “see” things

when given just two dimensions. We “learn” to see as young children and it may be difficult if we encounter these things later in life.

Crying and display of emotions. In American society, “big boys don’t cry,” but males are allowed to display anger by swearing or expressing pain with a grimace. But some Native Americans, living in what we now consider the United States, had rites of passage where both pain and anger were suppressed. We are taught by the various agents of socialization when crying, anger, or anguish is appropriate (or not).

Knowledge and what we learn. In some more primitive societies, people count only to 10 or 20 (using fingers and toes). Anything above that number is designated as “many.” But in western, advanced societies many people learn advanced mathematics. In the western world we learn to read from left to right, from the top of the page going down. In other parts of the world we read from the top to bottom, or from right to left. Agents of socialization teach us these things.

SEE ALSO: Mass Media and Socialization; Organizations as Total Institutions; Resocialization; Socialization; Socialization, Adult; Socialization, Anticipatory; Socialization, Gender; Socialization, Primary; Socialization and Sport

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socialization, anticipatory

Gordon Shepherd

Anticipatory socialization refers to preparation for status changes and role transitions and, as such, is an important aspect of most forms of human socialization over the entire life course. While socialization in general may be defined as the social process in which groups transmit their culture and individuals simultaneously acquire self concepts and personality characteristics, anticipatory socialization directs particular attention to those situations where individuals are likely either to be induced to change or prepare themselves for change in conformity or opposition to a set of normative standards.

The concept of anticipatory socialization was introduced by Robert K. Merton and Alice S. Kitt in their 1950 article "Contributions to the Theory of Reference Group Behavior," in which they amplified the theoretical implications of *The American Soldier*, a large scale empirical study of military recruiting and training published in 1949. Merton and Kitt developed the concept to explain variations in the conformity of enlisted personnel to official military values and their subsequent promotions in military rank. They then generalized the concept as a key mechanism for understanding the relationship between reference group identification and social mobility in social systems. Merton and Kitt initially defined anticipatory socialization as the process in which individuals adopt the values of a group to which they aspire but do not belong. Merton subsequently refined the definition in 1968 to include not only non membership reference group aspirations but also, more generally, social statuses to which individuals aspire and which they are likely to attain. This allowed Merton to include in his analysis the structural concepts of normatively defined status sequences and role gradations which function to facilitate anticipatory socialization, producing greater continuity over time for both groups and individuals rather than disjunctive status changes.

Anticipatory socialization may occur in both formal and informal settings. In formal settings,

organizations deliberately recruit new members and programmatically attempt to shape their attitudes and values in conformity with organizational goals. Anticipatory socialization is especially prominent in organizations that sponsor opportunities for upward mobility in a status hierarchy. In general, anticipatory socialization is characteristic of achievement oriented, open systems which function in competitive environments. Merton and others have argued, however, that the major focus of analysis should be on the informal aspects; that is, situations in which role preparation occurs but which do not require specialized training personnel or didactic learning. Even in schools or training organizations, informal anticipatory socialization takes place outside the formal agenda and curriculum. Individuals respond more or less unwittingly to cues from an assortment of role models or reference others and draw implications for future role behavior, becoming oriented toward statuses they do not yet occupy.

Anticipatory socialization in formal settings draws attention to the agents of socialization, the group interests they represent, and the methods they use to shape the attitudes and values of novices who aspire to pursue organizational careers. The agents of socialization and the normative models which they project are important to the understanding of informal anticipatory socialization as well, but attention also is drawn to the individual agency of those being socialized and the choices they make in selecting reference groups and corresponding career paths over the life course. Personal agency is particularly significant in pluralistic social systems that offer individuals a wide range of life choices, in contrast to highly traditional or closed systems in which individuals have relatively few status or role options from which to choose. Thus the nature of the larger social structure in which groups and individuals function has a major impact on both formal and informal modes of anticipatory socialization.

Informal anticipatory socialization is an implicit part of the subject matter of both developmental psychology and the sociology of the life course. In both disciplines the patterned transition between various age statuses is a central topic of analysis. In developmental psychology, maturational and cognitive changes are discussed in conjunction with the various

modes of socialization to which individuals are exposed. There is a large literature on both the intended and unintended effects of different parenting styles on personality development in childhood. Considerable attention also has been given to the sometimes mutually reinforcing, sometimes competing influence of siblings and other family members, play groups, peer cultures, and the effects of an increasing array of mass media in contemporary society in the process of anticipatory socialization for adult roles during childhood and adolescence.

In addition to the various agents and methods of anticipatory socialization, two socialization outcomes in particular have received major attention: gender role identification and occupational career orientations. The term "differential socialization" is often used when referring to these outcomes. Differential socialization in these contexts means that individuals typically are socialized differently depending on their sex and social class. Numerous studies have documented the ways in which females are systematically defined and treated differently than males by parents, siblings, peers, teachers, and various role models or reference others portrayed in books, television, movies, computer games, music videos, advertising, and other agencies of mass culture. The net effect of these influences is to reinforce identification and compliance with gender role expectations in the process of development. Similarly, research initiated by Melvin Kohn demonstrates the way in which parents' social class and own occupational experience are correlated with their approach to childrearing in anticipation of the occupations they project their children will most likely pursue in life. Working class parents typically are more successful in jobs when they observe organizational rules and consequently tend to emphasize conformity to external authority in raising their children. In contrast, middle class parents typically are more successful in jobs when they take the initiative, work effectively without close supervision, and get along well with co workers. Consequently they are more likely to reinforce self expression and self control in their children. In societies where public schools track and sort students into vocational or college bound cohorts, the link between

social class and anticipatory socialization for occupational careers is especially evident.

While many empirical studies have incorporated anticipatory socialization as an explanatory variable, little has been done to develop the concept theoretically since Merton's pioneering work. One interesting exception is Kazuo Yamaguchi's exposition of rational choice models of anticipatory socialization and, in particular, his development of a related theoretical concept which he calls anticipatory non socialization. In contrast to different types of anticipatory socialization involved in the process of role entry and status attainment, anticipatory non socialization concerns decision making processes that rational actors engage in when exiting current roles or withdrawing their investments from previous commitments and social relationships.

SEE ALSO: Developmental Stages; Game Stage; Identity: Social Psychological Aspects; Mass Media and Socialization; Mobility, Horizontal and Vertical; Play Stage; Reference Groups; Socialization; Socialization, Adult; Socialization, Agents of; Socialization, Gender; Socialization, Primary; Status Passages

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socialization, gender

Deana A. Rohlinger

As children grow up they develop a sense of who they are, how they should relate to others, and the role they play in a larger society. The lessons children learn and the processes through which cultural norms are passed from one generation to the next is known as socialization. The focus on gender socialization highlights that there are roles, or cultural expectations and norms, which are associated with each sex category ("male" or "female"). Sociologists make distinctions between sex and gender. While sex is based on biological categories, gender is the result of cultural processes that construct different social roles for men and women. Gender socialization, then, is the process through which boys and girls learn sex appropriate behavior, dress, personality characteristics, and demeanor.

While gender socialization is lifelong, many sociological theories focus on early childhood socialization. Four such perspectives are the psychoanalytical, cognitive development, social learning, and social interaction perspectives.

The most famous psychoanalytical explanation of gender socialization is Sigmund Freud's identification theory. Freud argued that children pass through a series of stages in their personality development. During the first two stages (the oral and anal stages), boys and girls have similar behavior and experiences. Around age four, however, boys and girls become aware of their own genitals and that members of the opposite sex have different genitalia. It is during this phallic stage that children begin to identify and model their behavior after their same sex parent, thus learning gender appropriate behavior, although this process differs for boys and girls. At an unconscious (and precognitive) level, a boy's love for his mother becomes more sexual, and he views his father as a competitor, a feeling that is frightening because of the father's imagined retribution. Fearing his own castration, the boy begins to identify with his father, who he regards as powerful since he still has a penis, and models his father's behavior. The process is different for girls. Like boys, girls initially identify with their mothers. However, upon viewing male genitalia, a girl believes that she has been

castrated and develops the desire for a penis. This desire causes the girl to shift her love to her father, but to identify with her mother in an effort to find ways to win her father's penis. Eventually, she recognizes that she can only have a penis symbolically, through intercourse and childbirth. However, her continued penis envy causes her to adopt gender appropriate behaviors and to desire men.

While Freud's theory has been largely discredited, sociologists have drawn on it to extend psychoanalytical explanations of gender socialization. Nancy Chodorow (1978) drew on Marxist theory and psychoanalytic object relations theory to argue that gender socialization processes are key for the reproduction of the capitalist economy. She argued that identification is more difficult for boys than for girls because boys need to psychologically separate themselves from their mothers and model their fathers, who are largely absent from the home as a result of the breadwinner homemaker division of labor. This results in boys being much more emotionally detached than girls, who do not experience this psychological separation. Instead, mothers and daughters maintain an intense relationship, and during their interactions the female gender role is transmitted from one generation to the next. Ultimately, gender roles are reproduced and the next generation is socialized when these children are grown and try to recreate the families in which they were raised. Men work outside the home as their fathers had done, and women desire children in order to recreate the bonds of their youth and find emotional fulfillment. Chodorow argued that the socialization of children into traditional gender roles, where women are responsible for child rearing and men for earnings, reproduces a family structure that benefits a capitalist economy because the breadwinner expectation keeps men working at unsatisfying and often exploitative jobs. Moreover, because of their powerlessness in the labor market, men exert control over their families and reinforce traditional gender roles. This, in turn, ensures that men will continue to sell their labor in the market, despite their dissatisfaction, and that women will stay at home raising the next generation of workers and mothers. Chodorow's theory of socialization has been criticized for being limited to white, middle class families in western democracies,

and thus unable to explain how children from other family structures and other cultures acquire gender roles.

The second perspective points to cognitive development as a way to explain gender socialization, arguing that socialization occurs as children try to find patterns in the social and physical world (Piaget 1954; Bem 1993). From this perspective, children's earliest developmental task is to make sense of a seemingly chaotic world. As they observe and interact with their environment, they develop schema, or organizing categories. Because children rely on simple cues to understand the world and because there are clear differences in how women and men look and act, biological sex provides a useful schema. Children first label themselves, and then apply the schema to others in an effort to organize behaviors into distinct gender categories. Schema, however, are not static. Children's understanding of gender roles changes as they grow older and reflect increased complexity in their cognitive development. Thus, very young children are more rigid and stereotypical in their understanding of gender appropriate behaviors than older children, adolescents, and adults.

Critics highlight three problems with the cognitive development perspective. First, while the perspective suggests that children develop gender identities between the ages of three and five, a body of research indicates that the development of gender identities occurs much sooner. Second, while the cognitive development perspective assumes that children's use of sex and gender schemas are undifferentiated by sex, girls generally are more knowledgeable about gender than boys and are more embracing of cross gender behavior. Third, this perspective ignores the social world in which children are embedded. Children's understanding of gender identities is not limited to mental development, but also stems from interactions with peers, parents, and teachers.

The social learning perspective (Bandura 1986) posits that gender socialization is learned. This theory draws on the psychological concept of behaviorism to argue that children learn gender by being rewarded for gender appropriate behavior and punished for gender inappropriate behavior. Rewards and punishments may be direct. For example, a parent may

directly admonish a boy for wanting to purchase a doll with his birthday money, but praise a girl for the same choice. Children also learn gender appropriate behavior through indirect rewards and punishments as when they observe peers, parents, and other adults model the behaviors that will elicit praise or opprobrium. The main problem with the social learning perspective is that it assumes children are passive recipients of gender socialization messages rather than agents who actively seek out and evaluate information.

The social interaction perspective offers a fourth approach to gender socialization. This perspective has deep sociological roots. In 1902, sociologist Charles Cooley argued that individuals develop a sense of self by imagining how they appear to others, interpreting others' reactions to their actions, and developing a self concept based on these interpretations. Thus, a person's sense of self, which he called "the looking glass self," is an ongoing process embedded in social interaction. From this perspective, interaction forms the basis of gender socialization.

One set of interactions integral to gender socialization are those between parents and children. More often than not, parents tend to interact with boys and girls in ways that reinforce traditional gender roles. For example, while on average there are no sex differences among one year olds' attempts to communicate, adults respond to boys and girls differently. Parents respond to boys when they demand attention by being aggressive, crying, whining, and screaming, and they respond to girls when they use gestures, gentle touching, or words spoken in non demanding tones. Such parent-child interactions have long term effects on girls' and boys' communication styles, leading to boys with more assertive styles and girls with more talkative and emotive styles. Parents also tend to encourage physical play and roughhousing in boys and vocal interaction games with girls. These differences affect how girls and boys handle interpersonal strife and conflict later in life, with boys more likely to resort to physical confrontations and girls attempting to "talk out" their problems. Traditional gender roles also are introduced and reinforced through the kinds of toys parents provide their children. Dolls, doll houses, and miniature home appliances

encourage girls to be nurturing and engage in domestic tasks such as cooking, cleaning, and childcare, while blocks, construction vehicles, and science kits encourage boys to engage in construction, invention, and exploration which will provide skills useful in a competitive corporate world. In short, gender socialization occurs through parent-child interactions that reinforce traditional notions of gender in which girls are emotional and nurturing and boys are physical, aggressive, and competitive.

Social institutions are crucial to gender socialization. Parent-child interactions like those described above do not occur in isolation, but are embedded in the social institution of the family. Other social institutions important to gender socialization in childhood are school, sports, and mass media. In the educational system, a "hidden curriculum" refers to the values that are not explicitly taught in the classroom but are still part of the schools' unacknowledged lessons. This curriculum reinforces traditional conceptualizations of how girls and boys look and act through the use of course material, examples used in class, and activities that separate and pit boys against girls. These messages are buttressed through interactions with teachers and peers. Teachers, for example, reinforce gender roles by encouraging girls and boys to develop different skills (encouraging boys to excel at math and science and girls to excel in humanities and social science) and by differently praising their school work (commending boys for substantive content and girls for the neatness of their work). Children also divide themselves along gender lines in the lunch room, claim different spaces of the playground, and often sanction individuals who violate gender norms (Thorne 1993).

Sports are important to socialization because they teach children about cooperation, competition, and gender. For boys, the sports arena becomes a site where masculinity is performed. A boy's success at sports is seen as more masculine by other boys, which generates prestige in his peer group, while boys who fail are ridiculed and labeled "sissies" or "girls" (Messner 1992). Rewarding boys for "acting masculine" on the sports field has lasting consequences because it teaches boys that they must publicly prove their masculinity to others. This, in turn, encourages boys to develop

instrumental relationships, or relationships in which something of value may be acquired, rather than meaningful relationships based on mutual emotional fulfillment. Most sports sociology has focused on how sports affect the gender socialization of boys. However, since the passage of Title IX in 1972 in the US, the participation of girls in sports has increased dramatically. It remains to be seen how sports will affect the gender identities and socialization of girls.

Mass media are one of the most powerful tools of gender socialization because television, magazines, radio, newspapers, video games, movies, and the Internet are ubiquitous in American culture. Like other social institutions, mass media reinforce traditional gender roles. Magazines targeted at girls and women emphasize the importance of physical appearance as well as finding, pleasing, and keeping a man. While boys' and men's magazines also focus on the importance of physical appearance, they also stress the importance of financial success, competitive hobbies, and attracting women for sexual encounters (rather than lasting relationships). These supposed "masculine" and "feminine" characteristics and behaviors are reinforced across the media system, from video games and movies that show athletic heroes rescuing thin and busty damsels in distress, to television programs that depict women as housewives, nurses, and secretaries and men as lawyers, doctors, and corporate tycoons. Print media also play an important role in socialization. In children's literature, for example, boys typically are the protagonists, who use strength and intelligence to overcome an obstacle. When girls are included in stories, they are typically passive followers of the male leader or helpers eager to support the male protagonist in his plan. This state of affairs is undergoing change, however. An increasing number of television shows (*Zena: Warrior Princess*, *Buffy the Vampire Slayer*, *Alias*, and *Veronica Mars*), movies (*Laura Croft: Tomb Raider* and *Elektra*), and books (*Harry Potter*) have crafted new visions of masculinity and femininity. It remains to be seen if these images take hold and affect gender socialization processes.

In sum, sociologists offered a variety of theories to explain gender socialization. The most fruitful to date has been the social interaction

perspective because it recognizes that gender is an ongoing process and that gender roles are produced and reproduced in social institutions. A great deal of theoretical and empirical work remains to be done, however. Much of the scholarship on gender socialization has examined middle class, white heterosexuals. Thus, sociologists need to examine how their theories and data apply across class, race, ethnic, and sexual boundaries.

SEE ALSO: Gender, Development and; Gender Ideology and Gender Role Ideology; Sex and Gender; Socialization; Socialization, Agents of; Socialization, Primary

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socialization, primary

Leslie Wasson

Socialization is the process by which humans learn the ways of being and doing considered appropriate and expected in their social environments. We call it primary socialization when the individual is a newly born member of society and is therefore experiencing this process for the first time. Primary socialization

has the social psychological characteristic of primacy, meaning that its position as first in the acquisition of social knowledge renders it a filter and a foundation for the subsequent information internalized by the fledgling social being. Primacy also makes early socialization remarkably resilient, in that it is much more difficult to change primary habits and beliefs than those learned later in the life course.

With regard to symbolic interaction, primary socialization becomes the initial set of significant symbols by which the individual interprets the perceived social world, formulates a conception of personal identity or identities, and through which he or she communicates understanding and desire with others. Through the symbolic structure of language, coupled with non verbal communication and other cultural cues, the individual negotiates an understanding of the agreed upon realities of social settings with significant others in their environment.

An early social philosophy of childhood portrayed the newborn social participant as a tabula rasa, or a blank slate upon which society then inscribed an identity. Later theorists, however, questioned the passivity of this model of child socialization. In his discussion of the origins of the self, George Herbert Mead (1934) drew upon the "looking glass self" model formulated by Charles Horton Cooley (1902). Cooley's socialization process entailed the individual engaging in a cycle of observation of the reactions of others to a behavior and the subsequent adjustment of that behavior to match perceived expectations. Unlike Cooley, however, Mead located the self as more than a passive reflection of social observation and response. Mead's novice social being was an active participant and negotiator in the socialization process, and his conceptualization of this agency has influenced subsequent theorizing on the subject.

There may be some biological preconditions for primary socialization to be effective. The work of Piaget (1954), for example, on the development of cognitive abilities in young humans indicates that at least some of the physical elements of human life must be present in order for the social aspects to persist. Although any stage theory should be treated with caution, Piaget's schema indicates that a child may not be capable of socialization beyond a certain point if physical development is inadequate.

Ancillary implications include a consideration of the primary socialization difficulties encountered by persons born with disabilities, although their acquisition of social competency may also be influenced by social expectations of their ability.

Some recent efforts to expand primary socialization include the use of music to stimulate cognitive development even prior to birth, and the use of American Sign Language as a communication medium with babies who are not yet physically able to speak coherently. Although more data collection is under way, early results indicate that non verbal forms of socialization are effective at much earlier ages than previously believed.

Children require sociability in order to thrive. Kingsley Davis (1947) and others (Spitz 1945, 1946; Curtiss 1977) who studied children raised in isolation provide evidence of the essentiality of interaction with human others for the full development and ongoing physical well being of the child. Children who are denied interaction in the extreme fail to thrive emotionally, mentally, and physically. It appears that the causality between the physical and the social in human development is complex.

Primary socialization involves learning, and humans are capable of a complex set of learning behaviors. Learning processes that may occur during primary socialization may include operant conditioning to environmental or social contingencies, observational learning (imitation), and internalization of social and emotional norms and values. The content of primary socialization is likely to include language and other forms of communication, identities and role taking, negotiation and meaning construction, and cultural routines. Contemporary researchers such as Strand (2000) distinguish between developmental and behavioral research on the socialization of young children.

Humans emerge at birth fairly unfinished. They go through a long period of dependency and require years of training in order for socialization to be perceived as successful. Anthropological research describes a myriad of human arrangements to which children are socialized, giving credence to a view of humans as remarkably flexible in their adaptation to material conditions. For the individual, primary socialization serves the very important function of making the

world predictable and easing interaction with others.

Primary socialization performs important functions for any society. Since society exists before the individual arrives, primary socialization allows new members to be integrated into existing social arrangements. This primary socialization process also makes possible the perpetuation of culture via intergenerational transmission. In primary socialization, therefore, the earliest agents of socialization are crucial to the fundamental construction of new social beings. In most cases, the foremost agents of primary socialization are parents, especially mothers. Changes in the composition of families in contemporary society, however, such as single parent households, grandparent parenting, and day care for working families, may create a shift in the source and character of primary socialization.

SEE ALSO: Cooley, Charles Horton; Mead, George Herbert; Looking Glass Self; Resocialization; Socialization; Socialization, Adult; Socialization, Agents of

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socialization and sport

Jay Coakley

There is a long tradition of research on socialization and sport. The roots of this research are grounded in theories that explain the role of play in child development, in Progressive era notions that team sports constituted an environment in which valuable lessons could be learned, and in popular twentieth century assumptions that playing sports was an inherently character building experience.

Empirical studies of socialization and sport were initiated in the 1950s as the first cohort of baby boomers in North America inspired parents as well as developmental experts to seek optimal conditions for teaching children, especially boys, the skills needed to succeed as adults in rapidly expanding, competitive, national and global economies. The structured experiences embodied in competitive sports were seen by many people in Western Europe and North America – especially suburban parents in the United States – to be ideal contexts for adult controlled socialization of children. It was assumed that sports taught young people lessons about teamwork, competition, achievement, productivity, conformity to rules, and obedience to authority. Consequently, organized youth sports and interscholastic sports grew dramatically, although the pace of this growth varied by nation and regions within nations.

The growth of organized sports for young people sparked questions about the benefits of sport participation and how to attract and retain participation. Those who asked these questions were often associated with organized sport programs, and they usually had vested interests in recruiting participants and promoting their programs by linking sport participation to positive developmental outcomes. Scholars in physical education were the first to use these questions as a basis for research, and their studies were usually designed to examine sport participation as an experience that shaped social and personal development in positive ways. Most of these studies found correlations between sport participation and positive character traits, although research designs were generally flawed and

provided little information about the dynamics of specific socialization experiences in sports compared to other activities (Stevenson 1975).

Research on socialization and sport has also been done in psychology and anthropology, as well as sociology. Psychological studies have focused on the socialization effects of sport participation on personality characteristics, moral development, achievement motivation, sense of competence, self esteem, and body image. Anthropological studies have focused on the role of play, games, and sports in the formation of value orientations in particular cultural contexts, especially those in pre industrial societies. Sociological studies, published mostly by scholars in North America, have focused on three main topics: (1) socialization into sport, dealing with the initiation and continuation of sport participation; (2) socialization out of sport, dealing with termination and changes in sport participation; and (3) socialization through sport, dealing with participation and multiple facets of social development.

Through the mid 1980s most sociological research on socialization and sport was grounded in structural functionalism or forms of Marxism, neo Marxism, and conflict theory. This research was based on the assumption that socialization was a process of role learning through which people internalized values and orientations enabling them to participate in established social systems. It was also based on the assumption that sport was a social institution organized in connection with the social system of which it was a part.

Since the mid 1980s most research has been grounded in a combination of interactionist and critical theories. The approach used in these studies assumes that: (a) human beings are active, self reflective decision makers who define situations and act on the basis of those decisions; (b) socialization is a lifelong process characterized by reciprocity and the interplay of the self conceptions, goals, and resources of all those involved in social interaction; (c) identities, roles, and patterns of social organization are socially constructed through social relations that are influenced by the distribution of power and resources in particular cultural settings; and (d) sports are cultural practices with variable forms and meanings (Coakley 2004).

This shift in the theoretical approaches and the assumptions used to guide research on socialization and sport is represented in the ways that scholars have studied socialization into sports, out of sports, and through sports.

SOCIALIZATION INTO SPORTS: BECOMING INVOLVED AND STAYING INVOLVED

Research based on an internalization social systems approach clarified that socialization into sport is related to three factors: (1) a person's abilities and characteristics, (2) the influence of significant others, including parents, siblings, teachers, and peers, and (3) the availability of opportunities to play and experience success in sports. Most of this research utilized quantitative methods and presented correlational analyses, but it provided little information about the social processes and contexts in which people make participation decisions and in which participation is maintained on a day to day basis at various points in the life course.

Research based on an interactionist social process approach has focused on the processes through which people make decisions to participate in sports; the ways that gender, class, race, and ethnic relations influence those decisions; the connections between participation decisions and identity dynamics; the social meanings that are given to sport participation in particular relationships and contexts; and the dynamics of sport participation as a "career" that changes over time. This research, often utilizing qualitative methods and interpretive analyses, indicates that sport participation is grounded in decision making processes involving self reflection, social support, social acceptance, and culturally based ideas about sports. Decisions about sport participation are made continually as people assess opportunities and consider how participation fits with their sense of self, their development, and how they are connected to the world around them. These decisions are mediated by changing relationships, the material conditions of everyday life, and cultural factors, including the sport related social meanings associated with gender, class, race, age, and physical (dis)abilities.

SOCIALIZATION OUT OF SPORTS: CHANGING OR TERMINATING SPORT PARTICIPATION

Research on changing or terminating sport participation is difficult to characterize in terms of the theoretical and methodological approaches used. Even the terminology used to describe socialization out of sport has been confusing. References have been made to attrition, disengagement, desocialization, withdrawal from sport roles, dropping out, nonparticipation, burn out, transitions, alienation, "social death," exits, retirement, and involuntary retirement (i.e., being "cut" or denied access to participation opportunities). Studies have focused on many issues, including the relationship between participation turnover rates and the structures of sport programs, the attributes and experiences of those who terminate or change their sport participation, the dynamics of transitions out of sport roles, the termination of participation in highly competitive sport contexts as a form of retirement or even as a form of "social death," and the connection between declining rates of participation and the process of aging.

Prior to the mid 1970s, socialization out of sports was not a popular research topic. Changing or terminating sport participation was treated more as a fact than a problem. It became a problem when baby boom cohorts younger than 13 years old declined in size and growth trends in organized programs slowed relative to the rapid increases that characterized the 1960s. Additionally, many parents in the 1970s had come to define participation in organized sports as important for the development and social status of their children. A growing emphasis on physical fitness in post industrial nations also heightened general awareness that physical activities, especially the strenuous activities involved in sports, were important to health and well being. And finally, there was an emerging system of elite sport development that depended on an expanding pool of developing young athletes nurtured through a feeder system of youth sports and interscholastic teams. As the vested interests in participation grew, so did research on the processes related to terminating and changing participation in sports.

This research indicates that terminating or changing sport participation occurs in connection with the same interactive and decision making processes that underlie becoming and staying involved in sports. When people end their active participation in one sport context, they often initiate participation in another context – one that is more or less competitive, for example. Terminating active participation due to victimization or exploitation is rare, although burnout, injuries, and negative experiences can and do influence decisions to change or end participation. Changes in patterns of sport participation often are associated with transitions in the rest of a person's life, such as moving from one school to another, graduating, initiating a career, marriage, and becoming a parent. And for people who end long careers in sports, adjustment problems are most common among those who have weakly defined identities apart from sports and lack the social and material resources required for making transitions into other careers, relationships, and social worlds.

SOCIALIZATION THROUGH SPORTS

The belief that sport builds character has its origins in the class and gender relations of mid nineteenth century England. Although the history of beliefs about the consequences of sport participation varies by society, the notion that sport produces positive socialization effects has been widely accepted in most western industrial and post industrial societies, especially England, Canada, and the United States. For nearly a century the validity of these beliefs was taken for granted and promoted by those associated with organized competitive sports in these countries. It was not until the 1950s that people began to use research to test the validity of these beliefs.

Most research between the 1950s and the late 1980s consisted of atheoretical, correlational analyses presenting statistical comparisons of the attributes of "athletes" and "nonathletes," usually consisting of students in US high schools. The dependent variables in these studies included academic achievement, occupational mobility, prestige and status in school cultures, political orientations, rates of delinquency and deviance, and various character

traits such as moral development. Because few of the studies used longitudinal, pre test/post test designs, research findings were usually qualified in light of questions about "socialization effects" (i.e., the attributes that were actually "caused" by sport participation) versus "selection effects" (i.e., the attributes that were initially possessed by those who chose to play organized sports or were selected to play by coaches and program directors). Additionally, most of these correlational studies simply divided all respondents into so called "athletes" and "nonathletes," thereby ignoring their participation histories and the confounding effects of participation in a wide range of activities offering experiences closely resembling those offered by playing on school sponsored varsity teams.

McCormack and Chalip published a key article in 1988 in which they critiqued the methodological premises of research on socialization through sports. They noted that most researchers mistakenly assumed that (a) all sports offered participants the same unique experiences, (b) all sport experiences were strong enough to have a measurable impact on participants' characters and orientations, (c) all sport participants passively internalized the "moral lessons" inherently contained in the sport experience, and (d) that sport participation provided socialization experiences that were unavailable through other activities. These assumptions led researchers to overlook that (a) sports are social constructions and offer diverse socialization experiences, (b) participants give meanings to sport experiences and those meanings vary with the social and cultural contexts in which participation occurs, (c) the personal implications of sport participation are integrated into people's lives in connection with other experiences and relationships, and (d) sport participation involves agency in the form of making choices about and altering the conditions of participation. Focusing strictly on socialization outcomes led researchers to overlook the processes that constituted the core of socialization itself. Therefore, their studies missed the tension, negotiation, misunderstanding, and resistance that characterize lived sport experiences.

These assumptions and oversights gave rise to a body of literature containing contradictory and confusing findings often leading to the conclusion that little could be said about

socialization through sports. However, research initiated during the 1980s and 1990s, often guided by interactionist and critical theories, began to focus less on socialization outcomes and more on the social processes associated with sport participation and the social and cultural contexts in which sport experiences were given meaning and integrated into people's lives. The findings in this research indicated that:

- Sports are organized in vastly different ways across programs, teams, and situations offering many different socialization experiences, both positive and negative, to participants.
- People who choose to play sports are selected to participate by coaches, and those who remain on teams generally differ from others in terms of their characteristics and relationships.
- The meanings that people give to their sport experiences vary by context in connection with gender, race/ethnicity, social class, age, and (dis)ability, and they change through the life course as people redefine themselves and their connections with others.
- Socialization occurs through the social interaction that accompanies sport participation, and patterns of social interaction in sports are influenced by many factors, including those external to sport environments.
- Socialization through sport is tied to issues of identity and identity development.

These findings indicate that sports are most accurately viewed as sites for socialization experiences rather than causes of specific socialization outcomes. This distinction acknowledges that sports and sport participation may involve powerful and memorable experiences, but that those experiences take on meaning only through social relationships that occur in particular social and cultural contexts.

Since the late 1980s an increasing number of studies related to sports and sport culture have viewed socialization as a community and cultural process. Using various combinations of critical theories, cultural studies, and poststructuralism, researchers have undertaken textual and semiotic analyses in which they focus on sports as sites where people construct and tell stories that can be used to make sense of

their lives and the worlds in which they live. In the process, culture is produced, reproduced, reformed, or transformed. Much of this research analyzes media based discourses by deconstructing the images and narratives used in connection with sports and the personas of sport figures, especially high profile athletes.

This research acknowledges that sports and the discourses that constitute them have become one of the more influential narratives in twenty first century culture. They are implicated in struggles over meanings, processes of ideological hegemony, and the expansion of global capitalism and consumer culture. One of the goals of this research is to understand sports in ways that contribute to informed and progressive explanations of the political, economic, and social issues that influence people's lives.

SEE ALSO: High School Sports; Identity, Sport and; Play; Socialization; Socialization, Agents of; Socialization, Gender; Youth Sport

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socialized medicine

Sarah Nettleton

Socialized medicine is a system of health care delivery in which care is provided as a state supported service. The term was introduced in 1954 by an American academic – Almont Lindsay – on a study visit to the United Kingdom. On his return to the US, he published a book called *Socialized Medicine in England and Wales* (Lindsay 1962), describing the history, organization, and structure of the National Health Service (NHS). However, the term “socialized medicine” is one that tends to be used by “observers” (particularly North American observers) of the UK health service and it is less commonly heard within the UK itself (Webster 2002: 1). This may be because the British NHS is considered by many analysts to be a unique example of socialized medicine. Indeed, it is often described as “a socialist island in a capitalist sea.” In this respect it forms part of a welfare system which rests on collective provision, social justice, social equality, and democracy in order to mitigate the adverse effects of capitalism. The fundamental principles of the NHS are therefore: that it should be publicly funded (predominantly by taxation); health care should be universal and be provided on the basis of health “need” rather than the ability to pay; and services should be comprehensive in that they should include preventive health services as well as treatment for those who are ill.

The NHS was established by the Labour government that had won a landslide victory after World War II and came into operation on July 5, 1948 as a result of the NHS Act passed in 1946. The Minister of Health, Aneurin

Bevan – said to be the architect of the NHS – described it as “the biggest single experiment in social service that the world has ever undertaken” (quoted in Webster 2001: 171). It is unique. Other European countries and Canada developed variations on compulsory social insurance schemes. Sweden’s universal system, established in 1955, perhaps best approximates the UK system, although it required higher levels of direct payments from patients (Webster 2001).

But to what extent can the NHS be regarded as an example of “socialized medicine”? A definitive definition of the term socialized medicine that would be required in order to answer this question is not easy, in that it would invariably fail to capture the diversity of debates associated with socialism or, more accurately, socialisms (Ginsburg 1998). However, a comparison between the initial proposals for the NHS and its subsequent design may offer some clues.

Following the two world wars there was a general consensus that health care provision in the UK was partial, chaotic, ineffective, and inequitable. Experiences during World War II not only threw these facts into sharp relief but also provided civil servants, policymakers, and practitioners with opportunities for delivering more effective “emergency” services. Proposals for a new system of health care came from the influential Socialist Medical Association, the British Medical Association (BMA), and the thinktank Political and Economic Planning. The proposals were very popular with the public and the ideas formed the basis of the 1944 White Paper (that is, a government document that sets out legislative proposals) entitled *A National Health Service*. There was to be a comprehensive, universal service provided on the basis of need and divorced from the ability to pay, provided by the state which, in turn, would employ doctors on a salaried basis. The service would be run by local authorities and located in hospitals and health centers. Before the Act was passed, however, Bevan had to modify his plans as a result of the opposition and skepticism of the medical profession. The profession’s trade union – the BMA – was anxious about its clinical freedom, and negotiated a number of concessions. Bevan is regarded as a smart political operator because he managed to capitalize on a

division within the profession between those who provided specialist secondary hospital care and those who provided primary generalist care (known in the UK as general practitioners or GPs). In particular, the latter would not be employed on a salaried basis and retained their status as independent practitioners being paid on a capitation basis, whilst the former could continue with their private medical practice alongside their NHS work. Bevan gave explicit reassurance that their clinical freedom was sacrosanct, and quietly dropped the plan for health centers. In addition, instead of implementing the unified, centrally controlled, and locally run system, a tripartite structure was introduced which meant that the hospitals, local authorities, and primary care GPs, dentists, etc. were run separately. This latter concession led to insurmountable problems in terms of coordination of services. Thus the ideal of socialized medicine resulted in a compromise, not least as a result of the need to win over the powerful profession of medicine. Such compromises continued; as the health policy analyst Rudolf Klein (2002: 230–1) notes, the political history of the NHS is one of a series of conflicts between governments and the medical profession. In particular there have been conflicts over pay, private practice, and the structure of the NHS.

In recent decades this has changed. Through out the 1980s ideologically conservative governments dominated British politics; they challenged the medical profession and altered the internal dynamics of the NHS. The NHS was established in a period of political consensus and commitment to social welfare and collectivism. Forty years later when the government led by Mrs. Thatcher was in office, the mood was for consumerism, individualism, marketization, and privatization. It is perhaps remarkable, therefore, that such a libertarian political leader proclaimed that “the NHS is safe with us” (Thatcher cited by Klein 2002: 119). The NHS remained funded predominantly out of public funds, services remain predominantly free at the point of use (although charges for drugs and services first introduced in the 1950s have increased), and health care practitioners are predominantly employed by government funded institutions. In this respect it adheres to the principles of socialized medicine. Privately financed health care and private health

care insurance remain at the margins. The margins, however, may be getting wider. Attempts to alter the internal structures of the NHS and to establish new opportunities for private finance initiatives may shift the extent to which it remains a collective and communal service. According to the official historian of the NHS Charles Webster (2002: 258), it is misguided to represent Bevan’s health service as some kind of obsolete command and control system. He suggests that politicians would do well to endorse Bevan’s conception of the NHS as a triumphant success, wherein the merits of collective provision outweigh the pernicious consequences of commercialization.

SEE ALSO: Health Care Delivery Systems; Health and Medicine; Socialist Medicine

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society

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The concept of society is both core to sociological analysis and subject to wide ranging dispute that is often informed by the theoretical disputes within the discipline. When in 1987 the British prime minister Margaret Thatcher said in an interview “There is no such thing as society. There are individual men and women and there are families,” many sociologists

offered a robust defense of the concept. But one British sociologist subsequently stated: “Thatcher might have been right [in her claim] . . . or at least the riposte from the sociological community was not fully justified” (Urry 2000). This illustrates an uncertainty within the discipline as to the appropriateness of the concept, especially in a globalized age in which the idea of discrete societies bound by national borders has been widely questioned. Ironically, however, in the rest of her interview Thatcher went on to emphasize the importance of reciprocal social obligations and bonds between people – things that many sociologists would regard as central to the idea of society.

However, the idea of society as a generalized term for social relations is relatively new and appeared, like sociology, during the transition from pre industrial to industrial society. Implicit concepts of the social can be identified much earlier, for example in Platonic and Aristotelian philosophy, but premodern philosophies did not generally differentiate “society” from the political organization of the state. It is only in late seventeenth and early eighteenth century European social thought that the term society begins to be applied to the ensemble of social relations. The use of the adjective “social” to mean “pertaining to society as a natural condition of human life” derives from Locke (1695). This use of the concept of society is based in the delineation of “civil” from “political” society, which in turn reflected the increasing complexity of social life with the transition from feudal to modern society. The principle of the feudal state as the property of the sovereign slowly gave way to the principle of impersonal rule bound by juridical rules, while the state underwent a process of differentiation into administrative, judicial, and representative functions. Civil society theorists such as Adam Ferguson celebrated the new commercial social order, the rise of public opinion, representative government, civic freedoms, plurality, and “civility.” Thus, society came to depict a realm of contractual and voluntary relationships independent of the state, which in turn became merely one area of social activity among others. Society was increasingly conceptualized as a realm of life no longer emanating from a political center, but rather the site of diffuse voluntary associations, in which individual self interested

actions result in an equilibrium of unintended consequences.

However, the liberal Enlightenment understanding of these processes as realms of individual liberty conflicted with Catholic conservative reactions to the 1789 French Revolution and its aftermath. For conservatives such as de Bonald and de Maistre, enlightened individualism and the revolution had destroyed the organic bases of society that lay in sacred moral authority and the institutions of church, monarchy, and patriarchal family. Although not sociologists, their ideas set the scene for the organic functionalist theories of society of Comte, Durkheim, and later Parsons and Luhmann. For Durkheim, society is an internally differentiated yet functionally integrated system whose operations could be understood only from the point of view of the whole. This complex system is an entity *sui generis*, that is, a discrete reality that cannot be reduced to or explained with reference to another ontological level such as biology or psychology. For systems theory, core problems of society are those of achieving sufficient internal integration to persist over time and boundary maintenance, that is, preserving borders between internal and external systems. This concept underpins systemic functionalist analysis, although mechanisms of integration are viewed differently in different theorists – moral integration in Durkheim; a more complex process of adaptation, goal attainment, integration, and latency in Parsons; and complexity reduction in Luhmann.

This approach has been criticized from at least two perspectives. First, Marxist and other critical theories have emphasized the centrality of power, exploitation, and conflict as central organizing principles in society such that “society” is a field of contestation around class, gendered, and racialized structures. Moreover, these structures operate to some extent “behind the backs” of acting subjects such that they are not immediately accessible to conscious reflection. From this point of view, “society” has only an illusory unity which critical analysis deconstructs to reveal patterns of hegemonic domination and resistances.

Secondly, individualistic theories drawing on liberal pragmatism appear in writers such as Simmel, Mead, Becker, and Goffman. They approach “society” as at best a metaphor for

an aggregation of human interactions rather than an entity *sui generis*. Indeed, Simmel would have had much sympathy with the view that we should not speak of “society” in abstraction from the forms of association that connect individuals in interaction.

This central issue has been core to many debates in sociological theory – that is, how to comprehend society both as social action and as a system of interrelated practices with unintended consequences. One can say that “society” refers to all forms of mutual and intersubjective communication in which the perceptions and behavior of actors are oriented to those of others. These may be specific others – such as family members, colleagues, friends, rivals, enemies, and authority figures – or they may be generalized others in the form of internalized expectations derived from cultural, moral, practical, and communicative practices. These intersubjective networks can exist on a multiplicity of levels – personal and impersonal; local and global; within regions, nations, and across borders. They exist across a continuum between informal and voluntarily entered relationships (such as friendship), through formal institutional interactions (e.g., in workplaces and with officials), to highly coercive ones such as prisons. Social relationships at each of these levels can be constituted by expressive (affective) orientations or by instrumental ones. Relationships can be highly personal and influenced by the particular characteristics of others or highly impersonal and formalized encounters, such as a money exchange or phoning a call center. “Society” thus refers to the complex patterns of social relationships that will be sustained through time and space, although encounters may be anything from fleeting to lifelong and proximate to distant. Any social interaction though will summon up or, as Giddens (1979) puts it, “instantiate” vast amounts of tacitly held, taken for granted background cultural knowledge about how to perform and attribute meaning to social interaction. This means that as well as situated interactions and communications, “society” also refers to the latent structures of linguistic, affective, cultural, and normative rules that are deployed piecemeal in any actual interaction. Systems of power and domination also inhere within these structures, although they can be accessed and subject to

critical reflection and practice through intersubjective communication.

SEE ALSO: Civil Society; Functionalism/Neofunctionalism; Globalization; Social Worlds; Society and Biology; Sociology

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society and biology

Adrian Franklin

Society and biology is one of the new transdisciplinary fields of sociology that emerged in the 1990s. Owing to its strong links with genetic research, medicine, health, agriculture, environment, and science and technology, it has developed a number of important research centers, such as Bios (Center for the Study of Bioscience, Biomedicine, Biotechnology, and Society) at the London School of Economics, the Center for Biology and Society at Arizona State University, the Center for Science Studies at the University of Lancaster, and the Department of Biology and Society at the University of Amsterdam.

In the 1990s it became clear, from work in the areas of the sociology of health, the sociology of the body, and science and technology studies, that it was no longer possible to conceive of a sociological domain that was separable from the biological even if biological processes and social processes could be distinguished as different (Newton 2003a, b). Critically, social phenomena operate in material and biotic contexts in which important transfers of materials, information, prehensions, and

inscriptions take place. Anthropologists, for example, are just beginning to take notice of and understand the natural construction of society as well as the social construction of nature (see Franklin 2002: ch. 4).

Foucault argued that power, surveillance, and control operate on and through the human body. However, our very conception of biology and “life itself” has enormous implications for how we think of ourselves socially. Sarah Franklin argues that we can identify three shifts in the way life itself has been considered in modern societies.

First, in the nineteenth century nature was *biologized*. According to this view, life originates in narratives of evolution and natural selection. It became possible to think of human difference in biological terms (such as race). Equally, individuals could be explained in conception stories of eggs and sperm, and of genetic blueprints. These were “the facts of life.”

Second, biology itself became geneticized in the latter half of the twentieth century, and now social issues surrounding human behavior, pathology, and risk were geneticized: social planning and management now involved *genetic* assessment. Social life oriented itself to genetic genealogy and referenced “genetic parents,” “genetic relatedness,” “genetic risk,” “genetic identity,” and “genetic variation.” Concern over genetic inheritance gave way to socially significant technologies of control such as genetic screening, the human genome project, and human gene therapy. The discourse of genetics, then, was an important language to describe not only the human condition, but also the condition of life itself, and technologies emerging in the human world were transferred to new concerns with environmental change and the future of reproduction generally. Life had been reduced to information.

Third, geneticization became inseparable from its instrumentalization or the uses that could be made of it. In addition to being able to make new life and change existing life at will (theoretically), geneticization made possible completely new forms of property and power. More can be done with genes, such as the capitalization of life itself. The commodification of genomics drove international scientific competition to claim biotechnical market share but also expertise in the management and

surveillance of genetic risk. Patents were now possible for new life. As Franklin (2000) put it, “emergent definitions of genetic risk, and their attendant techniques of detection and intervention, are indexical of changing relationships between health and pathology, disease and cure, technoscience and the body, humans and animals, and the regulation of public health. In turn, such altered understandings contextualize the ways in which life itself can be owned, capitalized and patented.”

Nature becomes biology, becomes genetics, through which life itself becomes reprogrammable information across time, space, and “species” (which become irrelevant?). Franklin asks us to think about *Jurassic Park* as an example of the emergent genetic imaginary. However, it is not just life that changes but *being*. Creatures such as Dolly the Sheep, “Onco mouse,” and Jefferson the Calf were not born but *made*; they were not beings but “done tos.” More social life will focus on accumulation strategy deals between corporate wealth generation and molecular biology. And as this happens, sociologists are beginning to ask whether society itself will become recombinant.

Tim Newton argues, however, that genetic technologies and future technologies to tackle hitherto uncontrolled natural forces such as weather and volcanic activity will dissolve finally the very distinction between biology and society: “What remains of interest is how far human techno linguistic skill will enable us to increasingly plasticize biological and physical processes and ‘short circuit’ seemingly millennial natural stabilities. Are we moving toward plastic bodies (with ‘clonable’ parts) and a pliable world where we will be able to play with *all* the times of nature? If we move toward the latter scenario, current differences between natural and social times will increasingly erode” (2003a: 27–8).

In the meantime, the sociological study of society and biology will monitor not only social change emerging from new technologies and their implications, but also its *contested* nature in the realm of biopolitics. Nikolas Rose says that “the biological existence of human beings has become political in novel ways” (2001:1). He traces the history of biopolitics, beginning with the nineteenth to mid twentieth centuries when those in power sought to discipline individuals, through health and hygiene

regimes and breeding programs, “in the name of the population.” Further into the twentieth century the massive political apparatus of health would not have been possible without the increasing health aspirations of the people themselves. This alliance between state and people shifted in the second half of the twentieth century from an emphasis on avoiding sickness to an emphasis on attaining well being (an optimization of health, but also of beauty, fitness, happiness, sexuality, and more). As Rose says: “selfhood has become intrinsically somatic – ethical practices increasingly take the body as a key site for work on the self” (2001: 18). This biopolitics merges with what he has called ethopolitics or the politics of life itself: “the ethos of human existence – the sentiments moral nature or guiding beliefs of persons, groups, or institutions – have come to provide the ‘medium’ within which the self government of the autonomous individual can be connected up with the imperatives of good government. In ethopolitics, life itself, as it is lived in its everyday manifestations, is the object of adjudication” (2001: 18). Because of this, the salience of biology and society is not just important for sociology, it is the basis on which important life choices must be made by most of the individuals it studies.

SEE ALSO: Actor Network Theory; Actor Network Theory, Actants; Animal Rights Movements; Biosociological Theories; Gender, the Body and; Genetic Engineering as a Social Problem; Human Genome and the Science of Life; Nature; Science and Culture; Society

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sociocultural relativism

John Curra

INTELLECTUAL AND SOCIAL CONTEXT

While the word “culture” was first used in 1877 by Edward Tylor to describe the totality of humans’ behavioral, material, intellectual, and spiritual products, it was Franz Boas who gave the term one of its most distinctive elaborations. Unlike some other anthropologists (e.g., Malinowski), Boas refused to devalue cultures regardless of how primitive they might appear to outsiders. For Boas, the principal task was to describe accurately and understand completely the cultures of the world, not to rank them from good to bad. Students of Boas, especially Benedict and Herskovits, carried on his legacy, especially his commitment to cultural relativity. They adopted cultural relativity as a principal way to generate respect and tolerance for human diversity, while defending indigenous peoples from threats to their collective and individual well being.

Sociocultural relativism is a postulate, a method, and a perspective. One implication of the postulate of relativity is that actions and attributes vary from time to time, place to place, and situation to situation. If anything “real” or “objective” exists in the social world, it is the intrinsically situational nature of both rules and reactions and the dynamic, negotiated nature of social order (Becker 1973). A second implication of the postulate of relativity is that collective *definitions* of actions and attributes are elastic and also vary from time to time, place to place, and situation to situation (Cohen 1974). Things that are mightily upsetting to one generation may be trivial to the next

(or vice versa), and a particular trait of an individual can be admired by friends but despised by enemies (Goode 2001: 37). The concept of relativism is based on the fact that at certain times and places, acts and attributes that an outsider might find distressing or wrong are not defined as such by individuals living in those times or places (Goode 2003). Sociocultural relativism is a method, too. It demands an actor relevant approach in which social scientists take the role of their subjects and understand the world through the subjects' eyes. While this does not guarantee freedom from ethnocentrism, it does make this bias less likely. In Goffman's (1961: 130) words, "the awesomeness, distastefulness, and barbarity of a foreign culture can decrease to the degree that the student becomes familiar with the point of view to life that is taken by his [her] subjects." Sociocultural relativism requires that you put yourself in the shoes of another, maybe even an adversary's, in order to understand why some one might wear those shoes at all (Fish 2001). Sociocultural relativism is also a perspective, as it is possible to find relativism or nonrelativism in human experience depending on how an observer's eye is slanted. If you are looking for vacillation, drift, and indeterminacy, they are easy to find in this constantly changing, multiplex world of ours; if, however, you are looking for stability and constancy, you can find them, too. Not all sociologists consider themselves relativists, but *all* sociologists must wrestle with the ethical, philosophical, logical, theoretical, and empirical issues that surround a discussion of sociocultural relativism.

Respect for diversity must be tempered with the knowledge that some conditions can neither be easily overlooked nor dismissed as an example of the equivalency of human cultures. We have neither a convincing moral code that can be applied to all places and times nor any theory that makes it possible to understand human experience separate from its social context (Hatch 1997). Nonetheless, situations will be found in which it is impossible to maintain an attitude of indifference. Sociocultural relativists do not have to believe in the absolute equivalency of values, norms, or customs and blindly accept whatever they find. Romanticizing diversity blunts our ability to recognize the genuine

tragedy, pathos, and harm that deviant social practices can produce.

Marx had relativistic leanings, apparent in his claim that economic forms are transitory and historical, and he was opposed to any fixed or determinate view of nature. However, the first extensive application of sociocultural relativism is found in Durkheim's *Rules of Sociological Method* when he contrasts the "normal" with the "pathological." He asks us to imagine a society of saints, a "perfect cloister of exemplary individuals" (Durkheim 1938: 68–9). Crimes like murder, rape, robbery, and drug addiction would not exist in this virtuous place, but crime would still be found even though it would seem minor to individuals from the less than saintly society. Durkheim was contending that it is the *attitude* about, and *reactions* to, some act (i.e., how it is judged and punished) by observers that is principally responsible for its categorization as criminal. Acts may be viewed as offenses even though they are not harmful in any essential or intrinsic way, as is found in proscriptions against allowing a sacred fire to die down or mispronouncing a ritual formula. Even when a crime *is* indeed harmful to a society, the intensity of the reaction may be disproportionate to the harm done (Durkheim 1933: 72). Deviance as an analytical and empirical category may be near universal, but the particular form that deviance takes most assuredly is not (Ben Yehuda 1990: 11).

A relativizing motif is a driving force of sociological consciousness, and sociologists call into question what most other people take for granted. One of sociology's strengths is that it can make sense of groups and relationships in a world in which values have been radically relativized (Berger 1963: 48). Sociologists uncover and critically evaluate the pretensions and propaganda individuals use to hide, distort, or legitimize what they are doing. They shift from one perspective to another, ranging from the impersonal and remote transformations of the wider society to the inner experiences of individuals in order to understand the interconnections between the two. Sociologists participate mentally in the experiences of individuals differently situated from themselves no matter where or when they are found. Sociocultural relativism can help us to understand the experiences of

people in groups and subcultures *within* the boundaries of any one society, as well as the experiences of people drawn from different societies and cultures.

PATHOLOGY, BASIC HUMAN RIGHTS, AND SOCIOCULTURAL RELATIVISM

To describe some culture, social arrangement, group, or human being as “sick” may be convenient, but it does little, or nothing, to further our understanding of human experience. Things do not have to be categorized as pathological for them to be recognized as harmful or to admit that humans and their societies would be better off without them. Sociologists are inclined to think that the concept of pathology fails to illuminate actual happenings and needs to be rejected. The principal defect of pathologizing diversity is that it fails to explain correctly the phenomenon under review (Matza 1969: 44). It fails to recognize the functionality and durability of deviance.

Even as the notion of pathology was being purged from sociology, it was being replaced by a notion of intrinsic harm and a normative definition of deviance. The global concern with basic human rights, principally in response to the horrors of the Holocaust and World War II, was formalized in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR) of the United Nations (1948). Before World War II, human rights protections were viewed as a domestic, not international, project. The atrocities of the war, especially the Holocaust, changed things. It became clear that individuals were at a disadvantage when faced with governmental power, and they needed more protection against abuse than the legal system of any one nation could provide. The UDHR was sanctioned by each member country of the United Nations in 1948, and it continues to be viewed as a standard against which human decency should be measured. It forbids murder, torture, and slavery, even while it authorizes freedom of conscience, speech, and dissent. Specific sections of the document confirm the rights to employment and fair working conditions; to health, food, and security; to education; and to participation in the cultural life of the community. These

human rights claims are based on principles of fairness, rightness, justice, or equity that should in principle extend to people in all parts of the world.

A normative approach to basic human rights is not without its problems. Mills’s critique of the ideology of “social pathologists” (specialists on social problems and deviance) was thoughtful and thought provoking. His discussion offers a cautionary note to any normative approach that defines harms in terms of universal social norms. Norms, Mills (1943) instructed, reflect the interests, experiences, and resources of the people who fashion them, not a universal morality or global consensus. Norms do not simply create and channel human behavior, they also serve as the standards against which deviation is defined and measured. To the extent that norms are ideological, so are definitions of right and wrong or proper and improper. The push for universal human rights is difficult to justify in the face of substantial cultural and religious diversity, and profound doubts exist about the workability of implementing uniform moral standards cross culturally (Zechenter 1997). Rights and harms must be understood from a study of particular social historical groupings and their relationships with other social groupings, not from the application of abstract, self contained sets of rules.

We must be careful not to be duped by what may be called “expedient relativism.” This exists when elites in sovereign nations justify everything they do, no matter how harmful it is, by insisting that they should be allowed to do whatever they want. Countries that violate the human rights of their populations most often are the ones whose leaders are most likely to justify their actions by appealing to sovereignty and cultural relativity. They defend practices such as corporal or capital punishment, the abuse of women (including genital mutilation), sexism and racism, and political violence by claiming that their critics are ethnocentric or indifferent to their local customs. The concept of relativity, which was developed to encourage an awareness of, and respect for, human diversity has returned to haunt the social sciences. It is used to legitimize the subjugation of indigenous groups, women, and minorities and to excuse human rights abuses.

RELATIVITY OF DEVIANCE

Sociocultural relativism has kindred ties with Matza's (1969) idea of "natural deviation." Naturalism is an approach that views the human actor as a self-conscious, reflexive being who engages in meaningful activity. Naturalism rejects determinism, and its only obligation is to offer a correct rendition of worldly activities. It combines observation with empathy, intuition, and experience, while it views humans as individuals who intentionally create the world within which they live. "The growth of a sociological view of deviant phenomena involved . . . the replacement of a correctional stance by an *appreciation* of the deviant subject, the tacit purging of a conception of pathology by new stress on human *diversity*, and the erosion of a simple distinction between deviant and conventional phenomena, resulting from more intimate familiarity with the world as it is" (Matza 1969: 10). The difficulty in defining deviance is due neither to flaws in the concept of deviance nor in sociocultural relativism. The difficulty lies in the unruly nature of society and the indeterminacy of interpersonal relationships. Definitions of deviance are naturally ambiguous because deviance lacks inherent or essential characteristics, and human relationships are characterized by both drift and defiance. We have a right to our views of proper and improper but, if we are studying deviance, we have to pay attention to how such judgments are constructed and vary through time and space. How visitors to some culture or group react to some act, attribute, or condition is a completely separate issue from how its members do (Goode 2003).

Sociocultural relativists are inclined to view deviance as a relationship instead of a condition that some people have that others lack (Curra 2000). Social control can actually cause deviance by categorizing acts, attributes, and actors as deviant and helping to mold deviance into a pattern or career (Becker 1963: 25–39). Goffman (1961) showed that rules and reactions regularly produce counter rules and resistance, which inevitably produce new categories of "deviance" and "deviant" because resistance to authority is usually defined as a serious matter by those who do not want their authority challenged. Cohen (1974) noted that social definitions continually work to ensure that all positions on a continuum

from good to bad are always filled, so some individuals will always be classified as worse than other individuals. The wickedness of the villain, like the virtue of the saint, may have to be invented. Parsons (1951) made it clear, at least as clear as he could, that social control agents assigned the status of "deviant" to individuals and "deviance" to acts because it helped to support and sustain the normative order, as well as masking or disguising legitimate social conflicts over proper and improper motivational orientations and behaviors. In creating an "other," groups may manufacture a scapegoat that can be used to explain away continuing or worsening social problems.

Becker's writings synthesize the sociological concept of deviance with sociocultural relativism. In fact, relativism is at the core of the interactionist or labeling approach to deviance. With his ideas of "sides" (Becker 1967), "sentimentality" (Becker 1964, 1967), "hierarchies of credibility" (Becker 1967), and "moral entrepreneurs" (Becker 1963), Becker was able to draw attention to the role played by labeling, power, and audience reactions in producing careers of deviance. By moving away from the inclination of many other theorists to define deviance in terms of intrinsic qualities of actions and attributes, Becker gave a new spin to the sociology of deviance. Groups of people create deviance as they act together; no individual can create deviance alone. Social control agents, as Goffman (1961) showed with both precision and elegance, have both personal and bureaucratic reasons to create labels and apply them to individuals. If individuals refuse to follow rules or resist the labels being applied to them, control agents will view the resistance itself as a problem and in need of correction. In this way, deviance grows exponentially to the number of institutions established to deal with it (Sumner 1994).

Lemert's idea of "putative" deviance allowed sociologists of deviance to clarify the parameters of sociocultural relativism in regard to *warranted* or *unwarranted* definitions and reactions. "The putative deviation is that portion of the societal definition of the deviant which has no foundation in his [her] objective behavior. Frequently these fallacious imputations are incorporated into myth and stereotype and mediate much of the formal treatment of the deviant" (Lemert 1951: 56). Reactions to deviance can be

disproportional, and individuals can be falsely accused (Becker 1963). Members of a society may come to believe that the threats from deviance are greater than they actually are (Goode & Ben Yehuda 1994). Objective mole hills can be transformed into subjective mountains (Jones et al. 1989), and moral enterprises can evolve into moral panics (Goode & Ben Yehuda 1994).

Becker's concept of sentimentality shows that what is deviant depends on whose view is being taken. He borrowed the term from Freidson's (1961) study of physicians and their patients. Freidson was willing to give credibility and authority to patients' views of their physicians, even when these views were at odds with what physicians thought of themselves. Becker defined sentimentality as a disposition on the part of a researcher to leave certain variables in a problem unexamined or to refuse to consider alternate views or distasteful possibilities (Becker 1964). We are sentimental particularly when we refuse to consider the merits (or lack thereof) of *both* conventional and unconventional social actors only because we do not want to face the possibility that some cherished sympathy of ours might be shown to be untrue (Becker 1967). Putative deviance, coupled with "unsentimentality," can serve as an excellent foundation upon which to identify and, if necessary, condemn inhumane practices and, more important, the sociocultural features that produce them in the first place. If sociocultural relativists believe in anything universal, it is their belief in human potentialities and their confidence that individuals can be better than they are.

SEE ALSO: Boas, Franz; Cultural Relativism; Deviance, Absolutist Definitions of; Deviance, Constructionist Perspectives; Deviance, Reactivist Definitions of; Labeling Theory; Moral Entrepreneur; Moral Panics; Social Pathology

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socioeconomic status, health, and mortality

Richard G. Rogers and Jarron M. Saint Onge

The World Health Organization broadly defines health as “a state of complete physical, mental, and social well being and not merely the absence of disease or infirmity” (WHO 1948). Health can be assessed in a number of ways, but generally includes subjective health, physical impairment, vitality and well being, and chronic disease. Health is a measure of the quality of life, whereas mortality defines the risk of death and can be used to measure length of life. Socioeconomic status (SES) exerts a profound influence on all dimensions of health and mortality. Individuals who are situated in elevated positions in the social hierarchy tend to experience superior levels of health and survival.

Mortality captures the extreme consequences of socioeconomic disadvantage and in some cases reflects the ultimate state of poor health (Rogers et al. 2000). Mortality outcomes are a useful way of understanding the negative effects of socioeconomic disadvantage. For example, while death rates in the general population have fallen overall, more advantaged groups have experienced greater declines in mortality, which has resulted in increased mortality disparities between socioeconomically advantaged and disadvantaged groups (Pappas et al. 1993).

SES MEASURES AND RELATIONSHIPS

SES is usually conceptualized to include multiple dimensions (knowledge, employment, and economic status) and is often indexed by educational and occupational attainment and income. Individuals who are employed, with higher levels of education, and with greater incomes

tend to enjoy better health and lower mortality than socioeconomically disadvantaged individuals. SES is measured in a variety of ways, depending on data availability and the specific research questions posed.

Education is regarded as the most important dimension of SES. It is typically measured categorically by highest degree attained, with the assumption that qualitative differences exist between those with less than a high school degree, a completed high school degree, and advanced degrees. Educational attainment usually occurs prior to employment, may be a prerequisite for occupational advancement, engenders a broader world perspective, contributes to a sense of personal control, is related to healthy behaviors, and provides the requisite knowledge and skills to obtain health information (Mirowsky & Ross 2003).

Education has a graded effect on health and mortality, with higher educational levels contributing to better health and survival prospects. Figure 1 shows this education gradient for both sexes. The gap in life expectancy between high and low levels of education is larger for males than females. And the returns to education are substantial: a 25 year old male with less than a high school degree can expect eight fewer years of life than a comparably aged male with an advanced degree. Increased education adds years to life.

Income can be measured for the individual or family. Family incomes are noteworthy because families can pool resources to provide for all members and they benefit from economies of scale. Methods of measuring income include per capita income, poverty rates, income to needs ratios, and various consumption thresholds. Income can also be measured through relative comparisons. Whereas incomes can directly affect health through access to health care and opportunities for healthy lifestyles, income inequality can indirectly affect health outcomes and mortality through underinvestment in social spending, erosion of social cohesion, and stress. For example, reduced social spending can limit life opportunities for less privileged groups by means of public goods such as education. The disintegration of social cohesion may increase levels of mistrust and reduce civic attachments, thereby limiting important social buffers to mortality. Finally, income inequality can




Figure 1 Education-specific life expectancies at age 25 by sex, USA.
Source: Derived from Richards & Barry (1998) and based on 1990 data.

increase stress and frustration levels by means of relative deprivation in which perceived disparities contribute to potential health problems.

Recent research has expanded measures of economic status. Diversified income portfolios, higher levels of wealth, home ownership, and a lack of credit card debt predict better health and lower mortality. Income portfolios demonstrate that individuals derive income from multiple sources, such as job income, self employment income, interest income, dividend income, pensions, and Social Security. Additional income streams help individuals buffer against the loss of any single income source, and higher levels of wealth can translate into better health at older ages.

Researchers have begun to examine the associations between SES and health and mortality among individuals with limited socioeconomic resources. In an innovative analysis, Krueger and colleagues (2004) examined the effects of Food Stamp receipt on mortality. Food Stamp aid can improve health and reduce mortality by directly providing access to adequate nutrition, while also indirectly allowing households to allocate other earnings to such factors as health

care, education, job training, or simply paying bills, which could reduce stress, and thereby improve health and survival. Not all eligible individuals participate in the Food Stamp program, but those who participate experience reduced risks of death.

Assessing the causal direction between income and health is complicated: does low income produce poor health or vice versa? In some instances, sick, ill, and frail individuals may suffer job demotions and pay reductions. But the overwhelming evidence supports the strong and persistent effects of income on health. Low income increases the likelihood of poor health and contributes to higher risks of death.

Compared to individuals who are not in the labor force, employed individuals are generally healthier, in part, because they have access to income, workplace camaraderie, workplace health factors such as gyms and exercise programs, and health insurance. This employment benefit is termed the healthy worker effect. Again, causality is difficult to assess: poor health also impedes the likelihood of employment.

Specific occupations affect health behaviors, health risks, and mortality. For instance,

Academy Award winners can expect to live 3.9 years longer than less recognized actors and actresses (Redeimeier & Singh 2001). Others, using measures of occupational status, such as the Nam Powers Occupational SES Scores (OSS), or indicators of occupational prestige, such as Duncan's Socioeconomic Index (SEI), show that mortality and morbidity decrease with increased status and prestige.

FUNDAMENTAL CAUSES AND PATHWAYS

There are many explanations for the existence of health disparities by SES. Explanations can be examined through both resource and non resource dependent characteristics. According to Jonathan Feinstein (1993), resource dependent characteristics include, for example, income and wealth, whereas non resource characteristics are composed of psychological, genetic, and cultural factors. Additionally, the non resource dependent characteristics depend on life span experiences and differential access to health care services.

Bruce Link and Jo Phelan (1995) make a persuasive case that higher levels of SES translate into behaviors that minimize the risks associated with morbidity and mortality. Compared to individuals with lower SES, individuals with higher SES are more likely to engage in healthy behaviors – exercise, abstention from smoking, more nutritious diets, use of seatbelts, avoidance of drug use or excessive alcohol consumption – which translate into lower risks of death from such causes as cardiovascular disease, many forms of cancer, diabetes, accidents, and homicide.

Researchers have demonstrated that poor SES conditions in infancy and childhood may predispose individuals to later health problems. Poor SES conditions early in life may expose individuals to additional infectious diseases, environmental hazards, or stress that may contribute to health problems in middle and older ages.

A stress paradigm may also explain deleterious health effects. Individuals with lower SES are more likely to suffer greater environmental and social insults, such as discrimination and social subjugation, which contributes to higher

psychological and physiological stress. Higher stress can translate into detrimental health behaviors, including drug and alcohol dependence, which result in increased risks of chronic conditions, functional limitations, and mortality. Lower SES individuals also have fewer resources to deal with these stressors, which further exacerbates their poor health and survival prospects.

Contextual or structural components may lead to deleterious negative health outcomes. Lower SES individuals have less access to health information and healthy foods, and are less able to implement health recommendations. Additionally, the marketing and location of fast food restaurants target lower SES groups and lead to poorer diets. Lower SES groups are more likely to be exposed to violence, crime, disorder, and fear that adversely affect health and mortality.

FUTURE DIRECTIONS IN RESEARCH, THEORY, AND METHODOLOGY

Although a vast literature on SES and health and mortality exists, a number of questions warrant further investigation. Researchers have shown strong associations between education, measured as formal years of schooling completed, and health outcomes. The use of more refined measures of education might provide additional insight into what it is about education that is health enhancing. Is education merely a proxy for ability or IQ or is it the knowledge, skills, training, and certification that education confers that leads to better health outcomes? There may be measurable differences between individuals who obtain a high school diploma, a GED, or who do not graduate but all of whom obtain 12 years of formal schooling. In addition, many individuals acquire extensive on the job training. Others may not accrue additional years of formal education but instead dedicate substantial time and effort to, and gain important insight through, workshops and seminars. Further, some individuals, especially in professional positions, are required to maintain levels of certification. Formal years of education is a crude measure of the multiple aspects of knowledge attainment that may influence behaviors that either enhance or impede good health.

Some researchers are investigating an expanded array of occupational characteristics that may also be related to health and mortality. Jencks et al. (1988) have proposed new measures of job desirability. They have asked individuals to rate their job relative to others based on such characteristics as educational requirements, hours worked, on the job training, level of supervision, repetitiveness, and job dirtiness. Some jobs are more physically demanding, requiring twisting, turning, vibrating, and bending. Other jobs may expose workers to hazards such as chemical exposure to insecticides, pesticides, solvents, and acids, or to radioactive material, risk of fire, or risk of accidents.

Longitudinal panel data, life course conceptual frameworks, and related analytic techniques allow the assessment of time varying covariates, or changes in statuses over time, and the effects on later health outcomes. For example, we need to know more about how job loss, income shocks, job transitions, or temporary layoffs affect health and mortality. Also, individuals do not live in social isolation; they are nested within families, households, neighborhoods, and communities. Future analyses must examine these multilevel dynamics. For instance, families often make employment decisions for family members. Thus, families may endeavor to optimize the health of all family members rather than focus on selected family members. Finally, new research on social capital and social networks may also provide valuable insight into health and mortality.

SEE ALSO: Biodemography; Gender, Health, and Mortality; Health Risk Behavior; Health and Social Class; Healthy Life Expectancy; Life Chances and Resources; Mortality: Transitions and Measures; Race/Ethnicity, Health, and Mortality

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sociolinguistics

J. K. Chambers

Sociolinguistics is the systematic study of the social uses of language. It proceeds by observing the way people use language in different social settings. People adjust their vocabulary, sounds, and syntax depending upon who they are speaking to and the circumstances of the conversation. Such adjustments are often linguistically subtle and socially meticulous and largely subconscious. They are not taught or consciously learned, but are part of the innate linguistic competence of all normal people.

Philosophers have always recognized that socialization is the primary function of language. In 1690, Locke wrote: "God, having designed man for a sociable creature, made him not only with an inclination, and under a necessity to have fellowship with those of his kind, but

furnished him also with language, which was to be the great instrument and common tie of society." Yet linguistic research into its social significance is relatively recent, having emerged as an international movement only in the second half of the twentieth century. Sociolinguistics extends social science methods to the venerable study of language, which since Plato has been conceived as the abstract study of the combinatorial possibilities of parts of speech (syntax) and speech sounds (phonology). Around 1960, linguists began tracking social variables in speech acts, such as the age, sex, and social class of the participants, and correlating them with dependent linguistic variables.

Variation in language is socially motivated and linguistically insignificant. To take a simple example, it is possible in English to say either *John doesn't need any help* or *John doesn't need no help*. Those two sentences convey the same linguistic meaning and both are readily understood by anyone who speaks the language. Linguistically, they are perfect paraphrases. Socially, however, they are not equivalent at all, with the former deemed to be correct, educated, standard usage, and the latter, though it differs by only one small word, deemed to be incorrect, uneducated, or rustic.

Variables with widely held social evaluations, like double negatives (and *ain't* for *isn't*, *hissself* for *himself*, and *me wasn't* for *me weren't*), are said to stigmatize. Most variables carry more subtle social evaluations. William Labov (1966), in the seminal sociolinguistic masterwork, showed that New Yorkers, who variably pronounce /r/ in certain contexts, so that *cart*, *pork*, and *bird* are sometimes pronounced "r less," like *caht*, *pohk*, and *boid*, carry complex biases. Labov's subjects, when asked to guess the occupations of speakers based on tape recorded samples of their speech, guessed "TV personality" for one woman, but on hearing another sample, unwittingly spoken by the same woman, they downgraded her to "receptionist"; the second speech sample was identical to the first except that it contained one r less pronunciation. Moreover, the New Yorkers made that judgment regardless of whether they themselves usually used r less pronunciations.

Hallmarks of the sociolinguistic enterprise are (1) the identification of linguistic variants correlated with social factors, (2) the incorporation

of style as an independent variable, and (3) the apparent time apprehension of linguistic changes in progress. All represent innovations in language studies due to sociolinguistics (Chambers 2002).

Social factors largely determine the linguistic realization of speech acts. Janitors speak differently to lawyers in the office block than they do among themselves, and vice versa. Young mothers meeting by chance at the local doctor's office chat to one another more familiarly than they do to elderly neighbors in the same situation. Men and women in sex exclusive domains such as locker rooms tend to slant both the topics of their conversation and their speech styles in different ways. These responses are partly predictable in terms of the social attributes of the participants.

Social class, age, and sex are overriding determinants of linguistic variation, but others also play roles. Ethnicity figured crucially in the development of sociolinguistic concepts because close study of African American varieties became a testing ground and sounding board at the inception of the new discipline (as summarized in Rickford 1999). American sociolinguists like Labov, Walt Wolfram, and John Baugh demonstrated beyond any doubt that African American varieties, notwithstanding more than a century of disparagement by cultural arbiters, were as systematic, rule governed, and complex as main line Philadelphia speech or any other English dialect, or for that matter any human language from Latin to Laotian.

In modern industrial societies the speech of the educated middle class in capital cities tends to gain acceptance as the national norm and get codified (in somewhat idealized form) in dictionaries, grammar books, and usage guides. Working class varieties typically differ from the standard dialect both grammatically and phonologically, and the differences are socially stratified, so that they become greater down the social hierarchy, with lower working class more different from the standard than middle working class, and so on. Within social classes, women tend to use fewer stigmatized and nonstandard features than men, a robust difference that apparently holds in all complex societies. The age groups at the social extremes also tend to differ most from the standard, with the oldest groups preserving some features that have

become archaic or old fashioned in the dialect, and adolescents accelerating changes and adopting innovations at a greater rate than their elders.

Most variation is a matter of degree rather than kind. Only stigmatized variants like multiple negatives occur as absolute differences, in that they almost never occur in middle class speech but do occur in working class speech. Most variants typically occur with graded frequencies in all the social classes. For instance, the common English variable known as (ng), which indicates variant pronunciations of present participle endings as *walking* vs. *walkin'*, *running* vs. *runnin'*, and *telling* vs. *tellin'* (phonetically, a final velar nasal vs. alveolar nasal), is graded throughout the social hierarchy (as summarized in Chambers 2003: 121–6). A study in Norwich, England, showed lower middle class people used the *walkin'* variant 18 percent of the time in casual conversation, while upper working class used it 72 percent and lower working class 91 percent in the same circumstances. Consistent with sex patterns, women always use it less than men of the same social class: for instance, upper working class Norwich women use it 66 percent of the time, but the men who are their brothers, husbands, and neighbors use it 79 percent of the time. Consistent with the acceleration of variation by adolescents, a study in Sydney, Australia, showed that working class teenagers used the *walkin'* variant 26 percent of the time, but their parents and grandparents only 4 percent of the time.

Style cuts across the social variables and adds a second dimension to linguistic variation (Schilling Estes 2002). Stylistic adjustments in more casual contexts usually result in an increase in the frequency of vernacular variants, and vernacular variants are generally the ones that characterize working class speech. So, in terms of the *walkin'* variant, middle class speakers use it more frequently among friends in recreational situations than among colleagues at business meetings. Casual styles thus bear some of the characteristics of social class speech lower on the social hierarchy, but since the adjustments take the same direction for all social classes the styles remain stratified, with little or no overlap between the classes. This recurring pattern shows that a speech community is defined not because its members speak the same

as one another, but because they share the communal norms.

Adjustments in style are usually explicable in terms of self monitoring. As social settings become more casual, participants become less self conscious about their behavior. Linguistically, they use more vernacular variants. This explanation presupposes that the vernacular is more natural than standard speech, more relaxed, and presumably more deeply embedded in the language faculty. Under special circumstances, stylistic adjustments are highly self conscious, as when a white adolescent adopts African American features with his peers (called “crossing,” Rampton 1995), or an adult with social airs adopts features of the higher social class (called “aspirers,” Chambers 2003: 101–5). Self conscious adjustments like these attract attention and are sometimes subject to criticism, whereas style shifting toward the vernacular in casual settings generally goes unnoticed.

Understanding language change constitutes perhaps the greatest advance in language study that is a direct consequence of sociolinguistic methods. Labov noticed consistent differences in the speech of people in different age groups, and postulated that the differences represented changes in progress, such that the younger people were using features that were supplanting the ones used by older generations. Prior to sociolinguistics, historical linguists had studied change in what is called “real time,” by comparing two (or more) states of a language at different periods. Studying change in “apparent time,” by comparing two (or more) age groups in the same period, reveals its dynamics and introduces the possibility of determining how the change is progressing, which groups are leading it, and how it is spreading socially (summarized in Bailey 2002).

The apparent time hypothesis assumes that people acquire their accents and dialects in their formative years, say, by age 20, and retain them throughout their lifetimes. The speech of 80 year olds thus reflects the language norms of the community some 60 years earlier. Generally, the hypothesis holds, as shown in tests whereby apparent time results have been subjected to real time comparisons, by linguists revisiting a community 20 or more years later. The apparent time hypothesis provides a framework that yields, as Weinreich et al. (1968) put it

in a seminal article, “a theory of language change that bypasses the fruitless paradoxes with which historical linguistics has been struggling.”

Nevertheless, as a hypothesis, it must be applied prudently and tested rigorously. It can be disrupted, for instance, by individuals going against the grain of their social cohort, like the aspirers mentioned above, and one subcategory of individuals can defy communal norms in predictable ways (discussed as “oddballs and insiders,” in Chambers 2003: 93–115). A type of linguistic change that disrupts the apparent time hypothesis is “age grading,” the regular adjustment of linguistic features as maturity emblems (Bailey 2002: 324; Chambers 2003: 206–11). For instance, Japanese boys use honorific markers characteristic of women and only gradually adopt the adult male system as adolescents; an apparent time study would thus show differences between boys and men, indicative under ordinary circumstances of change in progress, but a real time study of those boys 10 years later would reveal them perfectly aligned with the adult males, evidence that no change had taken place in communal norms.

Sociolinguistics has discovered nuances such as social subcategories and age graded changes in coming to grips with the manifold ways in which interacting variables of class, sex, age, ethnicity, and style affect the way people speak. For the first time, a branch of linguistics studies grammar and phonology as they are enacted in the service of communication. Sociolinguistics is necessarily variant, continuous, and quantitative, and in all those respects it differs from older branches of linguistics. For centuries, thinking people have recognized, at least tacitly, that our speech expresses who we are and how we relate to the social setting, as well as what is on our minds. The social uses of language are so deeply engrained in our human nature that they were thought to be beyond human comprehension, as were consciousness and genetic coding. Like them, when sociolinguistics came into being in the second half of the twentieth century, its very existence represented an assault on the presumed limits of knowledge. Also like them it made rapid progress, a consequence undoubtedly of the fact that there was every thing to learn. It is now firmly established as a core area in the study of language.

SEE ALSO: Language; *Langue and Parole*; Quantitative Methods; Sex and Gender; Social Structure

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sociological imagination

Christopher Andrews

The term “sociological imagination” comes from a book with that title by American sociologist C. Wright Mills (2000 [1959]) and describes an understanding of one’s own position and experiences as reflective of broader social and historical forces. According to Mills, the sociological imagination is more than just a

theoretical concept or heuristic device: it is a “promise.” The promise of the sociological imagination is to allow individuals to understand their place in the broader social and historical context. As Mills says in the first sentence of *The Sociological Imagination*, people today increasingly feel that their private lives are a series of “traps” (p. 3). The promise of the sociological imagination is to understand the nature of these traps and to determine if they are in fact private in nature, or if, as Mills suggests, their actual origin lies with broader social and historical forces.

In this regard, the sociological imagination provides a “fruitful distinction” between individual and social problems. Some problems faced by individuals simply reflect those which threaten individually held values or lifestyles, and are problems whose origin and resolution, according to Mills, lie in the personal sphere (p. 8). Other problems, however, reflect broader social or public issues. While the individual may experience these problems subjectively or first hand, the sociological imagination prompts one to imagine or speculate as to how such problems may be tied to broader structural or historical trends.

The “promise” of the sociological imagination involves the linking of “personal troubles” to “public issues” (p. 8). Described by Mills as a form of “self consciousness,” the sociological imagination directs attention to the linkages between “the personal troubles of milieu” and “the public issues of social structure” (pp. 7–8). “Troubles” reflect one’s personal problems and are “private matter[s]” undeserving of sociological attention, whereas “issues” reflect problems that transcend the private sphere of the individual, and are therefore “public matter[s]” (p. 8).

One example offered by Mills concerns unemployment. When one person is unemployed, he notes, it is a personal matter. However, when a significant number of people are unemployed, it becomes a public issue concerning a lack of economic opportunity. Thus, broad social and historical trends, such as deindustrialization, produce outcomes felt and experienced by individuals as private or “personal troubles,” masking their structural origins. The key, therefore, is in linking experiences such as unemployment to broader social and historical

trends (e.g., deindustrialization). When many people experience similar personal troubles or find themselves in a similar set of “traps,” it suggests structural rather than personal origins.

In this respect, the sociological imagination is reflective of a broader sociological preoccupation with the micro–macro linkages of society. For Mills, many of the individual, or micro level, problems that people face in fact reflect broader structural, or macro level, phenomena. Thus, by focusing on these macro level or structural arrangements, one can grasp a better sense of one’s own life experiences or “biography.” Rather than individuals blaming themselves for their own problems, Mills offers the sociological imagination to the American public as a way of linking personal troubles and the “traps” of daily life to larger social and historical trends. As Mills suggests, many of the pressing problems in our daily lives are problems of social structure; the key is in linking individual outcomes or “biographies” to broader social structures and structural trends.

In viewing one’s own life or “biography” as reflective of larger social and historical forces, Mills saw those focused on the intersection of history and biography as being directed toward three key questions concerning (1) the structure of society, (2) its relation to other past or contemporary societies, and (3) the types of people such a society produces. Accordingly, the sociological imagination in practice denotes a focus on the nature of social institutions, the way in which they interact and change over time, and the effect they have on the outlook, attitudes, and orientations of individuals.

Mills himself arguably utilized the sociological imagination in much of his own work. With Hans Gerth (1953), Mills explored how certain types of institutions create or select for certain traits and personalities, such as authoritarianism. In *White Collar* (2000 [1951]), Mills documented how the shift from entrepreneurship and small businesses toward corporations and bureaucracy brought about changes in how individuals defined “success” and experienced work, while *The Power Elite* (2000 [1956]) linked the increasing concentration of power or “ascendancy” of the executive branch to growing political disillusionment and the emergence of a “mass society.”

SEE ALSO: Micro–Macro Links; Mills, C. Wright; Social Problems, Concept and Perspectives; Social Structure

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sociology

Gerard Delanty

Sociology is a form of social inquiry that takes wide ranging forms. As is the case with many disciplines, it is contested and there is no generally accepted definition of what constitutes sociology. But we should not draw the conclusion that the contested and diverse nature of sociology amounts to the absence of any sense of self understanding and that the discipline has lapsed into irreversible fragmentation. Sociology can be partly defined by citing examples of what sociologists actually do, but it can also be defined by referring to some of the major intellectual statements of the discipline, such as classic works or theoretical and methodological approaches that are characteristically sociological. To begin, it is helpful to look at sociology in terms of its subject matter, its approach, and some of the classical works that have shaped the discipline.

Many disciplines have a clearly defined subject matter, although very often this is due to

the absence of methodological scrutiny and uncritical consensus, as in the general view that “the past” is the subject domain of historians while political scientists study “politics.” Sociologists generally have a tougher time in defending their territory than other disciplines, even though they unhesitatingly take over on the territory of others. Sociology’s subject domain can arguably be said to be the totality of social relations or simply “society,” which Durkheim said was a reality *sui generis*. As a reality in itself the social world is more than the sum of its parts. There has been little agreement on exactly what these parts are, with some positions arguing that the parts are social structures and others claiming that society is simply made up of social actors and thus the subject matter of sociology is social action. The emphasis on the whole being greater than the sum of the parts has led some sociologists to the view that sociology is defined by the study of the relations between the different parts of society. This insight has tended to be reflected in a view of society as a movement or process. It would not be inaccurate to say that sociology is the social science devoted to the study of modern society.

In terms of theory and methodology, sociology is highly diverse. The paradigms that Thomas Kuhn believed to be characteristic of the history of science are more absent from sociology than from other social sciences. Arguably, anthropology and economics have more tightly defined methodological approaches than sociology. As a social science, sociology can be described as evidence based social inquiry into the social world and informed by conceptual frameworks and established methodological approaches. But what constitutes evidence varies depending on whether quantitative or qualitative approaches are adopted, although such approaches are not distinctively sociological. There is also considerable debate as to the scientific status of sociology, which was founded to be a social science distinct from the natural sciences and distinct from the human sciences. The diversity of positions on sociology today is undoubtedly a matter of where sociology is deemed to stand in relation to the experimental and human sciences. While it is generally accepted that sociology is a third science, there is less consensus on exactly where the limits of

this space should be drawn. This is also a question of the relation of sociology to its subject matter: is it part of its object, as in the hermeneutical tradition; is it separate from its object, as in the positivist tradition; or is it a mode of knowledge connected to its object by political practice, as in the radical tradition?

A discipline is often shaped by its founding figures and a canon of classical works. It is generally accepted today that the work of Marx, Weber, and Durkheim has given to sociology a classical framework. However, whether this canon can direct sociological research today is highly questionable and mostly it has been relegated to the history of sociology, although there are attempts to make classics relevant to current social research (Shilling & Mellor 2001). Such attempts, however, misunderstand the relation between the history of a discipline and the actual practice of it. Classic works are not of timeless relevance, but offer points of reference for the interpretation of the present and milestones in the history of a discipline. For this reason the canon is not stable and should also not be confused with social theory: it was Parsons in the 1930s who canonized Weber and Durkheim as founding fathers; in the 1970s Marx was added to the list – due not least to the efforts of Giddens – and Spencer has more or less disappeared; in the 1980s Simmel was added and in the present day there is the rise of contemporary classics, such as Bourdieu, Bauman, Luhmann, Habermas, and Foucault, and there are recovered classics, such as Elias. It is apparent from a cursory look at the classics that many figures were only later invented as classical sociologists to suit whatever project was being announced. The word “invented” is not too strong here: Marx did not see himself as a sociologist, Weber was an economic historian and rarely referred to sociology as such, and Foucault was a lapsed psychiatrist; all of them operated outside disciplinary boundaries.

The impact of Foucault on sociology today is a reminder that sociology continues to change, absorbing influences from outside the traditional discipline. The range of methodological and theoretical approaches has not led to a great deal of synthesis or consensus on what actually defines sociology. Since the so called cultural turn in the social sciences, much of sociology takes place outside the discipline itself, in

cultural studies, criminology, women’s studies, development studies, demography, human geography, and planning, as well as in the other social and human sciences. This is increasingly the case with the rise of interdisciplinarity and more so with post disciplinarity, wherein disciplines do not merely relate to each other but disappear altogether. Few social science disciplines have made such an impact on the wider social and human science as sociology, a situation that has led to widespread concern that sociology may be disappearing into those disciplines that it had in part helped to create (Scott 2005).

ORIGINS, TRAJECTORIES, AND NATIONAL TRADITIONS

Sociology today still remains in the shadow of its origin. As Levine (1995) has pointed out, sociology has always continued to return to its history and all the major schools have elaborated trajectories of their own history. So the story of the emergence of sociology is often inseparable from the attempt to define sociology.

In the most general sense sociology arose as a mode of knowledge concerned with the moral problems of modernity. The origins of sociology go back to the discovery of the existence of the social as a specific reality independent of the state and the private domain of the household. The eighteenth century marks the emergence of social theory as a distinctive form of intellectual inquiry and which gradually becomes distinguished from political theory. The decline of the court society and the rise of civil society suggested the existence of the social as a distinctive object of consciousness and reflection. Until then it was not clear of what “society” consisted other than the official culture of the court society. By the eighteenth century it was evident that there was indeed an objective social domain that could be called “society” with which was associated the public. This coincided with the rise of sociology.

One of the first major works in the emergence of sociology was Montesquieu’s *The Spirit of the Laws*, which brought about the transformation of political theory into sociology. The central theme in this work, which was published in 1748, was that society is the source of all laws.

Society was expressed in the form of conditioning influences on people, shaping different forms of life. Durkheim claimed that the notion of an underlying spirit or ethos that pervades social institutions was a resonating theme in modern sociological thought from Montesquieu – a thread that is also present in Weber’s *The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism*. *The Spirit of the Laws* demonstrated the sociological notion that social laws are socially and historically variable, but not to a point that human societies have nothing in common. According to Montesquieu, who was acutely aware of the diversity of societies, they differ most notably according to geographical factors, which have a conditioning influence in norms, morals, and character. His empirical method demonstrated a connection between climate and social customs and gave great attention to the material condition of life. It was this use of the empirical method to make testable hypotheses that Durkheim admired and which had a lasting influence on French sociology to Bourdieu and beyond.

Although generally regarded as one of the founders of modern political philosophy, Rousseau anticipated many sociological theories. He was one of the first to identify society as the source of social problems. In the *Discourse on the Origin of Inequality*, published in 1755, he argued that inequality is not a natural characteristic, but a socially created one for which individuals themselves are not responsible. The notion of the “general will” – itself based on Montesquieu’s “spirit of the laws” – influenced Durkheim’s concept of collective representations. The general will signified the external normative and symbolic power of collective beliefs. But Rousseau’s enduring legacy is the theory of the social contract, which can be seen as an early notion of community as the basis of society and the state as a political community. In his most famous work, *The Social Contract*, published in 1762, he postulated the existence of the social contract to describe the social bond that makes society possible.

The discipline of sociology has been strongly influenced by the French sociological tradition, for in France social science – where the term first arose – was more advanced as an officially recognized activity. Auguste Comte coined the term sociology to refer to the science of social

order and which he believed to be the “queen of the sciences.” Comte’s plea for a positivistic sociology must be seen in the context of the age, where social inquiry was largely associated with the speculative approaches of Enlightenment intellectuals and the officers of the restored *ancien régime*. Against the negative critiques of the intellectuals, Comte wished sociology to be a positive science based on evidence rather than speculation. But his legacy was his notion of sociology as the queen of the sciences. In this grandiose vision of sociology, the new science of modernity not only encapsulated positivism, but it also stood at the apex of a hierarchy of sciences, providing them with an integrative framework. While few adhered to this vision, the idea that sociology was integrative rather than a specialized science remained influential and has been the basis of the idea of sociology as a science that does not have its own subject matter but interprets the results of other sciences from the perspective of a general science of society. From the nineteenth century this general conception of sociology became linked with the problem of the moral order of society in the era of social and political unrest that followed the French Revolution. This is particularly evident in the sociology of Durkheim, whose major works were responses to the crisis of the moral order. This was most acutely the case with *Suicide*, which was one of the first works in professional sociology, but was also the central question in the *Division of Labour in Society*. Thus it could be said that the French tradition reflected a general conception of sociology as the science of the social problems of modern society.

Attention must also be paid to the Scottish origins of sociology, which go back to the moral philosophers of the Scottish Enlightenment, who can be regarded as early sociologists in that they recognized the objectivity of society (Strydom 2000). This tradition, too, provided a basis for a tradition of sociology as a general social science of modernity. Adam Ferguson’s *Essay on the Origin of Civil Society*, published in 1767, emphasized the role of social conflict and in terms very different from John Hobbes’s account of conflict and individual egoism. For Ferguson, conflict between nations produces solidarity and makes civil society as a universal norm possible. He recognized that society is

always more than the sum of its parts and can never be reduced to its components. In marked contrast to the prevailing ideas of the age, Ferguson argued that the state of nature is itself a social condition and that sociality is natural. John Millar's *Origin of the Distinction of Ranks*, published in 1770, contained one of the first discussions of social class and can be seen as a pioneering work in historical sociology. Millar and Ferguson were particularly interested in the historical evolution of society, which they viewed in terms of a model of progress. But it was in the writings of Adam Smith that the notion of progress was most pronounced. Smith developed moral philosophy into a theory of political economy coupled with a theory of progress that was influential for over a century later. Society progresses in four historical stages, he argued, which can be related to stages – hunting, pastoral, agricultural, and commercial – in the development of the means of subsistence. Commercial society is based on private property and the economic pursuit of individual interest. Smith argued, however, that the well being of commercial society and indeed the very fact of society is due to a collective logic – which he called an “invisible hand” – at work, which ensures that individual actions function to serve collective goals. Although Smith came to personify laissez faire capitalism, his concerns were largely philosophical and must be understood in the intellectual and political context of the age. Like the other moral philosophers in Scotland, Smith was acutely aware of the contingent nature of the human condition, which could never be explained by natural law. Moral norms and the rules of justice must be devised in ways that function best for the needs of society and in ways that will reduce evil and suffering. In this respect Smith, Ferguson, and Millar established a vision of sociology as a moral science of the social world, the outcome of which was that the social and the natural were separated from each other and sociology became the science of the social.

From its early origins in Enlightenment thought, sociology emerged along with the wider institutionalization of the social sciences from the end of the nineteenth century. In France, as already noted, it was most advanced and the Durkheimian tradition established a firm foundation for modern French sociology,

which was based on a strong tradition of empirical inquiry. In Germany, where sociology emerged later, it was more closely tied to the humanities. While in France sociology had become relatively independent of philosophy, in Germany a tradition of humanistic sociology developed on the one side from the neo Kantian philosophy and on the other from Hegelian Marxism. While Weber broke the connection with psychology that was so much a feature of the neo Kantian tradition, German sociology remained strongly interpretive and preoccupied with issues of culture and history. Weber himself was an economic historian primarily concerned with the problem of bureaucracy, but increasingly came to be interested in comparative analysis of the world religions and the relation between cultural and moral meaning with economic activity. His work was testimony to the belief that social inquiry can shed light on moral values that are constitutive of the social condition. Where German sociology as represented by Weber was concerned with the problem of subjective meaning, French sociology was animated by the concern with social morality. For this reason it is plausible to argue, as Fuller (1998) claims, that sociology has been a kind of secular theology. Underlying both the German and French traditions has been a vision of sociology – distilled of Comtean positivism – as a general social science of modern society.

According to Talcott Parsons in one of the classic works of modern sociology, *The Structure of Social Action* (1949), Hobbes and Locke articulated the basic themes of sociology, namely the problem of social order. But we cannot speak of a British sociological tradition before the Scottish Enlightenment thinkers mentioned above. Hobbes and Locke have been claimed by political theory and were not influential in sociological thought. Modern British sociology initially emerged from the work of such Victorian liberal reformers as J. S. Mill and Herbert Spencer. Although Spencer broke from Mill's utilitarianism, his biological evolutionism led to a restrictive approach that has now been largely discredited. British sociology has on the whole been shaped by a vision of sociology as a social science concerned with specific issues. By far the dominant trend has been a view of sociology concerned with class and social structure. The social relations and

associated social institutions – class mobility, work and industry, education, poverty, and social problems – that defined sociology for several decades were of course closely linked to industrial society and the kind of political values it cultivated. Modern British sociology was strongly influenced by Marxism. Another significant British tradition in sociology was one allied to social policy, as reflected in the tradition associated with Hobhouse and the London School of Economics, where sociology and social policy were closely related. To this tradition belongs T. H. Marshall and what broadly can be called policy relevant social science. In the British tradition the continental European vision of sociology as a general social science has mostly been absent. However, it must be noted that much of modern British sociology was the product of continental European traditions that had come to Britain since the 1930s. Sociologists such as Norbert Elias and Karl Mannheim who came from Germany and John Rex from South Africa gave to British sociology a varied character that was not encapsulated in a specific tradition. In addition, of course, there was the Marxist tradition, beginning with Marx himself in exile in London. Nevertheless, British sociology tended to reflect a view of sociology as in part having a special subject matter: class and social structure.

There is little doubt that the international prestige of sociology in the twentieth century would not have been possible were it not for the tremendous expansion and institutionalization of the discipline in the US. American sociology arose out of economics and was professionalized relatively early, with the foundation of the American Sociological Society by Albion Small and others in 1905. The Society, renamed American Sociological Association in 1959, in fact was a break away movement from the American Economic Association. Small, Charles Horton Cooley, and William Thomas were the most influential figures in shaping American sociology, which was closely related to the American philosophical tradition of pragmatism at least until the 1940s. Comparable to the British reformist concern with social policy, pragmatism reflected a belief in the public role of social science. Early American sociology was thus shaped in the spirit of scientific knowledge assisting in solving social problems (Lynd 1939).

The twentieth century, however, saw a growing professionalization of American sociology, which shed its reformist origins. On the one side, a strong tradition of empirical sociology developed which was largely quantitative and often value free to a point that it ceased to be anything more than hypothesis testing. On the other side, a tradition of grand theory associated with Parsons developed, but it rarely intersected with the empirical tradition. Existing outside these traditions was the remnant of the early pragmatist tradition in the sociology of symbolic interactionism, stemming from George Herbert Mead.

This short survey of some of the major national histories of sociology tells us that no one national tradition has prevailed and within all these national traditions are rival traditions. This has led some critics to complain that sociology has somehow failed. Horowitz (1993) complains that sociology is in crisis due to its specialization and also due to its over politicization. Sociology is decomposing because it has lost its way. The great classical visions of sociology no longer prevail and the discipline has lost its integrity. Much of what is called sociology is merely untheoretical empirical case studies, he argues. Such pessimistic views often depend on whether one believes that sociology is based on a single method or vision that can provide a foundation for the discipline. But this may be too much to demand. It is certainly the case that a single school or method has not emerged to define the discipline, but this could also be said to be the case for much of the social and human sciences. It would be an oversimplification to characterize the history of sociology as a process of decomposition or fragmentation of an inner unity guaranteed by a discipline. The classical tradition was not a unified one and much of this has been reflexively constituted by a discipline that changes in response to changes in the nature of society.

INSTITUTIONALIZATION OF SOCIOLOGY

Sociology has been shaped in three major phases: the pre institutional period prior to the early twentieth century, the era of institutionalization and disciplinary specialization, and the

current period of post disciplinarity. As discussed, sociology arose out of different national traditions of social science. In the nineteenth century only Comte, Spencer, and later Durkheim used the term sociology to describe their particular mode of social inquiry. Even with Durkheim this was a pre institutional period. Durkheim's chair was in educational thought and much of early sociology was a development out of economics, psychology, philosophy, law, or history. In this early phase the disciplinary identity of sociology was formed to a large extent by the question of its scientific status. Durkheim's *Rules of the Sociological Method*, published in 1895, provided the first systematic outline of sociology as a scientific inquiry. Weber's essay "Objectivity in Social Science and Social Policy," published in 1904–5, provided an additional statement of what social scientific objectivity consists (Weber 1949). In these accounts, despite their different perspectives and backgrounds, sociology was established as an empirical science based on objective factual knowledge. Both accounts (perhaps Weber more so) were aware that the scientific status of sociology was a limited one, as is apparent from Weber's neo Kantian styled attempt to qualify the limits of objectivity. But social science could nonetheless attain objective knowledge. This was a debate that continued up to the 1960s, when the neo positivist philosophies of science espoused by Carl Hempel and Ernst Nagel provided new justifications for sociology to claim scientific status. The result of some of these efforts was to reduce the scope of sociology to testable hypotheses in order to uncover the laws of society (Adorno et al. 1976). While sociology was pulled in the direction of the natural or experimental sciences on the one side, on the other it remained allied with the human sciences. This bifurcation of sociology led to an uncertain relation to social and public policy, with the result that sociology tended to enter the period of institutionalization relatively depoliticized.

The institutionalization of sociology coincided with the formation of disciplines in the twentieth century. As a profession, one of the early statements was Weber's address "Science as a Vocation" in 1918, which although addressed to the wider question of a commitment to science as a different order of

commitment than to politics, has been recognized as one of the major expressions of the professionalization of sociology (Weber 1970). The notion of *beruf* invoked referred to both the idea of sociology as a profession and as a vocation whose calling required certain sacrifices, one of which was not to seek in science answers to fundamental moral questions. As a science, sociology is concerned with providing explanations about social phenomena and in Weber's view it also has a role to play in guiding social policy.

In its formative period sociology had to compete with the natural sciences. As social science gained general acceptability as an area distinct from both the human sciences and the natural sciences, sociology found that its greatest challenges came in fact from the more established of the social sciences (Lepenies 1988). In Britain the prestige of anthropology overshadowed sociology. The older disciplines, geography and economics, as well as political science tended to command greater prestige than sociology, which never held the same degree of reliance to the mission of the national state. It must be borne in mind that much of social science owed its existence to its relation to the state: it was the science of the social institutions of the modern state.

The institutionalization of sociology did not fully commence until the period following World War II, when the discipline expanded along with the rise of mass higher education. The professionalization and institutionalization of sociology was marked by the foundation of academic journals such as the *American Journal of Sociology*, founded in 1895, and the later *American Sociological Review*. Professional associations such as the American Sociological Association and the British Sociological Association, founded in 1951, greatly enhanced the professionalization of sociology as a discipline, which subsequently underwent a process of internal differentiation with new subfields emerging, ranging from urban sociology and industrial sociology to political sociology, historical sociology, and cultural sociology. By the 1960s sociology became increasingly taught in secondary schools and in the 1970s it became an A level subject in British schools. The 1960s and 1970s saw a tremendous expansion in the discipline in terms of student enrollments and teaching and

research careers. In this period sociology became recognized by governments as a major social science and many chairs were created. Sociological research became recognized by the principal national research foundations and acquired prestige within the university system. In the US there are over 200 sociology journals, a professional associational membership of some 14,000, and more students major in sociology (25,000) annually than in history and economics (Burawoy 2005a). As sociology became one of the major social sciences in universities throughout the world, it became increasingly seen as the most comprehensive science of society. This was viewed by some as a source of the strength and relevance of sociology, but in the view of others it was in danger of becoming a pseudo science, lacking subject specialization, since when sociologists specialize they cease to be sociologists. Neo positivist philosophies attempted to check the dangers of over generalization, while the growing politicization of the discipline that came with its widening social base led to fears that sociology was too closely linked to radical causes, such as Marxism.

Many influential sociologists openly questioned the institutionalization of sociology. If the first era was one of the struggle for the institutionalization of the discipline, the phase that drew to a close in the 1970s was one that was marked by calls for the political engagement of sociology with everyday life. Gouldner (1970) argued that sociology needs to be reoriented to be of relevance to society. In his view, sociology went through four main phases: sociological positivism in nineteenth century France, Marxism, classical European sociology, and finally American structural functionalism as represented by Parsons. Contemporary sociology must articulate a new vision based on a completely different sense of its moral purpose. For Gouldner, this had to be a reflexive sociology and one that was radical in its project to connect sociology to people's lives. The purpose of sociology is to enable people to make sense of society and to connect their own lives with the wider context of society.

This turn to a reflexive understanding of sociology had been implicit in C. Wright Mills's *Sociological Imagination*, which was published in 1959 and was widely read in the 1960s and 1970s. Sociologists such as Mills and Gouldner were opposed to the depoliticized kind of

sociology that was emerging in the US. They wanted to recover the moral purpose of sociology that had become lost with its institutionalization in specialist subfields. Mills provided a definition of sociology that continues to be relevant: "The sociological imagination enables us to grasp history and biography and the relations between the two within society. That is its task and promise" (Mills 1970: 12). This conception of sociology was as much opposed to general theory as it was to administrative social research. Mills was primarily inspired by the American pragmatic tradition, which predisposed him to be critical of social science that was cut off from the practical purposes of improving social well being.

The vision of sociology articulated by Mills was not too far removed from the continental European conception of sociology as a diagnosis of the age. In this tradition, which was represented by a broad range of sociologists, such as the Frankfurt School and the humanistic tradition of western Marxism, sociology was connected to social renewal and was primarily a critical endeavor. As represented in the programmatic thought of Theodor Adorno, sociology must recover its mission in philosophical thought as a mode of critical thinking. For Adorno, the rise of neo positivism had a detrimental effect on sociology, which had the promise to become the leading critical science of what Daniel Bell and Alain Touraine in their respective works called the "post industrial society." Habermas (1978) outlined the basis of a view of sociology as concerned with critical knowledge tied to an interest in human emancipation.

Since the 1970s, which saw the expansion and institutionalization of sociology as a discipline, the question of the scientific status of sociology became less important. Although major methodological differences continued to divide quantitatively oriented sociologists from those in the humanistic tradition, sociology had become too broad to unite under a common method. With the consolidation of the discipline, sociology developed in many directions. The large scale entry of women into sociology in the 1980s inevitably led to different concerns and feminist approaches emerged around new research fields, which on the whole tended to orient sociology in the direction of cultural issues concerning identity, gender, and biographies. The shift from

industrial to post industrial societies and the growing impact of globalization have led to a series of shifts in the subject matter of sociology. Without a common method, a cumulative theoretical tradition, the result has been that sociology has been drawn in different directions. While this has led to some weaknesses, it is also a source of strength. Today, sociology has many different approaches which together constitute an influential body of methodologies and theories that have made considerable impact on the wider social and human sciences.

As a discipline acutely aware of the overall reality of society and the historical context, sociology has been more versatile than many sciences. This has been especially the case with regard to the “cultural turn” of which postmodernism has been one expression. Sociologists have been very prominent in developing new frameworks that have greatly advanced the scientific understanding of the social world. One only has to consider the influence of sociologists such as Ulrich Beck on the idea of the risk society, Pierre Bourdieu on the habitus and the forms of capital, Anthony Giddens on structure and agency, Jürgen Habermas on modernity and the theory of communicative action, Edward Soja on space, Bruno Latour on science and technology, Niklas Luhmann on systems theory, Manuel Castells on the information society, Roland Robertson on globalization, and Bryan Turner on citizenship. Sociology, in particular social theory, played a leading role in the reorientation of human geography around space. Much of urban geography today is simply the rediscovery of sociological approaches to the city. The shift in anthropology from the study of primitive societies to modern western societies has made it more or less indistinguishable from sociology. Anthropology, which enjoyed greater prestige in the past, has suffered a far greater crisis in its self understanding than sociology. In this context the rise of cultural and contemporary history as well as cultural studies can be mentioned as relatively new interdisciplinary subject areas that have been closely linked to sociology.

This, however, comes at a price. Much of sociology today is outside of sociology. As sociology becomes more specialized on the one side, and on the other more influential, the result is that it easily loses a specific identity. Thus, the sociology of crime has influenced criminology

where most specialized research on crime now occurs and which is not essentially sociological but interdisciplinary. Norbert Elias in 1970 complained of “pseudo specialization” and the retreat of sociologists into sub areas; but he noted what was occurring in sociology was something that had already happened in other disciplines. It would only be a matter of time, he wrote, before the “fortress will be complete, the drawbridges raised.” Like many continental European sociologists, Elias held to the Comtean vision of sociology having the distinctive feature of a general science. Despite Elias’s resistance to specialization, sociology did undergo specialization and it may be suggested that social theory took over the general conception of sociology (Delanty 2005b). But the resulting kind of specialization that sociology underwent led to fears that sociology cannot in fact be a specialized science, since what it does is merely to open up the ground for specialized interdisciplinary areas elsewhere. Thus, specialized sociological research occurs only outside the actual discipline – it is a question of sociologists without sociology. While some see this as the end of sociology, others see it as a new opportunity for a post disciplinary sociology, which should not retreat into the false security of a discipline. John Urry (1981), for instance, argues that sociology does not have a specific disciplinary area in terms of a method or subject matter and it has often been (and necessarily so) “parasitic” on other sciences. Consequently, it should cease to think of itself as a science of society and enter the diffuse territory of post disciplinarity (Urry 2000). This is a contentious position and there have been several recent defenses of sociology, such as the notion of a public sociology advocated by Ben Agger (2000) and Michael Burawoy (2005a, 2005b) and the various attempts of John Scott (2005) and Steve Fuller (2006) to revive the sociological imagination. On the other side, there is a position advocated by John Goldthorpe (2002) that confines sociology to a narrow methodologically grounded science. Is it a choice of “disciplinary parochialism” or “imperialism,” as Andrew Sayer (2000) asks?

CURRENT CHALLENGES

It is evident that the challenges facing sociology are no longer those that it faced a century ago; it

is no longer a question of the scientific status of the discipline and the need to demarcate a space between the natural sciences on one side, and on the other the human sciences. Some of the major debates of the second half of the twentieth century will continue to be important, but will not define the field of sociology, such as the micro-macro link, agency and structure, quantitative versus qualitative methods, the nature of theory and its relation to empirical research, the question of normative critique, the status of evidence and the limits of explanation, etc. Three major debates have emerged in recent times which capture the current situation of sociology more fully than these methodological and theoretical issues: the question of the subject matter of sociology in light of globalization; the question of disciplinarity; and the debate about the public function of sociology.

As the science of society, sociology has always been a contested inquiry. Many of the major disputes have been about the nature of method and the scope of social science more generally. The debate about the subject matter of sociology has mostly resolved around issues of the knowability of the social world. In recent years an additional challenge has emerged around the very conception of the social (Gane 2004). To a large degree this has been due to major changes in the very definition of society. While much of classical sociology on the whole took society to be the society of the nation-state, this is less the case today. It should be pointed out that while the equation of classical sociology with national societies has been exaggerated, there is little doubt that sociology arose as the science of the modern industrial nation-state. The comparative tradition in sociological analysis, Weber's historical sociology, and much of Marxist sociology is a reminder of the global concerns of sociology. However, as an institutionalized social science, sociology has mostly been conducted within national parameters. By far the greatest concentration of sociological research in the second half of the twentieth century has been in the US, where sociology has been the science of social order and national consensus. While the national institutional frameworks continue to be primary in terms of professional accreditation, teaching, funding, and research, the global dimension is coming more to the fore. International sociological associations such as the International Sociological Association and the

European Sociological Association now offer rival contexts for sociological research.

It is true too that much of what might be called global sociology is merely the continuation of the comparative tradition, which can be located within an "international" view of sociology. But this would be to neglect a deeper transformation which is also a reflection of the transformation of the social itself. While many social theorists (e.g., Urry 2000) have argued that the social is in decline and others that the social does not coincide with the notion of society, conceived of a spatially bounded entity, it is evident that notwithstanding some of these far-reaching claims the social world is undergoing major transformation and the notion of society is in need of considerable reevaluation (Smelser 1997). Exactly how new such developments will continue to be debated. A strong case can be made for seeing current developments as part of a long-term process of civilizational shifts and transformation in the nature of modernity. It is no longer possible to see the social world merely in terms of national structures impacting on the lives of individuals. Such forces are global and they interact with the local in complex ways. The turn to globality in contemporary sociology is not in any way an invalidation of sociology, even if some of the classical approaches are inadequate for the demands of the present day. Indeed, of all the social and human sciences, sociology – with its rich tradition of theory and methodology – is particularly suited to the current global context. Just one point can be made to highlight the relevance of sociology. If globalization entails the intensification of social relations across the globe, the core concern of sociology with the construction and contestability of the social world has a considerable application and relevance.

This leads directly to the second challenge, the question of disciplinarity. According to the Gulbenkian Commission for the Restructuring of the Social Sciences: "To be sociological is not the exclusive purview of persons called sociologists. It is an obligation of all social scientists" (Mudimbe 1996: 98). Does this mean the end of sociology? Clearly, many have taken this view and see sociology disappearing into new interdisciplinary areas and that it can no longer command disciplinary specialization due to its highly general nature. This is too pessimistic, since the Gulbenkian Commission report also

points out that the same situation applies to other sciences: history is not the exclusive domain of historians and economic issues are not the exclusive purview of economists. In the era of growing interdisciplinarity, sociology is not alone in having to reorient itself beyond the narrow confines of disciplinarity. Political scientists hardly have a monopoly over politics. Sociology now exists in part within other disciplines, in particular in new post disciplinary areas which it helped to create, but it also exists in its own terms as a post disciplinary social science. In the present day it is evident that sociology takes disciplinary, interdisciplinary, and post disciplinary forms.

While much of sociology has migrated from sociology to the other sciences, sociology today is also increasingly absorbing influences from other sciences. A survey of the discipline's most influential works noted that a large number have been written by non sociologists (Clawson 1998). This is nothing new: from the very beginning sociology incorporated other disciplines into itself. Of course, this is not without contestation, as in the debate about the influence of cultural studies – itself partly a creation of sociology – on sociology (Rojek & Turner 2001). Sociology is well positioned to engage with other sciences and much of modern sociology has been based on a view of sociology as a science that incorporates the specialized results of other sciences into its framework. As Fuller (2006) argues, today this engagement with other sciences must include biology, which can now explain much of social life. Sociology must engage with some of the claims of biology to explain the social world and offer different accounts. In this respect, then, interdisciplinarity and post disciplinarity need not be seen as the end of a sociology, but a window of opportunity for sociology to address new issues.

One such issue is the public function of sociology. The specialization of sociological research by professional sociology has led to a marginalization of its public role. Michael Burawoy argued this in his presidential address to the ASA in 2004 and opened up a major debate on the future of sociology (Burawoy 2005a, 2005b; Calhoun 2005). Public sociology and professional sociology have become divorced and need to be reconnected, he argues. Public sociology concerns in part bringing professional society to wider publics and in shaping public

debates and it may lead to a reorientation in professional sociology as new issues arise. However, as Burawoy argues, there is no public sociology without a professional sociology that supplies it with tested methods and theoretical approaches, conceptual frameworks, and accumulated bodies of knowledge. Public sociology is close to policy relevant sociology, which is a more specific application of sociology to problems set by the state and other public bodies. Public sociology is wider and more discursive and takes place in the public sphere. Burawoy also clarifies the distinction between public and critical sociology. The latter concerns a mode of self reflection on professional sociology and is largely conducted for the benefit of sociology, in contrast to public sociology. Critical sociology has a normative role to play for the discipline. While critical and professional sociology exist for peers, public and policy sociology exist for wider audiences. Of course, many of these roles overlap, as is apparent in the connection between critical and public sociology.

According to many views, one of the functions of sociology is to raise social self understanding. Adorno (2000), for instance, held that while sociology may be the study of society in some general sense, society as such is not a given or a clearly defined domain that can be reduced to a set of “social facts” in Durkheim's sense. Rather, society consists of different processes and conflicting interpretations. Sociology might be defined in terms of the critical analysis of these discourses in a way that facilitates wider public self reflection. This is a view of sociology reiterated by Mills (1970) and Habermas (1978). In different ways it is present in Scott's (2005) and Fuller's (2006) cautious defense of a disciplinary sociology. This means that sociology must be relevant; it must be able to address major public issues (Agger 2000). Inescapably, this means sociology must be able to ask big questions. The success of sociology until now has been in no small part due to its undoubted capacity to address major questions, in particular those that pertain to everyday life.

CONCLUSION

Sociology is the only science specifically devoted to the study of society in the broad sense of the term, meaning the social world and the open

field of the social. Like many of the social and human sciences it does not have a clearly defined subject matter. This situation often leads to the assumption of a crisis. Sociology today is often faced with three broad choices. One is the classical vision of a field that is based on the interpretation of the results of other sciences from the perspective of a general science of society guaranteed by a canonized sociological heritage. Second, those who reject the first as too generalist, parasitic, and lacking a clearly marked out specialized field argue that sociology must confine itself to a narrow territory based on a tightly defined conception of sociological research and disciplinary specialization. Third, those who reject the highly specialized understanding of sociology and resist the generalist understanding of sociology tend to look to post disciplinarity, whereby sociology is not confined to the traditional discipline and occurs largely outside sociology.

These are false dilemmas, despite the fact that there are major challenges to be faced. Interdisciplinarity is unavoidable today for all the sciences, but it does not have to mean the disappearance of sociology any more than any other discipline. It is also difficult to draw the conclusion that sociology exists only in a post disciplinary context. However, it is evident that sociology cannot retreat into the classical mold of a general science. Sociology is a versatile and resilient discipline that takes many forms. One of its enduring characteristics is that it brings to bear on the study of the social world a general perspective born of the recognition that the sum is greater than the parts.

SEE ALSO: Aging, Sociology of; AIDS, Sociology of; American Sociological Association; Biosociological Theories; Body and Cultural Sociology; British Sociological Association; Computational Sociology; Death of the Sociology of Deviance?; Durkheim, Émile; Economic Sociology: Classical Political Economic Perspectives; Economic Sociology: Neoclassical Economic Perspective; Economy (Sociological Approach); Environment, Sociology of the; Existential Sociology; Family, Sociology of; Figurational Sociology and the Sociology of Sport; Financial Sociology; Globalization; Institutional Review Boards and Sociological Research; Knowledge, Sociology of; Law, Sociology of; Marx, Karl; Marxism and Sociology; Mathematical Sociology;

Medical Sociology; Medical Sociology and Genetics; Medicine, Sociology of; Microsociology; Military Sociology; Neurosociology; Political Sociology; Rational Choice Theory (and Economic Sociology); Religion, Sociology of; Revolutions, Sociology of; Rural Sociology; Scientific Knowledge, Sociology of; Simmel, Georg; Society; Sociological Imagination; Sociology in Medicine; Taste, Sociology of; Weber, Max; Work, Sociology of

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sociology in medicine

Carey L. Usher

Sociology in medicine is the label given to the collaborative work between sociologists and medical or health personnel within medical institutions or health care organizations. This distinction represents the applied work of medical sociologists in the pure versus applied dichotomy of the social sciences. In its most extreme form, sociology in medicine encompasses sociological work aimed at the provision of technical skills and problem solving for the medical community while neglecting contributions to the parent discipline.

Medical sociology, like its parent discipline, experienced dual roles early in its institutionalization. The distinction between applied and pure work in medical sociology arose in conjunction with the desire for a communication network that would identify the activities and affiliations of medical sociologists in the United States. Sociology in medicine and sociology of medicine were the names designated for applied and pure work, respectively, by Robert Straus in 1957. Sociology in medicine represents the thrust toward reform, advocacy, and application, with which medical sociologists responded to the call for inclusion of clinical research in the social components of health and illness. During the 1950s and 1960s, the roles of the social sciences in health care organizations experienced significant increases due to expansion of medical schools, increased private and public supports for medical research and training programs, and significant proportions of funds granted for establishment of social science units within schools of medicine, public health, and nursing. The primary aim of medical sociology during this time was to serve medicine, with a large majority of medical sociologists employed by health science schools, and only 30 percent holding appointments in traditional sociology departments. The ascendancy of sociology in medicine was short lived, however, as the effects of the Cold War, which equated sociology with socialism, decreased the influence of sociology on public health issues and policy. The role of the medical sociologist in medicine decreased, while academic work in medical sociology, or sociology

of medicine, began to increase. During the 1980s, increasing opportunities for nonacademic sociology applications were recognized by the American Sociological Association. Sociology in medicine again became an exciting career choice for medical sociologists, although they were now competing with other health related researchers for funding in medical institutions.

The work of the sociologist in medicine is intended to be directly applicable to health issues, and consists of teaching and research activities focusing on disease processes or factors influencing patients' responses to illness, with the goal of improving diagnosis and treatment. Sociology in medicine may examine doctor-patient relationships, various therapeutic situations, or social factors that affect and are affected by specific health disorders. The sociologist in medicine may also have responsibilities of educating health science students in the sociology of health and illness. The major contributions of sociology in medicine have been to medical education, social epidemiology, and knowledge of utilization and compliance. Sociologists in medicine seek to answer questions of interest to their sponsors and institutions rather than to the discipline of sociology.

Sociology in medicine, then, treats sociology as a supporting discipline to medicine, which involves achieving the goals of medicine while neglecting those of sociology. For this reason, sociology in medicine has been severely criticized since its inception. Sociologists in medicine are less compelled to defend the significance of their work, theoretical or otherwise, to the academic community than are conventional sociologists. The demands placed upon the sociologist in medicine are for practical applications rather than sociological significance. Therefore, sociology in medicine has consistently battled with the question of whether or not it is real sociology. Aside from the criticisms of its parent discipline, sociology in medicine has historically faced problems within its working environment as well. Communication, status, and relationship issues have surrounded sociology in medicine since the first tenure track position was created for a sociologist in a medical school in 1953. Howard Freeman and Leo Reeder, as early as 1957, point out the difficulty the sociologist in medicine has in attaining co worker status with the physician, stating that

all PhDs working with MDs face a continual threat of relegation to subordinate status. Communication and understanding have been problematic as well, as neither the sociologist nor the physician would freely discard discipline specific, esoteric rhetoric to adopt that of the other.

When the distinction was made between pure and applied work of medical sociologists, the predominant opinion of sociologists was that the two were incompatible. Academic sociologists believed sociologists in medicine showed more loyalty to the medical institution than to their parent discipline, and did not contribute to the discipline. Those working in medicine, however, considered themselves to be quite practical sociologists, as their work was directly applicable to human health, and they had less restricted access to research funds than did conventional sociologists. The opinion of incompatibility has changed dramatically and will continue to change in the future. Robert Straus, who as we saw named the distinction in 1957, wrote in 1999 that it is possible for the medical sociologist to do both pure and applied work at the same time. Many medical sociologists consider the structural position of the scholar to be irrelevant today, and have called for a renaming of the work of medical sociologists. Rather than distinguishing between sociology *in* medicine and sociology *of* medicine, the work of medical sociologists may be aptly called sociology *with* medicine.

SEE ALSO: Health and Medicine; Medical Sociology; Medicine, Sociology of

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sociometry

Barbara F. Meeker

The word “sociometry” was coined by Jacob Levi Moreno (1889–1974). Moreno, one of the pioneers of psychotherapy, is also credited with developing psychotherapeutic techniques such as psychodrama and role playing. As he used it, sociometry was a way of uncovering the underlying emotional structure of a small group by asking group members which other members they would choose or reject as partners in specific roles such as roommate or fellow team member for a work project. Moreno believed that if group activities were set up according to these preferences, the task performance and morale of the group would be maximized and individual group members would experience satisfaction, empowerment, and personal growth. Jointly with Helen Hall Jennings (Moreno 1934), he applied his methods to the assignment of girls to residential cottages in the New York Training School for Girls, concluding that the predicted positive results did occur. Moreno also founded a journal named *Sociometry* to promote his research. This journal eventually became one of the official journals of the American Sociological Association where it has been for many years the primary outlet within sociology for social psychological research in general. Reflecting this more general interest, it changed its name and is now the *Social Psychology Quarterly*.

Within research sociology, “sociometry” refers to the measurement aspect of Moreno’s concept, not to its use as a principle for organizing groups. It also refers to results about interpersonal attraction and group structure and cohesion that have been found using sociometric techniques, and to statistical and mathematical techniques for analyzing sociometric

data. Typically, in a sociometric study respondents are asked in a paper and pencil survey to name their best friends, or the three or five others they like best, or to rate the name of each other group member on how much the other is liked, admired, respected, or other evaluation; these ratings may extend into negative sentiments such as dislike. Some may include behavioral ratings (such as how often the respondent talks to or works with the other). In a historical reflection of Moreno’s intentions, these ratings are referred to as “choices.” Analyzing choices identifies social isolates (individuals neither giving nor receiving choices); mutual pairs (two individuals each choosing the other); pairs with unreciprocated choices; transitive triads (three individuals all choosing each other); sociometric stars (an individual receiving more choices than others); and cliques (a set of individuals making positive choices within the set but no choices or negative choices outside). These patterns can be displayed as a diagram called a sociogram, in which points represent individuals and arrows represent their choices. Influential early use of sociometry includes Theodore Newcomb’s study of the development of friendships in two college dormitories and George Homans’s emphasis on interpersonal sentiments as basic building blocks in a theory of individual and small group behavior.

A large body of research in natural settings as well as in laboratories shows that the principles that affect the formation and maintenance of sociometric choice are: (1) propinquity (or proximity) – bonds of attraction form between individuals who encounter each other in daily life; thus, sociograms show choices between people who live in adjoining rooms in dormitories, have offices next to each other, sit in adjacent seats in a classroom, etc., or marriages that occur between persons from the same neighborhood; (2) reciprocity – attraction tends to be mutual, people choose others who they think choose them; (3) perceived similarity – individuals choose others they think share socially important characteristics, attitudes, or values; and (4) status – individuals choose others who have high prestige within the group. The principles of reciprocity and perceived similarity produce mutual attraction and increase the number of reciprocal pairs, while the principle of status produces one way or unreciprocated

choices as persons with higher status are more often chosen.

Cognitive balance theory, especially as formulated by Fritz Heider (1958), has been used by many students of sociometry. Heider proposed that a basic principle of individual cognitive organization is that people seek to agree with others whom they view positively and to disagree with others whom they view negatively; these are *balanced states* and are assumed to be stable and to provide personal satisfaction. On the other hand, when an individual finds that she or he disagrees with a positively valued other, or agrees with a negatively valued other, this is an *imbalanced state* which produces dissatisfaction and a motivation to change at least one bond, that is, imbalanced states are unstable. This explains both reciprocity and similarity as types of cognitive balance and also predicts that relationships among three or more persons will become transitive and positive bonds will form in larger structures transitively.

Sociometric structure also concerns the relationship among behavior, attitudes, and interaction. Informal interaction tends to occur between persons who have positive bonds and such persons tend to influence each other and hence to become similar. Thus, a sociogram can give predictions about the flow of gossip, attitude change, formation of group or organizational culture, and boundaries of cliques or conflict groups within organizations. An example of an application is work examining effects of school integration on the interracial friendships of students (Hallinan & Smith 1982).

The formal properties of consistency and transitivity appeal to mathematically inclined sociologists, overlapping with rapidly developing work in social networks and using the mathematics of graph theory.

SEE ALSO: Attraction; Cognitive Balance Theory (Heider); Friendship: Interpersonal Aspects; Interpersonal Relationships; Networks; Social Influence; Social Psychology

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solidarity

Rodney Coates

Solidarity, defined as the perceived or realized organization of individuals for group survival, interests, or purposes, may result from either external threats or internal needs. Solidarity, reflecting various dimensions and forms of organizing, may best be described in Durkheimian terms as ranging from organic to the inorganic. That is to say, we may describe solidarity that derives from some intrinsic characteristic of the participants or from extrinsic characteristics. When we speak of intrinsic characteristics, related to organic solidarity, we typically include such types as family, racial/ethnic groups, national and to some extent religious affiliation. Alternatively, inorganic solidarity, related to the more voluntary, associational characteristics of such organization, suggests greater volition on the part of its members. When we speak of inorganic solidarity we typically make reference to neighborhood associations, clubs, political organizations, and the like. Given the more transient nature of today's populations, religion and national identity may also fall into this latter category for obvious reasons associated with mobility and personal choice. Depending upon type, solidarity comes into being for multiple reasons. Social and political movements, community organizing, and social activism rely upon the ability of respective leaders to organize and solidify significant groups for the purposes of social action. The capacity of groups to solidify is directly associated with their capacity to

organize about significant issues, events, visions, and/or threats. Thus the capacity to solidify is evidence of the capacity to survive, thrive, persist, and promote group interests, viability, and/or vitality.

While it is possible, for heuristic purposes, to distinguish between organic and inorganic solidarity, in reality such distinctions are blurred. Hence successful social movements, political or social activism, and collective actions often depend upon multiple types and methods for generating solidarity. Hence, if we were to discuss the successful Civil Rights movements in the United States of the 1960s, or that led by Mahatma Gandhi in India – we clearly see the overlapping of family, religion, political, civil, ethnic/racial, and social groups. More simply, we would see the cultural, social, and political elements within specific societal contexts solidifying about specific issues, visions, and interests. These complex moments of heightened solidarity, so critical for social, political, and cultural activism, are rare examples of multiple forms, dimensions, and levels of solidarity coalescing at the national and often international levels.

Differing forms of solidarity (to include dimensions, levels, and types of solidarity) may be associated with different types of groups, institutions, or organizational components. Hence, along the organic continuum and within the family, issues of kinship and major life events such as marriage, births, deaths, reunions, holidays, celebrations, and so on form the basis of specific events that may evoke episodes of solidarity. These events, repeated over time, and depending upon frequency, intensity, and level of interaction, produce a sense of family solidarity. Thus we can talk about solidarity in the family as being a process experienced over these various and collective life events.

Alternatively, within religious or other cultural institutions, we can likewise talk about events which serve to enhance, inspire, or evoke episodes of solidarity. Such events typically revolve around the ceremonial, but may also include the commemorative, induction of new members, proselytizational, and other significant life events of members which have been serialized within the cultural institution (e.g., typically marriage, birth, coming of age, and so on find expression within religious and other

cultural institutions and also serve as solidifying events). Religious and other cultural institutions also provide, encourage, and to a great extent require vision and visionary leaders that serve to express institutional wide ideas, values, and purpose which not only transcend the every day events and issues of its members, but also give members a sense of collective identity, thus encouraging solidarity. These visions and visionaries, occurring periodically through the institutional memories of members, serve to produce and sustain group cohesion. Collectively, then, within religious and cultural institutions, the ceremonial, those life events that are commemorated, and visions and visionary leaders provide the organizational glue that accounts for solidifying events. These events over time are what we refer to when we speak of solidarity within religious and cultural institutions.

Often solidarity is held out to various groups (e.g., racialized, gendered, political) as if it were some actuality that can be achieved. As such, and given the reality that it is often presumed to be associated with specified dominant groups, it only manifests itself oppositionally. Solidarity, for heterogeneously large groups, presumes a level, form, and/or quality of unity which is prevented by the very nature of heterogeneously large groups. What solidarity that does come into being tends to be experienced not universally but partially by specific sections of groups whose interests, goals, and/or opportunities are perceived to be challenged, effected, or affected. More generally and typically, members of groups seek to organize or mobilize as a consequence of perceived organization or mobilization by external groups, forces, and/or threats. Consequently, solidarity is not an event but a process that is never quite complete and is dependent upon such things as perceived threat, advantage, and disadvantage to which and by which organizational resources are expended. The nature of these organizational resources is defined by the resource base(s) of the group, the historical progression or context to which the group owes its existence, and the ability of group members to effectively acquire, access, and mobilize resources and members for the purposes of obtaining levels of solidarity.

The problem inherent in a constant insistence upon solidarity is that such calls may be at the expense of legitimate, necessary, and

important conflict. Conflict, differences of opinion, and critical discussions require opposing perspectives, the ability to be heard, addressed, and exist. The notion that solidarity somehow eliminates or minimizes such critical dialogues fails to understand the nature of group dynamics. Solidarity, as a relative construct, therefore exists to the extent that group members feel free to express critical differences, identify alternative strategies, and explore multiple frames of references. The extent to which relative solidarity becomes a reality is determined to the extent that agendas, priorities, and goals can be identified which garner significant group support, to which members are willing to devote their individual resources. Further, to the extent that the understanding of solidarity advanced here does not preclude multiple agendas, goals, and interests within and overlapping various groups, we may speak of a more elaborate conceptualization (i.e., one which is not monolithic but pluralistic) that is being envisioned.

Ideally, solidarity is achievable across the full spectrum of group members. In reality, solidarity tends to be tenuously associated with specific threat levels, opportunities, and member interests. Specific external inducements, threats, and/or events can serve as catalysts to solidarity initiatives, but these initiatives tend to be uniquely experienced and structured by the internal dynamics of the specific groups. Hence, solidarity episodes may be identified, catalogued, and understood within specific historical contexts for specific groups.

When we observe these solidarity episodes across time, i.e., within specific historical contexts, we may note increasing or decreasing levels of solidarity associated with what we may call social movements. Social movements, here being defined as increased group cohesion aimed at effecting system changes within societal or community contexts, are successful to the extent that solidarity events are sustainable over multiple events and/or episodes. The effectiveness of these social movements is directly associated with the appearance of solidarity, but in actuality may be associated with the ability of group leaders to control external impressions. The implication of this is that solidarity is more about impression management than actual (perceived or otherwise) levels of solidarity.

It is in the interests of group leaders to present the impression of high levels of solidarity as this gives credence to their legitimacy and credibility. This is especially true for social movement leaders, whose political currency is tied to these impressions and who are keenly aware how notions of solidarity impact upon their effectiveness as leaders, both within and external to the group. Hence, such things as marches, meetings, and various types of protests are selectively used to demonstrate the level of solidarity, leaders' ability to encourage solidarity, and their ability to promote specific issues and/or advance specific agendas as a result. What this also suggests is that numbers, counts, and levels of involvement become highly subjective and contested pieces of information as they are related to perceptions of levels of solidarity, leadership capacity, and group viability.

SEE ALSO: Accommodation; Acculturation; Agency (and Intention); Alliances (Racial/Ethnic); Assimilation; Black Feminist Thought; Charismatic Movement; Civil Rights Movement; Class Consciousness; Diversity; Durkheim, Émile; Ethnic Enclaves; Ethnicity; Feminism; Feminism, First, Second, and Third Waves; Indigenous Movements; King, Martin Luther; Leadership; Race; Race (Racism); Social Movements; Social Movements, Leadership in; Solidarity, Mechanical and Organic

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solidarity, mechanical and organic

Anne M. Hornsby

French sociologist Émile Durkheim (1858–1917) coined the terms mechanical and organic solidarity to describe two types of social organization, that is, ways in which individuals are connected to each other and how they identify with the groups and societies in which they live. Social solidarity is a state of unity or cohesion that exists when people are integrated by strong social bonds and shared beliefs and also are regulated by well developed guidelines for action (values and norms that suggest worthy goals and how people should attain them). In his first book, *The Division of Labor in Society* (1893), Durkheim argued that social solidarity takes different forms in different historical periods and varies in strength among groups in the same society. However, reflecting the popularity of social evolutionary thought in the late nineteenth century, Durkheim summarized all his torical forms of solidarity into a traditional–modern dichotomy. Mechanical solidarity is a simple, pre industrial form of social cohesion and organic solidarity is a more complex form that evolves in modern societies.

In developing his mechanical–organic distinction, Durkheim drew on the organicist thinking that influenced many intellectuals of his generation, where human societies are analyzed with analogies to biological organisms. A single cluster of embryonic cells, where each cell is initially identical in structure and function,

develops by dividing into separate clusters with cells changing form and specializing into kidney cells, skin cells, etc. Over time they form organs that have distinct boundaries but must be inter dependent for the functioning of the whole organism. By analogy, settlements of small kin ship groups are scattered across territories and organized similarly. Over time these simple societies disappear as rural and urban areas emerge, cities grow, and a complex division of functions appears within cities.

Specifically, mechanical solidarity occurs in small, simple organisms, where people live in small groups and each group is likely to perform all the functions needed to survive (familial, economic, political, religious, etc.). There is no specialization or differentiation of function. Each person feels and lives a similar connection to group life because everyone’s experience of the world comes from a religiously based common culture that reproduces in each person the same ways of thinking, feeling, and acting. By mechanical, Durkheim does not mean machine like or artificial. He means that the conditions of life are the same for everyone so there is little diversity in people’s experiences and ideas. Individuals do not have a sense of identity separate from being a member of a family, clan, or a warrior caste. Consequently, “the ideas and tendencies common to all the members of the society are greater in number and intensity than those which pertain personally to each member” (Durkheim 1964: 129).

Organic solidarity occurs in complex organisms composed of specialized parts, each of which performs distinct functions to support the whole. No one household, neighborhood, town, or economy can produce everything its members need to survive. Economies begin to depend not only on the family but also on educational institutions to produce dependable workers with a range of needed skills. A complex division of labor has developed, where there are many different occupations, a great diversity of racial and ethnic backgrounds, and a wide range of religious beliefs and political views. Such diversity of people, groups, and institutions is organized into distinct yet interdependent roles and functions. Moreover, a cultural concept of the individual and individualism emerges, and people are integrated by social exchange among free individuals in market economies.

Durkheim grew up as the son of a rabbi in the long established and tightly knit Jewish community of Alsace Lorraine. He left his traditional world to pursue his studies in the cosmopolitan world of Paris. Many scholars have observed that Durkheim's personal experiences of tradition and modernity inspired his lifelong interest in the nature and condition of solidarity in contemporary democratic society. The central question Durkheim posed in *The Division of Labor* is what is the basis of social solidarity in modern societies where there is a great diversity of people living in vastly different settings? How do the parts of a modern society (individuals, groups, institutions) become more interdependent while at the same time becoming more distinct from each other?

His argument is summarized in a well known statement: "Social life comes from a double source, the likeness of consciences and the division of labor" (Durkheim 1964: 226). Here, Durkheim identifies the two key variables that distinguish mechanical and organic solidarity, which continue to be important variables in sociology today: (1) the extent (degree of complexity) of the division of labor, by which he means differentiation of distinct functions or roles, such as the historical separation of economic production from family and kinship systems, and the organization of economic production into differentiated occupational groupings and industries; (2) the extent to which members of a society share a collective consciousness (i.e., all the ways of thinking, feeling, and acting that are common to a group or society). (The extent of collective consciousness means the number and intensity of the values, beliefs, norms, emotions, and activities that are shared.)

In mechanically organized societies the division of labor is absent or weak, and the collective consciousness contains a large number of clear, powerful beliefs, values, and traditional practices shared intensely by all members. In contrast, organic societies have a complex division of labor and a smaller number of more ambiguous and thus less constraining ideas and practices that everyone shares. A complex division of labor and great diversity of people creates the condition where the collective consciousness becomes more abstract by virtue of including only values and norms that are meaningful to

everyone. Durkheim notes that perhaps the only value widely shared and strongly held in modern western societies is individualism – the inherent dignity, worth, and freedom of the individual. As the collective consciousness becomes more abstract because shared ways of thinking, feeling, and acting are far fewer in number and are more ambiguous, society is less able to regulate all behavior.

Exactly how does the evolution from mechanical to organic solidarity occur? Durkheim argues that physical and social density increase, which generates competition among people, resulting in differentiation of roles and institutional functions. Population size increases and is distributed across a territory differently due to improvements in transportation and communication that link people and villages more easily. Villages and towns grow, cities emerge, and as urbanization increases, each person has more contact with a great many more people. This increase in social density – the actual pattern of who interacts with whom, how, and with what frequency – stimulates competition for jobs and other resources. From competition emerges a more complex division of labor, where people find occupational niches, firms find market niches, and different zones of a city specialize in different functions.

In short, social ties are based on difference instead of likeness. Everyone is more interdependent, in worlds separated yet linked by specialization. Durkheim concludes that "even where society relies most completely upon the division of labor . . . the members are united by ties which extend deeper and far beyond the short moments during which the exchange is made. Each of the functions that they exercise is, in a fixed way, dependent upon others, and with them forms a solidary system" (Durkheim 1964: 227).

In *The Division of Labor* Durkheim argued that as specialization and interdependence of function increase, the extent and intensity of collective consciousness recede in importance as a source of social solidarity. Together, both changes produce a different type of society. In subsequent work, however, Durkheim became less convinced that the collective consciousness recedes in importance in modern societies. Over time his work focused more on the pre rational basis of solidarity (i.e., the moral and emotional

effect of social ties), especially how groups produce ideologies through mechanisms such as ritual practices (Collins 1994: 190, 204). Durkheim did not discuss mechanical and organic solidarity per se after *The Division of Labor*. Yet over his lifetime he continued his interest in both manifestations of the structural relations among people: the evolution of institutions and the symbolic and emotional components of social life that unify groups and societies.

SEE ALSO: Collective Consciousness; Division of Labor; Durkheim, Émile; Durkheim, Émile and Social Change; Norms; Tradition; Values

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Sombart, Werner (1863–1941)

Alan Sica

Werner Sombart was born in the small Protestant town of Ermsleben (Harz region) and died in Berlin, an event fully recorded in the *New York Times* with obituary and editorial (May 20 and 22, 1941). His father, Anton Ludwig Sombart, was from seventeenth century Huguenot stock and personified what Sombart's friend Max Weber would call in 1905 the Protestant ethic, and what Sombart himself named the bourgeois

spirit. The elder Sombart was elected *Bürgermeister* of Ermsleben in 1848, and became rich as an industrialist and estate owner through the sugar trade. Not satisfied simply to enjoy his wealth, he co founded the famous *Verein für Sozialpolitik*, an influential organization of concerned citizens that sponsored social research prescribing government policy, particularly pertaining to the liberation of agricultural workers from virtual serfdom on large estates. Bismarck invited him to become minister of agriculture, but he declined owing to poor eyesight.

Despite his own eye disease and nascent tuberculosis in youth, Werner Sombart was able to use his family's great wealth to study economics and humanities at Pisa (1882), Berlin (1893), and Rome. His Berlin dissertation on the ancient Roman *Campagna* (1888) (substantively similar to Weber's) was directed by Gustav Schmoller, the leading exponent of sociohistorical economics. It remains an impressive scholarly achievement by virtue of the way primary documents from the Roman state archives were examined. Sombart's first professional position was as a city lawyer for Bremen, which he was loath to leave after 2 years when offered a professorship (partly through the machinations of his father) at remote Breslau in 1890. (Max Weber unsuccessfully applied for the very position in Bremen which Sombart had vacated.)

Sombart's first classes treated the Communist Manifesto and *Capital* (Vol. 1), to which he had been drawn after becoming radicalized, not by reading social science, but instead the fiction of Emile Zola. He decided at this early date to commit his prodigious scholarly energy to the study of the proletariat and the nature of capitalism as they evolved in unison throughout history. Like today's sociologists, he toured worksites in order to understand the proletarian's plight, a practice which did not sit well with his hidebound academic colleagues, who already regarded him as "a young and conceited person." Thus, from this unusual background of familial wealth and connections, childhood disease and poor early school performance, wide travel, and passionate interests in literature, economics, and history, plus the usual linguistic capacity of mandarins of his period, Sombart perfected a style of living and writing which throughout his life shocked his staid peers while thrilling readers and auditors. He was known as

a dandy among the more straitlaced, yet was able through sheer force of style to write books that sold 30,000 copies, some in cheap editions to the working class. C. Wright Mills, writing about Veblen, quoted from Bernard Shaw's *Man and Superman* – “he who has something to assert will go as far in power of style as its momentousness and his conviction will carry him” – which could as well be applied to Sombart (quoted in Grundmann & Stehr 2001). Once again in the history of social thought, a son of privilege dedicated himself utterly to the interpretation of life among the lower orders (as with Weber, Simmel, and Lukacs), and for reasons not entirely clear, perhaps even to himself.

Beginning with the belief that Marx was “the greatest social philosopher of the nineteenth century,” Sombart elaborated his predecessor's arguments. For some years his fellow leftist intellectuals fully expected him to succeed Marx as the foremost analyst of capitalism. The wide spread belief that he was heir apparent to the leftist tradition began early, after he published a brilliant analysis of Marx's *Capital* (Vol. 3) at the age of 31. This 40 page work (Sombart 1894) has won steady encomia ever since it appeared, beginning with Engels's celebrated remark in a letter from 1895: “It is the first time that a German professor has made the effort to try to understand from his writings what Marx really has been saying” (published in an appendix to *Capital*, Vol. 3). Yet eventually he became impatient with the proletariat – which he knew first hand – for its inability to transcend its quotidian self definition by becoming an effective agent of social change, and found others to admire, principally among the leaders of National Socialism. Nor could he accept Marx's utopian tendency, substituting for it the hardnosed English and German view of economic life – perhaps due to a sobering realism that sprang from witnessing his father's efficacious business activities. (He also rejected full scale political work and “self sacrifice” when invited by his friend Ferdinand Tönnies to join the Social Democratic Party in 1893, partly at least for fear of losing his job and jeopardizing his young family's welfare.) In brief, he wanted to substitute an evolutionary for a revolutionary brand of Marxist theory and practice, and he enunciated this viewpoint

before other leftist thinkers, like Eduard Bernstein, had done so. By 1900 he was speaking regularly to large trade union audiences and had been publicly branded as a Marxist, despite the fact that by 1908 he announced in print that most of Marx's ideas about capitalism's dynamics he found unsupportable when measured against the evidence of economic history. Some critics argue that Sombart peaked as a scholar and thinker when quite young, and the older he became and the larger his audiences, the poorer his analysis and the less credible and admirable his political allegiances became.

Sombart's lingering fame in the anglophone sphere is mostly due to a short book, *Why is There No Socialism in the United States?* (1976), which he would have regarded as ancillary to his major project. It is ritually cited by authors discussing “American exceptionalism,” but there is little evidence that it is any longer read with the sort of care lavished, say, on Weber's *The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism* (1930). And ever since Sombart's death, his magnum opus *Der moderne Kapitalismus* (1902 and thereafter) – never fully translated into English (Sombart 1967b) – has been eclipsed in importance by two briefer works, *The Jews and Modern Capitalism* (1913) and *Luxury and Capitalism* (1967a). In the former work he imaginatively argues that the Jews, due to their money lending and trading skills, were pivotal in the formation of capitalism, a point which caused some proud, early Jewish reviewers to embrace the book. But others, due perhaps to Sombart's thoroughgoing support of the Nazis in later years, find his argument anti Semitic because he juxtaposes rationalist Jewish economic practices against Germanophilic industrial behavior, all to the detriment of the former. In taking this position he was quite self consciously extending Tönnies's 1887 argument about the forgoing warmth of *Gemeinschaft* versus the urban chill common to life within *Gesellschaft*. And Sombart (unlike Weber or Tönnies) explicitly attributed the former to “real” Germans and reserved the latter, unhappy condition to the influence of Jewish commercial practices and the worldview that went along with it. Later critics insist that Sombart's notion of Judaism is fantasy, a result of his lack of Hebrew and consequent misunderstanding of the religion's social and sacred practices. The canonical comparison is with Weber's

Ancient Judaism (1952), which had held up well even after decades of study.

More useful today, however, is Sombart's book on luxury, which some scholars believe is more suited for the explanation of contemporary consumerist culture than is Veblen's more famous sister tome, *The Theory of the Leisure Class* (1899). Sombart held that the desire for what Veblen wonderfully called "conspicuous consumption" played a vital role in the birth of capitalism, beginning with courtiers wishing to outdo each other in the presence of their sovereigns. Veblen regarded this as a pathological condition, but Sombart, anticipating the late twentieth century, saw in it the roots of capitalist behavior, and as such not in itself ethically or morally questionable.

Werner Sombart's legacy is a troubled one, to be sure. On one hand, he wrote a multi volume study of capitalism which for sheer detail and historical sweep has no rivals, after Marx's own works. Yet it has often been noted that his use of data lacked precision and his powerful prose style swept him, and his unsuspecting readers, into unsupportable claims. His occasional anti Semitic remarks coupled with a longstanding support for *Deutschum* (chauvinist Germanness) via the Nazi party have naturally made him permanently anathema to many readers. Yet some scholars argue (e.g., Stehr and Grundmann in Sombart 2001) that he deserves continued study. They see him as a potent counterbalance to the ideas of Weber, Simmel, and others in that luminous circle, whose principal scholarly preoccupation was the explanation for capitalism's wild success in Europe and America, and also for its corrosive nature and high social costs across the globe.

SEE ALSO: Capitalism; Culture, Economy and; Global Economy; Political Economy; Weber, Max

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Sorokin, Pitirim A. (1889–1968)

Edward Tiryakian

By any objective criteria of contributions to macrosociology, Pitirim Aleksandrovich Sorokin ranks alongside such twentieth century figures as Max Weber, Émile Durkheim, and Talcott Parsons. His pioneering contributions in the comparative historical study of revolutions, social mobility, cultural sociology (considerably in advance of the "cultural turn" of sociology), rural urban sociology, and the sociology of altruism are lasting landmarks with a prime focus on the hows and whys of what he designated as sociocultural change.

As Coser (1977: 489) has noted, there is considerable overlap in the general structural functional perspective of Sorokin and Parsons regarding the significance of culture, values, and meaningful symbols in social organization (both consequently highly critical of economic reductionism, as in later rational choice theory). Yet these departmental colleagues differed as to

the course of social change in the period of late modernity. Sorokin came to reject a linear view of social change, opting for a more cyclical and critical perspective; Parsons in later writings on social change and the value system of modernity took a more optimistic perspective of current western cultural orientations becoming globally accepted.

During the length of a long, productive career, Sorokin filled many roles as a sociologist: he was an entrepreneur in founding departments of sociology at Petrograd University on the eve of World War I and at Harvard in 1931 (where Robert K. Merton was the first graduate student to enrol and became his early collaborator); he engaged in “public sociology” as a student activist in prerevolutionary and revolutionary Russia, and again in the last decade of his life in his opposition to the Vietnam War; like C. Wright Mills at Columbia, he was highly critical of the “establishment,” including the “power structure” of the United States and of the dominant, reductionist methodology of the profession. Sorokin readily took on the role of prophet in various writings on the cultural crisis of modernity, and experienced a double exile – an exile from his native Russia after being banished by Lenin for obstructing the Bolshevik Revolution (a fate he shared with his contemporary Georges Gurvitch, who became a leading figure in French sociology after World War II), and a second symbolic exile from American mainstream sociology after World War II. His “banishment” came to an end with his election after a write in campaign to the presidency of the American Sociological Association in 1964, and perhaps as important, symbolically in 1969 when the radical students protesting the Vietnam War adopted the recently departed Sorokin as their icon at the ASA meetings in San Francisco by having a special session on “Sorokin Lives!”

EARLY RUSSIAN PERIOD

Born in a remote rural ethnic enclave of Russia, Sorokin came of age in a period marked by modernization as well as by agrarian and urban unrest, culminating in the failed revolution of 1905 and the successful revolution of 1917.

Noted as a brilliant student, Sorokin developed his interests in law and criminology (his doctoral dissertation was *Crime and Punishment*) and broadened them to sociology. He was a participant observer of the revolutionary setting, later making use of his observations at close hand of how people behave towards one another in extreme situations, including the condition of mass food deprivation (*Hunger as a Factor in Human Affairs*, eventually translated into English). His political involvement led to various arrests subject to capital punishment, but his academic reputation and scholarly publications provided the grounds for clemency from Lenin, subject to Sorokin’s permanent exile.

Not all or even the majority of his writings of this period have been translated (see the selections in Sorokin 1998). Beside providing him with a treasure house of observations on collective behavior and social movements, the ruptures of World War I and Revolutionary Russia provided Sorokin with materials to reject the naïve positivism associated with an evolutionary and linear view of change.

EARLY AMERICAN PERIOD: 1920s

Coming to the University of Minnesota and a more tranquil academic life, Sorokin brought to American sociology an important comparative historical perspective in major volumes dealing with rural urban differences and convergences (Sorokin & Zimmerman 1929), stratification and mobility (Sorokin 1927), and schools of sociological theory in terms of their major premises and orientations.

In *Principles of Rural Urban Sociology* Sorokin noted that the city plays predominantly the role of innovator, the countryside that of the preserver of existing national culture. The heterogeneity of the population and a greater percentage of foreign born inhabitants generates a more “international” character to city culture, while rural classes have a greater development of patriotism, which as a particular attachment to one’s region and place of birth becomes a part of personality. Urban dwellers, with greater mobility and heterogeneity, are more prone to atheism and secularism; rural societies have a better chance of preserving the integrity of their

national culture in times of foreign political subjugation and to regain their political independence than highly urbanized societies. These observations of Sorokin and Zimmerman were borne out in African colonial rule and Eastern Europe under communist rule.

Although much more is to be found in this massive comparative study, for the purpose at hand it may be noted that (in contrast to other perspectives prevalent at the time, which looked at rural society with nostalgia as a setting of virtue and *Gemeinschaft* only) the perspective deployed is one of even handedness concerning rural–urban differences. There is not, in other words, an idealization of rural life and “small town” community. The volume also looked at dynamic aspects of the modern rural urban setting rather than as set in fixed poles. As important sociologically as the differences of rural and urban are their interchanges, with increasing urbanization of the rural world and also with the “ruralization” of the city world (a dialectical process which a later generation recognized as gentrification and suburbanization, and yet later as the global–local interplay).

MIDDLE AMERICAN PERIOD: 1930s AND 1940s

In addition to launching and chairing the Harvard department of sociology, Sorokin produced a four volume magnum opus, *Social and Cultural Dynamics* (1991), the most comprehensive sociological analysis of the institutional components of civilizations understood as dynamic cultural systems. Other publications in this period apply the theoretical perspective of a decaying “sensate” phase of civilization to diagnoses of the global crisis of the later 1930s, culminating in World War II (*Crisis of our Age*, 1941; *Man and Society in Calamity*, 1942). In a different vein, Sorokin published a methodological treatise having affinity with phenomenology (*Sociocultural Causality, Space, Time*, 1942) and a comparative study of the two countries that became the superpowers of the postwar era (*Russia and the United States*, 1944). While aware of some obvious differences, Sorokin in the latter study also pointed out important similarities and structural bases of compatibility.

LATE AMERICAN PERIOD: 1950s AND 1960s

This bitter sweet period of Sorokin’s career was marked initially by an increased estrangement from the profession (*Fads and Foibles in Sociology and Related Sciences*, 1956) and a very critical orientation to cultural and political aspects of American society (*The American Sex Revolution, Power and Morality: Who Shall Guard the Guardians?* 1959). His “critical” writings, published well in advance of critical sociology, tended to be dismissed by the profession, with grudging accolades given to more “mainstream” works (*Sociological Theories of Today*, 1966). However, the accolades became more pronounced in his last decade, and a certain reconciliation of Sorokin with the profession is best manifest in his ASA presidential address “Sociology of Yesterday, Today and Tomorrow” (published in the *American Sociological Review*, December 1965).

His most creative activities in this last period were devoted to setting up the Harvard Research Center in Creative Altruism, which generated several important volumes (see the discussion in Johnston 1995). These relate to Sorokin’s view that sociology needs to provide from empirical data possibilities of social reconstruction emphasizing creativity, love, and normative ideals as alternative to prevalent emphases in popular culture and in research on what in a comparative historical perspective are malevolent features of the human condition.

MAJOR THEMES OF SOCIAL CHANGE

For Sorokin, echoing the insight of Heraklitus, the social order is characteristically in flux. The social order is given its orderliness by the cultural integration of its component parts, which are themselves institutions and systems of ideas (political, economic, philosophical, cultural). These parts of a complex whole sociocultural system (a civilization) are grounded in a basic worldview of ultimate reality, with three primary modes of apprehending reality as truth. First, reality may be taken to be given by the senses and the objects of the senses: this Sorokin termed *sensate* reality. Second, in contrast, ultimate reality may be seen as lying beyond the

senses and their time space coordinates; it is apprehended by intuition, intuitive experience, a moment of “enlightenment” and the like, recognized in various cultural and religious traditions, from Plato to Zen Buddhism. This Sorokin termed *ideational*. Third is a combination or synthesis of the first two by means of the faculty of reason and rational thought – what Sorokin called *idealistic*.

All three cognitive modes are present in any complex social order, though in any period of the existence of a social system one mode may have salience over the other two. But because all three are features of social organization, in order to have a comprehensive understanding of the structure and dynamics of social reality – of the comportment of social actors and of inevitable changes in social organization – sociology must be an “integralist sociology,” that is, it must have a multidimensional methodology that can treat social reality in all three modes. Stated in different terms, an adequate methodology for sociology is one that is empirical (Sorokin utilized quantitative data in various studies), rational, and interpretive.

However integrated sociocultural systems and their component parts may be, there is no perfect, permanent integration – humans can imagine a perfectly integrated society (as in socialist and other totalitarian systems), but history shows that change is prevalent and that the major factors producing change are internal factors (Sorokin’s *principle of immanent change*). Over time, the cultural premises exhaust their creative capacity of integration, and in periods of decay (or decadence), normative disarray is reflected in social pathological behavior, from anarchy and civil wars to world wars and genocides.

Drawing from his early observations on the Russian scene, but also from secondary sources of other settings, Sorokin proposed that in periods of crisis and at the end phase of a given system of cultural integration, particularly the modern one of a late sensate period, there is the phenomenon of *polarization*. Instead of the modal “average” conduct of morality, the majority may be drawn to acts of violence and brutality against others, but a creative minority will engage in acts of abnegation, sacrifice, and altruism.

Lastly, Sorokin’s perspective on change is a rejection of a linear view of change in favor of a *principle of limit*. There is a limit to how far in extent a given cultural mentality can go, and there is only a finite number of immanent possibilities available to a given sociocultural system. Hence, the historical process can be observed through various indices to have recurrent rhythms and patterns, rather than being unidirectional.

In brief, long term change is cyclical with a *longue durée* of the dominant mentality, whose exhaustion results in crises of malintegration manifest in social disorders and wars. In essential respects, Sorokin’s analysis of change in late modernity converges with and amplifies Durkheim’s theory of anomie.

CONCLUSION

Sociology has at various times “discovered” major figures of the past, as their overlooked or forgotten writings take on new relevance with changing societal conditions: Karl Marx, Georg Simmel, and Norbert Elias come to mind as receiving new “upgrades” in the decades after World War II. Sorokin is a prime candidate for “upgrade status,” with his focus on civilizational change as a unit of macrosociology (a theme accentuated by the “clash of civilizations” replacing the clash of superpowers), with his studies of by products of social deterioration in an era of the accelerating decline of sensate culture (witness Internet pornography, “reality” TV shows, and other anomic manifestations of popular culture), and with his comparative historical research on the creative and beneficial aspects of altruistic behavior. The “postmodern condition,” however elusive this may be, is one of flux and ambiguity. The rosy optimism of a “new international order” at the end of the Cold War has given way to a more sober realism of late modernity in the face of new cycles of genocide and warfare. In this period of transition, Sorokin’s integralist sociology offers methodological guidance for dealing and researching with emerging sociocultural phenomena, and his studies of altruistic behavior (which he designated as the study of “amity”), well in advance of current emerging research on

philanthropy, point to a possible new paradigm of modernity, a new “idealistic” period, though not a new utopia.

SEE ALSO: Anomic; Durkheim, Émile; Gurvitch, Georges; Social Change; Parsons, Talcott; Phenomenology; Revolutions

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sovereignty

Stephen D. Krasner

The term sovereignty has been used in many different ways. The most important and widely understood distinction is between internal (domestic) and external (international) sovereignty. Internal sovereignty refers to the existence of an authoritative decision making structure within a political entity, a structure that is both legitimated and effective. External sovereignty refers to the autonomy or independence of a political entity and its associated authority structure from external control or interference.

INTERNAL OR DOMESTIC SOVEREIGNTY

Internal sovereignty is associated with the principle that within each political entity there is a structure capable of making authoritative determinations. In its modern formulations this idea is rooted in the work of Bodin and Hobbes, both of whom wanted, above all, to create a basis for domestic political order in the face of religious conflicts that were undermining the major states of Europe. Bodin’s *Six Books of the Commonwealth* was motivated by the religious wars in France and was a rebuttal of the claim made by some Huguenot theorists for the right to rebel. Bodin himself was almost killed in the St. Bartholomew’s Day massacre of 1572. For Bodin, the basic goal of government was to ensure order, and order could not be preserved if there was a right of rebellion against the sovereign. Bodin recognized that the sovereign could be a tyrant and he accepted the possibility that such a tyrant could be killed by outsiders, but he rejected in principle the right of domestic resistance.

Hobbes published the *Leviathan* at the end of the English Civil War, the bloodiest conflict in per capita terms for Britain until World War I and one of whose victims was the British king. Hobbes’s basic contention was that once individuals had entered into the social contract, they had given up any right of rebellion. The alternative to the Leviathan, the sovereign, was the state of nature in which life was “nasty, brutish, and short.” Both Bodin and Hobbes believed that there must be some one final point of authority within the state, an idea never realized in practice and perhaps even inimical to domestic order because of the dangers presented by the arbitrary exercise of power. Locke’s idea of the state as a fiduciary trust for the citizens who did have the right of rebellion if that trust was violated has proven a more durable formula for establishing stability. Regardless, however, of whether domestic sovereignty is organized in some single hierarchy or based on a separation of powers, the basic claim of internal or domestic sovereignty is that decent human existence requires an independent authority structure capable of providing order and, ideally, justice and prosperity as well.

Domestic or internal sovereignty has never been taken for granted. Issues of order and justice, which informed the work of the great political thinkers of the past, continue to be the concern of modern scholars. In the contemporary environment there are huge variations in the quality of domestic sovereignty or governance. In the modern industrialized countries of North America, Western Europe, and East Asia economic prosperity has grown, life expectancy has increased, and the lives of most individuals are secure. Domestic sovereignty works. In other parts of the world, however, there are populations in many countries that suffer under failed, weak, incompetent, or abusive national authority structures. Life expectancy is declining. Public services are not delivered. Per capita income is falling. Civil war is endemic. In the most extreme cases, any semblance of an effective national or even regional authority structure may have collapsed. Internal or domestic sovereignty has failed.

EXTERNAL OR INTERNATIONAL SOVEREIGNTY

External or international sovereignty refers to a way of organizing political life among political entities. In its ideal typical form external sovereignty is defined by three characteristics: territory, autonomy, equality. A sovereign state has a defined territory. A sovereign state is autonomous or independent; no external actor has authority within the state's territorial boundaries and each sovereign state accepts the autonomy of other sovereigns. Finally, sovereign states are formally equal. Although they obviously vary with regard to size, population, resources, and wealth, every sovereign state has the right to sign treaties with others and to be free from interference by external actors. With regard to equality, sovereign states are analogous to individuals in a liberal society; each state is regarded as having a basic set of rights regardless of other attributes.

Conventional analyses by international lawyers and by international relations scholars as well have treated international or external sovereignty as fundamental for any adequate understanding of the modern international system. The sovereign state system has been seen as

emerging from the Peace of Westphalia of 1648, which ended the Thirty Years' War. In his classic "The Peace of Westphalia, 1648–1948," Leo Gross wrote that the "Peace of Westphalia, for better or worse, marks the end of an epoch and the opening of another. It represents the majestic portal which leads from the old world into the new." For Gross, the Peace marked the end of the hierarchical medieval system within which the emperor and the pope stood at the pinnacle of religious and secular authority.

For the conventional perspective, once sovereignty was accepted at Westphalia it became increasingly embedded over time. Conventional sovereignty became the foundation upon which international law was based. Law was the result of treaties or customary behavior undertaken by sovereign states, each of which was free to choose its own course of action. For international relations scholars, especially those associated with realism, the dominant perspective for American political scientists from the 1950s through the 1990s, sovereignty was the fundamental assumption upon which their analyses were based: outcomes in the international system were the result of the distribution of power among states, each of which was assumed to be independent from all others. For many scholars, as well as policymakers, international or external sovereignty came to have a taken for granted quality.

Conventional understanding of international and domestic, of external and internal, sovereignty is complementary. An autonomous territorially based political unit capable of entering into agreements with other such units on an equal basis, the key to international sovereignty, must also be a unit in which there is a domestic authority structure capable of guaranteeing that international commitments can be honored.

ALTERNATIVES TO SOVEREIGNTY

Sovereignty can be contrasted with other ways of organizing political life. Traditional tribal groups claimed authority over their members but did not have a defined territory. Authority relations were defined in terms of individuals rather than territory. Colonies had specific territory but they did not have autonomy; final authority rested with the colonizing state. In

the traditional sinocentric world, imperial China was regarded as superior to other political entities; these other entities, tributary states, sent periodic tribute missions to China (missions that were often as much concerned with trade as with deference), and China sent investiture missions to tributary states when new rulers were chosen; but in most other ways tributary states were effectively independent.

SOVEREIGNTY IN PRACTICE

Observers have always recognized that in practice domestic or internal sovereignty can be problematic because domestic authority structures can break down. There is also now increasing recognition of the fact that external sovereignty as well can not be taken for granted. External or international sovereignty can work in practice only if two fundamental rules are observed by states. The first rule, a corollary of the idea that each state is supposed to be independent or autonomous, is that no state should intervene in the internal affairs of another. The inhabitants or rulers of each state can create whatever domestic authority structures they want free from outside interference. The second rule is that there should be mutual recognition among juridically independent territorial entities. Mutual recognition allows states to enter into international agreements on the basis of formal equality. In the contemporary world, it also provides membership in international organizations and, for poorer states, access to the resources of international financial institutions. The official representatives of recognized states are accorded special privileges such as diplomatic immunity.

Both of these rules, the rule of non intervention and the rule of mutual recognition, assume the absence of any final authority structure in the international system. Indeed, it is the absence of such a final authority that distinguishes a world of sovereign states from an imperial system in which there is a final arbiter for all political entities. If, however, there is no final authority in the international system, why would we expect that the rules of non intervention and mutual recognition would be honored? One possibility is that these rules, which define a logic of appropriateness for the

international system, are so taken for granted that political leaders cannot conceive of violating them. This possibility, however, is not consistent with the empirical evidence.

The rule of non intervention has frequently been violated. For example, during the Cold War, the Soviet Union and the United States both sought to promote their own model of domestic authority in other states. In Western Europe after the war, the United States used both financial resources and military threats to weaken the position of the Communist Party in Italy. In what became West Germany and in Japan, the occupying powers led by the United States pressed for the creation of authority structures based on democracy and capitalism. The Soviet Union, for its part, supported or imposed communist regimes in the countries of Eastern Europe that its army occupied at the end of World War II. In the developing world, both the Americans and the Soviets supported political leaders who, at a minimum, would shun the other side. In Korea and Vietnam the United States intervened to prevent a communist regime from assuming control of the entire country, an enterprise that was successful in Korea but not in Vietnam. The United States sent troops into the Dominican Republic and Grenada to prevent what American political leaders perceived to be the dangers of a communist takeover. In Afghanistan the Soviets intervened, ultimately unsuccessfully, to prevent the overthrow of a communist regime.

The inescapable tension at the core of international or external sovereignty is that a logic of consequences may dictate a different behavior than a logic of appropriateness. The international system is characterized by power asymmetries, differing interests, and the absence of any final authority. The core interests of powerful states have repeatedly been threatened by the nature of domestic political regimes in weaker states. To lessen this threat, political leaders in powerful states have moved to change the domestic authority structure in weaker ones. If the interests of powerful states are furthered by intervening in the internal affairs of weaker ones, there is no authority that can prevent such policies from being implemented. Violations of the rule of non intervention are not an aberration but rather an enduring characteristic of the sovereign state system.

In the post Cold War environment failures of internal or domestic sovereignty, violations of basic human rights, and the threat of trans national terrorism have created new tensions between a logic of appropriateness and a logic of consequences. Genocidal developments have led major countries to condemn developments in some countries, for instance Rwanda, and to intervene in others, for instance Kosovo. Concerns about terrorism motivated wars against Afghanistan and Iraq. Transitional administrations with executive authority, usually authorized by the United Nations Security Council, have been created in a number of countries since the end of the Cold War, sometimes for short periods, such as in East Timor, and sometimes for much longer periods, as in Bosnia, where the high representative, a Western European essentially appointed by the major European powers, continued to make key political decisions for many years after the signing of the Dayton accords in 1995. Thus, while ideological differences between the Soviet Union and the United States during the Cold War created tensions between the logic of appropriateness associated with external sovereignty and the logic of consequences driven by the desire of the super powers to support regimes that mimicked their own domestic authority structures, in the post Cold War period failures of domestic authority and the dangers of terrorism have led to similar tensions.

In an environment as complex as the international system, strains between logics of appropriateness and consequences are inevitable. In their relations with each other powerful states with effective domestic sovereignty may honor the rules of international sovereignty because such behavior is consistent with a logic of consequences. But in relations between powerful states and weak states with either poor or abusive domestic governance, logics of consequences driven by material interests will trump logics of appropriateness. Both internal and external sovereignty have not been, and cannot be, taken for granted.

SEE ALSO: Authority and Legitimacy; Colonialism (Neocolonialism); Global Politics; Imperialism; Nation State and Nationalism; Organizations as Social Structures; State

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space

Leslie Wasson

Space has many faces: the bubble of individual space, the private spaces we maintain for our personal lives, the situated space defined for social interactions, the public spaces of wider social activity, and space as a scarce distributed resource in the organization of human social life. A sociological examination of space might look at one or more of these aspects. Although some theorists use the terms space and place interchangeably, they are not the same concept. A place is a social organization of space to which we have attached a particular meaning, and in which certain activities are more likely to occur. Space is the physical distance among the elements of which that place is constituted.

Hall's groundbreaking text *The Hidden Dimension* (1966) treats space as a sociological category of experience. For Hall, as for other well known theorists of space such as LeFebvre (1991), space is ordered by human custom and definition. The reverse is also observed: the design or definition of a space can affect the sort of activities and meanings that occur within it. Hall cites the transitory character of late industrial society, and ties it to conflict among the unspoken cultural assumptions about space,

time, and other abstract concepts. His exploratory study raises many subtopics, such as proxemics, which is the individual's need for space between people in order to interact, and which varies by culture. He also suggests an examination of the city, wherein he delineates three kinds of spaces: fixed feature, semifixed feature, and informal spaces.

INDIVIDUAL SPACE OR PROXEMICS

Individuals carry an invisible bubble of space around them in order to feel comfortable interacting with others. The size of this cushion of space varies from one individual to another, and also varies across cultures. For example, a person in one of the Arabic cultures needs to get very close, about 1 foot away, in order to communicate effectively. In other cultures, about 4 feet is the acceptable communication distance. Most Americans need about 30 inches (Sommer 1969). The implication for diplomatic missions and everyday conversation is that others may be perceived as either too pushy or too cold and distant for reasons that have nothing to do with the content of their communications, and much to do with the amount of intervening space.

PRIVATE SPACE: HOMES

There is, according to conventional wisdom, no place like home. Home is the essential private space. Douglas (1991) suggests that homes need not be large, but that a home begins by bringing some space under control. She characterizes the private space of the home as being regarded with a mixture of resistance and nostalgia. The sociological interest in this construction of meaning, however, is that home as a private space may or may not be "fixed" in its location or attributes. As Levinson and Sparkes (2004) find in their study of Gypsy culture and space, when previously nomadic people leave their home on the road and start living in houses they may experience a loss of cultural identity.

Homes are domestic spaces. They reflect the interests, roles, and statuses of the men, women, children, and pets who are their inhabitants (Walker 2002). Walker provides the

example of the space allocation and semiotic relations of the rooms in a Victorian house, and ties that architecture to the prevailing assumptions about age, gender, and social roles of the time.

SITUATED SPACE

Spaces of any kind are subject to a variety of social definitions. This variety is not infinite, but spaces can be flexible to different definitions of the situation and accompanying interactions. A small space beneath a kitchen table may be room for feet and legs, a cave or a castle to a young person, or the land of bountiful opportunity to the family dog. For the situational attributes of space, an excellent starting source would be Goffman (1959), who describes the settings and spaces of everyday life as stages for scripted social interactions. Lessons from the world of architecture and design indicate that more flexible spatial frames can lead to greater participation in sociability, as participants engage in the process of fine tuning a space to a more transient situated meaning that suits their needs of the moment.

PUBLIC SPACES

Oldenburg (1999) demonstrates the importance of everyday community spaces to the construction of social relationships and meanings. His examination of the "third spaces" that people spend time in after home and work highlights the importance of semi private and public spaces in providing meaning and continuity to human life. Historians and political scientists have examined the roles of taverns and coffee houses as community facilitators and sites for political discourse and organization. Milligan (1998) looks at what happens to the definition of a community place when it is moved into a new space. Community bonds forged in the crucible of one intense social space lose their integrity when those facilities and their limitations are no longer extant. Du Bois (2001) provides examples from his consulting work as an applied sociologist of space sensitive designs that encourage social interaction in nursing homes, bars, and other public spaces.

HUMAN SPACES AND URBAN GEOGRAPHY

Although space as a form of social organization has been studied most thoroughly by human geographers (Tuan & Hoelscher 2001), their studies have had a significant influence on sociological research. Jones (2001) proposes that sociology could and should be done in concert with the design professions who create human habitations. He provides a rationale based on many classic sociological studies of cities, beginning with the Chicago School. Subsequent researchers and theorists have examined the relationship between behavior and environment in both directions, from the perspective that all social interactions are guided or constrained by their physical contexts, to the proposition that all physical designs occur partly as a result of social processes.

Many studies of the use of space in human communities focus on urban settings. Some research examines the contestation of the finite commodity of public space in crowded urban conditions, and the marginalization of some public spaces over others (Madanipour 2004). Also, some research indicates that the homogenization of public urban spaces discourages intercultural communication (Rahder 2004). This can be an unproductive use of scarce space in crowded and diverse city settings, as it silences the participation of some groups. Kitchin (1998) explores social responses to disability as a spatialized political economy combined with social constructivism in which spaces are defined to exclude certain kinds of people and limit their visibility.

Space in suburban communities can influence interaction patterns as well. Gans (1967) described the layout of space in the early Levittown communities and suggested how this kind of organization affected the interactions of the residents. Rural sociologists might include space, in the form of isolation and transportation issues, in research on dispersed households or agricultural communities. They might also examine the transformation of food producing agricultural space into housing developments.

There may be a growing view of residential sprawl as a loss of open space and therefore a decline in the quality of life of a community. Such a perception can result in

social movements and legislation attempting to limit uncontrolled or unplanned development (Romero & Liserio 2002). Communities with abundant space may negotiate a balance between the individual tendency to spread out more or less evenly over available space versus distinctions in the allocation of location, acreage, and square footage by social status. Communities with more limited space may experience competition and rising prices that place ownership or even tenancy beyond the means of a significant percentage of their population.

Related to the idea of urban or suburban space is the political theory concept of "civic spaces," which contribute to the exercise of shared governance in a democratic society. An example of this might be Speaker's Corner in Hyde Park in London. To complicate matters, occasionally a convergence will occur between civic or political spaces and sacred religious spaces, as in Jerusalem. Such a contest of meanings may result in conflict over the space and its use.

CONFLICT AND CONTROVERSY OVER SPACE

Competition over desirable space has a long history. Many wars have been fought over territory. Much of American history is a tale of expansion into larger spaces perceived as uncultivated or marginally tenanted by their native caretakers.

There is some ethnocentric bias in defining anything as "open" space. Spaces that are not already saturated with urban or suburban forms of development are assumed to be empty and therefore available. Some ecological writers in the popular press, for example, suggest that conserving land by evicting its indigenous residents is illogical and unethical, and also potentially disruptive of an existing ecological balance. With an ever expanding global population and dwindling non renewable resources, this competition over space, and the emergence of social movements aimed at preserving it, may increase.

Cyberspace may be viewed as a nearly infinite virtual commodity in the age of computers, but not all human interaction has the benefit of Internet access. Space may indeed be the final

frontier, but perhaps not the space above us. In a rapidly globalizing world, we may find it more pressing to address the space around us and between us.

SEE ALSO: Chicago School; Cities in Europe; City Planning/Urban Design; Definition of the Situation; Dramaturgy; Goffman, Erving; Identity Theory; Lefebvre, Henri; Levittown; Place; Suburbs; Urban Space

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spatial mismatch hypothesis

Ted Moww

The spatial mismatch hypothesis argues that the movement of jobs away from central city areas, combined with constraints on geographic mobility imposed by continued residential segregation, limits the employment prospects of inner city minorities. The basic story is straightforward: as jobs decentralize to the suburbs or beyond, black workers find it difficult to move to where the jobs are because of racial residential segregation, resulting in a “mismatch” between the jobs and black workers that raises unemployment and/or lowers wages. The spatial mismatch hypothesis has been widely discussed since it was first proposed in the late 1960s as an explanation for black–white differences in unemployment rates. At the same time, there are longstanding and unresolved debates in the literature regarding the magnitude of the effect that it has on racial differences in unemployment and wages.

John Kain (1968) was the first to attempt to empirically test the spatial mismatch hypothesis. He used data on employment location from the 1950s to divide Detroit and Chicago into 98 workplace areas. He then regressed the share of black employment in the workplace area on the share of the population and the spatial distance from the black ghetto area and found a strong relationship between black employment share and distance from the ghetto. He estimated that the geographic mismatch between workers and jobs resulted in a loss of about 22,000 jobs for Chicago and 9,000 for Detroit.

Despite changes in residential segregation and job decentralization since Kain's initial formulation, the basic story behind the spatial mismatch hypothesis is still relevant today. Residential segregation between blacks and whites has declined slowly over the past two decades, but is still high, suggesting that in many metropolitan areas the geographic mobility of black workers is constrained. The evidence on employment decentralization suggests that the general trend over the past several decades has been one of job loss and decentralization in large urban areas as jobs moved toward the suburbs or left the metropolitan area entirely. John Kasarda (1995) shows that between 1980 and 1990, employment growth was much higher in suburban counties of metropolitan areas than in their central cities. Recent data indicate that this pattern held during the economic boom of the 1990s; between 1992 and 1997, for example, central cities experienced an increase in employment of 8.5 percent, compared to 17.8 percent in their suburbs. Steven Raphael and Michael Stoll (2002) calculate segregation indices between workers and jobs using data on population and employment by zip codes and argue that the mismatch between black workers and jobs declined slightly during the 1990s, but that blacks are still significantly more isolated from employment than whites.

CRITIQUE

In a prominent critique of the spatial mismatch hypothesis, David Ellwood (1986) tests the effect of average commuting time on youth (ages 16–21) unemployment in Chicago. He finds little effect of commuting time on neighborhood unemployment rates, and concludes that it is “race not space” that is of central importance in understanding the high unemployment rate of black workers.

Keith Ihlanfeldt and David Sjoquist (1990) argue that Ellwood's results are misleading because of the small sample sizes that he used to calculate neighborhood commuting times and because he did not estimate separate equations for black and white workers. They estimate the effect of average travel time on youth unemployment using micro level census data for Philadelphia, Chicago, and Los Angeles, and find results consistent with the spatial mismatch hypothesis.

A one standard deviation increase in average commuting time for black youth in Philadelphia (3.7 minutes) is associated with a predicted reduction of employment rates of 4 to 6.3 percentage points. Overall, Ihlanfeldt and Sjoquist estimate that spatial job accessibility explains about 33–39 percent of the racial difference in unemployment among 16 to 19 year olds who are not enrolled in school.

In general, most tests of the spatial mismatch hypothesis use neighborhood black unemployment rates as the dependent variable and some measure of distance to jobs as the central independent variable. The empirical question is whether neighborhoods with better spatial access to employment have lower unemployment rates for black workers. Two important difficulties in assessing the magnitude of the spatial mismatch effect, however, are the measurement of the spatial proximity of employment and the problem of endogeneity posed by selective migration.

THE MEASUREMENT OF EMPLOYMENT PROXIMITY

In order to calculate spatial job proximity, one needs to measure how far the average job seeker in each neighborhood has to travel to find employment opportunities. Recent research has done this in two ways. A number of studies use the average travel time for employed black workers in each neighborhood as a measure of spatial accessibility. A problem with this is that an unemployed person's travel time may be longer because nearby jobs may already be filled with local workers. An alternative is to use data on the spatial location of jobs and calculate the number of “nearby” jobs for each neighborhood. There are two measurement difficulties with this approach. First, one must take the number of competing workers into account. Hence, the jobs to workers ratio is a better measure of job availability. Second, one has to take the two dimensional spatial data on the location of jobs and workers and transform it into a measure of job accessibility. Raphael (1998) and Ted Mouw (2000) both borrow the “gravity model” of commuting behavior from the transportation literature to calculate spatially weighted indices of job accessibility (as well as

the size of the competing labor force), where “near” jobs are given more weight than “far” jobs based on the analysis of actual commuting behavior. Using data from the San Francisco metropolitan area, Raphael (1998) calculates changes in the proximity to jobs between 1980 and 1990 and controls for the size of the competing labor supply. In regressions of youth unemployment rates that combine both black and white workers, Raphael estimates that changes in job proximity explain about 29 percent of the racial gap in unemployment. Nonetheless, when he estimates these models separately by race, job proximity is statistically insignificant for black workers, reflecting a small sample size ($N = 367$).

Mouw (2000) estimates a “fixed effects” model of the spatial mismatch hypothesis by calculating changes in job proximity and adult unemployment rates between 1980 and 1990 in Detroit and Chicago. Data on job location from the 1980 and 1990 Census Transportation Planning Packages (CTPP) are used to calculate spatial measures of job proximity. The data document the substantial decentralization of employment that occurred during the 1980s in Detroit; within a 10 mile radius around the average black worker’s home there was a net loss of about 100,000 jobs between 1980 and 1990.

ENDOGENEITY

In addition to the problem of calculating job access, estimates of the spatial mismatch hypothesis may be biased if workers sort themselves into different neighborhoods based on unobserved characteristics that affect labor market outcomes. If housing prices and neighborhood quality tend to increase with distance from the city center, then more “successful” workers may end up living closer to suburban areas of employment growth. To the degree that this is true, proximity to regions of suburban job growth may be the result of labor market outcomes rather than the cause. Recent research on the spatial mismatch hypothesis has studied unemployment of teenagers rather than adults as a way to get around this problem of endogeneity. If teenagers live at home, then their residential location might be considered an exogenous factor uncorrelated with unobserved

labor market factors that would affect their ability to get a job. Even in this case, however, the decision of a teenager to work full time instead of being in school is probably correlated with his or her parents’ socioeconomic status, and hence this research is not immune to questions about endogeneity. Examples of this approach are Ihlanfeldt and Sjoquist (1990) and Raphael (1998).

An alternative approach is to study changes over time. As mentioned above, Mouw (2000) used “fixed effects” models of changes in neighborhood unemployment and job proximity between 1980 and 1990. Provided neighborhood selectivity – i.e., the tendency for workers to sort themselves into neighborhoods on the basis of their labor force characteristics – has remained constant over the time period, fixed effects models represent an alternative way to get around the problem of endogeneity in residential location. Based on his results, Mouw concluded that a 10 percent drop in job proximity would result in an increase in the black unemployment rate of 5.6 percentage points in Detroit and 2.9 percentage points in Chicago.

In another approach to the problem of endogeneity, Jeffrey Zax (1991) and Zax and Kain (1996) studied the effect of a single firm’s decision to move from downtown Detroit to the suburbs, about 8 miles away. The advantage of studying a single firm is that it represents a “natural experiment” to observe the effect of distance on employment. By studying employment records for racial differences in quit rates, Zax and Kain (1996) concluded that the resulting spatial mismatch between the location of the firm and the residences of their black workers forced about 11 percent of the black workers to quit after the relocation. While this research is persuasive, studies of a single firm cannot assess the magnitude of job decentralization as a whole or follow the employment outcomes of those workers who quit the firm.

Recent quasi experimental evidence from government funded housing programs, the Gautreaux program and Moving to Opportunity (MTO), has been used to assess the spatial mismatch hypothesis. In both of these programs, inner city black residents were given housing vouchers to allow them to move to different neighborhoods in their metropolitan area. In the Gautreaux program, voucher recipients

were randomly assigned to either suburban or urban neighborhoods in Chicago. James Rosenbaum (1995) showed that, in the Gautreaux program, respondents who moved to suburban neighborhoods had higher post move employment rates than urban movers. Nonetheless, the suburban movers did not have significantly higher employment rates than before they moved (64.3 percent employed pre move and 63.8 percent employed post move; see Rosenbaum 1995: 237). The MTO program is a large scale housing mobility experiment conducted in five cities. Families were randomly assigned to an “experimental” group and offered vouchers to live in a low poverty neighborhood, a “Section 8” group that was given vouchers with no geographic restrictions, and a control group that did not receive vouchers. Five years after random assignment, there is no statistically significant difference in employment rates or earnings between the experimental and control groups. Nonetheless, Jeffery Kling et al. note that these MTO results do not directly contradict the spatial mismatch hypothesis, as an analysis of employment growth by zip code suggests that the experimental group was not living in regions of higher job growth than the control group (employment in the control group zip codes increased by 5 percent compared to 4.9 percent in experimental group zip codes).

Overall, research during the past decade, with better measurement and methodological approaches than earlier research, has found substantial evidence to support the spatial mismatch hypothesis. Ihlanfeldt and Sjoquist (1998), for example, found that 21 of the 28 studies they reviewed that were published between 1992 and 1997 reported findings consistent with the spatial mismatch hypothesis. Nonetheless, the modest size of the effects in most studies indicates that the spatial mismatch hypothesis cannot be the only explanation of the black–white employment gap. Individual cities may differ greatly in their degree of “spatial mismatch” between workers and jobs, and even in Detroit, which because of high levels of racial residential segregation and job loss would seem to be the poster child for the mismatch hypothesis, a recent empirical estimate (Mouw 2000) suggests that the large scale decentralization of employment during the 1980s explained no

more than 30 percent of the 1990 racial gap in unemployment rates.

SEE ALSO: Discrimination; Economic Geography; Exurbia; Gentrification; Hypersegregation; Labor Markets; Race; Residential Segregation; Rustbelt

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spatial relationships

Martin Hess

Traditionally, the analysis of spatial relationships has been considered to be the domain of geography, whereas the academic discipline of sociology was concerned about the relationships between societies and social actors. Following a period of regional geography approaches in the first half of the twentieth century that had emphasized territorial differentiation as being at the core of human geography, this view has been subsequently contested. Rather than space being conceived of as a Kantian *a priori* for human existence and action (absolute space), the focus of many human geographers began to shift towards the analysis of spatial relationships between objects and events, thus introducing the concept of relative space.

During the 1960s and 1970s this concept underpinned an emerging strand of spatial science studies, with mathematical space superseding physical space to the extent that more and more human geographers became concerned about the “spatial fetishism” of the discipline (Gregory 2000). This is not to say that social interaction never has been a subject of geographical enquiry. But the prevalent tendency of treating social relationships as purely spatial relationships at the time was increasingly criticized, calling for a different ontology of space as being socially constructed and shaped by human practices (relational space).

As an increasing number of human geographers have adopted such a social science perspective, at the same time there has been an increasing awareness among sociologists of the spatiality of social structures and social action, to the extent that it sometimes has been called the spatial turn in social sciences. This alleged spatial turn and the related dialogue between sociology and geography recently have become most pronounced in the subdisciplines of economic sociology and economic geography (Grabher 2006); however, according to commentators from both sides there still is too little serious engagement in sociology with issues of space and place and how they shape and are shaped by social interaction (Tickamyer 2000; Peck 2005).

When analyzing spatial relationships, we need to make a distinction between different aspects of the notion of space as discussed above. On the one hand, space is seen as an arena in which social interaction takes place. On the other hand, space has to be conceived of as being relational, and therefore is much more than a mere “container” for human activities (Pries 2005). The analogy of a football match may serve as a good illustration of these two conceptualizations: while a football match is played out on a pitch within a confined, Euclidian space (the spatial “container”), it ultimately is the spatial relations of players on both sides and their interactions that define the match and its outcome.

Among social theorists, Anthony Giddens is one of the relatively few academics in sociology to have theorized space (see Giddens 1984). For example, Giddens (1990) argued that in premodern times the spatiality of social relations was very much place bound, as well as time and space being linked together in particular places. With the decoupling of time and space in the modern age, Giddens argues, space and place have become separated as social interaction is now possible through spatial relations beyond the place or locality. One of the consequences of modernity – highlighted by what has become the catchword of globalization – is thus the dislocation or disembedding of spatial relationships.

The notion of embeddedness is very often at the center of debates about the relationships between sociology and geography, between social and economic relations and spatial relations

(Peck 2005; Grabher 2006). Based on Karl Polanyi's seminal work about the relationships between markets and societies, embeddedness has become a key concept in some social sciences, particularly through the work of American economic sociologist Mark Granovetter. Unlike the schools of thought that apply a methodological individualism approach, Granovetter (1985) conceptualizes economic action as being embedded in a set of ongoing social relations. This relational view of human action – albeit silent on the spatial nature of these social relationships – has been adopted by geographers who have used it in particular at the local and regional scale of analysis.

This emphasis of localized social interaction and embeddedness is mirrored in other branches of social science (e.g., the sociologies of everyday life), where social relations are assumed to be based on face to face contact and thus spatial proximity is paramount. However, such a reading of locally embedded social relationships runs the risk of becoming an over territorialized concept by privileging one geographical scale over others (Hess 2004). This is problematic for a number of reasons. First, it tends to create a false dichotomy of place and space, where social interaction is either “in here” (the place) or out there (the space). Second, it does not fully recognize the multi scalarity of sociospatial relations. Third, it often fails to acknowledge the importance of embedded ties beyond the locale.

As Massey (2004) rightly observes, in academic as well as in policy discourses place is considered to be more “real,” more “grounded,” and thus often seen as much more meaningful than space, which denotes the outside: an abstract spatiality outside place. Such a perceived antagonism of place vs. space often comes hand in hand with questions of power and identity, whereby the latter is often seen as being created through spatial relations on the local level, and, according to Massey, through a process of “othering” – negatively defining local identity by regarding others (non locals) as outsiders. Likewise, place is often regarded as powerless in a globalized world, where power is overwhelmingly exercised outside the place, in a global arena.

A relational view of sociospatial interaction, however, will take seriously the multiple forms of identity that characterize individuals and

communities, as becomes clear by – for instance – having a look at global cities like London. There, as elsewhere, most identities are shaped simultaneously by local–non local social relations, creating relational spaces of belonging as in the case of transnational communities. Likewise, places are by no means powerless vis à vis global actors out there, but part of much wider networks of power within which a locale is not automatically condemned to passivity. Spatial relations across the scalar spectrum thus require an understanding of spatial scale not as something mutually exclusive or separable like the different shells of a Russian doll, but as intrinsically interwoven.

As we have seen, space is an integral conceptual part in the analysis of social relations. And over the last few years there was certainly progress in the development of more elaborate multi scale or multi level concepts, the lack of which has recently been criticized by Tickamyer (2000). A case in point is the emergence of work in social sciences that is informed by actor network theory (ANT). Although ANT is too critical of concepts that are concerned with social relations in space and time at the expense of non human agents, it has nevertheless contributed to a less deterministic analysis of spatial relationships, applying an understanding of space as topological stratifications and linking time and space in dynamic, heterogeneous relations (Hess 2004). In their theorization of space, Mol and Law (1994) develop a threefold typology of space and spatial relations, echoing previous discussions of multi scalarity and multiplicity: regions, networks, and fluid spaces. In their work there is still the acknowledgment of territories as regions in which objects are clustered together and social relations may be concentrated. These regions, however, are criss crossed by networks as topological spaces, where distance is a function of social and cultural relationships rather than designating physical proximity. Finally, there are fluid spaces, characterized by “liquid continuity” and constituted by mobile agents (Hess 2004).

The nature of spatial relationships and how to conceptualize them are still subject to ongoing debates in human geography. But it seems that their analysis is no longer considered to be the sole domain of this academic discipline, with sociology and economics, among others,

sharing for instance an interest in questions about spatial inequality that has long been at the core of much research, yet with an often unsatisfying or insufficient reflection on the spatiality of social interaction and the social construction of spatial relations (Gregory & Urry 1985). As it is, there is still much work left to do within and beyond academic disciplines if we want to improve our understanding of how space is folded into social relations through human practices and interactions (Harvey 1996).

SEE ALSO: Actor Network Theory; Community; Economic Geography; Globalization; Identity Politics/Relational Politics; Networks; Place; Space; Time Space

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speaking truth to power: science and policy

Javier Lezaun

“Speaking truth to power” refers to the belief that scientists, unimpeded by economic self interest or partisan bias, will deliver honest and often uncomfortable truths to those in positions of power.

It is the foundational claim of the sociology of science that only certain types of social structure enable scientists – or, rather, science as a social institution – to reach the truth and present it with due authority. In a series of pioneering articles, written at a time when science was actively enlisted in the service of the state and made subservient to totalitarian projects, Robert K. Merton (1938, 1942) argued that a self governed science was most congenial to the aims and principles of a free society, and that this autonomy was best guaranteed by the distinctive “ethos” of its practitioners, which he characterized by the norms of universalism, communitarism, disinterestedness, and organized skepticism. Capable of regulating itself through these normative principles, science was entitled to demand freedom from external influences and pursue unhampered the acquisition of fundamental knowledge.

Merton’s depiction of a self regulating science as the pillar of a democratic society and the best guarantee of uninterrupted scientific and technological progress reinforced the case of those scientists and politicians who, in the aftermath of World War II, believed that the state should continue its active support of science but ought to leave the management of resources and the setting of research agendas to the scientific community. A peculiar “social contract” between

science and the state was established following the demobilization of science. This consensus was embedded in new institutions, like the National Science Foundation, through which government continued to provide enormous amounts of funding for basic scientific research, conducted mostly in academic institutions, but abstained from intervening directly in the setting of research priorities or the evaluation of the knowledge being created.

Thus, the model of science as a community driven by an ethos of disinterestedness, organized skepticism, and universalism allowed the drawing of a sharp boundary between science and the state. It is this balance of separation and mutual dependency between science and politics that has become the central object of investigation of the sociology of science ever since.

Starting in the 1970s, sociologists and historians began to explore more closely the historical origins of the “ethos of science” and to question the degree to which it informed the actual practice of science. Studies of both the paradigmatic American case (Price 1965) and the contrasting experience of totalitarian regimes shed light on the historical imbrications of science and political power. These works were either skeptical of the idea of an autonomous science, driven solely by the curiosity of its practitioners, or at least put this image in a historical and comparative context. They expressed an uneasiness over the subjugation of science to the objectives of its patrons and the emergence of the infamous “military industrial scientific complex.” The image of a “basic,” or “pure,” science, innocent and deaf to the interests of power and in a position to provide useful advice to policymakers, appeared increasingly untenable, and sociologists began to question the demarcations of the scientific and political realms.

In other words, what *kind* of truth does science speak to power, and how does its close engagement with state and market affect the scientific community? Detailed analyses of the role of scientific and technical expertise in policy debates highlighted the inability of science to bring technical closure to policy discussions, and showed how the truths that science speaks to power are often shaped and informed by the powers it hopes to speak to. The work of Dorothy Nelkin (1979) and others

showed that groups of scientists, committed from the start to different policy options rather than disinterestedly searching for the independent truth, used their expertise to shore up their positions and to challenge alternative views that were themselves supported by equally confrontational scientific advocates. The scientification of policy leads to an intensification of differences rather than to their smooth resolution.

Similarly, Collingridge and Reeve (1986) showed how the desire to influence policy, and the consequent obligation to address the concerns and interests of policymakers, brings science to violate the very conditions – autonomy, clear disciplinary boundaries, and a low level of criticism of scientific claims – on which its ability to produce clear answers and unquestioned consensus is predicated. The result is almost paradoxical: to speak truth to power, science must abandon many of the normative and institutional conditions that protect its autonomy and efficiency. Science cannot deliver consensus when it is oriented toward questions posed by external actors, and on terms defined by those actors, and its legitimacy suffers as a consequence.

The intimacy of science and politics gives rise to forms of knowledge production and validation that differ significantly from the model offered by Mertonian sociology. Terms such as “regulatory science,” “trans science,” or “mandated science” convey the sense in which science is increasingly a hybrid product, constituted by the constraints of political and economic agendas; they also express a desire to distinguish these hybrids from the paradigmatic “pure” or “basic” science, the kind of unencumbered truth finding enterprise from which the social authority of science still derives. This “boundary work,” through which science shores up its autonomy and authority, has been a constant theme in the sociology of science (Jasanoff 1987; Guston 1999). In a similar vein, science’s ability to provide public truths to powerful institutions becomes more a matter of rhetoric and “staging” (Hilgartner 2000) than of revealing self-evident truths.

When science speaks truth to power, then, it often has to answer the questions that power poses to it, and the truths it can speak are of a particular kind – they are a form of knowledge deeply attuned to the logic and demands of the

policymaking process. The complexity of political issues, most conspicuously in the regulatory arena, where matters of fact and technical assessment are inextricably linked to political and societal choices, turns science into a more complex, less pure, and less autonomous social institution. Some may think this threatens its integrity; others believe that it enriches it, and reintegrates science into the fabric of politics.

SEE ALSO: Big Science and Collective Research; Controversy Studies; Expertise, “Scientification,” and the Authority of Science; Military Research and Science and War; Science/Non Science and Boundary Work; Scientific Norms/Counternorms

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Species-Being

Rob Beamish

Species Being (*Gattungswesen*), a controversial Feuerbachian inspired term refashioned in Marx’s critique of Hegel’s idealist philosophy, is central to Marx’s conception of alienation.

Hegel had argued the form and substance of knowledge developed historically. The conscious mind (*Geist*) initially experiences reality as external and separate; true knowledge seems to reside in that alien reality. Exploring that world, consciousness becomes self-consciousness as mind progressively grasps the complex, dialectical subject/object basis of knowledge. An increasingly comprehensive intellectual Spirit (*Geist*) emerges, culminating in an Absolute form. Overcoming the original perception of separation – alienation – Mind’s full potential is actualized in grasping the totality of Absolute Being.

Hegel’s philosophy buttressed nineteenth century Prussia’s narrow, intolerant state. Ludwig Feuerbach’s *Essence of Christianity* – a democratically inspired critique of the supreme religious Absolute – challenged the state’s Hegelian foundation. In religion, the powers of humankind are alienated from it, extrapolated, made infinite, and then impose themselves as an Absolute Being. Feuerbach’s anthropologically based critique of theology undermined idealism by emphasizing humankind’s material Being as a species (*Gattungswesen*) – the real, existent, identifiable, characteristics of humankind that religion hypostatized.

Species Being in Marx emanates from his critiques of Hegel and Feuerbach. Following Feuerbach, Marx began with real, active humans, but “inverting” Hegel’s idealism produced a dramatically different conception of Species Being. Hegel, Marx (1975) argued, “grasped the self-creation of humankind as a process, objectification as loss of object [*Vergegenständlichung als Entgegenständlichung*], as alienation [*Entäußerung*] alienation.” Hegel “grasped the essence of labor and objective [*gegenständlichen*] humankind,” but only as mental (*geistige*) labor.

For Marx, humankind was a materially active, social being, compelled to produce (labor) in order to exist. Production (labor) – the ontological basis to praxis – changes and develops humankind’s knowledge, conditions of being, and social arrangements. Labor, the material mediation of subject and object, is the ontological basis for humankind’s mental, creative, social, and material development. This is humankind’s Species Essence. Species Being is not a set of fixed natural characteristics – our species’ Being is materially active, interactive,

and creative, producing our material life, thereby changing our circumstances.

Mind developed through intellectual subject/object mediation with Hegel; with Marx, human life develops in the material practice of subject/object mediation – labor. Humankind's Species Essence or Being is the praxis of such development.

Under conditions of private property, humankind's fundamental Species Being – its creative laboring activity – is dominated by an external reality. Rather than developing workers, the externalization process creates products, a process, and a system that confronts and stultifies their physical, emotional, social, and political development. Labor's alienated products confront the producers and oppose them. Only by overturning private property can humankind's Species Being fully flourish in freedom.

SEE ALSO: Alienation; Feuerbach, Ludwig; Hegel, G. W. F.; Labor; Marx, Karl; Praxis

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Spencer, Herbert (1820–1903)

Jonathan H. Turner

Herbert Spencer was the most widely read sociologist of the nineteenth century, but by the second decade of the twentieth century his

influence had declined dramatically, prompting Talcott Parsons in 1937 to ask “who now reads Spencer?” Today, very few sociologists read Spencer, who, through sociology's biased eye glasses, is seen as a political conservative and as a crude functionalist. This contemporary conception of Spencer is not only incorrect but, more fundamentally, it also keeps present day sociologists from realizing the power of Spencer's ideas. The other classical figures in sociology have been canonized, with each generation of sociologists continuing to read the canon with the same dedication as biblical scholars. In contrast, Spencer is ignored, to the detriment of the cumulative sociological theory (Turner 1985). Nowhere is Spencer's genius more evident than in the topic of social change. Spencer developed several models of social change. One is a stage model of societal evolution from simple to complex forms; another is a dialectical model emphasizing the transformative effects inherent in the centralization and decentralization of political power; still another explores “selection” as a force behind social change; and a final model deals with the rise and fall of empires and interstate systems.

Before reviewing these models, it is wise to deal with the functionalism that runs through Spencer's sociology. Spencer argued that all superorganic systems composed of relations among organisms must address three fundamental problems: *operation* or the need to secure resources (production) and to generate new members (reproduction); *regulation* or the coordination and control of system units through power and cultural symbols; and *distribution* or the movement of resources, commodities, people, and information. These three “functional requisites” are critical to understanding all of Spencer's sociology, as we will come to appreciate.

THE STAGE MODEL OF SOCIETAL EVOLUTION

Like all functional theorists, Spencer saw differentiation as a master social process as societies move from simple to complex forms. As populations grow, structural differentiation ensues in order to support the larger “social

mass” (an ideal that Spencer first developed in *The Principles of Biology*, 1864–7). Structural differentiation occurs along three axes corresponding to the functional requisites: operation (production and reproduction), regulation, and distribution. The first node of differentiation is between new kinds of productive and reproductive structures, on the one side, and regulative structures revolving around the consolidation and centralization of power. Later, as differentiation continues, new kinds of distributive structures (markets and infrastructures for transportation and communication) emerge. For Spencer, then, long term evolution revolves around continued differentiation of structures within each of the axes and between these three axes. In the 2,000 plus pages of *The Principles of Sociology* (1874–96), Spencer provides a wealth of empirical detail (taken from his monumental 16 volume *Descriptive Sociology*) in describing each stage of evolution. He denotes each stage in terms of the degree of “compounding” from simple to more complex societal formations: simple without political leaders (e.g., hunting and gathering); simple with political leaders (Big Man hunting and gathering as well as horticultural systems); double compound (agrarian societies); and treble compound (industrial societies). If he had lived through the twentieth century, he would have no doubt described post industrial societies as the new level of compounding. Spencer’s description of these stages of evolution is by far the most sophisticated of the nineteenth century, and it certainly rivals any description on the stages of societal evolution in the twentieth and twenty first centuries. This stage model is largely descriptive, but evolutionary stages are all driven by dynamics outlined in Spencer’s other models of social change.

THE DIALECTICAL MODEL OF SOCIAL CHANGE

Probably the most important pages in *The Principles of Sociology* are those devoted to the analysis of “militant” and “industrial” societies. Spencer made this distinction in order to examine the dynamics of power (as it is consolidated and centralized along the regulative axis of differentiation); and this analysis of power is woven

throughout the pages of *The Principles of Sociology*. In fact, Spencer is a theorist of power more than any other topic – an emphasis that goes against the perception of Spencer as a stage model functionalist. For Spencer, once power emerges in human societies at *any* stage of evolution, it reveals an inherent dialectic between highly centralized (militant) and more decentralized (industrial) forms. There is, Spencer argued, a tendency for systems with highly centralized power to sow the seeds for their transformation to a more decentralized profile, and conversely, decentralized political systems establish the conditions for the centralization of power. Societies thus cycle between centralized and decentralized patterns of political power. Let us start with a society revealing centralized power (militant). Power in such systems is used to regulate operative (production and reproduction processes) and distributive structures to a very high degree, while at the same time increasing the level of inequality as elites with power usurp resources for their own privilege and for sustaining the administrative and coercive structures necessary for tight control of a population. Such regulation generates problems of productive stagnation and market contraction, as well as resentments over growing inequality. The result is for liberal ideologies stressing freedom from such control to emerge, leading actors involved in production, reproduction, and distribution as well as those in lower social classes to exert political pressure for less regulation and redistribution of elite privilege. The end result is a more decentralized political system that, in turn, sets into motion its own set of dialectical forces. Decentralized power allows for increased differentiation within and between the operative and distributive axes, but as this differentiation occurs, problems of coordination, control, and conflict escalate, leading to the formation of conservative ideologies emphasizing the need to control the emerging chaos; and eventually these ideological pressures and the social movements that they inspire cause the consolidation and centralization of power which, over time, will set into motion pressures for decentralization of power. Thus, long before Vilfredo Pareto’s analysis of the circulation of elites, Spencer had developed a far more sophisticated model of dialectical change.

SELECTION AS A TRANSFORMATIVE DYNAMIC

Nine years before Darwin published *On The Origin of Species*, Spencer (1851) coined the famous phrase “survival of the fittest,” and unfortunately his sociology has been tainted by this view of human social organization. But a sympathetic reading of Spencer leads to a more favorable view of what this phrase means in his sociological reasoning. For Spencer, the social world is driven by social selection within and between societies. When populations grow, competition for resources increases, with the more fit securing resources and the less fit dying out or finding new resource niches. This is the argument that Durkheim would adopt 20 years later in *The Division of Labor in Society* (1893); and of course, it is the basic point of emphasis in all contemporary theories of human ecology. Spencer also used this phrase to describe war between societies. Indeed, Spencer viewed war as a powerful force in the evolution of societies from simple to complex forms. He argued that the more complex and differentiated society typically wins a war, absorbing the conquered society (often repressively). Yet, with each round of conquest of the simpler society by the more complex, all human societies become more differentiated. Thus, an important force behind the long term trend toward differentiation of societies has been war and conquest of the simple by the more complex.

Spencer also developed another view of selection as a transformative force. For Spencer, populations often encounter problems of adaptation that require the invention of new structures. For example, if a population grows, it requires new kinds of productive and regulative structures to feed and control the larger population, but if such structures cannot be developed, a society “dissolves” or “de evolves.” Here, then, is another kind of selection in which new organizational problems and logistical loads facing a population generate selection pressures for new structures if the population is to survive in its environment. If individual and collective actors find a way to respond to these selection pressures, the development of these new structures increases the level of differentiation in society and makes it more adaptive to its environment (an idea that Talcott Parsons was later

to develop into the notion of “adaptive upgrading,” apparently unaware of Spencer’s reasoning 100 years earlier). The most important selection pressures arise from the functional needs for operation, regulation, and distribution. That is, as populations grow or confront problems internally or in their environment, the selection pressures almost always revolve around developing new structures for resolving problems of production, reproduction, regulation, or distribution.

THE MODEL OF EMPIRE FORMATION AND DISINTEGRATION

Spencer was one of the most important early geopolitical theorists, although most sociologists remain unaware of his analysis of intersocietal dynamics. When populations grow, Spencer argued, they mobilize power; and often this power is used to conquer neighboring populations (frequently under selection pressures to secure more resources to support the growing population). As neighboring societies are conquered, the logistical loads for regulation and control increase. The result is for governments to impose ever more taxes in order to support the administrative and coercive bases of power that are needed to maintain control. As government imposes additional taxes, it increases the level of inequality in the expanding empire, thereby generating another kind of logistical load for control. Conquest thus generates enormous pressure on polity to control the larger population, conquered territories, and problems inherent in inequality. As a polity copes with these selection pressures, it often conquers more territory to secure needed resources, but in doing so, it only increases the logistical loads: more people must be controlled; larger territories must be governed; ethnic diversity and diverse cultures of the conquered must be managed; and the threats arising from growing inequality must be repressed. Eventually, these logistical loads and the selection pressures that they generate cannot be managed, leading to the collapse of the empire and the devolution of societies back to simpler forms. The history of the world, Spencer felt, was very much a history of these dynamics, as empire formation increased societal complexity, only to be undone

by the logistical loads inherent in all empires and the need to concentrate power. These inevitable dynamics led Spencer to oppose British colonialism. For, at the height of the British Empire, Spencer argued that colonialism concentrated too much power in the hands of elites, increased tension generating inequalities, diverted capital (in the long run) from production, and eventually imposed logistical loads that would lead to the collapse of the empire.

It is impossible to communicate the sophistication of Spencer's analysis. Moreover, Spencer had professional historians and ethnographers develop the large database in *Descriptive Sociology* to illustrate his theoretical models (the largest database ever created in the nineteenth century, and one that served as the model for George P. Murdock's Human Relations Area Files). Indeed, when *The Principles of Sociology* was first published, readers complained about what they saw as too much descriptive data, but Spencer wanted the reader to be sure that each analytical point in his theoretical models could be assessed with data from a wide variety of societies – from the simplest hunter gatherer society to the England of his time. The great tragedy is that Spencer is often viewed as an “armchair theorist” who had no contact with data but, in fact, Spencer paid professionals to collect the largest database ever assembled by a sociologist. And, while he was an armchair theorist in that he did not collect the data himself, his sociology avoided speculative ideas that could not be assessed with data. The models of social change summarized above represent only one theme in Spencer's sociology, but their sophistication should encourage other sociologists to mine this classic work.

SEE ALSO: Division of Labor; Durkheim, Émile; Ecological View of History; Evolution; Functionalism/Neofunctionalism; Historical and Comparative Methods; Institution; Political Sociology; Social Change; Structural Functional Theory

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spirituality, religion, and aging

Robert C. Atchley

Religion and spirituality are enduring aspects of the human condition. Some of the earliest human records were accounts of the spirituality and religious culture of the day. Religion and spirituality have also fueled human conflict for thousands of years. Our concern here is how religion and spirituality interact with aging: how aging affects religion and spirituality, and how religion and spirituality affect aging.

Religion is a social institution concerned with ultimate questions such as the meaning and purpose of life, the existence of a higher power, coping with the reality of suffering and death, the existence and nature of an afterlife, and what it means to lead a moral life. Religions are also social organizations that meet not only the need to join with other believers, but also various social needs such as comfort, aid, and social support. Most American adults are associated with a local congregation of a major faith. There are hundreds of religions with widely varying answers to life's ultimate questions. Religious beliefs are among the most deeply held, and religion can be a source of both comfort and conflict. There are also people who attach no significance to religion. Religiousness is an individual attribute – the extent to which a person

has internalized a religious culture and uses it to make decisions in their life.

Spirituality is an experiential, inner aspect of consciousness. It is the capacity to experience the sacred directly. Such experience can be cognitive, emotional, and/or motivational. For many people, the sacred can be experienced in an enormous variety of situations: nature, in relationships, in music, dance, and art, in religious devotions, in inspirational texts and orations.

The inner experience of spirituality and socially constructed religion are related for most people, and for some people are inseparable. But there are also people who consider themselves spiritual who disavow religion and still others who find neither term applies to them.

In the US, a large majority of elders have had a lifelong identification with their religion and are long time members of their local religious group. Local religious groups are the most common type of community organization membership for middle aged and older people. About half of the general population attends religious services at least twice a month. Frequency of attendance increases with age up to age 60 and then declines gradually thereafter. Informal religious behavior such as reading scripture, personal prayer or meditation, or participation in religious study groups also increases with age and is especially important for disabled elders. Religious involvement is particularly important for African Americans and women.

Local religious groups and regional and national denominations vary considerably in how they approach the needs of aging and older members. Some consciously work to maintain integration of older members in the life of the religious community by taking steps such as recruiting elders for leadership positions, making special efforts to provide transportation to elders, and mobilizing the religious group to attend to the special needs of frail elders. Other local religious groups may do very little to encourage continued participation or attend to the needs of their older members, even in situations where the proportion of older religious group members is rapidly increasing. Religious groups are not immune to the agism that permeates their culture.

More than 90 percent of adults express a religious preference, and a large proportion of older adults believe that their faith has grown

stronger over time. Life stage appears to be related to spiritual development. In middle age, many adults begin to address seriously the issue of life's meaning. They may find that conventional superficial answers to this question are increasingly unsatisfying. During this stage, many adults embark on a quest that may involve systematic study and reflection, which in turn often gives a sense of deepening understanding. Tornstam's (1994) theory of gerotranscendence holds that as people move into later adulthood, they begin to develop a more universal and less personal stance toward the meaning of life. By old age, many people take more enjoyment from their inner life, feel greater connection to the entire universe, and are less afraid of death.

Experiences of spirituality begin in childhood for many people and contain an element of transcendence in the sense that the experience transports the individual from his or her conventional perceptual field to being able to see things in a wider context. It could be said that spirituality is a direct experience of the source of spirit, the life force that animates all being. Spiritual practices such as prayer, meditation, or making sacred music and art aim to cultivate a deeper awareness of spirit within the individual. For most people, spirituality is integrated with religious values, beliefs, and attitudes, but some see themselves as spiritual but not religious. A lifetime of spiritual practice makes a difference. From middle age onward, people may find that many years of spiritual practice and life experience combine to soften the edges of their religious ideas and create a more inquiring, spacious, and tolerant attitude toward other faiths. Spiritual development seems to lead toward more interest in common ground among religions and peaceful coexistence. One of the unfortunate results of age segregation in large urban communities is the loss of everyday interaction with spiritual elders, people whose high degree of spiritual development can be an important source of wisdom within the community.

Involvement in organized religion, subjective religiousness, and spiritual experience are associated with greater physical and mental well being and longevity. People affiliated with religions that prohibit tobacco, alcohol, and drug consumption tend to be healthier and live

longer than others. As people age, the degree of participation in both formal and informal religious activities has been associated with better health and greater life satisfaction.

In general, the greater the degree of religiousness, the better people's health and subjective well being. The greater the religiousness, the lower the prevalence of anxiety, fear of death, and loneliness. Highly religious people also cope better with grief. Religious beliefs and spiritual orientations are the very prevalent resources for coping with negative aspects of life, especially in old age. The more serious the problem, the more likely that people will use religious coping. However, religiousness can also be maladaptive if it isolates elders from others, if it defines negative aspects of aging as resulting from sin, or if elders seek support from their congregations and do not get it.

Sociologically, the subject of aging, religion, and spirituality represents a relatively new field of inquiry, filled with important questions begging for better answers. There can be no doubt that those who see themselves as religious and/or spiritual have a different, often better, experience of aging compared with those who do not. But better analytical description is needed of what happens, how, and why. In addition, we need better maps of how aging people relate to various types of religious organizations and better understanding of the effects of specific religious and spiritual beliefs and practices over time. Major challenges facing research in this area include incomplete theory development, difficulty in constructing measures that are valid across faith groups, and coping with the enormous diversity of religious beliefs and practices and their potential interactions with aging.

SEE ALSO: Aging, Sociology of; Religion, Sociology of

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sport

John W. Loy and Jay Coakley

Sport is an embodied, structured, goal oriented, competitive, contest based, ludic, physical activity. Given the multitude of sport forms and the vast variety of specific sports, ranging from rural, primitive athletic folk games of old, to new urban, hi tech, extreme sports, this definition is unlikely to satisfy one and all. It does, however, (1) highlight the major social characteristics of modern sport; (2) suggest the specification of the embodied structural properties and social processes underlying the social development of modern sport; and (3) provide a set of common features for examining the magnitude and complexity of sport as a social phenomenon at different levels of analysis, including sport as a unique game occurrence, sport as a particular type of ludic activity, sport as an institutionalized game, sport as a social institution, and sport as a form of social involvement (Loy 1968).

SPECIFIC CHARACTERISTICS OF MODERN SPORTS

Sport is Embodied

The degree of physicality varies by sport, but the body constitutes both the symbol and the core of all sport participation (Hargreaves 1986). The essence of embodiment in sport is

that sporting activities involve many kinds and degrees of physicality, including physical activity, physical aggression, physical combat, physical exercise, physical presence, physical prowess, physical recreation, physical sexuality, physical training, and physical work. In short, sporting bodies represent a range of desiring bodies, disciplined bodies, displaying bodies, and dominating bodies.

Sport is Structured

There are at least four ways in which sport is highly structured. First, all sports (whether informal or formal) are *rule governed* by either written or unwritten rules. Second, most sports are *spatially circumscribed* by the sites of their venues, whether they be arenas, courts, fields, pools, rings, rinks, stadiums, or tracks. Third, most sports are *temporally circumscribed* as illustrated by designated time periods such as innings, halves and quarters; or number and time of bouts and rounds; or allocated attempts within a specific time period. Indeed, to prevent indefinitely long sporting encounters sports have instituted tie breakers, “sudden death” playoffs, and “shorter versions” of selected sports (e.g., one day cricket matches). Fourth, modern sports tend to be *formally administered*, whether by local clubs, universities, professional teams, or sport federations.

Sport is Goal Oriented

Individuals, teams, and organizations are typically goal directed in sport situations, especially in terms of the perennial overriding goal of winning. Athletes and coaches alike continually attempt to achieve various standards of excellence. And numerous forms of self testing and contesting take place in all sporting encounters. The sporting media constantly stresses the theme of being Number 1 in terms of games won, points earned, medals obtained, rank on the money list, most career victories, or number of Grand Slam titles.

Sport is Competitive

A key feature of all forms of sport is physically playful competition. Such competition may be

between individuals or teams, and may involve either an animate object of nature (e.g., a bull in a bullfight), or an inanimate object of nature (e.g., climbing the highest mountain in the world), or it may be focused on competition against an “ideal standard” (Loy 1968). A spectator typically perceives three basic forms of competition (McPherson et al. 1989: 16): First, *direct competition* where two opponents, either individuals or teams, directly confront one another, as for example, in boxing or football. Second, *parallel competition* wherein participants compete against one another indirectly by taking turns as in bowling or golf; or contesting in separate spaces, as for example, separate lanes in swimming events or track sprints and hurdle races. Third, there are forms of competition which are largely *competition against a standard* such as trying to make a qualifying time for an Olympic running event, or attempting to set a world automobile speed record on the Bonneville Salt Flats in Utah.

Sport is Contest Based

Many, if not most, sporting encounters are contests, that is, competitive activities characterized by two or more sides (individuals, teams, or larger organizations), agreed upon rules, and criteria for determining the winner, with a non reciprocal outcome. As defined below, most sport contests are either agonal games or sporting matches.

Sport is Ludic

Even the most highly professionalized forms of sport possess some play like elements. Two ludic or play elements inherent in all sports are *artificial obstacles* and *realized resources*. Individuals and groups are confronted in daily life by obstacles they must attempt to overcome. Unfortunately, individuals and groups often do not have the required resources to cope adequately with the specific obstacles that they confront. Contrarily, in the context of sports, individuals and groups artificially create obstacles to overcome, be it a hurdle in a steeplechase or the height of a pole vault. And unlike real life situations, individuals and teams

in sport situations are typically provided with the needed resources (e.g., coaching, equipment, training, etc.) to cope with their artificially created obstacles.

Sport, as defined and described above, represents a particular type of ludic activity and thus is closely related to the social phenomena of play and games.

COMMON CHARACTERISTICS OF LUDIC ACTIVITIES

Like play and games, sport is ancient, ubiquitous, and diverse.

Antiquity and Ubiquity

Play precedes culture and humankind: some mammals exhibited play activity about 65 million years ago. Human play is a universal activity found in all institutional sectors of society. Similarly, games, at least games of physical skill, have been found in all societies, past and present (Chick 2004). Although games are not as old as play, archeologists have discovered gaming artifacts that are several centuries old. Today, board games like chess and new electronic video games are pervasive throughout the world.

In turn, sports are at least as old as the first recorded Olympic victor in Greece in 776 BCE. Although sports are particularly characteristic of modern societies, and while the phenomenon of sport is not found in all past societies, many contemporary sport forms have long cultural traditions and historical legacies.

During the past century sport has become a social phenomenon of great magnitude and complexity, having both positive and negative consequences for individuals and groups throughout the world. The ubiquity of sport is illustrated by Boyle's (1963: 3–4) observations about American sport in the early 1960s. He explains that sport pervades all spheres of social life and influences everything from values, status, and race relations to business, fashions, and ideas about heroes. The pervasiveness of sport in society today is best indicated by the mass media that covers sundry forms of sport throughout the world on a daily basis.

Diversity

There seems to be an infinite number of play forms worldwide. And there are hundreds, if not thousands, of different game forms throughout the world. In turn, the great variety of sports throughout history and in very different cultures and diverse geographical regions of the world amply attests to the diversity of sport. Moreover, it is evident that modern sports have diverse historical roots and social derivations.

First, some of our contemporary sports are derived largely from relatively primitive, fundamental movement activities such as climbing, diving, kicking, jumping, running, swimming, throwing, vaulting, and weightlifting. Many events of our modern Olympic Games are based on such basic fundamental movement activities.

Second, several forms of modern sport have their roots in early survival activities and often represent transformations of work practices to play practices. Noted examples of such sport forms are fishing, hunting, skating, sledding, and skiing. Sporting activities such as dog racing, horse racing, pigeon racing, and rodeo events may also be assigned to this category, as they represent the transformation of human use of domestic animals for work to purposes of play.

Third, still other forms of sport today represent modifications of ancient martial arts and military exercises. Readily recognizable examples include archery, boxing, fencing, javelin throwing, and wrestling.

Fourth, less directly, but no less importantly, a number of modern sports have distant roots in ball games, dances, and ceremonies associated with the religious practices of traditional, preliterate societies. Lacrosse is perhaps the most prominent example of a modern sport having its origins in religious ritual.

Fifth, some contemporary sports are the patent result of individual invention. Classic examples are basketball (invented by Canadian James Naismith in December 1891 while a student at the YMCA Training College in Springfield, Massachusetts) and volleyball (invented by William G. Morgan in 1895 while serving as physical education director at the YMCA in Holyoke, Massachusetts).

Sixth, other modern sports represent a continuum of development from informal (if often brutal) play, to formal competitive play, to

athletic folk games, to recreational and representational sports. For example, it may be reasonably argued that selected forms of folk football (Elias & Dunning 1986) led to the development of soccer (Chick 2004), which led in turn to the development of rugby (Dunning & Sheard 1979), and in turn to the development of intercollegiate gridiron football (Riesman & Denny 1951), and finally the emergence of both American and Canadian versions of professional gridiron football.

Although modern sports may differ markedly from their original folk forms they nevertheless possess significant residual sporting traditions, styles, and practices (Ingham & Loy 1993).

BASIC DIFFERENCES OF LUDIC ACTIVITIES

On the one hand, physically competitive play, agonal games, and elite sports are similar in that they typically involve competition between two or more sides, with agreed upon rules, criteria for determining the winner, and the outcome largely based on the display of superior physical skill. Because they share the same basic features, play, games, and sport are often treated as one and the same. For example, tennis is considered a sport, but we play a game of tennis, and the person who wins the most games and takes the most sets wins the match. A tennis match is, of course, a contest, like a boxing match or a wrestling match. And tennis matches are an official sport of the modern Olympic Games.

On the other hand, play, games, and sport differ in degree, if not in kind, in terms of formalization, reciprocal activity, and non reciprocal outcome. *Formalization* refers to the formal structure of ludic activities in terms of social, spatial, and temporal organization as well as the rules that govern them. Play is generally informal in terms of both structure and rules, whereas most games are more highly structured and have more formal rules. In turn, sports are extremely structured, with some having large volumes of published official rules.

Reciprocal activity denotes the degree of interaction among rival participants and the degree of sociability among both playful friends

and foes. Informal competitive play ranks high in terms of reciprocal activity; face to face games involve at least moderate degrees of interaction; while sports tend to show the lowest degrees of sociability, especially among opponents at the elite and professional level.

Non reciprocal outcome refers to the degree to which the end result of a ludic encounter is zero sum, with only one winner or side taking all. Among play, games, and sport there is an inverse relationship between reciprocal activity and non reciprocal outcome. Traditional play places little emphasis on non reciprocal outcomes, most games give moderate emphasis to such outcomes, while nearly all sports clearly stress the importance of non reciprocal outcomes. The most extreme examples of non reciprocal outcomes are found in terminal contests such as bullfights, cockfights, dogfights, and, most critically, war.

Specific similarities and differences among play, games, and sport are denoted by the following definitions of ludic action and typology of ludic activities.

DEFINITIONS OF LUDIC ACTION

Ludic, from the Latin term *ludus*, refers to any play like and/or game like expressive activity. *Agonal*, from the Greek term *agon*, refers to any contest involving struggles of physical prowess. *Physical prowess* denotes the display of athletic ability in terms of varying degrees of skill (accuracy and coordination), strength, speed, and stamina (endurance). *Play* is a voluntary, expressive activity, which is both uncertain and unproductive, characterized by spontaneity, pretense, and non linearity, which focuses on process rather than product, and which can be initiated and terminated at will. *Competition* denotes active efforts by individuals or groups to reach a goal, to achieve a superior position, or to win a prize or title. *Physically playful competition* represents earnest struggles for supremacy in agonal games or sporting matches. *Contests* are competitive activities characterized by two or more sides (individuals, teams, or larger organizations), agreed upon rules, and criteria for determining the winner, with a non reciprocal outcome. *Matches* are contests between opposing

individuals. *Sporting matches* typically involve individual demonstrations of physical superiority in terms of speed, strength, stamina, accuracy, and coordination (Weiss 1969). Although some team sports may be called matches (e.g., cricket matches and soccer matches) they are classified here as agonal games. *Games* are playful contests whose outcome is determined by physical skill, strategy or chance, employed singly or in combination. *Agonal games* are games whose outcome is largely determined by the demonstration of superior physical prowess in combination with superior tactics and strategy. *Sports* represent institutionalized agonal games or sporting matches.

These definitions are summarized in the following typology of ludic activities:

- 1 *Non play contests* (e.g., deadly fights, duels, wars)
- 2 *Non contest play* (e.g., drama, humor, music)
- 3 *Playful contests* (e.g., puzzles, riddles, spelling bees)
- 4 *Non sport games* (e.g., bridge, checkers, chess)
- 5 *Sporting matches* (e.g., boxing, tennis, wrestling)
- 6 *Agonal games* (e.g., basketball, ice hockey, soccer)

THE FUN FACTOR IN LUDIC ACTIVITIES

Given the plethora of play forms in culture and the pervasiveness of games and sports throughout the world, one must ask why these ludic activities are so attractive and appealing for participants and spectators alike. Perhaps the primary answer is given in Huizinga's (1955) assertion that *fun* is "the essence of play." He contends, however, that "the *fun* of playing, resists all analysis, all logical interpretation." Huizinga may be correct, but some sociological reasons can be given as partial explanations for why play, games, and sport are fun. For example, sociability, euphoric interaction, quest for excitement, and emotional dialectics may in large measure account for the fun factor in ludic activities.

SOCIABILITY

Simmel (1950) views sociability as the play form of human association and proposes that the principle of sociability rests on maintaining reciprocity in the values offered and received in interaction. Henricks (2003) observes that, for Simmel, the distinctive characteristics of sociability are fourfold. First, sociability is simultaneously connected to and disconnected from everyday life. For example, in "real life" situations, individuals must confront serious obstacles without the resources needed to overcome them, whereas, in ludic activities, individuals create artificial obstacles to overcome and all participants are provided the resources to meet the challenge of the obstacles adequately.

Second, the dynamics of sociability involve depersonalizing participants. The masks worn by gridiron football players, the costumes worn by participants at fancy balls or children on Halloween, and the personas assumed by professional wrestlers ensure the playing of distinctive roles while keeping personal matters to a minimum.

Third, sociability calls for cooperation and tactfulness. For an expressive configuration of positive affect to hold, the instrumental concerns and ego demands of the participants must be minimized, equalized, or ruled as irrelevant (Ingham & Loy 1973). As Goffman (1967) notes, in order to maintain the expressive frame of sociability, it is expected that participants will make efforts to support the feelings and face of interaction partners, and that these efforts will be made spontaneously and without second thought because participants mutually identify with each other's emotions and feelings.

Fourth, sociability is fostered by the social equality of participants. For example, Loy (1968) notes that the contestants in a game act as if they were equals, and status distinctions related to income, occupation, education, and race are not considered relevant through the contest. Ingham (2004) observes that games are democratic, and sociability is sustained only when intrinsic outcomes are available to all participants and when extrinsic gains are perceived as shared.

EUPHORIC INTERACTION

Goffman (1961) refers to the pleasurable sociability provided by gaming encounters as “euphoric interaction.” He argues that the bases of fun in games are twofold: an uncertain outcome and sanctioned display. “A successful game would then be one which, first had a problematic outcome and then, within these limits, allowed for a maximum possible display of externally relevant attributes” (p. 68). Goffman’s two primary bases of fun in games are an inherent part of the structural dynamics of modern sport. In order to ensure an *uncertain outcome* in sporting contests, a variety of efforts are made to establish equality between opposing sides. Efforts to establish equality of competition typically focus on the factors of age, gender, size, and skill. For example, youth sport teams typically represent age groups, and at the level of elite sport, men and women seldom compete against one another. Examples of controlling for size are restricting competition according to weight class for boxers and wrestlers, while examples of control for skill level are the handicap systems developed in golf and bowling to help equate the contestants. Chance also plays a role in efforts to ensure equality for purposes of ensuring an uncertain outcome, as for example, flipping a coin to determine which team begins play, or randomly drawing a number for a lane in a running or a swimming event.

Sanctioned display is another important structural feature of sports for generating excitement. The display of bodily excellence in terms of various forms of athletic ability and physical prowess provides pleasurable excitement to participants and spectators alike. However, too much extraneous display, in the form of taunting and other player antics, can greatly detract from the pleasurable excitement of a ludic activity. As Stone (1955) pointed out, play and display are precariously balanced in sport, and once that balance is upset, the whole character of sport in society may be affected. Furthermore, the spectacular element of sport, may, as in the case of professional wrestling, destroy the game.

It is evident that Goffman believes that sanctioned display and a problematic outcome lend

excitement to game encounters by creating tensions. Elsewhere he implies that a third element also generates tension in a game encounter, namely, “what is at stake.” The value of the stakes that players compete for, in combination with the value of the stakes that players risk, adds excitement to any ludic activity. Gaming encounters with *high stakes* involve what Goffman calls “action,” referring to engagement in activities that are consequential, eventful, and problematic, which are undertaken for what is felt to be their own sake, and wherein participants may put their very lives “at risk” (Goffman 1967: 185). A world championship poker game or a bullfight are ready examples of ludic activities providing exciting tension because the stakes are high.

QUEST FOR EXCITEMENT

While Simmel speaks of pleasurable sociability, and Goffman talks about euphoric interaction, Elias and Dunning (1986) analyze sport and leisure in terms of what they call “quest for excitement.” They distinguish between “real excitement,” such as that associated with seriously critical situations in everyday life, and “mimetic excitement,” characteristic of sporting encounters. They propose that sport situations are structured in such a way as “to stir the emotions, to evoke tensions in the form of a controlled, a well tempered excitement without the risks and tensions usually connected with excitement in other life situations” (pp. 48–9). Elias and Dunning discuss a number of tension balances built into sport situations, which are designed to evoke tensions related to mimetic excitement. They place particular emphasis on the controlled expression of emotions related to aggression, conflict, danger, risk, and violence.

With reference to the structural dynamics of team sports they stress the importance of “interdependent polarities” for generating tension balances in sporting encounters. For example, they cite the overall polarity between competing teams; and the tension balances between offense and defense, cooperation and competition within teams, and the external control by sport authorities versus the internal control of players (pp. 202–3).

EMOTIONAL DIALECTICS

The theorizing of Elias and Dunning about "quests for excitement" can be considered an important example of what Sutton Smith has termed "emotional dialectics." As Goodger and Goodger (1989) have summarized the work of Elias and Dunning: "It is not a case of there being a special type of relationship between the content of mimetic events and that of critical situations that they appear to resemble (for example, a sporting contest and a 'real life' struggle), but rather there is a relationship between affects simulated by mimetic events and those simulated by real life events, the affects in the former resembling those in the latter in a 'playful and pleasurable fashion.'" In a somewhat similar vein, Goffman (1961) discusses "subversive ironies" and the "function of disguise" in his interactional analysis of "fun in games." Fun, he explains, occurs when participants abide by rules of irrelevance and are careful to conceal reality to the point that it does not disrupt encounters.

Like Huzinga, Sutton Smith (2003) thinks the primary purpose of play is having fun. Further, like Elias and Dunning, he believes fun in play provides mimetic excitement. In turn, like Goffman, he believes play offers contexts for subversive irony and treats play as a parody of emotional vulnerability. In reference to what have variously been called involuntary emotions, reflexive emotions, or survival emotions, Sutton Smith focuses on what he calls the six primary emotions of anger, fear, shock, disgust, sadness, and joy. In proposing a dialectical hypothesis, he suggests that these emotions must be exercised (as in play) because they are fundamentally required for survival in the face of emergencies, but must also be constrained in the familial emotional contexts of contemporary social life. However, Sutton Smith also recognizes that there are times when the expression of these emotions surpasses normative limits and results in "excessive noise, riots and hooliganism."

The preceding account supports the Goodgers's (1989) supposition that people have a basic, socially induced desire to experience "enjoyable excitement." But Ennis (1967) observes that societies face a sociological

challenge when determining how such a motivational state can be institutionalized when it is grounded in the sense that all institutional enclosures are being broken or transcended. Some insight into how society institutionalizes this motivational state is given in accounts of both ludic institutionalization and sportification.

LUDIC INSTITUTIONALIZATION

Ingham (1978) aptly calls the transformation of play and games to modern sport the process of ludic institutionalization. He suggests the process can be understood most clearly if it is viewed in terms of multidimensional continua in which play and sport constitute the polar extremes. This enables one to see that sport involves ludic activity that is, to relatively extreme degrees, regulated, formalized, instrumentalized, regimented, and estranged. In general, what have been variously called traditional games, folk sports, or folk athletics fall at the expressive end of the continuum; whereas, what has been variously called elite sport, top level sport, or professional sport falls at the most instrumental end of the continuum. However, even the most instrumental forms of ludic action possess some play like elements; thus, modern sports can be placed on a truncated expressive instrumental continuum. For example, "recreational sports" (e.g., street or playground pickup games), largely based on the principles of play, pleasure, and participation, represent expressive sporting activities; whereas "representational sports" (e.g., intercollegiate and professional sport), largely based on the principles of performance, profit, and prestige, represent instrumental sporting activities.

In sum, the ludic institutionalization of sport is best understood in terms of the tension balances associated with the expressive and instrumental dimensions of sport. Current analyses of the sportification process reflect thoughtful examinations of the expressive and instrumental dimensions of modern sport.

SPORTIFICATION

The transformation of modern sports from primarily expressive activities to largely instrumental

activities reflects the process of sportification. More specifically, as Renson (1998) notes: "Sportification is depicted as a universal hegemonic trend of standardization and globalization of sport practices." The global sport monoculture of representational sport denoted by the concept of sportification is also reflected in Heinila's (1998) concept of the "totalization of sport" and Donnelly's (1996) concept of "prolympism." Heinila (1998) argues that due to the totalization process, international sport has been transformed from contests between individuals and/or teams to contests between nation states that have unequal resources to produce elite athletes and teams. In a similar manner, Donnelly (1996) documents the articulation of professionalism and Olympism as the two dominant sport ideologies of the twentieth century. He demonstrates how these formerly very different alternative codes of sport merged into a single organic hegemony. Donnelly argues that prolympism is self reinforcing, in that it marginalizes alternatives and becomes a standard against which other forms of physical culture are assessed.

BASIC QUESTIONS AND SOCIAL PROCESSES

The degree of sportification of any particular sport can be usefully examined by answering four questions in terms of four related social processes: (1) What is the *social structure* of the sport? What are the kinds and degrees of *rationalization* characteristic of the sport? (2) What is the *social thought* about the sport? What are the ideologies and rationales put forth to *legitimize* the sport? (3) What are the kinds and degrees of *social participation* in the sport? What are the kinds and degrees of *democratization* characteristic of the sport? (4) What is the *social diffusion* of the sport? What are the kinds and degrees of *globalization* of the sport?

Table 1 The sportification process

<i>Social parameters</i>	<i>Social focus</i>	<i>Social binary</i>	<i>Social process</i>
Social structure	Efficiency	Expressive/Instrumental	Rationalization
Social thought	Efficacy	Legitimate/Illegitimate	Legitimization
Social participation	Equality	Inclusion/Exclusion	Democratization
Social diffusion	Equatorial	Export/Import	Globalization

These questions direct attention to specific social parameters, polarities, foci, and social processes that aid the assessment of the degree and kind of sportification for a particular sporting activity or sport form, as shown in Table 1.

RATIONALIZATION OF SPORT

The most fundamental characteristic of the monolithic social structure of elite international or representational sport is its instrumental rationalization. The totalization of international sport and the prolympism of representational sport indicate that for the principles of performance, profit, and prestige, virtually every basic component or element of sport has been rationalized to the ultimate degree for reasons of efficiency and effectiveness. Examples of the key elements of representational sport and the specific processes underlying their rationalization are shown in Table 2.

LEGITIMIZATION OF SPORT

Both recreational and representational sport have been legitimized in a variety of ways at various historical periods of different societies. Table 3 lists some of the selected rationales that have been used to justify the social significance of modern sports. As is also indicated in the table, modern sports must continually confront problems of delegitimatization, such as the use of illegal performance enhancing drugs.

DEMOCRATIZATION OF SPORT

A notable historical trend of the sportification process has been the increasing democratization of modern sports. For example, the early modern Olympic Games were noted for their elitism, sexism, and racism. Today, few Olympic events are closely linked to social class per se,

Table 2 The rationalization of sport

<i>Element</i>	<i>Focus</i>	<i>Process</i>
Players	Personnel	Resource allocation
Rules	Regulation	Formalization
Equipment	Technology	Innovation
Skills	Training	Specialization
Strategies	Knowledge	Complexity
Outcomes	Records	Quantification
Spectators	Fans	Spectatorship
Administrators	Organization	Bureaucratization
Owners	Profits	Entrepreneurism
Rewards	Salaries	Professionalization
Rights	Equity	Unionization
Publicity	Media	Mass communication

Table 3 Legitimization and delegitimization of sport

<i>Legitimization of sport</i>	<i>Delegitimization of sport</i>
Personal development	Blood sports
Social development	Bribery
Health and wellness	Cheating
Military preparedness	Doping
Community spirit	Drug abuse
National prestige	Gambling
Patriotism	Game fixing
Escapism	Hazing
Entertainment	Sexual harassment
Corporate profits	Violence

there is a marked increase of women participants and events in which they can compete, and many Olympic athletes, both male and female, are persons of color. Further, games and sports have been developed for special populations (e.g., the Special Olympics, the Paralympics, the Gay Games, and various “Senior” Games). Table 4 highlights the major forms of social discrimination that scholars, journalists, and cultural critics have addressed in the sportification process over time.

GLOBALIZATION OF SPORT

It is difficult to determine precisely the general emergence of the globalization of sport, but as evidenced by the diffusion of British sports

Table 4 Democratization of sport

<i>Opposing social categories</i>	<i>Discriminatory process</i>
Able vs. Disabled	Ableism
Young vs. Old	Agism
Class vs. Mass	Elitism
White vs. Black	Racism
Men vs. Women	Sexism
Straight vs. Gay	Homophobia
Rich vs. Poor	Statusism

Table 5 Globalization of sport

<i>Forms of globalization</i>	<i>Sporting examples</i>
Economic globalization	IOC corporate sponsors
Political globalization	IOC host city bidding
Cultural globalization	Media empires and satellite telecasts of events
Global migration	International professional athletes
Global tourism	Sport ecotourism
Global slavery	Third world labor for sporting goods
Global terrorism	1972 Munich Olympic massacre; Athens spends est. \$1.5 billion on security for 2004 Olympic Games

throughout the world, the development of international sport federations, and the establishment of the modern Olympic Games, by the beginning of the twentieth century sport was already a worldwide phenomenon (McIntosh 1971: 95). Today, we can find examples of nearly every different form of globalization within the world of sport, as shown in Table 5.

COUNTER REACTIONS TO THE SPORTIFICATION PROCESS

Broadly viewed, a strong case can be made that the sportification process has or will result in a monolithic global sport culture. On the other hand, folk sports and forms of recreational sport survive in the face of powerful global economic

and cultural processes. This illustrates that sporting practices are dynamic ongoing activities always subject to change and transformation in connection with local and global actions. For example, traditional sporting activities are constantly being modified as the conditions of play are negotiated through relationships and processes that involve a combination of players, managers, administrators, owners, media personnel, and spectators. All sports are historically produced and socially constructed. And while the most prominent cultural forms of sport embody systems of dominant meanings and practices, new sports and sporting practices are continually being invented which may generate forms of resistance and/or offer alternative structures and subcultures. In this sense, sports constitute contested cultural and social terrains.

A case in point is what are currently called extreme sports or variously known as adventure sports, alternative sports, action sports, panic sports, X sports, or whiz sports. These sports are typically characterized by risk, speed and vertigo, and a desire by participants to maintain control of their bodies and physical activities without the intrusion of formalized administrative structures and hierarchical supervision. Many participants in such sports express a rhetoric and follow norms that are anti-establishment and often transgressional in their nature (Rinehart 2004). These sports might be considered as modern folk sports, given their grassroots origins and local variations. At the same time, some of these new and alternative sport forms have been captured in the "iron cage of play" of the monolithic global sport culture. Their technology and popular appeal among young men and women with money to spend has attracted the attention of mainstream sporting bodies and commercial enterprises, including media organizations and sponsors. As some participants resist commercial cooptation and others maintain parallel forms of non-commercial, participant controlled activities, there are questions to be asked about the dynamics of cultural production and transformation (Honea 2004) and about sport as a game occurrence, a ludic activity, an institutionalized game, a social institution, and a form of social involvement. In this sense, sport constitutes a pervasive social phenomenon of great magnitude and complexity that continues to

attract the attention of sociologists and other scholars.

SEE ALSO: Globalization, Sport and; Leisure; Play; Sport and Capitalism; Sport as Catharsis; Sport and Culture; Sport and Ethnicity; Sport, Professional; Sport and Social Capital; Sportization; Sports Heroes and Celebrities; Sports Industry

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sport, alternative

Joy Crissey Honea

Many sports can be considered alternatives to dominant sport forms, but the term alternative sport has generally been used in sociology to refer to a group of activities that meet a particular set of organizational criteria. Alternative

sports initially existed outside of formal sports organizations and participants were primarily young people who, for one reason or another, did not fit into the world of traditional youth sports such as baseball and football. Though they differ greatly from one another, Robert Rinehart (2000) suggests that alternative sports can be loosely defined as: (1) participant controlled and directed, rather than organized through a governing body or other official organization; (2) individually focused, emphasizing personal achievements; (3) focused less on competition than traditional sports; and (4) generally possessing an insider requirement. That is, they are more likely than traditional sports to encompass their own subculture – one that stands in opposition to the dominant culture. In other words, skateboarders, for example, are not just people who happen to ride skateboards, but are “skaters,” expected to participate in a lifestyle associated with involvement in the sport.

Some alternative sports were originally titled “extreme.” This appears to have meant that they involved risk taking that more mainstream sports did not (like BASE jumping or cliff diving). The term was appropriated by the media and applied to any sport that was not generally considered a sports staple on television in the 1990s, and the label has by and large been abandoned by participants and, to some degree, by the media. Increasingly, mass media narratives refer to alternative sports as “action sports.”

Throughout the 1990s, alternative sports became increasingly popular. All sports cable television networks like ESPN and Fox Sports have been instrumental in exposing the sports to the public, particularly targeting the attention of young males (aged 12–34) in their coverage. These sports are now featured on ESPN, ESPN2, ESPNNews, ESPN Classic, and ABC. The best known alternative sporting events are ESPN’s annual X Games and Winter X Games, which feature a varying array of sports including skateboarding, snowboarding, inline skating, motocross, bicycle motocross (BMX), ski boarding and snow mountain biking. The X Games premiered in 1995 (originally titled the eXtreme Games). ESPN reported that between 1994 and 1998 its audience for alternative sports increased 119 percent and that the 2003

X Games were expected to reach more than 110 million homes in 145 countries and territories worldwide. Corporate sponsors have also gotten into the action and previous X Games sponsors include AT&T, Coors, Nike, Taco Bell, Mountain Dew, Chevrolet, VISA, and Snickers. According to a recent newspaper article, sales of skateboard shoes exceed \$1.4 billion annually, more than the total regular season game receipts of major league baseball, and skateboarder Tony Hawk's series of video games earned him a \$20 million advance from Activision while his clothing line brings in \$50 million annually.

Participation rates also reflect the increasing popularity of alternative sports. According to a survey conducted by the National Sporting Goods Association (NSGA), between 1996 and 2001 participation rates for snowboarding increased 72 percent and skateboarding participation rates increased 106 percent. These two historically alternative sports had the highest growth rates of all sports surveyed. For example, baseball, a more traditional sport, had a growth rate of only 8 percent and two other traditional sporting activities had declining participation rates – football was down 4 percent and basketball was down 12 percent.

The rapid increase in popularity of these sports has led researchers to examine why they are attracting so many (especially young) people and what they offer that perhaps mainstream sports do not. NSGA Vice President of Information and Research Thomas B. Doyle points out that snowboarding participation rates have tripled since 1990, while alpine skiing rates dropped more than 30 percent, and adds that skateboarding has experienced phenomenal growth since 1995, when it hit a low of only 4.5 million participants. Doyle contends that the growth of these two sports may reflect the fact that young people often choose activities that set them apart from adults. He suggests that traditional sports like skiing may have become too mainstream to be of great interest to adolescents and young adults.

Sociologists have addressed the claim that traditional sports are too mainstream for young people today and have examined what has historically attracted individuals to alternative sports. Beal (1995) analyzed the subculture status of alternative sport in her study of skateboarding in the early 1990s. Using Gramsci's theory of hegemony, she examined

the competing potentials of sport as an enforcer of dominant ideology and as a site of social resistance. Her findings indicated that members of the skateboarding culture she studied held beliefs about their sport that stood in contrast to the ideals of commercial sport. They were generally non competitive, process rather than goal oriented, and emphasized participant control of sporting events. She determined that, to some degree, the skaters were successful in resisting outsider control of their sport. Rinehart and Grenfell (2002) studied a group of BMX riders and examined the differences between the participants' experiences of riding at a self made bicycle track and at a corporate sponsored "park." They found that the riders often preferred the home made course, as it was truer to the original values of the sport, including participant control and informal organization.

Rinehart (2000) has studied a variety of alternative sports and their associated subcultures and has addressed the conflicts that arise as the sports become increasingly commercialized. He argues that participants' desire to have their sports legitimated and to prosper individually from their participation leads them to take part in commercial events like the X Games, but there they encounter conflicts with corporate and media sponsors who have different ideas about how to organize and present the sports. Rinehart contends that, while athletes participate in commercial events like the X Games, they simultaneously resist outsider definitions of what and who they are. He concludes that control over the presentation of alternative sports is significant because those who own and control the presentation of these events control not only the economics, but also the very core or "soul" of these sports.

What is emerging within alternative sport subcultures are struggles between corporate culture producers who are attempting to organize and present these sports like mainstream sport forms and the participants themselves, who seek to maintain some control of their sports and of the "authentic" roots of their cultures as they become commercialized. Beal and Weidman (1998), for example, found that skateboarders were indeed resisting outsider definitions of their culture and were participating in the production of their culture by influencing the advertising industry in its marketing

strategies toward skaters. Within snowboarding, Crissey (1999) found that Winter X Games participants were dissatisfied with ESPN's organization and presentation of their sport and engaged in symbolic forms of resistance to the commercialized nature of the event. Snowboarders refused to be interviewed, criticized the judging format, and called the competition "a joke." However, this resistance did not appear to be having much success, as the opposition was largely in the form of verbal complaining rather than organized action directed at change. In addition, their complaints were certainly not broadcast by ESPN or affiliates and the participants were essentially supporting the commercialized version of their sports by participating in the X Games events. The snowboarders appeared to be ambivalent about the role of commercial interests. Kleinman (2003) comes to a similar conclusion in his analysis of professional skateboarders, who expressed both positive and negative sentiments toward the commercialization, or "mainstreaming," of their sport.

Commercialization can be both beneficial and detrimental for alternative sports and their adherents. While commercialization results in organizational changes such as outsider control, increased competition, and extrinsic rewards for performances, it also provides new opportunities for participants including monetary rewards, product endorsements, new facilities, and video and television appearances. The most current data indicate that while athletes dislike the organizational changes and the commercial versions of their sports, they recognize that the newfound popularity and media coverage of their activities have opened new avenues for involvement in alternative sports, in terms of both sport participation and business ventures. For example, public and privately funded skateboard parks can now be found in many cities and towns, ski resorts now cater to snowboarders by building terrain parks, and the most talented athletes can earn income through contests, corporate sponsorships, and media performances. Though many alternative sport participants continue to view participation in the commercial version of their activities as "selling out," there is evidence of an increasing acceptance of the mainstream status of alternative sports and attempts to capitalize on their current popularity through participant owned

businesses that market equipment and apparel, host demonstrations and contests, and produce videos of sport performances.

While commercialization and social resistance are the most common targets for analysis, researchers have also examined other aspects of alternative sports and their subcultures. For example, sociologists have studied gender relations within alternative sports to determine how alternative sports either reinforce or challenge dominant gender roles. Alternative sports are overwhelmingly a male activity. Approximately 17 percent of skateboarders, 20 percent of surfers, and 30 percent of snowboarders are female. At ESPN's X Games, arguably the most publicized current alternative sporting event, only 15 percent of the competitors in 2000 were female. Of the three most popular events, skateboarding, BMX, and inline skating, only inline skating featured a women's division, and there were six female competitors as compared to 20 in the men's division. While some competitors and ESPN organizers attribute the disparity to a genuine lack of interest on the part of women, many female participants call it sexism.

Male participants in alternative sports often attribute the lack of female involvement in their sports to the difficulty of the activities – claiming, for example, that BMX requires exceptional upper body strength. Advocates of women's participation in these sports contend that it has little to do with physical ability or lack of interest and much more to do with discouragement from male participants. Beal (1995) found that, in her study of skateboarding, girls and women were marginalized as a result of discouragement by male skateboarders and trivializing terminology such as referring to female skaters as "Skate Betties." Although four of her 41 participants were female, Beal found that, within skateboarding, girls and women were most frequently relegated to the role of girlfriend or supporter of male skaters.

Although the marginalization of female athletes occurs in both traditional and alternative sport, gender relations are not identical across the two sport forms. Beal (1996) points out that male skateboarders construct an alternative masculinity that, while continuing to privilege males, rejects the "jock mentality" of traditional sports. Within snowboarding Kristen Anderson (1999) argues that the alternative nature of

snowboarding means that the construction of gender in the sport is different than it is in mainstream, organized sports. She asserts that male snowboarders construct the sport as a masculine practice through a variety of social practices including sporting a “street punk” style of dress, adopting an aggressive and superior attitude, emphasizing the danger of their sport, and stressing their heterosexuality. Because alternative sports like snowboarding are individualistic, loosely organized, and controlled by the participants, standard methods of constructing and enforcing gender are less readily available to male participants than they are in the organized world of mainstream sports, especially team sports, where gender borders can easily be patrolled through the sex segregation of teams.

Other areas of inquiry within alternative sport include issues of identity, subcultural membership and cultural production, and, particularly within skateboarding, the use of urban space. Sociologists interested in the use of public space have studied how skateboarders utilize urban locations for purposes other than what was intended, and, in this way, “disrupt” city space. Methodological approaches in the study of alternative sport have been largely qualitative, employing methods such as participant observation, interviewing, and content analysis of sport media. Future analyses of alternative sports are likely to continue to explore the strategies commercial interests use to “mainstream” these sports, the changes that occur as they become mainstream (as is currently the case within snowboarding), and forms of social resistance employed by participants as they seek to retain some control over the future of their sports. Quantitative data are also needed to assess the reasons for the popularity of alternative sports among participants and to investigate possible future directions for these sport forms.

SEE ALSO: Gender, Sport and; Identity, Sport and; Popular Culture; Sport; Sport and Culture; Sport and Social Resistance

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sport, amateur

Bruce Kidd

Amateurism in sport is at once ideology, a network of sports organizations, and a system of athletic eligibility. First articulated in Victorian England – there is absolutely no substance to the

International Olympic Committee's oft made claim that amateurism governed the athletics of ancient Greece – amateurism melded the upper class desire for social hierarchy with the middle class belief in education, self discipline, and social responsibility. The amateur ideal has always been to improve individuals and society by instilling the values of hard work, team sacrifice, and fair play, and inspiring community pride through inspirational performances. Amateurism resonated with the aspiration to “rational” or “improving” recreation that led urban reformers and the respectable working class to start public libraries, adult education classes, community orchestras and theater companies, public playgrounds, and children's summer camps.

In sport, amateurs sought to enforce adherence to their beliefs through a system of eligibility known as the amateur code. The first codes required competitors to be gentlemen, excluding women, workers, and, in some countries, aboriginals and persons of color simply on the basis of their status. As sports organizations became more meritocratic, in the face of growing working class political power, the spread of democratic ideas, and the outstanding performances of black and aboriginal “professional” athletes, amateur governing bodies replaced the ascriptive code with rules that required participants to adhere to the value of disinterested play. The adoption of amateurism in 1894 by the newly formed International Olympic Committee (IOC) for its quadrennial Olympic Games gave enormous affirmation and clout to this system of regulation and, in many countries, linked it strongly to nationalism. By World War I (1914–18), the principal test of eligibility in most international, national, and local governing bodies, including educational and faith based leagues, was whether an athlete had accepted monetary benefit from his participation or had ever played with or against a professional (i.e., someone who had accepted pay for play).

Although the prohibition against remuneration discouraged working class participation, especially during periods of high unemployment, it encouraged those who could afford to participate to combine athleticism with education and careers and realize the ideals. Not surprisingly, amateurism drew its greatest strength from the male urban middle class. It resonated

with their belief in education, self discipline, and social order, and enabled them to win most of the prizes. In many countries, the advocacy of amateur sport also contributed to the development of more universal programs of sport development in state schools and municipal recreation departments. But when strictly enforced, the amateur rules had telling consequences. Those deemed to have violated them were usually banished from amateur competition, without any of the basic rights of “natural justice” or due process. When the aboriginal American Jim Thorpe, who won the pentathlon and decathlon at the 1912 Olympics in Stockholm by overwhelming margins, was reported to have received \$25 a month for playing baseball, he was stripped of his medals and records. Numerous other athletes met the same fate at the hands of international, national, and local amateur officials. In many countries, the definition of an amateur, and its interpretation and enforcement, often divided clubs, coaches, athletes, and entire sports into warring factions. Not surprisingly, during the heyday of amateurism, the public and scholarly discourse was almost entirely preoccupied by these debates.

By the 1960s, the pressures against a strict financial definition of amateurism had grown to the point where they threatened to split the entire network of Olympic and amateur sports organizations worldwide. The rapid post war growth of spectator sports in the capitalist world gave athletes the incentive to train and compete on a full time basis and sporting goods manufacturers and event impresarios the revenue with which to pay them, while the state financed victories of Soviet bloc athletes in international competitions gave western sports leaders the rationale for liberalization. In 1974, the IOC dropped the term “amateur” from its eligibility code and gave member International Federations the right to set the terms of participation. By 1983, virtually all prohibitions against athletes receiving remuneration were dropped in Olympic sports. These changes were accompanied by new scholarship, which focused on the “social control” represented by amateurism and “rational recreation” and the socioeconomic status of those who benefited.

While amateurism has disappeared as a code of eligibility, the ideas it represents remain as

strong as ever. The amateur ideal continues to provide motivation and legitimation for the vast network of public and voluntary sports organizations in the developed world, as any award banquet speech or appeal to private or government sponsors will attest. Beginning in the early 1990s, the amateurs' claim that sport can serve as a vehicle for education, health, and citizenship has also begun to inform a new wave of "rational recreation" for children and youth "at risk" in the ravaged areas of the developing world, and in international development assistance, particularly at the United Nations. In 2003, the General Assembly endorsed the idea of sport as a major tool of development and peace, and declared 2005 the International Year of Physical Education and Sport. Even the Olympic Movement has retained the structure of amateur regulation in the strict prohibitions against performance enhancing drugs it now enforces through the World Anti Doping Organization. Not all of these interventions are progressive, as concerns about the "assimilative reform" implicit in such well publicized programs as "Midnight basketball" in US inner cities make clear. There is much social scientists can contribute to our understanding of these changes and continuities through an analysis of the auspices of contemporary forms of amateurism and the impacts upon/resistance by the peoples involved.

SEE ALSO: Olympics; Sport; Sport, College; Sport, Professional; Sport as Work

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sport and the body

Pirkko Markula

Given the centrality of the body in sport performance, it might be assumed that the corporeality of athletes has been an essential facet of sport sociological analysis. Despite its vital role, however, the body has occupied "an absent presence" in this research and only since the late 1980s have sport sociologists expressed a growing interest in this topic.

This rather late awakening to the social construction of the body can be attributed to the persistent mind/body dualism that has had a deep impact on how the sociology of sport and sport studies view themselves as academic disciplines. The break of sport sciences from physical education reflected the move away from the bodily experience into an intellectual understanding of sport and a validation of sport as a scientific discipline. Opting for the science route, in its early phase from the mid 1960s to the early 1980s, sport sociology was dominated by structural functionalist theorizing that focused on examining human beings as role actors within social structures ignoring the embodied actor. However, in the late 1980s and during the 1990s, along with other social sciences, the "non-body bias" started to lift and there was an increased awareness of the importance of studying how the sporting body has been constructed within power relations.

Examinations of the sporting body have evolved through several theoretical traditions. Inspired by the work of Norbert Elias, several sport sociologists have looked at how the (male) sporting body has become more civilized when molded through different figurations of power over time. This has evolved into further process sociological examinations of interrelationships between the body, power, and identity construction.

Interpretive sociology, particularly the dramaturgical work of Erving Goffman, has inspired sport scholars to examine the presentation of the body in its everyday context. In addition, phenomenological approaches have been used to examine how the lived body is experienced within the sporting context.

Critical cultural studies examine how the body has been shaped by the ideological construction of sport and by the dominant groups that maintain the current structure of sport. In addition, researchers using this approach have drawn attention to how different bodily identities – such as gendered bodies, lesbian/gay bodies, disabled bodies, ethnic bodies, and aging bodies – have been constructed within commercialized, globalized sport. They have also examined how a body can act as site of agency to resist the dominance of the powerful groups in sport.

More recently, the work of French poststructuralists such as Pierre Bourdieu and particularly Michel Foucault have become increasingly visible tools to examine the social construction of the sporting body. Bourdieu's work has enabled sport scholars to locate the body within the context of social fields where different sport practices construct distinctive habitus for its participants. Foucault's understanding of the body as a material site of disciplinary, discursive practices has been used to examine sport as a technology of domination. However, there is also an expanding literature on how the body might act as practice of freedom from the truth games that dominate sport and subvert the ethics of self care. Feminist sport research, particularly, has contributed to growing Foucauldian interpretations of sporting bodies (Markula 2004).

Against this theoretical backdrop, several major topics emerge. One of the major premises for the current investigation of the sporting body as socially constructed is not just about how it is shaped but also about how individual bodies are shaping the power relations in sport. From the modernist perspective, the sporting body is seen as a contradiction: simultaneously being constructed by and constructing the dominant ideologies of sport. Sport, therefore, has been identified to act as a social field that has potential to liberate such oppressed identities as women, lesbian/gay people, disabled, aged, minority ethnicities, or economically underprivileged groups, but who simultaneously conform to the current dominant ideologies of sport. Similarly, different sports, such as male contact sports, have been identified as particular sites for oppressive bodily practices, whereas other sports, such as women's team/contact

sports or women's bodybuilding, have been analyzed as sites for liberation from the structures of power.

Poststructuralist/postmodern theorists aim to expand the possibilities for the body's ability to change the existing power relations by assuming the embodied human being as an anti-essentialist self who, instead of struggling to resist against power that someone else exclusively holds, assumes a certain amount of power themselves. In this scenario, power relations turn from something to be resisted and eventually overturned into a potential source of creative and positive change through bodily practices. These examinations have also transgressed the boundaries of "traditional" definitions of sport to examine bodily dimensions of such popular phenomena as extreme and adventure sports, "trash sport" events such as the performances by World Wrestling Enterprise (WWE), and the fitness industry within the increasingly global economy of leisure.

While sport scholars have used a variety of methods, their examination of the sporting bodies can be located within two broad categories: textual readings of the sporting body and the sporting body as experienced by the athletes. The textual readings range from the representation of women athletes' bodies in the media, to the signification of celebrity athletes in the current socioeconomic climate. Individual bodily experiences have been mapped primarily by interviewing athletes within a diverse range of sports and at diverse levels of sport. These studies have focused on such bodily issues as violence, physicality, the impact of injury in a sporting career, body image, disordered eating, sexuality, sexual harassment, sport for disabled, and becoming disabled through sport. Several researchers have also embarked on interview studies to determine whether a particular sporting body can be interpreted as a transgressive body. In addition to interviewing, ethnographic studies have been conducted to trace the social construction of sporting bodies within such contexts as bodybuilding, boxing, the fitness industry, sport spectatorship, football hooliganism, football industry, adventure sports, WWE, women's ice hockey, and rugby union. There is also a growing literature of autoethnographically based examinations of

bodily experiences. These studies trace, through the authors' personal experiences, how the physically active body has been lived into existence within the structures of power.

The sporting body has been examined from diverse theoretical perspectives using multiple methods to create a rich and varied body of literature. This multiplicity is likely to characterize future research on the social analyses of sporting bodies. However, there appears to be a theoretical trend toward the postmodern/post-structuralist analysis of the body. Therefore, while the modernist body as ideologically constructed into such categorical identities as gender, class, race, or sexuality will persist as part of sociological examination of the sporting body, the performative, postcolonial, queer, cyborg, and embodied postmodern body that is fragmented and in constant flux in the hyperreal, global economy of the sign will feature strongly in future research, as scholars expand their research horizons to further transgress the definitional boundaries of sport. In addition, the storied bodily writing continues to challenge social science research texts through their engagement in performance and performative writing.

SEE ALSO: Body and Cultural Sociology; Disability Sport; Drugs/Substance Use in Sport; Gender, Sport and; Sport; Violence Among Athletes

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sport and capitalism

Rob Beamish

As an analytic term, capitalism refers to the economic system that began to emerge in thirteenth century Europe and extends into the present. Sport is an abstraction that denotes a variety of cultural practices that occur and develop within the context of specific socioeconomic formations. "Sport" and various sports exhibit several particular tendencies and characteristics when they occur within capitalist socioeconomic formations.

As an economic system, capitalism is a mode of "providing for material wants, animated by a definite spirit, regulated and organized according to a definite plan and applying a definite technical knowledge" (Sombart 1930: 196). The spirit of capitalism is based upon a historically unique approach to acquisition, specific attitudes about unfettered competition, and the use of instrumental reason (Weber 1927: 352–68). Acquisition under capitalism is not directly or centrally related to human need; it is focused on money (capital) and its potentially unlimited accumulation. As a result, each economic unit competes to extend its sphere of acquisition as far and as advantageously as possible, using all available means (within the existing penal code).

Instrumental reason pervades the capitalist system, as all economic units plan (usually long term), calculate the best means for acquisition, carefully manage all resources, and develop and

employ technology to enhance profitability and competitiveness (Borkenau 1934). Most important, the “strict adaptation of means to ends, one of the essential ideological props of capitalism, permeates the totality of culture and leads in the course of time to a purely utilitarian valuation of human beings, objects, and events” (Sombart 1930: 198). Within the spirit of capitalism, everything is viewed as a means for accumulation. People are labor power or consumers; nature is a repository of resources; perfecting the business enterprise dominates the working day; progress is the creation of new wants, advances in technology, reductions in costs, and increases in the speed of capital circulation.

Within this socioeconomic context, all of the key issues related to sport and capitalism arise. Sport becomes a market opportunity for owners or promoters to purchase the skills of individual athletes to produce an athletic spectacle that can be sold to live spectators, sponsors, and various media. Athletes are workers engaged in labor processes that are tightly controlled by their employers and the corporations employing them accumulate the profits. In addition, just as the education system develops future workers, youth sports and schools provide opportunities for young athletes to feed into professional sport. To mitigate the excesses of the drive for acquisition and the unbridled application of instrumental reason in industries centered upon maximizing human physical performance in a competitive, zero sum, environment, local, regional, and national governments have more or less successfully regulated different aspects of sport (Houlihan 1991).

The ascendance of town over country as the center of economic activity characterized the early emergence of capitalism. The associated shift in population facilitated the transformation of rural folk and traditional pastimes and games into urbanized, rule bound games and sport forms that could be carried out in defined and confined spaces, creating the conditions for commercialized sport (Ingham & Beamish 1993; Kidd 1996). While amateur sport and tradition tempered the ascendance of capitalized sport forms, the exclusion of workers, the existence of paying spectators, traditions of gambling and gaming, interest among various media, and the spirit of entrepreneurialism

created opportunities for open competitions and professional sport.

The early pursuit of sport entertainment revenues pitted promoters and owners against each other, as they bid for the best athletes to produce the most commercially appealing spectacles. To prevent their own self destruction, owners in many sports formed leagues which acted as cartels to control costs, prevent economic competition internally, and to set prices in the marketplace (Beamish 1988). Though illegal in other forms of commerce, a 1922 Supreme Court decision granted baseball immunity from American anti trust laws – a decision that had tremendous repercussions for all professional sports. The 1922 *Federal Baseball Club of Baltimore, Inc. v. National Baseball Clubs* decision centered on the control of players through the “reserve system.” In their efforts to gain the freedom of movement all other employees enjoy, the players in North America used labor laws, the courts, and engaged in open conflict with league owners. After a number of court challenges, it became apparent that athletes’ interests could be best defended through unionization and collective bargaining. The leagues in which the players had the most leverage unionized first – basketball in 1954 and hockey in 1967. Organized in 1956 and recognized in 1968, the owners used replacement players in 1987 to break the National Football League Players Association (NFLPA). The NFLPA was recertified 6 years later. From the Brotherhood of Professional Base Ball Players (1885) through to the American Baseball Guild (1946), the attempts to organize baseball players did not succeed until 1965 (signing its first collective agreement in 1968).

Once drastically underpaid and toiling under conditions set completely by owners, collective bargaining has balanced owner–player power relationships so that today’s professional athletes in most North American sports receive an increasingly fair share of the tremendous revenues they generate for their teams and leagues. While players’ salaries dwarf those of regular working people, their remuneration is consistent with the television celebrities they have become and the revenues accruing to the near monopoly conditions established by team owners.

Pierre de Coubertin launched the modern Olympic Games as a sport spectacle that would

inspire and reestablish traditional values in opposition to the crass materialism and decadence of nineteenth century capitalism. From their inauguration in 1896 through to the present, commercial interests and nationalist political objectives – seen especially in the Nazi Games of 1936 and the Cold War confrontations between 1952 and 1989 – the Games have become as commercialized and profit driven as any other professional sport in the modern era. The International Olympic Committee's 1974 decision to revise the "Eligibility Code" in the Olympic Charter removed the last vestiges of amateurism and any barriers that genuinely separated the Games from other professionalized sport forms (Beamish & Ritchie 2004). The dominant instrumental rationality of the contemporary Games has led to significant questions about child labor, the neglect of athletes' rights, performance enhancing substance use, and financial and ethical corruption (Hoberman 1992; Voy & Deeter 1991). As a movement that began as the antithesis of the capitalist spirit, the Olympic sports now rank among those that are the most deeply entrenched in the drive for acquisition, accumulation, the use of instrumental reason, and a purely utilitarian approach to human athletic performance.

Oppositional forms like "extreme sports" and other alternative sport forms have sprung up to resist the logic of capital, but they are quickly incorporated into the marketplace and begin to display the same ethos as mainstream, commercial, and high performance sport.

SEE ALSO: Capitalism; Drugs/Substance Use in Sport; Gambling and Sport; Political Economy and Sport; Sport, Alternative; Sport as Work; Sports Industry

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sport as catharsis

Michael L. Sachs

The word catharsis comes from the Greek *katharsis* or *katairein*, which means a cleansing or a purging. *Webster's Dictionary* definition reads: "A discharge of pent up emotions so as to result in the alleviation of symptoms or the permanent relief of the condition." Catharsis essentially refers to a release or discharge or cleansing of emotions, generally with the purpose of relieving the stress that develops from holding these emotions within the individual. English and English (1958) talk about "the relaxation of emotional tension or anxiety by any kind of expressive reaction." We often refer to the cathartic nature of sport (and exercise), relieving stress or tension that might build up, or serving as a release for anger and hostility (that may be seen as acceptable on the playing field or in the arena).

In exercise and sport settings the concept of catharsis may actually be seen as encompassing

two possible areas. The most “popular” is the use of sport as a means to express one’s anger or hostility in a setting where such behavior is sanctioned. The less commonly thought of application of catharsis is the use of exercise and sport as a stress reducer, a reliever of the stresses and tensions that may build up in an individual.

In considering the most popular use of the term, the thinking is that some individuals have elevated levels of anger or hostility (we all have differing levels of many different personality traits, some more socially acceptable than others). While expressing these emotions overtly is generally considered anti social or even illegal, depending on how and where the expression occurs, the playing field or arena often offers a site where expressing certain emotions is permissible, and even desirable. This is likely to be the case when emotional expression facilitates competitive success. Given the importance in our society of success in the form of winning, coaches in some sports, such as those involving heavy contact, prefer players who express emotions related to aggression and motivation.

Many theories are related to this notion that catharsis is especially valuable for releasing aggression through sport. Instinct theories often assume that we have innate instincts to be aggressive, and catharsis allows us to release them in socially acceptable ways. Little empirical evidence supports this theory, despite its intuitive appeal to many people. The frustration aggression theory suggests that, as the name implies, aggression is manifested when frustration is caused by failure to achieve a goal. But again, little research supports a sport/aggression link because frustration does not always result in aggression, and aggression may be manifest even when frustration does not appear to be present. Indeed, aggressive acts may increase during the course of a sport event rather than decrease in the later stages of the event due to catharsis.

Other theories that apply to aggression (social learning and a revised frustration aggression theory which incorporates elements of the original frustration aggression hypothesis as well as social learning theory) are available, but they have similar weaknesses: some individuals may find exercise and sport settings cathartic in relieving anger/aggression, while others do not

(or even find themselves learning to increase aggressive acts). The general public tends to support the notion that aggressive actions, by athletes and/or spectators, have a cathartic effect. However, research supports the exact opposite: engaging in or viewing aggressive actions often leads to increased levels of aggressive feelings and actions. Additionally, learning theory suggests that for those whose aggression facilitates success (winning), emotions related to aggression are reaffirmed and legitimized rather than being purged or cleansed as catharsis theory would predict.

In psychoanalysis, therapeutic approaches (following the lines of Freud) dealt with recalling traumatic events in one’s past and venting these experiences, reaching a point of understanding these emotions, and then cleansing/draining these pent up feelings to achieve symptom relief. Some schools of therapy incorporate the potential healing power of cathartic experiences. This potential may be seen in considering the second use of the term, as a stress reliever. Herein we find a more frequent application of the concept of catharsis, although most exercise and sport participants would not use the term in this way. Many sport participants see physical exercise and sport as stress relievers (although in some competitive situations stress/pressure may be perceived to increase). This is an appropriate hypothesis, and when considering catharsis more metaphorically (or more broadly) it is easy to see that exercise and sport participation could reduce the physical and even cognitive manifestations of tension and stress. Exercise and sport are ideal for this function, especially when stripped of their competitive elements, allowing one to focus on the process of physical activity and the potential joy that comes with human movement. Other activities such as yoga and meditation may be helpful as well. There are, of course, undesirable stress reducing activities, such as drinking alcoholic beverages and using recreational drugs. Exercise and sport, however, are preferred, because they produce physical and psychological benefits in addition to the stress release/catharsis role they may serve.

SEE ALSO: Health and Sport; Play; Sport and the Body; Violence Among Athletes; Violence Among Fans

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sport and the city

Kimberly S. Schimmel

As even a casual observer may recognize, the phenomenon of contemporary sports bears little resemblance to that of the fairly recent past. At the turn of the twentieth century, sports were occasional and unregulated events played by members of local sports clubs. In the late 1950s and early 1960s, an individual's association with sport might have been limited to participant, spectator, or consumer of sport news mainly through radio or newspaper. However, as sports became meaningful to more than just the people who played them, the emergence of crowds at local sport club contests provided the opportunity for risk taking entrepreneurs to turn games into profit making ventures. In a relatively short time, traditional agrarian pastimes became today's urban commercial spectacles. Voluntary participation was replaced by binding contractual arrangements, and small hometown rivalries gave way to regional and international urban mega events produced for global television audiences.

Historians agree that the urbanizing landscapes and expanding capitalist economic system that transformed the societies of Europe and

North America fueled the evolution of contemporary sport. The mass production of agricultural and material goods necessary to sustain and stimulate urban growth disrupted traditional patterns of work, leisure, and land use. In large cities such as London and New York, immigrants with widely diverse sporting backgrounds adjusted to the routine of congested urban industrial culture, which created both the demand and the means for the development and growth of sports. Cities were the sites of the dense populations, transportation networks, technological innovations, discretionary incomes, and entrepreneurial spirit necessary for the success of commercial sports. Additionally, cities were the focus of concerns for health, morality, and community, which continually served as rationales for promoting sports to urbanites. Through numerous case studies, sport historians have documented how the development of sport and the development of cities was intertwined. David Nasaw (1993), for example, shows how cities were not just the problems for which sports were an answer; only cities had the necessary conditions and elements to sustain the rapid growth of sports. Other scholars, including Melvin Adelman and Steven Hardy, considered sports as both cause and effect in the development of physical structures, social organizations, and ideologies in Boston and New York between 1820 and 1915.

A dominant theme in the social science literature on sports and the contemporary city is an examination of the ways sports have come to be valued not for their own sake, but as a means to some other desirable end. City governments, for example, support inner city "midnight basketball" leagues in an effort to reduce crime rates. In many cities, sport is advertised as a way to generate a sense of civic pride or to create a civic identity. In cities around the globe, sport stadium and infrastructure construction is promoted to have both tangible and intangible benefits for city residents. The tangible benefits are connected to urban regeneration through the belief that sport facilities will attract elite sport teams and events that stimulate the local economy and create jobs. In turn, this investment in sport related construction is thought to enhance the quality of life for urban community residents. However, many social scientists view with deep caution any notion that sports can act as a

solution to general urban problems. While sports may create a sense of attachment that is important at an interpersonal level, these scholars point out that sports does not significantly change the economic, social, and political realities of every day urban life. Many scholars who study sport related urban development, for example, refute the claim that this type of civic investment provides real benefits for the city as a whole. Empirical evidence shows that while some groups in a city may profit, others are actually burdened. As has been the case since the rise of sport in an urban industrial context, ethnic assimilation, class conflict, control of urban space, and race and gender relations are inseparable from the promotion of contemporary sports.

SEE ALSO: Leisure; Sport and Capitalism; Sport, Professional

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sport, college

D. Stanley Eitzen

Organized sport competition and institutions of higher education are inseparable in the United States. But the intertwining of the two as found

in the US is not present in other countries. In European and Scandinavian countries, for example, intercollegiate sports competition is virtually nonexistent. Rather, there are club sports outside of the school system where young people in teams compete against other clubs. Canada fits somewhere between the European way and the American system. Jay Coakley and Peter Donnelly describe the Canadian system as one where interuniversity sports are a normal, but not highly significant, part of student life. There just are no parallels with the highly publicized "big time" sports programs in US universities. However, sport in the Canadian schools is akin to other levels of university sport in the US, such as the NAIA level of competition (2004: 453). In short, sports are social constructions. In this sense, sport and education can be organized and played in many ways.

College/university sport in the US is organized into six divisions, five administered by the National Collegiate Athletic Association (NCAA) and one by the National Association of Intercollegiate Athletics (NAIA) (Coakley 2004: 494-6). These divisions reflect athletic budget size, level of competition, rules, and the availability of athletic scholarships. The NCAA Division I is subdivided into three categories: 117 schools with big time football programs (I A), 123 schools with smaller football programs (I AA), and 85 schools without football teams but with big time basketball programs (I AAA). Division II and Division III with 270 and 410 schools, respectively, have smaller programs with smaller budgets and few, if any, full time athletic scholarships. The NAIA has about 300 relatively small schools with meager athletic budgets.

To illustrate the differences, the range in athletic budgets is from \$70 million at Ohio State University to less than \$400,000 at small liberal arts colleges. Large universities may field as many as 18 varsity sports for men and women, while small colleges may have only a few varsity sports, supplemented by a number of club sports. In Division I schools, sports have multiple coaches who are separate from the educational part of their schools, while coaches in Division III and NAIA schools often teach academic classes and may coach two or more teams. The Division I schools are popular on a regional and sometimes a national basis because of

television and other media coverage, while schools in other Divisions play in relative obscurity. And, most significant, at the big time level, student athletes, with few exceptions, are athletes first and students second. At the lower levels, they are students first with the athlete role second. Throughout the world there is no equivalent to the highly commercialized system where athletics supersedes education, as found in the US version of big time college football and basketball.

Big time college sport involves many contradictions. The overarching contradiction is that sport is organized as a commercial entertainment activity where educational goals have been compromised. At the heart of this contradiction is that institutions of higher learning allow the enrollment and subsidization of ill prepared and uninterested students, solely for the purpose of winning games, enhancing the visibility of the university, and producing revenue. This occurs even at the most prestigious institutions where athletes are admitted below the standards applied to others (Shulman & Boyer 2001). Add to this mix demanding coaches who require so much for practice, watching film, travel, weightlifting, and meetings. The athletic sub culture also discourages athletes from identifying primarily with the student role (Adler & Adler 1991; Curry 1991).

Positively, college football and basketball offer entertainment, spectacle, excitement, festival, and excellence. Negatively, educational goals have been superseded by the quest for revenue. Because winning programs receive huge revenues from television, gate receipts, fees for seating, bowl and tournament appearances, boosters, and even legislatures, many sports programs are guided by a win at any cost philosophy, which leads to a second contradiction.

This contradiction is that while higher education should be a model of ethical behaviors, the enormous pressures to win result on occasion in scandalous behaviors. Sometimes there are illegal payments to athletes. Education is mocked by recruiting athletes unprepared for college studies, altering transcripts, having surrogate test takers, providing phantom courses, and by not moving the athletes toward graduation. As a result, the graduation rates of male athletes in the revenue producing sports of

football and basketball are relatively low compared to other athletes and to the general student population.

To this contradiction related to ethics add problems associated with the exploitation of athletes. This abuse of athletes takes several forms (Eitzen 2003). One form of abuse is that athletes' freedoms are restricted. Once athletes sign a contract to play for a school, they are bound to that institution. They make a four year commitment to that university, yet the school makes only a one year commitment to them. If an athlete wishes to play for another big time school, he is ineligible for one year. Yet, if a coach wants to cut an athlete from a team, the school is merely bound to provide the scholarship for the remainder of that school year. Furthermore, the right to privacy of athletes is invaded routinely, for example, with mandatory drug testing and bed checks, social controls not applied to other students. Some coaches insist that their athletes not engage in political protest. Some prohibit athletes from associating with individuals or groups that they deem undesirable, and some demand dress codes, organize mandatory leisure time activities, and even inflict their religious beliefs on their athletes. Another form of abuse, although by no means a universal trait of coaches, involves instances of physical and mental cruelty toward athletes. This may take the form of intimidation, humiliation, and even physical aggression.

A third contradiction found in big time athletic programs is that while universities promote diversity and equity, they have historically denied women and minorities equity in athletics. Using African Americans as an example, they were denied athletic participation in most colleges and universities until the 1950s. Now they are the majority of players in the revenue producing sports of football and basketball, but are underrepresented as head coaches (in 2004, only five of the 117 Division I A head football coaches were African American), athletic directors, athletic trainers, and directors of sports information.

Another area of concern in big time college sports is the dominance of male elite sport. Title IX, which Congress passed in 1972, mandated gender equity in school sports programs. While women's intercollegiate sports programs have

made tremendous strides toward that goal, they lag behind men's programs in participation, athletic budgets, athletic scholarships, and coaches' salaries. Moreover, a majority of women's teams are coached by men and the top administrators of athletic departments are overwhelmingly men. If participation in sport is educational in and of itself, a common rationale that university administrators advance in support of college sport, then these educators are caught in a contradiction because many of them willingly accept, and sometimes actively resist, changes to correct the present maldistribution of resources, scholarships, and opportunities for women's sport.

A fourth contradiction is that although big time sports are revenue producing, for most schools they actually drain money away from academics. This occurs when more scholarship moneys are given to students with athletic abilities than to students with cognitive abilities, and when athletic budgets are supplemented with generous sums from student fees and subsidies from the academic budgets.

Another contradiction involves the influence of money on decision making as the power to decide tends to leave the university and flow toward the sources of revenue. Television money dictates schedules. Prominent donors may influence the hiring and firing of coaches. When a football coach makes over eight times more money than the university president and when the coach has a powerful constituency outside the university, the athletic "tail" often wags the university "dog," thus subverting the independence of colleges and universities (Sperber 1990: 35).

A final contradiction is that although the marketing/sales side of big time sport is big business, the production side is an amateur extracurricular activity in which athletes are "paid" only with an "education" (e.g., room, board, tuition, fees, and books). This limitation is to keep the activity "amateur." Economist Andrew Zimbalist (1999: 6) describes this unequal system as like no other industry in the United States, since it manages not to pay its principal producers a wage or a salary. Meanwhile, individuals, schools, and corporations make huge amounts of money off of these "amateurs" (Sack & Staurowsky 1998).

Dealing with these contradictions presents challenges to university administrators. The most commonly suggested reforms are based on a goal of achieving educational objectives and include the following:

- Athletic departments must not be self contained corporate entities that are separate from the university; rather, they should be placed under the control of university presidents.
- Presidents must monitor athletic programs for illegalities such as recruiting violations, dehumanizing behaviors by coaches, and other unethical acts.
- Athletic departments must also be monitored by an external body other than the NCAA, which has a fundamental conflict of interest.
- Limits should be placed on coaches' income (e.g., no more than the college president).
- Athletes should be paid a living wage.
- Only those athletes who have the potential to compete as students should be admitted – no special admissions and no special curricula for athletes.
- Student athletes must make satisfactory progress toward a degree.
- Time demands on athletes should be kept within reasonable bounds and strictly enforced.
- A comprehensive athletes' bill of rights should be established to ensure a non exploitive context (Eitzen 2003: 131).
- Moneys from student fees and discretionary funds from the administration, as well as from legislatures, should be funneled exclusively to women's sports and to minor men's sports to achieve greater equity.
- The expenditures for football should be reduced by limiting scholarships and the size of teams, reducing the number of coaches, and eliminating costs unrelated to the health and education of athletes.
- The financial spending race should be stopped by placing limits on the amount that can be spent on capital expenditures for athletics.

In light of these suggestions for reform, administrators have three choices. First, they

can retain the current system with all of its contradictions. Second, they can remove the hypocrisy by accepting a semi professional team that is separate from the educational mandate, but this choice assumes that universities should sponsor commercial entertainment activities outside the sphere of education. A third possibility is to shift to a sports system such as that found at the NCAA Division III level or among the NAIA schools where athletic programs are more likely in harmony with educational goals.

What will happen? If history is a guide, university presidents involved in big time programs will push the NCAA for cosmetic changes, but they will balk at meaningful structural changes and passively allow athletic programs to do what they have to do to win.

SEE ALSO: Deviance, Sport and; High School Sports; Socialization and Sport; Sport; Sport, Amateur

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sport and culture

David Rome

For sociologists subscribing to a hierarchical model of culture, sports may be regarded as its antithesis: a bodily practice, of little cultural consequence, gazed on by passive spectators for the enrichment of the leisure and media industries. The neglect of sports as a sociological subject until relatively recently may be attributed to a common resistance within intellectual culture to engagement with the corporeal realm of popular pleasure. However, the increasing prominence of (especially electronically mediated) sports, a more open minded attitude within sociology to what has often been dismissed as “mass” or “low” culture, and the influence of interdisciplinary approaches (especially cultural studies) has created space for a developed cultural sociology of sport. This shift by no means signals a theoretical, conceptual, and methodological consensus concerning sports and culture in the discipline, but, rather, a new willingness to explore their relationship within a sociological framework.

One obstacle to a sociological engagement with sports and culture is establishing an agreement on the defining characteristics of the objects of analysis, a particular problem given their diversity and dynamism. Precisely what constitutes sports and culture presents, in itself, grounds for dispute, alongside contending evaluations of their relationship. In broad sociological terms, sports can be conceived as the social institution developed out of the rationalization and commercialization of physical game contests that has occurred since the mid nineteenth century (notably, first, in Britain), and culture as the shifting ensemble of symbols, signifying practices, and texts that give expression and

meaning to the social world of which sports is an increasingly significant part. The twin focus of this entry, then, is on the place and influence of sports within the wider sociocultural sphere, and on the specific, rapidly developing characteristics of sports as a “subset” of society and culture as a whole.

SPORTS AND THE “CULTURAL TURN” IN SOCIOLOGY

Many sociologists have noted – and often regretted – the “cultural turn” in sociology that has produced, among other subdisciplinary shifts, an increasing interest in sports. Prior to the 1960s there was a tendency for sociologists to be suspicious of the everyday subjects that appeared epiphenomenal to the main sociological determinants – class structures, state relations, and so on. However, analyzing culture, especially in its popular form, became a more compelling activity in the light of what can be called “culturalization” and “mediatization” – the heightened social, economic, and political importance of the making of meaning and the circulation of symbols, especially through popular media such as television, radio, magazines, newspapers, and recorded music. Stuart Hall (1989: 128) makes this point eloquently in proposing that, in the late twentieth century, a “New Times” had emerged that demanded new perspectives. For Hall, culture is no longer, and probably never has been, the epiphenomenal symbolic superstructure determined by the material socioeconomic base. Culture is now deeply material in its productive processes, and the material world is permeated by cultural practices and meanings.

Sociologists in the post World War II era began to find the objectivist tradition of mainstream sociology (and the streak of puritanic rationalism that it often displayed) overly austere and lacking in contemporary relevancy. The influence of youth culture, for example, now registered in subcultural and deviancy theory, and the popularization and personalization of politics (encapsulated in the catchcry “the personal is the political”) taken up by feminist and postcolonial scholars also resonated within sociology. More sociologists felt licensed to

embrace everyday life as a legitimate starting and reference point for their investigations of the social. Addressing popular cultural subjects like rock music, television consumption, and sports enabled a more reflexive mode of analysis that conceived culture as dialectically constitutive of structural relations, not as the predetermined outcome of them. New strands of social theory, such as postmodernism, and interdisciplinary perspectives like cultural and media studies, challenged the grand narratives of sociological theory and the integrity of its disciplinary boundaries. The distanced, all seeing eye of macrosociology was criticized for producing a universalist regime of knowledge that obscured its own historically conditioned, subjectivist limitations. The cultural turn enabled (mainly male) sociologists who were “closet” sports aficionados (fans), as well as those who had felt victimized by sports (through compulsory physical education at school or by the ideologies embedded in the sports media), to interrogate, critically and self reflexively, their own and others’ cultural tastes and consumption. Adopted excessively, such an approach can be condemned as unscientific, impressionistic, narcissistic, and self indulgent. But with appropriate attention to the enduring questions and techniques of sociology, it is able to illuminate the ways in which contemporary culture (aided and abetted by capital and state formations) is both shaped by and profoundly influences the social.

Taking sports seriously as culture, therefore, was a crucial step in a more general reinvigoration of sociological inquiry. Instead of seeing sports and other forms of popular culture simply from, say, a functionalist perspective – and thereby necessarily emphasizing its adaptive and integrative ramifications for the social whole – it became possible to explore sports as a social domain of contending ideologies and values with a disparate range of relations to social reproduction and change. Similarly, from an orthodox conflict (including Marxist) sociological perspective, sports tended to be seen as a straight forward product of social class relations, especially those involving commodification and “false consciousness,” but a less mechanical engagement with sports as culture offers a more dialectical, complex understanding that is less

reliant on a single, central axis of domination and subordination.

The analysis of sports in traditional macro sociological terms can still be productive, but a culturalist approach, appropriately informed by social theory, is able to draw on a richer, more contingent theoretical repertoire as well as a more intimate, ethnographic insight into how sports culture is “lived” as everyday practice. This intellectual project does not necessitate the abandonment of formative sociological questions of structure, agency, and power, but helps to “rehabilitate” and extend them into hitherto neglected areas of growing prominence. In this regard, sports, by a series of measures, can be seen to be a pivotal element of contemporary society and culture. Its raw popularity as spectacle alone makes it so – for example, it has been estimated that the cumulative audience for the 2002 Korea/Japan World Cup of association football was 28.8 billion viewers; that 9 out of 10 people in the world with access to television watched some part of the Sydney 2000 Olympic Games; and that there was 35,000 hours of dedicated broadcast coverage of the 2004 Athens Olympic Games among 220 countries. Such “mega media” sports events are profoundly instructive about cultural change in (post)modernity.

THE RISE OF SPORTS CULTURE AND THE CULTURAL SOCIOLOGY OF SPORTS

Over the last three centuries, occasional physical folk play and game contests have become codified, scheduled practices, and the love of the game (the “amour” at the root of “amateurism”) has progressively given way to professional spectator sports. The relatively modest remuneration of sportspeople (mostly male) that followed the decline of the class based, aristocratic ideal of the “sporting gentleman” involved first the payment of expenses and lost wages by those who had to exchange their labor power to live; then payment for play that was usually insufficient to provide a living wage; and, later, reasonable returns for “sportswork” for the duration of the usually short and uncertain career of the professional athlete. But, just as in other areas of the labor market where income inequality grew

between fellow workers in the same industry and between industries, so the emerging cultural “sale ability” of sports has produced “superstars” compensated at extraordinary levels. Conspicuous examples of celebrity athletes include the African American basketballer Michael Jordan, surveyed in the 1990s as the world’s most recognizable individual, and English footballer David Beckham, whose high profile, like Jordan’s, derives from “leveraging” his sports standing for a diverse range of pecuniary purposes. The restructuring of the athletic labor market into a tiny minority of the “super rich,” a larger but still small group of modestly rewarded professionals, and a vast number of aspiring professional athletes with little prospect of success, reflects a “structure of culture” in sports that now aligns it closely to the broader entertainment industries.

Even those (the majority of active sportspeople, although not of the whole population) who play sports but earn little or no income from it are part of a large sports industry supplying facilities, clothing, training, and equipment. Thus, professional athletes represent the alluring face of contemporary sports, behind which lies the “industrial” engine that produces it – including sponsors, advertisers, media companies, sports agencies, peak sports organizations, management, equipment and clothing manufacturers, privately and publicly funded sports educators, administrative and training bodies, and research scientists. Systematic planning, design, and operation are central to contemporary sports, while retaining a crucial symbolic element of a spontaneous culture of play.

Sports is, then, both symptom and cause of a much larger sociocultural shift, as the highly localized cultural practices of spatially fixed settlements such as villages and small towns have become concentrated in large urban centers, only for sports to be dispersed in mediated form through their dissemination as images and sounds. This symbolic sports communication, in turn, has become a pivotal means by which national cultural identity can be constructed through the sports press, and public service and commercial broadcasting. Mediated international sports events are extraordinary opportunities for internal and external representations of nation, an inherently ideological practice demanding close sociological interrogation,

not least because of its apparent innocence. This brief sketch reveals how mediated sports culture can attract the interest of sports sociologists, who have found its terrain richly productive, pursuing questions surrounding social relations, economics, politics, ideology, and culture within and beyond the sports world.

Dimensions of Sports and Culture

The major dimensions of the sports–culture relationship concern the impacts of the industrial development of sport, the social ideologies that circulate within the “media sports cultural complex” (Rowe 2004: 4), and the positioning and influence of sports within the wider socio-cultural sphere. In relation to sports and industry, the developments outlined above can be regarded as important elements of the penetration of the logic of capital into everyday culture. Inducing, from the mid nineteenth century onwards, spectators to pay to enter the controlled space of the sports stadium in order to watch paid athletes perform, is a significant instance of the industrialization of leisure time and practice. The combination of the incipient sports industry and the betting and hospitality industries proved an effective way of facilitating the congregation of large crowds and the expenditure of the discretionary income that organized labor secured from the owners of capital. A class cultural dimension to the sports industry reproducing wider social structural relations is an important feature of its historical formation. For example, cricketers were divided by class into (amateur) gentlemen and (professional) players well into the twentieth century, and horse racing – the “sport of kings” – displayed a hierarchy extending from the member’s enclosure down to the “punters” restricted to the open areas of racecourses. As the sports industry has grown and “massified,” these overt class cultural distinctions have been less sharply drawn, but they have not been eradicated. For example, the “bourgeoisification” of contemporary sports stadia, including expensive seating, corporate boxes, and high class catering, has ensured that quality of access and service provision are governed by socioeconomic circumstances. Similarly, the sports labor market

is stratified and segmented, with privileged access to individual expensive sports (such as golf and tennis) more readily available to the already privileged, while in team sports there are patterned divisions of labor that commonly restrict leadership positions to the socially advantaged (the practice of “stacking”).

Although these spatialized aspects of sports culture remain important – major stadia, for example, are invested with the kind of quasi-spiritual qualities that lend support to the proposition that sports is a secular religion – the most important force in the development of sports over the last century has been its increasingly intense relationship with the media. Without the media, sports would be hampered by the restrictions of time and space, with itinerant caravans of sports people displaying their wares in different towns, cities, and countries. This practice is, of course, still evident, but in economic terms it is much less significant than another, more flexible process: the symbolic transportation of the unique sports event to the domestic hearth. The simultaneous development of the sports and media industries has been, although not without some tensions, synergistic. The development of sports was limited while it relied on the staging of events for the exclusive pleasure of those present. Correspondingly, the commercial media could not flourish without regular, popular uses for their communicative infrastructure enabling exposure of large audiences to the advertisers who underwrote their print and electronic texts. In sports, with its large, passionate audiences, regular, relatively inexpensive and “long form” programming, and capacity to function in both news and entertainment genres, the media found an ideal industry partner. As a result, sports became an integral component of contemporary culture, inescapable for all citizens regardless of their cultural tastes because of the efficiency and reach of the sports media.

Because of its intimate involvement with the media, sports is a highly effective bearer of social ideologies disguised as natural, self-evident truths. The sports industry is imbued with a highly performative ethos, with its outcomes organized around measurable qualities and outcomes – winning and losing, faster and slower, stronger and weaker, and so on. When coupled with an ideology of transparent

meritocracy (those who succeed deserve and can be seen to do so) and a mythology of a sports world that stands aloof from the “ordinary” world, sports culture can be seen to offer a microcosm of a simpler, fairer universe. In this sense, there is a close articulation between sporting values and neoliberal ideology. But sports culture also contains within it anti modernizing values reliant on tribalism and collective identity. Sports as cultural practice is arbitrary and trivial in that it consists of rule governed physical game contests onto which meaningful significance is projected by participants and spectators. The often nostalgic (and, indeed, sometimes atavistic) forms of identification on which sports draws its cultural power may, then, release reactionary impulses that are inimical to the “disembedding” that is constantly attempted by modernism and neoclassical economics. For example, as discussed below, the spatial relocation of a sports team (economically classified as a franchise), as has occurred with many grid iron and ice hockey teams in the USA, or the attempted takeover of a sports club, can stimulate anti market, anti capitalist sentiments among sports fans. Such ideological tensions within sports mean that its institutional analysis cannot be reduced to an assumed capture by a commercial ethos. Instead, sports can be seen as a social site – albeit one that is heavily scored with ideologies of dominance – in which the cultural interplay involves social ideologies that are both reinforced and contested.

These ideologies in and of sports do not only involve, directly, matters of capital and labor. The (re)construction of the nation through international sports competition can reinforce, in some instances, racism and xenophobia, but also challenge the power of globalizing processes to erase the specific qualities of the local. Sports culture displays a discourse that is split between universalism (humanity united by the love of and respect for the game) and particularism (humanity fractured into competing, partisan clusters that support one team – sometimes violently – against national, racial, and ethnic others). The critical task of sports sociology is to analyze, “without prejudice,” these fissures and tensions within sports culture.

The linkage between nationalism and gender – the “masculinization” of citizenship criticized by feminists – suggests the potential role of

sports in the cultural “enforcement” of the societal gender order. Sports, like many other cultural forms, is marked at many levels by sex and gender, although there are few forms of culture that have been so clearly and consistently divided by sex (reflected most obviously by sexually segregated competitions). The social construction of sexual difference in sports – its gendered complexion – is an important subject when analyzing the ideological reinforcement of notions of masculine superiority and exclusion.

Sports, both with regard to participation and spectatorship, is historically a key aspect of masculine culture. According to the “objective” performative measures of sports, men dominate in terms of athletic records, athlete remuneration, and spectator interest. Over the last century, in which women have challenged men in many domains – such as the workplace, representative government, and the home – sports has tended ideologically to reproduce male (pre) dominance. Those sports prizing the qualities in which men have an advantage (biologically inherited and socially learned) with regard to strength, speed, and aggression (as opposed to, say, style, subtlety, and cooperation), have consistently been the most valorized in sports culture.

However, the logic of capital accumulation has simultaneously eroded this gender segregation, as the saturation of the male and the neglect of the female spectator markets have been recognized. The commercial importance of television sports spectating, in particular, has prompted systematic strategies to attract the female viewers who also make many of the purchasing decisions on household products. Sports broadcasts are now increasingly tailored to mixed sex audiences, but greater recognition of women as viewers has not been matched by higher status in sports. Thus, apart from a small number of elite sports, such as tennis and golf, and relatively infrequent multi sports events, like the Olympic and Commonwealth Games, the gendered culture of sports is largely one of males and females watching predominantly male sports (such as the football codes of soccer, rugby, gridiron and league, and other major team sports such as basketball, ice hockey, and baseball). Male viewing of female sports is routinely accompanied in sports journalism and

commentary by their sexual objectification, and an emphasis on their performative inferiority (in relation to men), maternal and marital status, and dependency on males. This assertion of “hegemonic masculinity” is also applied to other men, especially those who are homosexual, and is expressed in sexist and homophobic insults in sports (such as “playing like a girl/queer”). Again, however, the gendered repositioning of sports marketing has fostered the sexualization and reconstruction of sporting masculinity, leading sportsmen (such as David Beckham) who adopt a more flexible, (post)modern masculine style, to become subjects of popular debate concerning new forms of manliness.

By such means, the space of sports culture can operate as a forum for wider social debate about change and continuity. Recurrent sports scandals, intensively covered by the media, are especially prominent vehicles for collective reassessments both of the institution of sports and the societies of which it is a part. For example, financial impropriety (such as betting related match fixing in association football and cricket, or secret inducements to the International Olympic Committee members who decide on which city is to host the Summer and Winter Olympic Games) and the use of performance enhancing drugs in sports (for example, in Olympic athletics and weightlifting, and Tour de France cycling), provoke intense debates about the corruption of sports by commerce and the associated privileging of ends over means. Personal indiscretions by sports stars, ranging from the criminal (such as rape) to the individual ethical (like infidelity), also discursively bridge the sports and wider social worlds, enabling the airing of issues that concern both the corrosive effects of celebrity culture and the everyday dilemmas confronting “ordinary” people that are held in common with sports stars. Sports culture, from this perspective, can be regarded as a vivid symbolic canvas onto which grand pictures of contemporary society are drawn, often with reference to idealized representations of the past.

Sports discourse and language is also highly influential in framing the wider society in its own image – the “sportification” of society. As noted above, there is an apparently simple competitive logic within sports that conjures up a world of clearly defined competitors, rules, and

outcomes. As a result, sports metaphors, such as those involving “level playing fields,” regulatory “hurdles,” and “races” for company acquisitions and profit goals, have insinuated themselves into business discourse, not least in news bulletins. Similarly, political discourse in representative liberal democracies is suffused with the language of sports, with electoral contests, parliamentary debates and policy disagreements routinely framed in the language of sports encounters. Advertisers also often “pitch” products and services in sporting terms, with companies and consumers represented as “teams” and “oppositions,” and the visual imagery of sports used to depict producers and consumers. The ideological implications of representing diverse organizations, relations, and practices as analogous to sports phenomena require skeptical sociological examination given their symbolic reduction of complex social, economic, and political processes to simple, imagined sports contests and outcomes.

Such ideological deployments of the culture of sports also impute to it a “purity” of contest (based on talent, tactical acumen, and diligence) that is highly contestable. For example, success in international sports, while often represented as reflecting national character and physique, is also deeply influenced by the resources provided by capital and the state to support the sporting effort. Success in sports, as in commerce and politics, is the product of the mobilization of existing (often inherited) social advantage; “behind the scenes” maneuvering, not all of which is legal or ethical; and contingencies (favorable or unfavorable conditions). The idealization of sports draws misleading, ideologically loaded contrasts between it and other domains of social practice. For this reason, sports sociologists and their counterparts in cultural studies, gender studies, postcolonial studies, and so on, have counseled skepticism when the “lessons” of sports have been extended to other social spheres.

Nonetheless, the resilience and influence of sports culture cannot be underestimated. Elements of sports culture constantly threaten to spill out into the wider sociocultural spaces. For example, viewers of television – the medium that, despite “post broadcasting” challenges by new media technologies such as the Internet, remains the most popularly significant form of

contemporary culture – have increasingly been presented within the high profile television genre of “reality TV.” Formats such as *Survivor*, (*American Idol*), and *Big Brother* are profoundly influenced by sports and sports television. They all involve, like sports, “actuality” coverage of contestants in competition with each other for a prize, shot from multiple angles, points of view, and speeds. The contests require strategic and tactical maneuvers akin to sports contests, with competing teams and individuals, and performative tasks and goals. There is also, like sports, fan participation, including expressions of approval or disapproval of contestants, and large, staged real time events with boisterous audiences. In other words, it can be argued that sports has not only, as is often claimed, taken on the values and practices of entertainment but, by means of a cultural feedback loop, it now influences other major forms of popular culture. Indeed, sports has challenged the prime place of rock music as the principal source of popular cultural “cool” style in the last two decades.

Central to popular culture is the figure of the fan, and sports is a key arena in which a dynamic interplay between culture and commerce in fandom can be discerned. The sports fan is often represented in sports sociology as something of a victim of powerful commercial forces, stripped of agency by the capture of their pastime by capital and the state. The media, in particular, are often accused of taking over sports, with television reducing its physical practice to sedentary spectacle, and shaping sports contests to fit the demands of audience maximization and broadcast schedules. Sociologists have also been critical of the media’s imputed seizure and deformation of sports discourse. Because sports is a cultural form that can be readily adapted to fill cultural space throughout the media – including live, replayed, and edited broadcasts, quiz shows, news bulletins, feature films, documentaries, newspaper sections, photo essays, magazines, novels, and biographies – sports culture can appear reducible to a simple, unidirectional relationship between a range of media producers and passive cohorts of media sports consumers. However, this is a misleading account of how popular culture is made, remade, and used that relies on totalizing and static analyses of cultural relations.

While there is a corresponding danger of romanticizing the resistive agency of the fan, sports culture displays many examples of fandom in action that do not correspond to orderly and guided consumption. Fans are by no means inherently progressive – indeed, as was noted earlier, sports culture is often deeply nostalgic and characterized by xenophobia, leading on occasions to racially motivated abuse and violence. The inequitable gender order described above that is structured into the formal institutions of sports can also be viewed as a common feature of “informal” sports fandom – for example, in the many exclusive, homosocial fan groupings in association football, or in some crowd chants and behavior towards women in sport stadia. In this regard, though, sports culture can be seen to be connected to wider social structures, practices, and values – it would be profoundly unsociological to imagine otherwise. Reactionary behavior and values are not the preserve of sports, but it provides a vivid popular theater in which all forms of signifying practice – whether socially progressive or regressive – can be accentuated and “writ large.” Indeed, the pivotal presence of the media creates circumstances in which sports spectators are not just watchers, but also the self consciously watched, and so can be performing, like the professional athlete, for each other, for others present, and for the vast, unseen television audience. The mediated spectacles that are so central to sports culture are, then, opportunities for spectators to be key participants as essential producers of the atmosphere (“ambience”) of the sports event.

Sports fandom, then, exhibits a number of responses to the transformation of sports and the society of which it is a part. For example, the aforementioned “bourgeoisification” of sports, through which spectatorship is systematically subjected to a commodifying, “civilizing” leisure consumer influence intended to replace earlier unruly, proletarian, and aggressively masculine forms of sports fandom, has provoked some (mostly male) sports fans to protest against its sanitization. The unhappiness of some fans with what they see as clichéd and compromised professional sports journalism has also encouraged the emergence of “fanzines,” which range from technically rudimentary publications with small circulations to more sophisticated, widely read, idiosyncratic magazines

that take both sports journalism and the sports industry to task for their lack of consideration for grassroots fans.

Fan activism can also take on more formal political dimensions, as in the case of lobbying by the Independent Manchester United Supporters Association against the attempted takeover in 1999 of Manchester United Football Club by the dominant force in English football television, the Rupert Murdoch controlled BSkyB. The British government accepted the view, put by these football supporters, the fans of other clubs, and the non Murdoch media, that such a move would overly concentrate power in football, reduce economic competition in the football industry, and have deleterious social effects by disadvantaging smaller football clubs and so their local communities. Here it can be seen that sports culture is a test bed for both economic and social debates, with the proponents of the takeover arguing that the primary locus of the association football industry was no longer national but international (in this case European), and that city based fans look beyond the nation to new, transnational communities (in this case involving supporters of equivalently elite clubs from Italy, Spain, Holland, and other countries). The deregulation of the football labor market through the so called 1995 "Bosman ruling," and its associated freedom of labor migration within the European Union, challenged received ideas of local and national sports, just as the extension of the functions of the European Union, the operation of the World Trade Organization, and other transnational arrangements and agreements have caused wider anxieties. The highly charged area of sports, therefore, can symbolize and articulate in a concrete, dramatic fashion often abstract notions of transnational regulation and national identity.

In the same year that many Manchester United fans agitated against a takeover of the club, in the United States fans of the Cleveland Browns gridiron team (supported by its local elite), following the owner's relocation of the franchise to Baltimore, successfully lobbied the National Football League to award it an expansion team, allow it to retain its key signifiers (name and colors), and even to provide a loan to renovate its stadium. Not all such activist campaigns are successful and, indeed, most of

them are defensive rather than proactive in nature, but they reveal that sports culture is in part created by affective, identity based communities and coalitions that are sometimes able to influence developments in sports, rather than the product of a monolithic "sportsbiz" with an unstoppable commodifying momentum.

Thus, sports fans sometimes identify themselves as citizens who demand respect for the rights of "cultural citizenship" associated with sports. This extension of the concept of citizenship to the cultural domain reflects the strengthening of the broad processes of "culturalization" and "mediatization" discussed above. It registers in the successful petitioning of many governments to enshrine access to prime free to air television sports (as opposed to its delivery only through paid subscription) as part of a citizen's cultural entitlement and heritage, and in the reluctance of peak sports bodies like the IOC to allow sports broadcasting exclusivity to "pay" television operators. It is also evident in agitation to provide citizens' access to sports infrastructure – including community sports facilities, elite institutes of sport, and high quality sports stadia – to be guaranteed by state subvention. Furthermore, opposition to sports sponsorship promoting and advertising unhealthy products (such as tobacco) and support for the use of sports in health promotion campaigns (such as the landmark "Sport for All" and "Life. Be In It" campaigns) have prompted positive and negative intervention in sports by the state. Thus, as sports culture has become increasingly pervasive in social life, it has taken on a range of features, including athletic display, carnivalesque fandom, commercial deployment, and state regulation.

The participants in this culture are, in some form, almost of necessity the entire population, which is confronted daily by sports, willingly or not. The omnipresent signs of sports in public and media space ensure that, to a degree, contemporary culture has been "sportified." These circumstances have stimulated more discerning, interactive forms of sports fandom and consumption. For example, new media technologies have reduced the power of a small number of television companies and their producers to determine when and how a televised sports event can be seen. Digital broadcasting has made it possible for viewers to make many of their

own spectatorial decisions, such as which match to watch in a tennis tournament, which camera angles to use, and what statistical data to summon. The advent of the Internet, furthermore, has created multifarious opportunities for fans to access written sports texts and still and moving images, thereby eroding the centralized power of large media corporations. However, such choices can only be made by those affluent enough to invest in the requisite equipment and services (apart from those provided freely or cheaply by public service broadcasters), thereby indicating that debates about empowering sports fans cannot be isolated from broader questions of social equity and access.

SPORTS AND CULTURE: INTO THE FUTURE

The sociological analysis of sports and culture has to deal adequately with the size, complexity, scope, and volatility of its immediate subject, and then to seek to encompass its deep intrication with the sociocultural world as a whole. This is no mean task, and, as Crawford (2004: 111) has noted in relation to sports fandom and consumption, there has been a strong temptation to concentrate on out of the ordinary phenomena and to advance already constructed theories founded on binary notions of hegemony and resistiveness. Crawford complains that little serious attention has been given to the mundane, everyday experience and consumption of sport, with researchers drawn to unrepresentative groups of especially ardent fans, whose very conspicuousness makes them relatively easy to research. Thus, he argues, sports researchers have tended to conceive sports fandom as an artifact of a theoretical predisposition that neatly divides it into dichotomous clusters of passive sports consumers and actively resistant sports fans. This observation is a reminder of Raymond Williams's famous dictum that "culture is ordinary." Sports culture, it might be observed, is now an ordinary element of social life, punctuated by extraordinary moments, both of which offer multiple opportunities to research the dynamics of increasingly heterogeneous, evanescent social formations.

Sociological inquiry into sports and culture is, then, an exacting exercise. It has been

limited, once belatedly commenced, by inherited dualistic theoretical frameworks, with a functionalist assessment of social adaptation and integration posited against a conflict theory based (often Marxist inflected) critique of sports culture. Each tradition has produced its own variants and developments, with those emphasizing the more benign ritual dimensions of sports culture challenged by assertions of its repressiveness, although sometimes conceding that sport can be a site of popular cultural "productivity" where structures and ideologies of dominance are countered by (self reflexive or unconscious) communities of resistance. The theories and methods adopted in this field of research and scholarship have tended to reflect these divergent positions. Disciplinary debate is crucial to the health of sociology, but the divergent approaches of political economy, ethnography, discourse analysis, textual interpretation, and so on evident in analyses of sports culture have often resulted in an unproductive series of parallel, disconnected conversations.

In current and anticipated trends, though, there are some signs of more auto critical and less predictable approaches to sports and culture. These are less likely to imply that sports culture can be hermetically sealed from its global, national, and local social context, and are more attuned to the specific, contingent ways in which sports culture can exert its influence on wider society. This research and scholarship demands a closer attention to what constitutes sports, how it is mediated, and the diverse, structurally influenced ways in which it is encountered and used by human subjects in their various social locations and relational networks. The overwhelming available evidence is that sports is an increasingly important component of culture and society in nations with conspicuously different histories. The global "club" of sports is no longer exclusive (there are, for example, currently 202 National Olympic Committees across five continents), but the power that can be wielded within sports culture is highly variable and clearly related to other resources of power (including economic, military, and geopolitical). The form that sports culture takes in different national and transnational contexts is both highly diverse and globally connected, and demands a rejuvenated, theoretically rigorous, historically informed,

and culturally attuned sociology of sports and culture.

SEE ALSO: Body and Cultural Sociology; Identity, Sport and; Media and Sport; Sport, Alternative; Sport Culture and Subcultures; Sport as Spectacle; Sports Heroes and Celebrities

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sport culture and subcultures

Peter Donnelly

Research and theoretical approaches to sport culture and subcultures in the sociology of sport fall into three overlapping periods: (1) early interest in sport subcultures from an interactionist perspective; (2) a transition period during which more critical theoretical approaches to culture and subcultures and more rigorous methodological approaches emerged; and (3) a wholehearted embrace of “cultural studies” and the consequent fragmentation of approaches to sport culture and subcultures. These changes were accompanied by parallel theoretical and definitional concerns about the meaning of culture and subculture.

Following the example of sociologists such as Howard Becker and Everett Hughes, some of the earliest work in the emerging subdiscipline of sociology of sport concerned sport subcultures. Weinberg and Arond’s (1952) study of boxers preceded studies of professional baseball players, professional wrestling, pool hustlers, ice hockey players, and the various jobs involved in horse racing. These were followed by a series of striking comparative studies of, for example, hockey players and Hollywood musicians, professional wrestlers and physicians, and female gymnasts and professional wrestlers.

These studies of occupational subcultures were grounded in the US tradition of subcultural research. Definitions of culture had not really developed beyond Tylor’s (1871) “complex whole which includes knowledge, belief, art, morals, law, custom, and any other capabilities acquired by man as a member of society.” Culture was that which humans passed along socially, rather than biologically; subcultures

were sub units of the larger culture; and even Fine and Kleinman's (1979) attempt to "rethink" subculture maintained a basic interactionist definition in which "the referent group" encourages potential members to take on the cultural characteristics of a particular subculture. The original subcultural research in sociology, focusing on youth and deviance, had spread from "deviant careers" to other occupations and avocations, and Arnold (1972) provided justification for the study of sport subcultures by arguing that they "have a sociological importance in and of themselves." Arnold proposed that membership in such "achieved" (as opposed to ascribed) subcultures provided an alternative identity status as the institutional significance of work decreased.

Ingham (1975) signaled the critical shift in the sociology of sport subcultures by combining Marx, Weber, and Goffman in his analysis of "occupational subcultures in the work world of sport." His work was contemporary with a "cultural turn" in both sociology and the sociology of sport. Culture was no longer something relatively inert, "meanings and ways" that were passed from generation to generation; rather, it was a social construction, a site of struggles, something that was produced, reproduced, and resisted – and subcultures could now be seen as both the engines of cultural production and the battlegrounds for contesting culture. As Bourdieu (1993) pointed out: "The field of sporting practice is the site of struggles in which what is at stake, *inter alia*, is the monopolistic capacity to impose the legitimate definition of sporting practice and the legitimate function of sporting activity."

Thus, in sport, these struggles were fought over the "meanings and ways" of what was now being recognized as a dominant sport culture – a culture that was outcome, achievement, and record oriented; a culture that was characterized by homogenizing principles of governance and commercial interest. In the dominant sport culture, sport was rationalized and utilitarian – it was for the purposes of entertainment and/or to encourage civic/national pride; it was to demonstrate the effectiveness of a political ideology (e.g., Olympics during the Cold War); it was for the purposes of health (in the new era of privatized/personal conceptions of health); and it was primarily for socialization – character,

work habits and discipline, individual achievement and teamwork, etc.; or even just to occupy the time of those considered to be "dangerous" or "youth at risk" (e.g., "midnight basketball" for the social control of urban youth).

Studies of sport subcultures slowly began to incorporate these changes, influenced both by Geertz's (1973) "thick description," which produced richer and more nuanced ethnographies, and by the more politicized ethnography and subculture theory that was developing at the Centre for Contemporary Cultural Studies in England. Although the broader notion of "career" was still at the root of most research, there was also the beginning of a change toward socialization and identity factors in sport subcultures, an interest in class cultures and sport, and the beginning of a focus on sport subcultures as sites of cultural production. Gruneau (1981) pointed out that the study of sport subcultures now concerned how "subcultures, with their various 'establishment' and 'countercultural' emphases, have been constitutively inserted into the struggles, the forms of compliance and opposition, social reproduction and transformation, associated with changing patterns of social development." Bishop and Hoggett (1987) similarly argued that sport and leisure subcultures are crucial sites for the transmission, resistance, and negotiation of the dominant values of the larger society.

Research during this second period maintained an interest in careers – extending that interest to the life cycle of a career in sports, and to processes of socialization and desocialization or retirement from participation (for a collection of studies representing this type of research, see Coakley & Donnelly 1999). Identity issues also began to emerge in terms of how individuals developed appropriate subcultural identities and how those identities are negotiated and accepted (or not) by other members.

Further evidence of transition during this period concerns what are now referred to as alternative or extreme sport subcultures – they were "alternative" to the dominant sport culture, openly rejecting many of the "meanings and ways" noted above. Earlier research on sports such as surfing and rock climbing had focused on the activities as deviant subcultures; research emerging at this time began to reinterpret the alternative nature of such subcultures as

“resistance” rather than “deviance.” This work also led to recognition of the ephemeral nature of resistance to the dominant sport culture, and the ways in which activities such as freestyle skiing, skateboarding, and snowboarding were subject to commercial and media pressures, and to incorporation by the dominant sport culture. The life cycle of freestyle skiing, from its “hot dog” origins, resisting all of the trappings of mainstream sport, to almost complete incorporation into the international skiing federation (FIS) and recognition as an Olympic sport, represents a classic example of such resistance and incorporation (Donnelly 1988). Using Raymond Williams’s approach to hegemony and resistance, Donnelly (1993) also showed how alternative cultural formations were evident in both residual and emergent contexts.

Recent research on sport culture and subcultures represents a completion of the shift toward cultural studies evident in the transition period, and an increasing fragmentation of approaches to subcultures parallel to the broader fragmentation of approaches to sociology following the postmodern turn. In addition to an increasing interest in identity work in sport subcultures, there has been increased interest in (and opposition to) the idea of a global sport culture, increasing amounts of research on fan culture and celebrity culture in sports, and a substantial focus (given the embodied nature of sports) on body culture. Research in the sociology of the body now covers a wide range of bodily practices, including sports. As Bourdieu (1993) pointed out, the definitional struggles associated with sport also extend to defining the “legitimate body” and “legitimate uses of the body.” Definitional concerns have also reappeared with regard to the concept of subculture itself, with some contending that “subworld” represents a better descriptor than “subculture” of the cultures that emerge around sports; they argue that “subculture” implies a condition of domination and subordination that does not exist in some sport “subworlds.” And theoretical issues range from concerns that some researchers have overused the concept of resistance to the point that it no longer has a political impact, to concerns that studies of subcultures imply a homogeneity of culture where heterogeneity is widespread.

Recent research suggests that sport sociologists will continue to be interested in fan

culture, celebrity culture, and body culture in sports, and interest in alternative sport subcultures is increasingly popular. To the extent that sport subcultural research continues to shed light on the historical processes by which a way of playing a sport becomes *the* way of playing the sport; on the ways that cultural meanings and ways are produced in sport subcultures; and on the ways in which sport subcultures are involved in larger processes of resistance, social reproduction, and social transformation, such research will continue to be of interest to sociologists. The recent reemergence of interest in class cultures in sport suggests that this is still the case.

SEE ALSO: Sport and Culture; Sport as Spectacle; Sport as Work; Sports Heroes and Celebrities

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sport and the environment

Otmar Weiss

Everything outside the boundaries of the sub system *sport* is considered to be its environment, and this can be influenced and altered by sport or, conversely, can itself influence sport. Examples of the latter are to be observed, for instance, in the effects on athletic performance of certain climatic qualities of the environment of Mexico City (tropical uplands) during the Olympic Summer Games 1968, or of Lagos (humid tropical lowlands) during the Pan African Games in 1973. In the sociology of sport it is principally the first mentioned influence – sport on the environment – that is the subject of discussion and study, and in particular the integration of sport in ecosystem structures is at the centre of consideration.

Since the United Nations Conference on Environment and Development (UNCED) in 1992, the guiding principle of sustainability has been internationally recognized. This principle says that nature must be protected from over-exploitation so that it will be available to future generations in sufficient quality and quantity. And it is also a guideline for sport (e.g., when choosing the location for sports grounds). Here it is important to exploit areas which can stand ecological strain, and to spare sensitive areas (Schemel & Erbguth 2000: 13–22). This principle not only applies to the construction of buildings and development of sports grounds, but also to the practice of outdoor sports. Originally looked upon as harmless leisure activities, they are now being subjected to harsh criticism. For

even though sport is a secondary problem compared with the main causes of environmental destruction (agriculture, industry, settlements, and traffic), it is nevertheless imperative to reconsider various aspects of the subject “sport versus environment.”

Noxious emissions and pollution caused by sports tourism and by athletes and spectators traveling to and from events must be mentioned in this context. There is also the construction of stadia, hotels, roads, etc., all too often in other wise unspoiled countryside, and sometimes exclusively for one single big event, such as the Olympic Games. A further matter for discussion is the huge consumption of energy at big athletic events, and all the effects of various individual sports, such as alpine skiing, on the environment. Every year 120 million tourists and athletes go to the European Alps. This figure makes it clear that the compatibility of sports and leisure activities in the Alps with nature and the environment must be subjected to scrutiny in the light of the principle of sustainability. Building ski lifts not only means the loss of trees and the natural appearance of the local landscape, but, above all, also results in damage to vegetation cover due to the use of crawler type vehicles, which also brings up the question of erosion. Then there is the damage caused by each individual: the noxious emissions produced during travel to and from the mountains, garbage, ski wax and waste water left on site, vegetation damaged by skiing off piste or when there is too little snow to protect it (Weiss et al. 1998). This is discussed more often since 1990 due to recent climatic changes. On the other hand, all the alpine ski pistes and slopes together only represent a total of 0.9 percent of the entire area of the Alps (Baetzing 1997: 215), so that damage to mountain regions is in effect very slight.

The effects of sport on the environment need not necessarily be negative. Opinions can be subjective and often differ greatly. Laying out a golf course, for instance, will probably be regarded by conservationists as a negative alteration to the natural environment. Golfers, on the other hand, will look upon it as conservation of the countryside. This is mainly due to differences in the appreciation of nature. For those who understand “natural” to mean “unspoiled” or “untouched,” sport appears to be a threat to the environment, for it brings mountain bikers,

joggers, hikers, riders, skiers, and other sports people into regions hitherto unused by human beings. However, if humans are seen as a legitimate part of a common habitat together with flora and fauna, then specially bred plants, flowerbeds, paths, or skiing pistes are all part of nature. From this point of view, sport has a positive effect on the environment, in that it gets human beings out of their over heated living rooms and air conditioned cars and (following Rousseau) back to Nature.

SEE ALSO: Sport; Sport and Capitalism; Sport and the City; Sportization; Sports Stadia

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sport and ethnicity

C. Richard King

Ethnicity has proven fundamental to sport. It has long determined who has played, what participation and performance has meant, treatment by fans, media representations, and presentation of self.

Ethnicity is closely related to race. In fact, the two concepts are often confused with one another and used interchangeably, because both provide means to classify and organize observable differences among people. It is important, however, to distinguish between them, particularly in the context of sport. Whereas race describes the use of biological features, especially skin color, to understand people and define social groups, ethnicity refers to the use of cultural characteristics, including language, nationality, country of origin, and custom, to

make sense of others and create social groups. While the physicality of sport rightly directs attention to issues of race and racism, the relationships between ethnicity and sport afford keen insights into the formation of identity, community, and society.

ETHNIC IDENTITY

Through sport, ethnic groups define who they are or aspire to be, the values that matter to them, and what distinguishes them from other people. In a very real sense, sport has facilitated the creation of imagined communities: athletic performance and circulation of it through print, visual, and electronic media encourage individuals to identify and connect with others, seeing themselves as part of a common people, or ethnic group. The capacity to play and watch sport has proven to be especially meaningful for ethnic minorities, particularly when great performance offers a foundation for pride and celebration.

In many instances, a particular sport becomes emblematic of a people. Baseball, for example, is said to be America's pastime and as American as mom and apple pie. Similarly, hockey has come to be closely associated with Canadian identity and rugby with what it means to identify oneself as a New Zealander. And ethnic groups, particularly native peoples, increasingly have sought to revive historic sporting practices as a means to reinvigorate heritage and culture.

In other cases the style of play becomes a means to claim or refuse a particular ethnic identity. In the US, the flamboyance, creativity, individuality, and flair associated with the black urban culture has transformed contemporary sport and society, providing African American and Euro American athletes and fans an important reservoir for the presentation of self and the nurturance of social networks. Negative public perceptions of this style of play and its association with urban blackness have also caused gatekeepers to affirm the values defining whiteness through controlling transgressive expressions. Similarly, the hard and fast style of cricket cultivated in the West Indians not only radically changed the sport, but it also became a powerful affirmation of ethnic identity. Increasingly, corporations and sport teams, mindful of ethnicity

and style, have capitalized upon ethnicity to attract fans and sell products.

Increasingly, over the course of the twentieth century, sporting spectacle offered important occasions for ethnic and national groups to present themselves. The opening ceremonies of the Olympic Games provide an excellent illustration of this pattern. In 1936 the Nazi regime used the Summer Olympics in Berlin to articulate a muscular, romantic vision of Germanness, while giving material expression to its anti-Semitism. The Summer Olympics in Mexico City in 1968 witnessed a much more oppositional statement when African American athletes raised their fists in a black power salute on the award stand, affirming an ethnic identity too long marginalized and demonized. The Calgary Winter Olympics in 1988 were also the scene of ethnic protest. The Lubicon Lake Cree Band used the ceremonial torch run passing through Saskatchewan in advance of the games to bring attention to their ongoing land claim disputes and the destruction of their culture.

It would be a mistake, however, to think of the assertion of ethnic identity through sports to be a matter of choice free from the constraints of history or power. In fact, a range of factors, including cultural expectations, political access, social location, and education, delimit the capacity of ethnic groups to articulate an identity audible to all. Making matters worse, stereotypes, bias, and misconceptions often influence public understandings of athletes and athletics. Indeed, research shows that media coverage, beginning with the emergence of modern sport in the nineteenth century, has displayed a propensity to frame players in ethnic terms. In the US, Canada, Australia, and Great Britain, for instance, the media have lamented the minimal work ethic and discipline of athletes of color, while emphasizing their natural abilities, and in turn, have praised white athletes for their hard work, intelligence, and leadership abilities.

In many ways, Tiger Woods offers a striking example of the limits and possibilities of ethnic identity in sport. The celebrated golfer has sought to be identified and accepted as *Cablinasian*, a term he created to encapsulate his multi ethnic heritage. Supporting Woods's hybridity, Nike ran a series of ads in which kids from a number of distinct ethnic groups proclaimed, "I'm Tiger Woods." Most journalists,

commentators, and fans, however, worked hard to assign a singular identity to Woods. Many observers sought to claim Woods, taking him as an example of African American or Asian American excellence and a source of ethnic pride. Media coverage, in turn, frequently presented the golfer in terms that broke with conventional understandings of blackness, but when Woods was not successful, stereotypes of the black athlete became more common.

ETHNIC RELATIONS

While many commentators and fans have pointed to sport as a prime example of multiculturalism and social progress, athletics actually is a much more complex arena of ethnic relations, at once highly visible, saturated with power, and often very contentious. Sport often emerges as a borderland or middle ground that has promoted efforts to assimilate ethnic minorities, encouraged ethnic groups to challenge the precepts and practices of mainstream society, and prompted countless cultural borrowings and social reinventions.

Sport socializes. Sport teaches. It conveys important ideas about the social order. When incorporated into school, physical education and extracurricular athletics have proven important to the efforts of multi ethnic states to deal with perceived social problems. Through sport societies seek to nationalize those deemed foreign – immigrants, indigenous peoples, and other ethnic minorities. In the US (and Canada), boarding schools were established in the late nineteenth century for Native Americans. Over time, athletics became increasingly important to efforts to Americanize indigenous peoples, or as it was often put at the time, "kill the Indian, to save the man." Educators hoped to instill a competitive spirit, discipline, morality, and manliness. In time, they would come to see sports as a powerful public relations tool that might elevate public perceptions of Native Americans, easing the process of assimilation as it eroded misconceptions and prejudices. As Native American boarding schools began to fall out of favor in the 1920s, the post revolutionary Mexican government sought to use physical education for similar ends, namely to unify a multi ethnic country around shared values.

In contrast to its northern neighbor, the effort was not focused on eradicating Indianness. Instead, it amplified ethnic difference, incorporating indigenous practices into the physical education curriculum to forge the hybrid, mestizaje it envisioned Mexico becoming. Importantly, in both of these examples, athletics in education target ethnic minorities, affixing the problems of broader society on their backs.

In neither case did sport ease ethnic tensions or misunderstandings; however, in both instances sport proved to be especially transformational precisely because the play of sport simultaneously changes individuals and invites differently situated players in turn to change it. Encouraging interaction among different ethnic groups, sport offers a space in between, a meeting ground in which ideas, practices, games, pleasures, and possibilities can be shared, exchanged, and borrowed. Ethnic minorities often adapt individual sports to their own ends. In addition to the play of cricket and basketball previously discussed, the introduction of cricket to the Trobriand Islands is instructive here. Missionaries hoping to acculturate Trobrianders and offer them a substitute for warfare taught them to play cricket. Much to the missionaries' chagrin, however, the islanders rewrote the rules of the sport and used matches as occasions to perform traditional rituals and magic. Dominant ethnic groups remake games played by marginalized groups as well. After watching and playing it for years, Canadians appropriated lacrosse from Native groups, taking a traditional sacred cultural complex and turning it into a rationalized and secular sport that looked quite different. Later, lacrosse organizations in Canada banned First Peoples from participating in sanctioned matches. At the same time, sport has allowed marginalized ethnic groups to survive in hostile social environments. On the one hand, many immigrants play games brought with them. Latino soccer leagues in urban areas in the US allow participants to establish important social networks, find work and community, and maintain connections with homelands. On the other hand, ethnic groups often turn to sport in unbearable social circumstances, such as Japanese Americans in internment camps during World War II.

In highly stratified societies, where the distribution of rights and resources turns on

ethnicity, there are limits to the creativity and freedom afforded by sport. Indeed, as in other social domains, sport has long exhibited pronounced ethnic inequality. Ethnicity has been the basis for exclusion from competition. It is common knowledge that indigenous peoples were barred from lacrosse in Canada, African Americans could not participate in baseball, football, and myriad other sports in Jim Crow America, Jews were marginalized in athletics under the Nazi regime, and Asian immigrants could not play as equals in Great Britain. Even more commonly, ethnic minorities have endured discrimination in position assignment and coaching opportunities, while suffering persecution as they have taken the field and played the game. At the same time, the marginalization and underdevelopment of ethnic communities frequently translates into extremely limited social and economic opportunities. Ethnic minorities regularly turn to sport as a means to achieve a better life. In fact, the history of sport in virtually every country throughout the world parallels its history of immigration; successive waves of immigrants enter into particular sports, only to be replaced a generation later by a subsequent, more newly arrived ethnic group. Only a small fraction of athletes ever achieve their dreams of playing professional sport, suggesting that it is an uncertain path to upward mobility which misdirects energies and aspirations and in turn furthers the underdevelopment of marginalized communities.

Finally, sport is a site of social struggle and ethnic resistance. The ongoing controversy over the use of American Indian names, images, and symbols in sport provides an excellent example. For nearly a century, Native American mascots have reflected and reinforced dominant notions of masculinity, citizenship, and history. Over the past 35 years, a multi ethnic coalition, led by American Indians, has challenged such symbols, asserting that they misappropriate, misuse, and misunderstand indigenous culture and history. They have protested and petitioned, pressing educational institutions and professional teams to change their mascots. In many ways, the controversy has derived in part from efforts to defend traditional formulations of identity in the US, especially its foundations in ethnicity (whiteness), gender (masculinity), nation (Americanness), and history (the myth of the

frontier). It also reflects deep interpretive differences. Whereas supporters insist that mascots foster respect and are meant to honor Native Americans, opponents assert that they denigrate Native Americans, perpetuating historical patterns of discrimination and dispossession. Moreover, supporters stress text (honor, intention), while opponents emphasize context (history and racism).

Ethnicity has been central to athletics since the emergence of modern sport in the nineteenth century. It has proven particularly important for the articulation of ethnic identity and the shape of ethnic relations. As sport becomes increasingly global and mass mediated, the relationships between ethnicity and sport undoubtedly will become more intense and intricate.

SEE ALSO: Ethnic Enclaves; Ethnic Groups; Ethnicity; Identity, Sport and; Nationalism and Sport; Postcolonialism and Sport; Race and Ethnic Consciousness; Sport and Culture; Sport and Race

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sport, professional

Jim McKay

According to the ideal type suggested by Freidson (2001), sport does not exhibit all of the characteristics of a profession. Unlike

archetypal high status professions (e.g., medicine) in which the practitioners rather than governments or markets exert significant control over their labor, professional athletes work in cartels and oligopolies where they must respond to the demands of owners, managers, coaches, sponsors, consumers, and the media. Thus it is more appropriate to say that like many institutions, sport exhibits particular *professionalizing tendencies* (e.g., specialization, relying strongly on expert knowledge). However, these professionalizing propensities can only be understood if they are located in a complex of five other interdependent and mutually reinforcing processes that have shaped modern sport from youth leagues to the international level: commercialization, commodification, bureaucratization, globalization, and governmentalization (Gruneau & Whitson 2001; Miller et al. 2001; Ingham 2005).

Modern sport has been transformed into a multibillion dollar global industry that employs millions of professional athletes, administrators, coaches, scientists, and lawyers. Paying this labor force would be impossible without the income that sporting organizations generate from gate receipts, the sale of media rights, and contracts with sponsors from the business world. It is crucial to emphasize that commercialization, commodification, and mediatization are not simply economic phenomena. For instance, commercialization and commodification simultaneously both constitute and are constituted by discourses in the sporting media. At a more general level, Rowe (2004: 95–6) refers to the *culturalization* of all institutions, noting that despite being progressively more commodified and commercialized, “sports events have become the most important, regular manifestations of . . . national culture.”

Commercializing and commodifying sport occurred in tandem with the replacement of part time volunteers in informal community organizations by national and international bureaucracies administered by full time professionals holding degrees in business, economics, marketing, public relations, and management. Thus sport has gone from being discussed around the kitchen table to being managed by the executive office (McKay 1997). For example, virtually all private and public sporting organizations now have an executive director

overseeing managers who monitor their business, operational, and strategic plans.

The Olympics, various World Cup events, and the Super Bowl are some of the most popular entertainment events in the world. One outcome of the integration of sport into the global entertainment industry has been the creation of “celebrity athletes,” in whom multinational corporations invest vast sums of money in the form of endorsements and sponsorships. Like other sought after and mobile professionals, elite athletes and coaches have become “flexible citizens” who switch nations and even nationalities for commercial purposes. Like most global processes, this one is based on the capacity of powerful nations to exploit disadvantaged ones.

The commercialization, commodification, bureaucratization, and globalization of everyday life have been facilitated by governmentalization, the process by which capitalist states have steadily calibrated and managed the conduct of their citizens. Citizens today are the objects of myriad private and public strategies that frame health, well being, lifestyle, fitness, quality of life, and “at risk” behavior as a matter of individual responsibility (Rose 2001: 5–7). This important shift in biopower means that professional experts have become increasingly authoritative in spheres that were not traditionally subjected to direct intervention by private and public agencies. Thus most nations now have government departments responsible for the national planning and funding of “amateur” sport, which are often linked with health, lifestyle, and physical education programs (McKay 1997; Howell & Ingham 2001).

In this regime of biopower, professional athletes have become classic “somatic individuals”: both participants in and targets of “molecular politics,” with their technologies of self government articulating favorably with the emphasis by professional experts in both the private and public spheres that individuals must accept responsibility for managing their lives (Rose 2001). Thus cyborg athletes gradually subject their bodies to a plethora of legal and illegal performance enhancing techniques. Moreover, all of the above processes have transcended their origins in capitalist states and now pervade virtually *all* formal organizations worldwide.

There are immense qualitative and quantitative differences between organized sport when

it was the pastime of mainly Victorian gentlemen amateurs and the current hegemonic “power and performance model” (Coakley 2004: 110–12), which features the professionalizing developments outlined above. Although these professionalizing trends cannot eliminate all other forms of sport, alternatives seemed destined to occupy a marginal status, given that they exist in a context in which there is heavy reliance on the knowledge of professional experts who continually try to improve athletic performance by the tiniest fraction. Like life in effectively all formal organizations, the tradeoff for the rewards that flow from submitting to this professionalizing regime is the unremitting “government of the soul” (Rose 1999).

SEE ALSO: Media and Sport; Sport, Amateur; Sport as Work; Sports Heroes and Celebrities

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sport and race

Ben Carrington

Sport and race have been in complex articulation since the nineteenth century, yet a *critical* sociology of sport and race has only developed substantially since the 1990s. In the 1960s a few academic studies and journalistic accounts examined segregation and racial discrimination in sport, but these were largely descriptive. Two exceptions to this were C. L. R. James's critical reading of the role of cricket in shaping West Indian political identity in the anti colonial struggles of the 1950s and 1960s, and Harry Edwards's important account of the radicalization of the black athlete in the context of America's Civil Rights Movement of the 1960s and black nationalist politics of the 1970s. In the 1970s and 1980s sport sociologists began to investigate continuing racial discrimination in sport with a liberal focus on issues of equity and opportunity, normally using quantitative methods to measure the degree of meritocracy in sports. More recently, scholars have used cultural studies approaches to examine questions of representation and ideology in sport media texts, and ethnographic methods to understand racial identity construction in sport and its intersections with class, nation, gender, and sexuality.

SPORT AND RACE AS SOCIAL PHENOMENA

"Sport" and "race" are sociologically problematic because, at first sight, both appear to be aspects of human life that are immediately knowable and products of a natural physicality that precedes socialization. "Race," the division

of humanity into biologically discrete groups based on phenotypical markers, is commonly believed to be the result of an inherent, fixed, and natural distinction between actually existing groups. But sociologists and biologists alike have demonstrated that the supposed "natural" division of humanity is unrelated to underlying genotypical distinctions. Instead, racial distinctions are based on arbitrarily chosen physical features, such as skin color and hair texture, that are used to demarcate people into groups. Thus, "race" is a complex system of representation learned through socialization, and then acted upon as if these distinctions were "real." In short, "race" appears to be a biological fact of absolute physical difference when it is actually a socially constructed and culturally reproduced set of ideas and beliefs.

Similarly, "sport" appears to be a purely physical activity that is separate from the wider divisions and structures of society. Although we might immediately recognize the social conditions of education, cultural capital, and aesthetic discernment that frame the production and consumption of other cultural forms, sport is commonly seen as an activity that is "simply" physical and open to all regardless of class, gender, race, or sexuality. Barriers in sports, it is believed, exist only in connection with the physical abilities and motivation of individuals. This view of sport as "free" from structural constraints means that sport's role in maintaining and reproducing power relations is underestimated.

Sociologists of sport have sought to explain how the sports we choose to play, the ways that we play them, the meanings we give to and take from them, and the material and social rewards associated with participation and success are intimately related to the structure and organization of societies. Given this, it requires great sociological imagination to go beyond such everyday understandings to reveal how both race *and* sport, far from being universal, naturally occurring phenomena, are actually the result of temporally bound and historically specific human action. In short, the interrelationship between race and sport is a deeply sociological articulation with profound political consequences for how we generally understand racial difference and who has access to sport itself.

RACIAL SCIENCE AND EMPIRE

There is an interesting historical parallel between the emergence of the scientific foundation for ideas of racial difference and the formation of organized, codified, competitive sport. Racial science – the scientific belief in the inherent superiority of white Europeans – developed into a coherent set of ideas during the nineteenth century. In Britain this was the period when sports such as rugby football, cricket, and soccer were institutionalized, as emerging governing bodies formalized rules and assumed authority over how these sports should be played.

The nineteenth century was also the high point for European imperialism, when the idea of race emerged to justify conquest and exploitation. Countries such as Britain sought to maintain their power over their colonies in Africa, South and East Asia, and the Caribbean by a twin process of undermining and destroying local cultures while attempting to “civilize” native peoples by the imposition of British customs and ways of life. In this context of imperialist expansion, buttressed by notions of inherent white European supremacy, sport came to be seen as a way of educating and socializing colonized peoples into more civilized forms of modernity. Cricket served this purpose in the English speaking Caribbean, South Asia, Central and Southern Africa, and in the white settler colonies of New Zealand and Australia. The notion of “cricket, the classics, and Christianity” was seen by British Victorian elites as a way to bring order and civilization to the British Empire – at once a form of control over the masses and a way to inculcate them into the values and norms of an imperial notion of Britishness.

Elsewhere, soccer was “exported” by Europeans to Africa, Asia, and Central and South America. In this context, indigenous games and pastimes, suppressed since the first European expeditions overseas in the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries, faded away or were gradually replaced with new sporting imports. For example, the game of *ulama de cadera*, or hip *ulama* – *ulama* meaning “ball game” – was once popular throughout Mesoamerica, but began to die away after the Spanish outlawed what they perceived to be a pagan game with inappropriate rituals,

such as decapitation for the losers. The game itself, which is similar to volleyball but requiring the use of the hip rather than the hand, dates to around 1500 BC. Although it still survives in parts of Mexico, it is no longer central to Mexican culture, except as a focus for anthropologists, archeologists, and tourists. Soccer is now the national sport of Mexico, as it is throughout most of Central and South America, and most Mexicans have no idea of what *ulama*, one of the world’s oldest sports, actually involved.

SPORT, RACE, AND THE STRUGGLE FOR FREEDOM

At the start of the twentieth century notions of white European supremacy were simply assumed to be an objective, unquestionable fact. While Africans were often seen to be “animal like” in their nature, it was still assumed that whites were intellectually and physically superior to all other “races of man.” The newly emerging international sports arenas were one public space where this obvious superiority was seen to be confirmed. Given the importance of sport in reproducing dominant forms of hegemonic masculinity, it is not surprising that boxing, and heavyweight boxing in particular, came to be regarded as one of the prime avenues for demonstrating the attributes of white male strength, power, and courage. The symbolic significance of black and white athletes competing against each other in public *as equals*, and the fear of black success in the sporting arena, was such that sporting encounters began to take on wider political significance.

In this context Jack Johnson’s successes in the boxing arena heralded a pattern of racial contestation that was to structure relations on the world’s sporting fields for over a century. In 1908 Johnson became the first black World Heavyweight Champion. Given the racial politics of the Jim Crow era, Johnson’s victory caused widespread consternation within wider white society and jubilation among blacks. The search then went out for a “great White hope” to reclaim the mantle of masculine supremacy from the black Texan. In order to prevent such threats to the symbolic racial order, the so called “color line” was redrawn when Johnson

eventually lost his title which once again prevented black boxers from competing against whites. The later achievements in the 1930s, 1940s, and 1950s of African American athletes such as the boxer Joe Louis, the athlete Jesse Owens, the baseball player Jackie Robinson, and the tennis player Althea Gibson, were subsequently seen by black people throughout the African diaspora as victories in the struggle for freedom from racial oppression.

Sport as a form of political resistance can be seen in the example of cricket in the Caribbean. While the imposition of European sporting forms led to both the extinction of indigenous games and an attempt at colonial governance over local populations, these very same conditions led to sports becoming a site for cultural contestation and ideological struggle. Campaigns for equality within the game of cricket thus paralleled wider struggles for freedom and emancipation from colonial rule. Thus, the campaign to allow a black player to captain the West Indies national cricket team – previously only white West Indians were deemed intelligent enough to assume such leadership roles – was achieved in 1960 when the captaincy was finally given to Frank Worrell. Increasingly, from the 1950s onwards, former colonized countries gained their independence, giving further impetus to the symbolic significance of international sporting competitions, especially against their former colonial masters.

The politics of protest through sport continued into the 1960s and 1970s as sport became an important vehicle through which racial oppression and injustice could be highlighted. The “black gloved” protest at the 1968 Mexico Olympics by Tommie Smith and John Carlos similarly drew attention to the human rights abuses that were taking place in America and elsewhere. Their simple but powerful protest also portrayed the ideological role of black athletes who were now able to compete in international arenas for western countries; when athletes succeeded on the field they were hailed as heroes at the same time that black people were denied full rights as citizens. The radical black athletes of the 1960s, best personified perhaps in the figure of Muhammad Ali, revealed the previously ignored racial politics of sport. This enabled a generation of black athletes to speak out, as previous generations dared not do,

against discrimination in sports and society at large.

Nowhere was racial oppression more explicit than in the apartheid regime of South Africa, where a minority white population held complete power and control over the country’s majority black African population. The 1977 Gleneagles Agreement led to a sporting boycott of the regime. This called attention to the suffering of South Africa’s black population and it assisted the anti apartheid movement by exerting political pressure on the South African government. By further isolating South Africa from normal international relations, the boycott contributed to apartheid’s eventual collapse in the early 1990s. Thus, sport – in Caribbean cricket squares, American sporting arenas, and South African rugby pitches, among other sites – has been central to the wider story of black diasporic struggles for freedom throughout the twentieth century.

STEREOTYPES AND THE RETURN OF RACIAL SCIENCE IN SPORT

A persistent legacy of nineteenth century racial science is the ideology of absolute racial difference and its alleged effects on human behavior. While notions of a direct biological link between race, intelligence, and the propensity to commit criminal acts has been effectively critiqued, the belief that a person’s “race” is linked to abilities on the sports field remains strong. For example, using limited and often contradictory evidence, it continues to be asserted that “West African blacks” are genetically predisposed to power and speed events such as sprinting and jumping, while “East African blacks” are meant to have special properties that allow them to dominate endurance events like long distance running.

Stereotypes attributing to black people natural advantages compared to whites when it comes to running and jumping have affected structural and strategic dimensions of sports. Sociological research since the 1970s has shown how “stacking” – the disproportionate placing of black athletes into certain positions assumed to be more suited to their “natural” abilities – has occurred in many sports from American football to rugby league and rugby union. Linked to stacking is the concept of “centrality,” which

suggests that certain positions are more important to a team's chances of winning as these require players to make cognitive decisions, as opposed to merely reflexive or instinctive physical reactions to opponents' movements. These "central" positions are thus seen to be more suited to white players who have a greater ability to "read the game," thus relegating black players to positions believed to require pure physical ability and little if any cognitive ability. In American football, for instance, this supported a stacking pattern in which there was a disproportionate number of white quarterbacks and black wide receivers. This pattern reproduced a racial ideology focused on innate biological differences and led people to overlook socially produced conditions in which coaches and school teachers selected and encouraged players from different racial backgrounds to play in certain positions. Even when stacking patterns have become less apparent, the race logic used in the sports media recategorizes players by, for example, suggesting that "new" black quarterbacks are somehow more "athletic" than their white counterparts, and play in a more "physical" way.

Black success in certain elite sports is often "explained" by these alleged natural differences, further reifying the idea of race. This undermines black athletic excellence by implicitly linking it with an inherent genetic disposition shared by the entire "black race" and ignoring the dedication, hard work, and ability of individual athletes who happened to be racialized as black. Such stereotypes persist in the face of evidence to the contrary. For example, the record breaking times of British long distance runner Paula Radcliffe or the "super human" achievements of the American cyclist Lance Armstrong are often seen by scientists and journalists in terms of dedication and their almost fanatical commitment to training to compete at the highest level. Rarely is white achievement in sport explained by biological or genetic racial attributes. This preserves the myth of black athletic superiority as well as ideological notions of "natural" racial difference. This illustrates the power of hegemonic racial ideology in framing how people interpret success or failure in the world's sporting arenas and how the discredited legacy of racial science continues to inform sports science discourse today.

SPORT AND RACE TODAY

Success in sport has been one way for subordinated racial and ethnic minority groups to register protests and fight discrimination in the wider battles for recognition and inclusion. In the 2000 Sydney Olympics, for example, Cathy Freeman became the first Australian Aborigine to win an Olympic gold medal, and was widely seen as a symbol of Australia's attempts to come to terms with its racist treatment of Aboriginal peoples. A century after Jack Johnson's arrival on the international boxing scene, black athletes now compete successfully in sports such as tennis and golf that were previously the preserve of whites only. The achievements of sportsmen and women of color have only recently been recognized as part of the wider struggle for racial justice and equality.

A danger is that the perceived level playing field of sport can serve an ideological function by leading people to assume that western societies in particular have achieved a meritocracy that transcends the structural correlates of a racialized social order. Similarly, rather than using their position to speak out on issues of racial injustice and social inequality, contemporary millionaire black celebrity athletes often align themselves with commercial programs bringing them monetary rewards. However, research continues to show that, despite diversity on many playing fields, the power positions in the structure of sport organizations are controlled by white men who coach, manage, and own teams. Similarly, the abuse of athletes of color by spectators and occasionally by fellow players and managers continues to be a feature of domestic and international competitions in sports such as soccer. The myth of race is sustained by the apparent "obviousness" of racial difference in sports performance, while the continuance of racism is often disavowed.

The centrality of sport as a cultural practice in many nations and the pervasiveness of ideas about racial difference mean that the complex articulation of "race" and "sport" will persist well into the twenty first century. Critical research on the ways that sports serve as sites for "race related" identity formation for all racialized minorities as well as majority white populations is needed in order to develop more nuanced and effective anti racist strategies.

Research into non English speaking contexts is also required to explain the many forms of racism that exist alongside the local and national context of particular sporting cultures.

SEE ALSO: Colonialism (Neocolonialism); Color Line; Postcolonialism and Sport; Race; Race and Ethnic Consciousness; Race (Racism); Sport and Ethnicity

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sport and religion

Tara Magdalinski

Sport and religion have a conflicted relationship. At times, sport has served the objectives of religious authorities and has been imbued with a morality and philosophy derived from religious doctrine. At others, it has been rejected for its secular, corporeal emphasis and its capacity to divert attention from godly activities. Sport has been utilized as a means to evangelize and to convert non believers, and yet it has also represented a threat to the social and moral order. As such, religion has had an indelible impact on modern sport, and sport has been both embraced and rejected by religious authorities across the centuries.

The Ancient Greek Olympic Games is perhaps the most renowned example of the inclusion of physical contests in a religious festival. The Ancient Olympics emerged from the ritual celebration of Zeus, the king of the Ancient Greek pantheon of gods, with the first event, the stade, recorded as part of the festivities in 776 BC. In other regions, religious or ritualized practices influenced athletic contests, including the ancient Mayan culture in Central America, where priests presided over ball games on playing grounds adjacent to their temples. In Japan, the ritualized aspects of sumo wrestling borrow extensively from the national religion, Shinto. Christianity, however, has most influenced modern conceptions of sport.

The relationship between Christianity and physical activities has not always been congenial. The Christian church has regarded sport with suspicion, owing to its emphasis on the profane body and its potential to lure its followers away from their godly responsibilities. While the Catholic Church included many popular

physical activities into its religious and festive occasions, the rise of Puritanism in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries heralded an era where many sporting activities were regarded as sinful. While the Puritans did recognize the political and military utility in many physical endeavors, recreations popular among the peasant classes were prohibited as they were invariably accompanied by drinking and gambling and other dubious pursuits. Nevertheless, since the mid nineteenth century, there has been a shift in the relationship between the two institutions, beginning with the incorporation of games in the education of the elite classes in the English public schools. The inclusion of a physical education curriculum to complement the intellectual and moral training already in place elevated sport from a mere corporeal activity to one with a moral and ethical philosophy. In short, sport was employed specifically to teach boys qualities that would transfer to other aspects of life, and as such became a training ground to produce morally and physically competent civic leaders.

Using sport to construct generations of strong, fit, Muscular Christians was the mission of many organizations that feared the feminization of the male youth as a result of industrialization and urbanization. The closer relationship between religious and sporting ideologies was in part responsible for the reconfiguration of Jesus from effeminate and fragile to strong and robust, a more inspiring athletic figure. This mission is apparent in both early Christian organizations that provided sporting opportunities for its members, such as the Young Men's Christian Association, as well as in contemporary evangelism that utilizes sport and sporting organizations as a means to preach to and/or convert adherents.

Since the rapid expansion of the sports industry through the twentieth century, it has not been uncommon to hear popular commentators refer to sport *as* a contemporary religion. In this conception, stadia are said to be *ersatz* cathedrals, while athletes fulfil the role of modern deities. Harry Edwards (1973) pointed to the close structural relationship between sport and religion, identifying saints and gods, ruling patriarchs, high councils, scribes, shrines, houses of worship, symbols of faith, and seekers of the kingdom as features of both. His typology is, on one level, appealing, though he himself

regarded sport as quasi religious rather than an outright religion. Yet the similarities he identified have inspired a number of authors to declare categorically that sport is a religion, though this controversial statement is not without its opponents.

In arguing that sport is an actual religion, researchers have examined the emotional and devotional aspects of sport and suggest that sport holds meaning for fans in a way that traditional religions are unable to do. The structural similarities between sport and religion, as identified by Edwards, are not solely what define sport as a religion, but rather the passion, commitment, agony in defeat, and elation in victory reveal a transcendent experience in followers that provides sacred, communal moments between players and fans. For them, a religion delivers a sense of ultimacy, and sport is capable of providing a means of ultimate transformation that alters people's lives.

Others are not convinced, but recognize that there is more than a coincidental relationship between sport and religion. These researchers argue that sport is similar in structure to a revealed religion and that the two share many ritualized and sacred aspects. But sport itself is also regarded as religious as it represents in tangible form epic human and spiritual struggles, the quest for perfection, an intrinsic drama, and the explication of moral attributes. The ritualized engagement with and in sport, it is argued, serve to deliver a religious experience to their participants, feeding a "deep human hunger" (Novak 1976).

Sport may also be considered a folk religion, which can be understood as the result of shared moral ideals as well as behaviors, and emerges from daily life experiences to provide a means to integrate society, legitimate national values, and communicate societal ideologies. In this conception, sport is accepted as a product of its social, political, and economic context and as an institution that is complicit in reproducing these ideologies. In declaring sport to be a folk religion, researchers recognize its mythic, collective, and historical elements, without necessarily suggesting it is a transcendental experience.

By contrast, those who challenge sport's elevation to the status of a religion argue that the objects of each institution are not consistent, and

thus to equate the two would be to ignore fundamental philosophical differences. Religion, they suggest, is derived from the divine realm, while sport is firmly located in the human experience. One offers truths about life beyond our own experience; the other is simply a corporeal activity embedded in the profane. There is concern that to equate the two might secularize religion and diminish its value.

Essentially, the argument that sport is not a religion rests on the recognition that the intentions underpinning the two institutions vary significantly. Rather than examining sport and religion in terms of structure, it is perhaps more revealing to analyze each from the inside out. Such an analysis reveals the key difference to be the role of religion to proffer answers to, or explanations about, the mysteries of human existence. Sport has no such stated purpose, and even the most ardent sports fan would disagree that devotional activities will reveal anything about people's lives, destinies, or significance. Sport may well embody and reflect social values and ideologies, they argue, but it does not offer any deeper meanings about this world beyond the activity itself.

For others, the contention that sport is a religious experience is problematic. The mere physical act of playing or watching sport, they suggest, has little relationship to rituals of worship. At the same time, they identify a difference between having a religious experience when playing sport and playing sport for the actual purpose of glorifying a god. While these researchers may recognize that many of the rituals, passions, and even myths within sport can take on a religious like significance for participants, they maintain that the actual sporting performance is not a religious act. Thus the symbolic links between physical movement and the expression of a religious doctrine are questioned. As such, some have suggested it is best to examine the moments when sport and religion serve each other's interests rather than trying to define one as the other.

A final way of examining this phenomenon is to regard sport as a cultural vehicle through which religious communities may disseminate their faith or reinforce their beliefs to their existing members. This approach suggests that sport may not be divine in and of itself, but as an institution that reproduces cultural

meanings and values, it might also serve the interests of religious groups. Cultural activities that rest upon ritualized performances are significant ways to reproduce hegemonic ideologies, and sport is no exception. There are numerous examples where sport has been used as one of a number of cultural means to reinforce the collective identity of a religious community. In South Africa, the Muslim population of Cape Town used rugby as an avenue through which their religious and cultural identity could be consolidated. While not using sport as a direct means to proselytize, rugby nevertheless provided social opportunities for members of the community to interact and reaffirm their sense of belonging. Similar outcomes can be seen among Jewish Americans who used physical recreations as both a means to maintain their faith and cultural heritage, and also to integrate themselves into a new national community. In this way, sport contributes to the reproduction of the religious community's social arrangements, particularly in new or rapidly changing cultural contexts as members engage in repetitive, ritualistic cultural practices.

The use of sport has not been as pronounced in Eastern or traditional indigenous religions as it has in the Judeo Christian religions, though there is certainly much evidence that movement cultures are incorporated into religious or sacred practices. The primary point of divergence for many Eastern philosophies, such as Hinduism and Buddhism, is a rejection of the material world in preference for the attainment of a higher spiritual order. An emphasis on the body merely for the sake of gaining material rewards in the secular world is antithetical to the quest for enlightenment, and as such, modern, rational, quantified sport does not serve a purpose in the transcendence of the material world and the development of spiritual awareness.

The relationship between sport and religion has been influenced by differing perceptions of the body, the significance of sporting practices in the expression of religiosity, as well as the structure of both institutions. Christianity has had the most pronounced impact on the philosophy of modern sport, though the various Christian churches have not always regarded sport as a suitable activity for their followers. The emphasis on the corpus was thought to be at the expense of the spiritual, a division that

remained until the rise of the Muscular Christian movement in the nineteenth century, which provided a new model of the sport/religion nexus, one that led to the proliferation of evangelist practices in sport throughout the twentieth and early twenty first centuries. The popularity of modern sport and the devotion that fans display to their teams has led some to regard sport as a contemporary religion, one that holds more meaning for their followers than traditional religions; however, this standpoint has been challenged by those who regard the inherent natures of sport and religion to be fundamentally different.

SEE ALSO: Civil Religion; Identity, Sport and; Politics and Sport; Popular Religiosity; Religion, Sociology of; Socialization and Sport; Sport; Sport and Ethnicity

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sport and social capital

Jean Harvey

The literature on sport and social capital is scarce and discussions are fragmented because there are disagreements about the definition of social capital, the role of sport in contributing to social capital, and the forms of social capital that may be generated in the sphere of sport.

Three major approaches to social capital exist in the social science literature. The most

dominant is the functional approach, as represented in the work of political scientist Robert Putnam. For Putnam (1993: 167) social capital consists of “features of social organization, such as trust, norms, and networks, that can improve the efficiency of society by facilitating coordinated action.” Putnam (2000) argues excessive individualism in the US has reduced civic engagement and participation in the electoral process, both of which are marks of declining social capital. This, in turn, undermines the efficacy of public institutions. In the case of sports, declining participation in sport clubs and volunteerism is a sign of declining social capital.

Within Putnam’s framework, three forms of social capital are distinguished: (1) bounding, referring to the relations within homogeneous groups, like sport teams or clubs; (2) bridging, referring to relations across horizontal social divisions, such as across teams within a league; and (3) linking, referring to ties between different strata of society, for example citizens from all social classes who are fans of their local pro football club. Putnam’s work has been criticized (Dyreson 2001), especially by those who argue that the evidence on aggregate measures of social capital and civic engagement may obscure “a more complex reality” and that “the overall picture is of shifts in civic engagement more than losses, and of only moderate net losses at worst” (Curtis et al. 2003).

A second approach is based on the work of Pierre Bourdieu. For Bourdieu (1986: 249), social capital is “the aggregate of the actual or potential resources which are linked to the possession of a durable network of more or less institutionalized relationships of mutual acquaintance and recognition or, in other words, membership in a group.” Moreover, Bourdieu explains that the amount of social capital possessed by an agent depends on a combination of the number of network connections one can mobilize, plus the economic, cultural, and symbolic capital possessed by those comprising the network connections. Bourdieusian studies of sport and social capital are rare, although several scholars who use the two other approaches often refer to his work.

The third approach regroups a wide variety of network based approaches to social capital. Those who use this approach build on

Bourdieu's emphasis on social capital as a resource. For example, Lin (2001: 25) defines social capital as "the resources embedded in social networks accessed by actors for actions." Within this general social network approach, some researchers are more interested in the networks themselves (the structure of relations within the networks), whereas others focus on the relational aspects of the networks (the resources available and accessible).

Most sport scholars use the functional definition of social capital, although they do not all adopt a functionalist theoretical framework. Jarvie (2003), Maguire et al. (2002), and Smith and Ingham (2003) have focused on the role of sport in the regeneration of community social capital. They argue that there are ways in which sport can positively contribute to community social capital, although it cannot be assumed that sport always increases social capital all the time.

Smith and Ingham (2003) highlight this situation in their exploration of public discussions (i.e., town meetings) over the development of professional sport stadia in the US. Their findings demonstrate that the public subsidization of professional sport stadia does not contribute to or re/generate the sense of a "community as a whole, but indeed may further divide residents depending upon their situated interests." Dyreson (2001) also notes that there are situations in which sport can promote division, excessive competition, and unhealthy practices among people and communities.

Some scholars are examining sport through the lens of network based social capital. Alegi's (2000) study of soccer in Africa illustrates Bourdieu's theory of social capital as resources grounded in network connections, namely with people who are in positions of power or in a position to change things. Alegi examined the importance of soccer to the social experiences of black African workers, entrepreneurs, and political leaders and analyzed how people subject to systemic discrimination and without political rights used soccer as a site for developing social networks based on community identities at a national, regional, and local level. Specifically, while black African workers and youth were generally not interested in seeking personal mobility in the political sphere, they often turned to soccer for self advancement

combined with the "charitable uplift of their community." Litwin (2003) used a network based approach to confirm that physically active older adults are more socially connected. Furthermore, the older adults in diverse networks consisting of connections across the spheres of friends, neighbors, and family were most likely to engage in physical activity.

Overall, research on social capital supports the notion that sport can enhance social capital as well as erode it. Future research will explain the circumstances under which these outcomes occur.

SEE ALSO: Social Capital; Sport and Culture; Sport and Social Class; Sport and Social Resistance

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sport and social class

Alan Tomlinson

Sport is a significant contributor to relations of social class in that people in elite groups have the resources to organize and maintain games on their own terms and in spaces inaccessible to others. This ultimately serves to reproduce social and economic distinctions and preserve the power and influence of those who control resources in society. The growth of modern sports cannot be fully understood unless this key influence and core dynamic is fully recognized.

In its most general sense, social class refers to the social and cultural expression of an economic relationship. Classes are made up of individuals located and identified by (1) their contribution to economic production, (2) their access to and control over resources, and (3) their distinctive class cultures and lifestyles. In modern societies social classes are based on the individual's and the group's place in the industrial and economic process, with the most significant measures of class distinction being wealth and occupation. Explaining the relationship between these indices of class position and other sources of status and identity has long been a focus of sociological theory and research. For example, at the end of the nineteenth century, Veblen (1953) stressed that people in the ruling class recreated imagined lifestyles of the elites from previous times and constructed a life of leisure that set themselves apart from lower classes and less privileged groups. Veblen explained that the accumulation of wealth and conspicuous consumption in sport and leisure were inextricably linked. As the leisure and consumer economies of the twentieth century consolidated and expanded, this link would

become increasingly important for social classes that could balance work–leisure choices, and not just for those who could afford to dispense with paid work or employment altogether.

HISTORICAL CONTEXT

Forms of inequality and exploitation characterized the civilizations of the ancient world, where participation and spectatorship in Greek festivals and Roman games were based upon position and rank in the social and economic order. In the European Middle Ages, when the military rationale of the jousting tournament receded, it was maintained by despotic rulers as a spectacular public display of power and a form of theater in which participation and spectatorship were based on social status and class position.

In comparable ways, a structure of social differentiation based on class characterized the emergent social order of the West's early modern period as industrialization and urbanization reshaped the basis of society and culture. Ascribed status, leaving little option for social mobility, was superseded by achieved status that, in theory, held the promise of a change in status, according to the individual's economic position and potential. Social standing came to be defined in terms of what people did to make a living and how they publicly displayed their acquired economic status rather than in terms of inherited status and prescribed opportunities (Sugden & Tomlinson 2000). Yet, in practice, social class, defined in terms of economic status and its associated cultural dimensions, reproduced the status quo and contributed to the consolidation of power relations and cultural distinctions.

Seminal social histories of sports in Britain – association football/soccer (Mason 1980), rugby football (Dunning & Sheard 1979), and cricket (Birley 2003) – have vividly demonstrated how the emergence and the evolution of modern sports forms were rooted in class relations. Association football in its amateur form was championed by the middle and upper classes, and developed in its professional form by the working class and lower middle classes. The attitudes and beliefs embodied in the ethos of particular sports expressed class based status and values. The middle classes, for instance,

believed that the amateur code of the game built character, strengthened the body, discouraged drinking, and unified social classes (Mason 1980: 229). Rugby football's "Great Schism" of 1895 saw the split between the Northern English mass spectator form of the game, and the amateur, Southern English based Rugby Football Union (Dunning & Sheard 1979: 198–200). Class patronage shaped many forms of sports provision, in the US and advanced societies generally. Marxist influenced accounts have had a widespread impact upon how such class dynamics and relations have been theorized.

NEO MARXIST ACCOUNTS

Miliband (1977) noted that the development of a Marxist sociology of sport was not an outstandingly urgent theoretical imperative, but added that neither was it the most negligible of tasks. Marxist and neo Marxist analysts of sport have been concerned mainly with two themes: sport's ideological role and sport's potential as contestation and resistance.

Marx said nothing about sport or its relationship with social class, but neo Marxists have explored the nature and histories of class dynamics and class struggles. Thompson's (1968) historical interpretation of the making of the English working class describes how sport and leisure often were sites for class struggle, as the social forces that pioneered the development of capitalism emerged and sought to shape the ideological and cultural production of the new age. The establishment of capitalism and the inexorable rise of an industrial and commercial bourgeoisie demanded a disciplined and reliable labor force. A priority for the new ruling class was the reformation of the working rhythms of those whose experience of labor was based in rural rhythms past and seasonal cycles. Necessarily, the non work habits of the masses formed part of the equation of reform, for what people did in their spare time had implications for how they related to the process of production. Thompson showed how an emergent bourgeoisie in England used its influence both in government and within the church to carry out a legal and moral crusade against the recreational habits of the lower orders. He also explained that new

labor habits were established through the imposition of time discipline, a division of labor, the supervision of labor through the use of fines, money incentives, and bells and clocks, the words of preachers and teachers, and the suppression of fairs and sports (Thompson 1967). The incipient working class did not willingly surrender long established customs and leisure practices. Such reforms succeeded only through processes of resistance and struggle between classes and class fractions. For example, Delves's (1981) study of the decline of folk football in the English city of Derby illustrated how new cross class alliances – the emergence of newly dominant class fractions with common interests in commerce, change, and reform – accounted for the demise of the traditional form of folk football, and the rise of horse racing – a more regulated, enclosed, civilized, and profitable form of sport.

SPORT CULTURES: CLASS, HABITUS, AND REPRODUCTION

Bourdieu (1978) notes that sports emerged in exclusive English public schools, where the sons of wealthy, powerful, and aristocratic families appropriated popular games and changed their function to suit their interests. He connects the rationalization of games into modern sport forms with a class based philosophy of amateurism that expressed the moral ideal and the ethos of the most powerful segments of the bourgeois class. To play tennis or golf, to ride or to sail, was, as Bourdieu argues, to bestow upon the participant what he called gains in distinction. Sports in which lower middle class or working class people participate develop as spectacles created for the people as mass commodities. Sports, therefore, are not self contained spheres of practice, and it is class habitus that defines any meaning conferred on sporting activity, and any social value that is associated with the sporting practice. From this perspective, then, sports participation is not a matter of personal choice or individual preference; it depends upon the financial resources available to the potential participant, the social status of those prominent in that activity, and the cultural meaning of a sport and the individual's relationship to those meanings.

Far from being an open sphere of limitless possibilities, sport is a social phenomenon and cultural space that operates in Weberian terms as a form of social closure, in which potential entrants are vetted and excluded to suit the incumbent gatekeepers. At the same time, the inner world of the sports culture is tightly monitored and controlled, as in golf or tennis club membership committees, and in other sports institutions in which formal or informal entry requirements are barriers to open participation. The recruitment and induction processes into such clubs are operational expressions of and examinations in cultural capital. For example, entrance into a tennis club requires that newcomers must communicate competently with the gatekeepers of a club; read the social interactions and etiquette and conventions of a club; comply with the dress code; be equipped with relatively sophisticated technology; and have the ability to play at an acceptable level of competence. This apparently open choice is in reality a possibility or trajectory based upon what Bourdieu recognizes as the power of economic and cultural capital, so that class variations in sporting practice can be understood as shaped by not just the basic financial costs of an activity, but also by the perceived benefits that will accrue, either immediately or later, to the participant. Sporting practices, and associated physical and body cultures, are therefore aspects of the class habitus. Practices, in the Bourdieuan framework, are articulations of habitus.

Bourdieu is sensitive to the fact that classes are not monolithic. He argues that there can be divisions within classes and these too can be reflected in sports. An interesting example that he uses is that of the gender dimension of the class habitus that produces a sexual division of labor that in turn affects participation in particular sporting activities. But in general, for Bourdieu, the analysis of sport is a form of class analysis. Sport acts as a kind of badge of social exclusivity and cultural distinctiveness for the dominant classes; it operates as a means of control or containment of the working or popular classes; it is a potential but unlikely source of escape and mobility for talented working class sports performers; it articulates the fractional status distinctions which exist within the ranks of larger class groupings; and it reveals the capacity of the body to express social principles

and cultural meanings, for physical capital (Wacquant 1995) to connect with forms of economic and cultural capital. Bourdieu described his study *Distinction* (1986) as an attempt to think through Marx and Weber's rival conceptions of class and status, and his major achievement was to connect the study of class position and concomitant lifestyles and statuses. The lesson here for the sociologist of sport is to recognize the need for a complementary and integrated analysis of both the class dimensions of a sport and its associated lifestyle dimensions.

CONCLUSION

Studies of sport continue to pose the question of how important social class is as an influence upon participation and/or spectatorship. A Canadian study (White & Wilson 1999) reports the primary influence of socioeconomic status upon sport spectatorship; a Scandinavian study (Thrane 2001) questions this, disputing any linear influence of household income upon spectatorship, and claiming a further complexity by seeking to measure the influence of education, cultural capital, and sport participation. Unsurprisingly, the more that is measured, the more confusing the picture gets. However, analyzing data from the US General Social Survey in 1993 and drawing upon Bourdieu's concept of cultural capital, Wilson (2002) is much more analytically unequivocal: cultural capital enables people to do more sport, and social class provides the knowledge, tastes, skills, and preferences that motivate individuals towards particular types of sport consumption.

An overemphasis upon the potential of sport to offer social mobility to a few can distort this picture of sport's reproductive capacity. It is often thought that working class males take up boxing in order to get out of the ghetto. Some do; a few more may. But Sugden's (1987) insightful ethnography of the Burnt Oak boxing gym shows how for the majority who will not graduate to the professional ranks, boxing is a form of exploitation, giving them little more than survival skills, honing skills and fueling hope, but confirming their ghetto culture.

In societies such as Britain sport participation in a general sense has demonstrated a relative stability. National participation figures

are notoriously difficult to unravel in completely reliable ways, but it is clear that there was no boom in participation during the 1990s. In fact, sport participation rates and the patterns of participation between different social groups have remained largely unchanged since the early 1970s, with the exception that more women now participate in fitness activities (Rowe 2003). The 2002 General Household Survey in Britain showed enormous differences between groups classified by socioeconomic criteria: 20 percent of adults in the higher occupational cum economic groupings did keep fit; for those not working, or long term unemployed, it was 4 percent; 59 percent of the former group took part in at least one physical activity in the 4 week reference period compared with 30 percent of those in routine jobs. One in 10 of the top occupational group had played golf, the same figure for running/jogging; only 1 in 50 of those in routine jobs had participated in these activities (Fox & Rickards 2004).

National studies confirm such persisting patterns of class based inequality; local and regional studies provide parallel confirmation, as in analyses of urban space and sport and leisure consumption. Twenty first century consumer society without doubt offers numerous opportunities for the expression of experimental identities, for a kind of project of the self to which sport can be one contributing source, as work on lifestyle and extreme sports has shown. Cultures can and do change, but as Williams (1977) noted, in subtle ways in which the dominant, residual, and emergent elements sometimes intermesh. Dominant cultures resist transformation though, and in this wider context sport, at its various levels of performance, participation, and spectatorship, continues to show how class habitus and cultural capital remain major determinants of everyday practices and cultural institutions.

SEE ALSO: Political Economy and Sport; Sport and Capitalism; Sport and Culture; Sport and Social Capital; Sport as Work

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sport and social resistance

George H. Sage

Social resistance is a social phenomenon in which disadvantaged, exploited, and dominated groups contest the dominating practices that nation states, social institutions, social organizations, and traditional cultural practices have constructed. Resistance and acts of agency – meaning the capability of individuals to construct and reconstruct their world – against abuses of power, discrimination, inequality, social injustice, and autocratic control are pervasive features of human history. There are always ongoing struggles against domination through various forms of social resistance. As British social theorist Robin Williams (1977) asserted, dominance “does not just passively exist . . . It has continually to be renewed, recreated, defended, and modified. It is also continually resisted, limited, altered, challenged by pressures not at all its own” (p. 112).

Individual resistance and human agency are the means through which individuals change social processes and structures and build alternatives. When social resistance is carried out under the auspices of an organized group, this is referred to as a social movement. Research on social movements most often focuses on the social and psychological characteristics of those who participate in the movement, the relations between the leaders and other participants, and the social and political outcomes of the organized resistance.

Resistance movements use violent and/or nonviolent tactics. Several of the most common forms of resistance are boycotts, civil

disobedience, guerrilla warfare, and passive resistance. Social scientist James C. Scott (1990) asserts that opposition and resistance of subordinate groups is frequently “found neither in overt collective defiance of powerholders nor in complete hegemonic compliance, but in the vast territory between those two polar opposites” (p. 136).

Sporting practices have typically been vehicles of cultural reproduction, but they have also been avenues for the expression of various forms of social resistance and agency. Athletes and others associated with sport have resisted dominant models of sport in subtle and not so subtle ways. In doing so, they have contradicted, modified, and transformed definitions and modes of control in sporting practices. Several areas of research in which social resistance struggles have taken place in sport are illustrated in the following selected examples.

Issues of race and gender have given rise to social resistance in sport. African American athletes have challenged the sport establishment over racism in sport in a variety of ways. For almost a century after the abolishment of slavery, blacks were excluded from participation and attendance at most mainstream American sports. As one form of resistance to being barred from mainstream sport, blacks formed their own teams and leagues. The so-called Negro baseball leagues flourished for more than 40 years in the first half of the twentieth century. All black basketball teams and leagues succeeded in many cities of the Northwest and Midwest during this same era. Black boxers resisted formidable barriers to their boxing careers and several, such as Jack Johnson and Joe Louis, became world champions. More recently, heavyweight boxing champion Muhammad Ali refused to serve in the military and participate in the Vietnam War, saying that he didn’t have anything against the North Vietnamese.

In the 1990s, black and white athletes and coaches boycotted several sport events because of racist policies or practices of the sponsors. They also increased the pressure on the sport establishment for greater African American representation in coaching and managing. Sport has become a medium for demonstrating black pride through hairstyles and handshakes and other rituals carried out in connection with sport events, thus affirming black capabilities,

and challenging the subordination imposed by the politically and socially powerful within American society.

Gender differentiation has been powerfully constructed through sport and the culture of sport. Historically, one of the most persistent and widespread forms of discrimination was the lack of access to sport opportunities for females. Social attitudes and conditions made female athletes an anomaly until the 1970s. Before that, girls and women who participated in competitive sports faced social isolation and censure. Even into the late 1980s, public attitudes supported sport as a male preserve in most nations around the world.

With the women's movement as an ideological foundation, resistance to traditional restrictions to female involvement in sport began in earnest in a few nations. At the youth sports level, girls and their parents began to question the rules and regulations of youth sport organizations. In the United States, for example, they challenged baseball's Little League "boys only" policy by registering to play on Little League teams. They challenged policies of public recreation departments that sponsored only boys' sports teams, and insisted that girls be allowed to play on these teams or that an equal number of girls' teams be created.

Women were a major force resisting the sport inequities for females in US high schools and colleges that were conspicuous and widespread before the 1970s. They were successful at securing the passage of the Education Amendments Act of 1972. A key provision in this act, Title IX, required that educational institutions receiving federal funds must provide equivalent programs for males and females. Similar forms of resistance have occurred internationally and in other nation states.

In recent years sport related political protests have been waged on behalf of various causes. Between 1970 and the overthrow of the white government in South Africa in the early 1990s, unpopular American government and corporate support for South Africa and its apartheid policies led many sport groups to successfully resist the participation of South African athletes in sporting events in the US. Indeed, sport resistance was one of the most important sites for condemning the South African apartheid government.

Athletes and activist groups, even nations, have occasionally chosen sporting venues for social resistance to demonstrate against political policies and practices. In the 1968 Summer Olympic Games in Mexico City, African American Olympic medal winners Tommie Smith and John Carlos raised their gloved fists during the playing of the national anthem to protest racism in the US and racial oppression around the world.

In the 1970s and 1980s, nation state boycotts plagued the Olympic Games. African nations boycotted the 1976 Olympics because New Zealand's rugby team had played in South Africa. The United States and several other western nations refused to compete at the Moscow Olympics in 1980 because of the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan. The Soviet Union and its Eastern Bloc partners countered by boycotting the 1984 Olympics in Los Angeles.

In the United States protesters have used major sporting events to stage protests against war, racism, sexism, nuclear proliferation, and environmental pollution. Speeches, distribution of literature, and placard displays typically take place outside the sports venue, while demonstrations occur inside during pre game or half time. Intercollegiate athletes themselves have engaged in a type of resistance that James C. Scott calls low profile resistance and infra politics. Because they do not receive a salary or wage for their labor – they receive an "athletic scholarship" – they have forged an underground economy, frequently accepting under the table payments and improper benefits from coaches, boosters, and sports agents. Although their actions are not intended to have structural ramifications, they are struggles for social justice in the distribution of wealth that is generated from their labor.

One form of social resistance involves with drawing or evading the dominant canon of a social practice, which in contemporary sport is a highly competitive organized sport culture. Outdoor activities such as hiking, rock climbing, rafting, hang gliding, skydiving, skateboarding, scuba diving, and so forth where participation has priority, have boomed among a clientele seeking alternatives to organized, commercial, and corporate forms of sport. This phenomenon is worldwide. Many participants create alternative norms and relations that

emphasize participant control of the physical activity and open participation rather than rule bound, high level competition.

There are several categories of these alternative sports forms – “action” sports, “whiz” sports, “adventure” sports – often overlapping into a rather ill defined category called extreme sports. Most of these activities do not attract masses of spectators, so the fanfare associated with mainstream sports is not missed. One sport sociologist claims these forms of sport “are about sharing the experience and about community” (Rinehart 2000: 504) – characteristics that attract many of the participants.

Social resistance represents an important precursor for social transformation. This can occur when groups of people use sport to resist certain social attitudes, practices, and laws in an effort to raise public consciousness and bring about social change. For example, to call public attention to prejudice and discrimination against homosexuals and to improve public attitudes about them, in 1982 leaders of the gay and lesbian community planned to create and hold a Gay Olympic Games in San Francisco. The event was quickly crushed by a lawsuit from the United States Olympic Committee (USOC), claiming that the use of the word Olympics violated a trademark the USOC was granted under the Amateur Sports Act of 1978. Nevertheless, resistance quickly emerged within the gay and lesbian community. The name of the event was changed to the Gay Games and the first Gay Games were held in 1982. They have been held every four years since then in different cities throughout the world. The Gay Games have helped to transform the attitudes of many “straight” people towards homosexuals, and have had a transformative effect for many members of the gay community, giving them a sense of empowerment, enhanced self esteem, and opportunities to display socially valued physical skills in a visible context.

Social resistance has extended to apparel and equipment used by sports participants. In the global economy, product manufacturing is a major driving force. A key aspect of the global economy is a system of manufacturing and division of labor known as the export processing system. In this system, product research, design, development, and marketing take place in industrially developed countries, while the

labor intensive, assembly line phases of product manufacture are relegated to developing countries. The finished product is then exported for distribution in developed countries of the world.

Sporting goods manufacturing is one of the most flourishing export processing industries, and Nike was one of the pioneering sporting goods corporations in foreign export processing. During the 1990s, 16 major investigations were made of factories producing Nike footwear in Asian countries. The reports uniformly found appalling working conditions in Nike’s factories: local industrial safety laws were violated and workers’ rights were nonexistent. Between 1992 and 1996, as global understanding and consciousness grew about Nike’s Asian factories, a mass chord of horror and outrage spurred collective actions and launched what became the Nike social movement. This resistance movement was composed of an international coalition of organizations. Their goal was to create enough public outrage against Nike that governments, businesses, unions, religious organizations, and human rights groups would bring pressure on Nike to change its labor practices and improve conditions in the factories. The Nike social movement severely damaged the Nike brand name and reputation for millions of people throughout the world. In 1998 the Nike CEO announced plans for what he called New Labor Initiatives, which was a plan for significant reform in the company’s labor practices. These reforms likely came about as a direct result of the Nike social movement campaigns.

SEE ALSO: Agency (and Intention); Social Movement Organizations; Social Movements; Sport; Sport, Alternative

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sport as spectacle

David L. Andrews

The spectacle, in the form of an imposing public display, is not simply a benign cultural form, because it can seldom be separated from “non-coercive strategies of power and persuasion” (Cary 2005). This is often overlooked when considering contemporaneous high-profile sporting events staged for the entertainment of spectating publics (e.g., the NFL Super Bowl, Olympic Games, or FIFA World Cup), which, despite their celebratory sporting veneer, routinely communicate the values and ideologies of the dominant corporate capitalist order. The sport spectacle has, of course, long been a vehicle for the expression and/or performance of dominant cultural practices and sensibilities. This can, at least partially, be attributed to the fact that the visceral intensity of competition-based physical culture possesses an almost unrivaled capacity to capture the interest and imagination of publics located within divergent historical and social contexts. Moreover, the very practice of bearing witness to (or spectating) particular displays of competitive physicality has played an important role in establishing the sociocultural import of

some physical activities over others. Thus, the Olympic festivals of ancient Greece, the gladiatorial contests of ancient Rome, and even the folk football rituals of pre-industrial Europe (such as the Florentine *calcio*) were only fully constituted as socially, culturally, and indeed politically significant practices through the presence and involvement of massed ranks of spectators, whose numbers dwarfed those of active participants.

As resonant focal points for popular identities, desires, and fears, physical cultural spectacles have frequently become appropriated by particular social groupings looking to advance their own political and ideological agendas. This is perhaps best exemplified in what Juvenal famously described as the “circuses” of violent entertainment staged within Rome’s vast amphitheaters as a means of appeasing the baser sensibilities of the Roman populace. As well as providing a diversion for the underworked (due to the presence of an extensive slave populace) yet disenfranchised (due to the nature of the Republic’s constitution) Roman masses, these games also constituted a highly visible site for the Roman elite to exhibit their economic and political power. Roman luminaries thus regularly sponsored ever more extravagant, blood-thirsty spectacles (including gladiatorial combat, elaborate and voluminous human sacrifices, the mass slaughter of animals, and even carefully staged naval battles) as a means of securing the popular approval of Rome’s excitement-seeking plebeian classes.

While the emergence of modern spectator sport in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries incorporated considerably less savage forms of competitive physicality than their ancient antecedents, they did nonetheless perform similar sociopolitical functions. By codifying sporting practice (regulated participation) and sanctioning cathartic release (mass spectatorship), the patrician industrialist power bloc ensured that sport helped constrain working bodies to the demands and discipline of the industrial workplace, while simultaneously contributing to the commercialization of what was a burgeoning urban leisure culture. Thus, within the modern industrial era, and specifically its newly defined realm of leisure time, institutionalized sport became an increasingly important site of “surveillance, spectacle, and profit”

(Miller & McHoul 1998). As Brookes (2002) reiterated, the instantiation of modern sport during the nineteenth century both disciplined and commodified popular physical culture, through the standardized regulation of sporting “time, space, and conduct,” which provided opportunities for aspirant participants, entrepreneurs, and spectators alike.

While most industrializing nations began developing their own inventory of spectacular sporting events at this time, the modern Olympic Games, originating with the 1896 Athens Olympiad, rapidly became sport spectacle of truly global proportions. The global spectacularization of the Olympic Games was expedited through successive phases of technological advancement in the mass communications industry (i.e., news reel, radio, television, and Internet innovations) that allowed the Olympic spectacle to engage, and inform, both internal and external audiences alike. Initially advanced as a festive celebration of sporting excellence, fair play, amateurism, and internationalism, the modern Olympic Games soon became appropriated by, and an expression of, the prevailing power structure within the host nation. Thus, the Games have become forums for the (inter)national display and attempted validation of specific political economic orders, such as those associated with British imperialism (London, 1908), German fascism (Berlin, 1936), USSR communism (Moscow, 1980), US capitalism (Los Angeles, 1984), and US neo imperialism (Salt Lake City, 2002). Interestingly, within many recent Olympic celebrations (Salt Lake City, 2002, excluded), the Games have been spectacularized – particularly through the performance of defining national cultural characteristics within Olympic opening ceremonies, and the utilization of specific national geographies as event locations and facilities (Hogan 2003; Tomlinson 1996) – as mechanisms of place marketing for potential tourist visitors to the host cities. In this manner, Barcelona (1992), Sydney (2000), and Athens (2004) are all illustrative of the commercial processes through which the Olympic Games have become implicated within, and veritable motors of, what are the overdetermining forces and networks of global (consumer) capital.

In the second half of the twentieth century sport was conclusively and apparently

irreversibly integrated into the commercial ferment of the dominant consumer capitalist order. Of course, many sporting entities, such as Major League Baseball (MLB), the National Basketball Association (NBA), the National Football League (NFL), and the National Hockey League (NHL), originated as professional, putatively commercial, ventures. However, until relatively recently, most occupied a space at the periphery of the commercial marketplace, with utility maximization (sporting performance) routinely taking precedence over – frequently to the exclusion of – profit maximization (financial performance). The commercialization and modification of sport – what Walsh and Giulianotti (2001) describe as a continuing process of converting “the social meaning of a practice or object into purely financial terms” – reached a heightened level of intensity with the contemporaneous advancement of the profit driven corporation as the naturalized, and largely unquestioned, model of social organization. Sporting *bodies* (sport organizations, events, leagues, teams, athletes, etc.) thus became incorporated into the structures, values, and directives of late capitalist culture. Put simply, a conjuncture within which “everything . . . has become cultural; and culture has equally become economic or commodity oriented” (Jameson 1998). Within this context, an expansive economy of highly managed and marketed sport spectacles has become an important “correlative” to a consumer society in which consumption (of commodities and services) has become the generative core (Kellner 2003: 66). Since contemporary capitalism’s culturally inflected regime of accumulation is prefigured on the operationalizing of the mass media (simultaneously as both core commercial product and commercializing process), sport’s evolution has become inextricably tied to the rhythms and regimes of an expanding media industrial complex. Thus, from the mid twentieth century onwards, the emergence and rapid diffusion of commercial television has played a crucial role in the enlarging presence, and intensifying influence, of mass mediated, mass entertainment oriented, commercial sport spectacles. Moreover, the relentless rise of commercial television as a major conduit to both the *commercialization of culture* and the associated *culturalization of the economy* has revolutionized the sport economy:

escalating fees from the selling of broadcast rights and media sponsorships having become, for many professional sports, teams, and events, the single most important source of revenue generation (Bellamy 1998). Thus, there is a growing tendency for media organizations and corporate sponsors/advertisers to exert monopoly like control over sport organizations (Jary 1999). In other words, there has been a conclusive "institutional alignment of sports and media in the context of late capitalism" (Real 1998).

Of course, the demands of understanding the spectacular economy of contemporary sport culture lead, somewhat predictably, to Debord's (1990, 1994) theorizing on the society of the spectacle. However, as Tomlinson (2002) warned, all too frequently Debord's provocative treatise on the transformations in relations between capitalism, technology, and everyday life is the subject of little more than superficial invocation. Within examinations of sport, this is routinely done through reference to the proliferation of mass mediated spectacular sporting events as if they, in and of themselves, encapsulate the complexities of spectacular society. In Tomlinson's terms, this trite appropriation belies an "interpretive shorthand" used by academics, whose passing references to Debord signify an acknowledgment of the mediated spectacle "without any fully developed sense of the conceptualization of the spectacle." The tendency toward reifying the spectacle is soon eviscerated through actual recourse to Debord's theses which exhume the layered complexity and multidimensionality of the spectacle, and its position and function within spectacular society: "The spectacle appears at once as society itself, as a part of society and as a means of unification" (Debord 1994: 12). According to Debord, the upper case Spectacle (mediated mega event) and the lower case spectacle (relentless outpourings of the corroborating and/or parasitic culture industries and processes) provide both the monumental and vernacular architecture of a spectacular society, in which the spectacle as capitalist product and process realizes a situation in which the "commodity completes its colonization of social life" (p. 29). Kellner (2003: 66), this time with specific reference to the dualism of the sport spectacle, similarly observed that "postindustrial sports have transformed traditional (and in some cases, non traditional) practices into

media spectacles in such a way that exemplifies the broader processes of cultural commodification associated with the rise of a mass media driven consumer society."

SEE ALSO: Debord, Guy; Olympics; Sport and Capitalism; Sport Culture and Subcultures; Sport and Culture; Sport as Work; Sports Heroes and Celebrities

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sport and the state

Jacques Defrance

Since the end of the nineteenth century the dynamics of the sport–state relationship are best understood by taking into account (1) the dramatic growth of sport relative to other forms of physical activity (gymnastics, traditional games, etc.) and (2) socially significant changes in the operation and status of the state.

Sport is a competitive form of physical activity, codified to ensure equal opportunities of victory to competitors and guarantee physical security in contests. This mode of physical game, a unique feature of industrial and parliamentary societies, emerged first in England during the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries (Elias & Dunning 1986). Between 1880 and 1900 it had become common in western industrial societies and territories controlled by the British Empire (Mangan 1985) and it became worldwide after the era of decolonization in the 1950s and 1960s.

The British state, under which modern sport was invented, was also the first to adopt a parliamentary form of government. As these developments occurred, British society also was characterized by relatively stable internal social relationships (i.e., during the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries). However, as organized forms of competitive sports spread during the twentieth century, they were appropriated and incorporated into diverse social formations and different state structures, including those that were socialist, fascist, corporatist, liberal, etc. These recent historical developments raise a series of questions about sport and the state. Through what processes did states acquire power over sports (Harvey et al. 1993)? What functions were fulfilled by sports in different political systems? How are institutionalized forms of sports shaped and developed as autonomous activities in different types of states? What relations are formed between institutionalized versions of sports and public powers?

Scholars in the social sciences have raised these questions only since the 1960s. Although research on the state is common among scholars in political philosophy, law, sociology, and political science, it has only recently been undertaken by scholars in the sociology of sport.

There have been English, French, and German speaking scholars with interests in political economy and the sociology of sport who have published research and theoretical essays on the relationship between sporting institutions and the state. This work varies with the underlying conception of the state used by scholars. Some have employed a Marxist or neo Marxist definition of the state and focused attention on the nature of the state, domination by the bourgeois classes (employers, capitalist class, leisure class), and the role of class power in the reproduction of the social order in general and institutionalized forms of sport in particular. This approach is structural and theoretical. Other scholars have done empirical analyses of the state, including its agencies and policies related to sport. They have provided sociohistorical accounts of the making and transformation of the contemporary state through the twentieth century (Houlihan 1991; Callède 2000). They have focused on nationalism, imperialism, and the form of the nineteenth century state, and then on the forms of the state that emerged in connection with advanced capitalism and the formation of public welfare policies during the twentieth century. Less functionalist than Marxist analyses, these studies have revealed a less monolithic state and produced typologies of state forms.

Among sociological traditions that deal with relations between sport and the state, only figurational theory produces specific insights on the making of the modern state and the place of sport in this process (Elias & Dunning 1986). The civilizing process that occurred during the fifteenth through nineteenth centuries in Western Europe assumed an associated process of state formation and the state's monopoly over the exercise of legitimate violence. Norbert Elias's analysis of the civilizing process in eighteenth century England shows that the English inner political space was pacified through a civilizing spurt, in which political elites agreed to challenge each other for access to governmental offices by using non violent strategies. Two factions of the upper classes struggled to gain power through the use of rhetoric and persuasion in a parliamentary system, rather than using coercive force. At the same time, political elites transformed their pastimes into sports, that is, into rule governed competitive games in which opponents, regulated by the norms of civility,

compete for victory without destroying each other. Elias uses historical data to show that the quest for domination in the realm of the state and on playing fields is grounded in a competitive disposition shared by those elites attracted to both political involvement and sporting activity. This theory also takes into account that as social space has divided into separate spheres through the twentieth century, it has broken the direct class based links between political activity and sporting practice. Chris Rojek addressed this divergence and proposed a complementary analysis to the work done by Elias and Elias and Dunning (Dunning & Rojek 1992).

Scholars using forms of critical theory have studied the growing involvement of political bodies in capitalist and socialist industrial nations/states in sport since the beginning of the Cold War. The sociology of culture and political sociology have been used as frameworks for developing explanations of the ways that government involvement have influenced sporting practices and the development of elite level sport in the USSR, the US, Japan, and Europe. A "pluralist" sociological model is employed by some political scientists who analyze diverse management methods across the nations, and the social functions that sport fulfills for contemporary political powers (Meynaud 1966).

Work based on a Marxist model defines the state as an apparatus dominated by the bourgeoisie, whose control is gained through a struggle among different groups competing for power (hegemony theory). This work shows the ways that sport fits into state policies, market mechanisms, and commercial entertainment regulated by the state (Cantelon & Gruneau 1983; Hargreaves 1986). It highlights the similarity between the sport related values of physical efficiency and competition, and capitalist norms of productivity and economic competition, all of which are fostered by the state (Brohm 1978). Much of this work is conceptually limited, but it has pointed out the contradictions between (1) the development of a sporting culture which attracts popular classes (soccer in Europe, football in the US, hockey in Canada), (2) the domination of bourgeois values in the sporting ethic and the control exercised by dominant classes over sport organizations, (3) the state, and (4) the corporations that sponsor sport.

In England and North America, hegemony theorists, inspired by Gramsci, and sociologists using cultural studies frameworks, have studied the ways that the working classes construct and interpret sporting practices according to their ideological and material interests. Similar work has been done by sociologists analyzing the sporting field and habitus; they identify the historical circumstances in which members of lower classes have succeeded in using the symbolism of sport to support protest and opposition to dominant economic and political norms. The state usually assists mainstream sport organizations in condemning protesters and marginalizing grassroots sport forms. However, in the US, for example, there have been cases of collective protests, such as those by African Americans in the 1960s and women in the 1970s, when the state enacted legislation to make discrimination by race and sex illegal in sports (e.g., in 1972, Title IX of the Equal Education Amendments to the Civil Rights Act made discrimination by sex illegal in schools receiving federal funds).

When scholars have analyzed sport and its functions in international political relationships they have focused on the ways that the state promotes or restricts international sporting relationships. They examine the autonomy of sporting powers and the degree of politicization in the sphere of sport. This work has examined foreign affairs and diplomacy, but has ignored other aspects of relations between sport and the state.

The material support given by the state to sport, mostly during the 1960s, enhanced the legitimacy of sport in many societies. As a result, sport and sport related values were introduced into the school curriculum in several European countries and Canadian provinces such as Quebec. The sociology of education and culture, therefore, has focused some attention on the conditions under which a bond is established between the state and sports organizations in order to impose a sporting culture in school. Some research has tried to identify the ways that state agencies are influenced by sport related lobbying interests that work in and through committees for school reform, with representatives of sport industries, or under the leadership of coaches' associations and elected representatives. The receptiveness of public officials to sporting

interests indicates a spurt of “sportization” in connection with the state. Conversely, the situation in some countries shows state interference in sport in the form of government control and a corresponding lack of autonomy in the sporting field. This was the case in the USSR with the socialist sporting system (Riordan 1977), in the Fascist regime in Italy and Germany in the 1930s, and it is still the case in nations with authoritarian regimes and military dictators (e.g., some African nations and Western Asian kingdoms). Partial forms of government control exist in strongly centralized democracies like France, where the state manages sporting centers (e.g., the National Sporting Center in Paris established in 1942), creates state guaranteed diplomas (state certificate for sporting educators established in 1962), and employs and finances technical staff in sporting federations, among other things.

In the US there is another type of articulation between the (federal) state and the sporting field dominated by men’s professional leagues (such as the National Football League and Major League Baseball). Until the 1960s, the state seldom intervened in sports, except when a dispute between officials or other parties threatened the system, or when a scandal or unsavory events occurred and received public attention. The state then played a regulatory role in reconciling conflicting interests and providing equal opportunity to practice sports; it also mediated conflicts that interfered with winning medals in international competitions such as the Olympic Games. When the economic stakes associated with sports increased dramatically during the 1960s and 1970s, and when a dispute subverted the process of selecting athletes for national teams, the federal government intervened and restructured the organization of amateur sports. Like other states, the US government has influenced sports through its economic and fiscal policies (Johnson & Frey 1985).

Studies on sport and the state increased through the 1970s and early 1980s, when public sports policies reached their peak. They decreased afterwards, when neoliberal policies reduced state interventions in all social and cultural domains, including sport. At that point,

research in the sociology of sport began to focus on the professionalization and commodification of sport, and other issues in which public policies do not play a major role.

The revival of state theory in political science served as an incentive for research based on Marxism during the 1960s, and research focusing on welfare policies as state funded social programs were reduced during the 1980s. Functions of the state, as a normalizing, regulating, and repressive agent, were reexamined during the 1990s and 2000s.

The concepts used to study the state have come from the political sciences, history, and the sociology of social relationships and conflicts. Although scholars need to clarify concepts such as “the state,” (sporting) “ideology,” “public policy,” and “domination,” they have used the theories of Marx, Weber, Durkheim, Elias, Giddens, and Bourdieu in their research on sport and the state. Some research has helped us understand details in decision making processes and the financing of sport, but many questions remain unanswered. A clear definition of a frame of analysis for the “world of sports,” conceived as precisely as the models of the state, would permit the development of a more coherent body of research, as it is proposed by the theory of “fields,” borrowed from Pierre Bourdieu (Defrance 1995). Comparative studies are needed to explain the relationships between sport and various state forms, such as those organized around religious power, those established alongside a strong industrial capitalist sector, those that have been militarized for a long time, and others.

Questions related to the culture of the state personnel (qualified occupations in public administration) and their perception of sport should be examined to understand the public administration of sport, as well as when and where it prevails over private administration. The specific transformations of the neoliberal state since the 1980s form a new topic in the analysis of sports policies. During this period, the issue of controlling sport doping practices has become a topic that enables scholars to study alliances and oppositions between public and private powers in the governance of contemporary sports.

SEE ALSO: Figurational Sociology and the Sociology of Sport; Nationalism and Sport; Political Economy and Sport; Politics and Sport; Sport and Capitalism; Sport and Culture; Sportization

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sport as work

Peter Donnelly

If work and sport are referred to in the same breath, it is usually as opposites. Although it is now commonplace to refer to professional sports as a business, perhaps some resentment about the salaries of some professional athletes in some sports (as opposed to, for example, a more

widespread acceptance of corporate salaries/bonuses, and incomes in the entertainment industry) is related to this sense that sport is not work. Along with leisure, recreation, games, and play, sport is usually considered as part of the non serious side of social life. However, there are many ways that sport is and has become work like, and a number of ways that sport is related to work.

Consider, for example, how sport has become a metaphor for work. Even in children's sports we continually find references to "work out," "work rate," "hard work," and "getting the job done." Taylorism, the scientific management and measurement of work, found its way into coaching and training principles in sports in the twentieth century, as coaches emphasized discipline, routine, and repetitive systems of training. As sports became both ideologically and commercially important following World War II, the emphasis on outcome (product) in the form of "win at all costs"/ends justify the means approaches became widespread. By the 1980s a system of early talent identification and intensive and specialized training for young athletes was widespread, making the experience of sports work like for many children, and leading some sociologists to refer to such involvement as "child labor" (Donnelly 1997).

The utilitarian idea that sport for its own sake was not justification enough and that sport and recreation ought to have a rational purpose first became evident in the nineteenth century, when it was assumed that the function of sport was to build character. Eventually, sport took on a larger socializing purpose. Riesman (1978) highlighted this when he observed: "The road to the boardroom leads through the locker room." Seeley et al. (1956) described how sports prepared upper middle class boys in a Toronto neighborhood for the "career." The somewhat contradictory, but career necessary skills of individual achievement and teamwork were exemplified in sports, and sports created opportunities for bonding and networking. Berlage's (1982) corporate socialization research involved a series of studies of boys' sports in upper middle class suburbs of New York City. However, feminism added a new interpretive dimension to her research, highlighting the relationship between the "glass ceiling" and sport participation. Lacking experiences in team sports,

Berlage noted, prevents women from being more successful in the corporate world.

The socialization theme was also evident in the work of several European neo Marxist sociologists of sport in the 1970s. They argued that sport in capitalist societies was practiced in such a way as to enculturate work discipline in participants and spectators. However, their argument went further, pointing out that in the relations of production of sport, working athletes (amateur and professional) were alienated from both the process and the product of their labor (Rigauer 1981). As with alienated labor more generally, sport participation held no intrinsic satisfaction for athletes who did not own the profits of their labor. These ideas were picked up in North America, where similar arguments were made with regard to college athletes (in the US) and professional athletes.

Occupational analyses of sport have addressed both direct involvement – athletes, coaches, and officials – and the numerous ancillary occupations associated with sport.

Some of the earliest studies in the sociology of sport were of professional wrestling and horse racing. Subsequent studies focused on careers such as university coaches and referees. These studies used an interactionist/interpretive approach and often focused on “career contingencies.” A critical and cultural shift in the field of subcultural research in the late 1970s led to a combination of interactionist and more critical sociologies (e.g., Ingham 1975), leading to a cultural studies approach to occupational subcultures in sports.

Ancillary occupations (e.g., sport agents, sport lawyers, sport scientists, and those engaged in the administration and marketing of sports) have received less sociological attention. However, there are growing bodies of research on clinicians involved in sports medicine; and on sports journalism, including newsroom studies, television production ethnographies, and the struggles of female journalists to cover sports. Another set of ancillary occupations involves those who work in the manufacture of sporting goods and clothing, and the construction of sports facilities. The manufacturing group has been the focus of research deriving from the anti Nike campaigns (Sage 1999) and more recently the focus has returned to child labor in the sporting goods industry, and to the

trafficking of child athletes (Donnelly & Petherick 2004). However, the majority of work in sports is carried out by unpaid volunteers – without them, a significant number of organized sports events would not occur. Although research on volunteers is just beginning, there is a small but important body of research on the ways in which women’s unpaid labor facilitates the sport participation of men and children (Thompson 1999).

The final form of work that has generated interest in the sociology of sport has been termed identity work. Research shows how individuals becoming involved in sports actively work to construct appropriate athletic identities (Donnelly & Young 1988). More recently, interest has shifted to class and gender, and to studies of racial, ethnic, and national identities, exploring the relationships between sport and attempts to produce, reproduce, and maintain relevant identities.

The Beijing Olympics may provoke more interest in fair labor practices in sports; there is growing interest in the work of sports clinicians, and in workplace health and safety/injury issues related to sports; research has begun to focus on sport volunteers and ideas of social capital and community; and studies of identity work will continue as researchers turn to Bourdieu’s theories to analyze the ways that individuals work to maintain class distinctions through sports.

SEE ALSO: Identity, Sport and; Leisure; Sport, Amateur; Sport and Capitalism; Sport Culture and Subcultures; Sport, Professional; Sport and Social Capital; Sport and Social Class; Sports Heroes and Celebrities

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sportization

Joseph Maguire

The sportization process involved a shift towards the competitive, regularized, rationalized, and gendered bodily exertions of achievement sport that, in turn, connected to wider changes at the level of personality, body deportment, and social interaction. This process entailed regulating violence, developing formalized sets of rules and governing bodies, and shifting body habitus. Despite the existence of European rivals in the form of German and Swedish gymnastics, and although some older folk pastimes also survived, it was male achievement sport, emerging out of England, that was to affect people's body habitus on a global scale. Resistance to and reinterpretations of this body culture have been evident throughout the ongoing sportization process.

The initial sportization of British/English pastimes occurred in phases. There was a seventeenth and eighteenth century phase in which the principal pastimes of cricket, fox hunting, horse racing, and boxing emerged as modern sports. A second, nineteenth century phase followed in which soccer, rugby, tennis, and track and field assumed modern forms and during

which school based sport developed (Elias & Dunning 1986). A third sportization phase during the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries paralleled wider globalization processes and was shaped by a series of global flows. Modern sport rapidly diffused globally along the lines of the formal and informal British Empire. At this stage, the content, meaning, and control of sport reflected British/European male values. The fourth phase lasted from the 1920s through to the 1960s, when sportization processes, though still powered by western values, increasingly reflected "American" notions of sport and was further consolidated across the non western parts of the globe. Beginning in the late 1960s, there emerged a fifth phase of sportization containing two seemingly contradictory features: the increasing standardization of what counts as sport – through media sport and the Olympic movement – combined with new varieties of body cultures and movements that challenge the hegemony of modern achievement sport (Maguire 1999).

There is a series of structured processes that have permeated the five phases of sportization (Maguire et al. 2002). While the reach and spread of each of these structured processes has varied over time and across space, they now constitute modern achievement sport – the context within which people experience global sport (Guttman 1994; Van Bottenburg 2001). The pattern and development of these structured processes also reflects and reinforces prevailing established/outsider relations and the power geometry within specific societies. These structured processes involve the following.

First, there is the emergence and diffusion of achievement sport accompanied by the decline of both western and non occidental folk body cultures. Modern achievement sport has marginalized indigenous games. Although such practices have not disappeared, and may, in some societies, be undergoing revival, the overall trend is for folk games to become residual features of body cultures (Renson 1998).

Second, global sport reflects a gendered ideology and content, making it a "male preserve" whose levers of power are still handled by men (Hargreaves 1994).

Third, sportization involved the development of physical practices that entail schooling the body. There have been shifts from

nineteenth and twentieth century forms of “drill,” European forms of gymnastics and dance, Physical Training, and Physical Education to late twentieth century practices associated with Human Movement Studies, Sport Science, and Kinesiological Studies. The state, through its compulsory schooling policies, has thus played an active role in the reinforcement of global sport (Maguire 2004a).

Fourth, from its inception through its current high tech manifestations, modern achievement sport has reflected and reinforced the medicalization, scientization, and rationalization of human expressiveness. The athlete is increasingly seen as an enhanced, efficient machine, adhering to a sport ethic associated with the “ultimate” performance. The logic at work may well be leading the athlete towards genetic modification and a cyborg coexistence (Hoberman 1992).

Fifth, global sport has impacted the habitus of people across societies and the habitats in which they live. Over time, as sport practices moved from small to large scale, from low intensity to high intensity forms, and from “natural” materials to synthetics, the athlete, spectator, viewer, and employers became consumers of scarce resources and threats to the environment (Maguire et al. 2002).

Sixth, the global diffusion of sport has reflected the ongoing balance of power within and between nations, and today the sport power elite have maintained their grip on power and been joined by a range of representatives from large media and sponsoring corporations (Miller et al. 2001). Demands for democratic control and transparency and accountability in decision making remain unfulfilled, while academic stakeholders are frozen out of the sport policy process.

Seventh, both in the making and ongoing formation of global sport we see the reinforcement and enhancement of global inequalities within the West and between the West and non occidental societies. Here, questions concerning cultural power, civilizational struggles, and wider globalization processes arise (Maguire 1999; 2004b).

SEE ALSO: Gender, Sport and; Globalization, Sport and; Postcolonialism and Sport; Sport; Sport and the Body; Sport and the Environment; Sports Heroes and Celebrities

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sports heroes and celebrities

Steven Jackson

The terms hero and celebrity have increasingly become used interchangeably, but they are fundamentally different. According to Daniel Boorstin, “*The celebrity is a person who is known for his well knownness . . . The hero was distinguished by his achievement; the celebrity by his image or trademark. The hero created himself;*

the celebrity is created by the media. The hero is a big man [*sic*]; the celebrity is a big name” (1992: 57, 61). Thus, there are some clear distinctions between the two concepts and the challenge is to ascertain how and why they have become conflated. First, we must examine the meaning, significance and types of heroes and why sport remains such an important site for their identification and development. In turn, we need to understand how changes in wider society have tended to shift attention, status, and rewards from heroes to celebrities.

Heroes/heroines have existed throughout human history. From ancient Greece and Rome through the Middle Ages and the Renaissance to the twenty first century, societies and cultures have created, defined, bestowed, and otherwise recognized what is known as a hero (Klapp 1949). In Browne’s (1990) view, heroes highlight the potential and possibility of humans by expanding and/or conquering the physical, psychological, social, spiritual, and altruistic limits of human beings.

And while there are many cultural arenas in which individuals have emerged as heroes, sport has always been one of the key sites. There are likely many reasons for this, but in particular sport, as a cultural practice and institution, offers the opportunity for the demonstration of physical superiority in a system with clear rankings and rewards, the display of courage, commitment, and sacrifice, and the chance to represent a particular group, community, or nation. In a contemporary commercial context the latter point is quite important, given that “Only sports has the nation, and sometimes the world, watching the same thing at the same time, and if you have a message, that’s a potent messenger” (Singer 1998; cited in Rowe 1999: 74).

Even a cursory look at the diversity of sport heroes, both historical and contemporary, indicates that they emerge from a wide range of personal achievements, social backgrounds, and cultural contexts. In effect, there are different ways by which heroes emerge. Although the typology that follows is not exhaustive, it may aid in understanding the process of how different individuals became heroes. Although the categories are not mutually exclusive, one becomes a hero in one of four ways (Ingham et al. 1993). First, a person can perform an extraordinary superhuman feat. In actual fact

heroes are often people who perform ordinary things but at a much higher level and with much greater consistency than the average. A few people who fit this category might include Sir Donald Bradman, Babe Didrikson, Jessie Owens, Paavo Nurmi, Pelé, Nadia Comaneci, Michael Jordan, Wayne Gretzky, Carl Lewis, Tiger Woods, and Lance Armstrong.

Second, one can become a hero by being the first to achieve a particular and unexpected standard. Such a category would include people like Sir Roger Bannister who, in 1954, was the first person to break the 4 minute mile; or Sir Edmund Hillary who, along with Tenzing Norgay, was the first to climb Mount Everest, the highest point on earth, in 1953.

Third, one can become a hero through risk taking, personal sacrifice, and/or saving a life. There may be no better example of this type of hero than Canadian Terry Fox. Diagnosed with cancer and with part of his right leg amputated, Fox set out to run across Canada in what he called the Marathon of Hope. Sadly, his run ended after 3,339 miles because the cancer spread to his lungs. Terry Fox died at age 22 on June 28, 1981. Still his life and mission are celebrated annually. Each September 13 marks the Terry Fox Run and to date his foundation has raised over \$360 million.

Fourth, a person can become a hero by virtue of a particular performance within a specific sociohistorical context: being the right person at the right time (see Ingham et al. 1993). One example of this type is John Roosevelt (Jackie) Robinson, who, facing enormous racial discrimination and other social barriers in 1947, became the first “black” athlete to play Major League Baseball.

The world still has heroes, but something has changed in terms of the type of people that society celebrates and rewards. Increasingly, status appears to be something that is *manufactured* versus *achieved* and heroes are being marginalized by celebrities, stars, and idols (cf. Andrews & Jackson 2001; Dyer 1979; Gamson 1994; Rojek 2001). While there are no simple answers to explain this transformation, consideration must be given to the emergence of the society of the individual, a greater scrutiny of private lives embodied in an exploitive tabloid culture, and a world driven by consumption, advertising, and marketing. As a consequence,

“everyone is involved in either producing or consuming celebrities” (Rein et al. 1997: x). Arguably, the most powerful vehicle in this shift are the media, whom Leo Braudy (1997: 550) calls the “arbiters of celebrity.” The media are global, immediate, and increasingly interconnected, resulting in a virtual saturation of celebrity culture linked to sport, music, fashion, movies, and reality television.

Ultimately, we are left with a challenge to gain a better understanding of the social and political function of contemporary heroes and celebrities. In part, this will require an examination of who has the power to define heroes and celebrities, under what conditions, and in whose interests.

SEE ALSO: Celebrity Culture; Media and Sport; Sport; Sport and Capitalism; Sport and Culture; Sport Culture and Subculture; Sport, Professional; Sport as Spectacle; Sports Industry

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sports industry

Dominic Malcolm

Sport became an industry at the point at which events (matches, races, bouts) ceased to be oriented solely toward participants and became largely organized so that they could be consumed by spectators. In perhaps the earliest sociological analysis of this process, Gregory P. Stone (1955) argued that consequently “play” (unscripted, spontaneous) became overshadowed by “display” (prearranged, staged, spectacular); that is to say, in some respects industry or commercialism is the very antithesis of sport. This critique still lingers amongst those who might be termed “purists,” but it must now be recognized that whilst on the one hand sport has become an industry just like any other, on the other hand, and particularly in terms of the demand for sport, it has a number of distinctive or peculiar features.

Contemporary analysis of the sports industry can be subdivided into four mutually interdependent parts: sports teams and leagues; the media; sponsors and manufacturers; and sports celebrities. A brief initial examination of the development of the sports industry, however, will be used to demonstrate the long lineage of these commercial processes, and therefore to correct the prevalent, false, assumption that they are unique to contemporary sport.

Aspects of a sports industry can be seen in the “sports like” activities of ancient Rome, but it is more useful to trace the development of the sports industry back to eighteenth century Europe, and England in particular. At this time, tavern owners and innkeepers started to exploit existing sports events to increase trade. The more entrepreneurial would provide facilities for playing cricket, quoits, horse racing, cock fighting, and so on. As the eighteenth century progressed, tavern owners started to charge admission fees to supplement the profits made through the sale of refreshments and lodgings. Subsequently, the emergent ruling bodies of sport (e.g., the Jockey Club, the Marylebone Cricket Club) established their own permanent facilities (i.e., Newmarket Race Course, Lords Cricket Ground) to contain the 10,000 plus

spectators that could be attracted to the major sporting events of eighteenth century England.

The development of the sports industry in England progressed relatively unrestricted until the advent of amateurism in the middle of the nineteenth century. Boxers, cricketers, and jockeys were often sponsored by a wealthy aristocrat who would employ talented sportspeople, nominally as household servants or for work on his estate but, in fact, principally on account of their sporting skills. The first professional sports team was William Clarke's All England XI, a cricket team which toured England playing "exhibition" matches from 1846 to 1870. A number of imitators soon followed. Churches and factories were subsequently influential in establishing works teams. These teams came to represent towns and cities and thus became key sites of identity formation in a time of industrialization led geographical mobility. Public demand for regular and meaningful fixtures, fueled by the emerging publishing industry that grew up around sporting contests, led to the establishment of the Football Association (FA) Challenge Cup in 1871 and the English Football League, consisting of 12 clubs from the English Midlands and the north, in 1888. In 1895, rugby clubs in the north of England broke away from the staunchly amateur English Rugby Football Union (RFU), ultimately forming a professional version of the game, rugby league. English counties first competed for a cricket championship in 1873 (Holt 1989).

Whilst the emergence of a sports industry in America was initially slower, the lack of a strict adherence to amateurism enabled it to subsequently develop rather more rapidly. During the 1860s sports entrepreneurs enclosed grounds, assembled "all star" teams, and charged entry fees. Initially, baseball was strongly influenced by the amateur ethos, but by the time the National Baseball League (NBL) was formed in 1876, commercialization and covert professionalization were well established. Albert Spalding, a significant driving force in the development of the NBL, had the year before moved from the Boston Red Stockings to the Chicago White Stockings because he was offered a well paid job in a grocery which entailed minimal duties and thus the chance to play regular baseball. Spalding subsequently went on to organize

promotional baseball tours to England and develop baseball related merchandise such as balls, uniforms, and bases. The antecedents of today's sports industry were well established in nineteenth century Britain and America (Wiggins 1995).

SPORTS TEAMS AND LEAGUES

The appeal of sport, and therefore the economic viability of the sports industry, is said to depend on "uncertainty of outcome," i.e., its unpredictable, unscripted nature. It is on this basis that anti competitive practices (the draft system, collective merchandising, and revenue sharing agreements) and legal exemptions from antitrust laws exist in many US sports (and to a lesser extent under EU law). US leagues are organized as monopolies – or cartels – with no automatic mechanism for the removal of weaker clubs and their replacement by stronger teams. By limiting the extent to which the individual teams compete against one another for fans, media revenues, and merchandise sales, the league is in a stronger position to eliminate competition from rival leagues. The peculiar feature of sport in the US is that competitions are oriented toward the economic benefit of all the teams in the league, rather than forwarding the interests of individuals and individual teams (Gratton & Taylor 2000).

Somewhat ironically, after decades in which team sports have not been particularly profit oriented (economists have traditionally described English professional football clubs as utility maximizers rather than profit maximizers), the leagues and sports clubs of Europe have, in some regards, "out commercialized" their American role models. Pyramids of leagues exist to enable weaker teams to be replaced by stronger ones. Leading clubs have successfully sought to consolidate their own economic position, at the expense of teams with less popular support, using as leverage the threat of withdrawal from existing competitions and the establishment of their own private league and cups. Recently developed European football competitions (e.g., the European Champions League in football) structure prizes and revenue sharing to favor the clubs from the wealthiest leagues. Currently,

broadcasting rights are sold by the league or competition as a whole, but if clubs were to negotiate individually, some, and Manchester United in particular, would be likely to profit considerably. To this end, some clubs (e.g., Manchester United) have established their own television stations. Whereas most American sports organizations are privately owned but reliant on publicly funded or owned stadia, mainland European (football) clubs have traditionally been membership clubs owning their own facilities (though an increasing number have established commercially oriented, more streamlined, executive boards in the last decade). Traditionally, English sports clubs have been privately owned but in an attempt to release capital and increase spending power, many have become publicly listed companies on the London Stock Exchange. A consequence of this is that clubs now have a legal obligation to prioritize the interests of shareholders, and inevitably this leads to a more direct pursuit of profit.

THE MEDIA

It is often said that the relationship between the media and sport (but strictly speaking the sports industry) is symbiotic. Media companies pay large amounts for the right to broadcast particular sports events because the programs are cheap to produce, attract relatively large audiences, and because the demographics of the viewers they attract (e.g., young males with large disposable incomes) appeal to sponsors who, in turn, are willing to pay large fees for the right to advertise during the broadcast. The sports industry needs the media both as a source of income and as a means of publicity. The balance of power between the sports industry and media companies varies from sport to sport and between countries. However, certain common patterns of the ways in which the media have shaped sport in recent years are identifiable (Wenner 1998).

First, media companies request that events are scheduled at particular times in order to appeal to the largest viewing audience. The establishment of Monday night football in the US is a classic example. Similarly, whilst

English football matches have traditionally been held on Saturday afternoons, increasingly television has (successfully) requested matches to be rescheduled to Sundays, Monday nights, and Saturday mornings in order to maximize viewing figures (which itself has led to the expansion of the phenomenon of sports consumption based around bars and inns). International sporting events, such as the Olympics, are most heavily influenced by the media of economically dominant countries, i.e., the US. Second, it has been claimed that media companies have forced changes to the structure of the sports themselves. Boxing contests were reduced from 15 to 12 rounds, it has been argued, to enable television companies to more conveniently package bouts within a 1 hour time slot. Rule changes have increasingly protected quarterbacks in American football to encourage a more open passing game. Free throws in basketball have been minimized to speed up the action. Third, accompanying these structural and timing changes have been changes in presentational style. The use of loud music, video, cheerleaders, and mascots all serve to make the behavior of sports crowds more orchestrated, and thus more amenable to broadcasters' desires and production needs. Whilst there is a tendency to exaggerate the media's influence (sports are not fixed in time, and rules are not inherent or unalterable but have continually been refined for various purposes), commercial interests currently play a larger part in rule reformation than at any stage in the past (Sewart 1987).

Some sports events combine some or all of these characteristics and essentially become "TV made" (e.g., Kerry Packer's cricket "circus" in Australia, indoor soccer leagues in America, professional wrestling competitions). Television programs such as *Gladiators* illustrate the media's ideal format for sports but, tellingly, as Stone earlier argued, the demands of spectacularization are sometimes entirely antithetical to play, for they destroy the uncertain element that is the basis of the appeal of sport. This has led television companies to pursue a new strategy, the purchase of sports clubs, for this is now seen as the most effective way in which broadcasters can exert control over "genuine" sporting events which enjoy enduring and widespread popularity.

SPONSORS AND MANUFACTURERS

Sponsors of sport can be divided into two groups, those whose products are intrinsically sport related, and those whose aren't. For the latter group, sport is seen as a useful tool through which to promote products because of the supposedly health promoting and character building qualities of sport. The mass and youth appeal of sport is similarly attractive to sponsors and the male dominance of sports spectatorship has led numerous beer manufacturers to sponsor leagues and teams. In recent years tobacco companies have used sports sponsorship (most notably motor racing) to overcome legal restrictions on their ability to advertise. A classic example of what has been called the "sport-media-production complex" is the coalition of the National (American) Football League (NFL), Anheuser Busch (makers of Budweiser beer), and British television company Channel 4 (Maguire 1990). Their mutual interests converged in an attempt to increase the popularity of American football in the UK, overcome the British perception of American beers as unmasculine, and aid a newly established broadcaster to develop a distinct profile and market. Despite the triumvirate's success in the 1980s, the subsequent decline of American football in the UK again shows the limits of the industry's ability to manipulate popular demand.

There is, however, a more natural link between sport and companies producing sports related products, but it is only since the 1980s that the demand for sports related goods – such as sports shoes – has become big enough (i.e., as high performance sports gear has become high fashion) to justify the levels of expenditure required to sponsor major sports events. Nike are thought to have changed the rules for sports marketing by paying huge endorsements to tie athletes to using their equipment (\$90 million for basketball's LeBron James, \$450 million for the right to run Manchester United's merchandise and kit operation) and "in your face," aggressive advertising linking their products to the athletic success of a few high profile individuals. Nike, more than most, have had to deal with accusations about their dependency on exploited Asian labor, but this seems to have had little impact on sales and profits (Sage 1999).

SPORTS CELEBRITIES

It is the convergence of the interests of sponsors such as Nike, media/television companies, and sports organizations that means that when we look at the sports industry we must recognize the role of sports celebrities (Andrews & Jackson 2001). The sports industry idealizes images of sports celebrities so that they become general objects of glamour and fantasy in popular culture. Nike's endorsement deal with basketball superstar Michael Jordan led the "Air Jordan" sports shoe to become the highest selling sneaker of all time, and helped bolster the popular appeal of the NBA. But these interdependencies also fed Jordan's celebrity status, which in turn served as a site for the production of particular (largely racial) ideologies. Sociologists have also highlighted how, in tennis, the Anna Kournikova sports industry produces ideologies relating to gender and how Nike's work with self starred "Cablinasian" golfer Tiger Woods has sought to promote a color blind, multicultural America of the future, which in turn has helped open up lucrative new markets for golf equipment in Asia.

But perhaps at the pinnacle of this sports celebrity industry is English footballer David Beckham, about whom an increasing quantity of academic literature has appeared (Cashmore 2004). Beckham ties all these themes of the sports industry together: a sport which has in the last decade exploited satellite television technology to increase exposure and generate ever increasing income; a player for the wealthiest soccer clubs in the world (Manchester United, Real Madrid); huge endorsement contracts with Adidas, Brylcreem, and others; and, underlying his success and celebrity status, the production of various class and sexuality discourses. But more than this, unlike Michael Jordan whose celebrity was a largely North American phenomenon, Beckham, by virtue of playing the only truly global sport, is perhaps the most globally recognized sports celebrity.

The sports industry started as a local financial venture, with locally based sports celebrities like Albert Spalding. As the Beckham case shows, the contemporary sports industry has expanded to be global in scale, hunting out new audiences and markets for merchandise, filling increasing amounts of television airtime, and creating new

sources of revenue for sports teams, sports media, sports sponsors, and sports celebrities.

SEE ALSO: Consumption, Mass Consumption, and Consumer Culture; Media; Media and Sport; Sport, Amateur; Sport and Capitalism; Sport and Culture; Sport, Professional; Sports Heroes and Celebrities

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sports stadia

John Bale

Sports do not require stadia, but in their modified form they have come to be seen as necessities. In contemporary discussions of the sports stadium two broad themes have attracted the attention of both sports scholarship and public opinion: (1) activity and organization

within the stadium, and (2) extra stadium effects and implications. Academic approaches to these themes are considered in turn.

The sports stadium is an ambiguous architectural form. It has been read and written from various perspectives. With its rows of numbered seats, its geometrically segmented form, and the all prevailing video surveillance equipment, the modern stadium has been read as an example of container architecture analogous to a prison. Such a reading draws on the ideas of Michel Foucault. It is undoubtedly a secure place to house large numbers of bodies and, in times of unrest, stadia occasionally have been used as places of incarceration. The gaze of the police and video camera is, at the level of the "playing field," matched by the gaze of the referee or umpire. The controlled character of stands and bleachers is matched by the spatial positioning and constraints on those who entertain the entertained. The spectators and the players each have defined positions in stadium space. The stadium, then, is a facility for displaying dominance and power. A Marxist view would add that it is a modern site of "bread and circus" (Brohm 1974) in the production of "docile bodies." This is not to say, however, that resistance from both spectators and players has been eliminated, as numerous studies of deviance and hooliganism testify (Dunning et al. 2002).

The Foucauldian model can be read as a malign, pessimistic view of power. An alternative, slightly more benign perspective is to see the stadium as a theater. Elias and Dunning (1986) write that the drama as a game of soccer unfolds has something in common with a good theatrical play. The play has a script; sports have their game plans. A major difference, however, is that the modern theater crowd remains passive compared with that of the sports stadium, though this was not always the case. And there is a logical case for making the sports crowd more like that of the theater. After all, it is well known from studies of the home field advantage that the crowd has an impact on sporting performance, hence contributing to an unfair advantage. Some postmodernists have suggested, therefore, that crowds should be excluded from stadium sports events (Bale 2003).

A widely used third metaphor is that of the garden: a stretch of grass (nature) in the middle of the city (culture). This view is encouraged

by the notion that there is more to the stadium experience than watching a game (Raitz 1995). The color, the playfulness, the noise and smell are said to make the stadium visit a sensory experience or a carnival. Of course, there is nothing “natural” about a football, baseball, or cricket field. Indeed, the progress of “turf science” has produced grass surfaces that are often almost indistinguishable from nylon carpets. Nevertheless, the garden metaphor is revealing in that, like the garden, the stadium is a melding of horticulture and architecture, and of dominance and affection. Arguably the prime advocate of the stadium as garden is Bartlett Giamatti (1989), who sees the stadium as an adult version of the kindergarten. And it worth recalling how many stadia are still called gardens and parks, despite the absence of flowers, trees, and foliage.

It is also possible to read the stadium as a reduced mirror image of the city (Bromberger 1995), with its segmented spectator space and sense of community. Different research, then, reads and writes the stadium in different ways.

A second broad approach to “stadium studies” is to explore the wider impact that the stadium has on urban or rural space. The social, economic, and geographical impact of stadia in urban areas has been the subject of considerable research. Residents and business in close proximity to stadia may receive both indirect benefits and disadvantage from such proximity. Quality of life can be reduced for such residents on game days as noise, crowds, and various forms of pollution may be imposed upon them. These are the stadium negative externalities. Contrariwise, some businesses such as bars and vending depend greatly on stadium events for revenue. From a social perspective the presence of a local stadium and its occupants can generate bonding and place pride (Bale 2001).

Stadium relocation – implying the migration of the clubs and teams that play in them – has become a widespread phenomenon in the United States. It is widely believed that the construction of such new stadia adds to urban image, status, and economic regeneration. It is further argued that the new spending associated with such facilities creates an economic multiplier effect that boosts local or regional wealth. The evidence for such positive effects of stadium development is mixed, but the general

view is that the benefits of such developments are often negative (Baade 1995).

Stadia are increasingly becoming multifunctional facilities or “entertainment centres” rather than monofunctional spaces, dedicated to a specific sport. The diversity of stadium activities is driven by the need for revenues and profits, hence the need for intensive use of space. The ambiguous nature of domed stadiums, for example, with retractable roofs, and associated banqueting, hotel, conference, and restaurant facilities, makes it clear that these places are not just for sport. The Toronto Skydome (Kidd 1995) represents an early example of such a structure, and Ritzer (2005) has identified recently constructed, large stadiums as “cathedrals of consumption.”

SEE ALSO: Sport; Sport and Capitalism; Sport and the Environment; Sport, Professional; Sport as Spectacle; Sports Industry

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stalking

Emily Finch

No single definition of stalking exists. This is probably because, despite certain commonalities, there is no prototypical case upon which a definition could be founded. Although some types of behavior are common in many stalking cases – silent/abusive telephone calls, unwanted gifts and letters, surveillance – each case involves an idiosyncratic combination of these and other diverse types of behavior that renders a definition based on the conduct involved somewhat nebulous. Other than this, definitions have isolated factors such as the relationship between the parties or the motivation behind the behavior, but again, these are so diverse and wide ranging that it is impossible to formulate a definition that captures the full spectrum of stalking cases. Although the various attempts at definition differ, a common theme exists that facilitates the identification of core characteristics: repeated and unwanted intrusions into the life of another that engender a negative reaction in the recipient.

Stalking emerged as a pressing and prevalent social problem during the 1990s. Its emergence was incremental as stalking developed through a series of manifestations before becoming embedded in the public consciousness. Initially, stalking rose to prominence in the United States as a problem experienced by celebrities as overzealous fans resorted to desperate measures to make contact with the object of their affections. Gradually, it became apparent that stalking was not just a celebrity problem but something that affected “ordinary people” too, although this was generally viewed as occurring in the context of a turbulent or terminated domestic relationship. It was for this reason that stalking became viewed for a time as inherently associated with domestic violence. It underwent a further metamorphosis as non relational stalking

rose to prominence. This manifestation of stalking, in common with celebrity stalking, had connotations of irrational obsession and mental illness as it became clear that stalkers could develop an obsession based on only tenuous contact with the victim. Although the evolutionary period of stalking gave rise to some divergent constructions, it finally emerged as a problem that was based upon repeated, unwanted, and unwelcome intrusion into the victim’s life irrespective of the identity or relationship of the parties involved.

Even after the emergence of stalking as a social problem and the development of a shared social understanding of its nature, there were impediments to the formulation of an appropriate and effective legal response. Definitional difficulties thwarted some of the earliest attempts at the introduction of stalking legislation due to the formidable challenge of creating legislation that differentiated between stalking and lawful conduct. It became clear that an unfortunate paradox existed in relation to a legal regulation of stalking. If stalking involved conduct that was inherently unlawful such as damaging property or causing harm/injury, for example, the police were able to intervene without the need for reliance on stalking legislation. Frequently, however, the stalker would engage exclusively in lawful conduct such as sending gifts or waiting for the victim in a public place, so any attempt at the criminalization of stalking needed to find a means of distinguishing between such conduct undertaken for lawful reasons and that undertaken as part of a campaign of stalking. How is the law to encapsulate the amorphous distinction between the single minded pursuit of the object of desire that occurs in stalking cases and which mirrors the socially acceptable pursuit of one’s true love in a way that criminalizes the former without undermining the legitimacy of the latter?

Ogilvie (2000) attributes this definitional dilemma to the “paradoxical status of stalking as simultaneously being an exemplar of conformity and criminality.” This acknowledges that stalking frequently involves behavior that would not be regarded as deviant or unacceptable if it were to occur in a different context. Sending flowers to a loved one can be distinguished from sending flowers to a total stranger, but even this is not unacceptable if it is welcomed by the

recipient as a romantic gesture. Context is every thing in stalking cases. Unlike the majority of criminal offenses, stalking frequently involves no breach of normative conventions; rather, it often involves lawful conduct that engenders a negative reaction in the recipient. As such, the response of the recipient of the conduct is legally transformative; a positive or indifferent response allows the conduct to retain its lawful nature whilst an adverse response brings the conduct within the remit of stalking and hence within the reach of the regulation of the law.

Stalking is particularly problematic in the complex context of sociosexual relationships in which pursuit and persistence is socially acceptable, even desirable. Mullen et al. (1999) believe that the apparent increase in stalking in the late twentieth century can be attributed in part to the more transient nature of relationships, which can leave individuals feeling isolated and rejected and thus engender desperation to find a partner. The intensity of these feelings and the pressure to achieve social acceptability by the formation of a romantic relationship can lead individuals to engage in overexaggerated or excessive romantic gestures; what Ogilvie (2000) describes as an “amplification of normative conformity.” If this coincides with an anxiety induced inability (or reluctance) to recognize the often subtle social cues that delineate the parameters of acceptable behavior at the early stages of a sociosexual relationship, then the initiator of the conduct may be unaware that his attentions are unwelcome. Differential understanding and interpretations of the same events by different actors are frequently the basis of accusations of stalking. In a culture in which the authorities play an increasing role in what was previously considered to be the private realm of interpersonal relationships and in which there is an expectation of the state’s protection from all that is adverse and unpleasant in society, the primacy of the recipient’s interpretation and the consequent criminalization of such events were an almost inevitable development.

SEE ALSO: Crime; Deviance; Deviance, Crime and; Domestic Violence; Mental Disorder; Social Problems, Concept and Perspectives; Victimization; Violence

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standardization

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Standardization is a procedure used in science to increase the validity and reliability of research. It is predicated on the principle that truly objective scientific findings ought to be non-contradictory and replicable and that the most efficient technique for facilitating both internal consistency and replication is to ensure that the various aspects of research design and conduct (e.g., measurement instruments, methods of data collection, methods of analysis) do not clash either within the confines of a particular study or from one study to the next. Standardization is thought to fortify scientists against the biases that may otherwise be introduced into research by things like their own personal characteristics and/or the characteristics of the particular social contexts within which research is conducted. The concept of standardization is used in two distinct but related senses in science. In a purely descriptive sense, the standardization of research methods secures uniformity in the scientific enterprise by establishing a certain lingua franca within which to conduct meaningful and productive dialogue and debate. Standardized methods facilitate confidence among researchers conforming to them that they and others who also conform are gathering new knowledge about the same empirical phenomena. In the second sense, standardization is less descriptive than prescriptive. Hence one seeks to standardize scientific research methods not

only to make them uniform among scientists studying the same things, but also to ensure that a certain level of excellence is maintained. In this sense, scientists seek to standardize research methods not only to keep standards uniform but also to keep them “high.” In the social sciences, the concept of standardization has become particularly important in survey research. Considerable efforts are made to both promote the uniform adoption of particular question formats and other kinds of measurement instruments across studies and to ensure uniformity of procedure amongst interviewers working on the same study. Critics of standardization sometimes argue that procedures that ensure scientific findings can be replicated, or reproduced at different times and in different places, are not the same as procedures that might ensure that those findings are in fact valid. These critics argue that the preoccupation with replicability can easily mistake reliable findings for valid ones. Other critics suggest that standardization inevitably entails a level of veiled coercion as proponents of different standardized procedures wrangle with one another for supremacy. Still others suggest that standardized research methods impose an artificial framework on the collection of data that can introduce distortions into our data. These critics suggest that a more naturalistic and spontaneous approach to data collection may facilitate a more nuanced sensitivity to the nature of phenomena under investigation. More recently, sociologists of science have shown that standardized procedures must inevitably be applied in real world research situations that require discretionary assessments as to whether those procedures have been implemented properly. Because these discretionary assessments themselves can never be fully reduced to standardized protocols, we must remain cognizant of the fact that standardization can never completely eliminate the influence of specific individuals and specific social contexts on the conduct of scientific research.

SEE ALSO: Demographic Techniques; Decomposition and Standardization; Experimental Design; Quantitative Methods; Reliability; Replicability Analyses; Science, Ethnographic Studies of; Survey Research; Validity, Qualitative; Validity, Quantitative

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standardized educational tests

Mark Berends and Albert Boerema

Standardized tests are tests that are administered under controlled (or “standardized”) conditions – specifying where, when, how, and for how long test takers may respond to questions. The test questions provide a way to gather, describe, and quantify information that assesses performance on particular tasks to demonstrate knowledge of specific topics or processes. Standardization is important to compare individuals or groups and involves a consistent set of procedures for designing, administering, and scoring the test. The aim of standardization is to ensure that test takers are assessed under the same conditions, assuring that their test scores have the same meaning and are not influenced by differing conditions. Such standardized tests occur over the life course, with a range of uses including determination of school readiness, achievement throughout the schooling progress for students, accountability for districts, schools, teachers, and students, capabilities for college, and achievement as employees in the workforce.

Standardized tests, as a part of the wider educational, psychological, and sociological testing and assessments, have a long history within the United States. They represent one of the most important contributions of behavioral and social science to society, even though tests have been used in a myriad of proper and improper ways (AERA 1999). Their history is deeply rooted in a United States culture that is: empirically oriented and data driven; focused on change, which is assumed to be progress; embraces a belief that evidence can provide general guidance for efficient action; and straddles the choices that give individuals certain advances versus choices that serve the larger society (Baker 2001).

As described by *Standards for Educational and Psychological Testing* (1999) – an authoritative document on standards for measurement – there are four important facets of testing standards: (1) technical standards for test construction and evaluation; (2) professional standards for test use; (3) standards for particular applications; and (4) standards for administrative procedures. For a standardized test to be technically adequate, it should meet standards of validity and reliability, whether the test is norm referenced or criterion referenced.

Reliability is the degree to which the results of an assessment are dependable and consistently measure particular student knowledge and/or skills. Reliability also refers to the consistency of scores over time, across different performance tasks or items intended to measure the same thing, or consistency of scores across different raters. That is, reliability statistics can be computed to measure (1) *item reliability* – the relationship between individual test items intended to measure the same knowledge skills; (2) *test/retest reliability* – the relationship between two administrations of the same test to the same student or students; or (3) *rater reliability* – the extent of agreement between two or more raters. If assessments are not reliable, they cannot be valid.

Validity refers to both the extent to which a test measures what it is intended to measure and the appropriate inferences and actions taken based on the test scores. If a math test can only measure a subset of the domain of math skills, how confident are we that students are good at math if they perform well on a math test? How

confident are we that the proficiency level accurately portrays proficiency in mathematics? Within the current policy environment of the United States, if an assessment is to be valid, it should be aligned with the standards it is intended to measure and it should provide an accurate and reliable estimate of the students' performance relative to the standard.

In addition to the importance of standardized tests being reliable and valid, they can be either norm referenced or criterion referenced. A *criterion referenced* test is linked to specific performance standards or learning objectives. One interprets scores on criterion referenced tests based on the degree to which students demonstrate achievement of the specific learning standards and not how students perform compared to other students. On a criterion referenced test, it is possible that all students (or no students) will perform well on the specific learning objectives or standards. Of course, the percentage of students who will perform well on specific learning objectives depends on how ambitious those performance standards are (Linn 2003).

In contrast to criterion referenced tests, *norm referenced tests* are tests that compare student performance to a larger group. Typically, this larger group, or norm group, is a national sample representing a large and diverse cross section of students that allows comparison of a particular student's performance to the performance of others. The scores on norm referenced tests allow comparisons between the norm group and particular students, schools, districts, and states. All of these tested groups can be rank ordered in relation to the norm group. Thus, norm referenced tests are typically used to sort students rather than measure proficiency of specific learning objectives or standards.

Standardized testing has played a number of important roles in educational settings. These tests have been used for placement in instructional groups (e.g., ability groups or tracks), measuring achievement, assisting in making career and postsecondary educational choices, determining acceptance of applicants to colleges and universities, and monitoring the performance of educational systems.

Intelligence testing to guide ability grouping was one of the early uses of standardized testing (Cronbach 1975). The perceived need for ability grouping arose as two factors – students

staying in school longer and the large waves of immigration to the US at the turn of the twentieth century – created a wider range of student ability in high school classrooms. These changes had an impact on college bound students whose progress was held back, according to some ability grouping proponents, by the large number of students who did not seem to be academically gifted.

Following from the work of Binet in development of what were called “mental tests,” Terman developed a screening tool to identify students who were viewed as not prepared for the intellectual challenges of typical schooling with such labels as “feebleminded” or “retarded” (Resnick 1982). These early tests were administered individually to students to determine whether they should be removed from normal instruction. Wholesale use of intelligence testing was introduced by the military during World War I, when tests were developed to identify potential officers. The successful use of standardized testing by the military encouraged further development of tests and non military use, such as determining placement of students in homogeneous instructional ability groups (Resnick 1982). In the 1950s, there was a resurgence of intelligence testing for the purpose of grouping as a result of implementing the comprehensive high school with differentiated tracks (Linn 2000).

A second use of standardized testing has been the measurement of student achievement levels in a variety of academic domains. Examinations had long been used to determine student progress and set standards for high school graduation, but as the number of students increased it became the necessary to establish standardized criteria. The National Education Association adopted recommendations to standardized evaluation in 1914. At the time of World War I, there had been a rapid increase in the number of achievement tests, numbering more than 200 available for use in the primary and secondary schools (Resnick 1982). Later, a related use of achievement testing was the implementation of minimum competency testing for high school graduation in the 1970s and early 1980s (Linn 2000, 2001).

Standardized testing played a third role as it was used by school guidance departments to assist students in job or career selection and in

making decisions about attending postsecondary institutions. Testing in this area included assessing student aptitudes, interests, and skills to guide decision making between career and educational options. One aspect of this innovation was the move to keeping cumulative student records to document continued individual development (Resnick 1982; Linn 2001).

Determining whether students were academically prepared for college and university entrance is a fourth use of standardized tests. In 1899, the College Entrance Examination Board was created to “establish, administer, and evaluate examinations, in defined subject areas for entrance to participating colleges” (Resnick 1982: 187). After World War I, the Scholastic Aptitude Test (SAT) was developed to provide a standardized test that was not based on a specified curriculum, such as one from a college preparatory school. The focus on aptitude rather than curriculum was seen as being more equitable. In addition, the SAT introduced the use of multiple choice rather than essay type questions. Performance on the SAT and the American College Test (ACT), which was introduced in 1957, became a major component in the decision to accept students into most postsecondary institutions in the US.

A final important role of standardized testing, and possibly one of the earliest, was to compare schools and monitor their performance. As early as the 1840s a set of common questions was used in Boston to determine student progress. The result of this testing had little effect on students or teachers, but provided the Superintendent with a way to hold schools within the district accountable to common standards of student and teacher performance (Resnick 1982). This practice of using student achievement tests to hold schools accountable grew and continued through the rest of the nineteenth century, and is certainly prevalent today (Linn 2001).

New interest in the use of standardized testing occurred as a result of the 1965 federal Elementary and Secondary Education Act (ESEA). Standardized achievement tests became the means of monitoring and evaluating the use of these funds (Linn 2000; Koretz 2002). The 1983 *A Nation at Risk* report on the state of American education added a new impetus for the use of standardized testing in evaluating the performance of schools. While the testing arising

from the ESEA focused on educational equity, the new emphasis after *A Nation at Risk* was overall performance of the American educational system relative to international education systems.

Most recently, the 2001 ESEA reauthorization, the No Child Left Behind Act (NCLB), increased the importance of standardized testing to new levels in the US. This wave of standardized testing has moved the focus to establishing content standards, the setting of performance (or proficiency) standards for all students, and the addition of high stakes assessments for schools, educators, and, in some jurisdictions, students (Linn 2000, 2003; Linn et al. 2002).

In the foreseeable future, there are several avenues of research that are currently underway or likely to be carried out.

First, research should continue to examine reasonable projections for schools making adequate yearly progress toward learning objectives. The current federal law of NCLB increases the testing requirements and establishes accountability standards for states, districts, and schools in that they need to make measurable adequate yearly progress (AYP) for all students and subgroups of students defined by socioeconomic background, race/ethnicity, English language proficiency, and disability. There is currently wide variation in the rigor of both standards and tests so that students measured to be proficient vary widely from state to state. Over the next few years, researchers could continue to analyze data from different states to examine which schools make large gains on state assessments to understand what ambitious, yet reasonable, goals might be established for AYP (see Koretz 2002; Linn et al. 2002; Linn 2003).

Second, research needs to focus great attention to the tradeoffs that schools and teachers deal with under NCLB by examining how instructional resources are devoted to students at different points in the achievement distribution. For example, by focusing educators on the task of bringing all students to a minimum level of proficiency, it is possible under NCLB that schools will divert attention and resources from students who already meet this standard. In addition, schools may divert resources away from students who are so far below the standard because schools perceive little chance of

bringing them to the proficient level. However, such consequences are not inevitable. It may be possible to avoid negative distributional effects if schools instead make more efficient use of their resources, but additional research is needed to address this important issue.

Third, researchers should continue to examine how school principals and teachers actually use test score results for improvement (Goldring & Berends 2006). Schools are typically inundated with data and many teachers and principals are not trained in statistics and measurement to thoroughly understand how to use test score results for improving the conditions of schools and classrooms. Further research into the capabilities and capacity of schools to use data in effective ways for improving students' test scores would be beneficial for accountability systems that require shared responsibility (Linn 2003).

Finally, researchers should explore different ways to use tests to hold schools accountable. The current research suggests that test based accountability does not always work as intended, but there is no adequate research base to offer a compelling alternative to policymakers and educators. Koretz (2002: 774) describes the current situation as one in which "the role of researchers is like that of the proverbial custodian walking behind the elephant with a broom. The policies are implemented, and after the fact a few researchers are allowed to examine the effects and offer yet more bad news." Alternative accountability approaches would expand beyond just tests to examine a mix of incentives for teachers, changes in instructional practice, quality of examining standardized test score gains and growth for students in addition to proficiency levels, and alignment of instruction to standards to tests (see Porter 2002). Together, empirical analyses of these elements incorporated into various programs, policies, and interventions may provide not only alternatives, but also better information about the system of student learning.

SEE ALSO: Education; Educational Inequality; Intelligence Tests; Meritocracy; Opportunities for Learning; Schooling and Economic Success; Standardization; Stratification and Inequality, Theories of; Validity, Quantitative; Variables; Variables, Dependent; Variance

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state

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Few concepts are as central to social analysis and political practice as the state. Many assume that the state is synonymous with the elected government. All the non-elected state administrators, coercive apparatuses, and sociocultural institutions that constitute modern states are often ignored. Despite the crucial nature of state power, major political and methodological

disputes remain over the nature and role of the state and how to acquire and maintain state power. Some argue that state institutions are interwoven with social and economic relations in society. Others view the state as distinct from non-state institutions because they perform coercive, taxing, judicial, and other administrative roles that private institutions cannot perform. Despite the privatization of various state industries and services, there is little prospect that the state will be abolished and that all its current roles will be performed by private businesses. Sociologically and politically, Marxists argue that class and power relations in society hold the key to understanding state institutions and the way states maintain ruling class power, ideology, and cultural practices. Conversely, liberals and conservatives claim that society is made up of rich and poor individuals rather than a ruling class dominating other classes. Hence, they see the state as independent of class divisions in society. Weberians also argue that states are autonomous of class relations in society and have their own bureaucratic rationality and political and military agendas. Regardless of the political perspective, state theorists are also divided between those who formulate ideal types and models such as the “feudal state,” the “capitalist state,” or the “advanced liberal state,” and those who reject ideal types and stress the historical uniqueness of each state.

Without a notion of state institutions it is difficult to explain how stateless societies (such as indigenous communities) differ from societies with elaborate forms of military, fiscal, and administrative state power. Revolutions, imperialism, world wars, welfare states, and numerous other developments would be unintelligible if the vital roles played by state institutions were ignored. State theory has always been intimately related to particular historical and political developments. Political philosophers from Aristotle to Machiavelli analyzed political power in city states and empires. Between the fifteenth and eighteenth centuries, religious conflict and secular opposition to religious authority led to a redefinition of church–state relations. Absolutism gave rise to liberal ideas about state sovereignty and property rights, constitutional checks on tyranny, and the belief in a “social contract” between rulers and citizens. Hobbes, Locke,

Rousseau, and Hegel produced differing conceptions of the relationship between civil society and state institutions. States were either conceived as embodying the highest spiritual, legal, and political values, or as a constant threat to the freedom and privileges of citizens. The eighteenth and nineteenth century political economists – from Adam Smith to Karl Marx and J. S. Mill – helped lay the foundations of contemporary liberal and Marxist analyses of the role of states in developing capitalist societies.

By the late nineteenth century, two parallel trends were evident in state theory. The formal legal constitutional state theorists produced numerous books outlining national constitutions and various laws (Dyson 1980). However, little was written by these nineteenth and early twentieth century constitutional formalists on the *informal* structures of state power, such as “backroom” machinations and bureaucratic processes. By contrast, between the 1880s and the 1930s a combination of new political movements and academic analyses established the foundations of contemporary state theory. Politically, the rise of labor, socialist, and communist parties on the one side, and various conservative and fascist parties on the other, thrust the whole issue of state power on to center stage. From an anti socialist and anti liberal perspective, the “new Machiavellians” or elite theorists Mosca and Pareto celebrated the cunning of foxes and the brute force of lions as necessary to winning and holding state power (Bottomore 1964). The elite theorists later became admirers of Italian Fascism, which made a cult of state power. Lenin (1917) also criticized parliamentary road strategies favored by socialist and labor movement parties as naïve. According to Lenin, socialists should not place too much faith in formal liberal constitutional processes and ignore the power of state repressive apparatuses (the army, police, and bureaucracy). Repressive apparatuses can defend capitalism by obstructing or overthrowing a socialist party should it win a parliamentary majority. The Italian Communist leader Antonio Gramsci (imprisoned by the Fascists in the 1920s) analyzed the complex relationship between capitalist states and civil society. Capitalist hegemony required both coercion and consent via an elaborate set of cultural and educational practices, values, and socioeconomic

relations. The visible state in the industrial capitalist West, Gramsci (1971) argued, could not be captured by revolutionaries (as Lenin had done in the largely agrarian Russia of 1917) if the less obvious “earth works” (shoring up the state) of cultural and social hegemony remained largely intact. Fifty years later, neo Marxist state theorists used Gramsci’s work to reconceptualize contemporary state–civil society relations.

State coercion and consent were also central in the work of Weber. He differentiated between traditional forms of spiritual and princely authority or legitimacy and the development of an impersonal legal rational authority that underpinned modern organizations – especially bureaucracies of the modern state. Weber defined the modern state as an organization that has “a monopoly of the legitimate use of physical force.” Although state authorities do not like sharing armed power with other groups in nation states, Weber’s definition is limited in that many state officials tolerate both non state criminal organizations and illegitimate coercion and corruption within state armed forces and police. Various state administrations and secret police have practiced state terrorism and illegal torture without the knowledge of citizens or other branches of government, thus mocking the notion of a monopoly of “legitimate violence.” The legitimacy or illegitimacy of a whole state system (rather than the popularity or hatred of a particular party or individual in government) requires an understanding of how state power is maintained. Some states rely heavily on repressive power, while others prefer voluntary adherence to the law and social norms. Anarchists and other anti statist regard all states as illegitimate and advocate a non hierarchical stateless society. Freedom for the individual or community from abusive hierarchical state power may be desirable, but it remains unclear whether cooperative stateless societies can carry out complex administration, production, and distribution at local, national, or global levels.

Between the 1930s and 1950s liberals became increasingly divided over theories of democracy and the modern state. Conservative liberals continued to favor a *laissez faire*, “minimal state” that primarily defended private property rights against demands for social equality.

The Great Depression of the 1930s, followed by the defeat of fascism in 1945, led various Keynesian liberals and “social market” liberals to champion new interventionist welfare states and international economic steering bodies such as the International Monetary Fund. Nevertheless, most liberals believe parties or individuals in government might pursue sectional interests, but view the state as neutral, serving all citizens impartially. Marxists, however, argued that it was impossible for the state to be a neutral umpire in a class divided society. Despite their differences, Marxists agreed that without capitalist state institutions private market forces would be unable to manage society, sustain profitability, or, equally importantly, defend capitalism against working class and other opposition. In the US a new generation of liberal pluralist theorists had fused the insights of the elite theorists, Weberian sociology, and neoclassical economics into a redefinition of democratic government. The two party system, they argued, was a choice between competing elites. Liberal representative democracy was no longer based on a relationship between the state and the rational individual. Instead, the mass media and interest groups helped frame policy agendas. The “new class” of managers, bureaucrats, and technocrats now ran private corporations and government, rendering obsolete the world imagined by both classical liberal individualism and Marxian class analysis (Bottomore 1964). Paradoxically, the new political science dominant in American and other western universities during the Cold War resulted in state theory almost disappearing between the late 1940s and the late 1960s. While western modernization theorists wrote many works on how newly decolonized or “undeveloped” African, Asian, and Latin American countries could take the correct path to “state building,” few scholars paid attention to state institutions in the West. It was widely assumed that state power was crucial in totalitarian communist societies. However, in the West, systems theory and American pluralism reduced states to neutral structures akin to a black box, with inputs (interest group pressures) that produced outcomes (policies and decisions). What happened inside the box or the state was not entirely clear. Yet American pluralists vigorously asserted that there was no ruling class or power elite as

claimed by orthodox Marxists and radical critics such as Mills (1956). Against a background of mass protest movements in the late 1960s and 1970s, a renaissance in state theory occurred as new state theorists broke the deadlock between pluralists and radicals by refocusing on state institutions.

The various Althusserian, Frankfurt School, Gramscian, capital logic, and other schools of neo Marxist state theory rejected both elite theory and the liberal claim of a classless society and state neutrality by documenting the pro capitalist material and immaterial roles played by state institutions. The *material* roles ranged from vital infrastructure (roads, ports) through to numerous state subsidies for industry and other state funded contracts and benefits without which private businesses could not function or earn high profits. The *immaterial* roles included everything from states undertaking the education and training of labor, research, and development necessary for new products, through to promoting and securing pro market values and ideology in the public sphere. Capitalist states were also defined by what they could not do. Private capitalists strongly opposed replacing market competition with state planning or nationalizing private companies. The neutrality of the state was also challenged by pointing to the inequity of taxation and budgetary allocations at the expense of workers and those dependent on state benefits. State repressive apparatuses constantly protected private property and maintained commodity production and capital’s dominance over labor, while little was done to protect workers, consumers, and the environment from abuses perpetrated by businesses and government departments.

Most neo Marxists rejected simple orthodox Marxist mechanical notions of the state as a superstructure determined by the economic base. Poulantzas’s (1969) critique of Miliband’s (1969) work on the capitalist state highlighted the “relative autonomy” of the capitalist state from market forces and the structural role state officials had to perform. Individual office holders or managers in state apparatuses may have bourgeois or working class family and school or economic backgrounds. What counted were the structural roles each had to perform as part of the capitalist state, regardless of social

background. Marx and Engels's definition of the capitalist state as "the executive committee of the bourgeoisie" or the "ideal collective capitalist" was seen as simplistic by many neo Marxists (Frankel 1979). The idea that the capitalist state embodied the *collective will* that eluded capitalists because of perennial conflicts and competition was replaced by neo Marxist emphasis on the *contradictory* nature of state institutions. Capitalist states were arenas of class struggle. If labor movements and other social protest movements were strong, parties sought electoral support and state officials implemented policies to placate demands for better welfare services or such things as environmental pollution regulations. O'Connor (1973) and Habermas (1975) analyzed the economic and social contradictions flowing from the capitalist state promoting the private accumulation of wealth while simultaneously trying to disguise or legitimate this class based set of policies. Poulantzas (1973) emphasized the divisions between the finance, industrial, merchant, and other fractions of capital and how these ongoing divisions among capitalists gave rise to particular state policies that antagonized sections of business depending on which fraction or fractions were dominant. Offe (1975) stressed the formal methods of acquiring state power via election or appointment to office as opposed to the informal bases of power exercised by private capital upon which state administrators depended for fiscal revenue and the smooth running of society. If governments pursued policies designed to redistribute wealth to non capitalists or other social justice strategies, they risked investment strikes by capitalists, destabilization, and other hostile reactions. Reform governments encountered obstacles ranging from obstructive behavior by hostile senior state bureaucrats through to military *coups d'état*, as happened to the Allende government in Chile in 1973. The extensive growth of state activity in all spheres of socio economic life during the twentieth century meant that state institutions were not just political administrative structures separate from, or intervening in, "the economy." State institutions at local, regional, and national levels employed up to a third of the workforce, sustained millions of pensioners, the sick, and unemployed on state income, and generally accounted for a significant proportion of investment and

economic life in capitalist societies. According to Offe (1975), where state officials are preoccupied with "allocating" state resources in a routinized manner – that is, any activity that involves fixed rules and sanctions – then the Weberian notion of bureaucracy has a degree of applicability. But where state officials are involved in "productive" state activity – administering and creating policies and practices in a whole range of areas such as health, education, and so forth – then the Weberian notion of bureaucracy as "routinization" is grossly inadequate and inappropriate. Most state employees also do not conform to the Weberian notion of independent bureaucrats standing between capital and labor. Instead, millions of state workers lack power and share many characteristics with white and blue collar workers employed by capitalists, such as poor work conditions and insecurity of employment (Frankel 1983).

The neo Marxist renaissance in state theory also stimulated interest in the state by feminists who focused on the *patriarchal state*, which reproduced male dominance and worked against the interests of women in all spheres of social policy and power relations (Chappell 2003). Environmentalists also analyzed the absence of a *green state* or an *ecological state* (Eckersley 2004). Like Marxists and feminists, environmental theorists rejected the liberal notion of a neutral state and highlighted the manner in which capitalist and communist states endangered ecological sustainability. The demise of Keynesian policies and the rise of neoliberalism since the late 1970s ushered in analyses of changes from the *corporatist state* (tripartite agreements between capital, labor, and government) to the *contract state* of privatization and the importation of market practices into state institutions and services. Ascendant market values and greater global corporate power have ironically coincided with the unpopularity of Marxist theories of the capitalist state. Post Marxist followers of Foucault (1991), for instance, reject class analyses of the capitalist state in favor of studies of "governmentality" and "advanced liberal" technologies of power. The Foucauldians often appear more concerned with surveillance and accountability rather than explaining how neoliberal states sustain social inequality and pro market policies.

Despite numerous state theories, many misconceptions and problems remain. It is common for radicals, liberals, and conservatives to speak of complex state institutions as if they were a homogeneous actor or subject, like Machiavelli's Prince, capable of moral, immoral, or amoral behavior and having a "collective mind" or political will. Similarly, others simplistically conceive of state institutions as instruments that can be wielded by a ruling class or elite outside the state (Frankel 1983). Despite numerous cases of cronyism and corruption and the complicity of state officials and presidents in corporate collapses or the promotion of special favors, the complex sociopolitical relations embodied in state institutions make them more than mere instruments. Economistic Marxists conflate the political with the economic. Yet state institutions also embody residues of pre-capitalist legal, religious, racial, and sexual values and practices, as well as contemporary cultural and social policies that are not derivative of the conflict between capital and labor (Frankel 1983). Capitalist relations currently coexist with republics, monarchies, communist states, military dictatorships, theocracies, and federalist, unitary, and other state institutional forms. Boundary problems are also very confusing, as no two Marxists or liberals, for instance, can agree on what constitutes the state, "civil society," or "the economy" and whether they overlap or are separate spheres. Althusser (1971) placed almost all the institutions of "civil society," such as family, media, and school, inside the "ideological state apparatuses," thus making the notion of the state all inclusive. Blurred state/society boundaries are also evident in the "party state" of fused political and state officials, or the "para corporatization" of non-state associations to provide social welfare services on the cheap, or expensive public-private partnerships of combined state and capitalist economic and social activity that earn businesses high profits. The orthodox Marxist notion of capitalist repressive apparatuses also fails to explain how the military led revolutions or staged *coups d'état* ranging from Egypt to Portugal. Moreover, there is no agreement among state theorists on how large a state-run public sector can become in a capitalist society and how many egalitarian reforms are possible before the capitalist state ceases to defend and reproduce capitalist social relations.

Finally, state institutions are not equivalent to a particular nation state. Globalization and the emergence of supra states such as the European Union exacerbate the confusion over state-society "boundary problems" and raise questions about the future power and role of existing state institutions (Jessop 2002).

SEE ALSO: Anarchism; Civil Society; Culture, the State and; Liberalism; Marxism and Sociology; Nation State; Nation State and Nationalism; Patriarchy; Sport and the State; State and the Economy

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state and economy

John L. Campbell

The literature on the relationship between states and economies is vast. This entry focuses exclusively on states and economies in advanced capitalist societies. In this context, sociologists tend to follow Max Weber in viewing nation states as organizations consisting of administrative, legislative, judicial, and military apparatuses that govern a finite territory, ultimately through the use of force if necessary. They tend to view economies as systems of material production that are organized around market exchange and the pursuit of profit, and that are embedded in a variety of surrounding institutions, including political ones. Research in the area of state and economy has focused on several questions. How does the economy affect the state? How does the state affect the economy? How are state–economy relations organized? How are state–economy relations changing?

HOW DOES THE ECONOMY AFFECT THE STATE?

To address this question, sociologists have often researched why government promulgates the regulatory, macroeconomic, and other business related policies it does. For example, pluralists argue that a wide variety of economic actors, including representatives from business and labor, but also consumers, environmentalists, and others, struggle to influence the policy making process. Policymakers tend to respond most favorably to those groups who have the most resources, organizational skills, and access to policymakers. If labor is strongest in this regard, then states pass legislation protective of workers; if business is strongest, then states pass

legislation that is protective of corporate interests; if consumers are strongest, then states pass legislation that regulates product safety and quality.

However, some scholars maintain that the business community has a significant advantage in this political competition because it has more resources than other groups in society and so is generally able to capture, dominate, or otherwise influence the policymaking process to its advantage. For instance, according to this view, business leaders are able to make comparatively large contributions to politicians' electoral campaigns. This affords them greater access to politicians and therefore greater opportunity to influence the policymaking process than other groups enjoy, who have less money to contribute.

Taking a view that focuses more on the structural constraints imposed on states by economies than on the influence of instrumentally oriented economic actors per se, other researchers claim that policymaking is inevitably biased in favor of business interests. This is because policymakers have little choice but to promote continued business investment and economic growth. For instance, regardless of how much pressure the business community or others put on policymakers, states must ensure that the economy continues to operate smoothly, that unemployment remains relatively low, and that inflation remains in check. Otherwise, political leaders will be voted out of office, tax revenues will dry up, and the state will suffer political and fiscal crises.

Still other observers argue that states enjoy far more autonomy over economic policymaking than any of these other perspectives acknowledge. Some go so far as to suggest that states are predatory in the sense that their rulers are driven to maximize the revenue their states extract from the economy in order to increase their own power. In the extreme, self interested rulers may extract so much revenue that it saps the vitality of the economy altogether.

These debates have provoked an enormous amount of empirical research (e.g., Evans et al. 1985). Much of this has focused on the development of welfare states insofar as they provide the social policies upon which economies depend, such as unemployment compensation, pensions, health care, job training, and education (Hicks 1999). Less attention has been paid to identifying the determinants of tax policies

(but see Campbell 1993). This oversight is surprising because welfare spending would be impossible without sufficient revenues to finance it and because tax policy itself has significant effects on the economy, as we shall see later. And sociologists have largely ignored the formation of general macroeconomic and monetary policy, subjects that have traditionally been the province of economists and political scientists.

HOW DOES THE STATE AFFECT THE ECONOMY?

Regardless of who or what influences state policymaking, the state always influences the economy in several ways (Lindberg & Campbell 1991). First, governments provide and allocate resources to business through direct subsidies, infrastructure investment, and procurement, which create incentives for firms to engage in many kinds of behavior. As noted earlier, welfare and tax policy also affect the economy. For instance, welfare spending can affect the availability and quality of labor in the labor market and the amount of money firms need to spend on health insurance and pension benefits for their workers. State spending can also affect the sorts of research and development in which firms engage and the types of products they manufacture.

Second, states establish and enforce *property rights* and regulate firms in ways that affect not only their behavior, but also their organization. Anti-trust law, for instance, influences whether firms form cartels or merge to create vertically and horizontally integrated firms. Similarly, dairy cooperatives were commonplace in many European countries during the early twentieth century, but were illegal under anti-trust law in the US and were therefore relatively rare until Congress passed legislation in 1922 legalizing them. Tax law is another form of property rights insofar as it determines the amount of profit firms can retain and the amount of earnings workers can keep. Tax policy also influences, among other things, whether consumers buy or save, whether firms invest or return profits to stockholders, and whether workers seek to improve their skills through education.

Third, the *structure* of the state apparatus affects business. For example, decentralized

states provide different opportunities for firms to relocate their operations within national borders than do centralized states. In decentralized states like the US, where there is wide variation across subnational governments in tax, labor, and other types of business law, these variations may create incentives for firms to relocate their operations from one part of the country to another. Different laws of incorporation were one reason why US firms tended to incorporate in New Jersey during the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. And differences in labor law were one reason why US textile manufacturers moved from their mills from the northeast to the southern part of the country later on. Variations like these are less common in more centralized states like France or Japan.

Fourth, nation states engage other nation states in *geopolitics*. Such international activity often impacts national economies. Notably, when war breaks out, economies can be devastated or revitalized, as occurred in Western Europe and the United States, respectively, during World War II. But even during peacetime, geopolitics can have significant effects. The development of common markets, such as the North American Free Trade Agreement and the European Union (EU) are two important examples. In both cases, the states involved agreed to open their borders to increased levels of trade, capital mobility, and labor migration. In the EU, this eventually led to the adoption of a common European currency that replaced several national currencies. It also led to hundreds of EU directives that were designed to harmonize the business environment across member countries.

HOW ARE STATE-ECONOMY RELATIONS ORGANIZED?

The complex relationships between states and economies take different institutional forms in different societies. Generally speaking, scholars recognize three types of state-economy relationships in capitalist countries (Katzenstein 1978). First is the *liberal* model where the state tends to maintain an arm's length relationship from the economy, grants much freedom to markets, pursues relatively vigorous anti-trust policy to ensure market competition, relies heavily on

broad macroeconomic and monetary policies to smooth out business cycles, and tries not to interfere directly in the activities of individual firms. The US is often cited as the typical example of the liberal model.

Second is the *statist* model. Here countries like Japan, France, and South Korea come to mind. In these countries the state is much more involved in the economy and exercises much greater influence over individual firms, such as by providing finance and credit directly to them. Occasionally, the government owns and runs firms in key infrastructural industries such as railways, telecommunications, and energy, although since the 1980s statist countries have privatized many of these firms.

Third is the *corporatist* model, typically found in the Scandinavian countries, Germany, Austria, and Switzerland. In this model the state promotes bargaining and negotiation among well organized social partners, notably centralized business associations and labor unions, in order to promulgate economic and social policies that benefit all groups in society. In Germany, for example, national legislation passed after World War II ensured that labor would be represented on corporate boards of directors and would be able to establish works councils that would facilitate bargaining between managers and workers over issues like investment, plant closings, shop floor relations, and the introduction of new production technologies. The state also organized centralized bargaining between employers' associations and unions over wages, benefits, and in some cases prices.

In sum, government can be an arm's length regulator, a strong economic player, or a facilitator of bargained agreements. But regardless of which model we refer to, it is important to understand that the state and economy are *always* connected in important and complicated ways. And this has always been true, even in the most *laissez faire* examples. For example, in the US during the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries the state was pivotal in providing corporate charters, infrastructure, subsidies, property rights, and a variety of other supports for the economy's development. Furthermore, during the early days of industrialization when capitalism was first emerging in Europe, the state played an important (albeit rudimentary) role in defining property rights, regulating

business, and providing at least minimal protection to workers. According to Karl Polanyi (1944), this was necessary in order to prevent capitalist self interest and the pursuit of profit from getting out of hand to the point where it hurt workers, consumers, and the environment so much that it would have led eventually to capitalism's self destruction.

Variations in how state–economy relations are organized matter in terms of the ability of firms to compete successfully and the ability of states to manage macroeconomic problems, such as inflation and unemployment. However, there is much disagreement as to which variation is best. Many economists and conservatives maintain that the liberal model is the best because it ensures relatively unbridled market activity, which, following neoclassical economics, is the most efficient and surest way to achieve positive economic performance. Many political scientists and sociologists tend to favor the other two models, reasoning that coordinated economic activity will more effectively mitigate market failures and social ills like inequality and poverty.

Recently, some scholars have shown that each variety of capitalism has its own strengths and weaknesses. For instance, liberal economies enable firms to compete by making decisions quickly, keeping costs low, and moving capital rapidly from sector to sector and region to region. The other varieties enable firms to compete by producing high quality products and by ensuring a high degree of cooperation between labor and management. Why? Because governments in statist and corporatist countries tend to provide a well educated labor force, ensure bargaining and negotiation between business and workers, and offer generous welfare supports to facilitate the sort of economic restructuring that enables business to be competitive internationally (Hall & Soskice 2001).

HOW ARE STATE–ECONOMY RELATIONS CHANGING?

Since the mid 1970s, economic activity has become increasingly globalized. In particular, capital has gained the ability to move from one country to another faster than ever and in greater volume than ever. This has generated much concern that the ability of firms to shift

investments rapidly from one country to another has undermined the institutional differences associated with the three models of capitalism discussed earlier. Many have warned that states will need increasingly to compete against each other to retain and attract capital investment. To do so, it is argued, they will have to realign their institutional arrangements with the liberal model. In other words, they will have to grant firms more autonomy to do as they please without having to worry about the interests of government, labor, or other actors. As a result, states will have to reduce taxes, welfare spending, and the regulatory burden on business. If they fail to do so, then capital flight will result and precipitate a host of economic problems, including plant closings, job loss, unemployment, and poor economic growth. Ultimately, according to this view, state sovereignty is at risk to the extent that the only way to control capital in such a globalized environment is for nation states to relinquish some of their powers to regulate economic activity to international organizations, such as the World Trade Organization, the European Union, and the like.

During the 1990s this became a popular argument among politicians who sought to roll back business regulation, welfare spending, and taxes. Nevertheless, researchers have shown that there is little sign of institutional convergence on the liberal model, or that serious economic problems result for countries that fail to adopt it (Hicks & Kenworthy 1998; Swank 2002). Instead, the relationship between state and economy and the institutional basis by which business competes continue to evolve along a variety of trajectories. There are several reasons why.

To begin with, states are not helpless in the face of increased global economic pressures. After all, states are partly responsible for the rise in international trade and capital mobility because they have deliberately lowered barriers to trade and investment. As such, they can surely reverse these trends if they want. States can also block these sorts of reforms if political forces are strong enough to resist change. This happens, for example, when well organized labor unions and social democratic parties defend welfare spending from its political opponents. And even when states make concessions in one area, such as by lowering corporate profit taxes, they can compensate in other areas,

such as by devising new taxes on Internet commerce or cross national financial transactions (Campbell 2003).

Second, institutional change tends to proceed in path dependent ways. Even when governments try to mimic institutional practices observed elsewhere, they typically translate them into local contexts in ways that do not fully supplant current practices (Campbell 2004: ch. 5). So, for example, even though the Japanese state privatized its national telephone company in 1984, it also developed a powerful regulatory ministry to supervise many aspects of the new private firm's operations, including pricing and technology development. These state capacities were much more in line with Japan's traditional statist model than the alternative liberal model. In other words, Japan *reregulated* rather than *deregulated* the industry.

Third, firms do not compete just on the basis of costs. Even if they can find cheaper labor or lower taxes somewhere else, they do not automatically move their operations there if they recognize that they enjoy other competitive advantages where they are currently doing business. For instance, firms operating in the Scandinavian countries may face much higher taxes and labor costs than their competitors elsewhere, but they enjoy other offsetting advantages like a well educated workforce, peaceful labor-management relations, excellent infrastructural support, and more. The point is that even though capital may have become increasingly mobile internationally, firms recognize that they can compete on the basis of comparative *institutional* or *cost* advantage. Thus, when firms recognize this they will often defend against attempts to undermine these institutional advantages. Although German firms pay relatively high wages and benefits to their workers as a result of the institutionalized bargaining described earlier, they have resisted recent calls to dismantle these arrangements precisely because they understand the advantages that accrue from them, such as very cooperative labor-management relations that facilitate high quality production and the ability to be flexible in the face of the rapidly changing market demands that are associated with globalization. These are things that have bolstered Germany's international competitiveness for decades and many firms want to preserve this.

This is not to say that state–economy relations will not change in the face of globalization. As noted earlier, the point is that the institutional environments within which economic activity takes place – including the institutionalized relationships that link state and economy – will continue to evolve as they have for decades. But variation among institutional types of capitalism will likely persist for a very long time.

SEE ALSO: Global Economy; Globalization; Law, Economy and; Political Economy; State; State and Private Sector Employees

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state and private sector employees

Rolf Becker

Public employment is a significant characteristic of modern welfare states. After the building of nation states, professional employment in the state sector has become for an increasing share of citizens an indicator of modernization and democratization in most of the western countries (Weber 1920–1). While in the early phases of industrialization and modernization public employment has been characterized in terms of bureaucratization and the privileged status of a minority of the labor force, employment in the state sector became the pioneer of the post industrialization of social stratification (Esping Andersen 1990). In the twentieth century, the dominance of traditional tasks of the state sector such as military, police, public administration, and production of common goods (electricity, railway, and water supply) has shifted to social services and welfare production. As in any large scale organization in the private sector, a division of labor and well defined areas of competencies are basic characteristics of the state. A segmentation of specific welfare programs as well as segmentation within state employment is brought about (Mayer & Schoepflin 1989).

This development arising in the nineteenth century has been accelerated by the expansion of the welfare states in the post war era of the twentieth century. The rapid increase of public employment is the most visible direct effect of the welfare state expansion in the post war era (Table 1). In the modern western nations, in particular during the “golden era of the welfare state” from the 1960s until the end of the 1970s, at least 20 percent of employed individuals are public employees (Rose et al. 1985). After 1980, political changes in the government, economic crisis, and declining ability to finance labor intensive welfare programs led to decreasing shares of public employment over total employment. In most contemporary mixed economies, the welfare state is still one of the largest employers: public employment grew faster than private employment during the post war decades and

Table 1 Growth in public employment (in % of employed persons)

<i>Country</i>	<i>Pre 1850</i>	<i>Pre 1914</i>	<i>Pre 1939</i>	<i>ca. 1950</i>	<i>ca. 1960</i>	<i>ca. 1970</i>	<i>ca. 1980</i>	<i>ca. 1990</i>	<i>ca. 1999</i>
UK	2.4	7.1	10.8	26.6	24.3	27.6	31.4	19.5	12.6
France	5.0	7.1	8.9	17.5	23.3	23.2	29.1	20.4	21.3
Germany	7.2	10.6	12.9	14.4	16.0	21.2	25.8	15.1	12.3
Italy	2.2	4.7	7.8	11.4	13.4	19.8	24.4		15.2
Sweden				15.2	16.6	25.6	38.2		
Finland							25.3	23.3	24.3
USA	0.8	1.4	7.9	17.0	17.6	19.8	18.3	14.9	14.6

Source: Rose et al. (1985); OECD (2001).

contemporary public employees make a major claim upon tax revenues.

The social democratic welfare states (e.g., Sweden, Finland, Norway, Denmark) have expanded their labor intensive welfare programs (education and health) and are followed by the state corporatist welfare states (e.g., Germany, France, Austria) in which economic programs dominated until the 1960s and 1970s. One of the major aims of the expansion of the social democratic welfare state was the reduction of social inequality by the guarantee of long term employment and income in the state sector. In state corporatist welfare states, the generous alimentionation of civil servants is a significant tradition in such systems. The rationality of this alimentionation is the exchange of political loyalty of employees and the maintenance of their privileged social status and position in the social stratification. In this respect, this exchange between the modern state as employer and public employees results in the maintenance of existing social inequalities to the advantage of civil servants. Liberal welfare states (e.g., US, UK, Canada, Australia, Switzerland) as well as rudimentary welfare states (e.g., Italy) provide a minimum of public support of individuals and their families, and social welfare is oriented toward market processes. These countries employ citizens mainly in the state defining programs including police, law enforcement, and military defense.

The growth of public employment is linked to political decisions related to several programs and the shift of public employees to these programs (Table 2). In terms of the type of welfare state, most of the public employees produce

goods and services in the social welfare program. The number of public employees producing common goods in state defining programs has been diminished to a greater degree than the number of public employees in economic activities. The byproduct of this shift among the state programs is the increase in female employment in the state sector (almost 50 percent of the employees are female) and the recruitment of qualified employees offering skilled services. In most of the western welfare states, the state sector employs a higher proportion of educated personnel than the private sector. Government can even employ a majority of highly educated graduates. The post war expansion of labor intensive social programs is the chief cause of a high level of public employment of qualified manpower and reflects the self consumption of the output of educational expansion initiated by the state itself.

As a side effect, the expansion of the welfare state and increase of public employment has had an important impact on the careers of state employees and their position in social stratification compared to employees in the private sector (DiPrete & Soule 1988). In particular, the employment and career prospects of qualified women have been advanced by the state as employer (Becker 1993). Similar to private employees in the internal labor market of large scale firms, for the state employee there are privileged working conditions with special occupational status and labor contracts, guarantee of employment, early recruitment in hierarchical systems of career lines, formal regulations of careers by certificates and seniority, rigid and stable structure of careers and mobility patterns

Table 2 Growth of public employment and the functional distribution of public employment

<i>Country</i>	<i>1950</i>	<i>1960</i>	<i>1970</i>	<i>1980</i>
<i>Sweden</i>	15.2	16.6	25.6	38.2
Social welfare	30.8	37.3	52.2	53.1
Economic activities	37.7	33.0	27.3	25.3
Defining activities	24.6	19.5	15.6	13.7
Other	6.9	10.2	4.9	7.9
<i>Germany</i>	14.4	16.0	21.2	25.8
Social welfare	30.8	29.3	32.4	37.8
Economic activities	50.1	43.3	37.8	31.8
Defining activities	17.4	24.4	25.2	24.7
Other	1.7	3.0	4.6	5.7
<i>USA</i>	17.0	17.6	19.8	18.3
Social welfare	23.9	35.8	45.1	48.8
Economic activities	15.5	17.4	15.6	17.5
Defining activities	54.2	41.2	30.7	28.0
Other	6.4	5.6	8.6	5.7

Source: Rose et al. (1985), own calculations.

in career lines, and more independence from individual characteristics (Grandjean 1981). In the course of increasing the importance of internal labor markets in the private sector, the differences between the private and state sectors in terms of such organizational and institutionalized working conditions (DiPrete & Soule 1986; Erikson & Goldthorpe 1992) are probably diminishing. However, studies of career and income trajectories in the private and public sectors demonstrate remaining differences (Visher 1984; Carroll & Mayer 1986; Becker 1993). On the one hand, there is less empirical evidence for the self selection of individuals with a specific personality and habitus (rule orientation, unconditional obedience, dogmatism, risk avoidance, need for security) into the state bureaucratic sector (Grunow 1991), but some indications that there is an intergenerational reproduction of state employees (Becker 1993). For Norway and Germany, we have empirical evidence for consecutive birth cohorts that the relationship between social origin and entrance into the state sector has become closer in the course of educational expansion and expansion of labor intensive service in the state sector. On the other hand, because of their privileges, state employees are not interested in job shifts from the state sector into the private sector during their working life (Becker 1993). However, in contrast to the employees in the

private sector, they have lower rates of upward mobility and remain longer in their jobs and in the same organization.

SEE ALSO: Bureaucratic Personality; Class, Status, and Power; Labor Markets; Post Industrial Society; State; State Regulation and the Workplace; Welfare State

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state regulation and the workplace

Holly J. McCammon

Workplaces are highly regulated spaces. As Edelman and Suchman (1997) state, they “are immersed in a sea of law.” In regulating the workplace, the state attempts to control the behaviors of employers, managers, and workers using a system of incentives and penalties and a variety of policy tools. In the US, the government has at least some say – and often much say – over discrimination in the workplace, union activities, workplace safety, wage levels, hiring practices, work hours, employee leaves, plant closings, and compensation for injuries at work. The two main areas of workplace regulation in the US are employment law and labor law. Employment law encompasses anti-discrimination law, affirmative action policy, and equal pay law. Labor law, on the other hand, regulates trade union organizing, collective bargaining between workers and employers, and

strike action by workers. Both areas have received substantial attention by researchers in sociology as they try to make sense of the law’s development over time and its impact on employment relations.

EMPLOYMENT LAW

The 1960s were a watershed in US employment law. In 1963 the Equal Pay Act was passed, requiring employers to pay men and women equally for equal work. And in 1964, in response to the Civil Rights Movement, Congress enacted the Civil Rights Act, which greatly broadened the state’s ability to restrict race and sex discrimination, including in the workplace. Prior to this time, workplace discrimination against women, African Americans, and other minorities was commonplace. Employers routinely refused to hire blacks, ethnic minorities, and women for a variety of jobs, and even when hired these social minorities were segregated into occupations and jobs deemed culturally “appropriate” for them (Hodson & Sullivan 2002). Title VII of the new law made it unlawful for employers to treat employees differently because of their “race, color, religion, sex, or national origin.” The law also established the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) to oversee the law’s enforcement. Title VII fundamentally altered the cultural environment of workplaces by instituting due process rights. But as Reskin (2001) points out, enforcement of Title VII has often depended on the perseverance of the victims of discrimination to carry their cases forward. This stems primarily from underfunding of the EEOC. In addition, the nature of Title VII and of EEOC procedures obscures the intersectionality of discrimination by requiring that plaintiffs choose among their social identities when filing cases (Crenshaw 1989). The unique experience of a black woman, for instance, can be overlooked if, as the law requires, she must identify herself as *either* female or African American to file her case.

Another key development in anti-discrimination law in the 1960s was the passage of Executive Order 11246 in 1965 by President Lyndon Johnson. This affirmative action policy, as it has come to be known, requires that a company doing business with the federal government

“take affirmative action to ensure” that employees and applicants for jobs are not discriminated against with regard to “race, color, religion, or national origin.” In 1967, Executive Order 11375 included “sex” in its affirmative action provisions. Affirmative action policies are thus proactive workplace regulation, mandating that companies with governmental contracts establish workplace policies that give preference, particularly in hiring, to qualified female and minority applicants in order to address the effects of past discrimination. The policies, however, have been controversial and support for them has declined over time among whites (Sears et al. 2000). Moreover, many workplace policies have called for only minimal adjustments in hiring and promotion practices and thus have had a limited impact in reducing occupational race and sex segregation (Reskin 1998). But research indicates that the policies have helped some workers, particularly women and minority men seeking professional and managerial positions, where most affirmative action programs have been targeted (Tomaskovic Devey 1993). Research also shows that the effectiveness of affirmative action depends on the organizational resources devoted to the programs, the commitment of company leaders, and the duration of the programs’ existence within a business (Konrad & Linnehan 1999).

Research on anti discrimination law has also explored the impact of these policies on race and gender wage inequality. Wage data document that an earnings gap continues to exist between men and women and among racial and ethnic groups, with white men being substantially advantaged (Padavic & Reskin 2002). Various studies, however, indicate that the 1960s shift in employment law helped to narrow the disparity. McCrone and Hardy (1978) find that the racial wage gap declined significantly under Title VII. Burstein (1979), using indicators of EEOC funding and the number of lawsuits decided in favor of the plaintiff, shows that women’s and minority wages increased with greater agency enforcement, resulting in greater equality. A number of US states have enacted comparable worth or pay equity laws that go beyond the 1963 Equal Pay Act and stipulate (for public employers but as yet not for private employers) that compensation systems must pay workers equally for comparable, and not just

identical jobs. The US federal government, however, has not yet enacted comparable worth legislation. Instead, federal comparable worth law has developed as a result of wage discrimination suits filed within the courts (Guthrie & Roth 1999).

A more global perspective finds affirmation of equality in the workplace in both the United Nations’ Declaration of Human Rights and its International Covenant on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights (see especially Article 7). The International Labor Organization as well states in its Declaration of Philadelphia that “all human beings, irrespective of race, creed or sex, have the right to pursue both their material well being and their spiritual development in conditions of freedom and dignity, of economic security and equal opportunity.” Most western countries today have adopted such principles in their body of law. Some recent developments include Northern Ireland’s Fair Employment Act of 1989 (which places restrictions on discrimination based on religious affiliation) and Germany’s Frauenförderungs gesetz of 1994 and Israel’s Civil Service Act of 1995, both of which provide for fair gender representation in government service (Ben Israel 2001). Other nations have also made important strides in establishing equal employment law. China enacted a law to protect women’s right to employment, and India and Belize now have policies to prevent sexual harassment in the workplace (United Nations Office of Public Information 2000).

US LABOR LAW

If the decade of major change in US employment law was the 1960s, in labor law it was the 1930s. In 1935 during the Depression, Congress passed the National Labor Relations (Wagner) Act, which institutionalized a system of collective bargaining and provided workers with a legal right to organize unions and to strike. The law also established the National Labor Relations Board (NLRB) to adjudicate workplace disputes. The US Supreme Court upheld the constitutionality of the new law in 1937. Prior to this time and largely through the courts, the government had regularly impeded attempts by workers to organize unions and mount strikes.

Both state and federal judges routinely issued labor injunctions to end strikes and enforce “yellow dog” contracts or contracts which a worker signed to gain employment but in which he or she was also compelled to agree not to join a union. The courts’ use of injunctions significantly restricted the collective activities of labor (McCammon 1993b). In 1932, just before enactment of Wagner, the Federal Anti Injunction Act was passed. The anti injunction law was a response to labor and legal reformers who called for an end to the courts’ constraints on labor’s actions. The anti injunction act barred the federal courts from issuing injunctions to halt strikes; however, it did not go so far as to protect the right of workers to strike. This came with Wagner. The Wagner Act, a New Deal law, was passed in a period of acute unemployment and economic stagnation, but also one of increasing labor militancy. Workers struck to force employers to recognize their unions. But even with passage of Wagner, strikes continued, largely because employers ignored Wagner, refusing to recognize unions and participate in collective bargaining. Not until the Supreme Court affirmed the law in 1937 did employment relations gradually begin to calm.

The 1937 decision of the Supreme Court redirected the actions of employers away from attempts to repeal the law and away from open resistance to unionization in the workplace and instead toward establishment of bargaining relations with organized labor. In short, a new legal regime of employer–labor relations was instituted (Bowles & Gintis 1982). Prior to the New Deal era, the government’s legal policy concerning worker collective action was generally one of “repressive intervention,” as it wielded the injunction to halt worker actions (McCammon 1993a). With passage of Wagner and the Supreme Court’s affirmation of it, however, the state’s legal policy became one of “integrative prevention.” The law granted workers legal rights in their interactions with employers, viz., the right to organize, bargain, and strike. But the law also constrained these rights. The subsequent development of labor law after passage of Wagner, with the enactment of the Labor Management Relations (Taft Hartley) Act of 1947 and a number of pivotal Supreme Court decisions (e.g., *Lincoln Mills*, 1957; “Steelworkers Trilogy” cases, 1960; *Boys*

Markets, 1970; *Buffalo Forge*, 1976), meant that unionization and collective bargaining were increasingly regulated and the circumstances in which workers could strike became particularly limited (Wallace et al. 1988). While strikes over wages between labor contracts were legally permissible, strikes over issues that challenged employer control in the workplace were typically defined as illegal.

Moreover, the developing law provided employers with important tools for resisting worker organizing and collective action (Gross 1995). During union certification elections, for example, the law grants long delays between the filing of a petition for a union and the actual election, and whereas employers have free speech rights to communicate their opposition to a union with employees while employees are at work, union access during working hours is greatly restricted (Bronfenbrenner 1994). The law also allows employers to hire permanent replacements for striking workers, so that strikers may not be able to retain their employment. And although the law does not permit employers to discharge workers for attempting to unionize, the law’s minimal penalties for such action can make the strategy viable for some employers (Comstock & Fox 1994). Surveys suggest that employer intimidation of unionizing workers is more common among low wage, minority, and female workers (Comstock & Fox 1994). A number of researchers provide evidence that these provisions in labor law are at least in part responsible for the decline in the labor movement in the US today (Sexton 1991). Given that unions have played a significant role in increasing working class wages and augmenting the size of the middle class in the US, their decline and the role of state regulation in that decline are likely to be important contributors to rising economic inequality in the US today.

Antagonistic labor–employer relations are not limited to the US, but most Western European nations generally have a history of more harmonious relations. Collective bargaining exists in the UK and France similar to that in the US, although strikes are more common in France when bargaining breaks down (Hodson & Sullivan 2002). In Germany, Norway, and Sweden, workers have greater power in workplace decision making, through works councils (composed of workers and management) in

unified Germany and autonomous work groups in the Scandinavian countries (Servais 1998). Arthurs (1998), however, suggests that in most western nations collective bargaining laws are no longer being strengthened as these countries' economies adapt to competitive pressures in the global economy. He points out that only in "newly reconstructed states," such as South Africa, South Korea, and in Central and Eastern European nations, have labor's legal rights been augmented in recent years.

SEE ALSO: Affirmative Action; Labor-Management Relations; Labor Markets; Labor Movement; Law, Economy and; State and Economy; State and Private Sector Employees; Work, Sociology of; Workplace Diversity

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statistical significance testing

Andrew Poggio and John Poggio

The act of reasoning from factual knowledge or evidence is a process ubiquitous in the lives of individuals. In order to make good decisions and function effectively, one must make distinctions between events that are likely to occur and those that are not. If the morning sky is dark and threatening, one logically concludes that the forecast is for rain and thus one carries an umbrella. A student attends class on the assumption that the professor will be there. Most of the decisions a person makes involve subjective estimates of the probability of various events occurring based on specific observations. Statistical inference uses probabilistic reasoning in a more objective and precise fashion and allows the researcher to account for chance error in drawing inferences from a small set of observed data to a larger set of unobserved data.

Suppose a researcher is interested in the attitude of taxpayers toward the use of state dollars for subsidizing a federally mandated education program. It would not be possible to question every taxpayer in the country, therefore the researcher would want to survey the attitudes of a random sample of taxpayers to infer characteristics about the population. The fundamental goal of statistical inference is simple: based on information obtained from a sample of elements, the researcher draws conclusions about a population by inferring that what is observed in the sample reflects what one might expect to be true in the population. While convenient, when one deals with sample data and not data from the entire population,

one cannot describe the population characteristics with complete certainty so any statement about the population is somewhat risky. Had the investigator only surveyed a group of five citizens, for example, the ability to generalize the findings from these few individuals interviewed would be low as the observed difference in attitudes could be due to chance alone with such a small sample.

The adequacy of statistical inferences depends on how well the sample represents the population. If one is uncertain of how representative a sample is, then the individual should be equally uncertain about inferring any results to a specific population. The key to solving problems of statistical inference is to answer the question, "How likely is the occurrence of sample events when the sample is assumed to be representative of the population?" Or, stated another way, "What kind of sample results can be expected from chance alone?" These are questions of probability that are pertinent to the statistical inference process. Thus, one assigns probabilities to the inferences. Probability allows the researcher to make decisions with predetermined levels of confidence.

A hierarchical relationship exists between the research process and the statistical inference process. The research process is all encompassing and provides the framework for general research activities. Statistical inference imposes a logical reasoning methodology on the research process, resulting in inferences about population characteristics based on sample data. Statistical reasoning and procedures for making inferences about populations from sample data are defined by the hypothesis testing process and confidence intervals. Statistical hypothesis testing, also known as significance testing, is the most widely used statistical inference approach by behavioral and social science researchers.

HYPOTHESIS TESTING

The goal of statistical inference is to be able to infer something about the truth of a hypothesis without collecting data from an entire population. Hypothesis testing allows the researcher to make this inference, but one must start with some hypothesized value of a population characteristic. In hypothesis testing, the statistical

hypothesis identifies an *assumed* value or relationship about a population. The exact population characteristic value is not known, so a hypothesis is formulated about it. One assumes that the hypothesized population value is correct (null hypothesis) until the sample data provide contradictory evidence. The null is rejected if an event can be shown to be *highly unlikely* to occur if the hypothesis is assumed true. That is, if the sample result is contrary to what is expected when the hypothesis is assumed true, then the hypothesis is rejected as a possibility. “Highly unlikely” refers to a specified statistical significance level, or *alpha* (α) level. As one will not be able to be certain of any inferences when sampling from a population, probabilities are assigned to the inferences. The level of significance is set prior to data analysis and is the probability criterion level for rejecting the null hypothesis. For example, if the difference between the sample value and the hypothesized parameter is due to random chance fewer than five times in a hundred (i.e., $\alpha < .05$, or a 5 percent level of significance), then the results are statistically significant. Researchers in the social and behavioral sciences typically select low alpha values (e.g., .01 and .05, most commonly) to protect against concluding that an observed result is true when it could have occurred by chance.

Hypothesis testing is a sequential process that typically involves five steps. Illustrative examples, definitions of certain terminology, formulas, and other discussions regarding the logical aspects of the process facilitate understanding and appreciation of the procedure but are beyond the scope of this entry. Further treatment of the topic is available in many sources as standard statistics texts discuss hypothesis testing in detail (see Blalock 1979; Glass & Hopkins 1996; Shavelson 1996; Levin & Fox 2006).

The hypothesis testing steps outlined below are described through references to the simple situation of testing differences between group means. It should be noted, however, that the thinking and reasoning behind the steps are the same whether one is dealing with these types of situations or very sophisticated multivariate problems. Hypotheses will differ depending on a particular study (e.g., one may want to

hypothesize differences in group means, variances, and proportions, or in terms of correlations), yet the same general steps are employed and the logic guiding the process is the same.

Step 1: Identification of the hypotheses, which are represented statistically using population parameter symbols such as the mean, proportion, indices of variability, and correlation, for example. The convention of labeling the statistical hypothesis to be tested (the null) is H_0 . Possible alternative hypotheses are labeled H_A . A null hypothesis is a statement of equality, that is, no difference or no relationship exists between population parameters. The alternative hypothesis, or research hypothesis, is the null’s complement, a statement of inequality. The alternative is formed by specifying a direction of the difference from the hypothesized value, so H_A is formed by using the symbols for “does not equal” (\neq), “less than” ($<$), or “greater than” ($>$). The alternative does not state a specific alternative value for the population parameter as the process does not test a hypothesized alternative. The following illustration translates a simple research question into verbal and symbolic hypotheses:

Research question: Does assertiveness training help make people more assertive?

Verbal H_0 : There exists no difference between the mean level of assertiveness between persons who have received training and those who have not

Symbolic H_0 : $\mu_{\text{training}} = \mu_{\text{no training}}$

Verbal H_A : The mean level of assertiveness is greater for people who have received training than for those who have not.

Symbolic H_A : $\mu_{\text{training}} > \mu_{\text{no training}}$

The alternative hypothesis in this example specifies the direction of the difference between the means. This is a one tail hypothesis, whereas an alternative in which the direction of the difference is not specified is called a two tailed hypothesis, meaning it can be significant in either direction.

Step 2: Specification of the a priori level of significance (α) to be used, that is, the criteria

for rejecting H_0 . The extent to which the sample value coincides with expectations is defined by the probability of the sample value occurring as a result of random sampling from the hypothesized population. The researcher can set any probability level as a criterion for rejecting H_0 . As decisions based on probabilities will not be correct 100 percent of the time, it is always possible that an error has been made in the statistical inference resulting from the decision on whether to reject H_0 . The level of significance defines the degree of improbability deemed necessary to cast doubt on the null hypothesis to warrant its rejection. The probability level chosen as a criterion for rejecting H_0 directly affects the potential for making specific kinds of errors in the inferential process. When a criterion level is set for rejecting the null, one is actually identifying the *potential* probability of committing a Type I decision error. For a discussion of these potential errors and a consideration of factors influencing the choice of significance level, see below.

Step 3: Determination of the region(s) of rejection by identifying the critical value result from the α level set for testing H_0 . The critical region is an area under the normal probability distribution; thus, critical values (z) are obtained from the normal distribution. The area of the curve to the left of the lower critical value and to the right of the upper critical value is the region of rejection. Consistent with the level of significance adopted, it is chosen so that if the obtained value of the statistic (test statistic, *step 4*) falls within the region, rejection of the null hypothesis is indicated. For example, for a two tailed hypothesis ("does not equal"), a z must exceed 1.96 or be less than -1.96 to be significant at the $\alpha = .05$ level. The critical value for a one tail test ($\alpha = .01$) is 2.33 or -2.33 depending on the direction of the alternative hypothesis.

Step 4: Calculation of the sample statistic value needed to test the null hypothesis. The term *test statistic* refers to the statistic employed in the testing of H_0 . In conducting research and engaging in hypothesis testing, a sample is drawn from a population and a summary statistic, such as a mean, is obtained. Direct comparison between the sample value and the hypothesized population value is not an appropriate procedure as the sample data will deviate

somewhat from the population characteristics. Rather, one must convert the sample value to a standard test statistic. Common test statistics include z , t , F , and χ^2 . The framework for testing statistical hypotheses is similar for each of these tests. While a discussion of each test statistic is beyond the scope of this entry, examples as well as formulas for computing various tests of significance can be obtained from the same sources listed previously.

Step 5: Decision regarding the null hypothesis. The decision process in hypothesis testing is straightforward as it involves a comparison of the observed sample standard score to the critical value determined by the α level. If the test statistic falls in the region of rejection, the null hypothesis is rejected and the inference is made to accept the research hypothesis. If the test statistic does not fall in the critical region, the null fails to be disproved and no inference can be made.

CONFIDENCE INTERVALS

Statistical inference under the significance testing paradigm uses a sampling plan to select a single representative of some population, or a point estimate, which is often a mean. However, there is another approach to statistical inference: interval estimation. Rather than using a single value as a direct estimate of a parameter, interval estimation establishes a range or interval to which a level of confidence (typically 95 or 99 percent) can be attached that the interval contains the parameter. Establishing a range for the population mean based on the sample data with an upper and lower bound intuitively provides more information about the mean; however, in terms of accuracy of the estimate, interval estimation and point estimation are identical as both are based on the same information.

When the value specified by the null hypothesis is not contained in the confidence interval, the result is statistically significant. Standard notation for confidence intervals is to let the confidence level equal the quantity $1 - \alpha$. Thus, if $\alpha = .01$, the confidence level is .99 or 99 percent. To construct the interval, the upper and lower limits are found using the formulas (when σ is known):

$$\text{Upper limit} = \bar{X} + (z_{1-\alpha/2}) \sigma_{\bar{X}}$$

$$\text{Lower limit} = \bar{X} - (z_{1-\alpha/2}) \sigma_{\bar{X}}$$

$$\text{where } \sigma_{\bar{X}} = \sigma/\sqrt{n}$$

The proper interpretation of a confidence interval reflects the sampling concept of the sampling distribution (discussed in the next section): over repeated random samplings of size n , the probability is that $(1 - \alpha)$ percent of all of the confidence intervals that could be constructed around the sample means will contain the population mean. Interval size relates directly to estimate precision: the smaller the range, the more precise the interval estimate of the population mean. Additionally, with greater confidence comes a wider interval, meaning that a 99 percent interval will encompass a wider range than a 95 percent interval. Sample size and the amount of variability in the population affect the precision of interval estimates by affecting the size of the standard error. Both factors improve estimator precision by making the standard error smaller.

SAMPLING DISTRIBUTIONS

Inferences are made from a single event, single experiment, or single set of sample results. Assuming a model of randomness, one is usually interested in determining how probable a result is by chance for the single event or sample. To make this determination, the researcher needs to know something about how the sample outcomes are distributed in general. A *sampling distribution* is the relative frequency distribution of a statistic of all possible samples of size n that could be selected from the population. Fortunately, the characteristics of sampling distributions for various sample statistics have been derived by statistical theory. Sampling distribution characteristics describe theoretical models to indicate a sample statistic's precision in estimating a population parameter of interest.

Different sampling distributions are possible; every sample statistic has one and each is defined by its shape, mean, and standard deviation. Characteristics of a sampling distribution of means, for example, are expected and predictable from mathematical theorems. One such theorem, the *central limit theorem*, identifies

these three characteristics that describe fully the expected distribution of sample means resulting from random samples of size n .

Shape: The sampling distribution approaches normality as sample size increases and for a very large n is approximately normal.

Measure of central tendency: The mean of a sampling distribution of means ($\mu_{\bar{X}}$) for samples of any size n equals the population mean (μ).

Measure of variability: The standard deviation of means ($\sigma_{\bar{X}}$) in a sampling distribution is known as the standard error of the mean, which reflects the amount of variability among the sample means.

Figure 1 illustrates distributions of various sized random samples. Suppose one were drawing random samples of size 16, 49, and 100 from a population with $\mu = 50$ and $\sigma = 10$. Figure 1 shows how the theoretical sampling distribution of means would appear. As n is increased, the standard error becomes smaller and the more closely the sample means cluster around μ : that is, the sampling distribution approximates a normal curve more closely.

TYPE I/TYPE II ERRORS AND POWER

Earlier, it was said that the α level selected directly affects the potential for making specific kinds of errors in the inferential process. Examining the consequences of one's decisions resulting from hypothesis testing, it is clear that only two decisions regarding H_0 can be made: one can reject it or not. Consequences of this decision relate directly to the true state of affairs concerning H_0 – whether H_0 is true or whether it is false as a description of the population characteristic. Table 1 identifies the consequences (correct decision or error) of rejecting or not rejecting H_0 given the truth about the null.

A Type I error – a decision to reject H_0 when H_0 is true – can only occur when the null hypothesis is true. When α is set as the criterion for rejecting H_0 , one is actually identifying the potential probability of concluding that a difference exists where really one does not. Type II error (β) refers to a decision to not




Figure 1 Distributions of various-sized random samples.

Table 1 Consequences of the hypothesis test

	True State of Affairs	
	H ₀ True	H ₀ False
Decision:	Type I	Type II
Reject H ₀	Decision Error (α)	Correct Decision (1 - β)
Do Not Reject H ₀	Correct Decision (1 - α)	Decision Error (β)

reject H_0 when H_0 is false. In many instances, Type I error is the more severe error as change is likely to be implemented upon finding a significant result. Therefore, one usually sets the probability criterion level for rejecting H_0 by chance quite low (typically .05 or lower) in social science research.

If one decides to reject H_0 , one of two potential consequences results: an error (Type I) or a correct decision. The α probability level is only relevant and applicable if H_0 is really true. If one decides to reject the null and H_0 is really false, this is a correct decision. The probability of this outcome is called the *power* of a statistical test (rejecting H_0 when the null is truly false) and equals $1 - \beta$. Manipulating several design factors can increase the power when testing the null hypothesis so that if H_0 is false, the probability of rejecting it is high. Factors affecting power include: increasing sample size and sampling from a more homogeneous population (reduces standard error resulting in a more precise estimate), using a one tailed test (a directional hypothesis results in greater power than a two tailed test), and using a larger α level. The latter factor will result in greater power in testing H_0 when H_0 is false; however, when

H_0 is true, the Type I error rate is larger due to the increased α . Therefore, many researchers are reluctant to use a larger significance level in an attempt to increase power.

MEANINGFUL DIFFERENCES:
STATISTICAL VS. PRACTICAL
SIGNIFICANCE AND EFFECT SIZE

Statistical significance is often confused with practical or substantive significance. When a null hypothesis is rejected, a difference between two means has been found, but the magnitude or importance of the difference does not necessarily follow. Given large samples, any difference will likely be significant in statistical terms. A misconception of significance testing is that a smaller significance level (α) indicates a stronger treatment effect or that somehow this indicates a more important result. However, a statistically significant outcome does not imply that a difference is large or of substantive importance. To determine if a difference is substantively trivial, researcher judgment (simply examining results) should play a role in addition to available empirical procedures.

In recent years, *effect size* reporting has become a popular empirical method for reporting the magnitude of a difference between means: that is, the size of a statistically significant result. In comparing distributions, the researcher will typically find the standard deviations to be similar, though not identical. In such situations, the standard deviations can be pooled for the purposes of appraising the magnitude of the difference between two means. Effect size (d) is the index that quantifies a mean difference in terms of pooled standard deviation units. One convention defines effect sizes $d = .20$ as small, $d = .50$ moderate, and $d = .80$ large (Cohen 1988). The need for judgment regarding practical significance should not be abandoned at this point as any sample difference is subject to sampling variation, especially in the cases of small sample size.

SEE ALSO: Confidence Intervals; Descriptive Statistics; Effect Sizes; Hypotheses; Measures of Centrality; Quantitative Methods; Statistics

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statistics

Wayne Gillespie

Censuses are used to enumerate a population and its characteristics. Statistics are mathematical calculations derived from this information or

data that are collected and recorded in a numeric or quantitative format. Quantitative methods such as these have been used to describe human populations for hundreds, even thousands, of years. Censuses, or the numbering of people, occurred throughout the ancient world. For example, the Romans conducted censuses in order to determine household income for political (i.e., voting) and taxation purposes. The Han dynasty census from 2 CE China is the earliest, intact census surviving from ancient times; it shows that the population of this dynasty exceeded 57 million. Another notable census is the *Doomsday Book*, which was compiled in 1086 after the Norman invasion of England to determine the amount of wealth obtained from the conquest. Sometimes censuses are conducted on the dead as opposed to the living. In 1662, John Graunt reported the number of deaths in London over the preceding 30 years. He even analyzed mortality trends by gender, season, and location. Graunt eventually published the first “life tables,” used to compute life expectancy. In 1693, Edmund Halley refined Graunt’s calculations to correctly compute life expectancy (Heyde & Seneta 2001). Censuses of human populations are still conducted throughout the modern world. The first census in the United States was taken in 1790, and censuses are done every 10 years in the US (US Census Bureau 2005).

Censuses are useful in describing an entire population, but they can be costly and time consuming. Probability sampling and statistical analysis allow for information to be generalized from a smaller group of people to the general population from which the group was selected. The primary advantage of statistical analysis is that compiling information on entire populations is not necessary. Rather, by drawing from probability theory, statistics allow researchers to estimate the attributes of populations from the characteristics of samples.

Statistics is an applied mathematical science, but not necessarily a subfield of mathematics; as Moore and Cobb (2000) noted, statistics values mathematical understanding but only as a means to an end, not as an end unto itself. Indeed, statistics has application in many seemingly disparate fields such as biology, education, public health, and sociology. In their text on statistical reasoning in sociology, Mueller

et al. defined the concept of statistics in two related manners: “(1) the factual data themselves, such as vital statistics, statistics on trade, production, and the like; and (2) the methods, theories, and techniques by means of which the collected descriptions are summarized and interpreted” (1970: 2).

The discipline of sociology emerged in tandem with the development of the field of statistics in the nineteenth century. Adolphe Quetelet (1796–1874) was a Belgian astronomer who became deeply interested in the application of statistical principles to human populations. He used probability theory to explain the consistency in the number of crimes from year to year, as well as to describe the characteristics of the “average” man (Mueller et al. 1970). For example, Quetelet used statistics to devise the first body mass index, known as the Quetelet Index, which is still used today as an indicator of obesity. Quetelet even organized and presided over the First International Congress of Statistics in 1853 (Heyde & Seneta 2001). According to de Heer et al. (1999), Quetelet’s two important contributions toward social statistics were his concept of the average man and his fitting of the normal curve to social phenomena.

Positivism was the first major paradigm in sociology, and it relied on statistical methods, such as those advanced by Quetelet, combined with Auguste Comte’s (1798–1857) positive philosophy and later Émile Durkheim’s (1858–1917) structural functionalism. This variant of early sociology was concerned with patterning social science after natural science and identifying laws of human behavior and social facts. The positivist approach is inherently quantitative, and it has been criticized for reducing complex social behavior to statistical probabilities and undermining human free will (Mueller et al. 1970). It is this penchant toward determinism that is the greatest criticism of both positivism and statistics.

Current statistical methods rely on laws or rules of probability. The estimation of population parameters from sample statistics is possible through probability theory. Probability is the numerical representation of the likelihood of an expected outcome occurring over multiple trials. It is the ratio of the number of expected outcomes (i.e., successes) to the total number of possible outcomes (Blalock 1972). There are at

least three rules of probability that inform statistics (Ritchey 2000). The first rule notes that probabilities are bound between 0 and 1, or between 0 percent and 100 percent. The second rule is called the addition rule. When two mutually exclusive outcomes are expected, then the probability of either of these events occurring is equal to the sum of the probabilities of the individual outcomes. However, when these events are not mutually exclusive, the probability of either the first or second outcome occurring is equal to the sum of their separate probabilities with the probability of their joint occurrence subtracted. The third probability rule is known as the multiplication rule. When two outcomes are statistically independent, the occurrence of the first event does not influence or predict the second. When two outcomes are statistically independent, the probability of both events occurring at the same time is equal to the product of their separate probabilities. However, when two outcomes are not statistically independent, the probability of both events occurring simultaneously is the same as the product of the probability of one event and the conditional probability of the other.

These rules of probability are important to statistics because many statistical tests assume that there is independence between events or outcomes, and that conditional probabilities do not need to be used. As Blalock pointed out, “it is assumed that there is independence of selection within a sample – the choice of one individual having no bearing on the choice of another individual to be included in the sample” (1972: 142). Random sampling, where every subject has an equal chance of being selected into the sample, is required to meet the assumption of independence.

Probability theory is used to produce sampling distributions. Sampling distributions are infinite since they involve repeated sampling (i.e., random samples repeatedly drawn from a population). A sampling distribution is another mathematical representation derived from repeated sampling that describes all possible event outcomes and the probability of each one (Ritchey 2000). It is important to note that sampling distributions are hypothetical, theoretical distributions, and researchers never attain a sampling distribution through empirical trials. Yet, when statistics are calculated for

each of these samples and then graphed, it results in a bell shaped or normal distribution. The normal distribution is one of the fundamental concepts in statistics, and it is expressed as the central limit theorem. According to this principle, regardless of the shape of the raw score distribution of a characteristic measured at an interval or ratio level, the sampling distribution of means will be more or less normal in shape as the sample size increases.

Probability and sampling provide the theoretical basis for statistics from a mathematical perspective. However, many of these rules and laws are implicitly assumed. The field of social statistics, in practice, is probably more concerned with the levels of measurement and the various types of statistical tests rather than the laws and rules that make such analysis possible in the first place (Blalock 1974). Indeed, the level at which social phenomena are measured dictates the type of statistical test that can be calculated. Once a characteristic is measured, and the characteristic shows variation, then it is called a variable. Variables are measured at four levels: nominal, ordinal, interval, and ratio. Ratio measurement is the most precise because the distance between values is both equal and known, and variables measured at the ratio level may contain a true zero, which signifies the total absence of the attribute. As with variables expressed at the ratio level, interval level variables are continuous, and the distance between values is also both known and constant. However, for variables measured at the interval level, no true zero point exists; the zero in interval level data is arbitrary. Variables measured at the nominal and ordinal levels are categorical. With ordinal level data, the response categories are both mutually exclusive and rank ordered. The categories of a variable measured at the nominal level have no relationship with one another; they simply signify the presence or absence of a particular quality. It is important to note that these levels of measurement are cumulatively related to one another; for example, a ratio scale possesses all the properties of an interval scale, included in an interval scale are all the properties of an ordinal scale, and the ordinal scale has all the properties of the nominal level.

Blalock (1972: 21) observed that “the use of a particular mathematical model presupposes

that a certain level of measurement has been attained.” Statistical tests are generally univariate, bivariate, or multivariate in nature. Univariate statistics involve the description of one variable. If the variable was measured at a nominal level, then it is possible to report the mode (i.e., the most commonly occurring value), proportions, percentages, and ratios. When the variable is measured at the ordinal level, it becomes possible to calculate medians, quartiles, deciles, and quartile deviations. Then, at the interval and ratio levels of measurement, univariate procedures include means (i.e., the arithmetic average), medians (i.e., the midpoint), variances, and standard deviations. Measures of central tendency include the mode, median, and mean; measures of dispersion or the spread of the values for a given variable are typically reported as a quartile, percentile, variance, or standard deviation.

Bivariate statistics involve tests of association between two variables. Again, the level of measurement determines the appropriate bivariate statistic. For example, when both the dependent variable (i.e., the effect or the characteristic that is being affected by another variable) and the independent variable (i.e., the cause or the characteristic affecting the outcome) are measured at a nominal level, then the chi square statistic is most commonly used. Unfortunately, the chi square test only reveals if two variables are related; in order to determine the strength of a bivariate relationship involving two nominal variables, other statistics such as lambda or phi are used. When the dependent variable is measured at an interval or ratio level, and the independent variable is categorical (i.e., nominal or ordinal), then it becomes necessary to compare means across the categories of the independent variable. When the independent variable is dichotomous, the t test statistic is used, and when the independent variable contains more than two categories, an analysis of variance (ANOVA) must be used. When both variables are measured at an interval or ratio level, then statistical tests based on the equation for a line, such as Pearson’s correlation and least squares regression, become appropriate procedures. Multivariate statistics often test for the relationship between two variables while holding constant a number of other variables; this introduces the principle of statistical control.

Examples of multivariate techniques include multivariate analysis of variance, multiple linear and logistic regression, factor analysis, path analysis, structural equation modeling, hierarchical linear modeling, and meta analysis (Grimm & Yarnold 1998).

Blalock (1972) identified five steps that all statistical tests have in common. First, assumptions concerning the population and the ability of the generalizations from the sample must be made. The assumptions also influence the formal stating of hypotheses (e.g., the null hypothesis is a statement of no association, and the research hypothesis is the alternative to the null). Then, the theoretical sampling distribution must be obtained or the probability distribution of the statistic must be rendered. Next, an appropriate significance level and critical region for the statistic must be selected. Fourth, the test statistic must be calculated. Lastly, based on the magnitude of the test statistic and its associated significance, a decision about the acceptance or rejection of hypotheses must be made. In many ways, hypothesis testing is the apex of statistical methods because it combines statistical theory with empirical, mathematical calculations to describe social phenomena and determine relationships between social facts.

SEE ALSO: ANOVA (Analysis of Variance); Demographic Data: Censuses, Registers, Surveys; Descriptive Statistics; Factor Analysis; Hierarchical Linear Models; Hypotheses; Measures of Centrality; Meta Analysis; Multivariate Analysis; Path Analysis; Positivism; Quantitative Methods; Random Sample; Regression and Regression Analysis; Statistical Significance Testing; Structural Equation Modeling

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status

Vasiliki Kantzara

Status, originally a Latin word, means state of affairs, condition of a person as defined by law and in social sciences; it denotes standing in society. In sociology, the notion of status or social status designates location and position of collectivities – communities, groups, or strata – in the social hierarchy of honor and prestige. Positions are distinguished from one another in terms of differentiated duties and rights, immunities and privileges, and usually are associated with a lifestyle or a consumption pattern. In their turn, these distinguishing traits are attributed a hierarchical value that generally represents the scale of social worth in society.

Status as a concept denotes both the evaluation process entailed in achieving a position and the granted location in the social hierarchy. Individuals attain status mainly in two ways: status is achieved and is ascribed (Linton 1936). It is achieved on the basis of personal effort, which is represented in educational titles and income earnings. Status is ascribed on the basis of characteristics that seem given, such as a person's age, ethnicity, or gender. In addition, status has an interrelational aspect, that is, the honor or prestige achieved needs to be granted

or attributed so that one may argue that a high status is truly attained. Groups and individuals strive to maintain or increase their acquired status, while they may strongly resist status loss.

THEORETICAL FOUNDATION OF STATUS

The term status captured the imagination of social scientists and particular sociologists, for they thought that the term could explain the constitution of social order and the position and relation of individuals to this order. The latter is emphasized in Linton's approach, the former in Weber's.

Ralph Linton, a social anthropologist in the US, employed the term status in the 1930s, referring to status as "a position in a particular pattern" (1936: 113). The status of an individual is, for Linton, the "sum total" of all the statuses a person occupies. A status is distinct from the person and it is defined as a collection of duties and rights, which form the static aspect of a position. When duties and rights are put into effect, they constitute the "dynamic" part of status, that is, the role involved in a position. These obligations and rights derive primarily from custom rather than law. Until about that time, the term status was largely employed in a legal sense, that is, rights and duties conferred to a person by law. Status in Linton's sense departs from this definition as the social position of an individual is viewed in terms of the degree of attributed prestige, esteem, and respect rather than in terms of possessing wealth and power (Zelditch 1968: 250).

Max Weber defined status as "a quality of honor or a lack of it" (1974: 405). Honor is furthermore differentially attributed, constituting a system of social stratification that is based on custom and communal values. In Weber's view, status groups differ in an important respect from classes. Classes are based upon the economic order, being an essential part of this order (pp. 180–1), and status groups are based on and are part of the social order, which is formed by customs and legal arrangements.

Status groups may be tight or less tight – "amorphous" – communities and are distinguished entities, as they are characterized by a

common consumption pattern and a lifestyle. These social groups, furthermore, claim rights and privileges for their members and strive to increase their status, while defending acquired rights. In this, status groups may come into conflict with other social groups or may exercise a closure strategy by controlling, for instance, the admission of new members to their ranks.

Status groups are in Weber's view part of the stratification system and are "knitted" into the economic order. In the long run, status groups and classes are interlinked and interconnected: a highly valued status group will acquire wealth and power, and a wealthy class will eventually acquire a high status (Weber 1974: 180–94; Scott 1996). Later, Benoit (1966), drawing on Weber, described this tendency as a "status conversion mechanism."

Weber's approach has been significant for the social stratification paradigm in social sciences. In the US, his approach has been influential, albeit without the social conflict component of his theory (Turner 1988). Linton's approach is important in that it has laid the basis for approaching status at the level of individuals. Subsequent theorizing and research on status throughout the twentieth century focused on varied aspects and dimensions of the term. From these researches and theories three broad areas can be discerned. First, a considerable amount of research has investigated the importance and relevance of social status to stratification by exploring the status of occupations. Second, status has been examined in relation to interaction and its outcomes within groups, exploring inequality in face to face interaction. This approach is known as the expectation states theory. Third, status consistency or inconsistency has been the focus of some approaches that sought to explain variation of holding different statuses at an individual level.

SOCIAL STATUS AND OCCUPATIONAL STRATIFICATION

In social sciences, it is viewed that in modern western societies the status of an individual derives primarily from one's occupation, as it is considered the main avenue of acquiring immunities, privileges, honor, and wealth, and

is an indicator of authority and power. Its significance becomes evident in some studies that relate achieved status and occupation to levels of self esteem.

The significance of occupation in determining an individual's position in the social hierarchy underlies the paradigm that focuses on occupational stratification. In this paradigm, it was thought that measuring the standing of occupations would provide an answer to questions and issues relating to social stratification and upward social mobility (Bendix & Lipset 1966). It has been largely assumed that achievement in western societies can overcome ascription and barriers posed, for instance, by social origins or gender (Treiman 1977). Ideally, in an open society, supposedly even the highest positions are open to every aspiring individual worthy of such a position.

Research in this area was directed to exploring occupational status or prestige (Reiss 1961; Treiman 1977) by measuring the standing of occupations. The terms status, social status, occupational status, and occupational prestige are used interchangeably and sometimes synonymously (Kantzara 2001). Research has been mainly quantitative and the main criteria or "variables" employed are education, occupation, and income, best known as the socioeconomic index.

The occupational stratification paradigm has produced numerous indices that depict the "images" and the hierarchy of occupational status as well as the changes it undergoes. This variation within a country as well as in comparative studies has made it difficult to sustain the main argument that social stratification is "invariant," obeying "laws" that the sociologist has only to uncover. Certain tenets and arguments of this paradigm have been criticized and challenged (Burawoy 1977), while research from this perspective continues to this day.

STATUS AND GROUP INTERACTION

Status order within groups is the primary focus of the expectation states theory or status characteristics theory. This theory constitutes a theoretical program comprising different but related research programs. It is based on the

work of Bales and others, who found that in small task oriented groups, inequalities could be observed in relation to members' participation and influence (cited in Berger & Zelditch 1998: 97–8). Expectation states theory sought to elaborate on these findings and explore some of the conditions in which a status order emerges or is maintained. Concepts such as status characteristics, status organizing processes, and path of relevance are employed in order to analyze patterns of evaluation and status order in small task oriented groups (Berger & Zelditch 1998; Ridgeway 1992).

Research has focused more particularly on the status characteristics of individuals, such as their age, ethnicity, and gender and the relation of these traits to judging individuals' degree of competence, quality of work performance, or the degree of influence these actors exercise in making decisions in small groups. The research results are based on experiments conducted in these groups. There is sufficient evidence that the assumed status of individuals plays a major role in the evaluation of competence and the quality of one's work performance; that is, the higher the status, the higher the positive evaluation of work performance regardless of whether it is qualitatively better. Status expectation theory is an ongoing research project that has already passed through various stages within the disciplines of social psychology and sociology (Berger & Zelditch 1998).

STATUS CRYSTALLIZATION OR CONSISTENCY AND INCONSISTENCY

Focusing on an individual level, some authors have referred to the phenomenon of status consistency or inconsistency. These terms broadly denote that an individual's achieved status in one area converges or on the contrary may differ from ascribed or achieved status in another area.

In cases where status in one area converges with status in another, some authors suggest that an individual's status is crystallized or consistent. Lenski's approach attempted to formulate this proposition with a mathematical equation (cited in Smith 1996). The equation has been challenged to a great extent, but not the content of the argument. Lenski's work is

based on that of Benoit, who discusses status equilibration and status conversion mechanisms, drawing on Weber's approach. The terms denote that different "types" of status tend to reach a common level; that is, an individual's high status in the economic hierarchy will match the achieved status in the "political hierarchy" and this in turn will be equivalent to the status in the "hierarchy of prestige" (Benoit 1966: 80).

Merton (1966), who takes up Linton's definition of status and role, suggests that when an individual puts into effect different roles that have conflicting obligations, we witness a status inconsistency. Merton suggests that society usually develops adaptive mechanisms to mitigate these conflicts. In addition, individuals may avoid role conflicts by exercising "self selection," which means that they usually avoid occupying positions that cause role conflicts.

Hughes, on the other hand, discusses status contradictions and dilemmas people face when they interact with those who are in a status inconsistent position. Such cases, Hughes suggests, can be seen in occupations where the expected traits of professionals do not match with those in reality: a "black" doctor and a woman engineer were common examples in his time of status dilemmas. The solutions given include segregation, in two ways: (1) the individuals who differ are "put out of sight," so that, for instance, clients or co workers do not come into contact with them; (2) the individuals in question are directed to occupations that are thought to suit best their race and gender, that is, a "black" sociologist will eventually teach "race studies" and a woman engineer will design household appliances (Hughes 1971: 142–9). This approach also touches upon the issue of the interrelational aspect of status – to attain it, it needs to be granted (Kantzara 2001) – and "status passage."

CURRENT RESEARCH

Status both in Weber's and in Linton's sense has in a variety of ways greatly influenced theorizing in social sciences in general and in sociology in particular. Since the 1970s, the concept has also been increasingly employed to document the position and relative ranking or standing of disadvantaged social groups on the basis of gender

or ethnicity. In sociology of education, for instance, studies from a Weberian perspective explore and explain the changes in educational systems as an outcome of conflicts between rival status groups aspiring to control education and access to certain benefits. Additionally, the term status is employed to explain advantage or underachievement in education. Currently, however, status is mostly employed descriptively as shorthand for social position, as for instance women's status, or indicating a current state of affairs, as in the term health status.

It seems that status as a term has ceased to be at the center of theorizing in social sciences. However, the relevance of the concept for investigating the constitution of society has not diminished in importance. Status could be employed as an analytic concept in exploring and explaining social hierarchy, stratification, or inequality, which is still very relevant in the face of such social tendencies as increased diversity on the one hand and homogenization on the other. The relation of status to social identity and citizenship is a promising area of research as well. The latter relation is apparent in cases where various or competing social groups pursue and demand equal rights, and most importantly demand the application of equal rights for their members. In practice, it is witnessed that depending on context, prestige and standing still largely define the unequal distribution of rewards, whether financial, political, or cultural, and unequal access to social goods and services.

SEE ALSO: Class, Status, and Power; Ethnicity; Inequality/Stratification, Gender; Role; Status Attainment; Status Construction Theory; Status Passages; Weber, Max

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status attainment

Claudia Buchmann

Status attainment research begun by sociologists in the United States more than three decades ago laid the foundation for the study of the transmission of socioeconomic advantage from one generation to the next (also called intergenerational social mobility). Status attainment research seeks to understand how characteristics of an individual's family background (also called socioeconomic origins) relate to his or her educational attainment and occupational

status in society. It developed a methodology – usually path analysis and multiple regression techniques with large survey data sets – to investigate the intergenerational transmission of status.

In the classic study, *The American Occupational Structure* (1967), Peter Blau and Otis Dudley Duncan used national level data obtained from the 1962 Current Population Survey from the US Census Bureau and presented a basic model of the stratification process in which father's education and occupational status explain son's educational attainment, and all three variables, in turn, explain son's first job and subsequent occupational attainment. They found that the effect of son's education on son's occupational attainment was much larger than the effect of father's occupation on son's occupational attainment; thus they concluded that in the United States in the mid twentieth century, achievement was more important than ascription in determining occupational status.

David Featherman and Robert Hauser replicated the Blau and Duncan study in their book *Opportunity and Change* (1978), and found many of the same results. They found evidence of mobility both within generations (intragenerational mobility) and between generations (intergenerational mobility). Most mobility was rather short in distance and occurred primarily in the middle of the occupational hierarchy. They also found more upward mobility than downward mobility. Combining the findings of Blau and Duncan, Featherman and Hauser, and follow up studies, status attainment research has determined that there has been a long term decline in the importance of family background in determining an individual's occupational status.

Around the same time that Blau and Duncan were writing *The American Occupational Structure*, William Sewell and colleagues at the University of Wisconsin began publishing papers that addressed questions regarding the relative impacts of family background and schooling on subsequent educational and occupational attainments (Sewell et al. 1969). A notable aspect of the "Wisconsin model" of status attainment was its focus on social psychological factors, such as aspirations and motivation, in conjunction with family socioeconomic status in determining student achievement. In this regard, the Wisconsin

model attempted to specify the mediating mechanisms by which family origins influenced individual educational and occupational outcomes. The Wisconsin model of status attainment demonstrated that “significant others,” including parents, friends, and teachers, strongly affect the educational and occupational expectations of male high school students. Subsequent research found that peers and parents help shape students’ ambitions and attitudes toward schooling, both of which are mediating factors in later educational attainment and achievement. Generally, parents are more influential as definers of behavior while peers are important as both modelers and definers of behavior. Most of these studies include controls for socioeconomic status, parental education, and the student’s academic ability or achievement, all of which have the effect of increasing aspirations. While Blau and Duncan specified father’s occupation and education as separate influences, the Wisconsin researchers usually combined these measures, along with mother’s education and family income, into a single measure of socioeconomic status. Despite these measurement differences, both models concluded that socioeconomic status strongly determined educational attainment.

The now classic research by Blau and Duncan and the Wisconsin model of status attainment established a framework for the study of family background on educational and occupational attainment in a wide range of contexts. By the early 1980s, more than 500 papers had attempted to replicate or extend their basic findings (Campbell 1983).

Human capital models in economics, in which family background and schooling decisions determined education and earnings outcomes, also contributed to this growing field.

While some studies applied the status attainment model to nationally representative samples in the United States, others examined status attainment processes in very different countries and contexts. Building on the foundation laid by status attainment research in the United States, studies have examined the role of social origins in determining educational and occupational status and mobility in a range of countries; other research has investigated how intergenerational mobility changes over time with large societal changes, such as the expansion of formal

schooling, the industrialization of society, or the transition from socialism to capitalism.

Some comparative status attainment research sought to examine another hypothesis offered by Blau and Duncan. On the basis of their findings from the United States, Blau and Duncan predicted that as societies industrialize, achievement processes become more important and ascriptive processes become less important in determining educational and occupational attainment. They tested this hypothesis for the United States by comparing the experiences of different birth cohorts but they found no clear trend over time. Donald Treiman (1970) expanded upon these ideas to provide a detailed explanation of the mechanisms by which industrialization should promote greater mobility. As societies develop, urbanization, mass communication, and industrialization should lead to greater social openness and a shift from particularistic to universalistic bases of achievement. As a result, the direct influence of father’s occupational status on son’s occupational status, as well as father’s educational and occupational status on son’s educational attainment, should decline, while the direct influence of son’s educational attainment on his occupational status should increase. During the 1970s and 1980s, researchers set out to test these propositions. Most studies examined historical or regional differences within a single society and few found support for the industrialism thesis. To date, the evidence regarding how the impact of social origins on educational and occupational attainment varies with industrialization remains inconclusive, largely due to the lack of cross national survey data for a wide range of countries.

International studies of social mobility have contributed greatly to our understanding of how family socioeconomic status shapes educational and occupational outcomes. The influence of the Blau–Duncan model is clearly evident in this international research; most studies conceptualize socioeconomic status as either father’s education and occupation or a composite measure of these and other family background factors. Some researchers have had to alter this approach due to data limitations or considerations of the local context, but still, the systematic approach to the measurement of family background is striking. As a result of these efforts, status attainment models now

exist for many nations in all regions of the world.

In status attainment research, occupational status is typically measured via scales that have been developed to generalize the prestige associated with occupations across a wide range of societies. The earliest of these was the Socioeconomic Index (SEI) scale formulated by Duncan for the United States and subsequently modified by other researchers for other countries. Comparative stratification researchers have devoted considerable effort to developing internationally comparative scales of occupational prestige and testing their reliability cross culturally. Two of these scales, the Standard International Occupational Prestige (SIOP) scale and the International Socioeconomic Index (ISEI) of occupational status, have been used extensively in international research. Although most prior research relied on paternal occupational status in constructing this measure, recent empirical evidence indicates that mother's occupational status has a strong impact on educational outcomes, independent of father's education and occupational status. Such findings, combined with the increasing prevalence of women's full time labor force participation throughout the world, suggest that mother's occupational status should be included as a measure of family background in future status attainment research. The inclusion of mother's education has been more common, perhaps because early status attainment research indicated that mother's education had positive effects on children's schooling, net of father's education and occupational status. In many cases, maternal and paternal education are highly correlated and researchers use one or the other as a measure of parental education. In contexts where mothers spend more time with their children or where males are typically absent from the household, it is reasonable to expect that mother's education should have a stronger impact than father's education, and researchers have used mother's education as the measure for parental education. Another strategy has been to use the sum of both parents' schooling.

As in the case of occupational status, scales have been developed for measuring educational attainment with the goal of ensuring comparability cross nationally. CASMIN and ISCED are two such scales. The International Standard

Classification of Education (ISCED) was originally developed by UNESCO and is regularly used by UNESCO and other international organizations for reporting national education statistics. The CASMIN categories were developed as part of a project known as "Comparative Analysis of Social Mobility in Industrial Nations." Walter Mueller and his colleagues at the University of Mannheim, Germany developed CASMIN with the express purpose of facilitating comparative research on social stratification and mobility. ISCED and CASMIN are similar in that they focus on the levels of education completed: elementary, secondary, and tertiary education, and specify some subdivisions at each level. The CASMIN scale goes a step further to distinguish general or academic credentials from vocational credentials. These scales have facilitated international comparisons of educational systems and educational stratification.

Status attainment research constitutes one of the largest bodies of empirical research in the study of social stratification. It reshaped the study of social mobility by focusing attention on how aspects of individuals' socioeconomic origins relate to their educational attainment and occupational status in society. Nonetheless, critics have noted several limitations with this line of research. First, status attainment research does a better job of explaining the social mobility for white males than females or minorities. Second, this line of research has limited explanatory power because, even for white males, status attainment models can explain only about half of the variance in occupational attainment. This indicates that even the most complex status attainment models still do not get very close to approximating the even more complex reality of the attainment process. Third, in its focus on individual characteristics, status attainment research has tended to neglect the role of structural factors in determining individual educational and occupational outcomes. Changes in the economy or changes in the opportunity structure of occupations caused by large scale policy changes (e.g., equal employment opportunity policies) are just two examples of factors that create societal shifts that can impact status attainment processes at the individual level. Since the 1990s, more research has expanded status attainment research to account for such

social structural or organizational factors that may play a role in individual mobility.

SEE ALSO: Capital: Economic Cultural, and Social; Intergenerational Mobility: Methods of Analysis; Mobility: Horizontal and Vertical; Mobility: Intergenerational and Intragenerational; Occupational Mobility; Status

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status construction theory

Cecilia L. Ridgeway

Status construction theory focuses on the collective development of widely shared status beliefs about apparently nominal social differences among people, such as sex or ethnicity (Ridgeway 1991; Webster & Hysom 1998; Ridgeway & Erickson 2000). Status beliefs associate greater respect and greater competence at socially valued tasks with people in one category of a social difference (e.g., men, whites) than with those in another category of that difference (women, people of color). A typical reaction to the recognition of social difference is for people in each category to assume that their own group is “better.” When status beliefs develop about a recognized social difference, however, they transform simple difference into an evaluative hierarchy so that the distinction

becomes a status characteristic in society. The distinctive aspect of status beliefs is that those in the social category that is favored by the status beliefs and those in the less favored category both come to hold similar beliefs that “most people” view the favored group as better than the other group. Status construction theory describes one set of processes by which such beliefs could come to be accepted as a matter of social reality by those they disadvantage and by those they advantage. In this way, beliefs become roughly consensual in society. The theory claims that the processes it describes are sufficient to produce widely shared status beliefs but are not the only way such beliefs might develop in a society or collectivity.

Status construction theory developed in the 1990s in the context of two well established bodies of theory and research. Several decades of research on status hierarchies among individuals in groups, especially research associated with expectation states theory, had documented that interpersonal influence and deference are largely driven by differences in the status characteristics of the individuals involved (Berger et al. 1977). How social differences became status characteristics, however, was unknown.

While this micro tradition of theory and research examined status between individuals, macro approaches to status, beginning with Max Weber, focused on status as a relationship between social groups in society. Status between individuals and status between groups are linked by the widely held status beliefs that both represent the social standing of groups in society and cause group differences to manifest as status characteristics in interpersonal settings. Status construction theory attempted to connect these two bodies of work by offering an account of the development of status beliefs about social differences.

The theory is a micro–macro theory that focuses on the aggregate effects that emerge from interpersonal encounters between socially different actors when these encounters have been framed and constrained by macrostructural conditions. The theory takes as a starting point the existence of a socially recognized but not yet consensually evaluated categorical distinction. An assumed scope condition is that members from the groups created by the distinction are to some degree interdependent in that they must

regularly cooperate to achieve what they want or need. Under these conditions, status construction theory, drawing on its roots in expectation states theory, argues that the local contexts in which people from different categories encounter one another become arenas for the creation, spread, and maintenance of status beliefs about categorical difference.

The theory's basic arguments can be summarized as follows (Ridgeway & Erickson 2000). In interdependent encounters between categorically different people, interpersonal status hierarchies are likely to develop among the participants just as they do in most cooperative, goal oriented encounters. Such interpersonal influence hierarchies develop implicitly, through multiple small behaviors that the participants rarely scrutinize. Since the actual origins of their influence hierarchy are obscure to them but their categorical difference is salient, the theory argues that there is some chance that the participants will associate their apparent difference in esteem and competence in the situation with their categorical difference. If the same association is repeated for them in subsequent intercategory encounters, the theory argues that it will eventually induce them to form generalized status beliefs about the categorical distinction.

Once people form such status beliefs, they carry them to their next encounters with those from the other group and act on them there. By treating categorically different others according to the status belief, belief holders induce at least some of the others to take on the belief as well. In effect, they "teach" the others the beliefs by acting on it. This in turn creates a diffusion process that has the potential to spread the new status belief widely in the population.

Whether the new status belief does in fact spread widely and which categorical group it casts as higher status depend on the structural conditions that shape the terms on which people from each group encounter one another (Ridgeway 1991; Ridgeway & Balkwell 1997). Of central interest is whether structural conditions result in an unequal distribution between the groups of some factor such as material resources or technology that is helpful in gaining influence in intercategory encounters. The unequal distribution of such a "biasing factor" means that in intercategory encounters, there

will be a systematically greater likelihood that people from the group with more of the factor will emerge as the influential actors in the situation compared to people from the group with less of the factor. As a consequence, the set of intercategory encounters in the population will continually foster more status beliefs favoring the structurally advantaged group than favoring the other categorical group. As these beliefs spread and diffuse through future encounters, beliefs favoring the structurally advantaged group will eventually overwhelm counterbeliefs and become nearly consensual in the population. From this reasoning, the theory argues that if a biasing factor is unequally distributed between categorical groups, status beliefs favoring the structurally advantaged group will emerge and spread to become widely shared in the population.

As this description shows, the theory consists of two sets of arguments. The first addresses processes through which participants form status beliefs in micro level encounters between categorically different actors. The second set of arguments addresses the role of structural conditions in determining the aggregate consequences of belief formation in micro encounters.

In its initial formulation, status construction theory focused on one specific structural condition, a correlation between superior material resources and membership in a particular categorical group (Ridgeway 1991). Since Max Weber, sociologists have observed that a common precondition for the development of status beliefs about two social groups is that people in one group become, on average, richer in material resources than those from another. In its first statement, the theory delineated a set of processes through which this precondition gives rise to status beliefs about the group distinction. This statement brought together Peter Blau's (1977) theory of how social difference affects the likelihood that people encounter one another with expectation states theory's arguments about the influence hierarchies that would be likely to develop in encounters of various social composition. The analysis shows that "doubly dissimilar" encounters between people who differ in both material resources and the categorical distinction are especially important for the systematic development of status beliefs.

Although other intercategory encounters may induce status beliefs, it is only in doubly

dissimilar encounters that material resources systematically bias the development of influence hierarchies so that these encounters reliably produce more status beliefs favoring the materially advantaged group. Doubly dissimilar encounters are the least common type of intercategory encounter according to Blau's association arguments. However, through the diffusion process, these encounters feed a steady surplus of beliefs favoring the materially advantaged group into the population. Such beliefs overwhelm the cultural confusion of conflicting local beliefs, allowing widely shared status beliefs to emerge.

Two sorts of evidence support the initial formulation of the theory. Laboratory experiments suggest that people do form status beliefs favoring the materially advantaged group after two repeated doubly dissimilar encounters, as the theory predicts (Ridgeway et al. 1998). In these experiments, participants formed beliefs that most people would see the typical member of the materially advantaged group as higher status, more respected, and more competent, but not as socially considerate, as those in the other group. Participants formed these beliefs even when the beliefs cast their own categorical group as less respected and competent, although more considerate, than the other group.

In addition, computer simulations of the diffusion process provide logical support for the theory's arguments about how structural conditions shape the aggregate consequences of encounters. These simulations show that the emergence of nearly consensual status beliefs would be a logical consequence under a variety of assumptions about the strength of the correlation between categorical membership and superior resources, the strength of homophily bias in associations, and the relative sizes of the categorical groups (Ridgeway & Balkwell 1997).

Subsequent developments revealed that the theory's initial focus on the effects of inequalities in material resources was unnecessarily narrow and that the theory could account for the development of status beliefs under a broader range of structural conditions. The logic of the theory was shown to imply that an inequality in the distribution between two categorical groups of any factor, not just material resources, that biases the development of influence hierarchies in encounters will lead to the emergence of status beliefs about the categorical distinction

(Ridgeway et al. 1998; Webster & Hysom 1998). Webster and Hysom (1998) used this more general formulation of the theory to show how the social distribution of moral approval based on sexual orientation acts as a structural biasing factor that fosters the formation of status beliefs about homosexuality.

The viability of this more general formulation of the theory depends on the assumption that people form status beliefs simply from the repeated, consistent association of categorical difference with participants' relative influence in intercategory encounters. Further laboratory experiments showed that this does occur and that participants form these status beliefs even when the beliefs represent their own group as lower status and less competent than the other group (Ridgeway & Erickson 2000).

The above studies offer evidence that people form status beliefs about salient social differences from their cooperatively interdependent encounters with different others. For widely shared status beliefs to emerge about a categorical distinction, however, people must also be able to spread their newly acquired status beliefs to others by acting on those beliefs in subsequent encounters with those who differ on the distinction. Two laboratory experiments have examined this aspect of the theory (Ridgeway & Erickson 2000). The first showed that when participants had two repeated experiences of being treated in a status evaluated way, i.e., either deferred to or treated assertively, by a nominally different other, the participants formed status beliefs about the nominal distinction that corresponded to the way they were treated. A second study showed that participants acquired status beliefs not only when they were directly treated according to such beliefs themselves, but also when they witnessed the status evaluated treatment of someone like themselves by someone different. These studies suggest that intercategory encounters have the potential to propagate newly forming status beliefs widely through the population.

Status construction theory and the research that supports it suggest that interactional contexts are relatively powerful contexts for transforming nominal social differences into status differences. Yet despite this, not all socially recognized differences become status differences. Recent developments in status construction theory

examine in greater detail the processes of belief formation in encounters in an effort to discern how the processes of belief formation can some times be interrupted and undermined in local contexts so that widely shared beliefs do not emerge.

This recent elaboration of the theory argues that for participants to form status beliefs, not only must the influence hierarchies in their encounters be consistently juxtaposed with a salient categorical distinction, but the apparent correspondence between influence and difference must also seem socially valid to the participants (Ridgeway 2006). The stronger the appearance that the correspondence between difference and influence is consensually accepted by others, rather than resisted or challenged, the more socially valid it will seem, and the more likely it is that clear status beliefs will form. Legitimated authority will also make the correspondence seem socially valid, facilitating the formation of status beliefs. Supporting these arguments, experimental evidence shows that challenges to consensus undermine the formation of status beliefs, while the support of authorities strengthens status beliefs. These results suggest that widely shared status beliefs are most likely to emerge about a categorical distinction when structural conditions not only advantage one categorical group in gaining influence in intercategory encounters, but also constrain the ability of those in the structurally disadvantaged group to display resistance to that influence.

Status construction theory has framed its principal arguments in terms of the creation of new status beliefs. The theory also claims, however, to speak to the maintenance of existing status beliefs, particularly over changes in the initial social conditions that created them (Ridgeway 1991). According to the theory, if structural conditions described by the theory, such as an inequality in resources between the categorical groups, are currently present, then status construction processes will be sufficient to maintain status beliefs about that categorical distinction. This will occur whether or not these processes played a role in the actual historical origin of the status beliefs. Status construction processes, then, may cause status beliefs based on race, gender, or other social differences to persist in contemporary societies even though the original historical cause of those status

beliefs has disappeared. This aspect of status construction theory has been used in combination with other arguments to account for the persistence of gender status beliefs in western societies over major transformations in the socioeconomic organization of gender relations in those societies, such as those associated with industrialization or the movement of women into the paid labor force.

SEE ALSO: Blau, Peter; Class, Status, and Power; Expectation States Theory; Micro-Macro Links; Status; Status Attainment; Weber, Max

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status passages

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The term status comes from the Latin word meaning "to stand," which helps to clarify how the term has come to be used in sociology as

constituting a basic analytic unit in a social system (society), denoting a *position* that an individual holds (stands) in a particular institution or social structure. The concept of status had wide currency in the post World War II heyday of structural functionalism (Parsons 1951), and generally referred to a collection of specific institutional rights and duties (Linton 1936). The enactment of these rights and duties, on the other hand, was considered an individual's "role," the more dynamic aspect of status. Status passages, therefore, refer to persons passing from one status to another (e.g., from being single to married).

Gennep (1960) enduringly inscribed in the social scientific community's consciousness the phenomenon of status passages, in particular, age based status passages (e.g., adolescence to adulthood). Although Gennep was an anthropologist, sociologists used his work to explain various societies' methods for moving people from one status to another. Although sociologists have studied these transforming procedures, it could be argued that they have been overly influenced by Gennep's work in assuming that most status passages are regularized, scheduled, and prescribed. Certainly, many status passages have these characteristics and sociologists have spent considerable effort in studying these within occupations (careers) and organizations (mobility), as well as how these status passages affect self identity. But it was not until Strauss published "Some Neglected Aspects of Status Passages" (1968) and Glaser and Strauss's book *Status Passage* (1971) that various other properties or characteristics of status passages were theorized and studied. Among the other properties of status passages, Glaser and Strauss list the following:

- The passage may be desirable or undesirable (getting married or becoming a prisoner).
- The passage may be inevitable (birth to childhood).
- The passage may be reversible to some degree (job demotions).
- A passage may be repeatable or nonrepeatable (being sick).
- The person "passing" may do so alone or collectively (with any number of persons).
- It follows that when people go through a passage collectively, they may not be aware that they are all passing through together (large school classes).
- Persons involved may or may not be able to communicate with the others (junior executives being simultaneously demoted).
- The person making the passage may do so voluntarily or have no choice in the matter (commitment to a mental institution).
- Degree of control during the passage by the one making the passage and others who oversee it (father not allowing his son to obtain a driver's license).
- The passage may require some special legitimation by one or more authorized agents (a physician and being sick).
- The clarity of the signs of the passage may vary from great to negligible (a con man turning one into a mark or parents not knowing their daughter is getting married).
- The signs of passage may be clear or disguised by relevant parties (which are also signs of control).
- The centrality of the passage to the person, that is, how much difference it makes to him or her (similar to desirability, above).
- The length of time or duration of a status passage.

Glaser and Strauss admit this is an incomplete list of properties. Nevertheless, these properties sensitize the researcher to the broader and more dynamic nature of status passages. Indeed, Glaser and Strauss argue that they have developed a formal theory of status passages, which is a theory developed for a formal or conceptual area of sociological inquiry which transcends any one substantive or empirical area of investigation.

Since the work of Glaser and Strauss, status passages have come to be viewed as dynamic, constantly shifting, changing, and in motion rather than as static. This dynamism is evident in the fact that status passages involve not only the "passagee" but various "agents" who assist or hinder the passage. These agents are some times called coaches, sponsors, teachers, guides, gurus, parents, and so forth who assist the passagee particularly during the transitional or liminal phase of the status passage, for this is when the passagee is betwixt and between statuses and, consequently, most vulnerable. For example, an individual passagee has left the single life

status (engaged to be married), but has not yet been fully initiated into married life. Equally important is the fact that the relationships involved and developed during the status passage underscore the social nature of such passages, that is, they are not traversed alone.

Accordingly, from a sociological perspective, status passages reveal the fundamentally social nature of human life. Successfully or unsuccessfully negotiating a status passage assumes that agents/others have been integral to the status passage (whether bane or blessing). The status passage can vary in terms of how much individuality or collectivity is involved, but there is always some degree of the "other" involved in a status passage. Although status passages are most often researched at the social psychological level, the broader social dimension is evident as well in the fact that society at large legitimates certain statuses into which one may pass. Individuals do not make up statuses and then passages to go through to obtain them without "others" recognizing and legitimizing them as such (Stone 1970).

As indicated above, most recent studies have been at the social psychological level in that they have focused on how individuals have completed the passage into a host of professional occupations (MacNeil 1997; Bradby 1990), been converted to a particular religion (Snow & Machalek 1984; McCallion & Maines 2002), pass through the life course (Glaser & Strauss 1968), attain the status of deviant (Becker 1963), and many others. What have been under researched are the broader levels of the social and cultural. For example, do various societies have more or less extensive status passages, more or less opportunity to undergo a status passage, and, if so, why? If more extensive, for example, does this indicate that the particular society is more rigid and closed or flexible and open – a question sociologists and historians have examined for years. And if there are more opportunities, are the status passages strong or weak, short or long? The basic sociological question that still needs further research is under what social conditions are there more or less, weak or strong, long or short, fewer or more opportunities for status passages? Why are some churches (Catholic), for example, maintaining lengthier status passages than others (Protestants)?

Status passage research can reveal much about a society and its culture, especially in terms of socialization, social mobility, social structural arrangements, and identity salience. Further research on status passages, therefore, could advance sociological theory about these matters, as well as how societies work at the more macro level.

SEE ALSO: Aging and the Life Course, Theories of; Cognitive Dissonance Theory (Festinger); Collective Consciousness; Durkheim, Émile; Generalized Other; Interaction Order; Networks; Norms; Reference Groups; Resocialization; Ritual; Role Taking; Sacred/Profane; Social Control; Socialization; Socialization, Adult; Socialization, Agents of; Socialization, Anticipatory; Status; Status Attainment; Symbolic Interaction; Youth/Adolescence

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steering, racial real estate

Gregory D. Squires and Jan Chadwick

Racial real estate steering occurs when home seekers are guided by housing providers to communities where their race is already highly concentrated. So as racial minorities are channeled to integrated or predominantly non white neighborhoods and whites are shown homes primarily in white communities, steering contributes directly to the segregated housing patterns that have long persisted in urban communities and the many costs associated with that separation.

Steering can take several forms. Information steering occurs when minority homeseekers are shown or given information on fewer homes or neighborhoods than non minority homeseekers. Segregation steering occurs when minorities are shown homes in areas with larger minority populations than areas shown to non minorities. And class steering occurs when neighborhoods shown to minority homeseekers are of lower socioeconomic status than those shown to non minorities. Several actors in the housing industry engage in steering. Mortgage lenders and insurance agents often provide less information and offer fewer, more expensive, and lower quality products to non white households or residents of non white communities than they do for whites and predominantly white communities. These practices influence the location and range of housing options for minority families. However, racial steering is most closely associated with the practices of real estate agents who are often the gateway to housing opportunities, which often differ for white and non white families.

Historically, steering was virtually required by law and widespread industry practice in many communities. Early in the twentieth century steering took the form of restrictive

zoning laws that apportioned particular city neighborhoods for different racial groups. Blacks and other minorities were prohibited by law from living in certain neighborhoods of several cities, North and South. When these policies were ruled unconstitutional by the Supreme Court in the 1917 case of *Buchanan v. Warley*, they were replaced by the racially restrictive covenant. These covenants generally took the form of deed restrictions stating that the property could not be occupied by members of certain ethnic groups. They were promulgated and often instigated by real estate agents and mortgage brokers who would encourage entire neighborhoods to participate. The National Association of Real Estate Boards (NAREB) promoted this practice by stating in its code of ethics up until 1950 that "a realtor should never be instrumental in introducing into a neighborhood . . . members of any race or nationality . . . whose presence will clearly be detrimental to property values in that neighborhood" (Massey & Denton 1993: 37). While judicial enforcement of racially restrictive covenants was declared unconstitutional in 1948, and the words "race" and "nationality" were eliminated from NAREB's code of ethics in 1950, the practice of steering between already established segregated neighborhoods has continued.

Racial steering has been motivated by several factors. Real estate agents generally serve selected neighborhoods within metropolitan areas and rely heavily on word of mouth advertising to recruit new clients. Many fear loss of business if they introduce a minority family into a white neighborhood. Historically, some agents feared strong reprisals from area residents if they introduced a household that could have a "detrimental" effect on the neighborhood. Some maintain they are simply responding to the preference of renters and buyers who prefer to live in homogeneous neighborhoods. And others no doubt still assert that they are helping to maintain property values by steering homeseekers to such communities.

A combination of statutes, court cases, and regulations has declared racial steering to be unlawful. In 1968 Congress passed the federal Fair Housing Act (Title VIII of the Civil Rights Act of 1968), prohibiting discrimination on the basis of race, color, national origin, sex, or religion, and in 1988 persons with disabilities

and families with children were added as protected classes. While the law does not specifically use the word “steering,” case law has generally found steering to be in violation of section 3604(a) of the Act, which states that it is unlawful “to otherwise make unavailable” housing because of a protected class status. Both rental and sales steering have been successfully challenged in court, and not always by actual homeseekers who were steered. In *Trafficante v. Metropolitan Life Insurance Co.* (1972), the white plaintiffs claimed that they had been injured because they had lost the social benefits of living in an integrated community; they had missed the business and professional advantages which would have accrued if they had lived with members of minority groups; and they had suffered embarrassment and economic damage in social, business, and professional activities from being stigmatized as residents of a “white ghetto.” Other significant steering cases included *Gladstone, Realtors v. Village of Bellwood* (1979) and *Havens Realty Corp. v. Coleman* (1982) where the court gave standing under the Fair Housing Act to other local residents and investigators with fair housing centers who claimed that steering by real estate agents was destroying the racial balance of their neighborhood or community and denying residents the benefits of integrated living. In the 1985 case of *Heights Community Congress v. Hilltop Realty, Inc.*, the Sixth Circuit held that a real estate agent who engaged in intentional racial steering violated the Fair Housing Act. Perhaps more significantly, the court held that even if the statements made by the agents about the racial makeup of the neighborhoods were truthful, if the effect of the statements was to discourage people of particular races from considering those neighborhoods, it violated the Act.

In addition to the statutory and case law, when the Fair Housing Act was amended and strengthened by the Fair Housing Amendments Act of 1988, the US Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD) promulgated regulations prohibiting steering, which it defined as any effort to “restrict or attempt to restrict the choices of a person by word or conduct in connection with seeking, negotiating for, buying or renting a dwelling so as to perpetuate or tend to perpetuate, segregated housing patterns, or to discourage or obstruct choices in a community,

neighborhood or development.” These regulations state that unlawful steering includes but is not limited to: (1) discouraging any person from inspecting, purchasing, or renting a dwelling because of the minority status of the person, or the minority status of the persons in a community, neighborhood, or development; (2) discouraging the purchase or rental of a dwelling because of a protected class reason by exaggerating drawbacks or failing to inform any person of desirable features of a dwelling or of a community, neighborhood, or development; (3) communicating to any prospective purchaser that he or she would not be comfortable or compatible with existing residents of a community, neighborhood, or development because of a protected class reason; or (4) assigning any person to a particular section of a community, neighborhood, or development, or to a particular floor of a building, because of a protected class reason.

Even with the passage and strengthening of the Fair Housing Act, studies have shown that racial steering continues. These studies generally take the form of a housing audit and utilize “matched paired testing” where white and minority testers posing as homeseekers are identically matched on all relevant housing related characteristics (e.g., income, occupation, housing preference) and sent to visit real estate offices. While many local housing audits have been conducted, the most comprehensive national audits have been sponsored by HUD and conducted by the Urban Institute. In 1979, 1989, and 2000, national paired testing studies were conducted. Due to methodological differences, it is not possible to draw comparisons between the 1979 research and the two subsequent studies. But the latter two studies, each of which covered more than 20 metropolitan areas, do permit some conclusions about the changing nature of housing discrimination.

The key finding from the 1989 and 2000 studies is that overall discrimination has dropped considerably, but still remains a central feature of the nation’s urban and metropolitan housing markets. The share of black and Hispanic homebuyers and renters experiencing discrimination dropped from approximately one third of all homeseekers in 1989 to about one out of every five in 2000. However, these studies understate the actual level of

discrimination, for several reasons. The studies included only housing units that were advertised in major daily newspapers. Homes in minority neighborhoods are less likely to be advertised in these outlets than are homes generally. This is also the case for homes in exclusively white neighborhoods where racial discrimination may be the most explicit. And testers did not follow up their initial contact with housing providers, so the study did not capture behavior that occurs during subsequent visits, after an offer is made, or when insurance or mortgage loans are applied for in the homebuying process. Consequently, the 2000 study reports a conservative estimate of the actual level of discrimination that occurs in the housing market (Turner et al. 2002).

Despite the lower incidence of racial discrimination overall in 2000 compared to 1989, the frequency of racial steering actually increased. For example, the percentage of tests in which whites were shown homes in communities that had a higher white population than the communities in which black testers were shown homes increased from 7.5 percent in 1989 to 11 percent in 2000. When whites and Hispanics were paired, the share of white favored tests on this measure increased from 7.4 percent to more than 14.7 percent. However, steering most commonly occurred through informal, unsolicited comments directed to white home seekers about the racial composition of selected neighborhoods. Among these comments were the following:

“I would not recommend (area), it’s totally black. And I don’t like (area), it’s pretty mixed.”

“There are lots of Latinos living there . . . I’m not supposed to be telling you that, but you have a daughter and I like you.”

“(Area) is very mixed. You probably wouldn’t like it because of the income you and your husband make. But I don’t want to sound prejudiced.”

“(Area) is different from here; it’s multicultural . . . I’m not allowed to steer you, but there are some areas that you wouldn’t want to live in.” (Galster & Godfrey 2003: 19, 23).

If racial discrimination has declined in recent years, it persists at very high levels in the nation’s urban and metropolitan communities.

And steering has increased. Steering, along with other forms of discrimination, contributes to the ongoing segregation of American cities and its many social costs. Segregation nurtures the concentration of poverty, and particularly the concentration of poor minorities. Housing values and the wealth accumulation associated with homeownership are undercut for racial minorities because of their continued isolation from more favored neighborhoods. Consequently, racial minorities are disproportionately trapped in neighborhoods where school achievement is lower, crime rates are higher, and most public services and private amenities are of lower quality or not available at all.

But fair housing enforcement appears to be working. Reductions in discrimination during the 1990s suggest that the efforts of HUD and other law enforcement authorities, along with the work of non profit fair housing organizations around the country, are having the intended effect. During the 1990s lawsuits filed by non profit housing centers generated more than \$180,000,000 for plaintiffs. But the fair housing agenda remains unfinished. Racial steering is clearly one of the issues that should be the focus of future enforcement efforts. Persisting high levels of discrimination (even if lower than in previous years) indicate that equal housing opportunity, though the law of the land, is not yet the reality.

SEE ALSO: Blockbusting; Hypersegregation; Inequality and the City; Race (Racism); Red lining; Residential Segregation; Restrictive Covenants

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stepfamilies

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Stepfamilies are common throughout the industrialized world. In the US nearly everyone marries, and about half of the marriages include at least one previously married partner (US Census Bureau 2000). Most divorced people in other western countries also either remarry or cohabit, but at lower rates than in the US. About half of the remarriages involve adults who have children.

Because not all remarriages involve parents, remarriages and stepfamily formation are not the same. A stepfamily is a cohabiting or legal union of two adults, at least one of whom has a child or children from previous relationships. According to Fields (2001), about 17 percent of all children in the US live in a stepfamily household, usually with a stepfather and mother. An estimated 30 percent of children in the US will live in a stepfamily household before they become adults. A large number of children who live primarily with a single mother also visit a remarried or cohabiting father.

Although stepfamilies have been common throughout history, they have not been studied until relatively recently. Until past the midpoint of the twentieth century, remarriage was considered the solution to a social problem. When divorce rather than bereavement became the

most common precursor to remarriage and step family formation (around 1974), stepfamily formation became viewed as a social problem. This view appeared to stimulate both research and clinical work (Ganong & Coleman 2004). Most stepfamily research has been done since 1990 (Coleman et al. 2000). These studies offered marked improvement over previous work: samples were more representative, large scale longitudinal studies were launched that allowed us to examine family process, more observational research was conducted, measurement was greatly improved, and there was increased use of theory. However, little attention has yet been paid to racial, ethnic, or SES diversity.

The most frequently studied phenomena have been the effects on children of living in stepfamilies. These studies generally have reported that stepchildren, on average, are slightly more at risk for externalizing and internalizing behavior problems, do less well in school, and are less likely to form stable couple relationships as adults than are children who grow up living with both parents. However, the differences between stepchildren and children in first marriage families tend to be small, and most stepchildren (about 80 percent) function normally on psychological, cognitive, and interpersonal outcomes. The research emphasis primarily has been on documenting problems in stepfamilies – sometimes called a *deficit comparison* approach. In recent years, more researchers have begun to explore how and why some stepfamilies function well and others do not, using what has been called a *normative adaptive* approach.

Numerous reasons for problems in stepfamilies have been offered, but one of the more widely known is Cherlin's (1978) seminal work that described families formed after remarriage as *incomplete institutions*. Cherlin argued that stepfamilies lack institutionalized guidelines and support in solving family problems, and as a result they have more problems than do first marriage families. Research in general has lent some support for this hypothesis. A contributing factor to the incomplete institutionalization of stepfamilies is *nuclear family ideology*. This means that there are strong cultural biases that families *should* live in nuclear families, and those who do not conform to this model are deficient and/or deviant. The nuclear family ideology

creates social stigma that appears to result in many stepfamilies attempting to hide their status and to act as if they were a nuclear family (e.g., stepchildren using their stepfather's surname even though it is not their legal surname), which may only further contribute to their feelings of isolation or being different. Negative media images and language negatively stereotyping stepfamilies and stepfamily members (e.g., "the parks system is the stepchild of city government") continue to be a problem as well. Stepparents are motivated to adopt stepchildren, in part, to convert a step relationship legally into a parent-child relationship, thereby avoiding stigma and acquiring norms for guiding their relationship.

People who remarry differ from those in first marriage families in several ways. For example, individuals who remarry are older, engage in shorter courtships, and are more likely to have children from previous relationships. They also are more likely than couples in first marriages to marry someone who is different from themselves in various ways (age, race, religion, SES). In the US, whites are more likely to remarry than other racial groups, divorced adults tend to remarry other people who have been divorced, and men remarry more quickly and at a higher rate than women. On average, people in the US remarry within 4 years of divorce. Additionally, individuals cohabit or remarry quickly, often within months of beginning a relationship. Approximately 75 percent of remarried couples cohabit before legally remarrying; increasingly, couples in all western cultures are cohabiting in lieu of legal remarriage. We know little about how decisions to remarry or cohabit are made.

Until the late 1970s, clinicians basically treated stepfamilies as though they were the same as first marriage families, which, perhaps not surprisingly, resulted in stepfamily members reporting that therapy was not helpful. Early work by clinicians such as Goldner, Sager, and John and Emily Visser identified a number of ways in which stepfamilies are different from first marriage families. For example, stepfamilies are more complex than nuclear families and this complexity either can be exciting and challenging or it can be overwhelming to family members. Contributing to this complexity is the fact that children often belong to two

households. They typically have their primary residence with their mother and stepfather, but increasingly also are likely to spend significant amounts of time with their father and stepmother. Because of this often legally mandated sharing of children between the two households, if stepfamilies are to function well, they need to have permeable boundaries that allow children to move in and out of the household comfortably.

Stepfamilies' histories differ from those of nuclear families. In nuclear families the parents have been together from the beginning and over time they have developed roles, rituals, family rules, and other patterns of behavior to which children are socialized. Stepfamilies, however, can form any time in a child's lifetime, from infancy to adulthood. Adults in stepfamilies do not have the luxury of gradually developing family routines and rituals together before they socialize children. Instead, adults and children in stepfamilies find they must negotiate their new household rules and routines while they are learning how to live together. Without clear and frequent communication, the opportunities for hurt feelings and oppositional behavior are great. Children seldom appreciate new rules, especially if they come from the stepparent. They also may miss the rituals from their previous family household and be unenthusiastic about developing new ones, especially when the stepfamily household is first formed.

Still another way that stepfamilies differ from first marriage families is that the parent-child bonds are older than the spousal bonds. This means that at least during the early formation of the stepfamily, the parent-child bond is likely to be the closest one. As a result, it is often difficult for the stepparent to feel a part of the family early in the stepfamily's life. Fortunately, over time, most stepparents develop step relationships and find functions that they can fulfill in the household. For example, a stepparent may become the math homework expert or the tennis teaching expert in the family. Stepparents who try to fill more traditional parental roles such as disciplinarian are more likely to find their efforts meet with resistance. Clinicians suggest that the genetic parent should be the main disciplinarian for quite some time and that the stepparent should enforce household rules, such as bedtime, in much the

same way that a babysitter might enforce them. If the stepparent takes on the role of disciplinarian too soon, without a relationship being formed with stepchildren, coalitions are likely to form between the children or between the parent and the children. Such coalitions weaken the couple bond and seriously hamper stepfamily functioning and stability.

Finally, legal relationships between stepparents and stepchildren either do not exist or are ambiguous. This means that a stepparent does not have the legal authority to check a child into the emergency room if there is an accident. It also means that if the parent and stepparent divorce, the stepparent no longer has any rights regarding the stepchild. If the parent does not want the child to see or keep in touch with the stepparent, the stepparent must abide by the parent's wishes. The effect that the lack of a legal relationship has on the stepparent-stepchild bond has not been fully explored, but some scholars have speculated that it might hinder efforts by stepparents to develop close relationships with stepchildren.

Evolutionary scholars posit that it is not the lack of a legal relationship that contributes to stepparents investing less emotionally in their stepchildren, it is the lack of a genetic tie that results in low investment. Their view is that men who treat their stepchildren well do so only to impress the children's mother rather than out of an interest in the children's well being. Evolutionary scholars propose that individuals want to protect and invest in their own offspring, so stepchildren are at much greater risk of child abuse and neglect than children living with both parents. There is evidence that children who live in a household that includes an adult who is not their genetic parent are at greater risk of abuse than those who live with their genetic parents only, but stepparents (usually stepfathers) are categorized with mothers' boyfriends, uncles, grandfathers, and a host of other adults who share the mother's home. There also is speculation that there are fewer barriers to reporting a stepfather or other household member for child abuse than for reporting a parent. Regardless, some stepchildren are abused by stepparents, and this has caused a few social scientists to accuse parents who remarry of engaging in child abuse by placing their children at risk! This argument is an

extreme overreaction that perpetuates harmful stereotypes that may negatively contribute to stepfamily process. Other, perhaps more plausible reasons for stepchildren faring slightly less well than children in first marriage families have to do with stress (the cumulative effect of multiple family changes and transitions), poor quality parenting by parents who are too stressed to competently monitor their children, and conflicts (between divorced parents and within stepfamily households).

In addition to differences between nuclear families and stepfamilies, there are numerous differences among stepfamilies. Stepfamily configurations are diverse. For example, stepfather families are different from stepmother families, and they both differ from complex households in which both adults are stepparents to each other's children. Additionally, it makes a difference if a stepfamily is formed following the death of a parent, following parental divorce, or if the parent had never been married. The sibling configuration within stepfamilies makes a difference as well. Some stepfamily households contain only full siblings, often the children of the mother. Blended stepfamily households contain children from previous relationships of both adults. These children are stepsiblings that share a residence but have no genetic ties. Many stepfamily households have at least one half sibling. These children are a product of the remarried couple, and they share one genetic parent in common with the other children in the household. To add further complexity, some stepfamilies may have children living with them as well as with the other parent. If a stepfamily adult has shared physical custody of children from prior relationships, children move in and out of the stepfamily household. Stepfamily variations seem almost endless and this complexity has created tremendous research challenges.

In spite of the challenges, there has been an increase in studies in the past decade. However, more longitudinal studies are needed to explore how stepfamily processes change over time. We also need more within group studies to replace the deficit comparison approach so that we gain a better understanding of how strong stepfamilies function. Additionally, we need qualitative studies that provide in depth understanding of stepfamily members' experiences. We lack information about family processes in

cohabiting stepfamilies. Although there has been a large number of studies on residential step father/stepchild relationships, stepmothers and nonresidential stepparents have received little attention from researchers. Stepsibling relationships, relationships between stepchildren and stepgrandparents, and mother-child relationships in stepfamilies have been overlooked as well. Finally, researchers need to continue to develop more innovative designs that capture the complexity of remarriage and stepfamilies.

SEE ALSO: Childhood; Cohabitation; Divorce; Family Diversity; Family, Men's Involvement in; Family Structure and Child Outcomes; Stepfathering; Stepmothering

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stepfathering

Rosalind Edwards with Lucy Hadfield

Stepfamilies are becoming increasingly common in contemporary developed societies, with the vast majority (in heterosexual families) comprising a stepfather who has partnered and formed a (married or cohabiting) household with a biological mother and her resident children. The rise in stepfather households,

however, occurs in an institutional context where legislation in many countries has shifted towards the view that bringing up children, and financial responsibility for them, primarily and unchangeably rests with biological parents. In contrast, and despite their prevalence, the institutional position of stepfathers is largely one of invisibility, or at least ambiguity, with few defined rights and responsibilities.

Stepfamilies are usually considered to involve particularly complex family forms and relationships. Work that has developed typologies of different forms of stepfamilies, focusing on gender of the stepparent, marital status, step and biological children's residence and access patterns, and so on, draws attention to the diversity of stepfamilies. As a body of literature, however, the evidence on the implications of this diversity, in terms of stepchildren's development and relationships between stepfathers and stepchildren, is equivocal. Further, a continuous theme of work on the topic is that there is normative uncertainty around the practice of stepfathering, focusing on how much of a father figure stepfathers can, are, or should be. This is especially the case because stepfathers now often have to negotiate their practice alongside the involvement of a nonresident father. In this respect, issues of context, including gendered expectations of fatherhood in general over time and social class, are coming increasingly to the fore.

One key preoccupation of studies is the effect of stepfathers on children's behavior and attainment. This usually draws on survey data, and has largely been conducted within the psychological and therapeutic fields, drawing on clinical inventories or family systems theories, as well as cohort based social studies. Family structure is examined in relation to the outcomes for children's psychological adjustment, educational achievement, "transition" points such as leaving school and home, sexual activity and parenthood, and involvement in criminal activity. The age of the child when a stepfather enters the household and the child's gender in relation to the stepfather are often highlighted as factors. The evidence, however, provides equivocal messages. For example, boys are said to be especially affected negatively by having stepfathers, but there are also problematic issues of sexuality in stepfathering girls in early

adolescence (for assessments of the literature, see Gorell Barnes et al. 1998; Hughes 1991). Another inconclusive facet is the issue of whether or not stepfathers are more likely than biological fathers to abuse their stepchildren (Daly & Wilson 1998).

Overall, the relationship between stepfathers and their stepchildren is seen as a difficult one to manage, primarily because it is built on a third person, the mother. On the one hand, stepfather-stepchild relationships are characterized as ones of conflicting loyalty. Stepfathers are said to be subject to resentment and jealousy about the time and attention children require impinging on their own time and relationship with their partner, as well as on the part of the children over sharing their mother (Robinson & Smith 1993). On the other hand, there is also some evidence that stepfathers can understand their coupledness with the children's mother as a foundation for building relationships with their stepchildren (McCarthy et al. 2003). The mother's involvement in facilitating the mode of stepfathering practice, and the stepchildren's own perceptions and reactions, are also issues here.

Another potential cause of conflict of loyalties relates to the fact that many stepfathers have their own biological children, either from a previous relationship and with whom they have contact, or in their stepfamily household from their current relationship. Again, the evidence is contradictory, with some concluding that stepfathers feel more commitment to their biological children and others concluding that having their own biological children enhances stepfathers' ability to take on a fathering identity in relation to their stepchildren (Marsiglio 1995).

This leads into another key preoccupation of the literature: the extent to which stepfathers are father figures to their stepchildren. In turn, this raises issues of the historically situated constitution of fathering. Lack of clarity in quite what stepfathering consists of is often related to a shift towards a less clear formulation of norms concerning fathering in general, in particular whether or not it is ascribed and status bound or achieved and socially constructed. Ascribed fatherhood is rooted in the biological tie and its accompanying social status as a father, which in itself is seen to constitute the essence of fatherhood. Within this status, fathering practice is

related to the gendered division of labor between married parents wherein fathers are breadwinners, disciplinarians, and emotionally distanced, and mothers are nurturing carers. In contrast, fathering as an achieved relationship is rooted in what are considered to be new expectations that fathers should actively engage with their children as physically and emotionally involved carers. The emphasis has shifted from fatherhood as an institutional status to fathering as an engaged relational form; a transition from ascribed to achieved.

Stepfathering is not necessarily captured in this idea of a transition from ascribed to achieved fathering because both concepts are underpinned by the biological tie. For this reason, researchers often make a distinction between biological and social fathering, with stepfathers falling into the latter category in that they act as fathers in the social sense. This does not tell us about the content of social fathering, however. For example, the practice of stepfathering may work towards ascribed fatherhood in all but biology.

There are two main strands of work attempting to throw light on this issue, using different methodologies but both working within a constructionist approach to stepfathering practice. The first and dominant strand comprises survey data. This can examine stepfathers' identity and the extent to which they seek and maintain "affinity" with their stepchildren, with the evidence here equivocal again. On the one hand, nonresident fathers are said to impinge on stepfathers' ability to take on a fathering identity, in that they have the ascribed breadwinner and authority role undermined by the nonresident fathers' input. On the other hand, there is also evidence that stepfathers can take on a father identity alongside the biological father rather than feeling in competition with or undermined by them (Marsiglio 2004). Survey data is also used to assess stepfathers' behavior, focusing on patterns of parental employment, family activities, and practical involvement in childcare and child rearing. Here shifts over time can be detected, from a social practice akin to ascribed fatherhood towards one that represents more involved achieved fathering (Ferri & Smith 1998).

The second strand is relatively small, but comprises grounded qualitative studies that

provide a valuable insight into the subjective aspects of stepfathering. A feature of this work is the extent to which stepfathers feel their step children to be “their own.” Some research, taking a developmental approach, attempts to posit “timescales” governing stepfathers’ integration into, and involvement in, their stepchildren’s lives, but again the evidence for a distinct pattern is contradictory, and in some views the search for it is misplaced (Gorell Barnes et al. 1998). More interpretive work attempts to draw out the images and factors informing step fathers’ orientation towards their stepchildren. In this respect, several studies across different national contexts indicate that working class stepfathers are more concerned with a social practice in which they can feel and act the same as biological fathers, while middle class step fathers are more likely to place an emphasis on the primacy of biological fatherhood, meaning that they cannot take on a full fathering role (Edwards et al. 2002). The interplay between economic and material circumstances, and culture over time, may well be an issue here, and is one that deserves further attention, including in relation to ethnicity.

SEE ALSO: Divisions of Household Labor; Family Diversity; Family, Men’s Involvement in; Family Structure and Child Outcomes; Fatherhood; Gender Ideology and Gender Role Ideology; Stepfamilies; Stepmothering

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stepmothering

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Stepmothers are women who marry or cohabit with partners who have children from prior unions. This broad definition of stepmothers includes women from a variety of roles and who live in diverse family constellations – those who have children of their own as well as women that are childless or childfree, women in lesbian relationships, and it includes step mothers who reside with their stepchildren all of the time, some of the time, or never. Women who live with their stepchildren are called *residential* stepmothers and those who do not live with their stepchildren, or who spend only part of each year living with their stepchildren, are called *nonresidential* stepmothers. Some women that fit the broad definition of stepmothers, such as women cohabiting with fathers whose children live elsewhere, and some lesbian partners, do not see themselves as stepmothers, and, in fact, are seldom included in studies of step mothers. Given the diversity of stepmothers’ situations, it is unfortunate that the majority of studies have been limited to married step mothers and most researchers have not distinguished between residential and nonresidential stepmothers.

Anyone who is familiar with children's fairy tales such as Cinderella and Hansel and Gretel knows that stepmothers are not a new phenomenon; there have always been large numbers of stepmothers. However, throughout most of human history, stepmothers were women who moved in with a father and his children after the death of the children's mother. In the past, stepmothers often were considered mother substitutes; in fact, fathers often were motivated to wed because they needed help with childcare after the death of their wives. In the last century, better control of disease, especially infections related to childbirth, resulted in fewer early deaths of mothers and less need for stepmothers as substitute mothers. Fewer early maternal deaths, combined with increases in divorce, resulted in divorce replacing death as the precursor to remarriage in the 1970s, a trend that continues (Ganong & Coleman 2004). Consequently, stepmothers now are not replacements for deceased mothers, but are additional family members.

In western societies fathers are seldom awarded physical custody (at least, sole physical custody) of their children after divorce, so the vast majority of stepmothers do not live with their stepchildren on a daily basis. These nonresidential stepmothers may have adult stepchildren whom they barely know, they may have minor aged stepchildren who visit them on occasion, or they may have stepchildren who visit regularly and frequently. According to Nielsen (1999), over 90 percent of the estimated 13 million stepmothers in the US are nonresidential, and it is reasonable to expect similar percentages of nonresidential stepmothers in other western societies.

Because mothers most often have physical custody of their children after divorce, there are about five times more residential stepfathers than residential stepmothers. Not surprisingly, the majority of stepfamily research has focused on stepfathers and stepfather-stepchild relations, in part because they are easier for researchers to find (Coleman et al. 2000; Ganong & Coleman 2004). As a result, a lot more is known about stepfathers than is known about stepmothers.

Clinicians (Bernstein 1989; Visher & Visher 1979) and some researchers (MacDonald & DeMaris 1996; Sturgess et al. 2001) have

indicated that stepmothers struggle more with their roles within stepfamilies than do stepfathers. Clinicians and the few researchers who have studied nonresidential stepmothers have found that these women are involved in the lives of their stepchildren, but they struggle with ambiguous expectations and feel frustrated with the lack of support from their partners (Ambert 1986; Church 2004; Morrison & Thomson Guppy 1985; Weaver & Coleman, in press).

Stepmothers are stressed by not knowing how they should interact with their stepchildren. As additional adults, nonresidential stepmothers report actively avoiding acting as if they were the mother to their stepchildren out of fear of usurping the inviolate role of the biological mother (Church 2004; Weaver & Coleman, in press). One nonresidential stepmother in Weaver and Coleman's study described herself as enacting "a *mothering* but not a *mother*" role. However, when she described her behaviors in the stepfamily (taking care of the stepchildren, cooking for them, helping them with homework) it was difficult to tell how these behaviors differed from what a mother would do. Nonetheless, this stepmother was typical of others in her efforts to distinguish what she did from what her stepchildren's mother would do for them. Because of cultural expectations that women should be responsible for the quality of their family's relationships, stepmothers are in a difficult position. They are not the mothers of their stepchildren, yet to be a good woman, they are responsible for their stepchildren's well being, at least during the time they share a household. This is an ambiguous position at best, and one that many stepmothers report feeling ambivalent about. Church (2004) found that one way stepmothers deal with this is by identifying more strongly with their spousal/partner role than with their parenting role. This enables them to avoid competing with the mother and attempting to meet the nearly impossible expectations that assuming the mother role would require.

Stepmothers who reproduce with the father of their stepchildren are not as close with their residential stepchildren as are stepmothers who do not produce a half sibling for the stepchildren (Ambert 1986) and they are less satisfied with being a stepmother (MacDonald & DeMaris 1996). The role of mother is so

important (Hayes 1996) that it likely predominates over the stepmother role in stepfamily households.

Women who become stepmothers to grown (adult) stepchildren struggle less with issues about how to relate to their stepchildren. They often attempt to be friends with stepchildren or take a peripheral position to that of the father. Vinick (1998) found that women who became stepmothers later in life often played an important role in promoting the reestablishment of relationships between their husbands and their stepchildren. Nonresidential fathers often lose contact or maintain only minimal contact with their children after divorce, a situation that their new wives try to remedy. Vinick referred to these women as “carpenters” because they “repair” relationships between their husbands and their children.

In addition to problems determining their roles within stepfamilies, stepmothers have been demonized across cultures for centuries (Church 2004). In fact, no other family position has been held in such low regard. Stepmothers are stereotyped as “evil” and “wicked.” Young children have an early introduction to this stereotype through many old and beloved fairy tales. Because of the stigma surrounding stepmothers, the chief goal of many of them is to avoid the “wicked” label. Unfortunately, there are no clear guidelines for doing so.

It is evident from the research that stepmothers have quite different experiences, depending on whether or not they share a residence on a daily basis or only see their stepchildren occasionally. There are also differences depending on the age of the stepchildren, and whether or not the stepmother shares a mutual child with her partner. Unfortunately, clinicians and most researchers do not distinguish between the various types of stepmothers. To understand the nature of stepmothering, far more attention needs to be paid to these variables in stepfamily research. Considering the difficulties that clinicians and researchers identify that stepmothers have in negotiating their roles within stepfamilies, it is unfortunate that we have so little empirical evidence to guide them.

SEE ALSO: Childhood; Divisions of Household Labor; Divorce; Family Diversity; Family

Structure and Child Outcomes; Gender Ideology and Gender Role Ideology; Motherhood; Stepfamilies; Stepfathering

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stereotyping and stereotypes

Michael Pickering

STEREOTYPING DEFINED

Stereotyping is a way of representing and judging other people in fixed, unyielding terms. These revolve around an alleged characteristic of the category to which they are assigned. They are reduced to the stereotype that results from this, rather than being viewed as individuals with their own personal features and qualities. Instead of being considered and treated as particular and distinctive, they are represented simply through their category assignment and the essentialized and naturalized attribute this is made to carry. The force of the stereotype is strongest when it is commonly held to be irrevocable.

In countering stereotypes, individuality can be exaggerated. The fallacy of individualism lies in its conception of personal uniqueness. For social, cultural, and historical reasons, all individuals share in the characteristics of certain groups, such as those of their social class or status, or their gender or ethnicity; people have group memberships and possess the insider knowledge required to operate efficiently within those groups and the milieux associated with them. The question is where to strike the line between group membership and individuality. Stereotypes involve refusing this distinction. Those who wield them see the people they represent entirely in terms of prescriptive assumptions about their biology, nationality, sexual orientation, disability, or whatever. Such assumptions fix on what is putatively most characteristic of broad, indiscriminate categories. Stereotypes make categories seem categorical. Since they are unconditional and not amenable to qualification, we could say that they are individualism in reverse. Anyone assigned to a stereotype is perceived primarily, if not solely, through the alleged characteristic that is considered to be definitive of who they are and what they do. Their identity and conduct is seen as the

natural – and therefore necessary and unchangeable – consequence of this one key element. That is the fallacy of essentialism.

There are certainly cases where people adapt themselves to the alleged characteristic, at least in certain circumstances. They internalize the stereotype of them under the pressures of social conformity, censure, or fear of what will happen if they buck the stereotype. This may appear to confirm and validate it. All it does is conceal and possibly confuse or hedge in the subjectivity of the person stereotyped, along with the capacity of self determination upon which subjectivity depends. Stereotyping denies this capacity in others. It is important here to distinguish stereotyping from the way we operate all the time with preconceptions and mental schemas as a means of cognitively mapping the world and negotiating different situations and circumstances, including those with which we are not necessarily familiar. These help us in our encounters and interactions in everyday life; they can be modified, updated, and flexibly used as our lives develop and move on. Stereotyping is by contrast a rigid form of cultural representation that creates barriers between people. It attempts to place and fix other people – who they are and what they represent – once and for all. The fact that this is not possible increases the effort to make it seem so, to make stereotypes seem absolute, not relative. That is why they are in the first place inflexibly based on homogenous, naturalized features regarded as integral to members of a specific group or category. Resisting stereotypes involves contesting the necessity of this in the name of self determination. Three questions follow from this: who does the stereotyping; what purpose does stereotyping serve; and has stereotyping always existed?

PRACTICE, PURVEYORS, AND PURPOSES OF STEREOTYPING

Those who generate and perpetuate stereotypes of others are usually in positions of greater power and status than those who are stereotyped. Stereotypes not only define and place others as inferior, but also implicitly affirm and legitimate those who stereotype in their own position and identity. That has, for example,

usually been the case with anti Semitic stereotypes. For this reason stereotypes say far more about those who stereotype than about their stereotypical targets. This is usual, but not invariable. There are times when stereotypes may speak to a sense of deficiency in people's own identities or a sense of alienation from their own mainstream cultures. The stereotypes may involve selective idealizations of others, as for instance with the way some white men have regarded black jazz, blues, or rap musicians. They may then appear more positive as images, but they are still one sided projections and may have negative consequences for the other, as for example in confining them to a set role or ability. Other stereotypes have figured as a juncture of both disavowal and desire on the part of dominant groups or nations; various Orientalist stereotypes have operated historically in this way. It is also the case that stereotypes are held by those with relatively little power and status in society. Those who are stereotyped may then serve as scapegoats for the feelings of frustration, disaffection, or anger connected with this lack of power and status. Travelers, foreign workers, and refugees (or so called asylum seekers) are examples of people who have suffered from this displaced aggression, not least when it is given vent by a commercially driven press. The aggression is projected negatively onto whoever is targeted by the stereotype, and the stereotype then acts as a source of consolation for those who are relatively powerless or low in social status and esteem.

This is closely related to the various purposes which stereotyping can have. It may not only bolster the sense of superiority of those among whom the stereotype circulates, but also act as a means of validating elements of an existing social order or cultural hierarchy. Stereotyping creates symbolic boundaries between peoples and cultures, as for instance in the nineteenth century when Africans or people of African descent were considered socially and culturally backward, or when women were confined to certain functions (such as carers and house keepers) and excluded from certain activities (such as participation in certain "higher art" genres like history painting and musical composition). The symbolic boundaries which stereotypes patrol strategically exclude those who are targeted by them. This is the political dimension

of stereotypical representation. It is the focus of much of the struggle that goes into contesting stereotypes. We should remember and take heart from the successes of such struggle, for they tell us that stereotypes are not, of necessity, historically unchanging. Both women and black people have over time challenged the negative closure of their stereotypical representations; they have achieved, even if as yet incompletely, a greater inclusiveness within society, an expansion of opportunities and scope, and a more positive social identity. As the content of stereotypes diminishes and recedes, so the targets of stereotyping change historically, across different times and conjunctures. This brings us to the issue of whether stereotyping itself has always existed.

Prejudiced attitudes and hostility towards collectivities different to one's own are problems that stretch back a long way in time. They have occurred in many societies and cultures, and because of this it seems that stereotyping can be conceptually applied to various social contexts and circumstances, over both time and space. The difficulty here is that it has only been developed as a concept in modern times, with particular reference to modern societies or societies becoming modern. In various ways it is specific to such times, and may even be said to be characteristically modern in the problems it addresses. Its historical or anthropological application outside the context of these times is possible, but transposing a period related formulation as a tool for interpreting phenomena beyond its usual social and cultural range requires care and caution. The concept is perhaps strongest when used with reference to specifically modern conditions, though of course these conditions have not been realized to the same extent, or in the same invariant combinations, across time and space.

MODERNITY AND LIPPMANN'S DILEMMA

That is why we need to remember that in the first place the concept arose specifically in western societies during the process of their becoming modern. Conceptual thought often develops through a metaphorical amplification in the semantics of an existing term. This was

the case with the stereotype, which was initially used in printing to describe the process of type setting: fixing characters and text in rigid form for the sake of their repeated use without subsequent modification or change. During the nineteenth century it was figuratively adapted as a synonym for commonplaces or over-conventionalized diction, but its conceptual power was only realized later when it became, metaphorically and then in its own right, a term of reference for reductionist forms of social and cultural representation – fixing and perpetuating such categories as “woman,” “foreigner,” “native,” or the “undeserving poor” in their pejorative forms. The same applies to any of the stereotypical variants of these broad categories, such as “blonde bimbo,” “wops,” “chinks,” or “welfare scroungers.”

The American political columnist and social commentator Walter Lippmann is generally acknowledged as the first person to elaborate the term in this way, particularly in his book *Public Opinion* (1965). Lippmann not only offered the initial formulation of the concept – from which point it became a key term in the social and human sciences – but was also the first to link it to the problems of modernity. In this respect, he conceived of stereotyping as a dilemma attendant on living in the increasingly differentiated formations characteristic of modern urban societies, along with the expansion of encounters with cultural difference and of contact with multiple social groups which they have entailed.

The dilemma can be summarized in the following way. On the one hand, it can be argued that the difficulties of understanding and response that accompany our proliferating social and cultural relations under conditions of modern life create the need for informational short cuts, readymade devices of discourse and representation that help us process the otherwise overwhelming data of daily social realities. We may turn to the modern media as sources of information and knowledge, and we may find that at their honest best they help us build mental bridges and enrich our experience of the complex world around us. On the other hand, this modern social need provides a fertile bed for the cultivation of stereotypes, as for instance in media such as film, advertising, and tabloid journalism. Once established and

widely accepted, stereotypes diminish or block our appreciation and understanding of other social groups and categories because of the stunted, fixed manner of their representations. As already noted, stereotyping works by making these representations seem natural and absolute, and when it is successful the resulting view of others becomes entrenched and difficult to shift, even in the face of empirical evaluation or conflicting experience. The media are certainly not the only sites in which this process occurs, but media stereotyping attains influence and power beyond that of every day conversation and interpersonal exchange because of the broad distribution and circulation of the products of modern communications, and the extent to which they are accredited as sources of authority or truth. Media accreditation increases the rhetorical force of stereotypes, whether this involves young people reading teen magazines or adults watching the news on television.

The dual sense of stereotypes as both necessary and undesirable modes of representation encapsulated for Lippmann an endemic contradiction of modernity, a simultaneous product of the imperatives of development, expansion, and change *and* the drive to order, control, and the enforcement of social norms. A key line of response to this contradictory combination involves a hardening and entrenchment of people’s mental schemas or cognitive structures, converting aspects of them into stereotypes or making people more receptive to stereotypes already in circulation. Lippmann’s resolution of the problems thrown up by these opposed imperatives was to side with the need for order, stability, and control in producing a consistent view of the world and securing public opinion on this basis. This was a diminution of conceptual vision. It undermines the need to critique stereotypes as ideological forms of representation which strive to repress both politics and history by injecting into social and cultural processes the fixity of their naturalized forms.

CONCEPTUAL REFINEMENTS AND CRITICAL ISSUES

There is a strong temptation to adopt some form of stereotyping when people are faced

with ambivalence, uncertainty, loss, or bewildering change. They may also then be more vulnerable to influence from the media use of stereotypes. In these circumstances, the fast frozen figures of stereotypes promote an intolerance of social and cultural difference on the basis of their categorical, unbending views of particular ethnic, gender, sexual, or other categories. In the face of these undesirable views and their various consequences, we should not lose sight – as Lippmann did himself – of the epistemological dilemma we face in modernity of embracing complexity and contingency without resorting to reductive simplification, either/or forms of thinking, and the absolute judgments of others that go with the territory of mediated and situated stereotyping.

All too often, this is what has happened in the subsequent application and development of the concept. It is as if those concerned with stereotyping in the social and human sciences see only one side of the dilemma, and not the other. For example, there is a strong tendency to see stereotyping as a problem associated only with other people, a critical distanciation that sets off “us” against “them” in a process which is akin to stereotyping itself. Stereotyping creates and maintains rigid boundaries between “us” and “them.” Ironically, this is what happened after Lippmann’s initial formulation of the concept, when stereotyping became widely conceived as a pathological process, an abnormal and irrational way of responding to others conveniently set apart from normal and rational forms of categorization. It could then be seen as entirely the product of deficient schooling, damaged personalities, or extreme beliefs – such as the anti Semitic views of mid twentieth century Fascists – and the propagandist dissemination of these in contemporary media. Partly because of the dominance of behaviorism in both mid twentieth century psychology and communications research, this response to stereotyping was common to both from roughly the 1930s to the 1960s. The us/them dichotomy it set up between stereotyping and the rational coming to terms with difference may have appeared to resolve the dilemma identified by Lippmann, but it did this by all too cleanly separating the (rational) researcher from the (irrational) acceptance and use of stereotypes.

The model had no way of explaining the wide spread social prevalence of stereotypical views – as for instance in the Nazi period of the Third Reich or the apartheid era in South Africa.

What followed from this unsatisfactory resolution was that the opposed senses of stereotyping in Lippmann’s formulation became split off from each other. In late twentieth century psychology, for instance, social cognition and social identity theory reacted to the pathologization of stereotypical prejudice by questioning the rigid divide between irrational (“false”) and rational (“correct”) thinking. However, in pointing up its wider social occurrence, they turned the pathological model on its head and began to conceive of stereotyping as a necessary component of ordinary human cognition, vital for the way we process and utilize information. The question of ideology was repressed, not because it is overburdened with all sorts of past intellectual baggage, but because stereotyping itself was normalized. This occurred around another binary opposition, that of ingroups and outgroups. The dichotomy distinguished between the assimilation of people into their own social groups and categories where their similarities are exaggerated, and the division between such social groups and categories and others where their differences are blown out of proportion and heavily biased. In this simplistic conception of culture, association, and belonging, stereotypes are vital to positive group identities, so being a member of any group inevitably leads to bias, distortion, and denigration of others. Stereotyping comes to appear as cognitively universal and natural whereas, from a critical sociological perspective, it is stereotyping which naturalizes its own universalized definitions of others.

More recently, the emphasis on just one side of Lippmann’s epistemological problem has been redressed by other psychologists who have attended more fully to the social dimensions of stereotyping and other forms of representation or to the cultural models they involve, though these developments have occurred with cognition as their general informing background, and with the media being almost completely ignored. Social psychologists who pay explicit attention to the issues of power and ideology and their discursive accomplishments remain

exceptional. For example, Augoustinos and Walker's (1995) definition of stereotypes as "ideological representations which are used to justify and legitimize existing social and power relations" is made against prevailing traditions within their discipline. Media and cultural studies, along with many areas of sociology, have moved mainly in the other direction to these traditions, opting to focus only on ideology and power at the expense of the psychological dimensions of experience, perception, knowledge, and belief. Much of the work that has resulted has been of enormous significance for sociology and other disciplines – the conceptual formulation and analysis of representations of the stereotypical Other in postcolonial and historical studies is just one example of this – but again there has been a tendency to lose sight of Lippmann's dual conception of stereotyping. The benefit of this is that it offsets the academic split between cognition and culture, or psychology and politics, and reminds us of the dilemma underlying stereotyping which stereotyping seeks to annul: the dilemma of how "we" are going to go about getting to know "you." Is this to be accomplished in terms of one dimensional representations that help maintain existing structures of power, order, and control, or should we treat these representations critically for the way they help to produce and perpetuate inequality and oppression, and so try to develop a more complex vision characterized by its openness, flexibility, and tolerance?

Critical sociological commentary on stereotypes needs to focus not only on the pernicious images of public stereotyping and their discursive properties, but also on the broad relational dynamics of power and conflict that are always present in stereotyping as a social process. It has certainly proved fruitful to apply philosophical, feminist, and psychoanalytical theory to these dynamics, but we should remember that they are always definite and contingent, which means that methodologically the relations between identity, representation, and difference need to be historicized, understood within specific social and cultural contexts in time and space, across the different periods and formations of modernity and late modernity. These relations are fluid and changing, and

although the belief that they are not may itself be the result of stereotyping and its underlying self assertions, it is important to see how stereotypes have been historically situated within such modern constellations of identity and discourse as sexual politics, nationalism, militarism and war, colonialism and postcolonialism, imperialism and neoimperialism, crime, normality and deviance, race and ethnicity, disability and disease. This may be something of a wish list for further research, but such research is necessary wherever the relations of identity, representation, and difference generate the production or reproduction of those tight knots of symbolic figuration we refer to as stereotypes.

SEE ALSO: Anti-Semitism (Religion); Deviance, the Media and; Essentialism and Constructionism; Generalized Other; Ideology; Racist Movements; Representation; Social Cognition; Social Identity Theory; Stigma

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stigma

Abdi M. Kusow

The term stigma refers to a social or individual attribute that is devalued and discredited in a particular social context. As Goffman (1963) noted, however, this definition requires an important qualification, one that defines stigma in terms of “a language of relationship” that can link attributes to particular stereotypes, rather than a priori objectified attributes. The language of relationship between attributes and stereotypes is extremely important because an attribute, in and of itself, does not carry an inherent quality that makes it credible or discreditable outside the nature of the stereotype that corresponds to it.

Link and Phelan (2001) defined stigma in terms of the presence and convergence of four interrelated components. First, people distinguish and label human differences. Second, members of the dominant cultural group link labeled persons with certain undesirable attributes. Third, negatively labeled groups or individuals are placed in distinct and separate categories from the non stigmatized. Fourth, as a result of the first three components, labeled individuals experience status loss. Finally, the process of stigma placement, and therefore management, is dependent on the degree of one’s access to social, economic, and political power.

Regardless of how stigma is defined, however, in order for an attribute to be designated as a mark of stigma, two conditions must be present. First, the designation of stigma must be informed by a collectively shared understanding

by all participants of which attributes are stigmatizing in the available pool of socially meaningful categories in a particular social context. This statement is important because an attribute that is stigmatizing in one social context may not be stigmatizing in another. The second condition relates to the degree to which a mark of stigma is visible. The degree of visibility determines the stigmatized person’s feelings about themselves and their interactions and relationship with non stigmatized groups and individuals, particularly in situations perceived as potentially stigmatizing encounters.

There are two general categories of stigma attributes. The first category refers to attributes that are immediately or potentially visible upon social encounters. Three types of stigma attributes can be outlined within this category. The first relates to outward and clear physical deformations. The second relates to what Goffman described as “the tribal stigma of race, nation, and religion.” The latter is transmitted through lineage, and affects all members of the stigmatized group. This type of stigma can be characterized as collective or group stigma, while the first, physical deformities, affects only individuals, and can therefore be referred to as individual stigma.

The second broad category relates to stigma attributes that are not clearly and outwardly visible, but may or may not become visible upon social interaction and where the stigmatized person believes that their stigma is not known to those with whom they interact. The distinction between whether or not a particular stigma attribute is visible is important because it determines the nature of social interaction between those who are perceived as stigmatized and the normals. More importantly, it situates the nature of the reactions and information management by stigmatized individuals that appear to reveal their stigma attributes. In the case where the stigma attribute is readily and clearly visible, the process of information management involves attempts to minimize tensions generated during social interactions.

If the stigma attribute is visible, the process of information management shifts from mere tension management to information management about one’s feelings of having a spoiled identity. The concern of the stigmatized in this

case becomes one of whether or not to display discrediting information, and ultimately leads to what Goffman described as information management techniques.

There are a number of information management techniques employed by stigmatized individuals. One common technique is “covering.” Covering refers to attempts by stigmatized individuals to conceal signs commonly considered stigma symbols. Another strategy is “distancing,” where stigmatized individuals or groups disassociate themselves from those roles, associations, and institutions that may be considered as stigmatizing. Still another strategy is “compartmentalization,” where individuals divide their worlds into two social worlds: a small and intimate one to which the stigmatized reveals their identity, and a larger group from which the stigmatized individual conceals their identity. Finally, individuals may engage in “embracement” through the expressive confirmation of the social roles and statuses associated with stigma (Snow & Anderson 1987).

A recent criticism of the nature of stigma, however, pertains to the uncritical assumption of the existence of a normatively shared understanding of the distribution of stigma symbols (Kusow 2004). The conventional literature on the distribution of stigma divides a society into stigmatized and normals. This distinction is less tenable than before, however, because the current demographic, social, political, and economic context in which stigma symbols are distributed is radically different from those when Goffman’s seminal essay *Stigma* first appeared. Due to changes in the political and social climate, particularly as a result of the impacts of multiculturalism and the embracement of wider social identities in the US, we are approaching a situation or an era in which who and what is normal, and therefore the question of who stigmatized whom, is under constant revision. Given this situation, future scholars must also consider how stigmatized individuals disavow dominant perspectives regarding the distribution of stigma, instead of merely concentrating on information management on the part of the stigmatized.

SEE ALSO: Deviance; Facework; Goffman, Erving; Interaction Order

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strain theories

Robert Agnew

Strain theories argue that strain or stress is a major cause of crime. Individuals engage in crime to reduce or escape from their strain (e.g., theft to reduce monetary strain, running away to escape abusive parents), seek revenge against the source of their strain or related targets, or cope with the negative emotions caused by strain (e.g., illicit drug use). There are several major versions of strain theory in sociology, distinguished in terms of the types of strain they examine and their description of the factors that influence or condition the effect of strain on crime. This entry describes the major versions of strain theory, beginning with Durkheim and ending with Agnew, whose general strain theory builds on previous strain theories.

DURKHEIM

Durkheim presented the first modern version of strain theory in his book *Suicide* (1951). Durkheim argues that healthy societies set limits on individual goals, such that individuals

have a reasonable chance of achieving their goals. During periods of rapid social change or turmoil, however, societies may lose their ability to limit individual goals. Individuals, lacking the ability to limit their own goals, come to pursue unlimited or ever escalating goals. The despair that inevitably results from the pursuit of unlimited goals was said to be a major cause of suicide and was also linked to other directed violence. Durkheim's view of strain as the pursuit of unlimited goals, however, never had a significant effect on the study of crime, in part because it was overshadowed by Merton's version of strain theory (see Passas & Agnew 1997).

MERTON

Like Durkheim, Merton (1938) focuses on that type of strain involving the inability to achieve one's goals, particularly economic goals. Merton departs from Durkheim, however, in two important ways. While Durkheim focuses on the pursuit of unlimited goals, Merton focuses on the inability of lower class individuals to achieve more limited economic goals. This difference may reflect the fact that Merton's theory was developed during the height of the Depression. Further, while for Durkheim the failure of society to regulate individual goals is the source of strain, the opposite is the case in Merton. Merton argues that society encourages individuals to pursue the goal of monetary success, but prevents large segments of the population from achieving this goal through legitimate channels. In particular, Merton argues that all individuals in the US – regardless of class – are encouraged to strive for monetary success. Many individuals, however, particularly those in the lower classes, are prevented from achieving such success through the legitimate routes of educational and occupational advancement. Such individuals experience much frustration and, according to Merton, they may respond in one of five ways.

Conformity is the most common response: individuals continue to strive for monetary success through legitimate channels, living with their frustration. Innovation involves the attempt to achieve monetary success through illegitimate channels, like theft, drug selling, and prostitution. Ritualism involves lowering

the desire for monetary success to the point where it can be achieved through legitimate channels. Retreatism involves rejecting the goal of monetary success and the means to achieve it. Retreatists, according to Merton, include skid row alcoholics, drug addicts, and in the most extreme case, those who commit suicide. Rebellion also involves rejecting the goal of monetary success and the means to achieve it, but individuals substitute new goals and means in their place. While rebellion may assume political forms, it can assume criminal forms, as illustrated in the discussion of Cohen, below.

It is of course critical to understand why some people adapt to strain in ways that involve crime while others do not. Merton provides some guidance here. He states, for example, that lower class individuals are more likely to employ criminal adaptations because they are less committed to legitimate norms due to their inadequate socialization. The revisions in Merton's theory by Cohen and by Cloward and Ohlin shed additional light on the ways in which individuals, particularly lower class juveniles, adapt to strain.

COHEN

Cohen (1955) drew on Merton's theory in an effort to explain lower class gang delinquency. According to Cohen, lower class boys do not simply desire money; rather, they desire middle class status more generally – including respect from others. Such boys, however, have trouble achieving this status through legitimate channels. Most notably, they are often frustrated and humiliated when they compete with middle class students in the school system and try to meet the expectations of middle class teachers.

There are several ways to cope with this frustration, but the response of innovation is not a viable option. Middle class status is not easily achieved through illegitimate channels. Many lower class boys, however, cope through the response of rebellion. They reject the goal of middle class status and set up an alternative status system in which they can successfully compete. Their hostility toward the middle class leads them to set up an oppositional status system which places high value on criminal acts like theft and fighting. Cohen's description of this

oppositional subculture has been challenged as extreme, but Cohen's use of strain theory to explain the origin of delinquent groups is a fundamental contribution to criminology. Most contemporary researchers view delinquent groups as an adaptation to the strain experienced by group members.

CLOWARD AND OHLIN

Cloward and Ohlin (1960) also apply strain theory to the explanation of lower class gang delinquency. Drawing on Merton, they argue that lower class people want to achieve monetary success, but are often prevented from doing so through legitimate channels. Drawing on Cohen, they argue that if conditions are right, adolescents sometimes adapt to their strain by forming or joining delinquent groups like gangs. These delinquent groups facilitate law violation; among other things, they provide rationalizations or justifications for delinquency. But Cloward and Ohlin go on to argue that there are different types of delinquent groups; some specializing in fighting, some in theft, and some in drug use. The type(s) of delinquent group available depends, in part, on the characteristics of the individual's community.

Cloward and Ohlin have been criticized because research suggests that most gang members do not specialize in particular types of delinquency. Their work is nevertheless important because it makes the point that explanations of crime must not only consider the factors that predispose individuals to crime, like strain, but also the opportunities that are available for crime – referred to as illegitimate opportunities.

CRITIQUES OF CLASSIC STRAIN THEORIES

The classic strain theories of Merton, Cohen, and Cloward and Ohlin were perhaps the dominant explanations of crime during the 1950s and 1960s. They were also part of the inspiration behind the War on Poverty, which was designed to make it easier for individuals to achieve economic success through legitimate channels. Certain of the programs that were part of the War on Poverty (like Head Start and Job Corps) are still in existence. Classic strain theories came

under heavy attack in the late 1960s and 1970s, however. Self report surveys showed that delinquency was common in all social classes. This fact was taken as evidence against classic strain theories, although these theories can explain middle class delinquency if one focuses on relative deprivation (Passas & Agnew 1997). Also, empirical tests provided little support for classic strain theory. Such tests typically examined the individual's educational or occupational aspirations and expectations, in an effort to determine if crime was highest among those who did not expect to achieve their aspirations. Crime, however, was found to be highest among those with both low aspirations and expectations, a finding usually interpreted in terms of control theories (Hirschi 1969).

These tests have been criticized; among other things, they do not focus on the key goal of monetary success. More recent data suggest that dissatisfaction with one's monetary situation is related to crime (Agnew 2001). Further, qualitative studies frequently report that criminals engage in income generating crimes because they have a desperate need for money, but few legal prospects for obtaining it. Nevertheless, classic strain theories fell into decline. There were several attempts to revise strain theory in the 1970s and 1980s, most of which argued that people may pursue a ranges of goals and that goal achievement is a function of more than social class. In 1992 Agnew drew on classic strain theories, the revisions in these theories, and the broader stress literature to develop his general strain theory of crime, which led to a renewed interest in strain theory.

AGNEW'S GENERAL STRAIN THEORY (GST)

Agnew's (1992) general strain theory focuses on a broad range of strains or stressors. Certain of these strains involve the inability to achieve positively valued goals – the type of strain emphasized in previous versions of strain theory. Other strains involve the loss of positively valued stimuli (e.g., romantic partners) and the presentation of negatively valued stimuli (e.g., verbal and physical abuse) – the types of strain emphasized in the stress literature. Hundreds of specific types of strain fall under these broad

categories, but GST argues that those strains most likely to lead to crime are (1) seen as unjust, (2) are high in magnitude, (3) are associated with low social control, and (4) create some pressure or incentive to engage in criminal coping. Specific strains that meet these criteria include the inability to achieve goals such as monetary success, thrills/excitement, autonomy, and masculine status; the experience of parental rejection; discipline that is very strict, erratic, excessive, and/or harsh; child abuse and neglect; negative secondary school experiences like low grades and negative relations with teachers; work in the secondary labor market; homelessness; criminal victimization; and experiences with prejudice or discrimination based on ascribed characteristics.

These types of strain lead to a range of negative emotions, including anger, frustration, and depression. These negative emotions in turn create pressure for corrective action. Crime is one possible response, since it may allow individuals to reduce or escape from their strain (e.g., running away from abusive parents), seek revenge, or alleviate negative emotions through illicit drug use. Whether strained individuals turn to crime is influenced by a range of factors which affect the individual's ability to engage in legal coping, the costs of crime, and the individual's disposition for crime. Such factors include coping skills and resources (e.g., intelligence, financial resources), level of conventional social support, parental supervision, personality traits like low constraint and negative emotionality, beliefs regarding crime, and association with delinquent peers.

GST has some empirical support, with studies suggesting that the above strains increase the likelihood of crime and that their effect on crime is partly mediated by negative emotions (Agnew 2001). Evidence on the extent to which the effect of strain on crime is influenced by the above factors is mixed, although some recent studies provide support for GST. Recent work has applied GST to the explanation of group differences in crime, including age, gender, community, and race/ethnic differences in offending rates. It is argued that some groups are more likely to experience those types of strain conducive to crime, react to strain with strong negative emotions, and respond to such strain and negative emotions with crime. Strain

theory, then, is once again playing an important role in the explanation of crime and deviance.

SEE ALSO: Anomie; Deviance, Crime and; Deviance, Explanatory Theories of; Durkheim, Émile; Merton, Robert K.

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stranger, the

Terri LeMoyné

Simmel defined the field of sociology as the study of social forms, or the assorted patterns that people impose upon social interaction to give it coherent meaning. Social forms are the structured features of interaction, and Simmel argued that the sociologist should ascertain these social forms because actors typically create them unconsciously. In addition, he maintained that "social types," or general character traits, are based upon social forms and are dependent upon social interaction. Therefore, individualisms, or qualities that we oftentimes assume to be uniquely personal, are really rooted in social interaction. "The Stranger"

(1971 [1908]) is but one illustration of a social type.

The notion of distance is important to Simmel in his typology of the stranger, whose social position involves a synthesis of both attachment and detachment. The stranger is someone who can be located within any social environment at any point in time. He is both remote from us while still being close; he is simultaneously a part of the group as well as outside of it.

Simmel utilized "the trader" as an exemplar of the stranger, and more specifically, the European Jew as the classic example of it. By definition, the trader obtains a range of goods for his community from outside groups. Because he is the middleman for trade, he is mobile and is not tied to the group through kinship, locality, or occupation. As a result, he is not completely enmeshed within the group. Because of his unique position, members of his group view him as both far and near.

Because of this unusual social position, others assume that the stranger possesses an objective attitude regarding social matters; he is both involved in and indifferent to the community. Therefore, group members are more inclined to divulge private information to the stranger that they often keep hidden from intimates.

The stranger is also viewed as possessing greater individual autonomy. Simmel writes that the stranger is less apt to distort information because of his differences from the group. This allows him to reach conclusions that more easily deviate from those members who are more entrenched within the collective.

This objective stance provides the stranger with a greater freedom than that experienced by those enmeshed in the group. His attitudes and perceptions are less likely to be distorted because he is not as closely attached to the group. His atypical social position allows him to assess more accurately situations, even close ones, from a distance. This unique freedom allows him to examine a variety of situations with minimal personal bias. As a stranger, he possesses standards that are more general and objective, and his actions are less constrained by customs, religion, or established community practices.

In determining the qualities of the stranger, Simmel writes that group members tend to highlight the general abstract traits that they

share with him. In contrast, when people share a close relationship to someone, they attend to those attributes and qualities that are specific to their relationship. While a focus on general qualities unifies people as a whole, they do not lead particular individuals toward one another. This approach results in a lessening of the bond between people coupled with their awareness of the tenuousness of the relationship. In these cases, the stranger is close to others based upon general similarities like nationality, social position, or occupation, but these same universal attributes make him remote because they also pertain to many others.

Because there is an emphasis on these common general human qualities, they also tend to stress the individual characteristics that they do not share with the stranger. This approach results in a relationship that is characterized by tension. For example, if one is a stranger in terms of nationality or race, these differences are not viewed as individual, but are seen instead as qualities that the stranger shares with other strangers. It is here that strangers are viewed as types rather than people. As types, their nearness is no more specific than their remoteness. Simmel cites the taxation practices of the Middle Ages as an illustration of the Jew as a social type. Where the Christian population was taxed according to their individual assets, all Jews were charged an identical tax no matter what their income. A fixed tax was levied upon the Jews because they were treated as a social position rather than as separate, distinct individuals, with separate, distinct incomes.

In an effort to make this social type more universal, Simmel claims that there is a level of strangeness in all relationships, even the most intimate ones. When entering into romantic relationships people tend to concentrate on what is unique and distinctive about the association, while ignoring any general similarities. This occurs because they believe that no other relationship is comparable to theirs. This love has never existed before. As time passes, each participant will come to question the validity of their relationship when they realize that it is not particularly unique. In fact, relationships just like this one occur with great frequency and each partner could have just as easily met someone else who would have fulfilled this romantic void. All close relationships must endure this

assessment because what they all share is never exceptional to them. The outcome of this new found awareness is an overall level of strangeness within the relationship.

Simmel argues that although varying degrees of remoteness and nearness are present in all relationships, there is a “special proportion and reciprocal tension” between farness and nearness that produce the unique social type of the stranger (Simmel 1971 [1908]: 149). But, Simmel warns, we cannot define or quantify this special proportion with great certainty. All we know is that there are certain amounts of nearness and farness that must be present for this social type to exist.

SEE ALSO: Simmel, Georg; Stranger, The

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strategic decisions

David C. Wilson

Theoretical and empirical studies of decision making pervade organization theory. They have done so for over six decades. James March and

Herbert Simon suggested in 1958 that managing organizations and decision making were virtually synonymous. From this broad perspective, decision making has maintained its centrality to the field of organization theory and is one of the most active areas of current management research, particularly in the field of strategic management. The dynamics of organizing brought with them the need for understanding decision making. As organizations grew and became more complex, decision making became a central activity. Managers, in particular, were expected to make choices amongst often uncertain alternatives and to choose wisely – benefiting the organization and its many stakeholders. Scholars were expected to uncover the characteristics of decision processes and to explain ways in which we might, ultimately, improve the ways in which decisions were made in organizations.

The scholarly study of decision making covers many levels of analysis (from individual cognition to the cultural characteristics of nation states), and many disciplines inform our knowledge (from mathematics to behavioral theories of social science). The term strategic decision making is usually used to indicate decisions made in organizations, as opposed to individual choice activity (such as choosing where to go on holiday). Organization includes any collective social, economic, or political activity involving a plurality of human effort. Strategic decisions emphasize the social practice of decision making as it is carried out amongst and between a group of such individuals. It is the organizing of decision activity as a collective phenomenon which takes center stage, rather than the cognitive processes of individual choice makers.

Equally, strategic decision making is not primarily concerned with computation in the field of judgment and choice. Various branches of mathematics can inform us about risk, options, game theory, and choice. All have their utility in understanding choice processes, but are less useful when considering how organizations full of people make decisions. For example, the most well known variant of game theory (decisions between two players) is the prisoner’s dilemma, where two criminals are in separate cells and have to decide whether or not to betray each other (having agreed not to betray in advance of the game). The greatest payoffs come from both

prisoners sticking to their agreement, but most betray each other and the payoffs are significantly reduced. The lesson is that computational mathematics could help the players maximize their returns. This is choice theory (rather than strategic decision making).

Why *strategic* decisions? These decisions are usually large, expensive, and characterized by high levels of uncertainty (no one has done this before). Once implemented, they set the course of many operational (everyday) decisions that follow in their wake. A further characteristic of strategic decisions is that they are difficult to reverse once resources (human and financial) have been committed to their cause. A more robust list of the characteristics of strategic decisions would include the following:

- They are difficult to define precisely (the nature of the problem is elusive).
- Understanding the problem is also part of understanding the solution.
- There is rarely one best solution, but a series of possible solutions.
- Each solution is associated with different tradeoffs and priorities.
- They are difficult to assess in terms of performance, since they tend to continue through the organization without a clear final end point against which performance can be judged.
- They are highly interconnected with other problems in the organization.
- They have high levels of uncertainty associated with them.
- They require strategists to accept fairly high degrees of risk in making decisions.
- Once made, they are difficult to reverse.
- They are likely to be discontinuous and political, with different competing interests trying to influence the outcome in line with their preferences.

At its simplest, strategic decision making may be considered an instantaneous action, a choice between two or more known alternatives. However, this “point of decision” approach is unable to capture the richness and complexity of:

- the processes that lead up to the point of decision;

- the influences that impact upon putting the decision into action;
- assessing the ultimate performance of that decision.

Decision making from this choice perspective also assumes that managers have full agency and control over decisions. Sometimes they may have very limited discretion to make decisions or choose amongst alternatives. This could be the case, for example, where strategic decisions in organizations are heavily constrained by interventionist government policies (such as privatization or deregulation), where all strategic decisions are framed and shaped by this wider context. Nevertheless, managers still have some degree of strategic choice even if the wider context (e.g., privatization) is firmly set in place. Managers can still make strategic decisions, for example, concerning such key topics as organizational design, choice of suppliers, choice and sophistication of information systems, and general product or service portfolios.

Theorists such as Drucker (1974) and Weick (1995) showed how decision making processes in organizations were as much about *defining the question* as they were about *providing an answer*. The important aspects of understanding strategic decisions are deciding whether there is a need for a decision and, if so, what that decision should be about. Weick likens this process to those of boards of inquiry following a disastrous event. Such boards have a number of roles. They are historians – reconstructing the past to allocate responsibility and to prevent future disasters happening through the same processes. Essentially, they take an outcome and interpret it to be the result of a series of decisions (which were often not seen as discrete decisions at the time by those involved). Much of strategic decision making is about this kind of social reconstruction.

There are many other views of strategic decision making. You could view strategic decisions as a *plan*: the decision is a consciously intended course of action. In the same way that you might intend to catch an airplane to a specific destination at a particular time, decision making is a process which is carried out in advance of the action that follows and is developed with a clear purpose. Or you could view strategic decisions as a *ploy*: a decision from this

perspective is a set of actions designed to outwit the competition and may not necessarily be the “obvious” content of the decision. For example, a decision to build a new building in order to expand may not be the overt strategy, but is more concerned with increasing barriers to entry for potential competitors. Here, there are connections with strategic decision making as conceived in its military roots, where the plans of campaigns may have similar characteristics to those of a ploy to outwit the “enemy.” You could view strategic decisions as a *pattern*: decisions are not necessarily taken with a planned purpose and decision makers do not always have access to the range of knowledge required to plan wholly in advance. What happens is that multiple decisions taken over time form a pattern. It is this pattern of resulting (emergent) behavior that we call the strategy of the firm. Strategy is therefore characterized as a pattern that emerges from a stream of decisions.

Strategic decision making can also be seen as achieving a *position*: decisions are less about the dynamics of planning or gamesmanship and more about trying to achieve a match between the organization and its environment. This position can be one of alignment, so that the organization matches its environment (e.g., highly decentralized structures to match a turbulent and unpredictable environment), or one of trying to secure competitive advantage (where the organization achieves a unique position in the market for some time). Positions, of course, can be planned, emerge, or be a combination of both emergent and planned processes.

Finally, strategic decision making can be viewed as a *perspective*: decisions are characterized as being a reflection of how strategists in an organization see and perceive the world and their organization. For example, the strategic perspective of Nokia is one of continuous and sometimes radical change (Nokia began as a paper and pulp company); IBM favors a dominant marketing perspective, whilst Hewlett Packard favors an engineering excellence perspective. This perspective, if pervasive enough, can influence the kinds of decisions taken, in respect of their content and their processes. We can see the effects of this embedded view of decision making by observing that organizations in similar industries often choose similar strategic decisions. They

become institutionalized. Universities tend to follow broadly similar strategies, as do large retailers or service organizations.

Over the last 50 years there have been radical changes in the ways in which strategic decision making has been researched. For example, the 1950s and 1960s saw an emphasis on the planning approach to decision making. The focus was on tools and techniques to help managers make informed decisions about future business directions. Such tools included industry structure analyses and portfolio matrices (e.g., the Ansoff matrix or the Boston Consulting Group’s Box). Strategic decision making was mostly about planning. The 1970s onwards saw a different emphasis. Decisions were now supposed to emphasize the payoffs to organizations that may accrue if they pursued different strategic directions. Typical options were diversification decisions, but this was also the era of innovation (R&D), acquisition, joint venture, and internationalization decisions.

The 1980s saw a move away from examining the content of strategic decisions (that is, what they were about) to examining them more as processes. The question now became whether we could map the progress of a strategic decision and make any inferences about why such processes might occur. David Hickson and his colleagues characterized such processes as sporadic (discontinuous), fluid (continuous and smooth), or constricted (restricted to a small group of stakeholders and highly political). This work also underscored the importance of such processes since they underpinned the recognition amongst managers for strategic change. The 1990s onwards have seen a continuing interest in unfolding the characteristics of decision processes, but the emphasis has changed to focus on whether or not there are any links between decision making activity and performance (did the decision succeed or fail – and do a number of failed strategic decisions lead to failed organizations)? Finally, very recent approaches to strategic decision making have started to concentrate upon the more micro aspects of how managers think, act, and interpret strategic decisions. This approach has been termed the *strategy and practice* perspective (Whittington 1996).

Strategic decision making has encountered many attacks on its theoretical and empirical claims to be a discrete field of study. It has not

only survived these attacks, but has also prospered in recent years with many established authors returning to some of the original ideas in decision making (we can see this, for example, in the more recent works of Karl Weick and James March), and there are many newer researchers joining the field. The major criticisms of the field were:

- The decision itself is an inappropriate level of analysis.
- A lack of large scale empirical studies (too many assumptions based on too few cases).

The first critique argues that studying decisions as the primary unit of analysis “gets in the way” of what is really important. That is, actions occur in organizations where decisions may not have been taken and to isolate and study “the decision” is to miss that process. The counter argument says that deciding and implementing are matters of degree in quite diffuse processes. Since then, the decision as a unit of analysis has become the firm focus of many theoreticians, with general agreement that in order to understand “strategy” in organizations one has to understand the processes of the handful of decisions which make up that strategy. Key authors in the field (including Henry Mintzberg, James March, Karl Weick, Paul Nutt, David Hickson and colleagues) are today focusing on the decision as the appropriate unit of analysis.

The second critique was more robust until the large data sets of Paul Nutt and Dean and Sharfman in the US and David Hickson and colleagues in the UK began to emerge from the late 1980s onwards. After this empirical work, it was no longer necessary to base the interpretation of decision making on a few key in depth cases, but the comparative empirical study of decisions was possible using multivariate tools for analysis. It became recognized in the social science community that strategic decision making could be argued to be a robust field of study and that it remained theoretically (and empirically) distinct from other related cognate areas such as corporate strategy or individual choice theories such as consumer behavior.

Overall, strategic decision making research has informed the general field of organization theory in distinct ways. For example, the

notion of *incrementalism* (piecemeal attention to small steps in any process) arose from Charles Lindblom’s research into how decisions were made. The notion of *problemistic search* (managers only seek information when they have to, or when there is a pressing problem) came out of work by Richard Cyert and James March. The concept of *enacted environments* (managers only see and interpret the bit of the operating environment they focus upon) came out of research by Karl Weick. All of these concepts were developed in the field of strategic decision making and have become more generically applied to organizational processes in recent years. Strategic decision making has proved a rich ground for the emergence of such concepts.

The processes of making strategic decisions can appear deceptively simple. Actions are formulated toward the solution of a particular problem. The problem with this approach is that there may be discernible actions and there may be observable outcomes, but they need not necessarily be wholly related to one another. Problems may be solved by factors other than strategic decisions and, sometimes, taking a strategic decision can create a whole new set of problems (without solving the initial problem the decision was supposed to address).

These polar views can be represented as the *planning* versus the *chaotic* processes of strategic decision making. They are extremes and, although most decisions lie somewhere between the planned and the chaotic, both perspectives are useful for understanding the processes of strategic decision making. Viewing processes as basically a set of planning tools allows *actions*, *procedures*, and *measurement* to be explicitly addressed. Planning facilitates decision makers in analyzing and codifying what appear initially as complex problems. Planning simplifies complexity and helps reduce uncertainty. Because of this, planning can also help decision makers examine current planning practices in their organization and assess their utility in light of current problems. From a behavioral perspective, planning can ensure that others in the organization are involved and are communicated with as fully as possible. Note that although involvement and communication can be explicit parts of the plan, this may not endow those participants with any influence over the process or its eventual outcome. Finally, planning

processes help decision makers identify key performance indicators by which progress of the decision can be monitored and judged.

Chaotic processes mean that organizations can be viewed as an “anarchy” or as a system with chaotic tendencies. Hence decision makers can neither understand fully nor control decision processes. Means and ends are unlikely to be coupled, which implies that actions do not lead to expected outcomes and are swayed one way or another by other decisions, other actions, and unforeseen circumstances. The main components of a strategic decision making process (problems, solutions, participants, and choice situations) interact in an apparently haphazard way, a stream of demands for the fluid attention and energies of managers. Participants move in and out of the decision making process (every entrance is an exit elsewhere), and this can create discontinuity. At other times, participants fight for the right to become involved and then never exercise any influence they may have.

Viewing decision making processes as chaotic also has some advantages for decision makers. Unlike the planning approach, the chaos perspective does not seek to simplify and to reduce uncertainty. It avoids any oversimplification of the process and allows decision makers to appreciate and expect the role of politics and influence to be a natural part of the decision making process. In theory, the chaos perspective should encourage decision makers to think creatively around complex problems and help them to avoid thinking solely in linear sequences.

Creativity and innovation may be enhanced by decision makers being encouraged to take actions that seem unrelated to the decision under consideration. On the other hand, we should bear in mind that the distinction between creativity and madness is a rather fine line. From a decision making perspective, this means that no one will know whether the tangential explorations were useful or folly until a long way down the track of the decision process.

The work of James G. March characterizes and summarizes many of the basic features and debates in strategic decision making. The basic decision process can be illustrated as in Figure 1.

The major contribution of this simple flow diagram was that its very simplicity could be misleading. The cycle can be broken or can malfunction at each stage of the process and between stages. James March taught us to beware of assumptions of rationality both in individuals and in organizations. Actions can be taken for a variety of reasons which correspond to the ways in which organizations are structured (each specialized function developing its own view on what should happen). This was added irrevocably to the vocabulary of organizational decision making in the form of “local rationality” (Cyert & March 1963).

March was later to refine this concept by emphasizing local preferences (rather than rationality). His argument was that in organizational decision making, the main thing was in forming *interpretations* rather than in making choices. Here, interpretations cover a wide arena




Figure 1 Strategic decision-making processes (James March).

of examining organizational decision making. In particular, March was keen to show the differences between decisions that were choice based or rule based. The main distinction was whether decision makers pursue a logic of consequences, making choices amongst alternatives and evaluating their consequences in terms of prior preferences, or do they pursue a logic of appropriateness, fulfilling identities or roles by recognizing situations and following rules which match appropriate behaviors to the situations they encounter? In this respect, organizations provide the context in which such interpretations are formed, sustained, and sometimes changed.

March also alerted our attention to the fact that organizations could engender two very different types of decision behavior. One may be characterized by clarity and consistency and the other by ambiguity, inconsistency, and chaos. In the former case, organization is all about coherence and reducing uncertainty to avoid equivocality. In the latter case, organization is anarchic and acts as a background for decisions which may not be linear in process, may not be logical in a consistent sense, and where solutions may precede outcomes (in the sense that organizations by their very nature are collections of solutions already made – waiting for new decision opportunities to which they can become attached).

Finally, March argued that decision outcomes can be seen as primarily attributable to the actions of autonomous actors in organizations, or can be the result of the systemic properties of organizations as an interacting ecology. Here, the links between organization and decision are made explicit. Is it possible to describe decisions as emanating from the intentions, identities, and interests of independent actors? Or is it necessary to emphasize the ways in which individual actors, organizations, and societies fit together?

There is unlikely to be any resolution of the above theoretical disjunctures. Future work in strategic decision making may have to try and seek a synthesis – not to force choices amongst epistemologies – so that one can weave together both approaches in ways that allow one to high light or illuminate the other. Whatever the outcome of this process, it is certain that strategic decision making will remain at center stage of

the sociology of management and organization for many years to come.

SEE ALSO: Behaviorism; Change Management; Culture, Organizations and; Decision Making; Existential Sociology; Organization Theory; Strategic Management (Organizations); Structure and Agency; Top Management Teams

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strategic essentialism

Kristina Wolff

The concept of strategic essentialism is a “strategic use of positivist essentialism in a scrupulously visible political interest” (Fuss 1994: 99).

It utilizes the idea of essence with a recognition of and critique of the essentialist nature of the essence itself. It is a means of using group identity as a basis of struggle while also debating issues related to group identity within the group.

Strategic essentialism emerged out of Gayatri Chakravorty Spivak's critique of the Marxist, historical collective called the Subaltern Studies Group. The collective's main project was to operate as a counter movement, working to expose elitist representations of South Asian culture, particularly within Indian history. Subaltern studies performed the rewriting of the history of colonial India from the position of subordinated social groups or the *subaltern*. The *subaltern* is often used as a word for the oppressed or "Other" in society. Spivak's usage is based on Antonio Gramsci's definition, which consists of subordinated or non elite social groups. These groups occupy a space of difference with no or extremely limited access to the culture of the elite. The goal of the Subaltern Studies Group was simply to provide access or space for the subaltern to speak. The subaltern is a product of the network of elites, of differing understandings of what the subaltern *is*, as defined by the elites.

Strategic essentialism recognizes the complexities of occupying a subject object position, of the subaltern, whether it is a movement, group, or individual. They are working from within a structural position of subordination in society, while also embodying and critiquing that position. For example, a movement for immigrant laborers' rights would be challenging the elites in their definitions of and practices of domination over the workers, while also recognizing the complexities of what it means to be an *immigrant laborer*. The fundamental nature of this concept is that it deliberately suits a particular situation and does not serve as an overarching theory.

Spivak combines the techniques of deconstruction with Foucault's theory of power in the foundational pieces of strategic essentialism. *Deconstruction* as a method of critique provides a means to examine something that is important to how we understand society, perhaps something that is defined as an "essence," while also investigating the complexities of that

essence. Power is examined where it occurs, as a place of domination and of resistance.

Strategic essentialism as applied to feminism serves to utilize essentialist definitions of *woman* while also continually critiquing the concept itself. For example, one of the main goals of liberal feminism is the political struggle to gain equal rights for men and women. This includes providing equal pay for equal work. When arguing for this change in status, the concept of "woman" is used as being as able as men to complete tasks and uphold responsibilities in the working world and therefore they should be judged equally. There is no critique of what being a woman is, but there is a critique as to women's subordinated status in society due to their gender as well as the effects of this on the availability of jobs for women. Strategic essentialism also recognizes that women exist in positions of power within the working world, thus placing them in a position where they may be using female traits that are understood as inherent to all women. This concept moves beyond basic liberal feminist understandings, recognizing that women may be seen as rejecting these "natural" traits in order to fit into a "man's world" of work so that they can be successful. Here women are embodying and rejecting essentialist qualities of being a woman in a calculated manner.

Within the liberal feminist movement, discussions and debates occurred surrounding the ways in which they were utilizing their status as women to fight for their rights. This included the way they fulfilled their expected roles as wives and mothers, as well as using these roles as points of resistance. Additionally, women began to question essentialist definitions of "woman," thus causing great debate within the movement and the development of alternative forms of feminism based on these critiques and definitions of what being a woman means and the effects this has on identity on the individual, group, organization, and societal levels.

Critiques of strategic essentialism often focus on whether it can account for the complexities of race, class, and gender, specifically if it is to focus on a specific situation, within a certain political, geographic, historical context. Others question if those utilizing the technique are always making a strategic choice, as there is an

assumption of a certain awareness at play. However, the loudest and most constant critic of strategic essentialism is Spivak. She sees it as morphing into a tool for promoting essentialism rather than serving as a means of critique. Many utilizing it stop short of deconstructing essentialist beliefs serving as the foundation of what is considered essentialist. Strategic essentialism has been adopted and used as a theory rather than remaining a technique, a strategy for understanding the complexity and fluidity of subject/object positions, of identity and power, and of the ways in which subordinated groups operate and work for changing their situations, their status. The indiscriminant use of strategic essentialism broadly to all oppressed groups ignores the importance of tactics and in turn becomes a misapplication of the spirit of the concept. Spivak does find that it can continue to be useful through the consideration of how individuals and others are essentialist in different ways, thus embracing the challenge of the relationship of race, class, gender, and other components of identity.

SEE ALSO: Deconstruction; Essentialism and Constructionism; Foucault, Michel; Liberal Feminism

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strategic management (organizations)

David Knights

On being asked to define strategic management, the temptation is to respond by asking what is *not* strategic in management. In other words, as soon as the idea of management is addressed, it is necessary to see it as strategic, although clearly much of management is about managing organizational routines. Such a response begs the question of what is meant not only by strategy, but also by management. Some writers on strategy and management have seen the two as coincident, but others perceive the focus on strategy to be contemporary and linked to the emergence and development of large, often multisite and sometimes multinational corporations. Both terms are in need of definition, even though we know that their meanings are tied to the context of their use. Nowhere is this made more obvious than when consulting the Shorter Oxford English Dictionary, where both terms are treated in terms of usage and would seem to share a similar genesis in activities concerned with battle or the military.

Management has its derivation in managing as controlling the affairs of the household or training horses (to be put through the exercises of the *manège*). Alternatively, it refers to the handling of weapons or instruments to serve one's purposes. It is then about directing both animate and inanimate resources toward a particular objective. But the art of managing can also be seen as the use of contrivances for effecting some purpose, often by way of deceit or trickery. On the other hand, it can refer to indulgence or consideration shown toward a person. As with the term strategy, there is a strong association between management and military activities since it is clear that "handling weapons" and the use of horses cannot be separated from the conduct of battle in medieval warfare. The relationship continues even today, with the police use of horses in managing crowds during mass demonstrations. These activities might be seen as the "hard" practices of management, but the term has links with a "softer" meaning in which it refers to "animal

and household husbandry,” where it relates to caring for and maintaining what is under its tutelage.

Strategy has its origin in military history and may be defined as the art of projecting and directing the larger military movements and operations of a campaign. Chandler (1962) defined it largely in terms of long term goals and the means (i.e., courses of action and allocation of resources) for attaining them. In organizations, however, strategy operates at various levels.

- *Corporate strategy* refers to how the corporation defines itself, what business it is in, and its future direction and scope.
- *Business strategy* is concerned with the application of the corporate strategy to a subsidiary, division, or business unit of the corporation.
- *Strategic management* focuses on managers in general acting strategically in order to make the best use of the corporation’s competitive advantages, core competences, and market positioning and to advance the corporate mission, while having due regard for external constraints and opportunities.

While these different levels of strategy need to be distinguished, often the term strategic management is used less technically to refer generically to all three levels.

INTELLECTUAL AND SOCIAL CONTEXT

Insofar as the term management was used within the field of productive work, it tended to be associated with engineering and the military; thus, social class was extremely important in the context of recruitment into, and the pay differentials of, managerial positions during the period of the Industrial Revolution. The transparency of this privilege declined after 1790, when payment became attached to the job rather than to the person and seemed to coincide with an erosion of the differential between proprietors and salaried managers, though the latter were more often than not the relatives of the former (Pollard 1965: 139, 145). At this time, however, management was seen as

restricted to achieving the goals of the organization as laid down by entrepreneurs, who determined the nature and scope of the business, its goals, finance, and markets (Pollard 1965: 3). In effect, proprietors were rightly seen as entrepreneurs and were responsible for strategic thinking (a term not used at the time), whereas managers were simply functionaries translating their ideas into practice.

Once the joint stock company legislation was passed in 1854, those owning capital could invest their funds without being liable for any thing other than the amount invested should the company fail. They therefore took the opportunity to spread risk through owning a portfolio of shares in several companies, thus becoming absentee landlords. Managerial agents were employed to run the business, but they also assumed responsibility for designing strategies against which the owners could evaluate their performance at annual general meetings.

After this institutional separation of ownership from control, the distinction between entrepreneurs and managers began to erode as the latter assumed executive responsibility for both activities, although they were accountable to a board of directors who represented the interests of shareholders. Insofar as managers were clearly beginning to be recognized as of equal, if not greater, importance than the absentee owners, this could be seen as a point of discontinuity between the pre managerial and the managerial world. This, it could be claimed, provided the conditions that made it possible for strategic management to be practiced and eventually for it to become a topic of academic and popular management discourse.

Although some notion of strategy has been a central feature of armies for centuries, Hoskin and Macve (1986) argued that strategic management only became meaningful when writing, recording, and calculation became common practice within organizations. Strategy and management were identified as virtually synonymous since they were mutually interdependent.

Hoskin (1990) sought to pursue this theme with greater precision, suggesting that modern management had its genesis in mid nineteenth century America with the development of the Pennsylvania railroad. By “importing the practices of writing, examination, and grading,” Hoskin (1990: 23) argues, Herman Haupt of

the Pennsylvania railroad changed the “rules of business discourse” in the direction of being “proactive and future oriented,” or what we would now define as strategic. It is this orientation to strategic corporate decision making that Hoskin identifies as synonymous with a concept of modern management. This is seen as coterminous with the development and transformation of the internal discourses and practices of organizations into a written recorded and calculable form.

Modern management, from this point of view, is grounded in the knowledge and power that make it possible to control labor and the organization of production in pursuit of a set of strategic ends such as profit or corporate expansion. It is accomplished through practices that turn everything and everyone into an “object” to be managed (Miller 1987). Case files on employees and customers are written, recorded, and stored, and their behavior is continuously examined so as to render it calculable in terms of both the present and future prospects of the corporation. Examining, quantifying, and grading people and events brings them readily within the disciplinary gaze and the techniques of surveillance of strategic managers who exercise power and constitute knowledge within organizations.

While so far this analysis has been entirely academic in focus, as with many of the concepts in management, the strategy literature is heavily dominated by managerial approaches that see the academic’s role as helping managers to do their jobs more effectively and efficiently in terms of meeting goals presumed to be those of, or defined by, that self same management. This takes us to an examination of the main approaches and dimensions of strategic management.

MAJOR APPROACHES AND DIMENSIONS

The idea of strategy in management did not become standard in academic discourse until the 1960s, when the Master of Business Administration (MBA) was widely introduced. However, an equivalent notion of planning can be traced as far back as 1916 to the writings of Fayol (1949 [1916]: 43), who, in arguing that

“managing means looking ahead,” presumably was reporting on his experience of planning as a practitioner. While business schools were established in the US around the turn of the twentieth century (Wharton, 1881; Harvard, 1908; Stanford, 1925), largely in response to industrialization and the need for “trained managers” (Robinson 1995), it was not until around the middle of the twentieth century that they began to expand dramatically and to begin their development in the rest of the world.

It is possible to identify numerous approaches to strategy (Mintzberg 1994), but these can be contained within two broad perspectives – the rational and the processual. Similarly, there are several levels or dimensions in addition to those of corporate, business, and generic management strategy, but again these can be restricted to issues relating to creation, formation, development, and implementation. It should be noted, however, that these various approaches, levels, and dimensions may differ depending on the area of the business – accounting and finance, customer service, human resource management, information and computer technology, marketing, operations, and so on.

Rational Approach

The rational approach continues to dominate mainstream thinking about strategy, particularly within economics, but also, with some modifications, in organization analysis. One of the most popular rational approaches is Porter’s (1980) competitive forces model. Although broadly based on the economic theory of competition, the model also draws on the marketing theory of product differentiation and the organization theory of corporate power. Porter’s model is illustrated in Figure 1.

If the magnitude of the five competitive forces is zero, the strategic competitive advantage of the company is infinite for it is, in effect, in a monopoly position, although this is rare. The normal situation is for the five forces of competition to be of variable degrees of magnitude, and all will affect the strategic competitive advantage of the company, the price it can charge for its products or services, and hence its profitability. Product differentiation, especially when supported by expensive advertising,




Figure 1 Porter's model of competitive strategy.

helps to reduce, if not eradicate, product substitution and the threat of new entrants, as do highly capital intensive operations. However, high levels of profitability will attract new entrants regardless of capital costs and product differentiation, and high prices will encourage both suppliers and buyers to look for substitutions. Powerful suppliers push up costs, as does the effect of competitors, and powerful buyers will force down prices.

Within organizations studies, the rational approach is most vividly represented by the Design School, which sees strategy largely as being designed and developed by senior executives and then distributed through the hierarchy in a top down, cascade like fashion. Strategic management is informed by a SWOT analysis, which involves developing the strengths and minimizing the weaknesses of the organization as well as exploiting environmental opportunities and neutralizing any threats. Implementation of the strategy is expected to proceed bureaucratically without divergence or disruption.

Process Approach

The process approach considered the Design School to have a naïve view of organizations, since it presumed rather than demonstrated coherence and consensus. From an examination of the processes whereby decisions are made and implemented, it is clear that there is as much conflict as consensus, as much contest as compliance, and as much competition as cooperation within organizations. Implementation cannot therefore be presumed to be a smooth and uncontested process; it therefore makes sense to adopt a more flexible approach toward strategic management (Mintzberg 1994). In order to secure the commitment of those who have to implement strategies, managers need to "find"

strategies lower down the organization rather than simply trying to impose formal plans from above. This approach seeks to remedy the failings of formal strategic planning, which include its inflexibility, its preoccupation with management control, and the problems that these generate for creative and innovative work. If strategies emerge from below, they will not suffer the same problems of implementation since staff will identify with them. Incremental and emergent conceptions of strategy, where design and implementation go hand in hand on a trial and error basis, are more appropriate in contemporary turbulent environments (Mintzberg 1994).

A process approach draws on contingency theories of organization, which reject universal approaches to management in favor of flexibility and responsiveness to the environment, often presumed to be unstable. Scenario planning, in which every aspect of the environment is investigated in order to produce medium and long term forecasts of its development, is a necessary prerequisite for this kind of strategic management.

CURRENT EMPHASES IN RESEARCH AND THEORY

Strategic management has tended to assume a different form and content, not only historically, but also in relation to where it is located within the organization. Generally, corporate strategy is a boardroom discourse and practice, although it will usually also be a responsibility of senior managers who advise the board. Business strategy, by contrast, is invariably a cascaded translation of this corporate strategy to the various divisions, departments, or business units of the organization. However, much depends on how power is distributed in the organization since some corporations operate a strict command

and control system, whereas others may simply distribute budgets and leave their divisions, units, or profit centers to manage themselves. A divisionalized structure usually means that strategy is distributed to the divisions or profit centers, but those corporations that retain strategic thinking at the center have clearly not been influenced by the idea of “emergent” strategy.

Corporate strategy may be understood as having passed through at least five phases from the 1950s until the present (Grant 1998). Financial control dominated in the early period, giving way to a concern for planning, then strategic diversification, competitive advantage, and, most recently, a preoccupation with innovation and guru prescriptions. Insofar as these approaches to corporate strategy have been simply recording the fads and fashions of business practice, they remain descriptive in content but often seek to influence practitioners and thereby follow a prescriptive line that suggests a particular approach is more effective than previous ones. Sometimes those academics (e.g., Gary Hamel, Rosabeth Moss Kanter, Tom Peters, Michael Porter) prescribing the “strategic one best way” entered the bestseller lists through entertaining vast armies of business managers with time to kill in airport lounges and on long haul flights.

Strategy, then, like other aspects of management, is subject to the fads and fashions of managerial thinking. Knights and Mueller (2004) suggested an alternative classification to the rationalist (realist) and processual (social constructionist) approaches, for these are respectively objectivist and subjectivist. A non dualist approach perceives strategy neither as a “thing” nor merely as a “process” to capture but as an ongoing project that reflects and reproduces particular forms of subjectivity. Although closer to the social constructionist than to the objectivist approach, it combines both to theorize a range of rationalities, processes, and politics, but then seeks to delve beneath the surface of discursive practices to explore their dynamic. Whereas the process theory recognizes organizational politics only to seek its eradication on the basis that it is often disruptive to the achievement of strategic objectives, the project theory sees politics as an inescapable but necessary part of securing managerial and staff

commitment to the strategy. Strategy can only be fully accomplished when it coincides with the subjectivity of members of the organization. While strategy clearly is about penetrating existing and new markets, gaining competitive advantage, restructuring, or mergers and acquisitions, an unintended effect is how it transforms individuals into subjects that secure their sense of identity, meaning, and purpose by participating in the activities it invokes (Knights & Morgan 1991). In short, a side effect of strategy is a stimulation of subjective self discipline that secures the management control of employees, enrolls the support of fund managers and shareholders, and facilitates the mobilization and incorporation of consumers as loyal customers.

METHODOLOGICAL ISSUES AND FUTURE DIRECTIONS

The major methodological problem in studying strategy is access, because ordinarily corporations are secretive about their strategy on the basis that it contains competitively sensitive data and material. Few academics have managed to secure access to the boardroom to observe rather than speculate on how strategy is formulated. Consequently, most studies of strategy rely on archival or secondary data that are in the public domain. Rarely does research take place in the boardroom where strategy is enacted (see, however, Knights & Willmott 1992; Samra Fredericks 2000). Only direct observation of boardroom interactions can avoid the selection of material for purposes of impression management, since the ongoing context of seeking to develop or implement a strategy in a boardroom meeting must prevail over any attempt to impress the observer.

The above two studies used the most sensitive of methods – recorded observations – to study boardroom behavior and the data are therefore available for further analysis. They sought to show how strategy was accomplished through, rather than independently of, the boardroom social encounters and that it was both a medium and an outcome of the exercise of power and the concern to secure identity among board members. Samra Fredericks (2000) not only

tape recorded board meetings but also video recorded them, thus providing verbal transcripts as well as the various bodily movements and expressions that often reveal more than the words themselves. Both studies used a range of methods, including non participant observations, work shadowing, interviewing, and documentary investigation.

A fairly limited literature has begun to develop that may be seen as providing some of the missing links on what makes strategy work operationally. Developing a strategy, whether from above or below, does not amount to operationalizing that strategy or translating it into practice. This requires organizational members to be fully conversant with the strategy as well as committed to it. Recent research has used methods that secure access to boardroom meetings where strategy is usually formulated and/or distributed to other members of the organization. Drawing on analytical approaches about subjectivity and self discipline, this research suggests that strategy is less important for its actual content than for the effect it has on subjects, who may begin to secure a sense of themselves – their meaning, purpose, and identity – through engaging in the discourses and practices that the strategy invokes.

SEE ALSO: Capital: Economic, Cultural, and Social; Change Management; Management; Management Innovation; Management Theory; Methods; Strategic Decisions

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stratification, distinction and

Wout Ultee

Behind a lot of research on societal stratification lurks the idea that, if persons are given a choice between a large and a small pay packet, they will opt for the larger one. Yet people in general not only want to have more than they already have, they also want to be more than others around them, particularly others who have about as much as they themselves have. This is the subject of distinction within the field of stratification. It became important in sociology through studies by Thorstein Veblen on conspicuous consumption, Norbert Elias on changing standards about what counts as good manners, and Pierre Bourdieu on distinction

through leisure activities. Also to be mentioned is work by the art historian E. H. Gombrich on “the logic of vanity fair.”

Although the tendency for people to distinguish themselves from others may be assumed to be present in most persons, the tendency supposedly is stronger in societies with open stratification systems, that is, systems where a person's station in life is not fixed at birth, but in which social mobility and marriages between societal strata occur. In societies that to a large extent are closed, visible markers of an elevated position often are restricted by custom and law to the persons with these positions. The game of outdoing the other took place among persons on more or less the same rung of the social ladder in European agrarian societies until the beginning of industrialization and was limited by sumptuary laws and similar devices. Their contemporary form in highly developed societies is the rate of value added tax on luxury goods, which is higher than that on the necessities of life.

Of the various sociological contributions to the topic of stratification and distinction, perhaps that of Elias is the most important. By way of a comparison of a series of French books on good manners ranging from the fifteenth to the nineteenth centuries, Elias made clear that the tendency for persons to distinguish themselves from others by following the rules of good manners in gatherings and encounters, if imitation of these standards by persons just below them on the social scale is possible, makes the old rules of civility lose their discriminatory power, leading to more strict rules of politeness, which in turn are imitated, and so on. For that reason the process of distinction shows a particular direction unintended by any of the original persons involved. Gombrich has argued that such processes of devaluation of old signs of distinction through imitation stand behind contemporary phenomena such as rapidly changing fashions. One may think here of shorter skirts and louder pop music. The question of where these inflationary processes end is an important topic for research.

SEE ALSO: Bourdieu, Pierre; Conspicuous Consumption; Distinction; Elias, Norbert; Lifestyle; Stratification: Functional and Conflict Theories; Stratification Systems: Openness; Veblen, Thorstein

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stratification: functional and conflict theories

Paul M. de Graaf

Every society can be characterized by a set of social positions that are related to the access to the scarce and desired goods in that society. Functional and conflict theories of stratification are formulated to provide an answer to the question how are positions distributed across members of a society.

The functional theory of stratification was formulated by Davis and Moore (1945), who refer to the universal necessity which calls forth stratification in any social system. They explicate the functional theory as follows. Every society has a number of positions (occupational structure), which can be ranked by the importance they have for society and by the skill level required. If position A is more important than position B, and if position A requires more skills than position B, then the rewards of position A must be larger than the rewards of position B, otherwise its attractiveness would not be large enough to be filled by able individuals. Individuals who have either the required native abilities or the required training must have an incentive to fill the most important positions. Functional importance and scarcity of personnel both are relevant for a social position to be highly rewarded. If a position is functionally

important but can be filled easily, its rewards do not need to be high to motivate individuals to prepare for it and to acquire the necessary skills. In other words, functional importance is thought to be a necessary but not a sufficient condition for a function to be rewarded highly. Rewards can be diverse, ranging from material rewards like income and wealth, to more symbolic forms of rewards like occupational prestige and admired lifestyles, as long as they motivate individuals to use and develop their talents.

An important element of the functional theory of stratification is that the distribution of social positions varies between societies and between historical periods, mainly because of technological innovation. As a consequence the relevant talents and skills individuals must acquire in order to fill the social position also vary between societies and periods. Examples are the transition from an agricultural to an industrial society, the increasing efficiency in industrial production, and the emerging information technology, which all have changed the occupational structure. Following Blau and Duncan (1967), the modernization process in industrial and post industrial society could have made educational qualifications more important, a process which was labeled a shift from "ascription" to "achievement" and soon as the leading determinant of status attainment.

The functional theory of stratification has been criticized for at least two reasons. First, functional theory lacks an individual basis. It seems to assume that individuals adjust their careers to support society's need for qualified personnel in a given set of social positions. However, individuals cannot be expected to support the interests of society as a whole; instead, they pursue their individual interests and strive for income, prestige, and power. Second, the functional theory is criticized because it has an eye only for the eufunctions of social stratification: the incentive it provides for all individuals in a society to acquire the skills needs for the given set of social positions. Doing this, it neglects dysfunctions of social stratification, mainly the negative consequences for social cohesion.

The conflict theory of stratification stresses that inequality is not a benefit for all members of society, but mainly for the elites. Power differences mean that some groups take more of the scarce goods than other groups. The

privileged groups exploit the subordinate groups. Using their superior resources, elites tend to attempt to increase their share, and to transmit their privileged position to their children. The Marxist interpretation is about economic ownership of the means of production and distinguishes between two *classes*: the bourgeoisie and the proletariat. This Marxian class scheme has been extended in different directions. In international sociology two important class schemes have been developed by Eric Olin Wright and John Goldthorpe. Both are based in the differentiation in the occupational structure, especially on the market situation and employment relations.

The conflict theory of stratification has been developed explicitly by Collins (1971), based on the concept of status groups (Weber). Status groups include persons who share a common culture and lifestyle: behavior and manners, language style, consumption patterns, values, attitudes, and preferences. Status groups are often but not necessarily based on their position in the occupational structure (classes). The struggle for wealth, power, and prestige is assumed to take place primarily between status groups, and education is thought to be the primary battlefield. Schools teach the culture of the dominating status groups, and because education is so important for selection in the labor market, education is the channel of intergenerational transmission of privileged positions. Collins argues that educational requirements for jobs are often not (only) based on technical reasons. Employers select the higher educated because they feel that they are better socialized and more respectable. Bourdieu (1973) adds to this argument that the educational system works in a way that children from the elites feel at home at school. Their parents have provided them with cultural habits and preferences that are parallel to what is expected at schools. The conflict theory of stratification argues that education is serving as a device to transmit social status from one generation to the next. Note that this interpretation of conflict theory can be seen, to some degree, as a conspiracy theory.

Educational expansion is explained by the functional theory of stratification as a logical system answer to technological innovation. The shifts in the occupational structure mean that job requirements have changed and educational

growth is a functional consequence of this change. Conflict theory interprets educational expansion as the consequence of individual choices. When education has become a key factor in the selection process of personnel, it becomes worthwhile to invest in it. If people start to invest in education, the logic of the situation means that it becomes necessary for everybody to invest as well. Empirical tests of the functional and conflict theories of stratification are scarce and not very convincing. Whether in modern society education serves as a meritocratic device or as a reproduction channel remains at issue, and both interpretations are probably valuable.

SEE ALSO: Class, Status, and Power; Conflict Theory; Functionalism/Neofunctionalism; Stratification: Gender and; Stratification and Inequality, Theories of; Weber, Max

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stratification, gender and

Catherine Hakim

The documentation, interpretation, and explanation of structured social inequality has always been a central focus of sociology. Although social stratification lies at the heart of macro sociology, and is the subject of extensive theoretical and empirical analysis, the study of gender and stratification is comparatively recent, and developed in the 1970s onwards as a result of the second wave of the feminist movement in

modern western societies (Crompton & Mann 1986). The traditional sociological view was that the subordination and oppression of women could be adequately incorporated into class analysis. Feminist theory insisted that in modern societies the class structure, and the oppression of women within patriarchal systems (i.e., women's oppression by men), were separate but interacting social processes.

In conventional class analysis, women generally, and wives in particular, took the social class position of the males in their family or household: initially their father's social class, then later, after marriage, their husband's social class. This was essentially because occupation, or any other status in the public sphere (such as elected politician), was taken as the most obvious indicator of a family's or household's social class/status in modern capitalist societies. The unit of analysis was the cohabiting and income sharing social unit, not the individual. The feminist focus on women's oppression within the patriarchal family, and within patriarchal societies, forced sociologists to look at the class/status position of individuals as well. This led to an extended debate among empirical sociologists on whether the family or the individual is the appropriate unit for class analysis and, more specifically, whether wives should be allocated to social classes on the basis of their husband's occupation or on the basis of their own current (or last) occupation (Dex 1990; McRae 1990).

It is now agreed that women's position in society, and in the labor force, should be studied separately from class analysis. Empirical research has shown that the sex segregation of occupations, and the pay gap between men and women, cut across social classes in ways that vary from one society to another, and vary across time (Hakim 1998). Occupational segregation and the pay gap develop and change independently within labor markets as a result of anti-discrimination policies and other social policies (such as family friendly policies) that often have unintended deleterious effects (Hakim 2004). Similarly, women's position in the family can be studied independently of their position in the class structure, and may depend on their property rights (Crompton & Mann 1986: 69–72, 191–2) or their level of education as much as their position within the labor market (Hakim 2000).

The feminist challenge to conventional class analysis was based in large part on the idea that rising female employment rates in modern western societies were leading to a new situation in which all couples would be dual career as well as dual earner, wives would cease to be financially dependent on their spouses, and symmetrical family roles would become the norm, so that it no longer made sense to classify wives by their husband's occupation and social class, especially in the context of serial monogamy and declining marriage rates. Here too, empirical research provided a new perspective and led to the development of preference theory. Hakim (2000, 2004) showed, firstly, that there has in fact been relatively little change in female employment rates in modern societies over the past 150 years and that most of the visible change (in economic activity rates) was due to rising levels of part time employment, and to some women switching from full time to part time employment; in consequence, less than one quarter of all women of working age achieve the male pattern of continuous full time, lifelong employment by the start of the twenty first century. In most societies, the female full time employment rate remains far lower than that for men, and typically wives remain secondary earners in their household rather than equal earners. Rising female employment was exposed as a myth in most European countries, although it is real in the US. Secondly, Hakim showed that, in most modern societies, in Europe as well as North America, women divide into three distinct groups: a minority of work centered women who follow the male employment profile and are financially self supporting; a minority of home centered women who are entirely dependent on their spouses after marriage; and a majority of adaptive women who are generally secondary earners within their households rather than careerists. This heterogeneity of women's lifestyle preferences, and thus their employment profiles, cuts across social classes, education levels, and income levels. This diversity of female lifestyle choices produces a polarization of female employment profiles over the life cycle, and is a major cause of rising income inequality between households in liberal modern societies – as illustrated by the income differences between dual career childless couples and one earner couples with several children to

support. Similarly, preference theory predicts that occupational segregation and the pay gap can never be completely eliminated – two goals that are underlined by feminist campaigners and by policymakers in the European Commission.

Female social stratification is thus substantially different from male social stratification in modern societies, because women now have two avenues for achieving higher social status and class position – through the labor market, or through the marriage market. Both are still actively used by women, even in modern societies after the equal opportunities revolution of the 1960s and 1970s (Hakim 2000). In contrast, men are limited to using the labor market almost exclusively. All research shows that the vast majority of women resist the idea of role reversal in marriage, with the female as the sole or main income earner (Hakim 2000). Overall, stratification and inequality among women will tend to be larger than among men. For example, in the US and Britain at the start of the twenty first century, there were more female than male millionaires, because some women achieved success and wealth through their own activities in the labor market, and some achieved wealth as rich men's widows or ex wives.

The picture in less developed societies is different, and depends a lot on whether women have independent access to the labor market/market economy, have access primarily through male members of their family (father or spouse), or are expected to refrain from market activities and devote themselves exclusively to homemaking and childrearing activities (reproductive work rather than productive work). In agricultural societies, technology itself has also been an important factor in women's social and economic position, as illustrated by large differences in women's position in economies depending on the hoe or on the plow (Boserup 1970).

The precise importance of patriarchy and male dominance as a cause of women's position in the family and in the social structure continues to be the subject of theoretical debate and empirical research. Feminist theory tends to treat patriarchy as the main cause of women's oppression in all societies, and at all times in history. In modern societies, patriarchy is argued to work through occupational segregation and the pay gap in particular; these are

imposed by men on women in order to restrict women's economic independence, force them into financial dependence on men, and thus keep women subject to male control (Hakim 2004: 8–11). However, new research by historians, political scientists, and sociologists suggests that in reality male desire for control of female reproductive work may be far more important as the catalyst for patriarchal systems than male desire to control female productive work. If this analysis is correct, patriarchy will be eliminated by technological advances in reproduction and fertility control. An extensive review of the historical evidence by Lerner (1986) led her to conclude that male desire to control women's sexuality and childbearing, in order to safeguard the inheritance of private property, was the primary cause of the introduction of patriarchal control of women's activities. The control of women's gainful activities outside the home was an accidental side effect, never the main aim. This conclusion is consistent with the results of analyses of World Values Survey data for 85 countries around the world in all six continents. Inglehart and Norris (2003) and Norris and Inglehart (2004) argue that culture can be viewed as providing a survival strategy for a given society. In subsistence level traditional societies, life is insecure and short, and the culture encourages maximum fertility. Partly through religious beliefs and institutions, and partly through patriarchal value systems, women's primary role is defined in terms of childbearing and high fertility. In rich secular knowledge societies with long life expectancies, the culture changes to accept low fertility levels but with high quality children, and women are encouraged to have more diverse social roles – in public life and the labor market as well as in the family. In short, patriarchal values, along with religious values, are maintained by women as much as men, and then jointly abandoned in prosperous modern societies, according to the importance of high fertility as a survival strategy in a given society.

SEE ALSO: Class, Status, and Power; Dual Earner Couples; Employment Status Changes; Feminism; Feminism, First, Second, and Third Waves; Fertility: Transitions and Measures; Gender Ideology and Gender Role Ideology; Income Inequality and Income Mobility;

Inequality/Stratification, Gender; Patriarchy; Sex Based Wage Gap and Comparable Worth; Stratification and Inequality, Theories of

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stratification and inequality, theories of

David B. Grusky

The term stratification system refers to the complex of institutions that generate inequalities in income, political power, social honor, and other valued goods. The main components of such systems are (1) the social processes that define certain types of goods as valuable and desirable, (2) the rules of allocation that distribute these goods across various roles or

occupations in the division of labor (e.g., houseworker, doctor, prime minister), and (3) the mobility mechanisms that link individuals to these roles or occupations and thereby generate unequal control over valued goods. It follows that inequality is produced by two types of matching processes. The social roles in society are first matched to “reward packages” of unequal value, and individual members of society are then allocated to the roles so defined and rewarded. In all societies, there is a constant flux of incumbents as newcomers enter the labor force and replace dying, retiring, or out-migrating workers, yet the positions themselves and the reward packages attached to them typically change only gradually. As Schumpeter (1953: 171) famously put it, the occupational structure can be seen as “a hotel . . . which is always occupied, but always by different persons.”

There is a growing consensus among academics, policymakers, and even politicians that poverty and inequality should no longer be treated as soft “social issues” that can safely be subordinated to more fundamental interests in maximizing total economic output. This growing concern with poverty and inequality may be attributed to such factors as (1) the dramatic increase in economic inequality in many countries over the last quarter century; (2) the rise of a “global village” in which spectacular regional disparities in the standard of living have become more widely visible and hence increasingly difficult to ignore; (3) a growing commitment to a conception of human entitlements that includes the right to secure employment and be spared extreme deprivation; (4) an emerging concern that poverty and inequality may have negative macro level effects on terrorism, ethnic unrest, and total economic output; and (5) a growing awareness of the negative individual level effects of poverty on health, political participation, and a host of other life conditions. Although the growth of anti inequality sentiment thus rests in part on an increased awareness of just how unequal and poverty stricken the world is, it may also be attributed to an ever evolving and accreting list of human rights (i.e., a “normative” account), as well as a growing appreciation of the negative externalities of inequality and poverty (i.e., a “consequentialist” account).

CONCEPTUALIZING INEQUALITY

The first task in understanding inequality and poverty is to specify the types of assets that are unequally distributed. It is increasingly fashionable to recognize that inequality is “multidimensional,” that income inequality is accordingly only one of many forms of inequality, and that income redistribution in and of itself would not eliminate inequality (e.g., Sen 2005). When a multidimensionalist approach is taken, one might usefully distinguish between the eight types of assets listed in the left most column of Table 1, each understood as valuable in its own right rather than a mere investment item. It must nonetheless be recognized that the assets of Table 1 are also inevitably “resources” that serve some investment functions. For example, most economists regard schooling as an investment that generates future streams of income, while some sociologists likewise regard cultural resources or social networks as forms of capital that can be parlayed into educational credentials, income, and other valued goods. There is much research and theorizing on the social processes by which inequality in one domain is converted into inequality in another domain.

The core task of the contemporary inequality researcher is to develop evidence on how much inequality there is, whether some countries are more unequal than others, and whether inequality is increasing or decreasing within and between countries. Although the vast majority of research within this fact finding tradition has focused on income distribution, inequality scholars are increasingly examining how distributions of other assets may or may not resemble income distribution. It is now fashionable, for example, to examine the structure of inequality with respect to such outcomes as computer literacy (i.e., the “digital divide”), mortality and health, risks of imprisonment or capital punishment, and lifestyles and consumption practices.

This line of research typically takes the form of an exposé of the extent to which seemingly basic human entitlements, such as living outside of prison, being gainfully employed, freely participating in “digital” culture, or living a reasonably long and healthy life, are unequally distributed in ways that amplify well known differentials of income. The continuing attraction

Table 1 Types of valued goods and examples of advantaged and disadvantaged groups

<i>Assets</i>		<i>Examples</i>	
<i>Asset Group</i>	<i>Types</i>	<i>Advantaged</i>	<i>Disadvantaged</i>
Economic	Wealth	Billionaire	Bankrupt worker
	Income	Professional	Laborer
	Ownership	Capitalist	Employed worker
Power	Political power	Prime minister	Disenfranchised person
	Workplace authority	Manager	Subordinate worker
	Household authority	“Head of household”	Child
Cultural	Knowledge	Intelligentsia	Uneducated
	Popular culture	Movie star	High-culture “elitist”
	“Good” manners	Aristocracy	Commoner
Social	Social clubs	Country club member	Non-member
	Workplace associations	Union member	Non-member
	Informal networks	Washington “A list”	Social unknown
Honorific	Occupational	Judge	Garbage collector
	Religious	Saint	Excommunicate
	Merit-based	Nobel Prize winner	Non-winner
Civil	Right to work	Citizen	Illegal immigrant
	Due process	Citizen	Suspected terrorist
	Franchise	Citizen	Felon
Human	On-the-job	Experienced worker	Inexperienced worker
	General schooling	College graduate	High school dropout
	Vocational training	Law school graduate	Unskilled worker
Physical (i.e., health)	Mortality	Person with long life	A “premature” death
	Physical disease	Healthy person	Person with AIDS, asthma
	Mental health	Healthy person	Depressed, alienated

of such exposés (at least among academics) may be attributed to our collective discomfort with an economic system that generates rather more inequality than is palatable under contemporary cultural standards. That is, capitalist economic systems are not only highly successful in delivering the goods (i.e., high gross national products), but are also great inequality producing machines, and we are hard put to reconcile such extreme inequality with our post Enlightenment cultural commitment to the view that humans are “fundamentally” equal. Although the equalizing reforms of social democracy have historically been a main solution to this tension, the declining legitimacy of such reform (especially in Europe and the US) leaves the tension an increasingly unresolved one.

This tension is only exacerbated by recent trends in income inequality. Arguably, the most dramatic social scientific finding of our time is that income inequality has increased markedly

over the last 35 years, reversing a longstanding decline stretching from the eve of the Great Depression to the early 1970s. According to the classic Kuznets curve (Kuznets 1955), the initial stages of capitalist development will bring about a one time increase in income inequality as capital is increasingly concentrated among a small number of investors, whereas more advanced forms of capitalism entail a growth in the size of the middle class and a consequent reversal of the upward trend. This story aligns nicely with the facts of inequality up to the early 1970s, but then a dramatic, unprecedented upswing in inequality in the post 1970 period (within many countries) made it clear that history does not end with the much vaunted middle class expansion.

We have since witnessed one of the most massive research efforts in the history of social science as scholars sought to identify the “smoking gun” that accounted for this dramatic

increase in inequality. Initially, the dominant hypothesis was that deindustrialization (i.e., the relocation of manufacturing jobs to offshore labor markets) brought about a decline in demand for less educated manufacturing workers, a decline that generated increases in inequality by hollowing out the middle class and sending manufacturing workers into unemployment or into the ranks of poorly paid service work. Although this line of argumentation still has its advocates, it cannot easily be reconciled with evidence suggesting that the computerization of the workplace and related technological change has been a driving force behind a heightened demand for highly educated workers. Because of this result (and other supporting evidence), the deindustrialization story has now been largely supplanted by the converse hypothesis that “skill biased technological change” has increased the demand for high skill workers beyond the increase in supply, thus inducing a short term disequilibrium and a correspondingly increased payoff for high skill labor. At the same time, most scholars acknowledge that this story is at best an incomplete one and that other accounts, especially more narrowly political ones, must additionally be entertained. Most notably, some of the rise in income inequality in the US is clearly attributable to the declining minimum wage (in real dollars), a decline that in turn has to be understood as the outcome of political contests that increasingly favor pro inequality forces (e.g., Levy 1999).

The future of income inequality depends on which of these underlying mechanisms is principally at work. The silver lining of the deindustrialization story is that within country increases in inequality should be offset by between country declines (as poor countries profit from new manufacturing jobs), whereas the silver lining under skill biased technological change is that the heightened demand for high skill workers is presumably a one time, short term disequilibrium that will, by virtue of the higher payoff to high skill jobs, trigger a compensating growth in the supply of high skill workers. There is, unfortunately, no shortage of competing stories that imply more disturbing futures, even futures consistent with a classical Marxian account in which low skill workers are emiserated by virtue of a globalization induced “race to the bottom.” Indeed, accounts that focus on

the political sources of rising inequality often take on this more disturbing character, given that social democratic ideologies have fallen largely out of fashion and no longer provide capitalists with a viable high road of “enlightened self interest” (e.g., support for labor unions, redistribution). As social democratic agendas come to be viewed with suspicion, political support for the minimum wage and other inequality reducing institutions may increasingly falter, and market generated inequality may no longer be much restrained by pre market or after market interventions.

CONCEPTUALIZING SOCIAL CLASS

The claim that inequality takes on a “class form” is one of the few distinctively sociological contributions to inequality measurement and stands as the main alternative to approaches that either focus exclusively on income inequality or analyze the many dimensions of inequality independently and separately. The main advantage of class based measurement, as argued by sociologists, is that conventional class categories (e.g., professional, manager, clerk, craft worker, laborer, farmer) are institutionalized within the labor market and are accordingly more than purely nominal or statistical constructions. The labor market, far from being a seamless and continuous distribution of incomes, is instead a deeply lumpy entity, with such lumpiness mainly taking the form of institutionalized groups (i.e., “classes”) that constitute prepackaged combinations of the valued goods listed in Table 1.

Within sociology, the implicit critique, then, of income based approaches rests not so much on the argument that the income distribution is just one of many distributions of interest (i.e., multidimensionalism), but rather on the argument that measurement strategies based on the income distribution alone impose an excessively abstract, analytic, and statistical lens on a social world that has much institutionalized structure to it. This structure takes the tripartite form of a set of social classes that are privileged under capitalist labor markets (e.g., capitalists, professionals, managers), a set of social classes that are less privileged under advanced capitalism (e.g., routine nonmanuals, craft workers,

operatives), and an “underclass” that stands largely outside of the labor market and is accordingly deeply disadvantaged in market systems. The rise of class models should therefore be understood as a distinctively sociological reaction to the individualism of the income paradigm and other unidimensional approaches to measuring inequality.

The foregoing account, which is a largely consensual rendition of the rationale for social class measurement, nonetheless conceals much internal debate within the field on how best to identify and characterize the boundaries dividing the population into classes. These debates can be conveyed by recounting the three phases through which the field has developed.

Structuralist Phase (1945–1985)

The class models of the postwar period rested implicitly or explicitly on the assumption that classes are coherent bundles of endowments (e.g., education levels), working conditions (e.g., amount of autonomy), and reward packages (e.g., income). The middle class of “craft workers,” for example, comprises individuals with moderate educational investments (i.e., secondary school credentials), considerable occupation specific investments in human capital (i.e., on the job training), average income coupled with substantial job security (at least until deindustrialization), middling social honor and prestige, quite limited authority and autonomy on the job, and comparatively good health outcomes (by virtue of union sponsored health benefits and regulation of working conditions). By contrast, the underclass may be understood as comprising a rather different package of conditions, a package that combines minimal educational investments (i.e., secondary school dropouts), limited opportunities for on the job training leading to intermittent labor force participation and low income, virtually no opportunities for authority or autonomy on the job (during those brief bouts of employment), relatively poor health (by virtue of lifestyle choices and inadequate health care), and much social denigration and exclusion. The other classes appearing in conventional class schemes (e.g., professional, managerial, routine nonmanual) may likewise be understood as particular combinations of scores on the dimensions of Table 1.

For the purposes of illustration, consider a simplified case in which the multidimensional “inequality space” comprises only three individual level variables (e.g., education, autonomy, income), thus allowing the class hypothesis to be readily graphed. Additionally, assume that the class structure can be represented by six classes (e.g., professional, managerial, sales & clerical, craft, laborer, farm), signified in Figure 1 by six different symbols (dark squares, light squares, dark circles, etc.). As shown in this figure, the two main claims underlying the class hypothesis are that (1) the structural conditions of interest tend to cluster together into characteristic packages, and (2) these packages of conditions correspond to occupational groupings. For a class analyst, the multidimensional inequality space is presumed to have a relatively low dimensionality, indeed a dimensionality no more nor less than the number of postulated classes. The individuals falling within the classes comprising this scheme will accordingly have endowments, working conditions, and reward packages that are close to the averages prevailing for their classes. Moreover, even when individual scores deviate from class averages, the conventional class analytic assumption (albeit wholly untested) is that the contextual effect of the class is dominant and overcomes any individual level deviations. This type of contextual effect would appear to be ubiquitous; for example, the full professor




Figure 1 Class regime.

who lacks a PhD is presumably just as market able as a fully credentialed (but otherwise comparable) full professor, precisely because membership in the professorial class is a “master status” that tends to dominate all other individual level ones.

The postwar period also was notable for a flourishing of gradational measurement approaches that again treated occupations as the fundamental units of analysis, but then assumed that such occupations may be ordered into a unidimensional “socioeconomic” scale. In Figure 1 we assumed that the class structure cannot be understood in simple gradational terms, meaning that the underlying individual level variables did not vary linearly and that at least some classes were formed by combining high values on one dimension with low values on another. It is possible, however, that the structural conditions of interest tend to covary linearly, thus generating a class structure of the very simple type represented in Figure 2. In a regime of this sort, inequality becomes rather stark, as privilege on one dimension implies very reliably privilege on another. There should accordingly be much interest in determining whether inequality indeed takes this form. Unfortunately, inequality scholars of the post war period did not typically test the linearity assumption, but rather simply assumed that it held and proceeded to develop socioeconomic scales that treated education and income as the main dimensions of interest (and ranked

occupations by averaging scores on these two dimensions).

It may be noted that many neo Marxian scholars during this period also deviated from a strict multidimensional stance by nominating particular dimensions within Table 1 as being theoretically crucial and hence the appropriate basis upon which social classes might be defined. There are nearly as many claims of this sort as there are dimensions in Table 1. To be sure, Marx is most commonly criticized for placing “almost exclusive emphasis on economic factors as determinants of social class” (Lipset 1968: 300), but in fact much of what passed for stratification theorizing during this period amounted to reductionism of some kind, albeit often an expanded version of reductionism in which two or three dimensions were nominated as especially crucial (Wright 1985). When a reductionist position is adopted, the rationale for a class model is not typically that classes are coherent packages of conditions (as represented in Fig. 1), but rather that the nominated dimension or dimensions are crucial in defining interests and will accordingly come to be the main sources of social action. The classic Marxian model, for example, has workers ultimately appreciating that their status as workers (i.e., nonowners) defined their interests.

Culturalist Phase (1985–1995)

In the mid 1980s, Bourdieu (1984) and other sociologists (especially Wilson 1996) sought to develop a culturalist rationale for class models, a rationale that rested on the claim that classes are not merely constellations of structural conditions (e.g., endowments, outcomes), but are also socially closed groupings in which distinctive cultures emerge and come to influence attitudes, behaviors, or even preferences of class members. Throughout this period many sociologists continued to work with more narrowly structuralist definitions of class (Wright 1997; Goldthorpe and Erikson 1992), but Bourdieu (1984) and Wilson (1996) were instrumental in legitimating the claim that class specific cultures are a defining feature of inequality systems. The two main forms of closure that serve to generate class specific cultures are residential segregation (e.g., urban ghettos) and workplace segregation




Figure 2 Gradational class regime.

(e.g., occupational associations). As Wilson notes, members of the underclass live in urban ghettos that are spatially isolated from mainstream culture, thus allowing a distinctively oppositional culture to emerge and reproduce itself. The effects of residential segregation operate, by contrast, in more attenuated form for other social classes. After all, residential communities map only imperfectly onto class categories (i.e., the demise of the “company town”), and social interaction within contemporary residential communities is in any event quite superficial and cannot be counted upon to generate much in the way of meaningful culture. If distinctive cultures emerge outside the underclass, they do so principally through the tendency for members of the same occupation to interact disproportionately with one another in the workplace and in leisure activities. In accounting, for example, for the humanist, anti-materialist, and otherwise left-leaning culture and lifestyle of sociologists, class analysts would stress the forces of social closure within the workplace, especially the liberalizing effects of (1) lengthy professional training and socialization into the “sociological worldview,” and (2) subsequent interaction in the workplace with predominantly liberal colleagues.

When classes are allowed to have cultures in this fashion, one naturally wishes to better understand the content of those cultures and, in particular, the relationship between such content and the structural conditions (i.e., endowments, outcomes, institutional setting) that a class situation implies. At one extreme, class cultures may be understood as nothing more than “rules of thumb” that encode optimizing behavioral responses to prevailing institutional conditions – rules that allow class members to forego optimizing calculations themselves and rely instead on cultural prescriptions that provide reliable and economical shortcuts to the right decision. For example, Goldthorpe (2000) argues that working class culture is disparaging of educational investments not because of some maladaptive oppositional culture, but because such investments expose the working class (more so than other classes) to a real risk of downward mobility. In most cases, working class children lack insurance in the form of substantial family income or wealth, meaning that they cannot easily recover from an educational

investment gone awry (i.e., dropping out), and those who nonetheless undertake such an investment therefore face the real possibility of substantial downward mobility. The emergence, then, of a working class culture that regards educational investments as frivolous may be understood as encoding that conclusion and thus allowing working class children to undertake optimizing behaviors without explicitly engaging in decision tree calculations. The behaviors that a “rule of thumb” culture encourages are, then, deeply adaptive because they take into account the endowments and institutional realities that class situations encompass.

The foregoing example may be understood as one in which a class specific culture instructs recipients about appropriate (i.e., optimizing) means for achieving ends that are widely pursued by *all* classes. Indeed, the prior “rule of thumb” account assumes that members of the working class share the conventional interest in maximizing labor market outcomes, with their class specific culture merely instructing them about the approach that is best pursued in achieving that conventional objective. At the other extreme, one finds class analytic formulations that represent class cultures as more overarching worldviews, ones that instruct not merely about the proper means to achieve ends but additionally about the proper valuation of the ends themselves. For example, some class cultures (e.g., aristocratic ones) place an especially high valuation on leisure, with market work disparaged as “common” or “polluting.” This orientation presumably translates into a high reservation wage within the aristocratic class. Similarly, “oppositional cultures” within the underclass may be understood as worldviews that place an especially high valuation on preserving respect and dignity for class members, with of course the further prescription that these ends are best achieved by (1) withdrawing from and opposing conventional mainstream pursuits, (2) representing conventional mobility mechanisms (e.g., higher education) as tailor made for the middle class and, by contrast, unworkable for the underclass, and (3) pursuing dignity and respect through other means, most notably total withdrawal from and disparagement of mainstream pursuits. This is a culture, then, that advocates that respect and dignity deserve an especially prominent place in the utility function

and that further specifies how those ends might be achieved.

It should by now be clear that sociologists operating within the class analytic tradition have adopted very strong assumptions about how inequality and poverty are structured. As noted, intrinsic to the class concept are such claims as (1) the space of outcomes and capabilities has a (low) dimensionality equaling the number of social classes, (2) the class locations of individuals become master statuses that dominate (or at least supplement) the effects of individual level endowments, and (3) such class locations are socially closed and come to be associated with adaptive or maladaptive cultures. The foregoing claims have been unstated articles of faith among class analysts in particular and sociologists more generally. In this sense, class analysts have behaved rather like stereotypical economists, the latter frequently being parodied for their willingness to assume most anything provided that it leads to an elegant model.

Postmodernist Phase (1995–present day)

The third phase of conceptual work within sociology has been marked by an increased willingness to challenge the assumptions underlying the class analytic status quo. In recent years, such criticisms of the class analytic enterprise have escalated, with many postmodernist scholars now feeling sufficiently emboldened to argue that the concept of class should be abandoned altogether. Although the postmodern literature is notoriously fragmented, the variant of postmodernism that is most relevant here proceeds from the assumption that the labor movement is rooted in the old and increasingly irrelevant conflicts of industrial capitalism, that political parties have abandoned class based platforms in favor of those oriented toward values and lifestyles, and that class based identities accordingly become ever weaker and more attenuated. The resulting “individualization of inequality” (Beck 1992) implies that lifestyles and consumption practices are becoming decoupled from work identities as well as other status group memberships. The stratification system may be regarded, then, as a “status bazaar” (Pakulski & Waters 1996: 157) in which identities are actively constructed as

individuals select and are shaped by their multiple statuses.

This hypothesis, which is represented in extreme form by Figure 3, has not yet been subjected to convincing empirical test and may well prove to be premature. Moreover, even if lifestyles and life chances are truly “decoupling” from economic class, this ought not to be misunderstood as a more general decline in inequality per se. The brute facts of inequality will still be with us even if social classes of the conventional form are weakening. As was already noted, income inequality is clearly on the rise, and other forms of inequality show no signs of withering away. The postmodernist hypothesis speaks, then, to the way in which inequality is organized, not to the overall amount of such inequality.

CONCEPTUALIZING ALLOCATION

Although inequality scholars have long sought to understand how different “reward packages” are attached to different social positions, an equally important task within the field is that of understanding the rules by which individuals are allocated to the social positions so defined and rewarded. The language of stratification theory makes a sharp distinction between the distribution of social rewards (e.g., the income distribution) and the distribution of opportunities for securing these rewards. As sociologists




Figure 3 Disorganized inequality.

have frequently noted, it is the latter distribution that governs popular judgments about the legitimacy of stratification. The typical American, for example, is quite willing to tolerate substantial inequalities in power, wealth, or prestige provided that the opportunities for securing these social goods are distributed equally. If the competition has been fairly run, we are quite willing to reward the winners and punish the losers.

The study of opportunities (or “capabilities”) is no less fashionable among economists. However, the main motivation among economists for studying opportunities is not some intrinsic interest in mobility processes themselves, but rather a concern that standard outcome based measures of inequality are tainted by the confounding effect of differential tastes. For example, an employee with a well developed taste for leisure will presumably opt to work for relatively few hours, leading to low earnings but nonetheless high utility (by virtue of the high valuation placed on leisure). Whenever income inequality is generated through the operation of differential tastes, most economists would argue that it should be regarded as quite unproblematic, given that low income workers are simply choosing, by virtue of their particular tastes, to tradeoff income for some other valuable good (e.g., leisure). This line of reasoning implies that inequality scholars should measure the distribution of opportunities that prevails before differential tastes can express themselves. The main task of an inequality scholar under this formulation is to determine whether “capabilities” (i.e., opportunities to secure rewards) are equally distributed, not whether rewards themselves, which reflect the operation of tastes, are equally distributed (e.g., Sen 2005).

It follows that sociologists and economists have become quite interested, albeit for different reasons, in the study of opportunity and how it is unequally distributed. In most of the resulting research, the liberal ideal of an open and discrimination free system is treated as an explicit benchmark, and the usual objective is to expose any inconsistencies between this ideal and the empirical distribution of life chances. This objective leads, then, to analyses of the net effects of gender, race, and class background on income and other labor market rewards. The size of such net effects may be uncovered

statistically by examining between group differences in income (and other rewards) in the context of models that control all merit based sources of remuneration. Additionally, experimental approaches to measuring discrimination have recently become popular, most notably “audit studies” that proceed by (1) sending employers resumes that are identical save for the applicant’s gender, race, or class, and (2) then examining whether call back rates (for interviews) are nonetheless different across such groups. Although the available statistical and experimental studies all indicate that opportunities are far from equal, there remains some debate about whether or to what extent such inequalities are declining or will continue to decline.

The main reason that long run declines in discrimination might be anticipated is that employers who opt to discriminate (in favor of men, whites, or upper class families) cannot successfully compete against those who select without bias the most qualified and efficient workers (Becker 1957). Furthermore, the spread of egalitarian values renders discriminatory tastes ever more suspect and illegitimate, and indeed some employers now appear to have “tastes for equality” or perhaps even “tastes for reverse discrimination.” The ongoing diffusion of egalitarian values additionally underlies the emergence of equality generating political reform (e.g., affirmative action, anti discrimination law), as well as the rise of bureaucratic labor markets in which hiring and firing is, at least in principle, rigorously merit based. This package of equality generating forces, which is featured in the so called “liberal theory” of industrialism, suggests that economic rationality will ultimately triumph over discrimination and ascription.

At the same time, each of the main forms of unequal opportunity (i.e., race, gender, class) is actively supported by various countervailing forces that make it difficult to predict how quickly, if at all, discrimination will indeed erode away. There are many countervailing forces of this kind, but perhaps the most important ones are (1) the tendency for African Americans to be segregated into ghettos with few jobs and, some would argue, maladaptive cultures (i.e., “segregation”); (2) the continuing cultural presumption that women are best suited

for domestic duties and that men should accordingly invest disproportionately in education, on the job training, and other forms of human capital (i.e., “gender essentialism”); and (3) the presumption that parents have a fiduciary responsibility to their children and should therefore assist them in the competition for good jobs by providing them with economic, cultural, and social resources (i.e., “intergenerational transfer”). These countervailing forces of segregation, essentialism, and intergenerational transfer are seemingly organic features of late industrial stratification rather than simple residues that automatically wither away as economies modernize and rationalize. The key question of our time, and one which remains largely unanswered by the evidence of the last half century, is whether the forces for equality featured in the “liberal theory” are strong enough to overcome such countervailing processes.

SEE ALSO: Educational and Occupational Attainment; Ethnic Groups; Gender, Work, and Family; Income Inequality and Income Mobility; Inequality/Stratification, Gender; Mobility, Intergenerational and Intragenerational; Poverty; Race; Status Attainment; Stratification: Functional and Conflict Theories; Stratification, Gender and; Stratification, Race/Ethnicity and; Work, Sociology of

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stratification: partner effects

Paul M. de Graaf

Partner effects refer to the impact that partners (spouses or partners in consensual unions) have on each other's life chances. In stratification research partner effects especially refer to the ways in which partners affect each other's labor market careers with regard to labor market supply and occupational status. Educational homogamy means that partners are similar with regard to their human capital and thus, *ceteris paribus*, an individual approach would predict a similarity with regard to the labor market careers of partners. However, couples face time budget problems when both partners have full time careers because of the domestic and caring tasks which have to be dealt with, especially when they have children. Couples must decide how to divide the paid and unpaid work, and in this decision process partner effects have proven to be important. The question is: how do partners mutually affect each other's career opportunities?

The notion that stratification research should focus on households and not on individuals has been clear for a long time. However, only recently have the combined status positions of husband and wives, and the interdependencies

in their labor market careers, been the object of research (Blossfeld & Drobnič 2001). Earlier, the status position of male family heads was thought to be decisive for the social status of the family. The status of married women was derived from the status of their husbands, even when the wives held positions in the labor force as well. The traditional family model of a male breadwinner and a female caretaker was dominant, in society just as in social studies. This may have been reasonable in times when most women stopped working when they married or when they had their first child. Since the 1960s and 1970s, however, the number of married women who participate in the labor market has increased dramatically, as has the age at which they enter motherhood. The traditional family model is no longer dominant. The increasing labor market supply of women is the result of a modernization and emancipation process. In this process the educational opportunities of girls and boys have become more equal and the labor market has opened for women.

In many households and families in industrial societies both partners add to the family income, although there is still much cross national variation (Blossfeld & Hakim 1997). In Southern Europe the traditional model is dominant, in Northern Europe many mothers work in part time jobs and some in full time jobs, and in the US dual full time couples are much more common. The possibility of dual careers means that husbands and wives have to decide who is going to work in the labor market and who is going to work in the household, and especially how many hours both partners are going to work inside and outside the household. Economic theory uses an explicit household perspective: it is assumed that decisions are taken by husband and wife together. Exchange theory and bargaining theory argue that individuals pursue their own interests as well, but it is obvious that the household perspective must be taken into account explicitly.

The economic theory of the family (Becker 1981) argues that household and families divide the paid work in the labor market and the unpaid work at home according to the principle of comparative advantage. The partner who has comparative advantage in the labor market will focus on paid work and the partner who has comparative advantage in domestic work

will take care of the home and the children. Although this theory can be seen as gender neutral, it is often believed that wives are more productive in the household and husbands are more productive in the labor market. It is important to note that the human capital investments of young men and women reflect the sex specific division of work in society in the period they are growing up, and thus some continuation of the prevailing division of work can be expected.

Partners affect each other's labor market careers in positive and negative ways. A positive partner effect means that the labor market career of one's partner is a resource to one's own career, and a negative partner effect means the partner's labor market career is a restriction to one's own career opportunities. It is clear that economic theory predicts negative partner effects. If one's partner is doing well in the labor market, he or she has a comparative advantage and there are fewer incentives for the other spouse to be successful as well. Note that economic theory, quite implicitly, assumes that the comparative advantage in the labor market is more important than the comparative advantage in domestic work. Another way to look at the negative spouse effect comes from the (traditional) additional worker hypothesis, that wives have an incentive to work when their husbands are not able to earn a living. This hypothesis may have special value in periods when one salary is not enough to cope with the costs of living.

Social capital theory argues that partners have positive effects on each other's careers. It is obvious that the partner is an important part of someone's network. If one's partner has a resourceful network and if he or she has access to these resources, this network is an important source of information about labor market opportunities. The idea that resources available through the social capital of one's partner facilitate one's own career goes against the mechanism of specialization. A caveat here is that the close relationship between partners might mean that the social capital of one's partner is not much different to one's own social capital. Partners have a strong tie, and thus it may be that the expected positive effect is not large.

A third mechanism has to do with norms about female labor market participation. Since

the more highly educated have less traditional norms about the sex specific division of labor, it will especially be wives of highly educated husbands who will participate in the labor market. It is clear that this would produce a positive partner effect. On the other hand, if a couple has modern, egalitarian values about the division of labor, it may be that the husbands of highly educated wives are more willing to share in home work and refrain from pursuing only their own career. This would lead to a negative partner effect.

Research has shown that, indeed, a husband's income has a negative effect on his wife's participation in the labor market, but that his level of education has a positive effect on his wife's working hours (Bernasco et al. 1998; Blossfeld & Drobnič 2001), and it has been established that the job levels of partners are associated. Effects of wives on husbands are much less clear, partly because they have not been investigated much, probably because the variation in husbands' participation in the labor market is limited.

Although hypotheses on partner effects have been developed to explain the association between the labor market careers of partners, they can be used in a wide variety of other sociological domains, among them the sociology of religion, social aspects of health (e.g., eating and drinking habits, smoking), leisure time behavior, and consumption patterns.

SEE ALSO: Connubium (Who Marries Whom?); Dual Labor Markets; Educational and Occupational Attainment; Gender, Work, and Family; Stratification, Gender and

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stratification, politics and

David Brady

One can divide this area into how stratification shapes politics and how politics affects stratification. Since at least Marx, of course, scholars have highlighted the reciprocal relationship between these two as well. Stratification in this context has meant a system of class inequality, the processes of class attainment, mobility, and disadvantage, and has involved class identities, mobilization, and structuration (how classes become real and manifest in the experiences, actions, and cultures of class members). Stratification and politics increasingly involves racial and gender stratification as well. Politics, in this sense, involves the collective and individual behavior in regards to the state, public authorities, and powerholders. Politics covers the ground from micro level political ideology to the macro level welfare state. As Wright explains, stratification and politics integrate the micro level interactions of locations, practices, and consciousness and the macro level interactions of structure, struggle, and formation. For our purposes, the focus here is on class voting, class ideology, power resources theory, and the political sources of economic inequality.

Class voting has been one of the most studied areas within political sociology. Early research simply sought to show that the working class was more likely to vote for leftist parties within the advanced capitalist democracies. Indeed, this was the case in the first several decades after World War II, though always less so in countries like the US. Working class voters were motivated by interest since leftist parties supported welfare state expansion and redistribution. In the last few decades, critical scholars began to document a declining tendency for the working class, albeit crudely defined, to vote leftist. Based on such claims, Clark and Lipset answered affirmatively the question, "Are social

classes dying?” Sassoon contends that major reasons for the purported decline include the fragmentation of leftist politics into environmental, gender and racial identity, and social justice movements, and the rising material security and comfort of the working class.

In the past 10–15 years, interest in class voting has revitalized because of methodological and theoretical innovations that led to scrutiny over the decline of class voting. Hout, Brooks, and Manza demonstrated it is essential to use a more sophisticated class schema and measure of class voting than the traditional blue collar versus white collar Alford index. With the Erikson Goldthorpe schema and a measure of the variation in the probability of voting Democrat across the classes (Kappa), they showed that class voting had been stable in the US since 1952. More recently, Manza and Brooks showed that within this stability there have been marked shifts such that the manual working class has become a swing voter, professionals vote predominantly Democrat, while the self employed and managers vote overwhelmingly Republican. A lively debate has continued over whether class voting is in decline in advanced capitalist democracies and in former state socialist societies. The evidence has been mixed, though it is reasonable to conclude that class remains important to how people vote. Despite this renewed evidence for class voting, one emerging challenge is that regardless of whether class voting is stable or not, race and religion may have far more influence on how people vote, at least in the US.

Research on how stratification shapes ideology has remained vibrant for decades. In the 1970s and 1980s, it was common for scholars to use attitude data to examine the patterning of “stratification beliefs” across classes, occupations, and socioeconomic status. Across advanced capitalist democracies, Wright shows that the working class holds much more anti capitalism views, followed by the middle class, while the bourgeois hold pro capitalism views. Interestingly, cross national differences exist in polarization and ideological coalitions. Others show that class, race, and gender shape one’s ideology on diverse topics like beliefs about schooling and attainment, job attitudes, poverty and inequality, the welfare state, religiosity, and general moral cosmologies like whether the

world is a just place. These ideologies are a dimension of structuration and a source of class formation, and research in this area has broadened our understanding of why or why not people act politically and mobilize. This research has complicated the assumption that phenomena like class voting are simply a matter of interest (economic or otherwise). Some of the advances in this area have involved the study of how race, gender, and class intersect to shape attitudes. For example, scholars have examined variation in stratification ideologies across ethnic groups and of wives in relation to their husbands and their own class position.

One of the most influential threads in this area is power resources theory. Developed by Korpi, Huber and Stephens, and others, this theory holds that in capitalist societies, the affluent always have greater power than the working class. Since capitalists control the means of production, capitalism distributes greater resources to the elite. Within a democracy, however, the working class can collectively bond together and mobilize politically (e.g., through strikes or voting) to pressure the state to redistribute resources. Thus, the working class’s power resources can manifest in labor unions, leftist or social democratic political parties, and even egalitarian ideology. When these power resources mobilize, the welfare state is expanded to ensure that the working class is protected from the insecurity of unemployment, old age, and sickness and the profits of capitalism are redistributed. When an encompassing welfare state is institutionalized, the middle class can become a constituency of beneficiaries that also support the welfare state.

Work influenced by power resources theory has elaborated how politics shape inequality. This work has countered the normal explanation of economic inequality, which focused on the Kuznets curve, economic performance, demographics, and labor markets. Many scholars have shown that advanced capitalist democracies with strong labor unions and powerful social democratic parties have lower poverty and greater social equality. As Brady explained, this is because those power resources channel through the welfare state – causing a more generous welfare state, which then causes reduced poverty. In the labor market, institutions like corporatism (collective labor market organization to

ensure management–labor cooperation, long term planning, and centralized bargaining) and high unionization compress the earnings distribution and raise worker pay. Most recently, scholars have shown that stratification can be driven by the ascent of market fundamentalist, neoliberal ideology and rightist political parties. Rightist parties have ushered in a program of monetarism, privatization, and free markets and have at least sought to dismantle welfare states, labor unions, and social democracy. The rise of rightist parties in Thatcher's Britain and Reagan's US has probably contributed to the Great U Turn of increased inequality since the 1970s. Certainly, the free market ideology of rightist political parties has become quite powerful in the contemporary era after Keynes and state socialism.

Several questions warrant attention for future research. Can power resources mobilize when traditional working class organizations appear to be in decline (and if so, how)? After decades of steady decline, unions seem almost irrelevant in much of the US. As a result, it becomes difficult to envision working class mobilization when class consciousness, structuration and formation, and egalitarianism seem to have been trumped by individualism and political mobilization over cultural, religious, and gender issues. Some recent persuasive research contends that racism and racial divisions are an extremely powerful force undermining public support for the welfare state and working class formation. Though class voting may or may not have declined, it is hard to argue that the working class votes collectively in its economic interest. Because of developments like these, it is harder to sustain an orthodox power resources theory. Potentially, power resources and research on the politics of inequality can benefit from cross fertilization with the aforementioned research on stratification beliefs and ideology. Another interesting question could examine how elites, the upper middle class, and corporate power have cultivated an intellectual establishment for market fundamentalist, free market, and neoliberal opinion makers and public intellectuals. Maybe class politics has not declined per se, but in this era, it might be more about the reassertion of capitalist ideological hegemony in the public sphere. A third question could involve a greater appreciation for the

intersection of race/ethnicity/nationality, gender, and class in the politics of stratification. In many of the egalitarian social democracies and even the mid twentieth century US higher unionization was facilitated by the exclusion of ethnic minorities and the cohesion of relatively homogeneous groups of male workers. In this era of increased immigration, greater ethnic diversity, and the presence of ethnic minorities and women in the workplace and political arena, stratification politics will have to reconstitute itself in order to remain relevant. How and if that can occur is unclear. Finally, unfortunately, the study of stratification and politics, like so much of sociology, continues to neglect many of the world's regions and peoples. Certainly, this field has disproportionately concentrated on the advanced capitalist democracies, and especially the US. Africa, Latin America, and Asia (outside the former Soviet Union and China) definitely deserve greater scholarly attention. Even applying the traditional debates and theories to these regions would be a rare contribution.

SEE ALSO: Class Consciousness; Class, Status, and Power; Ideology; Political Sociology; Power, Theories of; Stratification, Gender and; Stratification and Inequality, Theories of; Stratification, Race/Ethnicity and; Welfare State

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stratification, race/ethnicity and

Frank van Tubergen

An important research field in the stratification literature is concerned with inequalities along the ascribed characteristics of race and ethnicity. The term race connotes biological differences among people (skin color, facial features) that are transmitted from generation to generation. As such, these biological differences are seen as permanent characteristics of people. However, the notion of race does not make much sense as a biological concept, because the physical characteristics that make people distinctive are trivial. Even though biological differences are superficial, they are important sociologically. For if people believe that others are biologically distinctive, they tend to respond to them as being different. Furthermore, skin color is transmitted from generation to generation by assortative marriage, a prime sociological phenomenon.

Race is considered a social construct and in that sense incorporated in the more general notion of ethnicity. An ethnic group is a sub population of individuals who are labeled by the majority and by the members of a group itself as being of a particular ethnicity. The term ethnicity refers to the (perceived) historical experiences of a group as well as its unique organizational, behavioral, and/or cultural characteristics. Thus, ethnic groups can be distinguished by their country of origin, religion, family practices, language, beliefs, and values. The more visible the characteristics marking ethnicity, the more likely it is that those in an ethnic category will be treated differently.

Ethnic inequality is documented in different ways. Important aspects of inequality include education (school dropout, educational attainment), the labor market (unemployment, occupational status, income), wealth, housing

quality, and health. These issues are examined at the national level, telling us something about the distribution within a population, and at the individual level, informing us about mobility. Questions on mobility include examinations of the life course of people (i.e., intragenerational) and studies comparing parents and their children (i.e., intergenerational).

The literature on ethnic stratification is divided into three different research lines. The first is concerned with the position of *indigenous populations* that were annexed through military operations and colonization, such as the American Indians in North and South America, Aborigines in Australia, and Maori in New Zealand. The second focuses on ethnic groups that are the offspring of *slaves* or *involuntary migrants*, such as African Americans in America. The third is concerned with the economic position of *voluntary migrants* and their offspring, such as the Italians who moved to the US at the turn of the twentieth century.

Research on indigenous populations has focused on native Indians in the US. The levels of education attained by Native Americans are below those attained by white Americans. Native Americans are under represented in white collar occupations and over represented in service occupations. For example, in 1990 almost 42 percent of Native Americans were employed in white collar occupations compared with 61 percent of white Americans. Native Americans tend to have lower quality housing and lower incomes than whites. Over the last decade the incomes of Native Americans have risen somewhat.

A considerable amount of research on the position of involuntary migrants has focused on the economic position of African Americans in the US. The general assessment is that inequalities between whites and blacks are declining, but still persist long after slavery was abolished. For instance, in 1960, 20 percent of blacks attained a high school degree, compared to 43 percent among whites. In 2000, the figures were 79 percent and 88 percent, respectively. In 1960, 55 percent of blacks were living in poverty; in 2000 this was 23 percent. The black family median income as a percentage of white median income increased from 0.54 in 1950 to 0.68 in 2000.

Research on voluntary migrants has focused on the economic mobility within and between

immigrant generations. Chiswick (1978) argued and indeed found that after a certain time, immigrants of the first generation catch up economically with natives in the US. Borjas (1987), however, showed that the assimilation effect was largely due to lowering quality of (un)observed human capital in immigration cohorts. The intragenerational mobility of immigrants still attracts ample research, and the issue of assimilation remains highly debated. Evidence of economic mobility is more convincing with respect to intergenerational comparisons.

Several studies have compared the economic standing of voluntary migrants, involuntary migrants, and indigenous populations simultaneously. One classical study is by Van den Berghe (1967). He found that hierarchies of ethnic stratification are quite similar in Brazil, Mexico, South Africa, and the US. In all countries, those at the top of the ethnic hierarchy are of European ancestry. These are the offspring of voluntary migrants from Portugal (Brazil), Spain (Mexico), Great Britain and the Netherlands (South Africa), and Great Britain (US). At the bottom of the hierarchy are blacks, who either formed the indigenous population (South Africa) or who were imported as slaves (Brazil, Mexico, US). In the countries of North and South America, native Indians fall in between these two groups. A more contemporary study that compares African Americans and white immigrants can be found in Lieberman (1980).

Different explanations of ethnic inequality have been proposed. Some theories have been applied exclusively to one of the three research fields (voluntary migrants, involuntary migrants, indigenous populations), whereas other ideas have been applied to two or all of them.

The idea of assimilation was proposed by Park and Burgess (1969), worked out later by Warner and Srole (1945) and Gordon (1964), and more recently by Alba and Nee (2003). Although the idea has many variants, the core assumption is that over time ethnic groups will gradually integrate into mainstream society. Thus, it was expected that both within and across generations immigrants and ethnic groups will experience upward mobility to the point that their economic position equals that of the native majority.

Chiswick (1978) provided a human capital explanation for the assimilation idea. The

human capital theory states that people's life chances depend on their human capital, and that people are aware of this relationship and rationally invest in their own human capital. Chiswick argued that immigrants have a weaker economic position at arrival than natives because immigrants have less human capital: they have less command of the host language, fewer occupational experiences, and less knowledge of the host labor market. Because immigrants invest in post school training, gradually learn the host language, and acquire knowledge of the host labor market, they improve their position over time. And because the offspring of immigrants obtain their schooling in the host country and have perfect language skills, their position will outperform that of their parents. In this way, the human capital theory explains why ethnic groups will gradually reach economic parity with natives.

One empirical challenge for the assimilation theory and the human capital interpretation is the observation that economic incorporation differs between groups. Why do some immigrant groups rapidly integrate economically, whereas other ethnic groups, such as African Americans, remain economically at a disadvantage? Borjas (1987) and other researchers have tried to explain these issues with an extended human capital framework, incorporating notions of selective migration and the influence of (unobserved) skills, talents, and motivation. Alternatively, researchers have proposed a number of other theories to explain differences between ethnic groups. These are notions of inheritance, cultural values, discrimination, spatial mismatch, and ethnic capital.

One of the oldest explanations of ethnic group differences is the idea that groups have different biological endowments, which are genetically transmitted from generation to generation. Such biological explanations flourished in the US during the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, providing "scientific" evidence of the biological inferiority of non Anglo Saxon groups and justifying their subordinate status. The evidence is typically drawn from studies that compare intelligence test performances of ethnic groups and the native population. One recent example is Herrnstein and Murray's *The Bell Curve* (1994), in which they claim that African Americans and Latinos are less

intelligent than whites and for that reason have a lower economic standing. As with other studies that are informed by notions of inheritance, their study was heavily criticized by psychologists and sociologists on theoretical, methodological, and empirical grounds. For instance, contrary to the statement of Herrnstein and Murray that the race–intelligence link is stable over time, researchers showed that intelligence test scores of blacks and numerous ethnic groups improved dramatically over the course of the twentieth century. Overall, most researchers nowadays conclude that inheritance is unable to explain ethnic stratification.

Another, more sociological explanation of group differences in ethnic stratification is concerned with cultural values. Echoing the Weberian notion of the Protestant work ethic, Sowell argues in *Markets and Minorities* (1981) that Asians are model minorities at school and in the labor market because of their cultural traits of effort, thrift, dependability, and foresight. By contrast, the disadvantaged socioeconomic positions of African Americans, Latino Americans, and American Indians today are portrayed as a consequence of their cultural characteristics, which are perceived to be incompatible with a modern industrial society. The cultural approach of Sowell was criticized by several researchers, most notably Steinberg in *The Ethnic Myth* (2001).

Another cultural explanation of ethnic group differences is the hypothesis of “oppositional culture,” which argues that black youth develop an oppositional identity relative to whites because they focus on their parents’ past experiences of discrimination. As a consequence, blacks distrust the dominant society and develop distinct cultural norms in which they reject schooling as a route to socioeconomic mobility.

Many researchers use notions of discrimination to explain group differences in ethnic stratification. Two different types of ethnic discrimination (i.e., the unequal treatment of minority groups) are outlined: attitudinal and institutional. Attitudinal discrimination refers to discriminatory practices influenced by prejudice. Research shows that prejudice, and, in turn, discrimination, tends to increase when ethnic groups are perceived as threatening to the majority population in terms of cultural, economic, or political resources. Ethnic groups

that are numerically large and that are distinct culturally are especially vulnerable to discrimination. This led to theories about ethnic competition and split labor markets. Another important theory is that of statistical discrimination.

Institutional discrimination refers to rules, policies, practices, and laws that discriminate against ethnic groups. This type of discrimination is used to explain the economic difficulties that African slaves and their offspring experienced in the US. For instance, through the first half of the twentieth century, they were formally excluded from acquiring or inheriting property, marrying whites, voting, testifying against whites in court, and attending higher quality schools. Contemporary evidence on institutional discrimination is provided by Massey and Denton (1993).

Researchers have argued that group differences in ethnic inequality can be explained by the residential concentration of ethnic groups and regional variations in economic opportunities. One influential idea states that the economic opportunities of blacks are hampered because they live in inner cities. In *The Declining Significance of Race* (1981) and *The Truly Disadvantaged* (1987), Wilson maintained that the economic position of the black inner city poor has deteriorated because of structural economic changes, including change from goods producing to service producing industries, increased industrial technology, and the flight of industries from central cities. The process of deindustrialization has created an economic mismatch between the available jobs and the qualifications of inner city residents, predominantly blacks. As a result, the economic position of the African American urban poor is diminishing.

Another argument stresses the role of social or “ethnic” capital, that is the resources that are available to a person through their relations with others. A highly debated issue in this respect is whether “ethnic enclaves,” in which ethnic capital is shared, promote the economic incorporation of ethnic groups. Authors have argued that more sizable and geographically concentrated ethnic groups develop an independent, mono ethnic labor market in which their members can obtain positions otherwise held by the native majority. In ethnic economies the returns to human capital are expected to be higher than outside the ethnic economy.

Various research designs have been used to study ethnic stratification. The classical design is the case study, in which a single ethnic group in a single receiving context is examined. Because this design provides little information on contextual effects, comparative macro designs have also been developed. One such popular framework is the “comparative origin” method, which compares multiple ethnic groups in a single location, yielding important insights into ethnic group differences. Similarly, researchers have paid attention to the role of the receiving context by comparing a single ethnic group across multiple destinations, such as cities or nations (“comparative destination” design). More recently, these macro approaches have been combined into a “double comparative” design, which studies multiple origin groups in multiple destinations simultaneously. This design provides a better understanding of ethnic origin, the receiving context, and the specific interaction between origin and destination (“ethnic community”).

Another methodological development in the literature is to rely on dynamic designs. Initially, researchers compared the position of ethnic groups at a single point in time (e.g., by relying on a single cross sectional survey). By pooling cross sectional surveys that are apart in time, researchers were able to disentangle assimilation effects from cohort effects (“synthetic cohort design”). Dynamic designs have been improved further by the appearance of panel surveys on immigrants.

In general, three different measures of ethnicity are used: country of origin, nationality, and ethnic self identification or subjective ancestry. Country of origin and nationality are often used to study *voluntary* migrants. A drawback of using nationality as a measure of ethnicity is that voluntary migrants who are successful in the labor market are more likely to naturalize, leading studies on nonnaturalized migrants to underestimate their economic performance. For that reason, researchers generally prefer the country of origin of the respondent, the parents, and the grandparents.

Research on *involuntary* migrants and *indigenous* populations generally relies on ethnic self identification and subjective ancestry. These measures are problematic for several reasons. First, like nationality, ethnic self identification

is partly an outcome of people’s economic position, leading the more successful people not to identify with their lower status ethnic background. Second, ethnic and racial boundaries and self identified characterizations change over time. For instance, previously “non white” ethnic groups such as Irish and Italians became “white,” often by deliberately distinguishing themselves from blacks. Third, subjective measures of ethnicity assume a single identification, whereas, through intermarriage, a considerable proportion of the population has multiple identifications.

In many countries, general population surveys or specific immigration surveys contain questions on country of origin or nationality, providing a wealth of data for studies on *voluntary* migrants. Large scale surveys rarely contain subjective measures of ethnicity, leading to fewer data sources available for the study of *involuntary* migrants and *indigenous* populations. An exception is the census of the US. As an alternative, several researchers have conducted small scale or qualitative studies to examine these populations.

Researchers nowadays agree that ethnicity plays a role in people’s life chances, that ethnic groups gradually improve their economic standing across generations, and that the process of assimilation can be interpreted in terms of human capital accumulation. At the same time, it is found that assimilation rates of ethnic groups vary. Initially, researchers have relied on theories of biological traits and cultural dispositions to explain such group differences, but they have been largely replaced by extensions of the human capital theory, ideas on discrimination, the concept of ethnic capital, and spatial differences in economic opportunities. In recent work, researchers have combined the theories explaining group differences with micro level approaches explaining individual assimilation.

Methodologically, as more large scale data become available, researchers increasingly prefer to use comparative research methods rather than the case study. Much of the classical and contemporary work on ethnic stratification has been done in the US, but research in other countries is rapidly growing. This opens the possibility of comparing patterns of ethnic stratification cross nationally, possibly also including ethnic groups in developing countries.

Another important direction of future research is the development and application of dynamic research designs to study ethnic mobility.

SEE ALSO: Assimilation; Ethnic Enclaves; Ethnic and Racial Division of Labor; Ethnicity; Race; Race (Racism); Spatial Mismatch Hypothesis; Stratification, Gender and; Stratification and Inequality, Theories of

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stratification systems: openness

Wout Ultee

All societies are stratified, but some more so than others. Perhaps the most visible variable feature of a society's stratification system is the difference in the standard of living of its

inhabitants at a particular point in time. Nowadays, most advanced industrial societies regularly publish statistics on yearly household income, such as the share of all incomes going to the top 20 and bottom 20 percent of all households. Statistics on the causes of income differences are published on a regular basis too, such as figures on inequalities in household wealth, the relation between wealth and income, and the returns to education in terms of income.

For sociologists, these measures fail to capture an important aspect of a society's stratification system: the degree to which it is open or closed. If households are made up of dual earner couples and the two partners have different incomes, this equalizes the income shares of quintile groups. To the extent that such marriages occur, a stratification system may be said to be open. But what if the individual income shares of quintiles do not change over time? Stability at the societal level does not imply that incomes of individuals remain the same: there may have been an exchange of persons between quintiles. That is why individual or household mobility, along a criterion like income, is also an important aspect of societal openness for sociologists.

Of the classical sociologists, Max Weber most clearly conceived of societal stratification as a process comprising less advanced and more advanced stages of closure. In a society consisting of strata that can be ranked according to some principle from higher to lower, those within a stratum may combine so as to limit the number of newly entering persons, in tacit or explicit cooperation with state authorities and employers. This happened in some countries during the second half of the twentieth century with respect to occupations such as general practice and printing. Medieval guilds also limited the number of new entries and strengthened exclusion by granting sons the right to succeed their fathers. A stratification system is even more closed if the members of two different societal strata do not intermarry. In Europe, the marriage of a member of the nobility with someone from another estate was at least a *mésalliance*. Weber pointed out that the Southern states of the United States forbade marriages between whites and blacks by law around 1900. The sanction against marriages between members of different classes went further in Hindu

India: according to Weber, in the India of his day a child born of a marriage between two castes belonged to a caste lower than either of the castes involved in the marriage. Compared with medieval estates, religion and magic discouraged mixed marriages. It may be added that Nazi Germany went even further: after forbidding marriages between Aryans and Jews, it sought to discourage friendly association between Aryans and Jews by refusing Jews entry to public meeting places like restaurants and cinemas. In the end, Nazi Germany destroyed Jews in specially built gas chambers. Weber referred to the phenomenon of who marries whom as *connubium*, and that of who befriends and shares meals with whom as *convivium* and *commensality*.

Turning to contemporary sociologists, Lenski (1966) distinguished stratification systems by the number of dimensions along which a society's members may be ranked from more to less advantaged in life chances and endowment in resources (complexity). As the position of a person on the various dimensions need not be the same, inconsistency is another aspect of a society's stratification system. The range of variation along one dimension Lenski called *span*, and movement along one dimension he labeled *mobility*. Lenski hardly focused on *connubium* and *convivium*.

Several recent studies attest that in advanced industrial societies with higher income inequalities, mobility is less widespread on average. This was established by Erikson and Goldthorpe (1992) for a dozen advanced industrial societies by way of odds ratios for the relation between father's and son's social class. It has been held that the United States has high income inequality and high mobility, but recent figures seem to indicate that for this country father and son earnings mobility, as computed over a period of several decades, is less widespread than in Sweden and Finland, two countries with limited income inequality. Lipset and Bendix (1959) took father-son mobility and assortative marriage according to broad occupational groupings as interchangeable indices of societal openness. Ultee and Luijkx (1990) established, with figures for 23 advanced industrial societies from around 1970, that greater father-son mobility across the manual/non manual divide goes hand in hand with more educationally mixed marriages.

SEE ALSO: *Connubium* (Who Marries Whom?); *Convivium* (Who is Friends with Whom?); *Income Inequality and Income Mobility*; *Stratification and Inequality, Theories of*; *Stratification: Technology and Ideology*

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stratification: technology and ideology

Nazneen Kane

Several theories of social stratification have emerged from the discipline of sociology. The ultimate focus of this body of knowledge has quite clearly been the production of a comprehensive understanding of inequality within and across human societies over time and place. Yet, few theories have constructed adequate working models of stratification that satisfy geographical and historical particularities.

Gerhard Lenski's ecological evolutionary theory of social stratification, however, has quite adequately addressed the research question and has come closest to attaining the goal. His theory was, for the first time ever in the discipline, able to provide a causal explanation of *how* things came to be (Huber 2004). Indeed, Lenski's ecological evolutionary theory attempts to comprehensively explain the ultimate and proximate causes of societal differences. Although Lenski addressed many realms of societal difference, the focus here is specifically on the relationship

between subsistence technology, ideology, and social stratification.

SUBSISTENCE TECHNOLOGY → IDEOLOGY

The theory argues that subsistence technology, “The technology that is used by the members of a society to obtain the basic necessities of life” (Lenski & Nolan 2004: 366), is the key factor in making possible (but not determining) societal differences, including the level of stratification within and across societies. Within societies, ideology, defined as “cultural information used to interpret human experience and order societal life,” is then developed in attempts to understand the existing material conditions (p. 363). The main premise of the theory is that societal differences “begin in the realm of technology and extend into almost every other sphere of life” (Lenski 1966: 144). Because the level and form of technology vary across societies, so too does ideology. In short, changes in stratification levels are dependent upon shifts in subsistence technology (Lenski & Nolan 2004). For example, the shift from the wooden digging stick of simple horticultural societies to the metal hoe of advanced horticultural societies also allowed for an increase in economic inequality. Ideologies may then also shift and are often used by elites to legitimate unequal distributions of power and wealth. For example, US slavery was often legitimated by racist ideologies of black inferiority. Thus, the nature and formation of class stratification and other trends in social inequality are all shaped primarily by subsistence technology.

TYPES OF HUMAN SOCIETIES

Hunting and gathering society (average population size: 40; approximate date of first appearance: 100,000 BCE). The subsistence technology of hunting and gathering societies is described as that which can be derived from nature. Wood, bones, and stone are used as tools for survival. Hunting and gathering societies have little or no economic surplus because of their nomadic character and limited subsistence technology. Sharing is the norm and resources are readily available in nature. These societies

consequently experience relative equality in terms of distribution of goods and services.

Inequality in hunting gathering societies varies but is generally limited to “functional inequality” (Lenski 1966: 105). That is, the elderly, those attributed with possessing super natural powers, and those with exceptional hunting capabilities are often afforded greater prestige. In general, however, there is very minimal inequality in power, wealth, and privilege and those prestige inequalities that do exist are mainly individually based. The accompanying ideology is often animism, the religious belief that spirits inhabit everything in nature, and is used to explain this prestige inequality. The dominant belief is that those individuals imputed with prestige are more in tune with the rituals of the spirits and are blessed as they please these spirits (Lenski & Nolan 2004: 98). In sum, due to the limited subsistence technology, hunting gathering societies are relatively equal with little prestige inequality, and ideology has little effect on societal change.

Simple horticultural society (average population size: 1,500; approximate date of first appearance: 8000 BCE). In the gardening economy of simple horticultural societies, the digging stick is the basic subsistence tool. Because land and tools are readily available to any member of society who is willing to put forth the effort, there are no significant inequalities in material possessions. There are, however, both more and varied possessions as compared to hunting gathering societies. This increase in possessions is due to the fixed character of simple horticultural societies. The digging stick allows for gardening, which in turn decreases reliance upon hunting and stabilizes communities in terms of movement. It is this increased permanence of settlement that is associated with ideology emphasizing the importance of kinship and the increasing incidence of ancestor worship and religious rituals.

Simple horticultural societies demonstrate the population/surplus dialectic. That is, permanency of settlement allows for food surplus, making possible a population increase. In turn, population increase also allows greater productivity. Fixed communities can accumulate more possessions, and a larger population allows for some members of society to specialize in production of goods such as tools, clothes, pottery,

and baskets as “leisure” time becomes more prevalent. This leisure is said to allow for ceremonial activities, warfare, and political organization. Social inequalities become more pronounced as society becomes increasingly hierarchical with political subordinates, slavery, wealth inequality (often in the form of wives), and prestige inequality. Forms of prestige are broadened to encompass not only hunting and spiritual recognition, but also political and military prowess.

Advanced horticultural society (average population size: 5,250; approximate date of first appearance: 4000 BCE). In advanced horticultural societies, “inequality is carried to a level far beyond anything ever observed in technologically less developed societies” (Lenski 1966: 154). Indeed, it is in advanced horticultural societies that substantial differences in social inequality emerge. Lenski attributes this to the shift in subsistence technology, from the digging stick to the metal hoe. Metallurgy is the distinguishing technological difference between simple and advanced horticultural societies.

The metal hoe allowed for increased efficiency and permanency of settlements as it could reach nutrients previously unreachable by the digging stick. Consequently, soil was not exhausted as quickly and plots of land could be utilized for longer periods of time. This allowed for greater food production, an increase in population, greater specialization, and a more complex political organization.

The increased complexity and growth of the government led to state building. Those linked most closely to the king tended to make up the small warrior nobility who became increasingly distinguishable from the mass of commoners. The primary determinant of status in advanced horticultural society is the relationship of an individual or group to the king. Metal weapons allowed for successful militaries that not only subjected and controlled the common population, but also allowed for empire building and the subjection of more distant communities. Those privileged in the state hierarchy tended to live in walled urban centers and controlled the redistribution of resources. Redistribution was not equal and often led to severe exploitation of those working the land.

Wealth, privilege, and status are directly tied to this distribution of goods and services.

Extreme exploitation of the king’s subjects, a numerous class of slaves with no legal rights, human sacrifice, and the exchange of women are all prevalent in these types of human societies. Lenski and Nolan (2004) argue that it is in these types of societies that ideology begins to play a major role in societal development. Traditional beliefs in the cult of the warrior often led to increased warfare, and hence further shifts in societal development.

Agrarian society (average population size: 100,000; approximate date of first appearance: 3000 BCE). Horticultural societies often evolved into agrarian societies. In this fourth type of human society, the distinguishable subsistence tool was the plow and the harnessing of animate energy. With this major technological shift, cultivated fields replaced gardens, population size greatly expanded, and food production increased (Lenski 1966). “The net effect of all these innovations was the substantial enlargement of the economic surplus. Under agrarian conditions of life, far less of the total product of man’s labor was required to keep him alive and productive, and hence more was available for other purposes” (Lenski 1966: 193).

“Other purposes” often meant a greater division of labor and developments in arts, crafts, and particularly in military technology and war, i.e., the strengthening of the state. The simultaneous growth of economic surplus and government meant elites were controlling that surplus. This interdependency of economics and politics allowed significant forms of stratification to emerge (Lenski & Nolan 2004).

A greater division between the governing, landowning, urban literate class and the illiterate rural mass was salient. In many of these societies, peasants were required to give all produced surplus over to elites, exacerbating class inequality to unprecedented levels. Military forces were often used to extract taxes and goods and to control the peasant population. This economic and political control was often justified through appeals to religion. Religion, in fact, becomes a major site of ideological control. Universal faiths such as Buddhism, Christianity, and Islam emerged, and while it was during this era that church and state began to separate, elites remained closely tied to clergy, often giving them land grants, tax exemptions, and generous financial support. Clergy defended elites,

justifying their privilege through appeals to divinity and lineage (Lenski & Nolan 2004). Ideology was in this way a tightly controlled outcome that was continually reconstructed to legitimate the status quo. In sum, following the subsistence pattern, as stratification in agrarian societies increased in complexity and inequality, so too did ideology transform.

Industrial society (average population size: 17 million+; approximate date of first appearance: 1800 CE). Industrial society is marked by the technological shift from human and animate energy to machine technology. Industrialization is revolutionary in that the trend toward increasing inequality reverses itself. While the “range of possibilities for inequality” has increased and the stratification system has become more complex, the standard of living for the average person simultaneously increases (Lenski & Nolan 2004: 257). Lenski argues that these changes led to greater specialization, occupational stratification, greater organizational complexity, growth of government, and a rise in market economies. Indeed, specialization meant an increase in societal interdependence, and hence the rise of a moneyed capitalist economy. From these changes come a series of short and long term societal changes. For example, within industrial societies, opportunities for participation in political decision making have broadened, income inequality has been reduced, and “the overall level of inequality in industrial societies is considerably less than that in agrarian societies of the past, or in most nonindustrial societies in the world today” (Lenski & Nolan 2004: 271). However, Lenski also argues that inequality between the rich and poor nations of the world is increasing, as the wealthy consume considerably more of the world’s wealth and resources.

Because of the vast increase in economic surplus and consequential socioeconomic transformations, ideologies seemingly shift to make sense of these changes. New secular ideologies such as democracy and capitalism replaced the traditional beliefs of many (Lenski & Nolan 2004). Such ideologies defended free market policies and the interests of wealthy business enterprises. Economic surplus increased, however, unlike the previous trend of increasing economic inequality, and wealth and income were no longer as unequally distributed,

according to Lenski. From this idea came an important line of work concerning the relationship between stratification systems and democracy (Hewitt 1977).

In sum, Lenski’s theory of human societies explains not only what society *is*, but *how* and *why* it came to be. Subsistence technology is, for Lenski, the ultimate cause of societal difference. The type of technology used to ensure survival is a necessary precondition for the significant increase in the size and complexity of society. Subsistence technology, then, is not necessarily a determinant of societies, but rather limits what is possible and is the main explanation for great intersocietal (dis)advantage.

Although Lenski does recognize societal variation, his ecological evolutionary theory provides a general and extensive theory of human societies. From it has emerged a small but significant body of work such as that produced by Joan Huber and Rae Blumberg, both of whom have extended the theory to better understand sex and gender stratification. That an entire issue of *Sociological Theory* (Vol. 22, June 2004) was devoted to Lenski’s life, career, and social thought is evidence of this. Lenski’s theory of social stratification is not without criticism and much future work remains to be done. Further, Lenski’s work sits awkwardly next to sociological theories of *post* industrial society and postmodernity, a societal type not theorized by Lenski. However, as Patrick Nolan says of Lenski’s theory, “a good theory should provoke more questions than it answers” (2004: 336).

SEE ALSO: Class, Status, and Power; Income Inequality, Global; Inequality, Wealth; Stratification, Politics and

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stratification in transition economies

Péter Róbert

Although one could argue that all economies are in transition, permanently, from one state to another, this entry will focus on former socialist societies, which have undergone a post communist transition both in a political and a socioeconomic sense. Accordingly, economies that experienced a transition to democracy but not to a market economy (e.g., countries in South America) are not considered. Thus, this entry provides information on developments in social stratification in societies as a consequence of political and economic changes since the collapse of socialism at the end of the 1980s.

The sociological context is a change in mechanism, which creates social inequalities and generates stratification in socialist planned economies and in capitalist market economies. Former socialist societies represent good test cases for studying these different mechanisms because the same nations with their historical and sociological characteristics can be observed before and after the transformation, in a situation dominated earlier by socialist *redistribution* and later by the capitalist *market*. With respect to these two mechanisms, the basic assumption is that inequalities under socialism are generated by the redistribution and reduced by the market, while inequalities in market economies are produced by the market and decreased by state intervention (Manchin & Széleányi 1987; Széleányi & Kostello 1996).

A more elaborated and detailed set of hypotheses referring to different elements of this transformation process has been developed by Nee (1989) as market transition theory (MTT). One of its assumptions is the *market power thesis* and it expects that the power of the former communist cadres or party members will be replaced by the new power based on market ability. The persistence or feebleness of the advantageous position in the former redistribution system is one of the key issues in stratification of transitional economies. This research question focuses on the elite in these societies and formulates two alternative hypotheses. The first, in accordance with MTT, predicts an elite circulation by assuming that the new elite of transforming societies will replace the former (communist) elite. The second hypothesis expects less circulation but more reproduction and predicts that the former cadres will be able to convert their political capital into economic capital (Hankiss 1990; Staniszki 1991; Széleányi & Széleányi 1995). A further elaboration of this latter hypothesis adds that only those members of the nomenklatura who have cultural capital and good educational credentials can successfully move from political positions into economic ones.

Another element of MTT is called the *market incentive thesis* and it expects that educational investments will obtain higher financial returns. One of the main features of socialist stratification used to be the low returns to human capital investment (i.e., professionals like engineers, teachers, and doctors were not paid much better than the manual, skilled labor force). Nevertheless, the level and field of education strongly determined occupational chances in these societies, in line with how the planned economy worked under socialism: when leaving the school system, young people could find a job that suited their studies and labor market mobility was restricted even later during further careers.

Another element of MTT focuses on the role of the emerging private sector. The *market opportunity thesis* assumes that individual ambitions, aspirations, and habitus were hindered under socialism when people were employed in big state owned, inefficient firms, but individual capabilities will lead to higher social status and more salaries when working in the

private sector for private companies or as an entrepreneur in one's own business. With respect to the new entrepreneurship under post communism, Szelényi (1988) formulated the interrupted embourgeoisement theory. This hypothesis predicted that the offspring of previously bourgeoisie families with appropriate habitus, ambition, and some material capital, who were forced to stay in the "parking lot" under decades of communism, would get into a private market position during the transition process.

MTT expects a kind of *meritocratic* change, which restructures the stratification system of the transition economies. Former merits connected to political trustfulness are replaced by other personal credits like education, ambition, and hard work and these merits will basically determine individuals' status attainment. During this process the stratification of transition economies gets closer to the stratification of advanced market economies. This does not mean, however, that former socialist countries transform simply into capitalist states. Their past and historical roots and experiences influence the transition process in every element of the emerging markets in these countries (Stark 1992).

Two major structural shifts strongly influenced the stratification in transition economies. First, in consequence of privatization, employment in the public sector has shrunk and became restricted to such sectors as health, education, and governance, while employment in the private sector has increased. Privatization techniques varied in the different countries, but a *decrease* in the size of firms and an *increase* in their number is a common feature. The big state owned companies could not be privatized in one step; they were split into smaller units and smaller private enterprises have been established. At the same time, the old economic structure dominated by heavy and light industry went through a crisis; post industrialization obtained a push, with new private companies in the service sector, finance, trade, social services, personal services, etc. Second, transition economies, which were characterized by full employment, experienced a huge drop in economic performance and employment in the first half of the 1990s. The new private owners rationalized companies' economic activities and

dismissed part of the labor force. A class system of cadres and workers turned into a dichotomy of *winners and losers*.

With respect to the winners, post socialism brought new political and economic prospects for a definite group of people. The political elite expanded as the multiparty system replaced the one party system; the new democratic parties opened up new political positions as well. Privatization increased available managerial positions, since the big state owned firms turned to several smaller companies, generating special upward mobility paths – a step forward for those who had occupied lower positions. Characterizing this process, some talked about the "revolution of deputies" (Kolosi 2002), others about the rise of managerial capitalism (Eyal et al. 1998). In any case, occupants of the new political and economic elite positions did not come from the "bottom" of society; they had been in good positions either in the redistributive hierarchy or in the quasi market of the socialist second economy. Thus, empirical evidence does not fully support either the elite circulation or the elite reproduction hypothesis based on former party position, and the interrupted embourgeoisement theory cannot be confirmed either. However, human capital, cultural capital combined with social capital (useful network relationships), helped to maintain advantages in the transition economies, as analysis of privatization reveals (Stark & Bruszt 1998).

As for the losers, their largest group consisted of employees of former big industrial state firms who were not well educated, had restricted skills, and were too old to learn something new and to adapt to the changes. After being dismissed, if they were not able to find a new job, the unemployed went frequently to disabled pension or to old age pension. The hope that the emerging private service sector could provide jobs for everybody who had been dismissed from state industry turned out to be an illusion. Though women could find a job more easily in the service sector, in most transition economies they are over represented among the unemployed. Early pension programs were an escape for the older representatives of the former political and economic elite without appropriate human and cultural capital. However, unlike manual workers, these former cadres received a

specific high allowance when they had to leave their advantageous positions. The level of unemployment is still substantial in several transition economies, but it is not the main reason why the official employment rate is lower in most of these countries. The black economy is also widespread and it employs a sizable fraction of the labor force. Since young school dropouts have difficulty finding a legal job, both unemployment and black employment persist.

Education also takes a leading part in generating stratification in transitional economies. As expected by the market incentive theory, human capital investments have higher returns and tertiary diploma holders especially are better paid. Although transition economies experienced great educational expansion, the tertiary level of schooling pays well, especially if the diploma is obtained in some developing field and if one is employed in the private sector. Nevertheless, the level of schooling of the labor force is still lower in transition economies than in OECD countries. Even with higher income returns in comparison to the socialist era, salaries in transition economies are significantly lower than in developed market economies, while consumer prices are not that much lower. With the lower purchasing power of wages, differences in salaries play a greater role in generating stratification. Income differences used to be low under socialism and increased considerably during the transition. Income differences are still not extremely high, but living on a low income means greater poverty in an absolute sense. Low education is the strongest factor in decreasing the chances of finding a job and increasing the likelihood of becoming unemployed and consequently living in poor conditions.

The occupational distribution of the labor force indicates similar tendencies to those in developed market economies: the proportion of agricultural laborers decreases, employment in the service sector and the percentage of the "service class" (managers and professionals) increases (Domanski 2000). A typical feature of the structural changes was the rapid increase in the numbers of self employed. Entrepreneurship is a mixed category in transition economies; the distinction between winners and losers is relevant here, too. For some, the market opportunity thesis holds because some people benefited from the transformation: they had the

opportunity to follow their ambitions, motives, and habitus for becoming private entrepreneurs and now they earn more and live in better conditions. Others, however, were simply forced into self employment because nobody wanted to employ them, as the employee–unemployed–self employed sequence indicates in some research on occupational careers.

A further characteristic of the stratification in transition economies is increasing flexibility. Atypical forms of labor force participation emerged, such as self employment, part time work, and employment with fixed term contracts. This caused growing uncertainty, further increased by the collapse of the safety net and the decline of the state in compensating social inequalities.

SEE ALSO: Communism; Democracy; Educational Attainment; Markets; Meritocracy; Occupations; Schooling and Economic Success; Socialism; Status Attainment; Stratification, Politics and; Transition Economies; Unemployment; Welfare State

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stratified reproduction

Amy Agigian

Stratified reproduction is a term originally coined by Shellee Colen in her classic 1986 study of West Indian nannies and their (female) employers in New York City, which found inequalities of race, class, gender, culture, and legal status played out on a social field that was both domestic and transnational. Colen elaborated the term in her later work to describe situations in which women perform physical and social reproductive labor structured by economic, political, and social forces and differentiated unequally across hierarchies of class, race, ethnicity, gender, and place in a global economy (Colen 1995). Many feminist social scientists since the 1980s have adopted stratified reproduction as a theoretical framework within which to examine a variety of issues relevant to the intersections of reproduction and stratification.

The term stratified reproduction implicitly acknowledges both the sexual politics and the political economy of reproduction. In this way it derives from, and elaborates on, second wave feminist concerns with removing childbearing (biological reproduction) and domestic labor (social reproduction) from the realm of the “natural” and placing them squarely under critical, social scientific analysis. Researchers of stratified reproduction continue the feminist project, demystifying still relatively unexamined gender relations and gender inequalities, particularly those related to procreation and

carework. Prior to second wave feminism, social and biological reproduction – pregnancy, childbearing, childcare, housework – was undertheorized within sociology and seen largely as private and “natural,” as opposed to political and socially constructed (Laslett & Brenner 1989). Scholars of stratified reproduction examine the ways that reproduction is stratified within and across cultures, with particular attention to the transnational organization of reproduction. For example, Ehrenreich and Hochschild examine global flows of nannies, maids, and sex workers, while Inhorn (2002) analyzes the gendered and cultural impact of “western” reproductive technologies in Egypt. Since reproduction is so inextricably entwined with women’s bodies, the political reverberations of the study of stratified reproduction are immediate and often radical. As with other analyses of sexual politics, injustices in people’s intimate and private lives become apparent. Similarly, the stains of both colonialism and eugenics on current global hierarchies of embodiment become unavoidable.

As a social scientific framework, stratified reproduction has enabled scholars across fields including sociology, history, political science, and especially anthropology to examine power relations and inequalities in the realm of reproduction. Inherent in this framework is the understanding that certain kinds of reproduction are privileged, encouraged, and supported, while others are stigmatized, discouraged, and oppressed. As Ginsburg and Rapp (1995: 314) note, “Throughout history, state power has depended directly and indirectly on defining normative families and controlling populations.” In this understanding, reproduction is shaped by struggles among and within powerful institutional forces such as the state, global capitalism, religion, and gender hierarchies. Reproduction can be, and is, stratified along multiple axes of social status and exclusion. Relevant inequalities include gender, race, class, nation, sexual orientation, age, health and disability status, and legal status. Such social inequalities are played out dramatically in differential access to and use of reproductive technologies such as fetal screening, prenatal care, donor sperm and eggs, and a choice of skilled birth attendant, as well as in reproductive sites such as surrogacy and genetic counseling.

Stratified reproduction can also be seen in the policy realm when some forms of reproduction are encouraged and resourced while others are stigmatized and discouraged. Some children are considered highly worthy of being born, and considerable resources are used to enable their births (e.g., through in vitro fertilization made available to affluent, predominantly white heterosexual couples), while others are strongly discouraged (e.g., through welfare policies that impose “family caps” limiting the subsistence income of poor mothers who have children). Some women are seen as reproductive threats to society and “reproductive sinners” by virtue of their race, class, and/or other characteristics. For instance, Chavez (2004) analyzes popular discourses about the presumably dangerous sexuality and procreation of Latina women in the United States. Roberts (1997) documents the brutal impact of US welfare laws that punish poor, African American women for having children. Conversely, other women are seen as potential “reproductive saviors” of the state, ethnic group, religion, and/or normative family. Kahn’s (2000) study of the use and regulation of reproductive technologies in Israel, for example, finds that a strong pronatalist ethic outweighs concerns regarding the potential social disruption occasioned by the new forms of assisted reproduction. Another group that is encouraged to procreate, though in a very different way, is Ivy League educated, white, blond, tall, “healthy” young women, who are paid tens of thousands of dollars to sell their eggs on the global market. While these incentives and disincentives to procreate may appear to be unrelated phenomena, the theoretical framework of stratified reproduction promotes articulation of the important links among them.

The lens of stratified reproduction overlaps and differs in significant ways from other sociological approaches to the study of reproduction. For example, while it may use demography to understand trends in transnational caregiving, stratified reproduction emphasizes the political and cultural forces shaping migratory caregiving, the care deficits left behind in regions vacated by third world caregivers when they depart for first world households, and the ways that paid caregiving reinscribes patriarchal power in high earning, heterosexual, two career households. Similarly, studies of stratified

reproduction in alternative insemination demonstrate how racial, class, homophobic, and phenotypic hierarchies are inscribed in the practices of sperm banking and sperm selection.

Research regarding stratified reproduction tends to favor qualitative methodologies. In depth, on the ground studies of particular sites of stratified reproduction are the bases for the development of theoretical frameworks as well as for claims about the importance of reproduction to all social theory. *Conceiving the New World Order* (1995), edited by feminist anthropologists Faye D. Ginsburg and Rayna Rapp, was a pivotal book in articulating the significance of stratified reproduction as a framework for the burgeoning work of feminist social scientists on reproduction. The second section of the book, “Stratified Reproduction,” suggests something of the concept’s scope. In addition to Colen’s work there are chapters on lesbian motherhood (Lewin); the politics of race, class, and gender in female headed households (Mullings); and early childbearing (Ward).

The use of the theoretical framework of stratified reproduction appears to be well on its way to becoming mainstreamed in the sociological study of areas including procreation, transnational carework, and reproductive technology.

SEE ALSO: Carework; Family Planning, Abortion, and Reproductive Health; Feminism; Feminism, First, Second, and Third Waves; Feminist Anthropology; Feminization of Labor Migration; Genetic Engineering as a Social Problem; International Gender Division of Labor; Lesbian and Gay Families; New Reproductive Technologies

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stress and health

Jeffrey E. Hall

Stress is an emotional psychophysiological state that occurs in a situational context when an individual is confronted with cues that elicit fear or anxiety responses. Medical sociologists are interested in stress because the situations that cause it are often social and increase a person's risk of disease by taxing or exceeding his or her adaptive capacities (Wheaton 1994). Admittedly, the word stress has other connotations, but this view captures the essential facets of an extensive body of research that has been expanding for almost a century.

THE STRESS PROCESS

Although various stress process models exist, they generally involve (1) a stimulus problem, (2) a processing state where information regarding the stimulus is organized, and

(3) some form of response. The first stage of the stress process involves the presence of stimulus problems or "stressors" consisting of environmental, social, and internal demands that challenge adaptive abilities and call for behavioral adjustments (Holmes & Rahe 1967). The content of stressors varies greatly depending upon individual and group circumstances. For example, adaptive abilities may be significantly challenged by (1) the loss of a job or the death of a loved one; (2) minor but regular annoyances, such as traffic problems and inconsiderate neighbors; (3) enduring exposures to urban problems, such as crowding, environmental pollution, and high rates of crime and unemployment; or (4) disruptive experiences, such as unemployment, war, and acts of terrorism. Such categories of problems are, respectively, labeled life events, daily hassles, chronic strains, and traumas (Pearlin 1989; Thoits 1995). These categories have emerged out of research identifying and measuring stressful stimuli.

Once a stressor is encountered, information regarding the stimuli is evaluated in preparation for the selection or elicitation of a response. Specifically, the threat potential of stressors is assessed and determined based upon the meanings given to these occurrences within specific social contexts (Lazarus & Folkman 1984). This segment of the stress process is termed primary appraisal; the results of activities here vary according to stressor features such as the intensity and controllability of the stimulus and individual traits like personality dispositions.

Logically, appraisal activities also include actions of a secondary nature, hence the use of the term secondary appraisal. Entry into this phase of appraisal is initiated after it is determined that some form of response is needed. Possible responses may include the generation of (1) coping or (2) stress responses. Coping responses are actions that "help individuals maintain psychosocial adaptation during stressful periods; [they] encompass cognitive and behavioral efforts to reduce or eliminate stressful conditions and associated emotional distress" (Holahan et al. 1996). During secondary appraisal, coping repertoires (the possible strategies for dealing with problems) are evaluated first to determine the feasibility of eliminating stressors or reducing their aversive impacts.

If an appropriate coping response is available and perceived as a potentially effective means of dealing with a stressor, then the negative affects of the stressor may be neutralized. If, however, it is determined that a suitable response is not within one's coping repertoire or is available but ineffective, then a stress response is generated.

Stress responses include (1) physiological and biochemical responses, such as the arousal of the sympathetic nervous system and changes in corticosteroid steroid levels (Selye 1936); (2) physical health problems such as cardiovascular disease, hypertension, and ulcers (e.g., Aneshensel & Gore 1991); and (3) reactions involving the onset and course of forms of psychological distress. Initially, stress responses were studied separately with primary attention given to specifying the breadth and depth of stressor impacts upon specific outcomes. Later efforts (e.g., Thoits 1995), however, focused on interconnected and multifaceted stress situations. This effort entails explorations of junctures among physical and psychological health, and attempts to define the implications of stress induced changes in one domain for functioning in the other. In summary, the stress process links our bodies to the environment by way of our minds and their psychosocial filters. Encountered stimuli become threatening and thus "stressful" if they are appraised as such relative to specific cultural and individual meanings and cannot be adequately responded to using available coping responses.

PERIPHERAL ELEMENTS OF THE STRESS PROCESS: VULNERABILITY FACTORS AND MODERATORS

While the conception presented in the previous section is useful, it is limited in that it only depicts the basic framework of the stress process. The history of stress research also identifies other influential variables. Two classes of these variables are particularly important: vulnerability factors and mediators.

Vulnerability Factors

Early stress research depicted the stress process beginning with the emergence of a potentially

stressful stimulus. In contrast, subsequent research has acknowledged the need to model the effects of statuses and dispositions that may increase (1) the probabilities that stressors will be encountered or (2) the likelihood that problems will be experienced in the face of stress. Such statuses and dispositions are considered vulnerability factors (Turner & Avison 1989).

Demographic statuses such as age, race, gender, education level, and marital status have been classified as vulnerability factors because they "determine the stressors to which people are exposed, the mediators they are able to mobilize, and the manner in [and the extent to] which they experience stress" (Pearlin 1989: 241). These statuses are indicators of social location that convey contextual information about the circumstances in which specific stressors are more likely to be generated, contended with, and felt. They also reflect differences in the initial positioning of certain groups relative to society's goals (e.g., sound health and financial success) and in relation to the approved networks and pathways for reaching and retaining them (e.g., quality medical care and stable, lucrative employment). Lastly, they influence the form of the stress response that is called forth when attempts to eliminate stressors are ineffective.

Personality dispositions such as the consistent exhibition of Type A behavioral patterns (TABP) and perfectionist behavior are other factors that may render individuals more susceptible to the adverse effects of stressors. The increased vulnerability associated with the possession of the Type A personality may be attributable to its interference with the "natural" course of secondary appraisal. It inspires the selection of inadequate coping responses that subsequently compromise efforts to diffuse the effects of stressors (Vingerhoets & Flohr 1984). The perfectionist personality type increases stressor vulnerability in quite a different manner. It increases the frequency of encounters with stressors and amplifies their negative psychological effects by changing minor issues into major problems and by increasing the likelihood that failures will be interpreted as signs of personal deficiency (Hewitt & Flett 1993). Social statuses and personality dispositions can affect each stage of the stress process.

Mediators

An extension of the stress process model focuses on the role of constructs that govern the effects of stressors on outcomes and function as barriers to the adverse effects of exigencies. These constructs are called mediators (Pearlin 1989). This entry has already presented one mediator (coping) in its description of options for response that are selected during secondary appraisal. Other constructs that may act as mediators include personal resources and social resources. Coping responses, personal resources, and social resources may improve or protect well being by reducing the effects of existing stressors and by discouraging the occurrence of secondary stressors.

Coping Responses

Coping responses are elicited or enacted in order to manage specific situational demands (Lazarus & Folkman 1984; Pearlin & Schooler 1978). These responses are intended to regulate or alter stressor effects. The first set of responses is known as "emotion focused" coping, while the second is "problem focused" coping. Emotion focused coping includes behaviors such as venting, positive reframing, religion, acceptance, and the use of emotional support. In contrast, use of instrumental support, active coping, and planning are actions exemplifying problem focused coping.

A third set of coping responses that may be elicited in response to stressors entail actions that deny the threat posed by potential stressors. Such responses are labeled as either avoidant or disengagement coping styles (Carver & Scheier 1993). Avoidant coping typically involves the initiation of activities or the occupation of mental states that prevent or delay direct confrontations with stressors and their implications for well being. Such responses include self distraction, substance use, behavioral disengagement, and the excessive use of humor. Problem focused, emotion focused, and avoidant coping responses are elicited based upon the personal and cultural meanings assigned to specific stressors. Coping involves interaction between environmental, personality, and health factors.

Psychological Resources

Psychological resources are personality characteristics that people draw on to help them withstand the threats posed by events and objects in their environment. These resources function as internal "barriers," reducing the impact of stressors on the self and decreasing the levels of distress experienced. Two forms of commonly studied psychological resources are self esteem and mastery.

Self esteem refers to the positiveness of one's attitude toward oneself. High self esteem has been shown to significantly reduce psychological symptoms and to moderate the emotional consequences of stressors (Thoits 1995; Turner & Roszell 1994). Mastery refers to "the extent to which one regards one's life chances as being under one's own control in contrast to being fatalistically ruled" (Pearlin & Schooler 1978: 5). Studies suggest that individuals with higher levels of mastery are less vulnerable to the impacts of stressors, less likely to experience psychological disruptions, and more likely to have better mental and physical health compared to individuals with low mastery levels (Mirowsky & Ross 1990). High levels of mastery and self esteem may inspire self appraisals that reduce the level of threat assigned to stressors. In addition, they may elevate confidence in one's ability to control these stimuli. In addition, high levels of mastery may promote greater accuracy in the selection of ways of responding to stressful stimuli, while high self esteem levels may make it less likely that encountered problems will give rise to self evaluations that might engender emotional distress.

Self efficacy, resiliency, and optimism are other psychological resources that may serve as mediators. Although these constructs have received less attention than either self esteem or mastery, they may have a role in the stress process.

Social Resources

Social resources constitute the final class of mediators considered in the stress literature. These resources consist of various forms of social support: functions performed by others

to aid individuals in dealing with stressors (Thoits 1995). Forms of social support used to explain variations in stress responses include: (1) emotional support, which is the expression of positive affect, emphatic understanding, and the encouragement of expressions of feelings; (2) informational support, the offering of advice, information, guidance, or feedback; (3) instrumental support, which is the provision of material aid or behavioral assistance; and (4) expressive support, which involves the expression of love and affection.

Although studies by House and Kahn (1985) indicate that these forms of support are highly correlated, scrutiny of each is warranted since specific forms of support may be more or less effective in counteracting particular stressors (Cohen & McKay 1984). For instance, emotional and expressive support may be required during bereavement, while informational and instrumental support may be vital when confronting the physical limitations accompanying an injury such as an ankle fracture. Furthermore, it is noted that each form may also contribute uniquely and interactively to the acquisition of particular stress outcomes (Rook & Underwood 2000). Emotional and expressive supports directly address basic needs for love and esteem, whereas instrumental and informational supports assist in the performance of problematic activities and provide function promoting regulation. Combinations of emotional, expressive, instrumental, and informational may help to stabilize and strengthen interactions with internal and external environments.

Attention has been given to the perceptual elements of social support and their roles in the stress process. Work in this area illustrates the health related significance of perceptions concerning resource availability apart from the actual receipt of resources. Specifically, whether or not one receives support has been shown to be less important for health and adjustment than one's beliefs about resource availability. The belief that support is available diffuses stressor impacts by way of the secondary stage of appraisal; it increases the likelihood of concluding that one has "enough" or the "right" coping responses and social resources to deal with specific circumstances. The extent to which stressor effects are mediated by resources depends on ideas about what is supportive, as well as actual

resource levels. Stress related experiences reflect the social dispositions possessed and cognitive postures assumed when stimuli are defined as threatening.

THE STRESS PROCESS AND HEALTH: SYNOPSIS AND SYNTHESIS

Generally, the term stress is used to describe feelings experienced when a person is confronted by disruptions, demands, or challenges. Yet among stress researchers this term is linked to a process that takes shape far before the arousal of any feelings. In this latter context stress has internal and external origins, includes occurrences requiring adjustments acutely, daily, and chronically, and is expressed both emotionally and physiologically. Moreover, the process is seen as affected by factors that increase or decrease exposures to potentially noxious stimuli.

This entry provides an overview of the stress process and health as one of many domains impacted by stressors and mediators. It is limited in that some ideas about the stress process were not covered (e.g., the array of stress model variants depicting relations among vulnerability factors, stressors, mediators, and health; the role of social capital and social networks in the stress process). Information concerning developments in these areas can be obtained by consulting works by Ensel and Lin (1991) among numerous others.

SEE ALSO: Social Support; Stress and Migration; Stress, Stress Theories; Stress and Work; Stressful Life Events

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stress and migration

Judith T. Shuval

Migration within and between different countries is an ongoing, worldwide phenomenon which is likely to continue well into the twenty first century and involve over 130 million persons. It is caused by population pressures, environmental deterioration, poverty, wars, persecution, and human rights abuses. Migration is a response to the flow of capital, technology, and cultural innovations in an interactive process across the globe. It links countries by flows and counter flows of people in sets of networks which are both interdependent and independent of each other. Countries of origin and destination are determined by historical ties based on earlier colonization, political influence, trade, investment, or cultural ties – as well as the present economic, social, and political contexts.

Migrants are extremely diversified. They include a wide variety of people and the various categories of migrants may shift over time from one type to another. The most prominent categories include permanent settlers, temporary and seasonal workers, refugees and asylum seekers, legal and illegal immigrants, diaspora migrants who return to their former homeland, persons who come for purposes of family reunion, skilled and unskilled persons of varying social class backgrounds, persons of urban and rural origins, wage earners and entrepreneurs, and many varieties of ethnic groups.

Extensive illegal immigration characterizes many of the receiving societies and poses a major threat to the authority and power of the state, since it represents a loss of control in the flow of people and goods over borders. Efforts to

control illegals have included penalties on employers who provide them with jobs, as well as limitations on such benefits as welfare payments, tax and housing assistance, family support, student loans, and medical care.

Illegal migrants take the least desired jobs on the market, make their living in the "informal" sector, and satisfy employers' demand for cheap labor. Because of their willingness to accept lower wages, illegals pose a job threat to the local population. Illegals are subject to increased stress in some countries because of their ineligibility for health and welfare benefits, education for their children, and fear of deportation. In many parts of the world there is a concern that immigrants import Islamic fundamentalism and terror as well as increasing crime rates. Humanitarian concerns have been compromised for security considerations by imposing tighter controls on the entry of illegal immigrants.

Stress occurs when an individual confronts a salient situation in which their usual modes of behavior are inadequate and the consequences of not adapting are sufficiently disturbing to result in a disruption in homeostasis. Situations are not objectively stressful, but are constructed as such by individuals in relation to their own social and cultural norms. If one is unable to mobilize personal or social resources to cope with the situation in such a manner as to restore homeostasis, energy will be bound up dealing with the perceived disturbance.

The availability and usability of coping mechanisms constitute the link that determines whether a situation will in fact result in stress for the individual. Indeed, there is considerable evidence for the stress mediating and stress buffering roles of coping resources. Such coping resources are of two types: individual (e.g., personal skills, personality traits, intelligence, knowledge) and social (e.g., formal institutions, informal groups, social norms and values). In the context of migration, earlier, familiar coping mechanisms may lose their efficacy in the transition from one cultural setting to another. Furthermore, stress experienced in the country of origin may be "imported" into the destination and even be exacerbated by the newer stresses of the migration process.

Stress may be viewed as both a cause and a consequence of migration. On the causative level, stress in any given location may act as a

motivator of migration, when people believe that they can reduce stress and improve their overall situation by migrating to a different setting. In order to serve as an effective motivator, two conditions are required: (1) a level of stress which is perceived as sufficiently powerful and salient to justify uprooting oneself and one's family from a familiar setting; and (2) knowledge about the destination and a belief that conditions there will provide less stress and a more satisfactory setting.

The relationship between migration and stress is best conceptualized in terms of an integrated, macro micro framework. On the macro level, the changing nature of state responses to the presence of immigrant communities needs to be considered against a background of shifting notions of nationhood and transnational processes. Processes of globalization which induce the circulation of capital, commodities, people, and cultural practices, reconfigure spaces and identities, and change earlier notions of attachment and citizenship. While people from less developed parts of the world try to move to the economically developed regions, there is anxiety in migrant receiving countries about job loss and changes to national culture which promote state policies to restrict, control, and select international migrants.

On the micro level it is necessary to consider issues of individual and collective identity, life chances, and how immigrants perceive themselves and their social reality. Social networks are micro structures which play a core role in migration processes by their role in providing assistance at the destination in job location, financial support, practical information, and a base for the migration of additional persons. The ongoing nature of the process is seen in the fact that the larger the number of people who migrate, the thicker the social networks at the destinations and the consequent amount of available help; this tends to decrease the costs and risks of migration for others from the same origin. Widespread policies of "family reunification" reinforce these networks.

The processes of change which are inherent in migration undermine the sense of the self with respect to the individual's place in the social order. One of the major sources of stress for immigrants is the loss of numerous self identities that were embedded in their former

communities, jobs, skills, language, and culture. These represent a serious loss in human capital. Racism, prejudice, and xenophobia exacerbate the difficulties encountered in the reconstruction of identity. Role theorists have suggested that when a person has multiple identities, they are better able to cope with the loss of a specific role because viable alternative identities are available and can be given increased weight in defining one's self.

Migration has stimulated the rise of transnational communities which challenge conventional identities, notions of belonging, rights, and responsibilities. Studies of diaspora migration have highlighted the multiple ethnic identities that are maintained by immigrants – as ties to former homelands are retained through cheap travel and electronic modes of communication. These patterns have challenged older notions of the nation state and patterns of exclusive loyalty and identity.

On the structural level, migrants are not dispersed at random in a social system, but tend to be located in specific occupational and geographical niches, often in marginal locations. These patterns reflect informal or formal barriers imposed by the host society, as well as immigrants' choices. Since migration is frequently a response to job openings in the host society, the types of jobs available vary widely, from unskilled laborers to skilled technicians or professionals. Limited options for housing and exclusionary mechanisms often force migrants into slum neighborhoods and substandard housing. Thus, the structural location of the migrant in the social system exposes them to different stressors, including health risks.

Occupational and geographic concentration contributes to the visibility of migrants, and this affects both the migrant group itself and other populations in the society. Insofar as the migrants are concerned, a common structural location carries implications for self identification, solidarity, and feelings of commonality. A sense of cohesion may result, promoting group identification and social support, but may also exacerbate stress by encouraging or reinforcing collective perceptions of exploitation and deprivation.

Ethnic enclaves composed of immigrants and their offspring have attained growing

legitimacy as demands for cultural assimilation have been found to be incompatible with democratic values of tolerance and equality. Ethnic pluralism has become normative in many societies. One result has been the long term persistence and viability of ethnic communities and neighborhoods in which traditional cultural patterns are retained and reinforced over several generations. These have strengthened ethnic cohesion as well as ties with former homelands which encourage the development of cross national communities. But when such enclaves are perceived as ghettos which serve as a barrier to mobility and achievement, the resulting sense of deprivation is often expressed in hostility or violence focused on other accessible target groups, which include immigrants stemming from different cultural backgrounds or veteran groups in the host society who are perceived as legitimate targets. Indeed, violence as a mode of attaining goals may be part of the normative cultural baggage of some groups of immigrants in a multi ethnic society.

There is a dynamic quality to structurally determined stressors. During the early period in the host society, migrants often accept low status or deprivation as inevitable; however, there is generally a strong underlying expectation of change for the better. When the host society's culture includes such values as equality, achievement, and social mobility these expectations are reinforced. If improvement is perceived as slow or absent, such lack of change serves as a stressor. Stress is felt by subgroups in such a value context, as they feel they are not succeeding or are not attaining as much as relevant others. Migrants are especially vulnerable to such feelings when they have been in the host society for increasing lengths of time and especially in the second and third generation. Under such conditions, it may be said that the stress induced by migration is multi generational and its effects can be long term, as they spread to other segments of the population.

Attitudes of groups in the host society toward migrants range from acceptance and tolerance to hostility or overt aggression. In any case, the visibility of the migrants makes possible a clearer focus on them by the host population or by subgroups in it. Expressions of prejudice, intolerance, aggression, or xenophobia

may serve as stressors, especially when the more successful migrants are perceived as competing with, or advantaged relative to, veteran members of the society.

Another structural dimension on which migrants are not randomly distributed is the power and influence hierarchy in the host society. At the time of entry, migrants tend to be low on these factors. For migrants who enjoyed and utilized power before their move, its absence may serve as a stressor in the new society. However, when large numbers of immigrants from one country of origin arrive, they may themselves constitute a political power in the host country. Their interests may dictate that they lobby for the admission of groups from specific countries of origin, for limitations in the numbers of immigrants, or for their own special interests.

Absence of power may express itself on the simplest level by lack of citizenship. For a period of time the migrant may be unable to vote, hold office, acquire property, or qualify for certain jobs. Once formal citizenship has been acquired, migrants may still encounter barriers in the economic and political spheres, where positions of power are occupied by veterans who have little interest in relinquishing such influence to newcomers. In open, democratic societies, political organization of migrant groups may provide channels to acquire power and influence within such groups and through them eventually enter into the broader political context.

On the informal level, migration often results in a shift in the balance of power within families and other informal social contexts. Thus, persons who traditionally have wielded power in the family (e.g., grandparents or fathers) may find themselves stripped of their accustomed roles as a result of different patterns of family life in the new society. Unless alternative rewards are found for the demoted traditional leaders, they are likely to experience stress.

The above processes are intensified by globalized media messages which serve to inflate expectations and intensify trends toward increased democratization. Immigrants often expect rapid improvement in their economic and social status in the host society, immediate rewards, and a voice in decision making. When these are slow in coming, the ensuing frustration may lead to violence.

SEE ALSO: Migration, Ethnic Conflicts, and Racism; Migration: Internal; Migration: International; Migration: Undocumented/Illegal; Stress and Health; Stress and Work

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stress, stress theories

Gerald F. Lackey

What differentiates the study of stress in sociology from similar work in fields like biology or medicine is the attention given by sociologists to the social distribution of mental health and well being. Sociological inquiry focuses on how the causes of stress, the resources for coping with stress, and the outcomes of stress vary across subgroups in the population. As distinct from a psychological or biological approach, the sociological study of stress focuses on how the social condition can determine a number of different stress outcomes. A significant step forward in this endeavor was made by Pearlin et al. (1981) when they formalized a sociological theory of the stress process.

There are three fundamental concepts that form the core of the stress process: stressors, moderators/mediators, and stress outcomes. Stressors can be external, environmental, or social factors, or internal, biological, or psychological factors that challenge an individual to adapt or change. They can be discrete events such as the destruction of one's home by a tornado or chronic problems such as a degenerative neurological illness like Alzheimer's disease. Related, moderators are the social or personal resources that attenuate the effects of

stressors or change the situations that are producing the stressors. In addition to this buffering effect, research also shows that certain resources can have mediating effects on stress outcomes. The three types of moderators/mediators are coping strategies, personal resources, and social support. Lastly, stress outcomes are the psychological, emotional, or physiological conditions resulting from exposure to stressors, after accounting for the the moderators/mediators.

In a simplified model of the stress process, people's position in the social structure exposes them to stressors, which in turn leads to stress outcomes. Moderators and mediators primarily have effects between the stressors and the outcomes, and the social structure and the stressors. This simplified model hides the reciprocal relationships and agentic processes that exist in practice between stressors and moderators, outcomes and stressors, and also individually among stressors, moderators, and outcomes. Nonetheless it accurately represents the underlying connections among the key stress theory concepts (Pearlin 1999).

There are two broad categories of stressors: event stressors and chronic stressors. Event stressors include any sudden and generally unexpected phenomena that result in a stress outcome. Initial work measured the effect of an event stressor by the amount of change it required of an individual (i.e., the larger the magnitude, the more negative the outcome), but subsequent work has shown this to be a poor measure when taken on its own. In defining the effect of an event it is important to take into account whether or not the event was anticipated (e.g., retirement), whether it represents a closure of another stressor (e.g., divorce after a long period of litigation), or even whether the individual deliberately sought the event as a problem solving strategy to other stressors (e.g., getting fired from a miserable job). Thus, research shows that seemingly negative life events may actually decrease the likelihood of having a negative stress outcome when considered in context of a person's other life course trajectory. In fact, current work embeds an understanding of life events (both positive and negative) within the life course framework of transitions, trajectories, and pathways.

Chronic stressors comprise a wide variety of stressors, including status strains, role strains,

ambient strains, and quotidian strains. As their name suggests, status strains are stressors that arise out of a person's position in the social structure (e.g., living in abject poverty). Furthermore, the holding of a status that is stigmatized or devalued by society (e.g., a particular race, gender, sexuality, or religion) can also be a status strain. Role strains focus on the stressors that arise from conflicts or demands within an individual's role set and they provide stress theory's key link between macro level influences and individual outcomes. Initial research focused only on the negative effect of having many roles, arguing that they create competing demands on the individual, thus acting as stressors. Yet subsequent research has shown that under certain conditions having many roles can benefit the individual by providing more fungible resources that carry over from one role to another. Ambient strains focus on the stressors that come from an individual's proximal environment, most often measured as their neighborhood. Here the focus is on threats of crime or violence, or on access to resources like schools, hospitals, fire departments, and other public services. Quotidian or daily strains are perceived to produce the lowest intensity stressors and arise out of the daily hassles of things like waiting in traffic, fighting for a spot on the subway, or cooking. Research suggests that the effect of these strains may stem more from the fact that they are repeated daily than from the individual stressors themselves.

It is important not just to know the types of stressors an individual faces, but also the timing and interrelationship of these stressors. Stressors rarely occur in isolation from one another. Often, some primary stressor leads to several secondary stressors, a process known as stress proliferation. When the sequence of stressors is considered in conjunction with a person's multiple roles, the concept of a carry over effect is introduced, whereby stressors in one role domain or life stage may have impacts in other domains or stages. For example, facing multiple stressors in childhood may have consequences for adult mental health. Similarly, facing stressors at home may have consequences for anxiety levels at work. The study of sequencing is an increasingly important one in the sociological study of stress, as it can better account for the dynamic link between individuals and society as

well as illuminate the long term consequences of stressors that are often obscured by cross sectional or short term studies.

Related to the sequencing of stressors is the sequencing of life events, a concept that is a core component of life course theory. Stress researchers and life course researchers have been combining efforts to investigate how the sequencing of life events and transitions leads to both positive and negative outcomes. Two competing arguments exist as to why the timing of life events produces stressors. One argument is that there are societal norms for when certain transitions should be made relative to others and that when individuals deviate from these paths the society produces stressors. For example, in some societies it is a violation of social norms to have children outside of wedlock, thus if a woman violates this norm it may increase her likelihood of experiencing stressors. The other argument puts less emphasis on the violation of societal norms and more on the belief that certain sequences generate practical, objective obstacles, which in turn create stressors. For example, having a child outside of marriage normally necessitates being both a full time parent and a full time mother, something which may or may not generate stressors depending on other factors. In the end, this union of methods, theories, and concepts between life course theorists and stress theorists holds promise for understanding the role of the stress process over a much longer time horizon.

The second major component to the stress model is the role of moderators/mediators like coping strategies, personal resources, and social support. Coping strategies are the changes people make to their behavioral or psychological state in response to the stressors they encounter. Coping strategies may be focused on changing the situation that is causing the stressors (e.g., finding a new job after being fired), on preventing a stressor from occurring (e.g., marriage counseling to prevent divorce), on reinterpreting the stressors in a different light (e.g., looking at increased job responsibility as an opportunity instead of a burden), or on managing the stress outcomes (e.g., including meditation in one's daily routine). In order to make use of these coping strategies individuals need coping resources which can be either personal or social.

Personal resources include a sense of self mastery or control over one's life and environment, as well as one's self esteem. More of the research on personal resources has focused on self mastery and less of it on self esteem, but both have been shown to directly reduce the severity and prevalence of stress outcomes as both mediators and moderators. More work, however, still needs to be done to understand the interaction effect these personal resources have with social support and coping strategies, as well as their potential to condition the types of social support and coping strategies one receives.

Social support has been the most widely studied resource and continues to show strong, significant direct and buffering effects on stress outcomes. Social support comes chiefly in the forms of instrumental assistance, informational assistance, and emotional assistance from other people. Three major conclusions can be drawn from the literature on social support: (1) being a member of a closely knit group has direct positive mental health benefits, but does not act as a moderator on stress outcomes; (2) perceived emotional support (whether real or not) has both direct and buffering effects on the severity and significance of negative life events for stress outcomes; (3) having an intimate relationship that encourages confiding in one another has the largest effect on attenuating stress outcomes.

The biggest shortcoming with the work on social support is with how the concept is measured. Progress has been made in treating social support as a type of social network with defined measures of range, density, composition, and availability, but this is not standardized. Furthermore, it is largely measured only from the perspective of the individual under observation without acknowledging that these are reciprocal, social relationships. Along similar lines, future work on social support needs to consider the reciprocal relationship between support and stressors, as having too many stressors or too long a duration of stressors may lead to a weakening of one's social support network.

The final step in the stress process model is the stress outcome, which can be any health or mental health illness. Most often sociologists study generalized depression, anxiety, or drug/alcohol abuse, but there is a push to study the comorbidity of multiple health and mental

health outcomes. Aneshensel et al. (1991) were the first to note the importance of studying multiple outcomes in a single study. In their words, "single outcome studies . . . are clearly inadequate for identifying the impact of social factors on overall psychological well being across subgroups of the population." This conclusion is made all the more important given that one of the primary contributions of the sociological study of stress is its focus on the social distributions of mental health and well being. Much more work is needed on this part of the stress model, but it promises to make an important contribution to researchers in fields outside of sociology.

SEE ALSO: Life Course Perspective; Role Theory; Social Support; Stress and Health; Stress and Migration; Stress and Work; Stressful Life Events

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stress and work

Johannes Siegrist

While stress is a popular concept in everyday life that describes a feeling of pressure resulting from overload, it is also a scientific term of growing importance. In a scientific perspective, stress differs from the everyday notion in at least two important ways. First, stress defines a reaction to a challenge (stressor) from the external world or from within the organism that interrupts or threatens the usual behavior and normal functioning of a person and that requires specific efforts to meet the challenge. These efforts are termed coping. It is important to note that major stressors that are experienced in everyday life emerge from the social rather than the physical environment. Examples of such social stressors are interpersonal power, role obligations, competition between organizations, groups, or individuals, and social deprivation or inequality. Therefore, stress is an important sociological topic.

A second difference between everyday and scientific notions of stress concerns the distinction of several dimensions of a person's response to a stressor. In scientific terms, four dimensions of the stress response are distinguished: the cognitive, the affective or emotional, the physiological, and the behavioral response. At the cognitive level, a challenge is appraised according to its degree of threat or harm. This appraisal is paralleled by negative or positive affective responses. Most importantly, the experience of threat goes along with intense negative emotions of anger, irritation, or anxiety. At the physiological level, stress reactions elicit arousal of the organism through activation of the autonomic nervous system and the so-called stress hormones. Through this activation the person is prepared to adapt their behavior in terms of fight or flight. If the challenge is met by

successful coping efforts, positive emotions of self-esteem and self-efficacy are experienced, and the organism recovers quickly. However, if an overwhelming challenge results in a defeat or in a chronic unresolved struggle, strong negative emotions and sustained autonomic activation are evoked that "get under the skin." In the long run they trigger bodily dysfunction and disease, such as cardiovascular disease, metabolic or gastrointestinal diseases, or affective disorders (Weiner 1992).

Work and employment belong to those core social circumstances that produce recurrent stress responses in exposed people. Therefore, the scientific inquiry into associations of stressful working conditions with health is considered a prominent topic of medical sociology. This subdiscipline of general sociology is in a unique position to bridge the social sciences with the biomedical sciences by combining sociological, psychological, and physiological information in epidemiological study designs. When analyzing associations of work-related stress with health one has to keep in mind that the nature of work has changed considerably over the past several decades in economically advanced societies. Industrial mass production no longer dominates the labor market. This is due in part to technological progress and to a growing number of jobs available in the service sector. Many jobs are confined to information processing, controlling, and coordination. Sedentary rather than physically strenuous work is becoming more and more dominant. New management techniques may be introduced, and economic constraints can produce work pressure, greater rationalization of tasks, and reduction in personnel. These changes go along with changes in the structure of the labor market. More employees are likely to work on temporary or fixed-term contracts, or in flexible job arrangements. Overemployment in some segments of the workforce is paralleled by underemployment, job instability, or structural unemployment in other segments. Overall, a substantial part of the economically active population is confined to insecure jobs, to premature retirement, or job loss.

Why is work so important for human well-being, and how does work contribute to the burden of stress and its adverse effects on health? In all advanced societies work and occupation in adult life are accorded primacy for the

following reasons. First, having a job is a principal prerequisite for continuous income and thus for independence from traditional support systems (family, community welfare, etc.). Increasingly, level of income determines a wide range of life chances. Second, training for a job and achievement of occupational status are among the most important goals of socialization. It is through education, job training, and status acquisition that personal growth and development are realized, that a core social identity outside the family is acquired, and that goal directed activity in human life is shaped. Third, occupation defines an important criterion of social stratification. Amount of esteem in inter personal life largely depends on type of job and level of occupational achievement. Fourth, occupational settings produce the most persuasive continuous demands during one's lifetime, and they absorb the largest amount of active time in adult life, thus providing a source of recurrent negative or positive emotions. It is for these reasons that stress research in organizations where paid work takes place is of particular relevance.

There is now growing awareness among all parties of the labor market that stress at work produces considerable costs, most importantly a high level of absenteeism, reduced productivity, compensation claims, health insurance, and direct medical expenses. Permanent disability and loss of productive life years due to premature death add to this burden. At the same time, scientific evidence on associations between stress at work and health is growing rapidly. This research differs from traditional biomedical occupational health research by the fact that social stressors cannot be identified by direct physical or chemical measurements. Rather, theoretical models are needed that aim at identifying the "toxic" components of stressful work within the complexities and diversities of occupational settings. Ideally, such a sociological model has rather general explanatory power and can be applied to a wide range of different working conditions. With its focus on the social reality of work it may identify specific occupational risk groups and thus explain the burden of work related illness above and beyond individual susceptibility.

During the past 30 years, several sociological models of work stress have been developed

and tested. The "person-environment-fit" approach was probably the first one of these models (Caplan et al. 1980; Cooper 1998; Dunham 2000). More recently, two such concepts received special attention in health related research: the "demand control" and the "effort reward imbalance" models (Karasek & Theorell 1990; Siegrist & Marmot 2004).

The demand control model is based upon the premise that stress at work occurs when there is high psychological work demand in combination with a low degree of task control. Low control at work is defined in terms of low level of decision latitude (authority over decisions) and a low level of skill utilization. Job task profiles characterized by high demand and low control are assumed to evoke recurrent stress responses among those exposed. Conversely, demanding jobs that offer a high level of decision latitude and skill utilization promote personal growth and thus may be beneficial to health. More recently, the two dimensional demand control model was modified to include a third dimension, social support at work. If social support at work is available, it may act as an interpersonal coping resource to buffer the adverse effects of stress on health. On the other hand, high demand/low control conditions at work were shown to produce highest levels of stress reactions among those who work in social isolation or who suffer from inadequate social support.

The effort reward imbalance model is concerned with contractual fairness at work. It assumes that effort at work is spent as part of a contract based on the norm of social reciprocity where rewards are provided in terms of money, esteem, and career opportunities, including job security. Work contracts often fail to be fully specified and to provide a symmetric exchange between requested efforts and given rewards. In particular, this is the case when there are few or no alternative employment opportunities for the employees. Additional conditions of non equivalent exchange were identified by the model, including a personal pattern of coping with work demands ("overcommitment"). Non symmetric work contracts are expected to be frequent in a global economy characterized by job insecurity, forced occupational mobility, short term contracts, and increased wage competition. The model of effort reward imbalance

claims that lack of reciprocity between the costs and gains (i.e., high cost/low gain condition) elicits recurrent stress reactions due to obvious violation of a basic norm of social exchange, reciprocity. In the long run, the negative emotions that parallel these stress reactions result in increased risks of ill health and disease. These two models of stress at work complement each other. They offer opportunities for combining information on work stress and health, as conditions of low control and low reward often occur simultaneously in the same work environments.

Evidence of reduced health due to exposure to the social stressors that are defined by the two models is growing rapidly. Overall, prospective epidemiological investigations found a twofold elevated risk of a number of physical and mental disorders among employees working under high demand/low control or high effort/low reward conditions. Elevated risks were documented for coronary heart disease and cardiovascular mortality, for depression, for type II diabetes, and for alcohol dependence. Although some of the prospective findings seem to be restricted to men, they are not confined to a specific occupational group. Rather, work stress is found to affect the health of employees in industrial as well as in service and administrative occupations and professions. Currently available prospective evidence is supplemented by a large body of data derived from cross sectional investigations, case control studies, and experimental findings testing the two work stress models. For instance, higher rates of sickness absence, musculoskeletal disorders, health adverse behaviors (e.g., smoking), and biomedical cardiovascular risk factors (high blood pressure, elevated blood lipids, and fibrinogen) were observed in association with high demand/low control or effort/reward imbalance (Schnall et al. 2000). Finally, in search of psychobiological mechanisms linking exposure to social stressors with illness susceptibility, elevated levels of stress hormones, reduced competence of the body's immune system, and reduced heart rate variability were documented.

These findings of health related sociological research have policy implications, given the fact that up to one third of a country's workforce may be exposed to conditions of work related stress that were identified by the two models.

Moreover, a risk factor that doubles the incidence of frequent disorders, such as cardiovascular disease, depression, or musculo skeletal disorders, calls for increased preventive efforts. Health promoting improvements of quality of work require specific measures of organizational and personnel development that can be derived from the theoretical models. Concerning the demand control model they include job redesign in terms of increased autonomy, skill discretion, job enlargement, and enhanced participation. Provision of compensatory wage systems and models of gain sharing, strengthening of non monetary gratifications (e.g., through leadership training), and ways of improving promotional opportunities and job security are measures derived from the effort reward imbalance model. Clearly, the power of economic life and the constraints of globalization limit the options and range of worksite health promotion measures. Such measures need to be supplemented by more comprehensive interorganizational and governmental activities that aim at reducing the gap between scientific evidence and policy development. Research on work stress and health illustrates the promising contribution sociology can make to this end.

SEE ALSO: Stress and Health; Stress, Stress Theories; Stressful Life Events

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stressful life events

William R. Avison

Stressful life events are discrete social experiences or life changes that require individual adjustment or manifest themselves in emotional arousal or physical reactions. The defining characteristic of life events as stressors is that they are observable life changes that have relatively clear onsets and endings. This quality of discreteness distinguishes stressful life events from chronic stressors that typically have more insidious onsets and whose conclusions are less easily demarcated. Chronic stressors tend also to have longer time courses than life events.

Interest in the relationship between stressful life events and health can be traced to Hans Selye's biological research which concluded that events that constitute a threat to the organism produce a series of responses, some of which are adaptive and others of which are maladaptive. Wheaton (1994) argued that an engineering model of stress may be more useful conceptually to social science researchers because it conceives of stress as an external force or pressure that exceeds the capacity to adjust. Both formulations distinguish between relatively discrete or eventful stressors and more continuous, ongoing challenges or threats.

The early work of Thomas Holmes and Robert Rahe in developing a life events checklist (the Social Readjustment Rating Scale) stimulated much of the subsequent research on stressful life events and their consequences for mental health and illness. Their inventory of life events generated a substantial body of subsequent research that took two distinctive directions. Dohrenwend and Dohrenwend (1974) led the way in further developing and refining life events inventories to address contextual effects and the problem of intra event variability. Their

approach retained the life events checklist method but elaborated this approach with additional probes and editing procedures that addressed problems of measurement. Their work focused on the importance of stressful life events as mediators of the relationship between social status and mental health problems. George Brown's approach (Brown & Harris 1989) has been to focus on the psychological meaning of life events by conducting in depth interviews that focus on the strong emotions that life events produce. Although these two approaches differ substantially in method and emphasis, both have stimulated a wealth of research that documents the association between the experience of stressful life events and a wide range of mental health outcomes.

Despite the early excitement among researchers that the experience of stressful life events might constitute an important determinant of mental health problems, several researchers observed that the magnitude of the association between stressful life events and mental health outcomes was relatively small. This observation generated a vast body of research that attempted to explain how the theoretically compelling association between stressful life events and mental health could be so modest empirically. A number of important conclusions have emerged from this research.

There is substantial evidence of variability in stressful life events both in terms of the events themselves and the social contexts in which they occur. A number of researchers have addressed the issue of intra event variability by incorporating probe questions in checklists in order to better specify the nature of stressors. From a sociological perspective, a more important development has been the recognition that stressful life events occur in different social contexts. Brown's work has been important in understanding how individuals' life experiences around the occurrence of stressful life events condition their meaning and emotional impact. Other researchers have documented how biographical histories influence the experience of events and how community contexts modify the impact of stressors on mental health. Still others have demonstrated how certain circumstances lead to stress proliferation and how some stressors amplify the effects of other life events on symptoms of mental illness.

In the 1980s there was substantial interest in the possibility that the modest association of stressful life events with symptoms of mental illness might be due to the differential vulnerability, responsiveness, or susceptibility of more disadvantaged social groups to stressors. The sources of this differential vulnerability were hypothesized to be group differences in social resources such as social support, in more personal resources such as mastery or coping capacity, or in other susceptibilities including biophysiological differences. Over time, sociologists have largely concluded that there is little evidence for the hypothesis of differential vulnerability. When exposure to stressors is measured comprehensively and when a wide array of mental health outcomes are considered, social group differences in vulnerability appear to be less important in accounting for variation in mental health outcomes than are differences in exposure to stressors.

These findings have had important implications for a broader conceptualization of the domain of stress. Wheaton (1994) has argued for a much more elaborate stress universe that supplements standard life events checklists with measures of chronic stressors, traumatic experiences in childhood and adolescence, and daily hassles. Subsequent research suggests that consideration of a much broader array of stressors reveals a much more robust association between stressors and mental health than can be observed for stressful life events alone. Moreover, research shows that reliance only on measures of stressful life events may underestimate social group variations in exposure to stress.

Perhaps the most important contribution that sociologists have made to the study of stressful life events and mental health is to document how individuals' positions in the social structure of society profoundly affect their experience of social stressors that ultimately manifest themselves in symptoms of mental illness. Pearlin (1989) clearly articulated this in outlining his vision of the sociological study of stress. Since then, many sociologists have documented how variations in social status and role occupancy are associated with differential exposure to stressful experience.

Another noteworthy development in the sociological study of stress is the incorporation

of the life course perspective. Sociologists have increasingly argued for the importance of considering the impact of stressful life experiences on mental health over the life course. The theoretical rationale for this has been specified by Pearlin and Skaff (1996) and George (1999).

The challenge for future sociological research on stressful life events is to integrate concepts and ideas from the broader sociological discipline so that we can better specify the interplay among social structure, stress, and health. In this way, the importance of stress in social life will be better understood.

SEE ALSO: Aging, Mental Health and Well Being; Mental Disorder; Social Epidemiology; Stress and Health; Stress and Migration; Stress, Stress Theories; Stress and Work

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strong objectivity

Nancy A. Naples

The notion of strong objectivity was first articulated by feminist philosopher Sandra Harding. Strong objectivity builds on the insights of feminist standpoint theory, which argues for the importance of starting from the experiences of those who have been traditionally left out of the production of knowledge. By starting inquiry from the lived experiences of women and others who have been traditionally outside of the institutions in which knowledge about social life is generated and classified, more objective and more relevant knowledge can be produced. In fact, Harding (1986) and Hartsock (1983) argue that knowledge produced from the point of view of subordinated groups may offer stronger objectivity due to the increased motivation for them to understand the views or perspectives of those in positions of power.

A scholar who approaches the research process from the point of view of strong objectivity is interested in producing knowledge for use as well as for revealing the relations of power that are hidden in traditional knowledge production processes. Strong objectivity acknowledges that the production of power is a political process and that greater attention paid to the context and social location of knowledge producers will contribute to a more ethical and transparent result. In fact, Harding (1991) argues, an approach to research and knowledge production that does not acknowledge the role that power and social location play in the knowledge production process must be understood as offering only a weak form of objectivity.

Another aspect of traditional approaches to science and knowledge production that contributes to a weak form of objectivity is found in the move to greater and greater generalization.

As a result, material reality is replaced with abstractions that bear little resemblance to the phenomenon originally under examination. Smith (1987), another scholar who has contributed to the development of standpoint theory, explains that the traditional androcentric approach to sociology that privileges a white, middle class, and heterosexual point of view produces results that are both alienating and colonizing (see Stanley 1990). Harding (1998) has been especially concerned with the role of colonization in marginalizing the situated knowledges of the targets of colonization. Western science has developed through the exploitation and silencing of colonial subjects. In this way, much useful knowledge has been lost or rendered suspect (see Sachs 1996). Strong objectivity involves acknowledging the political, social, and historical aspects of all knowledge (Longino 1993). The strongest approach to knowledge production is one that takes into account the most diverse set of experiences.

Reflexivity is another practice that contributes to strong objectivity. Harding argues for a self-reflexive approach to theorizing in order to foreground how relations of power may be shaping the production of knowledge in different contexts (also see Naples 2003). The point of view of all those involved in the knowledge production process must be acknowledged and taken into account in order to produce strong objectivity. In this way, knowledge production should involve a collective process, rather than the individualistic, top-down, and distanced approach that typifies the traditional scientific method. For Harding (1991), strong objectivity involves analysis of the relationship between both the subject and object of inquiry. This approach contrasts with traditional scientific method that either denies this relationship or seeks to achieve control over it. However, as Harding and other standpoint theorists point out, an approach to research that produces a more objective approach acknowledges the partial and situated nature of all knowledge production (also see Hartsock 1983; Haraway 1988; Collins 1990).

Postmodern critics of this approach point out that the goal of producing a strong objectivity replicates the limitations of traditional scientific methods, namely, privileging one or more accounts as most "accurate" or true (Hekman

1992). Postmodern theorists argue that all social positions are fluid. Such fluidity makes it impossible to identify individual knowers who can represent any particular social group. Furthermore, they insist, the search for truth, even one that is partial, is fraught with marginalizing other accounts. However, those who adopt the stance of strong objectivity argue that it can avoid the “arrogant aspirations of modernist epistemology” (Longino 1993: 212).

SEE ALSO: Black Feminist Thought; Feminist Methodology; Feminist Standpoint Theory; Materialist Feminisms; Matrix of Domination; Objectivity; Outsider Within; Postmodern Feminism; Reflexivity; Subjectivity

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Strong Program

Lena Eriksson

The Strong Program is a programmatic statement that calls upon social scientists to examine the social content and underpinnings of scientific knowledge. It played an important part in the wider development of the field of sociology of scientific knowledge. The Strong Program originated from the so called Edinburgh school in the mid 1970s and was most famously set out by David Bloor in his 1976 book, *Knowledge and Social Imagery*. Bloor was part of a group of sociologists and historians based in the University of Edinburgh who proposed that social scientists should treat and analyze scientific knowledge claims as they would any other type of knowledge claims: as knowledge constructed and located in a specific societal framework. The Strong Program was inspired by Wittgenstein’s argument about rules, which states that to apply a rule, or a taxonomy, or a term, a judgment of similarity or difference is needed. The Edinburgh group introduced the concept of *finitism* to argue for why the content of scientific knowledge could not, and should not, be exempt from sociological analysis. No two cases or events are ever “the same,” or “not the same,” without a human decision about similarity or difference.

Scientific knowledge claims had hitherto been excluded from sociological analysis – it was considered to be a unique type of knowledge derived by special means. The way in which scientists arrived at their conclusions, via systematic empirical study, granted such knowledge a special status. Scientific knowledge was seen as the simple result of our observations of nature; inextricably linked to that nature by force of the scientific method. Thus, while one could conduct interesting sociological analysis of

the circumstances that surround scientific knowledge production, such as Robert Merton's famous studies of scientific institutions, the actual *content* of scientific knowledge was seen as exempt from any social influences. The Strong Program challenged this assumption and instead argued that no distinction should be made between natural knowledge and other types of knowledge. Thus, all knowledge claims should be treated as material for sociological investigation and explanation.

The most well known part of the Strong Program is the four tenets of causality, impartiality, symmetry, and reflexivity. The tenet of causality is concerned with the conditions that will enable or give rise to a certain belief or state of knowledge. Just as we look for causality in nature, we should systematically examine the causes and conditions that bring about our knowledge about the natural world. One example of such causal conditions could be wider political structures. Many analysts working within the framework of the Strong Program during the 1970s and 1980s invoked external interests of particular groups to explain internal states of knowledge. One pivotal study by historian Steven Shapin correlated the rise of phrenology in Edinburgh during the 1820s with the interests of a burgeoning middle class whose status and legitimacy were boosted by the idea of biological heritage over that of inherited privilege. Such scientific theories were resisted by an upper class, mainly represented by the Royal Society, whose power and legitimacy depended on the idea that ability and fitness to rule were class dependent.

The tenet of impartiality states that the analyst should examine all beliefs on an equal basis, regardless of whether they are held to be true or false, rational or irrational. This requirement overlaps with the third tenet, that of symmetry. The tenet of symmetry is the most well known feature of the Strong Program and is perhaps also its lasting legacy in the field of science studies today. Symmetry means that all knowledge claims should be explained in the same way and with the same methods, e.g., in terms of their social causes and by means of detailed empirical investigation. This should be done regardless of their societal status as "true" or "false." Beliefs held to be irrational thus warrant

the same level of attention by the sociologist as rational beliefs would. Furthermore, they should be treated and explained by reference to their social causes and conditions, without reference to "nature." Our beliefs about nature are the objects of sociological investigation, and the argument would thus become circular if those beliefs were explained by reference to themselves.

Bloor uses the metaphor of a train crash – it is when things go wrong that we tend to look for "the human factor." Perfectly functioning train services are, of course, as "social" as the ones that go wrong, but we never launch investigations into why trains do not crash. We exempt seemingly unproblematic events from sociological investigation. Social science analysis that explains knowledge or beliefs thought to be false or irrational with reference to its social production, but leaves claims held to be true and rational as in no need of sociological attention, is referred to as a "sociology of error."

Finally, the tenet of reflexivity means that the same types and patterns of explanations should and must be applicable to sociology itself. Sociology does not think of itself as standing apart from other types of knowledge production, and is therefore as viable a material for sociological investigation as any other type of knowledge claim.

The Strong Program has been criticized for containing an inherent asymmetry, as scientific knowledge is explained by reference to social interests, but the social interests themselves are taken as "real" and stable entities. Another weak point is the so called "problem of imputation" – how do you first identify, for example, a class interest and then show that this is directly linked to a given aspect of scientific belief?

Even though few people today would identify themselves as followers of the Strong Program, its legacy in the wider field of science studies is well recognized and the tenet of symmetry still holds sway, both as a methodological principle and as a theoretical position.

SEE ALSO: Knowledge, Sociology of; Laboratory Studies and the World of the Scientific Lab; Merton, Robert K.; Science, Social Construction of

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structural equation modeling

Xitao Fan

Structural equation modeling (SEM) has witnessed an exponential growth in its application in social and behavioral science research in the last two decades. Because of its versatility, SEM has been heralded as a unified model that joins methods from econometrics, psychometrics, sociometrics, and multivariate statistics (Bentler 1994). Many statistical techniques can be considered as special cases of SEM, including regression analysis, canonical correlation analysis, confirmatory factor analysis, and path analysis (Bentler 1992; Fan 1996; Jöreskog & Sörbom 2001).

Several aspects of SEM distinguish it from other multivariate procedures (e.g., multivariate analysis of variance, exploratory factor analysis). Unlike other multivariate techniques, SEM takes a *confirmatory* rather than an exploratory approach. The pattern of relations among variables is specified a priori based on theoretical expectations. This characteristic of SEM lends itself especially well to testing theoretical models.

Many researchers in social sciences are familiar with the traditional path analysis for modeling causal relationships. The major weaknesses of path analysis are (1) all variables are assumed to have been measured *without* error;

(2) there is a lack of statistical mechanisms for testing the model–data fit. The assumption that variables are measured without error is obviously unrealistic, because measurement error is the norm in social sciences. Path analysis only describes “causal” relationships among observed variables, and it is not capable of dealing with latent constructs represented by multiple observed indicators. The lack of model–data fit test also imposes a major limitation on the use of path analysis.

Confirmatory factor analysis (CFA) is a submodel (measurement model) of SEM. In measurement practice, a subscale may consist of multiple items (or item composites) as its observed indicators, and an instrument may consist of multiple subscales. Substantively, the subscales often represent different constructs (or latent variables), and these subscales, or latent variables, are often correlated to some degree. Because CFA as a submodel of SEM describes the relationships between measured indicators and latent constructs, and those among the latent constructs themselves, it is particularly useful for construct validation in instrument development.

The distinction among path analysis, CFA, and SEM can be characterized as follows: path analysis examines the “causal links” among observed variables; confirmatory factor analysis examines “causal links” from constructs (factors, latent variables) to their respective observed indicators; and structural equation modeling examines the “causal links” among the latent constructs and those from the latent constructs to their respective indicators. In SEM analysis, a variable is either exogenous or endogenous. An exogenous variable (observed or latent) “gives” effect to other variable(s) in the model, but itself does not “receive” effect from any variable in the model. An endogenous variable “receives” effect from other variable(s) in the model, and it may also “give” effect to other variable(s) in the model. Statistically, the variation in an endogenous variable is assumed to be accounted for by the model (i.e., by other variables in the model), while the variation in an exogenous variable is assumed to be accounted for by something outside of the model. A hypothetical structural equation model is graphically represented in Figure 1.




Figure 1 A hypothetical SEM model.

The prerequisite for conducting SEM analysis is to construct a model (e.g., Fig. 1) that represents the theoretical expectations about the data structure (i.e., relationships among the variables). The parameter value of each coefficient in the model will either be specified (i.e., equal to a specific value, including zero) or estimated from sample data. Once the model (including all its path coefficients) is specified, the sample data are used to test the fit of the model–data fit. First, the unspecified parameters are estimated based on an estimation method (e.g., maximum likelihood estimation, generalized least squares). Then the parameter estimates, both those specified by the researcher and those estimated from sample data, are used to reproduce the *model implied covariance matrix*. The model implied covariance matrix is compared against the original sample covariance matrix to see how much difference there is between the two matrices. The difference between the two covariance matrices is quantified as the “minimal fit function,” and this fit function is translated to a χ^2 (chi squared) statistic for testing model–data fit. A small difference between the two matrices suggests that the model fits the data well, while a large difference leads to the rejection of the model for its poor fit to the sample data.

Unlike most statistical tests (e.g., *t* test, regression), in SEM analysis model degrees of freedom (*df*) are based not on sample size but on the difference between the number of unique elements in the sample covariance matrix and the number of parameters to be estimated in the model. For k variables, the

number of unique elements in the covariance matrix is $k(k+1)/2$, and $df = k(k+1)/2 - (\# \text{ estimated parameters})$.

Although testing model–data fit in SEM appears conceptually straightforward, in practice considerable uncertainty and subjectivity often arise. Statistically, the test for model–data fit is the χ^2 test, with the null hypothesis being that the model fits the data. Rejection of the null hypothesis indicates that our theoretical model is not statistically consistent with the sample data. Unlike most hypothesis testing situations, in SEM we usually want to see that the null hypothesis is not rejected. However, statistical significance is heavily influenced by sample size, and SEM is a large sample technique (Boomsma 1987; Bentler 1998; Jöreskog & Sörbom 2001). Because large sample size results in high statistical power, it is not surprising that, when sample size is large, the χ^2 test may declare a model as having poor fit, even though the model implied covariance matrix differs minimally from the sample covariance matrix, and the model makes strong substantive sense.

The dissatisfaction with the χ^2 test led to the mushrooming of many goodness of fit indices for assessing model–data fit. These fit indices are generally descriptive, in contrast to the inferential nature of the χ^2 test. However, there is a lack of consensus regarding which one(s) to use for decision making. To get a sense of this variety of indices, one can take a look at the types of fit indices provided by a typical SEM software package (e.g., LISREL, AMOS, SAS/CALIS).

For most social science researchers without sophisticated quantitative training, it is difficult to have a good understanding of all the differences/nuances among the fit indices. However, it is generally advised that information from three sources should be considered in considering model–data fit: (1) χ^2 test; (2) some fit indices (e.g., TLI, RMSEA, SRMR, CFI); (3) the fitted covariance matrix residuals (the difference between the sample and the model implied covariance matrices). As discussed by many (e.g., Jöreskog & Sörbom 2001), relying solely on one index (especially the χ^2 test) may cloud one’s judgment. Although there have been some interesting developments in this area (Hu & Bentler 1998, 1999) in specifying cutoff criteria of fit indices in model–data fit assessment, the issues are still far from being settled (Marsh et al. 2004).

Appropriate application of SEM depends partially on whether some basic assumptions have been met. In SEM application, it is assumed that the variables involved have a multivariate normal distribution. This assumption is relevant because, under typical SEM estimation procedures (maximum likelihood, generalized least squares), the χ^2 test and the standard error estimation in SEM are sensitive to departure from multivariate normality. If this assumption is not met, “the statistical basis of the method is lost and standard errors and chi square tests have little meaning” (Bentler 1982: 421). When there is evidence that the data depart considerably from multivariate normality, one of several approaches can be taken. First, we may use estimation methods that do not require multivariate normality (e.g., asymptotic distribution free, or ADF). Alternatively, a test statistic corrected for the effect of data non normality can be used (e.g., the Satorra Bentler scaled χ^2 test), and standard errors corrected for the effect of data non normality can also be obtained. More recently, the bootstrap method has also been advocated as an empirical approach for dealing with the data non normality issue in SEM application (e.g., Byrne 2001).

Statistically, the data covariance matrix should be used for SEM analysis. Statistical theories for the estimation methods (e.g., maximum likelihood, generalized least squares) were developed for covariance matrices

(i.e., unstandardized variables), but not for correlation matrices (i.e., standardized variables). As discussed in SEM literature (e.g., Cudeck 1989; Loehlin 1998; Jöreskog & Sörbom 2001), using correlation matrix in SEM analysis may be problematic in several aspects, such as unintentional alteration of the model being tested due to scale changes caused by converting covariance matrix to correlation matrix, possible incorrect χ^2 test and other fit indices, and possible incorrect standard errors for parameter estimates. In practice, the correlation matrix is sometimes substituted for the covariance matrix to circumvent the interpretation problem caused by different measurement scales of the observed variables (Loehlin 1998). This strategy may be deemed acceptable in some practical situations, but it should not be considered as the norm. It would be preferable for the covariance matrix to be analyzed whenever possible. The interpretational difficulty caused by different measurement scales can be compensated by producing a standardized solution, an available option in all SEM software packages.

In SEM application, the model fitted to the data represents a researcher’s theoretical expectation about the data structure, and it is typically desirable that the model is not statistically rejected. The power to reject the model, however, increases with the sample size. Statistical theory underlying SEM is such that, for the χ^2 test to be valid, it is assumed that the sample size is sufficiently large. Although there is no rule of thumb about what sample size is sufficiently large, sample size of a couple of hundred (e.g., Boomsma 1987) is usually considered as the minimum, and should be considered in light of the complexity of the model (Floyd & Widaman 1995). The requirement for a sufficiently large sample in SEM application creates a dilemma: large sample size increases the power of the test, and as a result small discrepancies between the model and data tend to lead to the rejection of the model.

In SEM application, the model–data fit may be found to be inadequate, and it may be tempting to modify the model to achieve better model–data fit. SEM computer programs also routinely provide “modification indices” that pinpoint possible model change(s) that lead to better model–data fit. Before revising the theoretical

model, it is important to understand the consequences of such post hoc model modification. First, a distinct advantage of SEM is its confirmatory approach. Post hoc model modification may transform the confirmatory approach of SEM into an exploratory analysis. Statistically, it is always possible to obtain better model–data fit by continuously modifying our model, with or without the guidance of substantive theory (Cliff 1983). Second, sample data always contain some idiosyncrasies due to sampling error. In fitting a model to sample data, what we want to obtain is a model that will fit future similar data well, not just to obtain good fit for this particular sample. As Loehlin (1998: 195) discussed, researchers want “genuine improvement in measurement or theory, not just a procedure for decreasing chi square.” If modifications are not based on theoretical considerations, it is very likely that the model revision will capitalize on sample data idiosyncrasies, and the model fit improvement cannot hold for different sample data.

This concern naturally leads to model validation. In research practice, if model modifications are made based on either statistical or substantive considerations, it is imperative that cross validation be carried out with independent sample data to make sure that the improved model fit is not just the result of sample data idiosyncrasies. Ideally, the cross validation should be carried out in a new sample. In practice, if the original sample is reasonably large, the model validation issue can be readily accommodated by randomly splitting the original sample into two independent data sets: one used for fitting the initial model and making necessary modifications, and the other used for testing the revised model.

A variety of statistical software packages are available for implementing SEM analysis, such as LISREL, EQS, AMOS, Mplus, SAS/CALIS, SYSTAT, and Mx. These programs typically offer considerable flexibility in conducting SEM analysis, and a researcher’s choice of a particular program is usually based on personal preference.

SEE ALSO: Correlation; Factor Analysis; General Linear Model; Latent Growth Curve Models; Methods, Bootstrap; Multivariate Analysis; Path Analysis; Regression and Regression Analysis

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structural functional theory

Jeffrey W. Lucas

Structural functional theory holds that society is best understood as a complex system with various interdependent parts that work together to increase stability. For most of the twentieth century the structural functional perspective (also called functionalism) was the dominant sociological approach in the US and Western Europe. Although the label structural functional theory has subsumed multiple perspectives, there are a few basic elements that generally hold for all functionalist approaches in sociology: social systems are composed of interconnected parts; the parts of a system can be understood in terms of how each contributes to meeting the needs of the whole; and social systems tend to remain in equilibrium, with change in one part of the system leading to (generally adverse) changes in other parts of the system.

HISTORICAL DEVELOPMENT

An irony in the development of structural functional theory as a perspective that essentially came to define the discipline of sociology is that the theory in large part arose out of a nineteenth century effort to link the emerging field of sociology with other more established disciplines. Comte, the social theorist first to use the term sociology, attempted to gain legitimacy for his emerging field by linking it with the biological sciences. Comte's social theory largely grew out of his vision of a good or correct society. In his view, society had in many ways broken down as a result of influences including the French Revolution, and he sought ways to restore order to society. As an outgrowth of these interests, Comte initiated a focus on how various aspects of society contribute to the functioning of the whole. In this vein, and in an attempt to link sociology with the more established field of biology, Comte likened society to a biological organism. He theorized that society is an ordered system of

interdependent parts, but in a sense greater than the sum of those parts, requiring that it be studied as a whole.

With this approach, a reasonable concern becomes how each part of the system contributes to the functioning of the whole. Spencer argued that in order to determine the function of a social institution or arrangement one must determine the need that it meets for society as a whole. Toward this end, he developed the concepts of *structure* and *function* that lie at the core of structural functional theory. To Spencer, understanding society consists of understanding the functions that various structures serve for society as a whole.

Another theorist closely associated with structural functional theory is Durkheim. While rejecting many of the positions of Comte and Spencer, Durkheim retained the primary elements of their functional approaches. Durkheim's sociology focused on the interrelationships among the parts of society and their contributions to the functioning of the whole. For example, Durkheim (1965) discussed the function of religion in society: "Before all, it is a system of ideas with which the individuals represent to themselves the society of which they are members, and the obscure and intimate relations which they have with it. This is its primary function." Durkheim also built on the functionalism of Comte and Spencer in his distinction between causal analysis and functional analysis. Causal analysis, to Durkheim, consists of studying why a structure or social form exists. Functional analysis, in contrast, assesses the functions that a structure performs for society as a whole. Durkheim argued that a sociological analysis of any structure is incomplete without each of these elements.

Talcott Parsons was perhaps most instrumental in promulgating structural functional theory in the twentieth century (Parsons 1937). He constructed a theory of social action which argued that individual action is rooted in the norms of society and constrained by its values. In this way, individuals carry out actions that benefit the whole of society. Drawing on Spencer's work, Parsons also asserted that all societies must meet certain needs in order to survive. His AGIL scheme (Parsons 1951) proposed that all societies must fulfill an *adaptive* function, a

goal attainment function, an *integrative* function, and latent pattern maintenance (*latency*).

Following Parsons, Robert K. Merton laid out a working strategy for how to “do” structural functional theory in distinguishing between manifest (or intended) functions and latent (or unintended) functions, noting that the same acts can be both functional and dysfunctional for the social whole. Merton (1968) proposed that sociologists can examine the functional and dysfunctional elements of any structure, determine the “net balance” between the two, and conclude whether or not the structure is functional for society as a whole.

CENTRAL ELEMENTS

Although structural functional theory has taken various forms, there are a few basic elements that are central to the perspective. First, the theory leads to a focus on the functions of various structures. By “functions,” theorists in the perspective generally mean consequences that benefit society as a whole, contribute to its operation, or increase its stability. “Structure,” in its broadest sense, can mean anything that exists independent of individual actors. Social arrangements such as stratification systems therefore are social structures, as are social institutions such as marriage. Structural functional theorists tend to examine social structures in terms of the functions they serve for society. Davis and Moore (1945), for example, developed a functional theory of stratification in which they argued that a stratification system is a functional necessity, with positions in society that are more functionally important garnering higher rewards.

A second basic element of structural functional theory is rooted in the organic analogies of Comte and Spencer. The theory treats society as an integrated whole with a series of interconnected parts. Further, the theory holds that the various parts contribute to the functioning of the whole. Durkheim, for example, proposed that when all of the parts of the social whole are fulfilling their necessary functions, then society is in a “normal” state. When individual parts are not fulfilling their functions, Durkheim argued, society is in a “pathological” state.

Third, structural functional theorists assume that society rests on the consensus of its members, and that there is widespread agreement on what is good and just for society. Davis and Moore’s theory of stratification, for instance, rests on an assumption that members of society generally agree on which social positions are most important for society.

CRITICISMS

In the middle of the twentieth century, structural functional theory became the dominant sociological perspective in the US and Western Europe. In the 1960s, however, criticisms of the theory began to mount. These criticisms took a variety of forms, but two were perhaps most common: the theory deemphasizes social conflict and it does not adequately address social change.

According to critics, structural functional theory overemphasizes social cohesion while ignoring social conflict. By treating society as an interconnected whole, structural functional theory emphasizes integration among the various parts of society. With this approach, critics hold that the theory disregards social conflict. Moreover, because of its focus on social consensus and integration, any attention the theory does pay to conflict tends to treat it as disruptive.

Critics also contend that structural functional theory is ill equipped to deal with social change. Another consequence of viewing society as a system of interconnected parts is that any changes are seen as having the consequence of disrupting the entire system. To early thinkers in the functionalist perspective, change was a major threat. Herbert Spencer, for example, held that any change made with the objective of benefiting society will have unforeseen negative impacts. While more contemporary theorists in the structural functional paradigm have not been as hostile to social change as was Spencer, the theory still has difficulty in dealing with change. This has led to a criticism of the perspective as being conservative in nature.

A third criticism that can be leveled against structural functional theory stems from its assumption that the parts of society function together to support the whole, while at the same

time it seeks to determine the functions of various social structures. In traditional structural functional theory, then, any institution that exists in society must be functional for the whole. For example, Davis and Moore treated stratification as a functional necessity in society. However, because all known societies have contained some level of stratification, it is impossible to find independent evidence for the functional benefits of a stratification system. That is, we cannot know what functions a stratification system serves that would not be served in its absence or that might be served by alternative structures.

Largely as a result of criticisms lodged against it, structural functional theory has seen a decline in sociology since the 1960s. There are, however, contemporary approaches that draw significantly on the roots of the perspective.

CONTEMPORARY FUNCTIONALISM

Perhaps the best known contemporary variant of structural functionalism is the neofunctionalism of Alexander and colleagues (Alexander 1998; Alexander & Colomy 1990). Neofunctionalism is largely a reconstruction of Parsons's body of work, avoiding many of the pitfalls of earlier structural functional theorists. It accomplishes this in part by not taking social integration as a given, by giving greater weight to social action, and by specifying the role that the perspective should play in the production of knowledge.

Early functionalists, most notably Parsons, took integration of a social system as a given. This thought lay at the root of many of the criticisms brought against structural functional theory. The assumption of social integration led to the perspective's conservative character, its deemphasis of conflict, and its difficulty in dealing with social change. With neofunctionalism, Alexander argues that integration of functional parts should not be considered a fact, but instead should be treated as a social possibility. Although Alexander has distanced himself from the functionalist perspective since his writings in the late 1990s, the neofunctionalist approach he developed with his colleagues remains an important contemporary contribution to structural functional theory.

By treating society as a number of structural elements unified into an integrated whole, structural functional theory has tended to view individuals as constrained by the social system. Further, in his theory of action, Parsons accorded little room to human agency. Neofunctionalism sought to address this shortcoming of structural functionalism. Drawing from symbolic interactionism, ethnomethodology, and exchange theory, Alexander's neofunctionalism offered a theory of action that gives equal weight to social order and to the actions of individuals.

Alexander also argues for a distinction between sociological discourse and sociological explanation. Sociological discourse, in Alexander's distinction, is more speculative and general, while sociological explanation is geared toward empirical evidence and the determination of causal relationships. To Alexander, functionalist approaches should be seen as discourse; that is, not as formal theories but rather as general pictures of social systems and their parts in a descriptive rather than explanatory sense. In this regard, neofunctionalism, and structural functional theory in general, should be seen less as theories with testable propositions and more as orienting strategies comprised of broad assumptions about how society operates.

Another contemporary link to the historical roots of structural functional theory lies in the growing trend in sociology to take human evolution as a framework for social theory. Evolutionary theory, particularly the assumption that organisms retain characteristics that help them to adapt to (or function in) their environments, is an inherently functional perspective. While those carrying out research on the evolution of human characteristics and social structures are not likely to consider themselves structural functional theorists, they share some basic assumptions with the roots of the perspective. In fact, it was an early structural functional theorist, Herbert Spencer, who first popularized the term "survival of the fittest." Although structural functional theory has seen a decline over the past four decades, theoretical perspectives seldom die, but rather become reinvented in new iterations. In this way, structural functional thinking continues to be expressed in contemporary formulations.

SEE ALSO: Comte, Auguste; Durkheim, Émile; Functionalism/Neofunctionalism; Merton, Robert K.; Parsons, Talcott; Spencer, Herbert

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structural strains, successive transition of

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The successive transition of structural strains refers to the mechanism and social process of the following vicious cycle: a policy or a countermeasure aimed at solving one problem gives birth to another serious problem, and the solution of that problem results in the creation of yet another more serious one and finally reaches a dead end. The first step in the wrong direction leads into deep woods that are impossible to escape. In research into the social impacts of the Tohoku and Joetsu bullet train line construction project, Funabashi (1988) invented this concept and described this vicious cycle. The concept of structural strain, defined as deprivation caused by a structural factor neither personal nor accidental, came from Smelser's

(1963) concept. This perspective reveals how the response to one risk factor can result in the creation of new risks, and that subsequent attempts to address the new risks produce yet further risks, until, finally, no remedy can be found. The concept explains rapid environmental degradation and other social problems.

One example is the mechanism by which huge budget deficits grow rapidly:

slowing down of the economy → *increasing public investment* → *budget deficits* → *raising tax* → *recession* → *revenue deficits* → *reducing public investment* → *heavy recession* → *increasing revenue deficits*

Another example is the social process leading to the concentration of nuclear facilities in Rokkasho Village in the northern part of Japan (see Funabashi et al. 1998):

failure of building settlements and cultivating farmland → *failure of the proposed Mutsu Steelworks project* → *failure of cultivating beetroots* → *setbacks in developing new rice fields* → *the Mutsu Ogawara Industrial Park fiasco* → *the introduction of nuclear fuel processing facilities* → *the accumulation of radioactive waste* → *the further concentration of nuclear facilities in the area*

We can also observe the workings of this vicious cycle in typical cases of establishing nuclear power stations:

depopulation of the area → *electric utility company proposes to establish a nuclear power station* → *community confrontations over the issue* → *construction and start of operations at the new nuclear power station* → *sharp drop in labor demand with completion of construction works* → *population decrease* → *local government develops a dependency on revenue from the nuclear power station* → *local government invites an additional nuclear power plant* → *construction works and start of operations* → *increase in the amount of radioactive waste generated* → *storage of this waste in the area* → *construction of storage facilities to accommodate spent fuel*

The latter two cases clearly illustrate the vicious cycle that compounds environmental degradation: the establishment of a single nuclear facility or plant often results in an ever-expanding number of risky nuclear facilities.

The center or “upstream” area of a society has a lot of alternatives to escape from the vicious cycle. But for peripheral or “downstream” areas

where lower class or minority people are living it is more difficult to escape. For example, the experience of development projects in the global South resulting in steeper economic decline exemplifies this successive transition of structural strains.

SEE ALSO: Daily Life Pollution; Ecological Problems; High Speed Transportation Pollution; Pollution Zones, Linear and Planar

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structuralism

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Structuralism is a catchall term for a set of explanatory approaches or paradigms in the social sciences that emphasize the causal force of the relations among elements in a system or of emergent properties of their patterning. The character of the elements themselves (beyond what conditions their relations) is viewed as arbitrary and of no explanatory bearing. Various structural approaches have at times been popular in linguistics, psychology, anthropology, and sociology. In the latter two fields, distinct forms developed that can both be traced back to Émile

Durkheim, while sociology has also produced strains of structuralism influenced by Georg Simmel. Arising from Durkheim and Simmel as well has been the programmatic contention that in structuralism alone will be found a basis for distinguishing sociology from other disciplines.

Anthropological structuralism achieved celebrity in the third quarter of the twentieth century through the writings of Claude Lévi-Strauss. He argued that structural factors pattern our cultural expressions so as to make them resonate with us beneath awareness. His explanatory strategy first involved reducing expressive objects (e.g., artwork or mythological stories) to *contrastive structures* in which some elements were opposed to others. These structures were then argued to be similar in form to (or otherwise influenced by) an abstract picture of the social structure in which they were produced. The formal correspondence produced a resonance that explained why particular expressive objects were enjoyed and repetitively consumed. Methodologically, Lévi-Strauss followed Prague School linguists who saw meaning as conveyed structurally by contrasts among sound elements, as well as Ferdinand de Saussure's suggestion that meaning arose from relations among essentially arbitrary linguistic elements. Substantively, Lévi-Strauss followed Durkheim's suggestion in *The Elementary Forms of the Religious Life* and in *Primitive Classification* (written with Marcel Mauss) that certain cognitive constructs have the same form as elements of social life.

For example, in *Tristes Tropiques* Lévi-Strauss reduced the face paintings of the Caduveo of Brazil to a pattern that is diagonally sectioned, defining two dimensions of contrast such as we see in playing cards. The two dimensions played symmetry off against asymmetry to achieve a striking effect unique to the Caduveo among surrounding tribes. To explain this, Lévi-Strauss argued that the Caduveo faced a particular social structural problem that their neighbors had solved. A system of castes which exchanged marriage partners within themselves exerted disintegrative pressures on Caduveo society, pressures reduced in surrounding tribes by marriage rules that forced exchanges across caste lines. This produced a social symmetry that balanced the hierarchic asymmetry of castes

and thus held these tribes together. The Caduveo were too snobbish to marry across caste lines, argued Lévi Strauss, but they produced the same balance of symmetry and asymmetry in their face paintings, which he interpreted as a cultural solution to a social structural problem. In this analysis, both the cultural product and the social structure were reduced to contrastive relations between symmetric and asymmetric features, with social factors influencing cultural phenomena.

In Lévi Strauss's later work on Amerindian myths (*Mythologiques*), the influence of social structure dropped out and myth was analyzed as an elaborate self organizing system reflecting fundamental structuring habits of the human mind. The stories that myths told, which often seemed surreal, were viewed as less important to listeners than the harmonies that derived from logical relations among properties of the creatures, artifacts, or incidents that the myths included. It was these harmonies that caused myths to please people, and thus to be told over and over even when they lacked intelligible narrative structure. Lévi Strauss argued that "savage minds" employed different principles in constructing myths from those we use in stories – ones that were entirely novel and heretofore unimagined. In his decoding of myths, the reduction to contrastive structures was retained, but the explanation of their pattern took a path similar to the generative grammar being formulated in linguistics by Noam Chomsky, looking to features of the human brain rather than social structure.

This revolutionary work soon came under attack. It was seen as too systematic and scientific by some scholars in the humanities (e.g., Derrida 1978; for an overview, see Culler 1975), whose critiques were instrumental in launching poststructuralism and postmodernism as intellectual currents. At the same time, some anthropologists and sociologists (e.g., Harris 1968; Schneider 1993) criticized it as a form of self validating idealism that depended upon dubious interpretive methods and unlikely cognitive mechanisms. It never propagated as a method.

In sociology, structuralism has had a longer, more varied, and less meteoric career. One strand of structural analysis follows Durkheim and Mauss in viewing *expressive culture* (which differs from *instrumental culture* – such as our

tools – in being relatively free of practical constraints) as determined by social structure. Another carries forward Simmel's view of social structure as having formal properties that condition behaviors well beyond the domain of expressive culture. They join in viewing social structure as the source of what Durkheim called *social facts*, that is, causal currents that generally operate outside the awareness of social actors.

The attempt to uncover structural determinants of expressive culture has been handicapped by disagreement among sociologists and anthropologists over the precise meaning of social structure. Without consensus over the important dimensions along which social structure varies, not to speak of measures thereof, scholarship has been eclectic and has not given rise to organized research traditions. Two examples must suffice.

In *The Birth of the Gods*, sociologist Guy Swanson argued that the structure of relations among organized groups in society determined how the spiritual world was conceptualized. His approach modified Durkheim's argument in *Elementary Forms* to make it more amenable to testing. Using anthropological sources for a sample of world societies, Swanson showed, for instance, that the concept of a "high god" directing lesser spiritual agents occurred with frequency only in societies with a significant number of hierarchically organized "sovereign groups," each having jurisdiction over an array of human affairs. Societies with lesser numbers of such groups believed either in unorganized spiritual forces or in multiple, competing divinities. Thus the structure of sociopolitical organization was shown to determine relative monotheism within the cultural domain.

Anthropologist Mary Douglas looked to different aspects of social structure in explaining why some cultures or subcultures enjoy rituals while others find them hollow. Drawing on comparative case studies, Douglas hypothesized that impermeably bounded groups divided among many ranked statuses favored ritual, whereas more permeable groups with few ranked statuses viewed ritual as empty, opting for individually crafted or spontaneous ceremonies that were seen as more authentic. Thus important aspects of cultural style were argued to be determined by variation in social structure.

If this Durkheimian strand of structuralism has devoted itself largely to explaining variation in expressive culture, the Simmelian strand has taken a more systematic approach to defining and mapping social structure, and used the result to explain a wider range of social behavior. The main objective is to show how well defined properties of social structures (or occupancy of particular positions within them) constrain behavior. The structures range from small scale friendship or work groups, mapped sociometrically, to entire societies, viewed in terms of specific structural properties.

Network theories, for instance, use features of social structure such as the comparative intimacy of social relationships, the proportion of weak to strong ties among individuals, and the relative frequency of bridging ties among groups, to explain an array of social phenomena ranging from the capacity of communities to mobilize politically to the comparative catholicity of cultural tastes. An interesting feature of network theories has been their suggestion that occupants of positions that are connected to other positions in similar ways should behave similarly (Burt 1982). The explanatory power of the principle of structural equivalence is only now being explored.

A somewhat different approach was taken by Blau (1977), who viewed the skeleton of social structure as composed of the different dimensions along which people are differentiated from one another. Among these might be wealth, education, gender, religious confession, political party, and so on. Societies vary in the number of dimensions involved in drawing distinctions (their heterogeneity) and the tendency of dimensions to be ranked (their inequality). They also vary in the degree to which positions allow for interaction with diverse others (the relative intersection of dimensions) and the degree to which ranking on one dimension predicts ranking on others (relative consolidation of dimensions). Blau explores many features of social life that are dependent upon these variables, as well as on the proportions of the population distributed into differentiated groups and rates of mobility among them. For instance, greater intersection of dimensions seems to decrease the likelihood of intergroup conflict.

Bridging this approach and the one derived from Durkheim, DiMaggio (1987) argues that

the tendency of societies to view expressive culture as divided among distinct genres is determined by such structural features as social heterogeneity, the prevalence of weak ties, and the relative complexity of role structure in a society. DiMaggio also notes that the relative consolidation of status dimensions within the society determines its tendency to see genres as ranked and their mixing as a species of cultural pollution. Less consolidation leads to less stratification of genres and consequently less concern with their mixing. DiMaggio's theory draws upon symbolic interaction as well as Durkheimian and Simmelian strands of structuralism, and connects with structuralist arguments that were central to Goffman's sociology of culture.

Programmatic structuralism advances the claims of Durkheim and Simmel that the integrity of sociology as a scientific discipline depends upon establishing a realm of causation distinct from those explored by psychology or economics. Among contemporary sociologists, this position has been most forcefully argued and illustrated by Black (1976, 2000). Neither Durkheim nor Simmel, he argues, had the strength of their convictions, since both consistently relied on individual psychologistic explanations despite their evident concern with sociology's disciplinary integrity. All classical and most modern sociology, suggests Black, is psychological, teleological, and individualistic. Its focus is on understanding people rather than understanding social life, with the consequence that it is not really sociological. To finally become sociological, sociologists must replace their interest in people with an interest in social life and how it can be explained structurally.

Black's structural theory attempts to explain the behavior of law as a property of social life. Law, taken to be governmental social control, can be viewed as a quantitative variable. For instance, social life is more regulated by law as the average social distance among individuals increases. Law's "direction" influences its quantity as well. More law flows downward from higher ranking positions in social structures than flows upward, and more flows outward from positions more densely connected to those less densely connected. The greater the vertical and horizontal distance between two positions, the greater the proportion of downward and outward law in comparison with

inward and upward. In practice this means that lower ranking and more peripheral litigants succeed in court less frequently against higher ranking and more central litigants, with the imbalance directly proportional to their positional distance. Like DiMaggio, Black shows how these structural effects play out in a wide range of human interaction, connecting his structural analysis to what Goffman called the interaction order.

The above examples illustrate again the lack of agreement among sociologists over how to define social structure. Were consensus reached, problems of measurement would still plague structuralist theorizing, since many of its propositions will be hard to test unless and until metrics are established that allow comparisons across the important dimensions of social structure. Put somewhat differently, a successful structuralism must be able to assign to particular positions an absolute location at the intersection of multiple dimensions of social structure, rather than, as is most often the case today, assigning a relative location along only one dimension. Until this methodological problem can be solved, structuralist theorizing is apt to remain suggestive rather than establishing the core of a purified sociology.

A much more detailed and somewhat broader view of structuralism is available in Turner (1998), who includes an array of sociologists who have made anatomizing social structure and analyzing the processes by which it is reproduced over time the subject of scrutiny.

SEE ALSO: Culture; Deconstruction; Durkheim, Émile; Networks; Paradigms; Poststructuralism; Semiotics

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structuration theory

Rob Stones

Structuration theory is a term used by the British sociologist Anthony Giddens in a series of publications in the 1970s and early 1980s as he attempted to define a distinctive approach to the study of social relations. Giddens wanted the term to both embrace and go beyond the more static notion of social “structure.” He wanted the praxis and dynamic qualities of agency also to be included within the term. Thus, both structure and agency are captured within the philosophy of structuration. Many commentators soon noted the striking similarity between Giddens’s structuration theory and the work of Pierre Bourdieu in France. Bourdieu also wanted to go beyond the reification and objectivism of approaches that emphasized the pressures of the social milieu to the exclusion of individual and collective action. By creating a synthesis of the best from different traditions, Giddens was able to fashion a path between the deterministic tendencies of Marxism and Positivism, on the one hand, and the overly voluntaristic, free floating approaches of interpretive sociologies such as ethnomethodology and symbolic interactionism, on the other. Bourdieu, working within the French post war intellectual scene, devised a path between the overly

objectivist and dehumanizing tendencies of structuralism and Marxism, and the idealistic and subjectivist tendencies of existentialism, which put far too high a premium on the role of an individual's will power.

Structuration theory includes the weight of structures within its compass, the material, social, and personal inheritances from the past that set the limits to what can be done by people in the present. It also includes the sense that this structural inheritance provides the enabling conditions that are drawn on by individual or collective actors in pursuing their projects. However, it goes beyond these insights in emphasizing the dynamic and recurring processes by which these structures are "worked upon" by actors who draw from them, and who then either reproduce the structures or change them through the very process of acting. The reproduction or the changes can either be intended or unintended outcomes of the agent's practices.

Thus, we have a "duality of structure" whereby agents draw on structures to produce actions that then change or maintain structures. More than this, however, in structuration theory the structures themselves must be conceptualized in terms of praxis. The very existence of social structures themselves relies on their continuing to be "put to work" by the agents within them. A concrete institutional structure such as a library only continues to exist in a meaningful form as long as people continue to run it and use it as a library. This, in turn, requires that these people share a phenomenological understanding of what a library is and of how to "do" things such as cataloging, searching, lending, borrowing, reserving, and so on. The latter emphasis on phenomenology and the sociological traditions it has spawned, including a prominent place for ethnomethodology, is central to Giddens's version of structuration theory. Social actors possess stocks of mutual knowledge that exist within a wider worldview, and it is necessary to hermeneutically interpret and understand these actors' worldviews or "frames of meaning" in order to be truly able to grasp what they do and why they do it. An agent would not be able to act in the world without some "knowledgeability" of her circumstances, and this is always knowledge

embedded within a view of the world containing all sorts of formative cultural, social, and religious influences.

The way in which structuration incorporates phenomenology into its approach means that it also conceptualizes a "duality of structure and agency" whereby the social structures "out there" beyond the agent in focus enter "in here" into her body and mind in terms of knowledgeability and dispositions. For Giddens, the structures out there that mold or influence the body and perceptions in here can be analytically divided into three different dimensions. Thus, one can look at any one or all of the structures of power, norms, or meaning and significance in terms of how they provide enabling or constraining conditions for action. Bourdieu gave a particular emphasis to how the cultural discourses and forms of life out there necessarily mold, influence, and implicate the bodily, perceptual, and appreciative dispositions of agents, capturing this in his celebrated concept of habitus.

The status and significance of this intertwining of structure and agency is one among a series of conceptual issues germane to the structuration project that have been given greater clarity and analytical precision through subsequent debates. Structuration has by now developed beyond its founders as a vibrant, lively tradition in its own right, strengthened and emboldened by critique, counter critique, diverse empirical applications, and synthesis (Stones 2005). The work of Chris Bryant and David Jary, drawing together and critically dissecting a legion of theoretical contributions and empirical studies, has played a particularly important role in the formation of structuration's status as an internally evolving tradition.

Beyond this there have been a number of key moments in the conceptual elaboration of structuration, all of them much more concerned with empirical application than the early philosophically oriented work of Giddens. Margaret Archer, while supporting the structure–action–structure–action sequencing promoted by structuration theory, famously criticized the way that structuration's emphasis on structures entering into the agent unhelpfully confused the clear boundaries between the agent and her structural context. Archer felt that this undermined our

ability to have a clear sense of objective constraints, limits, and possibilities. She argues that we need to maintain a clear “dualism” between structure and agency. Subsequent criticism of Archer accepted that it is important to be able to conceptualize dualism, but argued that this was not incompatible with also needing to conceptualize the duality of structure and agency. Indeed, Nicos Mouzelis works, in effect, with dualism, the duality of structure, and the duality of structure and agency. On this basis he has developed a series of conceptual categories that allow one to distinguish between a subtle variety of structure–agency relationships. These allow one, for example, to distinguish between (1) the degrees of power that different agents possess to affect aspects of the world out there; and (2) to investigate whether particular agents have more or less ability to achieve a critical and/or strategic distance from the inherited cultural and normative milieu. Further issues concerning differences between knowledge of the immediate conjuncture and the more general and transposable dispositions captured by habitus; the conceptualization of the relational meso level of position practices within which individual practices are enacted (Cohen 1989); the methodology of empirical applications; and the relationship of structuration theory to more traditional macro conceptions of structure, have all been the subject of recent developments in structuration.

SEE ALSO: Bourdieu, Pierre; Ethnomethodology; Existential Sociology; Phenomenology; Structure and Agency

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structure and agency

Rob Stones

The concepts of structure and agency are central to sociological theory. Structures are typically seen as the more fixed and enduring aspects of the social landscape. As used by Durkheim and others working within a similar tradition, *structure* is a metaphor that denotes qualities of society that are akin to the skeleton of a body in the field of anatomy, or to the frame of a building in architecture. Durkheim’s work was heavily influenced by his desire to establish a sphere of study for sociology that was distinct from both biology and psychology. To this end he insisted that there are structured ways of acting, thinking, and feeling that are general throughout a society and that act as external constraints over its members. This was to emphasize the role of society in the process of causation, as opposed to individual or group agency. Some writers taking issue with this position went to the other extreme. Weber, for example, emphasized the role of individuals and rejected the idea that terms such as “society” or “group” could refer to any reality other than that of individuals and their actions.

For writers seeking to include both structure and agency in their analytic frameworks, the Durkheimian emphasis on structures is maintained. Now, however, agency is conceived as the more processual, active, dimension of society – analogous to the physiology of an organism or to the activities conducted within the spaces of a building. Agency is the ability of individuals or groups, such as class movements,

governments, or economic corporate bodies, to “make things happen” within given structural constraints and opportunities. There is a close parallel between this conception and Marx’s dictum that people make history, but not in circumstances of their own choosing. This “middle way” approach to structure and agency is the dominant conception in contemporary sociological theory. Now debates are less in terms of structure *versus* agency and more about specific emphases and the precise ways in which these two major aspects of social life affect each other or are combined. Key questions within this approach have concerned the extent to which structures constrain or determine the actions of agents, and the extent to which agents act independently of social structures.

Although mutually entwined, structure and agency can still be conceptualized independently. Much of the agency/structure debate revolves around just how independent of each other they are or can be. Lopez and Scott (2000) argued that there are two primary ways of conceptualizing structure, both deriving from Durkheim. The first is the *relational* notion of structure, referring to networks of social relations that tie people together into groups and social systems. These networks of interdependencies, characterized by mutual reliance within divisions of labor, are typically clustered into specialized sectors of social relations such as kinship, religion, the economy, the state, and so on. Durkheim referred to these as *collective relationships*. Georg Simmel similarly emphasized relationships, conceiving of society as a dynamic complex of social forms and interactions. These may involve smaller or larger numbers of people or specific types of association that structure the way that agents behave in one another’s presence. Norbert Elias’s *figurational sociology* likewise emphasized the webs and networks of relationships within which individual agents must act. Pierre Bourdieu consistently argued against a view of social life that analyzed social entities without placing them in the context of the relations that produced and sustain them, and which provide the fields in which the actions of such entities produce their consequences. Recent work on social and policy networks has also taken a relational viewpoint, looking at such things as the frequency, direction, duration, and quantity of in house and

external relationships between individual and corporate agents.

The second notion of structure, the *institutional*, refers to the beliefs, values, symbols, ideas, and expectations that make up the mutual knowledge of members of a society and that allow them to communicate with each other. Durkheim (1984) referred to this dimension of structure as a society’s *collective representations*. The structural functionalist tradition associated with the work of Talcott Parsons, Robert Merton, and others, captured this aspect of structure under the rubric of “social institutions.” Other writers emphasized cultural patterns. Parsons’s focus was on the rules and normative expectations into which agents were socialized as children, and on their adaptation to the various roles and positions they occupied as adults. This emphasis on rules and norms held in individual minds within institutions can be seen to continue in various ways in diverse strands of current writing, including the neo-functionalism of Jeffrey Alexander, new institutionalists such as Powell and DiMaggio, and in the work of Pierre Bourdieu and Anthony Giddens.

Both approaches to structure are compatible with another metaphor routinely associated with structure: *pattern*. The notion of a pattern is often included in the very definition of structure. For example, social structure may be seen as “a system of patterned relationships of actors in their capacity as playing roles relative to one another” (Parsons 1945). Such patterns can be produced by agents acting in accordance with normative expectations, as in the institutional version of structure, or in accordance with the requirements of mutual interdependence, as in the relational view of structure.

Both notions exist side by side in many of the oretical traditions. Marxism, for example, emphasizes the importance of one’s position with respect to the relations and forces of production, and also the significance of ideology or cultural hegemony in the perpetuation of class oppression – themes emerging from the Frankfurt School and from Gramsci and the neo Gramscians. Nicos Poulantzas’s later work also explicitly stressed a relational approach to political strategy. The two notions of structure, relational and institutional, are clearly not mutually exclusive. The precise way in which

the two notions should be combined is, however, a much more complex question.

Contemporary theorists increasingly have confronted the uneasy relationship between these accounts of structure and the concept of *agency*. Alan Dawe's account of "Theories of Social Action" noted a theoretical tension between social order – associated with the enduring qualities of structure – and creative, potentially disruptive, social action. To account for the reproduction of relatively stable social circumstances, major theorists such as Parsons ultimately allowed their concern with agency and action to be subsumed by the normative rules, sanctions, and regulations associated with the institutional approach to structure. Structures mold, constrain, and determine the actions of agents. This *substantive* privileging of structure over agency is often associated with structuralist writers such as Claude Lévi Strauss, Roland Barthes, and Louis Althusser, who tended to treat agents as the mere "bearers" of structures, and with Michel Foucault, whose emphasis on the overwhelming force and imposition of discursive regimes (institutional structure) and multiple power relations (relational structure) led him to pronounce the death of the subject or agent.

Agency theorists have asserted that structural approaches fail to recognize how agents are involved in the production of structured patterns or of social change. From the founding texts of sociology through the 1960s, a variety of ways of establishing and conceptualizing the autonomy of agency have been offered. Two overlapping traditions have dominated. One – the tradition of pragmatism and symbolic interactionism – includes Mead, Blumer, and Goffman (although, intriguingly, Goffman also borrowed heavily from Durkheim). The other includes Weber, Schütz, Berger and Luckmann, and Garfinkel in the neo-Kantian and phenomenological traditions. Their common emphasis is on the internal makeup of agents and action. They assumed from the start that agents and their actions were not subjugated to structures, and thus set out to explore their key characteristics. Weber, for example, distinguished between four different types of social action: *instrumentally rational* action geared towards "the attainment of the actor's own rationally pursued and calculated ends"; *value rational*

action, which is pursued for reasons of personally held value irrespective of the prospects for success of that action; *affectual action*, determined by the actor's emotional states and orientations; and *traditional action*, "determined by ingrained habituation" (Weber 1968: 24–5). Mead and Blumer emphasized the reflection, reflexivity, and creativity inherent in the very process of interaction itself, and in the making of selves. Schütz, and also Berger and Luckmann, drew attention to the storehouse of preconceptions, typifications, of objects and practices – the latter as "recipe knowledge" – that we draw upon in appropriate circumstances. Garfinkel highlighted the array of competencies, skills, and moral commitments that are intrinsic to agents' routine accomplishments. Goffman, like Garfinkel, emphasized the chronic role played by tacit knowledge in the production of social practices. His insightful cameos prefigured the work of writers such as Bourdieu and Giddens in drawing attention to the ways in which such agential knowledge was permeated by structured social norms. All three writers stress the powerful sense individual agents have that others expect them to behave in manners appropriate to the immediate social context.

Bourdieu, Giddens, and Jürgen Habermas are major contemporary theorists who have each attempted to synthesize the two notions of structure and the two traditions of agency outlined above. The syntheses are facilitated by philosophical insights that help to both reveal and refine previous oversimplifications of core concepts. Each combines structure and agency in a more nuanced and inclusive manner than their predecessors. Each emphasizes not only structures external to agents, and the stocks of knowledge possessed by agents, but also the *social* origins and grounding of agents' knowledgeability. The key mediating concepts are *habitus* for Bourdieu, *practical consciousness* for Giddens, and the phenomenological *lifeworld* for Habermas. Social structures are seen as having entered into agents. These traces of structures within agents are drawn from both the relational and the institutional. Giddens's notion of "virtual" structures within agents, for example, draws on the institutional in stressing normative and signifiatory structures, whereas the relational seems to be emphasized more with respect to structures of domination or power. Each of

these authors also emphasizes the agent's phenomenological frame of meaning and the attendant role played by the agent's situational "horizon of relevance" in affecting how she draws upon stocks of knowledge.

A final way that contemporary theorists acknowledge the separate treatment of structures and agents is *methodological*. Here structures are not thought to subsume agents. Rather, agents are treated as important components of the very makeup of structures (thus complicating and moderating the analogies made with skeletons or the walls of a building), and as having much to contribute to the reproduction or transformation of structures and to the unfolding of events. It is just that the theorist may want to focus temporarily on the conceptualization, mapping, and analysis of specific characteristics of social structures (e.g., on norms, rules, regulations, and on the nature of networked and patterned relations and interdependencies) without attending to the specific characteristics and contribution of agents.

Recent contributions to the development of structure and agency have been made by Nicos Mouzelis, who has elucidated the range and variety of types of interconnection between structure and agency, and Mustafa Emirbayer and Anne Mische, and also Margaret Archer, on different dimensions of relations between temporality, structure, and agency. All have called for more links between the conceptual apparatus of structure and agency and the empirical, *in situ* level. This will necessarily require that greater attention be paid to methodological issues than hitherto. An accompanying call to further refine the concepts themselves has been prompted by a related desire to increase their practical utility.

SEE ALSO: Agency (and Intention); Bourdieu, Pierre; Durkheim, Émile; Ethnomethodology; Marxism and Sociology; Parsons, Talcott; Phenomenology; Schütz, Alfred; Structuralism; Structuration Theory; Weber, Max

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student movements

Christopher Rootes

Although students have been prominent among the actors in many revolutions and revolutionary movements, as well as other forms of contentious politics, student movements – social movements comprised wholly or mainly of students, especially university or college students – are a distinctively modern phenomenon. Their emergence is predicated upon the existence in a society of a critical mass of students.

Student movements have emerged in all manner of modern and modernizing societies, often as agents of change, sometimes in reaction against change, but usually as challengers of regimes perceived to lack legitimacy or moral authority. They have appeared in authoritarian states in Europe, Asia, Africa, and Latin America, as well as in the liberal democratic states of the industrialized world.

Student movements have an important place in the development of social movement theory. In the US, it was dissatisfaction with the psychosocial and reductionist explanations of student protest (see, e.g., Feuer 1969) that stimulated explanations that took social

movements seriously as forms of political action. In Europe, theories of “post industrial” society and “new social movements” were developed by Touraine (1971) and others as explanations of the student protest that con-founded orthodox Marxist theories.

Sociological interest in student movements was excited principally by the eruption during the 1960s of student protest in the US and in many states in Europe and the Pacific. Protests against the US’s prosecution of the war in Vietnam were central to the student movements of the 1960s, but they also had other and deeper causes.

In the US, the student movement emerged in the early 1960s out of the campaign for civil rights for African Americans in the South as well as the socialist Student League for Industrial Democracy, which became Students for a Democratic Society (SDS) in 1960. It came to prominence with the student revolt, in the name of freedom of speech, at the University of California, Berkeley, in 1964, the Berkeley events inspiring new scholarly interest in student movements as well as student mobilizations on other campuses across the US and beyond. The US student movement, fueled by increasing opposition to the Vietnam War, spread nationwide before reaching a crescendo in the spring of 1970. In Western Europe, student movements developed in most countries and, most spectacularly, brought normal life to a halt in much of France in May 1968 when students appeared to put revolution back on the political agenda of liberal democratic states. However, student movements also challenged regimes and/or contested government policies in Australia, Asia, and communist ruled Eastern Europe.

Student movements emerged in the advanced industrialized societies toward the end of a period of doubling, even trebling, of enrollments in higher education. As a result, students were everywhere unprecedentedly numerous, both relatively and absolutely. The expansion of higher education had various sources. One was demographic pressure – the swelling, consequent upon the post war “baby boom,” of the age cohorts from which most students were drawn. But everywhere the main pressures for expansion were political – from governments influenced by human capital theorists to invest in more highly qualified workforces in the hope

of improving economic competitiveness, and from newly affluent parents concerned to ensure the career prospects of their offspring. As socio-technical change sketched in the outlines of the “knowledge economy” and began to transform occupational structures, so demand for and the supply of higher education grew dramatically. At the same time, increasing affluence made it possible for unprecedentedly large numbers of young people to enjoy a moratorium upon adult obligation. Youth as a distinct stage of life was born, and the university was its ideal locus.

The numbers of students expanded just at the time that demographic and socioeconomic changes combined to enhance the status and visibility of youth. The entry of this generation produced strains within universities which, in many countries, were elitist and traditionalist. Inadequate facilities, unreformed curricula, and antiquated rules generated conflicts between students who considered themselves adults and authorities who regarded themselves as acting in loco parentis. These local conflicts with university authorities were, however, symptomatic of wider strains in society.

Yet these were not simply the self interested complaints of the materially deprived. Everywhere, students were drawn disproportionately from the relatively privileged strata of societies. Actual or anticipated graduate unemployment, sometimes proffered as an explanation of the rise of student radicalism, played little or no part. This was before the peak of the long post war economic boom and, even in Italy, where the mismatch between output and labor market was legendary, the peak years of the student revolt coincided with historic lows in the frequency of graduate unemployment. If there were grievances about employment prospects, they were less about the lack of jobs than about demands for “jobs worth doing.”

Social, demographic, and educational changes provided the actors for student movements, and local difficulties that raised civil libertarian issues often generated the first sparks, but it was events in the wider political arena that accounted for the spread of protest and cross and intranational variation in its incidence. Students’ local grievances generally highlighted political rigidities at state level as university authorities found themselves powerless to respond in ways that might defuse protest, as

in France where university rectors had no power even to modify dormitory regulations. However, the general political condition that stimulated the development of student movements was an effective vacuum of political opposition to government policies within the mainstream political arena.

In the US, where only a few legislators voiced opposition to the Vietnam War, the draft compelled students to think seriously about the issues, and student opposition expanded to fill the space available. In Western Europe, the sclerotic politics of states frozen by the communist/anti communist divide were similarly conducive. In West Germany, the absence of opposition was almost literal, as student socialists had been expelled from the Social Democratic Party and a "grand coalition" government of Social and Christian Democrats overwhelmingly dominated the parliament. The vacuum of opposition was often reproduced at local levels. In Europe, the student movements of the 1960s usually began not at campuses such as the Sorbonne, Heidelberg, Munich, or Rome where the institutionalized left was strong, but at those, such as Nanterre, Berlin, Frankfurt, Trento, and Turin, where the left was weak or absent. The most propitious condition for the development of the utopian student movements that so captured the imagination of observers was their political and social isolation (Statera 1975: 119).

The subsequent development of student movements was the product of interaction between the movements, their environments, and their internal social and political dynamics. Mass media coverage generalized student movements, but raised the stakes and contributed to internal dynamics that were divisive and ultimately destructive (Gitlin 1981). Media attention amplified recruitment but, once the movement had peaked, a "reverse bandwagon" effect exaggerated its decline. By focusing upon the outspoken and the outrageous, media coverage created "leaders" without authority or political acumen, encouraged spectacular and provocative actions, and amplified the incidence of violence. This deepened the movement's political isolation and encouraged political adventurism, with the result that in several countries, including Italy, Germany, and the US, small minorities of student activists drifted

into terrorism. More generally, frustrated by the limitations of their student constituencies, they rediscovered Marxism and embarked upon mostly fruitless missions to revolutionize the proletariat. Secular processes may have dictated the inevitable demobilization of student movements, but the turn to sectarian theorizing and Leninist organization everywhere hastened the process, antithetical as they were to the civil libertarian and moral protests that had inspired student mobilization in the first place (Rootes 1980).

Although encounters with apparently unjust authority were crucial to the mobilization of student movements, it was crucial to their survival that official repression should remain moderate and unsystematic. Nowhere in the West did the level of repression of student protest reach the levels usual in Eastern Europe, Asia, or Latin America. Student movements were thus able to develop in the free spaces of liberal democracies aided by the intermittent stimuli of erratic police action. On those few occasions where repression was extreme – as with the 1970 shooting of four students at Kent State University – the immediate reaction was indignant protest, but the longer term effect was demoralizing and demobilizing. Generally, however, the repression of student movements was mild compared with that of striking workers. State responses were more generally reformist than simply repressive.

In most countries student movements simply declined, but in the US and France they collapsed suddenly. In the US, the invasion of Cambodia demonstrated the impotence of the movement, and the shootings at Kent State raised the stakes. Most students returned to their books, but the most radicalized minority, as the Weather Underground, resorted to clandestine political violence. In France, the student movement was overwhelmed by the political crisis it unleashed, and outmaneuvered by General de Gaulle's appeal to the electorate. Thus disconcerted, the libertarians in the movement were no match for the Marxist sects who, emboldened by the crisis, sought to hegemonize a chimerical worker–student alliance. The student movement's rediscovery of the proletariat occurred almost everywhere and guaranteed the extinction of student movements as activists' mobilizing efforts were directed off campus.

Only in Germany was the student movement so completely isolated from the working class that, in forming an extra parliamentary opposition, it looked to broader sections of society, thereby intimating the coalition of forces that eventually coalesced into the Greens.

By 1971, student movements had burned themselves out almost everywhere. The turn to Marxism meant that, in the rare cases where issues stimulated renewed protests by students, they did not generally produce student movements. In 1976, the longest and most wide spread student strike in French history paralyzed the universities, but it found little wider resonance, both because the political context had changed and because the prominence of leftist groups determined to portray the protests as anti capitalist obscured the elements of cultural critique that had made the 1968 revolt so iconic. Because most protesting students rejected leadership of any kind, the presence of the sectarian left was less an aid to more effective mobilization than an obstacle to it, and the collapse of the protests left no significant legacy.

The direct impact of the 1960s student movements upon political structure was extremely limited. Their one nearly universal legacy – the extension of the franchise to 18 year olds – has made little impact. Nowhere in the West did student movements succeed in overthrowing elected governments. Even in France, the demise of de Gaulle in 1969 was less a delayed result of the student revolt than of his own political miscalculation. Nor did student protests influence elections in the ways they hoped. The election that ended the French student revolt produced a decisive shift to the right. If student protest persuaded Lyndon Johnson not to seek reelection, the outcome was the election not of a liberal anti war candidate but of Richard Nixon. Student movements' impacts upon policy were probably more positive. Student protest certainly raised the salience of the Vietnam War and probably hastened US withdrawal. But the greatest impacts were in higher education where both curricula and governance underwent reform.

The wider political impacts of student movements were diffuse. Graduates of the "generation of '68" contributed to the radicalization of Labour parties in Britain and Australia, and the secularization of communist parties in Italy

and Spain, but their most important legacies were in the other social movements they inspired, the women's and personal liberation movements chief among them. "Movement entrepreneurs" who learned their skills in the student movement moved on to organize workers and the poor as well as to the environmental and anti nuclear movements that emerged in the 1970s. By these means, student movements contributed to the legitimation of protest and the "participatory revolution" in liberal democracies whose effects continue, especially in Western Europe.

In and since the 1980s, observers, especially in the US, have claimed to detect in various campus based campaigns – from disinvestment in South Africa under the apartheid regime to that against sweatshop labor in developing countries – the makings of a new student movement comparable to that of the late 1960s. But although students have indeed been among the early activists in such campaigns and in the anti globalization/global justice movement, none has developed as a fully fledged student movement. The principal reason is that, in all these cases, either students rapidly found allies in other, more powerful social or political actors, or the movements that developed quickly mobilized much broader cross sections of society.

What is extraordinary about western student movements is not that they so quickly disappeared but that anybody should have expected them to endure. The conditions of student life and the rapid turnover of student generations scarcely favor a politics of the long haul. The student movements of the 1960s arose out of an extraordinary conjunction of demography and social change, sustained rises in living standards, the expansion of higher education in response to technological change and changes in occupational structures, and an effective vacuum of political opposition. It is possible that some of these conditions will recur; it is improbable that they will again occur in such conjunction. The 1960s now appear as a transitional stage in the development of industrialized societies in two respects. First, they marked the point at which youth emerged as a distinct stage of life and was accorded the liberties and rights of adulthood. Second, the 1960s was the crucial decade in the transformation of the university from an elite institution at one remove from society into a site

of mass education increasingly integrated with the demands of the market for highly skilled labor.

The transformation of higher education amounts in many places to its dilution. Not only are studies increasingly vocational, but students themselves are less likely to be 18 year olds straight from school. Students are increasingly obliged to work at least part time, and policies favoring late entry and recurrent education have encouraged universities to enroll greater numbers of older students. The status of "student" has, in consequence, become less determinate as students are increasingly integrated into the social and economic mainstream. Cultural and moral concerns have not disappeared from student politics, but they have, with the proliferation of the "new" social movements, become more widespread in non student politics. Distinctively student politics have, as a result, come more closely to resemble the politics of other sectional interest groups.

If student movements have all but disappeared from the liberal democratic states of the advanced industrialized societies, they have continued intermittently to play important roles in authoritarian states. In the 1970s, student movements played critical roles in the democratization of Franco's Spain and of Greece during years of military dictatorship, in Spain because the universities enjoyed a degree of political immunity and so provided space for political discussion and organization not enjoyed by other groups in society, and in Greece because students dared to challenge an increasingly unpopular regime. In Hungary, Poland, and Czechoslovakia, student movements repeatedly challenged communist regimes from the 1950s to the 1980s. Sometimes their protests were bloodily repressed – as in Hungary in 1956 – but student movements kept alive democratic aspirations and so contributed to the eventual collapse of those regimes.

The role of student movements in the democratization of Asian societies is even clearer. In Thailand, South Korea, Taiwan, and Indonesia, despite often savage repression, student movements provoked political crises in authoritarian regimes that ultimately issued in the expansion of civil liberties and democratic rights. Student protests against more closed and systematically repressive regimes have, however, had less

fortunate results. The student movement in Burma/Myanmar has been aggressively repressed, but perhaps the best known example, both for the hopes it raised and the brutal way in which they were dashed, was the Chinese movement that focused upon Beijing's Tiananmen Square in 1989.

What these and the many other instances of student movements in authoritarian states have in common is that it was generally students who first challenged oppressive regimes in the name of universalist principles of liberty, morality, and democracy. The critical conditions for the emergence and development of student movements are a suitably moralistic political grievance, an absence of effective opposition within the polity from other, more powerful political actors, and a lack of powerful allies. Chief among the conditions of their success, however, is their ability to attract allies either from reformists within governing elites or from other sections of society, and upon the vigor of the state's repressive response. Students, who are relatively unconstrained by the obligations of adult life, may be the least inhibited partisans of anti authoritarianism, but they are seldom able by themselves to achieve their objectives.

The development of student movements in modernizing societies under authoritarian regimes is common, but their development in fully democratic states in economically advanced societies is wholly exceptional.

SEE ALSO: Anti War and Peace Movements; Global Justice as a Social Movement; Globalization and Global Justice; Modernization; New Left; New Social Movement Theory; Revolutions; Social Movements; Women's Movements

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subculture

David Muggleton

A subculture in general terms is a group with certain cultural features that enable it to be distinguished from other groups and the wider society from which it has emerged. But before it is possible to attempt a more precise clarification of the concept of subculture, it is necessary to examine the wider and related term “culture.” The definition of culture that underpins the analysis of subculture is that which derives from the discipline of anthropology, and is concerned with the study of “a whole way of life” of a group or society. This widely encompassing and democratic definition does, however, raise the issue of what aspects of groups or societies are, or are not, “cultural.” Sociologists have always regarded both religious and secular systems of values and beliefs to be cultural, along with those “styles of life” that arise from patterned modes of consumption. More recently, the discipline of cultural studies has reserved the term culture for those “signifying practices” – including cinema, fashion and design, cuisine, popular recreations, advertising, music, and so forth – through which people communicate their tastes and give expressive form to their emergent identities.

This does raise the issue of the level of generality or specificity at which culture is shared. In an age of global communications, certain cultural forms clearly cross national boundaries; yet it is also possible to identify distinctive national cultures. Within nations, cultural patterns are also cross cut by region, religious affiliation, and other social characteristics such as class, gender, age, ethnicity, and sexuality. It might therefore be appreciated why early definitions of subculture proposed the term to refer to a unified subset or division of the wider, national culture, one that had an integrative function for the individual member. Other initial attempts at conceptualization preferred to employ the designations subworld, population segment, or scene. But while precise agreement has never been reached over what constitutes subcultures, they can fundamentally be regarded as social groups whose specific, shared culture, lifestyle, or identity is distinctive enough to mark them off as different in some significant way from their “parent culture” (the immediate cultural milieu from which they arise). They can be organized around many kinds of shared interests and activities, including drug taking, fashion and music, or sport. Any particular social class, age span, gender, or ethnicity could conceivably dominate membership, although sociological studies of subcultures have often focused on those composed of white, male, working class youths.

In a pluralistic and highly differentiated society, cultural identifications do not all wield the same influence or share equal status; rather, they are unevenly ranked in terms of power, so it is broadly possible to identify cultural clusters that stand in mutual relationships of domination and subordination. While subcultures can emerge from relatively powerful parent cultures, such that they can be considered enclaves within the dominant culture, ultra radical groups of this kind whose values and activities are too sharply opposed to those of the dominant culture, and/or that are perceived to have developed a potentially revolutionary political self awareness, tend to be conceptualized as “contra cultures” or more often “countercultures.” On the other hand, the term subculture is rarely used to denote sets of practices that are too conservative, reactionary, or reflective of the dominant culture. The assumption is that

subcultures are inherently oppositional in that they are necessarily predicated on some form of disorder, delinquency, or deviance. Furthermore, they are also held to be “subterranean,” their underground status and lack of formal barriers to membership contrasting sharply with the bureaucratic entry requirements of “official” organizations and legitimately sanctioned groups. The concept of subculture has therefore more typically been applied to those groups, arising from a subordinated parent class culture, whose position vis à vis the dominant culture is less clearly articulated or overtly politicized than those of the countercultures.

Various forms of social inquiry into a range of subcultural groups had taken place long before the concept itself had begun to gain currency in academic circles from the late 1940s onwards; but the pioneering, institutional research in this respect was that conducted by members of the sociology department at the University of Chicago in the period between the two world wars. The Chicago School, as they were collectively known, were concerned with the ecology of the urban environment and specifically the high incidence of crime and delinquency occurring in “zones of transition” – areas of rapidly shifting population and social disorganization in which normative controls had been weakened. By treating the city as a “social laboratory,” the resulting case studies of juvenile gangs, hobos, and taxi dance hall habitués were characterized by the symbolic interactionist principle of examining the world from the point of view of those being studied.

The Chicago School’s legacy of commitment to qualitative interviews and ethnographic practice can be discerned in American studies of deviant and delinquent subcultures undertaken throughout the 1950s and 1960s. It also surfaced during this time in a slightly different strain of American sociological research into subcultures, one influenced by anomie theory, which suggests that certain groups, having internalized dominant success goals, find it impossible to realize their aspirations due to their structural position in society. A situation of anomie or “normlessness” results in which legitimate means are abandoned and alternative, “illegitimate” ones proposed. Lower working class youth, for example, having suffered educational

failure, blocked opportunities, and “status frustration,” invert respectable middle class values, placing emphasis instead upon delinquent activities that are prized from the perspective of their own peer group. In this sense, the delinquent subculture can be said to arise as one collective “problem solving” device. This paradigm was to dominate US subcultural theory throughout this period, albeit with various attempts at modification (including an analysis of the differential opportunities for illegitimate as well as legitimate means for success). It was also to become influential in Britain during the 1960s and 1970s, but took on slightly different emphases, being allied first with interactionism, then Marxism.

Of the various approaches apparent in British subcultural research during the first two post war decades, two are particularly worthy of note. The first involved ecological explorations of delinquent, deviant, or impoverished urban communities and of the groups that formed within these neighborhoods. Unlike American studies that emphasized social disorganization or anomie theory as explanations for the formation of subcultures, the British context more usually stressed differential socialization – an adherence to alternative, subterranean working class values and disassociation from middle class notions of respectability. The second approach focused more specifically on schools and how streaming and banding (the allocation of pupils to school classes on the basis of perceived academic ability) aided the creation of pro and anti school pupil subcultures that respectively revered or rejected the educational ethos of academic achievement. The role of the teacher in ascribing either a positive or negative label to the pupil (such as “hardworking” or “troublemaker”) and the response of the pupil in rejecting or, alternatively, accepting and internalizing the label, could also be seen as a factor in the formation of these school based subcultures; as, indeed, could be the home background of students and their socialization into the parental social class culture, as well as their involvement in commercialized youth leisure activities.

By the late 1960s and early 1970s, youth subcultures based around highly visible styles of dress became an explicit focus of academic

attention in Britain. Initial explorations were concerned with how social reactions to deviance could escalate the problem through the generation of “moral panics” – a form of collective righteous indignation involving calls for greater law enforcement measures and tougher penalties for offenders. This involved an analysis of how the media, along with the agencies of social control such as the police and judiciary, labeled, stereotyped, exaggerated and, in so doing, amplified the very forms of delinquent behavior they sought to contain. Even so, the problem solving approach was still relied on for structural explanations of the *origins* of the initial deviance and thus of the subcultures themselves. Throughout the 1970s the interactionist dimension of this body of work was displaced by a neo Marxist mode of theorizing that saw these and other style based subcultures, such as teddy boys, skinheads, and punks, as attempts by working class youth to resist “hegemony” – the process by which middle class (or bourgeois) culture attempts to define and circumscribe on its own terms the experience of subordinate classes. But again, in a manner echoing the American delinquency theory of the 1950s, each successive subculture was seen as an attempt at a solution to a historically specific “problem” faced by its working class parent culture.

It is important to recognize two very different methodological strands within this general theoretical approach, associated with the Centre for Contemporary Cultural Studies (CCCS) at the University of Birmingham, UK. The first harked back to the classic ethnographic tradition of Chicago School sociology with its use of qualitative interviews and participant observation. The second more innovatively borrowed from French theory the principles of structuralism and semiotic analysis, which enabled all cultural practices to be read like a language. In this way, the styles of the subcultures were “decoded,” like texts, for their hidden meanings, without recourse to the subjective motives of the subcultural members themselves. Some of the CCCS work was also notable for its consideration of how British “race relations” and black style subcultures, such as rude boys and Rastafarians, impacted upon the formation of white, indigenous British youth

subcultures. But much of the output by its male academics was silent on issues of gender divisions: the too close identification with male dominated groups and the masculine elements of style had rendered “invisible” the presence of girls in subcultures. To date, the few extensive, systematic explorations that have been conducted on females in male dominated subcultures have confirmed the tentative assumptions made by early feminist critiques of the CCCS – that females use subcultures as a means of negotiating and resisting aspects of conventional femininity.

Although the work of the CCCS has proved highly influential in many other English speaking countries, its position as the dominant paradigm in subcultural studies has been slowly undermined since the early 1990s by intense criticism from a new generation of academics who, eschewing textual analysis and once more embracing ethnography, have attempted to engage with the rapidly changing cultural conditions of contemporary youth. These developments have been further stimulated by the emergence of the “Acid house,” rave, or techno party event from the late 1980s onwards. Because this new youth movement could not be easily accounted for by existing youth subcultural theory, academic attempts to come to terms with its prominence have helped advance the field of study. It is perhaps now accurate to say that we are in a situation where no one theoretical perspective dominates, although two of the major contenders for supremacy are those influenced by the work of Pierre Bourdieu and Michael Maffesoli, respectively.

The concept of “subcultural capital” has been developed on the basis of Bourdieu’s “cultural capital” to explain the hierarchies of taste operating within both clubbing crowds and subcultures. It refers to that form of “hip” status accrued by having esoteric knowledge regarding what is currently “in or out” on that scene, and is a means by which members of such groups display their “authenticity” – the legitimacy of their underground tastes in comparison to what is perceived to be the mass tastelessness of commercialized, “mainstream” culture. Maffesoli’s concept of the “tribus” has, in the guise of “neo tribe,” also been applied to subcultures and dance crowds because of its

connotations of transitory membership, eclectic tastes, and multiple allegiances – all markers of the “postmodern,” and which are said to characterize contemporary youth movements.

Indeed, the widespread use of such concepts as “clubculture,” “neo tribe” or, in some cases, “lifestyle” has led to a questioning not only of the relevance of existing theory but the very term subculture itself. It would seem, however, that despite the polemical pronouncement that we are now “post ” or “after ” subculture, future work will not necessarily dispense with the concept of subculture, but is likely to emphasize the characteristics of flux, fluidity, and hybridization that these groups do, and perhaps to some extent always have, displayed.

SEE ALSO: Consumption, Fashion and; Consumption, Girls’ Culture and; Consumption, Masculinities and; Consumption, Youth Culture and; Lifestyle Consumption; Postmodern Consumption; Sport Culture and Subcultures; Subcultures, Deviant

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subcultures, deviant

T. J. Berard

Subcultures come in an incredible diversity of forms, associated with street gangs, organized crime families, prison inmates, drug addicts, football hooligans, surfers, religious cults, hippie communes, and punk rockers. On a grander societal scale, subcultures include working class and underclass subcultures, racial/ethnic subcultures, immigrant subcultures, regional subcultures, and youth subcultures. Although not all subcultures are deviant, the term subculture is often used to refer to the values and attitudes of deviant groups, and especially deviant groups of juveniles. Therefore, the study of deviant subcultures has traditionally been associated with the sociology of deviance and crime, criminology, and youth social work. But the study of deviant subcultures has expanded well beyond its traditional disciplinary boundaries.

DEFINING CHARACTERISTICS

The term *subculture* is similar to culture in that both refer to a shared collection of traits, including beliefs, values, interests, language, behaviors, and a collective identity. The terms subculture and culture can alternately refer to the *group(s)* or *populations* of persons characterized by distinctive traits. The distinction between subculture and culture deals primarily with the relative size of different cultural groups sharing the same territory. Distinctive cultural groups become “sub” cultures by contrast to the conventional or mainstream values of a larger cultural group which serves as the cultural standard, due to its numerical majority and often greater status and power. Because the members of a subculture are characterized by cultural difference in relation to a larger, dominant, or mass culture, these differences are often evaluated as *deviant*, meaning that they violate conventional standards or fall short of conventional expectations. Some subcultures actually oppose or resist dominant culture, and these subcultures can be called *counter* cultures.

ALBERT COHEN'S DELINQUENT BOYS

The sociology of deviant subcultures was first delineated in Albert Cohen's *Delinquent Boys: The Culture of the Gang* (1955). Cohen combined "cultural transmission" theories of delinquency with a "psychogenic" account at the level of individual psychology. Cohen attempted to explain the prevalence and persistence of urban delinquency in terms of neighborhood subcultures which recruit successive youth groups as subcultural "carriers." Recruitment depends on the provision of subcultural "answers" to problems of adjustment experienced by members of each subsequent cohort of working class boys, each facing similar risks of status frustration in the face of middle class norms, especially in school.

Cohen's arguments reference earlier scholarship on delinquency and gangs from the Chicago School of sociology. Clifford Shaw and Henry McKay's *Juvenile Delinquency and Urban Areas* (1942) had revealed higher rates of delinquency in Chicago's working class immigrant and minority neighborhoods. Cohen attributed the "cultural transmission" theory of delinquency to Shaw and McKay, and to Edwin Sutherland's later theory of differential association. Cohen also drew on Shaw and McKay and subsequent scholarship on the social disorganization or differential social organization of urban working class communities as causes of delinquency. Frederick Thrasher's study *The Gang* (1927) was related to the structural and ecological theory of social disorganization, although Thrasher was also instrumental in drawing attention to the *group* nature of much delinquency, and for pioneering observational research on gangs. Cohen also attributes to Shaw and McKay the theory of "culture conflict," best known from Thorsten Sellin's *Culture Conflict and Crime* (1938), in which Sellin analyzes crime partly in terms of the existence of different normative groups in society, resulting in a conflict of "conduct norms" or "cultural codes." Cohen acknowledges Shaw and McKay yet again with respect to the "illicit means" theory, which he secondarily attributes to Robert Merton. Merton was responsible for disseminating this theory under the name of anomie or strain theory, which explains economic street

crime as an illicit or innovative means of satisfying American cultural norms of materialism and economic success.

One of Cohen's more distinctive contributions was to emphasize that new cultural forms emerge and are perpetuated through social interaction in youth peer groups, as youths collectively "solve" shared problems of social adjustment through delinquency. Cohen's subcultures thus provide a microsociological bridge between class and neighborhood location and delinquency. Previous usage had often referred to the subcultures of abstract population segments such as classes and races, rather than genuine groups, but in Cohen's hands, the term became more concrete.

SUBSEQUENT STUDIES AND THEORIES OF DEVIANT SUBCULTURES

The institutionalization of deviant subcultures as a topic within the sociology of crime and deviance was cemented when Cohen's *Delinquent Boys* (1955) was followed by Cloward and Ohlin's *Delinquency and Opportunity* (1960). Despite some differences, the two books were similarly theoretical in nature, and both saw deviant subcultures and delinquency as responses to problems of "adjustment" caused by structural issues of class inequality. A third influential author during this period was Miller (1958), who described lower class culture in terms of a number of "focal concerns," including trouble, toughness, excitement, and autonomy. Cloward and Ohlin, and especially Miller, disagreed with Cohen's thesis that working class boys experienced status anxiety over failure to live up to middle class norms, but all agreed that the culture of delinquents should be understood against the background of class structure, with subcultures serving as links between class location and delinquency.

One of the most searching criticisms of the theory of deviant subcultures came with the work of David Matza. Matza's *Delinquency and Drift* (1964) criticized existing positivist theories of deviant subcultures for emphasizing determinism and constraint at the expense of

the will or agency of subcultural members. He also argued that the norms of delinquents could not be sharply differentiated from conventional norms. Two related suggestions were that delinquents employ conventional moral techniques for neutralizing norms or excusing violations, and that delinquent culture and conventional culture overlap in a "subterranean" fashion. Jock Young later pursued Matza's subterranean analysis with great effect in his book *The Drug takers* (1972). Young suggests that values of hedonism and disdain for work, for example, are subterranean values throughout society, and that drug takers accentuate these values rather than create them as unique features of a deviant subculture.

In the 1970s, subcultural theories of deviance took on new forms in Britain, largely associated with Birmingham University's Centre for Contemporary Cultural Studies. Stuart Hall and Tony Jefferson's collection *Resistance Through Rituals* (1975) signaled the arrival of the British on the scene. The influence of 1960s labeling theory was evident in that British theorists and ethnographers skipped the foundational American concerns with the reform or control of juvenile delinquents. Instead, British scholarship reflected a neo Marxist project of class analysis sympathetic to the symbolic resistance ostensibly represented by working class youth subcultures. Paul Willis's *Learning to Labour* (1977), which documents a group of working class youths leaving school and accommodating themselves to their place in the labor market, became one of the most celebrated ethnographies of deviant subcultures. Another landmark British contribution was Dick Hebdige's *Subculture: The Meaning of Style* (1979), a semiotic analysis of the aesthetics adopted by musical subcultures such as punk rockers. Both Willis and Hebdige suggested, in different manners, that youth subcultures signify ideological resistance to the hegemonic and oppressive nature of post war capitalist society. The British tradition was distinct in many respects, but generally shared with American studies an underlying tendency to treat culture as secondary to structural and economic conditions, and to treat subcultural responses to structural inequality as ultimately ineffective, if not outright dysfunctional.

POLITICS AND MORALITY

The theoretical contributions of the early Chicago School partly reflected a liberal, reformist position on urban social problems, evident in their arguments that delinquency and crime were to be explained by the social disorganization of communities rather than in terms of individual pathology or racial proclivities. In the 1940s and 1950s, Cohen, and Cloward and Ohlin, raised more critical questions about unequal opportunities in American society, but stopped far short of radical critiques of the American class structure. Such early criminological theory also displayed an underlying correctional morality.

Ethnographic work remains perhaps the least evaluative and least political of traditions in the study of deviant subcultures, although ethnographers often cooperate with social service institutions, and portray their subjects with more sympathy than condemnation. Many British contributors identified unabashedly with the neo Marxist theoretical tradition, but this in the post war period when neo Marxism entailed cultural critique rather than revolutionary politics. British work suggests that the problem is not so much delinquent youth groups as class inequality, unemployment, disruptive urban planning, and the like. In the US the "culture of poverty" argument has been used at times to hold the poor responsible for their poverty. The sociology of deviant subcultures has therefore always been associated with discourse on social problems, whether deviant subcultures serve as targets for reform, as targets for crime control, or as indicators of larger problems rooted in class relations, race relations, and urbanization.

It is important to recognize, however, that the term deviant subculture does not necessarily reflect a sociologist's judgment that particular groups are deviant. While the term can reflect such judgments, it can also be used by sociologists in a purely descriptive, non judgmental sense, in reference to the common evaluation of a subculture in the wider cultural environment, which the sociologist merely observes to be the conventional evaluation. Howard Becker's *Outsiders* (1963) served as an

influential introduction to non judgmental studies of deviance and deviant subcultures.

METHODOLOGICAL ORIENTATIONS AND ISSUES

Methodologically, the study of deviant subcultures is complicated by the coexistence of two largely distinct traditions of research. Many positivist, quantitative studies starting in the 1960s have tested formal theories of delinquency, but these theories often address subcultures only tangentially, and many are not specifically *cultural* explanations of deviance. In such studies, subcultures might figure as a potential explanation for deviance, rather than as phenomena in their own right. Qualitative studies often describe real subcultural groups, who really deviate from middle class norms and criminal codes. Qualitative researchers are often not concerned with formal theory testing, for formal theory construction, or even causal explanation. Studies of deviant subcultures have often been of the latter, qualitative variety, employing observational and interview methods, which offer accounts of identity, behavior, and commitment as these are related to a way of life and system of meanings.

One of the more reflective methodological discussions is provided by Ned Polsky, a later member of the Chicago School, in his book *Hustlers, Beats, and Others* (1998). Polsky advocates studying criminals in their natural environment, and raises several objections to research trends in the sociology of crime and criminology. Polsky argues that good ethnographic research on criminals requires a disinterested stance on questions of morality and law, and finds fault with those who approach their studies with a social control or social work orientation. He charges that these trends have worsened recently because opportunities for jobs and grants are increasingly weighted towards the practical concerns of criminal justice administration. He objects to the common practices of studying criminals in "anti crime settings" such as prisons and half way houses, and criticizes the over reliance on the recollective testimony of such caught criminals. He criticizes what he

suggests are scientific prejudices and bureaucratic fetishes leading to the dismissal of unstructured field observations in favor of more structured research methods. The more structured methods, he charges, erect screens between researcher and subjects and prevent the observation of subjects in their ordinary life situations.

While all of these are serious and important issues, Polsky risks being overly dismissive. Many noteworthy studies have been informed by the labeling/social reaction theory, which studies deviance as a function of social labeling, thus opening up new topics for research. Stan Cohen in his *Folk Devils and Moral Panics* (1972) noted the role of media in constructing a moral panic about youth subcultures, which led ironically to increased affiliations with such subcultures. Similar observations have been made about the gang eradication efforts of social workers and police. Meehan (2000) suggests that gang activities are in an interesting sense constructed by police dispatchers and gang units for bureaucratic and political reasons. Solid work has also been done in correctional settings. John Irwin explored inmate subculture in *The Felon* (1970), and D. L. Wieder's *Language and Social Reality* (1973) analyzes the "convict code" in a half way house, prefiguring contemporary interest in the relevance of language for displaying subcultural norms.

A more recent discussion is provided by Katz and Jackson Jacobs (2004) in a survey of gang research. Although the research surveyed includes noteworthy quantitative and positivist studies, Katz and Jackson Jacobs note several shortcomings of quantitative data. Data from official sources, victim surveys, and self report surveys are all problematic in different ways. Gang identities can go unremarked and unrecorded, can be recorded erroneously or inconsistently, or can be recorded in insufficient detail. Katz and Jackson Jacobs argue that the field of gang studies "is structured on a quiet agreement not to press the causal question" (p. 93). They suggest that causal explanations may be tautological, and they ask whether gang membership causes violence, or vice versa. More broadly, these authors note that gangs are often treated as an index of the background social conditions

which happen to preoccupy each given theorist, resulting in a failure to document the realities of gang life.

Although many quantitative studies have had minimal impact on subsequent theory and research, the entire project of explaining deviance in terms of subcultures is premised on statistics suggesting different rates of deviance in different segments of the population or in different neighborhoods. Such data cannot demonstrate that deviance is caused by subcultures, but they can be suggestive. The *lack* of statistical differences across groups or neighborhoods can throw subcultural theories into question, also. For this reason, self report studies indicating that middle class youth might engage in delinquent behavior at similar rates as poorer youth have added an interesting debate to the study of delinquency, as have studies suggesting that lower class youth have similar rates of delinquency regardless of membership in delinquent peer groups. The theoretical relevance of quantitative analysis is also limited in part by the theories in question, which have frequently been criticized for being difficult to test or for being tautological. Such issues may ultimately reflect divergent traditions of inquiry. Theories of deviant subcultures have rarely been designed to satisfy the requirements of formal theory, although they have often implied a researchable causal relationship amid largely interpretive accounts of deviant subcultures.

FUTURE DIRECTIONS

By the 1980s the sociology of deviant subcultures had established a core literature, around which much discussion still revolves. This has led to an under appreciation of historical developments, including the increasingly economic and violent character of street gangs in the US, blamed largely on the drug trade, and the further commercialization of youth subcultures, especially with respect to music and fashion. Academic developments have had greater influence on deviant subcultures scholarship. Sarah Thornton expanded subculture theories by incorporating Pierre Bourdieu's sociology into her *Club Cultures* (1996). The interpretive and linguistic turn in the social sciences has brought new attention to the identities and

commitments of subcultural members as understood by the members themselves. Sue Widdicombe and Robin Wooffitt's *Language of Youth Subcultures* (1995) is exemplary in this vein.

Although the first generations of theory and research on deviant subcultures tended to focus on the delinquent behavior of young urban males, the literature has expanded considerably to address a wide range of deviant behavior, in a great variety of settings, and among girls as well as boys, adults as well as juveniles. The expansion of the subject area has occurred hand in hand with the proliferation of relevant theories and perspectives. Within criminology and the sociology of crime and deviance, relevant work is addressed to social learning and differential association theories, social disorganization and social control theories, labeling theory, class conflict and cultural conflict theories, and several others. Many relevant publications appear outside the sociology of crime and deviance, including in youth studies, cultural studies, urban studies, minority studies, and many other fields. Studies of cults, organized crime, hate groups, and other deviant subcultures are often pursued as independent topics, in what are now largely separate literatures. The sociology of youth culture, in particular, has broadened the discussion of subculture towards cultural rather than criminal deviance, for example emphasizing alternative music and dress rather than vandalism and street fights. Michael Brake's *Comparative Youth Culture* (1985) traces as well as represents this trend. Much of the existing momentum in the study of subcultures is now addressed to youth culture, and is associated with the field of cultural studies as well as sociology. Importantly, the early tendency to resort to subcultures primarily as an explanation for the apparently irrational behavior of urban youth, in the context of a structuralist emphasis on class relations, has been counterbalanced to some degree. In recent studies, cultural analysis sometimes appears as an alternative to structural analysis, meaning that subcultural identity, commitment, values, and styles are not always understood as determined and dysfunctional.

The relationship between deviance and cultural groups and cultural differentiation continues to be a rewarding topic of study, and has informed and even generated theoretical

and empirical work across a growing variety of disciplines and subdisciplines.

SEE ALSO: Birmingham School; Chicago School; Consumption, Youth Culture and; Cultural Studies; Deviance; Gangs, Delinquent; Subculture

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subjectivity

Vivienne Boon

In sociology, subjectivity is often positioned as the opposite of objectivity, with objectivity being the ideal to which all empirical sociology should aspire. When Auguste Comte coined the phrase sociology, he had in mind the objective study of human behavior according to rational principles. A pertinent example of objective sociological analysis is that of Emile Durkheim, who argued that sociologists should analyze the internal (and impersonal) causes of social phenomena through the observation of concrete facts. Another notable example is, of course, the scholarship of Karl Marx, who also believed in a form of social scientism that went beyond

the surface of social life through the analysis of concrete social facts. Durkheim distinguished this analysis from philosophical introspection and generalizations that would be unduly affected by subjective influences such as beliefs and values (Giddens 1993; Crow 2005).

Objective sociology has been criticized by those who believe that the observation of social phenomena cannot and should not be separated from our subjective perspective, since doing so entails a form of distortion and even repression. Here, introspection and philosophical reflection play an important role and social analysis proceeds through the chief methods of "imagination, psychological insight and historical interpretation" (Mayer 1934: 341).

However, subjectivity is more than the mere opposite of objective social research. For it is an intrinsically modern concept that is bound up with ideas of the self as an acting agent. Through secularizing and modernizing processes, it was no longer a universal order that predetermined individual actions but, rather, it was within the thinking subject herself that reason and freedom were to be found. It was as a result of modernization processes that a preoccupation with the flourishing of the authentic individual self emerged (Berman 1970).

In the Enlightenment writings of Immanuel Kant, the transcendental subject stood at the center of all possible knowledge and reason. It was in the unified subject that sensibility and understanding collided, giving rise to the universal (Kant 1968). This idea of the unified subject was already contested by Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel, who argued that the subject was not in and of itself but, rather, became aware of its subjectivity through its relation to surrounding objects and subjects.

Yet, it was with Friedrich Nietzsche that the subject disintegrated and became celebrated as an aesthetic endeavor. For Nietzsche intended to "inculcate a greater degree of personal agency, and the taking of responsibility for one's actions in the process of self creation" (Hall 2004: 70). Nietzsche is hence often regarded as the forefather of postmodern and poststructuralist thought, which claims that there is no grand knowledge (Lyotard 1984) and no centered (or unified) subject (Lacan 1977; Foucault 1984).

According to Michel Foucault, our subjectivities are formed through our subjection to

various discourses that position a subject within a web of knowledge–power relations. Whilst these discourses of power are oppressive, they also provide a site of resistance in that we can continuously reinvent our subjectivities (Foucault 1984: 41–2). It is for this reason that Foucault endeavored to engage in a genealogical critique that consists of a “historical investigation into the events that have led us to constitute ourselves and to recognize ourselves as subjects of what we are doing, thinking, saying” (1984: 46). Thus whilst we are subject to various historical discursive processes, we are also agents acting and interfering in these historical processes.

Appeals to active subjective agents have been made in light of identity and subcultural politics. For example, within identity politics, it is argued that women’s voices provide alternative voices (through their female subjectivity) within a political realm that is dominated by a male hegemonic order. Similarly, subcultural styles such as punk have also been heralded as the creation of new subjectivities (Hebdige 1979).

We should be careful, however, not to conflate the notions of identity and subjectivity, even though they are rather difficult to distinguish since they are intrinsically related. It is difficult to think of one’s identity without regarding one’s subjectivity, just as it is hard to perceive of one’s subjectivity without a sense of I, or identity. Yet, as Heidrun Friese notes, identity thinking in the social sciences has often been motivated by the desire for unity of the subject, and has proceeded through the construction of narratives and the process of naming that synthesized the manifold (Friese 2002: 26). Reflection on subjectivity is slightly different from identity thinking in that it is more specifically focused on the consciousness of being, on the medium of one’s own mind in the perception of things, and on the awareness of one’s subjective feelings. Thus reflection on subjectivity is more related to the idea of consciousness and stands at the intersection of “two lines of philosophical inquiry: epistemology (the study of how we know what we know) and ontology (the study of the nature of being or existence)” (Hall 2004: 4).

SEE ALSO: Belief; Collective Identity; Discourse; Epistemology; Foucault, Michel; Identity Theory; Objectivity; Realism and

Relativism: Truth and Objectivity; Strong Objectivity; Values

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suburbs

Judith J. Friedman

Social scientists in the US usually identify a city’s suburbs as the municipalities (plus any “urban” unincorporated areas) that are located outside the political boundaries of that city, but are adjacent to the city or to its other suburbs. A city’s suburbs form a band around the city that has (1) lower population density overall than the city, yet (2) predominantly urban land

uses. Unless the city is located near another city, its suburbs end where farmland or open space predominates. The term suburb refers either to the entire band of suburbs around a city or to particular places within a suburban band. The term suburban also can refer to a way of life identified with suburbs.

The definition of suburb and the characteristics of suburbs differ around the world, in part because of differences in local government structure. In many countries, suburbs are relatively new neighborhoods within a city or within a metropolitan area served by one government. This entry focuses on suburbs in the US, where municipalities, including those considered suburbs, have substantial political and fiscal autonomy. In 2000, half the US population lived in suburbs of metropolitan areas (Hobbs & Stoops 2002).

Early US cities absorbed more people and more activities by (1) using land more intensively, and (2) expanding on the edge, as developers converted farmland to an urban use. Cities routinely annexed the newly urban land. In the nineteenth century, railroads permitted a new kind of small town: a primarily residential town linked by rail to a city. These towns were called suburbs. As the city expanded toward a commuter suburb, well-to-do residents frequently resisted annexation. State laws in Eastern states soon facilitated this method of retaining local political control by making incorporation relatively easy, and annexation difficult.

The US population shifted from small towns and farms to large towns and cities during the nineteenth century, and additional types of suburbs formed. Before 1900, street car lines facilitated lines of urban land use that extended outside city limits. Factory owners built modern factories on the city's outskirts, creating industrial suburbs. Cities annexed some of this newly urban land, but residents of other new places incorporated. New urban land uses eventually surrounded older towns, cities, and commuter suburbs. Despite the resulting diversity among a city's suburbs, the term suburb retained a connotation of new, residential, and middle class.

Factories built during World War II brought more jobs to former farmland around cities, and both residential and commercial construction boomed after the war. Farmland near a city provided ideal locations for large developments,

especially when near a highway. Diverse federal and state policies subsidized new schools, hospitals, sewer lines, and other infrastructure, but did little to repair and upgrade existing infrastructure. Federal housing policies combined with banking and real estate practices also tended to put cities at a disadvantage. Some cities, especially cities in the West, continued to annex new development. If a city did not annex growing areas, its suburban band expanded in land area, employment, and population. If the city itself failed to attract new residents and businesses, its property tax revenue declined, putting it at further disadvantage.

As cities stopped routine annexation, social scientists and administrators needed a straightforward definition for this urban land outside city limits, a definition that would facilitate both data collection and comparisons among places and across time. The US Bureau of the Census based such definitions on political boundaries – municipal or county. Standard Metropolitan Statistical Areas (SMSAs) contain a large city and its “ring” – the rest of the county that contains the central city land plus any adjacent counties economically tied to the city. An SMSA can include substantial rural areas. In 1910 the Census identified 25 metropolitan districts – cities plus adjacent “urban” minor civil divisions (Gardner 1999) – but published little information about the “fringe” of each district. In 1950 the Bureau defined 35 urbanized areas, units again based on minor civil divisions. A city's fringe could include incorporated places (residential suburbs, industrial suburbs, older towns and villages) plus unincorporated land that had a population density of 1,000 per square mile or more or was surrounded by other land within the fringe. Since land area and the population size of a city's fringe depended in part on past annexation, large fringe areas were more typical of cities in the Northeast than of cities in the West or South.

In Census reports and in academic research using Census data, a city's fringe (and its ring) became its suburbs. Individual incorporated places within the fringe or ring also are called suburbs. Demographers such as Schnore (1965) emphasized the diversity of these incorporated places, and suggested categories. Schnore reserved “suburb” for primarily residential

municipalities; suburban residents still largely commuted to city jobs. Schnore called municipalities that provided substantial employment, and hence had some independence from the city, “satellites.”

Even in 1950, distinctions between city and suburb were not always obvious, particularly in highly urban areas. Jersey City, NJ could be a central city or a satellite, but was it a satellite of Newark or of New York City? Similarly, was Newark a city with suburbs, or a part of New York City’s suburbs? With each subsequent Census, this situation has become more common and more complex.

Further changes in land use, particularly the growth of jobs in suburbs, have generated a new kind of commute and a new term: exurb. Exurbs are small towns or unincorporated areas with sizable new housing developments. Located outside the suburban fringe, an exurb houses many people who work in suburbs.

The suburbs (and exurbs) of any US city tend to be different from each other, yet internally homogeneous. Employment is no longer a key distinction. Municipal zoning practices, economic development policies, and other local policies mean that a suburb can appear residential, yet have substantial commercial, office, and even industrial activity. Suburbs now concentrate such activities in malls or in “parks” located near highway interchanges, effectively out of sight as corporate landscaping blends into the residential landscape.

The critical difference among US suburbs today involves ability to finance municipal services. US municipalities, counties, and school districts depend heavily upon property tax revenue, and per capita property tax revenue varies substantially. Federal and state funds have not equalized local revenue (and services). A suburb with wealthy residents plus substantial non residential development can provide services more easily than a primarily residential community with low income residents. Over time, these differences have produced substantial “stratification of place” among each city’s suburbs. As this suggests, there is wide variation in median family income as well. Suburbs are not necessarily middle class.

The processes creating the decline of annexation, suburban stratification of place, and substantial population and housing homogeneity

within each suburban municipality involve more than municipal finance. Long held beliefs about proper land use planning, use of local land use planning (rather than metropolitan area planning), and the importance of home ownership as a financial investment make substantial contributions. The initial characteristics of each suburb also have lasting impact. Older industrial suburbs, for example, tend to follow a different track than older suburbs that began as upper middle class residential areas.

Housing stock can be especially important, as it varies with the period in which a suburban municipality experienced rapid growth (Friedman 1994). Suburbs that grew rapidly before World War II include satellites with substantial multi family housing and other housing built for the working class. Other older residential suburbs can have large homes that have retained, even gained, value. Places that grew rapidly just after World War II are likely to include former defense plants and post war housing tracts that initially had small houses on small lots. In this period, many municipalities, anticipating future growth, zoned for large lot single family homes. In part for this reason, average house size increased rather steadily after 1948. Single family homes built in 1955 averaged 1,270 square feet. The mean for new single family homes increased to 1,500 in 1970, 2,080 in 1990, and 2,330 in 2003 (HUD and US Bureau of the Census 2004). Suburbs also vary in the extent they have added condominium and townhouse developments, a possible source of “moderate” cost (but not necessarily “affordable”) housing.

The total suburban population of the US is becoming less “white” as others settle in suburbs. By 2000, over half (58 percent) of the Asian population, half (49 percent) of the Hispanic population, but only 39 percent of the black population lived in suburbs (defined as the rings of SMSAs) (Logan 2001). Koreans and Asian Indians are especially suburban, in part because immigrants are settling directly in suburbs. In the entire country, 75 percent of the 2000 suburban population was non Hispanic white. The remaining 25 percent included 11 percent classified Hispanic, 8 percent black, and 4 percent Asian (US Census).

The suburban history of blacks is complex. US suburbs have always housed and employed

African Americans (Wiess 2004). Before World War II, high status suburbs typically had neighborhoods that housed African American servants and other local workers. In the South, African Americans typically lived on the outskirts of the city. In the North, freed slaves founded villages and towns that are now within a city's fringe. The vast majority of the housing developments that went up outside (and also inside) city limits before, perhaps, 1970 were, however, entirely white. Homogeneity in residential neighborhoods was "best practice." Realtors and sociologists alike argued that neighborhoods homogeneous in income, race, ethnicity, and other characteristics were more likely to retain property value over time. Further, housing discrimination was legal until the late 1960s. Since then, the percentage of blacks living in suburbs has slowly increased. Informal practices continue, however, to limit housing integration.

SEE ALSO: City Planning/Urban Design; Exurbia; New Urbanism; Residential Segregation; Urban Ecology; Urban Policy; Urbanization

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suicide

Steven Stack

Suicide is among the top ten leading causes of death. Over 30,000 Americans take their own lives each year: about 85 per day. Further, there are an estimated 250,000–600,000 suicide attempts each year. There are at least 5 million living Americans who have attempted suicide in the past. While Americans fear being murdered more than dying by their own hand, the suicide rate is currently double the murder rate.

The dominant mode of analysis of suicide has stressed Durkheim's (1966) concept of social integration – bonds between the individual and society. Subordination of the individual to society is thought to provide meaning and prevent selfishness or "egoism." Groups lacking in ties to society, such as widowers, the divorced, atheists, the unemployed, and non church members, are at higher than average risk of suicide.

According to Durkheim, the greater the number of religious beliefs and practices shared with co religionists, the lower the suicide rate of a group. Historically, Catholics were more integrated (e.g., meatless Fridays, confession, weekly church attendance) than Protestants, and had lower suicide rates. In modern times, Islam is a religion with a high level of integration (e.g., prayer is expected multiple times a day). Research finds that the higher the proportion of Muslims in a nation, the lower the nation's suicide rate.

Marriage and parenting are seen as providing a set of responsibilities, such as obligations to a spouse (e.g., giving and receiving emotional support) and children, that act as protections against excessive self involvement or egoism. A review of 132 studies found strong support for

this thesis in 77.9 percent of their findings. For example, in Austria, the suicide rate of divorced persons is 128.6/100,000. This rate is 4.22 times higher than the suicide rate among married persons (30.5/100,000). Divorce rates are the best predictor of suicide rates in the 50 American states for all census years (e.g., 1940, 1950, 1960, 1970).

CHANGES OVER TIME IN THE TOPIC AND ITS TREATMENT

Religion and Suicide

Two new theories have linked religion to suicide. First, Stack's theory of religious commitment and suicide argues that belief in a few life saving principles (as opposed to the many that Durkheim posited) may be enough to prevent suicide. For example, belief in a blissful afterlife for those who persevere may protect against risk factors such as poverty, divorce, and death of loved ones. Second, Pescosolido's religious networks perspective argues that friends from church (co religionists) may provide emotional and material support for otherwise suicidal individuals. It may not be religious beliefs per se that save lives, but the social support networks in churches that prevent suicides. Most of the empirical work on these new, perhaps complementary, perspectives has supported the respective theories. For example, in an analysis of 261 Canadian census divisions, a 10 percent increase in the proportion with no religious affiliation (a sign of both low religious commitment and religious networking potential) is associated with a 3.2 percent increase in the suicide rate.

Economic Strain and Suicide

Durkheim argued that poverty was a school of social constraint. The poor were toughened by impoverishment and could handle life's adversities better than the more affluent. However, in the last 50 years, most research on social class and suicide risk has found that lower status persons have higher, not lower, suicide rates. For example, data for the US indicate that laborers have a suicide rate of 94.4 suicides per 100,000, eight times the national suicide

rate. The high suicide rate of lower class persons is partly a consequence of their high rates of severe mental troubles, alcoholism, and family disruption.

Unemployment can influence suicide by affecting suicide risk factors such as lowering household income, self esteem, work centered social networks, and increasing depression levels. For example, in London, the unemployed had a suicide rate of 73.4/100,000, five times that for the general population (14.1/100,000). In Austria the suicide rate for the unemployed was 98.3/100,000, a figure nearly four times that for the general population (25.0/100,000).

Alcohol and Suicide

Durkheim rejected alcohol abuse as a contributing factor to suicide, although his own data, if carefully analyzed, showed a significant association. Nevertheless, alcohol can increase suicide risk through such means as emotional disinhibition, which enhances impulsive behavior including suicide, pharmacological effects, and depression. To the extent that a culture provides positive definitions of alcohol use, it may indirectly promote suicidal behavior. Sociological research over the past three decades has often illustrated an association. For example, at the level of individuals, in a panel study of 40,000 men over four decades, the lifetime prevalence of suicide by age 60 was 4.76 percent for alcohol abusers compared to 0.63 percent for non abusers.

CURRENT EMPHASES IN RESEARCH AND THEORY

Media and Suicide

Durkheim, on the basis of scant data, viewed media based stories, such as those in newspapers, on suicide as largely irrelevant to explaining suicide rates. However, since 1967 many of the 106 studies on this issue have found copycat effects. From news and other coverage of suicide, depressed people may learn that there are troubled individuals who commit suicide in response to life's problems. For example, the publication of *Final Exit*, a guide recommending

suicide through asphyxiation for the terminally ill, was associated with an increase of 313 per cent in suicide by this method in New York City. This was for the year that the book was published. A copy of *Final Exit* was found at the scene of 27 percent of these suicides.

From the standpoint of social learning theory, widely publicized suicides are most likely to trigger copycat suicide if the model is a celebrity, someone that many people identify with, a well known and admired person. In particular, studies of the widely publicized suicides of entertainment or political celebrities are 14 times more likely to find a copycat effect than studies of ordinary suicides. When famous movie stars commit suicide, there are, on average, 217 additional suicides during the month of news coverage of their suicide.

Gender Suicide Ratio

After a century of converging, the suicide rates of men and women are diverging. For example, while the suicide rate of women was half that of men 50 years ago, it is currently only a quarter that of men in the US. Stack developed a cultural theory of a curvilinear relationship in the gender suicide ratio. First, female rates of suicide would rise along with increases in labor force participation. The cultural definition of women's place as being in the home would promote a certain amount of strain and guilt for many working women, increasing their risk of suicide and closing the gender gap. However, after a critical mass of women was in the labor force, culture defined the working mother in more positive terms. Supportive social institutions such as day care centers emerged, and women's percentage share of better jobs in the professions increased. Women could take more advantage of the benefits of work, such as adult companionship, careers, and higher household income, and their suicide rate declined. However, the gains for women in such areas as medicine, law, and the professorate represent corresponding losses in occupational mobility for men. Male suicide rates have increased proportionately, thus widening the gender suicide gap. Pampel has successfully applied Stack's curvilinear theory to a sample of other industrial nations.

Sexual Orientation and Suicide

Given significant homophobic tendencies in the cultural systems of western developed societies, one might anticipate that persons with homosexual orientations would have a higher incidence of suicidal behavior. It is often argued that the recognition of one's homosexuality is often associated with anxiety, depression, confusion, and other suicidogenic conditions. The families of many gay youth may multiply the risk of suicidal behavior through the rejection of the gay child. While there are few well designed research studies on sexual orientation and suicide, two patterns are found in the existing research evidence. First, homosexuals have higher rates of suicide attempts than heterosexuals. For community samples, the prevalence of having attempted suicide among gay males ranges from 20–35 percent and is about twice that of heterosexual males. Among disturbed samples (e.g., runaway youth) the prevalence rate of attempted suicide sometimes exceeds 50 percent. The prevalence of suicide attempts is higher among lesbians, but the gap between lesbian and heterosexual women is smaller than that for men. Second, while completed suicide and sexual orientation is an understudied area, there is no evidence that homosexuals have a higher rate of completed suicide than heterosexuals. Further, the stress and other factors underlying the suicides of gay and heterosexual persons were more similar than different and include relationship difficulties with lovers. However, gay suicides are more apt than heterosexual suicides to use hanging as a method and to have been diagnosed schizophrenic.

QUALITY OF SUICIDE DATA

Data on suicide tend to underreport the phenomenon. Some authorities seek to conceal suicide as a cause of death. The best estimates of underreporting place the suicide undercount as being somewhere between 3 percent and 18 percent. For example, suicide is undercounted by 2.8 percent for males and 5.6 percent for females. These error rates are not large relative to undercounts for crime rates. For example, crime underreporting in federal crime statistics amounts to 67 percent of all index crimes,

including 49 percent of the rapes and 50 percent of the burglaries.

Analyses of data for 404 American county groups support the validity of suicide data. Indicators of misreporting in the official statistics have little discernible effect on the relationships between major sociological variables (e.g., divorce rates, religion) and suicide rates. The errors in suicide reporting are not considered large enough to preclude meaningful sociological analyses.

FUTURE DIRECTIONS

The vast majority of sociological studies on suicide deal with suicide as a phenomenon isolated from other forms of deviant behavior. However, recent research finds that suicidal persons, those who are basically depressed and out of touch with the value of life, are involved in a broad range of deviant behaviors. For example, analyses of national data found that suicidal youth are more likely than others to engage in each of the following deviant behaviors: crack cocaine use (9.25 times more likely), marijuana use (3.25 times more likely), binge drinking (2.69 times more likely), heavy smoking (3.17 times more likely), unsafe sex (2.65 times more likely), getting someone pregnant/getting pregnant (4.63 times more likely), carrying a gun (4.73 times more likely), aggravated assaults (6.56 times more likely), and threatened with a weapon (5.23 times more likely). Research on crime and deviant behavior could benefit by viewing deviance, in part, as an expression of suicidality.

Of course, in future research there is the issue of the direction of causality. Does suicidal behavior cause deviance, or does deviance cause suicidality? Perhaps a common factor x may account for many types of deviant behavior, including suicidal behavior. The common factor may be, as Durkheim argued, lack of adequate subordination of the individual to society: low social integration. Factor x may also include a psychological state such as depression, which has been associated with a wide variety of deviant behaviors, especially suicide.

SEE ALSO: Alcoholism and Alcohol Abuse; Divorce; Drug Use; Durkheim, Émile;

Homosexuality; Media; Mental Disorder; Religion; Stressful Life Events; Unemployment

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Sumner, William Graham (1840–1910)

Bernd Weiler

William G. Sumner, born in Paterson, New Jersey, is commonly regarded as one of the most influential American social scientists in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. In his theories of sociology he is often portrayed or – as some would argue – misportrayed as a conservative apologist for “tooth and claw” capitalism and as the great Social Darwinist antipode to his progressive and reform oriented contemporary and fellow countryman L. F. Ward.

After graduating from Yale in 1863, Sumner, the son of an immigrant mechanic and pious Protestant from Lancashire, attended

the universities of Geneva, Goettingen, and Oxford to study languages, history, and theology and to prepare himself for the ministry. In 1866 he returned to Yale as a classics tutor and, shortly afterwards, joined the Protestant Episcopal clergy. In 1872 he was appointed to the newly founded chair of political and social sciences at Yale, a post he held until his retirement in 1909. In the 1870s Sumner also served as a politician for the Republicans. Disillusioned, he left politics after a few years and became a liberal Mugwump. In 1908, two years before his death, Sumner succeeded L. F. Ward as the second president of the American Sociological Society.

Among the main intellectual influences on Sumner's work were classical economic theory, especially Malthus's population theory, the positivistic approach to the study of history (e.g., Buckle), Darwinian evolutionism, Spencerian sociology, and, later in his career, the emerging comparative researches in ethnography and cultural history (e.g., Lippert), as well as the contributions of the "Austrian Struggle School." Like many theorists of his age who converted from religion to social science, Sumner replaced the belief in a divine providential design with a naturalistic conception of the lawfulness of the social world.

Sumner's writings span a broad spectrum of subjects and genres. Apart from extended treatises on American economic history and political biographies, Sumner, in the first part of his career, gained fame as a public intellectual who vigorously supported laissez faire economics and adhered to a Social Darwinist philosophy. In numerous articles he polemicized against bimetalism, protective tariffs, trade unionism, socialism, governmental paternalism, amateurish "meddling" in social affairs, and utopianism. Far from simply glorifying the status quo and contrary to the prevailing optimism of his time, however, Sumner remained skeptical about societal progress, warned against the danger that plutocrats might undermine the independence of political life, and argued forcefully against the emerging American imperialism.

In the second part of his career, following a breakdown in health in 1890 and accompanying his increasing disillusionment with American society, Sumner turned his attention from current social, political, and economic affairs to the

cross cultural study of the importance of tradition for human conduct. The major works resulting from this research, in the course of which Sumner and his collaborators collected and indexed a massive amount of data from cultural history and ethnography, are the loosely structured treatise *Folkways* (1906) and the voluminous, similarly unsystematic, posthumously published *The Science of Society* (1927). At the core of Sumner's late theoretical work, which was not free from contradictions, lie his identification of four universal needs (hunger, love, vanity, fear), his argument that societies had developed different means or "folkways" to satisfy those needs, his claim of the priority of the group over the individual, his analysis of the antagonistic relationship between "we groups" vs. "others groups," his inquiry into the universal nature of "ethnocentrism," and his emphasis on the mighty and unconscious influence that "folkways" exerted over all people, whether "savage" or "civilized." The main thrust of Sumner's late work, however, may be seen in the enormous collection of empirical data. Though Sumner and his disciple Keller neglected the use of statistical methods, were unable to synthesize their data in a satisfactory manner, and were unable to lay the foundations for a comparative science of society, they anticipated and influenced the much more comprehensive and systematic *Human Relations Area Files* that are intimately linked to the name of G. P. Murdock, another Yale scholar.

SEE ALSO: Cultural Relativism; Ethnocentrism; Gumpłowicz, Ludwig; Ratzenhofer, Gustav; Social Darwinism; Spencer, Herbert; Ward, Lester Frank

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Sunbelt

Vern Baxter and David Johnson

The Sunbelt is a contested construct adopted by scholars in the late 1970s from journalistic accounts of industrial relocation and shifts in population and political power to the Southern and Western regions of the US after World War II. The Sunbelt is defined by juxtaposing rapid economic growth and the rise of conservative politics in the South and West, with economic collapse and political liberalism in the Northeast and Midwest (Frostbelt). Sunbelt boundaries are ambiguous, depending on whether attention is directed to relocation of old industry, location of new industry, or political realignment. Sale's (1975) early designation of the Sunbelt as that area below the 37th parallel (northern border of North Carolina through lower third of California) was largely confirmed by Rice and Bernard's (1983) survey of business and public perceptions of the region, but other scholars believe the Sunbelt represents a sloppy form of regionalization that combines disparate patterns of growth and prosperity found in the South and West.

While scholars quarrel about geographic boundaries, most agree the Sunbelt represents economic growth and conservative politics in a new urban environment. Spurred by federal investment in military and space programs, the expansion of Sunbelt defense, aerospace, electronics, agribusiness, oil and gas, and tourist industries places the region at the center of

the new economy. Industrial restructuring and flexible production methods favor Sunbelt cities as locations of new industry and for relocation of northern manufacturing plants. Sunbelt cities generally offer lower labor costs, non union workforces, and less stringent environmental and zoning regulations than found in the north. Larger cities like Los Angeles, Houston, and Atlanta now challenge the prominence of New York and Chicago, while medium size Sunbelt cities like Charlotte and Albuquerque are peers to Cincinnati and Providence. Automobile transportation facilitates urban sprawl in Sunbelt cities where annexation and city-county mergers favor private investment and unfettered, if uneven, economic growth. Internal migration to the South and West and extensive immigration from Asia and Latin America increased population and political representation of increasingly Republican Sunbelt states that spearheaded realignment of national politics.

Convergence and uneven development theories provide the broadest explanations of Sunbelt economic growth. Convergence theory emphasizes long term equilibrium in national market economies. Earlier industrial growth, higher incomes, and lower unemployment in Northern industrial cities was eventually offset by lower wages and factor costs in the Sunbelt. Regional convergence occurred as investors took advantage of lower costs and backlogs of unapplied technologies in industry and agriculture. Rostow (1977) argues that the global economic upswing after 1972 favored the Sunbelt with higher food and energy prices and expansion of electronics and petrochemical investment, while demand stagnated for products like textiles, shoes, steel, and autos produced up north. Ecological theories highlight a filtering process whereby firms move from higher to lower wage regions and take advantage of new infrastructure in the Sunbelt. Both convergence and ecological theories emphasize private rather than public sector impetus for Sunbelt economic growth. The superior business climate that attracts investment to the South and West is enhanced by lower taxes, weak regulation, and local coalitions committed to privately organized growth.

Theorists of uneven development argue that capitalist economies grow in a spatially concentrated and uneven fashion that creates divergent development patterns that engender

dependence of one set of cities on another. Watkins and Perry (1977) argue that economic investment is not dispersed throughout the country by some equilibrating mechanism, but that historic conditions change so old centers of growth (Northern steel, autos, rubber) lose momentum and new ones (Sunbelt defense, electronics, oil) emerge. The Sunbelt has not prospered because low wage manufacturing moved South, but because new high wage, high tech industries located in the South and West. Contrary to convergence theory, uneven development theorists emphasize the role of government in the rise of the Sunbelt. They argue that inequities in federal spending broke earlier barriers to Southern industrial development. New Deal era federal spending on highways and infrastructure and Cold War federal spending on defense technology and military bases are critical determinants of Sunbelt growth.

The political importance of the Sunbelt is widely debated. Controversy initially centered on whether the emergent Republican majority in most Sunbelt states would fragment the national polity and undermine the liberal consensus that supported the welfare state. Debate extended to whether regional shifts were occurring in the composition and politics of the ruling class. One view is that political ascendance of the New Right evidences a shift from dominance by moderate Eastern "Yankee" to ultraconservative Southwestern "Cowboy" capitalists. The "Yankee Cowboy" thesis is that rapid post World War II economic growth in the Sunbelt created new elites who made money speculating in oil, defense, and real estate. These "Cowboy" elites oppose government intervention in the economy and advocate an expansionist foreign policy, states' rights, weak unions, and individualistic morality. Opponents insist that the 1970s corporate profit squeeze and political reactions to Civil Rights and environmental protection legislation catalyzed a convergence of elite politics on a New Right consensus. Empirical research finds little consistent evidence of a split between "Cowboy" and "Yankee" elites. Salt (1989) finds that Sunbelt capital was more supportive than Northeastern capital of conservative candidates in national elections held between 1978 and 1986, while Midwestern capital was more supportive of the New Right

than either Sunbelt or Northeastern capital. Refutation of the Sunbelt "Cowboy" thesis comes from Cohen (1977), who finds that Sunbelt economic growth remains dependent on Northern and Midwestern banks, accounting, and law firms and that no real shift has occurred in corporate control with the rise of the Sunbelt.

Debates about local politics in Sunbelt cities concern the extent to which governance of Southern cities by white business and civic elites has given way to suburban growth coalitions committed to fiscal conservatism, annexation, and private initiative and urban minority ruling coalitions committed to wealth redistribution. While business oriented urban and suburban growth coalitions still dominate most Sunbelt cities, black or immigrant minority mayors and minority based coalitions have risen to power in places like Birmingham, San Antonio, New Orleans, Atlanta, and Miami.

Scholarly interest in the Sunbelt has waned, largely because of difficulties characterizing regional patterns of economic development and political change. Economic growth stagnated in the South and West in the 1980s and whatever growth did occur was uneven and unequally distributed between urban and rural areas and across racial and ethnic groups. It is also difficult to characterize urban politics across the Sunbelt and differentiate them from the politics of Northern cities. For example, traditional ruling coalitions in New Orleans, Nashville, and Memphis look a lot like the party machines that dominated urban politics in the North; and battles over governmental reform in the South resemble similar battles fought in the North.

The Sunbelt remains ambiguous. Perhaps the South and West are too disparate for any regional synthesis to gain explanatory traction. Old distinctions also remain salient between urban and rural and between urban and suburban, and this confounds efforts to highlight regional differences in economic development, culture, and politics. During the 1990s the idea of globalization largely supplanted regional and even national level analysis of industrial restructuring and decentralization. However, suburban and leisure tourism scholars still find the Sunbelt a useful construct to understand migration and cultural differences in the US, and recent patterns of Hispanic immigration have reinforced the salience of the Sunbelt (Goldfield

2003). To conclude, the Sunbelt construct served as a bridge in the analysis of shifts in the global division of labor and national politics between the eras of post war industrial prosperity and liberal politics and the current era of globalization and conservative realignment of national politics in the post industrial economy.

SEE ALSO: Political Economy; Rustbelt; Uneven Development; Urban Political Economy

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supermarkets

Kim Humphery

Defined in commercial terms a supermarket is a predominantly self service retail shop selling a range of foodstuffs and household goods. These products are displayed mostly on open shelves, selected by the shopper and placed in a basket

or trolley, and purchased by way of moving through a check out or past a cash register. The supermarket is differentiated from other food stores in terms of the range of foods available within it (which usually includes manufactured and packaged products, fruit and vegetables, and refrigerated produce) and the area of selling space. Supermarkets are generally larger than similar environments such as corner shops or convenience stores, but smaller than other types of large, self service establishments such as hypermarkets.

Initially, then, the supermarket can be understood as an economic institution, and one which is dominant (or at least highly significant) as a vehicle of everyday retail food distribution within nations as diverse as the United States, Britain, Australia, Germany, France, Japan, and China. This increasing dominance of the supermarket as a retail form is matched in many countries with a high concentration of commercial ownership, such that a small number of retail companies or “chains” own and operate a large number of supermarkets dispersed throughout a region or nation and sporting the same logo, store design, and product profile.

Yet the supermarket is also much more than an economic phenomenon. It is a part of everyday life within many industrialized countries – so much so, that the above definition can seem a little ludicrous, as if to make the very ordinary and already known somehow strange and technical. It is this everydayness, and the position of the supermarket within a much broader field of consumption, that has recently begun to interest those working in the social sciences and humanities. Beyond the economic, the supermarket is a *social space*, in the sense in which it is a terrain of interaction; a *cultural field*, in the sense in which it marks out particular ways of symbolizing and emotionally valuing consumer goods; and a *terrain of politics*, in the sense in which it is embedded within a set of labor practices, global production frameworks, and environmental consequences. Supermarkets, then, may be mundane and ordinary, but they are not simple or unimportant places because of this. On the contrary, supermarkets are central to the nature and levels of consumption within the contemporary highly industrialized world.

Historians and cultural analysts have recently turned their attention to the rise of

supermarketing, drawing on and reformulating histories of retailing, shopping, and individual companies. An indisputably “American” phenomenon, the supermarket is seen to have appeared in the 1930s, particularly in New York where there was originally an emphasis on large warehouse type stores selling a plethora of goods at cheap prices. These stores were integrally dependent on changes in food manufacturing and packaging, on the suburbanization of cities, and on the rise of the automobile as a form of transport. They were also modeled on much earlier retail experimentation in North America, Europe, and elsewhere with the practices of cash and carry and self service. By the 1950s the supermarket was fast becoming the dominant form of retail food distribution in the United States and, as a retail form, it was emerging in Britain, Australasia, Canada, France, Germany, and in other western nations. This pace of development continued, such that by the mid 1960s the supermarket could claim status as a global phenomenon, having spread beyond the West into Southeast Asia, parts of Africa, and elsewhere. In the process, the supermarket had become a preeminent symbol of capitalist modernity, connected with images of choice, convenience, abundance, and everyday luxury. Its internationalization spurred also further retail experimentation, with the development in France of the hypermarket during the early 1960s.

Within a number of countries this consolidation of the supermarket resulted in significant restructuring of the economics of retailing and the social practices of shopping. With the rise of the supermarket the number of retail shops, particularly grocery stores, dramatically decreased within many countries, while the size of retail grocery outlets, in terms of area of selling space, grew significantly. Older forms of retailing, along with the independent shopkeeper, were thus eclipsed by the rise of supermarket chains which, in turn, consolidated the economic dominance of key manufacturers of foods and household goods and fostered highly commercialized forms of agricultural production. Socially, the supermarket also quickly transformed everyday consumption, shifting the responsibility for the selection and transport of goods purchased onto the shopper, and thus increasing the domestic workload of many

women who have always constituted the majority of supermarket shoppers. Equally, the goods available within the supermarket gradually contributed to population wide transformations in dietary intake. Moreover, the supermarket as a social space reframed the experience of shopping, placing people within an environment which blurred class distinctions, partially challenged the highly gendered nature of everyday provisioning, and positioned people as autonomous within an ideological framework of consumer choice.

These and other consumption practices and frameworks mark the contemporary supermarket as well. Yet it is only comparatively recently that scholars have turned their attention to the supermarket and taken it seriously as a subject of social and cultural analysis. This recent work has been productive in terms of exploring the very particular place of the supermarket within the broader historical development of consumption cultures. Analysts have thus explored the supermarket in terms of the rise of mass marketing, transformations in technologies of manufacturing and packaging, the development of post World War II cultures of capitalist abundance, and shifts in the nature of domestic work. Further, scholars have explored the connections between everyday supermarket shopping and the concepts of self identity, cultural fragmentation, and rituals of provisioning under conditions of modernity and beyond.

It might also be said, however, that the future direction of such analysis is undergoing timely challenge. The recent study of consumption, and of the supermarket along with it, has arguably been dominated by explorations of the cultural significance and social dynamics of shopping in terms that have been too narrowly focused on questions of identity, meaning, and postmodernity. This has tended to eclipse an analysis of other aspects of supermarket retailing: its placement within global systems of provision, its connection with the logic of global capitalist expansion, and its embeddedness within systems of overconsumption leading to significant individual, social, and environmental costs. It is perhaps to these more avowedly critical explorations of the supermarket, and life within and *beyond* it, that commentators might now turn.

SEE ALSO: Consumption; Consumption, Cathedrals of; Consumption, Food and Cultural; Consumption, Provisioning and; Shopping

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supply chains

Chris Lonsdale

The term supply chain is actually a metaphor for a complex series of interactions between a set of organizations responsible for delivering a product or service to an ultimate customer. Indeed, this series of interactions has more recently been referred to as a network (Hakansson and Snehota 1990; Harland 1996). A supply chain starts with a set of raw materials and ends with the delivery of a finished product or service to the ultimate customer(s). Figure 1 provides a simplified representation of a supply chain.

The term gained prominence within the management field because of the realization that an organization's prospects are dependent not only on its interactions with its immediate customers, competitors, and suppliers, but also on those that take place elsewhere in the chain or network. This can be explained using the hypothetical supply chain in Figure 1. First, organization A can be affected by the actions of organization B, despite having no direct commercial relationship with it. For example, organization B might be ineffective at providing demand information to organizations D and E. If that then affects the ability of those two organizations to interact effectively with

organization A, then this will have an adverse affect on organization A. Given that the problem is poor demand information, the effect could be related to organization A's efforts to plan its capacity.

Alternatively, organization A can be affected by the actions of organization C, again despite having no direct commercial relationship with it. For example, organization C may refuse to adhere to an agreement with organization F, one of organization A's own suppliers. If organization C's actions affect the ability of organization F to supply organization A, then organization A may well suffer adverse effects, perhaps to its production schedule. More dramatically, the same principle means that all of the participants in the supply chain are dependent on the actions of organization G.

While this realization was initially made in the manufacturing context, it is also entirely applicable to both the service and public sector contexts. For example, work has been undertaken on supply chain optimization in the health care sector, the advertising sector and, of course, the defense sector, where considerations of supply chain efficiency have long been a key concern of armed forces. Work in the construction and information systems industries has also shown that the concept of the supply chain can be applied to a project as well as process environment.

The contribution that the concept of the supply chain has made to the study of management and organizations, therefore, has been to broaden the focus of business management from dyadic and direct interactions to the wider terrain of the supply network. It has highlighted the broader range of interdependencies which organizations need to cope with in order to fulfill their objectives (Gadde et al. 2003).

Supply chains and their management have been studied by academics from a vast range of disciplines. For example, contributions have come from the areas of operations management, purchasing and supply, information technology, institutional economics, strategic management, organizational behavior, law, and marketing. However, it is possible to provide some kind of organizing schema. This schema is based upon the view that the supply chain subject area consists of three broad dimensions: structures, relationships, and operations.




Figure 1 A simplified representation of a supply chain.

The study of supply chain structures has focused on a number of issues, some of which have long been of interest to economists. These include assessments of vertical integration, or its recently fashionable opposite, the virtual organization (Chesbrough & Teece 1996). Related to this has been the study of outsourcing and make buy decisions. Finally, there has also been interest in the positioning decisions made by organizations within supply chains. Different stages of supply chains offer different levels of profitability and organizations have often shifted their position accordingly (Gadiesh & Gilbert 1998). The literature that has supported this dimension of the study of supply chains has included resource based theory, institutional economics, and marketing theory.

A second dimension to the study of supply chains has concerned relationships. On the one hand, this has concerned the internal relationships that impact upon organizational buying behavior (Ronchetto et al. 1989). On the other, it has concerned inter organizational relationships, with contributors again utilizing resource based theory, institutional economics, and marketing theory, but also accessing information economics, behavioral economics, game theory, and law. Relationships with other customers, suppliers, and competitors have been

described in the supply chain literature as a key organizational resource. For example, Gadde et al. (2003) comment: "Firms operate in the context of interconnected relationships, forming networks ... these relationships affect the nature and the outcome of the firm's actions and are their potential sources of efficiency and effectiveness."

If we look at the relationships organizations have with their suppliers, for example, we can begin to understand why Gadde et al. might hold this view. Take IBM. According to recent company statistics, 73 percent of IBM's revenue generated by sales of manufactured goods was accounted for by supply inputs (Urioste 2000). There are two consequences to this. First, the quality of IBM products is heavily dependent upon the performance of suppliers. Second, the ability of IBM to control its costs is heavily dependent on its ability to manage its relationships with suppliers effectively.

Much of the study into relationships within supply chains has investigated the perceived need for organizations to match relationship forms with transactional circumstances. Again using the example of supply side relationships, it has been shown in the literature that organizations face transactional circumstances that differ in terms of magnitude, complexity,

uncertainty, power relations, asset specificity, and likely duration. As a result, most academics studying supply side relationships have advised managers that they need to adopt a contingent approach to relationship management (Williamson 1985; Cox et al. 2000; Gadde & Hakansson 2001). Similar ways of thinking have been employed in relation to the study of customer relationships.

The third dimension of the supply chain literature concerns operational management. Over the past 20 years, a great deal of attention has been paid to the perceived need for production operations to be integrated or synchronized along the whole of the supply chain. There are sound reasons for this. As has been pointed out, it is literally the case that a supply chain is only as strong as its weakest link. Supply chains that have a mixture of effective and ineffective participants have a tendency to develop "islands of excellence." This can either lead to high levels of inventory in the chain if the offending party is a customer, or production delays if it is a supplier. This logic has led to the operations management discipline broadening its focus from the individual organization to the overall supply chain.

Much work has been undertaken, therefore, on how organizations might integrate their operations. In particular, traditional operational methods such as batch production have been challenged by methods based on just in time (JIT) or "pull" systems. Indeed, JIT production, with all of the organizational and information technology integration that it entails, has been put forward by its proponents as a superior approach to supply chain management rather than an alternative (Womack et al. 1990), although as we shall see below this is questioned by many.

There are, therefore, three broad dimensions or domains to the study of supply chains. They each contribute to making the subject area extremely diverse. This is not to say, however, that all academics include all three in their work. For example, the tendency in the US is for supply chain academics to focus on operational issues, whereas in Europe the focus is more (although by no means exclusively) on structure and relationships (Giannakis & Croom 2004).

The debates in the supply chain literature echo those of the management literature in

general. Perhaps the most significant debate in the literature concerns the issue of supply chain integration. There is a divide in the supply chain literature between those that are optimistic about the achievement of supply chain integration and those that believe that supply chains or networks will always be messy and the deliverer of highly imperfect outcomes. In considering this debate, it is hard to overstate the impact that the models of integrated supply chain management have had over the past 15 to 20 years. The best known is the lean supply model. The model encompasses two of the three dimensions of the subject area outlined above: operations and relationships. In terms of operations, the lean supply model provides techniques aimed at integrating the supply chain. In terms of relationships, the lean supply model takes a view on the type of relationships required to support the operational techniques.

The lean supply model was originally developed on the basis of comprehensive research into the Japanese automotive industry – particularly Toyota – although over the past 10 years the model has been applied and modified in a range of other industrial contexts. The research highlighted that the Japanese automotive assemblers had a totally different approach to managing the supply chain from their western counterparts. While the supply chains of the western assemblers were conflictual and anarchic, those of the Japanese assemblers were apparently more consensual and orderly, with a network of collaborative relationships referred to as a *keiretsu*.

From these observations of Toyota (and many of its Japanese competitors), a number of academics proceeded to develop the lean supply model. This was then widely disseminated during the 1990s (Womack et al. 1990; Lamming 1993; Hines 1994). There are four key operational principles to the lean supply model. First, there is the insistence that value is specified from a customer perspective. Such a specification requires the abandonment of sectional interests within the supply chain, whether they be at a firm or intrafirm level. Second, it is stated that supply chain participants should then consider how that proposition can be delivered in the most efficient manner possible. The starting point of this task is process mapping.

The aim of process mapping is to (1) identify the total process that currently exists and (2) locate the problems within that process. Once the problems have been located, remedial action can be taken. This remedial action has as its target the reduction of waste. Lean supply identifies seven types of waste: overproduction, unnecessary waiting, excessive transportation, inappropriate processing, unnecessary inventory, unnecessary motions, and defects. In the mapping process, all current supply chain activities are divided into three categories: value adding, non value adding but necessary, and non value adding. The aim of lean supply is to minimize the second category and eradicate the third category.

Third, and key to the reduction of waste, is the just in time (JIT) principle. JIT is a method of production where a supply chain process only operates when a customer indicates its demand. JIT or “pull” systems are said to benefit the firm by contributing to the reduction of inventory within the chain, reductions in number of defects, a reduction in the requirement for storage space, and an increase in the ability of managers to identify problems early. Finally, the fourth principle of lean supply is that of continuous improvement. Lean supply strongly adheres to the principle of continuous improvement and takes the view that the task of pushing out the productivity frontier is never complete.

These operational principles are then supported within the lean supply model by the development of close, collaborative buyer–supplier relationships. Such relationships include high levels of product/process information exchange (e.g., proprietary or cost information), extensive operational linkages (e.g., aligned information systems), cooperative norms (e.g., a code of conduct), and transaction specific investments (Cannon & Perrault 1999).

The lean supply model has been very successfully disseminated throughout the world. One of the early texts outlining the model, *The Machine that Changed the World*, by Womack, Jones, and Roos (1990), has sold over half a million copies. This success has not, however, stopped many supply chain academics from criticizing it. In particular, claims that lean supply is a universally applicable model of supply chain “best practice” have been widely contested. In a critique that echoes the realist critiques of many

other management models, Cooney (2002) argues that the “value creation” in the lean supply model is not just dependent on just in time flow, but is also contingent on general business conditions (economic cycles), the differing nature of buyer–supplier relationships in a supply chain, and the structure of social and political institutions in different national contexts. These are all factors that, according to Cooney, the lean supply model simply dismisses.

With respect to the nature of buyer–supplier relationships, one of the factors that is said to cast doubt on the universality of the lean model is the existence of buyer–supplier power relations (Ramsay 1996; Ford 1997; Cox et al. 2000; Cooney 2002). The lean supply model requires the development and maintenance of long term, collaborative relationships throughout the supply chain. However, according to the lean supply model’s critics this is not always going to be possible because the nature of buyer–supplier power relations will not permit it.

Ford et al. (1998) seek to make this point by referring back to the original exemplar upon which the lean supply model was based – the Japanese automotive industry. They comment: “It seems that many of the Japanese subcontractors have been more or less forced into relationships involving extensive coordination by a customer because of the considerable power of those customers . . . It is likely to be very difficult for a small customer to involve large suppliers in these efforts [collaborative relationships] except on the most favorable terms” (p. 147). Cooney (2002) argues that because of the variable nature of buyer–supplier power relations, other, more traditional methods of managing supply chains (e.g., batch systems of operational production and arm’s length relationships) may well have to be adopted on many occasions.

The general consensus of the critics of the lean supply model is that the management of supply chains cannot be modeled on any set template of “best practice.” Rather, their management is about “identifying the scope for action, within existing and potential relationships, and about operating effectively with others within the internal and external constraints that limit that scope” (Gadde et al. 2003: 357). The view is taken that organizations

will need to develop many different approaches to operations management, adopt many different customer and supplier relationship types (arm's length and collaborative, equal and unequal), and understand that the organization will influence and be influenced by such relationships. It will also need to remain flexible in the face of changing supply chain circumstances and understand that change is likely to be incremental rather than the result of strategic planning.

This philosophical divide over the management of supply chains is underpinned by methodological differences. The academics researching the implementation of lean supply and other similar supply chain integration models, such as agile supply (Christopher 2000), are mainly positivists undertaking quantitative research into operational techniques. Those providing the critique are mainly, although not by any means exclusively, critical realists undertaking qualitative research into intra organizational and inter organizational relationships and processes. Not surprisingly, many of those that fall into the former camp are those with an operations management background, whereas those in the latter have emerged from the disciplines of marketing, organization theory, political economy, and institutional/behavioral economics.

Consideration of the future direction of research into supply chains and their management brings to mind three comments. First, it is possible that the idea of a contingent approach to the management of supply chains will become more prominent in the coming years. Such an approach is widely accepted among industrial marketing academics (especially those in the influential Industrial Marketing and Purchasing Group) and is slowly gaining more prominence among purchasing and operations management academics.

Second, supply chain academics from all disciplinary backgrounds will have to continue to monitor the impact of the Internet on supply chain management. The Internet based software that facilitates supply chain relationships and real time auctions will continue to have an impact on the structural features, relationships, and operational practices within supply chains and has the potential to challenge many closely held assumptions.

Third, it seems that the high level assumption of the supply chain fraternity – that individuals and organizations need to be seen as operating within a wider network of interdependencies – is likely to become more and more influential within other management disciplines. The network concept can already be seen in the strategy literature (Dyer & Singh 1998) and the human resource management literature (Harris 2002), for example, and this trend only seems likely to continue.

SEE ALSO: Alliances; Management Networks; Operations Management; Outsourcing; Power Dependence Theory

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surveillance

David Lyon

Most of us take for granted today that our personal data are required for many purposes and that our images, scans, and traces are used by organizations. When we identify ourselves we usually need evidence to back up our claim: an ID card, a PIN, a drivers' license, or a passport. We are not surprised to see video surveillance cameras in the street or the shopping mall and we are aware that our transactions, phone calls, and emails are logged and processed. Personal data are extremely valuable to many agencies today, from marketers to insurance companies to the police.

Not all ordinary citizens, workers, travelers, or consumers realize, however, the scale or significance of surveillance today. Personal data

businesses are worth billions of dollars, and government departments and law enforcement agencies mount massive computer and telecommunications systems to support their processing of such data. Surveillance in these circumstances cannot but involve questions of power and the distribution of rights and responsibilities. While ostensibly personal questions about privacy may well be raised, public issues also demand attention – of how our choices and life chances are affected by surveillance and how trust and accountability can be enhanced.

Surveillance is as old as human history, but over the past few decades it has risen rapidly to a position of central importance – and controversy – in sociology. The reasons for this are complex, but relatively clear. The use of new technologies in surveillance and their promotion and adoption by a wide range of agencies have created a situation in which surveillance capacities are unprecedented and their effects widespread. Surveillance is also politically disputed. At the same time, sociological tools for understanding and analyzing surveillance have been developed, especially since the groundbreaking work of Foucault. This has also generated debate regarding already existing theory and the possibilities of new theories that question how far Foucault's work really addresses the key issues in surveillance today.

Surveillance may be defined as the focused and systematic attention to personal details for the purposes of influence, management, or control (which is similar to the definition in one of the earliest sociological treatments of surveillance, Rule 1974). Not all "watching" is focused and systematic, but "watching over," as in the French verb *surveiller*, is likely to be so. The watching may be literal, as in daycare assistants "watching over" children, or street intersection cameras "watching out" for speeders who cross the line on a red light, but it may also be metaphorical. Our activities may be "seen" in our telephone records or our credit card purchases. But the watching is always purposeful – in these examples, to care for children or to catch out careless drivers. Marketers may wish to influence consumers, employers to manage their workers, or prison guards to control their inmates.

Before considering some contemporary situations, however, it is worth noting the long

history of surveillance. Ancient civilizations such as the Chinese or the Roman used censuses, for example, to keep track of citizens for taxation or conscription purposes. And overseers of work projects have always checked on their labor forces to ensure that the project is done correctly and on time. The use of clocks, from the thirteenth century, aided this endeavor. The making of maps was also a means of locating, in general terms, where people were. So both direct supervision (another English word meaning “watching over”) and record keeping are antique practices of coordination and control.

The coming of modernity made many such practices routine and systematic. Indeed, modernity is in part defined by such routinization and systematization. Bureaucratic methods of organizations, within a hierarchy governed by rules, in which communication passes only through certain prescribed channels, and files are kept – on persons as well as transactions and events – were examined classically by Weber (see Dandeker 1990). But Marx also observed astutely that within capitalist organizations there are additional incentives to maintain control, and that, for example, placing workers together under one roof in early factories enabled monitoring and supervision more readily to take place. Such analyses were pursued in the twentieth century, for example in the much debated work of Braverman on *Labor and Monopoly Capital* (1974).

Another dimension of surveillance, emphasized by Foucault, was modernity’s shift away from forceful, coercive, and sometimes brutal methods of social control. In their place, argued Foucault, were “technologies of power” that induced self discipline through surveillance. For Foucault (1979), the Panopticon, Jeremy Bentham’s late eighteenth century semi circular prison design with a central watchtower, was the archetype of modern surveillance power. Prisoners would be constantly observed, and, being in back lit cells, would be continuously visible. At the same time, the inspector in the tower would be obscured from view by slatted blinds, so that prisoners could never be sure that anyone was actually there. But they would develop self discipline and act appropriately, just in case they were being watched.

The big change on which Foucault made no comment was the use of computers in surveillance. While the earliest surveillance involved direct watching and supervision, plus some basic record keeping, and modern surveillance adopted rational methods of bureaucratic governance, a key development in the later twentieth century was computerization. James Rule researched this in relation to items such as credit card and social security systems, and Gary T. Marx (1985) established some crucial new dimensions of surveillance based on new technologies. He argued that it transcends barriers of darkness and distance and that data storage means it transcends time. New surveillance tends to be capital – not labor – intensive, introduces categorical suspicion, and tries to prevent violations. It is decentralized, hard to discern, is both more intensive and extensive. He warned about the potential for new soft forms of secret manipulation and control.

Of course, social changes relating to computers depend in turn on the perceived needs for and benefits of certain kinds of surveillance. The new technologies do have “effects,” but they are also subject to social, economic, and political forces that give them their chance in the first place. Thus some effects are intended – government departments wish to reduce costs, including fraud, and thus install systems to detect violators, for instance – but some are unintended. Notoriously, systems set up to increase production or distribution efficiency in manufacturing may also have surveillance side effects in allowing workers to be monitored more closely. Similarly, retail surveillance to prevent shoplifting may be expanded to check on staff.

The technologies that facilitate deeper surveillance have appeared at a snowballing pace, each adding another dimension while maintaining previous capabilities. In the later 1980s searchable databases extended surveillance capacities (Lessig 1999) and in the 1990s networked multimedia provided increased opportunities for integration between previously separate databases. Those opportunities were also earnestly sought, for example by policing networks, keen to trace offenders in cross border activities such as drug smuggling, or corporations desiring to target more precisely their most profitable consumers (Gandy 1993).

A further boost to integrative ambitions came following the “terrorist” attacks of 9/11, when law enforcement bodies ratcheted up their efforts not only to get different departments cooperating more intelligently with each other, but also to obtain personal data from whatever source – including commercial, educational, and medical – that might provide them (Lyon 2003).

It is important to understand, however, that no surveillance system can work fully without the cooperation, witting or unwitting, of its subjects. In many cases ordinary people trigger surveillance practices in the mundane routines of everyday life. When cards are swiped, web sites accessed, or when phone numbers or postal codes are given to store clerks, data are extracted. Those data reveal when transactions were made and for how much, and today, cell phones and other locational devices may also indicate where we are geographically. And if ordinary people are involved in enabling surveillance, they may as readily question or block surveillance as simply comply with it. People sometimes withhold information, or alter it slightly, in order to evade the gaze. In particular cases, outcry may be strident, such as when otherwise law abiding citizens of Athens spray painted surveillance camera lenses before the 2004 Olympics.

The diagram of the Panopticon provides a useful way of organizing theoretical approaches to surveillance (Wood 2003). It has stimulated an ongoing debate about the best ways to understand and explain what is going on within and under the “gaze.” A number of writers (e.g., Poster 1996) proposed that electronic technologies enable the perfection of Bentham’s ideas. Software architectures can achieve more completely what the bricks and mortar of the original plan were meant to do – to create control through uncertainty. But others object that the Panopticon’s genius cannot be generalized to other situations. It may be present for cases such as welfare recipients, but in other contexts other models must be sought. In this critique, the panoptic paradigm is relevant but limited.

Those who doubt the extent of the Panopticon’s usefulness for theory may themselves fall into one or another group. The “pre panoptics” are those who insist that the works of say, Marx, Weber, or Machiavelli yield plenty of clues about how surveillance works and why

it is expanding and intensifying. Its meanings may be found in the inner workings of capitalism, in bureaucratic management, or in geopolitical control. The “post panoptics,” on the other hand, would now include theorists such as Gilles Deleuze, Michael Hardt and Antonio Negri, or Giorgio Agamben, who work from other guiding models. Deleuze’s notion of “societies of control” suggests how surveillance simply closes or opens opportunities for action. Hardt and Negri’s “empire” claims that surveillance is vital to new global regimes of imperial power. And Agamben proposes that Foucault never worked out “how sovereign power produces biopolitical bodies” and why exclusion is today a more powerful surveillance effect than inclusion in the Panopticon.

Needless to say, issues of theory provoke questions of methods. How do we know what kinds of surveillance are in place, and what their effects are, given the high degree of secrecy in some corporations and government departments? And how can researchers avoid being seen merely as critics of surveillance with the consequence that access to sites and spokespersons may be blocked by those who argue that the surveillance is necessary or desirable? One could say, of course, that these issues have always produced problems for academic investigation, and that the task of independent researchers is still to find out as much as possible by whatever means are legal and ethical. No doubt critics of surveillance studies would say that the enterprise is hypocritical – have not social scientists always been in the business of surveillance themselves? Such methodological questions do present difficult conundrums, but these can also be placed in context by recalling some key points from the above discussion.

Surveillance is moving steadily closer to the center of social order and governance in technologically advanced societies. New technologies are implicated in this as they facilitate and even “drive” some developments, but those technologies are also themselves shaped by social, economic, and political factors. In the early twenty first century this is seen clearly in the surveillance responses to security threats in the “war against terror.” Much surveillance accompanies current thrusts towards efficiency and safety in the modern world and thus its effects may never be correctly viewed as only

negative. Surveillance is always ambiguous. But because questions of trust and responsibility in relation to the handling of personal data are paramount, yoking sociological work to the ethics and politics of information is vital.

SEE ALSO: City Planning/Urban Design; Consumption, Mass Consumption, and Consumer Culture; Credit Cards; Foucault, Michel; Information Technology; Privacy; Social Control; Welfare Regimes

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survey research

Patricia Snyder

Survey research refers to systematic investigations designed to gather information from populations or samples for the purposes of

describing, comparing, or explaining phenomena. Survey research involving samples often is distinguished from census surveys, which involve the study of populations. As Kerlinger noted in *Foundations of Behavioral Research* (1986: 377): "Survey research studies large and small populations (or universes) by selecting and studying samples chosen from the populations to discover the relative incidence, distribution, and interrelations of sociological and psychological variables."

Several types of research approaches are described in the survey methodology literature. *Descriptive or status* survey research focuses on accurately characterizing information about defined units of analysis, such as individuals, social groups, geographic areas, or organizations. In descriptive research applications, surveys are used to quantify phenomena such as unemployment rates in a state, the health status of citizens of the US, or the number of certified teachers in a school district. Public opinion surveys or polls (e.g., Gallup Poll or Harris Survey) are a type of status survey designed to quantify information from defined samples about their subjective preferences, beliefs, or attitudes. *Correlational* survey research is directed toward examining interrelationships among variables. An example of correlational survey research might involve using surveys to examine familial and community factors associated with juvenile delinquency. *Explanatory* survey research typically involves hypotheses testing to explicate relationships between attribute or predictor variables and criterion variables of interest. Although explanatory survey research does not permit causal inferences, because of the lack of experimental manipulation and control, it offers important opportunities to model and test complex relationships among variables of interest using advanced statistical techniques such as multiple regression analysis, structural equation modeling, or hierarchical linear modeling.

Commonly employed survey research designs include cross sectional and longitudinal designs. In cross sectional designs, information is collected at a single point in time from a sample of respondents. Three common types of longitudinal designs include panel, trend, and cohort. Panel designs involve data collected at different points in time from the same sample. In trend designs, different samples from the same general

population are used at each measurement occasion. Cohort designs involve identifying a specific population who share a common attribute, such as infants born in the US in 2005 or those who graduated from high school in Texas in 2004. The same specific population is involved in the cohort study over time, but a new sample from this population is selected each time survey data are gathered.

Survey research involves processes common to other quantitative research approaches, including identification of the research question, selection of the study design, selection of the sample, development or selection of the survey instrument, pretesting of instruments, data collection, data coding and processing, data analysis, data interpretation, and dissemination of findings. Fowler (1993) characterized the *total survey design* approach as one focused on the complete data collection process and suggested that in survey research particular attention be paid to the quality of the sample, the quality of the measures, the quality of data collection, and the mode of data collection. Decisions made about each of these components impact the accuracy and validity of survey results. In a widely cited text, Groves (1989) details sources of imprecision and bias found in survey research that are associated with four common types of error: sampling, coverage, nonresponse, and measurement.

Sampling decisions are important in survey research, particularly when the intent is to evaluate the precision of sample estimates in relation to population characteristics. Three interrelated processes are associated with sampling decisions: defining the sample frame, determining sample size, and choosing a sampling method. The sample frame is the list of people or objects that comprise the accessible population. Survey samples are selected from the frame by specifying sample size and determining whether probability or nonprobability sampling methods will be used to select units. Probability sampling permits use of statistical tools to estimate the amount of sampling error. Random sampling error occurs due to chance variations in different samples drawn from the same population. Systematic sampling error occurs when inadequate sampling procedures are used. Coverage error is a form of systematic sampling error. An example of coverage error

would be surveying only individuals with access to computers when the variables of interest are related to having or not having computer access. Errors in sampling also can arise from poor definitions of the sampling frame and the use of small sample sizes. Fowler (1993) offers an expanded discussion of factors to consider when making sampling decisions.

Biases associated with low response rates often are problematic in survey research and represent a major source of survey error. Low response rates are particularly problematic when researchers are unable to characterize how responders differ from nonresponders. Dillman (2000) describes tailored design methods and presents strategies designed to enhance response rates.

Survey questions are designed to operationalize variables of interest. Comprehensive instrument development and validation strategies should be used to ensure that questions are well formulated and that reliable and valid data are obtained when surveys are administered across samples of respondents. Pilot testing of survey items and data gathering procedures is uniformly recommended to help reduce measurement error. Reliability and validity should be systematically evaluated each time a survey is used with a sample of respondents because these two characteristics are not static properties of measures.

Modes of survey administration involve face to face, telephone, mail, and web based formats. Use of computers in survey research is becoming commonplace, including laptops and personal data assistant (PDA) devices. Each mode has its strengths and limitations. Decisions related to the mode of administration to be used typically involve considerations of the characteristics of the sample to be surveyed, the types of questions to be asked, the response rate desired, and time and cost considerations. Entire texts are devoted to describing strategies for minimizing systematic error by standardizing interviews and telephone surveys (Fowler & Mangione 1990; Lavrakas 1993).

Survey research is one way to collect quantifiable data in a standardized way from samples or populations. As noted in this review, if not conducted with appropriate rigor, survey research is particularly susceptible to various sources of error related to sampling, measurement, and data collection processes.

SEE ALSO: Convenience Sample; Hierarchical Linear Models; Interviewing, Structured, Unstructured, and Postmodern; Random Sample; Reliability Generalization; Structural Equation Modeling

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Sutherland, Edwin H. (1883–1950)

Gilbert Geis

Edwin H. Sutherland is generally regarded as the father of the scientific study of criminology in the United States. In 1924 he published *Criminology*, the first systematic textbook study of crime. Sutherland advanced the principle of differential association, a social learning construct that sought to interpret criminal behavior in theoretical terms. He also coined the term

white collar crime in his 1939 presidential address to the American Sociological Society. In addition, Sutherland wrote a pioneering monograph on confidence scams, as well as highly regarded papers on the death penalty and prisons. He also published journal articles critical of sexual psychopath laws and psychiatric interpretations of illegal behavior.

Sutherland was born in Gibbon, Nebraska, and spent most of his formative years in Grand Island, Nebraska, where his father, a Baptist minister, served as president of Grand Island College. Sutherland did his undergraduate work at the college, and tied with a friend for a Rhodes scholarship that eventually was awarded to the other man. He taught Greek and short hand at the college for several years, and then enrolled in the divinity program at the University of Chicago, but soon switched to sociology, where he came under the tutelage of Charles Henderson. He later focused on political economy, working with William Hoxie, a labor historian and disciple of Thorsten Veblen, earning a joint PhD, magna cum laude, in sociology and political economy. His dissertation dealt with the work of public employment agencies in Chicago.

Sutherland's first teaching position was at William Jewell College, a Baptist school in Liberty, Missouri, where he remained for six years and published just one article, on the results of rural health surveys. His Chicago connections then served to secure him a teaching job at the University of Illinois (1925–6). The next year, he moved to the University of Minnesota (1926–9). He spent 1930 visiting prisons in England, Western Europe, and Sweden under the auspices of the Bureau of Social Hygiene. Following that, he was appointed to a research position at the University of Chicago, which ended in 1935 under uncomfortable circumstances that are still not clear. In the fall of 1935 Sutherland became the founder and chair of the sociology department at Indiana University, where he assembled a sterling faculty and attracted a cadre of to be eminent graduate students, including Donald Cressey, Albert Cohen, Lloyd Ohlin, and Karl Schuessler, as well as many others. He remained at Indiana for the next 15 years, until his death.

Sutherland's *Criminology* textbook dominated the study of the subject until the 1960s.

The book (its title altered in later editions to *Principles of Criminology* and then back again) would go through 10 editions over a span of almost 70 years, with Cressey as co author from the fifth edition until the tenth, when David Luckenbill assumed that role. The text was notable for the strikingly sophisticated analysis of empirical and ethnographic work on law breaking. Sutherland would inventory the relevant research findings and then systematically assess their credibility and shortcomings in a list that often would begin “First, . . .” and then continue through half a dozen or more precise summaries of the state of knowledge on the subject.

The book dropped from its preeminent position primarily because it was too austere and perhaps too erudite for later generations of students and, more importantly, because it analyzed criminal behavior in general in terms of social correlates, such as race and ethnicity, social class, mental competence, and immigration. Successfully competing later textbooks adopted an approach that focused substantively on forms of crime, such as homicide, sex offenses, and robbery. In addition, as criminology became the creche and the graveyard for a plethora of interpretive schemes, the Sutherland text’s single minded focus on differential association left devotees of other approaches out in the cold. Newer textbooks sought to attend to the ever expanding roster of theoretical postulates in the field of criminology.

Sutherland coined the term white collar crime, now in common popular and professional use throughout the world, and in 1949 published *White Collar Crime*, a pioneering monograph detailing and interpreting crimes committed by high status offenders in their occupational roles. He offered varying definitions of what constituted such crime and squabbling about the proper realm of its subject matter has taken up a great deal of the intellectual energy of scholars doing research on such subjects as fraud, anti trust violations, insider trading, and embezzlement. At the same time, the term white collar crime has entered into popular usage and, as with pornography, there are many persons who indicate that while they cannot define the term precisely they recognize the behavior perfectly well when they see it.

Hermann Mannheim, an eminent English criminologist, was among many of Sutherland’s colleagues who were greatly impressed with *White Collar Crime*. Mannheim wrote that if there were a Nobel Prize for preeminent criminological contributions, then Sutherland assuredly would have earned it for that monograph. On the other hand, critics, especially criminal law scholars, persistently have faulted *White Collar Crime* for what they regard as its muck raking slant and its failure to attend to legal doctrines which differentiate criminal behavior from civil violations and administrative wrongdoing.

White Collar Crime had its roots in the populist, anti business mood prominent in Nebraska politics during Sutherland’s time in the state. It also reflects Sutherland’s strong moral values, values that were epitomized in an interview he gave when he taught summer school at the University of Washington in 1942, not long after America’s entrance into World War II. He had the courage to tell a reporter for the student newspaper that the evacuation of the Japanese from the west coast and their forced internment in “resettlement camps” had “resulted more from race prejudice than from military necessity.”

Sutherland’s theory of differential association consists of nine postulates that maintain that crime is a behavior learned from association with others who transmit attitudes, teach tactics, and offer rationalizations that put persons on the path to illegal behavior. The postulates themselves are an uneven conglomerate, some of them core concepts, others rather in the nature of asides. It is arguable that criminal behavior is learned only in primary groups, that is, from family and friends, as Sutherland’s theory maintains. A considerable literature now concludes that secondary learning sources, such as television and song lyrics, can lead to violent law breaking. Sutherland’s formulation also rather gratuitously indicates that crime is *not* the result of imitation, a position enunciated at the time by Gabriel Tarde, a French sociologist, who maintained that what humans did was a product of what they saw being done. Sutherland makes the important point that criminal behavior is not an expression of general needs and values, since noncriminal behavior results from these same

conditions. Two people may need money; one will commit a robbery, the other will get a second job pumping gas.

Differential association today is generally regarded as overly simple and absolutely untestable as Sutherland formulated it: how, for instance, can the ratio of experiences favorable to crime and those pushing in the other direction, a key element in the theory, be measured? How can the theory explain why persons who seemingly are exposed to similar experiences respond very differently to these stimuli? The theory also has been faulted for its total neglect of biological and genetic contributions to criminal and to law abiding behavior. For Sutherland, human behavior is the product solely of those things that we encounter and absorb after birth.

Interestingly, the most pointed critique of the theory was by Sutherland himself in an unpublished essay written in 1944 and circulated among his colleagues. It carried the whimsical title, “The Swan Song of Differential Association.” Sutherland noted that he had not given adequate attention to “opportunity” as a necessary correlate of illegal behavior, nor had he sufficiently calibrated the intensity of particular needs in terms of the role they play in triggering criminal acts. He concluded that the sufficiency of differential association as an explanation of criminal acts was “questionable.” Nonetheless, the theory continued to dominate the field for several more decades.

Sutherland was not a prolific writer, but what he published tended to be carefully crafted. As three of his close colleagues note: “Sutherland’s writing is distinguished by unusual clarity, simplicity, and unpretentiousness. He seldom wasted words, and he seldom repeated himself in different papers.” His was a serious, humorless style, though the man himself was an iconic figure to most of the graduate students with whom he worked. Albert Cohen, in a tribute to Sutherland as a mentor, observed: “It was not only that we felt that Sutherland was at the frontier; we felt we were at the frontier.” For all the tenacity of Sutherland’s own views, Cohen added, he “was never overbearing, never didactic, never arrogant. He invariably treated the students with respect, never humiliated them, always made them feel we were partners in a quest.”

In addition to his monograph on white collar crime, a subject that he came to late in his career, Sutherland used material furnished by Chic Conwell, a skilled con artist, to write *The Professional Thief*, and, with Harvey Locke (one of his very few collaborations) he wrote a monograph about homeless men in Chicago during the Depression. Critics regard the former book as marked by a kind of hero worship, and insist that Conwell conned Sutherland into accepting a tale that was at best only a partial truth; that Sutherland either was in the dark or chose to ignore Conwell’s history of drug addiction. They also argue that while Sutherland was appalled by corporate predators, he romanticized a smooth talker such as Conwell, who boasted that he was an outlaw, and proclaimed that only the greed of his victims allowed him to exploit them.

Sutherland’s articles critiquing sexual psychopath laws remain relevant today when community notifications regarding released sex offenders add an extra judicial penalty to the sentence that the offenders have served. Sutherland’s writings on prisons have worn less well. Today, his view that the length of incarceration ought to be left to the professional judgment of social scientists and prison authorities – a common position when he was writing – seems unpromising and likely to be unduly punitive. Objections also are raised that such a program would punish people for what they are rather than only for what they have done. On the other hand, Sutherland’s diatribe against corporate criminals, which he sought in vain to camouflage as objective social science, resonates in our time, as major American businesses are charged with crimes involving the theft of extraordinary amounts of money and their culpable executives are handcuffed and led off to prison.

SEE ALSO: Chicago School; Crime, Psychological Theories of; Crime, Social Learning Theory of; Crime, White Collar; Criminology

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Suzuki, Eitaro (1894–1966)

Yasushi Suzuki

Eitaro Suzuki is one of the pioneers of Japanese rural and urban sociology. Graduated from Tokyo Imperial University in 1922, he taught at Gifu Agricultural High School and Seoul Imperial University. After World War II, he became a professor at Hokkaido University.

Sociology was introduced to Japan in the 1880s, but empirical research on Japanese society did not develop until the 1920s.

By then, Japan had reached an early stage of industrialization and urbanization. Sociology of the family, rural sociology, and urban sociology were launched in this historical context. Suzuki was a pioneer of rural sociology in the 1930s and turned his interest to urban sociology in the post war era.

Suzuki studied the social structure of Japanese rural villages during the 1930s, under the influence of German cultural science, American rural sociology, and Le Play's (French) School. He published his first major work, *Principles of Japanese Rural Sociology*, in 1940. His main contribution to this field was the introduction of the concept of "natural village" as a unit of sociological analysis. Operationally, he divided "social districts" into three categories, by examining the geographical overlaps of social relations and groups of villagers. The first social district is the small neighborhood, which is a subunit of the natural village. The second is the natural village itself, and the third is the "legal village." The legal village was an artificial construct by the national government after the Meiji Restoration, and typically contained several natural villages within it. The natural village, in contrast, has been a self-sustaining community, typically founded three centuries or more ago, according to Suzuki.

Referring to Sorokin's concept of cumulative community, Suzuki emphasized that the natural village was not only a cumulative community, but also a community with a collective spirit that was the ultimate source of social order in the village. As a cumulative community, it comprised many social relations and groups. It was basically composed of traditional stem families, which were taken over from generation to generation by male successors. It also included other social groups, such as formal residential associations regulated by the local government, traditional mutual aid associations, religious and kinship (Japanese lineage) groups. Moreover, the natural village is a distinctive entity. It owned common forests and properties, and managed water systems collectively (Japanese agriculture typically uses water-laden paddies). It had its own guardian deity and the group of shrine parishioners. They were considered to be the legitimate members of the village. In addition, the natural village held a collective consciousness that Suzuki called "the spirit of the

village.” It is this spirit that controlled traditional behaviors and attitudes of villagers.

Thus, by describing the social structure of the natural village in the 1930s, Suzuki constructed the ideal type of Japanese rural community. The natural village and its elements have become basic concepts in Japanese rural sociology. Although natural villages have disappeared in the face of rapid urbanization since the 1950s, their remnants today can still be seen, even in highly urbanized areas.

After World War II, Suzuki devoted himself to the study of urban sociology and published his second major work, *Principles of Urban Sociology*, in 1957. This book is not tightly organized, but includes many insightful concepts, a classificatory schema for social relations and groups, and detailed descriptions and analyses of urban traits. Among these, the “nodal organ” thesis, the “normal life of the normal population” thesis, and the concept of “life structure” are widely known among Japanese sociologists.

Based on his observations of various rural and urban communities in Japan, Suzuki developed his own definition of the city: the city is a community that differs from a rural one in the way that it contains nodal organs (social institutions) that connect social interactions to the national society as a whole. This definition is unique in that it has no reference to any demographic or other traits. Rather, he argued that urban traits such as population size, density, heterogeneity, strangeness, and so on are accompanied by the concentration of institutions and that the city should be defined in relation to the nodal function in the national society. The presence of nodal institutions, such as government agencies, retail and wholesale services, and the offices of various kinds of corporations and associations, makes a community a city. He argued that all the communities in the national society are organized in a hierarchical urban–rural system, in which the rural communities are positioned at the lowest level. Thus the characteristics of the nodal institutions in a given community determine its position as a city in the nationwide hierarchy of urban system.

Other Japanese urban sociologists suggested similar definitions. Fukutaro Okui (1996 [1940]), another pioneer of Japanese urban

sociology, argued that although a “city in itself” may be defined in terms of its population aggregation and regions, it is important that we study it in relation to the development of the national society as a whole. He claimed that the “essence” of the city is the locus of the central functions in a wider social economic life. Later, Takeo Yazaki (1962) also emphasized the integrative function of urban institutions. These suggestions reflect the fact that Japanese cities have been controlled by the central government and its local agencies since the Tokugawa era. Suzuki made it clear that urban and rural communities are organized within the national hierarchy, and, therefore, cities should be defined and analyzed in relation to the wider society.

In addition to the “nodal organ” thesis, Suzuki suggested a general framework for analyzing the social structure of cities. In order to clarify the urban social structure, he emphasized “the normal life of the normal population,” instead of “abnormal life” or “abnormal population.” By “abnormal,” he meant a state which is unable to reproduce itself if it continues. The “normal life” should therefore constitute the “structure” of complex urban life. The ordinary life of the ordinary urbanite entails commuting between home and the workplace. Suzuki therefore identified households and workplaces (and schools for children) as central axes of the structure. He added neighborhoods and leisure groups to them. Yet he maintained that leisure groups were merely “superficial elements of the structure, or accessories [of urban life], no matter how exaggerated or gorgeous they appear.” Although some critics argue that one could find distinctive characteristics (and problems) of urban life within the “abnormal life” and “abnormal population,” Suzuki’s intent was to emphasize that the urban social structures were not disorganized, as claimed by some of the followers of American urban sociology. While he estimated the number of abnormal populations in cities, he argued that these must be ignored in order to understand the basic urban structures.

Before introducing Suzuki’s concept of metropolitan areas, it is worth mentioning his basic concept of the community. By community, he meant “a local social unity that performs the functions of cooperation for living

and of collective defense.” This conception of community applies to both cities and villages. Both serve the defense function against enemies and disasters (floods, fires, and earthquakes). It is clear that the villagers cooperate for living. As for the city, he claimed that some basic human needs are satisfied within the community by public services and private transactions. This is the critical point, however, for his development of another scheme for analyzing the metropolitan areas: “the pre social unity existing within and beyond the city.” As a site of concentration of nodal institutions, a city interacts with other communities positioned at a lower level. Such interactions produce five types of metropolitan areas: urban living area, urban dependency area, urban users’ area, urban dominance area, and urban influential area.

The urban living area is where urbanites lead their everyday life. It constitutes adjoining areas to shop for basic life necessities. The urban dependency area encompasses residents who depend on the city for their livelihood, typified by the commuting sphere. The urban users’ area includes all residents who use urban institutions. Since such institutions are typically located in central business districts or subcenters, it constitutes the trading areas of the central city. The urban dominance area is where the institutions of the city deploy their branch offices. In theory, it differs from institution to institution, but in reality they overlap significantly. Finally, the urban influential area extends to all residents who receive information transmitted by the city. Since the mass media in Japan are concentrated in Tokyo, Suzuki suggested that Tokyo’s urban dominance area extends across Japanese society as a whole. Other urban centers are, in comparison, “like the light of a candle under the Sun.”

Each area is defined in terms of particular types of relationships between persons and institutions. Here, the spatial orders of “the normal life of the normal population” combine with “nodal institutions.” This is one dimension of Suzuki’s “life structure of the city.”

Suzuki defined “life structure” as a set of spatial and temporal orders of the community. It refers to a dynamic aspect of urban life. He argued that the routine activities of persons and institutions must follow a set of spatial and temporal orders, and thus produce cyclic pulses

of urban life. These orders are not only the effects of aggregation of individuals’ daily activities but also sometimes institutionalized as norms. The norms of workplaces, schools, and households define the time for work, rest, and sleep. Suzuki classified the temporal orders of the city in terms of the temporal units of the cycle (the examples mentioned below are selected from the original text):

- a day – rest, sleep, nutrition, and work for daily workers;
- a week – weekly schedules, leisure, and rest on Sundays;
- a month – salary system, rent payment, etc.;
- a year – new year holidays, gift giving, annual settlement of accounts;
- lifetime – karmic backlash;
- endlessness – traces of the feudal obligations among traditional families.

Among these, Suzuki focused on the settlement of accounts and the breaks and holidays for workers, illustrating how they occur through various terms of cycles. In addition, he aimed to describe the typical life cycle of the Japanese people. As he had previously developed a model of the life cycle of Japan’s traditional stem families, he expected to be able to apply it to urban Japanese. He thought he would be able to identify a distinctive life cycle common to Japanese urbanites but different from their counterparts in other countries.

Suzuki’s analytical schemas for urban social structures and the life structures are very clear, and fit the social conditions of Japan at the time. Suburbanization was limited, and there was no need to distinguish the natural city from the legal city. Basically, he established a descriptive framework for Japanese cities in the national context. Yet it is not clear how his definition of the city is related to the schema of the urban social structure. He failed to classify Japanese cities by their distinctive functions, e.g., manufacturing, shipping, political administration, commerce, and tourism, beyond their differential status in the urban hierarchical system. He also failed to explain how the urban social structures differ by size and status. In sum, he delineated the urban social structure common to Japanese cities without delineating their differences.

His theory of rural and urban communities was constrained by time and place, for it was based on Japanese materials in the 1930s to the 1950s. Although the concepts and schemas he developed need to be reviewed and redefined, Eitaro Suzuki's analysis is a distinctive heritage of Japanese sociology. He depicted the typical Japanese villages and cities of his time and their relationships to the national society as a whole. Thus his work continues to provide key concepts and insights for understanding cities and communities in relation to the national and global system.

SEE ALSO: Global/World Cities; *Ie*; Sorokin, Pitirim A.; Traditional Consumption City (Japan); Urban; Urban Community Studies

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symbolic classification

Simone Ghezzi

Symbolic classification – literally, complex arrangements of symbols into wholes – refers to the process of classifying and ordering by means of which individuals are able to make sense of the natural and social world. They do so by means of models of categorization that are culturally and socially determined. Such categories are cast in concrete images that we may call symbols, which are, by definition, polysemic and relativistic because they convey different meanings.

Durkheim and Mauss were among the first scholars to pick up the age old philosophical idea about the ways human beings conceive of time, space, causality, unity, plurality, and so on. Their ideas are elaborated in an article entitled “De quelques formes primitives de classification: contribution à l'étude des représentations collectives,” published in *L'Année sociologique* (1903) and translated in English as *Primitive Classification* (1963). The importance of this publication lies in the fact that some of the issues illustrated here were eventually discussed in greater depth in structuralist social theories that emerged several decades later; moreover, it may be regarded as an early contribution to the sociology of knowledge and to sociological epistemology. The central argument of their essay is that there exists a connection between the classification of natural phenomena and the social order. The act of classifying does not occur through the effect of a “spontaneous” attitude of the mind, based for example upon the principles of contiguity, similarity, and opposition among objects or among living beings, but originates within the organization of social life. When they state that the “individual's mind is incapable of classification,” it does not mean that the individual's mind lacks “the innate faculty of classification” – indeed, it would be difficult to conceive of a mind incapable of processing information and distinguishing objects of the environment; rather, Durkheim and Mauss insist on the social expression of human knowledge and on the social root of human thought. They oppose the idea both that categories exist before experience (built in or a priori categories) and that categories are the product of experience (empiricism).

To investigate and elaborate on this assertion, they focus in particular on Aboriginal totemic societies from Central Australia, held at that time to be the most primitive of all, and to a lesser extent on Native American tribes. These societies appeared to classify people, animals, and things according to taxonomic criteria corresponding to the specific organization of their society (moieties, clans, kin). Durkheim and Mauss seek evidence of this by considering the patterns of residence, the arrangements of marriage, and the dominant organizing principles of these societies, and relate these aspects to logical thought processes.

From a functionalist point of view, the classification of categories makes the relationship between phenomena explicable; from an evolutionary perspective, it constitutes the first foundations of scientific thinking. Durkheim and Mauss conclude that among the Australian tribes “the classification of things reproduces the classification of men” (1963 [1903]: 11). The implication is that ideas and worldviews are constructed on a model that reproduces the society from which they have emerged. This argument will be taken up again by Durkheim a few years later in *Les Formes élémentaires de la vie religieuse: le système totémique en Australie* (1912). Some have argued that to prove their point, Durkheim and Mauss omitted cases where social organization and symbolic classification do not correspond; nonetheless, their original ideas have influenced other scholars, such as Lévi Strauss and Mary Douglas.

Lévi Strauss analyzes symbolic classification at a much deeper, i.e., unconscious, level. Native categories of thought are the output of universal mental processes (e.g., binary or dual oppositions), which manifest themselves in different ways. Both the cosmologies of “primitive” societies and the scientific thought of industrial societies are founded upon the same bases – the unconscious but structured regularities of human thought. Whereas for Durkheim and Mauss the taxonomy of the classifications reflects the kind of relationships that regulate social institutions, for Lévi Strauss classifications are viewed and analyzed as cognitive models. Evidence of these two different viewpoints emerges in the theory of totemism. Durkheim explains totemic classifications of animals or plants in terms of a structural homology between the social and the symbolic sphere. A group identifies symbolically with an animal, a plant, or a natural phenomenon, one of which then becomes the symbol of the group itself. By contrast, for Lévi Strauss totems must be understood metaphorically in terms of the relationship between groups. The identification with a totem is arbitrary; what counts are the differences among animal or plant species because they are used to express differences among groups of people. In such a manner the observed world is used as a sort of template for a symbolic representation of the social world.

The British anthropologist Mary Douglas departs from the epistemology of Durkheim and Mauss’s notion of symbolic classification and refines their sociology of knowledge. She avoids their evolutionary typology, i.e., the distinction between primitive and modern symbolic worlds, and insists time and again on the importance of classificatory impurities. To understand the environment, individuals introduce order out of the chaos by means of classification. Yet in this process individuals discover that a few objects, living beings, actions, or ideas appear to be anomalous – matter out of place – which may pollute the entire classificatory system. What does not fit must be dealt with ideologically to keep the anomaly under control, both in the natural and in the social world. Douglas’s pollution studies demonstrate how the human body is used to symbolize certain social relations. Bodily substances, processes, and orifices play a significant role in rites and prohibitions by expressing relationships between social groups and categories (Douglas 1966, 1970). The ideas elaborated in the study of symbolic classification have recently been reexamined and employed. This is evident, for example, in studies on ethnicity which deconstruct the ethnic anomalies stressed by a hegemonic system of classification, especially in multi ethnic societies.

SEE ALSO: Anthropology, Cultural and Social: Early History; Durkheim, Émile; Ethnicity; Knowledge, Sociology of; Semiotics; Sign; Symbolic Exchange; Structuralism; Totemism

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symbolic exchange

Michael T. Ryan

Symbolic exchange is the organizing principle, the cellular structure, of the earliest forms of society, the forms that Anthony Giddens designates as “tribal cultures.” The exchanges that take place within and between clans, within and between tribes, and between chiefs and other members of the tribe are more than economic exchanges as we know them in modern societies, and their circulation integrates the members of these societies. Marcel Mauss conceptualizes these exchanges as a form of gift giving, and the gift is a “total social phenomenon.” They are multidimensional: economic, moral, religious, mythological, juridical, political, aesthetic, and historical.

Mauss (Durkheim’s nephew) created his concept from the work of nineteenth and early twentieth century anthropologists in Melanesia, Polynesia, and Northwest America. Like Durkheim, he also wanted to demonstrate the social basis for exchanges as a refutation of the utilitarian notion that individual interests were the foundation for the creation of market relations. There was no “natural” economy that had preceded political economy.

Further, while the tribes of the Americas, Africa, and Asia seemed so different, so “other,” to Europeans, Mauss wanted to demonstrate through comparative analysis the underlying similarities as well. The complex structure of the gift made it more difficult for Europeans to see these groups as inferior primitives whose annihilation or assimilation would be of no loss to humanity.

Gift giving was obviously an economic phenomenon, although it did not involve the exchange of equivalent values as it does in market economies. In the Kwakiutl tribe the *potlatch*

ritual exchanges were competitive and required a reciprocal exchange at a later moment that was of more value than the original gift. This was how the chief, the clan, or the tribe maintained prestige and power; the chief would distribute the gifts later received to the members of his clan or tribe. The chief was the member of the tribe who shared the most. The goods exchanged were often destroyed in festivals which made the accumulation of wealth impossible.

Gift giving also involved a relation with nature and created a balanced reciprocal relation between society and nature. For example, since tribes deified natural forces in their animistic religions, a wood carver made an offering to the spirits of the forest before cutting down the tree that he would use. The domination of nature is a modern phenomenon; these tribes lived in nature.

Gift giving also included a morality of reciprocity. The members of tribes were obligated to give gifts as well as receive gifts. Failure to do either would mean a loss of status, perhaps enslavement, or possibly war if it occurred between two tribes. The norm of reciprocity bound clan to clan, men to women, and tribe to tribe, and the circulation of gifts reproduced these tribes as tribes.

Thorstein Veblen brought the analysis of symbolic exchange to the consumer practices of wealthy Americans in his *Theory of the Leisure Class*. Veblen developed his concepts of vicarious consumption and conspicuous consumption from the same sources as Mauss, from tribal cultures and agrarian societies. The leisure class originally derived its prestige from avoiding ignoble work and devoting its time to pursuits that had little practical significance: sports, indolence, war, religious activities, and government. They also derived prestige through the idleness and vicarious consumption of their wives, families, and servants. Further, as the members of the middle class took up practical positions as professionals and managers, they derived their prestige from conspicuous consumption, “keeping ahead of the Joneses.” Further, the competitive logic of the rat race filtered down throughout the class structure. Although Veblen also recognized that, once his theory had become understood by the leisure class, the members of this elite could reverse course and practice asceticism. Old money has

often adopted low profiles in their lifestyles, and the arts and crafts movement with its functional aesthetic was very popular for members of the professional managerial class in the early twentieth century. Veblen also recognized that the pursuits of the leisure class often had functional qualities and were not always a pure waste of time and wealth.

Jean Baudrillard developed his analysis from a critical reading of Mauss, Galbraith, and Veblen. Symbolic exchange for Baudrillard was a way to escape the consumer society and the political economy of the sign. He demonstrated in his early writings how the code of consumption and the system of needs had completed the system of production. The use value of the commodity provided no way out of the capitalist mode of production as it had for traditional Marxists (“to each according to his needs”) – it only provided an alibi to exchange value. Consumers were even more alienated in their private lives than they were at work engaging in unequal exchanges with capital and producing surplus value. They were unconscious of the process of semiosis that led through their acts of consumption of commodities with their coded differences to the reproduction of the capitalist mode of production. The only way out of this system was a return to symbolic exchange where the accumulation of wealth and power was impossible and where exchanges were reciprocal and reversible. Symbolic exchange was also likely to restore a balance between society and nature, whereas the logic of the consumer society, predicated on continuous economic growth and the ideology of economic growth, is likely to destroy the environment.

What are the analytical problems with Baudrillard’s analysis of symbolic exchange? A number of critics point out that he does not clearly define the concept of code in his writings. But it seems that what he means is that every commodity has a hierarchical structure with the originals at the top that are appropriated by the elite and models of descending quality that are appropriated by the other strata. The consumption of the sign value of each commodity reproduces the code and the relations of domination between the programmers of consumption and the consumers. George Ritzer finds “commotion” in Baudrillard’s appropriation

of concepts from diverse theorists: Marx, Durkheim, Mauss, structural linguistics, Lévi Strauss, Lefebvre, etc. But this is the procedure for dialectical method. The most serious problem is the criticism that he has given us a romantic possibility without identifying any actual agents or movements of social change.

SEE ALSO: Consumption; Gift; Gift Relations

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symbolic interaction

Peter M. Hall

Symbolic interactionism (also known as interactionism) is a uniquely American theoretical perspective that draws its primary inspiration from pragmatism. It refers to humans’ distinctive use of language to create symbols, common meanings, for thinking and communication with others. Herbert Blumer (1969) coined the term to express his “reading” of George

Herbert Mead's thought developed in the early 1900s and codified it in the elaboration of three premises: (1) humans act on the basis of the meanings which things have for them; (2) meanings arise in interaction between people; and (3) meanings are handed and modified through an interpretive process used by people in dealing with things encountered.

Another source for the perspective came from early twentieth century Chicago sociologists W. I. Thomas, Robert Park, and Everett Hughes (a contemporary of Blumer's), who examined urban settings, racial/ethnic hierarchies, work and occupational relations, and social problems. They presented views of social processes, social organization, and social change. While they shared many ideas with Blumer, they gave such ideas as social forces, constraints, and obduracy more emphasis. Students of both Blumer and Hughes (such as Howard Becker, Anselm Strauss, and Helena Lopata) fused the two lines of thought into what is labeled interactionism. Strauss (1993) brings this fusion together in a comprehensive vision for the perspective.

KEY ASSUMPTIONS AND CORE CONCEPTS

G. H. Mead noted two distinctive human qualities: handedness and language. The human hand allows feeling, taking apart, putting together, and modifying the environment. Language (with consciousness and mind) in conjunction with the hand facilitates thinking, imagining, creating, and communication with others to plan, coordinate, and assess social action. Humans are assumed to be at work, active in managing their existence. The hand serves as a metaphor for doing the work of affecting the environment and offering feedback of the results for thought. Society precedes any individual. As humans enter this world and develop they are socialized into it (i.e., learn how to use the hand and language). They are taught or come to know what objects mean and how they are used. They develop a self, make an object of their actions, and use this reflexivity to think and interact with others. From this foundation there are five key assumptions: process, emergence, agency, conditionality, and dialectics.

Process

Rather than static or equilibrium states, interactionists believe things social are always active, in process, ongoing, becoming, and changing. Society and the individual are seen as in process. Even in stability there is process because actions/activity are necessary to maintain that state. Interactionists also deconstruct and dereify totalities and structures into activities and processes.

Emergence

Emergence refers to unique combinations that create qualitatively different manifestations. For example, hydrogen plus oxygen creates water. Similarly, an aggregate of individuals together as a group is more than the sum of the parts. It has different consequences. Thus, the emergent developments of handedness and language lead to human social organization and culture. Emergence also means unpredictability and contingency. Interactionists are relative determinists, who because of vagaries (e.g., ambiguous communication, divergent interests, problematic coordination, and unforeseen obstacles) expect the unexpected, the accidental, novelty, or resistance/deviance. Interactionists remain open to possibilities and potentialities.

Agency

Agency refers to the idea that humans are not robots and have the capacity to exert some control over themselves, others, and the environment. Humans are able to construct, pursue, and achieve their intentions (within limits). Activity and social action are not predetermined but are constructed in the process of doing and therefore capable of being altered to meet whatever circumstances arise. Humans construct social worlds and transform environments.

Constructed Conditionality

Constructed conditionality embeds two processes. The world as we know it is a social construction. Humans have built societies, groups, and relationships. Humans then have

to live with the consequences of their constructions. They condition subsequent activity. Humans are born into societies with conditions to which they adapt, respond, and often change. There is an obdurate reality that humans must take into account. The conditions/reality do not necessarily determine social action, prevent agency, or mute social construction, but they cannot be ignored without consequences. The existing conditions shape but do not determine behavior.

Dialectics

There is a rejection of standard dichotomies or dualistic thinking. Western societies have long accepted dualisms such as mind/body, individual/society, and rationality/emotion. Interactionists see these in relational and processual terms. The self is said to be composed of a social aspect (me) and a personal (I) one, which are in conversation, dialogue, and interaction with each other. Thus, self and society are not opposites but implicated in each other and in process. The ideas of relationality, mediation, and dialectics are expressed here as interpenetrative phases and aspects. Interactionists responded to debates about macro/micro, structure/process, and agency/structure by transcending these dualities with alternative conceptualizations.

A set of core concepts draws upon these assumptions. Work as something to be done stands for action. Working things out implies "with others," thus interaction. Interactionists take the dyad or joint action as the basic social unit. From this form and process are built greater complexity. Dyads with relative stability have general agreements about identities, intentions, expectations, and coordination. Joint action occurs because each actor builds upon and completes the actions of the other. But interactionists assume agreements are working consensuses, subject to differences and obstacles, and then renegotiated.

Situations constitute basic contexts for action. Over time actors encounter familiar ones which they recognize and then produce the appropriate and consequent identities, actions, and outcomes. These are routine situations

characterized by habitual behavior. When actors encounter obstacles, novelty, or ambiguity the situations are problematic and require social action to define and specify the situation and its interactional requirements.

Much of social life occurs in collectivities of different sizes, forms, and complexities. Collective action, joint action by multiple actors, whether in teams, families, congregations, or social movements, requires significant planning, coordination, timing and spacing, and monitoring. Collectivities may be seen as networks which connect and implicate multiple others, but may vary on how tightly or loosely coordinated the collectivity is. Since such collectivities may not be located in a single space and may have projects that extend for long durations, the ability to maintain, coordinate, and accomplish their goals poses major problems. Interactionists have consequently paid attention to temporality, spatiality, and coordinated action.

Interactionists have questioned the strengths and stability of conventional organizational forms. They have offered conceptualizations of organizations as negotiated orders stressing the problematic, ambiguous, and contested nature of those contexts and the necessity of actors to reconstitute activity through negotiation. More generally, they have proposed a new concept, "social world," to represent collectivities organized around an activity/idea/purpose but dispersed across space and time with diffuse boundaries and membership. Using this concept, Becker (1982) demonstrated how art worlds involving production, dissemination, and consumption of art were held together in networks by conventions, resources, and context. Others have shown how multiple social worlds come together, interact, and evolve in organizations, institutions, and arenas of public issues and social problems. Social worlds represent a fluid, dynamic, and changing social formation due to problematic circumstances and consequential interaction.

Interactionists prefer the term social organization to social structure because they perceive greater fluidity, looseness, and change. They see dialectical relationships between order/disorder, stability/instability, yet at the same time they see processual ordering through constructed conditionality. There is recognition of

structuration, constraints, sedimentation, and inequality. Not all actors have equal access to cultural and material resources and hence agency is restricted. However, there are opportunities, contingencies, alternatives, and imaginations that provide dynamic possibilities. So while one can acknowledge that the inequality orders of class, gender, and race intersect, their ordering can be said to be “tentative, messy and incomplete.”

SCHOOLS OF THOUGHT

Interactionism lacks a consensual, integrated, transmitted body of ideas; rather, scholars have taken what they wanted to fit their purposes at hand. Major faultlines in interactionism have been around Herbert Blumer’s interpretation of Mead. On the one hand, some scholars believed Blumer minimized social structure and rejected a positivist approach to exploring relations between individuals and society. Others believed Blumer focused too much on the self, symbols, and cognitive aspects and insufficiently on behavior or forms of social interaction.

There are two forms of interactionism that stand in some contrast to conventional symbolic interaction. The first is the Iowa School, which has seen several forms. It was first developed in the 1950s under the leadership of Manford Kuhn, who believed (following his views of Mead and Cooley) that it was possible to pursue the scientific study of the self. His view of the self was more structural than the presumed fluid view of Blumer. Kuhn proposed the Twenty Statements Test as a simple, quantitative way to get data about people’s ideas about their selves. Numerous studies were conducted and published using this instrument that led to ultimate understandings of how self conceptions were altered by social change and new conditions.

Later, in the 1970s, Carl Couch and his colleagues developed the “new” Iowa School with the same interest in systematic, scientific study. They took a position that more attention needed to be given to examining the social act and the problematic coordination of behavior. Their social behaviorism made the core

ontological units, not individuals, meanings or situations, but rather forms of coordinated behavior (e.g., dyad, triad, small group). For them, the basic building blocks of society were two or more people coordinating behavior with experienced, enduring consequences. They did so by studying the emergence of relationships and different forms of relationships in varying contexts. Carl Couch used these studies as the basis for *Constructing Civilization* (1984), which explored the evolution of complex forms of social coordination across expanses of space and time. It remains a foundation piece for interactionist studies of social organization.

The second form, the dramaturgical perspective, most completely developed by Goffman (1959), has been utilized by numerous interactionists, providing an extensive literature (see Brissett & Edgley 1990). It has its formal origins in the writings of Kenneth Burke on dramatism and was utilized by C. Wright Mills in his early work on motives. Gregory Stone and Robert Perinbanayagam were also instrumental in expanding the framework and integrating it with ongoing interactionist analysis. Several factors distinguish it from traditional symbolic interactionism. Like the Iowa School, dramaturgy focuses on actions and situations. It focuses on how people express themselves with others. But that interest involves more than verbal communication. The formulation includes nonverbal elements: appearance, attire, gestures, sounds, and movements. Following Goffman, dramaturgists believe accomplishing expressive actions jointly is problematic, socially emergent, and variable. Dramaturgists believe all social actors have to express themselves to interact, but they may or may not be aware of or be able to control how they do so. Thus, there are numerous possible alternatives in these interactions. The dramaturgical perspective and the language of theater continue to offer insights and methods for interactionists.

METHODOLOGY

Interactionists have used a variety of methods and techniques to develop an extensive empirical base. Use of different methods may arise from varying assumptions about interactionism

and social reality. Many practitioners operating from interpretive assumptions have conducted ethnographic fieldwork and depth interviews designed to access actors' perspectives, biographies, and experiences and to reveal detailed observations of group life. Other interactionists whose focus was on social action and social process chose various ways to conduct systematic observations of different behavioral phenomena in laboratory or public settings. Some of these studies utilized multiple observers and/or videotaping or photographing of social gatherings and interactions (e.g., experimental role playing or large protest demonstrations). A third approach has utilized questionnaires, hypothesis testing, and statistical analyses to explore connections between self, roles, relationships, and social structures. A final category of empirical study involves content analyses of documents or visual and print media to elicit thematic elements.

Because early ethnographic and qualitative research was criticized as idiosyncratic, Glaser and Strauss (1967) presented grounded theory as a systematic method of relating qualitative data and emerging theory through comprehensive fieldwork strategies, coding, conceptualization, and theory generation. The approach has been extensively elaborated, revised, expanded, and strengthened in later works by Strauss and others. A major recent advance comes from Clarke (2005), which integrates historical, visual, and narrative discourses and structural contexts with grounded theory to produce a more comprehensive basis for conducting qualitative research.

Another significant change in interactionist qualitative research emerges from making explicit the significance of the self in the conduct of the research. Since the researcher's self is the instrument of data gathering, it is imperative to show that their identities, perspectives, actions, and relationships affect and are affected by the field. Reflexivity, the dialogue between self as subject and object, is central to understanding that imperative and requires explication. The subjectivity of the researcher facilitates the research, but also becomes author of the research presentation. That makes the presentation and its form subject to analysis.

One result has been to adopt a narrative approach that is consciously explicit about a rhetorical structure with dramatic appeal.

It is common for interactionists to use multiple methods in their research in order to examine the empirical and theoretical problems with different information. Researchers often combine fieldwork and interviews with document analysis or surveys. Recent work has utilized self-administered questionnaires and interviews with participant diaries and video-taped conversations. Several interactionists have made strong arguments about combining qualitative and quantitative analysis where the latter can provide insightful and appropriate exploration of outcomes, variation, comparisons, and contexts to supplement processual and perspectival analysis. It is in keeping with the pragmatist tradition that the nature of the problem will determine what methods will most appropriately be applicable. Many require multi-method approaches that provide complementary and triangulating assessments of the problem.

RECENT CONTRIBUTIONS

In the last 30 years there have been dramatic changes in interactionist scholarship. The renaissance of pragmatism has meant reexamination of early writings and attention to new topics such as temporality, physical objects, science, and society. Scholars have also examined power, organizations, institutions, dynamic social structures, and large scale social processes (Hall 1997). A particular new and important focus has been inequality, where scholars have examined processes of reproduction, emerging social stratification systems, and the intersection of class, gender, and race inequality (Schwalbe et al. 2000).

Other significant ventures have transformed the field of collective behavior and social movements, eliminating mythical notions of irrational actors and group minds, adding cultural/symbolic elements to instrumental/political social movement analysis, and expanding the scale and scope of studies to encompass expanses of time and space (McPhail & Tucker 2003).

Symbolic interactionists were among the first sociologists to include emotions as a topic of sociological study. Utilizing early work by Cooley, Shibutani, and Goffman, they showed the interplay between cognition and feeling, the definition and categorization of emotions, and the normative shaping of emotional behavior. More recently, interactionists have been attentive to neurocognitive research and its relationship to conceptions of mind, self, emotions, and action (Franks 2003). Recent developments in human genetics and biotechnologies have also renewed interest in biology by interactionists.

SEE ALSO: Blumer, Herbert George; Crowd Behavior; Dramaturgy; Goffman, Erving; Mead, George Herbert; Pragmatism; Public Realm; Role; Self; Social Psychology; Social Worlds

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system theories

Tom Burns

In the most abstract sense, a system is a set of objects together with relationships among the objects. Such a definition implies that a system has properties, functions, and dynamics distinct from its constituent objects and relationships. A system theoretic approach is not unique to sociology. Many of the major system theorists have belonged to other disciplines, including mathematics, with conceptual and analytic challenges rather different from those confronting sociologists and social scientists. Within sociology there have been several system theories, differing from one another in the extent to which, for example, human agency, creativity, and entrepreneurship are assumed to play a role in system formation and reformation; conflict and struggle are taken into account; power and stratification are part and parcel of the theory; structural change and transformation – and more generally, historically developments – are taken into account and explained. What the various system theories have in common is a systematic concern with complex and varied interconnections and interdependencies of social life. Complexity has been a central concept for many working in the systems perspective. The tradition is characterized to a great extent by a burning ambition and hope to provide a unifying language and conceptual framework for all the social sciences.

MULTIPLE APPROACHES

Below, we consider three general approaches to studying social systems: functionalist and neo-functionalist theories (identified particularly with Parsons); the historical, Marxian approach; and actor oriented, dynamic system theories

(e.g., those of Margaret Archer, Walter Buckley, and the European group including Thomas Baumgartner, Tom R. Burns, and Philippe DeVille). These three approaches are methodologically holistic (Gindoff & Ritzer 1994).

Functionalist Systems Theories

The theorists in this tradition explain the emergence and/or maintenance of parts, structures, institutions, norms, or cultural patterns of a social system in terms of their consequences, that is, the particular functions each realizes or satisfies. This includes, for instance, their contribution to the maintenance and reproduction over time of the larger system. The major functionalist in sociology is arguably Talcott Parsons (1951, 1966). Society in a Parsonian perspective is not just an aggregate of social structures but an actual functioning or operating system, with some varying degrees of coherence, integration, and effectiveness. Societal subsystems such as politics, law, economics, and education are interrelated and may contribute differentially to overall systemic performance, the quality and quantity of which may vary.

Parsons extended earlier functionalist explanations which had left open such questions as: Which are the necessary or requisite functions, if any, of a society or its institutions? Is the number infinite or finite? Is there a prioritizing of functions? Of particular importance is Parsons's theory of universal functions or *requisites*. He identified four universal social functions with which any society must deal in order to be sustainable:

- 1 Goal attainment (*G*): political and administrative institutions are designed to determine the ends to which a society should orient (both externally and internally): societal goals, priorities, and political and administrative effectiveness.
- 2 Adaptation or economic efficiency (*A*): institutions deal with the economy and the material environment: transforming material inputs to serve the physical needs of the population and to provide resources to maintain and establish particular institutions of the social system.

- 3 Latency (*L*): institutions of socialization and social control maintain commitment to, or at least acceptance of, basic cultural patterns, in particular the complex of cultural values, principles, and basic institutional arrangements.
- 4 Integration (*I*): institutions coordinate and manage individual agents and multiple societal structures to a greater or lesser extent as a coherent, functioning whole.

The performance and effectiveness of AGIL institutions in accomplishing relevant functions may be treated as variables, thus suggesting varying degrees of societal effectiveness and sustainability of any given system. Put otherwise, the reproduction of a system entails the maintenance of "essential variables" within certain limits (Buckley 1998).

In the late 1960s and 1970s criticisms emerged against Parsons's theory and mode of theorizing, his presumed ideology, and even against his person – his religious background, ethnic and cultural heritage, putative support of the power elite, and writing style. The critique of Parsonian systems theory was well placed in many instances, albeit often exaggerated and *ad hominem*. Fortunately, some sociologists (Jeffrey Alexander, Shmuel N. Eisenstadt, David Lockwood, Peter Munch, David Scullin, and Bryan S. Turner, among others) continued to work with Parsonian concepts and issues and in a number of instances succeeded in overcoming some of the limitations of his original work. Alexander (1995), in particular, strengthened the theorizing about conflict and power as well as culture in Parsonian systems theory. Another important development related to Parsonian systems theory is Niklas Luhmann's (1995) autopoietic systems theory. While following a functionalist theory line, Luhmann was original in several respects. For instance, he eliminated human agents from his theory, eschewed materiality, developed a purely constructionist approach to systems theorizing, and, above all, stressed self-reflectivity and self-organization. However, the theory still neglected to incorporate or to develop major conceptualizations of central importance to the development of modern sociology and social science, such as institution, human agency, and creativity.

Historical, Political Economic Systems Theory

The Marxian approach to system theorizing clearly points us to sociologically important phenomena: the material conditions of social life, stratification and social class, conflict, the reproduction as well as transformation of capitalist systems, the conditions that affect group mobilization and political power, and the ways ideas function as ideologies. Marx's historical approach conceives of all societies as evolving in a series of stages. Each stage is characterized by a particular structure, a certain mode of production, the "superstructure" of politics, and a culture derived from and dependent on the substructure of production. Human beings generate these structures through their own actions, but not always under the conditions of their own choosing or in the ways they intend. Marx and Marxists focused their theoretical and empirical research on the emergence and transformation of capitalist systems. Because of contradictions between structures – between, for instance, the "forces of production" (such as new knowledge, techniques, and scientific developments that contribute to generating such forces) and the "relations of production" (such as the private ownership of the means of production) – the capitalist system undergoes crises, leading eventually to its transformation.

Marxist theory identifies and explains why certain modes of production or social structures give advantages to one group or class rather than another. The relative power of social classes is determined by the particular mode of production, the ownership of productive property, and the authority system required by a given technology (Collins 1988). Classes have not only different interests (ideology and modes of mental production), but also different capabilities and means of political mobilization and influence. The capitalist system is historically characterized by economic crises, conflicts, and tendencies for continuous transformation, not only of economic relations, but also of other social relationships. Nevertheless, institutions were developed in modern societies to deal with destabilizing developments such as overproduction, as well as other systemic problems of capitalism such as class struggle, multiple social dislocations, volatility, overexploitation of natural resources, environmental degradation, etc.

Marx's historically oriented systems theory and its variants have contributed to the development of a complex of structural concepts and analyses and to a conceptualization of particular forms of reproductive and transformative processes. In contrast to Parsonian and other system theories, however, it has been relatively weak in conceptualizing and taking into account human agency and in developing relevant institutional and cultural theories. Recent developments in neo Marxist theorizing (which rejects simplistic materialism) have overcome some of these deficiencies. Among other related major developments, world systems theory (Wallerstein 2004) should be mentioned. Inspired by Marxist theories, it addresses dependency among nations and imperialism, placing the evolution of capitalist systems in a global and comparative perspective. Another variant of Marxist system theory is that of Pierre Bourdieu (1977), which unifies the material and the symbolic, as well as agency and structure.

Actor Oriented, Dynamic Systems Theories

This family of theories – inspired to a great extent by Buckley – is largely non functionalist. It includes Buckley's (1967, 1998) "modern systems theory," Archer's (1995) "morphogenetic" theory, Burns's "actor system dynamics" (also ASD; Burns et al. 1985; Burns & Flam 1987), and the "sociocybernetics" of Geyer and van der Zouwen (1978). Complex, dynamic social systems are analyzed in terms of stabilizing and destabilizing mechanisms, with human agents playing strategic roles in these processes. Institutions and cultural formations of society are carried by, transmitted, and reformed through individual and collective actions and interactions. On the one hand, such structures are temporally prior and relatively autonomous with respect to social action, yet exhibit causal force. They constrain and enable people's social actions and interactions. On the other hand, individual and collective agents through their interactions generate structural reproduction, elaboration, and transformation. The approach concerns not only the identification and development of social structures, but also the specification of the social mechanisms, including *morphostatic* feedback processes that entail

stabilizing, equilibrating features, and *morpho genetic* processes of structural elaboration and transformation. In such terms, social structures help to create and recreate themselves in an ongoing developmental process in which human agents play constructive as well as destructive and transformative roles in the context of complex sociocultural arrangements. The approach entails systematic theorizing of individual as well as collective agents, institutions, and cultural formations and their part in processes of reproduction and transformation. Active agents with their distinctive characteristics, motivations, and powers interact and contribute to the reproduction and transformation of structure. They establish as well as reform such structures as institutions, socio technical systems, and physical and ecological structures, always within constraints and opportunities, and not always in ways they intend. The selective and structuring mechanisms that reproduce, modify, or transform social structures are themselves based on institutional arrangements and distributions of powers among societal agents and social populations such as classes and ethnic and religious groups.

This approach to systems theory, particularly in the work of Archer and ASD, theorizes institutions and sociocultural formations in their own right, identifying and explaining the real and variegated structures which have emerged historically and are elaborated and developed in ongoing social processes. The approach enables one to identify and analyze the complex mechanisms of stable reproduction as well as of the transformation of societal structures and the genesis of new forms. In other words, human agents constitute and reconstitute institutions and cultural forms through their interactions. Rule interpretation, formation, and development are viewed as a form of normatively guided problem solving and entrepreneurship.

ASD has drawn to a significant degree upon Marxist theory, redefining key Marxian concepts in modern sociological terms (above all, through institutional and cultural theorizing), including concepts such as class, power, domination, exploitation, conflict and struggle, and unequal exchange and accumulation, reproduction, and transformation.

CONTRIBUTIONS OF SYSTEM THEORIES

System theories have been applied to a wide spectrum of empirical cases and policy issues. Parsons and his followers, in particular, applied their systems theory to diverse empirical phenomena in sociology as well as in other disciplines: modernization, economics, politics, social order, industrialization and development, Fascism and McCarthyism, international relations, social change and evolution, complex organizations, health care, universities, religion, professions, small groups, and family as well as abstract questions such as the place of norms in maintaining social order both historically and cross nationally. Marxian theory and dynamic system theories have also been applied to a spectrum of diverse empirical and policy subjects.

Among the major contributions of the approaches outlined here is the development of conceptual and methodological tools to investigate *complex* interdependencies of social phenomena, including (1) the multi dimensionality of social action and interaction, (2) inter structural problems and dynamics, and (3) complex action structure loops such as those of reproduction and transformation. These are outlined below.

Multi Dimensionality

Action and interaction has been interpreted and conceptualized as multi dimensional, entailing the confluence of economic, social, cultural, instrumental, and moral factors. One implication of this perspective is that unidimensional action such as pursuit of profit or gain would tend to be functionally or evolutionarily disadvantageous to a society as a whole. Social integration – the realization in general of other social requisites – is sacrificed to productive efficiency in such a unidimensional perspective on action and interaction. Similarly, purely procedural rationality also proves disadvantageous because it ignores real consequences. More generally, the neofunctional and dynamic system theories as well as neo Marxist theory have fruitfully addressed multidimensional, multi level phenomena, taking into account human agency as

well as developments in institutionalism and in the sociology of culture.

Interstructural Problems, Forces of Change, and Dynamics

A common thread in system theories has been the analysis of interstructural relations and the instability to which they give rise. Multiple, incompatible structures cause performance failures and disorder. Lockwood (1964) addressed these issues in his distinction between *system integration* and *social integration*. He utilized Parsons's idea of a normative order, incorporating "factual order" or substratum as a determinant of social conflict and social instability. For Lockwood, the key factor in social transformation is system contradiction; for instance, between forces and relations of production. If present at the same time that there is social conflict and struggle between groups of societal agents or classes, then social transformation is likely. Among the major subtypes of interstructural problems are incompatibilities between structures of the social system and structures in the environment. Complex feedback loops between societal orders and their environments may generate uncontrollable instability and non sustainability (e.g., in connection with soil erosion or other resource depletion).

Reproductive and Transformative Action Structure Loops

In investigating complex interdependencies in social life, system approaches have typically worked with multiple forms of causality and complex mechanisms of system functioning, stability, and change. A major common interest – although formulated in different ways in the three approaches – relates to processes of system reproduction and non reproduction (or transformation). The conceptualization of reproduction processes contributes to the explanation of structural stability or morphostasis. Disturbance or blockage of these processes leads typically to restructuring via transformations or morphogenesis.

Social Reproductive Mechanisms

These entail particular types of action structure loops. Any given social structure consists of constraining and enabling factors for the agents involved. Under certain conditions, these lead to consequences maintaining and reproducing the structure. In a given context, one theorizes factors that may disturb reproductive loops and factors that may handle disturbances so that reproduction can be sustained. Some reproductive loops are consciously designed. That is, particular practices and institutions are constructed so as to contribute to, or set in motion, reproductive loops. Thus, we find in modern societies a spectrum of institutional arrangements designed to prevent or to regulate conflicts between diverse agents and groups. Democratic institutions, court systems, particular government agencies of regulation, and formalized negotiation systems deal with, for instance, labor capital and commercial conflicts. Along such lines, Sciulli (1992) emphasized procedural norms, collegial forms of organization, and symbolic media of interchange, which facilitate integration and effective collective action in the face of the substantial diversity in agents' beliefs and interests in a modern society. Also, modern societies have developed a number of institutions to deal with destabilizing features of capitalism and to assure its effective reproduction, albeit often in modified form.

Transformative Mechanisms

Endogenous processes such as economic or political competition among agents, and social entrepreneurs responding to incentives, may restructure and transform a system. Under some conditions, these initiatives result in self sustaining, cumulative transformative processes. As a result of an initial, possibly modest, change in institutional rules and/or rule enforcement activities, different opportunity and constraint structures are shaped, leading to shifts in patterns of action and interaction. These in turn may result in new initiatives, social mobilization, and successful efforts at extensive reform or transformation. In general, a transformative

action structure loop entails a type of circular causality with cumulative transformative effects. In some cases, the initial impetus may have been an external shock.

Power, knowledge, values, and interests are key ingredients in structural innovation and transformation. The power of agents to mobilize resources including wealth, government authority, and coercive powers to maintain or change institutional orders is well recognized in sociology. Emerging groups and movements may also mobilize sufficient power resources to challenge established elites and, under certain conditions, to bring about transformative loops such as revolutions. The interaction between established elites and challenging groups or movements is a common theme in the study of institutional and societal dynamics. Such power mobilization and conflict are fueled by actors' material and ideological interests. They are reflected in paradigms that define appropriate institutional arrangements, strategies, and policies to deal with collective problems, including problems of social order. In general, a political or economic order is historically vulnerable when reproductive loops are eroded or collapse. For instance, one or more of the conditions for rule enforcement, transmission, and self replication may be unsatisfied (Burns & Dietz 1992). Even initially successful institutionalization of a major reform or revolution can be undermined by complex processes of reproductive failure. There are numerous historical examples of what appeared to be successful institutional innovations, even revolutions with great visions of new, even utopian social orders. Many have collapsed, degenerating into substantially different social orders.

CHALLENGES AND OPPORTUNITIES

The vigorous critique of Parsons in the 1960s and 1970s extended to other system theoretic approaches such as those of Archer, Buckley, and ASD. These other theories generally were treated as "grand theorizing" and regarded as suspect when not rejected out of hand. Sociological textbooks neglected much of the diversity of system theorizing, such as the work of Buckley and his European followers. Including them would have complicated the picture

considerably. For a time, an exception was made for Marxist theory, which was viewed as non functionalist – although Collins (1988) later disproved this characterization – and more compatible with the ideological tenor of the times.

The general rejection of systems approaches since the 1960s did not stem the incorporation of systems concepts into other theoretical traditions by major American and European sociologists (e.g., James Coleman, Klaus Eder, Anthony Giddens, David Lockwood, Charles Perrow, W. Richard Scott, Arthur Stinchcombe, Piet Styrdom, and Piotr Sztompka). Consequently, much of the language and conceptualization of modern system theories has become part of everyday contemporary sociology (e.g., open and closed systems, loosely and tightly coupled systems, information and communication flows, reflexivity, self referential systems, positive and negative feedback loops, self organization and self regulation, reproduction, emergence, non linear systems, complexity). Institutionalists and organizational theorists in particular have co opted a number of system concepts without always pointing out their etiology.

The tendency of neofunctionalist, neo Marxist, and dynamic system theories to converge through contemporary institutional and cultural analysis is an important part of the ongoing revitalization of systems theorizing. One might ask, why not simply concentrate solely on developing institutional and cultural theories, and forget systems theorizing as such? But the multi dimensional conceptualization of action and interaction, the interrelatedness of diverse multiple structures, and the action structure loops of reproduction and transformation call for a more encompassing or holistic approach. The interplay of physical or material structures, sociocultural systems, and interaction orders cannot be properly conceptualized, described, and analyzed through strictly institutional and cultural theories.

Another key factor is the system approach's conceptual and methodological capacity to facilitate cooperation among social, natural, engineering, and medical sciences. Already there is increasing convergence and some cooperation between natural scientists and mathematicians, on the one hand, and social scientists on the other, in constructing models of "multi agent,

dynamic systems.” A major force here is the emergence of complexity theory and the theoretical work and simulation of complex “multi agent systems,” of interest to many mathematicians, computer scientists, and natural scientists as well as a growing number of social scientists.

System theories also perform an important intellectual function within sociology, and among the social sciences and humanities: they contribute a common language, conceptualization, and theoretical integration in the face of the extreme fragmentation among the social sciences as well as within sociology. The latter suffers as a result of the institutionalized concentration on mid level empirical and theoretical research (i.e., “middle range theorizing”). The challenge which Parsons and others including Buckley originally addressed remains to overcome the fragmentation of sociology and the social sciences generally, the lack of synergies, and the failure to develop a cumulative science by providing them a common language and integrative theoretical framework to mediate, accumulate, and transmit knowledge among all branches and sub branches of the social sciences and allied humanities (Sciulli & Gerstein 1985). On a practical level, there remains the venerable challenge to establish and develop a social science complex that can readily and systematically put pieces of specialized knowledge together to address major contemporary problems – perhaps a type of meta theoretical framework rather than a single overarching theory.

SEE ALSO: Complexity and Emergence; Function; Functionalism/Neofunctionalism; Marx, Karl; Metatheory; Parsons, Talcott; Political Sociology; Simulation and Virtuality; Social Change; Structure and Agency

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T

Takata, Yasuma (1883–1972)

Kazuo Seiyama

Yasuma Takata was a prominent neoclassical economist in the pre war era. He was also a tanka poet and published several collections of original poems.

He was born in Kurume, a city in Northern Kyushu, Japan, and graduated in sociology from Kyoto Imperial University. He taught at various universities, including Kyoto, Kyushu, and Osaka, mainly as an economics professor. He wrote more than 100 books, of which about half were on economics and about 30 were sociological.

Although his work was multidimensional he began his career as a sociologist and retained this focus throughout his academic life. His sociological works bridged various sociological fields, such as general theory, class theory, social change, population, social power, and others. He was principally a theoretical sociologist. The basics of his theory are principally addressed in his early (and voluminous) *Shakaigaku Genri* (Treatise on Sociology) (1919), in which he endeavored to construct a general sociological theory based on methodological individualism (using the term coined by economist J. A. Schumpeter in 1908, with whom Takata became acquainted sometime later when Schumpeter visited Japan).

A pivotal concept in the *Treatise* was the individual's "desire" as the main factor underlying various social phenomena and social evolution. He assumed that several kinds of desires are naturally given to people and determine their behavior. Important among them were the "desire for power" and "desire for gregarious

living." Desire for gregarious living was a ground for basic social formation. On the other hand, desire for power was a basis for dissociation, differentiation, and individuation.

This description might make Takata appear to be an old fashioned Spencerian sociologist with a hint of Tönnies' conceptual framework thrown in. But the originality of Takata's thinking lies in his way of constructing a large scale theoretical system beginning from those basic presumptions. Various original concepts were introduced, for example, "homogeneous association and heterogeneous association," "direct association and indirect association," and "fundamental society and derivative society." And several "laws" – such as "the law of fixed quantity of association," "the law of the loss of intermediate societies," and "the law of the decline of fundamental societies" – were formulated. After giving extensive explanations for these concepts and laws, he presented a theory of social evolution which emphasized three major trends: cultural flourishing, the expansion of liberty, and the development of individuality. This main framework of the *Treatise* was followed by *Principles of Sociology*, originally published in 1922 as a more compact version.

In one sense, his sociology may be characterized as a social theory of atomistic liberalism. First, he was entirely opposed to any collectivist or substantivist view of society, although these were so common as to be taken for granted by his contemporary social theorists, especially in Japan. His theory of the relationship between state and society anticipated in many respects the pluralist theory of state formulated by R. M. MacIver and H. J. Laski. Secondly, at the same time, he envisaged a social evolution in the process of individualization, arguing that it would lead to a new type of social integration and solidarity far preferable to the old one. This thesis was later developed in his *Sekai Shakai*

Ron (On World Society) (1947), in which he presented a theoretical future vista of a politically and socially unified global society where nation states would be extinguished, at least as independent political units. (It is astonishing that this was presented immediately after Japan's devastating defeat in World War II.) Thirdly, his optimistic view of social evolution was grounded in his conviction that fundamentally individual liberties would bring about a desirable and well ordered society, a view common to neoclassical economics.

Takata's theory of social change is known as "the third view of history" or "the population view of history." Many have interpreted it, mistakenly, as a claim that history is determined by the growth of population. Importantly, it was originally presented as a new interpretation of class theory in an anthology *Kaikyu Oyobi Dai San Shikan* (Class and the Third View of History) (1925), shortly after his *Treatise*. His class theory is well known as a theory of power; that is, what determines class formation and changes in class structure is neither an Idea (*Geist*) nor the relations of production, but social power. In opposition to Marxian class theory in which the power structure is supposedly subordinate to the economic structure, Takata thought that power is the most fundamental determinant of class structure. Hence, his "third view of history" should be understood as basically "a power view of history," meaning that it is neither the first, Hegelian idealist view, nor the second, Marxian materialist view.

He provided three main reasons why Marxian class theory – that class is formed according to people's common location in the relations of production – is wrong: (1) some landowners and capitalists form a class without engaging in any economic activity; (2) in a future classless society, there will still be a division of labor and differences in economic activities; (3) individuals engaged in the same profession may yet belong to different classes. Instead of similarities in economic activities, he insists that similarity in social power is the constitutive factor of class structure.

Although since his earliest work power had been the pivotal concept, his most extensive discussion of power was not produced until relatively late, in *Seiryoku Ron* (On Power) (1940), where his "power view of history" was

systematically presented by articulating and developing both theoretical and historical accounts of power. He considered this to be his major work. And yet, it should be stressed that his basic conceptual framework on power had already been formulated when he presented his extensive class theory (1922). This was well before the sociological power theories, such as those by Weber, von Wiese, or Russell, had appeared or become available to him, let alone the post war writings of Hunter, Dahl, and other political scientists.

One distinctive feature of his theory is seen in the definition of power, which was initially given as "the ability of governing another's will," but later revised in *On Power* as "the chance of being obeyed." Compared to Weber's "chance of accomplishing one's will," which should have been available to him at that time, the uniqueness of Takata's definition is that it refers simultaneously to both the power exerciser and the power obeyer. Hence it is a relational concept, not an action based concept. At the same time, it is still a broadly individualistic concept, in contrast to the Foucaultian and other current trends in conceptualizing power.

From the contemporary general theoretical perspective, whether power is defined individually or collectively is an extremely important issue.

In this regard, what is important for Takata's theory of power is that, while he was from the beginning the foremost individualist sociologist, there are various signs of collectivist ways of thinking about power in his writings. The definition above is the first example. We might note that the power exerciser does not explicitly appear in this definition. The term "chance," in contrast to "ability," expresses a contextual, relational, or structural property, as per Weber.

To be more precise, Takata's theory of power is double edged. For example, an important pair of concepts in his theory is "external power" and "internal power" which were borrowed, slightly modified, from Wiese. Basically, external power is that in which a certain individual or group is identified as a power holder, while internal power refers to the power of social norms like customs, laws, or morals, where no particular power holder exists, implying that internal power is collective. Takata considers internal power theoretically very important,

and argues that a new power emerges initially as internal power within a small group and then extends its scope as external power to a large part of the population. And yet, he emphasizes that we should not disregard those powers which come from a proper and independent personal identity. For Takata, power must ultimately be imputed to a person or a group of persons, even if effected by collective elements such as social norms, customs, or laws.

His theory of power fluctuates between methodological individualism and collectivism. In fact, when he describes concrete historical events in terms of power and related concepts, his description betrays his faith in methodological individualism. For example, he argues that the state is an organizational and official power of the first order, and inherently involves the legitimacy of power. And for the latter, Takata rightly emphasizes the importance of “propaganda,” “thought,” “ideology,” and “religion.” He even claims that the core of a new wild power which is emerging is a thought, and a new ruling organization is established as a realization of this thought. As for the emergence of modern society in Europe, Takata explains that, as Christianity declines, the status of the pope and religious aristocrats who occupy the special position between God and human beings changed, that the rise of republican thought in Europe had removed several monarchs, and that the spread of egalitarian thought had raised the status of the proletariat class and realized the liberation of slaves. Astonishingly enough, this is a sort of idealist explanation of historical change. Of course, this is another example of the double edged character of Takata’s power theory.

His peculiar position as a central figure in neoclassical economic theory is closely related to this. Being a methodological individualist, he was inherently drawn to neoclassical thinking. But, interestingly, in developing his own economic theory – the power theory of economics – he diverged from the mainstream of economics. He repeatedly emphasized that power, or the relations of power, is the fundamental factor of the economy. He criticized the mainstream for neglecting power or, at best, treating it as a given in theory. He provided several reasons for the significance of power. First, the government and labor unions interfere extensively, as economic

powers, in various economic decisions. Secondly, socioeconomic inequalities or differences, such as in wage differences by sex, ethnicity, and educational background, should be conceived as effects of non economic, social power.

In spite of his laborious insistence and his reputation as a leading economist, Takata’s power theory of economics was never fully accepted by Japanese economists such as M. Morishima, who became one of the leading figures in post war Japanese economics, and nevertheless greatly admired him. In any case, it should be clear that, as an economist, Takata employed a collectivist mode of thinking that was unmistakably revealed in his sociology of power.

Takata’s double edgedness can also be seen in another important aspect: that is, nationalism and globalism. Of course, he was never a narrow minded nationalist, even during World War II, but was rather a noble and moderate nationalist who was born into a family of Shinto priests. At the same time, though, his sociological theory was entirely cosmopolitan and liberal. In *On World Society* (1947) he envisaged a future global world, politically unified, where individual liberty and equality would prevail. This was overly optimistic from the contemporary perspective.

However, this optimism and the various inner contradictions in his theory are rather charming, and not merely a fault in his sociology. In reading his work we certainly find profound inspirations and stimulations in these days when new social theories are waiting to emerge.

SEE ALSO: Class, Status, and Power; Individualism; Liberalism; Power, Theories of; Schumpeter, Joseph A.

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Taoism

Chee Kiong Tong and Cheuk Yin Lee

Taoism takes its name from the concept of Tao, or Way. In Chinese, the word “Tao” (or *dao* in *hanyu pinyin*) is made up of two components, one depicting a human head, the other a motion verb meaning to pass, go through, or walk. The earliest and most important work on Taoism is a short book of some 5,000 characters known as *Daode Jing* (*Classic of the Way and Virtue*) by the legendary Laozi (literally, Old Master, around sixth century BCE). The oldest manuscripts of the *Daode Jing*, unearthed in 1973 from an ancient tomb in Changsha, Hunan province, China, dated to about 200 BCE. Next to the Bible, it is probably one of the most translated works in the world, with close to 100 translations in English (see Lee et al. 1994).

The “Tao” is conceived as a metaphysical reality, the origin of heaven and earth, and the very beginning and end of all things. In Chapter 42 of the *Daode Jing*, it states: “The Tao gave birth to the One. The One gave birth to the Two. The Two gave birth to the Three. And the Three gave birth to the myriad creatures.” This process of creation can also be understood as a process of differentiation from unity to multiplicity.

RELIGIOUS ROOTS AND HISTORICAL DEVELOPMENT

The origin of religious Taoism is extremely complex. As an organized religion, it probably started during the Eastern Han dynasty (25–220 CE). However, religious Taoism did not occur suddenly in a historical and religious vacuum. Rather, it drew upon preexisting ancient Chinese religious ideas and practices, incorporating Chinese ideas of nature worship and ancestor worship. Divination and other religious arts of ancient Chinese religious experts or “shamans” also became part of the repertoire of the Taoist priests. In addition, religious Taoism was influenced by the teachings of ancient Taoist philosophers as well as the cult of immortality promulgated by religious teachers of the Warring States period (475–221 BCE). In this sense, religious Taoism can be seen as a synthesis of several currents of thought going back to the very beginning of Chinese history.

During the reign of Emperor Shun (126–144 CE) of the Han dynasty, Zhang Ling, native of Jiangsu province, established the first Taoist sect in Sichuan, China. He claimed to have received a revelation from the divine Laozi to establish a new Taoist order. Known as the “Celestial Master” sect, it made the Taoist philosophical classic *Daode Jing* the chief scripture of the sect, and followers were taught to venerate the Tao and to repent their sins. By means of sacred incantations, talismans, and purification rites, the Taoist master sought to restore the spiritual and physical health of the followers. The movement attracted a large following and quickly developed into a major religious force. At that time, the Han Empire was already on the brink of disintegration, and the country was plunged deep into civil war. The rise of religious Taoism can be viewed in the context of its ability to provide meaning and meet adherents’ spiritual and material needs at a time of sociopolitical and economic strife.

Religious Taoism may have been started as a popular movement, supported mainly by the rural peasants, but by the post Han period (third century CE) it began to attract the attention of the educated elites. The Taoist master Ge Hong (283–343 CE), an expert in Taoist alchemy and traditional medicine, is one of the key figures responsible for the “upward” swing

of the religion. Ge Hong envisioned a synthesis of Confucianism and Taoism, in which spiritual practice and moral cultivation form an inseparable union, combining the Taoist goal of attaining spiritual liberation and becoming an immortal with the Confucian emphasis on moral self cultivation, filial piety, benevolence, trustworthiness, and other moral virtues. In the fifth and sixth centuries CE, during the Eastern Jin (317–420) dynasty, two new major Taoist sects were formed: the Supreme Purity Sect (*Shangqing*) and the Numinous Treasure Sect (*Lingbao*). Over time, the Supreme Purity Sect became the dominant Taoist group in medieval China. As the hermitage of the sect was on the famous Taoist mountain, Mao Shan, in Jiangsu province, the Supreme Purity Sect came to be known as Mao Shan Taoism. The teachings of the Supreme Purity Sect concentrated on internal spiritual cultivation, supplemented by the study of scriptures and performing good deeds. Unlike the Celestial Master Sect, it does not emphasize the performance of rituals or the use of talismans and other religious devices. The Numinous Treasure Sect had a more outward orientation and emphasized both spiritual cultivation and rituals. It paid close attention to doing good deeds and universal salvation.

During the Southern Song dynasty, around 1167, a new Taoist sect with a strong monastic flavor – the Complete Perfection (*Quanzhen*) Sect – was founded. Its teachings prescribed a heavy dose of monastic discipline. Practitioners had to remain celibate, embrace poverty, abstain from indulgence of all kinds, including food and sleep, and refrain from injuring all forms of life. The Complete Perfection Sect was very successful and attracted a large following. In response, the other Taoist lineages gradually joined forces to form a new orthodoxy known as Right One (*Zhengyi*) Sect (see Qing 1988; Ren 1990).

Both the Complete Perfection and Right One Taoism venerate the “Three Pristine Ones” as the supreme gods of the cosmos. In terms of practice, however, the two are quite different. Complete Perfection Taoism is monastic; all priests must observe celibacy and live in seclusion. Right One Taoism is more lay oriented; its priests can marry and live among the common people. Doctrinally, Complete Perfection Taoism emphasizes quiet self cultivation, while

Right One Taoism relies mainly on the use of talismans, incantations, prayers, and the performance of rituals.

DIVINE HIERARCHY AND KEY TAOIST IDEAS

In Taoist religion, both Laozi and his follower Zhuangzi are worshipped as gods and founders of the religion. As an incarnation of Tao, Laozi is regarded as the “Supreme Venerable Lord.” The “Three Pristine Ones” and the other divinities of Taoism, including the Heavenly Gods, the Earth Gods, and the Human Gods, are all considered to have evolved from Tao. Thus, Religious Taoism is a devotional religion with a polytheistic structure. It has a highly sophisticated and hierarchically structured pantheon with countless gods and goddesses under the command of a sovereign high god and with specific stations in the divine hierarchy. The organizational principle seems to have been modeled on that of the imperial government. However, from the Taoist perspective, the earthly government reflects the structure of the heavenly kingdom.

The highest level of the Taoist pantheon is comprised of the Lordly Spirits of Anterior Heaven. It is headed by the “Three Pristine Ones” (*Sanqing*): the “Celestial Venerable of the Original Beginning” (*Yuanshi Tianzun*), the “Celestial Venerable of the Numinous Treasure” (*Lingbao Tianzun*), and the “Celestial Venerable of the Way and Virtue” (*Daode Tianzun*), also commonly known as the “Supreme Venerable Lord.” However, the “Three Pristine Ones” are perceived to be so exalted that they reign, but do not rule. Cosmic governance is delegated to a subordinate chief known as the “Great Sovereign Jade Emperor” (*Yuhuang Dadi*). The Jade Emperor, whose “birthday” is celebrated on the ninth day of the first month in the Chinese lunar calendar, is the supreme high god, the ruler of the Taoist universe. He has direct command over all deities and has absolute control over all human and divine matters. Like the imperial emperor, his counterpart on earth, the Jade Emperor is assisted by a multitude of officials and functionaries. These, in turn, are organized into a divine bureaucracy, and can be classified in terms of their rank, jurisdiction,

functions, and responsibilities, such as the God of Wealth, the Earth God, the Kitchen God, and the Door God.

Broadly speaking, Taoism can be divided into three interrelated traditions. A Taoist philosophical tradition associated with Laozi's *Daode Jing*, Zhuangzi's work, and other texts; a religious tradition with an organized doctrine, formalized cult activities, and institutional leadership; and a popular religion tradition, where there is a syncretic mix of Taoist beliefs, folk beliefs and rituals, including ancestor worship, and elements of Confucianism and Buddhism. This tradition is often referred to as a "diffused" religion, with no canonical scriptures and its rituals and religious ideas largely orally transmitted from one generation to the next.

While these are three different traditions, they are interrelated and draw from some of the key ideas of Taoism, such as the conception of *yin* and *yang*, and the five elements. For Taoists, the origin of the universe is known as the Great Beginning. The universe began as a void, from which the great breath (*Taiji*) developed. The Great Breath in turn gathered momentum, and split into two equal breaths; a light pure breath, *yang*, moves upwards and created heaven, while the opaque heavy breath, *yin*, descended and created earth (Robinet 1997: 8). Together, they constitute the cycle of life and death. The positioning of these forces is considered instrumental for social order on earth, and a disjuncture in the correct positioning will result in hazards and natural calamities (Kuah 2003: 23–4). *Yin* and *yang* form the foundation of both philosophical and religious Taoism. From these two forces, the five elements, fire, water, earth, wood, and metal, are produced. These, in turn, govern the four seasons and all aspects of human existence.

RELIGIOUS SPECIALISTS

As noted above, the concepts of *yin* and *yang* form the foundation of both philosophical and religious Taoism. The classical texts of Laozi and Zhuangzi explicate the principles of this philosophy, while the priests, mediums, and so on found in religious Taoism draw on these ideas in the performance of rituals relating to birth, marriage, death, festival cycles, and all

aspects of human life. Taoist priests, *daoshi*, are professionals who earn their living through providing a range of religious services and ritual performance. These ritual specialists, particularly in Taiwan, are called "red headed" Taoists or barefoot masters as they wear a red turban around their head and are barefoot when dressed in ceremonial ritual costumes.

Curing rituals are the most common of their services. Using divination techniques and traditional Chinese medical knowledge, they diagnose ailments. A simple cure for the illness requires the priest to write a charm, which the patient places in his or her house, or burns to drink the ashes as tea or to wash with. Complex problems may require more elaborate ritual solutions. For example, a *daoshi* may be called upon to exorcise demons that have invaded a person's dwelling or body. He performs dramatic rites, including sword dances and elaborate gestures, to chase the demons away.

In addition to the *daoshi*, there is another class of religious specialists who draw on Taoist ideas. Chinese spirit mediums, or shamans, are called *dang ki*, literally, "child diviners." Chinese spirit mediumship is based on the idea that a spiritual being, or *shen*, can temporarily possess a human body. In such a state, the *dang ki* becomes the personification of the *shen* and mediates between the human and spiritual worlds. Human beings can then consult the spirits seeking advice as well as solutions to human problems. Mediums, when possessed, enter into a state of trance. Rituals performed by spirit mediums include the sacrifice of offerings of food and joss papers, that is, paper printed in gold and silver and sometimes inscribed with prayers that are burnt, to appease the spirits.

There is a clear hierarchical distinction between the *dang ki* and the *daoshi*. *Daoshi* are regarded as the religious superiors of the shamans. To be a *daoshi* is to fill an office that is hereditary, and they are considered as the administrators of the spiritual world, a reflection of the bureaucracy that governs the earthly world. In fact, in Taoist traditions, Laozi is regarded as the first Heavenly Master and Zhang Ling (or Zhang Daoling) the universal head of the Taoist liturgical tradition. Succeeding Heavenly Masters have been representatives from this family line. The Heavenly Masters

bestow the hereditary office on the *daoshi*, who then become the priests of the regional and lay organizations. Thus, the group of *daoshi* is a confederacy of masters, not a church. The legitimacy of their mastership rests in part on the ownership of the manuscripts for liturgical use: books for reciting, rituals, collection of formularies, secret formulas, talismans and diagrams, passed down from each generation in the family (Schipper 1993: 59).

There is a clear distinction between the vernacular *fashi* and the classical *daoshi*. Besides the contrasting vestments and ceremonial garbs, the rituals performed by the two are significantly different. Vernacular rituals often contain ballads that describe a journey or the myth of the deity invoked. They also tend to give a mythological rendering of the other worlds. The classical rituals, on the other hand, do not contain such mythological aspects or journey narratives, as they are concerned with the expression of moral law and sentiment. They also constantly refer to the abstract cosmology of Taoism. Another distinct difference between the two is the use of trance techniques. Classical Taoism does not practice trance techniques that are quite commonly used by the vernacular Taoist priests. The classical Taoist rejects all forms of individual rites (as opposed to communal rites) such as healing and exorcism. Despite the apparent ritual differences between classical and vernacular Taoist priests, many of the rituals are complementary and may be performed together, as during the *jiao* festival, staged to pacify wandering ghosts, to purify the community's territory, and to reach cosmic renewal (see Liu 2003).

TAOISM AND CHINESE CULTURE

Confucianism, Taoism, and Buddhism form the three pillars of traditional Chinese culture. They provide a window to help understand the Chinese, their values, customs, and way of life. Taoism, unlike other religions that also flourished in China, is an indigenous religious tradition, shaped and formed by native religious beliefs from the start. Taoism can be said to embody a synthesis of traditional Chinese culture. As a popular religion, its teachings influenced the masses. In addition, it penetrated

Confucian traditions and added Taoist features and hues to the Confucian landscape. By blending its doctrine of immortality with Confucian ethics and political philosophy, it had a substantial impact on the educated elite as well.

Taoism also influenced the nature of moral education and self cultivation in China, with its emphasis on performing good deeds and the accumulation of religious merits. One popular belief is that to become a "celestial immortal" a person is required to perform at least 1,300 good deeds. Later, when the genre of Taoist writings known as "Ledgers of Merit and Demerit" gained currency, the moral teachings of Taoism became even more widespread. Essentially, daily actions are classified into good and bad deeds, each of which is assigned a fixed number of merit or demerit points. In this way, Taoism was able to regulate behavior and promote its vision of the good life.

External alchemy and internal alchemy, natural methods of nourishing and preserving life, represent the two foci of Taoist self cultivation. External alchemy is above all concerned with the manufacture of an "elixir" of everlasting life and involved an understanding of the nature of chemical processes and the properties of plants and minerals. Internal alchemy is concerned with nourishing and strengthening the internal vital energy that contributed to the concept of *Qi*, which plays a central role in the teachings of religious Taoism. Although external and internal alchemy may no longer be pursued in their classical form, their influence remains today. Rather than through overt missionary effort or deliberate indoctrination, Taoist practices simply merged with the common Chinese conception of physical health and spiritual well being. Other more conspicuous practices such as hanging a symbol of the "eight trigrams" in the front of a house or pasting talismans on doors to ward off evil spirits, among countless other practices, likewise reflect the pervasive presence of Taoism in Chinese culture.

Taoism was able to sink deep roots in China, not simply because of the worship of many gods and goddesses. The dimension of practice is equally important, especially in terms of various forms of religious arts. Taoism incorporated ancient astronomy, medicine, mathematics, alchemy, and other religious arts into its understanding of Tao, and further developed

various forms of divination such as astrology and geomancy. All these activities were and still are intimately related to the everyday life of the Chinese. Many practices that originated from Taoism, from the use of herbs and drugs and the art of *Qigong* (breathing exercise) to certain rituals and customs, have gradually and imperceptibly become part of the daily life of Chinese people.

CONTEMPORARY TAOISM

The classical secularization hypothesis suggests that a consequence of modernity, and for some scholars an inevitable outcome, is the decline in social significance of religion. The process implies that sectors of society are increasingly removed from the domination or religious institutions and symbols. In the main, it is argued that the process of secularization has been dependent on the rise of empiricist thinking and differentiation of roles and functions within society. The religious situation of Taoism in China, Taiwan, and Hong Kong shows that rather than secularization, there has been a revival of Taoist practices and rituals.

Revivalism in China

Despite the tenets of orthodox Marxist theory, and suppression and strict restrictions placed on religions during the communist era, religion in China is thriving, particularly after economic liberalization. Thousands of temples destroyed or damaged during the Cultural Revolution have been restored and increasing numbers of people are taking part in ritual activities. Currently, China has over 1,500 Taoist temples and more than 25,000 Taoist priests and nuns. With the rebuilding and reconsecrating of the temples, many Taoist priests found new job opportunities and returned to work. In addition, many Chinese communities began to celebrate elaborate Taoist *jiao*, communal sacrifices, as well as reviving elaborate funerary and ancestral rituals. There has been a renaissance of popular religion with the growing popularity of temple cults, local deities, and temple festivals. With the boom in economic activity, many Chinese could also afford to rebuild temples to their local god.

The resurgence in religious activities is also linked to the donations from overseas Chinese. They return in large numbers to attend religious rituals and to bury their dead, or at least hold services in their places of origin for those who have died overseas. Many have been persuaded to make large contributions to local schools, hospitals, and roads once they have been allowed to conduct the rituals (see Dean 1993; Fan 2003; Lai 2003a).

Although the state has always wanted the Taoists to conform to the Buddhist ideal of celibacy and monastic life, most of the Taoist priests or *daoshi* live a married life at home, wearing liturgical vestments when performing the rituals. Since they perform services and ceremonies in the context of the cults of various gods in local temples, they are not easily distinguishable from local temple shamans whose religious activities have been criticized as superstitious. In order to legitimize and effectively manage this group of Taoist priests, the National Daoist Association has classified the “correct” or “recognized” *daoshi* of the Zhengyi order. By law, the *daoshi* have to register with their local Taoist association and will receive a “Daoist certificate belonging to the Zhengyi sect,” which is issued by the National Daoist Association (Lai 2003a: 424).

Popular religious practices have not lost their importance as China begins its modernization process. Instead, Fan argues that there has been an increase in spirituality among the population as many urban workers who have moved beyond basic struggle for survival are now faced with deeper questions of personal meaning. In his study on religion in the modern city of Shenzhen, Fan shows the trend toward a privatization of popular religion among urban Chinese. To them, religious beliefs are private concerns and the search for spiritual meaning is a personal one. Although many of these urban Chinese do not organize large communal worship events, they still uphold the traditional Chinese popular religion worldview of *mingyun*, *luanfen*, and *feng shui* (Fan 2003: 455).

Taiwan’s Religious Situation

Since the end of martial law in Taiwan, religion is thriving. Taoism, with over 4.5 million adherents,

is one of the most popular religions in Taiwan. The number of Buddhist and Taoist temples in Taiwan nearly doubled in 50 years from 3,661 in 1930 to 5,531 in 1981. According to the statistics provided by the Ministry of the Interior, by 2003 Taiwan was home to 8,604 Taoist temples that had registered with the state. In addition, there are numerous unregistered temples and household shrines (Katz 2003: 396).

Popular religion or folk religion is very wide spread. Temple cults in particular have retained their importance as sites for daily worship and community festivals, with popular deities worshipped for their ability to provide health and prosperity. Some of the popular deities include Mazu (patron goddess of the sea and fishermen) and the Royal Lords. Not only are these temple cults and festivals flourishing, they are also moving beyond their local boundaries to play a significant role on the national stage. These temples have also extended their reach into social services, and currently operate a total of 20 hospital and clinics as well as 180 schools ranging from kindergarten to university (Katz 2003).

In Taiwan, another modern, syncretic form of religion similar to those found in the folk or temple cults is currently growing in significance. The *Yi Guan Dao* (Religion of the One Unity) draws upon both traditional teachings and each of the world's major religions. *Yi Guan Dao* adherents try to identify common principles underlying Buddhism, Christianity, Islam, Judaism, and Hinduism. They ascribe to an idea of a god above all other gods called *Mingming Shangdi* (God of Clarity). *Yi Guan Dao* adherents follow many of the Confucian rituals and engage in ancestor worship. They strive to uphold the precepts of not killing, stealing, committing adultery, lying, and drinking alcohol while putting into practice the ideals of benevolence, righteousness, and universal love envisioned by Confucian teaching. As of 2001, the *Yi Guan Dao* had 887,000 believers, making it the third most popular religion in terms of number of adherents.

The Religious Situation in Hong Kong

Buddhism and Taoism, traditional Chinese religions, have a large local following with more

than 600 Chinese temples in Hong Kong. Religious practices are still very much observed today. Tablets for ancestors, Master of the Site (*dizhu*), Heaven God (*tiangong*), Kitchen God (*zaojun*), and Door God (*menguan*) are commonly found in homes where there is the practice of local religion. People regularly organize temple festivals to celebrate the birthdays of the local deities and to seek blessings. Leading deities include Buddha, *Kwan Yin*, *Guandi*, and *Luzu*. *Tian Hou*, the Queen of Heaven and Protector of Seafarers, is reputed to be worshipped by 250,000 people. During the *Tian Hou* Festival, which falls on the 23rd day of the third moon, many worshippers visit the most famous *Tian Hou* temple, at Joss House Bay on the Clear Water Bay Peninsula. The *jiao* festival is another popular event for the community. During the major *jiao* event, a large stage is constructed for the Taoist rituals and Cantonese opera. Taoist priests are hired to perform rituals that last several days. After the Taoist ritual, a Cantonese opera is performed for several days to signify the beginning of a new cosmic cycle (Liu 2003). In addition, many participate in deity festivals, birthdays, Hungry Ghost festivals, and communal *jiao* festivals. There are an estimated 500 Taoist masters of the *Zhengyi* tradition (known as *Nahm mouh* Taoist masters in Hong Kong) who are in high demand, especially for the performance of funerary rituals (Lai 2003b: 464).

In his research on Hong Kong, Lai (2003b) notes that in contrast to the *Zhengyi* Taoist tradition, which does not usually unite as a community to conduct group worship, many Hong Kong Taoists belong to sects, halls, and temples. Many of these include altars devoted to cult of *Lu Dongbin*. *Lu Dongbin* was a Taoist in the latter half of the Tang dynasty. He is an immortal and was presented as a master of internal alchemy and venerated as the patriarch of the Taoist *Quanzhen* order. He is also worshipped in the popular religious tradition as a deity famed for exorcistic and healing powers. Such *Lu Dongbin* cults were very popular in Guangdong and many Taoist altars in Hong Kong are offspring of main altars in Guangdong.

In recent years, the Taoist organizations in Hong Kong have also evolved into socially conscious, charitable organizations. Once offsprings of parent institutions in Guangdong, they have

supported the revival of Taoism in mainland China. With greater economic prosperity in Hong Kong, the Taoist organizations have raised millions of dollars to reconstruct temples in China. They have also funded universities, schools, and hospitals, established social services for old people, and set up orphanages, clinics, and study rooms for students (Lai 2003b: 466).

SEE ALSO: Buddhism; Confucianism; Culture; Globalization, Religion and; Plural Society; Popular Religiosity; Religion; Religion, Sociology of; Secularization

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taste, sociology of

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The importance of taste as a sociological concept was emphatically pointed out by Pierre Bourdieu. In his sociology, probably more than any where else, taste is a central theoretical concept of analysis. By distinguishing between good and bad, tasteful and tasteless, beautiful and ugly, taste classifies and orders the natural and social world. By taste one classifies oneself and is classified by others. Understood in this way, the sociological concept of taste shares many important features with its predecessor in classical philosophical aesthetics, the power of judgment. In this capacity, taste does not just refer either to individual preferences or dispositions (the term used by Bourdieu), or to some standards used in making choices in consumption. It is an important concept in bridging the gap between an individual's choices and his or her socially shared preferences or habits. In addition, it can refer to more or less automatic responses as well as to highly reflective acts of judgment, and to behavioral responses which share both these aspects at the same time.

TASTE AND POWER OF JUDGMENT IN PHILOSOPHICAL AESTHETICS

The old saying that one should not dispute over matters of taste (*De gustibus disputandum non est*) was not originally understood to refer to the inevitably private nature of judgments of taste. Nowadays, it is often interpreted to mean that since judgments of taste are everyone's private matters, there is no use in arguing about them or presenting any reasons for one's own, presumably superior taste. The lesson to be learnt was rather the opposite. Because taste was something self evident and shared by all, it was

part of “common sense” or *sensus communis*, and it was both futile and unnecessary to argue about it. On the other hand, according to the self understanding of the representatives of this moral sense theory, taste was based on a sense of feeling about the goodness or badness of objects or forms of conduct. Therefore, it was in principle impossible to formulate any general maxims of good taste. Sole reliance on one’s sense or “instinct” of good and bad, tasteful and tasteless, precluded distinction of both beauty and goodness: “sense of beauty” and “sense of right and wrong” were inseparable. Taste was essentially both an aesthetic and a moral category. Thus, decent conduct, dress, and decorum, as well as eating habits, were all indicators of an individual’s moral and aesthetic value, or good taste.

In neoclassical economics taste is an exogenous factor. Consumer preferences are taken as given and regarded simply as something which lie behind an individual’s choices. Therefore, in economics, individual tastes and the social process of their formation are neither theoretically problematized nor empirically studied.

ANTINOMY OF TASTE

This problem inherent in the common sense of taste (i.e., taste as basically both totally private and subjective, and universally valid and objective) was formulated most poignantly by Immanuel Kant in his third critique, *The Critique of Judgment*. He called it the antinomy of taste. According to Kant, in claiming that something is beautiful we only express our own feeling or subjective taste, but at the same time presume that all others will join us in this judgment. Without this latter presumption, our statements of taste would only express our subjective feelings of sensual pleasure and their general validity would be decided solely empirically by counting how many fellow citizens join us in any particular judgment of taste. In this influential tradition of thought, genuine aesthetic judgments differ from judgments of pleasure exactly because of their claim to universal validity.

Whereas the criterion of good taste gradually disappeared from the aesthetics of fine arts during the eighteenth century, it retained its role in the aesthetics of everyday life and popular

culture, in the aesthetics of “lower” arts like gastronomy or popular music, which were often understood to be closer to sensual delights. The philosophical aesthetics in the classical European humanitarian tradition of thought which culminated in Kant’s third critique has left deep traces in later sociological thinking and conceptualization of taste. One could claim that his famous antinomy of taste is repeated in two ways in later sociological thinking about taste. First, since it is obvious that people’s tastes, in fact, differed, often drastically, from each other, the question of a common or good taste became an empirical question: taste – or good taste – was understood to be either the taste of a certain group of people, representatives of a “high society,” or in a more democratic interpretation, of the great majority of people. It became in principle an empirical question to find out to what extent people shared a common taste and to what extent different tastes existed side by side in any society or culture. This tradition of research can, with good reason, be traced back to David Hume’s writings on taste. In a sense, the rich and long history of sociological studies of lifestyles and consumer choices or preferences can be understood to originate from this question: to what extent do people, as a matter of fact, share a common taste which unites them in some respects and gives coherence to their choices in various fields of consumption, from housing to clothing, from art and music to food? It is the guiding principle in most market research to search for some standards unifying certain consumer segments and various social groups at the same time as singling them out from others.

Second, taste is an important concept in sociological theories of what constitutes the relation between an individual and his or her social existence and in answering the question of what unifies the members of any social community. In the tradition of classical sociology most prominently represented by Georg Simmel, taste was something which helped to overcome the distance or opposition between an individual and the larger social totality of which she or he was supposedly a part. Through shared taste or style, people would show their affiliation to a common social group as well as preserve their individuality. In social life, as in art, it was possible to share a style, as well as retain

one's own individuality and personality, by having a taste of one's own. A painting, for instance, can be characterized as representative of the impressionistic style in art as well as a unique masterpiece painted by the French artist Monet. By the same token, a person can be recognized both as a hip hopper and an individual called John. Of equal importance was the fact that, ideally, to have a taste in common was thought to restrain an individual's own instincts and preferences less than social norms would, not to mention the legal makeup of a society. In addition, it helped to create social order by coordinating individuals' behavior. Taste united people in taste communities which, supposedly, unlike any kind of political or economic association, allowed people to express their individuality and particularity more.

TASTE AND FASHION

To Georg Simmel, the social formation of fashion was an important phenomenon of modernity. Like Baudelaire's "modern artist" at his best, it can capture the meaning of eternity in one fleeting moment. Fashion is contingent, eternally changing and fleeting. Unlike Hamlet, fashion did not have to decide "whether to be or not to be." In fashion, something could be as well as not be, at the same time. What is now in fashion becomes out of fashion the very next moment. What is even more important, fashion offers in practice, in the everyday life of ordinary people, a sociological solution to Kant's antinomy of taste. As a simultaneous process of social imitation and distinction, it is both individual and social, on the one hand, an expression of an individual's own taste – ideally choosing simply what he or she finds pleasing – on the other, socially shared taste: in fashion, I offer my own choices or judgments of taste for all others to join in and share. The community of fashion is a veritable *sensus communis* – a community of taste – which comes into being only in order to disappear the very same moment. It is just a weak community, notwithstanding effectively creating order in a rapidly changing modern social world.

One of the most pertinent tenets in the social sciences is that taste usually "trickles down"

the social ladder, as do fashionable items. New fashions and styles, just like stylish or fashionable utensils and commodities, always first appear in the higher echelons of society, only to descend, more or less gradually, to its lower groups. The consequence of this presumption is that even though the lifestyles of social classes or status groups always differ, they all have basically the same taste. Since the lower classes or status groups emulate the lifestyles of the higher ones and would prefer to live like their social superiors if only they could, they in fact share the same taste. The process of social imitation is a process motivated by the demand and will of social ascent. The dynamics of consumption in the modern world are characterized by the social aspirations of "status seekers."

Thorstein Veblen's classic study of the conspicuous consumption of what he called the leisure class interestingly emphasized the changes taking place in a modern commercial society. Whereas, earlier, men could distinguish themselves and enjoy their fellow men's esteem because of their superior work performances, in modern societies these generally become increasingly invisible to others. The result of one's labor or one's monetary resources is usually equally invisible. Therefore, "showing off" one's wealth becomes important instead. Taste in a modern society is in the final analysis guided by the aspirations to gain social esteem by explicitly showing off one's pecuniary power. Furthermore, the degree of "uselessness" and instrumental nonfunctionality adherent to an artifact or an occupation, or the amount of idle time required to spend at it competently, seems to equal the high degree of prestige and social esteem afforded its owner/practitioner. This is why, in Veblen's opinion, fine riding horses or pet dogs, just like housewives and domestic servants, among others, serve as ideal and highly visible symbols of one's social standing.

In his classic study of the Paris fashion shows, Herbert Blumer suggested another and competing interpretation of the social mechanism of fashion and of taste formation in general. According to Blumer, taste is a result of collective selection. What Blumer witnessed in the Parisian fashion shows was the process of formation of a collective or common taste. Some how the fashion designers or representatives of

fashion trade could each year select, from among a multitude of dress designs brought to the show, just a few stylistically similar ones. It looked almost as if they had reached a consensus or an agreement by actually negotiating and arguing about the merits of their own favorites whereas, in fact, they chose them largely independently of each other. What was important to Blumer was that this collective taste did not emanate from any powerful or prestigious center, but took place among peers or colleagues. Somehow, almost as if by magic, a taste shared by all crystallized out of a multitude of individual tastes and a new seasonal fashion collectively selected.

Blumer's idea has far reaching consequences for sociological reasoning because he emphasized that such dynamic social processes like taste formation do not necessarily presume any hierarchical order of superiority. The gravitational center of taste in a modern society is its social center, the middle class, and not its peak. In this respect it reminds one of Gabriel Tarde's classic work on the laws of imitation, where he claimed that in imitating social models people just imitate themselves, or others who are just like them. Consequently, taste is not a class, but a mass phenomenon. The idea of social worlds with their own aesthetics and etiquette of conduct, developed later by symbolic interactionists, makes it possible to take into account social differentiation of taste which is not hierarchic.

Fashion, without a doubt, serves economic interests and ultimately promotes the accumulation of capital by artificially aging otherwise functional products. In clothes fashion strong economic incentives are at play. But it can reasonably be argued that what goes on in the collective selection of taste is similar to a process of aesthetic judgment. The basic criterion of fashion is that it could just as well be otherwise. As far as fashion is concerned, there cannot be any objective criteria of superiority. Therefore, it does not actually matter what, exactly, is the fashion at each point in time, or, say, what will be the fashionable color of the next season or the length of the female dress this autumn. Even if manipulation of taste takes place one can always ask who manipulates the manipulators.

DISTINCTIONS OF TASTE AND SOCIAL DIFFERENCES

One of the most pertinent questions concerning the role of taste in society has been to what extent taste is an expression of an individual's preferences alone. Are the individual's choices in consumption free and conscious choices? To what extent are they socially determined and habitual? In economic market research such choices are as a rule regarded as individual preferences. Sociologists, contrariwise, emphasize choices' social origin and their socially shared nature. Pierre Bourdieu's work *Distinction: A Social Critique of the Judgment of Taste*, published in English in 1984 (French edition, 1979), has perhaps more than any other single sociological work influenced the sociological discussion of taste during the last decades. Bourdieu's work was explicitly intended as a sociological critique of Immanuel Kant's analysis of aesthetic judgment (and, with him, of the whole tradition of philosophical aesthetics). Bourdieu aimed at revealing the true social nature of good taste, which always presents itself as objectively valid and legitimate.

To Bourdieu, taste is the basic analytical concept of sociology. *Distinction* is a study of social distinctions of taste and their relationship, on the one hand, to social positions and, on the other hand, to different symbolic activities and lifestyles. An individual's relative social position, and, consequently, lifestyle and taste disposition, is always determined by the specific combination of the three different types of capital: economic, cultural, and social. To an extent, these three forms of capital can be transformed into each other. In Bourdieu's study, the sum total of one's capital, as well as the interplay of these three forms of capital, explain the class differences in taste dispositions and their visible expressions, different lifestyles and, finally, consumer choices.

HIERARCHY OF TASTE

If *Distinction* had only claimed that tastes and lifestyles of various social groups will vary according to the amount and type of capital in their possession, it would not differ much from

most ordinary sociological studies, which identify correlations between socioeconomic background factors and various cultural practices and habits. Bourdieu, however, made a further claim. He claimed that in any society tastes are hierarchically ordered. This means that there is a legitimate taste in each society which gains its legitimacy from the very fact that other, lower echelons of society, the middle classes in particular, acknowledge its superiority by aspiring to acquire it and its visible symbols. A process of continuous social emulation reproduces both cultural distinctions and, by doing so, the different forms of capital. This process perpetually forces the upper classes to distinguish themselves from their social competitors by adopting new signs and symbols of excellence. One of the logical consequences of Bourdieu's analysis is that, as a result of the continuous process of making new distinctions, the taste of the upper classes tends to become more and more refined and exclusive. What we have here is, essentially, an aristocrat's taste. The cultural hero of early modernity, the dandy, is its true representative.

CLASS TASTE OR A VARIETY OF TASTES

Bourdieu's strong emphasis on the hierarchical and aristocratic nature of the ruling class taste is what has caused most reservations among sociologists toward his theoretical interpretations. The criticisms address concrete empirical and theoretical questions concerning his model. The dissenting empirical results can be explained both by different and rapidly changing socioeconomic conditions (most notably the democratization of educational opportunities) and by theoretical and methodological differences in the study designs.

An interesting question raised in recent studies is the emergence of a cultural omnivore. According to this idea – proposed by Peterson and Kern (1996) – what distinguishes the present cultural upper class from other classes is not the exclusiveness and refinement of its taste, but rather the very opposite, its inclusiveness. Peterson and Kern's studies of musical tastes

in Northern America revealed that the elite were omnivores – this was true above all of the economic elite graduating from business schools. They appreciated most or several musical genres almost indiscriminately, whereas social groups with less economic and cultural capital were much more restrictive in their tastes, with preferences such as country and western or gospel. Quite unexpectedly, business school graduates are the new cultural heroes.

Another interesting empirical observation to which Bourdieu paid very little attention in his own study are the distinctions according to gender. In virtually all subsequent empirical studies, gender differences seem to lie behind many distinctions in various fields of consumption and culture. They are particularly accentuated in the consumption of goods or in the practices of traditional high culture often associated with established cultural institutions, such as museums, art exhibitions and galleries, theatres, dance performances, etc. All have become leisure time activities for an increasingly female public. What is more important, they are practiced by women of various educational backgrounds, that is, not only by relatively well educated women but even by those in the middling positions. An equally clear distinction between the sexes can often be found, for instance, in eating practices and food tastes.

FUTURE DIRECTIONS

One of the interesting questions facing future research is to what extent does this validate the fact that by increasingly taking over such typically "highbrow" cultural practices women have really become a new cultural elite. Or, conversely, does this signify a general social and cultural degradation of these traditional genres and fields of "highbrow" culture? Or, finally, is it more likely, as suggested by some sociologists, that even though relatively clear cultural distinctions related to different taste preferences exist in present day societies, they are not in general or in the majority of cases hierarchically ordered? Women and men, or for that matter young people and old people, may just develop different tastes, but this practice does

not necessarily have to signify an eternal struggle over the determination of legitimate or good taste. Instead, we may have entered a state of societal development which is characterized by the emergence and coexistence of a number of different and equally good – or, if you like, bad – tastes. Social groups with similar lifestyles may just share a common taste without sharing anything else. Or, finally, as some sociologists claim, taste may have become more individualized and society more fragmented.

SEE ALSO: Blumer, Herbert George; Bourdieu, Pierre; Conspicuous Consumption; Consumption, Fashion and; Consumption, Food and Cultural; Distinction; Highbrow/Lowbrow; Lifestyle Consumption; Simmel, Georg; Veblen, Thorstein

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tatemae/honne

Jane Bachnik

Tatemae/honne distinguish between the world of social relations (surface reality) and the world of feelings (inner reality). *Tatemae* refers to formal principles or rules to which one is at least outwardly constrained, while *honne* conveys personal feelings or motives, which cannot be openly expressed due to *tatemae*. Rather than a discrepancy between a “false” exterior and “true” interior, *tatemae/honne* are better understood as conveying the existence of more than one kind of truth in social situations. Thus the “truth” of what is appropriate to say directly to others may be different from the “truth” in our hearts. Japanese cocoon their guests in *tatemae* so that a faux pas by a guest, even if it offends the host, will not be communicated directly in *tatemae*. Japanese accept that social communications may not correspond to personal feelings; moreover, they consider the surface reality to be just as “real” as the inner, private reality.

The words *tatemae/honne* came into frequent use only in the post war period, although the distinctions they characterize are found in literature as far back as the fourteenth century. *Tatemae* refers to the ridgepole (or main beam) in Japanese architecture, which supports the rest of the structure, and psychiatrist Takeo Doi considers the logic of *tatemae/honne* to be manifested in the relationship between the *tatemae* and the finished building. The *tatemae* is not the real aim of the builders, who construct the ridgepole in order to add the roof, walls, and floors that will constitute the completed building. Yet by the same token, it is impossible to complete the rest of the building unless the *tatemae* is raised first (Doi 1986). This logic privileges *tatemae* as the “core structure” of a building, which seems the opposite of its meaning as “surface reality.”

But this same logic links *tatemae* to its prime meaning of social conventions, such that *tatemae* supports the “structure” of social life much as the ridgepole supports the house. For example, the *tatemae* of the science fiction novel refers to the conventions for writing this kind of novel, which are created by a consensus that

can change over time. In its relationship to social conventions, *tatemae* always implies the existence of people in the background who assent to it, while at the same time keeping their own personal motives and opinions in *honne* (Doi 1986). Rather than being unique to Japan, *tatemae/honne* represent tensions between conforming to social conventions and giving expression to one's heartfelt desires – tensions between individual and society that are a fundamental part of social life everywhere.

In fact these same tensions are represented in a number of paired sets of terms, which include *omote* (“appearance,” “in front”) and *ura* (“behind the scenes,” “in back”). *Tatemae* is part of *omote* as official, public, and social, while *honne* is within *ura* as hidden, secret, and personal, and may also include what is publicly unacceptable or even illegal. Another set of terms, *uchi* (“inside,” “us,” “our group”) and *soto* (“outside,” “them”), is also linked to *tatemae/honne*, since *tatemae* constitutes the surface communication of *omote* presented to *soto* outsiders, while *honne* is expressed in the behind the scenes *ura* sphere of *uchi* insiders. *Tatemae/omote/soto* are always linked together, as are *honne/ura/uchi*.

The Japanese language also exhibits wide ranging distinctions manifested in formal/informal grammatical forms which parallel the distinctions contained in the double sets of terms. For example, communication of *soto/omote/tatemae* is characterized by choice of a formal register to express varying degrees of distance and deference through elaborated polite forms of speech. Communication of *uchi/ura/honne* is marked by choice of an informal register to express varying degrees of closeness (and some times intimacy) through highly contracted plain forms of speech. These distinctions permeate the entire language, since even single utterances, and certainly anything longer than two item exchanges, are marked by the use of register.

These language distinctions in tandem with the paired sets of terms indicate two distinct spheres in self and social life, which are nonetheless linked like two sides of a coin. Each sphere mutually defines and constitutes the other, in a way that actually mirrors the constitution of self and society. Thus *honne* exists only in relation to *tatemae*, and *tatemae* is constructed out of *honne*, which manipulates it from behind

the scenes. Consequently, the paired terms have been used as a basis for defining the organization of Japanese self and society. Takeo Doi (1986) developed the organization of a double sided Japanese self, based explicitly on *omote/ura* and *tatemae/honne*. Chie Nakane (1972) defined *uchi* as a basic and ubiquitous component of Japanese society. Bachnik and Quinn (1994) argued that the paired sets of terms form a theoretical basis for defining self, social life, and language, spelling out pragmatic and practice oriented perspectives.

Japanese society is distinctive in placing a high value on avoiding direct communication of *honne* problems, disagreements, and other “uncomfortable truths” in *tatemae*. Japanese are taught to sacrifice *honne* for the sake of *tatemae*, and are very skilled at keeping *honne* from “leaking” into *tatemae*. Yet *tatemae* can be seen as one of Japan’s “truly excellent features” (Kerr 2001), which infuses daily life in Japanese face to face communities with grace and calm. The emphasis placed on preserving *tatemae* over expressing *honne* can be regarded as self sacrifice for the sake of the greater social good (in this case the smooth functioning of social life).

But by the same token, should the sense of self service for a greater social good be distorted or lost, the results can be socially corrosive and dangerous. Many authors have noted that *tatemae/honne* distinctions are pervasive in Japanese large scale institutions, including those at the apex of power in government, big business, and politics. It is also noted that *tatemae/honne* have undergone a shift in meaning, so that *tatemae* now widely conveys falsity and emptiness, while *honne* is considered “true,” but tinged with dirtiness and corruption.

At the same time, a shift can be noted in the organization of *uchi/soto* when comparing small scale family organizations to large institutional organizations. This shift is exemplified by the constitution of *uchi*, which in family organizations consists of family members themselves (as “we,” “us,” “insiders”), making them privy to the realms of *ura* and *honne*. In contrast, in the government bureaucracy, for example, each government ministry is organized as an *uchi*, whose “inside” realms of *honne* and *ura* are accessible only to its own insider bureaucrats. The public is strictly *soto* to such a ministry and therefore privy only to *tatemae* communication.

Consequently, the inside operations and affairs of each ministry are kept opaque, and the hidden nature of *honne/ura* in these bureaucratic *uchi* gives rise to a circular process, whose aspects have been the focus of considerable research and investigative reporting in English. They include the fostering of dishonest and collusive practices in *uchi*; sabotaging of safety and regulatory procedures; and cosmetic accounting (*funshoku kessan*) to keep information about dishonest practices from reaching the *soto* public.

For example, bid rigging (*dango*) is pervasive in Japan, particularly in the construction industry, to whom the Construction Ministry channels the considerable funds allocated to public works construction. Ministry officials also participate in *dango* and have publicly defended bid rigging practices in 2005. *Dango* rests upon a tender system that is both fixed and closed, and such bidding inflates the project costs to the public by 30–50 percent. Crucial to carrying out *dango* is a practice known as *amakudari* (descent from heaven), in which bureaucrats from the ministry shift to high positions in industry or public agencies. *Amakudari*, in effect, creates an *uchi* conduit between the ministry and the firm or agency into which the bureaucrat descends. This allows that organization to create *uchi* ties with the ministry to create *dango* (and other *ura* practices) – through a *honne* motivation to maximize profits among themselves.

Such collusion is not limited to the Construction Ministry. In 1996 all of Japan's seven housing loan corporations (known as Jusen) went bankrupt with losses of eight trillion yen. Yet, even though over 90 percent of the loans extended by the Jusen were non performing by the early 1990s, and the Ministry of Finance knew this, the ministry failed to take any action. This was because six of the seven Jusen were run by *amakudari* directors from the Ministry of Finance, and so the ministry had no desire to “hurt its own,” as one critic put it (Bowen 2003). Consequently, in the years before bankruptcy, the *amakudari* executives guided the banks in an elaborate shell game of accounting trickery that is highly developed in Japan. By the time the scandal became public in 1996, the public had to pay hundreds of billions of additional yen to clean up the mess (Kerr 2001).

During the 1990s a series of scandals circulated throughout the ministries, involving almost all of them. The scandals demonstrated the collusive processes outlined above, and one might expect the press to play an investigative role in breaking up such collusions. But since reporters can only get access to the news by being embedded in government attached press clubs, they also end up in collusion with the institutions in which they are embedded. The result is that the published news is largely *tatemae*.

The collusive relationships outlined above reveal a distinct – and pathological – inversion in the values of *tatemae/honne*, so that personal profiteering in *honne* takes precedence over self sacrifice for the greater social good in *tatemae*. Here the “good” has been transposed from the public, social good to a selfish, *uchi* good – “taking care of our own” – resulting in a huge variety of corrupt practices. This inversion of the government servant/public service relationship victimizes the public, who ultimately pay for the corruption – through wasted tax money which has created enormous fiscal deficits (and cuts in services), made pension funds insolvent, inflated construction costs, and created numerous safety hazards due to lack of effective regulation.

The kinds of collusive practices described above make it understandable how *tatemae* now connotes falsity and deceit, *honne* conveys dirtiness and dishonesty, and both *tatemae* and *honne* are held in low regard. The crucial question is whether the “excellent features” of *tatemae/honne* can be reclaimed, so that the corrupt and inverted relationship between bureaucrats and the public can be righted and self sacrifice for the social good take precedence over personal profiteering. These issues of bureaucratic corruption are of interest far beyond Japan, for they pervade today's world. Resolving them would strengthen Japanese democracy, by allowing the people to reclaim power from the bureaucracy and follow the constitution, which places sovereign power in their hands. These steps may also allow the people who produced the “economic miracle” to finally emerge from the quagmire of their 15 year slump.

SEE ALSO: *Seikatsu/Seikatsusha; Seken*

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taxes: progressive, proportional, and regressive

Christine A. Wernet

The generation of government revenue and the redistribution of income among the population are two central reasons for taxation (Davies 1986). Governments have used taxation as a means to generate revenue for centuries, and some governments have been using taxation as a means of resource reallocation since at least the 1800s. The three main types of taxation, progressive, proportional and regressive taxes, are outlined.

Progressive taxes are taxes that require those who earn more money to pay higher taxes. Personal income taxes in the US are progressive. For example, those who have a family income of \$100,000 or higher may pay as much as 29 percent of their total income in annual taxes, while those in the lowest income bracket, who may have a family income of \$10,000, pay approximately 4.6 percent of their total income

in annual taxes (Mishel et al. 1999). Proponents of progressive taxes argue that wealthy individuals have a moral obligation to society to pay higher taxes. Opponents argue that progressive income taxation has a negative effect on capital formation and economic growth.

Proportional taxes refer to taxes that equally burden all income groups in a society. Proportional taxes are sometimes referred to as a flat tax. For example, if a society had a proportional income tax of 15 percent, a family with an annual income of \$100,000 would pay \$15,000 a year in income taxes, while a family with an annual income of \$10,000 would pay \$1,500 a year in income taxes.

Regressive taxes burden lower income groups more than higher income groups. Less affluent individuals spend a higher proportion of their income on regressive taxes, such as sales taxes and excise taxes, than do more affluent individuals. For example, \$400 of sales tax is a much larger proportion of \$10,000 than it is of \$100,000. Sales tax is tax that is placed on all items that are sold: food, clothing, furniture, etc. Some states place a sales tax of, for example, 7 percent on all items sold. In this case, if an item is purchased for \$100 the individual will owe \$7 in sales tax to the government. Another regressive tax is the excise tax. Excise taxes are placed on certain items such as alcohol, tobacco, and gasoline. Excise taxes place a heavier burden on the poor than on the rich because excise taxes, like sales taxes, account for a larger proportion of their total income.

When all forms of taxation are considered, some countries, such as the US, actually have more income inequality after taxation than before (Devine 1983; Kerbo 2003). Therefore, while taxation does much to generate revenue for the government, it may do little to redistribute resources.

SEE ALSO: Class, Status, and Power; Economic Development; Income Inequality and Income Mobility

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Taylorism

Harland Prechel

Taylorism was developed by Frederick Taylor in the 1880s. By the 1920s, together with other forms of scientific management, Taylorism was widely adopted in the US and other industrial societies. Taylor was raised in a prominent Philadelphia family, but rejected his parents' plans for a Harvard education and became an apprentice in a metal working plant. Later, he obtained a technical degree. Despite his career focus, Taylor retained the ideological bias of his upper class background that incorporated dimensions of socio-Darwinism and utilitarianism. This doctrine provided the ideological context for Taylor's system of scientific management, which emphasized the idea that economic success is caused by superior abilities and those abilities can be learned.

Changes in the political legal arrangements in which business enterprises were embedded and the emergence of the modern corporation established the social structural context for implementing Taylorism. In the 1880s and 1890s, New Jersey and other states passed laws that made it easier for industrial firms to use the joint stock holding company. The embeddedness of industrial firms in these institutional arrangements permitted corporate consolidation, which created giant corporations by merging firms and incorporating them as subsidiary corporations (Prechel 2000). Attempts by capitalists to exercise more control over the labor

process in these corporations resulted in labor unrest, which was manifested as high rates of absenteeism, labor turnover, and strikes. In response to these historical contingencies, Taylor (1967) claimed there was a need for "greater national efficiency" and efficiency is best achieved through systematic management of people. He argued his system would reduce costs, increase efficiency, and appeal to workers' economic self interest. Taylor claimed that the increased efficiency from scientific management would result in high profits, which would permit capitalists to increase wages, thereby eliminating labor unrest and workers' desire to join unions.

The technical dimensions of Taylorism focused on the "one best way" to perform work. Taylor (1967) maintained that workers (1) retained knowledge over the production process, and (2) incorporated rest breaks into the production process (i.e., soldiering) that were so sophisticated and complex that capitalists and their foremen could not detect them. To increase control over the labor process, Taylor collected information from workers and located it in a centralized planning department where engineers used this information to establish rules to control the execution of each task by specifying how to complete it and the amount of required time to do it.

Drawing from the Marxian Hegelian conception of alienation, Braverman (1974) maintained that the separation of conception from execution in Taylorism dehumanizes the worker because it limits the opportunities for individuals to use their creative capacities. This separation occurs when engineers transform craft knowledge into work rules (i.e., bureaucratic controls) and machines (i.e., technical controls) (Edwards 1979). Although the centralization of knowledge also subordinated operating managers to centralized control, these managers retained a substantial degree of control over the managerial process during this historical period. Taylor also developed a reimbursement system that rewarded managers in relationship to their position in the hierarchical division of managerial labor.

There are several long term effects of Taylorism on class relations. First, the adoption of Taylorist ideology, which assumes that workers are inferior to managers, has been the source of

conflict between workers and managers. Second, the emergence of organizational hierarchies and the concomitant ideology of Taylorism encouraged managers and engineers to disregard workers' knowledge of the production process, which created obstacles to improving efficiency. Third, the reimbursement system initiated by Taylor contributed to inequality by establishing a system of pay differentials between managers and workers, which reached a historical high point in the late twentieth and early twenty first centuries.

SEE ALSO: Alienation; Capitalism; Decision Making; Fordism/Post Fordism; Ideology; Labor Process; Marxism and Sociology; Weber, Max; Work, Sociology of

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teachers

Kristin Gordon

With over 3 million teachers working in the US public school system, teaching attracts considerable attention from sociologists. Many issues have been explored. Dominating the field are questions concerning teachers' roles, quality, professional status, training, gender composition, pay, staffing, and placement. Teachers play multiple roles in the educational process. First, teachers impart academic skills and knowledge (human capital). Second, teachers socialize children in the lifestyles, values, and cultures of society (cultural capital). The importance of the academic, social, and cultural dimensions of this work for children raises one

of the foremost questions in research on teachers: Does teacher quality matter? Early research studying the impact of teacher credentials and experience largely indicated that teacher quality did not consistently relate to student achievement. More recent exploration reveals that teacher preparation, particularly subject matter knowledge, does positively impact student achievement.

In addition to debates over teacher quality, the occupation is plagued by questionable professional status. In an effort to assert teacher professionalism, new models of teacher training have emerged. Historically, normal schools assumed responsibility for instruction in teaching theory and pedagogy. As teachers increasingly turned towards colleges and universities for training, substantive knowledge began dominating the curriculum. Today, reforms aimed at affirming teacher professionalism stress initial and ongoing training in subject area knowledge.

The gender composition of the occupation also contributes to its questionable professional status. Teaching in the US began as a male occupation. Around 1850, teaching became a predominantly female occupation and this pattern persists today. Despite the fact that teaching is a female dominated occupation, men are over represented in administrative positions. This occupational sex segregation reinforces the semi professional status and low pay of teaching. These factors are held partly responsible for the current staffing problems afflicting the occupation.

Recent research indicates that the US continues to have difficulty staffing classrooms with qualified teachers. Two possible causes of school staffing problems have been investigated: increased enrollments combined with high teacher retirement and teacher turnover. Recent research provides limited support for the notion that staffing problems are the result of increased enrollments and retirements. Rather, the evidence indicates that large numbers of teachers are leaving the occupation in response to problematic working conditions, specifically student discipline problems and insufficient administrative support. One consequence of these school staffing problems is the growing occurrence of out of field teaching. This phenomenon, in which a teacher does not possess a major or minor in their teaching field, is

particularly important for understanding teachers' careers, satisfaction, turnover, and student achievement.

Cross national research on teachers and teaching examine similar issues. Questions of teacher quality pervade educational reform in many national contexts. Recent data indicates that in many countries a large proportion of teachers are working without minimum qualifications. While concern over teacher quality appears in many nations' reform agendas, little research supports the contention that variation in teacher quality cross nationally explains national differences in student achievement.

Like the US, comparative studies reveal that many countries have trouble recruiting and retaining qualified teachers. This can be partially explained by teacher pay. While the salaries of experienced teachers studied by the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development range from less than US\$10,000 in Poland and the Slovak Republic to US \$45,000 and more in Germany, Japan, Korea, Luxembourg, and Switzerland, there is agreement among teachers that teaching provides inadequate financial reward. Of those countries that share the US's staffing problems, the most frequent solutions include out of field teaching and increasing other teachers' workloads. Interestingly, staffing problems are not universal. Several nations, such as Greece and Korea, actually have an oversupply of teachers, which also introduces policy challenges.

Despite unique contexts, tremendous demands are being placed on teachers in their multiple roles. Debates about teacher quality, professional status, preparation, and placement persist. Continued sociological exploration of teachers and teaching is imperative for understanding these issues.

SEE ALSO: Education; Professions; Professors; Teaching and Gender

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teaching and gender

Linda Grant and Linda Renzulli

The study of teachers and teaching has always been an important focus of sociology of education, but the analysis of links between teaching and gender has developed more recently. As Grant and Murray (1999) contend, K-12 teaching and postsecondary teaching are two different occupations and thus relationships between gender and teaching differ at each level. Other researchers have studied gender as it affects pedagogy and curriculum at all levels of schooling. Finally, some scholars, especially those working from a feminist perspective, have explored what students learn about gender in schooling, and how teachers – intentionally or not – affect the gender climates of educational institutions.

GENDER DISTRIBUTIONS IN THE TEACHING PROFESSION

Teaching is a classic example of an occupation that feminized. Today, about 75 percent of teachers in grades K 12 in the US are women. Similarly, in 11 of 20 OECD countries, women make up 70 percent or more of elementary teachers. Preschool teaching is also strongly woman dominated, with precise proportions hard to tabulate because few states license preschool teachers.

Women gained access to teaching in the late 1800s. Not until the 1920s in the US, and not until 1995 in OECD countries, did women represent 70 percent or more of teachers. The feminization of teaching occurred in part because with the growth of the middle class and formalization of schooling, teaching became a full time job. However, pay did not rise along with increased time demands. Thus, men left teaching in the US and internationally for better higher paying occupations, creating open positions that were relatively attractive for women.

As women entered the profession, the definition, role, and expectation for teachers' work changed. Contracts required that teachers be single women, and teaching was viewed as preparation for motherhood. Teachers' work was nevertheless controlled by male only school boards and administrators. As in other feminized occupations, women grew in numbers, but not in pay, power, or autonomy. More recently, pay and autonomy have increased, but pay remains low (Ingersoll 2001). In fact, as the rate of feminization increases in OECD countries, teacher salary seems to decrease.

Teaching became an avenue for upward mobility for farm and working class families and for black and white men and women. By the 1930s, however, most US teachers were middle class white women. Teaching in segregated schools was an important means of upward class mobility for African Americans. Under segregation, educated blacks' access to positions as teachers and administrators helped to establish a black middle class. When the *Brown v. Board of Education* decision ended legally mandated school segregation, many black educators lost their jobs, even when they were more qualified than their white counterparts. Blacks now make up less

than 8 percent of public school teachers, although about 17 percent of students are black. Black middle class women, and other educated minority youth, nowadays seek more lucrative careers.

At the postsecondary level, teaching remains a white *male* dominated profession. Women and persons of color have made only modest inroads into professor positions in recent decades in the US and in most other countries. Before the mid 1900s, white women in the US comprised only a small fraction of college faculty, concentrated primarily at women's colleges or in feminized disciplines such as home economics, education, or social work in coeducational institutions. Women's enrollments in PhD programs expanded dramatically in the late 1970s, and affirmative action policies adopted by colleges aided their entry into college teaching. By 2004, women were about one third of postsecondary faculty in the US, up from about 23 percent in 1974. In research intensive universities, women are only about 14 percent of full professors, but nearly 60 percent of lecturers and instructors (AAUP 2004). Women, however, are better represented across ranks at Historical Black Colleges and Universities (HBCUs) than in colleges generally (NCES 2004).

PAY GAPS

The heavily feminized occupation of preschool teaching is poorly paid, averaging lower hourly wages than bus drivers, secretaries, and practical nurses (Whitebook & Sakai 2004). K 12 teachers also earn relatively low wages, with women averaging only 90 percent of men's wages in 2000. In countries such as Japan and Turkey, where men are more numerous in the teaching ranks, teachers' salaries compare more favorably to the country's cost of living index than is the case in the US.

Several explanations have been offered about the gender gap in teachers' pay. One is the gender segregated composition of teaching staffs, with women more dominant in elementary grades where pay is low and men more numerous in secondary grades and administrative posts where wages are higher. Men are about three times more numerous among high school as among elementary teachers.

In addition, segregation in types of position within the hierarchy of teaching by gender also occurs (Cognard Black 2004). Men who enter teaching rise rapidly in status and often are tracked into administrative positions. In the US about 56 percent of principals are men, and male principals average three more years' experience than women counterparts. This contrasts sharply with the disadvantages to advancement that women often face in male dominated occupations, such as postsecondary teaching.

Gender differences in credentials also account for some of the pay gap. Male teachers are more likely to have advanced degrees, and they average more years of teaching experience than women. In addition, men are more likely to teach in unionized systems, and unions have been successful in raising teacher pay.

Women professors are more poorly paid than their men counterparts in US colleges and universities, with pay gaps even wider than at the K 12 level. In recent years women full professors have lost ground compared with men of similar ranks (AAUP 2004), but at lower ranks they have gained slightly, mostly as a result of wage stagnation for men. Among full professors, women's average salaries are 12 percent lower than men's. HBCUs show a different pattern. Although overall salaries at these institutions average only about 80 percent of college salaries generally, women and men of similar rank are closer to parity (NCES 2004).

Salary gaps reflect in part women's more recent entry into college teaching and consequent lesser seniority and their concentration into lower paid academic fields. Men have longer records of uninterrupted service and are in types of institutions with higher pay; for example, research universities rather than community colleges. Men also outnumber women in administrative positions. Women faculty are ghettoized into lower paid fields (e.g., English, foreign languages, or education rather than math, science, business, or law) (NSF 2004). Higher pay for the male dominated fields usually is justified by arguments that faculty in these disciplines have attractive job opportunities outside of academia. Nevertheless, with controls for rank, degree year, quality of degree, and employer type, margins of difference favor men (AAUP 2004).

Research has been inconsistent about whether men scholars have been more successful than women in publication and grant productivity, a major basis of salary awards in higher education. Earlier studies concentrated largely on natural scientists found productivity gaps favoring men, but more recent works suggest a convergence of publication and tenure rates, of women and men in fields such as sociology where women are not tokens (Hargens & Long 2002).

A comprehensive study of faculty shed light on subtle processes leading to gender inequities (MIT 1999). Women faculty recognized the negative impact of the gender climate on their careers and well being, but felt that complaints would be fruitless. Women faculty were underpaid relative to comparable men and systematically disadvantaged in areas such as teaching loads, assignment of laboratory and office space, access to mentoring and support, and sponsorship for awards and other special opportunities. Women faculty believed they did more mentoring than their male colleagues. Many had experienced sexual harassment, and women believed they would be seriously penalized for having a child or otherwise investing heavily in family.

GENDER AND PEDAGOGY

Few differences in teachers' pedagogical style by gender appear at either the K 12 or the postsecondary level. Where differences exist, they reflect the differential distributions of women and men across elementary and secondary teaching and their locations in different academic specialties using variable pedagogical approaches. Nevertheless, widespread concern that too few men are entering teaching and that male students in public schools in particular lack male role models has resulted in special programs to recruit men, especially men of color, into teaching. Gender differences in pedagogical style at the postsecondary level are more apparent in patterns of out of class mentoring and support than in classroom performance.

CURRICULUM AND GENDER CLIMATES

Studies have explored what is taught in schools about gender, in the formal curriculum and the

informal, or hidden, curriculum. Reports by American Association of University Women (AAUW 1992–2004) explore ways in which curriculum and gender climates of educational institutions can marginalize women. The reports critique formal curriculum for excluding or trivializing girls and women and for not addressing issues of particular significance to women's lives; for example, pay equity law, family leave policies, or women's health. Staffing patterns in public schools usually place men in positions of authority over women, modeling patriarchal systems for young learners. Furthermore, teachers do not necessarily create, but often tolerate, gender climates that are hostile to girls and women. The AAUW report has drawn criticism for failing to fully consider educational problems of boys and for blaming teachers for gender inequities that they have little power to influence. In many systems, teachers have proactively addressed gender equity issues via efforts to create gender equitable curricula and educational climates.

At the postsecondary level, studies of gender and teaching focus on whether women students face chilly climates in college classrooms, especially in male dominated fields such as math and science, and whether they have adequate opportunities for mentoring and sponsorship. Scholars have also explored harassment and other forms of sexual exploitation as they affect women faculty and students. Finally, a growing body of scholarship has examined whether or not women's scholarship is valued as much as men's in making hiring, tenure, promotion, and salary decisions in colleges and universities.

The impact of gender scholarship and feminist thought has been uneven across disciplines. Nevertheless, substantial change in the influence of women is evidenced by the rapid growth of women's and gender studies curricula, departments, and majors. Academic disciplines now include committees to monitor status of women, organizations of women scholars, and publication outlets for gender research. In sociology, the Sociologists for Women in Society and its affiliated journal, *Gender and Society*, are examples.

CONCLUSION

Gender affects teaching careers and advantages for men persist at all levels of education. Yet we

know little about why gender inequities persist in teaching, why men are reluctant to enter teaching (despite salary advantages), and why recruitment and retention of teachers of both genders is increasingly problematic. Possible links between these concerns and the feminization of teaching, its semi professional status, and the professionalization of the field have not been explored in theoretically sophisticated ways. At the postsecondary level, teaching may be threatened with deprofessionalization, just at a point when women comprise a significant presence.

Although studies in local contexts have established the importance of formal and informal curricula and gender climates for teachers and for students, these issues are rarely researched in national studies. We know more about the content of curricula and the characteristics of gender climates of educational institutions than about the long range impact on teachers and students. We lack a finely nuanced understanding of the role of teachers and educational institutions in reproducing or challenging gender stratification in society.

At the postsecondary level questions remain about how structural changes in colleges and universities will affect the status of women faculty and gender inclusive scholarship. Women's proportions of college enrollments at all levels continue to increase, and women are likely to make up larger shares of college teachers in the future. As colleges rely more heavily on part time, contingent workforces, men are leaving academia, and this trend is partly responsible for increasing proportions of women faculty in many disciplines. The implications of these changes are not yet clear.

SEE ALSO: Education, Adult; Educational Inequality; Gender, Education and; Gendered Organizations/Institutions; Professions; Professors; Teachers

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teamwork

Michael A. West

Teams are a particular form of work group. They are groups of people who share responsibility for producing products or delivering services. They share overall work objectives and ideally have the necessary authority, autonomy, and resources to achieve these objectives. Team members are dependent on each other to achieve the objectives and therefore have to work closely, interdependently, and supportively to achieve the team's goals. Members have distinct and clear roles. Effective teams have as few members as necessary to perform the task and are ideally no larger than six to eight members. And the team is recognized by others in the

organization as a team. The team rather than the individual is increasingly considered the basic building block of organizations and team based working the modus operandi of organizations (West et al. 2003).

There are multiple types of teams in organizations: advice and involvement teams, e.g., management decision making committees, quality control (QC) circles, staff involvement teams; production and service teams, e.g., assembly teams; maintenance, construction, mining, and commercial airline teams; departmental teams; sales and health care teams; project and development teams, e.g., research teams, new product development teams, software development teams; action and negotiation teams, e.g., military combat units, surgical teams, and trade union negotiating teams.

Why work in teams? In many areas of endeavor, research has shown how team working can lead to greater efficiency or effectiveness. An analysis of the combined results of 131 studies of organizational change found that interventions with the largest effects upon financial performance were team development interventions or the creation of autonomous work teams (Macy & Izumi 1993). Applebaum and Batt (1994) reviewed 12 large scale surveys and 185 case studies of managerial practices. They concluded that team based working led to improvements in organizational performance on measures of both efficiency and quality. Similarly, Cotton (1993) reports on studies examining the effects of team working on productivity, satisfaction, and absenteeism. The author reviews 57 studies that report improvements on productivity, seven that found no change, and five that report productivity declines, following the implementation of self directed teams. Finally, studies in health care have repeatedly shown that better patient care is provided when health professionals work together in multidisciplinary teams.

THE HISTORY OF TEAM THEORY AND RESEARCH

The source of the stream of research on teams can be traced to the Hawthorne studies which established the importance of intergroup relations in organizations, the influences of teams on their members, and the importance

of informal groups in influencing work related behavior.

Two strands of thought about teams emerged in the 1960s and 1970s. The first focused on the whole team and examined unconscious phenomena in work teams (Bion 1961). Bion argued that teams developed “basic assumptions” in discussions of organizational culture, which could impede their effective functioning. These include basic assumptions of *dependence* (one of the team’s members will look after the needs of the team and ensure its effectiveness); *pairing* (two team members will join together to produce a leader in some way, leading to a sense of messianic anticipation in the team); and *fight-flight* (the team meets to fight an enemy or run away, and is consequently unable to do any effective work). However, little research has been stimulated by this approach.

The second strand has led to considerably more theorizing and research internationally. The sociotechnical tradition proposed that social and task related outcomes can be optimized through appropriate task and work design – the well being of team members can be achieved in conjunction with team performance, through the joint optimization of the application of technology, organization, and the use of human resources.

In the last 20 years, there has been an altogether new emphasis amongst writers concerned with understanding work team effectiveness – the organizational context within which teams perform (Hackman 1990; Guzzo & Shea 1992). Hackman (1990), for example, has drawn attention to the influence of organizational reward, training, and information systems in influencing team effectiveness.

Guzzo and Shea developed a reciprocal model of team effectiveness. They argue that *outcome interdependence* among team members leads to higher team effectiveness. Outcome interdependence refers to the extent to which team members are dependent on each other to achieve organizational rewards such as recognition, career advancement, and financial rewards. *Task interdependence* moderates the relationship between outcome interdependence and effectiveness, because outcome interdependence can only lead to greater effectiveness if team members are required to work interdependently to get the job done. But the most significant element of the

model (theoretically) is the concept of *potency*, rather like self efficacy but at the team level characterized by a team sense of likely success and ability to meet challenges. This is a direct predictor of team effectiveness in the model. They extended this approach by proposing that potency best predicts team effectiveness in conjunction with three other factors – the alignment of team goals with organizational goals, organizational rewards for team accomplishments, and the availability of resources for teams.

Another model of team effectiveness has been developed from a focus on team reflexivity. West (1996) argues that most models of team performance tend to present static rather than dynamic processes, yet teams often change rapidly as a result of experience and member turnover, requiring repeated adaptation of communication and decision making processes. West proposes that what may best predict team effectiveness is an overarching factor influencing all aspects of team performance – team task reflexivity. He argues that teams are effective to the extent that they reflect upon their task objectives, strategies, processes, and environments and adapt these aspects of their functioning accordingly. In relation to the wider organizational environment, non reflexive teams will tend to comply unquestioningly with organizational demands and expectations; accept organizational limitations; fail to discuss or challenge organizational incompetence; communicate indebtedness and dependence on the organization; and rely heavily on organizational direction and reassurance. Reflexive teams, in contrast, are more likely to be agents of innovative change within the organization, developing ideas for new and improved products, services, or ways of working.

This brief account of some of the major theoretical approaches illustrates the move toward less descriptive models, which take into account organizational factors and reveal too that researchers are coming to terms with the inherent complexity and cloudiness of real teams in organizations.

TEAM EFFECTIVENESS

Much effort has been devoted to understanding the factors which promote team effectiveness. The thinking of most researchers has been

dominated by an input–process–output model, mainly because of its simplicity and utility. Inputs include the task of the team, team composition (size, functional and demographic diversity, tenure), and organizational context (such as culture, support for team working, structure). Some processes mediate the relationships between inputs and outputs such as participation mediating the effects of diversity upon innovation, while some inputs such as organizational context directly influence outputs. Processes include participation (influence over decision making, interactions, and information sharing), leadership, conflict, decision making, interteam processes, and reflexivity. Team outputs include productivity, innovation, team member well being, and team learning.

Inputs to Teams

The team task. The task a team performs is a fundamental influence on the work team, defining its structural, process, and functional requirements – who is in the team, what their roles are, how they should work together, and the nature and processes of the tasks they individually and collectively perform.

Dimensions for classifying task characteristics include task difficulty; solution multiplicity; intrinsic interest; cooperative requirement tasks which are unitary versus divisible, conjunctive, disjunctive, and additive; conflict versus cooperation elements; and conceptual versus behavioral components. These classification systems, developed by social psychologists, have not been fruitful for researchers exploring team performance and innovation in organizational settings, probably because such goals as producing television programs, battleground training, health care, product development, and providing financial services cannot be neatly categorized into discrete tasks and subtasks.

Sociotechnical systems theory (STST) provides a powerful framework for examining the effects of task design upon work team innovation. Sociotechnical systems theorists argue that autonomous work teams provide a structure through which the demands of the social and technical subsystems of an organization can be jointly optimized. The key to effective performance is then whether the work team can

control variation in quality and quantity of task performance at source. The joint optimization of the two subsystems is more likely when work teams have the following characteristics:

- The team is a relatively independent organizational unit that is responsible for a whole task.
- The tasks of members are related in content so that awareness of a common task is evoked and maintained and members are required to work interdependently.
- There is a “unity of product and organization,” i.e., the team has a complete task to perform and team members can “identify with their own product.”

The *task* characteristics that evoke “task orientation” or intrinsic motivation (and therefore innovation) according to STST are:

- completeness (i.e., whole tasks);
- varied demands;
- opportunities for social interaction;
- autonomy;
- opportunities for learning;
- development possibilities for the task.

Team composition. Team composition – used here to refer to the “mix” of members making up a team – has been examined in various ways. One examines the question of whether heterogeneity is advantageous to groups. The theoretical perspectives that have guided much of the research in this area include the attraction–selection–attrition model, similarity–attraction theory, and self categorization theory. A basic premise of all three is that we are attracted to those who are similar to us and thus organize, and evaluate, our social worlds accordingly. In the second line of research, it is assumed that heterogeneity is valuable but groups need to have the right mix of members. This approach questions which combination of roles, styles, or skills fits together particularly well and which types of people are needed within groups. Research in this area has tended to focus on heterogeneity in terms of demographic variables, skills, attitudes, cognitive ability, and, more recently, personality traits. Although much of the early research on group heterogeneity examined experimental laboratory based

groups, focus on “real world” groups has typified more recent research in this area.

Some studies suggest facilitative effects of heterogeneity on team performance. This pattern is most likely when the characteristics in question are skills or educational specialization. Strategic management initiatives appear more likely to be made by groups that were heterogeneous with respect to educational specialization. More recently, studies in health care suggest that the greater the number of professional groups represented in teams, the higher the levels of innovation in patient care. It might be that skill heterogeneity means that each group member is more likely to have non redundant – and, presumably, relevant – expertise to contribute to the team activities. Groups that include both diverse and overlapping knowledge domains and skills are particularly creative.

Some debate has surrounded the question of whether it is advantageous to have groups that are homogeneous or heterogeneous with respect to cognitive ability. Results of two recent meta-analyses suggest that the relation between ability heterogeneity and performance may be somewhat complex. Based on these analyses, it appears that, in general, ability heterogeneity and performance are unrelated. Thus, there would seem little justification to select team members with a view to dispersing their cognitive ability levels.

Teams which are diverse in task related attributes are often diverse in relation to attributes inherent in the individual. These relation oriented characteristics can trigger stereotypes and prejudice which, via intergroup conflict (Hogg & Abrams 1988), can affect group processes and outcomes. For example, turnover rates are higher in groups that are heterogeneous with respect to age. Two studies that have examined ethnicity diversity in groups have suggested that the effects of diversity may change over time. Milliken and Martins (1996) suggested that ethnic diversity in groups can have negative effects on individual and group outcomes, primarily early in a group’s life. Similarly, in one of the very few longitudinal studies in this area, Watson et al. (1993) reported that groups that were heterogeneous with respect to culture initially performed, on a series of business case exercises, more poorly than culturally homogeneous groups. As group members

gained experience with each other over time, however, performance difference between culturally homogeneous and heterogeneous groups largely disappeared.

Organizational supports. Various organizational contextual factors have been proposed as important in predicting team effectiveness. Reward systems, such as public recognition, preferred work assignments, and money, have long been known to provide motivation and affect performance, particularly when the rewards are contingent upon task achievement. Gladstein found that pay and recognition had an effect, especially upon the leader’s behavior and the way the group structured itself. Hackman (1990) identified two contingencies: whether the rewards are administered to the group as a whole or to individuals, and whether the rewards provide incentives for collaboration or delegation of tasks to individuals (the former, in both cases, are associated with positive relationships between rewards and group effectiveness). Feedback is important for setting realistic goals and fostering high group commitment. In addition, high job satisfaction requires accurate feedback from both the task and other group members. However, group feedback can be difficult to provide to teams with either long cycles of work or one off projects. Limited empirical evidence suggests training is correlated with both self reported team effectiveness and managers’ judgments of effectiveness.

Team Processes

The second major element of the input–process–output model is team processes. Among these, the most consistently important factor in determining team effectiveness is the existence of team goals or objectives (Guzzo & Shea 1992).

Objectives. The clarity or specificity of goals has also been shown to predict team performance outcomes. In order to combine efforts effectively, team members have to understand collectively what it is they are trying to achieve. Much research also indicates that involvement in goal setting fosters commitment to those goals and consequently better team performance.

Participation. The second factor of central theoretical and empirical concern in the study of team performance is the notion of participation.

Research on participation in decision making has a long history, revealing that participation tends to foster greater team effectiveness and commitment. When people participate in decision making through having influence, interacting with those involved in the change process, and sharing information, they tend to invest in the outcomes of those decisions and to offer ideas for new and improved ways of working. In Europe, schemes to increase participation have resulted in higher levels of innovation among industrial workers. At the organizational level, most writers concur that high centralization of decision making (low participation) inhibits innovation, although there is limited empirical evidence to support these views.

Task conflict. A central theme in the teamwork literatures is that divergent thinking and the management of competing perspectives are important processes in teamwork. Such processes are characteristic of task related team conflict and controversy. Tjosvold and colleagues have argued similarly that constructive controversy in teams improves the quality of decision making (Tjosvold 1991). Constructive controversy is characterized by full exploration of opposing opinions and frank analyses of task related issues. Constructive controversy occurs when decision makers believe they are in a cooperative team context where mutually beneficial goals are emphasized, rather than in a competitive context, where decision makers feel their personal competence is confirmed rather than questioned, and where they perceive processes of mutual influence rather than attempted dominance. Another perspective on conflict comes from minority influence theory. A number of researchers have shown that minority consistency of arguments over time is likely to lead to change in majority views in teams (Nemeth & Owens 1996). A homogeneous team in which minority dissent is suppressed will reduce creativity, innovation, individuality, and independence.

Outputs

The final component of the input–process–output model is outputs and this refers to team effectiveness or productivity, team innovation

(new and improved products, services, ways of working), team member well being and satisfaction, and team viability and attachment (the cohesion and commitment to the team shown by team members). This model continues to dominate in research but it is giving way to new concerns.

CURRENT AND FUTURE EMPHASES IN TEAM RESEARCH

The focus of research is increasingly turning toward an understanding of micro and macro processes hitherto neglected by researchers and theorists. The first is a concern with agreement within teams about their perceptions of team processes and outputs manifested in theorizing about team “mental models.” These refer to team members’ implicit and (to a greater or lesser extent) shared models of their team and its functioning as well as the wider environment with which the team engages (schema congruence and accuracy). High levels of congruence and accuracy are predicted to relate to team effectiveness. The methodological challenges of measuring shared mental models are yet to be overcome.

This concern is matched by a strong focus on trust, identity, and attachment in teams as factors that promote individual cooperation in teams (Korsgaard et al. 2003). Trust is defined as “the individual’s intention to accept vulnerability to the group based on the expectation that the group will act in a considerate and benevolent manner toward the individual” (Korsgaard et al. 2003: 116).

However, the most vigorous new developments in this area are likely to relate to research into team based organizations (Agarwal 2003). The study of work teams has developed rich understanding of social processes and performance in organizations (West et al. 2003) and the future for this area is immensely promising. The challenge now is to understand the functioning of team based organizations (or multi team systems) and how they can be structured and developed to maximize the benefits of this basic form of human functioning in modern, large, complex organizational settings. Moreover, as alliances and networks develop within

and between organizations, the spotlight of research is also exploring how teams can operate effectively across organizational boundaries (e.g., joint venture teams) and across networks to enable people to cooperate on tasks that no single organization can accomplish.

SEE ALSO: Group Processes; Organizations as Social Structures; Organizations, Voluntary

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technological determinism

Alan Bryman

Technological determinism refers to the thesis that the path of social change is directly influenced by technological developments. As such the thesis ascribes agency to an inert object, namely technology, in human affairs and their development.

It is common to distinguish between hard and soft versions of the thesis. The hard version views technology as the sole determinant of social development, whereas the soft version depicts it as one among several other factors and as greatly implicated in the social circumstances out of which it arises. The soft version thus moderates the anti determinist's dislike of

the ascription of agency to a thing and of the marginalizing of human intervention.

Nowadays, technological determinism is considered a discredited thesis about the nature of society. Few social scientists today would describe themselves as technological determinists without qualifying the description considerably. A lingering technological determinism can sometimes be discerned in approaches that seek to depict technology as both cause and effect (e.g., Hughes 1994).

Technological determinism was particularly influential in sociological studies of work and organizations. In the 1950s and 1960s, studies of work contexts like the automobile assembly line frequently construed the largely negative work attitudes of workers as directly produced by the technology with which they worked. The most sophisticated version of this approach can be discerned in Blauner (1964), where four different production technologies in US industry (craft, machine tending, assembly line, and process) were examined. Blauner showed that levels of work alienation varied systematically by the prevailing technology in the industries concerned. Another prominent study was Woodward's (1965) British investigation of technology in relation to organization structure. Woodward showed that structures varied by the prevailing technology of the organization in terms of characteristics like the flatness of the hierarchy. The suggestion that it was necessary to achieve a good fit between technology and organization structure was perceived as a corrective to the view that there could be universal laws of administration that could be applied without regard to an organization's special circumstances.

A number of problems with technological determinism have been identified. First, it is pointed out that a technology is designed with specific purposes and applications in mind, so that the "effects" that technological determinists claim to identify are in fact natural outcomes of how designers envisioned its purpose. Secondly, it is often observed that a technology can be implemented in several different ways, so that the supposed outcomes of its application are in fact the result of the ways in which it is introduced and executed (e.g., Buchanan & Boddy 1983). Third, technologies are interpretively flexible and as such can be construed in

different ways by those responsible for making them operational and by users (Grint & Woolgar 1997). Fourth, in the context of work situations, it is often pointed out that people bring to the workplace a variety of orientations that will also play a significant role in conditioning their work attitudes and behavior (e.g., Goldthorpe et al. 1968).

While technological determinism is frequently seen as outdated, it should not be replaced with the equally extreme view that technologies have no implications for human affairs, since technologies are responsible for constraining responses to them, as several writers have observed (e.g., Law 1992; Orlikowski 1992).

SEE ALSO: Actor Network Theory; Organization Theory; Organizational Contingencies; Scientific Knowledge, Sociology of; Technology, Science, and Culture; Work, Sociology of

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technological innovation

Polly S. Rizova

The topic of technological innovation has been fascinating generations of scholars, managers, and policymakers ever since Schumpeter's influential *Theory of Economic Development* (1934) appeared in English. In it, he compellingly argued that the survival of firms as well as that of society is dependent upon their ability to perpetually find new uses for the existing resources and to recombine the latter in novel ways. The economic and social changes in the western world, particularly after the Industrial Revolution, are attributed to a considerable degree to technological innovations.

At first addressed by economists, the topic has become of interest to an array of social science disciplines such as sociology, management science, industrial psychology, and the history of technology. Empirical research on the economic and social determinants and consequences of technological innovation surged in the 1980s and 1990s when leading scholarly journals devoted special issues to it: *Administrative Science Quarterly* (1990), *Strategic Management Journal* (1990), and the *Academy of Management Journal* (1996). *Social Studies of Science* was even more specific; in 1992 it published a symposium on "Failed Innovations."

Technological innovation is defined as a process which stretches from the origination to the development, implementation, and diffusion of new products or processes which have market and social value. Innovation is not to be identified with the act of scientific discovery or invention. The latter marks the very first occurrence of an *idea* for a novel product or process; the former encapsulates the deliberate *actions* of people from diverse organizational units – research and development (R&D), manufacturing, and marketing – to develop and to commercialize it. All through, it is ideas and knowledge that are sought, processed, and transmitted by both people and organizations. That is why technological innovation is conceived of as an information and knowledge processing activity which takes place in an organizational context and goes beyond the generation of a creative idea in the minds of single individuals.

In the years after World War II, a set view regarding what the force is behind technological innovation took prominence; namely, that scientific technical research is the single most important drive for innovation and, consequently, for economic development. Promulgated by Vannevar Bush in *Science: The Endless Frontier* (1945), it became known as the "linear model." This model was the framework used to inform all efforts to organize for successful innovation up to the 1980s. It rests on the assumption that innovation results from the application of science in a process which takes place through well defined sequential linear stages – scientific research, development, production, and marketing. Not only are the stages neatly defined, but so are their technical objectives and output. According to this understanding, innovation moves from one stage to the next after a successful completion of each stage's goals. Hence, by its nature, the model takes for granted that technological innovation springs from the new scientific knowledge and breakthroughs created in the first stage. Not surprisingly, research from this period addressed the link between science, scientific knowledge, and new technology. This view was also mirrored in the high level of government funding for university research and federal R&D laboratories.

An important shift in the contemporary understanding of technological innovation has been marked by the recognition of what technological innovation is *not* – namely, a linear process. Research in the 1980s demonstrated that although scientific research continues to be a viable source for innovations, the large majority of them began with a recognized market demand. It is often the case that a technological innovation is initiated at the stage located at the very end of the "linear model," from where it moves backward and forward throughout the rest. Hence, it involves nested goal formation and problem solving activities grounded in an iterative interaction between science, technology, and the market. The relative importance that scientific research and the market play in technological innovation, though, varies over time, with the size of a firm, and between, as well as within, industries. For instance, in *Forces of Production* (1984), David Noble shows that although the preponderance of innovations, as measured in absolute numbers, stemmed

from market driven competition, critical innovations such as supercomputers, integrated circuits, and the digital control of manufacturing were directly linked to government funded research. A reflection of this new way of looking at *why* and *how* innovation happens is the continuous search for design forms which are to respond to the need for coordination and information exchange between the multiple organizational divisions that take part in the innovation process.

The literature discusses four types of technological innovation. When the classification criterion is the locus of technological change, the differentiation is between *product* and *process* innovations. The former concerns any change to a firm's existing product or service portfolio; the latter refers to a change that the company introduces in the way a product is made or service is provided. More recent research has suggested that it is somewhat misleading to regard the two as completely independent from each other. Rather, as Utterback demonstrates in *Mastering the Dynamics of Innovation* (1994), they ought to be seen in an interrelated relationship in which their relative importance for the firm changes over time. Depending on the degree of technical change that is introduced to a final product or process when compared to the existing state of technology and the knowledge base, a distinction is made between *incremental* and *radical* technological innovations. *Incremental* innovation corresponds to a little departure from the currently existing and relied upon technical and scientific knowledge and practices; it only adds new features to an already existing product or process. In contrast, *radical* technological innovation involves a drastic departure from the existing technology, knowledge base, and practices; it is normally linked to a breakthrough in knowledge (e.g., the introduction of the airplane) (Damanpour 1998).

An important reason for distinguishing between radical and incremental innovation lies in the complexity of scientific knowledge that they draw upon and the degree of the predictability of the tasks associated with carrying out research and development. As a result, each imposes different requirements on staffing and organizing. For example, testing the conventional mechanical properties of batches of

commercial plastics is a highly predictable task. The complexity of a task refers to the requirement that knowledge must be drawn from multiple knowledge domains that are at most only loosely connected to one another. Complex tasks deal with ill structured, ambiguous technical circumstances that require assessment of the implications of multiple, and perhaps conflicting, knowledge domains to characterize them in terms of the actions needed. Simple tasks, on the other hand, deal with circumstances that are perceived to fall into the range of ordered experience, to conform to a well established paradigm. Integrating knowledge from medical practice, electronics, chemistry, and mechanical engineering to produce a concept for a medical magnetic resonance imaging device is a highly complex task. So too may be that of deciding which are the important characteristics of a plastic to test, while the selection of procedures to carry out routine tests is generally a simple task.

Technological innovation has been studied qualitatively and quantitatively at the level of the individual, the project, and the organization, as well as at the intra and interindustry levels. A wide array of topics has received coverage ranging from paradigm shifts, organizational learning, entrepreneurship, knowledge organizations, individual and organizational creativity, and, of course, how to organize for and succeed at innovation.

Much of the empirical research has been focused on structure and the investigation of the effect of the formal organization on the individual and firm behavior and outcomes. After decades of preoccupation with discovering the "one best way to organize," the contingency tradition, which developed in the 1960s, broke the old model. In this tradition, organizational structure is shaped by the nature of the technology and then in turn shapes the relationships between people in the work processes. In *The Management of Innovation* (1961), Burns and Stalker studied the relationship between a firm's innovativeness and organization design in 20 British electronics and rayon firms. They argued that *organic* (decentralized and less formalized) structures are conducive to technological innovation, particularly a radical one, as they are better able to respond rapidly to the ever changing environment, whereas *mechanistic*

(bureaucratic and highly formalized) organization forms tend to be innovation resistant. The literature on the management of technological innovation has examined various structural aspects and the conditions under which they affect the ability of individuals and organizations to innovate. Examples of those are: centralization, formalization, horizontal and vertical integration, and stage of industry development. The research informed by this tradition mostly relied on large surveys and statistical methodology to infer the effect of different structural arrangements on performance. Ultimately, it produced valuable insights and, much to the dissatisfaction of the managers of technology, one broad design rule: "*it all depends.*"

By the late 1970s, the structural contingency school was heavily criticized for focusing exclusively on the investigation of the formal structural attributes at the expense of neglecting the contribution of informal structures. This void has been filled by another structuralist approach – the social networks perspective. The origin of the social networks perspective can be traced to Simmel's (1950) work on dyads and triads, but it was Granovetter's (1985) seminal article that carved a prominent place in social research for the individuals and the social relations that they establish and maintain. Unlike the traditional structuralist approach which looks at performance as a function of the relationship between positions and people as *prescribed* by an organization chart, the social networks perspective seeks to capture the *actual* patterns of linkages and relations. It is based on the premise that the actors' behaviors and outcomes can be understood through the informal structural configurations (friendship, advice, and collegial networks) that they are a part of, and the positions they occupy within them (high or low respect, status and informal power). At the center of the social network analysis is an examination of the form and content of the stable patterns people develop in their relationships, as well as the effects these create.

The impact of social networks, their structural properties, and the social capital they create on outcomes has been investigated at multiple levels of analysis. This literature is replete with empirical evidence of the advantages that the informal structures offer over the formally prescribed rules and behaviors to

technological success (van de Ven 1986; Powell & Brantley 1992; Ibarra 1993). Informal structures have been shown to foster innovation through the creation of opportunities for learning, expanding on one's communication network and easing access to knowledge and information (Allen 1977; Tushman 1977).

Yet another influential stream of research on innovation, a qualitative one, came from the social constructivist perspective. In the 1980s it has been applied to scrutinize the production of scientific knowledge, technology, and technological innovation. The latter, according to this view, is not to be understood as a result of following the natural progression of technological development. Rather, it is seen as emerging from the constant interaction between technology and social processes. It is this interaction that explains how some innovations come to fruition and others do not, and why the same technologically sound projects could be funded under one type of social arrangement and abandoned under a different social cast. This literature gave us the insight that the same technologies could have different meanings to different people; thus, it addressed the question of *how* decisions on technology are reached and what role those who have interest in them play (Bijker et al. 1994).

Despite the impressive amount of empirical studies, the research on technological innovation is marked by inconsistent findings. Years of investigation and valuable contributions have not converged into a dominant theoretical perspective which incorporates the multiple streams of innovation research. This could be, at least, partially explained by the fact that innovation has been studied by researchers who represent a multitude of academic disciplines; their efforts and findings, though, are yet to be integrated. A systematic investigation designed to shed light on the phenomenon from more than a single theoretical perspective simultaneously is also lacking. Furthermore, there is a need for more studies which approach the understanding of innovation from a multilevel standpoint. The future research on technological innovation will need to address these issues.

SEE ALSO: Industrial Revolution; Science, Social Construction of; Scientific Knowledge, Sociology of; Social Network Analysis;

Technological Determinism; Technology, Science, and Culture

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technology, science, and culture

Noah Efron

It is because the sciences, especially the natural sciences, were for so long, and by so many, taken to be divorced from culture that their great interpenetration with culture remains surprising

and, in some circles, controversial. In recent decades, historians, sociologists, and anthropologists of science have documented many ways in which cultural influences have affected the development of the sciences, and in which sciences have left an imprint on seemingly far flung aspects of culture. This scholarship has been vigorously, sometimes viciously, disputed by scientists and others who still see the sciences as largely unswayed by the cultures in which they are practiced. In the 1990s, this dispute became commonly, if rather grandly, known as "the Science Wars."

It is difficult to characterize the relationships between science and culture because neither "science" nor "culture" is easily defined. "Science" typically refers to a set of practices aiming to uncover and formalize regularities in nature, and to the bodies of knowledge these practices produce. Since both the practices and the bodies of knowledge have varied by epoch, place, and discipline, however, any general characterization of science is partial and problematic. "Culture" too is a general term that has no universally accepted referent. Alfred Kroeber and Clyde Kluckhohn famously catalogued over 200 definitions of culture, including "the social legacy the individual acquires from his group," "a way of thinking, feeling, and believing," and "the storehouse of pooled learning." A recent United Nations declaration reckoned culture as the "set of distinctive spiritual, material, intellectual, and emotional features of society or a social group," and that it "encompasses, in addition to art and literature, lifestyles, ways of living together, value systems, traditions, and beliefs." The relationships between "science" and "culture," then, are relationships between hazy and ill grasped concepts.

Often, these relationships are viewed from one of two opposite directions. One concerns the impacts that culture has on science and technology, while the other concerns the influences of science and technology on culture. This crass division is problematic in the eyes of many because it assumes that "culture" and "science and technology" are fundamentally independent entities. For those who see science as a complex of human activities that are cultural from the ground up, the distinction between culture and science is misleading (making no more sense than similarly distinguishing

between, say, culture and music). Still, the notion that science and culture *are* fundamentally independent realms has a long history, and remains influential to this day. For this reason, at least, there is heuristic value in distinguishing between the place of culture in science, and that of science in culture, so long as the limitations of this distinction are acknowledged.

CULTURE IN SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY

The view that science is free from cultural influences was most rigorously (and influentially) formulated by a group of scientists and philosophers meeting regularly in 1920s Vienna. This “Vienna Circle,” as it became known, included some of the greatest philosophers of the twentieth century – Rudolf Carnap, Karl Hempel, Moritz Schlick, and A. J. Ayer, to name a few – who developed a philosophy that became known as logical positivism, or logical empiricism. These philosophers saw in science the best exemplar of knowledge properly won. Science, as they saw it, ideally had two ways of ascertaining and verifying knowledge: direct observation and logic. No other source of knowledge (like tradition, intuition, or revelation) could be considered credible.

This view implied that good science is by its nature insusceptible to cultural influences, because it is a product solely of the logical manipulation of sense data. If the laws of nature are the same in New York and Nairobi, generating similar sense data, then the logical positivist view of science left no room for local culture to affect science. Indeed, in the view of many philosophers, scientists, and others who embraced this view, the greatest virtue of the scientific method was that it allowed flawed and subjective human beings to produce highly reliable, objective knowledge. As they saw it, science – unlike art, literature, philosophy, politics, couture, cuisine, and practically every other human endeavor – transcends human culture, a view that is sometimes called “scientific exceptionalism.”

Though this image of scientific knowledge as uniquely divorced from the culture has retained currency in some circles to the present

day, its heyday was brief. In July 1931, a Soviet physicist named Boris Hessen delivered before the Second International Congress of the History of Science and Technology in Kensington, London, an address entitled “The Social and Economic Roots of Newton’s *Principia*.” In it, Hessen insisted that Newton’s physics was influenced by class ideology and by the practical needs of moneyed Englishmen. These claims were embraced by some Marxist philosophers and scientists eager to see a link between early modern science and the culture of emerging capitalism, and they were rejected by many others for whom Hessen’s paper was a crass attack on the intellectual purity of science. In 1935, Polish economist Henryk Grossman published in *Zeitschrift für Sozialforschung* a paper further developing Hessen’s approach, called “The Social Foundations of Mechanistic Philosophy and Manufacture.” In the same year, Ludwig Fleck argued in a book called *Genesis and Development of a Scientific Fact* that “thought styles” in medicine and science greatly influence even seemingly objective observations. One year later, American sociologist of science Robert K. Merton completed a Harvard dissertation entitled “Science, Technology, and Society in 17th Century England,” tracing links between the rise of science and both Puritan ideology and contemporary economic circumstance. These works and other “externalist” accounts (so called because they attributed scientific development to factors outside science itself) challenged the positivist account of the advance of science, suggesting that cultural, social, political, and economic factors greatly affected science, even influencing the very content of scientific theories.

Partly in response to these challenges, in 1938 philosopher Hans Reichenbach distinguished between what he called the “context of discovery” in science, in which accident, human foibles, and social and cultural forces played a part, and the “context of justification,” in which objective observation, logic, and reason alone determine which hypotheses are accepted and which are rejected. If cultural factors had any impact upon science at all, Reichenbach and the logical positivists insisted, it was limited to the messy and uninteresting “context of discovery.” But over ensuing decades, historians, sociologists, and anthropologists continued to

describe cultural and social influences in almost every aspect of science. The most influential of these was Thomas Kuhn, who asserted in *The Structure of Scientific Revolutions* that science does not progress by amassing and correlating observations, but rather through sudden changes in fashion after which prior theories, and even data, acquire new meaning. Echoing Fleck, and drawing some inspiration from gestalt psychology, Kuhn argued that sense data themselves appear different to different researchers working from within different theoretical orientations. A Chinese acupuncturist and a Canadian cardiologist will see different symptoms in the same patient.

Kuhn's book inspired a great deal of research, some challenging his outlook, and some taking it much farther than Kuhn himself could endorse. Philosopher of science Paul Feyerabend concluded that science has no overarching method at all, and that in research "anything goes." Further, he declared in the 1975 introduction to the Chinese translation of his famous book *Against Method* that "First World science is one science among many." Different cultures produce different sciences. One of the most spirited efforts to describe the interpenetration of sciences and sociocultural factors was conceived at about this time in Edinburgh (and advanced by Barry Barnes, David Bloor, Donald MacKenzie, Steven Shapin, Andrew Pickering, and others) and called the "Strong Program." Its aim, according to Bloor, was to show that "it was not possible anymore to hold a vision of science as exempt from social influences." The accuracy or "truth" of a scientific theory can never be taken to explain its acceptance, Bloor and his colleagues insisted, because it is acceptance on the part of a scientific community that determines which theories are considered accurate and "true." Thus, it is not just "logic, rationality, and truth" that explain the progress of science, but also sociocultural negotiations within a scientific community. This view, embraced and expanded by a generation of historians, sociologists, and anthropologists of science, was developed into what became known as the "social constructivist" (or sometimes "social constructionist") view of science, which held that what is taken to be true among scientists reflects social consensus among them, and not bedrock facts about

nature. Scholars advocating the "social construction of technology" (SCOT) have similarly described how technologies do not evolve according to an inevitable logic of their own, but are constituted through ongoing negotiations between engineers, consumers, users, marketers, and others, and as a result reflect a mosaic of social and cultural assumptions.

In recent decades, feminist historians and philosophers of science like Evelyn Fox Keller and Donna Haraway have argued that cultural assumptions about gender greatly influence the production of scientific knowledge. Casual and commonplace sexist presumptions lead scientists to misrepresent women's physiology, psychology, and social roles, as well as to prefer certain sorts of scientific theories (reductive ones, for instance) over other sorts (holistic ones). More radically, Sandra Harding and other feminist scholars of science have argued that scientists' canons of epistemology – what they take to be knowledge and how they seek knowledge – are themselves conditioned in part by gender. In this view, often called "standpoint epistemology," what counts for evidence and argument may differ between female and male scientists. Other philosophers have emphasized that aesthetic considerations have greatly influenced which scientific theories have been accepted and which rejected. ("One can always make a theory, many theories, to account for known facts," wrote Nobel physicist George Thomson, "the test is aesthetic.") Still others have emphasized the impact of literary conventions on science, arguing that canons of literary coherence influence which scientific theories are accepted and which are rejected. Sociologist of science Karin Knorr Cetina has recently argued that scientific knowledge is mediated through varying "epistemic cultures, shaped by affinity, necessity, and historical coincidence." Taken together, sociologists, anthropologists, historians, and philosophers of science have, in the past 70 years, described how religion, politics, economics, class, gender, race, art, etiquette, and many other ambient aspects of culture and society have affected the process and products of science. Scholars have found traces of these influences in every facet of scientific practice: choice of subject to investigate, experimental design, observation, inference, analysis, publication, and more. These findings have been

embraced by many, probably most, scholars who study science, but they have remained a subject of acrimonious debate.

SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY IN CULTURE

Little (if anything at all) in modern, western culture remains untouched by science and technology. Science has long found a place in the arts, for instance. Science and scientists have been a recurring theme in modern literature, from John Donne's "The Anatomy of the World: The First Anniversary" and Molière's *The Learned Ladies* to Mary Shelley's *Frankenstein*, Sinclair Lewis's *Arrowsmith*, and on to recent generations' torrent of science fiction. Science has left imprints on centuries of painters and sculptors. Leon Battista Alberti acknowledged as much in his *On Painting* (1435), which applied classical optics and geometry to techniques for producing perspective on canvas. Leonardo da Vinci's painting reflects years of patient empirical study of the human form, as well as of physical and mechanical principles. Andreas Vesalius's *De Fabrica* (1543) was at once an anatomy atlas and a masterpiece of early modern artistic engraving. The tradition of artists consulting natural philosophers and scientists to perfect their craft continued unabated to the modern epoch when, for example, studies of vision carried out by researchers like Hermann von Helmholtz were eagerly devoured by early impressionists like Seurat, who acknowledged the crucial influence of science on his painting. A contemporary observed that a key to Picasso's work was his use of "geometric figures – of a geometry at the same time infinitesimal and cinematic." Around the same time, futurist painters like Giacomo Balla and Umberto Boccioni championed science, and especially technology, as the principal object of their art, calling for a moratorium on nudes, still lifes, and other traditional artistic subjects and declaring that instead "we will sing the multicolored and polyphonic surf of revolutions in modern capitals; the nocturnal vibration of arsenals and docks beneath their glaring electric moons . . . factories hanging from the clouds by the threads of their smoke; . . . large breasted

locomotives bridled with long tubes, and the slippery flight of airplanes." More recently, "transgenic artists" and "bio artists" like Eduardo Kacs have adopted laboratory techniques as an artistic medium, asserting that "new technologies culturally mutate our perception of the human body from a naturally self regulated system to an artificially controlled and electronically transformed object." Kacs works in the medium of genetic modification, and he is not alone. In fact, for each of these examples, hundreds of similar examples can be adduced.

The influence of science upon music is, if anything, still more longstanding and deeply ingrained. Until modern times, music was itself considered a science (and was one of the mathematical sciences of the classical *quadrivium*, along with astronomy, geometry, and arithmetic). Until after the Renaissance, Boethius's sixth century *De musica* remained the most influential guide to music, advancing the notion that music expresses the same mathematical principles that govern the relations between all elements in the cosmos. Marin Mersenne investigated pitch in his physical inquiries (describing his findings in his 1636 *Harmonie universelle*), and Galileo Galilei, himself a lutenist of reputation, described his own empirical studies of the sounds produced by vibrating strings in his *Discourses Concerning Two New Sciences*. The relationship between physics and music remained intimate for subsequent centuries, for both scientists like d'Alembert, Bernoulli, Euler, Laplace, and Helmholtz and composers like Bach, Handel, Telemann, and Rameau. In the twentieth century, new technologies allowing sounds to be produced electronically and recorded greatly changed the nature of music. Electric pianos and guitars came into common use by mid century, finding their place alongside a great number of newly minted instruments, from the Theremin to the Moog synthesizer. By the final decades of the century, synthesized and computer generated compositions dominated much of both popular and avant garde music. In some cases, contemporary science was an immediate source of inspiration, as when Iannis Xenakis produced a series of compositions structured according to the kinetic theory of gases.

The impact of science and technology was greater still in newer cultural media like film

and television. These media would not exist at all without technological advances produced by modern science. Science and technology have in turn been constant themes in movies and television. From early movies like *Frankenstein* and *Dr. Jekyll and Mr. Hyde* to recent ones like *Contact* and *AI*, the cinema has constantly reflected on science and technology and their effect and meaning. So too has television, in dramas ranging from *Star Trek* to *Dark Angel*, and in hundreds of thousands of hours of science and nature documentaries broadcast over the six decades of the medium's existence. At the same time, advances in computer science have greatly expanded what is possible to depict on screen.

The influence of science on culture reaches well beyond the rarefied reaches of the arts. Historians have shown, for instance, how advances in bacteriology in the first half of the twentieth century changed conventional views of cleanliness, leading in time to a great increase in the time housewives devoted to housework. Advertisers enlisted science, pseudo science, and fake science to sell soft drinks, clothing, shampoo, baby formula, anti perspirant, and automobiles. A lab coated scientist soberly explaining the virtues of a product became one of the most recognizable images in western consumer culture.

Science has also helped fashion modern political culture. Friedrich Engels captured some thing crucial of Karl Marx's aspirations (if perhaps not his accomplishments) when he said of him in eulogy, "just as Darwin discovered the law of development of organic nature, so Marx discovered the law of development of human history." Throughout its century of growing and waning popularity, Marxism was presented by supporters as a "scientific" politics, its scientific nature warranting its validity and inevitability. In liberal societies, science played a different, though no less important, role as growing armies of economists, sociologists, engineers, and other "scientific experts" have been called upon to help fashion and evaluate every aspect of policy and administration. In a similar way, scientists now exercise great influence in the courts, serving as expert witnesses hired to persuade juries and judges of the veracity of facts, the credibility of litigants and witnesses, and the extent of damages.

SCIENCE, TECHNOLOGY, AND CULTURE

In the end, the complex relations between science and culture are not exhausted by canvassing how culture influences science and science influences culture. It is often the case, and more now than ever, that science and culture are indistinguishable, even in principle. Historian William Everdell has described how in the first years of the twentieth century many came to doubt the possibility of attaining true objectivity, a change that owed at once to the politics, economics, science, and art of the day, and ultimately changed each of these fields. "The belief in objectivity crumbled so that phenomenology and solipsism began to take over not only philosophy, but literature, politics, psychology and at last even physics" (Everdell 1997). More recently, the enormous attention paid to the impact of genetics on human character and behavior reflects a change in the very notion of what it means to be human, which is equally a product of scientific and cultural assumptions and has equally (and enormously) affected both the practice of science and the nature of the societies and cultures that produce science. In such cases, it is impossible to tease apart the mutual influences of science and culture, because the two are so tightly and diversely intertwined as to be inseparable. Many scholars today, expanding on the pioneering work of philosopher and anthropologist of science Bruno Latour, picture social and cultural artifacts, human actors, and natural objects as linked in a single "network." The identity of each element of the network is constituted, in varying degrees, by all other elements in the network. In Latour's system, it makes little sense to hypothesize social and cultural "influences" on science, or even about the "social construction" of scientific knowledge, because these formulations overlook the fact that society and nature (and the sciences that ostensibly study nature) are mutually constituted. This model, though not without problems, captures nicely the inextricability of science and culture.

SEE ALSO: Actor Network Theory; Feminism and Science, Feminist Epistemology; Kuhn, Thomas and Scientific Paradigms; Laboratory Studies and the World of the

Scientific Lab; Political Economy of Science; Realism and Relativism: Technological Determinism; Technological Innovation; Truth and Objectivity; Science across Cultures; Science, Social Construction of; Scientific Knowledge, Sociology of; Strong Program

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telephone

Nicola Green

The telephone was developed in 1876, and alongside communication technologies such as the telegraph and steam based transportation systems, it was one of the key technologies that

contributed to the transformation of late nineteenth and early twentieth century western societies. The ability to transmit sound across long distances in real time was initially treated with either wonder or suspicion, but by the end of the twentieth century the telephone had become a taken for granted feature of everyday life in many parts of the western world. It is because of this ubiquity that sociologists have tended to neglect the telephone as a fundamentally social technology. More recently, however, sociologists have come to pay more attention to the extent of its significance in social communication, interpersonal interaction, social organization, and the regulation of social life.

The telephone was a technology that emerged from the era of industrialization, and the first means that sociologists have come to understand its sociological significance is by considering the technology in terms of its social and historical development. As a “new media” of its day, the telephone served to extend the social transformations of the industrial era, not by introducing entirely new social behaviors, but by providing new means to conduct familiar social practices, and prompting the revision of older forms of social organization in new settings. The telegraph and modern transportation systems had already transformed physical space and time by the late nineteenth century by, for example, collapsing distances and altering the perception of natural time and clock time, concentrating the tempo and reach of industrial production and consumption systems. The telephone extended these transformations by allowing communication to take place at a distance between commercial urban centers and businesses conducted from the newly emerging Victorian era suburbs, contributing to the spatial organization of the cities we see today.

The alteration of time and space in this way also enabled a revision of the boundaries between, for example, public and private life. Whereas one early use of the telephone was as a “broadcast” medium (one to many transmissions of, for example, public entertainments such as concerts), the telephone soon became an instrument wired into the homes of wealthy families in the US and Europe to facilitate one to one calls, thereby introducing a potential intrusion of the “public” sphere into the “private” life of the home. Whereas it was

initially envisaged by telephone companies that telephones in homes would primarily be used by the male head of household to conduct business, or (of secondary and later importance) be used by the female household manager to run the household more effectively, family members soon found the telephone could be used for communications beyond the economic life of the household, to maintain intimate social networks and relationships at a distance. The role of knowledgeable individuals and groups (whether “expert” or not) was therefore to negotiate and manage the revised boundaries of public good and domestic intimacy as framed by the technology.

The uneasy relationship between the public and the private as it was negotiated over the early history of the telephone highlights the central role that gender has played throughout the technology’s history. With the disruption of familiar boundaries as telephones were introduced into homes, the roles of men and women with respect to the technology were also called into question. The telephone was originally conceived (along with other “electric” new technologies and media of the time) as a masculine technology, to be used primarily by (technically competent) men as heads of households, communities, and businesses for the public good and in the public sphere. With the development of larger centralized telephone exchanges serving a number of households and small communities, however, “operators” came to be employed to manage the calls to and from individual devices. As it gradually became accepted (through practice, legislation, and the organization of telephone provision) that the telephone could be used to facilitate all kinds of communications between both intimate relations and more distant associates, women operators were specifically enroled to facilitate telephone contact. Social communication and the maintenance of social networks and bonds was held to be a particularly feminine skill, and it was via these means that the association between the telephone and “talk” of all kinds was cemented, and over time in the domestic sphere came to be particularly associated with women and the emotional labor of social contact between family, friends, and social networks.

The management of revised boundaries of time and space, public and private, prompted

by wired, “landline” telephones also presented new dilemmas for the negotiation of interpersonal “presence” and “absence” in human communication. A second way that sociologists have investigated the importance of the telephone in social life is to focus on the technology particularly as a communications medium. Social interactionists in particular have examined the ways that social relationships are mediated, established, and maintained during telephone communications, both with those “co present” and not directly party to the communication, as well as those “telepresent” others with whom one is communicating at a distance. The ring of a telephone is a “summons” to communicative interaction (prompting some sociologists to ponder why, in contrast to most other communicative media, the telephone has no “off” switch – the summons is designed to be imperative). From this first summons, individuals may choose between a range of responses framed by normative contextual rules and procedures of interaction. In Goffman’s terms, the instance of a phone call is a “stage” that needs to be managed via interactional strategies with respect to both co present and telepresent others. The normative procedures for taking a telephone call in private space where it might be overheard by intimate others conform to one set of rules, those for making a call in public space conform to another. In each case, individuals might develop strategies for deciding to make or take a call by negotiating the relative power of those co present and telepresent to demand attention and to establish the rules of conversation. The strategies will also include common rituals of negotiating identification, availability, and the purpose of the call. Of particular importance has been the evolution of normative rules and conversational rituals to establish interactional resources through which the relevance and sense of a telephone call can be understood. Goffman’s notion of “footing” has been used to explain how mutual understanding and human “presence” are established and maintained when interlocutors are communicating at a distance.

Using conversation analysis, ethnomethodologists in particular have turned their attention to the contextually framed interactional skills used by members of a community in everyday telephone talk. Initially, ethnomethodologists

used recorded telephone conversations to investigate the social organization of telephone talk, mutual identification, turn taking, the achievement of communicative context, and the negotiation of talk content. Of particular interest has been the management of interaction given the absence of physical context. A range of studies have identified common features of telephone interaction, one of the most important of which is verbal exchanges that are paired in turn taking, one statement or question requiring a matched response. The opening sequences of telephone conversations will conventionally consist of normative telephone greetings, the identification of the caller and recognition, the inquiry as to well being, which all have their ritualized, common paired responses, framed with respect to context and the identity of the caller.

One important outcome of these studies was the recognition that the micro coordination of telephone talk and interactional norms differed across cultural contexts. A third way of understanding the sociological importance of the telephone has therefore been to examine comparatively the role, uses, and availability of the telephone across cultures, regions, nations, and internationally. Interactional studies have pointed out that conventional norms in telephone talk reflect deeper cultural differences in behavioral norms, the conventional rules of politeness, conversational norms in public spaces, turn taking, and informational requirements for mutual identification and recognition. Many of these studies have, however, concentrated on cultural differences within and between different nations and cultures in North America and Europe. This in itself points to a wider sociological phenomenon – that of globally unequal availability of a telecommunications infrastructure, and population access to associated technologies. This inequality has historically reflected the unequal division of resources between the developed and developing worlds – a number of sociologists have pointed out that the deployment and use of the landline telephone, especially when positioned in a domestic context, is a particularly western phenomenon. Despite its ubiquity in western settings, it was estimated at the turn of the millennium that around 70 percent of the world's population had no direct access to a landline telephone. By concentrating on comparative research between western

nations, sociologists have sometimes neglected alternative configurations of people, cultural practices, and technologies that have evolved around telephony in non western settings, particularly community based and shared uses of telephones, its role in ritual, religious, and kinship practices, and its uses in the processes of both colonialism and development.

Access to telecommunications infrastructures has itself, however, again been transformed with further innovations in the configuration of telephony itself – in the form of wireless, mobile, or cellphone technology. Throughout the 1980s and 1990s, cellular telephony emerged as a key technological infrastructure in European and North American societies. The transmission of voice over distance no longer relied on fixed line telephone wires, but rather employed digital signals over radio waves. The devices to send and receive telephony signals were no longer bound to a single place such as the domestic household, and instead became the “hand set” or cellphone. This entailed a significant shift in telephone practices, as rather than being attached to a fixed geographical space, telephone devices instead became attached to particular persons and bodies. Via such means, telephony has become further individualized, and in the process, the mobile devices themselves became part of the consumption and commodity systems to an extent not previously seen. Telephone receivers could be highly personalized by, for example, changing the appearance of the hand set, and the devices not only carried voice calls, but incorporated address books and answering services more extensive than their fixed line predecessors, and featured “text messaging” – the ability to send short written rather than oral messages. More recently, mobile phones have also incorporated digital cameras (and the ability to exchange images), as well as hardware and software to support polyphonic “ringtones” and play digital audio files.

This mobilization of telephony has been extensive, most notably in Western Europe, where some countries' mobile phone subscription rates exceed 90 percent of the population. Because mobile telephony does not rely on a wired infrastructure, it has also overtaken subscription to fixed line telephony in some nations of the developing world. The extent of this change in telephony has led sociologists to

reevaluate the social relationships mediated by telephones, where those devices have become mobile.

As was the case with the fixed line telephone, the presence and use of telephones “on the move” has affected how the public and the private are negotiated in everyday life. Because mobile phones are significantly *personal* devices, they come to symbolize (through voice messaging, address books, and text messages) the social networks of which the individual is a part. At the same time, they are public by virtue of their use in shared spaces, whether those shared spaces are in the home or family relationship, or in collective spaces such as public transport. On the one hand, therefore, mobile phones can establish and maintain the private and personal as in the case, for example, where young people can bypass parental gatekeeping of the fixed line household phone to engage with their peers. On the other hand, mobile phones can both mediate and disrupt the public – when, for example, peers “gift” one another with text messages and images that can then be displayed to co present others to demonstrate participation in a telepresent social network, or when phones are used for voice calls in public space disrupting conventional behavioral norms. Similarly, gender is implicated in emerging norms of use, for example in the ways mobiles are used by women to manage their multiple responsibilities with respect to work, household, and extended family.

As was also the case with the fixed line telephone, the interactional norms governing use and behavior with respect to the mobile phone must be negotiated over time. The conversational norms with both co present and telepresent others are being rewritten as mobile phones become a more ubiquitous feature of everyday life. The “etiquette” of mobile phone use has been the subject of significant public debate, and continues to be so with the introduction of further features such as cameras that can readily be used across a range of social situations. Sociologists have begun to conduct ethnographies of a range of places and spaces to investigate these emerging norms, and to uncover the ways in which the mobile phone intervenes in social and communicative practices across a number of nations and cultures. They are investigating the historical significance of the mobile

with respect to the technological landscapes and social networks of which they are a part, and considering the organization, hierarchies, and power relations embedded in their production and consumption. As mobile and fixed line phones continue to converge with technologies such as the Internet, sociology now recognizes that in contemporary societies telephony has a central role in the technology and media landscape, and have adjusted their focus accordingly.

SEE ALSO: Conversation Analysis; Historical and Comparative Methods; Information Technology; Interaction; Technological Determinism; Technological Innovation; Urbanization

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televangelism

William H. Swatos, Jr.

Initially an American phenomenon, televangelism refers to the use of television for Christian missionary outreach, of an evangelical fundamentalist type, usually incarnated in a single leadership figure, which became particularly prominent in the 1970s as a result of shifts in broadcasting policies regulated by the United States Federal Communications Commission (FCC) in 1960. Prior to that time, the FCC

required the commercial broadcast networks to donate a portion of their airtime to “public interest” use. A convenient way to do this was for the stations to cooperate with large, mainstream religious bodies to produce a variety of non confrontational, non sectarian programs that could fit within this category. This ended when the FCC in 1960 ruled that the stations could count commercial programming toward their public interest quotas. The effect was to open a new market, wherein profit interests could redefine the public interest within category limits. Hence, “religious interest” could be met by allowing the religious interests with the most money to have the available slots. This was greatly enhanced as more broadcast frequencies became more easily available. So was born the parallel religious institution of the “electronic church,” with its most successful exponents eventually termed “televangelists.”

As a part of media coverage of the growth in fundamentalist and evangelical churches in the United States during the 1970s and 1980s, one focus of attention became the concomitant expansion in the activities of religious broadcasters, especially the televangelist stars of Sunday morning. Eventual revelations of scandals involving sexual misconduct and/or financial misrepresentation by some of the best known television preachers, such as Jim Bakker and Jimmy Swaggart, served to fix popular gaze firmly on the operations of religious broadcasters. Unnuanced and even derisive reporting of these scandals also reinforced persistent stereotypes concerning the rather diverse ministries that jointly inhabit the airwaves. Chief among these is the impression that all religious broadcasters are money hungry opportunists, accountable to no higher authority, who promise miracles in order to lure huge numbers of the desperate and the gullible – and their financial contributions – away from the putatively sounder fellowship of mainline congregations or secular professional help.

A sociological account of televangelism is better constructed in aspects of the roles that broadcast ministers perform and the economic and organizational constraints within which they work. The electronic church, like other western institutions, is voluntaristic, diverse, market oriented, entrepreneurial, technologically advanced, and activated by vast amounts

of time and money. In the media market, there simply is no ministry without money. In a different sense than is normally intended, within broadcasting time is money – that is, time costs money. Thus, the head of a broadcast ministry, virtuous or not, must always preach with one eye glued to the financial bottom line and one foot planted a step ahead of his creditors. Hence the seeming obsession during religious broadcasts with talk of raising and spending money. Additionally, the very evangelistic nature of religious commitment among conservative Christians reinforces this entrepreneurial style. To their way of thinking, a faith that is not actively being passed on is a faith that is indolent and moribund. Not only is there a Christian imperative to extend the faith, but also a conviction that God has established a (hidden) time limit within which this must be done and that those who do not receive the Christian gospel are eternally lost. The logical conclusion to this line of thought is the incessant appeal for money to retire debts, maintain operations, and advance into the future.

The principal spokesperson for these appeals is the televangelist himself. Because very few current broadcast ministries are the projects of denominations, it is almost always an individual (most frequently the founder) who comes to embody the spirit of a religious program. He becomes the focal point for all that his ministry is and does; for all practical purposes, he *is* his organization. Televangelists are not above turning this condition around, however, and using it to cultivate loyalty among their followers. It is, after all, harder for people to trust an institution than a person, and even harder for them to endorse the worth of an abstract idea. So their gazes settle naturally on the profile of the preacher at center stage; hence, for example, viewers are much more likely to know *who* they watch among the televangelists than they are the actual name of his program.

Audience research shows that despite the sometimes outlandish claims of broadcast preachers themselves, the size of the regular audience for religious television in the United States is rather modest. It is dwarfed by the average ratings for the most popular talk shows and situation comedies on network television and its cable counterparts. The audience for religious television is also heavily concentrated

in Southern states, where religious convictions as a whole have greater salience than they do in the rest of the country; hence religious broadcasting may simply intensify already existing convictions rather than change alternative worldviews. Across the entire audience, furthermore, viewers are not ordinary unchurched, but are comparatively religious in the first place. Hence, there is little basis for a concern that religious television is substituting for worshiping with a congregation; the majority of viewers who are not otherwise religiously active are among the elderly, the immobile, and the chronically infirm, who would not swell the participatory ranks of congregants if televangelism were to cease.

SEE ALSO: Fundamentalism; Media; Popular Religion; Religion; Television

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television

Toby Miller

What is television? It is an object that is produced in a factory, then distributed physically (via transportation) and virtually (via advertising). At that point it transmogrifies into a fashion statement, a privileged (or damned) piece of furniture – a status symbol. Finally, it becomes outmoded junk, full of poisons and pollutants

in search of a dumping ground. In short, television has a physical existence, a history as an object of material production and consumption in addition to its renown as a site for making meaning. That renown is the focus of most sociological theory and research into the media.

Prior to the emergence of TV appliances and services, people fantasized about the transmission of image and sound across space. Richard Whittaker Hubbell made the point by publishing a book in 1942 entitled *4000 Years of Television*. The device even has its own patron saint, Clare of Assisi, a teen runaway from the thirteenth century who became the first Franciscan nun. She was canonized in 1958 for her bedridden vision of images from a midnight mass cast upon the wall, which Pius XII decided centuries later was the first broadcast. As TV proper came close to realization, it attracted intense critical speculation. Rudolf Arnheim's 1935 "Forecast of Television" predicted it would offer viewers simultaneous global experiences, transmitting railway disasters, professorial addresses, town meetings, boxing title fights, dance bands, carnivals, and aerial mountain views – a spectacular montage of Broadway and Vesuvius. A common vision would surpass the limitations of linguistic competence and interpretation. TV might even bring global peace with it, by showing spectators that "we are located as one among many." But this was no naïve welcome. Arnheim warned that "television is a new, hard test of our wisdom." The emergent medium's easy access to knowledge would either enrich or impoverish its viewers, manufacturing an informed public, vibrant and active, or an indolent audience, domesticated and passive (Arnheim 1969: 160–3). Two years after Arnheim, Barrett C. Kiesling (1937: 278) said "it is with fear and trembling that the author approaches the controversial subject of television." Such concerns about TV have never receded. They are the very stuff of sociology's inquiries into this bewildering device.

Like most sociological domains, the study of television is characterized by severe contestation over meanings and approaches, not least because its analysts "speak different languages, use different methods," and pursue "different questions" (Hartley 1999: 18). Broadly speaking, TV has given rise to three key topics:

- 1 Ownership and control: television's political economy.
- 2 Texts: its content.
- 3 Audiences: its public.

Within these categories lie several other divisions:

- 1 Approaches to ownership and control vary between neoliberal endorsements of limited regulation by the state, in the interests of guaranteeing market entry for new competitors, and Marxist critiques of the bourgeois media's agenda for discussing society.
- 2 Approaches to textuality vary between hermeneutic endeavors, which unearth the meaning of individual programs and link them to broader social formations and problems, and content analytic endeavors, which establish patterns across significant numbers of similar texts, rather than close readings of individual ones.
- 3 Approaches to audiences vary between social psychological attempts to validate correlations between watching TV and social conduct, and culturalist critiques of imported television threatening national culture.

There is an additional bifurcation between approaches favored by those working and/or trained in US social sciences versus the rest of the world. These relate to wider intellectual differences, but also to distinctive traditions of public policy. Like so many other areas of social life, TV is principally regarded as a means of profit through entertainment in the US and, historically at least, as a means of governance through information elsewhere. The first tradition focuses on audiences as consumers, the second as citizens. Pierre Bourdieu (1998: 48) refers to these rather graceless anti-nomies as "populist spontaneism and demagogic capitulation to popular tastes" versus "paternalistic pedagogic television." Neoliberal deregulation since the 1980s has privatized TV all over the globe under the sign of the US exemplar, but there continue to be theoretical, analytic, and political correlatives to this difference between the US and the rest.

Just as US sociology determinedly clings to a binary opposition between qualitative and

quantitative approaches, between impression and science, between commitment and truth, so it has hewed closely to methodological individualism in seeking to explain why people and television interact as they do, looking for links between TV and violence, misogyny, and educational attainment. Conversely, sociologists elsewhere worry less about such issues. They are more exercised by Hollywood's impact on their own countries' cultural expression. Global sociology is inclined to use critical terminology and methods that look at TV as a collective issue, rather than an individual one; a matter of interpretation and politics more than psychological impact. But there is in fact a link between the two anxieties.

In their different ways, each is an effects model, in that they assume television *does* things *to* people, that audience members are at risk of abjuring either interpersonal responsibility (in the US) or national culture (in the rest of the world). In Harold Garfinkel's (1992: 68) words, both models assume that the audience is a "cultural dope . . . acting in compliance with the common culture." Caricaturing people in this way clouds the actual "common sense rationalities . . . of here and now situations" they use. Most of the time that the television audience is invoked by sociologists, or by TV's critics and regulators, it is understood as just such a "dope"; for example, the assumption that "children are sitting victims; television bites them" (Schramm et al. 1961: 1).

The dope splits in two, in keeping with dominant audience models. The first appears in a *domestic* effects model, or DEM. Dominant in the US, and increasingly exported around the world, it is typically applied without consideration of place and is psychological. The DEM offers analysis and critique of education and civic order. It views television as a force that can either direct or pervert the audience. Entering young minds hypodermically, TV can both enable and imperil learning. It may also drive viewers to violence through aggressive and misogynistic images and narratives. The DEM is found at a variety of sites, including laboratories, clinics, prisons, schools, news papers, psychology journals, television stations' research and publicity departments, every day talk, program classification regulations, conference papers, parliamentary debates, and

state of our youth or state of our civil society moral panics. The DEM is embodied in the US media theatrics that ensue after mass school shootings, questioning the role of violent images (not hyper Protestantism, straight white masculinity, a risk society, or easy access to firearms) in creating violent people. The DEM also finds expression in content analysis, which has been put to a variety of sociological purposes. For example, a violence index has been created to compare the frequency and type of depictions of violence on US TV news and drama with actual crime statistics, and content analysis has also been applied to representations of gender and race.

The second means of constituting “dopes” is a *global effects model*, or GEM. The GEM, primarily utilized in non US discourse, is spatially specific and social. Whereas the DEM focuses on the cognition and emotion of individual human subjects, via observation and experimentation, the GEM looks to the knowledge of custom and patriotic feeling exhibited by populations, the grout of national culture. In place of psychology, it is concerned with politics. Television does not make you a well educated or an ill educated person, a wild or a self controlled one. Rather, it makes you a knowledgeable and loyal national subject, or a *naif* who is ignorant of local tradition and history. Cultural belonging, not psychic wholeness, is the touchstone of the global effects model. Instead of measuring audience responses electronically or behaviorally, as its domestic counterpart does, the GEM interrogates the geopolitical origin of televisual texts and the themes and styles they embody, with particular attention to the putatively nation building genres of drama, news, sport, and current affairs. GEM adherents hold that local citizens should control TV, because their loyalty can be counted on in the event of war, while in the case of fiction, only locally sensitized producers will make narratives that are true to tradition and custom. The model is found in the discourses of cultural imperialism, everyday talk, broadcast and telecommunications policy, unions, international organizations, newspapers, heritage, cultural diplomacy, and post industrial service sector planning. In its manifestation as textual analysis, it interprets programs in ideological terms.

Both models have fundamental flaws. The DEM betrays all the disadvantages of ideal typical psychological reasoning. It relies on methodological individualism, thereby failing to account for cultural norms and politics, let alone the arcs of history and shifts in space that establish patterns of imagery and response inside TV coverage of politics, war, ideology, and discourse. Each massively costly test of media effects, based on, as the refrain goes, “a large university in the [US] mid West,” is countered by a similar experiment, with conflicting results. As politicians, grant givers, and jeremiad wielding pundits call for more and more research to prove that TV makes you stupid, violent, and apathetic (or the opposite), sociologists and others line up to indulge their contempt for popular culture and ordinary life and their rent seeking urge for grant money. The DEM never interrogates its own conditions of existence; namely, that governments and the media use it to account for social problems, and that TV’s capacity for private viewing troubles those authorities who desire surveillance of popular culture. As for the GEM, its concentration on national culture denies the potentially liberatory and pleasurable nature of different forms of television, forgets the internal differentiation of publics, valorizes frequently oppressive and/or unrepresentative local bourgeoisies in the name of maintaining and developing national televisual culture, and ignores the demographic realities of its “own” terrain.

Nevertheless, the DEM and the GEM continue unabated. From one side, Singer and Singer (2001: xv) argue that “psychophysiological and behavioral empirical studies beginning in the 1960s have pointed . . . to aggression as a learned response.” From the other side, García Canclini (2001: 1) notes that Latin Americans became “citizens through our relationship to Europe,” while warning that links to the US may “reduce us to consumers.”

In contradistinction to the DEM/GEM, a third tendency in sociology picks up on Garfinkel’s cultural dope insight. Endorsing the audience as active rather than passive, it constructs two other model audiences:

- 1 All powerful consumers (invented and loved by neoliberal policymakers, desired

and feared by corporations) who use TV like an appliance, choosing what they want from its programming.

- 2 All powerful interpreters (invented and loved by utopic sociologists and cultural critics, investigated and led by corporations) who use TV to bring pleasure and sense to their lives.

These models have a common origin. In lieu of citizen building, their logic is the construction and control of consumers. Instead of issuing the jeremiads of rat catching psy doomsayers, they claim that the TV audience is so clever and able that it makes its own meanings from programs, outwitting institutions of the state, academia, and capital that seek to measure and control it. Ownership patterns do not matter, because the industry is “wildly volatile,” animated entirely by “the unpredictable choice of the audience” (De Vany 2004: 1, 140). The first approach demonstrates a mechanistic application of neoclassical economics. The second varies between social psychological tests of viewers’ gratifications and a critical ethnography that engages cultural and social questions.

A summary of sociological approaches to television up to the present might look like Table 1.

And the future? What are we to make of digitally generated virtual actors (synthespians), desktop computers that produce and distribute expensive looking images, the New International Division of Cultural Labor’s simultaneous production work on TV programs across the world, and broadband home video

access (Miller et al. 2005)? The rhetoric of the new media is inflected with the phenomenological awe of a precocious child who can be returned to Eden, healing the wounds of the modern as it magically reconciles public and private, labor and leisure, commerce and culture, citizenship and consumption. “Television is dead” (de Silva 2000) and the interactive web is the future. That may be. But it is worth remembering that television stations continue to multiply around the world, that TV is adapting to the use of Internet portals, and that the digital divide separating the poor from high technology is not changing. Two billion people in the world have never made a telephone call, let alone bought bookshelves on line.

In any event, the questions asked of television today illustrate its continued relevance. For example, leading bourgeois economist Jagdish Bhagwati (2002) is convinced that TV is partly to “blame” for global grassroots activism against globalization because television makes people identify with those suffering from capitalism, but has not led to rational action (i.e., support for the neoclassical economic policies he supports, which many would say caused the problem). Just a few pages further on in Bhagwati’s essay, however, cable is suddenly a savior. There is no need to litigate against companies that pollute the environment, or impose sanctions on states that enslave children to become competitive in the global economy, because the rapid flow of information via the media ensures that “multinationals and their host governments cannot afford to alienate their constituencies”

Table 1 Sociological approaches to television

<i>Origins</i>	<i>Topics</i>	<i>Objects</i>	<i>Methods</i>	<i>Allied disciplines</i>
Global	Regulation, industry development	State, capital, labor	Political economy, neoliberalism	Economics, political science, law, communications
US	Genre	Text	Content analysis	Communications
Global	Genre	Text	Textual analysis	Literary/cultural studies
US	Uses	Audience	Uses and gratifications	Communications, psychology, marketing
Global	Uses	Audience	Ethnography	Anthropology, cultural studies, communications
US	Effects	Audience	Experimentation, questionnaire	Psychology, marketing, communications

(pp. 4, 6). The tie between the medium as a heaven and hell is as powerful as it was in Arnheim's forecast seven decades earlier.

We are perhaps witnessing a *transformation* of TV, rather than its demise. Television started in most countries as a *broadcast, national* medium dominated by the state. It is being transformed into a *cable and satellite, international* medium dominated by commerce, but still called "television." A TV like screen, located in domestic and public *spaces*, and transmitting signs from other *places*, will probably be the future.

In many ways, television has become an alembic for understanding society. There is intellectual and political value in utilizing the knowledge gained from sociology to assess this transformation and intervene in it, especially if we borrow from the right traditions. The three basic questions asked by students of the media – "Will this get me a job?" "Is television bad for you?" "How do we get that show back on?" – have direct links to the relationships between text and audience, as understood through ethnography and political economy. The respective answers are: "If you know who owns and regulates the media, you'll know how to apply"; "The answer depends on who is asking the question and why"; and "If you know how audiences are defined and counted and how genre functions, you'll be able to lobby for retention of your favorite programs."

In summary, analyzing television requires interrogating the manufacture and material history of TV sets; creation, commodification, governance, distribution, and interpretation of texts; global exchange of cultural and communications infrastructure and content; and economic rhetoric of communications policies. This can be done by combining political economy, ethnography, and textual analysis into a new critical sociology of TV.

SEE ALSO: Audiences; Culture; Genre; Media; Media and Consumer Culture; Media and Globalization; Media Literacy; Mediated Interaction; Popular Culture

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terrorism

Douglas Kellner

The term terrorism derives from the Latin verb *terrere*, "to cause to tremble or quiver." It began to be used during the French Revolution, and especially after the fall of Robespierre and the "Reign of Terror," or simply "the Terror," in which enemies of the Revolution were subjected to imprisonment, torture, and

beheading, the first of many modern examples of state terrorism.

Over the past two centuries, terrorism has been a highly contested and volatile category. Those accused of terrorism are vilified as enemies of the state and social order, but many labeled “terrorists” insist that they are “freedom fighters,” strugglers for national liberation, or *mujaheddin* (holy warrior) or *fedayeen* (“prepared for martyrdom”), ready to die for righteous causes. Many decry terrorists’ indiscriminate violence against civilians, while other critics like Chomsky (1988) and Herman (1982) document state use of violence and terror against its perceived enemies.

During the nineteenth century, terrorism was frequently associated with anarchism. Russian anarchists and Narodniks (populists) advocated political terror and were responsible for assassinating Czar Alexander II, a frenzied milieu depicted by Fyodor Dostoevsky in his novel *The Possessed* (1913). Nationalist movements also began to use terrorism in anti colonial movements, such as the Irish Republican Brotherhood which carried out attacks in England in the name of Irish nationalism, or groups like the Internal Macedonian Revolutionary Organization which was driven by Slavic nationalism (Laquer 1998).

Sociologically, terrorist groups often recruit disaffected and alienated individuals, often motivated by strong ideologies like nationalism or religion to commit terrorist acts. These in turn generate societal fear and exacerbate conflicts and hatred within the social fabric.

During the twentieth century, oppositional political groups ranging from anarchists and nationalists on the left to fascists and the ultra right used political terror to promote their agendas, engaging in bombing, destroying property, political assassination, and other destructive action to attack the established order. Colonial national liberation movements spread throughout the globe, such as the Mau Mau group in Africa, the Palestinians in the Middle East, the Irish Republican Army in Britain, and the Basque liberation group ETA in Spain.

The term has also been associated in the twentieth century with indiscriminate or excessive use of state violence and has been leveled against actions of Nazi Germany, the Soviet Union, the United States, Israel, and other

countries. For instance, Chomsky (1988) and Herman (1982) document a wide range of US state terrorist actions in Southeast Asia, Africa, South America, and elsewhere, with Chomsky pointing out that the US is the only country that has ever been convicted of an international act of terrorism by the World Court, which condemned US acts against Nicaragua during the 1980s.

From the 1980s to the present, terrorists have constructed spectacles of terror to promote their causes, attack their adversaries, and gain world wide publicity and attention. Terror spectacle has become an increasingly significant part of contemporary terrorism and various groups systematically use spectacles of terror to promote their agenda. Extravagant terrorist acts are thus orchestrated in part as media spectacles to gain worldwide attention, dramatize the issues of the terrorist groups involved, and achieve specific political objectives (Kellner 2003).

The hijacking of airplanes had been a standard terrorist activity, but the ante was significantly upped when, in 1970, the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine hijacked three western jetliners. The group forced the planes to land in the Jordanian desert, and then blew up the planes in an incident known as “Black September,” which was the topic of a Hollywood film. In 1972, Palestinian gunmen from the same movement stunned the world when they took Israeli athletes hostage at the Munich Olympic Games, producing another media spectacle turned into an academy award winning documentary film.

In 1975, an OPEC (Organization for Petroleum Exporting Countries) meeting was disrupted in Vienna, Austria when a terrorist group led by the notorious Carlos the Jackal entered, killing three people and wounding several in a chaotic shootout. Americans were targeted in a 1983 bombing in Beirut, Lebanon, in which 243 US servicemen were killed in a truck bombing orchestrated by a Shiite Muslim suicide bomber, which led the US to withdraw its troops from Lebanon. US tourists were victims in 1985 of Palestinians who seized the cruise ship *Achille Lauro*, when Leon Klinghoffer, 69, a disabled Jewish American, was killed and his body and wheelchair were thrown overboard. In June 1985, a double bombing of Air India jets originating from Canada attracted

global attention, as did a 1988 bombing of Pan Am Flight 103 over Lockerbie, Scotland.

In 1993, the World Trade Center was bombed in New York by Islamist terrorists linked to Osama bin Laden, providing a preview of the more spectacular September 11 aggression. An American born terrorist, Timothy McVeigh, bombed the Alfred P. Murrah Federal Building in Oklahoma City, killing 168 and wounding more than 500. Further, the bin Laden group assaulted US embassies in Africa in 1998 and a US destroyer harbored in Yemen in 2000.

Periodic IRA attacks in Britain continued, including a 1998 car bomb attack in Omagh, Northern Ireland that killed 29 and injured hundreds, creating great outrage. On September 11, 2001, terror attacks against the World Trade Center in New York and the Pentagon in Washington, DC became a global media spectacle (Kellner 2003). The September 11 terror spectacle was the most extravagant strike on US targets in its history and the first foreign attack on its territory since the war of 1812. The 9/11 attacks inaugurated a “war on terror” by the Bush administration and was the prelude to highly publicized terrorist bombings in London, Pakistan, Bali, and elsewhere, and Bush administration military interventions in Afghanistan and Iraq as “preemptive” actions in the “war on terror.” Many critics accused the Bush administration of state technology in its invasion and occupation of Iraq.

Terrorism and terror war have thus become defining features of the twenty first century. Governments throughout the world have attempted to more precisely define and criminalize terrorism, while terrorist activities multiply. As weapons of destruction become more deadly and widespread, social divisions between haves and have nots multiply, and conflict rages throughout the world, terrorism will likely continue to be a major issue and problem of the present era.

SEE ALSO: Violence; War; World Conflict

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text/hypertext

Gregory L. Ulmer

Hypertext refers to a network of nodes or lexias (units of content) connected non sequentially by links, forming a docuverse that includes users in a feedback loop, usually in a computer medium. The first description of hypertext as a concept was by Vannevar Bush, in an article entitled “As We May Think,” published in the *Atlantic Monthly* in 1945. Bush imagined a machine desk called “memex” that could solve the problem of storage and retrieval created by the modern information explosion. Merging the functions of a library and a personal filing system, memex proposed to support and augment an associative indexing corresponding to the actual processes of human thought, memory, and imagination. Individuals researching the branching paths of information related to an inquiry would build trails of connections through the collective archive of recorded information, and these trails would be preserved, shared, and cross referenced, establishing possibly a new profession of knowledge “trailblazers.”

Inspired by memex, Theodor Holm Nelson coined the term hypertext (and also hypermedia, to include multimedia) in 1965. “Such a system as the ELF (Evolutionary List File) actually ties in better than anything previously used with the actual processes by which thought is progressively organized, whether into stories or hypertext or library categories. Thus it may help integrate for human understanding bodies of material so diversely connected that they could not be untangled by the unaided mind” (Nelson 1989: 145). Nelson’s vision, called the

Xanadu project (referring to the “magic place of literary memory” in Samuel Taylor Coleridge’s poem *Kubla Khan*), extended memex into a global archive in which users could write as well as read. Xanadu’s multiple styles of hypertext were at least partially realized in the greatest hypermedia system to date, the World Wide Web. Tim Berners Lee introduced the document description language HTML (hypertext markup language) in 1989 that made the Internet into a hypertext system. Even with the addition of the graphical browser, created by Marc Andreessen in 1993, however, the available equipment and its applications have not approached the full realization of the hypertext vision. Lev Manovich argued that the most important creators of the twentieth century are the people who invented the hypermedia tools, adding to the names already mentioned those of Douglas Englebart, who invented the mouse and windowed interface, Ivan Sutherland, whose Sketchpad was the first paint program, and J. C. R. Licklider, director of DARPA (Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency). All these figures made their contributions in the 1960s.

To appreciate the full potential of hypertext it is useful to place its development in the context of the concept of apparatus (social machine) commonly used in media studies. To say that hypertext is part of a new apparatus beginning to replace literacy helps avoid the fallacy of technological determinism. A language apparatus includes not only technology, but also institutional practices and human identity formation. It is possible to grasp what is happening in our time by analogy with the shift from orality to literacy in classical Greece, when Plato and Aristotle invented the institution of school, and the practices of alphabetic writing, including logic, method, and the category system of concepts (metaphysics) that eventually produced modern science. To have a term for the digital equivalent of literacy helps identify more easily the full range of inventions in progress across the dimensions of the apparatus. This neologism is “electracy,” combining “electricity” with the theory of “trace” used by Jacques Derrida to describe the operations of text (Ulmer 1989).

The beginnings of electracy as technology date from the 1830s, with the invention of

photography and Charles Babbage’s analytical engine, an information processor (never built) based on the punchcards of the Jacquard loom. The metaphor of “textile” in the root of “text” is worth noting in this context. The separate trajectories of these inventions converged finally in the graphical computer, making possible the mutual mapping between the culture of mass media entertainment operating through television and the culture of disciplinary science supported by the databases of information processors.

Hypertext is not only the result of a history of technology, but also the most recent manifestation of the ancient dream of a perfect or universal language. To deal with the information overload caused by manuscript culture, for example, medieval pedagogy promoted the art of memory. Mnemonic systems, associating real or imaginary settings and striking (violent or sexual) images with bodies of information, facilitated memorization in service of oratory. The practice led to attempts to build actual memory theaters, such as the one designed by Giulio Camillo in the 1530s. Large enough to be occupied by two people, the theater was a hypertextual organization (consisting of cross-referenced drawers filled with slips of writing) of the oeuvre of Cicero.

Mnemonic learning practices served several historical currents, including hermeticism and the trend leading from the search for a universal language to the creation of the encyclopedia in the Enlightenment. Jorge Luis Borges, whose story *The Garden of Forking Paths* (1941) is often mentioned as an allegory of hypertext design, drew upon this tradition of philosophical languages as a source for a number of seemingly bizarre ideas about writing and memory. The most influential fictional representation of what it might be like for an individual to think with complete access to the entire dynamic archive of collective information is William Gibson’s cyberpunk novel *Neuromancer*. In the two novels following *Neuromancer*, Gibson, who coined the term cyberspace, drew upon the event of possession in Haitian Vodun as a metaphor for this merger of individual and collective mind.

The key practical issue for those continuing to invent hypertext as an apparatus concerns the nature of the human–computer interface (HCI).

What remains to be invented is the electrated equivalent of logic, rhetoric, and poetics that allows people to be native users of a docuverse. The issue is foregrounded in Michael Joyce's *Afternoon* (1987), the first and still one of the most important examples of hypertext fiction. Composed in StorySpace, a hypertext authoring program developed by Joyce with Jay David Bolter and John B. Smith, *Afternoon* is a detective story in which the reader attempts to figure out the plot by navigating a complex set of nodes and links. The feeling of being lost in a maze reported by many readers of *Afternoon* may be extended to hypertext in general, in which reading is the exploration of an information space, whether in the mode of fiction, game, or encyclopedia. In this regard Espen Aarseth proposed as the two primary rhetorical figures of hypertext the tropes of aporia (impasse) and epiphany (revelation). The pleasure of navigation involves a eureka moment in which the user discovers how to continue the path productively. Aarseth also proposes the term "ergodic" to replace "narrative" to describe cybertexts in which the sequence through the lexias is different at each reading.

The labyrinth effect of hypertext makes explicit what was always implicit in the literate archive. Umberto Eco's study of semiotics clarifies that what hypertext embodies and renders tangible is nothing less than the dynamic, open, and infinite operation of meaning in process. Eco describes semiotics as a transition away from the logical categories of literate concepts generated by definition (semantics), to a new kind of category functioning through inference, having more to do with pragmatics. Since the meanings involved are interpretants, including the subjectivity of the individual, they take the form collectively of a labyrinth of the network or rhizomatic type, lacking both center and outside.

What are the practices that enable reading and writing in a labyrinthine docuverse? This is the fundamental active question of hypertext. Within the unifying framework of electracy it is possible to recognize that hypertext is being invented across the apparatus. The fact that hypertextual features are found in certain literary works such as *Tristram Shandy* (digression) or *Wuthering Heights* (nested points of view), not to mention *Finnegans Wake* (trace)

and other experimental works, is explained by the fact that the genealogy of hypermedia is social and cultural as well as technological. *Afternoon* is described as modernist in its aesthetics and postmodernist in its use of technical devices. Lev Manovich has shown that the practices of collage montage invented by the vanguard arts across the media, especially concentrated in the movements of the 1920s, have been designed into the interface controls of the software used to author in new media. Unfortunately, many artists experimenting with new media complain that the public have yet to internalize the equivalent rhetoric in their worldview, and continue to use as their default model of intelligibility the pop forms of mass entertainment.

The institutional practices appropriate for hypertext have at least been theorized, beginning in the same decade of the 1960s that produced the Xanadu project and the GUI tools, when a group of critics working in France formulated the poststructural theory of "text." When commentators claim that hypertext makes poststructuralism seem obvious, or that the Web is the laboratory for testing poststructural principles, they are referring to the writings of such figures as Roland Barthes, Julia Kristeva, and Jacques Derrida. The new meaning of "text" appearing in the 1960s was the culmination of the "linguistic turn" in the arts and letters disciplines going back to the beginnings of modernism in the nineteenth century. Meaning based on reference to an objective reality was replaced by signification emerging from the relationships among the elements of a system. Structuralism was the science of such systems. Poststructuralism took up the question of pragmatics, concerned with the experience of people within discourse.

Structuralism treated everything in culture as a language, thus doing for theory what the convergence of media in digital technology did for the equipment. The way was prepared for theorizing reading and writing as the traversal of a virtual world designed as a discourse. Roland Barthes (who introduced the term *lexia* to describe a unit of reading) devoted his entry on "text" for the *Encyclopaedie Universalis* to an exposition of Julia Kristeva's "semanalysis," which he said created an epistemological mutation by integrating linguistics and semiotics

with dialectical materialism and psychoanalysis. The old notion of a literary “work” as a unique bounded entity expressing the intentions of an individual author was replaced with the semiotic notion of text as an intertextual transformation of other texts. Kristeva introduced “intertext” to translate Mikhail Bakhtin’s “dialogical word” – the idea that every word is a crossroads of other words, opening onto the entire field of language, with meaning as an ideological struggle for possession of the field. Derrida’s “trace” expresses a similar idea that every sign carries the traces of all other signs.

The shift of identity experience in electracry is related to the “death of the author,” which Barthes reminds us is also the birth of the reader. Or, rather, text deconstructs the opposition between writer and reader, since what it names is not an inherent property of completed works, but a “productivity” of signification produced by the reader reworking the found materials of discourse. Text theatricalizes the encounter of the subject with language. “Subject” is not the person, but the identity position ideologically constructed in culture. The subject does not speak language, but is spoken by it. There is no position of critical distance outside the text, outside history or society, from which to judge events.

This loss of control over intention is compensated for by a new relationship of the subject immersed in discourse, which Barthes characterizes as “bliss.” Signification does not concern communication or message, but a new dimension of logic, of inference, which Barthes compares to Freud’s dreamwork (condensation and displacement). The technical, vanguard, and theoretical trajectories converge on this insight: the rhetoric of hypertext is precisely poetry (Bush’s associative thinking, or what Marcos Novak called liquid architecture). Poetry, or more generally the aesthetic operations observed in all varieties of creative thinking, contains the resources which it is the task of educators and designers today to translate into a “general electracry” that is to digital culture what general literacy is to print culture.

SEE ALSO: Cyberculture; Deconstruction; Digital; Internet; Media Literacy; Postmodernism; Poststructuralism; Semiotics

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theology

Karl Gabriel

The modern conception of theology as both a faithful and rational or scientific way of talking about God dates from the Christian Middle Ages. Theology as a term is rooted in Greek philosophy, which consisted of three parts: the mythology of the gods, theology as a form of philosophy of nature, and political theology as a public cult. Christendom only reluctantly accepted the term. It is only from the twelfth century onwards that the term theology is commonly used for this science of Christian faith in contrast to the term philosophy. The late Middle Ages finds the term entirely accepted and it is even taken over by Martin Luther. In modern times it is especially used to distinguish between religious philosophy and religious studies on the one hand and Christian doctrine on the other.

Christian theology finds its roots in the biblical tradition. In its first phase since the second century, theology was dominated by the apologetical defense of faith from external attack as well as inner gnostic debate. Clement of

Alexandria and Origen developed the first conceptions of systematic knowledge and of an understanding of faith. From the thirteenth century a new prototype of theology as science of faith was established. The West and East developed differently, with western theology concerned with inner processes of systematization and rationalization, while the East was more liturgically and spiritually oriented. Furthermore, philosophy and theology in the West were separated, and challenged faith and science to bring forth their inner connection. Thomas Aquinas thought of God from the rational as well as the revelational points of view. The plurality of theologies was already apparent in the Middle Ages. Thus, scholastic theology with its tendencies to rationalize and intellectualize faith went hand in hand with forms of theology with ties to Augustinian Neoplatonic thinking or those which were more biblically or affectively oriented, such as the *devotio moderna*. Nominalism in the late Middle Ages came under the pressure of the medieval synthesis of faith and reason until it fell apart during the Reformation.

Modern western theology is marked by schism and conflict with modern society and culture. Reformation, due to the negation of scholastic theology, fell back on the Bible and on patristic theology, as well as trends of mysticism. For Luther, the object of theology was no longer the unity of faith and reason, but "the culpable and forlorn individual and the justificatory or saving God" (WA: 327). Modern trends in Protestant theology are marked either by the search for a connection with modern culture (e.g., the theology of the Enlightenment and liberal theology) or a stress on separation (e.g., Pietism and dialectical theology). At first, modern Catholic theology was anti Protestant and dominated by controversy. Neo Scholasticism, which was established in the nineteenth century, combined the critical debate with Protestantism with a separation towards modern culture and society. Approaches in liberal Catholic theology like the "Tübinger Schule" cannot convince or were clerically sentenced during the controversy over modernism. The struggle against modernism did not exclude inner processes of modernization in Catholic theology or in ecclesiastical structures.

Theology conceives of its modern form in processes of inner differentiation which follow the general development of society and science. When it began in the twelfth and thirteenth centuries it was still homogeneous in its interpretation of the Bible, reflection on faith, and introduction to religious practices. The beginnings of the separation of biblical and systematic theology reach back as far as the Middle Ages. In its function of thinking about faith, theology consists of three basic structures: historical, systematic, and practical science. Historical theology gained its modern form through the development of the historical critical method, which leads to tensions with systematic theology. Pastoral theology reacts to the modern differentiation of religion and society and helps establish practical theological disciplines which specialize in the practical role of the church in society. It is a specific part of modern theology that it reflects and copies the plurality of scientific approaches and disciplines. Today, theology signifies the connection between historical disciplines (contemporary history and exegesis of the Old and New Testament, church history), systematic disciplines (philosophy, fundamental theology, dogmatics, moral theology, social ethics), and practical disciplines (pastoral theology, liturgics, canon law, missionary science, religious education). The unity within the plurality of theologies is nowadays mainly expressed in the challenges it faces: the overcoming of confessional separation, the dialogue between religions, the variety of cultures, and the separation of the world into the poor and the rich. Theology is challenged to demonstrate the unity of the Christian promise of salvation and the culturality of Christian faith. It proves to be most fruitful where it succeeds in interpreting faith as part of a sociopolitical and cultural sphere with a view to its capability for experience and action. This is all the more clear in outlines of contextual theology developed across confessional boundaries, the best known of which are feminist theology, the theology of liberation, the theology of enculturation, and the theology of religions. In the sciences, theology nowadays appears to be an indispensable science of the cultural memory and a challenge to overcome the limitations of the modern understanding of science as a system of

hypothetical deductive propositions within interdisciplinary dialogue.

SEE ALSO: Catholicism; Denomination; Hermeneutics; Orthodoxy; Protestantism; Religion; Science and Religion; Secularization

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theoretical research programs

David G. Wagner

A theoretical research program has three components: a set of interrelated theories, a set of substantive and methodological working strategies used to generate and evaluate these theories, and a set of models for empirical investigation and analysis based on these theories. Theoretical research programs provide accounts of social phenomena as diverse as affect control, status

organization, network exchange, resource mobilization, revolution, and coalition formation in political action. Berger and Zelditch (1993, 2002) present detailed discussion and analysis of these and many other programs. Wagner (1984) discusses the source of the concept in the work of philosopher of science Imre Lakatos (1968, 1970) on scientific research programs.

Theoretical research programs are important to our understanding of how sociological knowledge grows. Programs are distinct from the broad, overarching meta theoretical strategies, such as functionalism and interactionism, which orient the construction of individual theories. Programs are more dynamic than strategies, the latter growing only very slowly and seldom in response to assessment of the theories that they generate. Programs are also distinct from individual theoretical arguments, or *unit theories*, such as Davis and Moore's theory of stratification or Lenski's theory of status crystallization. Although programs generally originate in a unit theory, they become much more complex as a network of interrelated theories emerges over time.

TYPES OF RELATIONS

The interrelation among theories in a program arises from a *core set* of key abstract concepts and assertions that are used in all the theories in the program. For example, the idea of an expectation state is central to the status characteristics program, the notion of a resource flow to the network exchange program. Over time these core ideas come to be used in a variety of different ways that expand our knowledge. Each of these ways represents a distinct pattern of the theoretical growth.

First, the ideas may be elaborated to provide a more detailed or specific account of the phenomenon under study. Theory T_2 is an *elaboration* of theory T_1 if it uses the same underlying core ideas to address a similar explanatory domain as T_1 , and is more comprehensive or specific or has better empirical grounding than T_1 . Usually, T_2 is intended to serve as a replacement for T_1 . Elaborations may expand the explanatory scope of a theory, formalize its structure, or enhance the empirical consequences of a theory and its corroboration.

For instance, a distributive justice theory that originally dealt only with situations involving quantity goods later expanded to deal with quality goods.

When combined with a few other new ideas, the core ideas may generate a new theory designed to explain different phenomena. T_2 is a *proliferant* of T_1 if it expands the core ideas (or adds new ones) to address a new explanatory domain or new theoretical problems in the domain of T_1 . In this case, both theories are likely to be viable and important explanatory tools, since they address different problems or phenomena. Proliferations significantly expand the range of sociological problems or phenomena to which a program's theories can be applied. For example, the concept of a source evaluator was added to expectation states theory to help explain how significant others affect actors' self evaluations and subsequent group behavior.

Sometimes two very closely related theories are developed from the same core ideas to develop more precise knowledge about how a process operates. T_1 and T_2 are *variants* of each other if they address the same or very similar explanatory domains, but propose slightly different mechanisms to account for how the process operates within that domain. Variants allow the theorist to consider and resolve small differences in understanding. Often, the result is a specification of different conditions under which each mechanism operates. For example, variant accounts of bargaining processes suggest that the use of threatening tactics either deters others from engaging in punitive behavior or leads to a spiral of conflicting threats that increases the likelihood of punitive behavior. Such variant theories may then be closely compared to determine which account provided the more effective explanation.

A superficially similar kind of relation appears when T_1 and T_2 use different sets of core ideas to address the same or overlapping explanatory domains. In this circumstance the theories are *competitors*. However, because of the significant differences in theoretical structure, it is often much more difficult to resolve explanatory differences between competitors than between variants. For example, one theory for the stabilization of mental illness invokes a labeling process, another focuses on psychophysiological

processes, and these have competed with each other without full resolution since they were first articulated in the 1960s.

Finally, ideas in one theory may be combined with ideas from another theory to provide a deeper or more complete account of phenomena or domains that previously were treated separately. Theory T_3 is an *integration* of T_1 and T_2 if it consolidates many of the ideas from the earlier theories, articulating ways in which they may be related. The manner in which integration is accomplished depends on the nature of the relation between T_1 and T_2 . If the integrated theories were variants, a common outcome is likely to be conditionalization. That is, T_1 is identified as operating under one set of conditions, T_2 under another set. Thus, when considering deterrence versus conflict spiral accounts of bargaining behavior, research has shown that deterrence occurs as long as the stakes in the bargaining remain relatively low. As the stakes increase, threat tactics prompt like responses, thereby generating the conditions for conflict spiral.

If T_1 and T_2 are proliferants, the integrating theory is likely to describe ways in which the different processes considered by the two earlier theories are interrelated. Accounts of the two processes may remain distinct, but connections between them are specified. For instance, reward expectations theory partially integrates status characteristics theory and the status value theory of distributive justice, the latter two theories previously having been proliferants. Reward expectations theory accomplishes this by specifying how expectations for task performance and expectations for reward allocation may form simultaneously in status situations.

Integrating competitors is most challenging. In this case the integrating theory usually must specify a new set of core ideas with which to describe the phenomena within its domain. Thus, Guillermina Jasso combined ideas from both multiple prior theories of distributive justice in developing her own. Key to her integration was the concept of a justice evaluation function, an idea that did not exist in either earlier theory.

Much more thorough accounts of the types of relation that may occur in theoretical research programs are available in Wagner (1984) and Wagner and Berger (1985). Those sources also

include detailed discussion and citation of relevant examples of each type.

WORKING STRATEGIES

Orienting strategies specify the fundamental aims and presuppositions that guide theoretical work. They provide an underlying ontology (what is to be seen as sociologically real) and an epistemology (how we know what is real). They also provide a substantive foundation of presuppositions about such issues as the nature of the actor, action, and the social order. Does the actor have agency? Is action rational? What is the relative importance of conflict and consensus in action? While orienting strategies provide the meta theoretical framework within which theoretical research programs may grow, they generally do not grow significantly or very rapidly, nor do they generally change in response to developments in the programs they frame.

There are, however, other elements of orienting strategies that do change and grow significantly in association with theoretical research programs. The directives of these *working strategies* are somewhat more specific and concrete than those of an overarching orienting strategy. Methodological working strategies provide concepts and principles dealing with the nature of the theory, the logic of inquiry, and the criteria for assessing theories. Herbert Blumer's proposal of a naturalistic method for investigating symbolic interaction is, for example, a methodological working strategy. Substantive working strategies provide concepts and principles specifying what properties of actors, action, and society are considered to be crucial for investigating social phenomena. They identify what kinds of problems are worth solving and what concepts and principles to use in solving them. Merton's proposals for functional analysis represent a substantive working strategy.

Working strategies play an important role in determining what the core ideas in a program should be, what questions should be addressed, and how they should be investigated. The answers generated constitute the different theories in a program. Methodological working strategies specify how these theories are to be constructed and what methodological tools are

to be employed in testing them. The foundational directives of orienting strategies provide the premises that justify working strategies; working strategies then specify more concretely how those premises can be realized.

Working strategies do not simply respond to broad foundational directives. They also respond to the success or failure of the elaborations, proliferants, variants, competitors, and integrations they stimulate. In fact, an articulation of at least some of the elements of a working strategy may only emerge gradually as theories in a program develop, broaden, and deepen understanding of the ideas under investigation. (For an illustration of this process, see the conceptualization of social interaction as a state organizing process in expectation states theory, in Berger et al. 1989, 1992). Thus, working strategies grow and change as a part of, and in concert with, the theories in the programs they guide.

MODELS

Another aspect of the development of theoretical research programs is associated with the implementation of theoretically based empirical models for research. Such models may include specifications of concrete instances of phenomena that can be modeled with the concepts and principles of theories in the program; they may specify conditions under which the model is expected to apply; they may identify observational techniques and procedures useful in applying the model; they may provide ways of interrelating elements from different theories in a program to deal with the complexity apparent in a particular application situation.

These are all issues of relevance in evaluating theoretical research programs. Models are central to evaluating the empirical adequacy of a program in representing specific social situations. They are also useful in specifying the range of situations and phenomena to which a program can be applied. Finally, models are essential in assessing how useful a program might be as a basis for intervention and change in specific social situations. (On the role of models in theory growth, see Berger & Zelditch 1998.)

MULTIDIMENSIONALITY OF THEORY GROWTH

Whether and how sociological knowledge is seen to grow thus depends on the unit of analysis chosen for considering the issue. A focus on the broad foundational orienting strategies of the discipline reveals very stable intellectual structures that change only very slowly (if at all) and without being particularly responsive to the fortunes of the theories generated from these strategies. A focus on individual unit theories yields only a consideration of changes in the empirical base for a static theoretical structure. And a focus on organizational and institutional properties like citation analyses and funding patterns reveals only growth in the social structures within which knowledge might occur, not the growth of knowledge itself.

A focus on theoretical research programs reveals *multiple* kinds and sources of growth. Knowledge grows through articulation and refinement of the working strategies that guide the construction of programs. Knowledge grows through the construction of new theories within programs. Elaborations, proliferants, variants, competitors, and integrations increase both the breadth of theoretical issues considered and the depth of understanding of those issues. Knowledge grows through assessments of the empirical adequacy and instrumental utility of the theory based models programs generate. A consideration of all of these patterns is necessary to fully understand how our sociological knowledge may be improved.

SEE ALSO: Affect Control Theory; Exchange Network Theory; Expectation States Theory; Power Dependence Theory; Social Justice, Theories of; Stratification and Inequality, Theories of; Theory; Theory Construction; Theory and Methods

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theory

Barry Markovskiy

There are many different views in sociology about what theory is and what it should be. Many of these views are complementary, referring to different aspects of the process of theorizing, or to particular qualities that are more or less emphasized by different theorists. Some views are so disparate, however, as to be mutually incompatible, even while achieving legitimacy within mutually exclusive streams of sociological work. The purpose here is not to critically evaluate sociology's various theories and approaches, but rather to provide a short overview of some of the major strands of theoretical work. The approach will be to present several dimensions along which sociological theories have varied.

First, theories may be distinguished by major "schools," also known as approaches, frameworks, paradigms, metatheories, orientations, traditions, and by other labels as well. These

forms of theorizing tend to be relatively unstructured, open to interpretation, and immune to falsification – qualities that contrast markedly with the more parsimonious and rigorous products of formal theorizing. Some argue for reserving the term “theory” just for this more tightly constructed form, as this more clearly distinguishes statements that are considered to *embody* the theory from statements and discussions that are merely *about* the theory. Second, theories may be distinguished along a temporal dimension based upon when they first entered and impacted the discipline’s corpus of knowledge. A number of historians of sociology have attempted to rationalize the progression of the theories and schools, typically interpreting later developments as reactions against their immediate predecessors. Third, theories may be distinguished according to the extent to which they have been developed and evaluated with explicit reference to scientific standards. This dimension of evaluation should be important to sociology to the extent that its ultimate goal is to develop theories that are general, precise, and systematically evaluated in the empirical world. Finally, several additional properties will be considered that do not fit neatly into the above scheme.

SCHOOLS OF SOCIOLOGICAL THEORIZING

A small number of schools of sociological theorizing appear in virtually all textbooks on the subject. The remainder, a very much larger number (at least 70, judging by the 2005 edition of the *Encyclopedia of Social Theory*), range from near universal coverage to rarely seen in contemporary theory texts. This means that any review covering more than a handful of schools is invoking the personal tastes of the reviewer: there is no agreed upon metric for evaluating a school’s relative success or impact.

Conflict. Conflict theories focus on destabilizing factors such as social inequalities and social change. Karl Marx usually is credited with ushering in this orientation, with his emphasis on struggles between social classes with opposing interests, the emergence of collective consciousness among the oppressed, and the conditions for violent revolutionary change. Early versions

of the perspective were further articulated by Max Weber and Georg Simmel. Beginning in the late 1950s and extending through the 1970s, a succession of theorists extended and refined various strands of thought within the developing tradition. Ralf Dahrendorf, Lewis Coser, Jonathan Turner, and Randall Collins are among the more prominent. Each developed a critique of prior work, and each sought to integrate and streamline some of the disparate insights of his predecessors. The conflict approach since has evolved into other lines of work, e.g., neo Marxist theories, resource mobilization theory, theories of social revolutions, and breakdown theories of social movements.

Exchange. Social exchange theories reflect a kind of economic approach to social relations. As such, social actors (individuals or collectivities) are regarded as having individual interests that can be satisfied through exchanging goods, information, services – anything that others might accept in return for providing something of value. Many exchange theorists are further concerned with the larger social forces that bind together different interactants even as they pursue their individual interests. Roots of the exchange tradition in sociology can be found in the writings of Marx and Simmel. However, it was the more focused and explicit work of George Homans on behaviorist foundations, John Thibaut and Harold Kelley on rewards and costs in dyadic relationships, and Peter Blau on bridging to macro structures that really established this area’s identity by the 1960s. Richard Emerson and his collaborators subsequently developed a formal theory of power–dependence relations based on exchange principles, including an initial foray into social network relations. During this time, James Coleman, David Willer, and others also were developing exchange network theories addressing power, structural change, and other phenomena. Most theories of distributive justice and equity owe a debt to the exchange perspective, and more recent theorizing on group solidarity and commitment, legitimacy, and rational choice are offshoots of, or otherwise connected to, the exchange perspective.

Functionalism. Functionalism (a.k.a. *structural functionalism*) dominated sociology for much of the period between 1930 and 1960. It regards social systems as consisting of differentiated,

interdependent substructures having corresponding functions that operate in a coordinated fashion to maintain the integrity of the system as a whole. The basic ideas were first inspired by analogies to living organisms. Many theorists in this area strove to identify a set of universal *requisite* functions that are essential for the survival of any system. Early theorists included Auguste Comte, Herbert Spencer, and Émile Durkheim. In the mid twentieth century, major figures included Robert K. Merton, who was best known for emphasizing the development of “theories of the middle range” (between grand and particularistic), and Talcott Parsons, known for his adaptation, goal attainment, integration, and latency (AGIL) model of system functions. Although functionalism lost its dominant status in sociology many years ago, its core ideas have continued to evolve and persist through several other lines of work such as human ecology, organizational ecology, neo-functionalism, evolutionary approaches, and others.

Interactionism. In contrast to the larger field’s primary concern with macro scale social phenomena, the interactionist tradition in sociology gives primacy to what we may call the *social individual*. Charles Horton Cooley’s work in the early 1900s on the emergence of self concepts out of social interaction proved to be seminal. George Herbert Mead became a leading figure in the 1930s and beyond by synthesizing earlier work and making theoretical connections between societal institutions, the social self, and the minds of human actors. Mead’s ideas were extended by theorists such as Jacob Moreno and Robert Park, both of whom emphasized the self–society connections inherent in the process of occupying social roles. While the core of this line of work came to be known as *symbolic interactionism*, branches instigated by the likes of Edmund Husserl, Alfred Schütz, Herbert Blumer, Manfred Kuhn, and others included phenomenology, ethnomethodology, self theories, role theories, identity theories, emotion theories, sociolinguistics, dramaturgical analysis, conversation analysis, and more. There have been numerous prominent contributors to these theoretical developments including Ralph Turner, Erving Goffman, Aaron Cicourel, Harold Garfinkel, Sheldon Stryker, Theodore Kemper, Randall

Collins, and others. Among the more interesting developments are several theories that go against the interactionist preference for discursive theorizing: David Heise’s affect control theory, Peter Burke’s identity control theory, and Joseph Berger’s expectation states theory are all formal theories with roots in interactionism. Each has survived systematic empirical testing and grown increasingly broad and precise over time.

Structuralism. As the label implies, structuralism is concerned with the ways that patterns among social objects determine social behavior. Within this rubric can be found a dizzying array of topics, levels of analysis, and styles of theorizing. Thus, the objects of investigation can range from patterns of individual cognitions to the patterns of political coalitions among nations. The field of structuralist theories was far simpler in the twentieth century when it emerged as a direct extension of certain strands within Marxist, Durkheimian, and Simmelian theorizing. Toward the middle of the century, however, the area experienced an infusion of disparate influences from the French social anthropologist Claude Lévi Strauss and his cognitive linguistic approach; from the British anthropologist Alfred Radcliffe Brown, who emphasized the reality of social structures rather than cognitive representations of them; and from the US by Moreno’s sociometry, Alex Bavelas’s communication network studies, balance theoretic approaches of Fritz Heider, Theodore Newcomb, Dorwin Cartwright, and Frank Harary, and Blau’s macrostructural theory. Today, the more recent approaches emerging from structuralist traditions hardly seem related at all: social network analysis, Pierre Bourdieu’s cultural conflict theory, Anthony Giddens’s structuration theory, and many others.

Others. The preceding represents only a small sample of schools of sociological theorizing, albeit a sample whose components have had profound impacts on the field. Many others have achieved at least some level of prominence, however. In addition to several schools or perspectives mentioned but not elaborated in the preceding paragraphs, members of another set receive relatively frequent mention in contemporary textbooks and websites. To characterize some of these briefly and in no particular order:

Critical theory is so named based on its critical stance toward modernity, culture, capitalism, or other properties of what at the time is contemporary society. *Ethnomethodology* examines methods by which actors develop a sense of social order and meaning. *Feminist theories* are concerned with examining and elevating the social, political, and economic status of women in society. *Postmodernism* offers non- and anti-scientific commentaries on conditions in post-industrial society. *Systems theories* focus on structures and dynamics constituted by social system components. *Neofunctionalism* offers postpositivist antidotes to some of the limitations of functionalism. *Neo Marxism* consists of twentieth century attempts to account for major problems in Marx's earlier theorizing.

In summary, it is evident that sociology has a great accumulation of schools and perspectives. An optimistic view might then be that there is a fantastic "database" of ideas from which to solve intellectual and social problems. A more pessimistic view is that most of the vast proliferation of ideas seem to wax and wane according to factors that have little to do with their precision, generality, parsimony, or communicability. A view that is both realistic and constructive might be that theorists may now focus less on the process of proliferating ideas, and more on the task of weeding out via careful logical and empirical analyses those which cannot demonstrate their merits. This means relegating many ideas strictly to "history of sociology" texts, despite whatever intellectual, political, or emotional appeal they may hold for however many contemporary adherents. Progressive fields improve systematically on their most promising theories and move beyond the rest.

HISTORIES OF SOCIOLOGICAL THEORIZING

There have been many attempts to trace the historical development of sociological theory, usually from a "classical" era in the mid nineteenth century to the present day. Most efforts interweave temporal and intellectual dimensions. That is, the publication dates of the works that are reviewed in any such reconstruction can be ordered along a timeline. Sometimes the timeline provides the backbone for the entire

review. Otherwise the timeline may be applied within but not across intellectual schools, for instance separately retracing the emergence of functionalism and interactionism via the appearance of publications associated with these respective areas. A third strategy has been to focus on one or more intellectual epochs, interpreting their development as resulting from the influences of contemporaneous intellectual endeavors and other factors. This exemplifies the application of sociology of knowledge to sociology itself: the objects of inquiry are sociological ideas and theories, with historians of the discipline offering speculations as to how empirical factors – prevailing social and political conditions, personal histories of the authors, received theories and perspectives of the day – instigated and shaped emerging schools of thought. Thus, the line between historical description and historical interpretation may blur – a bad thing if one is interested in the bald facts of sociology's history, but a good thing if one is interested in speculating on how sociology came to be the way it is today. Perhaps needless to say, there is high consensus on the temporal dimension of sociological theorizing, but less consensus on the intellectual dimensions that have shaped sociological theory.

The "sociological canon" – the authors whose seminal work is assigned in practically all sociological theory courses – includes Marx, Weber, and Durkheim. Their masterworks comprise sociology's body of *classical theory*, usually along with those of several of their contemporaries and near contemporaries whose selection tends to vary across writers. Classical theory is rife with big ideas and big aspirations. That the theorizing tended to manifest grandiose rhetoric and only selective empirical validation was and is perfectly forgivable: these were trailblazers in new territories.

Sociological theory produced within the current generation of scholars (roughly the last 25 years or so) is deemed *contemporary*. Theorizing that emerged in the years between the classical and contemporary periods also is often called contemporary, or else distinguished from contemporary theory by being called *modern*. In the brief sketches to follow, this period simply will be called *post classical*, distinct from work residing both in the classical canon and in the most recent decades.

Classical theorizing. The sociological literature cites more or less frequently a number of European scholars that made substantial contributions either during or directly preceded the classical period. In order of their birth years (1770 to 1864) and including those noted above, they were G. W. F. Hegel, Comte, Marx, Spencer, Vilfredo Pareto, Sigmund Freud, Thorstein Veblen, Durkheim, Simmel, Mead, and Weber. Most of these men were multidisciplinary in orientation. "Sociologist" was only beginning to develop its academic identity during these years, and the extent of its assimilation by these theorists correlates positively (though imperfectly) with their chronology. Without a doubt, later theorists were influenced by their contemporaries and predecessors, sometimes building on foundations laid by others, sometimes tearing them down, sometimes launching from them into new territories. Moreover, these theorists cited influences by numerous writers in other disciplines, and almost certainly were further affected by the prevailing states of science, culture, politics, economics, and other bodies of knowledge. Together they initiated, then eventually amassed, a body of scholarship that was sufficiently distinct from others in its substantive topics, value orientations, and level of discourse to warrant its unique name.

Post classical theorizing. For a half century after around 1920, sociology experienced an upsurge of activity and visibility. Along with the increasing number of sociologists came an intensification and proliferation of theorizing and debate, much of it operating in the shadow cast by functionalism, the era's dominant school. Some of this activity may be attributed to the rise of the critical theory school, led by Theodor Adorno, Max Horkheimer, and other continental scholars. However, the ascension of American sociology also occurred during this period, most famously (and chronologically) via the so called Chicago School (including W. I. Thomas, Florian Znaniecki, Park, Cooley, and Blumer), Harvard University (including Pitirim Sorokin, Parsons, and Homans), and Columbia University (including Merton, Paul Lazarsfeld, Daniel Bell, C. Wright Mills, and William J. Goode). Toward the latter part of this period, the aforementioned scholars and their intellectual offspring began to populate new departments of sociology. The resulting decline

in the hegemony of these influential programs did not reflect any decline in the production of sociological ideas, however. Every school of theorizing spawned multiple intellectual offspring, many of which have survived to the present.

Contemporary theorizing. The proliferation and diversification that characterized theorizing in the post classical era has only accelerated. This most recent phase in the development of sociological theorizing is the most difficult to portray, with many more theorists and would be theories arriving on the scene, and more complex relationships and influences among them. Textbooks from only five to ten years ago cite what then seemed to be burgeoning new trends that never really panned out. At best, feminist, postmodernist, agency-structure, and modernity approaches, to cite just a few, have achieved a sort of steady state as far as their impact on the "big picture" of sociological theory and research is concerned. Most of these impacts are far from discipline wide, and some already are shrinking.

Every approach, old and new, is important to some sociologists. Whereas there is near perfect consensus on the classical canon, however, and there is *some* consensus on what we may deem to be important post classical writings, there is nothing remotely approaching a consensus on important contemporary theorizing. Part of this state of affairs is attributable to the recency of the work. But if the past is any indication, it is more likely due to the sheer number of theoretical offerings being generated combined with the absence of any widely shared disciplinary norms for the evaluation and culling of sociological theorizing.

SCIENTIFIC VS. NON SCIENTIFIC THEORIZING

Sociology generally is considered to be a social *science*, but a significant proportion of its theorists, researchers, and practitioners operate in ways that are indifferent to scientific norms and practices, and a subset of its members is even overtly anti science. A central tenet of scientific fields is that research is oriented toward the development and evaluation of explicit, testable

theories. In this context, a theory is a set of general, parsimonious, logically related statements containing clearly defined terms, formulated to explain the broadest possible range of phenomena in the natural world. *Formal* theories reside at the most rigorous end of the theoretical spectrum. Authors of such theories pay special attention to the form of their theoretical arguments in the sense that they take care to (1) identify and define all of the theory's key terms, (2) identify all of the theory's key statements (which may be called axioms, assumptions, propositions, or by some other name), (3) ensure that their theoretical conclusions derive logically from the other key statements, and (4) distinguish statements that are *in* the theory from statements made *about* the theory. Many sociologists believe that formal theories are expressed in mathematical languages; however, this is not necessarily the case. The defined terms may be words, and the arguments may consist of linked declarative sentences for which *sentential logic* provides rules and methods used to check for logical correctness.

Scientists regard with skepticism theories that contain ambiguous terms or ambivalent statements, or that do not have a high degree of support gathered through systematic empirical testing. Ideally, scientific theories are public and collectively evaluated in the sense that informed proponents and informed critics all have the opportunity to check them against agreed upon standards of semantic clarity, logical integrity, and empirical verisimilitude. Science is progressive and self-correcting in the sense that its theories improve over time. This is largely due to the fact that scientists take it as their job to identify problems in theories – e.g., in their clarity, logic, or empirical support. It then becomes the job of a theory's proponents to solve the problems, lest the theory be discarded for a less flawed alternative. In this way, even while the work of individual scientists can be biased by values, politics, wishful thinking, or other factors in the short run, the long run effect of collective evaluation is theoretical improvement at the level of the scientific discipline.

Some sociologists would prefer to reserve the "theory" label only for the brand of theorizing just described, and use terms such as perspective, metatheory, orientation, framework, or ideology for writings that fail to satisfy

the foregoing definition for theory. This view is far from normative, however, and all manner of discursive, non-scientific products are referred to as theories in sociology. Some forms are self-consciously non-scientific, at the end of a spectrum opposite that of formal theories. Here, the explicit goal is not to create or evaluate theories as defined above. It may be, for example, to create rich descriptions of complex empirical phenomena, or to promote ideological or philosophical positions. For example, Marx's concept of *praxis* is often considered to be a component of Marxist theory, but is actually a prescription for revolutionary social action. In a similar way, while some contemporary feminist theories offer explanations for gender inequalities, others are explicit calls to political action. Even more confusing is that a given formulation may blend all three functions – explanatory, descriptive, ideological – and switch among them indiscriminately.

Much theorizing in sociology is non-scientific for yet another reason: the objects of discourse are not phenomena in the empirical world, but instead are other theoretical writings. Most theorists recognize this so that, for example, neofunctionalists who interpret the writings of Talcott Parsons would not claim to be doing science. Whereas the greater good of such activity may be incomprehensible from a scientific standpoint, nevertheless there is a sense in which the intellectual products of such activities grow and evolve, with the potential to discover previously unrealized nuances and insights. From a scientific standpoint, however, these activities fall short of cumulative theoretical development because the internal changes that occur as a result of discussion and debate are not governed by rules of logic and evidence. Factors such as writers' disciplinary status, personal charisma, or rhetorical skill may then produce an unwarranted degree of impact and acceptance of the theorizing they produce.

Arguably, the non-scientific label would also fit a highly *empiricist* form of research that may superficially appear to be scientific. In such work, rather than focusing on the evaluation of abstract and general theory, attention is focused solely on descriptions of observed relationships among indicators in specific data sets. Some times the descriptions may be highly quantitative, as would be the case with statistical

modeling; or they may be highly qualitative, e.g., “thick descriptions” of observed events in natural settings. Both forms of analysis may be invaluable in the process of theory development, particularly with respect to inducing plausible theoretical conjectures to be assessed later in more diverse empirical settings. Also, such observations may be deemed to be important for some non theoretical purpose, e.g., inferring practical solutions to problems associated with a particular empirical setting. Nevertheless, most scientists and philosophers of science now agree that observation and data analysis alone cannot sustain a science because they cannot “add up” to a theory without the aid of inductive leaps.

OTHER PROPERTIES OF SOCIOLOGICAL THEORIES

In addition to those discussed above, there are many other properties that a given sociological theory may possess or manifest to varying degrees. A selection of some of the most interesting and significant are mentioned below.

Grammatical structure. Although we may think of great theories as standing the test of time, successful theories tend to not stand still for long. As they are tested and refined, they evolve through stages as a consequence of modifications large and small. They may grow branches that address new classes of phenomena, and they may gain strength by integrating with other theories. The general term for both the ongoing theory building and theory testing activities, and for the resulting theoretical product, is *theory program* or *theoretical research program*. Philosopher of science Imre Lakatos was best known for exploring the dynamics of research programs, as well as the implications of conceptualizing theories as developing within programs.

Levels of analysis. To sociologists, “micro level theorizing” or “micro theorizing” implies a focus on the level of the individual person or small group, and often considers how they affect or are affected by phenomena at higher levels of analysis – social contexts, organizations, institutions, and so forth. “Macro theorizing” typically focuses on relationships among larger scale phenomena at higher levels of analysis, e.g.,

city level rates of crime as related to levels of urban poverty. Although macro theorists frequently make implicit assumptions about the capacities and proclivities of individuals, such links to the micro level generally are, at most, peripheral aspects of the macro theorizing. Traditionally, sociology is a macro theoretical discipline and so this is understandable. Since around the late 1980s, however, interest has increased in explicitly linking micro and macro levels by constructing *multilevel theories*.

Grounded theorizing. The method of grounded theorizing is used to arrive at a theory that is assured of being consistent with a set of observations. It is an inductive process in the sense that the specific observations in which the theory is “grounded” are used to stimulate the development of more abstract and general definitions and categories. Although this guarantees that the theory will conform to the given observations, it also becomes possible to “over fit” the theory, i.e., to tailor it too closely to particular nuances of the data at hand and so render it less likely to generalize beyond those data. Until a grounded theory is validated by systematic testing with a variety of methods, data sets, and phenomena not employed in its development, it is more accurate to consider it to be a form of empirical generalization.

Typologies. A typology is a framework for organizing concepts. As the name implies, it is concerned with different types or manifestations of the ideas it organizes. Thus, a simple one dimensional categorical typology of norms for the allocation of social rewards may include “need,” “equity,” and “equality.” A typological dimension also may be ordered, e.g., ranking degrees of national economic development by the labels “first world,” “second world,” and “third world.” Typologies also may have multiple dimensions. For instance, we could classify nations simultaneously along two dimensions: economic development (as just described) and form of government (monarchy, democracy, etc.). Frequently such typologies are presented in tabular form. Within each cell of the table may be either a general term for that particular cross classification (e.g., “Type C”), or an illustrative or exhaustive list of empirical referents (“Germany, New Zealand, Costa Rica”). Importantly, only a very broad definition of “theory” would include typology building as a

form of theorizing because typologies do not by themselves provide explanations or define the theoretical terms. Nevertheless, they can be a powerful theoretical tool by providing systematic refinements of theoretical terms that, in turn, promote finer grained explanations of the phenomena classified by the typology.

Propositional inventories. Some sociological articles and books offer lists of theoretical propositions highlighted in the body of the text or listed in an appendix. Such lists or inventories are intended to encapsulate the theoretical knowledge contained within the work. However, a list of propositions does not automatically constitute a theoretical knowledge. First, the propositions in a theory should be abstract, general statements linked to one another to form a logical system from which new statements may be derived. There is no such requirement for propositional inventories, and usually they are compiled without concern for the extent or pattern of their propositions' logical interrelatedness. Even so, a subset of propositions within an inventory could provide key components for a theory. Second, propositions in an inventory frequently vary in the extensiveness of the evidence upon which they are based, or in the care taken by the author in defining their terms.

Computer simulations. Although fundamentally they are nothing more than instruction sets, computer simulations (or *computational sociology*) have been adopted as a tool for expressing and logically examining theoretical statements. Just as statements in everyday language may range from particularistic and concrete to general and abstract, so may statements in computer programs depending upon how their terms are defined. When terms in program statements are defined abstractly, and the statements organized so as to model general phenomena and processes, simulations can function exactly like theories. In addition, computer simulation offers tools for automatic logic checking and dynamic analysis that are unparalleled in traditional methods.

SEE ALSO: Conflict Theory; Exchange Network Theory; Functionalism/Neofunctionalism; Grounded Theory; Knowledge, Sociology of; Mathematical Sociology; Metatheory;

Micro–Macro Links; Postmodernism; Post positivism; Rational Choice Theories; Social Exchange Theory; Social Structure; Stratification and Inequality, Theories of; Structural Functional Theory; Structuralism; Symbolic Interaction; System Theories; Theory Construction; Theory and Methods

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theory construction

Murray Webster, Jr. and Barry Markovskiy

In sociology, the term theory is used in a variety of ways, not all of which are mutually compatible. For present purposes we adopt a definition that is consistent with how the term is used by many sociologists, and by most scientists outside of our field: a *theory* is a set of explicit, abstract, general, logically related statements formulated to explain phenomena in the natural world. *Theory construction* is then the process of formulating and assembling components of theories into coherent wholes, or the process of revising and expanding theories in light of logical, semantic, and empirical analyses.

HISTORICAL DEVELOPMENT

Sociology's interest in theory construction arose quite suddenly in the 1960s, and tapered off relatively quickly thereafter. As one indicator of this pattern, all of the books that could be found on the subject of building sociological theories were located. None was published before 1960; 13 appeared between 1960 and 1975, seven between 1976 and 1990, and only one since – ironically, a collection of papers from a 1990 conference on the failure of formal theory to thrive in sociology. It is clear that sociology's interest in theory construction is less prominent now, as shown by decreasing numbers of didactic books and journal articles on the topic.

One possible reason for the decline in interest in the topic is that sociologists may be prone to embrace new approaches, only to move on to others as the glow of novelty fades. Also, advocates of the theory construction movement sometimes promoted differing, arcane, and even contradictory methods and rationales. We see two other influences as most significant, however. First, while relatively few sociologists would object to the goals of the theory construction movement (e.g., clear language and sound logic), approaching those goals entails hard work and discursive, informal theories are still the norm in sociology. Second, and

relatedly, the theory construction movement may have seemed to promise more than it delivered. Theories did not leap forward, full blown paradigms were not replaced, and sociological knowledge appeared to continue growing at a measured pace without the adoption of explicit theory construction methods. Disappointment led some to falsely caricature the movement, creating and then destroying “straw men.” Some reached the pessimistic conclusion that, because sociological theory has not advanced as they hoped, it may be impossible to build theory in our field (Cole 2001; for a more hopeful view, see Berger et al. 2005).

There is cause for optimism about sociology's future attention to theory construction issues. Interest in the subject has never disappeared and, over the course of decades, published work increasingly has attended to formal aspects of its underlying theories. It would not be surprising to see a resurgence of interest. This is because theory construction not only is a substantive topic, but also a body of *methods* that can improve theories *and* research, and bind the field more securely to the broader fabric of interdisciplinary knowledge.

ELEMENTS OF THEORIES

All theories are built from just a few basic elements. Different approaches to sociological theory building have emphasized some of these elements more than others, and sometimes elaborated them in ways that mask their simplicity. Nevertheless, theories boil down to just this: *terms* are used to build *statements*; statements are used to build *arguments*; and arguments apply under a set of *scope conditions*.

Terms

Ideally, every word or symbol in a theory is carefully chosen by the theorist to convey an idea or concept. Some terms may not be understood a priori the same way by all readers, however. To promote their clear communication to others, the theorist may assign to a term one or more conditions that must be satisfied in order for something to be considered an instance of it. For example: “*social power*: the capacity to

extract resources from another actor against the other's interests." Here, "social power" is a *defined term*. Having "the capacity to extract resources" along with it being "against the other's interests" are conditions of the *definition*. Terms, so in any given theory the theorist will need to employ as a foundation some *primitive terms* whose meanings already are clear to the intended audience. A theory should have the minimum number of primitive terms and defined terms that are needed to communicate its claims to an intended audience.

Statements

Theories contain statements, each of which relates the states or values of one or more terms to the states or values of one or more other terms. For example, "The higher the parents' income, the more education is achieved by their children." A more famous example from another discipline: $e = mc^2$.

Arguments

Well constructed theories combine multiple statements and apply rules of logic to generate new statements. These are called arguments, and their component statements go by various names such as propositions, assumptions, premises, postulates, or axioms. The new statements they generate are called derivations, implications, conclusions, or theorems. Consider the above proposition on income and achievement, to which we add: "The more education a child receives, the higher his/her income upon entry into the workforce." Combining the two statements and applying basic logic, lets us conclude: "The higher the parents' income, the higher the child's income upon entry into the workforce." Note also how the two propositions *explain* the conclusion via the mediating effects of education.

Scope Conditions

Scope conditions are provisional statements that assert the conditions under which a theorist considers the theory to be applicable. Relatively few sociological theories identify scope

conditions as such, but nevertheless they are crucial because they provide guidance to researchers who are interested in testing or applying a theory.

PROPERTIES OF THEORIES

Inspiration for a theory can come from any where: observation, imagination, modifications to existing theories, and so on. Not all theories are created equal, however, and a variety of criteria exist that allow reasoned selections among alternative theories. In a word, such criteria help us to decide among theories on the basis of their *believability*. Some of these criteria are empirical, as when statistical methods are applied to help decide whether data confirm or refute hypotheses derived from a theory. Here we are most concerned with criteria pertaining to qualities that may be "built in" at the time the theory is constructed. Their goal is to promote accurate communication, rigorous testing, high accuracy, and broad applicability. They include the following: absence of contradictions, absence of ambivalence, abstractness, generality, precision, parsimony, and conditionality. We will describe each briefly.

- *Absence of contradictions*. If statements in a theory contradict one another (e.g., "If X, then Y" and "If X, then not Y," then the rules of logic dictate that the theory must be false. As such, it cannot fulfill its primary function of explaining phenomena.
- *Absence of ambivalence*. Ambivalent statements such as "If X, then maybe Y" are not themselves contradictory, but they allow other contradictory claims to coexist. In this case, "If X then Y" and "If X, then not Y" are both consistent with the ambivalent statement, but cannot coexist without creating a contradiction. Thus, ambivalence must be eliminated from theories.
- *Abstractness*. If a theory were *concrete* – the opposite of *abstract* – then it could explain only one particular phenomenon at a certain place and time. Abstractness ensures that theories have the potential to explain many phenomena in many times and places, including those that have yet to occur.

- *Generality.* This is a two pronged criterion. First, a general theory has numerous and varied applications to phenomena in the world. Second, a general theory has survived numerous and varied tests. It is important for a sociological theory to be capable of generating hypotheses about a wide variety of social phenomena, and just as important that the hypotheses survive empirical testing. If a theory has few applications, it will not be useful. If it has not survived tests, it lacks believability.
- *Precision.* A theory could be general, but also imprecise in the sense that it has survived many tests that were not especially stringent. For instance, predicting and verifying that “Group A existed longer than Group B” is not nearly as precise and informative as predicting and verifying that “Group A survived 3 years and 75 days; Group B survived 11 days.”
- *Parsimony.* All else being equal, theories with fewer terms and statements are preferable to those having more terms and statements. This facilitates communication, as well as logical and empirical analysis of the theory.
- *Conditionality.* One of the qualities that distinguishes theories from descriptions of phenomena is the conditionality of theories. In particular, the core statements of theories assert how one concept is conditional on another: “If A, then B,” or “The greater the X, the greater the Y,” or even “ $e = mc^2$.” Conditional statements then combine to form theoretical arguments, from which new conditional statements may be derived and tested. In another sense, theories are also conditionalized by their use of scope conditions which express the conditions under which the theory is deemed to apply or not to apply.

Once the components of theories are assembled into a coherent whole, it becomes possible to compare them on each criterion. At present, there is no formula for adding up these qualities into something like an overall “believability index.” However, the criteria are useful for thinking about ways to improve individual theories, or to compare multiple theories on particular dimensions when “all else is equal” or nearly so.

BUILDING INDUCTIVELY

In the social sciences, two different motivations account for much of the work that is done with theories. The first is the desire to understand a set of observations by developing a theory to explain them. The second is the wish to explore the untapped consequences of preexisting theory, seeking empirical tests and applications, and thereby evaluating the power of the theory. We refer to these general approaches as *inductive* and *deductive*, respectively. In this section we discuss the former, and then discuss the deductive approach in the next section.

Status characteristics theory (SCT, a.k.a. “the theory of status characteristics and expectation states”) will illustrate the inductive aspects of theory construction. SCT’s roots can be traced to 1950s research by Robert F. Bales on task focused, collectively oriented discussion groups. These so called Bales groups usually included 2–20 individuals, often college students who volunteered to participate. Through open discussions regarding a given problem or issue, groups typically arrived at collective decisions in 30–60 minutes. Members of the research team tallied their observations of such factors as who initiated contributions, the nature of those contributions, and to whom each was directed.

Early Bales group researchers observed four regularities:

- 1 There were participation inequalities. For instance, in 3 person groups, the highest, middle, and lowest participants initiated about 50 percent, 30 percent, and 20 percent of the group’s contributions, respectively.
- 2 Group members’ rates of initiating task relevant communications tended to correspond with their rates of receiving such communications from others.
- 3 Once inequalities emerged, typically they remained stable for the rest of the session, then reappeared in any subsequent interactions.
- 4 Individuals’ ranks on participation rates tended to correspond with their ranks on all manner of perceived skills and influence.

Berger (1958) posited that these observed regularities are components of a social structure

that arises under certain task focused interaction conditions. He reasoned that the empirical regularities could be explained by *observable power and prestige orders* that emerge from underlying *performance expectation states* that are built up through the interaction process. The first published version of Berger's new theory came with a set of abstract and general scope conditions, among which were the requirements that group members are task focused and collectively oriented. Explicit propositions explained the process whereby performance expectations are formed and how expectations are transformed into the group power and prestige order.

While Berger's theory of performance expectations and behavior was subjected to tests in new situations, theorists also began to consider cases in which group members have preexisting status differences – a condition largely absent in Bales groups. For instance, juries are certainly task focused, collectively oriented groups. Unlike Bales groups, however, jurors typically vary by status characteristics such as age, gender, race, and occupation. What happens in such groups is that power and prestige orders emerge very quickly from initial encounters among members. When jurors choose a foreperson before they deliberate, they have minimal knowledge regarding one another's abilities. Nevertheless, they overwhelmingly favor some one with advantages on their society's status characteristics, such as a member of the racial majority with a high prestige occupation.

Research from a variety of sources confirms that groups with members differentiated on external status organize their internal power and prestige orders in a manner consistent with advantages the characteristic confers in the larger society. This occurs whether or not members' status characteristics are relevant to the group task. It seems that group members develop expectations for task performance by "importing" cultural beliefs regarding status advantages and disadvantages, and then infer specific skills to group members on that basis. These and many diverse cases became explainable by the SCT as it was extended to include explicit, testable propositions regarding links between status characteristics, performance expectations, and social behavior (Wagner & Berger 2002).

To summarize, the evolution of SCT implies a series of steps through which inductive theory building can transpire:

- 1 *List empirical generalizations.* In the case of SCT, a body of findings from prior research provided the raw material for the theoretical explanation.
- 2 *Formulate generalizations abstractly.* To build SCT, it was necessary to develop abstract concepts removed from particular studies and historical circumstances.
- 3 *Explain generalizations theoretically.* That is, additional general propositions are postulated with an eye toward combining them into a theoretical system that permits the focal generalizations to be deduced from others.
- 4 *Explicate scope conditions.* The purpose here is to demarcate classes of situations within which the general propositions should explain and predict phenomena of interest, and to distinguish these from situations in which the theory does not claim to provide explanations.
- 5 *Derive and test new consequences.* By deriving general statements and substituting empirical indicators for theoretical terms, it becomes possible to develop and conduct independent tests of the theory.
- 6 *Identify and conceptualize new applications.* Useful theories never stop developing. In this case, SCT was extended to incorporate predictions for situations of status heterogeneity as well as for the original equal status cases. SCT also has been extended and refined in a number of other ways, making it far deeper and broader than it was when first developed.

In all this work, there is an interplay of the empirical and the theoretical. The theorist attempts to explain some limited set of phenomena, develops an explanation, and conducts tests independent of the original observations that the theory was designed to explain. The tests may confirm theory, or they may refute it and stimulate modifications. The theorist searches for new applications and attempts to account for them with the theory, leading to new tests and modifications in an endless process of development.

BUILDING DEDUCTIVELY

We illustrate deductive theory building using Blau's (1977) *theory of inequality and heterogeneity*. Blau's original theory was entirely verbal, but later it was formalized by Skvoretz (1983) using an algebraic language. Blau began by considering two groups of different sizes. For convenience, we may think of them as groups of people, but the theory applies as well to any interacting units, whether human, animal, or computer simulated. To say there are two groups suggests there may be a differentiating basis (e.g., skin color or religion). Now suppose there is some interaction across the boundary between the groups, such as friendships or marriages. The theory's first task simply was to analyze how different relative group sizes affect cross boundary interactions.

If the two groups differ in size, and if interaction across the boundary is essentially random, one can deduce that an individual from the small group is more likely to interact with an individual from the large group than vice versa. For instance, suppose (1) the differentiating principle is skin color, (2) there are ten times as many in the larger group as in the smaller group, and (3) the interaction basis is friendship. If friendships form at random, then a much larger proportion of the small group (black) will have out group (white) friends than vice versa. Blau noted that this explained a lament he had heard among some of his egalitarian white friends who wished they had more black friends. They simply do not encounter enough potential out group friends in their daily interactions. That could only transpire if there were a high degree of cross group interaction and black individuals on average were willing to accept ten times as many friends as white individuals. For religion and marriage, the same relations hold. All else being equal, any randomly selected Jew in the US (about 3 percent of the population) has a higher chance of marrying a Christian (about 90 percent of the population) than does a randomly selected Christian of marrying a Jew. It is purely a "numbers effect," independent of other factors such as individual preferences for in group friends or spouses. After exploring consequences of the basic two group framework, Blau considered more complex situations by introducing preferences that biased

the random associations, hierarchical factors such as status differences, and intersecting bases of differentiation within and between groups.

In the Christian–Jew example, we know that interaction across groups is not random, and that it is not the case that 90 percent of Jews marry Christians. Interactions between and within groups tend to be biased by the shapes of social networks, and those networks tend to be connected more densely within groups than between them. Skvoretz (1983) took this into account when he formalized Blau's discursive theory using a kind of mathematics called *biased net theory*. He translated Blau's propositions into equations where the dependent or resultant variables were probabilities of in group associations, and the independent or causal variables were generalized, symbolic versions of factors identified by Blau. Skvoretz's version can claim several accomplishments. First, the formalized theory corrects some errors that are not obvious in the discursive theory. For instance, "salience" in the discursive theory is treated the same as "in group preference," whereas the formal theory demonstrates the utility of distinguishing the two concepts. Second, the formalized theory is more precise and thus more testable in its implications. Third, the formalized theory is more general, applicable to types of association beyond the friendships and marriages that Blau considered.

To review, this case of deductive theory building proceeded through these stages:

- 1 *Assert and explore general propositions.* Blau postulated that relative group sizes should affect intergroup associations in predictable ways, independent of all other factors. He explored the consequences of his theoretical propositions for cases of friendship and marriage formation.
- 2 *Explore new or modified propositions.* Further work explored the effects of additional factors in more complex situations, such as those with in group preferences, ordered differentiation, and cross cutting differentiation.
- 3 *Formalize.* Skvoretz's formalization revealed new and improved predictions, extended the theory's scope, and produced a more rigorous, general theory. Formalizing does not necessarily mean translating words into mathematical expressions, however.

Sentential logic and predicate logic are formalizations that can be applied to well constructed English sentences, and definitions of terms certainly can be written in carefully formulated prose. Formalization is best thought of as a process for improving discursive theory by sharpening the meanings of terms and the explicitness of arguments.

RECOMMENDATIONS

Once they are built, all good theories are deductive in the sense of having clearly stated propositions from which other statements logically follow. As well, most theories also are inductive in the sense that their propositions, and modifications to their propositions, typically began as conjectures and intuitive leaps. The inductive and deductive approaches we outlined have different emphases, but it is worth noting that any theory building enterprise can be improved by keeping in mind the following:

- 1 *Identify all significant terms.* Select primitive terms judiciously, and define the rest at a level of abstraction that will facilitate the construction of general propositions, useful links to empirical phenomena for tests and applications, and comprehension on the part of readers in the intended audience. There is an art to developing a theory's terminological system, along with much trial and error.
- 2 *Identify general propositions.* Be sure a reader can tell what the theory is arguing (i.e., what it assumes to be true, and what it concludes on the basis of those assumptions). Explicit terms and propositions facilitate logical and empirical analyses of a theory, and also facilitate its formalization.
- 3 *Identify scope conditions.* It is important for a theorist to place some limitations on the domain in which his or her theory will apply. For tests within its scope, confirmations increase the theory's believability, while disconfirmations diminish it. For tests conducted outside of a theory's scope,

neither confirmation nor disconfirmation can impact the theory. If scope conditions are not stated, then its author implicitly claims either that the theory applies everywhere to everything – an impossibility – or that he or she simply has not thought about the theory's limitations, making the theory highly vulnerable to failing tests in settings that the author may not ever have considered to be relevant.

- 4 *Conduct rigorous tests.* Building theories differs from punditry in the sense that the theorist who seeks out disconfirmations through well designed tests is more likely to home in on an accurate explanation than the theorist who only looks for confirmations. Rigorous tests are more likely than weak tests (or no tests) to identify areas where a theory can be improved. *Critical tests* evaluate conflicting hypotheses from competing theories and are thus especially valuable for the advancement of knowledge.
- 5 *Improve the theory.* Theories improve over time as they are refined and extended. Every element of a theory is subject to modification: terms can be sharpened to incorporate or exclude great swaths of empirical phenomena; scope conditions can be relaxed to permit broader application; propositions may be added to address new kinds of phenomena, and formalized to allow more precise explanations and hypotheses.

We began this entry by noting that theoretical knowledge, far from being mysterious, is actually how we understand the social world. What we *know* about social processes and social structures is exactly that which is embodied in our *theories* of social processes and social structures. Our knowledge is never completely valid and reliable, and it is always provisional, as tomorrow's tests and theoretical modifications alter what we think we know today. At the same time, these changes must be progressive. That is, today's knowledge should be more valid and reliable than it was, say, a few decades ago. And knowledge in a few decades (or sooner) should be better than today's. The more systematic our adoption and application of the tools of theory construction, the more efficiently our knowledge will improve.

SEE ALSO: Blau, Peter; Expectation States Theory; Mathematical Sociology; Micro–Macro Links; Theory; Theory and Methods

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theory and methods

Barry Markovsky

Theories organize and manipulate elements in a world of ideas. In contrast, *methods* organize and manipulate elements in the natural world, the world of concrete objects and events. Although *theory* has a variety of meanings in sociology, a definition that is both widely shared within the field and also consistent with the term's use in mainstream sciences is the following: a theory is a set of abstract, general, logically related statements formulated to explain phenomena in the natural world. The term *method* is commonly used two ways in

sociology: (1) a procedure enacted in the natural world for the purpose of yielding theoretically relevant observations; (2) an analysis of recorded observations that is intended to summarize or to make inferences about them. The first usage is loosely referred to as *research methods*. The second usage, *methods of data analysis*, encompasses our rather large palette of qualitative and quantitative techniques for working with empirical observations.

Countless books and journal articles have been published on topics in sociological theory and sociological methods over the years. However, there is relatively little information to be found on the details of their interface – the points of contact where correspondences are drawn between theories and the slices of the natural world to which they are intended to apply. This also reflects common practice: published research generally establishes relatively loose and intuitive linkages between theories and their empirical realizations. Sometimes the informality is appropriate, as when new theoretical ideas are being explored and there is uncertainty as to the specifics of their applicability to natural phenomena. Other times the lack of specificity can be highly problematic, such as when researcher A claims to have tested and falsified B's theory, but B contends that the theory was not intended to address the phenomena used in A's test. In general, the burden is on the theorist to clarify terms so that appropriate methods and analyses may be developed by others.

The theory–method interface is a crucial area of concern because, as social scientists, we are motivated to make our theories relevant to the natural world, either for the purpose of understanding it better or to intervene in sociological phenomena in desired ways. It is through our research methods and our methods of data analysis that we attempt to determine the degree of relevance of our theories to the phenomena that we seek to understand. This implies that there is an intimate relationship between theories and methods, but also that they are distinct spheres of operation, each with its own rules and standards. Without a doubt, sociological writings often obscure distinctions between theoretical statements and observation statements, and it may be difficult or even impossible to fully

prevent theories from coloring the observations that we make. However, to then presume that theory and method are indistinguishable in some inherent sense only leads to unwarranted confusion.

When developed without the benefit of strong connections to the natural world, the ories are no more valid than fantasies, and they deserve no better than highly provisional support. By the same token, when enacted without the benefit of clear theoretical purposes, methods are no more useful to us than undocumented snapshots of unfamiliar objects. Thus, theories rely on methods to make them believable, and methods rely on theories to give meaning to their products.

The interface of theory and methods – where elements in the theoretical realm connect to elements of the natural world – becomes most apparent when theories are written explicitly and succinctly, and their connections to objects in the natural world are rendered unequivocal. This is the ideal situation, and we will conclude by examining it in a bit more detail.

There are three essential components to the theory–methods connection: statements in the theory, statements about particular observations, and statements that link terms in the theory with specific observations. Their relationship is shown schematically in Figure 1.

Theories employ conditional statements, often called propositions or assumptions, to make general claims that can be subjected to scrutiny. An example appears in the upper half of the figure in the “theoretical world.” The statement may be read “If A, then B,” where A

and B are each simple declarative statements. For example, A may be “A group has a role structure” and B could be “A group has a system of rewards and punishments.” The conditional statement $A \rightarrow B$ asserts that if the first statement is true, then the second statement will be true as well.

To link theoretical propositions to the natural world, the terms in the propositions must be connected to actual empirical phenomena. The theoretical terms are abstract constructions (or “constructs”), not at all like descriptions of rich, complex objects in the natural world, but extremely useful from the standpoint of a theory: abstract terms are needed if the theory is to be *general* (i.e., applicable to a wide range of empirical cases). In the figure, each simple statement from the theory is connected to multiple concrete and specific referents in the natural world. For instance, a_1 may be “The Chess Club now active at Fairview High School has three elected positions” and b_1 could be “The Chess Club now active at Fairview High School has trophies for outstanding performance, and rescinds the membership of any member caught cheating.” There are also implicit linking statements: “‘The Chess Club now active at Fairview High School’ is an instance of ‘a group’” and “‘A combination of multiple elected and appointed positions’ is an instance of ‘a role structure.’” Now, having translated the theoretical statements into empirical statements, we can derive as many testable *hypotheses* as we have empirical instances (e.g., “If the Chess Club at Fairview High School has multiple elected and appointed positions, then it will have trophies for outstanding performance and rescind the membership of any member caught cheating”). Furthermore, a_2 , b_2 , a_3 , b_3 , and so on, can pertain to wildly different kinds of groups, rewards, etc.

Instructions for how to create these linking statements are supplied by the definitions of the theoretical terms; that is, the definitions for terms such “role structure,” “reward,” and “punishment” in the example above. This is why it is important for a theorist to define terms as clearly as possible. Failing to do so means that researchers will be uncertain as to the theory’s proper application, leaving it vulnerable to interpretations that its author never intended for it to cover. At the same time, definitions




Figure 1 The heart of the theory methods connection.

must be sufficiently open to interpretation so that the theory will be applicable to the widest possible range of cases. Thus, good theories strike a useful balance between specificity and generality.

Now that the theory can guide the choice of empirical indicators, research methods can be used to gather data, (e.g., through experiments, surveys, participant observation, text analysis, or other means – preferably more than one). The choice of research methods, in conjunction with the specific questions the researcher would like to answer, jointly guide the choice of methods for data analysis.

SEE ALSO: Experimental Methods; Mathematical Sociology; Social Indicators; Theoretical Research Programs; Theory; Theory Construction

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third world and postcolonial feminisms/subaltern

Marietta Morrissey

Sociological interest in feminism in the so called third world nations of Asia, Africa, and Latin America has been conditioned by disciplinary reactions and responses to larger theoretical transformations in the academy. The consequence has been a shift from liberal

feminist interpretations to more comprehensive understandings of the range of feminisms that have emerged in conditions of economic dependency, underdevelopment, and globalization. More recently, sociologists have begun to consider the complexity of women's positions and those of other powerless groups – the subaltern – through the lens of postcolonial studies.

THIRD WORLD FEMINISMS

Liberal Feminism: WID and GAD

Sociologists' initial contributions to our understanding of third world feminism coincided with the early stages of the sociological study of women more generally. Emphasizing occupational and educational inequality and gendered wage disparity, sociologists of the late 1970s and early 1980s assumed parallels between feminisms in the first and third worlds. Indeed, many women in poor countries aspired to higher levels of education and occupational achievement. Vibrant liberal feminist movements developed in many nations of the third world. Often led by western educated women from wealthy families, they encouraged women and girls to seek educational parity with men and success in the occupational and business sectors from which they had been excluded. Progressive women's groups and organizations recognized in traditional cultural norms and male inspired and dominated development strategies impediments to socioeconomic achievement by women (Boserup 1970).

International development and lending agencies encouraged liberal feminism by promoting Women in Development (WID) policies. Internationally funded economic development projects, particularly those emphasizing entrepreneurship, urged women's participation. Multilateral sponsors often required a WID component in project proposals. Many national governments adopted a similar approach. These practices remain in place today as development agencies recognize more fully women's roles in the production and marketing of crafts and food.

Academic and other critics of WID argued that separating women from families and community ties and the larger context of underdevelopment

misunderstands women's positions and thus has had little impact on women's educational or occupational statuses. Meanwhile, men have objected to the exclusive funding of women's business projects in some settings, claiming discrimination (Barriteau 2001). Thus, Gender and Development (GAD) initiatives were launched. They emphasize the relationship between the development process and gender relations and insist that neither men nor women be disadvantaged in nationally and internationally sponsored development projects.

Ultimately, the liberal feminist philosophy embodied in WID and GAD embraces only sectors of populations with access to basic resources. Larger populations of women have economic, health, and political concerns that have gradually come to the attention of scholars both within and outside the third world (Kandiyoti 1988). Researchers and theorists throughout the academy now generally acknowledge that western defined liberal feminism has little adaptability to women's concerns in third world nations. Indeed, the commonly cited distinctions among liberal, socialist, and radical feminisms deemed appropriate to first world countries do not accurately capture the reality of feminism in the third world.

National Feminisms

The most significant contributors to the redefinition of third world feminism have been activist and academic women working in national contexts. Themselves often from bourgeois backgrounds, they have had access to governmental organizations and NGOs working with the poor. The transmission and interpretation of the voices of low income and marginalized people broke conceptual barriers and allowed new definitions of third world feminist ideology and political movements to emerge. Representing many different disciplines with a strong affinity to sociology (particularly history, political science, and anthropology), academic work of the late 1980s and the 1990s on feminisms in the third world was often interdisciplinary and privileged the voices of the poor and disenfranchised over methodological issues and debates. No longer strictly or primarily sociological, studies of third world feminisms

from a social science view became part of a core of women's and gender studies literature.

Women's and gender studies caucuses and studies sections within Latin American, Caribbean, Asian, African, Middle Eastern, and other regionally focused organizations have provided important venues for the discussion and dispersal of the work of international feminists that together form interdisciplinary bodies of knowledge about third world women's positions and politics. Within sociology, *Gender and Society* has been an important vehicle for the education of sociologists in the US about work on feminism, women, and gender in third world settings. Of particular note are the literature reviews authored by third world feminist sociologists treating the state of women's and gender studies in their nations and regions (e.g., Ampofo et al. 2004).

POSTCOLONIAL FEMINISMS

Poststructural and Postcolonial Studies

While national scholars within third world nations redefined feminisms in ways pertinent to the social sciences, a parallel process was occurring in humanities disciplines. It began with a theoretical challenge to more traditional interpretive theories from proponents of poststructural approaches to literary and cultural interpretation. With their origins in linguistic theory, poststructural and postmodern critical and interpretive methods have called for the interrogation, deconstruction, and reinterpretation of representation in literature, art, and other cultural forms. Postcolonial theories have considered cultural representations produced in colonial and postcolonial settings. Third world feminist scholars (in particular, Spivak 1988, 1999) have expanded postcolonial theoretical categories in analyzing gender in postcolonial culture.

Postcolonial theories recognize the impact on third world nations of the historic termination of formal political and economic relations in the 1960s and 1970s. Indeed, decolonization was a product, albeit sometimes an indirect one, of third world social movements. However, much postcolonial analysis focuses on consciousness, culture, and ideology, rather than economic,

social, or political conditions and responses. Some postcolonial theorists (e.g. Bhabha) follow Foucault in examining the discourses and disciplines of culture and knowledge and the repressing forces internal to them. Bhabha's view, that it is in the interstices of colonial and national experiences that postcolonial culture lies, echoes anthropological work on liminal, syncretic, and other cross national and cross group cultural forms. This theoretical tendency complements sociological understandings of colonial and other forms of oppression (including gender) and their impacts on culture in the broadest sense. Others (e.g., Spivak) have been influenced by Said's (1979) efforts to uncover oppressive images and language in the colonizers' literary and cultural representations of the colonized. The latter approach has resonated in humanities disciplines, including postcolonial feminist cultural studies.

Sociological Contributions to Postcolonial Thought

Sociology has only slowly joined the poststructural critique of academic canons (Mirchandani 2005). The strength of hermeneutic and other anti positivist methodologies in sociology relative to many other disciplines has diminished the attraction of poststructural thought. Nevertheless, sociology has made an impact on indirect contributions to the elaboration of postcolonial theory. Moreover, the debates among sociological theorists about postmodernism as a historical epoch have had important implications for our understanding of globalization and its impacts on international feminisms.

Critical conceptualizations of third world economic development that incorporate understandings of bilateral dependence and global interdependence have been important in sociology since the 1970s. Sociologists James Petras (1973), Immanuel Wallerstein (1974), and others played pivotal roles in the elaboration of worldwide patterns of dependency and sectorally uneven development.

Equally important has been sociologists' reception to research and theory about the consciousness of the oppressed. The work of Franz Fanon (1961, 1967) and Albert Memmi (1965) on the complex intellectual and emotional effects

of colonialism – the mixed feelings of cultural inferiority, fear, and anger experienced by the colonized – contributed to sociological understandings of economic and political dependency and echoed issues raised by sociologists regarding other twentieth century conflicts. W. E. B. Du Bois (1903) wrote about the “dual consciousness” of African Americans, both oppressed by and subjugated by whites and at the same time conscious of oppression and resistant to it. Later, members of the Frankfurt School of European émigrés to the US, in particular Theodor Adorno, Erich Fromm, and Max Horkheimer, used the experiences of those terrorized and violated by the Nazi regime to explore further the duality of consciousnesses and cultures of subjugation and resistance and ideological responses.

Postcolonialism and Feminist Sociology

Feminist sociology has had a significant impact on the development of feminist postcolonialism. Patricia Hill Collins's book *Black Feminist Thought* (1990) has been widely cited in postcolonial feminist studies. Collins draws on the critical theory tradition and later standpoint theories such as that elaborated by Dorothy Smith (1989) to valorize the standpoints and situated group knowledge of African American women and to recognize the layers of oppression and hence knowledge that separate women by ethnicity, income, education, region, etc. Collins's work has thus been valuable in exploring a multiplicity and hierarchy of meanings in representations and in the daily consciousness, culture, and ideology of colonized groups.

Collins's contributions to third world and colonial feminisms go beyond the consideration of these topics within other nations to their discussion within the borders of wealthy nations. Immigrants and internally colonized ethnic minority groups are often termed third world people and their political and cultural ideologies (including gender politics) share dimensions with both the majority population and with other marginalized groups. Third world feminism in the US and other industrial countries shares the liminality and hybridity of feminisms in postcolonial nations. Moreover, the representation of ethnic minority women

in cultural works influenced by dominant groups within nations resembles in theme and form those treating women and gender relations in postcolonial nations.

Sociology and the Subaltern

Sociologists have long struggled with the problem of how research methodologies can allow us to hear, present, and interpret the voices of marginalized groups. American sociology's expansion of qualitative techniques beyond the ethnographic to include lengthy interviews and narrative analyses has coincided with the rise of gender studies in the field. Indeed, the concept of feminist methodology, which goes beyond the disciplinary confines of sociology, embodies a commitment to give voice to the powerless (DeVault 1999). At the same time, postcolonial literary and cultural studies have struggled with the challenge of giving means of expression to sectors of third world populations that are estranged from the means of cultural production and representation. The ways in which this problem has been conceptualized once again go back to theoretical work of broad significance to sociology.

From the late 1920s through the mid 1930s, imprisoned Italian political theorist and activist Antonio Gramsci produced a set of "note books" treating the difficult political problems of ideological hegemony, critical consciousness, and revolution. Published posthumously, Gramsci's *Prison Notebooks* (1991) are widely cited by neo Marxist academics eager to understand why objectively oppressed and subjugated classes have been unable to marshal forces to transform the class structure and in the case of fascist regimes seem in fact to embrace ideologies that run dramatically counter to their class interests. Gramsci's references to the subaltern have gained the attention of third world feminists and others trying to give visibility to the interests of marginalized groups.

"Subaltern" refers literally to a military officer rank below the highest levels, but is used more generally to mean subordinate groups. Gramsci wrote about two social categories of the subaltern: incipient challengers to traditional dominant classes and relatively powerless groups subject to constraining ideological

power. The Subaltern Studies Group of South Asian Historians followed Gramsci's lead in considering why Indian workers, peasants, and other "subaltern" groups did not emerge as revolutionary classes. The resulting emphasis on "history from below" has influenced and reinforced social science efforts to reveal and understand the ideology and culture of the powerless and the politically invisible. "Subaltern" has shifted meaning, however, as critical academic writing and postmodern and postcolonial feminists have argued that the conceptual and discursive meanings of Marxist and neo Marxist thought, including Gramsci's theorization of the subaltern, reproduce the binary and essentialist thinking that has limited third world women's political options. Spivak's (1988) article was particularly influential in moving the "subaltern" away from neo Marxism to a feminist epistemology that permits women to express unanticipated, untheorized thoughts, emotions and political strategies. Literary and cultural studies have since addressed the meanings of the expressions and representations of subaltern groups, and the implications of their exclusion from political and cultural platforms.

Sociologists have been notably absent in debate about the role of the subaltern per se, although issues of radical and revolutionary consciousness among workers, peasants, and other social groups have long been of interest in the discipline. In adhering to a fundamental disciplinary focus on social stratification and its elaboration in precisely defined social strata, sociologists may find the term subaltern imprecise both with reference to socioeconomic status and assumed group ideology, culture, and consciousness. Sociologists refer more frequently to "marginalized" groups, acknowledging more simply and exclusively an estrangement from economic and political power and privilege.

Globalization and Feminisms

Third world and postcolonial feminisms continue to command scholarly attention and inspire theoretical debate. However, changing economic conditions in rich and poor countries with increased globalization have generated an intense effort in the social sciences to understand women's changing positions.

Sociologists' recent collections on women in the third world (e.g., Blumberg et al. 1995) focus on women's roles in production and community based efforts to improve women's status.

Academic and policymakers' current discussions of globalization have to some extent supplanted the debates of the 1980s and 1990s about the meaning of late capitalism, postmodernism, and postcolonialism. Methodological and epistemological challenges to structuralist categorizations of cultural and historical change continue to engage feminist and other critical political theorists and activists. However, recent recognition of the breadth and depth of global interdependence has reinvigorated the scholarly quest to explicate the dynamics of global capitalism and the political spaces therein that allow for fundamental change. For third world women, whether in postcolonial or industrial settings, the feminist challenge is ever more complex as the interstices of the colonial and the national multiply and become less distinct.

Third world and postcolonial feminisms/subaltern present vital substantive, methodological, and political challenges and strategies of study that unite humanities and social science disciplines. Sociologists have taken a more prominent role in the interdisciplinary identification of third world women's economic, social, and political positions and interests in both postcolonial nations and in the US. The nearly century long debate within sociology about biases and inaccuracies produced by positivist derived methods and techniques and the continuing efforts of important subgroups within the field to reveal and valorize the voices of the marginalized has allowed the discipline to move in tandem with much of the postmodern critique of academic knowledge without joining fully in it. Postcolonial feminism has, in a similar way, engaged elements of sociological theory while accommodating a distinction between humanities disciplines' critical study of gendered cultural representation and social science efforts to understand gendered social relations.

SEE ALSO: Black Feminist Thought; Decolonization; Feminist Activism in Latin America; Gender, Development and; Hybridity; International Gender Division of Labor; Intersectionality; Marginality; Methods, Postcolonial; Orientalism

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Thomas, William I. (1863–1947)

Robert A. Stebbins

W. I. Thomas was born in Virginia and raised in a Protestant, rural, religious milieu. In 1884 he received his bachelor's degree from the University of Tennessee, and after two years of study in Germany followed by teaching English and sociology at Oberlin College, he joined in 1895 the new faculty in sociology at the University of Chicago. He had been among that department's first group of graduate students (he worked under Albion Small), starting in 1893 and receiving his doctorate in 1895. He remained at Chicago until 1918 when, for personal reasons, he retired. In 1923 Thomas returned to active teaching, now at the New School for Social Research, but his teaching was largely part time, for he preferred to mix teaching with research. Between 1930 and 1936 he went regularly to Sweden to work with the Social Science Institute at the University of Stockholm. He was appointed lecturer at Harvard University in 1936 and 1937, living in New Haven until his move to Berkeley, California, in 1939. He resided there as an independent researcher until his death in 1947.

Thomas is well known for his collaboration with Florian Znaniecki in *The Polish Peasant in Europe and America*, a five volume study published between 1918 and 1920. Other celebrated works include *The Unadjusted Girl* (1923) and, with Robert Park and Herbert Miller, *Old World Traits Transplanted* (1921). His reputation has lived on in sociology largely in the legacy he left symbolic interactionism in the theoretic sections of the *Polish Peasant*. The analytic framework of this study was based on the transformations in the personality and

social structure of the Polish peasant community as it moved to the US.

Thomas had an enduring interest in the pragmatic tradition in sociology, one center of which, at the time, was the University of Chicago. For him, sociology concentrated on human activities, wherein people demonstrated conscious control in developing art, religion, language, forms of government, and the like. More precisely, sociology looks at *attention*, the attitude that takes note of the outside world and then manipulates it. From this stance he wrote a great deal about attitudes and attention, later preferring to conceptualize both as *definition of the situation*. Crises in everyday life, be they large or small (e.g., upsetting a habit), bring people to define the situation in which they occur and then to act accordingly. Development and change in larger, abstract forms of structure and culture occur when many people define similar situations.

Today, Thomas is widely recognized as one of the founders of symbolic interactionism. A dictum from a work co authored with his wife, "if people define situations as real, they are real in their consequences" (Thomas & Thomas 1928: 571–2), is still frequently quoted.

SEE ALSO: Chicago School; Definition of the Situation; Small, Albion W.; Symbolic Interaction; Znaniecki, Florian

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time

Peter Clark

Time reckoning systems contain benchmarks that indicate the passing of time and durational expectancies with respect to sequences, rhythmic features, and periodicities. There is no social ordering without temporal ordering, yet time comprises more than the chronological use of calendar and clock time (CCT) with which most of the world associates it. There are also very significant frames of action calculated through the heterogeneous events located within natural and task based processes (Gurvitch 1964; Dubinskas 1988; Clark 1985; Bluedorne 2003). Time reckoning is a multilayered, hierarchical, contingent relationship between past, present, and future processes (Gurvitch 1964; Clark 1985; Harvey 1989; Adam 2004). The present is constituted through the differences between the remembered past and images of the future. One aim of an organization or society should be to establish an accessible, robust repertoire of temporal recipes and heuristics which enable the actionable interpretation of those future events that are located in emergent processes and flows.

It is from the processes, flows, cultures, and social structures that time reckoning frameworks are socially constructed. There are multiple, coexisting frameworks to choose from and choices are consequential. Individual competencies in self managing the different time reckoning situations are increasingly demanding. There has been a tendency to understate the times of consumption relative to the work times of the factory and the office (e.g., Thompson 1967; Harvey 1989). The temporality of "consuming for capitalism" is evident in the design of sports like American football, shopping at Wal Mart, engaging in mass tourism, eating slow food, or watching the media. The emergence of new social and non social processes associated with globalization depends upon and affords hybrid time reckoning systems.

Understanding temporal structuring and developing categories of temporality are central problems for practice and theory. Time is a key referential principle and its explication is required to understand the coordination and

synchronization within and between different segments of activity. Time and space are closely connected. Currently there is a rich vein of research, theorizing, and critical debate concerning the politics of time.

HOMOGENEOUS INSTRUMENTAL TIME AND EVENT BASED TEMPORALITY

The distinction between homogeneous instrumental systems of time reckoning and heterogeneous, event based reckoning is fundamental (Hassard 1996). Homogeneous time reckoning codes are represented by the calendar (e.g., week, month, year, 1917) and the clock (e.g., day, hour, minute). Calendars provide markers placed at equal standardized intervals derived from astronomical processes. A calendar expresses the rhythms of a society and suggests regularity. The calendar can be cyclical, as in the year when most societies celebrate the event of the "new year" but do so in contrasting ways. The calendar also provides a linear temporal structuring going backward into the past and forward into the future, as in utopian prophecy and scenario writing. Calendrical units are used reflectively to arrange past events, to plan the extended present, and to envisage different scenarios of the future. CCT is non reversible. So, 1066, 1776, and 1917 are in the past but 2020 is in the future. However, the imagining of different timescapes, including reversing time, is central to the modern and postmodern imagination and the cultural media. Linear event chains formed the basis for the emergence of historical consciousness about nature, especially geology (e.g., Darwin). The regularity of linear calendrical time was supplemented by the major innovation of narrative history and the imposition of determinate patterns (e.g., thesis, antithesis, synthesis). Calendrical time was and is used by powerful elites and their challengers to formulate linear chains of political events and to reveal anachronisms.

In Europe from the fourteenth to eighteenth centuries public clocks came to occupy a different role compared with China (Landes 1983). Christian monasteries, especially the Benedictines, established strict and exacting forms of temporal discipline which structured the day

very tightly. Christian bureaucracy initially structured everyday life in the emerging towns. New temporal structures were assembled around the ringing of bells and the display of public clocks. These were variously used to regulate the start and end of activities. Later this was extended to the increasing synchronization of activities within the towns. The escarpment movement clock required immense collective investment and struggle. The use of the clock to conquer space is illustrated by the mid eighteenth century development of a chronometer that could be used at sea to calculate the position of a ship relative to its intended trajectory. On land, from the eighteenth century onward the clock came to be used in the workplace by employers seeking to control work discipline. In England clock time was vigorously opposed and subverted by opposition by work groups in certain sectors (Thompson 1967). The Chinese used clocks for status and decoration throughout this period (Landes 1983). Homogeneous world times provided a global network which enabled high volume consumption.

CCT provides the framing to the world time of capitalism, travel, and trade in the twentieth century (Harvey 1989). CCT is a classificatory system of standardized, formalized units that can be added, subtracted, multiplied, divided, and arranged in linear and recurring patterns. CCT appears to be objective, authoritative, rational, and legitimate, yet CCT inscribes power at multiple levels. The regular units of CCT are tightly intertwined with use of money as medium of stored time. CCT enables planning, synchronizing, and coordinating activities by the state and by corporations.

Heterogeneous time reckoning contains clusters and sequences of events which are anchored in the duration of processes mainly known to local and specific groups of people of varying kinds: engineers and scientists. Events are contextual, directional, and irreversible. The units of event time tend to be pregnant with durational meanings like excitement, fear, and surprise. Scientists and engineers regularly use heterogeneous systems of reckoning (Dubinskas 1988). Marketing departments use event markers and intervals that are irregular and contingent yet have a patterning (Clark 1985).

Heterogeneous time reckoning is characterized by events as markers of intervals and by a heightened awareness of the durational aspects.

The big debate about time has been whether members of industrial and capitalist societies in the twenty first century use heterogeneous systems. Thompson (1967), in a seminal narrative about capitalism and work discipline, claimed that heterogeneous systems are displaced by homogeneous systems. However, as already indicated, industrialism and capitalism depend upon heterogeneous time reckoning. In practice, time reckoning is always multiple and diverse.

THEORETICAL LINEAGE

The agenda for time is contested. Gurvitch (1964) provides a stimulating history of time from Newton into the mid twentieth century. Abstract homogeneous time has been a dominating influence. Newton's (seventeenth century) universal framework, which was anchored in the metaphor of clock time, enabled the dualist separation of static and dynamic analyses. Dualism retained a powerful influence in sociology. Marx moved beyond descriptive chronologies based on calendrical time to construct a teleological, dialectical history of humankind as a journey toward a secular utopia. Marx focused on how capitalists equated homogeneous time units with the costs of production and opportunities for profit. The owners of firms translated units of time into money and commodified time. CCT became the framework in planning and controlling. The owners imposed clock based discipline, minimized porosity in the turnover time of financial capital, and replaced human time with technology. Weber sought to show a relationship between the measured work time of Taylorism, formal instrumental rationality, and the likelihood of disenchantment. Weber's historicism imposed ideal types on big structures and large processes. Gurvitch claimed that Weber's typological method was overly static and insufficiently processual.

The lineage of Newton and CCT was challenged in the early twentieth century. Bergson contended that the durational qualities of time

could not be understood within the temporality derived from Newtonian mechanics because social and biological processes were emergent. Therefore understanding flows, processes, and the future required a new ontology. Gurvitch provides a clear and relevant critique of Bergson's contribution. Durkheim stated that time, space, and causality are representations of collective life and are the solid frame that encloses all thought. Time is a serial order of experiences distinguishing the past, present, and future. The sequences can be cyclical (e.g., seasons), linear (e.g., birth to death), or open ended. Durkheim's attention to the durational features such as excitement highlighted the elements that distinguished sociology as an emerging discipline.

In the mid twentieth century Gurvitch sought to restate the sociology of time and history in terms of contingent processes, disjunctions, and a depthful ontology of places (Gurvitch 1964; Clark 1985). His spectrum of social times includes: the extent of continuity, contingency, and surprise; the pace of durations; and the relative influence of the past/present/future. An eightfold typology distinguishes levels in terms of surface or depth for different social formations (Harvey 1989: 224–5). Gurvitch, in contrast to Weber, proposed discontinuous typologies for specific periods and places.

The bold, complex approach of Gurvitch was displaced by Parsons's treatment of time in social systems. Parsons reinstated the dualism of static/dynamic from the Newtonian lineage and theorized time as an abstract objective framework. This complemented the new time geography, time budgets, and life cycle models. Time space geography records and maps the trajectories of individuals and cohorts during the day, week, and year as they move through particular spaces. This minimizes contingency and emphasizes chronic recursiveness about human activity (May & Thrift 2001). Time budgets are extensively used to audit activities in the typical day and week. They reveal consistent gender differences and significant differences between some nations. The life cycle model of birth, maturity, and death has become a temporal metaphor used to anticipate, justify, and explain the shifting changes to everyday

life. Commodities can have life cycles – and so can personal relationships.

Contemporary theory is being uneasily shaped by a blending of structuration theory (Giddens), casino capitalism (Harvey 1989), and dissipative structures. Giddens's sociology reconnected time with history whilst also subverting orthodox calendrical narratives. He adapted an objectified time and chronic recursiveness from time geography. Modernity became the capacity of historical narratives to provide reflexivity about custom and tradition so that existing time space is bracketed and scrutinized. The emergent future becomes the disrobing of the past of traditions. Innovation became routine. The relevance of time space distancing cannot be overstated. Giddens provides a temporal tool kit for examining the stretching of corporations from local entities into massive global firms, of cities into regions, and of the state apparatus in the modern nation state. Giddens's treatment of temporal agency is much more rampant and controversial than in the alternatives to structuration. He contends that there has been a transformation into "late modernity" or "post traditional society" rather than a rupture from modernity. Giddens's theory of time provides a protective belt for otherwise unconnected studies in different disciplinary areas: organization theory, historical geography, and information systems (Bluedorne 2003). Harvey (1989), a critical geographer, contends that the temporal mechanisms of finance capitalism have been qualitatively transformed by the instantaneity of information technology to create casino capitalism. This rapid speeding up inserts new time frames on top of older, taken for granted time priorities and practices, causing personal disruption, high risk, and uncertainty. Finally, dissipative structures were theorized in modern science to conceptualize and explain the inner temporality of processes as continuous flows of becoming. Adam (2004) draws on this theory to argue that sociological theory needs to address the non social context and its future consequences for social processes. Dissipative structures confront and challenge "Giddens time," overturn the dualism of static/dynamic analyses, and promote attention to the multiple event trajectories located within all kinds of processes.

MULTIPLE TIMES

The combination of heterogeneous and homogeneous systems provides temporal orientation and ordering to everyday life and to the specialized activities of the state, religious organizations, science, corporations, and occupations. For example, in the multitude of different disciplines within a typical university, the times of contemporary physics still differ from those found in geology and both differ from those found in sociology or economics. Musical scores and orchestras had been a repository of controlled time, but these orderly conceptions have been complemented and confronted by a blooming of aesthetic temporalities in the humanities and the arts. Times are differently constructed, expended, and experienced in different strata in the same society. Regions may possess repertoires of times that enable or disable economic success. All these processes are pregnant with political conflicts and inequalities.

There are many highly abstract times. Eternal time constructs linear flows from the distant past into a glorious extended present. Italian fascism invoked the Roman Empire. A linear eternal orientation may be utopian or dystopian. Some religions link the past to a future state. The template of eternity underpins the aim of producing universal generalizations in the social sciences. Since the mid twentieth century there has been the routine and extensive development of temporally open, multistate models that are independent of any context. These start with an undesired state and move through progressive time to further states and arrive at the desired goal. The models provide an abstract, instrumental, multilinear conceptualization of processes such as the diffusion of innovations between nations. The intervals of time are sequential rather than simultaneous, yet irreversibility can be imagined as a game of comparisons and the auditing of performance. The discourse of tasks, events, milestones colonizes the temporal life of everyone. Families in Silicon Valley can coordinate their identities on a daily basis using handheld technologies.

In some theories of modernity it was mistakenly assumed that sacred religious time had been ousted as a major time setting authority

and replaced by the secular temporalities of science, the state, and commerce.

COMMODIFIED WORLD TIME:
EXPERTS, CORPORATIONS,
AND NATIONS

A market economy depends on and reproduces standardized, decontextualized, and commodified units of time. CCT provides a major discourse in capitalism to the coordination of technologies and labor discipline. The commodification of time and its separation from commodified space is an indicator of the role of the economy in capitalist societies. The market has been the route through which the work rhythms and temporal principles of corporations predominate. Time is experienced in everyday contexts through schedules of all kinds, calendars, deadlines, seasonal events, and project times. Even intimate moments like “quality time” seem scheduled. There are different temporal effects in the metropolitan centers like Los Angeles, Tokyo, and Frankfurt from those experienced in peripheries such as Nigeria producing raw materials or Kenya producing edible products. The metropolitan temporal flows instantiate the supply chains and networks that organize the spatial. The harvesting of flowers in Kenya is temporally orchestrated like a musical score to mesh with both the rate of expected sales in Europe and the fragile, aesthetic perishing of the flowers. A new discourse of flexible temporal principles is being imposed – “serving the consumer” – and contested.

Professional time experts, consultancies, and corporations are the leading edge of compressing and stretching time. They constantly use abstract representations to remove delays and waiting times when the financial return is low and the porosity is high. The evolution of the Gantt method of charting time lines and its inscription in software is very important. Gantt charts became a temporal boundary object in corporate power struggles (Yakura 2002). Time lines are graphical representations of tasks, events, and milestones. Gantt charts make abstract time visible to powerholders. Time experts orchestrate the temporality of urban spaces and search for places that can be more

deeply commodified, as in tourism around the Indian Ocean. They are the eyes of capitalist power (May & Thrift 2001) that reflexively search the world to compare practices and to construct sites for simulating novel practices. By enrolling and incentivizing innovation in information technology, they introduce mechanisms and organizational formations which tend to transform sticky processes into flows over vast distances. They develop software for the planning and surveillance of the use of resources in organizations. Time sequencing and synchronizing are embedded in expert systems like enterprise resource planning (ERP). These reduce the porosity of capital accumulation by envisaging the simultaneous actions and flows. A focus upon the cycle time of production can disrupt the total time from design to the consumer's purchase (Clark 1985).

Some corporations (e.g., Toyota) have developed capacities to stretch time through expert systems that embed capacities to design temporal structures which stretch across continents. Large organizations typically calculate an abstract temporal container expressing the aggregate volume of standardized time available to undertake a portfolio of activities over a given calendar period (Clark 1985; Hassard 1996; Bluedorne 2003). Large retailers are streamlining the purchasing function to speed up and control transactions whilst introducing barcode scanners and extending the panoptic gaze of the firm. The temporality is closer to that of super market than hospital.

Some nations, their corporations and their professions may be the source of time reckoning frameworks that are carried across large areas of the world. The key to analyzing the internal dynamics of the capitalist state is that revenue for the state is dependent upon processes of valorization which the state does not directly control. The state frames many of the new forms of temporal ordering through legislative actions (e.g., France). The temporal complexity within America is remarkable and consequential for the world. The spectrum ranges from the ordered times of American football and McDonald's to the event dominated temporal modularity associated with some West Coast communities and with the emergent segments of information technology. In twentieth century America, the

clock was used most extensively by influential specialist occupations specifically situated with a role in the temporal structuring of workplaces of all kinds, which to some extent occasionally structured home life as well (e.g., funerals). Many of the practices and technologies were commercially developed in and marketed around the world: from Gantt charts to systems of production and inventory control. Currently more over, time experts and firms specialize in "events" and in historicizing the past in a post modern history of the future. So, contrary to some views (e.g., Bluedorne 2003), there is a remarkable articulation between homogeneous and heterogeneous time reckoning in America. Celebratory and sacred times are evident in many social occasions.

TIME SPACE COMPRESSION AND THE POLITICS OF TIME

Critical theorists contend that in capitalism the political control of temporal structures by corporations has unfavorable consequences because we live in an extended present of time space compression and instantaneity. They contend that we are in an era when established expectations of what comes next are much less clear than in the past: it is a runaway world. If so, established temporal expectations are a poor guide to future navigation. Temporal relations may become so destabilized as a result of constant flux that they can provide little in the way of anchoring for social relations and place bound nostalgias. Time space compression means reducing the total cycle time of global financial capital accumulation by quickening the time from design to sale (Harvey 1989; May & Thrift 2001). The time to travel distances is reduced through increases in the speed of sending material goods, information, and people. Most of our electronic devices are dedicated to speeding things up. Commodified times relentlessly colonize and replace the social rhythms with greater speed of transactions. New forms of advertising create an aesthetic audiovisual economy of signs, brands, and logos which can be constantly upgraded. Consequently, the objectified qualities of how we represent the

world to ourselves are disrupted and this can lead to a tension between the speed of turnover and the capacity of societies to regenerate. Radically new forms of time disrupt linear homogeneous time with forms of project and event time that can be chaotic and volatile. There is discontinuity and there are new times (Gurvitch 1964). The experience of simultaneity and synchronized processes from the “electronic embrace” is complemented by new possibilities of asynchronicity in situations typified by a consensually grounded grammar. The time of mass production is replaced by mass customization and the opportunities for diversity.

SEE ALSO: Commodities, Commodity Fetishism, and Commodification; Distanciation and Disembedding; Durkheim, Émile; Gurvitch, Georges: Social Change; Management History; Space; Taylorism; Time Space

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time series

Robert M. Capraro

Time series analysis can be used in two general situations: (1) forecasting and (2) exploring the nature of some event represented by a set of points or observations, with both techniques serving the purpose for establishing theory that can, at some point, represent future events. Time series analyses are often used in business settings by forecasting stock, commodity, and product valuing. Time series is less often used in educational research; therefore, it is this perspective that will be used in all examples to contextualize possible research scenarios where time series analyses would be appropriate.

Among the myriad techniques subsumed by the term time series analyses are autocorrelation, trend, and seasonal variation, which all help in the quest to understand the underlying structure or the fit of a theoretical model. Just as with the general linear model, time series can handle single or multiple dependent variables. Some techniques for fitting a time series include Box Jenkins univariate and multivariate, and Holt Winters. The fit techniques, similar to the way classical measurement attempts to differentiate between true and unsystematic error score for each item, attempt to differentiate between data points that are and are not useful in helping to predict future events. Therefore, time series analyses incorporate procedures for dealing with these erroneous data points. Specifically, time series analyses make use of smoothing techniques; the approach to the smoothing differs, as well as the smoothing technique's susceptibility or ability to deal with “noise” or random unsystematic error. The smoothing techniques generally fit into one of two methods, consisting of averaging and exponential smoothing methods.

Generally, univariate time series refers to data that are recorded sequentially, at regular intervals, over some period of time. For example, a case for a univariate time series would be examining the impact of free/reduced lunch programs on school attendance patterns for low socioeconomic status as compared to the other students, for, say, 2 years. These time series data allow the researcher, depending on

sampling technique, to examine school attendance trends for these two groups based on their enrolment in the free/reduced lunch program. If trends were detected an additional time series analysis might be undertaken, one in which attendance patterns might help to identify trends in academic success or on high stakes tests. Currently, as with many statistical analyses, the minimal number of observation points is somewhat debated, but as a general rule of thumb, 50 observation points should suffice.

Two other general types of time series analyses, multivariate and interrupted time series, can be used when additional data points are available and related to the phenomena under investigation or when comparing the effects of an external event on the observations, respectively. From the example above, one might consider that the changes in attendance trends among the groups of interest might be due to other factors. In this case, a multivariate time series analysis might be reasonable and include other measures, such as classroom behavior management referrals, suspensions, or school climate measures such as parent volunteerism, teacher absenteeism, and phone calls to or from parents. When one is considering changes in programs or the impact of new programs, then an interrupted time series is applicable. The kindergarten through twelfth grade public education system provides a rich source of time series appropriate data. Many states hold textbook adoptions every 5 or 7 years. This change in textbooks allows one to consider student academic achievement in an interrupted time series that considers student performance before and after the change in textbooks. On the surface, this study is of marginal interest except if in changing textbooks a downward trend in student academic achievement was detected and this downward trend was predictable with each new adoption – some legislators may attempt to forgo the textbook adoption process for schools and opt for a single textbook. Again, referring to the original example, one might be interested in any of the above additional variables, but also want to consider the impact of new legislation influencing free/reduced lunch in conjunction with the inception of the Head Start legislation on school attendance, which represents an interrupted time series from before and after each of

the legislative actions. Interrupted time series allow one to consider the impact of some intervening variable on the phenomenon of interest. Often, interrupted time series make some use of retrospective data collection or the inclusion of extant data along with current data. However, the research question and paradigm should govern when and how to use any of the myriad varieties of time analyses.

RESEARCH PARADIGM

Time series can be useful when the researcher needs to be able to isolate the dependent variable from other exogenous variables. Therefore, it is necessary to find a design that allows for the control of variables that can function as threats to validity. When the researcher needs to interpret a dependent variable from some set of measured variables, why not simply use an experimental design? One option for measuring the outcomes of social interactions or programs is true experiments (Fishman & Weinberg 1992). In a true experiment, individuals are randomly assigned to either an experimental or a control group. The purpose for randomization is that it presumably controls for the effects of unmeasured variables, allowing the researcher to claim that the outcomes are the result of the intervention (i.e., not the result of unmeasured variables or quirky data) (Cook & Campbell 1979; Shadish et al. 2002). In the absence of random assignment or in non experimental situations, researchers attempt to control the effects of unmeasured variables on the outcome variable. However, in non experimental designs researchers cannot make causal statements regarding treatment results on the outcome variable. Researchers are limited to statements about linkages between the treatment and the outcome variable situated within the presence of other variables. In social science situations, non experimental designs can be more attractive than experimental designs because they are less costly, make retrospective longitudinal investigations possible, allow the use of extant secondary databases, and incorporate a reasonable control of extraneous variables. In time series analysis, aggregate data allow for the measuring of global changes, separate from other variables that can impact the outcome variable.

TIME SERIES ANALYTIC METHODS

Several different approaches are available for time series analyses. The time domain approach focuses on the correlation between immediately surrounding points in time by the dependence of the current values on past values. This modeling can be thought of as linear regressions of present values on past values generally considered as a useful forecasting tool. This approach is associated with autoregressive integrated moving average or ARIMA models. Conceptually, ARIMA handles data in the general form of time correlated events where one presumes that past values are predictive of future events. Just as multivariate analysis of variance better models real world events (Thompson 1991), multivariate time series can provide a better model by accounting for more than one input series through a multivariate ARIMA or transfer function.

The frequency domain approach focuses on periodicity and the idiosyncratic nature that can be explained by external factors. In social sciences or education one might be interested in monthly attendance patterns across rural, urban, and suburban schools or performance of students on minimal skills testing that occurs during various months across states.

Spectral analysis is often used to examine the various periods of interest in the data. This analytic method examines the variance associated with each interest period separately. This method often works well with long series or when the periods are clearly defined. For instance, the frequency domain approach seems to fit well with analyzing speech. Speech consists of clearly defined periods that can be analyzed by computer software to provide speech to text applications. However, in financial applications, one would want to know about summative trends for companies, financial indexes, and sector performance. Just as with education and social sciences, it is important to match what the time series analyst wants to know to the appropriate approach.

Conventionally, whichever approach one chooses the result is presented in graphical form with the *x axis* being time. There are three general forms for presenting the results. Continuous time series represent data collected

longitudinally, and observations could be made at any continuous point in time. Discrete time series use equally spaced points along the time continuum. The discrete nature for the data collection should be purposeful and intentional. Interrupted time series refers to examining related events before or after some intervening variable during the time series. While sampling technique is a non trivial issue, it is important to note that the sampling rate (frequency) can appreciably change the appearance of the representation of the data. Improper sampling can lead to distorted data, referred to as aliasing.

ANALYTIC DECISIONS AND STUDY FORTITUDE

Finally, in choosing a time series analysis it is important to keep some questions in mind: (1) How much data are required (for an interrupted time series) and how many baseline data points are needed? (2) How many schools/teachers/programs etc. are needed? (3) How large should subject pools be? (4) How many follow up years should be included in the analyses? These questions address factors influencing estimates of program impact. After the study is complete and these questions are considered in the design, it is important to consider impact. A simple way to represent the precision of a research design is its "minimum detectable effect." Intuitively, this is the smallest impact that has a good chance of being identified if it actually exists. The smaller the minimum detectable effect, the more precise the design. The first step in assessing the minimum detectable effect of a research design is to decide how impacts will be reported. However, the minimum detectable effect does not induct replicability of the observed effects. A popular way to determine effect that does infer replicability, especially for education research, is a measure called effect size. This is simply the impact in its original units (e.g., a scaled test score) divided by the standard deviation of the original measure for the population or sample of interest. Hence, effect sizes are measured in units of standard deviations. Thus, an effect size of 0.25 means a positive impact that is comparable in magnitude

to 0.25 standard deviations. An effect size of -0.40 means a negative impact that is comparable in magnitude to 0.40 standard deviations. Although judgments about whether a specific effect size is large or small are ultimately arbitrary, some guidelines do exist. Many researchers use the rule of thumb proposed by Cohen (1988), which suggests that effect sizes of roughly 0.20 be considered small, 0.50 be considered moderate, and 0.80 be considered large. Lipsey (1990) provides empirical support for this approach based on the distribution of 102 mean effect sizes obtained from 186 meta-analyses of treatment effectiveness studies, most of which are from education research. The bottom third of this distribution (small impacts) ranged from 0.00 to 0.32, the middle third (moderate impacts) ranged from 0.33 to 0.55, and the top third (large impacts) ranged from 0.56 to 1.26.

SEE ALSO: Experimental Design; Multivariate Analysis; Variables

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time-space

James Slevin

All social life is ordered over time and through space. However, when sociologists attend to the "situated" character of social life, they do not treat time space as simply the temporal and spatial environment of the phenomena they study. They see social life as not just being "in" time space, they see time space as central to all social interaction. The "situatedness" of social life involves time space as a constitutive feature in the construction and reconstruction of what people do and in the way they do things together. The ordering of social life comes about because social practices are routinely made to come together across time space as shared experiences. This binding of time space is expressed in the ways in which societies, institutions, and individuals organize time space.

Anthony Giddens draws attention to three features that need to be addressed by sociologists when seeking to understand the way in which social life is ordered across time space. The first involves the construction and reconstruction of regularized social interaction across time space through informed practices. Take, for example, the actions and interactions relating to the lending and borrowing of a library book. These are knowledgeable activities involving the understanding of a range of time space relations by both lenders and borrowers. A borrowed book has to be returned before the elapse of a specific time period and returned to a specific place in the library in order for it to be made available for the next person wishing to borrow it. The library staff gather and process information on the whereabouts of the books they have lent out and apply sanctions, where necessary, in order to secure their timely return.

The second feature involves the association of social interaction with purposefully designed spatial and temporal environments. Taking once again the example of a library book, such transactions are embedded in purposefully designed spatial and temporal settings for the storage, distribution, and collection of books. The design of a library building, the spacing of facilities for the storing of books, the catalog access points,

the information and administration desks, the reading rooms, etc., are all features integral to the spatial and temporal coordination of library transactions and are integral to what a library is.

The third feature involves the organizational mechanisms which are used to regulate the timing and spacing of social interaction. The lending and borrowing of a library book are organized by means of various time space organizing devices. A library will have specific opening hours. These may alter depending on which day of the week people wish to visit the library. The annual cycle of opening hours may include calendar dates when there are holiday closures. Other time space schedules, such as a library's borrowing and cataloging system, regulate the location of books, the total number of books borrowed, and the length of the borrowing period.

The development and use of information, communication, and transportation technology impact on all three of the features set out above. David Harvey's term "time space compression" describes the reduction of distance experienced through the decrease in the time taken, either to cross space physically by means of transportation, or symbolically by means of communication. People can, for example, use the Internet to access and consult cataloging systems of distant libraries which, due to their far off location, they would have never considered visiting physically. They can also increasingly download reading material digitally and so cancel out the need for physical transportation altogether. The use of the Internet also impacts on libraries as purposefully designed spatial and temporal settings. For example, library users may browse through books on a computer screen rather than in the open book stacks in a library building. Finally, Internet use impacts on the organizational mechanisms which are used to regulate the timing and spacing of library transactions. People can, for example, consult a library's cataloging system and download reading material even outside a library's opening hours. Moreover, material stored and distributed by a library in a digital form does not need to be returned to the library in order for it to be made available to others.

Time space compression allows for the stretching of social life across time space, a phenomenon that lies at the heart of one of the

most central transformative processes of our time: globalization. Tomlinson (1999) writes of "the 'proximity' that comes from the networking of social relations across large tracts of time space, causing distant events and powers to penetrate our local experience." However, as he makes clear, the compression of time space is not just about physical distance. It is also about social cultural distance.

SEE ALSO: Culture; Environment and Urbanization; Globalization; Goffman, Erving; Information Society; Media and Globalization; Network Society; Organizations; Space; Surveillance; Urbanization; Time

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Tocqueville, Alexis de (1805–59)

Sam Binkley

Born into a French aristocratic family in 1805, Alexis de Tocqueville was a French political theorist, sociologist, and cultural and historical commentator whose contributions are equally claimed by the disciplines of sociology, political science, American studies, and American history. In 1831, together with his colleague Gustave de Beaumont, Tocqueville embarked on a tour of the nascent American democracy in an

effort to understand the inner workings of the democratic spirit in the everyday lives and social institutions of the American people. On returning to France he wrote his famous two volume investigation, *Democracy in America* (1835). Tocqueville uncovered within American society a tension between democracy's conflicting imperatives: the egalitarian character of democratic societies, while successfully eliminating forms of despotism identified with feudalism, did not provide sufficient integration of the individual into the social fabric. Hence, democratization, if extended unchecked and in irresponsible ways, could produce excessive individualism (a term Tocqueville coined for this purpose), and ultimately new forms of despotism. In a comparison of the American and French experiences with democracy, Tocqueville pointed to the dangers posed by the French case, in which a sudden leveling of social hierarchies following the French Revolution eliminated the intermediary institutions that maintained the integration of individuals within the larger social fabric, leading to revolutionary despotism, a theme developed more completely in his other major work, *The Old Regime and the Revolution* (1856).

The American case, on the other hand, fostered voluntary democratic institutions which ensured local involvement and instructed in the methods and techniques of self rule. The American case, however, was possessed of the equally ominous threat of the "tyranny of the majority," or leveling and homogenizing of public opinion by the belief in the ultimate sovereignty of the views held by the greatest number. Tocqueville cited as an example the persecution of the editors of a Baltimore newspaper who, during the war of 1812, after voicing an unpopular view, were besieged by a mob of enraged locals, had their printing presses destroyed, and were jailed and ultimately killed. Tocqueville's assessment of such majoritarian absolutism contributed to later debates around mass society and twentieth century totalitarianism, conformity, and homogenization, and resonates with David Reisman's *The Lonely Crowd* (Reisman et al. 1950).

Tocqueville's legacy is still very much in dispute, particularly in debates around the welfare state, civic engagement, and democratic citizenship (Goldberg 2001). On the political right,

Tocqueville is cited as a critic of the tyranny of the welfare state and of public assistance as a means of redressing inequality. On the left he is taken up as an advocate of an active role for the state in offsetting the atomization of society through policies that enable associative engagement of individuals in democratic and community participation (Arato & Cohen 1992). Tocqueville's imprint is also visible in contemporary sociological concerns with declining social capital and the erosion of civic engagement in urban, mediated, and postmodern societies (Putnam 2000).

SEE ALSO: Citizenship; Civil Society; Democracy; Individualism; Totalitarianism; Welfare State

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tolerance

Susanne Karstedt

In 1598, Henri IV King of France decreed the Edict of Nantes that proclaimed the principle of tolerance as guiding principle of the state, its administration, and the life of its citizens. The Edict of Nantes established the principle of tolerance in order to end civil strife and religious conflicts, and to enhance the safety of all

citizens, independent of their religious beliefs. Looking back over a period of more than 400 years, the Edict of Nantes is an astonishingly modern document. It granted equal access to the institutions of the state, public office, and educational institutions for all religious denominations, in particular for Protestants. As such, it is a document not only of the toleration of (religious) diversity, but also of the creation of those institutional safeguards and arrangements that underpin tolerance as a lived experience and practice of citizens.

Europe and the United States have been the seedbeds of tolerance, of the philosophical ideas on which it is founded, the legal and institutional framework where it is enshrined, and the education of citizens and their habits, through which tolerance becomes a lived experience. In Europe, tolerance emerged as a mechanism of internal conflict resolution during the period of religious wars and strife, and the Confederation of Warsaw (1573) is one of the earliest documents of (religious) tolerance guaranteed by the state. In the Middle Ages, cities like Toledo or Granada thrived on the established tolerance between Muslim, Christian, and Jewish citizens; Sarajevo is another of these notable examples, all from countries under Islamic occupation (Spain, Bosnia). It took nearly another 250 years after the Edict of Nantes for the principles and institutional foundations of religious tolerance to be firmly established in Europe in the nineteenth century. In this process Europe lagged behind the United States, which had adopted the ideas as well as the legal and institutional framework, had proclaimed religious tolerance in its Declaration of Independence, and guaranteed it in its Constitution. The European and American philosophers of the Enlightenment proclaimed toleration as the notion that all human beings are essentially the same, despite their religious and moral convictions, and that the beliefs of other races and civilizations are equal to those of Christianity. Tolerance emerged as a core concept and value in the formation of modernity and modern societies.

Tolerance is a concept which can only be defined in a negative way, and its essence is defined by the lack of action, social bonds, or emotions. It is not an expression of benevolence, but embodies a sense of disapproval. Tolerance

is the deliberate choice not to interfere with conducts and beliefs, lifestyles and behaviors, of which one disapproves. Tolerance is defined by passivity, not activity, and it is non reaction and non interference that characterize tolerant attitudes and behaviors. Tolerance means the absence, not presence, of strong emotions, and neither love nor hatred is comprised in the concept of tolerance. As such, tolerant attitudes and behaviors are situated between a positive and negative extreme; at its positive extreme, tolerance expressively includes respect for others, and acceptance and embracement of social diversity and individual difference. At its negative extreme, tolerance can be characterized by total neglect, disregard, ignorance, and avoidance of those individuals and groups who are different. The range covered by tolerance is reflected in thresholds, where behaviors and lifestyles of others are seen as threats to the social and moral order, and as such become "intolerable." How far tolerance can be stretched, and at what tipping points intolerance takes over, varies individually between groups and societies.

Tolerance owes its prominent role in the formation of modernity to its essential character as non interference. It is decisive for the cultural change from "passions to interests" (Hirschmann 1997 [1977]), which gave birth to modern capitalism. It constitutes the foundation for the development of universalistic and individualistic value patterns, and is essential for the development of the weak ties (Granovetter 1973) that are a defining feature of modern societies. Tolerance is embedded neither within those bonds of solidarity that develop between equals nor within groups, where tolerance of difference is not actually needed. Tolerance is, however, essential in the formation of links between different social groups, and facilitates the everyday interactions of their members. Tolerance is one of the foundations of the transformation from *Gemeinschaft* to *Gesellschaft* (Tönnies). Modern democracy and its "civic culture" (Almond & Verba 1963) are based on the lack of strong bonds and emotions, and tolerance is seen as an indispensable "underpinning of democracy" and cornerstone of civic culture (Sullivan & Transue 1999). The stability of modern democratic regimes is based on acceptance of the majority rule by the

minority, succession through elections with winners and losers, and peaceful negotiation of different interests between groups, as well as a specific attitudinal pattern amongst the citizenry that supports these institutions and makes them work.

Tolerance can only flourish where weak ties are strong. Weak ties need a certain level of trust and cohesion amongst the citizenry. Inglehart (1997) shows with data from the World Values Survey that generalized trust in others and tolerance of different and deviant lifestyles are highly correlated in his sample of 43 countries. In particular, generalized trust that links different ethnic groups increases tolerance of and the integration of ethnic minority groups (Jorgensen 2004; Uslaner 2004). Amongst the predictors of intolerance, perceived threat from all who are defined as "others" is an extremely potent, completely exogenous, and by far the most significant predictor of endangered tolerance (Gibson 1992; Sullivan & Transue 1999). This is mirrored by the individual dispositions and personality traits that are linked to intolerance. Adorno et al.'s *Authoritarian Personality* (1950) laid the foundations for an influential stream of research, which linked psychological insecurity and individual dogmatism to intolerance of "others" (Stouffer 1955; Gibson 1992; see Sullivan & Transue 1999). It has, however, proven to be difficult to establish that a "modal" and more authoritarian character is responsible for a higher or lower level of intolerance in a specific society. Rather than individual or collective dispositions, a specific social situation of anomie, felt insecurity, and perceived threats seems to combine into the significant social conditions conducive to intolerance, though these can be based on tradition and history (Gibson & Gouws 2003).

Consequently, transitional societies and emerging democracies seem to be in particular vulnerable to widespread intolerance and ethnic and religious strife, and more affected by resulting violent conflicts with ethnic minorities. The quest for "group rights" in the transition countries of Eastern and Central Europe has been made responsible for a decrease in tolerance and the revival of ethnic conflicts and boundaries, combined with increased violence (Offe 2002; Mann 2005). In divided societies like South Africa, perceived threats still loom large and

endanger tolerance and the building of democracy and civic culture (Gibson & Gouws 2003).

Contemporary societies and democracies put the tolerance and toleration of citizens to the test in new and different ways. They stress individualistic expression, individual autonomy, and identity, and citizens ask for the toleration of their own behavior and identity as much as they are asked to tolerate others. More autonomy and less restraint in behavior exercise the tolerance of citizens. As such, tolerance in modern societies encompasses a much broader spectrum of attitudinal and behavioral patterns than those related to political and/or religious affiliations. Citizens have to cope with new levels of ethnic and cultural diversity in contemporary societies due to the influx of ethnic minorities and immigrant groups, and their different ways of life. They experience increased levels of insecurity through crime and disorder in their neighborhoods and cities, or deep generational gaps between the lifestyles of younger and older generations in society. All this is perceived as threats to the existing "moral order" of groups and communities. Most recent developments indicate that religious affiliation in combination with ethnicity is perceived as a threat again, or that threats from crime become racialized (Frederico & Holmes 2005), thus pointing to highly differentiated patterns of tolerance and intolerance within different social groups. Tolerance has become precarious as citizens increasingly demand higher levels of personal and community security from the state, are increasingly willing to accept restrictions on civil liberties, are increasingly opting for populist solutions to such problems, and are more inclined toward punitiveness and less toward tolerance of deviance than before.

In responding to the challenges to tolerance in contemporary societies, political theory and philosophy have reconfigured the concept of tolerance in terms of liberalism, identity, and difference (Horton 1993; Walzer 1997; Horton & Mendus 1999; Shweder et al. 2002; Castiglione & McKinnon 2003; McKinnon & Castiglione 2003). Traditional notions of political and religious tolerance needed to be broadened in order to account for all aspects of the new forms of diversity in contemporary societies, and to relate them to the institutional framework of democracy, justice, and human

rights (Kymlicka & Opalski 2001). Beyond those mechanisms that citizens use to deal with the behavior, actions, and beliefs of “others” that they perceive as a threat to their “moral order,” citizens need to link with the institutions of society when they address them for support and help in dealing with such behaviors and the resulting social conflicts. The civic culture that engenders tolerance amongst citizens needs support from the institutions and associations of civil society, as well as strong democratic institutions. It is crucial in this process that freedom from insecurity and perceived threat is distributed equally, and that minorities as well as the majority are equally secure. The provision of security to all citizens by institutions as diverse as criminal justice and welfare is vital in ensuring and developing tolerance in societies. Contemporary societies need to find the balance between closely knit communities and diversity, stability, and disorder that shapes tolerance in all realms of life (Weissberg 1998).

SEE ALSO: Adorno, Theodor W.; Affirmative Action; Citizenship; Civil Society; Democracy; Discrimination; Prejudice

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Tönnies, Ferdinand (1855–1936)

Raymond M. Weinstein

Ferdinand Tönnies was born near Oldenswort, Germany, in the northern province of Schleswig Holstein. He came from a well to do farming family and grew up at a time when

Germany was expanding as a colonial empire and undergoing profound changes such as population growth, urbanization, and industrialization. Tönnies's oldest brother was involved in mercantile endeavors and thus he experienced the world of the peasant farmer as well as the town merchant. He received his doctorate in philosophy from the University of Tübingen in 1877, then returned to his native province, and later taught for over a half century as a private lecturer and professor at the University of Kiel.

Tönnies was interested in social philosophy and social science. His best known work was his first, *Gemeinschaft und Gesellschaft*, published in 1887. Translated into English as *Community and Society* (1957), this book on social change and modernization had a pioneering influence in the new discipline of sociology. Its later editions served to enhance Tönnies's reputation as an important social theorist. *Gemeinschaft* referred not so much to a geographic place as to a "community feeling," intimate and holistic relationships, and a common meeting of minds characteristic of people living in a village or small town. By contrast, Tönnies used *Gesellschaft* to describe the impersonal, limited, and contractual relationships people have in an urban industrial world, an "associational society." The two terms were meant to call attention to the dramatic shift occurring in the late nineteenth century in social groupings and interpersonal relations.

Tönnies believed all social relationships were governed by human will, the need to belong to groups or associate with others. He spoke of "natural will," the motivation for action derived from the temperament, character, or intellect of the individual. This will is typified by *Gemeinschaft* and is found in kinship groups, neighborhoods, and friendship circles. People are bound together by blood, locality, or common interest and naturally work together or help each other as an end in and for itself. Tönnies believed "rational will" is characteristic of *Gesellschaft*. People associate with one another as a means to an end, for economic or political gain in capitalist society, to rationally choose their associations for practical results rather than personal motives. Tönnies developed his concepts to be ideal types of historical relationships found in medieval or rural, as opposed to modern or urban, societies.

As a sociologist, Tönnies was ahead of his contemporaries – Durkheim and Weber in Europe and Cooley in the US – who likewise created dichotomies of the changing forces that bind people and different orientations guiding their actions. He was a prolific writer and made contributions to many areas of sociology, publishing over 900 works during his lifetime. In 1910 Tönnies wrote a philosophical treatise on Thomas Hobbes. In 1922 he produced a book about public opinion and research methods. The papers he considered most relevant were collected in three volumes from 1924 to 1929. In 1931 he published an introduction to sociology as a social science. His last book, *The Spirit of Modern Times*, appearing in 1935 shortly before his death, connected theoretically back to *Community and Society* a half century earlier.

Tönnies co founded the German Sociological Society and served as its president for several years. He came to America in 1904 to lecture at Harvard University. He was removed from his academic post at Kiel by the Nazis in 1933 because of his liberal ideas and public criticism of the regime. After the war, times changed and the father of sociology in Germany was honored by the creation of the Ferdinand Tönnies Gesellschaft at Kiel in 1956. The FTG sponsors research, journals, and conferences on sociological topics, and from 1998 published a 24 volume critical edition of Tönnies's complete works. Tönnies's first work, however, composed as a young man, turned out to be the one he would be most remembered for. His ideas continue to move, intellectually and emotionally, younger generations of scholars on both sides of the Atlantic. The German words *Gemeinschaft* and *Gesellschaft* are readily employed without translation by sociologists lecturing and writing in any language.

SEE ALSO: Community and Economy; Cooley, Charles Horton; Durkheim, Émile; Durkheim, Émile and Social Change; Social Change; Urban Community Studies; Weber, Max

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top management teams

Phyl Johnson and Steven W. Floyd

The top management team (TMT) literature concerns itself with the study of the most senior teams of executive directors in both private and public sector organizations. These teams are studied in terms of their makeup, their activities, and the extent to which either of these variables has a causal relationship with organizational performance. Top management teams are widely acknowledged to play a key role in organizational success and failure and, as such, generate significant research interest.

Although sharing some themes in common, the TMT literature does not normally include work that is interested in boards of directors and issues surrounding corporate governance. These literatures look at the next level up in organizational hierarchy where the decision making body is made up of directors that are internal (executive) and external (non executive) to the organization and are answerable to (or representative of) the owners of the business and other key stakeholders.

The TMT literature is tangential to other fields. As the most senior managers within the organization, it is the task of the membership of the TMT to both develop and lead the implementation of the strategy that organization is seeking to follow to achieve success. Therefore, both the leadership and strategic decision making literatures are relevant to and share common themes with the TMT literature.

Different perspectives have been used to explore the nature, role, and impact of TMTs.

One of the more widely known and recognized is the literature on the *demographic* profile (e.g., size, turnover, tenure, occupational background) of TMTs. In general, this research examines relationships between such variables and the organization's strategy or its financial performance. One of the causal mechanisms proposed to account for these relationships is the effect of demographic characteristics on the information processing capacity of the TMT. Thus, for example, Haleblan and Finkelstein (1993) argue that larger TMTs have a greater degree of information processing capacity, that this leads to better strategic decisions, and thus, that the size of the TMT is positively associated with organizational performance. A similar line of causal reasoning connects the demographic characteristics of the TMT to its beliefs or knowledge base. Thus, for example, Michel and Hambrick (1992) argued that the more an organization's diversification posture relied on interdependence among business units, the more likely that operations, marketing, sales, and R&D would be represented in the functional backgrounds of TMT members. The most widely cited work within this genre is Hambrick and Mason's (1984) theoretical paper in which they outline both the rationale and the methodology for using demographic variables in the study of TMTs. This paper is usually recognized as launching this stream of research, which Hambrick and Mason call the "upper echelons perspective."

Another body of work that is focused on the TMT is the *strategic decision making* literature. One stream of debate and discussion within the strategic decision making literature breaks the decision making process into subtasks: scanning for strategic issues, interpreting these issues, and making a strategic choice. Here, the cognitive processes, biases, and routines of the members of the TMT are explored. For instance, one finding is that how strategists categorize a strategic issue influences strategic choice: when issues are categorized as threats, the decision is more likely to affect a significant change in strategy. Other researchers focus much more on the processes associated with strategic choice. One stream of work analyzes the comprehensiveness of strategic decision processes (Fredrickson 1984; Fredrickson & Mitchell 1984). A high degree of comprehensiveness means that the TMT pursues a more rational approach

to decision making, including the articulation of clear goals and the analysis of multiple alternatives, while a low degree of comprehensiveness means that decision making follows a more incremental pattern, involving a more limited comparison of a potential course of action against the status quo. Another body of work on TMT decision process examines the extent to which TMT members agree or disagree about strategic decisions, i.e., the extent of strategic consensus. Both the antecedents and outcomes of consensus have been explored (e.g., Dess 1987; Dess & Origer 1987; Woolridge & Floyd 1989; Dess & Priem 1995). Others focus on the manner in which the TMT interacts in the process of achieving agreement. Three modes of interaction are usually discussed: devil's advocacy, dialectical inquiry, and consensus building.

A more recent perspective on TMT decision making has sought to bring a finer grained understanding to the subject. Here a *cognitive lens* is used to explore how TMT members think about (Huff 1990) or make sense of (Weick 1995) the internal and external organizational environments and their role as strategists. The cognitive strategic groups literature would be an example (e.g., Porac et al. 1989; Reger & Huff 1993; Johnson et al. 1998). Here, researchers seek to account for strategic outcomes in terms of the way strategists think about the structure of their competitive environment.

So far the discussion of TMTs has been focused on the outcomes and nature of TMT activity and has been clearly aligned to the strategic decision making literature. However, there is a body of work within the TMT literature that is concerned less with the strategic nature of TMT activity per se than with the exploration of the *characteristics* of those who make it to the TMT. This is largely contingency based theorizing and moreover is more heavily focused on exploring the characteristics of those managers who make it to the CEO role rather than the executive suite generally. Norburn's (1989) study is an example of work that focuses on CEOs; he describes a set of psychological characteristics that predict CEO or director status.

There is a smaller literature that examines characteristics of individual TMT members, not in terms of who makes it to the top, but rather in terms of what happens to executives physically and psychologically when they

become members of the TMT. This literature is concerned with the causes and consequences of *executive health*.

Finally, there is a small literature that, encompassing all of the above and more, seeks to create a *typology* of TMTs. Often papers on this topic are designed for a practitioner as opposed to academic audience. Pitcher (1997) is a good example of work that is practically oriented and academically sound.

The primary methodological problem with studying the TMT has been access. That is, the upper echelons of organizations are comprised of powerful people who are not inclined to become objects of research. In the past, the preference has been to theorize using data that are in the public domain. Hence, the demographic methodology discussed at the outset has been used widely. However, the use of such *surrogate measures* (using demographic variables as a surrogate measure of TMT members' attitudes and beliefs) has been criticized (Lawrence 1997; Markoczy 1997) and calls have been issued for researchers to carry out more work that collects primary data from the TMT.

The issue of sensitivity and access remains, however. It is rare for a researcher to gain access to a TMT in order to observe members at work and ask them detailed questions about their activities. Balogun et al. (2003) argue that in order to induce such cooperation there must be a clear quid pro quo for the organization. Also, it is the responsibility of the researcher to have a meaningful contribution to offer the team (over and above feedback from the research itself). This sentiment is also echoed elsewhere in the management literature (Maclean & Macintosh 2002).

SEE ALSO: Leadership; Organization Theory; Organizational Failure; Strategic Decisions; Strategic Management (Organizations); Team work

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totalitarianism

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Totalitarianism refers to a political system in which the people are completely or nearly completely dominated by an all embracing state. Totalitarianism is often said to involve the lack of independent social sectors, the non existence of rights and pluralism, and the eradication of politics. The concept is frequently viewed as differing from authoritarianism in a number of ways: being more ideological; involving the domination of a single political party; seeing pervasive state intervention at every level; and being a peculiarly twentieth century political form.

Totalitarianism is commonly deployed as a concept that encompasses both fascist and socialist social orders. Critics note that the concept thus deals with very different social formations and is of little analytical value. Although there are socialist accounts of totalitarianism (e.g., Franz Neumann, Claude Lefort, Cornelius Castoriadis, Agnes Heller), Marxists tend to be unhappy with the equation of the USSR with Nazi Germany, especially on account of what they see as clear socioeconomic divergences, viewing the concept as largely an expression of Cold War politics and as an inoculation against emancipatory change. Marxists have also criticized the idealism of attempts to trace the genesis of totalitarianism to thinkers such as Hegel

and Marx. They have insisted on the complicity of liberal democracies in totalitarianism – even charging that liberal democracies are themselves totalitarian – and some have insisted that the concept falsely implies the absence of conflict within these states. On the other hand, “totalitarianism” has been defended as a useful ideal type, and it has continued to have popular currency.

There have been a number of important contributions to the theory of totalitarianism. Friedrich and Brzezinski (1965) denoted six features of totalitarianism: an elaborate ideology which centers on a final, perfected humanity; a single mass party; a system of terror; near complete monopoly by the party of the means of mass communication; a near monopoly, too, over the use of weapons of armed combat; and central control of the economy. F. A. Hayek viewed totalitarianism as arising from planning and collectivism; Popper (1945) located the origins of the “closed society” in holism and in the “historicist” notion that history unfolds through knowable general laws towards an end point; and Talmon (1961) explored the beginnings of totalitarianism in the thought of Plato, Hegel, and Marx. Arendt (1951) underscored the role of imagined laws of history or nature, a frantic dynamism, terror, and ideology (separating people completely from reality); and she found precedents to, and conditions for, totalitarianism in imperialism, capitalism, and the superfluousness of the mass of people in industrial societies.

Although the term lost some of its intellectual appeal from the 1960s and the 1970s, it has gained something of a renewed currency in postmodernist discourse, which comes to echo the critical theory of the Frankfurt School. Here, an ethical turn has focused variously on the erasure of difference and otherness in totalizing, teleological narratives, on the coercive consequences of the rule of reason and science, and on the normalizing, even totalitarian, tendencies of modernity’s desire for order and transparency and its fear of ambivalence.

SEE ALSO: Arendt, Hannah; Communism; Democracy; Fascism; Propaganda; Socialism

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totemism

Gaetano Riccardo

The word totemism denotes in a broad sense the complex of beliefs concerning the existence of a sort of kinship between a human group, or a single individual, and an animal or a plant serving as an emblem of this link. This relationship implies a range of rituals and taboos, especially alimentary and sexual ones, which bind those who recognize themselves as members belonging to the same totem. The word itself, in the variant *totam*, was used in 1791 by the English traveler J. Long to designate the link of kinship and the worship of plants and animals by the Algonquin Indians of the Ojibwa, in Eastern North America. Although the term referred to the clan totem, Long used it to describe individual totemism, that is to say, the belief in the existence of a personal link between a person and an animal (more rarely a plant), which is considered as a guardian spirit.

In anthropology, the acceptance of the notion of totemism began in the late nineteenth

century and diminished at the beginning of the twentieth century. During this period scholars focused their attention especially on religious aspects of totemism, and they considered it principally as one of the most archaic forms of worship. So conceived, the idea of totemism achieved widespread fame and it was analyzed by various disciplines. Its introduction in the anthropological debate goes back to McLennan, who stressed how totemism was typified by three elements: fetishism, exogamy, and matrilineal descent. To these aspects Rivers would later add another, namely, prohibiting the group from eating the plant or the animal considered as a totem, except during certain ritual events.

While on the one hand the rapid increase of ethnographic data concerning totemism promoted their inclusion in great evolutionistic syntheses suggested by various authors, on the other it already heralded their superseding. The first important comparative exposition of known ethnographic data is due to Frazer's *Totemism and Exogamy* (1910), in which three different hypotheses concerning the origins of totemism are suggested. The first hypothesis states that the first form of totemism is the individual one, involving the idea that there is an external soul dwelling in animals and plants. The second hypothesis stresses the magical aspect of totemism, particularly expressed in its Australian variant. The third hypothesis stresses primitive humans' misunderstanding about the existence of a bond between sexuality and conception, with the consequent idea that the latter could depend on the action of an animal or vegetable spirit.

In Frazer's monumental work the arrangement of the collected ethnographic data concerning totemism aimed particularly to stress western modern rationality, in contrast to primitive thinking. One of the results of this approach was to hide a large variety of differences existing in the ethnographic data. The continuous decrease of this concern enabled scholars to stress how the variety of totemic phenomena was too wide to be ranged in a single typology. Research put forward by other scholars enabled them to identify very different phenomena, and when agreement was rare it was not easy to formulate universal hypotheses. Analogies began to be suggested with greater care, and with consideration of historical and geographical continuities and discontinuities.

Consequently, the age of major diffusion of the notion of totemism coincided with that of its major decline. In the year in which Frazer's monumental work appeared, another author, Goldenweiser (1910), stressed that it was misleading to include such different data as social organizations by clans, their being labeled by names of plants and animals, and, finally, the belief in a real or mystical relationship between clan members and a totemic species in a single institution. All these phenomena were not always equally present. Furthermore, in many cases they were independent of one another.

The evolutionistic approach to the problem of totemism did not necessarily presuppose the comparative method. It was sufficient to assume that totemism could be one of the most archaic forms of religion. Thus Durkheim (1912) was interested only in Australian totemism, which he claimed to be its most archaic form. According to Durkheim the totem is the main symbol of the society itself. In this way his analysis of totemism becomes an illustrative example of the inextricable link between the religious and the social. Durkheim's sociological approach was an alternative to a previous approach in which a psychological explanation concerning the creation of institutions and religious phenomena prevailed. The advance offered by this new approach was evident. Social phenomena were explained by the social itself and not by more or less imaginative conjectures about primitive thinking.

Although Durkheim's arguments were very incisive, the psychological approach to the study of totemism received a new impulse from the father of psychoanalysis, Sigmund Freud. In his work *Totem und Tabu* (*Totem and Taboo*) (1912), Freud tried to establish a parallelism between the two major prohibitions concerning totemism – alimentary and sexual – and the Oedipus complex. Ethnographic data were underestimated by him in favor of the Darwinian hypothesis concerning the prehistoric existence of the so called primitive horde. Freud supposed a social scenario in which there is not yet a form of exogamy and the whole group is ruled in a despotic way by a single man, the father, who is unable to control his instincts. This despotic father claims to be the only person who has access to the females of the group. Such an intolerable situation would have triggered a violent rebellion of the sons

against him. The youngest men killed the despotic father to devour him, and then they were racked with remorse. A sense of guilt for the crime committed led the sons to substitute the father with a symbolic figure, a totemic species. At the same time, the prohibition of sexual relationships with the females of the group, previously ordered by their despotic father, was spontaneously observed by them. This would be the reason for the appearance of totemism and exogamy as well.

Although in opposition to the arguments put forward by Durkheim, this purely psychological explanation of totemism formulated by Freud is to some extent similar because both authors share an evolutionistic and universalistic vision of cultural facts. A loss of interest in the notion of totemism began only when the evolutionistic perspective of analysis was abandoned. Until it was assumed as valid, the interest in totemism was assured by its presumed universalistic aspect, being considered as expressing a particular stage of human evolution. The fact that a particular and empirical form of totemism could not include any traits considered as an integral part of the totemic institution did not seem a problem. In any case, they were necessarily supposed to exist in a different stage of cultural evolution. So ethnographic evidence was considered important not so much for its local relevance as for expressing something considered as universal.

While Elkin was one of the last authors to assume that ethnographic analyses could still be developed in the direction of a more generalized interpretation of totemism, van Gennep (1920) was among the first authors to recognize that it could not be considered as a universal cultural phenomenon. This lack of universality of totemism was reasserted by some American anthropologists. Historical and relativistic methods of analyzing cultural facts gained ground in the United States. Authors such as Boas, Lowie, and Kroeber were very careful to stress the variety of ethnographic data. British functionalists such as Malinowski and above all Radcliffe Brown moved in an almost identical direction. In the latter's work particularly there are important suggestions concerning the tendency, typical of the most archaic societies, to change animals and plants into objects of worship able to ensure well being of the group.

A turning point toward the dissolution of the notion of totemism is represented by the publication of Lévi Strauss's famous book, *Le Totémisme aujourd'hui (Totemism Today)* (1962), in which the author speaks of "totemic illusion." He stresses that totemism does not correspond to a primitive form of religion but must be understood within the broader human tendency to classify everything in different species. According to Lévi Strauss, the core of totemism is represented not so much by a relationship between a group and a species as by the fact that this correspondence with different species is used to conceptualize the differences between the various human groups. Thus the specific nature of totemism would consist in enabling the representation of differences between human groups by resorting to analogies taken from the natural world. Totemism can be understood only on the basis that entire systems of differences, not single elements, are compared. Through totemism, relationships and differences among human groups are conceptualized by analogies with differences among species of animals and plants. According to Lévi Strauss, this would be the most important aspect of totemism. He supports his opinion through the statement that totemic species are useful for thinking and not for eating.

The analysis of totemism proposed by Lévi Strauss does not merely represent one opinion among others. It tries also to explain why the notion of totemism had an enduring life among anthropologists, despite its illusory character. According to Lévi Strauss, the idea of totemism was in a certain sense a sign of the ethnocentrism included in most anthropological works. To talk about totemism meant stressing the discord represented by a kind of thinking that assumed a confusion between natural and cultural spheres, considered quite different in western cultural tradition. Despite the rightness of these observations, the intellectualistic approach adopted by the French anthropologist in his analysis of totemism on the one hand effectively synthesizes the old fashioned debate concerning the idea of totemism, while on the other it seems to discourage possible alternative ways of research undertaken by other authors. Among these, those which focus their attention on the material and moral implications of totemistic practices assume a certain importance today.

A year before the publication of Lévi Strauss's book, Raoul and Laura Makarius (1961) resumed the argument concerning the relationship between totemism and exogamy and highlighted a possible "alimentary" origin of the marriage taboo among peoples composing a single group in which meals are shared. Furthermore, the remarks proposed by Valerio Valeri (1999) assume great importance with regard to the moral relevance of totemic taboos. Valeri highlights how the "phonological" approach adopted by Lévi Strauss does not allow us to appreciate the complexity of relationships between humans and animals, but merely focuses attention on less important aspects of totemism. Totemism constitutes a complex of phenomena reducible neither to an essence nor to a formalism in regard to which the conscious self representations of groups are considered as a trifling matter.

SEE ALSO: Animism; Durkheim, Émile; Fetishism; Primitive Religion; Religion; Religion, Sociology of

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tracking

Kathryn S. Schiller

Tracking is the process of differentiating individuals' school experiences through the grouping of students for instructional purposes based on actual or assumed differences in academic development or interests. In theory, such practices can maximize learning by allowing instruction to be tailored to the needs of each classroom of students. In practice, the quality of instruction often varies dramatically based on the group level, such that low track students receive few learning opportunities while high track students are exposed to a rich and rigorous curriculum. When group placements are related to ascribed characteristics such as social class or ethnicity, tracking contributes to social stratification by perpetuating social inequality in not only individuals' current learning opportunities but also future educational and occupational attainment.

The terms *tracking*, *ability grouping*, and *streaming* are frequently used as synonyms. When distinctions are made, ability grouping usually refers to sorting of students in a given grade level into groups that progress through a common curriculum but at different speeds. In contrast, tracking usually refers to differences in students' academic programs, which differ in the topics covered based on the courses taken. Ability grouping is a more frequent practice in primary and elementary schools, while tracking is usually found in secondary schools.

Tracking is a feature of most modern school systems, although the process and extent of stratification and segregation vary dramatically. In the US during the late 1980s, many schools officially eliminated tracking (i.e., *detracked*) in response to political pressures to increase academic standards while reducing gaps in standardized test scores or educational attainment between genders and racial or ethnic groups. However, consistency in group placement across subjects and years indicates that *de facto* perpetuate social stratification in both the economic and health benefits related to higher levels of educational attainment.

DIMENSIONS OF TRACKING

In sociology, the conceptualization of tracking recognizes that classrooms are the technical core of schools in which students, teachers, and curricular materials combine to create learning environments that vary in quality and quantity of instruction. In addition, students' academic careers consist of series of classroom experiences spanning grade levels that often provide increasingly divergent educational experiences. While the operationalization of tracking varies, the concept in sociological research consistently refers to some aspect of a student's overall academic status at a particular point in time or over a relatively short period of time.

When used synonymously with ability grouping, students' track placement usually refers to their relative status in the academic hierarchy within a classroom or school. Within some elementary school classrooms, tracking occurs when the teacher sorts students into instructional groups based on perceived academic progress or ability. In other elementary schools, students are tracked when they are assigned to classrooms based on similar criteria. These groupings are usually given labels such as *low*, *average*, and *high* or *remedial*, *basic*, *regular*, and *advanced* to reflect relative rankings within the academic hierarchy. In general, most students are expected eventually to cover the same core topics and master a common set of basic skills, although the speed of progress or degree of mastery may differ. Group labels are used to reflect differences in difficulty of the instructional material to which students are exposed, which should build on their prior academic progress.

When referring to secondary schools, tracking is also operationalized as differences in academic programs traditionally described by schools or students as *vocational*, *general*, and *college preparatory*. While now mostly archaic, these terms are used to characterize the types or difficulty of courses students are expected to take based on whether they are expected to enter the workforce or attend college after high school. Students in the college preparatory track, for example, tend to take more academic courses such as advanced placement English,

physics, calculus, and foreign languages. In contrast, vocational students tend to take a large number of courses with direct occupational links, such as business English, drafting, book keeping, and commercial photography. General track students usually take a combination of less difficult academic courses, such as regular English, and elective courses that might also include one or two vocational courses. To the extent that students are being exposed to distinctly different sets of topics or subjects, self reported or school designated track can be a useful summary indicator of a student's general academic experiences during high school.

Since the late 1980s, however, sociologists have recognized that the traditional track labels fail to capture the great diversity of students' academic experiences in American high schools. By 1990, the relationship between sophomores' self reported track and level of mathematics course did not align consistently, such that knowing one type of classification increased the ability to predict the other by only 14 percent (Stevenson et al. 1994). Several efforts have been made to develop finer grained measures of academic programs based on detailed analyses of the courses students take at a given time or overall during high school. These *course based* indicators of track usually use sophisticated statistical techniques to analyze students' high school transcripts. For example, Lucas (1999) developed his track indicators by a detailed mapping of course descriptions onto traditional track designations by taking into account both the level of difficulty and timing of when a student took a course. In this approach, for example, geometry is considered *elite college* track if taken as a freshman but *regular college* track if taken as a sophomore.

Other approaches to characterizing students' academic careers based on course taking during high school mostly abandon the concept of academic program. In one approach, clustering procedures are used to statistically identify *emergent* tracks based on constellations of course enrolments to which traditional labels may or may not be applied (e.g., Friedkin & Thomas 1997). The goal is to identify students who share similar educational experiences and positions within a particular school or a set of

schools without using an a priori classification system. Another approach focuses on indicators of students' progress through a proscribed curriculum by using indicators of whether a student took a given course in a given year and then statistically modeling changes between years to estimate trajectories through a normative sequence of courses (e.g., Schneider et al. 1998). These sequences are likely to be especially clear in high school mathematics due to the hierarchical and standardized nature of the curriculum in which mastery of a basic topic (e.g., functions) is usually required before attempting more advanced topics (e.g., geometry). This approach to characterizing students' academic status allows close examination of learning opportunity sequences, which are primarily a function of the structure and organization of a subject specific curriculum that link learning opportunities across time, even spanning levels of schooling.

While the comprehensive high school remains an institutionalized feature of American school systems, other countries often track students following a given academic program by placing them in the same school. For example, Germany has a three tiered system of secondary schools in which *Gymnasium* prepares students for higher education, *Realschule* prepare students for mid level occupations or careers, and *Hauptschule* provides a basic prevocational education. In Japan, students are admitted based on performance on entrance examinations to selective upper secondary schools, which have tight links to prestigious universities. Only a small portion of those students not intending to go to university attend technical upper secondary schools. Thus, tracking results from the sorting of students into secondary schools.

PROCESS OF SORTING STUDENTS

Tracking is of interest to sociologists as the product of schools' intentional sorting of students into courses or academic programs based on some observed or ascribed characteristic. On the most basic level, the availability of courses is determined by schools' master schedules, which specify which courses will be offered at what times. The master schedule thus constrains the possible combinations of courses students can

take in a given academic year. Within these constraints, assigning students to a selection of courses usually involves processes that consider a mixture of indicators for prior academic performance and individual preferences.

School officials begin the complex process of developing a master schedule for a given academic year in the spring of the prior year. Although they usually use previous years' schedules as templates, school officials must adjust for changes in staffing and student enrolments in light of available instructional resources (e.g., room space) and state regulations (e.g., curriculum and graduation requirements) (Delany 1991). For example, schools need to ensure they offer enough English or literature courses so that all students can meet most states' requirement that students complete 4 years of English to earn a high school diploma. However, a school may offer only one section of honors freshman English in order to free up a teacher for an English as a second language course to serve a growing number of immigrant students. When that honors course will be offered also depends on teacher availability and other courses being offered at the same time. Schools frequently make changes to their course schedules well into the academic year, as they continuously balance resource constraints with student demand.

While assignment policies can vary dramatically, most schools use several indicators of prior academic performance (such as grades or achievement test scores) in making course placement decisions. Turner (1960) described placement procedures that utilized performance on standardized assessments as *contest mobility systems*, in which individuals earn the right of entry into the elite. In contrast, more subjective criteria are used for making placement decisions in *sponsored mobility systems*, in which individuals with unusual qualities are singled out for special assistance. Sociologists have had heated debates over whether the US has more or less of a contest focused system than either Japan or Great Britain. This debate is the result of most school systems having features of both ideal type mobility systems, with some students earning placement in higher level courses and others being recruited to the academic elite.

Assignment systems, however, are rarely purely meritocratic due to limitations on the

availability of seats in a course and pressures from parents and students to change placements with which they disagree. For example, college educated parents may be so insistent that their children be given preference in assignment to the single honors English course being offered that other eligible students are prevented from enrolling in the class once it reaches capacity. Minority and lower class students often lack the social and academic resources to object or over turn undesirable track placements. This may partially account for the historical trend that minority and poor students are less likely to take college preparatory courses than equally talented white students or children of college educated parents.

ACADEMIC AND SOCIAL CONSEQUENCES

Whether official or *de facto*, tracking not only strongly influences learning and educational attainment, but also shapes the formation of friendships during high school and later occupational attainment and earnings. Organizational, individual, and societal factors influence the process of stratification of learning opportunities and academic outcomes related to course taking patterns.

Tracking clearly differentiates students' learning opportunities. In secondary schools, some are given academically challenging experiences preparing them for college, while others are relegated to classes with curriculum so diluted that they are caricatures of regular courses. Students in honors courses, especially in math and English, are generally exposed to higher quality learning environments in which they are expected to think critically and creativity is encouraged. In contrast, regular and basic courses often emphasize orderliness and regurgitation of facts and procedures. Conflict theorists such as Bowles and Gintis (1976) argue that these differences in curriculum reflect students' social origins and are one of the major mechanisms through which social stratification is perpetuated across generations. Lower track courses basically prepare working class children for menial jobs, while college track courses prepare the social elite's children for professional or managerial careers.

The distribution of academic rewards also differs across tracks and courses, with higher grades tending to be awarded in classes attended by students from more advantaged social backgrounds. Theoretically, grades reflect how well students meet their teachers' expectations of learning and behavior in a given course. Thus, differences between courses in the average grade awarded could reflect overall how well students in a given class met their teachers' expectations. However, grade inflation can result from parents pressuring teachers and schools to award higher grades in college preparatory courses to improve their chances of admission to competitive colleges and universities. Independent of students' individual achievements, these higher grades awarded in more advanced courses serve as public signals identifying the academic elite in a school.

Track placements also have long term effects on learning opportunities through what Kerckhoff (1993) described as *institutional inertia*, the consistency of placements across grade levels and schools created by organizational dependence on school records and prior placement decisions. The positional advantages gained from being placed in more advanced courses earlier in their careers helps academically elite students preserve their status even if they encounter difficulties in that or another course. Positional advantages also accrue from accumulation of prerequisites for later courses that signal to schools that a student was exposed to and gained the knowledge and skills thought necessary to progress. For example, taking algebra in middle school is intended to prepare students to take geometry as high school freshmen, although whether they get much exposure to algebra may be questionable. For these reasons, placement in a more basic course constrains access to advanced courses for even students who may later benefit from a more challenging curriculum. Thus, organizational signals concerning students' intellectual abilities and progress sent by prior course placements have lasting effects on their academic careers. When track mobility occurs, students are usually dropping down from a higher level course to a lower level one.

Finally, whether through direct intervention of parents or a more criterion based system, students' social backgrounds influence their

sorting into courses such that they tend to take classes with others similar to themselves. This social class segregation within schools may allow formation of micro communities with distinct norms and values relating to academic performance. Social capital developed in classes attended by large numbers of children with college educated parents is likely to create a classroom environment with high levels of academic pressure. Similarly, college educated parents may lobby for allocation of more qualified teachers and greater resources to the courses taken by their children. Thus, regardless of their own backgrounds, students are likely to benefit academically from attending classes with others from more advantaged social backgrounds.

SEE ALSO: Class, Status, and Power; Conflict Theory; Educational Attainment; Hidden Curriculum; Meritocracy; Mobility, Intergenerational and Intragenerational; Opportunities for Learning; Parental Involvement in Education; Schooling and Economic Success

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tradition

Robert Tonkinson

“Tradition” connotes a body of values, beliefs, rules, and behavior patterns that is transmitted generationally by practice and word of mouth and is integral to socialization processes. The content of tradition is shared by a given group and has informational and moral components that concern the nature of things, right and wrong behavior, and unanswerable questions about life and death. Strong connotations of fixity, stability, and continuity are inherent in the notion of “tradition,” as a benchmark or beacon guiding a society’s body of daily behavior and providing justification for beliefs and practices. In relatively homogeneous small scale societies, where tradition is the only blue print for acceptable behavior, it is typically

unquestioned and, whatever its truth value, logicity, or consistency, may be regarded as sacred lore (Hunter & Whitten 1976).

Where orally transmitted, however, tradition is always open to variation, contestation, and change; it can also be adjusted, reworked, or reinterpreted to accommodate changing circumstances. Such lability gives the lie to tradition conceived as essentially fixed, immutable, and unchanging over time, and has attracted the attention of historians and anthropologists, particularly in recent decades. In an interesting convergence of focus, two edited volumes on the "construction" and "invention" of tradition appeared in the early 1980s. (Use of the more inflammatory term "invention" by anthropologists ceased after some widely publicized exchanges with indigenous people angered by the implication that they had fabricated their pasts; see Linnekin 1992; Lindstrom & White 1993; see also Turner 1997, on the "authenticity" of invented traditions.)

The first volume (Keesing & Tonkinson 1982) led to a burgeoning interest by anthropologists and others in cognate disciplines in the "politics of tradition." This work reflected the rise of new nationalisms in the Melanesian region that demanded new ways of imagining tradition (Lindstrom & White 1993). Known in Melanesian Tok Pisin lingua franca as *kastom*, semantically opposed to "modern" or "foreign," tradition became a rallying cry of pro independence movements. In an area famed for its cultural pluralism, the uses of "tradition" highlight the nature of political ideologies and the power of abstract symbols in disguising and mediating contradictions that potentially threaten broader unities (Keesing 1982). In much of Melanesia, the impact of Christianity had caused converts to devalue their traditions and dichotomize their past into a shameful pre European era of darkness and evil and the Christian era of goodness and light. This prior refiguring of the past was to cause considerable confusion in some areas when leaders of independence movements began invoking the uniqueness and strength of *kastom* (explicitly opposed to non indigenous European and Christian elements) in their rhetoric aimed at fostering a shared national identity and unity (Tonkinson 1982). Such appeals to tradition encouraged anthropologists to investigate the heuristic possibilities

inherent in tradition's seemingly paradoxical malleability.

Most contributors to the 1982 volume adopted a "cultural constructionist" approach, holding that tradition, like culture, is a contested field in which differently located groups struggle to establish and then reproduce their particular symbolic forms and constructions of meaning. Constructions of tradition are always, at some level, about the present, historically contingent, and oppositional (but not always dichotomous) between the western and the indigenous (Lindstrom & White 1993). This perspective inevitably encourages an analytical focus on class and power relations (cf. Keesing 1993), and has become a theoretical imperative for many anthropologists. Linnekin (1992) offers the strongest analytical overview available on the theory and politics of cultural constructionism, and of many anthropologists' unease about the deconstructionist excesses of postmodernism.

The second volume (Hobsbawm & Ranger 1983), by historians, was prompted by two factors: the ubiquity, in Europe and elsewhere, of "traditions" that in form and prominence seem ancient and timeless yet are often relatively recent in origin and are sometimes invented; and the contrast between modernity's unremitting innovation and change and people's attempts to structure elements within their societies as invariant and unchanging (Hobsbawm 1983). Historians are interested principally in the appearance and establishment of such traditions, as well as those that emerge within a brief and datable period yet are less readily traceable. In his Introduction, Hobsbawm defines "invented tradition" as "a set of practices, normally governed by overtly or tacitly accepted rules and of a ritual or symbolic nature, which seek to inculcate certain values and norms of behaviour by repetition, which automatically implies continuity with the past" (p. 1). Besides separating tradition from conventions and routines that are technological rather than ideological, he explicitly contrasts "custom," which is dominant in "traditional societies" and necessarily flexible, with "traditions," including invented ones, which typically stress invariance. Anthropologists have criticized this contrast as denying pre European contact dynamism, and as reminiscent of claims that such peoples are "without history" (Jolly & Thomas 1992). Hobsbawm suggests

that the seemingly most prevalent post Industrial Revolution invented tradition type is "those establishing or symbolizing social cohesion or the membership of groups, real or artificial communities."

Despite ostensible differences in motivation and foci behind these two influential contributions to the literature on tradition, several interesting parallels can be discerned. There is a common interest in symbols and especially the power residing in them when they remain diffuse and undefined. Themes relating to appeals to history and tradition as legitimizing political action, such as resistance to colonial powers, and of reinforcing group cohesion also appear in both treatments. Related to this is another, stronger parallel: the process of nation building, wherein the emergence of new nation states worldwide and the growth of nationalism necessitate the creation and effective promulgation of symbols of shared identity and belonging, couching the recent, political, and cultural as timeless, "natural," and inevitable. Emergent national identities (informed by tradition) also take on value within the emerging global economic system by supporting tourism (people go to Scotland to see kilts and drink whisky, or to Vanuatu to see land dives and drink kava) as well as trade in localities and souvenirs.

Discussion and debate about the significance and uses of tradition have continued since the appearance of the two volumes just discussed. The topic has proved remarkably durable, engendering a multilayered body of knowledge about constructions of the past in contemporary societies (Tonkinson 1993). Social actors' received notions of tradition as the solid foundation that underpins customary behavior have been deemphasized in scholarly analyses in favor of conceptions of it as constantly subject to reinterpretation and rereading by each new generation of carriers, who construe their past in terms both of present perceptions and understandings and future hopes and needs (cf. Lindstrom 1982). Tradition becomes a model of past practices rather than a passively and unreflectively inherited legacy (Linnekin 1992). Heuristically, it is perhaps most usefully conceptualized as a resource, employed (or not employed) strategically by individuals and groups (Tonkinson 1993). As Lindstrom (1982) shows, *kastom* is subject to a range of

moral evaluations (or devaluations) by its carriers over time; it is understood by all as a symbol but no one can agree on its meaning, since understandings are embedded within rival groups and become part of competing political ideologies. A notable attribute of tradition is that it can be invoked just as effectively to manifest ethnocentrism and disunity, by emphasizing local differences and reinforcing boundaries, as it can when functioning as a political symbol of unity (in which case it is deliberately left vague and internally undifferentiated, so as to minimize its potentially divisive aspect). The consistent polarity of political uses of tradition between the grassroots, regional, and national levels of society suggests that different analytical strategies may be needed in each case (cf. Tonkinson 1993). In the last decade, the historical turn in anthropological theory has led scholars to attempt to contextualize the emergence of particular constructions of tradition within colonization, missionization, and post war "development" and in articulation with the global political economy (Lindstrom & White 1993).

SEE ALSO: Constructionism; False Consciousness; Generational Change; Identity Politics/Relational Politics; Social Change; Values

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traditional consumption city (Japan)

Yasushi Suzuki

“Traditional consumption city” is one of the categories introduced by Susumu Kurasawa (1968) in his typology of Japanese cities in the early 1960s. His typology emphasizes that the patterns of historical development of cities determine their distinctive social structures. The traditional consumption city refers to cities founded during the feudal era. A contrasting type is the industrial cities that developed

largely during the modernization that followed the Meiji Restoration of 1868. (For simplicity, the following description has been updated, although the typology remains essentially the same as Kurasawa’s original.)

The traditional consumption cities had, and many still have, castles that served as both the residence and offices for the feudal domain lords designated by the shogunate. In the Tokugawa era (1603–1867), those cities were financially sustained by tributes that were paid by the peasants of the domain and were inhabited by merchants and craftsmen who were largely dependent on the expenditures of the lords.

After the Meiji Restoration, some of these cities became the seats of prefectural governments. Kurasawa categorized the new prefectural seats as type A, other traditional consumption cities as type B. In type A, the prefectural governments provide a financial basis for the city. Other public agencies such as the prosecutor’s office, courts, Legal Affairs Bureau, and Land Transportation Offices are concentrated in type A cities, as well as private institutions such as banks, insurance, real estate, transportation, and trading companies. Thus, the type A traditional consumption city is characterized by relatively large numbers of upper middle class white collar workers. The type B cities, in contrast, are populated primarily by self employed merchants, small factory owners, and their employees. Most of these are locals who grew up in the city and surrounding rural areas.

Of course, even in the type A cities, small entrepreneurs are the majority in numbers, but the managerial, professional, and technical workers provide distinctive characteristics to the urban social structure. These workers are employed by large bureaucratic organizations, public or private, and relocate from city to city as a result of occupational promotion, although clerical and sales workers are usually recruited and promoted locally. Sendai, Kanazawa, and Fukuoka are good examples of the type A city; Hirosaki, Okazaki, and Kurashiki are examples of type B cities. Thus, the traditional consumption types are common among Japanese cities.

Kurasawa classified the industrial cities into three subgroups. First are small, light industrial cities (type C), some of which date back to traditional textile, ceramic, and knifemaking

towns. Then there are the heavy industrial cities based on modern industrial technologies for shipping, steel, chemical, electronic, and auto mobile manufacturing. These are divided into two different subcategories: one company towns such as Hitachi, Toyota, and Minamata (type D); and those with petrochemical complexes as in Yokkaichi, Kawasaki, and Mizushima (type E). Small industrial towns (type C) had flourished in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, but generally declined by the late 1960s. Now these towns are typically populated by small factory owners, their employees, and small wholesale merchants. One company towns often developed in rural areas. Kamaishi city, for example, was a fishing village before the Kamaishi Iron Works was established in the late nineteenth century. Toyota city was an agricultural village before the Toyota Motors Corporation established its major plants there. The social composition of the one company town is simple, primarily consisting of the employees of the company, of course, including a handful of executives, managerial, professional, technical, and clerical employees, and a large number of blue collar workers. Typically, there are also a lot of subcontractors, merchants, and service workers. The social composition of the type E city is quite similar, but it is more complex and less visible, because there are many establishments of different large companies and the sheer size of the city is generally much larger.

Since the type D and E industrial cities have developed in the modern era, they have a purely modern industrial base, although native families may still hold estates and have some influence in the local politics. But most Japanese cities developed as traditional consumption types. Of course, they have modernized in various ways, attracting factories, universities, and tourists and developing airports, expressways, and the superexpress train lines and stations. The three largest metropolitan areas in Japan – Tokyo–Yokohama, Kyoto–Osaka–Kobe, and Nagoya – developed from this type and came to have comprehensive characteristics. In Kurasawa's typology, they are therefore placed in a special category – type M (metropolis). All three initially established their bases in the seventeenth century. As the seat of the Tokugawa shogunate, Edo (now Tokyo) established its primary functions as the center of political control.

Osaka was also formed during the Tokugawa period as the national commercial center, called "the kitchen of the world." Nagoya was simply a great castle town ruled by one of the top three Tokugawa related families. After the Meiji Restoration, Tokyo inherited its political functions from Edo, and grew to be the capital of the centralized imperial state. Osaka developed as a private commercial center, and Nagoya, a typical traditional consumption city located between the two, gradually developed manufacturing industries. By 1940, Tokyo, Osaka, and Nagoya had grown into great metropolises with populations of 7 million, 3 million, and 1 million people, respectively. During World War II, all three metropolises and many other major cities in Japan suffered heavy bombardment from the US military. However, the three metropolises had all rebuilt their industrial bases by 1955 and began to absorb huge amounts of labor from rural areas. A large number of suburban residential and industrial cities arose in the surrounding areas in the 1960s. Since 1965, deindustrialization and the shift to a service economy have been prominent in the central cities of the metropolitan areas.

Although Susumu Kurasawa's typology was originally published in 1960 and the descriptions presented here have been somewhat updated, globalization and the information technology revolution since the 1980s have dramatically affected the historical paths of cities and transformed urban social structures. Thus this typology might require further revision from the contemporary global perspective. The concept of the traditional consumption city nevertheless remains useful for illuminating the cumulative effect of historical heritage on urban structures.

SEE ALSO: Cities in Europe; Global/World Cities; Metropolis; Suzuki, Eitaro; Urban Community Studies; Urbanism/Urban Culture; Urbanization

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traffic in women

Susan Hagood Lee

Traffic in women denotes the practice of transporting women away from their home to a distant location where they are coerced or forced into work or prostitution in slave-like conditions to the profit of their traffickers. Some 2–4 million women are trafficked annually. Women typically are lured into initial cooperation through the deceitful promise of employment at better wages than available in their home area. Traffickers target impoverished regions with few employment opportunities and transfer women to more affluent areas with a market for their labor or sexual services. Some victims are sold into trafficking by relatives or fellow villagers. Most fall prey to criminal organizations with extensive international networks which profit greatly from this lucrative trade. In many regions, legal businesses participate in trafficking under the guise of tourism or entertainment. States profit through taxes on these businesses, and corrupt officials benefit from bribes to protect the industry. In some areas, military installations and peacekeeping operations provide a customer base for trafficking. The international community has responded to trafficking with a Protocol calling on states to enact laws to criminalize all involvement in traffic in women. Heads of state have labeled this growing practice a new slave trade requiring concerted international action.

In a typical trafficking scenario, young women are recruited in their home region by agents who advertise plentiful jobs with high wages and good working conditions in another region. Advertised jobs include waitress, hostess, entertainer, dancer, model, restaurant worker, factory worker, maid, or nanny. The advertisements appeal to impoverished young women with few employment options in their home region due to poor economic development or lack of opportunities for women. The recruiting agents make the departure arrangements and obtain documents such as entertainment visas. The young women leave their home willingly in anticipation of a brighter economic future in which they will be able to contribute to the support of their impoverished families.

For many trafficked women, the journey is the first ever out of their home region.

Once at their destination, the recruiters turn the young women over to their new handler in exchange for a fee. The new handler often is a club or brothel owner who has placed an order for female workers with the recruiting agency. Sometimes the young women are presented with an employment contract in a foreign language which they must sign. The handler then takes custody of the women's legal documents and transports the women to a residence in which they are confined. The young women find themselves in an unfamiliar region, often in a foreign country. They lack possession of their legal documents and do not know the language or have any local contacts other than their traffickers. At this vulnerable point, they finally learn the real nature of their new work. They are told that they can leave only if they pay off their debts, including fees for visas, travel, food, shelter, and clothing. The employment contract is used as a seemingly legal document to coerce the young women into compliance. The women may be told that they can be arrested if they break their contract and attempt to leave. Since the police may be paid off by the club or brothel owners, this is not an idle threat.

Many trafficked women resist being prostituted. Sometimes drugs are used to placate the women and create a feeling of complicity in the criminal enterprise. Often, resistant women are severely beaten or gang raped to break their spirit. Sometimes cooperation is obtained by threatening the safety of the young woman's family. In poor regions, murders can be arranged cheaply, so such threats can be very effective. At other times, the traffickers may persuade the young women that prostitution is the quickest way to pay off their debts and regain their freedom.

There is no transparent accounting of the debts of trafficked women, however, and additional fees are added for ongoing expenses such as rent, clothing, and medical costs such as abortions. In the typical case, trafficked women never succeed in paying off the alleged debt until they become too old or too ill to be useful to the traffickers. Trafficked women are susceptible to HIV infection and AIDS as well as other sexually transmitted diseases. As their economic value diminishes, they suffer increasing abuse,

lack of nutrition, and sleep deprivation. Women's self esteem plummets with this disastrous turn in their lives. They fear the authorities and feel they cannot return home due to the stigma of prostitution. They lose any hope of economic betterment and realize they have lost their marriageability and chances for a normal life. They become depressed and unable to take action to help themselves. Even if they escape from their traffickers, the trauma of trafficking remains with them for a lifetime.

Many parties profit from trafficking. At the village level, women are sometimes sold by relatives or villagers whom they have angered by refusing a suit or divorcing a husband. Recruiting agents profit when they turn a young woman over to the customer who has placed an order. Transnational criminal networks such as the Russian Mafiya, Japanese Yakuza, and the Chinese Triads are involved in recruiting, transporting, and placing impoverished young women in cities where there is a market for sexual services. The CIA found that the Yakuza paid recruiters \$6,000 to \$10,000 per woman delivered to Japan. Unlike smuggling, where a person pays to be transported illegally, trafficking continues to pay the criminal syndicate long after the young woman is transported into the destination country. The CIA reported that Russian organized crime groups in Israel earn some \$1,000 to \$4,000 per woman per day. The profits from trafficking can then be used to finance other criminal activity such as corruption or terrorism. Trafficking in women is more profitable than other transnational crimes such as drug or arms trafficking, which do not offer ongoing income after transportation to their destination. Trafficking in women is less risky than drug or arms trafficking since there are fewer laws against trafficking in women. In many countries, trafficked women who come to the attention of the authorities are prosecuted for the crime of prostitution or expelled from the country as criminals themselves.

Legal businesses in the entertainment and tourism sectors sometimes participate in trafficking in women. Individual club owners or entertainment business associations place orders for women as entertainers or waitresses, paying recruitment fees or intermediary brokerage fees. Once hired, the women are pressured or coerced into prostitution roles in addition to

their legal waitress or dancer work. Tourism businesses such as hotels, travel agencies, and travel clubs profit from the market for sex tourism. States benefit from the taxes that such tourism and entertainment businesses render to the state treasury. Military bases fuel demand for prostitution and provide a magnet for trafficking activities. For instance, the Korea Special Tourism Association, an association of club owners near US military bases, imports impoverished women on entertainment visas to supply the military market. They charge participating clubs a brokerage fee for new recruits (Seol 2004). United Nations peacekeeping troops have contributed to the demand for prostitution, helping to create a lucrative market for traffickers. In Kosovo, UN and NATO troops constitute 20 percent of the prostitution market despite being only 2 percent of the population, according to an Amnesty International study. With the additional customers, a small scale prostitution network in Kosovo was transformed into a large scale industry run by criminal networks.

Trafficking takes place between poor regions with few employment opportunities and more affluent regions with a market for sexual services. The International Organization for Migration (IOM) reports that trafficking is growing most rapidly in Central and Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union. The economic devastation in these regions following the collapse of the Soviet system has produced many young people desperate for employment and willing to risk migrating for work. Criminal enterprises in Moscow and Kiev transport women to countries such as the US, Germany, Japan, Thailand, and Israel, where markets exist for white prostitutes. Romanian and Moldavian women are trafficked to Asia, where their light skinned appearance makes them exotic compared to local women. Women from Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan are trafficked into Turkey and the Middle East.

In Asia, women from impoverished Bangladesh are trafficked to Pakistan. Rural Nepali women displaced by the Maoist rebellion are trafficked into the urban centers of India. Vietnamese and Cambodian women are trafficked to the more affluent countries of Thailand and Singapore. Korea has become both a sending country and a destination country.

Korean women are trafficked to Japan under the guise of entertainers, while Russian, Chinese, Philippine, and Central Asian women are trafficked to Korea to supply the military base towns.

In Africa, women are trafficked from Sub Saharan countries such as Ghana, Mali, and Benin to Nigeria and Libya, as well as to the western nations of Italy, Belgium, the Netherlands, and the US. African women are trafficked into the Middle East, lured by employment as domestic servants. President Obasanjo of Nigeria named international trafficking a new slave trade at a Nigeria conference on trafficking in 2000.

In Latin America, less data are available on trafficking. The IOM notes that trafficking takes place out of the war torn country of Columbia and that women are being trafficked from Latin America to the US and Southeast Asia.

Reliable figures as to the number of persons trafficked annually are hard to obtain, given the illegal nature of this activity. A 1999 CIA report estimated that some 700,000 to 2 million women and children are trafficked globally each year. The report estimated that 45,000 to 50,000 women and children are trafficked into the US annually, mostly from Southeast Asian countries. The United Nations has suggested that perhaps as many as 4 million persons are moved annually within or between countries for trafficking purposes. UN sources estimate that trafficking is a US\$5–7 billion operation annually. The ready demand for prostitution services and the ample supply of vulnerable impoverished women account for the profitability of this industry and its appeal to criminal networks.

The phenomenon of sex trafficking takes place at the intersection of poverty and international capitalist enterprises. Female sexuality is commodified and bought and sold on an international market to the highest bidder. The lack of economic development and employment opportunities for women in poor regions fuels the supply side of the equation. The commoditization of women's bodies as instruments of male pleasure contributes to the demand side of the market. Thus the structural context of poverty is coupled with the cultural devaluation of women in patriarchal societies. The AIDS epidemic has impacted the trafficking market

due to fears of contracting HIV from a prostitute and cultural beliefs concerning the curative and rejuvenating effect of sex with a virgin. The outcome has been to lower the age of women recruited in trafficking enterprises, with virgin girls fetching a higher price on the international prostitution market.

In 2000 the United Nations adopted a Protocol to Prevent, Suppress and Punish Trafficking in Persons, Especially Women and Children. The Protocol defines trafficking as the "recruitment, transportation, transfer, harboring or receipt of persons, by means of the threat or use of force or other forms of coercion, of abduction, of fraud, of deception, of the abuse of power or of a position of vulnerability or of the giving or receiving of payments or benefits to achieve the consent of a person having control over another person, for the purpose of exploitation." When a person under the age of 18 is recruited into prostitution, the Protocol considers it trafficking even when fraud and coercion are not involved. The Protocol considers consent to trafficking irrelevant, since consent is typically based on the deceitful exploitation of economic vulnerability. Under the terms of the Protocol, crossing an international border is not necessary to qualify as trafficking. Trafficked persons are seen as victims of crime to be protected and assisted, not criminals involved in prostitution. The Protocol requires states to facilitate and accept the return of trafficked persons to their country of origin. Repatriation should be voluntary and take victim safety into consideration.

The Protocol calls on signatories to enact national legislation in order to criminalize trafficking activities and offer assistance to victims. In response, the US enacted the Trafficking Victims Protection Act of 2000. It distinguishes between "severe" forms of trafficking (those involving fraud, force, or coercion) and sex trafficking (other sorts of commercial sexual activity). The Act mandates that severe trafficking be included in the annual State Department country reports on human rights, and it sets minimum standards for countries to meet in order to receive certain forms of assistance from the US. It provides for a new non immigrant visa category, a "T" visa, for victims of severe trafficking who would suffer extreme hardship upon removal from the US.

SEE ALSO: Crime, Organized; Migration: Undocumented/Illegal; Patriarchy; Prostitution; Sex Tourism; Sexual Markets, Commodification, and Consumption; Slavery

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transcarceration

Robert Menzies

Commonly linked with the revisionist social control and new penology literatures of the 1980s and 1990s, transcarceration refers to the wide spread profusion of regulatory organizations, practices, authorities, and subjects across and beyond traditional boundaries of institutional governance in contemporary western societies.

The intellectual impetus for the transcarceration concept derived in large part from Michel Foucault's (1977) writings on the rise of the disciplinary society and "carceral archipelago"; from Andrew Scull's (1984) critique of conventional approaches to understanding community criminal justice and mental health initiatives; and from Stanley Cohen's (1985) analysis of late twentieth century "master patterns" of deviancy classification and punishment. From a range of disciplinary and substantive perspectives, theorists and researchers in the 1980s sought to account for the failings of the diversion, decarceration, rehabilitation, and reintegration schemes of the prior two decades – and of the post World War II liberal reconstructionist and civil libertarian political philosophies that these movements had embodied.

Transcarceration became both a metaphor and empirical yardstick for the unsettling paradox that state and civil projects aimed at downsizing control structures were in practice having precisely the opposite effect. Instead of disestablishing the old regimes, destructuring movements were generating hybrid systems of institutions, agencies, and programs which were multi sited, unbounded, virtually impossible to disentangle or evade, and widely dispersed through the contemporary landscape of the "punitive city" (Cohen 1985). In judicial, penal, psychiatric, welfare, and other arenas of human categorization and containment, traditional modernist dualisms between formal and informal, public and private, inside and outside, coercion and provision, were breaking down. Critical observers sought to explain how, having been freed from the oppressive regimes of prisons, asylums, and other exclusionary sites of confinement, untold thousands of citizens were finding themselves subject to new inclusionary modes of control which operated as appendages, not alternatives, to the systems they were supposed to eclipse.

An accumulating body of research showed how, with the proliferation of these "wider, stronger, and different nets" (Austin & Krisberg 1981), people and knowledge were circulating through jails, prisons, probation, parole and welfare offices, hospitals, clinics, halfway and boarding homes, the streets, and assorted other points of enclosure and transmission at ever accelerating rates. The grim consignment of

former patients and prisoners to lives of urban poverty, disease, drugs, and violence was disabusing even its most ardent exponents of the notion that decarceration was truly benefiting this burgeoning population of “conscript clientele” (Friedenberg 1975). Moreover, homelessless – the fate of so many deinstitutionalized people – was ascending into public consciousness as arguably the foremost domestic social problem of the 1980s. Concurrently, while James O’Connor’s “fiscal crisis of the state” (1973) might have initially triggered the closure of some public mental institutions (and many beds), the numbers of psychiatrized people continued to escalate as the average length of inpatient committals steadily declined; as mental health networks increasingly extended into general hospital wards, community clinics and the private sector; and as more and more patients faced the experience of being dumped destitute into inner cities only to be later rerouted into criminal contexts (a dynamic that persists into this new century). As for the penal realm, the decarceration era was ironically followed, in short order, by the unprecedented spasm of expansion that became the hallmark of neoconservative law and order programs through the 1980s and early 1990s, culminating in a combined jail and prison population of more than 2 million in the US alone.

By the 1980s, progressive scholars and activists were nearly united in acknowledging that the inclusionary agenda of destructuring and decentralization proponents had not only been ruinous in its own right, but had also sparked the punitive backlash and moral panics (Goode & Ben Yehuda 1994) that came to dominate late twentieth century penal politics. Socio legal scholars, radical criminologists, and anti psychiatrists, among others, came to recognize, in Stanley Cohen’s elegantly minimalist phrase, that “we blew it.” Accordingly, they set about rethinking some deeply held beliefs about the inherent benevolence and effectiveness of liberal policies and practices in corrections, mental health, and related fields. Moreover, the overarching constructs that had propelled the penal reform era of the 1960s and 1970s – the bifurcation of state and civil society, the public/private divide, the emphasis on individual autonomy and negative rights claims, the very ideas of decarceration and social control (the latter

subsequently described by Cohen (1985) as a Mickey Mouse concept) – were generally agreed to have lost their purchase. What was needed, in the eyes of many, was an utterly new “vision of social control.”

The transcarceration construct therefore emerged as a conceptual move toward the rehabilitation of social control theory, and the reworking of critical praxis in relation to this new hypermodern, pluralistic world of penality. Among other aims, revisionist academics and practitioners sought to deinstitutionalize the analysis of control structures and cultures by adopting interdisciplinary, holistic, structurally informed, and materially grounded approaches to the study of social order. Such work is sensitive to the nuances, diversities, and contradictions of all regulatory practices; to the hierarchies of class, gender, race, ethnicity, sexuality, nationality, generation, and (dis)ability within which control and counter control strategies play out; to the daunting capacity of systems and officials to neutralize, subvert, and coopt even the most well conceived of reform efforts; and to the cascading (and often unanticipated and unintended) effects of progressive ventures.

The transcarceration construct in many ways prefigured, and continues to resonate through, the legion of writing that has multiplied over recent years within the fields of moral regulation, legal pluralism, and governmentality studies, and on topics as diverse as administrative criminology, actuarial justice, critical penology, the risk and surveillance societies, technologies and cultures of control, and governance of the self. Their variations notwithstanding, these contemporary works are conjoined by what is arguably the key idea yielded from the 1980s revisionist social control literature – namely, that a paradigmatic redrawing of territorial, legal, institutional, and discursive geographies has occurred in the sphere of human regulation, and that any contemporary reformist project must either engage with the actualities of these latterday transcarcerational arrangements, or resign itself to failure.

SEE ALSO: Dangerousness; Deinstitutionalization; Deviance, Criminalization of; Deviance, Medicalization of; Deviance Processing Agencies; Homelessness; Mental Disorder; Neo liberalism; Social Control

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transcription

Linda Skrla

Transcription is the process of converting recordings of social or communicative human interaction into written text. Transcribing audiotaped or videotaped speech acts, conversations, interviews, or other forms of human engagement might be considered to be a relatively simple task, largely a chore or a secretarial matter. After all, to transcribe, one need only write down what was said by the parties involved in the interaction.

The writing down of what was said, however, is viewed by researchers in a variety of fields (including linguistics, communication, psychology, sociology, anthropology, education, and nursing) as only part of the transcription task. In addition to *what* was said, transcription often involves attending to *how* things were said (timing, volume, emphasis, nonverbals), how they were *not* said (silences), and *where* they were said (context and environment).

Furthermore, opinions in various disciplines differ as to what the product of the process of transcription represents. In some instances, a transcript is viewed as a transparent, printed representation of the recorded interaction (a *hard copy*), and it becomes the actual data used for further analysis. Traditions in other fields position transcripts as mediated forms of the original data that are useful aids for analysis, but that never are considered to be identical to the audio or video recordings, which remain the original data and are the primary records for analysis. Other researchers view the transcription process as theory laden work that fundamentally alters the original data. Kvale (1996), for instance, argues that transcription is a form of translation because of the transcriptionist's key decision making role.

Numerous decisions must be made when a transcript is prepared, and various fields have developed sets of conventions to guide individual researchers engaged in the process. Opinions differ among fields as to whether the researcher should or must do his or her own transcription work or whether the task can be delegated to others. In either case, transcription conventions cover such considerations as page layout, placement of verbal and nonverbal information, timing (overlaps, pauses, silences), choice of orthographic, phonetic, or combined representation, discourse unit (utterance, proposition, or turn), and symbols. Research fields vary as to the existence of and fidelity to an accepted set of transcription conventions. Conversation analysis is an example of a field that has a widely used set of conventions, the Jeffersonian Transcription System, developed by Gail Jefferson. Examples of symbols from the Jeffersonian System are as follows:

1 Pauses (numbers in parentheses indicate in seconds and tenths of seconds the length of the interval)

J: When I was (0.6) oh five or six we moved

K: To your current house?

2 *Sound stretch (a colon indicates that the prior sound is prolonged; multiple colons indicate a more prolonged sound)*

A: I re:::ally didn't like it

3 *Emphasis (indicated by italics or underscoring; the larger the italics, the greater the stress)*

D: That one is *mine*

S: NO it is not either yours it's *MINE*

4 *Transcriptionist doubt (other than timings of intervals, items enclosed in single parentheses are in doubt)*

B: Who were you there to meet?

N: The same guy from the day before (Jeremy)

Standardized transcription conventions such as these have proved useful for handling, comparing, and sharing of language data. However, these conventions have come under criticism for what they do *not* do, such as representing participants' situated meanings, attending to researcher subjectivity, and acknowledging contextual factors. Mishler (1991) and others have argued for a view of transcription that acknowledges the fact that the process is both interpretive and constructive. In other words, exploration is needed of how researchers create representations in their transcripts that follow from their purposes, theories, and worldviews and how this process shapes and constrains subsequent interpretations derived from analysis of transcript data. Suggestions for how this might be accomplished have included calls for researchers to become more reflective about their transcription practices and for them to include discussions of transcription issues along with the presentation of their findings.

SEE ALSO: Conversation Analysis; Interaction; Interviewing, Structured, Unstructured, and Postmodern; Representation

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transgender, transvestism, and transsexualism

Dave King and Richard Ekins

Twenty years ago a sociological encyclopedia would not have included a separate entry featuring cross dressing or sex changing. The medicalization and pathologizing of these phenomena under such categorizations as transvestism, transsexualism, gender dysphoria, and intersex ensured that cross dressing and sex changing were considered, in the main, to be the domain of medicine and psychology. The small number of sociological studies relating to "transvestism" and "transsexualism" was considered to be a peripheral concern of historical sociology, the sociology of deviance, and feminism and gender studies. Only Garfinkel (1967) and Kessler and McKenna's *Gender: An Ethnomethodological Approach* (1978) provided a hint of the importance of transsexualism to the discipline of sociology.

This situation began to change in the mid 1980s, a development marked by the more wide spread use of the term “transgender” among “transvestites” and “transsexuals” themselves, and the establishment in 1986 of the world’s first “transgender archive” housed in a university sociology department. The sociological literature on the topic is still small, but much of sociological interest is to be found in the fields of social anthropology, lesbian and gay studies, women’s studies, and (especially in recent years) cultural studies. Most recently, transgender studies is emerging as a specialism in its own right.

The inclusion of an entry on transgender attests both to the greater visibility of transgender phenomena in contemporary society and to the greater interest shown in it by sociologists and other scholars in the arts and social sciences. However, before we trace the evolution of the term transgender, its various meanings and the social phenomena to which it relates, we must go back to the end of the nineteenth century and consider the emergence within medical discourses of what came to be known as transvestism and transsexualism. The immediate origins of contemporary Euro American conceptualizations of transgender are to be found in the latter half of the nineteenth century, a period which saw the beginning of what Foucault in his *History of Sexuality* (1979) terms the “medicalization of the sexually peculiar.” It was during this period that psychiatrists and other medical practitioners began to puzzle over the nature of people who reported that they felt like/dressed as/behaved like a person of the “opposite sex.” Such people were initially situated within the category of homosexuality or – in the then common terminology – “inversion,” but in the writings of Magnus Hirschfeld and Havelock Ellis a separate category emerged. The term transvestite was coined by Hirschfeld in 1910 to refer to those men who enjoyed behaving and dressing as women, or, indeed, wished to *be* women, and both he and Havelock Ellis (who preferred his own term, *eonism*) argued that this did not necessarily involve homosexuality. Neither Hirschfeld nor Ellis employed the then fashionable language of degeneracy or perversion, but they nevertheless viewed such people as anomalies to be explained within a medical framework. Edward Carpenter in 1911 translated

Hirschfeld’s term as “cross dressing,” a term which along with that of “cross dresser” has become popular in recent years, being seen to avoid the medical and erotic connotations with which “transvestite” has come to be associated.

Hirschfeld first used the term transsexual in 1923. The first “full” male to female (MTF) “sex change” operation (vaginoplasty, following castration and penile amputation) was performed in Berlin at Hirschfeld’s Institute for Sexual Science in 1931. However, it was not until the early 1950s following the widespread publicity given to the cases of Christine Jorgensen in America and Roberta Cowell in Britain (both MTF transsexuals) that the terminology of transsexualism was adopted to distinguish those seeking to “change sex” from those who were “content” to cross dress. During the 1960s “sex reassignment” began to be carried out on an experimental basis in some medical centers, partly due to its legitimation by John Money’s influential ideas on the development of gender. From that decade the professional literature on the topic began to grow rapidly. At this time the work of the US based German endocrinologist Harry Benjamin came to the fore. He argued that carefully selected transsexuals could benefit from “sex reassignment” procedures and for a number of years his *Transsexual Phenomena* (1966) was referred to as the transsexual’s Bible.

In the early 1970s the term gender dysphoria entered the literature and quickly became the preferred term used in the titles of medical conferences, associations, books, and articles. However, it was the term gender identity disorder that became enshrined in the official diagnostic nomenclature (American Psychiatric Association, 1973).

Although, within the medical literature, transvestites and transsexuals began to be differentiated from one another from the 1950s onwards, the subcultural groupings that emerged around the same time included both, at least until the early 1980s, when separate transsexual organizations began to consolidate. At the individual career level there was some slippage between the two categories and a more complex picture than that provided by transvestite/transsexual began to emerge.

The medical centers that began to experiment with sex reassignment during the 1960s provided opportunities for some sociologists to

encounter patients seeking such procedures. One such sociologist was Harold Garfinkel, whose *Studies in Ethnomethodology* with its germinal chapter on the transsexual “Agnes” was published in 1967. Garfinkel was interested, though, not in transsexualism (in fact Agnes was initially thought of as intersexed), but in how Agnes’s experiences demonstrated the “rules” of doing gender. This approach to transsexuals continued in the work of Kessler and McKenna, among others.

Two other sociologists who were able to study transsexuals via the medical centers were Kando and Sulcov. Kando’s *Sex Change* (1973) research began in 1968 and documented the transition of 17 MTF transsexuals who had received surgery at the University of Minnesota. Drawing heavily on the work of Erving Goffman, Kando reported how transsexuals dealt with issues of stigma and information management and how their identities were positioned in relation to the emergence of feminist critiques of traditional femininity. Sulcov, in an unpublished PhD thesis entitled “Transsexualism: Its Social Reality” (1973), focused on the construction of the category “transsexual” by both the medical profession and transsexuals themselves – a theme taken up by a number of later writers.

Other opportunities for research opened up during the 1960s as subcultural groups and organizations began to develop firstly in relation to transvestism and, later, transsexualism. An important figure here was the influential “trans” activist Virginia Prince, whose American organization the Foundation for Personal Expression (for heterosexual transvestites) provided a model for many others around the world. Taylor Buckner carried out a survey of 262 members of Prince’s organization for his Masters degree in 1964. Buckner’s only publication on the topic contains some useful sociological material. However, the thrust of his article (appropriately published in the journal *Psychiatry*, 1970) was to provide an etiological theory of what he calls a “socially induced ‘pathology’”: an approach that by that time was out of favor within the discipline of sociology.

Two developments within sociology itself also shaped the approach to transgender phenomena in the mid 1960s. Firstly, there was the rise of the sociology of deviance and a general

interest in “alternative” lifestyles reflecting something of what was happening in Anglo American society at the time. This led in America to a number of empirical accounts of transvestites and transsexuals and their social worlds (e.g., Driscoll 1971; Feinbloom 1976). The second influential development was the (re)emergence of the women’s movement and the interest in gender. The distinctions which writers such as John Money and Robert Stoller had drawn between sex and gender were enthusiastically embraced by some sociologists as demonstrations of the lack of a necessary link between gender roles and biological sex. Ann Oakley’s influential *Sex, Gender and Society* (1972) drew on this literature and used transsexualism as a demonstration of the independence of sex and gender.

The new sociologists of deviance of the 1960s were generally “on the side” of many of the deviant groupings who were questioning conventional norms at that time. The norms and laws relating to such phenomena as homosexuality, drug use, and abortion were seen as oppressive instruments of power against which the deviant was rebelling. The rebels against gender norms, however, were feminists and, on the face of it, transvestites and transsexuals appeared to be embracing what feminism was questioning. While “radical drag” and “gender blending” were part of the gay liberation scene of the time, changing the content of what were beginning to be called “gender roles” was not what transvestism and transsexualism were about. However, some commentators did consider transvestites and transsexuals as “revolutionaries” who challenged the notion of ascribed gender in the sense that they broke the congruity between sex and gender. These ideas would not seem out of place alongside those of some of the queer theorists that we discuss below.

However, it was the work of Janice Raymond that dominated discussions of the political significance of transsexualism during the 1980s, when her particular style of radical feminism was in the ascendant. Raymond’s *The Transsexual Empire* (1980) argues that transsexuals are among the victims of patriarchal society and its definitions of masculinity and femininity. The creation by the male medical profession of transsexualism and its “treatment” by means of sex change surgery obscures the political

and social sources of the “transsexuals” suffering. Instead, “transsexuality” is conceptualized as an individual problem for which an individual solution is devised; the “real” problem – patriarchy – remains unaddressed. Moreover, Raymond sees MTF transsexuals and in particular those who identify as lesbian feminists as part of a masculine attempt to undermine feminism. Although Raymond’s book probably had little impact on what she called the “transsexual empire,” it was influential in some feminist circles. Riddell’s early and detailed critique of 1980 was not widely available until it was republished in 1996 (Ekins & King 1996) and, in line with the effect of radical feminism in other areas, most critics of Raymond’s position were intimidated into silence. Stone’s (1991) landmark riposte heralded a new era of transgender activism and theorization which drew heavily on postmodernism and the newly emerging queer theory. Since then, other critiques of Raymond’s work have been published (notably, Califia 1997).

Over the years a number of other empirical studies have appeared, mostly in America and the UK. Woodhouse (1989) reported on her research carried out from a feminist perspective into a small group of English male heterosexual transvestites and is unique for the attention given to their wives. Bolin (1988) followed a small group of North American transsexuals over a period of two years as they transformed their status from that of man to that of woman. In her use of the anthropological concept of liminality she anticipated one of the themes taken up in the theorizing of the 1990s. The first published sociological account from Australia was Perkins’s study of a group of transsexual prostitutes in Sydney, somewhat misleadingly entitled *The “Drag Queen” Scene* (1983). Lewins’s (1995) study focused on the social process of becoming a woman. This study was based upon interviews carried out in the early 1990s with over 50 MTF transsexuals attending a gender dysphoria clinic in Melbourne.

Rich in empirical data, Ekins’s (1997) study also contributed theoretically to exploring the interrelations between sex, sexuality, and gender; self, identity, and social world; and expert, member, and lay knowledge, as they develop over time. Using the methodology of grounded theory, Ekins developed the important conceptualization of “male femaling” which has major

ramifications for both the field of transgender and for the analysis of sex and gender more generally.

One theme within the sociology of deviance that was stimulated by the labeling theory of the 1960s was the study of the origins and applications of social labels. In this vein King (1993) sought to understand the nature of transvestism and transsexualism as social categories and documented how and why they have emerged, how they are applied, and their consequences. His work was based on a study of the medical literature, a large number of media reports, fieldwork with transsexuals and transvestites, and, most importantly, interviews with surgeons, psychiatrists, and psychologists and others working in this field. More recently, the historical work of Meyerowitz’s *How Sex Changed* (2002) has charted the emergence of transsexualism in America.

As we have seen, the terms transvestite and transsexual had emerged within a medical context and by the 1970s had become enshrined as diagnoses to designate what were seen as essentially pathological phenomena – gender identity disorders. Although used by transvestites and transsexuals themselves, the terms remained grounded in professional discourse. By the late 1980s some transvestites and transsexuals were beginning to use the term transgender in an inclusive, “umbrella” sense to encompass both identities. In due time other “gender variant” people (e.g., drag queens and kings and intersexed people) have come to be included within the umbrella term. By the early 1990s it became common to find references to the “transgender community,” although the use of the term has not been accepted by all. Although the term transgender has also entered medical and professional discourse (e.g., *International Journal of Transgenderism*), it nevertheless retains its essentially positive and non pathological meaning. By the mid 1990s Ekins and King (1996) were able to write of the “emerging field of transgender studies.” This was seen to encompass the personal experiences of transgendering, the different ways in which those experiences have become socially organized, the ways in which those experiences have been controlled principally by means of medicalization, and the various political issues raised by transgendering.

It is evident that the medical categories of transvestite and transsexual did not encompass the whole range of what we now think of as transgender phenomena. Although some of those who sought sex reassignment had been or were involved in female impersonation for entertainment purposes, the phenomenon of drag itself avoided the medical gaze. With the exception of Esther Newton's important ethnography (*Mother Camp*, 1972), drag also avoided the gaze of social scientists until the 1990s. Since then, Tewkesbury and Gagne and Schact and Underwood have updated the story. Similarly, those people with physically intersexed conditions were absent from the social science literature with one notable exception – Foucault's study of *Herculine Barbin* (1980). Born females who "transgendered" were dealt with mainly in the literature on lesbianism. Little reference was made to the literature on transgenderism in non contemporary western cultures, except to point to the ubiquity of the phenomenon.

A number of these gaps in the literature have begun to be filled since the early 1990s. There is growth in the literature on "transgender" related phenomena in non western cultures. Most of this literature has focused on North American indigenous cultures (e.g., Fulton & Anderson 1992), although there is work on other cultures. Recently, there has been a surge of anthropological interest in transgender, principally in Southeast Asia and in South America (Kulick 1998). Some of this literature has focused on conceptions that have developed without the influence of western medicine, such as the idea of an institutionalized "third" gender or liminal gender space. Nevertheless, it is also evident that western discourses of transgenderism have been exported to many parts of the world and are usurping or are heavily influencing more traditional notions of gender and "transgender" phenomena.

Academic attention has also begun to focus on those people with intersexed conditions. This has been partly stimulated by the development of a more visible and vociferous intersex community. One of the main issues here has been to question the practice of surgically forcing intersexed infants into sexed categories where there is no medical need. Kessler (1998) discusses the ways in which intersex "transgressions" call into question the whole system of binary genders.

One option that was not covered by the medical categories of transvestism and transsexualism was the possibility of living as a member of the other sex without undergoing genital surgery. It was known, of course, that this was a route taken by many transgendered people. Indeed, for most female to male (FTM) transsexuals it has remained the only option because of the inability to surgically create a satisfactory penis. However, what was not considered was that this possibility – women with penises and men with vaginas – might be an acceptable status in its own right. Virginia Prince had argued consistently that transvestism was not about sexuality (the erotic) or sex (the body), but was about gender (the social). She argued that it was possible for a man to be a woman socially without altering the body – something which she herself has done since the late 1960s, when she began to refer to herself and others like her who lived as members of the other sex but without surgical interventions as "transgenderal" and, later, as "transgenderist." Prince explicitly distinguishes this group from transvestites and transsexuals.

Until the early 1990s FTMs and cross dressing females were not very much in evidence in either the literature or in the transgender movement. Since then, FTMs or, more accurately, "female bodied transpeople" to use Cromwell's (1999) term, have become a more visible feature of the transgender community and in fact have come to play key roles within that community and within transgender politics. They have also been prominent in the emergence of transgender theory. Judith Halberstam's *Female Masculinity* (1998) is a key work in this regard. More specifically, it is female bodied transpeople who have led the way in linking transgender to revolutionary socialism (Leslie Feinberg's *Transgender Warriors*, 1996); to radical body configurations and pansexualism (Del La Grace Volcano's *Sublime Mutations*, 2000); and to the beginnings of a hitherto neglected transgender approach to class, race, and masculinity (Halberstam 1998).

The rise in popularity of the term transgender has paralleled the rise in academia of queer theory, within which crossing the gender border is seen as subversive and transgressive. Much of this work falls outside the boundaries of sociology and is to be found within what has

come to be called cultural studies. This approach has been particularly influential with some trans activists and academics and raises radical questions about the binary and fixed nature of gender categories themselves. Especially influential was Judith Butler's work on gender as performativity. Also influential was Marjorie Garber's *Vested Interests* (1992), which drew on examples ranging across history, literature, film, photography, and popular and mass culture: from Shakespeare to Mark Twain and Oscar Wilde, through transsexual surgery and transvestite support groups, to Elvis Presley and Madonna, indicating the ubiquity of transgender phenomena. In a phrase echoed in a number of other writings she argued "transvestism is a space of possibility structuring and confounding culture: the disruptive element that intervenes, not just a category crisis of male and female, but a crisis of category itself" (p. 17).

It is within this context that the phenomenon of the "drag king" has emerged. The western world has been familiar with drag for a long time, but the term has most commonly been applied to men performing in women's clothes, although it has also been used to apply to women in men's clothes. Only recently though has the use of the suffix "king" emerged. Apparently beginning in the late 1980s with the term becoming more widespread through the 1990s, drag kings entered the academic literature with the publication of Halberstam's *Female Masculinity* (1998). Usually viewed through the lens of queer theory, drag kings are viewed not simply as the female counterparts to drag queens, but as a much more subversive phenomenon because of the mainstream view of masculinity as non performative.

Stone's (1991) article can also be seen to provide the starting point for the emergence of a postmodernist approach to transgender, which is now seen by some to be at the very cutting edge of debates about sex, sexuality, and gender. This approach has achieved a position of prominence in a number of recent contributions to cultural studies and queer theory. Stone's image of transsexuals as "outside the boundaries of gender" chimed in well with many of the themes in cultural studies and queer theory, and provided an approach that has been developed extensively in recent years. This idea points to the position of trans people as located

somewhere outside the spaces customarily occupied by men and women, as people who are beyond the laws of gender. The assumption that there are only two (opposite) genders, with their corresponding "masculinities" and "femininities," is opened up to scrutiny. Instead, it is suggested that there is the possibility of a "third" space outside the gender dichotomy to make sense of various gendered identities that transcend dimorphism. Within this approach the idea of permanent core identities and, for some, the idea of gender itself, disappear. The emphasis is on gender transience, fluidity, and performance, as in Kate Bornstein's *Gender Outlaw* (1994).

Despite this late modern/postmodern approach with its emphasis on diversity, fluidity, and moving beyond the rigidities of the binary gender divide and its celebration of new combinations of masculinity and femininity, for most, in the professional and transgender communities, as in society at large, the binary view of gender prevails.

SEE ALSO: Drag Queens and Drag Kings; Ellis, Havelock; Female Masculinity; Hirschfeld, Magnus; Intersexuality; Queer Theory; Sex and Gender; Sexual Citizenship; Sexual Deviance; Sexual Practices

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transgression

Lauren Langman

Transgression, violating a formal rule and/or moral principle, crossing a boundary of acceptable conduct, or exceeding a social limit, is central to understanding social life in general and deviance in particular (Jenks 2003). Although there is no clear cut distinction between the criminal and moral, few societies ignore theft, while publicly breaking wind or picking one's nose is not usually punished as a criminal offense. At various moments, insanity, masturbation, homosexuality, and adultery have

been considered transgressions that have been deemed criminal and/or pathological. At some times, imputed transgressions such as witchcraft were harshly punished. A great deal of social history has concerned the attempts of competing groups to legislate morality – and most of these have been futile.

There are dialectical relations between what is deemed "normal" and what is "pathological" and hence constrained or isolated. Normative standards of right and wrong or good and evil are typically "contested terrains" with "policed boundaries" where powerful actors attempt to define "acceptable" action, thought, and belief. Yet indeed, establishing limits may itself foster the desire to transgress those limits because transgression can be "fun." How does society attempt to thwart transgression, and if that fails, how are transgressions punished? At the same time, how and why are some people impelled to transgress, and yet while transgressions are impelled by individual desire, notwithstanding, some transgressions elicit widespread revulsion, disgust, and outrage, even if they are not against the law?

A long history of thought has attempted to define "good" and "evil." While this has typically been the realm of religion, after the Enlightenment dethronement of faith it has been a concern of sociology. The nature of the "desirable" and "acceptable" ways of being and doing remain vital concerns. Today however, we are informed by the insights of Nietzsche, Durkheim, Freud, and Foucault, as well as Bataille, Bakhtin, Victor Turner, Mary Douglas, and many other scholars who have pondered the ways society constructs limits as well as desires to transgress.

Nietzsche (1989) was among the first to suggest that the "good," as kindness, charity, and humility, was typically an expression of the politics of *ressentiment* in which weak, petty, and banal people, typically majorities, imbued with a "slave mentality" of conformist subjugation, would attempt to stifle the "will to power" of the strong and noble, those who would transcend themselves. While Christian religion sustained servitude and the suppression of will, with modernity and the Death of God, "modern" forms of truth and power fostered the repression of will that in turn enfeebled the person and stunted his/her self fulfillment as an

Übermensch, the one who authentically transcended him/herself in overcoming the restraints of debilitating mediocrity and conformity. If that transcendence might require transgression, indeed cruelty and/or disdain of inferiors, then so be it. Transgression for Nietzsche challenges, overthrows, spoils, and questions the unquestionable (Jenks 2003: 81).

For Durkheim (1947 [1898]), society as a "moral order," expressed in its *conscience collective* (collective consciousness), depended on shared goals, values, norms, and beliefs, about words, deeds, and actions considered "normal," "right," and those considered "wrong," indeed "pathological," and subject to some kind of repressive sanction. This was evident in the laws that expressed the shared sentiments of tightly bound traditional societies or more diffuse modern societies. Such laws might be repressive or restitutive. Yet deviance was socially generated and inevitable in any society. The social structure fostered transgressions to periodically foster the collective outrage that would affirm the sanctity of norms through dramatic, emotion laden expiatory rituals. Even in a society of saints there must be sinners to affirm the rules among those untouched by the transgression and rekindle the solidarity of the society. Punishment brings the "decent people" together. But so too, at various moments such as festivals, episodic indulgence in the otherwise transgressive could celebrate norms and renew social bonds. At the same time, transgression can be a basis for social change as certain laws and norms are contested. At periods of social change marked by anomie, deviance becomes the basis for innovation and indeed, adaptation to new moral circumstances. What is considered transgressive in one era often becomes acceptable in another era and normative even later. Consider the changing notions of sexuality. At one time, masturbation, premarital sexuality (especially of women), and/or homosexuality were seen as psychopathology, criminality, or both.

In a similar vein, Mary Douglas (1966) has examined the relation of "purity" in which pollution, as transgression, threatens both elite power and the moral codes of a society. Thus certain kinds of people and/or actions must be kept separated, if not eradicated. Just as notions of ritual pollution safeguarded the traditional caste system of India by affirming social

boundaries, so too have various constructions of purity sustained certain class, race, or sex/gender boundaries. This can be seen in debates over immigration policies, gays in the military, and even the legality of gay marriage. Those who are "polluted" by virtue of their status or actions, often of a sexual nature, need to be excluded or isolated, lest their pollution "harm" the society as boundaries and norms are challenged.

Foucault, like Durkheim, looked at social structures. His concerns were the smaller institutional structures in which expertise was intertwined with power. He suggested that the construction of norms and definitions of transgression were not simply collective judgments, but indeed a reflection of localized institutional knowledge/power embedded within expert generated systems of meanings that define who and what is transgressive and prescribe the appropriate actions. Thus, for example, with the growth of rationality in European commerce, governance, and culture, self control and a methodical approach to everyday life became valued. The thoughts and behavior of the mad, the "unreasonable," the uncontrolled became stigmatized as "deviant." Thus as "madness" replaced leprosy as the socially required expression of deviance, psychiatry emerged as a system of knowledge/power whose "scientific" discourses "explained" insanity and prescribed its treatment, the "sequestration of unreason" in asylums (Foucault 1988 [1965]). In much the same way, Foucault argued that wardens and physicians possessed power/knowledge embedded in discursive practices that "explained" criminal or medical deviance, prescribed a remedy through their gaze and "expertise," and enhanced the power of expertise.

Similarly, for Jervis (1999), the transgressions of the modern are defined by demands of "purposive control and rationality in face of, if not contestation with the repressed other side, the irrational, uncontrolled otherness of the primitive, the insane, the woman and the debauchery of the carnival." The "otherness" of transgression is feared as it questions power. That "otherness" is not only feared but also desired and therefore tabooed, rendered disgusting to preserve the "purity" of rational yet repressed modernity.

Such inquiries raise questions about *how* the normative is socially constructed, defined, and

sustained and just *why* certain acts, beliefs, and thoughts are proper. In many cases, the transgressive has been punished by death, and often that death was the result of long, slow, painful, public torture. With modernity, transgression was more often punished by sequestration in institutions. Nevertheless, it is the society that creates experts who define and treat the socially generated transgression.

TRANSGRESSION AND DESIRE

As noted, transgression often involves sexuality. In the Victorian era, a “fallen” woman who lost her “virtue” was rendered an immoral outcast, not suitable for marriage. By the end of World War II, the majority of western women had become sexually active before marriage. Today, in the advanced countries, most unmarried youth are sexually active. Sexuality has a long history as a binary in opposition to culture. The construction of unbridled sexuality as transgressive and worthy of retribution was seen in the destruction of Sodom and Gomorrah as punishment for their sexual excesses. This set the tone for the Israelites’ opposition to the cultic religions of Baal and Ishtar in which temple prostitution was an essential part of fertility rituals. As an expression of nature, as passion, irrationality, and even death (orgasm as *la petite mort*), sexuality has stood opposed to order and control. This legacy informed Christianity, especially the teachings of Paul and later Augustine, and again in its conquests over paganism. When medieval Christianity became more tolerant of desire, Protestantism would reaffirm asceticism and denial.

The antagonism of civilization and desire, the binary of order versus passion, and the inherent tendency of desire to transgress limits were most clearly articulated by Freud; sexual and aggressive desires were the bases of motivation, while civilized society demanded restraint and control. Transgression presupposed desire, while taboos would prohibit gratifications that would render one dirty, polluted, and dangerous, and perhaps endanger the group. For Freud, the primary taboo was incest; the Oedipal desire of the boy for his mother was repressed or displaced due to the fear of castration as retaliation by the father. Taboo was one

of the earliest forms of conscience, internalized social controls of desire.

In much the same way, excreta became tabooed. Freud argued that civilization provided beauty, cleanliness, and order, aka an anal obsession. Civilization required limiting sexuality through rendering most erotic desires and/or their object(s) as tabooed and hence repressed. To ensure that people harmoniously worked together for the sake of collective adaptation, desire needed to be sublimated into work while libidinal aims (gratification) were inhibited so as to enable social ties. Yet such taboos fostered the very desires for transgression that they might thwart. But neither the desire nor the prohibition was likely to abate. However, the repression of desire, sustained by a punitive superego, held most transgressions in check, though the individual would suffer from his/her guilt.

Following Freud, while informed by Sade and Surrealism, Georges Bataille saw taboos on sex and violence rooted in the requirements of economic survival for the tribe. Bataille celebrated eroticism, sexuality purely for the sake of pleasure in the face of finitude – ultimately death. But at the same time, transgressions were ritualized violations of taboos such as in war, sacrifice, or the orgy. From what has been said, transgression is often a reflection of a desire for the tabooed, and indeed, desire is aroused because the act is “prohibited” and gratification rendered artificially scarce. In other words, if the society did not construct prohibitions, then people would not desire what is prohibited.

Finally, it must be noted that Freud and Marxists such as Wilhelm Reich, and later Herbert Marcuse, argued that sexual repression fostered the conformity required for workers in a capitalist system. But with the rapid expansion of consumer society after World War II, it became necessary to ease the restraints of repression so that people would spend rather than save money. One of the main ways impulse driven consumerism was encouraged was by linking it to sexuality – sex sells and the erosion of sexual constraints encourages the erosion of thrift and frugality. But society needed to “normalize” sexual transgression, thus it began to encourage fantasies of sexual fulfillment that would be obtained by consuming a particular commodity. Thus societies would tolerate the

premarital sexuality of consumers as a form of what Marcuse termed “repressive desublimation,” encouraging seeming freedom in the service of domination. Yet as has been seen, the greater toleration of sexuality, straight or gay, has also rekindled a number of fundamentalist movements that would oppose toleration for what had heretofore been transgressive.

THE SEQUESTRATION OF TRANSGRESSION: SPATIAL AND TEMPORAL ISOLATION

As Foucault noted, asylum psychiatry sought to isolate unreason if it could not be transformed. In a similar way, societies provide marginal sites, zones of transition where transgression is tolerated. Victor Turner (1969) has argued that social structures foster “anti structures,” marginal or liminal “in between” sites where transgressions are tolerated as long as they are isolated from the centers of the society.

In most societies, even those that are quite repressive, the transgressive that is strongly repressed will be desired. Yet perhaps because of that repression it can and will be available. Just as Victorianism fostered bordellos, and Prohibition fostered the “speakeasy,” cultures provide encapsulated realms and sites where the otherwise prohibited finds toleration. Thus in certain eras, bordellos, gay bars, or S/M dungeons were sub rosa, hidden to most outsiders. Similarly, every major city in the world has regions where drugs and many kinds of sexual pleasures can be found, even when deemed criminal.

There are certain times that allow, if not encourage, transgression such as vacations and certain festivals. The prototypical time of transgression was carnival, the days before Easter; Bakhtin (1968) argued that the medieval carnival emerged as an episodic popular festival in which the grotesque and transgressive critiqued, through mocking, parody, and inversion, the repressive norms of the elites. In Breughel’s *Battle Between Carnival and Lent* we see the joyous, rotund “king” of the carnival doing battle with the haggard, repressed Lent, just as we see the church next to the tavern. The peasants gathered together to drink, dance, and indulge what was otherwise prohibited; most of

these indulgences were bodily, especially erotic licentiousness and all manner of scatological excess. Carnival stood apart from everyday life, transgression was not just tolerated but celebrated. For Bakhtin, transgression embraced far more than sexuality. Carnival valorized the grotesque as a repudiation of elite aesthetic standards. Carnival was a critique of the elites, their lifestyles and seeming “superiority.” On the one hand carnival could be seen as a form of resistance, but at the same time that resistance, displaced to the cultural realms, ultimately served to reproduce the political economy.

Bakhtin’s work influenced a number of scholars such as Stallybrass and White (1986), and Presdee (2001). For Stallybrass and White, with the ascent of the trading classes and flourishing of coffeehouses, alcohol consumption dropped and fairs and carnivals waned. Presdee, more concerned with criminal transgressions, nevertheless argued that insofar as certain transgressions are labeled criminal, there are joys in such transgressions.

THE COMMODIFICATION OF TRANSGRESSION

In the contemporary era of globalized capitalism, the privatized hedonism of consumption has been universalized as the means of attaining the “goods life.” Indeed, consumerism as an ideology, lifestyle, and basis for identity serves to sustain markets and assuage the discontents of the contemporary market based civilization. More specifically, in the current age, there are three major sources of discontent: (1) economic stagnation and the uncertainty of employment; (2) highly routinized, regulated, and often surveilled work; and (3) the emptiness and shallowness of most forms of “mass culture.” Beneath the surface of such discontents lie deeper frustrations and anxieties over social fragmentation and attenuated social ties, problematic agency in an ever more controlled world, finding dignity and recognition, and finally, finding meaning in a world that seems ever more meaningless.

There are at least two reactions to these trends, fundamentalism and transgression, which indeed feed on each other. In the former case, the surrender of the self and subjugation to a higher “moral” authority provides integration

into a community of believers, empowerment through prayer and ritual, dignity through piety and purity, and clear cut meanings, rules, and regulations that disavow the transgressive. At the same time, for a great many people, the transgressive “compensates” for the adversities of modernity. Transgression exalts and rewards the self in its pursuit of hedonistic self indulgence. But further, transgressive means of assuaging the discontents of capitalism have themselves become commodified. Such modifications of transgression range from the shocking and grotesque realms of mass culture to transgressive subcultures and lifestyles of goths, punks, or hip hop. In these commodified transgressions, frustrations are allayed and discontent, anger, rage, and even ennui are contained by, while displaced from, the political economy. Much like the feudal carnival, adverse feelings are dissipated and potential disruption thwarted. Thus not only are discontents allayed, but capitalism finds profit in selling alternatives to its own mainstream and the system is reproduced.

CONCLUSION

Transgression, the crossing of often tabooed moral and frequently criminal boundaries, is not only a universal aspect of human societies but also a fruitful way of understanding how those societies construct and control deviant behaviors, while fostering the very deviance they abhor. In recent years, between the adversities of capitalism on the one hand, and the ever present need to expand the consumer economy on the other, we have seen the transgressive move from the margins to the mainstream. Whether we look at clothing/appearance, life styles, or musical styles, the boundaries of morality and the transgressive are quite fluid and variable. And while the embrace of the transgressive may cause many hardships, so too does transgression foster social change and, in the process, reveal much about the society.

SEE ALSO: Crime; Deviance; Deviance, Crime and; Fundamentalism; Norms; Ritual; Subcultures, Deviant; Values

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transition from communism

Josephine E. Olson and Irene Hanson Frieze

“Transition from communism” refers to the historical process of moving from a centrally planned economy to a market oriented economy with a dominant private sector. In most cases it has also meant a transition from a totalitarian state to a democracy. Transitions have taken place in European and Central Asian countries formerly under Soviet domination and also in East Asian countries such as China and Vietnam. The transition period is largely associated with the 1990s, but China’s transition began in 1978, and transitions are far from complete in many countries. Discussion of the transition generally focuses on economic changes, but many political, legal, social, and psychological changes were also associated with the transition. The focus here is on the transitions in Central

and Eastern Europe, the former Yugoslavia, and the former Soviet Union.

Before the fall of the Berlin Wall in 1989 and the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991, communist countries were centrally planned, with the government and cooperatives owning most means of production. Most communist economies emphasized heavy industry rather than services and consumer goods. Large factories and geographical specialization were common. Energy and transportation industries were often highly subsidized. International trade took place primarily among members of the Council for Mutual Economic Assistance (CMEA). Enterprises were controlled by strict administrative rather than financial constraints; managers had to meet the requirements of the central plan. A single state bank system served to meet the objectives of government economic plans.

All men and women of working age were expected to be employed outside the home, and unemployment was largely unknown. However, there were often provisions for lengthy maternal leaves for women. Services were provided for families, such as housing, government sponsored childcare centers, and meals at work. Governments provided retirement pensions for all workers, and retirement ages were often in the fifties. Employees received low wages, and wage differentials across jobs were low. By the 1980s, communist governments found they could not offer all the promised services. There were widespread shortages in consumer goods because of price controls, and consumer goods were often of poor quality.

With the breakup of the Soviet Union, Yugoslavia, and Czechoslovakia in the 1990s, there are now 27 transition countries. The German Democratic Republic merged with the Federal Republic of Germany in 1990 and its transition became an internal problem of Germany. The 27 countries are often classified into groups for analysis of the transition. The Baltic countries, Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania, were part of the former Soviet Union after World War II. The Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) includes the other countries of the Soviet Union: Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Georgia, Kazakhstan, the Kyrgyz Republic, Moldova, the Russian Federation, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, Ukraine, and Uzbekistan. Five Central European countries (the Czech Republic, Hungary,

Poland, Slovakia, and Slovenia) joined the European Union in 2004 along with the Baltic countries. These eight countries are referred to as the Central Europe and Baltic (CEB) countries. The Southeast European (SEE) countries include the countries of the former Yugoslavia except Slovenia (Bosnia and Herzegovina, Croatia, the Former Yugoslav Republic (FYR) of Macedonia, and Serbia and Montenegro) as well as Albania, Bulgaria, and Romania. Bulgaria and Romania expect to join the European Union in 2007 and Croatia and FYR Macedonia are official candidates.

The massive requirements of the transition from communism were unprecedented in history; there were few guidelines to the best process. The following reforms were generally considered necessary to successfully complete the transition to a market economy. Macroeconomic stabilization was required to control inflation and prevent excessive government deficits. This required breaking up the single bank system into a central bank and numerous commercial and investment banks (allowing the entry of new banks). The central bank's responsibilities included limiting the growth of the money supply to control inflation. To avoid large government deficits, controls on government spending, tax reform, and strong tax collection methods needed to be put in place. The tax system had to be reformed so that the government could collect revenue from the private sector that was needed to finance its new responsibilities in a market oriented economy. Price and trade liberalization were needed so that domestic prices would reflect world prices and encourage efficient allocation of resources. Among other things, this meant the breakup of the CMEA trading bloc.

Hard budget constraints needed to be imposed on companies. This meant eliminating subsidies and non payment of taxes. Enterprises had to restructure, laying off workers and increasing productivity, to become profitable. Given outdated production methods and previous subsidies, many old enterprises were not viable in a global market and had to liquidate. Methods had to be found to transfer viable government owned enterprises to a competitive private sector. New businesses needed to be encouraged to increase output and absorb excess workers. Commercial banks needed to make loans based

on profit potential and eliminate non performing loans. A social safety net was required to deal with unemployment and poverty.

Legal and judicial systems and related institutions that would provide a level playing field in a market economy and enforce property rights had to be created. In retrospect, analysts believe that policymakers underestimated the importance of developing legal systems, particularly for the protection of property rights, and related institutions to the proper functioning of a market economy.

The transition in Europe and Central Asia turned out to be far more difficult than expected. The transition initially led to inflation as price controls were removed and as financial crises developed in some countries. There were dramatic drops in output and increased unemployment due to disruptions from the collapse of communist institutions, tight macroeconomic policies, and credit crunches. Although initial drops in output were anticipated, they were much larger than expected: an average fall of about 40 percent. The European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD) estimated that output fell on average until 1994 and did not begin to rise again until 1998.

Privatization of state owned enterprises took several forms. Small enterprises were transferred quickly and rather successfully to the private sector, primarily through local auctions. Large and medium sized state owned enterprises were handled in a variety of ways. Some countries such as Poland and Slovenia moved slowly to privatize state owned enterprises, but appointed supervisory boards to run them before privatization. Estonia and Hungary carefully sold off state enterprises to outside buyers, including foreign buyers. Some countries such as the Czech Republic, Lithuania, and Slovakia used voucher plans to quickly transfer ownership shares to most adult citizens. Russia and Ukraine privatized rapidly using primarily subsidized management buyouts. In retrospect, studies suggest that privatization to concentrated outside owners led to better restructuring; privatization to diffuse owners and to enterprise workers and managers often made things worse for restructuring than continued state ownership.

The 1990s were a time of extreme hardship for many people in the transition countries.

The World Bank (2002) estimated that 1 in 20 people in this region had incomes below one dollar per day in 1998 compared to only 1 in 60 in 1988. Aside from drops in output and employment, worsening distributions of income contributed to the growing poverty. Income distribution became more unequal in most countries, but CIS countries like Russia, Armenia, and the Kyrgyz Republic became among the most unequal in the world. War and civil strife in Armenia, Azerbaijan, Georgia, Moldova, and Tajikistan and in most of the states of the former Yugoslavia as well as financial crises, particularly the Russian crises of 1998, undermined the transition in many places. Ethnic and religious strife also hindered transition.

Most countries had shrinking social services and benefits. Fertility and marriage rates dropped, and in some CIS countries average life expectancy fell. There were serious psychological costs for many people due to the greater uncertainty about jobs, social disorientation, and declining standards of living. Value systems based on collectivism began to transform to more individualistic ones. Under communism, people relied on the state to guarantee them a job and to provide social benefits. With the transition, people were confronted with unemployment for the first time. Salaries for government workers were generally quite low, and the private sector, as it developed, provided higher paying but more demanding jobs. Younger workers, especially men, were most often sought for these new jobs. Women of childbearing age were often not hired, as companies sought to avoid paying maternity benefits. Young, attractive, unmarried women were often the most likely women to be hired and older women experienced the highest levels of unemployment.

The psychological changes resulting from the economic transition often included discontent with the changes. Public opinion surveys conducted in 1999 in the Czech Republic, Hungary, and Poland, three of the more successful transition countries, indicated that more people believed that the losses from the transition exceeded the gains than the reverse. Reactions were even more negative in other countries. But, some young adults have responded positively to the opportunities provided by the private sector and to the increased freedom of

political expression in some transition countries. A recent study showed some improvement since the mid 1990s in life satisfaction among residents of transition economies.

Although all the European and Central Asian countries initially suffered significant drops in output and other problems at the beginning of the transitions, there were enormous differences 15 years later. The EBRD (2005) estimated that output in 2004 was 126 percent of its 1989 level in the CEB countries, but only 92 percent in SEE countries and 81 percent in CIS countries. Output, however, has been growing in all countries since 2002 and it has been growing quite rapidly in some of the CIS countries. In 2003, half the countries still reported unemployment of 10 percent or more. The EBRD reported that inflation rates and government deficits were relatively low in 2005. The economic structure of transition countries has changed. Services have grown in relative importance while industry shrank in all countries and agriculture also shrank in the CIS countries. In 2005, the private sector accounted for more than 50 percent of output in all but Uzbekistan (45 percent), Belarus (25 percent), and Turkmenistan (25 percent). In many countries, this change was due to the rapid growth of new private businesses more than privatization of old state enterprises.

The EBRD has a set of transition indicators to track structural and institutional reforms in the transition countries as they move toward mature market economies. Most countries show significant progress in liberalizing prices, in liberalizing international trade and their exchange rate regimes, and in privatizing small scale enterprises. They are somewhat behind in large scale privatization and in banking reform and interest rate liberalization. They are still slower in the areas of governance and enterprise restructuring, infrastructure reform, reform in securities markets and non bank financial institutions, and competition (antitrust) policies. The countries that are the most advanced in reforms are the CEB countries, followed by Croatia, Bulgaria, and Romania. The countries that have made little or no progress in the transition are: Turkmenistan, which has only liberalized some prices and done some small scale privatization; Belarus; Uzbekistan; and Tajikistan.

It is not surprising that the CEB countries that have joined the European Union and those SEE countries that are in the process of joining the EU have made the most reforms. Many of these reforms are also required for membership in the European Union. In addition, the Central European countries tended to start with some initial advantages, such as relatively high per capita income, high levels of education, shorter times under communism, and proximity to the West. However, the Baltic countries, which were less advantaged initially, are now as advanced as the Central European countries.

SEE ALSO: Capitalism; Communism; Ideology, Economy and; State and Economy; Stratification in Transition Economies; Transition Economies

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transition economies

Rainhart Lang

Societies or economies in transition have been the focus of sociological research since the fall of the Berlin Wall in 1989, which symbolized the demise of the state socialist system. The term *transition economies* therefore applies mainly to post socialist countries in Central and Eastern Europe, and also in East Asia, despite its wider use in the economic or sociological literature.

The term *transition* is used to describe the process through which a society or economy introduces the institutional facets associated with advanced capitalist economies, such as

the legal system, ownership structures, institutions of financial and labor markets, the party system, and the institutions of the independent and democratic state. While the term *transition* is often restricted to a small time span of an economic change, or relates only to an economic view of post socialist societies, or describes the fixed result of the changes as *the* western type of a market economy or capitalism (Offe 1996), the term *transformation* has been more widely used in the sociological literature, especially in Europe, since the mid 1990s. The latter term covers a wider social process of fundamental political, economic, technological, and cultural change in structures and values, including all areas and levels of the society: organizations, the individual, and collective actors (Nee & Matthew 1996; Clark et al. 2001).

Transformation has been described as both managed and evolutionary, or self organized, this quality impinging upon the adjoining concept of “follow up modernization” (Grancelli 1995). In light of this interpretation, economic transition may be regarded as a temporal and spatial element within the wider transformation process in which new economic institutions are formed and established.

Taking into consideration such a broad view of transformational change, transformation might also be seen as an ongoing process also in those post socialist countries now entering

the EU. These nation states are still confronting processes of adaptation and change at various levels, including the adoption of societal institutions and values. The broader research agenda on radical social change in transformational societies or economies in transition is therefore concerned with various levels and processes in social change, as represented in Figure 1.

The traditional discourse on economic transition has focused mainly on the process of successful transfer and functioning of capitalist institutions such as labor markets, financial institutions, adequate ownership structures, and the privatization and economic restructuring of economic organizations. But as Clarke (1996) contended, “Although the process of privatization has transformed a stratum of office holders into a potential class of property owners, private property is not a sufficient condition for the constitution of a capitalist system of social production.” A wider perspective on transition economies has therefore demanded consideration of the impact of various other factors and phenomena such as national values, traditional cultures, political interests, and the strategies of individual and collective actors on the development of economic institutions, economic organizations, and economic actors in transforming societies. While American economic sociology has predominantly focused on change or continuity in workers’ control over the labor process




Figure 1 Levels and social aspects of transformation research in transition economies.

(Burawoy & Krotov 1992), on the transformation in income relations as a result of privatization attempts (Nee & Matthew 1996), on privatization and restructuring of enterprises (Stark 1996), and the emergence of new elites (Waldner 2003), the European debate has been much broader, and has manifested an interdisciplinary approach to transformation. The social aspects of economic transition that have been analyzed most frequently since the mid 1990s are delineated below.

At the societal level, *institution transfers vs. institution building*, or reinstitutionalization of social processes, has been at the center of research attempts, this including study of the conflicts between inherent values of the transferred institutions and the local national value systems. (Clarke 1996; Fligstein 1996; Grabher & Stark 1997; Stanojevic 2001; Wang 2001; Lang & Steger 2002; Bakacsi et al. 2002).

The development of new capitalist institutions in the transition economies, introduced with the massive financial and moral support of western institutions such as the World Bank or governmental advisers and consultants, led to difficulties and failure in the respective economies in the mid 1990s. It has transpired that the transferred institutions often did not fit with national cultures in the CEE countries (Bakacsi et al. 2002) or China (Wang 2001), as well as with the special requirements of transformational settings. The traditional national cultures, characterized by strong in group collectivism and high power distance, consolidated by the past system, differed in their core values from the transferred institutions, which exhibited individualistic "western" cultural norms. Moreover, different transition strategies could be observed, ranging from early shock therapy to an incremental change (Offe 1996).

At the same time, the imposed transfer of western institutions, supported by a tendency towards mimetic processes from inside the transition economies, finally led to inconsistency problems with the historical and cultural background of the local actors, as shown in various studies (e.g., Lang & Steger 2002). Older interests tended to convert the new institutions in ways that stabilized parts of the heritage, as for example shown by Stanojevic (2001) in the case of the transfer of the German system of industrial relations to Slovenia and Hungary. As a

result, the transition economies in CEE countries, as well as in post socialist Asian countries, have developed a new type of capitalism (Stark 1996; Wang 2001) or a special business system, which is characterized by a distinctive mixture between public and private enterprise, and with the strong influence of social networks and groups with particular interests that have underpinned economic activities and institutions (Fligstein 1996; Grabher & Stark 1997). The emergent or newly embedded institutions are the result of a "recombination" of properties (Stark 1996) based on the culture of the past and transformation experiences with the transferred institutions. While classical neoliberal theories were not able to explain these changes, evolutionary theory, network theory, and new institutional theory have been used more often in these studies (see Fligstein's 1996 claim for an integration of institutional theories).

At the level of organizations, the traditional focus of research has been on the privatization and restructuring of the old enterprises as well as the emergence of small private firms as the main forms of organizational transformation. The social aspects analyzed in the wider perspective of organizational transformation include cultural changes in (economic) organizations, and their enabling and limitation effects on economic activities (Burawoy & Krotov 1992), including the emergence and establishment of new practices as a result of "recombination" (Stark 1996; Grabher & Stark 1997) or "bricolage" (Clark et al. 2001). In addition, the interrelated processes of organizational and institutional learning, and their intended or unintended consequences for a co evolution of the newly established organizations and institutions, have been analyzed, to explain the various steps of adjustment and adaptation (Child & Czegledy 1996; Lieb Dóczy 2001). The results show that the core values of old organizations and local embeddedness play an important role for a successful organizational transformation, even in the case of a radical restructuring. The learning process in transformational settings could therefore be characterized as an explorative learning process beyond simple adaptive or exploitative learning.

At the level of individual (and collective) actors, the emergence and shape of new social groups of actors, especially entrepreneurs or

managers (Puffer et al. 2000; Steger & Lang 2003), and their influence on the development of new organizational forms, values, and the (re-) construction of new institutions have formed an interesting field of transformation research. The results support the expectation of an elite reproduction instead of a radical change within the economic elite. The new owners, managers, or entrepreneurs of small businesses had mainly a management background in the old system, or belonged to distinctive social groupings. Since many of the old cadres, especially from the younger group of technocrats, have managed their individual transformation into the new capitalist system and have created new roles (Clark et al. 2001; Lang & Steger 2002; Waldner 2003), their values and experiences built the background for the new organizations. Not only the new managers but also the new social group of entrepreneurs differ therefore from their western counterparts with respect to values and preferred practices. Moreover, since they belong to informal social networks of different types, they also gain influence in the public sphere. As shown in early publications on transformation in CEE countries (e.g., Dittrich et al. 1995), powerful actors and their respective networks have to be seen as a central explanatory factor in transformation at societal level.

While in the early years of transformation research, surveys and statistics with questionable original data were used, the broader agenda of transformation research is now accompanied by a wider spectrum of research methods, wherein complex case studies and longitudinal type cases play an important role (Puffer et al. 2000; Clark et al. 2001; Clark & Michailova 2004). Even in the early years, statistics and surveys did not reflect the special influence of the informal "gray" market, the problematic state of official statistics, and the ability of the actors to produce a "good looking" surface picture ("social desirability" phenomena). A critical standpoint on the research methodology in transformation research has demonstrated that taking account of the important influence of third party agents such as translators, cultural interpreters, mixed research teams of insiders and outsiders, strangers, and indigenous researchers is helpful in overcoming partial "blindness," mistakes, and misinterpretations (Clark & Michailova 2004).

SEE ALSO: Institutional Theory, New; Networks; Social Problems, Concept and Perspectives; Stratification in Transition Economies; Transition from Communism

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transition from school to work

Fabrizio Bernardi

Research on the transition from school to work focuses on the relationship between the level of education and the first job achieved upon entry into the labor market. This has traditionally been a central topic in social stratification and social mobility research. As such, the study of the transition from school to work has reflected the main theoretical positions that have dominated research on social stratification since the end of World War II. Under the influence of functionalist theory, the relationship between education and the first job has been studied in terms of the classical achievement/ascription dichotomy. Thus, scholars were mainly interested in establishing the relative weights of achieved and ascribed factors in the process of status achievement, in particular with regard to the first job. The key research question was whether or not access to better jobs was increasingly dependent on achieved factors, such as education, and less and less dependent on ascribed factors such as the characteristics of the family of origin. In the same period, economists developed the theory of human capital, which assumes that formal education increases individual productivity by providing the skills

and knowledge required for the most demanding occupations. According to this theory, individuals can improve their productivity by investing in their own education. Moreover, employers can dispose of perfect information about school leavers' productivity by considering their level of education. Thus, this theory predicts a direct relationship between level of education and quality of the first job achieved.

In opposition to both functionalist sociological theory and human capital theory, credentialist theory, developed in the 1970s, questioned the idea that education increases individual productivity at work. In this interpretation, educational certificates are credentials that certify membership in a given status group, i.e., groups that share a common culture, worldview, and values. While functionalist and human capital theories argued that school leavers are sorted into occupations on the basis of their merits and productivity, credentialist theory suggested that the process of the school to work transition is ruled by dominant status groups who define the educational requirements for a given occupation and, in this way, control and limit access to their privileged positions. The critique of the human capital assumption that education increases individual productivity is also the starting point of the signal theory of education that has been developed by both economists and sociologists. According to this theory, employers interpret education as a signal of the future trainability of applicants for a job vacancy. Although the level of education is not directly related to actual productivity, it reflects other individual traits such as commitment and social and communicative skills that are crucial for subsequent success at work. The important implication for the school to work transition is that, among other factors, the signaling capacity of educational qualifications is crucially dependent on the number of school leavers with a given level of qualification: as their number increases, the discriminatory information attached to the educational qualification decreases. If this is the case, one might expect the outcome of the school to work transition to depend to a greater extent on factors other than the mere level of education.

In more recent years, research on the transition from school to work has reflected and partly fostered a progressive shift from social

stratification and social mobility studies toward labor market sociology. This shift has come about with three interrelated epistemological, theoretical, and methodological changes. First of all, more effort has been made to specify the mechanisms underlying the school to work transition. Second, the importance of the institutional context in which the school to work transition is embedded has been acknowledged. Third, dynamic methods of analysis have been applied to study entry into the labor market, as opposed to the traditional cross sectional methods.

The first of these changes can be described as an attempt to move from a "variable sociology," mainly interested in establishing the patterns of association between independent and dependent variables, to a "mechanism sociology" that searches for the generative processes of social inequality. In the past, research on the school to work transition mainly focused on the net association of individual education and different measures of quality regarding the first job. In recent years, however, it has been recognized that, in order to address the questions "Who gets which job upon entry to work, and why?" one should account for the broader processes underlying the supply and demand side of the labor market and how they match. An explanation of the school to work transition should ideally consider the number and characteristics of school leavers (supply side), the availability of jobs with given characteristics (demand side), and, finally, the processes through which the school leavers achieve valuable information about job vacancies and the employers select employees from among the potential candidates for a job (matching processes).

This shift toward broader explanations of the process of entry into the labor market has also led to the acknowledgment of the importance of the institutional context in which the school to work transition is embedded. Thus, comparative research has highlighted institutional differences among countries or over time that might affect both the characteristics of the supply and the demand sides and the matching processes in the labor market and, thus, condition patterns of entry into the labor market. With regard to the characteristics of school leavers, a widely applied typology in research on the school to work transition distinguishes

between the level of *standardization* of educational provisions, the *stratification* of educational opportunities that characterizes different educational systems, and the level of *credential inflation*. More precisely, standardization refers to the degree to which the quality of education meets the standard in the country under consideration. What is important in this regard is whether curricula are nationally defined, whether teacher training is uniform, whether there is a national standardized examination system, and whether there is any large variation in funding across schools and universities. On the other hand, the concept of stratification points to the degree of separation of students into differentiated educational tracks and to the selection procedures occurring at early ages. Finally, credential inflation refers to the proportion of each cohort that gets to the highest level of the educational system. This last concept is important because it expresses the idea that the value of a certain educational qualification upon entry to the labor market depends on the number of school leavers with the same level of education. In general, it has been argued that, in countries with highly stratified and standardized educational systems and low educational inflation, educational returns upon entry into the labor market are on average higher than in other countries. This is because high levels of stratification and low credential inflation make it possible for employers to select among fewer applicants with clear cut distinctions in the qualifications. Moreover, higher levels of standardization make the signals provided by education more reliable. The empirical evidence provided by various cross national studies largely supports this type of argument.

With regard to the matching processes between school leavers and job vacancies, the study of the school to work transition has benefited from the insights of *network analysis*. The key research issue in this respect is if and how the process of entry into the labor market is facilitated by the circulation of valuable information on vacancies and job applicants through the network of relatives, friends, or simple acquaintances. Comparative studies have also focused on the nature and strength of the institutional linkages between the educational system and the labor market. In this respect, it has been argued that the school to work transition

is smoother and the relationship between the level and type of education and quality of the first job stronger in those countries where there are direct linkages or co linear linkages between the educational system and the occupational structure. *Direct linkages* exist in the dual system types of vocational training, such as the German and Danish ones, where employers and school jointly collaborate in providing training. An additional and rather exceptional case of strong linkage is the situation where the school acts directly as a job placement office, as in the case of Japan. *Co linear linkages* are found when there is strong congruence between training and certification provided in school and training or legal requirements for specific occupations in the labor market. For instance in the Netherlands, although there is little joint delivery of training by school and employers, there are a large number of occupations which require applicants to have taken training programs in the educational system before entry. Finally, where *no direct linkages* between school and work exist, as in the US, employers are not involved in any way in schooling and there is no formal congruence between training and certification provided by the educational system and training or legal requirements to access given occupations in the labor market.

Less attention has generally been paid to cross national differences on the demand side of the labor market that may potentially have severe consequences for the transition from school to work. Obtaining a good job after leaving school depends crucially on the availability of good jobs. In their most general form, demand side institutional differences that are particularly interesting for the school to work transition refer to cross national variation in the ratio of vacancies of highly skilled/unskilled jobs. All other conditions being equal, more highly educated people will have an advantage in terms of the quality of the job upon entry into the labor market if the demand for skilled jobs is high. Accordingly, the demand for skilled and unskilled labor will depend crucially on the productive system of a country and on the dominant market and organizational strategies of national firms. The political economy literature on the varieties of capitalism and production regimes might offer useful insights on national differences in the demand

for qualified workers for research on the school to work transition.

With regard to the most important methodological changes in this area of study, one might mention that in recent years the outcome of the transition from school to work has been conceived not only in terms of the quality of the first job achieved, but also considering the duration of the first job search. Thus, one aspect studied is how different indicators of educational achievement affect the speediness of the transition to work and how the duration of the job search itself influences the quality of its outcome. In this way, the intrinsic dynamic nature of the process under study has been fully acknowledged.

In sum, the study of the school to work transition has traditionally been a border area between economics and sociology. One might conclude that in the last decades the progressive broadening of the scope of analysis to include supply, demand, and matching processes, the acknowledgment that the process of entry into the labor market is embedded in different institutional contexts that might vary from one country to another, and, finally, the adoption of a longitudinal perspective have made the sociological contribution in this area most fruitful.

SEE ALSO: Economy, Networks and; Educational and Occupational Attainment; Labor Markets; Stratification and Inequality, Theories of

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transnational and global feminisms

Manisha Desai

Transnational feminism refers both to the practices of women's movements around the world and to a theoretical perspective in which women theorize and strategize for women's rights and gender justice across national boundaries, work in collaboration with women from other countries, and frame their activism in terms that are both local and global. Thus, transnational feminism refers to the flow of ideas, issues, strategies, organizations, and activists across national boundaries. As practice it dates back to the mid- and late nineteenth century when women activists from the US and Europe worked in collaboration around the abolitionist and suffrage movements in those countries, when women from colonizing countries such as England worked together with women in India and other colonies to advance women's rights, particularly suffrage and education, as well as when European women in the communist and socialist parties worked to develop women's organizations around the world on issues of women's economic rights (Rupp 1997). This earlier practice of transnational feminism was limited in several ways: the issues addressed were restricted to suffrage, education, and workers' rights; the nation state was still the center of activism; the flow of ideas, strategies, and activists was primarily, though not exclusively, from the North to the South; there were few international organizations, all of which were

hierarchical in nature; and the practice was neither widespread nor the dominant mode of feminism. While this practice continued, primarily in its communist and socialist manifestations, it was not until the 1970s when the United Nations declared 1975 as International Women's Year and 1975–85 as International Women's Decade and organized women's world conferences – in Mexico City in 1975, Copenhagen in 1980, Nairobi in 1985, and Beijing in 1995 – that the practice took off and has now become a dominant strategy of women's movements around the world.

As a theoretical perspective, it emerged in the US academy in the 1990s. It was a response to the critique of second wave, white, middle class feminism by women of color in the US and the "third world" and by poststructuralism and postcolonialism, as well as to women's solidarities across the world, forged as a result of women's participation in the UN's International Women's Decade and its four world conferences and preparatory national and regional meetings. The term "transnational feminism" was seldom used by the women's movements and international non government organizations (INGOs) until after the Beijing conference. Today it is widely used but remains contested by some Latin American feminists who are uncomfortable with the term. To them it is too reminiscent of transnational corporations.

Grewal and Kaplan (1994) and Mohanty (2002) were among the early framers of this academic discourse. Their articulation incorporated critiques of western feminisms and post modernism without jettisoning either. They underscored the need for feminist political practices that addressed the concerns of women around the world in their historic and particular relationships to multiple patriarchies as well as to international economic hegemonies. For a transnational feminist politics, they noted, feminists have to move beyond polarities, without ignoring the histories of unequal power relations that construct them, and build coalitions based on practices that women around the world develop to address the complex realities of their lives. Together, these local feminist practices could lead to transnational solidarities. This formulation of an intersectional analysis and transversal politics came to be defined as transnational feminism in the 1990s.

Such a transnational analytic focus developed not only in feminism but also in other areas of sociology, specifically social movements, gender, race, and sexuality studies, immigration, families, and organizations among others. This focus on the transnational was fueled by the pace of contemporary globalizations and information technology which enabled easy, quick, and reliable communication across national boundaries. Thus, the transnational analytic aim is to understand how the local – in terms of issues, identities, strategies, methods, targets of protest, and worldviews – becomes global and how global is evident in the local. Analysts assume that identities, networks, and communities are as likely to be global as local and that global dynamics and audiences constrain and facilitate local realities.

Transnational feminism became a privileged discourse in the 1990s in the academy at the same time that women's activists began to privilege transnational activism over local activism. In part, this reflects the common realities, of globalization and structural adjustment policies, that began to influence women's lives all around the world as well as the opportunities made possible by the communication technologies and the UN world conferences that enabled women to meet across national borders. Transnational feminist solidarities were being forged among women across national boundaries around several important sites: the UN conferences, specific local struggles, academic and policy research, and the global justice movements. Most analysts agree that the dominant protest repertoire of transnational activism includes education and mobilization, symbolic framing, and strategic use of information. Advocacy, lobbying, support, and direct action are secondary. Furthermore, the major targets of most transnational movements have been policy mechanisms of local, national, regional, and multilateral international institutions. Finally, while a lot of transnational activism is cyber based, it also involves travel to sites of protests and gatherings. Such a modality privileges educated, middle class activists over other movement activists and participants.

The four world conferences and accompanying NGO Forums were contentious events with women, not all of whom identified as feminists, from the South challenging Northern women's

conceptions of women's issues based solely on gender and sexuality and insisting on bringing in issues of development, nationalism, and neo colonialism. These differences among women began to be acknowledged and "solidarities of difference" were forged as they continued to meet over the decade and shared experiences of inequalities and struggles for justice. It was the 1985 conference in Nairobi that marked a shift from contention to solidarity and by the fourth conference in Beijing, women despite their differences had found a common language in the human rights framework. "Women's rights are human rights" emerged at the World Conference on Human Rights in Vienna in 1993 but became paradigmatic in Beijing. Thus, the UN conferences and then its specialized agency meetings, such as the Convention on Elimination of all Forms of Discrimination Against Women and the Committee on the Status of Women, became the prime sites of this new phase of transnational activism. Most women who attended the NGO Forums accompanying the UN conferences, which are for government delegations though increasingly many governments include activists and NGO members among their official delegates, were middle class educated women from INGOS, donors, academics, and activists. Grassroots women are present as well but most participate in their own Forum outside the main workshops in tents, sharing, performing, and selling handicrafts. Only women from the major INGOs and donors are involved in interacting with the official conferences. Thus, when feminists come together across borders around spaces like the UN conferences, they tend to reproduce inequalities among women and privilege women from the North and elite women from the South.

But transnational feminist politics is not limited to activism around the UN. As the burgeoning literature on transnational social movements shows, activists are coming together across national borders at various local levels for specific struggles such as coalitions against sweatshop labor, fair trade cooperatives, slum and shack dwellers' coalitions, anti privatization of water, and various other social justice movements. When grassroots activists and networks that involve community based organizations come together across borders for specific struggles,

while the tensions and contradictions persist, local women are able to negotiate and influence politics based on their knowledge and resources. Networks such as Women in Informal Economy Globalizing and Organizing (WIEGO) and Slum/Shack Dwellers International (SID) are composed of people affected directly in their homes and communities by the process of globalization, in partnership with NGOs and academic institutions (WIEGO is based at Harvard University) to gather data and to propose people centered solutions at international, institutional levels and to engage in local organizing. Such networks have been successful in changing perceptions about the poor and marginalized people and their right to participate in decisions that affect their lives as well as their abilities to generate solutions to their situations. Because such networks represent people and are accountable to them, they are more legitimate than other elite and middle class networks and NGOs that have no connections to the constituency on whose behalf they make claims.

Educated, middle class, and elite transnational feminist networks – DAWN, WIDE, WEDO, AWMR – however, have also played an important role in research, policy, and advocacy for women's rights (Moghadam 2005). They are an innovative feminist response, participatory and non hierarchical, and the most effective form of organizing in an era of globalization. They have been effective in generating new knowledge, influencing policies, and advocating on behalf of women's rights in many international institutions such as the UN, World Bank, and the IMF.

Both grassroots and middle class transnational feminist networks have also come together in the context of the global justice movement. The protests against corporate globalizations that began in Seattle in 1998 and continued through the end of the decade created new networks and led to the consolidation of the global justice movement. It was in the name of the global justice movement and as an alternative to the World Economic Forum in Davos, where leaders of corporate globalization meet, that the first World Social Forum (WSF) was called in January 2001 in Brazil (www.worldsocialforum.org). The WSF was organized as a democratic space for people from around the world to share their struggles and

reflect on alternatives. The language of the WSF stresses process and autonomy from state and parties. Feminists were active in the WSF from its inception and gender equality was stressed as one of the important aspects of global justice. Yet the first two WSF did not have as many sessions on gender, nor were women in prominent positions in the International Organizing Committee. To address this, feminists from Latin America, Asia, and Africa formed "Feminist Dialogues" in 2004 to engender the WSF and make it feminist in its focus, method, and participants.

Transnational feminism, both as practice and a theoretical framework, has several implications. As practice, the domination of transnational feminism has led to reproducing inequalities among activists, from the North versus South and also among activists from the South. Organizationally, it has privileged networks over other organizational structures, which has contradictory effects. On one hand, it enables communication and solidarity in a participatory manner across many boundaries. On the other hand, there is very little accountability and responsibility. Transnational feminism has also diverted resources from local to transnational level, and most importantly, because a lot of transnational activism has been around research, policy, and advocacy, the changes have been more discursive than redistributive. Transnational feminist movements have primarily succeeded at the level of discursive power. They have operated on the notion of discursive representation rather than political representation. Discursive representation has sought to be inclusive, open, and self reflexive. Such an emphasis is in part a reflection of feminists' ability to harness communicative rather than conventional power. Discourses have an empowering function and are an important site of resistance. But feminist discourses have not become hegemonic, they remain an alternative. And when discourses such as gender mainstreaming and women's human rights are taken up by states and international agencies, they tend to become depoliticized and have little impact on actual policy changes.

Theoretically, transnational feminism, and transnationalism in general, have raised issues of methodology. For example, what constitutes a social movement? Some analysts prefer to use

networks as the unit of analysis as it has become *the* organizational expression of transnational social movements, while others focus on methods used, i.e., social movements use contentious methods while NGOs and networks tend to use routine means of social change. Yet others use the concept of transnational activism instead of social movements. They define activism as political activities based on a conflict of interest that challenge or support power structures, that are carried out by non state actors, and that take place outside formal politics (Piper & Uhlin 2004). Such a move blurs distinctions between NGOs and social movements and indicates the difficulties of using categories like social movements that derive from state centered sociology for transnational politics.

These definitional issues have been central in the current analyses of women's movements as scholars have moved away from "global" or "international" feminist movements to transnational feminist practices and solidarities, debated the use of feminist versus women's movements, and lamented the NGOization of women's movements. These conceptual issues are important because they both construct movements even as they describe them and show a discomfort with the shift in political terrain that has not led to greater equality for women.

Despite these methodological issues, transnational feminism is here to stay both as a theoretical perspective and as practice. To be more effective as practice, transnational feminism will have to devise strategies with other mass movements – such as unions in the informal sector as well as export processing zones that can hold corporations accountable, enforce land redistribution policies, challenge agribusiness to sustainable land use, and promote fair trade economic alternatives and political quotas for women – that can redistribute resources and emancipate women.

SEE ALSO: Colonialism (Neocolonialism); Feminism; Feminism, First, Second, and Third Waves; Feminist Activism in Latin America; Gender Ideology and Gender Role Ideology; Gender Mainstreaming; Gender, Social Movements and; Global Justice as a Social Movement; Mobilization; Social Movements; Third World and Postcolonial Feminisms/Subaltern; Transnational Movements; Women's Movements

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transnational movements

Jackie Smith

Social movements emerged in tandem with modern nation states, as groups of people organized to resist new claims being made by national authorities (such as taxes or military conscription) or to advance their own claims that states provide a variety of public goods and services (such as education, health care, and various forms of financial assistance). Ongoing competition between authorities and

citizen challengers generated new structures – including parliaments, bills of rights, and bureaucratic checks and balances – to routinize public participation in national politics and to otherwise enhance the accountability of political leaders to citizenry (see, e.g., Tilly 1984; Markoff 1996). Today, as states increasingly turn to international political arenas to manage their economies and ecologies as well as other aspects of social life, we find that social movements are becoming increasingly transnational in their structure and focus.

Movements are assisted in their transnational organizing efforts by the same rapidly advancing technologies that have assisted in the expansion of a global economy. Relatively cheap airline tickets, more widely available telephone and Internet access, expanding use of English as a global working language, and a globalized mass media help enable people from more diverse classes and geographical origins to share information and cultivate cooperative relationships across huge distances. While transnational social movements were active in the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries promoting international peace, an end to slavery, and women's suffrage, activists in these movements were by and large from privileged backgrounds. Today's transnational activism, which has expanded rapidly since the 1970s and 1980s, involves those of far more modest means. That said, it is still true that many transnational (and other) movements are disproportionately middle class, since people with more and better education as well as time, skills, and resources are the most able to be involved in social movements. But social movement politics by its nature attempts to lower barriers and costs to popular political participation, and many activists seek to confront the inequities they find in their own structures and operations.

Transnational social movements are best seen as networks of actors that are organized at local, national, and international levels. Many include formal organizations that have constitutions, staff members, bank accounts, and boards of directors. Others are neighborhood or friendship groups who meet informally and irregularly and who support each other's work to promote social change. Individuals are also key players in all social movements, and in transnational movements we often find members of

government delegations to the United Nations playing key roles in social movements. For instance, governments like that of Mexico have long been supportive of international disarmament efforts, and that government's delegates have helped peace movement activists get access to information and increase their influence on official disarmament negotiations.

United Nations officials, such as those in the United Nations Human Rights Commission, are also frequently involved in supporting the work of the transnational human rights movement. Journalists and academics are also part of many movements, helping to popularize debates or to advance new analyses that can assist social movements. Webs of interpersonal and interorganizational connections help expand the flow of information to different actors within movements. Transnational events like United Nations conferences or transnational meetings of civil society groups have helped increase the strength and density of these network ties, and the increased frequency of these events in recent decades helps account for the rise of transnational movements.

Transnational movements have adopted a number of strategies to promote global change. They can work to advance new international agreements, such as the Convention to Ban Landmines or the International Criminal Court, or to block agreements such as those in the World Trade Organization. They can work to press individual governments to abide by international norms or to ratify treaties. And they can appeal to global institutions or norms in order to strengthen their leverage in national conflicts (see Smith et al. 1997). Margaret Keck and Kathryn Sikkink (1998) refer to the latter of these strategies as the "boomerang effect." They argue that when national political systems are repressive or restrictive, appeals to international norms or alliances can bring international pressure to bear on states, thereby altering the balance of power in national political contests. So when Argentine human rights activists mobilized their transnational networks, they introduced an additional cost (US military aid) to the government if it persisted in flouting international law. In short, transnational movements can and do affect both national and international political processes. Moreover, by shaping international treaties and by working

with international institutions, they help define the institutional arrangements of our global political system.

The major distinction of transnational movements is that they mobilize people across national boundaries around a shared aim. They help people define their interests and identities in ways that go beyond the traditional nation state borders. By facilitating routine communication between people from vastly different regions and cultures, they help enhance understanding and mutual trust while making international friendships more feasible and likely. A member of Amnesty International, for instance, will share more common interests and perspectives with AI members outside her own country than she will with many of her compatriots. Organizations generate their own internal cultures and identities. And because they generally oppose predominant cultural systems, social movement organizations have a particular need for creating supportive identities that can bind members together and support collective action even in the face of repression (see, e.g., Rupp 1997).

As they attempt to define new activist identities, transnational movements must overcome the considerable influence of the national state in defining people's primary allegiances and motivations. However, just as the processes of global economic integration help generate the technologies and other infrastructures that support transnational organizing, here too global processes help break down the monopolies states have on their citizens' loyalties. The globalization of the economy has meant that people's educational backgrounds are more similar, as are their professional lives and working conditions. Moreover, there are increasingly obvious connections between global forces, such as transnational corporations or international trade laws, and one's daily experiences and interests, and these provide important foundations for the creation of shared understandings and meanings outside the framework of traditional state boundaries. Indeed, overcoming differences in national perspectives may be far easier than overcoming other differences within movements (Moody 1997). In other words, we can see important foundations for the globalization of civil society to parallel the globalization of economic and political institutions.

Like all movements, transnational social movements seek to enhance their political influence by cultivating alliances with other groups. A longstanding divide exists between social movements organized around issues such as the environment or civil rights and those organized to promote the interests of labor (Waterman 2005). In many contexts, corporate interests seek to undermine alliance building by framing environmental struggles as contests between jobs or development and environmental conservation. Divisions between richer and poorer activists persist in many movements, as economic class shapes the day to day experiences and perspectives of people in important ways. Sometimes, however, transnational movements can help overcome class or caste divisions by providing a broader perspective on the divisions that might exist within a single country. Activists in transnational environmental groups, for instance, are motivated out of a concern for a particular policy, and they will work with any groups they think can help secure their aims. In contrast, within countries we often find that urban-rural divisions or even anti indigenous prejudices can impede alliance formation within nations. Thus, when the World Social Forum – an annual gathering of social movement and other actors seeking to democratize the global system – was held in Mumbai, Indian activists were forced to confront more directly the claims raised by low caste Dalit which drew wide and sympathetic attention from international delegates to the Forum.

While social movements address any number of different issues, many work more or less self consciously to affect the formal means by which citizens can both participate in policy debates and hold their elected leaders accountable for policy decisions. So movements for racial equality have generated laws to protect minority voting rights, and demonstrators protesting against military arms races have helped to advance new legal protections for all forms of public speech. In short, in the course of mobilizing around particular issues, movements help shape the laws and institutions of our democracies. This is exactly what has taken place in the international political arena. As groups mobilized to advocate human rights or to limit the use of military force, they have found themselves involved in the process of helping define the

role of citizens in institutions that were established by states.

Global political institutions such as the European Union and United Nations were formally organized by governments with little desire to see much in the way of citizen participation. International diplomacy was seen as “high politics” that needed to be removed from the pressures of what were seen as poorly informed and passionate citizenries. But because a government’s participation in any international organization generally required that their national legislature approve of the arrangement, governments were forced to yield some space for citizens’ involvement in these bodies. And since the establishment of both these institutions, we have seen efforts by movements to further expand citizen participation in global politics.

Nevertheless, a substantial “democratic deficit” remains, and many national delegates to international institutions are unelected and largely unaccountable to citizens. There are no political parties organizing constituencies beyond the national level. Many international negotiations remain secretive, and even national legislators are denied access to official meetings and documents. Because global institutions have an increasing impact on the policy decisions that affect us, this global democratic deficit has undermined the quality of democracy within nations as well. Some analysts speak of a “hollowing out” of national democracy in recent years as states delegate more of their authority to supranational institutions, privatize more of their services to the corporate sector, and delegate more distributional decisions to local authorities (see Markoff 2004). Thus, after years of growing transnational activism aimed at promoting international agreements for human rights, more equitable development, and environmental protections, more transnational movement groups are demanding global democracy as the twenty first century unfolds.

Another key emphasis of contemporary transnational movements is a call for a more balanced approach to global integration than policy makers have pursued thus far. Since the late 1970s, key players in global politics have emphasized the development of global markets, and they encouraged all countries to reduce tariffs and other measures that limit the flow

of goods and services across national borders. Increased global trade was thought to bring economic growth that would benefit all. Unfortunately, for many reasons this simple economic logic has not proved true, and along with unprecedented increases in global trade we find unprecedented concentrations of wealth amid persistent poverty and environmental degradation.

Beginning in the 1990s, many groups began working transnationally to challenge this predominant neoliberal model of economic globalization. They argued that many decisions should not be left to the “free” market, because markets only respond to those with wealth. And many social goods – such as a clean environment or public health – are not readily reduced to simple cost benefit calculations. These decisions, activists argue, require informed public debate and consultation. By the last meeting of the World Trade Organization in Seattle in 1999, transnational movements came together with national and local organizers to demand more accountable and less market oriented international policies. Activists were demanding a greater say in decisions about how our national and local economies (and polities) are organized, as they were finding that global institutions were squeezing out possibilities for citizen input into decisions about what kinds of industries operate in local communities, what protections states can (and more often cannot) enact to preserve their natural environments, and how educational, health, and other services are managed. So we see a sort of “clash of globalizations” pitting a global system driven by markets against a system of global governance where politics determines how public goods are managed and how conflicting interests are reconciled.

In sum, attention to transnational social movements helps us understand the political processes behind globalization. Because movements are working to connect localized citizens with global political processes, they provide the connective tissue that helps integrate our global polity. They are also part of complex processes of contestation that help define the structure of global institutions and the character of local, national, and global polities. By helping shape institutions, policies, and systems of meaning, they are important actors in the global system. By insisting that the global system be made more

open and accountable, transnational movements are essential for the preservation of democracy.

Studying transnational movements is difficult. One needs to have expertise in the politics and cultures of different countries, as well as an understanding of the global political system – which constitutes a unique “area study” of its own. Because of these complexities, most studies to date are case studies of how transnational activism affects a particular national context or of particular transnational campaigns or events. The *Global Civil Society Yearbook*, published annually since 2001, has sought to trace the evolution of globally organized social change efforts, and it provides useful information about trends in global organization and activism. Electronic newspaper records have allowed for large scale, comparative analyses of media coverage of movements. Key questions that emerge from analyses of transnational movements are: How have globalizing trends affected the ways people engage in politics? How do transnational forms of activism compare with national ones? How does participation in transnational activism vary across different countries? And, perhaps most importantly, what impacts do transnational movements have on global political and cultural change?

SEE ALSO: Collective Action; Collective Identity; Democracy; Ecology and Economy; Environmental Movements; Global Economy; Global Justice as a Social Movement; Global Politics; Identity Politics/Relational Politics; Labor Movement; Social Movement Organizations; Social Movements; Social Movements, Networks and; Transnational and Global Feminisms; Transnationalism; Transnationals

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transnationalism

Larissa Remennick

The concept of transnationalism, described as an integral part of the globalization process, is becoming increasingly popular in social and political sciences (Glick Schiller et al. 1995; Guarnizo & Smith 1998; Portes et al. 1999). Originally coined in international economics to describe flows of capital and labor across national borders in the second half of the twentieth century, this concept was later applied to the study of international migration and ethnic diasporas. The transnational perspective became increasingly useful for exploring such issues as immigrant economic integration, identity, citizenship, and cultural retention. Transnationalism embraces a variety of multifaceted social relations that are both embedded in and transcend two or more nation states, cross cutting sociopolitical, territorial, and cultural borders. The ever increasing flows of people, goods, ideas, and images between various parts of the world enhance the blending of cultures and lifestyles and leads to the formation of “hyphenated” social and personal identities (Chinese American, Greek Australian, etc.).

Some authors argue that transnationalism may actually be a new name for an old phenomenon, in the sense that most big immigration

waves of the past were typified by ethnocultural retention and contacts with the homeland (Van Hear 1998; Guarnizo and Smith 1998). Indeed, historic studies of ethnic diasporas show that immigrants never fully severed their links with the country they left behind. Yet, due to technical and financial limitations of the time, for most migrants these links remained mainly in the sentimental and cultural realm, and were seldom expressed in active shuttle movement or communication across borders. Economic ties with countries of origin were typically limited to monetary remittances to family members. Although up to one quarter of transatlantic migrants of the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries eventually returned to their homelands, the decision to repatriate was in fact another critical and irreversible choice to be made. Hence, for the majority of historic migrants, resettlement was an irreversible process always involving a dichotomy: stay or emigrate, or else stay or return (Jacobson 1995; Van Hear 1998).

In the late twentieth century efficient and relatively cheap means of communication and transportation (time and space compressing technologies) made this old dichotomy largely irrelevant. As Castells (1996) pointed out, new technologies have virtually created new patterns of social relations, or at least strongly reinforced preexisting tendencies. They allowed numerous diasporic immigrants to live in two or more countries at a time, by maintaining close physical and social links with their places of origin. Transnational activities and lifestyles became widely spread, embracing large numbers of people and playing a significant role in the economy, politics, and social life of both sending and receiving countries. Guarnizo and Smith (1998) introduced a useful distinction between the two types of transnationalism: "from above" and "from below." The former refers to institutionalized economic and political activities of multinational corporations and organizations such as the UN, Amnesty International, or Greenpeace, which set in motion a large scale global exchange of financial and human capital. On the other hand, the increasing role in these networks belongs to ordinary migrants – grassroots agents of transnationalism who run small businesses in their home countries, organize exchange of material (e.g., ethnic food) and

cultural goods (e.g., tours of folk artists) within the diaspora, pay regular visits to their birth place, and receive co ethnic guests. This is called a *transnational lifestyle*.

The migration experience in the context of a global society, where the constant exchange of people, products, and ideas is reinforced by global media networks, has attained a whole new quality. The full time loyalty to one country and one culture is no longer self evident: people may actually divide their physical presence, effort, and identity between several societies. Citizenship and political participation are also becoming bifocal or even multifocal, since some sending countries allow their expatriates to remain citizens, vote in national elections, and establish political movements. In this context, international migrants are becoming *transmigrants*, developing economic activities, enjoying cultural life, and keeping dense informal networks not only with their home country, but also with other national branches of their diaspora. The split of economic, social, and political loyalties among migrants, and gradual attenuation of loyalty to the nation state as such, is seen as problematic by some receiving countries (Glick Schiller et al. 1995; Guarnizo & Smith 1998). Yet some recent studies show that dual citizenship may in fact promote immigrants' legal and sociopolitical attachments to both their home and host countries, rather than reinforce so called postnationalism (Bloemraad 2004).

Most transnational networks in business, politics, communications, and culture organize along ethnic lines (i.e., include members of the same ethnic community spread between different locales on the map). Common language and cultural heritage are the key cementing factors for the *transnational diasporas* (Jacobson 1995; Van Hear 1998). In most cases, transnationals become bilingual and bicultural, but different communities may exhibit various degrees of cultural separatism versus acculturation in the host society. Over time, many immigrant groups develop cultural hybridism – the mix of the elements of their ethnic language and lifestyles with those adopted from the host culture. The most common expression of this trend is the formation of hybrid immigrant languages – Mexican English, Algerian French, Turkish German, etc. (Glick Schiller et al. 1995;

Guarnizo & Smith 1998; Van Hear 1998). In psychosocial terms, immigrant/transnational identity and personality become increasingly “elastic,” if not “fluid,” being constantly shaped and reshaped by multiple influences of the different societies migrants actually live in. Transnationals of today experience increasing difficulty in answering the questions, “Who are you? Where do you belong?” In that sense, transmigrant identity emerges as the epitome of postmodern identity (Giddens 1991; Guarnizo & Smith 1998). However exciting, a transnational lifestyle has its underside. While for many immigrants it may be a blessing, enabling them to enjoy the best of two (or more) worlds, for some others it virtually means living in limbo, or in a state of permanent uprooting.

SEE ALSO: Bilingualism; Diaspora; Immigration; Migration; International; Nation State; Transnationals

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transnationals

Ray Loveridge

The term transnational corporation (TNC) is often used interchangeably with that of multinational corporation (MNC) or multinational enterprise (MNE) to mean a firm that owns or controls income generating assets in more than one country. In the more exacting definition of Bartlett and Ghoshal (1989) the multinational organizational mode is described as one subset of the TNC (see below). Other transnational organizations include intergovernmental bodies such as the United Nations Organization (UNO) and International Monetary Fund (IMF), regulatory or standard setting agencies such as the Basle Group of Bankers, and a rapidly expanding group of “voluntary” associations known as non government organizations (NGOs). The focus here, however, will be on TNCs rather than these latter forms of cross national governance. In popular usage, the TNC is usually seen as being extremely large in terms of its level of employment, financial turnover, and ownership of assets. Indeed, it is usual to compare the turnover and assets of the top TNCs such as General Electric or Wal Mart with the gross domestic product of nation states. While not wishing to deny the vividness of this crude comparison, we should be aware of its analytical limitations in assessing both the relative resources of these institutions and the nature of their authority. Also, there is an increasing number of small firms that seek an international presence in order to provide their services across borders. In large part this has to do with the increasing appeal of so called “world standards” and global presence in purchasing a service or material product. Thus, the United Nations’ (UNCTAD 2000) estimate of 45,000 parent TNCs existent in the mid 1990s is likely to have increased significantly over the ensuing decade and now includes many

little known startup firms that have local joint ventures or affiliates in several countries.

Trading organizations spanning territorial frontiers predate the modern nation state. Privately owned European corporations such as the East India Company and Hudson Bay Company played a major part in the establishment of overseas colonies of their parent nation from the seventeenth to nineteenth centuries (Hertner & Jones 1986). But the contemporary significance of TNCs can be traced to their varying contributions to the integration of global markets and, more controversially, to the possible convergent effects of “globalization” over the latter half of the twentieth century.

FOREIGN DIRECT INVESTMENT

In the mid 1980s the overall level of foreign direct investment (FDI) taking place between countries overtook that of exports and imports (Hirst & Thompson 1999). There was a major shift from the previously dominant pattern of entrepot trade in which western countries imported raw materials in order to manufacture finished goods for home consumption or for export. As Hirst and Thompson point out, FDI had actually reached a comparatively high level before World War I. However, the nature of foreign investment in the latter part of the twentieth century was fundamentally different from that of the earlier period. Earlier, FDI was largely composed of portfolio investment by European financiers in the material infrastructure of other countries. Today, it is most often carried out within the structure of a single TNC or its affiliates or associated partners in a cross national supply chain. Dicken (2003: 200–1) sees this temporal change as marking movement between an earlier mode of capitalist investment described by Marx as the circuit of commodity capital to one of finance capital and, most recently, to a global circuit of productive capital.

TNCs AND NATION STATES

Perhaps of equal analytical significance is the manner in which cross national transactions now often take place within an “internal market”

of bureaucratically structured relations between actors at different stages of the value adding chain. That is to say that the largest TNCs either exercise direct hierarchical control over operations performed in house or have a nodal position on global supply networks that enables them to shape outcomes according to managerial priorities rather than to short term movements in external prices (Dicken 2003: 17).

This shift in the nature of cross national transactions can be seen as changing the basis upon which national governments manage their economic balance of trade quite significantly. For example, the internal (transfer) value placed on a part manufactured component or product can be shaped by the desire of TNCs to minimize the amount of tax or tariff paid either to the country in which the exported component was produced or to the recipient importing country where it is to be finally assembled. The true cost of its original production may not be reflected in its “sale” price, and therefore in the national accounts of the supplying country.

In other respects also national governments often negotiate with TNCs from a position of greater or lesser dependency in a manner that has a direct effect on their domestic agenda. Where, as in, say, Nigeria, some 80 percent of capital investment and recorded national income derive from FDI, the local presence of TNCs is critical. Even in older economies such as that of the UK, up to 40 percent of local capital investment can derive from overseas. Indeed, some authors on business strategy see TNCs as becoming one of the most significant agencies of global governance (Ohmae 1995). Nation states are often seen to be competing with one another to obtain FDI in a “locational tournament.” For example, governments can offer advantageous low tax and/or low tariff regimes. Sometimes particular regions are designated as “export processing zones” (EPZ) with zero tariffs on materials imported simply for local processing and immediate reexport. In general, EPZs are designed to provide employment for low skilled labor. The attraction for the TNC is that of easy access to a cheap, stable, disciplined labor force (Froebel et al. 1980). In other cases the existence of a large potential consumer market that is best serviced “close to market,” such as exists in North America, Europe, and East Asia

(particularly China and India), attracts investment in the design and assembly of products to suit local tastes (Dicken 2003). For retail chains such as Wal Mart, Carrefour, and Tesco, as for professional service firms like financial accountants, a local presence is a prerequisite for delivery of their particular direct service.

The country's ability to attract so called "centers of excellence" (Cantwell & Santangelo 2000) or knowledge intensive plants such as R&D laboratories, which service the needs of the TNC throughout the world, is the ultimate prize. It has been described by one influential political theorist (Reich 1990) as the future "work of nations." By contrast, where the host country provides only extractive commodities such as mineral oil, metals, or precious stones, the processing of these materials can often be performed elsewhere unless the host state acts to prevent this and/or to reallocate investment income to the development of alternative sectors.

Some state governments consciously pursue a strategy of sponsoring "national champions" or locally based TNCs which occupy a significant place in global markets. The French government has, traditionally, been most overt in its pursuance of what is sometimes described as a "mercantilist" position. In practice, most governments tend to protect their "national interest" in important markets. In developing countries it has become part of conventional wisdom to attempt to create a hub of locally owned large business conglomerates from which to negotiate entry to world markets through joint ventures and learning alliances with more specialized TNCs from the developed world: Japan and South Korea are their models (Amsden 1989). Such government sponsored conglomerates are often seen as serving the dual function of "creating a local middle class" (Evans 1979).

TNC STRUCTURES AND STRATEGIES

From the viewpoint of the TNC acting as a "rational actor," a number of economic models have been put forward to explain its choice of strategy. These are put most succinctly in Dunning's (1980) "eclectic paradigm." The firm must first possess "ownership specific" advantages, particularly by comparison with local

producers. These may range from greater technological or managerial expertise to its more exotic reputation. Second, the firm must see advantage in keeping its capabilities within its own organization rather than licensing them or subcontracting them to a local supplier. This condition will evidently affect its willingness to share its knowledge with others, or even to allow local employees to appropriate this knowledge. Third, there must be location specific advantages of the kind described above to make the greater risk of overseas investment worthwhile. These can be expressed in terms of a variety of numerical indices such as geographical differences in labor productivity, wage costs, consumer tastes, sovereign (government) risk, and so on. Other models deployed by economists are modeled on sequential "learning" by the company through exporting or through the overseas assembly of product models that are considered outdated on the home market (see Vernon 1966 on the product cycle model). As markets have become increasingly open to global competition, such sequential models of overseas learning have become less applicable. For example, the Volkswagen Santana, produced in China since it was phased out in Germany in the 1970s, has recently been replaced by a range specifically designed for production in China. Perhaps more importantly, specialized producers of services for global supply chains, as well as so called dot.com website suppliers such as Amazon, target a cross national market from the outset, that is, they are global by design.

The analysis of the internal organizational structure of control within the TNC can, therefore, be seen as having an important significance for wider society in both its host and parent countries. Bartlett and Ghoshal (1989) summed prevailing wisdom on organizational form in a four part categorization of TNC control structure.

- The *global* company based on cost advantages through centralized control of a standardized product and production processes conducted in plants around the world. Examples include early US assembly plants such as automobiles and kitchen equipment. Nowadays, this mode is likely to be found among specialized component suppliers such as microchip producers.

- The *international* company that exploits the knowledge and design capabilities of head office through diffusion and local adaptation in local plants operating under close surveillance. Examples include most final assembly (original equipment) suppliers, but this also can include quasi professional services offering formulaic solutions such as management consultancy.
- The *multinational* company that seeks to meet the particular needs of local or regional markets and offers a wide mandate to local managers. Examples include retail chains, locally regulated professionals, or any close to market production.
- The *transnational* company in which head office is guided by the knowledge of local needs transmitted upwards by relatively autonomous local managers. It seeks to synthesize these experiences in a manner that allows lessons to be learned across diverse locations. Examples tend to be taken from among currently successful firms such as Unilever, GEC, and ABB, but in general Japanese firms are seen by most prescriptive writers as best in this process of “bottom up” learning.

A fifth mode, put forward by Hedlund (1986), is that of *heterarchy*. In this structural form, horizontal communication between overseas affiliates becomes a primary method of information passing, which may not involve going through head office. It is most likely that this will occur only where the passing of operational information can enhance immediate efficacy or avoid a crisis. But the widespread use of unmonitored email and chat rooms might well facilitate the emergence of such “communities of practice” in sectors such as oil drilling, logging, construction – or financial trading. In an exploratory study which combined case histories with a sample survey, Nohria and Ghoshal (1997) suggested that the most innovative TNCs were those that adopted a *differentiated network* approach in which affiliates were treated differently according to the “complexity” of their local context and the level of local “resources.”

As is suggested in the examples above, some analytic importance can be attached to the sector in which the TNC operates. But, equally,

this fivefold structural taxonomy has been treated by some writers as shaped by a temporally staged evolution from the export driven centralized organization to the dispersed and devolved structures of locally autonomous producers or servicers. On the other hand, the sheer size and internal complexity of its operations may be seen to trigger a devolution of authority. Other contingent factors can include those named by Nohria and Ghoshal (1997) as the contextual complexity and available capabilities to be found in the host country. Under the heading of “complexity” these authors subsume a widespread condition imposed by host governments that local affiliates must be partially owned and/or directed by local citizens. While intended to maintain some direct local control over the management of affiliate organization, these appointments can sometimes contribute to widespread accusations of corruption made against TNCs (Kaufmann 1999).

A different explanation is offered by cultural and institutional theorists adopting a more cognitive approach to strategic formulation. Perlmutter (1969) suggested that the values and interests of corporate elites encouraged one of four predispositions amongst TNC expatriate managers. These were ethnocentrism, polycentrism, regiocentrism, and geocentrism. Again, there is the suggestion that managers move along a learning curve from a home country dominance in thinking to a recognition of diversity in their local operations, moving toward greater rationalization across regions and, finally, to an integrated view of global strategy matching local capabilities. By contrast, comparative institutionalists such as Whitley (2003) tend to subscribe to the view that formal control structures within the TNC, including those determining job and career structures, are shaped more permanently by the back home institutions of the parent firm. In what has been the most cited study of managerial values carried out within a single TNC (IBM) in the 1970s, Hofstede (1980) discovered that what he described as “core work values” varied significantly across the 40 countries in which the study was conducted. Empirical evidence produced from a wide sample of TNCs by Harzing and Sorge (2003) suggested that whilst internal control structures appeared to be shaped by those of the parent country, strategic views on the external environment

held by TNC executives tend to converge on a pattern shaped by size of company and its sector or industry. Perhaps, then, it is not surprising that the more recent ethnographic work of D'Iribarne (1996) suggests the translation of centrally designed formal control structures can vary in different nationally and locally specific contexts, as can the enactment of "core work values."

HUMAN RESOURCE MANAGEMENT AND CIVIL RIGHTS

The study of human resource management (HRM) or employment practices within TNCs tends to dichotomize between a focus on expatriate management development and another on the workplace conditions of locally recruited operatives. Within these themes there are varying foci. The corporate career and personal needs of expatriate managers provides one set of prescriptive literatures, together with the desirability of a sensitivity toward local cultures (Dowling et al. 1994). Relationships with indigenous managers, particularly in the transfer of technical knowledge, are another more conflictual focus (Bhagat et al. 2002). What seems evident is that TNCs are generally likely to retain expatriates in a number of key functions, such as local financial executive or product development, whilst employing indigenous staff in other functions. Often this appears to be motivated by a desire to reduce salary costs and to satisfy the conditions imposed by the host government. However, over the close of the twentieth century it became evident that an emergent class of highly mobile executives was being appointed to senior positions within TNCs irrespective of nationality. Thus, a Brazilian was appointed to head the Japanese car manufacturer Nissan by its French shareholder, Renault. A US chief executive was externally recruited to the old German family owned firm of auto and electronic component suppliers, Robert Bosch, and so on.

Knowledge transfer also provides an important theme in the discussion of workplace practices. In the 1980s, research interest focused on the so called Japanization of work organization, in particular upon the adoption of teamworking

and the self regulation of quality standards within work groups in TNCs' affiliates across different national locations (Boyer et al. 1999). In the following decade, the emphasis tended to shift to the wider effects of rationalization undertaken within global supply chains, in particular to the effects of outsourcing low skilled work to low wage countries. In the early years of the present century, this movement spread to many routine office and sales functions of large western firms. This movement might be seen as confirming Reich's (1990) earlier notion of an emergent division of labor across relatively stable national systems in which "mature" economies rely on their capacity to produce knowledge workers ("symbolic analysts"). The response of labor unions in the West has been largely focused on obtaining better working conditions for TNC employees in developing countries with a view to equalizing employment opportunities for their local members in the parent company. However, the effect of cross national competition for low skilled jobs will inevitably bring about domestic tensions that may challenge the notion of a stable cross country division of labor (Storper 1997).

The role of the TNC in eroding boundaries to national markets has evidently been increasingly significant over the latter half of the twentieth century. In general, the literature is dichotomized into the managerially oriented study of organizational structures and strategies and that which describes and critiques the negative effects of the TNC as manifested in "globalization." There is a case for greater ethnographic study of the effect of TNCs on local communities in a manner that might provide a better qualitative understanding of both viewpoints. Most studies are conducted through questionnaires remotely designed and administered by western scholars to a sample of interested executives. Finally, it seems important to recognize that TNC strategies are bureaucratically conceived and can, given sufficient political will and understanding of their effects, be bureaucratically constrained.

SEE ALSO: Capitalism, Social Institutions of; Culture, Organizations and; Organization Theory; Organizations and the Theory of the Firm; Outsourcing; Supply Chains; Transnationalism

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transparency and global change

Burkart Holzner

The word "transparent" traditionally means the capacity of light to pass through clear glass so that one can see the things behind it. Transparency also means open, frank, candid, and true, as opposed to opaque or secret. Today, the concept "transparency" in sociology refers to the globally emerging value (and its derivative norms) of information disclosure and access. It asserts that all centers of authority have a "duty to disclose information" and that publics and citizens have a "right to know." The value of transparency does not stand alone; it is part of information value systems that include also its counter values. Thus, the rules for openness are often circumscribed by norms limiting disclosure, such as secrecy, privacy, confidentiality, and others. There are obviously

many different kinds of information linked to these norms, such as personal data, public information, proprietary, and others. However, transparency norms are increasingly expected to be followed by governments, international agencies, professions, corporations, foundations, and civil society organizations.

Transparency as a value is historically recent. It had its origin early in the eighteenth century in Sweden's law of information freedom and later in the US Constitution. However, only in the last decades of the twentieth century were the corresponding norms adopted by states on a nearly global scale. Prior to the recent breakthroughs to create open access of information, most centers of authority relied on secrecy as a matter of course. The history of transparency is linked to the history of global change. The first major political impulses in this direction arose in the Protestant mobilization against corruption in the Catholic Church of the sixteenth century. Much later, in 1766, only Sweden established rules for information freedom. About a decade later, as the US declared independence and wrote its Constitution, free speech and the free flow of open information became novel, liberal institutions pointing in the direction of transparency. In the entire nineteenth century virtually no country adopted such values. The Scandinavian countries followed the example of Sweden only in the early twentieth century.

Starting slowly in the 1970s and more rapidly in the 1980s and the following decades, more and more countries adopted freedom of information laws. According to the Freedominfo.org *Global Survey: Freedom of Information and Access to Government Record Laws Around the World* (May 2004), 50 countries have adopted formal freedom of information acts, and another 30 countries are on their way to adopting such laws. There exists a similar growth in the number of countries that became electoral democracies: according to Freedominfo.org, in 1987 there were 66 democratic countries, but by 2001 there were 121.

Another innovation in the direction of transparency came from Sweden in 1809. It was the creation of the office of the national ombudsman. The ombudsman mediates between government and citizens, and serves to improve communications between them. The other

Scandinavian countries followed Sweden's lead only in the twentieth century. At the close of the 1980s there were 21 countries that had adopted the office. By 2000 there were 111. Indicators for transparency, such as freedom of information laws, electoral democracies, and the establishment of ombudsmen, show a rapidly rising tide of transparency in the last two decades of the twentieth century and beyond.

The number of countries adopting specific laws on transparency norms grew in the late 1990s and in the early twenty first century. These rules have affected almost all domains of power and influence, such as governments, corporations, accountants, lawyers, health professionals, foundations, and civil society organizations. In addition, many significant organizations find it advantageous to adopt transparency practices on a voluntary basis. Voluntary disclosure practices tend to enhance an organization's legitimacy and freedom from corruption. Further, the norms of transparency are spreading far beyond the countries that initiated them. This circumstance poses the challenge of developing internationally accepted specific transparency measures, for example in the accounting rules for financial disclosures across countries. The International Accounting Standards Board has adopted this challenge for its global profession. Similar "harmonization" of measures is evolving in health care, education, and many other professions.

Corruption is not compatible with transparency. Corruption in any rich or poor country is by now recognized as a grave danger to the public good and a threat to good governance in states and corporations. As late as the early 1990s many governments and international agencies did not consider corruption in other nations a cause for international intervention. It was assumed that the national sovereignty of even blatantly exploitative governments was an insurmountable barrier that provided immunity for the perpetrators. This changed when global anti corruption movements effectively challenged national sovereignty as a source of immunity for corrupt high officials and persuaded international agencies like the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD), the World Bank, and many governments to establish international treaties inhibiting corruption and bribery. The largest

and most effective global civil society organization in this field is Transparency International, founded in 1993. It has expanded to become a worldwide network in approximately 80 countries, with a high level of influence in the domestic affairs of these countries, and in international agencies and governments. Transparency has become a major strategy in the effort to improve local as well as international governance.

The spread of transparency as a public value and the upsurge in national and international transparency norms is a very recent and rapidly growing phenomenon. Several increasingly global trends converged to produce the energy for the transparency phenomenon: the increase in global economic interdependence, the spread of demands for civil rights, and the arrival of breathtaking innovations in information technology. Economic interdependence also includes an increase in political interdependence: the demand for transparency soon became a necessity because global economic transactions require the availability of reliable economic and governmental information. Without this, trust at a distance across cultural barriers and boundaries would not be possible. The demands for transparency were a natural outgrowth of the movements for civil rights, women's rights, and consumer rights that started in the West and spread around the world, enhanced by the abolition of colonialism. Anti colonialism became a movement for autonomy in all former colonies. Initially, developing nations turned to nationalism; gradually, movements of responsible government and transparency are arising in many developing nations. In addition, the information revolution has made rapid communication and the creation of information infrastructures possible, and thereby made transparency technically viable in global change. This has a remarkable effect on the privacy of individuals: technology in the hands of governmental and commercial information systems produces comprehensive profiles of individuals, such as credit records, the value of homes, health data, and more. This development is also part of changing information value systems. It is very much in dispute.

The combination of global transformations, value changes, and the power of information and communication technology has created a historically new constellation of information

values. This constellation includes the transparency values of openness – autonomy, accountability, freedom of expression – as well as its counter values of secrecy and surveillance, with the value of privacy between them. The constellation of information values will have different profiles as perceptions of societal threats or security and general moral frameworks shift. Different interests of stakeholders virtually always lead to different interpretations of accessible information, inevitably provoking public debates.

Global change and intense interactions among regions and nations have given rise to novel border crossing solidarity formations. The treaties that established the European Union as a major power and supranational political institution are the most obvious example of such emerging transnational solidarities and of the way in which they are being achieved. The diverse transactions that are necessary beyond cultural and political boundaries have become a focus for creating trust building efforts. Valid transparency of important information is inevitably demanded in such situations. Trust at a distance is based on some form of certification of validity and reliability in the disclosed information. This form of trust at a distance is substantially different from “trust up close” among friends or relatives, or networks of shared commonalities. In fact, trust at a distance requires avoidance of conflicts of interest, cronyism, and insider privileges. Transparency requirements can actually limit or even destroy trust up close. It does need a relatively high degree of public information and formalization as against the friendly whisper.

The sources energizing the public demand for transparency are quite diverse, but they have converging effects. Colossal social upheavals, such as the defeat of Nazi Germany in World War II, have generated massive shifts in societies' moral frameworks. The crimes of the Holocaust and of criminal medical experiments on human subjects brought such outrage that massive reforms were called for by international publics. Certain transparency measures such as the establishment of “informed consent” rules were among the many changes that evolved from the catastrophe of the war. Bringing transparency to national histories became a necessity in order to establish justice for past governmental

crimes. Historical transparency has become a major factor in the countries in transition from authoritarianism to democracy, as in Germany, Japan, and in many countries more recently, such as South Africa and Argentina. Major sources of value changes also include lesser events such as scandals as value rational motives for reforms to adopt transparency. Scandals are very frequently drivers toward transparency – as in recent cases of corporate scandals in the US, or the scandals resulting from malfeasance in other professions such as accounting and medical research, or outright criminal acts on the part of prominent officials. Scandals call for repairs in the social rules and they often call for a shift of the socially accepted moral framework. Not infrequently, acts that were acceptable in the past become unacceptable later. Periods of legal remedial action often increase transparency in a more or less irreversible manner.

Social movements addressing such issues as government accountability, corporate malfeasance, environmental risks, and security problems invariably press for relevant information. They have become powerful sources for transparency demands within countries and globally. No one wants to deal with unknown risks from such sources as faulty products, environmental hazards, and government or corporate corruption. The structures for increasing the flow of information include legal provisions, such as freedom of information acts, ombudsmen, and court actions, market necessities, or the activities of civil society organizations such as the American Civil Liberty Union in the US and State Watch in the European Union.

There are further factors that encourage people to turn to transparency voluntarily. The information technology revolution has made it possible to generate and record information on such things as the value of real estate, the prices of goods, personal data, educational certificates, highway maps, sources of direction, and much more. This means that the historically prevailing condition of opacity – the absence of information about most things – is today shrinking. Many opportunities to use (and misuse) such information have opened up. Under these circumstances, the adoption of transparency can be an important advantage for individuals in visible positions, governments, and corporations. The rapid spread of governmental and corporate

codes of conduct is a function of this phenomenon. Corporate codes of conduct invariably emphasize the need for ethical conduct and transparency.

Very practical and matter of course transactions require transparency in markets. In all these various sources of transparency demands there is a need for certifying the validity of truth claims made by the information disclosing agency. The age of transparency, if we may call it that, is also an era of evaluation and certification, not only on the part of governmental regulators and in professional codes of ethics and their enforcement, but also by professional evaluation researchers in many fields of activity.

The social fact of transparency as a new globally relevant value also includes, of course, currents of resistance. Transparency was a child of the Enlightenment, but it is rapidly becoming a strategy for fighting corruption and authoritarianism in developing countries. These movements transcend civilizational boundaries and local cultural differences. The forms of transparency can vary, but transparency itself is always part of efforts that create open, democratic societies.

SEE ALSO: Authority and Legitimacy; Capitalism; Civil Rights Movement; Civil Society; Collective Trauma; Corruption; Democracy; Development: Political Economy; Social Change; Speaking Truth to Power: Science and Policy; Values: Global

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triangulation

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Triangulation refers to the application and combination of several research methodologies in the study of the same phenomenon. The concept of triangulation, as in the action of making a triangle, may be traced to the Greeks and the origins of modern mathematics. Introduced in the social sciences in the 1950s (Campbell & Fiske 1959), heavily criticized in the 1980s (see Silverman 1985; Lincoln & Guba 1985; Guba & Lincoln 1989) and 1990s (Flick 2004), triangulation is a postpositivist methodological strategy. It has recently returned to favor as a new generation of scholars is drawn to a mixed, or multimethod, approach to social inquiry (Teddlie & Tashakkori 2003).

When introduced in the social sciences the term functioned as a bridge between quantitative and qualitative epistemologies. It was seen as a way of helping qualitative researchers become more rigorous, perhaps allowing them to address a methodological inferiority associated with "a kind of stepchild complex" (Kamberelis & Dimitriadis 2004: 2). Advocates of mixed methods research argue that it allows them to answer questions that other methodologies taken alone cannot. Further, it provides "better inferences based on a greater diversity of divergent views" (Teddlie & Tashakkori 2003: 14–15).

The use of multiple methods in an investigation so as to overcome the weaknesses or biases of a single method is sometimes called multiple operationalism. Indeed, triangulation has become a metaphor for methodological integration, of the postpositivist variety, in the social sciences. The metaphor evokes multiple meanings, including (1) a synonym for mixed method, multimethod, or mixed model designs (Teddlie & Tashakkori 2003: 11, 14); (2) a method of validation; (3) the integration of

different mixed methods approaches; (4) combining quantitative and qualitative methodologies in the same study (Erzberger & Kelle 2003).

However, the history of the term, its uses and meanings, is not without contradictions. For example, some distinguish triangulation from those forms of multiple methods research which are informed by poststructuralism and cultural studies (Richardson 2000). In such projects "there are multiple standards for understanding the social world (epistemological relativism) . . . therefore diversity and contradictions should be incorporated within research accounts" (Spicer 2004: 298; see also Denzin 1989: 246). In contrast, Saukko (2003: 23) observes that the "classical aim of triangulation is to combine different kinds of material or methods to see whether they corroborate one another."

NEED FOR TRIANGULATION

Qualitative research is inherently multimethod in focus. However, the use of multiple methods, or triangulation, reflects an attempt to secure an in depth understanding of the phenomenon in question. Objective reality can never be captured. We only know a thing through its representations. Viewed thusly, critical or interpretive triangulation is not a tool or a strategy of validation, but an alternative to validation. The combination of multiple methodological practices, empirical materials, perspectives, and observers in a single study is best understood as a strategy which adds authenticity, trustworthiness, credibility, rigor, breadth, complexity, richness, and depth to any inquiry.

The social sciences, in varying degrees, use the following research methods and strategies: social surveys, experiments and quasi experiments, participant observation, critical performance ethnography, interviewing, case study and life history construction, grounded theory, action inquiry, testimony, unobtrusive methods, including archival materials, visual methods, autoethnography, focus groups, and discourse analysis. Each of these methods and strategies has inherent weaknesses, which range from an inability to enter realistically into the subject's life world in experiments and surveys, to the problems of reflecting change and process in unobtrusive methods, the attention to rival

interpretive factors in participant observation, to an excessive reliance on paper and pencil techniques in surveys and interviewing.

The realities to which sociological methods are fitted are not fixed. The social world is socially constructed and its meanings, to the observers and those observed, are constantly changing. As a consequence no single research method will ever capture all of the changing features of the social world under study. Each research method implies a different interpretation of the world and suggests different lines of action that the observer may take toward the research process. The meanings of methods are constantly changing, and each investigator brings different interpretations to bear upon the very research methods that are utilized. For those reasons, a productive search for sound interpretations of the social world employs triangulation strategies.

HERMENEUTICS OF INTERPRETATION

What is sought in triangulation is an interpretation that illuminates and reveals the subject matter in a thickly contextualized manner. A triangulated interpretation reflects the phenomenon as a process that is relational and interactive. The interpretation engulfs the subject matter, incorporating all of the understandings the researcher's diverse methods reveal about the phenomenon.

A hermeneutic interpretation does not remove the investigators from the study, but rather places them directly in the circle of interpretation. While it is commonplace in the social sciences to place the investigator outside the interpretive process, hence asking research methods to produce the interpretation that is sought, hermeneutic interpretation dictates that the circle of interpretation can never be avoided, but it must be entered the right way. Triangulation is the appropriate way of entering the circle of interpretation. The researcher is part of the interpretation.

TYPES AND STRATEGIES OF TRIANGULATION

While it is commonly assumed that triangulation is the use of multiple methods in the study

of the same phenomenon, this is only one form of the strategy. There are four basic types of triangulation: (1) data triangulation involving time, space, and persons; (2) investigator triangulation, which consists of the use of multiple rather than single observers; (3) theory triangulation, which consists of using more than one theoretical scheme in the interpretation of the phenomenon; (4) methodological triangulation, which involves using more than one method and may consist of within method or between method strategies. There is also multiple triangulation, where the researcher combines in one investigation multiple observers, theoretical perspectives, sources of data, and methodologies. Additional types of triangulation have been identified, including those labeled reflexive, structural, and multipurpose.

Critical or interpretive triangulation can be viewed as an alternative or incitement to traditional postpositivist forms of validation. Interpretive triangulation opens the space for conversations about how a text authorizes or legitimizes itself through the use of multiple voices and representational forms. These forms may act as catalysts to transgressive validities and to a politics of resistance (Lather 1993).

PROBLEMS IN DESIGNING MULTIPLE TRIANGULATED INVESTIGATIONS

There are at least four basic problems to be confronted in carrying out multiple triangulated research. These are (1) locating a common subject of analysis to which multiple methods, observers, and theories can be applied; (2) reconciling discrepant findings and interpretations; (3) novelty, or the location of a problem that has not been investigated before; and (4) restrictions of time and money.

The location of a common subject of analysis can only be resolved through a clear understanding of the question the investigator wishes to answer. Divergent and discrepant findings are to be expected. Each inspection of the phenomenon is likely to yield different pictures, images, and findings. Novel or new problems are often, upon inspection, not new, but merely manifestations of familiar topics previously examined from different perspectives and questions. Restrictions of time and money are the

least problematic, for if investigators are thoroughly committed to understanding a problem area they will persist in examining it even under difficult circumstances.

CRITICISMS OF TRIANGULATION

It must be noted that the method of triangulation is not without its critics. Several criticisms have been brought to bear upon the traditional treatments of the triangulation strategy.

Data Triangulation

Silverman (1985) has argued that a positivistic bias underlies the triangulation position and that this is most evident in the concept of data triangulation. He argued that a hypothesis testing orientation is present when authors argue that hypotheses that survive multiple tests contain more validity than those subjected to just one test. He also suggested that to assume that the same empirical unit can be measured more than once is inconsistent with the interactionist view of emergence and novelty in the field situation. If, as Silverman argued, all social action is situated and unique, then the same unit, behavior, or experience can never be observed twice. Each occurrence is unique. Patton (1980: 331) has correctly noted that the comparison of multiple data sources will “seldom lead to a single, totally consistent picture. It is best not to expect every thing to turn out the same.”

Investigator Triangulation

No two investigators ever observe the same phenomenon in exactly the same way. Guba and Lincoln (1989: 307) suggest that it is a mistake to “expect corroboration of one investigator by another.” The argument that greater reliability of observations can be obtained by using more than one observer is thus indefensible. This does not mean, however, that multiple observers or investigators should not be used. Douglas (1976) has suggested that team research (a similar term for the use of multiple observers) allows an investigator to gain multiple perspectives on a social situation. Members of a research team have a multiplier effect on

the research – each adds more than just his or her presence to the knowledge that is gained about the situation being studied.

Theory Triangulation

If facts are theory determined, then theoretical triangulation consists of using more than one theoretical scheme to interpret the phenomenon at hand. Seen thusly, this form of triangulation helps reveal complexity. However, Lincoln and Guba (1985: 307) argue: “The use of multiple theories as a triangulation technique seems to us to be both epistemologically unsound and empirically empty.” They base this conclusion on the argument that facts are theory determined. Theoretical triangulation simply asks the researcher to be aware of the multiple ways in which the phenomenon may be interpreted. It does not demand, nor does it ask, that facts be consistent with two or more theories.

Methodological Triangulation

This strategy takes the position that single method studies are no longer defensible in the social sciences. The researcher using different methods should not expect findings generated by different methods to fall into a coherent picture. They will not, for each method yields a different picture and slice of reality. What is critical is that different pictures be allowed to emerge. Methodological triangulation allows this to happen.

Multiple Triangulation

Fielding and Fielding (1986) offered a critical interpretation of this strategy, arguing that multiple triangulation is the equivalent for research methods of correlation in data analysis. They both represent extreme forms of eclecticism. Further, they suggest that theoretic triangulation does not reduce bias, nor does methodological triangulation necessarily increase validity. If there is a case for triangulation, it is because we should combine theories and methods carefully and purposefully with the intention of adding breadth or depth to our analysis, but not for the purpose of pursuing “objective truth.”

The goal of multiple triangulation is a fully grounded interpretive research approach. Objective reality will never be captured. In depth understanding, not validity, is sought in any interpretive study. Multiple triangulation should never be eclectic. It cannot, however, be meaningfully compared to correlation analysis in statistical studies.

ALTERNATIVE VALIDITIES

It is now understood that there are multiple forms of validity, many different ways of authorizing text and its arguments (Lather 1993; Saukko 2003: 18). These ways supplement, if not replace, triangulation as a preferred strategy of validation. Saukko (2003: 19–22) reviews three alternative validities. Dialogic validity asks how well a text captures the point of view of the person being studied. Deconstructive validity addresses a text's historicity, its hidden politics, and its underlying binary oppositions. Contextual validity asks how a text anchors itself in material reality, in concrete historical contexts, in the political economy of daily life. Each of these validities problematizes the positivist concept of a single truth. This opens the door for considering different ways of extending the logic of classic postpositivist triangulation.

ALTERNATIVE PARADIGMS FOR COMBINING METHODOLOGIES

Richardson (2000) disputes the concept of triangulation, asserting that the central image for qualitative inquiry is the crystal, or the prism, and not the triangle. Mixed genre texts, including performance texts, have more than three sides. Like crystals, montage in film, the jazz solo, or the pieces in a quilt, the mixed genre text can assume an infinite variety of shapes, substances, and transmutations. Crystals or prisms reflect externalities. They refract within themselves. This creates different colors and patterns, casting off in different directions.

Saukko, building on Richardson (2000), also challenges the classic postpositivist model of triangulation because the model presumes a fixed or semi fixed view of reality, and a view of methods as magnifying glasses that reflect or reveal this reality. The notion of prism works

well with dialogic and deconstructive validity. Like the prism, these validities draw attention to the multiple ways reality is constructed. Classic triangulation disappears under the prism model. Still, with its emphasis on fluid reality, the prism model gives too little attention to history and social context. Thus, Saukko advances a material semiotic perspective. This model looks at how material reality defracts rather than refracts vision. A defraction model shows how research is a material practice that "alters or creates reality" (Saukko 2003: 27). This visual defraction model is then compared to a participatory, dialogic model where multiple dialogues between multiple realities are created and encouraged. A dialogic framework attunes the researcher to the many different voices at work in a concrete situation. The scholar seeks out and incorporates multiple points of view in the research. This expands the egalitarian base of the project, and enhances its claims to strong objectivity; that is, to the commitment to take into account multiple perspectives (p. 29).

THE INCOMPATIBILITY THESIS

The incompatibility thesis disputes the key claim of triangulation, namely that methods and perspectives can be combined. The incompatibility thesis argues "compatibility between quantitative and qualitative methods is impossible due to incompatibility of the paradigms that underlie the methods" (Teddlie & Tashakkori 2003: 14–15). The incompatibility argument potentially discredits triangulation as a research strategy. Under this scenario researchers who try to combine methods that are incompatible "are doomed to failure due to the inherent differences in the philosophies underlying them" (p. 19). Others disagree with this conclusion, and some contend that the incompatibility thesis has been largely discredited because researchers have demonstrated that it is possible to successfully use a mixed methods approach.

There are several schools of thought on this thesis, including the four identified by Teddlie and Tashakkori: (1) the complementary strengths, mixed methods model; (2) the single paradigm mixed methods model; (3) the dialectical mixed methods model; and (4) the multiple paradigm mixed methods model.

Researchers using the complementary strengths, mixed methods model believe that the use of mixed methods is possible, but that the methods and their findings must be kept separate so that the strengths of each paradigm are maintained. Others argue that methods can be mixed because the paradigms are not pure anyway. In contrast, Morse (2003) warns that ad hoc mixing of methods can be a serious threat to validity. Single paradigm scholars (model 2) seek one paradigm to support their methodological preferences and critiques, for example connecting constructivism and qualitative methods. Pragmatists and transformative emancipatory action researchers posit a link between their model and mixed methods (Teddlie & Tashakkori 2003: 20). Adherents of model (3), the dialectical model, assume that all paradigms (and methodologies) have something to offer and “that the use of multiple paradigms contributes to greater understanding” (Teddlie & Tashakkori 2003: 22). Scholars in this group work back and forth between a variety of tension points, such as etic–emic, value neutrality–value committed.

In model (4), the multiple paradigm mixed methods model, several paradigms and mixed methods models are combined. It is argued that no single paradigm can apply to all designs or methods; that is, particular paradigms may work best with particular epistemologies and methodologies. “Several paradigms may serve as the framework for a triangulation design” (Teddlie & Tashakkori 2003: 23). The multiple paradigm position acknowledges the fact that a complex, interconnected family of terms, concepts, and assumptions surrounds the term qualitative research. These include the traditions associated with postpositivism, postfoundationalism, poststructuralism, and the many qualitative research perspectives and/or methods connected to cultural and interpretive studies.

Clearly, multiple frameworks and understandings circulate in the discourses that define how multimethod approaches are to be taken up at this time in history.

CONCLUSION

Over the past four decades the discourse on triangulation, multiple operationalism, and

mixed method models has become quite complex and nuanced. This entry has attempted to present some of this complexity, some of its history. This is not a neat, linear history. Each decade has taken up triangulation and redefined it to meet perceived needs. The very term triangulation is unsettling and unruly. It disrupts and threatens the belief that reality in its complexities can ever be fully captured or faithfully represented.

Drawing again from Saukko (2003), bringing these different views of triangulation and multiperspectival research into play with one another, “holding them in creative tension with one another . . . cultivates multidimensional research and politics” (p. 32). There is no intention of arriving at a final, correct, enlightened view. The goal of multiple or critical triangulation is a fully grounded interpretive research project with an egalitarian base. Objective reality will never be captured. In depth understanding, the use of multiple validities, not a single validity, and a commitment to dialogue and strong objectivity are sought in any interpretive study.

SEE ALSO: Methods, Mixed; Validity, Qualitative

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tribalism

Susan R. Trencher

Tribalism refers to customs and beliefs transmitted and enacted in groups (tribes) sharing a common identity and in which centralized political organization and authority are absent. Academic and public references to tribalism have been expanded to refer to behaviors and beliefs associated with diverse populations, including those that share any one, or all, of the following: race, ethnicity, language, religion, ways of life, kinship, attitudes, worldview, and generation.

Sociological interest focuses on aspects of ethnicity and stratification.

In response to “degeneration theory” – a biblically derived idea that non state societies had degenerated from a previous civilized state – late nineteenth century anthropologists theorized tribal organization as the second stage of social and political formation in an evolutionary sequence moving from the simple to the complex (band, tribe, chiefdom, state). By the early 1900s, anthropologists discredited these theories and focused on patterns of tribal life to define and differentiate these groups from other social and political entities. Patterns included participation and belief in a way of life where social and political formations are composed of kin based groups associated with a constellation of societal traits, including non industrialized modes of subsistence, reciprocal modes of economic exchange, and common group ownership of natural resources. As groups, tribes consist of single populations or small communities living within a limited geographic range that can arrange themselves as a single entity for common purposes. Societal institutions, including economics, religion, and politics, are incorporated into the activities of everyday life. Political processes are significantly egalitarian and include power conferred as authority upon specific individuals on the basis of personal merit. Political positions are not permanent and decisions cannot be imposed by force or other systems of control. Tribes can exist within larger political entities, including states and nation states.

Changes in the use and meaning of tribalism in part reflect the ways in which members of societies living outside such systems seek to categorize and classify them, as well as the ways in which these populations, often pressed by outside interests, redefine and reassert ethnic, regional, and generational identity. Historically, the term tribe was derived from the Latin *tribus*, traced as a reference to the three original divisions of the Roman people 2,500 years ago. In translations of biblical texts into Latin (and later into English), *tribes* referred to the 12 subdivisions of the peoples of Israel constituted through common kinship and custom. By the late sixteenth century, references to tribalism extended to behaviors and beliefs of races and ethnic groups.

In the nineteenth century era of Western European expansion, tribalism took on significantly negative connotations as a reference to indigenous populations in non state societies viewed as inferior, which were to be “civilized” by colonialist regimes. This definition was widely extended to non western societies even where highly centralized states existed (e.g., the Aztecs). In the US, tribes were given legal status as autonomous political entities with inherent powers of self government by Chief Justice John Marshall (1831) as “domestic, dependent nations,” although they remained subject to the authority of the federal government.

In the early 1950s, tribalism was extended to refer to the behaviors of any group of people characterized by strong group loyalty to an array of characteristics and institutions, including attitudes, language, religion, social causes, political leanings, economic interests, race, and ethnicity. In the 1960s, references to tribalism became increasingly problematic and complex. In anthropology, experts in tribal societies argued that the term had become too ambiguous to be useful (Fried 1967; Helm 1967). Vail (1989) argued that while many academics in the US claimed that tribes did not exist and the term tribalism was a racist label imposed on non western populations, young Africans in emerging nations were asserting themselves as members of tribes and reasserting historical and existing regional and ethnic identities, as well as enmities between and among such groups. Emerging African governments used accusations of tribalism to denounce groups that objected to the position of the dominant party (Wiley 1981; Vail 1989). Wiley (1981, 1990) argued that group identity along ethnic lines was given positive meaning in western settings, but was referred to as tribal and negative in Africa, Latin America, and indigenous American populations, leading to misdirected foreign and social policies.

Since the 1990s there has been a resurgent use of tribalism in terms similar to those found in the period of colonialism and in the 1950s. In political science and in public rhetoric, Huntington (1993, 1996) has argued that tribalism based on ethnicity, religion, and/or language is the dangerous result of the end of the bipolar enmity of the Cold War. From this standpoint, tribalism is a negative reference to groups seen

as inferior and insular that resist and oppose other forms of organization and political authority claimed as legitimate and found in nation states and global systems.

SEE ALSO: Boundaries (Racial/Ethnic); Colonialism (Neocolonialism); Ethnic Groups; Ethnicity; Indigenous Movements; Indigenous Peoples; Totemism

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trust

Karen S. Cook

A number of social theorists (e.g., Fukuyama 1995) argue that trust is somehow central to the production of social order in society. Trust fosters cooperative relations and lessens the need for monitoring and sanctioning. The strong argument that trust is *required* to produce cooperation, however, cannot be accurate since cooperation occurs in many settings in which there is very little trust. In such settings cooperation is secured by other mechanisms (Cook et al. 2005). In many instances these

mechanisms include reliable legal institutions that back property rights and contracts, as well as professional associations that monitor and sanction improper behavior and block the violation of trust relations (e.g., for physicians, lawyers, and others whose clients are often vulnerable).

Trust typically emerges when the parties involved have the opportunity to assess trust worthiness as they interact over time. In this sense trust is most likely to emerge in ongoing social relations in which there is a shadow of the future. It is much less likely (if at all) to emerge in settings in which the parties are strangers who will not encounter each other again. Cultural settings vary in the extent to which parties to an exchange are willing to take a risk on one another in the first instance of an exchange. In the trust literature, the term generalized trust is often used to indicate the extent to which individuals in a culture believe that "most people can be trusted," reflecting a relatively benign environment in which initial contacts are more often positive than negative. Where generalized trust is high, it is argued, exploitation tends to be lower; where it is low, the risks of exploitation are generally higher.

Adopting Hardin's (2002) encapsulated interest view of trust allows us to define trust primarily in relational terms. Actor A trusts actor B with respect to some particular matter(s) x, y, \dots, z when A believes that her interests are included in B's utility function, so that B values what A desires primarily because B wants to maintain a good relationship with A. Others have adopted a somewhat more general definition of trust as the belief that the trustee will not take advantage of a trustor's vulnerability. If there is no risk or vulnerability there is no need for a trust relation to emerge between actors. To the extent that actor A perceives actor B as trustworthy, A is also much less likely to monitor B or to sanction B's negative behavior. It is this fact that leads to the argument that trust reduces transaction costs. Trust may also be essential when there is great risk of exploitation. Exploitation is especially likely when there is a power difference between the actors involved in the interaction.

Understanding trust has become a major enterprise in the social sciences in the past

decade, in part because of the changes in the fundamental nature of social relations as individuals in many cultures spend more time outside of the confines of family and small local communities. As Blau (2002) notes, life in large complex societies is very different from life in small isolated communities because in complex societies there has been a decline in the significance of the groups into which one is born, together with the growing significance of reciprocal social relations with relative strangers. Cook and Hardin (2001) refer to this changing circumstance as the move from communal norms of association and social control to networked forms of association and a reliance on other mechanisms of social control, including reliance on trust relations in networks. For social association, strangers in modern societies become "dependent on reciprocated choices," to use Blau's terms, in order to sustain social relations. This social change implies that the types of norms that control behavior in tight knit communities or small groups are not likely to be effective in the world of networked social relations.

In general a lack of mutual trust in a society makes collective undertakings difficult, if not impossible, since individuals cannot know if they engage in an action to benefit another that the action will be reciprocated. It is not only the problem of not knowing whom to trust, it is also the problem of having others not know they can trust you. The lack of mutual trust, Arrow (1974) points out, represents a distinct loss economically as well as a loss in the smooth running of the political system which requires the success of such collective undertakings. Mutual trust, however, cannot be produced on demand and is difficult to maintain even in close personal relations.

In the global era social contacts extend across regional and national boundaries in social networks defined by business, work, or travel connections and increasingly are maintained by more remote forms of communication, such as computer mediated interaction. Economic relations also extend far beyond face to face contacts. Many economic transactions are secured primarily by social relations or are embedded in social networks, sometimes including trust relations among business partners. As Arrow (1974)

notes, trust not only saves on transaction costs, it may also increase efficiency at the system level by reducing other costs, thereby increasing productivity. Arrow points out that many societies in which mutual trust is low are less developed economically, raising the question that Fukuyama (1995) addresses concerning the role of trust in the economic productivity of societies more broadly. The role of trust in Arrow's view is mainly in the production of public goods. When do individuals set aside their own personal interests to respond to the demands of their local community or even the larger society? This general question has also been addressed in a large experimental literature on social dilemmas (Cook & Cooper 2003). Issues of trust will remain central to theories of social order in the new world of broad ranging networked interactions and a global economy.

SEE ALSO: Collective Action; Economy (Sociological Approach); Social Capital; Social Psychology; Trustworthiness; Uncertainty

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trustworthiness

J. Amos Hatch

Trustworthiness is a concept that constructivist qualitative researchers have used to establish criteria for judging the adequacy of their scholarly inquiries. Trustworthiness is roughly equivalent to the concept of validity in traditional quantitative research, and the genesis of its development is rooted in attempts by qualitative researchers in the early 1980s to find ways to legitimize their work and persuade others to take it seriously. Constructivist researchers think of trustworthiness as a system of checks and balances that take form in four criteria that reframe traditional, positivist elements of validity. *Credibility* is the constructivist criterion that parallels internal validity in the positivist paradigm; *transferability* parallels external validity; *dependability* stands in for reliability; and *confirmability* takes the place of objectivity. Along with the substitute criteria are corresponding empirical procedures (e.g., prolonged engagement, triangulation, and member checks) designed to affirm the adequacy of qualitative reports.

The term trustworthiness was first used in the context of qualitative research by Guba (1981). Guba contrasted criteria for adequacy between what he called rationalistic and naturalistic paradigms. He then introduced the criteria listed above and described a set of research techniques for enhancing the trustworthiness of naturalistic studies. In the same year, Guba and Lincoln (1981) published an elaboration of the same criteria and procedures. Over time, these authors have changed nomenclature, locating trustworthiness within the constructivist (not naturalistic) paradigm and contrasting their approach to positivist and postpositivist (not rationalistic or conventional) epistemological perspectives, but their descriptions of the trustworthiness concept and its purposes have remained constant (Guba & Lincoln 1994; Lincoln & Guba 2000).

Elements of trustworthiness and research techniques for improving the trustworthiness of naturalistic/constructivist studies are carefully described in Lincoln and Guba (1985). Building on their previous work, an entire

chapter is devoted to establishing trustworthiness in naturalistic research. A case is made for the importance of credibility, transferability, dependability, and confirmability as alternative criteria for establishing the merit of naturalistic studies, and research techniques for applying these criteria throughout the research process are detailed. Meeting the credibility criterion means demonstrating the “truth value” of the naturalistic inquiry by showing that multiple constructions of reality have been adequately represented and that the reconstructions of the researcher are credible to the constructors of the original realities. Lincoln and Guba suggest several research techniques designed to increase credibility: *prolonged engagement* (spending sufficient time in the field); *persistent observation* (bringing depth to the examination of salient elements); *triangulation* (using different data sources, methods, investigators, and theories); *peer debriefing* (exposing one’s research processes and findings to disinterested peers); *negative case analysis* (looking for alternative or disconfirming interpretations); *referential adequacy* (archiving portions of data for later comparison); and *member checks* (attaining feedback on research processes and results from those being studied).

Addressing the transferability criterion means providing enough information to potential users of research findings so that these individuals can make good decisions about the applicability of the findings to their own situations. Lincoln and Guba offer *thick description* as a technique for addressing transferability concerns. Adequately thick descriptions include sufficient contextual data so that readers can make their own determinations about how well the research settings match with other contexts in which the findings might be applied. Lincoln and Guba operationalize the trustworthiness criteria of dependability and confirmability in the form of an *inquiry audit*, including an *audit trail*. An inquiry audit can bolster a study’s dependability and confirmability by providing a careful analysis of the residue of records generated at all stages of the inquiry. The kinds of records that make up an audit trail include raw data, data analysis products, process notes, reflexive notes, and instrument development information. Lincoln and Guba conclude their description of research techniques by presenting *reflexive journal*

writing as a strategy that reaches across all of the criteria for enhancing trustworthiness. A reflexive journal should include a daily record of the logistical implementation of the study, a personal diary recording the researcher’s affective experiences, and a methodological log recounting decision processes as the study unfolds. Reflexive journaling and the research techniques associated with each criterion provide tools for increasing the trustworthiness of naturalistic studies.

The major contribution of the trustworthiness construct has been to provide qualitative researchers with an alternative perspective from which to consider issues of warrant that continue to trouble those operating outside the dominant discourse of positivism and quantitative research. In the 1980s, qualitative researchers were dismissed or even attacked for producing work that traditional researchers counted as “slipshod” or “touchy feely.” By identifying the elements of trustworthiness and applying the empirical strategies designed to accomplish them, qualitative scholars are able to make the case that their methods are legitimate. Even when the trustworthiness concept is not explicitly identified, its impact is evident in the frequency with which the strategies for accomplishing it are utilized in all kinds of qualitative reports. As qualitative inquiry has matured, the trustworthiness construct has been adapted to fit emerging research approaches under the qualitative umbrella. For example, Kincheloe and McLaren (1994) describe “critical trustworthiness,” Hatch and Wisniewski (1995) include trustworthiness among criteria for assessing narrative research, and Green (2000) points out the utility of trustworthiness for the evaluation of social programs. In the early twenty first century, qualitative research approaches are facing new threats as conservative political forces seek to return to narrow definitions of what constitutes “scientific” research (Erickson & Gutierrez 2000). Trustworthiness and adaptations of the procedures associated with achieving it continue to be important as qualitative research approaches seek to be acknowledged as legitimate.

Those who have critiqued the usefulness of the trustworthiness concept point out that it is more closely aligned with the assumptions of the positivist paradigm than many find

comfortable. In Guba and Lincoln's (1994: 114) own words, "although these criteria have been well received, their parallelism to positivist criteria makes them suspect." Others, who have moved past dividing research paradigms into binaries such as qualitative/quantitative or positivist/constructivist, argue that trustworthiness is not a good fit for evaluating qualitative research undertaken within alternative qualitative paradigms such as those embracing critical/feminist or poststructuralist epistemologies (Lincoln & Denzin 1994; Hatch 2002). Following this logic, seeking to establish trustworthiness remains a worthy goal for naturalistic researchers operating within the assumptions of the constructivist paradigm, but such an attempt would not make sense given the different worldviews that define paradigms other than constructivism.

SEE ALSO: Naturalistic Inquiry; Trust; Validity, Qualitative

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Truth and Reconciliation Commissions

Kevin Avruch

Truth – or Truth and Reconciliation – Commissions are “bodies set up to investigate a past history of violations of human rights in a particular country – which can include violations by the military or other government forces or armed opposition forces” (Hayner 2002: 14). Such commissions focus on the past (usually on violations committed under a previous regime) and have strictly delimited mandates, both as to duration and what “counts” as violation. In the Chilean commission’s mandate, for example, only cases where victims actually died under torture were to be counted as human rights violations and investigated. The majority of commissions were established by executive order (less frequently by legislatures) of the new government. In the case of El Salvador, the United Nations established the commission, and it was (untypically) headed by non Salvadorans. In a few cases an NGO established the commission, as in Rwanda and earlier in South Africa by the African National Congress to investigate its own abuses. In legal terms, Truth Commissions are to be distinguished from “tribunals” or other more strictly judicial entities, such as War Crimes Commissions, since they do not possess the formal power to prosecute or otherwise render “justice” – an important point to be discussed below. In a few cases, Truth Commissions operate alongside tribunals (East Timor and Sierra Leone), or parallel to other judicial processes (Rwanda).

Since 1974 some 25 Truth Commissions have been established, about 10 each in Latin America (Bolivia, Argentina, Uruguay (twice), Chile, El Salvador, Ecuador, Guatemala, Peru, and Panama), and African countries (Uganda (twice), Zimbabwe, Chad, Rwanda, Burundi, South Africa, Nigeria, Sierra Leone, and Ghana). The remainder occurred in Nepal, Sri Lanka, Haiti, Yugoslavia, and East Timor. They typically complete their work within six months to two years. In a few cases the commissions were disbanded before their work was completed and reports issued (Bolivia and Ecuador), in other cases final reports were completed but never issued publicly (Zimbabwe, Uganda, Philippines), or were issued in severely censored versions (Haiti). By contrast, in South Africa's case the report published in 1998 received extremely wide distribution, and the work of the Commission itself was reported extensively by South African and international media. Argentina's report, issued in 1985, published under the title of *Nunca Mas* ("Never Again"), was widely read in Spanish, translated into English, and republished commercially in Britain and the US.

Such variation in final reporting characterizes other aspects of the commissions, in the scope of their work, the resources or legitimacy they command, and observers' judgments of their ultimate effectiveness or success. With regard to scope for example, a few of these commissions, most notably South Africa's, add the term "Reconciliation" to their title, pointing to wider ambitions in the area of post conflict peacebuilding, while in some other cases the search for "truth" defines the commission's mandate but the further task of "reconciliation" is intentionally left out (Yugoslavia). Yet even where the search for "truth" is highlighted in the commission's name and mandate, some of the commissions have been able to command wide recognition and respect for their relative impartiality and effectiveness (South Africa and Argentina), while others have been seen as more compromised (Chile's, where members of the old regime remained influential), as reluctant responses to international pressure (Uganda's 1974 commission), or merely as platforms to criticize the old regime and legitimize the new one (Chad).

The majority of commissions were established by newly emerging and often very fragile democracies – "transitional governments" in Kritz's (1995) term – which sought or were pressured to present a formal accounting of the violence and civil and human rights violations of the past. The emphasis here is on the production of an *account*. More difficult questions (political and moral ones) of *accountability* are less adequately addressed by these commissions (Minnow 1998; Rotberg & Thompson 2000). Such questions focus attention on the problem of *justice*, specifically on the ability of the commissions to "deliver" justice to victims by finding perpetrators formally guilty of their crimes and rendering some sort of appropriate punishment – *retributive justice*, in other words. Kritz (1995) and others have argued instead for forms of "transitional justice" appropriate to transitional regimes: less adjudicative, formal, and retributive, but in their lesser stringency and flexibility more able to help a new, fragile regime maneuver around the potential resistance posed by former elites and potential "spoilers," and thus achieve a measure of stability. This is the necessary political compromise some see built into the nature of the Truth Commission, especially if, as in the South African and several other cases, the commission lacks the power to prosecute but not effectively to grant amnesty. The question of amnesty granted perpetrators is among the most controversial aspects of these commissions' work.

Others, however, claim more far reaching goals and positive achievements for the commissions than retributive justice, delivered in court rooms or war crimes tribunals, can provide. Bishop Desmond Tutu (1999), for example, has argued that these commissions offer both victims and perpetrators another valid form of justice entirely, *restorative justice*, focused not upon penalty, punishment, and retribution, but upon recognizing harm, encouraging healing, and aiming for reconciliation. Proponents of restorative (or "reparative") justice are more likely to add the notion of "reconciliation" to that of "truth" as among the explicit goals of the commission, and to consider reconciliation, consisting minimally of "contrition" (on the part of the perpetrator) and "forgiveness" (on the victim's part), as crucial elements in the broader project of post conflict peacebuilding.

Whatever the hoary questions around the intersection of truth and justice, most observers and analysts agree that these commissions often do succeed in providing an authoritative and widely accepted record of what actually took place in the past, and giving to victims (and perhaps also to perpetrators; see Gobodo Madikizela 2003) a platform and a voice to recount their experience and express their pain and suffering. This is the “truth” part of the commissions’ work. In the South African Truth and Reconciliation Commission, such “narrative” or “personal” truths, emerging from testimonies, sought to ensure that individual acts of oppression could never be forgotten, and to create an indelible public memory and record of these events. Yet with respect to “truth” these commissions routinely operate in politically charged worlds that would make the most steadfast of academic postmodernists blush. And facts, even if publicly accepted, do not necessarily conduce to publicly accepted truths. The apartheid security forces and Latin American colonels and generals apparently believed that they were fighting communist subversion under emergency conditions that demanded extraordinary measures to protect national security; and many believe this today, even some among them who appeared before various commissions and admitted their acts and expressed regret for their victims and offered apologies to the survivors (Avruch & Vejarano 2001).

The final question surrounding the work of Truth Commissions has to do with how well change or transformation effected at the individual level of victim and perpetrator “transfers” to the national level and the larger project of national reconciliation. Advocates and critics argue about this, with the South African case often used by both parties in their arguments. But rigorous data are lacking, and claims to assessment are mainly still anecdotal. What can be said is that Truth and Reconciliation Commissions are part and parcel of the larger

project in the globalization of human rights and democratization. No one claims they are panaceas for the spread of human rights and democracy, but most of their supporters see them as relevant and appropriate, and not a few, as indispensable.

SEE ALSO: Apartheid and Nelson Mandela; Burundi and Rwanda (Hutu, Tutsi); Ethnic Cleansing; Peace and Reconciliation Processes; Peacemaking; Race and Ethnic Politics

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uncertainty

Jens Zinn

Uncertainty is characterized by cognitive and emotional elements. Uncertainty indicates unclear, ambiguous, or contradictory cognitive constructions, which cause feelings of uncertainty.

In sociology as well as economics, uncertainty is about expectations. It refers to the future and whether our expectations will be met and also to the present and our capacity to produce expectations. Typically, norms and institutions structure our expectations. They support clear and unambiguous notions and expectations even though they are always – to a certain degree – uncertain (Luhmann 1993). Sociological classics (e.g. by Durkheim, Gehlen, Parsons, and Erikson) see the destabilization of institutions and normative expectations caused by social change as something negative. The destabilization of expectations would produce feelings of uncertainty, and can even lead to an increase in suicides (Durkheim 2002 [1952]).

More recently, the term uncertainty became prominent in the discourse on reflexive modernization (Beck 1992; Giddens 1991) and the thesis of the risk society and institutional individualization (Beck 1992). A growing complexity, diversity, and instability would destabilize expectations, and awareness of lack of knowledge, especially regarding new risks (e.g., global warming, ozone layer depletion, nuclear contamination, genetically modified food) which cannot be calculated and rationally managed, would trigger feelings of uncertainty.

In economics uncertainty is distinguished from risk and ignorance. Whereas ignorance is what we cannot know, risk is understood as calculable and therefore manageable uncertainty.

When the “distribution of the outcomes of a group of instances is known (either through calculation a priori or from statistics of the past experience)” we call it risk. In the case of uncertainty “it is impossible to form a group of instances, because the situation dealt with is in a high degree unique” (Knight 1921). That does not mean that we know nothing about the future, but our knowledge is limited and our expectations therefore more or less certain.

Even though uncertainty is seen as a lack of controllability and therefore as negative, it is widely acknowledged that uncertainty is more the rule than the exception. Especially in entrepreneurial decision making, there is always a high degree of uncertainty involved because of novelty and unstable markets.

Recent developments in sociology and economics have fundamentally changed the perspective on uncertainty. Since it became evident that we often cannot transform uncertainty into certain expectations, growing interest has developed into how we can manage uncertainties as such. Therefore, new strategies beyond instrumental rationality have appeared (e.g., emotion, trust, fast and frugal heuristics, precaution), while the positive aspects of uncertainty, such as giving space for shaping the future, have been recognized (Zinn & Taylor Gooby 2006).

SEE ALSO: Risk, Risk Society, Risk Behavior, and Social Problems; Science and the Measurement of Risk

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unemployment

Mikael Nordenmark

Unemployed persons comprise all those within the economically active population who are able and willing to work, and who are actively seeking jobs, but unable to find one. Unemployment and job loss affects millions of people every year throughout the world and the level of unemployment varies with economic conditions and other circumstances. The unemployment rate is expressed as a percentage of the total civilian labor force, where the latter includes both the unemployed and those with jobs (all those willing and able to work for pay).

Sociological unemployment research contributes to the understanding of the social and economic consequences of unemployment for individuals, family members, and others in the community. A majority of the studies have focused on the relationship between unemployment and mental health. The Great Depression of the 1930s generated some of the first studies of the effects of unemployment on the individual. Above all, it was the negative economic consequences of unemployment that were the focus, but their studies also indicated that unemployment affects individuals' social life, identity, and mental well being negatively (Jahoda et al. 1971; Bakke 1933).

As a consequence of the development of welfare states and welfare transfers, more recent unemployment research has concentrated on the psychosocial side of unemployment instead of the economic side. As with the investigations from the 1930s, most of these studies show that

the unemployed in general have poorer mental health than the employed. However, unemployment does not seem to have the same effect on everyone. The adverse effects of unemployment on mental well being have been found to be mediated by the individual's economic situation, work involvement, gender, social class, age, marital status, ethnicity, duration of unemployment, and previous unemployment experience.

There has been a debate on how the relationship between unemployment and mental health should be understood in causal terms. Does the level of mental well being cause unemployment or vice versa – is well being affected by the labor market situation? Longitudinal studies have shown that it is a question of both selection and effect. People with relatively poor mental health status run an increased risk of becoming unemployed, but also unemployment in itself has a negative impact on mental well being. However, most studies provide powerful evidence that unemployment causes, rather than merely results from, poor mental health (Gallie & Paugam 2000; Nordenmark & Strandh 1999; Warr 1987).

The most commonly used theoretical perspective for explaining the consequences of unemployment is the functionalistic approach developed by Maria Jahoda (1982). She looks at the consequences of unemployment in the light of the psychosocial meaning of employment. Jahoda maintains that employment, in addition to economic or the manifest functions, also has certain psychosocial functions (time structure, social contacts, participation in collective purpose, regular activity, status, and identity). It is the loss of these functions that is the main cause of poor mental well being among the unemployed.

One main critique of Jahoda's theory is that it sees all kinds of paid work as equally important for the individual's well being. Warr (1987) tries to solve this problem with his vitamin theory. According to the theory, there are vitamins that a human being needs for staying healthy and these can be consumed both in an unemployment, as well as in an employment, situation. Because the theory assumes that employment, and the loss of employment, can have different meanings for different individuals, it can

be used to explain mental health differences between categories of unemployed.

But perhaps the most serious critique of both Jahoda's theory about the latent functions of employment and of Warr's vitamin theory is the minimal role that the individual, or the actor, is assumed to play. These theories focus on how factors in the social environment affect individuals, rather than on how individuals experience, interpret, and act towards their social structure. This is what could be called a functionalistic perspective on the consequences of unemployment, and it has been criticized for instance by David Fryer (1986). In his agency theory, Fryer assumes that persons are active and motivated individuals who influence their environment and try to do their best to realize themselves. The effects of unemployment on mental health are then dependent on the degree to which the unemployment situation restricts agents from reaching what they see as desirable goals.

While Jahoda and Warr are criticized for overemphasizing the importance of the social structure, Fryer is often blamed for overemphasizing the role of the individual and not paying sufficient attention to the restrictions of the social environment. Therefore, there have been attempts to pay adequate attention to both individual and structural factors within one theory. In his status passage theory, Douglas Ezzy (1993) tries to integrate both structural factors and an acting agent. According to Ezzy, the level of mental well being among the unemployed is mainly decided by the individual's subjective interpretations of the objective social context.

In the light of previous unemployment research it is possible to distinguish two main dimensions of employment that structure the level of mental well being among the unemployed: the psychosocial and economic dimensions. In line with Ezzy's thoughts, the PEN model (*psychosocial and economic need for employment*) combines the psychosocial functions and agency perspectives into a conceptual model with which one can understand the interaction of these two needs. The model predicts that unemployed who have both a weak economic need and a weak psychosocial need for employment (for instance, unemployed living with a well paid partner and strongly involved in activities not directly connected to

employment) should not perceive unemployment as problematic and they may adapt relatively well to their new situation. On the other hand, the combination of both strong psychosocial and economic needs makes the likelihood of poor mental health higher (Nordenmark & Strandh 1999).

An important task for future unemployment research is to further analyze the diverse effects of unemployment in varying social and national settings, and to integrate research from the different social sciences. While unemployment research within the behavioral sciences has focused on mental health consequences, most economic research has analyzed causes of unemployment and employment. However, the only way to reach a deeper understanding of both the causes and consequences of unemployment is to combine economic research with research from the behavioral sciences.

SEE ALSO: Capitalism; Economic Development; Great Depression; Labor Markets; Occupations; Unemployment as a Social Problem; Welfare State

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unemployment as a social problem

Jutta Allmendinger and Wolfgang Ludwig Mayerhofer

All industrialized or post industrial societies consider themselves to be working societies. Work – or more precisely, *gainful* work – defines an individual's worth and status. It is for most people the main means of earning a living and frequently the prerequisite to be eligible for social security coverage. Therefore, unemployment is a principal social and political challenge – in particular since the mid 1970s, when most western countries experienced a marked increase in unemployment as a result of the so called first oil crisis. This followed an approximately 20 year period during which it was generally assumed that the interwar economic and labor market crisis was a thing of the past. Since then, the western industrial countries have tried, with varying success, to come to terms with the problem of unemployment. The post socialist economies – to varying degrees as well – are also hit by unemployment.

It is frequently alleged that unemployment results above all from regulatory interventions in the (“free”) labor market, including overly generous social benefits. One cites as proof the relatively low unemployment rates in countries such as the US and Great Britain, which, in contrast to most European countries or Japan, have a weakly regulated labor market and residual social security systems, targeted mainly at the poor. Yet countries whose market regulations and/or social benefits are comparable to or even surpass this last mentioned group of countries (in many respects, this is true of the Scandinavian states) have also been very successful in fighting unemployment.

DEFINITIONS

The definitions and statistical measurement of unemployment differ in international comparison. To be counted as unemployed, an individual must have no or little gainful employment and seek paid work (which can also mean

more extensive work than previously). Many countries use the International Labor Organization definition of unemployment, which is based on surveys: an individual is considered unemployed who was not in *any* gainful employment during a specific reference week and who is actively seeking work. In other countries (e.g., Germany) unemployment is defined by a state agency, which counts as unemployed those who register with the Public Employment Service; these individuals, however, are allowed to be employed up to half of the standard working hours of a fully employed person. On the other hand, individuals without any employment at all who are not registered as unemployed (often because they are not entitled to unemployment compensation) are not counted as unemployed, no matter how hard they are seeking paid work. Unemployment *rates* also differ depending on the chosen reference standard. In some countries, this reference group includes all dependent employees; in most other countries, it also includes the self employed. For the purposes of international comparison, the OECD is trying to standardize national unemployment statistics.

Aside from official unemployment, measured in whatever form, one can assume the existence of so called discouraged workers (i.e., individuals who would like to pursue gainful employment, but have given up hope of finding employment and thus do not actively seek work). Frequently, individuals who participate in active labor market policy measures are not counted among the unemployed. Therefore, the actual extent of underemployment is generally higher than officially stated.

At the same time, it is important to keep in mind that for many people unemployment is a transitional phase. In fact, one can observe high labor market dynamics even in times of high unemployment; in most countries more (in some countries, far more) people become unemployed – and for the most part find work again – than corresponds to the average yearly stock of unemployed. The average duration of unemployment and the extent of long term unemployment (generally defined as unemployment lasting one year or longer), which may serve as an indicator of entrenched unemployment, show large differences in international comparison.

UNEMPLOYMENT AS A SOCIAL PROBLEM

In most countries, the unemployment of individuals with low education is markedly higher – generally by a factor of 2 to 4 – than that of highly qualified workers. Often, the unemployment of younger and older workers is also above average; in the case of the former, this is mainly due to high entry rates to unemployment, while the duration of unemployment is mostly average or even below average. Marked gender differences can be perceived above all in continental European countries, where women's unemployment is often significantly higher than men's, while there are hardly any gender differences in Anglo Saxon countries with their liberal labor markets or in the Scandinavian countries with their greater emphasis on gender equality. In most cases, ethnic and racial minorities suffer significantly higher unemployment rates than the native born majority.

Unemployment endangers the livelihood of the unemployed individual and, possibly, also that of his or her family. Regardless of the existence of the so called working poor, unemployment in many countries is the most important cause of poverty. Only in a few countries (mainly in the Scandinavian states) do social security systems largely compensate for the loss of income due to unemployment. Unemployment is also frequently associated with problems such as crime, right wing extremism, suicide, and illness.

Generally speaking, these effects increase with the duration of unemployment. Therefore, it is important to ask how long term unemployment may arise on the individual level, and theories of self reinforcement of unemployment are perhaps best suited for this task. One explanation refers to employers' behavior. If an individual has been unemployed for some time, employers may assume that this individual has already been "checked out" by other possible employers and been found to be wanting the necessary skills; therefore, the longer a person has been unemployed, the fewer job offers they may receive. Another theory associates unemployment with loss of human capital. The longer a person has been unemployed, the more they are barred from access to the latest

developments in their occupation. Besides, they may also lose more general skills such as perseverance or develop health problems.

Finally, the unemployed often have the least access to (re)training and further education, although they would need it most, for instance, if they have been working in a declining industry and would fare better if they were to switch to an occupation that offers better prospects for future developments.

Unemployment frequently results in negative consequences, even after having been overcome ("unemployment scarring"). These "scars," for example, can be a lower income, a slower rise in income, or increased occupational instability. It should be added that such consequences need not necessarily arise; for instance, if unemployment has been caused by a bad "match" between the skills offered by the unemployed and those required by the earlier job, this match may be better on the next job.

Another facet of self reinforcing unemployment is repeated unemployment. Many findings suggest that multiple unemployment in the past increases the risk of renewed unemployment. Frequently, however, the duration of the new unemployment is shorter (i.e., those affected more quickly find new work). Generally speaking, long term unemployment and repeated unemployment seem to be different phenomena. The former seems to have more to do with (possibly ascribed) individual "deficits" (low education, health problems, age) that make the individual unattractive for employers, the latter with the idiosyncrasies of certain industries or partial labor markets (Andreß 1989).

Persistent unemployment on the societal level is frequently associated with the concepts of underclass and exclusion. The term underclass was coined by Gunnar Myrdal and describes a social group that, because of its lack of access to steady employment, is even below the "working class" and thus cut off from mainstream society; in American inner city ghettos this tendency is exacerbated by spatial segregation (Wilson 1987). The term underclass, however, was also used by some social scientists to ascribe to people certain traits such as the inability to work due to a lack of skills or the unwillingness to work due to certain values and attitudes; its use in sociology is therefore controversial. The term

exclusion (of French origin) plays a bigger role in Europe, yet at the same time is less clearly defined. Partly it is used in the context of a belief, according to which unemployment by definition damages the “social contract” and destroys social cohesion, so that (re)integration into the labor market simultaneously restores social integration. In empirical research, exclusion is operationalized as the extent to which unemployment results in fewer social contacts and lower cultural and political participation (Gallie & Paugam 2000). In critical perspective, the term is used to indicate that contemporary capitalism offers fewer and fewer opportunities to participate socially, especially for the “less productive.”

Unemployment is also a political challenge. Those polled in surveys in the European Union most frequently cite unemployment as among the “most important problems facing their country” (with marked variations, depending largely on the level of unemployment in any given country). Enduring unemployment in particular – especially in countries where unemployment benefits are based on the contributions of the employed – poses a challenge to the viability of systems of social security. A labor market crisis in general raises demands for reducing the cost of the work factor by, among other things, lowering the non wage labor costs; yet high unemployment may necessitate an increase in social security contributions, unless one simply cuts unemployment benefits. More generally speaking, a situation of permanent austerity requires a “new politics of the welfare state” (Pierson 2001), which poses complex challenges for governments. It cannot be assumed, however, that the fight against unemployment has the highest priority everywhere (Korpi 2002); it can conflict with other goals such as price stability, and occasionally the fight against unemployment is undertaken rather as a form of symbolic politics.

It is in this context in particular that the unemployed run the risk of being confronted with “blaming the victim” attitudes on the part of political leaders. Based on a long tradition of distinguishing between the “deserving” and the “undeserving poor,” there are repeated attempts to put many unemployed in the latter category, by representing unemployment as

voluntary or as an expression of an aversion to work. According to modernized versions of such theses, unemployment is caused above all by overly generous social benefits, which raise the reservation wage of the unemployed above the actual level of productivity or to where the marginal returns of employment would be too small compared to unemployment compensation. If such arguments, which are geared to moral hazard, cannot be wholly dismissed, they fail to recognize the possible positive effects of unemployment benefits. If unemployment benefits are contingent upon continuous contributions, they provide an incentive for gainful employment, and in the case of actual unemployment, unemployment benefits can alleviate the pressure to have to accept the next best job offer and thus improve the match between job and skills (Gangl 2004). In addition, one also has to take into account the non monetary benefits of employment, such as social contacts or prestige, which make many people accept employment that has little or no marginal return from an economic point of view.

LABOR MARKET POLICIES

It is difficult to provide an exact definition of labor market policies, given that some countries distinguish between a policy of fighting unemployment and a policy of maintaining or raising employment and others do not. In the field of labor market policies in the narrow sense, that is, policies directed at the unemployed, there is usually a distinction between “passive” and “active” labor market policies. Passive labor market policy refers to unemployment compensation; active labor market policy denotes measures that help bring the unemployed back to work. These distinctions are not as clear cut as they may seem at first sight, since the cutting down of benefits, which has occurred in most countries during the past decades, often has been justified on account of providing more “incentives” for the unemployed to actively engage in seeking work. Indeed, “activation” of the unemployed has been a central feature of recent labor market policies; in the European Union, this term serves as a central guideline, but the reforms in the US, often referred to as

“workfare” (Peck 2001) (i.e., making welfare receipt conditional on being engaged in paid work), likewise can be understood as activation. It may be useful to distinguish between at least two types of activation policies (Torfing 1999; Barbier 2004). “Low end” activation is based on providing low benefits and making them strictly conditional on the unemployed’s efforts in seeking work and undergoing “work test” measures. “High end” activation, while not necessarily opposing a tighter grip on the unemployed, emphasizes training the unemployed and possibly also more state sponsored or subsidized jobs, at least on a temporary basis. Both types of activation seem to bear fruit, as is testified by the success of such divergent countries as Britain on the one hand and Sweden or Denmark on the other. Yet it must not be forgotten that reducing unemployment usually also involves fiscal, monetary, and other types of policies. The Netherlands, for instance, has been rather successful not only in reducing unemployment but also in increasing female labor market participation (even though to a large extent based on part time work) due to a mix of policies of wage moderation, increased flexibility, tax and welfare reform, and a shift of jobs towards private services (Visser & Hemerijck 1997).

FUTURE OF UNEMPLOYMENT

Unemployment is frequently explained by the transition of capitalist societies to post industrial and post Fordist economies. Technological changes lead to a continual rise in productivity, and economic growth in many countries lags behind the ensuing job decline, so that one frequently talks about “jobless growth.” Earlier hopes that the jobs lost in the producing sector would be regained in the service sector have not come true in a number of countries. Negative utopias such as Jeremy Rifkin’s *The End of Work* (1995) picture a world in which computers, robots, biotechnologies, and the like render human work nearly completely superfluous. Globalization has in recent years become another hotly debated topic; as capital becomes more and more mobile, cheap labor in Eastern Europe or Asia poses a threat to

employment in those countries hitherto considered as the leading nations.

Yet the most likely consequences of globalization are more complex; as some jobs are “exported,” new jobs are created that are necessary for firms to survive on international markets. Firms increasingly act as multinational or transnational enterprises and work is distributed over many countries and linked by computer networks. The outcomes of these developments for national labor markets (which still exist for a vast majority of workers, higher transnational mobility on the bottom and the top of the hierarchy of jobs notwithstanding) are less than clear cut and may vary considerably between countries.

Such variation is even more likely in the light of different production regimes and social models; it is not at all clear that the more “liberal” and uncoordinated economies that can be found in many countries of the Anglo Saxon world are superior to the coordinated market economies that prevail on the European continent (Freeman 1998; Soskice 1999). While unemployment in Europe is at high levels, it has rightly been pointed out that this is largely due to the problems of four major economies: Germany, France, Italy, and Spain. Most other countries fare substantially better. On the other hand, the drawbacks of (nearly) full employment in countries such as Britain and the US should not be neglected: high wage inequality, large numbers of “working poor,” and in the US a huge number of imprisoned adults, mostly black, who otherwise would raise the unemployment rate by about 2 percentage points (Western & Beckett 1999). Yet it is obvious that the European economies, based largely on medium and high skilled jobs, have to increase their investments in human capital substantially if they do not want to lose ground and if they want to maintain their higher levels of equality. Also, inclusion of women in the labor market is still lagging considerably behind many Western European countries. At the same time, it may be increasingly necessary to loosen the hitherto tight connection between paid work and entitlements to welfare benefits, as job insecurity most likely will continue to grow and episodes of unemployment will be part of the life course of many individuals for the coming decades.

SEE ALSO: Capitalism; Labor Markets; Poverty; Social Exclusion; Unemployment; Welfare State

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uneven development

A. J. Jacobs

Uneven development refers to the inequitable spatial distribution of wealth and/or economic growth within a city, a metropolitan area, a nation state, or globally. The term also represents the simultaneous occurrence of economic and wealth expansion in one area accompanied by disinvestment and/or expanding poverty in another area. Urban scholars frequently have measured uneven development statistically, through an examination of the geographic distribution of income and employment within or among metropolitan regions, or by an analysis of changes in these and other variables among municipalities, over time. For example, Hill (1974) utilized zero order correlations to measure economic class and racial segregation by place within 127 American Metropolitan Statistical Areas. Jacobs (2003) compared the degree of place stratification in the Detroit and Nagoya Auto Regions by calculating the standard deviation divided by mean change in per capita income, population, and private employment in the two regions between 1969 and 2000 (i.e., the coefficient of variation) (see Jacobs 2005).

A prime case of interregional uneven development within a nation state was the large scale shift of industrial investment from the American Rustbelt (Northeastern and North Central US) to the American Sunbelt (Southeastern and Western US) that occurred during the 1970s and 1980s. A clear illustration of metropolitan uneven development has been the persistent post World War II out migration of population from American central cities to suburbia. In the case of the latter, many push and pull factors have contributed to these outcomes. The pull factors were fairly straightforward. The war,

combined with rapid economic growth in the US afterwards, created pent up demand for new housing in urban areas. However, in the early post war period, land in central cities was either unavailable or too expensive for the construction of new single family middle class residences. Therefore, Americans who dreamed of owning a home rather than renting, or owning a bigger and newer home with a backyard, were attracted to the open spaces and new housing in the suburbs. This phenomenon was supported by national monetary, tax, and infrastructure policies that made it possible for middle class families to receive secured, long term, low interest housing loans, and tax breaks for mortgage interest. It also made suburban locations greatly accessible to urban core employment centers through the construction and subsidizing of highways and water and sewer lines.

Unfortunately, the American dream was not open to everyone. Stated and latent national and local policies, such as those promulgated by the Federal Housing Administration (FHA), which recommended that banks only make loans in homogeneous areas, severely limited the housing opportunities of blacks, other minorities, and the poor. This served to exacerbate existing racial and class segregation in cities and metro areas; Gotham (2002) termed this racialized uneven development. It also allowed for the total abandonment of many inner city neighborhoods through restrictive covenants and bank redlining (e.g., the total refusal of banks to loan money in certain urban neighborhoods). The totality of these events dramatically heightened interracial animosity in the 1960s, especially in the industrial North. This served to accelerate central city white flight during the next decade. By the 1980s, hundreds of thousands of middle class jobs also had left for suburban green fields. The net result was rapid ex urban growth accompanied by massive fiscal shortages in the urban core, and place/spatial stratification by race, income, and educational and occupational status within many American metropolitan areas.

The academic literature on uneven development has been vast. Scholars of urban ecology were the first to conduct in depth studies examining the causes of spatial inequities. One of the most influential early twentieth century studies was Roderick McKenzie's *American Journal of*

Sociology essay, "The Concept of Dominance and World Organization" (1927). In this and other articles, McKenzie utilized biological metaphors to chronicle how human settlement patterns over time had led to a hierarchy of spatial locations. This system included the concentration of command and control activities in urban core areas, and the creation of specialized sub centers and subordinated periphery areas.

The Chicago School of urban ecology remained significant in the field of urban studies until the 1970s. Nevertheless, many of the most important studies of uneven development between the late 1950s and early 1970s focused on capitalism's impact on international inequities. In *Rich Lands and Poor*, Gunnar Myrdal argued that international place inequities were an inevitable social reality of modern capitalism, and that such unevenness naturally grew wider over time, as developed nations industrialized further, and investment and capital became more concentrated in these areas. In *Capitalism and Underdevelopment in Latin America*, André Gunder Frank argued that development and underdevelopment were like two sides of a coin. Drawing from the work of Paul Baran, he challenged the conventional economic thought of the time by claiming that global capitalism, rather than feudal backwardness, had been the primary cause of stagnation and poverty in certain nations and subnational regions, as well as metropolitan satellite polarization (developed-underdeveloped). Introducing dependency theory to North American scholarship, he maintained that uneven international and intranational outcomes were expected manifestations of metropolitan capitalist class extraction of surplus value from satellite labor.

While these studies and others were significant, perhaps the most important contributions to the discourse on uneven development during this period were those of Immanuel Wallerstein and Steve Hymer. Mirroring McKenzie, Wallerstein claimed that by the middle of the seventeenth century, capitalist development had already divided the world's territories into three unequal structural positions: core, semi periphery, and periphery. In his seminal piece, "The Multinational Corporation and the Law of Uneven Development" (1972), Hymer combined McKenzie's human ecology with Alfred Chandler's business organizational analysis to

explain the relationship between transnational corporations (TNCs or transnationals) and uneven spatial configurations (Hill & Feagin 1987). He argued that as a corporation evolved from a family firm to a TNC, territorial space was organized and reorganized locally and globally to reflect the internal organization of the firm. He suggested that like the nervous system in the body, political jurisdictions under the influence of TNCs became economically and socially dependent on such firms, rather than autonomous of them. This situation of dominance and subordination then served to both exacerbate social and economic divisions of labor and reproduce them on the spatial landscape.

It was the works of these two scholars that laid the foundation for the development of urban political economy. It has been this theory, whose advocates examine “the relationship between capitalism and urban organization on a global scale,” which has been the dominant paradigm in the study of spatial inequities over the past 25 years (Hill & Feagin 1987). For example, the global/world cities hypothesis (to be discussed later) is an urban centered derivative of Wallerstein’s world systems theory.

One other significant but under appreciated 1970s contribution to the discourse was Blue stone’s (1972) article. Here he wrote that uneven development was inevitable in the American economic system. Over time, those who controlled resources would tend to invest and reinvest in products, geographical areas, and workers that promised them the most profitable return on their investment. Conversely, disinvestment would occur over time in products, places, and people that the dominant class believed offered them a relatively low return on their investment. Moreover, he claimed that uneven development was not restricted to industrial investment alone, but also was clearly evident in employment, education, training, and health care opportunities. This was because American political and business leaders had a vested interest in maintaining an unequal distribution of resources, as it disproportionately concentrated wealth and political influence within a small circle of power elites. Based on this evidence, similar to Myrdal, Bluestone concluded that the American political economic system inherently produced “continuous growth and relative prosperity” in affluent areas and segments of society, and

relative stagnation and impoverishment in declining areas and sectors, with the gap between the haves and have nots growing wider over time.

The 1980s represented the peak period for the study of American urban and metropolitan uneven development. For the most part, scholars maintained that American metropolitan unevenness was best understood as a long term process evolving out of the actions of economic and political elites operating within a complex context of global, national, and local political economic and social forces. In other words, they believed that America’s particular forms of uneven development were deeply embedded within that nation’s specific national and sub national contexts. As Smith (1988) claimed, this has been why the widespread and pronounced sprawling development, urban fiscal stress, residential segregation by class, and depopulation of inner city areas in the US have generally not been found in other advanced capitalist states.

While the urban scholarship of the 1980s focused a great deal on unevenness within and among metropolitan areas, the discourse since the early 1990s has centered on the degree to which globalization has had an impact on spatial unevenness. Extending Wallerstein’s approach to the study of cities, global/world cities hypothesis theorists have argued that the continued globalization of the economic functions in modern industrial capitalism has created an international hierarchy/division of labor among cities and metropolitan areas. According to this view, expounded by John Friedmann, Saskia Sassen, and others, this hierarchy has served to expand inequities between core and periphery areas, between transnational elites and low skilled workers, and between dominant groups and racial minorities. In addition, it has led to an expansion of inner city ghettos, the development of a dual labor market within world cities, and to excessive rural–urban migration, and periphery–core immigration.

In contrast to global cities theorists, Richard Child Hill, Kuniko Fujita, and others propounding the nested city hypothesis have (re) asserted that national and local political economic contexts, rather than global capitalism, remain the decisive factors determining spatial configurations. Drawing from this approach, A.J. Jacobs claimed that over the past 30 years,

the US Federal Regulatory State's policies promoting fiercely competitive inter local relations, rather than inter local cooperation, have, in concert with subnational factors, served to accelerate suburban growth and central city hollowing in the Detroit Auto Region. Conversely, he argued that the reverse had been true in Japan, where national and subnational planning had fostered inter municipal collaboration, relatively balanced growth, and strong major cities in the that nation's auto region, Nagoya Tokai.

Over the next decade, cities and metropolitan areas will continue to dominate future research on uneven development. It is also clear that until a more integrated metatheory of spatial development becomes accepted, one which incorporates how the global, national, and local contexts all impact economic and social spatial patterns, the future scholarship on uneven development can be expected to teeter between global theories and embeddedness. Cross national comparative research should become a prominent method with which to both help settle this debate and shed light on a new metatheory.

SEE ALSO: Dependency and World Systems Theories; Global/World Cities; Metatheory; Metropolitan Statistical Area; Nation State; Residential Segregation; Transnationals; Urban Ecology; Urban Political Economy

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unions

Judith Stepan Norris

Unions are collections of workers who join together for the purpose of defending their common interests as employees. In capitalist societies, union representation provides many workers with their only potential for meaningful input in their workplaces. These workers benefit from unions because employers alone possess legal rights and authority over their property (both land and machinery), and therefore any single worker has limited bargaining power vis à vis an employer. In the unionized workplace, the hegemony of capital is manifested in a regime of production based on collective bargaining agreements, which are reinforced by the state. Still, capital's control over the workforce is never complete. Workers struggle and negotiate with employers over the terms of the regime.

When workers organize into unions their representatives normally negotiate collective bargaining agreements with management, which codify the terms and conditions of the labor process. These agreements (or contracts) specify workers' wages, hours, benefits, and seniority and grievance systems, whether or not workers may strike, and whether or not the union cedes managerial prerogatives for a specified period. The managerial prerogatives clause is especially important since it either does or does not give to management the right to hire, fire, discipline, plan production, and change production processes, etc. When this clause is absent, these rights are open for negotiation, usually through the grievance procedure. The contract also specifies the number of union representatives within the workplace. These representatives are called union stewards or committeepersons. Union stewards inform workers of their rights and represent them in grievances against employers.

Contracts may place a total, conditional, or no prohibition against strikes during the term of the agreement. Conditional prohibitions specify situations in which a strike is allowable. Whereas many collective bargaining agreements signed between the 1930s and the early 1950s in the US did not include strike prohibitions, the more recent pattern is for them to be included in these agreements. Still, unions that sign collective bargaining agreements with total strike prohibitions may strike once their contracts expire. Alternatively, workers sometimes take matters into their own hands by conducting "wildcat" strikes, which occur without union authorization.

There are several types of unions. The two main types are craft (or vertical) and industrial (or horizontal) unions. Following the lead of the medieval guilds, the earliest trade unions tended to organize craft workers by their skills. To become a member of a craft union, a worker must be proficient in that craft, and workers are organized across workplaces. As industrialization progressed, a larger proportion of the workforce was employed in non and semi skilled positions. The industrial unions organized workers by industries (e.g., auto, rubber, steel) and sought to represent all the workers within a particular workplace.

Individual national (and international) unions (e.g., the United Mine Workers of America) normally belong to national umbrella organizations such as the American Federation of Labor (AFL) or the Congress of Industrial Organizations (CIO). The pejorative term "dual unionism" is reserved for instances when two unions (usually belonging to different umbrella organizations) simultaneously organize workers within a single industry or trade. Although the mainstream US labor movement has considered dual unionism to be harmful, it may be associated with innovation and/or subsequent union growth. This was the case with the AFL's challenge to the Knights of Labor in the 1880s and with the CIO's challenge to the AFL in the 1930s.

Unionization rates vary over time, place, and industry. National rates of unionization vary from very low rates in the US and France to very high rates in the Scandinavian countries. The periods of increase in US union membership tend to coincide with the initiation of new and successful labor organizations, and the periods of decline have occurred as employment in highly unionized industries fell (especially when unions have not responded to the changing conditions). US union membership hit its peak during the 1950s, and has declined until the late 1990s, when the newly elected leadership of the American Federation of Labor Congress of Industrial Organizations (AFL CIO) began its emphasis on new organizing.

The level of democracy within unions has been an issue of heightened concern, especially during specific periods. The main charge is that unions tend to evolve into oligarchies that are unresponsive to workers' needs. Some researchers have pointed out that during certain periods, union democracy has been prevalent. So union democracy and oligarchy are "alternative possible paths of union development" (Stepan Norris & Zeitlin 2003).

Often, unions' efforts to organize workers were conducted in alliance with political parties. In Europe, unions tend to organize along industrial lines and to be affiliated with left of center political parties (some European countries also have had rival Christian, socialist, and/or communist unions). In the US there has been extensive involvement and interchange between

unions and political parties, but seldom any formal ties. Unions have both reacted to and influenced legislative change. In the early period of unionism, unions were prosecuted under existing and newly developed laws that served to control and/or eliminate them. Later, many such laws were repealed or modified. But considerable anti union legislation continues to exist. In the US the National Labor Relations (Wagner) Act of 1935 provided an important spur to union growth, while the 1947 Taft Hartley Act represented a severe setback for unions. In Great Britain the Combination Acts restricted and the Trade Union Act of 1871 liberalized labor laws.

Union organizing has been associated with conflict as well as a good deal of violence. Prior to the 1930s, US employers were given considerable leeway in protecting their property and often summoned the aid of state and federal troops to help. Taft and Ross's (1969) "grossly understated" estimate of US labor conflict casualties puts the death count at 700 and serious injuries at several thousand. They estimate that state and federal troops intervened in over 160 disputes. Although labor violence has decreased considerably over time, the US has had the most violent labor history of all industrialized nations.

SEE ALSO: Alienation; Bourgeoisie and Proletariat; Capitalism; Class Consciousness; Deindustrialization; Exploitation; Fordism/Post Fordism; Industrial Relations; Labor-Management Relations; Labor Movement; Mass Production; Taylorism; Work, Sociology of

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urban

Vincent N. Parrillo

Urban is one of those deceptive concepts that seem simple to grasp yet have many layers of complexity that are subject to varying interpretations, depending on one's theoretical and analytical predisposition. Derived from the Latin word *urbanus* (meaning characteristic of, or pertaining to, the city), *urban* essentially holds that same connotation to most people.

Complicating that understanding, however, are varying criteria among the 228 countries with urban populations. These criteria include *administrative function* (a national or regional capital), *economic characteristics* (more than half the residents in non agricultural occupations), *functional nature* (existence of paved streets, water supply, sewerage, and electrical systems), and *population size or population density*. Administrative function is used solely in 89 countries and in combination with other criteria in an additional 20. Economic is one of several criteria in 27 countries, as is functional in 19 countries; functional is also used solely in 5 countries. Population size or density is the sole criterion in 46 countries and in combination in an additional 42. No definition exists in 24 countries, while in Guadeloupe, Hong Kong, Kuwait, Monaco, Nauru, and Singapore the entire population is designated as urban.

Such differences make cross national comparisons difficult. For example, the lower range limit for population of an urban area ranges from 200 in Iceland to 10,000 in Greece. A universal standard, say a midpoint from these two extremes of 5,000 inhabitants, would be inappropriate in populous countries such as China or India, where rural settlements with no urban attributes at all could easily contain such large numbers. Using each country's own

criteria, the Population Reference Bureau (2003) reported that 47 percent of the world's population was urban. Significant variations existed: Africa, 33 percent urban; Asia, 38 percent; Europe, 73 percent; Latin America and the Caribbean, 75 percent; North America, 79 percent. In Canada and the US the urban population was 79 percent, while in the United Kingdom it was 90 percent. The lowest urban population (5 percent) was in Rwanda, while the highest (100 percent) were in the six countries previously identified.

For centuries the contrast between the city and its surrounding region was simple: urban (the spatially defined city) and rural (everything else). From the eras of ancient and medieval societies with walled cities to the pre industrial cities of commerce, most people lived outside the city. A symbiotic relationship then existed between the city and its hinterland. The latter provided the necessary agricultural products for survival and the city supplied leadership, protection, advances in science and technology, arts and crafts products, and various other luxury items mostly of value only to city dwellers.

Sociology was born in Europe, a child of the industrial and urban revolutions that transformed human existence. As millions left the countryside and flocked to work in the urban factories, a new breed of social observer analyzed these altered forms of social organization. Although they thought the city could be a liberating force from "barbarism to civilization," Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels (1976) were among the first to describe the excesses of industrialization and appalling lifestyle of exploited urban workers.

In a seminal masterwork, *Gemeinschaft and Gesellschaft* (1887), German sociologist Ferdinand Tönnies – openly acknowledging Marx's influence – described the contrasting elements of urban and rural life from a cultural perspective. His concept of *Gemeinschaft* (community) characterized the small village and surrounding area in which people united by close ties of family and neighborhood shared traditional values and worked together for the common good. In contrast to this "we ness," *Gesellschaft* denoted the "me ness" of the city, where a future orientation among a heterogeneous population replaced tradition, leading Tönnies

to a pessimistic view of the city as characterized by disunity, rampant individualism, and selfishness, even hostility. This typology of *Gemeinschaft* and *Gesellschaft* had a lasting influence on other urban sociologists.

Émile Durkheim (1962) also had an enduring effect. His emphasis on contrasting social bonds offered another perspective on urban and rural distinctiveness. He suggested that urban social order rested on an *organic solidarity* in which individual differences, greater freedom, and choice thrive in a complex division of labor where inhabitants are interdependent. Rural life, on the other hand, is organized around *mechanical solidarity*, with social bonds constructed on likeness (common beliefs, customs, rituals, and symbols), where inhabitants are relatively self sufficient and not dependent on other groups to meet all of life's needs.

For the first half of the twentieth century other social scientists continued in this twofold typology. Their examinations of urban growth and development (urban ecology) – and of behavior, communities, economics, lifestyles, politics, and subcultures within an urban context (urbanism) – mostly rested on a spatial or geographic emphasis on the central city. From this perspective, they examined different variables and compared them to non urban areas. In the century's second half, however, changing settlement patterns and the evolution of a global economy reduced the analytical value of this simplistic urban–rural dichotomy.

The post World War II suburban boom in Europe, Japan, and the US initiated an exodus from cities and a growing preference for that lifestyle. At first, this intermediary along the urban–rural continuum was easily understood. Suburbs were mostly bedroom communities on the cities' outskirts, where inhabitants typically lived in one family houses, but worked, shopped, and enjoyed leisure activities in the city. By ringing the central cities, the suburbs reinforced the original conception of *urban* in a spatial context, and were essentially viewed as residential appendages to the cities.

Much as pre industrial cities had a mutual interdependence with the hinterland, initially so too did twentieth century cities and suburbs. That changed with the development of suburban office and industrial parks, shopping malls, megastores, hospitals, and places of worship.

As the suburbs became more self sufficient, the definition of *suburban* changed into that of a third entity, an alternative to *urban* and *rural*. Even so, larger cities continued to extend their sphere of influence beyond their boundaries, particularly in such areas as culture, fashion, media, professional sports, sightseeing, and tourism. *Metropolitan* is the term describing that extended area of urban influence, which the US Census Bureau calls *metropolitan statistical areas* (MSAs). The official US urban population thus includes not just those living in cities, but also those living elsewhere in *urbanized areas* with populations of 2,500 or more, as well as those living in *urbanized zones* (unincorporated communities of less than 2,500, but on the fringes of metropolitan areas). Metropolitan areas, with varying definitions, exist throughout the world.

Sometimes metropolitan areas overlap each other in their spheres of influence, creating what Jean Gottman (1961) popularized as a *megapolis*. His example was the region extending from Boston to Washington. The Census Bureau identifies 18 such regions in the US and calls them *consolidated metropolitan statistical areas* (or CMSAs).

Spurred by increasing affluence, transportation improvements, and advances in telecommunications that allowed for working from home, a new form of "urban" living became apparent in the 1980s: the exurb. An *exurb* is an upper middle class community in an outlying semi rural community, where highly educated professionals seek an escape from more congested urban, even suburban, locales. Typically, their residences are large, expensive homes on large, wooded lots. This blend of urban attributes among residents in a semi rural locale blurred the previous clarity of *urban* based on a spatial conceptualization.

Disparities in urban definitions and the blurring of urban and non urban elements led social scientists into new considerations. Some scholars prefer a theoretical approach, such as *convergence theory*, which argues that technology will lead cities and communities everywhere to develop similar organizational forms. Its counter theory is *divergence theory*, which posits that increasingly dissimilar organizational forms will emerge because of differences in the (1) cultural values and histories; (2) timing

and pace of urbanization; (3) form of government and planning approaches; and (4) hierarchy of countries in the global economy. Another perspective, *postmodern theory*, rests on the premise that cities develop in ways that are no longer rational or manageable according to the old logic of urban ecology. Instead, global capitalism serves as the underlying rationale for actions by increasingly fragmented urban power structures.

In fact, the still growing world economic system and ease of worldwide telecommunications serve as the basis for arguments by the "new urban sociologists" that *urban* now displays a global character and is an international process. The economic welfare and changes in cities more often result from causes existing beyond their boundaries. Moreover, both the physical form and social life of cities result less from "natural" processes and more from political and economic institutions at the national and international levels that shape urban life. Conflicts between labor and management or among diverse population segments also impact on the physical and social characteristics of cities. This interplay of global, national, and local forces is an additional complicating factor in explaining what we mean by *urban*.

In the final analysis, *urban* remains subject to varying interpretations, with or without a spatial premise; with a local, regional, national, or global perspective; and with either a positive or negative emphasis. No matter what theoretical and conceptual approach one takes, the term nonetheless remains mostly suggestive of its Latin origins: that of particular qualities associated with people and patterns indeed found in cities.

SEE ALSO: Megapolis; Metropolis; Metropolitan Statistical Area; New Urbanism; Suburban; Urban Community Studies; Urban Ecology; Urban Policy; Urban Political Economy; Urban Rural Population Movements; Urban Space; Urbanism/Urban Culture; Urbanization

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urban community studies

Farah Gafford

Urban community studies consist of a range of case studies, comparisons, and local analyses that explore the local cultures, relationships, interactions and identities. As cities in the US experienced rapid growth during the early twentieth century, sociologists speculated about how the interactions and relationships in these urban settings would be influenced by a swelling population, advanced technology, and a mounting flow of immigrants. With the population of urban centers like Chicago approaching a population of 2 million in the early 1900s, urban centers provided sociologists with an opportunity to examine how inhabitants would adjust to the growing populations and the diversity within these spaces. The result of these early inquiries would be the establishment of a premier American school of urban sociology and a long tradition of urban community studies in the field of sociology.

The intellectual roots of urban community studies can be traced to Tönnies's *Community and Society* (1887) and Durkheim's *The Division of Labor in Society* (1893). Tönnies contrasted the types of human interactions present in pre-industrial societies to interactions in industrialized societies. He argued the *Gemeinschaft* world is characterized by close knit ties among family, kin, and neighbors. In these cohesive

societies, individuals are very familiar with one another. However, in the modern *Gesellschaft* world of the city, relationships are based on self interest, and close knit relationships are replaced by work based and interest based relationships. Continuing this line of thought, Durkheim discussed the type of relationships in societies with a complex division of labor. He argued that in areas characterized by large populations and a highly specialized form of division of labor, solidarity was no longer based on common values, but rather dependence and a reliance on each other's skills. Durkheim described this type of solidarity as *organic solidarity*. In a society with organic solidarity, it becomes harder for individuals to create bonds with each other. As a result, individuals in these societies experienced feelings of alienation.

Tönnies and Durkheim's classic generalizations about the interactions in industrialized societies can be identified in our definitions and perceptions of urban communities today. While community can be viewed as a particular geographic location, the concept of community also assumes that certain types of relationships and social ties exist. With this in mind, scholars typically agree that social ties, interaction, and geographic location are the three essential components for defining community (Hillary 1955).

Over the course of time, Tönnies and Durkheim's ideas on the social relations in urban areas would influence American sociology. Sociologists from the Chicago School were responsible for some of the most prominent studies on urban community life in the US. Comparing the city to an ecological system, studies out of the Chicago School viewed the neighborhood as part of a larger system. Robert Park and Ernest Burgess's *The City* (1929) used concentric circle models to demonstrate the growth of urban areas. The concentric model illustrates the outward expansion of the city from the core or the central business district. Within the zones of urban growth are local districts or communities and these in turn are subdivided into smaller areas called neighborhoods. According to the concentric model, neighborhoods tend to develop according to the growth and development of the city.

Prominent works out of the Chicago School tradition like Harvey Zorbaugh's *The Gold Coast and Slum* (1929) suggested that the term

community could only be loosely applied to several of the neighborhoods. He argued that in respect to some of the subdivisions of this area, community only served as a geographical expression. Neighborhoods within the area lacked common traditions and feelings associated with traditional societies. Although the studies out of the Chicago tradition made great contributions to sociology, the school's heavy emphasis on the city and larger ecological forces minimized the role of individuals in creating solidarity or a sense of community within their own neighborhoods.

Years later, Herbert Gans's *The Urban Villagers* (1962) found that a close set of relationships could exist in so called urban slum neighborhoods. In a slum neighborhood in Boston, Gans observed the interconnectedness of peer groups (or the peer group society), institutions (community), and the out group or outside world of the residents. The area Gans described had a sense of cohesion or solidarity that was fostered through interactions with peer groups that included not only family or relatives but neighbors as well. Gerald Suttles's *The Social Order of the Slum* (1968) also depicted a form of community solidarity in an urban slum district. Suttles's observations of a Chicago neighborhood found that various ethnic groups were able to share social spaces and connect over the sense of shared space despite intergroup tensions. The sense of belonging to the same place allowed the residents to unite in response to outside threats from other neighborhoods.

Over the past two decades, urban community scholars have focused on the concentration of poverty in metropolitan areas. There is a growing body of literature that seeks to examine the role of neighborhood poverty on individual life chances. The neighborhood poverty literature attempts to understand the connection between neighborhood poverty and unemployment, crime, high school completion, and out of wedlock births. While neighborhood effect studies represent a growing concern in the field of urban community work, one of the challenges for those who study neighborhood effects revolves around the conceptualization and measurement of neighborhood.

A neighborhood is more than just a physical location or geographic space. Urban scholars are usually interested in the interactions and

social networks that take place within a particular geographic space, hence the interchangeable use of the terms neighborhood and community. Small and Newman (2001) suggest there are various dimensions to neighborhood, such as a set of institutions, cultures, social spaces, and networks that should all be taken into consideration when designing research on neighborhood effects. Without considering the multiple layers of the concept of neighborhood, it becomes increasingly hard to determine the effects of neighborhoods on individuals.

Researchers who study the effects of neighborhoods also have to consider how neighborhoods are measured in their studies. Census tracts do not always provide an adequate operational definition of neighborhood. One limitation of using census tracts to operationalize neighborhoods is that it does not account for residents' perceptions of neighborhood boundaries. Small and Newman (2001) argue a resident's perception of the neighborhood boundaries can act as a determinant of how a neighborhood affects a resident. One alternative to using census tract data in neighborhood research is to use neighborhood clusters or boundaries drawn by the research for the purpose of studying neighborhood effects.

While contributions of the neighborhood effect literature delineate a range of social problems associated with urban community life, other scholars have attempted to highlight the agency of residents in urban communities. Instead of viewing communities as simply "containers of poverty," this vein of work attempts to demonstrate how residents assign meaning to their communities and how they negotiate the use of public spaces in neighborhoods. In the text *Streetwise* (1990), Anderson argues that the social life in the inner city community consists of various rules and strategies for various interactions. He examines how residents in an urban community negotiate the use of public spaces. Anderson argues that individuals who are streetwise understand the rules of interaction for specific places within the community. Streetwise individuals know how to interpret gestures and body comportment of those within the community. The mutual respect and understanding of the rules of interaction ultimately contribute to a social order of community life. Anderson emphasizes that although negotiating

public space in the community helps to maintain a certain order, it does not totally alleviate the social problems in the urban communities.

Gotham and Brumley (2002) examined how public housing residents “use space” in order both to create and reject identities. While the physical spaces in the neighborhood did influence the actions of the residents, the authors also argue that residents actively create safe spaces, and hot spaces (dangerous spots in the community), through their interactions and actions with one another. Using safe spaces allows residents to create respectable identities and to disavow the negative identities associated with public housing residents.

One of the oldest and most preferred methods used to study urban communities is ethnographic field research. In order to study certain urban communities, sociologists may move into a neighborhood or participate in various neighborhood meetings and organizations. The use of this method can also be traced to the early days of the Chicago School. Park and his colleagues produced a number of ethnographic case studies of neighborhoods. Some of the ethnographic studies out of the Chicago School tradition include William Whyte’s *Street Corner Society* (1943) – which focused on life in an Italian American slum district in Boston – and Drake and Clayton’s *Black Metropolis* (1945), a study of Chicago’s black residential neighborhoods.

Contemporary urban community studies continue to draw on the Chicago School sociological tradition of ethnographic case studies of communities. Recent sociological works from Mary Pattillo McCoy and Maria Kefalas (2003) provide ethnographic accounts of life in urban communities. Pattillo McCoy’s *Black Picket Fences* (1999) examines the social organization of a black middle class neighborhood in Chicago. Over a 3 year period, she embedded herself in neighborhood life by coaching cheerleading, participating in church and neighborhood meetings, and working on local campaigns. Kefalas’s *Working Class Heroes* (2003) is based on her observations and extensive field notes of meetings and events in a Chicago working class community. She uses ethnographic accounts to demonstrate how race and class shape residents’ attachment to place.

Ethnographic studies have been useful in understanding the organization of certain

neighborhoods and the interactions among the residents in urban communities. However, urban ethnographers face a range of challenges while conducting field research. Although a researcher may reside in a neighborhood with the hopes of carrying out research, there is still the issue of gaining access to the community. In many cases, urban ethnographies require the assistance of a gatekeeper. Gatekeepers are individuals who can assist researchers in navigating the community and gaining additional contact within the community (Whyte 1997). In Whyte’s *Street Corner Society* (1943) his key informant, Doc, was responsible for introducing him to other contacts in the community and helping him to learn the ropes in the community. Kefalas (2003) also indicates that her gatekeepers introduced her to other members of the community and served as unofficial tour guides. She also acknowledges that information from her informants provided a “foundation” for her work. In addition to gaining access to the field, researchers who study urban communities are also challenged with the task of connecting their work to larger social scientific questions and concerns. Ethnographic studies of urban communities offer audiences vivid depictions of the lives of inhabitants, but thick descriptions and narratives alone will not advance the field of sociology. The data from these ethnographies should advance sociological knowledge by either generating theory or expanding existing theory.

Urban community scholars also rely on survey methods to test models of community participation and residents’ attachment to place. For instance, one of the most common models used to explain social interaction in communities is the systemic model put forth by Kasarda and Janowitz (1974). The systemic model suggests that length of residence is more important in predicting attachment to community than variables such as community size and density. Using survey data, the scholars provided support for the systemic model and rejected the linear development model that suggests that size and density are the primary factors that influence attachment to community. Guest (2000) addresses some of the limitations of the systemic model by considering the role of extra community relations in community attachment.

In addition to testing the models that explain the level of interaction within communities,

researchers have used survey studies to test the social disorganization of inner city neighborhoods. For example, Rankin and Quane (2000) use survey research to test the social isolation thesis by examining the importance of neighborhood characteristics on the networks and community participation of residents. Although survey research has been useful in developing and supporting community models, it can be difficult to find data sets that contain information on a variety of neighborhoods and information on both neighborhood characteristics and individuals (Ainsworth 2002).

Future community research will have to address a range of issues. Sociologists have already recast the community lost debate, or the argument that the tight knit associations and interactions among people in a geographic location are gradually eroding. As virtual communities become more prevalent feature of our society, urban community scholars will have to consider how urban communities will be affected by the occurrence of virtual communities. While virtual communities and cyberspace represent a new set of challenges for urban scholarship, some issues linger from previous decades. Urban community scholars are still faced with some of the similar issues that Park and his colleagues addressed over 60 years ago. Issues like immigration, swelling urban areas, and residential segregation are still features of the urban landscape. However, unlike their predecessors, urban scholars now have to tackle these issues in the context of globalization.

SEE ALSO: Chicago School; Ecological Models of Urban Form; Ethnography; Robert E. Park, Ernest W. Burgess, and Urban Social Research; Urban; Urban Ecology; Urban Poverty; Urbanism/Urban Culture; Urbanization

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urban crime and violence

Walter S. DeKeseredy

Defining crime and violence is the subject of much debate. In fact, a review of the extant social scientific literature on these topics reveals a myriad of definitions. However, here, the focus is limited to illegal interpersonal behaviors that threaten people's social, economic, and physical well being. More specifically, the behaviors examined here are acts such as homicide, assault, robbery, theft, and drug dealing. While these harms affect both rural and urban communities, most of them occur in large metropolitan areas characterized by concentrated poverty and racial segregation (DeKeseredy et al. 2003).

Why are people who live in these neighborhoods at higher risk of committing and/or being victimized by crime? Not surprisingly, there are competing answers to this question. For example, heavily influenced by variants of Marxist thought, one group of scholars contends that lethal and non lethal crimes plaguing these disenfranchised communities are symptoms of the following factors: the rise of the "contingent" workforce; the outmigration of

people who can afford to leave poor urban communities; transnational corporations moving operations to developing countries to pay lower salaries; the "suburbanization" of employment; the implementation of high technology in work places; and the shift from a manufacturing to a service based economy (Massey & Denton 1993; Wilson 1996).

Another group of critical theorists argues that the above structural factors are, indeed, key predictors of urban crime, but asserts that it is a combination of these determinants and relative deprivation that motivate people to commit crimes, most of which are intra racial and intra class in nature (Young 1999). There are also sociologists driven by social disorganization theory who state that crime in socially and economically excluded neighborhoods is associated with an absence of collective efficacy. This concept refers to "mutual trust among neighbors combined with a willingness to intervene on the behalf of the common good, specifically to supervise children and maintain public order" (Sampson et al. 1998: 1). Generally, high crime rates are more likely to be located in urban neighborhoods characterized by anonymity, weak social ties with neighbors, and diminished control over people's behavior. However, collective efficacy does not completely mediate the relationship between a community's structural characteristics and crime. For example, Sampson et al. (1997) found that, after controlling for collective efficacy, concentrated disadvantage still exerted independent effects on violent crime.

Another widely read and cited perspective on the relationship between poverty and urban crime is culture of poverty theory. Developed by Oscar Lewis in 1966, this account is popular among and promoted by conservatives. Banfield (1974) is one well known culture of poverty theorist and he asserts that the values of poor and more affluent people are distinct. For Banfield, unlike more affluent people, the poor commit crime because they lack the discipline and moral fiber to avoid breaking the law if it means achieving short term gains. There are more recent culture of poverty theories and because they are well documented elsewhere, they are not reviewed here. Nevertheless, an important point to consider is that these perspectives fail to recognize that the poor and

affluent have the same goals and values. Both groups want to be happy, have jobs, decent standards of living, a warm and loving family, a safe neighborhood, and so on. However, only those near or at the top of the socioeconomic ladder have legitimate means of achieving the American Dream and its related status, which is why they are much less likely to engage in criminal forms of anti social behavior on the streets and elsewhere.

Of course, there are other theories of urban crime and violence and new ones are likely to be developed and tested in the near future. Further, those who study crime in urban communities use a variety of research methods to uncover rich qualitative and quantitative data on a wide variety of illegal activities. Still, there are major shortcomings in the extant empirical and theoretical literature on urban crime that must be overcome or minimized. For example, so far, most of the scholarly attention focuses on western industrialized nations and thus we know very little about urban crime in less developed societies (Crutchfield & Wadsworth 2003). Note, too, that there is a conspicuous absence of empirical and theoretical work on male to female intimate violence in poor and racially segregated communities, despite the fact that a few recent studies show that this is the most common form of criminal victimization experienced by women living in them (DeKeseredy & Renzetti 2004).

Another issue worth noting is that crime in public housing communities has received little sociological attention. In fact, to date, most of the information on violent and other offenses occurring in North American urban public housing communities is produced by journalists who portray crimes committed by and against those who live there as little more than "aberrations in an otherwise well functioning system" (Reiman 2001: 173). Fortunately, however, international scholarship on crime in public housing is starting to grow. Even so, most of this work is quantitative in nature and hence there is a major need for more rich ethnographic work on the contexts in which crimes in these impoverished social settings occur (Lab 2003).

Undoubtedly, these criticisms will be effectively addressed in the near future. Still, for those who directly and indirectly suffer from criminal victimization, the question of what is

to be done is much more important than the advancement of scholarship. Obviously, there are many prevention and control strategies currently in place, but most are simply aimed at “fixing poor people” (Crutchfield & Wadsworth 2003). Consider the massive expansion of the US prison population and major cutbacks to the welfare state. These policies, combined with the growing gap between the rich and poor, will only increase the amount of urban crime. Clearly, it is time for a new policy agenda. Rather than punishing the poor and minority populations, progressive scholars argue that we should strive to create stable quality employment, healthy public schools, a higher minimum wage, and other policies that reduce inequality and the anger and frustration it causes.

SEE ALSO: Collective Efficacy and Crime; Crime; Poverty; Social Exclusion; Urban; Urban Poverty; Urban Space; Violence; Violent Crime

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urban ecology

Michael J. White and Ann H. Kim

Urban ecology is the study of community structure and organization as manifest in cities and other relatively dense human settlements. Among its major topics, urban ecology is concerned with the patterns of urban community sorting and change by socioeconomic status, life cycle, and ethnicity, and with patterns of relations across systems of cities. Of particular concern is the dynamic evolution of cities and contrast in urban structure across time periods, societies, and urban scale. The notion of community is central to urban ecology; a premise of the ecological approach is that the aggregation of persons into communities has important implications for their life chances, for the behavior of groups, and for aggregate outcomes. A further aspect of community organization lies in its geographic manifestation, although a mere geographic reductionism would not accurately capture the theoretical or empirical approach of the ecological perspective.

A sub area of human ecology – a social science paradigm that seeks to understand the relationship between human organization and its environment, both in terms of physical setting and sustenance – the study of urban ecology has been interdisciplinary. Work in ecology has touched on sociology, demography, geography, economics, and anthropology, usually emphasizing the urban sectors of those disciplines. And at various times, human urban ecology has been more or less connected to biological ecology.

As Franklin Wilson argued, ecology is one of the oldest specializations within sociology and the intellectual roots of urban ecology can be found in the origins of sociology itself. For example, Émile Durkheim's *The Division of*

Labor in Society (1893) argued that modern societies are comprised of functionally interdependent units that are necessary for their survival and progress. As an explicit sociological approach, urban ecology is particularly associated with the Chicago School of sociology in the early twentieth century, even though the connection extends to a wide range of scholars and groups interested in cities and in population processes. The massive growth of cities at this time, fueled by the immigration of diverse origin populations, helped spur the interest in urban form and function, and hence urban ecology as a subject of interest.

These early thinkers attempted to establish a parallel for human behavior with the topic of ecology in biology to describe local biotic communities. Collections of organisms are seen as communities, and the membership and evolution of communities are seen in a framework of interdependence. Sociological approaches almost universally invoke notions of ecology that are at once aggregate, interdependent, and embedded in a spatial and environmental context. Thus, communities of plants and animals find their parallel in communities of human groups. Both approaches see competition for resources in a spatially delimited setting. A further aspect of the framework is the concept of sustenance, in which one considers the manner in which local organisms, here humans, are sustained by the environment and by organization.

Studies at this time of specific urban communities, such as Louis Wirth's *The Ghetto* (1928) and Harvey Zorbaugh's *The Gold Coast and the Slum* (1929), and of city form and subcommunities more generally, such as Robert Park, Ernest Burgess and Roderick McKenzie's *The City* (1925), offer key illustrations of early treatments by the Chicago School, also known as the classical position. Additional concern in this era was with land rents and gradients, which not only helped explain the distribution of social groups, but also connected to the evolving interest in urban economics.

These early notions of human ecology gave way to more statistically intensive and geographically driven analyses of human organization in urban physical space. Considerable analysis was devoted in the middle to late twentieth century to the dimensions of urban social

structure. These included extensive analyses of patterns of residential segregation, urban growth, and differentiation. The application of factor analysis, or "factorial ecology" in the nomenclature, identified life cycle, socioeconomic status, and ethnicity as key dimensions of urban ecological sorting.

The ecological approach then came under criticism from various quarters, the most notable early critic being Milla Alihan. The biological metaphor was seen as strained, limiting the crucial elements of human volition and cognition. Urban ecology was also at risk of appearing spatially deterministic and attention to the relative spatial position and mapping of social phenomena lent credence to the critique. Furthermore, ecological approaches were criticized methodologically, even generating a phrase, "the ecological fallacy," that has traversed into general social science parlance. The fallacy is the error of making inferences about individual behavior from analysis of phenomena at the aggregate level.

In the middle of the twentieth century, human (and hence urban) ecology received additional formulations, with perhaps the broadest theoretical treatment arising in Amos Hawley's *Human Ecology* (1950). This treatise emphasized the study of the community and the dynamic connections among individuals, human organization, and the environment. Around the same time the widely adopted POET framework came to the fore: Population, Organization, Environment, Technology. This POET paradigm is also part of the neoclassical or neo-orthodox approach and it provides an intellectual rubric for organizing the thinking about urban phenomena and community processes within them.

Much work carried out from the mid twentieth century for the next several decades was ecological in approach, if not always explicit in name. While one stream of research concentrated on the internal structure of cities, another focused on systems of cities and the relationships among them. Analyses of residential segregation by ethnic and socioeconomic group, the relationship between urban economic base and population growth, and some international comparisons of internal urban structure all took place at this time. Similarly, analysis of metropolitan functional specialization, trade, and the

comparative growth of urban settlements were undertaken from an ecological vantage point.

These efforts were again followed by critiques from a variety of points, including Marxist and political economy perspectives. Both explicit and implicit criticisms suggested that the ecological approach missed several crucial elements in the study of urban development, structure, and change: the role of the state, local governments, and capital interests. At the same time, the combination of methodological concerns and the availability of microdata made the classic ecological style of aggregate analysis less attractive.

With the reemergence of concerns for urban issues generally and neighborhood issues specifically, various aspects of urban ecology achieved visibility or were reinvented in the late twentieth century. New data forms and methodological developments helped spur this turn. The wider concern for social exclusion, especially as it had a community or spatial manifestation, incorporated the ecological approach. The framework also continues to be relevant and widely used in the study of ethnic groups. In fact, the increasing ethnic diversification of high income societies provides increasing impetus for the ecological approach, as Park's adage that spatial distance reflects social distance is put to the test in new settings. Interest in residential integration and sorting still involves the analysis of community patterns of ethnic concentration. Moving beyond classical ecology as applied to ethnic and racial groups, contemporary treatments examine dynamic changes in residential environments, such as in residential attainment, where a minority or disadvantaged group achieves residential parity with members of the advantaged majority. Such work is an extension of classical concerns for the process of residential succession.

An additional research theme is the restructuring of urban areas in light of significant transportation, communication, and industrial transformations. Scholars have noted the trend for the spatial decentralization of urban growth (e.g., suburbanization and urban sprawl, land use patterns, and corporate activity). Where limitations in transportation and communications necessitated spatial proximity in the past, current technology, to some extent, liberates producers, suppliers, workers, and consumers

from this constraint. Regional factors, including policy variation and climate, may also play a role in shifting urban development. In this context, new urban forms and systems of interurban hierarchy emerge.

A more methodological avenue of ecological investigation accompanies the exploitation of multi level or contextual data, in which individual data (microdata) is merged with characteristics of neighborhoods or a wider geographic area. Individual (person, household) behavior then, is taken to be predicted not only by individual traits, but also by characteristics of the local community. Indeed, the rapid development of the "neighborhood effects" literature, both substantively and methodologically, can be seen as a major intellectual current within sociology (Sampson et al. 2002), and this current taps directly into the central themes of urban ecology. Similarly, the broad interest in the problem of the macro micro link overlaps significantly with ecologists' interest in community, in multiple levels of aggregation, and in dynamic interchange. Such studies have examined the determinants of escaping distressed neighborhoods, the choice of new neighborhood as a function of its ethnic composition, community effects on child development and crime, and the role of neighborhood traits in determining health outcomes.

The multi level ecological approach is involved at a larger geographic scale, as well. The existence of social inequalities in health motivates a vein of research in which metropolitan income inequality is seen as playing a role in health outcomes such as infant and child mortality. Such studies have been carried out in some detail for the US. International comparisons also exist, where the "ecological" or aggregate measure is the level of inequality measured at the country level.

The predisposition of urban ecological analysis to spatial phenomena has made urban ecology readily receptive to the use of geographic information systems (GIS). More than merely mapping, GIS technology applied to urban ecology allows the analyst to redefine communities and networks, and to link micro to macro. Whereas social scientists were once bound by the community aggregation defined by others (such as a census agency's tract or ward boundaries), the availability of point coordinates

assigned to each person or housing unit, and to natural features and economic activities, would allow a more variegated and refined analysis of the relationship between human organization, sustenance activity, community, and territory. Tests for spatial autocorrelation, which examine the effect of proximity, further add to our toolkit for understanding urban structure and organization.

Such technological developments have stimulated a reconnection with biological ecology. Urban ecological analysis provides a framework for examining integrated human natural systems. Indeed, in several institutional and academic settings, the use of the phrases "urban ecology" and "human ecology" explicitly link human behavior to the biological environment. Here again human activity is seen as dynamic and community based, both influencing and influenced by its surrounding environment.

While urban ecology may be identified most clearly with American urban sociology and the Chicago School particularly, its adherents and manifestations are much broader. For example, it has been linked to the work of the French historian Fernand Braudel, who studied social system changes in the Mediterranean. It has been applied in analyses of urbanization in socialist countries as well as in the developing world. The paradigm was used to describe the somewhat inverted settlement patterns in Latin American cities. It has further found occasional expression in describing North African and European cities, where ethnic diversity had not yet achieved so clear a place in urban form. Still, the level of knowledge about urban ecology for settings outside of high income societies is less developed. It is far from certain that the models once applied to North America and Europe (and selected other locations) will apply so readily to other portions of world geography, especially to urban settings in developing countries. Yet themes of internal urban structure, geographical disparities in well being, and community change are relevant to all of these settings.

SEE ALSO: Ecological Models of Urban Form: Concentric Zone Model, the Sector Model, and the Multiple Nuclei Model; Residential Segregation; Urban; Urbanism/Urban Culture

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urban education

Alan R. Sadovnik

Urban education has been the subject of ongoing discussions in the US, with policies aimed at urban school improvement vigorously debated over the last 40 years. Since the 1960s, as cities became increasingly poor and populated by minority groups, urban schools have reflected the problems associated with poverty. Although rural and many suburban schools have similar problems, urban schools represent the most serious challenges. A significant percentage of urban schools have been labeled in need of improvement under federal No Child Left Behind (2002) guidelines, with large city school systems having dropout rates at or above 40 percent and student achievement well below 50 percent proficiency in mathematics and reading. Despite these alarming data, there are significant numbers of high performing urban

schools and a number of reform programs that show promise (Tractenberg et al. 2002).

As urban areas became increasingly poor and segregated, their school systems mirrored the problems of urban poverty, including low student achievement, high student mobility, high dropout rates, and high levels of school failure. Due to the concentration of poor and minority populations in urban areas, urban public schools have significantly higher proportions of low socioeconomic and minority students than their surrounding suburbs. Over the past four decades, affluent white families have either moved to the suburbs or sent their children to private schools. In 2003 the enrollments of some of the 12 largest city school districts in the US were overwhelmingly minority, with the percentage of white students ranging from a low of 5.2 percent in Detroit to a high of 16.4 percent in Philadelphia and the percentage of African American and Hispanic students combined ranging from a low of 73.4 percent in New York to a high of 92.9 percent in Detroit (Ladson Billings 2004).

Student achievement in urban schools mirrors the relationship between socioeconomic status (SES), race, ethnicity, and educational performance. Students from lower SES backgrounds have lower levels of academic attainment and achievement than students from higher SES backgrounds. African American and Hispanic students also have lower academic achievement than white and Asian American students. Given their high percentage of poor and African American and Hispanic students, urban schools reflect the achievement gaps that NCLB is designed to eliminate.

Since the 1960s the achievement gaps based on social class, race, ethnicity, and gender have been the focus of educational policy, especially in urban areas. These gaps include both group differences in achievement based on standardized tests and grades; attainment based on years of schooling, high school and college attendance and graduation and dropout rates and completion of honors and advanced placement courses; and opportunity based on access to qualified teachers, challenging curriculum placement in special education and investments in education, including state and local funding. The gaps include higher academic achievement by high income students compared to

low income students, white and Asian American students compared to African American and Hispanic students, even when controlling for socioeconomic level, and male students compared to female students. There have been some improvements since the 1960s, with the gender gap closing dramatically and in some cases with women outperforming men, and social class, race, and ethnic differences lessening until 1988. However, the social class, race, and ethnic achievement gap widened since 1988, despite continued educational policies aimed at reducing them (US Department of Education 2000).

The reasons for the differences in achievement are complex, including factors both outside and inside the schools. Rothstein (2004) argues that much of the achievement gap is due to factors related to poverty, such as inadequate housing, health care, and environmental problems, including lead paint and other toxins in the urban environment. Although this is the case, it is undoubtedly also true that factors within urban schools contribute to low achievement. These include unequal funding, unqualified teachers, low expectations and dumbed down curricula, and high turnover of teachers and principals.

With respect to investments, in 2001 the nation had an effective funding gap between highest and lowest poverty districts of \$1,256 per student, \$31,400 for a typical classroom of 25 students, and \$502,392 for a typical elementary school of 400 students. These gaps vary by state, with some such as Illinois, New York, and Pennsylvania having large gaps and some such as Delaware, Massachusetts, Minnesota, and New Jersey providing more funding to high poverty districts (Education Trust 2004). These funding gaps are most pronounced in large differences between urban and suburban districts. While some states, most notably New Jersey, have eliminated these differences through court intervention, children in most US cities receive considerably less funding than their suburban neighbors.

NCLB's requirement that all schools have highly qualified teachers in every classroom highlighted the problem of unqualified teachers in urban schools, many of whom were teaching out of their field of expertise. However, while most teachers meet the highly qualified standards of NCLB, the data indicate significant

numbers of classrooms staffed by teachers who are not highly qualified in the particular subject taught. This is the result of the practice called out of field teaching – teachers being assigned to teach subjects which do not match their training or education. This is a crucial practice because highly qualified teachers may actually become highly unqualified if they are assigned to teach subjects in which they have little training or education. At the secondary school level, about one fifth of classes in each of the core academic subjects (math, science, English, social studies) are taught by teachers who do not hold a teaching certificate in the subject taught. The data also show that urban schools, especially low income ones, have more out of field teaching than others.

Problems in staffing urban schools have less to do with teacher shortages and more to do with organizational issues inside schools. Principals often find it easier to hire unqualified teachers than qualified ones and the absence of status and professionalism and poor working conditions in teaching lead to high dropout rates in the first five years of teaching. Therefore, urban districts are constantly replacing teachers, which has significant consequences since it takes years to become an expert teacher. Rates of teacher attrition and misassignment are more prevalent in urban and high poverty schools (Ingersoll 1999, 2003). Ingersoll's research suggests that programs aimed at solving urban school staffing problems at the supply level through alternative teacher education programs such as Teach for America, the New York City Teaching Fellows Program, and New Jersey's Alternative Certification Program (all of which allow college graduates with majors in their teaching field to enter teaching without traditional certification through a college teacher education program) fail to address the organizational problems within schools that are responsible for high turnover rates.

Data from the Education Trust (2004) indicate that many urban schools do not have rigorous academic curricula for all of their students, often track a significant number into non academic programs, and have low expectations for success for a majority of their students. Bryk et al. (1993) argue that one of the reasons that urban parochial schools have higher academic achievement for low income

students of color is that these schools require a rigorous academic college preparatory curriculum for all of their students.

Despite these problems, there are also numerous examples of highly successful urban schools (Education Trust 2004). For example, in Newark, New Jersey, taken over by the New Jersey Department of Education in 1995 for, among other things, low student achievement, there are a number of district and public charter schools with high poverty and high minority populations that perform not only above the state averages, but also at the same levels as those in the highest socioeconomic districts (Barr 2004). Over the past 15 years a variety of educational policies have been implemented to replicate these schools and to improve urban schools. These include school finance litigation, comprehensive whole school reform programs, effective school models, school choice (including charter schools and private school vouchers), and state takeover of failing urban districts (Tractenberg et al. 2002).

These educational reforms have the potential to improve urban schools; however, by themselves they are limited in reducing the achievement gaps (Anyon 2005; Rothstein 2004) unless they also address the factors outside of schools responsible for educational inequalities. In addition to school based programs such as early childhood programs, summer programs, and after school programs, Rothstein (2004: 129–50) calls for economic programs to reduce income inequality and to create stable and affordable housing, and the expansion of school community clinics to provide health care and counseling. He also warns that although school finance suits are necessary to ensure that all children receive an adequate education, without addressing the economic forces outside of schools they will not be sufficient. Rothstein (a liberal) and Anyon (a radical) both conclude that school reform is necessary but insufficient to reduce the achievement gaps without broader social and economic policies aimed at reducing the effects of poverty.

These descriptions of US urban education and urban educational reforms are mirrored internationally. For example, research in the UK (Mortimore & Whitty 1999; Walford 1999; Power et al. 2001) indicates that students living in urban areas and disadvantaged minorities

achieve at lower levels than more affluent students. Mortimore and Whitty (1999) and Power et al. (2001) describe similar policies aimed at improving urban education and argue that although school reforms can make a difference, policies aimed at eradicating poverty must complement these. Whitty (1997), Walford (1999), Ladd (2002), and Plank and Sykes (2003) have examined the impact of school choice policies internationally to improve urban schools. Their research suggests that these policies have mixed success at best. Similar problems and policies have been described in Australia (Singh 2005) and numerous other countries (Cookson et al. 1992).

SEE ALSO: Bilingual, Multicultural Education; Educational Inequality; Educational and Occupational Attainment; Parental Involvement in Education; Race and Schools; School Choice; School Segregation, Desegregation; Schools, Charter; Schools, Magnet; Urban Policy

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urban movements

Hans Pruijt

Urban movements are social movements through which citizens attempt to achieve some control over their urban environment. The urban environment comprises the built environment, the social fabric of the city, and the local political process.

An alternative current term is “urban social movements.” Pickvance (2003) suggested that the term “urban movements” is to be preferred because it is more straightforward, analogous to “environmental movement” instead of “environmental social movement.”

The sociological study of urban movements emerged in the aftermath of May 1968. Previously, urban sociology had tended to focus on community and social integration, at the expense of neglecting the political economy of urban development and conflicts of interest. One of the first to set out to fill this gap was Manuel Castells. In *The Urban Question* (1972) he presented a model of the dynamics of the urban system in which there was one single mechanism for structural change. He called this mechanism “urban social movements.” Around the same time, citizens in many cities around the world were mobilizing in response to problems in the urban environment, which helped generate interest in the topic; a number of sociologists drew inspiration from their personal experience as participants in these mobilizations.

The urban movement literature shows a wide range of problems that citizens have responded to with collective action. A large section can be categorized under the heading of “collective consumption”: housing shortages, growing discrepancies between rents and wages, landlords’ neglect of maintenance – even up to the point of abandonment – and insufficient health care and education. In developing countries, shantytown dwellers face a lack of water supply, sewers, and electricity. A second set of action provoking problems is related to urban planning: displacement and destruction of beloved cityscapes. Finally, specific groups have mobilized around highly specific issues, such as squatters against anti squatter policies, property owners against proposed social housing and against property taxes, racist groups against migrants.

Urban movements tend to draw on a relatively stable set of familiar types of action. The action repertoires found in urban movements very much overlap with the action repertoires of other social movements. Some items, however, are specific for urban movements: the rent strike, squatting, and developing alternative spatial plans.

Organizational patterns can be bottom up or top down. Bottom up mobilization involves building networks of activists and occasional participants, the creation of committees, possibly formal organizations, newsletters, and neighborhood centers. An example in which substantial bottom up mobilization occurred was the 1970s Citizen Movement in Madrid. Top down mobilization occurs when political parties build local organizations, such as in the case of the land squatter movement of Santiago de Chile from 1965 to 1973, or when political groups try to take over or make use of a movement that started in a bottom up fashion. This occurred in the later stages of the Madrid Citizen Movement (examples from Castells 1983). Top down involvement of political groups or parties is often viewed as detrimental because it can entail a transformation into state oriented bureaucracy, and because it clashes with the prevalent ideal of self management (Castells 1983).

Often, urban movements exhibited a capacity for transcending social borders, such as through cross class mobilization. This has taken the shape of horizontal cooperation of participants from different class backgrounds (as in urban squatters’ movements), or instead middle class activists (such as students) helping poor people (such as immigrant workers). Some urban movements, however, have been restricted in terms of the participants’ ethnicity (such as black and Latino mobilizations in US cities in the 1960s and 1970s), class (e.g., rent strikes), or age (the Italian Social Centers Movement).

The relatively prominent role of women in urban movements – as far as social movements go that are not specific women’s movements – has often been noted. An example is the 1922 tenants’ protest in Veracruz, Mexico (Castells 1983). One explanation for this phenomenon points to the special role of women in collective consumption.

Protest goals are often clear and measurable, such as preventing a particular planned transformation in the built environment, ensuring that particular buildings are repaired instead of being abandoned, getting a street closed to through traffic, preventing the eviction of a building, or achieving a rent reduction. In studies of urban movements we tend to find ample

information on whether such goals have been attained. The resulting picture shows a mix of failure and success; it is evident that urban movements can have clear effects. The clearest are the effects of activists' victories in planning conflicts. In several cities (such as Amsterdam), the map shows the traces of urban highway construction projects that were abandoned in mid execution: a wide street, created as a stretch of urban highway after razing blocks left and right, stopped dead in a maze of ancient streets. Newly built houses or renovated buildings may be seen solidifying the protest movement's victory because the gap that they leave is only wide enough for a narrow street.

Beyond cancelation of individual construction projects we find wholesale transformations of urban planning, in a direction that more or less conforms to demands made by activists. An example is the influence that Castells (1983) ascribed to the Madrid Citizens Movement. Urban movements often are pre sentient of what later becomes accepted planning wisdom.

Ideally, claims about turns in urban history caused by protest are bolstered by an analysis of the decision making process and by an attempt to sort out movement influence from other factors, such as financial constraints.

Protesters' victories may be partial, such as a cap put on a rent increase instead of succeeding in preventing it completely, or being unable to prevent an eviction but instead securing rehousing. Also, there may be unintended effects, such as protests against eviction of squats leading to legalization. Some point to the risk that urban action can be self defeating: improvements in low income neighborhoods might attract gentrification, which forces the original inhabitants out of their neighborhood.

Some confusion exists as to whether urban movements should be seen as either instrumental movements or identity movements. The clarity in terms of goals that cases of urban protest often possess does not exist at the level of the movement. Movements do not need overarching goals, nor do they need a high level of organizational unification. Therefore, goals ascribed to urban movements tend to be somewhat arbitrary. For example, the same Dutch squatters' movement has been described by some as a "new social movement" or identity movement aiming

to create a new way of life, and by others, equally justifiably, as an instrumental movement fighting for affordable housing.

Urban movement studies tend to move beyond recording and explaining victories and defeats in individual cases of urban action and conflict. A question that has commanded much attention is the contribution that urban movements might make to social change. Castells, especially, has been involved in the search for a general theory. At first (e.g., in his 1972 book *The Urban Question*) he elaborated the idea that urban movements had a latent function in the class struggle. He stated that urban movements could only be significant for social change if they linked up with organizations involved in the class struggle in the sphere of production.

In a later attempt, Castells (1983) stated that the local focus of urban movements precludes transformation of production, communication, and government; the kind of social change that urban movements would be capable of producing is resistance to domination, or, in other words, changing the "urban meaning," resulting in "reactive utopias." Urban movements could achieve their maximum potential for social change (Castells reserved the title of urban *social* movement for this condition) when they were multi issue, pursuing all of the following three goals: (1) realizing collective consumption demands (such as those related to social housing) within a framework of promoting the city as a use value against commodification; (2) establishing and strengthening an autonomous cultural identity and promoting communication instead of "programmed one way information flows"; and (3) territorially based self management. Other criteria were explicit consciousness that active groups were part of a wider social movement, solidarity with other parts of the movement, expression of movement themes in the media, and – without giving up autonomy – the maintenance of links with professionals and political parties. Castells's model seems most fruitful when treated as an ideal type, i.e., as a conceptual tool for discussing similarities and differences between urban movements. Since the model does not include contextual variables and scarcely any action variables, not too much explanatory value is to be expected.

Rise, fall, and transformation of urban movements have been subject to analysis as well. In his early writings, Castells suggested that mobilization can be explained by the intensity of urban problems or the contradictions behind these. This stimulated other urban sociologists to identify contextual factors that play a role in mobilization, such as the extent to which citizens find themselves in a similar state of deprivation, whether or not it is a zero sum conflict (one neighborhood's gain is the other neighborhood's loss), and cleavages between tenants and owners or between those who are eligible for rehousing after renewal and those who are not. Insights from the general social movement literature, especially the political opportunity structure approach, apply here too: citizens mobilize in response to widening opportunities as cleavages within elites become manifest and new allies appear on the scene. Another relevant contextual variable is the extent to which urban managers succeed in redefining social issues as either individual or technical problems. Repression is an important factor everywhere, although most dramatically in developing countries where activists risk being murdered when they move against powerful interests (Corr 1999). Besides context, analyses of mobilization need to consider the strategies employed in the mobilization of resources such as influential sympathizers. The skills activists display in framing, i.e., verbalizing urban problems, identifying some one to blame, and proposing a solution, are important too.

Movements tend to have a life cycle; institutionalization (i.e., being channeled into a stable pattern based on formalized rules and laws) and cooptation (activists start performing some task at the request of the government) are often seen as the beginning of the end. It is an open question, however, whether institutionalization is inevitable. The introduction of conventional interaction such as consultation and negotiation does not imply that disruptive tactics necessarily disappear from the movement's action repertoire. Especially when disruptive tactics are part of the movement's identity (e.g., for a squatters' movement, squatting is both means and end) and when repression is moderate, they may remain part of the repertoire. Institutionalization and cooptation may cancel out the impulse toward change, but they may also offer

a way to secure the results of a movement's victory.

An emergent area of inquiry concerns the effect of structural regime change on urban movements. Post Fordist theory suggests that local governments increasingly feel contradictory pressures to decrease welfare bureaucracy and spending and, at the same time, to alleviate poverty. This results in a greater need to coopt urban movement groups, for example as managers of self help programs. Issues that prompt research and debate are whether activists should expect some influence in return for being coopted, because they perform an essential job, and whether cooptation of some movement groups means that new opportunities for radical groups emerge.

Some recent thinking deemphasizes the *local* focus of urban movements (Hamel et al. 2000). Indeed, we do find clear cases of urban movements that are both local and national or supra national, such as the youth movement that is involved in the creation of social centers, "Critical Mass" and "Reclaim the Streets." But more generally, the fact that urban mobilizations have appeared in at least nationwide wave patterns shows that influences beyond the local are relevant.

SEE ALSO: City Planning/Urban Design; Direct Action; Framing and Social Movements; Gender, Social Movements and; Gentrification; Mobilization; New Social Movement Theory; Political Opportunities; Political Process Theory; Resource Mobilization Theory; Urban Political Economy; Urban Policy; Urban Renewal and Redevelopment

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urban policy

Allan Cochrane

Urban policy actively shapes the ways in which people live in cities. As well as reflecting contemporary understandings of the role of cities in economic and social development, it also helps to create those understandings.

Definitions of urban policy are elusive in part because the term appears so self explanatory. It seems to be no more and no less than the sum of those policies that are intended to help cities or those living in them. Unfortunately, however, this commonsense approach is ultimately not very helpful – since most of us now live in urban areas of one sort or another, almost all public policy might be deemed to be urban policy. Assessing quite why one particular form of policy intervention attracts the sobriquet “urban” while another does not is more difficult than at first appears. Although there is a superficial continuity in the emphasis on “urban areas” rather than particular welfare client groups, the definition of the “urban” on which policy attention is focused has itself varied significantly, even if this has rarely been acknowledged by those making or implementing the policies.

The arrival of urban policy as a form of social policy in its own right (rather than an offshoot of urban planning or housing) can be located in the specific circumstances of the

US in the 1960s, in the context of the “War on Poverty” and the political demands of the increasingly urbanized African American population, which also found their expression in the urban riots or rebellions of the late 1960s. In this first incarnation it can be seen as a means of bringing previously excluded groups into the broader post war welfare settlement, even if still on rather different terms. And it was taken up in analogous ways in many other western countries (most obviously the UK). However, the development of urban policy from this starting point does not reflect a continuing process of learning with a clear and continuing set of aims and ambitions. On the contrary, it is “at least in western society, a chaotic conception” (Atkinson & Moon 1994: 20) because there has been no shared understanding of the “problem” around which policy might be defined.

There have been several quite distinctive attempts to find a means of defining urban policy that is capable of capturing and reflecting its full complexity. Some of its earliest analysts (e.g., Piven & Cloward 1972) saw its arrival in the US of the 1960s as a response to political pressure (whether expressed through the threat or reality of riots or the need to incorporate a rising black middle class) and the importance of such pressure in helping to generate urban policy, particularly in its early years, should not be dismissed. But the way in which it made its transatlantic migration (and has since gone on to become a global phenomenon) suggests that it is not enough to focus on its role as a response to popular pressures.

Another early explanation identified urban policy as an expression of the rise of a new political class: new professionals in government and academia seeking to stake their own position as an alternative policy elite, based around the rise of the social sciences and what has come to be called evidence based policymaking, rather than the traditional culture of the civil service or public bureaucracy (Marris & Rein 1972). This interpretation, too, has its attractions, since it fits well with the shift away from the traditional bureau professionalism of the Keynesian welfare state that has been widely recognized as a central feature of state restructuring since the 1970s. However, the extent to which urban policy can be closely identified

with the rise of a new professional class remains questionable, not least because that class has proved difficult to track or identify.

The emergence of urban policy in practice was accompanied by an explosion of critical theory which set out to place the new agenda in a wider context. At the core of this explosion were approaches that focused on issues of social reproduction, described as “collective consumption” by neo Marxists such as Manuel Castells. These approaches make it possible to identify a policy area that is not simply reducible to what is (confusingly and inconsistently) labeled “urban” in everyday speech or even the language used by new professionals. They also place the “urban” at the heart of political life and policy debate and the reshaping of contemporary welfare states. Castells (1977: 440) argued: “The essential problems regarding the urban are in fact bound up with the processes of ‘collective consumption’ or what Marxists call the organization of the collective means of reproduction of labor power.” Since in this formulation the “urban” is itself defined by policy – the delivery of services and goods provided by or through the state to support the reproduction of labor power – core aspects of social policy are redefined as urban policy.

Unfortunately, one of the strengths of approaches that focus on collective or social reproduction is also a weakness, since, by identifying a separate sphere for the urban, they effectively exclude from consideration some of the policy initiatives that increasingly define the politics and shape the experience of life in urban areas. Many of the policies that would not be defined as urban in this sense help to define the experience of urban life (including policing and economic development, as well as transfer payments through the social security and benefits systems). Equally important, spending on some programs (such as education and health) might qualify as collective consumption, but they are generally only seen as urban when they are associated with specific area based initiatives.

If the debates of the 1970s focused on the role of the urban in processes of social reproduction, by the mid 1980s the emphasis had shifted dramatically. Now it was placed increasingly clearly on the role of cities in processes of

production, or on the realization of profits from real estate development. So, for example, in a powerful phrase, Logan and Molotch (1987) identify the city as a “growth machine.” They argue: “*Local conflicts* over growth are central to the organization of cities . . . not only the economic imperative of the larger system, but also the striving of *parochial actors* to make money” (p. viii).

In some important respects the insights of these theorists are helpful, particularly because they seem to fit with key aspects of today’s actually existing urban policy. They are consistent with some of the policy shifts that have led to the identification of the “entrepreneurial” or the “competitive” city; that is, the policy approach that sees economic success as the necessary precondition for the well being (or welfare) of citizens rather than the existence of an extensive (social democratic) welfare state. For some, this understanding has come to form the basis of a critique; for others, it provided the basis of normative policymaking.

However, if Castells and others overemphasized the significance of cities as places of collective consumption, then this approach understates it. Because urban politics is understood through the drive to realize exchange value and generate profits from growth (through rising property values) or from the necessary relations associated with locally dependent business policy, aspects of urban policy that might be focused on other forms of social consumption (e.g., community) tend to be ruled out as irrelevant, or redefined as instrumental infrastructure. So, for example, the significance of urban policy as an attempt to control the disorderly and manage disordered spaces fits uneasily with a structural emphasis on growth as driver of urban policy. Similarly, while it might be possible to claim community based initiatives (and communitarian thinking) in terms that relate them to issues of production and the competitiveness of cities, the tension between a community based agenda and a more narrowly defined competitiveness oriented agenda is hard to ignore.

More recently, attempts have been made to position urban policy rather more explicitly within broader shifts in economy, public policy, and state restructuring. One aspect of this is

reflected in the major critique launched by those who see in its contemporary development and definition the working out of a global neo liberal agenda (Brenner & Theodore 2002). This approach invites us to understand urban policy as part of a wider process of change, while also positioning the city as an active agent in shaping that change. In this context, urban policy is seen to take on a key role in the reshaping of post war welfare states and the settlements associated with them. The rise and development of urban policy helped to shape (as well as reflect) the policy upheavals and state restructuring that characterized the fraying of the Keynesian welfare state and the unsettling of the political, economic, and welfare settlement implied by it. In its contemporary form(s) it begins to suggest the possibility of new political and welfare settlements, even if they remain highly provisional and contested.

The “urban” may often still be used as coded language for “welfare” (and black), but the rise of the “competitive” or “entrepreneurial” city powerfully illustrates the wider direction of change. Historically, the emphasis may have been on “inner cities” and those living in them, but now it is urban economies that are to be revitalized or restructured in order to make cities competitive and improve the economic well being of residents. Physical and commercial infrastructure is to be regenerated, making urban land economically productive once again, and there has also been a drive towards place marketing and cultural reimagination, so that cities can be made attractive to the “creative class.” Local neighborhoods are increasingly targeted either for community renewal (building social capital or community capacity) or for new forms of policing, where they cannot be relied on to police themselves effectively.

The rise of mega projects, the reimagination of cities as cultural centers, and “global cities” are as marked in Pacific Asia as in the US and Western Europe. In this context the nature of the urban “problem” is also interpreted differently – instead of a catalog of decline, which urban policy needs to reverse, in the new urban policy cities become potential (and actual) sources of growth and development. Even the “slums” of the new megacities in South America and Africa are now identified

by the World Bank as potential hotbeds of entrepreneurialism. There has been a broad shift away from a vision of the state as regulator of the market to one in which the state is defined as agent of the market, with an explicit policy focus on providing the infrastructure for profitable production rather than welfare support to those on the margins. It is within this context that cities are left to bargain and negotiate to achieve different outcomes for their populations.

SEE ALSO: Built Environment; City Planning/Urban Design; Community; Crime, Broken Windows Theory of; Growth Machine; Inequality and the City; Social Policy, Welfare State; Urban Crime and Violence; Urban Political Economy; Urban Poverty; Urban Renewal and Redevelopment; Urbanism/Urban Culture

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urban political economy

Leonard Nevarez

One of sociology's original and most fundamental questions is: how does the city shape social life? The answer provided by urban political economy is: as a mechanism in the accumulation of wealth, with all the power and inequality that results. "Political economy" generally refers to the scholarly paradigm that examines how material processes of production and exchange shape and are shaped by decisions made in economic and political institutions; with "urban," this concern centers around material production *of* and *within* cities. Since the 1970s, urban political economy has influenced the field of urban sociology, bringing insights from other disciplines – particularly social geography (with its conceptualization of social space and place) and political science (the focus on government and law) – while retaining sociology's social constructionist framework. Sociology provides an especially hospitable discipline for urban political economy's investigation of the ways in which the city's economic and political relations cohere and evolve across institutional, legal, and territorial domains.

Urban political economy emerged as a critique of the urban ecology paradigm, particularly the latter's explanation for the growth and structure of cities and regions. By emphasizing the spatial competition for resources by individuals, groups, and institutions, urban ecology has viewed political hierarchies, economic actors and laws, and other social institutions as expressions of more fundamental and pre-conscious forces. Its corollary that city governments, local business elites, urban planners, or racist neighborhood associations, for example, are not the "real" agents of urban structure and relations had long struck a cadre of conflict-oriented urban sociologists as a problematic denial of social power. By the 1950s and 1960s, urban ecology's inability to understand critically the problems of white flight and urban poverty in the US as well as urban and political unrest throughout the world created a breaking point for many urban sociologists. Consequently, a first generation of urban political economists began to emphasize the role of economic

structure and social power in explaining urban relations.

THE NEO MARXIAN TRADITION

Urban political economy updates the theoretical legacy of Karl Marx around the urban condition, a topic he did not address extensively in his nineteenth century writings. First, neo Marxians explained the city's evolution as structural expressions of *historical relations of production*. Beginning in the early twentieth century, their argument goes, industrial capitalists promoted the flight of manufacturing to the urban periphery and the growth of residential suburbs to advance their class interests in, respectively, avoiding the costs of aging and inflexible urban infrastructure and dispersing urban hotbeds of labor unrest. Industrialists promoted these interests in the political and cultural realms via federal policies and cultural sentiments promoting homeownership, suburban development, and the encouragement of growth in America's "Sunbelt" region (where the union tradition is much weaker than in the older "Rustbelt"). In urban sociology, these early neo Marxian claims appeared in the 1970s and 1980s alongside other intellectual agendas that, although not necessarily sharing the same conflict orientation, put urban class relations at the forefront of the field. Research on dual labor markets, immigrant entrepreneurs, ethnic niches, and related issues have all benefited from the neo Marxian insight that economic forces do not merely express social relations but in fact drive them as well. However, by emphasizing capitalism's causal role, this early urban political economy research in turn raised a question that casts doubt on urban sociology's disciplinary relevance: is the city merely a container for larger social forces?

A powerful rejection of that question began with a largely European cadre of neo Marxian scholars whose work integrated "urban" with "political economy" in new and compelling ways. First, British geographers starting with David Harvey explained how investment in land provided important functions for capitalism. Borrowing the idea of space as a "secondary circuit of capital" from French sociologist philosopher Henri Lefebvre (whose urban

writings at that time were mostly untranslated in English), Harvey contended that land and the built environment offer capital an important alternate site for investment when industrial investments soured. With this claim, Harvey reframed urban sociology's traditional interest for urban and regional development into a structural Marxist theory of *capital accumulation*. By assigning landed capitalists a distinct role vis à vis industrialists and financiers in the structural dynamics of capitalism, Harvey also established a new interest for the social role of landlords, developers, and other capitalists who profit from the built environment. Next, the Spanish born, French trained sociologist Manuel Castells theorized that the "urban" corresponds specifically to relations of *collective consumption*, those city based services, housing, and infrastructure provided by the state with which people reproduce their labor power. His claim particularly resonated in Western Europe and Latin America and launched a neo Marxian research agenda that examines urban politics, grassroots protest, and urban movements as expressions of class relations distinct from the capitalist-worker conflict usually emphasized by neo Marxians.

THE NEO WEBERIAN TRADITION

If Marx gives urban political economy its concern for the structural dynamics of capitalism, Max Weber's legacy provides the conceptual vocabulary with which to understand social power and human agency. This is underscored by the curious fact that for Marx, the notion of a "ruling class" is somewhat a contradiction in terms. Governance involves political processes that, to have theoretical integrity, must not be entirely determined by other social realms; yet Marx famously gave little credence to politics' autonomy from material relations of production. Consequently, structural Marxists like Harvey had no vocabulary with which to understand urban power and political contingency apart from the structural determination and historical conjunctures of the economy.

Reasserting its intellectual relevance, the American school of urban sociology reintroduced the neo Weberian question, "Who governs the city?" posed previously within political

science during the 1950s and 1960s. In this earlier *community power* debate, Floyd Hunter and other proponents of the elitist perspective argued that a core group of private urban elites regularly and successfully promote their interests through city hall. Rejecting this claim, Robert Dahl and other advocates of a pluralist perspective countered that private interest groups may prevail on certain issues, but not consistently enough to dominate urban politics. Eventually, the community power debates reached an impasse over inconclusive findings as well as theoretical and methodological differences. By the 1970s, as urban political economists studied the ways in which cities generate wealth for capitalists, it became clear with hindsight that neither side in the community power debate had theorized the material interests of the city's power holders in a substantial way.

Consequently, urban political economists adapted neo Weberian premises to the neo Marxian problematic and identified the social production of urban space – that is, *city building* – as the institution that organizes the material interests and galvanizes the political dominance of urban elites. This means that urban governance is not confined within urban governments; just as important are the private decisions made by place based entrepreneurs and businesses to make money. Harvey Molotch crystallized this idea with his theory of the *growth machine*, a territorially defined coalition of urban elites from across public, private, and civic sectors that promotes growth in order to advance its common interests in intensifying land based exchange values (higher rents for developers and landlords, increasing tax revenues for local governments, new readers for local newspapers, more ratepayers for utilities, more jobs for local trade unions, and so on). With his colleague John Logan, Molotch identified the class relations and political stakes underlying the growth machine, asserting that the exchange value interests of growth machines invariably portend environmental impacts, infrastructure strain, fiscal constraints on public services, and other material conflicts with the use value interests of residents. For urban sociologists, the growth machine theory transcended the earlier community power debate by identifying urban growth as the consensus agenda (which elitists emphasized) underlying the overt conflicts and

political factions of city hall (which pluralists emphasized).

Contemporary research on urban power has further developed the insights of growth machine theory, which did not theorize in detail on how urban elites engage the political realm, under what conditions they cooperate with one another (in fact, urban elites may be divided by vested interests in different parts of the city or different kinds of growth), or how effective they are in attracting urban growth and achieving political hegemony. These issues have been taken up by urban regime theory, a school of urban political science that has influenced urban political economy since the late 1980s. An *urban regime* is the set of formal and informal arrangements that makes urban governance by a public-private coalition possible. As Clarence Stone has explained, urban regimes vary by the agendas that their participants pursue; some are radically progressive, while others simply maintain the political status quo. However, the most frequently observed type is the development regime enacted by pro growth elites, although for reasons that go beyond the shared interests of the growth machine. Just as importantly, actors in the development regime most effectively marshal and share the political benefits, business opportunities, and other “selective incentives” that enforce cooperation and prevent dissent within their public-private coalition.

NEW PATTERNS OF URBAN RESTRUCTURING

Since the 1980s, urban political economy has developed in large part as a response to the dramatic shifts in economies, politics, population, and settlement associated with *urban restructuring*. This concept has pushed urban political economists to identify what is qualitatively new and significant about capitalism’s transformations of the city. For example, the globalization of traditional American industry, on the one hand, merely demonstrates at a larger scale structural dynamics that spurred the growth of the American Sunbelt decades earlier: industrial capital’s vulnerability to site specific labor costs and labor control, and its benefits from geographically uneven development. On the other hand, the technological and organizational

innovations that made globalization possible have generated unanticipated economic, spatial, and social outcomes.

In her *global city* thesis, Saskia Sassen explained how the financial capitals of New York, London, and Tokyo have assumed new centrality in the coordination of transnational corporate (TNC) activity. This is not because these global cities attract TNC headquarters, many of which have in fact left major cities, but instead because they concentrate the social networks of smaller financial and advanced business service firms that oversee, respectively, the capital investments and legal organizational management needed by TNCs. Sassen’s insight that geography, markets, and networks assume a coordinating role formerly contained within corporate bureaucracy parallels a larger theory about the geography of “flexible accumulation.” Rejecting the popular wisdom that place no longer matters in globalization, this theory documents the central function of *flexible industrial districts* in industries where skilled labor, entrepreneurial companies, and specialized support systems cluster, such as Silicon Valley (technology), Hollywood (film), Paris (high fashion), and the “Third Italy” (textiles).

Amidst the global context of capital mobility and job flight, these and other economically vibrant cities and regions in fact witness economic polarization and social inequality, due to economic growth as well as stagnation. For instance, well paid workers in booming technical, cultural, and creative industries create new demand for consumer services that employ low skill labor. Also, some creative industries remain competitive by relying on local sweatshops (endemic in fashion centers like New York or Los Angeles) or other informal enterprises. Manuel Castells and John Mollenkopf have described the subsequent urban structure with their idea of the *dual city*. In its more glamorous half, new professionals revitalize once staid urban economies, gentrify abandoned neighborhoods, and stimulate the growth of coffeeshops, bistros, bars, and other high end consumer services. In its less affluent half, working classes become less secure with the exodus of manufacturing and other activities that once created decent paying union jobs, while new immigrants leap over older ethnic and racial groups to manage and fill the low paying service and

sweatshop jobs, or to sell goods on the street in informal economies.

Theoretically, globalization underscores how the dynamics of growth and decline extend beyond the scale of any one city, region, or even nation. Not surprisingly, urban restructuring has thus challenged urban political economy's models of human agency. On the one hand, the structural context in which growth coalitions operate has always been "global" to some extent, as companies choose a location from a variety of places, and places' competitive advantages are influenced by non local factors like state budgets, national federal mandates, and interest rates. On the other hand, capital investment and urban growth increasingly materialize in a decentralized, market form. At least in the new economy's industrial clusters, the decisions that bring growth are made by a number of actors too large for any growth coalition to sway effectively with conventional lobbying. As urban political economy keeps abreast of the structural changes associated with urban restructuring, the paradigm's practitioners continue to reevaluate what constitutes the "political." Does the neo Weberian focus on political institutions' legitimacy, interest groups' pressure politics, and coalitional power plays still have explanatory value in this era of urban restructuring? If so, just how much, and at what scale does it explain?

SEE ALSO: Capital, Secondary Circuit of; City; Global/World Cities; Globalization; Growth Machine; Inequality and the City; Social Movements; Uneven Development; Urban Ecology; Urban Policy; Urban Renewal and Redevelopment

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urban poverty

David J. Harding

While a technical definition of the urban poor includes those individuals in families with incomes below the federal poverty line who live in metropolitan areas, most research on urban poverty focuses on racial and ethnic minorities living in segregated, high poverty neighborhoods in central cities. The study of urban poverty lies at the intersection of several sociological fields, including race and ethnicity, immigration, stratification, and urban sociology. As a predominantly problem oriented field, urban poverty research attempts to understand the roots of urban dilemmas such as crime and delinquency, single motherhood, unemployment, and low levels of education, often drawing theoretical concepts from other areas of sociology such as social capital, networks, and culture. The causes and consequences of spatially concentrated poverty and the intergenerational transmission of poverty are also frequent subjects of inquiry. A recurring debate in this field is whether income inadequacy causes problem behavior or whether problem behavior causes income inadequacy.

The study of urban poverty dates back to the founding of sociology as a discipline in the US with W. E. B. Du Bois's *The Philadelphia Negro*, first published in 1899. Du Bois developed the theoretical ideas that remain important to this day, including the connection between spatial isolation and social exclusion. Sociologists of the Chicago School largely viewed urban poverty as a temporary stage in the incorporation of immigrant groups from abroad and of migrants from rural areas. High population turnover, lack

of material resources, and ethnic heterogeneity lead to the breakdown of social control in immigrant receiving neighborhoods, creating higher rates of crime and delinquency. Through processes of neighborhood invasion and succession, they argued, ethnic groups moving upward in economic status also move from crowded, poor, central city neighborhoods through a series of concentric zones to progressively better off areas further from the central city.

The Great Migration, which brought Southern blacks to Northern and Western cities in great numbers between the two world wars and after World War II, challenged the Chicago School model of invasion and succession, as urban blacks were blocked from the economic and spatial advancement previously experienced by white ethnic groups. Focus shifted to understanding the intergenerational transmission of poverty. Some scholars emphasized structural constraints while others argued for cultural explanations, particularly the development of a culture of poverty, characterized by the intergenerational transmission of norms disparaging education and two parent families and encouraging crime. In response to the controversial Moynihan report, which argued that matriarchal family structures found in black communities were destructive, researchers began to train attention on the adaptive characteristics of black families and their resilience in the face of racial discrimination, segregation, and economic subjugation. Conservative scholars objected that these accounts ignored the more powerful and perverse incentives of the welfare system that, they suggested, encouraged out of wedlock childbearing, single parent households, and persistent unemployment.

The demographics of poverty shifted dramatically over the course of the twentieth century. Improvements in social security and other government programs for the elderly made urban poverty less of a problem among the elderly, while the spread of single parent families made urban poverty more of a problem among unmarried mothers and their children, the so called feminization of poverty.

With the publication of *The Truly Disadvantaged* (1986), William Julius Wilson refocused attention on the spatial or neighborhood context of urban poverty. Wilson argued that the black urban poor were doubly disadvantaged by both

their individual poverty and their residence in concentrated poverty neighborhoods. Advances in civil rights in the 1960s had made it possible for middle class blacks to move out of inner city ghetto neighborhoods in the 1970s, leaving the poor behind. At the same time, the decline of the manufacturing economy had led to chronic unemployment and underemployment among working class males, especially blacks. Wilson argued that an underclass emerged, a concentrated population characterized by single motherhood, poverty, joblessness, high school dropouts, and participation in the underground economy. Because of its spatial isolation, this population came to be socially isolated from mainstream society, and in the presence of economic deprivation, came to develop cultural practices that diverged from the mainstream. Though Wilson (1997) would later rename this group the ghetto poor and call special attention to the importance of joblessness, the emphasis on neighborhoods remained.

Wilson's work reinvigorated the study of urban poverty as researchers challenged his claims about the rise of concentrated poverty neighborhoods and tested his hypotheses about the consequences of neighborhood poverty for individuals. Massey and Denton (1993) charged Wilson with ignoring the role of racial segregation in magnifying the consequences of economic segregation, and Quillian (1999) later showed that though middle class blacks were able to leave ghetto neighborhoods, their new neighborhoods quickly resegregated as whites left. Scholars argued that the decline of manufacturing was important only in the industrial cities of the North, where manufacturing jobs paid well and where blacks were well integrated into the manufacturing workforce (Jargowsky 1997). Others challenged Wilson's emphasis on joblessness and pointed toward the large numbers of working poor in disadvantaged neighborhoods, for whom poverty is the result of low wages rather than unemployment (Newman 1999).

One strand of current research investigates the consequences of neighborhood disadvantage for individual residents. Residents of disadvantaged neighborhoods generally have higher rates of school dropouts, teenage pregnancy, single parent families, unemployment, crime and delinquency, and other problems, net of

differences in observed family and individual characteristics. While there is some question as to whether these differences are the product of unobserved differences between residents of advantaged and disadvantaged neighborhoods, results from mobility experiments and from sophisticated methodological techniques designed to deal with this selection bias have convinced most scholars that neighborhood effects are real. Debate continues, however, on their magnitude relative to other influences.

Attention subsequently turned to understanding the social processes that create neighborhood effects. Jencks and Mayer (1990) suggest four mechanisms by which neighborhood poverty might influence adolescents: relative deprivation, exposure to negative peer influences, collective socialization by neighborhood adults, and formal institutions, which distribute material resources and effect contact with non neighborhood adults. A social control perspective highlights the ability of neighborhood residents to control behavior in the neighborhood, both through informal sanctions and monitoring and through the acquisition of institutional resources such as police protection. Sampson et al. (1997) show that collective efficacy, or "social cohesion among neighbors combined with their willingness to intervene on behalf of the common good," mediates the relationship between neighborhood structural disadvantages and public disorder and crime.

A second strand of current research seeks to understand the causes of high rates of out of wedlock and teenage childbearing among the urban poor. Three explanations have emerged for out of wedlock childbearing, though to date there is not enough evidence to adjudicate between them (Small & Newman 2001). The male marriageable pool hypothesis holds that a shortage of economically attractive mates leads poor urban women to eschew marriage. The slavery hypothesis holds that the institution of slavery damaged gender relations among African Americans, leading to fewer permanent marital unions among them. A third hypothesis holds that out of wedlock childbearing has become more acceptable in society as a whole, and that the behavior of the urban poor reflects this new normative environment. Edin and Kefalas (2006) argue that poor urban women actually hold marriage and childbearing in such

high regard that they delay or avoid marriage when success is uncertain. Coupled with a belief that motherhood is the most important social role a woman can perform, these cultural understandings of marriage lead to high rates of out of wedlock childbearing among the urban poor.

Three explanations have also been offered for the higher rates of teenage childbearing among the urban poor (Small & Newman 2001). The peer culture hypothesis holds that among the urban poor, early sexual activity and early childbearing are a source of status among peers (Anderson 1999). The weathering hypothesis holds that early childbearing is a rational response to the deteriorating health of urban poor women as they age, making the teen years the optimal period for healthy childbearing. Finally, the poverty of relationships hypothesis holds that teenage girls have children to compensate for a lack of other meaningful social relationships and for lack of prospects for finding rewarding work.

As research continues, the study of urban poverty faces a number of methodological and theoretical challenges. First, today's urban poor are quite heterogeneous. For example, while most of the research focus has been on African Americans, Latinos now make up the largest minority group in the US, and Latinos and other immigrants have become an important and understudied segment of the urban poor. Indeed, the Latino paradox – higher rates of poverty but fewer negative outcomes among Latinos – raises fundamental questions about the roles of structure and culture. Second, while social isolation has been used theoretically to understand the consequences of urban poverty, we have only begun to understand how the urban poor are socially isolated or socially connected to others. Third, understanding the dynamics and consequences of high poverty urban neighborhoods requires new methods and new data for measuring the social and cultural characteristics of these neighborhoods, beyond the structural measures provided by the decennial Census. While methods for measuring the characteristics of urban neighborhoods are being developed, further data are needed to take advantage of these methods.

These three concerns highlight two important weaknesses in the current literature on

urban poverty. One is the lack of attention to the mechanisms or social processes by which poverty and poor urban neighborhoods have their effects, including the potential for heterogeneity in mechanisms across neighborhoods. A second weakness is a lack of attention to culture and to individual agency in understanding the causes and consequences of urban poverty. To have an impact, macro level structural forces such as joblessness or neighborhood disadvantage must affect individual behavior through decision making processes and cultural or cognitive understandings. While most urban poverty researchers continue to talk in terms of norms and values, the sociology of culture has moved toward a more cognitive view of culture that emphasizes cultural repertoires, strategies of action, frames, cultural capital, and boundary making. Poverty researchers are increasingly questioning current theories of urban space and investigating the strategies the urban poor use to challenge their marginality. Gotham & Brumley (2002) use ethnographic field observations and interviews with public housing residents to argue that the urban poor use space to provide a measure of security and protection, to designate and avoid areas of criminality and drug activity, and to challenge or support the redevelopment of public housing (see also Gotham 2003).

Finally, recent work on urban poverty has expanded into other domains. Health outcomes such as low birth weight, mental health, and disease have been shown to be related to individual and neighborhood disadvantage. Using new statistical techniques that assess the impact of a neighborhood's location within the urban context, researchers have also begun to investigate the importance of neighborhood spatial context.

SEE ALSO: Chicago School; Ethnic Enclaves; Hypersegregation; Social Exclusion; Uneven Development; Urban Crime and Violence; Urban Policy; Urbanization

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urban renewal and redevelopment

Gregory J. Crowley

The built environment deteriorates with the passage of time and the stresses of use and neglect. Unemployment, poverty, shortages of affordable housing, health epidemics, and transportation

problems often accompany physical decay in modern cities. Attempts to relieve these social problems through the maintenance, rehabilitation, and rebuilding of the physical environment are known as urban redevelopment.

European governments implemented the first large scale urban redevelopment projects in the nineteenth century. Louis Napoleon Bonaparte of France led the way with his massive renovation of Paris that began in 1853. Thousands of residents were displaced by the creation of a system of wide boulevards that “pierced” diagonally through dense, older neighborhoods of the city. Another wave of urban redevelopment began after World War II. In Europe, government acquisition and demolition of properties played a major role in the rebuilding of cities destroyed by war. Cities in North America meanwhile embarked on their first major effort at demolition and rehabilitation of the built environment. Title II of the 1949 Federal Housing Act, known as “urban renewal,” responded to a very different problem: the long term trend of suburbanization that threatened the stability of the central city.

The sociology of redevelopment in the US grew out of attempts to explain population dispersal and corresponding urban distress. Urban ecology, a leading perspective, explains population shifts in terms of “succession.” Competition for scarce resources causes some subspecies to replace, or “succeed,” others in a habitat. According to the logic of succession, middle class whites and blacks moved from central cities in the twentieth century simply because technological changes in transportation allowed them to adopt the higher standard of living promised by suburban areas.

Other scholars have criticized urban ecology for overlooking how social inequalities and power relations are structured in the form of the built environment. Neo Marxist theory emphasizes that capitalist firms change location not only to accommodate upgraded physical plant, but also to control labor conflict. Gordon (1978) used US Census data to show that manufacturing employment in the “rings” increased at more than twice the rate of centers of industrial cities beginning in the 1890s. The change occurred amid a steady increase in labor strife and well before the technological innovations that would later transform the organization of

work and domestic life. According to Gordon, executives at the turn of the century moved their plants to the suburbs mainly to avoid labor union activity, which was concentrated in central cities.

A third approach is urban political economy, which is critical of both ecology and neo Marxism for discounting the social and political context in which demographic changes occur. Political economy views territorial shifts in population as a result of urban governing coalitions that shape zoning, transportation, taxation, housing, and other policies affecting patterns of land use and migration within a territory. From the political economy perspective, metropolitan “sprawl” is caused by more than just a demand for high quality housing on the urban periphery. Urban governing coalitions promoting uncontrolled growth are certainly influential in many cities, but in others “smart growth” advocates attempt to direct new development into existing neighborhoods. Among the policy tools they use are loan programs, tax credits for historic preservation, growth controls, and transportation planning.

Understood as a process, redevelopment involves the mobilization of substantial resources controlled by state as well as non governmental actors. Community development corporations, tax increment financing (TIF), eminent domain, tax exempt bonds, human capital, and social trust are some of the many resources commonly involved in attempts to improve distressed neighborhoods. Valued resources may be controlled by real estate owners, financial institutions, developers, neighborhood residents, historic preservationists, or environmental groups. Sociological studies of redevelopment tend to revolve around questions relating to how the composition and dynamics of urban governing coalitions influence strategies of redevelopment.

In the 1950s and 1960s community power researchers visited cities across North America in search of data revealing who influences redevelopment and other local policies. In his pioneering study of decision makers in 1950s Atlanta, Floyd Hunter (1953) answered these questions by documenting who in the community held the greatest reputation for political influence. He identified some 13 leaders, mainly corporate executives, reputed to control important decisions in the city’s urban renewal

program. Many of Hunter's followers found in other cities the same pattern of corporate business dominance in physical rebuilding projects. Other scholars found "coalitional" power structures such that business elites who initiated urban renewal were less influential in formalizing and implementing specific projects. Still others found multiple competing factions in the community, which caused redevelopment to be neglected for a lack of leadership and common purpose.

Critics of Hunter's "reputational" method charged that it is impossible to determine who actually exercises influence over specific decisions by asking people who they believe has power. Just because business elites have reputations for power does not mean they will be united on all redevelopment issues or even have the time to examine them in sufficient depth to take a position. An alternative is the decision making approach, developed by Edward Banfield (1961) and Robert Dahl (1961) in their case studies of community power in Chicago and New Haven, Connecticut, respectively. Actual rather than potential control over specific public issues is the topic of decision making analysis.

When combined with reputational analysis, decision making has tended to produce more complete explanations of community power by showing the limitations imposed on elites by underlying community divisions. According to Banfield, a small group of corporate executives advocated federal urban renewal in Chicago, but they had to expend considerable political capital persuading other elites, who stood little to gain by the demolition of downtown, to go along with their 100 acre Fort Dearborn clearance and renewal project. The implementation of redevelopment, Banfield concluded, is often compromised by limitations in the stocks of political capital of elites who promote them. Similarly, Dahl attributed the success of urban renewal in New Haven as a result of the quality of New Haven's leadership. Mayor Lee and his urban renewal staff were distinguished in their ability to shape their proposals according to what they believed interest groups and voters in New Haven could be expected to support or reject.

Community power researchers were for the most part unconcerned with the impact of

redevelopment on the lives of residents in project areas or on the cultural and economic vitality of the city as a whole. They examined land use decisions mainly to demonstrate methods for measuring the distribution of community power. Other critically minded scholars attacked national urban renewal after a decade of post war slum clearance had demolished thousands of affordable housing units without replacement. The most celebrated among these critics was Jane Jacobs. In her *Death and Life of Great American Cities* (1961) Jacobs outlined a theory of urban planning that illustrated how physical features of older, mixed use neighborhoods – the sidewalks, parks, and corner stores – configure informal social contacts that ensure the safety and vitality of cities. Older, "blighted" neighborhoods in city after city were demolished for the purpose of upgrading them to accommodate high rise luxury apartments, offices, and large government buildings such as Government Center in the West End of Boston.

In the last section of his classic book *Urban Villagers* (1962), Herbert Gans described how destruction of the built environment caused by urban renewal disrupted relationships among neighbors and extended families in Boston's Italian West End. Gans introduced the important distinction, overlooked by local planners, between a slum and a low rent district. The West End definitely fell into the latter category, according to Gans, which benefited greatly the working class families residing there. Gans's work influenced a generation of urban planners to be skeptical towards the view that older neighborhoods must be demolished in order to be saved.

By the 1970s a growing body of research validated earlier criticisms of urban renewal. Most of this work was done by scholars versed in neo Marxist and political economy literature. They used case methods to develop theories of how class interests – especially those of corporate business and real estate – influence government intervention in the physical redevelopment of cities. Susan S. Fainstein and colleagues (1986) have studied dozens of American and European cities this way. Much government intervention, they argue, is geared toward large scale real estate projects such as the building of stadia and convention centers,

and the redevelopment of older warehousing and retailing districts. Prevailing forms of public support for these projects contribute little to the welfare of existing residents and businesses, even if the new development actually increases commercial activity in the city. Eminent domain authority is used to displace low income residents and small businesses from project areas, developer subsidies and tax increment financing increase the tax burden of city residents, and rezoning of neighborhoods for large scale projects can create unwanted traffic and noise, while undermining community identity.

Economic competition between cities also affects the redevelopment process. In his influential book *City Limits* (1981), Paul Peterson presented a theory of why some cities outperform others in the competition for mobile capital and skilled labor. The book became popular in the Reagan era of deep cuts in federal funding to cities and growing competition for private capital. Economic growth and urban redevelopment became the most important local policy arenas in which competition between cities was played out. Local officials must work to raise the value of taxable properties in order to finance public schools, transportation, parks, and other services. For declining municipalities, this means trapping mobile capital in place. As a city attracts investment from the outside, according to the argument, its government performs better and its quality of life rises in comparison to other places. Peterson overlooked the question of who gains and who loses in the struggle for urban growth. In his view, some urban dwellers would necessarily suffer from redevelopment along the lines pointed out by political economists. But the sacrifices of some would repay in the prosperity of the city as a whole.

Current sociological accounts of the distribution of benefits and costs of redevelopment owe much to urban regime theory, a perspective created by scholars familiar with neo Marxist, political economy, and city limits literature, but unsatisfied with their simplified views on coalition building and conflict management. Fundamental to regime theory is the concept of the city as a "growth machine" (Molotch 1976) made up of property owners, realtors, mortgage bankers, and others who profit from

the intensification of land use. Landed interests are among the most active members in the local polity, and their highest political priority is to create the right conditions for outside investment, which leads to economic growth. This may include low taxes, quality municipal services, a productive and inexpensive labor force, and minimal regulations on business. In the American political economy a division of labor exists between the state, which holds legal authority to act on behalf of all citizens, and the market, where productive assets are owned and controlled. Making and carrying out important policies related to economic growth and redevelopment thus requires the blending of resources from both sectors and the effective management of ensuing conflicts from within and without. Accordingly, the form of local government intervention in land use largely reflects who is incorporated into decision making and by what formal and informal arrangements decisions are reached.

The regime perspective reflects a more complex and changing reality of urban redevelopment than earlier approaches. It states that one cannot decide in the abstract whether or not large scale or government led urban redevelopment is a good or bad thing for the community as a whole or its individual members. Much depends on the nature of governing arrangements and the kinds of "solutions sets" that have evolved for dealing with urban distress. When arts organizations are represented in urban regimes, they shift land use strategies toward "mixed use" projects and the rehabilitation of older buildings, along the lines of Jane Jacobs's recommendations. Affordable housing advocates represented in regimes in Boston, San Francisco, and other places have created "linkage" policies, whereby downtown redevelopment projects are assessed a fee to help finance construction or rehabilitation of low and moderate income housing. Other policies and types of regime exist, to the good or ill of the cities they govern. To be sure, in local redevelopment there remains a strong "systematic bias," as regime theorist Clarence Stone (1989) calls it, towards corporate business interests. As long as productive assets, which create wealth and employment in a commercial republic, remain in private hands, government will

seek them as primary partners in urban governance.

Over the past century the physical decline of cities has corresponded more and more with patterns of socioeconomic distress. In the name of relieving distress, officials have facilitated redevelopment of the built environment. At times, government action has contributed to greater decline and distress, such as occurred with federal urban renewal. More often, redevelopment projects have mixed results. Understanding the institutions and coalition forms most conducive to more sustainable growth that meets the needs of all urban residents remains a high priority agenda for future research.

SEE ALSO: Black Urban Regime; Built Environment; City Planning/Urban Design; Gentrification; Growth Machine; Invasion Succession; New Urbanism; Redlining; Uneven Development; Urban Crime and Violence; Urban Movements; Urban Political Economy; Urban Poverty; Urbanization

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urban revolution

Kevin Fox Gotham

The urban revolution refers to the emergence of urban life and the concomitant transformation of human settlements from simple agrarian based systems to complex and hierarchical systems of manufacturing and trade. The term also refers to the present era of metropolitan or megalopolis growth, the development of exurbs, and the explosion of primate or mega cities. Archeologist V. Gordon Childe coined the term *urban revolution* to explain the series of stages in the development of cities that preceded the Industrial Revolution of the nineteenth century. For Childe, the first revolution – the “Agricultural Revolution” – occurred when hunting and gathering societies mastered the skill of food production and began to live in stable and sedentary groups. The second revolution – the “Urban Revolution” – began during the fourth and third millennia BCE in the civilizations of Mesopotamia and the Near East. The urban revolution ushered in a new era of population growth, complex urban development, and the development of such institutions as the bureaucratic state, warfare, architecture, and writing. For Henri Lefebvre (2003), the urban revolution not only signifies a long historical shift from an agricultural to an industrial to an urban world, but also refers to a shift in the internal organization of the city, from the political city of pre-medieval times to the mercantile, then industrial, city to the present phase, where the “urban” becomes a global trend. Today, many scholars use the term urban revolution to connote profound changes in the social organization of societies, but they disagree over the conceptualization, causes, and trajectory of the change.

One major point of debate focuses on issues of conceptualization and addresses questions about when, where, and why the first cities arose. In his oft-cited essay “The Urban Revolution,” Childe (1950) described the features of early

communities in Mesopotamia that marked the beginning of urban settlements. First, a key feature of the first cities was their immense population size, up to 20,000 residents, and their dense geographic concentration. A second major feature was the production of an agricultural surplus. This important development spearheaded several other changes, including the establishment of specialized groups such as craftsmen, transport workers, merchants, officials, and priests. Third, farmers and peasants gradually came under the control of the city through a system of taxation to support government activity, including standing armies. Fourth, the financing and construction of large public works, and other monuments and temples, came to “symbolize the concentration of the social surplus.” Fifth, the production of agricultural surplus created problems over the allocation and control of wealth, leading to the emergence of social stratification. Priests, military leaders, and other elites formed a “ruling class” that exempted themselves from physical labor and pursued “intellectual tasks.” Sixth, to control and regulate the growth of surplus, the ruling classes invented systems of recording, numerical calculation, and writing. Seventh, the first cities were the birthplaces of modern science, as the invention of writing “enabled the leisured clerks to proceed to the elaboration of exact and predictive sciences – arithmetic, geometry, and astronomy.” Eighth, the specialization of labor gave “a new direction to artistic expression” by providing a cultural foundation for artists and craftspeople to cultivate sophisticated styles and traditions. Ninth, the concentration of surplus helped encourage and expand trade, a development that led to “the importation of raw material, needed for industry or cult and not available locally.” Tenth, membership in the community was no longer based on kinship but on residence.

Childe’s thesis was highly controversial when it was published and the causes and nature of the urban revolution remain hotly debated. On the one hand, Childe offered a powerful theory of urbanization based on the specialization of work, the differentiation of the division of labor, and the interdependence of skills and tasks. These social relations provide the basis for the development of modern industrial societies. On the other hand, scholars have argued that

Childe’s thesis embraces a macro evolutionary orientation that ignores the diversity of human settlements around the world. Others have maintained that Childe’s theory employs an overly deterministic view of urbanization that downplays the important role of culture in development of complex societies. One major criticism is that Childe’s thesis is tautological and employs functionalistic assumptions to legitimate its arguments. It is not clear, for example, if the specialized division of labor promoted the early development of cities, or if the social complexity of cities encouraged the growth of a differentiated division of labor. It is also not clear if urbanization was the result or the cause of changes in the social relations of production and technological innovations.

These problems flow into a second point of debate, the periodization and trajectories of the urban revolution. Evidence from archeologists and sociologists suggests that urban development is discontinuous and contingent. While Childe argued that a precondition of cities is an agricultural surplus, others have suggested that human control over rivers and mastery of irrigation led to the development of cities. Other critics such as Jane Jacobs argued that early commercial centers such as those in Catal Hyuk in present day Turkey developed as centers of trade in the absence of agricultural surplus. Anthropologists have long maintained that ancient civilizations in North America developed complex and sophisticated systems of trade and commerce along the Mississippi River without knowledge of farming. One of the oldest cities, Jericho, had a thriving urban culture based on trade and crafts production over four millennia ago, many centuries before the development of agricultural surplus in the region. In short, Childe’s thesis suggests an interpretation of early urbanization in Mesopotamian cities. It’s generalizability to other regions and time periods remains in question. Still, Childe’s ideas offer an incisive and poignant perspective which generations of scholars have utilized to understand the historical development of human societies.

Third, scholars argue that there is not one urban revolution but several. A “Second Urban Revolution,” for example, began about 1750 as the Industrial Revolution generated rapid urban growth in Europe. The economy, physical form,

and culture of cities changed dramatically as feudal power broke down and trade and travel increased. Increasing size, density, and diversity of cities combined with the growth of commerce to make urban life more rational, anonymous, and depersonalized. Since about 1950, a “Third Urban Revolution” has been occurring in less developed countries, where most of the world’s largest cities are located. The increasing number of primate or mega cities of more than 8 million inhabitants illustrates profound demographic and population trends of the past century. In 1950, only two cities, London and New York, were that size. In 1975, there were 11 mega cities, including 6 in the industrialized countries. In 1995, there were 23 total, with 17 in the developing countries. In 2015, the projected number of mega cities is 36, with 30 of them in the developing world and most in Asia. In short, the urban revolution is a global trend that is taking place at different speeds on different continents. Any convincing attempt to understand and explain these important changes has to offer a coherent conceptualization of urban revolution; an account of causal logic; a clear set of propositions about historical periodization; a specification of impacts; and a sound explanation about the trajectory of the process itself.

SEE ALSO: Cities in Europe; Global/World Cities; Megalopolis; Metropolis; Primate Cities; Uneven Development; Urban/Rural Population Movements; Urbanization

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urban–rural population movements

Michael J. White

The movement of the population between rural and urban areas is both a major consequence and a major determinant of social change. From a sociological vantage point, this movement offers potential for significant transformation in sending and receiving communities alike, as various types of individuals (differentiated by age, sex, education, ethnicity, etc.) are added and subtracted from the community. For the individual, the relocation may bring attendant challenges, even as it brings new opportunities. Within the research community, the study of urban–rural population movement would be seen as a subdivision within the broader study of internal migration, urbanization, population redistribution, or migrant adjustment.

From a simple demographic point of view, migration forms one of the basic components of population change, and along with fertility and mortality, determines the growth of populations. Historically, the redistribution of persons between urban and rural regions has been driven mostly by changes in economic opportunity, although policy interventions, shifts in region political fortunes, ethnic relations, environmental stress, and other sweeping societal changes also provoke movement. While for decades, even centuries, the preponderant direction of net population shift was from rural to urban areas, this broad characterization overlooks some important counterflows and other more short term movement that may not fit the stylized pattern. In more recent decades high income societies, already highly urbanized, have seen something closer to equilibrium in rural–urban population flows.

DEFINITION OF MOBILITY AND THE CLASSIFICATION OF TERRITORY

Under most conventional definitions, rural–urban population movement occurs when an individual changes “usual place of residence” from a location classified as rural to another

classified as urban. This definition, and all the measures that follow from it, rests crucially on aspects of space and time that determine residence, territory, and the interval over which geographical mobility takes place. In general, urban territory is relatively high in population density, often bounded within a separate administrative structure, and linked to non agricultural production.

This simple urban-rural dichotomy is still used widely in national and international statistical compendia, and also in other social science applications, yet it is problematic. The definition of urban has resisted codification. No consistent definition of urban (and hence, rural) has been adopted by national governments (NRC 2003). A survey of contemporary practice found wide variation in thresholds and the balance between administrative and more functional classifications, with less than a quarter of countries using strict population size and density criteria (NRC 2003: 132). Typically, settlements over 2,000 or 5,000 persons are classified as urban, depending also on administrative considerations. (For the recent country specific list, see UN 2004: ch. 7.)

An alternative to the simple dichotomy is to identify "urban agglomerations." According to the recent UN compendium, the definition "usually incorporates the population in a city or town plus that in the suburban areas lying outside of but being adjacent to the city boundaries" (UN 2004: 111). The classification of territory as metropolitan helps address the shortcoming of the rural-urban dichotomy, but many classifications do not capture relocations across the wide range of scale of settlements. Many tabulations and presentations of data still abide by a simple dichotomous cutoff. In general, as urban territory is classified and reclassified, the categories of population residence and movement are also determined.

Time matters, too. The notion of a relatively permanent change in usual place of residence eliminates temporary and seasonal movement. In high income societies seasonal movement for reasons of climate and temporary job relocation are often missed in the study of population movements. In developing societies much short term movement related to seasonality of agriculture and managing economic risk is absent from official statistics. Rural-urban

population movement may be more likely to be missed in such circumstances.

CONTRIBUTION OF POPULATION MOVEMENT TO URBAN-RURAL BALANCE

Rural-urban migration contributes substantially, but not always overwhelmingly, to urban growth. The scale of the contribution of population movement to overall urban growth depends critically on the relative size (stock) of the urban and rural populations initially, and the relative rates of natural increase in the two sectors. In a typical circumstance that begins as predominantly rural, the contribution of rural-urban migration flow is likely to be quite high initially and then decline over time as the rural stock is depleted and the urban stock incremented. One careful empirical examination of urbanization in developing settings calculated that migration (and reclassification of territory) contributed about 40 percent of urban growth in recent decades in developing countries (Chen et al. 1998). Rural-urban migration generally contributes more to city growth in lower fertility settings (US, Europe, China) than in high fertility settings (Sub Saharan Africa). Many high income and industrialized societies already have a large urban population. Thus, modest increases in urban-rural migration rates or declines in rural-urban migration rates could shift the net flow in the direction of rural areas.

OVERVIEW OF RURAL-URBAN POPULATION MOVEMENT TRENDS

For much of the twentieth century, the predominant pattern of population change in industrializing societies was urbanization (i.e., an increasing share of the population classified as urban). The UN projects that the world will become majority urban by 2007 and 61 percent urban by 2030 (UN 2004), up from 29 percent urban in 1950. While much of the shift in the net balance of population is due to rural-urban migration, reclassification of territory usually works to further augment the urban population over time, as settlements pass the definitional threshold to become urban.

Counter urbanization, by contrast, is a decline in the share of population residing in cities and suburban territory. This reverse trend was noted in the US in the 1970s, and then in Europe and other industrialized societies. While it is correct to characterize the trend as a movement to lower density settlements, counter urbanization had several manifestations. Some movement was to exurban areas outside of the formal boundaries of urban agglomerations, some to more remote communities, and some was to smaller places within the urban hierarchy. In fact, from the 1970s through 1990s, several high income societies experienced competing trends of urbanization, counter urbanization, suburbanization, and continued selective rural depopulation. The US is illustrative, where the net population flow between non metropolitan to metropolitan territory fluctuated over these decades. As societies move into spatial equilibrium, and as the social distinctions between urban and rural become blurred, such fluctuations are more likely.

DETERMINANTS OF RURAL–URBAN POPULATION MOVEMENT

Economic opportunity has long been the driver of population movement. During much of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries in contemporary high income societies, migration was preponderantly from rural to urban areas, as industrialization generated labor demand in cities, and gains in agricultural productivity freed labor from the farms. The movement to the cities is still underway in a variety of middle and low income nations. China, during its late twentieth century economic transformation, provided a telling example as the fraction of the population living in urban areas increased steadily, augmented by a steady flow of both authorized and unauthorized migrants from the countryside. In high income economies as factors of production became less tied to geographic place, the pull of cities and their suburbs lessened, and so did the migratory flow to these central locations. In developed societies urban populations grew modestly in absolute terms and levels of urbanization increased by only a few percentage points during the decades of the late twentieth century (UN 2004).

At the level of the individual migrant, the economic underpinnings of relocation are borne out. Surveys asking individual migrants directly about their reasons for moving repeatedly indicate that the greater the distance, the more likely the move is linked to employment opportunity. These reasons tend to hold in both low income and high income societies, but in technologically advanced societies with dispersed employment opportunities, rural–urban and urban–rural population movement may involve a mixture of work and family reasons as life cycle changes drive both. For example, retirees often seek out lower cost housing and natural amenities, which are factors that generally favor smaller cities or rural areas.

In developing countries, the gender composition of the migration stream may vary with time, as primary migrants of one sex later reunify with family members who follow. Family and kinship related reasons (marriage markets linked to rural origin social networks, return to a natal village for childbirth) may also generate counter streams. Finally, sharp swings in economic and political stability may provide further impetus for movement between rural and urban areas.

SOCIAL CONSEQUENCES OF MIGRATION

Adaptation to the new setting of the city has long been of interest in the study of rural–urban migration. For destination cities, there is a parallel concern with the ways in which the influx changes community composition and social processes. Less attention has been paid to the adaptation of individuals and places in the urban–rural counter stream or those people and places that have been left behind by the migratory flow. A large sociological literature in the early twentieth century grappled with the consequences of the increasing scale of urban living and the social heterogeneity introduced by the influx of migrants from the countryside and, in some cases, from other nations. Ernest Burgess, Georg Simmel, Robert Park, and Louis Wirth, among others, examined these issues.

Migration generally benefits the migrant household economically. Some theories posit the development of a dual sector urban economy,

with migrants relegated to an informal sector of long term low wage employment. Nevertheless, one recent assessment concluded that even amid substantial variation in individual outcomes, rural–urban migrants attain improved earnings that compare to urban natives after a period of adjustment (NRC 2003: 353).

Urban living is associated with changes in various sorts of behavior (declining fertility, a shift in health exposure regime) and the access to new sorts of resources (schools, sanitation). The direct effects of urban living certainly exist, but were likely overstated by some early observers. Most intriguing for the sociologist is the manner in which social interactions may shift in urban areas. Various processes of diffusion of new ideas and the development of sub communities are possible when large numbers of new individuals are introduced into a dense heterogeneous environment.

Rural–urban migration also leaves people behind, and moreover, connects origin and destination communities. Social science has produced far less information about the consequences of migration for origin communities. What is known from examination of the composition of the migration streams is that origin communities tend to lose young adults, the more educated, and those with the most portable skills. Often, such departures are also differential by gender and ethnic group. There is reason to think that selective migration may have some adverse implications for those left behind, but a return flow of remittances and reduced labor market competition for remaining rural jobs may partly compensate for the outflow.

CURRENT DEVELOPMENTS

Several aspects of rural–urban population movement remain poorly understood. In some cases, this is due to the fact that this phenomenon is relatively new. In other cases, it is due to the fact that data collection or scholarly analysis is insufficient to shed light on the issue. Changes in transportation, communication, information technology, and associated economic incentives have made transnational rural–urban migration more extensive and more visible. There is international movement that is also rural–urban:

Southern European guestworkers flowing to major cities of Northern Europe; francophone African migrants to Paris; farmers in Central Mexico leaving for the Southwestern US. Circular, seasonal, and temporary migration has occupied the attention of migration scholars for some time. Such mobility is highly prevalent, and of significant economic and social impact, in some societies. Much of the time in cities is spent in economic activity with wages saved or remitted to the home family and community. At the same time, the absences – which may range from forays of several days to sojourns of several months – may bring the stress that comes with familial discontinuities.

Some new thinking on this topic considers contextual conditions. Migration offers a potential household strategy for managing risk and uncertainty, especially in agricultural regions. By sending some household members to the city, the household can spread its risks across the economic fortunes of agricultural and non agricultural sectors. Notably, such household behavior can generate seasonal and circular migratory flows. Interest in the migration development paradox stems from the observation that, contrary to expectation, migration out of impoverished rural communities is often quite low, and actually rises with community socioeconomic level. Some posit that this paradox of lower migration propensity in the face of potentially greater wage gains stems from the absolute lack of resources available to support mobility in the poor communities. This deserves greater examination, and certainly begs the question of how community context helps inaugurate, sustain, and terminate migration flows.

Some of the methodological and theoretical trends in sociology are likely to have particular benefit for the study of rural–urban population movement and other forms of population redistribution. The increasing prevalence of longitudinal data, the technological gains enabling the collection and storage of detailed geographically referenced data, and the growing attention to contextual effects all point to innovations in the future.

SEE ALSO: Global/World Cities; Migration: Internal; Migration and the Labor Force; Urban; Urban Revolution; Urbanism/Urban Culture; Urbanization

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urban space

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It is not an easy task to provide a definition of urban space because such a definition must consider the social parameters of its constituent parts: urban and space. The difficulty of defining urban space is enhanced if one considers that urban space is an artifact of urbanization – a social process that describes the manner in which cities grow and societies become more complex. For example, a synergistic perspective of space situates the location of “urban” as an outcome of social and institutional forces associated with urbanization. In contrast, a

structural perspective of space identifies “urban” as the product of social structures and relationships that typify urbanization. Combining the synergistic and structural perspectives results in the identification of social features associated with urban space: (1) diversity of social roles and relationships, and (2) institutional arrangements and social networks necessary for efficient social order. No matter which perspective one adopts, one thing is clear: urban space is a dynamic aspect of urbanization. Urban space involves synergistic and structural aspects.

From a synergistic perspective, urbanization is fueled by population growth and institutional expansion. In a simplistic scenario, in order for urbanization to occur, people must come together in large enough numbers that they are situated in a space that makes them noticeably different from less populated human groupings. In addition, the social diversity of the people situated in the same space promotes a form of social interaction characterized by formal role relationships rather than intimate or informal (e.g., familial) role relationships. That is, as a population increases its numbers within the same space it becomes necessary for the maintenance of social order that diversity within the population be characterized by formal role relationships (*Gesellschaft*) rather than informal role relations (*Gemeinschaft*). One might say that a distinction emerges between highly populated space (urban) and less populated space (rural).

The aggregation of people within the same space serves as a social force that brings together persons with diverse lifestyles and work ethics. In most cases people migrated to the same space because of shared interests or shared expectations regarding lifestyles and work ethics. Interestingly, social contact between persons in the population sharing the same space enhances the social diversity of the population by increasing familiarity with different lifestyles and work ethics. In turn, the diversity of lifestyles and work ethics necessitates the development of institutional structures for their expression; for example, churches for religious expression and a labor market for demonstrating a work ethic.

At the institutional level, situating a large number of persons with a diversity of lifestyles and work ethics within the same space required the centralization of social life. The dynamic

aspect of increased social contact between persons required the development of formal relationships between persons and institutions. For persons situated within the same space to be able to express their lifestyle and work ethic in an efficient manner required the formation of institutional structures for the performance of diverse lifestyles and work ethics. In particular, centralization was necessary for the efficient operation of institutional structures focused on coordinating the delivery of services vital to the expression of lifestyles and work ethics.

For example, in order to promote the efficient expression of social life, economic organizations such as banks and labor markets developed in order to provide a network of services that utilized labor, raw materials, and capital. The network of services, in turn, centralized the production of services that met the needs of a growing population. As such, a large and growing population, coupled with an institutional structure designed to promote centralization and social efficiency, created a context for defining urban space: the situating of a large number of persons with diverse lifestyles and work ethics in space nested within an institutional structure that promotes centralization and social efficiency. From a commonsense point of view, urban space is often regarded as a rudimentary definition for the city.

Given the preceding definition of urban space one must not assume that it is a twentieth century or twenty first century phenomenon. Large urban centers or urban spaces can be identified in the history of societies in the world system. According to some estimates, the city of Babylon had almost a million residents at the height of its social development. Similarly, Rome had almost half a million residents at its peak, while London had about a million residents by the early 1800s. All three cities or urban spaces were characterized by a large population of residents and the operation of institutional structures for promoting social efficiency in a diverse population (e.g., collection of taxes, distribution of raw materials, and the production of work).

The institutional structures that centralized social life in an efficient manner resulted in an outcome that one finds today. As the number of persons sharing the same space intensified, so did the diversification of lifestyles and work

ethics. In particular, the centralization of social life resulted in the hierarchical arrangement of persons based on lifestyle and work ethic. That is, class differences became visible and served to partition urban space. The partition of urban space made it possible to observe how persons sharing the same space associated with each other along class lines.

For example, in early nineteenth century Parisian society the aristocracy and growing bourgeoisie moved to the margins of the city to escape the increasing numbers of the “popular classes” in Paris. The access to capital and valued resources enjoyed by the upper and middle classes allowed them to situate themselves on the margin of urban space. In a sense, access to capital or valued resources served as a social force to extend the boundaries of urban space into rural space. As a result, what is often referred to as a suburb – space adjacent to or on the periphery of urban space – took rudimentary expression as the ability of persons with capital to differentiate themselves by class from persons subject to the homogenizing effects of the “popular class” on persons sharing the same urban space.

One finds in American society a similar phenomenon in the twenty first century. The increasing perception that urban space is pregnant with social problems such as crime, homelessness, and poverty has resulted in persons and families fleeing to space located on the periphery or within traveling distance of urban space. During the 1970s and early 1980s in the US, moving from urban space to the suburb was often characterized as “white flight” because it was a movement that was mostly driven by white persons and families. These were white persons and families that had accumulated equity in their homes located in urban space that permitted them to sell their homes and buy new larger homes in the suburbs. (Unfortunately, most of those left behind in urban space were racial and ethnic minorities who did not own their homes, thus resulting in the racialization of the suburbs.) Ironically, in some cases the number of persons and families moving from urban space to the suburbs was so drastic that suburbs became mirror images of the urban space persons and families were fleeing. The suburbs have become so much like urban space that persons and families are moving into rural areas,

resulting in “suburbs of the suburbs,” or what population experts refer to as exurbs.

Interestingly, as persons and families moved from urban to suburban space, the uses of public space have come into question. Who is entitled to occupy public space? In urban centers, the poor and homeless have been identified as targets for city redevelopment projects. For example, redevelopment policies have been used by cities to implement “eminent domain” practices to remove older homes, often occupied by the elderly on fixed incomes, to make room for upscale townhouses or condominiums that appeal to young people and families, especially those with white collar or professional occupations. Redevelopment policies have been designed by cities that establish vagrancy zones in downtown areas that make loitering on public walkways a misdemeanor – a strategic tool for criminalizing the homeless in downtown areas. As a result, city redevelopment practices seek to remove the poor and homeless from public space not so much to “clean up” the city, but so as to create an attractive locale for bringing back the capital that left the city when persons and families moved to the suburbs.

In the suburbs the fight is over how to allocate public space to parks and recreation areas versus businesses and commercial interests. For example, many of the suburbs’ residents commute to work in urban centers. In order to develop a system of services that meet the needs of growing suburbs, city councils in the suburbs have courted businesses, especially manufacturers, to relocate to the suburbs in order to generate sales tax revenue and jobs, thus keeping residents in the suburbs and improving their quality of life by providing jobs that do not require commuting. The push for attracting businesses, however, comes at a cost to residents. Public space that has been designated for recreational use is used as a carrot by city councils to attract businesses. As a result, public space in the suburb is a contest between resource used by people versus economic benefits for businesses.

In summary, if one considers the social construction of population centers, one might say that urban space is typified by what is called a “city.” A city is a collection of people and institutional structures that promote the efficient interaction between persons and place. Urban space has often increased in population to the

point that it serves as a synergistic force for the social construction of the suburb. Ironically, suburbs have decided that the only means for their survival is to mirror urban areas – formal social relationships and complex institutional arrangements. In turn, the suburb has served as a synergistic force to create its own alter ego, the exurb. As a result, the rapid growth of suburban populations makes it difficult to exclude the suburb from consideration as urban space because it is a product and catalyst for the social construction of urban space. It is possible to consider the rise of the suburb as an extension of urban space that seeks to accommodate the expression of increasing diversity in lifestyles and work ethics. It is not clear, however, how increasing racial and ethnic diversity in the US population will shape the synergistic link between urban and suburban space. Ironically, what urban and suburban spaces have in common is the transformation of public space into contested terrain.

SEE ALSO: Homelessness; Lefebvre, Henri; New Urbanism; Urban Policy; Urban Tourism

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urban tourism

Richard Lloyd

Urban tourism refers to the consumption of city spectacles (such as architecture, monuments, and parks) and cultural amenities (such as museums, restaurants, and performances) by visitors. Studying urban tourism requires taking seriously leisure activities and transient populations, features of the city that much of past urban theory declines to address. However, a number of developments in recent decades have led tourism to assume a larger place in urban scholarship. As industrial manufacturing deserts dense urban areas, entertainment plays an expanded role in many city economies. Leisure and consumption for some means work and profits for others. The attraction and accommodation of visitors has become a central concern for public and private city elites. The sizable but fleeting population of visitors to the city has a surprising influence over local politics, investment choices, and the built environment.

The label "tourist" frequently evokes pejorative connotations, which color not only popular but also scholarly representations. While crude stereotypes of the tourist suggest a plodding brute oblivious to all but the most obvious and pre-packaged attractions of the urban landscape, the leisure activity of tourism in fact contains a wide range of consumption activities and orientations toward the city. Moreover, the "business or pleasure" distinction obscures the fact that many trips are multi-purpose, with business travelers also shopping, visiting museums, and dining out. Susan Fainstein and Dennis Judd advocate the use of the term visitor rather than tourist, and see tourism as a particular mode of activity in which visitors engage. Especially today, even permanent residents may at times

use aspects of their own cities "as if tourists," consuming its spectacular, exotic, and heterogeneous amenities (Lloyd & Clark 2001).

Cities have long been privileged destinations for visitors as well as sites of residence. The ancient city was a destination for pilgrims, merchants, political envoys, and adventurers, some of whom produced accounts of the exotic spectacles they encountered. The industrial revolution led to rapid growth in the permanent populations of large European and US cities during the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. During the industrial epoch large cities remained spaces of spectacle and a multitude of entertainments. In the prototypical industrial city of Chicago, for example, city elites were not satisfied merely being hog butcher to the world, actively seeking to enhance the city's cultural image and attract visitors by launching the Columbian exposition of 1892 (in which the Ferris Wheel was introduced).

Still, the sociological study of the city, grounded in the massive growth of urban areas coinciding with the industrial revolution, has traditionally treated tourism peripherally if at all. The last half century, however, has brought significant change. Industry has increasingly declined in the older cities of the US and other developed nations, enhanced technologies of transportation and communication have made travel far more convenient and widely available, and the aesthetic and experiential dimensions of consumption have come to play an arguably much greater role in the global economy. Fast growing cities like Las Vegas and Orlando feature economies primarily organized around tourism and consumption. For old and new cities, the active production of spectacle and consumption opportunities is now a crucial feature of the political economy. In this case, tourism can no longer be a tertiary concern for urban theory.

In the 1980s, newly popular theories of post-modernism took the lead in examining the city as a site of spectacle and consumption. Focusing on the signifying qualities of the material landscape, thinkers such as Umberto Eco, Jean Baudrillard, and Mark Gottdeiner direct considerable attention to tourist destinations like the Las Vegas strip and Disneyland. The post-modern tendency to emphasize the transient and the ephemeral in social life likewise results

in considerable attention to the spaces and activities of tourists. In this light it is unsurprising that Frederic Jameson identifies Los Angeles's Bonaventure Hotel as the signature space of "postmodernism in the city." While these approaches have been influential, the mostly semiotic method employed in them is dissatisfying for many sociologists.

Disneyland and Las Vegas remain potent models that inform the study of the post industrial city as an object of consumption. Many theorists advance the notion that the city itself is increasingly constructed as a theme park in order to entice consumers. These approaches, which can be called the "Disneyfication" or "theme park" models of urban tourism (Sorkin 1992; Hannigan 1998; Bryman 2004), emphasize homogenizing tendencies in large cities, as tourist spaces come to look much the same from one city to the next. They focus on the injection of large scale developments such as sports stadiums, convention halls, and shopping malls into formerly decaying areas. Baltimore's Inner Harbor and Chicago's Navy Pier are signature spaces of this style of redevelopment in the US. These spaces of consumption tend to be highly segregated from the rest of the city and the everyday activity of residents. Hence, Judd (1999) identifies the construction of "tourist bubbles," districts that organize tourist activity in a highly regimented fashion while actively excluding undesirable elements.

The success of Disneyfied tourist entertainment is more uneven than these approaches usually anticipate, and themed entertainment venues like Planet Hollywood and the Rainforest Café routinely failed during the 1990s. Critics like Michael Sorkin (1992) decry the "inauthenticity" of themed spaces; what is increasingly clear is that tourists themselves often wish to consume what they perceive to be authentic attractions within a city. Rather than the homogenization of the urban landscape that Disneyfication anticipates, these attractions derive from specific aspects of local identity. Many cities combine large scale theme developments with more "indigenous" cultural attractions. Grazian (2003) shows that tourists search for authenticity in entertainments such as the Blues in Memphis and Chicago, or country music in Nashville. Local venues strategize to satisfy these expectations, producing what

MacCannell (1999) identifies as "staged authenticity." Often, tourists practice multiple styles of consumption, in Chicago visiting obligatory attractions like Navy Pier, the Sears Tower Observation Deck, and the splendid shopping of the Miracle Mile, while also attempting to locate the "real" Chicago in smoky Blues clubs "off the beaten path."

Indeed, the attraction of cities for tourists derives from both the breadth and the depth of urban culture. Breadth signals the diversity of attractions that center city districts are uniquely poised to offer, which can include professional sports, museums of various sorts, high, low, and middlebrow theater, musical performances, and an exceptionally wide range of dining and shopping opportunities. Depth refers to the cumulative nature of a city's identity (Suttles 1984), the resonance that attaches to particular aspects of the built environment and local culture. These include landmarks like the Eiffel Tower, the Golden Gate Bridge, or the Empire State Building. Tourists may experience Yankee Stadium as pleasantly haunted by the ghosts of Ruth and Mantle and the streets of Greenwich Village by past generations of storied bohemians. Thus, while some popular tourist destinations such as Orlando and Las Vegas are constituted almost entirely by prefabricated entertainments, and revel in the absence of depth, many others are valued for a place identity that emerges from distinct and varied histories.

At a more mundane but equally important level, cities contain essential infrastructure, achieved through a balance of public and private investment, which enables them to accommodate large numbers of visitors. Such infrastructure includes airports, convention centers, and significant amounts of lodging. Conventions are major vehicles for attracting visitors, and in these cases corporate expense accounts underwrite consumption in restaurants and other entertainment venues. Just as Chicago competed to win the Columbian Exposition near the end of the nineteenth century, entering the twenty first century urban boosters are locked in competition for major conventions as well as other high profile, visitor attracting events such as the Olympics or the Super Bowl.

Local boosters argue that new tourist attractions generate multiplier effects that will improve

the tax base and benefit permanent residents. Actual results have been uneven. While the entertainment economy of large cities implies a substantial workforce, the service jobs created are often far less promising than the manufacturing jobs that they replace, representing a mostly disorganized sector of cleaning personnel, kitchen staff, ticket takers, and the like. Casino gaming, a strategy for attracting tourist dollars recently turned to by the most economically desperate urban districts, including downtown Detroit and Gary, appears to produce particularly dubious effects for the local quality of life of poor residents.

The costs and benefits of tourist enterprises promise to be important objects of both theoretical and policy analyses in coming years. In the wake of the 2001 attack on the World Trade Center, security has emerged as another key factor in the regulation of city visitors that will bear considerable scrutiny. Long ignored, the relationship between cities and their visitors has become a core concern in contemporary urban theory.

SEE ALSO: Uneven Development; Urban; Urban Renewal and Redevelopment; Urban Space; Urbanism/Urban Culture

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urban way of life (East Asia)

Yasushi Suzuki

Among the various definitions of the “urban way of life” in Japanese social science, Susumu Kurasawa’s (1987) definition is most widely accepted in sociology. “Way of life” here refers to a way of coping with common and collective problems in the community. A “rural way of life” is characterized by a strong capacity of residents’ households to deal with common problems and their dependence on the mutual aid systems of laypeople in coping with collective problems. In contrast, the “urban way of life” is characterized by the low ability of households to sustain themselves, and their consequential dependence on the specialized systems of experts and professional institutions.

Kurasawa examined several classic arguments in modern sociology on the issue, such as Sorokin and Zimmerman’s (1929) urban–rural dichotomy, Simmel’s (1951) analyses of urban life, Wirth’s (1938) urbanism as a way of life, as well as Tadashi Fukutake’s (1952) and Eitaro Suzuki’s (1957) definitions of rural and urban communities. Kurasawa then identified the core of the urban way of life as the specialized systems of professional institutions in urban communities. His argument focuses on occupational diversity, social differentiation, division of labor,

and nodal institutions which have been identified as the structural characteristics of urban life, and he excluded from the conception individual and psychological traits such as secondary contacts, superficial and temporary relationships, rationality, impersonality, and alienation. In sum, Kurasawa argued that specialized systems of professional institutions are distinctive traits of urban social organizations. He also proposed his own definition of the city: it is a relatively large, dense settlement of non agricultural residents in a society at a given time.

While concentrating on defining the city and the urban way of life, Kurasawa's theoretical framework remains unclear. He may have considered the "urban way of life" to be an independent variable that affects both the ecological traits of cities and the social and psychological traits. Or perhaps he considered the "urban way of life" to be an intermediate variable between the two. Either way, his focus was on the concept of the "urban way of life" itself. Treating the concepts of professional and mutual aid systems as a dichotomy, he argued that the professional systems should be complemented by mutual aid systems even in urban settings (Kurasawa 1988). In effect, this can be used as an analytical framework for describing urban problems.

In the late 1960s and 1970s, suburbanization produced many new problems in urban Japan, such as a deficiency in infrastructures. Kennichi Miyamoto, one of the leading urban economists in Japan, argued that since the "urban way of life" includes concentration of population, commodity consumption, and collective consumption (i.e., public facilities such as water supply and sewerage systems, streets, parks, and schools), contemporary urban problems were distinctively characterized by the deficiencies in the means of collective consumption (Miyamoto 1980).

Another issue associated with them is the creation of local urban communities. Citizen's movements and public policymakers addressing urban problems advocated the creation of communities in cities. Kurasawa, as we have seen, recommended that local communities should play a significant role in providing mutual aid systems within the urban way of life.

Defining the urban way of life in terms of the reliance on specialized systems of professional

institutions thus implies that most urban problems result from expert systems. They may be caused by the deficiency of collective goods provided by governments or by excessive dependency on goods and services provided by markets. Local communities may complement the specialized systems and help alleviate the associated problems. This view remains limited, however, to the consumption sphere, as does Miyamoto's "urban way of life" (and Manuel Castells's similar arguments on "collective consumption"). More recently, specialized systems have been reconsidered in relation to the problems of trust and the risks of the "abstract systems" of modern societies (Giddens 1990). The conception of the "urban way of life" in terms of specialized systems may obtain further significance if it is connected to an analysis of the broader consequences of specialization on modern mental life, as with Simmel's argument in the early twentieth century.

SEE ALSO: Risk, Risk Society, Risk Behavior, and Social Problems; Simmel, Georg; Suzuki, Eitaro; Traditional Consumption City (Japan); Urban; Urban Community Studies; Urbanism/Urban Culture

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urbanism, subcultural theory of

Charles R. Tittle

Claude Fischer's (1975, 1995) urban theory is designed to explain how and why social relationships vary by size of population in settlements. According to the theory, urban life is bifurcated into public and private domains. In the public domain social relationships are typically superficial because people are usually interacting with others whom they do not know personally and may not see again. Such interactions are based mainly on the obvious roles people are playing at the time, such as bus rider, store clerk or customer, and pedestrian. Thus, the public domain, which varies directly with the size of the population, is characterized by anonymity, impersonality, tolerance, and lack of social bonding with others.

However, urbanites, even those in settlements with very large populations, have private lives characterized by interpersonal networks of friends, associates, and family, just as do people in smaller settlements. In addition, urbanites are more likely to be involved in other private networks with people who share interests that are somewhat uncommon and often unconventional. Through interaction concerning those peculiar interests, people within such networks develop distinct norms, a particular set of meanings and legitimations, status systems, and other social characteristics that distinguish them as *subcultures*. Thus, in their private worlds, urbanites are no less socially bonded interpersonally than people in other places and, in addition, they

are more likely to be involved in subcultural networks.

Cities promote subcultural formation because their large populations make it more likely that a number of people will share a given interest even though it may be statistically rare or unconventional. Moreover, the freedom implied by an anonymous, impersonal, tolerant public domain permits urbanites with peculiar interests to locate each other and interact sufficiently to produce subcultures. Fischer uses the term *critical mass* to refer to a situation where there are enough people with similar but unusual interests to form a subculture. The larger the city, the greater the number of critical masses and the larger the likelihood of subcultures of many types.

Because so many and so many different kinds of subcultures blossom and grow in cities, urban dwellers become more tolerant of the peculiar behaviors or interests that various subcultural affiliates embrace. In addition, subcultural affiliation provides supportive networks, distinct normative expectations, and social controls to encourage those who participate in them to embrace the behaviors around which the subcultures are oriented. Since many of those subcultures are concerned with unconventional or unacceptable things from the point of view of the wider normative context, their participants are likely to exhibit enhanced rates of deviant behavior. As a result, the larger the settlement, the higher the rates of misbehavior, including criminal behavior.

Hence, in a rather straightforward way, subcultural theory also implies a connection between changes in population and crime rates. As the size of a population increases, the critical mass for any given specialized interest also goes up, as do the critical masses for larger numbers and varieties of interests. Growing populations will therefore have enhanced chances of developing criminal subcultures as well as elevated chances of greater diversity in kinds of subcultures, especially unusual ones. Urban subcultures may facilitate innovation and diffusion of new ideas as well as promote conventionality or unacceptable behavior, so they also help distinguish cities as inspirational places for cultural change.

Fischer's theory has been especially important because it helped resolve contradictions between earlier urban theories. For example,

Wirth (1969) portrayed the city as a place of social isolation with consequent ineffective social control and high likelihood of social pathologies. Additionally, Gans (1962) had contended that urban social relationships and behavioral patterns were entirely the result of the socio demographic characteristics of their residents without urban contexts themselves having any causal effects. Fischer's account borrows from each, but it also adds a unique subcultural element.

However, because part of the theory concerns supra individual, ecological level phenomena that are hard to measure with city wide data, the complete theory has not been thoroughly tested. The evidence does seem consistent with the notion that urban dwellers maintain inter personal and familial ties while simultaneously occupying a public world of relative (though not as extreme as earlier accounts suggest) indifference, that many kinds of subcultures do thrive in cities, and that those who are affiliated with such subcultures are more likely to engage in the peculiar behaviors they promote. However, it has not yet been established that cities are the birthplaces or the most nurturing contexts for all subcultures and it is not yet clear whether modern communication systems, particularly the Internet, render cities less relevant to sub cultural formation or the behaviors presumably generated by them.

SEE ALSO: Compositional Theory of Urbanism; Deviance; Subcultures, Deviant; Urban Crime and Violence; Urbanism/Urban Culture

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urbanism/urban culture

Joanna Hadjicostandi

"With a year old son and a husband who traveled several days a week, she knew she wanted something more than a neighborhood. She wanted a community" (Richards 2005: 64).

"Urbanism" refers to the distinctive social and cultural patterns that develop in cities. "City," "urban site," "urban society," and "urbanization" are often used to refer to the physical structures as well as the social activities in an urban society. Cities have always been key sites for transcultural connections such as local and long distance trade and the transmission of innovations. They further have been the centers where political and economic power relations are instituted and maintained. Within urban centers multiple cultures develop, interact, and create social change.

Urbanism is not a monolithic term, but one that is complex, multifaceted, and centrally placed in history.

When discussing urbanism, Deitrick and Ellis (2004: 427-8) present a long list of key patterns that dominate urban areas. The first pattern they refer to is the creation of metropolitan regions that are composed of a structured hierarchy of cities, towns, villages, and neighborhoods. They recognize patterns revitalizing city centers with interconnected streets that are friendly to pedestrians and cyclists. They further argue that there is a very careful placement of unaesthetic structures such as garages and parking spaces with a transit oriented development. Well designed buildings and gathering places along with high quality parks and conservation lands are used to define and connect neighborhoods and districts. Finally, there is respect for local history and regional character in new architectural development. This can be particularly observed in neighborhoods that retain the character of their traditional inhabitants. Thus, we have Little Italy in the North End in Boston, or Chinatown in the middle of New York City and San Francisco, Astoria in New York, Soho in London, and so on. Interestingly, the nature of those neighborhoods and how they are viewed by the population have tremendous historical and ethnic/racial significance. For instance, visiting

Chinatown or Little Italy is a night out on the town as opposed to visiting Roxbury, a low income, economically depressed, black dominated neighborhood in Boston.

Others claim that urbanism is a cluster of variables. Cowgill (2004) defines a city as a permanent settlement within the larger territory occupied by a society considered home by a significant number of residents whose activities, roles, practices, experiences, identities, and attitudes differ significantly from those of other members of the society who identify most closely with "rural" lands outside such settlements. Beyond the structure of the city, he theorized about individuals and their practices, interests, and emotions; the extent to which the first cities were deliberately created rather than merely emerging as byproducts of increasing sociopolitical complexity; the internal structure of cities and the interplay of top down planning and bottom up self organization; social, economic, and political relations between cities and their hinterlands; interactions of cities with their physical environments; and the difficult "city state" concept.

GLOBALIZATION AND URBANISM

The city is a place where people typically lead in economic and technological developments as well as artistic and intellectual experiments. Foreigners and endogenous extramodal cultural elements contribute to the creative potential of these innovations.

Migration patterns have changed dramatically in the past two to three decades due to many socioeconomic and political changes that have occurred globally. The new waves of migrants stem from many Asian and African countries, as well as from Central and Eastern Europe and South and Central America. The great numbers of migrants from such diverse backgrounds and differences in lifestyle, with heterogeneous habits, food, clothing, music, film, dance, and literature, have instigated a shift of research focus in race, class, ethnicity, age, and gender. They have also become involved in the construction of new political spaces that cross conventional boundaries between nations and ethnic groups.

RACIAL SEGREGATION AND URBANISM

Although urbanism involves different patterns of cohabitation between groups, some kind of segregation exists almost in every city.

For example, most North American cities remain deeply segregated by race, economic status, or ethnic affinity. Although overt racism has decreased over the last 30 years, racial segregation continues to be a persistent feature of North American cities. Economic segregation continues, sometimes acting as a proxy for racial segregation, strengthened by ideologies justifying "neighborhood protection." Ethnic enclaves persist as protective way stations for recent immigrants as well as distinctive and valued urban neighborhoods.

A host of other problems, such as the lack of both public services and private enterprise in inner city black, Hispanic/Latino, or Chinese neighborhoods, have persisted in part because of this segregation. The challenge today is to address the legacy of nearly a century of institutional practices that supported racial and ethnic ghettos deep in our urban demography. Specifically, the practices of mortgage lenders and property insurers may have done more to shape housing patterns than bald racism ever did (Squires 1999).

In 1989, Urban Institute researchers found that the dual housing markets are perpetuated by racial steering, insurance decisions, and other forms of disparate treatment of minorities such as concentrating public housing in central city locations and financing highways to facilitate suburban development. Dismantling cities' dual housing markets will require appropriate political strategies that address the structural causes.

GENTRIFICATION

N. Smith (2002) uses several events in New York in the late 1990s to launch two central arguments about the changing relationship between neoliberal urbanism and so called globalization. First, much as the neoliberal state becomes a consummate agent of – rather than a regulator of – the market, the new revanchist urbanism that replaces liberal urban policy in

cities of the advanced capitalist world increasingly expresses the impulses of capitalist production rather than social reproduction. As globalization bespeaks a rescaling of the global, the scale of the urban is recast. The true global cities may be the rapidly growing metropolitan economies of Asia, Latin America, and (to a lesser extent) Africa, as much as the command centers of Europe, North America, and Japan. Second, the process of gentrification, which initially emerged as a sporadic, quaint, and local anomaly in the housing markets of some command center cities, is now thoroughly generalized as an urban strategy that takes over from liberal urban policy. No longer isolated or restricted to Europe, North America, or Oceania, the impulse behind gentrification is now generalized; its incidence is global, and it is densely connected into the circuits of global capital and cultural circulation. What connects these two arguments is the shift from an urban scale defined according to the conditions of social reproduction to one in which the investment of productive capital holds definitive precedence.

URBAN CULTURES/NEW URBAN PLANNING MOVEMENT

The new urbanism, a movement in urban town planning that developed in the late 1980s and early 1990s, is built on the belief that physical environments really matter and shape people's lives in ways they might not recognize. The principle of new urbanism is to erect fabricated "small towns" with an increased density of friendly residential neighborhoods, and all the facilities within walking (or skipping) radius of their home.

The objective is to facilitate everyday social interaction through the strategic design of public and private spaces, creating the sense of real neighborhoods. Traditional neighborhoods wove people together in economic interdependence, allowing for residents as well as most professionals to be deeply involved in the local society.

The most notorious new urbanism development is the Disney owned Celebration in Florida. Unveiled in 1994, this \$2.5 billion project nestled on 4,900 acres a mere 5 miles south of

Walt Disney World is the new urbanism embodiment of Walt Disney's utopian vision of an ideal planned community.

Ladera Ranch, an Orange County, California, development, is designed to mix homes, neighborhood shops, and jobs to get away from the developing individualism (Richards 2005). Houses are set close to the street and to each other, and are equipped with front porches to encourage social interaction, while banishing garages to the back. The community also employs six salaried event planners who organize at least a dozen functions a year, from harvest festivals to holiday lighting celebrations to garage sales to movies in the park. Residents are also linked around the clock on their own intranet system, Ladera Life, where message boards, chat rooms, and activity schedules are always accessible. Such innovations attempt to make people the moving force in the life of a neighborhood. Ladera embraces its mission with such intensity that residents joke that they are living on a stationary cruise ship. There are some who think that the intensive communitarian social engineering that distinguishes Ladera or other communities like it may ultimately work against it. Nicolaidis insists that too much planning can thwart natural community involvement, which has to grow organically over time to be real.

Another distinctive urban engineering project is Ave Maria, Florida. This intentional community, founded by pizza entrepreneur Tom Monaghan, is the expression of a community comprehensively embracing and enforcing the religious values of Roman Catholicism.

Another example of new urbanism is the creation of urban cultural parks, which was inspired by a Lowell park development (www.braypapers.com/new.html). There, planners found that the powerful architectural and urban artifacts of the industrial era could be used to transform a city where everything was perceived to be dull into a city where everything is interesting. New life was given to century old mill buildings and canals through adaptive uses. Urban cultural parks represent a major leap from the nineteenth century concept of the park as a retreat or escape from the city. In an urban cultural park, the entire urban landscape, with its amalgam of cultural and natural resources, becomes the "park,"

which serves as a unifying force, helping the city develop an integrated, resource based planning effort that addresses the goals of preservation, education, recreation, and economic development.

ARCHITECTURE, ART, AND SOCIAL CONDITION

KATARXIS is a website (luciensteil.tripod.com/katarxis/) dedicated exclusively to a new traditional architecture and urbanism that incorporates a reevaluation of the many world cultures in cities and includes the heritages of the West and the East. Another artistic development is the creation of murals in cities, honoring cultural backgrounds, political beliefs, anger, love, despair, or hope.

J. S. Smith (2002) analyzes the Hispanic urban experience as a window through which an intense attachment to rural places of origin can be examined. Hispanics, like Greeks, Italians, Polish, or Irish immigrants, have a deep attachment to the village of their family's roots. This is quite visible in the way they structure their lives and cultures in the new urban setting. It is not unusual to witness people sipping their coffee under a grapevine, just as they did in their Greek village, in a small street in Allston, Massachusetts. Similarly, Hispanics show their attachment to the rural village ideal in beautiful murals painted on neighborhood walls or the desire to be buried in the town of origin. Rural based, intensely local music and other kinds of public art frequently mark the territory of an urban ethnic enclave. The murals remind urban dwelling Hispanics of their cultural roots, reinforcing cultural identity and giving them feelings of comfort, security, belonging, and continuity with a long cherished historical tradition. These are physical and cultural features that are documented, but each also connotes a whole range of broader psychological and spiritual life, much as rural landscape always has.

COMMUNITY ORGANIZING

Community organizing has always been crucial in developing social movements, whether these

are in response to lack of government funding and support (Stoecker & Vakil 2000) or in objection to immigration policy proposals.

Organizing has been particularly powerful among the youth in most countries. Throughout the 1960s, most countries globally witnessed youth movements. The student uprising in Athens, Greece, is a good example of change in the country's political power. On November 14, 1973, students at the National Technical University of Athens (also known as "Athens Polytechnic" or *Polytechnion*) went on strike and started protesting against the regime of the colonels. There was no response to their demands, so the students barricaded themselves in and built a radio station that broadcast across Athens. Soon thousands of workers, citizens, and youngsters joined them, which marked the beginning of the end of the regime.

Generally in the 1960s, youth desired to crack the many codes that maintained sexual, social, racial, and political oppressions. Student revolts were connected with movements of rebellion in a number of sexual, social, racial, and political spheres. The intellectual resources came from writers and theorists such as Mao in the Cultural Revolution, Marcuse on sexuality, one dimensional man, art and socialism, and feminism. Alternative collective lifestyles were proposed, encompassing popular music forms, drug use, and living in environmentally friendly ways.

Today, two youth movements and cultures can be mentioned as examples. The first is hip hop, evolving in the US in the late 1970s and 1980s, exerting an ever stronger global influence. The code it cracked was that of complacency and passivity, which had socialized successive urban youth cultures into accepting unemployment and racial and ethnic oppression. The code it proposed in its place was a mixture of rap, music, dance, and graffiti. Oppressed ethnic/racial identities are celebrated by marginalized communities by challenging majoritarian aesthetic authority. This self assertion includes redefinition of language, and radical challenges to liberal and conservative social norms. The intellectual roots are in an indigenous people's aesthetic rebellion against Eurocentric Caribbean colonial authorities. It began with Caribbean artists such as King Stitt and Kool Herc, and developed its alternative

code through American pop artists such as Snoop Dogg and Ice Cube.

The second example is that of the development of new communities through the Internet. These communities overcome the limits of space and time upon communication. Resources develop organically on the basis of its users' interests, practices, and intentions. Users do not necessarily intend a reproduction of the norms that dominate in face to face communication. There are, however, a number of parallels, as in the email practice where messages are designed to *flame* and *insult* their recipients. This is paralleled by the face to face version of the open, raised voice argument where the intention is to provoke and bully the other party (Dobson 2002).

Cowan (2005) also presents popular music associated with urban culture, with entries on The Clash, Dancing in the Streets, and hip hop among others. The promiscuous mingling in the book of higher and lower culture, of professional jargon and street slang, is rather like real life that documents social change in the making.

SEE ALSO: Counterculture; Gentrification; Migration: Internal; New Urbanism; Popular Culture Forms (Hip Hop); Social Movements; Urban Renewal and Redevelopment; Urbanism, Subcultural Theory of; Urbanization

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urbanization

Anthony M. Orum

Urbanization refers to the process whereby ever larger numbers of people migrate to and establish residence in relatively dense areas of population. It is a phenomenon that has existed throughout the ages, from ancient times to the present. Large numbers of people have gathered and created urban sites in places like ancient Rome and Cairo as well as in ancient Peking in China. Yet, in recent times, the process of urbanization has gained increasing momentum and with it greater attention as well. Today, more than half of the world's population live in what are considered urban places, and demographers project that by the year 2050 much of the world's population will reside in them.

If urbanization were simply about large numbers of people living in dense residential settlements, it would hold little interest for sociologists. In fact, it is about considerably more. One of the questions posed about urbanization has to do with the reasons why people move into urban areas. What, in particular, draws people into urban areas and, once there, why do they remain? Even more importantly, what happens to people and to their lives as human beings once they move into the compact spaces of urban areas? These are questions that have prompted some of the most interesting and perceptive of sociological writings.

For many sociologists, life in the metropolis constitutes the essence of what societies are all about. If one can understand, for example, the nature of communities as they form in cities,

some would argue, then one can develop a good grasp of those elements that help people to bond with one another, in general. Others would point out, too, that a study of the lives of people in these dense and compact settlements provides great insight into such central sociological issues as the nature of social inequality and the roots of social conflict.

Urbanization thus is something that holds great interest for sociologists and the theories they develop about the way the world works. The first of the major sociological theorists to write about urbanization and its connections to social life was the German social theorist, Georg Simmel. He saw in the nature of urbanization and the growth of the modern metropolis elements that were characteristic not merely of cities, but of the broader development and change unfolding in the modern world. Simmel insisted that the modern city compelled people to treat one another in an indifferent and cool manner. People did not relate to one another as intimates, for example, but rather in an instrumental and calculating fashion: what can you do for me, in effect, rather than let us get to know one another better. This sense of rational calculation and its effects on the lives of people in large urban areas were pervasive throughout city life, Simmel argued, as the result of the emergence of these major centers of population: it shaped the character of society in the metropolis and it demanded that people adapt to its dictates and constraints. Life was swift in the city, relations transitory, and people were compelled to adapt to it by taking a new mental attitude.

Simmel, in effect, set the tone for much of the sociological writing about cities and urbanization over the course of the next several decades. His ideas, coupled with somewhat parallel ideas in the writings of thinkers such as Ferdinand Tönnies, became the building blocks for how others would come to think of urbanization and the metropolis. The next major perspective on urbanization and urban areas, in fact, came from a scholar who helped to create the Chicago School of sociology, Louis Wirth. Wirth, in effect, synthesized many of the key insights of Simmel in a work that would become perhaps the most famous essay about the urban condition in the twentieth century, "Urbanism as a Way of Life." Wirth insisted that the pace of life in the city forced people to deal with one

another in an impersonal fashion. People tended to become anonymous in the city; as a result, this influenced their own sense of comfort and security. The city, because of its size and the pace of its life, could become a place that helped to produce various forms of social disorganization, including divorce and crime. Urbanization also placed people into new relationships with one another, the effect being to undermine or to deemphasize the intimacy they had found in smaller places. Moreover, the city also gave birth to new and singular social developments, among them a range of new organizations, such as voluntary associations, not to say also new business groups. In effect, Wirth formalized and extended the basic insights of Simmel, creating both a sociological and a social psychological portrait of the city – a portrait that would remain in place for many decades and provide both an inspiration and a foil for subsequent sociological research.

Other writers and researchers from the Chicago School, among them Park and Burgess, helped to embellish and to flesh out this vision of what urbanization and cities were all about. The Chicago School, in effect, became that branch of sociology that would be devoted to understanding, interpreting, and even seeking remedies for the urban condition created in the modern world. The Chicago School sociologists turned to questions of immigration, for example, because of the great numbers of immigrants that began to enter cities like Chicago at the turn of the twentieth century. Park also turned to other issues, including race and race relations. Drawing on the work of plant ecologists, he developed notions about how immigrants and natives adapt to one another as they come into contact. The foremost theory of race relations during the twentieth century – the theory of assimilation – originated in the work of Park, from his own insights and views gleaned from his and his students' studies of urbanization and the city.

Eventually, the ideas and research of Park and Burgess and their students would become known as the school of human ecology. Taking their inspiration from plant ecologists, they used concepts of population, conflict, and change to talk broadly about what happens when urban areas are created, and as different social groups come into contact with one another. They

believed that urbanization necessarily implied tension and conflict, and that such conflict came about because social groups, possessed of different national origins and often different cultures, competed for scarce resources (in particular, land and space) in the city. The city itself seemed to be animated by some basic underlying forces. They argued, for example, that land values at the center of the city were the highest across the metropolis because the land there was the most prized, especially by business. These initial insights were later turned into a sophisticated and complicated theory of people and space by Hawley (1950).

For a long while, these ideas about the city – its impersonality, its conflict between different population groups, and its underlying population dynamics – remained at the forefront of sociological research into cities and urbanization. Then, in the 1970s, these ideas were challenged sharply by a new school of social theory about urban areas and urbanization, that of the neo Marxists. Central writers like Castells and Harvey argued that the conflict and change within cities – the various social changes that accompanied the process of urbanization – were the result not of some underlying features of urbanization per se, but rather of the growth and development of modern capitalism. It was capitalism – its inequalities and its tensions between the rich and the poor – that should be held to account for the underside of urbanization, they insisted. With such general assertions as these, then, Castells and Harvey, along with French social theorist Henri Lefebvre, introduced a fresh set of ideas into the thinking and writing about urban areas.

Today, it is the writings of this latter group of social thinkers, and others who share their basic orientation, that tend to dominate research and thinking about urbanization. Issues of poverty and inequality, in particular, seem to have emerged across the world as the world itself has become increasingly urbanized. New and compelling questions arise: How will the newcomers be treated within urban areas? Are conflict and poverty forever inevitable features of urban growth? And why is poverty persistent, especially among some groups of new immigrants to the city, but not among others?

In recent years scholars have begun to rethink the way they conceive both of cities

and of the broader process of urbanization. Lefebvre urged students of urbanization to turn their attention to urban areas as spaces, and to investigate the way such spaces were created. In particular, he insisted that the broader social forces of modern capitalism have much to do with the configuration and arrangement of spaces in the city. Thus, for example, the nature of work and the way that people must travel to work helps to account not only for the development of transportation routes and modes of transportation, but also for the nature of social life and the sites of residential settlements in urban areas.

Other scholars have taken up such themes and pushed them in new directions. David Harvey, for example, is particularly intent on uncovering the ways in which inequalities emerge in the spaces of cities. His ambition, among other things, has been to show how cities are constantly made and destroyed, a process that is a result, he argues, of the broader processes of capitalism that are devoted, in essence, to the creation of profit. The spaces and sites of cities thus become the pawns for capitalist enterprises: new buildings arise and others disappear because of the constant search for profit and its rise and fall over time. Sharon Zukin has explored these themes even further, noting the ways in which certain spaces of the city have been remade once the older industrial enterprises created during the early part of the twentieth century declined. Zukin also borrows from the work of Joseph Schumpeter, noting how the “creative destruction” of urban areas – the dismantling of old houses, for example, and the creation of new mansions in their place – is emblematic of the growth of market forces in cities, but also of the decline of cities as special places for the lives of human beings.

We tend to think of urbanization and the sites it creates as “places.” In recent years, more and more attention has been devoted to how people develop an attachment to the places of cities, and why such an attachment emerges as a key element in their lives. Anthropologists, historians, and philosophers have begun to create a new, broader perspective on the city that emphasizes it as a “place” – a specific site in social space where people regularly gather. The growth of this new view of urbanization and urban areas is somewhat ironic at this time, given that new

global forces are playing such a large and impressive part in driving urbanization and in reshaping urban areas.

One of the prominent themes in recent research deals with the forces that promote the growth and development of cities. When scholars such as those of the Chicago School wrote about the growth of urban areas in the past, they most often were concerned about the specific local factors that brought migrants into the city. Naturally, the most important of such factors, both to sociologists and to other scholars, were economic ones: the history of American and European cities in the nineteenth century, for example, provided ample evidence of the ways in which booming industries and new jobs, not to mention the right kind of civic leadership, provided just the right incentives for people to move into cities.

Today, however, the local has become global. Individual cities, and the attraction they hold for new migrants, must compete not only with other cities in their own immediate regions and surroundings, but also with cities worldwide. Moreover, there is a new stratification system that has emerged among cities. Sassen (2001) has argued that some cities have become global forces, their economic structures and enterprises so powerful that their decisions can actually override those of national governments. When taken to its broadest conclusion, this sense of the significance of global forces suggests that broad economic movements can have an impact on urbanization across the world: people will tend to migrate from the poorer places to the richer ones, and those movements no longer are dictated simply by local forces, or even national governments, but rather are the work of major economic firms and the movement of capital across the world.

The original sociologists of urbanization and urban areas, Simmel and Park, for example, observed the migration of people into cities and the emergence of new forms of life and activity there. Among the things they found were forms of class stratification within the city: in central areas they were the places where the dominant financial enterprises were found; nearby were warehouses where the goods of manufacturing were located; within this area and adjacent to it were the new ethnic villages that emerged, along with the growth of a

substantial working class; in the outer areas of cities would be found the wealthier residents – those people who could afford to commute into the city on a regular basis. This was essentially the pattern uncovered in America of space and the distribution of wealth. In other nations, such as France, spatial inequalities took some what different forms: the poorer immigrants would settle in the outskirts of cities, with the central parts of such cities still reserved for the wealthier residents. And in Latin American and African countries there was a similar pattern of class segregation that would emerge: in such instances, the relatively well off people in the cities themselves were surrounded by thousands of poor people who lived their lives in shacks and poverty.

Today, a century after many modern cities were formed, social and economic inequalities remain intact. Poor people continue to live apart from rich ones, whether they reside in the inner cities or on their outskirts. Major sociological attention has been devoted to this phenomenon – of poverty and spatial inequalities – over the course of the past two decades, driven initially by the powerful writings of William Julius Wilson on the American underclass. Cities continue to be spatially segregated, and sociologists seek to understand the nature of such segregation better. Poverty has been understood not to be a transitory state for many people, but rather it persists, especially for African Americans. As cities become the destination of ever growing numbers of immigrants, the poor among them (e.g., Mexicans in the US, Turks in Germany, Africans in the Netherlands), the story of race and inequality seems to be repeating the same tales of hardship and dislocation that happened to black Americans. Two major arguments now compete to explain this recurrent phenomenon of race and poverty: (1) that the roots of poverty are primarily economic, born of an inability of people in urban areas either to find high paying jobs or, given limited education, to qualify for them; (2) that the problem of race and poverty is even more pernicious, and that racism is a phenomenon that does not easily disappear, but rather influences the ways in which poor people are treated in many urban areas of the world.

The early sociologists of urbanization, it could be argued, seemed to think that the city

itself created a space in which new forms of social life and a new kind environment would emerge, and that these elements would reshape the character of life. What the research and findings of recent work on urbanization, poverty, and despair now show us is that there are indeed broader and more intractable forces at work in shaping urban areas – and that unless human beings work collectively to eliminate such elements as racism or the class segregation of cities, the lives of the poor and the rich will continue to exist as worlds apart. Urbanization, we now realize, is not simply a broad impersonal fact of modern life, but it is something that people and social forces create – and thus it is something that can be changed as well.

SEE ALSO: Chicago School; City; Ecological Models of Urban Form: Concentric Zone Model, the Sector Model, and the Multiple Nuclei Model; Global/World Cities; Park, Robert E. and Burgess, Ernest W.; Robert E. Park, Ernest W. Burgess, and Urban Social Research; Simmel, Georg; Urban Revolution; Urbanism/Urban Culture

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use-value

Rob Beamish

Marx begins *Capital* with an analysis of the use value of the commodity, suggesting, perhaps, that all useful concrete things have use values – but that is incorrect and the distinction, fine as it might seem, between the utility of a thing and the use value of a commodity is important. First, not every useful thing is a commodity, although every commodity, except one, is a useful thing. There are many things in the world around us – some may have no apparent use and others have known utility. As a thing – of utility or non utility – it is a concrete object with qualitatively distinct, physical properties; it is part of the natural order; it may have uses but it does not have use value. Use value inheres only in a commodity and the difference between utility and use value indicates the significant social dimension of a commodity.

The use value of a commodity appears to be the same as the utility of a non commodity thing. As use value, a commodity is also a qualitatively distinct, concrete object that can satisfy human want directly in consumption or indirectly as material in further production. Like all useful things, commodity uses are discovered in history and many have standard measures appropriate to their use – yards of linen, kilograms of steel.

Use value differentiates a commodity from things found in nature or procured or produced by private labor for personal use because the commodity is secured or produced to enter into a social relation of exchange. It enters exchange as a qualitatively distinct, concrete object – giving it physical utility or use – which simultaneously contains a quantity of socially necessary, abstract labor – giving it value (hence, use value). A use value's qualitatively concrete form determines its use and also constitutes the material embodiment of wealth that is congealed within it as a quantitatively comparable social substance – units of abstract, socially necessary labor time. A use value's form is concrete; its substance is social and abstract. The use values of commodities constitute a special branch of commercial knowledge that focuses on their concrete utility and their abstract value.

One use value is unique – it is not a thing but the capacity to do work within a social relation of exchange. The capacity to do work in general has no use value even though it has ontological significance and is important in one's private activities. However, as a qualitatively unique, concrete capacity, engaged in social labor – labor that will be congealed in a product that will enter the social relations of exchange – the capacity to labor has a concretely human form and a quantitatively comparable, abstract, social substance (the value required to restore the capacity to labor after a period of expenditure). Labor power is a unique use value because it can, under given conditions of social production, produce more abstract value than necessary to replace it. This unique use value is the source of surplus value.

SEE ALSO: Commodities, Commodity Fetishism, and Commodification; Exchange Value; Labor/Labor Power; Marx, Karl; Values

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utopia

David W. Lovell

Utopia is a type of imaginary ideal society. It generally takes a literary form, but it plays a role in social and political thought. From being playful, “utopian” has become a term of opprobrium, warning that a proposed scheme for improvement is not just impossible, it is perfidious. For there is a wide range of (different and often incompatible) notions of what is “ideal,” and attempting to realize one person's dream may become another's nightmare.

As with many concepts that have a long history, “utopia” has no agreed definition. Invented by Sir Thomas More for his book

Utopia, published in 1516, More's neologism was a play on the Greek words for "good place" and "no place." Thus began a tradition of writing about ideal societies, though ideal societies themselves were not new.

The diversity among what are commonly called "utopias" is vast. They include: Plato's *Republic*, a hierarchical society exemplifying justice; More's *Utopia*, an island on which communal ownership, material security, and the obligation to work were key features; Tommaso Campanella's *City of the Sun* (1602), a city built in seven concentric circles, with citizens dedicated to knowledge; Francis Bacon's *New Atlantis* (1627), a society run by scientists; utopias by Enlightenment thinkers such as the Abbé de Mably, Morelly, and Denis Diderot; socialist utopias of the early nineteenth century sketched by Charles Fourier, Étienne Cabet, and others; and (at the time) very popular utopias, based loosely on Marxism, in Edward Bellamy's *Looking Backward* (1888) and William Morris's contrasting *News from Nowhere* (1891).

Most utopias take the form of literary representations of ideal societies. Indeed, Kumar (1991b: 25) argues that what makes "utopia" distinctive is that it is a novel. In literature utopia should be distinguished from futuristic genres such as science fiction, where the technology may be extraordinary but the social relations are conventional (or even medieval). Nevertheless, as literature, utopia is unsatisfying because it abolishes the friction and opposition needed for character and plot development.

Utopia, however, is not just a type of literature, for it normally includes some plans that have been associated with social and political projects. Nor should it simply be equated with the notion of an ideal society, though it often is (Manuel & Manuel 1979). "Ideal society" is too broad, encompassing other worldly places such as "Heaven," or legends of a "Golden Age," or "Arcadia," or "Paradise." It also includes the "Land of Cockaigne" and similar dreams of extravagance and excess, and the Millennium, a vision of apocalyptic deliverance popular with some religions.

What sets "utopia" apart from other ideal societies is that in utopia human nature is not drastically altered: it is an imperfect society where social controls and discipline eliminate

disharmony (Davis 1981). Utopias accept a basic problem of social life: the scarcity that arises from our wants constantly outstripping our attempts to satisfy them. Thus, utopian institutions are designed to deal with the results of potential social conflicts that arise from this problem. "The utopian idealizes not man nor nature but organization" (Davis 1984: 9). While utopia relies on a malleable, and even perfectible, humanity (Kumar 1991a: 29), it is not a final, perfect state – an important distinction (Passmore 1970).

"Utopia" has meant different things to different people, and different things at different times. This is not so surprising, since our imagination – on which utopias must draw, at least in part – is historically conditioned. At its simplest, we might thus say that earlier utopias are technologically simple, while more recent utopias are high tech. Levitas (1990: 7) emphasizes this historical point in her argument that utopia is best considered as a "desire for a better way of living and being." Particular utopias tell us something about the conditions under which people live, because they show us what desires their historical circumstances generate but do not fulfill. Recent developments in utopian thinking, for example, have reflected changing social concerns: Callenbach's *Ecotopia* (1990) is an ecological utopia, while Piercy's *Woman on the Edge of Time* (1977) is a feminist utopia.

It is nevertheless difficult to link too closely the appearance and characteristics of particular utopias with their historical contexts, and utopias exhibit a number of recurring themes. From the time of Plato, many utopias have proposed common ownership, or stressed the evils of private property. Many rely upon benevolent despots or kings (in More's *Utopia*, the ruler Utopus laid down ideal laws 900 years previously). Some invoke rule by enlightened elites (the "guardians" in Plato's *Republic*; scientists and industrialists in Saint Simon's *New Industrial World*), and have a class system based on social function. But the most important common feature of utopias is their stress on social harmony, order, and a strong sense of community. Many of them therefore have the characteristics (both good and bad) of what Ferdinand Tönnies called *Gemeinschaft*, an organic community with face to face social relations.

What, then, have utopias looked like? Most have an elaborate system of rules, along with punishments for disobedience (Campanella's strict punishments, including community executions, are extreme, but even More was generous in this department). Most, however, devote very little attention to the community's processes of rule making in response to changing circumstances because of an implicit assumption that the social organization is static and thus that rules, once established, will not need to be changed. Politics as a dynamic process of peacefully reconciling different interests does not exist. Relations between utopia's inhabitants have not until recent times been envisaged as equal, but as conforming to a natural or functional hierarchy of roles, for the root of social disorder is never inequality as such, but rather the rejection of inequality. Some utopians have pushed their preference for order to the point of insisting on a particular architecture, as with Campanella's geometric patterns and Fourier's functional *phalanstères*. Children are sometimes reared in individual families, or more often by the community. How the citizens of utopia spend their daily lives depends largely on when the utopia was written, for many conventional matters (including gender relations and workplace issues) are unseen and unquestioned. This becomes particularly important in the wake of industrialization, when utopias can either be industrial or bucolic.

Even if utopias implicitly embody a critique of their host society by addressing unfulfilled desires, very few are written to generate movements for social change, or to inspire the creation of experimental settlements. More's *Utopia* was published in Latin, and was thus inaccessible to the vast majority of his countrymen. Linking utopias to revolutionary movements is actually a post-Enlightenment phenomenon (Rose 1987: 36). Furthermore, the socialist and religious traditions – Cabet, Victor Considérant, the Fourierists and Saint Simonians, on the one hand, and the Quakers on the other – began to establish experimental communities to implement their visions. The stress on community as mutual dependence even extended, in the Saint Simonian experimental community at Mênilmontant in the 1830s, to being compelled by virtue of the design of clothes to assist one

another to dress. Many of these communities were created in the United States, perhaps because of its relative openness (Holloway 1966). One of the longest lived was the Oneida Community (1848–81) in New York State, founded on religious doctrines developed by John Noyes. But Australia too – somewhat surprisingly, given its reputation as a “social laboratory” in the late nineteenth century – spawned a well known utopian, William Lane. Lane established “New Australia” in Paraguay in 1893, a short lived attempt at a socialist colony.

Experimental utopias have consistently dashed the expectations they raised. Begun with enthusiasm and sometimes in the face of great hardship, they display that mix of virtue and vice, communal spirit and individualism, and sacrifice and selfishness that is characteristic of societies in general. Physically isolating themselves from the corrupting influence of society also meant that such communities tended to turn inwards and ultimately devour themselves. However far people travel, they cannot escape their social relations. As for social cement, experimental utopias have been united (at least for a time) by allegiance to a charismatic leader, or by a sense of mission, whether social or religious. In literary utopias, there is a sense that fellow feeling will be the mainspring of community, and that the inhabitants will recognize the justice of its arrangements, however they are described.

Is Marx's vision a utopia? Given his emphatic critique of the “utopian socialists” in the *Communist Manifesto*, and Engels's determined contrast between socialism, utopian and scientific, it is often (understandably) assumed that Marxism is not utopian. Marx was, first of all, an analyst and critic of capitalism. But the contrast that he and Engels sought to draw between themselves and their socialist competitors was chiefly a difference over means, not ends. The Saint Simonians, Fourier, Cabet, and others of their ilk were indeed naïve about class struggle and industrial development, about the power of the state, about the chances for successful utopian settlements, and about the power of moral example for social change. Yet their goals were very similar to those of Marx: social harmony and material security.

Marx's critique of alienation and his expectation of its transcendence is central to understanding his utopia, even if the concept "alienation" was overshadowed in his later work by the language and methods of political economy. Like other utopias, the triumph over alienation means the end of politics: the rule over men, according to Marx, will be replaced by the administration of things. But Marx understood the limitations of literary representations of ideal societies, so he refused to write "recipes for cookshops of the future" and left his vision open ended. Beilharz (1992) has argued that socialists, in response to Marx's diverse assumptions about the future (whether human fulfillment will be found in labor, or in leisure, in harmony with nature or in subduing nature), have constructed a range of competing visions with quite different political consequences.

It is not surprising that some have questioned the possibility of a utopian reign of harmony, community, and security. With the attempt to implement a communist utopia in Russia after 1917, which imposed murderous uniformity on the masses and privileged the new rulers, "utopia" became sullied by association. It was dogged by "dystopias," literary attempts to describe the malign effects on human beings (particularly individuals) of the imposition of the ideal rules of some utopias, drawing strongly on the contrast between rulers and ruled. This tradition began with Yevgeny Zamyatin's *We* (1920), and went on with Aldous Huxley's *Brave New World* (1932), but achieved its greatest influence with George Orwell's *Nineteen Eighty Four* (1949).

One of utopia's functions is social criticism. But the line between utopia and other kinds of social theory is not clear cut. It has been described as a "mobilizing myth" to change society by Karl Mannheim (1936), though Mannheim distinguishes it from "wishful thinking," by which he meant most of what are usually called utopias. Bauman (1976) champions socialism as an "active utopia" because it challenges people to bring about a better world. Geras (1999: 43) has promoted the virtues of a "maximum utopia," insofar as it encourages people to reflect on social life. Utopias mix critique, projections, hopes, and desires in a variety of ways, not all of them considered positive. Indeed, opinion is split over whether utopia

is valuable or dangerous. Oscar Wilde said that "a map of the world which does not include Utopia is not worth even glancing at, for it leaves out the one country at which Humanity is always landing," yet respected thinkers have condemned "utopia" as the source of totalitarianism in the modern world (Kateb 1963).

Utopias nowadays are not written with much confidence, yet they remain an important way of reflecting on society. We should not disparage utopian thinking as mere escapism, nor lightly dismiss utopias. They help us to think beyond the everyday, the mundane, and the routine, and encourage us to question what is possible in human affairs. For we are inclined to confuse the possible with the familiar. For all its value, however, there seems to be a limit to how much utopian thinking is able to contribute to illuminating the complexity of social existence. The fundamental issues – whether they concern how to reconcile the individual and the community, who is to rule, how to prevent bad rulers from doing harm, or how to distribute scarce goods justly – are caricatured by those who envisage simple formulae, fixed rules, or an ultimate value. As a novel, utopia can have thought provoking effects; as a program for social renovation, it is insufficient.

SEE ALSO: Communism; Individualism; Marx, Karl; Politics; Property, Private; Social Order; Socialism

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V

validity, qualitative

Patti Lather

Validity is not just one of many issues in science but the crux of the issue: the claims of science to a certain privilege in terms of authoritative knowledge. How scientific knowledge is made credible is, hence, a longstanding issue. If one looks at validity as a social construction, one sees how the very calculus of credibility of what is deemed “good science,” the very determination of warrants of validity, has shifted across time, place, and various fields.

In the contemporary moment, the crisis of legitimation occurring across knowledge systems is registered in a cacophony of postpositivism, non foundationalism, kinds of realism and post realism, warranted assertability, logics of inquiry, construct validity, carefully controlled inference, objectivism, situational validity, and Cronbachian insights regarding the decay of generalizations. As a result, discourse practices of validity in qualitative research exemplify a proliferation of available framings in terms of the legitimation of knowledge, particularly the power and political dimensions of the issue of demarcation.

Various turns have characterized research in the human sciences over the last few decades, shifts that are not so much linear as multiple, simultaneous, and interruptive. It is as if the critiques of truth in Nietzsche, self presence in Freud, referential language in Saussure, and metaphysics in Heidegger were finally coming home to roost in the social sciences. Across this dizzying array of in movement shifts, these turns challenge the “view from nowhere” and the traditional foundations of knowledge that continue to undergird so much of contemporary research. The following outlines twentieth century turns

toward epistemological indeterminacy in order to underscore contemporary interest in situatedness, perspective, relationality, narrative, poesis, and blurred genres. It then surveys across the field of social inquiry in terms of the variety of available discourses of validity in order to delineate the weakening of any “one best way approach” to validity.

EPISTEMIC INDETERMINACY AND THE WEAKENING OF HOMOGENEOUS STANDARDS

In exploring the work of science in an era of blurred genres, validity is a “limit question” of research, one that repeatedly resurfaces, one that can be neither avoided nor resolved. Within a context of epistemic anti foundationalism, validity is about much more than the limits of objectivity: “It bores into the essence of science itself” (Kerlinger 1986: 432). What follows argues in a Foucauldian manner that validity be situated as practices toward spaces of constructed visibility and incitements to see which constitute power/knowledge. This post epistemic focus decenters validity as about epistemological guarantees and shifts it into practices that are situated, multiple, partial, endlessly deferred, a reflexive validity interested in how discourse does its work.

From a post epistemic focus, validity is a boundary line for what is acceptable and not acceptable in research. Validity is, in short, power, the power to determine the demarcation between science and not science. Such a post epistemic focus shifts the validity question in some interesting directions. Some argue for dismissing validity altogether as too much about the continuation of positivist ideals. Others worry that qualitative work that fails to provide systematic depth analysis and analytic rigor

threatens the fragile legitimacy that qualitative research has established and holds it to a scientific accounting. This is made most obvious in recent moves by the federal government to warrant experimental design as the “gold standard” for good science.

In contrast, Pam Moss, writing out of psychometrics and assessment, argues that all social science research is under theoretic pressure in terms of foundational assumptions. Moss (1996) argues for a reflexive complementarity between varied approaches to the social sciences in order to think reflexivity about our taken for granted practices and perspectives. Moss sees a reciprocity of accountability in this purposeful engagement across paradigmatic assumptions and her expansion of validity echoes Mishler’s (1990) argument that the “problem” of validity is about deep theoretical issues that technical solutions cannot begin to address. Ever since Cronbach and Meehl’s (1955) essay on the problems with construct validity in psychological testing, validity has been the problem, not the solution. Various post positivist efforts have been made to resolve the problem, from the naturalistic and constructivist paradigms of Lincoln and Guba that dominated the early discourse of qualitative research to discourse theory, ethnographic authority, critical, feminist, and race based paradigms and more recent poststructuralisms. Some efforts toward validity in qualitative research remain deeply inscribed in a correspondence model of truth and assumptions of transparent narration, while others attempt validity practices that take into account the crisis of representation. And some call for new imaginaries altogether, where validity is as much about the play of difference as the repetition of sameness. Rather than exhausting the problem, all exemplify how the effort to answer the problem of validity is always partial, situated, temporary.

The following traces these provisional “solutions” as an effort to displace normative criteria of quality. Normative criteria posit themselves as universal and attempt to regulate “best way” procedures, whereas socially grounded criteria are situated, relational, temporal/historical. Unlike standardized regulatory criteria, such criteria move away from compelling conviction to some essence and toward contextually relevant practices that both disrupt referential logic and shift orientation from the object to the

relations of its perception, to its situation of address and reception.

COUNTERPRACTICES OF AUTHORITY: FROM QUALITY CRITERIA TO SOCIAL PRACTICES

Just a decade ago, Lincoln and Guba’s delineation of validity served as a sort of mantra across qualitative work in the social sciences. This evidences the importance of a validity discourse appropriate to qualitative research, but most interesting is how Guba and Lincoln’s early delineation worked in unanticipated ways to undercut representational logic and spawn increasingly post epistemic practices of validity. This section traces the movement of their thinking across a decade of validity formulations. To set the stage for this, the first layer in the story of validity in qualitative research is the standard story from the side of positivism.

Whereas the criteria for the credibility of quantitative research are based on the validity and reliability of instruments and internal validity, in qualitative research the primary criterion is the credibility of the study. Credibility is defined as the extent to which the data, data analysis, and conclusions are believable and trustworthy as based on a set of standard practices. Markers of credibility include triangulation, the use of different methods, samples of people and/or times and places. Reliability is the fit between what occurs and what is recorded, and is established by: detailed fieldnotes, a team approach, participant confirmation of accuracy of observations, mechanized recording of data (tape recorders, videotapes, photographs), use of participant quotations, and an active search for discrepant data. Internal validity refers to the match between researchers’ categories and interpretations and what is actually true. It is claimed via prolonged engagement, thick description, thorough delineation of research process, and unobtrusive entry and participation in the setting. Finally, external validity shifts from generalizability based on sampling to reader assessment of transferability.

While this treatment of generalization evidences some attention to post positivist assumptions, the preceding is grounded in the sort of scientificity that is at issue here. Guba and

Lincoln (1989), for example, argue that internal validity, as an assessment of the degree of isomorphism between a study's findings and the real world, cannot have meaning as a criterion in a paradigm that rejects a realist ontology. Additionally, external validity or generalizability has little meaning if realities are multiple and constructed. Erickson's (1986) idea of "particularizability" seems more useful: documenting particular cases with "thick" description, so that the reader can determine the degree of "transferability." Most interesting in this standard treatment of validity in qualitative research is the rather unremarked work of the concept of "transferability." Displacing a validity of correspondence with a focus on the terms of address, of reception, shifts orientation to the reader who determines the degree to which a study is "transferable" to his or her own context of interest.

The next layer in the story of validity is a standard treatment of validity from the side of post positivism.

Michael Patton's *Qualitative Evaluation and Research Methods* (1990 [1980]) was one of the most widely used texts prior to the bestselling *Handbook of Qualitative Research* (Denzin & Lincoln 2000 [1994]). Patton elaborates on methodical reporting of systematic procedures of data collection and analysis. Particularly concerned about researcher effects, he cautions against the sort of self importance that often leads to overrating this problem. The key is that reducing distortions is based on "empathic neutrality," a kind of impartiality that works to minimize researcher effect while recognizing that "the data inevitably represent perspective rather than absolute truth" (p. 475). In delineating legitimating practices, Patton surveys across the most frequently noted figures: Lincoln and Guba and Miles and Huberman on specific validity practices; LeCompte and Goetz and Kirk and Miller on reliability and validity; Michael Scriven on rethinking objectivity; Denzin on triangulation; Peshkin on subjectivity as a resource; and Cronbach on generalizability. The basic assumptions of this canonical discourse on validity in qualitative research can be traced by unpacking the work of, arguably, the central figures in the validity debates in qualitative research, Guba and Lincoln.

In the summary chart in *Naturalistic Inquiry* (1985), Lincoln and Guba summarize the techniques for establishing trustworthiness as (1) credibility (prolonged engagement and persistent observation; triangulation of sources, methods, and investigators; peer debriefing; negative case analysis; referential adequacy; and member checks); (2) transferability via thick description; (3) dependability and confirmability via an audit trail; and (4) the reflexive journal (p. 328). Each practice is more or less developed, with the member check positioned as the most crucial technique. This involves taking back to the participants what you have learned from them and can range from a minimalist "transcript check" to a more involved reaction to a preliminary analysis to a maximal feedback loop in regards to the final write up. All are offered in the hopes of working against prescription and orthodoxy.

By 1989, Guba and Lincoln had moved to a delineation of three different approaches: parallel or quasi foundational criteria, now called trustworthy criteria; the nature of the hermeneutic process itself; and a new set of non foundational criteria, termed the authenticity criteria. The parallel criteria map onto the 1985 formulation, but they are more clearly located in a post realist ontology, for example, triangulation is deemphasized as "too positivist" in its assumptions of "unchanging phenomena" (p. 240). "The hermeneutic process as its own quality control" argues the difficulty of falsity because of the interactive, dialogic nature of the research process. The most noteworthy feature of the authenticity criteria is the break with more traditional methodological criteria into criteria that blur the line between ethics and validity. Termed *fairness* and *ontological, educative, catalytic, and tactical authenticity*, the criteria are about balancing viewpoints, encouraging the learning of both researcher and researched, sharing knowledge democratically, and fostering social action. The emphasis here is the move of validity from a set of epistemic concepts to a space of relational practices in situated contexts of inquiry.

By 1995, Lincoln shifted fully into an anti foundational discourse interested in research as relational and fostering of action and social justice. Quality criteria are posited as fluid and emergent, with a focus on criteria that collapse the distinction between rigor and ethics.

Tracing both the history and the rationale for the continued importance of rigor criteria, Lincoln notes her continued use of the parallel foundationalist criteria with her doctoral students as a place to begin. She then delineates emerging criteria that, while all relational, are differently aware of the exclusionary function of quality criteria and the inevitability of partial and incomplete standpoints. Regarding the latter, “detachment and author objectivity” become “barriers to quality, not insurance of having achieved it,” as she urges researchers to “come clean” about their own stances (p. 280). Epistemology is situated as an ethical issue, and objectivism is displaced by linking research as a community project to social action. Key practices are delineated: the use of multiple voices, reflexivity regarding the relationships and contradictions of research processes, reciprocity, sacredness, and sharing royalties as a way to address the cultural and economic capital that academics make out of the lives of others. This includes movement toward action inquiry. The interest here is the move beyond the search for uniform criteria toward criteria that emerge as a natural consequence of the inquiry effort. This is a call for a profusion of situated validities, immanent validities, within the context of a particular inquiry.

Seeing validity as an apparatus of betterment, as a cure for what ails us, Lincoln’s panegyric contrasts starkly with Scheurich (1996) who, rather than pay tribute, deconstructs “the masks of validity.” Across both positivism and post positivism, Scheurich organizes discourses of validity into three categories. The first, *originary validity*, translates conventional science concerns into post positivism, for example Lincoln and Guba’s parallel criteria. *Successor validity* recasts the concepts that arose in opposition to conventional notions of science, for example the concept of catalytic validity that grows out of advocacy research or “research as praxis” (Lather 1986a, b). Finally, *interrogated validity* deconstructs the policing function of validity, for example Cherryholmes’s argument that construct validity is “of and about power” (1988: 450). Scheurich argues that to the extent discourse practices of validity are about policing the borders between “the accepted from the not true or the unaccepted or the not yet accepted” (1996: 5), they are

“imperial” in allowing the same and disallowing the different. At the heart of the western knowledge project, Scheurich writes, is this “Same/Other power binary” (p. 6) that is more about “Eating the Other” (quoting bell hooks) than it is about increasing knowledge. “Validity practices are unconscious instantiations of a western philosophical . . . dualism” (p. 8) that is not about individual conscious intentions but about the western “civilizational project, an imperial project” (p. 7). To undermine this dualism, he urges new imaginaries of validity that both unmask dualisms and celebrate polyphony and difference, the shifting complexities of truth as multiply perspectival.

As a possibility, Scheurich unpacks Lather’s (1993) delineation of transgressive validities – ironic, paralogical, rhizomatic, and situated/embodied/voluptuous. All unsettle truth regimes, implode controlling codes, and work against the constraints of authority. All foreground the insufficiencies of language and the production of meaning effects, foster differences and heterogeneity, put conventional discursive procedures under erasure, and embody a situated, partial, positioned, explicit tentativeness. All anticipate a politics that desires both justice and the unknown, generate new locally determined norms of understanding, and proliferate open ended and context sensitive criteria that enact practices of engagement and self reflexivity. All bring ethics and epistemology together. Intended to “incite” the proliferation of validity discourse practices, this effort leaves Scheurich unsatisfied, however, still worried about the capacity of “our restless civilizational immodesty” to reappear with new masks in its continuing absorption of the other into the same (1996: 10). Turning to the accelerating proliferation of marginalized voices, he calls for “a Bakhtinian dialogic carnival, a loud clamor of a polyphonic, open, tumultuous, subversive conversation on validity” (p. 10). Here validity has moved from a discourse about *quality* as normative to a discourse of *relational practices* that evokes an epistemic disruption, a transgression of set forms.

This exemplifies how validity is being used to further change the terms of the legitimation of knowledge beyond discrete methods and toward the social uses of the knowledge we

construct. Across shifts in episteme and the consequent weakening of homogeneous standards and the proliferation of counterpractices of authority in qualitative research, the intelligibility and availability of alternative discourse practices of validity work to loosen positivism and suggest the critical potential of validity to put under theoretic pressure the claims of scientificity.

SEE ALSO: Culture; Legitimacy; Methods; Reliability; Representation; Science, Social Construction of; Scientific Knowledge, Sociology of; Theory; Theory and Methods; Trustworthiness

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validity, quantitative

Karen Lahm

The term validity can be defined and explained in a plethora of ways. In quantitative research, validity is most commonly discussed when a researcher is developing measures of variables or concepts to put on a survey or use in an experiment, etc. Specifically, validity is synonymous with accuracy in that a valid measure is one that is actually or in reality measuring the concept or variable that it is supposed to be measuring. For example, say a researcher needed to develop a measure for the variable IQ (Intelligence Quotient). So the researcher decides that he is going to ask his sample to get on a scale and weigh themselves in pounds. Such a measure of IQ (body weight in pounds) would be an invalid measure of one's intelligence because in reality body weight tells us nothing about one's IQ. A more valid measure of one's intelligence would be to give an IQ test and compute IQs from the answers gathered on the test.

In order to ensure validity, researchers strive to meet several criteria when they create their measures of concepts and/or variables. First, they try to ensure that their measure has face validity. Face validity provides a check to see if "on its face" or literally it is a measure appropriate for a concept. The example above lacks face validity because in reality body weight does not tell us anything about how intelligent one is. A second criterion for assessing measures is content validity. This suggests that a measure must cover a range of meanings for a given concept or variable. For example, if a researcher wanted to measure someone's criminality, he would not just ask them about how many times

they shoplifted. He would have to ask them about all types of criminal behavior (i.e., from shoplifting to violent crime) in order to cover the entire range of the variable. Third is criterion related or predictive validity. Predictive validity assesses whether or not a measure can adequately predict the future behavior or outcome that it is supposed to. For example, many researchers believe that SAT/ACT scores are good measures of college success because they have a high degree of predictive validity. SAT/ACT tests are standardized college entrance exams taken by high school students in America. The purpose of these exams is to test whether or not a high school student has learned what they needed to be successful in college. Thus, the higher one's score on these exams the more likely it is one will be successful in college (at least, that is what the testing services say). Predictive validity can be established through regression analysis. One can use the value and sign of a correlation coefficient (Pearson's r) as an indicator of predictive validity of the independent variable upon the dependent variable.

The fourth criterion for creating valid measures is construct validity. Construct validity ensures that one's measure "fits" within the theoretical system examined in the research. For example, in the field of criminology, social disorganization theory suggests that neighborhoods or cities with high levels of disorganization (i.e., poverty, ethnic heterogeneity, high population turnover) have less social control and thus more crime. Let us say a researcher came up with some measures of these concepts and went out and gathered some data on them. This researcher, through his data analysis, found that in his sample of cities higher levels of social disorganization led to more social control and less crime. These findings are opposite to what research in this area typically indicates, so he should go back and check the validity of his measures of variables because his finding does not jibe with what the theory suggests. It is important to note that some measures meet all of these criteria for validity, while some measures do not. Also, one measure is not universally valid in all times and places.

Once valid measures are created it is also important for a researcher to ensure both internal and external validity. Both internal and external validity most often come into question

within the field of experimental research; however, their importance encompasses all scientific endeavors. In most scientific research the goal is to establish causal connections between concepts or variables. One step in establishing cause is to ensure internal validity. Internal validity refers to the degree to which the researcher eliminates or controls for confounding variables in the study. For example, let us say a researcher wanted to establish that attending a study session will increase test score. In this example, there are many confounding variables that could be influencing test scores besides attendance at a review session. For instance, maybe the students studied more outside of the review session, maybe they got lots of sleep the night before the exam, maybe they ate healthier in the weeks leading up to the exam and were more alert.

To ensure more internal validity, the researcher could do several things, like add a control group or a group of students who did not have the exam and see how their scores compared to the experimental group who received the study session. The researcher could also have given a pre test to examine scores both before and after the study session. The researcher would also want to make sure students were randomly assigned to both the experimental and control groups, so that it was not only the smart students that attended the review session. Moreover, the researcher would also want to make sure that the control group and experimental group do not have contact with one another. He would want to make sure no one drops out of the study. He would also want to make sure the pre test and post test are the same instruments and that there are no other review sessions or outside study groups being offered to either set of participants.

Also important is external validity. It refers to the degree to which the results of an experiment can be generalized to the rest of the population. Think of this as the universality of your findings. Can your findings apply to other people at other places at other times? Some ways to ensure external validity is to randomly select experimental and control groups from the general population. Also, one should replicate their study in a variety of settings, times, etc. These techniques may help to ensure the generalizability of one's findings to the larger population.

SEE ALSO: Reliability; Reliability Generalization

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value

Rob Beamish

Value and theories of value might begin in economics but they have significant sociological importance. As with economics, two divergent conceptions of value dominate sociological thought: an objective, intrinsic, production centered theory versus a subjective, consumption focused conception of value – best represented in Marx and Simmel’s works, respectively. Marx’s systematic presentation of value’s form and substance in *Capital* critically extended Adam Smith, David Ricardo, and other political economists’ labor theory of value, while Simmel developed the sociological importance of subjective conceptions of value that began with political economist Jacques Turgot and William Jevons and the Austrian School developed with theories of marginal utility, value, and price.

Theories of value extend back at least to Aristotle and the social production of value and its social significance reach back to points in history when humankind lived in primitive communal groupings and the unit of production and consumption coincided. Group members worked collectively to meet their material needs and wants. Labor was communal and the communal product was shared. Products of labor were considered only for their concrete

utility, with no conception of value (abstract or concrete; subjective or objective).

Production above the material wants of the group and periodic interchange created the conditions for intermittent and then ongoing exchange between groups or communities and later within them. Surplus production allowed the social relations of primitive commodity exchange to emerge and a social division of labor between and within groups developed. As production was directed to both communal wants and social exchange, production changed from concrete, primitive communal to communal social and a separation of abstract and concrete labor within the commodity arose.

The form of communal life remained a kin, tribal, or communal group or village, but the substance of the social relations among members within production became increasingly mediated as exchange was introduced and expanded. Exchange created a social relation between the qualitatively unique concrete labors of commodities requiring their comparison as abstract, quantitatively comparable labors. Exchange also introduced mediate social relations between production and consumption. Exchange created the value form and labor created its substance. The form and substance of value permitted class division to develop and the accumulation of abstract wealth – value.

In his critique of classical political economy, Marx used Hegel’s dialectic of quantity and quality, general and specific, form and content, and form and substance to analytically synthetically, rather than historically, present an objectively based labor theory of value that would expose the underlying dynamic of exploitation within capitalist production and serve as the departure point for a synthetically based comprehension of capitalism’s totality. Marx argued that beneath a commodity’s qualitative, concrete appearance there are abstract, quantitatively comparable units of socially useful, socially necessary, simple, abstract labor. This objective substance of value pertains to all commodities, including the “capacity for work” or the labor power workers sell to capital in the labor market. In return for the full and fair exchange of the value of their labor power, workers contract themselves to work a specific period of time at certain levels of productivity, under particular conditions. Due to labor power’s unique nature, in

the course of a workday it can produce commodities with a total value that is greater than the value substance of labor power itself – creating a surplus of value (or surplus value). The key contradiction in capitalist production is that workers, receiving full value for their ability to do work, can still generate a surplus which maintains and builds the social relations of production that confront them, appropriate the social surplus, and exploit them. As Hegel began the *Phenomenology* with the single, simple category of sense certainty, and its immediate contradictions, to build an increasingly complex conception of human reason's totality, Marx established the objective substance of value as his departure point for an increasingly synthetic analysis of the contradictions of capitalist production, circulation, and then the system as a whole.

While value was not as central to Simmel's sociology as it was to Marx's critique of political economy, Simmel's discussions of value stem directly from his sociological perspective, illustrate his approach to understanding social phenomena, and represent a key "culturist" critique of historical materialism. Simmel's conception of value stemmed from his interest in money as one of many potential, heuristic concepts that sociologists could use to formulate understandings of social relationships. Simmel explored the ways in which money – one of the more important and highly complex cultural forms of social interaction – was a form in and through which particular types of social interaction occurred and how that interaction held broader social and historical implications.

Individual subjects, Simmel argued, assess and attach value or values to objects to overcome the physical distance and separation between them and the objects of their interest. In exchange processes, people assess their own relationship to an object as well as others' expectations to arrive at a particular, subjectively established value of the object – expressed or made concrete in the money form. Value, through the money form, is objectified; value becomes a "cultural objectivation." Unlike Marx, any labor substance to value is inconsequential. Value is a cultural product; it is produced through subjective understanding and assessment and, most significantly, stems from and further develops a particular worldview.

The calculation of value creates and reinforces a cultural form that seeks uniformity within diversity, rationality from within affective attachment, and individuation through interaction. Value, and its expression in money, establishes an economic rationality that progressively expands into a broader, more encompassing instrumental rationality. Like Weber, Simmel saw, through value and money, the increasing domination of a rational, instrumental approach to social relationships.

Despite their differences over value, Marx and Simmel's analyses led to similar concern with alienation in commodity based societies. Similarly, value served as a key departure point for more complex, comprehensive social analyses.

SEE ALSO: Exchange Value; Labor/Labor Power; Money; Use Value

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values

Giuseppe Giordan

Values represent beliefs and ideals which form the basis for choices and preferences, both at an individual and collective level. Generally speaking, a value is defined as that which is "good" and which is desired and is able to make one happy. Such long lasting and immaterial ideas regard both current conduct and one's ultimate objective in life: they are different from simple interests, which are not particularly characterized by duration, and also from moral laws,

which indicate what is the “right thing to do.” Values propose a certain lifestyle and “how to be” rather than purely concrete rules of behavior.

The utilization of the concept in sociology has been the object of lively debate owing to the difficulty of clearly defining what is meant by values. Sociologists often stress how difficult it is to provide a definition that is usable in empirical research and they underline the relativity and subjectivity of the definition itself. However, all researchers highlight the connection between values, social structure, and actual behaviour of social subjects. Hechter et al. (1993) identify some difficulties in the study of values: (1) they are not visible; (2) there are no theories capable of satisfactorily explaining the connection between values and behaviors both at individual and collective levels (and besides we lack theories explaining how values are formed); (3) they are not easily measurable.

Values are not to be confused with attitudes, norms, and needs or with the peculiarities of personal traits (Hitlin Piliavin 2004). Values are centered on ideals; hence, they have an abstract role in building self identity, while attitudes directly refer to the actual behavior of individuals. Compared to norms, then, values are perceived by individuals not as imposed from outside, but rather as outcomes of free personal choice. In addition, while needs refer to the biological sphere, values highlight the various cultural responses that can be given to such needs. The need for food or sex meets different responses according to the values of the different cultures where such needs are felt. Values also differ from traits because traits refer to the actual fixed aspects of personality, while values are abstract judgment criteria constantly inclined towards self transcendentalism.

Empirical research on values emphasizes how their origin can be traced to a heterogeneous multiplicity of factors such as biology (genus, race, ethnicity) and the various characteristics of the social structure to which the individual belongs (e.g., literacy level, occupation, professed religion, social class, family). The concept of values is found in various cognitive spheres and there is a multiplicity of definitions which vary according to the point of reference, be it economics, philosophy, psychology, or sociology, all of which offer significant contributions

to a more complete understanding of the concept.

ECONOMICS AND PHILOSOPHY

In the field of economics a value may be defined as that which defines two interconnected but different prospects: on the one hand, the characteristic of a good is that it may be exchanged for other goods (“exchange value”); on the other hand, all the characteristics which enable any given good to satisfy the multiple needs of humankind are defined as “use value.” The definition of the concept of value from an economic perspective is extremely important, as it has significant consequences in the sociocultural and psychological spheres: values also are conditioned by subjective, not objective evaluation and are identifiable and comprehensible in relation to a specific historical period and particular circumstances and therefore do not have an absolute or eternal character.

This dialectical relationship between the absoluteness of values and the relativism of historical perspective constitutes the heart of the philosophical debate that directly connects concepts of value to that which is good: this provides the reference for the objectives of life and the moral dimension of life. In classical philosophy (particularly Stoicism) the concept of values is explained in a subjective sense and defines the object of ethically good choices. Nietzsche, however, dramatically changed such philosophical reflection in both social and cultural terms at the end of the nineteenth century. His explicit proposal was to radically overthrow the order of traditional values which were based on metaphysics, logic, morals, and religion: all these values were identified principally by the Christian tradition, based on renouncement and asceticism. Nietzsche opposed to them the “vital values” centered on the free expression of the will of man.

From a phenomenological perspective, Max Scheler underlined the “objective” character of values and highlighted absoluteness and eternity: these may be grasped not only via the intellect but also intuitively via the emotional experience of the conscience. Scheler suggested a hierarchy of values, among which are values of the senses (pleasure is contrasted

with displeasure), vital values, spiritual values (legal, aesthetic, cognitive) and finally the supreme value of holiness. For Scheler, the ultimate foundation of values is the discovery of the unitary principle of love. Nicolai Hartmann also underlined the original emotional characteristic of values and interpreted this concept in a rigorously realistic manner: the perception of values may vary and may be completely absent, but values exist independently of subjective conscience.

It is easy to see how the foregoing influences the perception and the role that values play in the construction of identity: this process develops as a result of the need for certainty provided by secure and reliable points of reference and also as a result of the relativity of different situations and different historical periods.

VALUES AND IDENTITY

Values are found at the crossroads between different fields of cognizance, particularly evident when one takes into consideration their roles in the construction of identity, both at a personal and at a collective level. The theme of values is significant for in depth study of the complex relationship between the individual and the society and culture to which they belong, thus highlighting a nexus of interrelationships (the contribution of psychology, anthropology, and sociology are of particular importance). In addition to needs and attitudes, values constitute fundamental psychic contents: while needs "push" us into action, values "attract" our project making capacity. Thus, we are not made only to satisfy physical needs, but also to face risks and uncertainty in the search for and attainment of new goals and ideals.

Values have a specific function at the heart of one's mentality: they provide identity and they are traction elements of the entire mental apparatus. In other words not only do values unify the diverse components of "I," but they also push the individual to greater realization in the search for a positive identity. One's aim of surpassing the limits of the simple and every day gives meaning to life. This search for the meaning of life provides one with free choice in spite of continual clashes with the conditions of

one's own situation. Although the search is highly personal, the values of the individual are part of their social and cultural context. From a sociocultural point of view, values constitute a specific element of every culture: they are closely linked to the symbols, laws, and rituals which regulate the various dimensions of collective life. Thus, it is clear that values have the function of uniting individual and social praxis; it is this unity which coherently guarantees the link between the individual and society. From a sociological point of view, it is the complex mechanism of the transfer of values from one generation to another which constitutes the socialization process, within which the interaction between society and the individual and thus various aspects of culture become important for the individual.

Seen from the perspective of the social sciences, values do not concern the dimension of absoluteness and transcendence of the philosophical context, but are linked to precise historical, geographical, and social contexts related to various economic, political, and religious structures. The anthropologist Clyde Kluckhohn (1951) defined three fundamental dimensions of values. The entire emotional dimension underlines the profound link between values and the emotions of the subject. The intensity of this link depends on the degree of interiorization of the system of values within any given society. The cognitive dimension is where values implicate the consciousness and the capacity of rational justification on the part of the individual. Kluckhohn then underlines the selective function played by values: these are the criteria by which the subject judges, selects, and orders different behavior and the various ways of thinking which make up their social context: thus, values are fundamental in orienting social behavior.

VALUES AND SOCIAL CHANGE

The sociocultural approach to the topic of values relates to the phenomenon of social change. Knowing all the values which guarantee cohesion and guide the development of a social system is decisive for the comprehension of factors which have moved traditional society

to modern and postmodern society. It suffices to reflect on the value of progress, which is comprehended as a permanent innovation that ought to guarantee the development of humanity to ever improving conditions, and has been the tool used to back the change from traditional to modern society. In addition to progress, modernity is characterized by the affirmation of the individual's freedom of choice, which democracy must guarantee.

The contemporary situation can be characterized by what Inglehart (1977) defined as the "silent revolution": he referred to American and western society in general and underlined the fact that since 1945 society has been moving away from general values. Although the process is slow and gradual, there has been a move away from "materialistic values" to "post materialistic values" in the last few decades. In the past importance was given to physical and economic security; now, however, growing importance is given to the sense of belonging, self realization, and intellectual and aesthetic satisfaction. Although post materialists do not deny the importance of material issues in life, they emphasize quality of life, safeguarding the environment, and freedom of expression. Subjective quality of life and subjective well being are no longer expressed purely in economic terms.

Bellah et al. (1985) connect the search for happiness with the attainment of increasingly elevated levels of freedom. Individualism seems to be the characteristic trait of American and western society in general: the need to establish personal freedom and the search for success in economic terms as spurred on by the spirit of personal initiative and creativity, however, tend to isolate members of a community and thus often create discrimination.

"CRISIS OF VALUES" AND THE CHALLENGE OF CULTURAL PLURALISM

The rapid and profound changes which have touched society and culture in recent years have resulted in widespread discomfort, both for individuals and for collective life. Technological innovation encroaches upon the origins

of life; interpersonal relations are based increasingly on emotions and temporariness; wide spread emigration results in the cohabitation of different customs and traditions in the same territory – all often create difficulties between peers and between different generations. An increasingly accentuated diversity in lifestyles results in the questioning of consolidated traditions, which were, until recently, accepted as unquestionable and eternal.

This has been defined as the crisis of values, an expression which is not easy to define precisely unless one refers to the disorientation caused by the speed of change and the construction of identity and daily life in modern to postmodern society. The crisis of values principally signifies the need to underline the profound change in the process of legitimization of values. This legitimization is no longer to be found in the certainty of institutions and within the law, but is instead based upon individual freedom of choice and a desire for self realization. No longer is there obedience to a unique authority of tradition, but rather there is social recognition of the multiplicity of values. In addition, the crisis of values refers to a new "range of values" which may be adopted both by various societies and by individuals: these options are not always easy to match and reconcile with a common point of reference. Thus, the crisis of values is not a disappearance of values, but is rather the result of their excessive, incoherent, and often contradictory proliferation.

A result of social complexity is the creation of diverse possibilities in the composition of values and social change. These positions may be schematically recapitulated in fundamentalist and relativist models, as well as by the possibilities offered by cultural pluralism. The fundamentalist model (often, but not always, inspired by religious legitimization) aims to safeguard eternity and the immutability of values, negating the possibility of interaction with the concrete social and cultural context of the values themselves. The relativist conception stresses the radical freedom of the individual in the construction of personal values, as far as (in its extreme form) the affirmation of the impossibility of mankind's recognition of the foundation of good and evil.

The outlook of cultural pluralism aims at safeguarding the diversity of different cultural concepts through the legitimization of their very diversity. Surpassing an ethnocentric vision (which encompasses the belief that one's own cultural values are superior to those of other cultures) opens up one's system of values to comparison and relations with other cultural systems and values. Cultural diversity is now the biggest challenge for the construction of social systems which are able to guarantee the free expression of the values of individuals and the community to which they belong.

SEE ALSO: Culture; Fundamentalism; Identity: Social Psychological Aspects; Identity Theory; Plural Society; Religion; Social Change; Values: Global

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values: global

Dusko Sekulic

Social values are relatively abstract and generalized standards or principles of what the individuals in a society consider good and desirable. Equality, justice, and freedom are examples of such values. They are the basis for creating evaluative criteria for judging concrete social behavior as good or bad, desirable or despicable, acceptable or unacceptable. Values are the source of concrete prescription for behavior in practical situations of everyday life. Where the general value is equality, the norms of teacher impartiality or the presumption of innocence in courts are concrete norms derived from the abstract value.

There are two important points to be made regarding values and their role in understanding social life. First, society is partially constituted through values and the study of sociology is the study of values. Society can usually tolerate highly diverse attitudes, but it requires some degree of homogeneity and consistency in the values held by people. This provides a commonality of shared values, which shape social and political consensus. To what extent shared values are a necessary precondition for society to survive is a hotly debated issue in sociology. In Parsonsian sociology, social order depends on the existence of such general and shared values. They are regarded as legitimate and binding, and act as standards by which particular actions are selected. The linkage of social and personality systems is achieved by the internalization of values through socialization processes. The critique states that functionalism overemphasizes the importance of shared values in maintaining social order. Conflict theorists would argue that socialization, and the maintenance of common values, hides the underlying interests of those in power to preserve the existing order. The emphasis on the value of homogeneity underestimates the human capability to handle contradictions or simply to compartmentalize them.

Second, as much as society is partially constituted through values, it is also observed that the contents of values vary tremendously. All ethical and religious systems claim universal

validity of the values they profess. The empirical reality is that none of these values is universally accepted, and values prevailing in different societies do not reflect some universal value system characterizing humanity.

The practical reaction to this empirical fact can vary between ethnocentrism, the practice of judging another culture and its values by the standards of one's own culture and values, to cultural relativism, the practice of evaluating value systems by their own standards. Both positions have tremendous ethical and moral consequences. What are the standards that allow the ethnocentrist to claim superiority of his/her values? For cultural relativists, the moral dilemma stems from the fact that if almost any kind of behavior is normative and accepted somewhere in the world, does that mean every thing is equally right? Sociology, not being a normative science, does not provide answers to these normative questions. But there are several approaches within sociology that are preoccupied with the question of global or universal values.

We divide these approaches into three broad groups. The first tries to detect some common values derived from human nature in general. The widely used approach of this type is that of sociobiology. The second approach is based on comparative social psychology, which claims that some universal value structures can be discovered. Here we must emphasize that universal structure does not mean universal value *content*, but the universal *structure* of value systems. The third approach tries to detect shifts toward acceptance of some global values as a result of social change and globalization processes.

Sociobiology starts from the assumptions that values are at least partly rooted in our biological nature. If that is the case, our common "biological" human nature gives basis to some common universal tendencies. If altruistic behavior can be derived from inclusive fitness, then the positive values connected to such behavior, including universal positive evaluation and the great significance that is attached to kinship bonds, can be derived from our biological nature (van den Berghe 1979). The maintenance of values in populations could therefore be explained by a combination of biological and cultural mechanisms (Cavalli Sforza & Feldman 1981).

The second approach claims that there is a universal structure of human values, and that comparative research can discover such universal structures. Although the emphasis and frequency of particular values differ among societies, the underlying structure is the same and can be applied in every society. One such approach can be found in the work of Schwartz (1992, 1994). He developed empirically a schematic representation of what he finds to be an almost universal structure of human values. It is comprised of two higher order dimensions of values, and motivational types of values derived from the higher order values. The two higher order dimensions are openness to change versus conservation, and self enhancement versus self transcendence.

The first dimension indicates the degree to which individuals are motivated to engage in independent action and are willing to challenge themselves for both intellectual and emotional realization. The second dimension reflects the distinction between values oriented toward the pursuit of self interest and values related to a concern for the welfare of others. Within these two general dimensions, ten motivational value types could be distinguished. These ten values are hedonism, power, achievement, stimulation, self direction, universalism, benevolence, conformity, tradition, and security. Schwartz also adds spirituality, which can be differentiated in some, but not all, of his comparative samples. Adjacent values share motivational emphases. Achievement and hedonism both focus on self centered satisfaction, and power and achievement focus on social superiority and esteem.

Schwartz has found that the system of values is essentially the same worldwide. Initially his samples were limited to Western Europe, but recently his modified method replicated the structure in the Far East and South America (Schwartz 2004). Schwartz goes a step further and reports that there is a "surprisingly widespread consensus regarding the hierarchical order of values" across probed societies. Benevolence is most often ranked first, followed by self direction, universalism, security, conformity, achievement, hedonism, stimulation, tradition, and power. Values on the top and bottom of the scale are ranked most consistently, with the middle of the scale much less so.

Hofstede (2001) made a comparative study of values based on analysis of 117,000 IBM employees worldwide. He grouped societies together based on five value dimensions obtained using factor analysis. The dimensions are power distance (acceptance of inequality), uncertainty avoidance, individualism/collectivism, masculinity/femininity, and long versus short time orientations. The individualism/collectivism dichotomy is a widely researched topic within the comparative perspective. In this tradition, the individualistic cultures of the West are contrasted with the collectivistic cultures of the East and Latin America (Triandis 1995; Kagitcibasi 1997).

The third approach starts from analyzing the impact of broadly defined modernization processes, especially those of globalization, on value changes. It is a universally accepted truism that changes in social conditions of life produce changes in values, as values influence acceptance of certain material practices. Diffusion as a more benign form of variable producing change, and subjugation of one society by another as a more malignant form, all produce changes in values.

In the social sciences, a new concept, globalization, is used to describe supposedly historically unique phenomena of ever increasing flows of goods, information, and people. Will a homogeneous global culture and a universal value system be the consequence of such a trend? Is it true that the areas of the world, and the social groups more enmeshed in globalizing processes, are developing more universalistic values? The most comprehensive theory originating from this framework is Inglehart's theory of value change. His analysis is based on the World Value Surveys that have been collected in regular five year waves starting in 1981, and on the Euro Barometer surveys that started in the 1970s. The main conclusion from his research is that a phenomenon, which he calls the "post modern shift," is occurring.

This shift should be put into the framework of broad historical and economic changes that influence value changes. Inglehart is very careful to emphasize reciprocal causal linkages between economy, culture, and politics. Economic change, cultural change, and political change are linked in a coherent pattern and the postmodern shift is part of that broad pattern.

The modernization process resulted in increasing emphasis on individual economic achievement, and this emphasis on individual success made modernization possible, as described by Max Weber.

This shift toward materialistic priorities entailed the acceptance of social mobility and a deemphasis on communal obligations. The main ingredient of the postmodern shift is that the value of economic achievement as the top priority is giving way to an increasing emphasis on the quality of life. In a major part of the world, the disciplined, self denying, and achievement oriented values and norms of industrial society are yielding to increasingly broad latitude for individual choice of lifestyles and individual self expression. The shift from "materialist" values, emphasizing economic and physical security, to "post materialist" values, emphasizing individual self expression and quality of life concerns, are the key elements of occurring change.

This shift in the dominant values of modern society springs from the fact that there is a fundamental difference between growing up with an awareness that survival is precarious and growing up with the feeling that one's survival can be taken for granted. The origin of the shift is rooted in the economic miracles that occurred first in Western Europe and North America, and later in East Asia and then in Southeast Asia. Coupled with the safety net of the modern welfare state, this has produced unprecedented high levels of economic security.

This new security shifted the authority away from both religion and the state to the individual, with an increasing focus on individual concerns such as friends and leisure. The root cause of the postmodern shift has been the gradual withering away of value systems that emerged under conditions of scarcity, and the spread of security values among a growing segment of the public of these societies.

This change in the direction of a domination of post materialist values does appear as a gradual process. It takes place as the younger generation replaces the older in the adult population of society. This is the consequence of the socialization hypothesis introduced into sociology by Mannheim's famous essay on generations. The main idea is that one's basic values reflect the conditions that prevailed during one's pre adult

years. Those raised under conditions of unprecedented security can tolerate more ambiguity and are less in need of rigid rules. In accordance with the principles of diminishing marginal utility in economic theory and Maslow's concept of a need hierarchy in psychology, subjective well being and quality of life become higher priorities than economic growth.

Materialist/post materialist value priorities are, according to Inglehart, only one component of the much broader configuration of values constituting the postmodern dimension. This dimension has proven to be remarkably robust over time and it is comprised of two clear clusters of statements ranked by respondents. The post materialist statements clustering together deal with less impersonal society, more say in job, more say in government, ideas counting more than money, and freedom of speech. Opposites of these are materialist statements clustered in the opposite direction. They deal with a strong defense force, fighting rising prices, fighting against crime, maintaining order, economic growth, and maintaining stable economy. This clustering shows stability in a large number of surveys around the world with the gradual emergence of the domination of post materialist values in the youngest generations of the highly developed societies. Inglehart's interpretation is not in the sense of the life cycle, but as a cohort effect. That means that a global hierarchy of values in the developed societies is changing with important consequences for politics, culture, and society in general (Inglehart 1977, 1990, 1997; Inglehart & Baker 2000).

Two great shifts documented on the basis of the World Value Surveys are the rise of more egalitarian values and attitudes toward the roles of women and men. Generation comparisons suggest that post industrial societies have experienced a parallel liberalization of moral values toward sexuality among younger generations, and as this generation is replacing the older, the global shift will occur (Inglehart & Norris 2003). The second area is the most empirically founded support for the secularization thesis (Norris & Inglehart 2004).

Finally, we are faced with the dilemma of the presumed universal nature of the values of modernity. Here, the empirical and normative dimensions are intertwined, and it is very difficult to separate one from the other. To what

extent are the values of democracy, human rights, individual rights, and children's rights empirical expressions of the changes that are happening in the social structures of modern and postmodern globalizing societies? Or to what extent are they simply a reflection of the ideological goals of dominant sectors of the most modernized parts of highly developed societies? Are individual human rights the expression of the "natural" rights of all individuals reflecting some basic values deeply rooted in human nature? Do human rights reflect human nature in the same way as Adam Smith claimed that the existence of the market reflects "man's propensity to barter, truck and exchange one thing for another"?

If that is true, then as the market is the institution best suited to human nature, so the same can be said for political democracy of the western type. Is human nature an empirical fact or a construction of the ideological mind? Is the fact that these rights are trampled in so many societies just the result of bad institutions? Would their removal and replacement with the "normal" democratic institutions establish the "natural, order of things," with the sanctity of the individual as the dominant societal value? Or to use another perspective, is the insistence on Asian values just the ideologized defense of Asian authoritarian regimes or a genuine defense of the endangered principal values of traditional culture confronted with the imperial domination of the West?

SEE ALSO: Ethnocentrism; Functionalism/Neofunctionalism; Globalization; Ideology; Individualism; Norms; Values

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variables

Nina Baur

VARIABLES AND CASES

Variables (indicators, items) are an important concept in methods of social research and epistemology. A variable is a superordinated attribute, characteristic, or finding that exists in at least two distinct subordinated categories (classes, groups, units of measurement, values). Cases (individuals) can differ – vary – on the variable concerning the category they belong to. Variables thus are used to classify cases. Very

often, cases are persons as members of an organization, a region, a nation, etc. Note that in statistical terminology “individuals” and “persons” are not the same. Instead, many different types of cases can be conceptualized. Some examples are given in Table 1.

These cases can be assigned to categories of variables. For example, if John Smith was an American man voting for the Republicans and favoring tax cuts, he could be ascribed the attribute “male” on the variable “gender,” “American” on the variable “nationality,” “Republican” on the variable “preferred political party,” and “in favor of tax cuts” on the variable “attitude towards tax cuts.” Following the same logic, the film *Titanic* could be referred to the category “1997” on the variable “production year,” “PG 13” on the variable “rating,” and “11” on the variable “number of Oscars won.” Similarly, any type of case can be assigned to categories of variables.

Applying this principle, all cases of a sample or population can be allocated to variables. Categories should be mutually exclusive, meaning that any individual can only be allocated to one category. They should also be exhaustive (i.e., each individual should be assignable to one category). If for some reason one does not know what category a case belongs to, this is called missing data or missing value.

All cases assigned to the same category count as “the same” (concerning this variable). If two cases are allotted to different categories, they are regarded as being dissimilar. For example, the films *Titanic* and *10 Things I Hate About You* are of the same rating (PG 13), but differ concerning the number of Oscars they won and the year they were released.

VARIABLES AND MEASUREMENT

Although both qualitative and quantitative research use the principle of variables in the sense that cases are classified, the concept is more important in standardized research, especially in survey research, as it links questionnaires and statistics: each question in a questionnaire (usually) can be considered as one variable, each possible answer to a question as a category (value). Some researchers reserve the term “item” for lists of similar questions

Table 1 Types of cases and groups

<i>Case (individual)</i>	<i>Examples for specific cases</i>	<i>Possible population</i>
Person	John Smith, Mary Jones	All employees of a company
Country	US, Japan, France	All countries in the world
Software program	SPSS, Stata, SAS	Statistical packages
Newspaper article	Leading article of the <i>New York Times</i> on 11/17/2005 Third article in page 15 of the <i>Washington Post</i> on 12/23/2005	All newspaper articles in American newspapers
Conflict situation	Jim and Jane are fighting at 11.15 a.m. on 01/06/2006 Mary and Sue are spating at 09.47 a.m. on 01/09/2008	Interaction behavior in American kindergartens
Film	<i>Titanic</i> , <i>10 Things I Hate About You</i>	Romantic films
Organization	Amnesty International, Greenpeace	NGOs

with the same response spectrum. Using a coding system, the answers given have to be coded (i.e., they have to be transformed into figures in order to make them processible by statistics). Here, the problem of measurement arises (i.e., the verbal responses have to be correctly transferred into numbers without distorting their meaning). Defining a concept in a way that it can be measured is called operationalization.

Measurement is especially difficult in international comparative research as respondents might mean completely different things using the same concepts. For example, the German word *fremd* could mean “foreign,” “alien,” “strange,” or “external” in English.

Correct measurement is important, as any statistical procedure assumes that data are free from distortion. One can only achieve valid results if this assumption is true. On the other hand, these methods are very efficient because they can investigate the relation between variables independent of context. Univariate statistics describe the distribution of one variable, bivariate statistics analyze the relation between two variables, and multivariate statistics model the relation between three or more variables. Typically, one distinguishes dependent, independent, and intervening variables for statistical analysis. However, Abbott (2001) has criticized variable centered analysis methods because researchers using them tend to forget that not variables but human beings are acting. The latter are formalized in survey research as cases.

TYPES OF VARIABLES

One of the factors influencing which statistical analysis procedures are allowed and how results may be interpreted is variable type. There are multiple ways of classifying types of variables. First, variables can be classified by the number and discernibility of their categories (see Table 2).

Secondly, variables can differ concerning the level of analysis (level of aggregation) of the cases concerned. Researchers can study individuals (e.g., persons or single newspaper articles): (1) variables can describe these individuals' genuine characteristics; (2) relational variables describe a case's interrelationship to other cases (e.g., “Jim (case 1) is married to Jill (case 2)”; (3) contextual variables capture a case's embeddedness in a collective (e.g., “Jim (case) lives in the US (aggregate)”).

Researchers can also examine collectives (aggregates, higher levels of analysis) (e.g., countries). These collectives can be regarded as individual cases themselves, but they also consist of individuals of lower analysis levels. Global (integral) variables are variables describing characteristics genuine to the aggregate (e.g., western countries could be allocated to the variable “Welfare Regime” as “Liberal,” “Conservative,” “Social Democratic,” “Familistic,” or “Post Socialist”). Analytical (aggregative) variables have to be calculated from variables measuring characteristics of lower level cases

Table 2 Classification of variables by characteristics of categories

<i>Type of variable</i>	<i>Characteristics of categories</i>	<i>Example</i>	
		<i>Variable</i>	<i>Categories/ Values</i>
Binary variable (Dummy variable)	Two categories with clear boundaries that should be coded with “1” and “0”	Gender	Male Female
Discrete and polytomous	More than two (but finite number of) categories with clear boundaries	Continent	Africa, America, Asia, Europe, Australia
Continuous	Large (often infinite) number of categories that make the boundaries between categories hard to distinguish	Income in US \$	Any value from 0 to an infinite number

Table 3 Classification of variables by level of measurement

<i>Measurement level</i>	<i>Variable type</i>	<i>Characteristics of categories</i>	<i>Example</i>	
			<i>Variable</i>	<i>Categories/ Values</i>
Low  High	Categorical variable (Index, Nominal variable, Qualitative variable)	Categories are just different, but there is no rank between categories	Gender	Male Female
	Ordinal variable (Dimension, scale in the narrow sense)	Additionally, categories can be ranked	Attitude toward tax cuts	Completely agree Partly agree Partly disagree Completely disagree
	Metric variable (variable of interval scale)	Additionally, the distance between any two adjacent categories is the same	IQ	Any value from about 80 to about 180
	Variable of ratio scale	Additionally, a true point of zero exists	Number of children	Any value from 0 to about 20

(e.g., a country’s “unemployment rate” has to be calculated from dividing the number of unemployed by the number of persons fit for work in the country). Structural variables are calculated from information on the relation between lower level cases (e.g., “strength of local networks” could be measured by dividing the number of existing contacts between local actors by the number of all theoretically possible contacts).

Thirdly, variables differ in level of measurement (scale in the broader sense); that is, on the question how categories can be arranged (see Table 3). The higher the scale type, the

more severe are the measurement rules, but the more statistical methods are allowed as well.

Fourthly, variables differ on how they can be operationalized. Manifest variables can be observed and measured directly. For example, a person’s size can be assessed by using a tape line and ascribing the number reading on the scale to the person (e.g., 1.67m). In contrast, latent variables cannot be directly observed (e.g., conservatism could be measured by a person’s attitude toward many political issues). Special methods, such as factor analysis, can be used to reconstruct latent variables, which are some times also called dimensions or scales.

Fifthly, for some variables, individual values can be interpreted directly, without knowing other cases' values (e.g., if "size" is measured in meters and a person is "1.67m," one can imagine how tall this person is). In contrast, for other variables, one needs to know the whole range of values to assess the meaning of a single case's value. For example, if "size" is measured by the categories "short" – "medium" – "tall," and a person is classified as "tall," it makes a big difference if this person lives in the US or China. In the US a "tall" person is probably at least 1.80m, while in China a person might be called "tall" if she were 1.60m, which would probably be categorized as "short" in the US.

SEE ALSO: Computer Aided/Mediated Analysis; Quantitative Methods; Survey Research; Variables, Control; Variables, Dependent; Variables, Independent

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variables, control

Hung En Sung

Control variables are variables included in multivariate analyses to identify spurious associations. In assessing whether X is associated with

Y , it is important to examine whether the covariation between them persists after the effects of other variables on this association are removed (McClendon 2002). Here, "control" means to hold constant. A variable is controlled when its influence on the other variables in the model is held constant.

In laboratory experiments a variable Z can be controlled by setting a fixed value for it and observing the relationships between X and Y for that fixed value. The experiment can then be repeated at other fixed values of Z to see whether the same results occur. However, in most social science research, values of variables such as race, education, age, and income cannot usually be manipulated before obtaining the data. In correlational studies the portion of the association between X and Y that is caused by variation in Z can be removed by comparing only cases with equal or similar values of Z at a time. A spurious relationship exists between X and Y if both variables are dependent on Z , so that the association between X and Y disappears when Z is controlled (see Fig. 1).

Informed and methodological application of control variables is crucial to the advancement of scientific knowledge. Social research establishes causal claims by demonstrating temporally ordered covariation of variables and by discrediting alternative explanations as implausible (Sobel 1995). For example, earlier studies reported an inverse relationship between levels of female government officials and levels of corruption and urged countries to raise the number of women in public offices to fight corruption (see Fig. 2). But replications that included measures of liberal democracy (e.g., independent judiciary, freedom of the press, and universal suffrage) as control variables found that when forced into the same model, the effects of gender on corruption became statistically insignificant, whereas liberal democracy remained a very




Figure 1 Graphical representation of a spurious relationship between X and Y .



Figure 2 Graphical representation of a causal relationship between gender and corruption.




Figure 3 Graphic representation of a spurious relationship between gender and corruption.

powerful predictor (Sung 2003). The inclusion of the right control variables prompted the discovery that the observed association between gender and corruption was largely spurious and mainly caused by a political system that promoted both gender equality and better governance (see Fig. 3).

It is not always theoretically evident which variables should be controlled in multivariate analysis. Researchers should thus develop a thorough knowledge of the theory and previous work relating to their field of research so that one will be more likely to recognize possible spurious relationships and to control relevant variables, thus not giving too much importance to an observed bivariate statistical association.

SEE ALSO: Multivariate Analysis; Theory and Methods; Variables; Variables, Dependent; Variables, Independent

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variables, dependent

Ernest T. Goetz

Research involves identification and description of characteristics of organisms, objects, events, and locations. When these characteristics can take on different values (e.g., when they differ between people or from one time to another for the same person), they are referred to as *variables*. The variables involved in any particular research study are determined by the interests and intentions of the researcher. Much research focuses on the relationships between variables, particularly *causal relationships*. In such research, *dependent variables* are the presumed outcomes or effects of *independent variables*. In research about causal relationships, measurement (i.e., systematic assignment of numerical values to variables) of the dependent variable (or multiple dependent variables) is used to determine if the independent variable had the hypothesized effect or predicted relationship. For example, people's income might be measured to see if it is dependent on or predicted by their occupation. Their occupation, in turn, might be measured to see if it is dependent on or predicted by their education level. Thus, depending on the focus of a study or model, the same variable may function as a dependent variable or independent variable (Pedhazur & Schmelkin 1991).

Note also that income, occupation, and education level differ in the type of *measurement*

(i.e., “assignment of numbers to aspects of objects or events according to one or another rule or convention”) (Stevens 1968: 850) they represent and the information they convey. A commonly used system for classifying variables in this regard was developed by Stevens (1951, 1958). It should be noted at the outset that this analysis can be applied to variables serving different roles in a research design, statistical analysis, or theoretical model. Stevens identified four *scales of measurement*, which can be ordered from least to most informative or mathematically sophisticated. At the lowest level are *nominal scales*, in which different categories (e.g., male, female; Democrat, Republican; dentist, electrician) are arbitrarily assigned different numerical values. Note that the numbers so assigned (e.g., male = 1, female = 2) convey no information other than category membership (e.g., the values shown above do not indicate that females have more or less of anything than males). *Ordinal scales* convey information about relative degrees or amounts. They are constructed by assigning numbers to indicate rank ordering based on an attribute of interest (e.g., education levels might be ordered as follows: high school diploma, associate’s degree, bachelor’s degree, master’s degree, doctoral degree; also Stevens’s scales of measurement). The numbers assigned in an ordinal scale communicate relationships of less than/greater than, but tell you nothing about the magnitude of the differences. Thus, the number of years required or the amount of knowledge gained between a high school diploma and an associate’s degree may not be the same as that involved in progressing from a master’s degree to a doctoral degree. In *interval scales* (e.g., Fahrenheit and Celsius temperatures, calendar dates in years), differences between the numbers assigned to observations indicate the distance or interval between them on the dimension of interest and are invariant across the measurement scale. Thus, the difference in temperature between 37° and 42° Fahrenheit is the same as the difference between 79° and 84° Fahrenheit. However, it is not the case that 84° Fahrenheit is twice as hot as 42° Fahrenheit. Such statements can only be made for *ratio scales*, which have a true or absolute zero (e.g., Calvin temperatures, number of children, income in dollars).

The nature of the measurement constrains the statistical procedures that can be used to summarize data. According to Stevens (1958), the only permissible statistical operations for nominal scales are tabulation of the number of cases of each category and identification of the most frequent category (mode). Interval scales permit the identification of the median and percentiles and the calculation of rank order correlations. It is only with interval and ratio level scales that one can appropriately calculate a mean, standard deviation, and product moment correlation. Thus, there is a strong pull to interpret data in the social sciences as representing interval scale measurement when a more conservative ordinal interpretation might be more appropriate (e.g., rating scale data, standardized test scores).

In interpreting the information provided by measurement of dependent variables, it is also essential to consider their *reliability* and *validity*. Reliability refers to the accuracy or precision of the scores, that is, the extent to which they are free from error. Validity, on the other hand, refers to the appropriateness and utility of the interpretation of data derived via measurement procedures (Cronbach 1971). Although data must be reliable in order to permit valid interpretations, misguided or erroneous interpretations of reliable data also are possible. Thus, reliability is necessary but not sufficient for validity. Depending on the intended purpose of the interpretation, different approaches to gauging validity are possible. *Content validation* entails an examination of the appropriateness of the types of items included in an assessment to the domain being measured. Thus, a test of high school algebra should include items appropriate for that content area and level of instruction, and a survey of views on a president’s performance should include questions covering the major issues of the day. *Criterion related* validation is accomplished by examining the relationship between the measure whose validity is being assessed and some criterial outcome or measure. For example, the criterion related validity of a measure of an incumbent president’s popularity as a predictor of his or her reelection might be assessed by examining the ability of a poll of the president’s approval rating before an election to predict the outcome of the election. More generally, criterion related validity is measured via

correlation between the measure in question and the criterial measure. For example, the criterion related validity of exit polls in a presidential election might be tested by correlating exit polls with final vote counts in a sample of precincts. *Construct validation* is less straightforward. The term *construct* refers to human attributes such as knowledge, beliefs, attitudes, and opinions that are of theoretical importance to social scientists. Pedhazur and Schmelkin (1991) described construct validation as a never ending process that involves careful attention to the definition of the concept, item content, measurement procedures and scoring procedures, and internal structure analysis. Although concept validation is complex, it is essential to ensuring the validity of many measures such as surveys and tests as indices of the attributes they are intended to measure.

Finally, it is important to note that the operationalization of the dependent variable can play an important role in determining the size of the effect observed for the dependent variable. Wilson and Lipsey (2001) synthesized the results of 319 meta analyses encompassing 16,525 studies of psychological treatments (primarily in mental health and education) and found that study methods, which included type of design, method quality, and operationalization of dependent variables, accounted for nearly as much of the variance in outcomes of these studies as the nature of the treatments, with operationalization of the dependent variables being one of the most important aspects of study methods.

SEE ALSO: Experimental Design; Hypotheses; Intervention Studies; Multivariate Analysis; Regression and Regression Analysis; Reliability; Structural Equation Modeling; Variables; Variables, Control; Variables, Independent

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variables, independent

Ernest T. Goetz

Research involves identification and description of characteristics of organisms, objects, events, and locations. When these characteristics can take on different values (e.g., when they differ between people or from one time to another for the same person), they are referred to as *variables*. The variables involved in any particular research study are determined by the interests and intentions of the researcher. Much research focuses on the relationships between variables, particularly *causal relationships*. In such research, *independent variables* are the presumed causes whose effects are measured via changes in the value of *dependent variables*. Independent variables are temporally or theoretically prior to (and therefore independent of) dependent variables. For example, the manner in which the prosecutor and defense attorney present their closing arguments to a jury precedes the jury's deliberations and verdict, and so may influence them. Thus, various aspects of the closing arguments might be viewed as independent variables. According to Cohen et al. (2003), there are four requirements for the treatment of a variable *X* as a cause (or independent variable) of variable *Y* (the effect or dependent variable):

- 1 *X* precedes *Y* in time (temporal precedence).
- 2 Some mechanism whereby this causal effect operates can be posited (causal mechanism).

- 3 A change in the value of X is accompanied by a change in the value of Y on the average (association).
- 4 The effects of X on Y can be isolated from the effects of other potential variables on Y (non spuriousness or lack of confounders).

It is important to note that (3) above entails a probabilistic view of causality, which is at the core of causal research in the social sciences (Pearl 2000). Thus, a change in the independent variable is likely to be associated with a change in the dependent variable, but the occurrence, direction, and size of the change may differ from one individual or occasion to the next. In social science research, the probabilistic nature of causal relationships is compensated by the use of multiple observations.

Evidence of the causal relationship between independent variables and dependent variables is strongest in experimental research, which has long been held as the “gold standard” in the study of causality and sometimes anointed as “the scientific method.” The causal interpretation of relationships between variables in non experimental research is gaining increased acceptance and legitimacy (e.g., Cohen et al. 2003), although some authors still caution against causal interpretations of non experimental research and advocate the use of the term *predictor variable* in place of *independent variable* in such research (e.g., Brewer 2000).

In a prototypical experiment, causal relationships are tested by manipulating the independent variable (or variables) while keeping other factors constant (i.e., controlled). For example, the effect of hydrochloric acid on iron could be studied under laboratory conditions designed to eliminate the potential effects of other chemical agents or physical conditions (e.g., temperature, air pressure). Although this level of control is seldom if ever possible in social science research, researchers attempt to control or account for other potentially confounding variables. Thus, one might study the effect of mode of presentation of an argument in a study in which other potentially confounding variables (e.g., sex and age of the audience) are controlled by matching or by statistical procedures (e.g., removal of associated variance through *regression*).

In non experimental research, support for causal relationships is provided through tests of association, preferably by testing a priori causal models. Naturally occurring variation in the independent variable (or variables) is measured (that is, the independent variable is not manipulated), and its predictive value is tested after controlling or accounting for potential confounds. Although it is not possible to eliminate all potential confounds, judicious selection of control variables can help to minimize the problem. Thus, the effect of the sex of an audience member on response to a given form of argument might be studied by having men and women of the same age and education level listen to the same presentation. Research, both experimental and non experimental, can also explore the effects of more than one independent variable, and measure outcomes in terms of more than one dependent variable. Further, a fuller understanding of the relationship between independent and dependent variables may require consideration of *moderator variables*, which influence the relationship between independent and dependent variables, and *mediator variables*, which elaborate the relationship between independent and dependent variables through the specification of intervening processes or states in the causal process.

As Pedhazur and Schmelkin (1991) point out, the same independent variable can be manipulated in one study and non manipulated in another study. For example, sex is a non manipulated variable in the examples presented above, but it would be a manipulated variable in an experiment where male and female “attorneys” presented the same argument to different audiences. Further, the same variable can be an independent variable in one study and a dependent variable in another study. Thus, sex would be a dependent variable in a test of a drug whose intended effect was to increase the likelihood of giving birth to a female or male child.

Like dependent variables, variation in independent variables takes several forms. If one were to study the effect of a drug, one might compare various levels of dosage of the drug, or one might compare its effects to those of other drugs. In the first instance, variation is said to be *continuous* or quantitative; in the latter, variation is said to be *categorical* or qualitative. Statistical procedures have been developed that are

particularly appropriate to each type of independent variable: effects of categorical independent variables typically are assessed through *analysis of variance* and its variants (e.g., multivariate analysis of variance), while effects of continuous independent variables typically are assessed via regression and its variants (e.g., *multivariate* and *multiple regression*). There are also statistical techniques that are compatible with both categorical and continuous regression (e.g., *analysis of covariance*, *semantic equation modeling*). Some times researchers take continuous independent variables (e.g., age) and reduce them to categorical data by dichotomization. One common form of dichotomization is the median split, in which values above the median are lumped together in one group, while those below are lumped into another. By ignoring variation within these artificially constructed groups, dichotomization results in a loss of information, which makes the outcomes of statistical analyses less informative and reliable (Cohen 1983; MacCallum et al. 2002).

SEE ALSO: Experimental Design; Hypotheses; Intervention Studies; Multivariate Analysis; Regression and Regression Analysis; Reliability; Structural Equation Modeling; Variables; Variables, Control; Variables, Dependent

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variance

Ernest T. Goetz

Variability is one of the key characteristics of a set of scores. Measures of variability are used to provide an indication of the extent to which characteristics of people (e.g., income, education), events (e.g., attendance at concerts), or things (e.g., capacity of concert venues) differ from one another. Of the statistical indices of variability (e.g., range, semi interquartile range), the variance and standard deviation are the only ones that reflect the exact value of each score. In this respect, they are analogous to the mean, the measure of centrality from which they are derived. For this reason, the variance and standard deviation are the measures of variability used in parametric statistics (e.g., analysis of variance (ANOVA), correlation, general linear modeling, hierarchical linear modeling, regression and regression analysis, structural equation modeling).

The variance and standard deviation depict variability of a set of scores in terms of their distances from the mean, or deviation scores. A deviation score is computed by subtracting the mean of the set of scores from the score. Therefore, like the mean, deviation scores can only be computed for interval scales (e.g., Fahrenheit or Celsius temperatures) or ratio scales (e.g., height, weight, Kelvin temperatures), in which differences between scores are meaningful and consistent. Because of the way that deviation scores are defined and computed, the sum of the deviation scores is zero for all sets of scores. Therefore, the average deviation score (which also is zero by definition) is of no value as a measure of variability. This difficulty is overcome by squaring the deviation scores.

To illustrate, suppose we were to count the number of books high school students were carrying in their backpacks. A list of five students and the number of books in their backpacks is presented in the first two columns of Table 1. The mean number of books being carried by these students is six (i.e., $30/5 = 6$). The deviation scores for each student (i.e., number of books they are carrying minus the mean number of books, six in this case) are shown in column three. As previously noted, these add up to zero

Table 1

<i>Student</i>	<i>Score</i>	<i>Score</i>	<i>Mean</i>	<i>(Score - Mean)²</i>
Júan	12	6	36	
Laurie	1	5	25	
Ronghua	9	3	9	
Tufan	5	1	1	
Yolanda	3	3	9	
Total	30	0	80	

with an average of zero, as they would for any set of scores.

In descriptive statistics, in which you are interested in characterizing the set of scores that you have, the variance is found dividing the sum of the squared deviation scores (shown in the final column) by the number of scores in the set, or $80/5 = 16$ for our example. However, in inferential statistics, in which you want to *estimate* the variability of a large set of scores of interest (i.e., population) from some smaller set of scores that are available (i.e., sample), this approach systematically underestimates the variance of the population. To correct for this bias, the sum of the squared deviation scores is divided by the number of scores minus one, or $80/4 = 20$ in the present case. It should be noted that inferences about a population based on a sample of scores are most valid when they are based on a random sample of scores in which each member of the population (e.g., all US high school students) has an equal chance of being selected. Further, as sample size increases, so does the accuracy of the inferences that can be drawn regarding the population.

Since calculation of the variance yields a metric in which the unit of measurement is squared and sometimes interpretable (e.g., books squared), variability is most often reported in terms of the standard deviation. The standard deviation is found by taking the square root of the variance, which brings the number back to the original unit of measurement. In our example, if the set of scores were the population of interest, the standard deviation would be $\sqrt{16} = 4$. If the set of scores were a sample that was being used to make inferences about a larger population of scores, the standard deviation

would be $\sqrt{20} = 4.47$ (note that the disparity between the results of the two computational formulas decreases as sample size increases).

Thus, the standard deviation can be viewed as a modified average deviation score, adjusted to accommodate for the fact that the sum of the deviation scores is always zero. In our example, the variability of the number of books as measured by the standard deviation (4.47) is quite large compared to the mean number of books (6), assuming that the five students are a random sample of all the students in the high school. However, given the fact that our sample of students is small, the accuracy of our estimates would be limited, resulting in wide confidence intervals, or range of values in which the population parameters (i.e., statistics descriptive of the full set of scores of interest, here the average number of books carried in the backpacks of all US high school students) might be expected to fall.

It is important to note, however, that variance is more than just an intermediate step on the road to the calculation of the standard deviation. Directly or with modifications, it is used in the description and estimation of the relationships between two or more variables. For example, the strength of the relationship between two interval or ratio scales (e.g., height and weight) is measured using the *Pearson product moment correlation*, or Pearson *r*. The Pearson *r* is calculated using the variance of the two sets of scores and their covariance, which is an analogue of variance in which the deviation score of one variable is multiplied by the deviation score of the second variable for each observation in the data set (e.g., Margot's height and weight). The proportion of variance accounted for by one or more variables is a metric of effect size that is commonly used in inferential statistics.

SEE ALSO: ANOVA (Analysis of Variance); Confidence Intervals; Descriptive Statistics; General Linear Model; Hierarchical Linear Models; Measures of Centrality; Random Sample; Regression and Regression Analysis; Statistical Significance Testing; Statistics; Structural Equation Modeling; Validity, Quantitative; Variables, Dependent; Variables, Independent

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Veblen, Thorstein (1857–1929)

Matthias Zick Varul

Thorstein Veblen, US economist and social theorist, argued for an evolutionary institutionalist approach to social development. History is a non teleological process in which, by quasi Darwinian selection, institutions survive according to their fit with the current “state of the industrial arts.” Inert institutions inhibit further technological progress beyond the state they are adapted to facilitate. In this context, Veblen developed the theory of latecomer advantages and technological borrowing.

Veblen sees two driving motivational forces in the development of technology and institutions. The first, more primordial, is the *instinct of workmanship*, which motivates cooperative productive work for the good of the community. Having been dominant in a peaceful, egalitarian, and matriarchal *age of savagery*, it has been subdued by the second motive, the *predatory instinct*, seeking competitive advantage for the individual at the cost of others in a warlike and patriarchal *barbaric age*. In this setting, a non productive leisure class dominates the productive industrial classes of farmers, workers, craftsmen, and technicians.

This dominance is perpetuated in modern capitalism, although in a pacified form. Cultural dominance lies with a leisure class of rentiers and absentee owners and industry is dominated by a managerially active business class. While industrial workers and particularly engineers

adhere to the logic of production and efficiency, the business class follows the logic of profit, often fueling industrial innovation, but frequently also sabotaging efficiency and technological progress where doing so enhances monetary outcomes.

Widely seen as Veblen’s sociologically most significant achievement is the analysis of consumerism in his *Theory of the Leisure Class*. With the ability to waste being the principal determinant in class structure, the leisure class engages in conspicuous leisure and consumption to assert their social position. The sole utility of the goods thus consumed lies not in their capacity to satisfy any substantive need but in their capacity to demonstrate spending power and habitual abstention from productive work. Ascending groups try to *emulate* upper class habits of consumption and leisure. This sets off a dynamics of consumer good innovation as the emulated upper classes, in order to keep ahead of the runners up, constantly have to refine their *pecuniary canons of taste*. Those innovations then will trickle down to lower classes in a cascade of competitive emulation inspired by *invidious comparison*.

SEE ALSO: Conspicuous Consumption; Consumption, Mass Consumption, and Consumer Culture; Institutionalism; Leisure Class

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verstehen

Larry Ray

Usually translated as “understanding,” the concept of *verstehen* has become part of a critique of positivist approaches to the social sciences. Associated with the sociology of Max Weber, *verstehen* derives from the hermeneutic critique of positivism that emerged in German universities in the 1880s and 1890s that gave rise to a dispute over method in the social sciences (*Methodenstreit*). *Verstehen* refers to understanding the meaning of action from the actor’s point of view. It is entering into the shoes of the other, and adopting this research stance requires treating the actor as a subject, rather than an object of one’s observations. It also implies that unlike objects in the natural world, human actors are not simply the product of causal forces. Individuals are seen to create the world by organizing their own understanding of it and giving it meaning. To do research on actors without taking into account the meanings they attribute to their actions or environment is to treat them like objects (Drislane and Parkinson 2002).

Wilhelm Dilthey’s sociology provided a more elaborated method of understanding than Weber’s. Based on the view that since sociologists participate in the cultural worlds of those they study it is possible to gain a kind of inner understanding of social life that is impossible in the natural sciences, Dilthey distinguished several levels of understanding. The most formal level of understanding is based on signs and symbols, which make mental content intelligible but reveal nothing about the inner mental life of the subject. Then there is direct understanding – recognizing a symbol *as* something, which involves decoding the communication of expressions, gestures, and actions, or, say, the meaning of a sentence or mathematical expression. This infers intention from observation of action – so if we see someone hitting a nail with a hammer we might infer what their intention might be; similarly, we recognize certain facial expressions as indicating grief or happiness. Further, there are “higher” levels of understanding involving empathy and reexperiencing, which involve projecting oneself into a text or form of life and appropriating it on the basis of shared

experience. For example, to share the experience of poetic love one must have loved, to imagine suffering one must have suffered, and so on. Then on the basis of empathy arises the “highest” form of understanding, where one recreates or relives the process of cultural production. This occurs in *reverse order* to the sequence of events, and moves from the completed product or event back to the context and intentions that inspired it.

The procedure of placing oneself within the worldview of frames of meaning of contemporary or historical actors is crucial to making sense and thereby explaining social actions and outcomes. We are surrounded by Roman ruins, cathedrals, and summer castles, as Dilthey put it, fragments of the history of mind that can be understood only by interpretive techniques grounded in the life process of individuals.

This empathetic approach to social inquiry, it is argued, finds no analogy in the methods of the natural sciences, but aims to reconstruct the relationship between expressions and meanings and intentions of actors (Dilthey 1986). Its objective is less to explain the world and more to understand and reconstruct meaning to regain the lost unity of the act of creation of texts, cultures, artworks, institutions, and historical events. In this sense, as Delanty (1997) argues, hermeneutics had a more conservative orientation than positivism. Whereas the latter arose in the context of revolt against the authority of tradition and political absolutism, hermeneutics has tended to value community, be uncritical of social institutions, and ignore power relations. However, understanding is resolutely universalistic in its assumption that a common (and therefore comprehensible) humanity underlies all processes of cultural and historical creation.

Weber’s use of the method of *verstehen* attempts to reconcile interpretation of action with causal explanation in a way that establishes an interaction between the two. So causal explanations must have adequacy on the level of meaning, while meanings themselves may constitute causes. One of the most systematic uses of this method by Weber is in *The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism* where he supplements structural and economic accounts of the origin of capitalism in Europe with empathetic reconstruction of the worldview of

seventeenth century Calvinist and other Protestant groups. He argues that Calvinist belief in predestination, which precluded achieving salvation through good works, provoked “an unprecedented inner loneliness” and search for signs of salvation. Through attempting to resolve this paradox the theological quest for evidence of divine grace was transposed into the worldly but ascetic pursuit of capital accumulation, success in which was interpreted by Calvinists as signaling divine selection. What this example illustrates is that only through empathetic reconstruction of actors’ meanings is it possible to explain critical events like the growth of capitalism.

However, the use of *verstehen* is open to criticism. First, critics have argued that this is not a distinct method, but an elaboration of what all social actors do routinely in everyday life. Secondly, there is no way of validating *verstehende* interpretations since they cannot be tested against replicable evidence. Thirdly, it is claimed that interpretation of meanings adds no new knowledge and by definition recycles what is already known about society. Fourthly, *verstehen* is at best a source of hypotheses that then require testing against evidence. Fifthly, it is accused of over emphasizing meaning at the expense of material structures and unintended consequences of actions. To some extent these criticisms focus on *verstehen* as a form of introspection or imaginative reconstruction of meanings rather than as a systematic dialogue with a range of social materials – texts, archives, conversations, worldviews, and cultural artifacts – in which suggested interpretations can be “tested” with reference to the extent that they open up new layers of understanding.

SEE ALSO: Hermeneutics; Positivism; Weber, Max

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Viagra

Meika Loe

Viagra is a blood circulation drug (the first in its drug class as a PDE5 inhibitor) prescribed to treat erectile dysfunction. This drug, marketed by Pfizer Pharmaceuticals and approved by the FDA in 1998, has been widely cited for its record breaking sales and its “blockbuster” status. Specifically, Viagra set records as the fastest selling drug in America, and netted over a billion dollars in its first year. Viagra was the first FDA approved oral therapy for sexual dysfunction. After five years of consistent sales, competitors Levitra and Cialis (also PDE5 inhibitors) have entered the market, claiming to work faster and for longer periods of time. The financial success of Viagra has helped to construct and finance research and product development in sexual medicine.

Sociologists have treated the Viagra phenomenon as an opportunity to analyze the social construction of medicine, masculinity, sexuality, marketing, and aging. Viagra, when read as a social artifact of our times, is emblematic of changing social realities in the twenty first century. In sum, Viagra exemplifies the medicalization of social problems at a time when biomedicine is hegemonic, with increasing jurisdiction over areas of life not previously medicalized.

Viagra reflects the emergence of the pharmaceutical era, in which the increasingly consolidated pharmaceutical industry is the most profitable industry in America, with “unprecedented levels of control” over medical education, drug regulation, research, marketing, and advocacy. Viagra reveals the merging of science and capitalism in the pharmaceutical era, as

medical researchers and experts are increasingly affiliated with this industry. Viagra was also one of the first drugs to be marketed directly to consumers, after the ban on DTC advertisements was lifted in 1997. In the pharmaceutical era, drugs such as Viagra can be used as tools for the construction of personhood and idealized identities. In this way, the Viagra phenomenon heralds the commodification of sexuality and masculinity. The male body becomes an important new site for medicalization and marketing. Sexuality is increasingly a site for biomedical intervention, and Viagra represents the McDonaldization of sex in a culture that emphasizes efficiency and a quick fix mentality. Finally, as more products emerge to “treat” symptoms of aging, Viagra will be remembered as one of the first blockbuster drugs marketed to an aging populace, with senator and war veteran Bob Dole as its spokesperson. More recently, sexual medicine is marketed to a wider demographic in terms of age, ethnicity, and gender.

Viagra’s debut is a perfect opportunity to examine the construction of social norms, ideals, and expectations, particularly because it renders visible and influences many taken for granted social assumptions about sex, aging, gender, and medicine. For example, since Viagra’s debut, “normal sex” in America is more and more narrowly defined and difficult to achieve. Then again, normal sex is a seeming requirement for normal personhood. More recently, we have heard that “normal” for women means sexually desirous, easily aroused, fully lubricated, and orgasmic. With such elevated standards, normal sex in the Viagra era likely requires medical or pharmaceutical intervention.

SEE ALSO: Body and Sexuality; Consumption; Gerontology; McDonaldization; Popular Culture; Sexuality, Masculinity and

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victimization

Tancy J. Vandecar Burdin

Victimization is the action of victimizing, or fact of being victimized (Viano 1976). Until a variety of factors converged during the 1960s, individual victims were not always given much attention by the criminal justice system. During this time, the women’s movement began to address the victim blaming often seen with sexually violent crimes. Child abuse as a societal problem was also coming to the attention of local and state leaders. Finally, rapidly growing crime rates between 1960 and 1980 brought greater scrutiny to the criminal justice system, in part through President Johnson’s 1967 Commission report. Victimization was one focus of this report. The culmination of these factors began the discussion about the victim’s role in the criminal justice process, what services should be provided to victims, and data gathering about victimization in the US (Doerner & Lab 1995).

The 1980s were an active time in the history of victims’ rights. In 1981 President Reagan established the Annual National Victims of Crime Week in April and in the following year he created the President’s Task Force on Victims of Crime, which developed a series of recommendations regarding several victims’ issues (Davis & Henley 1990). The 1983 Omnibus Victim/Witness Protection Act addressed the rights of victims and witnesses of federal crimes. The Act stated that victims should not be subjected to intimidation by the offender, have the right to be consulted about possible plea bargains, and can provide victim impact

statements for sentencing consideration. Many states have followed the federal example by allowing the same protections for victims (Doerner & Lab 1995).

The 1984 Victims of Crime Act (VOCA) established the Crime Victims Fund of \$100 million to help provide grants to victim assistance and compensation programs (Doerner & Lab 1995). In fiscal year 2002, VOCA provided over \$93 million in victim compensation funds to the states (OVC 2003). The Office for Victims of Crime (OVC), established in 1988, now provides management for the fund, which is maintained by fines and other monies collected from federal offenders (Doerner & Lab 1995; OVC 2004). The OVC also provides training and education about victims, supports projects to improve victims' rights and services, and maintains and distributes a variety of publications about victim issues.

Information about victimization in the US can be found in a variety of sources. The Uniform Crime Report (UCR) collects crime information from law enforcement agencies throughout the country and is managed by the Federal Bureau of Investigation. The UCR collects data on crimes known to the police in two categories: personal and property offenses. Personal offenses include the violent crimes of murder, forcible rape, robbery, and aggravated assault. Property offenses include burglary, larceny, motor vehicle theft, and arson. While the UCR provides a way for law enforcement to consistently report crime data from year to year and locality to locality, there is very little information about the victim or offender (if the offender is never arrested). Also, the UCR can only report crimes made known to the police (Doerner & Lab 1995). Property crimes are more numerous than violent crimes and crime rates have generally been declining since the early 1990s. The number of violent crimes decreased 25.6 percent from 1994 to 2003. Property crimes decreased 14 percent during the same period. In 2003, about 1.38 million violent crimes were known to the police, compared to 10.44 million property crimes. This translates to 475 violent crimes per 100,000 people and 3,588 property crimes per 100,000 (FBI 2004).

The National Crime Survey (NCS) began in 1972 with a sample of 72,000 households. Each member within the household over the age of

12 was interviewed. The household remained in the sample for three years and was contacted every six months during that time. Each member was interviewed to obtain individual victimization data and one member was selected to give information about crimes committed against the household. However, this one person may not have knowledge of all crimes committed against the household (Doerner & Lab 1995). Several revisions to the NCS beginning in 1979 led to changing the name of the instrument to the National Crime Victimization Survey (NCVS). Changes included changes to the screening questions, the addition of supplemental special topic questions, and allowing for the use of the telephone to conduct interviews after the initial data gathering session were implemented. In 1992, the NCVS was further revised to capture more extensive data on rape, sexual assault, intimate partner violence, and vandalism. The NCVS now collects victimization data on rape, sexual assault, robbery, aggravated and simple assault, purse snatching/pocket picking, household burglary, motor vehicle theft, theft, intimate partner violence, and vandalism (Bureau of Justice Statistics 2002).

The percentage of households experiencing a property or violent crime as defined by the NCVS has been declining since 1994. In 2002, about 15 percent of 110.3 million US households experienced one of the NCVS measured crimes. This compares to 25 percent of households in 1994. Three percent of households in 2002 experienced a violent crime and 13 percent experienced a property crime. Theft and simple assault were the two most common offenses within each category (Bureau of Justice Statistics 2004). In terms of individual victimizations, there were about 5.5 million personal crime victimizations (this includes the violent crimes and purse snatching) in 2002. Property crime victimizations numbered about 17.5 million (Bureau of Justice Statistics 2003).

Certain demographic factors are associated with greater risks of victimization. The risk of victimization decreases with age after peaking in the 16–24 age group. The elderly (ages 65 and older) have much lower victimization rates than younger individuals (Laub 1990). Men in general are more likely to experience a violent crime than are women. Men experienced

crimes of violence at a rate of 25.5 per 1,000 persons aged 12 or older compared to 20.8 per 1,000 for women in 2002. Women are more likely to experience rape or sexual assault than are men (1.8 victimizations per 1,000 compared to 0.3 per 1,000, respectively, in 2002), as well as simple assault with minor injury (4.2 victimizations per 1,000 compared to 3.6 per 1,000, respectively). Blacks are also more likely to experience crimes of violence than other minorities and whites. Blacks had a violent crime victimization rate of 27.9 per 1,000 persons aged 12 or older in 2002, compared to 22.8 per 1,000 for whites and 14.7 for other minorities. Blacks are slightly less likely than whites to experience simple assault (14.6 victimizations per 1,000 in 2002, compared to 15.9 for whites) (Bureau of Justice Statistics 2003).

However, demographics alone cannot fully explain victimization and criminal behavior. Theories of victimization began in the 1940s with Hans von Hentig and his theory of victim–perpetrator interaction. Von Hentig observed that victims often contributed to their victimization by somehow provoking the offender or by putting themselves in situations that would make them prone to criminal acts. Ezzat Fattah stressed the link between victimization and offending and argued that the criminal act as a whole needs to be examined because of the interaction of the victim and offender. Victims can be offenders and vice versa (Adler et al. 2004).

Hindelang, Gottfredson, and Garofalo developed the lifestyle theory of crime in 1978. Changing gender roles (women working outside the home) and work schedules means that people live different lifestyles, spend varying amounts of time in public, and interact with different kinds of people. This theory is based on several propositions, including that increased time spent with non family members and in public places increases the chances for victimization. “Variations in lifestyle affect the number of victimization risks that a person experiences” (Adler et al. 2004: 223).

The lifestyle theory of crime is very similar to the routine activities approach to explaining criminal behavior and victimization. Cohen and Felson argue that a crime can only occur when there is a likely offender, a suitable target, no other person present to somehow prevent the

crime (“capable guardian”), and no “personal handler” to control the likely offender. If all of these factors come together spatially then the potential for criminal perpetration is high. Through the routine activities of everyday life – such as going to work or school, participating in recreational activities, and so on – potential victims can come into contact with potential offenders. And if no capable guardians or personal handlers are present, the chances increase that a criminal act will occur.

SEE ALSO: Crime; Crime, Hot Spots; Measuring Crime; Routine Activity Theory

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video games

Greig de Peuter

Video games are played via a dedicated console connected to a television (e.g., Sony's Play Station) and computer games are played on a personal computer, or PC. These two forms of digital play comprise a lucrative sector of the global entertainment complex, an immersive, simulation based interactive medium, a high profile domain of youth oriented popular culture, and a preferred leisure activity for millions of media consumers. Emerging early in the new millennium, game studies is the field of multi disciplinary scholarship devoted to the analysis of video and computer games.

The origins of digital play lie in the US military–university complex. Cold War era technologies that were intended to combat the “socialist threat” and to boost industrial productivity were turned upside down – from work to play – when, in 1962, student hackers at Massachusetts Institute of Technology created *Space war!*, one of the first computer games. This breakthrough was harnessed in the 1970s by Atari, the US corporation that led the transformation of digital play into a cultural industry. A harbinger of the “information society,” the spread of video arcades and the launch of the first home based consoles in the 1980s saw interactive entertainment suffuse cultural space, commodify “free time,” and prepare many young people for the digital age.

Combining audacious marketing campaigns and innovative game design, two video game companies with roots in Japan – Nintendo and Sega – significantly expanded the gaming audience in the late 1980s and early 1990s. Giants of information capitalism Sony and Microsoft entered the business in the mid 1990s, perceiving Internet ready game consoles as a vessel for the delivery of diverse digitalized media content into homes. Gaming meanwhile became a pre dominant use of PCs, driven especially by hardcore players of modem linked games. In the first decade of the 2000s, digital play further saturated virtual space and everyday life, with the rise of “massively multiplayer” online games and mobile phone games.

Generating higher revenues than the movie box office, video and computer games are a burgeoning cultural industry. The video game side of the industry has typically featured only three console manufacturers (i.e., Microsoft, Nintendo, Sony), an oligopolistic industrial structure that makes brand marketing aggressive. Every four years or so an upgraded generation of consoles is released, galvanizing a new cycle of game production and consumption. Increasingly hit driven, the software side of the industry has two arms: *development* involves the technical and creative labor of making games, a process that can require 50 people, nearly three years, and up to \$200 million; *publishing* involves the financing and marketing of games, a sector in which ownership is highly concentrated. The computer game side of the industry is more disparately organized, because proprietary licensing agreements do not restrict what software can be made for a PC.

Kline et al. (2003) argue that the interactive entertainment industry exemplifies the technological, cultural, and marketing dynamics of production and consumption in post Fordism: perpetual innovation, intellectual property, immaterial labor, cybernetic marketing, synergistic promotion, and “experiential” commodities whose value is rapidly exhausted. Transnationally organized, the largest games companies are headquartered in the US, Europe, or Japan, but manufacturing is frequently outsourced to countries such as China and Mexico – also the emerging consumer markets for games. Games corporations deepen the global digital divide by hyper exploiting manufacturing labor, while they also contribute (driven by the compulsion of market expansion) to the formation of a world spanning game audience.

The nascent field of game studies is evolving a vocabulary and an approach through which to examine games and gaming. Scholars variously emphasize that video and computer games are storytelling media (Murray 2004), narrative spaces (Jenkins 2004), and a new art form (Poole 2000). Others deconstruct the semiotics of games, looking at how the representation in game worlds of, for example, gender and violence, reproduce hegemonic ideologies and power relations. Still others emphasize the non representational dimension of games,

specifically “game mechanics,” or the programmed set of rules and freedoms that establish the parameters of “gameplay.” The precise qualities of this medium vary widely across the diversity of game genres (e.g., first person shooter, puzzle, role playing, sports).

Surrounding digital play is a multifaceted gamer culture. The militaristic roots of interactive entertainment and consumer research led game design have etched into the culture of digital play a symbolic subjective nexus of “militarized masculinity” (Kline et al. 2003: 246–68). Game culture is, moreover, thoroughly promotionalized. Games companies have constructed a dense web of promotional media, from magazines to online forums, that not only advertises games but also monitors players’ criticisms and creative proposals; that information is fed back into the game design process, closing the loop between game production and consumption. Games are further integrated into the cross promotional weave of popular culture via synergistic marketing (Kinder 1991). There is, however, also a bottom up, participatory gamer culture, with hackers, culture jammers, artists, and activists altering the content of existing games and creating new ones through various “modification” techniques, from laying female “skins” over male avatars to “patching” anti war messages into military themed online games.

Future research on video and computer games will need to develop in three directions: (1) media theory, to grasp the particularity of this new medium, the grammar of game design, and the nature of gamers’ experience of interactivity, simulation, and virtuality; (2) political economy, to examine the cultural consequences of the game sector’s concentrated ownership structure and high intensity marketing, the intellectual property battle between game companies and game piracy, and the relation between the games sector and the military; and (3) cultural studies, to inquire into the creative labor of game development, the ideological content of game narratives, and the active agency of gamers in both the commercial and the bottom up culture of digital play.

SEE ALSO: Consumer Culture, Children’s; Consumption, Youth Culture and; Culture

Industries; Cyberculture; Media and Consumer Culture; Postmodern Consumption

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violence

Trutz von Trotha

Violence is a form of power, of the “ability of human beings to prevail over forces which are directed against them” (Popitz 1999: 22). It is really power in action, “action power,” as Popitz says, a way of action, above all of harm, based on the power physically and materially to hurt other creatures or to be harmed. It is determined by the boundless relation of human beings with violence: the motivations for violence are so varied and numerous that they cannot be exhausted by any list. No genetic program limits the violent behavior of humans

to certain situations. Anyone can become a perpetrator and no one and almost nothing, neither human nor anything else, whatever category, is safe from victimization. Violence means to kill, to harm, to destroy, to rob, and to expel. These are the five basic forms of violence. All varieties of violence are variants and hybrids of these forms.

Among the basic forms of violence, killing stands out especially. It represents the extreme limit of violence. There is no unlimited progressive grading of violence. With killing there is *absolute* violence, an extreme limit of all social conflict, the end of dominance, power, and even sociation. As power over life and death, absolute violence is the experiential area for the idea of complete power, the source of absolute impotence, and the starting point for unlimited violent fantasies of immeasurable destruction and safe omnipotence – just as in the case of suicide, absolute violence is the source of absolute freedom. Deadly action power constitutes the antinomy of absolute power and the fact that all power of human beings over one another is imperfect. Both can become the trigger for fundamental legitimations: for the god like superiority of the killer and for unconditional opposition. The all powerful ruler is surrounded by those who attempt an assassination or a coup, become martyrs, or free themselves from the ruler's absolute power by committing suicide. They all definitively limit the power of death of the ruler. Absolute violence is present in all other forms of violence, whether openly or latently. Violence is action power within the experiential realm of the unsurpassable act of killing. These special characteristics differentiate killing from all other forms of violence.

Non lethal, physical violence is action power which leads to the deliberate physical harm of others or directly threatens this – ranging from the slap to sexual rape, from “police arrest” to torture. Unlike killing it can be graded. It is a form of sociation by way of the subordination and concretization of the other and the space of unlimited victim fantasies, in which all that is possible in powerless torment, despair, and humiliation is anticipated. In this sense physical violence belongs to the realm of lack of freedom, even when it is companion to the overthrow of more or less unfree political and social orders. As concerns the victim, the act of

killing is pure action power. Consequently, “binding action power” (Popitz 1999: 47), which creates lasting instances of power and relations of domination, is in the case of killing only for the survivors. By contrast, physical violence can become binding action power both for others and for those who are struck by physical violence.

Absolute violence and physical violence are both aimed immediately at the body, at the natural vulnerability and mortality of human beings. Therefore, notions and ideas of natural superiority and inferiority are typically associated with these forms of power – in the direct assault on the essential nature of human beings, absolute and physical violence seem to be a part of nature itself. Together with the threat of death and violence, they both as a rule stand at the beginning and end of centralized rule and of the state in particular. At the same time they are included among the most reliable guarantees for domination and its institutions of political and administrative rule.

Destructive violence and robbery are aimed at materially damaging others. It is a question of the property of others. If destructive violence – ranging from vandalism, the numerous strategies of anti guerrilla struggle, and the “fight against terrorism” to a scorched earth policy and carpet bombing – is the deliberate physical destruction of the property of others, then the armed robber or mugger, plunderer or raider uses or threatens to resort to physical violence when stealing others (e.g., slave raids) or when depriving them of their material goods. Unlike the case of destruction, which may indirectly lead to the acquisition of the property of others or of a territory, robbery is an immediate source of enrichment.

Expulsion, especially as a collective act, is typically accompanied by all the forms of violence mentioned hereto, and may be considerably determined by the aim of enrichment. Unlike robbery, it is a case of membership – the violent or threatened violent exclusion of people beyond the physical boundaries of a social unit. In expulsion, the protagonist forces others to abandon their “house and home,” their physical living space, whether it is a building, a neighborhood, or even a state territory. As in the case of killing, expulsion is notice to quit a society; however, unlike killing, this notice to

quit is not absolute and is therefore in principle reversible.

Death and physical suffering, destruction of house and home, abduction, kidnapping and material loss, flight and loss of country and home town are, together with all the psychic, mental, emotional, social, and symbolic harms which always accompany them, the physical and material wounds which violence imposes. The five basic forms of violent action power are the essential and non extendable core of the concept of violence. The core consists of the fact that violence is not a structure but an act of power, typically and particularly in the case of collective violence combined with other forms of violence. Death, complete power, complete impotence, and physical harm throw a shadow on all forms of violence.

In the lengthy discussion which is still going on today about the concept of violence, on the one hand the long tradition of political philosophy is continued in which power and violence are seen as opposites (Arendt 1970). On the other hand, the signification of the concept of violence has either been covered over by other more general concepts or extended to become unrecognizable. Together with the concept of aggression developed in ethology and above all in psychology, the concepts of structural, cultural, and symbolic violence have proved themselves to be the longest lasting and most successful, and have been joined also by the concept of psychic violence (Nunner Winkler 2004). Analytically, the problematic nature of these concepts lies in the fact that the connection to the above named forms of violence is lost. As a result, the sharp distinction between the numerous forms of inequalities, stigmatizations, and processes of exclusion and psychic mistreatment are lost. This emphasizes all the more the fact that the concept of violence is in particular evaluatively and normatively loaded, that it lies at the heart of the constitutive need for legitimation by power and violence, that it is an important part of legitimation discourse in political and social struggles and moral crusades, and that the idea of what violence *is* is historically interculturally and intraculturally highly variable.

In general, in sociological theory until very recently violence and especially war were neglected. Violence is one of the preferred topics

of the sociology of deviance, criminality, and social problems. The latter and the sociological mainstream research into violence are first and foremost *aetiological* research into violence and have a close link to cycles and fashions of the discourses of violence and social and criminal policy. They investigate the conditions under which violence is more likely to occur, whereby the explanation for violent criminality as individual behavior and its aggregation in the form of rates of crime are foregrounded. In the sociological aetiology of violence the main emphasis is on sociostructural and institutional relations and macrosociological processes of change. Anomie, poverty, social segregation, and marginalization belong here; social groups and subcultures, social opportunity structures, family relations, socialization, and education processes no less so than general social processes of economization, individualization, and social disintegration. Among the most influential theories in which violent crimes are topicalized as one of the many forms of criminality are the unchanged continuations of classical sociology, such as anomie theory, the theory of legitimate and illegitimate opportunity structures, and the theory of subcultures. In the 1980s and 1990s control theories – where not so much criminal behavior as conformity is seen to require explanation – and the macrosociological theory of individualization and social disintegration attracted a lot of attention. With the rise of neoliberal economic policy and its driving force in the field of criminal policy, aetiological theories and research were challenged by utilitarian theory on the basis of the general theory of rational choice, which understands criminal behavior to be the result of a cost benefit calculation. However, its reliability is treated with some skepticism. This is particularly true in the case of violent crime (Albrecht 2003).

An impressive number of analytical dimensions have shown themselves to be fertile, ranging from learning processes within the family and peer group to the transformation of whole political systems, societies, and cultures. They reflect the change in prominent incidences of violence, such as the change in public discourse about violence. Included here is the rise in civil wars, violent ethnic conflicts, terrorism, and (especially in Europe) right wing extremist violence, as well as the “rise of the victim,” where

the traditional focus on the perpetrator has been abandoned in favor of the victim of violence. An enormous amount of literature has been published about violence towards children, in heterosexual partnerships, against gays, lesbians, bisexual, and transsexual victims, in the family, at school, at work, and in road incidents. The gender theory of violence is one of the most politically influential and one of the most interesting discourses for the theory of violence and attempts to provide an answer for the fact that three quarters to 99 percent of those suspected of having committed violent crimes are men: violence is primarily a male phenomenon. With the theory of patriarchy, men's studies, and gender focused socialization theories, gender theory has taken a prominent place in the theory of violence and research into it. However, insofar as the one neglects the homosocial dimension of male violence, the others are primarily deficit theories of male violence, and attention is increasingly focused on the double distinction and dominance logic of doing masculinity: masculinity and violent masculinity in particular are established by men who set themselves apart from women, as well as from other men (Meuser 2002).

All in all, there arises from this diverse research the picture of a present in which violence is not only omnipresent but in western societies (not least as a result of scholarship and social movements) is also perceived to be all pervasive. As political violence, violence seems to have given up its utopian revolutionary character and can hardly be linked with a demanding western concept of politics. On the contrary, it asserts the claims of identity, belonging, and exclusion and is used as a strategy for escalation in the pursuit of power and recognition. It is a seismograph for growing social inequalities, especially as far as the segregation of the job market and housing are concerned. It is "individualized" insofar as, on the one hand, it displays the loss of social bonding forces, and on the other, the extremely varied extent of individual ways of coping with social problems. It is, however, mainly a violence which is anchored in extremely multifaceted social conditions and processes and consequently contradicts all the more the "thematization traps" (Heitmeyer & Hagan 2003) into which science and public discourse regularly

fall: the pitfalls of "reinterpretation" (i.e., of framing violence as an individual or social pathology or as a biological, genetic deficiency), the pitfalls of reductionism, "inflation," "moralization," and "scandalization," and the latter's uneven sister, the "normality trap."

In addition to the many levels of analysis, a pluralism of methods and a lively pleasure in experimentation and methodical imagination (which happened with the Chicago School at the beginning of sociology and of the sociology of deviance and crime in particular) are now enjoying a new heyday (Heitmeyer & Hagan 2003). In quantitative research the analysis of criminal statistics and research by means of questionnaires remains dominant. In the context of the former, the historical comparative research of criminal statistics is particularly relevant (Thome 2004). In Europe they show a U shaped curve for homicide: a clear decline in the homicide rate from the fifteenth century to the middle of the twentieth century, followed by another rise since the 1960s, which would appear to be long term. The theories of Elias (2000) compete with those of Durkheim (1951, 1957) as the most appropriate explanation for this development. Elias traced the process of civilization to the relationship between the state monopoly of violence, growing interdependence, corresponding control by others, and self control. While Durkheim saw the civilizing force in the complex differentiation and individualism of modern society, he also had a clear vision of the anomic side of the latter, which is taken up by the current prominent theories of individualization and disorganization. The use of questionnaires has continued, especially in the field of research into hidden crime, in spite of numerous methodological hurdles, including the over or underestimation of violent criminality as a result of too small chance random samplings.

Qualitative methods of all kinds are predominantly used where little is known of the environments and cultural connections of the violent actors, either as individuals or as a collective, and for the reconstruction and analysis of subjective and collective meanings of violence, the way of life of violent protagonists, and the processes of violent interaction. An ethnography of violence has developed here for which ethnographic journalism (Buford 1991) and especially

war reporting play an important role – it is still one of the most difficult and yet most banal methodological problems of research into violence that the immediate, academic observation of violence rarely occurs and is limited to a few forms and contexts. The Milgram experiment is a striking example of this: it still offers rich insights today (Blass 2000) and at the same time raises far reaching ethical research questions.

As for the future development of violence and its discourses, six circumstances deserve particular attention: the decline of the state, the rise of terrorism and asymmetrical war, the multiplication of basic conflicts of belonging, the increasing connection between religion and violence, the pleasure in violence, and the triumphant advance of the victim. Nowadays it seems that the triumph – anchored in colonialism – of the modern western state, characterized by the monopoly of violence, in many parts of the world is rather more formal than substantial. The modern state as welfare state is under pressure even in western societies. Violence, which arises from the many precarious forms of statehood, and which is connected with the decline of the state, its transformations, and accompanying inequalities underlines the fact that the sociological problem of violence is again to be conceptualized as it was analyzed by Thomas Hobbes, Arendt, and Popitz: as a problem of order which violence both endangers and creates and guarantees, and is therefore not exclusively the domain of specialized sociologists, as is the case with the sociology of crime or of social problems. The problem of violence lies at the heart of general sociology and in particular of the sociology of power. The sociology of violence is an intercultural, comparative, historical, and political sociology of the “forms of order of violence” (Hanser & von Trotha 2002). It is a sociology of institutions, rules, meanings, perceptions, and emotional patterns, which determine how societies and cultures deal with human violence; the most important and significant among them are the political systems of rule which, as Hobbes and other political philosophers have argued, are answers to the question how people can protect themselves from violence.

They are at the same time cause as well as product of the decline of the state and

increasingly determine the appearance of and the discourses about violence (Schwab Trapp 2002): basic conflicts of belonging where – in the shape of ethnic, religious, and racist conflicts – membership is denied and groups of people, determined by category, are violently excluded, raped, and destroyed (Wimmer et al. 2004), terrorism, and asymmetric war (Münkler 2002). With the war in the Balkans and the 9/11 attacks on the World Trade Center and the Pentagon, war has returned to Europe and the territory of the US. This has given rise to a rapid increase in research into and publications about these phenomena. It has led the sociology of war to gain a certain and hitherto unknown momentum, and contrary to the aetiological mainstream analysis of violence sociologists and anthropologists have begun to highlight that violence is not a structure but a process of interaction and escalation (Elwert et al. 1999). This is particularly true of the sociology of the asymmetric war, which in the shadow of atomic and conventional war (which itself has developed a historically incomparable potential for destruction) has become the main form of war with the greatest losses, chiefly among the civilian population. The rise of the asymmetric war has hardly foreseeable consequences for international order, foreign and domestic policy, law, and the constitution of the societies concerned. The latter include developments toward the disappearance of the traditional modern division between war and crime, and the commercialization of war.

The growing link between religion and war can be seen in many violent and war like conflicts – the conflict between Israel and Palestine, the global small war of al Qaeda, and the legitimization of preemptive war by means of Christian fundamentalist missions and eschatologies by evangelical movements in the US (Armstrong 2000). It will probably pose the greatest challenge for international order, policy, culture, and society, as well as for sociology. In Europe and in sociology rooted in the modern European world, where modernization equals secularization, it is particularly difficult to face up to this challenge theoretically and empirically.

What is almost as inaccessible for this western self image is the return of pleasure in violence. Violence is action and like sexuality it is the epitome of sensual experience – the pleasure of emotion, excitement, and physical

experience, the immediacy of the moment, an escape out of the mundane into the freedom of power and the now, the appetite of youthful masculinity and of action. The pleasure in violence is a powerful element of any social order. Elias's theory of civilization is one of the most influential, contemporary social scientific theories about such pleasure. It is a sociology of power arguing that by means of the monopoly of violence and the extended chain of actions made possible by it, the pleasure in violence is removed from the members of the modern state in their daily lives; it is "civilized." However, opposing developments are too evident to enable the analysis of Elias to be continued. In asymmetrical wars and violent, ethnic, and religious conflicts, the pleasure in violence has become a cult of unchained cruelty. Even in western states the pleasure in violence is still present in various forms: in the subcultures of misery and everyday violent criminality in the French "quartiers d'exil" (Dubet & Lapeyronnie 1992), in the inner city areas of the American equivalent, in networks of organized crime, the subcultures of prostitution and child pornography, the youth subcultures of the German "Skins," "Hools," or "Autonomous" and their soulmates in other European and non European countries. These phenomena are only the most obvious. They require a phenomenology and ethnography of violence. In the German speaking sociology of violence, such a debate is being held between "mainstreamers" and "innovators" (Imbusch 2004).

The rise of the culture of the victim goes together with a rise in the discourse of the victim, in which empathy and identification with the victim are self evident. The fact remains that the culture of the victim nowadays is becoming increasingly a source for the legitimization of violence, revenge, and extensive claims to security. The world of armed conflict is determined by a discourse pattern of accusation and self pity; the more irreconcilable, the more demanding and righteous it is, the more violent the action power becomes. The everyday, political side of this discourse is a discourse of criminalization, punishment, and revenge by the actual or potential victims of violence (Waldmann 2003). It is directed at "security" – above all at the *sense* of security – and against all actual or potential "perpetrators of violence" that can be

imagined by the fertile imaginations of the victims. Its protagonists are a mixed bunch whose social space extends from workers to academics, from police associations and political parties to the society for the protection of minors, workers in women's safe houses, and feminist movements. Its "successes" have radically changed the reality of North American criminal law in particular: the merciless execution of the death penalty, a policy of incarceration which has meant an all time high rate of imprisonment in the US, the return of public humiliation, and the ritual exclusion of sex offenders (Wacquant 1999). While Europe has until now largely opted out of this development, the discourse of the victim in connection with the problems of dramatically increasing social inequalities and social exclusions, of terrorism and organized crime, has however provided influential justification for the dissolution of classic legal principles. Once again it makes the Janus face of violence only too clear: it looks upon order and disorder; and in the face of order it can become a threatening grimace.

SEE ALSO: Aggression; Anomie; Bourdieu, Pierre; Capital Punishment; Civilizing Process; Conflict Theory; Crime; Criminology; Dangerousness; Domestic Violence; Ethnic Cleansing; Football Hooliganism; Fundamentalism; Gendered Aspects of War and International Violence; Genocide; Hate Crimes; Holocaust; Homicide; Marginalization; Poverty; Power, Theories of; Rape Culture; Religion; Sexual Violence and Rape; Social Disorganization Theory; Terrorism; Urban Crime and Violence; Violent Crime; War

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violence among athletes

Kevin Young

Aspects of violence among athletes, including behaviors encompassed within the rules as well as outside the rules of sport, have traditionally been condoned in many settings as "part of the game." This is witnessed in the way that aggressive, high risk, or injurious practices that would be socially and/or legally intolerable apart from sports are encouraged and expected to occur in connection with sports. Further, in many countries, sport is immersed in fervent cultures of aggression that may serve to compromise participant safety and limit the possibility of change. Such cultures may also have influenced sport scholarship, since sociologists have paid far less attention to violence among athletes than to violence among fans.

Most sociologists agree that while there is no single cause of violence among athletes, understanding the phenomenon requires examining socialization processes associated with many sports and, indeed, with the institution of sport in general, where athletes learn from an early age that behaviors such as hitting and being hit, and conceiving of violence as a vehicle to resolve conflicts (Coakley 1989), are acceptable and easily rationalized. Combined with an emphasis in many commercialized sports on heroic values, physical dominance, and winning at all costs, thinking and behaving aggressively is simply part of the learning that individuals and groups undertake in sport. Violence among athletes is one outgrowth of this learning.

Several typologies of player violence exist, but one of the most popular and useful comes from Canadian Michael Smith (1983), who classified violence among athletes into four

categories, the first two being relatively legitimate and the last two relatively illegitimate in the eyes of sports organizations and the authorities. *Brutal body contact* includes ordinary occurrences such as tackles, blocks, and body checks – acts that can be found within the official rules of many sports, and to which most would agree that consent is given or implied. *Borderline violence* involves acts prohibited by the official rules of a given sport but occur routinely and are more or less accepted by persons connected with the game (e.g., the fist fight in ice hockey). These actions carry potential for causing injury as well as prompting further violence between players – such as, in ice hockey, the bench clearing brawl. Historically speaking, sanctions imposed by sports leagues and administrators for borderline violence have been light and often tokenistic. *Quasi criminal violence* violates the formal rules of a given sport, the law of the land, and, to a significant degree, the informal norms of players. This type of violence usually results in serious injury that precipitates considerable official and public attention. Quasi criminal violence in ice hockey may include practices such as dangerous stick work, which can cause severe injury, and which often elicit in-house suspensions and fines. Finally, *criminal violence* includes behaviors so seriously and obviously outside the boundaries of acceptability for sport and the wider community that they are handled as exceptional, and possibly unlawful, from the outset. Consequently, it becomes possible to conceive of violence among athletes as sports “crime” (Young 2002). In depth assessments of how sports violence and sports injury cases are adjudicated by the courts, and the sorts of legal defenses available to prosecuted athletes, have been advanced in a number of countries (Horror 1980; Gardiner et al. 1998; Young 2004).

Smith’s sociolegal approach is useful, but it has two limitations. First, prompted by shifting scales of public and legal tolerance since approximately the 1970s, there has been some “collapsing” of his categories. For example, incidents considered ten years ago as “quasi criminal” or even “borderline” violence may today be brought before the courts and scrutinized seriously under law as “criminal” sports violence. In this connection, while Smith’s typology addresses the important sociological

question of the “legitimacy of violence” – that is, the legitimation/delegitimation process with regard to what is perceived as acceptable violence and what is not (Ball Rokeach 1971) – it requires updating to fit a dynamic sociolegal climate (Young 2004).

Second, Smith’s typology overlooks the way in which aspects of violence among athletes may result from gender processes. Feminist work on sport and gender (Bryson 1987; Theberge 1997) allows us to understand male tolerance of risk and injury linked to aggression and violence in sport as a constituting process enhancing masculine or subcultural identity. In this respect, playing sport in a hyperaggressive way and causing or incurring injury are means of establishing positive status and career success in the form of reputational and/or material benefits. How strongly hegemonic codes of masculinity insert themselves into different sports and sports cultures varies, but it is clear that numerous sports contain “patriarchal dividends” (Connell 1995: 79) for males who are willing to “sacrifice their body” in violent ways in order to win. However, research on the masculinization of player violence is complicated by the fact that studies demonstrate that many female athletes also revere risk and the use of aggression (Rail 1992; Young & White 1995; Theberge 1997). Female involvement in high risk, aggressive, and violent sport values thus suggests that sport socialization may be more important than gender socialization but, on this important question, far more research is needed.

A trend toward the assessment of “sports related violence” in its broader context is evident in the way that sociologists have recently expanded their conception of “violence among athletes” to encompass actions away from the field of play. Included here are “rape cultures” that pervade locker rooms, abusive initiation (“hazing”) practices, and athletes (professional and amateur) involved in domestic violence, partner abuse, as well as crimes of violence in the wider community. Such cases have not traditionally been viewed as “violence among athletes,” but clearly, they are potentially abusive, injurious, or otherwise unlawful practices, performed with some consistency by athletes, that cannot easily be separated from the sports process and that only begin to make sense when the socially embedded character of sport is

closely examined. Strong gender effects are visible here too, for while female athletes certainly participate in disturbing hazing rituals (Bryshun & Young 1999), it is clear that athletes involved in misogynist locker room cultures (Curry 1991) and acts of domestic violence and “street crimes” are predominantly male (Crosset et al. 1995; Benedict & Klein 1997). Fascinating questions of the interface between hegemonic sports codes (competition, winning, dominance, etc.), hypermasculinity, poverty, and race are thus raised but remain, to this point, largely unanswered.

The literature on violence among athletes is not new, but it remains limited. First and most importantly, sociologists have not exercised care in definitional and conceptual matters. *Aggression*, which most people would accept is a normative (though not necessarily agreeable) feature of many sports, is not the same thing as *violence* itself, which is often vaguely conceived of as the “unwanted” version of the sorts of aggressive behaviors and attitudes many sports simply require. Unraveling such definitional quandaries is important, though this is admittedly complicated by varied sport specific traditions where the definition of “wanted” and “unwanted” behavior is concerned.

After a hiatus in the late 1980s and early 1990s, sociolegal work on the relationship between sports violence and the law is being revitalized. Cross cultural comparisons of official responses to violence among athletes have not been made available to date. From a burgeoning literature, we know something about the relationship between violence, injury, and pain, but more information is needed. Because the bulk of this research has focused on the experiences of men, studies of risk taking, physicality, and injury among girls and women are again required, especially in light of evidence from some countries that, as opportunities open up, females are increasingly turning to aggressive, traditionally male defined sports such as rugby, ice hockey, boxing, and martial arts.

After years of research on the sports violence/media nexus, an impressive body of material has been amassed on coverage styles, but the question of “media effects” remains prickly, and the ways that audiences deconstruct and are impacted by mediated sports violence remain uncertain.

Finally, very little is known about forms of *sports related violence* that occur away from the field of play – the involvement of athletes, as victims or offenders, in practices such as hazing, abuse, and street crime. A recent shift by sociologists of sport in this direction, coupled with increasing media attention to and public awareness of athletes behaving badly, will expand knowledge of these additional dimensions of violence among athletes.

SEE ALSO: Deviance, Sport and; Sport as Catharsis; Sport Culture and Subcultures; Violence; Violence Among Fans

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violence among fans

Kevin Young

Multiple definitions of fan violence exist in the sociology of sport. Some are limited to specific behaviors, such as hand to hand fighting or acts of vandalism, or to violence committed in the context of a particular sport, whereas others are more expansive. Because research shows that the phenomenon is diverse, the latter definitional approach is more useful. Therefore, *violence among fans* is best understood as involving direct or indirect acts of physical violence by sports spectators, at or away from the sports arena, that result in injury to persons or damage to property.

Unlike acts of violence among athletes, violence among fans elicits anxious responses from the authorities and often is closely policed. The occurrence of numerous injurious, and several deadly, crowd episodes has sensitized the public and social controllers to the need for careful regulation of sports crowds. In many countries fan violence is seen as a serious social problem, and strict measures, including new laws, have been introduced (Young 2000, 2002). Fans of British and European soccer have certainly

gained notoriety for their violent rituals and practices, but, in fact, violent crowd disturbances occur regularly worldwide. Many sports have been affected, some more consistently than others, and some perhaps more surprising than others. These include, but are not restricted to, baseball, cricket, ice hockey, boxing, horse racing, basketball, American and Canadian football, rugby, and, of course, soccer. It is equally apparent that violence among sports fans has a long history (Guttmann 1986).

Most sociological research has focused on forms and causes of British soccer hooliganism. In step with a popular, but not necessarily accurate (Dunning et al. 1988), perception that hooliganism began in the 1960s and 1970s, and with several tragic episodes resulting in multiple injuries and deaths at soccer games, especially in the 1980s, the literature expanded rapidly during this period, though it has diminished of late. The debates between scholars on this issue have been complex and occasionally fractious, but certain strands within this research may be identified.

One of the initial explanations of hooliganism was social psychological. Building on Tiger's (1969) controversial study of aggression among *Men in Groups*, and on presumptions of the "need" for male bonding, Peter Marsh et al. (1978) developed the "Ritual of Soccer Violence Thesis" following observations at Oxford United Football Club. Employing a so called "ethnogenic method" to explore the organization and motives of hooligan fans from an insider's point of view, Marsh et al. conceptualized aggression as a means of controlling the social world in the process of achieving certain outcomes. Therefore, fan violence at soccer matches was viewed as a cultural adaptation to the working class environment for male British adolescents – a "ritual of teenage aggro." The contention that hooliganism is largely a ritualistic "fantasy" of violence has been severely criticized, especially for failing to explain the regularity of serious injuries at soccer games, and offering superficial explanations of the social class background of participants. There *are* ritualistic elements to soccer "aggro" in Britain and elsewhere (for instance, many of the crowd chants and gestures, and even aspects of intergroup provocation, are certainly ritualistic), but to argue that the essence of hooliganism is ritualistic, and that

actual violence seldom occurs, raises doubts about the potential of this approach, particularly when hooligan encounters have been widely reported, routinely injurious, and occasionally fatal.

In the 1970s and 1980s, Marxist criminologist Ian Taylor (1971, 1987) offered a macrosociological and class sensitive account of soccer hooliganism. For him, hooliganism was associated with two different phases in the development of the British game and of British society more generally. First, Taylor looked historically to the emergence of soccer in working class communities, and to the disruptive effects of commercialization on the game. Commercialization, he argued, fractured a formerly rich "soccer subculture" that weaved its way through such communities. Practices such as the invasion of playing fields and vandalism were interpreted as attempts by the remnants of this subculture to reclaim a game that had become increasingly removed from its control. In the 1980s, and clearly moved by the tragic events of the 1985 Bradford fire and Heysel Stadium riot, as well as the 1989 Hillsborough Stadium crush which resulted in the deaths of dozens of innocent lives (Young 2000), Taylor revised portions of his earlier thesis to argue that contemporary manifestations of soccer hooliganism could better be understood if placed against crises of the British state. Specifically, he argued that increasing dislocation within working class communities and the development of an "upper" working class jingoism (or "Little Englanderism") during the tenure of Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher's Conservative rule exacerbated Britain's hooliganism problem, and helped fuel a long sequence of xenophobically violent exchanges between fans of English club teams and of the English national team abroad and those of teams from other countries.

While sensitive to questions of history and social class, Taylor's work has been criticized for "romanticizing" any real "control" working class fans may ever have exerted over the game during its early phases, for ignoring very early "hooligan" encounters (during, for instance, the early twentieth century and alleged "soccer consciousness" phase), and for misidentifying the majority of hooligan fans as "upper" (and thus more affluent and resourceful) working class. The fact that Taylor's ideas, while

provocative, were never based on any acknowledged empirical protocol has not helped their durability, though his attempts to offer a form of "social deprivation thesis" have certainly influenced subsequent North American accounts of fan violence (Young 2002).

Taylor's Marxist views on dynamic class culture and on the development of the British game were echoed at approximately the same time by several writers at the Center for Contemporary Cultural Studies at Birmingham University, England where, once again, soccer hooliganism was viewed as a reaction by working class males to commercializing processes, such as the increasing presentation of soccer as a market commodity, emerging in what had traditionally been construed as "the people's game." Examining deep structural changes in working class communities, Clarke (1978) and others added a strong subcultural/ethnographic component to their class analysis, allowing them to explain the presence in the 1960s and 1970s hooligan "phases" of flamboyant skinhead groups combining traditional working class values (such as the fierce defense of local and national identities, and love of football) with interests in commercial youth style. Relating soccer hooliganism to the context of a culture in flux is a helpful framework of analysis, and the sociohistorical approaches of Taylor, Clarke, and others certainly offer considerably more explanatory insight into a complex social problem than the microsociological ventures of Marsh et al. However, as with Taylor's early work, Clarke and colleagues actually produced little concrete evidence to support the argument that hooliganism was a response to changing working class traditions and values. Stability of working class social relations in an allegedly "hooligan free" past (i.e., in the pre 1960 era) is a view that both parties tended to assume too uncritically – this, again, has not gone unnoticed by critics.

A group of sociologists at the University of Leicester (Dunning et al. 1988) have been interested to examine the "social roots" of British soccer hooliganism. Unlike Marsh and Taylor, however, the Eliasian/figurational work of the Leicester group is grounded in extensive comparisons of the phenomenon in its past and present contexts. Principally, Dunning and his colleagues argue that aggressive standards of behavior displayed by soccer hooligans are

directly influenced by the social conditions and values inherent in the class cultural background of those involved.

A predominant theme of their work, and one which represents a direct counterpoint to Taylor's "Little England" thesis, is that hooligan groups are largely comprised of individuals from the roughest and lowest (rather than "upper") sectors of the working classes. They argue that the hooligan's relatively deprived social condition is instrumental in the production and reproduction of normative modes of behavior, including strong emphases on notions of territory, male dominance, and physicality. It is precisely the reproduction of this social condition that is seen to lead to the development of a specific violent masculine style manifested regularly in the context of soccer. Notions of dynamic territoriality are also offered which allow the Leicester researchers to account for the shifting allegiances of fan support (and thus shifting expressions of fan violence) at local, regional, and international levels. While there are several unique features to the ideas of the Leicester "School," perhaps the most important is the adoption of a long term Eliasian view regarding the development of soccer hooliganism, which allows them to demonstrate that forms of spectator disorder have existed for over a century. The Leicester research has been heavily influential in Britain and internationally, both within the academy and with policymakers.

As comprehensive as these four approaches are, they do not represent the full spectrum of work available on fan violence in the UK. Other studies which have contributed to the "hooligan debate" include, but are not limited to, Murray's (1984) social history of religious sectarianism in Scottish football, Robins's (1984) accounts of the intersections between soccer violence and the popular cultural interests of young British men, and studies of soccer, violence, and gender in Ireland (Bairner 1995).

This impressive volume of research on soccer hooliganism has not been matched elsewhere, despite the known existence of problems with violence among sports fans. In North America, for instance, where there is clear evidence of fan disorders (Young 2002), remarkably little sociological work has been tendered. The work that does exist is neither as thorough nor as theorized as the British work. Notwithstanding several

notable attempts (Smith 1983) to explain North American fan violence in terms of its social causes, there seems to be a general reluctance on the part of researchers to take the phenomenon seriously, and far more work is needed. Indeed, despite the fact that the bulk of the research on violence among fans relates to transatlantic contexts and experiences, many countries where organized sport is played and valued have recorded problems with fan violence at one time or another. Regrettably, however, the research, and especially that portion of it written in or translated into English, remains slim, and there are no clear ways of classifying or categorizing this work into thematic "schools" or coherent bodies of theory.

Janet Lever's (1983) work on fan violence associated with Brazilian soccer set an early marker for the international research. Using a structural functionalist approach, Lever sought to show how sport in South America can represent both unifying and divisive properties – unifying in the sense that it may enhance community awareness and loyalty, but divisive because it underlines social class distinctions. Fan violence, she argues, is but one side effect of failed attempts by the Brazilian authorities to deal with poverty and such class distinctions – soccer stadiums have often been used as a venue for the expression of class conflict such as missile throwing from the "poorer" stadium sections into the "richer" sections. Arguably, Lever's functionalist approach cannot easily account for these tensions and her study is now outdated, but it nevertheless represents groundbreaking sociological work on fan violence in South America. A more contemporary account of fan violence in this context may be found in Archetti and Romero (1994).

By now, most serious students of sports violence understand that the argument that soccer hooliganism is a "British Disease" is a myth. In their early figurational studies, Williams et al. (1984) unearthed over 70 reports of fan violence at soccer games in 30 different countries in which English fans were not involved between 1904 and 1983. Slightly later, Williams and Goldberg (1989: 7) identified numerous cases of hooliganism where English fans were, in fact, the "victims of foreign hooliganism" rather than the assailants. Today, cases of fan violence in diverse international contexts are routinely

reported in the popular media and over the Internet.

Notwithstanding cultural variance in the nature and extent of fan violence, evidence indicates that soccer hooliganism expanded throughout the 1980s in a number of European countries. A considerable European research literature also emerged at this time. Greece, France, Spain, Belgium, Austria, Sweden, the Netherlands, Germany, and Italy are among countries known to have experienced significant problems with soccer hooliganism (Young 2000: 389). In many of these locations, fan violence has been shown to intersect with far right wing politics and racist ideologies, demonstrating a clear sociological link between problems in sport and those in the wider society.

While care must always be taken to differentiate between injuries caused by intentional fan violence and those caused by "accidental" crowd surges or stampedes prompted by such things as over ticketing, negligent policing, or stadium collapses, in terms of total numbers of injuries and fatalities, some of the most serious cases of injurious and fatal fan episodes have occurred in South and Central American locations. For example, a by now well known riot broke out at the National Stadium in Lima, Peru in May 1964, resulting in over 300 deaths, and in another notorious case of soccer related violence, a so called "Soccer War" lasting several days was waged between Honduras and El Salvador in the summer of 1969 following a game played between the two countries. More recently, 83 people were killed and over 150 others injured in a stampede linked to the distribution of forged tickets at a 1996 World Cup qualifying game held in Guatemala City (Young 2000: 389).

Violence among sports fans is a multidimensional and complex topic that has generated a huge volume of research on matters such as causes, manifestations and responses, and media coverage, but this research shows serious imbalances. For example, while there seems little doubt that the most substantial and rigorously theorized body of work in this area has examined forms and causes of British soccer hooliganism, relatively little is known about fan violence in other parts of the world. Again, this is true of North America, for instance, where the phenomenon is acknowledged by

sports organizations and authorities alike, but where, with only a few exceptions, much of what we know comes from descriptive and often less than reliable media accounts (Young 2002).

The portion of the research on fan violence summarized here underlines the importance of approaching the topic in ways that respect a historically informed sociology of cultural practices like sport. Culture is important because the often heterogeneous manifestations and meanings of fan violence develop in distinct ways in distinct places, as we can see from the varied manner in which fans from European countries differentially aggress at soccer games (Williams & Goldberg 1989). History is important because these manifestations and meanings always emerge from prior social arrangements, as the work of the Leicester School ably demonstrates. And, a sociology of fan violence is critical because, far from existing in a vacuum, the actions and practices of unruly sports fans coexist relationally with wider social institutions and processes, as can be witnessed by the deeply gendered character of fan violence, which remains a predominantly male activity. Again, cultural differences exist in this regard.

Finally, part of the complexity of explaining fan violence concerns the methodological fact that it is not easy to study. As with other aspects of crime and social "deviance," while outlining the main behavioral components of the phenomenon is relatively uncomplicated (we know how fan violence is *done*), detailing its causes, extent, and nature is not. This is particularly the case where fan violence is not restricted to one sport or one level of sport (Young 2002). Understanding the causes, extent/nature, and motives and meanings of fan violence requires careful and committed research that must overcome familiar problems of access, "entry," and reliability. To this point, the British research stands out as that body of work that has most consistently tackled these dilemmas, but the continued existence of violence among fans in other countries surely means that others must follow suit in due course.

SEE ALSO: Figurational Sociology and the Sociology of Sport; Football Hooliganism; Soccer; Sport as Catharsis; Sport Culture and Subcultures; Subcultures, Deviant; Violence; Violence Among Athletes

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violent crime

Rosemary Gartner

In popular discourse, violent crime is the intentional, malicious physical injury of one person by another, with assault, rape, and murder being obvious and apparently uncontroversial examples. In legal discourse, violent crime is behavior that leads to particular legal procedures and is thereby legally sanctionable. Here violent crime is constituted by legal reactions, not by characteristics inherent in behaviors or people. Legal definitions may appear precise and objective, but because they are created and applied through social and political processes, legally defined violent crime is historically and socially constructed. Social scientists acknowledge this but typically rely on legal definitions to delimit the violent acts they study (Jackman 2002).

Documenting and explaining the distribution of violent crime across time, place, and persons are the major tasks of those who study it. Most nations and sub national jurisdictions compile reports on crimes known to police, which include information on accused, victim, and incident characteristics. There are two principal limitations to these official statistics. First, because legal definitions of even serious crimes vary across time and place, official statistics may not accurately measure differences in the prevalence of violent behaviors across societies or over time. Second, because characteristics of the legal agencies that collect information on crime influence how acts are interpreted and reported, official statistics do not accurately measure levels of violent crime even within a single society. Some violent acts that fit legal definitions are subject to criminal enforcement less often than others. For example, in most nations, well under half of physical and sexual assaults are reported to police (Nieuwebeerta 2002). Since authorities learn about violent crime primarily from the public, popular views on the seriousness of particular violent acts, as well as perceptions of the legitimacy of legal officials, also influence which acts are reported. Official statistics on violent crime therefore underrepresent its true prevalence.

Unofficial data sources, such as general population surveys, avoid some of these problems by

providing information on violent crimes not known to officials. Victimization and self report surveys, which ask people about their violent victimization and/or offending over a specified period, yield higher estimates of the prevalence of violent crime than do official statistics. Victimization surveys also show that the likelihood that violent crimes will become known to officials depends partly on their severity, as well as on characteristics of victims, offenders, and the relationships between them. However, because victimization and self report surveys rely on the honesty, memory, and perceptions of respondents, they have their own limitations and biases.

Is there more violent crime today than in the past? The most reliable historical evidence comes from Western Europe and North America, where trends over the last six or seven centuries have been downward, albeit punctuated by short term crime waves (Eisner 2003). This decline reversed somewhat in North America and Western Europe in the 1970s and in Eastern Europe in the 1980s, when violent crime rates rose dramatically. Nevertheless, interpersonal violence has become a much less customary part of daily life over the long term.

Are some societies more prone to violent crimes? Data from victimization surveys and public health records suggest that rates of lethal violence vary greatly, even among similar societies (Nieuwbeerta 2002). For example, homicide rates are about three times higher in the US than in Canada and four times higher in Venezuela than Chile. Countries in Northern Africa and the Middle East appear to have lower rates of serious interpersonal violence, as do many Asian countries. Interestingly, rates of sub lethal and lethal violence do not correlate highly: countries with high homicide rates do not consistently have high rates of assault and robbery (Zimring & Hawkins 1997).

What social processes, conditions, or policies affect rates of violent crime? The centuries long decline in violence in the West was likely due to the expansion of state powers, the Protestant Reformation, and the rise of modern individualism (Eisner 2003). In contemporary societies, homicide rates are higher where inequalities in income and wealth are greater and where there are few restrictions on the

ownership and use of firearms. Some of the factors commonly thought to affect violent crime (e.g., urbanization, unemployment, or the death penalty) do not, in fact, appear to do so.

Are some people more likely to be involved in violence? Serious violent crimes tend to be the domain of young, economically disadvantaged males virtually everywhere (Reiss & Roth 1993). Most violent offenders have criminal records, but few specialize in violence. Victims of violent crime, with the exception of rape victims, generally share many characteristics with their victimizers (i.e., they also tend to be young, economically disadvantaged males). Females are more likely to be victims than offenders; most female victims are attacked by males they are related to or are intimately involved with. A substantial proportion of violent crimes occurs among relatives or persons well known to each other, though this proportion is smaller in the US than other countries, and has been declining.

Most sociological explanations of violent crime focus on one of three levels of analysis: the individual, the situational, or the structural cultural (Sampson & Lauritsen 1994). Individual level analyses look for characteristics that predispose or fail to discourage people from violence. Situational approaches attend to the context and processes immediately surrounding violent events, such as the nature of the interaction among participants and the presence of weapons or bystanders. Structural cultural approaches look at broader social forces, processes, and value systems shaping violent motivations and opportunities.

Most sociological research on violent crime has focused on interpersonal violence among individuals. But with recent changes in global politics and governance, sociologists are now confronted with violent behaviors, such as terrorist acts and war crimes, that present both challenges to traditional methods and theories, as well as opportunities for evaluating accepted knowledge about violent crime.

SEE ALSO: Crime; Domestic Violence; Hate Crimes; Homicide; Measuring Crime; Rape/Sexual Assault as Crime; Sexual Violence and Rape; Urban Crime and Violence; Violence

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virtual sports

Michael Atkinson

Virtual sports are symbolic representations of embodied, expressive, and “real world” athletic experiences. These sports can involve complete “out of body” practices wherein participants “play” a sport without exerting their bodies in a traditionally athletic way (i.e., a sports video game), or more embodied performances involving physical activity in a simulated sports environment (i.e., athletic movement in a modified sports setting like a cyclists’ wind tunnel). Centrally, virtual sports involve human beings as either real or represented athletes in a technologically enhanced setting. Although certain ludic activities might be considered representations of sport (e.g., “touch” football, “pick up” ice hockey, or go kart racing), virtual sports are those that place either embodied or computer generated athletes in simulated sports spaces.

Virtual sport has, by and large, escaped sociological scrutiny. Nevertheless, three types of virtual sport are ripe for investigation. First, and perhaps most commonly, virtual sports

abound in home and arcade video games. Through the advent of home entertainment systems in the 1970s and 1980s such as Atari, Intellivision, Collecovision, and Vectrex, sports video games became a staple of both popular and youth cultures in North America. From the 1980s onward, game players have competed in virtual sports ranging from hockey to basketball to hunting to skateboarding. Indeed, one of the very first video games commercially marketed in the US, Pong, resembled a crude form of table tennis. Since then, digitally refined and interactively dynamic computer systems such as Sega, Nintendo, Odyssey, Play Station, and X-Box have enabled consumers to play practically every mainstream western sport. Sports games presently account for approximately 20 per cent of video game sales in North America, the world’s largest gaming market, grossing US\$8 billion yearly (Liberman 2003).

Second, virtual sports enthusiasts now have access to physically interactive video games. For example, players may literally “step into” virtual golf courses. A person stands on an Astro-turfed tee box holding an electronically sensed golf club, and swings at a virtual ball. A simulated ball instantaneously appears on a large video screen situated several feet in front of the tee box, and flies down the virtual course according to the celerity and spin at which it had been virtually struck. Individuals may play an entire round of golf on the machine, selecting from any number of professional courses. People may also use similar machines (for a cost of US\$10–100) to drive virtual race cars, bat against virtual Major League Baseball pitchers, shoot virtual basketballs, ride virtual race horses, or even paddle virtual kayaks.

Third, simulated sports environments may be utilized as training tools for elite athletes. Virtual training machines carefully monitor and strictly control the effort levels of athletes in order to study and help improve their physical abilities. For example, swimmers are often placed in “current tanks” to scientifically evaluate the efficiency of their strokes and pinpoint $\dot{V}O_2(\max)$ rates. Elite level ice hockey players’ skating strides are technically studied in laboratories by using treadmills with simulated ice surfaces. Professional cyclists straddle stationary racing bikes in wind rooms and “peddle through” virtual rides that appear on video

screens in front of them; twisting and turn ing when they go through turns, and exerting effort when tackling hills.

The ascendance of virtual sport over the past 30 years points to how a host of “sociogenic” (Elias 1994) shifts within western cultures have altered our understandings of embodied athleticism. First, virtual sports are of increasing importance at a time in which both amateur and professional sports are intensely commercialized. Sociologists of sport suggest that, particularly in western nations with state sponsored, rigidly institutionalized and professional sports cultures, the entire sporting experience is fragmented into market commodities, including sport simulations that allow users to become more actively involved fans. As sport is consumed as a popular culture commodity, sports organizations profit by aggressively tapping home entertainment/gaming markets. Many global and national sports organizations license and/or package virtual game experiences for consumers, allowing them to create fantasy leagues and manipulate player performance at the push of a button or thrust of a joystick.

Second, athletic contests are globally promoted as contexts of social “mimesis” (Elias & Dunning 1986) by sports marketers. Audiences are sold virtual sport as symbols of emotionally charged and risky, yet rule bound, scenarios of physically intense competition. Because of the openness of the aggression, struggle, and toughness in sports, they provide a type of “exciting significance” for audiences. Virtual sports games highlight and exaggerate the taken for granted physicality and mimesis inherent in both mainstream and alternative sports. Extreme hitting, bloodletting, brutal tackling, and flamboyant injuries, for example, are common in virtual sports games. Rules are broken without penalty, virtual players do not experience the catastrophic effects of rough play, and users receive reward incentives within games for the number of on field hits levied or styles of aggressive play mastered.

Third, the booming popularity of virtual sports games should be contextualized against what postmodern sociologists like Baudrillard (1983) refer to as the “simulation” of social reality. Virtual sports games, for instance, create hyper representations of embodied athleticism

and transform social constructions of “real” sport for users. The games not only mimic what actually occurs in sport, they now partially define what audiences expect from embodied sports. Virtual games may also be more accessible forms of sport for many users, as one can play dozens of sports regardless of physical fitness level. Furthermore, one is granted an unprecedented agency to mold the contours and parameters of an athletic contest at whim (i.e., players involved, physical settings, length of competitions, speed of games, and rule structures). Comparatively, for athletes who are “plugged into” virtual sports machines, simulated sports fields allow for incredible physical exertion without many of the physical dangers inherent in competition. Therefore, performance evaluating or rehabilitating sports machines generate simulated contexts of performance so that athletes may become “swifter, higher, and stronger” during competition.

Fourth, virtual sports underscore how machines and bodies cybernetically intersect in western cultures. Donna Haraway (1991) noted, some time ago, that the postmodern era is one in which corporeality is increasingly breached by technology. For Haraway and others, it is difficult to conceive of any social activity, including a full gamut of sports performances, that has evaded technological improvement, innovation, control, and monitoring. When individuals are able to kick a soccer ball, catch a baseball, throw a javelin, or perform a ski jump by tapping a computer button or moving the body expressively in a “sports like motion” in front of video sensors, one cannot overlook how athleticism is deeply tied to computer technology.

Fifth, the prominence of virtual sports reflects emergent cultural preferences for stationary, home based digital entertainment. Virtual sports participation through video game play jibes with athletically inactive North American lifestyles. Virtual sports fit nicely into the social “sit down” lifestyles widely attributed to long school or work days, poor dietary practices, and exposure to computers as everyday tools. Troublingly, at a time when physical passivity in the leisure sphere and overall obesity rates are on the rise in North America, and as physical education programs are disappearing from educational curricula at all institutional levels, virtual games are a primary form of sports

participation for “growing” populations of North Americans (Clocksin et al. 2002).

Extant theoretical deconstructions of virtual sports are narrow in both scope and content. The bulk of the limited empirical research on virtual sports addresses how exposure to aggressive sports games is correlated with aggressive interpersonal behaviors (Bensley & Van Eenwyk 2001). Virtual sports are especially targeted in the contemporary moral panic about youth deviance and the consumption of violent video games. Using a blend of social psychological, behavioral, and sociobiological theories, researchers argue that virtual sports games desensitize users to extreme violence and confound users’ understanding of real world aggression. Yet despite nearly three decades of concentrated empirical research on youth violence and video game play, there is no consensus among social scientists that virtual sports play a causal role in any category of criminal or otherwise assaultive behavior.

Second, political economists study virtual sports as vacuous cultural commodities. Authors including Postigo (2003) weave a pastiche of Marxist, cultural studies, and post industrial theories to evidence how virtual sports have little use value but great exchange value among youth groups. Virtual sports alienate users from embodied athletic experiences and diminish the socially interactive aspects of competitive sport. As critics of virtual sport, political economists contend that athletes, teams, and leagues utilize video games as vehicles for crassly soliciting fan investment into athletics. Furthermore, they argue, virtual sports like video games discourage the first hand experience of athleticism in sport, and motivate individuals to participate passively via video interface.

Third, sociologists of sport employ post modernist theories to examine the impacts of computer technology on athlete training, performance, and rehabilitation. Sociologists including Debra Shogan (1999) study athletes’ bodies as fragmented, technologically invaded, and subject to penetration/improvement at the hands of therapists, doctors, and trainers. Athletes, as the subjects and targets of medical knowledge bases, are strategically crafted into cybernetic entities that resemble carefully engineered machines rather than embodied agents. Virtual sport machines used in athletic training or in

recreational leisure pursuits blur the boundaries between “natural” human performance and artificially engineered, hyperreal athletics. The postmodern athlete is one whose performance is carefully mapped, dissected, analyzed, predicted, and monitored by a full spectrum of computer systems.

Existing research on virtual sports explores only a small range of data collection techniques and strategies. Social experiments, self report surveys, content analysis, and to a lesser extent interviewing, are the main methods structuring empirical investigations of virtual sports and their cultural significance. Dominant research questions tend to focus on popular sports video games played, the impact of virtual sports on fan communities, and the significance of virtual sports for improving real world athletic performance.

Future research on virtual sports should encourage methodological diversity. At present, the population of virtual sports enthusiasts is not well defined, nor is the social significance of virtual sports across cultural lifestyles sufficiently probed. This is largely due to the methodological targeting of certain populations of “home system” game players (typically, young males from the middle class), online players (a similar population as home system players), or elite level athletes. We must determine, in the broadest sense, what groups participate in virtual sport, which have access to virtual sport, and how they are intersubjectively defined as socially meaningful. In particular, questions pertaining to users’ interpretive constructions of virtual sports should be pursued via qualitative methods. More exploratory and in depth ethnographic methods (i.e., participant observation, visual ethnography, or auto ethnography) might be tapped with greater fervor in this process.

Substantively, future research should venture beyond “game play aggression” hypotheses and cyborg case studies. Dominant approaches to the study of virtual sports highlight the solitary, anti social, and disembodied natures of game play for participants. Resultantly, we know very little about the socially integrative function of virtual sports or their creative insertion into everyday group practices. Particular attention might be given to online, multi user, “real time” sports gaming. Through the advent of online MUDs (Multi User Domains), MOOs (MUD

Object Oriented systems), and other forms of computer mediated communication (CMC), virtual sports enthusiasts cooperatively interact within digital game worlds. Online virtual sport spaces are relationship building and socially organizing contexts wherein individuals socially interface through shared games. Sport specific online leagues form through the efforts of hundreds or even thousands of participants scattered across the world. As part of studying ongoing globalization processes in sports worlds, sociologists might inspect how the innovation of online, virtual sports cultures erodes traditional time/space social barriers.

Future research on virtual sport should also examine potential ethical problems accompanying the increased reliance on computer technologies in athletics. For example, sociologists should question: Are virtual sport technologies available to all elite athletes, and if not, is this a source of stratification among them? Are unfair advantages created for athletes who access the premier virtual training and rehabilitation technologies? Does the adoption of virtual sport in training stress the science of athletic performance over its humanistic elements? Does video game play discourage rigorous physical activity and athleticism? Are youth cultures persuaded to consume sport in commodity form, and not as athletes? What role does virtual sport hold in the thickening of westerners' waistlines? Do online virtual sports actually facilitate community building and social interchange in ways embodied sports involvements do not?

SEE ALSO: Cyberculture; Figurational Sociology and the Sociology of Sport; Simulation and Virtuality; Sport; Sport and the Body; Video Games

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W

war

Wolfgang Knobl

To find an uncontested definition of war is an almost impossible task. Although definitions characterizing wars as major and oftentimes longlasting conflicts between political groups (especially states or nation states) and carried out by armed forces seem to be useful and convincing at first sight, they are not without problems. The difficulty lies not so much in the vagueness of terms like “major conflict” (how many injured or dead people make a war?) or “longlasting conflict” (there were certainly wars in history that lasted decades; how ever, can there be wars that last only hours?). The real problem with such definitions is the close link between war and the state. This link is a nuisance for those social scientists who – as social anthropologists or historians – have to deal with conflicts in areas or periods without states. And it is an obstacle for sociologists and political scientists who deal with contemporary conflicts in regions where once existing states have vanished as sovereign political units and where a variety of groups use their potential of violence in an often gruesome way. Is this form of mass violence to be called “war”? Or is it another type of conflict? Thus, the problem of definition is on the agenda again.

Although analyses of war (and peace) are probably as old as historiography, *systematic* research into this topic did not start before the European Enlightenment. This research, however, focused much more on the conditions of peace than on the realities of war: with clearly normative intentions, philosophers from Thomas Hobbes to Jean Jacques Rousseau and Immanuel Kant reflected on the possibilities of *preventing* war. It was only after that period that

a first analysis of war *as dynamic process* was published, Carl von Clausewitz’s famous and posthumously published treatise *On War* (1832). Clausewitz interpreted war as a continuation of politics by other means, but he never regarded war as a process planned and carried out exclusively by rational actors. On the contrary, Clausewitz framed war with his “trinitarian formula,” arguing that war has to be seen as an intersection of actions of governments, populations, and military commanders, actions that are motivated by rationality, but also by hatred and hostility and by daring calculations of chances.

The publication date of Clausewitz’s treatise ironically coincided with the beginning of sociology since it was exactly around that time that Auguste Comte wrote his *Cours de la philosophie positive*—“ironically,” because Comte already seemed to belong to a completely different world; whereas Clausewitz’s thinking was deeply shaped by the experience of the Revolutionary and Napoleonic Wars, Comte’s writings were impregnated by the liberal belief in continuous progress toward a peaceful and rational society. It was Comte who argued that history can be divided into three periods, a theological, a metaphysical, and a scientific era, the last one Comte’s own period dominated by a scientific spirit that in the end will eradicate all militaristic ambitions and adventures. Thus, Comte formulated a thesis that became a kind of premise for the majority of sociologists in the second half of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, the liberal thesis of a strict incompatibility between war and industrial society. According to this thesis, war is some kind of archaic and disappearing relic that therefore does not need to be analyzed in much detail, a point – though somewhat transformed – ironically shared by socialists and Marxists alike, since they also expected the end of war, at

least within the historical stage of socialism. It is revealing that both liberal and socialist theorists of imperialism (Hobson and Schumpeter; Lenin and Luxemburg) were much more interested in the political or economic causes of imperialist wars, not in war itself and its consequences.

Thus, within the early phase of the history of the discipline, it is difficult to find sociologists seriously and systematically analyzing war – precisely because of this liberal (and socialist) premise. True, in Max Weber's huge oeuvre one will always find scattered though certainly interesting hints at the consequences of warfare for societal development. But it is also true that most of the other founding fathers of sociology were rather quiet on that subject. It was only during World War I that Émile Durkheim, Georg Simmel, or George Herbert Mead were more or less forced to write something about war, but the pieces they published were definitely not at the heart of the ideas for which they became famous. Werner Sombart's well known book *Krieg und Kapitalismus (War and Capitalism, 1913)*, in which he sketched war's positive economic effects on the economy of early modern Europe, remained an exception.

Interestingly, the sociological neglect of matters of war did not really change that much with the coming of the two world wars: World War II and its aftermath saw the establishment of military sociology in the United States and the publication of Samuel Stouffer's marvelous *The American Soldier*, but – strangely enough – this alone did not put war on the sociological agenda: although one of the four volumes of Stouffer's multivolume work described and theorized "combat experience" and thus one of the central topics of war, the other volumes focused much more on the military as an institution and thus laid the groundwork for military sociology as a subdiscipline which above all analyzes organizational structures and problems of armed forces. War was only a side aspect of this research program. Thus, only some isolated figures shouldered the task of analyzing war and its societal consequences, notably Emil Lederer during World War I, Hans Speier just before and during World War II, and Stanislaw Andreski, Raymond Aron, and Morris Janowitz in the three decades after 1945.

It was not until the rise of historical sociology in the late 1970s and the coming of a new world order after the collapse of the Soviet Empire that war, and especially *the consequences of war*, really began to be theorized in a systematic way by closely connected groups of researchers. Starting with Theda Skocpol's *States and Social Revolutions (1979)*, the debate focused very much on how European modernity was shaped by the impact of wars. Whereas Skocpol had argued that especially the French and the Russian Revolutions and their outcomes can only be understood by focusing on international contexts, and particularly on the crises of state administrations weakened by longlasting or lost wars, others emphasized how the modern state and its monopoly of violence were the result of violent interstate conflicts: it was only by constant warfare that large state bureaucracies were built in Europe, bureaucracies for the purpose of extracting resources out of civil society in order to finance large standing armies. Even the rise of democracy and welfare states historically seemed to be closely connected with war since suffering populations could organize and successfully demand suffrage and social rights (see Porter 1994). And, last but not least, war was also linked to internal repression since the militarization of societies as a consequence of war sometimes led to ethnic cleansing or even genocide (Shaw 2003).

However, this kind of historical sociological research also made clear that war is not a homogeneous variable since different kinds of war have very different effects. Even within the context of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries at least four types of war are to be distinguished: (1) interstate wars between neighboring or competing nations; (2) colonial wars in which mostly European expeditionary forces usually defeated indigenous groups and populations in various parts of the world; (3) civil wars between established state apparatuses and rebels; and (4) wars of national liberation against mostly European colonial powers, a type of war that only came into being after 1945.

The common feature of all these types of war is that a more or less powerful state is at least on one side of the conflict. But what about major conflicts in which states are missing? As

indicated above, this increasingly becomes a problem for researchers specialized in some regions of the contemporary world where states have ceased to exist – but not mass violence. The debate on state failure and state breakdown that had started at the beginning of the 1980s and focused very much on some African and Latin American regions had a huge impact on war research as well. Some analysts have begun to talk about so called “new wars” (Kaldor 1999) that usually take place in spaces where the state monopoly of violence has vanished and where various types of combatants – armed bandits, ethnic groups, parts of former state elites, etc. – are violently fighting for resources. These conflicts – so the argument goes – are not shaped by clearly defined ideological or political goals any longer as, for example, the wars of liberation in the period of decolonization. On the contrary, this type of war is almost exclusively dependent on its own peculiar economy (Jean & Rufin 1996) since in the era of globalization combatants are able to use resources brought in by humanitarian organizations and ethnic and other groups living abroad. Since aid and transfer payments usually continue for a long time, these “new wars” can last a long time as well, wars in which clear cut demarcations between combatants and civilians can no longer be detected and in which so called child soldiers as well as private military firms play a significant role.

As these troubled spots and spaces and their “new wars” are often seen as major threats to either particular western states or to the world community as a whole, the number of military interventions by mostly western states (or UN forces) has dramatically increased since the end of the 1990s. Thus, one of the latest trends within social science research is the focus on these interventions. In contrast to former periods, the high tech warfare of western states often does not seem to affect western civilian populations very much and does not even risk the lives of western soldiers – but does often lead to many casualties among the population of those regions where western armed forces strike (see Shaw’s term “risk transfer war”). It remains to be seen, however, whether warfare really does not have much effect on the homefront of (western) democratic societies,

since wars – even those fought in faraway places and without many body bags coming home – do always restructure the domestic political scene. That research, however, has only recently started (see Merom 2003).

SEE ALSO: Anti War and Peace Movements; Democracy; Ethnic Groups; Gendered Aspects of War and International Violence; Genocide; Liberalism; Military Research and Science and War; Military Sociology; Modernity; Nation State; Peace and Reconciliation Processes; Peace making; Sovereignty; World Conflict

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Ward, Lester Frank (1841–1913)

Michael R. Hill

Lester Frank Ward, a man of modest origins born in Joliet, Illinois, was a major architect of American sociology. Prior to Ward's election to the first presidency (1906–7) of the American Sociological Society (ASS, now the American Sociological Association), academic sociology in the US had no independent national disciplinary organization save the unifying voice of the *American Journal of Sociology*, then edited by Albion W. Small at the University of Chicago. The ASS, under Lester Ward's pioneering and able leadership, catapulted sociology into the American intellectual and academic mainstream.

Following horrific service in the Union army during the US Civil War (Ward was seriously wounded, the details of which are found in *Young Ward's Diary*), he earned his undergraduate degree from Columbia University (now George Washington University) in 1869 and won a master's degree, in botany, in 1871. Like the interdisciplinarian Roscoe Pound, who later excelled in botany, law, and sociology, Ward was a formally trained botanist and a self-taught, pioneering sociologist. Working as a paleobotanist in various government offices, including the US Geological Survey, Ward privately developed his systematic analyses of human society and, like several early sociologists, personally underwrote the publication of his books. Ward's major works include: *Dynamic Sociology* (1883), *The Psychic Factors of Civilization* (1893), *Outlines of Sociology* (1898), *Pure Sociology* (1903),

and *Applied Sociology* (1906). His six-volume *Glimpses of the Cosmos* (1913) is replete with autobiographical commentary on the origins of his voluminous writings.

Ward's early books and his 1895 contribution of a seminal article on "The Place of Sociology among Sciences" to the inaugural issue of the *American Journal of Sociology* (AJS) demonstrate his leadership at the forefront of sociological thinking. From 1900 to 1903, Ward presided over the international Institut de Sociologie, foreshadowing his subsequent role as president of the ASS. In 1906, Ward achieved a formal academic post, as Professor of Sociology in Brown University.

Ward's interest in Darwinism, notions of systemic "synergy," his concept of "gynocentrism," and his advocacy of civilization's progressive "telic" forces allied him in promoting many of the same intellectual trajectories advocated by sociologists Edward A. Ross and Charlotte Perkins Gilman.

Ward died on April 18, 1913. His papers, manuscripts, and professional files repose in multiple locations, including the following major depositories: Smithsonian Institution Archives; Brown University Archives; George Washington University Archives and Special Collections; and the Manuscripts Division of the Library of Congress.

SEE ALSO: American Sociological Association; Gilman, Charlotte Perkins; Pound, Roscoe; Small, Albion W.

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waste, excess, and second-hand consumption

Nicky Gregson

Waste is a quotidian facet of all societies. All societies discard things; all societies have to deal with what remains of things, from human and animal bodies to vegetable peelings; and all societies are shaped through value regimes which acknowledge waste and/or rubbish as a category, albeit that they vary considerably in their determination of what exactly might benefit this category, in how much matter is placed in this category, and what they do with it. While disciplines such as archeology and anthropology and interdisciplinary fields such as material culture have long recognized the disclosing capacities of waste, and while others (notably cultural studies) have begun to explore its metaphorical purchase, sociology largely has left waste alone (O'Brien 1999). This silence is unlikely to remain, for theoretical and empirical reasons. Together with its close theoretical referent excess, waste poses questions which go to the heart of current sociological debates about materiality and mobility, about reflexivity and subjectivities, and about commodity exchange. Waste has begun to be good to think through and not just about. But waste itself matters, increasingly. What happens to the remains of things, and what should happen to them, is now at the forefront of political debate, globally, nationally, and locally. Rubbish defines us: it places us in the world and our relation to it discloses key social divisions, inequalities, and distinctions.

Waste's absence from the sociological frame has in no small measure been bound up with the frequent identification of waste matter with acts of disposal. Seen thus, waste is located as the end point in the commodity chain; as matter whose utility to networks of producers and consumers has been lost and which is therefore open to disposal. As a consequence, waste is cast in trajectories that position it within socio technical waste management systems that are more commonly the academic

preserve of engineers and environmentalists rather than social scientists. This is critical. Waste management systems separate waste matter from sites of production and consumption. They carry matter away from households, for example through the medium of containers such as bins and skips, and they remove them from processing plants, for instance in sealed drums and road tankers. As such, waste management systems render waste as matter out of sight, beyond everyday fields of vision and beyond the sociological frame. Waste management is constituted as a practice not for public display; as known of yet not widely known about, and as a process that discloses considerable ambivalence. In leaving waste alone, sociology has been both acknowledging these ambivalences and acknowledging disciplinary boundaries.

Recent work in sociology and more broadly within the social sciences, however, has begun to turn the mirror to waste. This is discernable in both empirical work on consumption and everyday life and in theoretical writings on consumption.

WASTE, CONSUMPTION, AND EVERYDAY LIFE

Susan Strasser's (1999) study of the history of trash in the US positions waste and disposal as an effect of mass production and mass consumption. For Strasser, manufactured obsolescence, shaped through the imperatives of fashion and technological change, is a post 1950s phenomenon; one in which the ready availability of replacements combines with discourses of disposal to render throwing away the no longer wanted or needed, and not just the worn out, a routine, easy act of convenience. Strasser shows this development to be predicated upon the rise of public health discourses in the US in the late nineteenth century, to relate to changes in municipal trash collection services, and to changes in the design of house interiors, notably the reduction in available space for storage in both apartment and suburban dwelling structures. However, she also argues that these changes constitute a transformation in people's relationships to objects. For much of human history, she argues, this has been a relationship of stewardship, in which

practices of caring for things, repair, handing down, and making do run parallel with the art of bricolage. Citing quilt making, “turning” articles of clothing, and rug making as emblematic of this sense of stewardship, she goes on to argue that mass production and mass consumption have brought about a far more ephemeral relation to things. Indeed, Strasser argues that the second half of the twentieth century ushered in a period in which the mantra of convenience, cleanliness, and disposability was regarded as the positive to stewardship’s negative.

There are clear parallels between Strasser’s work in the US and that of Shove and Chappells and Shove in the UK. Liz Shove (2003) highlights the importance of comfort, cleanliness, and convenience to understandings of key practices of contemporary consumption in the UK, but it is in her work with Chappells (Chappells & Shove 1999) that she addresses the importance of waste management systems directly, arguing that the changing technologies of household waste management disclose the changing meanings of household waste. Beginning with eighteenth century asphalt privies and moving through to early twentieth century metal bins, and thence to a late twentieth century combination of “wheelie bins” (garbage bins with wheels) and recycling bins, Chappells and Shove argue that these technologies are indicative of changing boundaries between the public and private management of waste. Although the advent of wheelie bin technology is considered to have increased the amount of household waste being disposed of, sorting and separating waste matter for disposal through kerbside recycling schemes is argued to have instigated a growing sense of collective responsibility around waste matter and its management. At the same time, recycling activities highlight the importance of a rather different sense of stewardship to that discussed by Strasser, one that goes beyond caring for things to connect practices of reuse and recycling to a stewardship of the planet and to arguments regarding sustainable futures.

Contemporaneous with the above work is the plethora of recent work on second hand exchange and consumption. Addressing a number of sites of second hand exchange and consumption

(including car boot sales and charity shops), Gregson and Crewe (2003) have highlighted the poverty of commodity chain analyses which identify first cycle retail as the end point of concern, emphasizing instead how value is recursively created in acts of second hand exchange and not just produced through value regimes (Thompson 1979). At the same time, Clarke (2000) through her work on nearly new sales has shown the importance of moral economies of mothers. In both sets of work many of Strasser’s arguments about stewardship reappear: practices of handing down and handing around, of care and of bricolage are shown not to have disappeared but to have been recast. Moreover, as Gregson and Crewe suggest, the proliferation of sites of second hand exchange, both face to face and virtual, not only works to reinstate the possibility of reuse, but also establishes hierarchies in sites of second hand exchange and works to defer the declarations of rubbish value that waste depends upon. Placing lots on eBay, doing a car boot or garage sale, taking worn and/or unwanted items of clothing or books to the local charity shop are all acts which, at least in part, seek to extend the economic and social life of things by placing them in conditions that allow for their revaluation. Furthermore, such sites of exchange connect with international economies in second hand goods. So that which remains unsold in several of these arenas may be sold on to intermediaries and displaced geographically to places which provide the conditions for their potential revaluation, usually in the third world. Clothing provides one of the best examples of this process, with unwanted garments from the UK and US traveling to Zambia to be reworked as a hybrid fashion (Tranberg Hansen 2000), but there are others too, notably mobile phones, spectacles, and computers.

Research on second hand exchange and consumption has not only extended understandings of the commodity chain and the complexities of value, but also highlights how acts of disposal are not necessarily acts of waste making. Developments within the waste management industry itself also warn against the easy, yet erroneous, identification of disposal with waste. Waste economies per se constitute a huge tertiary sector, spanning everything from the

handling of the most hazardous by products of the nuclear and chemical industries, to clinical (body related) waste and household discards. Within this, waste minimization through the expansion in markets for recyclables is a particular growth area, and likely to expand considerably within the European Union in the next decade. Fleeces from plastic, pencils from drinks vending machine cups, pens from computer printers, and mouse mats from recycled car tires are just a few examples of the expanding market in recyclables alongside more ubiquitous generic products such as recycled paper. Indeed, selling provenance is now not just a geographical matter but a material one too, as manufacturers proclaim a previous material configuration to their products either alongside or in place of a supply chain that appeals to both transparency and fair trade. "I used to be a car tyre" and "We used to be plastic cups" are just two of the logos that feature in the advertising of a UK based design company specializing in recyclables. Note that this is not just working with previous histories as consumer objects: these things also have an identity, they are "I's" and "We's." As such, these examples point to the way in which an ethics of care can be mobilized within discourses of recycling. Going beyond stewardship of the planet notions of sustainability, this is a custodial relation that mobilizes anthropomorphism, and one that simultaneously points to a flatter ontology of humans and things akin to that encountered within actant network theory (ANT).

Most recent empirical work in this field positions discussions of waste within debates about value and the commodity form, while paying attention also to the arguments of Appadurai (1986) and Kopytoff (1986) regarding the social life of things. Theoretical work on waste, however, regards waste as a category, integral to the ordering of both self and society and to the ordering of society through consumption.

WASTE, ORDER, AND EXCESS

It was Mary Douglas's key text *Purity and Danger* (1966) which first drew attention to the social significance of societies' ridding of certain sorts of waste matter. She highlighted the

centrality of expulsion and disposal to social classification, specifically to both the constitution of boundaries and the making of social order. Of particular significance here is the placing out, either on or beyond the margins, of matter deemed to be troublesome, particularly the symbolically polluting or contaminating by products of human bodies. Similarly, Gail Hawkins (2001) regards the passage of waste matter, and specifically its spatial separation from the body, as central to the ordering of self, maintaining the boundary between what is deemed to be self and what is not. In so doing, this process is regarded as providing the conditions for the renewal of the self through acts of loss. In this and in later work, Hawkins connects this more phenomenological sense of being with waste to theories of subjectivity and to garbage, in what is an explicit attempt to constitute an ethics of waste. Taking as one of her starting points the various "Don't litter" invocations evidenced in many environmental campaigns in the US, Europe, Australia, and New Zealand during the 1990s, Hawkins argues that such imploring works with a Foucauldian sense of an (un)disciplined self. Campaigns such as these are argued to highlight a self who is unable to regulate its actions in the interests of social and environmental order. Moving on, Hawkins outlines how the complexities of dealing with and putting out the garbage are an endless cycle of ritual and repetition dominated by time consuming acts of classification and sorting in which self surveillance and self scrutiny are at a premium. The self here is reflexively made in and through relations with waste. But this is also a self made in and through relations to others, as forged through technologies of waste management. This is a maneuver which takes Hawkins initially in the direction of Foucault's later writings on subjectivity and technologies of the self, through the governmentality literature, and thence to Deleuze and Connolly. Keen to move away from an ethics of waste which highlights normative moralities such as the Reduce-Reuse-Recycle mantra, and which promote recycling as virtue added disposal, Hawkins attempts to explore Connolly's politics of disturbance to create different, more uncertain and provisional ways of living and being with waste (Hawkins 2003). In a move which both echoes and reverses the

discourses identified in Dominic Laporte's groundbreaking *History of Shit* (2002), this takes Hawkins to what many would surely regard as an alternative, utopian world of living with shit and without drains; to a world which turns upside down modernist notions of civilization, in which shit remains within the domestic sphere, rather than being transported away, unsmelt and hidden via extensive networks of underground drains and sewers.

Although far from prominent in theoretical writing on the sociology of consumption, in which desire and distinction have figured centrally, waste has had a presence, even in the earliest writings. Frow (2003) for example, highlights how in one of the formative early texts on consumption, Thorstein Veblen pinpointed the capacity to be wasteful as critical to the sumptuary systems of nineteenth century capitalism, alongside the more commonly emphasized ownership of desired consumer objects. Frow emphasizes that Veblen saw the conspicuous wasting of time, and not just the wasting of desired things, as central to aristocratic notions of leisure, and therefore to the development of a theory of the leisure class. Waste's metaphoric power has been harnessed more recently, notably in relation to debates about organizations within the late twentieth and early twenty first centuries. Richard Sennett, for example, in *The Corrosion of Character* (1998), has emphasized how waste and specifically waste reduction and minimization are held up as metaphorical markers of creativity within the contemporary workplace. Although written nearly a century apart, both Veblen and Sennett's readings begin to touch on waste's relation to excess. For Veblen, this is construed in relation to an absolute need for humans to consume, which profligate acts of consumption exceed. Sennett, however, points to how excess in the workplace is identified with excess labor capacity and operational inefficiencies, and how the elimination of excess is regarded as imperative to the emergence of leaner, more flexible, and more competitive organizations. It is, however, in the work of the French philosopher Georges Bataille that the connections between waste, excess, and consumption are most fully explored.

In *The Accursed Share* (2002), Georges Bataille begins to develop a work of general economy which centers on the importance of

consumption rather than production and which locates the expenditure of wealth, or the surplus, as at the heart of consumption in all societies. Although these arguments are connected to some rather opaque comments about energy and resources, it is the surplus which is "the accursed share" of Bataille's title, and it is this which he argues must be expended, given away, lost, or destroyed by all societies. According to Bataille, then, the surplus – the excess – must of necessity be wasted. This theoretical position is one which is grounded in sacrifice and the gift economy of the potlatch, and not in the utility of commodity exchange. Although several commentators have highlighted the almost wilful disregard of historical evidence in Bataille's writings on both sacrifice and potlatch, the theoretical significance of both to an understanding of waste as excess is considerable. Both practices are concerned with managing the surplus and both appropriate objects (often including sentient beings) from the utility of productive consumption to arenas of conspicuous wasting. However, as others have remarked, as important to both sacrifice and potlatch is the cultural work performed by both practices and the social transformations wrought through these rituals. Sacrifice, then, is not just about wasting. Neither is it simply a devotional ritual to a divine being, but it is about a reaffirmation of a transcendent force.

A further recent theoretical development considers the connections between waste, disposal, and consumption, but without reference to excess. Kevin Hetherington (2004) disrupts the associations drawn frequently between waste and disposal. He argues that waste's lack of dynamism makes it a problematic category, and that disposal is best regarded not as an end point in consumption, but as constitutive of consumption as a social and ethical act. Hetherington begins his paper by critiquing Douglas's work, maintaining that in establishing the placement out of troublesome matter as a binary (there: not here), she misses how social order is always uncertain, provisional, and constantly open to being remade. In contrast, and drawing on the work of both Munro and Hertz, Hetherington argues that disposal is a constant act of placing absences through conduits of disposal. Attics, wardrobes, drawers, and even fridges are all argued to provide gaps between presence and absence, and to allow for questions

of value to be considered. Making a case for the importance of absence within sociological thinking, and hinging this to non linear ways of thinking about time and space characteristic of non representational work, Hetherington argues that the presence of the trace works to ensure that disposal is never a finished business. Instead, our lives are haunted by ghostly presences and absent presences. Disposal is the means through which we manage our social relations, through absence.

FUTURE DIRECTIONS

Recent theoretical and empirical work on waste has been proceeding in parallel universes, and there are some notable points of difference between authors. At the same time as there are clear differences between theorists, so too are there differences between theorists and those whose concerns are more empirical. Few of those conducting empirical research on waste, for example, would concur with Hetherington's argument that waste is an end point, or with his assertion that waste is unhelpful to think through given its lack of dynamism, a position supported by Bataille's emphasis on the exuberant qualities of waste as excess. Furthermore, waste matter is the stuff of value creation and its handling, even the location and manner of its handling, is a "frontline" governance activity. Increasingly, empirical research in this field is moving to address practices of divestment, ridding, and loss as these relate to things, and the transformations of waste. Its theoretical points of reference center on ideas of transience, durability, and materiality, and emphasize the traces in things and the depths to things. In such work it is the matter of matter which starts to matter. To paraphrase Laporte, shit is ... shit, and its qualities as such really do matter. Future sociological work on waste is likely to confront the materiality of waste, and not just content itself with thinking through it.

SEE ALSO: Bataille Georges; Commodities, Commodity Fetishism, and Commodification; Conspicuous Consumption; Consumption, Green/Sustainable; Consumption, Mass Consumption, and Consumer Culture; Veblen Thorstein

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weak ties (strength of)

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Weak ties are relationships between individuals marked by relatively low intensity and emotional closeness. By contrast, strong ties are relationships that involve high levels of intensity and emotional closeness. The importance of weak ties to a variety of sociological phenomena has been most influentially articulated by Mark Granovetter (1973) in one of the best cited articles in sociology, “The Strength of Weak Ties” (SWT).

Granovetter argues that most people intuitively expect strong ties to generally be more important than weak ties, because those to whom we are closely tied are more motivated to help us, and are also more likely to be stronger sources of social influence and social support. However, basing his argument on principles of social psychology, Granovetter argues that weak ties are – paradoxically – more important for a variety of phenomena, from helping people obtain a job, to the diffusion of ideas and innovations, to facilitating collective action. Granovetter also argues that insights provided by the “strength of weak ties” principle have implications for understanding the linkages between the micro and macro levels of social reality. His insights about the importance of weak ties have, in part, motivated a variety of methodological endeavors such as operationalizing tie strength, developing techniques to accurately estimate

network size, assessing the accuracy of respondents’ recall of ties, and the development of network sampling methods.

Granovetter utilizes network graphs to illustrate his theoretical insights. In one graph there are two egos of interest, A and B. Their set of friends is represented as $S = C, D, E, F, G, H$. All of the individuals in the set S have ties to either A or B. Granovetter argues that the stronger the tie between A and B, the larger the proportion of individuals in S to whom they will both be tied (connected by either a strong or weak tie). Granovetter predicts that the overlap will be least when the tie between A and B is absent, it will be greatest when the tie between A and B is strong, and it will be intermediate when the tie between A and B is weak.

Next, Granovetter introduces the notion of the forbidden triad. This is a set of three individuals in which A and B are strongly linked, A has a strong tie to a friend C, but the tie between C and B is absent. Granovetter argues that due to pressures on the actors to maintain balanced relationships with their alters (as articulated by Heider’s balance theory), this type of triad is very unlikely to occur. In elaborating the application of this idea to larger social networks, Granovetter introduces the concept of a bridge. A bridge is a line in a network which provides the only path between two points (see Fig. 1). He also distinguishes between more narrowly defined “bridges” (as described previously) and “local bridges,” the latter being a line in a graph that provides the only local path between two points. Granovetter notes that




Figure 1 Simplified diagram of Granovetter’s concept of a bridging tie. Points depict nodes, or individuals, and lines depict relations. The solid lines represent strong ties and the dashed line represents a weak bridging tie.

bridges are theoretically important to diffusion processes.

Granovetter argues that if, as theory suggests, the “forbidden triad” is absent, then it is unlikely that a strong tie will ever serve as a bridge. A strong tie can be a bridge only if neither ego has any other strong ties. This is unlikely in a social network. However, this constraint does not apply to weak ties. Weak ties are not automatically bridges, but according to Granovetter *all bridges are weak ties*. Granovetter asserts that in large networks it is unlikely that a specific tie provides the only path between two points, but local bridges may be functionally important. The significance of weak ties is that those which are local bridges create more and shorter paths. Consequently, whatever is to be disseminated can reach a larger number of people and cross greater social distance when it is diffused through weak ties rather than through strong ones.

Based on the notion of the “forbidden triad,” Granovetter reasons that strong ties should tend to be people who not only know one another, but also have few contacts not tied to ego as well. An ego’s weak ties in general, by contrast, will not be tied to one another but will tend to be tied to individuals not tied to ego. Granovetter posits that indirect contacts are typically reached through ties in this weak tie sector; and such ties are of importance not only in ego’s manipulation of networks, but also in that they are the conduits through which ideas, influences, or information socially distant from alters may reach ego. The fewer indirect contacts ego has, the more restricted she will be in terms of knowledge of the world beyond her own friendship circle. In a later article, Granovetter (1983: 208) clarified his argument by asserting that “only *bridging* weak ties are of special value to individuals; the significance of weak ties is that they are far more likely to be bridges than are strong ties.”

In his SWT article, and a related book, Granovetter goes on to describe the results of a study he undertook examining the role contacts play in helping an individual to get a job amongst recent professional, technical, and managerial job changers in a suburb of Boston. In his study, the majority of jobs were obtained through weak ties.

Granovetter’s SWT insights have spawned substantial work on the relationship between the tie strength between egos and contacts and job search outcomes, though there has been some variation in findings regarding the role and importance of weak ties. Some reasons for these varied results are: that measures of tie strength have varied; there may be differential effects for different types of outcomes (any job offer versus level of position of job offered versus salary offered); and there may be differential effects for different types of occupations/sectors of the economy. Other relevant factors may include whether or not the job is a “first job,” and there may be different patterns in nation states with different socioeconomic and political conditions (see Lin et al. 1981; Montgomery 1992).

Granovetter’s SWT insights also have implications for collective action at both the whole network and egocentric network levels. Granovetter has argued that at the level of whole networks, weak ties are important because they are more likely (than strong ties) to serve as bridges between otherwise isolated cliques in a community.

It is also worth considering the weak/strong tie distinction and its implications for collective action from the ego network perspective. Granovetter argues that at the level of egocentric networks, weak ties are important because they are more likely (than strong ties) to provide novel information (e.g., about social movement activities). McAdam (1986) distinguishes between high risk cost (hrc) activism (e.g., activities that entail potential physical risks to the individual, or that are costly in terms of time and money) and low risk cost (lrc) activism. He then relates the risks and costs involved in activism to tie strength and ideological commitment, and cites empirical evidence which suggests that prior ties to a recruiting agent are the most powerful predictor of recruitment to low risk activism. McAdam points out, however, that ideological commitment to low risk activism does not have to be high in order for individuals to participate. For instance, if an ego is asked to participate in a low risk cost demonstration for a seemingly worthwhile cause, low amounts of social pressure from weak ties (e.g., from acquaintances at work or school) might be

enough to tip the cost/benefit ratio in the direction of participating. In contrast to Irc activism, McAdam suggests that under conditions of hrc activism, strong ties are more important (than weak ties). One reason for this is that strong ties are much more likely to provide social support, and under conditions of hrc this may be crucial for participation (Tindall 2002).

Various definitions of tie strength between individuals have been developed, many of which overlap; these include: (1) felt closeness (e.g., emotional closeness); (2) frequency of contact (how frequently ego communicates with alter); (3) duration (the length of time the relationship has persisted); (4) role definition (e.g., using ties to “acquaintances” to indicate weak ties and ties to “close friends” and/or “immediate family members” to indicate strong ties); (5) reciprocation (reciprocal identification as a strong tie, or reciprocation of a particular type of exchange); (6) volume and type of exchanges; (7) multiplexity (being related through multiple ties of different content); (8) social homogeneity (social similarity); (9) ordinal rank of intimate ties; and (10) network overlap (ego and alter share members of their personal networks).

According to Granovetter (1973: 1361), the strength of an interpersonal tie is a combination of the amount of time, emotional intensity, intimacy, and reciprocal services that characterize the tie. Marsden and Campbell (1984) have provided a thorough conceptual and empirical review of the notion of tie strength. They argue that a distinction should be made between *indicators* and *predictors* of tie strength. Indicators are components of tie strength (e.g., closeness as a measure of the intensity of a relationship). Predictors, by contrast, are aspects of relationships that are associated with tie strength but are not components of it (e.g., role relationships such as neighbor or co worker statuses that arise out of interactions based on particular foci). Based on an analysis of empirical data, Marsden and Campbell (1984) concluded that closeness (the measure of the emotional intensity of a tie) is the best indicator of tie strength (among those available to them in their study).

These definitions primarily apply to ties between individuals. Additional definitions have been developed regarding ties amongst

groups. For instance, when an officer of company A sits on the boards of companies B and C, there is a strong link between A and B, and a strong link between A and C, but also a weak tie between B and C. In the former two cases the interlock is direct and thus strong, and in the latter it is incidental and thus weak (Granovetter 1983). Powell (1990) has looked at ties relative to interorganizational structure and views tie strength as a function of several factors in addition to those already mentioned, including trust, complementarity, accommodation, indebtedness, collaboration, and history. However, while the concept of tie strength has been incorporated into analyses examining relationships amongst larger social units (e.g., companies), it is unclear whether the logic of Granovetter’s SWT argument applies to such relationships, as his arguments are rooted in balance theory and relationships amongst individuals.

Somewhat surprisingly given the importance of tie strength in the sociological literature, there has been relatively little methodological work done on refining the conceptualization and measurement of tie strength. Further, most of the effort on conceptualizing tie strength has focused on ties between individuals. Less attention has been given to conceptualizing the strength of ties linking larger social units (e.g., organizations, corporations, nation states).

The SWT argument is implicitly connected to a number of substantive and theoretical problems in sociology; some of these include “small world studies,” network sampling, estimating personal network size, techniques for assessing and improving the accuracy of responses, and understanding the creation of weak ties.

Small world studies have examined social cohesion, the extent to which individuals are integrated into society, and the social distance that exists between pairs of individuals and/or different social groups. Understanding the prevalence of weak ties and the roles that bridging weak ties play in society is crucial to understanding cohesion/social distance.

In order to describe the structure of weak and strong ties in large bounded populations, one needs to be able to sample such populations because, amongst other reasons, it is impractical to collect network information on large

populations. Granovetter has also contributed to research in this area, as have others.

Being able to describe the potential effects of weak ties on outcomes for individuals is predicated on having a good estimate for how many weak ties an individual has in the first place. A variety of techniques have been developed for eliciting responses about ties, including *name rosters*, *name generators*, and *position generators*. Researchers have also worked at trying to assess the accuracy of respondents' reports of the number of ties they have and have developed techniques for the accuracy of recall and for improving recall of forgotten alters.

Finally, understanding the differential creation of weak ties is crucial for understanding their effects. Research has shown that social structures produce foci where individuals with similar social characteristics tend to meet and form ties. Researchers have examined tie strength in the context of patterned tie formation in communities and in voluntary organizations.

SEE ALSO: Cognitive Balance Theory (Heider); Networks; Social Capital; Social Movements, Networks and; Social Network Analysis; Social Network Theory

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wealth

Claudia W. Scholz and Juanita M. Firestone

Wealth is defined as assets held by an individual or household. These assets may include financial wealth such as savings accounts, stocks, or bonds as well as property such as the family home, farm, or business. Some estimates of household wealth also include consumer durables such as vehicles and refrigerators.

Wealth is an important dimension of stratification because property can be passed down from generation to generation. Families use accumulated assets or savings to bridge interruptions in income, preventing downward social mobility. In spite of its importance, sociologists tend to leave wealth out of their measures of socioeconomic status, because of the difficulties in obtaining valid and reliable data on household assets. Using the data that are available, sociologists and economists have determined that in American society, the distribution of wealth is far more unequal than the distribution of income. The US exhibits the highest levels of wealth inequality in the developed world.

For economists, wealth represents forgone consumption – income that is saved rather than being spent on daily necessities or consumer desires. It is important to note that not all individuals are equally able to save. The accumulation of assets is extremely difficult for the working poor because nearly all of their income goes to fulfill daily needs and because their needs are not subsidized by their employer through medical or childcare benefits.

Recent economic indicators suggest that more and more American families are having trouble saving a portion of their incomes. Net household liabilities have exceeded net asset accumulation in the United States since 1999, which means

that Americans are not only failing to accumulate wealth, they are also accumulating personal debt at unprecedented rates. Households that have seen an increase in net worth over the past few years have benefited from rising home values and stock prices rather than increasing personal savings rates. Some research indicates that US households in the bottom quintile have no wealth at all, and a large portion of these have negative wealth (i.e., debt).

Throughout the history of the United States, government initiatives have sought to encourage the acquisition of wealth by American households. These programs have enabled many families to secure homeownership and save for retirement. Unfortunately, many of these government subsidies have benefited native born white families far more than other groups, resulting in a large wealth gap patterned by race and ethnicity. For example, on average, African American households possess only 8 cents in wealth for every dollar possessed by white families. This disparity persists, even though the income gap between African American and white households has shrunk. African American households are also more likely to possess wealth in the form of residential property than in a more liquid form such as stocks or bonds. Recently, providers of social services have begun to address these disparities in wealth by implementing asset based poverty reduction programs that help low income families secure homes and save for education and retirement.

SEE ALSO: Income Inequality and Income Mobility; Inequality, Wealth; Stratification and Inequality, Theories of; Stratification, Race/Ethnicity and

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Weber, Max (1864–1920)

John Drysdale

German sociologist Max Weber, the first child of Max Weber, Sr., and Helene Fallenstein Weber, was born in Erfurt, Thuringia, April 21, 1864. When Max was 5 years old the family moved to Berlin, where Max, Sr., an attorney, became active in both municipal and national politics, and following German unification served as a member of the *Reichstag*, 1872–84. During these heady years the Weber household was often visited by leading politicians and professors. While the conversations of frequent guests provided much stimulation for the young Weber, there is no doubt that the most important and formative influence on him was provided by his mother, a devout Protestant, spiritually sensitive, ethically concerned and active, and intellectually curious.

Weber studied history, economics, philosophy, and law at the universities of Heidelberg, Göttingen, and Berlin. Along the way he completed his military training for an officer's commission. By 1889 he was awarded a doctorate *magna cum laude* with a dissertation on medieval commercial partnerships, and completed his legal training, entitling him to serve briefly as a junior barrister (*Referendar*) in Berlin. In his choice of Heidelberg for undergraduate study as well as in his study of law, the young Weber was following in the footsteps of his father. However, he eventually decided to pursue an academic career. In 1893 he married a distant cousin, Marianne Schnitger, who was to become perhaps his most important intellectual companion. The following year he accepted an appointment as professor of economics at Freiburg. Weber began to attract wide attention with his inaugural public lecture, "The National State and Economic Policy," given in May 1895. This address was a testament to Weber's economic nationalism and, when it was published, sparked a controversy over Weber's claim that economic policy was the servant of the national state. In 1896 he was lured to Heidelberg to take the professorial chair in political economy previously held by Karl Knies, one of his former teachers.

Just as he appeared to be settling into a promising academic career, Weber suffered a psychological breakdown in 1897, unable to resume scholarly work until 1902. His attempts to return to classroom lectures were unsuccessful, however, leading him to forsake his professorial salary and appointment. His breakdown is thought to have been occasioned by a serious altercation with his father during a parental visit in Heidelberg in the summer of 1897. His father died several weeks later without their becoming reconciled.

Having resumed scholarly writing in 1903, Max ventured to extend his activities and responsibilities to editing a journal and to professional travel. In 1904 Max and Marianne traveled as part of a delegation of German academics to represent their country at the World Exposition in St. Louis, Missouri, where he lectured on rural society and economy in Germany. The couple spent several weeks traveling around several regions of the US, visiting relatives, sightseeing, and pursuing contacts with various academics and social leaders (e.g., Booker T. Washington and W. E. B. Du Bois).

In the same year, Weber assumed the lead editorial responsibilities for the major social science journal of the time, *Archiv für Sozialwissenschaft und Sozialpolitik* (Archives for Social Science and Social Policy). He also completed work begun the previous year on a pair of extended essays under the title “The Protestant Ethic and the ‘Spirit’ of Capitalism.” From this point on to the end of his life he maintained an intense pace of scholarly work. Over the next few years he wrote several essays on methodological problems, replied to critics of his work on Protestantism, wrote further on religious sects in North America, conducted research and wrote about the psychophysics of industrial work and about agrarian conditions in ancient society. Beyond these topics he found time to contribute to public exchanges on various topics, including conditions of academic freedom in German universities and the status of women in employment. With the incipient revolution against the tsar in Russia, Weber learned Russian well enough to keep up with events in Russian newspapers and journals. He also published his political sociological analyses of current conditions in Russia in the wake of the 1905 revolution.

In 1910 he joined with his brother, Alfred, and a few other colleagues, including Robert Michels, Georg Simmel, Ferdinand Tönnies, and Ernst Troeltsch, to establish the German Sociological Society. Having begun his career in the study and practice of law and the academic appointments at both Freiburg and Heidelberg as a political economist, he began to identify himself also as a sociologist in the last decade of his life. The common thread in all three of these identities was his interest in the historical dimensions of social and cultural phenomena, including legal, political, economic, and religious spheres.

With the outbreak of war, Weber served for a brief time as an administrator for a military hospital in Heidelberg. Even during the war he continued to work on multiple research and writing projects. One of these, published after his death, became known as *Economy and Society*, part of a large scale handbook series in the social sciences. A second project became his largest body of work, his comparative studies of what he called “world religions,” again published posthumously under the rubric of the “economic ethic of world religions,” better known in the English speaking world as his sociology of religion.

Toward the end of his life, Weber again tried to resume university teaching. He taught a summer course in Vienna in 1918 before accepting an appointment to the chair of political economy at Munich for the academic year 1919–20. Here he lectured on economic history and sociology, among other subjects. He completed revisions to “The Protestant Ethic and the ‘Spirit’ of Capitalism,” but was still working on other revisions for the first volume of his multi volume series on the economic ethic of the world religions when he became ill with influenza in early June 1920. He succumbed to pneumonia at his home in Munich on June 14.

EARLY WORK AND VISION OF THE SOCIAL SCIENCES

Weber’s earliest projects were historical and empirical. On the historical side were his doctoral and habilitation dissertations, the first on the history of commercial partnerships in medieval Europe (1889), the second on agrarian

Roman economic history (1891). Each won accolades from his professors and attention from scholars. Weber's foray into empirical and quantitative research began as early as 1892 with his participation in a large scale survey of East Prussian agricultural conditions sponsored by the *Verein für Sozialpolitik* (Association for Social Policy) with a focus on conditions of rural labor. Weber joined the study in midstream but contributed significantly to the interpretation of the empirical findings. This work was related to the emerging fields of agricultural economics and rural sociology. Among other things Weber concentrated on the policy implications of the transition from patriarchal agrarian social and economic structures and traditional attitudes to more modern and rational entrepreneurial forms and practices associated with emergent capitalism. Also, the study of agricultural labor represented for Weber a shift away from legal toward economic perspectives.

Between 1903 and 1908 Weber published several so called "methodological" essays in which he addressed a wide range of questions concerning the goals, subject matter, and methods of the social sciences. The most famous of these essays was "'Objectivity' in Social Science and Social Policy," published in 1904 as Weber was assuming the co editorship of the influential journal *Archiv für Sozialwissenschaft und Sozialpolitik*. He sketched his vision of the social sciences as grounded in cognitive interests that are in part historical and in part theoretical, and as seeking relevance to questions of value and contemporary social policy.

Weber's extended discussion of concept formation focused on his notion of "ideal type" concepts. Ideal types are conceptual instruments that seek to represent the most relevant aspects of a given object (e.g., "city," "patriarchy," "capitalism") for purposes of social scientific inquiry. They are formed as deliberate constructs through a process of selection, abstraction, and idealization. Ideal type concepts aim to be useful rather than descriptive, for they are not intended to represent actual phenomena. Weber maintained that they were in fact indispensable for purposes of inquiry and clear exposition. Moreover, ideal types are well suited to a vision of social science concerned with representing the cultural significance and value oriented aspects of social phenomena

within the context of historically oriented causal inquiries. When it is forgotten that social scientific concepts of phenomena and processes are mere constructs, the result is the fallacy of *reification* with respect to objects (e.g., the view that "rationality" is real) or to processes (e.g., the view that "rationalization" is a real force). On similar grounds Weber was distrustful of both organicism (e.g., the view that collectivities as such are real) and evolutionism (e.g., the view that processes of change are lawlike, real forces moving in any single direction) as found in the nineteenth century sociological positivism of Comte and Spencer. Weber's position with respect to these issues has been variously characterized as methodological individualism, atomism, and nominalism.

WEBER'S RESEARCH PROGRAM: TWO MACROSOCIOLOGICAL STUDIES

Weber came to identify his work with the field of sociology relatively late in his career and only through a circuitous route that began with his training in law and proceeded through his early academic work in economic history and political economy. Initially skeptical of Comte and Spencer's sociology, in the last decade of his life Weber participated in the German Sociological Society and began to identify his work with sociology. His sociology was largely historical and comparative, a valuable complement to the historical study of economics, politics, and religion. His greatest substantive contributions to sociology were associated with two great macrosociological projects that occupied most of the last decade of his life.

Economy and Society in World Historical Perspective

Weber's first major project became known as "Economy and Society." This title actually was assigned to Weber's incomplete contribution to a multi volume series that was to include works from many social scientists under Weber's general editorship. The large scale project *Outline of Social Economics* was planned around 1910 and occupied a great deal of Weber's time and labor for the rest of his life. At the time of his death, his own contribution consisted of two

unfinished sets of manuscripts. The longer one, published as Part Two of *Economy and Society*, was written mostly between 1910 and 1914. A more compressed manuscript, published as Part One, was written in his last years. Following his death in 1920, his editors, chiefly Marianne Weber, had to decipher Weber's intentions regarding the inclusion and arrangement of these fragmentary manuscripts.

The book *Economy and Society*, although lacking in rigorous internal order and coherence, nevertheless represents an enormous achievement of encyclopedic scholarship with a global reach. Guenther Roth has called it a kind of "sociologist's world history." Its conceptual and theoretical foundations were first outlined in published form in Weber's 1913 essay "Some Categories of Interpretive Sociology." There he sketched a vision of an "interpretive" sociology that included both the interpretive understanding and the causal explanation of intelligible human conduct. "Social action" was treated as the core of human social life. This type of conduct has two chief characteristics. First, it is undertaken by an individual actor on the basis of a subjectively intended meaning. Second, it is oriented toward the behavior of other people. Such conduct is amenable to intelligible explanation despite varying degrees of rationality and familiarity in terms of an observer's experience. As Weber put it: one "need not be Caesar to understand Caesar." Any social action has both subjective meaning and objective conditions, both of which are important in sociological explanation. Weber's dualistic conception of social action can be understood as a synthesis of two scholarly traditions or paradigms: hermeneutics, which emphasized the understanding of meaning, and positivism, which focused on the causal explanation of empirically observable conditions.

Part of the opening chapter, "Basic Sociological Terms," in Part One of *Economy and Society*, includes Weber's extended treatment of social action as the basic conceptual building block for the interpretation of human conduct. There he develops a typology of social action in the form of a series of "ideal types." The types of action are delineated, first, in terms of a distinction between rational and non rational action, where "rational" refers to more or less conscious consideration of one's action as a way

of achieving a given end. Rational social action can be of two types: *instrumentally rational*, in which there is calculation of the choice of means to achieve a chosen purpose, and *value rational*, in which the calculation is limited to the possible means to be undertaken to pursue a value treated as an end in itself. Non rational action also displays two main types: *emotional affectual*, in which action is determined by immediate emotions toward someone or something without pausing to calculate choices in terms of relations of means to ends or likely consequences, and *traditional* action, in which action is guided by ingrained habituation, and may involve little consciousness, much less calculation. Weber intended the typology to provide value free concepts by which observers could interpret actions of people in virtually any kind of social context. In real life most, if not all, social action represents some mixture of these types. Traditional, or habitual, action is very common in all societies, as is emotional affectual action. Though perhaps less common, the rational types of action exhibit more individual mastery or self control over one's conduct, and imply also the possibility of taking responsibility for the values and consequences associated with individual conduct.

Consistent with the aims of a comprehensive reference work, much of Part One of *Economy and Society* presents a broad array of relatively abstract typologies, ranging from types of social action and social relationships to organizations, institutional structures, and social stratification. Also in line with the multidisciplinary reach of the work are typologies of economic and political action and structures. In general, Weber's procedure is, first, to stipulate a definition of a given concept as an "ideal" or "pure type," and then to provide illustrations and commentary based on historical and comparative research. The best known and most widely used of the dozens of typologies in Part One is Weber's threefold typology of political authority or legitimate domination (*Herrschaft*). *Rational legal authority* rests on a belief in the legality of a framework of enacted rules by which rulers are selected and by which they govern. Constitutional republican forms of government and parliamentary democracies exemplify rational legal authority. *Traditional authority* rests on a belief in the time honored sanctity of traditions.

Traditional leaders are chosen in accordance with inherited, unwritten rules and are obeyed on account of their traditional status. They often rule by personal loyalty based on either kinship or common upbringing. Among the types of traditional rulership Weber mentions gerontocracy, patriarchalism, and patrimonialism. Finally, *charismatic authority* rests on a belief in the special, even divine or superhuman, qualities (sanctity, heroism, exemplary character) of a person to rule, apart from inherited traditions or laws. Obedience is owed to the person and commands of the individual leader on the basis of personal *charisma* (literally, “gift of grace”), which may include magical powers or a record of heroic achievements in the hunt or in war. Charismatic rule may be involved to a greater or lesser degree in religious, military, and political contexts. Weber seems to have adopted the concept of charisma, modeled on the case of Jesus Christ, and extended it to apply to non religious contexts, for example, Alexander the Great and Napoleon.

In the second part of *Economy and Society* Weber elaborates his well known and highly influential concept of *bureaucracy*. Although bureaucracies existed in one form or another in ancient and non western contexts, such as Confucian China and Hindu India, Weber was interested primarily in the role of bureaucracy in modern western societies. In its purest form bureaucracy exhibits the following characteristics: a hierarchical organization of offices (official functions) is governed by laws or administrative regulations; each office has a specific and limited jurisdiction within which it has the authority to carry out its specialized activities; appointment to official positions requires technical qualifications and training; staff members are typically employees who regard their jobs as careers, but they do not own the resources or “means of production” associated with their offices; and official rules, decisions, and actions are recorded in writing and maintained on file as part of the organization.

In Weber’s view the development of bureaucratic forms of organization in the modern West was part of a marked trend toward *bureaucratization* across a broad range of institutions. Bureaucracy came to epitomize the modern national state in its legal system, and in its military and civilian administrative (e.g., civil service)

structures and procedures. The state was not alone, however, as a site of bureaucratic organization and control. Bureaucracy, which had arisen early on in the context of church organization, was adopted as the most efficient means of organizing work and decision making in economic units such as corporations and banks, educational institutions such as academies and universities, and other public services such as hospitals, transportation, and communications.

While bureaucracy was not a modern invention, nor exclusive to the western world, it became greatly elaborated within modern western institutions, especially in the government of modern national states. Weber regarded bureaucracy as particularly consonant with the rational legal type of political domination, also increasingly typical of western modernity. All the designated properties of bureaucracy, especially its governance of action by impersonal standards and systematic procedures, its organization of work activities in the name of efficiency, and its codification of rules and records, were harmonious with rational legal domination as opposed to governance based on personal loyalties to either traditional or charismatic rule.

Bureaucratization – the development and spread of bureaucracy – in turn, is conceived by Weber as part of a historical process of *rationalization*, which is the extension of various types of rationality. Bureaucracy represents *formal*, as opposed to *substantive, rationality*, given the character of bureaucracy as merely an instrument or tool which can serve virtually any set of (substantive) ends or purposes. That is, the rationality of bureaucracy is limited to its form rather than the aims or purposes of any particular organization. Weber envisioned the extension of rationalization in part through the growth of bureaucracy in ever widening sectors of society.

Bureaucracy cannot be judged to be completely good or bad in its consequences either for individuals or for the society as a whole. On the one hand, bureaucracy represents the most efficient form of organization for the achievement of a broad range of human purposes and values. For instance, the development of capitalism, which Weber termed “that most fateful power in our modern life,” has been greatly facilitated by bureaucracy with respect to the internal organization of economic enterprises and in

the environment in which these enterprises function (e.g., financial and governmental organizations) by providing for calculability. Indeed, in all the arenas of modern life, bureaucratic apparatuses enable the most efficient possible means for the achievement of complex tasks. On the other hand, bureaucracy has its costs and even irrational consequences. For one, the actions of bureaucratic staff are highly constrained by the framework of impersonal, abstract rules, and the personalities and attitudes of the staff tend to become habituated to the impersonal, emotionally indifferent patterns of behavior in the bureaucracy. The individual bureaucrat is reduced to the status of a small cog in a large and complex machine, prescriptively devoid of any exhibition of love, hate, or any other emotion or value commitment. At the societal level, the existence and intensity of value diversity and conflict are exacerbated by the very efficiency of organizations devoted to fundamentally different and perhaps incompatible goals such as capital versus labor, and public versus private interests.

Bureaucracy is only one of 16 chapters in more than a thousand pages of Part Two of *Economy and Society*. Three other chapters have been published separately as books and have achieved classic status in their own right: *The Sociology of Religion*, *The Sociology of Law*, and *The City*. Of these topics, religion most concerned Weber during his last years, although he never treated it in isolation from other institutions and spheres of life. It is also the topic that most obviously connects *Economy and Society* with his other major substantive project, discussed next.

The Comparative Studies of Civilizations: The “Economic Ethic of World Religions”

Weber’s second major project was conceived under the rubric of “the economic ethic of the world religions.” Massive in scope, this study focused on each of several “world religions,” including Confucianism, Taoism, Buddhism, Hinduism, ancient Judaism, Islam, and Christianity. (The treatment of the latter two religions was left incomplete upon his death.) The focus on religion as indicated in the titles of the component parts (e.g., *The Religion of China*,

The Religion of India) was misleadingly narrow. In actuality these were comparative civilizational studies, showing how religion is implicated in all the major spheres of society and culture in each case.

The design as well as the execution of Weber’s research program, culminating in this comparative historical project on major civilizations *cum* world religions, developed in stages over the last two decades of his life. The starting point can be traced to his renowned study of the relation of the Protestant ethic to the “spirit” of modern capitalism, dating from 1904–5.

The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism

In this earliest stage of his research Weber was interested in ascertaining the contribution made by a set of religious beliefs and practices to the development of the specific form of modern (“rational”) capitalism as found in Western Europe and the US. What marked this modern form of capitalism as new was especially the emphasis on the systematic organization of work done by laborers hired on a formally free market, and enterprises devoted to the pursuit of increasing profit without the constraints of traditionalism. Here as elsewhere in his work Weber recognized that there had been other prior forms of capitalism in Europe as well as non western capitalistic forms and practices. Likewise, he acknowledged that the rise of capitalism as a specific economic system in modern Europe had many causes, both material and cultural. His central problem here was, first and primarily, to explain the rise, not of capitalism as a system, but of the peculiar “spirit” (ethos, mentality) of this new economic system, and second, to show how this new ethos made specific contributions to the intensive growth of modern capitalism in its most crucial stages, especially in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. Hence, the problems he addressed were complex, yet circumscribed, as were his hypotheses, lines of argument, interpretations of evidence, and conclusions. This is not to say that his arguments were free of ambiguities, nor that the evidence he marshaled was completely convincing.

What was the new “spirit” of capitalism that Weber took as the object of his inquiry? He

described it as an ethic, albeit a secular one, lacking immediate religious foundation or reference, yet prescribing as a moral duty the pursuit of earning more and more money as an end in itself. Whether as an entrepreneur, independent craftsman, or laborer, an individual is obliged to make the acquisition of money from their occupation the center of their life. At the same time, the individual is also duty bound not to pursue wealth in order to spend money for the enjoyment of luxury or leisure. The acquisition of wealth is its own reward. Waste of time or money is admonished; frugality, reinvestment, and credit worthiness are virtues. Although the historical origins of this distinctly modern frame of mind are unclear, Weber believed that this new positive moral outlook on the acquisition of money had emerged in America and Western Europe by the eighteenth century. One of the surprising claims is that Weber's spirit of capitalism grew and flourished largely independently of the system of capitalism itself. Weber acknowledges that Benjamin Franklin, though a great exemplar of the new spirit, did not fit the model of the modern capitalist, nor was capitalism very advanced in its development in Franklin's America. This fact of the independent origin of the capitalist spirit, however, served Weber's view that it was not an ideology springing from the economic system that was its rationale, as Marxism might have posited. However, if the modern spirit of capitalism was not a product of the form or system of capitalism, the question becomes all the more urgent: What were the sources of this new attitude toward the acquisition of wealth, an attitude that became, as Weber put it, a leading principle of capitalism?

In his search for the historical origins of capitalism's modern spirit, Weber took as his point of departure the contemporary controversies over the respective orientations of Roman Catholics and Protestants toward capitalistic economic activities. In this context it had been noted as a matter of empirical fact that Protestants were more likely than Catholics to be involved in the more innovative and technically skilled types of capitalistic activity and at the same time were more likely to pursue the patterns of training and education appropriate for such work. Likewise, they tended to be more prosperous than their more tradition bound

Catholic counterparts. The attempts to explain these differences were the stuff of wide ranging if unproductive controversies at the time Weber himself began to take up the questions.

As Weber probed the possible sources of the differences he found them to lie in the early history of Protestantism. First, Luther and Lutheranism made key contributions, particularly in advancing the idea that worldly economic activities in pursuit of a livelihood were worthy "vocations," thereby providing enterprise and work with moral sanction. This, Weber reasoned, provided the impetus for individuals to devote themselves to worldly economic activity to a greater extent than in circumstances where tradition had dictated that work was either morally neutral or even evil, albeit necessary for economic sustenance. Second, Calvin and Calvinism provided additional, crucial incentives to work unstintingly in one's economic vocation. Here, Weber's line of argument about the connections between religious beliefs and economic activities becomes intricate and turns on the paradox of unintended consequences.

The central doctrine of original Calvinism was the belief in the predestination of one's soul to ultimate salvation or damnation, a fate that the individual believer could neither know nor change. This harsh doctrine was later moderated by pastoral interpretation (e.g., by the seventeenth century English minister, Richard Baxter) to alleviate the anxieties of believers tormented by their lack of knowledge concerning their personal salvation. Individuals were admonished to avoid self doubt regarding their status as members of the elect on the grounds that such doubts could be the work of the devil. Moreover, the best way to gain and sustain self assurance of one's salvation was to work tirelessly in one's earthly vocation. Thus, the only possible relief from the psychological isolation of salvation anxiety was to work assiduously and single mindedly in one's chosen economic vocation.

In Weber's interpretation the significant result of following this kind of religious counsel was the production of a new *this worldly rational asceticism* – "this worldly" in that the consequences were visible purely in the mundane world of work; *rational* in that the individual assumed self conscious control over their actions and life course; *ascetic* in that self discipline and

avoidance of temptations (idleness, pleasure, materialism) through complete devotion to labor came to dominate everyday life. With some variations this Calvinist asceticism permeated several other Protestant sects by the eighteenth century: Pietism, Methodism, and the Baptist sects, including Baptists, Mennonites, and Quakers, as well as Congregationalists and various independent sects.

According to Weber, this Protestant asceticism connected with the secular spirit of capitalism exemplified by Benjamin Franklin in the late eighteenth century. The exact nature of the linkage has been the subject of much dispute among Weber's interpreters and critics. Was Protestant asceticism the cause and capitalism's spirit the effect? Or was it mere parallelism, consonance, consistency, or "elective affinity" between the two? Or was it a case of historical metamorphosis, transformation, or secularization from the Protestant ethic to the later spirit of capitalism? Regardless of the exact nature of the connection between the religious ethic and the secular spirit, the potential economic consequences are easy to discern: employers and workers thoroughly dedicated to the program of capitalistic enterprise unfettered by the distractions of the world outside the factory, the workshop, or the firm. To the extent that Calvinism actually had these effects, they were clearly and paradoxically the unintended consequences of the religious doctrines and interpretations. Moreover, the contribution of Protestant asceticism in providing moral legitimacy and meaning to participation in modern capitalistic enterprises, however important in the crucial early stages of modern capitalism, began to fade into irrelevance during the nineteenth century. Capitalism had freed itself from religious and ethical moorings. By the early twentieth century the motivation to work had devolved into a mere compulsion in order to support an ever more prosperous and materialistic lifestyle, a compulsion likened by Weber to a "steel hard casing."

Economic Ethic of World Religions

If modern capitalism and its spirit were spurred initially by Protestant asceticism, and given that capitalism flourished in Western Europe, Britain, and North America as never before and as

nowhere else, the question became how to explain the relative lack of such capitalistic development in other times and places. In order to address this question Weber devised and partially executed a large scale study of civilizations, especially those of China, India, and the ancient Near East, a study that occupied much of his time during the last several years of his life. Of the multi volume work *Collected Essays on the Sociology of Religion*, he managed to complete only the first volume, which began with a revised version of the essay on the Protestant ethic, and included his essay on Protestant sects in America, his substantial study of Confucianism and Taoism, and finally an important essay on how various life spheres become differentiated from religion and from one another – "Intermediate Reflections: Religious Rejections of the World and their Directions." Further volumes were to include his studies of Hinduism, Buddhism, ancient Judaism, Islam, and early Christianity.

In each of these studies Weber examined a wide range of material and structural factors that in other times and places tended to retard a "rational" form of capitalism as it developed in the modern West. He reserved his central focus, however, for the role of the various religions, especially through the kinds of "economic ethic" they promulgated. In spite of significant differences among them they all lacked the kind of "this worldly rational asceticism" found in the modern West. Lacking this frame of mind and pattern of life inspired by the ideal of being God's instrument in, though not of, the world, none of the other world religions was in a position to support an ascetic, but energetic, spirit of rational capitalism.

RECEPTION AND LEGACY

In late 1917 Weber delivered a public lecture on "Science as a Vocation" at the University of Munich. This was followed in early 1919 by his lecture on "Politics as a Vocation" delivered at the same venue. The common theme of the two lectures was the importance of self renunciation involved in devoting one's life to either scholarship or politics. In both cases, however, the ascetic element was accompanied by a humanistic commitment to the values underlying the

pursuit of knowledge and public responsibility. In the lecture on science Weber was returning to a theme about which he had frequently spoken and written: the complex relation of values to science. On the one hand, scientist scholars are obliged to restrain their own value judgments from biasing inquiry. On the other hand, the problems of inquiry should be selected and constructed so as to make relevant contributions not only to knowledge but to social policy formation as well. In the lecture on politics, Weber distinguished between two “ethics” as alternative models of political leadership: the “ethic of conviction” by which leadership is based on the pursuit of an ultimate value as a “cause,” and the “ethic of responsibility” in which the emphasis is on taking responsibility for the consequences of decisions and actions. Weber clearly advocated the latter.

By the last stage of his career Weber had achieved a national reputation both for his scholarship and his politics. World War I had ended in Germany’s defeat, and Weber had assumed an advisory role to the defeated military and civilian authorities. As Germans looked forward to what became known as the Weimar Republic as the successor to the fallen *Kaiserreich* there was even some talk of Weber becoming a political leader. That possibility was cut short by his death in the early days of the new republic.

While Weber was widely recognized in Germany as a scholar and public figure, his work was not yet well known outside the country. None of his works had been translated into English prior to his death. Not until 1930 was *The Protestant Ethic* translated by Talcott Parsons. A complete English edition of *Economy and Society* had to wait until 1968. Even today it is still difficult to evaluate Weber’s reception and legacy. This is partly due to the fact that his work and perspective consistently transcended the boundaries of any single social science discipline of his time or ours. Thus, in addition to being claimed as a leading founder of twentieth century sociology and a major contributor to modern political science, public administration, and political theory, he has been recognized for significant contributions to the fields of economic history, historical jurisprudence, the study of ancient civilizations (most especially Rome and the Near East), and the comparative study of religions. He was a historian who

became a sociologist, a sociologist who remained an economist, a serious student of ancient society who contributed significantly to the understanding of modern western culture, its distinctiveness, and its development. He was equally captivated by the study of economics and religion, of material and ideal factors, of social structure and individual action. In sociology his contributions are recognized especially in the areas of law, religion, and the economy; in the study of social stratification, political, urban, and rural sociology, and the sociology of culture. In terms of the method and general conception of sociology, Weber insisted that social action is the conceptual foundation of our understanding of societal structures. Insofar as action carries meaning it is intelligible through the use of *Verstehen* (understanding) in the context of interaction and of sociological observation. As important as action is, Weber gave even more attention to what he called order and to what sociologists later came to view as social structure. Action and structure, for Weber, interact in complex loops, with structure emanating either directly or indirectly as a result of action, yet with subsequent action both enabled and constrained by existing structure. Weber is rightly regarded as the founder of structural sociology (stratification, institutions) as well as the sociology of action.

Weber’s influence, already enormous, is likely to increase. Not all of Weber’s writings have yet been translated into English or Japanese, the two major languages for the reception and study of his writings. Nor is the end yet in sight to the monumental project of collecting, editing, and publishing all Weber’s surviving writings and correspondence, the *Max Weber Gesamtausgabe*.

In preparation for the 14th World Congress of Sociology in Montreal in 1998, the International Sociological Association surveyed its members around the world to determine the most influential books written by sociologists in the twentieth century. Weber’s *Economy and Society* was selected as the most influential book of the past century, followed not far behind by his *Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism* (ranked fourth). Weber was also chosen as the most influential author of the twentieth century by both male and female sociologists among the 455 respondents to the survey. Given the broad

sweep of Weber's historical comparative sociology and the recent and planned publications of Weber's works in German, English, Japanese, Chinese, and other languages, his legacy is likely to increase in global influence.

SEE ALSO: Asceticism; Authority and Legitimacy; Bureaucracy and Public Sector Governmentality; Capitalism; Class, Status, and Power; Historical and Comparative Methods; Ideal Type; Law, Economy and; Marianne Weber on Social Change; Objectivity; Protestantism; Rational Choice Theories; Rational Legal Authority; Religion; Theory; *Verstehen*

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welfare dependency and welfare underuse

Hartley Dean

Welfare dependency is a term that refers to the use that people make of publicly provided cash benefits (sometimes called cash transfers) or human services. Welfare underuse is the term applied when people who are entitled to publicly provided benefits and services fail to take them up.

WELFARE DEPENDENCY

Welfare dependency, therefore, is a feature of advanced industrial societies with developed welfare states, whose citizens enjoy specific “social” rights (e.g., to social security, health care, social support, and education). The premise on which the advocates of state welfare provision promoted its development was that, as the social division of labor in society becomes more complex, the “states of dependency” that arise at various points in the human life course can be defined and recognized as collective responsibilities (Titmuss 2001: 64). However, the social policymakers who fashioned the modern welfare states of the post World War II era were often “reluctant collectivists” (George & Wilding 1985). They may have favored guaranteed basic minimum provision by the state, but they also wanted people to depend on income from paid employment on the one hand and on support from their families on the other. Welfare states have developed in different ways in different parts of the capitalist world, and while social democratic welfare states (e.g., Sweden) have sustained relatively high levels of state welfare dependency, liberal (e.g., the US) and conservative (e.g., Germany) welfare states have tended to discourage it in favor of labor market or family dependency, respectively (Esping Andersen 1990).

Since the 1970s, the idea of welfare dependency has become increasingly contested as support for state welfare provision has declined. Economic globalization, it was claimed, put welfare state spending under pressure (because it was alleged to make national economies uncompetitive); social and demographic changes in western societies placed what some regarded as unsustainable demands on welfare states (for example, because of population aging, and because of rising numbers of lone parent households); and the political rise of the New Right presented a wholesale challenge to the legitimacy of state welfare dependency. Despite this, where people depend on state education, contributory state pension schemes, or health care provision, these have by and large retained popular and political support, but cash benefits for people of working age and public housing provision by and large have not. In some countries – particularly the US – the term welfare has been associated specifically with means tested

or income related social assistance for the poorest and has acquired a distinctly pejorative connotation (Fraser 1997). Just as the Poor Law regimes that had preceded the development of modern welfare states had deliberately stigmatized the undeserving poor, dependency on the state for income and/or housing and for certain kinds of social support entailed an inherently and increasingly stigmatized status.

Theorists of the New Right (e.g., Murray 1984) claimed that the perpetuation of welfare dependency undermines society by eroding individual responsibility and that it discourages people from sustaining themselves through employment and/or within their families. Earlier anthropological studies had suggested that urban slums in various parts of the world exhibited a culture of poverty that was transmitted from generation to generation. Now, it was claimed, the welfare state was breeding a culture of idleness, irresponsibility, and dependency and was contributing to the creation in many developed western societies of an “underclass.” Unemployment and lone parenthood were blamed on the ready availability of cash benefits and public housing which acted as disincentives to self sufficiency and economic independence on the one hand and to marriage and family life on the other.

Critics of this thesis have drawn upon evidence that people who depend on cash benefits from the state exhibit no signs of a culture of dependency: on the contrary, they tend to subscribe to the same values, aspirations, and prejudices as does mainstream society (Dean & Taylor Gooby 1992). It has been argued that we are witnessing a form of “dependency fetishism” that obscures our understanding of the interdependency that characterizes human society. Popular and political discourse tends perversely to regard our dependency on employment and within families as “independence,” but uniquely to problematize state welfare dependency.

When one considers the total value of all the benefits and services citizens in developed countries typically receive from the welfare state, most of this is likely to have been self financed through the various taxes and social security contributions that they will have paid in the course of their lifetimes (Falkingham & Hills 1995). The availability of new forms of longitudinal social data enables us to consider the dynamics of poverty, and to see that for

many unemployed people and lone parents who claim cash benefits provided by the state, their dependency is likely to be a relatively short lived and not necessarily an enduring experience (Leisering & Walker 1998).

WELFARE UNDERUSE

Welfare underuse is in substantial part, but by no means solely, attributable to the stigma often associated with welfare dependency. It is important to distinguish between the underuse of cash benefits, transfers, or their equivalent in kind (e.g., food stamps or food cards) and the underuse of public or social services.

The underuse of cash benefits provision is often referred to as a failure of benefits "take up." A considerable body of research on benefits take up was conducted in the 1970s and 1980s (for an overview, see Craig 1991). It is widely recognized that conditional means tested benefits or social assistance schemes have much lower rates of take up than universal or contributory benefit schemes (under which citizens may have an automatic entitlement or an entitlement based in social insurance contributions). This was attributed by researchers to the sense of stigma that may attach to claiming such benefits, to ignorance on the part of potential claimants, and/or to the administrative complexity of the schemes. The research drew either upon psychological models, which assume a set of behavioral thresholds that potential claimants must overcome, or econometric models, which assume that potential claimants weigh up the utilities and disutilities associated with claiming their entitlements. Subsequent comparative research, however, has informed an "interactive model" of take up that looks at multi level influences at the scheme or systemic level, at the administrative level, and at the level of the claimant or client (Oorschott 1995). This sociological approach emphasizes both the structural features of welfare systems and the consequences that may flow, for example, from the behavior of administrators, bureaucrats, and caseworkers, who may develop informal methods to ration access to welfare provision.

The underuse of public services may similarly result from structural and administrative features of those services. Of particular concern

is the differential use of services by different social classes or minority groups. Certain kinds of public services, such as health care and education, may be more extensively used and provide greater benefits to middle class families than to the poorest families who need them the most (Le Grand 1982). One of the most spectacular failures of many modern welfare states is reflected in the fact that benefits of advances in medical science and health technologies have been so unequally distributed (Wilkinson 1996). Even in countries with a universal national health service (e.g., the UK) people from lower socioeconomic classes and/or from minority ethnic groups experience significantly higher mortality and morbidity rates and make less use of health services than people from higher socioeconomic classes and from the white population. The reasons for this are complex. They reflect the extent to which inequalities in income may be translated more generally into inequalities in life chances and inequalities of power. But they also reflect some of the subtle ways in which public service providers may discriminate against, or be culturally insensitive to, particular groups in society.

The majority of the population in developed capitalist welfare states will during particular stages of their life course depend upon or make use of publicly provided or state financed health, education, and welfare services. That is a measure of the level of a country's "social development." Social policymakers and sociologists may, however, be concerned about whether, by whom, and why dependency upon such provision becomes excessive; or conversely about whether, by whom, and why such provision may be underused.

SEE ALSO: Citizenship; Lone Parent Families; Social Policy, Welfare State; Social Services; Stigma; Unemployment; Welfare Fraud; Welfare Regimes; Welfare State

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welfare fraud

Siegfried Lamnek and Ralf Ottermann

Sociologists define *fraud* as any deception the intended outcomes of which are knowingly in breach of norms (of honesty, reciprocity, solidarity, etc.), and define *deception* as any intentional non disclosure and/or misrepresentation of relevant information, which is to make others behave in a way they would not if they were well informed (Ottermann 2000). Many frauds do not violate laws and/or are considered relatively harmless. But some frauds are regarded not just as unfair or illegitimate, but also as illegal acts of deception. Such is *welfare fraud*, committed in order to obtain unauthorized benefits, which is seen as a violation of statute, as an offense against the rules that regulate the welfare system. In legal terms,

welfare fraud (benefit fraud, public assistance fraud) is defined as making a false or misleading statement or committing an act intended to mislead, misrepresent, conceal, or withhold facts concerning the eligibility for public assistance, which is determined, for instance, by (dis)information of the current marital status, household composition, employment status, income, receipt of monetary and in kind gifts, bank accounts, and other resources of the claimants or clients. Welfare fraud is committed when persons make false statements, and/or misrepresent facts, or when (changed) situations are not reported to the departments of social services, in order to obtain public funds for which the beneficiaries would not otherwise be eligible. Labeled a crime, welfare fraud can result in imprisonment, probation, repayment, recoupment, or becoming ineligible for assistance for a certain length of time.

Welfare fraud is socially perceived as an illegal as well as an immoral act of deception and treated as a *social problem* in public discourse. In contrast to similar offenses against the state and its welfare system, such as minor tax evasion or illicit work ("moonlighting," "doing something on the side"), welfare fraud is easily scandalized and stigmatized by opinion leaders and moral entrepreneurs, since it is often seen as an "underclass fraud" and as such as a behavior of already otherwise stigmatized minorities predominantly problematized and combated by the "moralizing upper and middle classes" and the "legislating political elites" (social scientists included). Welfare cheats have few defenses since nearly all the circumstances of their lives are under public scrutiny and they carry a "moral taint" as persons unable – if not unwilling – to earn a living (Barker et al. 1990). Thus, people who intend and commit welfare fraud have to face and to deal with the fact of extraordinary *social control*. But even if they try, they will be less successful in doing stigma management than illicit workers and tax evaders, and this in spite of the fact that the latter are often perceived as doing the greater harm to the public purse (Schäfer 2002). Despite the relatively low costs caused by welfare fraud to the public purse, an outraged public opinion – fueled by mass media campaigns and pronouncements by politicians – led to the establishment of relatively expensive anti fraud

squads specialized in the detection and prosecution of welfare cheats (Pemberton 1990). This raises doubts whether the latter makes sense fiscally in regard to the former (Matt & Cook 1993). Moreover, the public (mis)perception of welfare fraud is often (mis)used as a justification of tax evasion and welfare cuts, and vice versa. However, there has to be a welfare system for people to commit welfare fraud, and people have to appear needy: they have to meet certain criteria, such as poverty and helplessness and/or a basic willingness to work, in order to at least seem eligible for public assistance (Lamnek et al. 2000).

The welfare state was originally not designed just for the poor; instead, it should prevent all people from becoming too poor and deprived, and hence becoming a risk for social order and cohesion. It was supposed to offer social protection for everyone, even though people depending on welfare should not be better off than self-sufficient laborers, therefore relying on deterrence and the stigmatization of (potential) welfare recipients as a way of policing the boundaries. However, social welfare has shifted back towards minimum provision of the poor and the stigmatization of welfare recipients (Spicker 2002). The policy of holding down support for the poor and unemployed is supposed to minimize the incentives to claim benefits and remain on welfare unnecessarily and to maximize the willingness to work for the purpose of self-sufficiency, thereby protecting laborers' dividends of conformity with the central rules of the *occupational society*. Welfare policy can then be seen as a form of social control which creates social values (e.g., the value of work) and shapes social identities (e.g., as deserving or not) and relationships (e.g., between taxpayers and the poor) (Raftopoulou 2004). But the policy of minimal provision plus financial cuts in the name of work has the unanticipated consequence of making illicit work while claiming benefit ("doing the double") more attractive – even for the employers of welfare cheats and contrasting with the stereotype that people on welfare usually are unwilling to work. The real issue is that legal employment opportunities ("proper jobs") to make a living are especially rare and declining for the less qualified, trained, and educated "reserve army of cheap labor" (Evason & Woods 1995).

In public discourses welfare cheats are often (mis)used as scapegoats for structural problems of social change and for unemployment in modern developed societies. Challenges (e.g., resulting from the mobility of global players or demographic aging) have limited the resources available to the welfare state, while at the same time increasing the extent and magnitude of welfare needs. Especially during economic recession, when financial resources are short and governments intend to redress budgetary deficits, the connection between socioeconomic positions and prospects on the one hand and people's attitudes towards welfare on the other hand is becoming obvious. The perceived (in)efficiency, (un)fairness and/or (il)legitimacy of the welfare system induces (non)compliance with the system and, as a result, (in)tolerance of welfare fraud, tax evasion, and moonlighting. The extent of compliance with the system, the degree of tolerance of fraudulent practices, and the tendency to minimize versus dramatize fraudulent behavior in public discourses correspond to differing conceptions of *distributive justice*. According to the principles of distributive justice, people believe that goods and burdens in a society should be fairly distributed. The principle of achievement or contribution contrasts with the principles of equality and neediness. Ideas of individual responsibility, minimal taxes and entitlements, private provision, and self-help partly collide with notions of welfare. In public opinion, a social policy of minimal support and welfare cuts seem the more legitimate the more welfare is associated with fraud, abuse, social irresponsibility, laziness, waste of public funds, tax burdens, and welfare costs. Politicians claim lean welfarism as an appropriate method to divide the deserving from the non-deserving. However, minimum welfare and maximum control of the welfare recipients also reduce the chances of the really needy escaping from welfare dependency. This in sum may lead to resentments against the system and the willingness to cheat it for socioeconomic reasons. These varying conceptions of distributive justice on attitudes towards the welfare state correlate with socioeconomic positions and prospects, risks, strains, aims, and claims. People use conceptions of distributive justice to legitimate welfare fraud. They can "blame the system," for instance, as "being rigged" and/or "fostering

social injustices.” In contrast, it is easier to scandalize welfare fraud when it is seen as “part of the system” (e.g., as a symptom of so called “welfarization”). When people are convinced that fraudulent behavior (welfare fraud, tax evasion, and illicit work) is widespread, they prepare themselves for such a behavior, which is, in the first place, to increase or keep their own socioeconomic resources (Lamnek & Luedtke 1999).

Public discourses of welfare fraud (e.g., its rise and fall as a social problem) are a subject of *discourse analyses* and historical and comparative sociology. In contrast to official statistics which mainly deliver the results of the (selective processes brought about by the) social control of welfare fraud, *social surveys* provide more valid data concerning intra and intercultural differences in the public opinion of welfare fraud, as well as its incidences. *Self reports*, focused *group discussions*, and *interviews* display the perspectives and motives of the cheats and their patterns of interpretation of the situation(s) and corresponding neutralizations of social norms (which lower the anticipated moral costs of deviant/delinquent behavior). *Life history approaches* give insight into so called de shaming processes (which reduce the costs of self and peer imposed punishment and stigmatization, and therefore, for example, explain, opportunity structures notwithstanding, why welfare cheats tend to engage or to be involved in further “criminality”), while *case studies*, *field observations*, and *ethnographic research* expose the impact of social milieus, such as differential associations and processes of (the offenders’) social learning and informal patterns of the agencies of (formal) social control. The combination of qualitative and quantitative methods seems to be the best practice for exploring the macro social and micro social dimensions of welfare fraud, as well as for generating and testing theories along the macro–micro–macro link.

As far as welfare fraud as a *deviant/delinquent behavior* is concerned – as a social action which makes sense to (potential) offenders – sociologists have found that anticipated threats and rewards through informal sanctions have greater effects on people’s behavior than anticipated threats and rewards through formal sanctions. Internal self control, the clear versus bad conscience which is anticipated, is – as far as social

norms have been internalized and cannot be neutralized – more important than the anticipated external social control. The anticipation of other people’s perceptions of one’s own actions is the more crucial the less is the social distance. Thus, besides the threat of legal sanctions and the feelings of guilt that individuals might impose upon themselves when they offend their own conscience by engaging in behaviors they consider morally wrong, there is also the threat of shame, embarrassment, and social disapproval that individuals might experience when they violate norms which people they value support (Yaniv 1998). Sociologists investigated the comparative deterrence effect of formal and informal sanctions (i.e., the perceived certainty and severity of legal punishment on the one hand and the anticipated peer imposed punishments on the other hand) and found that, apart from past criminal involvement, which plays a significant social biographical role in so called de shaming processes, informal sanctions have a greater effect on welfare fraud than formal sanctions. Only such persons who have nothing to lose (e.g., being chronically short of money and de shamed since already marginalized and stigmatized as “on welfare”) are out of control. Thus, people have to be socially included, not excluded, if society is really interested in diminishing “underclass fraud.” If full employment turns out to be a social fiction, we will be in need of a change in social policy and therefore in need of sociological thought.

SEE ALSO: Deviance, Crime and; Distributive Justice; Poverty and Disrepute; Social Control; Social Exclusion; Social Integration and Inclusion; Social Policy, Welfare State; Unemployment as a Social Problem; Welfare Dependency and Welfare Underuse; Welfare Regimes; Welfare State; Welfare State, Retrenchment of

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welfare regimes

Stephan Lessenich

Thinking in terms of "regimes" and "regime types" has become popular in comparative welfare research since the late 1980s. Originally stemming from international relations studies (Krasner 1983), the "regime" concept has been discovered for and adapted to welfare state research mainly by Danish sociologist Gøsta Esping Andersen, who used it in his seminal work on *The Three Worlds of Welfare Capitalism* e institutional nexus of work and welfare in advanced capitalist societies. Building on a welfare regime's capacity to reduce the market dependency of individuals ("decommodification"), its implications for the structure of social inequality ("stratification"), and the relative importance of state, market, and the family (or households) in the production of social welfare, Esping Andersen claimed that the modern welfare state comes in three ideal typical

variants: the "liberal," the "conservative," and the "social democratic" model. The great advance for welfare research brought about by this regime typology is twofold. On the one hand, the "three worlds" constitute a suitable tool for bringing order into the complex "real world" of welfare capitalism. On the other hand, and when it comes to specify the differences between advanced welfare states, the concept of welfare regimes focuses not simply on social expenditure data but on the qualitative aspects of welfare state policies, i.e., on the welfare state's relevance as a means of ordering social relations according to specific ideological convictions and normative principles. According to Esping Andersen, the relative weight of "liberal," "conservative," and/or "social democratic" convictions and principles in different national welfare regimes today depends on the power resources with which the respective social movements were able to engage in the "democratic class struggle" (Korpi 1983) around the welfare state, its emergence and its design, in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries.

Esping Andersen's "regime approach" has been the object of broad conceptual, methodological, and empirical criticism and, at the same time, guiding principle of much of the comparative research on social policy and the welfare state over the last 15 years. While the first wave of critique concentrated on the question of whether and how individual cases (i.e., national welfare states) could be subsumed to one (or another) of the three regime types, subsequent work focused on amending, extending, and transposing Esping Andersen's "holy trinity." Whereas some authors discovered alternative institutional models of linking work and welfare in Southern Europe, the Antipodes, or the emerging welfare states of Central and Eastern Europe, others contrasted Esping Andersen's male biased "decommodification regimes" with more gender sensitive "care regimes." In *Social Foundations of Postindustrial Economies* (1999), the author of *The Three Worlds of Welfare Capitalism* assumed part of that criticism, emphasizing the different welfare regimes' capacity of "defamiliarization" (i.e., of exonerating individuals from family burdens) and reformulating his regime types as different ("residual," "corporatist," or "universalistic") "models of solidarity." In any case, the ultimately academic

and futile struggle about whether there are three, four, or n “worlds of welfare” out there eventually has been settled. The future of the concept of welfare regimes lies in further analyses of the interplay (and possible “elective affinities”) between Esping Andersen’s “worlds of welfare” and different “varieties of capitalism” and, above all, in in depth case studies of the changing nature of national welfare regimes in times of accelerating social change, permanent economic austerity, and, not least, growing political transnationalization as it is most prominently reflected in the European integration process. In fact, this is where today the comparative study of welfare regimes may again, as back in the 1980s, profit from research on international regimes and their effects on policymaking and social agency.

SEE ALSO: Capitalism; Conservatism; Democracy; Institutionalism; Liberalism; Markets; Social Policy, Welfare State; Socialism

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welfare state

Markus Gangl

The essence of the modern welfare state lies in its institutional commitment to reconcile equity issues with the efficient operation of economic markets in industrial and post industrial capitalist societies. As capitalism institutionally relies on the free competition of autonomous individual agents in exchange markets to achieve economic efficiency, but meets with real world economies exhibiting an unequal distribution of wealth holdings, economies of scale in production, significant transaction costs, and imperfect information regarding prices and preferences, the unfettered operation of economic forces is likely to result in anything but an egalitarian distribution of economic well being in a society. As an institutional antidote, modern welfare states have developed various policy instruments to realign the distributional outcomes of the market with broader social objectives of governments and their constituencies – and hence, the welfare state has rightly come to be seen as institutionally expressing and preserving social solidarity in highly complex societies made up of socially as well as economically highly heterogeneous populations.

WELFARE STATE INSTITUTIONS

Historically, the foundations of the modern welfare state emerged in late nineteenth century Europe when governments responded to social upheaval generated by the transition to full fledged industrial economies. From the introduction of public health and pension insurance in Bismarckian Germany in the 1880s onwards, governments began – partly in response to dramatic social change itself, partly to check the

threat of a growing labor movement – to recognize the need to establish institutional mechanisms to guarantee that the broad majority of the population, especially the working class, would actually participate in economic growth generated by technological progress and an intensified transition to the capitalist mode of production. However, whereas the origins of welfare states have been in the social integration of the working class, welfare states have considerably expanded their scope and objectives, and have much refined their policy instruments over much of the twentieth century.

Nowadays, modern welfare states in fact consist of a broad array of institutions, policies, and programs aiming to secure adequate standards of living, broadly defined, for an encompassing majority of the population in industrialized societies. In consequence, welfare state institutions today comprise poverty relief through social assistance programs, social insurance against old age, ill health, job related accidents or unemployment, family policies through child benefits, childcare subsidies, and parental leave schemes, service provision in the form of job counseling, public employment offices, public childcare facilities or public systems of care for the elderly, public housing, and often extensive social worker services. Moreover, these welfare state programs, narrowly defined, have become embedded in systems of public education at the primary, secondary, and tertiary level of education, extensive public regulation of markets, extensive judiciary systems, systems of public policies to conserve the environmental bases of affluent industrial societies, and, last but not least, a tax system raising the financial means necessary to fund these various instruments of government intervention.

Clearly, existing real world welfare states differ significantly in both the level and range of welfare state commitments across the industrialized world. Encompassing welfare states and a respectively significant role of the state in social stratification as well as economic markets has been a hallmark of European societies. Due to strong labor movements and a long history of social democratic governance, Scandinavian countries, notably Sweden, feature particularly extensive welfare states that provide encompassing transfer systems compensating for social hardships, extensive public services to families

and the elderly, as well as a significant public sector providing these. As demonstrated by the historical experience of continental European countries like France or Germany, welfare state development was also spurred by Catholic social thought and dominantly Christian democratic politics, although resulting welfare states are typically more bent toward regulation, prefer social insurance to universal transfer systems, and are weaker on public service provision than their Scandinavian counterparts. In comparison, welfare programs are much less generous, and hence the role of the state in social stratification much more limited, in the United States, Britain, Australia, and New Zealand after the reforms of the 1980s, but also in most post communist countries of Eastern Europe.

ECONOMIC EFFECTS

Whatever the precise institutional arrangements, i.e., the specific national welfare mix institutionally balancing responsibilities and rights of families, markets, and government in any given society, there can be little doubt about the fact that the above policy instruments may constitute a veritable government intervention into private households' decisions on economic and social affairs. By providing transfers to compensate for social risk, governments deliberately alter the nexus between market incomes and household standard of livings, governments deliberately alter price structures by providing services and by subsidizing childrearing or education, governments deliberately alter households' market power by providing information, legal services, and regulation, and, last but not least, governments typically set up progressive tax systems to fund their services disproportionately through revenue generated from the well off as well as from prospering firms and sectors. As these and other effects are likely to significantly affect the structure of economic incentives and constraints, welfare states are equally likely to engender significant economic consequences in terms of both economic behavior of individuals and households at the micro level and with respect to societies' larger macro economic prospects – in fact, soliciting respective economic effects may well be considered, after all, the whole point of establishing welfare

state institutions. Given that welfare state institutions often fundamentally affect societies' economic structure, it is hardly surprising to find the empirical magnitude as well as the normative desirability of respective effects a matter of much social science discourse as well as public debate. To survey some of the key arguments and results, we address welfare state effects with respect to distributional outcomes, allocation, economic capabilities, and macroeconomic efficiency below, although this hardly provides an exhaustive list of total welfare state impact on the structure of advanced industrial societies.

Redistribution

To most, the welfare state simply is redistribution. Evidently, by providing income support to the needy and by funding these transfers through progressive taxes, welfare states succeed in redistributing income from the wealthy to the poor and hence contribute to alleviating relative poverty and to provide for minimally acceptable standards of living for practically the full population in the industrial world. To obtain empirical estimates of welfare states' redistributive impact, social scientists typically rely on data on household equivalent income, thus measuring standards of living by household income adjusted for household size. Defining (relative) poverty as standards of living falling below a threshold of 50 percent the national median household equivalent income, data from the cross nationally comparable Luxembourg

Income Study compiled in Table 1 indicate both generally low poverty levels in advanced industrial societies and a significant role played by the welfare state in bringing this about. In a country like Sweden, poverty rates measured for market incomes alone amount to about 15 percent, yet taking into account welfare state taxes and transfers, less than 5 percent of all households remain below the 50 percent poverty line. Apparently, much the same holds true for other European countries as well, whereas the United States clearly stands out for its weakly developed welfare state showing but little redistributive impact.

Furthermore, Table 1 also shows that welfare state redistribution extends well beyond the low income strata. Using the Gini coefficient – a measure ranging from 0 (perfect equality, i.e., everyone enjoying the same standard of living) to 100 (perfect inequality, i.e., all income earned by a single household) – to indicate the extent of overall income inequality in a given society, Table 1 again points to a significant reduction in income inequality due to welfare state efforts. Clearly, anti poverty transfers have their share in this as well, yet more detailed analyses make it plain that transfers to the non poor population like child benefits and particularly social insurance payments to the unemployed, the ill, and (although not included in the data of Table 1) the elderly are integral to welfare states' redistributive efforts in the population at large. As this points out, reducing the welfare state to mere anti poverty transfers would be to severely misrepresent its redistributive role: in

Table 1 Poverty and income in equality in western countries (working-age households only), 1980s–1990s

Country	Poverty rate (50% median income)			Income inequality (Gini coefficient)		
	Market income (%)	Disposable income (%)	Poverty reduction (%)	Market income (%)	Disposable income (%)	Inequality reduction (%)
Sweden	14.8	4.8	64.5	32.7	20.2	37.9
France	21.8	6.1	57.9	39.4	29.4	25.4
Germany	9.7	5.1	46.9	32.2	26.2	18.7
United Kingdom	16.4	8.2	48.7	38.2	29.3	22.7
United States	17.2	15.1	12.1	39.8	32.8	17.6

Source: Moller et al. (2003) (poverty rates); Bradley et al. (2003) (Gini coefficients).

particular, as social insurance seeks to protect households against income losses from adverse events, welfare states deliberately redistribute incomes to non poor households temporarily hit by income shocks in order to promote economic security and consumption smoothing over the life cycle. Accordingly, both pro poor redistribution through targeted transfers and redistribution over the life cycle through social insurance are decisive for the redistributive impact of the welfare state.

Allocation

Against the significant role of the welfare state in reducing economic inequality, social scientists have wondered whether these redistributive efforts might not generate negative side effects on the economic behavior of individuals and households. Most prominently, neoclassical economics asserts that high tax loads required to fund extensive welfare programs generate work disincentives or, at least, incentives to evade taxes by the high income households expected to fund the welfare state. Similarly, mainstream economic theory expects transfer programs like social assistance or unemployment benefits to create significant work disincentives among those actually receiving transfers since many low income households may hardly hope to command much higher market wages than what they might expect to receive from transfer programs.

Empirically, however, respective effects on work disincentives are typically found to be rather weak in general – labor force participation rates in the universalist Swedish welfare model, for example, are on a par with those in the United States, where a weak welfare state might be considered to induce the least significant distortions of economic incentives. In part this negative evidence might be related to the fact that work has intrinsic value to most people, that industrial economies successfully continue to maintain appropriate work norms, that workers are willing to pay payroll taxes that are seen as insurance premiums, or it might be the case that institutional provisions like job search requirements, minimum entitlement periods, and other qualifying conditions actually prevent transfer recipients from exploiting benefit systems.

On the other hand, many European welfare states clearly have been facing issues of high influx of older workers into unemployment or disability benefit systems as a form of early retirement, so that potential problems with work disincentives induced by welfare state programs are not easily to be dismissed at least for specific subgroups of workers.

What is also missing from the standard economic account of the relationship between welfare states and the allocation of economic effort, however, is the fact that welfare states might actually generate positive allocative impact that might act to counterbalance any presumed disincentive effects. In fact, tying transfer benefits to contribution records may induce workers to seek employment in the legal sector of the economy in order to qualify for benefits later on, thus implicitly also broadening the welfare state's tax base. Moreover, welfare states will alter the structure of the economy itself where, as perhaps most clearly to be seen in the case of women's labor force participation, welfare state provision of care and other social services increases demand for, and at least helps to build, a formal market for services and thus women's labor. Obviously, this in the very least implies a redistribution of employment and earnings opportunities in favor of women.

Capabilities

Efforts to systematically enhance the economic potential of individuals and households may in fact be seen as a constituent element of modern welfare states that is strangely absent from most discussions of the economic role of the welfare state in economics. Quite obviously, however, systems of public education are more than likely to improve access to training and skills, especially among lower class youth. Similarly, job counseling and retraining programs offered to displaced workers or disadvantaged youth represent veritable welfare state investment in worker human capital unlikely to be undertaken by either employers or workers themselves. Finally, anti discrimination laws and similar labor market regulation requiring equal treatment of different worker groups may have promoted economic opportunities for women and

minority workers. Again, these efforts to strengthen individual and household earnings power will counter potential disincentive effects of the welfare state and will generally contribute to a redistribution of labor market, i.e., income chances in the population.

Macroeconomic Efficiency

The strain between various and potentially counteracting economic effects of the welfare state is equally evident in work on welfare state effects on overall macroeconomic efficiency and growth. Clearly, macroeconomic efficiency is all important to welfare states committed to provide high standards of living to a broad majority of the national population. Against this background, neoclassical economics has once again nurtured doubts about the macroeconomic viability of extensive welfare states that would reduce incentives to save and invest and hence undermine societies' long term economic prospects. In fact, economists have compiled consistent empirical evidence from cross national research on post war economic growth that indicates a potential Achilles' heel of the welfare state: in general, countries that spent most on transfers and government consumption already back in the 1960s indeed incurred lower average growth rates up to the late 1990s.

However, economic research is also crystal clear that successful welfare states do have the means to prevent their own demise and that the key recipe to sustain extensive welfare systems is to maintain a balance between redistribution and investment in education and training. The same economic research indicating growth inhibiting effects of transfers and government size consistently points out that societies exhibiting more highly educated workforces are those that have been seeing significantly above average growth prospects over the post war period due to the intensified technological change thus induced. Facing intensified economic progress and globalization partly spurred by its own success, the welfare state of the twenty first century may thus, ironically enough, be very much in the same position as during its inception: on the one hand, the welfare state entails a significant redistribution of resources that threatens to create negative economic externalities, and, on the other hand, it is the very same redistribution

of economic capacities that legitimizes and thus indeed makes it possible to fully exploit the economic potential of a capitalist economy.

SEE ALSO: Affirmative Action; Capitalism, Social Institutions of; Education and Economy; Family Poverty; Income Inequality and Income Mobility; Life Chances and Resources; Poverty; Risk, Risk Society, Risk Behavior, and Social Problems; Social Policy, Welfare State; Stratification, Politics and; Taxes: Progressive, Proportional, and Regressive; Welfare Fraud; Welfare Regimes; Welfare State, Retrenchment of

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welfare state, retrenchment of

Olli E. Kangas

Retrenchment of the welfare state pertains to various cost containment efforts that governments have tried to introduce. Retrenchment has taken different forms in different countries and different policy areas. It can include cuts in generosity and increasing qualification conditions to make benefits less universal and restrict the number of recipients. Also, changes in the form of financing can be used. In many countries financial responsibilities have been transferred to individuals themselves. The state has limited its role and citizens have more responsibility for their own welfare. The naming of the policies varies. Sometimes retrenchment is used synonymously with cutting, rolling back, restructuring, reforming, recasting, recalibrating, and dismantling the welfare state.

The "crisis" of the welfare state is as long as the history of the welfare state. When the very first social policy programs were introduced 100 years ago there were worries about the overly excessive public spending that would hamper economic growth and erode individual morality and the competitiveness of the country. Thus, the theme is nothing new, but there have been fluctuations in policy priorities.

The oil crises of the 1970s changed the prevailing socioeconomic doctrine and more vociferous voices were raised against public spending, and public social spending in particular. The welfare state was seen as too costly and impossible to sustain. "A vicious spiral" metaphor obtained the upper hand. Influential international organizations warned against cost expansion caused by deteriorating economic growth rates, generous welfare provisions, and aging populations. It was anticipated that these factors would increase public expenditure, especially spending on pensions, to economically unsustainable levels. As a consequence, many countries introduced a series of austerity measures to reverse the development and adapt social policies to the immediate crisis and in the longer run to disarm the "pension bomb" triggered by demographic changes.

The changing economic and political climate also changed the sociological research agenda. Up to the early 1980s, analyses of the causes of the growth of the welfare state gave way to studies revolving around retrenchment. In that sense, Flora's huge comparative research project *Growth to Limits* (1987) was an omen. The welfare state had (seemingly) grown to its limits.

Just as Esping Andersen's *Three Worlds of Welfare Capitalism* (1990) launched an avalanche of studies on welfare state typologies and explanations of them, Pierson's *Dismantling the Welfare State?* (1994) inaugurated a new era of retrenchment studies in which welfare cuts (not improvements) were in focus. Consequently, a shift in explanatory factors took place. Previously, a power resource approach emphasizing the role of politics had been successfully used to explain country specific variations in welfare benefits, but gradually neo institutionalism and various forms of structural functionalist explanations (referring to globalization and demographic pressures) gained ground.

The political discourses that emphasize the decisive role of economic and demographic variables and constraints caused by globalization are not that novel. The old structural functionalism was revitalized after a period of stagnation in the 1980s and early 1990s. The new argument in the new politics of welfare was that policy goals had changed. Instead of seeking credit for improvement of the citizens' well being, governments in their retrenchment policies must try to avoid blame and to minimize political costs (Pierson 1994). In its blame avoidance politics a government has two devices at its disposal. It can obfuscate and make things too difficult for the general public to understand (e.g., mathematical formulas to calculate pensions are such a device). And there is the so called grandfather/mother clause that leaves current recipients intact but introduces cuts in future benefits. Again, the pension area is the best example.

Sociological retrenchment studies lean toward institutionalism and path dependent explanations. Here the argument goes that once established, social policy institutions have their own impact on possibilities to cut these institutions. The welfare state was changed from explanandum to explanans. On the one hand, clients of social policy constitute influential

pressure groups that politicians must take into consideration when deliberating about cuts in benefits. The central political question is blame avoidance (i.e., how to avoid punishment from the electorate). On the other hand, the welfare state itself has become an institution that has strong feedback loops to politics. Due to the impact of these loops, some schemes are easier to change, whereas others have stronger institutional inertia. One important stream in the retrenchment discourse has dealt with the degree of inertia. The idea that underpins this is that previous decisions constrain future options. Institutions are put on a specific track which creates path dependency.

The degree of path dependency varies between welfare state programs and regimes. Pension programs are the best example of a scheme that is difficult to change. In the pension area the state has given individuals certain promises that extend to 30 or 50 years in the future. Therefore, most pension reforms must be incremental to give individuals possibilities to adapt themselves to the new situation.

Historical analyses show that state corporatist programs – programs administrated on a bi- or tripartite basis either between social partners or between partners and the state and financed through social security contributions – are harder to change than, for example, schemes that are based on pure political administration and tax financing. In the former case social partners usually have a number of institutional veto points at which to reject any cuts proposed by the government. Moreover, insurance contributions paid by employees create a feeling that they have paid for the benefits, whereas the link between general taxes and benefits is more obscure and taxes do not create a basis for strong claim rights.

Institutional approaches are often divided into two or three variants. In rational choice institutionalism emphasis is on political actors who in their self interested rent seeking react/act in the institutional surroundings that the welfare state creates, whereas historical institutionalists are more interested in how, for example, the welfare state as such constructs interests and formulates actors' images of their interests. The most constructivist variant, sociological institutionalism, employs discourses and

consequently the politics of retrenchment is much more about discursive or ideological struggles over the right to give interpretation to "reality." From time to time the hegemonic interpretations are changed, which leads to changes in welfare policies. The shift from Keynesianism to monetarism is an example of a paradigmatic shift in the mode of thinking that in turn changes politics.

An important theme in the retrenchment debate concerns the possibilities for changing the existing welfare state. For structuralists, power resource sociologists, and sociological institutionalists, the answer is rather easy. Changes take place when structural preconditions, political constellations, and policy paradigms are changed. Path dependency and institutional stickiness may cause some problems in explaining change. A handy solution that adopts elements of all the above mentioned approaches is to say that welfare institutions (notably pensions) enjoy long periods of stability, but occasionally the stability is punctuated by crises – be they changes in structural, political, or discursive contexts or combinations of such factors – that may bring pathbreaking changes. The new path is then followed up to the next punctuation point. The problem in this kind of retrenchment discussion is that a pathbreaking change is supposed to be abrupt. However, many fundamental changes may go unnoticed and be based on non decisions: small scale adjustments can ultimately alter the whole system, including the underlying ideology of the responsibilities of the state vis à vis the market and the individual. To make the picture a bit more complicated, the severity of retrenchment depends on the indicator we look at. A change in the basic ideology (e.g., from means testing to universalism) may not yield better benefits to the clients. Social spending figures may give a totally different picture of the impacts of retrenchment policies than indicators of social rights. Moreover, consequences of cuts in terms of poverty and social exclusion/inclusion will be visible after a time lag of decades, which means that sociologists will also wrestle with these questions in the future. Perhaps, then, the strong western bias in welfare state retrenchment discourse will be changed and social policy debates will deal much more

with the distribution of resources in a global perspective.

SEE ALSO: Functionalism/Neofunctionalism; Globalization; Institutionalism; Political Sociology; Politics; Social Policy, Welfare State; Social Problems, Politics of; Welfare Fraud; Welfare Regimes; Welfare State

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whiteness

Howard Winant

Like water to the proverbial fish, whiteness has been largely invisible in the “modern world system” of European creation. This invisibility is somewhat unique among the racial categories. The uniqueness does not consist of the “normalization” of whiteness: the idea that whiteness is the “default” racial status, that whites are “just people” who “don’t have a race.” Nor does its uniqueness consist in the

“transparency” of whiteness: the way in which whiteness is taken for granted in the world’s powerful countries and thus not seen, like water by the fish. In many places, especially where one racially defined group predominates, that group’s raciality is relatively invisible. Think of much of Africa, Han China, or Yamato Japan.

No, the uniqueness of whiteness’s invisibility lies in the contradictions therein: while whiteness partakes of normality and transparency, it is also dominant, insistently so. And it is also beleaguered, nervous, defensive. These qualities in turn belie claims for the “normality” of whiteness, the default status of the concept.

Whiteness can hardly be hidden in a social system based on racial domination, one in which races are necessarily relational matters. White supremacy has never gone unresisted, for one thing, so whites (colonists, settlers, planters, etc.) have always had to “circle the wagons”: they had to theorize whiteness, defend its “purity,” and justify their rule. They had to take up their “White Man’s Burden,” carry out their “*Mission Civilisatrice*,” fulfill their “Manifest Destiny.”

From the early days of conquest and slavery, from the early phases of European empire building right down to the present, there has been white unease about the very white supremacy employed to organize and justify European rule. “What if. . . , what if. . .”

Resistance. What if the blacks, the natives, the kaffirs, the wogs, rose up against us? (Indeed, they often have done so.) What if they treated us as we have treated them? In white horror at the Haitian revolution, at Sepoy, at the Mau Mau, at Nat Turner, at the revolt of the Muslim Malês of Bahia in 1835, at the putative barbarity of the Algerian revolution (and in endless other instances), we see the inner fears and guilt that accompany white rule.

Migration. How can we keep ourselves from being “swamped” by the “rising tide of color”? Lothrop Stoddard (1920) and Madison Grant’s (1916) bestsellers contemplated with dread the declining fortunes of European rule, conceiving whiteness as a fortress, a laager, besieged by the lesser breeds who sought to immigrate, to overrun the “advanced” outposts of civilization, to drag down all the higher accomplishments of Europe

and its avatars. North American nativism of course preceded their panicky alarms by more than a century (Higham 1955). Mrs. Thatcher revived the “swamping” metaphor in her campaigns, and it continues to thrive under the careful tending of Le Pen, Haider, Fini, Tom Tancredo, and many other politicians in every white dominated metropole in the world.

Sexual purity. Miscegenation is a threat to whiteness authored by whites, notably white men, themselves. “Carnal knowledge and imperial power” (and slavocratic power too) have always gone together, as Stoler (2002) has most effectively demonstrated. Danger, race mixing ahead! Rape and concubinage, the problematic and ambiguous identities of mixed race offspring, the thrill of desire for the racialized “other,” and the constant risk that whites will “go native” (Torgovnick 1991) have always represented a risk to white purity, and thus white identity itself.

So despite numerous claims of universality, racelessness, and “colorblindness” (Bonilla Silva 2003), whiteness is not only still present but also racially particular in its own right. “White” is a racial category, and “whites” something of a racial group, of course partaking of huge variation across space and time. But what is “whiteness,” anyway?

In much radical literature, largely recent but not without precedent, whiteness is portrayed entirely in the negative: as the explicit absence of “color,” of raciality. Whiteness substitutes for class consciousness, subverting it by racially linking rulers and ruled. The social fact of *not* being black, *not* being “of color,” is seen as its essential quality. Ignatiev (1995), Lott (1993), Roediger (1991), and others have advanced this analysis, drawing to various degrees on Du Bois’s account in *Black Reconstruction* (1935) of the “psychological wage” derived by the North American white worker from the choice of racial rather than class identity. Whiteness arises as if to say, “I may be poor and exploited, but at least I’m white.” Morgan’s (1975) history of Virginia colonialism takes a similar view.

Other currents dispute this view at least in part, noting the problematic and partial character of the “achievement” of whiteness by many European immigrants (Jacobson 1998) and the weird reversals of white supremacist obsessions

with purity and beleagueredness that echo in such arguments. Some have argued that “white trash” is itself a distinct racial category, pointing to the persecution of the supposedly “feeble minded” during the heyday of eugenics, and the continuing contempt expressed for the white poor today (Wray & Newitz 1997). But the most telling objection to the idea that whiteness is a purely negative racial category, and hence something that could be “abolished,” is the recognition that racial identity is relational in character. However socially constructed the creation and perpetuation of racial identities may have been, these identities can no more be discontinued than can such other similarly situated human attributes that we now see as fundamental: gender, class, and nation, for example.

Beyond this, racialization is notoriously synthetic and absorptive. In forging its whiteness, Europe incorporated a great many of the characteristics of those over whom it ruled, imparting to them in turn many of its own qualities: not only resources, not only migrants, not only diseases, not only gametes, flowed in both directions across various racial divides, but so too did language, technology, and knowledge, both sacred and profane.

Thus the chief distinction between the racial category of whiteness and other racial designations is not some supposedly all encompassing negativity of white identity; indeed, the claim that whiteness is merely the “absence of color” is quite questionable. Rather, the concept’s problematic nature stems from its continuing (if often flexible and today often disavowed) involvement with domination. To adapt Lincoln’s formulation: whiteness cannot forever endure half asserting itself, and half denying itself. A whiteness that abandoned its ambivalent claims to “colorblindness” (another way of reclaiming invisibility) and that recognized that its gestation and development, right down to the present, have been tainted by “unfair gains, unjust enrichments, and unearned advantages” (Lipsitz 1998), could perhaps redeem itself by breaking decisively with that history. Could whiteness not be reinvented by such means as practical measures of redistribution and thoroughgoing racial democratization? After all, there have been many anti racist whites; from where did their motivations arise? Might not

white people yet achieve admission to a pluralist global community that acknowledged racial difference but refused racially based stratification or hierarchy? Since history has not ended, the final judgment on such questions has yet to be made.

SEE ALSO: Color Line; Double Consciousness; Race; Race and Ethnic Consciousness; Race (Racism); Racism, Structural and Institutional; Scientific Racism; Stratification, Race/Ethnicity and

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widowhood

Kate Davidson

There has been a slow but discernible increase in sociological interest in the experience of widowhood in later life in the last three decades of the twentieth century, which has come about as a result of two major western world trends: demography and feminism. People are living longer, and as a result of a decrease in birth rates, the proportion of older people in the population is steadily increasing. For example, in the UK, the 2001 census data revealed that 48 percent of women compared to 17 percent of men over the age of 65 were widowed. Second wave feminism's imperative has been to examine women's experiences and circumstances, and to reflect on what societal norms and values inform meaning and self conceptualization in relation to being female. Gradually now, feminism is addressing the issue of aging. The conjunction of these two trends has seen the steady emergence, particularly in North America, of sociological study of widowhood as experienced by women (Lopata 1996).

However, minimal sociological attention has been paid to the lives of widowed men, primarily because of their relative invisibility, both numerically and in welfare distribution statistics. The research there has been on widowers has principally focused on the health outcomes and psychological disorientation caused by an unanticipated disjunction: a husband does not expect to predecease his wife. Nevertheless, the issue of "who suffers more," widowers or widows, is shown to be contentious. Parkes and Weiss in their *Recovery from Bereavement* (1983), which looked at widows and widowers across all ages, revealed that both widowed men and women were found to have lower psychological well being

than their married counterparts. Health status and social networks were major predictors of psychological well being. Among women, close female friends contributed more to psychological well being than family contact, while among men, family contact was more important.

In the Netherlands, Stevens (1995) examined the well being and living conditions of older widows and widowers in order to establish gender differences in adaptation to conjugal loss. Her results indicated that there were remarkable similarities in the reported well being of the respondents. Availability of resources such as income, education, and freedom from limiting disability advantaged the widowers, but widows benefited from the support of close female friends and neighbors as well as adult children. Few significant differences were found in the reported personal relationship needs, although the relational patterns were different: the women tended to have more “emotionally intimate” female friends. The men were content with male friends for “sociability,” but also wished for a cross gender romantic relationship. The men, Stevens discovered, derived satisfaction from the presence of new partners or partner like relationships and tended to depend more on adult children than did the widows. She found that while widowed women were disadvantaged regarding income, education, and health resources, they reported similar life satisfaction to the widowed men. She concluded that this was because women had been socialized into greater flexibility and adaptability over the life course. This helped them with the major change brought about by widowhood and mediated the instrumental disadvantages.

Early research on spousal bereavement (almost exclusively for women) conceptualized widowhood as “role loss” and “role exit.” Bereavement was analyzed in terms of role change from wife to widow, which in turn considered a widow to be a “roleless wife,” who lacked any duties towards others in the social system. Widowhood was viewed as *involuntary disengagement* and as such the individual was thought to be rendered powerless. These disengagement theories have contributed to the literature which views widowhood as a totally negative state. The literature does not highlight whether this process is the same or different for widowers since the male identity is differently

socially structured. The primary social role of a man is not husband and father, his sense of self identity is derived from his occupational status rather than his marital status.

The death of a spouse is a devastating experience for the vast majority of people, but the consequential adaptation from “we” to “I” is substantially different for men and women. Later sociological theory such as that explored by Anthony Giddens in *Modernity and Self Identity* (1994) permits us to reconceptualize loss in terms of ontological security, which takes into consideration adaptation as a *process* mediated by age, gender, culture, and social capital. In doing so, we can contextualize these older people’s experience within a life course perspective, the outcome of which is not always unrelentingly depressing. Indeed, some widows express a sense of liberation and personal development after the loss of their husband. The few studies carried out on widowers indicate that it is the loss of the person whose care allowed them independence, and the need to take on the role as self carer, that requires psychological and social adjustment (Bennett et al. 2003). Men therefore rarely view widowhood as a time of freedom. Depending upon age, health, and financial status – that is, the younger, fitter, and richer they are – the more likely they are to seek cross gender companionship, with (preferably) or without sexual relations. Contrary to received wisdom, older widowers’ main motive for seeking a new partnership is not to have instrumental help from a housekeeper, but to assuage the loneliness they feel at the death of the most central person in their life. It is ironic that the men, socialized into independence and autonomy, seem to be less psychologically prepared to cope with aloneness.

SEE ALSO: Aging, Demography of; Aging and Social Support; Later Life Marriage; Retirement

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Williams, Raymond (1921–88)

Tony Bennett

Born in 1921 in Wales, Raymond Williams was educated at Cambridge and, after wartime military service and an initial academic position in Oxford's Extra Mural Delegacy, returned there on a permanent basis as Lecturer in English in 1961, subsequently becoming Professor of Drama in 1974.

A lifelong socialist, Williams was an active member of the Labour Party and a key figure in the British new left. These and his other political involvements – in the Campaign for Nuclear Disarmament (CND), for example – provided the horizon for his intellectual work. This took varied forms. A moderately successful novelist, Williams was much in demand as a political and cultural commentator and he wrote a number of specialist studies on specific literary and dramatic genres.

His most enduring impact, however, was a theoretical one focused on new ways of thinking about the relationships between culture and society that have had considerable influence on debates in sociology and, for cultural studies, remain of foundational significance.

Developed initially in *Culture and Society* (1958) and *The Long Revolution* (1961), Williams's central accomplishment was to dispute, and provide an alternative to, the terms in which the relations between culture and society had been debated in British social thought in the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. Reviewing the writings of Samuel Taylor Coleridge, John Ruskin, Matthew Arnold, T. S. Eliot, and others, Williams took issue with their sense of culture as an elite standard of perfection that had to be defended against the deadening influence of the masses, a view that informed the literary criticism of Williams's contemporary, F. R. Leavis.

Objecting that there are no masses, only different ways of seeing people as masses, Williams challenged this tradition of thought on two main grounds. First, drawing on the anthropological concept of culture proposed by Edward Burnett Tylor in his *Primitive Culture* (1871), Williams argued that any socially viable contemporary understanding of culture had to concern itself not only with the selective tradition of high artistic and intellectual culture but also with the beliefs, customs, and traditions – the everyday ways of life – of different social classes and groups.

His second contention was that such ways of life should not be studied in isolation from each other. Analysis should rather encompass the whole set of relations that organized the interactions between ways of life. Williams attributed to these a patterned complexity which – in a term whose exact meaning has proved elusive – he called the “structure of feeling” characterizing a particular period or society. The early work of the Birmingham School in cultural studies was profoundly shaped by its engagements with these aspects of Williams's work and the more empirically developed traditions of subcultural analysis coming out of American sociology (Hall & Jefferson 1976).

Williams's work took a different direction in the 1970s, mainly as a consequence of his exposure to the continental tradition of “western Marxism” that *New Left Review* made widely available in English translation. His intellectual engagement with European Marxism bore its most distinctive fruit in *Marxism and Literature* (1977) in which, while committing to a Marxist position, he also sought to reform it.

In earlier work, Williams had distanced himself from the Marxist formulations of the relations between culture and society that were then available to him. In *Marxism and Literature*, the influence of Antonio Gramsci, Lucien Goldman, and others led to a more favorable reading of Marxist thought on the condition that its understanding of the relations between culture and society be detached from the determinist implications of the base/superstructure metaphor. The result was a distinctive formulation of the relative autonomy of culture which Williams fashioned into a probing account of the role of materialism in Marxist thought – issues he returned to in *Problems in Materialism and Culture* (1980).

Other key texts include *The Country and the City* (1973), a commanding overview of the representation of the relations between rural and urban social life in British literature and social thought, and *Television: Technology and Cultural Form* (1974) which, in rebutting determinist accounts of the relations between media technologies and society and discussing the significance of flow in the organization of the television text, had a long term influence on the development of television studies. *Keywords* (1976) made an original contribution to public scholarship in its historical survey of the key terms in the English vocabulary of the relations between culture and society.

Williams died in 1988, shortly after retiring. While he remained intellectually active to the end – *The Politics of Modernism* (1989) was published posthumously – his later work spoke less centrally to changing political concerns. For Williams, the key point of social reference for discussing culture was always class. His work therefore yielded little purchase on the increasingly important questions regarding gender, sexuality, and culture that feminist thought had placed on the agenda. The exclusively national and white British framework of this thought was also incapable of addressing questions of race and ethnicity – an aspect of his legacy that Paul Gilroy (1987) drew attention to.

There are several critical commentaries on Williams's life and work and one biography (Inglis 1995). Williams, however, had always made commentary on his life a part of his work in a manner that was and remains distinctive. His interviews with the editors of *New Left Review*, published as *Politics and Letters* (1979), are still the most absorbing manifestation and portrayal of this interweaving of life and work.

SEE ALSO: Base and Superstructure; Birmingham School; Class Consciousness; Cultural Studies, British; Culture; Materialism; Media; New Left; Subculture

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Wollstonecraft, Mary (1759–97)

Cynthia Siemsen

Mary Wollstonecraft has been widely regarded at least since the 1970s as the first feminist thinker of consequence on women's sociopolitical condition. The label "feminist" is perhaps a misnomer considering the historical context of her life and the relative youth of the term. However, if the litmus test for feminist thought is opposition to gender hierarchy, acceptance that gender is socially constructed, and belief that women as a social group need collective action to bring about equality, Mary Wollstonecraft is a proto feminist thinker. Her writings appear on the shelves of literature, political philosophy, and women's studies. Wollstonecraft's life is also the subject in its own right of psychology, anthropology, and literature. However, the consideration of her contribution to classical sociological thought is more recent. Wollstonecraft's theoretical absence is not a reflection on her sociological contributions; rather, it symbolizes the patriarchal nature of society when sociology as a discipline emerged, and the everyday reality of most societies throughout history, including our own.

The statement that social theory cannot be disentangled from the life and historical moment of the thinker takes on great meaning when applied to Mary Wollstonecraft. Her biography reads like the plot of a great tragedy: berated daughter, servant, vilified political writer, at times suicidal lover, briefly happy wife,

and early death from the complications of child birth which delivered a great gothic novelist. The tendency to emphasize “Wollstonecraft, the subject” over “Wollstonecraft, the social thinker” is difficult to resist. However, Wollstonecraft’s biography informed her thought and her theory influenced her life. But Wollstonecraft’s theory goes beyond the particulars of her life to expose the gendered power relations of larger social institutions.

Wollstonecraft was born in the crowded East End of London. She was the second child of seven, and oldest daughter to a ne’er do well farmer who was a violent alcoholic and who beat his wife. Wollstonecraft recollected that she slept on the landing outside her parents’ bedroom in the event she should have to protect her mother from her father’s abuse. Wollstonecraft (1798) remembered her father as a tyrant and her mother as his willing victim. She was continually reminded of the status difference between herself and her parents’ firstborn son. Although she remained bitter toward her brother, and the institution of inheritance, later in life Wollstonecraft grew to appreciate poverty’s odd benefits. Wollstonecraft reasoned that, had she led the sheltered social existence of her middle class female counterparts, she may have developed physical and mental inadequacies fostered by patriarchal environments.

Wollstonecraft fled her parents’ house at 19 years to pursue a life of economic independence from men. Through service to moneyed women, Wollstonecraft became convinced that middle class women’s inadequacies grew from their dependencies upon husbands, which were supported by the spirit and letter of English law. A married woman legally could not own property in her own name; furthermore, as subservient to her husband, she had no legal control over her own children. Divorce was nearly impossible.

Wollstonecraft was for the most part self-taught. During her early years of independence, she combined her talents with those of her friend Fanny Blood, and opened a school for girls. Although the school folded following Blood’s death due to complications of child birth, the endeavor led Wollstonecraft to write her first work for money. *Thoughts on the Education of Daughters* (1787) stressed the power of women to cultivate their minds through education and reason, in order to realize independence

and virtue. While her first piece was less than original – a frequent criticism of Wollstonecraft (Sapiro 1992) – *Thoughts* reflected Wollstonecraft’s later preoccupation with outcomes of blind obedience, whether within the family or within the state.

Wollstonecraft wrote *Mary: A Fiction* (1788) the following year. The now 27 year old governess depicted a young woman who was belittled by her parents and forced to educate herself as a means of survival. The novel closes by reflecting on a “world where there is neither marrying, nor giving in marriage.” Obviously, *Mary* is not pure fiction, but it demonstrates Wollstonecraft’s potential for radical thought.

By the end of 1787, Wollstonecraft adopted the identity of a professional writer with the aid of the Dissenting publisher Joseph Johnson. Wollstonecraft joined Johnson’s political circle that included British poet and painter William Blake, American Revolutionary Thomas Paine, British political theorist William Godwin, and moral philosopher Richard Price. Wollstonecraft’s first great work would not be published until 1790; in the interim she became a frequent book reviewer for Johnson’s *Analytical Review*. Of note is her critique of Rousseau’s *Confessions*.

The Vindication of the Rights of Men (1790) was the first of many responses to Edmund Burke’s *Reflections on the Revolution in France* (1790), the most famous being Thomas Paine’s *The Rights of Man*. With the falling of the Bastille in 1789, England was thrust into a controversy over human rights. Burke declared that the principles of the French Revolution might prove the ruin of France (and perhaps England) if liberty and equality prevailed. Burke conceived those institutions threatened by the revolution – the monarchy, class distinctions, inheritance, and property – as the basis of social order. Without them society might revert to its previous brutish state where innate human passions ran rampant.

Less than a month after *Reflections* was published, Wollstonecraft dashed off her heated response that synthesized her ideas with those of Locke, Rousseau, and Richard Price. Wollstonecraft’s *The Vindication of the Rights of Men* was considered rude (especially after she revealed her identity), rushed, and emotionally personal. Despite its anger, *Rights of Men* has

been described as “one of the most sophisticated essays on political argument and political psychology of her day” (Sapiro 1992: 24–5). Wollstonecraft (1790) followed Locke in defining rights as God given to “such a degree of liberty, civil and religious, as is compatible with the liberty of every other individual with whom he is united in a social compact” (pp. 7–8). Following Rousseau, liberty in civil society was only an ideal that obscures the reality of private property. For Wollstonecraft, human rights were rational rights; they were inherited at birth by humans, as rational creatures; rational rights cannot be undermined by tradition or other social institutions. She criticized Burke’s view of human malice present at birth. For Wollstonecraft (1790), “children are born ignorant, [consequently] innocent” (p. 72). Following Price, morality was not an instinct; it existed in the sphere of human reason. Wollstonecraft ridiculed Burke for supporting the aristocracy and class distinctions; she instead stressed the bad effects of privilege on the person, for “the respect paid to rank and fortune damps every generous purpose of the soul” (p. 52). Wollstonecraft argued that upper class women were only half human, their biggest concern being to please men.

However, *The Vindication of the Rights of Woman* (1792) was the first place she identified – in today’s words – women as an oppressed group, crossing class lines. In it she set forth two theoretical propositions. First, she argued that the absolute monarchism of her day was tied to four institutions: the aristocracy, military, church, and most of all, the patriarchal family. Second, true freedom for all human beings (i.e., economic, political, and intellectual) would never exist as long as women and men were not equals. Wollstonecraft repeatedly asserted the right of women to prove their equality through enlarged opportunities (e.g., education) and independence from men. However, its more sociological reading is that just as the tyranny of men injures the character of women, so the tyranny of government harms its people.

By the end of 1792 Wollstonecraft had traveled to France to witness the revolution first hand. In a departure from liberal thought, Wollstonecraft grappled with power and domination in *An Historical and Moral View of the*

Origin and Progress of the French Revolution (1794), addressing both the political violence of the *ancien régime* and the violence of the Terror she witnessed. Wollstonecraft’s years in France are most often linked to her romantic liaison with American writer and entrepreneur Gilbert Imlay. By the end of 1793 France and England were at war and British expatriates were being arrested in France. Wollstonecraft sought protection at the American Embassy by registering as the “wife” of Imlay. Although they never married, Imlay fathered Wollstonecraft’s first daughter, Fanny, and was the impetus behind *Letters Written during a Short Residence in Sweden, Norway, and Denmark* (1796).

Imlay lost interest in Wollstonecraft after Fanny’s birth, plunging her into a deep depression. Todd (2000: 279–80) writes: “She took no comfort from the stern words in *The Rights of Woman* about the stupidity of women who put their trust in romantic hopes.” The knowledge of Imlay’s interest in other women led to Wollstonecraft’s first suicide attempt. To help her recover, Imlay sent Wollstonecraft (and Fanny) to Scandinavia as his business agent – a lost cargo ship needed recovery.

Wollstonecraft’s last great work began as part of a new genre, the travelogue; it also lapses into a memoir of a troubled woman struggling to find peace of mind. (Wollstonecraft did not achieve peace of mind on her travels to Scandinavia. Her affair with Imlay ended only after another suicide attempt.) However, it was also a treatise on society and human nature. Wollstonecraft’s consciousness of power’s oppressive nature was keener than ever. She witnessed the tyranny of Denmark against its weaker neighbors, men over women, and found power’s root in private property. Observing convicts on a road one day she reflected that the gold keys of the nearby noblemen were a greater disgrace than the prisoners’ chains. Whether a person was the aristocrat or the prisoner, they would feel the ill effects of the same unjust society at the level of their characters.

One of *A Short Residence’s* readers was William Godwin, who wrote: “if ever there was a book calculated to make a man in love with its author, this appears to me to be the book” (Ferguson & Todd 1984: 89). Wollstonecraft and Godwin’s intellectual and love relationship

was short lived. After learning of Wollstonecraft's pregnancy they chose to marry despite their public statements on the evils of the marriage contract as an artificial bond. While pregnant, Wollstonecraft was in the process of writing a novel she would never finish. At 38 years of age, Wollstonecraft died from complications after childbirth. Her infant, Mary Godwin Shelley, survived and went on to write *Frankenstein*. Although she never completed *The Wrongs of Woman, or Maria* (1798), in that work Wollstonecraft gave her most radical statement of the relationship between patriarchy, the state, and the family. She argued that the family represents a small commonwealth of the state, and that a husband is not only its patriarch, but also its police.

What earns Mary Wollstonecraft a place of prominence in pre sociological philosophy is her early articulation of micro and macro levels of analysis. On the one hand, she describes social environmental influences on the formation of the gendered self. Wollstonecraft's analysis also extends beyond her personal experience and close observation of gender roles of her day; she also demonstrates the tie between gender and power in the relations of dominance and subordination within social institutions such as the aristocracy, military, church, and family.

SEE ALSO: Feminism; Patriarchy; Women's Empowerment

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womanism

April L. Few

In 1983, Alice Walker contrasted Afrocentrism, black feminism, and white feminism using the term *womanist* to render a critique of possibilities for women and men who felt ostracized by the mainstream women's movement in the United States. Walker's much cited phrase, "Womanist is to feminist as purple is to lavender," reflects this comparison. Walker derived the term womanist from the Southern black folk expression of mothers to female children, "You acting womanish." Womanish girls and women "act out in outrageous, courageous, and willful ways." They are free from traditional conventions that limit white women's experience and relating. Walker stated that womanish girls and women want to know more and in greater depth than what was considered good for them. They

are “responsible, in charge, and serious” when relating to themselves and the world.

In her classic essay “In Search of Our Mothers’ Gardens,” Walker describes womanism as being rooted in black women’s particular history of racial and gender oppression in the United States. Yet, womanists are “traditionally universalists.” Womanism is a gender progressive worldview that emerges from black women’s unique history, is accessible primarily to black women yet also extends beyond women of African descent, as evidenced in the works of other multi ethnic feminists. Therefore, womanism is a pluralist vision of black empowerment and consciousness. Because it is a pluralist vision, womanism requires both women and men to be aware of the nature of gendered inequalities and to share a commitment to work toward social change.

Walker (1983) describes a womanist as many things. A womanist “loves herself . . . regard less.” She is a black feminist or feminist of color who is “committed to the survival and wholeness of an entire people, both male and female.” A womanist prefers women’s culture and has an appreciation for women’s flexibility and the strengths to negotiate adversity. Yet, a critique of womanism is that it does not address inter racial cooperation among women. She loves the spirit of black women and the struggle to confront and to overcome. Walker (1983: xi) also describes a womanist as “a woman who loves women, sexually and/or nonsexually.” The writings of many womanists are rather silent about this aspect of Walker’s womanism. As black feminist Barbara Smith suspects, this omission may speak to either ambivalence or homophobia in black communities.

Other scholars have described womanism similarly. Geneva Smitherman defined a womanist as an African American woman who is rooted in the black community and committed to the development of herself and the entire community. Jannette Taylor stated that the word “womanist” incorporates the complexity of experience for black women and that the framework allows the experiences to be shared through the language and principles of black communities. Delores Williams believed that womanism reflects Afrocentric cultural codes. These codes are female centered and relate to the conditions, meanings, and values that have

emerged from black women’s activities in their communities. In “Some Implications of Womanist Theory,” Sherley Anne Williams (1986) argued that womanist theory is especially accessible to black men because, while it calls for feminist discussions of black women’s texts and for critiques of black androcentrism, womanism places black psychic health as a primary objective. In 1994, Layli Phillips and Barbara McCaskill created the scholarly journal *The Womanist: Womanist Theory and Research* to demonstrate the interdisciplinary, intercultural, and international nature of womanist perspectives in the academy and to feature womanist grounded pedagogical and theoretical articles, creative writing, and art of black women.

In the late 1980s, black female theologians began to incorporate race and gender critiques into theology. Walker’s definition of womanism has played a significant role in raising consciousness among female seminarians regarding the moral agency of black women scholars, particularly and initially active members in the Academy of Religion and the Society of Biblical Literature who sought to create analytical frameworks to advance theoretically black women’s religious discourse. Womanism has been used by black women theologians to challenge and critique religious traditions and ecclesiastical political processes. Womanist theologians also have sought to clarify women centered aspects of biblical studies, church history, systematic theology, and social ethics. Katie Cannon’s *Black Womanist Ethics* (1988), Jacquelyn Grant’s *White Women’s Christ and Black Women’s Jesus* (1989), Delores S. Williams’s *Sisters in the Wilderness: The Challenge of Womanist God Talk* (1993), Emilie Townes’s *A Troubling in My Soul: Womanist Perspectives on Evil and Suffering* (1993), and Cheryl Kirk Duggan’s *Exorcizing Evil: A Womanist Perspective on the Spirituals* (1997) are significant Christian womanist texts that center the essence of black feminism in Protestant theology. Even Christian womanist self help books such as Renita Weems’s *Just a Sister Away: A Womanist Vision of Women’s Relationship in the Bible* and *I Asked for Intimacy: Stories of Blessings, Betrayals, and Birthings* (1993) have been published to extend womanism’s reach beyond the academy and seminary.

Some womanists like Clenora Hudson Weems (1993) argue that the feminist–womanist

tie should be separated by locating womanism in the words of Sojourner Truth (i.e., *Ain't I A Woman*) and Afrocentric cultural values. Africana womanism is this theoretical framework. Hudson Weems identified the characteristics of Africana womanism as self naming, self defining, role flexibility, family centeredness, struggling alongside men against multiple oppressions, adaptability, black sisterhood, wholeness, authenticity, strength, male compatibility, respect for self, others, and elders, recognition, ambition, mothering, nurturing, and spirituality. Hudson Weems believes that mainstream white feminism was too self centered or female centered with its focus on self realization and personal gratification. Africana womanists, on the other hand, are family centered and community centered, interested in collective outcomes and group achievement. It should be noted that although Africana womanists see sexism as an important problem, some do not see sexism as an objective more important than fighting racism. This perspective on sexism reflects the nationalist roots of womanism and is another critique of womanism.

SEE ALSO: Black Feminist Thought; Feminism, First, Second, and Third Waves; Women, Religion and; Women's Empowerment

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women, economy and

Elizabeth Esterchild

Women's position in the economy and their general well being in all other spheres of life depend heavily on the type of society in which they reside. All societies have a complex division

of labor by sex. In some, men's and women's tasks are not differentially evaluated and rewarded; in others differential evaluation is so strong that men receive the lion's share of property, material goods, and rights and privileges while women become the property of men and their work and work products are controlled by men. Societies differ because of alternative modes of organization of the productive forces and the subsequent differences in the parts played by the two sexes in these economic arrangements. Gerhard Lenski (1966) described six different types of societies based on the level of technology of the primary means of production, while gender scholars (Dunn et al. 1999) filled in the distinct implications for women.

In the earliest foraging and simple horticultural societies, women's contributions to food, clothing, and shelter ensured respect for them, as families depended on women's work for survival. Meanwhile, men garnered a bit more prestige because they hunted for the highly prized meat and distributed it outside the family. Material inequality was almost unknown because redistribution norms prevailed and each member of society had access to the means of production (Lenski 1966).

When the steel tipped hoe was introduced, societies were able to produce a surplus. People in these new, advanced horticultural societies demanded more land; both warfare and trading with other societies became widespread. Only men and eventually only certain men could participate in the military and the emerging governing class. The expectation that men would accumulate possessions replaced redistribution norms, and material inequality increased greatly (Lenski 1966). Women's lives and work became more and more subordinated to men's desires, and although a few were able to set themselves apart by being excellent traders or wives of high ranking men, the huge majority were completely occupied with producing more warriors, feeding their families, and working to produce surplus that was placed in the hands of men (Chafetz 1986). These changes in the economic structure and the division of labor had profound negative effects on women's status. A double standard of sexuality emerged, divorce was virtually impossible to obtain, and women were eventually viewed as property. Daughters could be traded as brides for military alliances;

wives, including sometimes multiple wives, were used to promote the husbands' interests. Women became interchangeable; women who were stolen or captured from other societies could be incorporated to produce more heirs and perform the same work for which wives were responsible. It is likely that the first patriarchal bargains were struck in this type of society. In the bargain, women, albeit reluctantly, traded their work to their husbands in return for the protection husbands provided.

The introduction of another mode of production – plow agriculture with several associated increases in level of technology – simply accelerated all these trends. A larger military and political apparatus appeared, and distinctions among ranks increased. The emergence of propertied classes coincided with a huge increase in the amount of material inequality. The elite class was made up of the highest status people from the military, the state, and the propertied classes; all were in a position to benefit from the labor of a large peasant class, a smaller artisan class, and sometimes a large number of slaves (Lenski 1966). As hereditary inequality solidified, women's status increasingly depended on the status of their fathers and husbands. More important, women of the elite classes were not allowed to participate in the military, the state with its expanding bureaucracy, or to own significant property. Elite women were unable, then, to directly reap the rewards associated with high status. Middle class women had plenty of duties to perform. They and peasant women – the bulk of the population – saw their work devalued in part because it did not produce anything for the market. Women were still responsible for feeding their families, so they labored in large gardens and with small animals, but they were denied access to the major means of production: the oxen and the plow. As a result, women's status deteriorated and an ideology of inferiority developed which carried over into industrial society (Chafetz 1986).

In the United States, ideological changes that accompanied the move to industrialization fueled the fires of classism, racism, and sexism. Capitalist employers were happy to fan the flames to keep the fires burning. They propagated the ideas that “real men” did not have a wife employed for pay, that woman's place was in the home, and that a good wife is one who can

make her husband look good by spending his money very wisely. In this way, employers had a large number of men who worked very hard, who were well cared for by their wives, and whose wives were seduced to become a market for consumer goods. As well, employers kept the labor market segmented into many distinct occupational niches and hired different categories of people in each. They did their best to forestall the formation of unions, while unions were not always willing to incorporate women into their organization. Many workers at different levels opposed hiring of minority women and men as well as white women in “their” jobs, thus helping perpetuate job segregation.

In the United States, at the beginning of the 1900s, male workers demanded a family wage, and employers were happy to push the twin myths that men were being paid a wage large enough to support a family and that women were only working until marriage or to supplement their husbands' income so they did not need a living wage (Charles & Grusky 2004). Over the course of the twentieth century, these ideas eroded somewhat as more and more women acquired an education and moved into the labor force. At mid century, unmarried women had been employed for quite some time, as had divorced and poor married women. Married women with high school age children joined the labor market after World War II, and beginning in the 1970s, more and more middle class women with preschool or school age children entered the labor market. Their fortunes were limited, however, as unequal pay scales continued, and women were crowded into relatively low paying clerical, service, and factory jobs. Most employed women were now doing a double shift, both working to feed their families and taking care of the emotional and physical needs of their husbands and children (Charles & Grusky 2004).

Moreover, as health care improved and people lived much longer, women were often faced with being the primary caretaker for their elderly parents or for their husbands' elderly relatives. Indeed, it was not uncommon to see women caught among the triple roles of raising their own children, caring for elderly parents, and keeping their own careers up and running. As employers recognized the need to keep women committed to working for them, some

began offering support for childcare, flexible working hours, and more generous family leave policies. Other women adapted by working part time or part year, but such strategies left them ineligible for even pro rated benefits (Reskin 1998; Gregory et al. 1999). Truly meaningful part time jobs that allow both husbands and wives to meet family needs as well as have some time to enjoy their lives are still very few in number.

Today, the United States, Japan, and some European nations have moved into a post industrial phase in which few workers actually produce goods but provide services instead (Lenski 1966; Charles & Grusky 2004). Automation and other technological advances free many workers – both women and men – from the factory but leave their future uncertain because of the loss of steady, relatively well paying blue collar jobs (Sernau 2006). Many production jobs moved overseas where employers are free from government taxes and restrictions and can employ an ever ready supply of laborers who work for low pay and few benefits. These shifts have left some men employed at high end jobs that pay well, but pushed more downward on the pay scale. In these early years of the new century, it appears that the market for women workers is becoming bifurcated as well.

Currently, around the world there is enormous variability in women's economic participation. The many so called developing societies result from the imposition and then the throwing off of colonial rule. Historically, colonizers exploited native people for natural resources and for labor. Today as well, third world societies supply a market for some goods and cheap, throwaway laborers for production. The destabilizing effects of colonization disrupted traditional family and cultural practices, frequently drew men away from their households to work, and left women to fend for themselves. Women in these traditional societies often lose rights to the land and hence face great difficulty in growing food for their children and elders (Sernau 2006). Today, a few women in these societies are gaining an education and moving into white collar positions in urban labor markets. Many more are forced by circumstances to work in the informal sector as housemaids, selling food or handmade objects on street corners, or as day

laborers. In most instances, their work is unacknowledged in computations of the gross national product and largely unregulated.

In post industrial societies, government policies designed to remedy employment discrimination often meet extreme resistance fueled by misunderstandings among the public and serious obstacles from employers who do not want to yield control over their business practices. The combined forces of anti discrimination laws and remedies, affirmative action regulations, and comparable worth campaigns are far from eliminating the deleterious effects of employment discrimination on white women or minority people of either sex (Reskin 1998).

Employees are reluctant to bring charges under anti discrimination laws and thereby risk their jobs. Class action suits have won major concessions from a handful of large companies in the United States; in the European Union, however, only individuals can contest instances of discrimination (Gregory et al. 1999). Affirmative action policies require employers to exert concerted efforts to ensure equal opportunities before choosing workers. They require employers to actively seek out women and minority applicants and make sure that they are not lumped into a limited array of job categories. Affirmative action requires quotas and time tables *only in those extremely rare cases* when employers have systematically and obviously discriminated against potential employees and have repeatedly failed to adjust their practices to more equitable arrangements (Reskin 1998).

Comparable worth policies offer a solution to the enduring problem that occupations in which women frequently work are often undervalued and underpaid. Because sex segregation of work is likely to endure for generations to come, advocates recommend a complete reevaluation of the demands and contributions of all job categories and gradually raising the pay of each undervalued occupation until pay equity is achieved. Despite the federal Equal Pay Act, comparable worth has most often been implemented – at least partially – in state and municipal employment rather than in private employment (Reskin 1998; Kahn & Figart 1999).

Contemporary women are rarely found in the ranks of the elite wealthholders but are more than numerous among the poor, especially those who are single and the mothers of small

children. Older women, especially those who are widowed, are most likely to have to depend on social security payments to subsist. Mean while, middle and working class couples typically find it necessary to have both wife and husband employed regardless of the ages and stages of the children and despite the fact that one or both draw relatively high wages. Improvements in the economic position of women await major changes in ideological patterns and in the institutional structure of work.

SEE ALSO: Affirmative Action; Divisions of Household Labor; Gender, Development and; Gender, Work, and Family; Occupational Segregation; Sex Based Wage Gap and Comparable Worth; Stratification, Gender and

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women, information technology and (Asia)

Helen Johnson

New information and communication technologies (ICT) challenge and have the potential to promote change in women's social status and socioeconomic opportunities in various ways. Some sociologists argue that innovative ICT embody the key characteristics required to provide women with effective opportunities to participate in mainstream economic activities in Asian societies, others that ICT are yet another tool of masculinized social, economic, and political power that is merely perpetuating gender differentiation.

"Asia" cannot be fully defined but the term is a useful shorthand to describe the array of countries whose economies now engage with ICT. "Asia" can encompass Japan, Singapore, and South Korea as three of the world's most technologically developed nations. Asian countries in general hold leading positions in the ICT arena, and nations such as India are sites for technology industries and practices that add significantly to the region's economies, societies, and cultures. While "women" cannot be considered a homogeneous group, "gender" is one of the major ways that humans organize their lives. Many Asian sociologists link ICT to

the analytical prism of "gender" to add detail to the social practices that imbricate ICT usage, examine the ways these may be shaped by gendered and cross cultural difference, assess the potential for marginalization of some social groups via ICT innovation, and add to current debates in the Asia Pacific region surrounding the development of social policies that address issues of social marginalization caused by ICT.

Female Internet use in Asia continues to increase, with women, in 2001, in South Korea comprising 45 percent of the online population, in Hong Kong 44 percent, and in Singapore and Taiwan 42 percent and 41 percent, respectively. Furthermore, women themselves are appraising the benefits of ICT. Previous international research on gender and ICT has focused on the participation of women in computer science as a profession; issues of access analyzed through the prisms of race, class, and gender; the diversity of social interactions on the Internet and their potential for the constitution of multiple identities; the gendering of information systems; and issues of sexual harassment and online pornography. Further studies argue that feminist historical analyses illuminate a range of concepts and actions missing from mainstream social studies of technology and highlight women's active use of the Internet for social change, support networks, and self expression. Others consider how gender is a factor online via experimentation with identity, and how the Internet can be a transformative space where gender categories are reconfigured. Haraway (1985, 1997) has theorized how traditional and innovative media have reconfigured social possibilities for bodies, technologies, and gender. Consalvo and Paasonen have critiqued the ways that technologically neutral or determinist positions do not question the social structures and cultures enveloping new media nor the social differences such as age, caste, class, and nationality that exist between women. Joshi's (1997) edited collection questions the potential for new ICT to expand the gender gap and/or to create more democratic environments in "Asian" nation states.

Analyses of the gendered access to and use of the Internet in the United States have stirred debate about whether the Internet perpetuates regressive social structures or enables progressive female agency in Asian nation states (see,

for Japan, Aoshima 1993; Kanai 1993; Kurano 1993; Hirose 1997; and for other nation states in Asia, Joshi 1997). They also detail the time and financial constraints that hinder women's access and argue that providing access to cyber empowerment is fundamental. Gan (1997) asserts that the gender marking of technology as a male domain has been transferred to the Internet via gender coded societal conditions in Singapore and, despite the government's vigorous program to place technology in the hands of all citizens, social attitudes about women's roles and capabilities must also change. Lumby (1997) notes that technological literacy has been defined against women's skills, and questions about whether the Internet is yet another tool of masculinized social, economic, and political power are deemed vital. Ang (2001) and Tan (1991) explore how researchers ignore, to their loss, how local peoples invoke different gendered perceptions to further their interests. And researchers such as Gupta and Singh (1994) and Hobart (1993) detail how geographical information systems (GIS), as computer programs for mapping definitive geographical identifications which can be linked to information databases about local peoples, have been critiqued for privileging spatial coordinates at the expense of incorporating and understanding poetry and performance as important components of local and indigenous communities' knowledge.

The ways in which ICT may change modes of thinking as well as practices have also been examined. Wong (2000) shows how new technology changes not only material reality but also the ways people think about reality, explores social relations and attitudes to cyberspace and the Internet, styles of interaction with new ICTs and perceived possibilities of identity formation, and argues that cyberspace not only connotes the possibility of transcending one's body but also provides a utopian space for transcendence to a higher state of being. Deconstructing the images and language used to describe cyberspace, Wong notes that most users are ambivalent, with attitudes spinning between idealism, cynicism, and indifference. Wong also explores how language is styled by the influences of the Internet as it becomes interwoven throughout society, and the appeal of the Net for adolescents in terms of relative

empowerment, word games, and flaming for entertainment. Of significance is her presentation of the Japanese Industrial Standard (JIS) character, its use to subvert ASCII text's globalism, and its development of a different range of emotions to express Japanese sentiments. Razak (1997) explores changes to modes of thinking via an index to Malay women's social consciousness, ascertaining how media technologies act to reinforce women's concepts of identity. She notes that improvements in women's consciousness of their rights and responsibilities are occurring and that women are receiving greater media coverage of their familial contributions and their broader social achievements.

Information literacy is examined via Amin's (1997) proposal that ICT may have a different meaning within the context of a "developing" nation such as Bangladesh, in that it must include older technologies such as fax and telephones. She suggests that ICT has a liberating potential in giving women the ability to choose from a wider range of occupations. While Amin's analysis does not take into consideration how class issues may impact on education and access, Joshi (2004) does discuss the difficulties of ensuring that a range of people participate in digitally empowered development in India and focuses particularly on the ways in which women's issues such as health, health education, and access to means of communication evolve. Rajesh (2002) also examines the potential for social disadvantage that is exacerbated by technological development, concentrating on issues of access, whereas Bhatnagare and Schware (1999) examine how ICTs are forming a significant component of rural development. Cheuk (2000) explores information literacy in the workplace via a user centered approach, considers common strategies that are exhibited by people in a group, and the diverse strategies of each individual adopted at different times, in order to gain a holistic understanding of information literacy and thence to improve education in this area.

Current research focuses on how women specifically engage with ICTs across cultures in Asia, the problems of access that face socially disadvantaged sectors of the region's many constituent communities, and the potential impact of technology on local peoples, particularly in relation to the loss or ignorance of local knowledge.

SEE ALSO: Culture, Gender and; Gender Bias; Gender Ideology and Gender Role Ideology; Information Technology; Internet; Social Change, Southeast Asia

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women, religion and

Sally K. Gallagher

Women's religious commitments, ideals, and involvement are increasingly of interest to sociologists within both the sociology of religion and other fields. While early research on religion focused on the origins, functions, meaning, and measurement of religion, the past few decades have witnessed a burgeoning interest in women's spirituality, the involvement of women within religious institutions, and religiously based women's social movements. Part of this shift is the result of the growth of gender

studies within sociology, as well as increased religious pluralism and expression across the religious landscape.

Women's involvement in religion varies depending on whether we are considering personal beliefs and practices or institutional affiliation and leadership. Some scholars have been critical of women's marginalization within religious institutions. Some critics, such as theologian Mary Daly, argue that women's historic exclusion from positions of leadership and authority within western religious traditions is evidence that the Judeo Christian tradition itself is inherently patriarchal and oppressive and should be abandoned in favor of non patriarchal feminist spiritualities. The recent growth of neo pagan (Neitz 2000), goddess worship, and other forms of feminist spirituality suggest that some women are moving away from traditional western religious institutions because they do not adequately meet their needs or provide the kind of overarching moral narrative that gives meaning to women's lives.

Others, however, argue that religion itself (especially western Christianity) is not inherently oppressive to women, but that the gender egalitarian teachings of these traditions and the historical involvement of women as leaders, teachers, and writers have been minimized for political and economic reasons. Thus, within both the Roman Catholic Church and evangelical Protestantism, for example, feminist organizations have emerged in an effort to restore more gender equitable practices and beliefs. Christians for Biblical Equality, the Evangelical and Ecumenical Women's Caucus, and the Women's Ordination Conference are examples of organizations that seek to advance feminist goals within conservative Protestant and Roman Catholic churches. Countering these are a number of conservative organizations and institutions that promote "traditional gender roles" in which women's nurturing is seen as a natural complement to men's responsibilities as leaders, protectors, and providers within both family and the church (Concerned Women for America and the Council on Biblical Manhood and Womanhood are two such examples). Although less and less willing to describe these relationships as one of women's submission and men's leadership, the model these groups promote is nevertheless one in which men have final

decision making authority and spiritual responsibility for family life. The abuses of this power have led to an increase of scholarship on links between religious teaching on women's submission and domestic abuse (Kroeger & Nason Clark 2001).

Sociology of religion has also explored the dimensions of women's leadership as clergy and lay leaders within the church. Adair Lummis, Nancy Ammerman, and Paula Nesbitt are examples of scholars who have written on the struggles of women in positions of leadership within conservative denominations and traditions and the organizational barriers women face as effective clergy.

What the above research highlights is how women's connections to religious institutions vary based on underlying ideas about the nature of masculinity and femininity themselves. The teachings of some religious institutions and traditions are that women and men are essentially different, and because of those differences should be differently involved in religious worship, teaching, and leadership. Orthodox Judaism, Roman Catholicism, Eastern Orthodoxy, Islam, and many conservative Protestant denominations are examples of religious traditions in which specific leadership positions and responsibilities are reserved for men. Within some of these traditions, religious ritual and family responsibilities are also gendered – with women and men being seen as having separate practices and obligations inside and outside the household.

Not all theologically conservative religions, however, are necessarily or uniformly conservative when it comes to the place of women in religious life. The past decade has seen a movement away from debates over androgyny and hierarchy toward a growing emphasis on complementarity and ideological egalitarianism. Both those who argue that there are essential gender differences and those who argue for gender equality have moved toward a pragmatically egalitarian approach in which symbolic offices and authority may remain limited to women, but women's increasing opportunities to teach, lead, and participate in institutional religious life are paralleled by greater emphasis on men's responsibility to become more involved in everyday family life as husbands and fathers (Gallagher 2003; Bartkowski 2004; Wilcox 2004).

In terms of personal religious life, sociologists of religion have been particularly interested in the appeal of conservative religious traditions to women and the articulation of religion and family life. Rather than focusing on women's institutional involvement, this body of research explores the personal benefits women find in religious observance. Recent studies of conservative Protestants (Manning 1999; Bartkowski 2001; Gallagher 2003), Pentecostals (Griffith 1997; Brasher 1998), Latter Day Saints (Beaman 2001), and newly Orthodox Jewish women (Davidman 1991; Manning 1999) have all made the case that women find personal satisfaction, growth, community, and family support through religious life. Small group participation, prayer services, and family rituals are particularly important in creating a sense of community and care for women within these traditions.

SEE ALSO: Church; Feminism, First, Second, and Third Waves; Fundamentalism; Gender Ideology and Gender Role Ideology; Religion, Sociology of; Sexuality, Religion and; Spirituality, Religion, and Aging

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women in science

Anne Kerr

The history and present status of women in science are of interest to sociologists because of the longstanding disparities in women's and men's relative rank and levels of productivity in science, but also because of the male domination of the sciences as a whole. A range of psychological, structural, and cultural explanations have been developed to explain these circumstances and a whole plethora of initiatives and schemes have been implemented to redress the gender imbalance within science. Disparities nevertheless remain and their entrenchment is the subject of continued theoretical and empirical debate.

Women have not always been a minority within science. As Carolyn Merchant has demonstrated, the scientific revolution was premised upon the formal exclusion of women from the new institutions of science. Wise women and midwives were persecuted and "well born" women intellectuals were confined to the home as the division between public and private life intensified. At the same time, dichotomies between mind and nature, reason and feeling, and male and female hardened. Great women scientists like Christine de Pizan (1365–ca. 1430) and Laura Bassi (1711–78) were nevertheless rediscovered in the 1970s as second wave feminists took up their predecessors' quest to show that women can do science just as well as men. They also concentrated their attention on the barriers to women's achievement in science, spawning a rich and diverse literature on the history and culture of science at a time when women were entering science

at a rapid pace. As Schiebinger notes, by 1995, 23 percent of US scientists and engineers were women. Yet it also became apparent that women's fortunes in science wax and wane according to the political and economic climate as well as the development of scientific institutions. Progression is far from linear.

There are copious amounts of empirical evidence to demonstrate that girls excel in science in the right context but that women drop out of science at each and every significant transition throughout the typical scientific career. Women are more likely to be found in low status, insecure jobs, and to devote themselves to the least valued aspects of academic life, particularly teaching. This means that their record of research fund raising is not as good as men's and, relatedly, their publication rates and their promotional prospects are worse. The glass ceiling has become something of a cliché but there is no doubt that it is very real. The proportion of female professors in the sciences is minuscule, and the rate of increase is far lower than the increases in women gaining PhDs in the sciences.

As Mary Frank Fox has convincingly argued, the organizational context of science is fundamental to these gender inequalities. Women are least likely to succeed in organizational contexts where the criteria of evaluation and assessment are informal and subjective. In environments where their contribution is not actively encouraged, they participate less in policy discussions and collaborative enterprises. The individualistic culture of some science departments means that graduate education in particular is essentially "privatized" and it is in this type of environment that implicit norms of masculinity flourish, and those who "look like" those currently in positions of authority are privileged. What Knorr Cetina has called the "epistemic culture" of science, sustained in part through the secrecy and informality of many peer review mechanisms, privileges already established scholars and those like them, and marginalizes female and other minority groups as "the other."

Women's domestic situation is also crucial to their success in science. The long hours culture of science does not suit women's double burden of paid work and unpaid domestic labor.

The widespread and entrenched cultural belief that women have prime responsibility for child care and the tendency for a woman's career to take second place to that of her husband are other obvious contributory factors. On a more positive note, women's marriages also give them access to different networks of influence, and it seems that women who are married to other scientists are more successful than their counterparts.

Of course there is a burgeoning industry of psychological research and pseudo scientific speculation in the wider culture which offers reductionist and essentialist explanations of women's lack of success in science. Differences in women's and men's patterns of speech, social ability, cognitive processing, visual-spatial ability, and levels of aggression have all been deployed to explain women's underrepresentation in science. These have been convincingly debunked by proponents of the "gender similarity hypothesis," whose meta analyses have shown that women and men are more alike than they are different, except in a few largely inconsequential characteristics like the ability to throw objects long distances. As authors such as Janet Shibley Hyde have pointed out, there is a high cost to the prevailing cultural emphasis on gender difference, as it undermines women's sense of their ability to succeed in the workplace (and men's sense of their ability to nurture). Low expectations of girls' and women's mathematical ability and scientific prowess undermine their confidence and perpetuate inequalities. In short, stereotypes matter.

SEE ALSO: Feminism; Feminism, First, Second, and Third Waves; Feminism and Science, Feminist Epistemology; Feminist Standpoint Theory; Scientific Revolution

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women, sexuality and

Tiina Vares and Annie Potts

Western thought is underpinned by hierarchical binaries or dualisms, for example, mind/body, culture/nature, masculine/feminine, active/passive, to name but a few. Within this framework, "woman" is associated with terms such as passive, responsive, and inferior. These are constructed in opposition to "man," described as active, aggressive/predatory, and superior. The cultural investment in binarization, particularly between the two sexes, also produces heterosexuality as the only normative form of desire and privileges so called masculine values and experiences over so called feminine. With respect to sexuality, Luce Irigaray, in *This Sex Which is Not One* (1985), argues that western culture has persistently negated or repressed those modes of sexual experience that may be specific to women and which do not fit with masculinist assumptions about women's sexuality.

Western knowledge about human sexuality prior to the nineteenth century has been largely attributed to the Greeks. The framing of women's sexuality as inferior to men's sexuality can be found in the works of early philosophers such as Plato and Aristotle, as well as Galen, the influential second century physician and theorist. Plato, for example, popularized the idea that a "wandering (inactive) uterus" causes female hysteria in women who do not bear children. While Galen accepted the Aristotelian thesis that a woman is like a man, but lower in the hierarchy of being, he disputed Plato's idea of the wandering uterus (Tuana 1993). Women's genitals, Galen argued, were like those of men

but found inside the body. This was explained by “arrested development” and supported Aristotle’s idea that woman is “less perfect” than or a “misbegotten” man. Galen’s thesis that women’s sexuality was similar, although inferior, to men’s sexuality remained popular well into the eighteenth century. With respect to hysteria, it is worth noting that this became increasingly medicalized from the seventeenth century onwards. By the nineteenth century, it had become the source of attribution for myriad ailments and symptoms supposedly associated with “woman” and firmly connected with women’s sexuality (Ussher 1997).

In *Making Sex: Body and Gender from the Greeks to Freud* (1990), Thomas Laqueur argues that it was only from the late eighteenth century that “sex as we know it” was invented. Until this period, he argues, a “one sex” model of sexual difference dominated western medico biological thought. The shift to a “two sex” model was the result of social, political, and economic changes in the late eighteenth century rather than scientific developments. These created the context in which sexual differences needed to be articulated to support shifting gender arrangements. Although women were no longer seen as inverted replicas of men, the association of women’s bodies and sexuality as reproductive and nurturing, as opposed to sexual and passionate, was reinforced. The anatomical and physiological differences between males and females were thus used to reproduce assumptions about the nature of “heterosexuality,” positioning men as more active, stronger, superior, women as weaker, passive, and inferior, and positioning penile vaginal penetration as “natural” and central to all conceptions of human sexuality (Potts 2002).

Sexology, the “scientific study” of sexuality, was first constituted as an object of medical and scientific knowledge in the nineteenth century. Two of its pioneers, Richard von Krafft Ebing (*Psychopathia Sexualis*, 1886) and Havelock Ellis (*Studies in the Psychology of Sex*, 1913), drew on biological and evolutionary understandings of sexuality which continued to endorse the inevitability of male domination and female submission. They equated sex and gender and saw male and female sexuality as fundamentally opposed. Although Ellis supported the possibility and importance of female genital pleasure,

he nonetheless saw women as creatures weakened by their reproductive biology, since the “worm” or menstruation “gnaws periodically at the roots of life” (Segal 1994). Furthermore, women’s sexual activity was seen as being primarily for reproductive purposes. Although it was given a more autonomous existence in the writings of Ellis, it still required a man to initiate and release it. Thus, while some saw Ellis as promoting a liberal shift away from the sexual repression of Victorian times, Margaret Jackson (1987), for example, argues that his theories eroticized the oppression of women.

In the mid twentieth century, sexologist Alfred Kinsey argued that a liberal, as opposed to repressive, attitude to sexuality was necessary for men and women to be more effective sexual partners. His aim was to promote better understanding between men and women and increase women’s orgasmic satisfaction (Segal 1994). As a zoologist, Kinsey framed sex as a straightforward biological function and a purely physical phenomenon. His reports on male and female sexuality detailed what people actually did sexually and hence challenged popular sexual norms. For example, Kinsey and his colleagues, in *Sexual Behavior in the Human Female* (1953), found that almost a quarter of women had extramarital sexual relations, 3 percent of the female population were homosexual, and there were high rates of premarital sex among women and men. Kinsey also challenged the notion of female frigidity by indicating high rates of sexual responsiveness among women. In opposition to Freud, he reported that the clitoris was the main site of sexual responsiveness. In fact, he claimed the vaginal orgasm was a physiological impossibility and criticized Freud and others for projecting male constructs of sexuality onto women (Irvine 2002). Furthermore, Kinsey challenged the idea that masturbation was a dangerous sexual practice and argued that it was the best way for women to reach orgasm. While Kinsey’s work was seen by some as opening up more “positive” attitudes to sex by countering gendered sexual norms of the period, others argued his emphasis on the power of the male drive perpetuated the positioning of males as agents and females as passive recipients of the sexual act (Potts 2002). Furthermore, Kinsey’s refusal to acknowledge the significance of ethical, social, or emotional factors in the study of sexuality,

and his use of a biologically deterministic theory of sexuality, supported the common assumptions about women's sexuality he was attempting to disrupt.

The popularization of sexological research, in particular the notions that women "enjoy" sexual intercourse and that orgasms are the sign of that enjoyment, reinforce what Paula Nicolson (1993) calls the coital and orgasmic imperatives. The coital imperative asserts that penile vaginal intercourse is a "natural" and "normal" activity, while the orgasmic imperative posits that all sexual activity culminates in orgasm. Nicolson (1994) argues that these imperatives provide clear definitions of pleasure for women to adhere to, in spite of Kinsey's claim that orgasm through intercourse is not necessarily common for women, or Shere Hite's assertion, in *The Hite Report: A Nationwide Study of Female Sexuality* (1977), that this is not what most women themselves see as constituting pleasure. This also set the scene for the medicalization of "female sexual dysfunction" by prescribing what constitutes "normal" and hence "abnormal" female sexual function/experience (see below).

The medico biological, psychological, and sexological approaches which dominated eighteenth to mid twentieth century theorizing and research on women's sexuality drew on "sexual essentialism," that is, the notion that sex "is a natural force . . . eternally unchanging, asocial and transhistorical" (Rubin 1984). Feminist anthropologist Gayle Rubin argued that sexual essentialism is a fixed phenomenon in the West, but that the domination of sexual knowledge by disciplines such as medicine and sexology reinforced this essentialism. Within such a framework, sex was "a property of individuals [residing] in their hormones or their psyches" and having "no history and no significant social determinants."

Over the past few decades, essentialist understandings of women's sexuality have been increasingly challenged. For example, while many feminist approaches have pointed to the social construction of sexuality, these have produced tensions with feminist approaches informed by essentialist understandings. Nonetheless, since the first wave of feminism in the nineteenth century, the issue of women's sexuality has been central to feminist theorizing and research. For example, prior to the emergence of the "human

sexuality" of the medical experts, nineteenth century feminists began to discuss questions that would later be categorized under "sexual politics." The attempt to politicize sex and gender relations was carried out indirectly through discussions of prostitution and the double standard (Valverde 1985). With the rise of second wave feminism in the late 1960s and early 1970s, feminists challenged what were defined as "male dominated" or "patriarchal" understandings of women's sexuality and assumptions about heterosexuality. For many feminists, heterosexual relations were seen as detrimental to women and implicit in women's subordination. The feminist slogan, "the personal is political," is often thought to refer primarily to bringing women's sexuality out into the open and exposing it as a major domain for the deployment and exercise of domination (Tiefer 1995).

Over the past decades, much feminist theorizing and debate about women's sexuality can be considered in terms of the title of Carol Vance's edited volume, *Pleasure and Danger: Exploring Female Sexuality* (1984), a collection of papers presented at the Feminist Conference at Barnard College in 1982. Vance explains that the conference attempted to explore the ambiguous and complex relationship between sexual pleasure and danger in women's lives and feminist theory. In part, this was a response to a focus on "sexual pessimism" or the "dangers" of sexuality for women.

Some of the "dangers" of heterosexual sex for women, for example, were highlighted in what was referred to as the lesbian-heterosexual split. This occurred in the women's movement in the 1970s. Lesbianism was first defined as central for women in the struggle against male dominance. Then, with the framing of heterosexuality as an eroticized institution through which male supremacy is maintained, came the assertion that heterosexual women were "sleeping with the enemy." Thus lesbianism became almost a "categorical imperative" for feminists (Faderman, cited in Segal 1994). What was referred to as "political lesbianism" entailed a significant theoretical revision in feminist thinking about women's sexuality, as well as behavioral changes (Segal 1994). However, this focus on the dangers of heterosexuality for women drew on, as well as reinforced, more essentialized understandings of *differences* between

men's and women's sexuality. Women's sexuality was framed as gentle, nurturing, and loving, in opposition to an aggressive and dominating male sexuality.

This situation was intensified in the 1970s and 1980s when feminist theorizing about women's sexuality became inseparable from theorizing men's violence against women. For example, Susan Brownmiller, in *Against Our Will* (1975), focuses on rape as the primary means by which men have kept women subordinate throughout history. Here, sexuality is seen as the fundamental source of men's oppression of women. The work of Catharine MacKinnon (e.g., *Feminism Unmodified: Discourses of Life and Law*, 1987) and Andrea Dworkin (*Pornography: Men Possessing Women*, 1979, and *Intercourse*, 1987) on pornography has been hugely influential in perpetuating the idea that heterosexual sex is coercive, violating, and disempowering for women. MacKinnon and Dworkin targeted the pioneers of sexology and their descendants for entrenching women's oppression by encouraging them to speak about pleasure in heterosexual relations, an encounter in which, they argue, women are inevitably positioned as subordinate (Segal 1994). Once again, this radical feminist theorizing drew on essentialist understandings of men's and women's sexuality as fundamentally different and neglected historical and sociological analyses in favor of naturalistic assumptions about what sexuality "really is" (Valverde 1985). This also worked to silence the voices of heterosexual women/feminists about their sexual lives and pleasures.

Much feminist theorizing in the 1980s and 1990s draws on the work of Michel Foucault, and poststructuralism more broadly, to explore the ways in which sexuality is constructed in discourse. Lynne Segal (1994) and Stevi Jackson (2003), for example, critique phallogocentric and essentialist models of women's sexual pleasure as "eroticized submission," in particular the way in which these denied agency to heterosexual women (seen as either misguided victims or dupes). While acknowledging the "dangers" in heterosexual relationships, such as sexual coercion and sexual violence, much feminist theorizing has focused on the discursive construction of heterosex and the diversity of heterosexual experiences and bodily

contacts. This includes a focus on women's sexual agency. Queer theory has also influenced contemporary understandings of sexuality and facilitated a shift to exploring the diversity and fluidity of sexual identities, preferences, practices, and meanings.

However, attention to the dangers of sexuality for women also remains a central component of theorizing and research. In the new millennium, sexual violence against women, from domestic violence to rape and the more recent "date rape," is prevalent. Recent work attempts to explore the complex ways in which normative understandings of heterosexuality and women's sexuality provide the "cultural scaffolding" (Gavey 2005) for rape and sexual violence against women. Attention to the location of discourses about sexuality within specific socio-historical contexts and the ways in which individuals are positioned within, and negotiate with, normative discourses underpins much contemporary research. Gavey (2005), for example, works to unsettle rigid gender binaries around both active desiring sexuality and physical aggression, as well as those around the possibilities of victimization. She advocates a transformation of the cultural conditions of possibility for gendered ways of being sexual and "aggressive."

Other contemporary feminist ways to "re-corporeograph" women's sexuality (Potts 2002) include decentralizing the penis, disrupting the masculine (active)/feminine (passive) dichotomy, and promoting the autonomous female sexual subject. Examples of such reframings include: rethinking heterosexual intercourse in terms of engulfment or embracement of the man's penis by the woman's active vagina, thinking in terms of the "phallic woman" or destabilizing impressions of female bodies as vulnerable interiorized spaces and eroticizing the "receptive" male, and promoting active female sexuality through attention to the "female ejaculation" (Bell 1991).

Challenging understandings of what constitutes normative heterosex, for example the coital and orgasmic imperatives, is therefore a central endeavor in much critical theorizing and research on women's sexuality. This extends to the recent critiques of the medicalization of women's sexuality. Since the 1990s there has been an increasing focus on women's sexual

problems, located primarily within medical and sexological frameworks. Female sexual dysfunction, as a sexual disorder, was “made” in the late 1990s and is routinely reported to affect around 40 percent of women (despite serious concerns about this figure by sex researchers). “Female sexual dysfunction” refers to women’s sexual difficulties with arousal, penile vaginal penetration, and orgasm and promotes a specific norm of sexually correct genital performance. The necessary ingredients for “successful” sexual experience are desire (vaguely indicated as being “for sex”), genital arousal, a timely orgasm, and the ability to enjoy vaginal penetration (Tiefer 2001). On the one hand, there is acknowledgment of women’s new sexual agency and rights, yet on the other hand, the medical model ignores the non medical nature of sexual problems and difficulties, in spite of women repeatedly telling researchers that these are their primary areas of sexual distress. Tiefer argues that the medical model promotes the idea that all women want the same thing out of sex, with routine orgasmic genital function as the centerpiece and physical manifestations as the main source of difficulty. It tells women there is something wrong with them whenever they experience a pattern of sexual desire, arousal, or orgasm defined by experts as “abnormal.”

The escalating medicalization of women’s sexuality provoked Leonore Tiefer (2001) to think about a “new view” of women’s sexual problems. Tiefer, together with a grassroots group of feminist social scientists, sex educators, therapists, sex researchers, physicians, and activists, developed the Campaign for a New View of Women’s Sexual Problems. In contrast to the medical model, the “new view” emphasizes sexual diversity, social context, education, empowerment, and attention to the ways in which sexual norms are constructed. It is hoped this “new view” will influence sexuality theory, research, and education.

SEE ALSO: Ellis, Havelock; Essentialism and Constructionism; Femininities/Masculinities; Feminism; Feminism, First, Second, and Third Waves; Freud, Sigmund; Heterosexuality; Kinsey, Alfred; Krafft Ebing, Richard von; Lesbian Feminism; Lesbianism; Patriarchy; Personal is Political; Queer Theory; Sex and Gender; Sexual Identities; Sexual Politics;

Sexual Practices; Sexual Violence and Rape; Sexuality Research: History

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women's empowerment

Denise A. Copelton

Women's empowerment is a central concern of the women's movement. It refers to the general process through which women gain knowledge about the structures that oppress them, and seek to alter the power imbalances in society. Bookman and Morgen (1988: 4) define empowerment broadly as the "process aimed at consolidating, maintaining, or changing the nature and distribution of power in a particular cultural context" that can range from "acts of individual resistance to mass political mobilizations." Given women's diverse experiences of inequality, women's empowerment has been partially achieved through a variety of strategies and within a number of different historical, institutional, and cultural contexts. For example, in the first wave of the women's movement in the US, women's empowerment was linked explicitly to political power in the form of voting rights. In the second wave, women's empowerment was linked to such issues as reproductive rights, workplace rights, freedom from men's violence, and furthering women's political rights and legal protections through the Equal Rights Amendment (ERA). Not all of these issues were successful, however, as the ERA never passed into law, violence against women continues, and reproductive rights are not shared equally by all women. Nevertheless, that large numbers of women demanded changes to the unequal institutional arrangements in politics, law, medicine, and intimate relationships illustrates the process of women's empowerment. Though the concept and process of women's empowerment is far reaching and factors into all areas of women's lives, the discussion below focuses on those

areas of women's lives in which the concept of empowerment has taken center stage. These include second wave US feminist organizing; women, sports, and self defense; women's health care; and women and development.

In the US, women's empowerment figured especially prominently in the second wave women's liberation movement of the late 1960s and 1970s and took the form of consciousness raising groups. As practiced by second wave feminist groups, consciousness raising is quite similar to the development of a sociological imagination, which allows its possessor to reframe her problems as collective rather than individual, as emanating from political or institutional structures rather than personal failings. The multistep process of consciousness raising began with sharing personal experiences with other women, connecting those experiences with larger institutional forces, and linking all of the above to larger theories of oppression and privilege (Ferree & Hess 1995). The process often facilitated a "click" experience or epiphany and politicized a large number of women as they collectively reframed their personal experiences as the result of institutionalized sexism and gender discrimination. The feminist slogan "The personal is political" resonated strongly with this overall process of consciousness raising. However, not all women wanted to press for political and institutional change. Some second wave feminist organizations' use of consciousness raising as a tool of empowerment functioned more like a self help "rap" session or feminist support group than as a collective strategy to press for societal change. In some groups, the process of consciousness raising never progressed to its final phase – that of facilitating political activism. Instead, some consciousness raising groups functioned merely as psychological support groups or self help groups, places where women could receive support from other women as they attempted to make changes in their personal lives.

In the 1970s, the women's health movement emerged out of second wave feminist organizing in the US. Feminist critics charged that medicine in general and physicians in particular mystified women's bodies and argued that if physicians shared information about women's bodies at all, they did so in complicated scientific terms which rendered such information

inaccessible to most women without a medical background. The medicalization of childbirth came in for special scrutiny as feminists argued that the medical treatment of childbirth placed control over this natural process entirely in the hands of medical experts, leaving childbearing women powerless to determine the course of their own care. Activists in both the feminist and childbirth reform movements believed that women must be empowered to wrest control away from physicians and reconceptualize health care to minimize power differentials between providers and patients, or as they were increasingly called, clients. Thus, women's empowerment in health care would come, they argued, through sharing medical information with women and leveling the power differentials embedded in the traditional doctor–patient relationship. A host of second wave publications such as *Our Bodies, Ourselves* and *How to Stay Out of the Gynecologist's Office* intended to make medical information accessible to women and empower women to take charge of their own health.

Feminist women's health centers, in particular, took seriously the goal of women's empowerment. Jan Thomas (2000) notes that feminist health centers empower women patients through three principal mechanisms. First, instead of merely providing care to women, these centers aim to educate and inform clients about their own health and health care options so women clients can become active participants in their own care. Second, feminist centers seek to break down institutional barriers to care by reducing the physical and social distance between clients and providers, increasing the average length of provider–client interaction, and by becoming visible in the local community. Finally, centers seek to treat all clients with dignity and respect. Thomas (2000: 144) writes that empowerment “takes place over time through the mutual sharing of information, knowledge, and skills” and “culminates in a woman's active control of her health care.”

The concept of women's empowerment has also factored heavily in arguments for women's sports and self defense courses. Title IX of the Educational Amendments Act of 1972 banned sex discrimination in US schools, including school sports programs. Passage of Title IX was seen as a victory for girls not only because

it banned school based sex discrimination of all sorts, but also because it required schools to offer girls opportunities for sports participation that were equal to those of boys. Advocates for girls' and women's sports argued that sports empower girls and women by improving self esteem, developing positive body images, offering a sense of accomplishment, and promoting self confidence, which then may translate into higher grades and standardized test scores, lower high school dropout rates, and higher college attendance rates. In other words, participation in sports empowers girls to develop greater confidence in their own abilities and thereby challenge gender stereotypes and power imbalances in societal institutions.

Advocates of self defense training for women and girls argue that self defense can prevent women's victimization by strengthening their physical and psychological capacity to resist male violence. By teaching women basic martial arts techniques, feminist self defense courses empower women to resist traditional gender role socialization that encourages passivity, and to develop instead both the self confidence and physical skills necessary to resist and flee an assailant. About the impact of women's physical development through sports, Roth and Basow (2004: 262) write, “as our bodies are transformed, so are our minds.” Women's participation in sport and feminist self defense, these scholars argue, therefore empowers women to contest traditional assumptions concerning the frailty of women and women's bodies and thereby challenge the power dynamics embedded in traditional gender roles that leave women susceptible to potential male violence.

Recently, the concept of women's empowerment has factored heavily in development discourse and practice, particularly among non government organizations (NGOs). One of the ways that women's empowerment is currently being pursued in developing countries is through micro credit lending. Historically, development programs focused on women only as a means of controlling fertility. Programs promoting women's education were thus often justified with reference to the lower fertility rates these programs would facilitate. Focusing almost exclusively on familial roles, such development programs typically ignored women's economic roles and rarely promoted women's

well being for its own sake. Development policies and programs also typically construed women as in need of aid or welfare, rather than as in need of sustainable income generating projects, despite the fact that many studies showed that women were often the main income earners within their households. However, since the mid 1970s development discourse and policy have increasingly recognized that women's equity in developing nations is tied to their income generating activities. Recognition that rural women earned a livelihood from a variety of economic activities besides waged labor led the Grameen Bank of Bangladesh to organize micro credit lending schemes aimed at poor women. NGOs and other private funders have adopted the model of micro lending in part, because of the higher loan repayment rates associated with micro lending compared to other credit schemes aimed at the poor.

Research examining the impact of micro lending on women's empowerment has found mixed results. Because micro lending is primarily concerned with women's economic position, providing credit to enterprising women who might not otherwise qualify for credit, its results have largely expanded women's economic resources while leaving untouched other sources of gender inequality. Offering micro credit to women in developing nations does not always result in women's control of economic resources. Thus, if women's empowerment means control over resources, increased self reliance, greater independent decision making, and shared decision making with men, then micro lending has been only partially successful.

SEE ALSO: Black Feminist Thought; Consciousness Raising; Feminism; Feminism, First, Second, and Third Waves; Gender Ideology and Gender Role Ideology; Gender, Sport and; Personal is Political; Sex and Gender; Sociological Imagination; Women's Movements

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women's health

Diane S. Shinberg

Women's health encompasses physical, emotional, and social health and well being associated with female reproductive and sexual development over the life cycle, or any medical condition more common among women. The sociology of women's health includes the study of gendered politics within medicine, medical training, doctor-patient interactions, self care, illness behavior, and health care utilization. Women's health can be more broadly construed to include the relationships between gender inequality (gender as a social institution) and health, even among men.

The pervasiveness of biological essentialism, the ideological emphasis on biology as *the* explanation for apparent differences between men and women, is one reason women's health is such a broad and dynamic area of sociological study. Gender inequality – the social constraint, devaluation, and oppression of women – historically has been justified on the basis that the female sex status is frail with respect to anatomy, physiology, hormones, development, sex, procreation, and, most recently, genes. The use of biomedical authority in theories regarding the fundamental differences between the sexes supports the pervasive belief in women's biologic vulnerability as “the weaker sex.” Such ideology has had social consequences, for example, as manifest in barring women from pursuing higher education because intellectual activities supposedly would divert the flow of blood to the brain from the uterus, leading to uterine atrophy, decreased fertility, and even barrenness. More recently, hormonal fluctuations associated with menstruation, premenstrual syndrome, post partum depression, and menopause are cited as causes of mental imbalance and unpredictability which prevent women from holding the reins of power in political and corporate offices.

DEMOGRAPHY AND EPIDEMIOLOGY OF WOMEN'S HEALTH

In post demographic transition societies women on average live longer than men. Mortality declines and gains in life expectancy were most substantial, especially among women, in the early to mid twentieth century, a trend related to declines in maternal and infant mortality. According to the National Center for Health Statistics for 2002 in the US, total female life expectancies at birth, at age 60, and at age 85 were 79.9, 83.5, and 92 years versus 74.7, 80.3, and 90.9 for males, respectively.

Despite a so called female physiological advantage in terms of survival, women apparently experience more sickness and ill health than men, contributing to a so called gender paradox in health where “women are sicker, but men die quicker.” However, this generalization is overly simplistic; indeed, careful

assessments reveal a more complex story about excess female sickness when specific aspects and definitions of health are considered. While women tend toward higher levels of overall physical illness, disability days, and health care utilization, men experience more life threatening ailments such as heart disease, respiratory disease, and cancer. Despite Americans' mistaken belief that female specific illnesses such as breast cancer are the leading cause of death among women, men and women die from largely the same set of causes, such as heart disease.

Biomedical approaches to sex differences in health and illness emphasize the portion of gender differences in morbidity attributable to female reproductive problems or to physiological differences between males and females that contribute to different rates of disease processes and aging among men and women. Although biophysiology may contribute to static sex differences in morbidity and mortality, it may be unlikely that such differences, per se, account for change in gender differences in health and death over time.

By contrast, sociomedical approaches to gender disparities in health consider social constructionism and gender role theories. Gender differences in material circumstances, social roles, social support, and lifestyle explain historical change in and gender patterning of health and mortality. People's social roles and characteristics are related to their health, and those roles that women tend to hold more than men may be important in explaining gender disparities in health. These acquired risks (e.g., low socioeconomic status, non employment, parenting, care giving, and certain health habits) decrease health status. Compositional gender differences in these acquired risks contribute to gender differences in health that favor men. Secondly, the social construction of gender roles is related to health in that traditional feminine role obligations are more compatible with illness behavior and sick role incumbency than traditionally masculine roles. Reproductive role obligations, such as nurturing and care giving, requires cognizance of the nutritional and behavioral requirements of others, and an awareness of what constitutes normal (versus deviant, sick, or out of the ordinary) behaviors and needs of other family members. Such responsibilities

may foster sensitivity to sickness and may foster adoption of health promoting behavior on one's own behalf and on behalf of others, and women tend to be the primary agent for health within the family. Finally, sociomedical approaches suggest gendered artifacts of health reporting behavior, help seeking behavior, and recall and response rates may contribute to measured gendered differences in subjective health.

ILLNESS BEHAVIOR, HEALTH CARE UTILIZATION, AND MEDICALIZATION

In general, women go to the doctor more than men, with rates of physician visits overall 40 per cent higher among women compared to men. According to the National Center for Health Statistics, among 25–44 year olds, women go to the doctor twice as often as men. Men seek preventive health care half as frequently as women do.

There is an apparent congruity between emphasized femininity and the sick role, with these associations influencing illness behaviors, such as help seeking. By contrast, an incongruity between hegemonic masculinity and sick role behavior is manifest among health lifestyles in which masculinity supports risk taking and negative health behaviors such as drinking, smoking, low seatbelt use, and health care avoidance. Men are twice as likely as women to have had no health care visits in the past 12 months and are three times as likely as women to have had no health care contacts whatsoever during a three year period.

Perhaps the predominant sociological focus on women's health has been the medicalization of the female life cycle. Medicalization refers to the process through which aspects of life fall under the purview of medicine and come to be defined as medical problems or illnesses. As women are more often patients than men, women's lives may be more easily subject to medicalization; for example, menstruation, premenstrual syndrome (PMS), pregnancy, birth, breast feeding, infertility, and menopause have all become medicalized to some degree with respect to medical language and to medical practice.

While the medicalization of birth in the US was strongly associated with the rise of medicine as a profession and medical control over the use of forceps in the early twentieth century, the medicalization of pregnancy is a more recent and ongoing process. Through technological advancements (e.g., sonograms, amniocentesis) and legal and insurance constraints (e.g., managed care and malpractice insurance), the definition of what is considered as a "high risk" pregnancy has expanded so that more technological interventions are brought to bear upon the pregnant and laboring woman (Rothman 2000). Infertility, once considered a social problem for unfortunate couples, is highly medicalized since 1978 and the birth of Louise Brown, the first "test tube baby" or child conceived as a result of *in vitro* fertilization. Although healthy birth rates resulting from hi tech assisted reproductive technologies remain modest, many private health insurance plans now cover some assisted reproduction trials. Other examples of medicalization research in women's health include Anne Figert's study of the politics of defining PMS as a medical and psychological disorder and Margaret Lock's research on the divergent medicalization of menopause in the US and Japan. With respect to medicalized language, Emily Martin has detailed how biomedical text books employ gendered language to describe gamete production, conception, menstruation, and menopause.

GENDER AND THE INSTITUTION OF MEDICINE

As feminism enhanced women's entry into medical fields, more women have access to medical schools today (nearly half of medical students are women). However, while about a quarter of doctors in the US are women, nursing remains a female dominated occupation; about 95 percent of nurses are women. Gender stratification operates at all levels within these fields: women who become doctors tend to specialize in pediatrics, family practice, and obstetrics/gynecology at higher rates than male doctors. Within more exclusive branches of medicine, such as advanced surgical specialties, women's representation remains scant. Overall,

male doctors earn more than female doctors, while female doctors are more likely to be salaried and less likely to be self employed than their male counterparts. Among full time physicians, women tend to work somewhat shorter hours than men, although total office hours spent with patients are similar. However, female physicians tend to spend slightly more time (about 2 minutes longer) with patients and thus tend to see fewer patients than male doctors. Given the gender distribution among doctors, nurses, and patients, the predominant dyads within medicine (doctor–patient and doctor–nurse) are gendered as well as hierarchical. Thus, medical settings have contributed to studies of dominance, authority, and gender (Fisher 1988).

The heightened inclusion of women in the profession of medicine has contributed attention to the differential treatment of women as second class patients relative to men and to the exceptional treatment of women as patients who receive excessive intervention. It is important to remember that differential and/or exceptional treatment of women as patients is not necessarily the result of overt discrimination. The gender system is strongly related to ideas about illness, etiology, and treatment. In the example of heart disease, McKinlay (1996) identified patient, provider, health system, and technological influences on the gendered detection of illness.

WOMEN'S HEALTH MOVEMENT, POLICY, AND SCHOLARSHIP

The last decades of the twentieth century were a dynamic period for women's health scholarship and activism. The modern women's health movement not only changed the US health care system but also applied the important sociological concepts of authority, deviance, labeling, and medicalization to resist stigma associated with being female.

The successes of the women's health movement in the 1970s buoyed larger movements in self help and consumerist health care. For example, activists concerned about coercive female sterilization practices against poor women, women of color, and Medicaid recipients fought for informed consent protocols for

such procedures. The National Women's Health Network lobbied the US Food and Drug Administration (FDA) to provide more information to women who opted to take contraceptive birth control pills; thus, the Pill became the first prescription drug in the US to include a mandatory patient package insert which disclosed potential side effects.

Pressure from groups outside medicine and from growing cohorts of women scientists, including doctors, forced a change in the way biomedicine was conducted and organized in the US. For decades, women were routinely excluded from clinical trials due to concerns over chemical exposures and reproductive vulnerabilities. Many medications had not been tested on women and thus physicians were on their own in prescribing dosages and assessing drug interactions. However, in 1990 the National Institutes of Health founded an Office of Research on Women to oversee the systematic inclusion of women in clinical studies. This development may be seen as an example of medicine's growing reliance on evidence based approaches to the clinical treatment of patients.

Just as sociology has shifted from a consideration of the sociology of women to the sociology of gender, the meaning of women's health is expanding to include gender and health. This provides opportunities to configure women's health to include many aspects of interlocking systems of domination, (e.g., race, class, sexuality, age, etc.) and to address ways in which gender as a social institution influences health. Other important influences within sociology include research on the sociology of the body and on aging and the life course.

The sociology of women's health will need to better understand the renewed interest of biomedicine in sex specific biology (Wizemann & Pardue 2001). Future developments in gender and health will address the continuation of medicalization, with new opportunities for gender based case comparisons (e.g., sexual dysfunction); the intersections of gender, disability, and the body; and gendered life course trajectories in health practices and outcomes.

SEE ALSO: Health Behavior; Health and Medicine; Illness Behavior; New Reproductive Technologies; Sick Role

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women's movements

Carol Mueller

Women's movements arise from the gendered social constructions that have accompanied the biological differences between male and female. Because social distinctions based on gender are the most basic forms of human differentiation, they pervade social life. Throughout history, across classes, ethnicity, nationality, sexuality, and religious groupings, the gendered division of labor has been associated with differential roles, rewards, and with an associated politics. That is, the political processes by which rules are made and valued objects and services are distributed have institutionalized gender differences since the beginning of human history. In only rare circumstances have these differences not been associated with the subordination of

women. Traditional systems of political thought, supported by most religions, have relegated women to a secondary status. Thus, the potential beneficiaries of "women's movements" conceivably encompass more than half of humanity throughout history.

Yet women are also divided by all of the other social distinctions and sources of subordination to which the human experience gives rise. These distinctions are characterized variously in terms of "multiculturalism," "intersectionality," and, for the last few years, the all embracing language of "human rights." Women's differences present both obstacles to mobilization and a multiplicity of competing claims characterized in terms of identity struggles (Hobson 2003). Others, however, argue that the resolution of differences occurs in an ongoing process of negotiation in specific sociopolitical contexts within which no long term historic actor is forged (Stephen 1997: 275-9). This perspective could help account for the periodic societal amnesia regarding the collective struggles associated with women's movements. Negotiating and defining who "women" are in terms of their competing identities, nature of subordination, and associated claims constitute some of the major processes of women's movements (see, for instance, Hobson 2003; Regar 2006).

We should also recognize that not all of women's mobilizations are full blown social movements. In fact, many are local campaigns restricted to neighborhood or community. Most of these remain local, such as the neighborhood groups that Naples describes in the New York area during the 1960s War on Poverty. Historically, the most famous of the shortlived women's protests was the October 1789 march on Versailles to protest increases in the price of bread, one of the defining *journées* of the French Revolution. Other local mobilizations by women have become national and then internationally modeled by other women. Such was the case with the Mothers (and Grandmothers) of the Plaza de Mayo in Buenos Aires in the late 1970s and the 1980s. The mothers' protests on behalf of their disappeared children were taken up by mothers throughout Latin America (Stephen 1997). In these cases, women were bound together by their identities as "mothers of the disappeared." Women in Black offer another example where gender alone is a binding identity. Their

signature protests against violence and warfare originated among Palestinian and Israeli women and then spread to Serbia and Ireland, and are now found all over Europe and North America.

FEMINISM AND WOMEN'S MOVEMENTS

To speak of "women's" movements, however, requires attention to the distinction between movements made up of women as a constituency or organizational strategy and those movements in which the empowerment of women is both a goal and source of theoretical and ideological negotiation and contestation, that is, "feminist" movements (Ferree & Mueller 2004). The distinction is that between an organizational or identity choice of female membership that may or may not be feminist and a mobilization that is based in ideology, framing, cultural discourse, and practices concerned with women's subordination, potentially made up of men as well as women. Women's movements take action on behalf of home and family as well as supporting principles like peace and justice as the responsibility of women in their roles as wives and mothers. Most of the short term mobilizations of women described above are of this nature.

Women's mobilizations can become feminist and vice versa, as when women in the anti-slavery movement of the early nineteenth century became the founders of the US suffrage movement (Flexner 1959). The recent origins of feminism in the US began with women who felt they had received second class treatment in the Civil Rights Movement and the new left of the 1960s. Similarly, Lynn Stephen notes that "Latin American women's activism ... often combines a commitment to basic material survival for women and their families with direct or indirect challenges to women's subordination to men" (1997: 267). For the sake of consistency, in the following discussion, the term "feminist" will be used to designate those movements concerned with rectifying women's subordination despite the fact that their goals are frequently much broader.

Although feminist mobilizations are always concerned with the subordination or self-actualization of women, the elasticity of that

definition has led to enormous variety in feminist movements. The term itself is a product of intellectual discourse in late nineteenth century France, but the "woman question" had been a matter of public concern in Europe since the sixteenth century among literate men and women. To emphasize ideas as the defining characteristic of a feminist movement is only to recognize a historic fact. As Karen Offen notes in her history of European feminism, "an expanding body of feminist criticism in print precedes by centuries the development of the women's groups which do begin to form, from 1789 on" (2000: 25). Like most of the social movements associated with modernity, feminist movements were also empowered by the spread of literacy and a print culture (Tarrow 1998). As Offen points out, the Enlightenment was as much about the "woman question" as it was about citizenship, democracy, science, and the authority of reason.

Among women and men who might be considered feminists, there have been many schools of thought on the subordination of women that have continuously served as major sources of ideological and political conflict. Despite this diversity, the most consistent division globally and historically has been between liberal and socialist feminisms. Prior to 1848, it seemed that socialists and feminists were pursuing the same goals, but after mid century, an intense rivalry developed in Europe that was echoed in most parts of the world where both systems of thought fought for dominance. Pre Marxist socialist visionaries on both sides of the Atlantic supported egalitarian utopias with communalized family systems like the Owenites in England and the Oneida Community in upper New York state. By the last half of the century, however, August Bebel, Friedrich Engels, Karl Marx's daughter, and Clara Zetkin made it clear that class had political primacy over sex in socialist thinking (Offen 2000). These differences have influenced positions on protective labor legislation, prostitution, state support for mothers, and, most importantly, the question of whether women's subordination is a result of capitalism or some more universal relationship between men and women.

The pervasive socialist/liberal difference between feminists is still found, for instance, in Raka Ray's (1999) comparison of feminist

organizing in Bombay and Calcutta; in European and North American feminists' responses to neoliberal political and social restructuring (Banaszak et al. 2003); and in Latin American women's responses to authoritarian governments, where the Zapatista rebellion in Chiapas shows the closest approximation to revolutionary socialist practice (Stephen 1997). In the US and Canada, with weak traditions of socialism, feminist union women such as the Women of Steel described by Fonow (2003) have, nevertheless, begun to make significant progress in building international coalitions.

MODES OF MOBILIZATION AND MOVEMENT LONGEVITY

As one of the major social movements developing in the modern period, feminist movements have, to some extent, shared the same repertoire of collective action (Tarrow 1998) as labor, environment, male suffrage, and other "rights" movements. While feminists' mobilizing structures may have been located in beauty shops, garden clubs, churches, and neighborhood groups rather than taverns, sporting events, and men's clubs, to some extent the resulting repertoires were similar despite the relative absence of violence, or of strikes and revolutionary attempts to take over the state. If we look back at the women's suffrage movements of the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, we see a very similar repertoire of mass meetings, petitions, demonstrations, and electoral campaigns that were associated with the birth of other social movements attempting to influence the state. The ultimate success of these movements is also credited to the formal organizations that coordinated national campaigns over decades and across large distances.

At the same time, nineteenth century feminists challenged cultural norms and values through a more symbolic and discursive repertoire associated today with "new social movements" (Melucci 1989). "Bloomer girls" defied the strictures of women's clothing as well as Victorian sensibilities (Flexner 1959). Among other radical challenges to nineteenth century culture was the call for free love and the end of marriage by leaders of the National Suffrage Association, echoing the programs of communal

utopians early in the century. While these claims sprang from the center of equal rights/liberal feminism in the United States, Engels and other socialists were making similar attacks on the institution of marriage as "legalized prostitution" in Europe.

A similar combination of cultural and political repertoires has characterized the more recent phase of feminist mobilization. The US feminist movement has, in fact, been primarily identified in terms of an equal rights branch engaged with the state (Costain 1992) and a women's liberation branch which has challenged basic cultural assumptions. The former has had its program institutionalized through legislation, court decisions, lobbying, formal organizations, electoral campaigns, and the increasing support of women in electoral and administrative offices. The latter branch of the movement achieves long term influence through the creation of women's studies programs in colleges and universities, performance art, books, journals, and music, book stores, coffee shops, and entire communities of feminists. The impressive success of Eve Ensler's *Vagina Monologues* has demonstrated how performance art can serve as a venue for consciousness raising. As Katzenstein (1998) points out, this distinction in repertoires exists even in the "unobtrusive" mobilizations of feminists within highly structured, patriarchal institutions like the US military and the Catholic Church.

Like most long running international movements, feminists have gone through periods of highly public mobilization followed by "abeyance" periods (Rupp & Taylor 1987). When the public visibility of the movement is lost, low profile organizations, networks, and communities can sustain the ideologies, framing, and collective memory of the movement. In Europe and North America, this periodicity or cycle of protest (Tarrow 1998) has been characterized in several ways. The most common is the "wave" analogy in terms of first and second waves, with younger scholars pointing to a third wave since the mid 1990s. The first wave, from the mid nineteenth century until after World War I, is associated with the campaign for women's suffrage, although the movement actually had a much broader agenda. The second wave is associated with the 1960s and, in terms of equal rights, the creation of the State

Commissions on the Status of Women leading to the formation of the National Organization for Women and a host of legislation for women, including the Equal Rights Amendment (Costain 1992). On the cultural side, women's liberation groups engaged in street theater against the Miss America Contest in Atlantic City, released mice at the New York Marriage Fair, and hexed Wall Street. While these "waves" span decades, Whittier (1995) points out that "generations" of feminists can change identities, claims, and repertoires as often as every few years in highly mobile grassroots organizations. Beginning in the 1990s, a "third" wave has been widely debated in terms of how much current feminist issues and practices are discontinuous from earlier mobilizations (see Reger 2006). These discussions are so pervasive that there are increasing arguments for other metaphors.

Regardless of the analogy, what seems very clear is that these transformative moments redefining the relationship of women to men and to society have historically been quickly suppressed by countermovements that reestablished women's traditional subordination. This was true until women gained a firm foothold in the polity through suffrage movements of the late nineteenth and twentieth centuries. Offen (2000) describes such a process of French movement and countermovement occurring repeatedly in 1789, 1830, 1848, and 1871. Institutionalized access to the polity has been a necessary, but not sufficient, condition for achieving cumulative gains toward eliminating women's subordination.

At the local level, periodicity and protest cycles are strongly influenced by sociopolitical conditions and the rise of countermovements. Globally, however, war and depression have played the primary role in suppressing transnational communication, travel, conferences, and organizational development (Ferree & Mueller 2004). Although the major effect of both world wars of the twentieth century was the suppression of women's international mobilization, as was the Cold War, all three conflagrations led to the creation of institutions that furthered global feminist movements. The League of Nations, the Organization of American States, the United Nations, and the decade of international conferences that followed the collapse of

the Soviet Union all served as targets of feminists' mobilizations, as forums for debates on differences in women's subordination North and South, and, eventually, as sources of both resources and legitimation.

A GLOBAL MOVEMENT?

By the time European powers encircled the globe with their empires in the nineteenth century, some of the ideas associated with feminism had become embedded in the larger cultural package of "modernity" (Kandiyoti 1991). Indigenous leaders in the European colonies some times entertained these ideas along with other modern systems of thought as a way of coming to terms with the imperial powers. Thus, attacks on footbinding in China, *sati* in India, and female circumcision in East Africa were largely campaigns sponsored by coalitions of western missionaries and modernizing local leaders with support from information campaigns aimed at European audiences of men as well as women (Keck & Sikkink 1998). As nationalist movements led to the overthrow of colonial powers in the twentieth century, feminist ideas were in danger of being attacked for their association with western imperialism and discredited "modern" ideas (Kandiyoti 1991). Similarly, when the Soviet system collapsed late in the twentieth century, ideas about women's equal participation in politics and the paid labor force were discredited in many countries of Eastern Europe because of their association with an imposed Soviet style socialism (Jacquette & Wolchik 1998). Despite these setbacks, both liberal equal rights and socialist interpretations of feminism have circled the globe.

In the late nineteenth century, railways and steamships increased the opportunities for travel, and international postal networks enhanced the opportunities for building transnational networks. The World Expositions held in Paris, London, and Chicago provided opportunities for feminists to hold their own parallel congresses, much as women have done in the late twentieth century during international UN conferences. With the Second International of 1889, socialists identified a common platform with class oppression given preference over the subordination of women as an accepted political

priority. The first wave of feminist mobilization in the late nineteenth century led to the creation of international organizations that merged women's concerns for peace and the end of poverty with feminist concerns about women's subordination. In a series of meetings before and after World War I, conferences were held to bring international attention to all of these issues and to create mechanisms for pursuing these aims between conferences.

In a surprising historic parallel, the late twentieth century saw comparable international expansions in opportunities for communication, travel, and networking. Air flights became increasingly affordable. By the end of the century, the Internet provided instant access to the far corners of the globe. Organizationally, the creation of the Commission on the Status of Women (CSW) within the United Nations gave feminists their initial entrée into the major governmental body with international legitimacy (see Meyer & Prügl 1999). From their beach head in CSW, feminists were successful in lobbying for an International Women's Year (IWY) conference in Mexico City for 1975 which became a starting point for a series of global conferences that brought together an increasing number of governmental representatives and movement organizers. In preparation and in response to these conferences, women's organizations flourished. Feminists also took their agenda(s) to UN conferences on the environment (Rio, 1983), human rights (Vienna, 1993), and population (Cairo, 1994). By the time of the UN conference for women in Beijing (1995), estimates placed the number of official and unofficial participants at 30,000 to 40,000 – the largest gathering of women in world history. Despite this impressive showing of global feminism as historic actor, the global face of the movement has received scant notice from the mainstream media.

Early in the twenty first century, the Internet was alive with debates over whether, when, and where further UN conferences for women should be held. Organizers feared the counter movement taking shape in the alliance between the Vatican and representatives from Muslim countries that appeared in Cairo and again at the Beijing Conference that would be reinforced by delegations appointed by conservative administrations in Australia, the United States,

and other western countries. Countermovements, however, have occurred as frequently as the feminist movements they oppose. There seems little likelihood that either feminists or their opposition will disappear in the coming century.

SEE ALSO: Collective Action; Colonialism (Neocolonialism); Feminism; Feminism, First, Second, and Third Waves; Feminist Activism in Latin America; Gender Ideology and Gender Role Ideology; Gender, Social Movements and; Modernization; Nationalism; New Social Movement Theory; Social Change; Social Movements; Socialism; Transnational and Global Feminisms; Transnational Movements

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work, sociology of

Melissa Bonstead Bruns

Work is typically described as the activities involved in the production of goods and services. The sociology of work, then, involves the systematic study of the interrelationship between the people and institutions associated with the production of goods and services. The general heading of the sociology of work subsumes many topics, which can be separated roughly into individual level approaches and structural level approaches. Individual level approaches treat the individual as the unit of analysis and typically focus on ascribed characteristics such as gender, race, and age. They also commonly address achieved characteristics such as education, promotion, compensation, and other labor force outcomes. Individual level approaches may also examine the impact of work over time by looking at the life course or career trajectory of individuals.

The units of analysis of structural level approaches range from jobs, to occupations, to industries, and may even focus on the individual *within* the larger structure. Common topics addressed under a structural rubric include occupational structures, internal labor markets (ILMs), bureaucracies, unionization, skills, professions, and globalization. Overlapping these two approaches is work on particular occupations or areas of employment, and work on public policy issues related to the labor market, such as affirmative action, comparable worth, welfare to work programs, and the welfare state in general.

Over the course of its evolution, the sociology of work has diverged into three separate subfields. One still goes by the name sociology of work, and the other two are industrial sociology and formal organizations. The sociology of work encompasses three main theoretical movements. The first spanned the years roughly between 1920 and 1950. It was rooted in the Chicago School of sociology and was strongly influenced by symbolic interaction and the pioneering work of Everett Hughes. His and other early approaches had a primarily micro focus and addressed the issues of worker culture and interpersonal relations, especially with regard to workplace problems.

The next two decades saw the field turning its focus from a symbolic interactionist concern for individual issues to a more structural focus where the individual worker was viewed as an actor constrained by various organizational impediments. Critics of this structural approach argued that it lost sight of the worker as a purposeful agent, with structure supplanting self-determination. At the same time, research shifted from primarily qualitative to heavily quantitative, in part to increase generalizability of research findings. As such, multivariate analysis became the norm. On the theoretical side, sociological theories such as structural functionalism, social conflict theory, neo-Marxist theory, and systems theory heavily influenced the research during this time. Arguably, the most significant work of this period is Blau and Duncan's *The American Occupational Structure* (1967), which mapped the factors that contribute to an individual's success, such as personal achievement and family background. By situating individuals within a status ranked occupational structure, Blau and Duncan systematically measured social placement while laying the groundwork for studying social mobility.

The third and most current movement emphasizes a synthesis of work done at the individual and structural levels. Two dominant subspecialties and countless other minor subspecialties are situated in this most recent movement. The first of the dominant subspecialties has its roots in Marx's *Capital* and was ignited by Harry Braverman (1974). Braverman introduced the idea of *labor process* to describe how capitalists have degraded the organization of work, leading to the homogenization of

workers. Though other theorists have criticized Braverman's work, it reinvigorated the Marxist influence on the sociology of work and led to future studies on worker organization and resistance, worker satisfaction, the role of the state, deskilling, and the role of class in the workplace.

The second dominant subspecialty examines various work structures, such as occupational structures, industries, and firms, and incorporates them into individual level models of inequality focusing on such issues as income and segregation. This *new structuralist* approach owes much to Averitt (1968). The new structuralists viewed work structures as segmented; thus, analysis focused on how work structures divide the economy, labor market, and labor force and on the inequalities inherent in these divisions. For example, dual labor market theorists such as Doeringer and Piore (1971) highlighted the existence of two distinct labor markets. The *primary labor market* is where the "good" jobs are: those with high wages, unions, good benefits, international markets, and, most importantly, internal labor markets. *Secondary labor markets* are marked by jobs that offer lower wages, are not unionized, have few if any benefits, and little opportunity for advancement. Current structuralist approaches have moved beyond the simplistic dualist approach in favor of more sophisticated models of segmentation.

Much of the current research in the area of sociology of work involves inequality. Researchers apply various theories to phenomena such as segregation (by job, occupation, firm, and industry), the wage gap, advancement and mobility, and problems stemming from disparate treatment and disparate impact. Ascribed characteristics such as race, ethnicity, age, and others are the keys to understanding inequality in the labor process, though inequality based on sex and gender is the most heavily researched.

Researchers interested in gender inequality largely concentrate on segregation and the wage gap. Occupational segregation has been the subject of a great deal of research as women tend to be crowded into a small number of traditionally female occupations such as nursing, teaching, clerical work, and other fields commonly associated with caregiving, service, or relating with others. Men, on the other hand, tend to be concentrated in engineering, architecture, protective services (e.g., police and fire fighters), skilled

craftwork, construction, mechanical repair, and other fields seen as requiring instrumental action, supervisory skills, physical strength, and analytical abilities. Explanations for occupational segregation vary. Individual explanations point to prevailing gender roles and gender role socialization to explain occupational choices made by men and women. However, a valid counterargument to this claim is that strong social pressures to bear the primary burden of child and household duties, the fear of disparate treatment in the workplace, and actual disparate treatment and disparate impact in the workplace constrain women's choices. Structural explanations examine how various work structures function to keep men and women in different fields. Segmented labor market theorists argue, for example, that statistical discrimination on the part of employers leads to a tendency to view women as less productive and subsequently leads to a funneling of women into "bad" jobs and men into "good" jobs. Even when women enter the firms where the good jobs are located, structural theorists argue that structures such as internal labor markets are often segregated as well.

The bulk of the research done on gender differences at work involves the wage gap. Though the size of the gap varies according to hours worked, career stage, age of worker, and human capital investments, a gap persists nonetheless. Again, the individual level explanations focus on worker choice and the tendency of women to choose lower wage options, often as a result of perceived family and household obligations. Structural explanations look to the gender structuring of occupations, the crowding of women into certain occupations, and the devaluation of skills commonly associated with women. This type of structural explanation has spurred interest in comparable worth (pay equity) policies. Comparable worth policies seek to assign equal rewards to men and women in positions that are comparable on the basis of skills, responsibilities, working conditions, and effort (England 1992). Researchers attribute the recent trends in the reduction of the wage gap between men and women more to the decline in wages for men as a result of changes to the occupational structure and the loss of high paying manufacturing positions than to significant gains made by women.

Occupational segregation and inequalities in labor force outcomes such as wages and

promotion also affect individuals who are members of racial or ethnic subpopulations. Minorities are disproportionately concentrated in peripheral firms, in low wage, low prestige positions, with little opportunity for advancement. Discrimination in the hiring process, educational inequalities, concentration effects, and class differences also factor heavily into the inequalities faced by racial and ethnic subpopulations.

The relationship between work and family is closely related to, and often overlaps, issues of gender and work. A reciprocal relationship exists between family life and work life; as for most families, changes in one lead to changes in the other. The impact of family life on the work experience differs for men and women, especially with regard to labor force outcomes such as income. This became especially apparent as the number of dual earner households surpassed the number of households following a more traditional division of labor. Some researchers have argued that men receive a wage premium for getting married and having children, while women receive a wage penalty, and that women retain the primary responsibility for the bulk of domestic work even when they work full time outside the home. However, factors such as social class, level of acceptance for egalitarian ideals, level of education, timing of marriage and family within one's career, and differences in earnings and occupational status between partners may temper these differences. Researchers also see the family-work connection as relevant to level of productivity, career advancement and aspirations, and individual well being and mental health.

Workers are increasingly feeling the effects of a global economy. Patterns of global communication, global migration, and global trade have led to numerous cross cultural studies of work along with research on the implications of a global economy. Extreme concentrations of power in the hands of a few multinational corporations and the rise of free trade zones where environmental and human rights concerns have been on the rise have led to a resurgence in worker organization and solidarity. Hence, much work in the field has concentrated on worker rights and collectivization.

Sociologists of work regard many of the problems associated with increased globalization as

a result of unevenness in the process of industrialization, which has led to vast wealth and power differences cross nationally. Three theories seek to explain this phenomenon. First, modernization theory purports that societies evolve through predictable stages of development and industrialization according to their own internal dynamics, which include technological advances and patterns of consumption. Second, dependency theory challenges modernization theory, claiming instead that, within the global economy, more developed countries place less developed countries in a position of dependency. Third and most recently, world systems theory also challenges modernization theory by rejecting the notion that nations evolve in a singular predictable pattern. Instead, it views the global economy as a system of interdependent parts where trade relations function to reproduce existing power differences.

The growth of the service economy and the impact of technology on the world of work and the economy have also taken center stage in recent years. One theoretical approach to these shifts in the organization of work is optimistic in that it sees a move toward a service economy as part of a natural economic process. Thus, theorists predict that changes in technology will improve the quality of work and work life for workers. A second and more pessimistic approach sees changes in the economy as heightening the inequality between skilled and unskilled workers, with technology leading to deskilling or even supplanting the worker.

Researchers expect much of the future growth in the field of the sociology of work to be in continued globalization, increased technological advances, and a continuing evolution of the structure of work and the growth in the service economy. As long as inequality in labor market outcomes exists, however, research will continue on gender, race, and the family, as well as other research programs addressing inequality. Future research will also likely continue the current trend of increasing methodological sophistication, as the quantitative methods currently employed in the field have become increasingly complex. Additionally, researchers recently have called for more integration and cooperation with other disciplines and specialties such as economics, economic sociology, industrial psychology, and others.

SEE ALSO: Braverman, Harry; Bureaucratic Personality; Gender, Work, and Family; Global Economy; Occupational Mobility; Occupational Segregation; Occupations; Organizations and the Theory of the Firm; Professions; Unions; Workplace Diversity

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workplace diversity

Stella Nkomo

Workplace diversity appears to have a rather short history as a field in organization studies if one locates its emergence only within contemporary scholarship (Nkomo & Cox 1996). Issues that commonly fall within the study of workplace diversity have always existed. Yet, early conceptualizations of organizations were rooted in universalistic approaches that largely ignored race, ethnicity, gender, culture, sexuality, and other social identities (e.g., Clegg 1990). Race

and gender in organizations gained some attention after the passage of equal employment legislation in the United States during the 1970s as well as in the UK. This work appeared under the rubric of women in management and in studies of the effects of affirmative action and workplace discrimination (for a review see Cox & Nkomo 1990).

Substantive attention to workplace diversity in organizations is attributed primarily to the publication of *Workforce 2000* (Johnson & Packer 1987). This report forecasted a radical increase in the number of women and racial/ethnic minorities entering the United States workforce. It seems this forecast was largely on target although some changes in the profile of the workforce were unforeseen, including an increase in the number of workers with disabilities and growing religious diversity. Women constitute 48 percent of the United States workforce. By 2020, 32 percent of the US labor force is projected to be ethnic minorities, and four of every ten people entering the workforce from 1998 to 2008 will be members of minority groups. Hispanics are now the largest minority group in the United States, surpassing African Americans.

The authors of *Workforce 2000* urged organizations and decision makers to identify ways to “manage” this growing diversity (Nkomo & Cox 1996). Consequently, the field was initially practitioner driven with scholarly attention lagging. Some would argue this accounts for the frequently lodged criticism that much of the literature on workforce diversity is atheoretical (Nkomo & Cox 1996; Cassell & Biswas 2000). However, in the last ten years, the research on workplace diversity has escalated (Ragins & Gonzalez 2003).

The conceptualization of and research on workforce diversity has largely emanated from North America, primarily the United States. Consequently, much of the extant literature represents a perspective rooted in the social and political history of the United States. More recently, the topic of workplace diversity has gained currency in Europe (e.g., Dick & Cassell 2002; Maxwell et al. 2003; Point & Singh 2003), with its growing immigrant population from Asia, Africa, and the Caribbean, as well as in other regions of the world, including Africa, Australia, and New Zealand (e.g., Jones et al. 2000; Nyambegera 2002; Hartel 2004).

Defining the concept of diversity remains problematic. Some scholars take a narrow approach, focusing on what has been referred to as surface level diversity or visible immutable identities (e.g., race, gender, age, ethnicity). Still others argue for a more expansive definition that encompasses surface as well as deep level diversity (Harrison et al. 1998). The latter refers to personality, attitudes, values, and beliefs. Another classification scheme uses demographic diversity, which is similar to surface level diversity, and job related diversity, which is defined as experiences, skills, and functional work responsibilities. Although the categorizations may differ, there appears to be a trend toward broader definitions of workplace diversity rather than narrow ones. Broader definitions suggest workplace diversity should focus on all the ways individuals differ from one another. Nkomo and Cox (1996: 339) argued that despite the level of disagreement over what constitutes diversity, the concept of identity is at the core of understanding workplace diversity in organizations. They suggest diversity refers to identities based on membership in social and demographic groups, and how differences in identities affect social relations in organizations.

A number of theoretical perspectives have been utilized to study workplace diversity. Most often, scholars have turned to the rich body of theory on intergroup relations. Social identity theory, embedded intergroup theory, and organization demography have been the dominant theoretical perspectives for examining workplace diversity. Generally, these perspectives focus on the effects and consequences of diversity in organizations. Research utilizing social identity theory typically examines the categorization processes that create in group and out group memberships, resulting in one's own group being more highly valued. This body of work suggests that social identification and related processes produce both negative and positive effects in organizations. Some studies have shown that diverse work groups make better decisions than homogeneous groups, while other results suggest diverse work groups evoke greater conflict and less cohesiveness (Ragins & Gonzalez 2003). The solution to managing diversity in the workplace within a social identity framework is a reduction in the salience of group boundaries.

While social identity theory is largely a cognitive theory, scholars examining workplace diversity have also sought to identify specific contextual influences on categorization processes. For example, contextual factors such as intergroup competition, faultlines, and ongoing within group interaction are seen as important predictors of the saliency of group boundaries (Lau & Murnighan 1998). Scholars have also acknowledged the influence of two way or reciprocal identification processes between organizational/work group members as well as the realization that members of any given social group or category vary in the extent to which identity group membership is a central and salient aspect of their overall self concept (Hogg & Terry 2000).

Alderfer and Smith (1982) developed embedded intergroup theory specifically for understanding identity group memberships within an organizational setting. Their theory posits that two types of groups exist within organizations: identity groups and organization groups. Their theory can also be seen as another way of classifying the content of workplace identities in organizations. An identity group is defined as a group whose members share similar biological or demographic characteristics such as sex or race. An organization group is viewed as one in which members share common organization positions or equivalent work experiences. A person's identity in an organization is composed of their group memberships as well as organization group membership. Alderfer and Smith (1982) propose complex interactions among these identities. For example, they argue that conflicts and tensions arise when the two identities are mirror societal positions. For example, often there may be a correlation between identity group membership and organization membership that reflects broader societal patterns. In the United States and in many countries, leadership and management positions tend to be dominated by heterosexual white males. The theory suggests workplace diversity in organizations requires an understanding of identity group membership, organization membership, as well as the broader societal context in which those relations are embedded. Much of the research on race and ethnicity in organizations has relied heavily on embedded intergroup relations theory to

demonstrate how attitudes toward minorities and their structural position in the broader society affect the workplace experiences (e.g., Bell & Nkomo 2001).

Organizational demography focuses on the causes, consequences, or distribution of employees in an organization (Tsui & Gutek 1999). Scholars studying workplace diversity have utilized organizational demography theory to focus primarily on the group identities of age, tenure, education, and functional background. However, Tsui and Gutek (1999: 15) emphasize that diversity and demography are not the same. They argue that demography experts focus on understanding the meaning of demographic diversity and analyzing the effects of such diversity on individuals, groups, and organizations. Their interest is not in prescribing action or change but in explanation. Demographic analysis employs three approaches to uncover the effects of demographic differences: categorical demography, composition demography, and relational demography. Categorical research focuses on the effects of an individual's demographic characteristics on work related behavior and attitudes. Composition demography is concerned with the effects of demographic compositions of work units and organizations on individuals or groups. Relational demography focuses on social relationships between an individual and the group with respect. The interest is in effects of the difference in the individual's demographic attributes and those of the other members in the group. For example, the situation of a lone female manager in a top management team is argued to be different from being a female in a top management team comprised mainly of females (Tsui & Gutek 1999). An important assumption of demography theory is equivalence among all types of diversity. The interest is in the effects of relative heterogeneity and homogeneity rather than the subjective meaning of the demographic identity (Ragins & Gonzalez 2003).

Recently, a more critical analysis of workplace diversity has emerged from critical management and postmodern theories. This work problematizes the very concept of diversity and its assumptions, particularly the discourse of diversity (Dick & Cassell 2002; Zannoni & Janssens 2003). Scholars have analyzed diversity as a rewriting project that overlooks the issue of

inequality of power among groups in the workforce (Linnehan & Konrad 1999) as well as viewing it as an effort to obscure the need for attention to issues of discrimination and oppression. Zannoni and Janssens (2003) analyzed the texts on diversity produced in 25 interviews with Flemish human resource (HR) managers from a critical discourse analysis and rhetorical perspective. They found that HR managers' diversity discourses reflect existing managerial practices. Similarly, Kelly and Dobbin (1998) argue equal employment opportunity/affirmative action specialists, primarily in the United States, retheorized anti discrimination and affirmative action practices as diversity management to make them more digestible and to ensure their institutional positions. Other scholars argue that the extant literature promotes an essentialist understanding of people and their identities (De los Reyes 2000). There is also work demonstrating the ways in which workplaces are fundamentally gendered and racialized (Fletcher 2001).

A review of the trajectory of the extant scholarship on workplace diversity reveals a great deal about its nature. Initial research was dominated by the question of how to manage workplace diversity and its effects. Scholars focused on research to uncover the effects of diversity and how organizations should manage diverse work groups. An implicit assumption was that diversity is a problem to be managed. Diversity was also assumed to reside in "others," not within dominant group members. Valuing diversity became the next dominant theme. Efforts were made to change the view of diversity from being a problem to a positive feature in workplaces and to make a business case for workplace diversity. Some scholars have attempted to empirically measure the effects of workplace diversity on the bottom line. Richard (2000) tested the effects of racial diversity on firm performance but did not find direct effects. Instead, racial diversity combined with business strategy to have a positive effect on performance. However, most of the literature advocating the valuing of diversity has been prescriptive. Thomas and Ely (1996) argued for the adoption of an "integration and learning" paradigm for workplace diversity. This approach seeks to incorporate diversity throughout the organization, vertically and horizontally, inclusive of the nature of the

organization's approach to processes, strategy, and work. According to Thomas and Ely under this paradigm, cultural differences among organization members are recognized as sources of skill and insight that can have a direct impact on the organization's core tasks.

The current trajectory suggests a questioning mode. On one hand critical management and postmodern approaches question the very ontology, essence, and aims of workplace diversity (Zanoni & Janssens 2003). At the same time, there is an evident broadening in the level of complexity in the study of workplace diversity within scholarship from a positivist and functional orientation. More attention is being given to the context in which diversity effects may occur as well as recognizing that individuals have multiple identities, not a singular identity. Others question whether enough attention has been paid to the effects of religious diversity, sexual orientation, disability, and class (Ragins & Gonzalez 2003). Despite the volume of research generated over the past ten years, clearly there remain a number of pertinent complex issues and unanswered questions. Not least among them is the persistence of discrimination, racism, sexism, and homophobia as well as continued inequality in the workplace. Ragins and Gonzalez (2003) noted that doing research on workplace diversity requires traversing a slippery slope. Yet, it is clear that there is still much research needed to understand the meaning, effects, and consequences of workplace diversity as well as how best to address the stubborn issues of inequality.

SEE ALSO: Affirmative Action; Age Prejudice and Discrimination; Discrimination; Diversity; Doing Gender; Ethnic Groups; Ethnicity; Gendered Organizations/Institutions; Postmodernism; Race; Race (Racism); Racialized Gender; Social Identity Theory; Work, Sociology of

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world conflict

Gordon Fellman

Fights of one kind or another show up in archaeological and anthropological studies of early societies as well as later ones. Usually limited to ritualized encounters, these conflicts seem more like sport than anything else; two

groups of men fight, the action ending when someone is hurt.

If war means using weapons deliberately to kill, in order to gain food, booty, land, honor, or other prizes, then war appears to start 12,000–15,000 years ago, probably around the time of the onset of agriculture and the settled communities that accompanied it. Surely the idea of taking food and other things from people who have them would occur to people more than once. Fighting strategies and weapons developed early on, as did the killing of civilians as well as warriors.

Historians can tell us about wars among and within tribes, city states, empires, and nations. What qualifies, though, as a world conflict? Here it is suggested that a world conflict must involve at least three continents and have an outcome with serious effects in much of the world. World War I mainly involved Western Europe and the United States. By contrast, World War II included the Pacific, Asia, Africa, Europe, and North America. It concluded with the end of most of colonialism that had flourished for up to two centuries; the Cold War, which lasted almost half a century; escalation in the deadliness of weapons systems; and the spread of “free market” economics, liberal democracy, and totalitarianism to places that had known little of these ideologies and practices before.

World conflicts can be examined in terms of at least four dimensions: economic, political, religious, and social psychological. It will not do to seek the “cause” of a given war. Nazism, for example, is a consequence of the humiliation of Germany in the Versailles Treaty marking the end of World War I, but it also reflects on the dire straits the Great Depression brought to much of the West, the romance of German nationalism, and the social psychology of the relationship between a charismatic demagogue and almost an entire people.

“World conflicts” do not mean only war in the traditional sense. In the twenty first century, “terrorism” has emerged as a variant on traditional war and a central form of world conflict. “Terrorism” has been applied recently to non state violence directed at civilians and combatants in contests of will, power, and systems. “Terrorism” can also include organized

violence against civilians no matter where it comes from. Hence, nations bombing civilians under any circumstances can qualify as “state terrorists,” as distinct from “extra state terrorists” all the way from organized movements to ad hoc suicide bombers.

In the twenty first century, terrorism is the most dramatic and overtly war like form of world conflict. Globalization is another. Whatever its multiple meanings, globalization brings about major conflicts between employers and workers, whether those fired in a developed country to save a company money or those working for low wages in less developed countries.

Another aspect of globalization based world conflict is between forces wishing to preserve the planet in healthy ways and those wishing to disrupt and even destroy delicate resource systems for profit. This includes damage in the ways resources are extracted and the use of fossil fuels in manufacturing and in transporting resources and goods over much of the world. These are all aspects of economy based world conflicts.

Politically based world conflicts are between political systems vying for dominance. The Cold War was partly about western capitalism and the so called communist alternative wanting to eliminate each other, but also between societies with at least a partially democratic underlay and those with totalitarian cores. The Cold War organized and stabilized world conflict from 1945 to 1989, when the Soviet Union disintegrated. The end of the Cold War represents a crisis in the nation state and the secularism that most often has accompanied it in the West. Before the great nation state period began in the eighteenth century, ethnic/national and religious identifications were paramount in much of the world. Part of the accomplishment of the secular nation state as defined, for example, by France and the United States in the eighteenth century was that national identity and politics edged aside ethnic and religious identities.

Major western nations developed somewhat democratic institutions along with capitalist economic systems. These two factors combined with industrialization to produce unprecedented goods, trade, and wealth. And also great disparities between the rich and the poor.

With the end of colonialism and imperialism, which were fundamental to the development of liberal democracy and capitalism, world conflict came to be defined as conflict between nations’ policies that favored manufacturers, traders, and bankers and the peoples whose resources, economies, and lives were disrupted, controlled, and even ruined by them. As industrialization grew, so did the exploitation of child and female labor, urban crowding, slums, poverty, disease, violence, prostitution, and family breakdown. Thus world conflict was defined heavily by the differences in interests between elites who ran economic and political systems and the majority of people who did not benefit very much from the elites’ policies and actions.

Objections to this state of affairs were articulated most forcefully by Karl Marx, who foresaw the brutalities of capitalism as a necessary precondition for liberation from them in the form of a successor society that would allow comfort and fulfillment for all people rather than primarily elites. Marx warned that Russia would ruin his ideas if it tried to implement them, as it had barely entered capitalist industrialization, the full development of which, according to Marx, was necessary before the true human liberation of socialism and communism could proceed.

It was Lenin who decided that communism could skip the full development of capitalism. Whatever the outrages and failures of the effort he set in motion, it at least maintained itself for hundreds of millions of people as an image of an eventually more humane alternative to capitalism. But between its own internal problems and pressures against it from outside, the Soviet alternative collapsed near the end of the twentieth century. This supposedly left the US as the surviving, triumphant system, but that was not exactly the way much of the world experienced the outcome of the Cold War. Even as the Soviet system ended, the seemingly triumphant American system hit some great snags. Its elites assumed that the US was now free to act as it wished in the world. It could take what it wanted on its own terms and could make wars with impunity.

This condition did not, though, sit well with vast numbers of people in the world and even in the US. The collapse of the Soviet

alternative and the mistrust and loathing of US efforts in much of the world provoked massive repudiation of both systems and widespread reversion to ethnic and religious identifications.

In the new century, world conflicts take forms other than traditional wars. One finds ethnicities (e.g., Hutus and Tutsis in East Africa) and religions (e.g., Catholics and Protestants in Northern Ireland), and combinations of religions and ethnicities (e.g., Sinhalese and Tamils in Sri Lanka, Israelis and Palestinians in the Middle East) pitted against each other. These conflicts blend anger over differences in wealth and control with belief in one's own group's legitimacy and the illegitimacy of its opponent.

The second current form of violent world conflict is terrorist movements against nation states. Some see this form of conflict as based on totalitarian commitments of one party versus democratic political commitments of the other.

The liberal hope of endless economic growth, increasingly fair distribution of goods and services, democratic political institutions, and the privacy of religious commitments and behavior seems to have run up against vast objections and rejections. The totalitarian alternative appeared in major force in Leninism/Stalinism, Nazism, and Maoism in the twentieth century, and appears to be gaining force in Islamism and some forms of Judaism and Christianity in the twenty first century. These movements and their ethnic nationalist counterparts appear to represent, individually and collectively, a rejection of relativism, "progress," electoral democracy, and the separation of religion and state.

The advertised freedoms of the market and democratic systems seem less and less attractive to more and more people. How can we explain this? At least two approaches come to mind. One harks back to a post World War II social science classic, *The Authoritarian Personality* (1950), by Theodor Adorno and three other European refugees. The authors set themselves the task of understanding not so much the rise of Hitler as the willingness of most Germans to support him. Adorno et al. found that the "authoritarian personality" harbors an "intolerance of ambiguity." They saw the contrasting term, "tolerance of ambiguity," as characterizing the "democratic personality," which they obviously preferred.

Certain kinds of leaders can provide a community feeling, a sense of bonding with similar others that appears to be lacking in the modern world of free market economics and pseudo democratic politics ("pseudo" because few if any "democracies" realize very fully the potential of the democratic ideal; money interests, media that seem more intent on keeping the lid on things than informing the electorate, cynical manipulations of emotions and information, and other forces operate to undermine the true potential of democracy). The yearning for strong leadership and absolute, unambiguous declarations about the world suggests a yearning for community which modernism seems to undermine. It also suggests that in some peoples at some times, emotional needs are not congruent with rational needs. For example, the needs for adequate shelter, food, employment, education, and health care do not necessarily define people's approaches to political choices.

The part of the brain that deals with emotions is older and more primitive than the part dealing with reason. Feelings are, of course, far stronger and more dominating for the first several years of life than is reason, and it is completely likely that the salience of feelings is never really abandoned. Rather, it becomes disguised and channeled into institutional behavior.

Young children rely on the authority and approval of parents they often experience as perfectly strong, caring, loving, and wise. Around age 6 or 7, the awareness dawns that parents are not perfect at all. This is a crucial moment, for societies intuitively understand that disillusionment with the imperfect parent does not lead the child to discard the wish for the parent previously idealized. Society offers metaphors, usually religious and national, for those ideal parents lost. The "perfect parent" is a cult figure or God or Nazism or Communism or Islamism, or fundamentalist Christian, Jewish, Hindu, or other clergy or secular national leaders.

At the heart of this are two compelling questions that absolute authority answers for the willing follower. One is, what am I to do with my love, which is so insistent and strong that it impels me way beyond the family in which I first learned its pleasures and centrality? The second question is, what am I to do with my anger, which is so insistent and strong that it

impels me way beyond the family in which I first learned it in its numerous manifestations?

Absolute leaders instruct their followers to love certain people and hate the rest. Such leaders take upon themselves the judgmental capacity and conscience of the followers. They say in effect, you do not need to bother yourself making judgments about good and bad, right and wrong, life and death. I will relieve you of those complex, painful decisions and reduce it all to easy contrasts and slogans. This will simplify your life while giving me the absolute power that every child dreams of but gives up fairly early on. I will speak to that child in you that wished to be omnipotent and also that child in you that wished for the perfect and all knowing parent. You will love the people I tell you to love and hate and even kill those I tell you to oppose.

And here we get to the least studied crucial issue in human behavior in our time: anger (which includes such manifestations as rage, wrath, hatred, loathing, fury, vilification, and much more). Like all emotions, anger originates in the self's predisposition to feel that emotion and in real experiences that draw it out. Children commonly are so consumed with anger that it frightens them as well as the adults who witness and feel it.

With loving, accepting care on the part of adults, children's anger can be accepted, understood, and contained. More commonly, though, the anger is not fully accepted, not completely understood, and not adequately contained. The child who has this experience, and most people have had it, is left with a field of metal rods representing numerous experiences of unfulfilled anger. Culture offers what amount to magnets that fly over those fields of anger rods and pull them swiftly to the magnet. In a racist society, culture says, take that free floating anger and use it against people whose skin color is different from yours. Or gender. Or nationality. Or religion. Or sexual orientation. Or anything else that offers an opportunity to attach anger to something and let it out there, even though it does not actually originate or belong there.

What conflict does on the world scale is to galvanize endless and countless rods of anger to the magnets of racism, nationalism, religious

superiority, and so forth, "opposition structures" that capture that free floating hatred and use it to accomplish domination, vilification, exploitation, and war. Certain leaders with excessive tendencies in this direction engage their own anger to organize and perpetuate opposition structures and encourage followers, who have their own reservoirs of anger, to join them in the enterprise.

When this anger is organized into structures that exploit economically and humiliate politically, we find the major alternative, in explaining terrorism, to the anti modernist one. This interpretation identifies terrorism as a form of war made by the weak against the strong, in retaliation for economic exploitations and political humiliations. Note that the anti modernist interpretation assumes war to the finish as the only solution. This other interpretation offers an entirely different view and hope.

Conflict at its base draws on anger in two forms: proactive and reactive. Those who ruin other cultures, tear out their resources, force their populations into cities and degradation, and put profit above the well being of humans, communities, and the environment are people who, in addition to making money, proactively find outlets for their anger. They do not act from malice or sadistic design so much as unacknowledged inner pressures they cannot identify and which they fear to face. "Acting out" those inner pressures is far easier and more familiar than facing them and working to overcome them.

The "structural violence" of domination, exploitation, and humiliation – all operating normatively through economic and political institutions, among others – often draws on physical violence in order to coerce the victims of political and economic strategies of domination to submit to the more powerful party. Familiar with violence as the objects of it, the victims turn to violence in reaction to it. Reactive anger – likely that of the bulk of terrorists in the world at this time – is a response to the proactive anger of someone else.

But there is an option, slowly working its way into the public consciousness of our species, which is non violent conflict resolution. This is ethically the most recent and most humane alternative to violence in world conflicts. In the recent period, its exponents and practitioners

trace a line from Thoreau through Gandhi, Martin Luther King, Jr., the Dalai Lama, Thich Nhat Hanh, and Aung Sang Suu Kii, among others.

If those who lead peoples into violent conflict draw on their followers' reservoirs of hatred – call them “war leaders” – the major and recent alternative leaders – “peace leaders” – draw on their followers' unfulfilled yearnings for peace, community, kindness, and love. These are as natural and fundamental human needs and desires as those for vengeance, hatred, and killing. But they speak to less raw, unsocialized parts of our selves, which it appears are harder to provoke and manipulate than the others. It is more difficult to bond with people than to separate from and oppose them. Those who would end violent conflict in the world need to recognize and take into account this deep, painful, but potentially liberating reality.

The ending of violent conflicts depends also on extending awareness of the true history of peace. In 1905, popular movements in Norway and Sweden forced two governments to withdraw troops massed at their shared border and ready for war. After the breakup of the Soviet Union, almost all its components moved to other forms of government and economy without violence. At the turn of the twenty-first century, long-time conflicts in Northern Ireland and Sri Lanka were on the verge, at last, of non-violent resolution. Numerous projects bring Israelis and Palestinians together in non-violent encounters that point toward peace.

There appears to be a dialectical process between old war customs and new peace visions and practices. Peace visions in this era must include the needs of all people on the planet for environmental health and safety, vibrant and viable communities and societies, and productive, fulfilling lives in relationship with others and the planet.

Organizations and movements that promote peace number in the thousands or tens of thousands throughout the world. They are less developed, disseminated, and experienced than organizations and movements promoting and practicing war, but they are clearly in motion. If they gain the momentum they need to banish

war to the history books, we will still face a slew of grave conflicts that will require inventiveness, patience, and determination to solve satisfactorily. There is no greater challenge to those concerned about the nature and fate of world conflict.

SEE ALSO: Aggression; Anti War and Peace Movements; Capitalism; Conflict Theory; Environmental Movements; Gendered Aspects of War and International Violence; Global Justice as a Social Movement; Globalization, Culture and; Globalization and Global Justice; Military Research and Science and War; Political Economy; Social Movements, Non Violent; Social Psychology; War

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world-systems theory

See *dependency and world systems theories*

writing as method

Elizabeth Adams St.Pierre

Writing as a method of inquiry refers to a research practice of foregrounding and investigating how researchers construct knowledge about people, themselves, and the world by writing. This concept, introduced by Laurel Richardson (2000 [1994]) and developed by Elizabeth St. Pierre (Richardson & St. Pierre 2005) and others, brings the idea that writing is thinking from the humanities to the social sciences.

Writers have always used writing to help them think about their lives and their work, but that function of writing has seldom been taken advantage of in that area of social science research that mimics research in the natural sciences by assuming that language can describe reality. However, after the linguistic turn, the crisis of legitimation, and the crisis of representation, many social science researchers no longer assume that language is transparent and can simply mirror or represent reality; rather, they understand that language helps to create reality. Writing is therefore not an objectifying practice or a mopping up activity at the end of a research project but a creative practice used throughout to make sense of lives and culture, to theorize, and to produce knowledge.

Since the Enlightenment, writing has been divided into two kinds: literary and scientific. Literature has traditionally been associated with personal expression, rhetoric, physicality, emotions, and subjectivity. Science writing is associated with facts, the truth, reality, rationality, and objectivity. Literature is soft and suspect; science writing is hard and true. Enlightenment thinkers such as René Descartes and Francis Bacon set up binary oppositions – mind/body, objective/subjective, fact/fiction – in which the first term is privileged and scientific. The scientific method assumes that the rational mind can divorce itself from its irrational body and produce true knowledge employing criteria of exactitude, rigor, and systematicity. In this scenario, mathematics is the perfect language, supposedly pure and uncontaminated by the inexactitude, imprecision, and precariousness of everyday life. Science is thus above life, and

science writing should reflect the same detachment, rationality, and control.

Of course, such a neat division of writing, and the world (scientific and non scientific), was never entirely successful, and events of the twentieth century, in particular, brought into question the idea that the knowledge produced by science could cure the problems of human kind. Indeed, the sometimes disastrous effects of an objective, rational science brought the entire enterprise into question after the atrocities of World Wars I and II, Algeria, and Vietnam. The social movements of the 1960s and 1970s demanded that science – both social and natural science – be taken to task for its complicity in perpetuating poverty, racism, sexism, homophobia, ageism, and so forth. Texts encouraging a mind–body connection resisted Descartes’s 300 year old theory and doubted that the mind and body had ever been separate. Scholars began to move out of their own fields, blurring disciplinary boundaries, as they sought different methods to use to produce different knowledge that might allow different possibilities for living. The “soft” social sciences began to claim the status of the natural sciences, no longer content to be called underdeveloped natural sciences or pre scientific. Physicists began writing for popular audiences, and social science writers began using the genres of the humanities.

Social scientists have always represented their work in words and written texts; however, after the blurring of the genres, forms of representation such as drama and film were increasingly used to report scientific knowledge. Form constrains content, and different genres of writing encourage different thinking and produce different knowledge. No particular genre of writing is superior to another; each has possibilities and limits. Though a conventional scientific research report modeled after that of the natural sciences has been privileged for some time in the social sciences, science does not require a particular genre. A poem can convey as much meaning (and a different meaning) as an academic essay. In fact, to learn as much as they can about their topic, researchers might write up data from a single project using a variety of forms – personal narrative, expository essay, autobiography, fiction, and poetry – in order to engage those data in more and more complex ways, thereby complicating the making of

meaning and illustrating the very partial and fragile nature of the work we call science.

Researchers who have special talents have indeed experimented with alternative forms of representation, including poetry, drama, auto ethnography, fiction, performance texts, polyvocal texts, hypertext, readers' theater, comedy and satire, visual presentations, mixed genres, and even painting and dance. Social scientists concerned with disseminating their work widely often write very different texts about the same project for different audiences.

The tenuous relation between language and meaning that emerges from postmodern theories of the last half of the twentieth century is central to the idea that writing is a method of inquiry. In *Of Grammatology* (1967), Jacques Derrida explained that language cannot contain and fix meaning. He theorized the concepts *différance* and *writing under erasure* to explain that meaning escapes language and so is always deferred. "Word and thing or thought never in fact become one" (Spivak 1974: lvii). When we write under erasure, we let go of meaning at the moment we introduce it. As a result, meaning cannot be a portable property that words can carry from one person to another, and language cannot "represent" the world.

Postmodern discourses differ from the interpretive discourses used in conventional social science inquiry that assume there is a deep, hidden, prelinguistic meaning that can be found and brought to discourse. If there is no mimetic link between a deep (or transcendental) Truth and a particular instantiation, then the copy theory of truth upon which some theories of representation are structured cannot hold. Postmodernism, after the linguistic turn, suggests that interpretation is not the discovery of meaning but the introduction of meaning. Because of this, writers can never control readers' interpretations since there is always an excess of meaning as people bring their own lived experiences to the texts they read. Writing, then, is not a neutral activity of expression that simply matches word to world. It becomes a task of responsibility as researchers create people, practices, and cultures in the texts they write.

Researchers also collect data in the texts they write, so writing can be a *method of data collection*. Researchers write throughout the research process as they document their day to day

activities, their impressions of events, their formal interviews and informal conversations with participants, and their formal and informal observations. Some of these data are conventional – data from formal interviews and observations, for example, that are textualized in interview transcripts and fieldnotes. These are official data that are described in social science textbooks.

Other data are transgressive (St.Pierre 1997) and may include memories of the past and the future, dreams, sensualities, emotions, the words of other scholars, the novel just read, a neighbor's comment. These data are found in every study, though their presence and importance are seldom acknowledged. Writers can not simply erase these transgressive data from their minds and bodies as they think and write about the more conventional data in their interview transcripts and fieldnotes. They bring the richness of their lives to their research. Thus, different researchers studying the same topic think with different conventional and transgressive data and necessarily produce different knowledge. There is no separation between the knower and the known in the work, and the unique positioning of the researcher is valued. *Bias* is not thinkable in this structure, but that does not mean that one does not discriminate among representations, that "anything goes." It means that readers develop more complex ideas of what good research is. Validity is not dismissed but constantly reworked as appropriate.

Since writing is thinking it can also be a *method of data analysis*. Writing allows us to think things we might not have thought by thinking alone. Writing takes us places we might not have gone if we had not written. We must think in order to write the next word, the next sentence, the next theory. An idea simply thought may seem brilliant until it is written. A brilliant unthought idea may appear as we write. Writing forces us to textualize the rigorous confusion of our thinking, and that work is analysis. This analysis is much more complicated than what is usually called data analysis – positivist practices of coding data, sorting it into categories that are grouped into themes that become section headings in an outline that organizes writing in advance of writing. Those practices ignore the work of writing as thinking, as analysis. They assume that writing only

documents what is already known. Using writing as a method of inquiry, however – as a method of data collection and data analysis – acknowledges and builds into the research process the generative work of writing.

The linguistic turn that recognized that meaning (the Truth) about people and culture could not be captured and closed off in language led to the crises of representation and legitimation that recognized that meaning (truth) is always partial, situated, contingent, inaccurate, and, thus, dangerous to some extent. The resulting burden of authorship led to the ethical turn that recognized that researchers' texts do not capture truth but produce it. Leery of writing texts that might misrepresent or even harm participants, social science researchers began to ask different questions about their work. Instead of asking "What does [marriage, race, subjectivity] mean?" they posed questions such as those Paul Bové (1990: 54) asked about discourse: "How does discourse function? Where is it to be found? How does it get produced and regulated? What are its social effects? How does it exist?"

From these questions comes a different question about writing: "What else might writing do except mean?" Some researchers, particularly postmodern researchers, have begun to question whether the goal of social science research should even be representation (the goal of interpretivism), and they are increasingly hesitant to get to the bottom of meaning, to gratify the interpretive entitlement of readers to *know* their participants. They are no longer willing to write comfort texts with rich, thick descriptions that provide easy access to and lay bare people's lives, whether exotic or ordinary. Their writing does not encourage an uncomplicated and sentimental identification that erases the difference of the Other. Rather, they shift the focus from their participants to the topic of their research – marriage, race, subjectivity – using conventional and transgressive data to theorize without deliv-
 ering anyone or any place in authentic, more adequate, persuasive representations. People and lives are no longer the epistemological end of

the study – objects that can be known – but provocateurs – lines of flight that lead else where. This elsewhere is the promise of writing as a method of inquiry, of discovery, of coming and going, of movement past what is known.

This kind of post representational work can be accomplished in any genre, but it requires that we understand writing differently. Writing becomes a field of play in which we are always unprepared to make meaning, and whatever meaning we make will always come too late to rescue us. Nevertheless, we write because we know that, in writing, anything can happen – and will. Like other writers, we may produce knowledge that will change the world.

SEE ALSO: Author/Auteur; Deconstruction; Discourse; Methods; Methods, Mixed; Post structuralism; Representation

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X

xenophobia

Paul R. Jones

Derived from the Greek words *xeno*, meaning “foreigner,” “stranger,” or “guest,” and *phobia*, meaning fear, xenophobia literally refers to a phobic attitude toward foreigners. However, “phobia” in this context is not meant in the clinical sense but rather refers to a part of the network of racist ideologies predicated on discriminatory discourse and practice. Xenophobia is thus a term that describes fear or prejudice with respect to something or someone perceived as “foreign” or “other.” As such, xenophobia is an exclusionary logic whose focus is primarily cultural, being directed toward those artifacts or cultural expressions considered somehow “different.” As with all discriminatory ideologies, xenophobia constructs a hierarchical order of people and cultures.

As xenophobia both maintains and constructs such social and cultural boundaries, it can entail a deliberate or unconscious misrecognition of other cultures. Indeed, the designation of certain attributes to other cultures expresses power in itself, as meanings can be imposed on one group by a more dominant group. Given this broad definition, xenophobia could be generalized to a wide range of social situations, but primarily it operates as an ideological basis for nationalism (when such discourses devalue and stigmatize the cultures of other nations) and for related anti immigrant discourses. Accordingly, xenophobia underpins much of the ideology of right wing political parties that emphasize cultural difference and perpetrate the myth of cultural incompatibility. By framing their arguments in terms of real or imagined cultural

differences, radical right populist parties have increasingly used xenophobic discourse to “legitimate” their racist policies.

Some commentators have suggested the existence of “xeno racism,” a confluence between xenophobia and racism, which is not only directed at black and minority ethnic groups and individuals but also is a “xenophobia that bears all the marks of the old racism, except that it is not colour coded” (Sivanandan 2001: 2). The displacement of poor white populations forced to seek asylum has shifted the focus of right wing political parties toward these dispossessed communities; the concept of “xeno racism” is useful for analyzing the growing racism in popular media and political discourses directed toward white people seeking asylum. Xenophobia is an important concept for sociologists and political theorists researching how such categorizations of the “other” are constructed and subsequently stigmatized or devalued.

SEE ALSO: Ethnocentricism; Hate Crimes; Ideology; Imagined Communities; Nationalism; Race; Race (Racism); Racist Movements; Social Exclusion

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Y

Yanagita, Kunio (1875–1962)

Takami Kuwayama

Kunio Yanagita is widely regarded as the founder of Japanese folklore studies or folkloristics. His influence transcended disciplinary boundaries and was felt in many other fields, including sociology and anthropology. Even today, he continues to be discussed, both inside and outside academic circles. Although little known outside East Asia, Yanagita is indisputably one of the intellectual giants of the modern world.

PERSONAL HISTORY

Yanagita was the sixth son of a poor family in the village of Tsujikawa, Shintō Province, known today as Kanzaki, Hyōgo Prefecture. His father made a living by teaching Chinese classics as a private tutor. Until he was adopted by the Yanagita family at the age of 27, he carried his father's surname, Matsuoka. In 1887, when Kunio was 13 years old, he moved to Ibaraki Prefecture, located northeast of Tokyo, where his brother practiced medicine. Three years later, in 1890, Kunio moved to central Tokyo to receive higher education, but his major interest at that time was literature. He thus joined a literary circle to study poems and became acquainted with some young talented men of letters. Yanagita maintained throughout his young adulthood a keen interest in literature, but eventually studied agricultural policy at the School of Law, Tokyo Imperial University. In 1900, soon after graduation, he found his first job as a bureaucrat in the Department of Agriculture and Commerce.

Having been adopted by a prestigious family in the next year, Kunio Yanagita assumed some important governmental posts, which culminated in 1914 in the appointment as chief secretary in the House of Peers. During office, Yanagita wrote articles about Japanese agriculture, in which he emphasized the need to implement structural reform, but his proposals were turned down. Discouraged, he gradually developed an interest in Japan's folk customs, and visited remote places in the countryside. His field trips resulted in the production of some pioneering books on Japanese folklore. It was about this time that he read James Frazer's *Golden Bough*.

In 1919, at the age of 45, Yanagita put an end to his career as a bureaucrat and started writing for *Asahi Shinbun*, Japan's leading newspaper. Soon afterwards, he was dispatched to Europe as Japan's delegate to the League of Nations. He took advantage of this opportunity to attend lectures at Geneva University. Yanagita was an avid reader of books published in Europe, being well versed in the latest scholarship there. In the early 1930s he resigned from all his public posts to devote himself to the study of folklore. Despite his reputation, he only occasionally taught at universities because he was convinced that folkloristics would only flourish when researchers lived side by side with *jomin* (ordinary people). He thus kept his distance from professional scholars, organizing instead nationwide networks of independent researchers. Many of his lectures on folklore were given for these researchers at his house in Tokyo. Besides his specialty, Yanagita distinguished himself as a public intellectual who addressed a variety of social issues. In 1951 he was awarded the Order of Cultural Merit, the highest honor to be bestowed on Japanese academics. After his death in 1962, his numerous books and articles were compiled in the form of *zenshu* (complete works), the latest version of which began to be

published in 1997. This version, when completed, will comprise a total of 38 volumes, each containing no fewer than 600 printed pages.

JAPANESE FOLKLORISTICS

To appreciate Yanagita's scholarship, some major characteristics of Japanese folkloristics should be mentioned first. In Japan, folkloristics and ethnology, now better known as social or cultural anthropology, have developed as twin disciplines since the late nineteenth century. This contrasts with Great Britain and the US, where the two fields have separate histories, except at the beginning. The Japanese situation is related to the relatively late modernization of the country. In Japan's countryside, researchers from the cities discovered many old manners and customs comparable to those found by western ethnologists in "primitive" society. Japanese intellectuals found a foreign culture within their own country. This discovery led Japanese folklorists to study a wider range of topics than their counterparts in the English speaking countries. Generally, in Great Britain and the US, the scope of research tends to focus on folktales, ballads, legends, and so forth, whereas in Japan topics like social structure and ideology are also explored. Thus, Japanese folkloristics may best be understood as the anthropological study of Japan by the Japanese. It is a typical example of what Takami Kuwayama (2004) called native anthropology.

THEORY AND METHODOLOGY

Folkloristics as a Historical Science

Yanagita regarded his discipline as a historical science. He criticized orthodox historiography of his time for two major reasons. First, it was concerned almost exclusively with the lives of great individuals and dramatic events. It revealed very little of commoners' history. Second, orthodox historiography reconstructed the past by using only written documents as data. As long as this methodology was followed, Yanagita thought, it was impossible to explore the folk traditions that had been passed on for generations without being recorded. He thus

proposed to gather data by doing fieldwork. More specifically, he devised ethnographic methods in which researchers interviewed people about their customs, both past and present. The rationale was that, because Japan modernized relatively late, old customs were still practiced in everyday life, so that thinking about the past was tantamount to thinking about the present. For Yanagita, history referred to the past within the present. Yanagita maintained that language contained the history of ideas and things, and he thus paid particular attention to the analysis of the words and phrases actually used during the interviews. There is, therefore, much etymological discussion in his writings. In today's terminology, Yanagita tried to write the social history of the Japanese people at large. One major difference, though, between Yanagita and today's social historians is that Yanagita aimed at discovering the general *pattern* of history. Put another way, he was interested in discovering the possible "laws" governing the changes that had occurred in ordinary people's lives. The history he wrote is often called *ikkai sei no nai rekishi* (history without unique events).

Folklore Research by Natives for Natives

Yanagita explained the fundamentals of his methodology in *Minkan Denshoron* (On Popular Tradition) and *Kyodo Seikatsu no Kenkyūho* (Methods in the Study of Local Community Life), published in 1934 and 1935, respectively. He classified the objects of folklore research into three categories: (1) material culture; (2) verbal art; and (3) mentalities. The first is a translation of *yukei bunka* (literally, culture that has a form), which includes the following: habitat; clothing; food; transportation; labor; villages; family and kinship; funerals; annual events; religious festivals; and children's games and toys. According to Yanagita, these merely scratch the surface of a folk culture, and even travelers can study them. The second category, *genko geijutsu* (literally, language and art), comprises the following: new words; new expressions; proverbs; riddles; prayers; children's language; songs and ballads; and narratives, folktales, and legends. This category is concerned with audible phenomena, which are more complex than the first because understanding them requires language

competence, but they are still not particularly deep. The third category is a translation of *shin'i gensho* (literally, psychosemantic phenomena), which roughly corresponds to mentalities in the sense of the term used by the Annales School of French history. It consists of knowledge, life skills, and purposes of life. Yanagita was convinced that only compatriots or natives could fully understand the mentalities of their people. Thus, he excluded foreigners from the study of mentalities. For Yanagita, folkloristics was *jisei no gaku* (science for self reflection).

Yanagita's model of research is similar to that of Bronislaw Malinowski's. In *Argonauts of the Western Pacific* (1922), Malinowski classified ethnographic research into three parts in ascending order of complexity: (1) the organization of the tribe and the anatomy of its culture; (2) daily life and ordinary behavior; and (3) the native mind. There is, however, a definitive difference between the two scholars. As noted above, Yanagita considered it practically impossible for non natives to understand the native mind, whereas Malinowski had no doubt concerning their ability to grasp it. If anything, Malinowski argued that natives were so absorbed in the details of everyday life that they could not observe themselves objectively. He further contended that the natives lacked the intellectual capacity to study their own culture, so that it must be studied and represented by professionally trained outsiders – western anthropologists.

There are both merits and demerits in these contrasting views. Yanagita's position, on the one hand, regards natives in the non western world as active agents of research into their culture. They are considered knowledge producers in their own right, rather than passive objects of research. In the age of colonialism, when the natives were denigrated as "primitive" and "uncivilized," Yanagita's view was innovative. On the other hand, it underestimates the ability of trained outsiders to investigate foreign cultures. It even generates a blinkered nationalism that excludes foreigners from the study of one's own country. By contrast, Malinowski's position encourages cultural research by qualified outsiders, but, in the name of science, it tends to elevate their status to the final judges on the cultures they are studying – a point criticized by many native intellectuals engaged in indigenous rights movements today.

Concentric Area Theory

One of the best known theories presented by Yanagita is called *shukenron*, which, for lack of suitable translations, is rendered here as concentric area theory. Proposed in his 1930 book *Kagyuko* (On Snails), this theory first divides Japan into many blocks, which are then arranged to form concentric circles, with Kyoto, Japan's ancient capital, at the center. Based on the premise that new ideas and things develop at the center/urban, concentric area theory holds that new forms of culture will gradually spread toward the periphery/rural, replacing the old with the new in the process of diffusion. Thus, according to Yanagita, customs more commonly practiced on the periphery at the time of investigation are older than those practiced at the center.

This theory grew out of Yanagita's research on dialects. The example he used was that of the snail, for which many different terms exist in Japan. Having collected hundreds of local terms, Yanagita drew a lexical map and demonstrated that, as they moved away from the capital city, snails were called, in descending order of proximity to the center, *dedemushi*, *maimai*, *katatsumuri*, *tsuburi*, and *namekuji*. (These terms were prototypes from which similar local terms had been derived.) Particularly interesting was the case of *namekuji*, which Yanagita considered the oldest term for the snail. In standard Japanese, *namekuji* means slug, but Yanagita discovered that, in many remote areas, slugs were lexically indistinguishable from snails. Significantly, these areas were usually located both at the southwestern and the northeastern frontiers of the country. This discovery was later named the correspondence of outlying areas, which Yanagita interpreted as indicating that the center's influence had not yet penetrated through the peripheral areas. The implication was that the periphery was not yet "civilized," and that it would eventually be assimilated into the center as civilization spread. In this way, Yanagita turned spatial differences (i.e., different terminologies used in different parts of Japan) into temporal differences (i.e., different stages of civilization or "progress" in which these areas were supposedly placed). Yanagita also maintained that his language analysis could also be applied to cultural analysis in general.

In western scholarship, this conversion of space into time, technically known as comparative method, is a distinctive feature of the nineteenth century social evolutionism represented by, among the most notable, Edward Tylor and Lewis Morgan.

A major problem of concentric area theory is the assumption that Japan constitutes a single national community. Without this assumption, it would have been impossible for Yanagita to contend that new customs had first developed at the center/urban and then spread gradually toward the periphery/rural. Concentric area theory would only apply on the assumption that Japan is a homogeneous nation, with a powerful centralized government situated at the geographical core. At least, it does not fully consider the possibility of external influences, such as prolonged contact with other people, which could have prevented the unchecked flow of culture. In today's critical theory, which emphasizes the multiplicity of cultural experience, Yanagita's theses have been much criticized for having overlooked Japan's internal diversity. It should be noted, however, that, in the early stage of his career, Yanagita enthusiastically studied minority groups, such as hunters and wood turners in the mountains. He in fact hypothesized that these people were genealogically separate from Japan's majority group, rice cultivating peasants on flat land. This hypothesis, however, was later discarded by Yanagita himself and fell into oblivion as his interest shifted to the study of Japan's national culture.

Another problem of concentric area theory is the neglect of Hokkaido, located at the northern end of the Japanese archipelago. Indeed, Yanagita left out Hokkaido from the lexical map of the snail mentioned above without giving any reason. Throughout his career, Yanagita paid only scant attention to Hokkaido, probably because it was (and still is) strongly associated with Ainu people. By contrast, Yanagita had been fascinated with Okinawa, Japan's southernmost island, since he was young. He even regarded it as the archetype of Japan. In his last book, *Kaijo no Michi* (Ocean Routes) (1961), he asserted that the ancestors of the Japanese people had first migrated from southern China to Okinawa, sailing on the Japan Current, in order to seek out porcelain shells, and then moved further north to mainland Japan, where they

had eventually settled as rice cultivators. This theory has only partially been supported by later archeological research, but illuminates how Yanagita assumed contrasting attitudes toward Okinawa and Hokkaido.

PROSPECTS FOR FUTURE RESEARCH

Despite such problems, there is no doubt that Yanagita was an intellectual giant whose influence continues to be felt today. Among his legacies that have yet to be fully explored, the idea of *sekai minzokugaku* or global folkloristics deserves special attention. Presented in *Minkan Denshoron* (1935), this idea has long been neglected for complex reasons. Recently, however, a new interpretation has been proposed (Kuwayama 2004), which holds that Yanagita originally conceived of global folkloristics as an international forum for dialogue, in which researchers from around the world could exchange ideas without privileging one or a few leading countries. In this new interpretation, global folkloristics is understood as an assemblage of different "national folkloristics" practiced in different parts of the world: it reflects Yanagita's strong desire to make folkloristics a global discipline without sacrificing each country's scholarly tradition. If the ideal of global folkloristics is realized, it will promote the study of one's own culture by natives, who have long been treated as no more than "research assistants" for the "real" researchers from the West.

SEE ALSO: Annales School; Culture; Eurocentrism; *Jomin*; Malinowski, Bronislaw K.; *Minzoku*; *Nihonjinron*

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youth/adolescence

Sue Heath

Youth and adolescence are terms which are often used interchangeably to refer to a phase of the life course between childhood and adulthood, yet are often positioned as contrasting approaches within academic discourse. Sociologists use the term youth to refer to a socially constructed life phase which is not only culturally specific, but which is also the product of particular historical conjunctures. Within this approach, youth is broadly construed as a collective experience which is shaped by social structures, age specific institutions, and societal expectations. In contrast, the term adolescence emphasizes processes of individual social and/or physiological and psychological development and as such is much more closely associated with the disciplines of developmental psychology and clinical medicine. Within this approach the phase between childhood and adulthood is often equated with puberty, and is represented as a time marked by experimentation and emotional storm and stress. Classic theorists of adolescence include G. Stanley Hall (1844–1924) and Erik H. Erikson (1902–94).

CONCEPTUALIZING YOUTH

There are a number of different approaches to the sociological conceptualization of youth. An approach which has been particularly influential in recent years defines youth as a period of *transition*, emphasizing young people's movement through key transitional stages towards the

attainment of adulthood. Writing from a Northern European perspective in his book *Youth and Social Policy* (1995), Coles, for example, focuses on three key transitions: the transition from school to work, from the family of origin to a family of destination, and from the parental house to a house of one's own. The assumption of linear progression that underpins this model has attracted criticism in recent years. It is further argued that the model is rendered obsolete by the increasingly widespread deferral of some of the traditional markers of adulthood and the increased visibility of alternative life styles which challenge the assumed desirability of attainment in these areas.

An alternative approach focuses on youth as a *relational* concept, which derives its existence and its meaning from its relationship to the concept of adulthood. This approach foregrounds and critiques the relative powerlessness of young people in relation to the world of adults, regardless of how adulthood may be defined over time and across different cultures. Wyn and White (1997), for example, argue that "if youth is the state of 'becoming,' adulthood is the 'arrival.' At the same time, youth is also 'not adult,' a deficit of the adult state" (p. 11). The concepts of both youth and adolescence thus can be employed to legitimate the differential treatment of younger people, and to justify adult intervention in their lives. As Griffin (1993) argues, this tends to result in the portrayal of young people in one of two ways: as either *victims* of social problems or as *perpetrators* of those same problems. Both portrayals serve to marginalize them in relation to adults.

A third approach focuses more on the political economy of youth, regarding youth as a period defined by the various *age related legal strictures* – including social policies – that regulate young people's lives. Phil Mizen (2004) has argued, for example, that "the simple fact of possessing a certain biological age brings with it differential access to social power, while age also provides the means through which young people are brought into a more or less common relationship with many of the central institutions of modern life" (p. 9). This approach, then, is closely related to the notion of youth as a relational concept. However, it places particular emphasis on the political underpinnings of the concept, and foregrounds the significance

of age as a means by which full citizenship is denied.

Youth is a culturally specific concept. Access to age related citizenship rights, for example, or social norms regarding key transitional stages, varies hugely across different societies and across different cultures and regions within specific societies (Brown et al. 2002). The prevalence of young people among the global population of street people, sweated laborers, sex workers, and militia powerfully underlines this point. Conceptualizations of youth are also historically specific. For example, it is often argued that the emergence of youth as a category which is separate and distinct from adulthood and childhood has tended to occur in parallel with processes of industrialization, in order to serve the needs of emergent capitalism.

DISTINCT TRADITIONS WITHIN THE SOCIOLOGY OF YOUTH

Earlier conceptualizations of youth within Europe and North America were strongly influenced by the *functionalist* theories of writers such as Talcott Parsons and, slightly later, Shmuel N. Eisenstadt. Within functionalist accounts, the period of youth serves as a means of facilitating the smooth transition from the particularistic values of the family of origin to the normative values of broader society. Youth culture plays a key role in facilitating this movement, although the exact nature of a young person's cultural affiliation is rendered theoretically irrelevant by the primary role of youth culture in ensuring the maintenance of social order. In contrast, the writings of Karl Mannheim on *youth and generation* point to the historically significant role of younger generations. Mannheim defined generation in terms of groups of individuals who, by belonging to the same birth cohort, share a common "generation location" in relation to key social and historical circumstances, and it is this common location that shapes their attitudes and actions as a distinct generation. While nonetheless arguing that some generations are noted more for their contribution to the status quo, Mannheim recognized the agency of young people by arguing that certain generations are very much in the vanguard of social change, whether for good or ill.

The *cultural studies tradition* within youth research originated in the work of the Chicago School in the first half of the twentieth century. Classic ethnographies such as Thrasher's *The Gang* (1927) and Foote Whyte's *Street Corner Society* (1943) highlighted the impact of urbanization in producing the stigmatized category of deviant youth. In the period following World War II, a more overtly political perspective on youth culture emerged. The Centre for Contemporary Cultural Studies (CCCS) at the University of Birmingham defined the field in terms of a class based critique of young people's roles as consumers and producers of mass and ghetto cultures. The classic CCCS collection *Resistance Through Rituals* (1976) contended that youth subcultures represented an attempt by working class young people both to give meaning to, and to solve, the "working class problematic," namely, their marginalization from hegemonic middle class society. Through studying a variety of colorful youth subcultures, it was concluded that such allegiances nonetheless represented "imaginary solutions" to this problematic and served to reinforce the alienation of working class youth.

Over time, the original CCCS position has attracted considerable criticism, including accusations of over interpreting the significance of "style" and of over emphasizing the place of leisure in young people's lives. The relative invisibility of young women in their accounts also generated a strong feminist critique. More recent work within the cultural studies tradition has attempted to address these criticisms, and has also moved beyond the earlier focus on social class. In the UK, key writers in the field use the language of "post subculture," "scenes," and "tribes" to argue that class is no longer of relevance to an understanding of contemporary manifestations of youth culture (Bennett & Kahn Harris 2004), although this is a contested position. Similarly, in the US there is greater focus on the diversity of youth cultures and a concern to explore the formation of cultural identity, particularly in relation to ethnic identity and hybrid youth cultures (Lee & Zhou 2004).

The *youth transitions tradition* has emerged as another influential strand within the sociology of youth over the last two decades, particularly in Northern Europe and Australasia. Transitions researchers have pointed to the disruption of

relatively safe and predictable transitional routes and their replacement by *fractured* and *extended transitions* to adulthood, especially in the economic sphere. The transitions tradition is also distinctive for its focus on the impact of social class, gender, and ethnicity on young people's life chances and, more recently, its engagement with debates concerning social exclusion, social capital, and the putative youth underclass. The approach has, however, been criticized for over-emphasizing the impact of social structure and for adopting an over-deterministic approach to understanding young people's lives.

More recently, Ulrich Beck's *individualization thesis* has been utilized by transitions researchers and others seeking to understand the experiences of young adults in "late modernity." In *Risk Society* (1992), Beck argues that there is an increasing tendency for young people to "write their own biographies" in a world characterized by rising levels of risk and bewildering choice. However, while the proliferation of individualized biographies might suggest that class, ethnicity, and gender are no longer determinants of young people's life chances, and have encouraged younger generations to feel that they are no longer constrained by these factors, critics argue that the old indicators nonetheless remain firmly in place. In *Young People and Social Change* (1997), Furlong and Cartmel refer to this paradox as "the epistemological fallacy of late modernity." This has led some youth researchers to distinguish between "normal" and "choice" biographies, the former marked by continuity with gender-divergent "traditional" working class transitional routes and the latter marked by the emergence of gender-convergent destandardized pathways among well-educated and/or affluent young adults (du Bois-Reymond 1998).

CURRENT THEMES AND METHODOLOGICAL CONCERNS

The subject matter of sociological youth research is wide-ranging, with few aspects of young people's lives left unexplored by contemporary researchers. Certain themes, such as youth culture and leisure, education and work, and health-related behaviors, are perennial concerns. More recent topics of interest have

included social space, globalization, new technologies, consumption and lifestyle, intimacy and sexuality and, as more overarching concerns, identity and subjectivity. A broader conceptual debate relates to the (re)definition of youth in late modernity and the blurring of the boundaries of childhood, youth, and adulthood among younger generations (see for example Cote's *Arrested Adulthood*, 2000, and Dwyer and Wyn's *Youth, Education and Risk*, 2001). The theme of youth (in) crisis is also common in youth research in many parts of the world. This is often a racialized debate, highlighting the pathologization of racial identity (see, for example, Giroux's *Fugitive Cultures*, 1996). There is also a strong gender dimension to the youth crisis debate, focusing on the global trend towards rising levels of academic achievement among young women and associated claims of a contemporary "crisis of masculinity."

In exploring these themes, youth sociologists have traditionally drawn upon a wide variety of methods for researching young people's lives, ranging from detailed ethnographic studies through to large-scale national and subnational cohort studies. Recent developments include the adoption of narrative and auto/biographical interviewing techniques by many youth researchers, and the increasing use of visual methods, including photo elicitation, video diaries, and spatial mapping techniques. This in part reflects a desire to use research methods which are deemed to have an intrinsic appeal to young people. There is also a growing emphasis on qualitative longitudinal research, and some moves towards greater inclusiveness in terms of sampling, incorporating groups who are often sidelined in mainstream youth research, such as young lesbians and gay men, disabled young people, students, young people from socially privileged backgrounds, and young people from rural areas. Finally, participatory youth research – youth research *for* and *by* young people – is becoming more common, and has been a particularly useful vehicle for giving voice to some of these excluded groups.

SEE ALSO: Age Identity; Birmingham School; Childhood; Consumption, Youth Culture and; Leaving Home in the Transition to Adulthood; Life Course Perspective; Mannheim, Karl; Transition from School to Work; Youth Sport

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youth sport

Paul De Knop and Marc Theeboom

Youth is defined for the purposes of this discussion as youngsters between 6 and 18 years. Sport means all sport activities practiced outside the physical education curriculum. Consequently, school sport as extra curricular activity is also included.

With the start of the Sport for All movement in the 1960s and 1970s, this period can be characterized as the years of growth for sport. Youth sport at that time was mainly an activity for adolescents and pre adolescents that took place in sports clubs or during extra curricular training at school. Now the age to begin participating in youth sport has decreased to 7 years or even younger. This policy of attracting younger children to become involved in organized sport is based not on pedagogical objectives but on those related to "survival." Sports clubs want to

remain in the market because their economic existence is threatened.

Sport has become a very popular leisuretime activity among youth. In most countries, at least 50 percent of all children in their early teens are active in various sports. Most of these activities take place in a sports club or during extra curricular training at school. More boys than girls are active in sports. Sports segregate the sexes as few other phenomena do. Boys and girls seldom take part in sports together.

Some of the most common youth sports globally are soccer among boys and swimming among both boys and girls. Among activities outside a sports club, jogging, cycling, and walking are the most popular. The most common sports are almost always universal. There are hardly any popular sports in a country that are played in that specific country alone. Sport has thus become international, not least with the help of television, with rules for performance that are understood by almost all individuals regardless of nationality and language.

The most common motives for taking part in sports are characterized by intrinsic values such as enjoyment and social aspects. These motives are more common than success in competition and better performance. Middle class children are overrepresented in organized youth sport. Membership of sports clubs is strongly related to gender, social class, and family situation.

Since the 1970s there have been important changes in sport and ideas about childhood and psychosocial development. The general value systems and norms in many societies have undergone significant transformations, and traditions and traditional social networks in local districts have been weakened. The way families have been individualized has led to less rigid authority structures, and a number of commercial and educational "adjustments" have taken place. Because of these changes, young people are more directed toward creating their own identities. Also, greater emphasis is placed on the role of institutions involved in leisuretime activities, to offer coherent experiences and guidance for the formation of identity among young people. Schultz Jørgensen and colleagues (1986) suggested that the time of youth has become a waiting period for the formation of a psychosocial identity. Sport plays a major role in this formation of identity.

The following trends in youth sport are noticeable.

- 1 The number of opportunities for youth sport participation have increased substantially since the early 1990s, and youth sports have become more specialized and differentiated at the same time as performance demands have increased.
- 2 Sport has become institutionalized. Traditional sports, such as team sports, are not played spontaneously to the same extent as before. In some countries spontaneous, informally organized sports have almost disappeared. Children's knowledge about and performance in sport have been more differentiated, and the extent and intensity of physical activity have become more varied. Two extreme groups of children can be identified today. In one group, children train intensively several times a week, some every day. In the other group, children are not physically active at all during their leisure time. As a result, physical capacity and sports skills vary considerably between children.
- 3 During recent decades more children have entered organized sport. Differences between boys and girls as regards both extent and trends have decreased, mainly because girls' sports habits have come to resemble those of boys. This trend is most common in Nordic countries, although it also exists in countries where there are increased opportunities for girls to participate in organized sports programs.
- 4 While the flow to organized sport seemed to have stopped and even diminished in many countries, activities in commercial training centers where there is an emphasis on systematic training and skill development have increased. What is significant about these centers is that, although possibilities for making social contacts exist, there are no far reaching obligations. Youngsters can come and go as they please and are not dependent on parents' engagement.
- 5 There has been a professionalization of sports delivery, including a need for quality assessment and control in organized sports programs.
- 6 There is an increased adaptation of rules, equipment, and competitive forms to

children's developmental stages and physical abilities.

- 7 Sports organizations have started to develop schemes to specifically attract young people to their sports.
- 8 There are an increasing number of initiatives in which organized sports are provided for youth at risk.

Problems in youth sports have received a great deal of attention in research. A dropout problem among teenagers, especially among girls, is reported in many countries. During adolescence there is a decrease in the number of participants. Interest in organized sports seems to have reached a breakpoint in many countries and is now even declining.

Youth sports have been shaped to a large extent by adult sports, and adult norms and values predominate. For example, rules for team sports are similar for adults and young children. In addition, youth sport often contains only specialized activities with sport specific training.

Youth sport has become more serious and less playful. Children are not allowed to play to the same extent as before. This problem increases with the decreasing age of participants. Youth sports have become heavily organized. Different sports compete for children's interest, resulting in a focus on increasingly younger children becoming members of sports clubs.

Youth sport participation is far from democratized as involvement is related to children's age and gender as well as their parents' socioeconomic status. Many children are dependent on their parents for financial and logistical support, for example transportation. Often, a certain economic standard is a prerequisite for participation.

Ethical questions in youth sport have been raised in many countries. In order for sport to serve educational purposes for youth, the following principles have been formulated: (1) rules and regulations should be followed; (2) respect should be shown to other players and officials; (3) participants should demand the same from themselves as from others; and (4) participants should display a sense of justice and be loyal and generous.

Western competitive sports have developed in the direction of a greater emphasis on the

importance of winning. This development can also be noticed in youth sport and can be regarded as a threat for the child orientation of sport. It is also reported from several countries that qualified youth sports leaders are hard to find. There is a heavy dependency on volunteers, which creates a high turnover and inconsistent quality of leadership and coaching.

Other problems also exist. For example, there is a need for effective cooperation between sports clubs, schools, and municipalities. The most successful programs have been those in which different actors have worked in partnership to make better provision of sporting opportunities for young people. Furthermore, the number of sports injuries among children and adolescents has been increasing in all nations where medical data are available.

In light of these problems, several policy recommendations have been made for youth sports programs. Some of these are listed below.

- One of the main objectives of a future policy for youth sport should be to increase quality from a pedagogical point of view. Such a policy needs to focus on the following topics: developing a cooperative approach to the provision of youth sport instead of "competition" between the different organizations; ensuring youth sports coaches have appropriate pedagogical qualifications; setting up specific youth sports coaching programs; persuading parents that informal play during childhood is more important than formal sports participation; promoting sport for youth with an emphasis on enjoyment and its social aspects; and scientifically evaluating the effectiveness of sports promotional campaigns.
- Sports among children must be made more accessible and should be offered close to residential areas. There should be greater possibilities for all children to try different sports, and better conditions should be created for varied physical activities.
- The intrinsic values of youth sports (play and learning) must have priority at all times.
- Training must be individualized and rich in variations. Firmly controlled and formalized training can be counterproductive. Sports clubs should aim to develop talent in the

best way possible instead of trying to find new talent. Selection and specialization of individuals should not be made before they have reached their teens. Distinct variations in the maturing process among youth make any early prognoses of success in later years very uncertain.

- A child's relation to sports and to her own body as well as the experience of her own physical ability are the result of learning motor skills. But sport is also a question of learning norms and values related to behavior and lifestyle. Children are socialized into sports and thus also into the value system of sports. Youth sport is one of the most important environments for socialization. Sports must therefore also be valued as such and given due significance in children's lives and development. Sport is perhaps the most important norm setter, second only to family and school. On the strength of its range and importance, sport must mediate and recreate essential values for the continued existence of a particular culture. In other words, it has a reproducing function. Therefore, it is vital that sport follow a sound ethical code. Also, in youth sport, leaders' personal characteristics and behavior are highly important.
- One of the greatest challenges facing youth sport is the development of a cooperative and coordinated approach by schools and clubs with the aim of offering sports as an educational environment for all children that enables them to develop at their own speed and according to their own interests.
- Quality improvement or quality control will need to become essential elements of sports policy with a focus on encouraging quality awareness, developing quality standards, measuring instruments and remedial techniques, and monitoring through research and transfer of knowledge.

In conclusion, youth sport can serve many purposes. It can be a meaningful activity for many children and give them a lifelong interest in physical activity as an important part of a healthy way of life and as a source of pleasure and relaxation. It can also form future elite sportsmen and women and become a means for self realization and success for young people who have a talent for sports. For many children,

sports are also an important environment for socialization and they play a vital role in the reproduction of culture. However, given the recent developments outlined above, many steps still need to be taken in order for youth sports to fulfill any of these aims in an optimal way.

SEE ALSO: Health and Sport; High School Sports; Leisure; Socialization and Sport; Youth Adolescence

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Z

Zimbardo Prison Experiment

Markus Kemmelmeier

Social psychologist Phillip Zimbardo (b. 1933) conducted a well known prison study known as the Stanford Prison Experiment. Funded by the US Navy to investigate conflict in military prisons, Zimbardo and his graduate students, Craig Haney and W. Curtis Banks, rejected the idea that the personality characteristics of prisoners and guards in the prison system were primarily responsible for conflicts as they occurred in the prison system. Broadly consistent with Goffman's (1961) concept of a total institution, Zimbardo and his team identified individual anonymity and loss of identity as the most prominent characteristics of prisons, which Zimbardo's (1970) deindividuation theory linked to antisocial behavior. Without room for individual identities, Zimbardo and colleagues reasoned that the social roles of prisoner and guard would be the dominant influence on behavior and allow participants to behave in ways that would otherwise be unimaginable to them.

Zimbardo and his team of researchers used newspaper ads to recruit volunteers to participate in a two week long "prison simulation" in exchange for payment of \$15 per day. From 75 applicants, researchers selected 24 young men, predominantly white and middle class (21 active participants and 3 alternates), whom pretests showed to be healthy, normal, and well adjusted. Through the toss of a coin, participants were randomly assigned to the role of prisoner or guard. Zimbardo assumed the role of "superintendent," an undergraduate research assistant played the role of "warden," and Zimbardo's graduate students

were "psychological counselors." The involvement of an ex convict consultant in planning and running the prison simulation ensured its realism. The prison was physically located in the remodeled basement of the psychology department at Stanford University. It included a small closet used as solitary confinement facility, quarters for the prison staff, as well as an interview testing room, which was also used for "parole" meetings. The mock prison was equipped with hidden video and audio recording equipment, allowing subsequent analysis of much of the activity that occurred.

The prison study began on August 14, 1971 with a guard orientation establishing the prison hierarchy and its procedures. The 11 guards were dressed in khaki military style uniforms and dark sunglasses to provide a sense of anonymity. They were also given whistles and night sticks as symbols of power. Guards were to work in eight hour shifts, but would otherwise pursue their normal lives outside of the study. Over the course of the study, many volunteered extra hours without additional pay. Guards received no formal training, but were allowed to run the prison in whatever way they wished, with the only stipulation being that physical violence would not be tolerated.

Having secured the cooperation of the Palo Alto Police Department, on August 15 Zimbardo had real police officers arrest the 10 prisoner participants at their residences. The alleged charges were burglary or armed robbery. After having been advised of their legal rights, prisoners were ferried off to the police station, where they were booked, fingerprinted, and had their mugshots taken. After a brief period in a police holding cell, prisoners were blindfolded and brought to the "Stanford County Prison," where they were stripped naked, deloused by the guards (using a deodorant spray), and then had their blindfolds removed. (Prisoners were

never aware that they were in a university building.) As their only piece of clothing, they were given a pair of rubber sandals and a "Muslim smock," onto which their prisoner number was sewn. No underwear was issued. Prisoners also received a nylon stocking cap to further conceal any distinctive features. Three prisoners were housed to a cell, with no personal belongings allowed, and prisoners were only referred to by their number. All procedures were aimed at fostering a sense of anonymity and humiliation, a sentiment reinforced by a lock and chain that prisoners wore around their ankles as a constant reminder of their oppressed state.

The study quickly devolved into a situation of great hostility and open tension, in which prisoners and guards quickly absorbed their respective roles. After a relatively uneventful first day of the study, on the second day many prisoners revolted against the degrading conditions by ripping off their prisoner numbers and barricading themselves in their cells. Without intervention from the research staff, the guards successfully crushed the riot by imposing harsh punishment that included stripping prisoners naked, solitary confinement, withholding of meals, and withholding of blankets and pillows, physical exercise, and various arbitrary activities. The guards further divided the prisoners by pitting "good," privileged cells against "bad" cells, and leading the latter to suspect that there were informers among them. In doing so, the guards affirmed the power and authority associated with their roles as well as a sense of unity against the prisoners. The subsequent harassment on the part of the guards and staff caused serious emotional disturbance in one of the ringleaders of the rebellion, Prisoner #8612. Because they had not anticipated the intensity of the interactions and reactions, initially Zimbardo and his colleagues did not give in to #8612's request to be released, but instead tried to recruit him as a "snitch." Although the prisoner was released later on the same day, the rumor persisted that prisoners would not be released under any circumstances.

Over the course of the following days, the guards' behavior became increasingly sadistic and abusive. Regular prisoner lineups, originally instituted as administrative procedures to familiarize prisoners with their number, devolved into hour long ordeals. Food and even going to the

bathroom turned into privileges that could be granted and withheld. Mattresses and bedding were removed from the "bad" cells, forcing prisoners to sleep on the concrete floor. Prisoners were forced to clean the toilet with their bare hands or were forced to stand naked in front of the guards. Occasional admonishments on the part of the psychological counselors to refrain from certain actions had limited effects, partly because the guards rejected any interference with the exercise of their "duty." Because surveillance was limited, some abusive behavior and even mild physical violence occurred outside of the supervision of the research staff.

Prisoners showed varied reactions to the abuse including "extreme emotional depression, crying, rage and acute anxiety" (Haney et al. 1973: 81). Disorganized thinking and uncontrollable emotional outbursts were common. Some sought to avoid punishment by becoming model prisoners and "zombie like" following guards' orders. A total of five prisoners had to be released, including one prisoner who experienced a sudden rash upon hearing that his request for early parole had been denied by a parole board consisting of secretaries and graduate students and chaired by Zimbardo's ex convict consultant. Zimbardo initially denied the sick prisoner's request to be released, on suspicions that he was faking illness to "con" his way out of the prison.

Following the failed revolt, the only resistance against the oppressive regime of the guards came from Prisoner #416, who joined the experiment as a replacement. In light of the terrible conditions, Prisoner #416 went on a hunger strike, which resulted in his being put in solitary confinement for several hours. The guards offered prisoners the choice to either give up their blankets and have #416 released, or keep their blankets and have #416 stay overnight in solitary confinement. Viewing #416 as a troublemaker, all prisoners decided to keep their blankets. (Upon the researchers' intervention, #416 was returned to his cell.)

The oppressive reality of the prison simulation was underscored by the fact that a visitor familiar with penal environments, who came to see the prisoners during Visitors' Night, described prisoners' reactions as those typical of first time offenders. A public defender who visited the prison in its final phase testified to

the similarity of the mindset and behavior of the prisoners to real inmates. Additional evidence showed that prisoners had internalized their roles. On the fifth day of the study, Zimbardo offered the remaining five prisoners a deal to lose all their pay in exchange for “parole,” and most prisoners accepted. When all parole requests were turned down, none of the prisoners requested to be released, suggesting that they believed that the only way out was to receive parole or go “crazy,” as all other previously released prisoners. In retrospect #416 commented: “It was a prison to me. I don’t regard it as an experiment or a simulation. It was a prison run by psychologists instead of run by the state.”

Zimbardo admits that he, as well as others on his staff, was increasingly absorbed by his role in the experiment, and failed to recognize its inhumanity. For instance, on the fourth day, rumors of an impending prison break had him enter a Stanford undergraduate student into the experiment in order to spy on the other prisoners. Zimbardo’s request to the Palo Alto Police Department to avert the outbreak by transferring his prisoners to a more secure detention facility was turned down. Zimbardo recalls being angry and disgusted at this lack of professional cooperation.

Originally scheduled for a period of two weeks, the experiment was ended after 6 days with the arrival of Christine Maslach, who had been asked to conduct interviews. As a social psychologist unrelated to the study, she objected to the horrifying conditions of the mock prison and convinced Zimbardo to terminate the study. Prisoners expressed great relief, whereas many guards were disappointed. Zimbardo notes that roughly 100 individuals had visited or participated, yet not one had challenged its legitimacy.

Results of this experiment illustrate the potential power of social contexts in shaping human behavior. The fulfillment of social roles within a closed social system overwhelmed individual moral intentions and standards. With preexisting personality difference providing no value in predicting the behavior of prisoners and guards, Zimbardo and colleagues concluded that the roles assigned to individuals within evil social systems are able to turn good people to evil. This idea was consistent with Stanley Milgram’s (1974) famous obedience research. Milgram found that most participants

in the role of a subordinate followed the orders of a legitimate authority, even when aware that doing so would likely cause the death of an innocent person. As a result of their research, Zimbardo and Haney have become vocal advocates of prison reform and frequent commentators on prisoner abuse, like that suffered at the Abu Ghraib prison at the hands of American military.

Even though the Stanford Prison Experiment had been approved by Stanford’s Human Subjects Review Board, it represented an ethical fiasco. All participants signed consent forms agreeing to have some of their civil rights temporarily suspended, but they were unable to anticipate the harm to which they would be subjected. Further, Zimbardo and his team were unable to anticipate the prison dynamics and, by aligning themselves with the guards in running the prison, failed to protect the human rights of the prisoners. Consequentially, this study has led to a tightening of regulations and practices in protecting human research participants.

Various criticisms have been leveled against this experiment. Some critics argued that prisoners and guards were only acting out familiar stereotypes of prisoners and guards. Zimbardo contends that it was role playing initially, but that participants internalized their roles over the course of the study – a notion which is supported by most participants and documented in the movie *Quiet Rage*. Other criticism concerns the nature of the data and the fact that documentation of the study was incomplete and often anecdotal, with conclusions often being drawn subjectively. Audio and video recording was focused on more spectacular events that confirmed the expected effects of anonymity and social roles, but did not document existing differences in the behavior of guards. Much of the documentation focused on the cruellest guard nicknamed “John Wayne,” with little attention devoted to much kinder guards. Further, it is unclear to what extent the simulation reflected actual conditions at prisons where this level of anonymity and humiliation is uncommon. Lastly, because the study was never replicated, the generality of its findings is unclear.

In 2002, social psychologists Steven Reicher and Alex Haslam, in conjunction with the BBC, set up a prison simulation study, which differed in many important aspects from the Stanford

Prison Experiment. Among other things, this research used an on average older and more diverse set of participants while allowing a much greater degree of experimental control and documentation. Results of this study differed dramatically, for instance, in that no prisoner abuse occurred.

The Stanford Prison Experiment inspired the novel *Black Box* by Mario Giordano, which was made into the German feature film *Das Experiment* directed by Oliver Hirschbiegl.

SEE ALSO: Aggression; Authority and Conformity; Experimental Methods; Goffman, Erving; Milgram, Stanley (Experiments); Organizations as Total Institutions; Role; Role Theory; Social Psychology

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Znaniecki, Florian (1882–1958)

Robert A. Stebbins

Florian Znaniecki was born to a well to do Polish family living in Russian occupied territory. His active support of Polish nationalism resulted in his dismissal from the University of Warsaw and an extended stay abroad. He studied at the University of Geneva and the Sorbonne. He later returned, this time to the University of Cracow, receiving his doctorate there in 1910. While helping Poles to migrate he met W. I. Thomas, who in 1914 invited Znaniecki to join him at the University of Chicago. Shortly thereafter the two began work on the famous five volume study *The Polish Peasant in Europe and America*, published between 1918 and 1920. Znaniecki taught at Columbia University (1916–17), at the University of Chicago (1917–19), and in 1920, following Polish independence, became professor of philosophy at the new University of Pozna. Here he helped to establish sociology, founded the Polish Institute of Sociology, in 1929 and launched a Polish sociological journal. Following the conquest of Poland in World War II, he was invited to Columbia University (1939). In 1941 he went as professor of sociology to the University of Illinois, retiring from there in 1951. Before his death in 1958, he was elected president of the American Sociological Society (1955).

Znaniecki, with W. I. Thomas and others, is often singled out as one of the founders of symbolic interactionism, primarily for his work in the theoretic sections of the *Polish Peasant*. Still, one of the best discussions of definition of the situation is found in his *Cultural Sciences: Their Origin and Development* (1952). Znaniecki's other books tackle different subjects, as in *The Method of Sociology* (1934) where he argues that we must avoid regarding the static and dynamic sides of society as mutually exclusive perspectives. In *The Social Role of the Man of Knowledge* (1940) he examines the scholar from the perspective of the sociology of knowledge.

In *The Method of Sociology* Znaniecki moves away from symbolic interactionism toward

sociological functionalism. By abstracting, generalizing, and then expanding on Pareto's concept of system, Znaniecki makes a unique contribution to sociology: social life is a *plurality* rather, that sociology must determine whether a particular system is included in a larger system and whether the particular system encompasses one or more smaller systems (Martindale 1981: 460–1). Sociology's task is to analyze causal relations within systems and then move from there to a more inclusive picture of comprehensive changes. In *The Social Role of the Man of Knowledge*, though in many ways influenced by symbolic interactionism, Znaniecki also treats culture as a system of knowledge. Participation in this system is determined by people's activities enacted through roles linked in social systems.

Znaniecki died at work, in the sense that he left upon his death an unfinished manuscript entitled "Systematic Sociology." It was published posthumously in 1965 as *Social Relations and Social Roles*. It includes a complete list of his works, compiled by his daughter, Helena Z. Lopata.

SEE ALSO: Definition of the Situation; Functionalism/Neofunctionalism; Pareto, Vilfredo; Role; Symbolic Interaction; Theory; Thomas, William I.

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